Scotland's Second War of Independence, 1332-1357 9781783271443

Table of contents :
Frontcover
Contents
List of Illustrations
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
A Note on Terminology
Introduction
1 Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1332–1357
Two Kings in One Kingdom: A Scottish Military Collapse? (1332–34)
Rebellion, Resurgence and Recovery (1334–36)
Winning the Battle for Hearts and Minds (1337–40)
The Return of the King: David II and Royal War Leadership (1341–46)
Casting a Long Shadow: Recovery after Neville’s Cross (1346–57)
2 The Organisation of War
Scottish Military Organisation
Leadership
The Structure and Size of Scottish Armies
The Scottish Soldier: Armour and Weapons
Funding and Supply
Naval Activity
3 Dramatis Personae: Military Biographies
Kings and Guardians
Noble Military Leaders
The Rank and File
The ‘Enemy’: the Balliol Scots and the Disinherited
4 The Conduct and Realities of War
War in the Countryside
The Urban Landscape
The Ecclesiastical Landscape
Combatants
5 Perceptions of War
War and Chivalry: The Chroniclers’ Perspective
I – ‘A support for the old, for maidens and for Holy Church’
II – Honour
III – Bravery
IV – Probity
War and Chivalry: The Warriors’ Perspective
I – The Warrior and Christian Chivalry
II – The Warrior and the Business of War
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

This book sets out to examine in detail the military campaigns of this period, to uncover the histories of those who fought in the war, and to analyse the behaviour of combatants from both sides during ongoing periods of both civil war and Anglo-Scottish conflict. It analyses contemporary records and literary evidence in order to reconstruct the history of this conflict and reconsiders current debates regarding: the capabilities of the Scottish military; the nature of contemporary combat; the ambitions and abilities of fourteenthcentury military leaders; and the place of chivalry on the medieval battlefield. D R I AIN A. M AC I NNES is a Lecturer and Programme Leader in Scottish History at the UHI Centre for History, University of the Highlands and Islands. Cover: Image of Anglo-Scottish warfare from Froissart’s Chroniques, PlantinMoretus Museum, Antwerp, MS 15.4, f. 1r © Museum Plantin-Moretus, Antwerp - UNESCO, World Heritage. Photo: Peter Maes.

scotland’s

second War of Independence 鵽 1332 –1357 鵾

1332 –1357

Warfare in History

scotland’s second War of Independence

THE SECOND SCOTTISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE began in 1332, only four years after the previous conflict had ended. Fought once more for the continued freedom of Scotland from English conquest, the war also witnessed a revival of Scottish civil conflict as the BruceBalliol fight for the Scottish crown recommenced once more. Breaking out sporadically until peace was agreed in 1357, the Second Scottish War is a conflict that resides still in the shadow of that which preceded it: compared to the wars of William Wallace and Robert Bruce, Edward I and Edward II, this second phase of Anglo-Scottish warfare is neither well-known nor well-understood.

MacInnes

IaIn a. MacInnes

warfare in history

Scotland’s Second War of Independence, 1332–1357

warfare in history issn 1358–779x

Series editors Matthew Bennett, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, UK Anne Curry, University of Southampton, UK Stephen Morillo, Wabash College, Crawfordsville, USA This series aims to provide a wide-ranging and scholarly approach to military history, offering both individual studies of topics or wars and volumes giving a selection of contemporary and later accounts of particular battles; its scope ranges from the early medieval to the early modern period. New proposals for the series are welcomed; they should be sent to the publisher at the address below. Boydell and Brewer Limited, PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk ip12 3df Previously published volumes in this series are listed at the back of this volume

Scotland’s Second War of Independence, 1332–1357

Iain A. MacInnes

the boydell press

© Iain A. MacInnes 2016 All rights reserved. Except as permitted under current legislation no part of this work may be photocopied, stored in a retrieval system, published, performed in public, adapted, broadcast, transmitted, recorded or reproduced in any form or by any means, without the prior permission of the copyright owner The right of Iain A. MacInnes to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 First published 2016 The Boydell Press, Woodbridge ISBN 978-1-78327-144-3 The Boydell Press is an imprint of Boydell & Brewer Ltd PO Box 9, Woodbridge, Suffolk IP12 3DF, UK and of Boydell & Brewer Inc. 668 Mt Hope Avenue, Rochester, NY 14620–2731, USA website: www.boydellandbrewer.com

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library The publisher has no responsibility for the continued existence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate

This publication is printed on acid-free paper Disclaimer: Some images in the printed version of this book are not available for inclusion in the eBook. To view these images please refer to the printed version of the book.

Contents List of Illustrations vii Acknowledgementsviii Abbreviationsx A Note on Terminology xiii Introduction 

1

1  Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1332–1357 11 Two Kings in One Kingdom: A Scottish Military Collapse? (1332–34) 11 Rebellion, Resurgence and Recovery (1334–36) 16 Winning the Battle for Hearts and Minds (1337–40) 30 The Return of the King: David II and Royal War Leadership (1341–46)40 Casting a Long Shadow: Recovery after Neville’s Cross (1346–57) 50 2  The Organisation of War 60 Scottish Military Organisation 60 Leadership68 The Structure and Size of Scottish Armies 71 The Scottish Soldier: Armour and Weapons 81 Funding and Supply 88 Naval Activity 92 3  Dramatis Personae: Military Biographies Kings and Guardians Noble Military Leaders The Rank and File The ‘Enemy’: the Balliol Scots and the Disinherited

98 99 116 148 151

4  The Conduct and Realities of War 157 War in the Countryside  157 The Urban Landscape 168 The Ecclesiastical Landscape 173 Combatants183

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5  Perceptions of War War and Chivalry: The Chroniclers’ Perspective I – ‘A support for the old, for maidens and for Holy Church’ II – Honour III – Bravery IV – Probity War and Chivalry: The Warriors’ Perspective I – The Warrior and Christian Chivalry II – The Warrior and the Business of War

198 200 203 210 215 219 223 223 229

Conclusion239 Bibliography245 Index266

Illustrations Plates Plate 1. Image of ‘Scots’ attacking English people from the Luttrell Psalter (©British Library Board, Add. 42130, f.169) Plate 2. Image of Sir Geoffrey Luttrell from the Luttrell Psalter (©British Library Board, Add. 42130, f.202v) Plate 3. Effigy of John of Eltham, Westminster Abbey (©Dean and Chapter of Westminster) Plate 4. Effigy of Alexander Stewart of Buchan, Dunkeld Cathedral (©Dunkeld Cathedral Chapter House Museum Trust) Plate 5. Scottish heraldic devices taken from the Armorial de Gelre (©Royal Library of Belgium, Manuscripts, Ms. 15652-56, f.64) Plate 6. Scottish armorial devices from the Balliol Roll (©British Library Board, Add. Roll. 77242)

206 231 232 232 235 236

Maps Map 1. The castles of Scotland (1332–1357) Map 2. The Scottish invasion of 1333 and its impact on Northumbrian religious houses

xiv 178

Tables Table 1. Valuation of Scottish horses purchased by David II Table 2. Scottish earls at Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill and Neville’s Cross

73 117

The author and publishers are grateful to all the institutions and individuals listed for permission to reproduce the materials in which they hold copyright. Every effort has been made to trace the copyright holders; apologies are offered for any omission, and the publishers will be pleased to add any necessary acknowledgement in subsequent editions. Disclaimer: Some images in the printed version of this book are not available for inclusion in the eBook. To view these images please refer to the printed version of the book.

Acknowledgements Thanks are due to a great many people for their assistance and encouragement during the process of producing this book. For their financial support I would like to thank the University of Aberdeen and the University of the Highlands and Islands. Thanks are also due to the staff at the National Archives, Kew, the British Library and the National Archives of Scotland for their assistance during my periods of research. Thanks also go to the Master and Fellows of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, the British Library, the Dean and Chapter of Westminster, the Friends of Dunkeld Cathedral, the Royal Library of Belgium and the Museum Plantin-Moretus, Antwerp, for allowing me to use and reproduce images from their collections. No small thanks are also due to Caroline Palmer and Rob Kinsey at Boydell & Brewer for their assistance, and in particular their understanding, during the production of this book. And to the anonymous readers of drafts of this book, my thanks for their helpful comments. A number of academics helped me along my way through the long process of turning this work into a monograph. I would not have started on this theme at all without the suggestion of Professor Matthew Strickland. Regards go to various staff at Aberdeen University who played various roles during the early stages of my research. These include Dr Nathan Abrams, Dr Jackson Armstrong, Dr Andrew MacKillop and Dr Micheal Ó Siochru, as well as Mrs Barbara MacGillvary and Mrs Gillian Brown of the History departmental secretariat. Credit must also go to Dr Andrew Ayton and Dr Peter Murray for their thoughtful consideration of and comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. Thanks are also due to my colleagues at the Centre for History, University of the Highlands and Islands (past and present), for their support during the latter phases of this project. Thanks therefore go to Dr Karen Cullen, Professor Jim Hunter, Dr Karly Kehoe, Dr Jim MacPherson, Dr Elizabeth Ritchie, Dr Iain Robertson, Dr David Worthington, Dr Kathrin Zickermann and Ms Alison MacWilliam. Special mention must go to Dr Alastair Macdonald and Dr David Ditchburn who have provided continuous support and feedback throughout this process. Their efforts throughout the research and writing of this book have made the whole thing possible, and their continued support is very much appreciated. Grateful thanks also go to various people who have provided assistance, both academic and practical, to the production of this book.



acknowledgements ix

In no particular order these include Dr Helen Brown, Iona and Gordon Henshall, Dr Jennifer MacDonald, Dr Steffi Metze, Dr Alan Fimister and Dr Barry Robertson. Ultimate thanks go, of course, to my family: to my grandmother, Helen Heath, for her support through the early years of this work, even though she has not been able to witness its conclusion; to my parents, Norman and Helen MacInnes, and my sister Gemma, for their support (in various forms) and helpfulness whenever I have required anything of them. And lastly heartfelt thanks to my partner, Dr Victoria Connor, for her constant support, in spite of her own workload, and for her ceaseless encouragement whenever things proved difficult. The publication of this book has been made possible by a grant from The Scouloudi Foundation in association with the Institute of Historical Research. The publication of this book has also been made possible by a grant from the Strathmartine Trust.

Abbreviations Ancient Petitions

Ancient Petitions Relating to Northumberland, ed. C.M. Fraser (Surtees Society, 1966). Annales Paulini ‘Annales Paulini’, in Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II, ed. W. Stubbs, vol. 1 Rolls Series (London, 1882–83). Bruce (Duncan) Barbour, John, The Bruce, ed. A.A.M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 1997). Brut The Brut or Chronicles of England, ed. F.W.D. Brie (Early English Text Society, 1906–08). CCR Calendar of Close Rolls (London, 1892–). CDS Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, ed. J. Bain (Edinburgh, 1881–88). Supplementary volume, ed. J. Galbraith and G.G. Simpson (Edinburgh, 1986). CFR Calendar of Fine Rolls (London, 1911–). Chron. Angliae Chronicon Anglia auctore monacho quodam Sancti Albani, ed. E.M. Thompson Rolls Series (London, 1874). Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334 The Anonimalle Chronicle, 1307 to 1334, from Brotherton Collection MS. 29, ed. W.R. Childs and J. Taylor (Leeds, 1991). Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381 The Anonimalle Chronicle 1333 to 1381: from a MS. written at St. Mary’s Abbey, York, ed. V.H. Galbraith (Manchester, 1927). Chron. Avesbury ‘Robertus de Avesbury de gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi tertii’, in Adae Murimuth Continuatio chronicarum. Robertus de Avesbury de gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi tertii, ed. E.M. Thompson, Rolls Series (London, 1889). Chron. Baker Chronicon Galfridi le Baker de Swynebroke, ed. E.M. Thompson (Oxford, 1889). Chron. Baker (Preest) The Chronicle of Geoffrey le Baker, trans. D. Preest and ed. R. Barber (Woodbridge, 2012). Chron. Bower Bower, Walter, Scotichronicon, ed. D.E.R. Watt et al. (Aberdeen/Edinburgh, 1987–98). Chron. Bridlington ‘Gesta Edwardi de Carnarvan, auctore Canonico Bridlingtoniensi, cum continuatione A.D. 1377’, The Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II, ed. W. Stubbs, vol. 2, Rolls Series (London, 1883).

Chron. Fordun (Skene) Chron. Knighton Chron. Hemingburgh

Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell) Chron. Le Bel Chron. Melsa Chron. Murimuth

Chron. Wyntoun (Laing) Chroniques de Jean Froissart CIM CIPM CP CPR EHR Ellis, Original Letters ER Foedera Historia Anglicana HMC Knighton’s Chronicle Morton Reg. NCH Northern Petitions

abbreviations xi Johannis de Fordun, Cronica Gentis Scotorum, ed. W.F. Skene (Edinburgh, 1871–72). Chronicon Henrici Knighton, monachi Leycestrensis, ed. J.R. Lumby, Rolls Series (London, 1889–95). The Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough, previously edited as the chronicle of Walter of Hemingford or Hemingburgh, ed. H. Rothwell (Camden Society, 1957). The Chronicle of Lanercost 1272–1346, ed. H.E. Maxwell (Glasgow, 1913). Chronique de Jean le Bel, ed. J. Viard and E. Déprez (Paris, 1904). Chronica Monasterii de Melsa, ed. E.A. Bond, Rolls Series (London, 1868). Murimuth, Adam, ‘Continuatio Chronicarum’, in Adae Murimuth Continuatio chronicarum. Robertus de Avesbury de gestis mirabilibus regis Edwardi Tertii, ed. E.M. Thompson, Rolls Series (London, 1889). Wyntoun, Andrew of, The Orygynale Cronykil of Scotland, ed. D. Laing (Edinburgh, 1872–79). Chroniques de Jean Froissart, ed. S. Luce (Paris, 1869– 1975). Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (London, 1916–). Calendar of Inquisitions Post Mortem (London, 1904–). The Complete Peerage, ed. G.E. Cockayne (London, 1910–40). Calendar of Patent Rolls (London, 1891–). English Historical Review (1886–). Original Letters Illustrative of English History, 3rd series, ed. H. Ellis (London, 1846). The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland, ed. J. Stuart et al. (Edinburgh, 1878–1908). Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae et Cuiscunque Generis Acta Publica, ed. T. Rymer (London, 1816–69). Walsingham, Thomas, Historia Anglicana, ed. H.T. Riley, Rolls Series (London, 1863–64). Reports of the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts (London, 1870–). Knighton’s Chronicle, 1337–1396, ed. G.H. Martin (Oxford, 1995). Registrum Honoris de Morton, Bannatyne Club (Edinburgh, 1853). The Victoria County History of Northumberland (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1893–1940). Northern Petitions Illustrative of Life in Berwick,

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Oeuvres de Froissart ODNB Polychronicon

PSAS Reg. John Kirkby

RMS Rot. Parl. Rot. Scot. RPS RRS Scalacronica (King) Scalacronica (Maxwell) SHR SP TCWAAS TDGNHAS TRHS Wright, Political Poems

Cumbria and Durham in the Fourteenth Century, ed. C.M. Fraser (Surtees Society, 1981). Oeuvres de Froissart, ed. K. de Lettenhove, 25 vols (Brussels, 1866–77). Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (http:// www.oxforddnb.com/, 2004–15) Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden monachi Cestrensis; together with the English Translations of John Trevisa and of an Unknown Writer of the Fifteenth Century, ed. C. Babington and J.R. Lumby, Rolls Series (London, 1865–66). Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland (1851–). The Register of John Kirkby bishop of Carlisle, 1332– 1352, and the Register of John Ross, Bishop of Carlisle, 1325–1332, ed. R.L. Storey (Twickenham/Woodbridge, 1992–95). Registrum Magni Sigilli Regum Scottorum, ed. J.M. Thomson and J.B. Paul (Edinburgh, 1882–1914). Rotuli Parliamentorum; ut et petitiones et placita in parliamento, ed. J. Strachey et al., 6 vols (London, 1783). Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londinensi et in Domo Capitulari Westmonasteriensi Asservati, ed. D. Macpherson et al. (London, 1814–19). The Records of the Parliaments of Scotland to 1707, ed. K.M. Brown et al. (St Andrews, 2007–16) [http:// www.rps.ac.uk]. Regesta Regum Scotorum VI: The Acts of David II, 1329–71, ed. B. Webster (Edinburgh, 1982). Gray, Thomas, Scalacronica, ed. A. King (Surtees Society, 2005). Gray, Thomas, Scalacronica, ed. H.E. Maxwell (Glasgow, 1907). Scottish Historical Review. The Scots Peerage, ed. J. Balfour Paul (Edinburgh, 1904–14). Transactions of the Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society. Transactions of the Dumfriesshire and Galloway Natural History and Antiquarian Society. Transactions of the Royal Historical Society. Political Poems and Songs Relating to English History, i, ed. T. Wright (London, 1859).

A Note on Terminology The competing groups involved in the war complicate any study of the period of conflict under examination here. Those men who accompanied Edward Balliol to Scotland in October 1332 were members of the ‘Disinherited’ faction that had grown around the person of the young Edward III during the years of his minority. Their arrival in Scotland, along with others who had been displaced by the Bruce settlement, prompted some Scots to renew their allegiance to a representative of the deposed Balliol dynasty. Such men supported militarily the Disinherited arrival and Balliol’s claim to the throne, but they were not themselves members of the Disinherited. The political machinations of 1332–36 also led to many people submitting to Balliol or even English lordship. At best they were pro-Balliol (not ‘Disinherited’ or ‘English’), but even this definition is problematic due to the regularity with which some individuals changed their allegiance. Indeed ‘the Scots’ are no less complex a group to define at any one time, due to similar reasons of changing allegiance and ongoing civil war in Scotland. To this end it is therefore important to define at the outset the terminology employed below. As it has been argued elsewhere, Edward Balliol’s support in Scotland was never consistent or numerically strong. Balliol supporters did however continue to exist, even in the 1350s when it was surely apparent that the Balliol dynasty would never reclaim the Scottish crown. For this reason, therefore, the distinction between Bruce Scots and Balliol Scots will be used consistently to differentiate between the competing groups within Scotland. The term ‘Disinherited’ is adopted for the opening years of the conflict, but after the expulsion of the Disinherited in 1334 it is perhaps more accurate to refer to either ‘Balliol Scots’ or ‘English’.

1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 

Lochmaben Dunoon Rothesay Dundarg Roxburgh Cupar Brodick Kildrummy Lochindorb

10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18 

Edinburgh Dunottar Kinneff Lauriston Stirling Perth St Andrews Bothwell Kinclaven

19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27 

Falkland Leuchars Dunbar Hermitage Hestan Island Liddel Nisbet Berwick-upon-Tweed Caerlaverock

28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36 

Dalswinton Rosneath Cumbernauld Loch Kinord Loch Leven Dumbarton Loch Doon Avoch Tarbert

Map 1. The castles of Scotland (1332–1357)

37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45 

Dumfries Jedburgh Oxnam Coull Loch Rutton Hawthornden Buittle Inverkip Burned Isle

Introduction Only four years after the end of the First Scottish War of Independence in 1328, Anglo-Scottish conflict began anew in 1332. The war continued sporadically until a peace deal was agreed in 1357 as part of the negotiations for the release of the captured King David II. This conflict has, until relatively recently, received little detailed analysis.1 Much of what has been produced has focussed on the war as a time of fragmentary military opposition to English and pro-Balliol forces by a group of self-interested individuals, fighting for personal territorial and political gain.2 For some historians of mid fourteenth-century Scotland, the Scottish war effort was barely an effort at all as many who purported to support the dynasty established by Robert I sided with the alternative Balliol regime or even with Edward III.3 This portrayal of the renewed conflict from 1332 onwards reflects the views of contemporary Scottish chroniclers. Although mostly writing in the years following the cessation of conflict in 1357 they continued to reminisce about earlier military successes under Robert I. In so doing they allowed the Bruce victories and the romance of the war fought between 1296 and 1328 to overshadow the history of the years that followed. The pervasive nature of this orthodoxy is demonstrated in modern accounts of the war of 1332–1357 which continue to depict a period of civil war and internal strife within Scotland; rival nobles advancing private interests ahead of the independence of the kingdom; a young and naïve David II residing in France, out of touch with the realities of the changing political situation back home; and the war with England only gradually turned towards slow and painstaking recovery against Disinherited and/or English forces.4

For modern overviews of this period, see for example, M. Brown, The Wars of Scotland, 1214–1371 (Edinburgh, 2004); K. Stevenson, Power and Propaganda: Scotland 1306–1488 (Edinburgh, 2014); A. King and C. Etty, England and Scotland, 1296–1603 (Basingstoke, 2015). 2 See for example, B. Webster, ‘Scotland without a King, 1329–1341’, in Medieval Scotland. Crown, Lordship and Community: Essays presented to G.W.S. Barrow, ed. A. Grant and K.J. Stringer, (Edinburgh, 1998), 223–38, at 223–4; N. MacDougall, An Antidote to the English: The Auld Alliance, 1295–1560 (East Linton, 2001), 35–8. 3 Webster, ‘Scotland without a King’, 231–2, 237–8. 4 MacDougall, Auld Alliance, 36–40. 1

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This was the historical perspective of Bruce Webster in 1998 when he focussed on the perceived nadir of Scottish fortunes in the years without royal leadership.5 Still, Webster’s article was important because it provided balance to a well established orthodoxy advanced by historians of the reign of Edward III. For some historians of fourteenth-century England the war in Scotland was little more than an inconvenient sideshow to the more significant and successful war in France. In spite of a wealth of English record evidence, from which a detailed picture of the conflict could be reconstructed, the idea remained that this was all simply a rehearsal for the greater war to come.6 Ranald Nicholson achieved some degree of balance in his discussion of Anglo-Scottish conflict in his Edward III and the Scots, but the choice of winter 1335 as the terminal date of his study suggests that this was the point at which the war in Scotland became less of a concern for Edward III.7 After this, it must be assumed, the English king was increasingly interested in continental developments and the remaining acts of the Scottish war were of less consequence than Edward III’s French adventures. Nicholson’s thesis portrayed the Scottish war as a rehearsal for the forthcoming conflict in France: for the English administration, in the collection and transport of supplies and money; for English soldiers, earning their spurs in real combat; and for Edward III himself. This idea of Scotland as little more than a training ground for Edward III and his growing ranks of ‘professional’ soldiers, who honed their skills before departing for the continent in search of greater rewards, has been developed in recent years. The most notable example is Clifford Rogers’s War Cruel and Sharp, which focuses in particular on Edwardian strategy and tactics.8 These studies by Nicholson, Rogers and others provide detailed examination of the Anglo-Scottish conflict but they do so predominantly from an English perspective, concentrating on the English king, the

Webster, ‘Scotland without a King’, 223–38. R. Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots: The Formative Years of a Military Career 1327– 1335 (Oxford, 1965); H.J. Hewitt, The Organization of War under Edward III, 1338–62 (Manchester, 1966); R. Nicholson, ‘An Irish Expedition to Scotland in 1335’, Irish Historical Studies, 13 (1963), 197–211; M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: the English Experience (New Haven and London, 1996); A.E. Prince, ‘The Payment of Army Wages in Edward III’s Reign’, Speculum, 19 (1944), 137–60; A.E. Prince, ‘The Strength of English Armies in the Reign of Edward III’, EHR, 46 (1931), 353–71; C.A. Candy, ‘The Scottish Wars of Edward III 1327–38’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham, 2005); D.J. Cornell, ‘English Castle Garrisons in the Anglo-Scottish Wars of the Fourteenth Century’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham, 2006). 7 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots. 8 C.J. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360 (Woodbridge, 2000). 5 6



introduction 3

activities of English soldiers and wider issues of English military organisation.9 Few historians have expanded their studies to incorporate a greater examination of similar themes from a Scottish perspective. Although the First War of Independence has received more detailed consideration, such focus has largely ended around 1328.10 In addition, there are discrepancies in the survival of English and Scottish sources from the period. This has meant that, with fewer materials available, historians of mid fourteenth-century Scotland have focussed on different issues than their counterparts studying contemporary England. Their approach has been dominated by broadly political studies of Scottish noble families, at times extended to analyse the history of territorial units.11 The most focussed political treatment of the period has been Michael Penman’s David II, a detailed investigation of the king’s reign as well as a widespread analysis of familial links within Scotland and the changing political situation during periods when the king was absent.12 Other works have created a more detailed picture of events in parts A. Ayton, ‘Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military Revolution’, in The Age of Edward III, ed. J.S. Bothwell (York, 2001), 107–32; C. Given-Wilson, and F. Bériac, ‘Edward III’s Prisoners of War: The Battle of Poitiers and its Context’, EHR, 116 (2001), 802–33; A.K. McHardy, ‘Some Reflections on Edward III’s Use of Propaganda’, in The Age of Edward III, ed. J.S. Bothwell (York, 2001), 171–89; J. Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Volume I – Trial by Battle (London, 1990); J. Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Volume II – Trial by Fire (London, 1999). 10 A.A.M. Duncan, ‘The War of the Scots, 1306–23’, TRHS, 6th series, 2 (1992), 125–51; J. Lydon, ‘The Scottish Soldier in Medieval Ireland: The Bruce Invasion and the Galloglass’, in The Scottish Soldier Abroad, 1247–1967, ed. G.G. Simpson (Edinburgh, 1992), 1–15; C. McNamee, ‘Buying off Robert Bruce: An Account of Monies Paid to the Scots by Cumberland Communities in 1313–14’, TCWAAS, 92 (1992), 77–89; C. McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306–1328 (East Linton, 1997); M. Prestwich, ‘England and Scotland during the Wars of Independence’, in M. Jones and M. Vale (eds), England and Her Neighbours, 1066–1453: Essays in honour of Pierre Chaplais (London, 1989), 181–97. 11 S. Boardman, The Campbells, 1250–1513 (Edinburgh, 2006); M. Brown, The Black Douglases (East Linton, 1998); M. Brown, ‘The Development of Scottish Border Lordship, 1332–58’, Historical Research, 70 (1997), 1–22; M. Brown, ‘Earldom and Kindred: the Lennox and its Earls, 1200–1458’, in The Exercise of Power in Medieval Scotland, c. 1200–1500, ed. S. Boardman and A. Ross (Dublin, 2003), 201–24; A.H. Grant, ‘Earls and Earldoms in Late Medieval Scotland (c.1310–1460)’, in Essays Presented to Michael Roberts, sometime Professor of Modern History in the Queen’s University of Belfast, ed. J. Bossy and P. Judd (Belfast, 1976), 24–40; A.J. Macdonald, ‘Kings of the Wild Frontier? The Earls of Dunbar or March, c.1070–1435’, in Boardman and Ross, Exercise of Power, 139–58; C.J. Neville, Native Lordship in Medieval Scotland: The Earldoms of Strathearn and Lennox, c.1140–1365 (Dublin, 2005); A. Ross, ‘Men for All Seasons? The Strathbogie Earls of Atholl and the Wars of Independence, c.1290–c.1335, part ii’, Northern Scotland, 21 (2001), 1–15. 12 M.A. Penman, David II, 1329–71 (East Linton, 2004). See also S. Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda in Fourteenth-Century Scotland: Robert the Steward, John of Fordun and the “Anonymous Chronicle”’, SHR, 76 (1997), 23–43; A.A.M. Duncan, ‘Honi soit 9

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of Scotland for which the most complete evidence exists, those southern sheriffdoms that assumed English control from 1334.13 This combination of studies has produced greater understanding of both the Scottish political community and the motivating factors behind the actions of some of the kingdom’s leading nobles. Increasingly too the fourteenth century has been considered as a whole as a period of Anglo-Scottish conflict. It has attracted detailed studies of the nature of war, the experience of the medieval soldier and greater focus on medieval Scottish military history more generally.14 qui mal y pense: David II and Edward III, 1346–52’, SHR, 67 (1988); R. Nicholson, ‘David II, the Historians and the Chroniclers’, SHR, 45 (1966), 59–78; M.A. Penman, ‘The Scots at the Battle of Neville’s Cross, 17 October 1346’, SHR, 80 (2001), 157–80; B. Webster, ‘David II and the Government of Fourteenth-Century Scotland’, TRHS, 16 (1966), 115–30; A. Beam, The Balliol Dynasty: 1210–1364 (Edinburgh, 2008). 13 M. Brown, ‘War, Allegiance and Community in the Anglo-Scottish Marches: Teviotdale in the Fourteenth Century’, Northern History, 41 (2004), 219–38; R.D. Oram, ‘Bruce, Balliol and the Lordship of Galloway: South-West Scotland and the Wars of Independence’, TDGNAS, 3rd series, 67 (1992), 29–47; A. Tuck, ‘A Medieval Tax Haven: Berwick upon Tweed and the English crown, 1333–1461’, in Progress and Problems in Medieval England: Essays in Honour of Edward Miller, ed. R. Britnell and J. Hatcher (Cambridge, 1996), 148–67; B. Webster, ‘The English Occupation of Dumfriesshire in the Fourteenth Century’, TDGNAS, 3rd series (1958 for 1956–7), 64–80. 14 For consideration of the Scottish military in the medieval period, see M.J. Strickland, ‘The Kings of Scots at War, c.1093–1286’, in A Military History of Scotland¸ ed. E.M. Spiers, J.A. Crang and M.J. Strickland (Edinburgh, 2012), 94–132; M. Prestwich, ‘The Wars of Independence, 1296–1328’, in ibid., 133–57; A.J. Macdonald, ‘The Kingdom of Scotland at War, 1332–1488’, in ibid., 158–81; M. MacGregor, ‘Warfare in Gaelic Scotland in the Later Middle Ages’, in ibid., 209–31. See also A.J. Macdonald, ‘Courage, Fear and the Experience of the Later Medieval Scottish Soldier’, SHR, 92(2) (2013), 179–206; A.J. Macdonald, ‘Triumph and Disaster: Scottish Military Leadership in the Later Middle Ages’, in England and Scotland at War, c.1296–c.1513, ed. A. King and D. Simpkin (Leiden, 2012), 255–82; A. King, ‘“According to the custom used in French and Scottish wars”: Prisoners and Casualties on the Scottish Marches in the Fourteenth Century’, Journal of Medieval History, 28 (2002), 263–90; A. King, ‘Englishmen, Scots and Marchers: National and Local Identities in Thomas Gray’s Scalacronica’, Northern History, 36 (2000), 217–31; A. King, ‘A Good Chance for the Scots? The Recruitment of English Armies for Scotland and the Marches, 1337–1347’, in England and Scotland at War, 119–56; A. King, ‘A Helm with a Crest of Gold: The Order of Chivalry in Thomas Gray’s Scalacronica’, Fourteenth Century England, 1 (2001), 21–35; I.A. MacInnes, ‘“Shock and Awe”: The Use of Terror as a Psychological Weapon in the Bruce–Balliol Civil War, 1332–8’, in England and Scotland in the Fourteenth Century: New Perspectives, ed. A. King and M.A. Penman (Woodbridge, 2007), 40–59; I.A. MacInnes, ‘“To be annexed forever to the English crown”: The English Occupation of Southern Scotland, c.1334–1337’, in England and Scotland at War, 183–202; I.A. MacInnes, ‘“To subject the north of the country to his rule”: Edward III and the “Lochindorb Chevauchée” of 1336’, Northern Scotland, 3 (2012), 16–31; I.A. MacInnes, ‘Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Bruce? Balliol Scots and “English Scots” during the Second War of Independence’, in The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, ed. A.R. Bell, A. Curry, A. Chapman, A. King and D. Simpkin (Woodbridge, 2011), 129–44.



introduction 5

Still, this has not led to a concerted analysis of Scottish military affairs in the Second Scottish War of Independence. It is this lacuna that this book will address. Current Scottish medieval historiography has created an accepted view around two key themes of relevance to this period of Anglo-Scottish conflict. First, the argument has been made that the years in which David II was absent from Scotland led to an alteration of the relationship between crown and magnates. Some Scottish nobles were able to take advantage of wartime conditions to enhance their own political and territorial power at the expense of the king.15 Linked with this loss of royal power a second assumption has developed that Scottish offensive military activity, especially that led by the king, involved little more than futile attacks upon a stronger enemy with little aim or organisation.16 The question of who was leading the conflict at various points, indeed if such overall leadership of the Bruce Scottish war effort even existed, is asked by Webster in ‘Scotland without a King’. Its title conveys the idea that the kingdom lacked its principal leader. Without an active, adult male Bruce ruler, Scotland fell back upon a succession of Guardians whose often brief periods of leadership led to further devolution of power onto other, sometimes lesser men. These ambitious and motivated individuals rose to prominence not through royal patronage and faithful service, but by force of arms. Territories returned to the allegiance of David II by a war leader and his military retinue were in reality won over to the lordship of the local victor. The war for Scotland became a series of localised struggles fought by those with both the means and the will to extend their power within their own area of influence.17 The loss of provincial lords and major nobles through death or capture in war only exacerbated this situation. The logical conclusion to this argument is that the Bruce Scottish war effort in Scotland, especially when the king was absent, was an incredibly piecemeal affair, lacking any co-ordinated action against Balliol/English forces. This is an over-simplification. Bruce Scottish forces

Brown, ‘Scottish Border Lordship’, 1–12; M. Penman, ‘Parliament Lost – Parliament Regained? The Three Estates in the reign of David II, 1329–1371’, in K.M. Brown and R.J. Tanner (eds), Parliament and Politics in Scotland, 1235–1560 (Edinburgh, 2004), 74–101, at 78–81. 16 M.A. Penman, The Scottish Civil War: The Bruces and the Balliols and the War for the Control of Scotland, 1286–1356 (Stroud, 2002), 129, 131; Brown, Black Douglases, 149; K. DeVries, Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2000), 177–8; J.A. Tuck, ‘War and Society in the Medieval North’, Northern History, 21 (1985), 33–52, at 39. 17 M. Brown, ‘“Rejoice to hear of Douglas”: The House of Douglas and the Presentation of Magnate Power in Late Medieval Scotland’, SHR, 76 (2002), 161–84, at 169–72. MacDougall describes the 1330s as a period when ‘the Scottish leaders conducted their own private wars over lands and offices’ (MacDougall, Auld Alliance, 36). 15

6

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were able to combine when undertaking military action on a larger scale.18 Nonetheless, the perception remains that Bruce Scottish military recovery was dependent upon the will and desire of men like William Douglas of Liddesdale to drive out the Disinherited/English from southern Scotland.19 The intention here is not to deny men such as Douglas their place in the Bruce Scottish war effort. It is however pertinent to investigate the extent to which the Scottish military effort involved overarching, large-scale planning. Did Bruce Scottish military activity display the implementation of co-ordinated strategy and coherent tactics? And to what extent did the Bruce Scots behave consistently towards those who fought against them? The ramifications of this shift in crown–magnate relations are, it has been suggested, also recognisable in the difficulties faced by David II upon his return to Scotland in 1341.20 Even the most recent and detailed study of the second Bruce monarch, in which David II is generally portrayed as a strong individual who did not fear confrontation with his nobles, nevertheless depicts an underlying weakness of royal authority against which the king struggled.21 In these circumstances his assumption of leadership of the Scottish war effort in the 1340s, culminating in the Neville’s Cross invasion (1346), has been portrayed as the king’s means of regaining lost power.22 David II attempted to fuse his kingship to the Scottish war effort by resuming attacks on northern England, leading the fighting men of Scotland in offensive warfare.23 In so doing he was perhaps mimicking his father’s successful propagation of the idea that war against England and support for Robert I’s kingship were indelibly linked: one could not exist without the other.24 In following this line of argument Scottish historians have, however, apparently accepted the very idea that David II attempted to create: that Scottish raiding in the 1340s was solely about the king’s leadership of the war. In discussing this return of royal war leadership historians have emphasised the king’s weakness in relation to his nobles. Scottish offensive warfare in the 1340s is depicted therefore as a futile attempt to recapture some of Robert I’s glory, raiding of northern England as nothing more than vainglorious

For the forces at Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill and Neville’s Cross, see for example, DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 115–18, 121–2, 180–1. 19 Brown, Black Douglases, 134–42. 20 Penman, ‘Three Estates’, 81–4. 21 Penman, David II, 433–4. 22 Penman, ‘Scots at Neville’s Cross’, 160–1, 175–7; Penman, ‘Three Estates’, 84. An alternative, but no more positive, view of the Bruce Scottish war effort is that David II led the armies of Scotland against England in an attempt to repay his debt to Philip VI (MacDougall, Auld Alliance, 39–40; Penman, ‘Scots at Neville’s Cross’, 175). 23 Brown, ‘House of Douglas’, 179. 24 Penman, ‘Scots at Neville’s Cross’, 160–1, 175–7; Penman, ‘Three Estates’, 84. 18



introduction 7

expeditions led by a militarily frustrated monarch.25 This accepted view fails to examine other potential goals of Scottish raids of northern England. It also fails to incorporate a discussion of Scottish raiding before David II’s return in order to better discern what the Bruce leadership, in their king’s absence, hoped to achieve. Without such discussion Scottish raiding in this period appears as something the Scots undertook simply because it was what they had always done.26 An English historical orthodoxy has also developed in relation to why Edward III failed ultimately to conquer, or at least subdue, Scotland. The accepted explanation relates to the English concentration on the war in France. England did not possess the resources to fight both conflicts simultaneously. With France the greater prize, Scotland was a continuing irritant that drained money and men from the Anglo-French conflict but which could not be resolved while the continental war continued. Indeed, Scotland’s survival during the Hundred Years War may very well have depended on the opening of the Anglo-French conflict.27 Few English armies invaded Scotland after its commencement and the Bruce Scots were provided with an opportunity to expand the Anglo-Scottish conflict to incorporate more extensive raiding of northern England.28 The Hundred Years War was not however the reason behind the Bruce Scottish success in the years before 1338. Penman, Scottish Civil War, 129, 131; Brown, Black Douglases, 149. For an alternative and more detailed discussion of the reasons behind Scottish raiding in relation to the Neville’s Cross invasion (1346), see A. Grant, ‘Disaster at Neville’s Cross: The Scottish point of view’, in The Battle of Neville’s Cross, 1346, ed. D.W. Rollason and M. Prestwich (Stamford, 1998), 15–35, at 17–21. 27 J. Campbell, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War in the Fourteenth Century’, in Europe in the Late Middle Ages, ed. J.R. Hale, J.R.L. Highfield and B. Smalley (London, 1965), 184–216, at 186–96. 28 For discussion of the impact on northern England of ongoing Anglo-Scottish warfare, see for example, C. Briggs, ‘Taxation, Warfare, and the Early Fourteenth Century “Crisis” in the North: Cumberland Lay Subsidies, 1332–1348’, Economic History Review, 58 (2005), 639–72; A. Goodman, ‘The Defence of Northumberland: A Preliminary Survey’, in Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France: Proceedings of the 1995 Harlaxton Symposium, ed. M. Strickland (Stamford, 1998), 161–72; King, ‘Englishmen, Scots and Marchers’, 217–31; King, ‘Helm with a Crest of Gold’, 21–35; A. King, ‘“Pur salvation du roiaume”: Military Service and Obligation in FourteenthCentury Northumberland’, Fourteenth Century England, 2 (2002), 13–31; A. King, ‘Fortresses and Fashion Statements: Gentry Castles in Fourteenth-Century Northumberland’, Journal of Medieval History, 33 (2007), 372–97; R. Lomas, ‘The Impact of Border Warfare: The Scots and South Tweedside, c.1290–c.1520’, SHR, 75 (1996), 143–67; C.J. Neville, ‘Local Sentiment and the “National” Enemy in Northern England in the Later Middle Ages’, Journal of British Studies, 35 (1996), 419–37; C.J. Rogers, ‘The Scottish Invasion of 1346’, Northern History, 34 (1998), 51–82; H.R.T. Summerson, Medieval Carlisle: The City and the Border from the Late Eleventh to the Mid-Sixteenth Centuries (2 vols, Kendal, 1993); J.A. Tuck, ‘Northumbrian Society in the Fourteenth Century’, Northern History, 6 (1971), 22–39; Tuck, ‘War and Society’, 33–52. 25

26

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The extent to which French economic, diplomatic and military assistance resurrected the Bruce war effort after the defeats of 1332 and 1333 requires greater attention.29 And discussing the reasons behind Bruce survival and English failure also requires study with regard to Bruce Scottish military tactics and strategy. Was it simply the case, as Webster has suggested, that the Bruce Scots did little other than survive the years from 1332 to 1338?30 Was this the best that Scotland could hope for until salvation arrived in the form of the Hundred Years War? Or is this an historical view made with the benefit of hindsight, knowing, as the Bruce Scots did not, that the outbreak of continental war would indeed provide much-needed solace from English invasions?31 Contemporary source material exists in numerous forms. Of perhaps greatest importance is that which remains unpublished and which is housed in various major archives. Scottish record evidence consists primarily of charters found in the National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh.32 Similar English material is found in the National Archives, Kew, and the British Library. English sources are particularly full of the detailed record of the English war effort in Scotland. Pay and supplies, arrays of soldiers and valuations of horses are all recorded in documents relating to the English fight for and occupation of Scotland.33 Coupled with already published documentary material relating to both Scotland and England, these sources provide the detailed evidence around which the military history of the Anglo-Scottish conflict can be constructed.34 As already indicated, much of this evidence According to MacDougall, in 1334 the Franco-Scottish alliance was ‘the one useful remaining part of the Bruce legacy’ and Philip VI ‘saved the boy king of Scots’ (MacDougall, Auld Alliance, 32–3). 30 Webster, ‘Scotland without a King’, 224–9, 236. 31 MacDougall, Auld Alliance, 35–6. 32 Manuscripts from the following collections: GD40 (papers of the Kerr family, Marquises of Lothian (Lothian Muniments)); GD297 (J. & F. Anderson Collection) and RH1 (miscellaneous transcripts etc., individual documents). 33 Classes of documents consulted at the National Archives: C47, Chancery Miscellanea; E39, Exchequer, Treasury of Receipt, Scottish Documents; E101, King’s Remembrancer, Accounts Various; E372, Exchequer, Pipe Office, Pipe Rolls; E403, Exchequer of Receipt, Issue Rolls and Registers; SC8, Special Collections, Ancient Petitions. Similar records held at the British Library include: Cotton MS Nero C VIII, fol. 1–318, Liber de compotis diversorum redditum in garderoba Regis, 4 Edward II–11 Edward III; Additional MS 7965, fol. 43v–59, Accounts for the King’s Wardrobe, 25 Edward I. 34 Examples of Scottish record evidence already in print include: The Acts of the Parliament of Scotland, ed. T. Thomson and C. Innes, 12 vols (Edinburgh, 1814–75); Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland, ed. J. Bain, 4 vols (Edinburgh, 1881–8); Calendar of Documents Relating to Scotland: Supplementary Volume, ed. J. Galbraith and G.G. Simpson (Edinburgh, 1986); The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland, ed. J. Stuart et al., 23 vols (Edinburgh, 1878–1908); Registrum Magni Sigilli Regum Scottorum, ed. J.M. Thomson and J.B. Paul, 11 vols (Edinburgh, 1882–1914); Regesta Regum Scotorum VI: 29



introduction 9

has undergone detailed examination by historians of fourteenth-century English history. Most of this work, by its very nature, focussed however on English affairs to the detriment of Bruce Scottish military activity. This book is based on a re-examination of this source evidence in relation to what detail it can provide regarding Bruce Scottish movements and activities. Although contemporary records provide large quantities of detailed evidence this book nonetheless relies heavily upon narrative sources. There are many problems to be confronted when working with such sources. Scottish chronicles in particular present difficulties. They are all products of the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and all include information provided by earlier, now lost, works in their accounts. The three principal writers (John of Fordun, Andrew Wyntoun and Walter Bower) constructed their chronicles within different political climates and their depictions of the wartime careers of David II and Robert the Steward are, in particular, coloured by the change in dynasty in 1371 from Bruce to Stewart.35 Nonetheless, this narrative evidence provides the opinions and ideals of those who produced the chronicles and evokes something of the contemporary mentalité, which documentary evidence often does not. This combination of sources allows analysis not only of what occurred during the Anglo-Scottish conflict but also the extent to which the activities of war were controlled, how warriors were perceived at this time, and how such men perceived themselves.

the Acts of David II 1329–71, ed. B. Webster (Edinburgh, 1982). Examples of English administrative evidence in print include: Calendar of Close Rolls (London, 1892–); Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (London, 1916–); Calendar of Patent Rolls (London, 1891–); Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae et Cuiuscunque Generis Acta Publica, ed. T. Rymer, 4 vols (London, 1816–69); Historical Papers and Letters from the Northern Registers, ed. J. Raine (London, 1873); Northern Petitions Illustrative of Life in Berwick, Cumbria and Durham in the Fourteenth Century [from PRO, Ancient Petitions], ed. C.M. Fraser (Surtees Society, 1982 for 1981); Rotuli Scotiae in Turri Londinensi et in Domo Capitulari Westmonasteriensi Asservati, ed. D. Macpherson et al. 2 vols (London, 1814–19). 35 For discussion of Scottish chronicles and their political sensitivities, see Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 23–43; S.I. Boardman, The Early Stewart Kings: Robert II and Robert III, 1371–1406 (East Linton, 1996), 4–10; D. Broun, ‘A New Look at Gesta Annalia Attributed to John of Fordun’, in Church, Chronicle and Learning in Medieval and Early Renaissance Scotland: Essays presented to Donald Watt on the Occasion of the Completion of the Publication of Bower’s “Scotichronicon”, ed. B.E. Crawford (Edinburgh, 1999), 9–30; S. Boardman, ‘A People Divided? Language, History and Anglo-Scottish Conflicts in the Work of Andrew of Wyntoun’, in Ireland and the English World in the Late Middle Ages, ed. B. Smith (Basingstoke, 2009), 112–29; S. Mapstone, ‘Bower and Kingship’, in Walter Bower, Scotichronicon, ed. D.E.R. Watt, 9 vols (Aberdeen, 1987–98), ix, 321–38; M.A. Penman, ‘Anglici Caudati: Abuse of the English in Fourteenth-Century Scottish Chronicles, Literature and Records’, in England and Scotland in the Fourteenth Century: New Perspectives, ed. A. King and M.A. Penman (Woodbridge, 2007), 216–35.

1

Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1332–1357 Two Kings in One Kingdom: A Scottish Military Collapse? (1332–34) Peace between England and Scotland was agreed in 1328, bringing to a close thirty-two years of conflict. Ratified at Edinburgh and Northampton, the peace treaty did not last. The fragile peace was undermined by the unresolved issue of territorial claims held by a group of English and AngloScottish nobles known as the Disinherited. Their desire to gain or regain Scottish territories provided Edward III with a means to recommence the war with Scotland.1 Led by Edward Balliol, son of the deposed King John, the Disinherited plotted the forcible seizure of the lands they claimed. This was undertaken at first with the complicity of Edward III, but soon after with the English king’s active personal involvement.2 The death of Thomas Randolph, Scottish Guardian and loyal lieutenant of Robert I, provided the opportunity for the Disinherited to attack Scotland while the kingdom lacked obvious leadership. Aware of Balliol’s imminent invasion, the Scots met in council at Perth around 2 August 1332 to elect Randolph’s replacement. A new Guardian was chosen but only ‘efftyr gret and lang dyssentyown’.3 The choice of Earl Donald of Mar fell upon a Scottish noble whose allegiance to the Bruce cause in the face of a Balliol alternative was far from guaranteed.4 Following his election as Guardian, Mar ordered the gathering of two armies, one on each side of the Firth of Forth, to guard the coast in anticipation of Balliol’s seaborne attack. Mar himself led the northern levies while Earl Patrick of March commanded the southern forces. Not knowing where the Disinherited would land, the Bruce Scots could do little more, but their wait was brief. On 6 August 1332 Balliol and his forces landed at the Fife Cameron and Ross, ‘Treaty of Edinburgh’, 251–6. Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, presents the fullest account of events from 1332 to 1335. See also Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp. 3 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 384; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 346; Chron. Bower, vii, 73. 4 For contemporary discussion of Mar’s possible allegiance, see Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 268; Chron. Bridlington, 105–6. See also Penman, David II, 47; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 81–2. 1

2

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port of Kinghorn.5 The only immediate opposition to the invaders came from local levies led by the earl of Fife, but the earl’s forces were driven off by the Disinherited archers who were the first ashore ahead of the menat-arms.6 With this early success achieved Balliol and his army marched inland to Dunfermline. The town held important political and religious significance and from here Balliol could begin to propagate his claims to legitimacy. Encamped at the long-established burial place of Scottish kings, Balliol could claim locally that he was in the ascendant and the true king of Scotland.7 Remaining there for two days the Disinherited were able to supply themselves with food and weapons before marching north towards Perth.8 It was here that Mar’s army waited. Positioned on either side of the River Earn, the two armies observed each other until the onset of darkness. Under the cover of night, the Disinherited crossed the river – with the help of a Scotsman, Andrew Murray of Tullibardine, who knew the location of a ford.9 They attacked the first Bruce Scots they came across, although these appear to have been predominantly servants and camp followers.10 Despite the success of this nocturnal attack the Disinherited were faced the following morning by a Bruce Scottish army in full array and possessing a large numerical advantage.11 Both English and Scottish chroniclers describe the outcome of the battle that ensued as an almost miraculous occurrence. The lead elements of the Bruce army rushed into battle in disorganised fashion.12 The Bruce Scots were all the while subjected to intensive archery The Lanercost chronicler attempted to dramatise further the Disinherited landing, writing that it was effected ‘where no ship had ever yet been known to land’, but Kinghorn was a well established port in Fife (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 269; A.T. Simpson and S. Stevenson, Historic Kinghorn: The Archaeological Implications of Development, Scottish Burgh Survey (Glasgow, 1981), 2). 6 Chron. Bridlington, 104; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 149; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 83. 7 D. Perry, ‘Dunfermline: From ‘Saracen’ castle to ‘populous manufacturing royal burrow’’, PSAS, 129 (1999), 779–815, at 789–90. 8 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 269; Scalacronica (King), 109. Balliol may also have used his march through Fife to rally support to his cause and gather financial contributions from local religious houses (Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 83–4; Penman, David II, 47). 9 He was captured after the fall of Perth to the Bruce Scots in October 1332 and executed as a traitor for having marked the spot of the ford to guide the Disinherited across the Earn (Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 394; Chron. Bower, vii, 83). 10 Chron. Bower, vii, 77; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 269; Scalacronica (King), 109–10; Brut, 276–7; Chron. Melsa, ii, 363–4. 11 For discussion of the size of the forces involved and chronicle estimates of troop numbers, see DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 115–18. 12 One English chronicle suggests that dissension amongst some Scottish leaders led to the uncoordinated charge of troops under Mar and Robert Bruce (Brut, 278–9). 5



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 13

fire from missile troops on the flanks of the Disinherited line. Crowding together in an attempt to avoid the deadly arrows the Bruce Scots were crushed by the weight of their own troops and more men apparently died from suffocation than from injuries inflicted by their enemies.13 The Bruce defeat was complete and by the end of the battle several leaders, including the Guardian, were dead. The town of Perth thereafter submitted to Balliol. The second Bruce army under the earl of March remained in the field and marched to besiege the town. Chronicle accounts differ over the conduct of the siege but it is clear that it was short-lived and that March withdrew after only a few days.14 Balliol was then able to hold his coronation at Scone. Meanwhile, the Bruce Scots regrouped. Balliol was lured into southwest Scotland, perhaps by targeted Bruce attacks on his ancestral territories in Galloway.15 Perth was entrusted to the custodianship of Earl Duncan of Fife who had apparently submitted to Balliol after his capture at Dupplin Moor.16 Fife’s control of the town did not last long, for around 7 October 1332, during Balliol’s absence, Perth was recaptured by Bruce forces led by James and Simon Fraser and Robert Keith.17 In southwest Scotland Balliol himself faced attacks by Bruce forces. Archibald Douglas ambushed Balliol near Jedburgh although the Disinherited successfully drove off the Bruce Scots.18 Balliol and his troops then marched to Roxburgh where they were attacked once again. Andrew Murray’s ambush of Balliol’s forces at Roxburgh Bridge ended in another Bruce defeat, Murray being captured along with the infamous pirate John Crabbe.19 Better fortune followed for Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 388; Chron. Bower, vii, 77–9; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 271; Scalacronica (King), 111. 14 The Lanercost chronicler describes a force coming out of Galloway led by Eustace Maxwell, which attacked the besieging army and helped drive it away from Perth. Wyntoun and Bower describe the Scots filling the moat to enable an attack on the town but provide no explanation why the army then abandoned the siege without making an assault. Gray writes that the Scots stayed for eight days before the town walls but were forced to leave through lack of provisions, while the Anonimalle chronicler lists the failure of a naval attack on Balliol’s ships by John Crabbe as the principal cause of the siege being lifted (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 272–3; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 390–1; Chron. Bower, vii, 79–81; Scalacronica (King), 111; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 151–3). 15 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 153. 16 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 391; Chron. Bower, vii, 77–9; see also Candy, ‘Scottish Wars of Edward III’, 55–6; Penman, David II, 48. 17 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 394; Chron. Bower, vii, 83; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 273. 18 Scalacronica (King), 111. 19 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 273–4; Chron. Bower, vii, 89; Scalacronica (King), 111–3; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 153–5; Chron. Bridlington, 109. For more on Crabbe, see H.S. Lucas, ‘John Crabbe: Flemish Pirate, Merchant, and Adventurer’, Speculum, 20 (1945), 344–50; E.W.M. Balfour-Melville, ‘Two John Crabbs’, SHR, 39 (1960), 31–4. 13

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the Bruce cause towards the end of the year. Having agreed a truce with the Bruce leadership over winter, and apparently feeling secure in his base at Annan, Balliol settled in to celebrate Christmas with a small retinue. The Bruce Scots attacked Balliol and his troops at night; the new king of Scotland was forced to flee partially clothed while some of his supporters were killed defending the king’s person.20 Having escaped to England, Balliol received hospitality from supporters in Cumberland. He pleaded with Edward III for assistance in crushing the insurrection in Scotland.21 This appeal provided Edward III, who in public at least still supported the peace defined in the Treaty of Northampton/ Edinburgh, with sufficient grounds to raise an army for an invasion of Scotland despite opposition at home.22 Balliol proceeded north, ahead of the main invasion, in February/March 1333, raiding the border countryside before besieging Berwick.23 Initial attempts were made by the Bruce Scots to draw off Balliol’s army. A raid was launched into Northumberland soon after the siege began. This was followed by an attack on Gilsland on 22 March 1333.24 The distance between Gilsland and Berwick suggests that this was a deliberately targeted attack on the lands of Ranulph Dacre, who may have been involved in the early stages of the Berwick siege with Balliol.25 This second foray only succeeded in provoking a counter-raid into Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 275; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347–8; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 394–5; Chron. Bower, vii, 83–5; Scalacronica (King), 113; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 306; Brut, 280–1; Chron. Melsa, ii, 366–7. Henry Balliol, described as Edward Balliol’s brother, was apparently amongst those killed. For discussion of this individual, see Beam, ‘Balliol Dynasty’, 330, 387–90; see also A. Beam, ‘One Funeral and a Wedding: The Neglected History of Scotland’s Forgotten Kings’, History Scotland, 3:1 (2003), 16–23, at 23. 21 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 275; Chron. Avesbury, 297; Beam, ‘Balliol Dynasty’, 330–1. 22 Rogers writes that ‘Parliament, which had not been anxious for war even before, now was positively averse to the idea. It is unusual to find an example of a medieval parliament offering direct opposition to a popular king’s foreign policy, but this one came close’ (Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 55–64; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 107). 23 The Anonimalle chronicler described Balliol and his forces entering Scotland on 20 February where they ‘raided several places in the land and did great damage to their enemies’ as well as capturing Oxnam peel (Roxburghshire) and its keeper, Robert Colville. The Lanercost chronicler described the army entering Scotland on 10 March, the earl of Atholl raiding ‘the neighbouring country with his following and [supplying] the army with cattle’ (Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 155; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 110). 24 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 157; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 112; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 61–2. 25 Dacre had assisted Balliol after his flight from Annan and he was to benefit from the redistribution of lands in southern Scotland following Halidon Hill (Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 62, n. 88; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 148; see also CDS, iii, no. 1139). 20



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 15

Dumfriesshire on 25 March led by Anthony Lucy. His force was overtaken by elements from the Scottish garrison of Lochmaben Castle, including William Douglas of Liddesdale and ‘the whole flower of the knighthood of Annandale’.26 Battle was joined at the village of Dornock on the Solway coast and was won by the English, who returned across the border with their booty and several prisoners, including Douglas and William Baird.27 At Berwick, the siege had achieved little by the time Edward III arrived with his army two months later. Following a series of Disinherited/English attacks against the town’s walls, and fearing ‘the ferocity of King Edward’, the townsmen of Berwick made arrangements for their surrender if not relieved by a Bruce Scottish army.28 Archibald Douglas, the new Scottish Guardian, raised an army and marched south to the relief of Berwick. Bypassing Edward III’s army to the west, the Bruce Scots crossed the Tweed upriver before appearing across the water from the besiegers to display their strength.29 The Bruce Scots even managed to send victuals and troops into the town across the remnants of the town’s broken bridge.30 They then began a diversionary assault on northern England, seeking to draw off the English army and repeating a tactic that had proved successful during Edward II’s aborted siege of Berwick in 1319.31 After burning Tweedmouth the Bruce Scots proceeded south on a destructive raid through Northumberland as far as Morpeth.32 Unperturbed by the sight of the English countryside in flames, Edward III pressed on with his siege. The inhabitants of Berwick, having received supplies and troops from a Scottish army in the field, protested to the English king that the conditions of the relief had been met. Edward III disagreed. Thomas Seton, the son of the town’s constable, who had been

Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 397–8; Chron. Bower, vii, 89; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277–8; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 159; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 307; Chron. Melsa, ii, 367–8. 27 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277–8; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 159; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 397–8; Chron. Bower, vii, 89; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 62; see also G. Neilson, ‘The Battle of Dornock’, TDGNHAS, second series, 12 (1894–5), 154–8. 28 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 397–8; Chron. Bower, vii, 91; Scalacronica (King), 115; Chron. Baker, 50; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 159–61; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 307; Polychronicon, viii, 328; Brut, 281–2; Chron. Melsa, ii, 368–9; Rot. Scot., i, 253–4. 29 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 399; Chron. Bower, vii, 91; Scalacronica (King), 115; Chron. Angliae, 4; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 161–3; Polychronicon, viii, 328; Chron. Melsa, ii, 369. 30 Chron. Bridlington, 112–13; Scalacronica (King), 115. 31 McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 90–1; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 112. 32 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 157; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277; Scalacronica (King), 115–17; Chron. Bridlington, 113–14, which describes the Scots raiding for three days and nights; Historia Anglicana, 196, estimates six days. For discussion of this raid see Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 68; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 124–9. 26

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surrendered as a hostage to the English king to ensure that the relief agreement was observed, was hanged before Berwick’s walls in full view of his parents.33 The townspeople had little option but to enter into further negotiations and were allowed to send men to locate the Bruce Scottish army in order to inform it of the need to return to Berwick and fight.34 Faced with the choice of battle or losing the strategically important town, the Bruce Scots returned north to find the English arrayed on top of Halidon Hill to the north of Berwick. Under the terms of the new agreement Berwick had to be relieved by the evening of 19 July.35 Forced to take the initiative if these terms were to be met, the Bruce Scots launched an uphill attack under volleys of deadly English arrows. Although most of the Bruce Scots reached the summit of the hill, they were met by the Disinherited/English men-at-arms, well arrayed on foot and with their archers still pouring fire onto the Bruce Scottish ranks. It was not long before some Bruce troops began to break and soon the whole force was in full flight from the battlefield. Mounting their horses, the Disinherited/English pursued their beaten foes and many Bruce Scots were captured or killed in the pursuit.36 Having suffered two catastrophic defeats in the space of a year the Bruce Scots were in no position to offer further resistance. Balliol was free once more to impose his will on Scotland and in the aftermath of the battle he and his forces marched north to Perth. Resolute Bruce partisans were pushed to the geographical margins of Scotland. Many other Scots simply entered Balliol’s allegiance.37 Rebellion, Resurgence and Recovery (1334–36) The situation was not irretrievable for the Scottish supporters of the young David II. Indeed they demonstrated the same ability to recover from defeat Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 399–400; Chron. Bower, vii, 91; Scalacronica (King), 115; Chron. Bridlington, 113; Brut, 282–3; E. Ewan, ‘The Dangers of Manly Women: Late Medieval Perceptions of Female Heroism in Scotland’s Second War of Independence’, in Woman and the Feminine in Medieval and Early Modern Scottish Writing, ed. S.M. Dunnigan, C. Marie Harker and E.S. Newlyn (Basingstoke, 2004), 3–18. 34 William Keith, William Prendergast and Alexander Gray, under English safe conduct, entered England and located the Bruce army at Witton Underwood, near Morpeth (Scalacronica (King), 117). 35 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 864–5; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 127–32. 36 ‘The Scots in the rear then took to flight, making use of their heels; but the English pursued them on horseback, felling the wretches as they fled in all directions with ironshod maces’ (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 279–8; see also Brut, 286). 37 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), 403–4; Chron. Bower, vii, 97; Scalacronica (King), 117; Chron. Baker, 53; Brut, 291; Chron. Melsa, ii, 371; Webster, ‘Scotland without a King’, 237–8. 33



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 17

as they had after Dupplin. As early as February 1334, when Balliol was summoned to a meeting of the English parliament, apologies were sent for his absence as he was already said to be facing rebellion within his territories.38 Yet despite these early signs of discontent outright support for the Bruce party remained weak. There was a lack of strong leadership capable of galvanising Bruce support against the incoming Balliol administration. This was unsurprising considering the losses at Halidon Hill, and the loss of successive Guardians illustrated the precariousness of the Bruce cause’s position, as well as the difficulties of establishing effective military leadership. Among those who remained, the decision was made to send David II to France for his own safety.39 David’s exile and the pacification of Scotland in the months following Halidon Hill prompted Edward III to seek compensation for his assistance from Edward Balliol. More specifically he sought the realisation of promises made by Balliol at Roxburgh in November 1332. These entailed delivery of £2,000 worth of Scottish land and recognition of English overlordship over Scotland.40 On 12 June 1334 the sheriffdoms of Berwick, Roxburgh, Selkirk, Edinburgh, Peebles and Dumfries were ceded to England.41 English administration was set up within these territories while Balliol and his supporters retained power and authority throughout the remainder of Scotland.42 The ceding of the southern sheriffdoms created an area of English occupation that demonstrated once and for all that the conflict in Scotland had changed. What had begun as a resumption of the Bruce–Balliol civil war and a fight for the crown of Scotland became entangled again in Anglo-Scottish antagonisms. The Bruce Scots had recognised this change as early as 1333 when English involvement in the siege of Berwick was countered by raids across the border, the first active attacks on English soil since before the Treaty of Northampton (1328).43 The partition of southern Scotland created a new situation. From this point the Bruce Scots faced not only two enemies, but also two wars. One was fought against the alternative Scottish king and his supporters, as well as those willing to work alongside the new regime. The other involved

Annales Paulini, 361; Chron. Baker, 53; see also Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 77–81; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 163–73. 39 Penman, David II, 51–3; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 78; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 157; MacDougall, Auld Alliance, 32–5; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 135–7. 40 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 847–8; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 97–9. 41 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 888–90; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 158–62. 42 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), 403–4; Chron. Bower, vii, 97; Scalacronica (King), 117; Chron. Baker, 53; Brut, 291; Chron. Melsa, ii, 371. 43 Contacts between Edward III and the Scottish government remained in place throughout the period of the Disinherited invasion and its aftermath (Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 95–6, 102–3). 38

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a fight against the forces of English occupation residing within the castles and towns of southern Scotland. The victory of the Disinherited/English cause, demonstrated in the months after Halidon Hill through the spread of alternative administrations and Balliol/English personnel throughout the kingdom, was not as profound as it had at first appeared. Following the unrest of early 1334 largescale rebellion broke out in July in southwest Scotland. Robert the Steward apparently sent his supporters on raids through Clydesdale, Renfrewshire, Carrick and Cunningham. These men ‘scattered everywhere as they laid the country waste, plundered for spoils, led men away as prisoners or brought them over to the Scottish side’.44 The Steward was able to call upon the assistance of Dougal Campbell of Lochawe and his men, who attacked and captured the castle of Dunoon.45 The Steward’s tenants in Cowal ‘assembled unanimously, and eagerly hurried to help their lord’.46 They captured the castle of Rothesay and ejected the administration established in the area by Balliol. The head of Alan Lyle, Balliol’s sheriff in the area, was sent to the Steward as a gift.47 Armed uprisings were also said to have occurred in Annandale and Kyle. The return from France of John Randolph, earl of Moray, son of the former Guardian and lord of Annandale, added further impetus to the rebellion in southwest Scotland.48 The leading role of Randolph and the Steward in the insurrection was recognised by their appointment as co-Guardians of Scotland and immediately thereafter the two men appear to have led a raid into Galloway.49 At this time the Bruce Scots were assisted by in-fighting Chron. Bower, vii, 107; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 414. Wyntoun stresses voluntary changes of allegiance amongst those who returned to the Bruce cause in the barony of Renfrew (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 414). Not all men were so willing. Bower relates that Godfrey Ros, Balliol’s sheriff of Ayr, was ‘dragged or forced along, after some resistance’ (Chron. Bower, vii, 107). 45 Rosneath Castle (Argyll) may have been captured during the same campaign (Boardman, Campbells, 58–9; A. Campbell, A History of Clan Campbell: Vol. I – From Origins to Flodden (Edinburgh, 2000), 81). 46 Chron. Bower, vii, 105. 47 Chron. Bower, vii, 105; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 414–15. Lyle had been appointed around autumn 1333 when Thomas Wooler was appointed lieutenant in the same region (Chron. Bower, vii, 97). 48 Chron. Bower, vii, 105; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 415–16; Scalacronica (King), 117–19. Wyntoun describes William Carruthers rising in rebellion in Annandale, and Thomas Bruce likewise in Kyle, with ‘lytill cwmpanyis, The qwethir thai rase in sere partyis.’ 49 Around this time Duncan MacDowell changed allegiance to support the Bruce party, possibly as a result of the raiding of his lands (although the Lanercost chronicler wrote that he did it for love of his wife). This defection was said to have been responsible for a further outbreak of hostilities within Galloway between supporters of David II and those loyal to Edward Balliol (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 97). Following the 44



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 19

within the Disinherited ranks over the division of territories.50 The situation became so serious that several prominent Disinherited leaders retired from the Balliol administration and proceeded to their own lands within Scotland.51 The Bruce Scots were able to take advantage of this split to score notable successes during September 1334, including the capture of several notable Disinherited figures. Richard Talbot and John Stirling were captured in Lothian while travelling towards England.52 David Strathbogie was pursued into Lochaber by a force led by the earl of Moray and enticed to adopt Bruce allegiance.53 Andrew Murray, recently released from imprisonment in England, also joined the attack against the Disinherited leadership. Murray besieged Henry Beaumont in Dundarg Castle (Buchan). Faced by an enemy army and with little chance of relief from his allies, Beaumont was forced to submit on terms.54 With many of his supporters defeated or captured, Edward Balliol was forced from his realm for a second time and sought shelter at Berwick.55 Balliol’s defeat left Edward III facing the dilemma of how to solve his ‘Scottish problem’. His backing of the Disinherited invasion had offered the possibility of dealing with a friendly administration on England’s northern raid on Galloway, Bruce forces swept east into English-held territory, possibly as far as Roxburghshire where, in November 1334, the countess of Mar’s lands at Cavers were described as being in the hands of the Bruce Scots (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 97; CDS, iii, no. 1140; RMS, i, App. i, no. 156; App. ii, no. 1908). 50 Scalacronica (King), 117; Chron. Bridlington, 119; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 406; Chron. Bower, vii, 95. 51 Scalacronica (King), 117–19; Chron. Bridlington, 119; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 406–7; Chron. Bower, vii, 95; Chron. Melsa, ii, 372. 52 Scalacronica (King), 117–19; Chron. Bridlington, 119; Chron. Murimuth, 72–3; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 349; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 406–7; Chron. Bower, vii, 95; Chron. Baker, 53; Chron. Melsa, ii, 372. 53 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 349; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 417; Chron. Bower, vii, 107; Scalacronica (King), 119; Chron. Melsa, ii, 372–3; A. Ross, ‘Men for All Seasons’, ii, 6–9. 54 Beaumont surrendered on 23 December 1334 in return for his life and goods (Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 349; Chron. Bower, vii, 95, 119; Scalacronica (King), 119; Chron. Bridlington, 120; Chron. Melsa, ii, 373–4). 55 Chron. Bower, vii, 107; Chron. Bridlington, 119. The collapse of Balliol support in this period is further demonstrated by the defections of men closely involved in the new administration. Talbot and Stirling were captured by Godfrey Ros and William Keith, Ros having previously served Balliol as sheriff of Ayr. One English account is scathing of their behaviour, stating that they faithlessly abandoned Balliol ‘from greed for their (ransoms)’ (Scalacronica (King), 119; see also Chron. Bower, vii, 95). Further, both Alexander and William Mowbray, original members of the Disinherited invasion, changed allegiance and participated in the siege of Henry Beaumont in Dundarg Castle (Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 349; Chron. Bower, vii, 119; Chron. Bridlington, 119; see also Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 80–6; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 168–9, 172, 185–6).

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frontier. Mindful of the assistance given to them by Edward III, the Disinherited lords could be expected to defend the English king’s interests in Scotland as well as their own. The loss of the Disinherited leadership through capture or defeat in the autumn of 1334 forced Edward III to intervene personally in Scotland once again. Taking an army north in the winter of 1334–5 he spent Christmas at Roxburgh. There he repaired the castle, which would be used as a base for the defence of the English administration in the area. As Edward III’s stay continued further troops arrived, although many of these forces were raised only after threatening letters for reinforcements had been sent south by the English king.56 His growing army then raided Ettrick Forest and Lothian, ravaging the land and attempting to bring the Bruce Scots to battle.57 A detachment of the army under Edward Balliol, the earl of Warwick and the earl of Oxford, was sent to the West March ‘in order to protect that western district from the Scots’.58 On their way to Carlisle they ‘burnt and wasted everything on their march’.59 The Roxburgh campaign, conducted over the winter at considerable cost, achieved little apart from refortifying Roxburgh Castle.60 Edward III may have utilised the campaign to gain a better understanding of the situation on the ground in Scotland in preparation for a planned invasion the following summer. Rogers goes further and argues that the Roxburgh campaign had originally been organised with a grander objective in mind: the relief of Dundarg Castle.61 Rogers claims that Edward III saw an opportunity to attack the Bruce Scots where and when they least expected it, in the far northeast in the middle of winter. This action would, he argues, have demonstrated quite clearly to the Scots that English military might could be brought to aid the Disinherited wherever and whenever it was required. It also afforded the possibility, Rogers argues, of establishing some control over the northeastern lowlands, which were ‘presumed to be more amenable to English influence, and which were certainly easier to control than the Gaelic highlands’.62 This argument presumes that Edward III envisaged a more complete conquest of Scotland in aid of Edward Balliol, and that northeast Scotland was a viable military target for English forces. Edward

Rot. Scot., i, 306–7, 308–9, 314, 319–20. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 288–9; Chron. Murimuth, 73–4; Chron. Baker, 56. 58 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 288–9. 59 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 288–9. This force, augmented by northern levies, raided north of the border around 6 January 1335 ‘destroying such towns and other property as they came upon, because the inhabitants had fled, and afterwards the King of Scotland returned to Carlisle’ (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 289). 60 For the costs of the campaign, see for example BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 233–235v. 61 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 83–4; see also Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 174–91. 62 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 83. 56 57



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 21

III’s activities in the northeast in the next two years may support this latter point to an extent, but it is difficult to see much in the way of long-term planning in the English king’s strategy. In any case the army that Edward collected at Roxburgh was not of exceptional size, numbering between 2,000 and 4,000 men.63 This was due in part to the time of year. Winter campaigns were unpopular and it took a great deal of effort to collect such a force for the time Edward III was camped at Roxburgh. This army would have been insufficient for an expedition through enemy terrain towards northeast Scotland and it would have had little ability to live off the land because of the time of year.64 This would seem to preclude the possibility of a campaign to rescue Henry Beaumont and emphasises the ultimate failure of this endeavour. Indeed it may even have helped the Bruce Scots. Edward III’s destructive march through southern Scotland led to Earl Patrick of March realigning himself with the Bruce Scots after his own lands were ravaged by the king’s army.65 English forces began to break up in February 1335 and Edward III retired south to begin planning a return with a larger expedition in the summer. After Edward III’s withdrawal the Bruce Scots continued to attack those who supported Balliol as well as those who had submitted to the Balliol/ English forces. Lothian was devastated by the earl of Moray ‘to bring the southern Scots back to loyalty’.66 William Douglas and his band of men ‘sought after much pillaging, killing, seizing, routing and beating among the English’.67 By April 1335 Bruce forces may also have besieged Cupar Castle.68 Bruce advances thereafter stalled following the agreement of an Anglo-­Scottish truce scheduled to last from Easter to Midsummer 1335, a product of Anglo-French negotiations over Gascony.69 Yet the truce was timeous since the Bruce Scots faced their own internal problems. These divisions, voiced in the ‘parliament’ held at Dairsie (Fife) in April 1335, involved disagreement between the Guardians. The inclusion in the Scottish Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 245–7; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 82–3; BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 233–235v. 64 It is difficult to see what long-term benefits such an invasion into northeast Scotland would have provided. The surprise invasion to relieve Lochindorb only a year and half later succeeded in driving away the Scottish besiegers only for a short time. As soon as the English armies had retired south the castle was besieged once more and eventually fell due to lack of further relief. 65 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 190–1; Scalacronica (King), 119. Gray suggests that the earl of March changed sides because of money that was stolen from him in England for which he gained no redress from the English king. 66 Chron. Bower, vii, 107. 67 Chron. Bower, vii, 107–9, 219, n. 37–8. 68 Penman, David II, 57. 69 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 192–4; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 87–96; Foedera, ii, p. ii, 903. 63

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council of the duplicitous David Strathbogie, a man who had only changed sides the previous winter and whose political ambitions were unlikely to be realised within a Bruce settlement, exacerbated matters.70 Come the summer of 1335 divisions within the Bruce ranks were further demonstrated in the response of some partisans to the massive invasion launched by the two Edwards. Edward III and Edward Balliol led this two-pronged assault that entered Scotland around the beginning of July, the English king marching through western Scotland while Balliol attacked in the east.71 The two armies converged near Glasgow and progressed with little opposition as far as Perth, where the town’s defences were improved.72 Meanwhile the Bruce Scots lost one of their principal military leaders when the earl of Moray was taken prisoner at the end of July. Having attacked and captured the count of Namur at Burgh Muir, near Edinburgh, Moray was escorting his prisoner back to the safety of the border when he was in turn ambushed by William Pressen and members of the Roxburgh garrison. Moray was led off to a lengthy imprisonment in England.73 After Moray’s capture, various Bruce Scots submitted to Balliol/English peace. These included, on 18 August, David Strathbogie, Godfrey Ros and Alexander Mowbray.74 Negotiations with Robert the Steward also appear to have begun around the same time.75 The Steward’s submission may have been prompted by attacks on his territories. An Irish fleet sailed up the Firth of Clyde at the end of August and attacked the Steward’s possessions Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 350; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 421; Chron. Bower, vii, 109; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 203; Penman, David II, 46–7; Ross, ‘Men for All Seasons’, ii, 9–10. 71 For the size and scale of this expedition, see BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 236–9; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 98; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 292; see also Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 96–102; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 203–24. 72 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 292; Chron. Bower, vii, 109; Scalacronica (King), 119–21; Chron. Avesbury, 298. Balliol’s army captured the castle of Cumbernauld and possibly also threatened Dumbarton while around Glasgow (Chron. Knighton, i, 475). Little offensive action was undertaken by the Bruce Scots to counter the invasion. Indeed, Bower suggests that ‘all the inhabitants living in the low country were on the instructions of the guardians fleeing to the mountains and to safer places with all their belongings, movables and beasts’ (Chron. Bower, vii, 109). 73 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 292; Chron. Bower, vii, 113–15; Scalacronica (King), 121. Count Guy of Namur was the cousin of Queen Philippa of England and was one of several Low Countries princes to enter Edward III’s service. He did homage to the English king and agreed a contract of indentured service in August 1335 (Chron. Bower, vii, 221–2; Foedera, ii, p. ii, 920–1). 74 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 294; Chron. Avesbury, 298–302. Also named in the agreement were Geoffrey Mowbray, William Bullock, Eustace of Lorraine and William Ramsay (Chron. Avesbury, 299–300). The chronicler of Meaux Abbey wrote that the earls of Fife and Menteith also surrendered around this time (Chron. Melsa, ii, 376). 75 Scalacronica (King), 121; Chron. Avesbury, 302; Penman, David II, 61. 70



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 23

of Rothesay Castle (Bute) and possibly Brodick Castle (Arran).76 Balliol/ English attacks against areas of Scotland as yet unfamiliar with the invaders continued as Edward Balliol led a force from Perth that raided ‘across the mountains’, although the scope and success of this expedition remains uncertain through lack of evidence.77 Nonetheless the war in this year had been successfully prosecuted throughout much of Scotland. Edward III retired south but stayed at Newcastle with a reduced English force in a position to counter any instability in southern Scotland. Apparently the English king saw no need to winter in southern Scotland as he had done the previous year.78 Edward Balliol too believed that the situation was under control and retired to England to celebrate Christmas. In the absence of the two kings David Strathbogie, their lieutenant for northern Scotland, set about mopping up residual resistance by subduing the local population and besieging Kildrummy Castle.79 In light of the recent submissions, Edward III may well have believed that the war was finally approaching its end.80 The English king was also aware, however, that several important Bruce Scottish leaders remained outwith the Balliol/ English peace. They were now led by Andrew Murray, appointed Guardian following the capture of Randolph and the submission of the Steward.81 Edward III had extended a truce to Murray and the Bruce Scots by 29 September which allowed time for discussions between the warring parties.82 Further talks led to an extension of this truce on 8 November, although this may only have been agreed to safeguard English possessions in southern Scotland against possible Bruce attack.83 David Strathbogie’s ongoing The Annals of Ireland by Friar John Clyn, ed. B. Williams (Dublin, 2007), 216. BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 236v–237v; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 222–3; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 104–5. 78 A contemporary letter discussing news of the war included the statement that ‘the Scots have retreated beyond the Forth. It is commonly said at York that they neither dare nor are able to fight with the king’ (CDS, v, no. 744). 79 Bower was particularly aggrieved at the tactics Strathbogie employed in subduing the northerners, ‘some [of whom] he disinherited, some he imprisoned in dungeons, some he even banished and murdered; and in the end he ordered the destruction of all the freeholders of the land without fail’ (Chron. Bower, vii, 115; see also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), 422). 80 In a letter to Phillip VI, Edward III felt confident enough in his endeavours to suggest that the war was indeed over: ‘quod primum placeat vobis scire quod per immensos labores et poenas non modicas inter nos et habitores Scotiae pacem fecimus stabilire…’ (Chron. Bridlington, 126; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 101). 81 Penman, David II, 61–2. 82 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 104. 83 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 925; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 107. For discussion of the AngloScottish truce and its relation to activities in northern Scotland, see Ross, ‘Men for all Seasons’, ii, 11–12; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 228–32; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 104–8. 76

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campaigning in northern Scotland demonstrated the lack of peace in those parts and prompted a response by the remaining Bruce Scottish leadership. Andrew Murray, accompanied by William Douglas and the earl of March, took a force north to relieve Kildrummy Castle, the defence of which was led by Murray’s wife. They met Strathbogie in battle on 30 November at Culblean (Mar). The Bruce Scots were victorious and the titular earl of Atholl died on the battlefield.84 His death removed one of the principal military leaders of the war on the Balliol side. The Bruce victory and the death of Strathbogie demonstrated yet again both the speed with which the Bruce Scots recovered from large-scale attacks, and the failure of the Disinherited/English to subdue Scotland effectively. Edward III’s belief that massive invasion armies could conquer Scotland was exposed as false by Bruce resurgence when those armies retreated. Shortterm defections to the Balliol/English cause could not hide the lack of widespread support for the Balliol and English administrations. And the death of Strathbogie removed the last Disinherited leader, apart perhaps from Balliol himself, who was willing and able to take the fight to the Bruce Scots in areas of Scotland outwith the English-occupied south. The apparently quick Disinherited and English victories in 1332 and 1333 were proven to be false dawns. By the end of 1335 at the latest it must have been clear to both Edward Balliol and Edward III that a change of strategy was required if Scotland was to be subdued effectively. Meanwhile the Bruce Scots followed up their victory at Culblean. Siege operations were begun by different forces at the castles of Lochindorb and Cupar.85 Their endeavours were, however, overtaken by ongoing negotiations between the English and the Bruce Scots over a possible peace deal. Complicated discussions seem to have taken place regarding the possibility of David II being recognised as Edward Balliol’s heir, assuming Balliol died childless.86 To allow these talks to continue the truce agreed with Andrew Murray in November/December 1335 was prorogued until 14 April 1336. The suggestion that previous negotiations between the English and the Bruce Scots concerned only the protection of English-held southern Scotland is Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 294; Chron. Bower, vii, 117; Scalacronica (King), 121; Chron. Baker, 56–7; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 229–36; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 107–9; Penman, David II, 61–2; W. Douglas Simpson, ‘The Campaign and Battle of Culblean, A.D. 1335’, PSAS, 64 (1929–30), 201–11. 85 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 930. Wyntoun and Bower add that, following Culblean, the Bruce Scots attacked and captured the tower of ‘Canmore’ to which Robert Menzies and his men had retreated following the battle (Chron. Fordun (Skene), 352; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 426; Chron. Bower, vii, 117, 225, n. 46). This has been identified as Loch Kinord Castle, five miles west of Aboyne (W. Douglas Simpson, ‘The Early Castles of Mar’, PSAS, 63 (1928–9), 102–38, at 130–1; M. Coventry, The Castles of Scotland, third edition (Musselburgh, 2001), 299). 86 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 104–13. 84



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borne out in this later prorogation. The stipulation that the Bruce Scots raise their sieges at Lochindorb and Cupar would only have been required if the previous agreement did not cover areas under the supposed control of Edward Balliol or David Strathbogie.87 Meanwhile, the negotiations over the future of the Scottish crown went nowhere and were rejected by David II’s council in France.88 With the opportunity of a lasting settlement lost the Anglo-Scottish truce was extended once more, this time until 12 May 1336, providing both the English and Bruce Scots with time to prepare for the resumption of conflict in the summer.89 During these periods of truce Edward III received reports that some Scots were giving their allegiance to neither Balliol nor Bruce but instead declared their allegiance to ‘the Lion’.90 This intelligence gave rise to a growing fear of Scottish invasions of English territory before the end of the truce period.91 Nonetheless, the truce held, but upon its expiry the earls of March, Fife and Sutherland renewed the siege of Cupar in May 1336 while Lochindorb was similarly besieged anew.92 A force from Edinburgh Castle led by John Stirling crossed the Firth of Forth and proceeded north to Cupar. Imagining this force to be a larger relief army, the Bruce Scots quickly retreated, abandoning their siege engines, stores and equipment in their haste.93 Although Stirling’s force was not as significant as the Bruce Scots had envisaged, another English invasion army did make its way north following the end of the truce. Led by Edward Balliol and Henry of Lancaster, the army marched from Berwick sometime after 1 May 1336. Included in its ranks were such notables as the earls of Warwick, Oxford and Angus.94 Around the same time a naval expeditionary force, led by Thomas Roslin, left Lynn and Foedera, ii, p. ii, 930. The stipulation regarding the sieges was not present in the short truce extensions agreed before this date. Fordun’s source and Bower claim that the Bruce Scottish siege of Cupar was halted and an agreement made with the garrison ‘on receipt of letters from the kings of France and Scotland’ (Chron. Fordun (Skene), 352; Chron. Bower, vii, 117; see also Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 295). 88 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 104–13; see also Penman, David II, 63. 89 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 933, dated 18 March 1336. Further negotiations remained a possibility and on 4 May Edward III appointed Henry of Lancaster, Thomas Beauchamp, Henry Beaumont and William Bohun to treat with the Bruce Scots over an extension of the truce until 24 June (Rot. Scot., i, 418; Foedera, ii, p. ii, 938). 90 Edward III wrote that ‘quidam homines de Scotia Domino Edwardo regi Scotie seu David de Brus aut eis adherentibus intendere recusantes set se de Leone et non de alio tenere asserentes’ (Rot. Scot., i, 401; see also Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 236). 91 Rot. Scot., i, 401–9. 92 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 296–7; CDS, iii, p. 354; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 352; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 428; Chron. Bower, vii, 117–19. 93 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 296–7; CDS, iii, p. 354; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 115. 94 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 240; Chron. Bridlington, ii, 128; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 296; see also Scalacronica (King), 121–3. 87

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sailed towards northeast Scotland to garrison Dunottar Castle.95 The Bruce Scots once again refused to be drawn into a large-scale confrontation with the invading forces. Instead they shadowed Balliol and Lancaster’s army as it marched north, skirmishing with smaller elements when possible.96 Splitting his army in two, Balliol travelled through the eastern lowlands. The remainder of the English army, led by Henry of Lancaster, marched through the ‘forestas et montana’, presumably through the West March, up Clydesdale and into Lanarkshire, where two of Lancaster’s men lost horses at Monklands.97 On its route north Lancaster’s force was attacked by William Douglas and his men although, according to an English letter describing this campaign, the Scots were driven back.98 The two English forces joined together once more around Stirling, where they successfully repulsed an attack by Andrew Murray and his men before marching north to Perth. The town was found to have been burned and abandoned by the Bruce Scots.99 Balliol set about repairing Perth’s defences once more.100 In June Edward III rode north with his household knights and a force of men from northern England to join Balliol at Perth.101 Remaining for around a month in the town Edward III and a small force departed Perth on 12 July and rode into northern Scotland on the ‘Lochindorb chevauchée’. The ostensible purpose of this expedition was to rescue David Strathbogie’s wife who had been besieged in Lochindorb Castle.102 The forces of Andrew Murray, last recorded ambushing Balliol and Lancaster’s army somewhere around Stirling, appear to have retired northwards and either rejoined or renewed the siege of Lochindorb Castle. As Edward III approached the castle on 15 July the Bruce Scots withdrew, Murray clearly unwilling to

BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 251. This force of 160 knights, men-at-arms and mounted archers faced resistance, and Roslin himself was killed in a skirmish in Aberdeen. Despite this the garrison appears to have settled in for at least two months’ service (they were paid until 16 July), presumably being relieved or reinforced when Edward III passed by Dunottar on 24 July (Ellis, Original Letters, 33; BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 251; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 422–3). 96 Ellis, Original Letters, 32–3; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 115. 97 TNA, E101/15/12. 98 Ellis, Original Letters, 32–3. 99 Ellis, Original Letters, 33; Chron. Bridlington, ii, 128; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 298. 100 Ellis, Original Letters, 33; Chron. Bridlington, ii, 128; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 298. 101 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 241–2, 260. Joining the king on this expedition were William Montague, Robert Ufford, Henry Ferrers and Thomas Bradeston, all ‘new men’ whom Edward favoured throughout his reign and who remained prominent in the king’s entourage (J.S. Bothwell, Edward III and the English Peerage (Woodbridge, 2004), 168–9). 102 Ellis, Original Letters, 35; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 298; Scalacronica (King), 123; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 7; Chron. Bower, vii, 119; Chron. Melsa, ii, 311–12; Chron. Murimuth, 77; Chron. Baker, 57–8; MacInnes, ‘Lochindorb Chevauchée’, 16–31. 95



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pit his forces against those of the English king.103 Denied the opportunity of meeting his enemies in battle, Edward III continued his raid through Moray.104 Forres was burned, as were the lands around Elgin, before the English king moved on to sack and burn Aberdeen.105 On his journey south from Aberdeen Edward III reinforced the east-coast castles of Dunottar, Kinneff and Lauriston before returning once more to Perth after 26 July.106 Further work, including the erection of stone towers at three of the town’s gates, was undertaken at Perth with the expenses met by six local monasteries.107 As the English marched through northeast Scotland, the Bruce Scots remained in the field. William Douglas, reportedly with 1,000 men, lay in ambush in the forest of Plater (Angus) as Edward III passed south from Aberdeen.108 Henry of Lancaster chased off Douglas and his troops but other Bruce forces may have been able to take advantage of the English presence in the north to campaign in the south.109 In a letter of 19 July Anthony Lucy reported to the English chancellor that Andrew Murray and his men had crossed the Forth, presumably from north to south, considering Murray’s last known location at Lochindorb.110 Murray therefore appears to have headed into either Lothian or Lanarkshire. The latter appears the more likely destination. Some of the Guardian’s own estates were located in the sheriffdom. He may have travelled south to ensure the continuing loyalty Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 428–30; Ellis, Original Letters, 35; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 116–8; G.W.S. Barrow, ‘The Wood of Stronkalter: A Note on the Relief of Lochindorb Castle by Edward III in 1336’, SHR, 46 (1967), 77–9. 104 Katherine Strathbogie was despatched south for her safety, apparently by a different route. She later petitioned Edward III around 1348 that she had lost her wardrobe and all she owned when she left Lochindorb, and that her expenses in retaining the garrison in the castle during the siege, coupled with her losses, amounted to over 400 marks (TNA, SC8/13/611). 105 Ellis, Original Letters, 35–8; Chron. Bower, vii, 123; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 298; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 7. The English forces reached Forres on 17 July and Elgin on 18 July. They then arrived at Aberdeen on the evening of 21 July, not departing from the town until 23/24 July (Ellis, Original Letters, 36–8). 106 Chron. Bower, vii, 123; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 298; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333– 1381, 7; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 118–19. Rogers suggests that Lauriston was a new castle built in Galloway, but it would appear more likely that the castle mentioned by Scottish sources was Lauriston Castle in Kincardineshire. Lying on the coastal road between Aberdeen and Perth, Lauriston was just south of Kinneff and Dunottar (see Coventry, Castles of Scotland, 290). 107 The abbeys listed were St Andrews, Dunfermline, Lindores, Balmerino, Arbroath and Coupar Angus; the prior of St Andrews alone apparently paid 280 marks towards the construction of one tower (Chron. Bower, vii, 123). 108 Ellis, Original Letters, 38. 109 Ellis, Original Letters, 38. 110 CDS, v, no. 758. 103

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of his tenants following Henry of Lancaster’s progress through the area, or perhaps to recruit more men into his military force. Murray’s presence in Lanarkshire is further suggested by the invasion of the third English army to enter Scotland in 1336. This force was led by John of Eltham, earl of Cornwall and brother of Edward III. Eltham had collected a force at Newcastle at the end of July ‘at the king’s orders’.111 Leaving there on 28 July this army did not proceed directly to join the king at Perth.112 Instead it took a westerly route, proceeding through Lanarkshire and Carrick.113 The Lanercost chronicler wrote that the purpose of this expedition was to win over areas not currently in the English allegiance, and to achieve this aim the English forces engaged in destructive raiding of western Scotland.114 Alternatively, Eltham’s force was perhaps charged with locating and defeating Andrew Murray and his troops.115 Scottish chroniclers describe in lurid detail the actions of Eltham and his forces on this campaign, including the destruction of Lesmahagow church as well as the deaths of those who sought sanctuary within.116 These destructive tactics may have been part of an attempt to entice Murray out of hiding or to drive him from the area. While Eltham made his progress through southern Scotland, improved defences were erected not only at Perth but also at Leuchars Castle and St Andrews Castle, while a peel was erected at Stirling to strengthen the fortifications there and repairs were made to the castles of Edinburgh and Roxburgh.117 Rogers argues that throughout the war Edward III attempted to pacify Scotland by establishing a ‘system of fortifications similar to the one BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 240. Eltham was joined on this campaign by Anthony Lucy and levies collected from northern England (BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 242; CDS, v, no. 758). 112 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 240. 113 Chron. Bower, vii, 123; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 299; see also Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353. The location of English forces in western Scotland around this time is corroborated by orders in July and August for 200 quarters of wheat, 100 quarters of oats, 10 tuns of wine and ‘quedam alia victualia’ to be sent from Ireland, Somerset and Gloucestershire to Ayr (Rot. Scot., i, 437, 441). 114 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 299. 115 The Lanercost chronicler stated that it was William Douglas who shadowed the English advance, but he was apparently around Angus at this time in the vicinity of Edward III’s army (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 299; Ellis, Original Letters, 38). 116 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353; Chron. Bower, vii, 123. The Scottish chroniclers describe indiscriminate burning in southern Scotland by the English forces. The Lanercost chronicler contradicts this, writing instead that Eltham only harried areas outwith the English allegiance (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 299). For discussion of the propaganda surrounding this campaign and Eltham’s death, see T.B. James, ‘John of Eltham, History and Story: Abusive International Discourse in Late Medieval England, France and Scotland’, Fourteenth Century England, 2 (2002), 63–80. 117 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 299; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353; Chron. Bower, vii, 111



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his grandfather had built in Wales’.118 Any such plans were, however, likely to fail. Scotland could not be encircled with fortifications as Wales had been by Edward I. And the fortifications that were constructed, for example in northeast Scotland, were of insufficient strength to offer anything other than temporary resistance. This is made clear by the ease with which these same fortifications fell to the Bruce Scots. The English king eventually departed Scotland by 22 September 1336.119 Around October, Andrew Murray took advantage of Edward III’s retreat to return to the northeast and recapture Dunottar, Kinneff and Lauriston, reducing each in turn to an indefensible state.120 He then spent most of that winter ravaging Gowrie, Angus and the Mearns in an attempt to reverse submissions to the English king which had taken place when Edward III passed through the area with his army.121 The Bruce Scottish recovery in the northeast appears to have prompted Edward III’s return to Scotland in October 1336. As one chronicler stated, it was ‘the common opinion of experienced men … that the land of Scotland could never be conquered unless in winter’.122 Having inspected the construction work at Stirling, Edward III moved southwest and began rebuilding Bothwell Castle, in a continued attempt to establish a defensive structure from which to control the countryside.123 There he remained until the end of November, retiring south to Roxburgh after leaving a garrison to defend the newly repaired Bothwell. His march was again shadowed by William Douglas and his forces who ‘killed some of the king’s men from time to time’.124 From Roxburgh the king withdrew into England before Christmas, leaving Edward Balliol in Perth with a small following.125 Such was the problem faced by Edward III. Despite four months of campaigning during the summer there were limits to the time and resources he could devote to Scotland. Large English armies could reduce areas of Scotland to submission but without consolidation these gains were purely temporary. The English king required the establishment 123; Chron. Melsa, ii, 378; BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 249–249v; The History of the King’s Works, i, ed. R. Allen Brown, H.M. Colvin and A.J. Taylor (London, 1963), 421–2. 118 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 87. 119 CDS, iii, nos. 1210, 1211. 120 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353; Chron. Bower, vii, 125; ER, i, 451. 121 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353; Chron. Bower, vii, 125. Anthony Lucy’s letter of 19 July stated that ‘the commons of Stirlingshire, Strathearn, Fife, Fotherick, Angus and Kincardine in the Mearns have come to peace’ (CDS, v, no. 758). 122 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 300. 123 CPR, 1334–38, 330; CCR, 1333–37, 717 (for his time at Stirling); Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 300. 124 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 300. During October an English force raided through Douglasdale which ravaged the area and returned to England with a quantity of booty (ibid., 300). 125 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 300; CDS, iii, nos. 1216, 1218, 1219, 1222.

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of Balliol or English administrations in those areas that military might had converted to friendly status. Outwith southern Scotland this consolidation was dependent upon the ability of Edward Balliol and his allies to ensure the continued allegiance of the people within converted territories. However, without English troops to assist him, Balliol possessed insufficient military resources and support within Scotland with which to accomplish his task. After 1333 the Bruce Scots continually refused to meet the English/ Balliol forces in the field, with the exception of small-scale engagements like Culblean. Still, growing Bruce confidence was demonstrated by increased small-scale forays against contingents of the English armies and attacks on exposed and poorly defended castles. Well might Thomas Gray lament that ‘the king soon lost all the castles and towns in Scotland which he had had strengthened, through a lack of good government in his pursuit of conquest’.126 Rogers claims that Scotland could have been subjugated, as Wales and Ireland had been, with ‘money and patience’.127 As the wars with Scotland continued without any sign of resolution, Edward III possessed a diminishing quantity of both. He also faced the problem of how to subjugate Scotland. Conquest of the kingdom was a chimera, something that had eluded even the most concerted efforts of Edward I. Subjugation of southern Scotland, while the remainder of the kingdom was ruled by a subservient Balliol, had been a possibility. But by late 1336 even this hope must have seemed remote as Balliol had proved unable to reinforce his rule throughout the kingdom, and even repeated English invasions and renewed expenditure on fortifications had failed to successfully secure southern Scotland. In any case, Edward’s attentions were soon diverted elsewhere. It was at precisely this time that the growing antagonisms between the English king and Philip VI of France reached breaking point.128 War between England and France was looming and it was the Scots who would become the principal beneficiaries. Winning the Battle for Hearts and Minds (1337–40) The year 1337 witnessed a large-scale Bruce Scottish attack on English- and Balliol-held castles, following on from Murray’s successes in the previous year. After the destruction of Kinclaven Castle (Kinross) in February, several Scalacronica (King), 123. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 87. 128 J. Le Patourel, ‘The Origins of the War’, in The Hundred Years War, ed. K. Fowler (London, 1971), 28–50; M. Vale, ‘England, France and the Origins of the Hundred Years War’, in England and her Neighbours, 1066–1453: Essays in honour of Pierre Chaplais, ed. M. Jones and M. Vale (London, 1989), 199–216; G. Templeman, ‘Edward III and the Beginnings of the Hundred Years War’, TRHS, 5th series, 2 (1952), 69–88. 126 127



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castles in Fife were besieged and slighted including St Andrews, Falkland and Leuchars.129 Cupar Castle was also besieged but proved stronger than the others, its defence led by Edward Balliol’s chancellor, William Bullock.130 Rural parts of Fife were devastated at this time and local people were captured and held to ransom.131 As the Balliol/English position in Fife was systematically undermined, Perth came under increasing danger of encirclement by Andrew Murray and his forces. Edward III was sufficiently alarmed about the town’s vulnerability to issue orders on 22 February 1337 for a relief force to be collected from the English north, led by Henry Percy and Ralph Neville, to relieve the town.132 Meanwhile, the Bruce Scots turned their attention south and captured the newly repaired castle of Bothwell, where Edward III had overseen repairs less than six months previously.133 The Bruce commanders led further forays into southwest Scotland which punished the Galwegians for their continued support of the Balliol cause.134 Stirling Castle was besieged around April 1337. Edward III only succeeded in riding to its rescue with a force of household troops and northern levies around June.135 The success of the Bruce Scottish campaigns, especially of the continued attacks on Galloway, is reflected to some degree by the defection of Eustace Maxwell to the Bruce cause during summer 1337, an action that provoked English retaliation.136 Maxwell’s changes in allegiance, and

Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353–4; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), 436; Chron. Bower, vii, 125–7. 130 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), 436; Chron. Bower, vii, 125–7. 131 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), 436; Chron. Bower, vii, 125–7. 132 Rot. Scot., i, 483. It is unclear whether this force proceeded north. The first recorded payment for troops campaigning in Scotland in 1337 only occurs from around 7 May and this relates to the forces of Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, gathered for the summer campaign of 1337 (BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 245; Rot. Scot., i, 487–8). 133 The Lanercost chronicler writes that the Scots attacked Bothwell knowing that Edward III was holding a parliament in England and that Robert Ufford, warden of the castle, was absent at the time of the attack (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 300–1; see also Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 354; Chron. Bower, vii, 125–7; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 313). 134 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 300–1. 135 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 354; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 437–8; Chron. Bower, vii, 131, 232–3; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 303; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 10; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 313; CDS, iii, nos. 1235, 1236, 1237; BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 261–261v; Candy, ‘Scottish Wars of Edward III’, 120. Edward III was at Callender by 8 June when he rewarded Richard Midhope and 44 sociis suis for guarding and escorting 284 bullocks and cows from Tweeddale and Selkirk to the king for his army (BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 284). 136 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 303–5. Caerlaverock Castle was granted to Ranulph Dacre, lord of Gilsland, who invaded Maxwell’s territory, ravaging his lands and driving off cattle. 129

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other similar defections, were probably short-term and born of desperation.137 Nonetheless, they point to a growing perception that the Bruce Scots were in the ascendant. This interpretation was not altered by the major English invasion of the year which was finally launched in late summer. Thomas Beauchamp, earl of Warwick, was placed in charge of English forces in Scotland in March 1337.138 He appears to have done little to obstruct the victorious march of the Bruce Scots against the increasingly isolated English garrisons outwith the ceded border counties. This was partly because of the limited forces at his disposal.139 When he did finally invade Scotland in September his army was reportedly defeated by the weather. The Lanercost chronicler wrote that rain swelled the rivers and denied the English army easy progress through much of southern Scotland.140 Warwick and his troops were forced to restrict their offensive raid to Teviotdale, Moffatdale, Nithsdale and Galloway, areas of mixed allegiance that were ostensibly under English control.141 Warwick’s failure to penetrate further than the English zone of occupation in southern Scotland may indeed have been a result of weather conditions. He may equally have planned to do little else than mount a punitive raid to remind southern Scots where their allegiance should lie. The lateness of the campaign, the lack of any military activity before this point, and the inadequate resources at Warwick’s disposal suggest that the incursion was mounted with limited objectives, and with little enthusiasm.142 In response to Warwick’s raid, a Bruce Scottish counterattack across the English border quickly followed.143 These troops entered Northumberland a matter of days after the withdrawal of Warwick’s army and marched through Coquetdale and Redesdale. They burned and ravaged Maxwell had returned to the Balliol/English allegiance by August 1339, when he was admitted into Edward III’s peace, along with Duncan MacDowell and Michael McGhie (Rot. Scot., i, 571). 138 Rot. Scot., i, 486–7, 488. 139 The size of Warwick’s army is reflected in the sums of money spent on soldiers’ wages. The wardrobe accounted for £3,458 14s 7d in wages to men-at-arms, in comparison to £9,379 17s in 1336 and £15,629 8s 9d in 1335 (BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 239v, 244, 247). Similarly the wages spent on the mounted archers and infantry were vastly reduced from previous years. Wages paid in 1337 amounted to £3,664 7s 9d, down on the £5,654 4s 4d paid in 1336 and substantially less than the £9,752 18s 10d expended in 1335 (BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 258v, 260, 263v). 140 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 305–6. 141 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 305–6. 142 King argues that the northern English nobility were less inclined to participate in campaigns into Scotland than in border defence, and that this was particularly so when the king himself was not present (King, ‘A Good Chance for the Scots’, 148–9). 143 There had already been a foray into northern England in response to the attack on Eustace Maxwell’s lands in August 1337, the Scots crossing the border and ‘marching towards the east, [where] they burnt about twenty villages, taking prisoners and an immense number of cattle’ (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 304–5). 137



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the countryside, but retreated after meeting resistance from forces raised by Gilbert Umfraville, lord of Redesdale.144 A further raid in the middle of October 1337 threatened Carlisle, with damage perpetrated against the town’s suburbs and the bishop’s manor at Rose. The Scottish army then passed south through Allerdale, making a detour to Copeland to seize cattle before returning to Scotland.145 Edinburgh Castle was besieged by the Bruce Scots at the beginning of November. A relief force was gathered in Cumberland, Westmorland and Northumberland to rescue the garrison.146 The English forces may have skirmished with the besieging Bruce Scots to the southeast of Edinburgh, and it was apparently at this time that ‘the total destruction of Lothian, both by the Scots and by the English’ occurred.147 Before the end of 1337, English preparations for the siege of Dunbar had already begun with troops ordered to gather at Newcastle by 1 December.148 Edward III made an appearance at Berwick in January 1338, possibly to oversee preparations for the Dunbar siege, but his stay was brief and the coming campaign was entrusted to his commanders, the earls of Salisbury and Arundel.149 The siege of Dunbar Castle began in January 1338. This fortification was targeted reportedly ‘because it was irksome and oppressive to the whole district of Lothian’.150 Earl Patrick of March utilised his principal castle and the seat of his earldom as the base from which to defy the English occupation in the south. The English sheriff of Berwickshire, Robert Tughale, recorded in his account for 1336–7 that no proceeds could be collected from the earl’s forfeited lands, in part because the earl and his ‘complices’ continued

Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 306–7. The Lanercost chronicler suggests that the people of Coquetdale and Redesdale had received prior warning of the Bruce Scottish raid, and ‘removed their cattle to distant parts’. 145 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 307–8; see also Briggs, ‘Cumberland Lay Subsidies’, 651–6. 146 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 262v; Reg. John Kirkby, i, no. 423; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 308; Scalacronica (King), 125. 147 Chron. Bower, vii, 131; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 438; Scalacronica (King), 125. Gray writes that the Scots lifted the siege and marched east to Clerkington, near Haddington, the English being at Crichton. The two sides met at ‘Chrictondene’ where there was ‘a fierce encounter between them, many being slain on both sides, but the English lost most’. The Bruce Scots then threatened to invade England, but the English blocked their entry and after two days of deadlock the Scots retreated. 148 Rot. Scot., i, 498–9, 501–4, 506–9. 149 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 449; Chron. Bower, vii, 139; Chron. Murimuth, 81; CDS, iii, nos. 1254, 1255, 1256. 150 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 311–12. The same chronicler wrote for the preceding year that the occupants of Dunbar Castle extracted one mark a week from ‘the whole of the surrounding district of Lothian, although it was then in the king of England’s peace’ (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 304). 144

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to hold some of the lands in question.151 Dunbar also lay on a possible invasion route from England into Scotland along the east-coast plains, and was an inconvenient obstruction to both invading English forces and the smooth operation of the English administration in southern Scotland.152 The prominence of the siege is reflected in the names of those who took part. Salisbury and Arundel were joined by the earl of Gloucester as well as the border lords Percy, Neville and Stafford, though following his brief visit over the winter Edward III took little further part in the operation.153 Instead the king concentrated on building a network of alliances with continental princes to assist him in the forthcoming war with Philip VI.154 The growing probability of continental war may also have been a distraction for the besiegers at Dunbar. In April 1338 letters were sent to Gilbert Umfraville, Anthony Lucy and Ranulph Dacre to ensure that they remained with the earl of Arundel in Scotland and did not leave with the task still incomplete.155 The absence of Edward III from the siege, and the knowledge that an army was being assembled for a continental expedition, only increased the possibility of English troops abandoning the siege as it dragged on towards June.156 Bruce Scottish forces remained in action elsewhere in Scotland while the English army was camped at Dunbar. William Douglas captured John Stirling, keeper of Edinburgh Castle, and a number of his garrison at ‘Crags of Craigie’, possibly near Bathgate.157 Returning to Edinburgh, Douglas paraded his prisoners before the castle walls and demanded the immediate surrender of the remaining garrison in return for his captives’ lives. In spite of this threat, the garrison refused to submit and, his ruse a failure, Douglas withdrew from the town. Reinforcements were despatched from the Dunbar siege to assist the remaining Edinburgh garrison. Maurice Berkley and Thomas Bradeston replaced the captured John Stirling.158 Elsewhere, CDS, iii, p. 368. Goodman, ‘Defence of Northumberland’, 164. For the coastal road from Berwick through Lothian, see G.W.S. Barrow, ‘Land Routes: The Medieval Evidence’, in Loads and Roads in Scotland and Beyond: Land Transport over 6000 Years, ed. A. Fenton and G. Stell (Edinburgh, 1984), 49–66, at 53, 56. 153 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 311–12; TNA, E101/20/25; TNA, E101/20/33. 154 On Edward’s continental alliances, see Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, chapter 6. Edward III did make one brief journey north. Thomas Gray reported the king was at Whitekirk, near Dunbar, to ask the advice of his nobles about the forthcoming French war (Scalacronica (King), 125). 155 Rot. Scot., i, 525. The order suggests that the army was beginning to break up. The earl of Salisbury had already left the siege by this point, the earl of Arundel being made sole commander of the army in Scotland on 25 April (Rot. Scot., i, 524). 156 King, ‘A Good Chance for the Scots’, 127–8. 157 Chron. Bower, vii, 139, 236. 158 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 312–13; TNA, E101/20/25, r. 3.

151

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Alexander Ramsay led a raid across the border, possibly in an attempt to lure the besiegers away from Dunbar. When met by a force made up of the local ‘Marchmen’, Ramsay and his troops pretended to flee before turning to defeat their enemy, capturing Robert Manners as a result.159 Perth was also besieged by the Bruce Scots by 18 May, prompting the assembly of another relief force in Northumberland.160 Bruce Scottish successes, strengthened by the apparent impotence of the English army at Dunbar to achieve any military gains, were offset by the death of Andrew Murray. He died in the spring of 1338 possibly of an illness contracted while besieging Edinburgh.161 Even this occurrence did not galvanise the English troops surrounding Dunbar, and the desire to continue the siege was quickly evaporating. Edward III’s departure for the continent was a principal source of such feeling, one English chronicler writing that those left behind in Scotland ‘wished to depart with their lord Edward to face the same dangers he would face, and so they sought discussions with the Scots, to remove the siege of the castle, and agreed a truce for a time’.162 Such truces were invariably of relatively short duration. Edward Balliol returned to Scotland in the aftermath of the Dunbar siege, apparently to strengthen the Perth garrison following the Scottish siege of the town in May.163 English involvement in Scotland for the rest of the year focused on the supply and reinforcement of the remaining Englishheld castles.164 These fortifications were increasingly insecure without the regular assistance of English field armies and this situation seems to have Chron. Bower, vii, 149; Scalacronica (King), 127. The location of the engagement was apparently Pressen (Northumberland) (C.J. Brooke, Safe Sanctuaries: Security and Defence in Anglo-Scottish Border Churches 1290–1690 (Edinburgh, 2000), 66; CP, vi, 484–5). 160 On 18 May the array of troops and ships was ordered in Northumberland. The assembled force seems to have succeeded in its task, as Thomas Ughtred was confirmed as Perth’s guardian by 24 June. More troops were to be sent from Yorkshire to bolster his garrison by an order of 26 July. Orders of 24 June regarding supplies explicitly state that Ughtred’s garrison also contained a number of Scots (Rot. Scot., i, 532–3, 539, 541). 161 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 438–9; Chron. Bower, vii, 137; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 313. 162 Chron. Melsa, ii, 385. See also Scalacronica (King), 127; TNA, E101/20/25, r. 1. 163 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 315. 164 For example, see Rot. Scot., i, 547, 551–6, 558–9, 562. Perth seems to have been singled out for special assistance in these orders, but supplies were likely not getting through. Thomas Ughtred seems to have been forced to go to England himself around October 1338 to gather the ships required to take men and victuals north to the town (Rot. Scot., i, 548–50). Ughtred complained following this incident that goods and victuals had not reached the town and that the conditions of his service had not been met. He therefore asked for a replacement to be found as guardian of the town. The English council sent a desperate reply promising that everything would be resolved if he remained in place, but remedies do not seem to have been forthcoming (CDS, iii, no. 1307). 159

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been only too clear to the Bruce Scots. This appreciation of the weakness of English castle defence in Scotland explains the concerted efforts to recapture Perth and Cupar in June 1339. Although evidence of further action within Scotland in 1338 is limited, there is at least the suggestion of continued unrest. John Warenne, earl of Surrey, sent his clerk, Robert Doget, to his lands in Strathearn on 5 November. Doget’s task was to protect the earl’s possessions there, in response to undefined local disturbances.165 After the death of Andrew Murray, the Guardianship of Scotland changed once more. Robert the Steward, seen as ‘the only … provincial magnate of royal blood who could lead the cause’, took over as Guardian in the autumn of 1338.166 The succession of the Steward was accompanied by a change in Scottish tactics. Direct assaults on northern England, which Murray had championed during 1337 following his successes within Scotland, were curtailed. Instead the Bruce Scots now concentrated on enforcing changes of allegiance within those areas of eastern Scotland still regarded as sympathetic to the Balliol/English cause. Historians have suggested that this change in strategy was related to the weaknesses of the Steward and that he only retained control of the war in areas where he possessed influence or where he sought to advance his personal interests.167 Certainly, the curtailment of attacks on England and the refocusing of Scottish military policy on targets within Scotland can be equated with weakness, especially as this was a period of opportunity for Scottish raiding of northern England due to Edward III’s continued absences on the continent. Nonetheless, this argument overlooks the continued co-operation between Bruce Scottish nobles in the military enterprises undertaken under the Steward’s Guardianship. The Steward undertook the siege of Perth in June 1339 with the earls of Ross and March, and was later joined by William Douglas.168 This seems to have been an unusually large-scale affair involving a siege by both land and sea. Douglas had ‘obtained the services of a certain dangerous French pirate called Hugh “Hampyle” who had with him five barges furnished with a multitude of armed men and weapons’.169 This force guarded the CDS, iii, no. 1289. Penman, David II, 67. 167 Penman, David II, 67–8; see also R. Nicholson, Scotland: The Later Middle Ages (Edinburgh, 1974), 138. 168 News of the Scots gathering a sizeable force seems to have reached the English government by 4 May 1339 when orders were sent to the northern magnates to raise their levies to combat a possible Scottish invasion. A further order of 10 May specifically called for the array of troops from Yorkshire to assist in the defence of Perth (Rot. Scot., i, 564–5). However, this force does not appear to have been sent. Troops were finally arrayed and sent north from Cumberland and Westmorland in late August–September (CDS, iii, no. 1316; CDS, v, nos. 780, 781; CCR, 1339–41, 208). 169 Chron. Bower, vii, 141–3; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 355; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 451–2; ER, i, 507. 165

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Tay estuary to prevent Perth’s inhabitants sending for help and to deny food and supplies reaching the town. In addition, Douglas had recruited French troops to fight with the Bruce Scottish besiegers on land. Miners provided by the earl of Ross ‘constructed tunnels, digging them over long distances, by which means they drew the water out of the moats and left them dried up’.170 With no help forthcoming, Thomas Ughtred and his garrison submitted to the Bruce Scots.171 Cupar had been captured shortly before the fall of Perth. William Bullock, its constable, changed allegiance and assisted the Bruce Scots in the Perth siege.172 Following these successes, Bruce Scottish forces went on to besiege Stirling Castle but quarrels broke out between the nobles involved which led to the departure of the earl of Ross.173 The Bruce Scottish successes seem to have provoked concern in England about a possible invasion from the north. In October 1339 Edward III ordered troops raised to protect both southern Scotland and northern England from attack as the king ‘knew for certainty that the Scots had gathered in one place and planned to attack the castles, towns and lands of the English in Scotland, and following which to attack the realm of England itself ’.174 Invasion scares became more frequent in this period, fuelled by a Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 451–4; Chron. Bower, vii, 141–3. The army raised to relieve Perth came from Cumberland and Westmorland and was led by Edward Balliol, Henry Percy, Thomas Lucy, Richard Talbot, Gilbert Umfraville and Ralph Neville. Having failed in its objective the force of around 1264 men appears to have spent three weeks raiding elsewhere in Scotland (CCR, 1339–41, 208; see also CDS, iii, no. 1316; CDS, v, nos. 780, 781; Nicholson, Scotland, 138). 172 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 451–2; Chron. Bower, vii, 141. Bullock forfeited a house in Berwick and the lands of Hoton (perhaps Roxburghshire) before 28 July 1339 for his change of allegiance (Rot. Scot., i, 571). Penman argues that the fall of Cupar occurred in April 1341, Bullock going on to join William Douglas in capturing Edinburgh Castle (Penman, David II, 73; see also Chron. Bower, vii, 238, n. 27–8; CDS, iii, no. 1321, where Bullock received a prest on his wages as constable of Cupar Castle in December 1339). The confusion may arise from possible changes of allegiance by Bullock throughout the period 1339–42. Ongoing doubts about his loyalty to the Bruce cause eventually led to his downfall. The English seizure of his border territories in July 1339 and the dating of his presentation to the rectory of Douglas as being in the same year all suggest that his capitulation at Cupar should at least be dated to 1339 (Brown, Black Douglases, 193; Morton Reg., ii, no. 41). 173 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 455. The quarrel between the Scottish magnates is described by Penman as part of a growing political rift between Robert the Steward and the earl of Ross over the justiciarship of Scotland north of the Forth, lands in Kintyre and the future of the earldom of Strathearn. Penman suggests that this argument took place at the siege of Perth, contrary to Wyntoun’s chronology, which places the events at Stirling (Penman, David II, 69). The suggestion has also been made that the siege of Stirling was an ongoing enterprise, begun in 1339 and punctuated by periods of local truce, until the eventual fall of the castle in April 1342 (see Chron. Bower, vii, 238–9, n. 18–22; see also 145). 174 Rot. Scot., i, 573–5, 577–8. 170 171

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combination of Scottish success and Edward III’s increasing commitment to campaigning in France. There is very little mention of Scotland in English narrative sources for the year 1340, mainly because of a growing concentration by English chroniclers on continental events. However, documentary evidence suggests at a continuation of concerns shown in the previous year about the escalating Scottish military threat, and about the possibility of invasion. This was especially true when the king was absent. On 18 February 1340 the men of Yorkshire were ordered to array and proceed to Newcastle by 5 March. They were to be led by Edward Balliol and his captains, Henry Percy and Ralph Neville, and were to proceed to the border ‘pro defensione Angliae contra invasiones Scotorum’.175 Towards the end of April Edward III ordered a levy of men from the northern counties and English lands in Scotland to proceed against the Scots.176 Another call for troops followed on 21 June, when it was ordered that men should stand ready to face the Scots, who were planning to invade. All men between the ages of sixteen and sixty were to be arrayed if this was deemed necessary by the commanders in the north.177 Such preparation was justified, as the Scots invaded around 28 June 1340. Led by the earls of March and Sutherland they raided as far south as Bamburgh, but were ambushed and defeated upon their return towards Scotland by a northern English force led by Thomas Gray and Robert Manners. Several Scots were captured and they were dispossessed of their booty.178 Around the same time Alexander Ramsay made an attempt to capture or burn the town of Roxburgh, but the Bruce Scots were beaten off by members of the garrison. Several of Ramsay’s men were captured or killed in the assault.179 Despite these setbacks the Bruce Scots continued attacking English outposts, a task made easier by Edward III’s continued concentration on continental affairs. English control south of the Forth was weakening and the southern garrisons were increasingly difficult to maintain and supply. By August 1340, English supplies arriving at Berwick were despatched to Stirling and Edinburgh by land rather than by sea to Leith, which was apparently unsafe for the landing of victuals.180 Transporting supplies overland was an expensive and potentially time-consuming way of re-supplying English-held Rot. Scot., i, 583–4. Rot. Scot., i, 588–9. 177 Rot. Scot., i, 592–4, 595. 178 Chron. Baker, 69–70; Scalacronica (King), 133–4; CDS, v, no. 809; Rot. Scot., i, 592–5. For the damage done in this raid, see CPR, 1343–45, 409, 410; CCR, 1343–46, 438. For the captured Scots, see Rot. Scot., i, 598. 179 CDS, v, no. 809; see also Chron. Baker, 69–70. 180 Rot. Scot., i, 601–2. Victuals had still been sent to Leith until around 28 April (Rot. Scot., i, 589). 175 176



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castles, as references in English records suggest. For example, in December 1336 victuals were sent from Edinburgh to the garrison at Bothwell. The convoy of seventeen carts would have been a rather obvious target for attack by the Bruce Scots. To counter this threat the convoy included an escort of men-at-arms, but these men and their supply train were dependent on a guide to lead them to Bothwell, who on this occasion was a Scot, William Mare of Linlithgow.181 The English also continued to fear the possibility of Scottish invasions, with Carlisle in particular perceived as being a target. In September 1340, Edward Balliol was ordered to proceed to the town quickly in order to counter the threat from the north.182 Meanwhile, the Bruce Scots once more besieged Stirling Castle. A short truce appears to have been arranged before 20 August and the Bruce Scots withdrew from the castle, but the English anticipated their return around 7 October, presumably when the truce expired.183 In order to defend the castle, orders were issued for the array of men by several leading English nobles including Henry of Lancaster, the earls of Surrey and Hereford, and the bishop of Durham. The border nobility too were expected to send troops to relieve the siege.184 It is doubtful whether this relief force ever left England as, in late September 1340, developments in France led to the agreement of a truce at Espléchin which was effective until June 1341.185 Since the truce incorporated Scotland – Bruce interests being represented at Espléchin by French negotiators – the siege of Stirling was called off in line with the truce terms and the English garrison was allowed to revictual the castle.186 Although agreed during a period of Bruce Scottish success the truce was probably welcomed by the Bruce Scots as it prevented immediate retaliation by the English for recent Bruce Scottish actions. Moreover, collusion between Scottish and French diplomats reminded Edward III once more of the difficulties of detaching the Scottish problem from his French ambitions.187 While Scotland and France remained allies Edward continued to face the likelihood of a two-front attack against his interests at home BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 278. For discussion of the transportation of supplies and other material of war around Scotland for the armies of Edward I, see Barrow, ‘Land Routes’, 52–4. 182 Rot. Scot., i, 632. 183 Rot. Scot., i, 600. 184 Rot. Scot., i, 600–1, 601–2. 185 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 1135; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 359. In June 1340 Edward III won a naval victory at Sluys after which he and his army marched south to besiege Tournai. Active warfare on the continent was, however, brought to a halt by the agreement of the truce of Espléchin (Chron. Murimuth, 115–16; Chron. Baker, 71; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 323; E.B. Fryde, Studies in Medieval Trade and Finance (London, 1983), chapters v and vii; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 324–8, 348–59). 186 Sumption, Trial by Battle, 359; Foedera, ii, p. ii, 1135. 187 Chron. Avesbury, 322–3. For discussion of the merits and flaws of the ‘Auld Alliance’ 181

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or abroad. With his focus apparently directed towards war with France, Edward III would now seek to solve his Scottish problem on the continent by defeating Philip VI and thereby neutralising the Franco-Scottish alliance. The Return of the King: David II and Royal War Leadership (1341–46) The pause in Anglo-Scottish conflict begun by the truce of Espléchin only provided a brief respite from military activity in Scotland. Indeed, in April 1341, before the scheduled end of the truce in June, William Douglas and William Bullock captured Edinburgh Castle by means of a ruse and surprise attack.188 The siege of Stirling Castle was resumed in June following the expiry of the truce. Edward III ordered the array of the men of Cumberland and Westmorland to relieve the castle.189 Bruce Scottish activity was stimulated further by the return from captivity in 1341 of John Randolph, earl of Moray.190 Having met with the Steward, Moray assumed control of the West March and campaigned vigorously within his familial lands of Annandale to win back the area to the Bruce allegiance.191 Henry Percy was awarded various border territories on 23 April 1341 in return for military action which he performed in Annandale and around Lochmaben.192 Moray’s actions may have been a response to Percy’s campaigning, or perhaps Percy was sent to halt Randolph’s encroachment into Annandale. Moray may also have been involved in activity centred on the Isle of Man. By 1342, the Manxmen were complaining to Edward III that they were in an increasingly dangerous situation. The king’s reply includes acknowledgment that local merchants ‘have lately made a fine for three hundred marks with our enemies in Scotland to enjoy a certain sufferance of peace with them, for the period of one year’.193 This agreement had been made with the consent of the English in this period, see MacDougall, Auld Alliance, 30–51; Campbell, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War’, 184–216. 188 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 457–60; Chron. Bower, vii, 145–7; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 356. 189 Rot. Scot., i, 609; Chron. Avesbury, 322–3. 190 For discussion of Randolph’s captivity, see chapter 3 below. See also Penman, David II, 75, 71; Webster, ‘Scotland without a King’, 234; CDS, iii, nos. 1337, 1343, 1349, 1359, 1361, 1364, 1376; Rot. Scot., i, 592, 599, 601, 602–3, 609–10. 191 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 463; Chron. Bower, vii, 149. 192 Percy was awarded the castle of Jedburgh, the lands of Bonjedward and Hassendean, and Jedburgh forest for his activities (Rot. Scot., i, 607). 193 Monumenta de Insula Manniae, ii, tr. and ed. J.R. Oliver (Douglas, 1861), 192–5. The local men planned to pay part of the fine with £106 13s 4d in cash and 40 marks worth of goods. However, the payment did not leave Man. Irish pirates descended on the island, seized the money and the goods, and sailed back to Ireland with their booty and several local men as prisoners.



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lord of Man, William Montague, and Edward III also gave his permission for the Manxmen to ‘treat and agree with our enemies of Scotland, upon truces and suspension of hostilities’.194 This would all suggest that there had been Scottish attacks on the island. Military activity on the island is also to be inferred from the chronicle reference to William Montague ‘conquering’ the island in 1342 when taking up his lordship there.195 John Randolph possessed a claim to the lordship of Man through his father and continued to style himself ‘lord of Man’ throughout the 1340s.196 His presence in southwest Scotland in 1341–2 and his continued claim to lordship over the island suggest that if there was military activity around Man, Randolph was its cause. For the Bruce leaders, military success strengthened their position and assisted in returning much of Scotland to the Bruce allegiance. In these circumstances it was deemed safe enough for David II to return from exile in France. He landed in Scotland at Inverbervie (Kincardine) on 2 June 1341.197 After settling back into his kingdom the Scottish king may have visited the ongoing siege at Stirling in July.198 An English force meanwhile appears to have marched north to relieve the town.199 English concerns over potential Scottish action in the wake of David II’s return are clear from the end of July 1341, when Edward Balliol was appointed commander of English forces in the north.200 The Scots appear to have raided northern England around August, entering Northumberland through Hexhamshire and travelling as far as the Tyne.201 An increased English military presence along the border through September may have been a response to this Scottish raid, but it also appears to have been part of a troop build-up in preparation for Edward III’s winter stay.202 The English king spent Christmas around Rot. Scot., i, 633; Monumenta de Insula Manniae, ii, 196–7; T. Thornton, ‘Scotland and the Isle of Man, c.1400–1625: Noble Power and Royal Presumption in the Northern Irish Sea Province’, SHR, 77 (1998), 1–30, at 5–6. 195 Chron. Baker, 75; see also Thornton, ‘Scotland and the Isle of Man’, 5. 196 RRS, vi, 84, 87, 88, 108–9, 277–8, 397–8; J.M. Thomson, ‘A Roll of the Scottish Parliament, 1344’, SHR, 9 (1912), 235–40. 197 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 356; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 466; Chron. Bower, vii, 151; Penman, David II, 77–8. 198 Penman, David II, 78–80; RRS, vi, no. 32. 199 Chron. Melsa, iii, 49; CPR, 1340–43, 382, which details payment to Henry Percy for having gone to relieve Stirling and then having taken up border defensive duties until the arrival of the earl of Derby. 200 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 1171; Rot. Scot., i, 610; CCR, 1341–43, 267. 201 Chron. Melsa, iii, 49; Chron. Bower, vii, 243, n. 22–25; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 324; Chron. Murimuth, 122–3. It may also have been on this raid that the Scottish force came into conflict with Henry Percy at ‘Farniley’, possibly Fairley (Co. Durham) (Chron. Melsa, iii, 49). 202 Rot. Scot., i, 610–11, 615, 616–18, 619; Foedera, ii, p. ii, 1175, 1179, 1181, 1183. 194

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Melrose but achieved little and soon headed south ‘half in a melancoly with them that movid hym to that yornay’.203 Edward III may have sought to lure his enemies into battle during this campaign. Instead, the English encampment became the focus for a series of knightly combats in the form of jousts of war involving such figures as William Douglas, Henry of Derby and Alexander Ramsay.204 In the wake of Edward III’s return south and the withdrawal of Derby’s army to Berwick, David II launched another raid across the border in the early part of 1342.205 Soon after, negotiations were begun between the two sides for a truce or even a peace treaty and a high-powered Scottish delegation was assembled to travel to England to discuss terms.206 In spite of these discussions the Scots continued to attack remaining areas of English/Balliol power within Scotland. Alexander Ramsay recaptured the important border castle of Roxburgh at the end of March 1342, his forces mounting a surprise attack utilising scaling ladders to climb over the walls.207 In April Stirling Castle also fell. Thomas Rokeby, the castle’s guardian, finally submitted to the Bruce Scots after a long siege, with English relief unforthcoming.208 Duncan MacDowell also appears to have been besieged on Hestan Island in April 1342.209 The truce negotiations, apparently ongoing throughout these periods of military activity, eventually ended in agreement for a short cessation of hostilities to last until 19 May.210 This temporary cessation of the conflict coincided, however, with political violence in Scotland. 203 Scalacronica

(King), 134; King, ‘A Good Chance for the Scots’, 134–8. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 440–6; Chron. Bower, vii, 137–9; Scalacronica (King), 134. 205 Penman, David II, 85–6; K. Fowler, The King’s Lieutenant: Henry of Grosmont, First Duke of Lancaster, 1310–1361 (London, 1969), 10; R. Lomas, County of Conflict: Northumberland from Conquest to Civil War (East Linton, 1996), 47. Thomas Gray dates this raid to around Candlemas (2 February 1342), in the wake of Edward III’s withdrawal (Scalacronica (King), 134). A raid launched in the immediate aftermath of an English withdrawal was a regular Scottish tactic, and a date of late January or early February seems appropriate. This dating of the raid also ties in with what is known of David II’s movements at this time. He was at Edinburgh in January 1342 with several leading military figures, including the earls of March and Moray, Robert the Steward and Maurice Murray, but had departed for Aberdeen by 14 February (RRS, vi, nos. 41–4). 206 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 1189, 1191; Rot. Scot., i, 621–4. 207 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 356; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 466–7; Chron. Bower, vii, 151. 208 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 456; Chron. Bower, vii, 145, 238–9, n. 18–22. The final date of service recorded in Rokeby’s accounts is 10 April, at which point his garrison consisted of around fifty troops and ten watchmen (TNA, E101/23/1, fol. 5). 209 Rot. Scot., i, 625–6. 210 Chron. Murimuth, 122–3. A letter of 29 April to Edward III from several notable Scots requested confirmation from the English king of a supposed Anglo-French truce that, it was believed, had been signed and in which the Scots had been included. The 204 Chron.



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David II rewarded Alexander Ramsay for his capture of Roxburgh Castle by appointing him constable of the castle and sheriff of Teviotdale, offices desired by William Douglas of Liddesdale. Douglas ambushed Ramsay and imprisoned him in Hermitage Castle, where he was apparently abandoned and starved to death.211 Bower records this tale of Scottish in-fighting as part of a moral allegory that looked back on Ramsay’s death as a turning point after which the war progressed unsuccessfully for the Bruce Scots.212 Looking back, knowing that David II would ultimately fail at Neville’s Cross, Bower could utilise the death of Ramsay as a portent of worse to come. And Ramsay’s death did cause unrest among the Bruce Scots. As late as June 1344 parliament agreed to the appointment of several nobles to oversee the followers of both Douglas and Ramsay and ensure that both parties ceased their feud.213 David II adopted Ramsay’s military cadre, and these men may have been involved in a further Scottish raid on Northumberland during the summer of 1342. In keeping with Bower’s negative portrayal of events this campaign apparently ‘did not cause much damage’.214 On the English side of the border Edward Balliol continued to serve as captain of English defensive forces. In this capacity he was able to array men from the counties north of the Trent to serve in his army.215 Yet, with Edward III increasingly absorbed in continental affairs and David II becoming more involved in the practicalities of keeping the peace among his own nobility at home, Anglo-Scottish military activity appears to have lessened after the summer. This relative tranquillity was formalised during Anglo-French negotiations in January 1343. Edward III’s forces had invaded Brittany in October 1342, but a difficult winter campaign had been brought to an end after request was for confirmation of when and where the truce was to begin and ‘whether it is to stand firm or not’ (CDS, iii, no. 1386). 211 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 357; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 468–9; Chron. Bower, vii, 153–7; Brown, Black Douglases, 42. 212 ‘And just as from the day of the battle of Culblean until the death of this Alexander everything at every stage of the war was carried to a successful end, so when he had been murdered exactly the opposite happened, and all campaigns undertaken for the benefit of the kingdom straight away took an unfortunate turn’ (Chron. Bower, vii, 155; see also Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 357–8; Penman, David II, 428–33; Nicholson, ‘David II, the Historians and the Chroniclers’, 75–8; Mapstone, ‘Bower and Kingship’, 321–38; Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 23–43). 213 Thomson, ‘A Roll of the Scottish Parliament’, 240; see also Chron. Bower, vii, 155. 214 Chron. Bower, vii, 151–3; see also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 467–70. This raid is easily confused with that of February because the chronicle accounts conflate the details of the two forays. It seems that on either the summer raid or that conducted in February several newly created Scottish knights were captured when Robert Ogle ambushed the Scots. The Scottish knights were named as Alexander Stewart, Hugh Eglinton, John Craigie, Thomas Boyd and Adam Fullarton (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 467–70; Chron. Bower, vii, 151–3; Knighton’s Chronicle, 37; Chron. Melsa, iii, 49; Penman, David II, 92). 215 Rot. Scot., i, 630–1.

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papal nuncios arrived at the English siege of Vannes with requests for the English and French to discuss a negotiated settlement.216 It was envisaged that the resulting truce of Malestroit would last for three years. English narrative accounts of the settlement are condemnatory, the Lanercost chronicler claiming that it was ‘rather a betrayal than a settlement’.217 Once again the king of Scots was included in the truce along with other allies of the warring parties. David II was to send messengers to the papal court to agree to the terms laid out. The truce was to be kept on land and sea and proclamations of its contents were to be made in Scotland within forty days.218 Actual cessation of fighting took somewhat longer than the truce envisaged. The Bruce Scots appear to have made an attempt in August to recapture Lochmaben Castle. The evidence is limited, but it would seem that a relief force led by William Bohun was already proceeding north when it received word that the Scots would allow the revictualling of the castle without interference.219 It would then seem that negotiations of some sort took place where acceptance of the terms of the truce of Malestroit was agreed.220 And yet English concern over the security of Lochmaben continued, and orders of 20 September 1343 for arraying men in Lancashire and Yorkshire stated that the men were required to protect the castle.221 The Scottish attempt on Lochmaben may have been a continuation of John Randolph’s campaigning in Annandale. As such it suggests that the Bruce Scots were willing to abide by the truce in relation to forays into England but that the recovery of parts of Scotland still under English control would continue as long as it did not provoke a large-scale English response. Chronicle evidence relating to border events in 1344 is sparse, although this does not necessarily imply peaceful observation of the truce by both sides. The existence of the three-year truce did not halt a growing English fear about events north of the border. Very obviously, the English crown did not trust the Scots to keep the peace. On 22 May 1344 orders were issued for the array of men from Cumberland, Westmorland, Northumberland, Yorkshire, Lancashire and Derbyshire in readiness for war. In explanation Edward III indicated that the Scots planned to break the truce, to which the Chron. Murimuth, 128–9; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 407. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 324; Chron. Murimuth, 130–2; Chron. Avesbury, 349–51; Chron. Angliae, 12; see also Sumption, Trial by Battle, 408. 218 Chron. Avesbury, 349–51; Chron. Murimuth, 130. 219 A.A.M. Duncan, ‘A Siege of Lochmaben Castle in 1343’, TDGNHAS, 3rd series, 31 (1952–3), 74–7; Chron. Angliae, 14; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 18; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 325. Merchants were ordered to send supplies to Lochmaben in June, and by 15 August the keepers of the truce were ordered to raise the men of Cumberland and Westmorland to proceed against the Scots if they should lay siege to the castle. Similar orders of 20 August suggest fear of an imminent Scottish invasion (Rot. Scot., i, 639–40). 220 Rot. Scot., i, 640; Penman, David II, 91. 221 Rot. Scot., i, 641. 216 217



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 45

English were adhering, and invade northern England.222 In July Aymer of Atholl was ordered to array the men of Tynedale in anticipation of a Scottish attack,223 and a further large-scale assembly was ordered in September 1344.224 These frequent and costly arrays of men from the northern counties may have increased tensions between northern England and the central government, as well as inadvertently stimulating local fear of attack.225 The situation on the border during 1344 remained, however, peaceful and by the end of the year the men of the earl of Northampton serving in Annandale were given permission to enjoy holidays and festivals at Carlisle ‘as was the custom in times of peace’.226 The frequent arrays of troops meant that English field forces, unconnected to the permanent military presence in northern English garrisons, were an almost constant presence on the Anglo-Scottish frontier. These forces were primarily defensive in nature, employed to face the threat of Scottish raids into northern England. They could also be utilised offensively, if required, such as when they were sent to attack Hestan Island Castle and to capture Duncan MacDowell because of his adoption of the Bruce allegiance around this time. MacDowell’s defection occurred despite his recent and lengthy receipt of English pay and supplies, notably in 1342 when the Bruce Scots besieged his castle.227 A further array of English troops was ordered on 28 August 1345. The intelligence received by the king stating that the Scots planned to invade proved, on this occasion at least, to be correct.228 By October 1345 the people of Northumberland, Cumberland, Westmorland and Yorkshire were ordered to take their animals south for safety.229 The

222 Rot.

Scot., i, 648–9. Orders were also issued for repairs to the walls and gates of Berwick in preparation for a possible invasion (Rot. Scot., i, 649–50). 223 Rot. Scot., i, 651. 224 The size of army envisaged from the September array was of around 7,800 men (Rot. Scot., i, 651–5, 657, 659, 635, 647). 225 The need for negotiations between the crown and the leaders of the army arrayed in August 1344 regarding the payment of troops suggests that problems arose from the almost constant calls for armed service (Rot. Scot., i, 651, 652). 226 Rot. Scot., i, 658. 227 Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 19 (for the attack on Hestan); Rot. Scot., i, 625, 626, 629, 634–5 (for supplies sent to MacDowell); R.C. Reid, ‘Edward de Balliol’, TDGNHAS, 3rd series, 35 (1956–7), 38–63, at 52–9; Webster, ‘English Occupations of Dumfriesshire’, 69–75; Oram, ‘Bruce, Balliol and Galloway’, 43–7; C.A. Ralegh Radford, ‘Balliol’s Manor House on Hestan Island’, TDGNHAS, 3rd series, 35 (1958 for 1956–7), 33–7, at 35–6. 228 The Scottish attack should have been unsurprising to Edward III, who had himself nullified the truce of Malestroit by attacking Philip VI during the summer of 1345 (Penman, David II, 117–18; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 407, 453–4). 229 CCR, 1343–46, 660–1.

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Scots duly attacked, William Douglas leading a raid into Cumberland on 3 October.230 A second raid, led by David II, John Randolph and William Douglas, was launched into Cumberland and Westmorland on 24 October, the ‘great army’ ravaging the countryside around Carlisle and Penrith for six days before returning to Scotland.231 English forces were ordered on 4 November to make ready for a retaliatory raid.232 Following a council held in London in October, Edward III returned to the border once more ‘ad roborandum marchiam Scociae contra Scotos’.233 Although the English king did not remain long in the region, his border nobles mounted a raid into Dumfriesshire in December ‘in revenge for the deeds they had endured’.234 The Bruce Scots had been quick to attack but were also quick to negotiate when the English responded in kind. Discussions for a truce were begun at the end of the same month, probably not long after the English incursion into Dumfriesshire.235 Bruce Scottish campaigning began again in the early months of 1346 with another raid into England directed against the castle of Liddel. On this occasion William Douglas and the earl of Moray led the Bruce Scottish force, but dissension is said to have broken out among the Bruce commanders and the siege was aborted.236 Another Bruce Scottish raiding party may have travelled as far south as Greystoke (Cumberland) in June 1346.237 Edward III embarked on the campaign that led to the battle of Crécy in July, and his departure acted as a catalyst for further Scottish raiding of northern England. The English king appears to have anticipated a Scottish army invading as soon as he left for France, and he therefore ordered the March Wardens to raise as large a force as they could muster to intercept enemy

230 CIM,

1307–49, no. 2051. CIM, 1307–49, nos. 1974, 2051; CCR, 1346–49, 22, 30; Historia Anglicana, 266–7; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 326; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 19; Penman, David II, 119; Hewitt, Organisation of War, 127–30; Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, i, 273; Briggs, ‘Cumberland Lay Subsidies’, 665–8. 232 The orders of 4 November specifically state that the Scots had raided England and that the force was being prepared to launch a counter-attack across the border (Rot. Scot., i, 665–6). 233 Chron. Murimuth, 189. 234 Chron. Murimuth, 190; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 326. 235 Rot. Scot., i, 667. 236 Chron. Murimuth, 202; Penman, David II, 122. English preparations to resist invasion were begun on 8 March with a general order to summon the men of the north in response to intelligence of the Scots massing on the border with a large army (Rot. Scot., i, 669–70). A similar order was given on 4 April ordering the men already there to remain to face an imminent Scottish threat (Rot. Scot., i, 672). 237 BL, Cotton Caligula A XIII, fol. 14v; see also Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, i, 272. 231



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 47

forces.238 These forces were, however, insufficient to deter David II from leading a large raid through Cumberland in July.239 English border forces seem to have been incapable of dealing with the escalating military activity on the border. Continuing apprehension is evident in orders of 22 August to send spies into Scotland in an attempt to discover the whereabouts of the Scottish commanders and the extent of their plans.240 Successful operations in the preceding months, as well as the knowledge that Edward III and a large proportion of his fighting men were in France, appear to have given the Bruce Scots sufficient confidence to launch a full-scale invasion of northern England in October 1346. An army was gathered from the length and breadth of the kingdom. Muster points at Perth and Peebles were the bases for the gathering of forces from both north and south of the Forth, and the army included contingents from the Highlands and the Isles.241 This massive effort appears to have provided David II with a Scottish invasion army of a size and scale unseen in England since the invasion of David I over two hundred years before.242 The Bruce Scottish army marched first to the border castle of Liddel which was captured after a siege of several days.243 It then marched east but did not inflict damage in Cumberland, which seems to have purchased a truce.244 The army then proceeded through Northumberland and then

238 Rot.

Scot., i, 672–3. Lanercost (Maxwell), 326; Scalacronica (King), 136. Orders of 20 August for troops to be sent to the border specified that the Scots had recently raided the north and planned to do so for a second time (Rot. Scot., i, 673–4). A number of settlements in Cumberland were exempted from collection of the tenth and fifteenth in 1348 due to the destruction carried out during the July raid (CCR, 1346–49, 448–9). 240 Rot. Scot., i, 674. Orders of 12 September mention recent invasions and discuss the need to gain information on Bruce Scottish troop movements from those Scots in English allegiance as there was fear of further attacks (Rot. Scot., i, 674). 241 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 471–2; Chron. Bower, vii, 253; Rot. Scot., i, 672; Grant, ‘Disaster at Neville’s Cross’, 22–3. 242 For the army of David I that invaded northern England in 1138, and was defeated at the battle of the Standard, see R. Toolis, ‘“Naked and Unarmoured”: A Reassessment of the Role of the Galwegians at the Battle of the Standard’, TDGNHAS, 78 (2004), 79–92, at 79–80; M. Strickland, ‘Securing the North: Invasion and the Strategy of Defence in Twelfth-Century Anglo-Scottish Warfare’, Anglo-Norman Studies XII: Proceedings of the Battle Conference, 1989 (1990), 177–98, at 191–4; R. Oram, David I: The King Who Made Scotland (Stroud, 2004), 134–40. 243 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 330–2; Scalacronica (King), 136–7; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 24; Chron. Avesbury, 376; Chron. Melsa, ii, 61; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 472–3; Chron. Bower, vii, 253. 244 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 332; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 24. 239 Chron.

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south into County Durham.245 The Scots, reportedly expecting to find the land empty of fighting men, planned to ravage large areas of northern England untouched by war for over twenty years.246 One English chronicler portrayed David II naively planning a march on London.247 Instead the Scots were met at Neville’s Cross, outside Durham, by an army composed of local county levies. The English troops soundly defeated the invaders. David II was taken prisoner and much of the Bruce Scottish nobility was either killed or captured.248 The defeat reversed the Bruce Scottish successes achieved since 1335 and opened the way for English reclamation of southern Scotland. Neville’s Cross also afforded Edward Balliol yet another chance to press his claims to sovereignty over Scotland. These factors, added to the scale of defeat at Neville’s Cross, have cast a long shadow over the success of the Bruce Scottish war effort in the preceding years.249 However, the negative portrayal of Scottish warfare caused by the Neville’s Cross defeat largely ignores the reality that Scottish raiding of northern England had resumed in force, with multiple raids, focused on different locations, and with practical financial gains achieved. It also fails to consider the gains made in southern Scotland, at times during periods of truce, that brought large territorial areas back to the Bruce allegiance, recovered important strongholds and did not provoke any large-scale English response. As has been demonstrated, far from being a period of half-hearted military endeavour and insubstantial Scottish raiding, the years before Neville’s Cross were a time of Bruce Scottish military ascendancy. The large size of the Bruce Scottish army at Neville’s Cross, the duration of the incursion and the geographical extent of the invasion all suggest burgeoning Scottish confidence. In both contemporary and recent commentary on the battle this has been portrayed negatively as baseless 245 Chron. Wyntoun

(Laing), ii, 472–3; Chron. Bower, vii, 257; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 332–4; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 24–5; Chron. Melsa, ii, 60–1; Chron. Avesbury, 376; Scalacronica (King), 136–7; Knighton’s Chronicle, 67–9; Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 56–8; DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 179–82; R. White, ‘The Battle of Neville’s Cross’, Archaeologia Aeliana, new series, 1 (1857), 271–303, at 273–8. 246 For discussion of the Scottish aims of this raid, see Grant, ‘Disaster at Neville’s Cross’, 17–23. 247 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 334. 248 For the battle itself, see Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 337–41; Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61; Chron. Angliae, 23–4; Chron. Murimuth, 218–19; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27–8; Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 61–6; DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 183–7; M. Prestwich, ‘The English at the Battle of Neville’s Cross’, in Rollason and Prestwich, Battle of Neville’s Cross (Stamford, 1998), 1–14, at 11–14; Grant, ‘Disaster at Neville’s Cross’, 25–33. For a list of those Scots killed and captured in the battle, see Penman, David II, 136. 249 For negative historiographical portrayals of the Scottish war effort in this period, see for example, Penman, Scottish Civil War, 129, 131; Brown, Black Douglases, 149; DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 177–8; Tuck, ‘War and Society’, 39.



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 49

over-­confidence.250 Considering the Bruce Scottish military activity of the preceding years, it was not. Confidence was instead built around a successful period of campaigning during which the Bruce Scots had recovered most of southern Scotland. Having achieved this, the next step involved active incursions into England, demonstrating to both Edward III and his subjects that the Bruce Scots were once more in a position to terrorise northern England whenever the conditions allowed. This phase, from the late 1330s until just before the Neville’s Cross invasion, involved a return to the strategy and tactics of Robert I’s era. Admittedly, Edward III was a far superior politician and general than his father had been, but his attentions were by now focussed on the continent. His policy of border truces and frontier defence forces led by the northern English nobility did little to combat localised Scottish raiding. English troops may have intercepted groups of Bruce Scottish raiders upon their return north, at times chasing the invaders back across the border, but they were unable to stem the number of raids that crossed the frontier. As the war progressed, Bruce Scottish forays became more frequent and more extensive. A corresponding increase in Edward III’s interest in and expenditure on northern English border defence did not follow. The difficulties faced by northern English commanders are well illustrated by orders of 12 September 1346 stating that those men who had deserted the garrison of Berwick were to be imprisoned.251 Immediately before a large-scale Bruce Scottish invasion, England’s most prized Scottish possession struggled to retain its garrison. In spite of these difficulties, Edward III still foresaw the possibility of a successful end to the AngloScottish conflict. The difference was that he now envisaged this victory being won in France. On 15 September 1346, following his victory at Crécy, Edward III wrote of his hope that his defeat of their ally would persuade the Bruce Scots to agree to peace.252 Three weeks later, the largest Scottish army assembled in decades would cross the border while Edward concerned himself with matters in France. The Neville’s Cross invasion represented the peak of Scottish confidence, involving a massive invasion force that was intended to foray over a large area of northern England for a prolonged period. These were no longer the tactics of Robert I; this invasion was something very different. The eventual failure of the Scots outside Durham was a shattering blow to Scottish confidence, but it occurred only after a much longer period of success.

250 For

historical treatment of the Scottish defeat at Neville’s Cross by chroniclers and early Scottish historians, see Nicholson, ‘David II, the Historians and the Chroniclers’, 62–3, 75–6; see also Penman, David II, 131–5. For a corrective view, see Grant, ‘Disaster at Neville’s Cross’, 17–21. 251 Rot. Scot., i, 674–5. 252 Rot. Scot., i, 674.

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Casting a Long Shadow: Recovery after Neville’s Cross (1346–57) The English victory at Neville’s Cross presented Edward III with sufficient breathing space to gain the upper hand in France without having to concern himself with Scotland for the time being. Immediately after the battle, English border commanders took possession of several important strongholds, including Hermitage and Roxburgh.253 It appears that much of the contested borderland again reverted to English allegiance at this time.254 Edward III was hopeful of finally bringing the war with Scotland to a conclusion and it was to this end that he summoned the northern magnates to a council at Westminster in December ‘de consummatione belli Scotiae tractaturi’.255 At this meeting it seems to have been decided to press the military advantage in Scotland. An invasion was launched on 13 May 1347.256 This large army was led by Edward Balliol and included a substantial proportion of the northern English nobility.257 The army marched through Lothian, burning the countryside, emphasising the change in political power, before passing westwards to Glasgow and on into Cunningham and Nithsdale.258 The army then appears to have fragmented, some English troops returning south after 10 June, while Balliol and his remaining forces entered Galloway and based themselves at Hestan.259 Balliol ceased to receive English pay on 25 August but he may have remained at Hestan, accompanied until 7 September by

Roxburgh Castle was surrendered to the English by Eustace of Lorraine. His capitulation ensured the release of his son, captured at Neville’s Cross, from English captivity. Edward III paid a ransom of £40 to Robert Bertram to secure his release (Rot. Scot., i, 685, 686). 254 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 358; Chron. Bower, vii, 269; Scalacronica (King), 137; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 342. 255 Rot. Scot., i, 679. 256 TNA, E101/25/10; CDS, iii, no 1479; CCR, 1346–49, 250. Troops for Balliol’s army were to be arrayed from as early as 23 January. By 20 March John Wodehouse had drawn up a schedule of payments for those men about to set off for Scotland with Balliol (Rot. Scot., i, 682–3, 691–2). Wage payment was, however, problematic and Edward III was forced to allow money raised for the knighting of his son to be spent on the wages of those guarding the border and serving in Scotland (Rot. Scot., i, 693, 695). 257 Northern English nobles who took part in the campaign included Gilbert Umfraville, Henry Percy, Ralph Neville, Thomas Lucy, Thomas Rokeby, John Stirling, Robert Bertram and Alexander Mowbray, while William Dacre and Walter Creyk were also represented (TNA, E101/25/10). 258 Chron. Bower, vii, 271; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 28–9; TNA, E101/25/10; Penman, David II, 147; Reid, ‘Edward de Balliol’, 45; Oram, ‘Bruce, Balliol and Galloway’, 45–6; Webster, ‘English Occupation of Dumfriesshire’, 74–5. 259 TNA, E101/25/10. Balliol arrived at Hestan on 12 June. His troops were joined by thirty carpenters and other builders and workmen who were sent by sea across the Solway to Hestan, presumably to strengthen the island peel. 253



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 51

Thomas Lucy, John Stirling and Alexander Mowbray.260 A second English invasion, which lasted for two weeks, followed on 8 October. It is possible that this foray involved a two-pronged assault on southern Scotland with forces crossing both the East and West Marches.261 The English forces had returned south of the border once more by 21 October.262 On the continent, the fall of Calais in August 1347 led to another AngloFrench truce, agreed in September, in which the Scots were included. This agreement was intended to last until 7 July 1348. It included the proviso that if the Scots did not agree with the truce, or indeed broke it at any stage, the Anglo-French truce would remain intact.263 The English raid of October could have been a cynical attempt to provoke the Scots into action, but it is more likely that news of the truce arrived too late to stop the incursion. In any case it seems unlikely that the Scots at this juncture had any desire to engage the English militarily and, with the French defeated, cessation of conflict was the sensible option. Truce with the Scots left Edward Balliol an increasingly remote and powerless individual, clinging to whatever local influence he retained in southwest Scotland.264 His position as king of Scotland, far from being enhanced by the capture of David II, was actually weakened by Edward III’s negotiations for David’s release and, through these discussions, the English king’s tacit recognition of Bruce kingship.265 Without a large English army to back up his claims, Balliol’s military support remained inadequate. He was unable to enforce his rule through military might. The ineffectiveness of Balliol, even in the border counties, is demonstrated by renewed Bruce Scottish attempts, in spite of the truce, to win back border territories to the Bruce allegiance. With a large number of Scottish nobles captured or killed at Neville’s Cross, responsibility for leading acts of resistance fell to lesser landholders who refused to submit to

260 TNA,

E101/25/10. Thomas Pickworth was despatched to London around this time with letters from Balliol, Percy and Neville, in which the prospect of Duncan MacDowell’s release to assist Balliol appears to have been raised or reiterated (TNA, E101/25/10; Rot. Scot., i, 703). Herbert Maxwell, recognising the change in the local political situation, entered English peace between 20 August and 5 September. By the latter date he had been recognised as an ‘Anglicatos’ and was given control of Caerlaverock Castle for the English (Rot. Scot., i, 704). 261 TNA, E101/25/10. Almost 700 archers were despatched to the East March for service from 8 to 21 October and almost 600 archers were sent to the West March for the same period of time. Wages for those serving in Scotland were despatched to both Roxburgh and Carlisle (TNA, E101/25/10). 262 TNA, E101/25/10. 263 Chron. Avesbury, 402–6; Rot. Scot., i, 713, 716; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 585. 264 Balliol’s remaining grants were issued either from Hestan Island or from Buittle Castle (CDS, iii, no. 1578; Beam, ‘Balliol Dynasty’, 439–40). 265 Penman, David II, 147; Reid, ‘Edward de Balliol’, 45–7; Duncan, ‘David II and Edward III’, 114, 127–32.

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Balliol and the English. In Galloway, amidst this ‘crisis of local lordship’, men such as John Kennedy and Alan Stewart emerged to lead the Bruce cause in the months immediately following the battle.266 Balliol himself may have been in danger of encirclement on his island castle of Hestan, as an urgent English order of 1 May 1348 to provide victuals for his use makes clear.267 Balliol’s position was assisted little by the return to Scotland of William lord of Douglas, the future earl, from France in 1347. Almost immediately, Douglas began scourging the border counties.268 With Balliol an isolated figure at Hestan, men like Douglas concentrated on areas of Scotland still under English control. He was said to have brought Douglasdale, Ettrick Forest and Teviotdale back into the Bruce allegiance.269 Bower states that Douglas was ‘extremely fond of war; and when he particularly wanted peace and to preserve his boundaries from interference, he forcefully provoked a fight’.270 Douglas was the pre-eminent border warrior at this time, using violence to force changes in local men’s allegiance to ensure loyalty to David II, and to himself. Like his fellow Bruce commanders in the area, he was a man with a vested interest in successfully prosecuting the war in southern Scotland. Nonetheless, overall strategy remained in the hands of the Steward who utilised the war with England and the Franco-Scottish alliance to his own benefit when his position was threatened by the possible return from captivity of David II.271 Continuing warfare in southern Scotland remained a piecemeal affair. This was in part because the war had become more localised, concentrated on the southern Scottish counties and fought by local men. This small-scale strategy allowed Bruce Scottish recovery while 266 Brown,

‘Scottish Border Lordship’, 17; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 477–8; Chron. Bower, vii, 269; Penman, David II, 174. Oram suggests that the attacks of Stewart and Kennedy in Galloway occurred in the months before Neville’s Cross, while Edward Balliol resided on Burned Isle on Loch Ken (Oram, ‘Bruce, Balliol and Galloway’, 45), but Wyntoun’s chronology places the raids after Neville’s Cross (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 477). If they had taken place before the battle, the attacks would more likely have been led by prominent Bruce military leaders, such as John Randolph or Malcolm Fleming, earl of Wigtown. 267 Rot. Scot., i, 715. 268 Brown, Black Douglases, 43–4. 269 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 480–1; Chron. Bower, vii, 271; see also Brown, ‘Scottish Border Lordship’, 18–19; Brown, Black Douglases, 44–5, 48; Penman, David II, 149. Scottish chronicle accounts may have overestimated the accomplishments of Douglas in southern Scotland. An English military presence remained in the areas he reportedly brought back to Bruce allegiance in the garrisons at Jedburgh and Roxburgh. And English possession of Teviotdale continued throughout the 1360s and beyond (A.J. Macdonald, Border Bloodshed: Scotland and England at War, 1369–1403 (East Linton, 2000), 13–14). 270 Chron. Bower, vii, 269–271. 271 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 8–10.



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 53

avoiding English counter-attacks against flagrant violations of the truce, such as that which would occur in 1356. This localised violence proceeded even while negotiations continued throughout 1347 and 1348 for both peace and the release of David II. By 4 July 1348 the Anglo-Scottish truce was extended, and it was renewed again by 8 August.272 Chronicle evidence of Scottish military activity between 1349 and 1355 is sparse, chroniclers concentrating instead on the renewed hostilities between England and France. In fact some action did take place, with the Bruce Scots apparently utilising the truce to push back gradually the encroachment of English administration in southern Scotland and to recover territories lost following Neville’s Cross. Around June 1349, the mayor and burgesses of Berwick considered themselves to be in such danger that they sought assistance from Edward III. According to the Berwick administration, ‘the Scots are greatly cheered because of the pestilence [the Black Death]; they daily do all the injuries they can by land and sea, and capture victuals coming to the town from England. They have made ladders and other engines to come to the town, to try if they can [to] take it.’273 Elsewhere, William Bohun’s lands in Annandale were raided in 1352 by John, son of Robert the Steward.274 Galloway may also have been attacked and on 13 November the Galwegians received the protection of Edward III.275 In spite of the English king’s protection, the Bruce Scots probably devastated the area once again around summer 1353. This latter raid apparently led to Duncan MacDowell deserting English allegiance for the last time.276 As a consequence the English sheriff of Roxburgh was ordered to seize his lands and goods.277 Despite the apparent ease with which the Scots were able to undertake brief spells of military activity in order to chip away at the English hold over southern Scotland, they continued negotiations with the English for extensions of the truce among wider discussions for the release of David II.278 Continental truce discussions also continued, with the French again 272 Rot.

Scot., i, 718, 721. v, no. 810. 274 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 488; Chron. Bower, vii, 297. Penman suggests that David II may have seen this move as an attempt to encroach upon Bruce familial lands in the area rather than an attempt to win them back to the Scottish allegiance (Penman, David II, 175–6). John Stewart’s actions may have been an attempt to ensure that Annandale remained under royal control, the lands having supposedly reverted to the crown upon the death of John Randolph. The competing claim of Earl Patrick of March to the Randolph inheritance may have prompted the Guardian to take action in this prominent border lordship (see Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 51–2, 67). 275 Rot. Scot., i, 754. 276 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 487; Chron. Bower, vii, 297. 277 Rot. Scot., i, 761; Foedera, iii, p. i, 376. 278 For the long series of negotiations throughout this period, see Duncan, ‘David II and Edward III’, 113–41; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 148–53. 273 CDS,

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representing Scottish interests when an Anglo-French truce was agreed at Guînes in March 1353.279 The truce was not particularly effective, or indeed popular at either the English or French courts, and had been repudiated by the French as early as May. French and English ambassadors met once more in July and announced an extension of the Guînes truce until November 1353, but this again did little to cease the violence in an increasingly disordered France.280 The existence of an official truce, in spite of its deficiencies in the continental theatre, provided the Scots with protection from large-scale English attack. As on the continent, though, outbreaks of violence did occur and on the Anglo-Scottish frontier both sides recognised the need for negotiations at a local level as a means of resolving periodic episodes of localised violence.281 For example, powers were granted in April 1353 to the English March Wardens (Thomas Lucy, Thomas Musgrave and Ralph Neville) to negotiate truces with the Scots whenever the opportunity arose.282 Meanwhile, Anglo-French negotiations continued and the truce of Guînes was officially extended once more around December 1353, to last until April 1354.283 Despite the relative lull in Anglo-Scottish conflict at this time Scotland itself was subject to further episodes of internal strife. The conflicting territorial desires of William Douglas of Liddesdale and William, lord of Douglas, culminated in the murder of the former in Ettrick Forest in August 1353. Liddesdale’s allegedly treasonable negotiations with the English provided an ostensible motive after the act, but the reality was that the territorial and political ambitions of the two men could not co-exist.284 Having achieved pre-eminence through the removal of his rival, William, lord of Douglas, apparently continued the recovery of southern Scotland in David II’s name.285

279 Sumption,

Trial by Fire, 122–3; M. Jones, ‘Relations with France, 1337–1399’, in England and her Neighbours, 1066–1453: Essays in honour of Pierre Chaplais, ed. M. Jones and M. Vale (London, 1989), 239–58, at 246–8. 280 Sumption, Trial by Fire, 115–23. 281 For discussion of English organisation of border negotiations, see C.J. Neville, Violence, Custom and Law: The Anglo-Scottish Borderlands in the Later Middle Ages (Edinburgh, 1998), 27–45; C.J. Neville, ‘Keeping the Peace on the Northern Marches in the Later Middle Ages’, EHR, 109 (1994), 1–25, at 6–9. 282 Rot. Scot., i, 758. 283 Penman, David II, 176–7; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 122–3. The Scots, despite occasional outbreaks of violence, seem to have accepted these agreements as a means of ensuring that any conflict remained small-scale in nature. By not provoking Edward III into undertaking large-scale military action in Scotland, Bruce commanders could prosecute local warfare against the remaining English administration without fear of major repercussions. 284 CDS, iii, no. 1562; Rot. Scot., i, 761; Brown, Black Douglases, 45–6; Penman, David II, 177. 285 Penman, David II, 180–1; Brown, Black Douglases, 46–9.



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 55

Douglas’s military activity may have aroused English fears of a Scottish invasion, and in October 1353 Edward III ordered the array of all northern men between the ages of sixteen and sixty to oppose any hostile forces.286 An invasion of northern England did not materialise but Douglas and others continued their activities in southern Scotland. The English response was minimal. The English crown seems to have been content keeping northern England prepared for war and entrusting the security of the border to the northern magnates.287 The Anglo-French truce, encompassing the Scots, was extended once more on 1 April 1354, this time for a year. Edward III once more ordered Thomas Lucy and Thomas Musgrave to ensure that the truce was observed.288 In this way large-scale conflict was avoided and northern England was protected. Southern Scotland was, however, increasingly abandoned by the English crown, its fate dependent on the actions and negotiations of the English March Wardens and local commanders. With the truce agreed the previous year due to expire on 1 April 1355, Edward III once more feared the invasion of northern England by Bruce Scottish forces. From February, troops were arrayed in the northern counties. Additional forces were summoned from Roxburghshire and Berwickshire, suggesting that in these sheriffdoms at least the English administration retained sufficient authority and control to array armed men from occupied southern Scotland.289 In his summonses Edward III stressed that the army should become active if it was certain that the Scots had invaded. In order to gain better knowledge of Scottish intentions and troop movements, spies were despatched to Scotland.290 The king’s actions at this time were not simply consequential to the imminent termination of the truce. Word had reached him that French troops had been despatched to aid the Scots in a summer campaign. Continued summonses of troops in June and July 1355 stated that an attack on northern England was expected by ‘multitudine Gallicorum et alienigenarum ac toto excercitum Scotorum’.291 Edward III’s planned departure for the continent in July as part of a two-pronged attack on France from north and south only strengthened the belief that an invasion was imminent, timed to coincide with his own absence.292 Eugene Garencières and a contingent of French troops had arrived in Scotland in April with promises of sizeable financial reward if the Scots could be

286 Rot.

Scot., i, 762. March 1354, Edward III ordered the sheriff of Carlisle to arrest any Scottish spies found in Cumberland (Foedera, iii, p. i, 273). 288 Rot. Scot., i, 766. 289 Rot. Scot., i, 775–6; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 153. 290 Rot. Scot., i, 776. 291 Rot. Scot., i, 780. 292 Rot. Scot., i, 777–80; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 162, 168. 287 In

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persuaded to ‘breke their trews with the king of England, and make werre apon hym’.293 Despite their arrival in the spring, active Franco-Scottish military operations did not begin until October 1355. The Scots seem to have awaited delivery of French financial reward before committing themselves.294 An Anglo-Scottish truce was reportedly negotiated at the end of September, allowing some English border nobles to proceed south with their retinues to support their king abroad.295 Edward III was understandably concerned by this development and believed that the Scots planned to break the truce as soon as he set sail for the continent.296 The English king’s concerns proved justified. Taking advantage of the absence of English border commanders, William Douglas, Earl Patrick of March, William Ramsay of Dalhousie and Eugene Garencières led an attack in October 1355. The Franco-Scottish forces rode through the border counties and harried the area around Norham. A local force led by Thomas Gray chased some of the invaders back across the border but was ambushed and defeated at Nisbet (Roxburghshire).297 It was either following this engagement or perhaps on its advance south that the Franco-Scottish force apparently captured Nisbet Castle.298 293 Scalacronica

(King), 139; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 484; Chron. Bower, vii, 279; Penman, David II, 182; Campbell, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War’, 199–200; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 152–3, 162. 294 Sumption, Trial by Fire, 170. 295 Robert of Avesbury noted that a truce, requested by the Scots and agreed on 29 September, was to last until 24 June 1356. Under the impression that this had secured the safety of the border, the bishop of Durham, Henry Percy, Ralph Neville, William, baron Greystoke, and others proceeded south with contingents for the English armies gathering at Sandwich (Chron. Avesbury, 427). Evidence of at least Greystoke’s departure south is provided by a pardon of February 1358, excusing him for having left Berwick, following which the Scots captured the town. The pardon states that ‘William left the town to be with (the king) in person in the voyage, and for no other cause, and likewise in all that voyage rode in (the king’s) company’ (CPR, 1358–61, 18; see also Rot. Parl., iii, 11–12). 296 Rot. Scot., i, 782. Thomas Gray’s description of events does not include mention of a general truce, the Northumbrian knight noting instead that a truce was agreed between Henry Percy and Ralph Neville, on the one hand, and William Douglas on the other, which was designed to guarantee Douglas’s recent gains in English-occupied southern Scotland. Gray’s account states that Earl Patrick of March refused to abide by this truce, which was in any case presumably of local nature, and he raided England with Garencières (Scalacronica (King), 140–1). 297 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 361–2; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 485–7; Chron. Bower, vii, 279–81; Scalacronica (King), 140–1; Rot. Scot., i, 782; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 169–70; Penman, David II, 183; Campbell, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War’, 200. 298 TNA, SC8/175/8708. Adam Bourne of Thorndale petitioned Edward III for assistance in paying his ransom having been captured by the Scots ‘en le temps de le trew’. He had previously been awarded £20 worth of land in Roxburgh, all of which was apparently ‘destruyes per ger’, and so Bourne petitioned instead for a grant of the vill



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 57

Their confidence boosted, the Bruce Scots now sought to capture a more valuable prize – Berwick. Thomas Stewart, earl of Angus, led a nighttime attack on the town, his troops scaling the town walls and overrunning the settlement. The Bruce Scots then settled down to besiege the English garrison within Berwick Castle.299 Bruce Scottish shipping was utilised in the siege, both to blockade the castle from receiving supplies and to mount seaborne attacks against the castle walls.300 Edward III could no longer ignore the Bruce threat and returned home from the continent.301 Orders were issued for a large army to assemble at Newcastle at some point after 20 October and Edward III joined his forces there around Christmas 1355.302 An advance guard under Walter Mauny was despatched to besiege the Bruce Scots within Berwick.303 The arrival of Edward III with his full army on 13 January 1356 apparently persuaded the Bruce Scots to negotiate, and they were allowed to leave with their lives.304 The English army then moved on to Roxburgh where Edward Balliol met Edward III. There Balliol resigned his claims to kingship over Scotland into the English king’s hands.305 Edward III, now apparently acting as king of Scotland, then took his army and punished much of the Scottish lowlands in the raid known as the ‘Burnt Candlemas’, long remembered for its destructiveness.306 The lands of the earl of March were ravaged, as was much of Lothian, including Haddington and Edinburgh. Unable to advance on Perth through lack of supplies, English supply ships having been sunk by a storm off North Berwick, the English returned south, shadowed by the forces of William Douglas.307 of Hadden (Roxburghshire). This had belonged to ‘la traytour’ Bernard of Hadden, who had apparently handed over Nisbet Castle to the Scots and had therefore been forfeited. 299 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 484; Chron. Bower, vii, 281–3; Chron. Avesbury, 431; Scalacronica (King), 141; Brut, 306; Knighton’s Chronicle, 137. 300 Rot. Scot., i, 782–3. Edward III ordered ships to be made ready, manned and sent to Holy Island, from where they were to attack the Scottish ships besieging Berwick. 301 Chron. Avesbury, 432; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 33–4; Historia Anglicana, 33–4; Knighton’s Chronicle, 137; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 362; Chron. Bower, vii, 287. 302 Rot. Scot., i, 782; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 171. See also Rot. Scot., i, 783–5. 303 Chron. Avesbury, 450–1. 304 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 363; Chron. Bower, vii, 287. Avesbury gives a full account of the siege and suggests that the Scottish capitulation was caused by miners brought to the siege by Walter Mauny, who cut off supplies of fresh water and undermined the town walls (Chron. Avesbury, 450–1; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 335; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 187–8; Penman, David II, 183). 305 Foedera, iii, p. i, 317–21; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 363; Scalacronica (King), 141; Chron. Avesbury, 453; Rot. Scot., i, 787; Penman, David II, 184. 306 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 363–5; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 485; Chron. Bower, vii, 291; Chron. Avesbury, 454–6; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 34; Knighton’s Chronicle, 139. 307 Chron. Bower, vii, 291; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 335–40; Penman, David II, 184; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 188–9; Campbell, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War’, 200. Knighton described the Scots as ‘always on either side, and behind them,

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Rogers argues that, through campaigns such as the ‘Burnt Candlemas’, Edward III ‘succeeded in teaching his enemies the unwisdom of attacking his lands even if he were absent, for what he could not immediately defend, he could at least avenge’.308 But recourse to such methods did not win Edward the war. The Bruce Scots may have been convinced that raiding England or threatening Berwick, Edward’s prized northern possession, was unsafe, but once again the English king failed to follow up his success. The ‘Burnt Candlemas’ did little to dissuade the Bruce Scots from continuing their attacks against English possessions elsewhere in southern Scotland. Bruce Scottish counter-attacks were launched as soon as the English retreated south. William Douglas raided Galloway once more to force the surrender of any remaining Balliol/English adherents.309 The capture of the castles of Dalswinton and Caerlaverock by Roger Kirkpatrick may also have occurred around this time, along with the return of Nithsdale to the Scottish allegiance. A further attempt may also have been made to capture Lochmaben.310 Douglas then appears to have crossed the border into Northumberland and at night attacked Robert Herle and his household at the English knight’s manor. Herle managed to escape, but several Englishmen were captured ‘naked in their beds’.311 Nonetheless, negotiations for a truce were begun once more around March 1356 and an agreement was reached by 4 June when the English appointed guardians of the ‘novarum induciarum’.312 Still, English concerns about the Scots continued and Edward III ordered the northern magnates to remain vigilant and arrayed in strength on the border as the truce neared

taking and slaying those who left the army to forage … and the rest, who tried to make their way to England, were taken in the forest of Ettrick by Sir William Douglas’ (Knighton’s Chronicle, 137–9; see also Chron. Bower, vii, 291; Chron. Avesbury, 454–6; Penman, David II, 184; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 189). 308 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 340. 309 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 487; Chron. Bower, vii, 297; Penman, David II, 185; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 189–90; Reid, ‘Edward de Balliol’, 58. 310 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 487; Chron. Bower, vii, 297; Rot. Scot., i, 793; Penman, David II, 185; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 190; Oram, ‘Bruce, Balliol and Galloway’, 46. Richard Thirlwall, custodian of Lochmaben for William Bohun, was given licence on 18 July 1356 to recruit more men for the safe custody of the castle (Rot. Scot., i, 795–6). 311 Chron. Avesbury, 456; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 340. Avesbury writes that, in the aftermath of Edward III’s withdrawal from Scotland, the king established defensive forces to remain in the north to guard the frontier, the West March being guarded by the earl of Northampton with a force 500 men-at-arms and 1,000 archers, while the bishop of Durham, Henry Percy and Ralph Neville guarded the East March (Chron. Avesbury, 454–6). Herle and his men may have been involved in these defensive duties, having already been part of the king’s invasion force. 312 Rot. Scot., i, 791, 794. A separate truce had been made between William Douglas and William Bohun by 18 April 1356 (CDS, iii, no. 1607; Penman, David II, 185).



anglo-scottish relations, 1332–1357 59

its completion in November 1356.313 The catalyst for meaningful peace negotiations between the warring kingdoms was provided, however, by the English victory at Poitiers in September 1356.314 This major defeat of a royal French army, coupled with the capture of the French king, brought France once more to the negotiating table. Scotland’s ally had been, to all intents and purposes, removed temporarily from the conflict. England once more attained a military and diplomatic dominance in international relations with Edward III holding both David II and John II as his prisoners. Without French assistance and support the Bruce Scots too were forced to negotiate with the English. In December 1356 they began discussions with the English regarding the release of their king. These were finally concluded in May 1357, and David II was freed to return to his kingdom in October.315 The peace treaty agreed between the two parties was observed for the rest of David’s reign. Instead of war with England, the Scottish king concentrated on defeating the regal aspirations of his cousin, Robert the Steward, and on securing a Bruce heir to the throne.316 By keeping the peace on the border, and at least negotiating the payment of his ransom, David II ensured that this stage of the Anglo-Scottish conflict had ended.

Rot. Scot., i, 797–8. Sumption, Trial by Fire, 291–2; Penman, David II, 185–6; Campbell, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War’, 200. 315 Penman, David II, 185–9; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 291–2. 316 Duncan, ‘David II and Edward III’, 134–8; Penman, ‘Scots at Neville’s Cross’, 171–2; Nicholson, ‘David II, the Historians and the Chroniclers’, 65–9. 313 314

2

The Organisation of War The richness of English sources has enabled scholars to explore English military organisation in great detail.1 Historians of Scottish military history are less fortunate. Administrative records relating to the organisation of war in fourteenth-century Scotland are practically non-existent, and this lack of evidence makes the discussion of Scottish military affairs difficult. Still, it remains a subject worthy of attention if Scottish military behaviour is to be properly understood. The means by which Scottish armies were assembled, the form these forces took, the types of soldier recruited, and the means by which they made war, are all relevant subjects of study. Likewise an understanding of warriors’ reasons for fighting, their suitability for that purpose and their abilities in combat, provide the basis upon which further discussion of chivalric behaviour and conduct can be built. Scottish Military Organisation The system by which Scottish armies were summoned to fight has been the subject of considerable analysis, although the absence of summonses, musters and pay rolls makes it a difficult area of study. Nonetheless, it seems clear that Scottish armies from at least the reign of David I onwards were summoned according to two distinct forms of service.2 The first was performed as an obligation defined by charters, and determined when individuals were awarded territories by the crown. This service is most easily described as ‘feudal’. The system concerned the elite of the Scottish army, the well-armed and mounted knights and men-at-arms. In Scotland this See for example, A. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses (Woodbridge, 1999); Cornell, ‘English Garrisons’; Hewitt, Organization of War; N.B. Lewis, ‘The Organisation of Indentured Retinues in Fourteenth-Century England’, TRHS, 4th series, 27 (1945), 29–39; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots; Prince, ‘Payment of Wages’; Prince, ‘Strength of English Armies’; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp. 2 G.W.S. Barrow, The Anglo-Norman Era in Scottish History (Oxford, 1980), 161–8; F.J. Watson, Under the Hammer: Edward I and Scotland (East Linton, 1998), 23–5; G.W.S. Barrow, ‘The Army of Alexander III’s Scotland’, in Scotland in the Reign of Alexander III, ed. N.H. Reid (Edinburgh, 1990), 132–47, at 133; Strickland, ‘Kings of Scots at War’, 96–8, 108–111; Prestwich, ‘Wars of Independence’, 58. 1



the organisation of war 61

only amounted to a small core of troops but they remained of importance on campaigns as well as for garrison duty.3 The second form of military summons was based upon those who performed military service in response to a muster of the ‘army of Scotland’. Originating before the ‘feudalisation’ of Scotland, and continuing as a means of service for those below knightly status, a summons of the ‘exercitus Scoticanus’ involved the array, in theory, of all men aged between sixteen and sixty who might serve for up to forty days.4 This force provided the bulk of the infantry for large Scottish armies involved in either external warfare or, more usually, to face invasion or internal unrest. The infantry possessed only basic equipment and received little training but they provided sheer weight of numbers to reinforce the smaller, better armed contingents.5 Barrow suggests that these differences in the manner of service produced a divide within the Scottish army, creating ‘in effect two armies’ which existed side by side;6 but there are issues with this terminology. When combined, as they would have been in cases of national emergency or for pitched battles, these two groups would have formed one army. It would have been made up of two very different types of soldier, certainly, but it remained one Scottish army.7 Perhaps in recognition of this, Barrow goes on to argue that, by the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Scottish army had become ‘a truly national force diversified by its weaponry and military skill rather than by its method of recruitment’.8 This development, Barrow argues, came about as a result of changes introduced by Robert I during the First War of Independence. Barrow’s argument for change in the nature of Scottish forces after 1306 is based on Robert I’s use of alternative forms of feudal service, written

Barrow, Anglo-Norman Era, 121–2; Strickland, ‘Kings of Scots at War’, 96–8. See also K.J. Stringer, ‘Kingship, Conflict and State-Making in the Reign of Alexander II: The War of 1215–17 and Its Context’, in The Reign of Alexander II, 1214–49, ed. R.D. Oram (Leiden, 2005), 99–156, at 122. Stringer describes the knightly feudal element of the Scottish army as ‘a small officer class’ that was joined on campaign by the much larger forces of the ‘common army’ (ibid., 122). 4 Barrow, Anglo-Norman Era, 161–6; Barrow, ‘Army of Alexander III’, 133; Strickland, ‘Kings of Scots at War’, 108–11; Prestwich, ‘Wars of Independence’, 138–40; A. Grant, ‘Service and Tenure in Late Medieval Scotland, 1314–1475’, in Concepts and Patterns of Service in the Later Middle Ages, ed. A. Curry and E. Matthew (Woodbridge, 2000), 145–79, at 150–1; A. Grant, ‘Aspects of National Consciousness in Medieval Scotland’, in Nations, Nationalism and Patriotism in the European Past, ed. C. Bjorn, A. Grant and K.J. Stringer (Copenhagen, 1994), 68–95, at 88–90; RRS, v, 52–4. 5 Barrow, ‘Army of Alexander III’, 133–4; Strickland, ‘Kings of Scots at War’, 111–14; Watson, Under the Hammer, 24–5. 6 Barrow, ‘Army of Alexander III’, 133; Barrow, Anglo-Norman Era, 166. 7 Strickland, ‘Kings of Scots at War’, 120. 8 Barrow, ‘Army of Alexander III’, 133–4. 3

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into his charters to complement knight service.9 Increasingly, charters of Robert I’s reign stipulated service of men-at-arms, spearmen and archers, while on the western seaboard Robert I preferred to utilise galley service as a feudal render.10 Alternative forms of feudal service were not a new development, and had already been common on the fringes of the kingdom in the thirteenth century.11 The forces that these forms of service produced in practice are not, however, readily apparent. It cannot be assumed that a man who undertook to serve with one knight did just that. And in spite of Robert I’s apparent changes to the military service demanded from his vassals, knight service continued as a requirement in the charters of David II.12 A prominent example related to new earldom of Wigtown, created for Malcolm Fleming in November 1341, for the service of five knights.13 Other examples are contained in a series of royal grants in 1369–70 which conferred territories on men within David II’s immediate military circle.14 William Cunningham was granted the lands of Kinclaven (Perthshire) for the service of one knight, as well as for the ‘forinsec service’ (service in the army of Scotland) due from those lands.15 Walter Leslie received the thanage of Aberchirder (Banff) for the service of one knight, while the thanages of Kincardine, Fettercairn and Aberluthnot (Mar) were erected into one barony, also for Leslie, for two knights’ service.16 All three of these men were close to the king and were rewarded with lands from which they would receive an income. The inclusion of knight service in their confirmation charters possibly did little more than reiterate a military bond between the king and his warrior elites. In this case, the number of knights required in the charters is, therefore, more likely to represent the size and importance of the territories involved than the actual number of men expected. Indeed, men of the rank of those discussed here would likely have taken most of their military retinue with them on campaign, and the adoption of large military retinues could have been a deliberate demonstration to his fellow warriors of a knight’s wealth and status.17 Duncan, ‘War of the Scots’, 145; G.W.S. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland, third edition (Edinburgh, 1988), 287. 10 Barrow, Anglo-Norman Era, 138–9; Barrow, Robert Bruce, 289; R. Andrew McDonald, The Kingdom of the Isles: Scotland’s Western Seaboard, c.1100–c.1336 (East Linton, 1997), 144; Penman, David II, 29; D.C. McWhannell, ‘The Galleys of Argyll’, The Mariner’s Mirror, 88 (2002), 14–32, at 15, 26–7. 11 Duncan, ‘War of the Scots’, 145; Barrow, Anglo-Norman Era, 139–41; Barrow, Robert Bruce, 287. 12 Barrow Robert Bruce, 287–9. 13 RRS, vi, 85–6; Penman, David II, 82–3. 14 Penman, David II, 383, 400. 15 RRS, vi, 462. 16 RMS, i, nos. 338–9. 17 For the growth in retinue size as a symbol of prestige and wealth, and associated 9



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Further evidence that ‘feudal’ demands for martial service bore little relevance to the number of men expected from military tenants is provided by the use of fractional knight service. In March 1332, for example, William Irvine was granted the lands of Whiteriggs and Redmyre (Kincardineshire) to be held for a tenth of one knight’s service and ‘Scottish service’.18 Fractional knight service had existed in Scotland since the thirteenth century.19 The extent to which such fractions resulted in actual provision of men for the battlefield is difficult to quantify as there is no set definition of what fractional fees actually entailed.20 They may have been an alternative means of defining the service of a less well-armed man, or simply the recognition of a financial contribution to the army rather than an indication of physical service.21 It has been argued that this second option is less likely since the English system of scutage, payment of a form of taxation in lieu of military service, never became established in Scotland.22 It is also possible that fractional service may reflect tenants providing financial contributions towards their lord’s feudal obligation, or the division of formerly whole knights’ fees between co-heiresses and descendants.23 Some other ‘feudal’ contributions did not provide military service at all, and instead returned a render in the form of supplies for the king’s army. Evidence for this practice survives for Lennox. A charter of the earl of Lennox from the reign of Robert I, confirmed by David II in 1342, stipulated the feudal return for the land of Luss (Dumbartonshire) to be two cheeses from every cheese-making house on the estate for the supply of the king’s army. This long-standing provision continued into the 1360s.24 David II’s charters also included use of ‘alternative service’. For example, in March 1331 Thomas Charteris was granted half the land of Kinfauns (Perthshire) for the service of two archers and in September 1341 Ingram Ardler was granted the lands of Baldowrie (Fife) for the service of one archer.25 These demands, like the stipulations requiring the service of knights or fractions of knights, likely bore little relation to the problems, see D. Crouch, Tournament (London, 2005), 46–9; see also Lewis, ‘Organisation of Indentured Retinues’, 32. 18 RRS, vi, 59–60. 19 Barrow, Anglo-Norman Era, 133. 20 See RRS, v, 51–2. 21 G.W.S. Barrow, The Kingdom of the Scots: Government, Church and Society from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth Century, second edition (Edinburgh, 2003), 267. For further examples of knight service see RRS, vi, 338–9, 357–8, 431. 22 Barrow, Anglo-Norman Era, 133–4; H.L. MacQueen, Common Law and Feudal Society in Medieval Scotland (Edinburgh, 1993), 21. 23 Barrow, Anglo–Norman Era, 134. 24 RRS, vi, 96–7; Barrow, Kingdom of the Scots, 273; Neville, Native Lordship, 57, 68, 75, 93, 129. 25 RRS, vi, 56–7 (Kinfauns); RRS, vi, 82–3 (Baldowrie); see also RRS, vi, 299–300, 437–8, 472–3, 521–2.

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reality of how many men served. Military service and the number of men who served at any given time more likely depended on the individual, and the number of warriors he could attract to his banner. The army of Scotland represented the mass of men who fought under an obligation dating back to pre-feudal Scotland to serve their king in time of greatest need.26 Representative of the kingdom as a whole, this force consisted, in theory, of all men between the ages of sixteen and sixty who were deemed able to fight. They were liable to serve in the army of Scotland for forty days each year for offensive warfare and perhaps for an unlimited period when an army was summoned to repel an invasion.27 There is no evidence to suggest that the common army received payment.28 Paid service may have been more likely in times of internal unrest when money, or the prospect of loot, could be offered as an enticement to fight.29 In 1363 David II raised an army to combat the insurrection of the Steward and the earls of Douglas and March.30 According to Fordun’s source, the king ‘mustered his lieges from the four corners of his land, offering them much money for their pay’.31 Garrison troops also appear to have been paid, either in money or in victuals. In 1361, John Danielston received two hundred marks a year for the keeping of Dumbarton Castle, although this had been reduced to one

Barrow, Kingdom of the Scots, 36, 273; Barrow, Anglo-Norman Era, 161–2; Grant, ‘Aspects of National Consciousness’, 88–9; W.D.H. Sellar, ‘Celtic Law and Scots Law: Survival and Integration’, Scottish Studies, 1–27, at 16–18. 27 It has been suggested that this system of recruiting the army had changed little by the sixteenth century, and has led to the description of the Scottish army at Flodden as being ‘medieval’ (J.D. Mackie (ed), ‘The English Army at Flodden’, Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, 8 (Edinburgh, 1951), 35–85, at 42–4; see also J. Goodare, State and Society in Early Modern Scotland (Oxford, 1999), 133–6). 28 Pay was available, however, to those who entered English or French service. For examples of Scots in English service in Calais in 1369–70, see Issue Roll of Thomas de Brantingham, Bishop of Exeter, Lord High Treasurer of England, ed. F. Devon (London, 1835), 83–5. For discussion of rates of pay in such service, see Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 115; D. Grummitt, ‘The Financial Administration of Calais during the Reign of Henry IV, 1399–1413’, EHR, 113 (1998), 277–99, at 285, n. 3. 29 The use of cateran forces in northern Scotland in the later fourteenth century involved the employment of professional Highland mercenaries in return for food, booty seized on raids, and indeed money, by many of the major landholders in the area (S. Boardman, ‘Highland Scots and Anglo-Scottish Warfare, c.1300–1513’, in England and Scotland at War, c.1296–c.1513, ed. A. King and D. Simpkin (Leiden, 2012), 231–53, at 233–4, 243–6; Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 83–8, 180–1). 30 Penman, David II, 288–9. 31 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 370; Chron. Bower, vii, 325. A payment of £618 9s 8d was recorded in the chamberlain’s account of 1364 ‘pro vadiis diversorum, tempore quo dominus noster rex fuit cum potencia apud Edinburgh’, although in comparison to the vast sums spent on the payment of English armies, this appears a rather meagre expenditure (ER, ii, 164). 26



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hundred marks by 1364.32 Archibald Douglas received two hundred marks a year in 1362 for the garrisoning of Stirling Castle.33 In contrast, soldiers in field armies were apparently expected to find their own supplies. When the Guardians arrayed the host in 1286 they ordered that men bring food sufficient for forty days’ service, and in 1296 men summoned from Galloway for the defence of Man were given the same order.34 Parliamentary legislation of 1318 stipulated that those on their way to the host had to pay for goods that they required, and not steal provisions from local people. Scottish lords were also ordered to provide suitable provisions for their own use. If they had to travel a great distance they were ordered to take sufficient money for the purchase of victuals and not travel ‘in the hope of burdening the countryside without making payment’.35 The number of men due from each part of the kingdom was based on the number of inhabitants.36 Orders were sent out by the king or Guardian for ‘all freeholders and other vassals of the king that were able to bear arms’ to gather at a predetermined place.37 The initial assembly points were in the localities, with earls and sheriffs taking the lead in gathering local tenants and freeholders.38 In 1333 the gathering of the army to relieve Berwick was said to have emptied the lands of the church of Fordun (Mearns). Although almost certainly an exaggeration, this array of local fighting men does seem

ER, ii, 79, 168. ER, ii, 92. These payments do not, however, specifically state that this was for the garrison as a whole as opposed to the wages of the castellan alone. 34 Scottish Letters and Brieves, nos. 89 and 88. 35 RPS, 1318/7; Duncan, ‘War of the Scots’, 147. 36 Barrow, Kingdom of the Scots, 273; Barrow, Robert Bruce, 3. Barrow states that the number of men due from the land ‘was based upon the unit of arable, the carucate of the south, the arachor of the middle west, the davoch of the east and north’ (Barrow, Kingdom of the Scots, 273). A charter of William, earl of Ross, to Robert Munro states that the forinsec service due from the land was ‘such as pertains to a davach land’ (Calendar of Writs of Munro of Foulis 1299–1823, ed. C.T. McInnes (Scottish Record Society, 1940), 1–2). For discussion of the davach as a territorial unit, see A. Ross, Land Assessment and Lordship in Medieval Northern Scotland (Turnhout, 2015). See also A.D. Ross, ‘The Province of Moray, c.1000–1230’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen, 2003), 42–52. 37 Chron. Bower, vii, 75. 38 Barrow, Kingdom of the Scots, 273; Barrow, Robert Bruce, 3; A. Grant, ‘The Higher Nobility in Scotland and their Estates, c.1371–1424’ (unpublished DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 1975), 43, 49–51, 134. A charter of David Strathbogie to Robert Menzies stated that the land granted to him was due the service of one archer in the army of the king of Scotland, that service to be rendered to the earl and his heirs (HMC, 6th Report (1877), 690). In 1346 Patrick Fleming was made sheriff of Tweeddale, the responsibilities of the office including ‘the leadership of the men of the sheriffdom’ (RRS, vi, 139). 32 33

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to have affected the church’s efforts to collect the parish teinds.39 Certain earldoms, such as Fife and Carrick, had systems of military organisation based on kin networks. The ‘army of Carrick’ and the ‘men of Fife’ could be quickly assembled for war and led to battle, either by the earl or by the leaders of the local kin-groups, respectively the kenkynoll or ‘MacDuff’.40 Similarly the ‘chiefs of Galloway’ could summon their kin for military service, as they did around 1296 in an attempted defence of Man.41 The men of the Highlands and Islands too could provide a sizeable military force. Many of them had long experience of fighting in Ireland and the Western Isles as galloglass mercenaries, and represented a sizeable, well-armed and experienced military force.42 Indeed the Highlands and Islands region could, on occasion, contribute quite significantly to the major military actions of the day.43 For example, during peace negotiations with England in 1365, the possibility was raised of West Highland troops assisting the English in Ireland for a period of three months each year for five years as a means of facilitating a peace deal.44 Alexander of Lochaber may have been present with a Highland contingent on the Otterburn campaign (1388).45 Some were also present in the actions of the Second War of Independence. The ‘Brandans’ of Bute rebelled against Balliol expansion in their region and helped the Steward win back his estates around the Firth of Clyde.46 However, for much of the period the principal figure in the region, John MacDonald of Islay, was either in English/Balliol allegiance, or remained aloof from the Liber Cartarum Prioratus Sancti Andree in Scotia, ed. T. Thomson (Edinburgh, 1841), 400. 40 J. Bannerman, ‘MacDuff of Fife’, in Medieval Scotland: Crown, Lordship and Community, essays presented to G.W.S. Barrow, ed. A. Grant and K.J. Stringer (Edinburgh, 1993), 20–38, at 37–8; H.L. MacQueen, ‘The Laws of Galloway a Preliminary Survey’, in Galloway: Land and Lordship, ed. R. Oram and G. Stell (Edinburgh, 1991), 131–143, at 136; N. Reid, ‘The Kingless Kingdom: The Scottish Guardianships of 1286–1306’, SHR, 61 (1982), 105–129, at 108; Grant, ‘Aspects of National Consciousness’, 89–90. 41 Scottish Letters and Brieves, no. 88. 42 Lydon, ‘Scottish Soldier’, 1–15; S. Duffy, ‘The Bruce Brothers and the Irish Sea World, 1306–29’, Cambridge Medieval Celtic Studies, 21 (1991), 55–86, at 66–70; K. Nicholls, ‘Scottish Mercenary Kindreds in Ireland, 1250–1600’, in The World of the Galloglass: Kings, Warlords and Warriors in Ireland and Scotland, 1200–1600, ed. S. Duffy (Dublin, 2007), 86–105; D. Ditchburn, Scotland and Europe: The Medieval Kingdom and Its Contacts with Christendom, 1214–1560 (East Linton, 2000), 219–20. 43 For consideration of the military capabilities of Gaelic Scotland across the later Middle Ages, see MacGregor, ‘Warfare in Gaelic Scotland’, 209–31. 44 RPS, 1365/7/3; Boardman, Campbells, 76–7. 45 Boardman, ‘Highland Scots and Anglo-Scottish Warfare’, 238. 46 Boardman, ‘Highland Scots and Anglo-Scottish Warfare’, 240; S. Boardman, ‘The Gaelic World and the Early Stewart Court’, in Mìorun Mòr nan Gall, ‘The Great Ill-Will of the Lowlander’? Lowland Perceptions of the Highlands, Medieval and Modern, ed. D. Broun and M. MacGregor (Glasgow, 2007), 83–109, at 98–9.

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conflict to focus on local territorial expansion. As a result, the supply of troops from the West Highlands at least was inconsistent at best, and at times non-existent.47 Scotland’s territorial units were, therefore, the basis from which large bodies of troops were raised.48 Scottish armies were also augmented by troops gathered from the kingdom’s burghs. Although most towns appear to have negotiated exemptions from ‘normal’ military service, they remained a useful source of manpower in times of need.49 Specific mention of burgh forces is infrequent in this period, but we know that contingents of townsmen were employed in some military campaigns. At the beginning of the Wars of Independence, orders were despatched for the array 120 men from an unnamed burgh in response to the imminent English invasion of 1296.50 The men of Aberdeen were similarly arrayed in 1411, and a large contingent from the town participated in the battle of Harlaw.51 These men were likely similar to those assembled around 1335–6 to meet the foray of Thomas Roslin and his English forces in a skirmish fought at ‘the Green’, in which the burgh men were defeated.52 A national army came into being when these various regional forces gathered at rallying points on either side of the Forth, before assembling at a strategically useful point for a forthcoming campaign. In 1296 the Scottish host met at Caddonlee, just north of Selkirk, apparently a historic meeting point for Scottish armies about to For discussion of John MacDonald’s relations with the Bruce leadership, David II and Robert the Steward in the fourteenth century, see M.A. Penman, ‘The MacDonald Lordship and the Bruce Dynasty, c.1306–c.1371’, in The Lordship of the Isles, ed. R.D. Oram (Leiden, 2014), 62–87, at 75–86. See also MacInnes, ‘Lochindorb chevauchée’, 25–6. 48 Grant, ‘Higher Nobility in Scotland’, 315–17. The earl of Ross wrote to Edward II around 1307/8, telling him of his military activities in trying to cut off Robert Bruce as he campaigned in northeast Scotland. Ross stated in his letter that he raised 3,000 men from his earldom who served for two weeks at his own expense (P.M. Barnes and G.W.S. Barrow, ‘The Movements of Robert Bruce between September 1307 and May 1308’, SHR, 49 (1970), 46–59, at 49; CDS, iv, 399–400). Although probably an exaggeration of the size of the force mustered, this does indicate that major landholders were able to summon large numbers of their tenants to provide military service, both for defensive and offensive action. 49 Early Records of the Burgh of Aberdeen, ed. W.C. Dickinson (Edinburgh, 1957), pp. cxlv–cl. 50 Scottish Letters and Brieves, no. 59. The men were ordered to be ready, fully equipped, within ten days. Six men were to be chosen to lead them and they were expected to serve for sixty days. Duncan has suggested that this was a force summoned to assist in the defence of Berwick in 1296. 51 Early Records of Aberdeen, pp. cxlv–cxlvii; S. Boardman, ‘The Burgh and the Realm: Medieval politics, c.1100–1500’, in Aberdeen before 1800: A New History (East Linton, 2002), 203–23; E. Ewan, Townlife in Fourteenth-Century Scotland, ed. E.P. Dennison, D. Ditchburn and M. Lynch (Edinburgh, 1990), 156. 52 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 422. 47

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invade England.53 The troops that assembled in 1346 for the Neville’s Cross campaign gathered separately at Perth and around Peebles before combining at Liddel (Cumberland).54 For those unable, or perhaps unwilling, to take part in war a system of fines may have existed. During the reign of Alexander II legislation required that men who did not join the host were required to pay a fine to the crown, usually in the form of livestock or other goods.55 Fourteenth-century evidence for the continuation of such a system is perhaps visible in the accounts of the sheriff of Elgin. For 1337 these included the sum of 23s 6d from ‘finibus absentacionis ab exercitu’.56 Since the fines are listed in the account of the sheriff’s expenses it would appear that this was a case of the crown imposing financial sanctions upon the sheriff for providing insufficient men for the host.57 Leadership Leadership of the army of Scotland was primarily the responsibility of the king. His commanders in the field were normally the earls, the constable and the marshal.58 When the king was absent, as he was effectively in the periods 1332–41 and 1346–57, leadership of the Scottish war effort, by necessity, passed to others. From the beginnings of the Wars of Independence it had been the Guardians who had assumed the role of military leadership. In 1286–7, for example, they called out the armed men of the localities Barrow, Robert Bruce, 66–7. The army of William the Lion that invaded North­ umberland in 1173 assembled at Caddonlee before crossing the Tweed into England (A.A.M. Duncan, Scotland: The Making of the Kingdom (Edinburgh, 1975), 229). 54 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 471–2; Chron. Bower, vii, 253. 55 A. Taylor, ‘Common Burdens in the regnum Scottorum: The Evidence of Charter Diplomatic’, in The Reality behind Charter Diplomatic in Anglo-Norman Britain. Studies by Dauvit Broun, John Reuben Davies, Richard Sharpe and Alice Taylor, ed. D. Broun (Glasgow, 2011), 166–234, at 232–3, 197. 56 ER, i, 444. 57 This fine would appear different from any sort of scutage payment on the basis that it does not appear to have been a sum paid as compensation for non-service, but a punishment on the sheriff for not providing the expected compliment of men from Elgin sheriffdom. 58 Prestwich, ‘Wars of Independence’, 141–4; Macdonald, ‘Kingdom of Scotland at War’, 164–5. In 1335 Edward III granted Edward Balliol the right to appoint a constable and marshal for his forces ‘with the power to punish offences in his army’ (Foedera, ii, p. ii, 903). For discussion of the marshal and the constable in a non-military sense see M. Bateson (ed), ‘The Scottish King’s Household and Other Fragments from a 14th Century Manuscript’, Miscellany of the Scottish History Society, 2 (Edinburgh, 1904), 3–43, at 10–17, 39–40. See also K.J. Stringer, ‘Periphery and Core in Thirteenth Century Scotland: Alan Son of Roland, Lord of Galloway and Constable of Scotland’, in Grant and Stringer, Medieval Scotland, 82–113, at 84. 53



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to protect against disorder during a particularly turbulent time.59 Social status appears originally to have been paramount in the appointment of Guardians. In 1286 they comprised two bishops, two earls and two barons. As the war progressed, the position of Guardian was increasingly awarded to, or assumed by, men whose military leadership promoted them to such a position. In 1297 the Guardians Andrew Murray and William Wallace were also styled ‘commanders of the army of the kingdom of Scotland’.60 It was his success in war that promoted Wallace to the position of sole Guardian following Murray’s death, but this situation pertained only for as long as he himself remained militarily successful.61 In the later fourteenth century, the succession of Guardians that ruled in the name of Robert II and Robert III did so because it was said that the king was incapable of fulfilling his duties in vigorously continuing the war against England.62 The choice of Guardians did not, however, solely rest on military capability. The Scottish nobility and political community retained an innate conservatism with regard to leadership. If the king was unable to lead the kingdom in war, then that responsibility usually devolved to the man next in line. This is reflected by the choice of Earl Donald of Mar as Guardian in 1332. Mar was third in line to the Scottish throne.63 The selection of Mar, though not without heated argument, ensured the natural progression of leadership in the hands of an individual who represented continuation of the Bruce dynasty. This was important in light of the imminent invasion of Edward Balliol, the active representative of an alternative royal line, even if Mar’s loyalty to the Bruce cause was later questioned.64 This apparently natural progression of Guardians was interrupted by the catastrophic defeat at Dupplin and the loss of several leading nobles. With the king (David II) and his heir (the Steward) deemed too young to lead the kingdom, the Scots turned once more to men of military experience for leadership. Archibald Douglas, Andrew Murray and John Randolph all fought through the early stages of the conflict from 1332 to 1334.65 Their success in smallscale confrontations against the Disinherited made them both obvious leaders of the Scottish war effort and obvious Guardians of the kingdom, Scottish Letters and Brieves, no. 89; Barrow, Robert Bruce, 17. Barrow, Robert Bruce, 91. 61 Reid, ‘The Kingless Kingdom’, 109. 62 S. Boardman, ‘Coronations, Kings and Guardians: Politics, Parliaments and General Councils, 1371–1416’, in Parliament and Politics in Scotland, 1235–1560, ed. K.M Brown and R.J. Tanner (Edinburgh, 2004), 102–22, at 108–11, 119–20. 63 For the choice of Mar as Guardian see Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 384; Chron. Bower, vii, 73; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 268; Penman, David II, 47. 64 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 346; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 384; Chron. Bower, vii, 73; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 268; Brut, 274, 278–9; Chron. Melsa, ii, 363–4; Chron. Bridlington, 105–6. 65 For the military careers of these Guardians, see chapter 3 below. 59

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though death or capture in battle limited their tenure of office. The calamitous choice of Mar as Guardian on the basis of his position within the line of succession did not in any case dissuade the Scottish nobility from promoting the Steward to the same position in 1334–5, 1339–41 and 1347–57. Although later Scottish chroniclers wrote confidently about the Steward’s martial vigour in this period, it was surely his position as heir presumptive that was key in his promotion to the Guardianship.66 He was the natural choice to lead Scotland in the absence of David II. When the Steward failed in 1335, he was replaced by John Randolph and then by Andrew Murray. With the removal of these two men by 1338, respectively through capture and death, the Steward became once more the natural choice as Guardian. This dependency for leadership – in all but the most desperate moments – on a man with a direct familial link to the crown reinforces the inherently conservative nature of the Scottish nobility. Even when strong military leadership was required to fight against the Balliol/English threat, military ability was not necessarily a primary requirement of Scottish Guardians.67 Scottish war leaders did not lead their forces into large-scale confrontations with any great frequency. Pitched battles were relatively rare. Instead, military activities were pursued on a smaller scale through raids, ambushes and sieges. During the Second War of Independence much of the war was fought by local leaders in their own territories. The frequent changes in national leadership highlight the importance of these local men in the continuation of the war against the Disinherited/English. For example, in response to the arrival of the Disinherited at Kinghorn in 1332, the earl of Fife raised a force of his own men to meet the invasion of his earldom. This was presumably the ‘army of Fife’.68 The importance of local leadership is even more obvious following the loss of prominent Bruce leaders in battle at Dupplin, Halidon and Neville’s Cross. During the rebellion of 1334, William Carruthers in Annandale and Thomas Bruce in Kyle both fought campaigns in their own lands against the incoming Disinherited lords and their administrations.69 In the later 1330s, William Douglas of Liddesdale and Alexander Ramsay established reputations as powerful local commanders in the border sheriffdoms.70 Following Neville’s Cross, John Kennedy and Alan Stewart, and later William, lord of Douglas, Roger Kirkpatrick and John Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 32–5. See Boardman, ‘Coronations, Kings and Guardians’, 121. 68 An English source described the earl of Fife meeting the Disinherited ‘cum exercitu 14 millium bellatorum de popularibus terrae’ which, although a major exaggeration of the local forces available, emphasises that the initial response to the Disinherited landing was indeed a local one (Chron. Melsa, ii, 362–3). 69 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 414–16; Chron. Bower, vii, 105. 70 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 460–1; Chron. Bower, vii, 109; Brown, Black Douglases, 36–8. 66 67



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Stewart, lord of Kyle, led their own retinues and tenants in war to regain lost territory in southern Scotland.71 These were individuals who rose to prominence through their capacity to wage successful local war against the Disinherited/English, and their reputations soon attracted others to fight in their retinues.72 ‘War bands’ were thus formed. They continued the war in the localities, and in combination they could also form a formidable army for use in larger campaigns. A gathering of individual retinues appears to have been the basis of the Bruce force that fought at Culblean. Including contingents led by Andrew Murray, Earl Patrick of March and William Douglas of Liddesdale, the Bruce force incorporated much of the military elite of southern Scotland.73 Among this group were Alexander Ramsay and Laurence Preston. Both were Lothian men and probably served in the earl of March’s retinue. Both were also important border leaders in their own right, and received glowing praise from Scottish chroniclers for their success in war in the name of David II.74 With their own retinues they served under the command of their territorial superior. Following the campaign’s successful culmination, they returned to fighting once more at the head of their individual war bands in the recovery of southern Scotland. The Structure and Size of Scottish Armies Scottish armies of this period were akin to the English forces they faced in that they fought predominantly on foot. Cavalry forces were rarely prominent in battle.75 This does not mean that the Scots failed to employ cavalry troops on other occasions. Their ability to raid northern England and evade invading English armies, while retaining a counter-attacking capability against both Scottish and English targets, could not have been achieved without the use of horses. Scotland’s mounted troops possessed horses of differing Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 477–8, 487–8; Chron. Bower, vii, 269, 297. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 417–8; Chron. Bower, vii, 147–9. John Stewart’s activity was in part based on Annandale which, although neither his own nor his father’s lands, lacked any clear leadership following the death of John Randolph at Neville’s Cross. Brown argues that William Douglas of Liddesdale attracted into his ‘following’ men who were ‘volunteers serving an effective leader in hope of receiving the profits of war, booty and ransoms’ (Brown, Black Douglases, 144). 73 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 423–4; Chron. Bower, vii, 117; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 232. 74 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 418, 423, 432–3,433–4; Chron. Bower, vii, 109, 127, 129–30, 137, 147–9. 75 The only mention of Scottish cavalry in a battle in this period of warfare is John Graham’s request for a detachment of one hundred ‘mounted lancers’ to drive off the English archers at Neville’s Cross (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 475; Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61). 71

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quality, although the Scottish knightly class at least were able to obtain warhorses capable of carrying a fully armed warrior. Jean le Bel famously referred to Scottish knights and men-at-arms on the Weardale campaign (1327) possessing ‘bons gros ronchins et coursiers’.76 The king certainly could afford good quality mounts. There was a Scottish royal stud, alluded to in 1329–30 when Alan del Knokis received payment for overseeing its relocation from ‘partibus ultramontanis’ to Selkirk Forest.77 Reference is also made to a destrier belonging to David II which in 1341–2 was kept at Lindores.78 From where these mounts originated is difficult to discern. The existence of the royal stud suggests that some horses at least were bred in Scotland. Trade in Scottish horses also suggests that a considerable quantity were produced within the kingdom, and a tax of 3s 4d in the pound was imposed on the exportation of horses from Scotland in 1369–70.79 The best warhorses were probably purchased further afield.80 England was one possible source of supply, but Edward III’s ban on the export of English horses means that most horses used by the Scots likely came from the continent.81 The quality and value of Scottish mounts is possible to discern through existing evidence. For example, Scots serving in English armies had their horses appraised, as English soldiers did, before embarking on campaign. In May 1336, John Comyn possessed a horse worth 20 marks, while in May 1337 John Marshal served with a horse worth 12 marks.82 This evidence

Chron. Le Bel, i, 52. ER, i, 340. Mention is also made in 1343 of the king’s horses being kept near Edinburgh (ER, i, 522). David II presented a gift of a black courser to Edward III in 1370 (Issue Roll of Thomas Brantingham, 145). 78 ER, i, 511. The destrier was the ‘great horse’ used for heavy cavalry duty on the battlefield, but it was of little use in difficult terrain and in siege situations (Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 21–2). 79 The returns of this tax from Roxburghshire in 1370 amounted to 46s 8d and the returns generally have been described as ‘insignificant’ (ER, ii, 351, p. lxxv). This may only have been an experiment in taxation as no other returns exist from other Scottish sheriffdoms and it was in any case made obsolete by Robert II’s orders of 1372 which banned the exportation of horses to England or elsewhere abroad (RPS, 1372/3/3; see also Ditchburn, Scotland and Europe, 160–1). 80 Edward III purchased warhorses from great distances. In 1333 he employed merchants to purchase horses for him in Spain, and in 1335 he purchased six horses from Sicily (Foedera, ii, p. ii, 862, 917). 81 Orders were sent out by Edward III in February 1345 banning the exportation of horses worth more than 60s from southern English ports (Foedera, iii, p. i, 30). David II despatched two men, described as the ‘custodibus dextrarii regis’, to France in 1342. Although no reason is provided for their journey, it is likely that they were involved in purchasing horses for the king (ER, i, 511). Scottish ability to procure horses from some distance away is demonstrated by James V’s purchase of mounts from Denmark and Portugal (Ditchburn, Scotland and Europe, 161). 82 TNA, E101/19/36, r. 2 (Comyn); TNA, E101/35/3 (Marshal). 76

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shows that the mounts of Scottish men-at-arms in English service varied greatly in value. In 1336 William McCulloch possessed a horse valued at £10, and Robert Melrose a horse worth £8, while in 1337 Henry Ramsey served with a horse worth £6.83 Those of William Hay in 1337 and John Dumfries in 1337–8 were worth only £5 and £3 respectively.84 Evidence of the value of Scottish horses is also provided by transactions whereby David II purchased horses from his own knights and men-at-arms. The figures for these transactions are provided in Table 1: Table 1. Valuation of Scottish horses purchased by David II Name John Stewart of Darnley Duncan Fleming John Fleming John Camera Malcolm Fleming of Biggar Simon Preston John Roos Hugh Guthrie William Kinninmonth Andrew Cunningham Alan Erskine Simon Reid John Bonkhill David Keith William Graham Maurice Camera John Danielston

Year 1342 1342 1342 1359 1360 1360 1361 1361 1362 1362 1364 1364 1364 1364 1364 1364 1368

Valuation £10 £20 (for 2 horses) £10 £5 6s 8d £4 13s 4d £3 6s £20 £6 13s 4d £2 13s 4d £20 £10 £10 £8 £12 £8 £4 £20

Source ER, i, 506 ER, i, 507–8 ER, i, 508 ER, i, 616 ER, ii, 49–50 ER, ii, 50 ER, ii, 80 ER, ii, 80 ER, ii, 113 ER, ii, 113 ER, ii, 125 ER, ii, 132 ER, ii, 165 ER, ii,166 ER, ii, 166–7 ER, ii, 168 ER, ii, 308

Ayton has compiled detailed figures for the value of English mounts during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and has discussed his valuations within three categories.85 Comparing the values outlined above with Ayton’s model, it is clear that the majority of Scottish mounts were of middle to low value. Of the mounts purchased for the king, only three were worth £20 or more, with seven worth between £10 and £20, and eight worth less than £10. In spite of this relatively low valuation of Scottish horses, comparison with Ayton’s calculations still demonstrates that Scottish knights and menat-arms did not possess horses of substantially lesser value than their English 83 84 85

TNA, E101/19/26, r. 2 (McCulloch and Melrose). TNA, E101/35/3 (Hay); TNA, E101/20/17, r. 7 (Dumfries). Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 196–8.

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opponents. For the Scottish campaigns of 1335, 1336 and 1337–8, the mean value of horses in the English army was £8.5, £7.6 and £10.6 respectively.86 These figures increased substantially when English armies campaigned in France. Ayton argues that the geographical conditions prevalent in Scotland, the improbability of large pitched battles, and the lack of opportunities for chivalric aggrandisement in Scotland, all led to a selection of lesser horses within English armies for Scottish campaigns.87 Such conditions appear to have had a similar impact on the Scottish choice of mounts. For most Scottish knights and men-at-arms the destrier and courser were either too expensive or too impractical for fighting a war in Scotland and on the Anglo-Scottish marches. A simple ‘equus’ was perfectly adequate, although these horses themselves seem to have varied greatly in value.88 For those mounted troops outwith the military elite, evidence is scant. They probably possessed the ‘petites hagueguise’ described by le Bel in his account of the Weardale campaign. They were quick, strong and invaluable in difficult terrain, but they were unable to carry the weight of a fully armoured knight into battle.89 On the battlefield, Scottish armies were predominantly infantry-based and fought on foot.90 The English used this style of fighting to great effect during the Hundred Years War, where they chose to dismount their cavalry to fight as heavily armed infantry.91 Split into battles (divisions), the Scots fought in ‘schiltroms’. In a schiltrom, infantrymen were deployed in a tight formation to present a solid infantry wall against which it was difficult to attack with cavalry. The earl of Mar’s schiltrom at Dupplin Moor was described as ‘like Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 195–6, 212–14. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 213–14. 88 Modern investigation based on archaeological remains and examination of medieval pictorial evidence has suggested that the average size of a horse was relatively consistent, probably no more than fifteen hands high. It remains possible that the difference between the ‘gros ronchins et coursiers’ and the smaller horses employed in Scottish armies may not have related to height, but to strength, ability to carry a large burden, and nobility of appearance (J. Clark (ed), The Medieval Horse and its Equipment, c.1150–c.1450 (Woodbridge, 2004), 23–5; see also M. Bennett, ‘The Medieval Warhorse Reconsidered’, in Medieval Knighthood V: Papers from the Sixth Strawberry Hill Conference, 1994, ed. S. Church and R. Harvey (Woodbridge, 1995), 19–40, at 21–6; A. Hyland, The Medieval Warhorse from Byzantium to the Crusades (Stroud, 1996), 145–6). 89 Lydon, ‘Scottish Soldier’, 7–8; see also J.F. Lydon, ‘The Hobelar: An Irish Contribution to Medieval Warfare’, Irish Sword, 2 (1954–6), 12–16; R. Jones, ‘Re-thinking the Origins of the “Irish” Hobelar’, Cardiff Historical Papers (Cardiff, 2008), 1–20. 90 Froissart’s description of the battle of Neville’s Cross includes the comment that the Scots were all mounted, but this is surely derived from le Bel’s description of the Scots on raids and invasions (see Oeuvres de Froissart, v, 121. P. Contamine, ‘Froissart and Scotland’, in Scotland and the Low Countries, 1124–1994, ed. G.G. Simpson (East Linton, 1996), 43–58, at 52). 91 Sumption, Trial by Battle, 64–5; DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 122. 86 87



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the body of a hedgehog constructed from shields, clubs, arms and lances which were pressing against each other like scales’.92 These formations had undergone changes in the years before 1332. At Falkirk, Wallace used the schiltroms in a purely defensive manner. The Scottish infantry was arrayed to withstand the attacks of English cavalry but, dug into its position, it could do little against enemy archers.93 Robert I developed more mobile schiltroms.94 At Bannockburn they stifled the English cavalry charge before moving onto the offensive and repulsing the enemy.95 When war broke out once more in 1332, the schiltrom was used in a similar fashion to its deployment at Bannockburn and in smaller victories at Myton and Old Byland. But the decision of the Disinherited and then the English to fight on foot, flanked by their archers, forced the Scots onto the offensive. This exposed the deficiencies of the schiltroms. Forced to attack a strong defensive force, Scottish formations frequently lost cohesion. At Dupplin Moor the Bruce attack, affected by a disorganised advance towards the Disinherited line, was further broken up by Disinherited archery.96 At Halidon Hill the Scots advanced across a marsh and up a steep incline. Archery attacks on the schiltroms from the elevated English position checked the forward momentum of the Scottish divisions. Conditions did not allow the Bruce Scots to attack the English line with any coherent force and they were repelled by the English/Disinherited troops.97 And at Neville’s Cross the terrain, which included a network of ditches, hedges and fences, forced the Bruce divisions to narrow their line of attack. Although initially successful in forcing the English troops back, the flanking English forces, unengaged by the narrow Bruce Scottish attack, succeeded in repelling the enemy schiltroms.98 The difficult terrain in these latter examples, coupled with the Disinherited/English defensive formations, highlighted the problems of Scottish military technique. The schiltroms were not particularly mobile, they were difficult to co-ordinate to any great effect, and they struggled to retain the cohesion required to make an offensive impact against a static defensive line. Chron. Bower, vii, 77–9. Barrow, Robert Bruce, 101–3. D.H. Caldwell, ‘Scottish Spearmen, 1298–1314: An Answer to Cavalry’, War in History, 19(3) (2012), 267–89, at 270–5. 94 For discussion of possible training of these formations, see below, 76–7; see also Caldwell, ‘Scottish Spearmen’, 275–89. 95 Barrow, Robert Bruce, 226–9; DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 79–83. 96 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 271; Chron. Bower, vii, 77–9; Scalacronica (King), 109–11; Chron. Avesbury, 296–7; Brut, 278–9; Chron. Melsa, ii, 364–5; DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 119. 97 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 279–80; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 167–9; Brut, 283–6; DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 124–5. 98 Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 341; DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 184–6. 92 93

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The problems of the schiltrom could perhaps have been countered with sufficient training. The successful deployment of these formations by Robert I suggests that they were able to call upon the service of good leaders and well-trained troops to ensure that cohesion was maintained. In comparison, the training received by men fighting from 1332 onwards appears deficient in light of these previous successes, but little evidence remains of the extent to which Scottish troops were drilled in the finer points of battlefield technique. The Scottish nobility and knightly class at least received training in arms from an early age.99 David II was accompanied into exile by men who could teach him the ways of war, including the marshal, Robert Keith, and David’s ‘foster-father’, Malcolm Fleming.100 The practice of fosterage, prevalent in Gaelic society but also more generally apparent within the Scottish noble class, included the training of a young noble in the household of another lord and no doubt involved elements of military instruction.101 Once older, tournaments offered nobles a test of individual skill as well as affording the opportunity to practise fighting in a unit.102 For the majority of men serving in national musters, some form of training likely took place at ‘wapinschaws’, the inspection of arms and equipment of those engaged in Scottish service.103 These are known to have occurred in 1296, 1318 and again in 1346, when the northern part of the host gathered and ‘held a show of weapons at Perth’.104 Similar inspections also occurred locally. In a charter granting lands to Maurice Buchanan, Earl Donald of Lennox retained in his hands the ‘ostencionem armorum suorum’.105 At times, troops may also have received some kind of uniform at weapon inspections. An English chronicler commented that at Halidon Hill the Bruce Scots all wore linen For knightly training, see K. Stevenson, Chivalry and Knighthood in Scotland, 1424– 1513 (Woodbridge, 2006), 19–23. 100 Chron. Bower, vii, 83; Penman, David II, 53–4. For the form that such training could take, and on later medieval training manuals on fighting, see J. Clements, ‘Wielding the Weapons of War: Arms, Armor and Training Manuals during the Later Middle Ages’, in The Hundred Years War: A wider focus, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and D.J. Kagay (Leiden and Boston, 2005), 447–75, at 451–67. For the training of English knights from a young age, see M. Bennett, ‘Military Masculinity in England and Northern France, c.1050–c.1225’, in Masculinity in Medieval Europe, ed. D.M. Hadley (London, 1999), 71–88, at 73–9. 101 Nicholson, Later Middle Ages, 73; Neville, Native Lordship, 48, 70; Sellar, ‘Celtic Law and Scots Law’, 12; Barrow, Anglo-Norman Era, 158. 102 C. Edington, ‘The Tournament in Medieval Scotland’, in Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France: Proceedings of the 1995 Harlaxton Symposium, ed. M. Strickland (Stamford, 1998), 46–62, at 48–51; J.R.V. Barker, The Tournament in Medieval England, 1100–1400 (Woodbridge, 1986), 32–6; Ditchburn, Scotland and Europe, 96–105. 103 Stevenson, Chivalry and Knighthood, 20–1; Goodare, State and Society, 136–7, 150–3. 104 Barrow, Robert Bruce, 66–7; RPS, 1318/29; Chron. Bower, vii, 253. 105 RRS, vi, 500. 99



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shirts over their armour to distinguish themselves from the English on the battlefield, and the ‘wapinschaw’ would seem to have been a convenient occasion for the distribution of overgarments.106 In spite of this, the overall effectiveness of training at these gatherings is likely to have been limited. Indeed, it has been argued that the orders regarding the ‘wapinschaw’ ‘place all the emphasis on … having (the) appropriate arms and armour, [and] not on being able to use it’.107 If group training in combat was, for most Scottish soldiers, inadequate then it is likely that Scottish armies were dependent on the knights and men-at-arms dismounting to fight on foot at or near the front of each schiltrom. This corresponded with contemporary practice in England where men like Edward III and the Black Prince forged reputations by leading their men in battle from the front.108 Knights were obviously the best-armed and best-trained men in the Scottish army. They acted as heavily armed infantry, entrusted with checking an enemy charge, while also possessing the capability to lead an attack on enemy positions. At both Dupplin Moor and Neville’s Cross it appears to have been the better armed troops (dismounted knights, men-at-arms and better equipped infantry) who attacked first. Though smaller in number, they were better able to withstand Disinherited/ English archery fire, and were better equipped for the hand-to-hand fighting required at the point of contact between the two forces. The less well-armed men were held back as reinforcements for those at the front, to be unleashed when tactically appropriate. At both of these battles the lesser armed men were simply not utilised effectively. At Dupplin they appear to have been deployed too soon, before the Disinherited line was destabilised. At Neville’s Cross they were hardly deployed at all, the Steward and the earl of March withdrawing with the rear battle when the tide appeared to be turning against the Scots. This withdrawal of the larger body of troops left the better armed men isolated and, as at Halidon Hill when those at the rear rode off with their lords’ horses, Scotland’s military elite was abandoned to its fate.109

Chron. Melsa, ii, 370; see also A. Ailes, ‘The Knight, Heraldry and Armour: The Role of Recognition and the Origins of Heraldry’, in Medieval Knighthood IV: Papers from the Fifth Strawberry Hill Conference, 1990, ed. C. Harper-Bill and R. Harvey (Woodbridge, 1992), 1–21, at 6–7; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 73. 107 D.H. Caldwell, ‘The Use and Effect of Weapons: The Scottish Experience’, Review of Scottish Culture, 4 (1988), 53–62, at 55; see also Goodare, State and Society, 151. See more recent comment on training, in particular in the reign of Robert I, in Caldwell, ‘Scottish Spearmen’, 289. 108 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 196–7, 294; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 529. 109 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 279–80; Brut, 283–6; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 167–9; Chron. Melsa, ii, 370 (Halidon Hill); Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 341; Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61; Chron. Angliae, 23–4; Chron. Murimuth, 218–19; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27–8 (Neville’s Cross). 106

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The actual size of Scottish armies in this period is difficult to ascertain because administrative sources that would allow for analysis of numbers have not survived.110 Narrative accounts in chronicles and letters provide the primary basis on which to construct a discussion of army size. The three major battles of this period (Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill and Neville’s Cross) have all received historical analysis that includes discussion of the number of men that fought in the Scottish army. All three battles involved the assembly of large armies gathered from the length and breadth of the kingdom. The Scots at Dupplin were said by contemporary sources to number between 20,000 and 40,000.111 The sense that these figures are exaggerated is strengthened by the existence of a second Scottish army in the vicinity of the battle that did not take part in the actual fighting. At Dupplin Moor, the Disinherited fought that part of the Scottish army levied in the lands north of the Forth. A glance at the nobles in the Bruce Scottish forces provides evidence of this north-south geographical split. The army that met the Disinherited at Dupplin was led by the earls of Mar, Fife, Moray, Menteith and Atholl. The southern force, led by Earl Patrick of March, included Archibald Douglas and perhaps Andrew Murray of Bothwell.112 Contemporary estimates for the Bruce army at Halidon range from a rather precise 14,629 to 90,000–100,000, while at Neville’s Cross the totals given range from 6,000 to 80,000.113 The size of the Neville’s Cross army is depicted in modern commentary as exceptional, its scale based on David II’s attempt to lead the entire kingdom in war following his return from French exile.114 It would appear that the armies at Dupplin and Halidon were also of large size, based on contemporary estimates of both Bruce and opposing forces.115 The Bruce Scottish ability to raise large armies when required is further demonstrated by the forces raised for the

Prestwich, ‘Wars of Independence’, 140; Caldwell, ‘Use and Effect of Weapons’, 53–4; see also Grant, ‘Aspects of National Consciousness’, 88–9, for a discussion of potential manpower. 111 DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 118, n. 34; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 40–1; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 86. 112 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 86, 92. 113 DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 121, 180; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 129; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 69; Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 57; Grant, ‘Disaster at Neville’s Cross’, 22–3; White, ‘Battle of Neville’s Cross’, 275. 114 Penman, David II, 124–7. 115 For Dupplin Moor, Rogers suggests that the Bruce Scottish troops outnumbered their Disinherited adversaries by ten to one, while at Halidon Hill he suggests a ratio of at least two to one (Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 41, 70). The differences in the figures provided by contemporary chroniclers ensure that such calculations are likely to be inaccurate, but they do provide a useful basis for discussion of the relative sizes of the forces involved. 110



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campaigns in France in the 1420s, where the army of Scotland may have numbered around 10,000 men.116 These large-scale examples apart, for most of the Second War of Independence armies were of far smaller scale. The strategy of raiding and ravaging the countryside, as well as generally avoiding pitched battles with Disinherited/ English forces after 1333, meant that large armies were not required.117 Even attempts to overthrow castle garrisons were often undertaken with small forces, using the element of surprise rather than formal sieges.118 Besides, political divisions within the kingdom made it difficult to raise an army from much of Scotland. Between 1333 and around 1337, various areas of the kingdom were under English control and some nobles in other parts of Scotland either were in league with the Disinherited or refused to commit their forces to either side. The generally smaller size of Bruce Scottish forces in this period is evident from the number of men involved in the battle of Culblean in 1335. Bower estimates that David Strathbogie’s force included 3,000 men, which was augmented by a large number of ‘comownys’ gathered locally.119 They faced a force led by Andrew Murray which, the chronicles suggest, included 800 men from south of the Forth, and an additional 300 men from the Kildrummy garrison and the surrounding territories.120 Analysis of Scottish knightly retinues indicates that the Scottish force at Culblean may indeed have been of this approximate size. William Keith and Godfrey Ros, for example, were granted English safe conducts in April 1335 to escort Richard Talbot, their prisoner, to the border. The safe conduct covered the two knights along with sixty of their men-at-arms.121 In an indenture of 1372 Earl William of Douglas retained James Douglas B.G.H. Ditcham, ‘The Employment of Foreign Mercenary Troops in the French Royal Armies, 1415–1470’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1978), 180–1. 117 It is possible that much of the campaigning undertaken in the Second War of Independence depended on a restricted class of mounted men rather than the infantry of the ‘army of Scotland’. This is suggested by Wyntoun when describing Andrew Murray’s force at Roxburgh Bridge: ‘Off sergeandys thare and knychtis kene He gat a gret company’ (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 396; see also M. Prestwich, ‘Miles in Armis Strenuus: The Knight at War’, TRHS, 6th series, 5 (1995), 201–20, at 201–4). 118 See, for example, the capture of Roxburgh (1342) (Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 356; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 466–7; Chron. Bower, vii, 151). 119 Chron. Bower, vii, 117; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 424–6 (who describes Strathbogie’s force as a ‘gret menyhé’); Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 107. 120 Chron. Bower, vii, 117; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 424; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 107; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 232; Simpson, ‘Battle of Culblean’, 205. 121 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 904. It is unclear whether the safe conduct reflects English expectations of the size of a Scottish knightly retinue, or if Ros and Keith requested that it cover a force specifically of that size. It does however provide an approximate number of men who would accompany a Scottish knight during wartime (see also Penman, David II, 290, n. 18). 116

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of Dalkeith for life service. Dalkeith received 600 marks in return for his obligation to serve the earl in peace and war with eight men-at-arms and sixteen archers.122 Dalkeith’s retinue appears small for a man whose wealth and landed possessions marked him out as a major magnate, especially when compared with the armed retinues of Keith and Ros.123 The agreement between the two Douglases is, therefore, likely to represent the minimum military support expected by the earl of Douglas who himself had taken a retinue of forty men-at-arms to Poitiers in 1356.124 Also of use for estimating the size of the Scottish knightly retinue is the record of Scots who entered paid English service. For example, when Eustace Maxwell entered the service of Edward III in December 1334, he was retained along with his retinue of twenty men-at-arms and twenty mounted archers.125 Although the prospect of pay may have inflated the number of men available to an individual lord, examples such as Maxwell’s do provide useful evidence for the size of a wartime retinue. Taking these few examples into account it may be tentatively suggested that a retinue of around twenty to forty men was normal for many nobles below the status of earl, while comital forces were probably larger.126 On the basis of these calculations it would not have taken a particularly large number of knights to have mustered a force of several hundred men. Since the Bruce army at Culblean consisted of the retinues of one earl (March) and two major nobles (Murray and Douglas), and included knightly retinues from much of southern Scotland, as well as additional northern contingents, the chronicle estimates for the size of the force involved appear plausible.127

Morton Reg., ii, 101. For Keith and Ros, see SP, vi, 29; vii, 247. 124 Brown, Black Douglases, 144–5. Brown states that the agreement between Earl William and Dalkeith was a political as well as a military alliance, establishing the right of the earl to lead Dalkeith’s men in war. Brown’s comment that the twenty-four men promised by Dalkeith ‘represented a significant force in the context of local warfare’ appears, however, to accept that this was all that was expected of Dalkeith in terms of a military contribution to Earl William’s own retinue. This appears unlikely. Although the two men were former enemies, Dalkeith could provide a large body of armed men that would only enhance the force available to Earl William for his use in southern Scotland. 125 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 239v, 253. 126 For the size of earls’ retinues, see Grant, ‘Higher Nobility in Scotland’, 328–32. Bower’s description of the earl of Fife’s retinue at Dupplin states that ‘three hundred and sixty men in armour … [were] killed under his standard’ (Chron. Bower, vii, 77–9). 127 For further figures relating to Scottish retinue sizes, this time for those in English service in the Calais garrison in 1369–70, see Issue Roll of Thomas de Brantingham, 83–5. The contingent led by William Weston, John Dalkeith and John Home consisted of sixty men (twenty men-at-arms and forty archers). That of William Livingston consisted of twenty-four (twelve men-at-arms and twelve archers). These were the largest contingents, with other forces consisting only of the named individuals and their valets. 122 123



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The Scottish Soldier: Armour and Weapons The Scottish military elite was well equipped to deal with the dangers of combat.128 Most knights and lords would have possessed defensive equipment that included plate armour.129 Scottish knights may also have been able to provide defensive equipment for their horses.130 In 1296–7 several Scottish knights were gifted armour by Edward I for their participation in the intended campaign in Flanders. Two sons of the earl of Menteith were each given: an aketon and a gambeson (both types of quilted jacket worn under the armour); a pair of treppars (harness); a bascinet and a capellis ferreis (both forms of metal protective head gear); a pair of quissettus (protective armour for the thighs); a pair of gambees (plate shin guards); a gorger (providing protection for the neck, probably made of quilted linen); a pair of plate gloves; and a targeis (shield).131 On 5 August 1335, Ivo of Argyll was rewarded by the English king with the gift of a bascinet with an aventail (mail attached to the bascinet to protect the neck and shoulders), and a pair of gloves.132 Although these examples may suggest that Scottish soldiers required gifts from English kings to provide them with suitable equipment, the type of armour involved is broadly similar to examples in the possession of James Douglas of Dalkeith, recorded in his will of 1390. To his son and heir Dalkeith left unum par de platis, a bascinet, mail gloves (lorica cirotecis), iron greaves (plate protection for the leg below the knee) and

For discussion of armour as it is depicted in Barbour’s Bruce, see I.A. MacInnes, ‘“A fine great company of good men, well armed and equipped”: Barbour’s Description of Scottish Arms and Armour in The Bruce’, in Battles and Bloodshed: Representations of War in the Middles Ages, ed. L. Bleach, K. Borrill and K. Närä (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 2013), 39–54, at 44–9. 129 Strickland, ‘Kings of Scots at War’, 111–14; Macdonald, ‘Kingdom of Scotland at War’, 170. Both Scottish and English chroniclers described the Scots as being well armoured. At Dupplin the Scots had marched into battle ‘well arrayed in armour’ (Brut, 278–9; Chron. Bower, vii, 77–9). On the march to Neville’s Cross there appears to have been a ‘wapinschaw’ held, which found that, although the army contained a large number of ‘lightly armed’ men, there remained a well-armed core consisting of the nobility and knights (Chron. Bower, vii, 257). 130 The raiding party led by William Douglas on the morning of the battle of Neville’s Cross was said to have possessed ‘armoured horses’ (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 336–7). 131 BL, Additional MS 7965, fol. 56. The earl of Strathearn’s son was presented with similar equipment at the same time, with additional gifts of a lance, a knife and a robe (ibid., fol. 56v). The earl of Ross too received gifts of armour including items of plate made from a single sheet of iron in 1302–3 (F. Lachaud, ‘Armour and Military Dress in Thirteenth- and Early Fourteenth-Century England’, in Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France: Proceedings of the 1995 Harlaxton Symposium, ed. M. Strickland (Stamford, 1998), 344–69, at 356–8, 360–1, 366; see also Prestwich, ‘Miles in Armis Strenuus’, 208). 132 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 279. 128

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a Jak, another form of quilted jacket.133 The possession of good quality armaments is further suggested by the description of Archibald Douglas, ‘the Grim’, when captured at Poitiers in 1356. He was said to have been ‘taken to be a great lord’ because of ‘the noble character of his armour’.134 Some armour was apparently produced in Scotland and David II employed an armourer in the 1360s.135 Armour was also imported, and there appears to have been a steady flow of equipment into the kingdom from France and the Low Countries.136 The supply of armour from France included a gift in 1348 from John II of twenty ‘harnesia armorum’.137 Such a gift was not without practical consideration as the king of France sought to ensure the continued potency of his Scottish allies. The apparent lack of other similar gifts suggests, however, that the Scots either possessed suitable equipment or were able to procure it. Although armour may have been purchased from the continent, supplies also reached Scotland from Ireland and even England.138 Edward III’s frequent proclamations concerning armour being taken to Scotland from England were surely an attempt to stop an active illicit trade, rather than simply unfounded royal paranoia. That such trade existed, despite repeated English attempts to disrupt it, suggests that at least some English merchants sought customers wherever they could find them, and that Scots were willing to purchase their wares. The availability of armour was probably also accompanied by its relative affordability. There remains a strong historical tradition that the expense of a knight supplying Morton Reg., ii, 171. All the equipment granted to Dalkeith’s son was described as ‘pro hastiludio de guerra competentibus’. Dalkeith also possessed various other pieces of armour that were to be distributed amongst family members, as well as an aventail and a pair of plate gloves belonging to John Kerr (ibid., 174; see also Grant, ‘Higher Nobility in Scotland’, 282–3). 134 Chron. Bower, vii, 301. 135 D.H. Caldwell, ‘Royal Patronage of Arms and Armour Making in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Scotland’, in Scottish Weapons and Fortifications, 1100–1800, ed. D. Caldwell (Edinburgh, 1981), 73–93, at 83–5. Armour was purchased for David II in 1362 at a cost of £23 (ER, ii, 90). A further purchase in 1364 from Alexander, son of John of Linlithgow, cost £10 10s (ER, ii, 168). For analysis of Scottish archaeological finds of armour, see J.G. Scott, ‘Two 14th Century Helms Found in Scotland’, Journal of the Arms and Armour Society, 4 (1962), 68–71; E. Martin Burgess and H. Russell Robinson, ‘A 14th-Century Mail Hood in the Royal Scottish Museum, Edinburgh’, Journal of the Arms and Armour Society, 2:3 (1956), 59–65. 136 See, for example, CDS, iii, no. 1160; A. Stevenson, ‘The Flemish Dimension of the Auld Alliance’, in Scotland and the Low Countries, 1124–1994, ed. G.G. Simpson (East Linton, 1996), 28–42, at 38–9. 137 Les Journaux du Trésor de Philippe VI de Valois, ed. J. Viard (Paris, 1899), no. 1278; Penman, David II, 149; W. Stanford Reid, ‘Trade, Traders, and Scottish Independence’, Speculum 29 (1954), 210–22, at 210. 138 See for example, CPR, 1338–40, 52; CPR, 1340–43, 360 (Ireland); CPR, 1340–43, 452–3; CPR, 1343–45, 93 (England). 133



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himself with armoured protection was a crippling burden, but some of the calculations leading to this conclusion are based on the combined cost of both armour and the knight’s horse.139 They are also generally based on fifteenth-century evidence when armour became more specialist and expensive.140 Alternative analysis of armour in thirteenth- and fourteenthcentury England has concluded that knightly equipment may not have been as heavy a burden as previously thought.141 The total cost of armour gifted to the earl of Ross in 1302–3 was just £7 13s 6d, and this included the cost of material with which to make a surcoat and the wages of six men to tailor it.142 Calculation of the average cost of a Scottish knight’s equipment is not possible for the Second War of Independence. Still, it remains likely that knights like Archibald Douglas, seeking to mirror and indeed outshine their contemporaries with the quality of their armour, were able to acquire modern and practical equipment from a variety of sources at an affordable cost.143 For those outwith the small group of nobles, wealthy lords and knights, evidence for the equipment they possessed is sparse.144 The armour possessed by those of gentry status, and those who fought as men-at-arms, is more difficult to discern. Armour was purchased in 1384 by the Scottish crown for twelve men of the Stirling Castle garrison. Although it is not clear what type of soldiers these men were, the total of £46 13s 4d spent in this instance suggests a relatively good quality of equipment for each of the men involved.145 An interesting example is also presented in a letter of 1340, probably written by William Felton, the English sheriff of Roxburgh. Felton described the death of John Kerr, a Scottish man-at-arms, who was killed M. Vale, War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages (London, 1981), 225. 140 Vale, War and Chivalry, 125–6. 141 L. James, ‘The Cost and Distribution of Armour in the Fourteenth Century’, Transactions of the Monumental Brass Society, 10 (1963–8), 226–31; Prestwich, ‘Miles in Armis Strenuus’, 208–9; Lachaud, ‘Armour and Military Dress’, 344–5, 363; R. Storey, ‘Military Technology in Late Thirteenth and Fourteenth Century England’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Reading, 2003), chapter 6. 142 Lachaud, ‘Armour and Military Dress’, 358, 366. The armour granted in 1297 to Gilbert, son of the earl of Strathearn, cost £10 11s. The cost of equipment for his two brothers came to £27 7s 4d and included two saddles and two targes (ibid., 352, n. 43); see also James, ‘Cost and Distribution of Armour’, 229; Prestwich, ‘Miles in Armis Strenuus’, 209. 143 In England, Edward III’s attempts to ensure that armour remained affordable to his knights is demonstrated by his orders to the mayor and sheriffs of London to appraise the goods in the armourers’ shops there, as they were apparently charging excessive prices (Foedera, iii, p. i, 303). 144 Strickland, ‘Kings of Scots at War’, 111–14; Macdonald, ‘Kingdom of Scotland at War’, 170. 145 ER, iii, 671. 139

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by one of Felton’s men when a sword or spear pierced both Kerr’s aketon (quilted jacket) and habergeon (mail coat).146 In discussing the lethality of border skirmishing, King argues that Kerr’s death was ‘remarkably unusual’ and that Felton’s detailed description of the killer blow proves that the English commander also perceived the fatality as an unexpected occurrence.147 In spite of their protective equipment, death in combat, even in small-scale skirmishes, was always a possibility. Fatal wounds could occur relatively easily, and the even the best form of armoured protection was not impervious to a well-placed blow.148 The dangers of medieval warfare were undoubtedly magnified for those who could not afford the trappings of the armoured knight or man-at-arms. An attempt to codify the minimum requirements of those who fought in war was made by Robert I in 1318 when he stipulated the type of arms required, based on the value of an individual’s possessions. Those with goods worth £10 were expected to possess an aketon (possibly including some plate), a bascinet and plate gloves. They were also to possess a spear and a sword. Those without an aketon and bascinet were instead to provide themselves with a habergeon, an iron hat and plate gloves.149 The armour required by the 1318 legislation is similar to that worn by Ross and Douglas, discussed above, and it is possible that this was an attempt by Robert I to ensure that the equipment required by all Scottish knights and men-at-arms was of a similar standard. For those of lower status, with goods to the value of a cow, the only requirement was possession of a good spear, or a bow with a sheaf of twenty-four arrows.150 Assessment of the extent to which Robert I’s legislation had a practical effect on the armament of the Bruce Scottish army remains problematic, though it is possible to suggest that Scottish armour did improve during the period from 1333 to 1346.151 A crucial element in the Scottish defeats at Dupplin and Halidon had been the presence of enemy archers and the inability of the Bruce Scots to withstand their attacks. Although the decisive impact of the English longbowmen at Neville’s Cross has been debated, it appears CDS, v, no. 809; King, ‘Prisoners and Casualties’, 268. King, ‘Prisoners and Casualties’, 268. 148 Clements, ‘Wielding the Weapons of War’, 460–1; I.A. MacInnes, ‘Heads, Shoulders, Knees and Toes: Injury and Death in Anglo-Scottish Combat, c.1296–c.1403’, in Wound and Wound Repair in Medieval Culture, ed. L. Tracy and K. DeVries (Leiden, 2015), 102–27; Macdonald, ‘Later Medieval Scottish Soldier’, 179–206. Wyntoun recounts an interesting tale from the siege of Dunbar (1338). A man was supposedly struck by an arrow that pierced three layers of protective clothing, including an outer covering of some form (‘blasowne’), a habergeon (‘awbrychowne’) and an aketon (‘actowne’) (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 432). 149 RPS, 1318/29; Barrow, Robert Bruce, 297; D. Caldwell, The Scottish Armoury (Edinburgh, 1979), 8. 150 RPS, 1318/29. 151 Caldwell, ‘Scottish Spearmen’, 286–9. 146 147



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that the Scots were better equipped to endure missile attacks than they had been in previous engagements.152 One English chronicler wrote that shields used by the Bruce Scottish troops, as well as the iron headpieces they wore, absorbed the brunt of the archery fire, suggesting perhaps better equipment than had previously been the case.153 The legislation of 1318 seems to have identified the sword and the spear as the principal Scottish battlefield weapons. Chronicle and archaeological evidence gives an impression of their frequent use by Bruce Scottish soldiers. The spear was useful in battle in both defensive and offensive situations.154 Bruce preparations for the anticipated Disinherited invasion in 1332 included stockpiling spears for use in battle. These ‘newly-made iron pikes which Thomas, earl of Moray, had caused to be made’ were discovered by the Disinherited in Dunfermline Abbey.155 When the Disinherited and Bruce forces met a few days later they fought ‘with their spears firmly fixed against each other’.156 At Culblean, the Bruce Scots ‘strawcht thare speris’ and advanced towards Strathbogie’s forces.157 The continuing use of the spear is highlighted by an English chronicle description of Neville’s Cross that depicts the troops of both sides resting on their spears during agreed periods of cessation.158 By contrast, swords are less often noted in the chronicle evidence, though one English chronicler wrote that the Bruce Scots ‘struck each other with their swords’ among the confusion at Dupplin.159 Describing the siege of Liddel, the Lanercost chronicler claimed that those about to assault the castle ‘armed themselves … with spears, stones, swords and clubs’, perhaps reflecting the different arms carried by troops of different standing.160 Archaeological evidence provides further evidence of the importance of spears and swords, although few examples survive intact from the fourteenth century.161 The actual dimensions of spears used in medieval warfare are Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 63–4; R. Hardy, ‘The Military Archery at Neville’s Cross, 1346’, in Neville’s Cross, ed. Rollason and Prestwich, 112–31, at 129–31. 153 Chron. Baker, 87–8. 154 MacInnes, ‘Barbour’s Description of Scottish Arms and Armour’, 40–4; Caldwell, ‘Scottish Spearmen’, 287–9. 155 Scalacronica (King), 109. The Brut chronicle described the discovery of five hundred ‘great staffs of fine oak, with long pikes of iron and of steel’ (Brut, 276). 156 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 271. 157 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 426. 158 Chron. Melsa, iii, 61–2. 159 Chron. Melsa, ii, 364–5. 160 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 330–2. 161 D.H. Caldwell, ‘Some Notes on Scottish Axes and Long Shafted Weapons’, in Scottish Weapons, ed. Caldwell, 253–314, at 256–9; J.G. Scott, ‘Three Medieval Swords from Scotland’, in ibid., 10–20; see also Clements, ‘Wielding the Weapons of War’, 460–1. 152

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unknown and the term ‘spear’ could entail anything from a short lance to the ‘great staffs of fine oak’ found at Dunfermline.162 Depictions of spears on medieval grave effigies similarly fail to illustrate the typical length of the weapon. These images do at least provoke questions about the relative status of the spear and the sword. Although chronicles appear to give greater prominence to the spear in accounts of battles, funeral effigies are more likely to depict swords. Even in West Highland grave images swords are the most commonly depicted weapons, although the spear remains prominent in several examples as a secondary armament.163 Lowland knightly representations are consistent in their portrayal of the warrior with the sword as his sole weapon.164 Axes too are well represented in West Highland effigies, but absent from Lowland examples.165 These differences may reflect a cultural division between Highland and Lowland Scotland, although chronicle evidence does not appear to suggest that spears or axes were perceived as inferior battlefield weapons in Lowland Scotland.166 It is probable, therefore, that it was the knightly warrior’s view of himself that dictated the sword’s prominence in grave depictions.167 Influenced by stories and images from chivalric romances, knights throughout Europe likely viewed the sword as a symbol of both knightly status and military might.168 Once again the surviving evidence provides an incomplete picture, and the prominence given here to the sword hides the differences that existed between the weapons used by those of different social status. Axes and spears were probably common and effective battlefield weapons, but a lack of evidence makes it difficult to suggest how common they actually were. This lack of information is particularly acute in relation to Scottish use of archery. Caldwell, ‘Scottish Axes’, 254–9; Caldwell, ‘Scottish Spearmen’, 273–4. Caldwell, ‘Scottish Axes’, 257–9; K.A. Steer and J.W.M. Bannerman, Late Medieval Monumental Sculpture in the West Highlands (RCAHMS, 1977), 24–5, 170. For a twelfth-century example of ‘Gaelic’ soldiers fighting with spears, see Toolis, ‘Naked and Unarmoured’, 83. 164 R. Brydall, ‘The Monumental Effigies of Scotland, from the Thirteenth to the Fifteenth Century’, PSAS, 3rd series, 29 (1894–5), 329–41, figs. 13, 14, 15, 18, 24. 165 Steer and Bannerman, Medieval Monumental Sculpture, 170–2; Caldwell, ‘Scottish Axes’, 262–76. 166 Robert I famously used his axe to kill Henry Bohun on the second morning at Bannockburn (Bruce (Duncan), 448–50; Caldwell, Scottish Armoury, 8–10; Caldwell, ‘Scottish Axes’, 283–286). Froissart also seemed impressed by the Scottish use of the axe in battle, even if it was used, as he suggests, at the expense of missile weapons (Chroniques de Froissart, iv, 236; xv, 122). 167 R. Dressler, ‘Steel Corpse: Imaging the Knight in Death’, in Conflicted Identities and Multiple Masculinities: Men in the Medieval West, ed. J. Murray (New York, 1999), 135–67, at 141–1, 144. 168 Dressler, ‘Steel Corpse’, 154–6; see also J. Martindale, ‘The Sword on the Stone: Some Resonances of a Medieval Symbol of Power (the Tomb of King John in Worcester Cathedral)’, in Anglo-Norman Studies, 15 (1993), 199–241, at 232–5. 162 163



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Scottish soldiers did use bows, but the number of archers who served in Scottish forces is impossible to calculate with accuracy. The legislation of 1318 made little mention of archers, suggesting only that those at the lower end of the social scale should possess either a bow with arrows or a spear.169 Chronicle descriptions mention archers in Bruce Scottish forces and English chroniclers refer to a large number of Bruce archers at Neville’s Cross.170 The deployment of archers during sieges is demonstrated by the death of two Bruce commanders of missile troops during the siege of Perth (1339).171 There were also those, already discussed, whose feudal service involved the provision of archers for Scottish forces.172 Also significant is the indenture of service of 1372 by which James Douglas of Dalkeith promised to serve the earl of Douglas with eight men-at-arms and sixteen archers. This shows a ratio of men-at-arms to archers of 2:1 in Dalkeith’s retinue, although postulating such a ratio for the entire army would be unwise without corroborating evidence.173 Further numbers of archers could be recruited from areas of the kingdom where the bow was as much a tool as it was a weapon, such as the Highlands and ‘the Forest’ (principally southern areas such as Selkirk and Ettrick Forest).174 The quality of the archers is difficult to assess, as is that of their weapons. Froissart commented that the Scots did not use bows often and did not practise archery particularly much.175 Although Froissart is a problematic source on Scottish military matters, a lack of quality in Scottish equipment at least is suggested by Wyntoun’s account of the Disinherited siege of Loch Leven (c.1334). The successful foray of the Bruce garrison against the enemy encampment resulted in the seizure of various weapons which the Scots themselves did not possess, including ‘Alblastrys, and bowys off vyse [crossbows]’.176 RPS, 1318/29. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 330; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 24. 171 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 452; Chron. Bower, vii, 141–3. 172 See above, 63–4. 173 In the armies sent to France in the fifteenth century, archers appear to have made up a large percentage of the total number of fighting men. One French historian has written that the Scots introduced to France the ‘English’ method of mustering armies, consisting of two archers to each man-at-arms (B. Chevalier, ‘Les écossais dans les armées de Charles VII jusqu’à la bataille de Verneuil’, in Jeanne d’Arc: une époque, un rayonnement (Paris, 1982), 85–94, at 87, 88). For further examples and discussion of Scots in fifteenth-century France, see Ditcham, ‘Foreign Mercenary Troops’, 180, 200; P. Contamine, ‘Scottish Soldiers in France in the Second Half of the Fifteenth Century: Mercenaries, Immigrants or Frenchmen in the Making?’, in The Scottish Soldier Abroad, 1247–1967, ed. G.G. Simpson (Edinburgh, 1992), 16–30, at 19. 174 Barrow, Robert Bruce, 96; Barrow, ‘Army of Alexander III’, 135; Duncan, ‘War of the Scots’, 142; Steer and Bannerman, Medieval Monumental Sculpture, 172. 175 Chroniques de Froissart, xv, 122. 176 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 411. Bower wrote that during the siege ‘many on both sides were wounded by archers’ (Chron. Bower, vii, 101). 169 170

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The lack of evidence regarding Scottish archers is curious.177 The low social standing of many of those who served with bow and arrow may bear some responsibility for the lack of comment in the surviving records. The use of Scottish archers as garrison troops provoked little comment in contemporary chronicle narratives, and the absence of detailed garrison accounts is similarly responsible for a deficiency of evidence regarding the Scottish provision of missile troops. The use of archers in sieges is also partly responsible for a general lack of contemporary comment on the use of missile troops. Chroniclers’ lack of interest in the minutiae of sieges, as opposed to the detailed accounts of battles, results in archers once more being omitted from the history of this period of conflict. The general silence regarding the Bruce Scottish use of missile troops may be an indication that archers were not used as prominently as they were in English forces. However, evidence such as Dalkeith’s indenture of service, with its stipulation that a force of archers was required in his armed retinue, does support a case that archers had an integral place within Scottish military affairs that is simply absent from the patchy surviving evidence. Funding and Supply The ability to feed the Scottish population and fund the war with England came under serious strain during the Anglo-Scottish conflict, but it can be argued that the Scottish war effort was at least more cost-effective than the English equivalent. For Edward III, economic difficulties were attendant on paying large invasion armies in 1333, 1335, 1336, 1337 and 1338, as well as raiding parties, border defence forces and permanent garrisons in Scotland.178 For the Bruce Scots, the tactics of hit-and-run raiding, fewer permanent garrison forces, and fighting a defensive war were somewhat more affordable. Scotland’s financial difficulties stemmed mostly from the destruction of lands in the raiding of both sides, loss of revenue from them, and the loss of large areas of southern Scotland to the English. In these circumstances it is unsurprising that Scotland sought external support in times of extreme need. And yet it appears clear that Scotland did not become completely reliant on such external provision. That the Scottish crown continued to supply castle garrisons is demonstrated by accounts of the chamberlain for 1340 which included victuals purchased for the castles of Dumbarton and Loch Doon.179 Still, these royal supplies were augmented by contributions from Scotland’s communities. In 1336 the garrison of Kildrummy received victuals Macdonald, ‘Kingdom of Scotland at War’, 169–70. The English wardrobe account recorded that the cost of war from 31 July 1334 to 30 August 1337 totalled £84,083 15s 3d (BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 256, 251, 247). 179 Dumbarton received 52 chalders of oat flour and 67 stones of cheese, to the value 177 178



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from the men of Forres as well as the granary at Elgin.180 The community of Fife appears to have contributed financially towards the upkeep and/ or supply of Loch Leven Castle, although it was agreed at parliament in 1339 that the priory of St Andrews be exempt from this obligation.181 In 1342 the burgh of Aberdeen and the sheriffdom of Perth provided victuals for Maurice Murray’s garrison at Stirling.182 Help was also provided by Scotland’s ecclesiastical communities. In July 1339 the Steward recognised Arbroath Abbey’s contribution to the recent siege of Perth, although the form this assistance took is not clear.183 In return the abbey received letters patent protecting its regality and confirming that it would not be expected to meet such exactions in the future.184 Most of these contributions were, therefore, occasional and were short-term expedients requested and granted in times of greatest need. They were not a constant drain on Scotland’s ecclesiastical, urban and rural communities. The need for gifts and subsidies to aid the Scottish war effort nonetheless suggests that the Scottish crown was dependent on a variety of sources in order to continue the war against the Disinherited/English forces. The destruction of war also increased the need for imports of foodstuffs, alongside the wartime requirement of armaments. For both goods and financial aid, Scotland looked to the continent, and especially to France. As early as 1333, when news reached the French court of the English siege of Berwick, Philip VI filled ten ships with arms and victuals to send to the Scots’ aid.185 As already noted, in 1348 John II sent the Scots twenty suits of armour.186 In terms of monetary contributions, Philip VI provided the Scots with a total of £1,000 before David II left for France.187 In his account for 1339–40 the Scottish chamberlain recorded that from 1334 to 1340 financial assistance from the French king amounted to £2,250.188 And Eugene de Gariencières of £55 7s. Loch Doon was supplied with 60 chalders of flour and 100 stones of cheese, costing £66 (ER, i, 467). 180 The sheriff of Forres accounted for victuals to the value of £6 13s sent to Kildrummy (ER, i, 442). The sheriff of Elgin accounted for 12 chalders of wheat that were sent to Kildrummy Castle and also 3 chalders sent to Avoch Castle, both for the custodian, Andrew Murray (ER, i, 445). 181 RRS, vi, 63–4. 182 ER, i, 508. 183 RRS, vi, 63. 184 RRS, vi, 63. 185 Sumption, Trial by Battle, 134; Penman, David II, 52; Campbell, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War’, 189. 186 Journaux du Trésor de Philippe VI, no. 1278; Penman, David II, 149. 187 ER, i, 449; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 135; Penman, David II, 52. 188 ER, i, 464. Philip VI also provided a pension of 2,000 livres a year to the Scottish court in exile (Penman, David II, 54; Campbell, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War’, 187).

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arrived in Scotland with his French force in 1355 accompanied by 40,000 gold écus as a gift from John II. This was distributed among the Scottish nobility as payment in advance for mounting a campaign against the English.189 The continuation of trade with the continent was essential to ensure that supplies of foodstuffs reached Scotland, but such trade became increasingly dangerous as Edward III ordered ships to sea to halt the transport of anything that aided his enemies in the north. Of particular concern was the flow of supplies from the Low Countries, one English chronicler writing that ‘the Flemings, who were adherents of the king of France … sent the Scots arms, victuals and other necessary things, and they did not cease from assisting the Scots’.190 In 1333–4 the burgesses of Newcastle were ordered to send two warships to sea ‘to seek out the Scots’. They captured and brought back to Newcastle five Flemish ships ‘because Scots were found therein’.191 In June and July 1335, two English captains were paid to capture foreign shipping returning from Dumbarton.192 In 1337 the English king ordered the assembly of various ships at sea to ambush merchantmen from Flanders and ‘other places allied to the Scots’.193 In January 1338 protection was granted to the galleys of John de Aurea and Nicholas Blancus, which Edward III had sent ‘to scour the sea towards Scotland’.194 English naval action against continental shipping headed for Scotland continued for as long as the war progressed. In 1348 a ship from Middelburg (Zeeland), called the ‘Palmeday’, was seized at Scarborough along with various goods

Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 483; Chron. Bower, vii, 279, see also 473, n. 5–6; Penman, David II, 182–3; Campbell, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War’, 199; Sumption, Trial by Fire, 162. Calculation of what this actually amounted to in Scots currency is rather difficult to ascertain, due to the fluctuating value of French gold and silver coinage throughout this period, changes so severe that French accounts sometimes used the term écu as a means of simply describing a large sum of money (J.B. Henneman, Royal Taxation in Fourteenth-Century France: The Development of War Financing, 1322–1356 (Princeton, 1971), 332). A tentative suggestion is that the 1355 payments amounted to between £5,422 and £9,110 Scots (based on calculations of figures found in P. Spufford, Handbook of Medieval Exchange (London, 1986), 190, 176, 200; D.M. Metcalf (ed.), Coinage in Medieval Scotland (1100–1600): The Second Oxford Symposium on Coinage and Monetary History (British Archaeological Reports, 45, 1977), 142). 190 Chron. Melsa, ii, 378. 191 Ancient Petitions, 32–3. 192 CDS, iii, no. 1160; CCR, 1333–37, 414, 425; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 146. The rather long trip to Dumbarton appears to have been quite frequently used by shipping unable to sail to many of Scotland’s east coast ports. According to Wyntoun, John Randolph returned to Scotland in 1334 ‘in a cog alone Come owt off Frawns til Dwnbertane’ (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 416). 193 Rot. Scot., i, 490. 194 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 1008. 189



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found within that belonged to Scottish merchants.195 Around February 1354 a Flemish ship and its cargo was arrested after the ship was wrecked and was found to have Scottish merchants on board.196 And in July 1355 Nicholas Rodum captured a Flemish ship off the coast of Newcastle regarding which he was ordered to take any Scots found on board and negotiate sufficient ransoms for their release.197 Edward III’s concerns about materials reaching Scotland from abroad were compounded by the ongoing problem of supplies being sent to Scotland from Ireland, and even England. The English king attempted to ban the sale of Irish goods to the Scots, and in June 1337 Roaldo Richmond, constable of Carrickfergus Castle, was ordered to ensure that this ban was enforced.198 Richmond appears to have achieved some success and was rewarded with £50 worth of peas and beans he had seized from merchants involved in the illicit trade.199 Richmond’s period in royal favour was not to last. By the end of 1338 the constable was ordered to investigate the loss of the king’s wine stores, which had apparently disappeared from his own castle and been sold to the Bruce Scots.200 On 25 December 1338 Robert Savage, the king’s steward in Ulster, was ordered to arrest merchants who had taken goods and victuals and sold them to the Scottish garrisons at Rothesay, Inverkip and Loch Doon.201 There is a lack of evidence for later years, but the continued English concern over trade between the Irish and the Scots is confirmed by orders of 1348 to Andrew Guildford, recently appointed Admiral of Ireland, to find and arrest all Scots and Frenchmen and their ships and arrest any who traded with them.202 Similar problems of illicit trading existed in England, especially in the northern counties where the border was extremely permeable and where the possibility of profit was a strong motivation to ignore governmental prohibition of trade with the Scots.203 Among the most specific examples are letters of 1337 which ordered the punishment of Cumberland men who were selling victuals and other goods to the Bruce Scots. The orders single out the Solway in particular as the main point of trade between Scotland and

CCR, 1346–49, 611. CCR, 1354–60, 4. 197 CPR, 1354–58, 292. 198 Rot. Scot., i, 491; see also Rot. Scot., i, 525–6. 199 CPR, 1338–40, 52. 200 CPR, 1338–40, 403. 201 CPR, 1338–40, 403. 202 CPR, 1348–50, 71. 203 Concern about goods crossing the border from the north of England can be seen in frequent orders to halt such activity. See, for example, Rot. Scot., i, 519, 523, 531, 598–9, 645, 648, 650. 195

196

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England.204 A merchant of Hartlepool, meanwhile, had his ship forfeited around 1342 as it had been found to be carrying victuals to Scotland.205 And yet trade with Scotland was not simply a problem of northern Englishmen trying to make money in wartime conditions. A proclamation of 1349 forbad the export of arms and other goods to Scotland from all parts of the kingdom.206 The difficulties of enforcing such orders are highlighted by an inquisition of 1337 which recorded in detail the movement of ships in and out of the English port of Lynn, including various ships that sailed to France and the Low Countries for trading purposes. The authors of the report were at pains to state that ‘no ship has sailed from the port of Lenn to Scotland, or other foreign parts to the aid of the Scots enemies’. Nevertheless some Lynn ships had sailed to Berwick, Stirling, Perth and other parts of Scotland, ‘to the help of the king and his army with victuals for their maintenance’.207 The issue of supplies for English forces based in Scotland had to be addressed, but it likely afforded some merchants the possibility of selling their wares to both sides on such a trip. Naval Activity The Bruce Scottish ability to mount offensive military operations at sea was limited by the lack of a permanent navy.208 In England, mercantile ships were pressed into service in time of war, and the English appear to have employed the same system at times in the occupied parts of Scotland.209 Eighteen ships collected from Castleton (now East Wemyss), North Berwick, Aberlady, Musselburgh, Leith, Cramond and Queensferry, all harbours on the Forth, were co-opted for the use of John Stirling at Edinburgh from February to May 1336, apparently to guard the port of Leith.210 The total number of ships at Leith grew to thirty-two in May when they were used to transport members of the Edinburgh Castle garrison across the Forth to rescue the besieged defenders of Cupar Castle.211 204 Rot.

Scot., i, 491. It was even reported to the king that men such as Andrew Murray, William Douglas, and Earl Patrick of March had crossed the border in person to purchase goods (Rot. Scot., i, 495). 205 CPR, 1340–43, 385. 206 Foedera, iii, p. i, 188. 207 CIM, 1307–49, no. 1499. 208 Prestwich, ‘Wars of Independence’, 151–3; Macdonald, ‘Kingdom of Scotland at War’, 171–2. 209 Hewitt, Organisation of War, 77; W. Stanford Reid, ‘Sea-Power in the Anglo-Scottish War, 1296–1328’, Mariner’s Mirror, 46 (1960), 7–23, at 11. 210 CDS, iii, pp. 352–3. 211 CDS, iii, p. 354. Stirling paid 224 sailors to man the ships, seven men to each ship, for four days service at a cost of £10.



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That the Bruce Scots adopted a similar system of impressment of shipping is perhaps demonstrated in the attack on Berwick in 1355 by Thomas Stewart, earl of Angus. In assembling his force, Stewart ‘got together a number of ships from the several harbours of Scotland’ with which he made his nighttime attack on Berwick’s harbour.212 In northwest Scotland, other maritime forces could be assembled by feudal obligation in the form of galley service. Incorporated into charters by Robert I as a means by which the crown could codify pre-existing obligations of naval service by western Scottish kindreds, galley service recurs as a feudal render in the charters of David II.213 By two charters of June 1343, land was granted to members of the Macleod family in return for the service of one galley of twenty oars and another of twentysix.214 Similarly Angus Macdonald owed service of a galley for lands he held on Islay.215 Scottish chronicles suggest that Dougal Campbell of Lochawe was able to raise a force of 400 men when he attacked Dunoon by sea in 1334.216 Estimation of the size of this fleet, based on the galleys being of twenty oars and with two men to each oar, suggests a fleet of around ten ships.217 Galley service of this sort was especially important since the Bruce party was denied the maritime resources of John MacDonald, whose allegiance lay with Edward III and Edward Balliol.218 Yet the ability of the Bruce Scots to mount naval operations in the west, in spite of MacDonald’s opposition, is indicated by a build-up of English shipping. Edward III ordered in Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 362; Chron. Bower, vii, 281. The Bruce Scottish ships appear to have remained in place to continue the siege of the castle, as Edward III ordered that English ships should gather at Holy Island from where they were to attack the Bruce naval assets around Berwick (Rot. Scot., i, 782–3). 213 D.H. Caldwell, ‘Having the Right Kit: West Highlanders Fighting in Ireland’, in The World of the Galloglass: Kings, Warlords and Warriors in Ireland and Scotland, 1200– 1600, ed. S. Duffy (Dublin, 2007), 144–68, at 144–51; S. Boardman, ‘The Campbells and Charter Lordship in Medieval Argyll’, in Boardman and Ross, Exercise of Power, 95–117, at 113–14; McWhannell, ‘Galleys of Argyll’, 15, 26–7; Reid, ‘Sea-Power in the Anglo-Scottish War’, 16. Boardman notes, however, that the purpose of such vessels ‘was not as warships per se, but as swift and efficient troop transports, so that ship service was inextricably bound up with the wider issue of securing men to fight on land’ (Boardman, ‘Highland Scots and Anglo-Scottish Warfare’, 240–1). 214 RRS, vi, 506–7. 215 McWhannell, ‘Galleys of Argyll’, 27; J. MacInnes, ‘West Highland Sea Power in the Middle Ages’, Transactions of the Gaelic Society of Inverness, 48 (1972–4), 518–56, at 529. 216 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 414; Chron. Bower, vii, 103–5; see also Boardman, Campbells, 58–9; McWhannell, ‘Galleys of Argyll’, 23–4; MacInnes, ‘West Highland Sea Power’, 529–30; Reid, ‘Sea Power in the Anglo-Scottish War’, 16. 217 McWhannell, ‘Galleys of Argyll’, 24; MacInnes, ‘West Highland Sea Power’, 519. 218 Penman, David II, 70; Brown, Wars of Scotland, 268–71; McDonald, Kingdom of the Isles, 188–9; N. Murray, ‘A House Divided against Itself: A Brief Synopsis of the History of Clann Alexandair and the Early Career of “Good John of Islay”, c.1290–1370’, in Rannsachadh na Gàidhlig 2000: Papers read at the conference ‘Scottish Gaelic Studies 2000’, ed. C. Ó Baoill and N.R. McGuire (Aberdeen, 2002), 221–30, at 225. 212

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September 1334 that two ships of war and four barges sail to Skinburness (Cumberland) to fight against the Scots. In June 1335 three armed Irish ships were despatched to combat Scottish ‘scomours’ operating in the Irish Sea.219 Two years later a merchant complained to the Irish chancellor that he had been seized by the Scots and taken to Dumbarton Castle with his ship and his goods. He had to agree to supply forty marks worth of victuals to the garrison as his ransom.220 The continuing threat which Bruce assets posed to shipping in the Irish Sea was highlighted by the inhabitants of Man agreeing a truce with the Scots in 1342. The agreement protected not only the Manxmen themselves, but also the merchants of England, Wales and Ireland whose goods were transported to and from the island.221 Scottish naval ability is further borne out by attacks on English shipping on the east coast. The Bruce Scots captured a ship of Berwick carrying supplies to Stirling Castle in 1341 on its return journey, the ship being burned and the crew held to ransom.222 In May 1346 vessels collected to take victuals to Berwick formed a convoy, escorted by two armed ships of war that were specifically employed to protect the merchantmen from Bruce Scottish attacks.223 In May 1349 three merchants petitioned Edward III that between Bamburgh and Holy Island certain Scots had attacked their ship and that the merchants were taken to Dunbar and held for ransom. The attacker was described as ‘a ship of Scotland armed as for war’ commanded by Walter del Park.224 In 1357 Henry Knighton described the actions of three Scottish ships, purportedly manned by 300 men-at-arms, and their activities against English merchant shipping. They reportedly searched the seas for ‘Englishmen crossing with merchandise, and [took] their goods and [killed] them, and they did much harm for a long time’.225 Although the Bruce Scots did, therefore, appear to have access to naval forces, there also remained a need for outside assistance. Ships sent to the Tay estuary to besiege the Disinherited in Perth in 1332 were Flemish merchantmen that had been requisitioned at Berwick for the task.226 When Rot. Scot., i, 277; Inquisitionum in Officio Rotulorum Cancellariae Hiberniae Asservatarum Repertorium, ed. E. Tresham, i (Dublin, 1826), 41. 220 Inquisitionum in Officio Rotulorum Cancellariae Hiberniae, 42. 221 CCR, 1341–43, 654–5. 222 CDS, iii, no. 1427. This information comes from a mercantile petition seeking financial aid and is thus of uncertain reliability. Edward III himself ordered an inquiry into the details of events in order to discover the truth of the matter. 223 Rot. Scot., i, 672. For convoys in the fifteenth century, see D. Ditchburn, ‘Piracy and War at Sea in Late Medieval Scotland’, in Scotland and the Sea, ed. T.C. Smout (Edinburgh, 1992), 35–58, at 43–4. 224 CPR, 1348–50, 317, 452. 225 Knighton’s Chronicle, 157. 226 ER, i, 450–1. Compensation of £359 4s was paid to the Flemish merchants whose ships had been impressed, for damage that they had suffered during the fighting. 219



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besieging Perth again in 1339 the Bruce Scots required help from French shipping hired specifically for the purpose.227 Reginald More sold a cog called ‘de Benmound’ to David II for £200 after he had repaired and equipped it. This may have been a captured English vessel and the Scots’ readiness to repair and reuse such a ship is perhaps illustrative of their own lack of naval assets.228 Further indication that the Bruce Scots acquired ships outwith Scotland is provided by the attempts of Edward III to block such transactions. In November 1336 he asked the count of Guelders to forbid his subjects from hiring or granting ships to the Bruce Scots, who were using them against himself and Edward Balliol.229 Similar letters were sent to the king of Norway.230 Indirect French naval assistance to the Bruce Scots took the form of the almost constant threat of invasion against the southern English coast. The French also provided bases for Scottish privateers as well as engaging in piratical attacks against the English.231 In 1335 orders were sent to William Clinton to ascertain if there was any truth in reports that the Scots were assembling ships at Calais and other French ports for service against the English.232 Edward III also ensured that ships were sent from Bayonne and Bordeaux to intercept a fleet being gathered in various French ports to assist the Bruce Scots.233 The men of Bayonne were promised remuneration for their losses in 1337 at the hands of the French and Scots.234 Franco-Scottish naval forces raided Jersey and Guernsey in 1336, and Sark and Alderney were likewise attacked the following year.235 This appears to have been a concerted attack on the Channel Islands, where Thomas Ferrers was ordered to array the men of the islands to resist the ‘invasion’ by the adherents of the king’s Scottish enemies.236 Norman and Scottish ships were also blamed for the capture of an English merchant vessel at the mouth of the Seine in 1335.237 There is no evidence to suggest that Scottish naval activity in league with the 227 ER,

i, 507. i, 451. 229 CCR, 1333–37, 717. During the First War of Independence Robert I had apparently been involved in negotiations to purchase ships from Genoese merchants (Reid, ‘Trade, Traders, and Scottish Independence’, 220). 230 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 949. 231 During the First War of Independence the Scots had received assistance from French, Flemish and German privateers in attacks against English shipping (Reid, ‘Sea-Power in the Anglo-Scottish War’, 16–17, 20–21; Campbell, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War’, 189; Reid, ‘Trade, Traders, and Scottish Independence’, 220–2). 232 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 911. 233 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 915; see also ibid., 946, 965. 234 CPR, 1334–38, 410. 235 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 953; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 247. Foedera, ii, p. ii, 969. 236 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 969. 237 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 912. 228 ER,

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French was anything more than piracy and privateering, encouraged by the French crown to attack English interests. Similarly there is little to suggest that naval activity on the west coast was under the control of the crown or leading Bruce commanders, and much of it may simply have been localised raiding, related more to the politics of Irish and Scottish gaeldom than to a co-ordinated attack on English interests in the Irish Sea. Nonetheless, naval activity by Scottish ships and sailors demonstrated their ability to continue the war in another theatre. It also ensured that important English resources were expended conducting defensive naval operations to protect English shipping, rather than blockading Scotland. Conclusion The military capabilities of Scotland were, to an extent, limited by the kingdom’s size and wealth in relation to England. The Bruce Scots were able to field large armies representing the kingdom as a whole. Insufficient training and inadequate armament among the majority of the ‘army of Scotland’ contributed, however, to the defeat of these armies at the hands of militarily superior Disinherited/English troops. ‘The creaky old military machine’ continued to function as the Bruce Scottish ability to summon large armies for the battles at Dupplin, Halidon and Neville’s Cross demonstrates.238 But the war for Scotland did not require the muster of large armies with any great frequency. These examples aside, the Bruce Scots chose to adopt a strategy of battle avoidance. Instead, they prospered in smallerscale conflict, ambushing Disinherited/English forces when the opportunity arose, attacking castles by surprise and only raising larger numbers of men for major sieges when there was little possibility of English relief. The forces utilised for this smaller-scale warfare were based upon the retinues of Scotland’s military elite. These men received training, were able to afford equipment suitable to their needs and status, and became experienced warriors through their consistent involvement in the war to regain Scotland. These were the men Scottish chroniclers of the later fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries held up as their heroes, as the leaders of the Scottish kingdom against the invading forces. And the success they achieved ensured that the Balliol threat was stifled, English attacks were frustrated, and Bruce Scottish soldiers earned a reputation as capable warriors. The recognition of their value as soldiers is displayed in the employment of Scottish troops in the Hundred Years War when Anglo-Scottish conflict was in abeyance. Scots served in France for English pay in the 1360s and 1370s, principally in garrison service, and it was to Scotland that the English also turned when 238 Watson,

Under the Hammer, 25.



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seeking troops for renewed campaigns in Ireland.239 It was men such as these, skilled in war and increasingly experienced as they served throughout this period of conflict, who maintained Scotland’s military efficiency in the face of the continuing Disinherited and English threat.

239 See Issue Roll of Thomas de Brantingham, 83–5; Ditchburn, Scotland and Europe, 220–3.

3

Dramatis Personae: Military Biographies Research into medieval military history in recent years has focused increasingly on the careers of individual soldiers. The creation of the database, ‘The Soldier in Later Medieval England’, has enabled detailed analysis of warriors of various types, and of different nationalities, who fought in English service in France during the fifteenth century.1 This focus has allowed detailed consideration of the extent to which the Hundred Years War witnessed the increasing professionalisation of the medieval warrior, as he took what had been an obligation and transformed it into an occupation.2 A lack of record evidence similar to that which has survived for medieval English armies means that similar work on the careers of Scottish soldiers has been largely absent. Although analysis has been undertaken on the political careers of important figures and families in contemporary Scottish history, their military careers have not been considered in detail.3 Chronicle sources provide a useful alternative to record evidence with their often detailed depictions of battles, sieges and raids, and the participants therein.4 Scottish literary sources, although written after the events described, are based in part on earlier works and therefore provide useful detail on the military careers of prominent men.5 As already suggested, these sources are not without

A.R. Bell, A. Curry, A. King and D. Simpkin, The Soldier in Later Medieval England (Oxford, 2013); A.R. Bell, A. Curry, A. King and D. Simpkin, ‘The Soldier in Later Medieval England: An Online Database’, in The Hundred Years War (Part III): Further Considerations, ed. L.J. Andrew Villalon and D.J. Kagay (Leiden, 2013), 19–48; A.R. Bell, ‘The Fourteenth Century Soldier – more Chaucer’s Knight or Medieval Career?’, in Mercenaries and Paid Men: The Mercenary Identity in the Middle Ages, ed. John France (Leiden, 2008), 301–15; A.R. Bell, A. Chapman, A. Curry, A. King and D. Simpkin, ‘What did you do in the Hundred Years War, Daddy? The Soldier in Later Medieval England’, The Historian: The Magazine of the Historical Association, 96 (2007), 6–13. 2 For various elements of this debate, see D.J.B. Trim (ed.), The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism (Leiden, 2003). 3 See above, 3–4. 4 C. Given-Wilson, Chronicles: The Writing of History in Medieval England (London, 2004), 99–111. 5 Broun, ‘New Look at Gesta Annalia’, 9–30; Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 1



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their problems. Scottish chronicles at times give prominent place in their accounts to the ancestors of families prominent at the time their authors were writing.6 They also sometimes rewrote historical events to better suit the political reality of their own time, illustrated by the differing depictions of Robert the Steward following the succession of the Stewart dynasty to the throne.7 English chroniclers too provide essential detail of military activity, often reproducing official correspondence regarding battlefield casualties, captured enemies, and the leaders of invading forces.8 Chronicles were also the means by which many warriors’ deeds were remembered, and it is probable that medieval soldiers themselves recognised this fact.9 This and other evidence will provide the basis for exploration of Scottish military careers in this period. Who were the men who fought, and at times died, in the cause of the Bruce dynasty and David II? How consistently did they participate in the major encounters of their day, and to what extent did they develop military careers during this period? And who indeed were those who fought for the ‘other side’, those who supported a return of the Balliol dynasty, and in what ways were their careers comparable to, or different from, those of their opponents? Kings and Guardians Considering first the commanders of Bruce Scottish armies, it was the king and a succession of Guardians who led the Bruce forces in war. David II is a figure who has been subject to detailed study in recent years but his military capabilities have not been a particular focus.10 This may be because his contributions to the war as king were relatively limited as a result of his extended periods in exile in France and imprisonment in England. In the early years of his reign David II was a minor and therefore a figurehead only. During his exile in France he was, however, trained in the arts of 23–43; J.E. Fraser, ‘“A swan from a raven”: William Wallace, Brucean Propaganda, and Gesta annalia II’, SHR, 81 (2002), 1–22. 6 S. Cameron, ‘Keeping the Customer Satisfied: Barbour’s Bruce and a Phantom Division at Bannockburn’, in The Polar Twins, ed. E.J. Cowan and D. Gifford (Edinburgh, 1999), 61–74. 7 Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 23–43; Fraser, ‘A swan from a raven’, 1–22; Nicholson, ‘David II, the Historians and the Chroniclers’, 59–78. 8 Given-Wilson, Chronicles, 102–4. For discussion of the use of chronicles in analysing military history, see K. DeVries, ‘The Use of Chronicles in Recreating Medieval Military History’, Journal of Medieval Military History, 2 (2004), 1–15; A.R. Bell, ‘Medieval Chroniclers as War Correspondents during the Hundred Years War: The Earl of Arundel’s Naval Campaign of 1387’, in Fourteenth Century England, 6 (2010), 171–84. 9 Given-Wilson, Chronicles, 104–11. 10 For the period of David II’s leadership of the war, see Penman, David II, 76–139.

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kingship and war, the latter at the hands of Scottish lords and knights such as Robert Keith, Reginald More, Alexander Seton and Malcolm Fleming.11 During this time the young king would also develop interests in chivalry, and the crusade, under the influence of the French king.12 They were both elements that would inspire the rest of his reign. David II’s active leadership of war against the Balliol/English commenced after his return to Scotland in 1341, but his military abilities have been underappreciated. The older view of David as a romantic, chivalric adventurer out to win renown for himself while leading his kingdom to disaster has largely been overcome. Still, the view of a king overshadowed by an illustrious father remains, as does that of a young monarch desperate to assert his dominance over those nobles who had led the war effort in his absence.13 It should come as little surprise that a young monarch returning to his kingdom would wish to make a name for himself through military leadership. He had witnessed the commencement of the Hundred Years War while in France, and had been present when French royal forces faced off against the English at Buirenfosse in 1339.14 He was perhaps eager, therefore, to take his place in the fight against the English, and it was soon after his return that he led the Bruce fight into England once again. As already indicated, the raiding of northern England undertaken by David II and his commanders was a highly successful enterprise. It emphasised that the tide of the conflict had turned and that Edward III’s attempts at creating a ‘buffer zone’ in southern Scotland, to protect northern England, had failed. Moreover, the rapidity with which English communities resumed the habits of the 1310s and 1320s – paying the Scots ransom and blackmail money to be left in peace – demonstrates fully the fear that such raiding created in the English north, and the opportunities it raised for the Bruce Scots. That this Bruce resurgence under the leadership of David II was short-lived, ending as it did with the defeat at Neville’s Cross, should not detract from the success that was achieved. Although the exact chronology of events is somewhat confused in the sources, it appears that in 1341–42 David was personally involved in at least three raids on English territory. At least two of these progressed as far as the River Tyne, and these raids provided early examples of the king blooding himself on campaign. More than this, there is a chivalric element to events as they are portrayed in Scottish sources. Bower suggests that David II fought in his first campaign ‘not openly as king, but as if he was fighting under the banner of the earl of Moray’.15 The suggestion that David rode under someone else’s banner is 11 12 13 14 15

Penman, David II, 53–4. Penman, David II, 54, 72. For discussion of the historiography of David II’s reign, see Penman, David II, 6–12. Penman, David II, 71–2; Sumption, Trial by Battle, 286–9; ER, i, 297. Chron. Bower, vii, 151, 243. See also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 467.



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resonant of chivalric tales of kings fighting incognito.16 Indeed, the idea that ‘chivalric incognito … [was intended] to establish or revise the perception of others concerning the disguised knight’s merits’ fits well with the idea that David II used these raids to gain the confidence of his lords and knights.17 It may also have represented the passing of the baton of war leadership from Moray, and others like him, to the king.18 In later raids the king fought under his own banner, an action that reinforced his authority both to lead his men, and to wage war.19 The chivalric exhibitionism of these campaigns was made equally clear on other raids. For example, Bower notes that David II knighted several of his squires during one raid, an action intended to tie these men more closely to his kingship and his leadership.20 David II continued royal-led expeditions into Cumberland and Westmorland in 1345–6, following the expiry of the truce of Malestroit (1343). The culmination of these activities was the large-scale invasion of England led by the king that resulted in the battle of Neville’s Cross. The generally negative portrayal of David II’s military qualities has stemmed largely from the events of this one campaign and battle. Several elements are open to criticism, including the length of time it took to gather the army, the king’s inability to control in-fighting among his nobles, the time wasted sitting outside the walls of Liddel, and the decision taken to fight the battle at all.21 There can be little doubt, however, that David II saw an opportunity, while England was apparently bereft of military forces, to launch an invasion into English territory on a scale not seen since the twelfth century. The ease with which this force progressed through northern England on its way south only reinforced the idea that there were few Englishmen left to oppose the Bruce Scots. In addition, there was nothing predestined about the result of the battle. The Bruce Scots had learned from past experience and adapted to try and overcome the dangers of the English longbow. The Scottish defeat was as likely caused by one of the Bruce Scottish divisions fleeing the field, as it was by poor generalship. The evidence provided by the whole period of raiding in the 1340s, and not just the events of October 1346, shows that David II was continuing a successful strategy already begun prior to his S. Crane, ‘Knights in Disguise: Identity and Incognito in Fourteenth-Century Chivalry’, in The Stranger in Medieval Society, ed. F.R.P. Akehurst and S.C. Van D’Elden (Minneapolis, 1997), 63–79. 17 Crane, ‘Knights in Disguise’, 70. 18 Chron. Bower, vii, 151. 19 R.W. Jones, Bloodied Banners: Martial Display on the Medieval Battlefield (Woodbridge, 2010), 43, 53. 20 Chron. Bower, vii, 151, 243–4; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 467–8; Keen, Chivalry, 69–71. For later Scottish examples of this practice, see Stevenson, Chivalry and Knighthood, 50–2. 21 Grant, ‘Disaster at Neville’s Cross’, 15–35. See also Macdonald, ‘Triumph and Disaster’, 261–2. 16

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return. Although there existed a chivalric undertone to some of his actions, such a focus was little different from the actions of contemporary kings like Philip VI and Edward III.22 Rather than a romantically-inclined monarch who put his own fame and renown above the safety of his kingdom, David should be remembered as the king who fought tenaciously to escape English capture. His single combat with John Coupland, in which the Englishman lost two of his teeth, speaks of a king determined not to surrender.23 Such determination is reminiscent of that demonstrated by King John II of France ten years later at Poitiers who, in spite of his defeat, was celebrated in English sources for his bravery in battle.24 Like David II, Robert the Steward is another figure whose war record has been somewhat overlooked in comparison with his political dealings. The Steward is a problematic figure in this respect. Robert II and his successors reigned when the principal Scottish chronicles were written and compiled. Examples show that history was altered in various sources to provide a more positive spin on the family’s wartime participation. Cameron has argued quite convincingly that John Barbour’s invention of a fourth division at Bannockburn was an attempt to link the Stewart family with the most famous Scottish military event of the period.25 Similar issues have been discussed in relation to Robert the Steward’s war record and his active participation in the second conflict.26 Consideration of source evidence does, then, need to be quite circumspect. In the early years of the conflict the Steward is certainly associated with key military activities. He may have been present at the defeat of Edward Balliol at Annan in December 1332.27 Several of his relatives were listed among the fallen at Halidon Hill and Robert himself appears to have fought in the battle at the relatively young age of around seventeen.28 The first time that Robert is described taking independent action is in 1334, following his own flight to Dumbarton Castle and the king’s departure for France. Having called upon the assistance of For criticism of David II’s chivalric focus, see Nicholson, ‘David II, the Historians and the Chroniclers’, 59–63. For other contemporaries’ interest in chivalry, see for example J. Munby, R. Barber and R. Brown, Edward III’s Round Table at Windsor (Woodbridge, 2007); T. Guard, Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade: the English Experience in the Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 2013), 182–206; C.J. Tyerman, ‘Philip VI and the Recovery of the Holy Land’, EHR 100 (1985), 25–52. 23 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 476; Grant, ‘Disaster at Neville’s Cross’, 32–3. 24 The Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince, ed. R. Barber (Woodbridge, 1986), 102–3; P. Hoskins, In the Steps of the Black Prince: The Road to Poitiers, 1355–1356 (Woodbridge, 2011), 189. 25 Cameron, ‘Keeping the Customer Satisfied’, 61–74. 26 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 4–10; Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 23–43. 27 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 275. 28 Chron. Bower, vii, 93; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–7; Chron. Brut, 283–6; Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 29–30. 22



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the Campbells, familial allies of the Stewarts, Dougal Campbell of Lochawe provided naval and military support for the Steward’s raids on Cowal and Bute. The Steward himself appears to have participated in these attacks which led to the capture of Dunoon and Rothesay castles.29 The Steward’s activity in the field also inspired the local men of Bute to rise up against the Disinherited administration there, and overthrow it.30 Following this venture, Bower wrote that the Steward ‘sent bands of brave men over the Clyde virtually every day, who scattered everywhere as they laid the country waste, plundered for spoils, led men away as prisoners or brought them over to the Scottish side’.31 Boardman has argued that the Steward was probably made co-Guardian of Scotland, alongside Earl John Randolph of Moray, around this time and so these military activities may be seen in light of his elevated position.32 While the Steward is not named as participating in these raids, he certainly appears to have reaped the benefits they incurred. The lords of Renfrewshire submitted to him, and Bower states that Kyle, Cunningham and Carrick similarly came under his control. Not all of those who submitted appear to have done so willingly, and it is interesting to see the Steward adopting a style of campaigning replicated by other Bruce commanders during this period. Violent raiding was employed to convince local men that the Steward was once more the dominant power in the region. David Strathbogie’s absence in northern Scotland meant that there was little Disinherited opposition to these campaigns, and the Steward’s lordship was re-imposed on the population. Those lords who were able to enforce their lordship were those to whom local people submitted. Bower emphasises the successful nature of this period for the Steward by stating that ‘he began to attract certain brave men to his side, and to draw Scots of good sense towards him, to enlarge his army every day, and to attach their hearts to himself in mutual affection and loyalty’.33 Such a comment seems to reflect the nature of the conflict being fought more generally, and could have been used about any lord of the period. Still, as co-Guardian and a young and energetic war leader looking to recapture his familial lands, it makes sense that the Steward should create a military cadre around himself as the basis of his retinue. The Steward’s participation in important military engagements is emphasised by his presence on the raid into Galloway in July 1334, aimed at punishing those who continued to support Balliol.34 Thereafter, the Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 414–15; Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 32–3. Boardman, Campbells, 58–9; Boardman, ‘Gaelic World and the Early Stewart Court’, 98–9. 31 Chron. Bower, vii, 107. 32 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 5. 33 Chron. Bower, vii, 105. 34 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 286–7. 29

30

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Steward’s wartime activities over the next several years were less impressive. Having treated with the two Edwards in 1335 he was replaced as Guardian by Andrew Murray of Bothwell.35 Although the Steward would return to the Guardianship again in 1338, following the death of Murray, he only appears fleetingly in the military enterprises of the years preceding the king’s return in 1341. He was in attendance, for example, at the siege of Perth in 1339.36 Wyntoun portrays him as the driving force behind the capture of both Perth and Stirling Castle, but this source is problematic in terms of its portrayal of the Steward and so may have deliberately accentuated his involvement.37 The Steward is associated with no further military activity until the Neville’s Cross campaign, where his withdrawal with the earl of March likely contributed to the Scottish defeat. Moreover, in the years before David II’s return, the Steward did not just fail to participate in the Bruce war effort. He appears also to have altered its direction. Andrew Murray’s policy of taking the war to England by re-instigating raiding of the English north was abandoned by the Steward as he focused instead on concerns within Scotland. While parts of the kingdom did still need to be re-won to the Bruce cause, this appears to have been a retrograde step. It denied the advancement of a confident Bruce strategy that had already rolled back much of the Balliol conquest and was turning its attention to Edward III. Indeed the importance of this approach is demonstrated by its adoption by David II and John Randolph of Moray following their respective returns to Scotland in 1341. The reasons for his change in military policy are unclear, but his focus on Scotland does appear to support the perception of the Steward as a self-serving individual who spent most of his time as Guardian acquiring land for himself and his extended family.38 The Bruce defeat at Neville’s Cross would only emphasise this opinion even if chroniclers such as Wyntoun and Bower tried to portray the retreat as a sensible course of action, in comparison to the headstrong actions of the king.39 While the Steward’s political career has been successfully reappraised by Steve Boardman, rescuing it from negative perceptions dating back to the writing of Froissart, it is more difficult to rescue his military reputation.40 While a tactical withdrawal at Neville’s Cross may well have been the sensible action to take, it stands in stark contrast to the king’s own brave stand. It also presented something of a propaganda coup to English

Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 6; ER, i, 435. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 451–5; Chron. Bower, vii, 141–3. 37 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 451–7; Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 35–41. 38 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 6–10. 39 Chron. Bower, vii, 259–6. See also Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 7–8; Penman, ‘Scots at Neville’s Cross’, 178–9. 40 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, xiii–xvi. 35

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chroniclers, who delighted in describing the Steward’s apparent cowardice.41 A further lack of wartime activity after 1346 also counts against him. Even Bower does little to aid this view, with the recovery of Scottish territory credited to others, including the Steward’s son, John of Kyle.42 The only time Robert is mentioned at all in a military capacity is in the aftermath of the Bruce capture of Berwick town in 1355. Even then he appears to have sought to share in the reflected glory of this brief Bruce victory, won by another commander.43 This apparent lack of military leadership in his later years as Guardian does, therefore, cast doubts on the descriptions of the Steward’s earlier military career. As Boardman has demonstrated, the depiction of these years is rendered problematic by the very different approaches of chroniclers to the Steward’s accomplishments.44 In relation to his political career, Boardman argues that ‘it seems unlikely that the most successful, ambitious and ruthless Scottish magnate of the 1340s and 1350s suddenly awoke [as king] as a man unable to deal with the political hurly-burly of the Scottish kingdom’.45 It would be equally unlikely that a man blooded at a young age in battle and involved personally in the military campaigns of the early years of the war would end such involvement when he became Guardian. Still, he may have been more circumspect in his activities than others who fulfilled the role, guiding the war rather than leading it from the front. Such an approach is certainly analogous to his leadership of the renewed Anglo-Scottish conflict during his own reign in the 1370s and 1380s.46 Andrew Murray of Bothwell is a figure whose contribution to the Scottish war effort has been overlooked for a long time.47 Unlike the Steward, Murray was a Guardian who very much led the Bruce war effort from the front. In spite of this, he appears to have been absent from the earliest engagement of the conflict. He does not appear among the lists of participants, nor among those captured or killed, at Dupplin Moor.48 Considering his involvement in the activities of later 1332, this raises the question of why he was absent from this confrontation. It would seem probable that, in spite

Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 340; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27; Chron. Melsa, iii, 61–2. 42 Chron. Bower, vii, 297. 43 Chron. Bower, vii, 281–3. 44 Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 33–5. 45 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 172. 46 Macdonald, Border Bloodshed, 27–74. 47 J.G. Taylor, ‘Fighting for the Lion: The Life of Andrew Murray’, History Scotland, 5(5) (2005), 24–31. 48 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 271; Chron. Bower, vii, 77–9; Chron. Fordun (Skene), 347; Scalacronica (King), 109–11; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 151; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 304; Brut, 278–9; Chron. Melsa, ii, 364–5. 41

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of his northern estates, Murray was in fact with the southern contingent of Bruce forces which assembled as a result of the imminent Disinherited invasion. These levies only reached Auchterarder before they received word of the northern force’s destruction. They then moved on to besiege Perth, and Murray is named as one of the leaders of Bruce actions thereafter.49 He was described as leader of the Bruce forces which ambushed Edward Balliol at Kelso/Roxburgh, suggesting an early elevation in his status following the carnage at Dupplin. The ambush at Roxburgh Bridge, around 14 October, involved an attempt to cut off Edward Balliol from his army camped at Roxburgh. Murray was captured in the ensuing skirmish when the ambush failed. Bower wrote of the encounter that a man-at-arms named Radulph Golding had been overrun by English troops. In response, Murray ‘instantly went in front of the others to the bridge and followed him; but no one else of his men came after him’.50 As a result, Murray was overcome and forced to surrender. Bower’s description suggests a man conscious of the chivalric expectations of a contemporary military leader, essentially sacrificing himself to save one of his own men-at-arms.51 Although his actions were far from practical, his capture had an unforeseen benefit. For his captivity ensured that Murray escaped the forthcoming Bruce defeat at Halidon Hill. While the catastrophic loss of Bruce commanders as a result was a heavy blow to David II’s cause, it ensured that Murray was in prime position to renew leadership of the war following his return to Scotland. Andrew Murray appears to have been released from English captivity, perhaps to raise his ransom, in the middle months of 1334.52 Soon after his return to Scotland, Murray was militarily active once more. He besieged Henry Beaumont at Dundarg Castle (Buchan).53 This siege demonstrates the importance of the Scottish north to Murray’s view of the war at this stage. In part, this was because of the location of his own estates in the region. It also related to the importance of northern Scotland to the Disinherited, as many of them claimed estates located in the area.54 The emergence of David Strathbogie, titular earl of Atholl, as a major figure in the north emphasised the need for decisive Bruce action there. Although Strathbogie submitted to the Bruce cause in 1334, his return to the Balliol/English camp in the summer of 1335 left few prominent Scots who remained solidly for David II. In such circumstances, and as Guardian, Murray entered into Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 272–3. Chron. Bower, vii, 89. 51 M. Strickland, War and Chivalry: The Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066–1217 (Cambridge, 1996), 98–104. 52 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 168–9. See also Beam, Balliol Dynasty, 243; Given-Wilson and Bériac, ‘Edward III’s Prisoners’, 827. 53 Chron. Bower, vii, 95. See also Scalacronica (King), 119; Chron. Melsa, ii, 373–4. 54 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 63–4. 49 50



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a series of truce negotiations with Edward III.55 Duncan has suggested that these were not necessarily the actions of a ‘stout patriot’, but 1335 was a low point for the Bruce cause.56 Following the surrenders of that summer, the Bruce leaders needed time to regroup and refocus. Moreover, the truces agreed with the English may not have included all the Disinherited. While Andrew Murray negotiated with Edward III, David Strathbogie was besieging Murray’s wife in Kildrummy Castle. Murray appears to have been granted permission by the English to take action in response to this challenge. Accompanied by William Douglas and the earl of March, Murray took a force north.57 Strathbogie lifted the siege to meet the Bruce Scots in battle and their respective forces clashed on 30 November at Culblean. The Bruce Scottish victory resulted in Strathbogie’s death and removed one of the principal military leaders of the war. It also left northern Scotland open to Bruce recovery. As the most prominent northern noble in the field, with John Randolph captured earlier that year, it may well have fallen to Andrew Murray to ensure that the north was successfully won over once more to the Bruce cause. As Guardian, Murray also had to oversee the continuing war effort across the whole kingdom. In the aftermath of Culblean, Murray oversaw the siege of Cupar Castle in Fife, and the renewed siege of Lochindorb Castle in Strathspey. In an interesting reversal of the events of the Kildrummy siege, Lochindorb was held by David Strathbogie’s widow, Katherine Beaumont. Edward III took a small mounted force north from Perth to relieve the siege and rescue the damsel in distress.58 Andrew Murray, aware of Edward III’s approach, withdrew from the siege and allowed the English king to proceed with his campaign through Moray and Aberdeenshire.59 This withdrawal did not end Murray’s activities, and he used the presence of the English king in the north to focus his own efforts on the Scottish south. It appears likely that Murray’s efforts concentrated on his own Lanarkshire estates, which had been raided by English forces earlier that summer.60 Murray’s presence in the south also allowed him to shadow the forces of John of Eltham, the English king’s brother, during his invasion of southern Scotland at the end of July 1336. Murray avoided engaging directly with English forces at this time, and he next appeared back in the north following Edward III’s withdrawal from Rot. Scot., i, 384–8, 391; Foedera, ii, p. ii, 926, 927; CDS, iii, no. 1185. A.A.M. Duncan, ‘Murray, Sir Andrew, of Bothwell (1298–1338)’, in ODNB. 57 Ross, ‘Men for all Seasons’, ii, 11–12. 58 For discussion of this campaign, see MacInnes, ‘Lochindorb Chevauchée’, 16–31. 59 C.J. Rogers, The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations (Woodbridge, 1999), 49; Ellis, Original Letters, i, 35; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 298; Scalacronica (King), 123; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 7; Chron. Bower, vii, 119; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 429–30; Barrow, ‘Wood of Stronkalter’, 77–9. 60 CDS, v, no. 758.

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Scotland in September 1336. Murray and his forces moved into northeast Scotland in an attempt to undo the work the English king had done in bolstering Balliol support in this region. In October 1336 Murray moved into Angus, basing himself within the forest of Plater. Using this as a base of operations he launched attacks against several Disinherited/English-held castles, as well as the surrounding countryside. As a result of the ongoing nature of this warfare, Bower wrote that ‘the whole land of Gowrie, Angus and the Mearns was reduced to almost irreparable devastation’.61 Andrew Murray’s campaigns continued into 1337. The castles of Fife were systematically attacked, captured and reduced, not only returning this region to Bruce allegiance but putting further pressure on an increasingly encircled Perth. As in his campaigns in Angus and the Mearns, rural parts of Fife were devastated and local people were captured and held to ransom.62 Murray’s own castle of Bothwell, which Edward III had repaired over the previous winter, was recaptured around Easter and Stirling Castle was also besieged.63 Further devastating raids were launched by the Guardian into Galloway to put further pressure on this largely pro-Balliol region to change its allegiance. Similar attacks were also made against Lothian and included a siege of Edinburgh Castle.64 The movement of significant Bruce resources into southern Scotland led to English counter-offensives but they only seem to have provoked a further Bruce response. Copying the tactics of Robert I and his commanders, Andrew Murray began from 1337 to unleash raids across the border. Walter Bower wrote of this period that Murray ‘often with hostile intent invaded England with a powerful force; he punished it with fire and sword, and carried spoils away from it, with which he enriched his army’.65 The recommencement of raids into northern England reflected a confidence within the Bruce leadership that the war in Scotland was being won. It was now possible to take the war to the English in conscious imitation of Robert Bruce’s raids of twenty years before. It was, however, during this period of resurgence of the Bruce Scottish war effort that Andrew Murray died around the spring of 1338. He may have contracted an illness while besieging Edinburgh in the winter months of 1337. Bower wrote that Murray returned to his estates in the north and died at his ancestral castle of Avoch.66 From there his body was taken to Rosemarkie for burial. Fordun’s

Chron. Bower, vii, 125. Chron. Bower, vii, 125–7. 63 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 300–1, 303; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 10; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 313; Chron. Bower, vii, 125–7. 64 Chron. Lanercost, 303–4, 308; Scalacronica (King), 125; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 314; Chron. Bower, vii, 131. 65 Chron. Bower, vii, 127. 66 Chron. Bower, vii, 137. 61

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source adds that Murray was later reinterred in Dunfermline Abbey, perhaps a more fitting burial place for one of Scotland’s wartime heroes.67 Another prominent figure and Guardian whose wartime record is somewhat underappreciated is John Randolph, earl of Moray. The earls of Moray continued the war record of their father, Thomas Randolph, one of Robert I’s leading commanders. His eldest son, also Thomas, briefly succeeded as earl following his father’s death in 1332, but was killed fighting at Dupplin Moor. Bower records that it was Thomas Randolph who led the charge against the Disinherited lines, but that he and his men were crushed by the attack of the earl of Mar’s division from their rear.68 Earl Thomas was succeeded by his younger brother, John Randolph, who quickly involved himself in the war effort and was part of the combined force that ambushed Edward Balliol at Annan in December 1332.69 Randolph’s chivalric pretensions appear to have been to the fore in his military engagements. As early as the Annan ambush, Randolph personally intervened to ensure the survival of Alexander Bruce, son of Edward Bruce and titular earl of Carrick, who was fighting on the Balliol side.70 Considering his elevated position within the Bruce Scottish military elite, it is unsurprising to find Randolph among the leaders of the Bruce forces at Halidon Hill the following year. Indeed, Randolph is listed as leading the first Scottish division.71 His location here may explain why some English chroniclers believed that Randolph was among those killed in the battle.72 Instead, he avoided both death and capture, and in late 1333–early 1334 he was in France, presumably in negotiations with Philip VI regarding David II’s impending flight to the continent.73 By the summer of 1334, Randolph was back in Scotland and actively involved once more, with the likes of William Douglas of Liddesdale, in attacking Balliol supporters in Galloway.74 Randolph’s apparently ‘dynamic’ youthful vigour, as well as his links to the exiled Scottish king in France, led to his elevation sometime in 1334–35 to co-Guardianship with Robert the Steward.75 Penman has argued that Randolph’s return to Scotland in 1334 was part of a concerted attempt by the Bruce court-in-exile to replace the Steward altogether, while Boardman writes that Randolph was David II’s

Chron. Fordun (Skene), 354–5. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 387; Chron. Bower, vii, 77. 69 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 275; Chron. Bower, vii, 83. 70 Chron. Bower, vii, 83–5; Chron. Fordun (Skene), 347–8; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 394. See also Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 276. 71 Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 165–7. 72 Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 167–9; Scalacronica (King), 117. 73 Chron. Bower, vii, 218–9, n. 1. 74 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 286–7. 75 Scalacronica (King), 117; Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 5; Penman, David II, 55–60. 67

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‘chief and most reliable agent in the Scottish kingdom’.76 Either as Guardian, or perhaps as justiciar in the north, Randolph campaigned in autumn 1334 against the rising power of David Strathbogie in northern Scotland. Bower wrote that the young Guardian went into the north, taking with him victorious knights who firmly adhered to him together with his own men. His neyfs quickly hurried to meet him, and the earl of Moray did not leave off pursuing Earl David, who was a fugitive deserted by respectable men, until he surrounded him at the impassable approaches to Lochaber; and he scourged him and his knights with hunger and cold for such a long time that, needing hardly any persuasion, he came over to King David’s side.77

Bower’s description of events, as Ross has discussed, ignores the likely fact that Strathbogie was invited back into the Bruce fold. Moreover, the cost of his submission involved the transfer of lands belonging to ostensibly ‘loyal’ families, including Moray himself, to placate Strathbogie.78 Randolph’s importance to the northern theatre of operations is emphasised by his appearance at Tarbert Castle in 1335 in an attempt to convince John MacDonald of Islay to give his allegiance to the Bruce cause.79 In spite of Randolph’s northern connections he was also a prominent southern landowner, with territories that included the important lordship of Annandale as well as a claim to the Isle of Man. His lordship over Annandale brought William Douglas of Liddesdale into his following in these early years, a connection that developed further in this period.80 During Edward III’s winter campaign of 1334–5, Randolph and his forces shadowed the movements of the English king.81 Following the English withdrawal, Moray campaigned in Lothian ‘to bring the southern Scots back to loyalty’.82 Here he joined once more with Douglas in a violent campaign, intended to reinforce the continued importance and military capability of the Bruce forces.83 Randolph’s reputation around this time also appears to have been growing and Wyntoun writes that around this time ‘men hym callyd wtraly / The best begynnyng off a man, / That in Scotland wes lyvand than’.84 John Randolph was in the south once more in the summer of 1335 and it was while there that he skirmished with the forces of Guy, count of Namur. The continental lord and his men were ambushed by Randolph, 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84

Penman, David II, 57–9; Boardman, Campbells, 60. Chron. Bower, vii, 107. See also Scalacronica (King), 119; Chron. Melsa, ii, 372–3. Ross, ‘Men for All Seasons’, ii, 6–7; Penman, David II, 57. Chron. Bower, vii, 111. Brown, Black Douglases, 35–6. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 288–9. Chron. Bower, vii, 107–9. Chron. Bower, vii, 107–9. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 419.



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William Douglas and Patrick, earl of March, at Burgh Muir. Although they were able to take refuge within the ruins of Edinburgh Castle, they were forced to surrender to the Bruce Scots on terms. Randolph, once again showing a chivalric flair in his treatment of enemy prisoners, allowed his men to take some booty but extracted no ransom from the Low Countries lord. He also volunteered to escort the count of Namur back to the relative safety of the English border.85 Around this time, however, Randolph and his men were ambushed by English border forces and defeated in a skirmish that resulted in Moray’s capture.86 He spent considerable time in English captivity as Edward III ensured that this prominent Bruce leader would not return quickly to the conflict.87 In spite of his captivity, Randolph still appears in events relating to AngloScottish warfare. For example, he was present at the English siege of Dunbar Castle in 1338. The English brought Randolph before the castle walls, because its defence was led by Randolph’s sister Agnes, and threatened to kill him if she did not surrender. She did not, however, behave as expected and stated that she would only submit at her husband’s command. As a result ‘the English would not do what they had threatened, but (decided) rather to take him back to England and keep him in ward, as before’.88 Randolph, still a captive, appeared in Scotland again around 1341. Edward III had agreed by October 1340 to an exchange of Moray for the captured William Montague, earl of Salisbury, taken at Lille around April 1340.89 The final agreement for their release involved complex negotiations regarding Moray, Montague and another prisoner, the Breton lord Hervy de Léon, which were not resolved until 1342.90 Chronicle accounts record, nonetheless, that Randolph led the raid into England in 1341 in which David II fought under the earl’s banner.91 The same chronicles even suggest campaigns undertaken by Moray in Annandale, before the king returned to Scotland, to retake

Chron. Bower, vii, 113–15. The sources differ as to the sequence of events following the capture of the count of Namur. See Chron. Bower, vii, 113–15; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 420–1; Chron. Melsa, ii, 375–6; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 292, 293; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 4; Scalacronica (King), 121; Chron. Murimuth, 75; Ann. Paulini, 364, Chron. Baker, 56; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 311. 87 CDS, iii, nos. 1171–4, 1337, 1349, 1359, 1361, 1364; CCR, 1333–37, 440, 712; CCR, 1339–41, 41, 271–2, 431, 540; CPR, 1338–40, 245. 88 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 314, 312. 89 Rot. Scot, i, 592, 599, 601, 602–3; CDS, iii, no. 1343; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 188, 214; M.W. Warner, ‘The Montague Earls of Salisbury, circa 1300–1428: A Study in Warfare, Politics and Political Culture’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University College London, 1990), 20. 90 Warner, ‘Earls of Salisbury’, 20. 91 See above, 41–2, 100–1. 85

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his lordship and Lochmaben Castle.92 This activity may have been made possible by the terms of the truce of Espléchin (1340). They included the stipulation that ‘prisoners were to be freed on condition that they return to their captors at the end of the truce if they had not been ransomed in the interim’.93 Release on parole would potentially explain Randolph’s involvement in these events, although it is likely that the terms of such would have disallowed military participation.94 That he remained a prisoner is borne out by English sources which continue to refer to him as such until his release around June 1342.95 Randolph’s elevation as March Warden upon his return demonstrates his importance as a Bruce commander, as well as his closeness to the young king as a dependable ally.96 It also emphasises that Randolph’s focus in the later 1330s and 1340s was on the Scottish south, a focus that reflected the war’s development as an increasingly border conflict. Randolph returned to his lordship around 1343 and besieged Lochmaben Castle, but was forced to withdraw at the intervention of an English relief army.97 Still, he remained active in the south and took a prominent role in the raids against northern England that preceded Neville’s Cross. The Lanercost chronicler lists him among those who took part in a raid on Cumberland in July 1346.98 He was also prominent at Neville’s Cross itself, fighting as he had at Halidon Hill, in the first Bruce division.99 Bower alone provides any specific detail on Randolph, noting that his division was ‘involved in a fearful fight between ditches and hedges’.100 In the midst of this melee, Earl John was killed, and with him ended the Randolph line of Moray earls.101 The last two Guardians considered here were in charge of Scotland’s war effort for the shortest periods. Earl Donald of Mar was catapulted into the role of Guardian as a result of the twin emergencies of Thomas Randolph’s death and the Disinherited invasion in 1332.102 He is described by Penman as Moray appears to have been made Warden of the West March around this time (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 462–3; Chron. Bower, vii, 149, 241, nos. 39, 40–41). 93 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 214. 94 R. Ambühl, Prisoners of War in the Hundred Years’ War: Ransom Culture in the Late Middle Ages (Cambridge, 2013), 41–2. 95 Rot. Scot., i, 609–10, 628; CDS, iii, no. 1376; CPR, 1340–43, 381. 96 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 7. 97 Chron. Angliae, 14; Historia Anglicana, 254; Chron. Melsa, iii, 52. See also Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 325; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 18. 98 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 326. 99 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 338–40; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27; Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61. 100 Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61. 101 Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 341; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333– 1381, 27–8; Scalacronica (King), 137; Chron. Melsa, iii, 61–2; Knighton’s Chronicle, 69–73; Chron. Angliae, 23–4; Historia Anglicana, 269–70; Chron. Murimuth, 218–19. 102 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 346; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 384; Chron. Bower, vii, 73; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 268. 92



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‘a prudent rather than an aggressive choice’.103 English sources suggest that Mar was an erstwhile Balliol supporter who only changed sides following his elevation to the Guardianship.104 If this was the view of Mar within Scotland as well, then it may go some way to explaining the disarray displayed by the Bruce leaders at Dupplin Moor. Both Scottish and English chronicles agree that there was a lack of organised leadership and battlefield control over the Bruce forces. Bower wrote that the earl of Mar was ‘lit up with passionate rage’ and was accompanied by ‘a countless multitude following in disorder … Unable to hinder the rush and too eager to fight with the English, he charged the [Disinherited line]’.105 The result of this disorganised attack was the crush of those Bruce Scots who were ahead of Mar’s forces, and the deaths of countless soldiers. The English Brut chronicle provides a remarkably detailed, though likely invented, account of a conversation between Earl Donald and Earl Robert Bruce of Carrick. Mar is said to have stated that it would be unfortunate to spill Christian blood in battle, and suggested that the Bruce Scots offer the Disinherited an opportunity to surrender. Bruce took this as a sign of Mar’s cowardice and treasonous behaviour and stated as much to Mar. As a result both men charged headlong into battle in their haste to demonstrate their desire and ability to defeat the Disinherited forces, which in turn led to the disorganised Bruce charge and Mar’s own death.106 Whether the Brut chronicle’s description of distrust and division within the Bruce leadership reflects reality, or an English view of Scottish politics, is unclear. It does at least suggest some explanation for the disorderly Bruce charge and perhaps also why Mar attacked the Disinherited before southern Scottish forces arrived. If Mar felt that his loyalties were distrusted, then a heroic action in leading his forces to victory over Balliol would have cemented his position as Guardian. It is also perhaps too easy to condemn Mar for lack of military competence. He had, after all, seen action on more than one occasion, although often when fighting for the English. He fought for Edward II at Boroughbridge (1322), where he took a number of notable rebel captives, and also fought against the Scots at Old Byland (1322).107 Upon his return to Scotland in the wake of Edward II’s deposition he was one of the Scottish leaders of the raid that led to the Weardale campaign

Penman, David II, 47. Brut, 274; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 268; Chron. Melsa, ii, 363–4; Beam, Balliol Dynasty, 213–15; Penman, David II, 47. 105 Chron. Bower, vii, 77–9. See also Scalacronica (King), 109–11. 106 Brut, 278–9. 107 V. Gibbs, ‘The Battle of Boroughbridge and the Boroughbridge Roll’, The Genealogist, new series, 21 (1905), 222–6, at 223, 225; SP, v, 582; F. Watson, ‘Donald, Eighth Earl of Mar (1293–1332)’, in ODNB. 103

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(1327).108 He was also involved in encouraging support for the deposed Edward II, and may have appeared personally in Wales in 1327 to raise rebellion in the English king’s name.109 Mar was not, then, an inexperienced warrior or commander, although his personal knowledge of Scottish strategy and tactics may have been more limited. Still, he did lead the Bruce forces at Dupplin, a battle described by one historian as ‘the apogee of … Scottish [military leadership] incompetence’.110 Killed in the crush that resulted from the Scots’ ill-controlled attack against the Disinherited line, Earl Donald was the most notable casualty among the large number of Bruce dead. Archibald Douglas did not become Guardian until after the capture of Andrew Murray in October 1332, but he was to the fore in the early actions of the Bruce forces in this period. Like others who escaped Dupplin Moor, Douglas appears to have been part of the southern army collected for the battle. Following the Bruce defeat he was among those who laid siege to Perth and, following the failure of this enterprise, was involved in raiding Galloway.111 Douglas also appears to have planned to ambush Edward Balliol when the newly crowned king ventured into the southwest. Thomas Gray wrote that Douglas was discovered before he could spring his trap near Jedburgh, and several of his men were captured by the Disinherited.112 Douglas was then involved in the far more successful ambush of Balliol at Annan at Christmas 1332.113 Indeed, he may have been instrumental in creating the conditions for this victory. He is listed among those who sought a truce from Balliol, a cessation of war that led the erstwhile king to lower his guard and resulted in his defeat and hasty escape. The Lanercost chroni­ cler even suggested that ‘Archibald Douglas [was] the prime mover in planning and prosecuting the said overthrow of the king’.114 Douglas’s career up to this point had been largely successful, and it may therefore have been a relatively simple decision to name him Guardian following Andrew

Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 256–7; Chron. Bower, vii, 35; Bruce (Duncan), 711–13; Scalacronica (King), 97–8. 109 M. Penman, Robert the Bruce, King of Scots (New Haven, 2014), 276–7, 280; R. Nicholson, ‘The Last Campaign of Robert Bruce’, EHR, 77(303) (1962), 233–46, at 234, 245; P. Dryburgh, ‘The Last Refuge of a Scoundrel? Edward II and Ireland, 1321–7’, in The Reign of Edward II: New Perspectives, ed. G. Dodd and A. Musson (York, 2006), 119–39, at 138–9. 110 Macdonald, ‘Triumph and Disaster’, 261. 111 Chron. Lanercost, 272–3; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 151–3; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 305; Chron. Melsa, ii, 365–6. 112 Scalacronica (King), 111; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 153–5. 113 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 275; Chron. Bower, vii, 83–5; Chron. Fordun (Skene), 347–8; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 394; Scalacronica (King), 111–13; Chron. Hemingburgh, 306; Chron. Melsa, ii, 366–7; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 157. 114 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 276. 108



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Murray’s capture.115 His first action after this elevation was to mount a counter-attack against the Disinherited invasion of February–March 1333 to besiege Berwick-upon-Tweed. Douglas gathered a sizeable force and crossed the border into Northumberland and Cumberland.116 This appears to have been an attempt to draw the English members of the Disinherited away from the siege to protect their own lands. Here Douglas was possibly mimicking James Douglas’s successful actions for the same purpose during the English siege of Berwick in 1319.117 This raiding failed, however, to distract the Disin­ herited from their efforts. It may also have contributed to direct English intervention in Scotland. In spite of the presence of Englishmen within the ranks of the besiegers, the siege of Berwick was ostensibly a Disinherited operation. As a result of the Bruce Scots invading England, Edward III had the excuse he needed to join the conflict in support of Edward Balliol, without breaking the terms of the treaties of Edinburgh and Northampton. This English invasion prompted a further Bruce raid into northern England. Bower argues that it was Douglas himself who decided ‘to traverse everything which was pleasant to the eye with fire and sword, so that in this way he might perhaps succeed in interrupting the siege of the town’.118 This issued a direct challenge to Edward III to protect his own territories, but Douglas may have underestimated the English king’s determination to regain Berwick.119 He was, after all, repeating a tactic that had already failed to dislodge the Disinherited. It also placed the Guardian in a position where he was eventually faced with the choice of fighting the English or losing Berwick. Archibald Douglas appears to have been unable to countenance Berwick’s loss.120 He may also have been convinced of the likelihood of victory as a result of possessing the larger army.121 But even if the Bruce army did outnumber the English, the decision to fight suggests that the Bruce leadership had learned little from Dupplin Moor.122 As with Mar at Dupplin, Douglas may also have been determined to prove himself as Guardian, and as a military leader, in the ultimate test. Although written by an English chronicler, a battlefield speech attributed to Douglas suggests Bruce confidence in their chances of success: Brown, Black Douglases, 34. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 157; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 307; Chron. Melsa, ii, 367–8. 117 Chron. Melsa, ii, 367–8; Bruce (Duncan), 642; Brown, Black Douglases, 34. 118 Chron. Bower, vii, 91. 119 For the Scottish raid, see Chron. Bower, vii, 91; Scalacronica (King), 115–17; Chron. Angliae, 4; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 161–3; Polychronicon, viii, 328; Chron. Melsa, ii, 369. 120 Brown, Black Douglases, 34. 121 Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308; DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 121–2. 122 Macdonald, ‘Triumph and Disaster’, 261. 115

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Take comfort my brothers and take up your arms with vigour. Behold, the lords of our enemy are on horseback, so that some of them after being put to flight might more easily arrive at the head of those fleeing. Fortune has led them to this position, as if they were enclosed by boundaries. At their back lies a large town armed with bellicose men. On their right is the spacious and deep ocean. And on their left run the waters of the Tweed River which is filled to overflowing by the tides. Therefore take spirit.123

Although likely intended to portray Scottish overconfidence to enhance the nature of the English victory, this speech nonetheless reflects the reality of the Bruce position. Located as they were atop a hill, they could well feel confident. The defeat that followed only demonstrated the extent of the Bruce miscalculation, especially when they abandoned their defensible position and charged the English lines. The fault for this decision is placed firmly on Douglas’s shoulders by one English chronicler.124 Like Mar at Dupplin, Douglas paid for his error with his own life.125 Bower wrote that Douglas ‘had a brave heart and a warlike nature’.126 He even argued that Douglas would have been successful if he had continued raiding England until Edward III was forced to retreat. He recognised, however, that Douglas was known to history as ‘the Tyneman’ (‘the loser’).127 Although Brown argues that Douglas’s individual successes in the period before Halidon Hill demonstrated military skill, it is clear that this was insufficient to bring him battlefield success.128 Noble Military Leaders Below the Guardians were the earls and major nobles who were expected to be military leaders during periods like the Wars of Independence. As in the previous conflict, this group’s participation was inconsistent. Tracing the careers of members of this group is problematic due to the existence of alternative claimants to earldoms from the ranks of the Disinherited. It is further confused by changes in comital dynasties as the period progressed. In such circumstances, then, inconsistent comital support for David II may be expected. This section will consider the extent to which this is correct, and reconsider the active military role of the Scottish nobility in this conflict. Beginning with the earls it is clear from the lists of those who fought at Chron. Bridlington, 115; translation in DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 122. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 279–80. 125 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 279–80; Chron. Bower, vii, 93; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307– 1334, 165–7; Scalacronica (King), 115–17; Chron. Melsa, ii, 370. 126 Chron. Bower, vii, 91. 127 Chron. Bower, vii, 91. 128 Brown, Black Douglases, 34. 123

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the major engagements of the period that this group was well represented (see Table 2).129 Table 2: Scottish earls at Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill and Neville’s Cross Angus Atholl Buchan Caithness Carrick Fife Lennox Mar March Menteith Moray Ross Strathearn Sutherland Wigtown

Dupplin Moor

Halidon Hill

?

?

? ü

ü ü ü ü

Neville’s Cross ? ü ? ü

ü ? ü

ü ü ü ü ü

ü ü ü ü ü ü

Note: Those marked ü were likely present at the battles listed. Those marked ? are named as being present in some sources, but doubt remains about their participation.

Considering that those listed for the battle of Dupplin Moor are only those who took part in the battle itself, and do not include those who were present in the southern army, this appears to represent a high degree of participation. Adding historical detail to these bare statistics only enhances this perception. Thomas Stewart, earl of Angus, was a minor during the 1330s, and may only have been sixteen by the time of the battle of Neville’s Cross.130 Still, Penman envisages Angus as one of those who may have fled the Durham battlefield with his close kinsman, Robert the Steward.131 As a close adherent of the Guardian he was active in Scottish political affairs in the 1340s and 1350s. Penman also conjectures that Angus was among those Scottish nobles after Neville’s Cross who continued to launch attacks against Balliol/Englishheld territory.132 Angus certainly played a notable military role, alongside Earl Patrick of March, in helping to lead the attack which captured Berwick These figures are sourced from a number of chronicle accounts cited throughout this work, references to which are also collated in DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 112–28, 176–87. 130 N.H. Reid, ‘Stewart, John, First Earl of Angus (d. 1331)’, in ODNB. 131 Penman, David II, 135. 132 Penman, David II¸153. 129

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town in 1355.133 This success was resonant of past Bruce sieges, including as it did a night attack by sea and the use of specially-made scaling ladders to climb over the town’s formidable defences.134 The earldom of Caithness was in this period in the hands of the earls of Strathearn. Malise, eighth earl of Strathearn, held Caithness in the 1330s and fought on the Bruce side at the battle of Halidon Hill.135 He resigned Strathearn, however, to Edward Balliol and was later tried for treason by David II as a result. The earldom of Strathearn at least was never returned to him, and Earl Malise retired north to his Caithness earldom, removing himself from the politics of the period and from the war.136 The earldom of Strathearn passed to Maurice Murray of Drumsargard who, in the 1340s, became a firm favourite of the Scottish king.137 It was as part of David II’s knightly cadre that Murray fought as earl at Neville’s Cross, where he was killed.138 Prior to becoming earl, Murray had a quite impressive war record. He was listed among those who refused to surrender to the two Edwards in 1335, suggesting that he was already a notable Bruce commander by this point.139 If Penman is correct, this position may have been based upon experience gained fighting at Dupplin and Halidon, as well as developing a warband in Clydesdale in opposition to Balliol forces in the area.140 Thereafter he was present at the siege of Perth in 1339, and was given custody of Stirling Castle after its fall in 1342, suggesting that he may have taken part in that siege.141 His death at Neville’s Cross appears to reflect the culmination of an active military career, and not just the death of one of the king’s favourites fighting alongside his lord. Malcolm, fifth earl of Lennox, was a Bruce supporter who, according to Barbour, had aided Robert I during his darkest days in the First War of Independence and who had fought at Bannockburn.142 His loyalty to the Bruce cause appears to have continued into the second period of conflict and Earl Malcolm fought and died at Halidon Hill.143 And yet it has been Scalacronica (King), 141; Chron. Bower, vii, 281–3; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 33. Chron. Bower, vii, 281–3. 135 Penman suggests that Strathearn also fought at Dupplin Moor but this is unclear (Penman, David II, 48). 136 For the political career of Earl Malise, see C.J. Neville, ‘The Earls of Strathearn from the Twelfth to the Mid-Fourteenth Century, with an Edition of Their Written Acts’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1983), i, 147–55. See also Penman, David II, 68–9, 106–8. 137 See Penman, David II, 68, 79, 95, 105–9. 138 Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 341; Chron. Knighton, 69–73. 139 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 294. 140 M.A. Penman, ‘Murray, Maurice, Earl of Strathearn (d. 1346)’, in ODNB. 141 Chron. Bower, vii, 141–3, 145. 142 Bruce (Duncan), 134–44; Penman, Robert the Bruce, 140–1. 143 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–7; Brut, 283–6; see also Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308–9. 133

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argued that, in spite of his involvement in both conflicts, Earl Malcolm and his son, Earl Donald, mostly took a ‘cautious approach to events beyond the Lennox’.144 This is borne out particularly in the career of Earl Donald who is absent from all major confrontations for which evidence survives. He would likely have been of an age to fight at Neville’s Cross, but his absence from this battle is noticeable and may speak to deliberate avoidance of military service.145 Earl Thomas of Mar, the former Guardian’s son, was a minor during the most active periods of the conflict and spent this time in England. He only came to political prominence following his return to Scotland in the early 1350s.146 Described by Penman as ‘an energetic and impressive knight … trained in the spirit of chivalry’, he was also ‘a one-off given to independent, almost maverick actions … content to serve the crown so long as it profited him’.147 His military activities appear to have largely taken second place to his political career during his early years back in Scotland. He may, however, have been one of the leaders of Bruce forces which hovered around the fringes of Edward III’s army during the ‘Burnt Candlemas’ of 1356.148 He also took advantage of the peace achieved by the Treaty of Berwick (1357) to enter the English king’s military service in 1359, a route increasingly pursued by other Scots during periods of AngloScottish truce.149 The earldom of Wigtown was created by David II in 1341 for the stalwart Bruce supporter, Malcolm Fleming. Wigtown fought in the king’s division at Neville’s Cross and was captured in the battle, although he was able to escape his imprisonment in 1347.150 Two of his captors, Robert Bertram and Robert Delaval, were punished by Edward III for allowing this to occur, although it is possible that one or both men conspired to allow Fleming’s escape in return for a ransom.151 Prior to his elevation as earl, Fleming had fought at Halidon Hill, from which he was able to escape the Bruce defeat.152 Having retired to Dumbarton Castle, he was there when the king arrived to take ship for France, and Fleming accompanied David II to the continent. Here he may have been involved in teaching the king Brown, ‘Earldom and Kindred’, 206. S.I. Boardman, ‘Lennox Family (per. c.1300–1425)’, in ODNB; SP, v, 336–7. 146 F. Watson, ‘Donald, Eighth Earl of Mar (1293–1332)’, in ODNB; Penman, David II, 159–60; Beam, Balliol Dynasty, 262. One English chronicler places Mar at Neville’s Cross, but this appears to be an error (Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 24). 147 Penman, David II, 159. 148 Oeuvres de Froissart, v, 336. 149 Rot. Scot., i, 836. For Scots in English service in the later fourteenth century, see Macdonald, Border Bloodshed, 44; G.S.C. Swinton, ‘John of Swinton: A Border Fighter of the Middle Ages’, SHR, 16 (1919), 261–79. 150 Rot. Scot., i, 695–6. 151 Rot. Scot., i, 680, 681, 695–6; King, ‘Prisoners and Casualties’, 278; Given-Wilson and Beriac, ‘Edward III’s Prisoners’, 811. 152 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–7; Brut, 283–6; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308–9. 144 145

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knightly and military skills.153 Such a role appears suitable for a noble who had fought, and would fight again, in some of the major confrontations of the period. Earl Hugh of Ross was another lord who fought and died at Halidon Hill.154 He and his men were praised by Bower for targeting, unsuccessfully, the division of Edward Balliol on the battlefield.155 Wyntoun wrote in a more lamentary style that Ross ‘made stalwart and rycht lang fychtyng, / That serwyd bot off lytill thyng; / For he wes dede, and all his men / Ware nere-hand slayne abowt hym then.’156 Earl Hugh may have been killed in spite of supposed saintly protection. John Maior, writing in the 1520s, wrote that Ross had ridden into battle while wearing a relic of St Duthac’s hair shirt. As Turpie writes, if this was indeed the case then ‘the relic failed spectacularly’.157 Earl Hugh’s son, William, may have been in exile in Norway when his father died, and as a result did not succeed to the earldom of Ross until around 1336.158 Despite this, Earl William was listed by one English chronicler among those Bruce partisans who continued to hold out in spite of the general Bruce submissions of 1335.159 He was involved in the Bruce siege of Perth in 1339, where the earl was able to employ miners who ‘constructed tunnels, digging them over long distances, by which means they drew the water out of the moats and left them dried up’.160 Ross, like his father before him, however, remained a difficult figure who actively sought to extend his lordship. This brought him into conflict with other Bruce nobles, including the Steward. Wyntoun wrote that, following the conclusion of the Perth siege, the Steward took his forces to besiege Stirling but Earl William left the army as a result of quarrels among its leaders.161 Such disagreements had more serious consequences when they impacted directly on the gathering of the army for the Neville’s Cross campaign. Following David II’s summons, Earl William led a company of men to the northern muster point at Perth. While there his feud with another political Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 404; Chron. Bower, vii, 83, 93, 96; Penman, David II, 53–4. Bower names Fleming as David II’s foster father (Chron. Bower, vii, 83). 154 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 279–80; Chron. Bower, vii, 93; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–9; Brut, 283–6; Scalacronica (King), 117; see also Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308–9. 155 Chron. Bower, vii, 93. 156 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 401. 157 T. Turpie, ‘Our Friend in the North: The Origins, Evolution and Appeal of the Cult of St Duthac of Tain in the Later Middle Ages’, SHR, 93(1) (2014), 1–28, at 22–3; John Major, A History of Greater Britain, ed. A. Constable (Edinburgh, 1892), 273. 158 R.W. Munro and J. Munro, ‘Ross Family (per. c.1215–c.1415)’, in ODNB; SP, vii, 237. 159 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 294. Earl William is named by the same chronicler at Culblean but this would appear to be an error (ibid.) 160 Chron. Bower, vii, 141–3; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 451, 453–4. 161 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 455; Penman, David II, 69. 153



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enemy, Ranald MacRuaridh, resulted in Ross’s men killing the earl’s rival at Elcho Abbey. He and his men fled back north in the aftermath of the act.162 The Bruce defeat at Neville’s Cross ensured that Ross largely escaped censure for MacRuaridh’s death, and thereafter he focused his attentions on his earldom.163 The earls of Carrick are listed as participants in several battles, but there are complexities over who possessed this title at the time of these engagements. Robert Bruce, lord of Liddesdale and illegitimate son of Robert I, is named as earl of Carrick by English sources in 1332.164 He does not, however, appear to have been granted this title, which instead belonged either to the young David II or to Alexander Bruce, illegitimate son of Edward Bruce.165 If Robert Bruce did indeed claim the title, then it may have been an attempt to take advantage of the distressed situation at the time to seize some political and territorial power for himself. He appears nonetheless to have done so while still supporting his half-brother’s kingship. Bruce was present at the skirmish at Kinghorn when the Disinherited landed in Scotland.166 He was also one of the leaders of Bruce forces at Dupplin Moor.167 As discussed above, Bruce was blamed by one English chronicler for causing the undisciplined charge of the earl of Mar’s division which led to his own death.168 Scottish chroniclers are more sympathetic towards Bruce and list him in the leading Scottish division that was first into battle and suffered as a result of Mar’s charge.169 Both portrayals suggest an individual keen to demonstrate his military prowess. Like Mar, Bruce may have sought to win chivalric renown and establish his position as earl of Carrick through a prominent display in the battle.170 The Bruce casualties at Halidon Hill also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 472; Chron. Bower, vii, 253; Penman, ‘Scots at Neville’s Cross’, 175–6. 163 Penman, ‘Scots at Neville’s Cross’, 178; Penman, David II, 157–8. 164 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 271; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 304; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 151; F. Watson, ‘Bruce, Sir Robert, Lord of Liddesdale (c.1293–1332)’, in ODNB. 165 Penman, David II, 35, 40; SP, ii, 436–7; A.A.M. Duncan, ‘Bruce, Edward, Earl of Carrick (c.1280–1318)’, in ODNB; A. Grant, ‘Royal and Magnate Bastards in the Later Middle Ages: The View from Scotland’, in La bâtardise et l’exercice du pouvoir en Europe du XIIIe au début du XVIe siècle, ed. É. Bousmar, A. Marchandisse, C. Masson and B. Schnerb. Revue du Nord hors-série. Collection Histoire, vol. 31 (Villeneuve-d’Ascq, 2015), 313–68; Chron. Bower, vii, 83, 206, n. 56. 166 Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 304. 167 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 271; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 151; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 304; Chron. Melsa, ii, 364–5; Scalacronica (King), 109–11. Scottish chroniclers do not name Bruce as earl of Carrick (Chron. Bower, vii, 77–9; Chron. Fordun (Skene), 347). 168 Brut, 278–9. 169 Chron. Bower, vii, 77; see also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 387–8. 170 Grant, ‘Royal and Magnate Bastards’. 162

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included an earl of Carrick, this time in the person of Alexander Bruce.171 Although an Alexander Bruce is named among the dead at Dupplin, this may be incorrectly recorded in place of his capture.172 For Alexander Bruce was in the Balliol camp only a few months later, and he was among Balliol’s followers ambushed at Annan in December 1332. As stated above, it took the direct intervention of the earl of Moray to ensure that Bruce survived the encounter.173 Despite this dalliance with the Balliol party, Alexander returned to the Bruce cause and his death at Halidon as earl of Carrick suggests that he was regranted the earldom as a reward for changing sides.174 A further earl of Carrick is listed among those captured at Neville’s Cross but this would appear to be a chronicle error. The earldom reverted to the crown following Alexander Bruce’s death and was not granted again until 1368.175 The earls of Menteith were quite prominent militarily in this period. Earl Murdoch fought at Dupplin Moor, where he was credited with being among the first to come to blows with the enemy.176 As a result, he and his men were caught in the ensuing crush and Earl Murdoch was one of the many notable Bruce casualties on the day.177 Earl John Graham of Menteith, who succeeded to the earldom through his wife around 1334, submitted to the two Edwards in 1335.178 Like various others, he later returned to the Bruce allegiance and played a notable role in the battle of Neville’s Cross.179 Seeing the danger posed by the English archers, Graham requested that his king allow him to take 100 mounted men to disperse the English bowmen, much as Robert Keith was said to have done at Bannockburn.180 David 171 Chron. Bower, vii, 83; Brut, 283–6; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308–9; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 279–80; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 167–9; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308–9. 172 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 151; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 304. 173 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 347–8; Chron. Bower, vii, 83–5; Penman, David II, 40–1; Beam, Balliol Dynasty, 237. 174 Duncan, ‘Bruce, Edward, earl of Carrick’; Grant, ‘Royal and Magnate Bastards’. 175 Knighton’s Chronicle, 69–73; SP, ii, 438. 176 Chron. Bower, vii, 77; SP, vi, 135–7. 177 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 347; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 151; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 304; Chron. Melsa, ii, 364–5. There is some confusion, however, regarding English sources listing an earl of Menteith amongst those killed at Halidon Hill a year later (Chron. Anonimalle, 165–9; Scalacronica (King), 109–11). John Graham did not become earl until around 1334 and, immediately following Earl Murdoch’s death, the earldom passed to his niece, through whom Graham became earl (SP, vi, 137–8). It may be that this is an English error for one of the Stewarts of Menteith. For their complex genealogy, see The Red Book of Menteith, ed. W. Fraser (Edinburgh, 1880), i, 458–61. 178 Chron. Melsa, ii, 376; SP, vi, 137–8. 179 Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 338–40; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27; Chron. Melsa, iii, 61–2; Knighton’s Chronicle, 69–73. 180 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 475; D. Cornell, Bannockburn: The Triumph of Robert Bruce (New Haven, 2009), 202.



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II refused Menteith’s request, and so the earl attacked the English line on horseback alone.181 His mount was shot from under him and, with difficulty, he struggled back to the Scottish line.182 He was thereafter captured in the aftermath of the Scottish defeat and taken to London as a prisoner. There he was condemned for treason, as a result of his previous submission to the two Edwards, and sentenced to death. Menteith suffered the full extent of an English treason execution where he was ‘drawn by horses and died after being tortured with various torments’.183 Following the forfeiture of the Strathbogie earls, the earldom of Atholl was granted to Neil Campbell, brother-in-law to Robert I.184 His son, John, succeeded to the earldom and fought and died at Halidon Hill as earl. He may also have been present at Dupplin Moor a year earlier, but if so English sources are incorrect in recording his death there.185 The earldom of Buchan was held by the crown for the duration of the war and was only regranted in the 1370s.186 The English source that lists an earl of Buchan at Neville’s Cross is, therefore, likely in error.187 Among those Scottish earls who fought in several of the major battles of the period are those of Sutherland. In spite of their geographical remoteness from the majority of wartime action, they are represented in several engagements from the period. Earl Kenneth does not appear to have been present at Dupplin Moor, but he responded to the summons in 1333 and was among those killed at Halidon.188 He fought in the same division as the earl of Ross and so is perhaps due some of the praise Earl Hugh gained from Scottish chroniclers for his bravery in targeting Edward Balliol’s division.189 Earl Kenneth’s son, Earl William, continued his father’s support for the Bruce cause. He was one of the leaders of Bruce forces at the siege Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 475; Chron. Bower, vii, 259. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 475. 183 Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61. See also Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 341; Scalacronica (King), 137; Chron. Melsa, iii, 61–2; Chron. Fordun (Skene), 358. 184 Boardman, Campbells, 40; A. Ross, ‘Men for All Seasons? The Strathbogie Earls of Atholl and the Wars of Independence, c.1290–c.1335’, part i, Northern Scotland, 20 (2000), 1–30, at 13–14. 185 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 271, which names Atholl as one of the Bruce leaders. See also Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 151 (which names Atholl as ‘the younger’); Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 304; Chron. Melsa, ii, 364–5. 186 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 80–2. 187 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 338–40. 188 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 279–80; Chron. Bower, vii, 93; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–9; Brut, 283–6; Scalacronica (King), 115–17; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308–9. Earl Kenneth’s absence from Dupplin is interesting, considering his relationship through marriage to Earl Donald of Mar (C.A. McGladdery, ‘Sutherland Family (per. c.1200–c.1510)’, in ODNB). 189 SP, viii, 324. 181

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of Cupar Castle in 1336.190 Around 1340, Earl William, alongside the earl of March, led a raid into northern England. Here they ‘pillaged the land up to two leagues from Bamburgh, taking a good two thousand fat beasts and many prisoners … and burned the land.’191 On their return north they were met by Anglo-Scottish forces under Thomas Gray and were defeated. Their booty was taken and ‘the two earls escaped with great difficulty’.192 Earl William was present once again when summoned by David II for the Neville’s Cross campaign. He survived the battle, but was captured in its aftermath.193 His military career ended with this defeat. Although he may have been released quickly to facilitate negotiations for David II’s release, he returned to English confinement in 1357 as a hostage for the king and remained a prisoner until around 1370.194 The remaining earls were two important figures who displayed vacillating loyalty towards the Bruce cause during this conflict, but who also participated in a large number of military engagements. Patrick V, earl of March, was an important border figure who represented a family which has ‘been regarded with suspicion in the historiographies of Scotland and England’.195 Considering the location of his territories, it is unsurprising that his allegiance to the Bruce cause was at times inconsistent. Despite this, it is clear that Earl Patrick enjoyed a prolonged military career fighting for the Bruce kings. Indeed, this career began during the reign of Robert I when he participated in the Scottish capture of Berwick (1318) and raiding of northern England in 1327.196 When the war recommenced in 1332, Earl Patrick was given command of the southern Scottish levies summoned to meet the Disinherited invasion.197 As a result Earl Patrick was absent from Dupplin Moor but his forces laid siege to Perth for several days soon after the battle.198 Bower writes positively about Earl Patrick’s leadership of the siege and that he ‘exhorted his companions to seek revenge from the English’.199 Despite the Bruce failure to capture the town, Earl Patrick was

Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 296–7. CDS, v, no. 289; Scalacronica (King), 133–4. 192 CDS, v, no. 289; Scalacronica (King), 133–4. 193 Chron. Bower, vii, 29–61. Henry Knighton mistakenly lists Earl William amongst the Scottish battle dead (Knighton’s Chronicle, 69–73). 194 Penman, David II, 145; McGladdery, ‘Sutherland Family’; SP, viii, 326–7. See also Given-Wilson and Beriac, ‘Edward III’s Prisoners’, 811, n. 42, which casts doubt on his capture but which argues that ‘if he was captured, he soon managed to escape’. 195 Macdonald, ‘Kings of the Wild Frontier’, 139. 196 Macdonald, ‘Kings of the Wild Frontier’, 149–50. 197 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 385; Chron. Bower, vii, 75. 198 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 389–91; Chron. Bower, vii, 79–81; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 305; Chron. Melsa, ii, 365–6. 199 Chron. Bower, vii, 79; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 390–1. 190 191



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soon after involved in raiding Galloway.200 He also participated in setting up the ambush of Edward Balliol at Roxburgh or Annan.201 In the following year, Earl Patrick was to the fore in the siege of Berwick and the battle of Halidon Hill. As Macdonald points out, March was given the prominent role of constable of Berwick Castle in anticipation of the Disinherited and English invasions. Considering the likelihood of this being a target for the invading forces, this suggests few doubts over Earl Patrick’s loyalty to the Bruce cause.202 He may have participated in the battle, or at least led an armed reserve force. English sources place March in the rear of the Bruce army with fifty men-at-arms, possibly from Berwick’s garrison, and ‘the commonalty of the town without number’.203 March surrendered his charge to Edward III following the Bruce defeat.204 Thomas Gray noted that thereafter Earl Patrick ‘became English, having no great respect for either side’.205 This suggests distrust of March by the English, matching perhaps the modern depiction of him as a ‘prominent waverer’, but his continued military career would not seem to reflect this view.206 Although the next few years saw Earl Patrick support the English settlement of southern Scotland, this did not last. He had returned to the Bruce allegiance by the early months of 1335 and soon after was preying on English supply lines and wavering Scottish communities.207 He took part in the skirmish at Burgh Muir in July 1335, and was listed as one of the Bruce leaders who did not surrender to the two Edwards in that year.208 His involvement in the Bruce military activities of 1335 continued with his participation in the important battle of Culblean in November.209 Success here was followed by his early involvement in the siege of Cupar Castle, before it was interrupted by a negotiated truce.210 Earl Patrick was at Cupar once more when

200 Chron.

Lanercost (Maxwell), 272–3. Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 153–5, 157; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 306; Chron. Melsa, ii, 366–7. 202 Macdonald, ‘Kings of the Wild Frontier’, 150. 203 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–7; Brut, 283–6. 204 Scalacronica (King), 117; Chron. Melsa, ii, 370–1; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 281; Chron. Bower, vii, 93; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 403. 205 Scalacronica (King), 117. 206 Penman, David II, 62. 207 Macdonald, ‘Kings of the Wild Frontier’, 150. See also Scalacronica (King), 119; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 310; Chron. Melsa, ii, 374; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 421–2; Chron. Bower, vii, 93; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 144. 208 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 350; Chron. Bower, vii, 109; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 292, 294; Chron. Melsa, ii, 375–6. 209 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 351; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 423; Chron. Bower, vii, 117; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 294; Scalacronica (King), 121. 210 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 352; Chron. Bower, vii, 117. 201

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the siege recommenced in 1336.211 He joined Andrew Murray’s campaign in Fife in early 1337, which resulted in the capture and destruction of Falkland and St Andrews Castles, and he may have participated in the Bothwell siege which followed.212 He was also present at the unsuccessful siege of Stirling Castle in April 1337.213 March’s military activities in and around his own earldom continued in addition to his activities elsewhere. In 1336–7 the English sheriff of Berwick wrote that he was unable to collect the proceeds of escheated territories because they were occupied by Earl Patrick.214 One English chronicler wrote that ‘the whole of … Lothian, although it was then in the king of England’s peace, paid each week one mark to those within [Dunbar] castle’.215 These activities may have persuaded the English of the need to remove March from the region and besiege Dunbar Castle in 1337. The failure of this enterprise ensured that Dunbar remained a prominent strategic obstacle to English activities in the area.216 Earl Patrick was next active at the siege of Perth in 1339, ‘wyth mony gud [men] off Lowthyane’.217 He and his forces were based on the South Inch during the events of this complex, and ultimately successful, operation.218 The following year he led, with the earl of Sutherland, a raid into northern England that was defeated by Thomas Gray.219 That his military activities declined in the years that followed may reflect his disfavour with the returned David II, and the king’s attempts to place the bulk of the war effort in the hands of younger men.220 Earl Patrick’s next involvement was therefore in the Neville’s Cross campaign, around six years after his last military activity. The events of the battle only confirmed the negative perception that some chroniclers displayed towards Earl Patrick. The Lanercost chronicler asserted that he was given leadership of the first Scottish division but ‘refused to lead the first line, demanding the third, more out of cowardice than eagerness’.221 From this position Earl Patrick, and the Steward, were able to see that the battle had been lost and they withdrew

Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 296–7. Chron. Fordun (Skene), 353–4; Chron. Bower, vii, 125–7; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 313. 213 Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 313. 214 CDS, iii, 323, 368; MacInnes, ‘English occupation of southern Scotland’, 191. 215 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 296–7. 216 For ‘Black Agnes’ and the siege of Dunbar, see Ewan, ‘Dangers of Manly Women’, 3–15. 217 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 451–2; see also Chron. Bower, vii, 141; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 317. 218 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 452. 219 Scalacronica (King), 133–4. 220 Penman, David II, 81, 110. 221 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 338; Penman, David II, 134. 211

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with their forces.222 In opposition to their English counterparts, Scottish chroniclers were more ambiguous about these actions. To Fordun’s source, March and the Steward ‘took to flight, and got away unhurt’, implying tacit condemnation of their actions.223 In Wyntoun’s work, Earl Patrick is only mentioned in earlier versions of the chronicle, where he is described having ‘eschapit’ with the Steward.224 Bower’s work developed Wyntoun’s source further and argued that Earl Patrick and the Steward ‘followed wise advice and saved themselves with the help of an about turn’.225 March was either a coward who abandoned his king, or a sensible commander who saved himself and his men from defeat. Despite the negative associations that may have followed March after the Neville’s Cross defeat, he remained militarily active. He participated in the Bruce raid on northern England in later 1355 which targeted Norham Castle, and which led to the skirmish at Nisbet.226 He was also involved in the successful capture of Berwick town in 1355.227 In total this amounts to a prolonged and militarily intensive career, one that is far removed from the ‘largely indirect’ role depicted elsewhere.228 Earl Patrick’s participation in several engagements, including one large-scale battle, as well as a number of sieges, suggests that he was a man of considerable military ability. He was also a man who had fought for many years of his life. By the time war recommenced in 1332 he was already around forty-seven years old.229 By his appearance at the battle of Neville’s Cross he was around sixty-one.230 And yet he was still fighting in the 1350s when he would have been entering his seventies. He was undoubtedly a highly experienced warrior, a veteran of numerous military endeavours and, perhaps most impressively, a survivor. The other earl whose problematic political loyalties have created a negative perception of his career is Earl Duncan of Fife. Like that of Earl Patrick of March, however, his record of military service appears impeccable. When 222 Chron.

Fordun (Skene), 358; Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 338–40; Chron. Melsa, iii, 61–2; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27. See also Scalacronica (King), 137, where Thomas Gray mistakenly includes March among the captured. 223 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 358; Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 35–6; Penman, David II, 134. 224 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 7–8; Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 38–40; see also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 476; Chron. Wyntoun (Amours), vi, 186. 225 Chron. Bower, vii, 261; Penman, David II, 134. 226 Scalacronica (King), 140–1; Chron. Bower, vii, 279–81; see also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 485–7. 227 Scalacronica (King), 141; Chron. Fordun (Skene), 362; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 483; Chron. Bower, vii, 281–3. 228 Brown, Black Douglases, 36. See also Macdonald, ‘Kings of the Wild Frontier’, 150. 229 F. Watson, ‘Dunbar, Patrick, Eighth Earl of Dunbar or of March, and Earl of Moray (1285–1369)’, in ODNB. 230 Penman, David II, 134.

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the war began in 1332 the earl was thrust to the forefront of the conflict. The amphibious landing by the Disinherited in his own earldom prompted Earl Duncan to lead his local levies into action, but the Bruce Scots were defeated and chased from the field.231 The Brut chronicle described Fife as ‘a fierce man and stern’.232 It also highlighted the earl’s defeat, commenting that he ‘was so wonder sorry, and full evil shamed that so little company had him discomfited, and shamefully put him and all his company that was alive for to flee’.233 Fife’s flight took him north, where he joined up with the forces of the earl of Mar outside Perth, and fought at Dupplin Moor only five days after the defeat at Kinghorn.234 As the tide of battle at Dupplin turned against the Bruce Scots, Fife appears to have been able to extricate himself from the fray. English sources note that his forces were towards the rear of the Bruce formation and so were perhaps better able to flee.235 They were overtaken, however, by the Disinherited who, having mounted the horses they had kept at their rear, chased down Fife’s contingent. It appears that it was at this point that Scottish chronicle descriptions of 360 men dying under the earl’s banner took place.236 The earl himself was captured and likely submitted to Balliol soon after.237 Fife’s defection was confirmed by his attendance at the coronation of Edward Balliol at Scone, the earl fulfilling his hereditary duty of crowning the new king.238 He was also made keeper of Perth and, when Balliol as king set out to reinforce loyalist elements in Galloway, Earl Duncan was left in charge there.239 In Balliol’s absence, a party of Bruce Scots attacked Perth around 7 October and took the town. One English chronicler blamed Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 269 (which numbers Fife’s force at 4000); Scalacronica (King), 109; Chron. Baker, 49; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 304; Chron. Melsa, ii, 362–3; Brut, 275–6; Chron. Knighton, i, 462; Historia Anglicana, 193; Chron. Bridlington, 104; BL Cotton Caligula A XIII, fol. 13; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 83; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 36–7; Penman, David II, 47. 232 Brut, 275–6. 233 Brut, 275–6. 234 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 271; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 391; Chron. Bower, vii, 77–9; Chron. Melsa, ii, 364–5; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 86. 235 Chron. Melsa, ii, 364–5; Chron. Bridlington, 106; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 89; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 45–6. 236 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 391; Chron. Bower, vii, 77–9. See also Candy, ‘Scottish Wars of Edward III’, 55–6, who suggests that Fife led the general withdrawal of troops from the battlefield. 237 Penman, David II, 48. 238 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 392; Chron. Bower, vii, 81; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 272; Chron. Melsa, ii, 365–6; Chron. Bridlington, 108; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 93–4; Penman, David II, 48–9; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 47. 239 Chron. Bridlington, 108. 231



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the earl directly for this turn of events, stating that he had ‘traitorously surrendered the town’.240 Taken prisoner in the aftermath of the town’s fall were Earl Duncan, his family and a number of his supporters.241 Thereafter, Fife may have been imprisoned in Kildrummy Castle. He did not long endure captivity,242 for he was listed among the witnesses to a charter of Edward Balliol dated 20 October at Roxburgh, and he may have been in attendance at the erstwhile king’s parliament in the town which began at the start of the same month.243 He must have missed the Bruce ambush of Balliol at Roxburgh, near the beginning of October, but he was to fall into Bruce hands once again not long after. The Lanercost chronicler reported that in December 1332 Fife was ‘treacherously captured … when he was travelling beyond the Scottish sea’ by Archibald Douglas, the new Scottish Guardian.244 Again Earl Duncan was imprisoned, but again only for a short while.245 This appears to have been in return for his re-adoption of Bruce loyalty and, as a result, he joined the ranks of Bruce Scottish nobles for the Halidon Hill campaign.246 Here he fought once more in the rearward Scottish division, alongside the Guardian.247 Unlike Archibald Douglas, Fife was able to escape the Bruce defeat, demonstrating again an ability to extricate himself from difficult circumstances.248 Earl Duncan fled back north, but the advancing Disinherited forces that spread throughout the kingdom after Halidon Hill soon overtook him and submission to Balliol followed once more.249 Further changes of allegiance by Fife may have occurred in 1335, with Bruce campaigns in the earldom in April followed by the earl’s appearance at the Dairsie parliament in the same month.250 By August, Earl Duncan was holding Cupar Castle for the Bruce Scots, but by 7 August he 240 Chron.

Knighton, i, 465. See also Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 273, which states instead that the Bruce Scots captured the town ‘by stratagem and wiles’. 241 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 394; Chron. Bower, vii, 83; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 273; Chron. Knighton, i, 465; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 94. 242 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 94; Penman, David II, 56. 243 CDS, iii, no. 1129; CPR, 1330–34, 553; Beam, Balliol Dynasty, 235; see also Rot. Scot., i, 273–4. 244 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 276. 245 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 276. 246 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 157; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277; Scalacronica (King), 115–17; Chron. Bridlington, 113–14; Historia Anglicana, 196; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 68; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 124–9. 247 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–7; Brut, 283–6; Chron. Melsa, ii, 376. 248 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–7, see also 68–73; Brut, 283–6; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308–9; Chron. Knighton, i, 468–70; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 73–4. 249 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 149. 250 Penman, David II, 57; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 350; Chron. Bower, vii, 109.

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had handed it over to Edward III in response to the English king’s arrival in Fife with a large army.251 A formal submission to the two Edwards appears to have followed at Perth.252 Once more, Fife’s change of allegiance did not last particularly long. The Bruce victory at Culblean led to Bruce attacks on Disinherited territory, including Fife, and Cupar Castle was besieged in the aftermath of the battle. The arrival of Bruce forces in his earldom likely prompted a further change in allegiance by Earl Duncan.253 Fife’s reintegration into the Bruce party was once again apparently seamless, and Earl Duncan was involved in the resumption of the Cupar siege in May 1336.254 This would be the last time that Fife would change sides, remaining for the rest of the conflict in the Bruce allegiance. Hereafter, Earl Duncan was involved in Bruce campaigns to clear remaining Disinherited/English forces from the refortified castles of St Andrews and Leuchars, as well as Cupar and Falkland in 1337.255 Earl Duncan was, however, largely absent from endeavours after this point, once his earldom had effectively been won back. He was absent, for example, from the largescale siege of Perth in 1339, and the raids of northern England in the early 1340s. He only returned to military action when summoned to participate in the Neville’s Cross expedition. On this occasion Fife was placed in the lead Scottish division. Penman implies that this was a deliberate decision by David II to keep the earl close, as he distrusted him, and to ensure that the earl could not run away easily.256 But if Penman is correct in suggesting that, in this battle, the Steward and the earl of March were demoted to the rear division as a sign of their disfavour, then Fife’s prominent positioning in the foremost Scottish battle perhaps suggests something different.257 It seems possible that Earl Duncan’s place in the king’s division related to his military standing among the assembled troops, possessing as he surely did the aura of an old and experienced warrior.258 He had, after all, fought in BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 239. Chron. Melsa, ii, 376. See also Chron. Avesbury, 298–302; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 294; Scalacronica (King), 121. 253 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 930; Chron. Fordun (Skene), 352; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 426; Chron. Bower, 117; Chron. Knighton, i, 477. 254 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 296–7; CDS, iii, p. 354; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 352; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 428; Chron. Bower, vii, 117–19. See also CDS, iii, 339, 387. 255 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 299; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353; Chron. Bower, vii, 123; Chron. Melsa, ii, 378; BL Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 249–249v; Brown, Colvin and Taylor, History of the King’s Works, i, 421–2. 256 Penman, David II, 125. 257 Penman, ‘Scots at Neville’s Cross’, 176–7, where he describes Earl Duncan as a ‘reluctant’ participant. 258 For discussion of the importance of experience to the commanders of English armies under Edward I, see D. Simpkin, The English Aristocracy at War: From the Welsh Wars of Edward I to the Battle of Bannockburn (Woodbridge, 2008), 39–42. 251

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the two major battles of the period, and was one of the few Scottish nobles who had survived the relatively rare occurrence of a pitched battle.259 Among the younger warriors that surrounded their militarily inexperienced king, it was perhaps even more sensible to retain an ‘old head’. Earl Duncan also took his position in this division alongside much of Fife’s military elite. Although Penman suggests that many Fife knights had been enticed by the king to form part of the new royal military cadre, the presence of the earl with men who were, or had recently been, his knights is perhaps telling.260 As for the battle itself, little mention is made in contemporary chronicles of Earl Duncan, apart from the detail that he was captured by the Northumbrian knight, Robert Ogle.261 This may have occurred after the flight of the rear division under the Steward and Earl Patrick of March. If so, then Fife may have been among those described by Geoffrey le Baker standing ‘closely banded together like a round tower, protecting their king in the middle, until there were barely forty of them left alive, of whom not one was able to escape’.262 The captive earl was transported to London where he was put on trial and found guilty of treason for his vacillations in allegiance. He was ultimately spared the public execution inflicted on the earl of Menteith as a result of his English wife and her familial relationship to Edward III. Earl Duncan was released in 1350 for a ransom of 1000 marks.263 Although portrayed by one historian as the ‘sad, lonely and aging Earl Duncan of Fife’, his military record appears to demonstrate something different.264 His age demonstrates the extent to which he, like Earl Patrick of March, was a veteran fighter of the Wars of Independence who continued to serve his military function into his fifties. If nothing else, he was an incredibly fortunate figure, a survivor of three major battles as well as various other skirmishes and sieges. In a world where chivalric kudos was attached to military experience and involvement in the notable events of the day, Fife’s record is as impressive as any other major Scottish noble. Below the earls were those greater and lesser landholders who took upon themselves a leadership role in the fight against the Disinherited/English. Some of these men have been covered already, such as Andrew Murray and Archibald Douglas. These were only the principal representatives of a class of men who seized the opportunities offered by war to enhance their military Prestwich, ‘Wars of Independence, 1296–1328’, 141–4; Macdonald, ‘Triumph and Disaster’, 257–67. 260 Penman, ‘Scots at Neville’s Cross’, 170–1, 177; Penman, David II, 101–5, 136–7. 261 ‘Thomas Sampson’s Letter to his Friends’, in Neville’s Cross, ed. Rollason and Prestwich, 136. 262 The Chronicle of Geoffrey le Baker, trans. D. Preest and ed. R. Barber (Woodbridge, 2012), 77. 263 TNA, E39/14/18. 264 Penman, David II, 68–9. 259

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and political positions.265 In a way, they were following in the footsteps of ‘the Good Sir James’ Douglas who began his career with a small following and earned land, political power and renown as a result of his participation in the first conflict.266 Other members of his extended family followed a similar career path. William Douglas of Lothian, and later of Liddesdale, is a pre-eminent example of a man who was able to take advantage of the political dislocation of the period to carve out territorial and political power for himself.267 His first military experience appears to have been achieved in the skirmish at Dornock on the Solway coast in March 1333. Here ‘the whole flower of the knighthood of Annandale’ attacked a force of English raiders under Anthony Lucy, but was defeated.268 Among the Bruce captives taken to Carlisle Castle was William Douglas, described as a ‘notorious malefactor’.269 The length of Douglas’s captivity is unclear, but it ensured that he missed the slaughter of the Bruce leadership at Halidon Hill. Upon his return to Scotland he appears to have assumed the place vacated by his relatives, Archibald Douglas and William, lord Douglas, both of whom had died at Halidon.270 Douglas was prominent in the forces which raided Galloway in July 1334, and he attacked the English-held southern sheriffdoms soon after to levy tribute from them.271 Around February 1335 he joined with John Randolph to raid Lothian. According to Bower, Douglas’s raids were motivated by a need to recoup the financial losses caused by his earlier ransom. As a result, he ‘sought after much pillaging, killing, seizing, routing and beating among the English’.272 Such campaigning appears to have elevated Douglas to a position of prominence.273 In summer 1335 he was involved in the skirmish at Burgh Muir with the count of Namur, and in the following skirmish in which John Randolph was captured and Douglas’s brother, James, killed.274 Douglas then took part in the Bruce victory over David Strathbogie at

265 Brown,

‘Scottish Border Lordship’, 6–12. Black Douglases, 14–28. 267 Brown, Black Douglases, 35–43. 268 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 397–8; Chron. Bower, vii, 89; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277–8; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 159; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 307; Chron. Melsa, ii, 367–8. 269 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277–8; CDS, iii, no. 1074; CCR, 1333–37, 101. See also Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 159; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 307; Chron. Melsa, ii, 367–8. 270 Brown, Black Douglases, 34–6. 271 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 286–7. 272 Chron. Bower, vii, 107–9, 219, n. 37–8. See also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 417–18. 273 Chron. Bower, vii, 109; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 421. 274 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 421; Chron. Bower, vii, 115; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 292. 266 Brown,



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Culblean in November 1335.275 Wyntoun’s detailed narrative of the battle describes Douglas in command of the Bruce vanguard, which contained the strongest fighters. Douglas is accorded some notable tactical acumen by the chronicler. He halted the vanguard’s advance at the sight of the enemy, provoked the Disinherited forces into advancing downhill into a ford, and only then ordered his own troops to advance in attack. Although the battle was only decided following Andrew Murray’s flank attack on the Disinherited, there is no doubt of the importance placed by Wyntoun on Douglas’s involvement. It was from this point at least that he may be regarded as one of the heroes of Wyntoun’s work.276 Douglas followed up the success at Culblean by participating in the aborted siege of Cupar in the winter of 1335–6.277 He then spent much of 1336 ambushing English forces throughout Scotland, including the invading army of John of Eltham, and a supply convoy for Bothwell Castle under Thomas Lord Berkeley.278 Douglas’s intensive military activity continued in the following years. He was involved in the Fife campaign in early 1337.279 He may have been part of the force that raided Cumberland in October of the same year, where his brother Henry was captured, and he may have regained Hermitage Castle around the same period.280 Other activities included: a defeat of John Stirling at a skirmish at the ‘Crags of Craigie’; an attack on Edward III’s army at Crichton, which involved Douglas charging a wing of the English king’s force and in which he was seriously wounded by a lance; another successful skirmish against the English at ‘Blaksawing’; a skirmish with Edward III’s forces at Melrose, where he seized the king’s provisions; and victories over Roland Vaus and Laurence Abernethy in further confrontations.281 While most of these actions are difficult to verify with any confidence, they do provide an overall depiction of Douglas as a strenuous man of action. That he undertook these activities for his own self-aggrandisement as much as for David II did not stop them being lauded by Scottish writers.282 Around 1338 Douglas attempted unsuccessfully to force the surrender of Edinburgh Castle.283 In 1339 he visited David II in France, and returned to Scotland in time to accept the surrender of Cupar Castle.284 He then went to the siege of 275 Chron.

Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 424–6; Chron. Bower, vii, 113–15, 117; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 292, 294; Chron. Melsa, ii, 376. 276 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 425–6. 277 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 352; Chron. Bower, vii, 117. 278 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 299, 300; Scalacronica (King), 121–3. 279 Chron. Bower, vii, 125–7; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 313. 280 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 307–8; CCR, 1337–39, 371; Chron. Bower, vii, 139. 281 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 447–50; Chron. Bower, vii, 139. 282 Brown, Black Douglases, 37. 283 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 312. 284 Chron. Bower, vii, 141; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 317.

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Perth, where he utilised French naval forces he had brought back with him as well as a group of French knights and men-at-arms.285 The French ships blockaded the Tay while Bruce attacks on the walls continued. During these events Douglas was injured by a crossbow bolt to the thigh.286 Wyntoun suggests that he carried on with his involvement in the siege in spite of his wound.287 A lack of involvement in the main events of the next two years suggests, however, that the injury instead removed him from Bruce military activity for some time. Douglas does not appear again in chronicle accounts of the war until April 1341. Here he is depicted by Bower as the key instigator of the successful capture of Edinburgh Castle. In true Bruce style, Edinburgh was captured by a ruse, the Bruce Scots pretending to be English merchants to gain access to the castle before defeating those inside and taking the fortress.288 Following this, Douglas raided Teviotdale and ‘brought [it] back into the king’s peace, after he had expelled the English’.289 His martial activities attracted the attention of Henry of Lancaster, earl of Derby, who wrote to Douglas and proposed that they engage in a series of tilts.290 The two duly met, but in the first tilt Douglas was wounded in the hand when his lance broke and the fight was abandoned.291 Knighton described the tourney as one ‘[fought] under the rules of war’.292 These were true tests of the knight’s skill, fought under combat conditions. Men died in such encounters. They were also increasingly an outlet for Anglo-Scottish rivalries.293 That Derby sought out Douglas indicates that the latter was perceived as a chivalric warrior of some renown, and also one who was conscious of the need to demonstrate his skills and bravery in such an engagement.294 This view of Douglas as a chivalric warrior is undermined somewhat by the events of 1342, which also brought a temporary halt to his military career against the English. His effective murder of Alexander Ramsay resulted in local feuding and the king’s effective side-lining of Douglas as a result.295 285 Chron.

Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 451–2; Chron. Bower, vii, 141–3. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 451–3; Chron. Bower, vii, 141–3. 287 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 452–3. 288 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 457–60; Chron. Bower, vii, 145–7. 289 Chron. Bower, vii, 137; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 460. 290 Chron. Bower, vii, 137; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 440–1. 291 Chron. Bower, vii, 137; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 441. 292 Knighton’s Chronicle, 39. Knighton, perhaps unsurprisingly, gives a different view than Bower, stating that the Scots ‘gravely wounded … returned into Scotland without honour’ (ibid.) 293 Barker, Tournament in Medieval England, 34–6; Edington, ‘Tournament in Medieval Scotland’, 50–2. 294 Chron. Bower, vii, 235, n. 40. 295 Chron. Bower, vii, 153; Penman, David II, 89–92. Penman suggests that Douglas of Liddesdale took part in David II’s raid into northern England around February 1342, 286 Chron.



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Continental and local truces also impacted upon Douglas’s military activity, but it appears that he was back in the king’s favour once more by the later months of 1345. At this time he led at least two raids into northern England.296 He was also to the fore in the Neville’s Cross invasion, although personal gain may once more have been a motivating factor. He wasted little time besieging Liddel, the target that appealed most perhaps to his interests, and he was accused of advising David II to abandon the campaign after the peel was taken.297 With the continuation of the campaign, Douglas led a raid near Durham that was ambushed by English forces and defeated with the loss of both men and booty.298 His escape from capture at this time was short-lived, and he was one of the many notable Scottish prisoners taken at Neville’s Cross.299 He was able to purchase his release from English captivity, but returning to his lands he discovered that matters had changed in his absence.300 The return to Scotland of William Douglas, lord of Douglas, in the wake of Neville’s Cross introduced a new figure into the region who sought to usurp Douglas of Liddesdale’s position in the Scottish south.301 The two men were unable to co-exist for long and Douglas of Liddesdale was assassinated in Ettrick Forest in 1353.302 Bower described him as ‘an energetic fighting man who endured much for the freedom of the kingdom; he was expert in warfare … a scourge of the English and a wall for the Scots’.303 Modern analysis has suggested that ‘Douglas’s participation was absolutely necessary to [David II’s] renewed prosecution of war against England.’304 His record certainly speaks for itself in terms of the sheer number of campaigns and military activities in which he was involved.305 At the same time, there can be little doubt that such energy was expended

but there is no mention of his involvement in the chronicle evidence (Penman, David II, 85). 296 CIM, 1307–49, no. 2051; Penman, David II, 119, n. 7. 297 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 330–2; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 473; Chron. Bower, vii, 253. Brown, Black Douglases, 43; Penman, David II, 126–7, 131. See also Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 24; Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 39. 298 Chron. Bower, vii, 259; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 336–7; Chron. Melsa, iii, 61; Knighton’s Chronicle, 69. 299 Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 341; Chron. Angliae, 23–4; Historia Anglicana, 269–70; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27–8; Polychronicon, viii, 342; Brut, 299–300; Knighton’s Chronicle, 69–73; Penman, David II, 132–5. 300 Brown, Black Douglases, 43–6; Duncan, ‘David II and Edward III’, 113–41. 301 Brown, Black Douglases, 43–6. 302 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 360; Chron. Bower, vii, 275. 303 Chron. Bower, vii, 275. For discussion of Douglas’s reputation, see Brown, ‘House of Douglas’, 169–72. 304 Penman, David II, 113; Brown, Black Douglases, 43. 305 Brown, ‘Scottish Border Lordship’, 5.

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as much, if not more, for himself than it was for the Scottish kingdom, but in that he was far from alone. The descriptions of William, lord and future earl of Douglas, and his military career are similar in tone and content to those of Liddesdale in the preceding period. Douglas returned to Scotland from prolonged exile in France around 1348 and quickly recovered Douglasdale.306 He similarly won Ettrick Forest ‘partly by force, partly by persuasion’.307 Douglas also undermined John Coupland’s attempts at ensuring the continued loyalty of Teviotdale to the English.308 This does not mean, however, that all such territories were in reality won back to the Bruce allegiance. Areas such as Teviotdale remained English outposts for a considerable time.309 Of importance is the means employed by Douglas in his campaigns, which replicated ‘classic’ tactics to win back wavering regions to the Bruce allegiance.310 This point is emphasised by Bower, who wrote, ‘[T]his William was extremely fond of war; and when he particularly wanted peace and to preserve his boundaries from interference, he forcefully provoked a fight.’311 His recapture of border territories continued apace throughout the early 1350s. Douglas led a raid into Galloway around 1353 that resulted in Dougal MacDowell’s submission.312 Thomas Gray noted that, around 1355, ‘William Dugles … had conquerid the landes that the Englisch men had won of the Scottes’.313 In the same year, Scottish chroniclers describe Douglas’s involvement in the raid on the area around Norham that resulted in the skirmish at Nisbet.314 In contrast, Thomas Gray, who was captured at Nisbet, makes no mention of Douglas’s involvement at all.315 Wyntoun and Bower may therefore have added Douglas because they could not conceive of an expedition taking place without the border warrior’s involvement.316 Douglas was back in action in 1356 and, in response to Edward III’s ‘Burnt Candlemas’ raid, based himself in Ettrick Forest to attack stragglers from the English army as they returned across the border.317 He is even reported to 306 Chron.

Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 480–1; Chron. Bower, vii, 271; Brown, Black Douglases, 43–4; Penman, David II, 148–9. 307 Chron. Bower, vii, 271; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 481; Brown, Black Douglases, 44. 308 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 481; Chron. Bower, vii, 271. 309 Macdonald, Border Bloodshed, 13–14; Brown, ‘War, Allegiance and Community’, 225–6. 310 Brown, Black Douglases, 43–4; Brown, ‘Scottish Border Lordship’, 17–21. 311 Chron. Bower, vii, 271. 312 Chron. Bower, vii, 297; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 487; Brown, Black Douglases, 46. 313 Scalacronica (King), 140. 314 Chron. Bower, vii, 279–81; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 485–7; Brown, Black Douglases, 138. 315 King, ‘Prisoners and Casualties’, 268; Scalacronica (King), 140–1. 316 Scalacronica (King), 140–1. 317 Knighton’s Chronicle, 139; Chron. Avesbury, 454–6.



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have followed these forces into England and mounted a night-time attack on the border lord, Robert Herle, from which the Englishman barely escaped.318 Douglas’s last military activity during this phase of the conflict occurred in France. Having gone to the continent on pilgrimage, Douglas took part in the battle of Poitiers (1356).319 His involvement in the battle was depicted in very different ways by various chroniclers. Scottish writers, surprisingly, had little positive to say about Douglas’s performance in battle, although Bower argued that his flight from the field had not been his choice, but the actions of his men who led him away for his safety.320 Froissart, who wrote positively about the extended Douglas family, described Douglas and his contingent as being well armed.321 Describing the battle itself, Froissart wrote that Douglas ‘fought bravely enough for a time’ but even he had difficulty excusing the Scottish lord’s flight.322 The only positive thing he could suggest was that Douglas ‘would have preferred death in battle, knowing for certain that they would never have agreed to ransom him’.323 The English account of Geoffrey le Baker, possibly informed by an eye-witness, gives prominence to Douglas.324 He describes Douglas as a man who ‘had been tried and tested in the harsh trials of [Scotland’s] wars’.325 Baker also writes that it was Douglas who advised John II that his troops should fight on foot, as the Scots were used to doing.326 Although Douglas tried to control a somewhat disorganised French attack, he is accused of joining the charge ‘to gain the glory of fame from this new exploit’.327 Following the English victory, Douglas ‘escaped wounded, and also took back home with him a few other Scots of his company … For war’s fierce fury had destroyed almost all the Scots.’328 Douglas’s flight from the battlefield appears to have undermined his reputation. Although Baker is more direct in his account, the possibility that Scottish writers felt similarly is suggested by Bower. Instead of focusing on the lord of Douglas, Bower’s account focused instead on William’s cousin, Archibald ‘the Grim’. He was captured in the aftermath of the battle, but was able to escape English captivity by means of

Chron. Avesbury, 456. Brown, Black Douglases, 210–11. 320 Chron. Bower, vii, 301; see also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 496. 321 Oeuvres de Froissart, v, 428. 322 Oeuvres de Froissart, v, 446; translation in Froissart, Chronicles (Brereton), 139. 323 Oeuvres de Froissart, v, 446; translation in Froissart, Chronicles (Brereton), 139. 324 Chron. Baker (Preest), 123. For discussion of Baker’s source, see Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince, 60–1. 325 Chron. Baker (Preest), 123. 326 Chron. Baker (Preest), 123. 327 Chron. Baker (Preest), 126. 328 Chron. Baker (Preest), 128. 318

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a ruse.329 It may be because of Bower’s knowledge of Archibald’s later career that he received commendation in this instance.330 It may also reflect the chronicler’s perception of capture being more honourable than flight from the battlefield.331 Many Scottish noble families, like the Douglases, distinguished themselves with military service during the first phase of the conflict (1296–1328). Barrow identified a number who were ‘specially trusted’, in part as a result of their military service, including the Keiths, Frasers, Hays, Boyds and Setons.332 Participation of members of these families in the renewed conflict of the 1330s demonstrates continuation of military service in support of the Bruce regime. Beginning with the Keiths, Robert Keith was a veteran of the first conflict who lived long enough to fight in the second war.333 As marshal of the Scottish army he had led the successful cavalry charge against the English archery at Bannockburn, and had participated in numerous Bruce raids into northern England, as well as the Berwick campaigns of 1318 and 1319.334 When the war recommenced, Keith appears to have served in close attendance to the king and accompanied him to France in 1334 as one of a group of men who would tutor him in exile.335 He likely returned to Scotland with David II in 1341. It is unclear, however, whether Robert Keith was the unnamed marshal listed among the Scottish dead at Neville’s Cross.336 Considering that this military career appears to have begun around 1299 he would have been in his sixties by the time of the battle outside Durham.337 As already demonstrated, such an age was not necessarily an impediment to fighting. Still, it may be that it was Keith’s brother, Edward, who died outside Durham, with Robert Keith having died in the years before the battle.338 Either way, both Robert and Edward Keith were seasoned warriors 329 Chron.

Bower, vii, 301. Black Douglases, 53–75. 331 Macdonald, ‘Later Medieval Scottish Soldier’, 204; King, ‘Helm with a Crest of Gold’, 34. See also S. Morillo, ‘Expecting Cowardice: Medieval Battle Tactics Reconsidered’, Journal of Medieval Military History, 4 (2006), 65–73, at 70–2. 332 Barrow, Robert Bruce, 399. 333 SP, vi, 30–3; C.A. McGladdery, ‘Keith Family (per. c.1300–c.1530)’, in ODNB. 334 Barrow, Robert Bruce, 296–7, 309; Cornell, Bannockburn, 200–2; Penman, Robert the Bruce, 184–5, 187, 206–7. 335 Penman, David II, 53–4. Some sources suggest Keith’s participation at either/both Dupplin and Halidon but this appears unlikely (see SP, vi, 32; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 167–9. See also Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308–9, which confusingly describes William Keith as ‘marshal of the army’.) 336 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 358; Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61, 464–5, n. 51–58. 337 SP, vi, 30–1. 338 For different views of which Keith died at Neville’s Cross, see SP, vi, 33; McGladdery, ‘Keith Family’; Penman, David II, 134–6. Penman suggests that it was Robert Keith ‘the younger’ who was killed at Neville’s Cross (Penman, Robert the Bruce, 252, 256). 330 Brown,



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whose military experience was likely of great benefit to the king. Other members of the extended kin network also appear in the military record of the second war. Robert Keith, described as ‘yhowng Robert the Keth’, was the elder Marshal’s grandson, and was involved in the sack of Perth in 1332.339 Other Keiths are listed among the dead at Neville’s Cross, including Edward Keith (possibly the old Marshal’s brother, already discussed, or a grandson) and Edmund Keith (likely another grandson of the old Marshal).340 In spite of the experiences of the elder Robert Keith, the most celebrated military career in the family may belong instead to a representative of a cadet line.341 William Keith of Galston distinguished himself before the recommencement of war with England on James Douglas’s crusading venture in 1330. He was, according to Barbour, injured with a broken arm on the day that Douglas was killed in battle around Teba, and therefore carried Douglas’s bones and Bruce’s heart back to Scotland.342 Following his return he was involved in the siege of Berwick in 1333. Keith was named as one of the Bruce knights who managed to evade the besieging English forces, and forced entry into the town to provide for its relief.343 As already discussed, Edward III refused to accept this as relief and, having been despatched to summon the Scottish army back to Berwick, Keith appears to have fought in the second Bruce division at Halidon Hill.344 English sources list Keith among the dead following the battle, but the designation of him by one as ‘marshal of the army’ suggests confusion with a member of the main family line not previously discussed.345 A William Keith of Galston, ‘that wes off gud renown’, was involved in the ambush and capture of Richard Talbot in 1334.346 He was one of the few Bruce leaders who remained outside the two Edwards’ peace in the summer of 1335, and he was also involved in the siege of Perth in 1339.347 His final action appears to have been the siege of Stirling Castle, between 1339 and 1342, where William Keith is described as one of the leaders of the Bruce forces.348 Scottish sources provide more detail on the events surrounding his death, Bower writing that Keith ‘had 339 Chron.

Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 394; Chron. Bower, vii, 83, 205, n. 40. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27–8; Knighton’s Chronicle, 69–73; SP, vi, 33; Penman, David II, 136. 341 SP, vi, 29. 342 Bruce (Duncan), 766, 772. 343 Scalacronica (King), 115–17. See also Rot. Scot, i, 253–4. 344 Polychronicon, viii, 328; Scalacronica (King), 115–17; Chron. Angliae, 4; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308–9; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–9; Brut, 283–6. 345 Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308–9; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–9; Brut, 283–6. 346 Chron. Bower, vii, 127–9; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 433; Chron. Melsa, ii, 372; Rot. Scot., i, 334. 347 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 294; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 451; Chron. Bower, vii, 141–3. 348 Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 313. 340 Chron.

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the unfortunate if extraordinary fate to be killed by his own lance’.349 Keith’s unfortunate and somewhat bizarre death does not detract from the fact that he had quite a long military career that attracted the attention of chronicle writers who ensured that his fame lived on after his death. Similar to the marshal, the constable was another veteran of the first war who continued to serve into the years of the second conflict. Gilbert Hay of Errol fought at Bannockburn and was a consistent supporter of the Bruce cause from 1306.350 He did not, however, long survive the resumption of war and appears to have died sometime in 1333. English sources list a Gilbert Hay among the dead at Halidon Hill, but he may have died in the months before the battle was fought.351 The constable’s son, Nicholas Hay, appears to have predeceased his father, although there is a suggestion in a later Scottish history that he was killed at Dupplin Moor.352 Nicholas Hay’s son and successor as constable, David, may have been involved in the king’s tournament at Aberdeen in February 1342.353 He was present at Neville’s Cross as constable, and was among the dead left on the battlefield.354 English sources also list a William Hay among the casualties at Durham, identified by Penman as William Hay of Lochorward.355 Additional members of the extended Hay family also appear at times in the sources of the period. Most notably a John Hay, described as ‘a noble Scottish man-at-arms’, was involved in the border tourneys of December 1341 at Berwick.356 He was injured in the tournament and is described by Bower as having died as a result of his wounds on his return journey north from Berwick.357 Moving on to the Fraser family, Alexander Fraser was another Scottish noble with close connections to the Bruce kingship who had earned his spurs in the First War of Independence.358 Barbour describes his participa349 Chron.

Bower, vii, 131, 232, n. 39–41; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 438. possible details of Hay’s military career in the first war, see Bruce (Duncan), 104, 226–8, 238. See also Barrow, Robert Bruce, 202, 204, 240, 354, 309, 369–70; C.A. McGladdery, ‘Hay Family (per. c.1295–c.1460)’, in ODNB; SP, iii, 559–60. 351 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–7; Brut, 283–6. For the dating of Hay’s death to April 1333 see ‘The coppy of the tabill quhilk ves at Cowper of al the erles of Erroll quhilk ver buryd in the abbey kirk thair’, in Spalding Miscellany, ii (Aberdeen, 1842), 347. 352 SP, iii, 560; McGladdery, ‘Hay Family’. 353 Penman, David II, 86. 354 Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27–8; Knighton’s Chronicle, 69–73. 355 Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27–8; Knighton’s Chronicle, 69–73; Penman, David II, 136, 468. 356 Chron. Bower, vii, 137–9; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 441–2. 357 Chron. Bower, vii, 137–9; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 442. 358 M. Brown, Bannockburn: The Scottish War and the British Isles, 1307–1323 (Edinburgh, 2008), 15, 55–7. 350 For



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tion at Methven (1306), where he may have been captured, as well as at Old Meldrum and Ben Cruachan (1308).359 He may also have been present, and perhaps knighted, at Bannockburn.360 This experience of military service carried on into the next phase of the conflict, but not for long; Fraser was in the lead division at Dupplin Moor and suffered alongside many others who died in the resultant crush.361 Following his death, leadership of the family in war passed to men who are presumed to have been Alexander Fraser’s younger brothers. Prominent in the Bruce recapture of Perth in 1332 were James and Simon Fraser.362 The latter was also involved in the ambush of Edward Balliol at Annan in December 1332.363 A number of Frasers also fought at Halidon Hill, where they appear to have suffered somewhat disproportionate losses. ‘The brothers Andrew, Simon and James Fraser’ were among the Bruce dead in the aftermath of the battle.364 A William Fraser, possibly of Cowie and therefore the younger son of Alexander Fraser, entered Edward Balliol’s peace around the time of his coronation.365 This may only have been a temporary defection, and a William Fraser is named by an English source among the Bruce ranks at Halidon.366 Later, William Fraser was involved in the capture of Edinburgh Castle in 1341, and he fought and died at Neville’s Cross in 1346.367 Like these other families, the Boyds were also represented at their head by a prominent Bruce supporter who lived beyond the reign of Robert I and fought for his son. Robert Boyd was very active in the first war, and was involved in the Bruce rebellion from its earliest days. He was involved in the uprising of 1306 and the Bruce recovery from 1307. He possibly fought at Bannockburn and participated in the Irish campaigns.368 He also went on to serve David II in a military capacity. Although absent from Dupplin,

Bruce (Barbour), 92, 100, 362; Penman, Robert the Bruce, 107–8. Frasers of Philorth, ed. A. Fraser, 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1879), i, 67; C.A. McGladdery, ‘Fraser family (per. c.1300–c.1500)’, in ODNB. 361 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 387–8; Chron. Bower, vii, 77–9; Scalacronica (King), 109–11; Penman, David II, 48. 362 Chron. Bower, vii, 83, 205, n. 40; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 394; Frasers of Philorth, i, p. xiii; ii, 129, 134. 363 Chron. Bower, vii, 83; Frasers of Philorth, ii, 129. 364 Chron. Bower, vii, 93; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 402; Frasers of Philorth, ii, 124, 129, 134. See also Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–9; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308–9; Brut, 283–6. 365 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 272; Frasers of Philorth, i, 92–8; Penman, David II, 97. 366 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–7; Frasers of Philorth, i, 98. 367 Chron. Bower, vii, 145–7, 259–61; Penman, David II, 136; Frasers of Philorth, i, 101–2; Chron. Fordun (Skene), 356. 368 Bruce (Duncan), 92, 158, 166–8, 174, 312, 344, 542; R.J. Tanner, ‘Boyd Family (per. c.1300–c.1480)’, in ODNB; SP, v, 138; Brown, Bannockburn, 29, 34, 55–7, 97, 144. 359

360 The

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he fought in the vanguard at Halidon Hill.369 It is unclear what happened to him there, but if he did survive the Bruce defeat he did not live long thereafter.370 It has been suggested that later Boyds ‘were less important for several generations’, but this appears to have been far from the case.371 In 1339, Alan Boyd, second son of Robert Boyd, is named by Bower as a ‘sturdy man-at-arms’ and ‘commander of archers’ who was killed during the siege of Perth.372 Thomas Boyd, Robert’s eldest son, was involved in raiding northern England in the 1340s. Boyd is named as one of a number of Scottish squires knighted by the king on the first raid launched under his own banner, which Bower’s editors have dated tentatively to the summer of 1342.373 The distinction of this act, being knighted on campaign by the returning king during one of his first expeditions as king, is notable and suggests that this was part of David II’s recruitment of young knights to form his own military cadre.374 If so it was as one of these young knights in the service of his king that Thomas Boyd fought and was captured at Neville’s Cross.375 The last of those families identified by Barrow, and whose military record spanned both periods of conflict, is that of Seton. Alexander Seton is another individual with a convincing war record, even if his participation at Bannockburn occurred as a result of his joining the Scottish side the night before the battle.376 Thereafter he served the Bruce cause loyally and took part in the Berwick campaigns (1317–18), as well as in Ireland.377 Although Seton was well rewarded for his military service, the renewed war of 1332 took a tremendous toll on his family. His son, also Alexander, was killed at the war’s outset during the skirmish that followed the Disinherited landing at Kinghorn.378 Alexander Seton senior had been placed in charge of Berwick before Robert I’s death, and it was as ‘a knycht off gud renown’ that he continued in this role in 1333.379 A second of Seton’s sons, William, was killed during the siege of Berwick where, ‘fighting courageously … [He] drowned underneath the ships while his father was looking from the 369 Brut,

283–6; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308–9. v, 139; Tanner, ‘Boyd Family’; Penman, David II, 93. 371 Tanner, ‘Boyd family’. 372 Chron. Bower, vii, 141–3; SP, v, 139. 373 Chron. Bower, vii, 151, 243–4, n. 25–31; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 467–8. 374 Penman, David II, 92–3 375 English sources list Boyd among the dead, but he was in fact taken prisoner (Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27–8; Knighton’s Chronicle, 69–73; Rot. Scot., i, 678). 376 Cornell, Bannockburn, 191–2, 235; Penman, Robert the Bruce, 141–3; C.A. McGladdery, ‘Seton Family (per. c.1300–c.1510)’, in ODNB. 377 Penman, Robert the Bruce, 184, 187, 206–7, 372. 378 Scalacronica (King), 109; Chron. Bower, vii, 73–5; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 384; Brut, 275–6; Chron. Melsa, ii, 362–3. 379 SP, viii, 567; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 395. 370 SP,



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walls.’380 A third son, Thomas, was handed over as a hostage to Edward III during the siege. He was executed on the orders of the English king after the town failed to surrender as previously agreed.381 Alexander Seton adopted the Balliol/English allegiance after Berwick’s fall, although he may have played some part in the battle of Halidon Hill with a small detachment from the town as a reserve.382 He returned to the Bruce fold in later years, but does not appear to have been militarily active thereafter. Indeed, the blow of losing his sons may have prompted him to join the Knights Hospitaller. While an ostensibly religious act, it is possible to see something of the warrior in Seton’s action, joining as he did a military, as opposed to a monastic, order.383 An example of a ‘new family’, members of which made a name for themselves principally in the war years of the 1330s–1350s, is provided by the Ramsays. Of note is the ‘model knight’, Alexander Ramsay of Dalhousie.384 He was with the southern forces at the time of Dupplin Moor and was sent by the earl of March to ascertain the truth of reports regarding the Bruce defeat.385 Ramsay is next mentioned in relation to the campaigns of 1334–5 when he is described by Bower as a ‘flower of chivalry’.386 The same chronicler describes him as one of several men who ‘firmly adhered to the king … and very often bravely won victories over the English’.387 One of these was the skirmish at Burgh Muir in 1335.388 He was present at the siege of Cupar Castle in 1337, where he jousted with and killed a Disinherited/English squire.389 In 1338 Ramsay was involved in the relief of Dunbar Castle. He was able to bring much-needed supplies into the castle, before launching a sally against the besieging English troops.390 Around this time Ramsay also established his ‘military school’ at his underground base at Hawthornden, where knights learned from this apparent paragon of knightly ability. He also attacked northern England and ‘seized plunder, led away captives, and 380 Chron.

Bower, vii, 89–91; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 398. Chron. Bower, vii, 91; Chron. Melsa, ii, 368–9 (which misnames him as Alexander); Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 161–3; Scalacronica (King), 115; Brut, 282–3; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 400; N. Royan, ‘Some Conspicuous Women in the Original Chronicle, Scotichronicon and Scotorum Historia’, Innes Review, 59 (2008), 131–44, at 134–7. 382 Brut, 283–6; C.A. McGladdery, ‘Seton Family (per. c.1300–c.1510)’, in ODNB. 383 Rot. Scot., i, 722; SP, viii, 568; McGladdery, ‘Seton Family’; The Knights of St John of Jerusalem in Scotland, ed. I.B. Cowan, P.H.R. Cowan and A. Macquarrie (Edinburgh, 1983), xxxii. 384 Penman, David II, 70. 385 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 390; Penman, David II, 64, 70. 386 Chron. Bower, vii, 109. 387 Chron. Bower, vii, 109; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 418. 388 Chron. Bower, vii, 113. 389 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 436. 390 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), 434–5; Chron. Bower, vii, 129–31. 381

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wasted provinces with fire and sword’.391 On one such raid the Scots were ambushed on their return, but Ramsay’s tactic of pretending to flee before turning to attack the English once more won them the day.392 Bower writes in detail regarding this episode, and it is interesting to see military tactics explained so explicitly in the words of a non-military chronicler. It may be that this story was taken from a now-lost work on Ramsay’s life, and that this skirmish survived in the popular memory as a result, even if the tactics used on this occasion were far from revolutionary.393 One of Ramsay’s most recorded exploits involved his participation in a series of border tourneys with Earl Henry of Derby in 1341–42, Bower reporting that Ramsay ‘was regarded as the most famous and worthy of the Scots’.394 The tourney at Berwick was particularly well recorded by Wyntoun, who described in detail the negotiations held between both parties as to the form the contest should take.395 The decision to fight à outrance, with edged weapons, resulted in the deaths of two English knights, as well as the Scotsman, John Hay, who died of his wounds after the tourney ended. William Ramsay, of whom more below, also suffered severe injury.396 Alexander Ramsay’s final act of military activity was his capture of Roxburgh in 1342.397 He was made custodian of Roxburgh Castle and sheriff of Teviotdale by David II as a reward for his actions. But as already discussed, this grant caused friction between Ramsay and William Douglas of Liddesdale, and Ramsay died as a result.398 According to one chronicler, he had before his death ‘felled the foe everywhere around, greatly checked their attacks, won many a victory, done much good, and … would have done more, had he lived longer’.399 Recognition of his military abilities is reflected in the statement that ‘in brave deeds of arms, and in bodily strength he surpassed all others of his day’.400 Few other Bruce warriors of this period received such fulsome praise. His career in arms demonstrates Chron. Bower, vii, 147–9; Penman, David II, 70. See also F.R. Coles, ‘Notices of Rock-Hewn Caves in the Valley of the Esk and Other Places in Scotland’, PSAS, 45 (1910–11), 265–301. 392 Chron. Bower, vii, 149. 393 The tactics are reminiscent of William the Conqueror’s at Hastings (B.S. Bachrach, ‘The Feigned Retreat at Hastings’, in The Battle of Hastings¸ ed. S. Morillo (Woodbridge, 1996), 190–3). For more on possible Ramsay involvement in raiding of England, see Penman, David II, 89. 394 Chron. Bower, vii, 137. See also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 441–2. 395 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 442–3. 396 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 443–4. 397 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 356; Chron. Bower, vii, 151; Penman, David II, 88. 398 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 357; Chron. Bower, vii, 151–5; Penman, David II, 88–9; Brown, Black Douglases, 41–3. 399 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 357. 400 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 357. 391



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an ability and desire to engage in the military life. This was done in no small part for political and territorial reward. It also reflects a martial spirit that was shared by many of Ramsay’s contemporaries, and goes beyond the ‘chivalric gloss’ suggested by one historian.401 It was certainly as a chivalric warrior that he was commemorated in chronicle literature. Ramsay of Dalhousie was not the only representative of his surname to play a role in this phase of the Anglo-Scottish conflict. As already indicated, a William Ramsay was also said to have participated in the border tourneys of 1341–42. He was either injured or killed during these engagements. Bower writes that he was killed after being ‘pierced by a lance through his helmet and brain’.402 Wyntoun’s earlier account denies his death, and instead relates a tale of William Ramsay being saved by the actions of Alexander Ramsay. Although William gave his confession to a priest while still in arms, Alexander Ramsay took matters into his own hands and, standing on the stricken knight’s helmet for leverage, pulled the lance out.403 Wyntoun has William Ramsay survive the incident, but this is somewhat difficult to believe. Although it was possible for warriors to endure major injury, the events described here, and the confusion over Ramsay’s eventual fate, cast doubt on his survival.404 Who this man was is a matter of some conjecture. He may have been William Ramsay of Colluthie, who was possibly a brother of Alexander Ramsay.405 A William Ramsay fought at Halidon Hill.406 Someone of the same name negotiated his surrender to the two Edwards in 1335. These negotiations involved discussion of ‘the pardon which William de Ramsey, knight, doth demand of trespass done by him to the lord William of Montagu, to wit the battering of his castle of Hawthornden’.407 The reference to this castle draws a definite link to Alexander Ramsay, as this castle was the site of his underground hideout, but the precise nature of their relationship remains unclear.408 This William Ramsay may also have been a brother of Alexander Ramsay, but not William Ramsay of Colluthie, who may have been a separate individual. There were a number of cadet branches of the Ramsay family, including those of Forthar,

Brown, Black Douglases, 37; A.J. Macdonald, ‘Ramsay Family (per. c.1300–1513)’, in ODNB. 402 Chron. Bower, vii, 137. 403 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 443–4. 404 MacInnes, ‘Heads, Shoulders, Knees and Toes’, 102–27; Macdonald, ‘Later Medieval Scottish Soldier’, 199–204. 405 Penman, David II, 83. 406 Brut, 283–6. 407 Chron. Avesbury, 302. 408 For discussion of the Ramsay genealogy, see J.H. Ramsay, ‘Notes on Early Ramsay Pedigrees, A.D. 1200–1600’, The Genealogist, new series, 31 (1915), 1–22. 401

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Clatto, Bamff and Auchterhouse.409 This extended family may have been represented at Neville’s Cross, where a number of men named Ramsay are listed in various chronicle descriptions of the battle. For example, Alexander Ramsay (possibly a grandson of Ramsay of Dalhousie) was listed in the lead Scottish division.410 Of the others, William and possibly Henry Ramsay were captured or killed in the battle.411 One of these may have been the William Ramsay ‘of Dalhousie’ who, in the years following his release, was drawn into the orbit of William lord of Douglas. According to Fordun’s source it was William Ramsay, ‘a valiant man, of tried prowess’, who attacked Norham Castle and led the counterattacking English forces into the ambush at Nisbet.412 This man appears to have been different, however, from William Ramsay of Colluthie.413 The latter’s career in the period after Neville’s Cross included his elevation as earl of Fife, and he is described by one historian as ‘a renowned jouster and sometime crusader’.414 He was not a consistently loyal Bruce adherent and served for a considerable length of time in the English/Disinherited garrison of Edinburgh Castle.415 He returned to Bruce allegiance before Neville’s Cross, and his participation in this battle was followed up by his involvement in the battle of Poitiers (1356). Bower records that it was William Ramsay who was key in helping Archibald Douglas ‘the Grim’ escape English captivity at minimal cost after the battle. Douglas was a prominent captive who, according to Bower, ‘outshone the other Scots who were prisoners with him by the noble character of his armour’.416 Ramsay of Colluthie pretended that Douglas was nothing more than a camp follower who had killed his lord and stolen his armour to ensure his survival. As a result, Douglas was ransomed for a small sum and ‘artfully escaped from the hands of rivals whom he had often attacked before’.417 Bower’s entertaining tale emphasises the chivalric credentials of one of his heroes, Archibald the Grim, but it also provides an interesting perspective on Ramsay of Colluthie, as well as the aftermath of battle.418 Like these others of his name, William Ramsay of Colluthie 409 Ramsay,

‘Early Ramsay Pedigrees’, 3. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 338; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27; Penman, David II, 125, 137. It could be this Alexander, or else his son, also Alexander, who fought at Otterburn (1388) and Homildon Hill (1402), where he was killed (Macdonald, ‘Ramsay family’; SP, iii, 90). 411 Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27–8; Knighton’s Chronicle, 69–73. 412 Chron. Fordun (Skene), 361–2; Chron. Bower, vii, 281. 413 Chron. Bower, vii, 474, n. 27; Macdonald, Ramsay Family’; Rot. Scot, i, 709. 414 Penman, David II, 91. 415 MacInnes, ‘Balliol Scots and “English Scots”’, 138. 416 Chron. Bower, vii, 301. 417 Chron. Bower, vii, 301; Penman, David II, 186. 418 For discussion of the number and treatment of prisoners after Poitiers, see GivenWilson and Bériac, ‘Edward III’s Prisoners’, 802–9, 814–30. 410



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continued his military career even after the wars with England passed into abeyance. Of particular note is his involvement in the Baltic crusades.419 As with other men already discussed, although the religious motivation for this later action is clear, it is also resonant of the chivalric convictions of such men to seek out military activity wherever it could be found.420 Many other men who fought in this period are recorded only fleetingly in contemporary sources. Some were noted only once, often when killed, or when they performed particularly memorable deeds. For example, Patrick Graham, likely of Kinpunt, may have fought at Halidon Hill.421 His tourneying brought him to the particular attention of Scottish chroniclers, and Wyntoun wrote that he travelled to the continent ‘till eyk his prys throw gret bownte’.422 Following his return to Scotland, he participated in the border tourneys of the 1340s where he fought jousts with Richard Talbot, whom he injured, and an unnamed English knight who was killed.423 Other notable men include William Carruthers, ‘with his brothers, nephews and kinsmen’, who were ‘good and tested Scots’ that raised rebellion in southern Scotland in 1334.424 Bower’s description of Carruthers refers to him and his men as ‘schawaldowris’.425 This is an interesting term suggestive of these men fighting a destructive form of warfare aimed at enforcing the loyalties of those they attacked.426 During the same period, Dougal Campbell is highlighted as an ally of the Steward in winning back Cowal and Bute.427 David Annan, a Fife knight and future favourite of the king, participated in the skirmish at Burgh Muir in which he was injured, and he was captured at Neville’s Cross.428 Stephen Wiseman, ‘a distinguished esquire’, was killed during the siege of Bothwell Castle (1337).429 John Kennedy of Dunure and Alan Stewart, following the battle of Neville’s Cross, raised rebellion in the

Brown, Black Douglases, 204. Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade, 123–43. 421 SP, vi, 210; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–7; Brut, 283–6; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 308–9. 422 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 444. 423 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 445. 424 Chron. Bower, vii, 105. See also Brown, Black Douglases, 65–6; Penman, David II, 56. 425 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 415. 426 A. King, ‘Bandits, Robbers and Schavaldours: War and Disorder in Northumberland in the Reign of Edward II’, Thirteenth Century England IX: Proceedings of the Durham Conference, 2001 (2003), 115–29, at 115, 128–9. 427 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 414; Boardman, Campbells, 58. Campbell may, however, have altered his allegiance in the years to come as he forfeited his lands in 1341–2 (Boardman, Campbells, 60–1). 428 Chron. Bower, vii, 113; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27–8; Knighton’s Chronicle, 69–73; Penman, David II, 101, 136, 152. 429 Chron. Bower, vii, 125. 419

420 Guard,

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southwest and ‘resisted [enemy] violence in manly fashion’.430 John Stewart of Kyle (the future King Robert III), fought similarly in Annandale.431 Roger Kirkpatrick, who may have been captured at Neville’s Cross, afterwards captured Dalswinton and Caerlaverock Castles ‘by force and valour’.432 And William Towers, a Douglas follower, is described as the first man up the scaling ladders during the Bruce capture of Berwick town in 1355.433 The Rank and File A prominent feature in surviving sources of the First War of Independence is the involvement of ‘the common people’ in defending the kingdom against English encroachment and in support of Robert Bruce. Many of these tales were the product of Bruce propaganda and are particularly abundant in John Barbour’s Bruce.434 The Second War of Independence is not recorded by a source like Barbour, and it is not so replete with similar examples of popular revolt. Still, there remain some notable tales that fall into this category, and some examples of popular participation in the war. Most visible are the examples of the ‘commons’ who fought in Scottish armies in several battles of the period. If the suggested figures for the armies at Dupplin, Halidon and Neville’s Cross are in any way believable, then a large proportion of the Bruce Scottish forces were made up of ‘commons’.435 One English source rather unreliably accounted for 64,200 of ‘the commonalty’ in the Bruce Scottish army at Halidon Hill.436 Although such numbers are obvious exaggeration, they suggest at least a large presence of ‘common’ men in Scottish forces. Also described as ‘commons’ at Halidon was a detachment of men from Berwick.437 The martial abilities of these men had been tested already when the town was attacked by Balliol’s forces. One English chronicler describes how the Berwick men ‘quickly mounted the walls of the said

430 Chron.

Bower, vii, 269; Penman, David II, 174. Chron. Bower, vii, 297; Penman, David II, 153. 432 Chron. Bower, vii, 297; Penman, David II, 137, 207. 433 Chron. Bower, vii, 283; Brown, Black Douglases, 100, 145, 148. Towers’s father was involved in the border tourneys of the 1340s (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 443; Brown, Black Douglases, 207). 434 B.W. Kliman, ‘The Idea of Chivalry in John Barbour’s Bruce’, Mediaeval Studies, 35 (1973), 477–508, at 498–501; W.F.H. Nicolaisen, ‘Stories and Storytelling in Barbour’s Bruce’, in Bryght Lanternis: Essays on the Language and Literature of Medieval and Renaissance Scotland, ed. J.D. McClure and M.R.G. Spiller (Aberdeen, 1989), 55–66. 435 For discussion of possible numbers at these battles, comparing various sources, see DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 115–18, 121–2, 180–4. 436 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–7. See, also, Brut, 283–6. 437 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–7. See, also, Brut, 283–6. 431



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town and honourably defended it against the English’.438 This description of the commons fighting honourably, while ultimately not in the interests of the English/Disinherited forces, stresses behaviour that could be deemed chivalric. Even though the people involved were not of the knightly class, they displayed warrior virtues and as such received praise, even from an English writer.439 The ‘commons’ were not, of course, solely found on the Bruce side of the war effort. There appears, for example, to have been a large number of ‘commons’ in the force fielded by David Strathbogie at Culblean in 1335.440 They were ‘pityingly spared’ by the Bruce Scots, according to Bower, as they had been forced into serving the titular earl of Atholl.441 The problems of picking a side, and the dangers of being caught on the ‘wrong side’, may account for a more general lack of popular support for either Bruce or Balliol in this period. It may have been easier to sit on the fence and await developments than declare clear support for one side or the other. One example that can be seen as a ‘popular revolt’ against the Disinherited occurred in 1334, when the residents of Bute rebelled against Edward Balliol’s new administration in the region. Spurred on by the Steward’s rebellion and Dougal Campbell’s capture of Dunoon Castle, the Brandans (the inhabitants of Bute) ‘rose in a spontaneous revolt’.442 They faced a hastily summoned force of Disinherited and ‘with their habitual agility took up stones in their hands and threw them at the sheriff’s men like a shower of hail’.443 Such tactics won them the day.444 This action was not, of course, without benefit to the Brandans, who demanded and received financial reward from a grateful Steward.445 A further example is provided by the popular response to an attack on Aberdeen around 1336. Led by Thomas Roslin and William Mowbray, Disinherited/English forces attacked Aberdeen but were met by a body of armed men, probably representing the burgh levy, at ‘the Green’.446 In the skirmish that took place, Roslin was injured in 438 Chron.

Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 155–7. living in towns were, however, a regular military resource and so the description of them as ‘commons’ is somewhat problematic. For discussion, for example, of the use and importance of urban forces in the medieval Low Countries, see S. Boffa, Warfare in Medieval Brabant (Woodbridge, 2004), 133–51. 440 Chron. Bower, vii, 117; Ross, ‘Men for All Seasons’, ii, 1–15. 441 Chron. Bower, vii, 117. 442 Boardman, ‘Gaelic World’, 98. 443 Chron. Bower, vii, 103–5. 444 Chron. Bower, vii, 103–5; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 414–15. 445 Chron. Bower, vii, 103–5; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 414–15. The importance of the battle, and of his tenant’s actions, appears to have been celebrated by the Steward in the years to come. It has been argued that he often returned to Bute in May to celebrate both the victory and the feast of St Brendan (Boardman, ‘Gaelic World and the Early Stewart Court’, 99). 446 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 422. 439 Those

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the knee and died of his wound.447 The death of their leader only inflamed the Disinherited/English forces who fought on and defeated the burgh men, riding down and killing those who fled.448 This slaughter of the men of Aberdeen may also explain why further examples of popular opposition are absent from the historical record. As argued elsewhere, Edward Balliol may have sought to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Scottish people to support his kingship in the early days of the war. As the conflict dragged on, with victory remaining elusive, Balliol appears to have changed tactics and followed a more ruthless policy aimed at winning Scotland at the point of the sword.449 In such a situation it would be unsurprising if the common people avoided taking direct action for fear of deadly consequences. And yet some individuals did take direct action on occasion. Bower, in particular, recounts tales of two men who rose in personal rebellion against the English/Disinherited. The chronicler provides a long tale regarding the actions of a Robert Prenderguest, describing him as a ‘strong and daring person’. Prenderguest aided the English/Disinherited garrison of Edinburgh in capturing a herd of cattle and taking them back to the castle. Expecting a reward for his actions, Prenderguest was instead offended when, upon attending supper in the castle, he was seated with the servants. When he voiced his anger, the English ‘marshal’ rebuked him for his arrogance, and beat him about the head ‘until the blood was splashed over the others sitting at the table’.450 Prenderguest waited until the following day to take his revenge, and ambushed the marshal and his men in the town. He stabbed the marshal through the heart and killed him, before running off and mortally wounding three of his pursuers in the chase. He then escaped to the sanctuary of Holyrood Abbey. The English blockaded Prenderguest within the church’s walls, but the Scot was aided by the monks of Holyrood who helped him to escape. Prenderguest then sought out William Douglas of Liddesdale, persuaded him to mount an attack against Edinburgh, and participated in a night-time raid on the town which resulted in the deaths of eighty Englishmen.451 Bower also relates the tale of Alan Steersman.452 As Bower describes it, members of the Cupar Castle garrison were on patrol and forced Steersman to ferry them across the Forth in his boat. They also beat Steersman and his men. The seaman therefore let the English onto his ship, but took them to a sandbank instead of the opposite shore.453 Pretending that this was dry land, Steersman let the English disembark. 447 Chron.

Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 422–3. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 423. 449 MacInnes, ‘Shock and Awe’, 40–59. 450 Chron. Bower, vii, 133. 451 Chron. Bower, vii, 133–5. 452 Chron. Bower, vii, 135. 453 Chron. Bower, vii, 135–7. 448 Chron.



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Realising their predicament, the English begged to be let back on board but Steersman sailed away and the incoming tide supposedly drowned every man. Stories such as these represent ‘traditional tale[s] handed down orally’ and recorded in Bower’s work.454 Their inclusion in Bower’s chronicle indicates the popularity of such tales and, while more likely composite stories rather than a record of actual events, they suggest some element of popular revolt, even if such actions were undertaken by relatively few. The ‘Enemy’: the Balliol Scots and the Disinherited Those who fought on the other side of the conflict have been studied even less than their Bruce opponents. The Disinherited leadership at least have received some consideration in recent years, including analyses of John Stirling, Ingram Umfraville, David Strathbogie and Edward Balliol.455 These and similar individuals were the core of the Disinherited invasion and took part consistently in the early confrontations of the war. Edward Balliol personally took part in the battles of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill, as well as the skirmishes at Roxburgh Bridge and Annan and the siege of Berwick in 1333.456 He also served in campaigns throughout Scotland in each year between 1335 and 1339.457 Thereafter he was involved in defending the English border from Bruce attack.458 He also returned to campaign in Scotland following the battle of Neville’s Cross, although this mostly involved small-scale and localised warfare.459 Other senior figures in the Disinherited leadership were similarly active and took part consistently in campaigns in Scotland. Men like Henry Beaumont, David Strathbogie, Gilbert Umfraville, Thomas Wake and Henry Percy appear repeatedly in the records of English military expenditure as proof of their service.460 They receive mention too in the chronicle evidence of the period as military and chivalric figures. The Lanercost Chronicle provides particularly heroic descriptions of many of the 454 Chron.

Bower, vii, 233. D. Cornell, ‘Sir John Stirling: Edward III’s Scottish Captain’, Northern History, 45(1) (2008), 111–123; A. Beam, ‘“At the apex of chivalry”: Sir Ingram de Umfraville and the Anglo-Scottish Wars’, in England and Scotland at War, c.1296–c.1513, ed. A. King and D. Simpkin (Leiden, 2012), 53–76; Ross, ‘Men for All Seasons’, ii, 1–15; Beam, Balliol Dynasty, 193–266. 456 See, for example, Chron. Bower, vii, 79; Chron. Melsa, ii, 363–4; Brut, 278–9; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 273–4, 275, 277, 279–80; Beam, Balliol Dynasty, 234–9. 457 See, for example, Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 292, 296; TNA, E101/20/19; Beam, Balliol Dynasty, 244–9. 458 Chron. Melsa, iii, 48–9; Knighton’s Chronicle, 51, 77–9. 459 Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 28–9. 460 See for example Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 246–50; Beam, Balliol Dynasty, 234–49; King, ‘A Good Chance for the Scots’, 129–34. 455

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Disinherited leaders when describing the English forces at Neville’s Cross.461 One of the most interesting examples comes, however, from a Scottish source. Describing the skirmish at Annan, Wyntoun wrote of Henry Balliol that he ‘wyth a staffe fawcht stwrdyly, / And dyntis delt rycht dowchtyly, That men hym lovyd efftyr his day.’462 Such praise of the chivalric and military worth of a man who fought on the enemy side in this conflict is interesting. It appears to reflect a relatively common trend of focusing on brave and militarily impressive acts and committing them to posterity, irrespective of the side on which the individual fought.463 Other notable figures who served the Balliol/Disinherited cause included knights who were also at various times important figures in the Bruce camp. For example, both Alexander Craigie senior and Alexander Craigie junior served in the Edinburgh Castle garrison in 1335–6.464 Alexander Craigie senior remained in English service until at least 1342.465 This prolonged service is likely to have begun before his recorded resubmission to Edward III in 1335, and may have been based on a familial history of similar service. In particular the Craigies had past associations with Edinburgh Castle, and the names of an Alexander and a William Craigie are listed among the members of the English garrison there in 1312.466 William Ramsay of Colluthie, already discussed, served alongside Craigie senior at Edinburgh in 1336–7 and 1339–40.467 Ramsay eventually submitted to David II, for which he was later well rewarded.468 Other knights who adopted English allegiance and performed English military service may have done so in response to the actions of their lord. Earl Duncan of Fife, mentioned above, may have influenced members of his knightly retinue. For example, John of Inchmartin was in Disinherited allegiance in June 1334.469 Michael Wemyss was in receipt of English pay and victuals in 1336.470 And both Michael and David Wemyss

See below, chapter 5. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 395. For discussion of the identity of Henry Balliol, see Beam, Balliol Dynasty, 279–80. 463 Given-Wilson, Chronicles, 104–11. 464 CDS, iii, p. 361; no. 1186. For Craigie junior’s service to David II in the 1340s see Penman, David II, 107, 108, 110. 465 TNA, E101/22/20, fol. 3, 3v; CDS, iii, no. 1186, and pp. 361, 363. Both men had left Edinburgh by the time of the next financial account, which began on 26 January 1340 (TNA, E101/23/1, fol. 5). 466 CDS, iii, 409. 467 TNA, E101/22/20, fol. 3, 3v; CDS, iii, pp. 360, 362; nos. 1292, 1294, 1323, 1351, 1367, 1368, 1388, 1392, 1409; pp. 360, 362. 461

462 Chron.

468

Penman, David II, 91–2, 101, 104, 107–8, 110.

469 NAS,

GD79/1/6; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 272; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 93; Beam, ‘Balliol Dynasty’, 313; Penman, David II, 69, n. 76. 470 Foedera, ii, p. ii, 935; Rot. Scot., i, 411.



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took part in the Disinherited siege of Loch Leven Castle around 1334–5.471 Another prominent knightly figure was Eustace Maxwell. He was in Edward III’s service by 1 February 1334, an act linked to his support of Balliol and the resultant destruction of his lands. The English king promised to find Maxwell a manor worth £40 a year as recompense for his damaged or lost estates.472 Maxwell’s service to Edward III was substantive and he received English pay for service in the winter of 1334–5 and over Easter 1335.473 He was custodian of his own castle of Caerlaverock and sheriff of Dumfries for the English.474 Although active military service in English armies became irregular as Edward III reduced his efforts in Scotland, Maxwell also took part in the last big English campaigns of 1336.475 Others from south-west Scotland were also prominent in military service for the Disinherited/English cause. Notable are various members of the McCulloch family.476 William McCulloch received pay for his service in 1336 on the campaign of the two Edwards to Perth.477 It was, however, Patrick McCulloch who most actively and consistently served Edward Balliol and Edward III in a military capacity. He was in receipt of English financial aid by 1338 and served with two men-at-arms in the garrison of Berwick from June 1340 to July 1341.478 He continued to receive English financial support, although not all of this may have been linked directly to military service.479 Patrick McCulloch then appears to have followed the example of many of his English contemporaries and used his record of military service in Scotland as a means to access the rewards of continental service. He served with English forces in Brittany between 1343 and 1347 with two armigers.480 McCulloch later returned to the Anglo-Scottish frontier and remained in English service in March 1354.481 He also continued to receive financial aid from the English exchequer, and as late as 1362 he was granted 100 marks a Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 409; NAS, RH1/2/103; NAS, GD1/349/1; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 165–7; Brut, 283–6. David Wemyss, like Ramsay of Colluthie and Craigie, would also be rewarded by the king for entering royal service (Penman, David II, 101, 107, 111).

471

472

CDS, iii, no. 1143.

473 BL,

Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 239, 253; CDS, iii, no. 1161. BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 256; Webster, ‘English Occupation of Dumfriesshire’, 69–72; Oram, ‘Bruce, Balliol and Galloway’, 44–5. 475 TNA, E403/288, fol. 7; see also BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 273. 476 Oram, Bruce, Balliol and Galloway’, 43–7. 477 TNA, E101/19/36, fol. 2v. 478 Rot. Scot., i, 541; Reid, ‘Edward de Balliol’, 51–2; Oram, ‘Bruce, Balliol and Galloway’, 44; CCR, 1339–41, 81; TNA, E403/321, fol. 7. 479 TNA, E403/318, fol. 8; TNA, E403/321, fol. 6; TNA, E403/326, fol. 13; Reid, ‘Edward de Balliol’, 51–2; CDS, iii, no. 1432. 480 TNA, E101/23/39. 481 Rot. Scot., i, 763. 474

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year ‘until the lands and tenements which are of his inheritance in Scotland should be restored to him’.482 The likelihood of this occurring was remote by this time, and it is probable that by this stage Patrick McCulloch had effectively ‘become English’. Still, he may represent a useful example of a professional Scottish soldier, earning his living wherever the English were willing to employ him. If so he was imitating the behaviour of his English contemporaries who used the military demands of the Hundred Years War to make soldiering their occupation.483 Patrick McCulloch’s prolonged military service in English pay may also have encouraged other members of his kin network to follow suit. Thomas and Michael McCulloch petitioned Edward III in April 1344 for arrears of wages for military service already performed.484 Gilbert McCulloch was in receipt of English wages in February 1343, and he remained in English service on the border in 1347.485 John, son of Gilbert McCulloch, another John, Patrick son of Patrick McCulloch, John son of Patrick, and Michael McCulloch all served in English border forces in the 1340s.486 This appears to represent the service of a major southwest Scottish kindred in war. This military service was often accompanied by unnamed others, listed as hobelars, armigers and valets, who may also have been members of the extended family group, or indeed supporters and tenants. As already discussed, kin military service, in particular relating to historical loyalty, may have also been present in areas such as Atholl and Lothian.487 Some Lothian kin groups similarly display evidence of familial military networks, with a number continuing English service begun during the First War of Independence.488 Alexander and Roger Dalmahoy served in Edinburgh Castle in 1335, Roger continuing his service in 1339–40 while Alexander served with English forces patrolling the border in 1342.489 Alexander and John Crichton, Thomas, Adam and William Pontekin, and Duncan, Richard and John Napier, all

482

Issue Roll of Thomas de Brantingham, 457; CDS, v, nos. 831, 833.

483 Bell,

Curry, King, and Simpkin, Soldier in Later Medieval England, 85–93, 118–30, 168–78. 484 CDS, iii, no. 1432. 485 CDS, iii, no. 1406; Rot. Scot., i, 690. 486 Rot. Scot., i, 611–12, 626–8, 690. 487 Ross, ‘Men for All Seasons’, ii, 4–5. 488 For examination of Lothian families and English loyalties during the First War of Independence, see J. Gledhill, ‘Locality and Allegiance: English Lothian, 1296–1318’, in England and Scotland at War, c.1296–c.1513, ed. A. King and D. Simpkin (Leiden, 2012), 157–82. See also G.W.S. Barrow, ‘Lothian in the First War of Independence’, SHR, 55 (1976), 151–71. 489 CDS, iii, p. 361; nos. 1390, 1407; Rot. Scot., i, 626–8 (Alexander Dalmahoy); CDS, iii, pp. 360, 363; no. 1323; TNA, E101/22/20, fol. 3; TNA, E101/23/1, fol. 1 (Roger Dalmahoy). See also BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 278v; CDS, iii, no. 1184.



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served in Edinburgh Castle between 1335 and 1340.490 The Crichtons, in particular, could trace familial English military service back to at least 1312. The Pontekins, meanwhile, expanded the scope of their service beyond Edinburgh and Adam and Thomas Pontekin served on the border with English forces in 1341 and 1342.491 Conclusion This chapter has demonstrated the extent to which Scottish nobles, and others, participated regularly in the war effort during the period of the Second Scottish War of Independence. On the Bruce side, involvement in combat operations was something that nobles and notables appear to have undertaken with a level of commitment that belies older views of this period as one of inconsistent and half-hearted activity. Even those individuals, like the earls of March and Fife, whose political record has led to the development of negative portrayals of their loyalty to the Bruce cause, have been shown as prominent in their military service. The wartime participation of those described above emphasises the extent to which Scotland’s nobles saw military service as a principal part of their raison d’être, and reflected their status as the military elite. For those below the political elite, warfare inevitably offered the opportunity for self-aggrandisement and social and territorial advancement. It also reflected the chivalric requirement that knights test themselves in real warfare as the ultimate examination of bravery and skill, and the principal means to earn renown. This conflict offered such men multiple opportunities to earn the praise of others, and the fact that their endeavours were recorded in the various chronicles cited here reflects the success of their efforts. In the careers explored here it also appears that there was a growing acknowledgement across the warrior class that war was their occupation. The careers of those who built on their experience in Scotland to serve the French, the English or to fight on crusade, demonstrates the extent to which military careerism was becoming part of the Scottish warrior’s way of thinking. Just like their contemporaries in England, war was for many men increasingly an occupation rather than an obligation. It is particularly interesting to note that this was a route taken by several individuals who fought on the Balliol side. For men like Patrick McCulloch, 490 TNA,

E101/22/20, fol. 3; CDS, iii, nos. 1184, 1323; p. 362 (Alexander Crichton); CDS, iii, pp. 360, 362 (John Crichton); CDS, iii, pp. 360, 363; no. 1323; TNA, E101/22/20, fol. 3; TNA, E101/23/1, fol. 1 (Roger Dalmahoy); CDS, iii, p. 361 (Alexander Dalmahoy); CDS, iii, nos. 1186, 1323; p. 363; TNA, E101/22/20, fol. 3; TNA, E101/23/1, fol. 1; see also CDS, iii, nos. 1390, 1406, 1534 (Pontekin). 491 CDS, iii, nos. 1186, 1323; p. 363; TNA, E101/22/20, fol. 3; TNA, E101/23/1, fol. 1; see also CDS, iii, nos. 1390, 1406, 1534.

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who would never likely recover his lands in Scotland, it may have been a necessity, and the links forged in English service may have made the transition into continental service much easier. The evidence also shows, however, that other Scots also entered English service in the period following the Treaty of Berwick (1357). The desire to seek out other theatres for military endeavour when war at home was in abeyance strongly suggests that military professionalism was increasingly part of the Scottish warrior mentality. This would develop further into the fifteenth century with the service of the ‘Army of Scotland’ in France in the 1410s and 1420s. There can be little doubt, however, that such developments had their beginnings in the warfare of the fourteenth century.

4

The Conduct and Realities of War In describing events during the Wars of Independence, both Scottish and English chroniclers often lauded the actions of their heroes in the fight against English domination or Scottish rebellion. At the same time, these chroniclers were forced to concede that the type of war fought in Scotland and northern England was one in which violence and destruction were to the fore. Similarly, medieval knightly warriors could perceive of themselves as figures of chivalric virtue, while at the same time undertaking violent acts of spoliation and devastation in enemy territory. This dichotomy of views, in which the medieval ‘ideal’ of the soldier sat somewhat uncomfortably alongside the contemporary reality, is investigated further in chapter 5. In this section, the idealised view of warfare is temporarily disregarded in place of an investigation of the realities of fourteenth-century conduct during the Anglo-Scottish conflict. How did contemporary soldiers behave when on campaign in the countryside, when attacking an urban community, when dealing with religious institutions and when faced by their fellow combatants? What was the nature of wartime damage, and what was the rationale behind this devastation? And how did these actions compare with those of ‘the enemy’? War in the Countryside Hewitt has argued that ‘devastation called for neither skill nor courage nor strength. It afforded no opportunity for personal distinction. Much of it was no more than arson.’1 Devastation was, however, the principal and most effective weapon of Scottish troops during the Wars of Independence. Robert I ruthlessly devastated large areas of Scotland to enforce his kingship on Balliol and Comyn supporters, before later expanding the geographical scope of such devastation to northern England and Ireland.2 When war began anew in 1332 with the invasion of the Disinherited, the Hewitt, Organization of War, 112. Barrow, Robert Bruce, 173–82, 314–17; McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, chapters 3 and 5; A. Young, Robert the Bruce’s Rivals: The Comyns, 1212–1314 (East Linton, 1997), 203–4; Barnes and Barrow, ‘Movements of Robert Bruce’, 47, 48. 1

2

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Bruce Scots attempted to win regions back from Balliol allegiance by means of intimidation, burning the lands of those who supported the alternative regime. Bruce armies targeted Galloway in particular, and Fife to a lesser extent, as areas of Balliol support. Lothian and the Borders were attacked as areas of English control that had to be reconquered.3 Andrew Murray, praised by Scottish chroniclers as one of the principal war leaders of the Bruce cause, was at the forefront of these destructive attacks. Walter Bower’s eulogy for the Bruce Scottish leader provides tales of Murray’s fight for Scottish freedom. Nevertheless, the chronicler was also forced to temper his glorification of Murray with the comment that the guardian ‘also reduced all the regions through which he passed during his expeditions to such desolation and scarcity that more perished through hunger and extreme poverty than the sword destroyed from the time of the outbreak of the war’.4 When the war in Scotland turned in favour of the Bruce party in the later 1330s and 1340s, Scottish commanders expanded the scope of their destructive activities and once more began raiding northern England. Throughout this period of conflict, both in Scotland and in England, it was rural communities that bore the brunt of the destruction meted out by the forces of both sides. Attacks on Galloway began in the immediate aftermath of the Bruce failure before the walls of Perth in 1332. Indeed, the activities of Galwegian forces in support of Edward Balliol were considered by chroniclers as a key reason for the Bruce withdrawal. Leaving the town, the Bruce commanders took their army and ‘invaded and burnt Galloway, taking away spoil and cattle, but killing few people, because they found few’.5 The Bruce Scots made another raid through Galloway in July 1334, before pushing eastwards into the English-controlled Scottish border sheriffdoms.6 In spite of such punitive actions, some Balliol supporters remained loyal to the new king and the Lanercost chronicler noted that in the aftermath of the Bruce campaign Galloway descended into civil war between the supporters of both parties.7 The extent of the damage done in Galloway during the early war years is evident from the accounts of Eustace Maxwell, sheriff of Dumfries for the English administration. Few of the lands under his jurisdiction produced significant financial returns and many, especially lands newly escheated to the English crown, were said to be ‘waste’.8 A MacInnes, ‘Shock and Awe’, 40–9. Chron. Bower, vii, 137. 5 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 272–3; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 153; Chron. Melsa, ii, 365–6. 6 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 286–7. 7 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 286–7. 8 CDS, iii, pp. 318–19. See MacInnes, ‘English Occupation of Southern Scotland’, 187–9. 3 4



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later Bruce attack in 1337 ‘once more destroyed the wretched Galwegians on this side [east] of the Cree like beasts, because they adhered so firmly to their lord King Edward Balliol’.9 Even in the troubled times immediately following their defeat at Neville’s Cross, the Bruce Scots targeted Galloway as they attempted to recover southwest Scotland from supporters of the reinvigorated Balliol cause.10 This war in Galloway has been described as a resumption of ‘the pattern of warfare as it had been under King Robert in the pre-Bannockburn days’.11 Indeed, the war in the southwest was probably one of the most consistently violent episodes of the conflict, as both sides used intimidation to induce the support of the local population. These attacks by Bruce and Balliol forces often led to short-term defections that only confused the local political situation further, and in turn encouraged ongoing attempts at forcing obedience from the Galwegians.12 Although not as consistently targeted as Galloway, Fife too endured periods of Bruce attack and devastation, just as it had suffered from English raids in 1335–6.13 A large-scale Bruce campaign took place in 1337 with a series of raids that devastated local lands. Several sieges resulted in the capture of most castles in the region. After the fall of Falkland Castle, Andrew Murray ‘laid waste the land everywhere around, with the inhabitants captured and held to ransom’.14 Further campaigning in 1339 completed the work begun two years previously, and resulted in the capture of Cupar Castle, the last remaining Balliol garrison in Fife, as well as that of nearby Perth. The capture of Perth too came at a cost to the local inhabitants. Bower states that almost all dwellings around the town were destroyed during the siege and that the local people suffered from starvation, with some turning to cannibalism.15 Further examples of destructive Bruce raiding within Scotland are found in the campaigns of Robert the Steward, John Randolph, earl of Moray, and Andrew Murray. The Steward apparently sent men from his base at Dumbarton Castle across the Clyde in 1334 to terrorise his own tenants. The Steward’s troops ‘laid the country waste, plundered for spoils, led men away as prisoners or brought them over to the Scottish side. And thus within a short time they brought under their subjection the lower part of Clydesdale

Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 300–1. Chron. Bower, vii, 269; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 477. 11 Oram, ‘Bruce, Balliol and Galloway’, 43. 12 MacInnes, ‘Shock and Awe’, 43–6. 13 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 239, 249–249v; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 299; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353; Chron. Bower, vii, 123; Chron. Melsa, ii, 378. 14 Chron. Bower, vii, 125–7; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353; see also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 436–7. 15 Chron. Bower, vii, 143–5; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 454–5; see also Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 355–6. 9

10

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and its inhabitants, regardless of whether they were willing or not.’16 In similar fashion the earl of Moray proceeded into Lothian in 1335 ‘to bring the southern Scots back to loyalty’, while as a result of raiding by both the English and Andrew Murray in 1336, ‘the whole land of Gowrie, Angus and the Mearns was reduced to almost irreparable devastation’.17 These sweeping chronicle descriptions cannot be taken at face value. They provide the chroniclers’ view of the destruction, and reflect their own opinion that, although perhaps necessary, the nature of Bruce warfare led to the unfortunate suffering of the Scottish people. Nonetheless, in the absence of detailed administrative evidence akin to that produced by northern English communities, these descriptions at least provide details of the areas targeted, and an insight into contemporary perceptions of the losses local people endured. The purpose of this destructive raiding against the Scottish countryside and its inhabitants was to terrorise those whose allegiance had wavered into returning once again to Bruce adherence. The Lanercost chronicler recognised this when he described the situation in Scotland following submissions to Balliol and Edward III in the summer of 1335. Those Bruce Scots who remained outwith the Balliol/English allegiance gathered together and ‘committed much injury upon those who had accepted peace’.18 This strategy was utilised most frequently in Galloway, where a stubborn pro-Balliol presence meant that violent physical pressure had to be exerted repeatedly against those who refused to submit to the Bruce party.19 Duncan MacDowell’s numerous temporary defections to the Bruce allegiance throughout the period were probably attributable to repeated attacks on his lands, coupled with political pressure applied in the 1340s and the promise of rewards for good behaviour.20 The Steward’s attacks on his own tenants successChron. Bower, vii, 107; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 416. Chron. Bower, vii, 107–9, 125; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 355; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 439. For destruction in Lothian in this period, see CDS, iii, pp. 326–43. 18 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 294. Examples of Balliol supporters whose lands may have been targeted include William Ramsey, whose lands in Berwickshire ‘have been entirely laid waste by the king’s enemies there, because he [Ramsey], born of those parts, is of the king’s fealty against them [the Bruce Scots]’ (CPR, 1340–43, 254; CDS, iii, no. 1367). David Marshall’s lands were similarly wasted (CPR, 1340–43, 275; CDS, iii, no. 1366). 19 The attacks on Galloway in 1334 and 1337 appear to have persuaded at least Duncan MacDowell, Michael McGhie and Eustace Maxwell to embrace the Bruce allegiance, and they did not return to their support of Balliol until July 1339 (Rot. Scot., i, 571; Oram, ‘Bruce, Balliol and Galloway’, 44; Webster, ‘English Occupation of Dumfriesshire’, 70–2). 20 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 286–7; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 487; Chron. Bower, vii, 297. Pressure on MacDowell included the creation of the earldom of Wigtown in 1341 for Malcolm Fleming, and possible sponsorship of an alternative kin leader in the shape of Fergus MacDowell (Oram, ‘Bruce, Balliol and Galloway’, 44–5; Penman, David II, 82–3; RMS, i, App. ii, nos. 835, 1007). Royal reward came in the grants of the estates 16 17



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fully brought them back under his control after their submission to David Strathbogie in 1333.21 By demonstrating his capacity to attack these lands, and in turn highlighting the inability of Strathbogie to defend them, the Steward exhibited strong lordship. Allegiance was won by the men most able to conquer territories, and then defend them. The Steward’s demonstration of force was enough to convince his tenants that their lord remained the dominant political force in his own locality.22 Similar raiding to reverse changes of allegiance was undertaken by Andrew Murray in his campaigns in northeast Scotland. Coming as it did directly following the English devastation of Aberdeen and the garrisoning of castles in the northeast, Murray’s campaign involved violent raiding against those whose allegiance may have wavered. The progress of Murray and his men through the very same territories Edward III had himself ridden through shortly before illustrates the process of re-subjugation at work.23 In a slightly different form, John Randolph’s campaign in Lothian targeted those who found themselves within the English-administered zone of occupation. Randolph’s raids into areas where he was not himself lord appear intended to sow discord in the area, and promote the Bruce cause in spite of the English presence there. The overall success of these raids is difficult to assess with precision. Scottish chroniclers wrote that people whose lands were attacked returned to the allegiance of David II and remained faithful Scots thereafter.24 No doubt the procedure of winning men back to the Bruce allegiance was, in reality, more complex. This is suggested in Bower’s description of William, future earl of Douglas, and the tactics he employed in the later 1340s and early 1350s to win back parts of southern Scotland. Riding through Douglasdale with a company of armed men, Douglas ‘speedily won his men back to his way of thinking’. In contrast, when his campaigning moved east into Ettrick Forest, he won the allegiance of the local men ‘partly by force, partly by persuasion’.25 Although perhaps highlighting Douglas’s positive attributes in possessing brain as well as brawn, Bower’s mention of persuasion suggests that, at times, violence alone was insufficient to alter local adherence. Similarly, in those areas of Scotland where Bruce partisans were unable to enforce changes of allegiance by short, sharp violent shocks, extortion – taking the form of looting and financial blackmail – was employed. In 1334, William Douglas of Liddesdale plundered Lothian as a means of taking the war to of Senwick, Twynholm and Kelton (Dumfriesshire) to Duncan MacDowell after his return to the Bruce allegiance in 1345 (RMS, i, App. ii, no. 1006; Penman, David II, 112). 21 Chron. Bower, vii, 107; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 416; Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 32–5. 22 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 416; Chron. Bower, vii, 107. 23 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353; Chron. Bower, vii, 125. 24 For example, see Chron. Bower, vii, 271. 25 Chron. Bower, vii, 271; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 480–1.

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‘the English’, as well as to finance the payment of the ransom he had negotiated for himself the previous year.26 The earl of March raided southern Scotland and forced the locals to pay him a form of protection money, ‘more, it is thought, out of fear lest it should be forced from them than from love’.27 Tribute was similarly levied during the raid on Galloway in July 1334.28 The longer-term success of these tactics in encouraging or forcing changes is, again, uncertain. At times the Scottish chroniclers describe defections that were brief, if they in fact occurred at all. John Steward, lord of Kyle and William, lord of Douglas, are credited with winning back respectively Annandale and Teviotdale in the 1350s.29 Still, both territories remained in English allegiance up to the 1380s, with Annandale under the shadow of the English garrison at Lochmaben and Teviotdale subdued by the English garrisons at Roxburgh and Jedburgh.30 The confused state of war across the occupied territories resulted in raids and counter-raids throughout this period, many of which probably did not alter significantly the allegiance of the people affected. As a means of employing consistent pressure on Scottish communities to support either regime, however, they remained fundamental. Scottish raiding of northern England exhibited similar destructive traits to raids in Scotland, although with greater emphasis on the elements of booty and plunder. Principal among the aims of Scottish raids was the exertion of pressure on both the local English nobility and the English government to protect the population of northern England against attack. In so doing, the Bruce Scots could hope to enforce a change in English strategic planning towards defending northern England, rather than supporting Balliol and attempting to hold the ceded southern Scottish sheriffdoms. Nonetheless, a secondary motivating factor for raiding northern England was the prospect of enrichment for those who took part, in the form of money and booty.31 English chroniclers consistently describe the actions of the Bruce Scots in terms that focus upon both destruction and plunder. Although these are sources hostile to the Bruce Scots and their activities, the language involved Chron. Bower, vii, 109. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 304. 28 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 286–7. The demand for tribute and protection money was, of course, a tactic well used by Robert I in his raids on northern England (see for example, Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1174–1328, ed. E.L.G. Stones (Oxford, 1970), no. 37; McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, chapters 3 and 4; J. Scammell, ‘Robert I and the North of England’, EHR, 288 (1958), 385–403; McNamee, ‘Buying off Robert Bruce’, 77–89). 29 Chron. Bower, vii, 297 (Annandale); Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 480–1; Chron. Bower, vii, 271 (Teviotdale). 30 Macdonald, Border Bloodshed, 9–10, 14–16; Webster, ‘English Occupation of Dumfriesshire’, 67–9; Brown, ‘War, Allegiance and Community’, 224–5. 31 See Chron. Bower, vii, 127; D. Hay, ‘Booty in Border Warfare’, TDGNHAS, 3rd series, 31 (1952–3), 145–66, at 147–9. 26 27



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in describing the raids differs little from chronicle accounts of English raiding in France. Lacking only the triumphalism associated with the English campaigns on the continent, English chronicle accounts of Bruce Scottish raiding remain likely to contain more than an element of truth in their descriptions.32 The Scottish raids of 1333 involved ‘slaying and burning, [and] carrying off prey and booty’.33 In a small-scale attack in 1337 Scottish raiders marched east from Arthuret (Cumberland), burning twenty villages and seizing a large number of cattle and also several prisoners for ransom. All of this was accomplished in a single day.34 In October 1337 a raid of much grander scale than those launched previously made its way through Cumberland. Having done considerable damage around Carlisle, the Scots burned much of Allerdale and sent a detachment south to Copeland to seize cattle.35 Following the death of Andrew Murray, who had advocated the raiding of northern England, new leaders such as Alexander Ramsay continued the attacks. Ramsay ‘repeatedly went to England … seized plunder, led away captives, and wasted provinces with fire and sword.’36 A raid into Cumberland in the summer of 1346 brought ‘slaughter and fire’ to that area, the Scots returning across the border ‘with great droves of cattle’.37 An example of the Scots destroying what they could not take is provided by David II’s raid in the winter of 1341. On this occasion, the Bruce Scots burned many homes, as well as large quantities of corn, presumably stored in barns for use through the winter.38 Chronicle descriptions of Scottish raiding appear rather formulaic at times in their commentary on different attacks. The Lanercost Chronicle, for example, utilises similar language and descriptions of Scottish raids throughout this period. Describing Scottish raiding of 1333 the chronicler described how the Scots proceeded through northern England ‘slaying and burning … carrying off cattle and booty (homicidia et incendia perpetraverunt, et praedas et spolia abduxerunt)’.39 As has been shown, the elements of fire and booty were indeed regular characteristics of Scottish raids, and the Lanercost chronicler would return to such descriptions often in later years. DeVries, ‘Use of Chronicles’, 1–15; Given-Wilson, Chronicles, chapter 5. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277; see also Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 157; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 307; Chron. Melsa, ii, 367–8. The English administration’s descriptions of the raids were similar, alleging that the Scots had ‘invaded the kingdom with a great army, committing murders, depredations, burnings, and other crimes’ (CCR, 1333–37, 22). 34 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 304–5. 35 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 307–8; see also Scalacronica (King), 125. 36 Chron. Bower, vii, 147–9; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 461. 37 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 326; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 19; Scalacronica (King), 136; Knighton’s Chronicle, 55. 38 Scalacronica (King), 134. 39 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277; Chron. Lanercost (Stevenson), 272. 32 33

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The element of murder (homicidia) appears to have been more unusual. It may be that in 1333, when the intent was to divert the English army away from its siege of Berwick, a more violent raid was deemed necessary. It is also possible that this statement represents a brief example of an existing northern English chronicle tradition that sought to portray the Scots in the worst possible light in reference to their behaviour.40 If so, it remains a far more reserved example than those apparent in the descriptions of twelfthcentury Scottish invasions, or indeed William Wallace’s invasion.41 Indeed, if anything, the above examples and the Lanercost chronicler’s use of more formulaic descriptions of burning, destruction, looting and ransom, speak to an acceptance by such writers that this had once more become part of daily life in northern England. The lack of fierce invective can therefore be seen as resignation on the part of these chroniclers that the Scots had returned, and that they were once more in the ascendancy. In spite of the issues raised by chronicle portrayals of events, their depictions can at times be supported by administrative evidence produced for the English crown. A letter to Edward III described the 1340 raid on Northumberland led by the earls of March and Sutherland. On this occasion the Scots captured ‘a good 2,000 fat beasts and many prisoners’.42 Following the Neville’s Cross campaign, inquisitions were set up to investigate the claims of the men of Cumberland and Northumberland that they required relief from taxation because of damage to their lands.43 In April 1348, the crown awarded several Cumbrian communities relief from payment of the tenth and fifteenth granted to Edward III in 1346. This decision was based on an inquisition that found that the Scots ‘have frequently entered the said parts and have burned and destroyed the lands, depriving the men of the county of their goods and chattels’.44 A more detailed inquisition recorded that during the Neville’s Cross invasion the tenants of Robert Herle in Northumberland had been ‘plundered of 70 oxen, 83 cows, 142 bullocks and quays [heifers], 32 avers [other cattle, possibly draught animals], 316

M. Strickland, ‘A Law of Arms or a Law of Treason? Conduct in War in Edward I’s Campaigns in Scotland, 1296–1307’, in Violence in Medieval Society, ed. R.W. Kaeuper (Woodbridge, 2000), 39–78, at 43–8; J. Gillingham, ‘Conquering the Barbarians: War and Chivalry in Twelfth-Century Britain and Ireland’, The Haskins Society Journal, 4 (1992), 67–84, 45–7; Strickland, War and Chivalry, 293–328; J. Gillingham, ‘The Beginnings of English Imperialism’, Journal of Historical Sociology, 5 (1992), 392–409. 41 Strickland, ‘Law of Arms’, 43–7. 42 CDS, v, no. 809; Scalacronica (King), Appendix i. The recorded number of cattle may be accurate, as the plunder was recovered following the defeat of the Scottish raiders on their return north by the men of Roxburgh and the garrison of Wark Castle (CDS, v, no. 809; see also Scalacronica (King), 134; Knighton’s Chronicle, 27; Chron. Baker, 69–70). 43 CPR, 1345–48, 301–2. 44 CCR, 1346–49, 448–9. 40



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sheep and muttons, and other goods’.45 The Bruce Scots did not, however, raid northern England only to cause destruction and deprive local people of their goods. Further profit could be acquired through payment of protection money in return for immunity from destruction and plundering. The efficient blackmailing of the English north had provided Robert I with large quantities of money.46 Similar rewards were envisaged by David II and his commanders, and as before, English communities appear to have readily agreed to pay. The people of Carlisle were persuaded to purchase a truce for 300 marks in 1346 as a result of the Bruce army’s appearance a few miles east at Liddel.47 By this time, a similar truce had been agreed to cover Westmorland. To avoid Scottish attacks the people of the county paid the sum of £233 6s 8d to secure the safety of their lands.48 Similarly, David II reportedly wrote to the bishop of Durham to demand 1,000 marks, or enough bread to supply his army for the duration of his campaign, in return for not destroying the lands of the Palatinate.49 Separate agreements were also reportedly negotiated with Durham’s secular landowners and with the monks of Durham Cathedral. The former agreed to pay in order that their lands and manors would be spared destruction.50 And the monks ‘promised to pay an indemnity to the Scots … for themselves and their estates and tenants, that [the Scots] should stay no longer.’51 Where the source material provides detail of how much the Scots were able to extract from northern English communities, it appears that these amounts were at times comparable to those raised during the systematic attacks of Robert I and his lieutenants during the 1310s and 1320s. The £200 CDS, iii, no. 1501; Penman, David II, 130; see also CPR, 1345–48, 379. See above, 162; see also McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, chapter 3; Scammell, ‘Robert I and the North of England’, 385–6, 388–90, 393–8. 47 Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 24; Penman, David II, 130; see also Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, i, 279; Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 56. 48 TNA, E101/25/10, fol. 2. The sum paid to the Scots was greater than the county’s contribution to the tenth and fifteenth granted to the crown, which raised around £180 in each of the two years covered by this account. 49 BL, Cotton Faustina B, fol. 93v; Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 57–8; Penman, David II, 127. The Scots had used foodstuffs as an alternative to money when blackmailing areas of southern Scotland in the early 1310s (McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 130–1). The bishop of Durham had foreseen the need to raise £160 to pay off the Scots as early as 1343 or 1344 to ensure continuing peace (Richard D’Aungerville, of Bury: Fragments of his register and other documents (Surtees Society, 1910), 159–60; see also S.S. Martin, ‘Richard D’Aungerville de Bury, 1287–1345’ (unpublished PhD thesis, Emory University, 1986), 148–9). 50 BL, Cotton Tiberius A VI, fol. 196v. According to this chronicle account, the Scots happily accepted such money, even though they planned to burn the lands on their return north; see also Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 58. 51 Knighton’s Chronicle, 69–73; Penman, David II, 130–1; Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 58. 45

46

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raised from Carlisle and the surrounding district in 1346 is relative to the £400 agreed for the entire county of Cumberland in December 1314.52 And the combined sum of £422 6s 8d from Carlisle and Westmorland compares favourably to the sum of £400 demanded from the same counties in January 1319.53 Similarly, the 1,000 marks demanded from the bishop of Durham, combined with the separate agreements made with the Durham monks and the local inhabitants, compares favourably with the sums extracted from the bishopric in 1314 and 1317 (800 marks) and 1327 (1,000 marks).54 These blackmail payments from the 1340s do, however, pale in comparison to the sum of 2,200 marks demanded of Cumberland in 1313–14.55 Even though Robert I received only around 1,290 marks from the county, this example is indicative of what could be extracted from northern England when the Scots held a dominant military position, as they did following Bannockburn. Although the Bruce Scots were once again in the ascendancy in the 1340s, and were able to extract some financial gain from northern English communities, it was unlikely as financially rewarding as the earlier period. The blackmail of the 1310s also demonstrates the almost ceaseless recurrence of demands for money each year. The piecemeal nature of similar demands in the 1340s, interrupted by truces and then ended by the Scottish defeat at Neville’s Cross, meant that the Bruce Scots were unlikely to repeat fully the gains made during the previous conflict. Nonetheless, if a system of organised blackmail was to work, there had to be a decent level of discipline within Bruce forces and control over the behaviour of their soldiers. The troops could not be allowed to devastate land at will and endanger the system of cash reward in return for sparing local communities. The ability to raise further sums through blackmail in future years also depended on the Bruce ability to demonstrate that negotiated agreements were adhered to. It appears that the necessary discipline was indeed maintained. There are no extant complaints from Cumberland communities about Scottish depredations in 1346 following Carlisle’s agreement of a truce, and this suggests that the area was spared devastation. Once into Northumberland, David II ordered ‘that four northern towns should not be burnt, to wit, Hexham, Corbridge, Darlington and Durham, because he intended to obtain his victual from them in the winter season’.56 Although these towns were spared in order to guarantee supplies for David II’s army, rather than to provide blackmail money, the recognition that Scottish troops should not be given free rein to destroy English communities McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 133. McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 133. 54 McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 135–9; see also Scammell, ‘Robert I and the North of England’, 395–401. 55 McNamee, ‘Buying off Robert Bruce’, 79–80; McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 133–4. 56 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 333. 52 53



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remains.57 If Bruce armies were indeed able to distinguish between areas that were free for devastation, and those that were under Scottish protection, as the albeit limited evidence above suggests, this proposes a good degree of command and control within the Scottish host.58 This ability to direct devastation against selected areas that had not purchased truces may also have been extended to the targeting of the estates of Englishmen who fought in Scotland, and of those who were prominent in the defence of northern England. One obvious example dates to 1333 when Bruce Scottish raids attempted to draw off the forces of Edward III that were besieging Berwick. The savage destruction of Northumberland is well attested to by English chroniclers, Edward III having apparently rejected a Bruce offer to spare Northumberland if he abandoned the siege.59 The Scots began their devastations at Tweedmouth, which was ‘reduced to ashes’. The land around was destroyed, and the people put to the sword.60 All this was done ‘in full view of the English army’, which almost certainly included local men who could only watch as the Bruce Scots ravaged their lands.61 The specific targeting of particular nobles’ lands appears evident in the example of Gilsland (Cumberland), which was attacked in early 1333. According to the Meaux Abbey chronicle, by attacking Gilsland the Scots ‘believed that … they could end the siege of Berwick’.62 The Anonimalle chronicler went further, suggesting that Gilsland was targeted because it

The Lanercost chronicler writes that some damage did occur at Hexham, with the church the victim of looting (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 332). The abbey appears to have been utilised by David II as a base whilst in the area, and so perhaps did suffer some loss while the Scottish army camped there. 58 Such control of military discipline may even have been codified, as suggested in the later-fourteenth century example of the Franco-Scottish disciplinary ordinance (A. Curry, ‘Disciplinary Ordinances for English and Franco-Scottish Armies in 1385: An International Code?’, Journal of Medieval History, 37(3) (2011), 269–94, at 281–3, 291–4). 59 Chron. Melsa, ii, 369. 60 English chroniclers suggest that this raid targeted Bamburgh Castle because Queen Philippa was supposedly resident there. This was intended to distract Edward III from his siege (Chron. Angliae, 4; Polychronicon, viii, 328; Chron. Melsa, ii, 369). The English queen does appear to have been in the English north around this time, although not definitely at Bamburgh, with record evidence showing her at Newcastle by 16 April and at Tweedmouth on 24 June (CPR, 1330–1334, 421, 454). 61 Scalacronica (King), 115; A. King, ‘War, Politics and Landed Society in Northumberland, c.1296–c.1408’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Durham, 2001), 34. The pay roll does not exist for the Halidon Hill campaign, but Northumbrian nobles who witnessed the agreement for Berwick’s surrender included Gilbert Umfraville, Henry Percy, Ralph Neville and William Ros, while Thomas Heton and Michael Pressen received rewards immediately after the battle (Foedera, ii, p. ii, 864–5; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 139–40). 62 Chron. Melsa, ii, 367–8. 57

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belonged to Ranulph Dacre.63 Dacre was an increasingly important border magnate, involved in the defence of the English West March, who would be closely involved in the war effort over the forthcoming years.64 Similarly, in September 1337 the Bruce Scots appear to have targeted the lands of Gilbert Umfraville around Redesdale and Coquetdale (Northumberland). As a prominent member of the Disinherited, with a claim to the earldom of Angus, Umfraville served consistently in English armies throughout the war.65 The Lanercost chronicler believed the 1337 raid resulted in part from the earl of Warwick’s invasion of Scotland in the same year, in which Umfraville had taken part.66 And such attacks may have been repeated against Balliol/English supporters in Scotland. Most of these individuals held lands in southern Scotland, and damage to their territories may have been as a result of passing destruction by either side. In January 1336, however, Richard Culvath, a Scottish knight, complained to Edward III that his lands north of the Forth had been ravaged, his dwellings burned and his goods stolen as a result of his loyalty to the English king.67 Punishment of individuals whose wartime service placed them firmly at odds with the Bruce Scots, through the devastation of their lands, again suggests that a measure of control was involved in Scottish raiding. The ability to target individuals, along with avoidance of areas that had paid for their safety, indicates that Bruce Scottish raids involved organisation and command of soldiers on an impressive scale. The Urban Landscape Limited evidence makes it difficult to assess completely the damage inflicted on Scottish towns during the war. Some urban centres, such as Perth, Aberdeen and Berwick, do at least provide an indication of the destruction suffered by such communities. The recapture of Perth by Bruce partisans in October 1332 was followed by the destruction of the town’s recently Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 157. Evidence of Dacre’s involvement in the siege of Berwick is lacking, but he was involved in the war from its earliest phases, for which he was rewarded with grants of land in Scotland from Edward Balliol (Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 96, 148; CDS, iii, nos. 1139, 1147). 65 Umfraville was part of the original Disinherited invasion force and fought at Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill and later at Neville’s Cross (Scalacronica (King), 107–9, 137; Foedera, ii, p. ii, 865). For his participation in later English campaigns, see BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 234, 236, 240, 245; TNA, C47/2/26, no. 13; TNA, E101/19/36, fol. 5. 66 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 306–7. 67 BL, Cotton Nero, C VIII, fol. 273v. On the same day another Scottish knight, Thomas Hay, complained of the destruction of his dwellings and goods, although with no specification of where his lands actually lay (BL, Cotton Nero, C VIII, fol. 273v). 63

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constructed defences, Bower noting that the town’s walls were levelled.68 Perth suffered again in 1336 when the Bruce Scots set fire to part of the town upon the approach of Edward Balliol and an English army.69 In the same year, Aberdeen suffered devastation at the hands of Edward III and his forces, which reportedly spent three days there in an attempt to ensure the town’s thorough destruction.70 The provosts of Aberdeen claimed inability to pay the burgh ferms in 1341, 1342 and 1343 because of the destruction of the town in 1336.71 In the aftermath of the brief Scottish capture of Berwick in 1355, the burgesses of the town complained to Edward III that the siege of the castle had led to the destruction of the majority of houses and tenements in the town.72 Destruction of the built landscape was accompanied by the suffering of the towns’ inhabitants. The people of Berwick demonstrated a very real fear for their safety following the Scottish capture of the town in 1355: ‘terrified and trembling at the sudden arrival of the Scots, [the local people] rose from their beds helter-skelter, and rushed outside the walls, leaving to the Scots gold and silver and the limitless wealth which the English had gathered together over a long period.’73 The dangers implicit when an enemy force captured a town by storm seem to have provoked this reaction, although the Scots appear to have been more interested, on this occasion, in seizing booty than in slaughter. William Greystoke, the town’s guardian, offered a rather different description of the episode. Writing to Edward III he informed the king that ‘some [townspeople] were slain and some taken and put to ransom and their goods and the goods of the king there were plundered, wasted and destroyed’.74 Greystoke himself was absent when the attack took place, and his description may not be completely accurate. Still, the deaths of some townspeople were likely during an enemy’s entry into an urban environment. Wyntoun wrote that following Perth’s capture by the Bruce

68 Chron. Bower, vii, 83. The Lanercost chronicler wrote that the victorious Bruce Scots burned the town (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 273). 69 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 298. 70 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 352; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 430; Chron. Bower, vii, 123; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 298; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 7; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 311–12; Chron. Melsa, ii, 377–8; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 118–19; Ellis, Original Letters, i, 37–8. 71 ER, i, 472, 484, 526. Although Aberdeen pled poverty in these years, the accounts of the town provost and custumers in 1340 show that some money was collected from the burgh ferms, although some of this included the collection of arrears from the previous two years (ER, i, 455). 72 Rot. Scot., i, 790–1. 73 Chron. Bower, vii, 281–3; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 483; see also Sumption, Trial by Fire, 174. 74 CPR, 1358–61, 18.

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Scots in 1332 the victors ‘slwe at thare lykyng’.75 Wyntoun himself reported that the Bruce Scots won the town ‘with manly fycht’ and Perth’s capture by storm could well have resulted in the victorious troops rampaging through the town, killing whomever they found.76 Even in this example, however, a number of prominent Disinherited Scots were captured by the Bruce troops at this time, including the earl of Fife, his family and household, and Andrew Murray of Tullibardine, a follower of the earl of Strathearn.77 Of these, all were either imprisoned or released in the expectation of ransom, with the exception of Murray of Tullibardine. He was tried and convicted of treason for guiding the Disinherited across the River Earn immediately prior to Dupplin Moor. Murray therefore ‘underwent the death which a traitor deserves’.78 Murray’s actions were treated as treasonous. Those of the townsmen of Perth, in assisting Edward Balliol and his men, were apparently not. The deaths of some men during the capture of the town by the Bruce Scots appear to have been the only physical punishment exacted against Perth’s population. Financial loss was, of course, another matter. Other examples of damage suffered by Scotland’s urban communities appear in the accounts of the sheriffs of English-administered southern Scotland. In Lothian, the returns of the sheriffs of Edinburgh, Haddington and Linlithgow illustrate this devastation. Linlithgow was able to contribute nothing at all in 1336–7 ‘because the said town lies totally wasted and uninhabited as a result of war’.79 In the same year the profits of Edinburgh Castle’s orchard and garden were greatly reduced ‘because of the destruction of war’.80 In Dumfriesshire, Eustace Maxwell, sheriff for Edward III, could raise no returns from Kirkcudbright in 1335–6 as the town was waste throughout the period of the account.81 Similarly the castle of Dumfries and its lands of ‘Kingsholm’ returned nothing of the 60 shillings expected for the same reason.82 Roxburgh’s returns were also minimal. In 1335–6 the king’s mill in the town lay destroyed and, similar to Edinburgh, the castle orchard produced only 10 shillings a year ‘because of the destruction of the war’.83 These examples, involving the loss of profits from orchards, suggest that the fruit trees may have been deliberately cut down and destroyed. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 394. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 394. 77 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 394; Chron. Bower, vii, 83; Grant, ‘Higher Nobility in Scotland’, 235–6. 78 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 394; Chron. Bower, vii, 83, 205–6. 79 TNA, E372/182, r. 43. 80 CDS, iii, 376. 81 CDS, iii, 317–18. 82 CDS, iii, 317–18, 319. 83 CDS, iii, 320–1. 75 76



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This was a tactic employed by Scottish raiders during Robert I’s invasions of northern England, and represents the deliberate destruction of local sources of fruit that would take some time to regrow.84 The destruction of infrastructure, such as mills, exacerbated the long-term impact of such devastation, affecting as it did the production of staples, such as bread. Although far from a detailed account of urban destruction, these examples suggest that Scotland’s urban communities suffered extensive damage and a considerable decline in revenue because of the ongoing war.85 And yet there does not appear to have been any concerted effort to provide greater protection for Scotland’s urban communities. Gates, earthen ramparts and ditches appear to have been the extent of protection provided for most Scottish towns.86 In part, this was because the building and repair of stone walls was expensive and there appears to have been no Scottish equivalent of English murage to pay for such.87 What obligations there were for the construction or defence of fortifications may have been owed to the crown and the nobility for the construction of royal and private castles, while provision for urban defence was part of the communal burghal responsibility.88 Indeed, Scotland would not alter this system until the sixteenth century, when the deployment against Scottish burghs of improved gunpowder weaponry by invading English forces made walls far more of a requirement.89 On the whole, English towns were outwith the reach of Scottish attack. Carlisle was a notable exception, though its defences were stout. In 1337 Bruce Scottish raiders spent some time outside the walls of Carlisle, but without siege engines they were unable to make any impact on the town itself which (unlike most Scottish towns) was well defended. Carlisle’s suburbs were more vulnerable, and chronicle accounts make clear that in 1337 they were damaged by the Scots, as was the hospital of St Nicholas

McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 76. For further investigation of the English-controlled southern sheriffdoms and the damage they sustained in this period, see MacInnes, ‘English Occupation of Southern Scotland’, 183–201. 86 O. Creighton, and R. Higham, Medieval Town Walls: An Archaeology and Social History of Urban Defence (Stroud, 2005), 75–7. 87 C. Wallace, ‘Late Medieval/Early Post-Medieval Urban Walls in Southern Scotland’, in Conservation and Change on Edinburgh’s Defences: Archaeological Investigation and Building Recording of the Flodden Wall, Grassmarket 1998–2001, ed. J.A. Lawson and D. Reed (Scottish Archaeological Internet Report 10, 2003, www.sair.org.uk); R. Oram, Domination and Lordship: Scotland 1070–1230 (Edinburgh, 2011), 289. 88 Taylor, ‘Common Burdens’, 193–4; Creighton and Higham, Medieval Town Walls, 75–6. 89 Wallace, ‘Urban Walls in Scotland’, 14; Creighton and Higham, Medieval Town Walls, 77. 84 85

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outside the walls.90 Elsewhere, during one of David II’s raids in the 1340s, Scottish chronicles describe the burning of Penrith.91 English accounts date its burning to 1345 during a raid in which Carlisle too was attacked.92 Direct attack was not, however, the sole means of harming urban communities. In 1345, unable to take Carlisle, the Bruce Scots instead attacked its hinterland.93 Similarly, upon reaching Durham in 1346, David II sent out raiding parties to ravage the countryside around the town.94 Attacking the urban hinterland was an alternate means of inducing the surrender of the town under attack. By providing an effective blockade and destroying all supplies within the hinterland, urban communities could be starved into submission. Such tactics were employed by the Bruce Scots most commonly in Scotland, as the ability to starve a town into submission required considerable time. When campaigning in England, rapidity of movement was a key element of Scottish raiding and such time was not often available, particularly for fear of being caught by local levies. Destruction of the urban hinterland remained, nonetheless, an effective tactic for ensuring that the inhabitants of English towns suffered in a similar manner to that endured by the rural population. It was an easier and in some ways a more practical means of injuring urban communities, without recourse to difficult and dangerous attacks on the towns themselves. Again, evidence for widespread destruction of urban hinterlands is limited, although the accounts of English sheriffs in southern Scotland provide some detail for the state of territories within the immediate vicinity of urban centres.95 Even these examples provide an incomplete picture. Although the Bruce Scots may have been liable for some of the destruction committed in and around southern Scottish towns, the Disinherited/English were likely also responsible for some of the evidently widespread damage. As the war progressed, and southern Scotland became

Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 307–8; Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, i, 266; G. Wiseman, ‘The Hospital of St Nicholas, Carlisle and its masters; Part 2 – The Period from 1333’, TCWAAS, 96 (1996), 51–69, at 53. 91 Chron. Bower, vii, 151; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 467. 92 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 326; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 19; Historia Anglicana, 266–7. In April 1346, the collectors of the tenth and fifteenth in Cumberland were ordered to suspend their collections in Penrith and the surrounding area because ‘the king has pardoned them their portion for the second year of the grant out of compassion for their estate, as the town and (surrounding) hamlets have been lately burned by the king’s Scottish enemies’ (CCR, 1346–49, 22; see also CCR, 1346–49, 30; Briggs, ‘Cumberland Lay Subsidies’, 665–8; see also Hewitt, Organization of War, 126–30). 93 Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, i, 272–3; Hewitt, Organization of War, 126–30. Carlisle’s hinterland had also been damaged during the raid of 1337 (Briggs, ‘Cumberland Lay Subsidies’, 653–4). 94 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 336–7; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 474; Chron. Bower, vii, 259; Chron. Melsa, iii, 61. 95 See CDS, iii, appendices 3 and 6. 90



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the focus of Anglo-Scottish conflict, the greater was the risk that the region’s urban communities would suffer as a result. The Ecclesiastical Landscape Attempts to restrict attacks against the clergy and ecclesiastical possessions during wartime took many forms. Rory Cox has recently shown that by the fourteenth century: ‘the notion that ecclesiastical property and members of the clergy … should enjoy immunity from violence was supported by a large body of literature, which incorporated canon law, theology, political works such as mirrors-for-princes, and secular legislation.’96 An example of the latter may be seen in the disciplinary ordinances drawn up for the Franco-Scottish campaign of 1385, which may have been based on earlier practice. They declared that ‘no man of arms, under pain of losing horse and equipment, or any archer, under pain of losing a hand or an ear, should lay or set fire to a church’.97 As Cox goes on to argue, however, the extent to which any of these various laws, promulgations and edicts had a practical effect on the behaviour of soldiers may be rather more limited.98 After all, one of the most prominent legal commentators on the laws of war in the fourteenth century, Honoré Bonet, wrote that ‘the man who does not know how to set places on fire, to rob churches and usurp their rights and to imprison the priests, is not fit to carry on war’.99 Ecclesiastical lands were an inviting target during wartime. Lands that belonged to a monastic house or parish church, but which were not particularly close to the ecclesiastical communities that held them, could quite easily suffer damage during periods of raiding.100 Although destruction of these lands was unlikely to be a direct attack on the ecclesiastical community itself, its longer-term effects may have been great. Accounts of deliberate damage to churches by Scottish forces are relatively few. In English chronicle accounts of the Bruce Scottish raid on the West March in 1333, the chronicle of Melsa is alone in stating that the churches of Gilsland (Cumberland) were burned, along with the surrounding R. Cox, ‘A Law of War? English Protection and Destruction of Ecclesiastical Property during the Fourteenth Century’, EHR, 128 (2013), 1381–1417, at 1381. On the laws of war and their relation to canon law, see J.A. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (London, 1995), 117–19; M. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages (London, 1965), 192–4. 97 Curry, ‘Disciplinary ordinances’, 294. Curry notes that the punishments imposed on Scottish troops for such crimes were lighter than those enacted against English troops in English ordinances of the same year, where such acts were treated as mortal offences (ibid., 284–5). 98 Cox, ‘Law of War’, 1415–17. 99 Honoré Bonet, The Tree of Battles, ed. G.W. Coopland (Liverpool, 1949), 189. 100 Keen, Laws of War, 192–4. 96

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countryside.101 Evidence of church damage on the East March from later in the same year is provided by the protection awarded to the hospital of St Mary Magdalen, Capelford by Norham, ‘seeking alms for building and relieving the said house, lately destroyed by the Scots’.102 These few examples apart, the main accusations of church destruction levelled at the Bruce Scots concern their behaviour on the Neville’s Cross campaign. The Lanercost chronicler, perhaps a witness to some of the events he described, provides lengthy detail of Scottish depredations in northern England. Arriving at Lanercost Priory the Scots ‘entered arrogantly into the sanctuary, threw out the vessels of the temple, plundered the treasury, shattered the bones, stole the jewels, and destroyed as much as they could’.103 Following their march across the country, the Bruce Scots camped at Hexham Priory, where they ‘utterly despoiled the aforesaid priory; for the Scottish army lay there for three whole days, and David took delight in burning, destroying and wrecking the church of God’.104 The chronicler, a religious man living in northern England, describing damage done to his own house as well as to others, used these examples to construct a moralistic description of the campaign and battle of Neville’s Cross.105 It was the Bruce Scots led by David II, described as worse than any pagan, who defied God by damaging his churches and who therefore suffered defeat when met in battle by the righteous warriors of northern England. Such commentary is little different from moralistic accounts by Scottish chroniclers describing English troops sacking religious establishments in Scotland, such as Inchcolm Abbey.106 The abhorrence chroniclers demonstrated in their reports of violent acts against churches is unsurprising. These reports may well be based on real events, but it is also worth noting the historical context against which such descriptions must be considered. Northern ecclesiastical institutions often bore the brunt of Scottish invasions. In 1137–8 David I invaded the English north and threatened the sacking of Hexham but allowed the canons to purchase immunity from destruction.107 David I was required, however, to send troops to Hexham to ensure that the protection he had granted to the priory was observed by his troops. Even then, it took the execution of several Galwegians to enforce discipline and

Chron. Melsa, ii, 367–8. CPR, 1330–34, 468; see also CPR, 1334–38, 36; CPR, 1334–38, 177. The hospital may never have recovered completely from the damage it sustained (D. Knowles and R. Neville Hadcock, Medieval Religious Houses: England and Wales (Bristol, 1971), 350). 103 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 332. 104 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 332. 105 Strickland, War and Chivalry, 75–7; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 334. 106 Chron. Bower, vii, 109; see also ibid., 119–21. 107 Strickland, War and Chivalry, 84, 319. 101

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ensure that the priory remained unscathed.108 William Wallace’s invasion of 1297 similarly targeted Hexham Priory. Again, the canons purchased letters of protection in return for a ransom payment.109 Unlike David I, Wallace was less able to control the depredations of his troops, and Hexham was robbed in spite of his efforts to protect it.110 Hexham’s suffering at the hands of David II was, therefore, only the most recent example of loss and destruction suffered by this institution at the hands of the Scots. Its past losses may very well have influenced the descriptions of Bruce Scottish depredations in 1346. Turning to the question of why such activity may have occurred, four possibilities suggest themselves. Firstly, like Wallace, the king may have had less control over his troops than he would have liked. As a young monarch, only recently returned from France, he may have lacked the command and control structures evident in the armies of Robert I. Secondly, Hexham in particular appears to have been used as a base of operations by David II, as well as by Wallace. In such circumstances, with a prolonged Scottish presence at the priory, depredations against it may have been less preventable. Thirdly, it may be that the canons were on this occasion less willing, or more likely less able, to pay the protection money expected by the Bruce Scots as a means to prevent destruction. Such ransom payments had been extorted from other northern communities during the campaign, and so it would have been unusual for the king to have denied the canons access to his protection for a fee.111 Lastly, there is the fact that somewhere like Hexham was a natural place of refuge for local people and their goods during Bruce raids. As such it was a prominent target for plundering, one that perhaps the Bruce Scots could not afford to overlook.112 This last point emphasises that, even if it was supposedly prohibited, soldiers’ recognition of churches as repositories of valuable objects made them probable targets for attack.113 In such circumstances, then, it seems likely that damage to churches was a result of vigorous plundering, rather than deliberate sacrilege, even if religious chroniclers preferred to ascribe Godless motives to enemy combatants.114 Barrow, Robert Bruce, 122; Strickland, War and Chivalry, 324. C.J. McNamee, ‘William Wallace’s Invasion of Northern England in 1297’, Northern History, 26, 40–58, at 47. 110 McNamee, ‘William Wallace’s Invasion’, 52–3, 56–7. 111 Grant, ‘Disaster at Neville’s Cross’, 23. 112 Brooke, Safe Sanctuaries, 179–83. Hexham Priory was increasingly altered to provide greater means for its defence. By the sixteenth century it was even garrisoned, as a result of its position as one of the few defendable structures in the region (ibid., 182–3). At the time of the Neville’s Cross invasion, there was an alternative defensible structure in the town in the shape of the prison, built between 1330 and 1332 (J.F. Dodds, Bastions and Belligerents: Medieval Strongholds in Northumberland (Newcastle, 1999), 410). 113 Strickland, War and Chivalry, 78–9. 114 See below, 207–10. 108

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Ecclesiastical lands in northern England were more likely than churches to suffer damage. Indeed, ecclesiastical institutions in the 1330s still suffered financially from the prolonged raiding undertaken by Robert I.115 These injuries were compounded by the newly inflicted damage of the 1330s. Several grants of August 1333 provide evidence of the damage done to ecclesiastical estates during the Bruce invasion of Northumberland in that year. Having marched south from Tweedmouth as far as Witton Underwood, the Scots then proceeded to the west of Morpeth. The hospital of St Mary in Newcastle’s Westgate was given licence to acquire 100 shillings worth of mortmain land and rent ‘for relief of [its] estate in the destruction of [its] possessions by the forays of the Scots’.116 The location of the hospital’s lands is unclear, but presumably they lay in the path of the Scottish invasion force. Greater detail of the extensive damage committed during this Scottish invasion in July 1333 is provided by the claims of three Northumbrian religious houses which sought assistance in light of damages done to their possessions. Newminster Abbey received respite because the Bruce Scots apparently burned thirteen of the abbey’s manors, destroyed its grain and wasted its lands.117 Holystone Priory was granted ten quarters of wheat by the king because its granges had been burned.118 Brinkburn Priory also was granted twenty quarters of wheat by the king ‘as [its] granges, lands, goods and chattels in … Northumberland have been destroyed in the last invasion of the Scots, so that [the monks’] state is much depressed’.119 The validity of such claims for financial assistance is open to question. The combined claims of these three institutions could have been a co-ordinated attempt by local establishments to take advantage of the recent raid and acquire financial aid from the crown. The proximity of these religious houses and their lands to the probable route of the Scottish invasion force, depicted in

The abbot and convent of Rievaulx (North Riding) were granted £10 of mortmain land and rent in 1331 ‘in consideration of their losses by frequent forays of the Scots’ (CPR, 1330–34, 47). Financial assistance was given around the same time by the English crown to the houses of Holm Cultram (Cumberland) and Newminster (Northumberland) (CPR, 1330–34, 52, 72). 116 CPR, 1330–34, 459. 117 Ancient Petitions, 201–2. The location of these thirteen manors is not altogether clear, but the abbey’s cartulary provides the names of at least three identifiable locations within reach of the Scottish raiders: Caistron, Newton and Rothley, with the fourth possibly at Felton (Chartularium Abbathiae de Novo Monasterio Ordinis Cisterciensis (Surtees Society, 66, 1876), 140, 184). See also CDS, iii, no. 1085; CCR, 1333–37, 69–70. 118 CDS, iii, no. 1085; CCR, 1333–37, 69–70. For Holystone’s property, see NCH, xv, 460–4. 119 CCR, 1333–37, 133; Knowles and Neville Hadcock, Medieval Religious Houses, 149–50. Brinkburn was given further assistance the following year, ‘out of compassion for the heavy losses sustained by the prior and convent by the war of Scotland’ (CPR, 1330–34, 551). 115



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Map 2, does however suggest that in this instance the claims of destruction and poverty were genuine.120 Evidence of crown awards to Cumbrian religious institutions appears to suggest similar damage to ecclesiastical landed interests by Scottish invaders. In March 1334, the king ordered that Holm Cultram Abbey and St Mary’s Priory, Carlisle, should receive respite at the exchequer from outstanding debts until Michaelmas following ‘in consideration of the damage sustained … by the frequent inroads of the Scots in those parts’.121 St Mary’s received further assistance from the crown in February 1338 when an exchange of debts was agreed between the king and the prior. This was done ‘considering that the prior and his tenants are newly destroyed by the Scots, and also the great expenses incurred by the prior for the safe custody of Carlisle.’122 The bishop of Carlisle’s lands were a particular target of Bruce Scottish raids. Following the ravaging of Carlisle’s hinterland in mid-October 1337, which included damage to the hospital of St Nicholas, the Bruce army proceeded to the bishop’s manor of Rose, which was burned along with the surrounding countryside.123 The Lanercost chronicler is quite clear that the Scots targeted this manor because it belonged to the bishop, whom ‘they held … in utmost hatred through his having marched against them in war’.124 John Kirkby, bishop of Carlisle, was active in border defence on the West March and took part in numerous invasions of Scotland with an armed retinue in the king’s service during ‘a virtually continuous military career in the Scottish wars’.125 For example, he served in the earl of Warwick’s campaign in southwest Scotland from June to August 1337, and again in November 1337 in the relief of Edinburgh Castle.126 Although there appears little evidence to state with certainty that Kirkby himself fought in arms, he did serve for pay in consecutive English armies and, according to one historian, should These claims for assistance could, however, continue long after the actual destruction occurred. Newminster Abbey, for example, pleaded poverty for several years after 1333 and received crown assistance throughout (CPR, 1334–38, 176; CPR, 1334–38, 7, 36, 340; CCR, 1341–43, 68). 121 CCR, 1333–37, 306. 122 CCR, 1337–39, 316. 123 Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, i, 279; Wiseman, ‘Hospital of St Nicholas, Part 2’, 53. For the attack on Rose, see Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 307–8; T. Tatton-Brown, ‘Rose Castle’, in Carlisle and Cumbria: Roman and Medieval Architecture, Art and Archaeology, ed. M. McCarthy and D. Weston (Leeds, 2004), 257–68, at 261. 124 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 307–8. 125 R.K. Rose, ‘The Bishops and Diocese of Carlisle: Church and Society on the AngloScottish Border, 1292–1395’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1983), 67; King, ‘Recruitment of English Armies, 123–5. 126 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 245v; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 305–6, 308; Reg. John Kirkby, no. 423. For a full account of Bishop Kirkby’s military career, see Rose, ‘Bishops and Diocese of Carlisle’, 67–89. 120

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Map 2. The Scottish invasion of 1333 and its impact on Northumbrian religious houses



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therefore ‘be viewed as exceptional in comparison with the majority of prelates who, apparently, took more seriously the canonical prohibition against bloodshed’.127 As a ‘fighting bishop’, as opposed to a clergyman who simply led his forces to war, the Scottish attacks against his lands could therefore be seen as legitimate as a result of his active involvement in the conflict. That his protected status was invalidated by bearing arms may well have been recognised by the Bruce Scots, as suggested in the words of the Lanercost chronicler.128 It was, however, his temporal estates that were attacked, and not his ecclesiastical possessions. In this way the Bruce Scots hindered the bishop’s tax-raising ability and his capacity to raise sufficient troops for border defence, a situation he complained about to the crown in 1337–8.129 Religious institutions more remote from the border also claimed assistance from the English crown for losses caused by Bruce raids. In 1346, the priory of Durham Cathedral suffered from localised destruction during the Neville’s Cross invasion.130 It experienced further losses because many of its lands, such as Norhamshire and Islandshire, as well as its daughter house of Coldingham Priory, were close to the border.131 The priory sought assistance from the king in 1355 because its lands ‘for the most part by the march of Scotland and in Scotland, are as it were totally destroyed and wasted by the Scots, and so the priory is grievously decayed in its faculties’.132 In response Rose, ‘Bishops and Diocese of Carlisle’, 88. Keen, Laws of War, 192–4; Summerson, Medieval Carlisle, i, 265. For discussion of English fighting bishops in an earlier period, and the problems faced by such men, see C.M. Nakashian, ‘The Political and Military Agency of Ecclesiastical Leaders in AngloNorman England: 1066–1154’, Journal of Medieval Military History, 12 (2014), 51–80, at 51–4. 129 Kirkby had already written to Edward III in June 1337 stating that he was unable to collect the tenth in his territories because ‘the bishop’s clergy have now dispersed through fear of a Scottish invasion of his march’ (Reg. John Kirkby, i, no. 381). He later complained to the earls of Arundel and Salisbury in early 1338 that he was unable to muster men for the latest invasion of Scotland because ‘the Scots have ravaged his lands, so he lacks the means to stay in the march or take part in the war, nor has he any other men at his command save those poorly raised to welcome the earls in the marches’ (Reg. John Kirkby, i, no. 426). 130 In a letter of 1347 the monks claimed that the manor of Bearpark, where the Scots took up residence before Neville’s Cross, was greatly damaged, with the priory’s crops destroyed and their animals stolen or killed. Their lands at Bywell (Northumberland) suffered similar destruction, while the Scots stole cattle from their lands at Merrington and Ferryhill, just south of Durham (Historical Papers and Letters from the Northern Registers, ed. J. Raine (London, 1873), 390). The priory also claimed that the monks of Coldingham currently resided at Durham as it was unsafe to remain in their own house, and were an onerous burden (Northern Registers, 391). 131 B. Dobson, ‘The Church of Durham and the Scottish Borders, 1378–88’, in War and Border Societies, ed. Goodman and Tuck, 124–54, at 135–6, 144; Lomas, ‘Impact of Border Warfare’, 150–5. 132 CPR, 1354–58, 357 127

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Edward III granted it the appropriation of the church of Hemingburgh (diocese of York) as compensation.133 Various Yorkshire establishments also claimed assistance from the crown. Nostell Priory (West Riding) was granted 100 shillings of mortmain land and rent in 1333 because the Scots had destroyed its possessions in Northumberland.134 Later claims were made in the aftermath of the Neville’s Cross invasion. In 1347 the abbot and convent of St Agatha, near Richmond (North Riding), were awarded the appropriation of the church of Manfield-on-Tees (North Riding) as they were ‘miserably depressed and impoverished by the last coming into England of the king’s enemies the Scots’.135 The abbot of Jervaulx (North Riding) also complained in September 1347 that his house had suffered. Having been ordered to provide four sacks of wool for the king, he stated that the monks had only eleven sacks for their own sustenance ‘and [the priory has] been so destroyed by the Scots that [it] will not soon recover’.136 Claims of destruction suffered by these Yorkshire monastic communities, when specified, relate not to lands in Yorkshire but to their estates in Northumberland, which lay in the path of invading Scottish forces.137 This suggests that the claims may have been based on reality, but the ecclesiastical establishments involved may also have made claims for compensation because it was to their advantage to do so. Once the crown began subsidising religious institutions to any great degree for losses suffered as a result of wartime destruction, a logical consequence was an increase in the number of claims for financial assistance similar to that demonstrated by these communities.138 The predominantly short-term awards described above were not the sole means by which ecclesiastical establishments could gain financial relief from wartime damage. Increasingly, they sought exemption from, or reassessment of, the various forms of taxation imposed on them. Twenty-four Northumbrian churches protested to Edward III in 1344 about their tax assessment for the ninth granted to the king on all sheaves, fleeces and lambs.139 They CPR, 1354–58, 357; see also ibid., 363. CPR, 1330–34, 460; Knowles and Neville Hadcock, Medieval Religious Houses, 169. 135 CPR, 1345–48, 362. 136 CDS, v, no. 804. 137 Nostell Priory’s lands in Northumberland (around Bamburgh) may well have been devastated in 1333, along with those of other Northumbrian institutions during the Bruce raid prior to Halidon Hill. The impact of this damage was, however, probably less important to this priory, as Nostell’s possessions in the north were of secondary importance to its major possessions in the West Riding (T. Burrows, ‘The Geography of Monastic Property in Medieval England: A Case Study of Nostell and Bridlington Priories (Yorkshire)’, Yorkshire Archaeological Journal, 57 (1985), 79–86, at 83–5). 138 Briggs, ‘Cumberland Lay Subsidies’, 649–56, 669–70. 139 The ninth was intended to raise goods from every parish in the kingdom, which would then be sold, with the proceeds going to the king as the parishes’ contribution (W.M. Ormrod, ‘The Crown and the English Economy, 1290–1348’, in Before the 133

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were expected to pay even though ‘their crops and other goods were burned and otherwise destroyed and their animals plundered by the Scots’ in the raid of 1340.140 The parish of Embleton (Northumberland) also complained about the tax, this time in July 1345, on the basis that the parish’s ‘crops and other goods were almost entirely burned and otherwise destroyed and [its] animals plundered by the Scots’ in the same raid of 1340.141 The inquisition held to investigate the complaint was given detailed instructions to ‘certify … whether [the parish’s] losses were once or several times, at what times of the year the destructions and plunderings occurred, the value of the said ninth from the parish and how much thereof could then justly and reasonably have [been] answered or could now answer’.142 These orders provide a useful insight into the apparently thorough system of investigation employed to examine the veracity of pleas for tax relief. They suggest that the results of the inquisition would provide an accurate account of the damage sustained in this case. Of course, inquisitions were not always reliable, because of the local provenance of the men who sat on such commissions.143 An example is perhaps provided by the case of Salton parish church (North Riding). The monks of Hexham appropriated the proceeds of the church, but complained in 1344 that it ‘was and is destroyed by the invasions and burnings of the Scots’.144 Local reassessment of taxation had taken place for other churches but not at Salton.145 An inquisition into matters in Salton found that the parish church ‘has been much destroyed by the invasions of the Scots, like the other neighbouring churches’ and that it should be reassessed.146 The inquisition was headed by William Melton, archbishop of York. Having suffered when his own lands had been ravaged in the 1310s, Melton was perhaps sympathetic towards northern English churches’ requests for tax relief.147 It has been suggested that, through various loans made over a long Black Death: Studies in the ‘Crisis’ of the Early Fourteenth Century, ed. B.M.S. Campbell (Manchester, 1991), 149–83, at 181; A.R.H. Baker, ‘Evidence in the Nonarum Inquisitiones of Contracting Arable Lands in England during the Early Fourteenth Century’, Economic History Review, 2nd series, 19 (1966), 518–32, at 518–19). 140 CPR, 1343–45, 409. That they were claiming such remission four years after the raid may better reflect their desire to avoid paying the tax than the actual state of the churches. 141 CPR, 1343–45, 577. 142 CPR, 1343–45, 577. 143 R.F. Hunnisett, ‘The Reliability of Inquisitions as Historical Evidence’, in The Study of Medieval Records: Essays in honour of Kathleen Major, ed. D.A. Bullough and R.L. Storey (Oxford, 1971), 206–235, at 206–7; King, ‘War, Politics and Landed Society’, 41–3, 57. 144 CCR, 1343–46, 409–10. 145 CCR, 1343–46, 409–10. 146 CCR, 1343–46, 438. 147 L.H. Butler, ‘Archbishop Melton, His Neighbours and His Kinsmen, 1317–40’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 2 (1951), 54–68, at 64–5. Archbishop Melton complained

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period of time, Melton sought to assist financially northern English religious communities.148 Melton was, however, also able at times to take advantage of impoverished local conditions to make some profit from his financial dealings with the northern churches. By helping them reduce their tax burden, and then assisting them to pay what remained, the churches were indebted to the archbishop. If he desired, Melton could, and sometimes did, later extract financial or territorial concessions from northern churches which further enhanced his own personal wealth.149 Damage to northern English religious estates was not only caused by Scottish raiding. Ongoing warfare led to the presence of large numbers of English soldiers in the border region. These men often stayed in or around ecclesiastical establishments, and the attendant costs often led to complaints to Edward III for redress. A protection of three years was granted in September 1334 to Newminster Abbey (Northumberland). This was in part because of damage inflicted by the Bruce Scots, but also because it was ‘lately burdened by men who daily lodge therein and in the manors and granges against the will of the abbot’.150 The bishop of Carlisle protested around 1335 that his clergy could not pay the tenth recently granted to the king because they ‘are heavily burdened by giving hospitality to magnates and others going to and from Scotland, and staying’.151 Protection was also granted in February 1341 to the priory of Tynemouth (Northumberland) for the duration of the war with Scotland, partly because of damage caused ‘by the coming thither of magnates and others’ who resided at the abbey resulting in it being ‘so miserably depressed in its estate that its goods no longer suffice for the maintenance of the prior and convent, and defence of the priory against perils now imminent’.152 And in January 1348, Egglestone Abbey (County Durham) was awarded the advowson of the church of ‘Ussebourn’ as compensation for its losses when the king’s army assembled and remained there for some time before Neville’s Cross.153 Damage to, and destruction of, lands and crops belonging to northern English churches was, therefore, a natural consequence of the wartime conditions. Although losses were not as severe as they had been during the 1310s and 1320s, the financial impact on smaller and poorer religious institutions may have been in 1319 to Pope John XXII that his manors at Hexham and Ripon had been devastated by Scottish raids (The Register of William Melton, Archbishop of York, 1317–1340, iii, ed. R. Hill (Canterbury and York Society, 1988), no. 38). See also R. Hill, ‘An English Archbishop and the Scottish War of Independence’, Innes Review, 22 (1971), 59–71, at 63. 148 Butler, ‘Archbishop Melton’, 63. 149 Butler, ‘Archbishop Melton’, 62–3. 150 CPR, 1334–38, 7; Chartularium Novo Monasterio, p. xii. 151 Reg. John Kirkby, i, no. 238. 152 CPR, 1340–43, 129. 153 CPR, 1345–48, 452.



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great. In these circumstances, with their finances at risk from a combination of war-related factors that included losses to the Bruce Scots, as well as taxation that supposedly paid for defence against Bruce attack, religious men responded by seeking financial compensation from the English crown. Although some claims may have been exaggerated, Edward III could not easily ignore assertions of religious impoverishment as a result of enemy actions against which he was supposed to provide protection. Such claims continued for as long as the Bruce Scots were able to mount punitive raids across the border and damage the landed interests of religious institutions as a result. Combatants The Lanercost chronicler provides an interesting comment regarding the capture of prisoners in Anglo-Scottish warfare. In relation to the Bruce attack on Edward Balliol at Kelso/Roxburgh Bridge (1332) the chronicler wrote that they planned to capture Balliol ‘with his small following in the abbey [Kelso], or kill him if he would not surrender to them’.154 The source of the chronicler’s information is uncertain. He at times demonstrates violent hatred of the Scots in his work, and the suggestion of them refusing to capture a man who had rejected surrender may have been invented to portray the Bruce Scots negatively. It is, nonetheless, not unreasonable to think of the Bruce Scots agreeing to kill Balliol if he would not surrender, or even seek to kill him in any case. He was the figurehead for the Disinherited and the adult male representative of an alternative Scottish royal line. His continued existence was a threat to David II and, in these early months of the war, removing him altogether from the picture may have been a consideration for the Bruce Scottish leadership. The chronicler’s comment may also, however, reflect issues with the mechanisms of surrender in the midst of an ambush or skirmish, where the chaotic nature of the engagement could result in the death of an opponent.155 It is somewhat ironic, then, that it was not Balliol but the Bruce commander, Andrew Murray, who ended up on the losing side at the skirmish which resulted at Roxburgh Bridge, and it was Murray who thereafter faced the issue of surrender. Cut off from his own men and surrounded by the enemy, Murray ‘surrendered to nobody (in particular) at that stage as is the custom with prisoners, until on being brought before the king of the English … he submitted to giving himself up’.156 This is seemingly a simplified depiction of events that hints at the Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 273–4. See King, ‘Prisoners and Casualties’, 265–7. 156 Chron. Bower, vii, 89; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 397. The depiction of Murray’s capture and the formal surrender of the prisoner to Edward III may be Scottish 154 155

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problems of surrender in combat. Murray may well have surrendered to one particular knight in the midst of the skirmish to ensure his safety. He would have displayed this by the recognised means of a verbal pledge and by giving a token, usually a piece of his equipment.157 Such a submission was akin to that of John II of France who, at Poitiers, was fought over by various men until he surrendered first to a Flemish knight, to secure his immediate safety, and then to the earl of Warwick.158 As in later examples, Edward III may have later taken Murray into his own hands as a valuable political prisoner, thus requiring a second formal surrender to the king.159 The surrender of warriors in battles and skirmishes was a fundamental element of medieval warfare. Expectation of fair treatment at the hands of an enemy captor was based on an uncodified but well understood practice that encompassed the elements of surrender, honourable treatment and release in exchange for payment of a ransom.160 It was the promise of financial enrichment that perhaps most encouraged the capture of prisoners.161 Chronicle accounts often describe how Scots enriched themselves with English ransoms. At the skirmish at Nesbit (1339) the Bruce Scots captured ‘syndry … gud sqwyeris … in the fycht and in the chas’.162 Following a similar skirmish at Nisbet (1355), English captives were imprisoned and later ‘ransomed for much gold and silver and other substance’163 The different forms of profit possible from captured English prisoners are borne out in the case of four knights who were captured in 1334 while in the company of David Strathbogie. An English chronicler wrote that, following Strathbogie’s submission, his knights were allowed to return home although not without some loss.164 Thomas Ros, Manselmo Marmion, Adam Percival and Anselm of Guisnes all received money from Edward III upon their return to England.165 The first three knights were granted this money specifically for the purchase of replacement arms and horses, the Bruce Scots having apparently propaganda, Wyntoun and Bower seeking the means to highlight Murray’s noble qualities in spite of his defeat. 157 Ambühl, Prisoners of War, 102–9; Keen, Laws of War, 164–7. 158 Sumption, Trial by Fire, 245. 159 Given-Wilson and Bériac, ‘Edward III’s Prisoners’, 809–10; Ambühl, Prisoners of War 147–8. 160 Strickland, War and Chivalry, 183–203; Keen, Laws of War, 157–64. 161 Strickland, War and Chivalry, 183–96; P. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1998), 255–9; Curry, ‘Disciplinary Ordinances’, 294. 162 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 462. 163 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 361–2; see also Chron. Bower, vii, 149. 164 Chron. Melsa, ii, 372–3; see also Scalacronica (King), 119, which states that the English knights and Strathbogie were all forced to submit to David II ‘under duress’ to save their lives. Strathbogie certainly used the explanation that he was forced into his change of allegiance when justifying his actions to Edward III in 1335 (CCR, 1333–37, 442). 165 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 268v.



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taken these goods either as booty or in place of a monetary ransom.166 The fourth knight, Anselm of Guisnes, may have escaped without the need for a ransom at all on the basis that he was a foreign stipendiary knight, his surname suggesting his possible origin in the Low Countries. Indeed, it appears likely that the Bruce Scots treated foreign knights differently from their English counterparts. Such good treatment could be repaid in future years if the Bruce Scots were themselves looking to hire foreign troops.167 Useful corroborative evidence for such an approach can be seen a year later in the aftermath of a skirmish with forces led by the count of Namur at Edinburgh Castle (1335). Chronicle accounts declare that, either to impress Philip VI or because the Scots passed through Namur on their continental travels, the earl of Moray released the count and his knights without any ransom.168 The English knights that had been captured were, in contrast, retained for ransom.169 On 10 September 1335 Thomas de Okshawe, apparently one of the count’s retinue, was gifted 20 shillings by Edward III ‘in aid of his expenses in returning to his own parts’ following the skirmish.170 Roger Dakeney, on the other hand, an English knight captured in the same engagement, remained imprisoned in Loch Doon Castle in July 1337.171 Considering that it was the earl of Moray who had also forced Strathbogie’s submission a year earlier, it would appear that he at least treated knights from the continent differently from his English captives. Still, the financial rewards possible from such prisoners likely remained a prime motivating factor in Bruce Scottish treatment of prominent English and Disinherited prisoners. On the English side, leading border nobles such as Robert Manners (1339) and Thomas Gray (1355) were captured in local skirmishes, and were retained for a period of time in Scotland while ransom negotiations continued.172 And even though Scotland is said to have been in the middle of a ‘vicious civil war’, prominent Disinherited leaders were treated in similar fashion.173 Richard Talbot (1334), Henry Beaumont (1334) and John Stirling (1334 and 1338) all found themselves in the hands of their enemies following defeat or forced surrender.174 All were captured during Ros, Marmion and Percival were allowed arms and horses to the value of £10, while Guisnes received £10 as a gift (BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 268v). 167 For discussion of Low Countries troops as mercenaries, see Boffa, Warfare in Medieval Brabant, 152–5. 168 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 350–1; Chron. Bower, vii, 113–15; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 292; see also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 419–21. 169 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 292; Scalacronica (King), 121. 170 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 272v. 171 CDS, iii, no. 1238. 172 Scalacronica (King), 127, 140–1; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 361–2; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 463, 485–7; Chron. Bower, vii, 149, 281. 173 King, ‘Prisoners and Casualties’, 271. 174 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 349; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 406–7, 427–8, 447–8; 166

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or after a military engagement, and all were able to surrender into Bruce custody until a sum was agreed and paid to ensure their release. There were, however, exceptions to the general practice of capturing and ransoming noble and knightly prisoners. David Strathbogie, for example, may simply have died at Culblean. Hacked down by the Scots while fighting to the last with his back to a tree, he may have chosen not to surrender.175 Having submitted to the Bruce Scots in 1334, Strathbogie may have expected little mercy if caught once more fighting for Balliol and the English. Mercy was certainly not afforded to Thomas Comyn/Broun, captured during the battle and beheaded in its aftermath, presumably for treasonable behaviour in taking arms against David II.176 But it is also possible that Strathbogie’s surrender was not accepted, and that his death was effectively a deliberate act of execution against a man who had become too difficult and too dangerous to be allowed to live.177 Elsewhere, other prisoners did not receive the treatment they may have expected. In a skirmish around 1338 reinforcements for the Dunbar siege clashed with a force of Bruce Scots under the command of Laurence Preston. Aggrieved at the death of their commander in the skirmish, the Bruce forces supposedly took revenge on their English prisoners by having them put to death.178 Some Scottish prisoners had almost met a similar fate three years earlier. Following the skirmish during which the earl of Moray was captured (1335), the English forces faced an attack from regrouping Scottish elements. William Pressen, the English commander, ordered his Scottish prisoners beheaded, as it was unsafe to retain them while his forces remained under

Chron. Bower, vii, 95, 119, 127–8, 138; Chron. Melsa, ii, 372, 373–4; Scalacronica (King), 117–19, 239; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 287–8; TNA, E101/20/25, r. 3; Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 169, 185–6; King, ‘Prisoners and casualties’, 269–70. 175 Bain states that Strathbogie was killed having refused quarter (J. Bain, The Edwards in Scotland A.D. 1296–1377 being the Rhind Lectures in Archaeology for 1900 (Edinburgh, 1901), 88). The source of this information is unclear. Wyntoun wrote that Strathbogie and his closest supporters died ‘Thare by an ake’, but no mention is made of possible surrender (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing) ii, 426); see also Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 294; Chron. Bower, vii, 117; Chron. Murimuth, 75–6; Chron. Baker, 56–7). 176 Chron. Bower, vii, 117; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 426; see also Ross, ‘Men for All Seasons’, ii, 4–5. 177 Ross, ‘Men for All Seasons’, ii, 12. Ross even suggests at collusion between Edward Balliol, Edward III, Andrew Murray and William Douglas to remove Strathbogie altogether from the political picture. He conjectures that Strathbogie had become a problem for all sides, partly because he possessed a claim to the Scottish crown through both his father and mother. If Strathbogie was indeed deemed an irreconcilable danger, ‘this might well account for his sudden death in battle and the complete lack of official reaction to his demise’. 178 Chron. Bower, vii, 127. Wyntoun makes no mention of prisoner deaths (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 433).



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attack. Moray interceded with Pressen, however, and persuaded him to spare all his prisoners in return for ordering his men to cease their attack and withdraw.179 This example is reminiscent of the battle of Agincourt, where French prisoners were executed under the orders of Henry V who was faced by continued enemy attack at a time when large numbers of French prisoners were being held in the English rear.180 Such examples of executing prisoners from necessity during the heat of battle are, nonetheless, different from the actions of Edward III at Halidon Hill. Here the English king is said to have ordered the execution of 100 Scottish captives the day after the battle.181 Although one English source blames the Bruce Scots for this action, stating that they had made it known before the battle that they themselves would take no prisoners, it is possible that the king intended to punish those who had ostensibly fought against their ‘true king’, Edward Balliol.182 In another possible instance of post-battle mistreatment of prisoners, Walter Bower relates a tale regarding the aftermath of the skirmish at Nisbet. A French knight who took part in the action was said to have purchased several English prisoners from their Scottish captors, and ‘led them over a hill, and beheaded them in revenge for his father who had been killed by the English in France shortly before’.183 Although this specific tale is highly unlikely, its inclusion suggests that the chronicler believed that such behaviour was at least possible. That it was a French knight whom Bower portrayed as acting in this fashion is itself interesting, and it may be that the chronicler was reflecting more on the different behaviour of troops in his own period of the 1440s than he was commenting on the fourteenth century. Scottish mistreatment of captives is highlighted in two prominent cases. Following the siege and storm of Liddel Peel during the Neville’s Cross campaign Walter Selby, the castle’s constable, attempted to surrender to the Scots. The Lanercost chronicler wrote that David II was not inclined to countenance Selby’s surrender and instead ordered him beheaded.184 Indeed, some accounts suggest that David ordered that all of his prisoners should Chron. Melsa, ii, 375–6. A. Curry, The Battle of Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations (Woodbridge, 2000), 472–3; M. Strickland, ‘Chivalry at Agincourt’, in Agincourt 1415: Henry V, Sir Thomas Erpingham and the Triumph of the English Archers, ed. A. Curry (Stroud, 2000), 111–22, at 122; Given-Wilson and Bériac, ‘Edward III’s Prisoners’, 806–7. 181 Chron. Melsa, ii, 370. Wyntoun states that, at the pleas of certain English knights, Edward III retracted his order to execute the Scottish prisoners (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 401–2). The Bridlington chronicler wrote that the Scots had been ordered to take no prisoners, perhaps explaining Edward III’s own decision to execute his prisoners (Chron. Bridlington, 115–16; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 74, n. 173). 182 Chron. Bridlington, 115–16; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 74, n. 173. 183 Chron. Bower, vii, 281. 184 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 330–2. 179 180

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be beheaded.185 Having been regarded as a Scot during his participation in the revolt of Gilbert Middleton, during the reign of Edward II, Walter Selby perhaps received the punishment of a traitor.186 He may alternatively have been the victim of his own defiance; taking the castle by storm allowed the Scots to do as they wished with their prisoners.187 Whatever the case, Selby’s fate indicated to others that resistance was dangerous. According to the prior of Durham, Aydon Castle (Northumberland) surrendered shortly after the fall of Liddel to save the lives of those within.188 Dubious Scot­ tish practice in relation to prisoners had also been recorded previously. In 1338 William Douglas of Liddesdale captured John Stirling and other members of the Edinburgh garrison in a skirmish, and then paraded his prisoners before the walls of Edinburgh Castle. He threatened to draw and hang Stirling, and to behead the other prisoners if the garrison did not surrender immediately. In spite of this threat, the garrison refused to capitulate. Douglas, instead of carrying out his threat, sent his prisoners off to the security of Dumbarton Castle.189 Threats of violence could be made to intimidate garrisons and encourage surrender, but the execution of prisoners was not undertaken lightly, even if the threat of this action did not produce the intended result. Molestation of prisoners had extremely negative assoc­ iations for whoever carried it out, and was only likely to bestow notoriety upon the perpetrator.190 For men further down the social scale, chivalric convention and potential ransoms offered little protection. Common soldiers, fighting on foot, were prominent among the scores of men who were hacked down as they fled

BL, Cotton Caligula A XIII, fol. 15; Chron. Melsa, iii, 61; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 330–2; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 24; Chron. Avesbury, 376; Scalacronica (King), 136–7; Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 56. Wyntoun states that the Scots slew all they found, except women and young children (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 473). Bower writes instead that Selby was captured (Chron. Bower, vii, 253). 186 Scalacronica (King), 136–7. 187 Keen, Laws of War, 121–4; Strickland, War and Chivalry, 222–4. 188 Northern Registers, 387. The assault on Liddel may also have been a deliberate attack on Thomas Wake, a principal member of the Disinherited whose northern English lands and possessions, including Liddel itself, were perched precariously on the border (CDS, v, no. 803; see also Penman, David II, 126–7). 189 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 312. The same chronicle includes a similar story regarding the siege of Dunbar. William Montague had the captured earl of Moray brought before the walls and threatened to kill him if his sister Agnes did not surrender the castle. Once again, a refusal to surrender caused no fatal repercussions to the prisoner involved, and Moray was returned to English imprisonment (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 314). 190 For twelfth- and thirteenth-century examples of maltreatment of prisoners leading to personal notoriety, see Strickland, War and Chivalry, 199–203; see also Strickland, ‘Law of Arms’, 39–78. 185



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the battlefield in the aftermath of fourteenth-century defeats.191 These men were not usually afforded the luxury of surrender, and even those who did manage to surrender were at times treated harshly.192 For example, following the skirmish in which Richard Talbot and John Stirling were captured, some Englishmen from the ranks of the archers and foot were apparently put to death.193 Some chronicle descriptions of events suggest better treatment of common soldiers at times. At Culblean, the commons who had been pressed into fighting for Strathbogie were spared by the Bruce Scots and allowed to return home having pledged allegiance to David II.194 An English account of the Bruce capture of Berwick town in 1355 describes members of the garrison being lured out of the gates by the use of a ruse. The Scots attacked the Berwick garrison troops and ‘killed them all except for a few of the lesser sort’.195 These few examples aside, most chronicles include regular descriptions of common troops being killed with little or no comment on the legitimacy of such action.196 This may reflect the differing social status of those writing the chronicles and those who made up the bulk of medieval Scottish armies. Medieval chroniclers, mostly men of the clergy and therefore of a specific position within the social hierarchy, at times described the lower classes as brutal and violent in their actions. Walter Bower wrote of a skirmish on Bute between the Steward’s tenants and the forces of Edward Balliol’s sheriff, Adam de Lyle, which ended in victory for the local men. As a trophy of their success, they presented Lyle’s head to the Steward as a gift.197 The sheriff appears to have been killed during the skirmish, but the mutilation of his corpse was a deed with few parallels in Scotland at this time.198 Instead, King, ‘Prisoners and Casualties’, 269–71. For examples of battlefield deaths relating to Halidon Hill, for example, see Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 279–80; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 167–9; Brut, 283–6. 192 Jean le Bel describes the treatment of some Englishmen captured by James Douglas’s forces during the Weardale campaign. Coming upon the Scottish camp after they had fled during the night, le Bel recounted that ‘we found five poor prisoners left by the Scots in the wood, shamefully bound to the trees stark naked, and two of them had had their legs broken’ (The True Chronicles of Jean le Bel, 1290–1360, ed. N. Bryant (Woodbridge, 2011), 49). 193 Chron. Melsa, ii, 372; Chron. Murimuth, 72–3; Annales Paulini, 362; Chron. Baker, 53. 194 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353; Chron. Bower, vii, 117. Andrew Wyntoun’s chronicle contains the most detailed description of the battle, but includes no statement that the common soldiers were deliberately spared. He instead writes that few were killed because most managed to escape amongst the trees of the forest, suggesting that the Bruce magnanimity described by Fordun and Bower may not be wholly accurate (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 426–7). 195 Knighton’s Chronicle, 137. 196 King, ‘Prisoners and Casualties’, 269–71. 197 Chron. Bower, vii, 105. 198 Edward Bruce was similarly beheaded following his death at the battle of Fochart 191

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this incident may speak to a perception of barbarity of the Bute men, and indeed Gaelic forces more broadly, who were recognised in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries for not taking prisoners and for mutilating those of their enemies who came into their possession.199 Another example is that of the Forth ferryman who abandoned members of the Cupar garrison on a sandbank because they had assaulted him and his crew. As he sailed away ‘at once the onset of the flood-tide overwhelmed them, and in the midst of the waves not one of them remained alive’.200 Although representative of ‘nationalist’ stories, describing the actions of Scots from all sections of society working to defeat the English/Disinherited invaders, the tales also appear to portray the common man in a violent, even brutish fashion.201 This depiction of the violent commoner may reflect contemporary belief and could explain the general lack of clemency common soldiers received at the hands of their social superiors. Concomitantly, it has been suggested that the apparent disregard of clemency by knights and men-at-arms when dealing with common soldiers in turn led to lesser men behaving in a similarly unmerciful fashion when the roles of victor and vanquished were reversed.202 Bower may have been influenced by such ideas when writing this tale, but it appears more likely to fit into a corpus of stories, depicted in works such as Barbour’s Bruce, which show the people of Scotland as a whole fighting to overthrow English oppression. The possibility that there was a ‘class divide’ between the knightly warriors and their infantry, and that there was a higher casualty rate among the ranks of nobles as a result, is seen to be an aspect of the infantry revolution of the fourteenth century.203 Indeed, Scottish examples have been used to argue that the accepted view of a majority of noble prisoners escaping the battlefield unharmed may not be accurate. Given-Wilson and Bériac argue that ‘the predictable fate of a soldier, noble or otherwise, who, finding himself on the losing side of a fourteenth-century battle, failed to make good his (1318), and his head sent to Edward II as a trophy of the Anglo-Irish victory (McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 185–6). 199 Strickland, War and Chivalry, 291–329. See also J. Gillingham, ‘Killing and Mutilating Political Enemies in the British Isles from the Late Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Century: A Comparative Study’, in Britain and Ireland, 900–1300: Insular Responses to Medieval, ed. B. Smith (Cambridge, 1999), 114–34; Gillingham, ‘Beginnings of English Imperialism’, 392–409; Gillingham, ‘Conquering the Barbarians’, 67–84. 200 Chron. Bower, vii, 135–7. 201 Grant, ‘Aspects of National Consciousness’, 82–8; F. Watson, ‘The Enigmatic Lion: Scotland, Kingship and National Identity in the Wars of Independence’, in Image and Identity: The Making and Remaking of Scotland through the Ages, ed. D. Broun, R.J. Finlay and M. Lynch (Edinburgh, 1998), 18–37, at 29–31. 202 Strickland, War and Chivalry, 175–9; Strickland, ‘Chivalry at Agincourt’, 120–1. 203 C.J. Rogers, ‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years’ War’, Journal of Military History, 57(2), 241–78, at 255–7.



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escape, was not to be taken prisoner. It was to die.’204 The casualty lists of Bruce Scottish nobles, knights and men-at-arms killed at Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill and Neville’s Cross would seem to corroborate this view. It was, however, largely the circumstances of these three battles that caused the fatalities witnessed on the respective battlefields. At Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill, in particular, the ‘bunching’ effect of the Scottish infantry turning inwards to escape the Disinherited/English archery fire resulted in catastrophe. At Dupplin it led to most of the casualties, nobles and knights included, suffocating to death within their armour. At Halidon, the uncoordinated nature of the Bruce attack and the resulting press of bodies precipitated a more general retreat from the battlefield. It was this type of disorganised flight that led to the deaths of troops of all ranks. Although Edward III, as already stated, ordered the execution of prisoners following the battle, the number of prisoners may have been few. The Lanercost chronicler, citing the account of a Scottish knightly prisoner, wrote that ‘whereas before the battle there were two hundred and three newly-made knights, none escaped death but himself and four others’.205 The example of Halidon is comparable to that of Crécy, where quarter was also said to have been denied by both sides before battle commenced, and where few French nobles or knights are known to have been taken prisoner.206 The example of Neville’s Cross, fought in the same year as Crécy, provides an interesting alternative. As Given-Wilson and Bériac themselves discuss, the number of Scottish prisoners acquired by Edward III as a result of his force’s victory there was substantial.207 Although a large number of notable Scots also died in the battle, this may have been caused in part by circumstances similar to those that occurred at Dupplin, Halidon and indeed Crécy. Incessant fire from the English archers caused innumerable casualties, as well as a further press of bodies that resulted in additional injury and fatalities as a result of crushing.208 The large number of prisoners from Neville’s Cross may relate, however, to the lack of a mass flight from the field of battle. This was because the final defeat of the Scottish forces was preceded by the withdrawal of the third division, led by the Steward and the earl of March, which likely included the horses of those fighting in the first two divisions.209 While the Bruce Scots who remained on the battlefield 204 Given-Wilson

and Bériac, ‘Edward III’s Prisoners’, 808. Lanercost (Maxwell), 281. 206 Given-Wilson and Bériac, ‘Edward III’s Prisoners’, 827; A. Ayton, ‘The Battle of Crécy: Context and Significance’, in The Battle of Crécy, 1346, ed. A. Ayton and P. Preston (Woodbridge, 2005), 1–34, at 5–6; A. Ayton, ‘The English Army at Crécy’, in ibid., 159–253, at 191–3. 207 Given-Wilson and Bériac, ‘Edward III’s Prisoners’, 809–14; Penman, David II, 136–7. 208 Hardy, ‘Military Archery at Neville’s Cross’, 18, 20. 209 Penman, David II, 134. 205 Chron.

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fought on manfully, including the forces of the earl of Fife and the king himself, the result was clearly no longer in doubt and therefore the opportunity to take such men prisoner may have been easier. Indeed, the fact that David II was captured, albeit with some difficulty, along with a long list of Scottish knights is demonstrative of the extent to which the taking of knightly prisoners remained a preferred option, when such an option was practical. David II’s capture also illustrates the extent to which there were recognised behaviours involved in the treatment of captives. He was, of course, a king and ultimately of great value. Still, the surgery he received to remove at least one of the arrowheads embedded in his skull, his slow progress south as befitted his injured status, and his eventual confinement in various castles from which he received and despatched various Scottish delegations, reflects favourable treatment at the hands of the English.210 Not all prisoners were so fortunate. For those men who became prisoners of the Bruce Scots, imprisonment in a Scottish castle was the likely next step until a suitable ransom could be negotiated. The conditions of imprisonment in Scotland for those Englishmen and Anglo-Scots captured on campaign remain uncertain through lack of evidence. Probably the most famous English captive during this period was Thomas Gray, not because of his social standing or his treatment, but because he wrote his Scalacronica while a Scottish prisoner. His year spent in Edinburgh Castle appears not to have been overly difficult, and access to manuscript resources at Edinburgh allowed him to include Scottish material within his work.211 For other Disinherited/English soldiers, the surviving evidence only provides the bare minimum of information on the length of their captivity, and the difficulties they faced in raising their ransoms. Henry Beaumont spent a maximum of six months imprisoned following his capture in the winter of 1334/5 at Dundarg. His release allowed him to take part in the summer campaign of 1335.212 Richard Talbot, captured in September 1334, managed to secure his release by April 1335, having spent around seven months as a Bruce captive.213 Roger Dakeney suffered longer imprisonment than those above and remained in Loch Doon Castle almost two years after his capture at Edinburgh in 1335.214 And James Selby, son of

CCR, 1346–49, 133; CDS, iii, no. 1478, 269; CPR, 1345–48, 226–7; Rot. Scot, i, 679–85; Penman, David II, 138–9, see also 140–74. 211 Scalacronica (King), pp. xix–xx, xli. 212 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 237v. For Beaumont’s captivity, see Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 349; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 427–8; Chron. Bower, vii, 95, 119; Scalacronica (King), 119, 239; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 287–8; Chron. Melsa, ii, 373–4. 213 Rot. Scot., i, 334. 214 CDS, iii, no. 1238. 210



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Walter Selby, claimed that the Scots imprisoned him for over eight years following his capture at Liddel in 1346.215 The treatment received by these individuals may not have been the same as Thomas Gray, but men like Beaumont and Talbot were important figures and it would not have been in the Bruce interest to mistreat them. One Disinherited figure who may have received harsher treatment was John Stirling. He had been ‘kept close prisoner … for a long time’ following his capture, along with Richard Talbot in September 1334.216 This description has been taken by some historians to suggest Stirling’s mistreatment and harsh confinement.217 Stirling’s period of confinement amounted to around a year in Dumbarton Castle, longer than his fellow-captive Talbot, but not as long as some of the examples above.218 The possibility of mistreatment relates, therefore, to the description of Stirling’s ‘close confinement’. This would appear to contrast with the ‘open custody’ enjoyed by Thomas Gray at Edinburgh.219 The conditions of this ‘close confinement’ are not alluded to in the surviving evidence, but English examples of the treatment afforded to Scottish prisoners provide possible comparative detail. Prisoners could be kept in irons. Following the skirmish at Dornock (1333), William Douglas of Liddesdale and William Barde were kept in irons within Carlisle Castle.220 Orders of 1336 stipulated that John Randolph, earl of Moray, be kept in irons upon his arrival at the Tower of London.221 And following Neville’s Cross, William Douglas of Liddesdale was placed in chains once more, this time in Nottingham Castle. He was only released from close confinement when Walter Haliburton and David Annan, fellow prisoners recently released to collect their own ransoms, agreed to pay a fine of 500 marks should Douglas leave the castle without the constable’s permission.222 Nonetheless, Scottish prisoners appear to have received varying degrees of care while in English confinement. The English crown provided allowances to its castellans for the expenses of keeping Scottish prisoners. Following Neville’s Cross, the constables of Windsor and Nottingham were allowed 2 shillings a day for the maintenance of both William Ramsay and Walter Haliburton, and of both William Douglas and William Vaux respectively.223 The constable of CDS, iii, no. 1671. CPR, 1334–8, 168. 217 King, ‘Prisoners and Casualties’, 271; Cornell, ‘English Garrisons’, 113–14; King, ‘War, Politics and Landed Society’, 114. 218 Stirling returned to Scotland upon his release around November 1335 and was appointed warden of Edinburgh Castle and sheriff of Lothian (CDS, iii, no. 1186). 219 Strickland, War and Chivalry, 196–7. 220 CDS, iii, no. 1074; CCR, 1333–37, 101. 221 CCR, 1333–37, 712. 222 CCR, 1349–54, 225. 223 Foedera, iii, p. i, 141, 146. 215

216

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Bristol Castle received 12 pence a day to provide for the sustenance of his prisoner, William Annan.224 The difficulties of captivity were matched by the prisoner’s problem of raising sufficient money to pay for his ransom and release. The cost of ransoms varied depending on the status of the prisoner, but most men at least claimed that they struggled to meet the demands made upon them, and sought crown assistance in paying off their debt. By August 1335, for example, Henry Beaumont had received a loan of 400 marks from Edward III towards the payment of his ransom.225 John Stirling received several manors in Northumberland from Edward III in October 1335, the proceeds of which were intended to assist in paying his heavy ransom.226 His importance to Edward III is highlighted by a further grant of 250 marks the following month for the same purpose.227 Robert Manners negotiated his release from captivity before October 1339 to allow his return to England to raise the required sum. Robert Clifford acted as hostage for Manners to ensure his return with the money.228 Manners apparently struggled to pay the total demanded of him and in 1340 received 200 marks towards its payment from Edward III.229 Thomas Gray was also able to secure financial assistance from the king towards his ransom. In November 1356, Edward III allowed Gray to export 100 sacks of wool from Berwick to contribute to the required total.230 Many captives appear, therefore, to have routinely expected the crown to assist in the payment of ransoms. Even lesser men in royal service might receive help of this sort. Members of the Dunbar garrison captured John Swanlond, John Stirling’s clerk, before August 1336. Edward III granted him 100 shillings in aid of his release.231 John Lilleburn requested payment from the king of an outstanding debt in order to facilitate

224 Foedera,

iii, p. i, 146. 1334–38, 165. Beaumont also received relief of repayment of his debts to the exchequer, possibly as part of the crown’s assistance to him in funding his ransom (CPR, 1334–38, 165; CPR, 1338–40, 8–9; CDS, iii, no. 1256; CCR, 1337–39, 302; CCR, 1339–41, 108). 226 CDS, iii, no. 1183; CPR, 1334–38, 168. 227 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 273. 228 CCR, 1339–41, 273–4. For the form that negotiations for release took, see the indenture of 1350 for the release of David Annan and Walter Haliburton, two Scottish knights captured at Neville’s Cross (CCR, 1349–54, 223; see also TNA, E39/14/18, the indenture of ransom for the earl of Fife). 229 CCR, 1339–41, 594–5. 230 Rot. Scot., i, 798. Fordun’s account describes few Englishmen being killed, the majority, like Gray, being led away, and ‘afterwards ransomed for much gold and silver’ (Chron. Fordun, 361–2; Scalacronica (King), 140–1). 231 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 277. 225 CPR,



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payment of his ransom.232 And a gift of 10 marks was made around October 1341 to Adam Eshot in aid of his ransom, his capture occurring while in royal service.233 Bruce Scottish captives were probably less likely to receive monetary assistance from the crown in financing their release from imprisonment. Andrew Murray received 1,000 marks from the Scottish exchequer to pay his ransom, but purchasing the freedom of the Guardian was likely a necessary expense. John Crabbe, captured at the same time as Murray, was less fortunate. Though not as valuable a political figure as Murray, Crabbe remained an important military prisoner and the ransom of 1,000 marks he agreed with his captor, Walter Mauny, reflects recognition of his worth.234 According to the Lanercost chronicler, however, Crabbe received no help from the Bruce Scots with his sizeable ransom. In order to pay for his release, Crabbe entered the service of Edward III and ‘became a most bitter persecutor of [the Scottish] people’.235 Nonetheless, Scottish prisoners generally appear to have been able to negotiate terms of release with Edward III, who increasingly monopolised discussions with captured Scots by purchasing them from his own knights.236 The earl of Fife negotiated a ransom of £1,000 with the English king, while lesser sums were agreed for the release of Walter Haliburton (£200) and William Vaux (£133).237 It has been suggested that following Neville’s Cross, where these three Bruce Scots were captured, Edward III concerned himself less with the financial gains that could be made by ransoming his captives. Instead he looked for political benefits that could be negotiated with those who sought their release.238 Edward III’s negotiations with William Douglas of Liddesdale, by which he entered English service, suggest that this may have been true, and Scottish ransoms generally may have been reduced as a result of similar discussions as the conflict progressed. A lack of evidence makes this point speculative, however, and it is impossible to know the extent to which Scottish knights and men-at-arms, in particular, gained or lost financially during wartime. Nonetheless, notable Scottish warriors appear to have been as able as their English counterparts to negotiate a ransom for themselves at a rate that was 232 CCR,

1341–43, 298. He was still requesting money from the king to pay his ransom in March 1342 (CCR, 1343–46, 15–16). 233 CCR, 1341–43, 298. 234 Despite surrendering his prisoner to Edward III, Mauny received all but £100 of the 1,000 mark ransom from the English king (Bothwell, Edward III and the English Peerage, 105). 235 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 274. 236 Given-Wilson and Bériac, ‘Edward III’s Prisoners’, 809–14; Ambühl, Prisoners of War, 147–8. 237 TNA, E39/14/18; Rot. Scot., i, 729; Given-Wilson and Bériac, ‘Edward III’s Prisoners’, 812–13. 238 Given-Wilson and Bériac, ‘Edward III’s Prisoners’, 813–14.

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within their ability to pay. And the recognition that Scots were valuable captives, whether for financial or political gain, suggests that they were just as likely to receive the type of treatment expected by contemporary English warriors. Conclusion Raiding, and the devastation and destruction that accompanied it, was the principal means of making war during the Anglo-Scottish conflict. For the Bruce Scots, it was a means by which Balliol sympathisers could be punished and forced to return to the Bruce allegiance, as well as affording the possibility of mounting offensive attacks against northern England. For Edward III, raiding offered the opportunity to demonstrate to the Scottish population the might of English military power over a wide geographical area. For both sides, the ability continually to raid areas that rejected their allegiance was of fundamental importance to the outcome of the conflict. This form of warfare, in which non-combatants invariably suffered loss of goods, money or even their lives, appears from a modern perspective to be the antithesis of acceptable chivalric behaviour. Some contemporary commentators agreed, but theirs were mostly opinions that ran counter to established military practice. The destruction that could be, and at times was, employed against agricultural and urban communities could be limited to a degree by the needs of the victors. Destruction wrought in the country­side was intended to influence people’s political affiliation during a period of fluid loyalties. It could be employed against specific towns or regions, such as Aberdeen or Galloway, as punishment for misdemeanours or to reinforce political allegiance, as well as against smaller groups and even individuals. That this latter action was possible demonstrates that ravaging and destruc­tion could also be employed with finer precision. The destruction of Aberdeen, for example, was a calculated act of demolition against a town whose population had apparently aggrieved Edward III, as well as an act of strategic planning in attempting to deny the Bruce Scots the use of the town as a harbour for incoming goods. Similarly, Bruce raiding of northern England had political and financial motives but could also be used to attack directly the lands of men who had begun to make careers out of fighting the Scots in an attempt to redirect English military efforts from offensive to defensive warfare. This command and control of soldierly behaviour on larger-scale campaigns is similarly reflected in the behaviour of the individual towards his fellow warrior. Prominent men on both sides of the Anglo-Scottish conflict were, more often than not, given the oppor­ tunity to surrender, and as prisoners received conventional and acceptable treatment. Only in specific examples was unconventional action taken, such as the execution of Scottish prisoners after Halidon Hill, or the death of



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Walter Selby, and these are highlighted in contemporary chronicles for the very reason that they were unusual. Certainly the possibility or indeed expe­ rience of enemy captivity did not dissuade Bruce, English or Disinherited troops from campaigning in Scotland or northern England. Indeed, experi­ ence of captivity and the large ransom that likely followed may well have encouraged men to continue their wartime careers in an attempt to make good their debts.

5

Perceptions of War Having observed the nature of Scottish conduct during the years of conflict between 1332 and 1357, I now examine the judgements that were formed concerning soldiers and warfare. Two types of sources will be examined. Firstly, contemporary chroniclers provided commentary on the events of their day including extensive discussion of warfare. Chronicles, to some extent, reveal the perceptions of the individual authors. They also set their comments within a local context. Yet by absorbing and regurgitating royal propaganda, and giving voice to ‘nationalistic’ feelings, they also – to some degree – rise above the personal and the parochial.1 Of course, chronicles were not unbiased. They are predominantly the product of religious men without battlefield experience.2 Their description of warfare was naturally coloured by their spiritual beliefs and inherent Christian values, as well as by their own place within the social hierarchy. In order to gain a more rounded view of how war was perceived, it is important to seek an understanding of the combatant’s view of the business of war. For some men, war increasingly became an occupation, one for which they had trained and into which they had invested varying sums of money in order to ensure their personal safety and to achieve a financial return. Nonetheless, for the medieval warrior there was more to fighting than simply money. Alongside the practical consideration of profit, medieval soldiers also sought more idealistic rewards in their desire to achieve honour, prowess and renown.3 Crucial to an analysis of the perception of war as portrayed by both chroniclers and See for example A. Gransden, Historical Writing in England, II: c.1307 to the Early Sixteenth Century (London, 1982), 58–9; R.A. Griffiths, ‘Edward I, Scotland and the Chronicles of English Religious Houses’, Journal of the Society of Archivists, 6 (1979), 191–9; L. Stones, ‘English Chroniclers and the Affairs of Scotland, 1286–1296’, in The Writing of History in the Middle Ages: Essays Presented to Richard William Southern, ed. R.H.C. Davis and J.M. Wallace-Hadrill (Oxford, 1981), 323–48; McHardy, ‘Edward III’s Propaganda’, 171–89; Fraser, ‘A swan from a raven’, 1–22. 2 For a more positive appreciation of chronicles as a source of contemporary military matters, see DeVries, ‘Use of Chronicles’, 1–15. 3 A.J. Macdonald, ‘Profit, Politics and Personality: War and the Later Medieval Scottish Nobility’, in Freedom and Authority, Scotland c.1050–c.1650: Historical and Historiographical Essays Presented to Grant G. Simpson, ed. T. Brotherstone and D. Ditchburn (East Linton, 2000), 118–30, at 119–23. 1



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soldiers is establishing a contemporary definition of acceptable behaviour – that is, in effect, contemporary understanding of the concept of chivalry. Unfortunately, the sources available for this period of Anglo-Scottish warfare provide serious challenges for analysis of contemporary perceptions of war. No contemporary Scottish chronicle material survives. Accounts of the Second War of Independence compiled by John of Fordun, Andrew Wyntoun and Walter Bower were written sometime after the events of 1332–1357.4 Fordun’s source compilation, constructed in the 1380s, has been shown to have incorporated now-lost chronicle material produced by clerical writers in St Andrews.5 As a continuator of Fordun’s work writing in the 1440s, Bower likewise reproduces such material in his own chronicle, and adds further to it with sources of his own.6 Wyntoun’s metrical piece, written around the 1410s, similarly utilises now-lost material, although his chronicle also contains material not found in the other two works.7 Moreover, it is clear that the chroniclers’ own editing processes have, to some degree, altered their original sources.8 It is also reasonable to assume that their perceptions of military and political events were influenced by contemporary circumstances. Nevertheless, these chronicles remain the principal Scottish narrative sources for the reign of David II. Useful material for understanding contemporary perceptions of war also appears in English chronicles. These accounts naturally provide a rather more negative view of Scottish behaviour. Examples of unsavoury Scottish conduct were highlighted and contrasted with ‘good’ English conduct. Nonetheless, English sources provide a useful counterpoint to the Scottish evidence. Of perhaps greatest use are those works produced by northern Englishmen, principally the Lanercost Chronicle and Thomas Gray’s Scalacronica. Both provide a wealth of local material and reflect the views of men who were part of a frontier society that bore the brunt of much of the fighting. Although other English sources were written by men further removed from the action, and often dependent on the government for information, they too provide useful evidence of perceptions of the Scots in the increasingly ‘nationalistic’ environment promoted by the war in Scotland, and the beginnings of the Hundred Years War.

For further discussion of Fordun’s chronicle, and the sources which informed it, see Broun, ‘New Look at Gesta Annalia’, 9–30; Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 23–43; Fraser, ‘A swan from a raven’, 1–22. 5 Broun, ‘New Look at Gesta Annalia’, 9–30; Penman, Robert the Bruce, 7. 6 For discussion of Bower and his chronicle, see D.E.R. Watt, ‘A National Treasure? The “Scotichronicon” of Walter Bower’, SHR, 76(1) (1997), 44–53. 7 Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 25–8. 8 Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 24–8; Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 4–21; Penman, David II, 428–33; Nicholson, ‘David II, the Historians and the Chroniclers’, 75–7. 4

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Understanding the warrior’s view of military behaviour, and his perception of his own conduct, is also beset by difficulties. No Scottish combatant is known to have recorded his experience. No Scottish knight followed the example of Thomas Gray and documented his own wartime career.9 The earliest example of chivalric literature produced by a layman in Scotland is Gilbert Hay’s translation, written in the 1450s, of Ramon Lull’s Livre de l’ordre de chevalerie and Honoré Bonet’s The Tree of Battles.10 Barbour’s Bruce remains the most eloquent work reflecting Scottish concepts of chivalry, but it is not a soldier’s view. Barbour may have based some of his work on the reminiscences of knightly men, such as Alan Cathcart, as well as on lost written sources, but his work remains predominantly that of a clergyman writing some seventy years after the events he describes.11 Thomas Gray’s Scalacronica, along with contemporary documents produced by soldiers themselves, stand alone therefore in providing the warrior’s view of contemporary Anglo-Scottish warfare. The opinions of these men provide an indication of how warriors viewed themselves. It is hoped to investigate whether this self-image was realistic, or purely an idealised view of behaviour and morals. Soldiers’ views will also act as useful counterpoints to those of noncombatant chroniclers. Utilising the views of both soldier and chronicler it should be possible to ascertain the types of behaviour deemed acceptable to contemporaries. Central to this discussion is the concept of chivalry, and what place it held in the eyes of those who wrote about military affairs. War and Chivalry: The Chroniclers’ Perspective Those who wrote about chivalry may not have possessed a clear definition of the term. Indeed, chroniclers recording deeds of arms often displayed wildly opposing views of what constituted ‘chivalric’ behaviour. In an attempt to define what contemporary chroniclers characterized as ‘chivalric’, it is worth identifying qualities espoused by contemporary writers. These qualities were often personified in descriptions of individuals whose idealised There may have been chronicles/romances complied about the lives of Robert Bruce, Edward Bruce and James Douglas which were used as sources by later writers such as Barbour, but these have not survived. The possibility exists that such works were compiled by those who took part in warfare, or at least that combatants contributed stories for other compilations (Bruce (Duncan), 16–23, 25–8; see also T. Summerfield, ‘Barbour’s Bruce: Compilation in Retrospect’, in Writing War: Medieval Literary Responses to Warfare, ed. C. Saunders, F. Le Saux and N. Thomas (Cambridge, 2004), 107–25, at 122). 10 The Prose Works of Sir Gilbert Hay, ed. J.A. Glenn, 2 vols (Scottish Text Society, 1993–2005), ii, 2; iii, pp. vii–viii; Gilbert Hay, The Buke of the Order of Knighthood (Abbotsford Club, 1848), pp. ix–xxiii. 11 Bruce (Duncan), 14–16. 9



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behaviour was commemorated by chroniclers. Andrew Murray provides a good example. Wyntoun praised the former Guardian as a man of great virtue, who led a sober and chaste life, was wise and virtuous in his advice, liberal in his gifts and pious in his devotions.12 He was a man of great deeds, ‘stowt and hardy of manhede’.13 Murray also ‘had been very useful for the liberty of the kingdom, a great commander, and very devoted to justice and works of mercy’.14 Similar characteristics were attributed to other Scottish wartime leaders. William Douglas of Liddesdale was ‘a wise and most sagacious man’.15 He was ‘an energetic fighting man who endured much for the freedom of the kingdom; he was expert in warfare and faithful to his promises, a scourge of the English and a wall for the Scots’.16 David Barclay was a ‘noble and mighty man’.17 And Alexander Ramsay ‘had done a good deal for the king and for the country’s freedom: he had felled the foe everywhere around, greatly checked their attacks, won many a victory (and) done much good … In brave deeds of arms, and in bodily strength he surpassed all others of his day.’18 English chroniclers similarly idealised the individual, a prominent example being the Lanercost chronicler’s description of the leaders of the English army at Neville’s Cross. The chronicler asserted that the English commanders were men of nobility and moral excellence. Gilbert Umfraville was ‘a noble personage among all those of England, (a man) of … remarkable probity’. Ralph Neville was described as ‘honest’, Thomas Rokeby as ‘a noble leader’ and John Mowbray as ‘abounding in grace and merit’.19 They were brave and strong in battle, leading their men by example by fighting from the front. Henry Percy ‘encouraged all men to take the field by putting himself in the forefront of battle’. Henry Scrope ‘had taken his post from the first in the front of the fight’, and Thomas Rokeby ‘was an example to all beholders of how to fight gallantly for the sacred cause of fatherland’.20 Alongside the description of the English battlefield heroes is the chronicler’s own belief that he had a part to play in recording his heroes’ feats of arms for posterity. John Mowbray’s ‘auspicious renown deserves to be published far and wide with ungrudging praise, for he and all his men behaved in such manner as should earn them honour for all time to come’. Umfraville

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 439. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 439. Chron. Bower, vii, 137. Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 360. Chron. Bower, vii, 275. Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 359; Chron. Bower, vii, 275. Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 357; see also Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 468–9. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 340–1. Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 340–1.

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performed ‘good deeds (that) no tongue would suffice to tell’.21 This notion of recording worthy deeds for transmission to a wider audience is echoed in much secular literature, such as Froissart’s Chroniques, and in chivalric romance.22 And despite the likelihood that the Lanercost chronicler’s words would not reach a wide or secular audience, the chronicler writes of the battle of Neville’s Cross in a style appropriate to the events he describes, and in so doing displays understanding of the world of chivalric literature and its major themes.23 The idealised representation of the warrior in religious chronicles is not as far removed from the military man’s perception of himself as might be presumed. Ideal moral qualities, exemplified by the heroes noted above, included honour, bravery and honesty, qualities the warrior himself no doubt regarded as essential in his own behaviour.24 Contemporary religious chroniclers, although capable of writing narratives using chivalric language and praising acceptable qualities, nonetheless retained an ambiguous perception of war. Though heroic behaviour was praised, war itself was a negative state of affairs only briefly alleviated by examples of good conduct. The idealised depictions of Scottish and English knights were, therefore, often qualified. Rendering Andrew Murray as a moral and just man was not entirely reconcilable with the chroniclers’ awareness of his wartime actions. Both Fordun and Bower related tales of destruction and want in the Scottish lands through which Murray and his forces passed.25 Indeed, it has been suggested that the war in Scotland presented specific problems to contemporary chroniclers.26 The war fought against both the English Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 340–1. J. Taylor, English Historical Literature in the Fourteenth Century (Oxford, 1987), 170; Oeuvres de Froissart. 23 Macdonald, ‘Profit, Politics and Personality’, 121. Barbour wrote in his preface to The Bruce that ‘those [men] should be highly esteemed who in their own day were bold and wise, [who] led their lives in great travail, and often in the hard press of battle won a great reputation for chivalry’ (Bruce (Duncan), 46). 24 For Barbour’s description of the heroic James Douglas, see A.M. McKim, ‘James Douglas and Barbour’s Ideal of Knighthood’, Forum for Modern Language Studies, 17 (1981), 167–80, at 171–3. 25 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 355; Chron. Bower, vii, 137. Fordun may have been writing about the destruction of territory to which he had a personal connection. His despair at the suffering of local communities at the hands of the man who was meant to protect them is, therefore, significant (Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 24). 26 Kliman, ‘Idea of Chivalry’, 478; S. Cameron, ‘Chivalry in Barbour’s Bruce’, in Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France: Proceedings of the 1995 Harlaxton Symposium, ed. M. Strickland (Stamford, 1998), 13–29, at 14–19; Summerfield, ‘Compilation in Retrospect’, 112–16; see also C. Edington, ‘Paragons and Patriots: National Identity and the Chivalric Ideal in Late–Medieval Scotland’, in Image and Identity: The Making and Remaking of Scotland through the Ages, ed. D. Broun, R.J. Finlay and M. Lynch (Edinburgh, 1998), 69–81. 21

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and those Scots who supported or tolerated the Balliol regime was one of destructive raiding. Violence was utilised to force Scots to adhere to the Bruce allegiance. This style of conflict, in which non-combatants suffered disproportionately to their involvement in the conflict, was at odds with the ideals of some chroniclers. This was especially true for those writers who wished to portray the war in chivalric terms – although English contemporaries in a similar dilemma seldom demonstrated difficulty celebrating destructive English raids during the Hundred Years War. The protection of non-combatants, the weak, the old, women and children, was a constant concern of contemporary chroniclers. The extent to which chroniclers perceived such protection existing in contemporary combat provides one indicator of whether soldierly conduct met the standards of the predominantly religious writers. Others are provided by qualities such as honour, bravery and honesty, elements discussed above as being of primary concern in descriptions of contemporary ‘heroes’. ‘A support for the old, for maidens and for Holy Church’ Thomas Gray employed the description above when discussing the warrior class of which he was part.27 It is an idealised statement of soldierly behaviour, but the general belief that non-combatants should receive support from the medieval soldier was commonplace in contemporary literature.28 The reality was, however, often rather different from Gray’s ideal.29 Rather than receiving support from the warrior class, non-combatants were more likely to suffer from the impact of war. Indeed, one historian has written of men-at-arms in the Hundred Years War possessing an attitude towards the peasantry ‘which can only be described as a suspicion, sometimes bordering on outright hatred’.30 The Scottish war lacked the sort of political strife Scalacronica (King), 3. Strickland, War and Chivalry, 55–7; Kliman, ‘Idea of Chivalry’, 479–81, 485–9; Cameron, ‘Chivalry in Barbour’s Bruce’, 25–8. Protection of non-combatants was also codified in wartime documents such as the 1385 Franco-Scottish disciplinary ordinances, which ordered that no man ‘should lay or set fire to a church, or kill a woman or child, or take a woman by force’ (Curry, ‘Disciplinary Ordinances’, 294). 29 Gray undoubtedly recognised the idealised nature of his description. It was the image that he wished to promote of himself and the warrior class. It remained, however, an image rather removed from the realities and requirements of border warfare. And it is this lack of distinction between the ideal and reality that has led one historian to suggest that Gray possessed a ‘casual indifference to the destructiveness of medieval warfare’ (King, ‘Englishmen, Scots and Marchers’, 230–1). For more on Gray and his thoughts on war, see A. King, ‘War and Peace: A Knight’s Tale. The Ethics of War in Sir Thomas Gray’s Scalacronica’, in War, Government and Aristocracy in the British Isles, c.1150–1500: Essays in Honour of Michael Prestwich, ed. C. Given-Wilson, A. Kettle and L. Scales (Woodbridge, 2008), 148–62. 30 N. Wright, Knights and Peasants: The Hundred Years War in the French Countryside (Woodbridge, 1998), 49. 27

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witnessed in France that resulted in events such as the Jacquerie revolt. Still, it remains possible that there was a developing antagonism towards the peasantry from among the warrior class that was at odds with the idealised notions of Gray’s statement.31 Ecclesiastical chroniclers in particular focussed on the suffering of noncombatants as a result of the raids that increasingly formed the principal means of warfare during the Second War of Independence. Religious men from either side of the conflict lamented the ravages of war, with special attention given to the suffering of the peasantry, especially women and children, and the clergy, whose non-combatant status was affirmed by canon law.32 The chroniclers’ thoughts on soldierly conduct towards these groups provides useful commentary on what religious men deemed satisfactory behaviour, and which deeds were outside the realm of acceptability. Commentary on Scottish raiding of northern England often stressed the destructive nature of the campaigns, with fire being employed as an effective weapon against the countryside and its people. The effect of such warfare was most greatly felt by those who were tied to the land, the peasantry. Descriptions of peasant suffering during this period of conflict are, however, seldom embellished with tales of soldiers indulging in indiscriminate slaughter of non-combatants. For the period of the Second War of Independence there are no descriptions of soldiers impaling babies on spears or burning children in churches, as had been the case in depictions of the Scottish invasions of 1296–7.33 The chronicle hysteria that was invoked by the raids of the 1310s and 1320s is almost wholly absent from the 1330s and 1340s. Indeed, the relatively sanitised descriptions of Scottish raiding during the Second War of Independence suggests either that Scottish invasions did not have as great an impact as in previous years, or that the raids had lost their ability to shock. This does not mean that negative imagery of the Scottish soldier disappeared completely. One English source states that the diversionary Scottish raid of 1333 involved the killing of local men.34 The same source also claims that during the Neville’s Cross campaign ‘neither old or young or women were spared, and all [the Scots] seized they killed’.35 These examples on their own provide little evidence that Scots routinely acted in a brutal fashion towards non-combatants. Indeed, the general description of the Scots killing the helpless appears to reflect the formulaic style that chronicle reports of raids increasingly took. They lack the lurid details of earlier reports of atrocities, such as those committed by the barbarous William Wallace and his

31 32 33 34 35

Wright, Knights and Peasants, 50. Keen, Laws of War, 189–92. Strickland, ‘Law of Arms’, 44–50. Chron. Melsa, ii, 369. Chron. Melsa, iii, 61.



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men in 1297.36 Instead, the chronicles emphasise that English peasants were frequently led off to Scotland as prisoners to be released when a suitable ransom was paid.37 This rather unexcited tone of chronicle accounts when describing Scottish attacks suggests an English sense of resignation at the return of the Scots to raid northern England. Consequently renewed invasions did not elicit a vitriolic response from contemporary chroniclers. Even in more popular works, such as the poems of Laurence Minot, the emphasis is placed not on Scottish atrocities, but on Scottish pride and dishonesty, and the image of the Scots as thieves. The language is at times vicious in its depiction of the Scots, but it is patriotic triumphalism and slander of the enemy character, rather than wild invective involving demonised portrayals of Scottish wartime activity.38 Although narrative sources do not appear to include demonising of the Scottish soldier as a barbaric and brutal murderer of English people, such imagery may be perceived in another medium. Illustrations in the Luttrell Psalter depict atrocities in which the attackers are purported to be Scots. These images include an unarmed man being attacked from behind, a woman being struck over the head with a club, and children being dismembered by a man with a sword (see Plate 1).39 It is not, of course, certain that these images were intended to portray Scots. Camille’s discussion of men with painted faces or swarthy complexions could, as he suggests, relate to crusading imagery and the contemporary perception of Muslims. Even if Camille’s supposition that the images do relate to Scots is correct, the imagery involved may relate to an earlier period of Anglo-Scottish conflict. Although the psalter was produced sometime before 1345, Luttrell’s own experience of the war with Scotland had occurred in the period 1297–1319. This phase of conflict witnessed the production of English propaganda that included claims of Scottish atrocities against non-combatants very similar to the actions depicted in the psalter.40 The possibility that the images relate to the first period of Anglo-Scottish conflict is further suggested by the context in which they are utilised. The images are an accompaniment to Psalm 93: ‘Thy people O Lord, they have brought low: and they have afflicted thy inheritance. They have slain the widow and the stranger: and they have

Strickland, ‘Law of Arms’, 43–6; M. Prestwich, The Three Edwards: War and state in England, 1272–1377 (London, 1980), 76–7. 37 For example, see Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 307; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 304–5. The Lanercost chronicler also wrote that David II’s forces around Durham in 1346 ‘[carried] women into captivity [and seized] men’ (Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 334). 38 Taylor, English Historical Literature, 242–3; Wright, Political Poems, i, 59–61. 39 M. Camille, Mirror in Parchment: The Luttrell Psalter and the Making of Medieval England (London, 1998), 284–5, plate 129. 40 Camille, Mirror in Parchment, 9; see also Strickland, ‘Law of Arms’, 45–6. 36

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Disclaimer: Some images in the printed version of this book are not available for inclusion in the eBook. To view the image on this page please refer to the printed version of the book.

Plate 1. Image of ‘Scots’ attacking English people from the Luttrell Psalter (©British Library Board, Add. 42130, f.169)



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murdered the fatherless.’41 Although this could relate to the Scottish raids of the 1330s and 1340s, it is more likely, based on the similar propagandist imagery produced at the time, to relate to the late 1290s or the raids of the 1310s and 1320s. These were periods when the English people did indeed appear to have been ‘brought low’ by the Scots, and when the fear and anger instilled in the English populace by large-scale Scottish raiding of northern England resulted in the widespread propagation of English accounts laced with tales of Scottish atrocity. In contrast to narrative portrayals of Scottish raiding in the 1330s and 1340s, accounts of English activities in Scotland, even in English sources, frequently describe violence against the Scottish peasantry. In the attack on Haddington market in 1333 the English ‘killed any Scots that they found’.42 During the same invasion Balliol and his English troops ‘entered Scotland, killing, burning and destroying, and made many evils against the local population’.43 It was even suggested that during their campaign in southwest Scotland in 1332 the English and Disinherited ‘decapitated whatever Scots they captured’.44 The chroniclers do not condemn these attacks on the civilian population. Indeed, the only suggestion in English sources that there was any discernment over who was killed relates to the invasion of the two Edwards in 1335. In this case the chronicler of Meaux Abbey wrote that the English armies ‘killed all the men, excepting only the women and children’, highlighting the English ability, on this occasion at least, to control military conduct and spare the most vulnerable groups in society.45 Chronicle descriptions of Scottish behaviour change little when we turn to the treatment of churches and the clergy. Again depictions of Scottish violence are few. One English chronicle describes the burning of churches during the destructive raid of Archibald Douglas and his forces through Gilsland in 1333.46 It was, however, the only chronicle to make such a claim for a raid that is quite well documented in other sources.47 The Lanercost chronicler’s description of the Neville’s Cross campaign also included tales Camille, Mirror in Parchment, 284. Chron. Melsa, ii, 368. 43 Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 306–7. 44 BL, Cotton Faustina B V, fol. 62v. This unpublished chronicle, known as the Historia Roffensis, was apparently written around 1350 by a clerk in the following of the bishop of Rochester, William of Dene. Although largely a work on the life and times of Bishop Hamo de Hethe, the chronicle does also provide interesting detail on wider national affairs (see Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 44; R.M. Haines, ‘Bishops and Politics in the Reign of Edward II: Hamo de Hethe, Henry Wharton, and the “Historia Roffensis”’, Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 44(4) (1993), 586–609, at 589–92). 45 Chron. Melsa, ii, 373. 46 Chron. Melsa, ii, 367–8. 47 See Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 157; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 307. 41

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of sacrilegious Scottish behaviour, relating in particular to the sacking of the priories at Lanercost and Hexham. The venom with which the chronicler attacked the Scots for their conduct is unlike any other account of this period of warfare, and is reminiscent of the monastic descriptions of the Scottish invasions of 1296 and 1297.48 In the account of the 1346 invasion the Scots are brutalised as animal-like barbarians, the chronicler going so far as to describe the invaders as minions of Hell, with David II assuming the mantle of the devil.49 Similar to the example of 1333, this depiction of the Scots stands somewhat alone and is not reproduced elsewhere. Indeed, no other mention is made of the sacking of the northern priories.50 The Lanercost chronicler is well known for his dislike of the Scots.51 The Scottish army may have camped at Lanercost, as it did at Hexham, on its march south. Any such stay would have been a drain on the priory’s resources, and may have prompted the chronicler’s indignant account of events he perhaps witnessed at first-hand. The vitriolic denunciation of David II and his army may also have been a response to the 1346 campaign itself. As the largest and most threatening Scottish incursion in decades, the Neville’s Cross campaign provoked a rather hysterical response. The vilification of the Scots stands, therefore, as testament to the impact the campaign had on contemporary opinion. The Lanercost chronicler’s response to it is reminiscent of accounts of past Scottish raids and the invasion may indeed have revived memories of incursions in the 1290s, 1310s and 1320s. Coupled with the particularly local resonance of the 1346 invasion to the chronicler in question, it is unsurprising that the Bruce Scots are portrayed in hostile fashion, but this example is not representative of English chronicle accounts as a whole. Scottish accounts of English church desecration usually involve the motif of divine or saintly intervention against those who had sacrilegiously attacked religious property. Fordun’s source, for example, describes a storm that sank English ships following the spoliation of the shrine dedicated to the Virgin Mary at Whitekirk by English sailors. The storm was attributed to the Virgin.52 Bower also describes divinely-created natural disasters Bower chastises David II for his attack on St Cuthbert’s patrimony and includes a tale in which the Scottish king was visited in his sleep by the saint. He made the ‘mild request that the Scots should not invade or damage his lands … [but the king] pressed ahead, just as a snake foolishly closes his ears in response to a charmer’ (Chron. Bower, vii, 255–7). 49 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 330–9. 50 The Anonimalle Chronicle also includes the sack of Lanercost and Hexham, but the Lanercost Chronicle, or the Minorite chronicle on which it was based, appears to have been the Anonimalle chronicler’s source of events (Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, pp. xxiv–xxx). 51 Gransden, Historical Writing in England, II, 114–16; Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), p. xix. 52 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 364–5; Chron. Bower, vii, 291–5, 480; Chron. Wyntoun 48



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that were unleashed upon English robbers of the church at Dollar, and St Columba’s monastery on Inchcolm.53 And Fordun, Wyntoun and Bower all detected an element of divine intervention in the death of John of Eltham following his destruction of the church of Lesmahagow.54 English destruction of churches was, albeit rarely, also commented on by English chroniclers. For example, the Lanercost chronicler explicitly criticised the destruction of a friary in Dundee and maltreatment of local Scottish clergy during the Disinherited/English invasion of 1335.55 His criticism was, however, softened somewhat because the chronicler was able to transfer blame for the attacks onto the Welsh and piratical sailors.56 The chronicler was, nonetheless, shocked enough to comment on these actions, and destruction and looting of churches was always likely to provoke the ire of ecclesiastical commentators. Accusations of church destruction could also be used as a useful propaganda weapon with which to attack the activities of enemy combatants.57 In spite of such examples, in the context of this period of conflict the reporting of such events does not appear to be a recurring element, suggesting that examples of church desecration remained relatively rare occurrences. There appears, nonetheless, to be a curious contrast between the depictions provided above of Scottish and English behaviour. English chronicle portrayal of Scottish treatment of non-combatants is generally free from exaggerated portrayals of barbaric violence. Indeed, English chroniclers appear to have spent more time describing the activities of English troops in Scotland, and at times stressed the violence of their own troops in the Scottish theatre. This may have something to do with the state of the conflict in this period. It has been suggested that ‘it is usually the victors who bring charges of “war crimes” against the vanquished’.58 In the second phase of

(Laing), ii, 485. Bower embellished the story with an oral account of the attack, adding that one of the robbers, who broke the statue of the Virgin at the altar, was killed when a two-foot long crucifix fell on him, ‘causing his brains to gush forth in a sudden death’ (Chron. Bower, vii, 293–5). 53 Chron. Bower, vii, 109 (Inchcolm); 119–21 (Dollar). Bower’s account of the attack on Inchcolm involved a personal element, as he was abbot of Inchcolm Abbey, but in this respect his description of the 1346 campaign is little different from the Lanercost chronicle. 54 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353; Chron. Bower, vii, 123; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 418–19; James, ‘John of Eltham’, 69–72. Wyntoun indulged in the greatest degree of moralising, stating ‘Thare wes the wengeawnce tane perfay Off the brynnyng off that abbay, As bathe gud resowne wald and skylle; For qwha till Haly Kirk doys ille, Suld nevyre to do welle have wenyng, Bot gyve thai come till amending.’ 55 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 292. 56 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 292; see also ibid., 310–11; Strickland, War and Chivalry, 89–91. 57 Strickland, War and Chivalry, 75–7. 58 Strickland, ‘Law of Arms’, 52.

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conflict between England and Scotland, it was perhaps more difficult to discern where exactly the dividing lines between friend and foe, and more importantly, victor and vanquished really existed. Some English depictions of the Scots contain the type of vitriol we would expect from patriotic fourteenth-­century writers, and it has been suggested that this period witnessed the solidity of a racist stereotyping of the Scots as wild, barbaric and generally inferior.59 Some chroniclers appear to have revelled in their descriptions of destruction meted out against the Scots. But the contemporary denunciation of Scottish behaviour appears not have been as full of clichéd tales of barbarity as had once been the case. This may in part relate to a change in official propaganda between the two conflicts. Although Edward III employed similar language to his grandfather in describing the Scots as traitors and rebels, and in describing in general terms Scottish depredations in northern England, there was less emphasis on Scottish depravity.60 Instead, the Scots would be targeted as breakers of the truce, as supporters of an illegitimate Valois regime in France, and as wanton pillagers of English territory. Claims of Scottish dishonour, cowardice and dishonesty began to replace tired old claims of barbarism, as English writers altered their portrayal of the Scots in line with the activities of the war. Honour Chronicle portrayals of warfare affecting non-combatants were unsurprisingly negative. To suggest that this tone reflects chroniclers’ view of war in general would not, however, be correct. Indeed when discussing tournaments, sieges and battles, a chronicler’s tone often changed, offering a heroic portrayal of the warrior. Crucial to this more positive depiction was the contemporary understanding of chivalry, and constituent elements such as honour, courage and honesty. Contemporary chroniclers portrayed the pursuit of honour as a mainstay of knightly behaviour.61 Honour could be achieved through military endeavour and chroniclers sought to record instances of honourable behaviour for posterity. At the siege of Berwick in 1333, for example, the Scots within the town ‘honourably defended it against the English’.62 The English troops outside ‘made a firm pact not to leave the siege until the town and castle had been returned, or it had been victoriously captured’.63 Describing the skirmish at Nisbet, Fordun’s source recorded that, upon recognising the ‘ensigns and banners’ of the Scottish leaders in Penman, ‘Abuse of the English’, 217–18. For example, see Rot. Scot., i, 233, 667, 681. 61 M. Keen, ‘Chivalry, Heralds, and History’, in The Writing of History in the Middle Ages: Essays presented to Richard William Southern, ed. R.H.C. Davis and J.M. WallaceHadrill (Oxford, 1981), 393–414, at 401–2. 62 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 155–7. 63 Chron. Melsa, ii, 367. 59

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the field before them, the English knights ‘could not now, with honour, flee; so they staked their lives upon their own prowess, and manfully fought it out with the Scots’.64 Wyntoun further emphasises the honourable nature of the English knights by placing a speech in the mouth of Thomas Gray. Gray is depicted as saying, ‘We mon fycht: Beis therefore off gud confurd all, That nane reprowe ws, quhat may fall. In fycht is mensk, and schame in flycht: Help ilke man tharefor at his mycht.’65 The battlefield oration was a common device employed by the medieval chronicler, and honour was often foremost in the words cited.66 The speech to his troops at Dupplin Moor attributed to Henry Beaumont urged the Disinherited to ‘think of our great duty to prove that we are descended from good knights, and of the great honour and profit that God has destined for us, and the great shame which will befall us if we do not boldly prove ourselves in this great affair’.67 Achieving and retaining honour was, therefore, perceived as a basic component of the knightly life described by the chroniclers. Further, the personal quality of possessing honour was an element that could be appreciated in all warriors and so the examples above also offer praise towards those of the ‘enemy’ camp.68 This belief gives credence to the existence of an international brotherhood of knights, of which Froissart was a principal exponent, by which warriors of knightly status perceived themselves a part of a warrior class that superseded national considerations. A warrior’s reputation was based upon his military performance and knightly qualities, not his nationality. An alternative means of attaining honour was on the tournament field. Indeed it seems that some chroniclers placed great stress on the renown that could be gained in this theatre. Knighton described a tournament at Berwick in 1341–2 involving the earl of Derby, who ‘bore himself in all humane works so graciously that all who heard of him accorded him honour and glory’.69 Wyntoun, who described several border tourneys in great detail, also commented upon the knightly qualities possessed by the earl of Derby.70 He ‘had gret yharnyng to wyn prys: He wes ay worthy, wycht, and Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 361; Chron. Bower, vii, 281. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 486. Following the battle, the chronicles also praised the English captives, perhaps to accentuate further the glory of the Scottish victory. Thomas Gray is described as ‘a noble knight’, James Darres as ‘a brave and famous squire’, whilst the Scots also captured ‘a great many other gallant English nobles’ (Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 362; Chron. Bower, vii, 281). 66 See, for example, J.R.E. Bliese, ‘The Courage of the Normans: A Comparative Study of Battle Rhetoric’, Nottingham Medieval Studies, 35 (1991), 1–26, at 2. 67 Scalacronica (King), 109. 68 See also S. Foran, ‘A Great Romance: Chivalry and Warfare in Barbour’s Bruce’, Fourteenth Century England, 6 (2010), 1–26, at 7–8. 69 Knighton’s Chronicle, 39. 70 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 440–50. 64 65

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wys, And mast renownyd off bownté, Off gentrys, and off honesté, That in till Ingland lywand was.’71 Similarly, Patrick Graham was ‘a gud knycht … (who) had trawellyd beyhond the se Till eyk his prys throw gret bownté, He herd spek off this justyng gretly, And sped hym thiddyr in all hy.’72 The language employed by these chroniclers suggests that they believed the joust to be an important test of the individual, as well as an ideal opportunity for the warrior to display his knightly qualities. The earl of Derby, through his prowess in the tourney and his behaviour towards other warriors, gained the respect of both his knightly fellows and of Andrew Wyntoun. Graham’s search for esteem (‘prys’) led him to the continent to joust with knights there, but he soon returned home when the prospect of jousting with Derby presented itself. Like Wyntoun, Froissart also highlighted the tournament as an ideal opportunity to earn honour. Although Froissart was not himself a warrior, he composed his work for a knightly audience and was well aware of the tournament’s appeal to the knightly class. His description of the tournament at Saint-Inglevert (1390), for example, describes in lavish detail practically every blow struck at the jousts, and a parallel may be drawn with Wyntoun’s long description of the border tourneys.73 Similarly Chandos Herald’s poem on the life of the Black Prince affords prominence to the tournament. Prince Edward’s regular sponsorship of jousts and tourneys only served to increase his popularity among the knightly elite.74 This view of the tournament as a worthy and honourable pastime was not, however, a view shared by all contemporaries. Importantly, it does not appear to have been the view of Thomas Gray, himself a contemporary soldier. Describing the aftermath of Halidon Hill, Gray wrote that Edward III returned home to England ‘where he diligently practised the feats of arms of peace’.75 To Gray, tournaments did not provide proper combat conditions and he offers a further jaundiced portrayal of the tournament when describing Edward III’s stay in Antwerp in 1338.76 There ‘he remained for fifteen months, without doing anything warlike, except for jousting and leading a high life’.77 King has suggested that Gray’s criticism stemmed from a belief that jousting contests were ‘a rather frivolous pastime’.78 Instead, the border warrior apparently only deemed ‘real’ combat as worthy of praise and honour. Like Wyntoun, Gray too wrote about the border jousts in which Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 440–1; Edington, ‘Tournament in Medieval Scotland’, 50–1. 72 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 444. 73 Oeuvres de Froissart, xiv, 105–51; Barker, Tournament in Medieval England, 37–8. 74 Barber, Life and Campaigns of the Black Prince, 105. 75 Scalacronica (King), 117. 76 King, ‘A Helm with a Crest of Gold’, 26. 77 Scalacronica (King), 127. 78 Scalacronica (King), 239, n. 5; King, ‘A Helm with a Crest of Gold’, 26–8. 71



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the earl of Derby took part. Gray’s own comments on the jousts have been lost and only an abstract of the original manuscript remains, but it records the definition of these encounters as ‘justes of were’.79 The differentiation between this form of combat and the king’s jousts in 1333 may be significant. Fighting with ‘arms of peace’ suggests a tournament à plaisance, where blunted weapons were used to reduce the risk of serious injury. ‘Jousts of war’, or those fought à outrance, were tournaments fought with sharpened weapons, far more closely reflecting the dangers of actual combat.80 The border tourneys were dangerous affairs and, as Wyntoun demonstrates, several men were killed in such examples.81 This more realistic form of combat was more acceptable to Gray and he afforded praise to those who took part. Nevertheless, for Gray, battles and military campaigns were the primary circumstances in which to gain honour.82 Describing the English decision to resume the conflict with Scotland in 1333, Gray wrote that ‘the king desired arms and honours, and his council was bold, and longed for war, and so they readily agreed [to resume the war]’.83 Gray’s indifference to the tournament may have rested on the belief that, during times of war, the tournament was a distraction. This was especially the case when the tournament lost some of its function in training men for the realities of war and instead was fought with ‘arms of peace’. During times of truce the tournament, if fought ‘with arms of war’, could be useful in sharpening the skills of warriors and those involved could attract praise and honour. But to men like Gray, real military engagements (battles, sieges, raids) remained the Scalacronica (King), 134. Barker, Tournament in Medieval England, 144–6. 81 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 440–6. 82 Gray’s approach is similar to that of another contemporary warrior, Geoffrey de Charny, who wrote in his Book of Chivalry that there was a scale of prowess for those who took part in war. While deeds of arms performed in the tournament were honourable, the most honourable of all were deeds of arms performed in war (The Book of Chivalry of Geoffroi de Charny: Text, Context, and Translation, ed. R.W. Kaeuper and E. Kennedy (Philadelphia, 1996), 85–91). 83 Scalacronica (King), 115. Even during a battle, Gray suggests that honour had to be earned by fighting in the correct fashion. His description of William Marmion riding into battle single-handedly against a Scottish force is a case in point. For Gray the chronicler, Marmion did not attain honour by his irrational action. Instead, the honour belonged to Thomas Gray senior, who marched against the Scots on foot and rescued the unhorsed knight. The chronicler is not without bias, as he describes the actions of his father in this instance, but he does emphasise a practical approach to battle in praising his father’s tactics that is at odds with Marmion’s idealised vision of how war should be prosecuted. In this respect, Thomas Gray junior provides an account of medieval warfare that differs from other contemporary accounts of selfless bravery in combat, and as King suggests, this may be the voice of the hardened border warrior making itself heard amongst other more idealised portrayals of combat (see King, ‘A Helm with a Crest of Gold’, 34–5). 79 80

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ultimate test of the medieval soldier, and the principal means of acquiring honour.84 The portrayal of honour in the narrative sources provides some evidence of its importance to the medieval warrior. It also highlights the importance of honour in the eyes of the writers themselves. And honour was something that could be lost as well as won, something that chroniclers could exploit for propaganda purposes. Chronicle portrayals of lost honour were usually attached to behaviour such as flight from the battlefield. In an Anglo-­ Scottish context this was employed to describe the Bruce Scots following the skirmish at Dornock (1333), where those who escaped were said to have ‘fled disgracefully’.85 The same chronicle condemned the Steward and the earl of March for their flight at Neville’s Cross while the battle still continued.86 The Steward was said to have broken an oath made to God to deliver the first blow in battle, being ‘overcome by cowardice’.87 Repetition of claims of cowardice in other English chronicles regarding these two individuals suggests that this narration of events may have been more widely known in England.88 Bower and Wyntoun’s narration of events, in turn, appears designed to counter English propaganda claims of cowardice on the part of these prominent Scottish figures, instead interpreting the withdrawal as saving the lives of the men who remained, rather than thanklessly committing them to a lost cause.89 This explanation was not, however, simply an attempt to portray Scottish soldiers in a more positive light. The description of the Steward’s flight is intrinsically linked to the political circumstances of the period in which the chronicles were written, namely, after the Steward’s elevation as king and his foundation of a royal dynasty. Both Bower and Wyntoun attempted to place a positive spin on the Steward’s behaviour during the war as a whole. This was done to counter anti-Steward propaganda produced following David II’s return from captivity, which is apparent in the ‘implication of cowardice and disloyalty’ regarding the actions of the Steward at the battle provided by Fordun’s source.90 There was also a Scottish chronicle attempt to ensure that no doubt was In depositions before the English Court of Chivalry, the important occasions that knights described were battles, chevauchées and sieges (A. Ayton, ‘Knights, Esquires and Military Service: The Evidence of the Armorial Cases before the Court of Chivalry’, in The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. A. Ayton and J.L. Price (London, 1998), 81–104, at 83–4). 85 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 277–8. 86 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 339–40. 87 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 340. 88 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 340; Chron. Anonimalle, 1333–1381, 27–8; Chron. Melsa, iii, 61–2; see also Given-Wilson, Chronicles, 101. 89 Chron. Bower, vii, 261. 90 Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 35–40; Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 7–8; Penman, ‘Scots at Neville’s Cross’, 178–80. 84



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cast upon the honour of William, lord of Douglas, following his escape at Poitiers. We are told that Douglas’s men ‘dragged their lord out of the thick of the fight, and took him away with them, against his will’.91 As with Neville’s Cross, the Scottish chroniclers were not united in their description of events. This time it was Wyntoun who deviated from the image presented by Fordun and Bower, stating that Douglas escaped the battlefield ‘by chance’ and with no mention of an unwilling withdrawal at his knights’ insistence.92 Instead, Wyntoun provided greater detail on the bravery of William Ramsay and Archibald Douglas ‘the Grim’ at the same battle.93 Archibald’s prominence in Wyntoun’s account may relate to his promotion to earl in 1389. It may also reflect lingering antipathy towards William, lord of Douglas, for his killing in 1353 of William Douglas of Liddesdale. Liddesdale had been one of Wyntoun’s heroes of the war against England in the 1330s, and Archibald Douglas had been one of Liddesdale’s closest supporters.94 Wyntoun’s praise of Archibald Douglas, and consequent indifference to William, lord of Douglas, at Poitiers, is consistent with the chronicler’s later portrayal of Archibald ‘the Grim’ during the Scottish invasions of 1388. Then, Archibald Douglas and the earl of Fife received praise for their successful raid into England, while James, second earl of Douglas and posthumous victor of Otterburn, was chastised for his rashness and poor judgement.95 Honour was, therefore, not only of importance to the warrior’s view of himself, but also to those who constructed the history of the period and the image of those they described. In demonstrating the significance that contemporary chroniclers attached to possessing or losing honour, the examples above highlight the importance of honour within medieval society as a whole. Bravery The depiction of bravery in war was linked to honour. Chroniclers highlighted heroic deeds of selfless bravery, and honour and praise was the reward of those behaving in such a manner. Inherent within the narrative literature is, however, a diametrically opposed view of bravery. Deeds that were senseless or foolhardy, that placed the outcome of a battle, siege or campaign in jeopardy, were roundly castigated by most contemporary writers. This dialectic creates difficulties in any discussion of the quality of bravery as a fundamental aspect of the warrior ethos. When a soldier charged into battle, did he stop to think if his actions would be remembered as brave or foolish? The answer is probably ‘no’, but the chronicler’s perception of bravery was in any case often based on the outcome of soldierly actions, not an evalu91 92 93 94 95

Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 366; Chron. Bower, vii, 299–301. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 496. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 496. Brown, ‘Scottish Border Lordship’, 4–6; Brown, Black Douglases, 53–4 Boardman, Early Stewart Kings, 144–8.

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ation of the actions themselves.96 This is evident in the instance of Andrew Murray, captured at Roxburgh Bridge while attempting to rescue one of his men who had been caught by the English. Wyntoun noted that Murray left the safety of his position to rescue the man, and that he did so without suitable support from his entourage.97 Murray’s struggle on the bridge was described as a heroic, but ultimately futile, endeavour that led to the Guardian’s capture.98 Although Wyntoun did not overtly criticise Murray for his actions, implicit in his description of events is criticism for having left a safe position and having done so without sufficient support. Also implicit is the chronicler’s view that the capture of the Guardian was not worth an ordinary soldier’s safety. A similar depiction exists of John Graham’s one-man cavalry charge against the English line at Neville’s Cross. Frustration at not being given the resources to tackle the English archers led to his impetuous charge. Having ridden against the English alone, his horse was shot from under him and he barely made it back to the Scottish line alive.99 As brave as his actions appear, they were nevertheless futile. He received no support from his fellow knights, nor indeed from the king, who would not ‘commit [troops] to such a risk’.100 Bravery, then, was not uncomplicated as an inherent quality of the warrior. Neither was its depiction in chronicle sources any less complex. Applauding the courage of a warrior, regardless of nationality, was a core trait of the chivalric ideal as depicted by men such as Froissart. Committing courageous deeds and actions to paper was the means by which brave men achieved immortal fame. Froissart’s description of the Black Prince’s treatment of John II after Poitiers, for example, presents the prince according due respect to the king of France for the bravery he exhibited on the battlefield.101 Froissart also described the brave deeds of both sides during the battle at Crécy, even though ‘too few great feats of arms were performed that day, considering the vast number of fine soldiers and excellent knights who were with the King of France’.102 Within a Scottish context, John Barbour displays a similar view to Froissart.103 Describing a skirmish at Dalry, Barbour included See for example the already mentioned case of William Marmion (see above, 213, n. 83). 97 ‘Schyre Andrew Murrawe owt off his stale, That wend, that all his menyhé hale Had folowyd, bot thai dyd noucht swa (For swme off thame war fere hym fra, And other swme out off array, For purwayd noucht at point war thai, Swa bot full fewe with ar gane)’ (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 396). 98 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 396–7. 99 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 475; Chron. Bower, vii, 259; Grant, ‘Disaster at Neville’s Cross’, 28–9. 100 Chron. Bower, vii, 259. 101 Oeuvres de Froissart, v, 460–2. 102 Froissart, Chronicles (Brereton), 90; Oeuvres de Froissart, v, 54. 103 Foran, ‘A Great Romance’, 7–8. It is unknown whether Barbour had access to 96



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a conversation between the ‘lord of Lorn’ and a man named MacNaughton, both then in English service. Criticised by Lorn for apparently praising Robert Bruce’s bravery in the skirmish MacNaughton replied that ‘whosever wins the prize in chivalry, be he friend or foe, men should speak faithfully of it’.104 Barbour’s suggestion that deeds were praiseworthy in themselves, irrespective of who performed them, provides a useful basis for comparison with other chroniclers’ depictions of bravery. English descriptions of the siege of Berwick in 1333 emphasise the bravery of all involved, especially that of the Bruce Scottish defenders. The Bruce Scots were said to have ‘defended themselves vigorously’ against an early assault, and ‘honourably defended [the town] against the English’.105 Similarly, the garrison was described as ‘a great and strong force …[who] defended [Berwick] nobly’.106 The two Edwards were repelled by ‘those within [who] resisted so strongly, and defended themselves so manfully, by means of the strength and height of the wall … that the English could not obtain entrance against them’.107 These depictions of Bruce bravery may not, however, have been intended purely to praise the courage of Berwick’s defenders. By highlighting the bravery of the Bruce Scots, the chroniclers further emphasised the qualities of the English who faced them. The depiction of English soldiers continually attacking the walls of Berwick while faced by a courageous enemy only increased the praise due to those who, as the chroniclers knew, eventually won the town. This example demonstrates the use that could be made of brave actions for propaganda purposes and suggests that there was a difference between the ‘chivalric’ portrayal of the conflict, and the growing corpus of ‘patriotic’ wartime commentary. Throughout the conflict with Scotland, religious chroniclers and the English ecclesiastical community as a whole were employed to disseminate the views of the English crown to a wider audience.108 In this way, negative perceptions Froissart’s Chroniques, or vice versa, but Duncan lists Froissart as one of Barbour’s ‘antecedents’ and notes that Barbour may have been in France in 1365 at the same time that Froissart was travelling in Scotland (Bruce (Duncan), 5, 27, 35, n. 7). 104 Bruce (Duncan), 120. 105 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 155–7. 106 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 157. 107 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 278–9. 108 McHardy, ‘Edward III’s Propaganda’, 178–80; W.R. Jones, ‘The English Church and Royal Propaganda during the Hundred Years War’, Journal of British Studies, 19 (1979), 18–30, at 24–5; see also Griffiths, ‘Chronicles of English Religious Houses’, 191–9; D.S. Bachrach, ‘The Ecclesia Anglicana Goes to War: Prayers, Propaganda, and Conquest during the Reign of Edward I of England, 1272–1307’, Albion, 36 (2004), 393–406, at 397–8, 400. For a more cautious view of English clerical ability and willingness to promote the war in France, see W.M. Ormrod, ‘The Domestic Response to the Hundred Years War’, in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, ed. A. Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), 83–101, at 97.

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of the Scots became more widely accepted and fuelled the development of stereotypes that left little room for acknowledgement of positive qualities.109 A likely parallel development in Scotland ensured that in both English and Scottish chronicles fewer acknowledgements were made over time of enemy bravery.110 Increasingly, in opposition to the definition of honour as a transnational concept, bravery came to define the ‘national’ warrior. There are therefore few other examples in English religious chronicles relating to the bravery of ‘the enemy’. English chroniclers instead focussed on providing examples of Scottish cowardice, emphasising their flight from several battlefields.111 Similarly Scottish chroniclers largely failed to include descriptions of English bravery and instead emphasised the heroism of Scottish soldiers in victory and, more often, in defeat. The Scottish leaders who marched to Culblean ‘chose rather to die in war than to watch the misfortune of their people … [and placed] themselves unanimously and eagerly in peril’.112 Individual heroism was attributed to men like Hugh, earl of Ross, and his retinue who died fighting to the last at Halidon Hill.113 The retainers of the earl of Fife were afforded similar praise for giving up their lives in the defence of their lord at Dupplin Moor.114 Even David II, castigated by Wyntoun for having marched to Durham in the first place, receives some praise from the same chronicler for his ultimately futile bravery in fighting to the last and punching out two of John Coupland’s teeth in his efforts to avoid capture.115 As with other issues relating to the war in Scotland, the reporting of heroic and brave deeds appears nonetheless to have been a troublesome point at times for Scottish chroniclers. This was in part caused by the civil war aspect of the conflict, and the portrayal of those who at various times adopted the Balliol/English allegiance. It was perhaps also a result of the different nature of Scotland’s chronicles. Boardman has stated that Wyntoun’s ‘secular and military concerns leave little room for the serious clerical moralising which was the hallmark of both Fordun and Walter Bower’.116 In this respect, Wyntoun’s depictions of war and the warrior were more similar to Barbour’s. They reflect a largely ‘chivalric’ approach to the conflict that, in places, is different from the more patriotic and religious commentary of Fordun’s W.R. Jones, ‘England against the Celtic Fringe: A Study in Cultural Stereotypes’, Journal of World History, 13 (1971), 155–71, at 158–9. 110 Penman, ‘Abuse of the English’, 227–8. 111 See above, 214. 112 Chron. Bower, vii, 117; Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 352. 113 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 401. 114 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 347; Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 391; Chron. Bower, vii, 77–9. 115 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 476; Chron. Bower, vii, 259–61. 116 Boardman, ‘Chronicle Propaganda’, 27. 109



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source and Walter Bower. One particular example relates to the battle of Culblean. Fordun and Bower’s patriotic description of the battle dwells on the selfless bravery of the Bruce Scots marching to save the people of northern Scotland from the evil David Strathbogie, who aimed to wipe out support for David II in the area. In comparison, Wyntoun avoids discussion of the Bruce Scottish motivation for marching north, and focuses instead on the military actions of the battle itself. Although according praise to the Bruce Scots for their bravery and success in battle, Wyntoun also adds an interesting, if brief, description of the death of David Strathbogie. He narrates that Strathbogie died ‘by an ake’, surrounded by the knights of his retinue who remained with him to the end.117 Considering the evil depiction of Strathbogie by both Fordun and Bower, Wyntoun’s uncritical comment is interesting. Although Wyntoun did not explicitly praise Strathbogie for his heroic death in battle, he does commemorate the death of a Scottish knight, albeit an enemy warrior, who died bravely fighting to the last. Probity The complications faced by narrative writers as they wrestled with notions of bravery, and to a lesser extent honour, were not repeated when the quality being discussed was probity. English writers consistently portrayed the Scots as dishonest, using this negative image to further the ‘just cause’ of the English war in Scotland.118 The perception of the ‘perfidious Scot’ is stressed time and again in English literature. This stereotype dated back to at least the beginning of the war and Edward I’s propaganda drive to discredit the Scots.119 Nowhere is this perception made clearer in the narrative literature than in descriptions of the Scots seeking truces only to renege on them to gain a tactical advantage. Although English accounts of Edward Balliol’s campaigns in southern Scotland in the winter of 1332 are confused, several agree that Archibald Douglas and Patrick, earl of March, approached Balliol and asked for a truce.120 Following the agreement of the truce, Balliol sent most of his followers away and settled down to celebrate Christmas. It was at this time, when he was at his most vulnerable, that the Bruce Scots returned to attack him. It is the deceitful nature of the attack, the broken truce, which the English chroniclers highlight. Balliol did not yet have the

Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 426. Jones, ‘Royal Propaganda’, 25–9; McHardy, ‘Edward III’s Propaganda’, 180–2; C.J. Rushton, ‘Of an uncouthe stede: The Scottish Knight in Middle English Arthurian Romances’, in The Scots and Medieval Arthurian Legend, ed. R. Purdie and N. Royan (Cambridge, 2005), 109–19, at 110. 119 Stones, ‘English Chroniclers’, 334. 120 Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 153–5; Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 306; Brut, 280–1; Chron. Melsa, ii, 366–7. 117 118

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experience to beware the ‘trickery’ of the Scots.121 In fleeing the ambush, Balliol ‘escaped their treachery’.122 Unsurprisingly perhaps, the Scottish sources make no mention of this truce, but neither, significantly, do northern English chronicles. The Lanercost chronicler, the Bridlington chronicler and Thomas Gray all agree that the attack at Annan was a dawn raid that caught the Disinherited, literally, with their trousers down.123 No attempt was made at blaming Scottish skulduggery for the unprepared state of Balliol’s forces. Instead, Balliol and his men behaved ‘like those too confident in the safety secured through many different victories already won’.124 And yet, these same northern English chroniclers also entertained notions of the ‘perfidious Scot’. Commenting on Balliol’s belief in his own safety following his successes of 1332 the Bridlington chronicler wrote that ‘to seek faith among the Scots is like trying to find a knot in a rush’.125 The Lanercost chronicler suggested that, following his expulsion from Scotland, Balliol at least ‘learnt to be more careful in dealing with the Scots, and look better after his own safety’.126 A further sign of Scottish treachery was the speed with which some Scottish Balliol adherents abandoned the alternative king following his defeat at Annan. The element of disloyalty, added to the existing portrayal of Scottish perfidy and dishonesty, furthered the negative perception of the Scots in narrative literature and popular opinion. The image of the double-dealing Scot was returned to time and again in contemporary literature. Some literary examples were responses to actual Scottish behaviour. Others appear to demonstrate the spread of royal propaganda about the war throughout England, used by Edward III to justify his demands for wartime taxation, purveyance and military service.127 The Bruce Scottish raids of 1333 were launched in response to Balliol’s siege of Berwick, but were advanced by Edward III as evidence that the Scots had broken the Treaty of Edinburgh (1328).128 This ‘aggression’ justified Edward III’s participation in the renewed conflict, possibly also serving to convince a wary parliament of the need to return to war with the northern neighbour.129 The Bruce Scots are described as acting ‘deceitfully’ in truce negotiations held Chron. Hemingburgh, ii, 306. Brut, 280–1. 123 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 273–4, 275; Chron. Bridlington, 109–10; Scalacronica (King), 111–13. 124 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 275. 125 Chron. Bridlington, 110; cited and translated in Gransden, Historical Writing in England, II, 114. See also Chron. Bridlington, 120, 127, 128. 126 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 276–7. 127 Jones, ‘Royal Propaganda’, 25–9; McHardy, ‘Edward III’s Propaganda’, 180–2. 128 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 278; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307–1334, 159–61. 129 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 56–8, 62–3. 121

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during the winter of 1335–6.130 During a period of truce in 1337 the Scots ‘inflicted many evils on the English’.131 They were accused of breaking a truce in 1339 to raid northern England, although war had in effect resumed several months earlier.132 And the Bruce Scots allegedly provoked Edward III’s ire during the ‘Burnt Candlemas’ raid by approaching the king for a truce, only to utilise the consequent delay in hostilities provided by the planned negotiations to flee with their goods and people, leaving nothing to assist the English king.133 The widespread perception of Scottish perfidy is also well represented in Laurence Minot’s poems on the battles of Halidon Hill and Bannockburn. In the former the Scots are described as ‘fals and wonder fell … And ful of treson, suth to tell’.134 The Bannockburn poem, meanwhile, hardly mentions this battle at all, dwelling instead on the victory at Halidon Hill as suitable revenge for the Scottish victory nineteen years before. The first stanza ends with the line ‘War yit with the Skottes, for thai er ful of gile’. Every stanza thereafter ends with a couplet that emphasises the Scottish ‘gile’.135 Minot’s poems, written in English and presumably intended for oral dissemination, demonstrate that the portrayal of Scottish dishonesty was reaching a wider audience than that amassed by monastic chronicles.136 Minot’s ‘strident tone of pro-English sentiment and wild invective against the Scots and French’, found to a lesser extent in contemporary chronicles, reflects an increasingly hostile portrayal of ‘outsiders’ as a result of growing English patriotism stimulated by the wars with Scotland and France.137 And although accounts of Scottish atrocities became less common, they were replaced by more focussed depictions of the Scots as lacking fundamental aspects of acceptable behaviour. The Scottish chronicle depiction of probity as a quality is complicated by the existence of the ‘perfidious Scot’ image, as well as by occasions when the Bruce Scots did indeed behave in a dishonest manner. Yet Scottish chroniclers may have been keen to celebrate cunning and cleverness that led to Chron. Baker, 57. Chron. Melsa, ii, 382. 132 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 315, 317; Chron. Baker, 69–70; Knighton’s Chronicle, 15. 133 Chron. Avesbury, 454–6. 134 Wright, Political Poems, 61. 135 Wright, Political Poems, 61–2; D. Matthews, ‘Laurence Minot, Edward III, and Nationalism’, Viator, 38 (2007), 269–88, at 272–3. 136 Matthews, ‘Laurence Minot’, 277–8. For other poetry containing negative portrayals of the Scots, this time in Latin, see A.G. Rigg, ‘Propaganda of the Hundred Years War: Poems on the Battles of Crécy and Durham (1346): A Critical Edition’, Traditio, 54 (1999), 169–211, at 188–96; A. Rigg, A History of Anglo-Latin Literature, 1066–1422 (Cambridge, 1992), 259–64. 137 Matthews, ‘Laurence Minot’, 271; Gransden, Historical Writing in England, II, 58; Penman, ‘Abuse of the English’, 217–19. 130 131

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successes against the English. They admitted, for instance, that the Bruce Scots achieved success during periods of unofficial truce, such as on holy days when violent acts were prohibited by canon law.138 During the first war, James Douglas attacked the English garrison of Douglas Castle on Palm Sunday at St Bride’s Kirk, a ploy for which he received praise rather than rebuke from Barbour.139 The Disinherited besiegers of Loch Leven Castle were attacked in similar circumstances in 1333–4. The Disinherited leaders left the siege of the castle to celebrate the feast of St Margaret at Dunfermline, leaving behind only a skeleton force. Observing this, the Bruce Scots sallied out from the castle, attacked and defeated the besiegers, and seized all the goods and weapons of the Disinherited. Both Wyntoun and Bower described the attack and lauded the Bruce Scots for their victory. Neither suggested any wrongdoing on their part.140 For Scottish chroniclers, even those of a religious background, fighting during unofficial or local truces could be legitimate if suitable advantage was gained. Unsurprisingly, their view of English dishonesty was much more critical. Scottish writers, like English ones, highlighted instances of the enemy breaking truces and behaving in a dishonest manner. For example, Barbour castigated the Anglo-Irish garrison of Carrickfergus Castle for breaking a truce negotiated to allow the celebration of Easter week.141 Scottish chroniclers also accused Edward III of breaking the truce agreed with the people of Berwick during the 1333 siege. Contrasting accounts of this siege in particular illustrate the polarised views of patriotic chroniclers. In English eyes the ‘perfidious Scots’ within Berwick broke the truce they had agreed with Edward III by refusing to surrender when called upon to do so by the English king. The Berwick Scots argued that they had been relieved by a Scottish force that had crossed the Tweed from the south and entered the town with men and supplies for the garrison. The English argued that this had been ‘underhand’ tactics and refused to accept that the town had been

M. Keen, Chivalry (New Haven, 1984), 27. Bruce (Duncan), 204–10; Cameron, ‘Chivalry in Barbour’s Bruce’, 27–8. 140 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 409–12; Chron. Bower, vii, 97–101. It seems improbable that the Disinherited were quite so naïve as to assume that the Scots would observe the feast of St Margaret, and it remains likely that a truce was agreed before the Disinherited commanders headed for Dunfermline. If so the Bruce Scots chose to break it. This would explain John Stirling’s rage when informed of the Scottish attack: ‘Than wes he nerrare wode thane wrathe, And swore mony ane awfull athe, That he suld nevyre rest, na blyne, Quhill he suld that castell wyn; Na fra that sege he suld noucht ga, Quhill all the men he suld gare sla, That than with-in that castell ware’ (Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 411–12; see also Chron. Bower, vii, 101–3). 141 Bruce (Duncan), 554–6, where Barbour writes, ‘I know that dishonesty will always have a bad and unpleasant conclusion.’ 138 139



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relieved.142 From this standpoint, Edward was well within his rights to act as he did in executing the town warden’s son, and threatening the same fate for the rest of his Scottish prisoners.143 In the eyes of Scottish chroniclers, Edward demanded the surrender of the town a day early for his own tactical benefit and therefore broke the terms of the truce agreement.144 Contemporary chroniclers expected men to behave in an honest manner, but possession of probity was a quality seldom recognised in ‘the enemy’. Whether derived from experience, or of stereotypes created by burgeoning patriotism, slander of dishonest opponents presents an image far removed from an idealised view of the warrior.145 War and Chivalry: The Warriors’ Perspective What, then, was the warrior’s view? How did the warrior perceive of himself, and the career in which he was involved? The qualities previously discussed – protection of the weak, honour, bravery and probity – all relate to an image of the warrior corresponding both to the warrior’s ideal of his own conduct and to religious writers’ expectations of acceptable behaviour. Other elements of the warrior’s ethos are depicted less often in contemporary chronicle narrative. Ironically, one of those elements was the extent to which Christian ideals played a role in the soldier’s view of himself. Another is the extent to which the soldier perceived of fighting as a career, as a means of gaining not only renown but also material wealth and social advancement. It is to these elements, demonstrated as much as possible by the words and actions of the warriors themselves, that we must now turn. The Warrior and Christian Chivalry Huizinga wrote that ‘medieval thought … was saturated in every part with the conceptions of the Christian faith.’146 Religion was also a key part of the knightly and warrior life, and this is reflected in the extensive use of religious symbolism and imagery in key works of chivalric literature and The original truce agreement has not survived, but the terms of relief agreed after the execution of Seton state explicitly that the Bruce Scots could not relieve Berwick from south of the Tweed (Foedera, ii, p. ii, 864–5). 143 Scalacronica (King), 115; Brut, 282–3. 144 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 399–400; Chron. Bower, vii, 91. 145 That the Scots continued to regard the English as dishonest in the fifteenth century is evident from Scottish accounts of the battle of Baugé (1421). In spite of the Scottish victory, one chronicler added that not only did the English launch a treacherous surprise attack on the Franco-Scottish army, but also that they did so during an agreed truce (J.D. Milner, ‘The Battle of Baugé, March 1421: Impact and Memory’, History, 91 (2006), 484–507, at 505). 146 J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages (Harmondsworth, 1972), 65. 142

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knightly manuals.147 The desire to please God through acts of bravery and heroism was, however, difficult to accomplish in reality. Christianity and chivalry were not mutually exclusive but the violent nature of the knightly and warrior lifestyle was often at odds with Christian ideals. The development of the crusade offered warriors the opportunity to participate in a military endeavour where they could indulge in feats of arms, undertake acts of courage and earn renown, while at the same time perform their Christian duty.148 This channelling of military energies into ‘good’ acts appealed to Europe’s military class and the crusade grew rapidly in popularity.149 Even in the fourteenth century, ‘long after the reconquest of Jerusalem had ceased to be a practical possibility’, crusading was still regarded as a worthy endeavour of the Christian warrior.150 Like their fellows in other kingdoms, a number of Scottish warriors continued to believe and participate in the crusading ideal. Scottish crusading fervour was encouraged by the patronage of David II in the years following his return from English captivity in 1357. His own desire to go on crusade was described by Bower, who wrote that David ‘determined to go over there with a military force, and to end his life in the Promised Land’.151 David also favoured men like Norman and Walter Leslie, Walter Moigne and Thomas Bisset, who took part in the Prussian Crusades.152 David’s fascination with the crusade is perhaps unsurprising considering his father’s stated desire to go to the Holy Land, and Robert I’s deathbed instructions for his heart to be taken on crusade by James Douglas.153 David’s crusading interests may have been enhanced during his stay in France where crusading fervour was fuelled by Philip VI’s long-planned efforts to rescue the Holy Land.154 It is, however, difficult to ascertain whether David’s Keen, Chivalry, 44–63; Strickland, War and Chivalry, 56–8. Keen, Chivalry, 48–9. 149 Keen, Chivalry, 51–63. 150 A. MacQuarrie, Scotland and the Crusades 1095–1560 (Edinburgh, 1997), 69. 151 Chron. Bower, vii, 361; Penman, David II, 97–8. 152 Chron. Bower, vii, 361; MacQuarrie, Scotland and the Crusades, 84–5; Penman, David II, 97–8, 268–9, 288–9. 153 MacQuarrie, Crusades, 73–6; G.G. Simpson, ‘The Heart of King Robert I: Pious Crusade or Marketing Gambit?’, in Church, Chronicle and Learning in Medieval and Early Renaissance Scotland: Essays presented to Donald Watt on the occasion of the completion of the publication of Bower’s “Scotichronicon”, ed. B.E. Crawford (Edinburgh, 1999), 173–86, at 176–80; S. Cameron, ‘Sir James Douglas, Spain and the Holy Land’, in Freedom and Authority: Scotland, c.1050–c.1650 – Historical and Historiographical Essays presented to Grant G. Simpson, ed. T. Brotherstone and D. Ditchburn (East Linton, 2000), 108–17, at 108–11. 154 MacQuarrie, Scotland and the Crusades, 80; M.A. Penman, ‘Christian Days and Knights: The Religious Devotions and Court of David II of Scotland, 1329–71’, Historical Research, 75 (2002), 249–72, at 249–50, 253; Penman, David II, 71; Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 87–97. 147

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crusading interests attracted Scottish knights to his personal circle, or if David was drawn towards knights who already possessed crusading ambitions. Penman has argued that David’s attempts at building his own military cadre, following his return to Scotland in 1341, focussed on men whose crusading credentials would become apparent in the 1350s.155 But it is also possible that it was David II’s intention to lead war against England, and the desire to be part of the royal military circle, that attracted knights such as the Leslie brothers, Bisset and Moigne to the king’s side. Indeed, David’s increased crusading interest may well have stemmed from the period after 1346 when he spent much time at the court of Edward III. His spiritual concerns were apparently heightened by the defeat at Neville’s Cross, and his growing religiosity may have been in gratitude for his survival in the battle, or as personal atonement for the destruction of St Cuthbert’s patria during the campaign.156 Sponsorship of crusading Scottish knights may well have formed another element of this personal piety. For Scottish crusaders, and for David II, Peter of Cyprus’s plans to attack Alexandria provided the ideal outlet for their beliefs. King Peter’s expedition in 1365, and the later northern crusades, provided outlets for Scottish warriors who wished to participate in crusading activities even at this relatively late stage.157 For those Scottish knights who undertook campaigns in the service of God, spiritual belief and warrior culture coalesced to produce an activity they followed with enthusiasm. Although their numbers were probably small, they followed in the footsteps of family members who had themselves been crusaders, and it is the continued participation of such men in the crusading ideal that demonstrates the ongoing prominence of religion within the warrior mentalité.158 Displays of personal piety remained important for those knights whose military interests lay closer to home. Involved as they were in the violent business of war, concern for their souls in the afterlife made it a sensible precaution to retain the support of churchmen. Although many fourteenthcentury knights may have paid only lip service to the idea of the miles Christi, they knew well the dangers of ecclesiastical censure and the perils of damnation. Protection of one’s soul, both in life and after death, could be assisted by patronising ecclesiastical establishments. Charter evidence Penman, ‘Christian Days and Knights’, 254, 261–4; Penman, David II, 97. Penman, ‘Christian Days and Knights’, 255. Penman has suggested that David II’s promotion of the cult of St Thomas of Canterbury occurred as a direct result of his imprisonment and his exposure to it while in England (M. Penman, ‘The Bruce Dynasty, Becket and Scottish Pilgrimage to Canterbury, c.1178–c.1404’, Journal of Medieval History, 32 (2006), 346–70, at 361). 157 MacQuarrie, Scotland and the Crusades, 80–1, 84–5; Ditchburn, Scotland and Europe, 69–71; Stevenson, Chivalry and Knighthood, 103–6. 158 Ditchburn, Europe and Scotland, 67–73; Stevenson, Chivalry and Knighthood, 104. 155

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highlights such patronage, either as thanks for what was perceived as spiritual intervention on an individual’s behalf, or as insurance for the future. An example relating to the aftermath of battle is the earl of Fife’s grant of the parish church of Auchtermuchty to Lindores Abbey upon his return from English captivity in 1350.159 This display of piety was partly inspired by his survival at the battle of Neville’s Cross, ‘where cruel death, with its keen edge having sway, carried many of the combatants from this life’. He also believed that God and the saints had interceded on his behalf when in captivity, where ‘we continually felt that the souls of our enemies were softened by mildness of clemency so much that now we enjoy the patronage of the said Saints with the desired freedom’. This latter comment surely refers to his survival despite being sentenced to death by Edward III for treason.160 David II, too, expressed gratitude for perceived spiritual intercession on his behalf. In 1362, the king established a chapel in Fife to St Monan. This was probably granted in thanks for his escape from shipwreck while crossing the Forth, although an alternative reason may have been the saint’s apparent intercession in removing an arrowhead from David’s skull which had been embedded there since Neville’s Cross.161 Giving thanks for survival or indeed for success in an endeavour was common in the medieval period. To the above examples may be added the grant to St Andrews by Robert I for his victory at Bannockburn, and Edward III’s foundation of the Abbey of St Mary Graces in light of his survival during a stormy sea crossing.162 William Montague’s establishment of Bisham Priory (Berkshire) was in thanks for the English victory at Halidon Hill.163 Ecclesiastical establishments were paid to say prayers of intercession for the souls of aristocrats and their families. The Scottish knights John Graham, lord of Dalkeith, and Patrick Ramsay, lord of Dalhousie, granted money to the monks of Newbattle Abbey for this purpose.164 Ramsay’s grant specifically requested prayers for the salvation of his soul and those of his wife and the earl of March.165 Even Englishmen based in southern Scotland donated money to local establishments. For example, William Felton, the English sheriff of Roxburgh, granted a tenement in Roxburgh and 10 shilThe Chartularies of Balmerino and Lindores, ed. W.B.D.D. Turnbull (Edinburgh, 1841), 43–5. 160 Rogers, ‘Scottish Invasion of 1346’, 68. As discussed, Fife had more reason than most to thank God for his survival during this period of warfare, having fought on the defeated side at Dupplin Moor, Halidon Hill and Neville’s Cross, all of which he survived. 161 Chron. Bower, vii, 261, 464, n. 36–42. 162 Barrow, Robert Bruce, 318; W.M. Ormrod, ‘The Personal Religion of Edward III’, Speculum, 64 (1989), 849–77, at 858. 163 Warner, ‘Earls of Salisbury’, 45. 164 NAS, GD40/1/49 (Graham); NAS, GD40/1/53 (Ramsay). 165 NAS, GD40/1/53. 159



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lings annually to the abbot, canons and church of St Mary’s, Dryburgh.166 Felton’s grant was made ‘for the salvation of his soul’ as well as that of his wife. It is tempting to suggest that these grants were the actions of militarily active men who felt the need to insure the safety of their souls should they die during the wars.167 It has been suggested that various types of spiritual aid were open to the warrior, including: ‘acts of benefaction or restitution prior to campaign or battle; spiritual purification before combat; the use of relics, hallowed banners and war-cries in battle itself; and always, supporting and reinforcing such measures … the prayers and intercessions of clergy and the religious’.168 It has been suggested recently by one historian that all such possibilities and more were likely utilised by Scottish soldiers before, during and after military campaigns.169 Prayers and masses before battle were commonplace. The immediacy of the danger that confronted warriors was obvious, and prayers for intercession and protection were a necessary precursor to the actual fighting.170 Garrisons were often provided with a chaplain, and a recent study has argued that the armies of Edward I contained large numbers of clergymen employed to cater to the spiritual well-being of soldiers.171 Among the ambushes and guerrilla warfare of the Second War of Independence, however, the style of fighting might afford little time for organised religious observance in advance of conflict. It would have been sensible to have a plan in reserve should the worst occur. Along with invocations to God and the saints once battle had been joined, patronage of a particular religious establishment enabled military men to NAS, RH1/2/108. Graham was captured at Neville’s Cross and was afterwards executed for treason by Edward III for abandoning his earlier allegiance to Balliol (Penman, David II, 51, 105, 133, 143–4). William Felton served almost continuously as constable of Roxburgh Castle and at times as sheriff of Roxburghshire from 1335 to 1342 and remained active in southern Scotland after the fall of Roxburgh robbed him of his position (Cornell, ‘English Garrisons’, 117–18). Evidence of Patrick Ramsey’s wartime career is not extensive but his provision of masses for the souls of the earl of March, as well as for his murdered uncle, Alexander Ramsay, suggests close affinity to both. As such he was probably involved in the military cadres of either or both men in the border warfare of the period (SP, iii, 89–90). 168 Strickland, War and Chivalry, 56–7; see also Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, 298–302. 169 M.A. Penman, ‘Faith in War: The Religious Experience of Scottish Soldiery, c.1100–c.1500’, Journal of Medieval History, 37(3) (2011), 295–303. 170 Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, 298–9. 171 D.S. Bachrach, ‘The Organisation of Military Religion in the Armies of King Edward I of England (1272–1307)’, Journal of Medieval History, 29 (2003), 265–86. Chaplains were also provided in Scottish castles for the pastoral care of their garrisons, demonstrated at Dumbarton in 1343 and at Stirling in 1359 (ER, i, 528, 577; see also A.C. Dow, Ministers to the Soldiers of Scotland: A History of the Military Chaplains of Scotland prior to the War in the Crimea (Edinburgh, 1962), 8–24). 166 167

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ride on raids and into ambushes confident in the belief that they retained God’s protection. Examples of personal piety during a military campaign are provided almost solely by English evidence. Edward III’s behaviour towards Scottish churches is, for example, especially interesting. He reportedly spared Elgin Cathedral in 1336 because of his reverence for the Holy Trinity, to which the church was dedicated.172 Notably, Scottish accounts of the 1336 raid concur with the English description of the event, both Fordun’s source and Bower noting that the cathedral and its associated buildings were spared by the deliberate intervention of Edward III.173 This portrayal of the English king differs from most other Scottish depictions of his behaviour. Edward was often castigated in the Scottish chronicles. He was held responsible for the destruction of the monastery and church of Haddington in 1356, and was even falsely accused of murdering his brother at the altar in Perth.174 Record evidence does, however, support the image of a pious monarch who provided financial support to ecclesiastical establishments in Scotland, presumably for spiritual as well as political reasons.175 Some of his gifts were practical, granted as compensation for damage done, or supplies consumed by the king’s army. Examples include contributions to the monks of Irvine, Dunfermline and Cambuskenneth.176 Other gifts were apparently of more pious motivation, granted to particular houses out of concern for their welfare as alms, rather than as compensation. These include sums granted to the nuns of Elcho, the Dominican friars of Stirling and the parish church of Kelso.177 Perhaps of greatest interest with regard to Edward’s piety, and relating to the prayers for warriors’ souls already discussed, is the gift he made to the church of the Holy Trinity in Berwick in October 1335. To the rector of the church he presented a cloth of gold to adorn the burial place of Ralph Molyns, scutifer of the king.178 Edward III similarly paid 24 shillings for a ‘spinnet’ (a type of cloth) to be placed over the body of Ebulom Lestrange, who died on the king’s service at Stirling.179 These acts of remembrance for dead retainers are demonstrative of the links between

Ellis, Original Letters, 36–7. Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 352; Chron. Bower, vii, 119. 174 Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 353 (Haddington); Chron. Fordun (Skene), ii, 364; Chron. Bower, vii, 291 (Eltham). 175 Ormrod, ‘Personal Religion of Edward III’, 850–3, 876–7. 176 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 202v (Irvine and Dunfermline); fol. 203 (Cambuskenneth). 177 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 202v (Elcho), 203 (Stirling), 205v (Kelso). 178 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 203. 179 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, fol. 204. 172 173



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war and religion and emphasise the importance of piety, perhaps of greatest concern during wartime, to warriors such as Edward III.180 The Warrior and the Business of War Thomas Gray’s already quoted statement that he belonged to ‘that order which is enlightened by good customs, a support for the old, for maidens and for Holy Church’, provides one soldier’s view of ideal behaviour.181 Gray’s statement is, however, an idealised version of his own and his fellow knights’ outlook. In most of his chronicle, Gray demonstrates that he was a man to whom ‘chivalry remained a thoroughly pragmatic (and entirely unromantic) arrangement’.182 To men like Thomas Gray, war had increasingly become a career. The professionalism of the fourteenth-century warrior has often been commented on, but that professionalism did not just provide a ‘better soldier’, one more equipped for the changing face of medieval warfare.183 In becoming a professional soldier a warrior’s outlook changed, and the experience of war became a profession, or even a calling, rather than the obligation it had been in the past. Soldiers trained for war, they invested substantial resources in acquiring suitable equipment, they fought both at home and abroad, and they increasingly regarded war as their occupation.184 The warrior mentality in this regard can be demonstrated in several ways. Visual expressions of the knight’s perception of himself are found in contemporary pictorial representations. In one English illustration, the knight Geoffrey Luttrell was represented in full armour, his charger decked in his familial coat of arms, his helm, shield and lance close at hand (see Plate 2).185 In every respect the illustration depicts Luttrell as the physical For Edward III’s commemoration of deceased noblemen, see Ormrod, ‘Personal Religion of Edward III’, 867–8. 181 Scalacronica (King), 3. For a fifteenth-century view by another northern English soldier and chronicler, and comparison of his views with Gray’s, see A.J. Macdonald, ‘John Hardyng, Northumbrian Identity and the Scots’, in North-East England in the Later Middle Ages, ed. C.D. Liddy and R.H. Britnell (Woodbridge, 2005), 29–42, at 32–6. 182 King, ‘A Helm with a Crest of Gold’, 35. 183 See A. Ayton and J.L. Price, ‘The Military Revolution from a Medieval Perspective’, in The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, ed. A. Ayton and J.L. Price (London, 1998), 1–22, at 11–15; A. Ayton, ‘English Armies in the Fourteenth Century’, in Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War, ed. A. Curry, and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), 21–38, at 32–6; Ayton, ‘Sir Thomas Ughtred’, 122–5; C.J. Rogers, ‘“As if a new sun had arisen”: England’s Fourteenth Century RMA’, in The Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300–2050, ed. M. Knox and W. Murray (Cambridge, 2001), 15–34, at 23–6. 184 For Scottish soldiers in foreign service in the fourteenth century, see CDS, v, no. 843; Ditchburn, Scotland and Europe, 220–3. At least 114 Scots served in the English garrison at Calais during the period 1369–70. 185 Camille, Mirror in Parchment, 98, plate 29. 180

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embodiment of medieval knighthood. Nonetheless, it has been argued that this image was far removed from reality. English knights were increasingly accustomed to fighting on foot by the time this illustration was produced. The depiction of Geoffrey Luttrell was instead a ‘glittering chivalric carapace that had been fixed during the time of his ancestors and that recalled a glorious personal history’.186 It portrayed the ageing knight as he wished to be remembered – heroic, warlike and representing his family’s history and honour. Other contemporary depictions of the knight similarly display an image of the individual as a warrior. The funeral effigy of John of Eltham, the younger brother of Edward III, retains the warrior image of the knight (see Plate 3). Like Luttrell, he is portrayed in his armour, armed with his shield and sword and bearing his familial arms.187 Another English warrior who fought in Scotland, John, second lord Willoughby, is displayed in similar fashion.188 Contemporary Scottish examples follow a similar pattern, knights being depicted in full armour, carrying the weapons with which they fought and displaying familial arms. Indeed, the prevalence of the warrior in full armour is striking. In some examples even the head is covered, some figures clad in a mail hauberk, while others are fully encased in armour enhanced by a bascinet or helm.189 One of the most striking Scottish examples in this regard is the funeral image of Alexander Stewart, earl of Buchan (see Plate 4). Although a later example, the recumbent knight is thoroughly encased in the armour of his profession, his status as a leader of men emphasised by representations of other armoured figures surrounding the tomb.190 It has been argued that, just as Gray emphasised an idealised vision of warrior behaviour, funeral effigies similarly presented a ‘physically powerful and active ideal’ representation of the warrior as he wished to be remembered.191 The warrior image, portrayed principally through the adoption of mail, armour and weaponry, emphasised the perception of the soldier as ‘muscular, vigorous and (in many examples) skilled at swordplay’.192 Like Camille, Mirror in Parchment, 55. L. Southwick, ‘The Armoured Effigy of Prince John of Eltham in Westminster Abbey and Some Closely Related Military Monuments’, Church Monuments, 2 (1987), 9–21, at 11, fig. 2. 188 Southwick, ‘Effigy of John of Eltham’, 16, fig. 6. John, second lord Willoughby, was engaged on campaigns in Scotland in 1333, 1335, 1340 and 1341, and also fought at Crécy (1346). He possessed further links to the Anglo-Scottish conflict through his marriage to the sister of Thomas Roslin (CP, xii, p. ii, 659). 189 Brydall, ‘Monumental Effigies’, 329–410, figs. 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 24, 26; A.V. Norman, ‘The Effigy of Alexander Stewart Earl of Buchan and Lord of Badenoch’, PSAS, 92 (1958–9), 104–13, at 108. 190 Norman, ‘Effigy of Alexander Stewart’, 104–5 191 Dressler, ‘Steel Corpse’, 154. 192 Dressler, ‘Steel Corpse’, 154. 186 187



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Plate 2. Image of Sir Geoffrey Luttrell from the Luttrell Psalter (©British Library Board, Add. 42130, f.202v)

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Plate 3. Effigy of John of Eltham, Westminster Abbey (©Dean and Chapter of Westminster)

Plate 4. Effigy of Alexander Stewart of Buchan, Dunkeld Cathedral (©Dunkeld Cathedral Chapter House Museum Trust)



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Luttrell’s depiction of himself in his psalter, the militaristic image was displayed alongside representations of social status and of family.193 The element of status is important: most warrior effigies depicted the individual as belonging to a definite order of society, that of the warrior, and the reality of whether he fought in the large-scale campaigns of his day or did not was secondary.194 In death, as in life, the knight sought to display an image of himself that represented the elements of his world that were of paramount importance – his calling in arms, his status and his lineage. The representation of family and lineage is also obvious in the use of heraldic imagery.195 English evidence for the relevance of heraldic devices to the militarised view of the warrior presented above is provided by cases brought before the Court of Chivalry in the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The evidence provided in such cases provides an invaluable insight into the mentalité of the warrior class. These cases included disputes over armorial bearings, exchange of prisoners, ransom payments, and in later years, complaints regarding non-payments of debts and accusations of treason.196 Armorial disputes, such as the cases of Lovel vs. Morley and Scrope vs. Grosvenor, document the very practical use of heraldic devices on campaign, as well as providing a social context for armorial display in churches and houses.197 And the importance of the heraldic device to family honour and prestige, as opposed to its practical use on the field of battle, provides further evidence of the ‘pervasiveness of the martial ethos in aristocratic culture’.198 Scotland lacks sources of similar detail to the cases before the English Court of Chivalry, but the importance of heraldic symbols to the knightly elite remains clear in other evidence. Bower described the Scots displaying their armed might before the English army at Berwick in 1333, P. Coss, ‘Knighthood, Heraldry and Social Exclusion in Edwardian England’, in Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display in Medieval England, ed. P. Coss and M. Keen (Woodbridge, 2003), 39–68, at 41–3. 194 B. Kemp, ‘English Church Monuments during the Period of the Hundred Years War’, in Arms, Armies and Fortifications, ed. A. Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), 195–211, at 195–6; Dressler, ‘Steel Corpse’, 139–41. 195 Coss, ‘Knighthood, Heraldry and Social Exclusion’, 48–65; Ailes, ‘The Knight, Heraldry and Armour’, 1–3. 196 G.D. Squibb, The High Court of Chivalry (Oxford, 1959), 16–18; Ayton, ‘Knights, Esquires and Military Service’, 81–104; M.H. Keen, ‘English Military Experience and the Court of Chivalry: the Case of Grey v. Hastings’, in Guerre et société en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne XIVe–XVe siècle, ed. P. Contamine, C. Giry-Deloison and M.H. Keen (Lille, 1991), 123–42; M.H. Keen and M. Warner (eds), ‘Morley vs. Montagu (1399): A Case in the Court of Chivalry’, in Chronology, Conquest and Conflict in Medieval England (Camden Miscellany, 34, 1997), 147–95; A. Rogers, ‘Hoton versus Shakell: A Ransom Case in the Court of Chivalry’, Nottingham Mediaeval Studies, 6 (1962), 74–108; see also Ayton, ‘Thomas Ughtred’, 114–18. 197 Ayton, ‘Knights, Esquires and Military Service’, 87. 198 Ayton, ‘Knights, Esquires and Military Service’, 87. 193

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with ‘their golden standards held high, their fully expanded banners flowing, and their military arms reflecting the sun’.199 The use of heraldic devices in Scotland appears to have developed during the twelfth century, and its growth ensured that by the fourteenth century heralds were appointed to record and grant heraldic arms.200 The proliferation of these arms throughout the Scottish warrior class is demonstrated in surviving examples of armorials which recorded an individual’s arms for posterity. Arguably the most famous fourteenth-century example is the ‘Armorial de Gelre’, which contains the heraldic devices of forty-two Scots, some of whom may have been involved in the Prussian crusade (see Plate 5).201 English armorials also contain examples of Scottish nobles and knights, of which the ‘Balliol Roll’ may represent a heraldic attempt to integrate Edward Balliol, his dynasty and supporters into the existing Scottish noble structure (see Plate 6).202 The object of these armorials was often the visual establishment of a family’s rank within the greater body of the warrior elite.203 Coupled with examples of armorial display on contemporary funeral effigies and brasses, it is clear that the warrior’s perception of himself was intricately linked with the remembrance of his and his family’s status and reputation. Two further Scottish examples link the importance of family and lineage to contemporaries with the dangers associated with a career of soldiering. In May 1333 Hugh, earl of Ross, assigned various lands to William, his son and heir, and others to William Ross (possibly William’s son, Hugh’s grandson).204 Although no mention is made of forthcoming campaigns, it is difficult not to see in these grants the earl attempting to put his affairs in order before marching south to Halidon Hill.205 Such precautions were warranted as the earl died on the battlefield, fighting to the last surrounded by the men of his retinue.206 Another example is the will of 1390 made by James Douglas of Dalkeith. Though a later source, it provides detailed testimony of Douglas’s militaristic outlook. Coupled with various gifts to monastic houses for Chron. Bower, vii, 91. McAndrew, Scotland’s Historic Heraldry (Woodbridge, 2006), 13, 23–35; Stevenson, Chivalry and Knighthood, 67–8; K. Stevenson, ‘Jurisdiction, Authority and Professionalisation: The Officers of Arms of Late Medieval Scotland’, in The Herald in Late Medieval Europe, ed. K. Stevenson (Woodbridge, 2009), 41–66; Court of the Lord Lyon, ed. F.J. Grant (Scottish Record Society, 1945), pp. i–ii. 201 A.H. Dunbar, ‘Facsimiles of the Scottish Coats of Arms Emblazoned in the Armorial de Gelre’, PSAS, 25 (1890–1), 9–19; Ditchburn, Scotland and Europe, 70–1. 202 McAndrew, Scotland’s Historic Heraldry, 129; English Mediaeval Rolls of Arms, Volume 1, 1244–1334, ed. R.W. Mitchell (Heraldry Society of Scotland, 1983), 437–40. 203 M. Michael, ‘The Privilege of “Proximity”: Towards a Re-definition of the Function of Armorials’, Journal of Medieval History, 23 (1997), 55–74, at 63–6. 204 For William, future earl of Ross, and William his son, see SP, vii, 237–9. 205 NAS, GD297/161; NAS, GD297/165; NAS, GD297/167; NAS, RH1/2/106. 206 Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots, 136. 199

200 B.A.



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Plate 5. Scottish heraldic devices taken from the Armorial de Gelre (©Royal Library of Belgium, Manuscripts, Ms. 15652-56, f.64)

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Plate 6. Scottish armorial devices from the Balliol Roll (©British Library Board, Add. Roll. 77242)



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the safety of his soul were comprehensive instructions for the distribution of his military equipment. His armour and arms were to be given principally to James, his son and heir, with the remainder distributed among his other sons and male relatives.207 Not only does the will provide insight into the warrior’s preparation for war and investment in suitable equipment, it demonstrates Douglas’s desires regarding the future use of his armour. Douglas’s preparations in his will appear based around a desire to ensure that his family, beginning with his son, retained the military equipment with which he had made his living.208 In so doing, he passed on to his relatives both the symbols of his military prowess, and the tools of his trade once his own military career had come to an end. Conclusion In attempting to find a working definition of the term ‘chivalry’, Maurice Keen concluded that it ‘cannot be divorced from the martial world of the mounted warrior: it cannot be divorced from aristocracy, because knights were commonly men of high lineage: and from the middle of the twelfth century on it very frequently carries ethical or religious overtones’.209 The evidence provided above has demonstrated that the elements Keen linked to the term ‘chivalry’ all retained a place in contemporary descriptions of the Scottish warrior, whether in the perceptions of contemporary commentators, or in the warrior’s self-image. For those of the elite, status and honour were important elements of their character that were fought for and jealously protected. For warriors of a lowlier status there was the possibility of attaining honour through acts of bravery and prowess. All of these qualities were achievable through war and, perhaps to a lesser extent, its peacetime equivalent, the tournament. For most warriors, personal piety also remained an important concern, either as a practical necessity based upon the dangerous business in which they were involved or through real religious devotion. Although fighting men did not always live up to the ideals that ecclesiastical chroniclers expected of them, religious writers remained able to recognise and praise those elements that contemporary soldiers themselves deemed worthy. The existence of common qualities that appear to have been central to most views of acceptable behaviour suggests that in regards to the issues discussed above there was a basic recognition of what was entailed by the term ‘chivalry’. That other qualities, deeds and forms of behaviour – in addition to the suggested elements of bravery, probity, honour and

207 Morton

Reg., ii, 170–6. Scotland’s Historic Heraldry, 9. 209 Keen, Chivalry, 2; see also Strickland, War and Chivalry, 19. 208 McAndrew,

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acceptable conduct towards non-combatants – were at times regarded as embodying chivalric behaviour is undeniable. But the core values appear time and again in the writings, actions and representations of both the warrior himself, and those who commented on war. And even if chivalry represented the world of the idealised combatant more often than it represented the reality of the battlefield combatant, it remained of relevance to both those who practised and those who witnessed war.

Conclusion When war in Scotland recommenced in 1332, it appeared rather quickly that the Bruce establishment of the kingdom was in danger of collapse. The twin threats of a return to Balliol kingship, and English conquest of southern Scotland, must have appeared likely outcomes in the aftermath of the crushing Bruce battlefield defeats at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill. And yet the war continued. Edward Balliol, for all that he retained support in Scotland, and could count on the military assistance of English field armies, was unable to impose his will sufficiently on the Scottish people. Edward III, despite his military effort and personal involvement in the war with Scotland, could not ensure the stability of the Balliol regime, or conquer Scotland outright. Indeed he was unable even to conquer southern Scotland and retain it against Bruce counter-attacks. Why then, after all the setbacks that befell the Bruce Scottish war effort, were they ultimately successful in repulsing attempts at a Balliol/English takeover? The Bruce Scottish war effort was a well organised and, more often than not, efficient operation. Leadership lay in the hands of either the king or, in his absence, the various men who were appointed Guardians to act in his stead. In the aftermath of catastrophic defeats, for example, immediately after Halidon Hill or Neville’s Cross, war leadership suffered from a power vacuum effect. This was, however, almost always a short-term problem. With the return of leadership in the form of a newly-appointed Guardian, wartime endeavour was once more pushed forward effectively.1 Scotland’s leading military figures were capable of fighting small-scale warfare in their localities, undertaking such activities most notably under Robert the Steward, when control of the war was devolved upon more military-minded individuals.2 Bruce Scottish success during the conflict as a whole came about, however, as a result of a national war effort. The victory over the forces of David Strathbogie at Culblean in 1335, for example, witnessed the combination of northern levies with the knightly retinues of southern Scotland. The first raid into England in 1340 involved the combined forces of the earls of March and Sutherland. In all three campaigns that led to

1 2

See above, 68–71. See above, 68–71.

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pitched battles, the kingdom of Scotland was represented as an entity as men from all regions served in the armies involved. The mass gathering of Scotland’s armed populace never ended in success in this period, as a result of both Scottish military unpreparedness amongst the population at large, and England’s natural advantages of population size, wealth and martial experience. But victories were won. And these Bruce Scottish successes were not simply the result of external factors denying the Balliol/English leaders the opportunity to achieve a complete victory. The suggestion has been made that the war in Scotland was changed fundamentally by the beginning of the Hundred Years War.3 This argument appears corroborated by the near-contemporary comment of the Scottish chronicler, Andrew Wyntoun, who wrote: It wes to Scotland a gud chance, That thai [the English] made thaim to werray in France: For hade thai halyly thaim tane For to werray in Scotland allane, Efftyr the gret myscheffis twa, Duplyne and Halidowne war tha, Thai suld have skaithit it to gretly. Bot fortowne, thowcht scho fald fekilly, Will noucht at anis myscheffis fall: Tharefore scho set thare hartis all To werray Frawnce richit to be, That Scottish lyve in grettar le.4

To Wyntoun the outbreak of Anglo-French conflict no doubt appeared to be the saviour of Scotland. Without the distraction of activities on the continent, it has proven difficult for historians to envisage the Bruce Scots succeeding against the concerted efforts of Edward Balliol and Edward III. This argument undervalues, however, the Bruce success in surviving almost six years of constant and at times overwhelming Disinherited/English military effort. Indeed, the suggestion that the Bruce Scots simply ‘survived’ the years from 1332 to 1337 before the ‘magic bullet’ of the Anglo-French conflict’s opening salvos saved the day, is itself a misrepresentation of the period.5 Military history may have been criticised for too often dwelling on battlefield narratives, but the historiography of Anglo-Scottish conflict remains dominated by the major battles of the period. It is the success or failure of these military actions that, as already suggested, cast long shadows over interpretation of the military history of this conflict. The myth that battles always provided decisive results has long ago been exposed as a falsehood, and the analysis above has shown that historiography should focus less on the fateful outcome of these major engagements as the dominant factors of the period. Just as Robert I did not ‘win’ the First Scottish War of Independence on the field at Bannockburn, the results of Dupplin Moor and Halidon Webster, ‘Scotland without a King’, 224–9, 236; Campbell, ‘England, Scotland and the Hundred Years War’, 186–96. 4 Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 435. 5 Webster, ‘Scotland without a King’, 228–9. 3



conclusion 241

Hill did not cripple the Bruce Scottish war effort to the extent that it could not recover. Edward Balliol was twice driven from Scotland, within three and twelve months respectively of battlefield victories in which he had fought. By 1334, amidst the rebellions taking place all over Scotland, it must have been plain to Edward III that Scotland would not be won on the field of battle. The English king’s winter stay at Roxburgh in 1334–5, on the basis of advice that Scotland could not be conquered ‘unless in winter’, was an expensive failure and reinforced the difficulties Edward III faced in subduing Scotland.6 The massive invasions of 1335, followed by the multi-frontal campaigns of 1336, emphasised English military power and capability across most of Scotland, but even these failed to bring lasting results. Edward III, between 1332 and 1338, spent hundreds of thousands of pounds, and called upon the service of thousands of English troops, and yet remained, on the eve of the conflict with France, with little to show for it. The Bruce Scots did more than simply survive the opening years of conflict. In spite of the trauma of two battlefield defeats in less than twelve months, and the consequent loss of leadership and military personnel, Scotland’s martial class continued to fight, utilising the historical Bruce tactics of ambush, raiding and surprise assaults on strongpoints. Having blunted the two Edwards’ attempts at conquest, the opening of the Hundred Years War is better recognised as affording the Bruce Scots the opportunity of progression. Instead of simply fighting a war for the removal of alternative Balliol/English forces, and enforcing the Bruce hegemony within Scotland, the Bruce Scots could now, with Edward III’s focus elsewhere, embark on offensive warfare in northern England. This latter phase of the conflict, when the Bruce Scots went on the offensive, has been defined by a further Scottish battlefield defeat, this time at Neville’s Cross. The capture of David II, and the death and captivity of several Scottish nobles during and after the English victory, has led to the denigration of Scottish raiding prior to 1346. This historiographical commentary is once more in agreement with the comment of Andrew Wyntoun, whose retrospective view on the Neville’s Cross campaign was decidedly negative: He [David II] mycht rycht welle content have bene, That he wes in till Ingland thryis Off were apon his innymyis, Syne nane thai tymys tuk on hand To pas off were in till Ingland. Qwhy couth he noucht have in to pes Haldyn his land, as it than wes, And hym-selwyn owt of dawngere? Qwha standis welle, he suld noucht stere. Bot for he saw than, that Fortown Sa ferly with his folk had down, That throwch wynnyng in juperdyis Scho had thame heyid on sic awyis, That thai nere wonnyn had thaire land, He trowyd, scho wald have bene standand: Bot that wes noucht off kind hyr lawe. Oure Kyng Dawy couth noucht that knawe.7 6 7

Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 300. Chron. Wyntoun (Laing), ii, 470–1.

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However, as in his previous comment, Wyntoun was able to call upon historical hindsight in making his judgements, both on the beginning of the Hundred Years War and on the Scottish disaster at Neville’s Cross. The years that followed the defeat at Durham, which witnessed devolution of wartime effort amongst lesser men and a lack of military leadership under the guardianship of the Steward, are easy to write off as worthy of little comment. Once again, though, the Bruce war effort should not be defined by its large-scale battlefield failure. Indeed, the very action of undertaking a large and protracted invasion of northern England, instead of confirming the strategic and tactical naïvety of the young and warlike David II, rather reflects a confidence amongst the ranks of the Bruce military leadership. This confidence was not founded upon overblown optimism of success in the absence of Edward III and many of his fighting men, but on successful raiding in the previous five years and more.8 Although military activities were curtailed in the aftermath of Neville’s Cross, the Bruce Scots continued to harass English forces in southern Scotland. These efforts resulted in various areas in the region being won back to the allegiance of David II and this was achieved (up to 1356 and the ‘Burnt Candlemas’ raid) without provoking large-scale English retribution. The organisation and efficiency of the Bruce military effort is further indicated by the behaviour of those involved in martial activities. Discipline, on the whole, was controlled and military actions were very often focussed on specific targets. Bruce Scottish military activity revolved primarily around raiding, both in Scotland and in England. This form of warfare involved the use of fire and destruction against any given area, with fields being put to the flame, crops trampled by horses, and homes destroyed by fast-moving forces. Plunder was also an essential part of the raiding process, with sheep and cattle driven back across the border, goods and valuables looted from homes, and men led away into captivity until a suitable ransom was paid. This form of warfare may indeed appear to be the antithesis of knightly or chivalric behaviour, but it was a style of combat that was practised across Western Europe in the medieval period.9 English chroniclers and writers had little problem describing the acts of English military leaders in chivalric terms despite the obvious destruction wrought against the French countryside during the chevauchées of the Hundred Years War. In this regard, Bruce Scottish raiding tactics conformed to contemporary practice. It can also be argued that the Bruce Scottish policy of destruction was not simply the use of a blunt instrument, with little or no appreciation of wider strategy. During the earlier years of war within Scotland, it would appear that violence was deliberately targeted against individuals and communities as a means of

8 9

See above, 30–49. Strickland, War and Chivalry, 281.



conclusion 243

punishment for anti-Bruce allegiance, as well as to reinforce Bruce power within a given area. The targeting of Galloway with devastating raids over a prolonged period appears connected to the local people’s continued support of Edward Balliol. In late 1336 Andrew Murray campaigned in the Scottish northeast to drive out residual enemy forces, and to remind the local population that Bruce military power was not transitory but could be brought to bear throughout Scotland at any time.10 The ability to target specific territories was replicated when the Bruce Scots began to attack northern England once more.11 Control of Scottish soldiers in this theatre in particular was essential for the successful return of a policy of forcing English communities to buy peace in return for large sums of protection money. Scotland’s military forces could therefore be unleashed on either the Scottish or English countryside with confidence, both in their ability to perform and in the belief that they would behave as ordered. This confidence was also based on Scottish forces being made up of men who, as the conflict progressed, became increasingly adept at prosecuting war, and who increasingly thought of war as their occupation. This was not simply the case for the elites, although it is with relevance to these men that most evidence exists. Although large Scottish armies were produced at times of need, it was the lordly or knightly retinue that was the basis of most Scottish military forces during the Anglo-Scottish conflict. These forces were especially useful when utilised in the war in Scotland, raiding areas of Balliol allegiance or ambiguous Bruce support, capturing Disinherited/English castles or sniping at the heels of larger enemy invasion armies. Continuing warfare in Scotland, and the raids launched against northern England, ensured that Scotland’s warriors gained valuable and at times extensive combat experience. That experience in turn shaped the warrior’s perception of himself, and Scottish soldiers increasingly displayed a militaristic image of themselves, for example, through the purchase of armour and equipment, or the depiction of the dead warrior in artistic representations and funeral effigies. The image of the warrior was also a construct of those who wrote the history of the Anglo-Scottish conflict. Contemporary chroniclers described their heroes, and their enemies, in terms of their behaviour. Several factors appear to have been key in chroniclers’ often idealised depictions of the warrior. These included bravery, probity, honour and the appropriate treatment of non-combatants. The idealised heroic vision presented by contemporary writers was not, however, far removed from the warrior’s own vision of himself, or at least how he wished to see himself. For the ideal, although not always apparent in some of the actions carried out by ‘chivalric’ warriors, remained important as an exemplar. The necessarily violent nature

10 11

See above, 29. See above, 166–8.

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of warfare was not without its restraints. The treatment of the enemy in this period of conflict, certainly by the Bruce Scots, was far from uncontrolled. Although incidents of vindictive cruelty could and at times did take place, these were unusual occurrences that did not define the conflict as a whole. More often, the Anglo-Scottish conflict was an arena into which the warrior class of both sides could enter with some confidence. The conflict was not barbarous, prisoners would not be subjected to cruel and unusual punishments, and long careers could be made participating in the conflict fought over Scotland’s future. Scotland’s Second War of Independence was a typical conflict of the Western European Middle Ages, and the Scottish warrior was little different in self-image and behaviour from his fellow soldiers in England or France.

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Index Aberchirder (Banff)  62 Aberdeen  26, 27, 42, 67, 89, 140, 149–50, 161, 168, 169, 196 Aberlady 92 Aberluthnot (Mar)  62 Abernethy, Laurence  133 Aboyne 24 Agincourt, battle of (1415)  187 Alderney 96 Alexander II, king of Scots (r. 1214–49)  68 Alexander, earl of Menteith (d. c.1306) 81 Alexander, son of John of Linlithgow  82 Alexandria 225 Allerdale  33, 163 Angus  29, 108, 160 Annan  14, 102, 109, 114, 122, 125, 141, 151, 152, 220 Annan, David  147, 193 Annan, William  194 Annandale  15, 18, 40, 44, 45, 53, 70, 71, 110, 111, 132, 148, 162 Antwerp 212 Arbroath Abbey  27, 89 Ardler, Ingram  63 ‘Armorial de Gelre’  234, 235 Arthuret (Cumberland)  162 Atholl 154 Atholl, Aymer of  45 Auchterarder 106 Auchterhouse 146 Auchtermuchty, parish church of  226 Audley, Hugh, earl of Gloucester (d. 1347) 34 Aurea, John de  90 Avoch Castle  89, 108 Aydon Castle  188 Ayr 28 Baird, William  15 Baldowrie (Fife)  63 Balliol, Henry  14, 152 ‘Balliol Roll’  234, 236 Balmerino Abbey  27 Bamff 146

Bamburgh  94, 124, 180 Bamburgh Castle  167 Bannockburn, battle of (1314)  75, 86, 102, 118, 122, 138, 140, 141, 142, 166, 221, 227, 240 Barclay, David  201 Barde, William  193 Bathgate 34 Baugé, battle of (1421)  223 Bayonne 95 Bearpark manor (County Durham)  179 Beauchamp, Thomas, earl of Warwick (d. 1369)  20, 25, 31, 32, 168, 177, 184 Beaumont, Henry, titular earl of Buchan (d. 1340)  19, 21, 106, 151, 185, 192–3, 194, 211 Beaumont, Katherine, countess of Atholl (d. 1368)  26, 27, 107 Ben Cruachan, battle of (1308)  141 Berkley, Maurice  34 Berkley, Thomas, lord Berkley  133 Bertram, Robert  50, 119 Berwick-upon-Tweed  19, 25, 33, 37, 38, 42, 45, 49, 53, 56, 57, 58, 67, 92, 94, 140, 142, 144, 148, 153, 168, 169, 194, 211, 228 siege of (1319)  15, 115, 124, 138, 142 siege of (1333)  14–16, 17, 65, 89, 115, 125, 139, 142–3, 148–9, 151, 164, 167, 168, 210, 217, 220, 222–3, 233–4 siege of (1355)  57, 93, 105, 117–18, 127, 148, 169, 189 Berwickshire  17, 33, 55 Bisham Abbey  226 Bisset, Thomas  224–5 Black Death, the  53 Blancus, Nicholas  90 Bohun, Henry (d. 1314)  86 Bohun, Humphrey, earl of Hereford (d. 1361) 39 Bohun, William, earl of Northampton (d. 1360)  25, 44, 45, 53, 58 Bonjedward 40 Bonkhill, John  73



index 267

Bordeaux 95 Boroughbridge, battle of (1322)  113 Bothwell Castle  29, 31, 39, 108, 126, 133, 147 Bourne, Adam, of Thorndale  56 Boyd, Alan (d. 1339)  142 Boyd, Robert (d. 1333)  141 Boyd, Thomas  43, 142 Bradeston, Thomas  26, 34 Brinkburn Priory  176 Bristol Castle  194 Brittany  43, 153 Brodick Castle  23 Bruce, Alexander, titular earl of Carrick (d. 1333)  109, 121, 122 Bruce, Christian (d. 1356)  107 Bruce, Edward, earl of Carrick (d. 1318)  121, 189, 200 Bruce, Robert, titular earl of Carrick (d. 1332)  113, 121 Bruce, Thomas  18, 70 Buchan, earldom of  123 Buchanan, Maurice  76 Buirenfosse (France)  100 Buittle Castle  51 Bullock, William  22, 31, 37, 40 Burgh Muir, skirmish at (1335)  22, 111, 125, 132, 143, 147, 185 Burned Isle, Loch Ken (Galloway)  52 ‘Burnt Candlemas’, the (1356)  57, 58, 119, 136, 221, 242 Bury, Richard, bishop of Durham (d. 1345)  39, 165 Bute  66, 103, 147, 149, 189–90 Bywell (Northumberland)  179 Caddonlee  67, 68 Caerlaverock Castle  31, 51, 58, 148, 153 Caistron (Northumberland)  176 Caithness 118 Calais  51, 64, 80, 95, 229 Callender 31 Cambuskenneth Abbey  228 Camera, John  73 Camera, Maurice  73 Campbell, Dougal, of Lochawe  18, 93, 103, 147, 149 Campbell, Neil, earl of Atholl (d. c.1315)  123 Campbell, John, earl of Atholl (d. 1333)  78, 123

Carlisle  20, 33, 39, 45, 46, 51, 55, 165, 171–2, 177 Carlisle Castle  132, 166, 193 Carrick  18, 28, 66, 103 Carrickfergus Castle  91, 222 Carruthers, William  18, 70, 147 Castleton [East Wemyss]  92 Caterans 64 Cathcart, Alan  200 Cavers (Roxburghshire)  19 Charny, Geoffrey de  213 Charteris, Thomas  63 Chivalry  100–2, 106, 109, 111, 119, 121, 131, 134, 143, 145, 146, 147, 149, 151–2, 155, 157, 196, 199–203, 210–38, 242 Clatto 145 Clifford, Robert  194 Clinton, William  95 Clydesdale  18, 26, 118, 159 Coldingham Priory  179 Colville, Robert  14 Comyn, John  72 Comyn/Broun, Thomas  186 Copeland (Cumberland)  33, 163 Coquetdale  32, 33, 168 Corbridge 166 County Durham  48 Coupar Angus Abbey  27 Coupland, John  102, 136, 218 Court of Chivalry, English  214, 233 Cowal  18, 103, 147 Crabbe, John  13, 195 ‘Crags of Craigie’, skirmish at  133 Craigie, Alexander, senior 152 Craigie, Alexander, junior  152, 153 Craigie, Alexander  152 Craigie, John  43 Craigie, William  152 Cramond 92 Crécy, battle of (1346)  46, 49, 191, 216, 230 Creyk, Walter  50 Crichton, family  155 Crichton, Alexander  154 Crichton, John  154 Crichtondene, skirmish at (1337)  33, 133 Crusade  100, 139, 146, 147, 155, 224–5, 234 Culblean, battle of (1335)  24, 30, 43, 71, 79, 85, 107, 120, 125, 130, 132–3, 149, 186, 189, 218, 219, 239 Culvath, Richard  168

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Cumberland  14, 33, 36, 37, 40, 44–7, 55, 91, 101, 112, 115, 133, 162, 164, 166, 172, 177–9 Cumbernauld Castle  22 Cunningham  18, 50, 103 Cunningham, Andrew  73 Cunningham, William  62 Cupar Castle  21, 24, 25, 30, 36, 37, 92, 107, 124, 125, 129, 130, 133, 143, 150–1, 159, 190 Dacre, Ranulph  14, 31, 34, 168 Dacre, William  50 Dairsie (Fife)  21, 129 Dakeney, Roger  185, 192 Dalkeith, John  80 Dalmahoy, Alexander  154 Dalmahoy, Roger  154 Dalry, battle of (1306)  216–17 Dalswinton Castle  58, 148 Danielston, John  64, 73 Darlington 166 Darres, James  211 David I, king of Scots (r. 1124–53)  47, 60, 174–5 David II, king of Scots (r. 1329–71)  1, 3, 5–7, 9, 16, 17, 18, 24–5, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46–8, 51, 52, 53, 54, 59, 62, 63, 64, 67, 69–70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 78, 82, 89, 93, 95, 99, 104, 106, 109–10, 111–12, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122–3, 124, 126, 133, 134, 138, 141, 152, 161, 163, 165, 166, 167, 170, 174–5, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 192, 199, 208, 214, 218, 219, 224–5, 241, 242 his military career  99–102 Delaval, Robert  119 Denmark 72 Derbyshire 44 Doget, Robert  36 Dollar 209 Donald, earl of Lennox (d. 1361x4)  76, 119 Donald, earl of Mar, Guardian of Scotland (d. 1332)  11, 69–70, 74, 78, 116, 121, 123, 128 his military career  112–14 Dornock, battle of (1333)  15, 132, 193, 214 Douglas, Archibald, Guardian of Scotland (d. 1333)  13, 15, 69, 78, 129, 131, 132, 207, 219 his military career  114–16

Douglas, Archibald, ‘the Grim’ (d. 1400) 65, 82, 83–4, 137–8, 146, 215 Douglas, Henry  133 Douglas, James, ‘the Black Douglas’ (d. 1330)  115, 132, 139, 189, 200, 222, 224 Douglas, James, earl of Douglas and Mar (d. 1388) 215 Douglas, James, of Dalkeith  79–80, 81, 87, 88, 234–7 Douglas, James, son of James Douglas of Dalkeith 237 Douglas, James, brother of William Douglas of Liddesdale (d. 1335)  132 Douglas, William, earl of Douglas (d. 1384)  52, 54–5, 56, 57, 58, 64, 70, 79–80, 87, 135, 146, 161, 162, 215 his military career  136–8 Douglas, William, lord of Douglas (d. 1333) 132 Douglas, William, of Liddesdale (d. 1353)  6, 15, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 34, 36, 40, 42, 43, 46, 54, 70, 71, 80, 81, 92, 107, 109–11, 144, 150, 161, 186, 188, 193, 195, 201, 215 his military career  132–6 Douglas, rectory of  37 Douglasdale  29, 52, 136, 161 Douglas Castle  222 Dryburgh Abbey  227 Dumbarton 90 Dumbarton Castle  22, 64, 88, 94, 119, 159, 188, 193, 227 Dumfries, John  73 Dumfriesshire  14–15, 17, 46, 153, 158, 170 Dumfries Castle  170 Dunbar 94 Dunbar, Agnes, countess of March (d. 1369)  111, 126, 188 Dunbar Castle  33, 34, 35, 84, 111, 126, 143, 186, 188, 194 Duncan, earl of Fife (d. 1353)  12, 13, 22, 25, 70, 78, 80, 102, 152, 155, 170, 192, 195, 218, 226 his military career  127–31 Dundarg Castle  19, 20, 106, 192 Dundee 209 Dunfermline 12 Dunfermline Abbey  27, 85–6, 109, 222, 228 Dunoon Castle  18, 93, 103, 149 Dunottar Castle  26, 27, 29



index 269

Dupplin Moor, battle of (1332)  12–13, 17, 70, 75, 77, 78, 80, 81, 84, 85, 96, 105–6, 109, 113, 114, 115–16, 117, 118, 121, 122, 123, 124, 128, 138, 140, 141, 143, 148, 151, 168, 191, 211, 218, 226, 240 Durham  48, 117, 135, 138, 166, 172, 205, 218, 239, 242 Durham Cathedral  165, 166, 179 Easby Abbey (Abbey of St Agatha)  180 Eastminster Abbey (Abbey of St Mary Graces) 226 Edinburgh  22, 33, 37, 38, 39, 42, 57, 72 Edinburghshire  17, 170 Edinburgh Castle  25, 28, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 92, 108, 111, 133, 134, 141, 146, 150, 152, 154–5, 170, 177, 184, 188, 192–3 Edward I, king of England (r. 1272– 1307)  29, 30, 39, 81, 130, 210, 219, 227 Edward II, king of England (r. 1307– 27)  15, 113, 188, 190 Edward III, king of England (r. 1327– 77)  1–2, 7, 11, 14–15, 17, 19–24, 26, 28–9, 30–1, 33–4, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39–40, 41–2, 43, 44, 45, 46–7, 49, 50, 51, 53, 55, 56, 57–8, 59, 68, 72, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 88, 90–1, 93–4, 95, 100, 102, 104, 107, 108, 110–11, 115, 119, 122–3, 125, 129, 131, 133, 136, 139, 143, 145, 152, 153, 154, 160, 161, 164, 167, 168, 169, 179–80, 182–3, 184, 185, 186, 187, 191, 194, 195, 196, 207, 210, 212, 217, 220–1, 222–3, 225, 226, 227, 228–9, 239, 240, 241, 242 Edward (Balliol), king of Scots (r. 1332–57)  11–14, 16–17, 18–20, 22, 23–6, 29–30, 31, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41, 43, 48, 50–2, 57, 68, 69, 93, 95, 102, 103–4, 106, 109, 110, 114, 115–16, 118, 120, 122–3, 125, 128–9, 141, 145, 148–9, 150, 151, 153, 158–9, 160, 168, 169, 170, 183, 186, 187, 189, 207, 217, 219–20, 234, 239, 240, 241, 243 Edward, of Woodstock, ‘the Black Prince’, prince of Wales (d. 1376)  77, 212, 216 Egglestone Abbey  182 Eglinton, Hugh  43 Elcho Abbey  121, 228 Elgin  27, 68, 89 Elgin Cathedral  228 Embleton parish (Northumberland)  181 Erskine, Alan  73 Eshot, Adam  195

Espléchin, truce of (1340)  39, 40, 112 Ettrick Forest  20, 52, 54, 58, 87, 135, 136, 161 Fairley (Co. Durham)  41 Falkirk, battle of (1298)  75 Falkland Castle  31, 126, 130, 159 Felton, William  83–4, 226–7 Ferrers, Henry (d. 1343)  26 Ferrers, Thomas  95 Ferryhill (County Durham)  179 Fettercairn (Mar)  62 Fife  29, 31, 66, 108, 126, 129–30, 133, 158, 159, 226 First Scottish War of Independence (1296–1328)  1, 3, 61, 67, 95, 118, 138, 140, 148, 154, 222 Firth of Forth  11, 23, 25, 92, 150, 226 Fitzalan, Richard, earl of Arundel (d. 1376)  33, 34, 179 Flanders  81, 90, 91, 94, 95 Fleming, Duncan  73 Fleming, John  73 Fleming, Malcolm, of Biggar  73 Fleming, Malcolm, earl of Wigtown (d. c.1363)  52, 62, 76, 100, 119, 160 Fleming, Patrick  65 Flodden, battle of (1513)  64 Fochart, battle of (1318)  189–90 Fordun (Mearns)  65 Forres  27, 89 Forthar 145 Fosterage  76, 120 France  1, 2, 7–8, 17, 18, 25, 30, 38, 39–40, 41, 44, 46, 49–50, 52, 53–4, 59, 72, 74, 78, 82, 87, 89, 91, 92, 95–6, 99, 102, 109, 119, 133, 136, 137, 138, 155–6, 163, 175, 187, 204, 221, 223, 241, 244 French troops in Scotland  55–7, 133–4, 167, 173, 203 Fraser, Alexander (d. 1332)  140 Fraser, Andrew (d. 1333)  141 Fraser, James (d. 1333)  13, 141 Fraser, Simon (d. 1333)  13, 141 Fraser, William, (of Cowie?) (d. 1346)  141 Fullarton, Adam  43 Galloglass 66 Galloway  13, 18, 19, 27, 31, 32, 50, 52, 53, 58, 65, 66, 103, 108, 109, 114, 125, 128, 132, 136, 158–9, 160, 162, 196, 243 Garancières, Eugene  55–6, 89–90

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Gascony 21 Germany 95 Genoa 95 Gilbert, son of Earl Malise of Strathearn 83 Gilsland (Northumberland)  15, 167, 173, 207 Glasgow  22, 50 Gloucestershire 28 Golding, Radulph  106 Gowrie  29, 108, 160 Graham, John, earl of Menteith (d. 1347)  22, 122–3, 131, 216, 226–7 Graham, Patrick (of Kinpunt?)  147, 212 Graham, William  73 Gray, Alexander  16 Gray, Thomas (d. c.1344)  38, 124, 126, 213 Gray, Thomas (d. 1369)  56, 136, 185, 192–3, 194, 200, 211, 212, 229 Greystoke (Cumberland)  46, 169 Guernsey 95 Guildford, Andrew  91 Guines, Anselm of  184 Guînes, truce of (1353)  54 Guthrie, Hugh  73 Guy, count of Namur (d. 1336)  22, 110–11, 132, 184 Hadden (Roxburghshire)  57 Hadden, Bernard of  57 Haddington  57, 207, 228 Haliburton, Walter  193, 195 Halidon Hill, battle of (1333)  14, 16, 17, 18, 70, 75, 76, 77, 78, 84, 96, 102, 106, 109, 112, 115–16, 117, 118, 119, 121–2, 123, 125, 129, 132, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 145, 147, 148, 151, 167, 168, 180, 187, 189, 191, 196, 212, 218, 221, 226, 234, 239, 240–1 Hampyle, Hugh  36 Harlaw, battle of (1411)  67 Hartlepool 92 Hassendean 40 Hastings, battle of (1066)  144 Hatfield, Thomas, bishop of Durham (d. 1381)  56, 58, 165, 166 Hawthornden 143 Hay, David, of Errol, constable (d. 1346) 140 Hay, Gilbert, of Errol, constable (d. 1333) 140 Hay, Gilbert (d. c.1465) 200

Hay, John  140, 144 Hay, Nicholas, of Errol, constable (d. c.1332/3) 140 Hay, Thomas  168 Hay, William  73 Hay, William, of Lochorward  140 Hemingburgh church (diocese of York) 180 Henry V, king of England (r. 1413–22)  187 Henry, of Lancaster, earl of Derby (d. 1345)  25, 26, 27, 28, 39, 41–2, 134, 144, 211–12 Herald, Chandos  212 Herle, Robert  58, 137, 164 Hermitage Castle  43, 50, 133 Hestan Island Castle  42, 45, 50–2 Hethe, Hamo de, bishop of Rochester (d. c.1357) 207 Heton, Thomas  167 Hexham  166, 167, 182 Hexhamshire 41 Hexham Priory  174, 175, 181, 208 Highlands  66–7, 86, 87, 93, 96 Holm Cultram Abbey  176, 177 Holyrood Abbey  150 Holystone Priory  176 Holy Island  57, 93, 94 Home, John  80 Homildon Hill, battle of (1402)  146 Hoton (Roxburghshire)  37 Hundred Years War (1337–1453)  74, 96, 98, 100, 154, 199, 203, 240, 242 Hugh, earl of Ross (d. 1333)  120, 123, 218, 234 Inchcolm Abbey  174, 209 Inchmartin, John of  152 Inverbervie (Kincardine)  41 Inverkip Castle  91 Ireland  28, 30, 40, 66, 82, 91, 96, 97, 141, 142, 157 forces from, as part of English war effort, 22, 94 Irvine 228 Irvine, William  63 Isabella, countess of Mar  19 Islandshire 179 Ivo, of Argyll  81 Jacquerie revolt (1358)  204 James V, king of Scots (r. 1513–42)  72 Jedburgh  13, 114



index 271

Jedburgh Castle  40, 52, 162 Jedburgh Forest  40 Jersey 95 Jervaulx Abbey  180 John (Balliol), king of Scots (r. 1292–6)  11 John II, king of France (r. 1350–64)  59, 82, 89–90, 102, 137, 184, 216 John, of Eltham, earl of Cornwall (d. 1336)  28, 107, 133, 209, 228, 230, 232 John, second lord Willoughby (d. 1349) 230 Keith, David  73 Keith, Edward, marshal (d. 1346)  138, 139 Keith, Robert, marshal (d. 1343/4)  13, 76, 100, 122, 138 Keith, Robert, ‘the younger’  138–9 Keith, William, of Galston (d. 1339x1342)  16, 19, 79, 139–40 Kelso  106, 183, 228 Kelso Abbey  183 Kelton (Dumfriesshire)  161 Kenkynoll 66 Kennedy, John, of Dunure  52, 70, 147 Kenneth, earl of Sutherland (d. 1333)  123 Kerr, John  82, 84 Kildrummy Castle  23, 24, 79, 88–9, 107, 129 Kincardine (Mar)  62 Kinclaven (Perthshire)  62 Kinclaven Castle  30 Kinfauns (Perthshire)  63 Kinghorn (Fife)  12, 70, 121, 128, 142 Kinneff Castle  27, 29 Kinninmonth, William  73 Kintyre 37 Kirby, John, bishop of Carlisle (d. 1352)  177–9, 182 Kirkcudbright 170 Kirkpatrick, Roger  58, 70, 148 Knights Hospitaller  143 Knokis, Alan del  72 Kyle  18, 70, 103 Lanarkshire  26, 27, 28, 107 Lancashire 44 Lanercost Priory  174, 208 Lauriston Castle  27, 29 Leith  38, 92 Lennox 63 Léon, Henry de  111

Leslie, Norman  224–5 Leslie, Walter (d. 1382)  62, 224–5 Lesmahagow Church  28, 209 Lestrange, Ebulom  228 Leuchars Castle  28, 31, 130 Liddel Castle  46, 47, 68, 85, 101, 135, 165, 187–8, 193 Lille 111 Lilleburn, John  194 Lindores 72 Lindores Abbey  27, 226 Linlithgow 170 Livingston, William  80 Lochaber  19, 110 Lochindorb Castle  21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 107 Lochindorb chevauchée (1336)  26–7 Lochmaben Castle  15, 40, 44, 58, 112, 162 Loch Doon Castle  88, 89, 91, 185, 192 Loch Kinord Castle  24 Loch Leven Castle  89 siege of (c.1334)  87, 153, 222 London  46, 51, 83, 123, 131 Lorraine, Eustace of  22, 50 Lothian  19, 20, 21, 27, 33, 50, 57, 108, 110, 126, 132, 154, 158, 160, 161, 170–1, 193 Lovel vs. Morley, case before the English Court of Chivalry  233 Low Countries  82, 90, 92, 149, 184 Lucy, Anthony (d. 1343)  15, 27, 28, 29, 34, 132 Lucy, Thomas  37, 50, 51, 54, 55 Luss (Dumbartonshire)  63 Luttrell, Geoffrey, lord of Irnham (d. 1345)  229–31, 233 Luttrell Psalter  205–7, 229–31 Lyle, Alan  18, 189 Lynn (Norfolk)  25, 92 MacDonald, Alexander of the Isles, lord of Lochaber (d. c.1440) 66 MacDonald, Angus  93 MacDonald, John of Islay, lord of the Isles (d. 1386)  66–7, 93, 110 MacDowell, Dougal  136 MacDowell, Duncan  18, 32, 42, 45, 51, 53, 160–1 MacDowell, Fergus  160 MacDuff 66 MacLeod family  93 MacRuaridh, Ranald, of Garmoran (d. 1346) 121

272

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Magnus VII, king of Norway (r. 1319–43)  95 Malcolm (II), earl of Lennox (d. 1333)  63, 118–19 Malestroit, truce of (1343)  44, 45, 101 Malise (III), earl of Strathearn (d. c.1317) 81 Malise (V), earl of Strathearn  118, 170 Man, Isle of  40–1, 65, 66, 94, 110 Manfield-on-Tees church  180 Manners, Robert  35, 38, 185, 194 Mare, William, of Linlithgow  39 Marmion, Manselmo  184 Marmion, William  213 Marshal, David  160 Marshal, John  72 Mauny, Walter (d. 1372)  57, 195 Maxwell, Eustace  13, 31–2, 80, 153, 158, 160, 170 Maxwell, Herbert  51 McCulloch, Gilbert  154 McCulloch, John, son of Gilbert  154 McCulloch, John, son of Patrick  154 McCulloch, Michael  154 McCulloch, Patrick  153–4, 155 McCulloch, Patrick, son of Patrick  154 McCulloch, Thomas  154 McCulloch, William  73, 153 McGhie, Michael  32, 160 Mearns, the  29, 108, 160 Melrose  42, 133 Melrose, Robert  73 Melton, William, archbishop of York (d. 1340) 181–2 Menzies, Robert  24, 65 Merrington (County Durham)  179 Methven, battle of (1306)  141 Middelburg (Zeeland)  90 Middleton, Gilbert  188 Midhope, Richard  31 Military equipment  61, 75, 81–8 armour 81–5 weaponry 85–8 Military leadership  68–71 guardians 68–70 constable 68 marshal 68 Military service  60–8 feudal service  60–4 knight service  60–3 forinsec service (the ‘Army of Scotland’)  61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 96

garrison service  61, 64, 65, 88 galley service  62, 93 pay  64, 65 Military structure  71–80 cavalry  71–4, 79 infantry  74–7, 79 schiltroms  74–6, 77 army size  78–80 Military supply  63, 65, 88–92 Military training  61, 76, 77 Minot, Laurence  205, 221 Moffatdale 32 Moigne, Walter  224–5 Molyns, Ralph  228 Monklands (Lanarkshire)  26 Montague, William, earl of Salisbury (d. 1344)  26, 33, 34, 41, 111, 145, 179, 188, 226 Monthermer, Marie, countess of Fife (d. c.1371) 131 Moray 27 More, Reginald  95, 100 Morpeth (Northumberland)  16, 176 Mowbray, Alexander  19, 22, 50, 51 Mowbray, Geoffrey  22 Mowbray, John  201 Mowbray, William  19, 149 Munro, Robert  65 Murdoch, earl of Menteith (d. 1332)  78, 122 Murray, Andrew, of Bothwell, Guardian of Scotland (d. 1338)  13, 19, 23–4, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30–1, 35, 36, 69–70, 71, 78, 79, 80, 89, 92, 104, 114–15, 126, 131, 133, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 183, 186, 195, 201–2, 216, 243 his military career  105–9 Murray, Andrew, of Petty and Avoch, Guardian of Scotland (d. 1297)  69 Murray, Andrew, of Tullibardine (d. 1332)  12, 170 Murray, Maurice, of Drumsargard, earl of Strathearn (d. 1346)  42, 89, 118 Musgrave, Thomas  54, 55 Musselburgh 92 Myton, battle of (1319)  75 Namur 185 Napier, Duncan  154 Napier, John  155 Napier, Richard  154 Naval activity, Scottish  36, 92–6



index 273

Nesbit, skirmish at (1339)  184 Neville, Ralph (d. 1367)  31, 34, 37, 38, 50–1, 54, 56, 58, 167, 201 Neville’s Cross, battle of (1346)  6, 43, 48–9, 50, 51, 52, 53, 68, 70, 71, 74, 75, 77, 78, 81, 85, 87, 96, 100–2, 104–5, 112, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122–3, 124, 126–7, 130–1, 135, 138, 140, 141, 142, 146, 147, 148, 151, 152, 159, 164, 166, 168, 174, 175, 179, 180, 182, 191–2, 193, 195, 201–2, 204, 205, 208, 214, 215, 216, 218, 225, 226, 239, 241, 242 Newbattle Abbey  226 Newcastle-upon-Tyne  28, 38, 57, 90, 91 Newminster Abbey  176, 177, 182 Newton (Northumberland)  176 Nisbet, battle of (1355)  56, 57, 127, 136, 146, 184, 187, 210–11 Nisbet Castle  56 Nithsdale  32, 50, 58 Norham  56, 127, 135, 146 Norhamshire 179 Northumberland  14, 15, 32, 33, 35, 41, 43, 44–5, 47, 58, 68, 115, 164, 166, 167, 176, 180 North Berwick  57, 92 Nostell Priory  180 Nottingham Castle  193 Ogle, Robert  43, 131 Okshawe, Thomas de  185 Old Byland, battle of (1322)  75, 113 Old Meldrum, battle of (1308)  141 Otterburn, battle of (1388)  146, 215 Oxnam (Roxburghshire)  14 Park, Walter del  94 Patrick (V), earl of March (d. 1369)  11, 13, 21, 24, 25, 33, 36, 38, 42, 53, 56, 57, 64, 71, 77, 78, 80, 92, 104, 107, 111, 117, 124, 130–1, 143, 155, 162, 164, 191, 214, 219, 226, 239 his military career  124–7 Peebles  47, 68 Peeblesshire 17 Penrith 172 Percival, Adam  184 Percy, Henry, second lord Percy (d. 1352)  31, 34, 37, 38, 40, 41, 50–1, 151, 167, 201 Percy, Henry, third lord Percy  56, 58 Perth  12–13, 16, 22, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31,

35, 36, 47, 57, 68, 76, 92, 94, 106, 108, 114, 120, 124, 128, 139, 141, 153, 158, 159, 168–70, 228 council meeting at (1332)  11 siege of (1339)  36–7, 87, 89, 95, 104, 118, 120, 126, 130, 133–4, 139, 159 Perthshire 89 Peter I, king of Cyprus (r. 1359–69)  225 Philip VI, king of France (r. 1328–50)  23, 30, 34, 40, 45, 89, 100, 102, 109, 185, 224 Philippa, of Hainault, queen of England (d. 1369)  22, 167 Pickworth, Thomas  51 Plater Forest (Angus)  27, 108 Poitiers, battle of (1356)  59, 80, 82, 102, 137, 146, 184, 215, 216 Pontekin, family  155 Pontekin, Adam  154–5 Pontekin, Thomas  154–5 Pontekin, William  154 Portugal 72 Penrith 46 Prendergast, William  15 Prenderguest, Robert  150 Pressen, Michael  167 Pressen, William  22, 186–7 Preston, Laurence  71, 186 Preston, Simon  73 Queensferry 92 Ramsay, Alexander, of Dalhousie (d. 1342)  34–5, 38, 42, 43, 70, 71, 134, 143–5, 163, 201, 227 Ramsay, Alexander  146 Ramsay, family  145–6 Ramsay, Henry  73, 146 Ramsay, Patrick, of Dalhousie  226 Ramsay, William  22, 144 Ramsay, William, of Colluthie (future earl of Fife) (d. c.1382)  145–6, 152, 153, 160, 193, 215 Ramsay, William, of Dalhousie  56, 146 Randolph, John, earl of Moray and Guardian of Scotland (d. 1346)  18, 19, 21, 22, 23, 40–1, 42, 44, 46, 52, 53, 69–70, 71, 100–1, 103, 104, 107, 122, 132, 159, 160, 161, 185, 186–7, 188, 193 his military career  109–112 Randolph, Thomas (I), earl or Moray and

274

scotland’s second war of independence

Guardian of Scotland (d. 1332)  11, 41, 85, 109, 112 Randolph, Thomas (II), earl of Moray (d. 1332)  78, 109 Redesdale  32, 33, 168 Redmyre (Kincardineshire)  63 Reginald (II), count of Guelders (d. 1343) 95 Reid, Simon  73 Renfrewshire  18, 103 Richmond, Roaldo  91 Rievaulx Abbey  176 Ripon 182 River Clyde  22, 66, 103, 159 River Cree  159 River Earn  12, 170 River Seine  95 River Tay  37, 134 River Trent  43 River Tweed  15, 222 River Tyne  41, 100 Robert I (Bruce), king of Scots (r. 1306– 29)  1, 6, 49, 61–2, 63, 75–6, 84, 86, 93, 95, 100, 108, 118, 121, 123, 124, 139, 141, 142, 148, 157, 159, 162, 165–6, 171, 175, 176, 200, 217, 224, 227, 240 Rodum, Nicholas  91 Rokeby, Thomas (d. 1357)  42, 50, 201 Roos, John  73 Ros, Godfrey  18, 19, 22, 79 Ros, Thomas  184 Ros, William  167 Ross, William  234 Rosemarkie 108 Rose Manor (Cumberland)  33, 177 Roslin, Thomas  25, 67, 149–50, 230 Rosneath Castle (Argyll)  18 Rothesay Castle  18, 23, 91, 103, 144 Rothley (Northumberland)  176 Roxburgh  13, 17, 29, 38, 51, 57, 83, 106, 125, 129, 170, 226 Edward III’s winter campaign at (1334–5)  20–1, 110, 241 Roxburgh Bridge, battle of (1332)  13, 79, 106, 151, 183, 216 Roxburgh Castle  19, 22, 28, 38, 42, 43, 50, 52, 162, 164, 170, 227 Roxburghshire  17, 19, 55, 72, 226 Saint-Inglevert, tournament at (1390)  212 St Andrews  199 St Andrews, prior of  27

St St St St St St St St St St

Andrews Abbey  27, 227 Andrews Castle  28, 31, 126, 130 Andrews Priory  89 Brendan  149 Bride’s Kirk, Douglas  222 Columba  209 Cuthbert  208, 225 Duthac  120 Margaret  222 Mary hospital, Westgate, Newcastleupon-Tyne 176 St Mary’s Priory, Carlisle  177 St Mary Magdalen hospital, Capelford, by Norham 174 St Monan  226 St Nicholas hospital, Carlisle  171–2, 177 St Thomas of Canterbury  225 Salton parish church (North Riding)  181 Sark 95 Savage, Robert  91 Scarborough 90 Scone 128 Scrope, Henry  201 Scrope vs. Grosvenor, case before the Court of Chivalry  233 Selby, James  192–3 Selby, Walter  187–8, 193, 197 Selkirk 31 Selkirkshire 17 Selkirk Forest  72, 87 Senwick (Dumfriesshire)  161 Seton, Alexander (d. c.1348)  100, 142 Seton, Alexander, ‘the younger’ (d. 1332) 142 Seton, Thomas (d. 1333)  15, 142, 223 Seton, William (d. 1333)  142 Sicily 72 Skinburness (Cumberland)  94 Sluys, battle of (1340)  39 Solway Firth  50, 91, 132 Somerset 28 Spain 72 Stafford, Ralph (d. 1372)  34 Standard, battle of the (1138)  47 Steersman, Alan  150–1, 190 Steward, Robert, Guardian of Scotland (future Robert II, king of Scots) (d. 1390)  9, 18, 21, 22, 23, 36, 37, 40, 42, 52, 59, 64, 67, 69–70, 72, 77, 99, 109, 117, 120, 126–7, 130–1, 147, 149, 159, 160–1, 189, 191, 214, 239, 242 his military career  102–5



index 275

Stewart, Alan  52, 70, 147 Stewart, Alexander, earl of Buchan (d. 1405)  230, 232 Stewart, Alexander  43 Stewart, John, of Darnley (d. 1374)  73 Stewart, John, lord of Kyle (future earl of Carrick and Robert III, king of Scots) (d. 1406)  53, 69, 70–1, 105, 148, 162 Stewart, Robert, earl of Fife and Menteith, duke of Albany (d. 1420)  215 Stewart, Thomas, earl of Angus (d. 1362)  57, 93, 117–18 Stewart, family of Menteith  122 Stirling  26, 28, 29, 37, 92, 228 Stirling Castle  31, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 65, 83, 89, 94, 104, 108, 118, 120, 126, 139, 227 Stirling, John  19, 25, 34, 50, 51, 92, 133, 151, 185, 188, 189, 193, 194, 222 Stirlingshire 29 Strathbogie, David, titular earl of Atholl (d. 1335)  14, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 65, 79, 85, 103, 106–7, 110, 132, 149, 151, 161, 184, 185, 186, 189, 219, 239 Strathearn  29, 36, 37, 118 Swanlond, John  194 Talbot, Richard, lord Talbot (d. 1356)  19, 37, 79, 139, 147, 185, 189, 192–3 Tarbert Castle  110 Teba, battle of (1330)  139 Teviotdale  32, 43, 52, 134, 136, 144, 162 Thirlwall, Richard  58 Thomas, earl of Mar (d. 1377)  119 Tournai 39 Tournaments  42, 76, 134, 140, 143, 144–5, 146, 147, 148, 210–11, 212–14, 237 Tower of London  193 Towers, William  148 Treaties of Edinburgh and Northampton (1328)  11, 14, 17, 115, 220 Treaty of Berwick (1357)  59, 119, 156 Tughale, Robert  33 Tweeddale  31, 65 Tweedmouth (Northumberland)  15, 167, 176 Twynholm (Dumfriesshire)  161 Tynedale 44 Tynemouth Priory  182 Ufford, Robert, earl of Suffolk (d. 1369)  26, 31

Ughtred, Thomas  35, 37 Umfraville, Gilbert, titular earl of Angus (d. 1381)  25, 33, 34, 37, 50, 151, 167, 168, 201–2 Umfraville, Ingram  151 Vannes, siege of (1343)  44 Vaus, Roland  133 Vaux, William  193, 195 Vere, John, earl of Oxford (d. 1360)  20, 25 Wake, Thomas, of Liddel (d. 1349)  151, 188 Wales  29, 30, 94, 113, 209 Wallace, William, Guardian of Scotland (d. 1305)  69, 75, 164, 175, 204–5 Wapinschaws  76, 77 Warenne, John, earl of Surrey (d. 1347)  36, 39 Wark Castle  164 Weardale Campaign (1327)  72, 74, 113, 124, 189 Wemyss, David  152, 153 Wemyss, Michael  152–3 Westminster 50 Westmorland  33, 36, 37, 40, 44–6, 101, 165, 166 Weston, William 80 Whitekirk (Lothian)  34, 208–9 Whiteriggs (Kincardineshire)  63 William, ‘the Lion’, king of Scots (r. 1165– 1214) 68 William I, king of England (r. 1066– 87) 144 William, baron Greystoke (d. 1359)  56 William (II), earl of Ross (d. 1323)  67, 81, 83–4 William (III), earl of Ross (d. 1372)  36, 37, 65, 120, 234 William, earl of Sutherland (d. 1370/1) 25, 38, 123–4, 126, 164, 239 Windsor Castle  193 Wiseman, Stephen  147 Witton Underwood (Northumberland) 16, 176 Wodehouse, John  50 Wooler, Thomas  18 Yorkshire  36, 38, 44–5

Warfare in History

The Battle of Hastings: Sources and Interpretations, edited and introduced by Stephen Morillo Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology, Kelly DeVries The Art of Warfare in Western Europe during the Middle Ages, from the Eighth Century to 1340 (second edition), J.F. Verbruggen Knights and Peasants: The Hundred Years War in the French Countryside, Nicholas Wright Society at War: The Experience of England and France during the Hundred Years War, edited by Christopher Allmand The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on Medieval Military and Naval History, edited by Donald J. Kagay and L.J. Andrew Villalon The Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513–1550: A Military History, Gervase Phillips The Norwegian Invasion of England in 1066, Kelly DeVries The Wars of Edward III: Sources and Interpretations, edited by Clifford J. Rogers The Battle of Agincourt: Sources and Interpretations, Anne Curry War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360, Clifford J. Rogers The Normans and their Adversaries at War: Essays in Memory of C. Warren Hollister, edited by Richard P. Abels and Bernard S. Bachrach The Battle of the Golden Spurs (Courtrai, 11 July 1302): A Contribution to the History of Flanders’ War of Liberation, 1297–1305, J.F. Verbruggen War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Richard W. Unger Swein Forkbeard’s Invasions and the Danish Conquest of England, 991–1017, Ian Howard Religion and the Conduct of War, c.300–1215, David S. Bachrach Warfare in Medieval Brabant, 1356–1406, Sergio Boffa Renaissance Military Memoirs: War, History and Identity, 1450–1600, Yuval Harari The Place of War in English History, 1066–1214, J.O. Prestwich, edited by Michael Prestwich War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century, Adrian R. Bell German War Planning, 1891–1914: Sources and Interpretations, Terence Zuber

The Battle of Crécy, 1346, Andrew Ayton and Sir Philip Preston The Battle of Yorktown, 1781: A Reassessment, John D. Grainger Special Operations in the Age of Chivalry, 1100–1550, Yuval Noah Harari Women, Crusading and the Holy Land in Historical Narrative, Natasha R. Hodgson The English Aristocracy at War: From the Welsh Wars of Edward I to the Battle of Bannockburn, David Simpkin The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 1436–1558, David Grummitt Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480–1560, David Potter Bloodied Banners: Martial Display on the Medieval Battlefield, Robert W. Jones Alfred’s Wars: Sources and Interpretations of Anglo-Saxon Warfare in the Viking Age, Ryan Lavelle The Dutch Army and the Military Revolutions, 1588–1688, Olaf van Nimwegen In the Steps of the Black Prince: The Road to Poitiers, 1355–1356, Peter Hoskins Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, Charles D. Stanton Shipping the Medieval Military: English Maritime Logistics in the Fourteenth Century, Craig L. Lambert Edward III and the War at Sea: The English Navy, 1327–1377, Graham Cushway The Soldier Experience in the Fourteenth Century, edited by Adrian R. Bell and Anne Curry Warfare in Tenth-Century Germany, David S. Bachrach Chivalry, Kingship and Crusade: The English Experience in the Fourteenth Century, Timothy Guard The Norman Campaigns in the Balkans, 1081–1108, Georgios Theotokis Welsh Soldiers in the Later Middle Ages, 1282–1422, Adam Chapman Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean, 1291–1352, Mike Carr Henry of Lancaster’s Expedition to Aquitaine, 1345–1346: Military Service and Professionalism in the Hundred Years War, Nicholas A. Gribit

This book sets out to examine in detail the military campaigns of this period, to uncover the histories of those who fought in the war, and to analyse the behaviour of combatants from both sides during ongoing periods of both civil war and Anglo-Scottish conflict. It analyses contemporary records and literary evidence in order to reconstruct the history of this conflict and reconsiders current debates regarding: the capabilities of the Scottish military; the nature of contemporary combat; the ambitions and abilities of fourteenthcentury military leaders; and the place of chivalry on the medieval battlefield. D R I AIN A. M AC I NNES is a Lecturer and Programme Leader in Scottish History at the UHI Centre for History, University of the Highlands and Islands. Cover: Image of Anglo-Scottish warfare from Froissart’s Chroniques, PlantinMoretus Museum, Antwerp, MS 15.4, f. 1r © Museum Plantin-Moretus, Antwerp - UNESCO, World Heritage. Photo: Peter Maes.

scotland’s

second War of Independence 鵽 1332 –1357 鵾

1332 –1357

Warfare in History

scotland’s second War of Independence

THE SECOND SCOTTISH WAR OF INDEPENDENCE began in 1332, only four years after the previous conflict had ended. Fought once more for the continued freedom of Scotland from English conquest, the war also witnessed a revival of Scottish civil conflict as the BruceBalliol fight for the Scottish crown recommenced once more. Breaking out sporadically until peace was agreed in 1357, the Second Scottish War is a conflict that resides still in the shadow of that which preceded it: compared to the wars of William Wallace and Robert Bruce, Edward I and Edward II, this second phase of Anglo-Scottish warfare is neither well-known nor well-understood.

MacInnes

IaIn a. MacInnes