Scamell and Gasztowicz on Land Covenants, 2nd edition, brings the material up to date, exploring the types of covenants
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English Pages [1035] Year 2018
Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Table of Statutes
Table of Statutory Instruments
Table of Cases
Introduction: Covenants generally
The doctrine of privity
Modifications of the doctrine of privity
Covenants relating to land
Part I Restrictive covenants
1. Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ (including general consideration of requirements for transmissibility)
The quality of transmissibility
The development of the rules relating to transmissibility
The current rules in relation to transmissibility
2. The benefit of the restrictive covenant
Categories of potential beneficiaries
3. 1: Original covenantees
The identification of original covenantees
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999
4. 2: Covenant beneficiaries
Origin of trusts of the benefit of restrictive covenants
Relationship between trusts of covenants and building schemes
Who, as between the trustee and the beneficiary, should be party to the action to enforce the covenants?
5. 3: Subsequent owners and occupiers of land benefited by the restrictive covenant as competent claimants: overview
General rule
6. Subsequent owners and occupiers of benefited land: (a) where there is annexation
The effect of annexation
The requirements for annexation
The land to which annexation takes place
Negating pre-existing annexation
Negating annexation effected under section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925
Can annexation be effected after the creation of the covenant by the unilateral action of the person entitled to its benefit?
7. Competent claimants: (b) express assignment
Assignability of restrictive covenants
Express assignability not negatived by qualified annexation
The time for making an express assignment
Formal requirements for an express assignment
Effect of section 62(1) of the Law of Property act 1925 or (pre 1926) section 6 of the Conveyancing Act 1881
Implied assignment
After the first assignment, is an unbroken chain of assignments connecting the first assignee with the claimant required?
Assignment by operation of law
8. Competent claimants: (c) building schemes
Introduction
1 The evolution of building schemes
2 The legal effects of building schemes
3 The facts which must be proved to establish the existence of a building scheme
4 Factors which may negative the existence of a building scheme
5 Requirements for registration of building scheme obligations under the Land Charges Acts, 1925 and 1972 and, in the case of registered land, under the Land Registration Acts 1925–2002
9. The running of the burden of restrictive covenants
The nature of the burden of a restrictive covenant
The running of the burden of restrictive covenants where the title to the land is unregistered
The running of the burden of restrictive covenants where the title to the burdened land is registered
Position of squatters who gain title to land
Covenants in leases
Local land charges
10. Restrictive covenants and public law
Introduction
I: Public bodies becoming covenantees pursuant to special statutory provisions
Public bodies as competent claimants
(A) Statutes allowing enforcement by deemed ownership of benefited land
(B) Statutes allowing enforcement without introducing the mechanism of deeming provisions
Burden of public law covenants registrable as local land charges
Failure to register covenants as local land charges
II: Public bodies acquiring land burdened by restrictive covenants
Powers of compulsory acquisition
Holding statutory powers to deal with land
Effect on restrictive covenants of the compulsory acquisition of the burdened land (or its acquisition by agreement in circumstances where it could have been compulsorily acquired)
Altering the statutory purposes for which land was acquired
Extension of immunity of Local Authorities to private individuals and bodies
Compensation for injurious affection under section 68 of the lands clauses Consolidation Act 1845 or Section 10 of the compulsory Purchase Act 1965 in respect of non-compliance with restrictive covenants
Effect on the covenant of the protected non-compliance
III: Relationship between restrictive covenants and planning permission
Various restrictions on the use of land
11. The construction of restrictive covenants
General principles
Specific areas of construction
Construction of common phrases
12. Restrictive covenants and competition law
General competition law
The Competition Act 1998
The Groceries Market Investigation (Controlled Land) Order 2010
13. Remedies for breach of a restrictive covenant
Introduction
Special remedies dependent upon terms agreed between the parties to the covenant
General remedies
(1) A declaration that the claimant is entitled to enforce the covenant
(2) A final injunction to restrain or to remedy a breach of the covenant
(3) An interim (‘interlocutory’) injunction in relation to a legal or equitable right
(4) Damages in addition to or in lieu of (ie in substitution for) an injunction
Defences to remedies generally or alternatively to the equitable remedy of an injunction (or potentially a declaration)
Stay of proceedings under section 84(9) of the Law of Property Act 1925
(5) Damages at common law
14. Freeing the title from unenforceable restrictive covenants
Introduction
Insurance against enforcement
Proceedings for a declaration under section 84(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925
15. Extinguishment, discharge and modification of restrictive covenants
The covenant ceasing to be enforceable at law or in equity
Express release
Extinguishment by operation of law
Variation by order of the county court under section 610 of the Housing Act 1985
16. The modification and discharge of restrictive covenants and agreements by the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) pursuant to section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925
Introduction
The provisions of section 84(1)–(1C)
Contracting out not possible
Who may apply
Who may oppose
What restrictions fall within the scope of the upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction?
The Upper Tribunal’s powers
17. The scope of the Upper Tribunal’s powers under section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925
The Upper Tribunal’s powers
18. The four alternative grounds giving rise to the Upper Tribunal’s powers
The grounds
Related matters
19. The grounds giving rise to the Upper Tribunal’s powers: paragraph (a)
Paragraph (a)
‘By reason of changes in the character of the property’
‘By reason of changes in the character of … the neighbourhood’
‘By reason of … other circumstances of the case which the upper tribunal may deem material’
20. Section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925: paragraph (aa)
Introduction
Question 1: Is the proposed user reasonable (for public or private purposes)?
Question 2: Would the continued existence [of the restriction] impede the proposed user?
Question 3: Does impeding the proposed user not secure practical benefits to the persons entitled to the benefit of it?
Question 4: If the restriction does secure practical benefits to the persons entitled to enforce it, are those practical benefits ‘of substantial value or advantage to them’?
Question 5: Is impeding that user … (b) contrary to the public interest?
Question 6 (under subsection (1a): If the answer to question 4 is negative (ie the practical benefits to the objector are not of substantial value or advantage) or the answer to question 7 is affirmative (ie the restriction is impeding the proposed user contrary to the public interest), would money be an adequate compensation?
21. Section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925: paragraph (b)
1 ‘Persons of full age and capacity … entitled to the benefit of the restriction’
2 ‘Whether in respect of estates in fee simple or any lesser estates or interests’
3 ‘The property to which the benefit of the restriction is annexed’
4 ‘Have agreed, either expressly or by implication, by their acts or omissions, to the same being discharged or modified’
5 Can reliance be placed partly on paragraph (b) and partly on paragraph (aa) or (c)?
When should paragraph (b) be relied upon?
Paragraph (b) and the Tribunal’s discretion
22. Section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925: paragraph (c)
Overlap between paragraph (c) and other paragraphs
Main differences between paragraph (c) and paragraph (aa)
The constituent elements of paragraph (c)
23. The power of the Upper Tribunal to award compensation
The Tribunal’s power
The persons in whose favour compensation may be awarded
The statutory yardstick for assessing compensation
The two alternative heads of compensation
Orders where compensation is payable
24. Procedure on an application to the Upper Tribunal under section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925
Rules and practice directions
Overriding objective
Delivery and service of documents
Competent applicants under section 84(1)
The three primary documents involved in proceedings under section 84(1)
Admission of objectors
Representatives
Statements of case
Staying the proceedings for alternative dispute resolution
Determination of a preliminary issue
Case management
Procedural applications
Failure to comply with directions
Expert evidence
Evidence and submissions
Withdrawal and consent orders
Hearings
Decisions
Setting aside decisions
Appeals and reviews
Costs
Post-hearing action
Part II Positive covenants and negative covenants which are not restrictive covenants
25. Meaning of ‘positive covenants’ and of ‘negative covenants which are not restrictive covenants’ and frequency of use
Introduction
Meaning of ‘positive covenant’
Meaning of ‘negative covenants which are not restrictive covenants’
Common rules of transmissibility of all such covenants
Frequency of use
26. Persons able to claim the benefit of positive covenants: (I) Original covenantees
Introduction
The three categories of original covenantee
27. Persons able to claim the benefit of positive covenants: (II) Subsequent owners and occupiers of the benefited land
Introduction to the common law rules
Common law rules for the running of the benefit of a covenant
Modification of the common law rules by equity and statute
The contracts (Rights of Third Parties) act 1999
Transmission of benefit only
28. The burden of positive covenants
Introduction
Background to the rule laid down in Austerberry v Oldham Corpn
The decision in Austerberry v Oldham Corpn
The resulting rule of law and equity
Section 79 of the Law of Property Act 1925
Statement of the general rule which applies to the burden of a positive covenant
Land Registration
Statutory exceptions where the burden of a positive covenant runs with the land
Local Land Charges
29. Methods of securing the indirect running of the burden of a positive covenant
Introduction
(1) Right of re-entry
(2) Right of entry
(3) Use of the rentcharge
(4) Conditions attached to property rights
(5) Lease of easements containing covenants
(6) Fresh covenants on every change of ownership
(7) Long lease followed by enlargement
(8) Chain of indemnity covenants
(9) The exceptional case of fencing covenants as easements
30. Remedies for breach of positive covenants
Introduction
Specific performance
Damages in addition to or in substitution for specific performance
Injunction
Common law damages
Appointment of a receiver
31. Covenants and commonhold
Introduction
The advantages of commonhold
The nature of commonhold
Enforceability of obligations
Winding-up of the commonhold association
Frequency of commonhold
Part III Planning obligations relating to land
32. Planning obligations
The nature of planning obligations
History
Current section 106: planning obligations
What planning obligations can cover, differences from conditions imposed on the grant of planning permission, and the use and value of them
Requirements of section 106
Mandatory requirements of section 106(9)
Planning obligations requiring the transfer of land
Severability of terms
Entry by local authorities as landowners into section 106 planning obligations
Enforceability against any person ‘deriving title’ from the person entering into the planning obligation
Registration requirements
Interaction between section 106 planning obligations and the law of contract
Interaction between section 106 planning obligations and existing restrictive covenants
Enforcement of planning obligations
Modification and discharge of planning obligations
Interpretation of planning obligations
Local acts
Part IV Reform
33. Reform of the law relating to restrictive covenants: Law Commission proposals
Background to the latest proposals
The Law Commission’s latest Report
Appendices
Appendix 1 Section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925
Law of Property Act 1925 (c 20)
Appendix 2 Practice Statement
Composition of Tribunals in Relation to Matters that Fall to be Decided by the Lands Chamber of the Upper Tribunal
Appendix 3 Practice Statement
Lands chamber of the upper tribunal delegation of functions to staff on or after 29 november 2010
Appendix 4 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 4
Part 5
Part 6
Part 7
Part 8
Part 9
Part 10
Part 11
Part 12
Appendix 5 Practice Directions
Lands chamber of the upper tribunal
Appendix 6 Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) Forms T379–T382
Form T379 – application under section 84 of the law of property act 1925 to discharge or modify a restrictive covenant
Form T380 – form of publicity notice
Form T381 – notice of objection to a restrictive covenant application
Form T382 – certificate of compliance
Appendix 7 Sections 106–106C of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
The town and country planning act 1990 (c 8)
Part III Control over Development
Index
Scamell and Gasztowicz on Land Covenants
ii
Scamell and Gasztowicz on Land Covenants Second Edition
Steven Gasztowicz QC
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PREFACE
The first edition of this book was published 21 years ago. I used it at the Bar from the time it came out because it seemed to me to explain the law in relation to land covenants very well. This was largely because it set out not just the prevailing law, but also the principles behind the various aspects of it and the way they had developed. Lawyers will not often find a case on exactly the same facts as that before them, but if the principles behind a decided case are understood, so is it able to be understood how the law is likely to be applied in another case, and how, indeed, the law may be expected to develop. As a result of the approach taken, the book has continued to be referred to in recent judgments of the higher courts notwithstanding the length of time that has elapsed since the last edition. Everyone involved with this area of law owes a great debt of gratitude to Professor Scamell, not least myself. I have, however, been surprised at how many developments there have been during the past 21 years in an area of law that was developed in a great deal of detail in case law over the previous 148 years since Tulk v Moxhay in 1848. In this edition, I have aimed to maintain a principled approach, but have also sought to keep an eye on the practicalities which the courts also invariably want to take into account. I have done so in particular in considering what the answer in future cases to questions currently left unanswered might be decided to be. As well as general updating, I have also tried to make the text as understandable and modern in style for the present day as possible, and added coverage of new topics of relevance. I have endeavoured to state the law as at 1 August 2017, though I have included reference to cases decided after that time where possible. I feel I ought to end this preface by answering the question of why I (born here of an English mother, and being entirely British in outlook) have never changed, or at least anglicised, my name, to save myself and everyone else a great deal of trouble in terms of pronunciation and spelling. The answer is that if my father could survive a World War II labour camp in his early teens, escape to Switzerland, be given six months to live, and make his way to England, where he had to learn the language by ‘reading’ the newspapers, experiencing unspeakable horrors along the way, it has always seemed to me a relatively small burden by which to honour him, and my mother, who took on that name as well as all his problems. With apologies to any who have to attempt it, the pronunciation of my name which serves for me, though I know it is not the entirely correct Polish one, is ‘Gastovitch’. I hope the second edition achieves its aims. Steven Gasztowicz QC Cornerstone Barristers 2–3, Gray’s Inn Square London January 2018 v
vi
CONTENTS
Prefacev Table of Statutes xxi Table of Statutory Instruments xxxi Table of Cases xxxiii Introduction: Covenants generally The doctrine of privity Modifications of the doctrine of privity I: Benefit II: Burden Covenants relating to land
1 1 1 1 2 3
Part I Restrictive covenants
7
1. Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ (including general consideration of requirements for transmissibility) The quality of transmissibility The development of the rules relating to transmissibility 1 The extension of Spencer’s Case theory 2 The conscience theory 3 Analogy to negative easements theory The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1 The covenant must be negative in substance 2 The covenant must be restrictive of the user of land 3 The covenant must have been entered into for the benefit of land ‘belonging’ to the covenantee 4 The covenant must in fact benefit land in which the claimant has a sufficient interest at the time of enforcement of it 5 The words of covenant must be such as to show that the covenant was not intended to be personal to the original covenantee or to be confined to a category of persons to whom the claimant does not belong 6 The covenant must have been entered into by a competent covenantor having a sufficient interest in the burdened (subjected) land
9 9 10 10 11 11 12 13 16 19 41
43 45
2. The benefit of the restrictive covenant Categories of potential beneficiaries
51 51
3. 1: Original covenantees The identification of original covenantees 1 Parties to the instrument containing the covenant 2 Original covenantees by virtue of s 5 of the Real Property Act 1845 or s 56 of the Law of Property Act 1925 3 Persons who are owners of land comprised within a building scheme at the time when other land within the scheme is sold off and subjected to the scheme of covenants
53 53 53 54 57
vii
Contents
4.
5.
6.
7.
viii
Effect of the loss of the original covenantee’s rights of enforcement against successors in title of the burdened land and remedies of an original covenantee The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 Remedies under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 2: Covenant beneficiaries Origin of trusts of the benefit of restrictive covenants Relationship between trusts of covenants and building schemes Who, as between the trustee and the beneficiary, should be party to the action to enforce the covenants? 3: Subsequent owners and occupiers of land benefited by the restrictive covenant as competent claimants: overview General rule Statutory exception Subsequent owners and occupiers of benefited land: (a) where there is annexation The effect of annexation The requirements for annexation Pre-1926 restrictive covenants Pre-1926 position following the decision in the Federated Homes case Post-1925 restrictive covenants The land to which annexation takes place Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Negating pre-existing annexation Negating annexation effected under section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 Can annexation be effected after the creation of the covenant by the unilateral action of the person entitled to its benefit? On the footing that subsequent annexation can be effected, the means of achieving this Competent claimants: (b) express assignment Assignability of restrictive covenants Express assignability not negatived by qualified annexation The time for making an express assignment Assignment made at the time of the transfer Assignment made after the time of the transfer Formal requirements for an express assignment Common law and equitable assignments – Law of Property Act 1925, section 53(1)(a) Effect of section 62(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 or (pre 1926) section 6 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 Effect of section 63 of the Law of Property Act 1925 Implied assignment After the first assignment, is an unbroken chain of assignments connecting the first assignee with the claimant required?
58 58 59 61 61 61 63 65 65 66 67 67 68 69 76 76 84 85 86 87 100 101 102 103 104 107 111 111 112 113 113 113 119 119 122 124 126 126
Contents Assignment by operation of law Death of person entitled to the benefit Bankruptcy of person entitled to the benefit
127 127 128
8. Competent claimants: (c) building schemes 131 Introduction131 1 The evolution of building schemes 131 Phase 1 – Deeds of mutual covenant at the forefront 131 Phase 2 – Deeds of mutual covenant as the backcloth 132 Phase 3 – Underlying intention generally as the backcloth 134 Phase 4 – The Development of an equity 136 2 The legal effects of building schemes 139 3 The facts which must be proved to establish the existence of a building scheme 143 Two essential elements of a building scheme 145 The evidence by which the requisite facts may be proved 164 4 Factors which may negative the existence of a building scheme170 1 One or more purchasers from the estate vendor unaware of vendor’s intention to create a building scheme 170 2 Retention of land by the estate vendor 171 3 Power reserved to the estate vendor to release or vary the scheme covenants 171 4 The inclusion of a covenant by the vendor with each purchaser to enforce the covenants entered into by the other purchasers 174 5 The making by the former estate owner of an express assignment to one of the purchasers of the benefit of the covenants entered into by the other purchasers 174 5 Requirements for registration of building scheme obligations under the Land Charges Acts, 1925 and 1972 and, in the case of registered land, under the Land Registration Acts 1925–2002 175 1 Unregistered land 175 2 Registered land 181 9. The running of the burden of restrictive covenants The nature of the burden of a restrictive covenant The running of the burden of restrictive covenants where the title to the land is unregistered 1 Pre-1926 restrictive covenants 2 Post-1925 restrictive covenants: the Land Charges Act 1925 and its successor, the Land Charges Act 1972 The running of the burden of restrictive covenants where the title to the burdened land is registered 1 Registered proprietor with an absolute title 2 Registered proprietor with a possessory or qualified title 3 Leasehold estates Position of squatters who gain title to land Unregistered land Registered land Covenants in leases Unregistered land Registered land Local land charges
185 185 186 186 192 200 200 209 210 210 210 210 211 211 211 211 ix
Contents 10. Restrictive covenants and public law 213 Introduction213 I: Public bodies becoming covenantees pursuant to special statutory provisions Public bodies as competent claimants (A) Statutes allowing enforcement by deemed ownership of benefited land Planning matters Other fields Effects of such deeming provisions (B) Statutes allowing enforcement without introducing the mechanism of deeming provisions Local Acts The covenant must be imposed and operated within the scheme of the Act under which it is imposed Burden of public law covenants registrable as local land charges Failure to register covenants as local land charges 1 Restrictive covenants which remain equitable 2 Covenants which have legal status II: Public bodies acquiring land burdened by restrictive covenants Powers of compulsory acquisition Holding statutory powers to deal with land Effect on restrictive covenants of the compulsory acquisition of the burdened land (or its acquisition by agreement in circumstances where it could have been compulsorily acquired) 1 The continued existence of restrictive covenants 2 The extent of the permitted non-compliance Altering the statutory purposes for which land was acquired Extension of immunity of Local Authorities to private individuals and bodies Position of the original covenantor Position of licensees and lessees of the statutory body Housing and Planning Act 2016, sections 203 and 204 Compensation for injurious affection under section 68 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 or Section 10 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 in respect of non-compliance with restrictive covenants 1 The right to compensation – showing injurious affection 2 The subject matter and measure of compensation Effect on the covenant of the protected non-compliance III: Relationship between restrictive covenants and planning permission Various restrictions on the use of land
213 213 215 215 216 219 221 223 224 224 225 225 226 227 227 227 228 228 229 236 237 237 237 238
241 241 242 247 248 248
11. The construction of restrictive covenants 251 General principles 251 Is there a covenant? 251 Implied covenants 252 Estoppel253 General approach to construction 253 x
Contents The contra proferentem rule 258 Implied terms in covenants 258 Specific areas of construction 261 1 Content and certainty of terms 261 2 The persons potentially within the scope of the benefit and burden of a covenant 263 3 The liability of the original covenantor for the acts of subsequent owners and occupiers 268 4 Whether the present owner or occupier of the burdened land is liable in respect of the acts or omissions of an earlier owner or occupier 271 5 Whether references in the body of the covenant to the covenantee or the covenantor include references to other persons who are within the scope of the benefit and burden of the covenant 277 Construction of common phrases 292 The construction of words commonly found in restrictive covenants292 12. Restrictive covenants and competition law 345 General competition law 345 The Competition Act 1998 346 What is covered? 346 Exemptions348 Effects of breach of Chapter I of the Act 350 The Groceries Market Investigation (Controlled Land) Order 2010 351 To whom the Order relates 351 Release of specified existing restrictive covenants 351 Prohibition on entering into restrictive covenants 352 Prohibition on enforcement of ‘exclusivity arrangements’ 353 Prohibition on entering into ‘exclusivity arrangements’ 353 What constitutes a ‘restrictive covenant’ under the Order and what constitutes an ‘exclusivity arrangement’ 353 13. Remedies for breach of a restrictive covenant 355 Introduction355 Special remedies dependent upon terms agreed between the parties to the covenant 355 Right of entry 355 Right of re-entry 356 Arbitration357 General remedies 357 (1) A declaration that the claimant is entitled to enforce the covenant 357 Jurisdiction of the court to grant a declaration 357 Special statutory jurisdiction in relation to restrictive covenants359 Interim declarations 360 Declaration in addition to injunction 360 (2) A final injunction to restrain or to remedy a breach of the covenant362 I: Claimant with the right to enforce the covenant at law 363 II: Claimant claiming to enforce the covenant in equity 370 xi
Contents (3) An interim (‘interlocutory’) injunction in relation to a legal or equitable right 373 (1) General considerations relating to an interim prohibitory injunction 373 (2) The principles in relation to the grant of an interim injunction375 (3) Added caution in relation to interim mandatory injunctions378 Enforcement differences between a prohibitory and a mandatory injunction 379 (4) Damages in addition to or in lieu of (ie in substitution for) an injunction 380 The jurisdiction to award such damages 380 The court’s discretion 381 The measure of damages under Lord Cairns’ Act in the context of restrictive covenants 390 Defences to remedies generally or alternatively to the equitable remedy of an injunction (or potentially a declaration) 394 Limitation395 Laches (or ‘acquiescence’) 396 Estoppel406 General inequitable conduct 407 Changes in the character of the neighbourhood per se 410 Stay of proceedings under section 84(9) of the Law of Property Act 1925 412 Extent of the subsection 412 The position where section 84(9) does not apply 414 Grounds for granting leave and ordering a stay under section 84(9) 414 (5) Damages at common law 416 14. Freeing the title from unenforceable restrictive covenants 419 Introduction419 Insurance against enforcement 419 Proceedings for a declaration under section 84(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 420 The court’s powers 420 Scope of section 84(2) 421 Procedure422 The court’s discretion 428 Consequential relief where the covenant is registered or protected 428 Costs430 15. Extinguishment, discharge and modification of restrictive covenants433 The covenant ceasing to be enforceable at law or in equity 433 Clearing the title of unenforceable restrictive covenants 434 Express release 435 The person or persons having power to release 435 Form of release 436 Covenants registered as land charges under the Land Charges Act 1972 or protected on the charges register of a registered title 437 xii
Contents Extinguishment by operation of law 437 Extinguishment by unity of seisin 438 Other Interests 443 Extinguishment by intervening illegality 443 Extinguishment by intervening impossibility 444 Extinguishment by statute 444 Variation by order of the county court under section 610 of the Housing Act 1985 445 The power 445 Matters to be taken into account 445 Compensation446 Differences in use between the section and the Upper Tribunal’s general power in s 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 447 16. The modification and discharge of restrictive covenants and agreements by the Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) pursuant to section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 449 Introduction449 The provisions of section 84(1)–(1C) 450 Contracting out not possible 451 Who may apply 451 Who may oppose 453 What restrictions fall within the scope of the upper Tribunal’s jurisdiction?453 ‘Freehold land’ 453 Restrictions affecting leasehold land 454 Restrictions affecting incorporeal hereditaments 457 ‘Affected’459 ‘Any restriction arising under covenant or otherwise … as to … user … or building’ 462 Identification of the restriction 471 The Upper Tribunal’s powers 472 The Upper Tribunal’s powers are additional to any concurrent powers exercisable by the courts 472 The discretionary nature of the Upper Tribunal’s power 474 The exercise of the discretion 475 The further or ancillary discretion 510 17. The scope of the Upper Tribunal’s powers under section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 The Upper Tribunal’s powers (i) ‘Wholly … to discharge … any such restriction’ (ii) ‘Partially to discharge … any such restriction’ (iii) ‘Wholly … to … modify … any such restriction’ (iv) ‘Partially to … modify any such restriction’
517 517 517 518 521 521
18. The four alternative grounds giving rise to the Upper Tribunal’s powers529 The grounds 529 Related matters 530 19. The grounds giving rise to the Upper Tribunal’s powers: paragraph (a) Paragraph (a)
531 531 xiii
Contents ‘By reason of changes in the character of the property’ 531 ‘By reason of changes in the character of … the neighbourhood’ 533 Meaning of ‘neighbourhood’ 534 Meaning of ‘obsolete’ 539 ‘By reason of … other circumstances of the case which the upper tribunal may deem material’ 548 The scope of ‘other circumstances’ 548 ‘Other circumstances’ deemed by the Tribunal to have been material549 ‘Other circumstances’ which appear not to be material 554 20. Section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925: paragraph (aa) 559 Introduction559 Question 1: Is the proposed user reasonable (for public or private purposes)?561 Reasonable user 561 ‘For public or private purposes’ 563 Question 2: Would the continued existence [of the restriction] impede the proposed user? 563 Question 3: Does impeding the proposed user not secure practical benefits to the persons entitled to the benefit of it? 564 (1) Who (for the purposes of the provision) are the ‘persons entitled to the benefit of the restriction? 565 (2) In impeding the proposed user, does the restriction not secure ‘practical benefits’ to those persons? 566 Question 4: If the restriction does secure practical benefits to the persons entitled to enforce it, are those practical benefits ‘of substantial value or advantage to them’? 581 ‘Substantial value’ 581 ‘Substantial advantage’ 584 Temporary effects 585 Question 5: Is impeding that user … (b) contrary to the public interest?587 Question 6 (under subsection (1A): If the answer to question 4 is negative (ie the practical benefits to the objector are not of substantial value or advantage) or the answer to question 7 is affirmative (ie the restriction is impeding the proposed user contrary to the public interest), would money be an adequate compensation?596 (1) Whether the amount of money which the Tribunal has power to award as compensation will be adequate compensation596 (2) The question of whether money per se would not be an adequate substitute for the loss or disadvantage which would be suffered from the discharge or modification 606 21. Section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925: paragraph (b) 1 ‘Persons of full age and capacity … entitled to the benefit of the restriction’ 2 ‘Whether in respect of estates in fee simple or any lesser estates or interests’ 3 ‘The property to which the benefit of the restriction is annexed’ xiv
609 609 610 610
Contents 4 ‘Have agreed, either expressly or by implication, by their acts or omissions, to the same being discharged or modified’ ‘[H]ave agreed … by implication’ 5 Can reliance be placed partly on paragraph (b) and partly on paragraph (aa) or (c)? When should paragraph (b) be relied upon? Paragraph (b) and the Tribunal’s discretion
611 612 614 615 616
22. Section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925: paragraph (c) Overlap between paragraph (c) and other paragraphs Main differences between paragraph (c) and paragraph (aa) The constituent elements of paragraph (c) ‘The proposed discharge or modification’ ‘Will not injure’
617 617 618 619 619 620
23. The power of the Upper Tribunal to award compensation The Tribunal’s power The persons in whose favour compensation may be awarded The statutory yardstick for assessing compensation The two alternative heads of compensation Head (i): a ‘sum … to make up for any loss or disadvantage suffered by that person in consequence of the discharge or modification’ Head (ii): ‘such sum by way of consideration as the Tribunal may think it just to award … to make up for any effect which the restriction had, at the time when it was imposed, in reducing the consideration then received for the land affected by it’ Orders where compensation is payable
629 629 629 630 631 632
646 650
24. Procedure on an application to the Upper Tribunal under section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 651 Rules and practice directions 651 Overriding objective 651 Delivery and service of documents 652 Competent applicants under section 84(1) 653 The three primary documents involved in proceedings under section 84(1) 653 (i) The application and the documents required to accompany it 654 (ii) Notices giving notice of the application to persons appearing to be entitled to the benefit of the restriction 655 (iii) Objection to an application 656 Position if there is no response to the notices 658 Admission of objectors 660 Representatives663 Statements of case 663 Staying the proceedings for alternative dispute resolution 664 Determination of a preliminary issue 664 Case management 666 The standard procedure 666 The simplified procedure 666 The special procedure 667
xv
Contents Written representation procedure 667 Case management powers 668 Procedural applications 669 Failure to comply with directions 670 I: All parties 670 II: Applicant 670 III: Objector 671 Expert evidence 672 Duties of an expert 672 Form and content of expert reports 673 Computer-based valuations 673 Questions to other party’s expert 674 Discussions between experts 674 Reliance on expert evidence of one party by another party 674 Single joint expert 674 Evidence and submissions 676 Withdrawal and consent orders 677 Hearings677 Constitution of the Tribunal 677 Place of hearing 678 Public hearing 678 Adjournments678 Failure to attend 678 Procedure679 Decisions680 Setting aside decisions 681 Appeals and reviews 682 Right of appeal 682 Permission to appeal required 684 Reviews685 Decision on review/application for permission to appeal 686 Supreme Court 686 Costs687 Powers of the Tribunal 687 Exercise of the Tribunal’s discretion as to costs 687 Post-hearing action 693 Unregistered land 693 Registered land 693 Part II Positive covenants and negative covenants which are not restrictive covenants
695
25. Meaning of ‘positive covenants’ and of ‘negative covenants which are not restrictive covenants’ and frequency of use 697 Introduction697 Meaning of ‘positive covenant’ 697 Meaning of ‘negative covenants which are not restrictive covenants’698 Common rules of transmissibility of all such covenants 699 Frequency of use 700 26. Persons able to claim the benefit of positive covenants: (I) Original covenantees 701 Introduction701 xvi
Contents The three categories of original covenantee 1 Original covenantee by being named as a party 2 Original covenantee by virtue of section 5 of the Real Property Act 1845 or section 56(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 3 Original covenantee under a building scheme 27. Persons able to claim the benefit of positive covenants: (II) Subsequent owners and occupiers of the benefited land Introduction to the common law rules Common law rules for the running of the benefit of a covenant Rule 1: Performance of the covenant must have a distinct connection with (ie ‘touch and concern’) the land Rule 2: The covenant must relate to clearly identifiable land Rule 3: The covenant must have been entered into with the owner of the legal estate in the land which is to be benefited Rule 4: The person seeking to enforce the covenant must have a legal estate in the land (and pre-1926, must have the same legal estate as the original covenantee) Rule 5: The covenant must show an intention that its benefit shall run with the land The effect of all five rules being satisfied Modification of the common law rules by equity and statute Greater stringency of equity in one respect The contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 Transmission of benefit only Special cases
701 701 702 703 705 705 706 706 708 709 710 712 713 714 717 717 718 718
28. The burden of positive covenants 719 Introduction719 Background to the rule laid down in Austerberry v Oldham Corpn 720 The decision in Austerberry v Oldham Corpn 721 The resulting rule of law and equity 722 Section 79 of the Law of Property Act 1925 722 Statement of the general rule which applies to the burden of a positive covenant 723 Land Registration 723 Statutory exceptions where the burden of a positive covenant runs with the land 724 1 Section 35 of the Highways Act 1980 – ‘walkway’ agreements724 2 Section 33 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 724 3 Section 39 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 – management agreements 725 4 Section 75 of the Mission and Pastoral Measure 2011 725 5 Sections 155 and 156 of the Housing Act 1985 (as amended) 726 6 Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 727 7 Section 19 of the Leasehold Reform Act 1967 727 8 Local and private Acts 728 Local Land Charges 728 xvii
Contents 29. Methods of securing the indirect running of the burden of a positive covenant 731 Introduction731 (1) Right of re-entry 732 Right of re-entry at common law 732 Effect of the 1925 property legislation on right of re-entry and the land affected: legal and equitable rights of re-entry 733 Enforceability of a right of re-entry against successors etc 735 Procedure when an event occurs giving rise to the exercise of the right of re-entry 736 Exercising the right of re-entry 737 The effect of re-entry 738 Relief from forfeiture I 739 Relief from forfeiture II 741 Relief from forfeiture III 743 Third party may now take a right of re-entry 745 Application of the perpetuity rule 745 Application of the Limitation Act 1980 to rights of re-entry and rentcharges 747 Practical use of the right of re-entry in connection with positive covenants 749 Monetary obligations – capital sum – right of re-entry or charge? 752 (2) Right of entry 754 Nature of a right of entry 754 Rights of entry and the perpetuity rule 755 The running of the burden of a right of entry 755 The running of the benefit of a right of entry 756 Practical use of the right of entry 757 (3) Use of the rentcharge 757 Estate rentcharges not subject to statutory extinguishment or redemption 758 (4) Conditions attached to property rights 759 The principle stated 759 Examples759 The operation and limits of the principle 759 The running of the burden of a condition 763 The running of the benefit of a condition 765 (5) Lease of easements containing covenants 765 Elements of the scheme 765 Operation of the scheme 766 (6) Fresh covenants on every change of ownership 766 (1) Unregistered land 767 (2) Registered land 768 (7) Long lease followed by enlargement 769 The rule in Spencer’s case 769 Section 153 of the Law of Property Act 1925 769 Effect of section 153(8) on the former lease covenants 770 The practical application of enlargement 771 Land registration 772 (8) Chain of indemnity covenants 772 xviii
Contents (9) The exceptional case of fencing covenants as easements Covenants exhibiting the characteristics of easements The ‘easement’ of fencing Scope of the easement of fencing The words of grant of an easement of fencing
774 774 774 776 776
30. Remedies for breach of positive covenants 779 Introduction779 Specific performance 779 Jurisdiction779 Cases of urgency 782 Enforcement of the order 783 Damages in addition to or in substitution for specific performance 783 The statutory jurisdiction 783 Damages in addition to specific performance 784 Damages in substitution for specific performance 784 The measure of damages under the Act 785 Injunction787 Injunction as an ancillary remedy 787 Mandatory injunction as a primary remedy 787 Common law damages 788 The breach complained of 789 The measure of damages 789 The date for ascertaining the loss 790 Method of assessing the loss 790 Appointment of a receiver 792 The jurisdiction 792 31. Covenants and commonhold 793 Introduction793 The advantages of commonhold 793 The nature of commonhold 793 Enforceability of obligations 794 Winding-up of the commonhold association 795 Voluntary winding up 795 Winding up by the court 796 Frequency of commonhold 796 Part III Planning obligations relating to land
797
32. Planning obligations 799 The nature of planning obligations 799 History800 Previous planning agreements 801 Current section 106: planning obligations 801 What planning obligations can cover, differences from conditions imposed on the grant of planning permission, and the use and value of them 803 Planning conditions 803 Planning obligations 805 Use and value of planning obligations 806 Requirements of section 106 808 ‘A person interested in the land’ 808 ‘Restricting the development or use of the land in any specified way’ 809 xix
Contents Mandatory requirements of section 106(9) 811 Planning obligations requiring the transfer of land 811 Severability of terms 814 Entry by local authorities as landowners into section 106 planning obligations 815 Enforceability against any person ‘deriving title’ from the person entering into the planning obligation 816 Registration requirements 818 Interaction between section 106 planning obligations and the law of contract 818 Interaction between section 106 planning obligations and existing restrictive covenants 819 Enforcement of planning obligations 819 I: By the identified local planning authority only 819 II: Remedies available to the local planning authority under section 106 819 Modification and discharge of planning obligations 820 Powers of local planning authority on an application to modify or discharge 821 Making an application for discharge or modification 822 Time for determination of the application by the relevant planning authority 823 Appeals823 Interpretation of planning obligations 824 Local Acts824 Part IV Reform
827
33. Reform of the law relating to restrictive covenants: Law Commission proposals Background to the latest proposals The 1960s The 1970s The 1980s The 2000s The Law Commission’s latest Report Problems intended to be tackled The Law Commission’s conclusions Prospects for reform
829 829 829 829 830 830 831 831 832 844
Appendices845 Appendix 1 Section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925
847
Appendix 2 Practice Statement
853
Appendix 3 Practice Statement
855
Appendix 4 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010
857
Appendix 5 Practice Directions
887
Appendix 6 Upper Tribunal (Lands Chamber) Forms T379–T382
901
Appendix 7 Sections 106–106C of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990
919
Index
931
xx
Table of Statutes
Acquisition of Land Act 1981ss s 7���������������������������������������������������� 10.72 Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 1919����� 16.1, 16.120 Administration of Estates Act 1925������������������������������������� 1.51; 33.11 s 39(1)��������������������������������������������� 15.11 s 39(1)(ii), (iii)�������������������������������� 1.63 Agricultural Holdings Act 1948 s 24(1)��������������������������������������������� 16.4 Agriculture Act 1947��������������������������� 11.120 Air Force (Constitution) Act 1917������ 10.58 Air Navigation Act 1920��������������������� 16.47 Allotments Act 1950 s 12����������������������������������������� 15.30; 19.69 Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Areas Act 1979 s 17(7)(a)����������������������������������������� 16.47 Arbitration Act 1996 s 9���������������������������������������������������� 13.7 Artisans’ and Labourers’ Dwellings Improvement Act 1875 s 9���������������������������������������������������� 10.6 Bankruptcy Act 1914 s 38, 53�������������������������������������������� 7.45 Celluloid and Cinematograph Film Act 1922 s 8��������������������������������������������� 16.1, 16.52 Chancery Amendment Act 1858���������������������������������� 13.31, 13.52, 13.74, 13.75, 13.78, 13.79, 13.86, 13.87,13.100, 13.101, 13.102; 30.15 s 2�������������������� 13.74, 13.76, 13.77, 13.83, 13.101; 30.14, 30.23 Civil Aviation Act 1949 s 19, 23�������������������������������������������� 16.47 Civil Aviation Act 1982 s 30, 41�������������������������������������������� 16.47 Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002����������������������� 31.1, 31.3, 31.5, 31.19; 33.6, 33.7 s 3���������������������������������������������������� 31.18 s 3(2)(e), (f)������������������������������������� 31.18 s 16(1)��������������������������������������������� 31.8 s 16(2)��������������������������������������������� 31.9 s 16(3)(a), (b)���������������������������������� 31.9 s 31�������������������������������������������������� 31.7 s 45(2)��������������������������������������������� 31.15 s 47(1)��������������������������������������������� 31.14 s 47(2)��������������������������������������������� 31.13 s 51�������������������������������������������������� 31.17
Common Law Procedure Act 1852 s 210������������������������������������������������ 29.25 Communications Act 2003 s 106(3)(a)��������������������������������������� 10.73 Companies Act 1985 s 35�������������������������������������������������� 1.64 s 35(4)��������������������������������������������� 1.64 Companies Act 1989 s 108(1)������������������������������������������� 1.64 Companies Act 2006 s 39(1)��������������������������������������������� 1.64 s 42�������������������������������������������������� 1.64 Competition Act 1998������������������ 12.4, 12.17 Pt I Ch I (ss 1–24)��������������������� 12.4, 12.5, 12.6, 12.14 s 2(4)����������������������������������������������� 12.5 s 9(1)���������������������������������������� 12.6, 12.10 s 49�������������������������������������������������� 12.15 Sch 3 para 1��������������������������������������������� 12.4 Compulsory Purchase Act 1965���������������������������������� 10.32, 10.35, 10.36, 10.76, 10.78 s 7���������������������������������������������������� 10.74 s 10������������������ 10.42, 10.44, 10.47, 10.48, 10.63, 10.74, 10.75, 10.77, 10.82 s 10(1)��������������������������������������������� 10.38 s 10(2)������������������������������������ 10.38, 10.39 s 39(4)��������������������������������������������� 10.36 Sch 8 Pt III�������������������������������������������� 10.36 Constitutional Reform Act 2005��������� 24.118 Consumer Rights Act 2015������������������� 12.26 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999���������� Int; 3.1, 3.9, 3.12; 27.39 s 1���������������������������������������������������� 5.3 s 1(3)����������������������������������� 3.10, 3.11; 5.3 s 1(5)����������������������������������������������� 32.51 s 2���������������������������������������������������� 32.50 Conveyancing Act 1881��������������� 9.16; 11.46 s 3(1)����������������������������������������������� 9.22 s 6����������������������������������������������� 7.29, 7.33 s 6(1)����������������������������������������������� 7.31 s 10,11��������������������������������������������� Int s 14(8)��������������������������������������������� 29.15 s 44�������������������������������������������������� 1.51 s 51�������������������������������������������������� 11.38 s 58�������������������������� 1.57; 6.24, 6.25, 6.26; 8.118; 11.41, 11.46 s 58(1)������������������������������� 7.2, 7.44; 11.42 s 58(2)��������������������������������������������� 7.44 s 65�������������������������������������������������� 29.101
xxi
Table of Statutes Conveyancing Act 1882���������������������� 9.16 s 3���������������������������������������������������� 9.16 s 3(1)����������������������������������������������� 9.22 Conveyancing Act 1911 s 11�������������������������������������������������� 8.118 Conveyancing and Feudal Reform (Scotland) Act 1970 s 1��������������������������������������������� 22.4; 23.39 s 1(3)(a)������������������������������������������� 19.2 s 1(4)(ii)��������������������������������� 23.52, 23.53 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988�������������������������������������� 13.130 Countryside Act 1968 s 15(4)��������������������������������������������� 16.47 County Courts Act 1984 s 15�������������������������������������������������� 30.3 s 21, 22�������������������������������������������� 14.17 s 23(d)�������������������������������������� 30.3, 30.14 s 38�������������������������������������������������� 30.14 Courts and Legal Services Act 1990�������������������������������������� 14.17 Criminal Law Act 1977 s 6(1)����������������������������������������������� 29.18 Defence Act 1842����������������������� 10.57, 10.58 Fair Trading Act 1973������������������������� Int Forestry Act 1967 s 5���������������������������������������������������� 10.13 s 5(1)�������������������������������������� 10.11; 16.47 s 5(2)(b)���������������������������������� 10.13; 16.47 Grantees of Reversions Act 1540�������� 29.98 Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1974��������������� 10.20; 28.27 s 16���������������������������������������� 10.20; 28.27; 32.37, 32.92 Green Belt (London and Home Counties) Act 1938��������������������� 10.95 s 22����������������������������������������� 10.21; 28.28 s 22(2)��������������������������������������������� 16.47 Highways Act 1959����������������������������� 10.86 Highways Act 1980 s 35����������������������������������������� 10.17; 28.16 s 35(4)������������������������������������ 10.30; 28.16 s 261(1)(a)��������������������������������������� 10.86 s 263(2)������������������������������������������� 32.58 Housing Act 1925������������������������������� 16.34 s 102������������������������������������������������ 16.52 Housing Act 1936 s 163��������������������������������������� 15.32, 15.33 Housing Act 1949 s 11����������������������������������������� 15.32, 15.33 Housing Act 1957 s 165������������������������������������������������ 15.32 Housing Act 1974 s 126������������������������������ 10.16; 28.17; 32.6 Housing Act 1980������������������������������� 20.95 Housing Act 1985���������������������� 10.22; 19.20 Pt V (ss 118–188)���������������������������� 28.21 s 155��������������������������������������� 10.11; 28.21 s 156������������������������������������������������ 28.21 s 156(1)���������������������������������� 10.30; 28.21 s 156(2), (2A), (2B), (3)������������������ 28.21 s 157������������������������������������������������ 16.38 s 159������������������������������������������������ 16.39 s 609������������������������������ 10.7, 10.11, 10.13
xxii
Housing Act 1985 – contd s 610������������������ 15.1, 15.31, 15.32, 15.36, 15.37, 15.38, 15.39, 15.40; 16.1, 16.12, 16.52, 16.54 s 610(1)(a)�������� 15.32, 15.37, 15.40; 16.54 s 610(1)(b)������������������������������ 15.32, 15.34 Housing and Planning Act 2016 s 203��������������������������� 10.55, 10.56, 10.68, 10.71, 10.72, 10.73, 10.74, 10.82, 10.87 s 204��������������������������� 10.55, 10.56, 10.68, 10.72, 10.74, 10.82 s 205��������������������������������������� 10.72, 10.73 Sch 19 para 9������������������������������������������� 10.72 Housing, Town Planning etc Act 1919 s 27�������������������������������� 15.32; 16.1, 16.54 Insolvency Act 1986 s 122, 124���������������������������������������� 31.16 s 283(3)(a)��������������������������������������� 7.46 s 291A(1)���������������������������������������� 7.45 s 293������������������������������������������������ 7.45 s 306������������������������������������������������ 7.45 s 306(1)������������������������������������������� 7.45 s 383(1)������������������������������������������� 7.45 Interpretation Act 1978 s 7���������������������������������������������������� 24.4 s 17(2)(a)����������������������������������������� 9.35 Judgments Act 1839 s 7���������������������������������������������������� 11.69 Land Charges Act 1900 s 2���������������������������������������������������� 11.69 Land Charges Act 1925���������� 1.18; 8.1, 8.22, 8.104, 8.106, 8.112; 9.3, 9.4, 9.13, 9.17, 9.25, 9.35, 9.63; 10.20; 14.1; 15.5; 28.25, 28.27; 29.12, 29.48 s 2���������������������������������������������������� 11.69 s 2(5)���������������������������������������� 1.18; 8.108 s 6���������������������������������������������������� 11.69 s 10(1)�������������������� 1.18; 6.38; 9.26; 10.27 s 10(1) Class C ������������������������������� 25.6 s 10(1) Class D(ii)����������������� 8.108, 8.115, 8.115, 8.116; 27.10 s 10(1) Class D(iii)����������������� 8.116, 8.117 s 10(1A)������������������������������������������ 10.27 s 11(1)��������������������������������������������� 10.27 s 13(2)��������������������������������������������� 15.5 s 15(1)��������������������������������������������� 10.27 s 17(3)��������������������������������������������� 9.32 s 50�������������������������������������������������� 27.10 Land Charges Act 1972������������������� Int; 1.18; 8.1, 8.22, 8.104, 8.106, 8.112, 8.115; 9.3, 9.4, 9.13, 9.25, 9.26, 9.35, 9.38, 9.39, 9.40, 9.43, 9.47, 9.61, 9.71; 10.24; 13.6; 14.1, 14.7, 14.15, 14.31; 15.5, 15.6, 15.8, 15.14, 15.15; 24.146; 28.2; 29.12, 29.65; 32.2; 33.11 s 1(6)���������������� 9.39; 14.15, 14.31; 24.146 s 2������������������������������������������� 29.12, 29.64 s 2(4)����������������������������������������������� 25.6 s 2(4)(iii)(c)������������������������������������� 29.65 s 2(5)������������������� 1.18; 6.38; 8.113, 8.116, 8.117; 9.26, 9.73; 10.25; 27.10
Table of Statutes Land Charges Act 1972 – contd s 2(5)(ii)������������������������������������������ 16.36 s 3(1)����������������������������������������������� 9.38 s 3(5)����������������������������� 6.38; 8.113; 27.10 s 4(5)����������������������������� 8.113, 8.117; 9.30 s 4(6)����������������������� 9.25, 9.30, 9.35, 9.36, 9.38, 9.58; 15.5 s 5���������������������������������������������������� 11.69 s 5(7)����������������������������������������������� 11.69 s 6���������������������������������������������������� 11.69 s 6(4)����������������������������������������������� 11.69 s 9���������������������������������������������������� 9.38 s 10��������������������������������������������� 9.31, 9.38 s 10(4)������������������������������� 9.25, 9.31, 9.32 s 10(5)��������������������������������������������� 9.32 s 11������������������������������������������� 8.115; 9.38 s 13(2)��������������������������������������������� 9.25 s 14(1)��������������������������������������������� 9.40 s 17(1)��������������������������������������������� 9.36 s 17(3)��������������������������������������������� 9.25 Land Charges Registration and Searches Act 1888 s 5���������������������������������������������������� 11.69 Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 s 3�������������������������������� 16.12, 16.52, 16.54 s 24�������������������������������������������������� 1.51 Landlord and Tenant Act 1954������������ 16.5 Pt II (ss 23–46)�������������������������������� 12.14 Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 s 19�������������������������������������������������� 33.11 Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995������������������������������������ Int; 25.9 s 3(5)������������������������������������������ 9.71, 9.72 Land Powers (Defence) Act 1958 s 13(c)���������������������������������������������� 16.47 Land Registration Act 1925���������� 1.18, 1.51; 7.35; 8.1, 8.22, 8.104, 8.124; 9.3, 9.27, 9.40, 9.46, 9.56, 9.57, 9.60, 9.62, 9.63, 9.65 s 5���������������������������������������������������� 7.35 s 19(2)��������������������������������������������� 9.64 s 19(3)��������������������������������������������� 7.35 s 20�������������������������������������������������� 7.35 s 20(1)��������������������������������������������� 9.64 s 23�������������������������������������������������� 7.35 s 30����������������������������������������� 29.57, 29.58 s 40(1)��������������������������������������������� 16.36 s 40(2)��������������������������������������������� 15.9 s 49(1)��������������������������������������������� 11.69 s 50(1)�������������������� 1.18; 6.38; 9.40; 16.36 s 50(2)������������������������������� 9.47, 9.48, 9.64 s 52��������������������������������������������� 9.47, 9.48 s 82������������������������������������ 9.56, 9.63, 9.64 s 84(1)��������������������������������������������� 1.18 s 112������������������������������������������������ 9.48 Land Registration Act 1988������������ 8.1, 8.22, 8.104; 9.3, 9.40 s 1���������������������������������������������������� 9.48 Land Registration Act 2002������ 1.18, 1.51; 8.22, 8.104; 9.3, 9.40, 9.41, 9.45, 9.53, 9.62, 9.63, 9.65; 14.7, 14.15, 14.31; 15.6; 29.106; 32.2 s 3����������������������������������������� 9.60; 33.11 s 3(3)��������������������������������������������� 29.97
Land Registration Act 2002 – contd s 4(1)����������������������������������������������� 9.60 s 4(1)(c)������������������������������������������� 9.60 s 9(2)����������������������������������������������� 9.41 s 9(3), (4)����������������������������������������� 9.67 s 9(5)����������������������������������������������� 9.66 s 10(2)��������������������������������������������� 9.41 s 10(3)��������������������������������������������� 9.60 s 10(4)��������������������������������������������� 9.67 s 10(6)��������������������������������������������� 9.66 s 11���������� 6.38; 7.35; 8.123; 9.41, 9.42, 9.68 s 11(4)������������������������������� 9.42, 9.53, 9.55 s 11(4)(a)����������������������������������������� 9.66 s 11(6)��������������������������������������������� 9.67 s 11(7)��������������������������������������������� 9.66 s 12���������������� 7.35; 8.123; 9.26, 9.42, 9.68 s 12(7)��������������������������������������������� 9.67 s 12(8)��������������������������������������������� 9.66 s 15������������������������������������������������ 29.13 s 20������������������������������������������������ 8.121 s 23������������������������������������������������ 8.121 s 23(1)��������������������������������������������� 9.56 s 27������������������������������������������������ 33.11 s 27(2)(e)��������������������������������������� 29.64 s 29�������������������� 8.121, 8.124, 8.125; 9.41, 9.44, 9.46, 9.56, 9.57, 9.60, 9.70; 11.69; 29.14, 29.64 s 29(2)(b)����������������������������������������� 9.72 s 29(4)��������������������������������������������� 9.60 s 30������������������������������������������� 9.46; 11.69 s 32���������������������������������� 1.18; 9.47; 11.69 s 32(3)���������������������������������������� 9.46, 9.56 s 33(c)�������������������������������� 9.26, 9.44, 9.72 s 34(3)��������������������������������������������� 9.49 s 40�������������������������������������������������� 29.96 s 43(1)(a), (b)���������������������������������� 29.96 s 49����������������������������������������� 29.57, 29.58 s 50(1)��������������������������������������������� 9.45 s 58�������������������������������������������������� 33.11 s 58(1)������������������������������������ 29.97; 33.11 s 58(2)��������������������������������������������� 29.97 s 59(2)��������������������������������������������� 28.21 s 65�������������������������������� 9.56; 14.15, 14.31 s 66�������������������������������������������������� 9.48 s 70(1)(a)����������������������������������������� 8.122 s 77(1)(b)����������������������������������������� 9.45 s 77(2)��������������������������������������������� 9.45 s 93�������������������������������������������������� 29.96 s 96, 97�������������������������������������������� 1.51 s 116������������������������������������������������ 13.155 s 123, 124���������������������������������������� 9.43 Sch 1������������������������������������������������ 9.43 para 6������������������������� 9.73; 10.25, 10.29 Sch 3����������������������������������������� 8.122; 9.45 para 2������������������������������������������� 8.122 para 6������������������������� 9.73; 10.25, 10.29 Sch 4����������������������� 9.53, 9.56, 9.65; 33.11 para 1������������������������������������������� 9.53 para 2������������������������������������������� 9.65 para 2(1)(b)������������������������ 14.15, 14.31 para 2(2)����������������������������� 14.15, 14.31 para 3�������������������������������������� 9.53, 9.65 para 5������������������������������������������� 15.7 para 6������������������������������������������� 9.53
xxiii
Table of Statutes Land Registration Act 2002 – contd Sch 6������������������������������������������������ 1.51 Sch 8����������������������������������������� 9.65; 33.11 Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845����������������� 10.31, 10.32, 10.35, 10.62, 10.76, 10.78, 10.86 s 68������������������ 10.36, 10.37, 10.38, 10.42, 10.43, 10.44, 10.45, 10.47, 10.52, 10.62, 10.75, 10.856; 11.143 s 127–130���������������������������������������� 10.61 Lands Tribunal Act 1949��������������������� 16.1 Land Transfer Act 1897����������������� 7.43, 7.44 Law of Property Act 1925��������������� 1.18; 9.4; 16.11, 16.19, 16.71 Pt I (ss 1–39)����������������������������������� 9.36 s 1(1)����������������������������������������������� 1.51 s 1(1)(a)������������������������������������������� 16.10 s 1(1)(i)�������������������������������������������� 20.86 s 1(2)����������������������������������������������� 1.51 s 1(2)(b)������������������������������������������� 29.7 s 1(2)(e)���������������������������� 13.6; 29.3, 29.5, 29.38, 29.50, 29.60, 29.64, 29.66, 29.69 s 1(3)�������������������� 1.51; 16.10; 29.5, 29.60 s 1(4)����������������������������������������������� 9.14 s 1(4)(ii)������������������������������������������ 9.16 s 1(6)����������������������������������������������� 21.1 s 2(3)(ii)������������������������������������������ 1.18 s 2(5)(a)���������������������������������������� 1.18; 9.5 s 3(3)����������������������������������������������� 29.21 s 4(1)������������������������������� 9.25; 13.6; 16.10 s 4(1) proviso���������������������������������� 9.2 s 4(3)����������������� 29.3, 29.35, 29.36, 29.37, 29.38, 29.53, 29.63 s 5(1)��������������������������������������������� 16.10 s 7������������������������������������������������� 6.1; 29.6 s 7(1)����������������������������������������������� 29.6 s 9���������������������������������������������������� 29.21 s 19�������������������������������������������������� 21.1 s 28(1)�������������������� 1.51, 1.63; 15.11; 21.2 s 30������������������������������������������������ 14.18 s 30(1)��������������������������������������������� 16.5 s 44(1)��������������������������������������������� 9.33 s 44(2)���������������������������������������� 9.22, 9.48 s 44(3), (4)��������������������������������������� 9.22 s 44(5)������������������������������ 9.22, 9.23, 9.28, 9.29, 9.30, 9.48 s 45(1) proviso (ii)�������������������������� 8.85 s 52�������������������������������������������������� 33.11 s 52(1)��������������������������������������������� 29.51 s 53(1)��������������������������������������������� 7.41 s 53(1)(a)�������������������������� 7.19, 7.20, 7.25, 7.41; 15.13 s 53(1)(c)����������������������������������������� 29.66 s 53(2)���������������������������������������� 7.19, 7.41 s 56���������������������������������������� Int; 3.4, 3.10, 3.11; 8.22, 8.49 s 56(1)������������������������� 3.1, 3.4, 3.10; 8.22; 26.4; 29.3, 29.35 s 60(1)������������������������������������ 11.38; 16.10 s 60(2)��������������������������������������������� 11.38 s 61(c)�������������������������������������������� 11.203 s 62������������������� 1.8; 7.30, 7.31, 7.32, 7.33, 7.36, 7.37, 7.39; 33.11
xxiv
Law of Property Act 1925 – contd s 62(1)������������������������������ 6.72; 7.29, 7.31, 7.35; 29.114 s 63�������������������������� 7.33, 7.34, 7.36, 7.37, 7.38, 7.39, 7.40 s 64(3)��������������������������������������������� 27.41 s 76(6)��������������������������������������������� 7.44 s 77����������������������������������������������� 1.24, 6.5 s 77(5)��������������������������������������������� 27.41 s 78���������������������������� 1.58; 6.2, 6.26, 6.27, 6.37, 6.42, 6.43, 6.44, 6.81, 6.105; 11.49, 11.91, 11.107; 27.19, 27.22, 27.23, 27.37; 28.11 s 78(1)��������������������������������������� 1.18, 1.44, 1.47, 1.51, 1.60; 6.27, 6.28, 6.32, 6.33, 6.41, 6.42, 6.44, 6.45, 6.46, 6.58 6.61, 6.64, 6.65, 6.66, 6.68, 6.73, 6.74, 6.78, 6.90, 6.93, 6.97; 7.2, 7.5; 11.43, 11.50, 11.90; 13.21, 13.30; 14.1; 15.4, 15.20; 26.7; 27.29, 27.32, 27.34, 27.38; 28.9; 29.50 s 78(2)��������������������������������������������� 6.24 s 79������������������������������������������������� 6.42, 6.44, 6.79; 10.11; 11.48, 11.51, 11.52, 11.59, 11.107; 28.9, 28.11, 28.12 s 79(1)����������������� 1.18; 28.9, 28.10, 28.11, 28.12; 29.98 s 79(2), (3)������������������������������������� 28.10 s 80�������������������������������������������������� 6.84 s 80(2)����������������������������� Int; 9.6; 27.14 s 80(3)�������������������� Int; 1.59; 9.6; 27.14 s 80(4)����������� Int; 1.59; 6.84; 9.6; 27.14 s 82�������������������������������������������������� 8.17 s 82(1)������������������������������������������� 16.42 s 82(9)����������������������������������������� 13.177 s 84������������������ 1.29; 10.11, 10.13; 13.135; 15.38; 16.4, 16.48, 16.53, 16.61, 16.84, 16.112, 16.116; 19.2, 19.66, 19.67; 20.21, 20.95, 20.96; 23.39, 23.40; 24.3, 24.6, 24.9, 24.148; 28.19; 32.75; 33.9, 33.11 s 84(1)����������������������� 1.8, 1.13, 1.29, 1.31, 1.44; 6.40; 8.22; 9.39; 10.13; 13.12, 13.180; 14.9, 14.33; 15.1, 15.12, 15.37, 15.38, 15.39, 15.40, 15.41; 16.1, 16.2, 16.4, 16.5, 16.9, 16.11, 16.22, 16.23, 16.26, 16.29, 16.30, 16.33, 16.36, 16.39, 16.43, 16.45, 16.46, 16.47, 16.48, 16.50, 16.53, 16.54, 16.55, 16.58, 16.63, 16.69, 16.70, 16.73, 16.103, 16.106, 16.113, 16.117, 16.120, 16.124; 17.1, 17.9,17.17, 17.18, 17.28, 17.29, 17.30, 17.31; 18.1, 18.2, 18.3; 19.2, 19.3, 19.62, 19.64; 20.1, 20.16, 20.19, 20.73, 2, 23.90.80, 20.88, 20.93; 21.11; 22.1, 22.4, 22.8, 22.9, 22.13; 23.1, 23.2, 23.3, 23.5, 23.8, 23.42, 23.43, 23.45, 23.46, 23.50, 23.52; 24.6, 24.8, 24.9, 24.23, 24.28, 24.41, 24.48, 24.52, 24.56, 24.70, 24.88, 24.89, 24.107, 24.108, 24.120, 24.128, 24.130; 25.5; 28.19; 32.2
Table of Statutes Law of Property Act 1925 – contd s 84(1)(a)��������������������������������� 8.99, 8.126; 13.170, 13.171; 15.27, 15.37, 15.40; 16.48, 16.50, 16.54, 16.55, 16.58, 16.92, 16.106, 16.114, 16.124; 19.1, 19.2, 19.9, 19.62,19.64, 19.67, 19.70; 20.22, 20.23, 20.67, 20.69; 22.1; 23.8, 23.40, 23.47, 23.52 s 84(1)(aa)������� 11.67; 15.27; 16.50, 16.55, 16.58, 16.106, 16.124, 16.125; 19.2, 19.64; 20.4, 20.5, 20.13, 20.14, 20.96; 21.17; 22.2, 22.3, 22.4, 22.13, 22.14, 22.16; 23.8, 23.23, 23.26, 23.28, 23.40, 23.52; 24.28, 24.30, 24.81 s 84(1)(b)�������������������� 15.13; 16.48, 16.50, 16.55, 16.58, 16.122; 18.4, 18.5; 19.2, 19.64; 21.9, 21.10, 21.11, 21.15, 21.16, 21.17, 21.20, 21.21, 21.22, 21.23; 23.8, 23.52 s 84(1)(c)�������������������������� 1.30, 1.31; 8.99, 8.126; 11.67; 16.50, 16.55, 16.58, 16.64, 16.106; 17.31; 18.4; 19.2, 19.64; 20.96; 21.17; 22.1, 22.2, 22.3, 22.4, 22.5, 22.13, 22.14, 22.15, 22.16, 22.17; 23.8, 23.47, 23.52, 23.53; 24.30, 24.138; 33.11 s 84(1)(i)��������������������� 20.78, 20.85, 20.88; 23.5, 23.8, 23.44, 23.50, 23.51, 23.52 s 84(1)(ii)��������������������� 16.95, 20.78; 23.5, 23.8, 23.9, 23.44, 23.51, 23.52, 23.54, 23.55 s 84(1A)����������������������� 16.1, 16.3, 16.129; 18.1, 18.2, 18.3; 20.2, 20.4, 20.7, 20.8, 20.19, 20.38, 20.71, 20.76, 20.77, 20.80, 20.86; 22.3; 23.33, 23.41, 23.52 s 84(1A)(a)����������������� 16.132; 20.4, 20.13, 20.18, 20.35, 20.54, 20.56, 20.77; 23.19 s 84(1A)(b)�������������������������� 16.78, 16.132; 20.4, 20.14, 20.54, 20.77, 20.89; 23.19 s 84(1B)������������������������������������� 16.1, 16.3, 16.58, 16.63, 16.65, 16.68, 16.72, 16.90, 16.120; 20.2, 20.8, 20.14, 20.24, 20.56, 20.61 s 84(1C)�������������������������� 16.1, 16.3, 16.58, 16.136, 16.137, 16.138; 17.3, 17.12, 17.13, 17.15, 17.19, 17.20; 19.43; 23.11; 33.11 s 84(2)������������������������� 1.53; 2.1; 3.4; 6.47; 8.23, 8.97; 9.39; 10.11; 11.130; 13.15; 14.4, 14.8, 14.9, 14.12, 14.13, 14.15, 14.17, 14.20, 14.21, 14.27, 14.28, 14.32, 14.33; 15.6, 15.13, 15.20; 16.4, 16.5, 16.11, 16.16, 16.17, 16.19, 16.26, 16.48; 21.12; 24.33, 24.34, 24.35, 24.36, 24.37; 28.19 s 84(2)(a), (b)���������������������������������� 24.33
Law of Property Act 1925 – contd s 84(3)������������������������������������������� 16.69 s 84(3A)����������������������� 13.12; 16.8, 16.26; 24.33, 24.34, 24.48, 24.107 s 84(4)��������������������������������������������� 16.91 s 84(5)�������������������������� 14.7, 14.31, 14.33; 16.138; 20.3; 24.18 s 84(6)��������������������������������������������� 16.49 s 84(7)���������������������������� 14.9; 16.5, 16.46, 16.47, 16.86; 24.48 s 84(8)��������������������������������������������� 14.31 s 84(9)������������������������������� 13.172, 13.175, 13.177, 13.178; 16.29 s 84(10)���������������������������������� 16.1, 16.120 s 84(11)������������������������������������ 14.9; 16.47 s 84(11)(a), (b)�������������������������������� 16.47 s 84(11A)���������������������������������������� 16.47 s 84(12)�������������������������� 14.8; 15.39; 16.5, 16.12, 16.14, 16.15, 16.16, 16.17, 16.18, 16.63, 16.91, 16.133, 16.134 s 85�������������������������������������������������� 16.10 s 87(1)��������������������������������������������� 1.51 s 88�������������������������������������������������� 16.10 s 89(9)��������������������������������������������� 13.177 s 94�������������������������������������������������� 29.57 s 94(1)��������������������������������������������� 29.65 s 94(1)(c)����������������������������������������� 29.58 s 117(1)������������������������������������������� 16.10 s 121����������������������������������������� 1.51; 29.37 s 121(2)������������������������������������������� 29.59 s 121(3)������������������������������������������� 29.3 s 122������������������������������������������������ 29.37 s 132(1)������������������������������������������� 9.58 s 136������������������������������������ Int; 7.3; 27.38 s 136(1)������������������� 7.11, 7.21, 7.22, 7.23, 7.27; 13.30; 29.51, 29.105 s 139������������������������������������������������ 27.13 s 141�������������������������������������������� Int; 29.90 s 141(1)������������������������������������ 6.54; 29.98 s 141(2)������������������������������������������� 29.98 s 142������������������������������������������������ Int s 146����������������� 29.15, 29.16, 29.17, 29.27 s 146(1)����������������������� 29.46, 29.52, 29.89 s 146(2)���������������������� 29.24, 29.27, 29.28, 29.29, 29.31 s 146(4)������������������������������������ 9.24; 29.24 s 146(5)������������������������������������������� 29.25 s 146(5)(a)��������������������������������������� 29.15 s 146(5)(b)������������������������������ 29.15, 29.24 s 146(5)(c)������������������������������ 29.15, 29.27 s 146(6)������������������������������������������� 29.25 s 146(1)������������������������������������������� 29.27 s 146(11), (12)��������������������������������� 29.15 s 153���������������������������������� 29.100, 29.103, 29.106 s 153(2)������������������������������������������� 16.10 s 153(4)������������������������������������������� 29.101 s 153(6)������������������������������������������� 29.101 s 153(7)������������������������������ 29.101, 29.103 s 153(8)������������������������������ 29.102, 29.105 s 162(1)(d)��������������������� 29.3, 29.62, 29.63 Pt XI (ss 180–200)�������������������������� 9.36 s 189(2)������������������������� 27.14, 27.41; 28.1
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Table of Statutes Land Registration Act 2002 – contd s 198������������������������������������������� 9.32, 9.34 s 198(1)������������������� 9.25, 9.27, 9.28, 9.29, 9.30, 9.32, 9.34 s 199�������������������������������� 9.36; 13.6; 29.13 s 199(1)�������������������������������������� 9.17, 9.35 s 199(1)(i)������������������������� 9.25, 9.30, 9.35, 9.36; 10.29 s 199(1)(ii)��������������������� 8.117; 9.16, 9.19, 9.25, 9.36, 9.58; 10.29 s 199(1)(ii)(a)���������������������������������� 9.17 s 199(1)(ii)(b)����������������������������� 9.18, 9.22 s 199(2)����������������� 8.117; 9.16, 9.19, 9.20, 9.36, 9.58; 10.29 s 199(3)��������������������������� 8.117; 9.16, 9.21 s 199(4)������������������������������������������� 9.16 s 200������������������������������������������������ 29.13 s 200(1)������������������������������������ 1.18; 8.118 s 201(1)���������������������� 16.10, 16.11, 16.19, 16.20, 16.21, 16.22 s 203(5)������������������������������������������� 14.32 s 205(1)(viii)����������������������������������� 14.7 s 205(1)(ix)������������������� 16.9, 16.11, 16.20, 16.21; 27.32 s 205(1)(xiv)������������������������������������ 16.12 s 205(1)(xxi)������������������������������� 9.16, 9.35 s 205(1)(xxvii)�������������������������������� 29.6 s 207������������������������������������������������ 6.24 Sch 7������������������������������������������������ 6.24 Law of Property Act 1969������������������ 14.6; 16.1, 16.65; 17.1; 20.1; 24.107 s 24�������������������������������������������������� 9.34 s 25�������������������������������������������������� 9.34 s 25(2)��������������������������������������������� 9.34 s 28(1)�������������������������� 16.1, 16.58, 16.65, 16.136; 23.1 Sch 1������������������������������������������������ 23.1 Sch 3����������������� 16.1, 16.58, 16.65, 16.136 Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s 1������������������������������������������� 11.3; 13.189 s 1(2)���������������������������������������� 15.13; 26.3 s 1(3)����������������������������������������������� 15.13 s 2������������������������������� 32.46, 32.47, 32.48, 32.49, 32.68 s 2(1), (2)����������������������������������������� 32.46 s 2(3)���������������������������������������� 26.3; 32.46 Leasehold Reform Act 1967��������������� 11.199 s 2���������������������������������������������������� 11.198 s 19����������������������������������������� 16.43; 28.23 s 19(1)��������������������������������������������� 28.23 s 19(5)��������������������������������������������� 16.43 s 19(8)��������������������������������������������� 28.24 s 19(10)���������������������������������� 16.43; 28.25 s 29, 30�������������������������������������������� 16.47 Sch 4 para 1(5)�������������������������������������� 16.47 Leasehold Reform, Housing and Urban Development Act 1993 s 26(1)��������������������������������������������� 28.25 s 50(1)��������������������������������������������� 28.25 Limitation Act 1939���������������������������� 13.115 s 16�������������������������������������������������� 9.6
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Limitation Act 1980����������� 6.3; 9.69; 11.160; 13.114; 29.40 s 4(3)����������������������������������������������� 29.40 s 5�������������������������� 13.114, 13.115, 13.189 s 8�������������������������������������� 13.114, 13.115, 13.189; 33.11 s 8(1), (2)����������������������������������������� 10.90 s 9����������������������������������������� 10.91; 13.114 s 9(1)����������������������������������������������� 10.90 s 15(1)��������������������������������������������� 29.40 s 17�������������������������������������� 1.51; 9.6, 9.69 s 19�������������������������������������������������� 29.43 s 28������������������������������������ 13.114, 13.118, 13.191; 29.42 s 29(2)��������������������������������������������� 29.42 s 32������������� 13.114, 13.118, 13.191; 29.42 s 36������������������������������������� 13.115, 13.118 s 36(2)��������������������������������������������� 13.119 s 38(1)��������������������������������������������� 29.43 Sch 1 para 7(1)�������������������������������������� 29.40 para 8������������������������������������������� 29.41 Lincoln’s Inn Act 1860��������������� 10.21; 28.28 Local Government Act 1972��������������� 1.65 s 111(1)������������������������������������������� 10.3 s 122(1), (4)������������������������������������� 10.62 s 123������������������������������������������������ 1.65 s 270(1)������������������������������������������� 10.62 Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 s 32�������������������������������������������������� 32.8 s 33���������������������������������������� 10.16, 10.30; 28.17; 32.6, 32.8 s 33(1)��������������������������������������������� 10.16 s 33(2)������������������������������������ 10.16; 28.17 Sch 7 para 6������������������������������������������� 32.8 Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 s 113������������������������������������������������ 1.65 Localism Act 2011������������������������������ 1.65 s 1���������������������������������������������������� 10.3 Local Land Charges Act 1975������������������������������������ 28.25; 32.2, 32.10, 32.64 s 1���������������������������������������������������� 10.23 s 1(1)(b)(ii)����������������������� 9.27, 9.32, 9.37, 9.73; 10.23; 28.29 s 1(1)(c)(ii)�������������������� 9.73; 10.23; 28.29 s 1(2)(a), (c)������������������ 9.73; 10.23; 28.29 s 1(3)����������������������������������������������� 10.23 s 2(c)������������������������������������������������ 10.23 s 4���������������������������������������������������� 9.27 s 4(6)����������������������������������������������� 32.2 s 5(5)����������������������������������������������� 10.26 s 10����������������������������������������� 28.16; 32.65 s 10(1)���������������������������� 9.32, 9.37; 10.29, 10.30; 32.65 London Building Act 1894 s 7���������������������������������������������������� 10.5 London Building Act 1930�������� 10.21; 28.28 London Building Act 1938����������������� 10.95 London Building Acts (Amendment) Act 1939����������������������������� 10.21; 28.28
Table of Statutes Lord Cairn’s Act 1858 see Chancery Amendment Act 1858 Mental Capacity Act 2005������������������ 21.3 Mission and Pastoral Measure 2011 s 58, 59������������������������������������������ 28.19 s 63(2)–(4)������������������������������ 10.11; 28.19 s 63(5)��������������������������������������������� 10.11 s 75����������������������������������������� 10.11; 28.19 s 75(1)��������������������������������������������� 16.47 s 75(3)������������������������������������ 10.13; 16.47 Municipal Corporations Act 1882 s 108, 109���������������������������������������� 1.65 National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990����������������������������������� 10.50, 10.51 National Trust Act 1907 s 21�������������������������������������������������� 10.11 National Trust Act 1937 s 8�������������������������������������� 10.11, 10.14; 16.47; 24.109 National Trust Act 1939 s 5���������������������������������������������������� 16.47 s 8���������������������������������������������������� 10.11 National Trust Act 1971 s 27����������������������������������������� 10.11, 10.13 Pastoral Measure 1983��������������� 10.12; 28.20 s 62����������������������������������������� 10.12; 28.20 Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964�������������������������������������� 29.37 s 1��������������������������������������������� 29.5, 29.37 s 1(1)����������������������������������������������� 13.6 s 3��������������������������������������������� 29.5, 29.62 s 11(1)���������������� 13.6; 29.36, 29.37, 29.38 Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009������������������������������� 13.6; 29.39 s 1(9)����������������������������������������������� 29.63 Planning Act 2008������������������������������� 32.10 s 1���������������������������������������������������� 29.63 s 194������������������������������������������������ 10.55 s 223������������������������������������������������ 32.20 Sch 9������������������������������������������������ 10.55 Planning and Compensation Act 1991�������������������������������������� 32.8 s 12(1)���������������������������� 10.9; 30.28; 32.8, 32.27, 32.66 s 20�������������������������������������������������� 16.73 s 26�������������������������������������������������� 16.71 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004�������������������������������������� 16.71 s 20�������������������������������������������������� 16.72 s 38(6)��������������������������������������������� 16.72 Protection from Eviction Act 1977 s 1���������������������������������������������������� 29.18 s 2��������������������������������������������� 13.5; 29.18 Public Health Act 1875���������������� 28.7; 29.76 s 51����������������������������������������� 10.45, 10.52 Public Health Act 1936����������������������� 10.95 Railways Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 s 6���������������������������������������������������� 10.43 Real Property Act 1845���������������� 8.49; 27.13 s 5������������������������������������ Int; 3.1, 3.3, 3.4; 6.62; 8.66; 26.4 s 64�������������������������������������������������� Int
Refreshment Houses Act 1860������������ 11.253 Rent Act 1977������������������������������������� 11.153 Rent (Agriculture) Act 1976������ 20.40, 20.84 Rentcharges Act 1977������������������������� 29.7 s 1(3)����������������������������������������������� 29.38 s 1(4)(a)������������������������������������������� 29.38 s 2���������������������������������������������������� 13.3 s 2(1)������������������������������� 1.51; 29.7, 29.45 s 2(2)������������������������������������������ 1.51; 29.7 s 2(3)���������������������������������������� 29.7, 29.68 s 2(4)����������������������������������������� 1.51; 13.3, 13.4; 29.7, 29.68 s 2(4)(a)���������������������������������� 29.11, 29.68 s 2(4)(b)������������������������ 29.8, 29.10, 29.45, 29.68, 29.70 s 2(5)����������������������������������������� 1.51; 29.7, 29.11, 29.68 s 3��������������������������������������������� 1.51; 29.71 s 3(3)(b)������������������������������������������� 29.71 s 8���������������������������������������������������� 29.71 s 8(4)����������������������������������������������� 29.71 Requisitioned Land and War Works Act 1945 s 33(1)��������������������������������������������� 16.47 s 38(3)��������������������������������������������� 16.47 Reverter of Sites Act 1987������������������ 29.21 Road Traffic Regulation Act 1967 s 28����������������������������������������� 10.46, 10.47 Senior Courts Act 1981 s 19�������������������������������������������������� 13.10 s 37�������������������������������������������������� 13.25 s 37(1)������������������������������������ 13.25; 30.39 s 37(2)��������������������������������������������� 13.25 s 39�������������������������������������������������� 30.13 s 49(1)������������������������������������ 27.27, 27.38 s 50������������������ 11.61; 13.31, 13.75, 13.77, 13.101, 13.185; 14.10; 30.14, 30.15, 30.25 s 51�������������������������������������������������� 14.32 Settled Land Act 1882������������������������� 16.21 s 10(i)���������������������������������������������� 16.21 Settled Land Act 1925������������������� 1.51, 1.63; 6.47; 15.11; 16.11 s 1(1)(ii)(d)�������������������������������������� 21.1 s 1(1)(ix)������������������������������������������ 21.1 s 7(1)����������������������������������������������� 7.14 s 18�������������������������������������������������� 1.63 s 18(1)(a)����������������������������������������� 1.63 s 26, 27�������������������������������������������� 21.1 s 49(1)������������������������������������������� 16.11 s 49(1)(b)���������������� 1.18, 1.51, 1.63; 16.36 s 58(1), (2)�������������������������������� 15.11; 21.2 s 59(2)�������������������������������������� 15.11; 21.2 s 64�������������������������������������������������� 1.63 s 102������������������������������������������������ 21.2 s 106������������������������������������������������ 6.48 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 s 133������������������������������������������������ 7.45 s 133(2)������������������������������������������� 7.45 Small Holdings and Allotments Act 1908�������������������������������������������� 1.66 Small Holdings and Allotments Act 1926�������������������������������������������� 1.66
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Table of Statutes Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act 1883��������������������� 13.75 s 5���������������������������������������������������� 13.75 Statute of Frauds 1677������������������� 7.20, 7.41 Supreme Court Act 1981 see Senior Courts Act 1981 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873�������������������������������������� 13.9 s 25(6)��������������������������������������������� Int s 25(8)������������������������������������ 13.24; 30.39 s 25(11)������������������������������������������� 27.27 s 26(6)��������������������������������������������� 7.21 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1875�������������������������������������� 13.9 Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 s 18(3)��������������������������������������������� 30.14 s 44�������������������������������������������������� 27.27 s 45�������������������������������������������������� 30.39 Town and Country Planning Act 1932�������������������������������������� 32.3 Town and Country Planning Act 1947�������������������������������������� 19.65 s 25�������������������������������������������������� 10.8 Town and Country Planning Act 1962�������������������������������������� 19.66 s 37������������������������������ 16.48; 20.94; 22.16 Town and Country Planning Act 1971��������������� 16.108; 19.37, 19.66; 32.31, 32.32, 32.34 s 52�������������������� 1.10; 10.8; 11.166; 16.48; 19.66, 19.67, 19.68; 20.86, 20.87, 20.88; 21.7; 22.15, 22.17, 22.18; 32.9, 32.30 s 52(1)������������������������������� 32.3, 32.4, 32.7 s 52(2), (3)��������������������������������������� 32.7 s 53�������������������������������������������������� 19.67 s 56�������������������������������������������������� 22.16 s 127������������������������������������������������ 1.18 s 164������������������������������������������������ 32.31 Town and Country Planning Act 1990���������������������������� 10.95, 10.97; 15.27; 16.44; 19.66 s 2E�������������������������������������������������� 32.10 s 43�������������������������������������������������� 16.81 s 52��������������������������������������� 16.124; 19.37 s 54�������������������������������������������������� 10.28 s 54A����������������������������������������������� 16.71 s 70(2)������������������������������������ 16.68, 16.71 s 72����������������������������������������� 16.44; 32.12 s 72(1)(a)����������������������������������������� 32.12 s 73����������������������������������������� 16.44; 32.12 s 74(1)(b)����������������������������������������� 16.71 s 78�������������������������������������������������� 32.13 s 106��������� 1.10, 1.13; 10.8, 10.9, 10.13, 10.16, 10.18, 10.98; 12.20, 12.22; 16.40, 16.44, 16.48; 19.37, 19.67; 20.87; 22.16, 22.18; 28.22, 28.27; 32.1, 32.8, 32.9, 32.10, 32.16, 32.17, 32.22, 32.25, 32.26, 32.27, 32.28, 32.29, 32.30, 32.32, 32.36, 32.41, 32.42, 32.45, 32.46, 32.47, 32.49, 32.53, 32.54, 32.55, 32.56, 32.58, 32.60, 32.61, 32.64, 32.66, 32.67, 32.68, 32.69, 32.71, 32.75, 32.76, 32.80, 32.91, 32.92
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Town and Country Planning Act 1990 – contd s 106(1)����������� 10.13; 16.40, 16.47; 30.28; 32.7, 32.16, 32.29, 32.36 s 106(1)(a)������������������ 16.40; 32.16, 32.35, 32.36, 32.43, 32.44 s 106(1)(b)������������������� 16.40; 32.25, 32.43 s 106(1)(c)�������� 16.40; 32.25, 32.43, 32.45 s 106(1)(d)�������� 16.40; 32.16, 32.25, 32.43 s 106(2)������������������������������������������� 32.7 s 106(3)������������������������ 10.13; 32.7, 32.55, 32.57, 32.60, 32.76 s 106(4)������������������������������������ 32.7, 32.57 s 106(5)����������������������� 30.28; 32.18, 32.71 s 106(6)����������������������� 30.28; 32.18, 32.72 s 106(6)(a)��������������������������������������� 32.74 s 106(7)������������������������������������������� 32.73 s 106(8)������������������������������������������� 32.74 s 106(9)���������������������� 10.13; 16.47; 32.11, 32.41, 32.53, 32.54 s 106(9)(d)������������������� 32.16, 32.54, 32.70 s 106(10)����������������������������������������� 32.75 s 106(11)����������������������������������������� 32.64 s 106A����������������������������������� 19.37; 20.87; 32.2, 32.10, 32.75 s 106A(1)���������������������������������������� 10.13 s 106A(1)(a), (b)����������������������������� 32.76 s 106A(2)������������������������������� 32.41, 32.76 s 106A(3)���������������������������������������� 32.26 s 106A(6)������������������������������� 32.77, 32.80 s 106B�������������������������� 10.13; 32.2, 32.26, 32.76, 32.87, 32.89 s 106B(5)����������������������������������������� 32.90 s 106BA–106BC����������������������������� 32.2 s 106C��������������������������������������������� 32.10 s 171A(1)(b)������������������������������������ 32.15 s 173, 187���������������������������������������� 16.44 s 187A������������������������������������ 16.44; 32.15 s 192������������������������������������������������ 19.67 s 203(1)������������������������������������������� 10.69 s 203(2)������������������������������������������� 10.69 s 203(2)(d)��������������������������������������� 10.70 s 203(3), (4)������������������������������������� 10.69 s 203(5)������������������������������������������� 10.69 s 203(5)(d)��������������������������������������� 10.70 s 203(6)������������������������������������������� 10.69 s 204������������������������������������������������ 10.69 s 204(5)(d)��������������������������������������� 10.70 s 205������������������������������������������������ 10.68 s 232, 236���������������������������������������� 10.70 s 237��������������������������� 10.52, 10.54, 10.55, 10.56, 10.68, 10.70, 10.71 s 237(1)������������������������������������������� 10.53 s 237(1)(b)�������������������������������� 1.18; 10.75 s 237(1A)���������������������������������������� 10.55 s 238, 239���������������������������������������� 10.53 s 246(1)������������������������������������������� 10.68 Pt XI (ss 262–283)������������������������������ 10.73 s 316������������������������������������������������ 16.73 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 s 6������������������������������������������� 24.34; 33.11 s 13�������������������������������������������������� 24.107 s 13(1)��������������������������������������������� 24.107
Table of Statutes Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 – contd s 13(3), (4)��������������������������������������� 24.110 s 13(8)��������������������������������������������� 24.115 s 13(11)������������������������������������������� 24.107 s 13(12)(a)��������������������������������������� 24.107 s 14�������������������������������������������������� 24.116 s 14A, 14B�������������������������������������� 24.117 s 25��������������������������������������� 24.61, 24.62 s 27�������������������������������������������������� 24.145 s 29�������������������������������������������������� 24.119 s 29(4), (5)��������������������������������������� 24.119
Trustee Act 1925 s 48, 50�������������������������������������������� 30.13 Vendor and Purchaser Act 1874 s 2���������������������������������������������������� 9.22 Waterworks Clauses Act 1847 s 6���������������������������������������������������� 10.43 Wentworth Estate Act 1964����������������� 10.21; 20.26; 28.28 Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 s 39����������������������������������������� 10.17; 28.18 s 39(3)������������������������������������ 10.30; 28.18
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Table of Statutory Instruments
Civil Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2013, SI 2013/262 ....................... 24.66 Civil Procedure Rules 1998, SI 1998/3132 ..................... 13.13, 13.16, 13.17, 13.47, 13.62, 13.68, 13.107, 13.171; 14.14, 14.20, 14.25, 14.33; 24.98, 24.135; 29.30, 29.110; 30.11, 30.28 r 3.1(2)............................................. 13.177 r 3.1(2)(f)......................................... 13.177 r 3.9 ................................................. 24.66 Pt 7 .................................................. 14.14 r 8.1(2)(a) ............................... 14.14; 15.42 r 8.1(3)(a) ........................................ 14.14 r 8.2(b), (c) ...................................... 14.15 r 8.2A .............................................. 14.20 r 8.5(1)–(6) ...................................... 14.16 Pt 20 ................................................ 29.110 PD 24 .............................................. 30.28 r 25.1 ............................................... 13.16 r 25.1(c)(ii) ...................................... 30.11 r 40.20 .................................... 13.10, 13.12 Pt 52 ................................... 24.112, 24.113 r 42.6(1), (2) .................................... 24.112 r 70.2A ........................ 13.72; 30.13; 33.11 r 81.4 ...................................... 13.72; 30.12 r 81.20 ............................................. 30.12 r 81.20(1)......................................... 30.12 Commonhold (Land Registration) Rules 2004, SI 2004/1830 ........... 31.5 Commonhold Regulations 2004, SI 2004/1829 .......................... 31.5, 31.7 reg 5................................................. 31.18 Sch 3.................................................. 31.7 Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010, SI 2010/948 reg 122(2) ........................................ 32.20 reg 123............................................. 32.21 Competition Act 1998 (Land Agreements Exclusion Revocation) Order 2010, SI 2010/1709 .............................. 12.4 Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules 2003, SI 2003/1372 ..................... 12.15 Groceries Market Investigation (Controlled Land) Order 2010 ...... 12.17 art 2 ............................. 12.17, 12.25, 12.26 art 3 ................................................. 12.18 art 4 ................................................. 12.19 art 4(2)............................................. 12.19 art 4(3)............................................. 12.19 art 4(3)(b) ........................................ 12.20 art 4(3)(b)(i) .................................... 12.20
Groceries Market Investigation (Controlled Land) Order 2010 – contd art 5 ................................................. 12.22 art 6 ................................................. 12.20 art 7 ................................................. 12.23 art 7(2)(b) ........................................ 12.23 art 8 ................................................. 12.24 art 9 ......................... 12.20, 12.23, 12.24 art 10 ............................................... 12.20 Sch 2a .............................................. 12.19 Sch 2b.............................................. 12.20 Sch 3a .............................................. 12.23 Sch 4............................ 12.20, 12.21, 12.23 Land Charges Act 1972 (Commencement) Order 1972, SI 1972/2058 ............................... 8.112 Land Registration Fee Order 2013, SI 2013/3174 Sch 3 Pt 1 para 1(b) .................................. 24.150 Land Registration Rules 1925, SI 1925/1093 ............................... 8.124 r 131 ................................................ 29.104 r 131(8)............................................ 29.104 Land Registration Rules 2002, SI 2002/2539 r 84(4).............................................. 15.16 r 87 .................................................. 15.16 Land Registration Rules 2003, SI 2003/1417 ........................ 9.40; 33.11 r 35(1).............................................. 8.124 r 64 .................................................. 28.14 r 65 .................................................. 29.109 r 81 .................................................. 9.50 r 92 .................................................. 29.96 r 126(1)............................................ 9.53 Lands Tribunal Rules 1975, SI 1975/299 ................................. 24.26 Lands Tribunal Rules 1996, SI 1996/1022 .................... 24.26, 24.130 r 17(1).............................................. 16.6 Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 2009 (Commencement) Order 2010, SI 2010/37 .................. 13.6; 29.39 Property (Northern Ireland) Order 1997, SI 1997/1179 (NI 4) .......... 33.12 Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, SI 1965/1776 Order 5 r 4 .................................................... 14.6 Order 18 r 19 .................................................. 13.62
xxxi
Table of Statutory Instruments Rules of the Supreme Court 1965, SI 1965/1776 – contd Order 29 r 2���������������������������������������������������� 30.11 Order 25 r 5���������������������������������������������������� 13.9 Order 45 r 8���������������������������������������������������� 33.11 Order 86 r 1���������������������������������������������������� 30.28 Supreme Court Rules 2009, SI 2009/1603������������������������������� 24.118 r 5(1)������������������������������������������������ 24.118 r 11(1)���������������������������������������������� 24.118 Town and Country Planning (Modification and Discharge of Planning Obligations) Regulations 1992, SI 1992/2832������������ 32.76, 32.81 reg 3(1)�������������������������������������������� 32.82 reg 4��������������������������������������� 32.83, 32.85 reg 5������������������������������������������������ 32.85 reg 6(1)�������������������������������������������� 32.85 reg 6(2)����������������������������������� 32.85, 32.87 reg 6(3)�������������������������������������������� 32.86 reg 7(1)�������������������������������������������� 32.88 reg 7(2)�������������������������������������������� 32.89 reg 7(3)�������������������������������������������� 32.90 reg 8������������������������������������������������ 32.90 Schedule Pt 1���������������������������������������������� 32.83 Tribunal Procedure (Amendment No 3) Rules 2013, SI 2013/1188����������� 24.1 Tribunal Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2012, SI 2012/500������������� 24.1 Tribunal Procedure (Amendment) Rules 2014, SI 2014/514������������� 24.1 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010, SI 2010/2600���������������� 16.6; 24.1, 24.2, 24.3, 24.25, 24.39; 33.11 Pt 1 (rr 1–3)������������������������������������� 24.3 r 2���������������������������������������������������� 24.3 r 4(3)������������������������������������������������ 24.57 r 4(4)(b)������������������������������������������� 24.96 r 5���������������������������������������������������� 16.70 r 5(1)������������������������������������������������ 24.56 r 5(3)������������������������������������������������ 24.56 r 5(3)(a)���������������������������������� 24.18, 24.63 r 5(3)(b)������������������������������������������� 24.7 r 5(3)(e)������������������������������������������� 24.110 r 5(3)(i)�������������������������������������������� 24.97 r 5(3)(j)�������������������������������������������� 24.67 r 5(3)(k)������������������������������������������� 24.36 r 6����������������������� 24.5, 24.44, 24.58, 24.60 r 7���������������������������������������������������� 24.6 r 7(2)��������������������������������������� 24.62, 24.69 r 7(2)(d)������������������������������������������� 24.68
xxxii
Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) (Lands Chamber) Rules 2010, SI 2010/2600 – contd r 7(3)–(6)����������������������������������������� 24.69 r 8������������������������������������ 16.6; 24.6, 24.62 r 8(1)���������������������������� 24.64, 24.65, 24.68 r 8(3)(a)����������������������� 24.64, 24.65, 24.69 r 8(3)(b)���������������������������������� 24.64, 24.96 r 8(5)������������������������������������������������ 24.66 r 8(6)������������������������������������������������ 24.65 r 10(1), (6)��������������������������������������� 24.120 r 10(8)���������������������������������������������� 24.135 r 10(10)�������������������������������������������� 24.110 r 11(3)���������������������������������������������� 24.39 r 12�������������������������������������������������� 24.17 r 13�������������������������������������������������� 24.4 r 14�������������������������������������������������� 24.5 r 16�������������������������������������������������� 24.98 r 16(1)(c)����������������������������������������� 24.70 r 16(6)���������������������������������������������� 24.85 r 17(1)���������������������������������������������� 24.71 r 17(2)������������������������������������� 24.26, 24.70 r 17(5)���������������������������������������������� 24.73 r 19�������������������������������������������������� 24.96 r 20�������������������������������������������������� 24.89 r 20(1)–(3)��������������������������������������� 24.86 r 20(4)���������������������������������������������� 24.87 r 32�������������������������������������������������� 24.8 r 32(2)���������������������������������������������� 24.10 r 32(3)���������������������������������������������� 24.6 r 33��������������������������������������������� 16.7; 24.8 r 33(1)���������������������������������������������� 24.11 r 33(2)���������������������������������������������� 24.12 r 33(3)���������������������������������������������� 24.13 r 34������������������������������������������� 24.8, 24.42 r 34(1)�������������������������� 24.13, 24.17, 24.19 r 34(2)���������������������������������������������� 24.19 r 35����������������������������������������� 24.34, 24.36 r 36�������������������������������������������������� 24.40 r 37����������������������������������������� 24.15, 24.25 r 38����������������������������������������� 16.70; 24.16 r 39�������������������������������������������������� 24.104 r 48�������������������������������������������������� 24.92 r 48(7)���������������������������������������������� 24.92 r 49�������������������������������������������������� 24.94 r 50�������������������������������������������������� 24.88 r 51�������������������������������������������������� 24.100 r 53�������������������������������������������������� 24.103 r 54�������������������������������������� 24.95, 24.105, 24.110 r 54(3)����������������������������������� 24.95, 24.106 r 55(1), (2), (2A), (3)–(5)���������������� 24.110 r 55(6)���������������������������������������������� 24.111 r 56�������������������������������������������������� 24.115 r 56(1)���������������������������������������������� 24.114 r 57�������������������������������������������������� 24.114 r 58�������������������������������������������������� 24.116
Table of Cases
6, 8, 10 & 12 Elm Avenue New Milton, Re [1984] 1 WLR 1398���������������� 8.42, 8.49, 8.97, 8.108, 8.110, 8.113; 10.32, 10.34, 10.35, 10.46, 10.49, 10.64; 11.173; 14.10, 14.20, 14.27, 14.29 12 Park View Skipton, Re [2016] UKUT 552, LC���������������������������������������������������� 11.109; 23.10
A
A Lewis & Co (Westminster) Ltd v Bell Property Trust Ltd [1940] Ch 345, [1940] 1 All ER 570, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.137, 11.174, 11.250 Abbey Homesteads (Developments) Application, Re (1985) 49 P & CR 263, [1986] RVR 159, [1985] JPL 189, LT������������������������������������������������������������������ 19.48; 24.48 Abbey Homesteads (Developments) Ltd v Northamptonshire CC (1987) 53 P & CR 1, [1986] 1 EGLR 24, (1986) 278 EG 1249, [1986] RVR 159, [1986] JPL 683, (1986) 83 LSG 1902, (1986) 130 SJ 482, CA����������������������������������������������� 1.10; 3.4; 16.35; 19.48; 22.2; 24.107 Abbey Homesteads (Developments) Ltd v Northamptonshire CC (1991) 61 P & CR 295, [1991] 14 EG 119, [1990] RVR 240, [1990] EG 120 (CS), LT������������������������������������� 19.48 Abbey v Gutteres (1911) 55 SJ 364������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.10; 16.16 Abbots Park Estate (No 1), Re [1972] 1 WLR 598, [1972] 2 All ER 177, (1972) 23 P & CR 180, (1972) 116 SJ 220, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28.23 Achilli v Tovell [1927] 2 Ch 243, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������� 1.10; 10.96; 11.127; 13.88, 13.90, 13.120 Ackroyd v Smith,138 ER 68; (1850) 10 CB 164, Ct of Comm Pleas����������������������������������� 1.8 Acraman v Price (1870) 18 WR 540�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.19 Adams v Rushmon Ltd (2000) WL 542133��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.34 Adealon International Proprietary Ltd v Merton LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 362, [2007] 1 WLR 1898, (2007) 151 SJLB 577, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.90 Adedeji v Pathaia [2014] EWCA Civ 681����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.45 Afzar’s Application, Re [2002] 1 P & CR 17, LT�������������������������������������������� 19.38, 19.46; 20.26, 20.34, 20.76 A-G & London Property Investment Trust Ltd v Richmond Corpn & Gosling & Sons (1903) 89 LT 700��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.100 A-G of Belize v Belize Telecom Ltd [2009] UKPC 10, [2009] 1 WLR 1988, [2009] 2 All ER 1127, [2009] 2 All ER (Comm) 1, [2009] Bus LR 1316, [2009] BCC 433, [2009] 2 BCLC 148, PC (Belize)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.24 A-G v Barker (Worldwide Injunction) [1990] 3 All ER 257, CA��������������������������������� 13.38, 13.63 A-G v Mid Kent Railway Co & South Eastern Railway Co (1867–68) LR 3 Ch App 100, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.127 A-G v Plymouth Corpn (1909) 100 LT 742, CA������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.174 AH Cole (Designs) Ltd’s Application, Re (1964) 15 P & CR 101, 186 EG 853, [1963] JPL 480, LT�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.21 AH Field & Co (Developers) Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 169, 165 EG 499, [1955] JPL 458, LT�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.108 AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49, [2008] 1 AC 678, [2007] 3 WLR 832, [2008] 4 All ER 190, [2008] Imm AR 289, [2008] INLR 100, (2007) 151 SJLB 1500, HL�������������������������������������������������������������� 24.101 Aiken v Stewart Wrightson Members Agency Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 1281, [1995] 3 All ER 449, [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 618, [1995] CLC 318, QBD�������������������������������� 13.189 AJ Building & Plastering Ltd v Turner [2013] EWHC 484 (QB), [2015] TCLR 3, [2013] Lloyd’s Rep IR 629, QBD���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.21 AJ Dunning & Sons (Shopfitters) Ltd v Sykes & Son (Poole) Ltd [1987] Ch 287, [1987] 2 WLR 167, [1987] 1 All ER 700, (1987) 53 P & CR 385, (1986) 83 LSG 3751, (1986) 130 SJ 860, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.124
xxxiii
Table of Cases Alderson v Secretary of State (1999) The Times, 5 July��������������������������������������������� 16.41; 32.40 Alec Lobb Ltd v Total Oil GB Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 173, [1985] 1 All ER 303, [1985] 1 EGLR 33, (1985) 273 EG 659, (1985) 82 LSG 45, ~ (1985) 129 SJ 83, CA���������� 6.47; 12.3 Alexander v Mansions Pty Ltd (1900) 16 TLR 431��������������������������������������������������� 13.78, 13.101 Allen v Greenwood [1980] Ch 119, [1979] 2 WLR 187, [1979] 1 All ER 819, (1979) 38 P & CR 54, (1978) 249 EG 139, [1979] JPL 237, (1978) 122 SJ 828, CA������������������� 11.132 Allen v Veranne Builders Ltd [1988] NPC 11�������������������������������������� 1.26, 1.45; 6.75; 8.22, 8.97 Alliance Economic Investment Co v Berton (1923) 92 LJKB 750��������������������������������������� 16.54 Allnatt (London)’s Application, Re (1961) 12 P & CR 256, LT�������������������������������� 16.65, 16.110, 16.135; 22.16 Alwoodley Motors Application, Re (1962) 13 P & CR 195, 180 EG 111, [1961] JPL 481, LT���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 22.5, 22.16; 23.9 Amec Developments Ltd v Jury’s Hotel Management (UK) Ltd [2002] TCLR 13, (2001) 82 P & CR 22, [2001] 1 EGLR 81, [2001] 07 EG 163, [2000] EG 138 (CS), [2000] NPC 125, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.106 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd (No 1) [1975] AC 396, [1975] 2 WLR 316, [1975] 1 All ER 504, [1975] FSR 101, [1975] RPC 513, (1975) 119 SJ 136, HL������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.58, 13.62, 13.63, 13.64, 13.65, 13.66, 13.131 Ames, Re [1893] 2 Ch 479, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 6.48 Amoco Australian Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd [1975] AC 561, [1975] 2 WLR 779, [1975] 1 All ER 968, (1975) 119 SJ 301, PC (Aust)��������������������� 12.3 Amsprop Trading Ltd v Harris Distribution Ltd [1997] 1 WLR 1025, [1997] 2 All ER 990, [1997] 2 EGLR 78, [1997] 47 EG 127, [1996] NPC 154, Ch D����������������������������������� 3.4 Argyle Motors (Birkenhead) Ltd v Birkenhead Corpn [1975] AC 99, [1974] 2 WLR 71, [1974] 1 All ER 201, 72 LGR 147, (1974) 27 P & CR 122, (1973) 118 SJ 67, HL������ 10.80 Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619, [2015] 2 WLR 1593, [2016] 1 All ER 1, [2015] HLR 31, [2015] 2 P & CR 14, [2015] L & TR 25, [2015] CILL 3689, SC������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.12, 11.23 Ashby v Wilson [1900] 1 Ch 66, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.235 Aspden v Seddon (1874–75) LR 10 Ch App 394, CA����������������������������������������������������������� 29.73 Aspden v Seddon (1876) 1 Ex D 496, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.72, 29.73 Associated Electrical Industries Ltd v Alstom UK [2014] EWHC 430 (Comm), [2014] 3 Costs LR 415, QBD���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.67 Associated Property Owners Application, Re (1965) 16 P & CR 89, 190 EG 465, [1964] JPL 492, LT��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 17.15, 17.17; 19.40, 19.45, 19.50 Austerberry v Oldham Corpn (1885) 29 Ch D 750, CA���������������������� 1.16; 25.3; 27.4, 27.6; 28.1, 28.4, 28.7, 28.8; 29.70; 30.27 Austin’s Application, Re (1981) 42 P & CR 102, [1980] JPL 605���������������������� 8.20, 8.22; 15.25; 20.26, 20.84; 23.26 Australian Hardwoods Pty Ltd v Railways Commissioner [1961] 1 WLR 425, [1961] 1 All ER 737, (1961) 105 SJ 176, PC (Aust)�������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.6 Avon CC v Millard 83 LGR 597, (1985) 50 P & CR 275, [1985] 1 EGLR 171, (1985) 274 EG 1025, [1986] JPL 211, (1985) 82 LSG 1173, (1985) 129 SJ.269, CA����������� 13.63, 13.64 Ayr Harbour Trustees v Oswald (1883) 8 App Cas 623, (1883) 10 R (HL) 85, HL�������������� 1.66 Azfar’s Application, Re [2002] 1 P & CR 17, LT������������������������������������������������������������������ 17.18
B
BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v The President, Councillors & Ratepayers of Shire & Hastings (1978) 52 AJLR 20������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.23 Baily v De Crespigny [1869] LR 4 QB 180�������������������������������������� 10.66; 11.59, 11.62; 15.29 Ballard’s Conveyance, Re [1937] Ch 473, [1937] 2 All ER 691, (1957) 7 P & CR 313, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.41, 1.52, 1.55; 6.47, 6.48, 6.49 Bank of Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risk Association (Bermuda) Ltd (The Good Luck) [1990] 1 QB 818, [1990] 2 WLR 547, [1989] 3 All ER 628, [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 238, (1990) 87(10) LSG 34, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.95 Banks Application, Re (1977) 33 P & CR 138, [1977] JPL 36, LT���������������������������� 20.26, 20.84; 23.14, 23.25 Bannister v Bannister [1948] 2 All ER 133, [1948] WN 261, (1948) 92 SJ 377, CA����������� 7.27 Barber v Whiteley (1865) 34 LJQB 212�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.72 Barclays Bank Plc’s Application, Re (1990) 60 P & CR 354, LT����������� 16.5, 16.37, 16.80, 16.86, 16.98, 16.124; 19.37, 19.52 Barret v Blagrave 31 ER 735, (1800) 5 Ves Jr 555, Ct of Chancery����������������������������������� 1.3, 1.10
xxxiv
Table of Cases Barrett v Hilton Developments Ltd [1975] Ch 237, [1974] 3 WLR 545, [1974] 3 All ER 944, (1975) 29 P & CR 300, (1974) 118 SJ 533, CA�������������������������������������������� 8.113; 9.38 Barry’s Application, Re (1981) 41 P & CR 383, [1980] JPL 830, LT����������������������� 16.87, 16.108, 16.122; 20.26 Barton v Keeble [1928] Ch 517, [1928] All ER Rep 198, Ch D������������������������������������������� 11.229 Bass‘ Application, Re (1973) 26 P & CR 156, [1973] JPL 378, LT����������������������� 20.3, 20.4, 20.6, 20.8, 20.14, 20.26, 20.35, 20.61; 22.4; 24.81 Bateman v Hunt [1904] 2 KB 530, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.19 Baxter v Four Oaks Properties Ltd [1965] Ch 816, [1965] 2 WLR 1115, [1965] 1 All ER 906, (1965) 109 SJ 332, Ch D������������������ 1.27; 6.12; 8.12, 8.51, 8.52, 8.54, 8.69, 8.78; 11.156, 11.227; 13.89, 13.90, 13.92, 13.110, 13.133 Beardsley & Co’s Application, Re (1973) 25 P & CR 233, LT������������������������ 20.26, 20.56, 20.59, 20.87, 20.88; 22.3 Beckett v Midland Rly Co (1867) LR 3 CP 82, Ct of Comm Pleas�������������������������������������� 10.84 Beecham Group Ltd’s Application (1981) 41 P & CR 369, (1980) 256 EG 829, [1981] JPL 55, LT���������������������������������������������������������� 16.73, 16.74, 16.97, 16.108, 16.112; 19.21, 19.67; 20.14; 22.16 Beech’s Application, Re (1990) 59 P & CR 502, LT���������������������������������������� 16.87, 16.90, 16.98, 16.108; 19.20; 22.16 Beechwood Homes Ltd’s Application, Re (1992) 64 P & CR 535, [1992] JPL 872, LT�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.107; 20.26 Beechwood Homes Ltd’s Application, Re [1994] 2 EGLR 178, [1994] 28 EG 128 (CA)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.67, 11.85, 11.86, 11.104 Belfast West Power Ltd v Belfast Commissioners [1998] NI 112, Ch D������������������������������ 13.11 Belgravia Insurance Co v Meah [1964] 1 QB 436, [1963] 3 WLR 1033, [1963] 3 All ER 828, (1963) 107 SJ 871, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 29.25 Bell v Norman C Ashton Ltd (1957) 7 P & CR 359, [1956] JPL 752, Ch D����������������������� 8.78, 8.100, 8.113, 8.117; 11.84, 11.86, 11.88, 11.90, 11.104; 13.168 Bellamy v Sabine 44 ER 842, (1857) 1 De G & J 566, Ct of Chancery������������������������������ 11.69 Bennett’s & Tamarlin Ltd’s Applications, Re (1987) 54 P & CR 378, LT�������� 1.30; 16.58; 20.86; 22.17; 23.1, 23.2, 23.8, 23.13, 23.33, 23.42, 23.46, 23.47 Bents Brewery Co’s Application, Re (1965) 16 P & CR 103, 191 EG 905, [1964] JPL 819, LT�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.35 Berridge’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 125, 164 EG 371, [1954] JPL 765, LT������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.135, 16.138 Berton v Alliance Economic Investment Co [1922] 1 KB 742, CA�������������� 11.58, 11.202, 11.240 Best v Glenville [1960] 1 WLR 1198, [1960] 3 All ER 478, 58 LGR 333, (1961) 12 P & CR 48, (1960) 104 SJ 934, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.53 Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58, [1967] 3 WLR 932, [1967] 2 All ER 1197, (1967) 111 SJ 540, HL�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.4; 26.4; 30.5 Bevan Application, Re (1965) 16 P & CR 92, 191 EG 62, [1964] JPL 556, LT������� 16.135; 19.13 Bewick’s Application, Re (1997) 73 P & CR 240, (1997) 161 JPN 389, LT������������ 16.108; 22.17 Bhimji v Salih, unreported, 4 February 1981, CA����������������������������������������������������������������� 29.34 Bickmore v Dimmer [1903] 1 Ch 158, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.121 Birdlip Ltd v Hunter [2016] EWCA Civ 603, [2017] 1 P & CR 1, CA�������� 8.27, 8.32, 8.41, 8.43, 8.44, 8.45, 8.49, 8.62, 8.71, 8.73, 8.74, 8.79, 8.88, 8.90, 8.91, 8.94 Bidwell v Holden (1890) 63 LT 104�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.28 Billson v Residential Apartments Ltd [1992] 1 AC 494, [1992] 2 WLR 15, [1992] 1 All ER 141, (1992) 24 HLR 218, (1992) 63 P & CR 122, [1992] 1 EGLR 43; [1992] 01 EG 91, (1992) 89(2) LSG 31, (1992) 136 SJLB 10, HL���������������������������������� 29.25, 29.27, 29.28 Birmingham & District Land Co & Allday, Re [1893] 1 Ch 342, Ch D��������������� 8.22, 8.23, 8.108 Birmingham Joint Stock Co v Lea (1877) 36 LT 843���������������������������������������������������� 1.51; 16.16 Bishop of St Albans v Battersby (1878) 3 QBD 359, QBD�������������������������������������� 11.137, 11.138 Biss v Smallburgh Rural DC [1965] Ch 335, [1964] 3 WLR 88, [1964] 2 All ER 543, (1964) 128 JP 354, 62 LGR 409, (1964) 15 P & CR 351, [1964] RVR 597, (1964) 108 SJ 297, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.19 Blackburn and District Benefit Building Society, ex p Graham, Re (1889) 42 Ch D 343, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.69 Blackburn v David Aston (Suffolk) Ltd [2001] All ER (D) 138 (Dec), [2001] WL 1676961�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.6; 13.152 Blake v Marriage (1893) 9 TLR 569������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.228
xxxv
Table of Cases Blumenthal v Church Commissioners for England [2004] EWCA Civ 1688, [2005] 2 P & CR 20, [2005] 1 EGLR 78, [2005] 12 EG 220, (2005) 149 SJLB 56, CA���������� 16.41; 32.39 Blue Town Investments Ltd v Higgs & Hill Plc [1990] 1 WLR 696, [1990] 2 All ER 897, [1990] 32 EG 49, (1990) 87(14) LSG 47, (1990) 134 SJ 934, Ch D��������� 13.57, 13.58, 13.62 Bluenthal v Church Comrs for England [2004] EWCA Civ 1688, [2005] 2 P & CR 20, [2005] 1 EGLR 78, [2005] 12 EG 220, (2005) 149 SJLB 56, CA��������������������������� 1.10, 1.13 Blyth Corp’s Application, Re (1963) 14 P & CR 56, 182 EG 679, [1962] JPL 551, LT������� 16.32 Bolton v Bolton (1879) 11 Ch D 968, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.8 Bonnen v Sadler (1808) 14 Ves 526�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.239, 11.250 Bourne v McDonald [1950] 2 KB 422, [1950] 2 All ER 183, 66 TLR (Pt 2) 226, (1951) 95 SJ 435, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.3, 30.28 Bowden’s Application, Re (1984) 47 P & CR 455, [1983] JPL 819, LT���������������������� 20.93; 22.4; 23.52, 23.53 Bower & Bower v Goodyear [1986] CLY 2827, CC������������������������������������������������������������� 11.162 Bowes v Law (1869–70) LR 9 Eq 636, Ct of Chancery������������������ 11.144, 11.228, 11.229; 13.43 Bowser v Colby, 66 ER 969, (1841) 1 Hare 109, Ct of QB��������������������������������������������������� 29.26 Boyle v Tamlyn, 108 ER 473, (1827) 6 B & C 329, Ct of KB���������������������������������������������� 29.113 Bracewell v Appleby [1975] Ch 408, [1975] 2 WLR 282, [1975] 1 All ER 993, (1975) 29 P & CR 204, (1974) 119 SJ 114, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.91 Bradford Banking Co Ltd v Henry Briggs Son & Co Ltd (1886) 12 App Cas 29 HL���������� 29.58 Bradley Clare Estates Application, Re (1988) 55 P & CR 126, LT��������������������������� 16.124;19.10, 19.28, 19.39 Bramwell v Lacy (1879) 10 Ch D 691, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������� 11.127, 11.173 Bray v Fogarty, I.R 4 Eq 544������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.222 Breams Property Investment Co Ltd v Strougler [1948] 2 KB 1, [1948] 1 All ER 758, 64 TLR 292, [1948] LJR 1515, (1948) 92 SJ 238, CA�������������������������������������������������� 1.26 Brett’s Application, Re (1966) 17 P & CR 49, [1961] JPL 417, LT�������������������������������������� 16.87 Brewster v Kodgill (1698) 12 Mod Rep 166������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.51 Briarwood Estates Ltd, Re (1980) 39 P & CR 419, LT������������������������������������ 19.41; 23.13, 23.52 Bridges v Mees [1957] Ch 475, [1957] 3 WLR 215, [1957] 2 All ER 577, (1957) 101 SJ 555, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 7.19 Brierfield’s Application, Re (1978) 35 P & CR 124, LT������������������������������������� 20.26, 20.61; 22.3 Brigg v Thornton [1904] 1 Ch 386, CA������������������������������������������������������������ 1.15; 11.82, 11.235 Briggs v McCusker [1996] 2 EGLR 197������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.216 Bristol Corp v Virgin [1928] 2 KB 622, KBD����������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.15 British Empire Mutual Life Insurance Co v Cooper (1888) 4 TLR 362������������������������������� 11.121 British Railways Board v Secretary of State for the Environment [1993] 3 PLR 125, [1994] 02 EG 107, [1994] JPL 32, (1994) 158 LG Rev 661, [1993] EG 175 (CS), [1993] NPC 140, HL������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 32.13 Bromor Properties Ltd’s Application, Re (1995) 70 P & CR 569, LT������������������������ 8.22; 16.113, 16.116, 16.117; 20.26, 20.58, 20.61 Broomheads’ Application (2003) LP/7/2001������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23.53 Brotherton, Re (1908) 77 LJ Ch 58������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 16.21, 16.23 Brown v Heathlands Mental Health National Health Service Trust [1996] 1 All ER 133, (1996) 31 BMLR 57, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������ 10.34, 10.49, 10.64 Brown v Inskip (1884) Cab & El 231������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 8.22 Brown’s Application, Re (1978) 35 P & CR 254, [1977] JPL 731, LT������������������������ 16.28; 22.2, 22.16, 22.17; 23.52 Brunner v Greenslade [1971] Ch 993, [1970] 3 WLR 891, [1970] 3 All ER 833, (1971) 22 P & CR 54, (1970) 114 SJ 787, Ch D��������� 1.26; 3.1; 6.58; 8.10, 8.15, 8.22, 8.49, 8.82, 8.111, 8.119, 8.126; 15.24, 15.25 Bryant Homes Southern Ltd v Stein Management Ltd [2016] EWHC 2435 (Ch), [2017] 1 P & CR 6, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.49 Buckle v Fredericks (1890) 44 Ch D 244, CA���������������������������������������������������������� 11.137, 11.179 Buckle v Mitchell, 34 ER 255, (1812) 18 Ves Jr 100, Ct of Chancery���������������������������������� 30.6 Bushall’s Application, Re (1987) 54 P & CR 386, LT���������������������������������������� 8.22; 20.26; 23.52 Button’s Lease, Re [1964] Ch 263, [1963] 3 WLR 903, [1963] 3 All ER 708, (1963) 107 SJ 830, Ch D ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Int; 6.98; 7.1
C
C & G Homes Ltd v Secretary of State for Health [1991] Ch 365, [1991] 2 WLR 715, [1991] 2 All ER 841, (1991) 23 HLR 145, (1991) 62 P & CR 69, [1991] 06 EG 170, [1990] EG 131 (CS), CA���������������������������������������������������� 11.8, 11.9, 11.10, 11.133, 11.173, 11.196, 11.201, 11.210, 11.246
xxxvi
Table of Cases Cadbury v Woodward (No 2) (1972) 24 P & CR 335, (1972) 116 SJ 664, Ch D������������������ 28.23 Cadogan & Hans Place Estate Ltd, ex p Willis, Re (1895) 73 LT 387���������������������������������� 11.5 Caerns Motor Services Ltd v Texaco [1994] 1 WLR 1249, [1995] 1 All ER 247, [1994] 36 EG 141, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.56; 11.83; 16.33; 29.90, 29.98, 29.102 Cain’s Application, Re [2009] UKUT 212, LC��������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.108 Cala Homes (South) Ltd v Carver [2003] EWHC 1995, Ch D�������������������������������� 11.193, 11.227 Calabar Properties v Seagull Autos [1969] 1 Ch 451, [1968] 2 WLR 361, [1968] 1 All ER 1, (1968) 112 SJ 49, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.19 Caldy Manor Estate v Farrell [1974] 1 WLR 1303, [1974] 3 All ER 753, (1975) 29 P & CR 238, (1974) 118 SJ 681, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25.5, 25.7 Caledonian Associated Properties, Ltd v East Kilbride Development Corp (1985) 49 P & CR 410, [1985] JPL 264, LT������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 19.2; 22.4 Caledonian Rly Co v Walker’s Trustees (1882) 7 App Cas 259, (1882) 9 R (HL) 19, HL�������� 10.79 Calgary & Edmonton Land Co Ltd v Dobinson [1974] Ch 102, [1974] 2 WLR 143, [1974] 1 All ER 484, (1973) 26 P & CR 516, (1973) 118 SJ 99, Ch D������������������������ 9.39 Calthorpe Estate, Edgbaston, Birmingham, Re (1973) 26 P & CR 120, Ch D������������ 16.43; 28.23 Campbell v Paddington Corpn [1911] 1 KB 869, KBD�������������������������������������������������������� 11.31 Campbell’s Application, Re (1958) 9 P & CR 425, LT����������������������� 8.99; 16.110, 16.135; 22.16 Camstead Limited’s Application, Re (2004) LP/26/2003������������������������������������������������������ 19.10 Canas Property Co v KL Television Services [1970] 2 QB 433, [1970] 2 WLR 1133, [1970] 2 All ER 795, (1970) 21 P & CR 601, (1970) 114 SJ 337, CA������������������������� 29.19 Caney v Leith [1937] 2 All ER 532, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.164 Cannon v Hartley [1949] Ch 213, [1949] 1 All ER 50, 65 TLR 63, [1949] LJR 370, (1948) 92 SJ 719, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.12; 32.46, 32.51, 32.68 Cantrell v Wycombe DC [2008] EWCA Civ 866; [2009] PTSR 96, [2009] HLR 14, [2009] 1 P & CR 12, [2008] 3 EGLR 93, [2008] 41 EG 158, [2008] 32 EG 82 (CS), [2009] 1 P & CR DG4, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.1; 10.7, 10.11 Canwell Estate Co Ltd v Smith Brothers Farms Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 237, [2012] 1 WLR 2626, [2012] 2 All ER 1159, [2012] 1 P & CR 19, CA������������������������������������������������� 29.9 Capital & Suburban Properties Ltd v Swycher [1976] Ch 319, [1976] 2 WLR 822, [1976] 1 All ER 881, (1976) 32 P & CR 101, [1976] JPL 374, (1976) 120 SJ 251, CA�������� 30.19 Caradon DC v Paton (2001) 33 HLR 34, [2000] 3 EGLR 57, [2000] 35 EG 132, [2000] EG 59 (CS), (2000) 97(22) LSG 44, CA������������������������������������������������������������ 11.210 Carbury 2000’s Application (2006) LP/84/2004�������������������������������������� 1.10; 16.35, 16.36; 20.84 Carnegie v Waugh (1823) 2 Dow & Ry KB 277���������������������������������������������������������������� Int; 26.1 Carpenters Estates Ltd v Davies [1940] Ch 160, [1940] 1 All ER 13, Ch D���������� 25.3; 30.7, 30.8 Carr-Saunders v Dick McNeil Associates Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 922, [1986] 2 All ER 888, (1987) 53 P & CR 14, [1986] 2 EGLR 181, (1986) 279 EG 1359, (1986) 83 LSG 2331, (1986) 130 SJ 525, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.132 Carter v Williams (1870) LR 9 Eq 678, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������������ 1.10; 9.8, 9.20 Carter’s Application, Re (1973) 25 P & CR 542, LT������������������������������������� 16.138; 20.26, 20.42, 20.84, 20.88; 23.16 Cator v Newton [1940] 1 KB 415, [1939] 4 All ER 457, CA��������������������������������� 6.92; 25.3; 27.6 Catt v Tourle (1868–69) LR 4 Ch App 654, CA������������������������������������������������������������ 1.10; 30.27 Cave v Horsell [1912] 3 KB 533, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.112, 11.115 Cayne v Global Natural Resources Plc [1984] 1 All ER 225, CA��������������������� 13.63, 13.64, 13.66 Celsteel Ltd v Alton House Holdings Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 512, [1986] 1 All ER 608, (1986) 83 LSG 700, (1986) 130 SJ 204, CA����������������������������������������������������������������� 8.122 CH Giles & Co Ltd v Morris [1972] 1 WLR 307, [1972] 1 All ER 960, (1971) 116 SJ 176, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.5 Chamber Colliery Co Ltd v Twyerould [1915] 1 Ch 268 (Note), HL����������������������������������� 29.74 Chamberlayne v Collins (1894) 70 LT 217, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.149 Chambers v Randall [1923] 1 Ch 149, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������� 7.8, 7.11, 7.43 Chapman Morsons & Co v Guardians of Auckland Union (1889) 23 QBD 294, CA����������� 30.21 Chapman, Re (1885) 29 Ch. D. 1007, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.101 Chapman v Michaelson [1909] 1 Ch 238, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.11 Chapman’s Application, Re (1981) 42 P & CR 114, [1981] JPL 520, LT������ 16.108; 22.16; 23.52 Charrington v Simons & Co Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 598, [1971] 2 All ER 588, (1971) 22 P & CR 558; (1971) 115 SJ 265, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.42 Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 AC 1101, [2009] 3 WLR 267, [2009] 4 All ER 677, [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 365, [2009] Bus LR 1200, [2009] BLR 551, 125 Con LR 1, [2010] 1 P & CR 9, [2009] 3 EGLR 119, [2009] CILL 2729, [2009] 27 EG 91 (CS), (2009) 153(26) SJLB 27, [2009] NPC 87, [2009] NPC 86, HL������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.11
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Table of Cases Chatham BC’s Application, Re (1970) 21 P & CR 661, [1969] JPL 280, LT����������������������� 16.29 Chatsworth Estates Co v Fewell [1931] 1 Ch 224, (1957) 7 P & CR 284, Ch D������� 8.22; 11.229; 13.123, 13.144, 13.164, 13.168, 13.169, 13.180 Chaumel’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 75, LT�������������������������������������������������� 17.15; 19.43 Chelsea and Walham Green Building Society v Armstrong [1951] Ch 853, [1951] 2 All ER 250, [1951] 2 TLR 313, Ch D ����������������������������������������������������������������������������� Int; 3.4; 26.1 Chelsea Yacht & Boat Co Ltd v Pope [2000] 1 WLR 1941, [2001] 2 All ER 409, (2001) 33 HLR 25, [2000] L & TR 401, [2000] 2 EGLR 23, [2000] 22 EG 139, (2000) 80 P & CR D36, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.199 Chesterfield & Midland Silkstone Colliery Co. v Hawkins, 159 ER 698, (1865) 3 Hurl & C 678 Ct of Exchequer��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.1 Child Bros Application, Re (1959) 10 P & CR 71, LT��������������������������������������������� 16.135; 17.21; 21.9, 21.12 Child v Douglas, 69 ER 237, 43 ER 1057, (1854) 5 De GM & G 739, (1854) Kay 560, Ct of Chancery��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.1 Chitty v Bray (1883) 48 LT 860�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.141, 13.163 Chojecki’s Application, Re (2005) LP/32/2003��������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.84 Chudleigh’s Case sub nom Dillon v Freine (1595) 1 Co Rep 120��������������������������������� 1.56; 27.14 Churchill v Temple [2010] EWHC 3369 (Ch), [2011] 1 EGLR 73, [2011] 17 EG 72, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.87, 11.95, 11.101, 11.103, 11.108, 11.165 City Inn (Jersey) Ltd v Ten Trinity Square Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 156, [2008] 10 EG 167 (CS),; [2008] NPC 28, [2008] 1 P & CR DG22, CA��������������������� 11.92, 11.93, 11.94, 11.95, 11.98, 11.99 City of London Building Society v Flegg [1988] AC 54, [1987] 2 WLR 1266, [1987] 3 All ER 435, [1988] 1 FLR 98, (1987) 19 HLR 484, (1987) 54 P & CR 337, [1988] Fam Law 17, (1987) 84 LSG 1966, (1987) 137 NLJ 475, (1987) 131 SJ 806, HL������� 10.29 City of London Corpn v Fell [1994] 1 AC 458, [1993] 3 WLR 1164, [1993] 4 All ER 968, 92 LGR 1, (1995) 69 P & CR 461, [1993] 49 EG 113, (1994) 91(4) LSG 44, (1993) 143 NLJ 1747, (1994) 138 SJLB 13, [1993] NPC 162, HL������������������������������� 1.51 City of Westminster v Duke of Westminster [1994] 24 HLR 572, CA���������������������������������� 9.59 City Permanent Building Society v Miller [1952] Ch 840, [1952] 2 All ER 621, [1952] 2 TLR 547, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.40 Civil Service Cooperative Society Ltd v McGrigor’s Trustee [1923] 2 Ch 347, Ch D��������� 29.16 Clark v School Board for London (1874) 9 Ch App 120, CA����������������������������������������������� 10.37 Clarke, Applicants [2015] UKUT 44, LC������������������������������������������������������������������ 16.108; 20.26 Clavering v Ellison, 11 ER 282, (1859) 7 HL Cas 707, Ct of QB����������������������������������������� 29.4 Clearbrook Property Holdings Ltd v Verrier [1974] 1 WLR 243, [1973] 3 All ER 614, (1974) 27 P & CR 430, (1974) 118 SJ 117, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������� 13.58 Clearwater Properties Ltd, Re [2013] UKUT 210, LC������������������������������ 21.9, 21.10, 21.15; 23.8 Cleaver v Bacon (1887) 4 TLR 27����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.239 Cleeve v Mahany (1861) 9 WR 882��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.239 Clements v Welles (1865–66) LR 1 Eq 200, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������������������ 9.71 Clore v Theatrical Properties Ltd [1936] 3 All ER 483 �������������������������������������������������������� Int Coastal Partnerships Ltd v Beddy [2007] EWHC 387 (Ch), Ch D�������������������������� 11.195, 11.227 Cobb v Lane [1952] 1 All ER 1199, [1952] 1 TLR 1037, [1952] WN 196, (1952) 96 SJ 295, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.51 Coldman’s Application, Re [2012] UKUT 6 (LC), [2012] JPL 749, LC��������������������� 16.53; 20.26 Coles’ Application (2004) LP/2/2003������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 20.84 Coles v Sims, 43 ER 768, (1854) 5 De GM & G 1, Ct of Chancery����������������� 1.16; 8.5, 8.9, 8.50 Collett’s Application, Re (1964) 15 P & CR 106, [1963] JPL 613, LT������������ 20.26, 20.42; 22.16 Collins v Castle (1887) 36 Ch D 243, Ch D���������������������������������������������� 8.5; 13.37, 13.39, 13.51 Collins v Plumb, 33 ER 1057, (1810) 16 Ves Jr 454, Ct of Chancery����������������������������������� 1.51 Collins’s Applications, Re (1975) 30 P & CR 527, [1975] JPL 224, LT��������������������� 16.72, 16.74, 16.76, 16.78, 16.81; 20.26, 20.35, 20.43, 20.55, 20.61, 20.70 Colls v Home & Colonial Stores Ltd [1904] AC 179, HL����������������������������������������������������� 13.96 Colyear v Countess of Mulgrave, 48 ER 559, (1836) 2 Keen 81, Ct of Chancery���������������� 26.1 Congleton Corpn v Pattison, 103 ER 725, (1808) 10 East 130, Ct of KB������������������������ 1.25, 1.26 Cooke v Chilcott (1876) 3 Ch D 694, Ch D������������������������������������������������ 28.5, 28.7; 30.6, 30.27 Cooker v Child, 83 ER 456, (1671) 2 Lev 74, Ct of KB���������������������������������������������������� Int; 26.1 Coombes‘ Application, Re [2012] UKUT 112 (LC), [2013] RVR 79, LC���������������������������� 19.55 Coombs v Cook (1883) Cab & El 75����������������������������������������������������������� 11.137, 11.243, 11.249
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Table of Cases Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1996] Ch 286, [1996] 3 WLR 27, [1996] 3 All ER 934, (1996) 72 P & CR 130, [1996] 1 EGLR 71, [1996] 09 EG 128, [1995] NPC 199, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.5 Cooperative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd [1998] AC 1, [1997] 2 WLR 898, [1997] 3 All ER 297, [1997] CLC 1114, [1997] 1 EGLR 52, [1997] 23 EG 141, [1997] EG 81 (CS), (1997) 94(26) LSG 30, (1997) 147 NLJ 845, (1997) 141 SJLB 131, [1997] NPC 79, HL����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.45, 13.65 Cooperative Retail Services Ltd v Tesco Stores Ltd (1998) 76 P & CR 328, [1998] EG 5 (CS), [1998] NPC 5, (1998) 75 P & CR D46, CA��������������������� 11.123, 11.188, 11.236 Coparcener’s Case (undated) YB 42 Edw 3��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27.6 Cordwell’s Application, Re (2008) LP/40/2006����������������������������������������������������������� 20.26, 20.34 Cordwell, Re [2008] 2 P & CR 26, LT���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.113 Cornick’s Application, Re (1994) 68 P & CR 372, LT���������������������������������������� 21.8, 23.53, 23.54 Cornish v Brook Green Laundry [1959] 1 QB 394, [1959] 2 WLR 215, [1959] 1 All ER 373, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.5 Coronation Street Industrial Properties v Ingall Industries plc [1989] 1 WLR 304, [1989] 1 All ER 979, (1990) 59 P & CR 8, [1989] 24 EG 125, [1989] EG 44 (CS), (1989) 86(14) LSG 46, (1989) 139 NLJ 400, (1989) 133 SJ 455, HL�������������������������������������� 1.27 Cosmichome Ltd v Southampton City Council [2013] EWHC 1378 (Ch), [2013] 1 WLR 2436, [2013] 2 P & CR 13, [2014] 1 EGLR 171, Ch D����������� 1.48, 1.49; 16.41; 32.40 Coulsdon and Purley Urban DC’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 16, LT������������������������ 16.26 Coventry School Foundation Trustees v Whitehouse [2013] EWCA Civ 885, [2014] 1 P & CR 4, [2013] 3 EGLR 85, [2013] 2 P & CR DG24, CA����������������������������������� 11.130; 14.11 Cowderoy’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 184, 166 EG 225, [1955] JPL 759, LT�������� 16.135 Cox & Neve’s Contract, Re [1891] 2 Ch 109, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������� 8.104 Cox’s Application, Re (1986) 51 P & CR 335, [1985] JPL 564, LT��������������������������� 16.74, 16.76, 16.80,16.138; 17.1, 17.12; 19.51 Crampton v Varna Railway Co (1871–72) LR 7 Ch App 562����������������������������������������������� 30.5 Crawley v Wolff (1888) 4 TLR 434������������������������������������������������������� 11.31, 11.75, 11.154; 25.4 Cresswell v Proctor [1968] 1 WLR 906, [1968] 2 All ER 682, (1968) 19 P & CR 516, (1968) 112 SJ 420, CA�������������������������������������������������������� 16.61, 16.65, 16.83, 16.85, 16.86, 16.89, 16.118; 24.107, 24.109 Crest Homes plc’s Application, Re (1983) 48 P & CR 309��������������������������������������������� 1.70; 11.3 Crest Nicholson Residential (South) Ltd v McAllister [2004] EWCA Civ 410, [2004] 1 WLR 2409, [2004] 2 All ER 991, [2004] 2 P & CR 26, [2004] 2 EGLR 79, [2004] 24 EG 150, [2004] 15 EG 105 (CS), (2004) 148 SJLB 420, [2004] NPC 54, CA��������������������������������������������������������������� 6.36, 6.43, 6.80, 6.81, 6.86, 6.87; 7.38, 7.40; 11.22, 11.26, 11.83, 11.86, 11.87, 11.88, 11.95, 11.104, 11.109, 11.110, 11.194, 11.197, 11.215, 11.216; 27.10, 27.11; 33.9 Crestfort Ltd v Tesco Stores Ltd [2005] EWHC 805 (Ch), [2005] L & TR 20, [2005] 3 EGLR 25, [2005] 37 EG 148, [2005] NPC 74, Ch D���������������������������������������������������� 25.7 Croft (Bickershaw) Ltd’s Application, Re [2017] UKUT 339, LC��������������������������������������� 16.27 Croft v London & County Banking Co (1885) 14 QBD 347, CA�������������������������������� 29.26, 29.30 Crow v Wood [1971] 1 QB 77, [1970] 3 WLR 516, [1970] 3 All ER 425, (1970) 21 P & CR 929, (1970) 114 SJ 474, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.8; 29.114, 29.115 Crowe & Heaton’s Application, Re (2008) LP/34/2006�������������������������������������������������������� 24.138 Cryer v Scott Bros (Sunbury) Ltd (1986) 55 P & CR 183, CA�������������������� 1.37, 1.43, 1.52; 8.22; 11.106, 11.107, 11.146, 11.147, 11.162, 11.164, 11.167, 11.169; 13.12; 15.20, 15.22; 16.108 Cutting v Derby, 96 ER 633, (1776) 2 Wm Bl 1075, Ct of KB��������������������������������������������� 29.15 Cygnet Healthcare Ltd v Greenswan Consultants Ltd [2009] EWHC 1318 (Ch), Ch D������ 9.62
D
Da Costa, Re; sub nom Clarke v Church of England Collegiate School of St Peter [1912] 1 Ch. 337, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.4 Da Costa’s Application, Re (1986) 52 P & CR 99, [1986] JPL 297, LT������������������������ 6.41, 6.91; 16.5; 20.40, 20.84 Dakins v Antrobus (1881) 17 Ch D 615, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.35 Dano v Earl Cadogan [2003] EWHC 239 (Ch), [2003] HLR 51, [2003] 2 P & CR 10, [2003] 12 EG 128 (CS), [2003] NPC 26, Ch D����������������������������������������������� 1.27, 1.34, 1.37 Dare’s and Beck’s Application, Re (1974) 28 P & CR 354, LT������������������������ 21.12, 21.17, 21.22 Dartmouths’ Application (2006) LP/64/2004������������������������������������������ 23.3; 24.28, 24.29, 24.30
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Table of Cases Dartstone Ltd v Cleveland Petroleum Co Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1807, [1969] 3 All ER 668, (1969) 20 P & CR 795, (1969) 113 SJ 626, Ch D����������������������� Int; 9.26; 16.16; 25.9; 28.13 Davie’s Application, Re [2006] UKUT 462, LC������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.108 Davies’ Application, Re (2006) LP/65/2006������������������������������������������������������� 20.6, 20.32, 20.33 Davies’ Application, Re (2000) LP/34/1999������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23.54 Davies, Re (1973) 25 P & CR 115, LT��������������������������������������������������� 11.158; 19.5, 20.9, 20.26, 20.58, 20.61; 22.16 Davies v Gas Light & Coke Co [1909] 1 Ch 708, CA����������������������������������������������������������� 30.28 Davies v Jones [2009] EWCA Civ 1164, [2010] 2 All ER (Comm) 755, [2010] 1 P & CR 22, [2010] 1 EGLR 67, [2010] 5 EG 114, [2009] 46 EG 142 (CS), [2009] NPC 126, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.82 Davies v Marshall (1861) 31 LJCP 61����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.49 Davis v Leicester Corpn [1894] 2 Ch 208, CA���������������������������������������� 1.65; 8.22; 11.156; 15.13 Davis’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 172, LT���������������������������������������������� 17.23; 19.8, 19.9, 19.15, 19.19, 19.22 Dawes v Tredwell (1881) 18 Ch D 354, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.3 Day v Hosebay Ltd [2012] UKSC 41, [2012] 1 WLR 2884, [2012] 4 All ER 1347, [2012] HLR 48, [2013] 1 P & CR 9, [2013] L & TR 3, [2012] 3 EGLR 33, [2012] 43 EG 116, [2012] RVR 359, [2012] 42 EG 132 (CS), (2012) 156(39) SJLB 31, SC��������������������� 11.198 Day v Waldron (1919) 120 LT 634, (1919) 88 LJKB 937���������������������������������������� 11.121, 11.202 De Brassac v Martyn (1863) 2 New Rep 512������������������������������������������������������������������������ 30.19 De Mattos v Gibson, 45 ER 108, (1859) 4 De G & J 276, Ct of QB ������������������������������������ Int Dean v Freeborn [2017] UKUT 203, LC������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.108; 22.11 Deans’ Application, Re. See Dean v Freeborn Deerfield Travel Services v Wardens and Society of the Mistery or Art of the Leather Sellers of the City of London (1983) 46 P & CR 132, CA�������������������������������������������� 16.54 Defries v Milne [1913] 1 Ch 98, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.57 Dendy v Evans [1910] 1 KB 263, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.5 Dennis v Davies [2009] EWCA Civ 1081, [2010] 1 EGLR 81, [2010] 3 EG 104, (2009) 153(41) SJLB 30, [2009] NPC 117, [2010] 1 P & CR DG13, CA������� 11.135, 11.136 Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906, [2014] 1 WLR 3926, [2015] 1 All ER 880, [2014] CP Rep 40, [2014] BLR 547, 154 Con LR 1, [2014] 4 Costs LR 752, [2014] CILL 3568, (2014) 164(7614) NLJ 17, CA������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.66 Derby Motor Cab Co v Crompton and Evans Union Bank (1913) 29 TLR 673������������������� 11.114 Derreb Ltd v Blackheath Cator Estate Residents Ltd [2017] UKUT 209, LC���������������������� 18.5 Derreb Ltd v White [2015] UKUT 667, LC�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.48 Derwent Holdings Ltd v Trafford BC [2011] EWCA Civ 832, [2011] NPC 78, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 32.23, 32.24 Dilieto v Ealing LBC [2000] QB 381, [1998] 3 WLR 1403, [1998] 2 All ER 885, [1998] 2 PLR 98, [1998] PLCR 212, DC����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.15 Direct Travel Insurance v McGeown [2003] EWCA Civ 1606, [2004] 1 All ER (Comm) 609, [2004] Lloyd’s Rep IR 599, (2003) 147 SJLB 1365, CA������������������������������������ 11.21 Dobbin v Redpath [2007] EWCA Civ 570, [2007] 4 All ER 465, (2007) 104(20) LSG 29, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.117; 20.26 Dobbin’s Application, Re (2006) LP/ LP/59/2004���������������������������������������������������������������� 20.26 Dobbs v Linford [1953] 1 QB 48, [1952] 2 All ER 827, [1952] 2 TLR 727, (1952) 96 SJ 763, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.110, 11.197 Doberman v Watson [2017] EWHC 1708 (Ch), [2017] 4 WLR 103, [2017] HLR 41, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.12; 16.27; 24.34, 24.37 Doe d Ambler v Woodbridge, 109 ER 140, (1829) 9 B & C 376, Ct of KB������������������������� 11.71 Doe d Anglesea v Rugeley (Churchwardens) 115 ER 41, (1844) 6 QB 107, Ct of QB��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.62; 15.26 Doe d Biass v Horsley, 110 ER 1400, (1834) 1 Ad & El 766 Ct of KB�������������������������������� 29.15 Doe d Bish v Keeling, 105 ER 36, (1813) 1 M & S 95, Ct of KB����������������������������������������� 11.246 Doe d Flower v Peck, 109 ER 847, (1830) 1 B & Ad 428, Ct of KB������������������������������������ 11.71 Doe d Freeman v Bateman, 106 ER 328, (1818) 2 B & Ald 168, Ct of KB�������������������������� 29.4 Doe d Gaskell v Spry, 106 ER 227, (1818) 1 B & Ald 617, Ct of KB���������������������������������� 11.250 Doe d Harris v Masters, 107 ER 466, (1824) 2 B & C 490, Ct of KB���������������������������������� 29.26 Doe d Lambert v Roe (1835) 3 Dowl 557����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.25 Doe d MacKenzie v Baylis (1851) 17 LTOS 172 ���������������������������������������������������� 11.229, 11.245 Doe d Mence v Hadley (1849) 14 LTOS 102������������������������������������������������������������������������ 30.31 Doe d Palk, Bart v Marchetti, 109 ER 953, (1831) 1 B & Ad 715, Ct of KB����������������������� 11.121 Doe d Wetherell v Bird, 111 ER 63, (1834) 2 Ad & El 161, Ct of KB�������� 11.173, 11.239, 11.250
xl
Table of Cases Doherty v Allman (1878) 3 App Cas 709, HL������������������ 1.20; 10.86; 13.31, 13.32, 13.36, 13.39, 13.43, 13.47, 13.48, 13.52, 13.83 Doig’s Application, Re (1981) 41 P & CR 261, [1980] JPL 687, LT�������������������������� 20.26, 20.84, 20.88; 23.26 Doloughan’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 46, LT��������������������������������������������������������� 19.7 Dolphin Maritime & Aviation Services Ltd v Sveriges Angfarygs Forening [2009] EWHC 716 (Comm), [2010] 1 All ER (Comm) 473, [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 123, [2009] 1 CLC 460, [2009] ILPr 52, QBD��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.10 Dolphin’s Conveyance, Re [1970] Ch 654, [1970] 3 WLR 31, [1970] 2 All ER 664, (1970) 21 P & CR 511, (1970) 114 SJ 266, Ch D��������������������������������������������� 8.43, 8.49, 8.53, 8.58, 8.71, 8.80, 8.81; 14.33 Dove’s Application, Re, LP/28/1990������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23.54 Downie v Turner [1951] 2 KB 112, [1951] 1 All ER 416, [1951] 1 TLR 217, (1951) 95 SJ 60, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.110 Dowsett Land Investments Application, Re (1960) 11 P & CR 394, LT������������������������������� 21.8 Dr Barnardo’s Homes National Inc Association’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 176, 166 EG 29, [1955] JPL 603, 105 LJ 460, LT����������������������������������������������������������������� 19.25 Drake v Gray [1936] Ch 451, CA������������������������������������������������������������������ 6.12, 6.13, 6.18, 6.53, 6.57, 6.66, 6.67, 6.68 Dransfield’s Application, Re (1976) 31 P & CR 192, [1975] JPL 539, LT������ 16.96; 20.84; 23.24 Dreyfus v Peruvian Guano Co (1889) 43 Ch D 316, CA������������������������������������������������������ 30.21 Driscoll v Church Comrs for England [1957] 1 QB 330, [1956] 3 WLR 996, [1956] 3 All ER 802, (1957) 7 P & CR 371, (1956) 100 SJ 872, CA������������������� 1.29; 16.5, 16.56, 16.60; 19.34, 19.35, 19.39; 24.107 Drive Yourself Hire Co (London) Ltd v Strutt [1954] 1 QB 250, [1953] 3 WLR 1111, [1953] 2 All ER 1475, (1953) 97 SJ 874, CA������������������������������������������������������ Int; 3.4; 26.1 Dublin, Earl of Pembroke v Warren [1896] 1 IR 76�������������������������������������������������������������� 11.239 Duffields’ Application, Re (2007) LP/36/2006���������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.26 Dugdale, Re (1888) 38 Ch D 176, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.4 Duke of Bedford v British Museum Trustees, 39 ER 1055, (1822) 2 My & K 552, Ct of Chancery��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.3, 1.10; 13.165, 13.166; 16.53; 30.6 Duke of Devonshire v Brookshaw (1899) 81 LT 83��������������������������������������������������� 11.32, 11.239 Duke of Devonshire v Simmons (1894) 11 TLR 52������������������������������������������������� 11.137, 11.233 Duke of Leeds v Amherst, 41 ER 886, (1846) 10 Jur 956, (1846) 2 Ph 117, (1846) 16 LJ Ch. 5, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������������������������������������ 13.120, 13.147 Duke of Northumberland v Bowman (1887) 56 LT 773�������������������������������������������������������� 13.139 Duke of Westminster v Guild [1985] QB 688, [1984] 3 WLR 630, [1984] 3 All ER 144, (1984) 48 P & CR 42, (1983) 267 EG 762, (1984) 128 SJ 581, CA����������������������������� 11.26 Duke of Westminster v Swinton [1948] 1 KB 524, [1948] 1 All ER 248, (1948) 92 SJ 97, KBD������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.30 Dulwich College Estate’s Application, Re (1973) 231 EG 845��������������������������������������������� 28.23 Dunn v Blackdown Properties [1961] Ch 433, [1961] 2 WLR 618, [1961] 2 All ER 62, (1961) 125 JP 397, (1961) 105 SJ 257, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������� 29.62 Dunn v Flood (1885) 28 Ch D 586, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.4, 29.36 Duppa v Mayho (1669) 1 Wms Saund 275���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.15 Dutton v Poole, 83 ER 523, (1677) 2 Lev 210, Ct of KB������������������������������������������������������ Int Dyson v Foster [1909] AC 98, HL���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.51, 1.57; 3.4
E
E & GC Ltd v Bate (1935) 79 L Jo 203��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28.8 Eagle v Charing Cross Rly Co (1867) LR 2 CP 637, Ct of Common Pleas�������������������������� 10.86 Eagling v Gardner [1970] 2 All ER 838, (1970) 21 P & CR 723, (1970) 114 SJ 531, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.45; 8.68, 8.70, 8.75, 8.78, 8.86 Earl of Cadogan v Guinness [1936] Ch 515, [1936] 2 All ER 29, [2008] BTC 7107, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.12, 16.14 Earl of Leicester v Wells-next-to-the-Sea UDC [1973] Ch 110, [1972] 3 WLR 486, [1972] 3 All ER 77, (1972) 24 P & CR 72, (1972) 116 SJ 647, Ch D����������� 1.26, 1.37, 1.41, 1.51, 1.52, 1.66; 7.8, 7.12, 7.14; 10.61; 11.61 Earl of Sefton v Tophams Ltd (No.2) [1965] Ch 1140, [1965] WLR 523, [1965] 3 All ER 1, (1965) 109 SJ 456, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.83, 13.86 Earl of Zetland v Hislop (1882) 7 App Cas 427, (1882) 9 R (HL) 40, HL������������������ 8.22; 13.163
xli
Table of Cases Easterby v Sampson, 130 ER 1429, (1830) 6 Bing 644, Ct of Comm Pleas������������������������� 29.102 Eastleigh BC v Town Quay Developments Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1391, [2010] 2 P & CR 2, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.166 Eastwood v Lever, 46 ER 859, (1863) 4 De GJ & S 114, Ct of Chancery���������������� 4.2, 4.7; 7.12; 13.78, 13.101 Ecclesiastical Comrs for England’s Conveyance, Re [1936] Ch 430, (1957) 7 P & CR 298, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.4; 6.9; 11.116; 14.20; 26.4, 26.7 Edward’s Application, Re (1984) 47 P & CR 458, 194 EG 965, [1965] JPL 441, LT������ 20.84; 23.27 Edwards Application, Re (1960) 11 P & CR 403, CA����������������������������������������������� 11.36; 24.107 Edler v Auerbach [1950] 1 KB 359, [1949] 2 All ER 692, 65 TLR 645, (1949–51) 1 P & CR 10, (1949) 93 SJ 727, KBD��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.53 Egerton v Brownlow, 10 ER 359, (1853) 4 HL Cas 1, Ct of QB������������������������������������������� 29.4 Egerton v Harding [1975] QB 62, [1974] 3 WLR 437, [1974] 3 All ER 689, (1974) 28 P & CR 369, (1974) 118 SJ 565, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 29.113 Elaen & Co’s Application, Re (1963) 14 P & CR 230, [1963] JPL 193, LT������������������������� 16.45 Ellenborough Park, Re [1956] Ch 131, [1955] 3 WLR 892, [1955] 3 All ER 667, (1955) 99 SJ 870, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.230 Elliman Sons & Co v Carrington & Son Ltd [1901] 2 Ch 275, Ch D����������������������������������� Int Elliott v Pierson [1948] Ch 452, [1948] 1 All ER 939, [1948] LJR 1452, (1948) 92 SJ 271, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.110 Elliott v Safeway Stores Plc [1995] 1 WLR 1396, Ch D������������������������������ 11.179, 11.185; 14.11 Ellis v Rogers (1884) 29 Ch D 661, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.32, 10.33 Ellis v Torrington [1920] 1 KB 399, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.57 Elliston v Reacher [1908] 2 Ch 374, Ch D�������������������������� 3.1; 8.10, 8.11, 8.18, 8.23, 8.47, 8.50, 8.52, 8.55, 8.56, 8.78, 8.91, 8.95; 11.233; 13.50, 13.91, 13.143; 15.25; 33.11 Emery’s Application, Re (1957) 8 P & CR 113, LT�������������������������������������������������� 16.108; 22.16 EMI Social Centres Ltd’s Application, Re (1980) 39 P & CR 421, [1980] JPL 185, LT��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.86; 22.17; 23.2, 23.13, 23.33, 23.42 Emile Elias & Co Ltd v Pine Groves Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 305, (1993) 66 P & CR 1, [1993] EG 31 (CS), (1993) 137 SJLB 52, [1993] NPC 30, PC (T&T)������������� 8.39, 8.46, 8.64, 8.79, 8.81, 8.83, 8.89; 11.6 Endericks’ Conveyance, Re [1973] 1 All ER 843, (1972) 25 P & CR 254������������������ 11.8, 11.216 Engel v Fitch (1868–69) LR 4 QB 659, Ct of Exchequer����������������������������������������������������� 13.80 English v Emery Reimbold & Strick Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 605, [2002] 1 WLR 2409, [2002] 3 All ER 385, [2002] CPLR 520, [2003] IRLR 710, [2002] UKHRR 957, (2002) 99(22) LSG 34, (2002) 152 NLJ 758, (2002) 146 SJLB 123, CA��������������������� 24.101 Equity & Law Home Loans Ltd v Prestridge [1992] 1 WLR 137, [1992] 1 All ER 909, [1992] 1 FLR 485, [1992] 1 FCR 353, (1992) 24 HLR 76, (1992) 63 P & CR 403, [1992] Fam Law 288, (1992) 89(2) LSG 31, [1991] NPC 103, CA������������������������������ 15.10 ER Ives Investment Ltd v High [1967] 2 QB 379, [1967] 2 WLR 789, [1967] 1 All ER 504, (1966) 110 SJ 963, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 8.117, 8.122; 29.72 Errington v Birt (1911) 105 LT 373��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.132 Escritt’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 134, 164 EG 576, [1954] JPL 883, LT�������������� 19.15 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] AC 269, [1967] 2 WLR 871, [1967] 1 All ER 699, (1967) 111 SJ 174, HL�������������������������������������� 12.1, 12.2 Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Kingswood Motors (Addlestone) Ltd [1974] QB 142, [1973] 3 WLR 780, [1973] 3 All ER 1057, [1973] CMLR 665, (1973) 117 SJ 852, QBD��������� 29.94 Ethel & Mitchells & Butlers’ Contract, Re [1901] 1 Ch 945, Ch D�������������������������������������� 11.38 Eton College v Nassar [1991] 2 EGLR 271��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28.23 Evans v Clayhope Properties Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 358, [1988] 1 All ER 444, (1988) 4 BCC 27, [1988] BCLC 238, (1988) 20 HLR 176, [1988] 03 EG 95, (1988) 85(9) LSG 46, (1988) 132 SJ 302, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.20 Everett v Remington [1892] 3 Ch 148, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������� 1.42; 11.107 Expert Clothing Service & Sales Ltd v Hillgate House Ltd [1986] Ch 340, [1985] 3 WLR 359, [1985] 2 All ER 998, (1985) 50 P & CR 317, [1985] 2 EGLR 85, (1985) 275 EG 1011, (1985) 82 LSG 2010, (1985) 129 SJ 484, CA����������������������������������������������������� 29.16 Eyre v Landi [1865] The Times, 1 June��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.132
F
F & H Joyce’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 245, 167 EG 625, [1956] JPL 382, LT������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.7, 19.15, 19.22 Fairclough Homes Ltd’s Application, Re (2004) LP/30/2001�������������������� 20.23; 23.15; 24.133
xlii
Table of Cases Fairclough v Marshall (1878) 4 Ex D 37, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.51 Fairweather v St Marylebone Property Co Ltd [1963] AC 510, [1962] 2 WLR 1020, [1962] 2 All ER 288, (1962) 106 SJ 368, HL������������������������������������������������������������ 1.51; 9.6; 10.13; 11.43; 32.61 Falgor Commercial SA v Alsabahia Inc (1986) 18 HLR 123, [1986] 1 EGLR 41, (1985) 277 EG 185, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.209 Farmiloe’s and Smith’s Application (1984) 48 P & CR 317, [1984] JPL 519, LT�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.103, 16.108; 22.9, 22.16; 23.52 Faruqi v English Real Estates Ltd [1979] 1 WLR 963, (1979) 38 P & CR 318, (1978) 251 EG 1285, (1979) 123 SJ 321, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.49 Fawcett & Holmes Contract, Re (1889) 42 Ch D 150, CA������������������������������������ 1.8, 1.56; 11.82 Fawcett Properties Ltd v Buckingham County Council [1961] AC 636, [1960] 3 WLR 831, [1960] 3 All ER 503, (1961) 125 JP 8, 59 LGR 69, (1961) 12 P & CR 1, (1960) 104 SJ 912, HL��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.36 Federated Homes Ltd v McAllister [2004] EWCA Civ 410, [2004] 1 WLR 2409, [2004] 2 All ER 991, [2004] 2 P & CR 26, [2004] 2 EGLR 79, [2004] 24 EG 150, [2004] 15 EG 105 (CS), (2004) 148 SJLB 420, [2004] NPC 54, CA������������������������������������� 1.26; 6.26, 6.35, 6.36, 6.37 Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 594, [1980] 1 All ER 371, (1980) 39 P & CR 576, (1979) 254 EG 39, (1980) 124 SJ 412, CA�������������� 1.44, 1.47; 6.5, 6.31, 6.32, 6.34, 6.42, 6.49, 6.55, 6.56, 6.58, 6.64, 6.65, 6.67, 6.69, 6.74, 6.76, 6.77, 6.78, 6.79, 6.82, 6.95, 6.96, 6.106; 7.5, 7.30, 7.42; 11.44; 13.21, 13.30, 13.92; 15.4; 27.4, 27.37; 28.11; 29.50 Feilden v Byrne [1926] Ch 620, (1957) 7 P & CR 276, Ch D���������������������������������� 13.178, 13.182 Fellowes & Son v Fisher [1976] QB 122, [1975] 3 WLR 184, [1975] 2 All ER 829, (1975) 119 SJ 390, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13.62, 13.63, 13.66 Fenner v Wilson [1893] 2 Ch 656, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.55 Ferguson v Wilson (1866–67) LR 2 Ch App 77, CA���������������������������������������������������� 30.19, 30.23 Ferryman’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 69, [1952] CPL 568, LT����������� 19.10, 19.15, 19.22 Fettishaw Properties Application (No 1), Re (1974) 27 P & CR 139, [1974] JPL 33, LT���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.12 Fettishaw Properties Application (No 2), Re (1974) 27 P & CR 292, LT������� 20.16; 21.12, 21.16, 21.22, 21.23; 22.5 FG Whitley & Sons Co Ltd v Secretary of State for Wales (1992) 64 P & CR 296, [1992] 3 PLR 72, [1992] JPL 856, [1992] EG 46 (CS), [1992] NPC 45, CA��������������� 32.14 Films Rover International Ltd v Cannon Film Sales Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 670, [1986] 3 All ER 772, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.70, 13.71 Financial Services Authority v Rourke (t/a JE Rourke & Co) [2002] CP Rep 14, (2001) 98(46) LSG 36, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.14 Finchley Electric Light Co v Finchley UDC [1903] 1 Ch 437, CA��������������������������������������� 1.53 Findlay & Co’s Application, Re (1964) 15 P & CR 94, [1963] JPL 345, LT���������������� 19.2; 21.12 First National Bank Plc v Thompson [1996] Ch 231, [1996] 2 WLR 293, [1996] 1 All ER 140, [1996] 5 Bank LR 113, (1996) 72 P & CR 118, (1995) 92(28) LSG 30, (1995) 139 SJLB 189, [1995] NPC 130, (1996) 71 P & CR D14, CA�������������������������� 15.10 Fisher & Gimson (Builders) Ltd’s Application, Re (1993) 65 P & CR 312, [1993] JPL 260, LT����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.118; 19.44; 20.12, 20.26, 20.39, 20.42 Fisher’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 153, LT��������������������������������������������������������������� 16.135 Fisher v Brooker [2009] UKHL 41, [2009] 1 WLR 1764, [2009] 4 All ER 789, [2009] Bus LR 1334, [2009] ECDR 17, [2010] EMLR 2, [2009] FSR 25, (2009) 32(9) IPD 32061, (2009) 153(31) SJLB 29, HL���������������������������������������������������������� 13.11,13.33, 13.37, 13.52, 13.122, 13.123, 13.126, 13.130, 13.146, 13.149, 13.154 Fisher’s Application, Re (2009) LP/31/2006�������������������������������������������������� 20.26; 24.83, 24.136 Fitz v Iles [1893] 1 Ch 77, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.177, 11.179 Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ Int Flavell, Re (1883) 25 Ch D 89, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.1 Fletcher v Birkenhead Corpn [1907] 1 KB 205, CA��������������������������������������������������� 10.43, 10.45, 10.46, 10.52 Flight v Bentley, 58 ER 793, (1835) 7 Sim 149, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������������ Int Flint v Brandon, 32 ER 314, (1803) 8 Ves Jr 159, Ct of Chancery��������������������������������������� 30.5 Flogas v Warrington (t/a Robin Sutton Gases & Calor Gas Ltd) [2007] EWHC 1303, QBD�������� 13.65
xliii
Table of Cases Foleys’ Application, Re (2008) LP/58/2006�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.82 Foli v Devonshire Club (1887) 3 TLR 706���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.31 Ford-Camber v Deanminster Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 458, (2007) 151 SJLB 713, CA��������� 10.71 Forestmere Properties‘ Application, Re (1981) 41 P & CR 390, [1981] JPL 125, LT��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.33, 16.138, 16.139; 17.1, 17.12, 17.15; 19.2, 19.43 Forgacs‘ and Garrett’s Application, Re (1976) 32 P & CR 464, [1976] JPL 637, LT���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.106, 16.108; 22.4, 22.11 Formby v Barker [1903] 2 Ch 539, CA����������������������������������� 1.6, 1.7, 1.20, 1.21, 1.51, 1.70; 7.3, 7.43; 11.4, 11.232; 13.38; 26.3 Forster v Baker [1910] 2 KB 636, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.11 Forster v Elvet Colliery Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 629, CA����������������������������������������������������� 1.51, 1.57 Fortescue v Lostwithiel & Fowey Railway Co [1894] 3 Ch 621, Ch D�������������������������������� 30.5 Foster and Wilson v Mapes, 78 ER 468, (1589) Cro Eliz. 212, Ct of KB����������������������������� 26.3 Foster v Fraser [1893] 3 Ch 158, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.141 Frampton v Gillison [1927] 1 Ch 196, CA��������������������������������������������������������������� 11.173, 11.250 Freeman Thomas Indenture, Re [1957] 1 WLR 560, [1957] 1 All ER 532, (1957) 121 JP 189, 55 LGR 232, (1957) 8 P & CR 175, (1957) 101 SJ 320, Ch D�������������������� 14.28, 14.30 Freer v Unwins Ltd [1976] Ch 288, [1976] 2 WLR 609, [1976] 1 All ER 634, (1976) 31 P & CR 335, (1975) 120 SJ 267, Ch D������������������������������������������������������ 9.36, 9.46, 9.56, 9.60, 9.63, 9.65 Fritz v Hobson (1880) 14 Ch D 542, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.110 Frost v King Edward VII Welsh National Memorial Association for Prevention Treatment and Abolition of Tuberculosis [1918] 2 Ch 180, Ch D�������������������������������� 11.127, 11.229, 11.239 Fulham Football Club Ltd v Cabra Estates Plc [1992] BCC 863, [1994] 1 BCLC 363, (1993) 65 P & CR 284, [1993] 1 PLR 29, (1992) 136 SJLB 267, CA������������������ 25.6; 29.54
G
G v G (Minors: Custody Appeal) [1985] 1 WLR 647, [1985] 2 All ER 225, [1985] FLR 894, [1985] Fam Law 321, (1985) 82 LSG 2010, (1985) 83 LSG 2010, (1985) 135 NLJ 439, (1985) 129 SJ 315, HL����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.109 Gadd’s Land Transfer, Re [1966] Ch 56, [1965] 3 WLR 325, [1965] 2 All ER 800, (1965) 109 SJ 555, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.26, 1.52, 1.53; 6.59; 13.12; 14.6, 14.10, 14.18; 16.21 Gaffney’s Application, Re (1978) 35 P & CR 440, [1975] JPL 159, LT��������������������� 20.26, 20.39, 20.84, 20.88; 23.52 Gafford v Graham (1999) 77 P & CR 73, [1999] 3 EGLR 75, [1999] 41 EG 159, (1998) 95(21) LSG 36, (1999) 96(40) LSG 44, (1998) 142 SJLB 155, [1998] NPC 66, (1998) 76 P & CR D18, CA������������������������������������������������ 13.59, 13.60, 13.61, 13.98, 13.99, 13.106, 13.125, 13.129, 13.136 Gaskin v Balls (1879) 13 Ch D 324, CA��������������������������������������������������� 8.5; 11.65, 11.74, 11.75 Gateshead Corps Application, Re (1961) 12 P & CR 265, LT��������������������������� 19.12; 22.4, 22.16 Gee v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty [1966] 1 WLR 170, [1966] 1 All ER 954, (1966) 17 P & CR 6, (1965) 109 SJ 935, CA�������������� 10.13; 16.47, 16.64, 16.65, 16.108, 16.118, 16.120, 16.134; 20.88; 24.107, 24.109 George Reed (Builders) Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 227, [1956] JPL 303, LT����������� 19.22 George Wimpey Bristol Ltd v Gloucestershire Housing Association Ltd [2011] UKUT 91, LC������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.125, 16.126, 16.127, 16.129; 20.82 German v Chapman (1877) 7 Ch D 271, CA���������������������������������������������������������� 11.229; 13.163, 13.170; 16.53 Ghey’s Application, Re; Galton’s Application, Re [1957] 2 QB 650, [1957] 3 WLR 562, [1957] 3 All ER 164, (1958) 9 P & CR 1, (1957) 101 SJ 679, CA����������������������� 16.5, 16.56, 16.58, 16.76, 16.103, 16.118; 17.1, 17.10, 17.27, 17.29; 20.6; 22.9, 22.16; 24.107 Gibbs v Guild [1882] 9 QBD 59, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13.117 Gilbert v Spoor [1983] Ch 27, [1982] 3 WLR 183, [1982] 2 All ER 576, (1982) 44 P & CR 239, (1982) 126 SJ 260, CA����������������������������������������������� 1.26, 1.27; 16.74, 16.112, 16.116; 20.20, 20.25, 20.26, 20.28; 22.16 Gilbey v Copley (1683) 3 Lev 138���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.1
xliv
Table of Cases Gill v Lewis [1956] 2 QB 1, [1956] 2 WLR 962, [1956] 1 All ER 844, (1956) 100 SJ 299, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.26 Gillingham Borough Council v Medway (Chatham) Dock Co Ltd [1993] QB 343, [1992] 3 WLR 449, [1992] 3 All ER 923, [1993] Env LR 98, 91 LGR 160, (1992) 63 P & CR 205, [1992] 1 PLR 113, [1992] JPL 458, [1991] EG 101 (CS), [1991] NPC 97, QBD������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.96 Glass v Kencakes Ltd [1966] 1 QB 611, [1965] 2 WLR 363, [1964] 3 All ER 807, (1965) 109 SJ 155, QBD����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.61 Glevum Estates (Western Counties)’ Application, Re LP/53/1972��������������������������������������� 20.6 GLN (Copenhagen) Southern Ltd v ABC Cinemas Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1279, [2005] LLR 282, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.15, 11.123, 11.124, 11.186 Goddard v Midland Rly Co (1891) 8 TLR 126��������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.159 Golden Lion Hotel (Hunstanton) Ltd v Carter [1965] 1 WLR 1189, [1965] 3 All ER 506, (1965) 109 SJ 648, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1.51; 8.22 Goldsmith’s Application, Re (1962) 13 P & CR 209, 179 EG 255, [1961] JPL 621, LT���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.63, 16.90, 16.118 Goldsoll v Goldman [1915] 1 Ch 292, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.47 Good v Epping Forest DC [1994] 1 WLR 376, [1994] 2 All ER 156, 92 LGR 306, [1993] 3 PLR 135, [1994] 27 EG 135, [1993] EG 188 (CS), (1993) 137 SJLB 277, CA��������� 32.27 Goodban’s Application, Re (1972) 23 P & CR 110, LT������������������������������������ 21.12, 21.16, 21.23 Gooden v Anstee (1868) 18 LT 898��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.10 Goodright on the demise of Stevenson v Noright, 96 ER 436, (1771) 2 Wm Bl 746, Ct of KB������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.26 Goolden v Anstee (1868) 18 LT 898������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.159, 11.220 Goring v Nash and Others, 26 ER 909, (1744) 3 Atk 186, Ct of Chancery��������������������������� 30.7 Gossip’s Application, Re (1973) 25 P & CR 215, LT����������������������������������������������� 16.75, 16.108; 19.16, 19.50; 20.26 GR & AL Developments Ltd, Re [2009] UKUT 238, LC����������������������������������������������������� 16.108 Graham v Easington DC [2008] EWCA Civ 1503, [2010] RVR 168, CA���������������������������� 20.62; 21.15; 22.17; 24.101 Graham v Newcastle-upon-Tyne Corpn (1892) 67 LT 790����������������������������������������� 1.10; 11.148 Graham’s Application LP/83/2005������������������������������������������������������������������ 20.26; 21.15; 23.53, 23.54; 24.142 Grampian RC v City of Aberdeen DC, 1984 SC (HL) 58, 1984 SLT 197, (1984) 47 P & CR 633, [1984] JPL 590, HL���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.13 Grant v Dawkins [1973] 1 WLR 1406, [1973] 3 All ER 897, (1974) 27 P & CR 158, (1973) 117 SJ 665, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.78; 30.18, 30.23, 30.25 Grant v Edmondson [1931] 1 Ch 1, CA������������������������������������������������������������������ 1.51; 6.1; 28.6, 28.29; 29.50 Grant v Langston (Surveyor of Taxes) [1900] AC 383, (1900) 2 F (HL) 49, (1900) 8 SLT 21, HL����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.200 Great North of England Clarence and Hartlepool Junction Railway Company v The Clarence Railway Company, 63 ER 520, (1844) 1 Coll 507, Ct of Chancery���������� 30.28 Greaves & Co (Contractors)‘s Application, Re (1966) 17 P & CR 57, 196 EG 158, [1965] JPL 748, LT����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.5; 17.7; 19.2 Green Masjid and Madrasah Trustees, Re [2013] UKUT 355, LC�������������������������� 16.126, 16.129 Greenhill v Isle of Wight (Newport Junction) Rly Co (1871) 23 LT 885������������������������������ 30.5 Gregory v Williams, 36 ER 224, (1817) 3 Mer 582, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������ Int Gresham Life Assurance Society Ltd v Ranger (1899) 15 TLR 454������������������������������������� 11.121 Greyfort Properties Ltd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2011] EWCA Civ 908, [2011] 3 EGLR 93, [2011] 43 EG 106, [2012] JPL 39, [2011] 31 EG 53 (CS), CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.14 Griffith v Pelton [1958] Ch 205, [1957] 3 WLR 522, [1957] 3 All ER 75, (1957) 101 SJ 663, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 7.25; 29.51 Griffiths v Band (1975) 29 P & CR 243, Ch D������������������������������������������� 6.58; 7.4; 14.21, 14.24; 15.13; 21.12, 21.21 Grosvenor (Mayfair) Estate v Merix [2017] EWCA Civ 190, [2017] L & TR 18, [2017] RVR 286, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.198 Grosvenor Motor Co v Chester Corpn (1963) 14 P & CR 478, LT��������������������������������������� 10.86 Groves’ Application, Re, LP/50/1986������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 23.54 Groves v Loomes (1885) 53 LT 592�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25.6 Gutteridge v Munyard, 173 ER 57, (1834) 7 Car & P 129���������������������������������������������������� 11.239 GW Atkins v Scott (1991) 7 Const LJ 215, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.38
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Table of Cases H
Hackney MBC’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 37, 157 EG 665, LT������������������ 17.15, 17.17; 19.42, 19.45; 21.12 Hadley v Baxendale, 156 ER 145, (1854) 9 Ex 341, Ct of Exchequer���������������������� 13.186; 30.33 Halifax Mortgage Services Ltd v Stepsky [1996] Ch 207, [1996] 2 WLR 230, [1996] 2 All ER 277, [1996] 1 FLR 620, [1996] 2 FCR 97, (1996) 28 HLR 522, [1996] Fam Law 279, (1996) 93(1) LSG 21, (1996) 140 SJLB 9, [1995] NPC 184, CA������������������� 8.87; 9.19 Hall & Co’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 159, 165 EG 473, [1955] JPL 371, 105 LJ 253, LT��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.135 Hall v Box (1870) 18 WR 820���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.137, 11.243 Hall v Ewin (1887) 37 Ch D 74, CA������������������������������������������������������ 1.10; 11.47, 11.73, 11.75, 11.77, 11.78, 11.239, 11.240 Hall v Warren, 32 ER 738, (1804) 9 Ves Jr 605, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������������ 30.6 Halsall v Brizell [1957] Ch 169, [1957] 2 WLR 123, [1957] 1 All ER 371, (1957) 101 SJ 88, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.3; 16.42; 26.3; 29.72, 29.73, 29.75, 29.79, 29.83 Hamilton Snowball’s Conveyance, Re [1959] Ch 308, [1958] 2 WLR 951, [1958] 2 All ER 319, (1958) 122 JP 305, (1958) 102 SJ 401, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������� 7.15 Hammersmith & City Rly Co v Brand (1869) LR 4 HL 171, HL��������������������� 10.36, 10.42, 10.43 Hammersmith & Fulham LBC v Top Shop Centres Ltd [1990] Ch 237, [1989] 2 WLR 643, [1989] 2 All ER 655, [1989] 41 EG 121, (1989) 133 SJ 877, Ch D������������������������������ 29.19 Hampstead & Suburban Properties Ltd v Diomedous [1969] 1 Ch 248, [1968] 3 WLR 990, [1968] 3 All ER 545, (1968) 19 P & CR 880, (1968) 112 SJ 656, Ch D���������������������� 11.33, 11.127, 11.128 Hanning v Gable Jeffreys Properties Ltd [1965] 1 WLR 1390, [1965] 1 All ER 924, (1965) 109 SJ 900, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.55, 13.174, 13.182 Harbour Estates Ltd v HSBC plc [2004] EWHC 1714 (Ch), [2005] Ch 194, [2005] 2 WLR 67, [2004] 3 All ER 1057, [2005] 1 EGLR 107, [2004] 32 EG 62 (CS), Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.34, 7.37, 7.38 Harlow v Hartog (1977) 245 EG 140������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.228 Harmer v Armstrong [1934] Ch 65, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Int Harper’s Application, Re (1986) 52 P & CR 104, [1986] JPL 443, LT���������������������� 20.93; 21.11, 21.12; 23.52 Harris v Beauchamp Bros [1894] 1 QB 801, CA������������������������������������������������������������������ 13.25 Harrison Broadley v Smith [1964] 1 WLR 456, [1964] 1 All ER 867, [2008] BTC 7085, (1964) 108 SJ 136, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.19 Harrison v Good (1871) LR 11 Eq 338, Ct of Chancery������������������������������� 1.16; 11.117, 11.127, 11.132, 11.246 Hart v Emelkirk Ltd [1983] 1 WLR 1289, [1983] 3 All ER 15, (1983) 9 HLR 114, (1983) 267 EG 946, (1983) 127 SJ 156, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������� 30.40 Harte Lovelace’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 147, [1955] JPL 74, LT������������������������ 20.86 Hartshorn v Angliss [1951] 1 TLR 1043, [1951] WN 293, (1951) 95 SJ 318���������� 11.138, 11.177 Hathway’s Application, Re (1969) 20 P & CR 505, LT����������������������������������������������� 19.10, 19.50 Hatton v Connew [2013] EWCA Civ 1560, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.108 Havergill v Hare, 79 ER 435, (1615) Cro Jac. 510, Ct of KB����������������������������������������������� 29.50 Havering College of Further Education’s Application [2006] LP/89/2004��������������������������� 11.104 Hawes v Scott (1896) 40 SJ 373, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.220 Hawkins, Re [2015] UKUT 564, LC������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.60 Hawley v Steele (1877) 6 Ch D 521, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.57, 10.59 Hayim v Couch [2009] EWHC 1040, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.13 Haywood v Brunswick Permanent Benefit Building Society (1881) 8 QBD 403, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.10; 28.6, 28.7; 29.16, 29.69 Haywood v Cope, 53 ER 589, (1858) 25 Beav 140, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������ 30.7 Heard v Stuart (1907) 24 TLR 104��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.121, 11.127 Heath’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 104, 162 EG 564, 103 LJ 752, [1953] CPL 726, LT����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.51 Hedges’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 270, 168 EG 633, [1957] JPL 61, 106 LJ 812, LT��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.88; 19.6 Hemingway Securities Ltd v Dunraven Ltd (1996) 71 P & CR 30, [1995] 1 EGLR 61, [1995] 09 EG 322, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 25.7 Henderson’s Conveyance, Re [1940] Ch 835, [1940] 4 All ER 1, (1957) 7 P & CR 332, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.56; 17.1; 20.26, 20.28
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Table of Cases Henman’s Application, Re (1972) 23 P & CR 102, LT������������������������������� 16.76, 16.103, 16.108; 20.26, 20.43; 22.9 Henshall v Fogg [1964] 1 WLR 1127, [1964] 2 All ER 868, (1964) 128 JP 511, (1964) 108 SJ 443, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.15 Hextall’s Application, Re (2000) 79 P & CR 382, LT����������������������������������������������������������� 20.84 Heywood’s Conveyance, Re [1938] 2 All ER 230����������������������������������������������������������������� 1.66 Hickman & Son’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 33, 158 EG 25, LT������������������� 15.27; 16.37; 19.13, 19.51 Hickman v Isaacs (1861) 4 LT 285���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.239 Hill v Harris [1965] 2 QB 601, [1965] 2 WLR 1331, [1965] 2 All ER 358, (1965) 109 SJ 333, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.53 Hill v Tupper, 159 ER 51, (1863) 2 Hurl & C 121, Ct of Exchequer������������������������������������ 1.8 Hillingdon London Borough Council v Arc Ltd [1999] Ch 139, [1998] 3 WLR 754, [1999] BLGR 282, [1998] 3 EGLR 18, [1998] 39 EG 202, [1998] RVR 242, (1998) 95(15) LSG 34, (1998) 142 SJLB 149, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.91 Hilton v Ankesson (1872) 27 LT 519������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.113 Hindley v Emery (1865–66) LR 1 Eq 52, (1865) 11 Jur NS 874, Ct of Chancery���������������� 13.78 Hipgrave v Case (1885) 28 Ch D 356, (1885) 54 LJ Ch. 399, CA������������������������������� 30.19, 30.30 Hobson v Tulloch [1898] 1 Ch 424, Ch D��������������������������������������������������� 11.201, 11.229, 11.246 Hodges v Jones [1935] Ch 657, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.22, 8.79 Hodson v Coppard, 54 ER 525, (1860) 29 Beav 4, Ct of Chancery�������������������������������������� 13.40 Holdom v Kidd (1991) 61 P & CR 456, [1991] 02 EG 163, [1990] EG 123 (CS), CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.119; 13.175 Holford v Acton UDC [1898] 2 Ch 240, Ch D�������������������������������������� 1.10; 8.22; 11.223, 11.225 Hollington Bros Ltd v Rhodes [1951] 2 All ER 578 (Note), [1951] 2 TLR 691, [1951] WN 437, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.3; 15.22 Hollis Hospital Trustees and Hague’s Contract, Re [1899] 2 Ch 540, Ch D������������������� 13.6; 29.4 Holloway Bros Ltd v Hill [1902] 2 Ch 612, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������� 11.47 Holman’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 56, [1952] CPL 125, LT��������������������������� 19.6, 19.22 Holmes v Buckley, 24 ER 20, (1691) Prec Ch 39, Ch D������������������������������������������������������� 28.4 Holms v Seller, 83 ER 702, (1691) 3 Lev 305, Ct of KB������������������������������������������������������ 29.111 Holt & Co v Collyer (1881) 16 Ch D 718, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.138 Hood v North Eastern Railway Co (No 1) (1869–70) LR 5 Ch App 525, CA���������������������� 30.6 Hooper v Bromet (1904) 90 LT 234��������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.5, 8.95; 13.159 Hopcraft’s Application, Re (1993) 66 P & CR 475, LT������������������������� 19.68; 20.26, 20.74; 24.97 Hopgood v Brown [1955] 1 WLR 213, [1955] 1 All ER 550, (1955) 99 SJ 168, CA����������� 29.72 Hopkins v Great Northern Rly Co (1877) 2 QBD 224, CA��������������������������������������������������� 10.43 Horne’s Case, Co Litt (1401) YB 2 Hen IV��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27.12 Hornsby’s Application, Re (1969) 20 P & CR 495, LT������������������������������������ 16.64, 16.65, 16.90, 16.110; 20.26; 22.16 Horsey Estate Ltd v Steiger [1899] 2 QB 79, CA������������������������������������������������������������������ 1.26 Horsler v Zorro [1975] Ch 302, [1975] 2 WLR 183, [1975] 1 All ER 584, (1975) 29 P & CR 180, (1975) 119 SJ 83, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.23 Hotchkin v McDonald [2004] EWCA Civ 519, [2005] 1 P & CR 7, [2004] 18 EG 100 (CS), [2004] NPC 64, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.4, 16.36 Houdret & Co’s Application, Re (1989) 58 P & CR 310, LT�������������������������������������� 17.10; 19.53 Hounslow and Ealing LBC’s Application, Re (1996) 71 P & CR 100, LT��������� 20.61; 21.8, 21.12 Howard v Fanshawe [1895] 2 Ch 581, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������� 29.25, 29.30 Hoyle’s Application, Re [2011] UKUT 439 (LC), [2012] JPL 479, LC������������������������������� 16.108 Hubbard v Pitt [1976] QB 142, [1975] 3 WLR 201, [1975] 3 All ER 1, [1975] ICR 308, (1975) 119 SJ 393, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.63 Hubbard v Weldon (1909) 25 TLR 356��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27.6; 28.1 Hulton v Hulton [1916] 2 KB 642, KBD; affd [1917] 1 KB 813, CA���������������������������������� 13.19 Humphrey v Rogers [2017] 23 November, unreported���������������������������������������������������������� 13.96 Hunt v Molnar (1957) 7 P & CR 224, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.170 Hunt’s Application, Re (1997) 73 P & CR 126, LT�������������������������������������������������� 16.108, 16.113 Hurleys’ Application, Re (2007) LP/74/2006�������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.129 Hutchins Cottage, Horley Row, Horley, Surrey, RH6 8DF, Re [2010] UKUT 235, LC����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.88, 11.89 Hutchinson’s Application, Re [2009] UKUT 182 (LC), [2010] 1 EGLR 105, [2010] 4 EG 114, LC���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.2, 3.7 Hyde v Warden (1877) 3 Ex D 72, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.4 Hydeshire Ltd’s Application, Re (1994) 67 P & CR 93, LT�������������������������������������� 16.109; 22.17 Hyman v Rose [1912] AC 623, HL������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 10.86; 29.30 Hythe Corp v East (1865–66) LR 1 Eq 620, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������������������ 30.19
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Table of Cases I
IDC Group Ltd v Clark (1993) 65 P & CR 179, [1992] 49 EG 103, [1992] EG 93 (CS), [1992] NPC 88, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.111 Ilford Park Estates Ltd v Jacobs [1903] 2 Ch 522, Ch D������������������������������������������������������� 11.200 Ind Coope & Co Ltd v Hamblin (1900) 84 LT 168, CA�������������������������������������������������������� 11.115 Independent Television Authority’s Application, Re (1962) 13 P & CR 222, [1962] JPL 268, LT����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.5, 16.18, 16.122; 17.25, 17.31; 22.16 Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees td [2012] EWCA Civ 195, [2013] Ch 91, [2012] 3 WLR 597, [2012] 3 All ER 210, [2012] 3 FCR 1, [2012] WTLR 1171, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 9.7 Inntrepreneur Estates (GL) Ltd v Boyes [1995] ECC 16, (1994) 68 P & CR 77, [1993] 47 EG 140, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12.14 Inntrepreneur Estates Ltd v Mason [1993] 2 CMLR 293, (1994) 68 P & CR 53, [1993] 45 EG 130, QBD������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 12.14 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896, [1998] 1 All ER 98, [1998] 1 BCLC 531, [1997] CLC 1243, [1997] PNLR 541, (1997) 147 NLJ 989, HL���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.11, 11.94, 11.95 Isaacs & Sons v Salbstein [1916] 2 KB 139, CA������������������������������������������������������������������ 13.19 Iveagh v Harris [1929] 2 Ch 142, (1957) 7 P & CR 281, Ch D�������������������������������� 13.176; 16.53 Ives v Brown [1919] 2 Ch 314, Ch D������������������������������������������������������ 6.21; 7.6, 7.8, 7.12, 7.14, 7.43, 7.44; 11.105, 11.126
J
J Sainsbury plc v Enfield London Borough Council [1989] 1 WLR 590, [1989] 2 All ER 817, (1989) 58 P & CR 441, [1989] 28 EG 134, [1989] EG 4 (CS), Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.11, 6.15, 6.16, 6.18, 6.25, 6.26, 6.68; 7.33, 7.38, 7.44; 11.42, 14.18, 14.33; 16.5 JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v South Gloucestershire DC (No 1) [2001] EWCA Civ 450, [2001] 2 PLR 66, [2001] JPL 1425, [2001] 14 EG 149 (CS), (2001) 98(20) LSG 41, (2001) 145 SJLB 99, [2001] NPC 66, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.25 Jackson v Normanby Brick Co [1899] 1 Ch 438, CA����������������������������������������������������������� 30.28 Jackson v Turnley, 61 ER 587, (1853) 1 Drew 617, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������� 13.9 Jackson v Winnifrith (1882) 47 LT 243��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.159 Jacomb v Knight, 46 ER 743, (1863) 3 De GJ & S 533, (1863) 32 LJ Ch 601, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 27.34 Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269, [1995] 2 All ER 189, [1995] 1 EGLR 146, [1995] 13 EG 132, [1994] EG 139 (CS), [1994] NPC 116, CA������������ 11.237; 13.34, 13.35, 13.39, 13.46, 13.47, 13.59, 13.60, 13.61, 13.75, 13.81, 13.83, 13.89, 13.93, 13.98, 13.101, 13.103, 13.104, 13.106, 13.110, 13.134, 13.187; 30.23, 30.24 Jamaica Mutual Life Assurance Society v Hillsborough Ltd [1989] 1 WLR 1101, (1989) 133 SJ 1032, PC (Jam)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.31, 8.89 Jamelson Property Co’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 253, 167 EG 625, [1956] JPL 457, LT������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.110, 16.135 James Hall and Co (Property) Ltd v Maughan [2016] UKUT 513, LC�������������������������������� 16.8 James Hall and Co’s Application, Re [2017] UKUT 240, LC����������������������������������������������� 20.29 Jarvis, Re [1958] 1 WLR 815, [1958] 2 All ER 336, (1958) 102 SJ 546, Ch D�������������������� 13.120 Jay v Richardson, 54 ER 1008, (1862) 30 Beav 563, Ct of Chancery����������������������������������� 11.235 Jeff’s Transfer (No 2), Re [1966] 1 WLR 841, [1966] 1 All ER 937, (1966) 110 SJ 385, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1.45; 6.59, 6.60, 6.63, 6.76, 6.78; 14.33 Jeff’s Transfer, Re (Practice Note) [1965] 1 WLR 972, [1965] 2 All ER 798, (1965) 109 SJ 515, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 14.33 Jefferys v Jefferys, 41 ER 443, (1841) Cr & Ph 138, Ct of Chancery����������������������������������� 30.5 Jeffkins Indentures, Re (Practice Note) [1965] 1 WLR 375, [1965] 1 All ER 608 (Note), (1965) 109 SJ 110, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������� 14.8, 14.31, 14.33 Jelson Ltd v Derby City Council [1999] 4 PLR 11, [1999] 3 EGLR 91, [1999] 39 EG 149, [2000] JPL 203, [1999] EG 88 (CS), (1999) 96(26) LSG 30, [1999] NPC 68, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 32.47, 32.48, 32.49, 32.52 Jenkins v Jackson (1888) 40 Ch D 71, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.127
xlviii
Table of Cases Jewell v McGowan [2002] EWCA Civ 145, [2002] 3 EGLR 87, (2002) 99(11) LSG 39, [2002] NPC 30, [2002] 2 P & CR DG6, CA����������������������������������������������������������������� 11.119 Jilla’s Application, Re, [2000] 2 EGLR 99, [2000] 23 EG 147, LT�������������������������������������� 20.83 John Bros Abergarw Brewery Co v Holmes [1900] 1 Ch 188, Ch D��������������������� 1.67; 9.8; 11.47 John Trenberth Ltd v National Westminster Bank Ltd (1980) 39 P & CR 104, (1979) 253 EG 151, (1979) 123 SJ 388, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.39 Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367, [1979] 2 WLR 487, [1979] 1 All ER 883, (1979) 38 P & CR 424, (1979) 251 EG 1167, (1979) 123 SJ 217, HL��������������������� 13.76, 13.78, 13.79, 13.101, 13.109; 30.19, 30.21, 30.23, 30.25, 30.34 Johnson v Moreton [1980] AC 37, [1978] 3 WLR 538, [1978] 3 All ER 37, (1979) 37 P & CR 243, (1978) 247 EG 895, (1978) 122 SJ 697, HL������������������������������������� 16.4, 16.36 Johnstone v Hall, 69 ER 844, (1856) 2 Kay & J 414, Ct of Chancery����������������������� 11.59, 11.229 Joint London Holdings Ltd v Mount Cook Land Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 1171, [2006] 2 P & CR 17, [2005] 3 EGLR 119, [2005] 42 EG 234 (CS), (2005) 155 NLJ 1552, [2005] NPC 113, [2006] 1 P & CR DG14, CA������������������������������������������������������������� 11.251 Jones & White & Co’s Application, Re (1989) 58 P & CR 512, LT����������������� 10.96; 17.9, 17.10; 19.44; 20.88; 21.15 Jones v Bone (1869–70) LR 9 Eq 674, Ct of Chancery�������������������������������������������� 11.137, 11.250 Jones v Herxheimer [1950] 2 KB 106, [1950] 1 All ER 323, 66 TLR (Pt 1) 403, (1950) 94 SJ 97, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 30.36 Jones v Humphrey [1902] 1 KB 10, KBD����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.11 Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832, [1962] 1 All ER 442, (1962) 106 SJ 531, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.61; 29.110 Jones v Oven [2017] EWHC 1647 (Ch), Ch D������������������������������������������������������������� 11.18, 11.27 Jones v Price [1965] 2 QB 618, [1965] 3 WLR 296, [1965] 2 All ER 625, (1965) 109 SJ 415, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.8; 29.113, 29.118 Jones v Pritchard [1908] 1 Ch 630, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1.8 Jones v Rhys-Jones (1974) 30 P & CR 451, CA������������������������� 11.3; 16.59, 16.61, 16.62, 16.65, 16.84, 16.85, 16.86, 16.94, 16.97, 16.101, 16.133; 24.107, 24.109 Jones v Secretary of State for Wales, 72 LGR 583, (1974) 28 P & CR 280, CA������������������ 32.30 Jones v Thorne, 107 ER 263, (1823) 1 B & C 715, Ct of KB���������������������������������� 11.132, 11.239 Jones v Watts (1890) 43 Ch D 574, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.21 Joseph v LCC (1914) 111 LT 276������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.121 Joyce v Joyce [1978] 1 WLR 1170, [1979] 1 All ER 175, (1978) 122 SJ 745, Ch D����������� 30.6
K
K & C Bhavnani (Holdings) Application, Re (1961) 12 P & CR 269, LT���������������� 11.172; 22.16 Kalsi’s Application, Re (1993) 66 P & CR 313, LT����������������������� 8.17, 8.22; 19.25, 19.38; 20.26 Kane Construction v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2010] EWHC 2227 (Admin), [2011] JPL 304, QBD��������������������������������������������������� 16.44 Kaye v Waghorn, 127 ER 900, (1809) 1 Taunt 428, Ct of Comm Pleas������������������������������� 15.13 Keates v Lyon 1868–69) LR 4 Ch App 218, CA in Chancery��������������������� 6.10; 7.19; 8.22; 15.13 Keith v Texaco Ltd, 1977 SLT (Lands Tr) 16, (1977) 34 P & CR 249, [1977] JPL 731, LT��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23.14 Kelly v Barrett [1924] 2 Ch 379, CA�������������������������������������������������������������� 1.26, 1.53, 1.55; 4.2; 8.105, 8.117; 13.51 Kelly v Battershell [1949] 2 All ER 830, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������ 8.87 Kelsey v Dodd (1881) 52 LJ Ch 34������������������������������������������������������������� 8.5, 8.6; 13.74, 13.128 Kemp v Bird (1877) 5 Ch D 974, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.7 Kemp v Sober (1852) 19 LTOS 308, 61 ER 200, (1851) 1 Sim NS 517, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.246 Kennet Properties Ltd’s Application, Re (1996) 72 P & CR 353, [1997] 1 PLR 49, [1996] 2 EGLR 163, [1996] 45 EG 139, LT���������������������������������������������������������� 18.4; 21.17 Kennewel v Dye [1949] Ch 517, [1949] 1 All ER 881, [1949] LJR 1250, (1949) 93 SJ 250, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.1 Keppell v Bailey, 39 ER 1042, (1834) 2 My & K 517, Ct of Chancery�������������������������������� 28.4 Kerai, Re, [2014] UKUT 153, LC����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.83 Kershaw’s Application, Re (1976) 31 P & CR 187, [1975] JPL 416, LT��������������� 11.172; 16.111, 16.138; 20.26, 20.49, 20.51, 20.84, 20.87, 20.88; 23.14, 23.23 Key v Barrett [124] 2 Ch 379������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.52 Kilbey v Haviland (1871) 24 LT 353������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.5; 13.43 Kimber v Admans [1900] 1 Ch 412, CA������������������������������������������������������� 11.72, 11.190, 11.194
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Table of Cases King v Dickeson (1889) 40 Ch D 596, Ch D������������������������������������������������� 8.19, 8.22; 9.8; 15.25 Kingsbury v LW Anderson Ltd (1980) 40 P & CR 136, Ch D���������������������������������������������� 8.87 Kirby v School Board for Harrogate [1896] 1 Ch 437, CA������������������� 10.33, 10.34, 10.37, 10.39, 10.42, 10.46, 10.49 Kirklees MBC v Wickes Building Supplies Ltd [1993] AC 227, [1992] 3 WLR 170, [1992] 3 All ER 717, [1992] 2 CMLR 765, 90 LGR 391, (1992) 142 NLJ 967, [1992] NPC 86, HL�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.55 Kitchin, Re (1880) 16 Ch D 226, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 10.83 Kitney v MEPC Ltd [1977] 1 WLR 981, [1978] 1 All ER 595, (1978) 35 P & CR 132, (1977) 243 EG 131, (1977) 121 SJ 355, CA���������������������������������������������������� 9.36, 9.40, 9.46 Knight v Simmonds [1896] 1 Ch 653, affd [1896] 2 Ch 294, CA�������������� 8.5, 8.19, 8.22; 11.239; 13.112, 13.170; 15.25; 16.53 Knott’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 100, 162 EG 426, [1953] CPL 674, LT������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 19.7, 19.9, 19.12, 19.15 Knott’s Application, Re (1968) 19 P & CR 282, [1968] JPL 96, LT������������������������������������� 22.16 Kumar v Dunning [1989] QB 193, [1987] 3 WLR 1167, [1987] 2 All ER 801, (1988) 55 P & CR 64, (1987) 283 EG 59, (1987) 84 LSG 1812, (1987) 137 NLJ 522, (1987) 131 SJ 974, CA������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.27; 5.2; 6.72; 7.31, 7.33, 7.34, 7.37, 7.38, 7.39; 27.6
L
Labone v Litherland Urban DC Liverpool Cooperative Society & Gourley Bros (Third Parties) [1956] 1 WLR 522, [1956] 2 All ER 215, (1956) 100 SJ 360�������������� 11.137, 11.175, 11.177 Labouchere v Earl Wharncliffe (1879) 13 Ch D 346, Ch D�������������������������������������������������� 11.35 Lady Langdale v Briggs, 44 ER 441, (1856) 8 De GM & G 391, Ct of Chancery��������������� 13.9 Lake v Bayliss [1974] 1 WLR 1073, [1974] 2 All ER 1114, (1974) 28 P & CR 209; (1974) 118 SJ 532, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1.51 Land at Sandy Lane, Dee Banks, Chester, Re. See University of Chester’s Application, Re Lansing Linde Ltd v Kerr [1991] 1 WLR 251, [1991] 1 All ER 418, [1991] ICR 428, [1991] IRLR 80, (1990) 140 NLJ 1458, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.64 Laugher v Williams (1672) 2 Lev 92������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27.20 Lavery v Pursell (1888) 39 Ch D 508, (1888) 57 LJ Ch 570, Ch D�������������������������������������� 30.19 Law Debenture Trust Corp v Ural Caspian Oil Corp Ltd [1995] Ch 152, [1994] 3 WLR 1221, [1995] 1 All ER 157, [1994] CLC 299, CA��������������������������������������������������������� 29.94 Lawntown Ltd v Camenzuli [2007] EWCA Civ 949, [2008] 1 WLR 2656, [2008] 1 All ER 446, [2008] 1 EGLR 73, [2008] 1 EG 136, [2008] JPL 1027, [2007] 42 EG 295 (CS), (2007) 104(41) LSG 26, [2007] NPC 103, CA���������������������������������������������������� 15.34, 15.35, 15.36, 15.40, 15.41 Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd; sub nom Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822, [2014] 2 WLR 433, [2014] 2 All ER 622, [2014] PTSR 384, [2014] BLR 271, 152 Con LR 1, [2014] Env LR 25, [2014] HLR 21, [2014] 2 P & CR 2, [2014] 1 EGLR 147, [2014] LLR 423, (2014) 158(9) SJLB 37, SC������������ 13.94, 13.95, 13.96, 13.97, 13.98, 13.99; 20.67, 20.68 Lawrence v Jenkins (1872–3) LR 8 QB 274, QBD������������������������������������������������������� 1.8; 19.113 Lawrence v South County Freeholds Ltd [1939] Ch 656, [1939] 2 All ER 503, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 4.1; 6.2; 8.10, 8.14, 8.17, 8.18, 8.22, 8.23, 8.81; 11.245; 15.25 LCC v Allen [1914] 3 KB 642, CA����������������������������������������������� 1.6, 1.8, 1.20, 1.68; 10.5; 13.38 Le Neve v Le Neve, 27 ER 291, (1747) Amb 436, Ct of Chancery��������������������������������������� 9.12 Le Puy Ltd v Potter [2015] EWHC 193 (QB), [2015] IRLR 554, QBD���������������������� 13.64, 13.68 Lee Application, Re (1963) 14 P & CR 85, 184 EG 862, [1963] JPL 120, LT��������������������� 17.14; 21.12; 22.5 Leech v Schweder (1873–74) LR 9 Ch App. 463, CA���������������������������������������������������������� 30.6 Leeds Industrial Cooperative Society Ltd v Slack [1924] AC 851, [1924] All ER Rep 264, HL����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.31, 13.75, 13.78, 13.88, 13.101, 13.110; 30.23 Lee’s Application, Re (1996) 72 P & CR 439, LT��������������������������������������� 16.116, 16.126, 16.127 Lee’s Application, Re [2012] UKUT 125, LC���������������������������������������������������������� 16.126, 16.127 Les Affréteurs Réunis SA v Leopold Walford (London) Ltd [1919] AC 801, HL��������������� Int, 4.1 Lester v Burgess (1973) 26 P & CR 536, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.39 Leverhulme (No 2) [1943] 2 All ER 274 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 29.52 Lindsay Petroleum Co v Hurd (1873–74) LR 5 PC 221, PC (Can)������������� 13.121, 13.126, 13.149 Ling’s Application, Re (1956) 7 P & CR 233������������������������������������������������������������������������ 19.12 Lipton’s Application, Re (1965) 16 P & CR 97, [1964] JPL 693, LT����������������������������������� 16.26
l
Table of Cases Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, [1976] 2 WLR 562, [1976] 2 All ER 39, (1984) 13 HLR 38, 74 LGR 392, (1976) 32 P & CR 43, (1976) 238 EG 879, [1976] JPL 427, (1976) 120 SJ 267, HL������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.26 Liverpool Corpn v Tomlinson (1826) 7 Dow & Ry KB 556������������������������������������������������� 1.71 Livingstones‘ Application, Re (1984) 47 P & CR 462, [1983] JPL 176, LT������������ 16.97, 16.108; 20.26, 20.45, 20.87 Lloyd v London Chatham & Dover Rly Co (1865) 12 LT 363��������������������������������������������� 10.33 Lloyd’s v Harper (1880) 16 Ch D 290, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������� Int Lloyd’s and Lloyd’s Application (1993) 66 P & CR 112, [1993] JPL 689, LT���������� 17.16, 17.18; 19.44, 19.46; 20.26, 20.73, 20.86 Lloyds Bank Ltd’s Application, Re (1978) 35 P & CR 128, [1977] JPL 668, LT����������������� 20.6, 20.12; 21.12 Locabail International Finance Ltd v Agroexport and Atlanta (UK) Ltd (The Sea Hawk) [1986] 1 WLR 657, [1986] 1 All ER 901, [1986] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 317, (1986) 83 LSG 876, (1986) 130 SJ 245, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.68,13.69 Lock v Furze (1865–66) LR 1 CP 441, 1866) 15 LT 161, Ct of Comm Pleas���������������������� 13.80 Loftus (Deceased), Re [2006] EWCA Civ 1124, [2007] 1 WLR 591, [2006] 4 All ER 1110, [2006] WTLR 1391, (2006–07) 9 ITELR 107, (2006) 156 NLJ 1365, [2007] 1 P & CR DG12, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.119 London & Blackwall Railway Co v Cross (1886) 31 Ch D 354, CA������������������������������������ 13.24 London & Blenheim Estates Ltd v Ladbroke Retail Parks Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 31, [1993] 4 All ER 157, (1994) 67 P & CR 1, [1993] EG 100 (CS), [1993] NPC 86, CA�������������� 6.10 London & North Western Railway Co v Garnett (1869–70) LR 9 Eq 26, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.138 London & South Western Rly v Gomm (1882) Ch D 562������������������������� 1.5, 1.7; 6.98; 7.1, 7.20; 9.1, 9.2, 9.14; 11.4, 11.47 London & Suburban Land Co v Field (1881) 16 Ch D 645, CA���������������������� 8.5; 11.137, 11.138 London and North Western Rly Co v Webb (1863) 9 LT 291���������������������������������������������� 11.127 London and South Western Rly Co v Humphrey (1858) 32 LTOS 70������������� 29.110; 30.5, 30.10 London County Council v Allen [1914] 3 KB 642, CA�������������������������������������������������������� 1.21 London, Chatham and Dover Rly Co v Bull (1882) 47 LT 413���������������������� 11.47, 11.78, 11.82; 13.120, 13.140 London Investment & Mortgage Co’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 194, 166 EG 621, [1956] JPL 56, LT������������������������������������������������������������������������ 16.135, 16.138 Long Eaton Recreation Grounds Co v Midland Rly Co [1902] 2 KB 574, CA���������� 10.37, 10.39, 10.42, 10.46, 10.89; 11.143 Long v Gray (1913) 58 SJ 46���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.7, 1.51 Lord Manners v Johnson (1875) 1 Ch D 673, Ch D���������������������������������������������������� 1.51; 11.146 Lord Northbourne v Johnston & Son [1922] 2 Ch 309, Ch D���������������������� 1.35, 1.41, 1.48, 1.52; 6.106; 7.8, 7.12, 7.13, 7.14, 7.42, 7.43 Lord Strathcona SS Co v Dominion Coal Co [1926] AC 108, (1925) 23 Ll L Rep 145, 1926 AMC 160, PC (Can)���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Int Lorden v Brooke-Hitching [1927] 2 KB 237, KBD�������������������������������������������������������������� 11.137 Lougher v Williams, 83 ER 465, (1672) 2 Lev 92, Ct of KB������������������������������������������������ 11.38 Lovelock v Margo [1963] 2 QB 786, [1963] 2 WLR 794, [1963] 2 All ER 13, (1963) 107 SJ 194, (1963) 107 SJ 390, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.25 Loverock’s Application, Re (1967) 18 P & CR 161, 119 EG 1043, [1966] JPL 653, LT����������� 21.12 Love’s and Love’s Application, Re (1994) 67 P & CR 101, LT�������������������� 16.98, 16.106, 16.118 Lucas v Commerford, 29 ER 469, (1790) 3 Bro CC 166, Ct of Chancery���������������������������� Int Luckies v Simons [2002] EWHC 2504 (Ch), [2003] 2 P & CR 30, Ch D�������������� 13.173, 13.177, 13.179, 13.183 Lukey v Higgs (1855) 3 Eq Rep 510������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.110 Lumley v Metropolitan Rly Co (1876) 34 LT 774����������������������������������������������������������������� 11.177 Lund v Taylor (1976) 31 P & CR 167, 239 EG 199, CA����������������������������������������� 8.72, 8.79, 8.89 Luton Trade Unionist Club’s Application, Re (1969) 20 P & CR 1131, [1969] JPL 582, LT���������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.22; 16.109, 16.118; 19.10, 19.26, 19.27, 19.32, 19.39; 20.12; 22.1 Lyle v Smith [1909] 2 IR 58�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27.6 Lyme Valley Squash Club Ltd v Newcastle under Lyme BC [1985] 2 All ER 405, Ch D��������� 11.132 Lymington Marina Ltd v Macnamara [2007] EWCA Civ 151, [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 825, [2007] NPC 27, [2007] Bus LR D29, CA�������������������������������������������������������������� 11.167 Lynch, Re [2016] UKUT 488, LC�������������������������������������������������� 19.5; 20.26, 20.83, 20.84; 23.4
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Table of Cases Lyne-Stephens & Scott-Miller’s Contract, Re [1920] 1 Ch 472, CA������������������������������������ 7.15 Lyon v Reed, 153 ER 118, (1844) 13 M & W 285, Ct of Exchequer������������������������������������ 13.151 Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499, Ch D������������������������������������������������������ 1.68; 7.15; 33.11 Lyus v Prowsa Developments Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 1044, [1982] 2 All ER 953, (1982) 44 P & CR 213, (1982) 126 SJ 102, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 15.22
M
M Howard (Mitcham)‘s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 219, 167 EG 413, [1956] JPL 304, LT��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.170 M&E Global (Staffing) Solutions Ltd v Tudge [2016] EWHC 597, QBD���������������������������� 13.64 MacKenzie v Childers (1889) 43 Ch D 265, Ch D����������������������������������������������������� 8.5, 8.7, 8.22, 8.57, 8.78, 8.108 Macleay, Re (1875) LR 20 Eq 186, Ct of Chancery�������������������������������������������������������������� 29.4 MacLeod v Golden Harp Properties [2014] EWCA Civ 1084, [2015] 1 WLR 1249, [2014] 3 EGLR 133, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.54, 9.65 Magnohard Ltd v Earl Cadogan [2012] EWCA Civ 594, [2013] 1 WLR 24, [2012] HLR 31, [2012] L & TR 32, [2012] 2 EGLR 74, [2012] 28 EG 82, [2012] 20 EG 93 (CS), CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.110, 11.195 Mahon v Sims [2005] 3 EGLR 67, [2005] 39 EG 138, QBD���������������������������� 11.91, 11.95, 11.98 Malekshad v Howard de Walden Estates Ltd (No 1) [2002] UKHL 49, [2003] 1 AC 1013, [2002] 3 WLR 1881, [2003] 1 All ER 193, [2003] HLR 31, [2003] L & TR 13, [2003] 1 EGLR 151, [2002] 50 EG 114 (CS), (2003) 100(6) LSG 26, (2002) 146 SJLB 279, [2002] NPC 160, [2003] 1 P & CR DG18, HL�������������������������������������������������������������� 11.199 Malhotra v Choudhury [1980] Ch 52, [1978] 3 WLR 825, [1979] 1 All ER 186, (1978) 122 SJ 681, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.23 Manchester Corp v Connolly [1970] Ch 420, [1970] 2 WLR 746, [1970] 1 All ER 961, 68 LGR 379, (1970) 21 P & CR 154, (1970) 114 SJ 108, CA������������������������������������������� 13.64 Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Rly Co v Anderson [1898] 2 Ch 394, CA����������������� 10.32 Manchester Ship Canal Co v Manchester Racecourse Co [1901] 2 Ch 37, CA������� 1.8, 1.11; 25.6 Mander v Falcke [1891] 2 Ch 554, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.6; 11.47 Manjang v Drammeh (1991) 61 P & CR 194, PC (Gam)������������������������������������������������������ 29.90 Mann v Stephens, 60 ER 665, (1846) 15 Sim 377, Ct of Chancery��������� 1.3, 1.10; 6.26; 8.9, 8.50 Manners v Johnson (1875) 1 Ch D 673, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.32 Mansfield DC’s Application (1977) 33 P & CR 141, (1976) 241 EG 241, [1977] JPL 106, LT��������������������������������������������������������������� 16.72, 16.73, 16.78, 16.79, 16.81; 19.4, 19.53, 19.56; 20.21, 20.26, 20.57, 20.74 Manz’s Application, Re (1973) 26 P & CR 148, LT����������������������������������������������������� 23.52, 23.53 Marcello Developments Ltd’s Application, Re (2001) LP/18/1999, LP/31/2000������ 17.18; 19.46; 20.26, 20.53, 20.84; 23.14; 24.137 Margerison v Bates [2008] EWHC 1211 (Ch), [2008] 3 EGLR 165, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.94, 11.95, 11.100 Marquess of Zetland v Driver [1939] Ch 1, [1938] 2 All ER 158, CA������������������� 1.10, 1.26, 1.32, 1.43, 1.51, 1.55; 6.10, 6.35, 6.36, 6.37, 6.42, 6.44, 6.49, 6.54, 6.71, 6.81, 6.85, 6.87; 7.5; 11.33, 11.35, 11.106, 11.107, 11.127, 11.169; 25.2 Marshall v Jarvis Homes Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 839, [2004] 3 EGLR 81, [2004] 44 EG 154, [2004] 29 EG 116 (CS), [2004] NPC 110, CA��������� 11.187, 11.218, 11.237 Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd [1962] Ch 115, [1961] 2 WLR 1018, [1961] 2 All ER 696, (1962) 13 P & CR 389, (1961) 105 SJ 442, Ch D��������������� 1.26, 1.27, 1.36, 1.41, 1.48, 1.51, 1.52; 6.19, 6.47; 9.6; 10.13, 10.32, 10.33, 10.35, 10.58, 10.66, 10.67, 10.92; 13.39 Martin Retail Group Ltd v Crawley BC [2014] L & TR 17, [2014] 1 EGLR 42, CC�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 12.12, 12.14 Martin’s Application, Re (1989) 57 P & CR 119, [1988] 3 PLR 45, [1989] 05 EG 85, [1989] JPL 33, [1988] EG 74 (CS), CA�������������������������������������� 10.96; 16.112; 19.39, 19.66, 19.68; 20.26, 20.34, 20.95, 20.97; 24.107 Martin v David Wilson Homes Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1027, [2004] 3 EGLR 77, [2004] 39 EG 134, [2004] NPC 105, CA���������������������������������������������������������� 11.216, 11.217 Martin’s Application, Re (1961) 12 P & CR 260, LT������������������������������������������������ 16.135; 21.12 Martyn v Clue, 118 ER 249, (1852) 18 QB 661, Ct of QB��������������������������������������������������� 29.102 Master v Hansard (1876) 4 Ch D 718, CA��������������������������������������������������������������� 11.106, 11.169 Mayner v Payne [1914] 2 Ch 555, Ch D������������������������������������������������� 8.100; 11.83; 15.9; 16.16
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Table of Cases MCA East, Ltd, Re [2002] EWHC 1684 (Ch), [2003] 1 P & CR 9, Ch D���������������������� 6.13, 6.17, 6.18, 6.23 McEacharn v Colton [1902] AC 104, PC (Aust)���������������������������������������������������������� 13.31, 13.40 McGruther v Pitcher [1904] 2 Ch 306, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������� Int McLean v McKay (1873) LR 5 PC 327, PC (Can)���������������������������������������������������������������� 6.9 McMorris v Brown [1999] 1 AC 142, [1998] 3 WLR 971, (1998) 142 SJLB 256, Pc (Jam)��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.102; 22.8 McVey’s and Robertson’s Application, Re (1973) 26 P & CR 429, LT����������������������� 23.20, 23.39 Meadows v Clerical Medical & General Life Assurance Society [1981] Ch 70, [1980] 2 WLR 639, [1980] 1 All ER 454, (1980) 40 P & CR 238, (1979) 255 EG 883, (1980) 124 SJ 257, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 16.5 Mercian Housing Society’s Application, Re (1972) 23 P & CR 116, LT����������������� 16.108; 20.84, 20.88; 22.16 Meredith v Wilson (1893) 69 LT 336����������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.142, 13.163 Messageries Imperiales Co v Baines (1863) 7 LT 763 ��������������������������������������������������������� Int Metropolitan Board of Works v McCarthy (1874–75) LR 7 HL 243, HL����������������������������� 10.79 Metzger v Department of Health and Social Security [1977] 3 All ER 444, Ch D; affd [1978] 1 WLR 1046, [1978] 3 All ER 753, (1978) 122 SJ 572, CA���������������������� 13.13 Meux v Cobley [1892] 2 Ch 253, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.86 Midland Bank Trust Co v Green [1981] AC 513, [1981] 2 WLR 28, [1981] 1 All ER 153, (1981) 42 P & CR 201, (1981) 125 SJ 33, HL����������������������������������������� 9.9, 9.12, 9.13, 9.36 Milbury Care Services Ltd’s Application, Re (1995) LP/78/1995������������������������������� 20.75, 20.76 Milebush Properties Ltd v Tameside MBC [2010] EWHC 1022 (Ch), [2010] 2 EGLR 93, [2010] 30 EG 64, [2010] JPL 1303, [2010] 20 EG 145 (CS), [2010] NPC 58, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.49 Milebush Properties Ltd v Tameside MBC [2011] EWCA Civ 270, [2011] PTSR 1654, [2012] 1 P & CR 3, [2011] 2 EGLR 143, [2011] 12 EG 114 (CS), [2011] NPC 31, [2011] 2 P & CR DG5, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.70 Miles v Easter. See Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance, Re Milius’s Application, Re (1995) 70 P & CR 427, [1996] 1 EGLR 209, [1996] RVR 91, LT������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.12; 16.33, 16.36, 16.38, 16.41; 25.5; 32.39 Millbank’s Executors v Secretary of State for the Environment (1991) 61 P & C.R. 11, [1990] 1 PLR 18, [1990] JPL 518, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.51 Millbourn v Lyons [1914] 2 Ch 231, CA��������������������������������������� 1.6, 1.23, 1.51, 1.68, 1.70; 6.10 Millgate Developments Ltd v Smith [2016] UKUT 515, LC��������� 16.129; 20.64, 20.66, 20.69, 20.90 Mills Application, Re (1967) 18 P & CR 391, [1967] JPL 405, LT���������������������������� 22.17; 23.10 Milnes v Branch, 105 ER 1101, (1816) 5 M & S 411, Ct of KB��������������������������������������� 1.51; 6.1 Ministry of Housing & Local Government v Sharp [1970] 2 QB 223, [1970] 2 WLR 802, [1970] 1 All ER 1009, 68 LGR 187, (1970) 21 P & CR 166, (1970) 114 SJ 109, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.32 Mira Oil Resources of Tortola v Bicimar NV [1999] 1 All ER (Comm) 732, [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 101, [1999] CLC 819, QBD������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.21 Mitchell v Steward (1865–66) LR 1 Eq 541, Ct of Chancery����������������������������������������������� 13.138 Mohammadzadeh v Joseph [2006] EWHC 1040 (Ch), [2008] 1 P & CR 6, Ch D��������������� 6.31 Monypenny v Monypenny, 11 ER 671, (1861) 9 HL Cas 114, Ct of Chancery�������������������� 11.2 Moody v Vercan [1991] 2 EGLR 288, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.58 Moore, Re (1888) 39 Ch D 116, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.4 Moore v Ullcoats Mining Co Ltd (No 1) [1908] 1 Ch 575, Ch D����������������������������������������� 29.19 Morgan v Pike, 139 ER 195, (1854) 14 CB 473, Ct of Comm Pleas������������������������������������ 26.3 Morgan’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 200, [1956] JPL 139, LT��������������������������������� 16.118 Morgan’s Application, Re (1960) 11 P & CR 399, LT�������������������������������� 16.135, 16.137, 16.138 Morland v Cook (1868) LR 6 Eq 252, Ct of Chancery����������������������������������������� 1.16; 25.3; 27.6; 28.5, 28.7; 29.70 Morrells of Oxford Ltd v Oxford United Football Club Ltd [2001] Ch 459, [2001] 2 WLR 128, (2001) 81 P & CR 13, [2001] 1 EGLR 76, [2001] 04 EG 147, [2000] EG 96 (CS), (2000) 144 SJLB 248, [2000] NPC 86, (2001) 81 P & CR DG3, CA���������������������������� 11.51, 11.53, 11.59; 28.12 Morris v Burroughs, 26 ER 253, (1737) 1 Atk 399, (1743) 2 Atk 627, Ct of Chancery������� 30.5 Morris v Grant (1875) WR 55������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.121; 13.68 Mortimer v Bailey [2004] EWCA Civ 1514, [2005] BLR 85, [2005] 2 P & CR 9, [2005] 1 EGLR 75, [2005] 02 EG 102, [2004] NPC 162, CA����������������������������������������������������� 13.61 Moses v Taylor (1862) 11 WR 81������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.239 Mosley v Cooper [1990] 23 EG 66, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28.23
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Table of Cases Mothercare Ltd v Robson Books Ltd [1979] FSR 466, Ch D����������������������������������������������� 13.62 Moto Hospitality Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [2007] EWCA Civ 764, [2008] 1 WLR 2822, [2008] 2 All ER 718, [2007] RVR 247, [2008] JPL 358, (2007) 157 SJLB 1426, [2007] NPC 95, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.77 Moxhay v Inderwick, 63 ER 1261, (1847) 1 De G & Sm 708, Ct of Chancery�������������������� 29.109 Muller v Trafford [1901] 1 Ch 54, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.47 Mumford v Walker (1901) 71 LJKB 19��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.59 Munday’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 130, 164 EG 399, [1954] JPL 766, LT������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.26, 20.30, 20.35, 20.42, 20.43 Murray’s Application, Re (1963) 14 P & CR 63, 182 EG 975, [1962] JPL 553, LT������������� 22.13 Murray v Dunn [1907] AC 283, 1907 SC (HL) 8, (1907) 15 SLT 2, HL������������������� 11.32, 11.154
N
Nalder & Collyer’s Brewery Co Ltd v Harman (1900) 83 LT 257�������������������������� 4.4; 6.101; 8.6, 8.22, 8.23, 8.27, 8.60, 8.91 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175, [1965] 3 WLR 1, [1965] 2 All ER 472, (1965) 109 SJ 415, HL����������������������������������������������� 1.51; 16.5; 27.34 National Schizophrenia Fellowship v Ribble Estates SA (1993) 25 HLR 476, [1994] 03 EG 132, [1993] EG 39 (CS), Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������� 11.127, 11.134; 14.6 National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty v Midlands Electricity Board [1952] Ch 380, [1952] 1 All ER 298, [1952] 1 TLR 74, (1952) 116 JP 65, (1952) 96 SJ 29, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.41; 10.13; 11.33, 11.139 Nemcova v Fairfield Rents Ltd [2016] UKUT 303 (LC), [2017] 1 P & CR 4, [2017] L & TR 10, LC���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.212 Nester’s Application, Re, sub nom Jones’s Application, Re, LP/53/2005; LP/62/2005���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.86, 24.141 New Ideal Homes Ltd’s Application, Re (1978) 36 P & CR 476, [1978] JPL 632, LT����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.28, 16.97; 20.40, 20.61, 20.64, 20.93; 23.52 Newbury DC v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 578, [1980] 2 WLR 379, [1980] 1 All ER 731, 78 LGR 306, (1980) 40 P & CR 148, [1980] JPL 325, (1980) 124 SJ 186, HL��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.12 Newman v Real Estate Debenture Corpn Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 131������������������������������� 8.48, 8.113 Newton Abbot Co-operative Sociey Ltd v Williamson & Treadgold Ltd [1952] Ch 286, [1952] 1 All ER 279, [1952] 1 TLR 283, Ch D���������������������� 1.26, 1.27, 1.50; 4.8; 6.7, 6.70, 6.100, 6.106; 7.8, 7.12, 7.13, 7.27, 7.42, 7.43; 11.19, 11.176; 27.11, 27.28 Nickerson v Barroughclough [1981] Ch 426, [1981] 2 WLR 773, [1981] 2 All ER 369, (1981) 41 P & CR 225, (1981) 125 SJ 185, CA������������������������������������������������������������ 29.90 Nicoll v Fenning (1881) 19 Ch D 258������������������������������������������������������� 1.14, 1.31; 4.3, 4.7, 4.8; 8.108; 11.47, 11.137 Nisbet & Pott’s Contract, Re [1906] 1 Ch 386, CA������������������ 1.4, 1.6, 1.7, 1.11, 1.16,1.51, 1.67; 8.104; 9.6, 9.11, 9.69; 11.47; 15.13; 33.11 Norfolk and Norwich University Hospital Trust’s Application, Re (2002) LP/41/2001������������ 24.144 Norman v Hardy [1974] 1 WLR 1048, [1974] 1 All ER 1170, (1974) 27 P & CR 509, (1974) 118 SJ 516, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13.58 North Bedfordshire Association for Moral Welfare’s Application, Re (1959) 10 P & CR 429, LT������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.108, 16.135, 16.138; 22.16 North London Railway Co v Great Northern Railway Co (1883) 11 QBD 30, CA�������������� 13.25 Northampton Gas-Light Company v William Parnell, 139 ER 572, (1855) 15 CB 630, Ct of Comm Pleas���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.3 Northumberland Ave Hotel Co, Re (1886) 33 Ch D 16, CA������������������������������������������������� 30.19 Norval v Pascoe (1864) 10 LT 809���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.10 Norwich & Peterborough Building Society v Steed [1991] 1 WLR 449, [1991] 2 All ER 880, (1993) 65 P & CR 108, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 9.56 Norwich City College of Further & Higher Education v McQuillin [2009] EWHC 1496 (Ch), [2009] 2 P & CR 22, [2009] 27 EG 90 (CS), [2009] NPC 85, Ch D������������������� 6.88 Norwich life Insurance v British Rlys Board (1987) 283 EG 846, Ch D������������������������������ 11.15 Notley’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 157, [1955] JPL 216, LT����������������������������������� 19.19 Nottingham Patent Brick & Tile Co v Butler (1886) 16 QBD 778, CA��������������������� 8.6, 8.9, 8.22, 8.23, 8.50, 8.61, 8.68, 8.78, 8.92, 8.104 Nussey v Provincial Bill Posting Co [1909] 1 Ch 734, CA������������������������� 11.142, 11.228, 11.239 Nwakobi v Nzekwu [1964] 1 WLR 1019, (1964) 108 SJ 518, PC (Nigeria)������������������������ 13.151
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Table of Cases Nweze v Nwoko [2004] EWCA Civ 379, [2004] 2 P & CR 33, (2004) 101(17) LSG 30, (2004) 148 SJLB 472, [2004] NPC 50, [2004] 2 P & CR DG1, CA����������������������������� 32.49 NWL Ltd v Woods (The Nawala) (No 2) [1979] 1 WLR 1294, [1979] 3 All ER 614, [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1, [1979] ICR 867, [1979] IRLR 478, (1979) 123 SJ 751, HL������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13.63, 13.64
O
Oakacre Ltd v Claire Cleaners (Holdings) Ltd [1982] Ch 197, [1981] 3 WLR 761, [1981] 3 All ER 667, (1982) 43 P & CR 48, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������� 13.78 O’Briens’ Application, Re (2008) LP/8/2005������������������������������������������������������������ 16.108; 19.29 Oceanic Village Ltd v United Attractions Ltd [2000] Ch 234, [2000] 2 WLR 476, [2000] 1 All ER 975, [2000] 1 EGLR 148, [1999] EG 152 (CS), [1999] NPC. 156, (2000) 79 P & CR D42, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������� 1.15; 9.26, 9.45; 11.14, 11.240 Official Custodian for Charities v Parway Estates Developments Ltd (In Liquidation) [1985] Ch 151, [1984] 3 WLR 525, [1984] 3 All ER 679, (1984) 1 BCC 99253, [1985] PCC 133, (1984) 48 P & CR 125, (1984) 270 EG 1077, (1984) 81 LSG 2382, (1984) 128 SJ 549, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.27 Ogle’s Application, Re; Ministry of Health’s Application, Re (1958) 9 P & CR 526, 170 EG 366, [1957] JPL 745, LT������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 16.5; 22.5 Onward Building Society v Smithson [1893] 1 Ch 1, CA����������������������������������������������������� 1.51 Orchard Trading Estate Management Ltd v Johnson Security Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 406, [2002] 2 EGLR 1, [2002] 18 EG 155, [2002] 15 EG 132 (CS), (2002) 99(17) LSG 38, [2002] NPC 49, [2002] 2 P & CR DG13, CA��������������������������������������������������������������� 29.8 O’Reilly’s Application, Re (1993) 66 P & CR 485, LT��������������������������������� 16.98, 16.138; 20.22, 20.23, 20.74, 20.93 Osborne’s Application, Re (1973) 25 P & CR 212, [1972] JPL 378, LT������������������������������ 21.12 Osborn’s and Easton’s Application, Re (1979) 38 P & CR 251, [1979] JPL 38, LT������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 16.6, 16.49, 16.108; 20.26, 20.60, 20.61 Osborne v Bradley [1903] 2 Ch 446, Ch D������������������������������������������������������ 1.8, 1.20, 1.55; 7.2; 8.22, 8.33, 8.38, 8.91, 8.95; 11.59, 11.69; 13.49, 13.52, 13.82, 13.87, 13.109, 13.124, 13.150, 13.161, 13.163 Oxy Electric Ltd v Zainuddin [1991] 1 WLR 115, [1990] 2 All ER 902, [1990] 3 PLR 115, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.27, 13.48, 13.52, 13.55, 13.58, 13.62
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P & A Swift Investments v Combined English Stores Group plc [1989] AC 632, [1988] 3 WLR 313, [1988] 2 All ER 885, (1989) 57 P & CR 42, [1988] 43 EG 73, [1988] EG 104 (CS), (1988) 138 NLJ Rep. 202�������������������������������������������������������������� 1.27; 7.34; 27.5, 27.6, 27.22 Paddington Corp v Attorney General [1906] AC 1, HL��������������������������������������������������������� 11.139 Page v King’s Parade Properties Ltd (1967) 20 P & CR 710, Ch D����������������������� 4.6; 8.84, 8.103 Page’s Application, Re (1996) 71 P & CR 440, LT����������������������������������������������������������� 16.108 Pakenham’s Case (1368) Y&B 42 Edw 3������������������������������������������ 7.1; 11.38; 27.4, 27.6, 27.12, 27.15, 27.20, 27.26; 28.1; 30.29 Pakwood Transport v 15 Beauchamp Place (1978) 36 P & CR 112, (1977) 245 EG 309, CA ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.27 Palethorpe v Home Brewery Co Ltd [1906] 2 KB 5, CA������������������������������������������������������ 11.59 Palser v Grinling [1948] AC 291, [1948] 1 All ER 1, 64 TLR 2, [1948] LJR 600, (1948) 92 SJ 53, HL����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.38 Parkash v Irani Finance Ltd [1970] Ch 101, [1969] 2 WLR 1134, [1969] 1 All ER 930, (1969) 20 P & CR 385, (1969) 113 SJ 106, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������� 9.47 Parker v Camden LBC [1986] Ch 162, [1985] 3 WLR 47, [1985] 2 All ER 141, (1985) 17 HLR 380, 84 LGR 16, (1985) 129 SJ 417, CA��������������������������������������������� 30.5, 30.9, 30.11, 30.13, 30.28, 30.40 Parsons v Thatchers Wood Residents Co Ltd [2011] EWHC 4095, Ch D���������������������������� 11.217 Patching v Dubbins, 69 ER 1, (1853) Kay 1; affd 2 Eq Rep 71�������������������������������������������� 11.115 Patel v WH Smith (Eziot) Ltd [1987] 1 WLR 853, [1987] 2 All ER 569, (1987) 84 LSG 2049, (1987) 131 SJ 888, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.62 Patman v Harland (1881) 17 Ch D 353, Ch D������������������������������������������� 9.20, 9.22, 9.48; 11.229 Patten’s Application, Re (1976) 31 P & CR 180, [1975] JPL 539, LT���������������������������������� 16.138 Pauling’s Settlement Trusts (No 1), Re [1964] Ch 303, [1963] 3 WLR 742, [1963] 3 All ER 1, (1963) 107 SJ 492, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.117
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Table of Cases Peabody Donation Fund Governors v London Residuary Body (1987) 55 P & CR 355, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.6 Pearce v Maryon-Wilson [1935] Ch 188, Ch D������������������������������������������������ 8.98; 11.35, 11.169 Pearson’s Application, Re (1978) 36 P & CR 285, LT������������������������������ 16.86, 16.97; 22.4; 25.6 Pease v Coats (1866) LR 2 Eq 688, Ct of Chancery�������������������������������������������������������������� 11.243 Peek v Matthews (1867) LR 3 Eq 515, Ct of Chancery���������������������� 4.2; 13.141, 13.163, 13.166 Penn v Lord Baltimore, 27 ER 1132, (1750) 1 Ves Sen 444, Ct of Chancery����������������������� 30.5 Pennell v Payne [1995] QB 192, [1995] 2 WLR 261, [1995] 2 All ER 592, [1995] 1 EGLR 6, [1995] 06 EG 152, [1994] EG 196 (CS), (1995) 139 SJLB 17, [1994] NPC 151, (1995) 69 P & CR D1, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27.13 Pennine Raceway Ltd v Kirklees MBC [1983] QB 382, [1982] 3 WLR 987, [1982] 3 All ER 628, 81 LGR 89, (1983) 45 P & CR 313, (1982) 263 EG 712, [1984] RVR 85, [1982] JPL 780, (1982) 79 LSG 921, (1984) 134 NLJ 969, (1982) 126 SJ 449, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 32.31, 32.32 Perkins v McIver [2012] [2012] EWCA Civ 735, CA������������������������������������������������ 8.22; 24.101 Peyton’s Application, Re (1961) 12 P & CR 263, LT�������������������������������������������������� 20.84; 22.16 Phillips‘ Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 182, 166 EG 148, [1955] JPL 682, 105 LJ 604 LT���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.19 Phillips Electronique Grand Public SA v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd [1995] EMLR 472, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.23, 11.25, 11.26 Phillips v Doelittle, 88 ER 247, (1724) 8 Mod 345, Ct of KB���������������������������������������������� 29.25 Piggott v Stratton, 70 ER 453, (1859) John 341, Ct of KB������������������������������������������� 8.22; 11.31 Pilcher v Rawlins (1871-72) LR 7 Ch App 259, (1872) 20 WR 281, (1872) 41 LJ Ch 485, (1872) 25 LT 921, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.9; 29.12 Pinewood Estate, Farnborough, Re [1958] Ch 280, [1957] 3 WLR 256, [1957] 2 All ER 517, (1958) 9 P & CR 51, (1957) 101 SJ 554, Ch D����������������������������������������������� 5.2; 6.106 Pioneer Properties Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 264, 168 EG 119, [1956] JPL 613, 106 LJ 460, LT��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.5 Pirabakaran v Patel [2006] 1 WLR 3112����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.18 Pitman v Woodbury, 154 ER 732, (1848) 3 Ex 4, Ct of Exchequer�������������������������������������� 26.3 Plumpton Parish Council’s Application, Re (1963) 14 P & CR 234, 185 EG 185, [1963] JPL 195, LT����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.46, 16.47 Pomfret v Ricroft, 85 ER 454, (1669) 1 Saund 321 Ct of KB����������������������������������������������� 29.113 Pordage v Cole (1669) 1 Wms Saund 319����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.3 Portman v Home Hospital Association (1879) 27 Ch D 81n������������������������������������������������� 11.229 Posner v Scott-Lewis [1987] Ch 25, [1986] 3 WLR 531, [1986] 3 All ER 513, [1986] 1 EGLR 56, (1985) 277 EG 859, (1986) 83 LSG 359, (1986) 130 SJ 14, Ch D����������� 30.5 Poster v Slough Estates Ltd [1969] 1 Ch 495, [1968] 1 WLR 1515, [1968] 3 All ER 257, (1968) 19 P & CR 841, [1968] JPL 687, (1968) 112 SJ 705, Ch D������������������������������ 8.122 Potter v Perry (1859) 23 JP 644���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28.1, 28.5 Potters Application, Re (1959) 10 P & CR 68, LT���������������������������������������������������������������� 16.110 Pottier’s Application, Re [1967] RPC 170����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.83 Pottier’s Application, Re [2010] UKUT 2006����������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.81 Poulton’s Application, Re (1993) 65 P & CR 319, [1993] JPL 473, LT�������������������� 16.108; 20.86 Pound v Ashford Borough Council [2003] EWHC 1088 (Ch), [2004] 1 P & CR 2, [2003] 2 PLR 83, (2003) 100(27) LSG 36, [2003] NPC 67, Ch D������������������������������������������� 10.28 Powell v Hemsley [1909] 1 Ch 680, Ch D, affd [1909] 2 Ch 252, CA�������������������������� 1.10, 1.26; 11.55, 11.56,11.57, 11.62, 11.74, 11.76, 11.77, 11.78, 11.80, 11.106, 11.147, 11.159, 11.160, 11.161; 13.90 Price v Bouch (1987) 53 P & CR 257, [1986] 2 EGLR 179, (1986) 279 E. 1226, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.163 Price v Price (1887) 35 Ch D 297, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.69 Pritchard v Briggs [1980] Ch 338, [1979] 3 WLR 868, [1980] 1 All ER 294, (1980) 40 P & CR 1, (1979) 123 SJ 705, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 25.6 Prothero v Bell (1906) 22 TLR 370��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.59 Public Trustee v Westbrook [1965] 1 WLR 1160, [1965] 3 All ER 398, (1965) 109 SJ 792, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.26 Pullan v Koe [1913] 1 Ch 9, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.1 Pulleyne v France (1912) 57 Sol Jo 173, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.166 Purkiss Application, Re [1962] 1 WLR 902, [1962] 2 All ER 690, 60 LGR 349, (1962) 13 P & CR 277, [1962] RVR 455, (1962) 106 SJ 308, CA������������������������������������� 13.12; 16.25, 16.26; 24.107 Purnell’s Application, Re (1988) 55 P & CR 133, LT������������������������������������ 16.108; 20.26; 22.16 Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637, KBD����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.47
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Table of Cases Q
Quaffers Ltd’s Application, Re (1988) 56 P & CR 142, [1988] EG 17 (CS), LT��������� 1.26; 16.78, 16.86, 16.113; 19.6, 19.22, 19.33, 19.37, 19.39, 19.52; 23.52 Quarterly’s Application, Re (1989) 58 P & CR 518, LT����������������������������������� 16.41; 19.51; 20.87 Quickfit & Quartz’s Application, Re (1965) 16 P & CR 99, [1964] JPL 760; 114 LJ 607, LT��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 21.12
R
R v Braintree District Council, ex p Halls (2000) 32 HLR 770, (2001) 3 LGLR 10, (2000) 80 P & CR 266, [2000] 3 EGLR 19, [2000] 36 EG 164, [2000] EG 32 (CS), CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.11, 10.22; 11.166 R v Cardiff CC, ex p Sears Group Properties Ltd [1998] 3 PLR 55, [1998] PLCR 262, (1998) 95(17) LSG 29, [1998] NPC 46, QBD��������������������������������������������������������������� 20.97 R v City of London Council, ex p Master Governors & Commonality of the Mystery of the Barbers of London (1997) 73 P & CR 59, [1996] 2 EGLR 128, [1996] 42 EG 156, [1996] EG 101 (CS), [1996] NPC 91, QBD������������������������������������������������������������������ 10.71 R v Cousins (1886) 31 Ch D 671, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.18, 9.19 R v Coventry City Council, ex p Arrowcroft Group Plc [2001] PLCR 7, QBD�������������������� 16.44 R v Paulter (1887) 20 QBD 132, QBD������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.75, 10.87 R v Plymouth City Council, ex p Plymouth and South Devon Cooperative Society (1994) 67 P & CR 78, [1993] 2 PLR 75, [1993] 36 EG 135, [1993] NPC 84, CA������������������� 32.27 R v Rent Officer of Nottingham Registration Area, ex p Allen (1985) 17 HLR 481, (1986) 52 P & CR 41, [1985] 2 EGLR 153, (1985) 275 EG 251, QBD����������� 11.153, 11.199 R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex p Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) [1997] Env LR 431, (1995) 7 Admin LR 434, (1995) 139 SJLB 86, [1995] NPC 22, HL������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.17 R v South Northamptonshire DC, ex p Crest Homes Plc, 93 LGR 205, [1994] 3 PLR 47, [1994] EG 158 (CS), [1994] NPC 123, CA���������������������������������������������������������� 32.44, 32.47 R v Tunbridge Wells Borough Council, ex p Blue Boys Development Ltd (1990) 59 P & CR 315, [1990] 1 PLR 55, [1990] JPL 495, QBD���������������������������� 10.96; 15.17; 19.67 R v Wandsworth London Borough Council, ex p Beckwith [1996] 1 WLR 60, [1996] 1 All ER 129, [1996] 1 FCR 504, 94 LGR 77, (1996) 8 Admin LR 242, (1996) 30 BMLR 105, (1996) 93(2) LSG 28, (1996) 140 SJLB 27, HL���������������������������������������������������� 10.67 R v Westminster City Council, ex p Leicester Square Coventry Street Association Ltd (No 2) 87 LGR 675, (1990) 59 P & CR 51, [1989] EG 59 (CS), QBD���������� 11.127, 11.148; 16.26; 20.17 R (on the application of AS Property Investments Ltd) v Hounslow LBC [2008] EWHC 1631 (Admin), QBD������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 32.37 R (on the application of Batchelor Enterprises Ltd) v North Dorset DC [2003] EWHC 3006 (Admin), [2004] JPL 1222, QBD����������������������������������������������������� 32.76, 32.78, 32.79 R (on the application of Garden and Leisure Group Ltd) v North Somerset Council [2003] EWHC 1605 (Admin), [2004] 1 P & CR 39, [2004] JPL 232, QBD������������������� 32.78, 32.80 R (on the application of Khodari) v Kensington & Chelsea Council [2017] EWCA Civ 333, [2018] 1 WLR 584, [2018] RTR 5, [2017] JPL 1105, CA�������� 1.13; 10.20; 16.40; 25.6; 28.27; 32.35, 32.37, 32.91, 32.92 R (on the application of Mayer Parry Recycling Ltd) v Environment Agency (Interim Relief) [2001] CP Rep 63, [2001] Env LR 35, QBD�������������������������������������������� 13.17, 13.18 R (on the application of Millgate Developments Ltd) v Wokingham BC [2011] EWCA Civ 1062, [2012] 3 EGLR 87, [2012] 39 EG 120, [2012] JPL 258, (2011) 108(29) LSG 20, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.25, 32.71 R (on the application of Renaissance Habitat Ltd) v West Berkshire DC [2011] EWHC 242 (Admin), [2011] 2 EGLR 80, [2011] 22 EG 104, [2011] JPL 1209, [2011] 8 EG 119 (CS), [2011] NPC 20, QBD��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.78, 32.79 Radford v De Froberville [1977] 1 WLR 1262, [1978] 1 All ER 33, 7 BLR 35, (1978) 35 P & CR 316, (1977) 121 SJ 319, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������� 29.110; 30.5, 30.24, 30.35 Radstock Cooperative & Industrial Society Ltd v Norton-Radstock UDC [1968] Ch 605, [1968] 2 WLR 1214, [1968] 2 All ER 59, (1968) 132 JP 238, 66 LGR 457, (1968) 112 SJ 135, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.22 Radstock Cooperative & Industrial Society v Norton-Radstock Urban DC [1967] Ch 1094, [1967] 3 WLR 588, [1967] 2 All ER 812, (1967) 131 JP 387, 65 LGR 518, Ch D����������� 19.76 Rae’s application, Re [2016] UKUT 552, LC���������������������������������������������������� 19.5, 19.62; 20.83, 20.84; 24.81
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Table of Cases Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50, [2011] 1 WLR 2900, [2012] 1 All ER 1137, [2012] 1 All ER (Comm) 1, [2012] Bus LR 313, [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 34, [2011] 2 CLC 923, [2012] BLR 132, 138 Con LR 1, [2011] CILL 3105, SC���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.17, 11.96, 11.98, 11.99, 11.102 Ramage v Womack [1900] 1 QB 116, QBD�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 26.3 Ramuz v Leigh-on-Sea Conservative and Unionist Club Ltd (1915) 31 TLR 174���������������� 11.227 Randall v Rigby, 150 ER 1372, (1838) 4 M & W 130Ct of Exchequer�������������������������������� 29.50 Ranken v Hunt (1894) 10 R 249�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.137 Rapley v Smart (1893) 10 TLR 174��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.239 Rasbridge’s Application, Re [2012] UKUT 246 (LC), [2012] JPL 1521, LC������������� 19.68; 22.17 Rayner v Preston (1881) 18 Ch D 1, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.51; 7.15 Reading Industrial Cooperative Society Ltd v Palmer [1912] 2 Ch 42, Ch D����������������������� 11.170 Reckitt v Cody [1920] 2 Ch 452, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.152; 29.109 Rees v Peters [2011] EWCA Civ 836, [2011] 2 P & CR 18, CA������������������������������������ 6.89; 9.53 Reeves v Cattell (1876) 24 WR 485������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.229 Reeves v Greenwich Tanning Company (Limited), 71 ER 380, (1864) 2 Hem & M 54, Ct of KB������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.239 Regent Oil Co Ltd v JA Gregry (Hatch End) Ltd [1966] Ch 402, [1965] 3 WLR 1206, [1965] 3 All ER 673, (1965) 109 SJ 833, CA���������������������������������������������������������������� 1.51 Regis Property Co Ltd v Redman [1956] 2 QB 612, [1956] 3 WLR 95, [1956] 2 All ER 335, (1956) 100 SJ 417, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.8 Reid v Bickerstaff [1909] 2 Ch 305, CA�������������������� 1.55; 6.2, 6.10, 6.20, 6.22, 6.23, 6.53, 6.84, 6.99, 6.100; 7.16, 7.19; 8.4, 8.22, 8.27, 8.30, 8.35, 8.48, 8.56, 8.75, 8.76, 8.81, 8.89, 8.91; 11.223, 11.225 Reid’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 165, 165 EG 473, [1955] JPL 457, 105 L.J. 317, LT��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.69 Renals v Cowlishaw (1879) 11 Ch D 866, CA������������������ 4.4; 6.14, 6.21, 6.52, 6.77, 6.99, 6.104, 6.106; 7.3, 7.15, 7.16, 7.18, 7.25; 8.9, 8.10, 8.22, 8.24, 8.47, 8.50 Reynolds‘ Application (Modification of Restrictive Covenant), Re (1987) 54 P & CR 121, LT���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.90; 20.46, 20.84 RG Kensington Management Co Ltd v Hutchinson IDH Ltd [2002] EWHC 1180 (Ch), [2003] 2 P & CR 13, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.49 Rhone v Stephens [1994] 2 AC 310, [1994] 2 WLR 429, [1994] 2 All ER 65, [1994] 37 EG 151, [1994] EG 50 (CS), (1994) 138 SJLB 77, [1994] NPC 43, HL��������������� 9.1; 25.3; 28.8, 28.11; 29.72, 29.73, 29.74, 29.78, 29.79, 29.80, 29.82, 29.84 Richard’s Application, Re (1984) 47 P & CR 467, LT�������������������������������������������������� 22.4; 23.52 Richards v Revitt (1877) 7 Ch D 224����������������������������������������� 1.16; 13.50, 13.52, 13.91, 13.142 Richardson v Jackson [1954] 1 WLR 447, [1954] 1 All ER 437, (1957) 7 P & CR 345, (1954) 98 SJ 145, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13.179, 13.181, 13.182 Ricketts v Enfield (Churchwardens) [1909] 1 Ch 544, Ch D������������������������������������������������ 11.39 Ridley v Lee [1935] Ch 591, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.17 Ridley v Taylor [1965] 1 WLR 611, [1965] 2 All ER 51, (1965) 16 P & CR 113, (1965) 109 SJ 292, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1.10, 1.27, 1.30, 1.31; 16.15, 16.28, 16.32, 16.61, 16.62, 16.63, 16.65, 16.84, 16.90, 16.91, 16.92, 16.94, 16.108, 16.119, 16.122, 16.133; 22.2, 22.3, 22.16, 22.17; 24.107, 24.109, 24.138 Rigby v Connol (1880) 14 Ch D 482, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.5 Rigby v Great Western Rly Co, 153 ER 703, (1845) 14 M & W 811, Ct of Exchequer������� 11.3 Roadside Group Ltd v Zara Commercial Ltd [2010] EWHC 1950 (Ch), [2010] 3 EGLR 41, [2010] 46 EG 118, [2010] 33 EG 70 (CS), [2011] 1 P & CR DG5, Ch D�������������������� 11.53 Roake v Chadha [1984] 1 WLR 40, [1983] 3 All ER 503, (1984) 47 P & CR 27, (1984) 128 SJ 32, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.44; 6.33, 6.42, 6.44, 6.54, 6.71, 6.74, 6.78; 7.5, 7.30; 27.38 Roberts v Church Commissioners for England [1972] 1 QB 278, [1971] 3 WLR 566, [1971] 3 All ER 703, (1971) 115 SJ 792, CA��������������������������������������������������������� 6.12, 16.14 Roberts v Howlett [2002] 1 P & CR 19, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.197 Robertson v Wait, 155 ER 1360, (1853) 8 Ex 299, Ct of Exchequer������������������������������������ 4.1 Robins’ Application, Re (2005) LP/17/2004��������������������������������������������������������������� 16.47; 24.48 Robinson v Harman, 154 ER 363, (1848) 1 Ex 850, Ct of Exchequer���������������������������������� 30.32 Robinson’s Application, Re (1965) 16 P & CR 106, 193 EG 565, [1965] JPL 111, 115 LJ 128, LT����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.5, 16.93; 21.8; 22.16
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Table of Cases Robinson’s Application, Re [2010] 1 P&CR 20�������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.84 Rock Portland Cement Co v Wilson (1882) 48 LT 386��������������������������������������������������������� 30.23 Rogers v Challis, 54 ER 68, (1859) 27 Beav 175, Ct of Chancery�������������������������������� 30.5, 30.19 Rogers v Hosegood [1900] 2 Ch 388, CA��������������������������������������������� 1.26, 1.51; 6.1, 6.2, 6.8, 6.18, 6.53, 6.70, 6.77, 6.83, 6.98, 6.99, 6.100, 6.101; 7.3, 7.29, 7.44, 11.39, 11.192, 11.193, 11.194, 11.195, 11.201, 11.227; 13.30; 27.30, 27.38 Rogers v Rice [1892] 2 Ch 170, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.27 Rolls v Miller (1884) 27 Ch D 71, CA������������������������������������������������� 11.8, 11.10, 11.173, 11.229 Roper v Williams, 37 ER 999, (1822) Turn & R 18, Ct of Chancery�������������������������������� 4.2; 8.22 Rosher, Re (1884) 26 Ch D 801, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.4 Rother v Colchester Corp [1969] 1 WLR 720, [1969] 2 All ER 600, (1969) 113 SJ 243, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.176, 11.177 Rowell v Satchell [1903] 2 Ch 212, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.87 Royal Mail Estates v Pridebank Ltd [2015] EWHC 1540 (Ch)���������������������������������� 11.16, 11.124 Royal Victoria Pavilion, Ramsgate, Re [1961] Ch 581, [1961] 3 WLR 491, [1961] 3 All ER 83, (1961) 12 P & CR 349, (1961) 105 SJ 684, Ch D��������������������������������������������������� 11.52 Rudkin’s Application, Re (1965) 16 P & CR 75, LT������������������������������������������������������������� 16.93 Russell v Archdale [1964] Ch 38, [1962] 3 WLR 192, [1962] 2 All ER 305, (1963) 14 P & CR 24, (1962) 106 SJ 390, Ch D������������������������������������������������������ 6.9, 6.34, 6.58, 6.68, 6.71, 6.73, 6.78; 7.4 Russell v Baber (1870) 18 WR 1021������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.220, 11.228 Russell v Watts (1885) 10 App Cas 590, HL������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.3 Rutherford’s Conveyance, Re [1938] Ch 396, [1938] 1 All ER 495, (1957) 7 P & CR 322, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.51, 1.68, 1.69; 7.9; 8.17, 8.22; 9.36; 11.4 Ruxley Electronics & Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC 344, [1995] 3 WLR 118, [1995] 3 All ER 268, [1995] CLC 905, 73 BLR 1, 45 Con LR 61, (1995) 14 Tr LR 541, (1995) 11 Const LJ 381, [1995] EG 11 (CS), (1995) 145 NLJ 996, (1995) 139 SJLB 163, HL������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.33, 30.37, 30.38 Ryan v Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association [1893] 1 Ch 116, CA�������������� 30.5 Rye v Rye [1962] AC 496, [1962] 2 WLR 361, [1962] 1 All ER 146, (1962) 106 SJ 94, HL�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.17; 32.54
S
Sack v West [1925] Ch 235, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.8 Saddington’s Application, Re (1965) 16 P & CR 81, 189 EG 455, [1964] JPL 203, LT������ 20.26 Sahota v RR Leisureways (UK) Ltd [2010] EWHC 3114, Ch D������������������������������������������ 11.28 Salford Estates (No 2) Ltd v Durham CC [2012] EWHC 2512 (Admin), [2013] JPL 293, QBD������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.24 Sampson, Re [2017] UKUT 127, LC������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.104 Samuels & Son (Newbury) Ltd’s Application, Re (1962) 13 P & CR 212, 179 EG 431, [1961] JPL 774, 111 LJ 536, LT������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 16.135 Sandbrook, Re [1912] 2 Ch 471, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.4 Sarfraz v Disclosure and Barring Service [2015] EWCA Civ 544, [2015] 1 WLR 4441, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.115 Sarum Trust v Duke of Westminster, 161 EG 104, [1953] CPL 86, CA���������������������� 15.33, 15.34 Savage v Foster, 88 ER 299, (1722) 9 Mod 35, Ct of KB����������������������������������������������������� 13.147 Saviker’s Application (No 2), Re (1973) 26 P & CR 441, LT������������������� 16.103, 16.108, 16.112; 20.40, 20.43; 22.9 Sayers v Collyer (1884) 28 Ch D 103, CA�������������������������������� 11.65; 13.23, 13.49, 13.74, 13.75, 13.82, 13.132, 13.166 Scala House & District Property Co v Forbes [1974] QB 575, [1973] 3 WLR 14, [1973] 3 All ER 308, (1973) 26 P & CR 164, (1973) 117 SJ 467, CA������������������������� 29.16 Schreiber v Creed, 59 ER 515, (1839) 10 Sim 9, Ct of Chancery����������������������� 4.1; 7.12; 8.4, 8.5 Scmlla Properties Ltd v Gesso Properties (BVI) Ltd [1995] BCC 793, [1995] EG 52 (CS), [1995] NPC 48, (1995) 70 P & CR D1, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������� 33.11 Scolefield v Whitehead, 23 ER 690, (1690) 2 Vern 127, Ct of Chancery������������������������������ 30.6 Segal Securities Ltd v Thoseby [1963] 1 QB 887, [1963] 2 WLR 403, [1963] 1 All ER 500, (1962) 106 SJ 1053, QBD���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.206 Selwyn’s Conveyance, Re [1967] Ch 674, [1967] 2 WLR 647, [1967] 1 All ER 339, (1967) 111 SJ 134, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 6.9, 6.49, 6.62 Serjeant Rudhall’s Case (1596) Sav 76���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.4 Severn Trent Water Ltd’s Application, Re (1994) 67 P & CR 236, LT���������������������������������� 24.141
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Table of Cases Seymour Road (Southampton) Ltd v Williams [2010] EWHC 111 (Ch), [2010] 2 P & CR DG5, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.26 Shafto v Bolckow Vaughan & Co (1887) 34 Ch D 725, Ch D���������������������������������������������� 13.40 Shah and Shah’s Application (1991) 62 P & CR 450, [1991] JPL 762, LT��������������������������� 16.138 Sharp v Harrison [1922] 1 Ch 502, Ch D������������������������������������������������������ 11.121; 13.23, 13.39, 13.43, 13.83, 13.85, 13.89 Sharp v Waterhouse, 119 ER 1449, (1857) 7 El & Bl 816, Ct of QB����������������������� 7.1; 25.3; 27.6 Shaw v Applegate [1977] 1 WLR 970, [1978] 1 All ER 123, (1978) 35 P & CR 181, (1977) 121 SJ 424, CA��������������������������������������������������� 11.73, 11.122, 11.157; 13.30, 13.31, 13.49, 13.55, 13.83, 13.84, 13.108, 13.124, 13.125, 13.126, 13.129, 13.133, 13.145, 13.149 Shaw v Foster (1872) LR 5 HL 321, HL���������������������������������������������������������������� 1.51; 7.15, 7.19 Shaw’s Application, Re (1967) 18 P & CR 144, LT����������������������������������������� 16.65, 16.75; 22.16 Shaw’s Application, Re (1994) 68 P & CR 591, LT������������������������������������������������������ 3.4; 11.116 Shayler v Woolf [1946] Ch 320, [1946] 2 All ER 54, [1947] LJR 71, 175 LT 170, (1946) 90 SJ 357, CA�������������������������������������������� 13.7; 25.3; 27.4, 27.6, 27.24, 27.26, 27.38 Shears v Wells [1936] 1 All ER 832����������������������������������������������������������������� 9.24; 11.59, 11.105 Sheehy’s Application, Re (1992) 63 P & CR 95, [1992] JPL 78, LT������������������������ 16.88, 16.103, 16.108, 16.109; 20.26; 22.9 Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Co (No 1) [1895] 1 Ch 287, CA������������� 13.33, 13.52, 13.87, 13.92, 13.95, 13.96, 13.97, 13.98 Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham (No 1) [1971] Ch 340, [1970] 3 WLR 348, [1970] 3 All ER 402, (1970) 21 P & CR 863, (1970) 114 SJ 636, Ch D���������������������� 13.42, 13.67, 13.181 Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham (No 2) [1971] 1 WLR 1062, [1971] 2 All ER 1267, (1971) 22 P & CR 835, (1971) 115 SJ 487, Ch D������������������������������ 1.10, 1.50, 1.51; 13.12, 13.32; 16.29, 16.92; 25.5 Shephard v Turner [2006] EWCA Civ 8, [2006] 2 P & CR 28, [2006] 2 EGLR 73, [2006] 20 EG 294, [2006] RVR 299, (2006) 103(7) LSG 26, (2006) 150 SJLB 166, [2006] NPC 6, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.129, 11.129; 16.102, 16.107, 16.108; 20.23, 20.26, 20.36, 20.38, 20.51, 20.52, 20.67, 20.68; 22.7, 22.10; 23.15 Sheppard v Gilmore (1887) 57 LT 614���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.23 Sherwood Close (Barnes) Management Co’s Application, Re [1972] Ch 208, [1971] 3 WLR 902, [1971] 3 All ER 1293, (1971) 22 P & CR 1031, (1971) 115 SJ 740, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28.23 Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] AC 691, [1973] 2 WLR 28, [1973] 1 All ER 90, (1973) 25 P & CR 48, (1972) 117 SJ 34, HL��������������� 8.117; 13.6; 29.5, 29.6, 29.12, 29.16, 29.24, 29.32, 29.33, 29.34, 29.48, 29.64 Shropshire CC v Edwards (1983) 46 P & CR 270, Ch D���������������������� 6.9, 6.11, 6.12, 6.20, 6.25; 7.29; 8.52; 11.9, 11.143, 11.151; 13.12, 13.13; 14.11, 14.22 Sidney v Clarkson, 55 ER 839, (1865) 35 Beav 118, Ct of Chancery����������������������������������� 8.98 Signature of St Albans (Property) Ltd v Wragg [2017] EWHC 2352 (Ch), [2017] HLR 45, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.69; 13.150, 13.161 Simeon & Isle of Wight RDC, Re [1937] Ch 525, [1937] 3 All ER 149, Ch D���������� 10.37, 10.44, 10.45, 10.46, 10.52 Simper v Foley, 70 ER 1179, (1862) 2 John & H 555, Ct of KB������������������������������������������ 27.34 Singh v Singh [2014] EWHC 2762 (Ch), [2015] 1 P & CR DG4, Ch D������������������������������ 13.13 Site Developments (Ferndown) Ltd v Cuthbury Ltd [2010] EWHC 10 (Ch), [2011] Ch 226, [2011] 2 WLR 74, [2010] NPC 4, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������ 6.82 SJC Construction Co Ltd v Sutton LBC (1974) 28 P & CR 200, LT������������ 16.123; 20.26, 20.36, 20.37, 20.47, 20.58, 20.59, 20.63, 20.88, 20.91, 20.92; 22.16; 23.17, 23.18, 23.19 SJC Construction Co Ltd v Sutton LBC (1975) 29 P & CR 322, CA������������������������� 20.37, 20.47, 20.54, 20.91, 20.92; 23.2, 23.6, 23.7, 23.17, 23.20, 23.22, 23.28, 23.29, 23.34, 23.36, 23.38, 23.52; 24.107 Skupinski’s Application, Re (2004) LP/34/03, [2005] RVR 269, LT����������������������� 11.118; 23.14, 23.36, 23.44, 23.46 Slack v Hancock (1912) 107 LT 14���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.18, 9.19 Small (Hugh) v Oliver & Saunders (Developments) Ltd [2006] EWHC 1293 (Ch), [2006] 3 EGLR 141, [2006] 23 EG 164 (CS), Ch D������������������������������������������� 6.77; 13.107
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Table of Cases Smith & Snipes Hall Farm Ltd v River Douglas Catchment Board [1949] 2 KB 500, [1949] 2 All ER 179, 65 TLR 628, (1949) 113 JP 388, 47 LGR 627, (1949) 93 SJ 525, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.4; 11.51; 13.30; 25.3; 27.4, 27.6, 27.7, 27.9, 27.18, 27.19, 27.20, 27.21, 27.22, 27.23, 27.25, 27.26, 27.34, 27.38; 28.2, 28.9, 28.11 Smith & Stott, Re (1883) 29 ChD 1009n������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.101 Smith v Colbourne [1914] 2 Ch 533, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 25.3 Smith v Jones [1954] 1 WLR 1089, [1954] 2 All ER 823, (1954) 98 SJ 540, Ch D������������� 11.28 Smith v Morgan [1971] 1 WLR 803, [1971] 2 All ER 1500, (1971) 22 P & CR 618, (1971) 115 SJ 288, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 25.6 Snaith and Dolding’s Application, Re [1995] 71 P & CR 104�������������������������������� 16.102, 16.103, 16.106,16.108; 20.26; 22.8, 22.9 Snook, Re [2014] UKUT 623 (LC), [2016] 1 P & CR DG18, LC���������������������������������������� 20.33 Snooks’ Application, Re [2016] 1 P&CR DG 18������������������������������������������������������������������ 20.82 Snow v Whitehead (1884) 51 LT 253, (1884) 27 Ch D 588, Ch D��������������������������������������� 11.200 Sobey v Sainsbury [1913] 2 Ch 513, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������� 1.55; 13.168, 13.170; 16.53 Solarfilms (Sales) Ltd’s Application, Re (1994) 67 P & CR 110, LT��������������� 16.108; 19.3; 20.26 Solicitors Arbitration, Re [1962] 1 WLR 353, [1962] 1 All ER 772, (1962) 106 SJ 221, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.203 Somerset Coal Canal Company v Harcourt, 53 ER 478, (1857) 24 Beav 571, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13.147 South Eastern Rly Co & Wiffin’s Contract, Re [1907] 2 Ch 366, Ch D�������������������������������� 1.66 South of England Dairies Ltd v Baker [1906] 2 Ch 631, Ch D��������������������������������������������� 27.16 Southampton City Council v Hallyard Ltd [2008] EWHC 916 (Ch), [2009] 1 P & CR 5, [2008] JPL 1440, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.32, 32.41 Southampton Corp’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 237, [1956] JPL 381, LT��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.135; 19.12 Southend on Sea BC’s Application, Re (1966) 17 P & CR 55, 195 EG 725, [1965] JPL 571, LT�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.135; 21.12 Spencer v Bailey (1893) 69 LT 179����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.51; 3.8 Spencer’s Case, 77 ER 72, (1583) 5 Co Rep 16a, Ct of QB��������������������������������������� Int; 1.5, 1.24; 11.4; 16.33; 29.98 Spicer v Martin (1888) 14 App Cas 12, HL����������������������������������������������� 4.4; 8.9, 8.9, 8.10, 8.11, 8.18, 8.19, 8.22, 8.24, 8.47, 8.59, 8.66; 11.229 Spring House (Freehold) Ltd v Mount Cook Land Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1833������� 11.21, 11.231A Spruce Enterprises Ltd v Palmer [2004] WL 1640384���������������������������������������������������������� 11.10 Spruit v John Smith’s Tadcaster Brewery Ltd (No 1) (1958) 9 P & CR 24, CA������������������� 24.107 St Albans Investments Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 260, 167 EG 509, [1956] JPL 462, LT����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.26 St Albans Investments Application, Re (1958) 9 P & CR 536, LT������������������������������ 16.48; 22.16 St Bernards Park’s Application, Re (1964) 15 P & CR 90, 185 EG 899, [1963] JPL 196, LT�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.6, 19.15; 22.16 St Edmundsbury & Ipswich Diocesan Board of Finance v Clark (No 2) [1975] 1 WLR 468, [1975] 1 All ER 772, (1975) 29 P & CR 336, (1974) 119 SJ 220, CA������������������������� 11.21 St Mary Magdalene, Stoke Bishop and the Bristol Diocesan Board of Finance’s Application, Re (1969) 20 P & CR 508, [1967] JPL 32, LT�������������������������������������������������������������� 22.16 St Marylebone Property Co Ltd v Tesco Stores [1988] 2 EGLR 40, [1988] 27 EG.72, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.180, 11.182 Stafford-Flowers v Linstone Chine Management Co Ltd [2015] UKUT 82, LC����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.108; 19.36; 20.26 Standard Commercial Properties Securities Ltd v Glasgow City Council [2006] UKHL 50, 2007 SC (HL) 33, 2006 SLT 1152, 2007 SCLR 93, [2007] JPL 758, [2006] 47 EG 181 (CS), (2006) 103(46) LSG 31, (2006) 150 SJLB 1534, [2006] NPC 122, 2006 GWD 38-748, HL��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.71 Stanhope v Haworth (1886) 3 TLR 34����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.26 Stannard v Issa [1987] AC 175, [1987] 2 WLR 188, (1987) 84 LSG 340, (1987) 131 SJ 133, Pc (Jam)�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.37; 20.20, 20.21, 20.23 Star Cinemas (London) and Central & Surburban Finance’s Application, Re (1970) 21 P & CR 825, LT����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 17.19; 22.2 Star v Rookesby, 91 ER 295, (1710) 1 Salk 335, Ct of KB��������������������������������������������������� 29.113
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Table of Cases Starlight Shipping Co v Allianz Marine & Aviation Versicherungs AG [2014] EWHC 3068 (Comm); [2015] 2 All ER (Comm) 747, [2014] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 579, [2014] 2 CLC 503, [2015] Lloyd’s Rep IR 54, QBD������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.98 Starside Properties v Mustapha [1974] 1 WLR 816, [1974] 2 All ER 567, (1974) 28 P & CR 95, (1974) 118 SJ 388, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.24 Startup v Macdonald, 134 ER 1029, (1843) 6 Man & G 593, Ct of Comm Pleas���������������� 29.15 Steedman v Drinkle [1916] 1 AC 275, Pc (Can)�������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.24 Stein v Stein [2004] EWHC 3212 (Ch), Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������� 14.15 Stephen’s Application, Re (1969) 20 P & CR 513, [1969] JPL 209, LT������������������� 16.135; 22.16 Steven’s Application, Re (1963) 14 P & CR 59, LT��������������������������������������������������� 16.92; 22.16, 22.17; 23.10 Stevens v Hutchinson [1953] Ch 299, [1953] 2 WLR 545, [1953] 1 All ER 699, (1953) 97 SJ 171, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 14.18; 16.5 Stevens v Ismail [2016] UKUT 43 (LC), [2016] L & TR 21, LC����������������������������������������� 1.10 Stevens v Willing & Co Ltd [1929] WN 53��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.142 Stilwell v Blackman [1968] Ch 508, [1967] 3 WLR 1397, [1967] 3 All ER 514, (1967) 111 SJ 413, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.64, 6.71, 6.73, 6.78, 6.91, 6.98, 6.100, 6.104, 6.106; 7.4 Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council v Alwiyah Developments (1986) 52 P & CR 278, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.29, 1.30; 11.120; 20.18, 20.19, 20.26, 20.40, 20.84, 20.86, 20.92; 22.17; 23.6, 23.7, 23.10, 23.12, 23.29, 23.30, 23.31, 23.32, 23.36, 23.40, 23.41, 23.42; 24.107, 24.143 Stokes v Cambridge Corp (1962) 13 P & CR 77, (1961) 180 EG 839, LT�������������� 13.015; 20.19; 23.19, 23.32 Storer v Great Western Railway Company, 63 ER 21, (1842) 2 Y & C. Ch 48 Ct of Chancery������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 30.6 Strand Music Hall Co Ltd, Re, 55 ER 853, (1865) 35 Beav 153, Ct of Chancery���������������� 15.22 Stromdale & Ball Ltd v Burden [1952] Ch 223, [1952] 1 All ER 59, [1951] 2 TLR 1192, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 3.4 Stuart v Diplock (1889) 43 Ch D 343, (1890) 59 LJ Ch 142, CA����������������������������������������� 11.177 Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852, (1879) 43 JP 716, (1879) 48 LJ Ch 785, (1879) 41 LT 219, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.239 Sugarman v Porter [2006] EWHC 331 (Ch), [2006] 2 P & CR 14, [2006] 11 EG 195 (CS), Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.81, 6.87; 7.33, 7.38, 7.40 Sunnyfield, Re [1932] 1 Ch 79, (1957) 7 P & CR 293, Ch D���������������������������� 14.21, 14.25, 14.30 Surana’s Application, Re [2016] UKUT 368, LC������������������������������������������������������������������ 16.108 Surrey CC and Mole DC v Bredero Homes Ltd [1992] 3 All ER 302, (1992) 64 P & CR 57, [1993] 03 EG 112, [1991] EG 127 (CS), [1991] NPC 125, Ch D��������������������������������� 25.3 Surrey CC and Mole DC v Bredero Homes Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 1361, [1993] 3 All ER 705, [1993] 25 EG 141, [1993] EG 77 (CS), (1993) 137 SJLB 135, [1993] NPC 63, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.103, 13.107, 13.187, 13.188; 30.5, 30.27, 30.38 Sutton & East Surrey Water plc’s Application, Re [2017] UKUT 248, LC��������������������������� 6.40 Swainland Builders v Freehold Properties [2002] EWCA Civ 560, [2002] 2 EGLR 71, [2002] 23 EG 123, [2002] 17 EG 154 (CS), CA����������������������������������������������������������� 11.27 Swatman v Ambler, 155 ER 1264, (1852) 8 Ex 72, Ct of Exchequer����������������������������������� 26.3 Sykes v Williams [1932] 2 Ch 190, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.24, 29.42 System Floors Ltd v Ruralpride Ltd [1995] 1 EGLR 48, [1995] 07 EG 125, [1994] EG 162 (CS), [1994] NPC 127, (1995) 69 P & CR D18, CA���������������������������������������������� 15.13
T
T Lucas & Co Ltd v Mitchell [1974] Ch 129, [1972] 3 WLR 934, [1972] 3 All ER 689, (1972) 116 SJ 711, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.48 Taddy & Co v Sterious & Co [1904] 1 Ch 354, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������� Int Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523, HL��������������������������������������������������������� Int Tailors of Aberdeen v Coutts (1834) 13 S 226, CSIH����������������������������������������������������������� 33.10 Taite v Gosling (1879) 11 Ch D 273, Ch D����������������������������������������������� 6.1; 11.39; 27.16, 27.33 Tamares (Vincent Square) Ltd v Fairpoint Properties (Vincent Square) Ltd [2007] EWHC 212 (Ch), [2007] 1 WLR 2167, [2007] 1 EGLR 26, [2007] 14 EG 106, [2007] 7 EG 143 (CS), Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.106 Tanfern Ltd v Cameron-MacDonald [2000] 1 WLR 1311, [2000] 2 All ER 801, [2001] CP Rep 8, [2000] 2 Costs LR 260, (2000) 97(24) LSG 41, CA������������������������������������ 24.109 Tarhale Ltd’s Application, Re (1990) 60 P & CR 368, LT��������������������� 20.26, 20.42, 20.50, 20.51
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Table of Cases Taroad’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 42, 158 EG 262, LT����������������������� 16.5, 16.18; 17.11, 17.24, 17.25, 17.31 Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] QB 133, [1981] 2 WLR 576, [1981] 1 All ER 897, [1981] Com LR 34, (1979) 251 EG 159, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.124, 13.153, 13.154 Taylor v London & County Banking Co [1901] 2 Ch 231, CA���������������������������������������� 9.18, 9.19 Taylor’s Application, Re (1965) 16 P & CR 169, 189 EG 753, [1964] JPL 351, 114 LJ 192, LT���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.63, 16.108 Tea Trade Properties Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd [1990] 1 EGLR 150, [1990] 22 EG 67, [1990] EG 9 (CS), Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.15 Teagle Application, Re; Sparkes Application, Re (1963) 14 P & CR 68, 183 EG 143, [1962] JPL 552, LT����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.106; 22.6, 22.13 Tendler v Sproule [1947] 1 All ER 193, CA������������������������������������������������������������� 11.208, 11.209 Tesco Stores Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] 1 WLR 759, [1995] 2 All ER 636, 93 LGR 403, (1995) 70 P & CR 184, [1995] 2 PLR 72, [1995] 2 EGLR 147, [1995] 27 EG 154, [1995] EG 82 (CS), (1995) 92(24) LSG 39, (1995) 145 NLJ 724, (1995) 139 SJLB 145, HL���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.25 Texaco Antilles Ltd v Kernochan [1973] AC 609, [1973] 2 WLR 381, [1973] 2 All ER 118, (1973) 117 SJ 146, PC (Bah)�������������������������������������������� 1.8; 8.18, 8.22, 8.78, 8.111, 8.119; 11.8, 11.174; 15.19, 15.21, 15.22, 15.24 Thames Valley Holdings Ltd, Re [2011] UKUT 325 (LC), [2012] JPL 66, LC���������� 20.97; 24.48 Thames Valley Holdings Ltd v National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty [2012] EWCA Civ 1019, [2012] 5 Costs LO 630, [2012] RVR 344, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 24.132, 24.136 Thames Water Utilities v Oxford City Council (1999) 1 LGLR 291, [1999] 1 EGLR 167, [1998] EG 133 (CS), (1998) 95(31) LSG 37, (1999) 77 P & CR D16, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 10.46, 10.50, 10.52, 10.53, 10.55 Thameside Estates Ltd v Greater London Council (1977) 249 EG 346�������������������������������� 20.93 Thamesmead Town Ltd v Allotey (1998) 30 HLR 1052, (2000) 79 P & CR 557, [1998] 3 EGLR 97, [1998] 37 EG 161, (1998) 95(3) LSG 26, (1998) 76 P & CR D20, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.80, 29.81, 29.82 Thomas Bates & Son v Wynhams Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 505, [1981] 1 All ER 1077, (1981) 41 P & CR 345, (1980) 257 EG 381, (1981) 125 SJ 32, CA���������������������������������������������� 11.27 Thomas v Hayward (1869) LR 4 Exch 311, Ct of Exchequer����������������������������������������������� 1.27 Thomas’s Application, Re [2011] UKUT 128 (LC), [2012] JPL 1139, LC�������������������������� 16.108 Thorn v Madden [1925] Ch 847, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������� 11.206, 11.208, 11.229 Thornewell v Johnson (1881) 50 LJ Ch 641������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.47 Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1996] QB 292, [1995] 3 WLR 650, [1995] 4 All ER 312, [1995] CLC 99, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������� Int Tichborne v Weir [1891-94] All ER Rep 449, 67 LT 735������������������������������������� 1.51; 9.69; 11.47 Tilley v Thomas (1867-68) LR 3 Ch App 61, CA����������������������������������������������������������������� 30.6 Tillotsons’ Application (2008) LP/56/2006��������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.26 Tiltwood, Sussex, Re [1978] Ch 269, [1978] 3 WLR 474, [1978] 2 All ER 1091, (1978) 36 P & CR 397, (1978) 122 SJ 573, Ch D������������������������������ 1.8; 8.22; 14.22, 14.30, 14.33; 15.20, 15.21 Tindall v Castle [1893] WB 40������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.5, 8.60 Tipping v Eckersley, 69 ER 779, (1855) 2 Kay & J 264, Ct of Chancery��������� 13.32, 13.39, 13.40 Tithe Redemption Commission v Runcorn UDC [1954] Ch 383, [1954] 2 WLR 518, [1954] 1 All ER 653, (1954) 118 JP 265, 52 LGR 231, (1954) 98 SJ 212, CA������������ 1.53 Tito v Waddell [1977] Ch 106, [1977] 2 WLR 496, [1977] 3 All ER 129, (1976) 121 SJ 10, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.10, 13.11; 29.72, 29.73, 29.74, 29.77, 29.84, 29.85, 29.86, 29.87, 29.88; 30.5, 30.19, 30.27 Tod-Heatly v Benham (1888) 40 Ch D 80, CA������������������������������������������� 11.127, 11.129, 11.136 Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1902] 2 KB 660, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Int Tompkins v Rogers [1921] 2 KB 94, KBD������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.229 Tophams Ltd v Earl of Sefton [1967] 1 AC 50, [1966] 2 WLR 814, [1966] 1 All ER 1039, (1966) 110 SJ 271, HL����������������������������������������������������������������� 11.58, 11.66, 11.77, 11.127, 11.240; 13.38, 13.40; 28.11 Torbay Hotel Ltd v Jenkins [1927] 2 Ch 225, Ch D������������������������������������������������ 8.38, 8.39, 8.51 Towner’s and Goddard’s Application, Re (1989) 58 P & CR 316, LT����������������������� 16.86; 17.16, 17.18; 19.44 Trenchard, Re [1902] 1 Ch 378, Ch D����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 6.48
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Table of Cases Truman, Hanbury, Buxton & Co’s Application, Re [1956] 1 QB 261, [1955] 3 WLR 704, [1955] 3 All ER 559, (1957) 7 P & CR 348, (1955) 99 SJ 796, CA�������������������� 18.5; 19.24, 19.25, 19.26,19.30, 19.32, 19.39; 24.107 TRW Steering Systems v North Cape Properties and Cornerstone Estates (1995) 69 P & CR 265, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.22, 16.30; 29.109 Tubbs v Esser (1909) 26 TLR 14������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.120 Tucker v Vowles [1893] 1 Ch 195, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������� 8.33, 8.37, 8.65, 8.68, 8.76, 8.79 Tulk v Moxhay, 41 ER 1143, (1848) 2 Ph 774, (1848) 18 LJ Ch. 83, Ch D�������������� 1.3, 1.6, 1.10, 1.16, 1.17, 1.18, 1.20, 1.26, 1.27; 6.51; 8.7, 8.105, 8.115, 8.116; 11.67, 11.76, 11.77; 13.28; 16.36; 26.8; 28.5, 28.7; 33.11 Turner v Pryce [2008] RVR 165, [2008] 1 P & CR DG 20, Ch D�������������������������� 13.144, 13.162, 13.164, 13.166; 16.54 Turner’s Application, Re (2005) LP/45/2003������������������������������������������������������������������������ 20.84 Tweddle v Atkinson, 121 ER 762, (1861) 1 B & S 393, Ct of QB���������������������������������������� Int Twiname’s Application, Re (1972) 23 P & CR 413, LT������������������������������������������� 11.158; 20.26, 20.58, 20.84
U
Union of London & Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance, Re [1933] Ch 611, 89 ALR 797, CA����������������������������������������������������������� 6.7, 6.15, 6.22, 6.28, 6.34, 6.51, 6.53, 6.57, 6.68, 6.70, 6.76, 6.98, 6.100; 7.3, 7.7, 7.10, 7.12; 27.11, 27.26 University of Chester’s Application, Re [2016] UKUT 457, LC���������������������������� 11.231, 11.242; 19.61; 20.70 University of East London Higher Education Corp v Barking and Dagenham LBC (Costs) [2004] EWHC 2908 (Ch), [2005] Ch 354, [2005] 2 WLR 1334, [2005] 3 All ER 416, [2005] 2 Costs LR 287, Ch D������������������������������������������� 14.33; 15.25A; 25.6 University of Westminster’s Application, Re (1997) 74 P & CR 86, [1997] 1 EGLR 191, [1997] 22 EG 147, LT������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.61; 17.20; 24.32 University of Westminster’s Application, Re [1998] 3 All ER 1014, (1999) 78 P & CR 82, [1999] RVR 8, [1998] EG 118 (CS), (1998) 95(33) LSG 33, (1998) 142 SJLB 245, [1998] NPC 120, (1998) 76 P & CR D44, CA����������������������������� 16.57, 16.61, 16.66; 17.20; 20.16; 21.13; 24.32 Urban Housing Co Ltd v Oxford City Council [1940] Ch 70, [1939] 4 All ER 211, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.144; 13.3
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Vaizey’s Application, Re (1974) 28 P & CR 517, LT����������������������������������������� 16.5; 20.40, 20.81 Vernon v Smith, 106 ER 1094, (1821) 5 B & Ald 1, Ct of KB��������������������������������������������� 29.102 Vertical Properties Ltd v New Hampstead Garden Suburb Trust Ltd [2010] UKUT 51 (LC), [2010] JPL 793, LC��������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.108; 20.26, 20.96 Victoria Recreation Ground, Portslade’s Application, Re (1979) 41 P & CR 119, LT���������� 8.22 Villar, Re [1929] 1 Ch 243, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.5, 29.52 Viscount Chelsea v Muscatt [1990] 35 EG 63, [1990] WL 754255, CA������������������������������ 13.44 Voice v Bell (1994) 68 P & CR 441, [1993] EG 128 (CS), [1993] NPC 105, CA���������������� 6.10
W
Waggot v Yip [2017] UKUT 108, LC������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 19.59 Wahab v Khan [2011] EWHC 908, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 24.67 Wake’s Application, Re (2002) LP/2/2001������������������������������������������������������������������ 20.26; 22.16 Wakeham v Wood (1982) 43 P & CR 40, [1982] JPL 242, (1981) 125 SJ 608, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.31; 13.47, 13.89 Walker v Kenley [2008] EWHC 370 (Ch), [2008] 1 P & CR DG21, Ch D�������������������������� 11.244 Walker, Re [2010] UKUT 16, LC������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 20.26 Wallace and Co’s Application, Re (1993) 66 P & CR 124, [1993] JPL 690, LT���������� 20.26, 20.74 Wallersteiner v Moir (No 1) [1974] 1 WLR 991, [1974] 3 All ER 217, (1974) 118 SJ 464, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.13 Walsh v Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch D 9, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 1.51 Waltham Forest LBC v Oakmesh Ltd [2009] EWHC 1688 (Ch), [2010] JPL 249, Ch D���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 32.55, 32.58
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Table of Cases Walthamstow Building Society v Davies (1990) 22 HLR 60, (1990) 60 P & CR 99, CA��������� 15.10 Wandsworth Board of Works v United Telephone Co (1884) 13 QBD 904, CA������������������ 1.53 Ward v Paterson [1929] 2 Ch 396, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.172 Wards Construction (Medway) Application, Re (1973) 25 P & CR 223, LT������������������������ 20.26 Warner Bros Pictures Inc v Nelson [1937] 1 KB 209, [1936] 3 All ER 160, KBD��������������� 13.38 Watson’s Application, Re (1966) 17 P & CR 176, [1966] JPL 347, LT��������������������� 16.29, 16.95; 22.17; 23.53 Waughton v Coppard [1899] 1 Ch 92, Ch D���������������������������������������������������� 8.5; 11.132, 11.246 Webb v Fagotti Bros (1898) 79 LT 683, CA������������������������������������������������������ 8.94; 11.72, 11.73, 11.137, 11.156, 11.222, 11.223, 11.224, 11.225 Webb v Hewitt, 69 ER 1181, (1857) 3 Kay & J 438, Ct of Chancery����������������������������������� 15.13 Webb v Russell, 100 ER 639, (1789) 3 Term Rep 393, Ct of KB�������������������������������� 27.13, 27.31 Webb’s Lease, Re [1951] Ch 808, [1951] 2 All ER 131, [1951] 2 TLR 530, (1951) 95 SJ 367, CA ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Int Weeks v Thames Water Authority (40/1979) (1980) 39 P & CR 208, (1979) 252 EG 280, [1979] JPL 774, LT�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.93 Wells v Attenborough (1871) 24 LT 312������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.253 Wells v Maxwell (No 1), 55 ER 160, (1863) 32 Beav 408 Ct of Chancery�������������������������� 30.6 Wembley Park Estate Co Ltd’s Transfer, Re [1968] Ch 491, [1968] 2 WLR 500, [1968] 1 All ER 457, (1968) 112 SJ 152, Ch D��������������������������������������������������������������� 14.26, 14.27 Wesson’s Application, Re (1964) 15 P & CR 109, 187 EG 435, [1963] JPL 614, LT���������� 22.16 West v Blakeway, 133 ER 940, (1841) 2 Man & G 729, Ct of Comm Pleas������������������������ 15.13 West v Williams [1899] 1 Ch 132, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.58 Western v MacDermott (1866) LR 1 Eq 499, Ct of Chancery, affd (1866–67) LR 2 Ch App 72, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.16, 1.51; 8.9, 8.27, 8.38, 8.50; 8.71, 8.81, 8.94, 8.96; 11.31, 11.146; 13.159, 13.160 Western v Macdermott (1866–67) LR 2 Ch App 72, CA������������������������������������������������������ 11.146 Westhoughton UDC v Wigan Coal & Iron Co Ltd [1919] 1 Ch 159, CA����������������������� 6.1, 11.39, 11.42; 27.16, 27.16; 29.72, 29.73 Westminster City Council v Duke of Westminster (1992) 24 HLR 572, CA������������������������ 16.47 Westminster City Council v Duke of Westminster [1991] 4 All ER 136, (1991) 23 HLR 174, [1990] EG 146 (CS), Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������ 1.10; 16.34, 16.35, 16.115 Westminster City Council v Haymarket Publishing Ltd [1981] 1 WLR 677, [1981] 2 All ER 555, 80 LGR 528, (1981) 42 P & CR 29, (1981) 258 EG 641, [1981] JPL 751, (1981) 125 SJ 220, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.63, 29.70 Whatman v Gibson, 59 ER 333, (1838) 9 Sim 196, Ct of Chancery��������������������������� 8.5, 8.6, 8.7; 11.137, 11.233 Wheeler v JJ Saunders Ltd [1996] Ch 19, [1995] 3 WLR 466, [1995] 2 All ER 697, [1995] Env LR 286, [1994] EG 209 (CS), [1995] NPC 4, CA��������������������������� 10.96; 19.38, 19.65, 19.70 White (Marion) v Francis [1972] 1 WLR 1423, [1972] 3 All ER 857, (1972) 116 SJ 822, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 13.22 White v Bijou Mansions Ltd [1937] Ch 610, [1937] 3 All ER 269, Ch D������������������� Int; 3.4; 4.5; 8.66, 8.68, 8.82, 8.102, 8.113; 9.48 White v Damon, 32 ER 13, (1802) 7 Ves Jr 30, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������������� 30.6 Whitehouse v Hugh [1906] 2 Ch 283, CA���������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.98, 8.100 Whitgift Homes Ltd v Stocks [2001] EWCA Civ 1732, [2001] 48 EG 130 (CS), [2001] NPC 169, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.37; 6.19; 8.22, 8.40, 8.42, 8.45, 8.54, 8.74, 8.94 Whiting’s Application, Re (1989) 58 P & CR 321, [1989] EG 3 (CS), LT��������������������������� 20.6 Whiting’s Application, Re (1989) 58 P & CR 321, [1989] EG 3 (C.), LT���������������������������� 21.12 Wickenden v Thomas Webster, Katherine Elder and Fanny Elder, 119 ER 909, (1856) 6 El & Bl 387, Ct of QB����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.229, 11.246 Wickin’s Application, Re, 183 EG 541, [1962] RVR 571, CA�������������������������� 11.3; 16.62, 16.65, 16.84, 16.88; 24.107, 24.109 Wickins Application, Re (1962) 13 P & CR 227, 181 EG 259, [1962] JPL 118, LT������������ 16.26 Wigram v Buckley [1894] 3 Ch 483, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.69 Wigsell v School for the Indigent Blind Corp (1882) 8 QBD 357, QBD����������������������� 25.3, 30.37 Wild Duck Ltd v Smith [2017] EWHC 1252 (Ch), Ch D������������������������������������������������������ 11.136
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Table of Cases Wildtree Hotels Ltd v Harrow London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 1, [2000] 3 WLR 165, [2000] 3 All ER 289, [2000] BLGR 547, (2001) 81 P & CR 9, [2000] 2 EGLR 5, [2000] RVR 235, [2000] EG 80 (CS), (2000) 97(28) LSG 31, (2000) 150 NLJ 984, [2000] NPC 71, (2001) 81 P & CR DG9, HL������������������������������������������������������� 10.39, 10.42 Wilkes v Spooner [1911] 2 KB 473, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 9.7, 9.8 Wilkinson v Kerdene Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 44, [2013] 2 EGLR 163, [2013] 7 EG 98 (CS), [2013] 1 P & CR DG19, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 29.83 Willé v St John [1910] 1 Ch 325, CA�������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.22; 11.156 William Aldred’s Case, 77 ER 816, (1610) 9 Co Rep 57, Ct of KB�������������������������������������� 11.31 William Brandts Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454, HL���������������������� Int; 7.11 Williams and Others v Earl of Jersey, 41 ER 424, (1841) Cr & Ph 91, Ct of Chancery������� 13.49 William’s Application under Section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925, Re [2017] UKUT 341, LC����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.26, 20.28 Williams‘ Application, Re (1988) 55 P & CR 400, LT������������������������������������������������ 20.26; 22.16 Williams v Atlantic Assurance Co Ltd [1933] 1 KB 81, (1932) 43 Ll L Rep 177, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 7.11; 13.30 Williams v Greatrex [1957] 1 WLR 31, [1956] 3 All ER 705, (1957) 101 SJ 43, CA���������� 30.6 Williams v Kiley (t/a CK Supermarkets Ltd) (No.1) [2002] EWCA Civ 1645, [2003] L & TR 20, [2003] 1 EGLR 46, [2003] 06 EG 147, [2002] 49 EG 122 (CS), (2003) 100(4) LSG 32, (2002) 152 NLJ 1809, (2002) 146 SJLB 270, [2002] NPC 149, [2003] 1 P & CR DG20, CA���������������������������������������������������������������� 11.180, 11.181, 11.182 Williams v Kiley (t/a CK Supermarkets) (No 2) [2004] EWCA Civ 870, CA���������������������� 11.185 Williams v Unit Construction Co Ltd (1955) 19 Conv (NS) 262��������������������������� 6.66, 6.67, 6.69, 6.73, 6.78, 6.90; 28.11 Willis, Re [1997] 6 P&CR 97������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.108; 20.26, 20.95 Wills v Adams (1908) 25 TLR 85������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 11.176 Willson v Leonard, 49 ER 146, (1840) 3 Beav 373, Ct of Chancery������������������������������������ 26.3 Wilson v Furness Railway Co (1869-70) LR 9 Eq 28, Ct of Chancery��������������������������������� 30.13 Wilson v Hart (1866) 1 Ch App 463, CA������������������������������������������������ 1.16; 11.47, 11.59; 13.52 Wilson v Northampton and Banbury Junction Railway Co (1873–74) LR 9 Ch App 279, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 30.5, 30.19, 30.31 Wilson’s Application, Re (1954) 164 EG 269����������������������������������������������������������������������� 19.5 Wimpey Homes Holdings v Secretary of State for the Environment and Winchester City Council [1993] 2 PLR 54, [1993] JPL 919��������������������������������������������������� 32.43, 32.51 Windsor Hotel (Newquay) v Allan [1981] JPL 274, CA������������������������������������������������������� 11.145 Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd v Millennium Productions Ltd [1948] AC 173, [1947] 2 All ER 331, 63 TLR 529, [1947] LJR 1422, 177 LT 349, (1947) 91 SJ 504, HL������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� Int; 1.51; 16.30 Winter v Traditional & Contemporary Contracts Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1740, [2007] 2 All ER 343, [2007] RVR 122, [2007] 3 EG 124 (CS), CA��������������� 24.130, 24.131, 24.133 Winter v Traditional & Contemporary Contracts Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1088, [2008] 1 EGLR 80, [2008] 3 EG 180, [2007] RVR 353, [2008] JPL 1011, [2007] 46 EG 177 (CS), (2007) 104(45) LSG 30, [2007] NPC 117, CA������������������������������ 16.128; 20.92; 23.14, 23.36 Wolverhampton Corp v Emmons [1901] 1 QB 515, CA������������������������������������������������������� 30.7 Wood v Cooper [1894] 3 Ch 671, Ch D����������������������������������������� 11.132, 11.135, 11.139, 11.144 Woodhouse, Re [2010] UKUT 235, LC�������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.55 Worsley v Swann (1882) 51 LJ Ch 576�������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.155, 11.227 Wreford’s Application, Re (1957) 7 P & CR 257, [1956] JPL 454, LT�������������������������������� 19.15 Wright v Berry (1903) 19 TLR 259��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.226 Wright v Dean [1948] Ch 686, [1948] 2 All ER 415, 64 TLR 467, [1948] LJR 1571, (1948) 92 SJ 393, Ch D�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 8.115 Wrighton’s Application, Re (1962) 13 P & CR 189, 177 EG 367, [1961] JPL 189, LT���������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1.44; 16.26, 16.110, 16.118 Wroth v Tyler [1974] Ch 30, [1973] 2 WLR 405, [1973] 1 All ER 897, (1973) 25 P & CR 138, (1972) 117 SJ 90, Ch D����������������������������������������������������� 13.79, 13.101, 13.109; 30.18, 30.19, 30.21, 30.23, 30.24, 30.25 Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798, [1974] 2 All ER 321, (1974) 27 P & CR 296, (1973) 118 SJ 420, Ch D������������������������ 1.26, 1.27, 1.31, 1.37, 1.41, 1.42, 1.48, 1.52; 6.42, 6.47; 11.79, 11.90, 11.107, 11.160, 11.163; 13.22, 13.39, 13.55, 13.89, 13.91, 13.92, 13.104, 13.109; 14.3; 20.65; 23.28, 23.29, 23.38; 30.21, 30.22, 30.24
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Table of Cases Wrotham Park Settled Estates v Hertsmere Borough Council [1993] 2 EGLR 15, [1993] 27 EG 124, [1993] RVR 56, [1994] JPL 832, [1993] NPC 48, CA������������������������������������ 10.78 Wrotham Park Settled Estates v Naylor (1991) 62 P & CR 233, [1991] 1 EGLR 274, Ch D������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 11.204 Wycombe DC v Williams [1995] 3 PLR 19, [1995] EG 83 (CS), QBD������������������������������� 32.9 Wyllie v Pollen, 46 ER 767, (1863) 3 De GJ & S 596, Ct of Chancery�������������������������������� 9.18 Wynyates Smith’s Application, Re (1964) 15 P & CR 85, 185 EG 720, [1963] JPL 269, LT�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 16.92
Y
Yogmin v Heath [1974] 1 WLR 135, [1974] 1 All ER 461, (1973) 26 P & CR 570, (1973) 117 SJ 795, CA��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 9.1 Young v Bristol Aeroplane Co Ltd [1944] KB 718, [1944] 2 All ER 293, (1945) 78 Ll L Rep 6, CA����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 23.37
Z
Zenios v Hampstead Garden Suburb Trust Ltd. See Zenios, Re Zenios, Re [2010] UKUT 260, LC��������������������������������������������������������������� 16.104, 16.108; 20.96 Zenios, Re; sub mom Zenios v Hampstead Garden Suburb Trust Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1645, CA������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 16.105, 16.108; 18.4; 20.26, 20.34; 21.17; 22.10 Zetland v Hislop. See Earl of Zetland v Hislop Zetland, Marquess of v Driver. See Marquess of Zetland v Driver Zopat Developments Application, Re (1967) 18 P & CR 156, 119 EG 941, [1966] JPL 589, LT���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 20.26; 22.16
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Introduction Covenants generally
THE DOCTRINE OF PRIVITY1 At common law, covenants2 entered into between two or more parties are, as a class, enforceable only by the parties themselves and their personal representatives.3 This doctrine of privity thus prevented enforcement of a covenant by a non-party notwithstanding that he was clearly intended to benefit from the promise.4 It also excluded the possibility of the benefit of the covenant being effectively assigned to a third party since such third party was (by definition) not a party to the deed.
MODIFICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF PRIVITY In its application to covenants generally, the strict common law doctrine of privity has been modified both by rules of equity and by statute.
I: Benefit In equity, a stranger to a deed will be allowed to enforce it if, on its true construction, a trust of its benefit in his favour can be established.5 Further, 1
For an illuminating article on the early history of the doctrine, see Dr Vernon V Palmer ‘The History of Privity—The Formative Period (1500–1680)’ The American Journal of Legal History, vol XXXIII (1989). 2 The word ‘covenant’ is of venerable antiquity and it frequently appears in the English translation of both the Old and the New Testaments where it has the meaning of a solemn promise. It is not, however, as solemn as an oath, breach of which may be visited by criminal (as well as religious) sanctions. In English law it means a promise contained in a deed. 3 It may well have been otherwise with promises contained in simple contracts prior to the decision in Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 1 B & S 393: see Dutton v Poole (1678) 2 Lev 210; but the principle of privity clearly existed in the case of contracts made by deed: see Carnegie v Waugh (1823) 2 Dow & Ry KB 277 and the judgment of Denning LJ in Drive Yourself Hire Co (London) Ltd v Strutt [1953] 3 WLR 1111, at pp 1119–1122. Naturally, in the case of a deed poll (ie a deed executed by the promisor but to which no promisee is a party), the rule of privity was qualified so as to permit the intended benficiary of the deed to enforce it: see Cooker v Child (1673) 2 Lev 74; Chelsea and Walham Green Building Society v Armstrong [1951] Ch 853 (concerning a transfer of registered land expressed to be made, and executed, only by the transferor and to which the transferee was not a party). 4 See, eg White v Bijou Mansions Ltd [1937] Ch 610, although in this case there was the additional ground (which section 56 of the Law of Property Act 1925 could do nothing to overcome) that the intended promisee was not identified at the date when the deed was executed. 5 See Gregory v Williams (1817) 3 Mer 582; Lloyd’s v Harper (1880) 16 ChD 290; Affréteurs Réunis SA v Walford [1919] AC 801; Harmer v Armstrong [1934] Ch 65.
1
Covenants generally the benefit of a covenant the performance of which does not involve personal confidence or skill6 might be the subject of an equitable assignment entitling the assignee to use the name of the assignor in enforcing the covenant.7 Such an ‘assignment’ is not, however, a true case of assignment since (as the need for joining the assignor as a party signifies) it does not create privity between the assignee and the covenantor.8 By statute, the benefit of a covenant relating to property (unless inherently non-assignable) is now assignable in a way which simulates privity between the assignee and the covenantor.9 Furthermore, an identifiable person who, by the terms of the covenant, is clearly intended to benefit,10 may enforce the covenant although not a party,11 thus placing such a person on a par with the covenantees who are actual parties and equating the position of such person with that of the intended beneficiary under a deed poll. Further, even where not identifiable at the date of the covenant, a person intended to benefit may enforce the covenant where it has been entered into on or after 11 May 2000.12 Moreover, even at common law, the non-recognition of an assignment was often readily side-stepped by the device of the intended assignee taking a letter of attorney from the covenantee authorising the assignee to sue in the covenantee’s name. In such a case, although the assignee sued and recovered as agent for the covenantee, nevertheless, as against his principal, the terms of the assignment gave him a good title to retain what he recovered.
II: Burden It will be observed, however, that all the foregoing relaxations to the strict doctrine of privity relate to the passing of the benefit of a covenant. Under them there was no corresponding relaxation in relation to the burden of a covenant.13 Accordingly, whilst the benefit could properly be recognised as a property interest in a chose in action, it could not enjoy the status of a property interest in any subject matter out of which the covenant fell to be performed. This can be illustrated by reference to two cases. In Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd v Millennium Productions Ltd,14 a licensee of a theatre whose 6
Ie, a covenant which amounted to a chose in action: see HW Elphinstone ‘What is a Chose in Action?’ 9 LQR 311. 7 See Tailby v Official Receiver (1888) 13 App Cas 523; William Brandts Sons & Co v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454; Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [1995] 4 All ER 312. 8 See Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1902] 2 KB 660 and Fitzroy v Cave [1905] 2 KB 364. 9 Law of Property Act 1925, section 136, re-enacting section 25(6) of the Judicature Act 1873. 10 An issue which has given rise to divergence of judicial opinion as to the correct approach: see below para 3.4(2). 11 Law of Property Act 1925, s 56, re-enacting with modifications the provisions of the Real Property Act 1845, s 5. These sections are considered in detail in Chapter 3 (para 3.3 et seq). 12 By reason of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999. 13 The cases of Lucas v Commerford (1790) 3 Bro CC 166 and Flight v Bentley (1835) 7 Sim 149 decided by Lord Thurlow and V-C Shadwell respectively, which appear to recognise the assignability of the burden of covenants on the basis of the availability of the remedy of specific performance as between the assignor and the assignee (although that remedy was not shared by the covenantee), were expressly overruled in Cox v Bishop (1857) 8 De G M & G 815 on the basis of the judges’ mistaken application of the doctrine of specific performance. 14 [1948] AC 173.
2
Covenants relating to land contractual rights were threatened with premature determination was held to be entitled to an injunction as against the licensor to restrain interference with the chose in action (or licence) created by the contract. On the other hand, in Clore v Theatrical Properties Ltd,15 where an assignee of the lessor of a theatre (the claimant) sought to prevent the lessor assignee (the defendant) from exercising similar rights, the Court of Appeal held that the defendant could not prevent this—the licence did not create a proprietary interest in the theatre and so it could not bind the assignee of the licensor.16 In relation to chattels, there has (with one common law and one statutory exception17) been no relaxation of the rule that the burden of a covenant relating to the chattels cannot bind a successor in title of the chattels. Thus, attempts by manufacturers (prior to the passing of the Fair Trading Act 1973) to impose price maintenance agreements on retailers who were not parties to them, signally failed.18
COVENANTS RELATING TO LAND However, in the case of covenants relating to land, the law has made significant departures from the doctrine of privity in recognising that certain categories of such covenants may have greater-than-contractual enforceability by and against third parties.19
15 16
[1936] 3 All ER 483. There is no reason why the benefit of a licence should not, in principle, be assignable although whether it is capable of assignment no doubt depends upon the construction of the particular licence. It may be that (unlike a proprietary interest such as an option which is presumed to be assignable unless the contrary appears: see Re Button’s Lease [1964] Ch 263), a licence will be presumed to be non-assignable unless the contrary appears. This is, however, by no means certain and it is noteworthy that in all the precedents of licences appearing in the precedents volumes of The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer an express provision appears declaring that the licence is personal and non-assignable. In an illuminating article in The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer vol 16, p 323 at 343, Professor Crane concludes that ‘the assignability of licences must, it seems, depend on the nature of the particular licence. Probably most licences involving full occupation or possession will be personal in character, but the benefit of commercial licences—such as the advertising arrangements in Re Webb’s Lease [1951] Ch 808 – ought to be assignable’. 17 The common law exception relates to the anomalous position of a charterparty of a ship having been held to be binding upon a subsequent owner of the ship: Lord Strathcona SS Co v Dominion Coal Co [1926] AC 108; De Mattos v Gibson (1858) 4 De G & J 276; Messageries Imperiales Co v Baines (1863) 7 LT 763. The statutory exception relates to the case of documents of title relating to the property of another where the person retaining them gives an acknowledgment in writing of the right of that other to production and an undertaking for their safe custody: see, now, the Law of Property Act 1925, section 64. Under subsections (2) and (9), the obligations to produce and keep the documents safe are binding upon each individual possessor of the documents as long as he has ‘possession or control’ thereof. These provisions re-enacted earlier statutory provisions which, in turn, embodied rules which had been established at common law. It is to be noted, however, that although title deeds are now treated by the law as chattels, they were, at common law, regarded as part of the land (since they devolved on the heir with such land) and were thus originally treated as realty. Lord Coke referred to them as ‘the sinews of the land’. 18 See Elliman Sons & Co v Carrington & Son Ltd [1901] 2 Ch 275; Taddy & Co v Sterious & Co [1904] 1 Ch 354; McGruther v Pitcher [1904] 2 Ch 306. 19 By ‘third parties’ is meant persons who were neither parties nor privy (by reason of devolution on death or by operation of law) to the covenant.
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Covenants generally It is this feature of greater-than-contractual enforceability (where it exists) which invests covenants relating to land with the character of rights in the subject matter20 to which they relate, ie the status of property rights; and this, in turn, occasions the need to consider such covenants as a separate species—if not, indeed, as a genus in their own right.21 Precisely how far covenants relating to land are capable of having greater-thancontractual enforceability, and how far they enjoy the status of property rights, depends upon the particular category into which they fall. These categories are as follows. Covenants relating to land
Covenants entered into between landlord and tenant
Where there is privity of estate
Where there is no privity of estate
Covenants not entered into between landlord and tenant
Restrictive covenants (ie covenants restrictive of the user of land)
Covenants which are not restrictive covenants
Positive covenants
Negative covenants not being restrictive covenants
Of the above categories, covenants entered into between landlord and tenant where there is privity of estate between the parties lie, for the most part, outside the scope of this volume.22 But in the case of covenants in leases which cannot be enforced under the doctrine of privity of estate,23 the rules which apply are substantially the same as the corresponding rules in the case of freehold covenants (although not identical).24
20
The term ‘subject matter’, although seemingly pedantic, is used advisedly. Whilst it is tempting to refer to rights in ‘land’, to do so would confuse the issue. As will be seen later in this volume, the subject matter against which covenants are enforceable may (in differing sets of circumstances) consist of a particular estate in land, a group of different estates or the physical land itself. Section 80(2) and (3) of the Law of Property Act 1925, refers to covenants ‘running with the land’, but gives a technical meaning to the expression in subsection (4). 21 The covenant in Clore v Theatrical Properties Ltd, above, was not within these. 22 The rules relating to enforceability as between landlord and tenant based upon privity of estate are well known and are substantially governed by Spencer’s Case (1583) 5 Co Rep 16a (in the case of assignments of the lease) and by sections 141 and 142 of the Law of Property Act 1925, replacing sections 10 and 11 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 (in the case of transfers of the reversion). 23 Eg, restrictive covenants in a head lease sought to be enforced against an underlessee and covenants in leases sought to be enforced by one lessee against another. 24 Thus, restrictive covenants in leases cannot be registered as land charges under the Land Charges Act 1972 even though they relate to land of the reversioner which is not comprised in the lease: Dartstone Ltd v Cleveland Petroleum Co Ltd [1969] 1 WLR 1807. Further, personal liability is now limited by the Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995.
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Covenants relating to land The categories of covenants dealt with in this book consist (in order or treatment) of the following: ●● ●● ●●
Part I deals with restrictive covenants. Part II deals with positive covenants and negative covenants which are not restrictive covenants (ie covenants which, although negative, do not restrict the use of land). Part III of the book deals with Planning Obligations under the Town & Country Planning Act 1990, the rules in relation to which are in many respects similar to the rules relating to covenants but which also have significant differences and are subject to special statutory provisions.
In Part IV, proposed reforms in relation to the law of land covenants will be considered.
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6
Part I Restrictive covenants
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1 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ (including general consideration of requirements for transmissibility)
THE QUALITY OF TRANSMISSIBILITY 1.1 Any covenant can, of course, be enforced within the limits of the doctrine of privity of contract. Broadly speaking, in land law terms, a restrictive covenant is an obligation in a binding written agreement (usually, but not necessarily, a deed) which restricts the use that can be made of land. The term is generally used, however, to refer to such an obligation that benefits other land and is also enforceable by successors in title of the land which benefits from it and against successors in title of the land the use of which is restricted (or ‘burdened’) by it. This book is essentially concerned with freehold restrictive covenants, that is to say covenants entered into between the owners of different pieces of freehold land,1 the burden and benefit of which are capable of running with the land. Covenants between landlord and tenant have developed separately and are subject to different principles governed by the separate law of landlord and tenant. 1.2 During the course of the nineteenth century, the law relating to restrictive covenants entered into between freeholders developed so that such covenants came to have a degree of enforceability going far beyond the limits allowed by the rules of privity of contract. Ultimately, the restrictive covenant became much more than a mere personal right and became that of a fully-fledged equitable interest in land. In the course of this development a number of technical requirements were evolved which a restrictive covenant has to satisfy in order for the benefit and burden to be transmissible. A full account of these as they now stand will be given in this book. Before considering these requirements in detail, however, it will assist in getting them into legal perspective, and in the understanding of them, to look briefly at the history of their development. 1
And between leaseholders of different pieces of land, eg where the lessee of Land A covenants with the lessee of Land B not to use land A in a certain way.
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1.3 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULES RELATING TO TRANSMISSIBILITY 1.3 The decision in Tulk v Moxhay2 is generally seen as the effective starting point. Though there had been earlier cases along the same lines,3 in Tulk v Moxhay the courts of equity (in which Cottenham LC upheld the injunction of the Vice-Chancellor) clearly recognised the greater than contractual enforceability of the restrictive covenant. The task which subsequently confronted the courts was the formulation of principles and rules governing such extended enforceability. 1.4 The development of the wider enforceability of restrictive covenants was unlike the majority of other historical developments of the Court of Chancery’s equitable jurisdiction since the maxim that ‘Equity follows the Law’ could not be applied – as it was, for example in the case of the recognition, in equity, of interests such as equitable easements, mortgages, leases and the like. There was, in fact, no legal counterpart for the transmissible restrictive covenant in relation to freehold land; it was sui generis. The result was that the court had no ready-made jurisprudential blueprint by which to sustain the development of this branch of its jurisdiction and it was compelled to improvise as occasion arose. In the process, it paid lip service to at least three4 different jurisprudential theories and borrowed from each of these in formulating the special restrictive covenant rules. These theories were as follows.
1 The extension of Spencer’s Case theory 1.5 One theory propounded was that equity was in fact acting by way of extension of the common law doctrine in Spencer’s Case5 relating to leases: see, for example, Jessel MR in London & South Western Rly v Gomm6 (who described this or the equitable rules relating to negative easements, below, as each being the possible origin of the doctrine. However, had the doctrine in Spencer’s Case been seen as supplying the relevant principles then not only would the limitation relating to user7 have been unnecessary but it would also have applied to positive covenants. This possible basis for allowing the transmission of the burden of a covenant was finally set to rest by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Austerberry v Oldham Corporation.8 This is notwithstanding that some of the
2 3 4
5 6 7 8
10
(1848) 2 Ph 744 (41 ER 1143). It was, however, by no means the first case of its kind; see, for example, Barret v Blagrave (1800) 5 Ves 555; Duke of Bedford v British Museum Trustees (1822) 2 My & K 552 (Lord Eldon); Mann v Stephens (1846) 15 Sim 377 (Lord Cottenham). A possible fourth, adumbrated by Farwell J in Re Nisbet and Potts’ Contract [1905] 1 Ch 391; affd [1906] 1 Ch 386, at p 397 was that the equity created by a restrictive covenant ‘stands on the same footing with, and is completely analogous to, an equitable charge on real estate created by some predecessor in title of the present owner of the land charged’. This does not, however, apppear to have received any degree of acceptance. (1583) 5 Co Rep 16a. (1882) ChD 562, at p 583. Considered below, at para 1.11 et seq. (1885) 29 ChD 750.
The development of the rules relating to transmissibility 1.8 language from Spencer’s Case, in terms of obligations ‘touching and concerning the land’ has been borrowed in relation to the doctrine that developed in relation to restrictive covenants.
2 The conscience theory 1.6 The second theory was that enforcement against a third party rested on an assumed principle that if such party acquires property knowing that the assignor is bound by a contract relating to the property, then equity would enforce the contract against the third party on the ground that his conscience was affected. This seems to have been the principle applied by Lord Cottenham in Tulk v Moxhay but so wide a principle would in other respects have given free rein to the enforceability of negative land covenants, whether relating to user or not, and to the enforcement of positive covenants. General unconscionability as the basis of enforceability has since been soundly rejected.9
3 Analogy to negative easements theory 1.7 The third theory was that enforceability was based on ‘an extension in equity of the doctrine of negative easements – for instance, a right to the access of light which prevents the owner of the servient tenement from building so as to obstruct the light’.10 This theory has effectively been adopted and applied by the Court of Appeal in such cases as Formby v Barker,11 where – as in the case of an easement – the absence of land benefited by the covenant precluded enforceability against a successor of the burdened land; Re Nisbett and Potts’ Contract,12 where the burden of a restrictive covenant was held to bind the land in the hands of a squatter who had acquired a title by adverse possession and who accordingly did not claim through or under the covenantor; and Long v Gray,13 where the benefit of a restrictive covenant entered into with a tenant for life under a strict settlement whose only interest in the land was a legal life estate, was held to enure for the benefit of a fee simple owner of part of the benefited land in the same manner as a negative easement, although the legal life estate of the covenantee had come to an end. 1.8 Whilst, in relation to the rules relating to the acquisition of a negative easement14 and to the running of the benefit of such an easement, this theory is out of line,15 nevertheless, unlike the other two theories, it would appear to fit
9 See Formby v Barker [1903] 2 Ch 539; Re Nisbet and Potts’ Contract [1905] 1 Ch 391; Millbourn v Lyons [1914] 1 Ch 34 (affd [1914] 2 Ch 231) and LCC v Allen [1914] 3 KB 642. 10 Per Sir George Jessel MR in London and South Western Rly Co v Gomm (1882) 20 ChD 562, at p 583. 11 [1903] 2 Ch 539. 12 [1905] 1 Ch 391; affd [1906] 1 Ch 416. 13 (1913) 58 Sol Jo 46. 14 To which alone prescription, implied grant and acquisition under s 62 of the Law of Property Act 1925 apply. 15 For the rules applying to restrictive covenants, see Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 below.
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1.9 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc reasonably comfortably (although not perfectly16) with the rules relating to the running of the burden of restrictive covenants. Thus, the following similarities are found: (1) In the case of negative (as well as other) easements, there must be a dominant and a servient tenement;17 in the case of restrictive covenants, there must be both benefited and burdened land.18 (2) Neither can exist (as such) in gross. A negative easement (in common with other easements) must accommodate the dominant tenement;19 a restrictive covenant must touch and concern (or benefit) the land of the covenantee.20 (3) The dominant and the servient tenements and the benefited and burdened land respectively, must be in different ownership.21 (4) The obligations imposed by both negative easements and restrictive covenants must be capable of being complied with without the expenditure of money or the doing of any act.22 (5) In the case of both negative easements and restrictive covenants, the obligations imposed are restrictive of the use and enjoyment of land. In the case of negative easements, mainly the easements of support, light and air, the inherent nature of the right in each case is such that the corresponding obligation is limited to restricting the use and enjoyment of the servient tenement. In the case of restrictive covenants, a corresponding limitation was evolved.23 (6) In each case, an intention to benefit successors has always been readily inferred from informal language.24
THE CURRENT RULES IN RELATION TO TRANSMISSIBILITY 1.9 By reference to one or other of the foregoing theories, the conditions which must be met before the benefit and burden of a restrictive covenant is 16 There are departures, especially statutory, both ways. Thus, restrictive covenants entered into with certain public bodies can run with the burdened land although not benefiting any land of the covenantee and (unlike easements) restrictive covenants can be discharged or modified by the Upper Tribunal under s 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925. Further, the potential scope of restrictive covenants is much wider: see Chapter 11. 17 Hill v Tupper (1863) 2 H&C 121. 18 As to benefited land, see LCC v Allen [1914] 3 KB 642; as to burdened land, see Re Fawcett and Holmes’ Contract (1889) 42 ChD 150; Osborne v Bradley [1903] 2 Ch 446, and cf Manchester Ship Canal Co v Manchester Racecourse Co [1901] 2 Ch 37. 19 Ackroyd v Smith (1850) 10 CB 164, at p 188. 20 For the details, see below, para 1.19 et seq. 21 For easements, see Bolton v Bolton (1879) 11 ChD 968; for restrictive covenants, see Re Tiltwood, Sussex [1978] Ch 269 (although where a building scheme exists, unity of ownership of benefited and burdened plots merely suspends the existence of a restrictive covenant: Texaco Antilles Ltd v Kernochan [1973] AC 609, PC). 22 For negative easements, see Jones v Pritchard [1908] 1 Ch 630, per Parker J at p 637, and Sack v West [1925] Ch 235; for restrictive covenants, see para 1.10 below. The rule also applies to other easements (see Regis Property Co Ltd v Redman [1956] 2 QB 612) with the exception of the easement of fence (see Lawrence v Jenkins (1873) LR 8 QB 274; Jones v Price [1965] 2 QB 618, and Crow v Wood [1971] 1 QB 77). 23 See the cases cited in connection with this required attribute, below para 1.11 et seq. 24 See below, para 1.57 et seq.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.10 capable of enjoying the maximum degree of transmissibility (in accordance with the rules considered in Chapters 6, 7 and 8) were evolved. To qualify, a restrictive covenant must satisfy the following six requirements, namely: (1) it must be negative in substance;25 (2) it must be restrictive of the user of land;26 (3) the original covenantee must have an interest in some land for the benefit of which the covenant was taken;27 (4) the covenant must in fact benefit land in which the claimant has an interest at the date when it is sought to enforce the covenant;28 (5) the words of covenant must be such as to show that the covenant was not intended to be personal to the original covenantee or to be confined to a category of persons to whom the claimant does not belong;29 (6) the covenant must have been entered into by a competent covenantor.30 Each of these general requirements will be considered in summary in turn.
1 The covenant must be negative in substance 1.10 A restrictive covenant can only qualify as such if it can be fully complied with without the doing of any act or the expenditure of any money.31 Four points fall to be noted: (1) If the covenant satisfies this test of negativity,32 it is immaterial whether the covenant is phrased in positive or negative language. Thus, in the leading case of Tulk v Moxhay33 itself, the covenant took the form of a covenant by the covenantor to ‘keep and maintain the said piece of ground and Square Garden, the iron railing round the same in its then form, and in sufficient and proper repair as a Square Garden and Pleasure Ground, in an open state, uncovered with any buildings in neat and ornamental order’. In the proceedings, the only matter complained of was the defendant’s action in commencing to build on the Square Garden, ie breach of the obligation to ‘keep … the Square Garden … in an open state, uncovered with any buildings …’. Although expressed in positive
25 See para 1.10 below. 26 See para 1.11 et seq below. 27 See para 1.19 et seq below. 28 See para 1.52 et seq below. 29 See para 1.56 et seq below. 30 See para 1.62 et seq below. 31 See Haywood v Brunswick Permanent Benefit Building Society (1881) 8 QBD 403: an owner of land cannot be compelled ‘to put his hand into his pocket’; Hall v Ewin (1887) 37 ChD 74 (freehold covenantor could not be compelled to bring an action against his lessee to prevent a breach of the restrictive covenant); Zetland v Driver [1939] Ch 1: ‘No affirmative covenant requiring the expenditure of money or the doing of some act can ever be made to run with the land’, per Farwell J (delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal) at p 8. 32 Ie, if it can be complied with without the doing of any act or the expenditure of any money. 33 (1848) 2 Ph 774. This is the leading case on restrictive covenants in the sense that Lord Cottenham there contrived to lay down an acceptable equitable principle, but it was not in fact the first of its kind: see, eg Barret v Blagrave (1800) 5 Ves 555; Duke of Bedford v British Museum Trustees (1822) 2 My & K 552 (Lord Eldon); Mann v Stephens (1846) 15 Sim 377 (Lord Cottenham).
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1.10 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc language, it amounted in substance to a prohibition on building and this obligation amounted therefore to a restrictive covenant. Similarly, in Abbey Homesteads Developments Ltd v Northamptonshire County Council,34 the Court of Appeal, after referring to the covenant in Tulk v Moxhay, held that a provision in a ‘section 52 agreement’35 that ‘An area of 1.3 hectares adjacent to the playing field and amenity open space areas shall be reserved for school purposes’ was a negative, and not (as the Lands Tribunal had held) a positive covenant.36 More recently, in Blumenthal v Church Commissioners for England,37 the Court of Appeal held that a covenant that part of a building should be occupied by a particular entity (the Royal Society of Literature) amounted, in its context, to a covenant that was restrictive in nature, namely not to allow occupation of the premises by anyone else. Construing it as a positive obligation that the premises must be occupied by the entity would mean the covenantor would be in breach of it if the entity failed to take up occupation or left it afterwards, which could not have been intended. In Re Carbury 2000’s Application (2006),38 a covenant that ‘Not more than nine garages shall be erected on the site and there shall be a single garage for each flat’ was construed by the Lands Tribunal to be entirely negative in nature. The Tribunal held as follows:39 ‘On the face of it restriction 5 is a hybrid with a restriction at the beginning not to erect more than nine garages but a positive obligation at the end that each flat shall have a single private garage. I agree with the applicant’s submission, however, that the deed does not contain a positive covenant to build garages and that the substance of restriction 5, when read in the context of the deed as a whole, is that of a negative covenant restricting the construction of flats without garages. The words “… and there shall be” in restriction 5, taken in context, do not show “a clear shift of meaning from restraint to activity” (per Harman J in Westminster City Council v Duke of Westminster [1991] 4 All ER 136 at 147d).’
34 (1986) 53 P&CR 1. 35 An agreement made under the former s 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 (as to which, see Chapter 10). 36 See also, Gooiden v Anstee (1868) 18 LT 898 (covenant to build a house within 12 months to the satisfaction of the vendor’s architect – house built after 12 months and not to the architect’s satisfaction – held this was a breach of a negative stipulation); Catt v Tourle (1869) 4 Ch App 654 (covenant that vendor of land should have the exclusive right to supply beer to any public house erected on the land – purchaser sold part of land to defendant who erected a public house and supplied with his own beer – held the covenant was in substance negative); Abbey v Gutteres (1911) 55 Sol Jo 364 (covenant to keep windows obscured and fixed – held negative); Collins v Castle (1887) 36 ChD 243 (covenant to spend on each dwelling house built not less than £1,200 – held negative); Graham v Newcastle-upon-Tyne Corpn (1892) 67 LT 790 (covenant that certain land ‘should for ever thereafter be kept open and unbuilt upon’ – negative but construction of an underground urinal was not a breach); and Blumenthal v Church Commissioners for England [2005] 2 P&CR 20 (covenent to keep and use premises as the headquarters of a particular organisation amounting to restrictive covenants not to use them for any other purpose). But a positive covenant as to the type of buildings which can be erected will not always imply a negative covenant that no other type of building can be erected: see Holford v Acton UDC [1898] 2 Ch 240. 37 [2005] 2 P&CR 20. 38 LP/84/2004. 39 At para 48.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.10 To similar effect is the decision in Stevens v Ismail.40 A 999-year lease contained a covenant ‘to use and occupy the demised premises solely and exclusively as a self-contained residential flat’. It was contended that this was a positive covenant and positively required that it be used and occupied as a self-contained flat. The form of words used was held by the Upper Tribunal to indicate an intention that, if the demised premises were to be used and occupied at all, then it had to be as a self-contained flat; if the owner chose not to use and occupy the premises he was free to leave them vacant. (2) Whilst, in the covenants referred to above, nothing turned on the intermingling of the positive and restrictive obligations,41 it is clear, as stated by Megarry J in Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham (No 2),42 that ‘what is worded or set out in the instrument as a single covenant may give rise to more obligations than one; and if one obligation is positive, that is no reason why another obligation should not be negative, and be enforced as such. There cannot be any doctrine of contagious proximity whereby the presence of the positive inhibits the enforcement of the neighbouring negative’. This assumes, of course, that the positive and negative obligations can be singled out, for, as Megarry J went on to say: ‘There may perhaps be cases where the positive and the negative are inextricably intertwined, and these cases may give rise to different considerations’. However, ‘The thing ought not to depend on whether the draftsman tends to the fragmentary or comprehensive in his style of drafting covenants’. (3) The fact that something is prohibited unless a positive act is done, does not prevent the covenant from being negative since one way of complying with the covenant is to do nothing. Thus, the commonly imposed covenant ‘not to erect any building without first submitting plans for the approval of” the covenantee is a restrictive covenant.43 In Ridley v Taylor,44 the Court of Appeal construed a covenant ‘to complete in a proper and workmanlike manner and with suitable materials to the satisfaction of the estate surveyor of the landlord and in accordance with the said drawing the alterations to the said premises and the works consequent thereon’ as a restrictive covenant not to carry out the conversion except in the specified manner. In Norval v Pascoe45 a similar construction was held to apply to a covenant by the owners and occupiers of mines not to let down the surface without paying compensation. (4) In construing the scope of the obligations imposed by a covenant which is prima facie a negative covenant, those obligations will stop short of requiring the person bound to do anything which may involve him in positive action or expense.
40 41
[2016] L&TR 21. The importance of the distinction did not, in fact, clearly emerge until the decision in Haywood v Brunswick Permanent Building Society (1881) 8 QBD 403. 42 [1971] 1 WLR 1062, at p 1067E-G. 43 See Powell v Hemsley [1909] 1 Ch 680 (at first instance) and [1909] 2 Ch 252 (on appeal). 44 [1965] 1 WLR 611. 45 (1864) 10 LT 809.
15
1.11 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc Thus, in Hall v Ewin,46 a covenant against ‘using or permitting’ land to be used for any ‘noisome and offensive trade’ did not require a purchaser of the freehold to take proceedings to prevent his lessee from committing a breach (consisting of running a ‘wild beast show’ on the land), even though such omission might ordinarily fall within the scope of the words ‘permitting’ the breach.47
2 The covenant must be restrictive of the user of land 1.11 It is sometimes inferred from the fact that all restrictive covenants must be negative48 that therefore all negative covenants are restrictive covenants. Such syllogistic inference is, however, incorrect. The only negative covenants which are restrictive covenants are covenants which are restrictive of the user of land.49 Thus, whilst a covenant against using land for any purpose other than a private dwelling house is a restrictive covenant, a covenant not to sell land for less (or more) than a stated price or a covenant not to sue an adjoining owner for nuisance, would not appear to satisfy this requirement. Such covenants, although restrictive do not restrict the user of the land.50 1.12 In Re Milius’s Application51 a covenant (on a sale under right to buy provisions) prevented the disposal of premises without the written consent of the covenantee council, but with such consent not to be withheld where the conveyance or grant was to a person who had been resident in a particular area. It was doubted by the Lands Tribunal whether this was restrictive of the user of the property, However, the question was not actually decided and it was said52 that: ‘it is perhaps arguable that the user of the property may in practice be limited or restricted by the restriction on free disposition of a legal interest. On the other hand, some limitation on user may be seen as a possible indirect consequence of the restriction on disposal and not as the effect or the purpose of the covenant. As Mrs Williams put it, reasonable user of the property could not be said to be impeded by this restriction, but only if an application for 46 47
(1887) 37 ChD 74. The scope of the obligations should not, however, be confused with the scope of the injunctive relief which may be awarded for breach of those obligations. Thus, if in such a case as that mentioned, the freeholder is himself in breach, as by initially facilitating a breach by his lessee, the injunctive relief against the freeholder may well require him to take positive steps to determine the lease: see Carter v Williams (1870) LR 9 Eq 678. Similarly, a mandatory injunction may be appropriate to redress a breach of covenant not to build, etc: see, eg Achilli v Tovell [1927] 2 Ch 243. 48 Ie, negative in substance, see para 1.10 above. 49 Farwell J in Re Nisbet and Potts’ Contract [1905] 1 Ch 391 (affd [1906] 1 Ch 386), summed up the position in the words, at p 397: ‘But if the covenant be negative, so as to restrict the mode of use and enjoyment of the land, then there is called into existence an equity attached to the property of such a nature that it is annexed to and runs with it in equity’. 50 Similarly, a right of pre-emption, although negative in substance (ie, not to sell without first offering the land to the grantee of the right) is not a restrictive covenant: see Manchester Ship Canal Co v Manchester Racecourse Co [1901] 2 Ch 37. These and other negative (but not ‘restrictive’) covenants are more fully considered in Chapter 25. 51 (1995) 70 P&CR 427(HH Judge Marder QC, President). 52 At p 432.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.15 consent to a disposal were unreasonably refused. The issue is not without difficulty, and I am unaware of any direct judicial authority.’ 1.13 In Blumenthal v Church Commissioners for England53 (above) the Court of Appeal held that a covenant part of a building be occupied by a particular entity (the Royal Society of Literature) amounted, in its context, to a restrictive covenant, not to let the premises be occupied by anyone else, and that the Lands Tribunal therefore had jurisdiction in respect of it under section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (ie it was a legally enforceable covenant restrictive of the user of the land). A covenant not to apply for a resident’s on-street parking permit or to permit others to do so was held not to be restrictive of the use of the land by the Court of Appeal in R (Khodari) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Council.54 1.14 As in the case of assessing the negativity of a covenant, however, so also in the present context the question is one of construction as to the substance of the restriction. This is illustrated by Nicoll v Fenning,55 the facts of which were as follows. Upon the sale in 1863 of land forming part of a 25-acre field known as ‘Great Star Field’, West Ham, Essex, upon which the purchaser (Collins) intended to erect a public house, the vendors covenanted that they ‘their heirs and assigns will not thereafter sell or convey any portion of Great Star Field without requiring the purchaser to enter into a covenant with them not to allow any building to be erected thereon to be used as a public-house, tavern, or beer-shop.’ Shortly thereafter, Collins erected a public house and named it the ‘Alexandra Tavern’. On a conveyance on sale of another part of Great Star Field in 1870, the vendors duly took a covenant from the purchaser, the Gas Light and Coke Company, not to use or permit to be used any building erected on the land as a tavern, public house or beershop. The claimant was the successor in title of Collins in respect of the Alexandra Tavern and the defendant, Fenning, was a yearly tenant of the successor in title of the Gas Light and Coke Company. Upon Fenning obtaining an excise licence for the sale of beer to be consumed off the premises, the claimant brought an action for an injunction to restrain him from selling beer from the premises. 1.15 The arguments and the judgment of Bacon V-C proceeded on the footing that the covenant sought to be enforced was the 1863 covenant rather than the 1870 covenant and although the 1863 covenant did not, in terms, restrict the use of the rest of Great Star Field, but merely required that it should not be sold without imposing a user restriction, the 1963 covenant was nevertheless treated as restricting the user even prior to any such sale and imposition. In the course of his judgment, Bacon V-C said:56 ‘Whether for convenience sake, for police purposes, or otherwise, it was at all events agreed that the vendors should sell one lot only for a public-house, and they bound themselves not to sell any other portion of the land unless
53 [2005] 2 P&CR 20. 54 [2018] 1 WLR 591. See, in relation to this case (where the actual obligation before the court was entered into under s 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990), para 16.40 below. 55 (1881) 19 ChD 258 (Bacon V-C). 56 Ibid, at pp 265–266.
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1.16 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc impressed with the burden of the restrictive covenant. From that date the rest of the property was subject to that restriction, and from that date it was not competent for the vendors in equity to dispose of that property, unless they protected not only Collins, but all the rest of the owners of the property … .’57 As with a number of the rules relating to restrictive covenants, the emergence of the present rule would appear to have occurred empirically rather than as a result of conscious formulation. 1.16 The early cases involving negative58 covenants which relied on the doctrine in Tulk v Moxhay were concerned with user covenants rather than any of the other types of negative covenants.59 and over the course of time in cases where judgments have sought to define the nature of the covenants which fall within the doctrine, they adopted this limitation. Thus, in Re Nisbet and Potts’ Contract,60 Farwell J stated the position as follows: ‘But if the covenant be negative, so as to restrict the mode of use and enjoyment of the land,61 then there is called into existence an equity attached to the property of such a nature that it is annexed to and runs with it in equity.’ 1.17 The doctrine in Tulk v Moxhay is in the result confined to negative covenants which are restrictive of the use and enjoyment of land and does not extend to other negative covenants notwithstanding that in relation to those covenants all the other requirements for the application of the doctrine may be satisfied. 1.18 In confirmation of this, the draftsman of the Land Charges Acts 1925 and 1972, the Land Registration Act 1925 and the Law of Property Act 1925, made special provision only for covenants restrictive of the user of land.62 Thus, section 2(5) of the Land Charges Act 192563 makes provision for the registration under the Act of ‘a restrictive covenant’ as a Class D(ii) land charge and defines ‘a restrictive covenant’ as ‘a covenant or agreement (other than a
57 Since there had been no breach of the restriction not to sell without imposing the restrictive covenant, it seems clear that the reference to ‘that restriction’ is a reference to a restriction against the user itself; only in this sense was there a threatened breach (by the defendant) of the 1863 covenant. Whilst (on this basis) the decision illustrates the proposition for which it is cited, the case itself is far from satisfactory. In the later case of Brigg v Thornton [1904] 1 Ch 386, the Court of Appeal held that a covenant not to let for the purpose of a particular trade did not preclude the covenantor from himself carrying on the trade (or selling the property free from the restriction). In contrast, in Oceanic Village Ltd v United Attractions Ltd [2000] Ch 234, Neuberger J, considered it implicit that if a covenantor agrees that he will not permit something to be done, that carries with it also an obligation on the covenantor not to do that thing, so as to amount to a restrictive user covenant (see p 240). 58 Tulk v Moxhay was relied upon as one of the grounds for the decision in Morland v Cook (1868) LR 6 Eq 252 which related to a positive covenant, but the decision on this point was afterwards discredited: see Austerberry v Oldham Corpn (1885) 29 ChD 750 and see also Chapter 28. 59 See, eg Coles v Sims (1854) 5 De G M & G 1; Western v MacDermott (1866) LR 1 Eq 499; Wilson v Hart (1866) 1 Ch App 463; Harrison v Good (1871) LR 11 Eq 338; Richards v Revitt (1877) 7 ChD 224; 60 [1905] 1 Ch 391, at p 397; affd [1906] 1 Ch 386. 61 Italics interpolated. 62 In the Land Registration Act 2002 the matter is dealt with by only intrests in the land (which would exclude covenants other than restrictive covenants under the rule in Tulk v Moxhay) being able to be the subject of a notice under s 32. 63 Re-enacting s 10(1) of the Land Charges Act 1925.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.20 covenant or agreement beween a lessor and a lessee) restrictive of the user of land64 and entered into on or after 1 January 1926’. Similarly, section 50(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925 made provision for applications to enter a notice on the register of the burdened land of ‘a restrictive covenant or agreement (not being a covenant or agreement made between a lessor and lessee) with respect to the building on or other user of registered land’. Further, section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (as amended) confers on the Upper Tribunal65 certain powers to discharge or modify ‘any restriction arising under covenant or otherwise as to the user’ of any freehold land.66
3 The covenant must have been entered into for the benefit of land ‘belonging’ to the covenantee 1.19 There are two separate aspects of this requirement which need to be considered: (A) the circumstances in which a covenant can be said to satisfy the test of benefiting land belonging to the covenantee; and (B) what ‘belonging’ to the covenantee means, ie what estate or interest in the land must be held by the covenantee at the date of the covenant in order to qualify. Each of these will be considered to in turn.
A: The covenant must benefit land belonging to the covenantee at the date the covenant is entered into 1.20 In Tulk v Moxhay this requirement was satisfied, since in that case the claimant who sold what is now Leicester Square, London, to the defendant’s predecessor in title (at the same time taking a covenant against building on the Square) retained certain houses bordering the Square. Lord Cottenham did not expressly state that such retention was essential to success, but in the course of his judgment, in answer to the argument that a successor in title to the covenantor was not bound, he said: ‘If that were so, it would be impossible for an owner of land to sell part of it without incurring the risk of rendering what he retains worthless’ and it seems clear that the existence of retained land at the date of the covenant was a significant factor in the decision.67
64 Italics interpolated. 65 Previously the Lands Tribunal. 66 There are many other examples of provisions in the property legislation (and other Acts) showing that the meaning of restrictive covenants is confined to covenants which restrict the use of land; see, eg s 49(1)(b) of the Settled Land Act 1925; ss 2(3)(ii), 2(5)(a), 78(1), 79(1) and 200(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925; s 237(1)(b) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (re-enacting with amendments s 127 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971). 67 However, in the course of his judgment in the Court of Appeal in LCC v Allen [1914] 3 KB 642, Scrutton J expressed the view that at the time of Tulk v Moxhay and for at least 20 years afterwards, a covenantee might have succeeded against a successor of the original covenantor even though the covenantee had not retained any land which benefited. It may also be noted that it does not specifically appear whether the claimant in Tulk v Moxhay continued
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1.21 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc All the restrictive covenant cases which were decided between 1848 (the date of Tulk v Moxhay) and 1903 were cases in which the covenantee held land for the benefit of which the covenant was taken and the question of whether this was actually required did not directly arise68 until the case of Formby v Barker69 in 1903. 1.21 In Formby v Barker the claimant sold all the land which he owned to the predecessor in title of the defendant, taking a covenant restricting the use of the land. The Court of Appeal held that no land ever having benefited from the covenant, it could not be enforced as a restrictive covenant against a successor of the covenantor. In so holding, the court appears to have been guided not so much by analogy to negative easements as by reference to the fact that in all the earlier cases where the claimant succeeded, he was the owner of land which, either from the terms of the covenant or by inference from surrounding circumstances, it appeared that the covenant was intended to benefit. The same point came before the Court of Appeal again in London County Council v Allen70 where, in applying Formby v Barker and arriving at the same result, Buckley LJ and Scruton J expressly drew on the analogy of negative easements, and the rule that such easements could not exist in gross ‘at the date of the covenant’. For the purposes of the present requirement, ‘the date of the covenant’ is the date of the instrument which effectively imposes the covenant. 1.22 Where the conveyance or transfer imposing the covenant is preceded by a contract making provision therefor, then even though the contractual interest of the purchaser in the land to be subjected to the covenant is sufficient to make him a competent covenantor,71 and even though the contract contains the terms of the covenant so as to make it effective pending completion, nevertheless when completion takes place and the purchaser covenants in the conveyance or transfer, the contract is superseded by such conveyance or transfer so that thereafter the date of the covenant is the date of that instrument. 1.23 In cases where there is no building scheme, this can present anomalies where, between the date of the contract and the date of completion, the vendor sells all or part of the land owned by him at the time of the contract. Thus, in Milbourn v Lyons:72 ‘The freehold owner of a hotel and adjoining houses and land contracted in 1898 to sell the hotel to H, the predecessor in title of the claimant. The contract provided that the conveyance should contain a restrictive covenant
68
69 70 71 72
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to own any of the houses as the date of the proceedings (40 years after the covenant was taken) but this is a separate point relating to whether the covenant continues as a restrictive covenant, a matter which is discussed below. The view expressed by Farwell J in Osborne v Bradley [1903] 2 Ch 446 (immediately before the Court of Appeal’s decision in Formby v Barker [1903] 2 Ch 539) that if a restrictive covenant is taken simply for the vendor’s own benefit, and not in his capacity as owner of specified neighbouring land, he can enforce it against a successor of the covenantor, was purportedly founded upon the rule enunciated by Lord Cairns in Doherty v Allman (1878) 3 App Cas 709; but Lord Cairns was there dealing with the entirely different case of enforcement between the original parties to the agreement. [1903] 2 Ch 539. [1914] 3 KB 642. See below, para 1.69 et seq. [1914] 2 Ch 231, CA.
The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.26 by H for the benefit of the adjoining houses and land restrictive of the user of the hotel. Shortly afterwards, the vendor died and completion of the contract by his executors did not take place until 12 months later when the covenant in the conveyance was entered into by H. Prior to such completion, however, the executors had sold and conveyed all the adjoining houses and land forming part of the estate and retained no property capable of benefiting from the covenant. In 1912 the claimant contracted to sell the hotel to the defendant free from the covenant but on investigating the title the defendant refused to complete claiming that the covenant was binding on the hotel land.’ In an action for specific performance, the Court of Appeal held that the material date for determining whether the covenantees owned land capable of benefiting from the covenant was the date of the conveyance, not the date of the contract, since (whatever may have been the position prior to completion) the contract had been superseded by the conveyance and since at that date the covenantees held no land capable of benefiting, there was no restrictive covenant which ran with the hotel land.
The Congleton test of ‘touching and concerning’ 1.24 Despite judicial reliance on occasions on the analogy of negative easements as the foundation for the present requirement, in considering whether individual covenants benefit the land of the covenantee, the courts have frequently applied the language of the test of ‘touching and concerning’ the land which grew up from the rule in Spencer’s Case (1583)73 relating to covenants in leases (where an assignee was at common law not bound by a covenant to do something which was merely collateral, and so did not ‘touch or concern’ the land demised74). 1.25 In the context of leases, in Congleton Corpn v Pattison,75 Bayley J held that a covenant by a lessee not to hire persons from certain other parishes to work in a mill was not binding on an assignee of the lessee since: ‘In order to bind an assignee, the covenant must either affect the land itself … as [to] the mode of occupation, or it must be such as per se, and not merely from collateral circumstances, affects the value of the land … .’76 1.26
Four points fall to be made about this test.
(1) It was enunciated by Bayley J in the context of whether the burdened estate (of the lessee) was affected by the covenant. In the case of restrictive covenants between freeholders, although there is undoubtedly a corresponding requirement relative to the running of the burden, the fact that the restrictive covenant, by definition, affects the mode of use and enjoyment of the land automatically ensures the first limb of the test, that of affecting ‘the land itself as to the mode of occupation’ is satisfied.
73 (1583) 5 Co Rep 16a (where the expression used in the third resolution of the Kings’s Bench Justices was ‘touches or concerns’). 74 This historical position is now altered in relation to leases by reason of the Law of Property Act 1925, s 77. 75 (1808) 10 East 130. 76 Ibid at p 135.
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1.26 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc (2) In relation to the second limb, that of affecting ‘the value of the land’, at least one other judicial test of ‘touching and concerning’ in relation to leasehold covenants generally has incorporated a reference to ‘value’77 and so long as due emphasis is given to the words ‘per se and not merely from collateral circumstances’78 in assessing the impact of a covenant on the value of the land of the covenantee, it seems clear that the effect of a covenant on maintaining or enhancing such value is correctly regarded as one way (but by no means the only way79) of showing that such land is ‘benefited’.80 (3) Whilst the test itself could be said to embrace two separate issues namely, first, whether the covenant of such a nature as to be capable of benefiting the land of the covenantee, and second, if it is, whether it benefits such land on the facts, as applied to covenants in leases, the cases have been much more concerned with the first of these issues than the second so that it has become possible to draw up a list of covenants of which it can be said that they will touch and concern the land in the case of almost any lease.81 Similarly in relation to restrictive covenants, it is possible to draw up a list of covenants which have been held to be capable of benefiting freehold land – such as a covenant not to erect more than one private dwelling house,82 not to erect any building without first submitting plans for the approval of the vendor,83 not to develop land for building purposes except in accordance with a lay-out plan to be submitted to and approved by the vendor,84 not to use the land for any purpose except agriculture,85 or other than as smallholdings or allotments,86 or not to do or permit any act on the land which in the opinion of the vendor may be a public or private nuisance
77
‘The true principle is that no covenant or condition which affects merely the person, and which does not affect the nature, quality, or value of the thing demised or the mode of using or enjoying the thing demised, runs with the land’: per Lord Russell CJ, in Horsey Estate Ltd v Steiger [l899] 2 QB 79, at p 89. 78 For example, the covenant in Congleton Corpn v Pattison, above, may well have increased the value of the lessor’s reversion but, if so, it would be by reason of collateral circumstances, ie, fuller employment in the parish. As to ‘ransom’ value, see paras 1.28–1.30 below. 79 An argument put by counsel in Kelly v Barrett [1924] 2 Ch 379, that unless a covenant increased the value of the covenantee’s land it could not be said to ‘touch and conern’ the land, was firmly rejected by Tomlin J at p 396. On appeal, Warrington LJ (ibid, p 411) indicated that he was not prepared to differ from Tomlin J on this point and suggested that the question which has to be determined in all such cases is: ‘May the land to which the benefit purports to be attached be reasonably regarded as capable of being affected by the performance or the breach of the obligation in question, as the case may be?’. 80 In Tulk v Moxhay itself, Lord Cottenham, in dealing with the contention that a purchaser from the covenantor might violate the covenant with impunity, said: ‘If that were so, it would be impossible for an owner of land to sell part of it without incurring the risk of rendering what he retains worthless.’ 81 See, for example, Cheshire and Burn’s Modern Law of Real Property,18th edn, pp 305–306. The further test, originally suggested by Professor Cheshire, of whether the covenant ‘affects either the landlord qua landlord or the tenant qua tenant’ and which was expressly approved by Scott LJ in Breams Property Investment Co Ltd v Stroulger [1948] 2 KB 1, again points to the nature of the covenant rather than to the nature of a factual inquiry. 82 Eg, Rogers v Hosegood [1900] 2 Ch 388; Brunner v Greenslade [1971] Ch 993; Gilbert v Spoor [1983] Ch 27. 83 Powell v Hemsley [1909] 1 Ch 680. 84 Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798. 85 Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd [1962] Ch 115. 86 Earl of Leicester v Wells-next-the-Sea UDC [1973] Ch 110.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.26 or prejudicial or detrimental to the vendor or to the neighbourhood,87 not to carry on the trade of an ironmonger,88 and many others.89 The Congleton test was adopted by Farwell J in Rogers v Hosegood90 as applicable (and satisfied) in relation to a restrictive covenant by a purchaser of a freehold plot with his vendor that no more than one dwelling house should at any time stand on the plot, as benefiting other plots retained by the vendor. In Re Gadd’s Land Transfer,91 Buckley J ‘was willing to accept’ the test, holding, on the facts, that it was satisfied in relation to a similar covenant benefiting an unadopted service road which was retained by the original covenantee. In many recent cases, however, the language of ‘touching and concerning’ has either not featured at all in determining whether a restrictive covenant is capable of benefiting the land of the covenantee or, where it has featured, it has done so, as in Re Gadd’s Land Transfer, in the context of the requirement considered below, namely whether, assuming the covenant to be inherently capable of benefiting land, it did in fact ‘touch and concern’ the land (or all the land) in the sense of benefiting it, not only at the date of the covenant, but also at the date of the proceedings. Thus, in Earl of Leicester v Well-next-the-Sea UDC92 and Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd,93 the question posed in each case was whether the covenant ‘benefited’ the land of the covenantee, and in considering this question no reference was made either to the test, or to the language, of ‘touching and concerning’. In Gilbert v Spoor,94 Eveleigh LJ alone of the three members of the Court of Appeal referred to whether the land of the respondents was ‘touched and concerned’; but again, this was in the context not of considering the nature of the covenant but of whether the covenant which was clearly capable of benefiting land, did in fact benefit the respondents’ land.95 In Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd96 Brightman LJ referred to the covenant in question as being clearly intended for the protection of adjoining property retained by the vendor, so that it ‘related to the land of the covenantee’, which he described as equating to the use of ‘the oldfashioned expression, that it touched and concerned the land’ (at p 604F). In Crest Nicholson Ltd v McAllister,97 Chadwick LJ for the court referred to the question of whether a covenant ‘does in fact touch and concern land of the covenantee’ in para 30, which the context of the case shows 87 88
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97
Marquess of Zetland v Driver [1939] Ch 1. Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold Ltd [1952] Ch 286. In Re Quaffers Ltd’s Application (1988) 56 P CR 142, the President of the Lands Tribunal (VG Wellings QC) expressed the view that there was no reason in law why a restrictive covenant should not be taken for the benefit of a trade and that whether it is, is a question of construction. Particular restrictive covenants are considered in Chapter 11 below. [1900] 2 Ch 388, at p 395, affd ibid, at p 399. [1966] Ch 56. [1973] Ch 110. [1974] 1 WLR 798. [1983] Ch 27. The observations of Eveleigh LJ on this point were not necessary for the decision. [1980] 1 WLR 594. [2004]1 WLR 2409.
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1.27 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc he understood to mean whether it benefited land of the covenantee (before going on to consider specific matters relating to annexation, as to which see below). (4) ‘Affects the value’ – in this context, it is clear that ‘value’ is not confined to monetary value. Thus, in Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd,98 Brightman J found as a fact that the construction of a road and the erection of 14 houses in breach of a restrictive covenant ‘had not diminished by one farthing’ the market value of the land claimed to be benefited by the covenant, although he found, on the evidence, the existence of other types of benefit which satisfied the benefit requirement. In some cases, indeed, the existence or continued existence of a restrictive covenant which has a sterilising effect on the burdened land, may well have a knock-on sterilising, and therefore depreciating, effect on the market value of the neighbouring land of the covenantee, yet this would not necessarily prevent the covenant from ‘benefiting’ the covenantee’s land. Thus, in Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd,99 the question was whether a covenant restricting the use of Crook Farm, formerly part of the Crichel Estate in Dorset, to agricultural purposes, benefited the remainder of the Crichel Estate (consisting of some 7, 000 acres). It was argued that if Crook Farm were developed, this would actually enhance the value of the Crichel Estate, since it would bring with it the development or the possibility of development of that estate which would therefore be better off without the covenant than with it. But Wilberforce J rejected this argument on the ground that there were other values which could be relevant to the estate other than enrichment (see (iii) below). 1.27 In the present context, the following kinds of value have been held to be material. (i)
Monetary value The qualifying nature of such value is implicit in the decision in Tulk v Moxhay itself100 and is illustrated in the context of leases by the decision of the House of Lords in P & A Swift Investments v Combined English Stores Group plc.101 In the case of freehold covenants, this kind of value clearly manifests itself in connection with the benefit conferred by covenants restricting the type of trade or business which can be carried on102 and, in the case of housing development, by covenants restricting the type of housing which can be built.103
98
[1974] 1 WLR 798. See also Allen v Veranne Builders Ltd [1988] NPC 11, Browne-Wilkinson V-C. [1962] Ch 115. Above, para 1.20. [1989] AC 632. See, also, Coronation Street Industrial Properties v Ingall Industries plc [1989] 1 WLR 304, HL and Kumar v Dunning [1989] QB 193, CA. See, for example, Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold Ltd [1952] Ch 286 (Wynn-Parry J). On the other hand, in Thomas v Hayward (1869) LR 4 Exch 311, a covenant by a lessor of a public house not to use adjoining land for the sale of liquor, was held not to touch and concern the demised land since its value to the tenant was considered to be collateral. As in Baxter v Four Oaks Properties Ltd [1965] Ch 816 (Cross J).
99 100 101 102
103
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.28 (ii) Amenity value Examples from the decided cases include covenants which operate to preserve a view, even though only seen from a road giving access to the benefited land;104 a covenant restricting the layout and density of residential development, even though the change of layout and increase in density take place in an area some distance removed from the benefited land;105 a covenant restricting the use of a 562 acre farm to agricultural use, even though the benefited land extended to some 7, 000 acres;106 a covenant restricting the use of any building otherwise than as a private residence, whether or not the offending building was visible from the benefited land;107 and a covenant not to use land except for the housing of the working classes, now equated broadly to social housing (this having the potential to attract people to land benefiting from the covenant because of the particular social value of an area).108 (iii) Control value The essence of the findings of fact of Wilberforce J in Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd109 was that it was of value to the whole of the Crichel Estate in Dorset that through the enforcement of the covenant a measure of control could be exercised over the adjoining Crook Farm. Two particular examples of such value referred to in evidence which were accepted as valid by Wilberforce J were that the construction of a substantial industrial undertaking on Crook Farm would make it more difficult to recruit and retain estate employees and that the installation of increased services in the way of roads, electrical cables and the like would change the character of the place. Benefit accruing from the element of control afforded by the enforceability of covenants was also successfully relied upon in Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd.110 1.28 However, it is considered that in the present context, control value, in order to qualify as such, must be shown to be attributable to the value which arises from the ability to enforce the covenants – not to the value which might be able to be realised by negotiating the release or modification of the covenants. In other words, the benefit claimed must be shown to accrue from the continued observance of the covenants, not from the price which might be able to be exacted for permitting non-observance. The ‘ransom’ value of a covenant would appear to be attributable to ‘collateral circumstances’ so as not per se to affect the value of the land. Only if the covenant can first be shown to confer an intrinsic benefit on the land of the covenantee will it confer any bargaining power for its release or modification and the converse cannot, it is considered, be logically argued. If these conclusions are correct, then the retention of a small area of ‘ransom’ land with a view primarily to exercising bargaining power against successors from the covenantors for the release or variation of covenants, would fail in 104 105 106 107 108 109 110
Gilbert v Spoor [1983] Ch 27, CA. Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (Brightman J). Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd [1962] Ch 115 (Wilberforce J). Baxter v Four Oaks Properties [1965] Ch 816 (Cross J). Dano v Earl Cadogan [2003] 2 P&CR 10. [1962] Ch 115. [1974] 1 WLR 798. See, also, Ridley v Taylor [1965] 1 WLR 611 (where control through restrictions contained in a lease of premises in Mayfair was treated as a benefit to the landlord (the Duke of Westminster) in pursuing his estate policy of securing the high residential quality of the area).
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1.29 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc its purpose by reason of that land not being ‘touched and concerned’ by the covenants. 1.29 Support for this view is provided indirectly by certain decisions of the Court of Appeal on appeal from the Lands Tribunal in section 84 applications involving the like issue in the context of whether a covenant has become ‘obsolete’ or whether it secures ‘practical benefits’ to the person entitled to enforce the covenant. Thus, in Driscoll v Church Comrs for England,111 Denning LJ said: ‘If he uses it [the power to consent to a discharge or modification of covenants restricting the use of premises on an estate] reasonably, not in his own selfish interests but in the interests of the people of the neighbourhood generally, as, for instance, when he gives his consent for any sensible change of user, then it will serve a useful purpose. I should have thought that he uses it unreasonably, for instance, to exact a premium as a condition of his consent; or if he refuses consent altogether when he ought to give it, as, for instance, for turning it into flats, it would no longer serve a useful purpose. In short, so long as the landlord uses the covenant reasonably in the interests of the public at large it is not obsolete, but, if he seeks to use it unreasonably, then it is obsolete.’ In Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council v Alwiyah Developments,112 Eveleigh LJ, after referring to the above observations, said (in relation to section 84(1)): ‘Bargaining power is only a benefit when it results in the receipt of the price upon the covenant being discharged. Such a benefit cannot be of the kind contemplated by the subsection for it results from the discharge and not the continuance of the covenant.’ The judgment of Dillon LJ was to similar effect and Griffiths LJ agreed with both judgments. 1.30 In the Lands Tribunal case of Re Bennett’s and Tamarlin Ltd’s Applications,113 the Tribunal applied the principle of the Stockport decision in considering whether the person entitled to the benefit of a covenant would be ‘injured’ by the discharge or modification of a covenant under paragraph (c) of section 84(1) as well as in the context of whether the covenant secured any ‘practical benefits’ to such person.114
The question of a possible value arising out of a moral obligation to enforce covenants for the benefit of others 1.31 It has been considered by some that a moral obligation might be sufficient because in Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd,115 the 111 112 113 114
[1956] 3 All ER 802, at 8071. (1986) 52 P&CR 278, at 281, CA. (1987) 54 P&CR 378 (VG Wellings QC). Unfortunately for the clarity of the law, the earlier Court of Appeal decision in Ridley v Taylor [1965] 1 WLR 611, where the existence of bargaining power to negotiate for the payment of a lump sum or extra rent in return for a variation of a covenant in a lease was treated as relevant to paragraph (c) of s 84(1), was not cited in either the Stockport or the Bennett cases. This whole matter is considered further in Chapter 23 below. 115 [1974] 1 WLR 798. But the issue of moral obligation is referred to only in [1974] 2 All ER 321 at 333h.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.32 claimant company based its claim to be entitled to enforce certain restrictive covenants on two grounds; first, that the covenants continued as a fact to benefit the part of the original Wrotham Park Estate which was now vested in it; secondly that it was under a moral obligation to enforce the covenants owed to the present owners of land formerly forming part of the Wrotham Park Estate which had been sold off, the position being that the restrictive covenants in question had been entered into for the benefit of ‘the Vendor’s Wrotham Park Estate’ (construed as referring only to the remaining part of the estate for the time being remaining in the ownership of the vendor as an estate entity, so that the present owners of other parts of the estate could not themselves enforce the covenants). However, whilst Brightman J accepted evidence that such a moral duty was owed,116 he did not actually decide whether the existence of such a moral duty would in itself have been sufficient to justify enforceability. In this connection, whilst the existence of an obligation by way of trust would no doubt extend the purview of the benefited land to that owned by the trust beneficiaries,117 since this depends on the existence of a trust, such a trust obligation would not apply to owners of land who were objects of a mere moral obligation. It has been suggested, however, in the context of applications under section 84(1) for the discharge or modification of restrictive covenants that the reason for the insistence in subsection (1)(c) of injury to ‘the persons entitled to the benefit of the restriction’ is to exclude in relation to applications under section 84(1) objectors whose only interest in enforcing the restriction is ‘out of a sense of duty or moral obligation to others’, as opposed to their own proprietary interest118 and this in turn may be seen as implying that for general purposes (ie absent section 84(1) coming into play), such an interest may be a sufficient benefit to satisfy the requirement now being considered. 1.32 In Marquess of Zetland v Driver,119 where the opening of a fried fish shop on the burdened land was complained of as being in breach of a covenant ‘that no act or thing shall be done or permitted thereon which in the opinion of the vendor may be a public or private nuisance or prejudicial or detrimental to the vendor and the owners or occupiers of any adjoining property or to the neighbourhood’, the Court of Appeal,120 in a single judgment delivered by Farwell J, expressed the view that if the covenant prohibited acts which were a nuisance or annoyance to an adjoining owner or the neighbourhood which were not also a nuisance or annoyance to the unsold land of the vendor, then the covenant might well be one which did not run with the vendor’s unsold land. But the enforceability of the covenant by a successor in title of the original vendor was upheld by construing it as meaning that nothing which would be a nuisance or annoyance to an adjoining owner or the neighbourhood was within the covenant unless it was also detrimental or injurious to the unsold land of the vendor. The question of whether a moral duty to enforce the covenant would be sufficient was not actually determined therefore.
116 [1974] 2 All ER 321 at 335e. 117 See Nicoll v Fenning (1881) 19 ChD 258, at 267 and Chapter 4 below. 118 Per Russell LJ in Ridley v Taylor [1965] 1 WLR 611 at 622. 119 [1939] Ch 1, CA. 120 Consisting of Sir Wilfred Greene MR, Luxmoore LJ and Farwell J.
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1.33 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc 1.33
There is therefore no decided case directly on point.
It is difficult to see how in principle a moral duty will be sufficient unless the enforcement of it can be seen as beneficial to the value of the covenantee’s land itself since it is the benefit of the covenant to the covenantee’s land that it is necessary to consider. However, depending on the facts, it could be argued that ensuring practical good neighbourliness may tend to lead to reciprocation where possible and therefore be to the benefit of that land. Only where by some means the benefit to others or a wider area can in some way be regarded as being of benefit to the covenantee’s land itself is such a benefit to the wider community or society likely to be sufficient. 1.34 In Dano Properties Ltd v Earl Cadogan,121 Etherton J, proceeding on the basis of the defendant’s submission it was necessary for the benefit of a restrictive covenant to benefit the covenantee’s land rather than just the public and the community in general, considered that a covenant not to use land other than for the housing of the working classes was of benefit to the covenantee’s land because it was a reasonable view that people may be attracted to occupying the covenantee’s land because of both the particular social atmosphere in the area and the provision of adequate services by competent people who may only be willing to work there if affordable housing is available to them in the locality (see in particular para 67).
The burden of proof as to whether a covenant benefits the land of the covenantee 1.35 The court will normally presume without evidence that the land identified in the deed as being intended to be benefited at the time the covenant is made was capable of being benefited. This presumption was first adumbrated by Sargant J in Lord Northbourne v Johnston & Son122 in the following terms: ‘When once a building plot or house had passed from the hands of the original purchasers to those of a third party, it would be incumbent on the owner of the estate to show, as a condition precedent to the enforcement of the covenant, first, that he had intended the covenant to be for the benefit of such portions of the estate as he still retained and, secondly, that it was in fact for their benefit at the time when enforcement was sought … . Benefit or detriment is often a question of opinion on which there may be the greatest divergence of view, and the greatest difficulty in arriving at a clear conclusion. It is, in my judgment, sufficient for the vendor to say, at any rate in the first instance, that the bargain was that he should be protected against certain acts which were recognized as being likely to prove noxious or detrimental to his building estate treated as a whole. The covenantor, being then, in my judgment, bound at the very least to show that the estate remaining to the covenantee at the date of the action was not intended to be protected by the
121 [2003] 2 P&CR 10. 122 [1922] 2 Ch 309, at 318–319.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.39 covenants, or that the breach of the covenants could not possibly hurt such remaining estate, the question arises whether this onus has been discharged in the present case.’ 1.36 In Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd,123 Wilberforce J set out the presumption in the following terms: ‘If an owner of land, on selling part of it, thinks fit to impose a restriction on user, and the restriction was imposed for the purpose of benefiting the land retained, the court would normally assume that it is capable of doing so. There might, of course, be exceptional cases where the covenant was, on the face of it, taken capriciously or not bona fide, but a covenant taken by the owner of an agricultural estate not to use a sold-off portion for other than agricultural purposes could hardly fall within either of these categories.’ 1.37 This statement of the law was cited with approval and applied by Plowman J in Earl of Leicester v Wells-next-the-Sea UDC,124 by Brightman J in Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd,125as well as more recently by the Court of Appeal in Whitgift Homes Ltd v Stocks.126 In the Wrotham Park case, Brightman J restated the matter thus:127 ‘If a restriction is bargained for at the time of sale with the intention of giving the vendor a protection which he desires for the land he retains, and the restriction is expressed to be imposed for the benefit of the estate so that both sides are apparently accepting that the restriction is of value to the retained land, I think that the validity of the restriction should be upheld so long as an estate owner may reasonably take the view that the restriction remains of value to his estate, and that the restriction should not be discarded merely because others may reasonably argue that the restriction is spent.’ This approach was followed by Etherton J in Dano v Earl Cadogan.128 1.38 The presumption is accordingly a continuing presumption and in the absence of evidence of a change of circumstances at least, will continue to hold good at the date when the issue comes before the court. 1.39 Where it is not possible to see from the deed containing the covenant itself what the physical land intended to be benefited is, but it uses words such as ‘the vendor’s land remaining unsold’ at the date of the deed, which is able to be ascertained, then evidence will clearly be required to show what physically the land benefited was. Once ascertained, however (the burden of proof being on the asserting party to establish it applies to the land contended for), the presumption will apply. Notwithstanding the presumption, where the land expressed to be benefited consists of a very large area, it would clearly be wise for evidence to be led to show that all the land referred to was originally, and still is, benefited.
123 124 125 126 127
[1962] Ch 115, at pp 136–137. [1973] Ch 110. [1974] 1 WLR 798. [2001] EWCA Civ 1732 at para 106. [1974] 1 WLR 798 at 808. This statement was cited with approval by Slade LJ in Cryer v Scott Bros (Sunbury) Ltd (1986) 55 P&CR 183 at 196–197. 128 [2003] 2 P&CR 10 – see paras 49–68, esp para 68.
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1.40 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc 1.40 Thus, in Re Ballard’s Conveyance,129 on the sale of several acres of land known as Bamville Farm, the purchaser covenanted to perform and observe a set of restrictions and stipulations including a restriction forbidding erection of buildings other than private dwelling houses. The covenant was expressed to be entered into with the vendor ‘her heirs and assigns and successors in title owners from time to time of the Childwickbury Estate’ consisting of some 1,700 acres. During the course of the hearing, counsel for the respondent company, the present owner of the Childwickbury Estate, asked for an adjournment in order to consider whether to call evidence to prove that a breach of the restrictions and stipulations, or of some of them, might affect the whole of the estate, but although the judge (Clauson J) had indicated that he was prepared to allow such evidence, none was called. In the result, Clauson J came to the conclusion that ‘while the covenant may concern or touch some comparatively small portion of the land to which it has been sought to annex it, it fails to concern or touch far the largest part of the land’ and that (no severance being then regarded as possible130) it therefore failed to be effectively annexed to any land at all with the result that the covenant was no longer enforceable.131 1.41 In Lord Northbourne v Johnston & Son, Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd (the Crichel Estate, Dorset, comprising 7,000 acres), Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd,132 and Earl of Leicester v Wells-next-the-Sea UDC, referred to above, extensive evidence was adduced133 to show that the whole of the land expressed to be benefited could in fact benefit from the relevant restrictions at the time of the proceedings and in each of those cases the court found that a covenant restricting or precluding development did extend to the whole of the land expressed to be benefited notwithstanding that in Lord Northbourne v Johnston & Son134 the benefited land extended to a large estate of unspecified area known as Shipcote Estate, Gateshead (in Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd135 it involved the 7,000 Crichel Estate in Dorset), in Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd it involved an extensive area known as Wrotham Park Estate, Potters Bar, Hertfordshire and in Earl of Leicester v Wellsnext-the-Sea UDC136 it concerned the 32,000 acre Holkham Estate in Norfolk. 1.42 It does not follow, however, that all the land originally specified as the benefited land, will continue to be capable of qualifying as such in the hands of a successor from the original covenantee. Whether it is so capable is a matter of construction. Thus, in Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd,137 the restrictions were expressed to be ‘for the benefit of the Vendor’s said Wrotham Park Estate’ with the added qualification ‘using that
129 [1937] Ch 473. 130 See now, as to severence, Chapter 6 below. 131 See also National Trust for Places of Historic Interest or Natural Beauty v Midlands Electricity Board [1952] Ch 380 where Vaisey J held that a covenant that ‘No act or thing shall be done or placed or permitted to remain upon the land which shall injure prejudice affect or destroy the natural aspect and condition of Midsummer Hill in the Malvern Hills, could not be said to benefit Midsummer Hill which was at least 1,100 yards away (the covenant also being held to be void for uncertainty). 132 [1974] 1 WLR 798. 133 In Earl of Leicester v Wells-next-the-Sea UDC, unchallenged affidavit evidence; in the other three cases, witness evidence. 134 [1922] 2 Ch 309. 135 [1962] Ch 115. 136 [1973] Ch 110. 137 [1974] 1 WLR 798.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.44 term in the broad and popular sense’. Brightman J, after referring to the judgment of Romer J in Everett v Remington,138 said of the latter words: ‘Their purpose seems to be to restrict the right to enforce the covenant to the person who is properly to be regarded from time to time as the owner of, in substance, the Wrotham Park estate, as distinct from lessees and purchasers of parts thereof, and to annex the benefit of the covenant to such estate.’ Brightman J then found as a fact that at the time the covenant was entered into in 1935, the Wrotham Park Estate then included all the land (apparently consisting of many hundred acres) which had subsequently been built upon and sold to individual purchasers and that the bulk of the remainder of the Estate was vested in the claimant company. From Brightman J’s above observations it would seem to follow that, at the time of the proceedings, the land treated as capable of benefiting was (as a matter of construction of the covenant) confined to that part of the original Wrotham Park Estate which remained as an integral whole in the hands of the claimant company and did not extend to the individual plots which had been sold off. 1.43 In other cases, the words of covenant have been more specific in confining the benefit to ‘the land of the vendor for the time being remaining unsold’ so that the construction issue has been avoided. Thus, in Marquess of Zetland v Driver,139 on a sale by the tenant for life under a settlement of a small part of the settled land, the vendor took a covenant which was expressed to be for the benefit and protection of ‘such part or parts of the lands in the borough, township or parish of Redcar then subject to the settlement as shall for the time being remain unsold or shall have been sold by the vendor or his successors in title with the express benefit of the covenants’.140 Similarly, in Cryer v Scott Bros (Sunbury) Ltd,141 the covenant was expressed to be ‘for the benefit of the remainder of the land comprised in the above title or the part thereof for the time being unsold’ and was treated as annexed only to the last part remaining unsold.142 1.44 Again, in the Lands Tribunal case of Re Wrighton’s Application,143 a covenant (of which modification was sought under section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925) contained in a conveyance of 1911 was expressed to be made ‘with Sarah Anne Chattock her heirs executors administrators and assigns and the owner or owners for the time being of the land and premises forming the residuary real estate of Thomas Piercy Chattock situate at Solihull’. Between 1919 and 1944 the trustees of the Chattock residuary estate sold off various plots of land forming part of the residuary estate subject to a covenant similar in effect to the 1911 covenant, including the plots owned by 11 objectors all of whom claimed to be entitled to the benefit of the covenant. The President of the Lands Tribunal rejected their claims on the ground that having regard to the terms of the 1911 covenant and to the terms of the covenants (to the like effect) contained in the later conveyances, he was ‘forced to the conclusion that they [the stipulations in the 1911 covenant] were imposed for the benefit of the vendors and not for the benefit of parts of the land forming the estate after it had been sold off’. 138 139 140 141 142
[1892] 3 Ch 148 at 157. [1939] Ch 1, CA. See, further, para 6.85 below. (1986) 55 P&CR 183, CA. Although passing to a transferee on a transfer of the whole (fairly small) unsold land, although it is not clear why. 143 (1961) 13 P&CR 189 (Erskine Simes QC).
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1.45 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc Similarly, in Roake v Chadha,144 on a sale of a plot forming part of the vendors’ Sudbury Court Estate, the purchaser entered into a restrictive covenant ‘with the Vendors but so that this covenant shall not enure for the benefit of any owner or subsequent purchaser of any part of the Vendors’ Sudbury Court Estate at Wembley unless the benefit of this covenant shall be expressly assigned’. It was held that the benefit had been effectively so confined.145 In this connection, imprecise language can give rise to difficult questions of construction whose resolution can frequently only be achieved by adducing extensive evidence of the surrounding circumstances. 1.45 In Re Jeff’s Transfer (No 2),146 the benefited land was described as ‘the remainder of Chorleywood Estate (Loudwater) belonging to the vendor’ and in Eagling v Gardner147 the benefited land was described as ‘remainder of the Mimms Hall Estate of the Vendor’.148 The question in each case was whether the benefited land consisted only of that part of the estate as was for the time being in the ownership of the vendor or whether it extended to the whole of the estate originally owned by the vendor including those parts which, at the date of the covenant, had already been sold off. In each case, the claimant was the owner of a part sold off and his success therefore depended upon establishing the latter construction. Prima facie, it might have been expected, since the words being construed in each of the two cases were to all intents and purposes identical, that the answer to the question would have been the same in each case. But according to the ordinary rules of construction, the meaning to be accorded to words in a document depends upon all the surrounding circumstances in which the document was executed so that identity of construction of any given set of words is never guaranteed.149 In the two instant cases, those surrounding circumstances were, on the evidence, found to differ markedly with the result that in the first case the words were construed restrictively as excluding any part of the estate which, at the date of the covenant, had already been sold off whilst in the second case, the words were given the wider meaning and treated as comprehending the parts of the estate which had already been sold off.150 1.46
See also the cases referred to at paras 6.86–6.89 below.
144 [1984] 1 WLR 40 (HH Judge Paul Baker QC sitting as a High Court judge). 145 Such formulas as those contained in the last two cases have been common for many years and were held, in the last-cited case, to be effective to negative annexation to the whole of the land under s 78(1) of the Law of Property Act (as to which see Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 594, CA, discussed in Chapter 6). As Brightman LJ said in the latter case, at p 606, ‘I can understand that a covenantee may expressly or by necessary implication retain the benefit of a covenant wholly under his own control, so that the benefit will not pass unless the covenantee chooses to assign’. The object of retaining such control is, usually, in order to have the exclusive power of negotiating any subsequent releases of the restrictions. 146 [1966] 1 WLR 841 (Stamp J). 147 [1970] 2 All ER 838 (Ungoed-Thomas J). 148 See also Allen v Veranne Builders Ltd [1988] NPC 11, Browne-Wilkinson V-C (covenant with vendor as owner of the unsold parts of an estate). 149 See Chapter 11. 150 In the Eagling and Allen cases it was found that there was a building scheme, thus entitling the claimant to enforce the covenants in question. The moral of these cases is clear, namely, that if expensive litigation is to be avoided, the draftsman should spell out exactly what he means. As to the drafting of covenants, see Chapter 11.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.48 1.47 In the case of covenants entered into since 1925 which answer the description of ‘relating to any land of the covenantee’,151 such covenants are, under section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, ‘deemed to be made with the covenantee and his successors in title and the persons deriving title under him or them, and shall have effect as if such successors and other persons were expressed.’ In view of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd,152 it would now seem that whenever that section applies,153 the presumption that the whole of the land in question is capable of being benefited will also apply. In all cases, however, the presumption remains a presumption, and if the evidence shows that in reality there was no benefit to retained land of the covenantee, the requirement that the covenant must be taken for the benefit of such land will not be satisfied. 1.48 By way of example, in Cosmichome Ltd v Southampton City Council154 the BBC acquired land for use as a broadcasting centre site and entered into a covenant with the transferor confining the use of the site to a broadcasting centre and restricting the use to the BBC or someone exercising the BBC’s franchise. The covenant was expressed to be for the benefit and protection of so much of the adjoining or adjacent land of the Council as was capable of being benefited thereby. The BBC sold the site and its purchaser sought a declaration that this covenant was not enforceable against it. Sir William Blackburne, sitting as a High Court judge, accepted that where, as here, the restrictive covenant was expressed to be for the benefit and protection of so much of the adjoining or adjacent land of the covenantee as is capable of being benefited, the court starts with the assumption that the restriction is capable of doing this, and quoted the words from Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd155 at pp 136–137 set out above. He accepted, at p 2442, that the burden was on the person who seeks to challenge the assumption to prove that, notwithstanding that a restriction is expressed to benefit the covenantee’s retained land, it does not in fact do so and quoted from the passage of Sargant J in Lord Northbourne v Johnston & Son156 also set out above. He also noted the importance of respecting the apparent acceptance by the original covenantor and the original covenantee at the time it is entered into, that the restriction was intended to and was capable of benefiting the covenantee’s land was emphasised by Brightman J in Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd.157 The Judge went on to consider, however, whether, notwithstanding this, the claimant had discharged the burden of showing that, despite the wording of the covenant, the restrictive covenant was not intended, at the time it was imposed,
151 As to the meaning of these words, see the discussion below, para 6.28 et seq. 152 [1980] 1 WLR 594, CA. This decision is discussed below, para 6.31 et seq, in the context of the annexation of the benefit of covenants. 153 The question when s 78(1) applies is considered fully below, para 6.28 et seq. 154 [2013] 1 WLR 2436. 155 [1962] Ch 115. 156 [1922] 2 Ch 309 at p 319. 157 [1974] 1 WLR 798 at p 808.
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1.49 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc to benefit the covenantee’s adjoining or adjacent land or, if it was, that it was incapable of doing so. Having reviewed the relevant evidence, he concluded (in para 36) that: ‘the restrictive covenant cannot be said to have benefited the Council’s adjoining or adjacent land when it was imposed in 1989 and it does not do so now. Moreover, the balance of the evidence strongly suggests that the reason for its imposition was twofold: to seek thereby to maintain the BBC at the Site and to serve as the lever for extracting a payment if and when the BBC should seek to have it removed and go elsewhere. As such it is in the nature of a money payment obligation rather than a restrictive covenant properly so called. It is not intended to protect or preserve the amenity or value of the Council’s adjacent land. It does not bind successors in title to the BBC.’ Accordingly, the court granted a declaration that the restrictive covenant was not enforceable against the claimant (the purchaser of the land from the BBC) or any successor in title to it. 1.49 In the absence of such evidence, though, the presumption will apply. For an example of a recent case decided on the basis of it, see Bryant Homes Southern Ltd and Others v Stein Management Ltd and Others,158 distinguishing Cosmichome (at para 25). 1.50 Where there is no express indication in the words of covenant that it was taken for the benefit of any particular land, in such a case, it will be necessary for the claimant to adduce evidence to show: (a) precisely what land belonged to the covenantee at the date of the covenant; and (b) that the covenant was capable of benefiting that land, or the part of it now owned by the claimant. As to (a), extrinsic evidence is admissible (and must be adduced) to show what land was owned by the covenantee at the date of the covenant.159 As to (b), evidence to establish, as at the date of the covenant, one or more of the several kinds of potential benefit considered above will be required. Where the transmission of the benefit of the covenant is by annexation (see Chapter 6) the land must actually be defined in the document containing the covenant so as to be easily ascertainable (see para 6.35 et seq below).
B: The estate or interest in the benefited land which the covenantee must own 1.51 At common law, for the benefit of a covenant relating to land to be capable of running with the land, it was essential that the covenant was entered into with the owner of a legal estate in the benefited land.160 But in equity,
158 [2016] EWHC 2435 (Ch). 159 Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold Ltd [1952] Ch 286 (Upjohn J); Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham (No 2) [1971] 2 All ER 1267, per Megarry J at 1275b–d. 160 See Onward Building Society v Smithson [1893] 1 Ch 1, CA and see also Chapter 26.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.51 the benefit of a covenant will be capable of running provided that the original covenantee has either a legal or an equitable interest in the benefited land.161 The estates and interests ownership of which by the covenantee are sufficient for this purpose in equity are as follows. ●●
●●
●●
●●
Legal fee simple estate Clearly the ownership of such a legal estate will satisfy the requirements of equity since (where it is consistent with equitable principles to do so) equity follows the law. Equitable fee simple estate In the case of restrictive covenants, equity treats an equitable owner as qualifying for the same recognition as a legal owner. Thus, the owner of an equity of redemption who, before 1926, had conveyed the legal estate to a mortgagee by way of legal mortgage, was a competent covenantee for the purpose of the running of the benefit of a restrictive covenant in favour of subsequent owners.162 So also is a contracting purchaser of the land to be benefited,163 since such purchaser has an equitable interest in the land corresponding in size to the legal estate contracted to be purchased.164 Legal or equitable fee simple held by trustees It is immaterial whether the covenantee is a beneficial owner of the estate or interest or a trustee provided that, in the latter case, the covenantee has power under the trust to take a restrictive covenant in the circumstances in question.165 Contracting vendor One case of trusteeship calling for special mention is that of a vendor who, before a covenant for the benefit of his land is entered into, contracts to sell the whole or part of it to a purchaser. Such a vendor is, at any rate for certain purposes, a constructive trustee of the land for the purchaser.166 As indicated above, the purchaser would thus himself be a competent covenantee. But there can be little doubt that if the covenant is entered into, not with the purchaser, but with the vendor, the vendor’s interest which he still holds pending completion will also be sufficient to satisfy the present requirement so as to enable the covenant to run with the land.
161 However, the requirement of some interest in the land would preclude the possibility of a covenant benefiting future acquired land in which the covenantee currently had no interest: cf Voice v Bell (1993) 68 P&CR 441, CA (an easement case). 162 Rogers v Hosegood [1900] 2 Ch 388, CA. 163 This was assumed in Re Rutherford’s Conveyance [1938] Ch 396 (Simonds J), although on the facts no covenants were held to have been entered into. 164 See Walsh v Lonsdale (1882) 21 ChD 9. 165 Thus, under s 49(1)(b) of the Settled Land Act 1925, a tenant for life or statutory owner under the Settled Land Act is a competent covenantee in respect of the settled land where the restrictive covenant is imposed on a sale or other disposition and trustees for sale and personal representatives have the like power by virtue of s 28(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 and s 39(1) of the Administration of Estates Act 1925. In Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd [1962] Ch 115, the original covenantees were special executors holding for an infant tenant in tail in possession and in Marquess of Zetland v Driver [1939] Ch 1 and Earl of Leicester v Wells-nextthe-Sea UDC [1973] Ch 110, the original covenantee was in each case a tenant for life under the Settled Land Act 1925. 166 See Shaw v Foster (1872) LR 5 HL 321 especially per Lord Hatherley at p 356; Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 ChD 499; Rayner v Preston (1881) 18 ChD 1; Lake v Bayliss [1974] 1 WLR 1073.
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1.51 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc
●●
●●
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Thus, if X, the freehold owner of Plots 1 and 2, contracts to sell Plot 1 to A on terms that B enters into restrictive covenants for the benefit of Plot 2 and X then contracts to sell Plot 2 to B, then provided the conveyance or transfer of Plot 1 to A (imposing the covenants) takes place before the conveyance or transfer of Plot 2 to B, B will get the benefit of the covenants. On the other hand, if (whether because of unavoidable delay or otherwise) completion of the sale of Plot 1 to A takes place after completion of the sale of Plot 2 to B, then since at the date when the covenants are entered into by A, X no longer had any interest whatsoever in Plot 2, the covenants would (in the absence of a building scheme167) be wholly ineffective.168 Reversioner subject to a lease The case of Regent Oil Co Ltd v JA Gregory (Hatch End) Ltd169 indicates that such a reversion may be a sufficient interest at least to enable the reversioner to enforce a restrictive covenant against a sublessee. Legal leasehold estates and equitable interests corresponding to pre-1926 legal estates less than a fee simple Where the estate or interest of the covenantee (having regard to the capacity in which he is the recipient of the benefit of the covenant) is less than equivalent to the fee simple estate, then the benefit of the covenant can run but only during the subsistence of the maximum duration of that lesser estate or interest.170 The reason for this is plain, namely, that no successor from the covenantee can be in any better position than the covenantee himself and since the duration of the covenantee’s proprietary right of enforcement will be confined to the duration of his interest in the benefited land, that is the maximum benefit which the covenantee can pass on. There may, of course, be more than one covenantee and in such a case, each covenantee’s position will depend upon the particular estate or interest which he owns. It would seem that neither the subsequent extension nor the premature determination of any such limited interest will affect the period during which the benefit of the covenant will run with the land.171 Mortgagees In the case of a mortgage effected by way of demise or subdemise for a long term of years, it is conceived that restrictive covenants entered into with such a mortgagee will enure for the benefit of the mortgaged property for the full duration of the term granted by the mortgage notwithstanding
167 If a building scheme existed then, in the case supposed, A would be deemed to be covenanting not only (ineffectively so far as successors are concerned) with X but also with B. As to building schemes generally, see Chapter 8. 168 Millbourn v Lyons [1914] 2 Ch 231. 169 [1966] Ch 402 at 433. See also Shepherd Homes Ltd v Sandham (No 2) [1971] 2 All ER 1267 at 1275a–b. 170 See Golden Lion Hotel (Hunstanton) Ltd v Carter [1965] 1 WLR 1189. 171 As to the effect of the statutory continuance of a lease under s 24 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927, see City of London Corpn v Fell [1994] 1 AC 458 and as to the effect of a renewal of a lease, see Collins v Plumb (1810) 16 Ves 454. Quaere in the latter case, whether if the renewal is pursuant to an option contained in the lease it makes any difference. As to the surrender and simultaneous grant of a new lease, see Birmingham Joint Stock Co v Lea (1877) 36 LT 843 and as to merger by acquisition of the reversion, the owner of the freehold land not being a party, see Golden Lion Hotel (Hunstanton) Ltd v Carter [1965] 1 WLR 1189 (Cross J).
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.51
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that the mortgage is paid off and the mortgage term comes to an end.172 Further, it is considered that the position would be the same in the case of a charge by way of legal mortgage by virtue of the operation of section 87(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925. The position in the case of an equitable charge is less clear but it seems likely that a restrictive covenant entered into with a mortgagee under such a charge would correspond in duration to the interest charged.173 Squatters I: Covenants entered into by the squatter before gaining title to the land The theory of the law in relation to such persons is that they have seisin as fee simple owners subject only to proof by the paper owner of his title paramount. Their estate is not a limited estate but a fee simple estate good against the whole world except the owner with title paramount and covenants entered into with them will enure for a corresponding interest. Accordingly, if and when, on the extinguishment by lapse of time of the title paramount,174 the estate becomes indefeasible, the covenants entered into by them will become similarly indefeasible. In the case of registered land, this will not occur until the squatter becomes registered as proprietor of the land.175 It is considered, however, that if the squatter is ousted by the true owner before the latter’s title is extinguished, then a covenant entered into by him would not run in favour of such owner since he is neither an original covenantee nor a successor in title to, or person claiming under, the squatter – the squatter’s former ‘ownership’ has simply come to an end, and with it the covenants.176 II: Squatter who has obtained title by adverse possession A squatter who has obtained title by adverse possession177 will be bound by restrictive covenants created by, or binding on, the owner before he gains title, to the same extent that any other person who obtains title to the land would be bound. Although he does not obtain the estate of the previous owner (rather that estate is extinguished by the Limitation Act178) the burden of the restrictive covenants is not incident to the extinguished owner’s estate (which would mean they would be extinguished with that estate), but, rather, paramount to the previous owner’s title, and all the Act extinguishes
172 See the cases cited in footnote 171 above. 173 In the pre-1925 legal mortgage case of Lord Manners v Johnson (1875) 1 ChD 673, a purchaser from mortgagees with whom a restrictive covenant had been entered into by another purchaser was held entitled to enforce the covenant. In that case, transferees of the mortgagees were also held entitled to enforce the covenant but it does not appear that the continued existence of the mortgage was the basis of the purchaser’s right to enforce. Further, in the pre-1926 case of Long v Gray (1913) 58 Sol Jo 46, a covenant entered into with the owner of a legal life interest under a settlement was held to enure for the benefit of the fee simple estate. 174 Under s 17 of the Limitation Act 1980. 175 See Land Registration Act 2002, s 96; also s 97 and Sch 6. 176 However, in the case of post-1925 covenants, on retaking possession, the true owner may thereby become an ‘occupier’ within the meaning of s 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925. See below para 6.27, and for a discussion on this subsection, see below, para 6.28 et seq. 177 In the case of registered land, by becoming registered proprietor. 178 Tichborne v Weir [1891–94] All ER Rep 449. The current Limitation Act is the Limitation Act 1980 (s 17).
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1.51 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc is the title of the previous owner. The right to enforce these covenants was no part of his title, and they are therefore enforceable against the squatter who subsequently becomes owner of the land by adverse possession: see Re Nisbet & Potts’ Contract.179 So far as the benefit of restrictive covenants is concerned, a squatter who gains title to registered land by adverse possession and is registered as proprietor of the land180 will be entitled as registered proprietor to all the rights relating to that land, and entitled therefore to enforce any restrictive covenants benefiting the land to the same extent as any other owner. In the case of unregistered land (or registered land where the squatter’s title has not yet been registered), so far as the position in relation to covenants annexed to land after 1925 is concerned, section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides as follows: ‘Benefit of covenants relating to land. (1) A covenant relating to any land of the covenantee shall be deemed to be made with the covenantee and his successors in title and the persons deriving title under him or them, and shall have effect as if such successors and other persons were expressed. For the purposes of this subsection in connexion with covenants restrictive of the user of land “successors in title” shall be deemed to include the owners and occupiers for the time being of the land of the covenantee intended to be benefited’ [Emphasis added].
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Aside from this (for example, where covenants have been entered into prior to 1926) restrictive covenants would seem not to be enforceable by the squatter even where he has gained title (subject to the particular wording of the covenant) as he does not obtain the title of the dispossessed owner or therefore his rights appurtenant to the land but an independent title.181 However, by registration of the land and becoming the registered proprietor the squatter would become entitled to enforce them (as referred to above). Non-proprietary occupiers (licensees) By this expression is meant persons who occupy land otherwise than by virtue of their ownership of any legal estate or equitable interest conferring a right to occupy and who do not claim to be in adverse possession of the land. Such persons will occupy by virtue of one or other of the various species of licence which can subsist in respect of land and will accordingly have no proprietary interest in the land.182 It follows that there can be no question of the benefit of a restrictive covenant entered into with such an occupier running with the land’.183
179 [1906] Ch 386 (CA), and also the clear exposition of the law by Farwell J at first instance reported at [1905] 1 Ch 391. 180 Under the Land Registration Act 2002, or earlier under the Land Registration Act 1925. 181 See Fairweather v St Marylebone Property Co Ltd [1963] AC 510 at p 535. 182 See National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175. 183 See Forster v Elvet Colliery Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 629, CA per Farwell LJ at p 641. This case subsequently went to the House of Lords sub nom Dyson v Foster [1909] AC 98 but the position of occupiers was not there canvassed.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.51
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Further, it is considered highly doubtful whether such an original covenantee could have enforced a covenant so entered into before 1926 against a successor in title of the covenantor184 for two reasons: first, because the covenant could not be said to relate to any ‘land’ of the covenantee185 and, second, because it would be inconsistent with principle to recognise a mere licensee, who had no interest in the land which he occupied under the licence, as having, in respect of that licence, a proprietary interest in the land of the covenantor. In the case of post-1925 covenants, it is considered the position remains the same since whilst some change in the law permitting mere occupiers to enforce restrictive covenants has been brought about by section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925,186 that section only applies to covenants which when created relate to ‘land of the covenantee’. The definition of ‘land’ contained in section 205(1)(ix) of the Act clearly does not include a mere licence187 – and it is only the licence which is ‘of the covenantee’. Tenants at will Since 1925, it would seem that a tenancy at will cannot subsist at law since such an interest does not fall under any of the provisions of section 1(1) or (2) of the Law of Property Act 1925. Presumably it now subsists as an equitable interest in the land by virtue of section 1(3) of that Act and, if so, this would appear to qualify such an interest as sufficient to enable the benefit of a restrictive covenant entered into with the tenant at will to be capable of running with the land during the subsistence of the tenancy at will.188 In this respect, therefore, such a tenant is in a superior position to a licensee. Owners of rentcharges In Grant v Edmondson,189 it was finally190 held by the Court of Appeal that the benefit of a positive covenant to pay the sum due under a perpetual rentcharge is not capable of running with the rentcharge and so could not be enforced by a subsequent owner of the rentcharge.191 Although there is no specific authority on the question whether the benefit of a restrictive covenant entered into by a freeholder with a person entitled to a rentcharge192 is capable of running with the rentcharge (and with the
184 Of course, as against the original covenantor no problem as to enforcement arises: see Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd v Millennium Productions Ltd [1948] AC 173. 185 With the result that the decision in Formby v Barker [1903] 2 Ch 539, CA would apply so as to preclude enforcement. 186 See the second paragraph of s 78(1), set out at para 6.27 below. 187 Cf National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175. 188 Cf Cobb v Lane [1952] 1 All ER 1199. 189 [1931] 1 Ch 1, CA. 190 The decisions in Brewster v Kidgill (1698) 12 Mod Rep 166 and Milnes v Branch (1816) 5 M & S 411 had already gone a long way to the same effect. 191 Such owner therefore being left only with the remedies of distress and entry for the purpose of taking the income which are now conferred by s 121 of the Law of Property Act 1925, re-enacting with amendments s 44 of the Conveyancing Act 1881. 192 Sales in consideration of a rentcharge, rather than a capital sum, were, prior to 1926, common in certain places in the north and west of England including Manchester, Liverpool, Bath and Bristol and, in order to preserve the value of the rentchargee’s security, it was usual for the purchaser/rentchargor to enter into both positive and restrictive covenants with the vendor/ rentchargee, such as to pay the annual sums due under the rentcharge, to keep the premises in repair, not to carry on any offensive trade and the like. For a precedent, see Key and Elphinstone’s Precedents in Conveyancing (15th edn), pp 817 et seq. By reason of the
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1.51 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc
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193
194 195 196
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burdened land), the principle of the above decision would seem to be equally applicable to restrictive covenants. However, it might be argued that there is no sound reason in principle for a court which was being asked to exercise its equitable jurisdiction to grant an injunction for the protection of a proprietary interest in land, to distinguish in this respect193 between corporeal hereditaments (and their equitable equivalents) on the one hand and incorporeal hereditaments (and their equitable equivalents) on the other. On the other hand, if, as seems to be the case,194 negative easements are regarded as the main model for developments in the law of restrictive covenants, then the absence of anything analogous to a corporeal dominant tenement might, by analogy, be regarded as fatal to such protection. In Western v MacDermott,195 it was held that the owner (in 1866) of a rentcharge with whom restrictive covenants had (in 1767) been entered into by the predecessor in title of the defendant, had no power to extinguish the restrictive covenant by release since there was a building scheme under which other plot owners were entitled to the benefit of the covenant.196 It was thus assumed, although the point was not fundamental to the decision, that the rentcharge owner was (apart from any release) entitled to enforce the restrictive covenant. By section 2(1) of the Rentcharges Act 1977, no new rentcharge can, except in the five cases set out in section 2(2), be created on or after the 22 August 1977 and provision is made in section 3 for the extinguishment of existing rentcharges except variable rentcharges (as defined in subsections (4) and (5)) and rentcharges falling within any of the five excepted classes set out in section 2(2). For present purposes, the most significant of the section 2(2) exceptions is that of the ‘estate rentcharge’ (as defined in section 2(4)) since this type of rentcharge has been by far the most commonly created in the last 40 years. It is likely, therefore, that the issue under consideration will, in due course, fall to be specifically decided by the courts. Subsequently diminished ‘interests’ of the covenantee which are nevertheless sufficient to justify continued enforceability Assuming that the original covenantee initially had a sufficient interest in the benefited land to render a restrictive covenant capable of being enforced against successors of the covenantor, the question arises as to what minimum ‘interest’ such covenantee must continue to hold in order to preserve such ability to enforce. I: Covenantee becoming a mere non-proprietary occupier (licensee) Although an occupier holding under a licence has no sufficient interest to enable either the benefit or the burden of a restrictive covenant entered difficulties highlighted in Grant v Emdondson, it became common practice to annex a right of re-entry not only to the non-payment of the rentcharge but also to the non-performance and non-observance of the covenants as in the precedent cited. Of course, all the other requirements for transmissibility considered above would also have to be satisfied and the nature of the incorporeal hereditament (such as a rentcharge) would considerably restrict the number of restrictive covenants which could be said to ‘touch and concern’ the rentcharge rather than being merely collateral. But, in the case of a rentcharge, if the restrictive covenant in question can be said to have a direct bearing on the preservation of the value of the rentcharge, then this test would prima facie be satisfied. See above, paras 1.7–1.8. (1866) LR 1 Eq 499, at 506; affd (1866) LR 2 Ch App 72. As to building schemes, see Chapter 8 below.
The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.52 into with him in that capacity to run against a successor in title from the covenantor,197 nevertheless it is considered that such an ‘interest’ is sufficient to continue to qualify him to enforce a covenant already validly entered into. For example, if a restrictive covenant had initially been entered into with a covenantee having a qualifying interest in benefited land, then if such covenantee subsequently transferred his interest in the land but remained in occupation as a licensee, it is considered he could still enforce the covenant against a successor in title of the covenantor even before 1926.198 Since 1925, a licensee would qualify for protection as an ‘occupier’ ‘for the time being of the land’ under section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (and the words of this provision seem wide enough to include an occupier who was an original covenantee). II: Covenantee ceasing to own but remaining subject to continuing personal liability under a subjective restrictive covenant In Spencer v Bailey,199 the claimant, who was originally the freehold owner of land known as the Earlsfield Estate, granted a lease of part of the land, taking from the lessee a restrictive covenant expressed to be for the benefit of the rest of the Earlsfield Estate. Subsequently, the claimant sold off other parts of the estate and covenanted with the purchasers that the demised land would only be used for the purposes permitted by the restrictive covenant. Later, after the claimant had sold the freehold reversion of the demised land, an assignee of the lease infringed the restrictive covenant and the claimant brought an action to enforce it. Romer J held that the claimant was entitled to enforce it since his liability under the covenants with the subsequent purchasers gave him a sufficient interest to do so.
4 The covenant must in fact benefit land in which the claimant has a sufficient interest at the time of enforcement of it200 1.52 This requirement ensures that the raison d’être of enforceability as against a successor of the covenantor, namely benefit to land in which the covenantee has a sufficient interest, continues to hold good in the case of the claimant at the time of actual enforcement. 197 Of course, as against the original covenantor, no problem as to enforcement arises in such a case: see Winter Garden Theatre (London) Ltd v Millennium Productions Ltd [1948] AC 173. 198 See Spencer v Bailey (1893) 69 LT 179. The facts appear in the next section. In holding that the claimant remained entitled to enforce the restrictive covenant on the basis of his continuing liability under the other covenants, Romer J was recognising that a purely personal liability was sufficient qualification and it is conceived that a purely personal right under a licence would similarly qualify for protection. See also Fairclough v Marshall (1878) 4 Ex D 37 where the owner of land benefited by a restrictive covenant was held entitled to enforce the covenant without joining his mortgagee although he had mortgaged the land by way of conveyance subject to a proviso for reconveyance on repayment of the loan. 199 (1893) 69 LT 179 (Romer J). 200 This is a requirement both of the right to enforce the covenant and of the prima facie availability of the remedy of injunction by reference to which alone, as against a successor from the covenantor, it can be enforced. See, eg, Lord Northbourne v Johnston & Son [1922] 2 Ch 309; Re Ballard’s Conveyance [1937] Ch 473; Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd [1962] Ch 115; Re Gadd’s Land Transfer [1966] Ch 56; Earl of Leicester v Wells-next-the-Sea UDC [1973] Ch 110; Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798.
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1.53 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc The presumption of benefit to the land referred to above which applies at the date the covenant is entered into applies equally to the presumed continuance of the benefit as at the date of enforcement provided that the claimant either has the whole of the land expressed to be benefited or (if he has part) the covenant was expressed to be for the benefit of the land or any part.201 The categories of benefit which may be relied upon for this purpose include each of the three kinds referred to in para 1.27 above (and, if moral benefit is sufficient that also – this question is referred to in paras 1.31–1.33 above) and reference may be made to the cases there cited. 1.53 In Re Gadd’s Land Transfer,202 in an application under section 84(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 for a declaration as to the enforceability or otherwise of certain restrictive covenants, the only relevant benefited land consisted of the site of an unadopted service road known as Bridle Lane, Loudwater, Hertfordshire, which had been transferred to the defendant company in consideration of the sum of 10 shillings together with the benefit of a covenant restricting to one house development on a piece of land having a frontage to Bridle Lane. This land was later purchased by the plaintif company with a view, subject to planning permission, to erecting 76 houses on it. In holding that the site of the road was effectively benefited by the covenant, Buckley J took into account (i) the fact that increased user of the road would result in increased wear and tear with consequent risk of liability to road users if the road were not properly maintained, (ii) the fact that if the road were not properly maintained, there would be an increased likelihood of the road being taken over by the local authority, and (iii) the fact that an increase in the amount of traffic would decrease the defendant company’s chances of being able to dispose of the road. The benefit therefore consisted substantially of an asset of nominal value not being at risk of being turned into an asset of negative value. On the other hand, if the only land owned by the claimant consists of the subsoil of an adopted road, then this would be insufficient to establish a locus standi.203 1.54 It is considered that the same would apply to a ‘ransom strip’ to which the benefit of covenants was expressed to be annexed but which was retained primarily with a view to preserving bargaining power for the release or variation of the covenants rather than the benefit of the land as such.204
201 See Cryer v Scott Bros (Sunbury) Ltd (1986) 55 P&CR 183, at 196–197 and 202. In that case, the remaining part of the benefited land was very small but in the absence of any evidence to show that it could not benefit the presumption was not displaced. 202 [1966] Ch 56. 203 Kelly v Barrett [1924] 2 Ch 379. In such a case, the ownership of the surface and of the air space above to such a depth and height respectively as are required for highway purposes, will have vested in the highway authority, so that neither the land which is retained nor the highway land itself would, on the above tests, be capable of benefiting from any covenant. As to the depth of the road surface land which, on adoption, vests in the highway authority, see Tithe Redemption Commission v Runcorn UDC [1954] Ch 383, and as to the height of the air space above to which the highway authority becomes entitled, see Wandsworth Board of Works v United Telephone Co (1884) 13 QBD 904 and Finchley Electric Light Co v Finchley UDC [1903] 1 Ch 437. 204 See paras 1.28–1.30 above.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.56
Difficulties for succeeding owners in establishing whether land held by them has the benefit of a covenant 1.55 If the benefited land is unregistered, there will be no register on which the benefit (as opposed to the burden) of the restrictive covenant can be entered and none from which it can by such means be discovered. In the case of registered land, prior to the Land Registration Act 2002 and the Land Registration Rules 2003 coming into force on 13 October 2003, an indication that land had the benefit of a restrictive covenant could be entered on the register of that land.205 Such an entry did not guarantee the land did have the benefit of the covenant (as the entry made merely stated that the covenant was ‘expressed to be for the benefit of the title in the land’), but it alerted subsequent owners to the likely existence of it.206 Since 13 October 2003, the benefit of a covenant cannot be entered on the register under rule 33 of the Land Registration Rules 2002, which provides that an entry may be made if the Registrar is satisfied ‘the right subsists as a legal estate and benefits the registered estate’, as the benefit of it is not a legal estate in land but merely an equitable interest. Where, however, it is clear to the Land Registry that a properly constituted building scheme has been created,207 the existence of this might be referred to in the register of the titles affected. If adjoining land is registered, the charges register of that land may reveal the existence of restrictive covenants which could benefit the searcher’s land. Beyond this, no assistance is likely to be available through the land registration system.
5 The words of covenant must be such as to show that the covenant was not intended to be personal to the original covenantee or to be confined to a category of persons to whom the claimant does not belong 1.56 In the oft-quoted classification of restrictive covenants contained in the judgment of Farwell J in Osborne v Bradley,208 the covenants were classified, in ascending order of degrees of enforceability, as follows: ‘(i) covenants imposed by the vendor for his own benefit, (ii) covenants imposed by the vendor as owner of other land of which that sold formed a part, and intended to protect or benefit such unsold land, and 205 Under s 40(3) of the Land Registration Act 1925. This would be indicated by note or notice on the property register. In order for this to be done, a certified copy of the deed creating the covenant had to be produced and the Land Registry satisfied the land in question was that benefited by it, by reference to a clearly defined building scheme (in relation to which, see Chapter 8) or otherwise. 206 Though the absence of such an entry would mean nothing, as the benefit did not have to be registered. 207 Building schemes are the subject of Chapter 8. 208 [1903] 2 Ch 446, at p 450, cited with approval in Reid v Bickerstaff [1909] 2 Ch 305; Sobey v Sainsbury [1913] 2 Ch 513; Kelly v Barrett [1924] 2 Ch 379; Re Ballard’s Conveyance [1937] Ch 473; Marquess of Zetland v Driver [1939] Ch 1.
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1.57 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc (iii) covenants imposed by a vendor upon a sale of land to various purchasers who are intended mutually to enjoy the benefit of, and be bound by, the covenants.’ The third category is concerned with building schemes which are dealt with in Chapter 8. Of the other two categories, the position varies according to the date of the covenant.
Pre-1882 covenants 1.57 At common law and apart from statute, the benefit of a covenant relating to freehold land prima facie enured only in favour of the covenantee and his heirs and it was therefore essential that the intention for it to have a wider operation (with a correspondingly increased burden upon the covenantor) should clearly appear from the terms of the covenant. There was, however, no strict common law requirement of any express mention of assigns or successors in title and (perhaps by analogy to the corresponding position in the case of easements) the position seems to have been that provided the covenant, taken as a whole, evinced an intention that the benefit should enure in favour of successors, then that would be sufficient.209 However, depending on the context, the absence of any reference to assigns may be an indication that the covenant was intended to be personal to the covenatee. Thus, in Re Fawcett and Holmes’ Contract,210 the purchaser of a plot of land, after entering into certain covenants ‘for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns’ then covenanted in the same deed that he ‘the said George Fawcett, on erecting any buildings on the land, shall only erect’ buildings of a specified description. The Court of Appeal held that in view of the difference of language in the two sets of covenants, the latter was to be construed as a mere personal covenant by Fawcett. This case concerned the question whether the covenant was personal to the covenantor, but the same principle of construction would, it is considered, apply to the corresponding question in relation to the covenantee. In the case of pre-1882 restrictive covenants, therefore, whether the covenant is personal to the covenantee and his estate is a pure question of construction untrammelled by any requirement for the use of any particular formula.
Covenants entered into after 1881 and before 1926 1.58 In the case of covenants entered into between these years, the provisions of section 58 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 applied which provided as follows: ‘(1) A covenant relating to land of inheritance, or devolving on the heir as special occupant, shall be deemed to be made with the covenantee, his heirs and assigns, and shall have effect as if heirs and assigns were expressed.’
209 See Chudleigh’s Case (1595) 1 Co Rep 120a, at 122b; sub nom Dillon v Freine Poph 70. This was a case of a positive covenant in an action at law, but clearly the position in equity was no more exacting. And see, as to the corresponding position in the case of the benefit of warranties of title, Bracton De Legibus Angliae f 17b. For leaseholds, see Caerns Motor Services Ltd v Texaco Ltd [1995] 1 All ER 247. 210 (1889) 42 ChD 150.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.62 Subject to satisfying the opening pre-condition to the operation of subsection (1), the effect of the subsection is that words of limitation211 are to be read into the covenant212 which, in effect, (in the case of freehold land) prima facie make it a fee simple covenant rather than a personal covenant with the result that the benefit can be transmitted to others.213
Post-1925 covenants 1.59 In the case of covenants entered into after 1925, section 78 of the Law of Property Act 1925 will apply and once it is shown214 that the covenantee did in fact own land capable of benefiting from a restrictive covenant, then such covenant is deemed to have been made ‘with the covenantee and his successors in title and the persons deriving title under him or them, and shall have effect as if such successors and other persons were expressed’. 1.60 Moreover, for good measure section 80(3) of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that: ‘(3) The benefit of a covenant relating to land entered into after the commencement of this Act may be made to run with the land215 without the use of any technical expression if the covenant is of such a nature that the benefit could have been made to run with the land before the commencement of this Act.’ The implied premise underlying this provision would appear to be that before 1926 it was, or may have been, necessary to use a ‘technical expression’ in order to make a covenant run with the land but as has been seen, so far as restrictive (and, indeed, positive) covenants entered into between freeholders were concerned, there was no strict requirement. 1.61 Unless the provisions of section 78(1) of the Act can be excluded or modified by express provision contained in the covenant then it would seem to follow that class (i) covenants in Farwell J’s above classification can no longer be created. This question is considered further in Chapter 6.216
6 The covenant must have been entered into by a competent covenantor having a sufficient interest in the burdened (subjected) land 1.62 The question of (i) a ‘competent’ covenantor, and (ii) a ‘sufficient interest’ will be considered in turn. The particular position of (iii) a contracting 211 Using the expression ‘words of limitation’ in the technical sense of words enlarging the size of the right or interest granted as contrasted with the expression ‘words of purchase’ which enlarge the category of persons upon whom a right or interest is initially conferred. 212 See the judgment of Cozens-Hardy MR in Forster v Elvet Colliery Co Ltd [1908] 1 KB 629, CA, at 635 (dealing with the words implied by the section in the case of covenants relating to leasehold land). On the subsequent appeal to the House of Lords, affd sub nom Dyson v Forster [1909] AC 98, no reference was made to section 58 of the Conveyancing Act 1881. 213 This statutory provision is considered further in Chapter 6. 214 As to whether, for the purposes of this section, it must be so shown from the contents of the instrument imposing the covenant or whether extrinsic evidence is admissible for those purposes, see below, para 6.35 et seq. 215 In the sense provided for in section 80(4) of the Act. 216 See below, para 6.42 et seq.
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1.63 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc purchaser, and (iv) a covenantor having no interest in, or occupation of, part of the land will then be considered.
(i) Competent covenantors 1 Beneficial owners 1.63 Beneficial owners clearly have the power to enter into restrictive covenants.
2 Fiduciary owners 1.64 Tenants for life and statutory owners under the Settled Land Act 1925, trustees for sale and personal representatives all have statutory power, on a sale or other disposition of or dealing with part of the trust or estate property, to enter into any restrictive covenant binding the whole or any part of the trust or estate property which is retained.217 This power is conferred on tenants for life and statutory owners by section 49(1)(b) of the Settled Land Act 1925, and the same power also extends to trustees for sale by virtue of section 28(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 and to personal representatives by virtue of section 39(1)(ii) and (iii) of the Administration of Estates Act 1925. There appears to be no statutory power for any such owner to enter into a restrictive covenant except on the occasion of an authorised sale, disposition or dealing but an application to the court may be made under section 64 of the Settled Land Act 1925 for an order approving such a transaction. If a tenant for life or statutory owner purports to enter into a restrictive covenant otherwise than on the occasion of a sale, disposition or dealing authorised by the Settled Land Act 1925, then the covenant will bind his equitable beneficial interest only to the exclusion of the legal estate vested in him.218 But a restrictive covenant entered into in similar circumstances by trustees for sale or personal representatives will be effective to bind the legal estate vested in them unless and until the covenant is set aside by the court on the ground that it amounted to a breach of trust.219
3 Companies incorporated under the Companies Acts 1.65 Under section 39(1) of the Companies Act 2006 (and since the coming into operation of section 35 of the Companies Act 1985, as substituted by section 108(1) of the Companies Act 1989), the validity of an act done by a company220 can no longer be called into question on the ground of lack of
217 As well as (under the same statutory provision) to take covenants from the purchaser binding on the land which is sold. 218 Settled Land Act 1925, s 18(1)(a). 219 Section 18 of the Settled Land Act 1925 does not apply to trustees for sale or personal representatives. Such fiduciary owners have the legal estate vested in them at common law and can make any disposition or dealing subject only to its liability to be set aside if not authorised. 220 Subject to certain exceptions in the case of companies that are charities: see s 42 of the Companies Act 2006 (and formerly s 35(4) of the Companies Act 1985, as substituted).
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.67 capacity by reason of anything in the company’s memorandum. Restrictive covenants entered into by such companies will accordingly have the same effect as if they had, in the like circumstances, been entered into by an individual of full capacity.
4 Local authorities and other corporations created by special Act of Parliament 1.66 In the case of such corporations, their capacity to enter into valid restrictive covenants will depend upon the existence of an enabling power conferred by, or pursuant to, the provisions of their parent Act. The most commonly encountered corporations of this kind are public corporations including, in particular, local authorities whose powers generally come from the provisions of the Local Government Act 1972, as amended,221 and the Localism Act 2011. In the case of covenants having been entered into at any earlier time, however, it will be necessary to have regard to the provisions of the relevant enabling Act operative at that time. Thus, in Davis v Leicester Corpn,222 the authority to dispose of two lots on an estate, given by two Lords of the Treasury under the provisions of sections 108 and 109 of the Municipal Corporations Act 1882, extended to the conveyance of the land and the taking from the purchaser of restrictive covenants against erecting buildings other than private dwelling houses, but although the surrounding circumstances clearly showed an intention to create a building scheme, the Treasury authority did not specifically extend to the corporation committing itself to the implementation of such scheme. The Court of Appeal held that although the circumstances were such that, had the corporation been an ordinary individual, it would have been bound by a building scheme to sell other lots subject to the same covenants, yet as the Treasury authority did not authorise such scheme, the corporation was not bound by it and was not liable for having sold two other lots for the purpose of building a church. 1.67 Notwithstanding any general statutory power to enter into restrictive covenants, however, such covenants will be ultra vires and void if they interfere with the statutory purpose for which the would-be burdened land is acquired or held by the local authority, for a local authority cannot, by contract, stultify itself in the exercise of its statutory powers.223 Subject to this limitation, a local authority can bind itself to a restrictive covenant. Thus, in Earl of Leicester v Wells-next-the-Sea UDC,224 on a sale in 1948 of 19 acres of land to the Wells Urban District Council for allotments, the purchase being authorised by the Small Holdings and Allotments Acts 1908 to 1926, the council covenanted with the vendor ‘That they will not
221 As to the power of a local authority to dispose of land in any manner it wishes, see section 123 of the 1972 Act as amended by the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, s 113 and Sch 23. 222 [1894] 2 Ch 208, CA. 223 See, generally, Ayr Harbour Trustees v Oswald (1883) 8 App Cas 623; Re South Eastern Rly Co and Wiffin’s Contract [1907] 2 Ch 366 and Re Heywood’s Conveyance [1938] 2 All ER 230. 224 [1973] Ch 110 (Plowman J).
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1.68 Meaning of ‘restrictive covenant’ etc use or permit the use of the property hereby conveyed for any other purpose than small holdings and allotments under the Small Holdings and Allotments Act 1926 or any Statutes amending or replacing the same’. In the 1960s demand for allotments declined and in 1971 planning permission was granted for building 53 houses on an area comprising the greater part of the land which the council were proposing to sell on the basis of requiring the purchaser to build the houses. On a motion for an injunction to restrain the council from conveying or agreeing to convey the land otherwise than expressly subject to the covenant it was argued, inter alia, that the covenant was ultra vires the council and void; but Plowman J held that far from fettering their use of the land for the purpose for which they bought it, the covenant in fact assisted that purpose.225
(ii) Sufficient interest in the subjected land 1.68 The period during which the burden of a restrictive covenant is capable of running with the subjective land will be commensurate with the size of the interest in the land which the covenantor had (or had power to bind) at the date of the covenant. Any attempt by the covenantor to bind the land for any longer period will be ineffective.226 This does not imply, however, that the burden only runs with the covenantor’s interest since whoever occupies the subjective land will be bound (other requirements being complied with) whether such occupier claims through or under the covenantor or not.227
(iii) Contracting purchaser 1.69 A contracting purchaser whose contract is specifically enforceable has an equitable interest in the land corresponding to the interest contracted to be purchased.228 This being so, there can be little doubt that such a contracting purchaser has the capacity to covenant so as to bind the land to the extent of such equitable interest and further, that if and when the contract is completed, the land will (unless the terms of the covenant otherwise provide or there has, in the meantime been a change of circumstances precluding enforceability229) be bound to the extent of the legal estate purchased.230 It is, however, a question of construction whether a restrictive covenant provided for in a contract is intended to operate independently of the contents of the follow-up conveyance. 1.70 Such a question arose in Re Rutherford’s Conveyance231 where, by a contract by way of subsale dated 24 July 1925, Davies contracted to subsell to Goadby part of a larger area land at Walton-on-the-Hill, Surrey, which Davies had contracted to purchase from Rutherford. In that contract, Goadby agreed
225 As to the action which a council might now take to overcome the covenant in such a situation, see Chapter 10. 226 See John Bros Abergarw Brewery Co v Holmes [1900] 1 Ch 188. 227 Re Nisbet and Potts’ Contract [1906] 1 Ch 386. 228 See Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 ChD 499, Jessel MR at p 506. 229 As in Millbourn v Lyons [1914] 2 Ch 231, discussed above. 230 This seems to have been accepted by Simonds J in Re Rutherford’s Conveyance [1938] Ch 396 although in that case the covenant was not established for the reason next referred to in the text. In LCC v Allen [1914] 3 KB 642, the Court of Appeal treated a person who was in possession of land under an option as a competent covenantor. 231 [1938] Ch 396.
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The current rules in relation to transmissibility 1.72 to enter into a covenant to observe certain stipulations and restrictions (for the most part restrictive in character) set out in the schedule to the contract. The contract was completed by a conveyance dated 27 November 1925 to which Rutherford, Davies and Goadby were parties, whereby Rutherford conveyed the land to Goadby in fee simple ‘subject nevertheless to the restrictions and stipulations set out in the Schedule hereto’ – these being verbatim the same as those contained in the schedule to the contract – but there was in the conveyance no express covenant by Goadby in relation thereto and Goadby did not execute the conveyance. 1.71 Simonds J held: (i) as a matter of construction the only covenants provided for by the contract were covenants to be entered into in the conveyance;232 (ii) whilst, in equity, it was no objection to finding a covenant that the purchaser had not executed the conveyance containing it,233 the fact that the land was expressed to be conveyed subject to the restrictions and stipulations was not sufficient to justify the implication of a covenant to observe and perform them;234 (iii) whilst, as between the grantor (Rutherford) and the grantee (Goadby), Goadby might have been under an obligation to observe and perform the restrictions and stipulations,235 such obligation was not based upon covenant and did not create an equitable burden the benefit of which ran with the land; (iv) even if it were permissible to look at the contract, this would not, on the facts, justify reading an implied covenant to observe and perform the restrictions and stipulations into the conveyance since whilst the contracting vendor was Davies, the vendor in the conveyance was Rutherford (who was not therein expressed as conveying by the direction of Davies) and it was therefore impossible to determine with whom any implied covenant was to be treated as having been made.
(iv) Covenantors having no interest in or occupation of part of the intended subjective land 1.72 Clearly, in the absence of a power of attorney, such covenantors cannot bind the land of a third party. However, notwithstanding the absence of any control over such land, the covenantors will be personally liable in damages if in fact an act prohibited by the covenant takes place at any time in the future on the land referred to.236 If a restrictive covenant relates to land to be acquired by the covenantor in the future, then subject only to any limits imposed by the perpetuity rule, there would seem to be no reason for its not taking effect as such if and when the land in question is acquired.237
232 See also on this point, Millbourn v Lyons [1914] 2 Ch 231. 233 See Formby v Barker [1903] 2 Ch 539, CA. 234 Contrast on this point the Lands Tribunal’s approach in Re Crest Homes plc’s Application (1983) 48 P&CR 309. 235 On the principle that a grantee cannot approbate and reprobate. 236 Liverpool Corpn v Tomlinson (1826) 7 Dow & Ry KB 556. 237 By analogy to the corresponding position in the case of future easements.
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2 The benefit of the restrictive covenant
CATEGORIES OF POTENTIAL BENEFICIARIES 2.1 There are three categories of people potentially able to claim the benefit of restrictive covenants, namely: (1) original covenantees or their estates (and those entitled to enforce the benefit of the covenant in the same way under statute); (2) those for whom the original covenantees hold the benefit of the covenant on trust (‘covenant beneficiaries’); (3) subsequent owners and occupiers of land benefited by the restrictive covenant who can show title to the benefit of the covenant by express assignment, by annexation or under a building scheme. If it is found that there is no person falling within any of these categories, then the restrictive covenant will have become spent and be of no further effect1 since there cannot be a legal burden without a correlative legal right and the above-mentioned categories of potential claimant are exhaustive. 2.2 If there is such a person, then before it can be said that the covenant can be enforced, it will still remain to be determined whether there is also a person who can be called upon to observe the covenant, ie who is subject to the burden and so an apt potential defendant.
1
Proceedings for a declaration to that effect could then be instituted under section 84(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 in order formally to clear the title. As to such proceedings, see para 14.4 et seq.
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3 1: Original covenantees
THE IDENTIFICATION OF ORIGINAL COVENANTEES 3.1 Persons falling within any of the following categories can claim the benefit of restrictive covenants as original covenantees: (1) those who are parties to the instrument containing the covenant; (2) those who, by virtue of suitable language in the instrument containing the covenant, are able to invoke in their favour the operation of section 5 of the Real Property Act 1845 (in the case of pre-1926 covenants) or section 56(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (in the case of post-1925 covenants); (3) those who are owners1 of land comprised within a building (or development) scheme2 at the time when other land within the scheme is sold off and subjected to the scheme covenants. In relation to covenants entered into on or after 11 May 2000, the position of those within the ambit of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 also requires to be considered.
1 Parties to the instrument containing the covenant 3.2 Subject to its terms, a party to the original deed or written agreement is plainly entitled to enforce a covenant in it against another party to it, so is a competent claimant (though he can enforce it against a successor in title to the other party it will depend on whether the burden of the covenant has passed). 1
‘Owners’ in the sense of having a qualifying interest of one of the kinds considered in Chapter 1 as sufficient to make them competent covenantees. 2 In Brunner v Greenslade [1971] Ch 993, at p 999F, Megarry J pointed out that the expression used by Parker J in Elliston v Reacher [1908] 2 Ch 374 in his famous dictum on the subject of such schemes, was ‘scheme of development’. Whilst acknowledging that the expression ‘building scheme’ had acquired a considerable measure of currency, Megarry J went on to express the view that this was undeserved since ‘scheme of development’ is the genus of which a ‘building scheme’ is merely a species. However, ‘scheme of development’ itself suggests at least some form of development (in the sense of some physical change or change of layout) yet a ‘scheme’ may be applied to an existing estate or block of flats on a sale, for example, of the individual freehold reversions to sitting tenants. The literal genus would therefore appear to whittle itself down to ‘scheme’. The historical truth of the matter is that there was originally no genus other than a building scheme in the narrow and proper sense and that when the building scheme concept was extended to other forms of development or disposal, the expression ‘building scheme’ was applied to them and thereby acquired a technical meaning which transcended its original and literal meaning. (A somewhat analogous example of departure from literal accuracy occurred in the case of ‘building societies’ when their activities were extended—or curtailed). Since ‘building scheme’ is the more commonly used expression in both the reported cases and elsewhere, it is adopted in this volume.
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3.3 1: Original covenantees If the party expressly assigns the benefit to another person, however, the original party will no longer be able himself to enforce it.3
2 Original covenantees by virtue of s 5 of the Real Property Act 1845 or s 56 of the Law of Property Act 1925 3.3 Section 5 of the 1845 Act, which applies to covenants entered into after the passing of the Act and before 1926, provides as follows: ‘Under an Indenture, executed after the First day of October One thousand eight hundred and forty-five an Immediate Estate or Interest, in any Tenements or Hereditaments, and the Benefit of a Condition or Covenant, respecting any Tenements or Hereditaments, may be taken, although the Taker thereof be not named a Party to the same Indenture.’ 3.4 Section 56(1) of the 1925 Act, which applies to covenants entered into after 1925, provides as follows: ‘(1) A person may take an immediate or other interest in land or other property, or the benefit of any condition, right of entry, covenant or agreement over or respecting land or other property, although he may not be named as a party to the conveyance or other instrument.’ In Beswick v Beswick4 the speeches in the House of Lords emphasised that section 56 of the 1925 Act was essentially a consolidating section and, as such, it neither operated to extend the section in the 1845 Act to personal property nor to remove the rule of privity of contract. In the light of the speeches in that case and decisions in other cases which were referred to and left unquestioned, it is suggested that three guiding principles may be extracted. (1) Firstly, that in order to be able to claim as an original covenantee under the relevant section the claimant must show that he was in existence and identifiable at the time the covenant was entered into. With one exception, this requirement was satisfied in all the cases in which the claimant’s claim as an original covenantee under the section was successful.5 Further, in those cases where the claimant has been successful on the basis of being a successor to a person whose only claim to being an original covenantee was under the relevant section, such original covenantee satisfied this requirement.6 The exception occurred in Smith and Snipes Hall Farm Ltd v River Douglas Catchment Board.7 In that case, Denning LJ (alone of the
3
And in relation to this, see para 3.7 below, relating to the decision in Re Hutchinson’s Application [2009] UKUT 182 (LC). 4 [1968] AC 58. 5 See Drive Yourself Hire Co (London) Ltd v Strutt [1954] 1 QB 250, CA (though see below in relation to the case itself); Stromdale and Ball Ltd v Burden [1952] Ch 223 (Danckwerts J); Chelsea and Walham Green Building Society v Armstrong [1951] Ch 853, per Vaisey J at p 859 (but decided on other grounds); Dyson v Forster [1909] AC 98, HL. 6 See Dyson v Forster, above; Re Ecclesiastical Comrs for England’s Conveyance [1936] Ch 430. 7 [1949] 2 KB 500.
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The identification of original covenantees 3.4 three Lords Justices) considered that the second claimant, which was not identifiable as an original covenantee at the date of the covenant, could enforce the covenant under section 56. However, this seems not to be consistent with the wording of section 56(1), which appears to presuppose that although not in fact a party, he could have been named as a party.8 In Beswick v Beswick9 both Lord Pearce and Lord Upjohn re-affirmed the law on the present point as it stood prior to Smith’s Case, although the actual decision was based on section 56 having no application to personalty. (2) Secondly, whether a person who satisfies the above requirement of being ascertainable at the date of the covenant can bring himself within the scope of the relevant section is a question of construction depending on whether the words of covenant show an intention to grant the benefit to such person. In Re Ecclesiastical Comrs for England’s Conveyance,10 a covenant ‘with the Ecclesiastical Commissioners and their successors and also as a separate covenant with their assigns owners for the time being of the lands adjoining or adjacent to the said land hereby conveyed’ was held to show an intention to grant the benefit to assigns who, at the date of the covenant, had already become assigns in respect of adjacent or adjoining land of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners. On the other hand, in White v Bijou Mansions Ltd,11 a covenant with the vendors ‘their heirs and assigns’ was held to show an intention to grant the benefit only to assigns who became such after the date of the covenant with the result that earlier assigns of the vendors (in the sense of persons who had already purchased neighbouring land from the vendors) were not shown to be intended to benefit as covenantees and therefore were not capable of being original covenantees by virtue of the section. Accordingly, there was nothing to which the claimant, who was a successor in title of one of such earlier purchasers, could claim to have become entitled through such purchaser. Simply that a person would benefit from the covenant is not enough for him to be entitled to enforce it. As was said by Simonds J in White v Bijou Mansions Ltd:12 ‘under section 56 … only that person can call it in aid who, although not named as a party to the conveyance or other instrument, is yet a person to whom that conveyance or other instrument purports to grant some thing or with which some agreement or covenant is purported to be made.’ [Emphasis added] That this is so was emphasised by Neuberger J in Amsprop Trading Ltd v Harris Distribution Ltd13 (at 1029H–1030C and 1032D) who referred to the fact that Simonds J’s view in White v Bijou Mansions was cited with approval by Lord Upjohn in Beswick v Beswick.
8 9 10 11 12 13
See the concluding words of the subsection: ‘although he may not be named as a party’. [1967] 2 All ER 1197 at 1216B–D and 1224A–F respectively. [1936] Ch 430 (Luxmoore J). [1937] Ch 610. Ibid, at p 625. [1997] 1 WLR 1025.
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3.4 1: Original covenantees He concluded that, as summarised in the then current 5th edition of Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property: ‘The true aim of section 56 seems to be not to allow the third party to sue on a contract merely because it is made for his benefit; the contract must purport to be made with him. Just as, under the first part of the section, a person cannot benefit by conveyance unless it purports to be made to him (as grantee), so he cannot benefit by a covenant which does not purport to be made with him (as covenantee).’ He held that ‘where the identity of the covenantee is clear and unambiguous, section 56 does not operate to confer the benefit of the covenant on a party who is not within the ambit of the expressly identified covenantee’, and dismissed the claim as a result. The position as set out by Neuberger J, by reference to White v Bijou Mansions, is also in line with earlier cases such as Abbey Homesteads Developments Ltd v Northamptonshire County Council,14 though not cited in Amsprop, where the Lands Tribunal held that a ‘section 52’ agreement entered into with a district council relating to land being reserved for school purposes could not be enforced by the county council (which was the education authority) under the section since the agreement did not purport to make a grant of the benefit of the covenant to the county council (or purport to be made with it). Neuberger J in Amsprop identified two decisions which seemed inconsistent with the conclusion, namely Drive Yourself Car Hire Company (London) Ltd v Strutt15 in the Court of Appeal, and Re Shaw’s Application16 in the Lands Tribunal. However, he held that the judgment of Denning LJ in the first of these cases could not be regarded as authority in light of observations made by the House of Lords in Beswick v Beswick, and that the decision in Re Shaw’s Application was based on reading observations of Sir Wilfred Greene MR in White v Bijou Mansions out of context, whereas on a true reading of them they were in line with the observations of Simonds J in that case at first instance.17 (3) Thirdly, once it is established that a person is within the purview of the covenant then, although not a party, he is treated fully as an original covenantee. This is clear from the decision of Luxmoore J in Re Ecclesiastical Comrs for England’s Conveyance.18 In that case: ‘In a conveyance made in 1887 by the Ecclesiastical Commissioners of a freehold house known as ‘W H House’, the purchaser covenanted ‘with the Ecclesiastical Commissioners and their successors and also as a separate covenant with their assigns owners for the time being of the lands adjoining or adjacent to the said land hereby conveyed’ to observe and perform certain restrictions. Prior to the conveyance, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners had sold and conveyed various other houses and plots of land adjoining or near to W H House. On an application by a successor in title of W H House under section 84(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 for a declaration under that subsection, 14 15 16 17 18
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(1984) 49 Ρ&CR 263 (VG Wellings QC) (reversed on appeal (1986) 53 Ρ&CR 1 but not on this point). [1954] 1 QB 250. (1994) 68 P&CR 591. See p 1031H–1032B. [1936] Ch 430.
The identification of original covenantees 3.6 certain of the respondents who were successors in title of some of the houses and plots which had been sold before the date of the 1887 conveyance, claimed the right to enforce the covenants as successors in title of the persons who owned those houses and plots at the date of the 1887 conveyance. Luxmoore J held that although those owners were not parties to the 1887 conveyance, they were original covenantees by virtue of section 5 of the 1845 Act with the result that the respondents could claim the benefit of the covenants in the same way as any other successor in title from an original covenantee.’
3 Persons who are owners19 of land comprised within a building scheme at the time when other land within the scheme is sold off and subjected to the scheme of covenants 3.5 Where a building scheme exists, special rules apply which greatly facilitate both the creation and the transmissibility of restrictive covenants amongst owners for the time being of land which falls within the scheme. The particular issue being considered at this point is related only to the creation of restrictive covenants and the persons who can claim as, or as successors to, original covenantees thereunder. Since building schemes are relevant not only to the present issue of identifying original covenantees but also to at least six other issues concerning the enforceability of restrictive covenants,20 the nature of such schemes and the question of when they exist is dealt with as a self-contained whole in Chapter 8. Accordingly, reference should be made to that chapter for the purpose of considering whether, in any particular case, a building scheme exists. 3.6 Assuming that a building scheme exists, the general effect is that although the covenants on the part of each purchaser are expressed to be entered into only with their vendor, such covenants are nevertheless deemed also to be made with (and so as to be enforceable directly by) the owners at that time (and their successors) of other parts of the scheme land. Thus, if A is the owner of an estate which he divides up into 50 plots with a view (which he makes known) to selling them subject to a consistent pattern of restrictive covenants, and he sells plot 1 first then, on the sale of the next plot, the covenants entered into by such later purchaser, although expressed to be made only with A, will also be deemed to be made with and for the benefit of the (then) owner of plot 1 (and his successors). Similarly, on the sale of the next plot, the purchaser will be deemed to be covenanting with the (then) owners of each of the plots previously sold (and their successors) and so on until the sale of the last plot when the last purchaser will be deemed to be covenanting with each and every one of the (then) owners of the other 49 plots.21 This assumes that all the requirements for the existence of a building scheme are extant on the occasion of each and
19
‘Owners’ in the sense of having a qualifying interest of one of the kinds considered in Chapter 1 as sufficient to make them competent covenantees: see above, para 1.51. 20 These issues are listed in Chapter 8. 21 In addition, of course, the later purchasers get the benefit of the earlier purchasers’ covenants as successors to the vendor so that reciprocity is achieved: this aspect (transmissibility) is dealt with in Chapter 8.
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3.7 1: Original covenantees every sale. If this is not the case in respect of any given sale, then the covenants entered into by the purchaser in question will not have any extended operation beyond their actual terms.22 The question of whether the extended operation of covenants which do fall within the scope of a building scheme is founded upon the concept of implied covenant or upon the concept of a ‘wider equity’ is considered in Chapter 8.
Effect of the loss of the original covenantee’s rights of enforcement against successors in title of the burdened land and remedies of an original covenantee 3.7 An original covenantee who has disposed of the benefited land to a person who does not have the ability to enforce the covenant (under the rules to be considered in the following chapters) will not by acquiring that land back revive his ability to enforce it against successors in title of the burdened land: see Re Hutchinson’s Application.23 3.8 Further, where the covenant is taken for the benefit of land belonging to the covenantee, once he has parted with that land, even if the burdened land is still held by the original covenantor, and privity of contract between them remains, any breach would only be likely to result in an award to the original covenantee of nominal damages as the real loss will be to whoever then has the land – unless the original covenantee could show loss by some other route, for example, because of liability of some sort under covenants entered into by him with the subsequent purchasers (see Spencer v Bailey24).
THE CONTRACTS (RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES) ACT 1999 3.9 By the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, it is provided that in relation to contracts entered into six months after the Act came into effect (on 11 November 1999): ‘a person who is not party to a contract (‘third party’) may in his own right enforce a term of the contract if: (a) the contract expressly provides that he may, or (b) subject to subsection (2), the term purports to confer a benefit on him.’ As a covenant amounts to a contractual stipulation, there is on the face of it no reason this should not cover enforcement by successors in title of a land covenant by which a benefit has been conferred on them as well as by the original covenantee. Though exceptions are specified by the Act, land covenants are not amongst them. Accordingly, for covenants entered into on or after 11 May 2000, the purported conferring of a benefit by the covenant on a person will be sufficient to enable him to enforce it. 3.10 This would appear to be similar in effect to the provisions of section 56(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, considered above (though not confined, of course, as section 56 is, to land and property matters). 22 23 24
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See, further, Chapter 8. [2009] UKUT 182 (LC) at para 11. (1893) 69 LT 179.
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 3.12 It appears insufficient simply for a person to benefit from the contractual stipulation: the contract must purport to confer that benefit on him. This was confirmed in relation to the 1999 Act by Clarke J in Dolphin Maritime and Aviation Services Ltd v Sveriges Angfartygs Forening:25 ‘A contract does not purport to confer a benefit on a third party simply because the position of that third party will be improved if the contract is performed. The reference in the section to the term purporting to “confer” a benefit seems to me to connote that the language used by the parties shows that one of the purposes of their bargain (rather than one of its incidental effects if performed) was to benefit the third party.’ Further, section 1(3) of the 1999 Act requires the third party to be expressly identified in the contract by name, as a member of a class or as answering a particular description. This again precludes someone coming along and saying that they should be entitled to enforce the contract simply because it happens to benefit them. 3.11 There is one key difference from section 56 of the Law of Property Act 1925, however. That is that section 1(3) expressly provides that there is no need for the third party to be in existence at the time the covenant is entered into. For the future, this could clearly be of considerable importance. Successors in title for whose benefit (as a class) a covenant is expressed to be taken, as well as that of the covenantee himself, could potentially rely on the 1999 Act to enforce the covenant, as they need not be in existence or identifiable other than as a class at the time of the covenant. The Act applies to contracts generally and there is no requirement the covenant must be taken for the benefit of any particular land, or other technical land law rules to be fulfilled. However, as the Act is relatively recent, and does not affect pre-existing covenants, there is as yet no reported case under it relating to land covenants.
Remedies under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 3.12 Where a volunteer takes benefit under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, there is some doubt as to whether the remedies available would include an order for specific performance on the third party’s application alone. This is because whilst section 1(5) states that ‘there shall be available to the third party any remedy that would have been available to him in an action for breach of contract if he had been a party to the contract (and the rules relating to damages, injunctions, specific performance and other relief shall apply accordingly)’, where the third party has provided no consideration specific performance will generally not be available to him because equity will not assist a volunteer (even where the promise was made by deed to which the person was party).26
25 [2009] EWHC 716, at para 74. 26 See Cannon v Hartley [1949] Ch 213.
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3.12 1: Original covenantees However, where consideration has been provided by the contracting promisee, it seems unlikely that this was Parliament’s intention, the general intention being to give the third party the ability to fully enforce the contract like the promisee27 and effect may be given by the courts to this intention if and when the matter comes before them notwithstanding the technical wording used. Even if not, a remedy in damages would be available to the third party.28
27 See eg the comments of Lord Irvine of Lairg LC in introducing the Bill for second reading: ‘… the noble and learned Lord, Lord Steyn, said that, “the case for recognising a contract for the benefit of a third party is simple and straightforward. The autonomy of the will of the parties should be respected. The law of contract should give effect to the reasonable expectations of contracting parties … there is no doctrinal, logical or policy reason why the law should deny effectiveness to a contract for the benefit of a third party where that is the expressed intention of the parties”. The Bill will give effect to that simple and straightforward principle’. 28 See again Cannon v Hartley [1949] Ch 213, referred to above.
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4 2: Covenant beneficiaries
ORIGIN OF TRUSTS OF THE BENEFIT OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 4.1 In 1839 in Schreiber v Creed,1 Shadwell V-C described as ‘perfectly familiar to the mind of every lawyer’, the device of covenantees with whom restrictive covenants had been entered into, holding the benefit of the covenants as trustees for all the owners from time to time of plots on an estate.2 This was but one example of the principle that a contracting party could hold the benefit of a contract for a third party under a trust either express or implied.3
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRUSTS OF COVENANTS AND BUILDING SCHEMES 4.2 During the formative period of building schemes,4 the device of a trust was an alternative to, and sometimes a correlative of, the device of the deed of mutual covenant, as a means of imposing a ‘local law’ for the regulation of the use of land comprised within a defined estate. In Roper v Williams5 Lord Eldon held that a vendor who took a covenant in the like terms from all his purchasers was stipulating not only for his own benefit but for that of all the tenants in his neighbourhood.6 In Eastwood v Lever,7 there was an express declaration of trust of the benefit of a covenant, whilst in Peek v Matthews,8 an implied trust of the benefit of the covenants was found. 4.3 As in the case of building schemes, so also with trusts of restrictive covenants; however, it appears that the era of carefully documenting the intention 1 2
(1839) 10 Sim 9, at p 33. Referred to by Simonds J in Lawrence v South County Freeholds Ltd [1939] Ch 656, at p 675. No question of perpetuity would arise provided that the benefit of the covenants was held absolutely for the current owners and was passed on by them on change of ownership to the new owners. 3 See Robertson v Wait (1853) 8 Exch 299, applied by the House of Lords in Les Affréteurs Réunis SA v Leopold Walford (London) Ltd [1919] AC 801. 4 See Chapter 8. 5 (1822) Turn & R 18. 6 Referred to by Sir W Page Wood V-C in Peek v Matthews (1867) LR 3 Eq 515 at 518 and by Tomlin J in Kelly v Barrett [1924] 2 Ch 379 at 389, who said: ‘Roper v Williams must have been a case of a building scheme’. 7 (1863) 4 De GJ & Sm 114. 8 Footnote 6.
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4.4 2: Covenant beneficiaries to create a building scheme or a trust of restrictive covenants was short-lived and that the question whether there was such a trust was not infrequently a matter which, as in the case of building schemes, fell to be resolved by whether an intention to create a trust could be inferred from the circumstances. Thus, in Nicoll v Fenninff:9 Trustees who were disposing piecemeal of a field, in 1863 sold one portion of the field to Collins (the predecessor in title of the plaintiff) who wished to erect a public house thereon and the trustees covenanted with Collins, his heirs and assigns, that they, their heirs and assigns would not thereafter sell or convey any portion or portions of the field without requiring the purchaser thereof to enter into a covenant with the trustees not to erect thereon or use or permit to be used any building to be erected thereon as a tavern, public house or beershop. Collins subsequently built a public house on the land. All subsequent conveyances by the trustees of other parts of the field included a covenant by the purchaser with the trustees to this effect, including a conveyance made in 1870 of the land of which the defendant was a lessee, to a predecessor in title of the lessee’s landlord. The defendant proposed to use his shop as an off-licence, for the sale of beer to be consumed off the premises. The plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain him from committing a breach of (inter alia) the covenant contained in the 1870 conveyance. 4.4 Before the case came on for hearing before Bacon V-C, an interlocutory motion for an injunction was heard by Sir George Jessel MR who intimated that the 1870 covenant did not run with the land and also that for the action to succeed at the hearing it would be necessary to join the then trustees (who had by then disposed of all parts of the field) as co-plaintiff’s and this was done. The essentials of Bacon V-C’s judgment appear to be as follows: (a) a finding of fact that the 1863 covenant was intended to be for the benefit of all future owners of portions of the rest of the field, (b) ‘that it was a plain principle of the Court of Equity that in matters of contract the intention of the parties was to be regarded where it could be carried into effect’, (c) that the decision in Renals v Cowlishaw10 ‘recognised in the most distinct terms that the intention of the parties to such contracts [relating to restrictive covenants] is to prevail, and that a Court of Equity will enforce that intention’ and (d) that (without considering further how the plaintiff obtained the benefit) the plaintiff could enforce the 1870 covenant ‘as if the covenant had been made by the Defendant’.11
9 (1881) 19 ChD 258 (Bacon V-C). 10 (1879) 11 ChD 866, CA, affirming Wills J (1878) 9 ChD 125, whose judgment is treated as a classic in the context of building schemes. 11 The conclusion so arrived at (unless supported by reference to a trust of the benefit of the covenant for Collins) would appear to represent a considerable extension of the principle of a building scheme as enunciated in Renals v Cowlishaw. In the first place, at the time of the sale to Collins, it does not appear that there was any general scheme of covenants intended to be applied on all subsequent sales. Secondly, according to the facts stated in the report, at p 258, Collins (the first purchaser) was not, in the conveyance to him, required to enter into any covenants (although according to the judgment at p 265, Collins entered into a building lease with the trustees). There would therefore seem to have been a distinct lack of mutuality as between Collins and the other purchasers even though (as found by Bacon V-C) there might have been mutuality amongst the subsequent purchasers inter se: cf Nalder and Collyer’s Brewery Co Ltd v Harman (1900) 83 LT 257. If the decision was an extension of the building scheme principle, it is unlikely to be followed in view of the comment of Lord Macnaghten in Spicer v Martin (1888) 14 App Cas 12, at p 24 that ‘I should be disposed to hesitate if I were invited to extend the principles recognised in Renals v Cowlishaw’.
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Who should be party to the action to enforce the covenants? 4.7 In apparent deference to the suggestion of Sir George Jessel MR resulting in the trustees being joined as parties, however, Bacon V-C added:12 ‘But whoever else might have sued at law, in enforcing the contract he would be at best but a trustee of the covenant for the benefit of the Plaintiff, who had a right to the benefit of it.’ 4.5 Whilst, as has been seen, trusteeship of covenants and a building scheme may co-exist in relation to the same covenants, more recent authority suggests that specific arrangements which would be unnecessary if a building scheme existed may militate against the inference of a scheme. Thus, in White v Bijou Mansions Ltd13 one of the factors leading to the Court of Appeal to conclude that there was an absence of intention to create a building scheme was that in the conveyance to the plaintiff’s predecessor in title (Fellows), the vendors covenanted that they would procure from future lessees and purchasers a covenant to observe the same six stipulations as those contained in that conveyance (a provision entirely consistent with a building scheme) and that they would, upon request, enforce them. Sir Wilfred Greene MR took the latter provision ‘to be a very clear indication that it was not the intention of anybody that Fellows should be entitled to enforce these covenants direct’.14 4.6 Again, in Page v King’s Parade Properties Ltd,15 Goff J regarded an express assignment of the benefit of covenants made some 18 years after they had been entered into, as an indication which was ‘completely inconsistent with a building scheme’.16 Similarly, an express trust of the benefit of covenants for the plot owners would prima facie exclude a building scheme which might otherwise be inferred from the circumstances.
WHO, AS BETWEEN THE TRUSTEE AND THE BENEFICIARY, SHOULD BE PARTY TO THE ACTION TO ENFORCE THE COVENANTS? 4.7 It is necessary for the claimant to show that enforcement is necessary for the protection of some ‘interest’ of the claimant in the benefited land. The question therefore arises whether a trustee who no longer holds any (or any sufficient) legal or equitable interest in the benefited land can nevertheless enforce the covenants in his name for the benefit of others who do hold such an interest. This issue appears never to have been directly litigated, although it was raised in argument in Nicoll v Fenning.17 It is by no means clear that such a bare trustee could enforce the covenants since the trustee as such suffers no damage from the breach either personally or to any property held on trust.
12 13 14 15 16 17
At p 267. [1938] Ch 351. Ibid, at p 363. (1967) 20 P&CR 710. Ibid, at p 718. 1881) 19 ChD 258, at pp 262 and 263. See, also, Eastwood v Lever (1863) 4 De GJ & Sm 114.
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4.7 2: Covenant beneficiaries It is, however, clear from Nicoll v Fenning18 that the beneficiary could, even without joining the trustee as a party, rely on his equitable interest in the covenant under the trust as a sufficient title to enforce the covenant and, of course, such beneficiary has the required interest (in his own right) in the benefited land to support that title.19
18 (1881) 19 ChD 258. 19 See also, as to the passing of the benefit by operation of law, Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold Ltd [1952] Ch 286.
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5 3: Subsequent owners and occupiers of land benefited by the restrictive covenant as competent claimants: overview
GENERAL RULE 5.1 Subsequent owners and occupiers may be competent claimants against a successor in title of the covenantor (ie new owner of the burdened land) if the covenant satisfies the six basic requirements for transmissibility referred to in Chapter 1 (summarised in para 1.9 above), namely that: (1) the covenant must be negative in substance; (2) the covenant must relate to the user of land; (3) the covenant must have been entered into for the benefit of (ie touch and concern) land ‘belonging’ to the covenantee; (4) the covenant must as a matter of fact benefit land in which the claimant has a sufficient interest at the time of enforcement; (5) the words of covenant must be such as to show that the covenant was not intended to be personal to the original covenantee or to be confined to a category of persons to whom the claimant does not belong; (6) the covenant must have been entered into by a competent covenantor having a sufficient interest in the burdened (subjective) land, and they can show entitlement to the benefit of the restrictive covenant by reason of: (a) annexation; (b) express assignment; or (c) a building scheme. The degree to which the covenant may run for the benefit of successors in title varies to an extent under each of these methods (and they may overlap – because one has been established does not mean another cannot be). Each of them will be considered in turn in the following chapters. 5.2 There is no fourth method derived from the cases or equity: Re Pinewood Estate, Farnborough.1 In Kumar v Dunning2 Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C 1 2
[1958] Ch 280, at pp 287–288. [1989] QB 193, at p 198.
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5.3 Subsequent owners & occupiers of land benefited etc reiterated the position as being that: ‘It is established that in the absence of annexation to the land or the existence of a building scheme, the benefit of a restrictive covenant cannot pass except by way of express assignment’.
Statutory exception 5.3 However, a fourth method appears now to have arisen in relation to covenants entered into on or after 11 May 2000, by reason of statute in the form of section 1 of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.3 From that date onwards the Act provides that any person for whose benefit a contract (and therefore a covenant) purports to be made is able to enforce it. By section 1(3) of the Act, such persons can be identified simply as a member of a class and need not be in existence at the time of the covenant. They could therefore potentially include the covenantee’s successors in title as a class. The Act applies to contracts generally and none of requirements listed in (a) to (c) above in relation to land covenants, applicable aside from this, would need to be fulfilled in relation to this. This only relates to covenants entered into on or after 11 May 2000 and there have not yet been any cases under the Act relating to land covenants.
3
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Considered at para 3.9 et seq above.
6 Subsequent owners and occupiers of benefited land: (a) where there is annexation
THE EFFECT OF ANNEXATION 6.1 Once it is established, in accordance with the requirements considered below, that the benefit of a restrictive covenant has been annexed to identified land then, in general, that benefit passes automatically with the land into the hands of any person within the scope of the benefit of the covenant who thereafter acquires a relevant interest in or right of occupation to the land. Thus, so long as the requirements below are fulfilled, if the covenant is made with the freehold owner of Greenacre ‘and his successors in title of Greenacre’, then the benefit will automatically pass on any subsequent conveyance or transfer of the freehold.1 Prima facie, however, a lessee or other owner of a derivative interest in Greenacre would not be able to claim the benefit by virtue of such annexation since such persons would not ordinarily (and apart from section 7 of the Law of Property Act 1925 considered below) fall within the scope of the expression ‘successors in title’ of the covenantee. But if the covenant were made with the freehold owner of Greenacre ‘and those deriving title under him for the benefit of Greenacre’, then the benefit would also automatically pass on a subsequent grant of a lease of Greenacre.2 6.2 Further, in the case of post-1925 covenants to which the provisions of section 78 of the Law of Property Act 1925 apply,3 the persons within the scope of the covenant are expressly extended to include mere occupiers of Greenacre whether or not they claim through the original covenantee with the result (it would seem4) that any such occupier would automatically get the benefit of the covenant. The automatic passing under annexation will take place whether or not on the occasion of the subsequent disposition of the benefited land there is any reference 1 2
3 4
Rogers v Hosegood [1900] 2 Ch 388, CA; Child v Douglas (1854) Kay 560. Taite v Gosling (1879) 11 ChD 273; Westhoughton UDC v Wigan Coal and Iron Co [1919] 1 Ch 159. But it will not pass with the grant of a rentcharge even though beneficial to the rentcharge: Grant v Edmondson [1931] 1 Ch 1, at p 25; Milnes v Branch (1816) 5 M & S 411. The covenants in the two last-mentioned cases were positive covenants but on this point, there is no difference between positive and restrictive covenants. As to which, see below, para 6.27. Below, para 6.28 et seq.
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6.3 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation to the covenant and whether or not the person taking under the disposition knew of the existence of the covenant.5 6.3 The effect of annexation is accordingly to make the covenant ‘run with the land’ in the hands of persons within the scope of the words of covenant. The judicial decisions go no further although in Reid v Bickerstaff6 CozensHardy MR expressed the view that an annexed covenant was ‘in the nature of an easement attached to his property as the dominant tenement.’ But these remarks were made obiter in the context of the benefit passing to a subsequent purchaser whether he knew of its existence or not, and it is thought that they were not intended to enlarge the persons who must (regardless of the words of covenant) be treated as falling within the scope of the benefit of the covenant. Furthermore, subsequent cases7 have clearly demonstrated, in the context of the fragmentation of the benefited land, that the analogy of annexed covenants to easements is by no means complete.8 It therefore seems that whilst the benefit of an annexed restrictive covenant is capable of ‘running with’ the benefited land in the hands of any subsequent owner or occupier claiming through or under the covenantee, the actual limits (if any) on the categories of persons in whose favour any particular annexed covenant will run will depend upon the intention of the parties as determined by the true construction of the words of covenant or, if those words are confined to the covenantee simpliciter, the true construction of the covenant in the context of the contents of the instrument which contains the covenant and in the light of the surrounding circumstances.9 6.4 The above statement as to the effect of annexation must, however, be qualified in two respects, namely: (1) it will not apply if, on the occasion of any particular disposition, annexation is effectively negatived;10 and (2) the benefit of annexation may be lost on the subsequent fragmentation into different hands of the benefited land.11 Before considering these two matters, it is proposed to deal with the requirements for bringing about annexation.
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ANNEXATION 6.5 In view of the direct effect and the further implications of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd12
5
6 7 8 9
10 11 12
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Lawrence v South County Freeholds Ltd [1939] Ch 656, per Simonds J at p 680: ‘such a benefit may pass with the land to which it has been annexed, even though the purchaser is unaware of it, a hidden treasure may be discovered in the hour of need’; Rogers v Hosegood [1900] 2 Ch 388, at pp 394, 408; Reid v Bickerstaff [1909] 2 Ch 305, at p 320. [1909] 2 Ch 305, at p 320. Considered below at para 6.45 et seq. As to the similarities and differences between restrictive covenants and easements generally, see also paras 1.7–1.8 above. It would seem, however, that such ‘running’ will (unlike the position in the case of the benefit of an easement) usually fall short of extending to a person who has acquired or is in the course of acquiring a title by adverse possession under the Limitation Acts unless, indeed, the actual words of covenant are wide enough to include such a person. Below, paras 6.90–6.92. Below, para 6.45 et seq. [1980] 1 WLR 594-considered in detail below, para 6.31 et seq.
The requirements for annexation 6.7 in relation to the effect of section 78 of the Law of Property Act 1925 on annexation, it is necessary to consider first the requirements for annexation in the case of covenants entered into before 1926 and then to consider the extent to which those requirements have been modified in the case of covenants entered into after 1925 (to which the provisions of section 78 apply).
Pre-1926 restrictive covenants 6.6 In order to establish that the benefit of a restrictive covenant entered into before 1926 is annexed to land of the covenantee so as to ‘run with the land’ in the hands of subsequent owners or occupiers who are within the scope of the words of covenant, it must be shown that on the true construction of the instrument creating the restrictive covenant, an intention is manifested that the covenant should enure for the benefit of particular land of the covenantee.13 This involves two elements, namely, that (1) the benefited land must be able to be identified from the words of the instrument creating the covenant, and be ‘easily ascertainable’; and (2) there are words in that instrument which show that the covenant is intended to benefit that land. Unless both these requirements are satisfied, there can be no annexation and it is therefore necessary to consider each requirement in turn.
(1) The benefited land must be able to be identified from the words of the instrument creating the covenant and must be easily ascertainable 6.7 As to the need for identification of the benefited land, in Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance,14 Romer LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said: ‘… apart from what are usually referred to as building scheme cases (and this is not a case of that sort), a purchaser from the original covenantee of land retained by him when he executed the conveyance containing the covenant will be entitled to the benefit of the covenant if the conveyance [containing the covenant] shows that the covenant was intended to enure for the benefit of that particular land.’ In Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold Ltd,15 Upjohn J, after quoting the above passage, said (more specifically to the present point): ‘In this difficult branch of the law one thing, in my judgment, is clear, viz, that in order to annex the benefit of a restrictive covenant to land so that it runs with the land without express assignment on a subsequent assignment of the
13 14 15
As to whether a covenant not originally annexed, can be subsequently annexed (otherwise than by novation), see below, para 6.94 et seq. [1933] Ch 611, at p 628; cited and applied by Upjohn J in Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold Ltd [1952] Ch 286. [1952] Ch 286, at p 289.
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6.8 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation land, the land for the benefit of which it is taken must be clearly identified in the conveyance containing the covenant.’ 6.8 It is not, however, necessary for such identification to be either by way of specific description or by reference to a plan. Thus, in Rogers v Hosegood:16 In 1869, the owners of land in Palace Gate, Kensington, sold and conveyed (on separate occasions) two plots to the predecessor in title of the defendant. The conveyances contained covenants by such predecessor with the vendors ‘their heirs and assigns and others claiming under them to all or any of their lands adjoining or near to the said premises’ not (inter alia) to erect more than one dwellinghouse on the plot. In 1872, the owners sold and conveyed another plot to the predecessor in title of the claimants. The conveyance to such predecessor contained no reference to the covenant in the 1869 conveyances and he was unware of their existence. The defendant was now proposing to build a block of residential flats on the plots sold in 1869 and on the question whether the claimants were entitled to enforce the restrictive covenant, the main issue was whether the benefit of the covenant had been annexed to the plot now vested in them. 6.9 It was argued that the words ‘any of their lands adjoining or near to the said premises’ (of which the claimants’ plot formed part) were too vague to identify land to which the covenant could be annexed but it was held by Farwell J and the Court of Appeal that this description was sufficiently certain and that the claimants were entitled to an injunction to restrain the defendant from building the block of flats.17 Similarly, a covenant expressed to be for the benefit of ‘the vendor’s adjoining and neighbouring land’,18 or ‘the adjoining or neighbouring land part of or lately part of the Selwyn estate in the parish of Richmond’,19 or ‘land … upon part of which Nobold House aforesaid is built and forms the present residence of the vendor’,20 have each been held to be sufficiently certain to enable the court to identify the benefited land, subject to the necessary extrinsic evidence showing the existence of land which falls within the relevant description. 6.10 However, the Court of Appeal in Marquess of Zetland v Driver stated21 that ‘the land which is intended to be benefited must be defined so as to be easily ascertainable’. This is a requirement which still applies post-1925 (see below). It will therefore be considered in detail below (at paras 6.35–6.40).
16 [1900] 2 Ch 388, CA. 17 See, also, McLean v McKay (1873) LR 5 PC 327, at p 335; Re Ecclesiastical Comrs for England’s Conveyance [1936] Ch 430, at p 440. 18 As in Russell v Archdale [1964] Ch 38 (Buckley J). 19 As in Re Selwyn’s Conveyance [1967] Ch 674 (Goff J). Only that part of the Selwyn estate which answered the description of being ‘neighbouring’ was held, as a matter of construction, to be within the terms of the covenant. The word ‘lately’ was construed as equivalent to ‘formerly’ and thus did not give rise to any question of whether only recently severed parts of the estate fell within the description. 20 Shropshire County Council v Edwards (1983) 46 P&CR 270, at p 275. 21 [1939] Ch 1, at p 8.
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The requirements for annexation 6.12 Where the covenant is expressed to be for the benefit of any adjoining land which the covenantee may acquire in the future,22 there would clearly be no annexation since no benefited land of the covenantee at the time of the conveyance would be identified.23
(2) The intention to benefit the identified land 6.11 If the benefited land is identified in the instrument creating the covenant, then the remaining question is whether that instrument shows, as a matter of construction, an intention for the covenant to benefit that land. The identification of the land without this second element will not bring about annexation.24 No particular formula or ‘magic words’25 are required provided that upon the true construction of the instrument containing the covenant there are words sufficient to link the benefit of the covenant to such land. 6.12 Two of the more usual methods for bringing about such link are by words showing an intention to benefit the ascertained land itself, or by words showing an intention to benefit classes of persons who will become, but are not now, interested in that land.26 In Shropshire County Council v Edwards,27 HH Judge Rubin, sitting as a High Court judge, expressed the position thus: ‘But it is not necessary, though highly desirable, that express words should be used to annex the benefit of the covenant to the land with which it is to run. If, on the construction of the instrument creating the restrictive covenant, [emphasis added] both the land which is intended to be benefited and an intention to benefit that land, as distinct from benefiting the covenantee personally, can be clearly established, then the benefit of the covenant will be annexed to that land and run with it notwithstanding the absence of express words of annexation.’ In that case, the vendor’s benefited land, having been held to have been sufficiently clearly identified in the conveyance containing the restrictive covenants, the judge went on to hold that looking at the contents of the conveyance as a whole, including a provision that ‘the covenants on the part of the vendor and the purchaser respectively should run with the lands of the vendor and the corporation respectively’, it was clear that the covenants were intended to be annexed to the vendor’s land.28
22 As to the material date for determining whether the covenantee owned land capable of benefiting from the covenant, see Millbourn v Lyons [1914] 2 Ch 231, CA. 23 See the analogous problem which arose in relation to the creation of easements in London and Blenheim Estates Ltd v Ladbroke Retail Parks Ltd [1994] 1 WLR 31, CA. In Keates v Lyon (1869) 4 Ch App 218, Selwyn LJ pointed out that a factor indicating that a covenant was intended to be personal to the covenantee would be if it was entered into for the benefit of other land which the covanantee did not own at the time but expected afterwards to acquire by inheritance or purchase. This observation was referred to by Buckley LJ in Reid v Bickerstaff [1909] 2 Ch 305 at 226. See, also, the easement case of Voice v Bell (1993) 68 P&CR 441, CA. 24 J Sainsbury plc v Enfield London Borough Council [1989] 1 WLR 590 (Morritt J). 25 See Shropshire County Council v Edwards (1982) 46 P&CR 270 at p 275. 26 See Drake v Gray [1936] Ch 451, CA, especially per Greene LJ at p 466. 27 (1982) 46 P&CR 270, at pp 277–278. 28 Compare Baxter v Fouroaks Properties Ltd [1965] Ch 816, below, para 8.52.
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6.13 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation 6.13
As Blackburne J put it in Re MCA East Ltd:29
‘… there must be an intention that the covenant should benefit identifiable land of the covenantee. This last element must be apparent from a true construction of the instrument containing the restriction. It may be shown expressly by the words of the covenant itself, or other words used in the instrument, or it may be implied, if, on a true construction of the instrument as a whole when viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances as they existed at the time the instrument as entered into, such an intention is to be gathered from the instrument …’ In Drake v Gray,30 Green LJ described at page 466 how express annexation is ordinarily achieved. He said this: ‘There are two familiar methods of indicating in a covenant of this kind the land in respect of which the benefit is to enure. One is to describe the character in which the covenantee receives the covenant … a covenant with so and so, owners or owner for the time being of whatever the land may be. Another method is to state by means of an appropriate declaration that the covenants is taken “for the benefit of” whatever the lands may be.’ 6.14 The use of the phrase ‘their heirs and assigns’ in a covenant is insufficient in itself to imply an intention that the benefit of the covenants should run with the vendors’ retained land. In Renals v Cowlishaw,31 a covenant expressed to be made with the covenantees ‘their heirs, executors, administrators and assigns’ simpliciter was held not sufficient to show that assigns of the covenantees’ land were intended to benefit since the assigns referred to could equally well mean assigns of the covenant; there was accordingly no annexation. 6.15 Similarly, in Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance,32 a covenant expressed to be made ‘with the vendors their successors and assigns’ was held not to be annexed to the vendors’ remaining land, the Court of Appeal being assisted in this conclusion by the fact that other covenants, entered into by the vendors with the purchasers, were expressed to be made ‘with the purchasers, their heirs and assigns or other the owner or owners for the time being’ of the land sold, thus clearly indicating that the parties intended to annex the latter covenants but not the former. See also J Sainsbury plc v Enfield LBC [1989] 1 WLR 590, especially at p 598. 6.16 In J Sainsbury plc v Enfield London Borough Council,33 Morritt J emphasised that on the authorities, the requisite intention must be apparent from the conveyance itself. In this respect, the inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence to prove an intention to effect annexation is to be contrasted with the admissibility of such evidence to prove an intention to create a building scheme.34
29 30 31 32 33 34
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[2003] 1 P&CR 9, at p 20–23. [1936] Ch 451. (1879) 11 ChD 866, CA. [1933] Ch 611, CA. [1989] 1 WLR 590. As to which, see below, para 8.79 et seq.
The requirements for annexation 6.20 6.17 Blackburne J in MCA made clear,35 however, that the question is whether the intention can be gathered from the words of the instrument as a whole needs to be viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Where, as in MCA, the covenantees did not intend to live on the land, but to sell it off in plots for development, that was pointed out to be consistent with them intending to retain the benefit of the restrictions personally, either by assigning the benefits of particular purchasers or by extracting payments from the owners of the plots as the price for releasing or modifying the restrictions. 6.18 Both MCA and the Sainsbury case are examples of cases where no intention to benefit land of the covenantee could be discerned by the court. In Rogers v Hosegood,36 the covenant was expressed to be made with the covenantees ‘their heirs and assigns’, but in addition stated that it was made with intent that the covenant ‘shall enure for the benefit of [the covenantees] their heirs and assigns and others claiming under them to all or any of their lands adjoining or near to the said premises’ and these added words showed clearly that the ‘assigns’ referred to were assigns of the land. In Drake v Gray,37 the covenant being said to be made with ‘the owners or owner for the time being of the remaining hereditaments so agreed to be partitioned as aforesaid’ showed a clear intention to annex the covenant to each and every portion of the partitioned land so that the benefit of the covenant ran with each and every part of the land. 6.19 As discussed at para 1.36 et seq above, where the parties have expressly referred to a covenant as having been imposed for the purpose of benefiting the retained land of the covenantee, ‘the court would normally assume that it is capable of doing so’: see Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd,38 Whitgift Homes Ltd v Stocks39 and the other cases referred to in those paragraphs.
Whether an intention to annex be spelt out of the nature and content of the restriction 6.20 The observations of Judge Rubin in Shropshire County Council v Edwards40 set out above must be read subject to the qualification that even though it may appear from the nature and content of the restriction that performance or non-performance will affect the adjoining property of the covenantee, nevertheless, this fact, unsupported by other indications in the document imposing the covenant, will not be sufficient to bring about annexation. As Sir Herbert Cozens-Hardy MR, pointed out in Reid v Bickerstaff 41: ‘I cannot hold that the mere fact that the plaintiffs’ land is adjacent and would be more valuable if the covenant were annexed to the land suffices
35 36 37 38 39 40 41
Re MCA East Ltd [2003] 1 P&CR 9, at p 21. [1900] 2 Ch 388, CA. [1936] Ch 451, CA. [1962] Ch 115 at 136. [2001] EWCA Civ 1732. (1982) 46 P&CR 270. [1909] 2 Ch 305 at 321.
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6.21 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation to justify the court in holding that it was so annexed as to pass [the benefit of the covenant] without mention simply by a conveyance of the adjacent land.’ 6.21 In Ives v Brown,42 in a conveyance on sale, of a parcel of land forming part of the vendors’ estate, the purchaser covenanted with the vendors ‘their heirs and assigns’ not (inter alios) to do or permit on the premises conveyed ‘a nuisance, annoyance or disturbance to [the vendors] or the persons deriving title under them or either of them’. Sargant J held that there was not enough in the conveyance to annex the benefit of the covenants to the remainder of the estate or any particular part thereof. In the course of his judgment his Lordship said:43 ‘No doubt one can see plainly that the covenants were inserted because the covenantees were owners of adjoining property and with a view to benefiting them accordingly. But this was really equally obvious in Renals v Cowlishaw,44 and I cannot see that there is any greater reason in this case than in that for ascribing an intention to benefit the retained property and the owners thereof from time to time by virtue merely of their ownership.’ 6.22 Similarly, in Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance,45 in a conveyance executed in 1908, the purchasers covenanted with ‘the vendors their successors and assigns’ not to do anything on the land conveyed which might be or become a nuisance and not to erect or authorise to be erected any factory or any hotel public house, beer house or beer shop ‘within 460 yards of the said land coloured green’ being land retained by the vendors. Both Bennett J and the Court of Appeal held that there had been no annexation. In delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Romer LJ, after referring to the content of the restrictions, said:46 ‘This circumstance does, no doubt, give some ground for the suggestion that these two restrictions were intended for the benefit of the green land as distinct from any other lands of the vendors and that, therefore, the restrictions as a whole should be so regarded.’ However, the court considered that the restrictions might also have been intended to benefit other neighbouring land which was owned by the vendors and held that there was no annexation to the land coloured green.47 6.23 In MCA, Blackburne J quoted the words of Sir Herbert Cozens-Hardy MR in Reid v Bickerstaff (above) and held that: ‘The mere fact that the vendor’s
42 [1919] 2 Ch 314 (Sargant J). 43 Ibid, at p 322. 44 (1878) 9 ChD 125; affd (1879) 11 ChD 866, where the restrictions in question were the usual residential estate restrictions relating to building lines, value, size and user as dwelling houses only. 45 [1933] Ch 611, CA. The full facts are set out below at para 7.7. 46 Ibid, at p 636. 47 For a fuller account of the grounds of the court’s decision, see below, para 7.8 et seq. See also, Reid v Bickerstaff [1909] 2 Ch 305, at p 321 where Cozens-Hardy MR said: ‘I cannot hold that the mere fact that the claimants’ land is adjacent and would be more valuable if the covenant were annexed to the land suffices to justify the Court in holding that it was so annexed as to pass without mention by a simple conveyance of the adjacent land.’ And see also, Radstock Cooperative and Industrial Society Ltd v Norton-Radstock UDC [1968] Ch 605, at p 628.
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The requirements for annexation 6.25 neighbouring land might be more valuable and be benefited, if the benefit of the covenants were annexed to it, is of itself insufficient’.
Section 58 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 6.24 What has been said above concerning covenants expressed to be made with the covenantee ‘his heirs and assigns’ without more, applies equally where such words are implied (in the case of covenants entered into after 1881 and before 192648) by section 58 of the Conveyancing Act 1881, which (so far as material) provides that: ‘A covenant relating to land of inheritance … shall be deemed to be made with the covenantee, his heirs and assigns, and shall have effect as if heirs and assigns were expressed’. 6.25 The question whether the words of this section were sufficient to bring about annexation arose in J Sainsbury plc v Enfield London Borough Council,49 where the facts were as follows. The owner of land forming part of the Highfield House Estate, Enfield, Alfred Walker, by a conveyance executed in 1894, conveyed part of the land to a purchaser. In that conveyance, the purchaser covenanted ‘with the said Alfred Walker’ to observe certain restrictions in respect of the part of the land conveyed and Alfred Walker covenanted to observe certain other restrictions in respect of ‘that portion of the said Highfield House Estate … shown on the said plan and thereon marked “other land belonging to Alfred Walker Esq”’. The plan referred to was drawn in the margin of the conveyance and showed the land conveyed and (it may be inferred) the other land belonging to Alfred Walker. The claimant was a contracting purchaser (under a conditional contract) from a successor in title of Alfred Walker’s purchaser and the defendant represented all the owners of the land belonging to Alfred Walker at the time of the 1894 conveyance. The claimant sought a declaration under section 84(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 that there were now no persons entitled to enforce the covenants entered into by Alfred Walker’s purchaser. The defendant council claimed that on the true construction of the 1894 conveyance, the benefit of those covenants had been annexed to Alfred Walker’s retained land by virtue of the combined effect of the identification of such land in the 1894 conveyance and the words imported into the purchaser’s covenant by virtue of section 58 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 with the resulting continued enforceability of the covenants by the present owners of that land. Dealing with this argument, Morrit J held that construing the 1894 conveyance in the light of the relevant surrounding circumstances the indications were equally consistent with an intention that the benefit of the covenants should remain with Alfred Walker and that in the absence of any indication of an intention to annex the covenant to the retained land in the covenant itself or of any necessary
48 Although s 58 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 has been repealed (Law of Property Act 1925, s 207 and Seventh Schedule) its effect on such covenants is preserved by s 78(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925. 49 [1989] 1 WLR 590 (Morritt J). The section was also relied upon in Shropshire County Council v Edwards (1982) 46 P&CR 270, but the court found it unnecessary to decide the point (at p 278).
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6.26 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation implication of such an intention derived from the surrounding circumstance, no such annexation was established.50
Pre-1926 position following the decision in the Federated Homes case 6.26 The decision of the Court of Appeal in the landmark case of Federated Homes v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd has substantially affected the law relating to annexation of covenants post-1925 and will be now be explained. However, it does not affect the position in relation to covenants entered into prior to 1926, and the interpretation set out in section 78 of the Law of Property Act 1925 has been held not to apply to its predecessor, section 58 of the Conveyancing Act 1881.51
Post-1925 restrictive covenants (A) So long as the covenant is one ‘relating to the land of the covenantee’ the condition that the covenant is intended to benefit such land is automatically fulfilled – there is annexation under section 78 of the Law of Property Act 1925 6.27 In the case of covenants relating to any land of the covenantee entered into on or after 1 January 1926, section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 will apply unless a contrary intention appears in the instrument creating the covenants.52 The subsection provides as follows: ‘(1) A covenant relating to any land of the covenantee shall be deemed to be made with the covenantee and his successors in title and the persons deriving title under him or them, and shall have effect as if such successors and other persons were expressed. For the purposes of this subsection in connexion with covenants restrictive of the user of land ‘successors in title’ shall be deemed to include the owners and occupiers for the time being of the land of the covenantee intended to be benefited.’
50 Since the defendant council had been appointed in the proceedings to represent persons who, between them, were the owners of all the land retained by Alfred Walker at the time of the 1894 conveyance, an argument could perhaps have been mounted that notwithstanding the absence of annexation, the benefit of the covenant was either vested collectively in such present owners or that it was vested in the present owner of the last parcel of the retained land which was disposed of by Alfred Walker’s executors after his death. See below, para 7.16 et seq. 51 See J Sainsbury plc v Enfield LBC [1989] 1 WLR 590 at p 601 (Morritt J): ‘There are no words in s 58 capable by themselves of effecting annexation of the benefit of a covenant. All that section did was to deem the inclusion of words which both before and after the enactment of s 58 had, with the exception of Mann v Stephens 15 Sim 377, been consistently held to be insufficient without more to effect annexation of the benefit of a covenant. Also, Seymour Road (Southampton) Ltd v Williams [2010] EWHC (Ch) at para 21 (Peter Smith J). 52 As to what kind of a contrary intention will exclude the subsection see below, para 6.42 et seq.
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The requirements for annexation 6.31 6.28 The condition precedent to this statutory addition to the words of a covenant is that the covenant must be one ‘relating to any land of the covenantee’. This would appear to be a simple question of fact, it not appearing to be material (for this purpose) whether the land of the covenantee is identified in the instrument creating the covenant or by extrinsic evidence. Where the subsection applies, the covenant is deemed to be made with the covenantee ‘his successors in title and the persons deriving title under him or them’ and it is clear both from the context and from the extension (at the end of section 78(1)) of the meaning of ‘successors in title’ so as to include ‘occupiers’, that (unlike the position in the case of Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance referred to above) the ‘successors’ referred to are successors to the covenantee’s land and not merely to the covenant. Accordingly, the words statutorily imported are such as show an intention to benefit the land of the covenantee, thus logically satisfying the second of the above requirements of annexation (referred to in para 6.11 above). 6.29 There is, however, nothing in the section which dispenses with the first requirement (referred to in para 6.7 above) and accordingly, the effect of the subsection would seem to depend upon whether ‘the land of the covenantee’ in question is or is not identified in the instrument creating the covenant. 6.30 It follows from the above that, with a covenant entered into after 1925, so long as the ‘the land of the covenantee’ which the covenant benefits (or ‘touches and concerns’) is identified in the instrument creating the covenant and easily ascertainable (as to which, see below), then both requirements for annexation would be satisfied with the result that the normal consequences of annexation which flow from the use of the statutory words would ensue. 6.31 It was so held by the Court of Appeal in the landmark case of Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd.53 Accordingly, so long as the covenantee’s land is so identified, annexation in post-1925 covenants is automatic.54 This case has received some extra-judicial criticism.55 However, it appears to fit logically into the accepted rules of annexation referred to above, and has considerably simplified the law in relation to annexation. The material facts of the case were as follows. In February 1971, Mackenzie Hill Ltd (‘Mackenzie’), the owner of a site which included three areas of land referred to as the red land, the green land and the blue land, sold and conveyed the blue land to the defendant company. In the conveyance the defendant covenanted ‘with the Vendor’ not to build on the blue land more than a total of 300 dwellings ‘so as not to reduce the number of units which the Vendor might eventually erect on the retained land’ under a planning permission which was in force which restricted the total number of dwellings which could be built on the entire site (‘the covenant’). Immediately after that conveyance (and a simultaneous
53 [1980] 1 WLR 594. 54 As emphasised eg by Etherton J in Mohammadzadeh v Joseph [2008] 1 P&CR 6. The rule is, however, subject to any words showing that this was not intended – see below, para 6.42 et seq. 55 Particularly in two scholarly articles, by G H Newsom QC, on ‘Universal Annexation?’ in (1981) 97 LQR 32, and (1982) 98 LQR 202.
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6.32 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation conveyance of another part of the site) the only land retained by Mackenzie consisted of the red land and the green land.56 In March 1971, Mackenzie sold and conveyed the red land and the green land to William Brandt’s Sons & Co Ltd (‘Brandt’s) and the conveyance to Brandt’s contained an express assignment of the benefit of the covenant. In March 1971, Brandt’s sold and conveyed the green land to the claimant company and the conveyance contained an express assignment of the benefit of the covenant. Shortly afterwards, Brandt’s conveyed the red land to BTA Trading Co Ltd (‘BTA’) and the conveyance to BTA also contained an express assignment of the benefit of the covenant. Following this conveyance BTA’s title to the red land was registered. In March 1975, BTA sold and transferred the red land to the claimant company. The transfer did not contain any express assignment of the benefit of the covenant. The defendant company, having obtained the requisite planning permission, was now proposing to build 332 dwellings on the blue land and the claimant company sought an injunction to restrain them from building more than 300 dwellings. 6.32 Whilst the claimant was undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of the covenant as owner of the green land (in relation to which there was an unbroken chain of assignments), the question was whether it was entitled to enforce the covenant as owner of the red land (in relation to which the chain of assignments was incomplete). On the face of the words of the covenant, there was no annexation, the covenant having been made ‘with the Vendor’ simpliciter. But the claimant argued that the covenant related to land of the original covenantee, namely, to the red land and the green land, that the covenant was therefore deemed, under section 78(1), to have been made with the covenantee and its successors in title and the persons deriving title under it or them and that the benefit of the covenant therefore passed with the red land into the hands of the claimant. In the course of his judgment (with which Browne LJ and Megaw LJ agreed), Brightman LJ said:57 ‘In the end, I come to the conclusion that section 78 of the Law of Property Act 1925 caused the benefit of the restrictive covenant in question to run with the red land and therefore to be annexed to it, with the result that the claimant company is able to enforce the covenant against Mill Lodge, not only in its capacity as owner of the green land, but also in its capacity as owner of the red land.’ 6.33
In relation to this decision, the following points may be noted.
(a) Although Brightman LJ expressed the view that the claimant company’s ownership of the green land, with its unbroken chain of assignments, was ‘sufficient to entitle the claimant company to relief, and that the claimant’s
56 57
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Together with the (irrelevant) ‘small areas’ referred to below. Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 594, at p 607C.
The requirements for annexation 6.34 right to relief would be no greater at the present time if it were held that it also had the benefit of the covenant in its capacity as owner of the red land’,58 nevertheless, the position concerning the red land was treated as a substantive issue in the case and, as such, was part of the ratio decidendi.59 (b) As a matter of construction, Brightman LJ found60 that the words ‘the retained land’ meant the red land and the green land together with certain small areas comprised in the original site which the covenantee still retained.61 This had two consequences, namely: (i) since the substantive contents of the covenant directly linked the burdened land (the blue land) with this retained land, the covenant was a ‘covenant relating to [the retained] land of the covenantee’ so as to satisfy the condition precedent to the operation of section 78(1);62 (ii) the land to which the covenant related was in fact identified by the instrument which created the covenant (so the court did not go on to consider what the position would be if it could only be identified by purely extraneous evidence – as to that, see below). The second of the requirements for annexation was accordingly satisfied. 6.34 It was further argued in Federated Homes that if (as was held to be the case) the covenant was annexed to the covenantee’s retained land, such annexation was to the whole of the retained land (only) and not to any separate part and that, in the absence of any indication that annexation was to the retained land or any part or parts thereof, the red land, being part only of the land to which the covenant was annexed, could not, treated by itself, claim the benefit of such annexation. This argument was rejected. Brightman LJ said:63 ‘… I would have thought, if the benefit of a covenant is, on a proper construction of a document, annexed to the land, prima facie it is annexed to every part thereof, unless the contrary clearly appears.’ Megaw LJ, agreeing with the judgment of Brightman LJ, added:64 ‘… I find great difficulty in understanding how, either as a matter of principle, or as a matter of practical good sense in relation to a legal relationship of this sort, it can be said that a covenant, which ex hypothesis has been annexed to
58 Ibid, at p 603B. 59 An argument that the part of the judgments dealing with the red land were obiter was rejected by HH Judge Paul Baker QC sitting as a High Court judge in Roake v Chadha [1984] 1 WLR 40. Whilst it is clear that the claimant company in the Federated Homes case was seeking an injunction, it does not appear, from the report, specifically to have been asking for a declaration of entitlement to the benefit of the covenant in respect of the green land and the red land respectively. Had it done so, then the legal position concerning the red land, considered as a separate entity, would clearly have been directly in issue in respect of the declaratory relief. However, the legal position of the red land, having been specifically dealt with as such by the Court of Appeal, it must presumably be regarded as a specific part of the general relief granted and thus part of the ratio decidendi. 60 Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 594, at p 599E. 61 The small areas referred to were of no direct relevance in the case: see ibid, p 603B. 62 Ibid, at p 605B. 63 Ibid, at p 606G. 64 Ibid, at p 608B.
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6.35 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation the land as a whole, is somehow or other not annexed to the individual parts of that land.’ Though considered by the court to be clear, this also in fact represented a change in the law as it was declared to be (where the covenant was not expressly stated to be for the benefit of the whole or any part or parts of the covenantee’s land).65 This point is considered in more detail later in this chapter.66 but is now generally regarded being as the true legal position.
(B) The land which is to be benefited must (still) be able to be identified from the words of the instrument and be easily ascertainable 6.35 The Court of Appeal in Federated Homes left open the question of whether, in the case of a post-1925 covenant, if the existence and identity of the land to which a covenant relates can only be gleaned from evidence outside the instrument creating the covenant, annexation would still result from the application of the subsection. However, it has now been made clear that it will not. As referred to above (at para 6.10 above), the Court of Appeal in Marquess of Zetland v Driver67 stated that in the case of a pre-1926 conveyance ‘the land which is intended to be benefited must be defined so as to be easily ascertainable’. 6.36 This decision was overlooked in Federated Homes v Mill Lodge Properties,68 in which Marquess of Zetland v Driver was not cited, and the question did not actually arise for decision (as the land was clear from the conveyance itself). In Crest Nicholson Residential (South) Ltd v McAllister,69 however, the Court of Appeal held, in relation to post-1925 covenants, that it is still a requirement that the land intended to be benefited must be identified in the instrument containing the covenant so that it is easily ascertainable. In Crest Nicholson, the Court, through Chadwick LJ, stated that: ‘30. The decision of this court in the Federated Homes case leaves open the question whether section 78 of the 1925 Act only effects annexation when the land intended to be benefited is described in the instrument itself (by express words or necessary implication, albeit that it may be necessary to have regard to evidence outside the document fully to identify that land) or whether it is enough that it can be shown, from evidence wholly outside the document, that the covenant does in fact touch and concern land of the covenantee which can be identified …
65 In particular, as set out in Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance [1933] Ch 611 and Russell v Archdale [1964] Ch 38 – see paras 6.53 and 6.58 below. 66 Below, para 6.65 et seq. 67 [1939] Ch 1, at p 8. 68 [1980] 1 WLR 594. 69 [2004] 1 WLR 2409.
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The requirements for annexation 6.38 32. The question left open in the Federated Homes case [1980] 1 WLR 594 had, I think, already been answered in the judgment of this court in Marquess of Zetland v Driver [1939] Ch 1, a decision not cited in the Federated Homes case.’ 6.37 Dealing with annexation, Chadwick LJ, quoted from page 8 of Marquess of Zetland v Driver as follows: ‘the land which is intended to be benefited must be so defined as to be easily ascertainable,70 and the fact that the covenant is imposed for the benefit of that particular land should be stated in the conveyance and the persons or the class of persons entitled to enforce it. The fact that the benefit of the covenant is not intended to pass to all persons into whose hands the unsold land may come is not objectionable so long as the class of persons intended to have the benefit of the covenant is clearly defined.’ He went on: ‘33. In its later decision in the Federated Homes case [1980] 1 WLR 594 this court held that the provisions of section 78 of the 1925 Act had made it unnecessary to state, in the conveyance, that the covenant was to be enforceable by persons deriving title under the covenantee or under his successors in title and the owner or occupier of the land intended to be benefited, or that the covenant was to run with the land intended to be benefited; but there is nothing in that case which suggests that it is no longer necessary that the land which is intended to be benefited should be so defined that it is easily ascertainable. In my view, that requirement, identified in Marquess of Zetland v Driver [1939] Ch 1 remains a necessary condition for annexation’ [emphasis added]. 6.38
The Court provided some reasons for this – Chadwick LJ said:
‘34 There are, I think, good reasons for that requirement. A restrictive covenant affecting land will not be enforceable in equity against a purchaser who acquires a legal estate in that land for value without notice of the covenant. A restrictive covenant imposed in an instrument made after 1925 is registrable as a land charge under class D(ii): section 10(1) of the Land Charges Act 1925 and, now, section 2(5) of the Land Charges Act 1972. If the title is registered, protection is effected by entering notice of the restrictive covenant on the register: section 50 of the Land Registration Act 1925 and, now, section 11 of the Land Registration Act 2002. Where practicable the notice shall be by reference to the instrument by which the covenant is imposed and a copy or abstract of that instrument shall be filed at the registry: section 50(1) of the Land Registration Act 1925 and section 3(5) of the Land Charges Act 1972. It is obviously desirable that a purchaser of land burdened with a restrictive covenant should be able not only to ascertain, by inspection of the entries on the relevant register, that the land is so burdened, but also to ascertain the land for which the benefit of the covenant was taken-so that he can identify who can enforce the covenant. That latter object is achieved if the land which is intended to be benefited is defined in the instrument so as to be easily ascertainable. To require a purchaser of land burdened with a restrictive covenant, but where the land for the benefit of which the covenant
70
This is Chadwick LJ’s emphasis.
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6.39 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation was taken is not described in the instrument, to make inquiries as to what (if any) land the original covenantee retained at the time of the conveyance and what (if any) of that retained land the covenant did, or might have, “touched and concerned” would be oppressive. It must be kept in mind that (as in the present case) the time at which the enforceability of the covenant becomes an issue may be long after the date of the instrument by which it was imposed.’ 6.39 That the land which is intended to be benefited must be defined so as to be easily ascertainable does not mean that this must be possible exclusively from the conveyance itself – the question ‘is whether the land intended to be benefited can be identified (from a description, plan or other reference in the conveyance itself, but aided, if necessary, by external evidence to identify the land so described, depicted or otherwise referred to) …’ (para 45 of the judgment). Accordingly, it must be able to be identified by reference to the conveyance aided by external evidence, but external evidence alone (ie where there is no reference to the land to be benefited in the conveyance or other creating instrument) will not do. 6.40 For a recent case where the objectors to an application for the discharge or modification of a covenant under section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 failed to show they had the benefit of the covenant because of the failure of the instrument to define the benefited land in a way that made it easily ascertainable, see Re Sutton & East Surrey Water plc’s Application.71 6.41 Where the covenant is expressed to be for the benefit of any adjoining land which the covenantee may acquire in the future, there would clearly be no annexation since no benefited land of the covenantee at the time of the conveyance would be identified. Accordingly, it has now been decided that the effect of section 78(1) in a case where there is no annexation is merely that the covenant is not personal to the covenantee but is capable of being assigned to a successor in title or disposed of for the benefit of persons having derivative interests.72
Excluding or limiting section 78 of the Law of Property Act 1925 6.42 Unlike section 79 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (which applies ‘unless a contrary intention is expressed’) there is no corresponding provision in section 78 expressly enabling the parties to a covenant to negative the effect of the section. In Roake v Chadha,73 it was argued that because of this, section 78 must be treated as mandatory so that a provision in a restrictive covenant that ‘this
71 [2017] UKUT 248 (LC). 72 Quaere whether the ‘occupiers’ referred to in the second paragraph of s 78(1) would include persons, such as licensees, who have no proprietary interest in the land. In the Lands Tribunal case of Re Da Costa’s Application (1986) 52 P&CR 99, the President of the Tribunal held a licensee of land to which the benefit of a covenant had been annexed under s 78(1) to have no locus standi to object to an application for the modification of the covenant. 73 [1984] 1 WLR 40.
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The requirements for annexation 6.44 covenant shall not enure for the benefit of any owner or subsequent purchaser of any part of the vendors Sudbury Court Estate at Wembley unless the benefit of this covenant shall be expressly assigned’ did not, in the absence of an express assignment, prevent the benefit of the covenant from passing to a successor in title under the section. Whilst expressing himself as being far from satisfied that the section had mandatory operation, HH Judge Paul Baker QC sitting as a High Court judge, held that even if the statutory importation of the additional words could not be excluded, a covenant containing those words nevertheless had to be construed as a whole to see whether the benefit was annexed and that giving full weight to both the statutorily imported words and the express words, the result was a plain intention that the benefit of the covenant was not annexed.74 He said:75 ‘The true position as I see it is that even where a covenant is deemed to be made with successors in title as section 78 requires, one still has to construe the covenant as a whole to see whether the benefit of the covenant is annexed. Where one finds as in the Federated Homes case, the covenant is not qualified in any way, annexation may be readily inferred; but where, as in the present case, it is expressly provided: “this covenant shall not enure for the benefit of any owner or subsequent purchaser of any party to the vendor’s Sudbury Court Estate at Wembley unless the benefit of this covenant shall be expressly assigned …” one cannot just ignore those words. One … has to consider the covenant as a whole to determine its true effect. When one does that, then it seems to me that the answer is plain and in my judgment the benefit is not annexed. That is giving full weight to both statutory force and also what is already there in the covenant.’ 6.43 In Crest Nicholson,76 Chadwick LJ for the Court of Appeal agreed, at para 41, with the decision of HH Judge Paul Baker QC that section 78 could be displaced by a contrary intention being shown. He said: ‘I can see no reason why, if the original covenantor and covenantee make clear their mutual intention in that respect [viz that the benefit shall not pass to successors in title without an express contractual assignment], the legislature should wish to prevent effect being given to that intention.’ 6.44 Further, he pointed out in paras 42 and 43 that whilst section 78 in its wording was on its face mandatory in deeming successors to be included, whereas section 79 (dealing with the burden of restrictive covenants77) was a deeming provision ‘subject to a contrary intention appearing’— ‘[S]ection 78 of the 1925 Act defines “successors in title” as the owners and occupiers of the time being of the land of the covenantee intended to be benefited. In a case where the parties to the instrument make clear their intention that land retained by the covenantee at the time of the conveyance effected by the transfer is to have the benefit of the covenant only for so long
74
75 76 77
The same would presumably apply in relation to land sold off in cases of ‘diminishing benefited land’ as in Marquess of Zetland v Driver [1939] Ch 1 and Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798. This may explain (or give an added reason) why the claimants in those cases did not seek to rely on s 78(1). Ibid, at p 46. [2004] 1 WLR 2409. Considered later in this book: see Chapter 9.
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6.45 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation as it continues to be in the ownership of the original covenantee, and not after it has been sold on by the original covenantee-unless the benefit of the covenant is expressly assigned to the new owner – the land of the covenantee intended to be benefited is identified by the instrument as … not including so much of the land as has been sold off without the benefit of an express assignment … This approach to section 78 of the 1925 Act provides, as it seems to me, the answer to the question why, if the legislature did not intend to distinguish between the effect of section 78 (mandatory) and the effect of section 79 (subject to contrary intention), it did not include the words “unless a contrary intention is expressed” in the first of those sections. The answer is that it did not need to. The qualification “subject to contrary intention” is implicit in the definition of “successors in title” which appears in section 78(1); that is the effect of the words “the land of the covenantee intended to be benefited”. If the terms in which the covenant is imposed show – as they did in Marquess of Zetland v Driver [1939] Ch 1 and in Roake v Chadha [1984] 1 WLR 40 – that the land of the covenantee intended to be benefited does not include land which may subsequently be sold off by the original covenantee in circumstances where (at the time of that subsequent sale) there is no express assignment of the benefit of the covenant, then the owners and occupiers of the land sold off in those circumstances are not “owners and occupiers for the time being of the land of the covenantee intended to be benefited”; and so are not “successors in title” of the original covenantee for the purposes of section 78(1) in its application to covenants restrictive of the user of land.’ The land to which section 79 applied was different, so the same logic did not apply there; hence the caveat ‘unless a contrary intention’ were imported there (see para 44). The position reached is surely a sensible one. There is no good reason why Parliament should have intended to restrict the parties’ freedom to prevent the benefit of the covenant from automatically passing to successors in title by making that intention clear.
THE LAND TO WHICH ANNEXATION TAKES PLACE 6.45 Assuming that the requirements (considered above) for annexation of the benefit of a restrictive covenant to identifiable land are prima facie satisfied, the following situations fall to be considered: ●●
●● ●● ●● ●● 84
Case 1. The covenant is expressed to be annexed (either directly or by virtue of section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925) to identifiable land as a whole but, on the facts, the covenant, whilst touching and concerning some part, does not touch and concern the full extent of that land. Case 2. As in Case 1 except that the covenant is expressed to be annexed to the land and to each and every part thereof. Case 3. As in Case 1 except that on the facts, the covenant touches and concerns the full extent of the land. Case 4. As in Case 3 except that the covenant is annexed to the land and (in terms) to each and every part thereof. Case 5. The covenant touches and concerns the land but is expressed to be annexed only in a limited way – for example, it is provided that it is
The land to which annexation takes place 6.47 annexed to such of the identified land as remains unsold or shall be sold by the vendor or his successors in title with the express benefit of the covenant. Each of these will be considered in turn.
Case 1 6.46 In Case 1 the covenant is expressed to be annexed (either directly or by virtue of section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925) to identifiable land as a whole but on the facts, the covenant, whilst touching and concerning some part, does not touch and concern the full extent of that land. 6.47 This case is concerned with the position where the expressed annexation goes beyond what the law allows (ie to cover land which is not touched and concerned by it). This is the situation which arose in Re Ballard’s Conveyance,78 where in a conveyance of 18 acres of land executed in 1906 by a vendor (Mrs Ballard) who was a tenant for life under the Settled Land Act 1882 of the Childwickbury Estate comprising some 1,700 acres, the purchaser (the applicant in the present application under section 84(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925) covenanted with Mrs Ballard ‘her heirs and assigns and successors in title owners from time to time of the Childwickbury Estate’ to perform and observe certain restrictions. The whole of the Childwickbury Estate for the benefit of which the covenant was found to have been taken, was subsequently sold and conveyed to the respondent company. On the question whether the respondent company was entitled to the benefit of the covenant, Clauson J, in the absence of evidence to show that the restrictions, or some of them, could benefit the whole of the Childwickbury Estate, concluded that the covenant could only benefit some comparatively small portion of the estate, with the result that it did not touch and concern the whole of the land to which it had been expressed to be annexed and that the covenant could not be severed so as to treat it as annexed to such part of the land as it did in fact touch and concern. In relation to this decision, the following points fall to be noted: (a) Whilst Clauson J regarded the burden of proof (as to whether the land to which the covenant was expressed to be annexed was in fact touched and concerned by the covenant) to be upon the person who claimed to be entitled to enforce the covenant, it has since been held that there is a rebuttable presumption that such land is touched and concerned and that the onus of establishing the contrary is on the party who claims that the covenant does not touch and concern such land.79 (b) On the facts as found concerning ‘touching and concerning’, it is clear that in attempting to annex the covenant to that part of the land which was not touched and concerned, the attempt could not succeed since the
78 [1937] Ch 473 (Clauson J). 79 See Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd [1962] Ch 115 (Wilberforce J) and Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 798 (Brightman J) and see also para 1.36 et seq above.
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6.48 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation covenant would, vis-à-vis that land, be personal.80 This part of the decision accordingly remains intact. (c) On the issue of severance, it should be noted that the case is not authority for the proposition that where a restrictive covenant is annexed to the whole of the covenantee’s land, then a subsequent owner of part does not get the benefit.81 It was concerned with the question of whether, when the expressed intention to annex the covenant to an extensive area of land is, as to part of that land, legally impossible, the element of impossibility makes the entire annexation void or whether the impossible element can be severed so as to leave what remains intact. The difficulty with the latter course is that it requires the covenant to be re-written and this is something the courts will not, on a severance exercise, generally do.82 This part of the decision would also, therefore, appear to remain valid.83
Case 2 6.48 As in Case 1 except that the covenant is expressed to be annexed to the land and to each and every part thereof. As indicated when considering Re Ballard’s Conveyance above, the problem which confronted Clauson J in that case was the legal impossibility of giving effect to the actual terms of the covenant. Where, however, the terms of the covenant are in part apt for their purpose and in part excessive, then it is permissible, under the general rules of severance, to treat the one part as valid and effective and the other part as invalid and of no effect.84 This is different from rewriting or adding words to the covenant.85 6.49 The distinction is illustrated by Marquess of Zetland v Driver.86 In that case, a restrictive covenant entered into by a purchaser in a conveyance made
80 Since, however, in the instant case, the burdened land was still in the hands of the applicant as original covenantor, there would appear to have been nothing to prevent the covenant from being enforceable by the respondent company against the applicant at law (but excluding the remedy of injunction) had the covenant been expressly assigned to the respondent company at the time of its purchase of the Childwickbury Estate. 81 As to which, see Case 3, below, para 6.50. 82 See in regard to the severance of covenants in restraint of trade, Alechobb Ltd v Total Oil GB Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 173, CA; T Lucas & Co Ltd v Mitchell [1974] Ch 129; Putsman v Taylor [1927] 1 KB 637; Goldsoll v Goldman [1915] 1 Ch 292. In these cases, there was, of course, an element of public policy involved which contributed to the court’s unwillingness to rewrite the covenants. But it is at least clear from these cases that if, in Re Ballard’s Conveyance, the attempted annexation had been to the Childwickbury Estate ‘or any part or part of such Estate which is touched and concerned by this covenant’, then severance by deleting the first reference to the estate would have been permissible. 83 It is considered that none of the later cases, some of which have questioned the notion that annexation to the whole of an area of land cannot operate as annexation to any individual part capable of benefiting (though see now below, para 6.67 et seq), has any relevance to this part of the decision. 84 In relation to this, see footnote 82 above. 85 The difference in principle and in effect is illustrated not only by the cases on covenants in restraint of trade but also in other contexts. Eg, in relation to the question whether the provisions of a settlement which are made void by s 106 of the Settled Land Act 1925 can be pruned out so as to leave the main stem intact or whether they go to the root of the entire plant; contrast Re Ames [1893] 2 Ch 479 with Re Trenchard [1902] 1 Ch 378. 86 [1939] Ch 1, CA.
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The land to which annexation takes place 6.50 in 1928 was expressed to be intended ‘to benefit and protect such part or parts of the lands in the borough township or parish of Redcar in the North Riding of the county of York now subject to the settlement (a) as shall for the time being remain unsold or (b) as shall be sold by the vendor or his successors in title with the express benefit of this covenant’. The question was whether the vendor’s successor in title of part of the land so stated to be benefited and protected (to whom there had been no express assignment of the benefit of the covenant) could enforce the covenant. At first instance, Bennett J found as a fact87 that the covenant did not touch and concern ‘the greater part of what was owned by [the vendor] in 1928’ and decided that Re Ballard’s Conveyance required him to hold that the attempted annexation of the covenant to the land of the covenantee failed. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that Re Ballard was clearly distinguishable: ‘… if only on the ground that in that case the covenant was expressed to run with the whole estate, whereas in the present case no such difficulty arises, because the covenant is expressed to be for the benefit of the whole or any part or parts of the unsold settled property.’ The words of annexation were thus construed88 as providing alternatively for annexation to the whole or for annexation to any part thus permitting the first (excessive) annexation to be disregarded and the second (permissible) annexation to be treated as standing on its own feet. This decision accordingly emphasises the need, where annexation is expressly89 provided for, for some such words as ‘or any part or parts thereof capable of benefiting from this covenant’ to be added after the reference to the benefited land.90
Case 3 6.50 As in Case 1 except that on the facts, the covenant in fact touches and concerns the full extent of the land. In this case, no question arises concerning the initial validity of the annexation to the whole of the land. Nor is there any doubt, in such a case, but that the benefit of the covenant would run in favour of any owner of the whole of the benefited land. But if the benefited land is subsequently fragmented into different ownership, the question then arises whether the benefit of the covenant runs with the separate parts of the benefited land.
87 [1937] Ch 651, at p 660. 88 Somewhat liberally, it would appear, in view of the word ‘such’ rather than the word ‘any’ preceding the words ‘part or parts of the lands’ in the words of covenant. 89 As opposed to taking effect under s 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, the opening words of which would appear automatically to limit annexation to land which is in fact touched and concerned by reason of the identity between such land and ‘the land of the covenantee’ to which the covenant relates: see the observations of Brightman LJ in Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 594, at p 605B. 90 The same observation applies in relation to the possibility that, even if the land expressed to be benefited is all capable of being touched and concerned, it may not all be owned by the covenantee. In such a case the purported annexation would, in part, be ineffective and, therefore, if there were no words of severance enabling the potentially effective part to stand on its own feet, the purported annexation would entirely fail: cf Re Selwyn’s Conveyance [1967] Ch 674 (Goff J).
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6.51 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation This raises two separate issues. First, whether it is possible, as a matter of law (or equity), for the benefit of a restrictive covenant to be severed so as to increase the number of persons who can severally enforce the covenant. Second, if there is no legal impediment, but severability depends on the intention of the parties, how that intention is established. 6.51 The position concerning the first issue was outlined by Romer LJ, in Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance.91 Delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Romer LJ, after referring to the running of the burden of a restrictive covenant under the rule in Tulk v Moxhay, said: ‘It was open, therefore, to the Courts of Equity to prescribe the particular class of assignees of the covenant to whom they should concede the benefit of the rule. This they have done, and in doing so have included within the class persons to whom the benefit of the covenant could not have been assigned at law. For at law the benefit could not be assigned in pieces. It would have to be assigned as a whole or not at all. And yet in equity the right to enforce the covenant can in certain circumstances be assigned by the covenantee from time to time to one person after another.’ In principle, therefore, there is, in equity, nothing to prevent the benefit of a restrictive covenant from being severed if that is the intention. 6.52 The position concerning the second issue (intention) was originally dealt with in the classic observations of Hall V-C in Renals v Cowlishaw92 where he said: ‘… in order to enable a purchaser as an assign (such purchaser not being an assign of all that the vendor retained when he executed the conveyance containing the covenants, and that conveyance not shewing that the benefit of the covenant was intended to enure for the time being of each portion of the estate so retained or of the portion of the estate of which the Plaintiff [Claimant] is assign93) to claim the benefit of a restrictive covenant, this, at least, must appear, that the assign acquired his property with the benefit of the covenant …’ 6.53 These observations were included in a passage which was cited with approval by Collins LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Rogers v Hosegood94 and were also referred to by Romer LJ in Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance in the context of the running of the benefit of a covenant which is annexed to land, after which he said:95 ‘It follows that, if what is being acquired by the purchaser was only part of the land shown by the conveyance as being intended to be benefited, it must also be shown that the benefit was intended to enure to each portion of that land.’96
91 92 93 94 95 96
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[1933] Ch 611, at p 630. (1878) 9 ChD 125, at p 130. On appeal, (1879) 11 ChD 866: these observations were amongst those expressly adopted in their entirety by James and Baggallay LJJ, Thesiger LJ expressing himself as being of the same opinion. Emphasis added. [1900] 2 Ch 388, at p 406. Ibid, at p 628. This statement of the law was cited and applied by the Court of Appeal in Drake v Gray [1936] Ch 451. Slesser LJ said, ‘I recognise and I accept entirely, what was said by this court in the case of Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance, that it must be shown that the benefit was intended to enure to each portion of the land’.
The land to which annexation takes place 6.57 A view to the same effect was expressed by Cozens-Hardy MR in Reid v Bickerstaff.97 ‘If on a sale of part of an estate the purchaser covenants with the vendor, his heirs and assigns, not to deal with the purchased property in a particular way, a subsequent purchaser of part of the estate does not take the benefit of the covenant unless (a) he is an express assignee of the covenant, as distinct from assignee of the land or (b) the restrictive covenant is expressed to be for the benefit and protection of the particular parcel purchased by the subsequent purchaser.’ 6.54 The problem with the case of annexation now being considered is that there is no express indication of an intention either that the benefit is intended to enure to each purchaser of part only of the benefited land or, as in Marquess of Zetland v Driver98 and Roake v Chadha,99 that it is not intended to do so, and the question arises, in such a case, as to what the presumption is.100 The extracts cited above strongly suggest that an intention that the covenant should benefit a severed part of the land should be specifically spelt out. 6.55 None of the above cases was directly concerned with the consequences of not doing so. However, prior to the decision in Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd,101 the courts before whom this issue had directly arisen had all spoken with one voice, holding that annexation expressed to be to an area of land as a single entity without words of severance was presumed to limit enforceability to the owner or joint owners for the time being of the whole of the benefited land unless, as a matter of construction of the covenant (construed in the light of the surrounding circumstances at the time the covenant was entered into), there was an indication to the contrary. 6.56 In order to state the present law on this issue, it is proposed first to consider the effect of the pre-Federated Homes cases where the decisions were directly concerned with the consequences of the absence of express words of severance and then to consider how far, if at all, this effect has been altered by the Federated Homes case.
Pre-Federated Homes cases Drake v Gray102 6.57 This is the first case in which the issue directly arose, where it was held, on the true construction of words of covenant contained in each of four deeds
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[1909] 2 Ch 305, at pp 319–320. [1939] Ch 1, CA. [1984] 1 WLR 40. In relation to the benefit of a lessee’s covenants which have reference to the lease or the reversion, the matter is specifically provided for by s 141(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 which provides that such covenants ‘shall be annexed and incident to and shall go with the reversionary estate in the land, or in any part thereof, immediately expectant on the term granted by the lease, notwithstanding severance of that reversionary estate, and without prejudice to any liability affecting a covenantor or his estate’. 101 [1980] 1 WLR 594, CA. 102 [1936] Ch 451, CA.
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6.58 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation of partition executed in 1922 (under which freehold land at Littlestone-on-Sea, Romney Marsh, Kent was partitioned between three sons and two daughters of H-T Tubbs, deceased), that annexation of the benefit of restrictive covenants had been effected so that such benefit enured to the owner at any time of any part, however small, of the partitioned lands.103 Slesser LJ ‘accepted entirely’ Romer LJ’s statement of the law in Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance104 (Romer LJ also being a member of the Court of Appeal in the instant case) and all three Lords Justices (the third being Greene LJ) treated the question as being purely one of construction as between the alternatives of annexation to the benefited land as a whole or annexation to the benefited land and each and every part.105
Russell v Archdale106 6.58 In this case, Buckley J held that a restrictive covenant contained in a conveyance executed in 1938 and expressed to be made with intent ‘to benefit and protect the vendor’s adjoining and neighbouring land’ was annexed to the land as a whole which, on the evidence, the vendor was shown to own at the date of the conveyance with the result that the claimants, having acquired part only of such land, could not claim the benefit of the covenant by virtue of such annexation.107 In so holding, Buckley J proceeded on the premise that in the absence of suitable words of severance, the parties must be presumed to intend annexation to the land as a whole and not to any fragmented part of the benefited land. This decision was followed by Goulding J in Griffiths v Band,108 where the description of the benefited land was identical except that the plural ‘lands’ was used.
Re Jeffs’ Transfer (No 2)109 6.59 The consequences, if, in the absence of a clear intention to that end, annexation were treated as applying to fragmented parts of the benefited land, were pointed out by Stamp J in this case. The facts were as follows.110 103 The case is therefore more directly relevant to Case 4 which is considered below, paras 6.83–6.84. 104 [1933] Ch 611. 105 Or, as Greene LJ put it in Drake v Gray [1936] Ch 451: ‘The question is whether, on the true construction of that conveyance, the benefit of a restrictive covenant is annexed to the whole of the land in question, or only to the land as a whole’. 106 [1964] Ch 38 (Buckley J). 107 Although the covenant was entered into after 1925, s 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 was not cited. Had it been, then the case would have been on all fours with decision in Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 594, CA. In fact, the claimants in Russell v Archdale succeeded by virtue of the existence of an express assignment in their favour of the benefit of the covenant. But the judgment on the annexation point (in so far as it was based upon a point of law as opposed to mere construction) was given after full argument and in view of this, whilst not being part of the ratio decidendi (since the decision on the annexation point did not support the judgment in favour of the claimants), the authority of the case on the annexation point would appear to stand close to it in weight: see the observations of Megarry J in Brunner v Greenslade [1971] Ch 993, at p 1003A. 108 (1974) 29 P&CR 243. 109 [1966] 1 WLR 841. 110 Further details relating to the background facts appear in the (otherwise unrelated) decision in Re Gadd’s Land Transfer [1966] Ch 56 (Buckley J).
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The land to which annexation takes place 6.60 In 1928, Cameron Jeffs, purchased and became the registered proprietor of the Chorleywood Estate (Loudwater) comprising some 135 acres. He prepared a layout plan showing new roads with plots adjoining which he proposed to sell to individual purchasers. Prior to the date of the transfer next referred to, plots had been sold off to some 70 purchasers. By a transfer of May 1939, Cameron Jeffs transferred a plot to Alfred Frankel, the predecessor in title of the claimant. In the transfer, Alfred Frankel covenanted ‘with the vendor … for the benefit of the remainder of the Chorleywood Estate (Loudwater) belonging to the vendor to observe and perform the restrictive conditions and stipulations specified …’ in schedule 2 thereto (‘the covenant’). Paragraph 12 of this schedule, after setting out various restrictions concerning building and user, expressly provided that nothing therein contained should be ‘deemed to create a building scheme for the said estate or any part thereof’. Thereafter, further plots were sold, including those now owned by the defendants, but the transfers of those plots contained no express assignment of the benefit of the covenant entered into by Alfred Frankel (or by any other prior purchaser). In 1957, the unsold part of the estate was transferred to Loudwater (Troutstream) Estate Ltd and at the same time, the benefit of the restrictions entered into by the various purchasers was expressly assigned to that company.111 6.60 On the above facts, the question was whether the owners of plots which were sold off by the owner of the estate subsequently to the sale of the claimant’s plot could claim the benefit of the covenant on the ground that they were the successors in title of land to which the benefit of the covenant had been annexed. The defendants argued that since it was clear from the background facts that the owner of the estate intended to sell it off piecemeal to various individual purchasers, it must have been the intention that the words ‘for the benefit of the remainder of the Chorleywood Estate (Loudwater)’ were intended to annex the benefit of the covenant in a way which would pass on such benefit to the individual purchasers. But Stamp J, in dealing with this argument, said:112 ‘… if, as [counsel for the defendants] contends, the covenants entered into by Frankel are enforceable by subsequent purchasers, an absurdity is produced, for Frankel and any other purchasers could enforce the covenants entered into on sales made prior to their own purchases but could not enforce them against purchasers who purchased subsequently to their purchases. Nevertheless, Frankel would be liable to be proceeded against by the very person against whom he would have no remedy. It strains my credulity … to suppose that the parties intended so Gilbertian a situation … I would, if necessary, decide the case on that ground alone, but there are other considerations which lead me to the same conclusion.’ 111 The question of the right of the company to enforce the restrictions was not in issue in the case, it being common ground that it had that right by virtue of an express assignment ‘or some other reason’: see [1966] 1 All ER 937, at 939A (not reproduced in the WLR report). The company was the owner of part only of the land to which the benefit of the covenant was held to be annexed as a whole and the issue of whether, in such circumstances, there can be an express assignment of the benefit to such an owner was not before the court. See further, on this point, below, para 6.71. 112 Re Jeffs’ Transfer (No 2) [1966] 1 WLR 841, at p 848 A-C.
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6.61 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation 6.61 Stamp J went on to supplement the above reductio ad absurdum reasoning by pointing out that there were provisions in paragraph 12 of schedule 2 to the transfer which showed that where the draftsman intended to refer to the estate ‘or any part’ thereof, then he knew how to do it with the result that it seemed to his Lordship ‘difficult to suppose that if he had intended the benefit of the covenant to be annexed to the whole or any part of the remainder of the estate in the operative part of the conveyance (sic), he would not have said so, but the words “… or any part of the remainder of the said estate …” are not there’.113
Re Selwyn’s Conveyance114 6.62 Here a covenant entered into in 1924 expressed to be intended to ‘enure for the protection of the adjoining or neighbouring land part of or lately part of the Selwyn estate in the parish of Richmond’ was held by Goff J to refer to the land in question and every part thereof. Whilst the owners of land which was no longer part of the Selwyn estate could not benefit from the covenant (since there was no building scheme and those owners were neither parties to the covenant nor persons falling within the scope of section 5 of the Real Property Act 1845115) and the purported annexation was therefore ineffective as regards that land, this did not prevent the attempt to include this land as benefited land from indicating an intention to benefit more than one owner and thus to establish, as a matter of construction, an overall intention that the annexation was not to the land as a whole but to the land or any part thereof. 6.63 In arriving at this decision, Goff J accepted that the consequences referred to by Stamp J in Re Jeffs’ Transfer (No 2) as ‘Gilbertian’116 would result, and that such consequences might be ‘rather fortuitous’ but added,117 ‘This, however, is inherent in any covenant expressed in terms to be for the whole or part and, as such covenants are by no means extraordinary or unusual, nor were they as far as I know in 1922, I do not feel that this is a very material consideration.’
Stilwell v Blackman118 6.64 On the issue of the underlying principle relating to severability, this case does not carry the position any further since the argument and judgment proceeded on the basis that the words used effected annexation only to the benefited land as a unit and not to part only of such land. The covenant in question was one contained in a conveyance executed in November 1955 whereby the purchaser ‘with intent … to benefit and protect the adjoining property of the vendor’ covenanted ‘with the vendor’ to observe and perform certain stipulations and restrictions. On the basis of these words, the annexation was treated as nonseverable although the claimant (who had originally purchased all the adjoining 113 In this case also, although the covenant was entered into after 1925, no reference was made to s 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925. 114 [1967] Ch 674 (Goff J). 115 As to which, see above, para 3.3. 116 See above, para 6.60. 117 Re Jeffs’ Transfer (No 2) [1966] 1 WLR 841, at p 689G. 118 [1968] Ch 508 (Ungoed-Thomas J).
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The land to which annexation takes place 6.67 property of the vendor but had afterwards sold part of it) succeeded as an express assignee from the vendor of the benefit of the covenant.119
The position after Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd120 6.65 The covenant in the Federated Homes case was contained in a conveyance executed in February 1971. The express words of covenant were the bare words ‘The Purchaser hereby covenants with the Vendor that …’ It was clear, however, that the covenant related to land of the vendor company which it retained, and accordingly, the words of covenant were supplemented, under section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, by the addition of the words (after ‘the Vendor’) ‘and his successors in title and the persons deriving title under him or them’. As has already been seen, these words were held sufficient to bring about annexation to the vendor’s retained land but although the claimant was in fact the successor in title of the vendor in respect of the whole of the vendor’s retained land which was intended to be benefited,121 part of that land was treated as the subject of a claim for separate relief.122 The question therefore arose whether the statutory words of annexation brought about annexation to that part. 6.66 Consistently with the approach adopted in all the above cases, this question could have been treated as one of construction dependent upon whether the statutory words referred only to the ‘land of the covenantee’ as an integral whole or whether those words could be treated as referring to such land or any part or parts thereof. On the basis of such an approach, there would appear to be a close analogy in principle between the formula used in section 78(1) and that used by the parties to the covenant in Drake v Gray,123 with the result that (as assumed, but not considered, in Williams v Unit Construction Co Ltd124) annexation is thereby positively effected to individual parts of the benefited land. 6.67 Brightman LJ did in fact base his judgment on the point partly on this approach, citing certain observations of Romer LJ in Drake v Gray, but both Brightman and Megaw LJJ were impressed by the views expressed in the 4th edition of Megarry and Wade’s Law of Real Property125 that ‘the rule that presumes annexation to the whole only is arbitrary and inconvenient. In principle, it conflicts with the rule for assignments, which allows a benefit annexed to the whole to be assigned with part, and it also conflicts with the corresponding rule for easements’. After citing the above passage, Brightman LJ said:126 119 For a consideration of further aspects of this case, see below, para 6.71. It may be noted that although the covenant was entered into after 1925, s 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (which, on the basis of the Federated Homes case, would have brought about annexation to separate parts of the benefited land) was not cited. 120 [1980] 1 WLR 594. The facts and decision in this case are set out at length above, at para 6.31 et seq. It is considered here solely in the context of when annexation is severable. 121 See p 599E. 122 See above, footnote 59. 123 [1936] Ch 451, CA. 124 (1955) 19 Conv (NS) 262, CA. 125 Sweet & Maxwell (1975) at p 763. 126 Federated Homes [1980] 1 WLR 594, at p 606G.
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6.68 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation ‘I find the idea of the annexation of a covenant to the whole of the land but not to a part of it a difficult conception fully to grasp. I can understand that a covenantee may expressly or by necessary implication retain the benefit of a covenant wholly under his own control, so that the benefit will not pass unless the covenantee chooses to assign; but I would have thought, if the benefit of a covenant is, on a proper construction of a document, annexed to the land, prima facie it is annexed to every part thereof, unless the contrary clearly appears. It is difficult to see how this court can have reached its decision in Williams v Unit Construction Co Ltd127 unless this is right. The covenant was, by inference, annexed to every part of the land and not merely to the whole, because it will be recalled that the plaintiff [claimant] was a tenant of only one of the four houses which had the benefit of the covenant.’ Further, Megaw LJ said:128 ‘For myself, I would regard the observations made in the passage which Brightman LJ read from Megarry and Wade as being powerful reasons, and I find great difficulty in understanding how, either as a matter of principle, or as a matter of practical good sense in relation to a legal relationship of this sort, it can be said that a covenant, which ex hypothesi has been annexed to the land as a whole, is somehow or other not annexed to the individual parts of that land.’ 6.68 As indicated above, the actual decision on this point appears to have been founded on the true construction and effect of section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925. Further, the above observations are couched in language which are dismissive of the suggestion that there is, in any event, any problem concerning annexation to parts of the land, rather than as separate grounds for the decision. Had the observations been intended to form part of the ratio decidendi, then it would have been expected that the judgments would have specifically overruled the earlier decisions at first instance referred to above and to have given particular attention to the decision in Russell v Archdale (which was affirmed by the Court of Appeal129) in so far as such decisions clearly proceeded upon the existence of a presumption that, in the absence of an indication to the contrary, annexation is presumed to be to the land as a single unit only, and would have specifically disapproved the observations to that effect of Romer LJ in Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance cited above130 which were adopted in their entirety and applied by Slesser LJ in Drake v Gray.131 It is accordingly considered that the above observations were obiter only.132
127 (1955) 19 Conv (NS) 262, CA. 128 Federated Homes [1980] 1 WLR 594, at p 608B. 129 (1962) 185 Estates Gazette 913. However, the main point argued on appeal (by the appellant in person) was whether there had been acquiescence in respect of the breach. As to acquiesence, see para 13.122 et seq below. 130 See above, para 6.53. 131 See above, para 6.57. 132 In J Sainsbury plc v Enfield London Borough Council [1989] 1 WLR 590, counsel for the claimants appears to have treated the observations on this point in the Federated Homes case as binding on, or alternatively unlikely to be rejected by, the judge at first instance since the point that the covenant was annexed to the whole of the retained land and not to each and every part was not taken before Morritt J but merely reserved for argument on any appeal.
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The land to which annexation takes place 6.71 Nevertheless, since those observations were not confined to cases of annexation effected under section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, their general effect, if adopted in future cases, is to substitute for the presumption of annexation to the land as a whole but excluding any smaller part, unless the contrary appears, a presumption of annexation to the land and each and every part thereof, unless the contrary ‘clearly’ appears. 6.69 The approach of the Court of Appeal in Federated Homes Ltd on this point is open to criticism. For the presumption adopted in the pre-Federated Homes cases to be displaced, one would have expected good reasons to have to be shown for doing so. The reasons which have been put forward are as follows: (a) the presumption conflicts with the rule for assignments which allows a benefit annexed to the whole to be assigned with part (as described in Megarry and Wade, 4th edn, which was referred to); (b) the presumption conflicts with the corresponding rule for easements (Megarry and Wade, 4th edn); (c) the presumption is conceptually difficult to grasp and runs counter to the decision in Williams v Unit Construction Co Ltd (Brightman LJ); (d) the presumption is difficult to understand either as a matter of principle or as a matter of practical good sense (Megaw LJ). 6.70 As to (a), annexation and assignment are alternative methods by which the benefit of a restrictive covenant may be passed on to a successor in title of the benefited land. Whilst certain requirements are common to both (in particular, that the covenant must touch and concern the land acquired by the successor), there are several important differences including the rules relating to the admission of extrinsic evidence to identify the benefited land133 (where the rule is more restrictive in the case of annexation) and the relevance of knowledge of the existence of the covenant on the part of the owner of the benefited land134 (where the rule is more liberal in the case of annexation). The instant difference is a further example. 6.71 There is accordingly no doubt that the rules of annexation are different from the rules of express assignment. However, it does not follow that because they are different, they therefore conflict. They are simply two independent methods by either of which (according to the circumstances) the benefit of a restrictive covenant may pass to a successor and, as Ungoed-Thomas J held in Stilwell v Blackman,135 the fact that the benefit cannot pass under one method (annexation) is no reason for treating it as incapable of passing under another method (express assignment) – unless there is something in the covenant to show that one method only was intended to apply. In the last-mentioned case, Ungoed-Thomas J expressed the position thus:136 ‘… annexation of the benefit to the whole estate does not necessarily preclude on principle an express assignment of the benefit to the purchaser of part of
133 Compare Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance [1933] Ch 611 with Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold Ltd [1952] Ch 286. 134 See Rogers v Hosegood [1900] 2 Ch 388, per Collins LJ at pp 407–408. 135 [1968] Ch 508. 136 [1968] Ch 508, at 527B.
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6.72 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation the estate; it seems to me to be a question of construction of each covenant and the provision for its assignment, whether the sole method of assignment is to be by the passing of the whole estate to which the benefit of the covenant is annexed.’ The fact that annexation to the whole did not preclude express assignment to a purchaser of a part illustrates the application of two separate and distinct but compatible presumptions, namely the presumption against the automatic passing of the benefit to such a purchaser and the presumption that the benefit of a covenant is freely assignable by express action unless the contrary appears. The decisions in Russell v Archdale137 and Stilwell v Blackman138 are examples of the parallel application of these presumptions.139 6.72 As to (b), whilst in a number of respects the law relating to restrictive covenants has adopted the corresponding rules relating to negative easements, this has by no means universally been the case.140 In the present context, the rule that an easement is presumed to accommodate each and every part of the dominant tenement which is capable of benefiting derives from the character of an easement as being ‘appurtenant’ to land, that is being deemed to attach to the physical land itself. This is a characteristic not shared by restrictive covenants141 whose breadth of attachment to the land and transmissibility is dependent upon the intention of the parties subject to the maximum which the law allows. Prima facie, therefore, it is for the terms of the covenant to spell out that intention and not for the law to presume an intention to invoke the maximum which the law allows unless there is a contrary intent. 6.73 As to (c) (conceptually difficult to grasp and inconsistent with Williams v Unit Construction Co Ltd), the difficulty appears to lie in a blurring of the distinction between a fragmentation of the covenant and a fragmentation of the land. If the benefit of a covenant relating to an area of land is whole and indivisible (this being the initial premise applicable to covenants at common law142), this does not mean that the benefit cannot be enjoyed as an entity in relation to the land or to any single smaller area. But it does mean that the covenant will not be automatically split up on the subdivision of the land and converted into as many separate covenants as there are separate pieces of land. In the context of annexation to land as a single entity, it is clear that the agreement between the parties is that so far as automatic succession to the benefit of the covenant is concerned, the covenant will not pass except to a person who acquires the whole
137 [1964] Ch 38 (Buckley J). Although in this case, as pointed out by Ungoed-Thomas J in Stilwell v Blackman [1968] Ch 508, at p 527, the question was never debated whether the annexation of the benefit to the whole estate precluded an express assignment of the benefit to the purchaser of part of the estate. The point therefore went sub silentio. 138 Stilwell v Blackman [1968] Ch 508. 139 The rules of law emanating from these decisions are further considered in Chapter 7. The forms of covenant in Marquess of Zetland v Driver [1939] Ch 1 and Roake v Chadba [1984] 1 WLR 40 each provide examples of express exclusion of automatic passing of the benefit and express inclusion of the right to make an assignment the benefit. In the end, it is a question of what the presumption should be; cf the different rules in this respect of common law and equity concerning whether a covenant can be split up and parts of it separately assigned: see the observations of Ungoed-Thomas J in Stilwell v Blackman, ibid, at 521G. 140 See above, paras 1.7–1.8. 141 See, however, Kumar v Dunning [1989] QB 193, CA where the question whether a covenant could be said to ‘appertain’ to land within the meaning of s 62(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 was mooted. And see, further, below at para 7.31. 142 See above, para 16.51 et seq.
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The land to which annexation takes place 6.75 of the benefited land. Accordingly, if the benefited land is fragmented, there can be no automatic fragmentation of the covenant. On the other hand, there is no reason why the covenant should not continue to benefit any part or parts of the land if the covenant is expressly dealt with in that way. On a sale of part of the land, the benefit of the covenant could either be retained by the vendor for the benefit of his retained land to the exclusion of the land sold143 or expressly assigned to the purchaser either as a whole (to the exclusion of the retained land) or by severing the benefit as between the land retained and the land sold.144 In this sense, therefore, a covenant which is annexed to the land as a whole remains capable of benefiting any part. So far as the decision in Williams v Unit Construction Ltd145 is concerned it has already been pointed out above that this was a decision on the effect of the words imported into covenants by section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 and that those words are consistent with effecting annexation to the benefited land and every part thereof.146 6.74 As to (d) (difficult to understand either as a matter of principle or as a matter of practical good sense) in referring to the matter of principle, Megaw LJ was apparently endorsing the criticism of the pre-Federated Homes presumption made by Megarry and Wade to which reference has already been made above. But apart from the validity or otherwise of that criticism, there would appear to be sound reasons as a matter of principle for upholding that presumption. In this connection, it has never been suggested147 that it is not open to the parties to agree that the benefit of a covenant shall only be capable of passing automatically to a successor in title of the whole of the land; accordingly, this is not the principle which is involved. The principle involved is whether there should be (a) a presumption to that effect unless the contrary appears or (b) a presumption that the benefit of the covenant can be automatically split up into as many separate choses in action as there are persons from time to time interested in different parts of the land, unless the contrary appears. 6.75 As has been seen, prima facie the benefit of a chose in action (such as the benefit of a covenant148) is whole and indivisible, except that in equity the benefit of a restrictive covenant may (unless a contrary intention appears) be split up by express assignment.149 If part of the benefited land is disposed of and the benefit of the covenant is expressly assigned, then that assignment will, in the context, no doubt be treated as an assignment of the corresponding part (but not the whole) of the chose in action. The intention of the parties is made clear as a result of the combination of the initial presumption of what can be done and the circumstances surrounding what is actually done on the subsequent disposal. If and only if annexation is invoked can there be any automatic passing of the benefit. Whether annexation is invoked is a question of intention as disclosed by the wording of the covenant.
143 144 145 146 147
As in Stilwell v Blackman [1968] Ch 508 (Ungoed-Thomas J). As in Russell v Archdale [1964] Ch 38 (Buckley J). (1955) 19 Conv (NS) 262, CA. See above, para 6.67. Apart from the argument in Roake v Chadha [1984] 1 WLR 40, referred to above, para 6.42, where s 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 applies. 148 See H W Elphinstone, ‘What is a Chose in Action?’ (1893) 9 LQR 311. 149 See above, para 6.51.
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6.76 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation Given that annexation may be either to the whole as a whole, or to the whole or any part or parts and given the fundamental difference between the two in either preserving the integrity of the covenant as a single chose in action or permitting it to be split up into an indefinite number of subdivided choses in action, the question which of the two results is produced must be a question of intention. Since the second of the above alternatives is much wider than the first, the onus must be upon the party seeking to establish it to show a sufficiently clear-cut intention. If the covenant is expressed to be made for the benefit of a specified area of land without more. then it would, in the circumstances, seem more reasonable, as a matter of principle, to imply the words ‘but not for the benefit of any separate part of such land’ than to imply the words ‘or, on severance of the land, for the benefit of each severed part’.150 Of course, whilst the land remains unsevered, the benefit clearly does operate for the benefit of each and every part of the land as already mentioned above. 6.76 Further, so far as practical good sense is concerned, as appears from the ‘Gilbertian situation’ to which Stamp J refers in Re Jeffs’ Transfer (No 2),151 it can often make practical good sense for the benefit of a covenant not to be split up on each subsequent sale off of a part of the benefited land, particularly in the case of the systematic sale of land in lots to which (as a result of express provision or on the facts) no building scheme applies. As between the two competing presumptions which are in contention, the fact is that the pre-Federated Homes presumption will have been the basis upon which draftsmen framed and interpreted the effect of covenants over a period of nearly half a century, between the decision in Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance152 in 1933 and the decision in the Federated Homes case in 1980, and even if (which would appear to be by no means clear) the balance of the arguments were, if the matter was one of first impression, thought to be in favour of the more recently suggested presumption, yet where there is found to be a consistent body of judicial authority over a lengthy period which has favoured the opposite presumption, and on the faith of which many properties must have changed hands (and many indemnity insurance policies issued!) it should require something much more than the balance of arguments as a matter of principle retrospectively to revive covenants thought to have been unenforceable. 6.77 However, in Hugh Small v Oliver & Saunders (Developments) Ltd,153 in relation to a 1925 covenant, Mr Mark Herbert QC sitting as a deputy High Court judge referred to the passages from Brightman LJ and Megaw LJ set out above154 and applied them, saying in para 30: ‘I read those as statements of principle that, in the absence of a clear contrary indication, annexation to identified land of the vendor, whether statutory or express, enures for the benefit of every part of the land.’
150 The opposite approach appears, however, to have been adopted by Browne-Wilkinson V-C in Allen v Veranne Builders Ltd [1988] NPC 11, although there a building scheme was also found to exist. 151 [1966] 1 WLR 841 at p 848, and see above, para 6.60. 152 [1933] Ch 611, CA. 153 [2006] EWHC 1293 (Ch). 154 See para 6.67 above.
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The land to which annexation takes place 6.80 Although the introduction of such a presumption may be said to represent a simplification of the position, as well as being questionable based on the law as laid down in previous cases, none of which have actually been overruled, this may seem somewhat unjust in that those dealing with pre-1926 covenants may reasonably be supposed them to have been based on the often quoted observations of Hall V-C in Renals v Cowlishaw referred to above155 and to have assumed that the pre-Federated Homes presumption would apply. 6.78 Post-1925 draftsmen will, however, have had their drafting supplemented156 by the provisions of section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 the language of which appears to have been regarded in the Federated Homes case157 as sufficient, without the aid of the ‘alternative presumption’, to bring about annexation to the whole or any severed part or parts.158 The decision in Federated Homes seems likely to be taken to now represent the law in relation to this aspect of the matter.
Annexation to any part of the land ‘unless the contrary clearly appears’ 6.79 Brightman LJ in Federated Homes made clear in the passage quoted at para 6.67 above159 that section 78 of the Law of Property Act 1925 meant that the benefit of covenants annexed to the land were to be taken prima facie to be annexed to every part thereof ‘unless the contrary clearly appears’. 6.80 There may be good reason for it to be agreed to the contrary. In Crest Nicholson Residential (South) Ltd,160 Chadwick LJ, for the court, said: ‘… a developer who is selling off land in lots might well want to retain the benefit of a building restriction under his own control. Where … development land is sold off in plots without imposing a building scheme, it seems to me very likely that the developer will wish to retain exclusive power to give or withhold consent to a modification or relaxation of a restriction on building which he imposes on each purchaser; unfettered by the need to obtain the consent of every subsequent purchaser to whom (after imposing the covenant) he has sold off other plots on the development land. I can see no reason why, if original covenantor and covenantee make clear their mutual intention in that respect, the legislature should wish to prevent effect being given to that intention.’
155 See above, para 6.52. In the case of the covenants in Rogers v Hosegood [1900] 2 Ch 388 which were entered into in 1869, Farwell J at first instance observed, at p 397: ‘The draftsman would appear to have had the words of Hall V-C before him when he framed this covenant, and I think it would be difficult to express the intention in clearer words.’ 156 Unless there was an express indication to the contrary contained in the covenant: see Roake v Chadha [1984] 1 WLR 40. 157 And tacitly in Williams v Unit Construction Co Ltd (1955) 19 Conv (NS) 262, CA. 158 As to which see above, para 6.67. The section could have been, but was not, relied upon in each of the decisions in Russell v Archdale [1964] Ch 38, Re Jeffs’ Transfer (No 2) [1966] 1 WLR 841 and Stilwell v Blackman [1968] Ch 508. 159 At P606G-H of the judgment. 160 [2004] 1 WLR 2409, at para 41.
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6.81 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation 6.81 In Sugarman v Porter,161 Peter Smith J, applying Marquess of Zetland and Crest, held that where a covenant is said to benefit the land of the vendor that remains unsold from time to time the effect is to annex the covenant to that land for the period in which the land remains unsold. Upon the sale of the land the covenant is not annexed and will only pass if there is an express assignment. The plain wording of the conveyance was held to be ‘a sufficient contrary intention’ to displace statutory annexation by reason of section 78. 6.82 In Site Developments (Ferndown) Ltd v Cuthbury Ltd162 a conveyance in 1926 contained restrictive covenants ‘with the Vendor and his successors in Title the owner or owners for the time being of the Canford Estate of which the land hereby transferred and conveyed forms part’. At the time, the estate covered several miles outside Poole, Dorset. There had been large numbers of transfers made of parts of it since then. Vos J found that it could not have been intended that covenants made in favour of the Estate could be enforced by every transferee of land from the Estate, however small or insignificant the parcel the transferee acquired. The remaining Estate still existed and could enforce or release the covenants as it chose, but it would be absurd to think each transferee of a part was in the circumstances intended to acquire the benefit of the covenants. Accordingly, it was not annexed to each part of the land in the way described in Federated Homes, as the contrary did clearly appear.
Case 4 6.83 As in Case 3 except that the covenant is annexed to the land and (in terms) to each and every part thereof. This was the situation in Rogers v Hosegood163 and represents annexation at its most comprehensive. In that case, in a conveyance executed in 1869 of a plot forming part of a site in Palace Gate which had been laid out in a number of plots, the purchaser covenanted with the vendors their heirs and assigns ‘with intent that the covenants thereinafter on his behalf contained … might enure to the benefit of [the vendors], their heirs and assigns and others claiming under them to all or any of their lands adjoining or near to the said premises’. Later, in 1872, the vendors sold another plot to the predecessor in title of the claimants who, when they purchased, were unaware of the existence of the covenant contained in the 1869 conveyance. Farwell J and the Court of Appeal held that the benefit of the covenant ran with the claimants’ plot and entitled them to an injunction to enforce the covenant. In the course of delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, Collins LJ said:164 ‘But when, as here, it has been once annexed to the land reserved, then … the presumption must be that it passes on a sale of that land, unless there is something to rebut it, and the purchaser’s ignorance of the existence of the covenant does not defeat the presumption.’
161 162 163 164
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[2006] 2 P&CR 14. [2010] EWHC 10 (Ch). [1900] 2 Ch 388, CA. Ibid, at p 408.
The land to which annexation takes place 6.86 6.84 Accordingly, this form of annexation undoubtedly gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that on every subsequent disposition of the benefited land or any part thereof, the benefit of the covenant or (as the case may be) a severed part of such benefit will pass with that land into the hands of subsequent owners165 without express mention. Unless the presumption is rebutted, the benefit of the covenant appears to attach, not to any particular estate or interest in the land,166 but to the physical land itself, in a similar way to that in which the benefit of an easement has, since the earliest times, been regarded as attaching to the soil of the land167 so as automatically to pass with the land into the hands of any owner or occupier of any part of the dominant land. ‘It is in the nature of an easement attached to his property as the dominant tenement.’168
Case 5 6.85 The covenant touches and concerns the land but is expressed to be annexed only in a limited way – for example, it is provided that it is annexed to such part of the identified land as remains unsold or shall be sold by the vendor or his successors in title with the express benefit of the covenant. This was the position in Marquess of Zetland v Driver,169 where clause 2 of the conveyance provided: ‘The purchaser to the intent and so as to bind as far as practicable the said property “hereby conveyed into whosesoever hands the same may come and to benefit and protect such part or parts of the lands in the Borough Township or Parish of Redcar in the North Riding of the County of York, now subject to the settlement (a) as shall for the time being remain unsold or (b) as shall be sold by the vendor or his successors in title with the express benefit of this covenant, covenants with the vendor that the purchaser will at all times observe, perform and keep the said stipulations contained in the Second Schedule hereto.” It was held by the Court of Appeal to effect annexation in the terms set out and, on the death of the vendor, the covenant was able to be enforced by his successor. See also the cases referred to at paras 1.43–1.45 above. 6.86 In Crest Nicholson Residential (South) Limited v McAllister,170 the land benefited was indicated to be ‘the property at Claygate aforesaid belonging [to the covenantee] or the part thereof for the time being remaining unsold’. In the context of development land being sold off in plots without imposing a building scheme, where the developer was likely to want to retain exclusive power to give or withhold consent to any modification or relaxation of a building restriction
165 As to the precise nature of the interest which must be owned to entitle the ‘owner’ to enforce the covenant, see above, para 1.51. 166 Contrast the definition, for the purposes of s 80 of the Law of Property Act 1925, of a covenant which ‘runs with the land’ in s 80(4) of the Act. 167 See Bracton De Legibus Angliae. 168 Per Cozens-Hardy MR in Reid v Bickerstaff [1909] 2 Ch 305, at p 320. 169 [1939] Ch 1. 170 [2004] 1 WLR 2409.
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6.87 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation imposed by him on each purchaser without the need to obtain the consent of every subsequent purchaser to whom (after imposing the covenant) he had sold off other plots171 it was held that the wording meant that the defendant’s land which had subsequently been sold by the covenantee did not have the benefit of the covenant. 6.87 In Sugarman v Porter,172 Peter Smith J, applying Marquess of Zetland and Crest, held that where a covenant is said to benefit the land of the vendor that remains unsold from time to time the effect is to annex the covenant to that land for the period in which the land remains unsold. Upon the sale of the land the covenant was not annexed and would only pass if there is an express assignment. 6.88 Again, in Norwich City College of Further and Higher Education v McQuillin,173 where the covenant was expressed to be ‘for the benefit of the Trafford Estate at Lakenham or the part or parts thereof remaining unsold’, annexation of the benefit of the covenant was held to be limited to so much of the land belonging to the vendor at the date of the conveyance as thereafter continued to be under the ownership of the vendor or his successors in title to the Trafford Estate. Land subsequently sold off from the estate by the original vendor or his successors in title was excluded. This made sense of the words ‘for the time being unsold’, and other indications, including the factual background, also supported the conclusion. 6.89 As this and all the cases emphasise, the true construction of the covenant is what needs to be ascertained, having regard to its context and the circumstances prevailing when it was entered into. In Rees v Peters,174 a covenant by the vendor of land ‘with the Purchasers and their successors in title … for the benefit of the property hereby conveyed, or the part thereof for the time being remaining unsold, and every part thereof’, not to build on a specified part of the retained land without the consent of the purchasers was construed by the Court of Appeal to mean that if the whole was sold the covenant would be enforceable by the purchaser successors in title, but that if just part was sold the covenant would not then apply to that part. In other words, in the particular circumstances of the case, and having regard in particular to the phrase ‘successors in title’ at the start, the words ‘or the part thereof for the time being remaining unsold’ referred to what was to happen if there was a sale only of part – namely, that the covenant was not then to apply to that part.
NEGATING PRE-EXISTING ANNEXATION 6.90 It sometimes happens that the owner of land to which the benefit of restrictive covenants is attached by annexation of the most comprehensive kind (category (4) annexation above) desires to dispose of parts of the benefited land without passing on the benefit of the covenants. The advantage of so doing is that if and when the owner of the burdened land wishes to negotiate for a
171 172 173 174
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As to which, see para 6.80 above. [2006] 2 P&CR 14; see para 6.81 above. [2009] 2 P&CR 22. [2011] 2 P&CR 18.
Negating annexation effected under LPA 1925, s 78(1) 6.93 release or modification of the restrictions, the number of persons involved in the release is confined and, with it, the persons entitled to share in any release consideration. This may be of particular concern when parts of the benefited land are to be leased or dealt with by way of licence since both under the general law175 and (in the case of post-1925 covenants) by the express language of section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, lessees176 and occupiers177 have a sufficient interest entitling them to enforce restrictive covenants benefiting the leased or licensed land. 6.91 It is clear from the decision of Ungoed-Thomas J in Stilwell v Blackman178 that the fact that the benefit of a restrictive covenant is annexed by express words to the benefited land does not preclude the possibility of the benefit of the covenant being dealt with, either by assignment or retention, in a way which overrides the annexation. Accordingly, where it is desired to retain the benefit, the question arises as to how annexation may be nullified in relation to the land being sold, leased or licensed.179 6.92 If, in the conveyance, lease or other transaction, there is simply a declaration of intent that the benefit of the covenant shall not pass, this may not be regarded as sufficient (though an estoppel might arise). To put the matter beyond doubt, there should sensibly be a formal release of the covenant by the competent owner in relation to the part of the land to be disposed of either absolutely, in the case of a sale, or for the period corresponding with the lease or licence, as the case may be. Further, since both parties will be affected by the release, it would be desirable for it to be contained in a document executed in duplicate, followed up either by a suitable note on the Property Register180 (in the case of registered land) or (otherwise) an endorsement on the title deed bringing about annexation.181
NEGATING ANNEXATION EFFECTED UNDER SECTION 78(1) OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY ACT 1925 6.93 The issue of excluding section 78(1) or negating its effect has already been considered generally above182 and as indicated there, there is nothing in the section which would preclude the negating of annexation effected under the section.
175 See above, para 1.51 (‘non-proprietary occupiers’). 176 See Williams v Unit Construction Co Ltd (1955) 19 Conv (NS) 262. 177 Section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, second paragraph. 178 [1968] Ch 508. 179 As to whether annexation in a proprietary sense can as a matter of law be annexed so as to vest the benefit in a mere licensee, see the Lands Tribunal case of Re Da Costa’s Application (1986) 52 P&CR 99. 180 Although there is no obligation on the Registrar to enter notes of either the benefit or absence of benefit of covenants: see Cator v Newton [1940] 1 KB 415. 181 Prima facie, this will be the instrument creating the covenant unless it is possible for annexation to be subsequently unilaterally effected, as to which see below, paras 6.94–6.103. 182 See paras 6.42–6.44 above.
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6.94 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation
CAN ANNEXATION BE EFFECTED AFTER THE CREATION OF THE COVENANT BY THE UNILATERAL ACTION OF THE PERSON ENTITLED TO ITS BENEFIT? 6.94 For this question to arise, it must be pre-supposed that a restrictive covenant has at some stage in the past been entered into for the benefit of the original covenantee’s land but without the requirements for annexation being met at that time (and there being no building scheme). In such a case, the question is whether, on a subsequent disposition of the benefited land (or any part thereof) it is open to the original covenantee or any later owner of the land who has acquired the benefit of the covenant by express assignment, to effect an annexation of the covenant without the covenantor (or other person for the time being subject to the burden of the covenant) taking part. 6.95 In Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd,183 Mr John Mills QC, sitting as a deputy High Court judge, gave his view in the following terms: ‘“Annexation”, in my judgment, is for the parties to the covenant itself to achieve if they wish to, and (though those parties may no doubt provide for annexation at a later stage) I am not satisfied or prepared to hold that there is any such thing as “delayed annexation by assignment” to which the covenantor is not party or privy.’ 6.96 On appeal, this issue did not arise but the above passage, together with another part of the judgment,184 was cited by Brightman LJ who, without commenting on its validity, added: ‘The reference to “delayed annexation by assignment” is to a proposition that a covenant can, on a later assignment, thereby become annexed to the land by the act of the assignor and the assignee alone.’ 6.97 As a matter of principle, the view (judicially expressed) of Mr John Mills QC would be correct if subsequent annexation would impose an additional burden on the covenantor (or his successor). In order to determine whether it would do so, it is necessary to consider whether there is any actual or potential difference, vis-à-vis the burden, between: (a) a restrictive covenant which is expressed to be entered into with the covenantee simpliciter (and to which section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 does not apply185), no reference being made to any land of the covenantee but which in fact clearly touches and concerns retained land of the covenantee (Greenacres); and (b) a restrictive covenant which is expressed to be entered into with the covenantee to the intent that it shall enure for the benefit of the covenantee and other the owner or owners of or persons interested in Greenacres or any severed part or parts thereof for the time being and from time to time. If there is no difference in the actual or potential liability of the covenantor (or his successors) as between each of the foregoing covenants, then there is no reason why, without the covenantor’s (or other liable person’s) consent, the
183 [1980] 1 WLR 594. 184 Which is not reported. 185 Either because it is a pre-1926 covenant or because the subsection is effectively negatived.
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Can annexation be effected after the creation of the covenant etc? 6.99 person from time to time entitled to the benefit of a covenant of type (a) should not be entitled to convert it into a covenant of type (b). 6.98 It is clear that under both types of covenant, the benefit is inherently capable of running with the land or any severed part thereof to precisely the same extent in each case. The difference is that whereas in the case of a covenant of type (b) such running will be automatic,186 in the case of a covenant of type (a) it is conditional on the original covenantee or other owner or owners for the time being of the benefited land, making an express assignment of the benefit of the covenant on the occasion (subject to the point now being considered) of any and every disposition of that land or of any part or parts thereof.187 The making of such express assignments is not subject to any requirement of consent from the covenantor, since the presumption in equity is that unless the contrary appears, the benefit of a restrictive covenant can be assigned either as a whole or ‘in pieces’ and ‘to one person after another.188 Since, therefore, a state of equilibrium between a type (a) covenant and a type (b) covenant can be achieved by an unbroken chain of express assignments within the scope of the terms of the type (a) covenant, would the bringing about of this result by invoking (somewhere along the line) a built-in mechanism (annexation) providing a substitute for such a chain of assignments but otherwise producing the same effect, operate to increase the burden of the owner of the burdened land? Prima facie, the route by which maximum enforceability is achieved would be expected to be a matter of indifference to the covenantor and simply to confer choice on the covenantee—and this is consistent with the rules, considered above, relating to annexation of a covenant to land either as a whole or to the severed parts.189 In other words, whether the benefit of the covenant is passed on automatically or by assignment is prima facie a matter in which, on a subsequent disposition, the covenantee and his assignee have an interest but which is not regarded as materially affecting the covenantor. 6.99 If the foregoing analysis is correct, then the view expressed by Mr John Mills QC, referred to above,190 appears, in principle, to be incorrect. Further, that view is contrary to a long and consistent line of dicta by other judges from time to time, of which the following are representative.
186 Rogers v Hosegood [1900] 2 Ch 388, see above, para 6.83. 187 See Chapter 7. 188 Per Romer LJ in Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance [1933] Ch 611, at p 630. This presumption arises from the fact that the benefit of restrictive covenant is an equitable interest in land (London and South Western Rly Co v Gomm (1881) 20 ChD 562, and as a property interest, is presumed to be freely alienable: cf Re Button’s Lease [1964] Ch 263 (option presumed to be assignable). 189 See above, para 6.45 et seq. The question whether, where annexation had originally been to the benefited land as a whole, it was open to the covenantee, on a subsequent sale of part, to annex the benefit to a part, was raised in Stilwell v Blackman [1968] Ch 508 but not decided. But it was also held in that case that initial annexation to land as a whole, did not preclude express assignment of the benefit of the covenant on a sale of a part of the land and there seems no sufficient reason, therefore, to treat such form of annexation as excluding the power of the covenantee to do by annexation to part what can be done by a chain of assignments in relation to that part. 190 At para 6.95.
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6.100 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation In Rogers v Hosegood,191 Collins LJ, delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal, said: ‘When, as in Renals v Cowlishaw,192 there is no indication in the original conveyance, or in the circumstances attending it, that the burden of the restrictive covenant is imposed for the benefit of the land reserved, or any particular part of it, then it becomes necessary to examine the circumstances under which any part of the land reserved is sold, in order to see whether a benefit, not originally annexed to it, has become annexed to it on the sale, so that the purchaser is deemed to have bought it with the land …’ In Reid v Bickerstaff,193 Cozens-Hardy MR said: ‘The benefit of a covenant capable of being annexed to land, but not expressed to be so annexed, either by the deed containing the covenant or by some subsequent instrument executed by the covenantee, does not pass as an incident of land on a subsequent conveyance.’ In applying this statement to the facts of the case, Cozens-Hardy MR said:194 ‘It is equally plain that there is nothing in the deed [of covenant] of 1840, or in any document prior or subsequent thereto, to indicate that the covenant was entered into for the benefit of the particular parcels of which the plaintiffs [claimants] are now owners.’ 6.100 In Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold Ltd,195 Upjohn J asked (in the context of a restrictive covenant previously exacted by Mrs Mardon on selling part of her land and retaining Devonia on which she carried on a business): ‘Mrs Mardon may well have had it in mind that she might want ultimately to sell her land and the business and the benefit of the covenant in such manner as to annex the benefit of the covenant to Devonia for, by so doing, she would get an enhanced price of the totality of the assets she was selling?’ In Stilwell v Blackman,196 Ungoed-Thomas J said: ‘Indeed, in the authorities, covenants are described as being for the benefit of land, whether annexed to it or to enable the covenantees to dispose of it to the best advantage (for example, by the Court of Appeal in Miles v Easter197). And the object of enabling land to be more advantageously disposed of is largely, if not completely, achieved by annexing the covenant to it, as equity itself recognises in permitting a covenantee, where the covenant is not annexed to land, to annex it on his disposing of the land or part of it (see Rogers v Hosegood and Reid v Bickerstaff).’ Later in his judgment he added:198 ‘It seems to me that the person entitled to make the express assignment can pass the benefit of the covenant by annexing it to all or any of the land 191 [1900] 2 Ch 388, at p 408. 192 (1878) 9 ChD 125, affd (1879) 11 ChD 866. 193 [1909] 2 Ch 305, at p 320. 194 Ibid, at p 321. 195 [1952] Ch 286, at p 293. 196 [1968] Ch 508, at p 525A. 197 Ie, Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance [1933] Ch 611. 198 Stilwell v Blackman [1968] Ch 508, at p 526F.
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Can annexation be effected after the creation of the covenant etc? 6.104 in connexion with which the covenant could pass, or, alternatively, by an express assignment, and that all succeeding express assignees of the benefit of the covenant could do likewise.’ 6.101 Entirely consistent with the above dicta is the decision of the Court of Appeal in Nalder and Collyer’s Brewery Co Ltd v Harman,199 the material facts of which were as follows. Tancock, the owner of a freehold estate in Croydon, sold and conveyed a small part of it to Drummond (the predecessor in title of the defendant’s landlord). In the conveyance, Drummond covenanted with Tancock his heirs and assigns to observe certain restrictions. Thereafter, Tancock created a building scheme in respect of the remainder of the estate, selling it off in lots. The claimant company was the successor in title of the purchaser of Lot 7. The conveyance by Tancock of that lot contained no express assignment of the benefit of Drummond’s covenant. The claimant company claimed that the benefit of the covenant had passed to it with Lot 7 by virtue of the subsequent creation and operation of the building scheme. The Court of Appeal (which included Collins LJ who, in the previous month, had delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Rogers v Hosegood200) upheld this claim. 6.102 This case accordingly demonstrates that it is open to a covenantee, where initially there is no mechanism (annexation or building scheme) for ensuring the automatic passing of the benefit of a covenant, afterwards to bring about such automatic passing by creating a building scheme – and clearly, as between the original parties to the covenant, it can make no difference if the same result is produced by subsequent annexation rather than by a building scheme. 6.103 In the light of the foregoing and of the principle considered above, it is considered that unless there is an express or implied indication to the contrary in the instrument containing the covenant, a restrictive covenant which is not initially comprehensively annexed to land must be treated as having been entered into on the footing that the covenantee, or any successor, has power in conjunction with an assignee to effect annexation to any severed parts of the benefited land on the occasion of severance.
On the footing that subsequent annexation can be effected, the means of achieving this 6.104 The most obvious method would be for the parties to the subsequent sale (or other transaction) to provide for the express assignment of the benefit of the covenant and to declare their intent that such covenant shall thereafter enure for the benefit of the land sold and each and every part thereof in the hands of any and every owner thereof or person interested therein from time to time.
199 (1900) 83 LT 257. 200 [1900] 2 Ch 388.
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6.105 Subsequent owners & occupiers of benefited land: (a) annexation It has been suggested that an express assignment in the same document as that which transferred the land would be sufficient without more.201 However, there is no decision to this effect. It is suggested that the question of how annexation is to be effected on assignment is in principle to be answered by reference to the ordinary rules on annexation: (1) is the land benefited by the covenant being assigned identified by the instrument of assignment so as to be easily ascertainable; and (2) are there words in the instrument of assignment which show the covenant is intended to benefit that land, ie subsequent owners of the land not just the immediate assignee? As to these matters, see paras 6.6–6.23 above. 6.105 In relation to the second requirement, section 78 of the Law of Property Act 1925 would not apply so as to import in an instrument, silent on its face, words showing an intention to benefit successors in title, as that only imports such words into a covenant and, at this stage, one is dealing with an assignment, so that express words are required. It would appear to follow that the mere making of an express assignment without words necessary to fulfil these two requirements being fulfilled will not be enough to bring about annexation. 6.106 Such dicta as there are in the cases above point both ways, but they are considered on balance to support this position: (1) In every decided case where the plaintiff has successfully relied upon express assignment as establishing title to the benefit of a restrictive covenant, there has in fact been an unbroken chain of assignments (express and/or by operation of law) through which the covenant has passed from the original covenantee to the claimant.202 (2) There are dicta in Renals v Cowlishaw,203 which suggest an express assignment might in itself be sufficient to achieve annexation: Hall V-C indicated the circumstances in which the unsuccessful claimants in that case who, in 1870, purchased from the devisees of Bainbrigge (Bainbrigge having previously purchased from the covenantees) might have succeeded, in the following terms: ‘If it had appeared in the conveyance to Bainbrigge that there were such restrictive covenants in conveyances already executed, and expressly or otherwise that Bainbrigge was to have the benefit of them, he and the plaintiffs, as claiming through him, would have been entitled to the benefit of them. But there being in the conveyance to Bainbrigge no reference to the existence of such covenants by recital of
201 By Sir Lancelot H Elphinstone Covenants Affecting Land (1946), art 54(2) – but the authority cited – Renals v Cowlishaw (1878) 9 ChD 125, at p 129 – lends only vague support for the suggestion; and also by counsel in Stilwell v Blackman [1968] Ch 508 – commented on by Ungoed-Thomas J. 202 The reported decisions are Lord Northbourne v Johnston & Son [1922] 2 Ch 309; Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold [1952] Ch 286, and (in respect of the ‘green land’) Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 594. 203 (1878) 9 ChD 125.
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Can annexation be effected after the creation of the covenant etc? 6.106 the conveyances containing them or otherwise, the plaintiffs cannot be treated as entitled to the benefit of them.’204 (3) However, in Re Pinewood Estate, Farnborough,205 Wynn-Parry J reaffirmed the more traditional view that where reliance has to be placed on express assignment, there must be a continuous chain of such assignments. (4) And in Stilwell v Blackman,206 Unged-Thomas J said: ‘It has been suggested that where an express assignment of the benefit of the covenant is made on the passing of the covenantee’s relevant land, the benefit is thereupon, automatically, and thenceforth, annexed to that land, and words used in particular by Hall V-C in Renals v Cowlishaw have been called in aid of this proposition. But again such words were not directed to any issue or argument upon this question, or, indeed, even to the recognition that this question arose. It seems to me that to base such a conclusion upon words so used is in effect to interpret them out of context, and to attach to them a weight which they were never intended to bear.’ (5) More recently, in Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd,207 the two earlier express assignments (on sales of the benefited land) prior to the transfer to the claimant company (which contained no express assignment) were tacitly treated as ineffective in themselves to pass the benefit to the claimant company in respect of the red land.208 It was not argued, or raised as a point by the Court, that either of the earlier conveyances, which did contain an express assignment, operated to annex the benefit to the red land.
204 205 206 207 208
At pp 130–131. [1958] Ch 280, at p 287. [1968] 1 Ch 508. [1980] 1 WLR 594. For the facts, see para 6.31 above.
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7 Competent claimants: (b) express assignment
ASSIGNABILITY OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS 7.1 Provided that a restrictive covenant satisfies the six basic requirements considered in Chapter 1 and summarised at para 1.9 above, the benefit of such a covenant is presumed to be freely assignable unless the contrary appears. In the words of Ungoed-Thomas J in Stilwell v Blackman:1 ‘… the passing of the benefit of a restrictive covenant by express assignment is permitted in accordance with equitable principles without any express provision between the original covenantor and the covenantee for such assignment … So express assignment of the benefit of a restrictive covenant can only be forbidden if it is positively excluded …’ This presumption stems partly from the fact that a restrictive covenant is a chose in action for the benefit of land, and thus assignable at common law,2 and partly from the fact that such a covenant confers an equitable interest in the burdened land3 to which the presumption of free alienability applies.4 In order to give rise to the presumption, it is not necessary to show that the covenant contains any express words showing assignability. 7.2 Further, if the covenant is expressed to be made with the covenantee ‘and his assigns’, this would in any event preclude any argument that the covenant was, on its true construction, intended to be personal to the covenantee.5 In the case of covenants relating to freehold land entered into between 1881 and 1926, such covenants are, by section 58(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1881, ‘deemed to be made with the covenantee, his heirs and assigns, and shall have effect as if heirs and assigns were expressed’, and such covenants entered into after 1925 are, by section 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, ‘deemed to be made with the covenantee and his successors in title and the persons deriving title under him or them, and shall have effect as if such successors and other persons were expressed’. Further, by section 80(3) of the same Act, such covenants ‘may be made to run with the land without the use of any technical expression’.
1 [1968] Ch 508, at pp 524–525. 2 See Pakenham’s Case (1368) Y B 42 Edw 3 fo 3 pl 14; Sharp v Waterhouse (1857) 7 E&B 816. 3 London and South Western Rly Co v Gomm (1882) 20 ChD 562, CA. 4 See Re Button’s Lease [1964] Ch 263 (option to purchase presumed to be freely assignable). 5 See Osborne v Bradley [1903] 2 Ch 446, at 450.
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7.3 Competent claimants: (b) express assignment 7.3 Although, as indicated above, assignability is recognised both at law and in equity, nevertheless in a number of important respects the common law rules are more restrictive than the equitable rules. In particular: (1) there could be no assignment at common law of the benefit of a covenant unless when the covenant was entered into the covenantee had a legal estate in the benefited land.6 (2) unlike the position in equity,7 there could be no assignment of part of the benefit of a covenant on the occasion of the severance of the benefited land, ‘For at law the benefit could not be assigned in pieces. It would have to be assigned as a whole or not at all’.8 (3) the covenantor must have executed the deed or other contractual document, whereas equity does not insist on this if the document containing the covenant has been acted upon.9 Accordingly, although some of the rules for assignment are common to both law and equity, the concentration in this chapter will be upon the wider equitable rules which, in any event, are exclusively involved when enforcement is sought against a successor of the original covenantor since such a person is bound by the covenant (if at all) only in equity.10
EXPRESS ASSIGNABILITY NOT NEGATIVED BY QUALIFIED ANNEXATION 7.4 In the absence of an indication to the contrary, the presumption of assignability extends to all forms of assignment permitted, including assignments of fragmented parts of the benefit of the covenant which correspond to fragmented parts of the benefited land produced by disposals.11 In Stilwell v Blackman,12 it was argued that where the original covenanting parties provide for a degree of annexation of the covenant to the benefited land which itself produces less than the maximum amount of transmissibility, then that constitutes an indication that the parties intend to restrict express assignments of the covenant to the same limits. This argument was, however, rejected on the ground that annexation and express assignment were two independent mechanisms by which the benefit of a covenant might be transmitted on a disposition of the benefited land, and the fact that the parties had restricted the scope of one of those mechanisms did not lead to the inference that they intended to restrict the scope of the other mechanism.
6
7 8 9 10 11 12
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For this reason, the restrictive covenant in Rogers v Hosegood [1900] 2 Ch 388 (which had been entered into with a mortgagor of the land whose only interest at the time was the equity of redemption) ran only in equity and not at law. The same applies to the covenants entered into with other covenantees having only equitable interests. See Renals v Cowlishaw (1878) 9 ChD 125, at pp 130–131. Per Romer LJ in Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance [1933] Ch 611, at p 630. The position, in this respect, of assignments under s 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 is unclear. This section is referred to further below. Formby v Barker [1903] 2 Ch 539, per Vaughan Williams LJ at p 549 and Romer LJ at p 555. See Chapter 9. Stilwell v Blackman [1968] Ch 508 (Ungoed-Thomas J). Ibid. For the facts of this case, see above, para 6.64.
The time for making an express assignment 7.7 The decision in this case did not give rise, in a clear-cut form, to the application of the above principle,13 but it had been tacitly applied (without argument on this point) in Russell v Archdale14 where annexation was found to have been made to the land as a whole (with the result that the benefit of the covenant did not pass to a purchaser of part only of the land) but where an express assignment of the covenant by the covenantee to that purchaser, made at the time of the sale, was treated as effective.15 7.5 In Marquess of Zetland v Driver16 and Roake v Chadha,17 the terms of the covenant in each case provided for annexation to be restricted or excluded but contained an express acknowledgment of the right of the covenantee to make any express assignment. In the former case, the intent of a covenant entered into in 1928 was expressed to be ‘to benefit and protect such part or parts of the lands in the borough, township or parish of Redcar then subject to the settlement as should for the time being remain unsold or as should have been sold by the vendor or his successors in title with the express benefit of the covenants’ and in the latter case a covenant entered into in 1934 provided ‘but so that this covenant shall not enure for the benefit of any owner or subsequent purchaser of any part of the Vendors’ Sudbury Court Estate at Wembley unless the benefit of this covenant shall be expressly assigned’.18 Neither case was concerned with the exercise of the power to assign, but it is implicit in each case that such power was effectively expressly preserved.
THE TIME FOR MAKING AN EXPRESS ASSIGNMENT Assignment made at the time of the transfer 7.6 The occasion for making an express assignment of the benefit of a restrictive covenant is normally a disposition of the whole or some part of the benefited land.19 If the assignment is made at that time, no difficulty will arise.
Assignment made after the time of the transfer I: General rule 7.7 In Re Union of London and Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance,20 an assignment made at a later date was held to be ineffective.
13 14 15 16 17 18
19 20
Above, para 6.71. [1964] Ch 38 (Buckley J). See, also, Griffiths v Band (1974) 29 P&CR 243 (Goulding J). [1939] Ch 1, CA. [1984] 1 WLR 40 (HH Judge Paul Baker, sitting as a High Court judge). These words were held to have the effect of excluding the annexing effect of s 78(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (as interpreted by the Court of Appeal in Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 594), and treated as preserving the right to make express assignments of the benefit of the covenant. See the remarks of Sargant J in Ives v Brown [1919] 2 Ch 314, at p 323. [1933] Ch 611, CA.
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7.7 Competent claimants: (b) express assignment In view of the importance of establishing the limits of what was decided in this case (and the difficulty of extracting the essential facts from the report), it is proposed to summarise these facts. They are as follows. In 1907, a company (‘the Shoreham Company’), purchased several hundred acres of land in the vicinity of Shoreham and Lancing in Sussex. By a conveyance executed in 1908, the Shoreham Company sold and conveyed some 515 acres of this land to purchasers who covenanted with the Shoreham Company to observe certain restrictions on building and user (‘the 1908 covenant’). At the time of this conveyance, the remainder of the land purchased by the Shoreham Company in 1907 (‘the land benefited by the 1908 covenant’) remained vested in the company. By a conveyance executed on 10 May 1909, part of the 515 acres was conveyed to Mr Bury who proceeded at once to divide it up into smaller parcels. By a conveyance executed on 11 May 1909, one of these smaller parcels comprising some 147 acres was conveyed to Mr Phillips who covenanted with Mr Bury his heirs and assigns to observe certain restrictions on building and user (‘the 1909 covenant’). Mr Bury at that time remained the owner of the other part of the 515 acres which had been conveyed to him (‘the land benefited by the 1909 covenant’). Subsequently (the precise date does not appear from the report) the first defendant, Mr Easter, became the owner in fee of the greater part of the land benefited by the 1908 covenant and remained the owner of a substantial part of it at the date of the proceedings. Further, Mr Easter and his wife (the second defendant) became (and were at the date of the proceedings) the owners in fee of a substantial part of the land benefited by the 1909 covenant. By assignments executed in 1920 and 1921, the Shoreham Company (and the erstwhile intermediate owners of the land benefited by the 1908 covenant) assigned to Mr Easter the benefit of (inter alios) the 1908 covenant and by an assignment executed in 1931, Mr Bury assigned to Mr and Mrs Easter the benefit of the 1909 covenant. At the dates of each of these assignments, the respective assignors had ceased to own any land capable of benefiting from the covenants. By a conveyance executed in 1929 (there having been one or more conveyances of the 147 acres in between) the claimant, Miles, became owner in fee of the 147 acres. In 1931, the claimant commenced these proceedings for a declaration that the 1908 covenant and the 1909 covenant were not enforceable by the defendants or either of them against the claimant or his successors in title as owner or owners of the 147 acres. The essence of the above facts is that the claimant had become the owner of the 147 acres upon which the 1908 covenant and the 1909 covenant had been imposed and the defendants, having become the owners of the land which was originally benefited by those covenants, took subsequent assignments of the benefit of those covenants. The sole question for decision was whether the defendants were entitled to the benefit of the 1908 covenant and the 1909 covenant.
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The time for making an express assignment 7.10 7.8
The Court of Appeal (affirming the decision of Bennett J) held:
(1) assuming, in favour of the covenantees, that they had each retained land capable of benefiting from the covenants, the words of covenant were such that neither covenant had been annexed to any land of the respective covenantees;21 (2) although each of the covenants was assignable, since at the date of each of the assignments the respective assignors had sold the whole of the land for the benefit of which the covenants were entered into, the assignors had ceased to be entitled to enforce the covenants and could not, unless they held the benefit of the covenants as trustees for the assignees,22 confer any greater rights upon the assignees than they possessed themselves.23 The purported assignments were accordingly of no effect and the defendants were not entitled to enforce the covenants. 7.9 It is to be noted that the covenants were entirely spent in the hands of the assignor. Accordingly, the actual decision is limited to the case of a purported assignment by an assignor who, at the date of the subsequent assignment, owns no other land entitling the assignor to enforce the covenant. In such a case (subject to point (III) below), the covenant is spent and no longer exists with the result that there is nothing for the assignor to assign.24 If at the date of the assignment the covenant is still enforceable by the assignor in respect of other land which he still retains, then the covenant clearly still exists in relation to that land and the question arises whether it remains assignable in respect of the part of the benefited land previously disposed of. On this issue, there remains no direct decision. However, as a matter of principle, as the purported assignor has no ability to enforce the covenant in relation to land other than that still held by him, there would seem to be no ability in him to assign rights of enforcement (ie the benefit of the covenant) in respect of the land transferred away previously in relation to which he has no right to enforce it. 7.10 Further, in the course of delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Re Union of London & Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance, Romer LJ said:25 ‘The covenantee must, indeed, be at liberty to include in any sale of the retained property the right to enforce the covenants. He might not otherwise be able to dispose of such property to the best advantage, and the intention with which he obtained the covenant would be defeated. But if he has been able to sell any particular part of his property without assigning to the purchaser the benefit of the covenant, there seems no reason why he should at a later date and as an independent transaction be at liberty to confer upon the purchaser such benefit. To hold that he could do so would be to treat the covenant as
21 As to the requirements for annexation, see Chapter 6. 22 As in Ives v Brown [1919] 2 Ch 314 and Lord Northbourne v Johnston & Son [1922] 2 Ch 309. See, also, Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold Ltd [1952] Ch 286 and Earl of Leicester v Wells-next-the-Sea [1973] Ch 110. 23 Applying the decision of Sargant J in Chambers v Randall [1923] 1 Ch 149. 24 See also as to this, Re Rutherford’s Conveyance [1938] 1 All ER 495. 25 [1933] Ch 611, at p 632.
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7.11 Competent claimants: (b) express assignment having been obtained, not only for the purpose of enabling the covenantee to dispose of his land to the best advantage, but also for the purpose of enabling him to dispose of the benefit of the covenant to the best advantage.’ 7.11 It would therefore seem that once part of the benefited land is sold, then even though the covenant remains alive as to another part, the benefit cannot be assigned to the owner of the part sold after completion of the sale.26 If there has been an equitable assignment, that may subsequently be converted into a legal assignment by the assignee giving notice in writing of the assignment to the owner of the burdened land pursuant to section 136(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925.27
II: Exception – covenant held by a bare trustee 7.12 The rule laid down in Re Union of London & Smith’s Bank Ltd’s Conveyance28 does not apply where the covenant is held by a trustee who has no beneficial interest in the benefited land upon trust (whether created expressly29 or by operation of law30) for a beneficiary in whom the benefited land is vested. In such a case, a subsequent assignment of the benefit of the covenant by the trustee to the beneficiary will be valid. Thus, in Lord Northbourne v Johnston & Son,31 trustees held the Shipcote Estate upon trust for Lady Northbourne absolutely. In 1881 they sold and conveyed part of the estate to a purchaser (the predecessor in title of the defendants) who entered into a restrictive covenant with the trustees. In 1884, the trustees conveyed the remainder of the estate to Lady Northbourne but without assigning the benefit of any covenants. On Lady Northbourne’s death, Lord Northbourne became absolutely entitled under her will to the remainder of the estate. In 1921, the sole survivor of the trustees assigned the benefit of (inter alios) the covenant contained in the 1881 conveyance to Lord Northbourne and the validity of this assignment was upheld. 7.13 Moreover, it appears from the cases cited below that, even without the subsequent assignment, the equitable entitlement to the benefit of the covenant under the trust would itself be sufficient to found an action for an injunction. Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold Ltd32 is to the same effect. In that case, in 1923, Mrs Mardon, the owner of Devonia 26 An argument to the opposite effect might be mounted on the basis of the remarks of Sargant J in Chambers v Randall [1923] 1 Ch 149, at p 159, but these remarks were made in the context of the benefit of the covenant which, before the assignment, was held (as to the land in question) upon trust for the assignee – as to which see point (III) below (Second possible exception – vendor as a constructive trustee of the covenant for the purchaser). 27 See William Brandts Sons & Co Ltd v Dunlop Rubber Co Ltd [1905] AC 454. It seems unlikely, however, that there can be a legal assignment under the subsection of part only of the benefit of a restrictive covenant: see Jones v Humphreys [1902] 1 KB 10; Forster v Baker [1910] 2 KB 636 and Williams v Atlantic Assurance Co Ltd [1933] 1 KB 81. 28 [1933] Ch 611, CA. 29 As in Schreiber v Creed (1839) 10 Sim 9, 33; Eastwood v Lever (1863) 4 De GJ & Sm 114. 30 As in Ives v Brown [1919] 2 Ch 314; Lord Northbourne v Johnston [1922] 2 Ch 309; Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold Ltd [1952] Ch 286 and Earl of Leicester v Wells-next-the-Sea UDC [1973] Ch 110. 31 [1922] 2 Ch 309 (Sargant J). 32 [1952] Ch 286 (Upjohn J).
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The time for making an express assignment 7.15 and neighbouring premises, sold and conveyed the neighbouring premises to purchasers (the predecessor in title of the defendant) who entered into a restrictive covenant. In 1944 Mrs Mardon died leaving her real and personal estate to her son, Leonard, absolutely and in 1945 Mrs Mardon’s executors assented in writing to the vesting of Devonia in Leonard, no mention being made of the covenant. In 1948, Leonard granted a lease of Devonia to the claimant society for 21 years and by a separate deed bearing the same date assigned the benefit of the covenant to the society. The society was held to be entitled to enforce the covenant by injunction. In the course of his judgment, Upjohn J said:33 ‘… in my judgment, when her [Mrs Mardon’s] estate was duly wound up and administered, and this case has been argued before me on the footing that that happened many years ago, the benefit of the covenant was held by the executors as bare trustees for the residuary legatee, Leonard Soper Mardon, who was himself one of the executors. He, therefore, became entitled to the benefit of this restrictive covenant in equity, and, in my judgment, he was entitled to assign the benefit in equity on an assignment of Devonia. No doubt, had the covenant been assigned to him by the executors, he could also have assigned it at law.’ 7.14 Similarly, in Earl of Leicester v Wells-next-the-Sea,34 a tenant for life, in whose favour a vesting assent had been executed but which did not refer to the benefit of a restrictive covenant which had devolved on the special executors with the land, was held to be entitled to the benefit of the covenant under the trust imposed upon the special executors by section 7(1) of the Settled Land Act 1925. Accordingly, the tenant for life could enforce the covenant without either joining the special executors as parties35 or obtaining an assignment of the covenant from them.36
III: Second possible exception – vendor as a constructive trustee of the covenant for the purchaser 7.15 In the case of benefited land which becomes subject to a binding contract for sale, for many purposes the vendor is, pending completion, a constructive trustee for the purchaser,37 but quite apart from the fact that the trusteeship is qualified,38 the vendor is a trustee only of the subject-matter of the contract. Accordingly, since, in the case of a restrictive covenant which is not annexed to the land, the benefit of the covenant comprises an interest which is separate and distinct from the land, it will not fall within the scope of the vendor’s trusteeship unless it is expressly referred to (either specifically or by way of general description of rights which is sufficiently comprehensive) in the
33 Ibid, at p 291. 34 [1973] Ch 110 (Plowman J). 35 As was considered necessary in regard to the executors in the corresponding position (although before the Settled Land Act 1925) in Ives v Brown [1919] 2 Ch 314 (Sargant J). 36 As happened in Lord Northbourne v Johnston & Son [1922] 2 Ch 309 (Sargant J). 37 See the judgment of Jessel MR in Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 ChD 499, at p 506. 38 See Shaw v Foster (1872) LR 5 HL 321, per Lord Hatherley at p 356, and the judgments in Rayner v Preston (1881) 18 ChD 1.
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7.16 Competent claimants: (b) express assignment contract39 or, perhaps, an intention to include it can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. 7.16 In the cases of Renals v Cowlishaw40 and Reid v Bickerstaff 41 at the respective dates of the sales of the benefited land, the vendors in each case retained other land benefited by the covenants. That fact excluded any possibility that the benefit of the covenants was impliedly included in the transactions of sale by reason of the disposal of the whole (it being for the benefit of the transferred land and the vendor having no reason to retain it). These cases are not therefore an authority on the position where the vendor disposes of the whole of the benefited land at one and the same time to the same purchaser. In such a case, if certain circumstances exist, it might be argued that they justify the inference that the parties intended to include the benefit of the covenant in the sale so that, although not expressly mentioned, the vendor would be treated as a constructive trustee of the benefit of the covenant for the purchaser under the contract for sale. 7.17 The circumstances par excellence would be where all the following facts could be proved: (a) that the contract for sale comprised the whole of the land originally benefited; (b) that at the date of the contract, the burdened land had changed hands; (c) that at the date of the contract, the purchaser was aware of the existence of the covenant; and (d) that the covenant was of such a nature as its continued enforcement would represent a clear-cut benefit to the purchaser. 7.18 That in such circumstances it might be possible to claim that the benefit of the covenant was impliedly included in the sale, is supported by the following judicial dicta. In Renals v Cowlishaw,42 Hall V-C said: ‘A purchaser may also be entitled to the benefit of a restrictive covenant entered into with his vendor by another or others where his vendor has contracted with him that he shall be the assign of it, that is have the benefit of the covenant. And such covenant need not be express, but may be collected from the transaction of sale and purchase. In considering this, the expressed or otherwise apparent purpose or object of the covenant, in reference to its being intended to be annexed to other property, or to its being only obtained to enable the covenantee more advantageously to deal with his property, is important to be attended to. Whether the purchaser is the purchaser of all the land retained by his vendor when the covenant was entered into, is also important.’ 39 See Re Hamilton-Snowball’s Conveyance [1959] Ch 308; Henshall v Fogg [1964] 1 WLR 1127; Re Lyne-Stephens and Scott-Miller’s Contract [1920] 1 Ch 472; Rayner v Preston (1881) 18 ChD 1. In Renals v Cowlishaw (1878) 9 ChD 125 (affd (1879) 11 ChD 866), Hall V-C said ‘it must appear that the benefit of the covenant was part of the subject-matter of the purchase’ and, since, in that case, it did not so appear, the benefit of a restrictive covenant was not part of the subject-matter included in the sale. 40 (1878) 9 ChD 125; affd (1879) 11 ChD 866. 41 [1909] 2 Ch 305. 42 (1878) 9 ChD 125, at p 129; affd (1879) 11 ChD 866.
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Formal requirements for an express assignment 7.20 And later in the same judgment43 the Vice-Chancellor, in stating that to enable a purchaser to claim the benefit of a restrictive covenant as an assign it must appear that the benefit of the covenant was part of the subject-matter of the purchase, added the qualification in parenthesis:44 ‘(such purchaser not being an assign of all that the vendor retained when he executed the conveyance containing the covenants, …)’. 7.19 said:
Further, in Reid v Bickerstaff,45 Buckley LJ in the course of his judgment
‘Where a vendor takes from a purchaser a restrictive covenant, it may be that he takes it for purposes of his own, or it may be that he takes it for the benefit of the land which he is retaining after the sale on which the restrictive covenant is entered into. If the vendor is subsequently selling all the retained land, it may be that this is an element which may lead to the inference that he intended to pass with that land the benefit of the restrictive covenant.’46 If, in accordance with the foregoing dicta, the circumstances referred to above were regarded as sufficient to show an intention to include the benefit of restrictive covenants in the sale, then in the absence of an express assignment in the conveyance, it is conceived that the vendor would, following completion, be in the position of a bare trustee of the benefit of the covenant for the purchaser47 and accordingly that this would (as set out above) entitle the purchaser both to enforce the covenant in equity without an express assignment and to complete his title to the covenant at law by obtaining a subsequent assignment.
FORMAL REQUIREMENTS FOR AN EXPRESS ASSIGNMENT Common law and equitable assignments – Law of Property Act 1925, section 53(1)(a) 7.20 Since the benefit of a restrictive covenant is an interest in land,48 the provisions of section 53(1)(a) of the Law of Property Act 1925 – or in the case
43 Ibid, at p 130. 44 The use of parenthesis is explained by the fact that some of the words within them were by way of repetition of a similar qualification made in the previous sentence in which the Vice-Chancellor was treating as not falling within the normal requirements for an express assignment the case of the ‘purchaser of all the property retained by the vendor upon the occasion of the conveyance containing the covenants.’ 45 [1909] 2 Ch 305, at pp 225–226. 46 Immediately following this passage, the judgment continues; ‘But this even does not follow for, as was pointed out by Selwyn LJ in Keates v Lyon (1869) 4 Ch App 218, it may be that he intended the restrictive covenant to enure for his own benefit so as to protect other land to which he was not at the time, but expected afterwards by inheritance or purchase to become, entitled, and for whose protection the restrictive covenant would be valuable. It is not necessary, however, in the present case to deal with the question as it arises where the vendor sells the whole of the retained land.’ The possibility postulated could not, however, avail the covenantee against a successor from the original covenantor whose proprietary liability (if any) is confined to the land which the covenant originally touched and concerned. 47 See the speech of Lord Hatherley in Shaw v Foster (1872) LR 5 HL 321, at p 356 and Bridges v Mees [1957] Ch 475. The trust, being a constructive trust, would be enforceable although not made by writing in accordance with s 53(1)(a) of the Law of Property Act 1925: see s 53(2). Section 53(1)(a) is considered in the next section of the text. 48 London and South Western Rly Co v Gomm (1882) 20 ChD 562, CA.
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7.21 Competent claimants: (b) express assignment of pre-1926 covenants, the corresponding provisions under the Statute of Frauds 1677 – will apply to all common law and equitable assignments of restrictive covenants.49 Under section 53(1)(a), the assignment must be ‘by writing signed by the [assignor] or by his agent thereunto lawfully authorised in writing, or by will’ or alternatively take effect ‘by operation of law’.
Statutory assignments 7.21 For a statutory assignment under section 136(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925,50 the requirements of that subsection must be complied with. The assignment must therefore similarly be ‘by writing under the hand of the assignor’. In this case: (i) the assignor can only act personally and not through an agent; and (ii) notice in writing must have been given to the person or persons bound by the covenant. 7.22 In the case of most choses in action, a legal assignment is only possible if section 136(1) is complied with but, as has been seen,51 a legal assignment at common law has long been permitted in the case of covenants which touch and concern land and it is not clear what, if any, advantage there is in a statutory legal assignment as compared with a common law legal assignment. In this connection, having regard to the language of section 136(1), the only type of assignment which appears to be permitted is an assignment of the entirety of a covenant and not a severed part so that, in this respect, an assignment under the section appears to be as restricted as an assignment at common law.
Should notice of the assignment be given to those burdened by the covenant? 7.23 If it is desired to obtain a statutory assignment under section 136(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, notice of the assignment must be given. In the case of common law or equitable assignments, the ideal course would be to give notice as those burdened by the covenant would appear to be entitled to assume that the original covenantee or other person known to be entitled remains the person entitled so that any consent, release or discharge given by that person would prima facie (and subject to the terms of the covenant) be effective even though he had assigned the benefit of the covenant, provided the person dealing with him had no notice of the assignment. Nevertheless, it does not appear to be the practice for any such notice to be given and it is no doubt the case that for most practical purposes it is unnecessary to do so.
Language of assignment 7.24 Subject to compliance with section 53(1)(a) (or its predecessor), no particular form of language is required but merely an indication of an intention 49 50 51
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But for the assignment of the contractual right only, no special formality seems to be required. Re-enacting s 26(6) of the Judicature Act 1873. Above, para 7.1.
Formal requirements for an express assignment 7.27 in the document that the benefit is to pass to the person acquiring the relevant benefited land. 7.25 In Renals v Cowlishaw,52 Hall V-C, finding no indication in a conveyance of the benefited land to one Bainbrigge, of any intention to pass on the benefit of covenants in earlier conveyances, said: ‘If it had appeared in the conveyance to Bainbrigge that there were such restrictive covenants in conveyances already executed, and expressly or otherwise that Bainbrigge was to have the benefit of them, he and the Plaintiffs, as claiming through him, would have been entitled to the benefit of them. But there being in the conveyance to Bainbrigge no reference to the existence of such covenants by recital of the conveyances containing them or otherwise, the Plaintiffs cannot be treated as entitled to the benefit of them.’ It would therefore appear that a recital of the existence of covenants previously taken for the benefit of land being transferred might, without more, be sufficient to effect an assignment, but each transfer presents its own question of construction. As Hall V-C also said in the same case,53 ‘it must appear that the benefit of the covenant was part of the subject-matter of the purchase’.
Extent of benefit assigned 7.26 Unless severance of the covenant is expressly excluded by the terms of the covenant, the benefit may be assigned in equity with any part or parts of the land so far as the benefit relates to such part or parts,54 and this is so even though the covenant may, on its true construction, be found to be annexed to the land as a whole.55 7.27 Further, whilst an assignment for a limited period only would not appear to be possible either at common law or under section 136(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925, nevertheless since this could be achieved behind a trust, it is considered that in equity such an assignment will operate, if not directly at any rate indirectly (under an implied or constructive trust56), to vest the benefit of the covenant in equity for the specified period. In Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold Ltd,57 the assignment of the benefit was made to the claimant society to whom (by a contemporaneous but separate instrument) a lease was granted of the benefited land for a term of 21 years. In form, the assignment appeared to be out-and-out and no issue arose in the case as to whether it was commensurate only with the term of the lease. This being the case, Upjohn J, after holding the society entitled to enforce the covenant, said towards the end of his judgment: ‘I say nothing as to the position when the plaintiffs’ lease expires so that their estate in Devonia comes to an end, nor whether Leonard Soper Mardon, having apparently assigned away the entire benefit of the covenant, will then be in any position further to enforce it.’ 52 53
(1878) 9 ChD 125, at pp 130–131; affd (1879) 11 ChD 866. Ibid, at p 130. Cf Griffith v Pelton [1958] Ch 205 (whether lessee’s option to purchase freehold included in an assignment of the lease). 54 Above, para 7.4. 55 Above, para 6.65 et seq. 56 Cf Bannister v Bannister [1948] WN 261. 57 [1952] Ch 286.
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7.28 Competent claimants: (b) express assignment 7.28 Clearly, in the case of an assignment to a lessee – or other limited owner – it should be made clear that the assignment is limited to the duration of the term or interest granted (including, in the case of leases of business premises, any statutory extension of the term).
EFFECT OF SECTION 62(1) OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY ACT 1925 OR (PRE 1926) SECTION 6 OF THE CONVEYANCING ACT 1881 7.29 By section 62(1) of the 1925 Act, a conveyance of land is deemed to include: ‘liberties, privileges, easements, rights and advantages whatsoever, appertaining or reputed to appertain to the land, or any part thereof, or, at the time of the conveyance, demised, occupied, or enjoyed with or reputed or known as part or parcel of or appurtenant to the land or any part thereof.’ In Rogers v Hosegood,58 Farwell J at first instance said that it might well be that the right to sue on covenants which were not annexed to land could not be said ‘to belong, or be reputed to belong thereto’ within the meaning of express general words in a conveyance under which the land was conveyed together with ‘all the rights, easements, or appurtenances belonging or reputed to belong thereto’. But the point was left undecided and on appeal, was not referred to by the Court of Appeal. In Shropshire County Council v Edwards,59 the question was raised but left open, the decision proceeding on other grounds.60 7.30 In Roake v Chadha,61 it was argued that the rights referred to in section 62 are legal rights, and HH Judge Paul Baker QC sitting as a High Court Judge said ‘there may well be something in this’, although he did not decide the point (as he found it could not be a right appertaining to the land or reputed to do so when the words used in the covenant itself indicated the opposite, as they did there). In contrast, in Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd,62 the judge at first instance held that section 62(1) did have the effect of assigning the benefit of a restrictive covenant to a purchaser of the benefited land, but there is no report showing the reasoning (it was simply referred to in the Court of Appeal as having been so held) and the decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeal on other grounds.63 7.31 However, in Kumar v Dunning,64 Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C, with whose judgment Croom-Johnson and Neill LJJ agreed, when considering section 62(1) in the context of whether, on the assignment of a reversion
58 59 60 61 62 63 64
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[1900] 2 Ch 388, CA. (1982) 46 P&CR 270, at p 279 (HH Judge Rubin sitting as a High Court Judge). Above, para 6.12. [1984] 1 WLR 40. [1980] 1 WLR 594, CA. Above, para 6.32 et seq. [1987] 3 WLR 1167, [1989] QB 193, CA.
Effect of LPA 1925, s 62(1) or (pre 1926) Conveyancing Act 1881, s 6 7.33 expectant on a lease, the benefit of a surety covenant contained in the lease would pass under the section, expressed the following view (at p 198): ‘The main intention of section 62 was to provide a form of statutory shorthand rendering it unnecessary to include such words expressly in every conveyance. It is a matter of debate whether, in the context of the section, the words “rights … appertaining to the land” include rights arising under covenant as opposed to strict property rights. However, I will assume, without deciding, that rights under covenant are within the words of the section. Even on that assumption, it still has to be shown that the right “appertains to the land”. In my judgment, a right under covenant cannot appertain to the land unless the benefit is in some way annexed to the land.’ He went on, ‘If the benefit of a covenant passes under section 62 even if not annexed to the land, the whole modern law of restrictive covenants would have been established on an erroneous basis. Section 62(1) replaces s 6(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1881. If the general words “rights … appertaining to land” operate to transfer the benefit of a negative restrictive covenant, whether or not such benefit was expressly assigned, it would make all the law developed since 1881 unnecessary. It is established that, in the absence of annexation to the land or the existence of a building scheme, the benefit of a restrictive covenant cannot pass except by way of express assignment. The law so established is inconsistent with the view that a covenant, the benefit of which is not annexed to the land, can pass under the general words in section 62’ [emphasis added]. 7.32 The thrust of the above statement is that even if the section can apply to covenants, it only applies to those covenants which are already ‘in some way annexed to the land’ being conveyed and capable of passing under the ordinary law of restrictive covenants – in other words, the section transfers the benefit of a restrictive covenant only when that benefit is one which is capable of passing without express assignment (that is to say, under the law of restrictive covenants – under which it would therefore pass anyway). Put another way, section 62 cannot operate to pass on anything other than ‘rights appertaining to the land’ by which is meant rights which are capable of passing without express assignment in the instrument relating to them – which in the context of benefits under freehold land covenants means restrictive covenants which comply with the necessary requirements of implied transmissibility (by annexation or by being part of a building scheme). 7.33 In the subsequent case of J Sainsbury plc v Enfield London Borough Council,65 the defendant before Morritt J did not contend that the benefit of restrictive covenants entered into in 1894 had passed in subsequent conveyances of the covenantee’s land under section 6 of the Conveyancing Act 1881 or section 62 of the Law of Property Act 1925, because of the decision in Kumar v Dunning.66 Though the point was reserved for argument on any appeal, no appeal was, for whatever reason, brought.
65 66
[1989] 1 WLR 590 (Morritt J). [1987] 3 WLR 1167, [1989] QB 193, CA – see p 595C of Sainsbury.
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7.34 Competent claimants: (b) express assignment In Sugarman v Porter,67 an argument arose under section 63 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (as to which, see below). Peter Smith J (in para 34) quoted the parts of Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson’s judgment in Kumar set out above, applied the same logic to section 63, and made the same point that a large amount of the law relating to the transmission of the benefit of restrictive covenants would, were it otherwise, have been largely redundant (see especially paras 35, 37 and 42–43). 7.34 In the earlier case of Harbour Estates Ltd v HSBC Bank plc,68 Lindsay J, considering section 63 in the somewhat different context of a break clause in a lease (below), though he said that he would himself be ‘loth to require of section 63 that it can pass only that which in a technical sense is an appurtenance of, annexed to, or is such as to touch and concern the property conveyed’ and considered it was arguable that that was not so for reasons he set out, considered himself bound by the decision and reasoning in Kumar, which he described (at the end of para 35) as ‘an insurmountable argument’ barring such a conclusion. Lindsay J went on to say this was ‘especially insurmountable as the Kumar case reasoning was approved by the House of Lords in Swift (P & A) Investments v Combined English Stores Group plc.69 That case related to the question of whether a particular landlord and tenant covenant ‘touched and concerned’ the land so as to be enforceable, and Lord Oliver, for the House, said at p 640H that the problem was to all intents and purposes identical on the question of what touched and concerned the land to that in Kumar and that – though focusing on that point – ‘the decision of the Court of Appeal in Kumar v Dunning … was correct and was reached for the correct reasons’. 7.35 The effect of the foregoing is that section 62(1) does not operate as an alternative to an express assignment in cases where there is neither annexation nor a building scheme. This is also consistent with the equivocal nature of such a covenant as being one having the potential for running with the land but requiring a further positive act before that potential can be realised. In the case of registered land, it is considered that section 11 (in the case of freehold land) and section 12 (in the case of leasehold land) of the Land Registration Act 2002 have no greater effect on the vesting of the benefit of a non-annexed restrictive covenant than section 62(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 since the rights which vest thereunder are limited to those which are ‘interests subsisting for the benefit of the estate’.70
Effect of section 63 of the Law of Property Act 1925 7.36
By section 63 of the 1925 Act:
‘(1) every conveyance is effectual to pass all the estate right title interest claim and demand which the conveying parties respectively have in, 67 68 69 70
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[2006] 2 P&CR 14. [2005] Ch 194. [1989] AC 632. And similarly, under the Land Registration Act 1925 the rights which vested thereunder were, under ss 5, 19(3) and 20 (in the case of freehold land) and ss 9, 19(3) and 23 (in the case of leasehold land) those which belonged to, or were appurtenenant to, the registered estate.
Effect of LPA 1925, s 62(1) or (pre 1926) Conveyancing Act 1881, s 6 7.39 to or on the property conveyed or expressed or intended so to be or which they respectively have power to convey in, to, or on the same. (2) This section applies only if and so far as a contrary intention is not expressed in the conveyance and has the effect subject to the terms of the conveyance and to the provisions therein contained.’ The same points apply as in relation to section 62 (above). 7.37 In relation specifically to section 63, as referred to above, albeit in the somewhat different context of a break clause in a lease, Lindsay J in Harbour Estates Ltd v HSBC Bank plc71 said that he personally would be ‘loth to require of section 63 that it can pass only that which in a technical sense is an appurtenance of, annexed to, or is such as to touch and concern the property conveyed’ and that it was arguable that that was not so for reasons he set out, but considered the decision and reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Kumar amounted to an insurmountable argument against this being the law, the same conclusion applying in relation to section 63 as in relation to section 62. 7.38 Again as referred to above, in Sugarman v Porter72 dealing specifically with section 63 in the context of a restrictive covenant, Peter Smith J, as well as referring to the relevant passages in Harbour Estates, quoted the passages from the judgment of Browne-Wilkinson V-C in Kumar, set out at para 7.31 above, and said:73 ‘This decision seems to me to be equally applicable to an attempt to pass the benefits of a covenant by section 63 of the Law of Property Act 1925’. He noted in relation to section 63 that it was not argued otherwise before Morritt J in Sainsbury plc v Enfield LBC,74 nor in the Crest Nicholson case, and that it did not appear to have been argued in any earlier case either. 7.39 As he pointed out (and as Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson V-C observed in Kumar in relation to section 62), if it was otherwise a large part of the law relating to restrictive covenants (namely that the transmission of the benefit requires annexation, assignment or a building scheme) would have been redundant. Peter Smith J concluded,75 ‘It is important to read Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilknson’s observations in Kumar in context. For the benefit of a covenant [to] pass he expressed the view that it would have to be shown that it touches and concerns the land so as to be capable of annexation. I accept that the benefit of a restrictive covenant may be an interest in land if it touches and concerns the land in question for the purpose of s 63. However there first has to be consideration whether if the interest in question is the benefit of a covenant it is something that touches and concerns the land’ [emphasis added].
71 72 73 74 75
[2005] Ch 194, at 210. [2006] 2 P&CR 14. At para 35. [1989] 1 WLR 590 at 595. In paras 42 and 43.
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7.40 Competent claimants: (b) express assignment On the facts of that case, he went on: ‘This throws one back to the wording of the Conveyance in my view. By the wording the Conveyance showed that the covenant touched and concerned the land for the time being that belonged to Mrs Hart that was unsold and thereafter if the benefit was expressly assigned. If on the occasion of the next sale off there is no assignment there is nothing upon which Section 63 can bite because there is no interest in land that is capable of being passed at that stage because Mrs Hart has plainly made a decision not to pass the benefit on. I do not see how section 63 can be used to counter the express wording of the covenant.’ 7.40 As in Crest Nicholson (where similar wording was used in the conveyance), the covenant in Sugarman was not annexed to the land in the hands of the claimant. The restrictive covenant had only been annexed to the land for the period for which it remained unsold by the original vendor. The claimant in Sugarman therefore failed in contending the covenant could be enforced by her. Section 63 can only pass an interest in land, and where there is a transfer of some of the covenantee’s land but the covenant is annexed only to unsold land of the covenantee, no such interest subsists in the land which is being conveyed (ie his ‘sold off’ land). Where the restrictive covenant is annexed to the land, the benefit may pass under section 63 (or section 62), but this adds nothing as it would pass anyway.
IMPLIED ASSIGNMENT 7.41 In view of the provisions of section 53(1)(a) of the Law of Property Act 1925 considered above (which re-enact similar provisions formerly contained in the Statute of Frauds 1677), it would appear (quite apart from any limits imposed by the law relating to covenants) that the only circumstances in which there could be an implied assignment of the benefit of a restrictive covenant would be by the benefit becoming vested in a successor under the operation of a resulting, implied or constructive trust all of which, by section 53(2) of the Act, fall outside the provisions of section 53(1). As has been seen,76 the law relating to covenants usually requires an assignment to be express, the only exceptions discernible from the reports being those of bare trustees77 or vendors as such trustees78 (and building schemes, which are considered separately in Chapter 8 below).
AFTER THE FIRST ASSIGNMENT, IS AN UNBROKEN CHAIN OF ASSIGNMENTS CONNECTING THE FIRST ASSIGNEE WITH THE CLAIMANT REQUIRED? 7.42
In the absence of annexation, the answer is considered to be ‘yes’.
As set out in paras 6.94–6.103 above, it is tentatively considered that an assignee of the original covenantee could effect annexation (the means achieving which is considered at paras 6.104–6.106 above). 76 77 78
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Above, para 7.1. At para 7.12 et seq above. At para 7.15 et seq above.
Assignment by operation of law 7.44 However, in the absence of annexation being achieved at any time (or there being a building scheme79), an unbroken chain of assignments will be required, through to the claimant. As referred to at para 6.106(1) above, in all the decided cases where the claimant has successfully relied upon express assignment as establishing title to the benefit of a restrictive covenant, there has been such an unbroken chain of assignments (express and/or by operation of law).80
ASSIGNMENT BY OPERATION OF LAW Death of person entitled to the benefit 7.43 There is no doubt but that a restrictive covenant which is assignable by the person entitled to its benefit can pass by assignment by operation of law.81 Accordingly, on that person’s death it will, since 1 January 1898 when the Land Transfer Act 1887 came into operation, devolve upon his personal representatives as part of his estate whether it is a ‘real’ covenant or a personal covenant82 provided that the requirements for passing by express assignment are satisfied. In particular, land benefited by the covenant must also have passed to the personal representatives83 or alternatively they must hold the benefit of the covenant as bare trustees for the owner of such land.84 In the absence of this requirement being satisfied, it would seem that the covenant will, on (if not before) the death of the deceased, have become spent and of no further effect.85 7.44 In the case of the death of the person entitled to the benefit of a covenant prior to 1898, the destination of the covenant as between his heir and his personal representatives would seem to have depended upon whether the covenant was a ‘real’ covenant or a personal covenant. It will have been a real covenant – devolving with realty – if the benefit was attached to his benefited land either by annexation86 or under a building scheme or (it would seem – although the position is not entirely clear) if the covenant had been made (either expressly or by virtue of section 58(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1881) with the covenantee’s heirs and the covenant was inherently capable of benefiting land
79 As to which, see Chapter 8. 80 The reported decisions being Lord Northbourne v Johnston & Son [1922] 2 Ch 309; Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold [1952] Ch 286, and (in respect of the ‘green land’) Federated Homes Ltd v Mill Lodge Properties Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 594. 81 ‘And, if such a covenant can be expressly assigned, it follows a fortiori that it can pass by assignment by operation of law’, per Sargant J in Ives v Brown [1919] 2 Ch 314, at p 323. 82 Ives v Brown [1919] 2 Ch 314; Newton Abbot Co-operative Society Ltd v Williamson and Treadgold Ltd [1952] Ch 286. 83 Formby v Barker [1903] 2 Ch 539, CA. 84 Ives v Brown [1919] 2 Ch 314 (Sargant J); Lord Northbourne v Johnston & Son [1922] 2 Ch 309. 85 Formby v Barker [1903] 2 Ch 539, CA (covenantee never having had any benefited land); Chambers v Randall [1923] 1 Ch 149 (covenantee having disposed of all the benefited land during his lifetime). 86 Rogers v Hosegood [1900] 2 Ch 388: ‘The accurate expression appears to me to be that the covenants are annexed to the land, and pass with it in much the same way as title deeds, which have been quaintly called the sinews of the land: Co. Litt. 6a. Thus the right to sue on such covenants passes to the heir and not to the executors’, per Farwell J at p 394.
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7.45 Competent claimants: (b) express assignment belonging to the covenantee.87 If this is not the position, it is difficult to see why in section 58(1) and (2) of the Conveyancing Act 1881, the legislature should have taken the trouble to distinguish so clearly between covenants deemed to be made with the covenantee, his heirs and assigns, (in subsection (1)) and covenants deemed to be made with the covenantee, his executors, administrators, and assigns (in subsection (2)).88 Further, whilst on a disposition inter vivos which is not by operation of law the benefited land and a non-annexed covenant are treated as separate pieces of property requiring individual attention, in the case of devolution on death it would have been absurd if the benefited land had devolved upon the heir and the covenant upon the personal representatives since, unless they became bare trustees of the covenant for the heir, the covenant would then cease to be enforceable as a result of one assignment by operation of law being preferred to another assignment by operation of law. Whilst this particular problem cannot arise in the case of persons entitled to the benefit of covenants who die after 1897, the like problem could arise where under the deceased’s will, his real and personal property are disposed of in different directions.
Bankruptcy of person entitled to the benefit 7.45 By section 306(1) of the Insolvency Act 1986:89 ‘The bankrupt’s estate shall vest in the trustee immediately on his appointment taking effect or, in the case of the official receiver, on his becoming trustee’. By section 291A(1) of the Act, as inserted by section 133 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, the official receiver becomes trustee of the bankrupt’s estate on the making of a bankruptcy order unless the court appoints another person under subsection (2). Accordingly, the bankrupt is now divested of his estate upon becoming bankrupt.90 By section 383(1) of the same Act,91 and subject to the exceptions specified in the rest of the section, a ‘bankrupt’s estate’ comprises ‘all property belonging to or vested in the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy’. 7.46 Since the benefit of a restrictive covenant is a chose in action, it is clearly ‘property’ which vests in accordance with the above provisions.
87 In Ives v brown [1919] 2 Ch 314, a covenant expressed to be made with two covenantees ‘their heirs and assigns’ and which in fact benefited land of the covenantees, devolved upon the personal representatives of the survivor of the covenantees. But she died in 1917 (ie, after the Land Transfer Act 1897 came into operation which provided for a deceased’s real, as well as personal, estate to devolve upon the deceased’s personal representatives. From the time when Glanvil wrote, just over a century after the Norman Conquest, the benefit of a vendor’s warranty of title devolved upon the purchaser’s heir (see Lib. VII, c. 2) until warranties as to title were replaced by covenants for title, this continued to be the position (see, now, s 76(6) of the Law of Property Act 1925). 88 It is not the case that covenants falling within subsection (1) are per se annexed to the benefited land: see J Sainsbury plc v Enfield London Borough Council [1989] 1 WLR 590 (Morritt J). 89 Substantially re-enacting s 53 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914. 90 In contrast to the previous position, where, contrary to common belief, under s 293 of the Insolvency Act 1986 (now repealed), read in conjunction with s 306, the bankrupt was not actually divested of his property rights upon his bankruptcy notwithstanding the involvement of the official receiver in his affairs thereafter until a trustee, in the form of the official receiver himself or another trustee, was formally appointed trustee, which could be some weeks later: see Adedeji v Pathaia [2014] EWCA Civ 681. 91 Substantially re-enacting provisions in s 38 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914.
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Assignment by operation of law 7.46 Whether, however, the bankrupt’s trustee could enforce the covenant or make a beneficial realisation thereof would, as in the case of personal representatives, depend upon whether any benefited land also vested in the trustee. If it did not, then the covenant will have become spent and of no further effect. Unlike the position in the case of personal representatives, however, an assignment by operation of law in favour of the bankrupt’s trustee can never operate to vest in the trustee a covenant which was vested in the bankrupt as a bare trustee since the ‘bankrupt’s estate’ which vests in the trustee excludes ‘property held by the bankrupt on trust for any other person’.92
92
Ibid, s 283(3)(a).
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8 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes
INTRODUCTION 8.1
The matters falling to be considered in this chapter are sixfold, namely:
(1) the evolution of building schemes (para 8.2 et seq); (2) the legal effects of building schemes (para 8.22 et seq); (3) the facts which must be proved in order to establish that a building scheme exists (para 8.23 et seq); (4) the factors which may negative the existence of a building scheme (para 8.90 et seq); and (5) the requirements for registration of building scheme obligations under the Land Charges Acts 1925 and 1972 or (in the case of registered land) under the Land Registration Acts 1925–2002 (para 8.104 et seq).
1 THE EVOLUTION OF BUILDING SCHEMES 8.2 Whilst there is inevitably some chronological overlap between them, four distinct phases can be identified in the evolution of building schemes.
Phase 1 – Deeds of mutual covenant at the forefront 8.3 During the first half of the nineteenth century, long before any planning restrictions of a public nature entered onto the scene, some developers of residential areas in England saw both the environmental and financial advantages of seeking to impose a strict control on the quality, type, size and number of buildings which might be constructed on the land and the use to which such buildings when constructed might be put. 8.4 Short of a private Act of Parliament, one of the more obvious legal mechanisms at the developers’ disposal for imposing such control was the deed of mutual covenant.1 Such a deed could contain covenants (primarily, but not exclusively, restrictive) designed to secure (generally by prohibition) the maintenance of prescribed standards of building of residential houses and
1
Another mechanism which was favoured in the early stages of building schemes was that of the trust: see Schreiber v Creed (1839) 10 Sim 9, per Shadwell V-C at p 33.
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8.5 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes freedom from encroachment of non-residential uses. In addition, it could impose on each original purchaser of a house or plot an obligation, on disposing of the property, to procure that the next owner became a party to the deed so novating all the covenants as between the owners for the time being of the various properties within the development and continuing their enforceability. This, therefore, was the mechanism which was adopted; and deeds of mutual covenant, imposing on the area to be developed what has been described as a ‘local law’,2 were successfully employed in a number of residential neighbourhoods many of which remain noteworthy for their distinctive stamp of elegance and character. 8.5 Such deeds were, for example, entered into in relation to residential developments in Cheltenham, Tunbridge Wells and Ramsgate. One of the earliest related to Nelson’s Crescent in Ramsgate and was the subject of the decision of Shadwell V-C in Whatman v Gibson3 where a number of restrictive covenants, including a covenant prohibiting the exercise of the trade of an innkeeper (which was held to be broken by the opening of a ‘family hotel’) were contained in a deed of covenant first executed in 1799. Similarly, the case of Schreiber v Creed4 was concerned with a deed of mutual covenant relating to the Pittville Estate in Cheltenham which was first executed by the owner (Pitt) in 1827, and Coles v Sims5 with a deed of covenant relating to the Cambray Estate in Cheltenham.6 The cases of Collins v Castle7 and Tindall v Castle8 each arose out of a deed of covenant relating to the Campden Park Estate in Tunbridge Wells.9
Phase 2 – Deeds of mutual covenant as the backcloth 8.6 Whilst the original theory underlying the deed of mutual covenant was a sound one, its practical operation as such depended upon a factor which
2
3 4 5 6
7 8 9
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This expression is, in this context, anachronistic. Indigenous property law jurists were more notable for their absence during most of the last century and it would appear that it was not until Reid v Bickerstaff [1909] 2 Ch 305 that the expression ‘local law’ in this context was first used judicially: see per Cozens-Hardy MR at p 319. The expression does, however, fit in neatly with Kelsen’s theory of the law as consisting of a ‘grundnorm’ and various subordinate norms or sources of law, including, at the more modest level, the law which parties make for themselves by entering into a contract. Given that an enforceable multilateral contract exists which regulates the rights and obligations of parties in relation to a given area, local law (albeit privately created) is thereby created. As to the expression ‘building scheme’, see above, para 3.1, footnote 2. (1838) 9 Sim 196. (1839) 10 Sim 9 (Shadwell V-C). (1854) 5 De GM & G 1. Other cases include Kilbey v Haviland (1871) 24 LT 353; Gaskin v Balls (1879) 13 ChD 324, CA; London and Suburban Land Co v Field (1881) 16 ChD 645, CA; Hooper Bromet (1904) 90 LT 234, CA; Mackenzie v Childers (1889) 43 ChD 265 (Kay J); Kelsey v Dodd (1881) 52 LJ Ch 34, CA; Tindall v Castle [1893] WN 40 (North J); Knight v Simmonds [1896] 2 Ch 294, CA. (1887) 36 ChD 243 (Kekewich J). [1893] WN 40 (North J). See also, Kilbey v Haviland (1871) 19 WR 698; Gaskin v Balls (1879) 13 ChD 324; London and Suburban Land and Building Co v Field (1881) 16 ChD 645; Wauton v Coppard [1899] 1 Ch 92.
The evolution of building schemes 8.6 could not be guaranteed, namely that those who became the owners from time to time of the land affected would in fact execute the deed. Not surprisingly, in a number of the cases referred to, it was discovered that later owners (both original and subsequent) had not executed the deed in question. Moreover, some of the deeds did not even specifically provide for execution by owners other than the original purchasers of the individual lots.10 It was therefore not long before the courts were confronted with the twin questions whether, despite non-execution, a covenant could, where such a deed existed and was known by the owner to exist, be implied on the part of non-executing owners (whether original or subsequent) for the benefit of other owners (whether original or subsequent)11 and whether the benefit of existing covenants could be regarded as vesting in subsequent owners in the absence of words of annexation or express assignment.12 Thus, in Whatman v Gibson13 the facts were as follows. Fleming, the owner of the site of Nelson’s Crescent in Ramsgate, divided it into lots for the building of a row of houses. By a deed of covenant executed in 1799, Fleming and two persons who had purchased some of the lots from him mutually covenanted with each other and also with the several persons who should at any time thereafter execute the deed that they and the proprietors for the time being of any of the lots should observe and abide by the several stipulations and restrictions thereinafter contained, including a restriction that none of the proprietors of any of the lots for the time being should at any time carry on thereon the business of an innkeeper. In 1800, Fleming sold and conveyed No 6 Nelson Crescent to Cull, the plaintiff’s [claimant’s] predecessor in title, and in 1802 he sold and conveyed No 7 to Austin, the defendant’s predecessor in title. Each conveyance recited that the purchaser had executed the deed of covenant but it is not clear that there was any finding of fact to that effect. Neither the plaintiff [claimant] nor the defendant had executed the deed. In an action by the plaintiff [claimant] to restrain the defendant from using No 7 as a family hotel, Shadwell V-C held that the defendant was bound by the covenant not to carry on the business of an innkeeper, that use of No 7 as a family hotel would constitute a breach and that the plaintiff [claimant] was entitled to an injunction. Whilst the precise grounds upon which Shadwell V-C held the benefit and burden of the covenant to run with the claimant’s and the defendant’s land are not easy to ascertain from the judgment, the Vice-Chancellor emphasised the apparent intention underlying the deed of covenant that the covenants were to be mutually binding upon and operate for the advantage of the owners for the time being of the individual lots and that each subsequent purchaser took his lot on this footing.
10 See, for example, Kelsey v Dodd (1881) 52 LJ Ch 34, CA. 11 See Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co v Butler (1886) 16 QBD 778, CA. 12 As to a building scheme being an alternative to an express assignment as a means of passing on the benefit of an existing covenant (even where the building scheme did not bind the covenantor by reason of its non-publication at the time he covenanted but where it was open to the covenantee expressly to assign the benefit on a subsequent sale of the land) see Nalder and Collyer’s Brewery Co Ltd v Harman (1900) 83 LT 257, CA. If a deed of covenant existed and was in fact executed by every subsequent owner then the existing covenants would have the required extended operation by virtue of their novation rather than assignment. 13 (1838) 9 Sim 196 (Shadwell V-C).
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8.7 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes 8.7 It appears from cases such as Whatman v Gibson14 and Mackenzie v 15 Childers that at this stage in the development of the law,16 enforceability was based on implying the necessary covenant or provisions so that earlier purchasers were treated as implied covenantees of later purchasers, implied assignments were treated as being made by the vendor of earlier purchasers’ covenants to later purchasers and implied covenants on the part of the estate vendor were treated as being made with all purchasers, respectively. This approach was entirely logical and gave recognition to the fact that a duly executed deed of mutual covenant was the original foundation of the building scheme, with any vacuum left by the non-execution of a deed by subsequent owners being able to be made good in appropriate circumstances by means of an implication.
Phase 3 – Underlying intention generally as the backcloth 8.8 Once the position in phase 2 above had been reached, it was a comparatively short step to imply mutual rights and obligations as between the owners for the time being of lots within a defined area not only where there was a clear-cut model for such implication in the shape of a deed of mutual covenant the contents of which clearly showed that it was intended to be all-pervading, but also where the background facts otherwise showed an intention to secure a direct nexus of enforceability by and between all such owners. 8.9 This development first took shape in the often-quoted dictum of Hall V-C in Renals v Cowlishaw17 in which Hall V-C said: ‘Who then (other than the original covenantee), is entitled to the benefit of the covenant? From the cases of Mann v Stephens,18 Western v MacDermott19 and Coles v Sims,20 it may, I think, be considered as determined that anyone who has acquired land, being one of several lots laid out for sale as building plots, where the court is satisfied that it was the intention that each one of the several purchasers should be bound by and should, as against the others, have the benefit of the covenants entered into by each of the purchasers, is entitled to the benefit of the covenant; and that this right, that is the benefit of the covenant, enures to the assign of the first purchaser, in other words runs with the land of such purchaser. This right exists not only where the several parties execute a mutual deed of covenant, but wherever a mutual contract can be sufficiently established. A purchaser may also be entitled to the benefit of a restrictive covenant entered into with his vendor by another or others where his vendor has contracted with him that he shall be the assign of it, that is have the benefit of the covenant. And such covenant need not be express, but may be collected from the transaction of sale and purchase’ [emphasis added].
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
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(1838) 9 Sim 196. (1889) 43 ChD 265. It will be noted that the decision pre-dates the decision in Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 2 Ph 774. (1878) 9 ChD 125 at p 129, approved on appeal (1879) 11 ChD 866 and cited with approval by Lord Macnaghten in Spicer v Martin (1888) 14 App Cas 12, at p 24. (1846) 15 Sim 377. (1866) 2 Ch App 72. (1854) 5 De GM & G 1.
The evolution of building schemes 8.11 Lord Esher MR, in Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co v Butler,21 approved as correct Wills J’s statement of the law in the court below in the following terms: ‘In my view he is right in saying that, when an estate is put up for sale in lots, subject to a condition that restrictive covenants are to be entered into by each of the purchasers with the vendor, and the vendor is intending at that sale to sell the whole of the property, the question, whether it is intended that each of the purchasers shall be liable in respect of those restrictive covenants to each of the other purchasers, is a question of fact, to be determined by the intention of the vendor and of the purchasers, and that question must be determined upon the same rules of evidence as every other question of intention. And, if it is found that it was the intention that the purchasers should be bound by the covenants inter se, a Court of Equity will, in favour of any one of the purchasers, insist upon the performance of the covenants by any other of them, and will do so under such circumstances without introducing the vendor into the matter.’ 8.10 The movement towards a general principle of mutual obligation based upon intention was carried a stage further by Lord Macnaghten in Spicer v Martin22 when, after citing with approval the dictum of Hall V-C in Renals v Cowlishaw, set out above, Lord Macnaghten said of the various persons who owned an interest in houses on an estate all of which had all been disposed of subject to a restriction confining their use to use as dwelling houses: ‘they all had a common interest in maintaining the restriction. This community of interest necessarily, I think, requires and imports reciprocity of obligation’.23 In the context in which these words were spoken, following as they did the dictum of Hall V-C, it is not entirely clear that Lord Macnaghten was intending to suggest that the ‘reciprocity of obligation’ was the product of some new equitable principle which was independent of the existence of any express or implied covenant.24 8.11 However, Lord Macnaghton’s words were clearly treated as embodying this suggestion by Parker J in Elliston v Reacher,25 where he said: ‘[T]he equity arising out of the establishment of the four points I have mentioned has been sometimes explained by the implication of mutual contracts between the various purchasers, and sometimes by the implication of a contract between each purchaser and the common vendor, that each purchaser is to have the benefit of all the covenants by the other purchasers, so that each purchaser is in equity an assign of the benefit of these covenants. In my opinion the implication of mutual contract is not always a perfectly satisfactory explanation. It may be satisfactory where all the lots are sold by auction at the same time, but when, as in cases such as Spicer v Martin, there is no sale by auction, but all the various sales are by private treaty and at various intervals of time, the circumstances may, at the date of one or more of the sales, be such as to preclude the possibility of any actual contract. For example, a prior purchaser may be dead or incapable of contracting at the 21 22 23 24 25
(1886) 16 QBD 778, at p 784. (1888) 14 App Cas 12, at p 25. Cited by Parker J in Elliston v Reacher [1908] 2 Ch 374 at p 385; by Simonds J in Lawrence v South County Freeholds Ltd [1939] Ch 656, at p 679 and by Megarry J in Brunner v Greenslade [1971] Ch 993, at p 1005A. See the observations of Simonds J in Lawrence v South County Freeholds Ltd [1939] Ch 656. [1908] 2 Ch 374, at p 385.
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8.12 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes time of a subsequent purchase, and in any event it is unlikely that the prior and subsequent purchasers are ever brought into personal relationship, and yet the equity may exist beween them. It is, I think, enough to say, using Lord Macnaghton’s words in Spicer v Martin, that where the four points I have mentioned are established, the community of interest imports in equity the reciprocity of obligation which is in fact contemplated by each at the time of his own purchase.’ 8.12 Subsequently, the position was explained by Cross J in Baxter v Four Oaks Properties Ltd26 as follows: ‘On the other hand, for well over 100 years past where the owner of land deals with it on the footing of imposing restrictive obligations on the use of various parts of it as and when he sells them off for the common benefit of himself (in so far as he retains any land) and of the various purchasers inter se a court of equity has been prepared to give effect to this common intention notwithstanding any technical difficulties involved. In the early days it was not unusual for the common vendor to have prepared a deed of mutual covenant to be executed by each purchaser … With the passage in time it became apparent that there was no particular virtue in the execution of a deed of mutual covenant – save as evidence of the intention of the parties – and what came to be called “building schemes” were enforced by the courts if satisfied that it was the intention of the parties that the various purchasers should have rights inter se, even though no attempt was made to bring them into direct contractual relations.’
Phase 4 – The Development of an equity 8.13 As has been referred to, in the course of the third phase of the development of building schemes, the judicial approach moved away from the process of implying the missing transaction or transactions towards the adoption of a wider principle of mutual obligation based upon the parties’ deemed intention. This eventually came to be seen as an independent equity. 8.14 In Lawrence v South County Freeholds Ltd,27 a plot of land was sold to a purchaser and a covenant was imposed on that purchaser in the same way that purchasers of other plots in the scheme were subject to them. However, the purchaser then sub-divided the plot into three. There was plainly no privity between the purchasers of the three plots and the question arose as to how they could enforce the covenants between themselves Simonds J acknowledged that, if a building scheme as established, there would be ‘an equity which is created by circumstances and is independent of contractual obligation’. In the event, the court held that no building scheme existed, but that had it done so each of the purchasers would have been bound by reason of equity. He said this was prima facle so – because if it could be positively shown there was a contrary intention that would obviously render any such ‘equity’ inapplicable.
26 27
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[1965] Ch 816. [1939] Ch 656, at p 682.
The evolution of building schemes 8.17 8.15 In Brunner v Greenslade,28 the same issue came before Megarry J and the practical relevance of whether the implied transaction theory or the ‘new equity’ theory lies at the root of building schemes was subjected to scrutiny on an application for an injunction which was launched in the following circumstances. In 1926, Bromley Park Garden Estates Ltd (‘BP Garden Estates’), the owners of the greater part of the Bromley Palace Estate, began to dispose of the estate taking from the purchasers covenants in circumstances which (it appears) created a building scheme in relation to the estate. In September 1928 BP Garden Estates conveyed a 0.7 acre site on the Estate to Stanfords (Builders) Ltd (‘Stanfords’) and Stanfords covenanted with BP Garden Estates (in terms which were consistent with the existence of a building scheme) to observe certain covenants, restrictions and stipulations (‘the estate covenants’) including a restriction that not more than one house should be erected on each building plot and that each such building plot should have a frontage of not less than 30 feet to a proposed road (which subsequently became Harewood Avenue). Stanfords divided the site into five plots, building one dwelling house on each having a frontage to Harewood Avenue and then selling each plot to a purchaser. Of these, No 62 was, in October 1928, sold and conveyed to the predecessor in title of the claimants [claimants] and No 64 was, in September 1928, sold and conveyed to the predecessor in title of the defendant. In each case the property was expressed to be conveyed subject to the estate covenants but none of the conveyances of any of the five sub-plots contained any covenant other than a covenant of indemnity in respect of the estate covenants. Whilst, therefore, both No 62 and No 64 were (on the assumption that the requirements for the running of the burden of the covenants had been complied with29) clearly burdened by the estate covenants, which had been entered into by Stanfords for the benefit of the remainder of the Bromley Palace Estate, there was no express covenant which extended this benefit to the purchasers of the plots inter se. In 1968, the owner of No 64 (a corner plot) sold off part of her garden having a frontage to Murray Avenue but no frontage to Harewood Avenue, to the defendant who proposed to build a house thereon. The claimants (the owners of No 62) sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain him from doing so, claiming that they were entitled to the benefit of the estate covenants. 8.16 It was not disputed that if the claimants were entitled to the benefit of the covenants the building of the proposed house would amount to a breach of covenant, but the defendant contended that since No 62 and No 64 were both within the 0.7-acre site, the claimants, as owners of No 64, could not claim the benefit of the covenants – and this was the sole issue on the motion. 8.17 The problem which confronted the claimants was that whilst, where a building scheme exists (as in the case of the Bromley Palace Estate), the covenants which are entered into by a purchaser (Stanfords in the present case) of a site forming part of the scheme land enured for the benefit of the owners
28 [1971] Ch 993. 29 Although the defendant was not the original covenantor, it appears to have been assumed that the burden of the covenant had run with his land. As to the position, in the case of post1925 building schemes, concerning the running of the burden of scheme covenants, see below, para 8.104 et seq.
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8.18 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes for the time being of other sites within the scheme, they could not enure for the benefit of a purchaser of part of a site (the claimant in the present case) as against a purchaser of another part of the same site (the defendant in the present case) since the covenantor in relation to the site (Stanfords) could not covenant with himself.30 There was therefore no covenant affecting any part of the 0.7 acre site of which the benefit could be claimed by an owner of part of that site.31 From this premise it was then contended that the absence of any relevant covenant was fatal to the claimants’ claim. Clearly, if this were correct, whenever the original purchaser from the common vendor purchased more than one plot but subsequently sold each plot to separate purchasers,32 then there would be pockets of scheme land where the owners of sub-plots within those pockets could not enforce the scheme covenants against the owners of other sub-plots in the same pocket – and this would in turn result in the incongruous situation where more proximate owners could take no action although more remote owners (of land outside the pocket in question) could. 8.18 Megarry J, after referring to the above situation and to the fact that even the complexities of schemes of development may usually be explained in terms of covenant, said:33 ‘If, then, the result of putting the basis of schemes of development on a relentless application of the law governing covenants is to produce an unsatisfactory or unworkable result, some other basis must be sought. Now it seems to me that such a basis has long existed, quite apart from the Lawrence case.’ After citing passages from the cases of Elliston v Reacher34 and Spicer v Martin,35 referred to above, Megarry J continued: ‘The major theoretical difficulties based on the law of covenant seem to me to disappear where instead there is an equity created by circumstances which is independent of contractual obligation. Further, whatever arguments there may be about unity of seisin destroying a covenant, by analogy to easements,36 I do not think that it precludes the application of a scheme of development as between purchasers of lots merely because they were initially in one hand. In this case I accordingly think that I am fabricating no new equity, but merely emphasising an established equity. This view illustrates the way in which equity, in developing one of its doctrines, refuses to allow itself to be fettered
30 See Ridley v Lee [1935] Ch 591 (Luxmoore J) and Rye v Rye [1962] AC 496, HL. In the present case, even if Stanfords had purported to covenant with BP Garden Estates and also with themselves, the covenant could only have operated as a covenant with BP Garden Estates to the exclusion of Stanfords: see s 82 of the Law of Property Act 1925. 31 In the absence of a building scheme relating to the burdened land and other land at the time of the covenant, there is no doubt that this is a fatal objection to enforcement of a covenant by the owners inter se of the burdened land: see Re Rutherford’s Conveyance [1938] Ch 396 (Simmonds J); Lawrence v South County Freeholds Ltd [1939] Ch 656 (Simmonds J). 32 Quaere as to the position where a puchaser of a single plot afterwards subdivides it: cf Re Kalsi’s Application (1993) 66 P&CR 313 (LT), at 320 and 321, ie concerning the problem of ‘Camelia’ in that case. See further as to this, footnote 52 below. 33 At p 1004D. 34 [1908] 2 Ch 374, at p 385. 35 (1888) 14 App Cas 12, at pp 18, 19. 36 Arguments later held not to be invincible in Texaco Antilles Ltd v Kernochan [1973] AC 609.
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The legal effects of building schemes 8.22 by the concept on which the doctrine is based if to do so would make the doctrine unfair or unworkable. After all, it is of the essence of a doctrine of equity that it should be equitable, and, I may add, that it should work: equity, like nature, does nothing in vain.’ Megarry J appears to have adopted the same view as Simonds J in Lawrence v South County Freeholds Ltd,37 that showing a positive intention the equity should not arise would negative it, saying: ‘Will the equity apply as between the purchasers of sub-lots only if a positive intention to this effect is established … or will it apply unless a contrary intention appears? The true view is, I think, the latter.’ 8.19 Accordingly, where a building scheme exists, reciprocity of enforceability of the covenants as between any and every owner of scheme land for the time being will be presumed unless a contrary intention is proved.38 8.20 In the Lands Tribunal decision in Re Austin’s Application,39 the Tribunal found such a contrary intention in the words of covenant which expressly declared an intent ‘that the benefit thereof may be annexed to and devolve with each and every part of the Shaw Hill Estate other than the plot or parcel of land hereby conveyed’. A subsequent purchaser of part of that plot was accordingly held not to be entitled to the benefit of the covenants entered into by the original purchaser of the entire plot. 8.21 It is thus that an ‘equity’ arising under building schemes which is independent of implied covenant was established. This represents the position now reached.
2 THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF BUILDING SCHEMES 8.22 When a building scheme exists, the effects are primarily40 sevenfold.41 Where there is such a scheme, this: (1) Provides an alternative to section 56 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (or its predecessor section).42 Purchasers who acquired their land from the common vendor at an earlier date get the benefit of later covenants entered into by later purchasers.
37 See para 8.14 above. 38 As in Knight v Simmonds [1896] 1 Ch 653; affd [1896] 2 Ch 294 and King v Dickeson (1889) 40 ChD 596 (North J) – although the decision in the previous December of the House of Lords in Spicer v Martin (1888) 14 App Cas 12, although directly relevant, was not cited in the latter case. 39 (1980) 42 P&CR 102. 40 For a further special rule, see Re Bromor Properties Ltd’s Application (1995) 70 P&CR 569, at 583, LT (greater onus on an applicant under s 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925). 41 For all these results to follow from the existence of a building scheme, both the burdened and the benefited land must fall within the scheme. If given land lies outside the scope of a building scheme which affects other land, then some of the consequences of the existence of the building scheme may affect the land which lies outside the defined area: see eg Nalder and Collyer’s Brewery Co Ltd v Harmon (1900) 83 LT 257, CA (burdened land outside the area of the scheme) and Allen v Veranne Builders Ltd [1988] NPC 11, Browne-Wilkinson V-C (benefited land outside the area). 42 Considered above, para 3.3 et seq.
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8.22 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes Proving the existence of a scheme thus provides an alternative for the need to show that such earlier purchasers were either (a) parties to the later conveyances or (b) persons who, on the true construction of the covenant, were intended to get the benefit of the covenant under section 56(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 (or its predecessor section where relevant).43 The value in this respect of a building scheme was explained by Jonathan Parker LJ in Whitgift Homes Ltd v Stocks:44 ‘[T]he effect of annexation in a case where the developer of an estate sells off the various developed plots subject to restrictive covenants is that the first purchaser will not be able to enforce the covenants entered into by the purchasers of any of the other plots, whereas the last purchaser will be able to enforce the covenants entered into by all the other purchasers. Hence in the instant case the owners of those of the respondents’ plots which were sold off by the developer before it sold off 14 and 16 Ruffetts Close cannot claim the benefit of the covenants by annexation. However, if the available evidence establishes the existence of a scheme under which similar restrictive covenants imposed on a number of properties in a defined area are mutually and reciprocally enforceable as between the respective owners for the time being of those properties (commonly referred to as a “building scheme”), then the owner for the time being of each of those properties will be able to enforce the covenants against the owners for the time being of each of the other properties subject to the scheme. Thus, in the case of an estate which is sold off by a developer in various plots, the owner for the time being of each plot will be able to enforce the covenants against the owners for the time being of all the other plots, regardless of whether such plots were sold off by the developer before or after his own plot. Hence in the instant case if such a scheme exists each of the fifty-five respondents will be able to enforce the covenants affecting 14 and 16 Ruffetts Close.’ This feature also ensures the validity of the covenants entered into by the purchaser of the last plot notwithstanding that the estate vendor with whom the covenants are entered into then retains no land capable of benefiting from the covenants. In the absence of a building scheme, it is obviously necessary to prove that the claimant’s land was retained by the covenantee at the time the restrictive covenant was entered into (and had not already been sold off by the covenantee previously) in order to be part of the covenantee’s retained land benefited by the covenant. This may be very difficult where two or more plots have been transferred on the same day (ie by transfers bearing the same date): see Perkins v McIver,45 where the Court of Appeal pointed out46 that the order in which land is registered with the Land Registry provides no evidence as to this (which may depend on which solicitor
43 44 45 46
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Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co v Butler (1886) 16 QBD 778, CA. See also, above para 8.9 and below, para 8.61. [2001] EWCA Civ 1293 (Ch), at paras 8 and 9. [2012] EWCA Civ 735. At paras 10 and 11.
The legal effects of building schemes 8.22 registers quickest, rather than on the order of transfers within the day). This problem does not arise where there is a building scheme. (2) Provides an alternative to annexation or express assignment. Later purchasers from the common vendor get the benefit of earlier covenants entered into with the common vendor.47 In the absence of a building scheme, such later purchasers would need to show either annexation or express assignment of the covenant.48 (3) Has the effect of imposing implied covenants on the part of the estate vendor. Notwithstanding that the estate vendor does not enter into any express covenant with any of his earlier purchasers to observe the scheme covenants in relation to his undisposed of land and to impose the scheme covenants on all (or any) of the later purchasers, covenants to this effect on the part of the estate vendor will be implied unless when the scheme covenants are imposed he expressly reserves the right to use his undisposed of land in any manner he thinks fit and to sell it free from (or subject to variations of) the scheme covenants.49 No such covenants will be implied in the absence of a building scheme.50 (4) Imposes the scheme obligations on the subsequent subdivision of a parcel of scheme land. Where more than one plot of land within the scheme is initially sold to the same purchaser so that initially such plots are mutually burdened but not (as between themselves) mutually benefited, on a subsequent sale (or subsale) of such plots to different purchasers who are aware of the scheme, the benefit of the scheme covenants will prima facie vest in such purchasers so as to be enforceable inter se (as well as against owners of all other plots within the scheme).51 In the absence of a scheme, then on the subsequent severance of the burdened land into separate ownership, no fresh rights to enforce the restrictive covenants are deemed to arise with the result that no owner of a severed part of the burdened land can enforce against any other owner of the burdened land the covenants which burden each severed part.52
47
Brown v Inskip (1884) Cab & El 231; Nalder and Collyer’s Brewery Co Ltd v Harmon (1900) 83 LT 257, CA. 48 Keates v Lyon (1869) 4 Ch App 218; Renals v Cowlishaw (1879) 11 ChD 866; Reid v Bickerstaff [1909] 2 Ch 305. 49 Spicer v Martin (1888) 14 App Cas 12; Mackenzie v Childers (1889) 43 ChD 265 at 287; Re Birmingham and District Land Co and Allday [1893] 1 Ch 342; Davis v Corpn of Leicester [1894] 2 Ch 208 at 232. As to expressly reserved dispensing powers, see below, para 8.95 et seq. 50 Holford v Acton UDC [1898] 2 Ch 240. Cf Piggott v Stratton (1859) John 341; Hodges v Jones [1935] Ch 657. 51 See Brunner v Greenslade [1971] Ch 993. This would appear not to be applicable where a single lotted plot is purchased and later subdivided: cf Re Luton Trade Unionist Club’s Application (1969) 20 P&CR 1131 at 1136 (LT); Re Austin’s Application (1980) 42 P&CR 102, LT; Re Bushall’s Application (1987) 54 P&CR 386 at 391, LT; Re Kalsi’s Application (1993) 66 P&CR 313, LT, at pp 320 and 321. 52 Willé v St John [1910] 1 Ch 325, CA; Re Rutherford’s Conveyance [1938] Ch 396 (Simonds J); Lawrence v South County Freeholds Ltd [1939] Ch 656 (Simmonds J); Re Tiltwood, Sussex [1978] Ch 269 (Foster J); Re Victoria Recreation Ground, Portslade’s Application (1979) 41 P&CR 119, LT.
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8.22 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes In two cases, however, even where there is a building scheme, the subsequent fragmentation into separate ownership of a parcel of land within the scheme will not extend the benefit of the scheme covenants to the owners of the fragmented parts so as to render the covenants enforceable as between those owners. These cases are: (a) where new covenants are imposed on the occasion of the disposition of the fragmented land which do not conform to the scheme covenants. In such a case, the principle ‘expressum facit cessare taciturn’ (‘what is expressed makes what is implied silent’) will apply so as to exclude the application of the scheme covenants;53 (b) where the right to enforce the scheme covenants by the vendor against the purchaser would constitute a derogation from grant.54 In Texaco Antilles Ltd v Kernochan,55 Lord Cross, delivering the advice of the Privy Council, instanced as an example of such derogation the case of a vendor of one of the combined plots who, before the sale, had instituted a use inconsistent with the scheme covenants. (5) Means covenants extinguished (or suspended) by merger will revive on subsequent severance of the merged plots. If there is unity of seisin between two or more lots forming part of the scheme land, so that the covenants are extinguished as between those lots, they will prima facie56 revive on a subsequent severance of the merged lots into separate ownership.57 The position is otherwise where there is no scheme.58 (6) Gives rise to special considerations in respect of the registration of the burden of the scheme obligations. In the case of post-1925 building schemes, special considerations arise in connection with the protection of the building scheme covenants by registration under the Land Charges Acts 1925 and 1972 or (as the case may be) the Land Registration Acts 1925–2002. This is dealt with later in this chapter. (7) Alters the effect of acquiescence in a breach of covenant. Where the estate vendor suffers or permits departures from a scheme covenant by some of the plot owners, then unless the acquiescence or waiver was referable to the exercise of a power to release or not to enforce the covenants, reserved to the estate vendor by the scheme, that covenant may cease to be enforceable against other plot owners by both the estate
53
Knight v Simmonds [1896] 1 Ch 653; affd [1896] 2 Ch 294. An expressed intention will also exclude the scheme covenants: see Re Austin’s Application (1980) 42 P&CR 102, LT. 54 King v Dickeson (1889) 40 ChD 596 (as interpreted by Megarry J in Brunner v Greenslade [1971] Ch 993). 55 [1973] AC 609, PC, where, however, no reference was made to King v Dickeson, above. 56 The cases referred to in footnotes 53 and 54 above would appear to be equally applicable to cases falling under the present rule. 57 Texaco Antilles Ltd v Kernochan [1973] AC 609, PC. 58 Re Tiltwood, Sussex [1978] Ch 269 (Foster J); Golden Lion Hotel (Hunstanton) Ltd v Carter [1965] 1 WLR 1189. See also Keates v Lyon (1869) 4 Ch App 218; Cryer v Scott Bros (Sunbury) Ltd (1986) 55 P&CR 183 at 188; Re Victoria Recreation Ground, Portslade’s Application (1979) 41 P&CR 119, LT.
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Facts to be proved to establish existence of a building scheme 8.24 vendor and the other plot owners.59 Where there is no building scheme, there is no such general waiver.60
3 THE FACTS WHICH MUST BE PROVED TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF A BUILDING SCHEME 8.23 Whether a building scheme exists or not is a question of fact61 and the burden of proof lies on the party asserting its existence.62 8.24 There must be proved to have been an intention on the part of the vendor and the covenantors (express or implied) participating in the scheme that there should be reciprocity of obligation and benefit amongst the covenantors. This intention may be inferred from the circumstances and need not be embodied in an express agreement. This has been clear since Renals v Cowlishaw63 where Sir Charles Hall V-C said: ‘[I]t may I think be considered as determined that anyone who has acquired land, being one of several lots laid out for sale as building plots, where the court is satisfied that it was the intention that each one of the several purchasers should be bound by and should, as against the others, have the benefit of the covenants entered into by each of the purchasers, is entitled to the benefit of the covenant … This right exists not only where the several parties execute a mutual deed of covenant, but wherever a mutual contract can be sufficiently established.’ Similarly, in Nalder and Collyer’s Brewery Co Ltd v Harman,64 Collins LJ said: ‘Where a vendor sells land and retains other land and imposes on the purchaser a covenant, it becomes a question of fact what the effect of that is. That being a question of fact, it must be decided by the light of evidence as are all other questions of fact. But if you find that a building scheme exists, proof of that building scheme may be given. It is only a matter of evidence, and it is perfectly competent to prove by other evidence, if you can find it, whether or not the building scheme applies.’ 59
See the observations of Lord Eldon in Roper v Williams (1822) Turn & R 18: ‘In every case in which the grantor suffers grantees to deviate from a general plan intended for the benefit of all, he deprives others of the right which he had given them to have the general plan enforced for the benefit of all.’; Earl Zetland v Hislop (1882) 7 App Cas 427. As to the limits of such general waiver, see Chatsworth Estates Co v Fewell [1931] 1 Ch 224 at 231–232 (Farwell J). 60 Osborne v Bradley [1903] 2 Ch 446. 61 ‘[I]t is a question of fact whether the restrictions are merely matters of agreement between the vendor himself and his vendees, imposed for his own benefit and protection, or are meant by him and understood by the buyers to be for the common advantage of the several purchasers’, per Wills J in Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co v Butler (1885) 15 QBD 261, at p 268 – on appeal, (1886) 16 QBD 778, where this statement was referred to with approval. See also, Sheppard v Gilmore (1887) 57 LT 614; Re Birmingham and District Land Co and Allday [1893] 1 Ch 342 and Nalder and Collyer’s Brewery Co Ltd v Harman (1900) 83 LT 257, CA. 62 Elliston v Reacher [1908] 2 Ch 374; Lawrence v South County Freeholds Ltd [1939] Ch 656. However, a claimant seeing a declaration under section 84(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 that no building scheme exists must adduce evidence to demonstrate its absence: below, paras 14.23–14.27. 63 (1878) 9 ChD 125, at p 129, approved (on appeal) by the Court of Appeal (1879) 11 ChD 866 and by Lord MacNaghten in Spicer v Martin (1888) 14 App Cas 12, at p 23. 64 (1900) 83 LT 257, at p 259, CA.
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8.25 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes 8.25 If a deed of mutual covenant, duly executed by all participating covenantors, actually existed, then such deed would necessarily: (1) contain particulars of the restrictions imposed by the covenants; (2) identify the parties as between whom the covenants will be enforceable; and (3) show without question that the parties to the deed intended to covenant with each other on a reciprocal basis. In the absence of an actual deed, but individual owners of land are found to have entered into covenants, not (in terms) with each other but with their vendor65 then of the above three elements, the only one which will necessarily be present will be element (1). 8.26 Accordingly, for such covenants to be shown to have been intended to be entered into by identifiable covenantors not only for the benefit of the vendor but also for the mutual benefit of each other, the other two elements (namely (2) the identity of the parties between whom the covenants were intended to be enforceable, and (3) that they intended to covenant with each other on a mutual basis) must be established by further evidence. 8.27 It is not enough that there should simply be owners of land who (or whose predecessors) have entered into covenants with the same vendor (see Wembley Park Estate Co Ltd’s Transfer London Sephardi Trust v Baker and Others,66 cited with approval by the Court of Appeal in Birdlip v Hunter).67 It is also necessary not only that they entered into such covenants but that in doing so they were all to be owners of a parcel of land forming part of a larger area, or estate, which had originally been intended to be disposed of subject to a consistent scheme of covenants amounting to a distinctive pattern of contractual ‘local law’. The area must be defined and the covenants with the estate vendor must have been intended both by him and by the individual purchasers to be mutually enforceable between the various owners for the time being inter se. As Cozens-Hardy MR said in Reid v Bickerstaff:68 ‘[T]here must be a defined area within which the scheme is operative. Reciprocity is the foundation of the idea of a scheme. A purchaser of one parcel cannot be subject to an implied obligation to purchasers of an undefined and unknown area. He must know both the extent of his burden and the extent of his benefit. Not only must the area be defined, but the obligations to be imposed within that area must be defined69 … A building scheme is not created by the mere fact that the owner of an estate sells it in lots and takes varying covenants from various purchasers. There must be notice to the
65 Except in the case of an initial purchase of several plots and their subsequent severance or of the subsequent subdivision of a plot; see above, para 8.22 at (4). 66 [1968] Ch 491. 67 [2017] 1 P&CR 1. The vendor could in such circumstances be disposing of land in two or more completely distinct neighbourhoods or may have disposed of some of his land in the same neighbourhood before deciding to dispose of the remainder on the basis of a scheme – as in Nalder and Collyer’s Brewery Co Ltd v Harman (1900) 83 LT 257, CA. 68 [1909] 2 Ch 305, at 319. 69 Though those obligations need not be identical – for example, as Cozens-Hardy MR pointed out, there may be houses of a certain value in one part and houses of a different value in another part.
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Facts to be proved to establish existence of a building scheme 8.31 various purchasers of what I may venture to call the local law imposed by vendors upon a definite area’. In the case of recently created building schemes, it is more likely than not that direct documentary evidence will be available to establish each of these two elements so that they will not need to be inferred from indirect evidence.70 8.28 However, with older estate developments, there may be little or no direct evidence to show whether the necessary elements existed or not and the question then arises whether there is sufficient evidence of an indirect kind to lead to the inference that the essential elements of a scheme existed.
Two essential elements of a building scheme 8.29 It follows from the above that the two essential requirements for the enforcebility of covenants under a building scheme (in addition to the need for the covenant to contain particulars of the restrictions imposed – item (1) in the list at para 8.25 above) are that: (1) Before any of the covenants are entered into, a defined area of scheme land must be identified which is intended to be sold off subject to a consistent scheme of covenants. (2) There must be evidence of an intention on the part of the vendor and of the individual purchasers that the purchasers’ covenants are intended to be enforceable on a reciprocal basis. 8.30 The reasons for each of these two requirements, was explained by Cozens-Hardy MR in Reid v Bickerstaff 71 in the terms set out above. Buckley LJ explained it in the same case in the following terms: ‘There can be no building scheme unless two conditions are satisfied, namely, first, that defined lands constituting the estate to which the scheme relates shall be identified, and, secondly, that the nature and particulars of the scheme shall be sufficiently disclosed for the purchaser to have been informed that his restrictive covenants are imposed upon him for the benefit of other purchasers of plots within the defined estate with the reciprocal advantage that he shall as against other purchasers be entitled to the benefit of such restrictive covenants as are in turn to be imposed upon them. Compliance with the first condition identifies the class of persons as between whom reciprocity of obligation is to exist. Compliance with the second discloses the nature of the obligations which are to be mutually enforceable. There must be as between the several purchasers community of interest and reciprocity of obligation.’ 8.31 In Jamaica Mutual Life Assurance Society v Hillsborough Ltd72 in 1989 the Privy Council stated that: ‘It is now well established that there are two prerequisites of a building scheme namely: (1) the identification of the land to which the scheme
70 For example, in the shape of recitals in each conveyance or transfer which clearly set out the intention to dispose of a defined area of land subject to a scheme of covenants intended to be mutually enforceable as between the various purchasers. 71 [1909] 2 Ch 305, at p 323, CA. 72 [1989] 1 WLR 1101.
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8.32 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes relates, and (2) an acceptance by each purchaser of part of the lands of the common vendor that the benefit of the covenants into which he has entered will enure to the vendor and to others deriving title from him and that he correspondingly will enjoy the benefit of covenants entered into by other purchasers of different plots is essential’. 8.32 These two requirements were recently affirmed and emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Birdlip Ltd v Hunter.73 Each of these two requirements will be considered in turn.
(1) Before any of the covenants are entered into, a defined area of scheme land must be identified which is intended to be sold off subject to a consistent scheme of covenants 8.33 A defined area of scheme land must be shown to have been intended to be sold off subject to the scheme of covenants before any of the sales off took place.74 8.34 It is not sufficient to satisfy this requirement merely to show that: (i) the vendor owned specific land; (ii) that he sold the whole of such land subject to similar covenants; and (iii) that the resulting development gives the appearance of having been planned as such from the outset. These three features may give rise to a plausible conjecture that there was, from the outset, an intention that the land which the vendor owned was intended by him and the various purchasers to be scheme land but are not sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference to that effect. 8.35 This is clear from the decision of the Court of Appeal in Reid v Bickerstaff 75 which has already been referred to.76 In that case, a copyhold estate of 64 acres on the outskirts of Liverpool known as the Fairfield Estate was devised by will to trustees upon trust for sale. The following facts were found: (i) Between 1833 and August 1835, the trustees disposed of certain outlying portions of the estate for various different purposes, including a cemetery and a brewery. (ii) In August 1835, they put ‘a considerable portion’ of the estate up for sale by auction in eight large lots and an advertisement in the Liverpool Mercury referred to an office where plans and particulars might be had. No such plans were able to be adduced in evidence. (iii) The auction did not realise any sales but thereafter the whole of the land was sold in plots of suitable size for the erection of one two or three private residences. (iv) From the record of the manorial court rolls, it appeared that restrictive covenants (including a covenant against the erection or use of any buildings otherwise than as private dwelling houses) were imposed on the purchasers 73 [2017] 1 P&CR 1. See, especially, paras 21–23. 74 See Osborne v Bradley [1903] 2 Ch 446 (Farwell J); Tucker v Vowles [1893] 1 Ch 195. 75 [1909] 2 Ch 305. 76 At para 8.30 above
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Facts to be proved to establish existence of a building scheme 8.38 in practically every instance, the only exceptions being two or three narrow strips which appeared to be set out as ways or passages and which were not eligible for building upon. (v) Modern maps showed a wholly residential estate having a defined character albeit the houses consisted of large buildings on one side and workmen’s cottages on the other. (vi) The defendant, whose predecessor in title had, in 1840, purchased a one acre plot and entered into a restrictive covenant with the trustees ‘their heirs and assigns’ not to build other than three dwelling houses on the plot was building thereon substantial commercial buildings including stables for 40 horses and large sheds for vehicles of all kinds. At first instance, Joyce J considered that there was sufficient indication of a building scheme and granted an injunction but on appeal this decision was reversed on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence of a defined area within which the scheme was to operate. In the course of his judgment Kennedy LJ said:77 ‘It is not, I think, improbable that if we knew all the facts in regard to this case as they happened the judgment under appeal would be justified … But we are bound to deal with the case upon the evidence as it stands, and to shun conjecture, however plausible and attractive, by keeping carefully within the bounds of legal inference.’ 8.36 Again, in Tucker v Vowles,78 the court declined to infer the existence of a building scheme relating to the whole of the vendors’ land merely by reason of the fact that they had identified the various plots which they had sold by reference to an estate plan showing the whole area originally owned with the individual plots marked out and had imposed covenants of a kind which were consistent with a building scheme. 8.37 Similarly, in Torbay Hotel Ltd v Jenkins79 a building scheme was unable to be established because of the absence of evidence of a defined area known to all the parties where, although the requisite intention of disposing of freehold land under a systematic policy and subject to a regular system of covenants for the mutual benefit of the purchasers was found to be present, there was no evidence to define the limits of the area over which the mutuality of enforcement was intended to extend.80 8.38 Again, in Re Wembley Park Estate Co Ltd’s Transfer,81 a substantial area of land at Wembley Park was developed as a residential estate by the Wembley Park Estate Co Ltd between the First World War and 1931 when the company went into voluntary liquidation and was dissolved. None of the company’s documents had been traced but the contents of ‘a considerable number of transfers’ of the individual sites showed that they all contained covenants which were in all material respects identical. There was, however, no documentary or
77 78 79 80
Ibid, at pp 326 and 327. [1893] 1 Ch 195. [1927] 2 Ch 225 (Clauson J). The covenants provided for arbitration in any particular case as to the distances within which the mutual obligations should be permitted to operate, but this was held to negative the existence of a defined area rather than to provide the means of ascertaining it. 81 [1968] Ch 491. See, also, Torbay Hotel Ltd v Jenkins [1927] 2 Ch 225 and Osborne v Bradley [1903] 2 Ch 446.
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8.39 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes other evidence either identifying a clearly defined area or any lotting as existing before any sales took place and Goff J held that it was impossible to infer a building scheme from ‘no more than a common vendor and the existence of common covenants’. 8.39 The Privy Council in Emile Elias & Co Ltd v Pine Groves Ltd,82 again affirmed the importance of each of the original purchasers of individual plots being aware, at the time of their purchase, of the precise extent of the defined area. In that case a vendor sold off (in 1938) five lots, lots 1, 2 and 3 to separate purchasers, and lots 4 and 5 to the same purchaser. The plan annexed to each of the conveyances of lots 1, 2 and 3 showed lots 1 to 4 but did not show plot 5. Two plans were annexed to the conveyance of lots 4 and 5, one showing lots 1 to 4 and other showing lot 5. Ten years later, in 1948, the owners of lots 1 to 3 joined as parties to a deed of release releasing the restrictive covenants affecting that plot so as to permit the erection of a house. There was no other evidence to show whether, at the time of their respective purchases, the original purchasers of lots 1 to 3 knew of the existence of lot 5. On this question of fact, the Privy Council held that although the 1948 deed of release was admissible as evidence of whether they were aware, in 1938, that lot 5 was included in the alleged building scheme, it was not sufficiently unequivocal to prove the requisite state of awareness. An additional reason for there being no building scheme was that there was not a consistent scheme of covenants. In particular, whilst the owners of lots 2 and 3 were restricted to using the dwellinghouse to be erected as a private dwellinghouse only, lots 1, 4 and 5 were not so restricted; further, only lots 2 and 3 were subject to a restriction against causing a nuisance to neighbouring occupiers. 8.40 Similarly, in the more recent case of Whitgift Homes Ltd v Stocks83 (where this was acknowledged by the trial judge, Neuberger J, to be a ‘strict requirement’) the Court of Appeal held that there was on the evidence nothing which showed the ‘defined area’ within which any scheme was intended to operate. This also meant the purchaser of any given plot could not know which plots on the estate were within the scheme and which are not so as to know the extent of his burden and the extent of his benefit. Accordingly, it was not possible to find there was a building scheme. 8.41 Even more recently, the Court of Appeal in Birdlip v Hunter,84 which has already been mentioned above,85 emphasised (at para 43) that ‘all buyers of land affected by the scheme must know what that area is’. In almost all the cases in which a building scheme has been found to exist, the area of land to which the scheme applied was ascertainable from the terms of the conveyance or other transactional documents (and conversely where they gave an indication of the land to which the scheme was applied, no scheme was found): see Birdlip at para 25. 8.42 If the conveyance referred to a plan, but the plan has been lost, the court may well infer, however, that the lost plan sufficiently identified the land
82 83 84 85
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[1993] 1 WLR 305, PC. [2001] EWCA Civ 1732. [2017] 1 P&CR 1. See para 8.32.
Facts to be proved to establish existence of a building scheme 8.47 to which the scheme of mutual covenants applied: see In Re 6, 8, 10 and 12 Elm Avenue New Milton86 and Birdlip at para 31. 8.43 The fact there was no map or plan of the affected area in the conveyance itself is not necessarily fatal to the existence of a scheme of mutual covenants if the description of the area to which it applies can be identified by extrinsic evidence: see Birdlip at para 32. By way of example, in Re Dolphin’s Conveyance87 the conveyance contained a number of references to the Selly Hill Estate. Stamp J admitted evidence to identify the extent of the Selly Hill Estate. He said: ‘I find, as a fact, that the references to the “Selly Hill Estate” in the several conveyances by the Dolphins and their nephew, Watts, are references to identified land: identified not in the sense that by looking at the conveyances you could, today, without researches, identify it, because the conveyances contained no plan or description of it, but identified in the sense that a reference in a document to Richmond Park would be a reference to an identified piece of land, notwithstanding the absence of a plan on the document delineating Richmond Park.’ 8.44 However, ‘it is not sufficient that the common vendor has himself defined the area. In order to create a valid building scheme, the purchasers of all the land within the area of the scheme must also know what that area is’: per Lord Browne-Wilkinson for the Privy Council in Emile Elias & Co Ltd v Pine Groves Ltd.88 Not all the land in a development need be the subject of the building scheme so long as the area which is subject to it is defined, so that all buyers of land affected by it know what it is, and indeed, there may be more than one enforceable building scheme created in relation to a large development: see Judge LJ in Whitgift v Stocks at para 111. 8.45 Whether the necessary degree of definition of the area is established is a question of fact (above), though it is clear from cases such as Birdlip and Whitgift Homes that it is one in relation to which the Court of Appeal is not afraid of concluding even experienced judges (such as Neuberger J in Whitgift Homes), have gone plainly wrong so as to give rise to a successful appeal.
Elliston v Reacher: the extent to which there needs to be a ‘common vendor’ and whether lotting of plots is always required 8.46 Assuming that a defined area of land is sufficiently identified to which the common covenants apply, the question arises whether, as a matter of law, any further conditions are required to be satisfied in relation to that defined area. 8.47 In Elliston v Reacher,89 the claimants (or any of them) could only succeed if they could show that a building scheme existed, since the
86 87 88 89
[1984] 1 WLR 1398. [1970] Ch 654. [1993] 1 WLR 305, at p 310. [1908] 2 Ch 374 (Parker J)); affd [1908] 2 Ch 665.
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8.48 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes predecessors in title of the claimants purchased their plots from the estate owner on 27 December 1861 whilst the predecessors in title of the defendants purchased one of the defendants’ plots (and covenanted) on the same date, 27 December 1861, and purchased the other plot (and covenanted) on 19 April 1866.90 In dealing with the question of the existence of a building scheme, Parker J91 expressed his view of the law in the following terms (in a paragraph which has been reformatted here for ease of understanding): ‘I pass, therefore, to the consideration of the question whether the plaintiffs [claimants] can enforce these restrictive covenants. In my judgment, in order to bring the principles of Renals v Cowlishaw92 and Spicer v Martin93 into operation it must be proved: (1) that both the plaintiffs [claimants] and the defendants derive title under a common vendor; (2) that previously to selling the lands to which the plaintiffs [claimants] and defendants are respectively entitled the vendor laid out his estate, or a defined portion thereof (including the lands purchased by the plaintiffs [claimants] and defendants respectively), for sale in lots subject to restrictions intended to be imposed on all the lots, and which, though varying in details as to particular lots, are consistent and consistent only with some general scheme of development; (3) that these restrictions were intended by the common vendor to be and were for the benefit of all the lots intended to be sold, whether or not they were also intended to be and were for the benefit of other land retained by the vendor; and (4) that both the plaintiffs [claimants] and the defendants, or their predecessors in title, purchased their lots from the common vendor upon the footing that the restrictions subject to which the purchases were made were to enure for the benefit of the other lots included in the general scheme whether or not they were also to enure for the benefit of other lands retained by the vendors. If these four points be established, I think that the plaintiffs [claimants] would in equity be entitled to enforce the restrictive covenants entered into by the defendants or their predecessors with the common vendor irrespective of the dates of the respective purchases.’ This statement of the law has figured prominently in all the post-1908 cases on building schemes. 8.48 Nevertheless, the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Reid v Bickerstaff,94 referred to above was delivered after Parker J’s decision and it will 90
Even assuming that it could have been shown that the defendants’ plot which was conveyed on 27 December 1861 was so conveyed before the claimants’ plots were conveyed on the same day, there were neither words of annexation nor any express assignment of the benefit of the covenants affecting that plot to the predecessors in title of the claimants; and so far as concerns the covenants entered into on the purchase of the defendants’ plot which was conveyed on 19 April 1866, such covenants were not expressed to be entered into with anyone other than the vendor. 91 Ibid, at p 384. 92 (1878) 9 ChD 125 and on appeal (1879) 11 ChD 866. 93 (1888) 14 App Cas 12. 94 [1909] 2 Ch 305 – a decision described by Atkinson J in Newman v Real Estate Debenture Corpn Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 131, at p 141B as ‘the last word on this topic’.
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Facts to be proved to establish existence of a building scheme 8.49 be observed that in two respects, the four requirements specified by Parker J in the above extract go further than the two requirements specified by Buckley LJ in Reid v Bickerstaff,95 which have been so often reaffirmed as the important principles and applied. These respects are as follows: (1) the requirement that the claimant and the defendant must derive title under a common vendor; (2) the requirement that prior to any sale, the estate or the relevant part (in which both the claimant and the defendant are interested as owners) must actually have been laid out in lots.96 While the present discussion is concerned primarily with (2) above, it will be convenient to deal here also with (1).
Common vendor 8.49 As to the requirement for a ‘common vendor’, the following observations may be made. (a) If there is a scheme it will crystallise on the first sale being made: see Brunner v Greenslade;97 Birdlip Ltd v Hunter.98 As a matter of principle, it follows from this not only: (i) that the area needs to be defined with sufficient clarity at that time; but also (ii) that so long as there is a common title holder at the start, it would not matter that someone else acquires the remainder of the estate (other than as a scheme purchaser – for example, under a deed of gift) before all the sales have been made. This second point is also clear from the decision of Stamp J in Re Dolphin’s Conveyance99 – provided there was an initially defined estate to which the then owner (or joint owners), A, intended a scheme to apply, and the fact that before all the sales have taken place, B acquired (otherwise than as a scheme purchaser – in the instant case, under a deed of gift) the remainder of the estate and then proceeded with the selling off so that A was the vendor in earlier conveyances and B was the vendor in later conveyances, this will not prevent a building scheme from applying as between all the purchasers, whether from A or from B. In arriving at this conclusion, Stamp J primarily rested his judgment on the broad principle of equity considered above100 which may underlie building schemes, namely, common interest and common intention. Clearly the change in the estate vendor does not exclude the implied intention of each purchaser to covenant with each of the other purchasers where factors exist which link each of the separate vendors with the common scheme.
95 Above. 96 Requirements (3) (relating to the intention of the vendor) and (4) (relating to the intention of the purchasers) do not differ but, though broken down into two, correspond with the second of the essential elements referred to in Reid v Bickerstaff [1909] 2 Ch 305. 97 [1970] Ch 993 at 1003G. 98 [2017] 1 P&CR 1, at para 44. 99 [1970] Ch 654. 100 Above, para 8.13 et seq.
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8.50 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes (b) If, as Re Dolphin’s Conveyance shows, it makes no difference to the overall comprehensiveness of a building scheme that there is a change of estate owner half way through the selling off process, the further question arises whether it would make any difference if there were two different owners of separate parts of the estate from the outset. It is considered not. If X, the owner of 10 acres, and Y, the owner of 12 acres, agreed to treat their combined 22 acres as a comprehensive area of development and laid it out as a single estate for disposal in accordance with an overall scheme of covenants, there would appear to be no sufficient reason for not treating all the purchasers, whether from X or from Y, as subject to one overall building scheme. In this connection, as in case (i) above, the pre-existence of an overall comprehensive scheme before any sales took place should provide sufficient basis for covenants entered into by Xs purchasers with X to be impliedly intended to enure for the benefit of and to be enforceable by not only other purchasers from X but also purchasers from Y and vice versa. The fact that X’s purchasers cannot, in any circumstances, claim the benefit of Y’s purchasers’ covenants by way of succession and vice versa, is not fundamental since that is always the position of the first purchaser from a common vendor and also of subsequent purchasers from a common vendor vis-à-vis later subsequent purchasers. As pointed out above,101 it is one of the effects of a building scheme that it provides an alternative to section 56 of the Law of Property Act 1925 (or its predecessor under the Real Property Act 1845) for enabling original covenants to be made with persons who are not parties to the covenant – and it is submitted that the identification of such persons ought primarily to be made by reference to the limits of the defined estate rather than to the source either of the title or of the express covenant. (c) The identification of a defined area of scheme land will usually carry with it the identification of the former common owner of that land at the time of the scheme. However, in Re 6, 8, 10 and 12 Elm Avenue, New Milton,102 in answer to an argument that there was insufficient evidence of an initial common vendor, Scott J was, on the balance of probabilities, prepared to infer from the similarity of contents of only three later conveyances of properties in Elm Avenue that there had earlier been a common vendor of the Elm Avenue Estate.103
Prior lotting 8.50 As to (2) above, before the decision of Parker J in Elliston v Reacher,104 there had been no case in which the necessity or otherwise for Parker J’s condition as to lotting had been in issue although in all the previous cases where a building scheme had been held to exist, there was in fact a common owner who had laid out the defined area in lots prior to the first sale off. In Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co v Butler105 Wills J had stated,
101 102 103 104 105
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See para 8.22 at (1). [1984] 1 WLR 1398. See, ibid, p 1406G. [1908] 2 Ch 374; affd by CA [1908] 2 Ch 665. (1885) 15 QBD 261, at pp 268–269; affd (1886) 16 QBD 778.
Facts to be proved to establish existence of a building scheme 8.51 in a passage which was referred to with approval on appeal to the Court of Appeal: ‘One circumstance which has always been held to be cogent evidence of an intention that the covenants shall be for the common benefit of the purchasers is that the several lots have been laid out for sale as building lots, as in Mann v Stephens,106 Western v MacDermott,107 Coles v Sims,108 or, as it has been sometimes said, that there has been ‘a building scheme’: Renals v Cowlishaw.’109 8.51 It is to be noted that this statement merely refers to one circumstance (thus clearly implying there may be others) and emphasises the evidential character of such circumstance. After the decision in Elliston v Reacher, however, and until the decision of Cross J in Baxter v Four Oaks Properties Ltd,110 the need for satisfying Parker J’s condition as to prior lotting went virtually unchallenged. There was, however, a strong suggestion of a challenge by Clauson J in 1927 in the case of Torbay Hotel Ltd v Jenkins.111 In that case, the facts were as follows: The owners of a fully developed estate – the Cary Estate in Torquay which included the Torbay Hotel – set out to dispose of the estate, as and when sales of the freehold became practicable, by disposing of the freehold under a systematic policy involving the imposition of a regular system of covenants intended to enure for the benefit inter se of all persons who from time to time became owners of part of the estate. Both the plaintiff [claimant] hotel company and the defendant derived their titles from persons who had purchased their properties from the estate owners subject to covenants which included a covenant not to commit a nuisance or annoyance to neighbouring owners. The hotel property had been sold off first and the defendant’s property later and the defendant’s property was being used as a ‘skee ball alley’ in a way which, if the covenant was enforceable by the hotel company would constitute a breach of covenant. In the circumstances, the hotel company could only succeed if a building scheme existed. Since the estate had been fully developed before any sales off took place, there was no prior laying out of the estate in lots of any particular size. But in the course of his judgment Clauson J said: ‘The present is not, of course, the case of a building scheme in the ordinary sense; the Cary Estate owners were not setting out to deal with vacant land and to parcel it out in plots for sale. They had, in or about 1890, an already fully developed estate … It appears to me that the principle as regards the common intention of the parties on which the building scheme cases proceed would apply to the present case, notwithstanding that the circumstances differ from those of the ordinary building scheme.’ But Clauson J went on to hold that there was no building scheme because there was no evidence as to the area within which the burden and benefit of the restrictive covenants was intended to extend. 106 107 108 109 110 111
(1846) 15 Sim 377. (1866) 2 Ch App 72. (1854) 5 De GM&G 1. (1879) 11 ChD 866. [1965] Ch 816. [1927] 2 Ch 225, at p 241.
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8.52 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes 8.52 In Baxter v Four Oaks Properties Ltd,112 the facts were as follows: In 1891, Lord Clanrikarde owned an estate of some 288 acres at Sutton Coldfield known as ‘Four Oaks Estate’. He decided to sell the estate for building development his intention being that the whole estate should be residential but that the minimum cost of the houses to be erected should not be uniform throughout. To carry out his intention, he divided the estate into several parts and a separate deed of covenant was drawn up for each part. The deed of covenant relating to the part with which the case was concerned related to development having a frontage to Lichfield Road (‘the Lichfield Road land’). This deed, which was made between Lord Clanrikarde of the one part and Samuel Hope (the first purchaser of part of the Lichfield Road land) of the other part, contained recitals indicating that it was supplemental to a conveyance of even date to Samuel Hope of part of the Lichfield Road land containing covenants as to building and user (by reference to the contents of schedule 1 of the deed of covenant) and that it was intended that all other persons who might thereafter purchase any of the Lichfield Road land would enter into similar covenants. The operative part contained a covenant by Samuel Hope and every other person who should purchase any part of the Lichfield road land to perform and observe the covenants contained in schedule 1 to the deed and declared that in the event of any breach such covenants should be enforceable by any person for the time being entitled to any part of the Lichfield Road land. In the ensuing 10 years, Lord Clanrikarde sold off the whole of the estate, including the Lichfield Road land, and all the conveyances of parts of this land contained covenants in substantially the same terms as those in the conveyance to Samuel Hope. Apart from Samuel Hope, the deed of covenant was executed by the purchasers of seventeen other parts of the Lichfield Road land, including the predecessors in title of the five claimants and the predecessor in title of the defendant company. Of the five claimants, the last three derived their title through persons to whom Lord Clanrikarde had sold parts of the Lichfield Road land after the covenants had been entered into by the purchaser of the land to which the defendant company was now entitled and it was conceded that those claimants were entitled to the benefit of the covenants entered into by the defendant’s predecessor in title by reason of words of annexation contained in the covenants. The issue in the case therefore revolved around the first two claimants who derived their title from persons to whom Lord Clanrikarde had sold parts of the Lichfield Road land before the sale of the defendant’s land to the defendant’s predecessor in title (and therefore before the relevant covenants had been entered into) and who accordingly could not claim to have acquired the benefit of the covenants through or under Lord Clanrikarde. Further, although such prior purchasers were parties to the deed of covenant, the words of covenant in that deed did not contain any words sufficient to annex the benefit of the covenants to such parties’ land.113 Accordingly, the first two claimants could only succeed if there was a building scheme.
112 [1965] Ch 816. 113 As indicated above, the operative part of the deed of covenant contained a declaration that in the event of any breach, any person for the time being entitled to any part of the Lichfield Road land could enforce the covenants, but although the report is silent on the point, it must be presumed that this provision was regarded as insufficient to bring about annexation. On this
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Facts to be proved to establish existence of a building scheme 8.53 Cross J, after citing the passage in Parker J’s judgment in Elliston v Reacher referred to above, distinguished that case on the point of the need for prior lotting on the ground that it ‘was not a case in which there was direct evidence, afforded by the execution of the deed of mutual covenant, that the parties in fact intended a building scheme’ and held there was a building scheme, with the result that not only the last three claimants but also the first two could enforce the covenants. In the course of his judgment, Cross J, after pointing out that Elliston v Reacher was not a case in which there was direct evidence that the parties intended a building scheme, said:114 ‘The question [in Elliston v Reacher] was whether one could properly infer that intention in all the circumstances. In such a case, no doubt the fact that the common vendor did not divide his estate into lots before beginning to sell it is an argument against there having been an intention on his part and on the part of the various purchasers that there should be a building scheme, since it is, perhaps, prima facie unlikely that a purchaser of a plot intends to enter into obligations to an unknown number of subsequent purchasers. I cannot believe, however, that Parker, J, was intending to lay it down that the fact that the common vendor did not bind himself to sell off the defined area to which the common law was to apply in lots of any particular size but proposed to sell off parcels of various sizes according to the requirements of the various purchasers must, as a matter of law, preclude the court from giving effect to a clearly proved intention that the purchasers were to have rights inter se to enforce the provisions of the common law.’ 8.53 Re Dolphin’s Conveyance115 is another case where Parker J’s prior lotting requirement was not insisted upon. In that case: Without any part of a 30-acre estate known as the ‘Selly Hill Estate’ having been laid out in lots, the greater part of it (part being retained) was sold off to nine different purchasers by conveyances all of which-imposed restrictive covenants on the purchasers in similar terms. In each conveyance the vendors also covenanted that on a sale or lease of any other part of the Selly Hill Estate they would procure a covenant from each purchaser or lessee to the effect of the covenants entered into by each purchaser. Whilst acknowledging that ‘It is trite law that if you find conveyances of the several parts of an estate all containing the same or similar, restrictive covenants with the vendor, that is not enough to impute an intention on the part of that vendor that the restrictions should be for the common benefit of the vendor and of the several purchasers inter se’,116 Stamp J found that having regard to the existence in each conveyance of the vendors’ covenant to procure that every purchaser of a part of the estate should enter into similar restrictive covenants ‘what was intended, as well by the vendors as the several purchasers, was to lay down what has been referred to as a local law for the estate for the common benefit of all the several purchasers of it’117 and concluded that
point, compare the decision of HH Judge Rubin (sitting as a High Court judge) in Shropshire County Council v Edwards (1982) 46 P&CR 270, considered above, para 6.12. 114 Ibid. 115 [1970] Ch 654 (Stamp J). 116 Ibid, at p 661E. 117 Ibid, at p 662A.
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8.54 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes a building scheme arose ‘not by the effect of an implication derived from the existence of the four points specified by Parker J, or by the implication derived from the existence of a deed of mutual covenant, but by the existence of the common interest and the common intention actually expressed in the conveyances themselves’.118 8.54 In Whitgift Homes Ltd v Stocks,119 Judge LJ in the Court of Appeal accepted (in para 111) that following Baxter v Four Oaks Properties Ltd (above) ‘It is no longer necessary to establish that the area covered by the proposed scheme has been divided into plots’. This is notwithstanding ‘the emphasis on the need for definition of the area subject to the scheme remains unchanged’. 8.55 The upshot of the foregoing is that Parker J’s condition (1) in Elliston v Reacher (above) is not of universal application whilst his condition (2), in so far as it specifies the need for prior lotting of the defined area, is subject to the qualification that such lotting is merely one ingredient towards establishing the requisite intention that the covenants relating to the defined area shall be for the common benefit, and is not an essential ingredient where there is other satisfactory evidence of such intention.
(2) There must be evidence of an intention on the part of the vendor and of the individual purchasers that the purchasers’ covenants are intended to be enforceable on a reciprocal basis 8.56 This second element of building schemes, as referred to in Reid v Bickerstaff, was subdivided by Parker J in Ellison v Reacher into conditions (3) and (4) (at para 8.22 above) relating to the intention of the vendor (condition 3) and of the purchasers (condition 4) respectively. These two conditions correspond with the second of the building scheme essential elements enunciated by the Court of Appeal in Reid v Bickerstaff.120 8.57 An ideal way of establishing this duality of intention is by reference to an actual deed of mutual covenant to which the vendor and all the purchasers from time to time are parties and which sets out in clear terms that the purchasers covenant with the vendor and with each other.121 8.58 An equally sound method would be by reference to a clearly expressed declaration of intention contained either in the individual conveyances or transfers by the estate owner to the purchasers or in a separate document to which all such persons are parties.122 The cases to which attention will now be directed, however, are concerned with the question as to when the requisite intention can be inferred from indirect evidence.
118 119 120 121 122
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Ibid, at p 664D. [2001] EWCA Civ 1732. [1909] 2 Ch 305. As in Mackenzie v Childers (1889) 43 ChD 265. Cases of this type have so far not been considered by the courts. They represent the modern method of ensuring the creation of a building scheme and would appear to provide little scope for successful legal attack.
Facts to be proved to establish existence of a building scheme 8.59 In the first place, it should be observed that the fact that it is found that a large number, or even all, of the conveyances from the estate owner contain covenants in more or less similar terms is not sufficient, by itself, to establish the requisite intention. Something more is required. In Re Dolphin’s Conveyance,123 Stamp J said: ‘It is trite law that if one finds conveyances of the several parts of an estate all containing the same, or similar, restrictive covenants with the vendor, that is not enough to impute an intention on the part of that vendor that the restrictions should be for the common benefit of the vendor and of the several purchasers inter se; for it is at least as likely that he imposed them for the benefit of himself and of the unsold part of the estate alone.’ In that case, however, the further fact that the vendors had, in every conveyance or lease of a part of the estate, covenanted to procure a covenant from each purchaser or lessee of any other part to observe and perform the same stipulations was held sufficient to establish the requisite intention of all parties – and to displace any need for the vendors to have laid out the estate in lots prior to any disposal. 8.59 In Spicer v Martin124 the following facts were found: (i) Spicer (the unsuccessful appellant to the House of Lords) purchased the freehold of a block of seven houses in Cromwell Gardens from the Commissioners for the 1851 Exhibition which were conveyed to him by seven separate conveyances each containing a covenant not to carry on any trade or business but to use the premises as a private dwelling house only. (ii) The seven houses were built on part of a larger site which had been laid out by the Commissioners in accordance with a building scheme. (iii) Spicer granted leases of each of the seven houses to different lessees, each lease containing a covenant on the part of the lessee not to carry on any trade or business but to use the premises as a private dwelling house only. (iv) A block plan was annexed to each lease, including Martin’s (the respondent) showing the sites of all seven houses. (v) During the negotiations for Martin’s lease, Spicer’s solicitors informed him that similar restrictive covenants to those contained in his lease were contained in the leases of the other six houses which had already been granted and Martin was also informed that there was a covenant to the like effect in the conveyance of the premises to Spicer. The House of Lords held that these facts were sufficient to establish the requisite intention, as between Spicer and Martin, that the benefit of the covenant into which Spicer had entered with the Commissioners as part of the building scheme established by them, should vest in Martin so that Martin, as lessee of one of the houses on the building estate could enforce that covenant against Spicer as the freehold owner of the other six houses.
123 [1970] Ch 654, at p 669f. 124 (1888)14 App Cas 12, HL.
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8.60 Competent claimants: (c) building schemes 8.60 A similar case came before the court in Tindall v Castle,125 where the following facts were found: (i) Defined parts of an estate were, in 1875, offered for sale by auction in lots for residential purposes in accordance with plans which showed the layout and type of property intended to be built on the plots. (ii) The particulars and conditions of sale provided that each purchaser of a residential lot would build one dwelling house only thereon. (iii) The defendant purchased two residential lots and a further lot marked ‘lodge’ on the plan and although he did not buy these plots at the auction but by private treaty some 10 years later, he was aware of the estate plans at the time when he bought and his conveyance contained a covenant in the terms referred to above. (iv) In 1890 the defendant began building several cottages on the plot marked ‘lodge’ and the purchasers of some of the other residential plots sought an injunction to restrain him from doing so. (v) The defendant bought knowing that the three estate plans were put forward by the vendor as part of a general scheme with the intention of representing to the purchasers that the plot marked ‘lodge’ would only be used as such. The claimants could only succeed if they could establish a building scheme. North J held that the requisite intention to create a building scheme had been established and granted an injunction.126 8.61 Again, in Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co v Butler,127 the following facts were found. (i) In 1865 an estate of about 43 acres was put up for sale by auction in 13 lots. At this sale, only lots 1, 2 and 12 were sold. The remaining lots were sold at various times to different purchasers during 1866 and 1867 including lot 11 which was sold in 1866 to the predecessor in title of the defendant. (ii) Every sale took place subject to the same conditions of sale and each of the purchasers entered into restrictive covenants with the vendors in identical terms, except for lot 13 which, the conditions indicated, would be sold subject to slightly different restrictive covenants. (iii) Since the whole estate was put up for sale by auction and thereafter the whole of the unsold lots were offered for sale, the vendors’ intention to sell the whole of the estate was clearly published. (iv) By reason of (iii), the individual purchasers must have known that the covenants they were required to enter into with the vendors ‘were really intended for the benefit of each of them as against all the rest.128 In the result, the Court of Appeal held that the restrictive covenants entered into by the purchaser of lot 11 could be enforced by the owners of each of the
125 (1893) 62 LJ Ch 555. 126 A similar case may also be found in Nalder and Collyer’s Brewery Co Ltd v Harman (1900) 83 LT 257 where the Court of Appeal found a building scheme to exist although on the facts the defendant was not bound. 127 (1886) 16 QBD 778, CA. 128 Per Lord Esher MR at p 784.
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Facts to be proved to establish existence of a building scheme 8.65 other plots, whether such owners claimed through predecessors who purchased before or after the sale of lot 11. The principles applied in arriving at this decision were explained by Lord Esher MR in the following terms:129 ‘There are two lines of cases to be found in the books. The first is where there has been a sale of part of a property, with no then existing intention of selling the rest, and subsequently there is a sale of another part; Then, as regards the later sale, you cannot look at the conditions of the former sale, you must look only at the conditions relating to the latter sale. The other line of cases is where the whole of a property is put up for sale (not necessarily under a building scheme), but is put up for sale in lots, subject to certain restrictive covenants; then it is a question of fact whether it was or was not the intention that the restrictive covenants should be entered into for the benefit of each of the purchasers as against all the others, and it is a most material circumstance whether the vendor reserves any part of the property for himself. If he does not reserve any part, that is almost if not quite conclusive (unless there is something contradictory) that the covenants which he takes from the purchasers are intended for the benefit of each purchaser as against the others.’ 8.62 In other words, where the vendor, to the knowledge of the purchasers, puts up the whole of his land for sale (by auction in lots, for example) without reserving any part of the property for himself a scheme may readily be inferred because there would be no point in taking restrictive covenants unless they were intended to be mutually enforceable by the purchasers.130 8.63 It should be observed, however, that whilst an intention on the part of the estate owner to dispose of the whole of his land is strong evidence of an intention on his part that the covenants are for the benefit of each purchaser, there may still be such a scheme, where the intention is otherwise overtly manifest, notwithstanding that the estate owner intends to retain part of the esta