Saudi Arabia : government, society, and the Gulf crisis 9781315812700, 1315812703, 0415093252

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Saudi Arabia Government, Society and the Gulf Crisis

Mordechai Abir

SAUDI ARABIA

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SAUDI ARABIA Government, Society and the G ulf Crisis

M ordechai A bir

London and New York

First published 1993 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, 0X 14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avc, New York NY 10016 R eprinted 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2002 Transferred to Digital Printing 2006 Routkdge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 1993 Mordechai Abir Typeset in Baskerville by Witwell Lim ited, Southport All rights reserved. No p art o f this book may be reprinted o r reproduced o r utilized in any form o r by any electronic, m echanical o r o th e r means, now known o r hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any inform ation storage o r retrieval system, without perm ission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record o f this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record o f this book is available from the Library o f Congress ISBN 0-415-09325-2 P ublisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original may be apparent

T o my daughter, RONIT, who had to share, unevenly, her mother with me and to my wife, Rutha, for all her suffering throughout the years of working with me

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C O N TE N TS

L ist o f tables Preface and acknow ledgem ents A bbreviations Introduction

x xi xiii xv

P art I R u lin g class and elites in Saudi Arabia 1 T H E C O N SO L ID A T IO N O F T H E R U L IN G CLASS ‘T he book and the sw ord’ - the ulama and the Sauds

3 9

2 M O DERN ED U C A TIO N AND T H E RISE O F NEW ELITES M odern education and the ulama T he developm ent o f higher education C onclusions

15 15 18 22

P art II M odernisation and struggle for political reform 3 T H E R EIG N O F SAUD (1953-64): ST R U G G L E FOR POW ER AND N ATIO NA LISM Socio-political change in the post-W orld War 11 years (to 1958) A uthoritarianism and the grow th of Arab nationalism Rivalry in the royal house (1953-8) K ing Saud, Arab nationalism and the West T he grow th o f opposition and the issue of political reform (1953-8) T h e Aramco 1953 strike and the rise of nationalist opposition T h e 1956 strike and the collapse of the E gyptian-Saudi axis Power struggle in the royal fam ily and the new elites (1958-64) Faysal’s first cabinet (1958-60) T he rise and fall of S aud’s ‘progressive’ governm ent (1960-2) vii

27 27 27 29 31 32 32 37 39 39 40

CONTENTS

D iluted reform an d the Yemen w ar C onclusions (1953-64) 4 T H E R E IG N O F FAYSAL (1964-75): NEW E L IT E S, O IL AND R A PID D E V E L O P M E N T M odernisation and new elites, fro m co nfrontation to co-operation (1964-70) Arab nationalism , and o p p o sitio n in the Sa u d i kin g d o m R adicalisation in the Arab w orld and the suppression of Saudi m ilitan ts T h e 1969 abortive c o u p attem pts an d their afterm ath R eg im e and new elites - the sh elvin g o f political reform s (1970-5) Faysal, the technocrats an d the central governm ent New elites an d the m o d ern isatio n of the bureaucracy Arab nationalism and S a u d i 'oil p o w er’ (1970-5) C onclusions (1964-75)

45 49 51 51 54 54 55 61 61 62 65 67

5 PO W E R S T R U G G L E , M O D E R N IS A T IO N AND R E A C T IO N (1975-80) 69 O il w ealth, m odernisation, political p articipation and royal house rivalry 69 T h e Mecca rebellion and the S h i'ite riots (1979) 79 6 T H E Z E N IT H O F T H E N EW E L IT E S ’ PO W ER : A FALSE DAW N (1979-83) T h e m iddle-class elites’ struggle fo r political p articipation T h e Saudi bourgeoisie - strength o r weakness? T h e ‘low er-class’ Saudis between dawla an d h u k u m a 7 T H E R E IG N O F K IN G FAHD: E C O N O M IC CRISIS AND O P P O S IT IO N (1982-7) F ahd’s policies and internal challenges T h e consolidation of the S udayris’ hegem ony T h e regim e an d n atio n a l in teg ratio n T h e regim e and the u lam a (1982-6) R ulers and o p p o sitio n in the 1980s M iddle-class elites in the mid-1980s - from co-operation to confrontation? T h e m ilitary as a co m p o n en t of the new elites

90 90 93 94 98 103 103 107 109 111 114 119

P art III Crises in the G u lf 8 SAUDI ARABIA AND T H E IR A N -IR A Q WAR B ackground Ira n -lra q war and Sa u d i policy - stage one (1981-6) E nter the Superpow ers - stage tw o (1986-8) viii

125 125 128 136

CONTENTS

L ast stage - Sa u d i Arabia and Iran (1988-9) C onclusion 9 P R E L U D E T O T H E IR A Q -K U W A IT CRISIS Saudi econom y and society in the afterm ath o f the Ira n -lra q war O PEC and the oil m arket (1987-90) G overnm ent, elites and internal security (1988-90) Sa u d i Arabia and inter-Arab affairs Ira q ’s regional aspirations re-em erging Iraq, pan-A rabism and the G u lf oil 10 SAUDI ARABIA AND T H E W AR W IT H IR A Q T h e Ira q -K u w a it crisis and Sa u d i Arabia T h e ulam a and the regim e (A u g u st 1990 - M ay 1991) 11 DEM ANDS FO R S O C IO -P O L IT IC A L C H A N G E IN T H E PO ST -W A R ERA T h e liberals’ ‘open letter’ to K in g Fahd T h e ulam a p e titio n - a challenge to the Sauds’ regim e M ilita n t fu n d a m en ta lism , regim e and reform (June 1991 - M arch 1992)

141 144 147 147 150 155 160 161 165 172 172 180 186 186 189 194

12 O IL AND G U L F SE C U R IT Y O il and politics ‘G u lf security’ and Iran

204 204 207

IB C O N C L U S IO N

215

N otes B ibliography Glossary In d ex

226 252 259 261

ix

TABLES

7.1 Saudi A rab ia’s oil revenues 1981-92 7.2 S audi A rab ia’s budgets 1981/2-1992

x

99 100

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

T h e first tw o parts of this book consist of an abbreviated an d updated version of my book Sa u d i Arabia in the Oil Era. R eg im e and Elites; C onflict and C ollaboration (listed in the bibliography). For the totally new p art (nearly half) of the book I relied heavily on Arabic, H ebrew and E uropean languages press an d periodicals, A m erican an d Israeli m o n ito rin g services, recent Saudi A rabian K ingdom official p u b licatio n s a n d o th er sources. Since S a u u i Arabia in the Oil Era was pu b lish ed ^ 8 8 ) m any more books have been w ritten on the kingdom . Yet, to my know ledge, none deals w ith the im pact of the crises of the 1980s an d early 1990s on the society an d governm ent of Saudi A rabia. N or am I aw are of any w ork th at treats the rise of ‘n eo -fu n d am en talism ’ in the k ingdom since the late 1970s. I faced the difficulty com m on to all Israeli socio-political h istorians d ealin g w ith Arab countries, th at of being un ab le to conduct field w ork in the countries w hich they researched. T h e situ atio n was exacerbated by my in ab ility to exchange ideas an d o p in io n s w ith Saudi counterparts, a lth o u g h I tried to do so o n several occasions. I take this o p p o rtu n ity to th a n k the m any Saudis w hose books, articles an d P hD an d MA theses relatin g to Saudi A rabia I have used, an d w ho u n beknow nst to them h elped me to u n d erstan d better th eir country, society an d governm ent. Special thanks are du e to Dr G hazi al-G osaybi the p ro m in en t Saudi scholar, poet an d form er cabinet m inister, w hose articles an d books I have fo und e n lig h ten in g . H is 1991 book H atah la ta ku n fitnaW , in ad d itio n to o th er sources, greatly contrib u ted to my u n d erstan d in g of the p h en o m en o n of m odern ‘n eo -fu n d am en talism ’ in Saudi Arabia. I am grateful to D r Jo sep h K ostiner an d D r Jacob G oldberg of the D ayan C entre of Tel-A viv U niversity, w ho allow ed me to use yet u n p u b lish ed drafts of the K uw aiti an d Saudi chapters w hich they p repared respectively for the 1990 Dayan C entre’s M iddle East C on­ tem porary Survey (M E C S). Dr K ostiner has also p u t at my disposal notes xi

PREFACE AND ACK NOW LEDGEM ENTS

for his forthcom ing 1991 M ECS K uwait chapter and some Arabic publications relating to Saudi Arabia. I am also grateful to my assistant Raz Zimt, for his help in researching m aterial for the new part of the book. T o my dear friend of m any years Dr Samuel H alperin I am indebted for o b taining for me recent Saudi statistical and other official publications w hich helped me update this book in W ashington DC and Jerusalem . I also exploited Dr H a lp e rin ’s short visit to Jerusalem to edit the English of Part III of my book. My brother-in-law , Dr Azriel Karny, to w hom I always turn w hen in need, helped w ith several difficult Arabic (Saudi) texts relating to religious polem ics. I am also grateful to my colleague, Professor H ava Lazarus-Yaffe, at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem , for com m ents on p art of chapter 10 of this book relating to Saudi ‘neo­ fundam entalism ’. She is, of course, not responsible for w hat I have w ritten in that sub-chapter. Last, but not least, this book, like all my previous works, could not have been produced w ithout the partnership, m eticulous work and infinite patience of my wife R utha. I have followed, whenever possible, the established system of translite­ ration of Arabic words and names. In the case of names and words which have become com m on in E uropean languages, the com m on European transliteration has been used. Because of technical difficulties, diacritical signs have been kept to a m in im u m and simplified. M ordechai Abir Jerusalem and W ashington DC

ABBREVIATIONS

ACC AFP A N LF AP Aramco E1U FBIS FT GCC IC O IH T IJM E S IP I IR O JP JQ KFU KSU KUNA m.b.d. M EC S M EED M EES MEI MEJ N LF NRF NYT PD F PD FP

Arab C o-operation C ouncil Agence France Presse Arab N ational L iberation F ront Associated Press A rabian American O il C om pany T he E conom ist Intelligence U nit Foreign B roadcasting Inform ation Service Financial T im es G ulf C o-operation C ouncil Islam ic Conference O rganisation International Herald T ribune International Journal o f M iddle East Studies Israel Petrolem In stitu te’s newsletter O rganisation of the Islam ic R evolution for the L iberation of the A rabian Peninsula Jerusalem Post The Jerusalem Quarterly King Faysal University K ing Saud University K uw ait News Agency m illion barrels daily M iddle East Contem porary Survey M iddle East E conom ic Digest M iddle East Econom ic Survey M iddle East International T he M iddle East Journal N ational L iberation Front N ational Reform F ront N ew York Tim es P o p u lar D emocratic Front P o p u lar D emocratic F ront for the L iberation of Palestine xiii

ABBREVIATIONS

PD P PDRY P etrom in PFL O A G PFLP PLO P&M U AR UK U PA P U PM SABIC SAMA SR W SJ WP

P o p u la r D em ocratic Party P eople’s D em ocratic R epublic of Yemen Saudi P etroleum a n d M inerals O rg an isatio n P o p u la r F ro n t for the L ib eratio n of O m an and the A rabian G u lf P o p u la r F ro n t for the L iberation of Palestine Palestine L ib eratio n O rg an isatio n C ollege of P etroleum an d M inerals U nited Arab R epublic U nited K ingdom U n io n of the Peoples of the A rabian P en in su la T h e U niversity of Petroleum a n d M inerals Saudi A rabian Basic Industries C o rp o ratio n Saudi A rabian M onetary Agency Saudi riyal Wall Street Journal W ashin g to n Post

xiv

INTRODUCTION

Saudi A rabia has a territory of abo u t 865,000 square miles and a citizen p o p u latio n of about six m illion. W ith the exception of Asir in the south and a score of oases, it is m ade u p of a largely arid plateau of varied desert landscapes. T he kingdom of Saudi A rabia consists of five m ajor regions. T h e core of the kingdom is N ajd, the Central R egion, the historical seat of the W ahhabi m ovem ent (m u w a h h id u n ) and the House of Saud. Al-Hasa, renam ed the Eastern Province (Al-Sharqiyya), the H ijaz or the Western R egion (the m ost populated), Asir or the Southern R egion (the second most populated) and the N orthern R egion (part of the Syrian desert), were conquered between 1913 and 1934 by the founder of m odern Saudi A rabia, K ing Abd al-Aziz A1 Saud (better know n as Ibn Saud). A dm inistratively, the kin g d o m ’s five regions are sub-divided into fourteen m ajor provinces - imarates (the num ber has varied over time). T h e governor of each province is an am ir (plural um ara’) w ho is a prince of the royal house, or a m em ber of one of the aristocratic families related to it. U ntil the developm ent of the m odern central governm ent in the 1950s and 1960s, the am ir ruled the province in the k in g ’s nam e and was the head of its adm inistration. T h e traditional governm ent hierarchy included local notables (a'yan) and tribal shaykhs, also know n as um ara’. W ith m inor exceptions all the k ingdom ’s citizens are M uslim Arabs w ho speak Arabic; most are of tribal origin and the Arab culture is com m on to all. Yet, the Saudi society cannot be considered fully hom ogeneous. A lthough about 90 per cent of Saudis are Sunni Muslims, a large pro p o rtio n of the p o p u latio n of A l-Hasa is Shi'ite Twelvers (ithna ‘ashariyya). Sm all com m unities of Twelvers and Ism a'ilis (seventh im am) are to be found in Asir and the H ijaz and Zaydis (fifth im am) in Asir. A lthough m ost of the p o p u latio n of Hijaz and Asir is now W ahhabi and adheres to the H anbali school of theology and religious jurisprudence (m adhab), followers of the Shafi'i, H anafi and M aliki schools are still to be found in the above provinces as well as in Al-Hasa. C ulturally, historically and clim atically, agricultural Asir is an offshoot of Yemen. xv

INTRODUCTION

A l-H asa (the Eastern Province), w ith its large S h i'ite com m unity an d m ixed coastal p o p u la tio n , is also very different and m ore oriented to the p o p u la tio n of the G u lf p rin c ip a lities an d Iran. H istorically, the H ijazi tow nspeople, considered by N ajdis to be of m ixed blood (an outcom e of the settlem ent of non-A rab p ilg rim s and m erchants and concubinage), are p ro u d of their u n iq u e heritage, h av in g given Islam to the w orld and b eing the g u ard ian s of Isla m ’s holy cities. T hey are closely connected w ith the M uslim w orld th ro u g h the h ajj an d trade; they are m ore sophisticated, co sm op o litan an d religiously m oderate th an o th er Saudis, the N ajdis in p articular. C u ltu ral variations exist betw een the nom ads (badu) and the settled (hadr) b u t m ore so betw een the ‘aristocratic’, conservative an d religiously p u rita n N ajdis w ho consider themselves ‘racially p u re ’, an d the p o p u la ­ tio n of the other regions. By the m iddle of the tw entieth century, m ore th a n h alf the p o p u la tio n of Saudi A rabia were still nom ads, an d perhaps 35 per cent settled and sem i-settled. Barely 10 per cent lived in the m ajor tow ns. T h e tribe an d clan were still the m ost im p o rta n t socio-political substructures in A rabia. T h e tribal um ara’ were considered p rim u s inter pares; their p o sitio n an d the extent of their a u th o rity depended o n their ind iv id u al m erit and leadership capability. T h e n u m b er of b edouin had begun to decline in the first half of the century, a process sharply accelerated after the 1950s by massive u rb an isatio n sparked by increasing oil w ealth an d m odernisation. By the late 1980s less th an 5 per cent of the p o p u la tio n was considered nom adic, w hile a b o u t 25 per cent were settled o r sem i-settled cultivators. T h e m ajor u rb an centres grew dram atically a n d claim ed over 50 per cent of the total p o p u latio n . T o w n s of under 100,000 people accoun t for a b o u t 12-14 per cen t.1 W ith u rb an isatio n , trad itio n al in stitu tio n s began to decline, as oil w ealth an d m odernisatio n increasingly bridged the differences between the p o p u la tio n of the k in g d o m ’s provinces. N o tw ith stan d in g these processes, n a tio n al in teg ratio n an d the stability of the regim e in Saudi A rabia are largely the result of the k in g d o m ’s oil revenues an d the delicate balance of pow er w ith in the H ouse of Saud, betw een the rulers a n d the religious leaders, the u lam a (sin g u lar ‘alim), and between trad itio n al elites an d the ex p a n d in g new m iddle class, led by the intelligentsia.

xvi

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Part I R U L I N G CLASS AND E L I T E S IN SAUDI ARABIA

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1

T H E C O N S O L I D A T I O N OF T H E R U L I N G CLASS

T h e Saudi p o p u la tio n , at the b e g in n in g of the tw entieth century, could be considered, w ith som e exceptions, a classless society. T h ere was no u p p e r class to speak of in A rabia at the time. O nly a sm all p ro p o rtio n of the m erchants and the u lam a in the tow ns of H ijaz an d N ajd could be described as ‘m iddle class’. T h e great m ajority of the A rabians tow nspeople as well as the ru ral nom ads and ag ricu ltu ralists - lived at or near subsistence level. T h e u n ificatio n of the Saudi k ingdom by Abd alAziz ibn Saud, in the first decades of the century, consolidated the pow er and au th o rity of a new Saudi ru lin g class - the aristocracy. T h e developm ent of the k in g d o m ’s oil in d ustry since 1938 an d the m odernisa­ tion of Saudi A rabia after W orld W ar II, produced, m oreover - in a d d itio n to existing regional a n d o ther differences - new classes an d a relatively rigid social structure. T h e latter depends n o t so m uch on pow er, w ealth and education as o n a ffiliatio n to the ru lin g fam ily an d o n regio nal (N ajd), tribal (noble) and u rb an or ru ral origin. T h e reconquest of D ari'yya (R iyadh) in Ja n u a ry 1902 is considered in Saudi a n n als as the b eg in n in g of the m odern Saudi kingdom . T h e sm all arm y of Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud was com posed at the tim e of a few score relatives, in-law s and som e b edouin. A bdallah ibn Jilu w i was said to have twice saved the life of his ‘co u sin ’ Abd al-Aziz (henceforth also Ibn Saud). Subsequently, the Jilu w is, a cadet b ranch of A1 S au d ,1gained a key po sitio n in the k in g d o m ’s ru lin g class. Such a developm ent is typical of considerations w hich influenced the form ation of th at class in Saudi A rabia. Indeed, m em bers of o th er im p o rta n t fam ilies w ho helped Ibn Saud in the co nsolid atio n of his k ingdom w eie incorporated in to the Saudi aristocracy. At th eir side, the u lam a led by A1 al-Shaykh (the descendants of M u ham m ad b. Abd al-W ahhab, the founder of the W 'ahhabiyya), and im p o rta n t tribal an d regional um ara’ (sin g u lar am ir) w ho jo in ed Ibn S au d ’s cam p at this stage can be considered p a rt of the Saudi ru lin g class. Ibn Saud co n tin u ed to ex p an d his pow er base by n u m ero u s m atrim o ­ nial arrangem ents w ith trad itio n al regional rulers an d im p o rta n t tribal 3

S AUDI ARABIA

shaykhs (um ara’).2 Most significant, however, was his affiliatio n w ith the pow erful Sudayris of n o rth e rn A rabia, w ho had already interm arried w ith the Sauds in the past. C ontrary to the W ah h a b i-S a u d i jih a d of previous centuries, Ib n S au d ’s m ilitary cam paigns were n o t aim ed at spreading the W ahhabiyya b ut rath er at re-establishing the au th o rity of the H ouse of Saud. T h e historical alliance betw een the N ajdi u la m a an d Ib n Saud had n o t been autom atically reinstated. T h e u lam a viewed Ib n S au d ’s governm ent w ith reservation, if n o t w ith suspicion, an d did n o t regard h im as sufficiently pious. H e toyed w ith technological in n o v atio n s w hich they considered heretical in n o v atio n (bid'ah). H e did n o t conduct jih ad s ag ainst the polytheists (m u s h r ik u n ) in the region, an d he was k now n to associate w ith the B ritish infidel au th o rities in the Persian G ulf. T h e cem enting of the re latio n sh ip betw een A1 Saud an d A1 al-Shaykh th ro u g h m atrim o n ial arrangem ents, an d the preferential treatm ent accorded to the religious hierarchy, undoub ted ly contrib u ted to the im provem en t of relatio ns betw een the k in g an d the m ajority of the u rb an N ajdi ulam a. Moreover, in order to establish a loyal m ilitary force to carry o u t his p lan s an d overcom e the n a tu ral o p p o sitio n of b edouin tribes to law an d order, a b o u t 1912 Ib n Saud revived the Ikh w a n m ovem ent. U lam a volunteers (m u tta w w a 'in ), some of tribal o rig in , were sent to teach the bedouin the p rin cip les of the W ahhabiyya, an d land an d funds were a p p o rtio n ed for their settlem ent. By 1930 this m ovem ent led to the settlem ent of appro x im ately 150,000 b ed ou in in over 200 m ilitary ag ricu ltu ral villages (h u ja r).4 After 1913 the Ik h w an were p rin cip a lly responsible for Ib n S au d ’s conquests in c lu d in g Jab al S ham m ar, the H ijaz an d Asir, an d becam e the m ainstay of his regim e. As a result, the im p o rtan ce of the tribal um ara’ an d the m u tta w w a 'in , an d the N ajdi u lam a in general, rapidly increased. As he becam e m ore d ep en d en t on them , the leading tribal um ara’, some of w hom had previously been Ibn S au d ’s bitter enem ies, an d the m ore fanatic ulam a, exploited th eir new leverage to coerce th eir ru ler to accept th eir extrem e in terp re tatio n of the W ahhabiyya an d th eir rig h t to intervene in the ru n n in g of the kingdom . Yet Ibn Saud chose to overlook the Ik h w a n ’s excesses in order to avoid an open breach w ith them . After the First W orld W ar Ibn Saud accelerated his efforts to establish a u nited centralised k in g d o m in the A rabian P eninsula. For this p u rpose he p la n n e d to introdu ce aspects of m odern ad m in istratio n an d W estern technology n o t contrary to the p rin cip les of Islam . Moreover, aw are of the p o litical realities in the region, he co-ordinated his activities, as m uch as possible, w ith the B ritish authorities. Such policies were a n ath e m a to the Ikhw an an d to m ost of the N ajdi u lam a. T h e fact th at the ru ler had also begun to consolidate his dynastic rule an d had taken to him self, instead of the trad itio n al title of A m ir 4

C O N S O L I D A T I O N OF T H E R U L I N G CLASS

N ajd, the title of ‘S ultan of N ajd an d its D ependencies’ (1921) an d ‘K ing of the H ijaz’ (1926) added fuel to the fire. Indeed, b oth tribal shaykhs and u lam a connected to the Ikhw an were convinced th at if they were n o t to stop Ibn Saud, or at least lim it his au th o rity , they w ould be incapable of d o in g so in the future. T h e Ik h w an rebellion (1927-30)’ was n o t only a challenge to Ibn S au d ’s policy b u t also a desperate a ttem p t on the p art of the leading Ik h w an am irs an d som e fanatic u lam a to preserve th eir pow er an d the trad itio n al socio-political fram ew orks from w hich they derived it. It was especially dangerous because its leaders, su pported by a few p ro m in en t u lam a, took on the m an tle of defenders of p u ritan ic W ahhabism and underscored the co m m u n ity 's in h eren t rig h t to replace a leader w ho betrayed its p rinciples or w ho was incap ab le of carrying o u t his duties. Ibn S au d ’s final victory over the Ik h w an in 1929/30, w ith the establish­ in g of a n ational arm y an d a centralised ad m in istratio n , deprived the tribal shaykhs and the u lam a of the pow er to intervene, o n their ow n initiative, in the cond u ct of state affairs. It led to a sh arp decline in the pow er of the latter an d eroded the u la m a ’s p olitical influence. T h e re are a b o u t 50 senior tribal am irs and a few h u n d red shaykhs (um ara’) of secondary tribes an d sub-tribes in Saudi A rabia. T h e pow er and au th o rity of these am irs has been gradually d eclinin g since 1930 as the pow er and au th o rity of the Saudi kin g d o m and its governm ent were consolidated and its ad m in istra tio n an d arm y expanded. Most im p o rtan t, Ibn S au d ’s revenues dram atically increased follow ing the conquest of the H ijaz an d com m ercial ex p lo itatio n of oil in Saudi A rabia (1946). T h u s the S audi ruler was now able to p urchase arm am ents an d tran sp o rt an d to ‘b u y ’ the loyalty of the tribesm en. T hereafter the a m irs’ p o ten tial to resist him was com pletely n u llified a n d they becam e p art of the Saudi regim e’s pow er base. T hey are considered a co m p o n en t of the ru lin g class, alth o u g h inferior to the others. After 1930, Ibn Saud still u p h eld w henever possible the golden rule of shura (consultation) an d ijm a ' (consensus) concerning m ost n o n -p o liti­ cal m ajor decisions. N evertheless, he was now able to disregard the u la m a ’s objections to his lim ited m odern isin g measures, essential for the con so lid atio n and developm ent of his kingdom . O therw ise he devoutly espoused W ahhabi p rin cip les, his k in g d o m ’s raison d ’être, an d confined the process of m odern isatio n to the m ost essential. N o tw ith stan d in g the con so lid atio n of his pow er, Ibn Saud continued to show respect for an d p am p er the u lam a, w hose su p p o rt was still essential for the legitim isatio n of his regime. Yet, consu ltatio n s w ith th eir ran k and file d u rin g the k in g ’s daily council (m a jlis f and w ith the senior u lam a in a far m ore im p o rta n t weekly m ajlis, could n o longer be viewed as a recognitio n of th e ir suprem e a u th o rity an d rig h t to p artici­ pate in decision-m aking. Indeed, in m atters of im portance, alth o u g h he

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consulted them , he m ade his fin al decision according to w h at he considered rig h t and, w henever necessary, disregarded th eir o p in io n . T h e ulam a, w ho were coerced in to accepting the new status quo, realised that, n one the less, W ah h ab i hegem ony a n d their special position in the kingdom were still g uaranteed, b u t their actual pow er an d influence were to be dep en d en t on the ru le r’s good w ill. Even as ju n io r partners of the Sauds, they enjoyed h ig h prestige, privileges an d influence. As the k in g d o m ’s g o vernm ent an d ad m in istra tio n developed they were given, in ad d itio n to co ntrol of religious in stitu tio n s, key positions in it, in c lu d in g justice an d the ed u cational system. P aradoxically, the role an d a u th o rity of the u la m a further declined after the rise of K ing Faysal, w hom they helped b rin g to the th ro n e in 1964. R elated th ro u g h his m o th er to A1 al-Shaykh, a n d know n for his piety, Faysal, nevertheless, deliberately eroded the u la m a ’s pow er and independence. F requently he ignored th eir o p p o sitio n to aspects of his accelerated m odernisation. Lastly, he curbed the au th o rity an d activities of the C om m ittees for E n co u rag in g V irtue an d P reventing Vice (H a y’at al-Am r b i’l-M a'ruf w a ’l-N ahy 'an al-M unkar) (henceforth the M orality C om m ittees an d the M orality Police). T h e above n o tw ith stan d in g , b o th the Sauds an d the ulam a, each for their ow n reasons, have a vested interest in the preservation of their historical alliance. O n the one h an d , it contributes to the regim e’s legitim isation, to stability and to n atio n al integ ratio n . O n the o ther hand, it helps preserve the W ah h ab i character of, and the role of the ulam a in, the kingdom . R egardless of the decline in th eir pow er an d influence, the u lam a thus rem ain an im p o rta n t co m p o n en t of the Saudi ru lin g class. In the scale of im p o rtan ce of the trad itio n a l elites they com e im m ediately after the royal house and its collateral an d associated fam ilies, b u t above the u m ara’. Indeed, in contrast to the um ara’ they are organised, have a hierarchy, leadership, state-supported in stitu tio n s an d com m on interests w hich b in d them as a cohesive g ro u p . T h e activities of the Al-Shaykhs, m oreover, are n o longer restricted to religion. M any are now to be found in key positions in the ad m in istratio n , ed u cational system, security services, arm ed forces a n d in the p rivate sector of the Saudi econom y.8 It is generally accepted th a t the H ouse of Saud, the u lam a an d the u m ara’ - the m ost im p o rta n t co m p o n en ts of the regim e’s pow er base - are in fact the Saudi ru lin g class. T h e size of this class is difficult to determ ine. T h e ‘recognised’ branches of A1 Saud, an d their associated im p o rtan t fam ilies, are generally estim ated to be a b o u t 10,000 strong. T h e u lam a, their associates an d all the m em bers of the religious hierarchy in Saudi A rabia probably n u m b er tens of thousands. Indeed A1 al-Shaykh has interm arried w ith all the o th e r branches of the ru lin g class, by itself believed to consist of a b o u t 7,000 people. As for the u m ara’ and 6

C O N S O L I D A T I O N OF T H E R U L I N G CLASS

their extended fam ilies, th eir n u m b er is probably equal to th at of the religious establishm ent. T h u s, the size of the Saudi ru lin g class, in the w ider sense, is q u ite substantial. Som e scholars classify the Saudi kin g d o m as an autocracy. O thers call it a ‘desert dem ocracy’.9 T h e m ore a p p ro p ria te description of the Saudi regim e after the death of Ibn Saud is probably an oligarchy w hose p illars are the Saudi royal house, the u lam a a n d the um ara’. T h e conduct of its governm ent still follow s Ib n S aud's golden ru le of c o n su ltatio n (shura) an d consensus (ijm a ‘) w ith in the ru lin g class. T h e m onarch has a pow er of veto over all the decisions of the executive system (governm ent an d ad m in istratio n ). Indeed, n o tw ith stan d in g the p rin cip les of shura a n d ijm a ' the k in g can also veto, at least in theory, decisions of his inform al royal C onsultative C ouncil (m ajlis al-shura),'0 the representative org an of the S audi oligarchy. Yet in certain circu m ­ stances, the oligarchy, th ro u g h its unofficial leadership - ahl al-hal w a’l'aqd (lit. ‘those w ho loosen a n d b in d ’) - may overrule the king, lim it his au th o rity and, in extrem e cases, even depose him , as was the case w ith K ing Saud (1964). T h u s, if the policies of the k in g were to threaten the k in g d o m ’s stability a n d the reg im e’s pow er, a sim ilar co alitio n to that w hich deposed Saud c o u ld re-emerge. U nlike the trad itio n al Islam ic concept of the ahl al-hal w a ’l-'aqd, this inform al in stitu tio n is n o t d o m in ated in Saudi A rabia by the ulam a. M ost sources agree th a t m em bership in the Saudi ahl al-hal w a ’l-'aqd is lim ited to a b o u t a h u n d red a n d fifty m em bers of A1 Saud an d its associated fam ilies - an d some o u tsta n d in g u lam a and several extremely im p o rta n t um ara'.u T h e criteria for m em bership in this au th o ritativ e body are o rig in , seniority, prestige an d leadership q u alities (scholarship an d piety for the ulam a), according to b edouin tradition. L eading u lam a have usually p articip ated w ith the o th er com ponents of ahl al-hal w a ’l-'aqd in co n su ltatio n s preceding or follow ing dram atic developm ents im p actin g the S audi governm ent. T hese in cluded S au d ’s coerced abdication, the Mecca rebellion in 1979, the o u tbreak of the Ira n Iraq w ar in 1980 a n d Ira q ’s invasion of K uw ait an d the in v itatio n extended to the US to p rotect the kingdom in 1990. In several such instances fatw as (relig io u s-leg al o p in io n ) were also issued by the u lam a leadership. Yet, the u la m a ’s p articip atio n in the above a n d in the inform al royal C onsu ltativ e C ouncil, the k in g d o m ’s decision- an d p o licy-m aking organ, is largely ad hoc a n d co n d itio n al on the need for relig ious sanction for specific decisions.12 T h e um ara’ - tribal shaykhs an d m em bers of regional dynasties provide the th ird leg of the trip o d of the S auds’ trad itio n al pow er base. Yet, ju s t a h an d fu l of the m ost im p o rta n t um ara’ are considered ahl al-hal w a ’l-'aqd. Indeed, only a few exceptionally im p o rta n t am irs have been 7

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invited in tim es of crisis o r in relatio n to m ajor policy debates, to p articip ate in co n su lta tio n s of the inform al royal m ajlis al-shura.IS D espite their role in the p ro v in cial governm ent, the im portance of the um ara', as m entioned above, has declined steadily, a process accelerated by the reo rg an isatio n an d stren g th en in g of the central governm ent by K ing Faysal. S im ultaneously, the stren g th en in g of central governm ent an d the extension of its ad m in istra tio n an d welfare services to the provinces eroded, u n til the early 1980s, the a u th o rity of the provincial governors (um ara’ al-m anatiq) an d governm ent. Moreover, the decline in au th o rity of the um ara' g athered m o m en tu m after the 1960s, also, as a result of the rap id u rb an isatio n of the bedouins an d ag ricu ltu ral p o p u la ­ tion. Indeed, the average S audi fo und him self increasingly tu rn in g to the central g overnm ent’s representatives for services an d h elp rath er th an to his am ir. H ow ever, the u m ara’, still the lin k between the ru ral p o p u la ­ tion a n d the Sauds, regained som e of th eir influence in the 1980s w hen Fahd began to strength en the a u th o rity of the p rovincial g o vernm ent.14 O bviously, the m ost im p o rtan t co m p o n en t of the Saudi ru lin g class an d of ahl al-hal w a ’l-'aqd is the royal fam ily. It dom inates the k in g d o m ’s decision-m aking a p p a ra tu s th ro u g h the king, his inform al royal C o n ­ sultative C ouncil a n d ahl al-hal w a’l-'aqd. T h e term ‘royal h o u se’ in m odern S audi A rabia is exclusively used to describe the descendants of Abd al-R ah m an ibn T u rk i ibn Faysal A1 Saud, forem ost a m o n g them the offsp rin g of his son Abd al-Aziz, as well as a few cadet branches of the fam ily. T h is defin itio n received legal sanction in 1932 w hen only they an d som e branches of the Sauds allied to them were to be considered royalty an d to receive a stipend. Indeed, reg u latio n s instituted by the Saudi civil service d u rin g Faysal’s reign dem and th at all the direct descendants of K ing Abd al-Aziz should be referred to as ‘H is R oyal H ig h n ess’. T h o se of his brothers an d som e of his uncles sh ould be referred to as ‘H is H ig h n ess’, an d m em bers of o ther recognised branches of the Sauds as ‘H is Excellency’, a title they share w ith cabinet m inisters, non-royal district am irs and o th er senior offi­ cials.15 All in all it is estim ated th a t ab o u t 7,000 m em bers of A1 Saud are considered today p art of the royal fam ily of w hich nearly 1,000 are direct descendants of Ibn Saud. W hen C row n P rince Faysal reorganised the k in g d o m ’s financial an d adm in istrativ e systems in 1958 he also removed from the royal list m em bers of rem ote branches of the fam ily. In 1962 Saudi A rabia again faced a m ajo r financial crisis. H ence Faysal requested in 1963 his uncle an d finance m inister, M usa'id ib n Abd al-R ah m an , to re-exam ine the royal list. S ubsequently P rince M usa'id lim ited the recognised m em bership of the royal fam ily to the offspring of Abd al-Aziz and his brothers an d Saud al-K abir, Abd a l-R a h m a n ’s nephew , the

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Jilu w is, a n d the less im p o rta n t T h u n a y a n s, Abd al-Aziz’s kinsm en and co m p an io n s since the b e g in n in g of his career. T h e royal fam ily (as defined above), the Sudayris (the pow erful bedouin dynasty from northern N ajd interm arried w ith all the branches of the Sauds) and the Al-Shaykhs are thus com posed of the u p p er echelon of the k in g d o m ’s ru lin g class. T h is g ro u p is estim ated at over 20,000 people. T ogether w ith their other non-royal partners in the kin g d o m ’s traditional elites (ulam a, um ara’), they probably num ber about 100,000 people. T h e crucial criterion fo r m em b ersh ip in the ru lin g class, we believe, sh o u ld be the ability to participate in policy fo rm u la tio n and decision­ m a kin g . In short, to be represented in ahl al-hal w a’l-'aqd. W ealth, education an d key po sitio n s in the a d m in istratio n , the m ilitary or the econom y, proposed by som e scholars as add itio n al yardsticks for in clu sio n in the Saudi ru lin g class, prove incorrect w hen exam ined ag ain st the above criterion. A lth o u g h consulted occasionally, Saudis of such b ackground were never considered ahl al-hal w a’l-'aqd n o r m em bers of the k in g ’s inform al m ajlis al-shura. F o llo w in g in the footsteps of their father the great Abd al-Aziz, the Saudi m onarchs carefully adhere to the golden p rin cip le of shura and ijm a'. U n til today, how ever, they have ap p lied this p rin cip le exclusively to the royal fam ily a n d its trad itio n al partners in the ru lin g class. Yet, the m o n a rc h ’s ‘a b so lu tism ’ is tem pered by the fact th at he consults w ith the inform al m ajlis al-shura on every im p o rta n t issue an d w henever policy decisions are required. In the case of a m ajo r crisis, m oreover, a larger forum of ahl al-hal w a’l-'aqd is convened. T h e centralisation of the governm ent, an d the rap id m od ern isatio n of the kingdom , nevertheless, eroded the pow er of the u m ara’ an d u lam a and, to a lesser degree, th a t of the related fam ilies: the Sudayris, the Jilu w is, Al al-Shaykh and the T h u n ay an s. T h u s the senior m em bers of the recognised royal fam ily do m in ate the ru lin g class an d its inform al consultative bodies. ‘T H E B O O K A N D T H E S W O R D ’ - T H E U L A M A 'A N D T H E SAUDS T h e term ‘u la m a ’ is used in this book in its w ider sense to include all recognised religious scholars: the judges (qadis) of the different ranks, religious lawyers an d all the o th er ‘alim s engaged in the ju d icial system; the various ranks of religious teachers (m udarris); im am s an d the o ther office holders of consequence in the mosques. It is estim ated th at the Saudi u lam a num bered in the mid-1980s ‘at least 10,000’, b u t it could well be th at th eir n u m b er is far larger, now th a t the three Islam ic universities produce several th o u san d graduates a n n u ally . Yet, n o t all the above are recognised ‘u la m a ’, n o r are they of eq u al im portance. At the head of the religious p yram id is the C ouncil of the Assembly of 9

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Senior U lam a (M ajlis H a y ’at K ibar al-Ulama), said to be com posed of twenty-five m em bers. L ead in g m em bers of several o th er in stitu tio n s are either included in the above o r are equally, o r alm ost as im p o rtan t. Such in stitu tio n s are: the H ig h e r C ou n cil of Q adis (Al-M ajlis al-‘A li li’l-Qada)-, the In stitu te for Scientific Study, the Issue of R eligio-L egal O p in io n s and the S upervision of R eligious Affairs (Dar a l-lfta’ w a’l Ish ra j ‘ala 'l-Shu’un al-D iniyya) and the C om m ittee for the C om m en d atio n of V irtue an d the Prevention of Evil (H a y ’at al-A m r b i’l-M a 'ru f w a’l-N ahy 'an al-M unkar), w hose M orality Police serve as the executive arm of the ulam a. Saudi A rabia is often described as a theocracy; its p u rita n ic al Islam ic law s an d reg u latio n s are m ain tain ed m ore strictly th a n ever since the 1950s. T h is, how ever, does not reflect the pow er of the u lam a and their influence. Moreover, on e m ust m ake a distin ctio n between the u lam a in general, w ho a lth o u g h n u m ero u s an d organised, exercise little pow er and the handful of senior u lam a, the apex of the religious establishm ent, w ho control the k in g d o m ’s relig io u s in stitu tio n s. T h e u lam a leadership, a p p o in te d by the ru ler and n u m b erin g probably ab o u t 30 or 40 ‘alim s, have direct access to the k in g an d all the senior princes. T hey are greatly respected, an d are consulted on m atters of im portance in ad d itio n to those related to religious affairs. T h u s, under certain circum stances, they m ay influence the ru lers’ decisions. Yet, in general, their role is lim ited to leg itim isin g a decision previously reached by the inform al royal m ajlis al-shura o r ahl al-hal w a ’l-'aqd an d thus p ro v id in g the required consensus (ijm a ‘). P articularly after K ing Faysal was enth ro n ed , the regim e progressively decentralised the u la m a ’s pow er. A lth o u g h Faysal placed the old and new ly created religiou s in stitu tio n s an d the m inistries of justice an d education un d er the co n tro l of lead in g ‘alim s, such u lam a becam e de facto p art of the establishm ent, accountable to him . Indeed, the most im p o rta n t fields of u lam a activity, justice, education a n d hajj, became form al m inistries w hose heads are m em bers of the cabinet chaired by the king. T h e u la m a ’s involvem ent in the Saudi p o litical process after Ibn Saud’s death (1953) rem ained m a rg in a l.18 T hey played only a p eripheral role in the dram atic developm ents in Saudi A rabia in the 1950s and 1960s. T h e ir involvem ent in various crises was necessitated by the regim e’s need to legitim ise succession, a n d /o r o ther extraordinary p olitical actions that required the issu in g of a fatw a by the senior ulam a. Such was the case w hen Faysal was ap p o in te d p rim e m inister (1958 and 1962) and king (1964),19 before the sto rm in g of the K a'ba in 1979, an d w hen ‘in fid el’ forces were invited to pro tect the kin g d o m in 1990. M ost u lam a since the 1950s have tended to accept, to some degree, the lim ited m odernisation efforts an d th eir su bordinate p o sitio n in the S audulam a trad itio n al alliance, since they nevertheless do enjoy a special 10

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status and practically control everyday life in Saudi Arabia. T h is som ew hat revised form of alliance between the ulam a and the Sauds was finalised by Faysal (1958-75). Yet, it seems that the ulam a in the late 1980s and early 1990s were no longer satisfied w ith this situation.20 A lthough he noticeably accelerated m odernisation, even Faysal, w hen­ ever possible, attem pted to gain the u la m a ’s consent for his reforms. E ndeavouring to m odernise and decentralise the religious hierarchy and to incorporate it in the Saudi establishm ent, Faysal created several very im p o rtan t religious institutions, some of w hich replaced the broad authority of the G rand M ufti w ho died in 1969. T hose institutions, funded by the governm ent, are today the centres of the u lam a’s authority in the kingdom and enjoy substantial prestige and influence. Frequently w hen the W ahhabi conservatives opposed his evolutionary reforms, Faysal did n o t hesitate to confront them. For instance, w hen he pioneered girls’ education in 1960 (when S aud’s prim e m inister), Faysal suppressed w ith an iron hand the riots incited by the ulam a in different parts of the kingdom . In 1965, the k in g ’s conservative nephew , Khalid ibn M usa’id, was killed follow ing a violent dem onstration against the o p en in g of a television station in Riyadh. As long as he was able to achieve his essential objectives, Faysal com prom ised w ith the ulam a. Once television was introduced, for exam ple, Faysal agreed th at its broadcasts w ould be restricted largely to religious program m es and news.21 After establishing T h e Female Educa­ tion A uthority and ex panding the kingdom ’s higher education, the m onarch entrusted their developm ent and supervision to senior ulam a. Saudi students, moreover, study m any religious courses and are con­ stantly rem inded that the rulers are the protectors of the W ahhabi state. T h is process of indoctrin atio n was accelerated and the 'Islam isation’ of m odern education was expanded after the 1979 Mecca rebellion. T h u s, the Saudi education system produces largely conform ist graduates, alth o u g h this process may be undergoing a change since 1980.22 Most ulam a of the 1960s an d 1970s, rather than fight Faysal’s acceler­ ated m odernisation, tried to curb the im pact of W esternisation on the S audi-W ahhabi kingd o m ’s special character and culture. T h e lower and m iddle ranks of the religious hierarchy, gradually being filled w ith a new generation of ulam a, w ho enjoyed prestige and affluence, were, w ith some im p o rtan t exceptions, w illin g to follow their m entors an d tolerate, if not support, the regim e’s policy. It could be said, that by the 1970s most of the ulam a had progressively been co-opted in to the system. Even if some extrem ist senior ‘alims expressed their views in the religious universities and publications, such critics of m odernisation were secure, affluent, old-school fundam entalists. W hile lashing at the k ingdom ’s W esternisation and the erosion of the ‘Saudi way of life’ by foreigners and W estern-trained technocrats, censuring other M uslim rulers for 11

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c o rru p tin g Islam , they absolved the Sauds of such g u ilt.21 Such hypocrisy was totally rejected by the h an d fu l of sem i-educated m ilita n t neo-Ikhw an w ho rebelled in Mecca in 1979. Moreover, in the 1980s, m any universityeducated ‘alim s and, in recent years, some p o p u la r you n g religious zealots began to voice criticism of the Sauds, th eir regim e and its policy.21 T h e developm ent of secular n atio n alism and pan-A rabism in the Arab w orld b ro u g h t to Saudi A rabia, betw een the 1940s and 1960s, M uslim B rothers (m ainly E gyptian) and o th er fu nd am en talist (salafi) refugees, w ho opposed th eir g ov ern m en ts’ official ideologies and reforms. All were given sanctuary and generous stipends by the Saudi au th o rities, on the un d erstan d in g th at they w o uld refrain from criticising their hosts. Faysal, w ho was fig h tin g N asser’s pan-A rabism , established w ith their help in 1962 T h e W orld Islam ic L eague (R abitat al-'Alam al-lslam i later renam ed the Islam ic Conference O rg an isatio n - ICO). Funded by the Saudis, it has becom e an im p o rta n t tool of R iy ad h ’s foreign policy. By the 1970s the M uslim w orld was experiencing an u p surge of Islam ic m ilita n t (neo)fundam entalism . T h a t an d the presence in the kingdom of a large W estern co m m u n ity w ith its abhorred lifestyle - a n an ath em a to the ‘believers’ - was b o u n d to affect the conservative Saudis, w ho feared th a t W estern cu ltu ral influences w o uld subvert th eir W ah h ab i-S au d i ‘way of life’. H ence, som e N ajdi ‘alim s even began openly to criticise the regim e’s m o d ern isatio n policy.25 Aware of the rise of m ilita n t fund am en talism in the M uslim w orld. C row n P rince F ahd strove in the late 1970s to im prove his relations w ith the ulam a, cu rb in g any flag ran t aspect of W esternisation. W ahhabi laws an d a p u rita n code of b ehaviour were m ore strictly enforced by the M orality Police, now endow ed w ith ad d itio n al au thority. Nevertheless, Fahd refused to slow dow n the k in g d o m ’s m odernisation program m es an d rarely consulted the u lam a even on in tern al problem s, unless they were related to religion. W hile m ilitan t, socially oriented, fu n d am en talist ideologies were by the 1970s rapidly sp read in g and, to som e extent, replacing pan-A rabism in the Arab w orld, this was far less the case in Saudi A rabia (the S hi'ites of the Eastern Province excepted). H ere, on the one hand, the standard of living of the largely u nsophisticated, conservative p o p u la tio n was rapidly risin g a n d the regim e g radually succeeded in solving the p ro ­ blem s w hich caused h ard sh ip to the new ly urbanised p o p u latio n . O n the o th er hand, the co-operation betw een the Sauds an d the establishm ent ulam a, in c lu d in g the tam e ultra-conservatives, produced a ‘pragm atic fu n d am en talism ’. T h e latter accepted m odern technology and state org an isatio n , closed its eyes to o th er aspects of m o dernisation, yet strongly rejected W estern culture, its m aterial values, consum erism and perm issiveness. It also provided a legitim ate o u tlet for W ahhabi xeno­ ph o b ia an d the anti-W estern sentim ents of m any Saudis.26 12

C O N S O L I D A T I O N O F T H E R U L I N G CLASS

T h e Mecca rebellion of 1979,27 rath er th an ex p o sin g the regim e’s vulnerability, u n d erlin ed its strength an d the dependence of the establish­ m ent W ahhabi u lam a on th eir trad itio n al alliance w ith the Al Sauds. T h e critical attitu d e of the Ik h w an tow ard the establishm ent, w hich neosalafi jih a d groups in the M uslim w o rld propagated, is nevertheless consistent w ith the W ah h ab i w orld view. Some senior N ajdi ulam a, it is claim ed, sym pathised w ith , an d may have even encouraged, neo-Ikhw an g ro u p s an d th eir criticism of the regim e.28 H owever, thirty senior ulam a, in c lu d in g several arch-conservatives, produced a falw a on 24 N ovem ber 1979 p e rm ittin g the sto rm in g of the K a'ba a n d condem ned the rebels. T h e Saudi regim e, they claim ed, ‘had done n o th in g to w arran t the reb ellio n ’. T h e sam e u lam a produced in 1990 a fatw a ju stify in g the in v itatio n of ‘in fid el’ forces to protect Saudi A rabia.29 T h e Mecca affair a n d the success of the Islam ic revo lu tio n in Iran had p u t the Saudi regim e, a n d especially C row n P rince Fahd, on the defensive. Saudi ‘in stitu tio n alised p u rita n ism ’ was now facing the challenge of the new m ilita n t fundam entalism . T h e Saud rulers, there­ fore, decided to strength en the historic alliance betw een ‘ch u rch an d state’ w hich guaranteed the u la m a ’s leg itim isatio n of the Sauds. D espite the c o n tin u o u s erosion of the u la m a ’s influence in the k in g d o m ’s pow er e q u atio n , th eir role was still indispensable n o tw ith stan d in g criticism by fu n d am en talist circles of the S auds’ lifestyle and behaviour. T h e alliance betw een the regim e and the u lam a has been even m ore carefully cultivated in the 1980s because of T e h ra n ’s revolutionary antiS audi p ro p ag an d a an d the Ira n -Ira q war. K ing Fadh now consulted w ith senior ulam a, on a variety of in tern al m atters, every week a n d w ith lesser ‘alim s d u rin g his reg u lar m ajlis.so Fahd, m oreover, reversed the hesitant lib eralisatio n of the mid-1970s and ed ucation has become m ore ‘Islam ic’. B ut alth o u g h he bow ed to th eir w ishes o n m atters connected to religious and m oral conduct an d the c u rtailm en t of ‘W esternisation’, the m onarch did n o t p erm it the ulam a to interfere w ith the ru n n in g of the kingdom , its developm ent or its foreign policy. T h e increased respect w hich the u lam a enjoyed in the 1980s and the fact th a t K ing F ahd frequently underscored his devotion to W ahhabi p rinciples n o tw ith stan d in g , it seems th a t ‘T h e u lam a have exercised very little o r n o influence over m ajor policies concerning foreign affairs, in tern al security, econom ic developm ent, oil p ro d u ctio n and pricing, w ealth d istrib u tio n an d reg io n al allo catio n , or p o litical p a rtic ip a tio n ’ (the latter, however, has begun to change in the 1990s). T h e pace of m odern isatio n in itiated by Faysal from the late 1960s, sustained in the 1970s by increasing oil w ealth, led to im p o rta n t changes in Saudi society and, to a lesser extent, in its c u ltu ral values. All social changes ru n ag ain st elem ents w hich cannot, or w ill not, adapt. T h a t partly ex p lain s the 1979 ‘n eo -Ik h w an ’ reaction, w hich protested ag ainst 13

SAUDI ARABIA

the c o rru p tio n of the fu n d am en talist jih ad ist W ahhabi state by m o dern isation an d g rad u al W esternisation. B ut in the age of jet airplanes an d a com plex security ap p aratu s, such elem ents can n o t hope to overthrow a regim e, unless they enjoy w idespread support. By the late 1970s, how ever, the Saudis were no longer an im poverished, backw ard people ready to em brace extrem ist p u rita n ideologies, b u t rather a society com posed largely of a relatively affluent an d educated u rb an m iddle class. Such a change, coupled w ith rap id m odernisation, has m ade m ilitan t W ahhabi fund am en talism (neo-Ikhw an) unattractive to the Saudi masses, a lth o u g h bein g essentially conservative they co n tin u ed to su p p o rt the existing d ilu ted version of W ahhabism . T h e W ahhabiyya was alw ays an antithesis of sophisticated religious p h ilo sop hy. W hat was left in the 1980s of its o rig in al fu n d am en talistjih a d is t message, besides old-fashioned u n itarian ism , was largely its trad itio n al p u rita n m oral code of p u b lic behaviour, feigned asceticism and x en ophobia, m erged w ith trib al custom s and heritage, p o p u larly referred to as the ‘Saudi way of life’; it was sanctified by the Sauds and the ulam a and transform ed in to a n a tio n al ethos. T h is u n iq u e co m b in atio n , coupled w ith oil w ealth, provides the regim e w ith a w orking form ula for c o u n terin g m ilita n t fu n d am en talism o n the one h an d an d radical n atio n alism on the other. As lo n g as the Sauds co n tin u ed to n o u rish the above ethos an d respected the special p o sitio n of the u lam a in the S au d iW ahhabi k ingdom , they were assured of the c o n tin u ity of their historic alliance w ith the ulam a. T h a t and econom ic prosperity (now renewed) ensures the Sauds of the su p p o rt of m ost of the conservative m ajority of their subjects. Yet by the 1990s, a new g eneration of 'alims, largely graduates of Islam ic universities, was no longer satisfied w ith the k in g d o m ’s pseu do-fun d am en talism and their role in its pow er e q u a ­ tio n /'

14

2

M O D E R N E D U C A T I O N AND T H E RISE OF NEW ELITES*

M O D E R N E D U C A T IO N A N D T H E U L A M A T ra d itio n a lly the u lam a, in ad d itio n to th eir religious an d judicial duties, were the teachers of the devout, an d of the sons of the ru lin g elites. T h e p u rita n ic a l W ahhabi u lam a, however, lim ited themselves to the study of the shari'a an d its recognised in terp re tatio n s and totally ignored all o th er subjects. O n the o th er h and the H ijaz, the m ost p o p u lated province, w ith its holy cities was of o ld a centre of Islam ic sch o larsh ip in the broader sense, a n d at the b eg in n in g of the tw entieth century it benefited from the developm ent of m odern education in the O tto m an E m pire. In 1926, Ibn Saud created in the newly conquered H ijaz a directorate of education, w hich opened the first secondary school, a n d introduced m odern subjects in to the cu rricu lu m of p u b lic schools. T h is in n o v atio n n atu rally aroused sub stan tial o p p o sitio n am o n g the W ahhabi ulam a. But the king, w ho considered such a developm ent essential for his kingdom , practically ignored th eir protests. Ibn Saud, however, pru d en tly tried to avoid a co n fro n tatio n w ith the ulam a. Indeed, as his m eagre revenues suffered in the 1930s from the w orld econom ic reces­ sion, the developm ent of m odern education in Saudi A rabia was slow an d illiteracy in the kingdom rem ained u n til the 1950s as h ig h as 95 per cent.1 C om m ercial ex p lo itatio n of oil in Saudi A rabia, after 1946, facilitated renew ed efforts to advance Saudi education. M any E gyptian and o ther A rabic-speaking teachers were hired by Ibn Saud and suitable Saudis were sent to study in Egypt. T h is was the b eg in n in g of the progressive E g y p tian isatio n of Saudi education. In 1949 the A rabian-A m erican O il C om pany (Aramco) launched a five-year p la n for the developm ent of the skills of its employees. Selected Saudi em ployees were sent to the A m erican U niversity in B eirut an d later o n to the U nited States. A ram co also provided m odern education for its em ployees’ children an d o th er children in the Eastern P rovince.' 15

SAUDI ARABIA

G enerally speaking, A ram co’s c o n trib u tio n to the developm ent of m odern Saudi ed ucation, especially in the Eastern Province, was very im p o rtan t. A m inistry of education was created in 1953 by K ing Saud (r. 1953-64). Indeed, the n um ber of schools an d students in all levels of education tripled o r q u a d ru p led d u rin g S au d ’s reign. F urtherm ore, K ing Saud established in 1957 R iyadh U niversity, the first secular university in the kingdom , an d in 1958 adopted a three-cycle sequence of education. A lth o u g h he ignored the u la m a ’s o p p o sitio n to m odernisation, Faysal follow ed his fath er’s policy an d tried to w in their su p p o rt for his reforms th ro u g h concessions an d com prom ises. For exam ple, after pion eerin g g irls’ education in 1960 in the face of violent o p p o sitio n , K ing Faysal placed the new general directorate of g irls’ education under the G rand M ufti. Subsequently, ulam a-co n tro lled fem ale education becam e com ­ pletely segregated. In retu rn for the u la m a ’s acquiescence in his reforms, Faysal in effect granted them supervision of the m odern education system and the a p p o in tm e n t of a leading 'alim S haykh H assan Al al-Shaykh as m inister of education. T h u s, this m in istry became a stronghold of conservative bureaucrats. In 1970 Faysal established the general directorate of religious in stitu tio n s and colleges th ro u g h w hich the governm ent funded the religious system of education. W hen the governm ent was reorganised by Prince Fahd in 1975 an d a m in istry of h ig h er education created, Shaykh H assan was a p p o in ted its head an d a conservative technocrat replaced him as m inister of education. Paradoxically, the u lam a, w ho at first opposed m odern education, under Faysal practically controlled it. T h e cu rricu lu m of Saudi schools cam e to be focused on Islam ic an d Arabic studies, to the p o in t where m andatory Islam ic courses con stitu te a b o u t a th ird of the cu rricu lu m in Saudi schools. Indeed all students are constantly rem inded of the organic relatio n sh ip betw een the Saudi state and the W ahhabiyya.3 C onse­ quently , the younger Saudis, their m inds co nditioned by the educational system, become largely conservative in th eir outlook. Faysal, believing th a t the m odernisation of Saudi A rabia was co n ­ ditio n al on the em ergence of a large educated elite, was determ ined to provide a m in im u m level of ed ucation for every Saudi. Sim ultaneously he accelerated the developm ent of secondary and h igher education an d the vocational system. T h e latter, however, failed to attract sufficient students (A l-H asa excepted), ow in g to the stigm a attached to m an u al w ork in Saudi society and the m ore attractive o p p o rtu n ities open to young Saudis.4 In the 1970s and early 1980s the m am m oth expansion of the Saudi educational system was facilitated by the enorm ous rise in state revenues from the sale of oil. Because of the econom ic recession in the 1980s 16

M O D E R N E D U C A T I O N A N D T H E R I S E O F N E W EI . ITF. S

vocational education g ained p o p u larity , b u t m any graduates of the system becam e in essence contractors, setting u p w ith governm ent loans, w orkshops or little factories em p lo y in g foreign w orkers.’ T h e rap id developm ent of m odern ed ucation necessitated m ore than ever the em ploym ent of foreign teachers an d adm inistrators. Over the years m ore an d m ore trained Saudis were em ployed in school ad m in ist­ ratio n an d as teachers. T h u s, elem entary ed ucation is now com pletely Saudi-ised, but a good p a rt of the interm ediary an d secondary levels still rem ains partly dependent on foreigners. Possibly m ore serious is the po o r q u ality of the Saudi educational system itself. T w o m ajor reasons for this are the low standard of foreign teachers and the E gyp tian m odel follow ed by the Saudis: this is based on rote-learning, recitatio n an d ‘c ra m m in g ’. Moreover, Saudi teachers w ho replace foreigners in elem entary and secondary schools are generally no better th an their predecessors. E ducated Saudis generally avoided the teaching profession w hich was n ot considered sufficiently p restigious or rew arding. Yet in recent years, p ro m p ted by unem p lo y m en t, m any more better qu alified graduates are jo in in g the teaching profession.'’ F o llo w in g F aysal’s death in 1975, K ing Fahd, w ho held the reins of pow er even w hile K halid reigned (1975-82), stepped u p the co u n try ’s rapid in d u strialisatio n , w hich necessitated accelerated m anpow er tra in ­ ing. T h e education system was expanded to an unprecedented rate; by 1989, the total num b er of students in Saudi schools had risen to abo u t 2,650,000 (40 per cent of the p o p u la tio n ) of w hom 1,160,000 were girls, com pared w ith a total of 33,000 in 1953. A fu rth er g row th of the system is projected by the k in g d o m ’s fifth developm ent p lan (1990-5).7 T h e enorm ous expansion of m odern education an d the substantial decline in illiteracy in Saudi Arabia are im pressive achievements. Yet, Saudi statistics often conceal the low standard of the educational system and the social com position of its students. T h e q u ality of schools and students varies according to the geographical and social environm ent. R ural and urban lower-middle-class students, largely bedouin, w ith traditional back­ grounds, are often un prepared for the systematic approach and foreign philo sophy of m odern e d u c a tio n / Beyond the first years, m any rural and newly urbanised students are incapable of, or n ot interested in, co n tin u in g their studies, w hich have no econom ic value for them. An exceptional case is that of the S hi'ites of the Eastern Province, w ho u n til the 1980s were officially d iscrim inated ag ain st by the W ahhabi kingdom . T h e ir best chance to acq u ire education above the elem entary level then was th ro u g h the A ram co schools, or on A ram co scholarships in foreign universities.J O thers were the sons of the new S h i'ite petite bourgeoisie, w hich began to em erge in the late 1960s. T h e Saudi regim e became, however, m ore sensitised to the S h i'ites’ needs in the 1980s. T h e standard of education in the u rb an centres catering to the Saudis of 17

S AUDI ARABIA

m iddle-class background is on the w hole also relatively low. M em orising is still the backbone of the system, w hile the standard of E nglish and science teaching is uneven an d often very p o o r.10 Saudi statistics take no account of the m iddle an d u p p er classes’ d isp ro p o rtio n ate benefits from subsidised education. M iddle- an d upper-class children, especially from the H ijaz an d ch ildren of the N ajdi hadr, are better prepared for m odern education and have access to better schools. T hese g ro u ps also d o m inated secondary education an d en ro lm en t in Saudi o r foreign universities in the 1980s. H owever, the governm ent is n o t unaw are th at the first two develop­ m ent p lan s (1970-80) favoured the urban p o p u la tio n , especially the m iddle an d u p p er classes. O ne of the aim s of the th ird and fourth developm ent p lan s (1980-90) was to im prove and expand the education system. N evertheless, the n u m ero u s successful ‘low er-class’" entrepre­ neurs have n o t been constrained by m in im al education. T o g eth er w ith their brethren w ho are school an d university graduates, they have become in the last tw o decades p a rt of the Saudi m iddle class. T H E D E V E L O P M E N T O F H I G H E R E D U C A T IO N D eterm ined n o t to rem ain com pletely dependent on foreign hig h er education, Ibn Saud established in Mecca a college of shari‘a in 1949 and a teacher tra in in g college in 1952, w ith an extension in T a ’if. T h e G ran d M ufti, co m p etin g w ith the governm ent system, also established in R iyadh a shari'a college in 1953 and an A rabic lan g u ag e college in 1954. T h is developm ent helped p ro lo n g som ew hat the conservatives’ hegem ony in education an d in the Saudi a d m in istratio n .12 T h e establishm ent of R iyadh U niversity in 1957 ushered in the second perio d in the developm ent of Saudi h ig h er education (1957-75). O lder colleges were consolidated in to , or m erged w ith, full-scale universities, w hile new ones were o pened elsewhere in the kingdom , to facilitate Saudi A rab ia’s m odernisatio n an d econom ic developm ent. It was also the regim e’s hope, apparen tly , to offset the tensions arisin g from rap id social change by en ab lin g talented Saudis to acq u ire university education and to benefit from their c o u n try ’s prosperity. As a result, n um ero u s E gyptian, W estern an d o th er professors and ad m in istrato rs were hired. O n ly in recent years did Saudi professors replace a good p art of the foreign faculty w ho dom in ated the k in g d o m ’s universities. As in oth er fields, the p a th of m odern educational develop­ m ent was facilitated by concessions to the u lam a. In this case the state funded Islam ic universities an d schools, m ade religious courses m andatory in the cu rric u lu m of the ‘secular’ universities a n d h anded to the religious leadership the supervision of w o m en ’s colleges.13 R iyadh U niversity (in 1980 K ing Saud U niversity - KSU), the largest in 18

M O D E R N E D U C A T I O N A ND T H E RISE O F N EW E L I T E S

Saudi A rabia, is the stro n g h o ld of the N ajdi ‘aristocracy’ an d is som ew hat m ore conservative th a n o th er ‘secular’ u niversities." T h e Islam ic U niversity of al-M adina was established in 1961 follow ing co n su ltatio n s between foreign fundam entalists, W ahhabi u lam a an d the Saudi authorities. D esigned to replace Al-Azhar (follow ing the latter’s reo rg an isatio n by N asser in 1961) as an in tern atio n al Islam ic university, its staff an d students are largely foreign M uslim s, w hile m ost of its Saudi ones are of bedouin o rig in , an d o th er Saudis, w ith fu n d am en talist tendencies. T h e U niversity of P etro leu m an d M inerals (U PM ), now K ing Fahd U niversity, in D h ah ran (E astern Province) is by W estern standards the best and m ost prestig io u s university in the kingdom . E stablished by A ram co in 1963 as a college (PfeM), it becam e a university in 1975. T h e U PM is an A m erican enclave in Saudi h ig h er education: its teaching language is E nglish, its faculty is largely foreign. H a lf of the students and som e of its faculty are said to be Shi'ites. T h e u lam a-controlled R iyadh colleges becam e in 1974 the Im am M u ham m ad Ibn Saud Islam ic U niversity. A stro n g h o ld of N ajd iW ahhabi fund am en talism , this university, in ad d itio n to pro d u cin g ju rists an d teachers, co-ordinates all S audi religious schools an d studies. It supervises the N atio n a l G u ard schools and the u p g ra d in g p rogram m e of the M orality Police. K ing Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud U niversity at Jedda was founded in 1967/8 by local p h ila n th ro p ists as a W estern-oriented business in stitu tio n . In 1971, it becam e a state university (‘secular’) and its o rien tatio n became m ore A rabic-Islam ic. In 1977 it opened a new cam pus in M adina and one in A bha (Asir) and is the second largest Saudi university. K ing Faysal U niversity (KFU), the fourth an d latest ‘secular’ university, was established in 1974/5 w ith cam puses in H u fu f and D am m an (Eastern Province). After 1980, the university established a full range of faculties. A good p a rt o f its faculty is W estern, an d courses in the sciences an d m edicine are still ta u g h t in E nglish (1987), a serious problem for the average Saudi student. Because of the regim e’s efforts to m itigate the trad itio n a l d iscrim in atio n ag ain st the S h i'ite m inority, the university has enrolled in the 1980s a g ro w in g n u m b er of S h i'ite students. U m m al-Q u ra U niversity (Mecca) was form ed in 1980, its nucleus the colleges founded in 1949 an d 1953. U m m al-Q u ra is ap p aren tly intended largely to serve the conservative p o p u la tio n of the H ijaz, b u t one q u arter of its students are foreigners. L ike o ther Islam ic universities, its aim is to supply the judges, im am s an d teachers required th ro u g h o u t the country; in the governm ent its g raduates occupy posts in the m inistries concerned w ith education, justice an d the ‘preservation of v irtu e’. By 1975 there were nearly 20,000 students in Saudi universities, and m ore th an 5,000 Saudis stu d y in g abroad. W hile som e of the latter, m ainly 19

S AUDI ARABIA

the o ffspring of w ealthy H ijazi and som e N ajdi m erchants and aristo ­ crats, studied at their ow n expense, the others, m ostly of u rb an middleclass background, were given governm ent stipends th ro u g h o u t their g raduate an d p o stgrad u ate studies. U p o n their retu rn to Saudi Arabia, these graduates of foreign universities were often ap p o in ted to im p o rtan t p ositions in Faysal’s an d F a h d ’s a d m in istratio n s and governm ents. G raduates of ‘secular’ dom estic universities (m ostly of hadr o r urbanised m iddle-class background), were a p p o in ted to lesser b u t still prestigious p o sitio n s w hen they chose n o t to go in to the private sector. Subsequently, bureaucrats of m iddle- an d upper-class background, largely H ijazis and to a lesser degree N ajdis, cam e to do m in ate the Saudi a d m in istratio n (w ith the exception of the u lam a-controlled m inistries an d the legal system), at the expense of trad itio n al bureaucrats and graduates of religious in stitu tio n s. T h e th ird period in the developm ent of h ig h er education in Saudi A rabia (1975-85) coincides w ith the rise to pow er of Fahd an d the second an d th ird developm ent plans. T h is was a p erio d of alm ost uncontrolled grow th in Saudi h ig h e r education. U nfortunately it saw the decline of q u ality an d standards. As the dem and for educated Saudi m anpow er increased follow ing the accelerated m odernisation, the enorm ous budgets for the ‘developm ent of h u m a n resources’ were com paratively increased. T h o u san d s of foreigners, ag ain m ainly E gyptians, were hired to teach in the universities, m any of in ferior qu ality . T h e Saudis w ho opted for an academ ic career were also, in m any cases, poorly qualified. Already in 1974, en ro lm en t requirem ents in the ‘secular’ universities (the U PM excepted) were noticeably low ered ‘by order of the g ov ern m en t’ a n d thereafter frequently overlooked alto g eth er.15 In ad d itio n to free education, h o u sin g , stipends an d o th er privileges, students were assured (u n til 1986) of governm ent em ploym ent on g rad u atio n . Such concessions were obviously m otivated by the regim e’s need to defuse socio-econom ic tensions. T h e m ajority of students n orm ally opted for the less d em an d in g h u m an ities an d social sciences, w here the teaching an d text-books were in Arabic; only a m in o rity chose engineering, sciences, business and m edicine, w hich were badly needed in the k in g d o m ’s developing econ­ om y b u t w here the teaching language was often E nglish, professors foreigners an d adm ission requirem ents m ore difficu lt.16 A lth o u g h the n u m b er of university graduates rose quickly in the 1970s and early 1980s, it could n o t satisfy the dem and. Nevertheless, w om en graduates were discouraged from seeking w ork and only a sm all percent­ age of fem ale graduates were em ployed in the Saudi econom y in the 1980s. As a result of K ing F ah d ’s p olitical difficulties after he was enthroned (1982), the separation of sexes in institutes of h ig h er education an d the lim ited em plo y m en t o p p o rtu n itie s for w om en becam e even more p ro n o u n ced th an before.17 20

M O D E R N E D U C A T I O N A ND T H E RISE O F N EW E L I T E S

In 1985, S audi A rab ia’s seven universities an d fourteen w o m en ’s colleges had a total student p o p u la tio n of a b o u t 80,000. T h e n u m b er of Saudi students abroad, nevertheless, continued to rise, and a b o u t 18,000 were believed to be a tte n d in g A m erican universities. H owever, the severe recession in the kingdo m in recent years grad u ally caused th at nu m b er to decline. S im ultaneously, the n u m b er of students in Saudi universities has risen by 1989 to ab o u t 100,000, w ith 20,000 graduates an n u a lly .1* By the early 1980s large sections of the a d m in istratio n had become over-inflated w ith u n iversity-trained bureaucrats, exacerbating the p rev ailin g inefficiency;19 b u t as senior an d even m iddle-range p ositions were hard to com e by, university graduates, in c lu d in g seasoned b u r­ eaucrats, progressively opted for prov in cial offices of the m inistries. Indeed, after 1985, o w in g to the econom ic recession, w hich was caused by the crisis in the oil m arket, governm ent offices an d agencies were instructed (1986) n o t to h ire a d d itio n al personnel. T h u s u n em ploym ent am o n g school a n d university graduates was on the increase.20 G raduates w ho returned to Saudi A rabia in the 1960s and early 1970s w ith P hD an d M aster’s degrees were a p p o in te d to key p o sitio n s in the g o v ern m en t’s bureaucracy and education system. T h e wave of foreigntrained graduates re tu rn in g hom e after the mid-1970s dom in ated m ost of the m iddle level of the civil service and governm ent agencies, an d increasingly joined the staff of the ‘secular’ universities. Besides their influence on the central governm ent an d its policy, their m anners, ideas and way of life have been copied by m any others. T h u s, even the transform ation of the universities from the E gyptian to the A m erican system in 1975 seemed to the conservatives an o th e r aspect of the g row ing ‘A m ericanisation’ of Saudi Arabia. Frustrated by w hat they perceived as the W esternisation of the W ahhabi kingdom th ro u g h u n co n tro lled m odernisation, m any conserva­ tives accused the governm ent and its U S-educated technocrats of h elp in g su p p la n t W ahhab i p u rita n ism an d ‘the Saudi way of life’ w ith W estern cu ltu re an d ‘the A m erican way of life’. Even before the 1979 Mecca rebellion P rince Fahd had com e u n d er gro w in g pressure from the m ore extrem e u lam a an d Saudi m iddle-class n atio n alists to reduce W estern influence in the kingdom . Indeed, after the Mecca incident even C row n P rince Fahd found it p ru d e n t to restate his declared o p p o sitio n to the W esternisation of Saudi A rabia. By the early 1980s, even som e A m ericantrained Saudis began to q u estio n W estern values and the aim s of m odern Saudi education w hich they h elped develop.21 T h e gro w in g n u m b er of graduates of Saudi universities, w ho knew very little E nglish and had little contact w ith the West, were largely conservative and increasingly anti-A m erican. T h e u lam a were given greater control of the education system and their influence seemed again to be on the increase."' 21

S AUDI ARABIA

C O N C L U S IO N S As in o th er fields, R iyadh tried to bridge over centuries of stag n atio n by allo catin g larger an d larger budgets for education. C ertainly, for a n atio n w hose illiteracy rate was 95 per cent in m id-century, the developm ent of Saudi education is p h en o m en a l. Yet its q u ality leaves m uch to be desired an d the low level of the S audi education system an d of its graduates is an accepted norm related, to a great extent, to the k in g d o m ’s p olitical realities. M oreover, it seems an absurd situ atio n th at Saudi Arabia, experien cing an acute shortage of m anpow er a n d needing to em ploy m illio n s of foreigners, keeps at an enorm ous cost to its treasury ab o u t 35 per cent of its p o p u la tio n in school (some for indefinite periods) and excludes w om en graduates from the job m arket. Indeed, for a n atio n of this size, the n u m b er of its students in dom estic and foreign universities seems excessive. Saudi A rabia’s oil revenue has declined from a b o u t 108 b illio n dollars in 1981 to ab o u t 18 b illio n dollars in 1986 (16.5-17.5 b illio n in 1987-8). C onsequently R iyadh has been trim m in g its expenditures o n one h an d an d d raw in g on its financial reserves o n the other. For p o litical reasons, the allocations to education, w elfare services and subsidies, w hich benefit all Saudis, have been reduced o nly m arginally. By the late 1980s, however, S audi A rabia was u nable to m a in tain its previous level of expenditure an d co n tin u e to d rain its fin an cial reserves. T h u s, the education a n d m anpo w er developm ent budget, over 10 per cent of the k in g d o m ’s budget, cou ld n o t be sustained at the previous level.23 Yet the w ar against Iraq a n d the sh arp rise in oil revenue in 1990 may ag ain change the situation. U n til 1986 the Saudi regim e em ployed all the university an d school graduates w ho chose to jo in its inefficient ad m in istratio n . By the mid1980s, unless they had a U PM degree or the necessary professional or vocational speciality, graduates had to be satisfied w ith w hatever job they could get in the provinces. Indeed, students have begun progressively to ad ap t th eir studies to th eir c o u n try ’s needs a n d some, in ad d itio n to AlH asa and p erip h eral areas, are finally jo in in g the science and engineer­ in g faculties an d the vocational stream. T h e question , nevertheless, rem ains (even in 1992) w hether Saudi A rabia can afford its extensive, w asteful an d in ad eq u a te educatio nal system. F u rth er econom ies by the governm ent and the slowly reviving private sector m ake it extremely difficult to provide su itable em ploym ent for over 100,000 school and 20,000 university graduates a n n u a lly .24 B ut this is a p o litical an d social rath er th an ju s t an econom ic issue, an d one of w hich the Sauds are well aware. T h e relatively sm all b u t gro w in g p ro p o rtio n of ‘low er-class’ students w ith secondary education in the last decade often chose the Islam ic 22

M O D E R N E D U C A T IO N AND T H E RISE OF NEW EL IT ES

universities w ith th eir trad itio n a l character a n d cu rricu lu m , easy ad m is­ sion requirem ents a n d h ig h er stipends. ‘Low er-class’ graduates, from b o th Islam ic an d ‘secu lar’ universities, rarely reached h ig h po sitio n s in the ad m in istratio n . T h is u n d o u b ted ly co n trib u ted to the interest of some in fu n d am en talist (neo-Ikhw an) ideologies an d to the gro w in g tension betw een graduates of S audi religious universities an d of the ‘secular’ ones - an d betw een b oth these g ro u p s a n d th eir W estern-trained colleagues, w ho have captured m ost of the key positio n s in the central governm ent an d its agencies.25 As the n u m b er of university graduates c o n tin u ed to grow in the 1980s, the three-sided co m p etitio n for jobs, exacerbated by gro w in g u n em p lo y ­ m ent am o n g the educated, p eak in g in 1986-9, has been extended to the lesser p o sitio n s in the m iddle level even in the prov in cial ad m in istratio n . Indeed, u n em p lo y m en t am o n g the new elites has becom e a serious socio­ po litical problem th a t could u n d erm in e the k in g d o m ’s stability, accom panied as it is by co n flictin g ideologies an d socio-religious tension. T h e rise in oil revenue since 1989 may h elp the Saudi regim e p artly to overcom e the problem if properly handled. T h e rise of the Saudi m iddle class has been greatly enhanced by the grow th of Saudi oil revenue. T h e acceleration of the k in g d o m ’s m odern isation on the one h a n d an d the dram atic rise in the n u m b er of educated Saudis on the o th er have given new dim ensions to this p h en o m en o n . Faysal’s policy in the 1960s and early 1970s, w hich enabled the new elites to p artic ip ate in his g overnm ent an d share in the co u n try ’s w ealth, encouraged them to co-operate w ith his regim e and, largely, to jo in its pow er base. T h u s, n o tw ith sta n d in g two abortive attem p ts at coups in 1969 a n d unrest in 1977 an d the early 1980s, social ferm entation am o n g the new m iddle class was avoided. Yet, despite the decisive role played by the new elites in th eir co u n try ’s m od ern isatio n and the dram atic expansion of th eir ranks, the Saudi oligarchy is only now , in 1992, hesitantly re lin q u ish in g its m o n o p o ly of the k in g d o m ’s decisionan d policy-m aking.26

23

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P a r t II M O D E R N I S A T I O N AND ST R U G G L E FOR POLITICAL REFORM

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3

T H E R E I G N OF SAUD (1953-64): S T R U G G L E FO R P O W E R AND NATIONALISM It is often assum ed th a t the n a tio n a list upheavals w hich had shaken the M iddle East from the late 1940s to the early 1970s left Saudi A rabia’s society relatively unaffected. Indeed, after the suppression of the Ikhw an u p risin g in 1929/30 the p atria rc h a l Saudi regim e seemed to rule the kin g d o m u nchallenged at least u n til 1979. T h e u p risin g in Mecca in th a t year, m oreover, was the o utcom e of a W ahhabi fu n d am en talist reaction to rap id m o d ern isatio n a n d h ad n o th in g to do w ith the rather secular socio-politically m otivated o p p o sitio n to the m onarchical regime. Yet, the changes w h ich Saudi society has experienced in recent decades, the em ergence of a new elite and of social ideologies, an d the gro w in g fru stratio n of the S h i'ite m in o rity , have produced in the k ingdom a m ilita n t n a tio n alist o p p o sitio n to the Sauds’ a u th o rita ria n governm ent. D espite its relatively lim ited follow ing, this m ilita n t o p p o sitio n has affected the k in g d o m ’s policy a n d in certain instances threatened the regim e’s stability. Even m ore im p o rta n t, however, was the rise in the kin g d o m of new pow erful m iddle-class elites w hose struggle for p o litical p a rticip atio n becam e a m ajo r issue in Saudi A rabia in the 1970s an d 1980s. T h e developm ent of a m ilita n t n a tio n a list (Shi'ites included) and m iddle-class o p p o sitio n to the Saudi regim e, the reason for its failure to g ain pow er despite the dram atic expansion in the ranks of the new m iddle-class elites a n d the latter’s p a rtia l in co rp o ratio n in to the ru lin g class’s pow er base, w ill be discussed in the follow ing chapters. S O C I O - P O L I T I C A L C H A N G E IN T H E P O S T - W O R L D W A R II Y E A R S ( T O 1958) A u th o ritarian ism a n d th e g row th of Arab n atio n alism Policy decisions in A rabia were usually adopted th ro u g h deliberations w ith the tribal elders o r regional notables rath er th an u n ilaterally by the Shaykh (am ir). Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud, a strong leader, once his pow er was 27

S AUDI ARABIA

consolidated often dispensed w ith this procedure. In the 1920s, as his pow er grew the ruler increasingly m ade m ajor policy decisions him self or consulted his unofficial m ajlis al-shura (C onsultative C ouncil) m ade u p of his m ost senior kinsm en and devoted friends. A m ilestone in this process was the collapse of the Ikhw an rebellion in 1929/30 an d the dram atic rise of Ibn S au d ’s revenues after the conquest of the H ijaz (1924) and follo w in g com m ercial ex p lo itatio n of oil in the late 1940s. A m ple funds n o t only enabled the ru ler to begin b u ild in g the k in g d o m ’s arm ed forces an d d isp en sin g w ith the m ilitary services of tribal a n d regional am irs b u t also, w henever possible, to buy off rather th an fight the o p p o sitio n - the S auds’ golden ru le to this day. T h e m onarch still m et tribesm en, m erchants an d u lam a in his daily majlis. Such audiences served largely as a forum for p etitio n s and com plaints. O n rare occasions the k in g convened large g atherings of tribal shaykhs, notables an d ulam a. T h is was to o b tain th ro u g h ijm a ‘ (consensus) their form al sanction for a m ajor policy decision w hich w ould have been reached previously after co n su ltin g senior m em bers of ahl al-hal w a ’l-'aqd. C o nsidering Ib n S au d ’s strong personality, his reluctance to delegate a u th o rity an d tendency to identify the kingdom w ith him self (l ’état c’est m oi), his governm ent after 1930 could be considered p atern alistic an d a u th o rita ria n rath er th an , as described by som e au th o rs, a ‘desert dem ocracy’. T h e Ikhw an rebellion, the last serious challenge to Ibn S au d ’s increas­ ingly centralist governm ent an d relations w ith the British, was crushed by 1930. N evertheless, Saudi A rabia rem ained relatively in su lar u n til the end of W orld W ar II. Yet the trad itio n al links w hich the H ijaz m a in ­ tained w ith the M uslim w orld served Ib n Saud as a channel for co m m u n icatio n w ith the Arab countries. Indeed w hen ap p o in ted Viceroy of the H ijaz (1926) P rince Faysal was also p u t in charge of relations w ith the outside w orld. T h o u g h they largely em braced the W ahhabiyya after 1926, m ost urban H ijazis, com pared w ith th eir N ajdi com patriots, rem ained to lerant and open-m inded. M odern ed ucation, the press an d broadcasting developed in the H ijaz faster th a n elsewhere in Saudi Arabia. In fact m ost of the reform s introduced un d er Ib n Saud were first tried o u t in the H ijaz, Saudi A rabia’s m ost developed an d p o p u lo u s province. F urtherm ore, u p to the 1970s, the gro w th of the foreign Arab com m u n ity in the province outpaced th at in the o th er regions in the kingdom . A nascent educated elite had already emerged in the kin g d o m by the 1940s. T h e ranks of the new m iddle-class intellig entsia gradually ex panded in p ro p o rtio n to the g ro w in g n u m b er of Saudis studying in universities abroad. At this stage the m ajority of such students cam e from urb an H ijazi fam ilies. Sons of m erchant fam ilies, som e N ajdis an d others from the Eastern Province w ho had w on A ram co scholarships also 28

T H E R E I G N O F S A U D ( 1 9 53 - 64)

studied in foreign countries. Yet u n til the 1970s H ijazis rem ained the m ajority of those stud y in g in foreign universities. O n re tu rn in g hom e they form ed the backbone of the new m iddle class an d the u p p e r echelons of the m odern ad m in istratio n . After W orld W ar II, the H ijaz was q u ick to respond to the rise of n atio n alism and an ti-co lo n ialism in the M iddle East. T hese were reinforced by the strongly anti-W estern foreign Arab co m m u n ity living in the province. A ccelerated m odern isatio n an d the 1948 w ar b ro u g h t to the H ijaz m any m ore E gyptians an d P alestin ian s to jo in relatives w ho had already o btained em p lo y m en t there. T h e size of the foreign Arab com m unities was constantly g ro w in g th ro u g h increased o p p o rtu n ities in the Saudi oil industry an d the ad m in istrativ e an d ed u cational netw orks. T hese com m unities were im p o rta n t in fostering n a tio n a list ag itatio n in Saudi A rabia as a w hole. In the early 1950s, events in the M iddle East and the g ro w in g foreign presence h elped dissem inate these sentim ents w hich were reinforced by th e press, p articu larly in the H ijaz, an d by radio broadcasts from n e ig h b o u rin g countries. Aware of developm ents in the Arab w orld the nascent H ijazi u rb an m iddle class served as the v anguard of A rab natio n alism in Saudi Arabia. R ivalry in the royal house (1953-8) D espite his uncontested succession to the th ro n e in N ovem ber 1953 King Saud (r. 1953-64) cou ld n o t h ope for the k in d of a u th o rita ria n regim e w hich his father h ad enjoyed. H e had to contend w ith personal shortcom ­ ings an d serious h ealth problem s; also, his sm ooth succession was c o n d itio n al on tw o factors: first sh a rin g his pow er w ith Faysal his heir a p p aren t, w ho was to becom e p rim e m inister, an d second, som etim es co n su ltin g the info rm al m ajlis al-shura m ade u p of the senior m em bers of the royal fam ily. Saud faced a variety of com plex problem s both w ith in an d outside the kingdom . T h e M iddle East was in co n stan t tu rm o il because of N asser’s m ilita n t n atio n alist leadership, w hile in Saudi A rabia oil w ealth a n d m odern isatio n were b e g in n in g to change the face of Saudi society. L ack in g the stren g th of character, finesse a n d savoir faire of his brother and rival Faysal, Saud was u n ab le to consolidate a pow er base w ith in the royal fam ily. A conservative, he turn ed for su p p o rt to the u lam a an d the tribal am irs b u t also tried to w in favour w ith the em erging m iddle class. U n h a p p y a t the loss of th eir p ow er an d the erosion of the trad itio n al way of life, the o ld elite dem anded an end to m odernisation. Conversely, the new m iddle class, a n d som e y o u n g princes, w ished for co n stitu tio n al reform s, faster developm ent an d lim its on the pow er of the conservatives. A lth o u g h he speeded u p the m o dernisation of the governm ent and 29

S AU DI ARABIA

expanded the educatio n al system, Saud gave in on the w hole to the dem ands of the traditionalists. Saud established the C ouncil of M inisters at the b eg in n in g of 1954 (decreed by Ibn Saud in O ctober 1953) an d later a p p o in te d Faysal to be its head. Yet he did n o t delegate a u th o rity to this body b u t rath er tried to rule the country w ith the h e lp of u n scru p u lo u s advisers, in the same p atriarch al style as his father. H is m anagem ent of the m odern ap p aratu s, how ever, frequently revealed his incom petence. T h ere was no distin ctio n betw een the k in g ’s privy purse and the k in g d o m ’s treasury. T h e larger the revenue from oil, the m ore Saud m anaged to squander, an d the k in g ­ d o m ’s financial situ atio n rapidly deteriorated. M atters were aggravated by the 1956 Suez war. T h o u g h Saudi oil installatio n s were spared because of S au d ’s su p p o rt of Nasser, the closure of the canal proved a setback to the k in g d o m ’s oil industry. By 1957 the kingdom was on the verge of b ankruptcy an d dissatisfaction w ith S au d ’s incom petence reached a peak. T h e cohesiveness of the kingdom , w hich Ibn Saud had achieved th ro u g h p o litical m arriages, proved to be its u n d o in g after his death. H is n um erous sons contended for pow er and w ealth. By the b e g in n in g of 1958, after Saud dram atically reversed his foreign policy an d clashed w ith N asser, it was clear th at the country was h ead in g for p olitical and financial crisis. By this tim e, the royal fam ily was sp lit u p in to three cam ps. T h e first was m ade u p of the king, the few princes w ho still su p p o rted him , S au d ’s n u m ero us sons an d m ost of the tribal am irs w ho rejected the m odernisatio n w hich eroded their pow er. T h e second consisted of m ost of the senior princes w ho su p p o rted Faysal’s dem ands for fin ancial reform s an d evolutionary m odernisation w hich w ould consolidate the pow er of the m onarchy in the face of risin g radical natio n alism in the M iddle East. T h e th ird consisted of a g ro u p of y ounger liberal princes, led by T ala l w ho, u n til 1955, was m inister of com m unications. P rince T a la l, w ho frequently visited Nasser between 1955 and 1958, w ished to tu rn Saudi A rabia in to a c o n stitu tio n al m onarchy and favoured m ore rap id m odernisation of the kingdom . W hen Saud’s com plicity in a p lo t ag ain st Nasser became p u b lic in M arch 1958, Faysal im m ediately resigned from his positio n as prim e m inister. Pro-N asser and pan-A rab sentim ents in the M iddle East, in c lu d in g Saudi A rabia, reached an unprecedented peak follow ing the establishm ent of N asser’s U nited Arab R epublic in February 1958. T h e royal fam ily, n atu rally , becam e exceedingly w orried lest S au d ’s b u n g lin g should cause the overthrow of the regime. Subsequently, after c o n su ltin g the senior ulam a and some tribal am irs, the m ajority of the senior m em bers of the H ouse of Saud decided to divest Saud of m ost of his responsibilities and to request Faysal to assum e the p o sitio n of prim e 30

T H E R E I G N O F S A U D (1953-64)

m in iste r w ith full au th o rity . F acin g a fa it a cco m p li S aud agreed to these d em an d s an d Faysal began h is first term as de facto ru le r of S audi A rabia. K ing S aud, A rab n a tio n a lism an d th e W est T h e M iddle East beg an to c h a n g e rap id ly in th e last years of the reig n of K ing Ib n S aud a n d especially after the 1948 w ar in P alestine. A new g e n e ra tio n of A rab n a tio n a lists becam e increasin g ly im p a tie n t w ith the ‘n e o -c o lo n ia l’ presence in th e re g io n a n d w ith th e tra d itio n a l regim es a n d p o litics of th e ir co u n tries. T h e u n rest in th e A rab c o u n tries reached a c lim ax w ith the 1952 o fficers’ re v o lu tio n in E gypt. T h e M iddle East h o ld s a m a jo r p a rt of the p ro v en oil reserves in th e w orld, an d th is m ade the reg io n a zone of c o n te n tio n betw een th e su p erp o w ers. T o g e th e r w ith its revenues from o il, th e A rab n a tio n a lists considered S au d i strategic im p o rtan ce cru cial for the ach iev em en t of th eir a sp ira tio n s. As its e x p a n d in g o il in d u stry a n d fast m o d e rn isatio n w ere b e g in n in g to have an im p a c t o n its society, S au d i A rab ia co u ld n o lo n g er re m ain in su lar. Ib n S au d ’s attem p ts, betw een 1949 a n d 1951, to persu ad e W a sh in g to n to sign a defence ag reem en t w ith S audi A rabia failed d esp ite A ram co ’s su p p o rt. H ow ever, they led to th e e x p a n sio n of W a s h in g to n ’s m ilitary a n d fin an cial a id to th e k in g d o m a n d to the ex ten sio n u n til 1956 of an ag reem en t u n d er w h ich the U S leased the D h a h ra n a ir base. A tra in in g m issio n c o m m an d ed by a U SA F b rig a d ie r jo in e d the m ilita ry advisory g ro u p w h ich had h elp ed to o rg an ise th e S audi arm ed forces since 1946. T h u s , m ilitary p erso n n e l fu rth e r bolstered th e A m erican presence in the E astern Province, w h ic h w as co n sta n tly g ro w in g at this tim e because of the in te n sific a tio n o f A ram co ’s activities in th e region. E n g lan d , as was to be expected, w as the m ain target of th e E gyp tian -led A rab n a tio n a list p ro p a g a n d a . F o llo w in g th e 1952 re v o lu tio n in E gypt a n d the u n d e rm in in g of P rem ier M u sad eq ’s g o v ern m en t in Iran by the CIA after the n a tio n a lisa tio n of the A n g lo -P ersian O il C o m p an y , sy m p ath y for th e U n ited States in th e A rab w o rld also declined. T h e US, m oreover, now the leader of th e W est, len t su p p o rt to Israel a n d had in itia te d re g io n al an ti-S o v iet defence p acts in c o m p a tib le w ith Arab n a tio n a list a sp iratio n s. E ven before he cam e to p ow er, th e tra d itio n a lly -m in d e d Saud, heavily re lia n t o n his fa th e r’s S y rian a n d P a le stin ia n p o litica l advisers, was believed to be u n frie n d ly to th e West. Im m ed iately after h is succession K ing S au d declared th a t he was n o t favourably in clin ed to th e p ro p o sed A m erican M iddle East defence pact. H e w as ap p reh e n siv e o f the closer relatio n s A m erica was fo rg in g w ith H ash em ite Iraq , a n d critical of US su p p o rt for Israel. E arly in 1954 S au d in fo rm ed W a sh in g to n th a t he w ished to dispense w ith its P o in t F o u r a id a n d he in stru cted th e P o in t F o u r M ission to leave th e k in g d o m .' 31

SAUDI ARABIA

A strange alliance em erged in 1954 between Saud a n d P resident Nasser. E ach needed the o th e r’s h e lp in fig h tin g the W estern-sponsored regional defence pacts. Saudi o il an d financial resources tem porarily m ade Saud an ideal p a rtn e r for Nasser, w h o was leading the struggle ag ain st B ritish a n d French colonialism in the Arab w orld. For his part, Saud h oped to capitalise o n N asser’s p o p u la rity an d prestige as a leader of Arab n ationalism . A ram co’s relations w ith Saud were less am icable th an they were d u rin g the reign of his father because of his p o litical bias an d his in satiable need for funds. Aware of the c o m p an y ’s vital help in various fields, an d w ith events in Iran u n fo ld in g before his eyes, Saud was careful n o t to an tagonise A ram co. T h e m onarch, how ever, faced a difficult dilem m a ju s t before he cam e to pow er in N ovem ber 1953 w hen confronted by gro w in g u n rest in the o il fields of the Eastern Province. T H E G R O W T H O F O P P O S I T I O N A N D T H E IS S U E O F P O L I T I C A L R E F O R M (1 9 5 3 -8 ) T h e A ram co 1953 strike an d th e rise of n atio n alist o p p o sitio n U n til the 1940s, the E astern Province (A l-M antiqa al-Sharqiyya o r AlH asa), was generally considered backw ard, as well as bein g u n p lea san t in clim ate. Its p o p u la tio n was largely m ade u p of nom adic S unni tribesm en, S h i'ite ag ricu ltu ralists (m ainly in the A l-H asa an d Q atif oases) an d a m ixed coastal p o p u la tio n w hich engaged in trade, fish in g an d pearl diving. T h e discovery of oil in A l-H asa in the 1930s, an d its com m ercial e x p lo itatio n from 1946 onw ards, com pletely changed the character of the province. M any A m erican a n d o th er W estern oil m en cam e to live in ‘A ram co tow ns’ w ith their fam ilies. T hey m ain tain ed their ow n lifestyle as far as possible. In ad d itio n , A ram co em ployed thousands of Italians, Indians, P akistanis, P alestinian s an d Lebanese clerks and technicians. T h e ex p a­ triate A rab em ployees in tro d u ced to the province social, c u ltu ral an d p o litical values com m on in the M iddle East b u t n o t com patible w ith those ex isting in the archaic W ah h ab i kingdom . T h o u san d s of bedouins, w ho despised m an u al w ork because of social mores, also settled tem p o r­ arily on the peripheries of the ‘oil tow ns’ and provided the com p an y w ith u n skilled transient labour. L ocal Shi'ites, a b o u t o n e-th ird an d possibly o ne-half of the p rovin ce’s Saudi p o p u latio n , form ed the backbone of A ram co’s p erm an en t u n sk illed an d sem i-skilled workforce. T ra d itio n ­ ally discrim inated ag ain st by the au th o rities, th eir o nly chance for a better life was w ith A ram co, w hose recru itm en t policy was ‘colour b lin d ’.2 T h e gro w th of A ram co’s o p eratio n s triggered off fu n d am en tal changes 32

T H E R E I G N O F S A U D ( 1 9 53- 64)

in the Eastern Province. Its coastal ‘oil tow ns’ rapidly developed and econom ic activity in the region intensified. T h e business of the oil com pany, the requ irem en ts of its foreign employees and the wages earned by its S audi w orkers caused the cost of living to rise sharply, and the local p o p u la tio n , in c lu d in g A ram co’s Saudi w orkers, experienced h ardship. T h e p ro u d W ahhabi bed o u in fo u n d it d ifficult to adjust to a W estern w ork regim e. T o th eir eyes they were being patronised an d discrim inated ag ain st in th eir ow n cou n try by ‘infidels’ w hom they had been ta u g h t to despise, and they resented th is.3 U n d oubtedly the S h i'ite com m u n ity in A l-H asa as a w hole greatly benefited from A ram co’s activity an d its liberal em ploym ent policy and tra in in g program m es. Some q u alified S h i'ite em ployees were even sent abroad by the com pan y for fu rth er tra in in g an d were later ap p o in ted to m edium -level clerical an d technical positio n s in the com pany (but n ot m anagerial ones). As m em bers of an oppressed m in o rity w ith a tendency to extrem ism , m any S hi'ites were attracted by radical anti-W estern Arab n atio n alism , w hich held prom ise of social and political equality. T h e deep fru stratio n of the S hi'ites of the Eastern Province w ith the S au d iW ahhabi regim e w hich oppressed them could find expression in the antiW estern m anifestation s of un rest in Aramco. In the early 1950s after Ibn S au d ’s h ealth rap id ly deteriorated the k ingdom was governed de facto by a council of regents. It was widely believed th a t w hen the o ld k in g died a struggle for pow er w ould break o u t in the country. Such an atm osphere of uncertainty, com bined w ith the n a tio n a list fervour w hich sw ept the region after the E gyptian revolution, increased the u nrest in A l-H asa and in the Hijaz. A ram co began to experience lab o u r difficulties in the first m o n th s of 1953. At the end of Ju n e a w orkers' com m ittee, largely m ade u p of Saudis trained abroad, handed the m anagem ent a p e titio n , dem an d in g hig h er salaries, im proved w ork co nditions and facilities an d the rig h t to organise the w orkers. A copy was also handed to the governm ent.1 As the situ atio n in the o il industry, w hich provided the governm ent w ith its m ain source of revenue, co n tin u ed to deteriorate, A m ir Saud, the h eir ap p aren t, was asked to h an d le the crisis. H e ap p o in ted a royal com m ission to look at the w orkers’ grievances. T h e arrest of the twelve m em bers of the W orkers C om m ittee, w ho became p o p u la r heroes over­ n ig h t, for their abusive treatm ent of the royal com m issioners, sparked off a general strike by the Saudi workforce. T h e strike ended only after the k in g ordered the workers to retu rn to w ork an d the strikers’ leaders were released from jail. O n 9 November, K ing Abd al-Aziz died an d Saud succeeded him . T h e new king, striving to consolidate his au tho rity , im m ediately issued a royal decree g ran tin g A ram co w orkers a 20 per cent pay rise and m any o ther concessions. T h e 1953 A ram co strike is often described as a spontaneous protest by 33

SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi w orkers, w ho were forbidden by law from o rg an isin g to contest unsatisfactory pay an d am enities. T h e value of A ram co’s salaries was eroded by the h ig h cost of liv in g in the A ram co tow ns an d by in flatio n . T h e Saudi w orkforce was incensed by the lu x u rio u s h o u sin g and o th er facilities enjoyed by the A m erican em ployees.6 H owever, an o th er elem ent - the stron g xeno p h o b ic an d anti-W estern sentim ents of the dom estic A ram co w orkforce - is frequently ignored. T hese were fom ented by native an d expatriate Arab (largely P alestin ian ) n atio n a list employees. T h e scale of d isco n ten t an d n a tio n a list ferm ent in Saudi A rabia in the early 1950s is u sually underestim ated. Five centres of o p p o sitio n to the Sauds’ p atriarch al regim e em erged inside the kin g d o m d u rin g this period. T h e first was a m o n g the u rb a n m iddle-class H ijazis, the second am o n g the S hi'ites an d the A ram co workforce. T h e th ird was am ong tribal an d hadr elem ents in n o rth e rn N ajd and in the Eastern Province, w ho had resisted the rise of the H ouse of Saud in the first decades of the century. T h e fo u rth em erged in Asir, where som e tribes were still n ot reconciled to the Saudi d o m in a tio n . T h e fifth was in the arm ed forces, generally am o n g officers w ho had gone abroad for tra in in g 7 o r cam e in to contact w ith their E gy p tian an d o th er Arab colleagues. T h e sophisticated H ijazis were n ot only closely a ttu n ed to n atio n alist activity in the Arab w orld bu t, after 1924/5, found themselves governed by the N ajdis, w hom they considered u n co u th . T h e N ajdis, w ho looked dow n u p o n the H ijazis as b eing of m ixed blood and religiously lax, im posed the restrictions of the W ahhabiyya u p o n them . T o add in su lt to injury, K ing Saud, shortly after his succession, abolished the special status of the H ijaz, gran ted by his father an d n o urished by Faysal, w hich gave its p o p u la tio n a degree of self-governm ent.8 H e also ordered all governm ent offices to be moved to R iyadh. A lth o u g h separatist tendencies were com m on in the province, it was inconceivable th at the H ijazis w ould really w ish to cut them selves off from Saudi oil revenue once the benefits became a p p aren t.9 T h e H ijazi intelligentsia, how ever, h o p ed th a t either a reform of the N ajdi-dom inated archaic regim e, o r its overthrow , w ould enable them to assum e a m ore fittin g role in the governm ent of th eir country an d inter alia abolish, or at least reduce, the ability of the W ahhabi u lam a to constrain its developm ent. T h e S hi'ites a n d som e of the S u n n i tribes of the Eastern Province w ho fought Ibn Saud an d particip ated in the Ikhw an m ovem ent (‘U jm an), h ad no reason to like the regime. T h e Shi'ites, subject to religious persecution a n d ill treatm ent, an d their S u n n i neighbours, believed th a t th eir oil was e n rich in g their oppressors w hile its benefits were denied to them . T h e 1953 strike was an im p o rta n t m ilestone in the re-emergence of m ilita n t o p p o sitio n to the Al Saud governm ent. A nti-m onarchical over­ 34

T H E R E I G N O F S A U D ( 1 9 53- 64 )

tones becam e a p p aren t in the later stages of the strike and the workers, despite the m any concessions they had w on, rem ained discontented and critical of the regim e. In the follow ing years, the A ram co w orkforce and the E astern Province as a w hole becam e the focus of n atio n alist and radical leftist activism .10 Saudis, alo n g w ith foreign Arab w orkers, most notably P alestinians, agitated ag ain st the A m ericans a n d the regime. T hey form ed clandestine o rg an isatio n s d em an d in g reform s, the rig h t to unionise, the p h asin g -o u t of the US air base in D h ah ran and increasingly the e n d in g of d iscrim in a tio n ag ain st the Shi'ites. T h e H ijazi u rb an m iddle class had access to the w hole of the Arab w orld, its press and rad io broadcasts. T h e ir o p p o sitio n to the Sauds in th is p erio d reflected the E gyptian-led m ainstream of Arab nationalism . Several sm all clandestine n atio n a list g roups, m ade u p of only a sm all n u m b er of active m em bers b elo n g in g largely to the educated w ell-to-do u rb an m iddle class, dem anded a c o n stitu tio n al-p arlia m e n tary regime an d a faster pace of m odernisation. Far m ore m ilita n t was the N atio n al R eform F ro n t (N RF) w hich em erged at the end of 1953 o r early in 1954. F ounded by the leaders of the 1953 A ram co strike a n d of the sm all N ajdi in telligentsia, it also claim ed m em bers in the H ijaz a n d the arm ed forces. T h e socialist an d secular o rien tatio n of this o rg an isatio n , influenced by contacts w ith the P alestin­ ian Arab N ationalists (Q a w m iyyin al-‘Arab), called for social and p o liti­ cal reform s a n d the ab o litio n of the C om m ittees of P u b lic M orality. As the N R F intensified its activities am o n g the A ram co w orkforce an d the m ilitary in 1954 an d 1955, its m ore o utspoken leaders were often im prisoned an d som e were forced to flee the country. T h e N R F, renam ed the N atio n al L ib eratio n F ro n t (N LF) in 1957/8, co n tin u ed its activities as a socialist pro-N asserite m ovem ent b o th in Saudi A rabia an d abro ad u n til the 1970s. Its leftist leanings, m ilitancy an d roots in the oil industry, in the arm ed forces an d am o n g some N ajdi tribal elem ents, m ade the N L F exceptionally dangerous to the regim e and a p rim ary target for its security services. T h e Saudi N L F moved fu rth er left from the N asserite m ainstream of Arab n atio n alism in the 1960s an d was ideologically related to the M arxist S outh Y emeni N L F and P alestin ian L iberation Fronts (especially the PD FP). Repeatedly sp littin g away from and reg ro u p in g w ith its m ainstream Arab N atio n alists an d its left w ing, the P o p u lar D em ocratic F ront (PDF), in the 1970s the N L F becam e the nucleus of the sm all Saudi com m u n ist an d B a'th parties (both Syrian- and Iraqioriented). A m em ber of the W orkers C om m ittee of the 1953 strike, N assir Sa'id, a N ajdi, the best-know n Saudi o p p o sitio n leader u n til the 1970s, was a fo u n d in g m em ber of the N RF. H e was the chief in stig ato r of the 1956 disturbances in A l-H asa, and, follow ing a n attem p t to form an A rabian 35

SAUDI ARABIA

1 rade U n io n A ssociation, escaped to Syria (1956). In 1958 he founded the Ittih a d S h u 'u b al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya later renam ed Ittih a d A b n a ’ al-Jazira al-’A rabiyya (U n io n of the Sons of the A rabian P en in sula) active ag ain st the Saudi regim e in the 1960s an d 1970s. S u p p o rt for this o rg an isatio n a m o n g Saudis seems to have been lim ited to the A ram co w orkforce and Jab al S ham m ar a n d it was especially p o p u la r am o n g the Y emenis an d o th er foreign A rabs resid in g in the kingdom . T h e P o p u la r D em ocratic F ro n t an d the O rg an isatio n of the N atio n al R evolution, offshoots of the Arab N atio n alists (Q aujm iyyin al-‘A ra b), also appeared in the 1960s. T h e ir su p p o rt in Saudi A rabia was m inuscule a n d largely am o n g foreign workers. A Saudi b ran ch of the B a'th m ovem ent was founded in 1958, shortly after the em ergence of the UAR. At first it looked to the Syrian B a'th for guidance, an d the little su p p o rt it found in Saudi A rabia cam e m ainly from tow nspeople in the H ijaz an d Asir. After the early 1960s, w ith the rise in pow er of the Iraq i B a'th, the sm all Saudi B a'th m ovem ent became largely Iraqi-oriented a n d its activities spread to the Eastern Province an d H ijaz. It also w on som e su p p o rt am o n g Saudi students ab ro ad .” In o th er A rab countries, discontented y o u n g n a tio n a list arm y officers represented the m ore serious o p p o sitio n to th eir regimes. In the 1950s the Saudi arm ed forces were still in an em bryonic form. T hey lacked prestige an d were easily co unterb alan ced by the tribal N atio n al G u ard loyal to the Sauds. It seems th at a lth o u g h suspected an d discrim inated against, educated H ijazi com m oners reached key positions in its com m and. A m ovem ent called the Free Officers had already emerged in the arm ed forces by 1954. In the sp rin g of 1955, m em bers of this g ro u p were arrested an d their leaders executed because of an alleged p lo t ag ain st the regime. T h e Free Officers a n d m em bers of the Arab N ationalists in the arm ed forces also p articip ated in an ti-m o n arch ical activities u n til 1959. But such activities were of little consequence an d only m ade Faysal m ore determ ined, in 1958, to freeze p la n s for the developm ent of Saudi A rabia’s arm y a n d air force. F o llo w in g the E gyptian in tervention in Yemen, some officers of the Saudi a ir force deserted to E gypt w ith their planes. But the m ost serious, albeit am ateu rish , atte m p t by the m ilitary to overthrow the regim e was to come, ironically, in 1969 after the rapprochem ent between N asser and Saudi A rabia. K ing Saud was not unaw are of the discontent in the kingdom . T h u s, paradoxically, w hile he courted pan-A rabism , he took steps to suppress the n a tio n alist an d radical o p p o sitio n to his regim e. A royal decree was p u b lish ed at the b e g in n in g of 1954 p ro h ib itin g strikes an d d em o n ­ strations, and control on the m edia was tightened. T h e security services began to h u n t dow n ‘c o m m u n ists’ an d radical n ationalists. Foreign Arabs, p articu larly P alestinians, were also accused of ag itatio n or of m em bership in pan-A rab m ovem ents. 36

T H E R E I G N O F SAUD (1953-64)

T h e efforts of the regim e to suppress the m iddle-class and socialistn a tio n a list o p p o sitio n were n ot very effective because of rivalry in the royal fam ily betw een 1955 and 1961 an d because the security services were inadequate. T h e bleeding of the co u n try ’s econom y by the royal fam ily an d S au d ’s pro-W estern an d anti-N asserite policy in fu riated the n a tio n ­ alists. Indeed ag itatio n am o n g the m ilitary, the in tellig en tsia and A ram co’s w orkforce was to c o n tin u e, and even intensify, in the years to come. T h e 1956 strike an d the collapse of the E g y p tian -S au d i axis Ironically, the intensificatio n of an ti-m o n arch ical activities am o n g the new elites an d the A ram co w orkforce coincided w ith the clim ax of the E g y p tian -S au d i co-operation. T h e B aghdad Pact was launched in F ebru­ ary 1955. O nly the jo in t efforts of Egypt an d Saudi A rabia prevented Jo rd an from jo in in g as well. Yet S au d ’s anti-H ash em ite an d anti-W estern activities could not offset the fact th at his co rru p t and reactionary regim e was unacceptable to the new elites an d o ther Saudi n ationalists. From 1955 anti-W estern an d anti-A m erican ag itatio n , aim ed, as well, against the regim e, escalated in the H ijaz a n d the Eastern Province. W hen K ing Saud visited D h ah ran in May of 1956 he was confronted by a hostile dem onstration ‘organised by n atio n alists an d co m m u n ists’ dem an d in g the p h asin g -o u t of the A m erican base there and the n a tio n alisatio n of Aram co. At the b eg in n in g of Ju n e , A ram co was paralysed by a general strike. T h ere was little d o u b t that in ad d itio n to legitim ate grievances the strike was p o litically m otivated an d directed ag ain st the regim e a n d the West. T h is tim e the strike was q uickly an d harshly suppressed on S au d ’s orders an d a n u m b er of dem onstrators an d strike leaders were killed or executed an d others were im prisoned. F urtherm ore, a new royal decree strictly forbade strikes and dem o n stratio n s of any k in d .12 It should n o t be overlooked that m odern education an d the econom ic developm ent of the Eastern Province had b egun to m ake the S h i'ite p o p u la tio n of the region m ore conscious of their disadvantages. Since 1953 A ram co had gradually divested itself of different o perations w hich it had carried o u t in the past by passing them on to local contractors. Because of this and the h ig h er skill of its workforce an d the term in atio n of labour-intensive in frastru ctu re projects, the com pany gradually reduced its w orkforce. At the sam e time, it was trying to increase the p ro p o rtio n of local em ployees an d the n u m b er of Saudis in its ad m in ist­ ratio n an d m an ag em en t.13 Yet, com ing as it did d u rin g a period of finan cial crisis in the kingdom , this reduction in m an p o w er was especially p ain fu l for the S h i'ite p o p u la tio n of the Eastern Province. T o 37

S A U D I AR AB I A

some extent Aramco became in the next decade a focal p o in t of radical anti-governm ent and anti-A m erican activity in Saudi A rabia.14 President Nasser arrived in D hahran in September for the m eeting w ith King Saud and President Kuwatly. H is n ationalisation of the Suez Canal two m onths earlier and the h u m iliatio n of the West had aroused Arab pride and turned Nasser into the idol of the Arab masses. H e was met in A l-H asa by huge crowds, w ho manifested their adm iration for him w ith great em otion. Saud was not only ignored but, according to one source,15 ‘stones were throw n at the royal entourage and slogans denouncing the H ouse of Saud were displayed by some of the dem onstrators’. Shortly afterwards, w hen Nasser arrived in Riyadh, the w hole p o p u latio n turned out to accord him a hero’s welcome. D isturbances in the Eastern Province in 1956 d u rin g Nasser’s visit there were an extension of the Arab natio n alist struggle, led by the Egyptian President, against W estern colonialism in the M iddle East. T h e Aramco concession and the D hahran a ir base were viewed as a symbol of the ‘neo­ colon ialist’ presence in the region and constituted a challenge to Saudi pride and Arab independence. T ogether w ith the authorities’ harsh suppression of the A l-H asa dem onstrations and strike, they exacerbated the resentm ent of the p o p u latio n of the Eastern Province and Saudi nationalists towards their regime. N asser’s visit to Saudi Arabia, it seems, was also a tu rn in g poin t in the relationship between Saud an d the E gyptian leader. A pprehensive of the universal em pathy in the kingdom for Nasser and his policy, Saud became determ ined to resist N asser’s grow ing pow er in the Arab world. W hen the Suez w ar broke ou t the king prudently severed Saudi A rabia’s relations w ith B ritain an d France an d slapped an oil em bargo on them. H e also helped Nasser to coerce King Hussayn to w ithdraw the m ilitary facilities E ngland enjoyed in Jordan; bu t despite the universal rejection of the Eisenhow er D octrine (January 1957) by Arab nationalists, Saud visited the US at the end of January and undertook to su pport the Doctrine. In exchange for an agreem ent to extend the lease of the D hahran air base for five more years Saud obtained from W ashington an undertaking of econom ic and m ilitary assistance. R elations between Saud and Nasser rapidly deteriorated in 1957. King Saud attem pted to stop the unification of Syria and Egypt w hich led to the establishm ent of the UAR in February 1958. In March it came o u t that the Saudi m onarch had financed a plot to assassinate President Nasser. As this happened w hen Arab euphoria at the establishm ent of the UAR was at its peak, the E gyptian an d Syrian media exploited the affair for an allout attack on the Saudi regime, and called upon the kingdom ’s p o p u la ­ tion to rise against its corrupt rulers. Faysal, w ho supported S aud’s opposition to the Western defence pacts, disagreed w ith his anti-W estern extremism and his su pp o rt for the 38

T H E R E I G N O F S A U D ( 1 9 53 - 64)

subversion of N asser in the A rab w orld. Always a n advocate of a cautious an d passive policy, Faysal was n atu ra lly u n h a p p y w ith S au d ’s total change of a ttitu d e a t the end of 1956. It was obvious to him th a t overt o p p o sitio n to the E gy p tian leader was b o u n d to cause N asser and the n a tio n a list cam p to focus th eir efforts o n u n d e rm in in g the Saudi regime. A lth o u g h careful n ot to challen g e his b ro th er openly, Faysal took advantage of his m istakes practically to rule Saudi A rabia in his name. P O W E R S T R U G G L E IN T H E R O Y A L F A M IL Y A N D T H E N E W E L I T E S (1 9 5 8 -6 4 ) F aysal’s first cabinet (1958-60) As soon as he assum ed pow er Faysal adopted a policy of appeasem ent tow ards N asser a n d q u ick ly declared his su p p o rt for his positive n e u ­ tralism . H e froze a ll the k in g ’s agreem ents w ith the US to assure Nasser of Saudi o p p o sitio n to A m erica’s M iddle Eastern policy. H owever, relations betw een the trad itio n alist k in g d o m an d its revolutionary n eighbours rem ained at best correct. By 1960, w hile N asser preached socialism an d m ilita n t pan-A rabism , Faysal began to experim en t w ith a p an -Islam ic policy m eant to block the spread of radical ideologies. E arlier, the kin g d o m had become a haven for Syrian a n d E gyptian M uslim fun d am en talists, w ho were now p erm itted to use the m edia to criticise E g y p t’s secularisation an d ‘so cialisatio n ’ of Islam .16 T h e period of Faysal’s governm ent in the late 1950s is m arked by the success of his financial reform s, the reo rg an isatio n an d m odern isatio n of the cabinet a n d ad m in istra tio n , an d the rap id ex p an sio n of the educa­ tio n al system. M any technocrats from foreign universities were given key p o sitio n s in the a d m in istra tio n .17 Yet, ironically, Faysal’s achievem ents caused h im to lose m an y of his supporters. H is austerity policy estranged the H ijazi m erch an t class. T h e substantially reduced allocations to the n u m ero u s princes an d to the trib al um ara' an tagonised both. T h e L iberal Princes led by P rince T a la l were disillu sio n ed w ith Faysal’s conservative m easures designed to preserve the system rath er th a n reform it. T hey considered the strong a n d capable crow n prince a m ore serious obstacle to change an d to their o w n asp iratio n s th a n Saud had been. As for the nationalists, w hen they realised th at Faysal’s lim ited reform s were m eant to p erpetuate the S auds’ a u th o rita ria n regim e, they were determ ined to transform S audi A rabia in to a co n stitu tio n al m onarchy, or get rid of the H ouse of Saud altogether. O nce it becam e ap p a re n t th a t Faysal had no in te n tio n of in stitu tin g a c o n stitu tio n al m onarchy, an d as the crow n prince a n d the k in g w ished to w in th eir sym pathy, the n atio n alists skilfully m anoeuvred betw een the 39

SAUDI ARABIA

two a n d in practice enjoyed the advantage of overt p olitical activity. At the tim e the S audi security services were extrem ely ineffective an d the regim e, atte m p tin g to appease Arab n atio n alism , did n o t w ish to u n derm ine its ow n efforts by persecuting the local progressives. Between 1958 an d 1960 o p p o sitio n o rg an isatio n s frequently distributed p am p h lets d em an d in g a reform in the k in g d o m ’s p olitical system an d its policies. T h e Saudi press, d o m in ated by E gyptians and the H ijazi intelligentsia, openly defied the censorship and frequently p ublished articles p ro m o tin g the cause of Arab n atio n alism an d indirectly a ttack in g the regim e. T h e estab lish m en t of the U AR caused m any m ore Saudi officers an d N C O s to jo in the Free Officers m ovem ent an d o ther Saudi clandestine organisatio n s. Yet the result of Faysal’s policy was th a t the arm ed forces rem ained w eak and in capable of seriously th reaten in g the regim e. By the b eg in n in g of 1960, Faysal’s p o p u larity was at a low ebb. A strange alliance em erged at the end of 1959 between Saud an d his conservative supporters, the L iberal Princes an d the intelligentsia. In an effort to w in the good w ill of the new elite, Faysal em ployed m any in his ad m in istratio n , speeded u p the process of m o dernisation, allocated greater funds to m odern edu catio n an d abolished the censorship laws. Yet, w hen the L iberal Princes an d the n atio n a list in tellig en tsia subm itted a pro posal to h im in Ju n e for a c o n stitu tio n al m onarchy and an elected body w ith legislative pow ers, Faysal, backed by m ost of the senior princes, rejected it o u t of h a n d .18 T h e rise an d fall of S au d ’s ‘progressive’ governm ent (1960-2) By the last m onths of 1960 Saud felt sufficiently stro n g to o ust Faysal. Subsequently, on 21 December, the king an n o u n ced the form ation of a new governm ent w hich he w o uld lead. S au d ’s new ‘progressive’ governm ent was probably the nearest th at the n atio n alists and co n stitu tio n alists ever got to g a in in g pow er in Saudi A rabia. T h e new cabinet did n ot include any of the senior princes of the royal house. In ad d itio n to S au d ’s son, the cabinet consisted of three L iberal Princes led by T a la l, w ho was ap p o in ted m inister of finance and n a tio n al econom y as well as deputy president of the Suprem e P la n n in g C ouncil. Six o u t of eleven m inistries in the cabinet were held by com m oners, five of w hom , m ostly w ith university degrees, were m oderate n ationalists. A bdallah ibn H a m u d T a rik i (a N ajdi and a co-founder of O PEC ) was the exception: his a p p o in tm e n t as the head of the newly created M inistry of P etroleum an d M ineral Resources represented the m ilita n t elem ent am o n g the nationalists. T h e Ju n e 1960 p ro g ram m e for co n stitu tio n al reform s w hich the L iberal Princes and the in tellig en tsia subm itted to Faysal was strongly 40

T H E R E I G N O F S A U D (1953- 64)

condem ned by the ulam a on the ground that it contravened the shari'a. Even Saud dissociated him self from the docum ent, declaring that the Q u r’an was Saudi A rabia’s constitution and the only source for its social principles. N otw ithstanding, im m ediately follow ing the form ation of the new cabinet R adio Mecca announced in its name the p rom ulgation of 'basic law s’ and the establishm ent of a legislative council: tw o-thirds of the members were to be elected and one-third appointed. T h e announce­ m ent was refuted by the king two days later in a radio broadcast and press interviews. Evidently the conservative king was opposed all along to his allies’ constitutional reforms. Nevertheless, the Liberal Princes and the n atio ­ nalist com m oners in the governm ent, inspired by Nasser’s revolutionary nationalism , believed that the days of the Saudi m onarchy were num bered. Indeed, as finance m inister and deputy president of the Suprem e P la n n in g C ouncil, T alal frequently attem pted to u surp the pow er of the C ouncil of M inisters in order to achieve his aims, but he thereby alienated the king and the m ore moderate m inisters.19 N ot unaw are of the progressives’ attem pt to m anipulate the weak king, the senior princes and the other conservatives in the Saudi ru lin g class exerted pressure on Saud to lim it the influence of leftist nationalists in his court and governm ent. T h e king dismissed his progressive advisers at the end of February 1961. In the next few m onths he began to strengthen the moderates in the governm ent, igno rin g the outraged protests of the Liberal Princes. A harsh State Security Law was prom ulgated by the king in March 1961, paradoxically, w hile a ‘liberal’ governm ent was ru lin g the country. It prescribed the death penalty or twenty-five years’ im prisonm ent for any aggressive act against the royal family or the state (including treason, attem pts to change the regime, or to spread disaffection am ong the armed forces). It also forbade the profession of any ideology other than Islam, or the form ation of political parties. T h is was necessitated by the rising tide of leftist-oriented clandestine activities aim ed against the regime, which followed on the shelving of the constitutional reforms and the dismissal of S aud’s progressive advisers.20 T h e American presence in D hahran became a source of increasing em barrassm ent to K ing Saud, w ho was accused of providing the im perialists w ith a base in Saudi Arabia. T h e Eastern Province, a centre of radical nationalism , did no t benefit, moreover, from governmentsponsored developm ent and suffered from grow ing unem ploym ent. T h u s, d u rin g a visit to the region in the first m onths of 1961, Saud was met by hostile dem onstrations. T h at, and pressure from Arab nationalists at hom e and abroad, caused the king, in mid-M arch, to announce his decision to term inate the D hahran agreem ent on its expiry in April 1962.21 N one the less, n atio n alist ferment all over the kingdom was 41

S A U D I ARABIA

aggravated in the sp rin g of 1961 by econom ic problem s an d risin g u n em p lo y m en t a m o n g the new ly urbanised un sk illed rural p o p u la tio n . All the different ideologies prevalent at this tim e in the Arab w orld C om m un ism , Socialism , B a'th ism a n d N asserism - were represented in Saudi A rabia, a lth o u g h their actual follow ing was lim ited in num ber. Yet all were u n ited in th eir dem ands for co n stitu tio n al reforms, for a ttu n in g S audi foreign policy to pan-A rabism an d for faster develop­ m ent. Some even p lo tted to assassinate m em bers of the royal fam ily and to hasten the k ingdom tow ards a p o p u la r revolution. Indeed, unrest in the arm ed forces follo w in g the o u tbreak of w ar in Yemen in 1962 dem onstrated the w isdom of Faysal’s decision to freeze its developm ent. T en sio n betw een N asser an d K ing Saud resurfaced in 1961 because of the difficulties the form er was e n co u n te rin g in Syria. W ahhabi ulam a an d M uslim B rothers, w ho fo u n d refuge in the kingdom , attacked the secularisation of the U A R an d its relations w ith the Soviet atheists. T h e Saudi regim e, e x p lo itin g pan -Islam to co u n ter pan-A rabism , authorised non-S audi fu ndam entalists to establish an Islam ic U niversity in AlM adina to com pete w ith the ‘socialised’ Al-Azhar. T h e Saudi govern­ m ent, claim in g th at the p rin cip le of Islam ic solidarity supersedes foreign ideologies, also founded in 1962 the W orld Islam ic League (R abitat al‘A lam al-Islami) w hich later set u p a p erm an en t secretariat in Mecca.22 Inter-A rab relations on the w hole becam e increasingly polarised in this perio d because of N asser’s m ilita n t pan-A rabism an d the rivalry betw een the E gyptian a n d the Iraq i revolutionary regimes. Ironically, w hen Iraq attem pted to ann ex K uw ait at the end of Ju n e 1961 shortly after its independence, R iyadh found itself in the sam e cam p as C airo. Yet, w hen the U AR collapsed in Septem ber, the E gyptian m edia ag ain viciously attacked the Saudi regim e. Isolated in the royal fam ily, an d ag ain facing a p o litical a n d econom ic crisis, the a ilin g Saud so u g h t reco nciliation w ith Faysal, th o u g h he did n o t w ish to relin q u ish the governm ent to him . T h e shrew d crow n prince agreed to co-operate on co n d itio n th at Saud dism iss T a lal an d the other L iberal Princes from the cabinet. A lth o u g h he accepted this conditio n , Saud, w hen he left the kin g d o m for m edical treatm ent in November, entrusted the p rem iersh ip to Faysal on co n d itio n th a t the latter w ould not m ake any changes in the cabinet. T h u s, from m id-N ovem ber 1961 to the b e g in n in g of M arch 1962, Faysal presided over a cabinet m ade u p largely of n atio n alists an d S au d ’s supporters. T h e usually cautiou s Faysal, ab an d o n in g his trad itio n al appeasem ent policy co n cerning E gypt, dism issed m any of the E gyptian advisers em ployed by the Saudi a d m in istratio n . Because of allegations of E gyptian espionage, each governm ent w ithdrew its am bassador from the o th e r’s capital. Faysal was n o longer w illin g , as w ell, to tolerate a hostile Saudi press. E gyptian a n d local n a tio n a list jo u rn alists were dism issed 42

T H E R E I G N O F SAUD (1953-64)

an d a m inistry of in fo rm atio n was established in 1962 in order, inter alia, to m o n ito r the press an d h elp fight ag ainst the E g yptian p ro p ag an d a. A press law was p ro m u lg ated in N ovem ber 1963, b u t strict state control over new spapers was re-established even earlier (and exists to this day). In 1962 Faysal o b tained the consent of the u lam a for the ex p an sio n of radio broadcasting to counter the v itriolic attacks from E g y p t’s Saw t al'Arab (the Voice of the Arabs). N o tw ith sta n d in g the u la m a ’s strong objection, the governm ent au th o rised shortly afterw ards the construction of TV statio ns in Jedda an d R iy ad h .25 W hen Saud retu rn ed to Saudi A rabia in M arch 1962 he was coerced by a co alitio n of senior princes to surrender his responsibilities as prim e m in ister to Faysal. A bdallah T a rik i and several of S au d ’s com m oner m inisters w ere replaced by m ore m oderate H ijazi notables and technocrats (Zaki Y am ani replaced the N ajdi T a rik i as m inister of petroleum ). M ost im p o rta n t, Shaykh H assan b in A bdallah Al al-Shaykh was ap p o in te d m inister of education, th u s en su rin g the su p p o rt of the ulam a for Faysal, despite the m odern isatio n of the kingdom and the ra p id developm ent of ‘secular’ education, an d M usa'id ibn Abd alR ah m an , Faysal’s uncle, becam e m in ister of finance. T h e latter m inistry was essential to the success of Faysal’s m odernisation policy and his in te n tio n to channel m uch of the k in g d o m ’s oil revenues to the p o p u la ­ tion th ro u g h governm ent and w elfare services. M u sa'id ’s prestige, m ore­ over, enabled Faysal to reduce substan tially the royal list a n d the stipends allocated to each p rince w ho rem ained on it. M uzzling the press a n d p u rg in g the cabinet of radicals an d the L iberal Princes served as a w a rn in g to the Saudi n atio n alists th a t a new era in th eir relations w ith the S au d s’ regim e had begun. Indeed, A bdallah T a rik i slipped o u t of Saudi A rabia an d settled in Beirut. H e was later follow ed by T a la l a n d som e of his brothers. Yet the attractio n of panA rabism was still considerable, an d m ost of the m oderate H ijazi n a tio n ­ alists in the cabinet did n o t hesitate to challenge Faysal’s policy w hen it clashed w ith N asserism . W hile n eg o tiatio n s betw een E gypt and Syrian an d Ira q i B a'thists about a new u n it p lan were g o in g on, F aysal’s Islam ic entente an d the de facto renew al of the leasing of the D h ah ran base to A m erica were viciously attacked. T h e overthrow of the m onarchy in Y emen at the end of Septem ber 1962, and the E gy p tian involvem ent there soon after, began a new era in active o p p o sitio n to the Sauds’ regim e. R adical n atio n alist o rg an isatio n s now turn ed increasingly to sabotage an d acts of terrorism ; b u t the H ijazi m iddle-class n atio n alists becam e less supp o rtiv e of Nasser after his in tervention in Yemen. T h e w ar in Y emen precipitated a new crisis in the Saudi governm ent. T h e royal house could n o lo n g er afford to be led by the irresolute and incapable Saud. T h u s, w ith the blessing of the ulam a, the m o narch was 43

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coerced in to h an d in g over the office of prim e m inister w ith u n lim ited au th o rity to Faysal. O n 31 O ctober, the crow n prince form ed a new governm ent in w hich all the m ajor pow er groups, excluding S au d ’s supporters, were represented. In ad d itio n to Faysal an d Prince M usa'id, w ho c o n tin u ed to hold foreign affairs and finance portfolios respectively, P rince F ahd (k in g in 1 9 8 2 ) , Faysal’s staunchest ally and the leading reform er, becam e m inister of the interior, his full brother S ultan replaced S au d ’s son M uh am m ad as m in ister of defence an d their older half-brother K halid becam e deputy p rim e m inister. T h e ‘alim Shaykh H assan was a p p o in ted m inister of ed ucation and a n o th er ‘alim became m inister of p ilg rim ag e a n d aw qaf. Six H ijazis, m ost of w hom were technocrats know n for their m od eratio n in in tern al an d external affairs, were a p p o in ted to the rem a in in g m inistries.3 W hen Faysal assum ed the p rem iersh ip at the end of O ctober 1962 the future of the Saudi regim e looked q u ite grim . Nasser considered Yemen a ju m p in g board to the co n tro l of the enorm ous oil w ealth of the A rabian P en in su la, an d he com m itted a large arm y and substantial resources to the w ar in Yemen. T h e E g yptian expeditionary force, su p p o rtin g the republicans in Yemen, succeeded in defeating the royalists, an d E gyptian planes bom bed the border tow ns of Asir w hich served as stag in g bases to the royalists’ tribal arm y. T h e Saudi arm ed forces at the tim e were sm all an d poorly eq u ip p ed an d m any of its officers sym pathised w ith N asser’s aspirations. Saudi air force planes, despatched w ith sup p lies for the loyalists, were flow n by their crews to Egypt, an d several rebellions erupted in rem ote garrisons. F urtherm ore, the N atio n al G u ard was in capable of w aging a m odern war and m ost of its com m anders (tribal am irs) were loyal to K ing Saud. In Septem ber P rince T a la l w ith his brothers A bdul M uhsin, Fawwaz an d Badr, an d his cousin Sa‘d ibn Fahd, founded in C airo the Free Princes M ovem ent. L ater on, together w ith the Saudi Nasserite and leftist organisations, they formed the Arab N atio n al L ib eratio n F ro n t (ANLF). In its nam e, E gyptian, Syrian an d Y emeni radio stations called u p o n the Saudis to overthrow their ‘c o rru p t’ an d ‘reactionary’ regime. W hen he was in the U n ited States in Septem ber and O ctober of 1962, Faysal realised that his policy had estranged Am erica an d that the kingdom could not co u n t on the Kennedy a d m in istratio n for su p p o rt in relation to Yemen. Nevertheless, contrary to his trad itio n al policy of appeasem ent and cau tio n , Faysal was now determ ined not to allow Nasser to have his way, and so he actively su p p o rted the Yemen royalists. Faysal was n o t unaw are of the rap id social change tak in g place in the country a n d of the gro w in g strength of the new Saudi m iddle class. By 1962, for instance, the n u m b er of students p ro fitin g from the m odern educational system had risen to m ore th an 113,000, com pared w ith 33,000 in 1953. Students in local in stitu tes of h ig h er learn in g num bered several 44

T H E R E I G N O F SAUD (1953-64)

th o u san d w hile those studying abroad, w ith governm ent or Aramco sp o nso rship, were conservatively estim ated at abo u t 1,200. M any more, the offspring of w ell-to-do fam ilies, were a tten d in g foreign universities at their ow n expense.26 Indeed, by the early 1960s the ranks of the educated m iddle class, especially in the H ijaz, had expanded to such an extent th at they could su p p o rt nineteen new spapers and periodicals com pared w ith the four of the early 1950s. In such circum stances it was of the u tm ost im p o rtan ce for the regim e to g ain the su p p o rt of the m oderate natio n alists, w ho were m ainly from the H ijazi m iddle classes and, to a lesser extent, of N ajdi hadr origin. T hese natio n alists m ainly aspired to a co n stitu tio n al m onarchy, an d the m odernisation of the k in g d o m b u t were n ot fired by the idea of Nasser's new socialist radicalism , n o r by the P alestin ian -in sp ired m ilitan t socialism w idespread in A l-H asa. Aware of the in h eren t weakness of the trad itio n al conservative W ahhabi k ingd om in a rap id ly ch a n g in g M iddle East, Faysal, en co u r­ aged by P rince Fahd, was determ ined to m odernise Saudi A rabia w ith the h elp of the new elites. Yet even th o u g h he was given a lo t of latitu d e by ahl al-hal w a ’l-'aqd to deal w ith the grave crisis th reaten in g the regim e, Faysal knew that there was a lim it to the concessions th a t he could offer. H e was aw are th a t the m ajority of the ru lin g class w ould n o t agree to sh arin g decision-m ak in g w ith the new elites, a step w hich w ould begin the erosion of th eir pow er an d privileges, n o r did he him self truly wish for such a change. H is experience w ith the H ijazi m iddle-class elite led Faysal to believe th at it w ould co-operate w ith him . All they needed were the rig h t incentives: the chance to share in ru n n in g the co u n try ’s developm ent a n d the h ope of eventually p a rtic ip atin g in decision­ m aking. D iluted reform an d the Yemen w ar O n 6 N ovem ber, the day th a t relations w ith E gypt were cut off after the bom b in g of Saudi tow ns near the Yemen border and a week after he becam e prim e m inister, Faysal an n o u n ced his te n -p o in t program m e; he prom ised a w ide rang e of social an d p o litical reform s, ra p id m odernisa­ tion and econom ic developm ent. T h e proposals were the closest to co n stitu tio n al m onarchy ever prom ised officially and in detail by the regim e. T h e follow ing were the m ost im p o rtan t: 1 T o p ro m u lg ate a fu n d am en tal law, based on the K oran an d the S unna, th at w ou ld allow for a N atio n al C onsultative Assembly (m ajlis alshura). 2 T o regulate the provincial governm ent an d provide for provincial councils. 45

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3 T o g u aran tee freedom of expression (w ithin the context of Islam ic laws). 4 T o preserve the independence of the ju d iciary an d to create a M inistry of Justice. 5 As ‘one of the g o v ern m en t’s m ost im p o rta n t functions is to raise the n atio n al social level’, to establish welfare services th at w ould take care of the needy an d the unem ployed. 6 T o provide free ed u catio n an d m edical services. 7 ‘As the financial an d econom ic developm ent of the kingdom are of p rim ary concern to the g o v ern m en t’ to enact laws to prom ote the above." T h e prom ised fundam en tal law in co rp o ra tin g a N atio n al C onsultative Assembly (m ajlis al-shura) an d the reorg an isatio n of the provincial governm ent w ith their councils have n ot yet m aterialised, alth o u g h reiterated by S audi m o n arch s d u rin g the last thirty years follow ing every crisis. R ather, shortly after u n d ertak in g to guarantee freedom of expression, Faysal lau n ch ed a cam p aig n to suppress the natio n alistoriented Saudi press. H ow ever, all the o th er p o in ts, some substantially m odified, were carried th ro u g h im m ediately or in the next few years. W ith in a decade, they led to a rap id m o dernisation of the Saudi kingdom , an im pressive rise in the standard of living and the involvem ent of its new elites in ru n n in g the affairs of its governm ent. Free m odern ed u cation and m edical treatm ent, social security laws, welfare services an d efforts to deal w ith u n em p lo y m en t were forth w ith tackled by Faysal’s governm ents. T o g eth er w ith m odernisation and econom ic developm ents they were m ade easier by the gro w in g revenue from oil. Past experience had ta u g h t Faysal th at the u lam a w ill resist any attem p t to u n d erm in e their control of in stitu tio n s, such as education and justice, tradition ally w ith in th eir ju risd ictio n . Yet, he also knew that d eterm in atio n to carry o u t the reform s seem ingly resu ltin g from shura an d ijm a ' (co n su ltatio n and consensus) w ould convince them that they sh o u ld accept a com prom ise, especially if control of the m odernised in stitu tio n s was to be left in the hands of an 'alim . Nevertheless, the prom ised independence of the judiciary an d the creation of a M inistry of Justice m et w ith stron g o p p o sitio n from the u lam a an d o ther conserva­ tives from the ru lin g class. As early as Ju n e 1963 Faysal attem pted to reorganise his governm ent and establish new m inistries of justice an d m u n icip al affairs. But the bitter o p p o sitio n of the ulam a, his uncle M u sa'id ’s refusal to accept the justice m inistry and the hostility of the um ara’ to the proposed reorga­ n isatio n of the ru ral governm ent, caused Faysal to p ostpone this p lan (only in 1970, follow ing the death of the k in g d o m ’s pow erful G rand 46

T H E R E I G N O F S A U D (1953- 64)

M ufti, did Faysal establish the m inistry of justice). By the end of 1963, no longer worried about the Yemen war, Faysal published an edict for the form ation of provincial governm ent and councils but did n o th in g about it. Yet, in later years, he systematically strengthened the authority of his central governm ent at the expense of the pow er of the um ara’. Faysal again avoided a confrontation w ith the ulam a in relation to his prom ise to establish a judiciary council by creating the Institute for the Issue of Religio-Legal O pinions and the Supervision of Religious Affairs (DaralIfta’ w a’l Ishraf 'ala'l-Shu’u n al-Diniyya) and the H igher Council of Qadis {Al Majlis al-'Ali li’l-Qada). Both were directed by, and composed of, senior jurists.28 A nother touchy problem was Faysal’s undertaking to reform and restrict the authority of the ulam a-controlled Committees of Public Morality. T h eir power, which Saud had re-established, and the zeal of their M orality Police was strongly resented by the new elites and the middle classes. Faysal, believing this extremist body to be a dangerous anachro­ nism, restored the status quo w hich had existed until 1953. Faysal’s strategy proved most successful. T h e old elites accepted his policy because it enhanced both stability and the regim e’s ability to overcome the grave threat facing it. T h e ulam a, as expected, were ready to com prom ise as long as the W ahhabi character of the kingdom was preserved and their role in it outw ardly respected. T h e larger p art of the middle-class intelligentsia, apprehensive of N asser’s increasing radical­ ism, welcomed the ten-point program m e. T h eir m ain aim in any case was to achieve faster developm ent in the country and constitutional reform gran tin g them p articip atio n in decision-m aking, both of which Faysal appeared to prom ise.29 A lthough it became evident later that the king had no in tention of carrying o u t the prom ised constitutional reforms, the m ajority of the new elites, tem pted by power, prestige and wealth, or induced by the cruel suppression of the m ilitants, opted to continue co-operating w ith the regime. M any even misled themselves into believing that Faysal’s evolutionary reforms, the m odernisation of the kingdom and their increasing influence in the governm ent and adm inistration, w ould eventually lead to their p articip atio n in policy-m aking. Some, however, felt that they had been misled by the ruler and in addition to the leftist opposition that had rejected Faysal’s evolutionary reform program m e from the start, began to plot the overthrow of the regime. Welfare benefits, governm ent services and subsidies increased in the follow ing years, in pro portion to the country’s rising oil revenue. T h is ensured the support of the rural po p u latio n , the newly urbanised and the m iddle class for the Al Saud regime. Most im portant was the fact that Faysal had publicly declared that the welfare of the p o p u latio n was the governm ent’s first concern an d that the country’s w ealth was to be used to im prove the p o p u la tio n ’s standard of living. 47

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In his relations w ith the n a tio n a list new elites Faysal adopted the carrot-and-stick p rincip le. H e differentiated betw een the m oderate m id ­ dle-class n atio n alists, m ainly H ijazis w ho had been carried away by the early success of N asser’s an ti-co lo n ial struggle and the idea of panA rabism , an d the hard-lin e m ilita n t leftists in the province and elsewhere in the kingdom . Some of the latter cam e from N ajd an d A l-H asa fam ilies trad itio n ally u n friendly tow ards the Sauds. For this m inority, the cadres of the different offshoots of the N L F , the Nasserites, socialists, B a'thists and the com m unists, he had n o com passion. T h ey were mercilessly h u n ted and tortured an d im p riso n ed w hen cau g h t.31 T h e A N L F disinteg rated in Septem ber 1963. T a la l an d the other princes, d esp airin g of g a in in g su p p o rt in Saudi A rabia an d o b jecting to the use of th eir nam es in the vitriolic E g yptian p ro p ag an d a offensive ag ain st Al Saud, begged Faysal’s forgiveness. T h e ir retu rn to Saudi A rabia in 1964 signalled the dem ise of th eir q u ix o tic m ovem ent an d of open liberalism in the royal fam ily (u n til recent years). T h e w ar in the Yemen, an d the escalation in the activities of the clandestine o p p o sitio n o rganisations, caused Faysal to expand and m odernise the security services w ith the help of A m erican experts. A directorate of in tern al security was established by the M inistry of the In terio r in 1964 (A l-M abahith al-‘A m m a ) as well as the Security Force C ollege (in R iyadh). T h e N atio n al G uard, en jo y in g the favour of the royal house, was to be ex panded and, w ith B ritish help, upgraded in q u ality . In 1963 it was p u t u n d er the com m and of Prince A bdallah (now crow n prince), the leader of the conservatives am o n g the senior princes su p p o rtin g Faysal, a n d its com m and structure was purged of K ing S au d ’s appointees. By the latter p a rt of 1963 it was already clear th a t the E gyptians were n o t g o in g to w in an easy victory in Yemen, an d by the end of the year Syria succeeded in focusing Arab atten tio n on the river Jo rd an project undertaken by Israel. T h is caused a tem porary détente in inter-A rab relations an d led to the C airo su m m it of Ja n u ary 1964. O nce en th ro n ed in O ctober 1964, and no longer apprehensive about the fu tu re of the S auds’ regim e, Faysal g radually rescinded his prom ise to in stitu te co n stitu tio n a l reforms. In an interview w hich follow ed his succession to the thro n e in 1964, he declared th at ‘Saudi A rabia has no need for a co n stitu tio n because it has the Q u r'a n , w hich is the oldest an d m ost efficient co n stitu tio n in the w o rld .’ L ater he added th at ‘the only true criterion of a regim e, m o narchical or rep u b lican alike, is the degree of reciprocity betw een ru ler and ru led an d the extent to w hich it sym bolises prosperity, progress an d healthy in itia tiv e ’.32 By the second h alf of 1964, a lth o u g h N asser realised th at his Yemeni adventure had failed, he renew ed his attacks on the Saudi regime. Saudi radical o p p o sitio n m ovem ents enjoyed the su p p o rt of C airo, S an 'a and 48

T H E R E I G N O F S A U D ( 1953- 64)

the B a'th regimes of Damascus and Baghdad and were encouraged to escalate their operations in the kingdom . In addition to occasional bom bing incidents and the d istribution of anti-governm ent pam phlets thro u g h o u t the provinces, leftist organisations attem pted to fom ent unrest in A l-H asa and its oil industry. T h e Aramco College of Petroleum and M inerals, w ith its partly S hi'ite student body became, shortly after its establishm ent, an additional focus of n ationalist ag itation.33 Faysal’s hard-line policy towards the radical opposition was dem on­ strated im m ediately by the w idespread arrests in the Southern R egion (Asir) and the Eastern Province am ong the local intelligentsia an d the Y emeni and S hi'ite workers. New anti-strike laws, announced in 1964, prescribed harsher pun ish m en t for incitem ent to strike and widespread arrests of o pposition activists accused of com m unism were carried ou t in the Eastern Province. Yet tension in A l-Hasa continued and dem on­ strations, rioting and even bom bing incidents were reported in the follow ing years. 4

C O N C LU SIO N S (1953-64) T h e reign of Saud (1953-64) w hich coincided w ith the rise an d continued success of N asser’s pan-A rabism , could be considered the golden era of Saudi nationalism . T h e weakness of the ruler and his am bivalent policies, and the struggle for power w ithin the royal family, presented the Saudi nationalist o ppositio n w ith the opportu n ity to expand its activities practically unchecked. T h e potential threat to the power m onopoly of the Saudi oligarchy by the largely bourgeois pan-A rab nationalists of the H ijaz, their socialist and even M arxist-oriented counterparts of northern N ajd, Asir and A l-Hasa (including Shi'ites in the latter), and by frustrated pro-Nasserite officers (m any of w hom were Hijazis), was not under­ estim ated by the rulers. Both Saud and Faysal, struggling for power, tried to w in their favour, especially after 1958 w hen a wave of euphoria swept the Arab w orld follow ing the establishm ent of the UAR. In December 1960 w hen he ousted Faysal and established his ‘progres­ sive governm ent’, Saud valued the su pport of the nationalist intelligentsia to such an extent that they were strongly represented in his cabinet and am ong his advisers. W hen he again became prim e m inister in 1962, Faysal considered w in n in g the sym pathy of the n ationalist public sufficiently im p o rtan t to m erit his ten-point program m e. T he very fact that Faysal ruthlessly persecuted the nationalists w ho were either dis­ satisfied w ith his partial reforms or u n w illin g to jo in his camp, was a tribute to their estim ated power. Indeed, the potential threat of the m ilitan t pan-A rabists to the conservative Saudi m onarchy was seriously exacerbated in the last m onths of 1962 by the establishm ent of a 49

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rep u b lican regim e in Yemen a n d the presence of E gyptian expeditionary forces there. T h e failure of the S audi n atio n alists to o ust the relatively weak and divided regim e was the result of several factors. T h e Saudi arm ed forces were still in an em bryonic state an d were balanced by the tribal N atio n al G uard. Most Saudis in the 1950s an d early 1960s were still country people, backw ard a n d conservative. T h e ir allegiance was to th eir tribes an d trad itio n al in stitu tio n s, in clu d in g the patern alistic Saud m onarchy, rath er th an to the ‘Saudi n a tio n ’. T h e nationalists, moreover, were identified w ith the u rb an (hadr) m iddle class w hom the bedouins trad itio n ally disliked. T h e socialists, even N ajdis, were considered a th ­ eists or identified w ith the despised S hi'ites an d their struggle for equality. O n its p art the regim e increasingly channelled oil revenues to im prove the standard of liv in g of the p o p u la tio n . T h u s, n o tw ith stan d in g the clim ax of pan-A rabism in the region, n atio n alism in Saudi A rabia failed to w in p o p u la r su p p o rt o th er th an from the in telligentsia, A ram co’s S h i'ite an d ex p atriate Arab w orkforce an d from the nonaristocratic officers in the in co n seq u en tial arm ed forces. F inally, at the end of 1962, faced w ith a serious threat, the royal fam ily an d the ru lin g class overcam e its differences and closed ranks b eh in d Faysal. T h e E gyptian in terv en tio n in Yemen provided Saudi natio n alists w ith w hat seemed their best chance ever to w in a share in policy-m aking. Faysal’s decision to ab an d o n his appeasem ent policy signalled the end of the radical n a tio n alists’ overt p o litical activity an d th eir attem pts to share in pow er an d decision -m ak in g from w ith in the establishm ent. It also led to the g ro w in g radicalisatio n an d m ilitancy of the sm all Saudi left and w idened the rift betw een the latter an d the largely H ijazi middle-class n atio n alists, m any of w hom were b ecom ing d isillusioned w ith N asser’s radical pan-A rabism w hich now threatened th eir country. A ttracted by new o p p o rtu n ities opened for them by Faysal, the m ajority opted, thereafter, to co-operate w ith the trad itio n al elites and provided the n u m ero u s technocrats w hich Faysal’s p lan s for speedy m odernisation and his evolutionary reform s needed. Finally, it b ro u g h t to the throne Faysal, a capable, stro n g leader w ith p o litical savoir faire, w ho mercilessly suppressed the m ilita n t Saudi oppositio n .

50

4

T H E REIGN OF FAYSAL (1964-75): NEW ELITES, OIL AND RAPID DE VELOPMENT M O D E R N ISA TIO N AND NEW ELITES, FROM C O N F R O N T A T IO N TO C O-OPERATION (1964-70) After he was enthroned in November 1964, Faysal continued to strength­ en the central governm ent and expand its responsibilities at the expense of the traditional socio-political institutions. W ith the exception of foreign relations, security and religious-oriented m inistries, all cabinet positions were placed in the hands of comm oners. O ther m inistries relating to social and econom ic developm ent and m odernisation, created in later years, naturally required the expertise of Western-educated technocrats. Subsequently m any more educated Saudis were incorporated into the adm inistration, gradually replacing the officials w ith traditional backgrounds or establishing new governm ent departm ents and services. T h e ever-increasing need for an educated and skilled Saudi workforce necessitated the expansion of the k ingdom ’s educational system and the establishm ent of additional ‘secular’ and Islam ic universities. T ogether w ith the increased enrolm ent of Saudis in foreign universities, the grow th of higher education swelled the ranks of the Saudi new elites. However, the rapid urbanisation of the unskilled rural po p u latio n , resulting from accelerated m odernisation, presented Faysal’s governm ent w ith serious problem s of unem ploym ent, inadequate housing and welfare services and rising cost of living in the cities of the Hijaz, the Eastern Province and Riyadh. Paradoxically, m odernisation necessitated the em ploym ent of large num bers of skilled and unskilled foreigners, most of them expatriate Arabs, to do the jobs th at Saudis could not, or were u n w illin g to do. O n the w hole the bourgeois new elites were satisfied w ith Faysal’s rate of m odernisation and they reconciled themselves to the fact th at some of his prom ised reforms seemed to take longer to materialise. Indeed, even Saudis w ho professed leftist ideologies d u rin g their studies abroad were enticed into jo in in g Faysal’s service on their return home: the prom ise of high office, prestige and w ealth soon facilitated their becom ing part of 51

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the fold.' Yet, radical elem ents of the new elites an d som e graduates of foreign universities, as well as som e S u n n i an d S h i'ite w orker activists in the E astern Province, rem ained sceptical a b o u t F aysal’s reform s an d were determ ined to b rin g dow n the Al Saud regime. W hile rapidly ex p an d in g the responsibilities entrusted to the new elites in his governm ent and the n u m b er of agencies involved in the m odernisa­ tion project, Faysal also increased the central role of the royal fam ily in policy decisions by c o n su ltin g regularly w ith the in form al majlis alshura. By 1964 President N asser was searching for a face-saving form ula to extract him self from the Y em eni q uagm ire. T h e A rab-Israeli conflict provided a tem porary solution. But N asser’s atten tio n was ag ain diverted to A rabia in the second h alf of 1964. T h e deteriorating situ atio n in Yemen in the follow ing year coerced Nasser to sign in A ugust 1965, in Jedda, a h u m ilia tin g agreem ent designed to enable him to term inate the costly Yemen adventure. Shortly afterw ards, however, the British an n o u n ced their in ten tio n of evacuating their forces from Aden by the b eg in n in g of 1968 (and from the G ulf by 1970), an d N asser’s am b itio n s to control the G u lf oil were rekindled. At the end of 1966 the C o n stitu en t Assembly of the W orld Islam ic L eague in Jedda denounced the inter-M uslim w ar in Yemen an d the persecution of the M uslim B rotherhood in Egypt. Faysal forged closer relations w ith the U n ited States, b rin g in g ab o u t the A m erican-B ritish m ilitary aid package in 1965, a n d renew ed A m erican guarantees for Saudi A rab ia’s territorial integrity in Ju n e 1966 as well as the m ilitary assistance agreem ent in Septem ber.2 All this caused Nasser to p u rsu e the w ar in Yemen w ith renew ed vigour. T h e b o m b in g of Saudi border tow ns and villages was resum ed a n d anti-regim e op eratio n s by Saudi an d expatriate A rab clandestine o rgan isatio n s were escalated. U nrest in the Eastern Province a g ain erupted in 1965 an d in 1966. T h is led to the detention of scores of natio n alists an d lab o u r activists. At the end of 1966 ru m o u red co u p attem pts follow ed bom bs w hich exploded near sensitive targets in different provinces of the k ingdom and in R iyadh. T h e Arab N atio n alist m ovem ent (Q a w m iyyin al-‘Arab), w hich by the mid-1960s could be considered M arxist, encouraged its Saudi offshoots to escalate their o p eratio n s in co-operation w ith P alestin ian and Yemeni g ro u p s in the kingdom an d in nearby countries. N ot surp risin g ly various Saudi groups identified w ith the Q a w m iyyin becam e the p rim ary target of the k in g d o m ’s security services. Yet, m ost of the b om bings were carried o u t by Y em eni an d P alestin ian in filtrato rs an d residents in Saudi Arabia. Scores of Yem enis and P alestin ian s an d h un d red s of S hi'ites were arrested at the en d of 1966 on suspicion of being m em bers of the B a'th an d other 52

T H E R E I G N O F F A Y S A L ( 1 9 64- 75)

illegal org an isatio n s, a n d a large n u m b er of foreign Arabs were deported from the kin g d o m .5 D u rin g the A lexandria Arab su m m it of S eptem ber 1964, Faysal realised th at the era of inter-A rab détente was over. Faced w ith the ex p an d in g cam p of hostile radical Arab regim es, and escalated E g yptian operations in Yemen in the first h alf of 1965, he was resolved to develop the Saudi arm ed forces. D espite stro n g o p p o sitio n in the royal house, the Saudi defence b udg et was increased from ab o u t 104 m illio n d ollars in 1964/5 to 335 m illio n in 1966/7. By 1967 the Saudi arm ed forces num bered abo u t 35,000 men com pared w ith ab o u t 18,000 a few years earlier. C onsidering the k in g d o m ’s enorm ous territory an d its sparse p o p u la ­ tion, Faysal (or his A m erican advisers) rig h tly gave prio rity to the developm ent of the S audi a ir force an d air defence system. T h e inadequacy of the latter was underscored by the renewed E gyptian air strikes on A sir’s tow ns a n d villages. Faysal requested an d received, in 1965, the assistance of the US D epartm ent of Defense in the form of an A m erican-B ritish m ilitary aid package w orth several h u n d red m illio n dollars. In ad d itio n to A m erican-m ade H ercules tran sp o rt p lanes and H aw k missiles, the Saudis purchased E nglish-m ade L ig h tn in g fighters an d SAM m issiles. W hile som e B ritish an d P akistani m ercenaries began to fly Saudi planes, ex-R A F p ilo ts train ed Saudi a ir and g ro u n d crews, m any of w hom were the better educated an d m ore sophisticated H ijazis.5 Faysal’s d eterm in atio n to b u ild u p the pow er of the arm ed forces was strengthened by the B ritish decision to evacuate th eir forces from Aden an d the P ersian G ulf. T h e d ep artu re of the E g yptian forces from Yemen a t the end of 1967, in Faysal’s view, w orsened the situ atio n in the A rabian Peninsula. An N L F gov ern m en t replaced the B ritish in Aden (South Yemen) in D ecember 1967. M arxist elem ents, benefiting from Soviet aid, attem pted to take pow er in S an 'a a n d an o th e r Q a w m iyyin offshoot, the P o p u la r F ro n t for the L ib eratio n of O m an an d the A rabian G u lf (PFL O A G ), began to o perate in D hofar an d O m an in 1968. So Saudi efforts to develop th eir arm ed forces were fu rther accelerated after 1967. Indeed the S audi defence b udget ju m p ed to 2,331 m illio n dollars in 1970/1.6 T h e Six-Day W ar b ro u g h t to a clim ax the anti-W estern sentim ents am o n g Saudi an d ex p atriate Arabs. A nti-A m erican d em onstrations took place in the H ijaz an d in R iyadh. M ore serious incidents, w ith a n ti­ regim e overtones, erup ted in the Eastern Province, c u lm in a tin g in largescale d em onstrations organised by the U P A P in Q atif, D am m an, AlK hobar an d R as-T an u ra. In D h ah ran mobs, led by students of A ram co’s P&M a n d by leftist n atio n alists, attacked the c o m p an y ’s in stallatio n s, the A m erican air base an d the US consulate. O nly the in tervention of the N atio n al G u ard prevented serious dam age and bloodshed. O il p ro d u c­ tion was paralysed for a week by a strike of the Saudi workforce, despite 53

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the strict laws p ro h ib itin g strikes, an d the T a p lin e was sabotaged in several places. Faysal pru d en tly decided to stop the sale of oil to the West, a m easure w hich had previously been dem anded by radical Arab leaders an d rejected. But, follo w in g the K hartoum su m m it in December, the direct sale of oil to the West was resumed.

ARAB N A T IO N A L IS M , A N D O P P O S IT IO N IN T H E SAU D I K IN GD OM Radicalisation in the Arab world and the suppression of Saudi militants By 1968, the N asser regim e was n o longer considered radical in the Arab cam p. E g y p t’s relations w ith Saudi A rabia greatly im proved, a lth o u g h they rem ained cool u n til N asser’s death in 1970. T h e B a'th governm ents in D am ascus and B aghdad now led the radical cam p an d actively su p p o rted revolutionary pan-A rabism . D am ascus became the focal p o in t for the activities of the S audi leftist dissidents, w hile B aghdad hosted Saudi B a'thists an d o th er dissidents (in clu d in g some Shi'ites) and facilitated th eir broadcasts to Saudi A rabia an d the p u b licatio n of their jo u rn a l Saw t a l-T a lïa 7 A p art from this, the radical Saudi o p p o sitio n seemed relatively inactive. T h e Iraq i B a'th had a special axe to grind. It still laid claim to Kuwait, b u t m ore im p o rtan t, as B ritain was p re p arin g to evacuate its forces from the Persian G ulf, B aghdad becam e increasingly frustrated w ith the A m erican-B ritish plan s th a t Iran, an d to a lesser degree Saudi A rabia, sh o u ld replace the UK as g u ard ian s of the reg io n ’s stability. B aghdad therefore tried hard to u n d erm in e the B ritish-sponsored arrangem ents an d the pro-W estern conservative regim es of the G ulf, w hich were led by Saudi Arabia. A lth o u g h Saudi A rab ia’s incom e from oil was constantly grow ing, 1968/9 proved to be a p erio d of increasing econom ic difficulties. Saudi revenues in 1969 were a b o u t one b illio n dollars. But, in ad d itio n to the aid prom ised to the ‘co n fro n tatio n co u n tries’ an d the P alestine L ibe­ ratio n O rg an isatio n (PL O ), defence expenditures grew substantially. T h e kin g d o m ’s involvem ent in the affairs of N orth Yemen an d its subversion of the Aden regim e also proved costly. Finally, Faysal’s m odernisation plan s dem anded ever-increasing funds. T h e Saudi governm ent was thus forced to seek loans from A ram co an d from com m ercial banks. T h e C entral P la n n in g O rg an isatio n , a m ost im p o rtan t tool for the k in g d o m ’s m odernisatio n , was form ed by Faysal in 1968. A nother of his protégés, H isham N azir (petroleum m inister since N ovem ber 1986), a m oderate A m erican-educated technocrat from a p ro m in en t H ijazi fam ily, 54

T H E R E I G N O F FAYSAL (1964-75)

was ap p o in ted its head.8 W ith A m erican h elp, N azir hastily prepared in 1969 an eig h t b illio n d o llar five-year developm ent p lan (1970/5). Aware of the h ard sh ip s facing the masses of newly urbanised Saudis Faysal, w ith the help of o th er technocrats, took steps to deal w ith the c o u n try ’s econom ic stag n atio n . F o llo w in g a decade of g ro w ing u n em ­ ploym ent an d tension at A ram co in spite of the m any benefits the co m p an y ’s w orkforce enjoyed, Faysal issued in 1969 new L ab o u r and W orkers R egulations w hich were far m ore beneficial to the w orkers th an the previous laws. L oathed by the regim e an d th eir fellow citizens an d still discrim inated again st, the A l-H asa S hi'ites w ould n o t have shared at all in their c o u n try ’s g ro w in g prosperity, had it n o t been for A ram co’s liberal em ploym ent policy an d services. Paradoxically, it was this co m m u n ity th at produced the m ost radical anti-A m erican elem ents in the k in g d o m .9

The 1969 abortive coup attempts and their aftermath By the late 1960s Faysal’s h a n d lin g of the k in g d o m ’s affairs had produced stability an d substantially reduced the tension in the kingdom . Increas­ in g oil w ealth, an d F aysal’s developm ent policies, helped speed a change in Saudi society. U rb an isatio n was greatly accelerated. T h e m ajor tow ns in the H ijaz an d the Eastern Province, an d the capital, R iyadh, now held a greater p ro p o rtio n of the Saudi people, w hereas the ru ral p o p u la tio n , especially the b ed ou in , rap id ly fell in num ber. By 1970 the kingdom boasted 7,000 students in its in stitu tes of h ig h e r education an d a b o u t half a m illio n youngsters atten d in g the m odern schools - a b o u t 15 p er cent of the k in g d o m ’s total p o p u la tio n .10 S audi A rab ia’s prestige in the Arab an d M uslim w orld was risin g quickly. T h e R abat (M orocco) S u m m it of the W orld Islam ic L eague in Septem ber 1969 was attended by 25 Arab an d non-A rab M uslim heads of state, w ith several radical ones a m o n g the p articip an ts; it adopted a decision to establish a p erm an en t secretariat for the org an isatio n in Jed d a." T h e year 1969 was one of g ro w in g tension an d upheaval in the w hole of the Arab w orld. In a d d itio n to several abortive coups, the trad itio n al regim es of L ibya, Sudan an d Som alia were overthrow n by the m ilitary. After the decline of pan-A rabism , the Nasserists were in search of a new ideology and leadership. T h e n atio n alist cam p grad u ally radicalised its position an d differences between it an d the Arab conservatives were polarised. In the G ulf, the B ritish had begun to evacuate th eir forces. T h is increased tension in the region as well as the activities of M arxist and B a'thist-oriented o rganisations. T h u s m any believed th at even the archaic conservative S audi regim e could becom e the target of a coup d ’état. R eacting to Saudi A rab ia’s undeclared w ar ag ain st it, the M arxist N LF 55

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governm ent of S outh Yemen (later P eo p le’s D em ocratic R epublic of Yemen - PD RY ) retaliated by la u n c h in g incursions in to the R u b ' alK hali in the first half of 1969, w hile its Arab N a tio n alist allies in the kingdom an d nearby countries escalated th eir clandestine operations ag ain st the Saudi regim e. T h e P o p u la r F ront for the L iberation of Palestine (P F L P - established by G eorge H abash), for instance, blew u p the Saudi T a p lin e in the G o lan H eights in M ay.12 T h e Saudi security services arrested in early Ju n e m any A ram co oil w orkers, especially P alestin ians, suspected of m em bership in the ‘Arab N atio n alists’. Investi­ g atio n uncovered a Q a w m iyyin p lo t to overthrow the regime. T h is in tu rn led to the arrest of a large n u m b er of Saudis in the Eastern Province, in R iyadh an d in the H ijaz. A m ong those arrested were arm y officers and governm ent officials, suspected of m em bership in the N L F .,S S im ultaneously (m ainly in Septem ber) the security services rou n ded u p several h u n d red officers, technocrats an d o th er Saudis involved in a n o th er plot. A bout a h u n d red were air force personnel, m ore th an a score were senior officers - a few were even generals. A m ong the civilians, largely H ijazis, were senior technocrats, in clu d in g the head of the In stitu te of P u b lic A d m in istratio n an d several of the directors of the Saudi Petroleum an d M inerals O rg an isatio n (Petrom in) an d o ther m em bers of the new elites. A second wave of arrests took place at the end of the year an d in 1970. It was estim ated th at the total n u m b er of those arrested was a b o u t 2,000, a m o n g them students w ho were recalled from the US a n d the S h i'ite dean of the P&M in D hahran , w hose tw o radical brothers-in-law had p re­ viously been detained for involvem ent in the 1966 bom b outrages. A few h u n d red S hi'ites were also rounded u p by the au th o rities at the end of 1970 on suspicion of m em bership in the B a'th, b u t m ore likely in relatio n to the alm ost yearly p olitically o r religiously m otivated dis­ turbances ('ashura) in the Eastern Province. T hese were partly, but clearly, an outcom e of the S h i'ite s’ fru stratio n resu ltin g from h u m ilia tio n by the au th o rities and the lag g in g developm ent of A l-H asa province. As the Saudi governm ent never disclosed the n atu re of the 1969-70 events, n o r com m ented on the confused in fo rm atio n p u b lish ed about them abroad, the story of the abortive coups rem ains unclear. It seems th a t the au th o rities dealt w ith four different an d largely unrelated o p p o sitio n gro u p s in 1969 an d 1970, an d th a t several thousands were detained for in terro g a tio n , of w hom a b o u t tw o th o u san d were jailed. It also appears th at the ‘p lo ts’ were blow n o u t of p ro p o rtio n an d led to disagreem ent betw een Faysal and the m ore liberal Fahd. A m ong the first to be arrested, in A pril an d May 1969, were H adram i (PD RY) residents of the kin g d o m and A sir tribesm en suspected of sy m p ath isin g w ith the Aden and S an 'a regimes. M ore serious was the wave of arrests o n 5 an d 6 Ju n e, w hen a large n u m b er of Saudis an d non56

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Saudis suspected of m em bership in different N L F offshoots were d e ta in ­ ed. It was alleged that, encouraged by the PD RY (South Yemen) and probably by the B a'th regim es, they p lan n e d to overthrow the Saud governm ent. A lth o u g h the Eastern Province was the N L F ’s pow er base, its offshoots flourished am o n g the N ajd i an d H ijazi new elites as well. T h e regim e at first believed th a t the largely m ilitary conspiracy constituted the m ore serious th reat to its existence. A bout a q u a rte r of the air force officers, in c lu d in g several generals co m m an d in g a ir force bases and academ ies in the H ijaz a n d in the Eastern Province, an d others h o ld in g , or w ho had once held, key positio n s in the general staff an d the arm y technical services, as well as m any technocrats, were involved. It was alleged th at the C om m ittee for the L ib eratio n of Saudi A rabia, as they called them selves, p lo tted to assassinate the k in g an d the senior princes an d to declare Saudi A rabia a republic. M any of the cu lp rits were of H ijazi origin. T o add to the confusion, Y usuf T aw w il, a prosp ero u s H ijazi m erchant, an d an acq u ain tan ce of Prince Fahd, was believed to be central to this plot. Yet, he an d his fam ily were know n to sym pathise w ith the idea of H ijazi separatism . O thers involved in this p lo t were N ajdis o r S u n n is from the Eastern Province. T h e h ig h ranks of a large n u m b er of the officers involved in the conspiracy rath er indicated th a t the organisers may have been m em bers of the pan-A rab T ree O fficers’ o r ‘Free S audis’ m ovem ents in the 1950s an d early 1960s. Probably in th eir late forties, successful an d w ell-to-do in 1969, it is u nlikely th a t they w o uld have been attracted by M arxistL en in ist ideologies. T h e re were even indicatio n s th at relations between m em bers of this g ro u p an d the E gy p tian secret services w ent back to the early 1960s. By 1969, how ever, such connections were no longer relevant to the alleged am ateu rish co u p p lan. By the end of 1970, w hen the naive n atu re of the ‘H ijazi air force p lo t’ was m ore fully com prehended, m ost of the two to three h u n d red officers an d civilians involved in it were moved to officers’ q u arters in m ilitary barracks o r were held in an o ld palace on P rince F a h d ’s orders. Some were pard o n ed by Faysal in 1972 and m ost of the others were freed im m ediately after his assassination in 1975. All were able to share, thereafter, in the b o o m in g Saudi econom y. N one the less, large-scale arrests of m em bers of the radical o p p o sitio n co n tin u ed in 1971 an d early in 1972. T h e treatm ent of the m em bers of the different parts of the radical N LF, especially those actually involved in the p lo t ag ain st the S auds’ regim e, was far harsher th an th a t of the ‘a ir force co n sp irato rs’. H owever, even the hard-core leftists arrested in 1969-72 were pard o n ed by K ing K halid an d C row n P rince F ahd in the years follow ing Faysal’s assassin atio n 14 an d the Saudi state helped in th eir physical an d financial reh ab ilitatio n . Indeed, by the mid-1970s the Saudi regim e no longer felt threatened by the h an d fu l of hom e-bred radicals n o r by its M arxist an d B a'th ist 57

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neighbours. By then the oil boom had turned Saudi A rabia in to a w orld econom ic pow er an d a leader in the Arab cam p. H o lden and J o h n s " term the 1969 abortive coups 'h alf baked’, ‘flam ­ b o y an t’ and lacking in d eterm in atio n an d a clear p lan . Yet, the dis­ sidents, th o u g h co m in g from p erip h eral groups, had a strong pow er base in the arm ed forces. Moreover, successful revolutions in the M iddle East were of sim ilar character an d th eir triu m p h was largely facilitated by the weakness of the trad itio n a l regim es w hich they overthrew an d the alie n a tio n of their peoples. T h is was n o t the case in Saudi Arabia. By 1969 the k in g d o m ’s security forces had been reorganised, expanded an d trained by A m erican experts and they enjoyed practically u n lim ited budgets. T h e tribal-based N atio n al G uard, on w hose loyalty the Sauds could c o u n t since the 1930s, had been strengthened in the 1950s and 1960s. T h e Saudi regim e, moreover, did n o t depend on one person or one sm all fam ily b u t o n a w idely-based ru lin g oligarchy, and its head, King Faysal, was a capable an d strong m onarch. As a result of the 1969-70 abortive coups, the relatively sm all active o p p o sitio n to the S au d s’ regim e was reduced to insignificance. T h e w idespread arrests, repressive m easures an d ru m o u rs a b o u t the fate of those im prisoned, dem oralised the radical new elites and o ther dissident groups. T h e ir activities w ith in the king d o m were negligible and they no longer constituted a serious factor in the Saudi pow er equ atio n . In the follow ing years, as the kin g d o m becam e im m ensely rich and p olitically pow erful, the Saudi o p p o sitio n was fu rth er hindered by the seem ingly endless funds at the disposal of the regime. D r Shaker, a Saudi intellectual clearly sym pathetic tow ards the radical new elites, conducted in 1970 an info rm al survey of Saudi p u b lic o p in io n concerning the abortive c o u p s.16 H er conclusions (corresponding w ith the w riter’s belief) are th at the great m ajority of the k in g d o m ’s p o p u la ­ tion, the intelligentsia an d S hi'ites excepted, utterly condem ned the conspirators. P art of the new elites ‘w ith vested interest in the regim e’, an d the older generatio n of the w ell-to-do u rb an m iddle class, were also unreservedly critical of the dissidents an d glad th at m em bers of their fam ilies were n o t involved w ith them . Shaker’s survey also show s th a t the great m ajority of the technocrats disapproved of the conspiracy because they were either w orried a b o u t their personal achievem ents or apprehensive lest the abortive coups prove detrim ental to the c o u n try ’s developm ent ‘because the conservatives in the ru lin g class w ill have the u p p e r h an d in the gov ern m en t’. T h o u g h m any were dissatisfied w ith different aspects of the trad itio n al regim e, they praised the progress achieved by Faysal’s governm ent, an d were of the o p in io n that an atte m p t to change the system by force w ou ld be counter-productive (true to this day). O nly a very sm all m in o rity of the educated (some educated abroad) young m iddle-class Saudis w hom she 58

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m et supported the abortive coups fully. A sm aller percentage said that they were w illin g to participate in one, if it were the only way to bring about a m eaningful change in Saudi Arabia. Faysal’s decision in 1958, bu t especially at the end of 1962, to allocate m ost of Saudi A rabia’s increasing oil revenue to the k ingdom ’s m odernisation and to im prove the p o p u la tio n ’s standard of living, was fully vindicated by the events of 1969-70. So was his carrot-and-stick policy for dealing w ith the new elites. Nearly all ordinary citizens were supportive of the Sauds’ governm ent (hukum a) in 1970 and most of the new elites, enticed by prestige, pow er and wealth and Faysal’s m odernisa­ tion and developm ent program m es, identified w ith the regime, if not joined its pow er base (true for the 1970s and 1980s as well). O thers in the new elites were frightened in to accepting co-operation w ith Faysal’s governm ent as the second-best o p tio n in Saudi Arabia. T h e 1969 failed coups polarised the differences between the m ajority of the new elites, largely Hijazis, of urban middle-class origin and the radical m inority. T he latter consisted of N ajdi elements inim ical to the Sauds and a m ixture of leftist-nationalist Sunnis and Shi'ites from AlH asa, to a lesser degree from Asir and a handful of Hijazis. T he m ajority of the middle-class elites co-operated w ith the Sauds, although many were privately critical of their paternalistic archaic governm ent, and their refusal to allow them to participate in decision-m aking. T h e radicals, m ainly active abroad after 1970, w ith a grow ing Shi'ite m em bership, joined the sm all leftist opposition groups supported by the Ba'th regimes, the PDRY and com m unist parties universally. T h e débâcle of the P L O in Jo rdan d u rin g ‘Black Septem ber’ (1970), however, reduced the possibility of help for the beleaguered Saudi offshoots of the Q aw m iyyin from their P alestinian associates. A natural outcom e of the events of 1969-70 was the stepping-up of the security measures in the kingdom . T h e ulam a, a foreign visitor cynically observed, were co-operative w ith the authorities in matters of security: they sanctioned an edict in 1970 w hich required a photo g rap h in the passports of Yemeni an d other Arab w om en w ishing to enter the kingdom .17 Even m ore im p o rtan t was the decision of the Saudi rulers to replace expatriate Arabs w orking in the kingdom w ith non-A rab M uslim Asians or non-M uslim s whenever possible. T h e preference was to use short-term Asian contract labour. These Asian workers were not allowed to settle in the country or brin g their families w ith them .18 T h e period from 1970 to 1975 saw a dram atic rise in Saudi A rabia’s econom ic pow er and leadership in the Arab world. It coincided w ith the first five-year developm ent p lan w hich Faysal had launched an d w hich at first looked unrealistic because it involved eight b illion dollars. T h is plan outgrew its original framework and budget, sparking off enorm ous changes in Saudi A rabia thro u g h o u t the 1970s and accelerated the social 59

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revolution th at the Saudi p o p u la tio n was undergoing. Yet, inasm u ch as the local o p p o sitio n to the Sauds was practically paralysed, it was also a period of g ro w in g ap p re h e n sio n of foreign intervention. T h e 1969 abortive coups aroused o p p o sitio n to fu rth er m odernisation, and p articu larly to the developm ent of the arm ed forces, am o n g the conservatives in the ru lin g class, led by P rince A bdallah, the N ational G uard com m ander. Such a policy, they argued, was b o u n d eventually to enable ‘Y oung T u rk s ’ in the arm ed forces to overthrow the Sauds. Purges slowed the developm ent of the air force a n d arm y an d the N atio n al G u ard was given ad d itio n al funds for ex p an sio n and m odernisation. Yet, King Faysal, su p p o rted by P rince S ultan, the m inister of defence, an d Fahd, the m inister of the in terio r (responsible for in tern al security), reached the conclusion th at the ‘air force conspiracy’ was n o t serious en o u g h to justify a total h a lt to the m odernisation and expansion of the arm ed forces. T h a t, ju s t w hen the B ritish were a b o u t to w ithdraw from the G u lf an d Saudi A rabia was bein g threatened by radical forces in the region. T h e N atio n al G uard, m oreover, vindicated at the tim e the claim th a t it rem ained an ineffective an d an ach ro n istic m ilitia. In N ovem ber 1969 P D R Y ’s reg u lar u n its conquered the Saudi southern o u tp o st of W adi’a. O n ly a n air strike by Saudi planes flow n by P akistani pilots forced the S outh Yem enis to retreat after arm y an d N atio n al G u ard u n its failed to dislodge them from the area. T h reaten ed by the B a'thist regim es in the n o rth , R iyadh feared the un ificatio n p lan s of the two Yemens (a reality in 1990) in itiated by the M arxist regim e in Aden. Furtherm ore, by 1971 a Soviet flo tilla appeared in the A rabian Sea shortly after the B ritish evacuated th eir forces from the G ulf. All the above and the Ira n ia n high-handedness in the region c u lm in a t­ in g w ith the forceful co n q u est of islands near H orm uz an d claim s to B ahrayn, caused the Saudis to seek m ilitary aid in E urope and, w hen tim e was o p p o rtu n e, to tu rn a g ain to the US for h elp (Peace-H aw k project, 1973). T h e k in g d o m ’s territorial size an d m anpow er p roblem on the one h an d a n d the availability of funds on the other, again m ade the a ir force the n atu ral choice for p riority. In the 1970s, thousands of educated youngsters, either of m iddle-class o rig in or A ram co-trained, were com ­ m issioned as officers an d N CO s in the arm ed forces. Yet, they were cou nterbalanced by hu n d red s of aristocratic offspring w ho were en co u r­ aged to jo in the arm ed services, especially the a ir force, and thousands of foreign m ercenaries, a m o n g them P ak istan i, A m erican, E nglish and French pilots, technicians, instructors an d advisers, w ho were hired by the M inistry of Defence.19

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REGIME AND NEW ELITES - T H E SHELVING OF POLITIC A L REFORMS (1970-5) Faysal, the technocrats and the central government H aving im prisoned most of the active opposition to the regime, King Faysal repeated his prom ise to establish a N ational C onsultative Assembly at the beginning of 1970. Despite the opposition of the conservative mem bers of the ru lin g class, Faysal, supported by a m ajority of his inform al m ajlis al-shura, continued the kin g d o m ’s course towards rapid m odernisation, and increased the role of its central governm ent at the expense of the traditional in stitutions (including the provincial amirs). T h e m onarch expanded the authority and responsibilities of the cabinet, regularly attended its m eetings and encouraged discussion in it. He consulted his m inisters daily before taking decisions, exploiting their expertise to devise a strategy for m odernisation. Despite the involvem ent of some senior technocrats in the abortive coups, Faysal continued to ap p o in t H ijazi, and w hen available Najdi, graduates of foreign universities, to key positions in the governm ent and its new agencies. O ut of four new m inisters appointed to his cabinet in July 1971, for instance, two were H ijazi graduates of W estern universities H isham Nazir, the head of the Central P lan n in g Board (now m inister of petroleum ) and Abd al-Aziz al-Q urayshi, the head of the Saudi Arabian M onetary Agency (SAMA). T h e other two (one Hijazi) were adm inistrators from traditional backgrounds. In 1972 M uham m ad A ba’l-Khayl was the first foreign-educated com m oner N ajdi to be appointed m inister (w ithout portfolio and finance m inister in 1975) since T ariki. O n the whole, graduates of the m odern education system rapidly replaced the traditional bureaucrats in all m inistries other than the religious-oriented ones. However, Faysal continued the paternalistic Saudi style of governm ent. As he increased the p ro p o rtio n of technocrats in his cabinet and strengthened the authority of the m odern central governm ent, he only grudgingly delegated authority to his com m oner ministers. Even then, he supervised them closely and frequently intervened in the ru n n in g of their m inistries.20 T h e repeated prom ise to establish a N ational C onsultative Assembly was again ignored; and despite the grow th of their num bers and their crucial role in governing an d m odernising the kingdom , the new elites were prevented from taking part in the decision-m aking process. By the early 1970s Faysal no longer tolerated questions about a constitution. H e even insisted on the use of the term ‘social developm ent' rather than ‘social change’ and in his m eeting w ith Dr Shaker in 1970 he told her: ‘revolutionary change is out of context w ith o u r traditional heritage and Islam ic cu ltu re’.21 T h e king, w ho was strongly opposed to the dém ocratisation of the system, believed that the kingdom needed to m odernise its patriarchal system w hich ensured the welfare of its 61

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p o p u la tio n according to Islam ic principles, rath er th an a d o p t the ‘c o rru p t m aterial W estern dem ocracy’ o r ‘atheist c o m m u n ism ’. New elites an d the m o d ern isatio n of the bureaucracy F rom the mid-1960s, in creasing oil w ealth facilitated the rap id m od ernisation of the kin g d o m and the co nsolidation of the Faysal regim e. It provided endless o p p o rtu n itie s of advancem ent for the educated Saudis w ho jo in e d the governm ent service an d of prosperity for the ones w ho opted for the p riv ate sector. As dem and for trained Saudis in the 1960s and 1970s becam e alm ost insatiable, Faysal abandoned any attem p t to im prove the q u a lity of the educatio n al system, an d allocated vast funds for its expan sio n . By the mid-1970s a m illio n Saudis, abo u t 20 p er cent of the k in g d o m ’s citizen p o p u la tio n , were studying in the different levels of the ed u catio n al system, ab o u t 25,000 students were registered in the k in g d o m ’s universities, and m ore th an 5,000 were study ing abroad. T h is, an d rap id u rb an isatio n , totally changed the character of Saudi society, w hile the m illio n s of foreign workers introduced c u ltu ral influences in co m p atib le w ith the character of the S au d i-W ah h ab i kingdom . T h e ranks of the new elites were now fu rth er expanded by m any graduates of Saudi an d foreign institu tes of h ig h er education. T h e m ajority (H ijazis) chose to jo in the a d m in istratio n an d rapidly changed its character by rep lacin g o r superseding the trad itio n al civil servants (N ajdis). G overnm ent a p p o in tm e n ts to h ig h po sitio n s unrelated to security or religious affairs were determ ined, m ore an d m ore, by educa­ tion an d ability, rath er th a n by social status. T h e new governm ent m inistries, departm ents, agencies and in stitu tio n s created to facilitate the c o u n try ’s developm ent were, in m ost cases, ru n by bureaucrats w ith doctorates an d m aster’s degrees from W estern universities, m any w ith little or n o practical experience, an d often trained in o th er fields altogether. T h e m ajority ow ed their a p p o in tm e n t to academ ic achieve­ m ents, the recom m endation of ‘first w ave’ senior technocrats, nepotism o r Faysal’s relations w ith leading H ijazi m erchant fam ilies. A lthough by the mid-1970s it was becom ing a p p a re n t th a t academ ic excellence did not by itself provide adm in istrativ e capability, only in the late 1970s, as inefficiency in the governm ent service became m ore ap p aren t, did p ractical experience becam e a m ajo r criterio n .22 As early as 1962, F aysal’s governm ent in cluded several W estern-trained H ijazi technocrats besides trad itio n ally -train ed com m oners. Yet, the heyday of the W estern-educated H ijazi new elites’ ‘aristocracy’ was the decade from the late 1960s to the late 1970s w hen m any H ijazi graduates of W estern, p articu larly A m erican, universities, were ap p o in ted to senior po sitio n s in the k in g d o m ’s ad m in istratio n . T h is was n o t o nly due to 62

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F aysal’s sym pathy for the usually m oderate an d o p en-m inded H ijazi m iddle-class intelligen tsia (w hom he befriended w hen Viceroy of the H ijaz), n o r was it ju s t an o utcom e of nepotism , b u t m ostly because the m ore sophisticated H ijazis were q u ick er th an the conservative and xeno p h o b ic N ajdis to take advantage of m odern education an d were not in h ib ited from en ro llin g in W estern universities. T h e H ijazi m erchant com m unity , an d the m iddle class in general, could also afford to educate th eir o ffspring abroad, w henever necessary, w ith o u t governm ent subsidies. N epotism , m oreover, is a com m on an d acceptable norm in Saudi society. O nce established in a governm ent m inistry or agency, the technocrat was expected to h ire a p p lic a n ts for jobs w ho were his kinsm en o r w ho belonged to his tribe an d region. Even the low liest p o sitio n in any u n it in the ad m in istratio n w ent to clients of the technocrat’s fam ily or that of o th er im p o rta n t officials in this adm inistrative u n it. T h u s, the p ro p o rtio n of traditionally-educated N ajdis in the civil service declined in the 1970s w hile th a t of m odern-educated H ijazis and, to a far lesser degree, N ajdis grew .25 Some N ajdis of hadr o rig in were also ap p o in ted by Faysal to senior p ositions in the governm ent. A few m erch an t an d N ajdi n otables’ fam ilies, w ho had assisted Ibn Saud w hen the kingdom was formed, were far-sighted en o u g h to h elp th eir sons to o b tain m odern ed ucation in the 1950s an d to enrol in foreign universities.24 M any m ore N ajdis graduated from the Saudi m odern educatio n al system in the early 1970s an d jo in ed o r replaced th eir traditionally-educated N ajdi kinsm en w ho had joined the civil service under Abd al-Aziz an d Saud. N ajdis increasingly enrolled in local religious and secular universities or w ent abroad for further studies. By the 1960s, especially in the 1970s, tension an d com petition began to em erge betw een the H ijazi and trad itio n al N ajdi civil servants an d by the mid-1970s betw een the form er an d the N ajd i new -elite bureaucrats an d betw een b o th an d graduates of the Islam ic universities.25 In the years follow in g F aysal’s assassination it became increasingly clear th at N ajdis again enjoyed preferential treatm ent by the regim e o w ing to the dislike a n d suspicion in w hich the H ijazis were held by m any senior princes.26 As the Saudi university system developed in the 1970s a clear d istinctio n also em erged between the W estern-educated senior technocrats, w ho, in m ost cases, jo in ed the governm ent service in the 1950s, 1960s an d 1970s an d the n u m erous new -elite bureaucrats, the p ro d u ct of the Saudi educatio n al system or of foreign universities (BAs), w ho jo in ed it in the late 1970s an d 1980s. T h e first, if they h ad proved capable, cau g h t Faysal’s, an d later F ah d ’s, atten tio n , an d were ap p o in ted as heads of new and existing m inistries, departm ents or agencies. T h is new ‘com m oner aristocracy’ enjoyed enorm ous power, prestige and w ealth by the early 1970s. A lth o u g h it did n ot p articip ate in decision­ 63

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m ak in g proper, it cou ld greatly influence it th ro u g h m em bership in the cabinet, control of m inistries and budgets and the fact that the k in g and his C onsultative C ouncil so u g h t its advice. As the governm ent was expanded by the creation of specialised m inistries, departm ents an d agencies, the foreign-trained technocrats at th eir head had a better chance of in flu en cin g policy decisions relatin g to th eir p articu lar field of expertise. For their p art, the senior and m iddle-level technocrats have a vested interest in the c o n tin u ity of the S auds’ regim e an d closely identify w ith it. An aristocratic P hD stu d en t27 v isiting Saudi A rabia ab o u t 1980 w rote the follow ing: T h e [senior] technocrats seem to be co n ten t w ith the system; as one m inister [A l-Gosaybi] observed, ‘the R oyal Fam ily com m and of the structure is not w eakened because they have responded to the need for technocrats. T h ey got them in to the governm ent to keep the system going; the [senior] technocrats are grateful for the stability this system provides’. How ever, in the final analysis, policy decisions were arrived at only in the royal m ajlis al-shura or by ahl al-hal w a'l-'aqd, to the exclusion of the senior technocrats. T h e rise of the foreign-educated technocratic ‘aristocracy’ was resented by the trad itio n al non-royal elites w hom they largely replaced an d led to com p etitio n if n o t ho stility between the two. In ad d itio n to reform and m odernisation w hich affected the ‘Saudi way of life’, th eir rise caused a noticeable erosion of the status an d a u th o rity of the non-royal m em bers of the ru lin g class. T h e decline of the u la m a ’s pow er u n d er Faysal has already been discussed above. Even m ore noticeable was the eroding au th o rity of the tribal an d regional am irs. M any of their responsibilities had been taken over by the central governm ent, their subsidies were substantially slashed, and Faysal received them scarcely once a week in the 1970s, com pared w ith his alm ost daily m eetings w ith them at the b eg in n in g of his reign .2S In the 1970s an d early 1980s the n u m b er of ra n k and file new-elite bureaucrats grew constantly. O p p o rtu n itie s for personal advancem ent, for achieving great w ealth an d for p artic ip a tio n in the co u n try ’s develop­ m ent enticed the m ajority to jo in the service of the regime. T h is did not m ean th at the ‘new m e n ’ were n o t critical of the patern alistic and ‘c o rru p t’ character of the S auds’ governm ent an d its refusal to allow them , an d the m iddle class as a w hole, to p articip ate in the pow er system. Faysal’s co n stitu tio n al reform s were totally ignored and the frequently prom ised N atio n al C onsultative Assembly did not take shape.29 But inasm uch as such criticism existed, it d id not m ean th at the successful new elites were ready actively to challenge the ru lin g class as they had in the 1950s and 1960s. O n ly a m in o rity sym pathised w ith the clandestine 64

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radical o rganisations and a h an d fu l of those, some students in foreign universities and graduates re tu rn in g from them , and m em bers of the nascent S h i'ite intellig en tsia, actually jo in ed them . Elsewhere in this book30 it has been pointed o u t that the expansion of the educational system largely benefited the traditional urban m iddle class until the 1970s, prim arily the H ijazis, and, since the 1970s, N ajdis of hadr origin. T hecity-dw ellers, m ore than the rural p o p u la tio n and the newly urbanised, also enjoyed the fruit of rap id m odernisation an d developm ent in other fields. By the mid-1970s the m iddle class of hadr origin largely m onopolised the technocratic ‘aristocracy’, the new elites’ bureaucracy and new m iddle class as a whole. T h e evidence indicates th a t the traditional tension between ‘n oble’ N ajdis and ‘sophisticated’ H ijazis still prevails, and the historic aversion of the rural p o p u la tio n for the hadr and vice versa has now also been extended to the relatio n sh ip between newly urbanised groups and the central governm ent adm in istratio n , controlled by the new middle-class elite of urban origin.*1Social change in Saudi Arabia has thus far proceeded w ith lim ited natio n al integration.

ARAB N A T IO N A L IS M A N D SAUDI ‘OIL P O W E R ’ (1970-5) W holesale arrests an d harsh persecution v irtually elim inated the w hole spectrum of clandestine m ovem ents in the kingdom in 1969-70 and m inim ised their activities w ith in Saudi Arabia to this day. Some radical m em bers of the new elites w ho were still free in 1970 told Dr Shaker w ith bravado ‘let them [the royal fam ily] do as they please . . . repression will breed m ore hatred an d fru stratio n , w hich in tu rn w ill b rin g the existence of the m onarchy to d o o m ’.32 Yet, the cruel suppression of the o p p o sitio n b ro u g h t stability an d encouraged the m ajority of discontented in tellig en tsia to accept the S auds’ regim e and the role w hich Faysal allocated to them . Faysal’s b io g rap h er V incent Sheean33 claim ed in the early 1970s th a t ‘T h e q u estio n of an alternative to F aisal’s rule is, indeed, seldom considered . . . except in the youngest and m ost advanced circles of students returned from foreign countries . . .’ T h is is largely true of the Saudi new elites to this day. In consequential an d rarely active in the kingdom , in the 1970s, the m ilita n t o p p o sitio n to the S auds’ regim e consisted of three groups. T h e first, the old N L F, now M arxist, was ‘officially’ renam ed in B aghdad in 1975 the Saudi C o m m u n ist Party. T h e second was N assir S ai'd ’s U PAP, still ideologically N asserite an d pan-A rabist, w ith some supporters in the arm ed forces, in the n o rth ern parts of N ajd (Sham m ar) and in the Aramco workforce. T h e last was the P o p u la r D em ocratic Party (PD P) created by the am alg am atio n of the rem n an ts of the Saudi B a'th (both Iraqi- and Syrian-oriented) and a leftist N asserite faction of the N LF. T h e m ilita n t o p p o sitio n rem ained inactive u n til the late 1970s. T h is was partly due to 65

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the prosperity enjoyed by nearly all the Saudis and partly because of Faysal’s iron-fist policy u n til 1975 and F a h d ’s carrot-and-stick policy thereafter.31 B ut the m ost im p o rta n t reason was the relative cohesion w ith in the royal fam ily u n d er Faysal an d im m ediately after his succes­ sion. By 1970 the oil m arket had u n derg o n e a dram atic change. T h e U nited States had become a net o il im porter, an d dem and for oil in the in d u strial West was increasing at an average rate of ab o u t 10 per cent per a n n u m and exceeded supply. N ot only was O P E C now able to flex its muscles b u t the balance of pow er in it had been changed, w ith G h a d h afi’s Libya jo in in g the m ilita n t cam p of the o rg an isatio n . T h u s, the price of o il in the early 1970s began to rise d ram atically com pared w ith the 1960s, as did Saudi A rabia’s revenue from it (655 m illio n dollars in 1959,1,214 m illio n in 1970, 4,340 m illio n in 1973 an d 22,574 m illio n in 1974).35 Pressure had been b u ild in g on S audi A rabia since the 1950s b o th from its sister Arab countries an d from different circles in the kin g d o m to use its oil as p o litical leverage ag ain st the West an d the U nited States in p a rtic u la r because of the A rab-Israeli conflict. Faysal resisted this u n til 1970 o n p o litical an d econom ic grounds; b u t then, as the situ atio n in the oil m arket changed, he decided th at co n fro n tatio n w ith the U nited States over this issue was unavo id ab le an d th a t the kingdom was in a positio n to u ndertake it. In 1972, therefore, Zaki Y am ani inform ed W ashington th at S audi A rabia was n o longer w illin g or able to separate oil supply from Arab p o litical interests a n d th a t unless the US were to take a m ore balanced (i.e. pro-A rab) stance in relatio n to the A rab-Israeli conflict, the kingdom m ig h t be forced to use oil as a w eapon ag ain st the West. A lth o u g h there are c o n flictin g reports a b o u t R iy ad h ’s role in the p rep aratio n for the Yom K ip p u r w ar of 1973 it is evident th at the use of the ‘oil w eap o n ’ d u rin g an d after the O ctober war, and the em bargo on o il exports to the U nited States a n d H o llan d , earned Faysal, a t least tem porarily, the respect an d affection of m ost Arabs. As the k in g d o m ’s revenues from oil grew d ram atically, Saudi A rabia cam e to be the financier of the Arab an d M uslim w orld, th u s ‘b u y in g ’ her peace even w ith the m ore radical Arab countries (riyal politik). Egypt, now under P resident Sadat, becam e an ally a n d even Syria, fo llow ing a coup that b ro u g h t H afiz al-Assad to pow er in 1971 after he had overcom e the leftist elem ents in the Syrian B a'th, im proved its relatio n s w ith the ‘reactionary’ Saudis. O nly B aghdad, w ith its d o gm atic B a'thist regim e and interests in the G ulf, an d the PD R Y because of its N L F M arxist ideology, continued after 1973 the m ilita n t cam p aig n ag ain st the Saudi regim e, an d gave shelter an d su p p o rt to the sm all leftist Saudi groups. W ith the ru lin g class u n ited aro u n d Faysal, the regim e seemed to be stable an d secure, n o tw ith sta n d in g the rap id change w hich Saudi society was undergoing. After a period of tension w ith W ashington, Faysal an d Fahd felt 66

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confident en o u g h in 1974 to im prove th eir relations w ith the U nited States once again. T hese were considered essential to the security of the kin g d o m in view of the Soviet presence in Aden an d the fact th a t the G u lf h ad becom e a focus of pow er p olitics. F ollo w in g earlier arrangem ents, P rince F ahd visited W ash in g to n in Ju n e w ith a retin u e of key cabinet m inisters an d h ig h -ra n k in g officers. T h e result was a far-reaching u n d e rstan d in g o n econom ic, technical an d m ilitary co-operation. R iyadh expressed its readiness to h elp m a in tain a regular supply of o il to the m arket an d to curb the rise in o il prices. For its p art, Am erica undertook to h elp in fin d in g a so lu tio n to the A rab-Israeli conflict acceptable to the Arabs, an d help the Saudis b u ild u p th eir defence capabilities th ro u g h the construction of suitab le m ilitary infrastructure (w hich the US used in 1990), the sale of sophisticated w eaponry an d the tra in in g of Saudi personnel. Close relations w ith the U nited States, co-operation concern­ in g oil supply and p ricin g , and Saudi involvem ent in negotiations re latin g to the settlem ent of the A rab-Israeli conflict, becam e im p o rtan t strands in F a h d ’s governm ent after the death of Faysal. K ing Faysal was assassinated by a deranged nephew in M arch 1975. T h e succession arrang em en ts established by h im after 1964 facilitated a sm ooth transfer of pow er. W ith the blessing of the ulam a, K halid was p ro n o u n ced k in g an d F ahd crow n prince an d actin g p rim e m inister. A bdallah, com m ander of the N atio n a l G uard and a conservative w ith strong ties w ith the trib al leaders, k now n for his dislike of the W est and for his relations w ith anti-A m erican Arab n atio n alist leaders, became second in the line of succession an d second deputy p rim e m inister. C O N C L U S I O N S (1 9 6 4 -7 5 ) Faysal had been confronted w ith N asser’s pan-A rabism w hich established a foothold in Y emen a n d in itiated a risin g tide of m ilita n t n atio n alism in the k ingdom w hen he a g ain becam e actin g p rim e m inister in 1962. Faysal believed the challenge to be so grave th a t at first he attem pted to w in the m oderate new m iddle class by his ‘ten -p o in t p ro g ram m e’, w hich included prom ises of co n stitu tio n al reform s an d p a rtic ip a tio n in decision-m aking th ro u g h a n atio n al m ajlis al-shura. At the sam e time, ab a n d o n in g his trad itio n al cau tio n , he challenged N asser’s intervention in Yemen by su p p o rtin g the loyalists, w hile su p p ressin g w ith an iron h an d the active o p p o sitio n to his regim e at hom e. W hile the m ilita n t natio n alists were mercilessly persecuted, th e m oderate m iddle-class elite was practically ‘b ribed’ by Faysal to p articip ate in the governm ent of the kingdom and its accelerated m odernisation. F aysal’s reform s an d the e x p an sio n of m odern education in Saudi A rabia, m ade possible by increased revenue from oil, led to substantial gro w th in the new m iddle class an d educated elite. Yet, a lth o u g h Faysal 67

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increasingly incorporated university graduates in his governm ent and its agencies, enabling them to gain prestige and to share in the country’s w ealth, he conveniently forgot the constitutional reforms and participa­ tion in decision-m aking w hich he had prom ised them. T h e ideological foundations of his (and his heirs’) paternalistic regim e rested on the prem ise that the Q u r’an was the constitution of a M uslim state and that institutions of W estern democracies were incom patible w ith the p rin ci­ ples of Islam ic society (in w hich the people are represented by ahl al-hal w a’l-'aqd and the rulers are obliged to safeguard the citizens’ interests). Faysal prudently channelled the m ajor p art of the kingdom ’s increas­ ing w ealth to m odernisation and developm ent and to im proving the standard of living of the various classes of Saudis through a netw ork of subsidies, welfare services and opportu n ities for advancement. T h u s, the danger of social upheaval resulting from accelerated m odernisation and rapid urbanisation was largely avoided. N otw ithstanding the increasing pow er of a central governm ent dom inated by the new, largely hadr, elites, the Sauds’ paternalistic regime continued to enjoy the loyalty of the newly urbanised masses and rural p o p u latio n , whose allegiance to their traditional institution s began to erode. Follow ing the abortive coups of 1969 Faysal mercilessly crushed the vestiges of o pposition to his regime. Indeed, after his demise, w hen the struggle for pow er w ithin the royal family re-emerged, the great m ajority of the intelligentsia neither opted for m ilitan t nationalism , nor attem pted to challenge Al S aud’s authority, as they had in the 1950s and 1960s. Even their half-hearted efforts to gain a share in the decision­ m aking process throu g h the often prom ised N ational C onsultative Assembly were easily frustrated by the ru lin g class. W ith the exception of insignificant radical-natio n alist leftist and Shi'ite opposition organisa­ tions, largely based abroad, the disunited new elites on the whole preferred personal achievement, prestige and w ealth to a confrontation w ith the regim e and reconciled themselves to the existing situation.

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POWER STRUGGLE, M O D E R N I S A T I O N AND R E A C T I O N (1975-80) OIL W E A L T H , M O D E R N IS A T IO N , P O L IT IC A L P A R T IC IP A T IO N A N D ROYAL H O U S E RIVALRY K ing K halid, a conservative w ith little experience in adm inistrative or p o litical affairs, was in a very p o o r state of h ealth w hen he cam e to pow er. F rom the outset, w hether by design or necessity, he delegated m uch of his au th o rity to C row n P rince Fahd, the actin g p rim e m inister, b u t the final pow er rested in the h ands of the king. L ike Faysal thirteen years earlier, Fahd used the C ou n cil of M inisters to fortify his ow n po sitio n in relation to K halid. B ut the a p p o in tm en t of Prince A bdallah as next in line of succession an d second deputy prim e m in ister lim ited som ew hat the ability of Fahd an d the m odernist cam p to act unilaterally an d ensured the fam ily’s consensus in all m ajor m atters. For six m o n th s after F a h d ’s accession to au th o rity Faysal’s a p p o in ted governm ent co ntinued to fu n ctio n alm ost unchanged. T h e only sig n ifican t exceptions were the follow ing: the a p p o in tm e n t of Faysal’s son, Saud al-Faysal, a representative of the th ird-generation royal fam ily, as foreign m in ister - P rince N a ’if, F ah d ’s full brother, replaced h im as m in ister of the interio r, an d an o th e r of the ‘Sudayri Seven’, A hm ad, was a p p o in ted his d ep u ty .1 In order to w in the general su p p o rt of the new m iddle-class elites w hom he consistently befriended, Fahd, w ith K h alid ’s blessing, an n o u n ced (1975) the reg im e’s in te n tio n to establish a N atio n al C o n ­ sultative C ouncil (m ajlis al-shura). T h is was to be com posed of a p p o in ted ‘y o u n g ’ trib al leaders, technocrats, professionals an d b u si­ nessm en of the new m iddle class, as w ell as the ulam a. Yet, once the regim e had consolidated its p o sitio n an d felt secure, the prom ise was again conveniently forgotten. As m in ister of the in te rio r responsible for security u n d er Faysal, Fahd was considered far m ore lenient th a n the k in g in dealin g w ith the o p p o sitio n . Now th a t he was practically in pow er, F ahd p ardoned all those still im p riso n ed as a resu lt of the 1969 abortive coups an d ordered 69

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the au th o rities to h elp reh ab ilitate them . C ensorship of the m edia was also relaxed a n d ‘positive constructive criticism ’ of the ad m in istratio n , b u t n o t the S audi regim e, was perm itted .5 At the sam e tim e N a ’if, the new m inister of the in terio r, reorganised an d expanded the In tern al Security Services, the feared A l-M abahith al-‘A m m a (lit. ‘the G eneral Investi­ g a tio n s’; p o p u larly kn o w n as m a b a h ith ).4 N a ’if also cultivated in te lli­ gence co-operation between Saudi A rabia an d the nearby G ulf p rin cip alities, to co u n ter subversive org an isatio n s su pported by the PD RY and Iraq. As an extension of such activities N a ’if initiated in 1976 negotiations that eventually led to the establishm ent (1981) of the G u lf C o-operation C ouncil (G CC) w hich excluded Iraq an d Iran .5 Fahd was alw ays considered the leading m odernist in Faysal’s cam p. H is enth u siasm was restrained, however, by the king, w ho was determ i­ ned to preserve the balance of pow er betw een m odernists an d conserva­ tives. O nce in pow er, relying heavily o n the technocratic upper-crust, the crow n prince began to accelerate Saudi A rabia’s developm ent. T h e k in g d o m ’s second five-year developm ent p la n (1975-80) estim ated at 142 billio n dollars (final cost over 180 b illio n ) was, to a great extent, F a h d ’s responsibility. In ad d itio n to the enorm ous defence allocations (over 20 per cent of the total), the p la n concentrated on b u ild in g the k in g d o m ’s infrastructure, diversifying its econom y an d e x p an d in g its welfare and other services w hich benefited the citizenry. T h is necessitated a su b ­ stan tial increase in the w orkforce, at a tim e w hen Saudi m an p o w er was already in sh o rt supply. It also necessitated th a t the central governm ent ad m in istratio n and its specialised agencies be expanded. T h e em ploy­ m ent dem ands of the late 1970s required, in ad d itio n to a large n u m b er of foreigners, m any m ore educated Saudis in the governm ent services an d in m anagerial p o sitio n s in the private sector. In O ctober, the cabinet was th o ro u g h ly reshuffled, sh ow ing m ore th an ever the m od ern isin g trend of C row n P rince F a h d ’s regime. It now had tw enty-six m em bers, e ig h t of w hom were princes and the rest com m o­ ners, sixteen w ith university degrees. Yet to cou n ter the S udayris’ pow er in the cabinet, two younger sons of Abd al-Aziz were a p p o in ted m inisters an d Faysal’s younger son T u rk i was ap p o in te d shortly afterw ards director of the G eneral (external) Intelligence Services (Al-Istikhbarat al‘A m m a). U nlike Faysal, Fahd delegated real a u th o rity to his com m oner m in is­ ters and encouraged them to take initiatives. O nce a policy was decided u p o n by the royal m ajlis al-shura, it was the m in ister’s responsibility to carry it o ut and thus, w ith in th eir respective areas of responsibility, the non-aristocratic m inisters enjoyed a m easure of decision-m aking. Accord­ ing to an A m erican observer w ho had spent the 1970s and early 1980s in the kingdom , ‘W hen K halid a n d Fahd prom oted the am b itio u s p lan s of the 1970s, they set in m o tio n forces w hich necessitated the diffusion of 70

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p ow er an d the delegatio n of increasin g responsibilities to the C ouncil of M inisters.’6 A nother d istin g u ish in g feature of F a h d ’s cabinet of O ctober 1975 was the assim ilatio n to it of W estern-educated N ajdi technocrats (the first after T a rik i left the cabinet) such as Sulaym an Sulaym , m inister of com m erce, G hazi al-G osaybi, m inister of industry an d electricity, and later M u ham m ad A ba’l-Khayl as m in ister of finance. T h is m arked the b e g in n in g of the erosion of the H ijazi pred o m in an ce and the re­ establishm ent of the N ajdi hegem ony in the Saudi governm ent service an d arm ed forces.7 T h e preference for th eir N ajdi hadr ‘constituency’ was m ainly an outcom e of a royal fam ily consensus, su pported by King K halid, despite F a h d ’s am bivalency on this m atter. T h e above trend was also strongly resented by the H ijazi m iddle class because of its econom ic ram ifications. In the first place it und erm in ed the advantage th at the H ijazi businessm en an d entrepreneurs had in o b ta in ­ ing fat com m issions from foreign com panies or w in n in g governm ent contracts for them selves a n d their foreign partners. F urtherm ore, it also affected em ploym ent o p p o rtu n itie s for H ijazi school leavers and university graduates, as the N ajdi m in ister and senior technocrats looked after th eir own. Faysal’s a p p o in tm e n t as p rim e m inister in 1958 and his retu rn to pow er in 1962-4 were facilitated to a great extent by a g ro u p of senior princes led by the ‘S udayri Seven’ an d Faysal’s uncles. A m ong these princes, Fahd enthusiastically su p p o rted Faysal’s reform p la n s even before he joined the Saudi governm ent in 1954. A coalition, formed betw een the above g ro u p an d o th er senior princes related to the Jilu w i bran ch of the royal fam ily led to the e n th ro n em en t of Faysal in 1964. T h e m ore loosely connected Jilu w i g ro u p was led by Prince (later king) K halid an d his elder brother, M uham m ad, Abd al-Aziz’s sons by a Jilu w i wife. P rince A bdallah, a n o th e r m em ber of the g ro u p , was related to the Jilu w is th ro u g h his m o th er an d had m arried a Jilu w i. A nother im p o rt­ a n t m em ber was the Jilu w i governor of the Eastern Province. T h is conservative g ro u p offset the m o d ern isin g zeal of the Sudayris. In contrast the P rin ceto n g rad u ate P rince Saud al-Faysal, an d Faysal’s two other sons by his Jilu w i wife, were m odernists. Nevertheless, Saud alFaysal an d his brothers were considered by m any to be likely allies of the Jilu w i faction in the royal fam ily. T h e strains betw een the Sudayri and the Jilu w i cam ps am o n g the senior m em bers of the royal fam ily were exacerbated at the end of 1975, w hen the Sudayris pressed o n w ith their dem an d th at Prince A bdallah, now second in line of succession and second deputy prim e m inister, relin q u ish the com m and of the N atio n al G uard. Yet, the conservatives encouraged A bdallah to resist this dem and because, at a tim e w hen the Saudi arm ed forces, u n d er S u ltan , were rapidly b ein g upgraded and 71

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Prince N a ’if as m inister of the in terio r controlled the strengthened security services, the N atio n a l G u ard was th eir only pow er base. T h e conservatives an d o th e r m em bers of the aristocracy also protested ag ain st the k in g d o m ’s pro-A m erican policy revived by Faysal w ith F a h d ’s help, and now vigorously pursued. P aradoxically, an im p o rta n t faction of the new elites su p p o rted the conservatives rath er th a n F a h d ’s m odernist cam p, as had been the case w ith Saud an d Faysal in the late 1950s. A lth o u g h F ahd was always considered th eir p a tro n , some of the graduates of the foreign an d the ‘secular’ dom estic universities were dissatisfied w ith his lukew arm p o si­ tion on p o litical reform . O thers were critical of his unbridled, extrava­ g an t m odernisation. Practically all of the ex p an d in g , dom esticallytrained, m odernist and conservative in tellig en tsia criticised F a h d ’s proA m erican an d oil policies. F a h d ’s pro-A m erican policy, an d ‘arch aic’ Saudi regim e, becam e the target of a p ro p a g a n d a cam p a ig n directed by Iraq, Libya an d the PDRY on one side an d their subversive affiliate org an isatio n s in the G u lf on the other. B ut in essence, anti-W estern sentim ents were widely shared as well by the conservatives an d by m ost new elites in Saudi A rabia. T h e regim e, moreover, faced increasing financial, as w ell as social, difficulties resu lt­ in g from the ra p id pace of ch ange due to the second five-year develop­ m ent p la n (1975-80) an d the decline of oil revenues. T h e k in g d o m ’s oil revenues declined in 1976/7 because of a decreasing dem and for oil w hile su p p ly increased. Incom e n o longer sufficed to finance the enorm ous ex p en d itu re relatin g to developm ents an d defence. A m erican ‘g o ld -p lated ’ m ilitary projects concentrated o n m u lti-b illio n defence-related co n stru ctio n and, to a lesser degree, o n the ac q u isitio n of very costly sophisticated w eapons. B u ild in g the co u n try ’s co m m u n ica­ tions in frastru ctu re proved exceedingly costly, as d id the enorm ous petrochem ical com plexes of Ju b ay l and Y anbu, m eant to diversify the Saudi econom y. All this necessitated the ad d itio n al em ploym ent by 1977 of m ore th an tw o m illio n , m ostly non-A rab, foreigners, in c lu d in g a b o u t 100,000 W esterners. T h ey all constituted a heavy burden on Saudi finances. R iyadh, m oreover, was also ex p an d in g the costly subsidies and netw ork of w elfare an d o ther services w hich benefited the p o p u la tio n .8 T h e first an d second five-year developm ent p lan s (1970-80) greatly accelerated changes in S audi society th at had been u n d er way since the 1940s. T h e ex p en d itu re of tens of b illio n s of dollars on developm ent, w hich in the 1970s largely benefited the u rb an p o p u la tio n , further expedited the m ovem ent of the ru ral p o p u la tio n in to the towns. T h u s, by the end of the 1970s, the p ro p o rtio n of u rb an to ru ral p o p u la tio n was com pletely reversed. Indeed, by 1980 the percentage of true bedouin, w ho had constituted the larger p a rt of the p o p u la tio n u n til the m iddle of the century, declined to less th an 10 per cent. City-dwellers a n d in h a b itan ts of 72

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sm all tow ns m ade u p ab o u t tw o-thirds of the p o p u latio n . Ironically, w hile Saudi A rabia w as em p lo y in g m illio n s of foreign m an u al workers an d technicians of different kinds, u n e m p lo y m en t am o n g newly u rb a ­ nised Saudis, resu ltin g from social m ores an d lack of skills, was a grave problem . At the sam e tim e, as the econom y overheated, the cost of living an d in flatio n in the kin g d o m were skyrocketing, and the governm ent was u n ab le to provide sufficient h o u sin g an d social services for the ever­ g row ing u rb an ‘p ro le ta ria t’. For a tim e, the fru stratio n of the ‘low er class’ was intensified by the increasin g p o la risa tio n betw een rich an d p oor and by tales of c o rru p tio n an d scandals relatin g to the Sauds. Such in frin g e­ m ents on W ahhabi p u rita n ism , m oreover, incensed the fundam entalists a n d especially the less sophisticated N ajdi. Yet, by the late 1970s, the Saudi governm ent, w ith practically u n lim ited funds at its disposal, succeeded in overcom ing m ost of the econom ic an d som e of the social problem s w hich it faced. T h e k in g d o m ’s citizens now enjoyed h o u sin g an d a w ide range of o th er subsidies, free education a n d extensive w elfare services. G u aran teed em ploym ent an d advancem ent in governm ent service, coupled w ith financial su p p o rt to businessm en a n d entrep ren eu rs, enabled m ost Saudis to share in their co u n try ’s w ealth an d facilitated the ra p id rise of ‘low er-class’ Saudis, m ainly of ru ral o rig in , to m em bership in the flo u rish in g m iddle class. T h e threat to the trad itio n al sym pathy for the Saud regim e of the rural an d p art of the u rb an p o p u la tio n was thus averted. W idespread c o rru p tio n in the Saudi governm ent was n o urished by the n u m erous m u lti-b illio n defence, infrastru ctu re an d o th er developm ent contracts. T h e k in g d o m ’s sp en d in g spree an d com m ission system at every level of econom ic activity enriched m any Saudis, p articu larly senior m em bers of the Saudi ru lin g class an d th eir ‘co nstituencies’ as well as Saudis related to the technocratic u pper-crust. T h a t, an d the fortunes w hich m em bers of the royal fam ily had am assed th ro u g h parasitical involvem ent (fictitious p artn ersh ip s) in the c o u n try ’s trade an d other econom ic activities since Faysal’s period, enraged the Saudi intellig en tsia an d the business com m u n ity . O nly a few com m oner cabinet m inisters an d other senior technocrats refused com m issions an d bribes offered by foreign contractors an d freely accepted by their associates an d m em bers of the royal fam ily. T h e p atro n ag e a n d com m ission systems were in fact m ajo r m eans by w hich the regim e channelled w ealth to the ru lin g class an d the new elites an d th ro u g h them to all levels of the m iddle class. Indeed, in 1977 C row n P rince F ah d enacted the ‘T en d er L aw ’ by w hich, inter alia, no Saudi was allow ed to represent m ore th an ten foreign com panies so as to enab le m any m ore technocrats, businessm en and princes to benefit from the sp o n so r an d com m ission system .10 T h e u lam a were also b ecom ing increasingly frustrated w ith the im pact of m odernisation an d the presence in the kin g d o m of m any foreigners, 73

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especially W estern experts, w hose cu ltu ral influences threatened the W ah h ab i-S au d i ‘way of life’. Some even began openly to criticise the Saudi ru lin g class for betray in g the p rin cip les of (W ahhabi) Islam . R ivalry in the royal fam ily a g ain broke o u t in to the o pen and endangered the S au d s’ external co m m o n fro n t in February 1977 w hen the ailin g K halid was rush ed to L o n d o n for u rg en t u eatm en t. R u m o u rs th at the k in g ’s h ealth was rap id ly fa ilin g exacerbated the rivalry in the royal fam ily a n d u n d erm in ed the consensus essential for u p h o ld in g the reg im e’s stability. T h e Sudayris ag a in dem anded th at P rince A bdallah, w hose p o sitio n was considered w eak because he d id n o t have any full brothers, surrender co n tro l of the N atio n al G uard. It was widely believed, moreover, th a t F ahd a n d his brothers w ished to replace A bdallah as second deputy p rim e m inister, an d second in lin e of succession, w ith S u ltan an d th u s consolidate the S udayris’ h o ld o n the governm ent. T h e S udayris’ alleged attem p t to m ono p o lise all pow er in the royal fam ily enraged m any of the senior m em bers of Al Saud b u t m ostly the conservative ones. F ru strated as well by the erosion o f the k in g d o m ’s trad itio n al character th ro u g h m o d ern isatio n an d W estern influences, they rejected the new b alance of pow er w hich the Sudayris w ished to im pose u p o n the ru lin g class an d encouraged A bdallah to resist the Sudayris’ dem ands. T h e conservatives, moreover, a ttrib u ted the socio­ econom ic difficulties faced by the k in g d o m to F a h d ’s governm ent and alleged th a t its pro-W estern oil an d foreign policy served W estern interests rath er th an those of Saudi A rabia a n d its Arab sisters.“ T h e conservatives attem p ted to form a c o alitio n w ith elem ents of the new elites dissatisfied w ith Fahd an d w ith the younger generatio n of princes, led by Faysal’s university-educated sons. B ut despite blood affiliatio n , the y ounger princes chose n o t to identify w ith any faction of th eir elder k insm en a n d avoided as w ell the pitfall of ally in g themselves w ith the n a tio n a list new elite w ith w hom they shared som e com m on interests.12 T h e com placent bourgeois new elites o f the late 1970s avoided a c o n fro n tatio n w ith the regim e an d d id n o t seriously press the ru lin g class for c o n stitu tio n al reform s. By con trast w ith the 1950s an d 1960s they operated, by a n d large, w ith in the fram ew ork of the establishm ent an d sh u n n ed the m ilita n t clandestine o rganisations. T h e officers of the m odernised arm ed forces, w ho enjoyed h ig h salaries a n d m any privileges, were closely w atched by the security services. M ore often th a n not, the ones a p p o in te d to key sensitive p o sitio n s were the o ffspring of the aristocracy an d of loyal bed o u in am irs. T h e Saudi officer corps, it seemed, n o longer bred frustrated ‘Y oung T u rk s’.13 R esp o n d in g to dem ands of the new m iddle class for p o litical reform , C row n P rince F ahd in A p ril 1977 expressed a n u n d erstan d in g of the need 74

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for a N ational C onsultative C ouncil and for sim ilar provincial in stitu ­ tions, stressing that the m atter was under review.14 Clearly Fahd was trying to w in the su p p o rt of the m iddle class at a time of crisis. T h e 1977 ‘T ender L aw ’, for instance, was also m eant to further spread the k in g d o m ’s oil wealth am o n g the new elites. Indeed, in the mid-1970s Fahd could be a benevolent ruler w ith regard to im prisoned opposition mem bers and an ultra-m odernist w hen it came to economic, technological and adm inistrative developm ent. Yet, w hen it came to political m odernisation, a lth o u g h m ore liberal than Faysal, Fahd was u n w illin g to antagonise the ru lin g fam ily by g ran tin g the intelligentsia particip atio n in decision-m aking. Such a step, his peers believed, was bo u n d eventually to underm ine the foundation of the Sauds’ regime. At the end of A pril K ing K halid returned to Saudi A rabia and began im m ediately an extensive to u r of the various provinces. O n their part, fearing that the stability of the regim e w ould be threatened by the interfactional rivalry, the Sudayris tem porarily accepted the existing arrange­ m ents by w hich A bdallah was to succeed Fahd as king. Nevertheless, they continued their efforts to reduce the pow er of the N ational Guard. In May 1977 Fahd flew to W ashington to discuss two m ajor issues w ith President Carter: the supply of oil to the West an d its price, and American policy relating to the settlem ent of the A rab-Israeli conflict. A lthough Fahd prudently co-ordinated the Saudi stance w ith President Sadat and President Assad, the crow n p rin ce’s A m erican-oriented policy again caused discord w ithin the ru lin g class and antagonised a sizeable part of the natio n alist (anti-A m erican) new elites. Earlier, opposing O P E C ’s decision to raise the price of oil by 15 per cent (December 1976), the Saudi governm ent increased its oil production and coerced the organisation into accepting its proposed 5 per cent rise in oil prices. T h e radical, m ainly P alestinian-controlled, press in Beirut and the G ulf, accused the Saudi regim e of being an instrum ent of Western im perialism and of US policy. R eports of unrest am ong Aramco workers were followed in May 1977 by two fires in the huge A bqaiq oil field, w hich caused serious damage. A quixotic attem pt at a coup against the regime involving thirteen H ijazi pilots of a squadron of the Saudi a ir force based in T ab u k and a num ber of civilians was also uncovered in mid-1977. T h e ir ‘p la n ’ was to bom bard and rocket governm ent b uildings and royal palaces in Jedda and R iyadh, and then proclaim the establishm ent of an A rabian R epub­ lic. A lthough the particip an ts were, it seems, B a'thists connected to Iraq, the p lo t was m asterm inded an d financed by Libya. Ironically, the head of L ibya’s m ilitary intelligence involved in this affair was ‘tu rned’ by the Saudi security services (or the CIA) and R iyadh was aware of this naive plot from its inception. All those involved, w ith the exception of three pilots w ho escaped to Iraq, were arrested and, for a time, all air force 75

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planes were forbidden to carry m unitio n s and were restricted to enough fuel for only thirty m in u tes’ flying time. Coincidentally, the salaries of all civil servants were doubled, as were those of soldiers and NCOs. Officers of different ranks also received salary rises, land grants and other benefits.15 A serious setback to Crow n Prince F ahd’s policy was President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. T h e k ingdom ’s policy in O PEC and its stance concerning the American peace efforts, in addition to an tag o ­ nising the Arab m ilitants, caused grow ing dissatisfaction am ong the Saudi new elites and the conservatives. T h e latter were also increasingly critical of the unbridled m odernisation pursued by Fahd w hich, they claim ed, underm ined the k in g d o m ’s religious and cu ltural foundation. T h u s, discontent w ith F ah d ’s governm ent noticeably intensified. T h e crow n prince prudently dissociated him self from Sadat’s peace initiative and reduced the profile of Saudi relations w ith W ashington. France and E ngland, b u t especially the first, subsequently benefited from m ilitary contracts m eant to diversify the kin g d o m ’s sources of weapons. T ension in the ru lin g class continued in 1978. D iscontent w ith F ahd’s pro-W estern policy and governm ent in general am ong the conservatives and new elites also became increasingly evident. T h e latter now openly aired dem ands for political p articipation. Subsequently, Fahd prom ised to review proposals for a C onsultative Assembly. Yet a text of a draft proposal for m unicipal elections later published in the Saudi press aw akened little enthusiasm am o n g educated Saudis.16 T h e lim ited am o u n t of anti-regim e activity of the sm all leftist clan­ destine organisations in Saudi Arabia in the 1970s took place m ainly in the Eastern Province an d to a lesser degree in Asir. In the former, the S hi'ite com m unity increasingly protested at the discrim ination practised against it by the governm ent. T h e developm ent an d prosperity enjoyed by the k ingdom ’s S unni p o p u latio n , the Southern R egion excepted, resulting from the sale of ‘th eir’ oil, frustrated the Shi'ites of A l-Hasa and enhanced the grow th of local radical and separatist organisations. In the last m onths of 1978 it was alleged th at tribal elem ents inim ical to the Sauds had staged an ‘u p risin g ’ in the Eastern Province which coincided w ith labour problem s in D hahran. T ension was also reported in Asir, w hich suffered badly from poverty and neglect. Pam phlets of regional separatist m ovem ents such as the O rganisation for the Libe­ ration of A l-Hasa, Asir an d the H ijaz were circulated, it was reported, in various parts of the kingdom . At the begin nin g of 1979 the radical Arab press even alleged th at Saudi A rabia was ‘on the verge of an explosion’. T he renewed unrest in Saudi A rabia em anated partly from the socio­ cultural ram ifications of hasty m odernisation and the grow ing tension w ithin Al Saud related to the rise in the pow er of Arab radicals follow ing the C am p David talks; bu t it was greatly enhanced by the collapse of the 76

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S h ah ’s regim e in Iran in 1978, and the decline of American credibility in the region. T h e success of the Iran ian revolution, alth o u g h involving Shi'ite fundam entalism , fanned neo-Ikhw an sentim ents am ong elements of the kingdom ’s S unni p o p u latio n . It instilled, moreover, new pride am ong the Shi'ites and by 1979 the O rganisation of the Islamic R evolu­ tion for the L iberation of the A rabian P eninsula (M unazam at al-Thawra al-lslamiyya litahrir al-Jazira al-'Arabiyya), p opularly called Al-Thaw ra al-Islamiyya - the Islam ic R evolution (henceforth IRO ) - began to operate in the Eastern P rovince.'8 T h e Saudi ru lin g class was seriously shaken by the collapse of the m onarchy an d the rise of the fundam entalist regime in Iran, prior to the C am p David agreem ent (M arch 1979). F ah d ’s pro-Am erican policy was totally discredited and blam ed for the grave situation w hich the kingdom faced. T h e crow n prince prudently even left the country in the spring for a long ‘vacation’. Feeling exposed to Arab radicalism d u rin g the short­ lived rapprochem ent between Syria and Iraq (September 1978 to July 1979) on the one hand and the rising tide of Shi'ite m ilitan t fundam ental­ ism on the other, the royal m ajlis al-shura, presided over by Prince A bdallah, know n for his friendly relations w ith Syria and anti-W estern sentim ents, and F ahd’s brother Sultan, hurriedly disengaged the k in g ­ dom from its special relations w ith the U nited States. In contrast to the m oderate policy they had followed in the past, the Saudis, at the Baghdad sum m it in M arch 1979, supported the im position of a boycott on Egypt, and strongly condem ned the C am p David agreem ent and the US policy in the region. A hum bled Zaki Y am ani accepted a substantial raising of oil prices advocated by O P E C ’s ‘haw ks’ and Saudi nationalists, causing the second ‘oil crisis’ in 1980 w hich later led, as he and Fahd expected, to the collapse of oil prices w ith grave consequences for Saudi Arabia. T h e Saudi rulers, in disarray, aim lessly followed in the com ing m onths the radicals in the Arab camp. W ith the conservatives attem pting to underm ine the Sudayris’ position and the middle-class new elites more vigorously pressing for pow er an d particip atio n in policy-m aking, the situation in the kingdom in the spring of 1979 som ewhat resembled that of the early 1960s. T h e m ore radical am ong the new elites hoped and even believed that the end of the Sauds’ regim e was rapidly ap p ro ach in g .19 By m id -1979, the crow n prince was back in Saudi Arabia resum ing his responsibilities. A lthough he tem porarily dissociated him self from the U nited States and condem ned its policy, specifically the C am p David agreem ent, his position rem ained precarious. O nly the shock of the Mecca rebellion and the Shi'ite rio tin g in the Eastern Province at the end of 1979 and the begin n in g of 1980 re-established solidarity w ithin the ru lin g class and, paradoxically, helped consolidate the regim e’s stability. Saudi A rabia’s influence and prestige in the Arab cam p and the in ternational arena continued to rise after the death of Faysal despite the 77

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struggle for pow er in the royal fam ily. T h e kin g d o m w ith its enorm ous oil reserves an d w ealth was now considered by the in tern atio n al co m m u n ity a m ini-superpow er. W hile S audi relations w ith E gypt and Syria had already im proved u n d er Faysal, C row n Prince Fahd, e x p lo itin g Ira q ’s resentm ent of the coerced 1975 (Algiers) border agreem ent w ith Iran, m anaged superficially to sm ooth the differences betw een R iyadh and B aghdad an d to reduce tem porarily the tension w ith the M arxist PD RY , p artly the outco m e of R iy a d h ’s efforts to prevent the un ificatio n of the tw o Yemens. D espite its pow er, p artly gained at the expense of the trad itio n al in stitu tio n s, the in tellig en tsia-d o m in ated central governm ent d id n ot enjoy the sym pathy of the new ly urbanised an d ru ral p o p u la tio n .20 T h e latter, as well as all classes of Saudis, shared in the co u n try ’s prosperity th ro u g h F ah d ’s accelerated d evelopm ent an d the e x p an d in g netw ork of w elfare services an d subsidies. T h e ru lin g class, w ith its wide pow er base, estim ated th at the fragm ented new elites, corru p ted by prestige and w ealth, despite th eir e x p an d in g ranks, d id n o t constitute a sufficiently serious challenge to m erit special consideration. T h u s, m eaningful co n stitu tio n al reform was rejected as being un -Islam ic an d the prom ised n a tio n al (Islam ic) m ajlis al-shura, resurfacing w ith every crisis, was again ignored. In so far as the backbone of the leftist o p p o sitio n was broken in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the m ainstream of the Saudi in telligentsia, en joying prestige an d econom ic prosperity, co n tin u ed loyally to serve the ru lin g class. T h e tam e, successful an d deeply divided bourgeois new elites of the 1970s half-heartedly attem p ted in 1977-9 to ex p lo it the rift in the royal fam ily to advance p o litical change in the k ingdom and radicalise its oil a n d foreign policy. Yet, it carefully avoided a co n fro n tatio n w ith the regim e over dem ands for m ean in g fu l c o n stitu tio n al reforms. T h e relatively conservative m ajority of the new elites was either satisfied w ith the ex istin g situ atio n , or naively hoped th at aw are of their ex p an d in g ranks an d role in the k in g d o m ’s governm ent an d econom y, the ru lin g class w ould eventually agree to in clu d in g them in som e way in decision­ m aking. In the m eantim e, the technocratic ‘aristocracy’ endeavoured to expand the m easure of decisio n -m ak in g w hich it enjoyed in the central g overnm ent an d w ith in the m inistries by u sin g its m em bers’ control of budgets an d role in the cabinet. T h e ir efforts, however, were usually blocked by the an tag o n ism of the u lam a an d of the royal fam ily. T hey were eventually m ore successful in pressing for a rise in oil prices follow ing a reduction in the k in g d o m ’s prod u ctio n . Even th o u g h the rival cam ps in the aristocracy occasionally courted the new m iddle class, its su p p o rt was considered secondary to th a t of the ulam a, the source of the S a u d ’s legitim acy. T h e e ru p tio n of the conflict in the royal fam ily an d the risin g wave of fund am en talism in Iran an d in 78

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the M uslim w orld as a w hole rath er p ro m p ted Fahd to im prove the S u dayris’ im age as g u a rd ia n s of the k in g d o m ’s W ahhabi character an d to reverse F aysal’s relatively liberal policy. T hereafter, the regim e ag ain increased the au th o rity of the u la m a an d th eir M orality Police, w ho supervised the piety of the citizens an d curtailed the ‘p rivileges’ of W esterners residing in th e k in g d o m .21

T H E MECCA R E B E L L IO N A N D T H E S H I'IT E R IO T S (1979) Saudi A rab ia’s rap id m o d ern isatio n since the late 1960s, an d the socio­ cu ltu ra l changes w hich it induced, rekindled the fu n d am en talist sen ti­ m ents w hich had been d o rm a n t after the suppression of the 1927-30 Ik h w an rebellion. T h e u lam a, w ho strongly objected to in n o v atio n s in troduced by Ibn Saud an d his heirs, reconciled themselves, in m ost cases, to the ru lers’ decisions. D u rin g F aysal’s reign, the u lam a increas­ ingly becam e p art of the state establishm ent. Indeed, a lth o u g h some u lam a bitterly criticised o th er M uslim rulers for in tro d u c in g m odernisa­ tio n an d foreign influences w hich were contrary to the p rin cip les of Islam , they were careful n o t to p o in t an accusing finger at the S auds’ regim e. Even before the 1979 u p risin g , the Sauds an d m ost new elites, n o t to m en tio n the u lam a, becam e g row ingly concerned a b o u t the im pact on th eir society of rap id m od ern isatio n , accom panied by W esternisation. T ra d itio n a l anti-W estern sentim ents were enhanced in this p erio d by the sense of pow er (oil) a n d the presence in Saudi A rabia of m any foreigners. H ence, in the late 1970s, m em bers of the ru lin g class an d even som e W estern-trained officials began to pay lip-service to the need to protect the ‘Saudi way of life’ from the co rru p t W estern cu ltu re w ith its m aterialistic values an d perm issiveness, in order to advance n atio n al solidarity. T o a sim ple b u t p ro u d p eople w hose oil has recently purchased their ra p id m odernisation an d m ade them in to a w orld (econom ic) pow er, the ‘Saudi way of life’ has com e to represent th eir u n iq u en ess a n d has becom e th eir n a tio n a l ethos. T h e ‘S audi way of life’ is, in fact, a synthesis of custom s of the pre-oil, im poverished A rabian society, sym bols of the trib a l-n o m a d ic people (the cam el, the tent, the dress) an d aspects of W ahhabi asceticism an d beliefs, m any of these features being alien to the trad itio n al urb an elem ents, especially to the H ijazis w ho d o m in ate the S audi bureaucracy.22 T h e accelerated developm ent an d change, w hich Saudi society was experiencing under F ahd, exacerbated the discontent of the N ajdi-led fundam entalists. T h e conservative u la m a frequently felt threatened as w ell by the W estern-educated technocrats a n d bureaucrats, w ho were 79

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often critical, however discreetly, of the ulam a. T h e students and faculty of R iy ad h ’s Islam ic U niversity in clu d in g Abd al-Aziz bin Baz (rector of A l-M adina Islam ic U niversity and the president of the A dm inistration of Scientific Study, [R eligious] Legal O pinions, Islam ic P ropagation and G uidance) claim ed in 1978 th at program m es screened by the state television were anti-Islam ic and subversive of W ahhabi society. In the same year the furious u lam a criticised the television for presenting the opinions of ‘m odernists’ on the status of Saudi women, another sore p o in t w ith the ulam a, and described them as anti-Islam ic. After Ghazi alGosaybi, the m inister of industry an d electricity, considered the doyen of the Saudi intelligentsia, was quoted as having said in an interview that the k in g d o m ’s m odernisation had ‘bridged over three thousand years of sub-hum an existence’, Bin Baz, whose ultra-conservatism often embarrassed the rulers, condem ned Al-Gosaybi in an article published in a K uwaiti periodical for in su ltin g Islam .25 T h e accelerated urbanisation w hich began d u rin g Faysal’s reign b ro u g h t to the tow ns m any illiterate or semi-literate, yet deeply religious bedouin, in clu d in g offspring of Ikhw an w ho participated in the 1927-29 rebellion. Some newly urbanised young Saudis attended the Al-M adina U niversity w ith its largely foreign student body, very low adm ission requirem ents and Islam ic character and curriculum . T h is university, run by foreign fundam entalists an d some ultra-conservative W ahhabi ulam a w ho often condem ned the evils of m odernisation an d the Western culture, became the focus of Saudi ‘neo-fundam entalism ’. A N ajdi ‘alim discussing the Mecca incident in 1980 said the follow ing: ‘An atm osphere favourable to Islam ic heresy sprang u p at M edina because of the presence of large num bers of foreign students . . . ’24 As the frustration of the conservatives rapidly grew after the mid1970s, the wave of ‘neo-fundam entalism ’ began to spread from AlM adina to the Im am M uham m ad ibn Saud Islam ic University (Riyadh) and to the theology faculty in Mecca an d the one at R iyadh’s ‘secular’ KSU. M any of the 'alim s an d the students (a sizeable percentage of w hom were foreigners) of the above were openly critical of many of the innovations and W estern influences introduced by the governm ent.25 Yet, the m ost outspoken critics of the regime, it seems, were offspring of the Ikhw an and dropouts from the m odern education system, m ainly of bedouin origin, overw helm ed by the revolutionary changes w hich their society was undergoing. D isillusioned w ith the establishm ent fundam entalists w hom they considered hypocrites corrupted by the regime, some turned to a synthesis of m ilitan t ‘neo-Ikhw an’ an d M uslim m illenarianism . A son of an Ikhw an w arrior w ho fought Ibn Saud, Ju h ay m an ibn Sayf al-‘U taybi, an ex-N ational G uard NCO, attended lectures by the N ajdi ultra-conservative 'alim Abd al-Aziz bin Baz at Al-M adina University. In 80

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1974 the disillusioned Ju h ay m an left al-M adina for his native Qasim (Najd) followed by a han d fu l of bedouin an d foreign students. In the com ing years he preached his version of ‘neo-Ikhw an’ ideology in the towns and oases of the N ajd where his kinsm en, m any of them Ikhw an descendants, had settled. D u ring this period additional university dropouts joined his gro u p an d he m anaged to lin k u p w ith m ilitan t neo­ fundam entalist organisations in nearby Arab and M uslim countries. By 1978 Ju h ay m an an d his followers moved to Riyadh, where they began to preach in several m osques against the evils of m odernisation, in sin u atin g that the regime was responsible for the corru p tio n of Islam by foreign influences. T h e Saudi secret services always kept an eye on the activities of extrem ist religious fanatics. T h u s, in the sum m er of 1978 Juh ay m an and about 100 of his followers were arrested and interrogated by the m a bahith; b u t they were released from jail after Bin Baz and other ultra-conservative ulam a interceded on their behalf, declaring them harm less crackpots. W ith the help of local salafis, Ju h ay m an printed in Kuwait four pam phlets in w hich he em ulated the Ik h w an ’s philosophy, attire and criticism of the ‘corru p tio n of Islam ’ by the rulers through m odernisa­ tion. ‘For Ju h a im a n . . . ulem a and state had com bined in a truly unholy alliance.’ In a p am p h let th at appeared in 1978 Ju h ay m an wrote that the ‘N ejd ulem a had been b o u g h t. . . W here is it that the ulem a an d sheikhs find their m oney, except th ro u g h co rruption?’; ‘how the religious authorities could be so prosperous w ith o u t active financial su pport from the Royal Family?’.26 A bout this tim e Juh ay m an convinced M uham m ad ibn A bdallah alQ ahtani, a bedouin theology student in R iyadh, th at he was the expected M ahdi. Indeed, in the pam phlets w hich he published an d distributed at the end of 1978 and in 1979, Ju h ay m an refers to the com ing of a M ahdi from the tribe of Q uraysh w ho w ould redeem the M uslim world. H ere he is indirectly accusing the Sauds of being usurpers not of Q uraysh origin. O n the n ig h t of 19 November, at the end of the M uslim fourteenth century, Ju h ay m an and abo u t 400-500 of his followers, including w om enfolk and children, entered the grounds of the Mecca m osque w ith q uantities of w eapons and food. O n the follow ing m orning, they seized the Ka'ba haram, denounced the corru p t governm ent of the Sauds and especially the ulam a w ho supported them , and declared M uham m ad ibn A bdallah al-Q ahtani the expected M ahdi. It took the regim e two weeks to crush the rebellion and regain control of the Ka'ba. T h e rulers aw aited at first a fatw a of the ulam a p erm itting the seizure of the Mecca m osque by force; b u t the Sauds were also indecisive and apprehensive of the reaction of the p o p u latio n and of tribal elem ents in the arm ed forces to the events. O n their part, the rebels bravely fought off the superior forces w hich surrounded them, expecting 81

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that all the believers w ho rejected the co rruption of Islam by the Sauds w ould rally to the flag of the ‘expected M ahdi’. W hen granted, after debates lasting several days, the fatw a proclaim ed by the ulam a did not denounce the rebels for heresy bu t rather for using w eapons in the holy Ka'ba an d rising against a legitim ate regime. Among the 30 ulam a w ho signed the fatw a were, ironically, leading N ajdi u ltra ­ fundam entalists know n for their opposition to m odernisation including Abd al-Aziz bin Baz. In the m eantim e the shocked p o p u latio n of the kingdom was largely angry at the rebels for defiling the holiest shrine of Islam. It became clear that by choosing the K a'ba as the site of their up risin g the Ikhw an rebellion had m isfired.27 Despite the enorm ous forces bro u g h t by the regim e to Mecca, it took a great effort to overcome the rebels. O nly on 3 December did the exhausted rem nants of the Ikhw an, in clu d in g Juhaym an, surrender to the a u th o r­ ities. T h e ir execution in the different towns of the kingdom several m onths later was generally considered appropriate and did no t seem to arouse any sym pathy. W hile the legitim acy of the Saudi regime was being challenged in Mecca the authority of Al Saud was threatened from another quarter by the unrelated eru p tio n on 28 November of serious violence in the Eastern Province. T h e Shi'ites in A l-Hasa had increasingly been protesting since the 1950s against their oppression and discrim ination by the regime. T h e success of the Iranian revolution gave them new pride and encouraged them to press their dem ands for equality. In addition, T eh ran repeatedly called upon them to rise against their corrupt rulers. T h e above, and the S h i'ites’ pro p o rtio n am o n g A ram co’s workers, and A l-H asa’s p o p u la ­ tion, m ade the unrest in Al-Sharqiyya seem extremely dangerous for the regime. In the early 1980s it was estim ated th at the Shi'ites in Saudi Arabia num bered about 500,000, or 10 per cent of the po p u latio n . Nearly all Saudi Shi'ites (Twelvers) live in the Eastern Province, and are concen­ trated in the oases of A l-H asa and Q atif.28 T h is com m unity is closely related to its co-religionists in Bahrayn and Kuwait and relations between it and m ost of its S unni neighbours are relatively good. After the rise of the W ahhabiyya in the eighteenth century the Al-Hasa Shi'ites, considered by the m u w a hh id u n worse than infidels, were constantly persecuted. W hen Ibn Saud reconquered the region from the T u rk s in 1913 its Shi'ites unsuccessfully sought the protection of the B ritish in Bahrayn. T hey renewed this attem pt in 1927 when, under the pressure of the Ikhw an, the W ahhabi ulam a instructed Ibn Saud to increase their oppression. Even though the treatm ent of the Shi'ites im proved after the collapse of the Ikhw an rebellion, they were despised by the Sunnis, and were considered at the bottom of the Saudi social 82

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stratification. T hey were officially discrim inated against by the a u th o r­ ities in m any m atters in clu d in g em ploym ent, an d prohibited from having their ow n m osques an d judicial system. Above all they were prevented from h o ld in g p u b lic religious ceremonies, especially the an n u al 'ashura processions com m em orating the assassination of H ussayn ibn'A li. T h e developm ent of the Saudi oil industry has had a most beneficial im pact on the oppressed, largely agricultural, S hi'ite com m unity of the Eastern Province. M any Shi'ites from the ru ral areas of the large Al-Hasa oasis, seeking em ploym ent and a better life, moved to the peripheries of the coastal ‘oil tow ns’: D am m am , Al-Khobar, Ras T a n u ra and D hahran. O riginally sm all, poverty-striken, villages, such towns prospered and rapidly grew in size. A ram co’s ‘colour b lin d ’ em ploym ent policy was no t an outcom e of m oral principles b u t of necessity. T h e Shi'ites constitute about 40 per cent (possibly one-half) of A l-Sharqiyya’s p o p u la tio n and their work ethics are q u ite different from those of m ost S unni Saudis who, because of social mores, consider m an u al labour dem eaning. For the Shi'ites, em ploym ent in Aramco, in m ost cases, was the only way to earn a decent living and to advance in life. T h u s, by 1978, Shi'ites were estim ated to make u p more than half of A ram co’s workforce an d w hile institutes of vocational train in g elsewhere in the kingdom failed to attract students, the ones in the Eastern Province had m ore candidates than they could handle. In the 1950s, moreover, Aramco encouraged its more enterprising employees to provide the com pany w ith supplies and services on a contractual basis. T h u s, it was instrum ental in the rise of a relatively sophisticated S hi'ite m iddle class an d intelligentsia alongside a socially conscious w orking class. Aramco not only provided em ploym ent bu t also education, w hich was partly the reason for A l-H asa’s having the lowest illiteracy rate in the kingdom . M any young Shi'ites u ain ed by the com pany or in schools established by it found their way to dom estic an d foreign technical institution s and universities. Indeed, by 1980 half of the students of Saudi A rabia’s most prestigious university, the UPM , an d the m ajority of those of K ing Faysal U niversity were Shi'ites. A h ig h percentage of the students sent to study abroad by Aramco, an d some by the Saudi governm ent, were also Shi'ites, not to m ention the ones w ho were supported by their middle-class fam ilies.29 N otw ithstanding the above, the Shi'ites rem ained a m inority, discrim i­ nated against, if not persecuted. T h e N ajdi establishm ent continued to distrust and abhor the Shi'ites an d considered them , despite their achievements, backw ard if no t m entally retarded. T h e testimony of Shi'ites, whose doctrines are viewed as heretical, was no t admissible in Saudi courts of law, an d units of the bedouin N ational G uard were 83

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stationed in the province’s m ain towns. A foreign correspondent observed in 1980 that ‘C ultural discrim ination is perhaps the most bitter for them. Shi'ite literature is banned an d S hi'ite history is not allowed to be taught in the local schools and university.’ T h e teaching profession was closed to Shi'ites, w ho are virtually excluded from all b u t the lowest ranks of the civil service and inhib ited from serving in the arm y and the security forces. A young Shi'ite told the above reporter: ‘T here are Sunnis, below them are C hristians an d below them are Jews; we are below the Jew s.’30 N ot surprisingly, the educated Shi'ites an d ‘w orking class’ have become involved w ith trade un io n ism and radical n ationalist clandestine movem ents since the 1950s. T h e emergence of a new Shi'ite middle class and intelligentsia provided the com m unity w ith the means to protest against their treatm ent and discrim ination. T h u s, as early as 1960, a S hi'ite delegation petitioned K ing Saud about a defam atory article published by a semi-official periodical an d dem anded an end to discrim i­ nation against them . T en sio n am o n g the Shi'ites grew in the 1960s sim ultaneously w ith the rise of pan-A rabism in Saudi Arabia. Shi'ite workers and intellectuals joined offshoots of the Q aw m iyyin al-'Arab, the U PA P and the B a'th and were involved in different anti-governm ent activities.31 A lthough the older generation and p art of the new Shi'ite middle class were reconciled to the gradual im provem ent in their position, the younger and better-educated Shi'ites became progressively more m ilitant, anti-N ajdi an d anti-A m erican. T h e ir frustration was enhanced by the fact th at revenue from ‘their o il’ financed the accelerated developm ent of Saudi A rabia, yet only m arginally benefited their province. W hen K halid-F ahd came to pow er in 1975 and ‘liberalised’ Faysal’s policy, the Shi'ites benefited, to some extent, as well. More funds were allocated for the b u ild in g of com m unications and industrial infra­ structure in A l-Sharqiyya and to expand the province’s education system, including the new K ing Faysal University in H u fuf an d D ammam . A few Shi'ites were advanced in the a d m in isu atio n an d one was appointed in 1976 the head of the Jubayl in dustrial complex. Many Shi'ites benefited indirectly as well from A ram co’s and the governm ent’s developm ent projects, and joined the Saudi m iddle class, bu t not its u p p er levels, w hich were com posed solely of successful S unni businessm en, ind u strial­ ists and contractors. Yet in the eyes of the N ajdi establishm ent, the Shi'ites rem ained a despised and abhorred m inority. Despite the measure of liberalisation in regard to S hi'ite religious practices, their 'ashura processions were still strictly prohibited, n o r were they allowed to have their ow n religious courts. S hi'ite graduates of the education system and universities met w ith difficulties in finding suitable positions in the governm ent and were rejected by the arm ed an d security forces. T h e grow ing unrest in the Saudi kingdom and the revolution in Iran 84

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were b o u n d to have a n im p act o n A l-H asa’s an d the G u lf E m irates’ S h i'ite com m unities. T h e 1978 violence in A l-Sharqiyya was follow ed at the b e g in n in g of 1979 by lab o u r u nrest in the oil fields an d the oil towns. A ram co h ad indeed been ex p ectin g tro u b le in the region follow ing the victory of the Islam ic rev o lu tio n in Iran an d the p ro p ag an d a broadcasts from T e h ra n aim ed at the S h i'ite p o p u la tio n in A rabia. B ahrayn, w ith its S h i'ite m ajority, a sh o rt distance from the S audi oil tow ns, experienced in Septem ber 1979 very serious riots w hich led to massive repression of S h i'ite a n d o th e r radical elem ents. By N ovem ber the m u jta h id s of Q atif a n d the nearby S h i'ite villages a n n o u n ced th eir d eterm in atio n to h o ld the ‘ashura processions in defiance of the g o v ern m en t’s p ro h ib itio n .32 Several days before the event new s of the rebellion in Mecca galvanised the AlH asa Shi'ites. W hen the police attem p ted to disperse the large crowds w ho p articip ated in the ‘ashura procession in Q atif o n 28 N ovem ber, the Shi'ites w ent o n a ram page. T h e tro u b le spread to Sayhat an d o ther S h i'ite settlem ents in the reg io n a n d o il in stallatio n s near Ras T a n u ra an d D h ah ran were sabotaged. T h e rio tin g lasted for three days. D em onstrators carried pictures of A yatollah K hom ayni an d placards d e n o u n c in g the H ouse of Saud an d the A m erican im perialists. T h ey ch an te d anti-A m erican slogans, an d dem anded th a t S audi A rabia sto p su p p ly in g the U n ited States w ith oil an d th a t it su p p o rt the Ira n ia n Islam ic revolution. O thers dem anded the estab lish m en t of an Islam ic rep u b lic in A l-H asa. T h e reinforced u n its of the N atio n al G u ard , w ho had n o love for the Shi'ites, opened fire o n the dem onstrators o n several occasions. A total of seventeen p eople were killed, m any were w ounded an d h u ndreds arrested. A pprehensive o f the im p act of the ferm ent am o n g the S hi'ites an d the Ira n ia n rev o lu tio n on the security of its oil industry, the Saudi govern­ m en t im m ediately despatched P rince A hm ad, the d eputy m inister of the in terio r (a Sudayri) to the province. A hm ad p ru d en tly ad m itted th a t the regim e had neglected the E astern Province an d discrim inated ag ain st its Shi'ites, a n d an n o u n ce d the b e g in n in g of a new era. H e prom ised massive investm ents in A l-H asa’s developm ent an d econom ic infrastructure, ed u catio n system an d o th er services. Yet, sim ultaneously, he w arned the S h i'ites th a t if they were to u n d erm in e law an d order they w o uld be severely p u nished. In spite of the above, tension am o n g the younger S h i'ites c o n tin u ed to rise. A declaratio n by P rince N a’if, the m in ister of the interior, th a t the S h i'ite rio tin g was in co n seq u en tial added fuel to the fire, as d id the antiSaudi p ro p ag an d a from T e h ra n . M ore politicised an d resentful of the N ajdi establishm ent, the y o u n g S hi'ites were m ore receptive to the Ira n ia n incitem ent. Indeed, the IR O claim ed (in 1981) th a t it had deliberately prepared the c o n tin u a tio n of the ‘ashura dem o n stratio n s in order to b rin g ab o u t the release from p riso n of all those arrested 85

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follow ing the November riots. Violent dem onstrations again erupted in Q atif and A l-H asa follow ing the Friday prayers on the first of February, the anniversary of the return of A yatollah K hom ayni to Iran. Anti-Saudi and anti-A m erican slogans were chanted and students from the UPM university set buses and private cars on fire, b u t Saudi banks were the m ain target of the dem onstrators this time. F our people were killed, and m any arrested, d u rin g this spate of rio tin g w hich also lasted several days.35 T h e S hi'ite rio tin g caused the regim e to realise th at it could not continue blatantly to discrim inate against the Shi'ites. Previously pre­ pared, b u t shelved, plans for the developm ent of Al-Sharqiyya were now quickly im plem ented. A m odern vocational train in g centre opened in D am m am . It was designed to produce technicians for the huge Jubayl industrial com plex w hich offered attractive job o pportunities for the local p o p u latio n . New com m ercial centres were b u ilt and Shi'ite busi­ nessmen were helped to expand their enterprises. Some traditional adm inistrators in A l-H asa were replaced by university-trained technocrats and additio n al faculties were opened in the KFU.54 In spite of these measures an d the change in the authorities’ attitude, discrim ination against the S hi'ite p o p u latio n was not eradicated. R ather the ap p o in tm en t of two S hi'ite officials to high, yet secondary, positions in the adm inistration, an d the relatively modest success of several Shi'ite businessm en (in m any cases related to Aramco) underscored the fact that on the w hole Shi'ites were still excluded from the m edium and upper levels of the Saudi adm in istratio n an d economy and totally from the security and arm ed forces. At the UPM Shi'ites com posed about half the student body, yet they could not be elected as officers of the students’ union . Shi'ite requests th at they be allowed to settle personal judicial m atters such as inheritance according to their customs were rejected out of hand. Even thoug h the authorities legalised low -profile 'askura processions, the S hi'ite leaders were w arned against exaggerated expressions of grief, typical of such processions, w hich anger W ahhabi puritanists.35 In Septem ber 1980, follow ing the eruption of the Iran -Iraq war, the Saudi governm ent substantially bolstered its arm ed forces in the Eastern Province. Security in the oil installations, relatively lax in the past, was markedly tightened. A new M inistry of the Interior security force was established solely to protect essential installations, largely in the oil province. T h e S hi'ite com m unity in Al-Hasa, constantly incited by the revolutionary regim e in Iran, and especially discontented elements am ong the intelligentsia, fundam entalists and workers, were closely watched, if n o t harassed, by the authorities. Moreover, alth o u g h the GCC was form ally launched in 1981, security co-operation between Saudi A rabia and its G ulf allies was prom oted by Prince N a’if (even earlier). 86

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Sim ultaneously, the developm ent of the Eastern Province supervised by Prince A hm ad was accelerated. Between 1980 and 1982, roads were paved, schools built, sewage systems constructed and a hospital opened. W hen K ing K halid visited the province in November 1980 he announced that 1 b illion dollars were being allocated for ‘p u b lic service projects’ in Al-Hasa. All those incarcerated d u rin g the November 1979 and February 1980 riots were pardoned and a general amnesty enabled political refugees to return to their homes. T h e legalised ‘ashura processions w hich took place shortly afterwards w ent off w ithout incident, w ith the security forces keeping o u t of sight.36 T h e regim e’s carrot-and-stick policy in A l-Hasa proved quite successful. T h e efforts to develop the region and gran t its Shi'ite p o p u latio n the nearest th in g to equality in a W ahhabi state were appreciated by m ost of the com m unity. T his, in addition to the q u antitative and qualitative u p g rad in g of the security forces, prevented an outbreak of serious anti-governm ent activity in Al-Sharqiyya in the follow ing years, despite Iran ’s vicious anti-Saudi propaganda and su p p o rt of subversion in the G ulf, an d the im pact of the Ira n -Ira q war. Yet, the unrest am ong the young Shi'ites and other radical elements in the Eastern Province persisted under the surface. Anti-regim e, separatist, radical socialist or fu ndam entalist sentim ents were now fanned by Iran ian m ilitan t propaganda. An Iranian plot to destabilise the regimes of Bahrayn and Saudi A rabia was uncovered at the end of 1981. Am ong the m any w ho were arrested in Bahrayn were Saudi Shi'ites w ho had undergone train in g in Iran. T he IR O , w hich began to operate in 1979, joined in the 1980s existing sm all groups of S hi'ite workers and intelligentsia-supported Marxist, B a'thist and p ro-Iranian organisations in their lim ited anti-regim e activities at hom e and abroad. In the en su in g years it was responsible for subversive activities in A l-H asa’s towns and villages. A lthough su p ­ pressed by the Saudi security services w ith an iron fist, it rem ained active and had followers am o n g the students and other Shi'ite elem ents.37 T h e lim ited activity of the Saudi m ilitan t opposition in the early 1980s focused largely on Al-Hasa. There, in addition to the IR O , Shi'ites are an im p o rtan t com ponent of the relatively inconsequential Saudi leftist clandestine movements. U ndoubtedly, the rapidly grow ing Shi'ite intelligentsia and w orking class (the nearest th in g to a p roletariat in Saudi A rabia) w ould be am o n g the first to jo in an anti-Saud n atio n alistradical revolution if it were to erupt. Yet, a Shi'ite up risin g in Al-Hasa is, ironically, likely to consolidate S unni su p p o rt for the regim e because of the latter’s nearly universal dislike of Shi'ites, fear of fundam entalist Iran and concern about A l-Sharqiyya’s oil revenue. T h e frustrated and dissatisfied Shi'ite m inority represents, nevertheless, a threat, even if not a m ajor one, to the regim e because it constitutes such a hig h p ro portion of 87

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A l-H asa’s p o p u la tio n a n d of A ram co’s workforce. T h e Ira n -Ira q w ar and T e h ra n ’s subversive p ro p a g a n d a (u n til 1989) underscored this danger. T h u s, besides ste p p in g u p security m easures since 1980, R iyadh has accelerated A l-S harqiyya’s developm ent an d su en g th en ed and im proved its ad m in istratio n . Progressively, the regim e was able to pacify, if n o t win the good w ill of, the m ajority of the Shi'ites. In retrospect the failure of the Mecca rebellion an d the little su p p o rt th at the ‘Ik h w a n ’ w on rath er d em onstrated that, in co n trad ictio n to o ther A rab an d M uslim countries, ‘n eo -fu n d am en talism ’ in Saudi A rabia, in this period, appealed only to p erip h e ra l elem ents. M ost Saudis, especially the religious an d conservative ‘low er classes’, are q u ite h ap p y w ith the synthesis of ‘p u rita n is m ’, m o dernism a n d m aterial prosperity, provided by Al Saud a n d legitim ised by the o n g o in g allian ce betw een the latter an d the u lam a. T rib a l loyalties, w hich began to erode at the tim e of the Ik h w an rebellion, m oreover, proved of little consequence fifty years later d u rin g the Mecca incid en t. Indeed, despite ru m o urs to the contrary, nearly all the b ed o u in an d the new ly u rbanised masses an d the N atio n al G u ard rem ained absolutely loyal to the Sauds. Such su p p o rt was co n d itio n al on the c o n tin u e d pro sp erity of the p o p u la tio n an d their satisfaction w ith the regim e’s perform ance. Yet in spite of the econom ic recession w hich the k in g d o m experienced in the 1980s, the p o p u la tio n , on the w hole, c o n tin u e d to su p p o rt the Sauds.58 T h e dam age caused by the Mecca affair to the prestige of the Saudi regim e was considerable. T h e Sauds, w ho took to themselves the role of ‘protectors of the holy places’ w hen they conquered the H ijaz, were w idely criticised for th e ir in ab ility to prevent the Mecca rebellion an d th eir m ish a n d lin g of its suppression. Ju h a y m a n ’s co n d em n atio n of the royal fam ily’s c o rru p tio n , the scandalous b eh av io u r of m any of its m em bers a n d th eir association w ith infidels did n o t go unheeded either. Prince Fawwaz, the governor of Mecca, accused by Ju h a y m a n of in d u lg ­ in g in alcoholic beverages, w as rem oved from office, some senior officers in charge of the k in g d o m ’s in tern al security were retired, and restrictions co n cern in g the possession of sp irits an d the beh av io u r of foreign residents were m ore strictly enforced. Aware of the grass-roots a p p re h e n ­ sion co n cerning the k in g d o m ’s rap id developm ent, K ing K halid an d C row n P rince F ahd expanded, m oreover, the u la m a ’s a u th o rity in relation to the supervisio n of the k in g d o m ’s W ahhabi character, d em o n ­ stratin g w henever possible th eir ow n piety a n d devoutedness. As lo n g as the u lam a d id n o t interfere w ith the k in g d o m ’s m odern isatio n an d p olitics Fahd, d isreg ard in g the reaction of his W estern-educated technocrats, was w illin g to g ra n t the u la m a ’s dem ands co n cern in g a stricter observation of the W ah h ab i edicts an d feigned asceticism. T h u s Sum m er Scott H uyette, w ho lived in the kin g d o m in the 1970s and early 88

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1980s an d w rote her P h D thesis o n S audi A rab ia’s ‘p o litical a d a p ta tio n ’, observed: T hey [the graduates of the three religious universities] rem ain the m ainstay of the legitim acy of the Al S aud a n d they do n o t hesitate to m ake th eir presence felt, e n jo in in g the k in g to adhere to the tenets of ib n ‘A bd al-W ahhab, b u t th eir im p act is felt m ore in the social th a n in the p o litica l realm .59 F a h d ’s new policy of course o u trag ed the intelligentsia, p articu larly its H ijazi m em bers a n d m ost of the W estern-educated technocrats.

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T H E Z E N I T H OF T H E NEW E L I T E S ’ POWE R: A FALSE DAWN (1979-83) T H E M ID D L E-C L A SS E L IT E S ’ S T R U G G L E FOR P O L I T IC A L P A R T IC IP A T IO N By 1980 the Saudi school p o p u la tio n was a b o u t one an d a h alf m illio n strong. N early 11,000 S audis g rad u ated th a t year from local an d foreign in stitu tio n s of h ig h er learn in g ; the m ajority of them jo in ed the prestig io u s civil service. In a d d itio n to sixteen cabinet m inisters, 2,000 senior technocrats held a P h D o r an MA degree. M any o th er university an d h ig h school graduates jo in ed the p rivate sector of the econom y and becam e m em bers of the professions, businessm en, in d u strialists and contractors or were em ployed in the private sector in m anagerial p o si­ tio n s.1 In the early 1980s it seemed th a t the new m iddle class, led by the technocratic ‘aristocracy’, had reached the zenith of its pow er. A lth o u g h the ru lin g class did n o t g ra n t them p o litical p artic ip a tio n , the ‘new m en ’ were largely absorbed in to the system an d formed a non-royal elite w hich exerted enorm ous pow er a n d com peted for a u th o rity w ith the trad itio n al non-royal elite. T h e technocratic u p p er-crust shared indirectly in policy­ m ak in g , by c o n tro llin g the h u g e governm ent budgets, by p a rtic ip a tin g in the cabinet discussions or by actin g as advisers to the in form al royal m ajlis al-shura, n o t to m en tio n th eir active role in th eir respective m inistries.2 T h e technocratic elite seemed to enjoy w ealth an d prestige in ad d itio n to enorm ous pow er an d som e, such as Zaki Y am ani, were considered allpow erful in the West. T hey h ad g radually replaced the non-royal trad itio n al elites as a source of influence since the mid-1960s as the central governm ent h a d eroded the trad itio n al socio-political in s titu ­ tions. T h e ir role in the in te rn al p ow er struggle was often exaggerated. T h e ir im p act on the k in g d o m ’s foreign a n d oil policies, w hich m anifested itself in the 1979-80 crisis, was believed by som e to be also a reflection of the technocrats’ g ro w in g pow er. By the early 1980s m any foreign observers believed th a t in view of their e x p an d in g ranks it was 90

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o nly a m atter of tim e before the new elites w ou ld g a in full p o litical p a rtic ip a tio n , o r even replace alto g eth er the Sauds’ regime. In reality, the technocrats, n o tw ith sta n d in g the h o n o u rs an d au th o rity they enjoyed, rem ained senior executives and advisers to the k in g an d the royal m ajlis al-shura, th eir pow er b ein g totally dependent o n those w ho a p p o in te d them . T h e ahl al-hal w a ’l-'aqd jealously guarded the ru lin g class’s m o n opoly of decision -m ak in g an d retained the key p o sitio n s in the cabinet essential for safeg u ard in g its suprem e authority. A lth o u g h occasionally disagreeing w ith th eir m entors, aw are of the lim itatio n s of their pow er, m em bers of the technocratic upp er-cru st, especially the new N ajdi executives, reconciled them selves to the situ atio n. T h e rise of fu n d am en talism in T e h ra n a n d the 1979 neo-Ikhw an rebellion d id n o t stren g th en the in te llig e n tsia ’s p o sitio n b u t rath er forced it fu rth er in to the arm s of the regim e. W ith the exam ple of Iran fresh in their m inds, the new elites now feared a fu n d am en talist backlash aim ed a g ain st m o d ernisation a n d the secular, especially W estern-educated, m iddle class. D espite the co n stan t e x p an sio n of their ranks, the im p o rt­ ance of the H ijazi-led secular b u reaucrats suffered a grave blow w hen C row n P rince F ahd decided to ab o rt his relatively liberal policy an d seek, w henever possible, the u la m a ’s blessing for his m od ern isatio n p ro ­ gram m e. A lth o u g h he still needed th eir co-operation to govern an d develop the k in g d o m a n d to resist the conservative o p p o sitio n w ith in the ru lin g class, w hen it cam e to a choice betw een the new elites an d the ulam a Fahd, con sid erin g the circum stances, opted for the latter. M oreover, the new elites’ g ro w in g criticism of the royal fam ily’s c o rru p t practices a n d extravaganza, w hile m any of the bureaurocrats benefited far m ore from the com m ission system a n d kickbacks, h a rd ­ ened the ru lin g class’s o p p o sitio n to ‘d em o cratisin g ’ the regim e. It also accelerated the trend to prefer ‘local’ N ajd i technocrats an d civil servants to the p o litically sophisticated a n d conscious, a n d religiously ‘lib e ra l’, H ijazi bourgeois elite.4 Even before the Mecca rebellion was over, the rulers revived the com m ittee charged w ith e x p lo rin g ways a n d m eans to involve the new m iddle class in the p o litical process. O n 10 Ja n u ary 1980, C row n Prince Fahd an n o u n ced the g o v ern m en t’s in te n tio n to p ro m u lg ate a basic law (based o n the shari'a), to establish a n a tio n a l m ajlis al-shura ‘th a t w ould share w ith the cabinet the responsibilities of g o v ern m en t’ an d to re­ organise the p rovincial governm ent. An eight-m em ber com m ittee m ade u p of u lam a an d conservative m inisters headed by P rince N a’if was ap p o in te d on 18 M arch to study a n d propose a Basic L aw of G overnm ent (N iza m A sasi li’l-H u k m ), a fram ew ork for a N atio n al C onsultative Assem bly an d a Pro v in cial G overnm ent Act (N izam li’l-M uqata'at), m eant to m odernise the latter. T h e new m ajlis al-shura of 50-70 m em bers, it was claim ed, was to 91

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represent the different pow ers in the kingdom : the royal fam ily an d the ru lin g class as a w hole, the u lam a, the technocrats an d o th er educated elem ents. Yet, the m em bers of this ‘N atio n al Assem bly’ were to be ap p o in te d an d n o t elected. T h e ir role in the governm ent was lim ited to p a rtic ip a tio n in the legislative process b u t they lacked au th o rity to veto the k in g ’s decisions. T h e new N iza m li’l-M uqata'at was to re-define the k in g d o m ’s provinces (and tow ns), th eir status a n d the a u th o rity of the pro v in cial a m ir a n d his su b o rd in ated governors in all m atters relatin g to th eir ad m in istrativ e u n it n o t in the p u rlie u of the central governm ent. O n the day fo llo w in g K ing K h alid ’s previous edict, the m onarch also ap p o in te d new am irs for the provinces of Mecca, A l-Q asim , T a b u k and H a ’il, all of w hom were younger an d capable sons of Abd al-Aziz. T h is was the b e g in n in g of a trend to stren g th en the p ro v in cial governm ent a n d ex p an d the au th o rity of its am irs, to som e degree a t the expense of the central governm ent, reversing Faysal’s policy.5 It was evident from the start that, even if carried o u t, this reform w ould n o t tu rn Saudi A rabia in to a ‘c o n stitu tio n al dem ocracy’ an d indeed m em bers of the m ajlis al-shura were to be largely ap p o in te d from am o n g the o ld an d new elites. T h is, C row n P rince Fahd stressed, was in lin e w ith the Islam ic m ode of governm ent (ahl al-hal w a’l-'aqd), ‘as the Q u r’an was the co u n try ’s c o n stitu tio n ’.6 In the sp rin g of 1980, w hen q u estio n ed a b o u t the progress m ade by their ‘c o n stitu tio n a l’ com m ittee, Princes N a ’if an d S alm an responded th at it was still m eetin g reg u larly b u t underscored the fact th at the com m ittee was n o t p re p a rin g a co n stitu tio n because ‘the Q u r’an is Saudi A rabia’s c o n stitu tio n ’. In a press interview in M arch 1982, Fahd claim ed th a t the recom m endatio n s co n cern in g the prom ised m ajlis al-shura w ould be im plem ented in a m atter of m o n th s, a lth o u g h the co m m ittee’s report was still n o t ready.7 Q u ite obviously, once the storm was over, the Saudi ru lin g class had no in ten tio n of en ab lin g the new elites to share in decision-m aking. T h is policy was vindicated by the difficulties experienced by the K uw aiti an d B ahrayni rulers, w ho h ad experim ented w ith parliam en ts, w hich included n atio n alistic a n d fu n d am en talist mem bers. Yet Fahd, w ho sym pathised w ith the m iddle-class elites, felt com pelled at least to reassure them th at he still intended to g ran t them some p artic ip a tio n in decision-m aking, especially since he needed th eir co­ o peration . By reiteratin g previous prom ises of lim ited p o litical reforms, the crow n prince, in a d d itio n to resp o n d in g to th eir dem ands for p a rticip atio n in decision-m aking, w ished to appease the new elites, especially the H ijazi m iddle class. T h is was also necessary because the ulam a had w on concessions w h ich led to a m ore vigorous enforcem ent of W ahhabi law s a n d custom s in the H ijaz and the Eastern Province. 92

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The Saudi bourgeoisie - strength or weakness? As m entioned before, it appeared that the Saudi new elites were steadily becom ing a pow er that could no longer be ignored, because of its sheer size. By the early 1980s the technocrats and bureaucrats, professionals and the m iddle and up p er ranks of the business com m unity com ponents of the m iddle-class elites probably num bered hundreds of thousands. Yet, the new elites of the early 1980s were even less m onolithic than in the 1950s and the 1960s. R ather, the differences th at had emerged in the past, besides the N ajd i-H ijazi cleavage, were now exacerbated. T h e intelligent­ sia was n o t necessarily socially liberal an d supportive of reform. Most rem ained deeply com m itted to Islam and the Saudi way of life and critical of Western lifestyle. W hile a large num ber became very wealthy, the m ajority were well off or modestly so. W estern-educated technocrats, w ho dom inated the key positions in the governm ent and its agencies, and professionals were largely the ones most anxious to m odernise the kingdom and generally im patient w ith its traditional in stitutions in clu d in g the q uality of the domestic universities and their ‘p ro d u ct’; b u t graduates of Saudi ‘secular’ universities, jealous of the former, tho u g h they supported m odernisation and reform in principle, were m ore traditionally oriented an d introvert and therefore m ore concerned about the im pact of m odernisation on their society and culture. G raduates of religious universities and institutions, m any of rural origin, were, as expected, the m ost conservative in their outlook and critical of m any aspects of m odernisation and governm ent. They resented, moreover, the preference given by the regim e in the em ploym ent and advancem ent of their secular (hadr) counterparts and accused the foreign-educated intelligentsia of in troducing into the kingdom Western influences w hich ‘corrupted the principles of the W ahhabi state’. A foreign professor w ho had spent several years in Saudi universities described the above cleavage in the follow ing way: ‘English and Arabic are forces w hich have pow erful sym bolic valence in Saudi Arabia; they stand for m o d ern /trad itio n al; secular/sacred; alien/com fortable.’8 T h e new elites were also polarised by social status determ ined by position, incom e, level of education and connections w ith the ru lin g class. T h e num ber of ‘technocrats’ (bureaucrats) employed in the govern­ m ent adm inistration an d its agencies in 1980 was 173,290. O nly a tiny fraction (0.77%) received the highest grades’ m onthly salaries (SR6,49111,460) on the civil service pay scale and belonged to the technocratic upper-crust, largely com posed of graduates of W estern universities. A bout 21% receiving u p p er m edium - and m edium -grade salaries (SR3,076-6,490) were mostly Saudi university-educated technocrats. Over 78% of the civil servants received the lower grade of the m onthly pay scale (S R I,610-3,075) and were probably largely traditional civil servants, 93

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graduates of religious in stitu tio n s a n d of the different levels of the m odern ed ucational system. T h e standard of liv in g of the last g ro u p co u ld be considered relatively low w hen com pared w ith the o ther two g ro u p s of bureaucrats, o r w ith th eir co u n terp arts w ho opted for the less prestigious an d m ore lucrative p rivate sector. T h ey thus belonged to the low er ru n g s of the m iddle class. C learly the interests an d sym pathies of such varied co m po nen ts of the ‘new elites’ were very divergent, ad d in g to its weakness. Salary scale aside, all the above, p articu larly senior technocrats, usually am assed w ealth th ro u g h th eir connections w ith the c o u n try ’s developm ent an d very frequently were involved in business enterprises in ad d itio n to th eir g o vernm ent jo b s.9 It w ould be w ro n g to th in k of the m iddle-class elites as being synonym ous w ith the technocrats a n d bureaucrats. M any graduates of dom estic a n d foreign universities, especially the ones w hose studies were financed by th eir fam ilies, becam e professionals, businessm en o r en tre­ preneurs. Some of the m ost successful Saudi businessm en-entrepreneurs, how ever, did n o t acq u ire a university degree o r even a secondary o r an interm ediary school certificate. T h e n u m ero u s m em bers of the low er m iddle class w ho ran petty business enterprises such as sm all tru ck in g an d taxi ventures, gaso lin e statio n s an d shops, o r w ho becam e p aid sponsors (k a fil) of foreign w orkers, often of b e d o u in o rig in , obtained o nly m in im al education, if any. O bviously, in ad d itio n to the g ap in w ealth an d standard of liv in g betw een the latter an d the m iddle-class elites, their interests an d sym pathies were also different an d often opposed to those of the m em bers of the in tellig en tisa an d the u p per-crust technocrats a n d w ealthy businessm en-entrepreneurs.

The ‘lower-class’ Saudis between d a w la and h u k u m a T h e S audi ‘low er classes’, w ith the exception of an in sig n ifican t elem ent, faithfully su p p o rted the regim e, its policy an d the conservative-W ahhabi character of the Saudi kingdom . T h e ir allegiance to the governm ent of the Sauds (h u k u m a ) goes back to the pre-k in g d o m (1932) era an d has been m ain tain ed th ro u g h the netw ork of trad itio n al socio-political in stitu tio n s. Even after the estab lish m en t of the m odern Saudi k ingdom in 1932, tow nspeople, n om ads a n d ag ricu ltu ralists were still governed th ro u g h their respective hierarchy of village, tow n, d istrict a n d p ro v in ­ cial am ir, tribal shaykh (am irs) an d ‘um da. T h e leadership of the ru ral p o p u la tio n was integrated in the regim e’s pow er base th ro u g h n u m erous m atrim o n ial arrangem en ts an d m anaged to som e extent to preserve th eir influence in the ru ra l areas an d p rovincial governm ent system. T h e Saudi p atriarch al system, m oreover, provided for the needs of the largely nom adic ru ral society th ro u g h the m ajalis system, welfare services, 94

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stipends, subsidies a n d em p lo y m en t in the N atio n al G uard, the arm ed forces an d the in tern al security forces. T h e accelerated developm ent of the k in g d o m since the 1960s and th ro u g h the first an d second five-year developm ent p lan s (1970-80), m ainly benefited the tow nspeople, th o u g h they sparked off ra p id changes in the ru ral society. By creatin g attractive em p lo y m en t o p p o rtu n itie s in the cities, m oreover, they accelerated the u rb an isatio n of the b edouin and settled ru ra l p o p u la tio n . T h is, an d the developm ent of a centralised governm ent ad m in istra tio n , caused an erosion of the trad itio n al socio­ p o litical in stitu tio n s of the tribal society. Yet, the new ly urbanised, on the w hole, m ain tain ed th eir contacts w ith th eir tribes, villages an d am irs. T h e th ird five-year p la n (1980-5) already gave the h ig h est p rio rity to the ru ral p o p u la tio n w ith the aim of e q u a tin g th eir standard of liv in g to th at of the tow nspeople a n d c u rb in g the process of u rb an isatio n . Indeed, the developm ent of the ru ral areas was on e of the m ajor goals of th e fourth developm ent p la n (1985-90), b u t o w in g to the econom ic recession by the mid-1980s circum stances som ew hat ch an g ed .10 O il w ealth a n d its d isp en satio n to all levels of Saudis th ro u g h welfare services, subsidies an d the like, an d by the senior princes directly to their constituencies, helped m a in ta in the links betw een the regim e a n d the people. Al Saud con tin u es to exercise its p atria rc h a l ru le based on patro nage, m arital ties w ith the im p o rta n t tribes an d fam ilies and personal re la tio n sh ip betw een the rulers a n d the ruled. Such contacts w ith the tribal p o p u la tio n , b o th ru ra l an d new ly u rbanised, are m a in ­ tained th ro u g h the hierarchy of am irs an d o th er trad itio n al in stitu tio n s. M ost im p o rta n t are the m ajalis held by the kin g , all the senior princes a n d their offspring, the leaders of the aristocratic fam ilies a n d the p rovincial a n d d istrict am irs. T h e royal fam ily u p to the m o n arch is thus, at least in theory, accessible to the low liest citizen. H e can p etitio n for, an d receive, financial a n d o th er h elp , or may b rin g before the ru ler any grievance he has. In div id u als a n d g ro u p s, moreover, also use the m ajalis to lobby for ‘w o rth y ’ p u b lic an d regional causes." D espite the erosion of trib al or regional loyalties a n d the p en etratio n of the central governm ent th ro u g h u rb an isatio n , the tribal fraternity still eased the settlem ent of the in d iv id u al badu or villager in the tow ns by p ro v id in g financial su p p o rt a n d /o r the necessary connections in the new a n d foreign environm ents. T h u s, a lth o u g h the au th o rity of the tra d itio ­ n al socio-political in stitu tio n s of the ru ra l p o p u la tio n was often replaced by the b ureaucrats of the central governm ent (dawla) w ho now provide services a n d subsidies to the new ly urbansied masses, the latter’s alleg i­ ance is still largely reserved for the S auds’ regim e (h u k u m a ) an d its representatives. T h e deeply relig io u s new tow nspeople, moreover, may have occasionally heard the im am of their m osque criticisin g foreign 95

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M uslim rulers, the dawla an d the technocrats but, nearly always, only praise of the Sauds’ hukum a. T h e distinction m ade by the Saudi ‘lower class’ between h u ku m a and dawla, both of w hich literally m ean ‘governm ent’, is q uite significant. T o the sim ple Saudi, dawla is a synonym of the m odern central governm ent and its agencies, largely controlled by W estern-educated bureaucrats of urban origin. T h e expansion of the central governm ent’s services, and rapid urbanisation, b ro u g h t the Saudi ‘lower and lower m iddle classes’, both largely of bedouin origin, in to daily contact w ith the dawla and m ade them dependent on services and subsidies provided by it. Neverthe­ less, the new tow nspeople usually dislike the bureaucrats, w hom they consider inferior and crafty and w ho despise them. In contrast, the Sauds’ paternalistic h u ku m a , w hich retains personal contact w ith them, they believe, respects them , understands their problem s and, as befits a governm ent, provides their requirem ents whenever the need arises.12 Some authors espousing radical ideologies lam ent the fact that the Saudi ‘lower class’ is not really a lower class per se because the poorer Saudis have already elevated themselves to the m iddle class, or are in the process of doing so, an d hence are not p roper ‘revolutionary m aterial’. 15 T h e rap id expansion of m odern education am ong the rural and recently urbanised Saudis, and the rise in their standard of living, may gradually bridge the differences between the Saudi ‘lower class’ and the new elite. But at present the new elites, m ainly of urban middle-class origin, can expect little sym pathy or su p p o rt from the lower-middle-class Saudis in the form er’s bid to penetrate or overthrow the Saudi regime. After the Mecca rebellion Crown Prince Fahd was determ ined to reinforce, reorganise and m odernise the provincial adm inistration. Y oung, educated and dynam ic princes gradually replaced ineffective traditional provincial governors. T h e new am irs, using their royal connections and explo itin g the priority given to rural areas an d the less developed provinces in the third (1980-5) developm ent plan, expedited the m odernisation of their provinces or districts. T h u s, for instance, K halid al-Faysal, appo in ted in the 1970s governor of Asir, began to im prove the situation in the backw ard and neglected Southern Region. No less im pressive were the achievements of Prince M uqrin b. Abd alAziz, a form er air force m ajor, appointed (1980) as governor of the Sham m ar (H a'il) province. Besides infrastructure an d other developm ent projects w hich he bro u g h t to the region, M u qrin took advantage of the generous subsidies to agriculture and the fossil water reservoirs in the region and b ro u g h t prosperity to the p o p u latio n (of M uham m ad al-Fahd and A l-Hasa, see below). O bviously the ability to overcome the red tape of the bureaucracy and access to the king, the senior princes and ministers, were essential to the success of the new u m a r a yet education, dedication to m odernisation 96

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an d special relations between the rulers and the ruled, w hich did not pertain in the case of the m odern bureaucrats, were im p o rtan t as well. T h e previously neglected largely nom adic northern, the largely agricultural southern and the Shi'ite-dom inated eastern provinces were granted substantial budgets in the third developm ent plan, and are undergoing accelerated developm ent. In recent years their um ara’ of all ranks were given additional responsibilities and authority and they were p u t in charge of the co-ordination of all projects initiated by the different m inistries in their governorates. K ing Fahd believes, it seems, that this w ill not only com pensate the loyal rural p o p u latio n for past neglect and curb m igration to the big towns bu t that the m odernised patriarchal provincial governm ent may also offset the influence of his conservative rivals, led by A bdallah, and of the new elites, w ho dom inate the central governm ent.14

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T H E R E I G N OF KING FAHD: E C O N O M I C CRISIS AND O P P O S I T I O N (1982-7) K ing K halid died in Ju n e 1982 an d F ahd was declared king. A bdallah becam e crow n prince a n d first deputy p rim e m inister, a n d S u ltan second in line of succession an d second d eputy p rim e m inister. A lth o u g h the prearran g ed succession w ent th ro u g h sm oothly, the struggle for pow er w ith in the royal fam ily soon re-emerged. A bdallah refused to surrender the com m and of the N atio n a l G u ard , thus v io latin g the u n d erstan d in g th a t the crow n p rin ce an d d eputy p rim e m inister sh o u ld n o t h o ld a cabinet po rtfo lio . O n his p art, A bdallah strongly resented the fact the u n lik e Fahd, w ho ruled the k in g d o m in K h alid ’s nam e, he was given a title w ith o u t real au th o rity . F urtherm ore, he also believed, as d id m any others, th at the Sudayris were p la n n in g to get rid of him an d a p p o in t S u ltan as F a h d ’s successor. A bdallah opposed F a h d ’s inter-A rab and pro-A m erican policy w hich found expression in his E ig h t-P o in t P rogram m e for the settlem ent of the A rab-Israeli conflict (A ugust 1981) an d co-operation w ith the US d u rin g an d after the Israeli invasion of L eb an o n (1982/3). H e disagreed w ith the k in g d o m ’s (and O P E C ’s) oil policy an d its involvem ent w ith the GCC, a n d advocated a m ore balanced policy w ith regard to the Ira n -Ira q w ar.1 K now n for his integrity, A bdallah was critical of the m oral c o rru p tio n an d extravaganza in the royal fam ily an d the ad m in istratio n an d of Saudi A rabia’s inflated budgets. M ost conservatives, in c lu d in g m any princes, u rb an a'yan an d tribal um a ra ’, su pported A bdallah. T h e g ro u p of W estern-educated, thirdgeneration princes, led by Saud al-Faysal, sided m ore openly w ith the anti-S udayri cam p this tim e, at least in m atters relatin g to foreign affairs an d oil policy. T hey, as the m ajority of the in tellig en tsia, w o u ld also have preferred th at the k in g d o m follow a m ore n eu tra list line in w orld an d inter-A rab affairs. T h ey were also displeased w ith the excesses and lifestyle of m em bers of the royal house, led by the ‘F ahd c la n ’, in a period of risin g econom ic a n d social difficulties. T h ey were also suspicious of the S udayris’ in ten tio n s reg ard in g the succession to the throne, believing th at the tim e had com e for the younger generatio n of Sauds to take over. 98

T H E R E IG N O F K IN G FAHD (1982-7) T a b le 7.1 S au d i A rab ia’s oil revenues 1981-92 Year

B illio n f

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992

108 70 37 35 22 16-18 (est.) 17.8 16.6 23 (est.) 43 over 40 (est.)

Source: FT, 22 July 1985, 21 April 1986, supplement, 30 April 1986, 2 January 1987; Knauerhase, 'Future', p. 75; IH T , 3 June 1986, 3-4 January 1987; N Y T , 8 February 1987; IH T , 20 December 1989, according to SAMA; Budget for 1989; FT, 2 January 1991, estimate of the Gulf International Bank; FT, 30 January 1992, supplement Saudi Arabia, p. II.

O P E C ’s su b stan tial price hikes in 1980 caused d em and for its oil, and oil prices, to decline in the co m in g years. T h is was due to the in tro d u c ­ tion of conservation m easures a n d alternative sources of energy by the in d u strial countries an d risin g p ro d u ctio n of no n -O P E C oil. In order to m a in ta in O P E C ’s shaky u n ity an d its leadership in it, Saudi A rabia gradually becam e the o rg a n isa tio n ’s ‘sw ing p ro d u cer’ (reducing its pro d u ctio n as d em an d for o il declined on the u n d erstan d in g th a t it w o u ld increase it w hen d em an d rose). Saudi p ro d u ctio n thus fell from ab o u t ten m illio n barrels daily in 1981 to a b o u t two m illio n by Septem ber 1985. H ence, the k in g d o m ’s revenue from oil, its m ain source of incom e, rapid ly declined from 1982 onw ards (see T ab le 7.1), o w in g to the fall in pro d u ctio n as w ell as decreasing o il prices. T h e intense pow er struggle in the royal fam ily since 1982/3 was th u s accom panied by g ro w in g criticism of F a h d ’s ‘catastro p h ic ’ oil policy, responsible for the k in g d o m ’s econ­ om ic crisis, on the one h a n d a n d his ‘in e p t’ foreign policy o n the o ther (A m erica’s pro-Israeli policy, decline of the Saudi role a n d prestige in the Arab w orld an d Ira n ’s in im ical attitu d e to the Saudi kingdom ). T h e Saudi g o v ern m en t’s b u d g et was largely dep en d en t on its oil revenue because the regim e was unable, an d u n w illin g , o w ing to religious an d p o litical factors, to tax the p o p u la tio n . A lth o u g h R iyadh co n tin u ed to draw u p o n its en o rm o u s fin an cial reserves (estim ated in 1981/2 a t over 150 b illio n dollars), it was obliged, nevertheless, p ro ­ gressively to reduce its a n n u a l b u dget by 1985/6 to ju st over o ne-half of its size in 1982/3 (see T ab le 7.2) an d to 37.5 b illio n in 1988. Subsequently the k in g d o m ’s econom ic activity, largely dependent on governm ent spend­ ing, totally stagnated. T h e p rivate sector faced, therefore, increasing 99

SAUDI ARABIA T able 7.2 S audi A rab ia’s budgets 1981/2 - 1992 Year

B illion $

1981-2 1982-3 1983-4 1984-5 1985-6 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

82.7 91 75 75 56.3 45.3 37.50 37.60 38.13 N o bu d g et 48.3

Source: Business America, 13 July 1981; Field, FT, 22 April 1985, supplement; Reuter from Riyadh, 5 January 1987; Saudi Budget Estimates, The Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Commercial Office (Washington, DC, 6 August 1991); FT, 30 January 1992, supplement Saudi Arabia, p. II.

hard sh ip s as business contracted a n d thousands of com panies, some am o n g the largest in the kin g d o m , faced cash-flow difficulties, an d even w ent b an k ru p t. As their incom e declined the Saudi p o p u la tio n n atu rally reduced its spending. T h is affected n o t only im porters b u t also the nascent dom estic industry. T h e petrochem ical an d o th er oil- an d energyintensive industries, in w hich the Saudi governm ent invested th ro u g h Saudi A rabian Basic Industries C o rp o ratio n (SABIC) tens of b illio n s of dollars, also proved far less pro fitab le th a n expected. T h u s, its c o n trib u ­ tion to the diversification of the k in g d o m ’s sources of revenue is still sm all com pared w ith the en o rm o u s investm ent in it.2 For a country of ab o u t eig h t m illio n p eople of w hom only a b o u t six m illio n are citizens, the Saudi b udget in 1985/6, in the vicinity of 56 billio n , was still extravagant. Yet, for p o litical reasons the Sudayris were u n w illin g significantly to reduce the en orm ous budgets of the m inistries of defence an d interio r or h a lt the developm ent of the po o rer N o rth ern an d S outhern R egions an d the p ro b lem atic Eastern Province, neglected u n til 1980. N or were they w illin g to cu t m ean in g fu lly the enorm ous subsidies and extensive w elfare services w hich the p o p u la tio n enjoyed. Indeed, w hen the governm ent attem pted to scale dow n the unrealistic subsidies for a g ricu ltu re (largely ben efitin g com panies established by the w ealthy) a n d gasoline, the m atter caused such an outcry th at the regim e quickly shelved the p la n s.1 T h a t nearly a m illio n foreign workers and experts, in c lu d in g tens of tho u san d s of W esterners, left Saudi A rabia betw een 1982 an d 1987 may have pleased the ulam a and the n ationalists, b u t it fu th er aggravated th e c o u n try ’s econom ic stagnation. E conom ic activity declined, tens of tho u san d s of villas an d n u m ero u s office 100

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bu ild in g s in the k in g d o m ’s m ain tow ns stood em pty; rents w hich provided m any Saudis w ith a han d so m e incom e were halved, an d in some cases reduced to a b o u t a th ird com pared w ith 1982.1 W hat at first was believed to be a tem porary crisis developed in to a pro lo n g ed econom ic recession. P aradoxically, w hile Saudi A rabia still em ployed nearly tw o an d a h alf m illio n foreigners, the p h en o m en o n of u n em p lo y m en t am o n g Saudi citizens re-emerged, o w in g to social mores a n d lack of skills. School leavers, moreover, m et w ith increasing difficulties in fin d in g em ploym ent, w hile salaries were noticeably reduced. T h e vocational school system, however, w hich o th er th an in the E astern Province failed to attract students, benefited from the new situ atio n because of the c o u n try ’s c o n tin u ed need for technicians and m echanics. Yet, m ost of the 'low er-class’ students, w ho enrolled in , and grad u ated from , vocational in stitu tio n s, rath er th an rep lacin g foreign m echanics an d technicians, becam e w o rkshop an d garage owners, e x p lo itin g the generous governm ent g ran ts and h irin g foreign forem en an d w orkers.5 U niversity graduates, w ho were previously snapped u p by the civil service or the private sector, m et w ith g ro w in g difficulties in fin d in g em ploym ent; this w as p articu larly true of those w ith degrees in Islam ic studies, h u m an ities an d social sciences. In the early 1980s m ost graduates of the dom estic universities still insisted on em plo y m en t in the m etro p o litan tow ns, a lth o u g h they had to settle for progressively less im p o rta n t positions. By the mid-1980s such graduates were considered lucky to get an a p p o in tm e n t in the ru ral areas, previously socially unacceptable. A h ig h e r percentage of students, a lth o u g h still less th a n a third , turned, therefore, to the m ore d em an d in g an d less p restigious (in Saudi A rabia) en g in ee rin g an d science faculties, the graduates of w hich could still find attractive em p lo y m en t o p p o rtu n ités. B ut as the recession becam e m ore severe in 1986, u n em p lo y m en t am o n g university graduates becam e a com m on p h en o m en o n an d was openly discussed in the Saudi press. T h e universities tig h ten ed their adm ission requirem ents an d reduced the stu d en ts’ stipends. T hey also failed m any m ore students in th eir final exam s, allegedly o n governm ent in stru ctio n s, to reduce the pressure on it to provide suitable em ploym ent. Yet occasionally the regim e intervened o n beh alf of students o w ing to p o litical consider­ atio n s.6 By 1984 the A ssociation of C ham bers of Com m erce an d Industry (below), lobbied the k ing, alb eit unsuccessfully, to disregard O P E C an d increase the k in g d o m ’s oil p ro d u ctio n an d , subsequently, governm ent spending. T hey m anaged, nevertheless, to persuade the governm ent to p ro m u lg ate a law re q u irin g foreign contractors o p era tin g in Saudi A rabia to purchase in the kin g d o m supplies, services an d Saudi products to the value of at least 30 per cent of th eir contract. L ater on the ‘offset’ 101

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requirem ents were expanded to include the settin g u p of jo in t ventures w ith Saudi entrepreneu rs in the field of h ig h technology. Indeed the fo u rth developm ent p la n (1985-90) was based on the assu m p tio n th a t the private sector w ould take over from the governm ent the burden of diversifying the k in g d o m ’s econom y.' A pprehensive of the fu tu re of th eir co u n try ’s econom y, m any Saudi businessm en preferred to invest th eir w ealth, valued at betw een 100 and 200 b illio n d ollars, in the econom ies of the m ajo r W estern ind u strial countries. D u rin g the second conference of the A ssociation of C ham bers of C om m erce an d Ind u stry in M arch 1985 K ing Fahd, h in tin g at the flig h t of cap ital from the kingdom , invited Saudi businessm en to take advantage of the in frastru ctu re provided by their governm ent an d the absence of tax atio n in Saudi A rabia to invest in th eir c o u n try ’s econom y. T h e S audi capitalists, how ever, used to governm ent su p p o rt an d subsidies, considered the ru le r’s request a w arn in g signal an d m any transferred ad d itio n al funds to foreign countries.8 By the last q u a rte r of 1985 the k in g d o m ’s econom ic situ atio n rapidly deteriorated a n d its oil p ro d u c tio n bottom ed at a b o u t two m illio n barrels daily. K ing Fahd now gave in to the pressure of m any senior princes, and of the business co m m u n ity , an d decided to ab an d o n the k in g d o m ’s role as ‘sw ing p ro d u cer’. At the b e g in n in g of 1986 he accepted Zaki Y am an i’s strategy to step u p S audi p ro d u c tio n substan tially an d cause the oil price to decline to un d er 20 dollars a barrel, possibly as low as 15 dollars. T h is, it was hoped, w ould d iscip lin e O P E C m em bers an d coerce n o n -O P E C oil countries in to agreein g to lim it th eir p ro d u ctio n , e n ab lin g O P E C (and S audi A rabia) to regain its ‘fair share of the m ark et’. H owever, this strategy backfired an d led to a total collapse of oil prices. In 1986 the S audi oil ind u stry was g en eratin g a fraction of the revenue th a t it had produced in the early 1980s. Still in sistin g on p ro v id in g the citizens w ith all the services an d m ost of the subsidies th at they enjoyed in the past, the governm en t was d raw in g u p o n the co u n try ’s financial reserves at an unprecedented rate.9 U n w illin g to reveal its predicam ent, the Saudi regim e postp o n ed the p u b lica tio n in M arch of its a n n u al budget for 1986/7. Even earlier, it becam e com m on for all m inistries to delay, as lo n g as possible, pay m en t to contractors an d suppliers, a policy th at aggravated the difficulties of local an d foreign com panies in Saudi A rabia an d led to m any bankruptcies. T h e situ atio n so deteriorated th a t ru m o u rs began to circulate that governm ent em ployees w o uld have to forgo part of th eir pay. T h u s in a speech to the n a tio n on 10 M arch, K ing Fahd assured the p o p u la tio n th at am p le funds were available for salaries an d for all the p lan n e d ex p en d i­ tures of the gov ern m en t.10 T h e budget, however, was n ot pu b lish ed until the end of the year, after the k ing, in desperation, ab andoned the ‘fair 102

T H E R E I G N O F K I N G F A H D ( 19 8 2 - 7 )

share of the m ark et’ strategy, and sacked Y am ani, an d after O P E C agreed to lim it its p ro d u ctio n and a d o p t a n 18-dollars-a-barrel reference price. Even then the k in g d o m ’s b u dget was based on the assu m p tion th at a deficit of ab o u t 13 b illio n dollars (in reality abo u t 17 b illio n ) w ould be draw n from reserves. S peak in g for the governm ent, P rince S ultan ju stified the size of the b udget (over 30 per cent of w hich w ent to defence), w hich drew criticism from the technocrats, by the need to m a in ta in the level of services an d the stan d ard of liv in g to w hich the Saudi p o p u la tio n was accustom ed." O bviously, at a tim e w hen the reg im e’s prestige was at a low ebb, it w as essential to keep the S audi masses content, so as to m ain ta in th eir su p p o rt for the Sauds.

F A H D ’S PO LICIES A N D IN T E R N A L C H A L L E N G E S The consolidation of the Sudayris’ hegemony A ggravated by budgetary cuts the friction betw een the two m ajor cam ps in the royal house reached a clim ax in the first m o n th s of 1983. By March it was widely ru m o u red th a t C row n P rince A bdallah an d the N atio n al G u ard were involved in an abortive co u p against K ing Fahd. T h e po larisatio n in the ru lin g class, as portrayed by the foreign m edia, seemed so acute th at A bdallah broke the u su al silence of the Sauds a b o u t royal fam ily politics an d p ru d en tly g ran ted an interview to a K uw aiti n ew sp ap er,'2 in w hich he categorically denied the ru m o u red c o u p and his involvem ent in any p lo t ag ain st the king. Yet he ad m itted the serious differences in the royal house reg ard in g the k in g d o m ’s in tern al (m odernisatio n) and external policies (relations w ith the West, Iran, the Arabs a n d oil) and, indirectly, accused Fahd of indecisive leadership. T h is interview was p artly an o utcom e of endeavours by the ahl al-hal w a ’l-'aqd to reunite the ru lin g class at a tim e of g ro w in g challenges to the regim e. Faced w ith a fin an cial crisis, subversion by a victorious fu n d am en talist Iran a n d risin g d isco n ten t a m o n g the new m iddle class, the ahl al-hal w a’l-'aqd accelerated in 1983 a n d early 1984 th eir efforts to re-establish the royal fam ily’s w avering external consensus (ijm a ' ). T h e outcom e was the co n solidation of the ‘collective lead e rsh ip ’ an d the increased influence of the royal C onsultative C ou n cil on decision-m aking. By 1984, m oreover, the Sudayris no long er seemed to challenge C row n P rince A b d allah ’s po sitio n as h eir ap p a re n t and co m m an d er of the relatively w eak N atio n al G u ard a n d agreed to let the latter develop alongside the arm ed forces. O n his p art, A bdallah refrained thereafter from publicly c h a lle n g in g K ing F a h d ’s policies a n d ap p eared to accept the latter’s role as active prim e m in ister.13 A m ost significant feature of F a h d ’s policies in the 1980s was the large103

S AUDI ARABIA

scale a p p o in tm e n t of y o u n g m em bers of the royal fam ily and offspring of o th er com ponents of the ru lin g class to im p o rta n t p ositions in the civil service, the imarates (provincial ad m in istratio n ) a n d the arm ed and security forces. T h e recognised branches of Al Saud, the A l-Shaykh, Jilu w is, T h u n a y a n s a n d Al Sudayri, by them selves probably n u m b er over 20,000 males. T h u s, candidates for such a p p o in tm en ts abounded. In his previously m entioned P hD thesis (1982), M ashaal A bdullah T u rk i Al Saud suggested the involvem ent of the n u m ero u s y o ung Sauds in the ad m in istratio n . E ager to assum e an active role in the k in g d o m ’s govern­ m ent these young m en, he claim ed, are ideologically dedicated to the k in g d o m ’s S a u d i-W ah h a b i character an d have a vested interest in the regim e’s survival, u n lik e the secular, n atio n alistic m iddle-class tech no crats.” Shortly after the reco n ciliatio n in the ru lin g house, M ishari, one of K ing S a u d ’s n um erou s sons, was a p p o in te d com m ander of the N ational G u ard in the crucial E astern Province. T h is, an d o th er ap p o in tm en ts of K ing S au d ’s sons in the follo w in g years, re q u irin g the a u th o risa tio n of the royal m ajlis al-shura an d the kin g , were probably an outcom e of efforts to reconcile the different branches of the royal fam ily. T hey were also in line w ith F a h d ’s policy to involve Ib n S au d ’s younger sons an d the d isgruntled th ird -g en eratio n Sauds in the k in g d o m ’s ad m in istra tio n and the p ro v in cial gov ern m en t.15 W hen F ah d was m in ister of the in terio r (1963-75) he g radually began to im p la n t m em bers of the ‘Sudayri Seven’ clan, th eir clients an d their ‘trib a l’ relatives in the pro v in cial governm ent. P rince Salm an (born 1936), probably the m ost capable an d p o p u la r of his full brothers, was a p p o in ted a m ir of the key R iyadh province (imara) as early as 1962. T h e au th o rity of such um ara’ was partly to offset the influence enjoyed by Princes K halid a n d A bdallah a m o n g the ru ral p o p u la tio n an d ulam a. T h e gradual ‘S u d ay ri-isatio n ’ of the p rovincial governm ent was fu rther accelerated w hen N a’if took over from C row n P rince Fahd in 1975 the M inistry of the Interio r, directly responsible for p rovincial governm ent an d governors (um ara’ al-m anatiq). In this he was occasionally assisted by com m oner m inisters loyal to him w ho controlled the budgets of the royal m inistries allied w ith A bdallah (P rince M ajid resigned from the governm ent in 1979). In 1977 F ahd exploited the reorganisation of the provinces, expanded su b stan tially the R iyadh province governed by S alm an an d im p lan ted S udayri su p p o rters in o th er provinces. As crow n prince, Fahd was also able to help a p p o in t an d advance his kinsm en an d his allies to key p ositio n s in the governm ent and its ad m in istratio n . T h u s, by the early 1980s, we find Sudayris an d th eir allies as governors, deputy governors a n d senior ad m in istrato rs, of m any of the k in g d o m ’s fourteen provinces an d by 1985 of the Eastern R egion as w ell.16 T h e sam e strategy was used by F a h d ’s full brothers N a’if an d S ultan 104

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w ith regard to th eir m inistries an d sensitive p o sitio n s in the security and arm ed forces. N early all of P rin ce S u lta n ’s sons served as senior a ir force officers (S alm an ’s son, an a ir force m ajor, took p a rt in a US space flight). M any sons of his S udayri bro th ers an d th eir royal an d non-royal trad itio n al elites allies (in c lu d in g the descendants of th eir uncles and m any A l-Shaykhs) also h o ld key p o sitio n s in the arm ed forces, the M inistry of Defence and o th e r m inistries. Indeed, the fo u rth com m and of the Saudi arm ed forces, the a ir defence com m and, organised in 1986, was entrusted to S u lta n ’s son P rince K halid, w ho was p rom oted to m ajor general (com m ander of the Arab forces in the 1990/1 G u lf war). Sudayris and their allies h old as well all the im p o rta n t dep artm en ts of the M inistry of the In terio r an d co m m an d its various security forces, in clu d in g the feared m a b a h ith .'7 T h e stren g th en in g of the prov in cial governm ent by Fahd, reversing Faysal’s policy, eroded som ew hat the au th o rity of the central govern­ m ent, controlled by the new elites, an d was also consistent w ith the regim e’s policy of b alan c in g centres of pow er. Yet the m ain th ru st of this policy was aim ed, it seems, at c o u n terin g the influence of Prince A bdallah and, u n til 1982, of K ing K halid an d his b ro th er M uham m ad (Jilu w i cam p) a m o n g the tribes an d o ther ru ral elem ents. In ad d itio n to the M u ja h id u n D epartm en t d ealin g w ith o ffspring of Ibn S au d ’s early bedouin follow ers, the M inistry of the In te rio r is also responsible for the p rovincial governm ents and their budgets an d for co -o rd in ating the activities of th eir u m a ra ’. Especially since 1980 (the th ird developm ent p la n ) the m inistry has been increasingly involved, together w ith the p ro v in cial governors, in the accelerated developm ent of the ru ral areas an d the im provem ent of the stan d ard of living of th eir p o p u latio n . T h e m in istry ’s special security forces recruited their personnel largely from am o n g ru ral or ex-tribal p o p u la tio n . T hese forces were rap id ly expanded in the 1980s a n d are a p p ro a c h in g in m an p o w er the stren g th of the N atio n al G uard. T h e ‘security tra in in g city’, established in 1982, gave N a ’if a role in the defence an d security fields equal to those of A bdallah a n d S u lta n .18 C ontrol of the M inistry of the In terio r thus enabled the Sudayris to consolidate a n d ex p an d th eir influence a m o n g the ru ral an d the newly urbanised low er m idd le class. N ot su rp risin g ly , w ith the resources of the M inistry of Defence, n o t to m en tio n the m onarchy, also at th eir disposal, the Sudayris have lured to th eir cam p in recent years m any b edouin um ara', regional a'yan an d th eir follow ers, previously su pporters of C row n Prince A bdallah. T h e Sudayris, it seems, expanded their co n tro l to the m edia as well. P rince T u rk i ibn Sultan is the director of the d ep artm en t of press in the M inistry of In fo rm atio n , w hose m inister, G eneral Ali al-S h a'ir, is F ah d ’s son-in-law , an d m any editors of Saudi new spapers are Sudayris. Indeed, 105

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Fahd frequently utilises the Saudi television an d radio to inform his subjects of th eir c o u n try ’s progress an d problem s. H e often visits universities an d academ ies an d answ ers stu d en ts’ queries an d this fact, an d w h at he says, is alw ays p ro m in en tly reported by the media. T h e co n so lid atio n of the Sudayris' pow er base at the expense of the Jilu w i cam p, despite the seem ing ‘collective lead ersh ip ’ and the claim ed erosion in the k in g ’s prestige in the mid-1980s, was evident in o th er areas as well. P rince A hm ad (deputy m in ister of the interior), and later his nephew M uh am m ad al-F ah d , took over after 1981 some of the duties of Abd al-M u h sin a l-Jilu w i, the reactionary an d ineffective governor of the crucial E astern Province. Nevertheless, by giv in g a free h a n d to the W ahhabi u lam a a n d th eir M orality Police, Abd al-M u h sin enhanced the tension w ith the Shi'ites in this crucial province w here m any A m ericans and o th er W esterners em ployed by A ram co an d the M inistry of Defence lived. After an earlier a tte m p t to get rid of Abd al-M uhsin failed, M u ham m ad al-F ahd an d h is cousin Fahd al-S alm an (P rince S alm an ’s son), officially replaced the governor an d his deputy respectively a t the b e g in n in g of 1985 a n d b ro u g h t to a n end the governm ent of the Jilu w i ‘dynasty’ in A l-Sharqiyya. A nother son of K ing Fahd, Saud, was a p p o in ted in 1985 d ep u ty to T u rk i al-Faysal, the head of external intelligence (Istikhbara t al-'A m m a), K ing Faysal’s son. B andar Ibn S u ltan (m arried to T u rk i al-F aysal’s sister), the W estern-educated e x -pilot son of the m inister of defence, was a p p o in te d in 1983 am bassador to the U nited States. T h u s, K ing F ahd provided him self w ith a direct lin k to W ashington, bypassing the foreign office, controlled by Saud al-Faysal.20 It is evident th at the Sudayris enjoyed the su p p o rt of a n u m b er of the ‘y o u n g er’ sons of K ing Abd al-Aziz an d o th er m em bers of the royal fam ily, w ho them selves, o r their offspring, were a p p o in te d to different p ositions in the govern m en t an d the ‘imarates system ’ or granted special concessions w hich enriched them . Even m ore im p o rta n t was the alliance betw een the ‘Fahd c la n ’ an d the descendants of some of the k in g ’s p aternal an d m atern al uncles an d lead in g representatives of Al alShaykh. H ence, if a new c o n fro n tatio n were to break o u t in the royal house in regard to the m o n a rc h ’s au th o rity o r the problem of succession, the Sudayris could c o u n t on sub stan tial su p p o rt in the ru lin g class as w ell. Indeed the Ira n -Ira q w ar has fu rth er strengthened the S udayris’ p o sitio n in the Saudi ru lin g class. Yet, on the other h an d , there was intensive o p p o sitio n in the royal house, b oth am o n g senior a n d frustrated ‘th ird -g en e ratio n ’ princes, to the S udayris’ dynastical tendencies an d endeavours to m o nopolise power. M oreover, as was the case w ith Faysal betw een 1958 an d 1960, the su p p o rt for Fahd a m o n g the different com ponents of the aristocracy an d the m iddle class (it is alleged even am o n g the Sudayris) was co n d itio n al on his success as a ruler, w h ich has been som ew hat tarnished as a result of 106

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events in the region a n d the econom ic crisis in Saudi A rabia u n til 1990. Between 1985 an d 1989, o w in g to the decline of the oil revenue w hich had fuelled the k in g d o m ’s prosperity an d co n trib u ted to its stability, govern­ m ent budgets have been halved an d econom ic activity has stagnated. Saudi A rab ia’s prestige has also u n d erg o n e an erosion due to its inab ility to co n tin u e sub sidisin g A rab an d T h ird W orld countries an d R iy ad h ’s in ab ility to influence A m erica’s pro-Israeli policy. T h e p ro liferatio n of royal officials in the provincial g o vernm ent and of royal technocrats in the central governm en t also antagonises the m iddle-class elites w ith w hom they com pete. T e n sio n w ith in the royal fam ily, th o u g h still covert, was rising; b u t it was tem pered by ap p re h en sio n a b o u t the rise of W ahhabi fu n d am en ta­ lism , dissatisfaction am o n g the masses an d m iddle class an d the fear of Ira n ’s pow er. T h e recession experienced by the kin g d o m was partly a ttrib u ted , by elem ents in the aristocracy an d the m iddle class, to F ah d ’s in a p titu d e as a ruler, a n d to the ‘failu re’ of his foreign policy.2' S im ilar accusations led to the d e th ro n in g of K ing Saud in 1964, yet Fahd is by far a better statesm an a n d ru ler th an Saud an d com m ands a broad su p p o rt w hich he has m anaged to consolidate in recent years.

The regime and national integration A 1982 doctoral thesis of A bdallah Ali al-Ib rah im dem onstrates how the m o dernisation of S audi A rabia u n til the 1980s favoured the central p rovince (N ajd) an d the m ore developed W estern Province (Hijaz). D evelopm ent has, how ever, largely bypassed the desert bedouinin h ab ited N o rth ern R egion (H a ’il, Q urayat, T a b u k and A l-Jaw f p ro ­ vinces) and, to a lesser extent, the Eastern Province.22 T h e n o rth ern and the sou thern provinces still had in the early 1980s ‘a h ig h rate of illiteracy, in ad eq u ate access to social services an d physical in frastru ctu re’. S ubsequently th eir p o p u la tio n m ig rated to H ijaz an d N ajd, where attractive em ploym ent o p p o rtu n itie s a n d governm ent services abounded. M inim al developm ent a n d a very h ig h rate of m ig ratio n were p articu larly noticeable in relatio n to the densely p o p u la ted S outhern R egion (over 25 per cent of the Saudi p o p u la tio n ). A n offshoot of Yemen, it su p p lied cheap lab o u r to Saudi ru ral an d u rb a n areas. In the sparsely p o p u lated n o rth , the settlem ent of b ed o u in nom ads has gathered m om en tu m w ith g overnm ent h elp since the late 1960s. Yet, in b o th regions jealousy of the prosperity of N ajd an d H ijaz caused fru stratio n an d alien atio n . In Asir, for instance, su p p o rt grew for N asserism in the 1960s an d for radical n atio n alism a n d separatist tendencies in the 1970s and 1980s.*3 T h e a p p o in tm e n t of young, dynam ic governors such as Princes K halid al-Faysal (Asir - to fu rth er stren gth en the S udayris’ alliance w ith AlFaysal), M u q rin b in Abd al-Aziz (H a ’il) a n d Fahd b in K halid al-Sudayri 107

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(w ho replaced his father, the ‘Sudayri Seven' m aternal uncle, as governor of N ajran), coincided w ith the th ird five-year developm ent p la n (1980-5) w hich gave the highest p rio rity to the developm ent of the perip h eral ru ral areas. T h e generous developm ent allocations and subsidies for ag ricu ltu re com pletely changed the above regions by the mid-1980s and halted m ig ratio n from them . Schools, infirm aries, h ospitals, roads and airfields were constructed, ru n n in g w ater, electricity an d telephones were introduced, lan d was d istrib u ted a n d the stan d ard of living of the p o p u la tio n was noticeably im proved. A ttem ptin g to pro m o te natio n al in teg ratio n and w in the favour of the ru ral p o p u la tio n , K ing Fahd insisted th at despite the drastic cuts in the g o v ern m en t’s budget in the mid-1980s an d thereafter developm ent allo catio n s for the N orthern, S o uthern and E astern regions sh o u ld rem ain a p rio rity .24 C om paratively speaking, the Eastern Province experienced some developm ent in the 1960s an d 1970s due to the oil industry an d A ram co’s o perations, yet its S h i'ite p o p u la tio n was the m ost d iscrim inated ag ain st in the kingdom . After the 1979-80 riots and the rise of Ira n ia n subversive activities in the G ulf, P rin ce M u h am m ad was instructed by C row n Prince Fahd personally to supervise the speeded-up developm ent of the Eastern P rovince an d to im prove the treatm ent of its S h i'ite com m unity. M ore­ over, F ahd an d K ing K halid (after 1982 K ing Fahd) regularly visited AlS h arq iy y a’s m ajo r tow ns, m eeting w ith their sectarian leadership and business co m m u n ities and w ith the students an d faculty of its two universities. T h e in stab ility in the k ingdom fo llo w in g F a h d ’s succession an d the rise of subversion in the E astern Province in 1982-3 caused the regim e to accelerate its effort to develop the region, im prove the standard of living and abolish the inferio r status of the S h i'ite com m unity. F ollow ing a visit by K ing Fahd to A l-Sharqiyya in the sum m er of 1983, it was decided to give p rio rity to developing p arts of the E astern Province w ith h ig h S h i'ite concentrations, especially the tow ns of Q atif an d H u fu f w hich d id n o t benefit from the oil boom . S im ultaneously, in the face of the intensified activities of leftist-supported w orkers an d in tellectuals an d p ro -Iran ian S h i'ite org an isatio n s, the g overnm ent accelerated the con stru ctio n of a N atio n al G u ard tow n near D am m am an d a ‘m ilitary to w n ’ n ear H u fu f an d reinforced the security forces in the province.2’ T h e pace of developm ent activity in the Eastern Province in the years 1980 to 1985 was the m ost intense in the kingdom , surpassing that of N ajd a n d H ijaz. A irfields, ports, h ospitals, schools, roads an d o ther facilities were feverishly constructed all over A l-Sharqiyya. T h e Jub ay l super-m odern oil-related in d u strial centre becam e o p eratio n al an d was follow ed by three in d u stria l sites aro u n d the tow n of D am m am .26 T h e a p p o in tm e n t of his son an d nephew as governor an d deputy governor m ay have been p ro m p ted by royal fam ily politics. Yet Fahd 108

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probably intended M u h am m ad , his able (and controversial) son, to accelerate as well A l-H asa’s developm ent and reduce sectarian tensions in the province d u rin g a d ifficult period to his regim e, w hen it was vulnerable to the effects of Ir a n ’s victories and the econom ic recession. P rince M u h am m ad a n d his deputy introduced a new style of relations w ith the S hi'ites and endeavoured to convince them th a t they were now to enjoy full citizen rights. T h e governor an d his deputy visited m em bers of the co m m u n ity and m ade S h i'ite leaders w elcom e in th eir majalis. A special effort was m ade to w in over the S h i'ite new elites and students, w ho tended to be the m ost rad ical.27 P rince M u h am m ad ’s en lig h ten ed policy m et w ith difficulties, h o w ­ ever. Predictably, the econom ic recession gravely affected the Eastern Province. A ram co an d its d au g h te r com panies, the largest single em ployer in A l-Sharqiyya, were forced to a d o p t severe austerity m easures an d substantially reduce the w orkforce. F urtherm ore, the a ttem p t of P rince A hm ad, an d later of his nephew M uh am m ad , to elevate the Shi'ites to an eq u al p o sitio n to th a t of th e S u n n is m et w ith strong o p p o sitio n by local conservatives. T ra d itio n ally strongly an ti-S h i'ite, the W ahh abi 'alim s’ revu lsio n for this sect was now rekindled by the G u lf w ar, Ir a n ’s fu n d am en talist an ti-S au d i p ro p ag an d a an d terrorist activities of extrem ist S h i'ite elem ents. In serm ons an d lectures in m osques, p u b lic in stitu tio n s a n d even the official m edia, the local u lam a lashed o u t at the S h i'ite s’ religious practices a n d beliefs, characterising the latter as infidels 'm ore d an gerous th an the Zionists and the C o m m u n ists’.28 W henever they could they harassed the Shi'ites, u sin g the M orality Policy m u tta w w a 'in . By the mid-1980s, how ever, h av in g regained th eir self-respect an d con­ fidence, the S h i'ite leadership an d m iddle class fo u g h t back an d signed p etitio n s to the k in g d em an d in g his personal in terv en tio n and the p u n is h m e n t of those responsible for the sem i-official cam p aig n ag ain st them .

The regime and the ulama (1982-6) T h e u la m a ’s su p p o rt for an d leg itim isatio n of the regim e seemed even m ore im p o rta n t in a period of risin g fu n d am en talism in the M uslim w orld. Even before his succession to the th ro n e Fahd becam e convinced of the w isdom of acceptin g som e of the u la m a ’s dem ands concerning the enforcem ent of W ahh ab i religious practices, as lo n g as the u lam a d id n o t a ttem p t to interfere w ith the k in g d o m ’s developm ent an d conduct of governm ent. In reality, how ever, the pace of m od ern isatio n was slowed dow n in the early 1980s, an d in som e areas there was a m arked regression from the relative liberalism introduced in the 1970s. After his succession in Ju n e 1982, Fahd, n o t know n for his piety in his younger days, attem pted fu rth er to im prove his relatio n s w ith the ulam a. 109

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H e now m et, as did his predecessors, w ith the religious establishm ent in a weekly m ajlis an d frequently consulted them on various m atters. In asm uch as he encouraged them to ‘codify’ laws ‘in accordance w ith the needs of m odern life’ (w ith in the context of the shari'a) he also p rudently su p p o rted th eir efforts to pro tect the k in g d o m ’s W ahhabi character and ‘Saudi way of life’. T h is m eant, inter alia, th a t the largely u n co u th M orality Police were perm itted to intensify the enforcem ent of Islam icW ahhabi law s in the k in g d o m ’s tow ns. Even W esterners in the Aram co enclaves in A l-H asa were now exposed to their interference an d n ot im m u n e to shari'a p u n ish m e n t. K ing F ah d ’s policies also resulted in the ex p an sio n of religiou s studies w ith in the ‘secular’ ed ucation system, stricter sep aratio n of sexes in the universities an d reduced em ploym ent • • r 2 !) o p p o rtu n itie s for w om en. As he advanced in age an d grad u ally assum ed the full responsibility of governm ent, F ahd, it seems, had begun to appreciate the im p o rtan ce to the regim e’s stability of the conservative o rien tatio n of the Saudi po p u lace and its acceptance of the p rin cip les of ‘Islam ic g o v ern m en t’ propagated by the ulam a. C onfronted by risin g criticism of his regim e by the in tellig en tsia a n d fu n d am en talists an d increasingly also by the m iddle class, K ing Fahd decided to encourage the reorg an isation and m o d ern isatio n of the archaic D irectorate for Islam ic P ro p a g a tio n in order to im prove the ‘in d o c trin a tio n ’ of the masses. O bviously the m onarch hoped that better trained an d educated m u tta w w a 'in w ould also be m ore palatab le to the new elites. H is policy resem bled, to a degree, th a t of Faysal, w ho b ro u g h t the u lam a in to the fold of the establishm ent, yet Fahd lacked Faysal’s p io u s re p u ta tio n a n d au th o rity and therefore could no t force the u lam a to accept his wishes. F a h d ’s earlier readiness to safeguard the k in g d o m ’s ‘W ahhabi c h a r­ acter’ an d his declared o p p o sitio n to ‘W esternisation’, helped w in the u la m a ’s co-operation. A lth o u g h the younger, better-educated ‘alim s were increasingly dissatisfied w ith the m o n a rc h ’s policy, nearly all the u lam a were w illin g , even keen, to m odernise the religious p ro p a g a tio n a p p a r­ atus an d h elp carry o u t F a h d ’s in d o ctrin a tio n policy. At the apex of the religious hierarchy, Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Al alShaykh, the head of the C om m ittee for E n co u rag in g V irtue an d P revent­ in g Vice, the m ost reactionary body in the kingdom , was thus co-opted by the k in g to m odernise an d u p g rad e the M orality Police. R e tu rn in g to the orig in al concept of the m u tta w w a 'in , he undertook to train them for Islam ic p ro p a g a tio n an d ex p an d their activities in the different provinces in co -operation w ith the M inistry of the Interior. S im ultaneously, Abd alAziz b in Baz, the reactionary president of the A d m in istratio n of Scientific Study, [R eligious] Legal O p in io n s, Islam ic P ro p a g a tio n and G uidance, also helped the k in g ’s efforts to in d o ctrin ate the ru ral p o p u la tio n .50 By the mid-1980s K ing Fahd n o t only appeared as the protector of the 110

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special character of the ‘S a u d i-W a h h a b i theocracy’ bu t, m ak in g u p for past re p u tatio n , he m ade an effort to project the im age of an ideal Islam ic ruler. Indeed, in O ctober 1986 he officially ado p ted the title ‘servant of the holy places’ (kh a d im al-haram ayn) instead of ‘H is M ajesty’. Inasm uch as Fahd needed religious legitim acy at a tim e w hen his credibility was som ew hat eroded, the estab lish m en t u la m a also had a vested interest in the stability of the regim e. T h is was an o utcom e of Ira n ’s con q u est of Ir a q ’s Faw P en in su la in 1986 (below) w hich increased the th reat to the W ahhabi kin g d o m an d of the estab lish m en t u la m a ’s d eterm in atio n to preserve S audi A rab ia’s special ch aracter in the face of criticism by the m iddle-class elite on th e one h a n d an d a g ro u p of ‘n eo -fu n d am en talist’ 'alim s on the other.*1 W hile m em bers of the royal fam ily co n tin u ed to in d u lg e in excesses (after 1985), the econom ic recession was progressively ero d in g the stan d ard of liv in g of m ost o th er Saudis. T h e new ly u rbanised masses were p articu larly affected by the recession a n d h ad also becom e m ore aw are of the S auds’ extravagances. T h e dissatisfaction of the ru ral a n d urban ‘low er classes’ was expressed th ro u g h letters to the editor, often p u b lish ed in the Saudi press. A n o n -S au d i M uslim scholar, w ho visited H ijaz d u rin g this period, rem arked th a t ‘T h e serm ons at Friday prayers in Mecca a n d M adina are filled w ith parables of O m ar, the second C alip h , w ho was know n for sim p le living an d h u m ility .’32

R U L E R S A N D O P P O S IT IO N IN T H E 1980s T h e succession o f F ah d to the throne, an d the struggle for pow er in the ru lin g class, signalled a resurgence of the activities of m ilita n t fund am en talists and le ftist-n a tio n a list circles in the kingdom , b u t especially in A l-H asa. T o m ake th in g s worse, Saudi A rabia becam e the target of subversion an d p ro p a g an d a cam p aig n s in itiated by Iran and, to a lesser degree, by Syria, the PD RY (u n til 1984) an d Libya. R adio broadcasts from , a n d agents of, these coun tries ag itated ag ain st the royal fam ily an d the Sudayris in p articu lar, em p h asisin g the reactionary ‘antiIslam ic’ character of th eir regim e a n d the sq u an d e rin g by the Sauds of the c o u n try ’s o il w ealth .35 T h e o p p o sitio n Saudi a n d leftist Arab press claim ed in 1983-4 that m any students, intellectu als, w orkers an d m em bers of the arm ed forces in N ajran, H ijaz a n d p articu larly in the Eastern Province, had been incarcerated for p a rtic ip a tin g in an ‘abortive c o u p ’. T h e org an isatio n s involved in the ‘p lo ts’ ag ain st the regim e, it seems, were the U n io n of D em ocratic Y outh, the Socialist W orkers Party an d the S h i'ite-dom inated IR O .31 By the 1980s, m ost of th e o rig in al radical o p p o sitio n org an isatio n s such as th at of N assir Sa‘id (abducted by the Saudi intelligence services 111

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from B eirut in 1980) P eo p le ’s D em ocratic Party (form erly U PA P), the Free Saudis, and the offshoots of the Arab N atio n alists (Q a w m iyyin al‘Arab), had been replaced by, o r had developed in to , a n u m b er of sm all, extrem e leftist-oriented or M arxist ones. T hese included the Saudi C o m m u n ist Party, the S ocialist W orkers Party of the A rabian P en in su la (related to the P alestin ian P F L P ), the U n io n of D em ocratic Y outh (related to the P alestin ia n P D FP) an d a Syrian-related B a'th ist party. Each had, it seems, several h u n d red su pporters am o n g students, intellectuals and w orkers, largely in the Eastern Province b u t also in H ijaz and Asir (the Saudi d iasp o ra ’s p u b licatio n s were the m ain source for in fo rm atio n abou t th eir existence). By far the m ost im p o rtan t, how ever, ju d g in g by its p u b licatio n s an d the n u m b er of its jailed m em bers, was the S h i'ite IR O . T h e la tte r’s ideology com bined Iran ian inspired fund am en talism and radical socialism an d was probably su pported by T ehran.*' W hile accelerating efforts to im prove the standard of living in Asir, the n o rth ern border regions a n d the Eastern Province and endeavouring to m ollify A l-H asa’s S h i'ite co m m u n ity , the regim e intensified its su p ­ pression of the m ilita n t o p p o sitio n groups. T h is was facilitated by the m odernisation of the S audi security services w ith A m erican h elp and th ro u g h closer co-operation w ith the G CC countries. A lready in 1981 the S audi governm ent had installed in R iyadh, w ith French help, a central co m p u ter w ith a data bank an d term inals in all airports, sea ports, m ajo r tow ns and the provinces. T h e US trained 400 Saudis to operate the in terio r m in istry ’s N atio n al In fo rm atio n C entre [Markaz al-M a‘lu m a t al-W atani). W ith the h elp of this centre, the P assport D epartm ent, an d the new ly in tro d u ced identity cards, the m inistry was now able to supervise both the m illio n s of foreign residents in the kingdom an d the Saudi citizens. T h e governm ent, moreover, required the ‘u m d a of each n eig h b o u rh o o d , as it did the am irs of rural areas, to serve also as representatives of the security services. T h o u san d s of suspected m em bers and sym pathisers of the o p p o sitio n groups, m ainly in the E astern Province, were q uestioned an d hundreds incarcerated between 1982 an d 1984. A new wave of arrests of suspected m em bers of the IR O an d different leftist org an isatio n s, resid in g largely in the Eastern Province, began at the end of 1984. By 1986 the n u m b er of Saudi p olitical prisoners was ab o u t 900. T h is is confirm ed by a detailed list of p olitical prisoners from the Eastern Province (b u t n o t H ijaz an d Asir) arrested betw een 1982 an d 1986, p u b lish ed jo in tly by S h i'ite and leftist-oriented Saudi o p p o sitio n circles in L o n d o n an d New Y ork.36 M any non-S audi A rabs (m ainly P alestinians) were deported from the kingdom in this period an d replaced, it is claim ed, by P ak istan i an d o ther non-A rab M uslim s. T h is follow ed evidence of increasing co-operation 112

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betw een the M arxist factions of the P L O , th eir Saudi co u n terp arts and S h i'ite fu n d am en talist o rg an isatio n s in L eb an o n an d the G ulf. Such co­ o p eratio n led in 1984-5 to h ija c k in g attem p ts o n Saudi airlines, attacks o n Saudi d ip lo m ats an d em bassies abroad, an d attem p ts to sm uggle w eapons an d explosives in to the kin g d o m from n e ig h b o u rin g countries. A m ong those arrested were, it is alleged, students, in tellectuals, m em bers of the arm ed forces, w orkers an d A ram co em ployees. T h e fact th a t ‘C om m ittees for the Defence of P o litical Prisoners in the A rabian P e n in s u la ’, w hich m u sh ro o m ed in B ritain, the USA and in som e M iddle Eastern countries, were jo in tly sponsored by the S h i'ite IR O an d Arab n atio n alist-leftist o rg an isatio n s, vindicated claim s th at such co-operation existed th ro u g h o u t the 1980s.37 T h e sm all leftist o p p o sitio n o rg an isatio n s in S audi A rabia were based largely in the E astern Province. O th er th an their p u b licatio n s abroad, their m ain activity in the k in g d o m was the d istrib u tio n of leaflets. O ccasionally they also sabotaged oil in stallatio n s an d police an d govern­ m en t vehicles, p lan ted bom bs, an d attacked the security forces. T h e ir activities caused the a u th o ritie s to a d o p t severe security m easures in airp o rts, governm ent offices, m ilitary in sta lla tio n s a n d even in hotels. At the en d of 1984 the in te rio r m inistry established, m oreover, a special force to protect such targets. In a d d itio n , in 1986 A ram co strengthened the security m easures aim ed at p ro tectin g A m erican an d E uro p ean residential enclaves.38 D espite the above, it is evident th at the reg im e’s ‘carrot-and-stick’ policy proved q u ite successful. T h e m ajority of the Saudi S hi'ites were, by a n d large, satisfied w ith the g o v ern m en t’s new policy, alth o u g h they w ould have w ished for fu rth er im p ro v em en t in th eir status, and sym pathy for Ir a n ’s Islam ic rev o lu tio n has declined.39 T h e size of the anti-regim e o rg an isatio n s o p e ra tin g in the k in g d o m in the m iddle an d latter p art of the 1980s was far sm aller th an the size of the m ilita n t o p p o sitio n to the regim e of the 1950s an d 1960s. T h e ir op eratio n s were relatively in co n seq u en tial a n d to ju d g e by w hat is said in the p u b lica ­ tions of the C om m ittees for the P ro tectio n of the R ig h ts of P o litical Prisoners in the A rabian P en in su la, the a u th o rities were able to arrest m ost of their activists. Fear of T e h ra n ’s p ro p a g an d a a n d its m ilitary success, the v u lnerability of the Saudi oil industry, an d the size of the S h i'ite com m u n ity in AlH asa, were p robably responsible for the m ore liberal policy introduced by the S audi au th o rities in the Eastern Province. T h e co n tin u ed success of this new policy, w hich led to the p ro v in ce’s rap id developm ent and grow th of its S h i'ite m iddle class, was, nevertheless, affected by the p ro lo n g ed crisis in the oil ind u stry an d the decline of the k in g o m ’s oil revenues u n til 1989. 113

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Middle-class elites in the mid-1980s - from co-operation to confrontation? Far m ore serious th a n the m ilita n t o p p o sitio n was the g ro w ing dis­ co n ten t w ith the regim e on the p art of m iddle-class new elites, w hose size a n d p o ten tial pow er increased a n n u ally . T h e ir dissatisfaction, especially in the H ijaz, em anated p artly from th eir being excluded from p o litical pow er, w hile the u lam a were p am pered a n d granted a d d itio n al au thority. B usinessm en a n d en trep ren eu rs resented as well the nu m ero u s princes w ho com peted w ith them or often forced them selves u p o n them as partners. Yet, as lo n g as the kin g d o m prospered an d everyone got a share of its w ealth, they reconciled themselves to the situ atio n . B ut as recession began to set in, both m erch an t-en trep ren eu rs and technocrats became increasingly outraged w ith the ‘co rru p t an d extravagant S auds’ w ho were w asting the k in g d o m ’s p atrim o n y an d increasingly m o n o p o lisin g , as well, business o p p o rtu n itie s an d key p o sitio n s in the central an d pro v in cial ad m in istratio n . T h e H ijazi new elites, m oreover, were angered by the preference given by the Sauds to the N ajdi technocrats. Always the staunchest su p p o rte r of m odernisation in the ruling-class in n er circle a n d sym pathetic to the m iddle-class new elites, K ing Fahd believed th at th eir exclusion from p a rtic ip a tio n in the k in g d o m ’s p o liti­ cal system was the m ajo r source of th eir fru stratio n . W hen he had tried to advance th eir cause in the past, however, he m et w ith stro n g o p p o sitio n from the senior princes a n d the ulam a. T h e form er opposed such a move because they believed th a t a ch ange in the k in g d o m ’s political system w ould eventually erode the S auds’ power. T h e latter rejected any change in the status q u o , because they feared th at if the new elites were to gain access to decision-m aking, they w o u ld grad u ally change the character of the S audi-W ahhabi state. B ound by the golden rule of c o n su ltatio n an d consensus a n d lacking Faysal’s pow er an d prestige, F ah d gave in to the conservatives’ pressure. H e hoped, nevertheless, th at in the lo n g ru n the Sauds and the u lam a w o uld accept his proposed ‘Islam ic’ n atio n al m ajlis al-shura an d g ran t the new elites m in im a l p a rtic ip a tio n in decision­ m aking. As was the case in 1979/80, F ahd endeavoured in the m eantim e to keep the m iddle class w ith in the reg im e’s pow er base by reiteratin g his su p p o rt for the elusive N atio n al C onsultative Assembly. F ahd was cognisan t of the rev o lu tio n w hich the Saudi society had undergone as a result of the k in g d o m ’s m odern isatio n an d the rap id developm ent of its edu catio n al system. T h o u g h far from c o n stitu tin g a cohesive class,10 the new elites, largely H ijazi and N ajdi an d to a lesser degree from the E astern Province, num bered several h u n d red thousands. Indeed, in ad d itio n to b u reaucrats (about 200,000) and professionals, the A ssociation of C ham bers of Com m erce an d Industry representing m iddle- and upper-level m erchants an d entrepreneurs already had in 114

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1984 a m em bership of abo u t 100,000 in eighteen branches in the k ingd om ’s m ain cities." T h e grow th of the Saudi Association of Cham bers of Commerce and Industry is a case in point. T h e association is a legacy of the pre-Saudi Hijaz. Its nucleus was the Jedda cham ber whose members after 1925 served in the new adm in istratio n an d proved most helpful to Ibn Saud and useful to his regent Faysal in dealing w ith foreign representatives and the k in g d o m ’s trade. W hen Faysal became king in 1964 members of the H ijazi C ham ber of Comm erce assisted him in developing the econom y and m odernising the kingdom . T h e organisation truly blossomed, however, in the 1970s, w hen it benefited from Saudi A rabia’s rapid developm ent an d its enorm ous oil wealth. T h e C ouncil of the Saudi Cham bers of Commerce and Industry, representing the up p er layers of businessm en, industrialists and con­ tractors, is located in Riyadh. It plays an essential role in consolidating middle-class su p p o rt for the royal fam ily an d susbsequently is believed to enjoy a lot of influence over the regime. It is the only m ajor organisation in the kingdom to elect its officers (two-thirds of its governing board are elected and a third are ap p o in ted by the m inister of commerce), has its ow n publications and is perm itted com plete freedom w ithin the scope of its interests.42 Still opposed to any form of professional organisations, the Saudi governm ent in the second p a rt of the 1980s gave its blessing to profes­ sional congresses of university professors, engineers, doctors, p h arm a­ cists, chem ists and others, whose num bers in the kingdom had grow n dram atically since the 1970s. In the first congress of engineers, which took place in Jedda, some participants proposed th at the congress request governm ent perm ission to form a professional organisation. A lthough the proposal was n o t adopted, it was another m ilestone in the process of consolidating the new elites’ pow er in Saudi Arabia. Sim ilar demands resurfaced in the wake of the G ulf w ar.15 Even before he was enthroned Fahd again attem pted to win the Sauds’ and the u la m a ’s backing for a watered-down form ula th at w ould enable the middle-class elites to p articipate in decision-m aking. U sing Ibn S aud’s tactic of confron tin g the orthodoxy w ith Q u r’anic precedents (or the lack of them ), Fahd instructed Prince N a’if, in charge of the com m ittee for ‘political reform s’, to extract from the Q u r'an all the verses (about two hundred) relatin g to the p rinciple of shura. These were to serve as a guideline for the proposed ‘Islam ic’ N ational C onsultative C ouncil. W ithin a m o n th of com ing to power, K ing Fahd vowed that the principles of the basic system of governm ent and the con­ sultative council . . . w ill, G od w illing, be in the forefront of the issues of concern to m e . . . T h is w ill be accom panied or preceded by 115

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moves to b rin g to co m p letio n the necessary measures to p u t in to force the provinces’ law. Always the m ost liberal am o n g the senior Sauds, Fahd was keen on w in n in g the su p p o rt of the ex p an d in g m iddle class. B ut once again , in the face of the royal fam ily’s an d the u la m a ’s o p p o sitio n , an d in view of the stronger role w hich the royal C onsultative C ouncil had exercised since 1983, the m atter was shelved. N one the less Ira n ian victories over Iraq, the grow ing unrest in the kin g d o m an d the deterio ratin g state of the econom y were probably p artly responsible for the subm ission by Prince N a ’if of his com m ittee’s recom m endations in mid-1984. T h o se included a ‘Basic Law of G o v ern m en t’ (Q u r’anic c o n stitu tio n ) and the m odernis­ atio n of the provincial a d m in istratio n . Each province was th u s to have a p artly elected assem bly, som e of w hose m em bers were to be m em bers of the proposed, largely ap p o in te d , N atio n al C onsultative Assembly. O n 12 Septem ber 1984, a tender was issued for the construction of the m ajlis al-shura b u ild in g . Shortly afterw ards K ing Fahd declared th a t the p lan n ed N atio n al C onsultative Assembly ‘w hose m em bers w ill be ap p o in ted , w ill begin to o perate in the first m o n th s of 1985’. T h e role of the new ‘p a rlia m e n t’, Fahd co n tin u ed , w o uld be to ‘express o p in io n an d supervise the execution of governm ent p o licy ’ an d thus ‘ensure the p a rticip atio n of the peo p le in g o v ern m en t’. In A pril 1985 the k in g a g ain reassured his people th a t he intended soon to establish the prom ised N atio n al C onsultative Assembly, ‘com posed of m em bers draw n from the p roposed partly elected prov in cial co u n cils’. A lth o u g h the k in g m ean t w h at he said, the delay in the im p lem en tatio n , of his prom ises, his su p p o rters argued, was a g ain the result of the strong o p p o sitio n of the conservative m em bers of Al Saud an d the religious estab lish m en t.'5 L ead in g intellectuals, o n the o ther han d , called this e x p la n a tio n a farce, cla im in g th a t the ru ler could easily overcom e the u la m a ’s o p p o sitio n had he truly w ished to do so. N ot only did such claim s ignore the Saudi realities, especially at this stage of the Ira n -Ira q w ar, b u t after the m ilita n t n a tio n a list-fu n d a m e n ta list K uw aiti p a rlia ­ m ent was dissolved in m id -1986, the likelihood th a t the Sauds w ould agree to g ran t political p a rtic ip a tio n to the m iddle-class elites further d im in ish e d .17 T h e tension betw een the m iddle class an d the regim e, and even between the latter a n d the technocratic upper-crust, reached a new clim ax im m ediately after F ah d 's succession. H av in g w illingly or u n w illin g ly disregarded prom ises co n cern in g political p a rtic ip a tio n w hile increas­ ingly a p p o in tin g royal technocrats to h ig h p ositions, the econom icfinancial nexus w hich held the m iddle class w ith in the regim e’s pow er base was also b e g in n in g to crum ble. As the k in g d o m ’s oil revenue declined from 108 b illio n dollars in 1981 to u n d er 17 b illio n in 1986, the 116

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Saudi b ud get was reduced to an estim ated 45 b illio n in 1986, a b o u t h alf of its 1982/3 size. T h e balan ce was m ade u p from incom e from o th er sources an d from the k in g d o m ’s financial reserves. C onsidered by the new elites th eir n a tio n al p atrim o n y , p articu larly in view of the lim ited success of the costly Saudi in d u strialisatio n p ro g ram m e in the 1970s an d early 1980s, the k in g d o m ’s liq u id assets sh ran k from over 150 b illio n in 1982 to u n d er 40 b illio n at the end of 1986.18 W hile the business co m m u n ity a n d en trep ren eu rs were displeased w ith the governm ent for serving as O P E C ’s ‘sw ing p ro d u cer’ an d reducing governm ent sp ending, the m iddle-class elites were critical of the regim e’s inflated ‘p o litical b u d g e tin g ’. T h e size of the Saudi budget, m any claim ed, had no econom ic ju stific a tio n a n d was a by-product of the avidity of m em bers of the royal fam ily an d the need of the rulers to ‘b u y ’ the p eo p le’s goodw ill a n d p o litical in fluence in the Arab countries and the w orld. As the k in g d o m ’s fin an cial situ atio n deteriorated, m em bers of the technocratic upper-cru st, largely H ijazis, often disagreed w ith the royal C onsultative C ouncil a n d the aristocratic cabinet m em bers over policy m atters. Som e non-royal m inisters even dared to challenge policy decisions related to finance m ade by their royal m entors. T hey, the m iddle-class as a w hole an d younger, university-educated ‘n o n -co n ­ fo rm ist’ u lam a, increasingly criticised the excesses an d co rru p tio n of m em bers of the royal fam ily an d the system of com m issions (sponsor­ ship) a n d coerced p artn ersh ip s, w hich enriched the ru lin g class (and the technocratic elites) b u t inflated the k in g d o m ’s budget an d the cost of its developm ent. Such excesses co n tin u ed at the sam e tim e th a t m inistries, o th er th an defence a n d in terio r, were instructed to trim th eir expenditures an d n o t to hire school graduates, w hen salaries were cut an d b ankruptcies becam e com m o n .49 T o add in su lt to in ju ry , som e senior Sauds argued th at the technocrats’ policy an d inefficiency were responsible, at least partly, for the difficulties w hich the k ingdom faced. T h e dependency of the technocratic u p p er-cru st an d the m iddle-class elites o n the w him s of the Saud rulers becam e now even m ore ap p aren t, w hen cabinet m inisters a n d lead in g technocrats, previously considered ‘the p illars of the g o v ern m en t’, the m ajority of w hom were H ijazis, resigned, were dism issed o r were practically exiled. In m ost cases they were replaced by ‘lo y a l’ N ajd i an d o th er technocrats or by civil servants w ho were the S udayris’ o ld retainers.50 T h e first co m m oner to resign from the governm ent in protest (u nheard of in the past) was Abd al-Aziz al-Q urayshi, a m em ber of a p ro m in e n t H ijazi m erchant fam ily a n d the head of SAMA (w ith the ran k of cabinet m inister). A l-Q uraysh i’s resig n atio n was caused by his stro n g objection to the proposed inflated b u dget for 1983/4, w hich w o uld further d rain the Saudi financial reserves. H e was soon follow ed by M uham m ad Abdu 117

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Y am ani, the Asiri in fo rm atio n m inister, w ho was dism issed because of the displeasure of the u lam a an d the Sauds w ith the way th at he h andled the dom estic m edia an d the coverage of the in tern atio n al press (Abdu Y am ani was a signatory in 1991 of the liberal in tellig e n tsia ’s ‘open letter’ to K ing Fahd req u estin g reform ).’1 T h e m ost significan t cabinet ch ange was the dism issal in 1984 of the ‘leftist’-oriented m inister of h ealth (previously of industry an d elec­ tricity), Dr G hazi al-G osaybi, universally regarded as the doyen of the Saudi in telligentsia. A l-G osaybi, from a p ro m in e n t A l-H asa S u nni m erchant fam ily of N ajd i o rig in , believed in the ab ility of the Sauds an d the new elites to co-exist, yet was critical of the extravagance of the ru lin g class. Always supportiv e of F a h d ’s m odern isatio n policy, he also praised h im for truly delegatin g au th o rity to his com m oner m inisters an d his h a n d lin g of the governm ent, com pared w ith Faysal’s era. W hen he clashed w ith P rince S u ltan over his m isa p p ro p ria tio n of the enorm ous defence budget, he naively h o p ed for the m o n a rch ’s sup p o rt. As such su p p o rt did n o t m aterialise, G osaybi dared to express his feelings in a poem w hich he m anaged to p u b lish in a Saudi daily. For this act he was dism issed a n d was ap p o in te d am bassador to Bahrayn. (From there he counter-attacked in the late 1980s an d early 1990s the risin g tide of m ilita n t ‘n eo -fu n d am en talism ’ in the k ingdom .)52 T h e m ost publicised dism issal of a senior Saudi technocrat was th a t of Zaki Y am ani, the petro leu m m inister, follow ed by the discharge of his H ijazi friend an d associate, A bdul H ad i T a h ri, as head of P etro m in (w ith the ran k of a m inister). Y a m a n i’s dism issal in O ctober 1986 proved, if p ro o f was needed, how insecure is the p o sitio n of the technocratic uppercrust and the m iddle-class elites, w hen they in c u r the displeasure of the Sauds. Y am ani was hand-picked by K ing Faysal, as were m any of the H ijazi com m oner technocrats w ho served in the Saudi cabinets in the last three decades. T h is in itself d id n o t endear h im to the Sudayris and the ulam a. Yet, his loyalty, expertise a n d in te rn a tio n a l prestige m ade him invaluable to Fahd. H is p o sitio n was seriously eroded, however, w hen in 1984, d u rin g a serious crisis in the oil m arket, he strongly objected to Prince S u lta n ’s ‘oil for B oeings’” an d sim ilar barter deals. Y am ani believed th at such transations, m ean t to ch an n el com m issions to S ultan, his protégés a n d to o th er princes, w o u ld erode the k in g d o m ’s credibility in the oil m arket a n d its financial stability. W hen in 1986 his strategy for reg ain in g Saudi A rabia’s a n d O P E C ’s ‘fair share of the m ark et’ backfired an d oil prices collapsed to ab o u t n in e dollars a barrel, Y am ani was sum m arily dism issed by Fahd, a lth o u g h the k in g had su p p o rted his p la n from its inception. T h e H ijazis have seen th eir influence dw indle, as the new N ajdi intelligentsia an d royal technocrats have filled m any of the p ro m in en t 118

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p o sitio n s in the govern m en t a n d its bureaucracy. T h is seemed even m ore th reaten in g because of the c o n tin u in g pre-em inence of the conservative N ajdi u lam a, w hose in fluence on the governm ent, in ad d itio n to the trad itio n al p o litical censorship, increasingly stifled intellectual debate on religious, social a n d p o litical m atters. T h e H ijazi technocrats, m erchants a n d entrepreneurs viewed Y a m a n i’s dism issal as a n o th e r sym ptom of the erosion of th eir p o sitio n a n d the ‘N ajd i-isatio n ’ of the governm ent and econom y, w hich follow ed K ing Faysal’s assassin atio n .54 T h e seat of the m odern g o vernm ent h ad already been rem oved from H ijaz to R iyadh d u rin g the reig n of Saud. It was follow ed in the 1970s by the m ig ratio n of the h ead q u arters of m ost foreign enterprises a n d several dom estic ones from Jed d a to R iyadh. T h e p attern repeated itself w ith m ost m ajo r banks in the early 1980s. By the mid-1980s, after the Foreign Office m oved in to its new head q u arters in the cap ital, it was the tu rn of the foreign em bassies, the fo reru n n ers of w hich were established in Jedda in the period preceding the Saudi co n q u est of the H ijaz, to move to R iyadh.55 T h e d ep artu re of the em bassies was received by the so p h isti­ cated an d trad itio n ally extrovert H ijazis as the suprem e in su lt, p a rti­ cularly because the trad itio n ally introvert a n d x en o p h o b ic N ajdis had discouraged W esterners u n til the 1960s from even visitin g R iyadh. Some H ijazis bitterly rem arked th at, if the N ajdis cou ld have, they w o uld have rem oved the holy tow ns from the H ijaz to th eir province as well. It is unlikely that the H ijazi m id d le class still entertain s separatist tendencies (a lth o u g h som e tiny g ro u p s do), w h ich m ean cu ttin g them selves off from the k in g d o m ’s oil w ealth. Yet, by virtue of their relative liberalism , a n d th e fact th at they co n stitu te a m ajority of the new elites, they have becom e the v an g u ard of the g ro w in g m iddle-class criticism of the S auds’ regim e. Such sentim ents were nourished, for some tim e, by the g ro w in g success of the N ajd i entrepreneurs an d m erchants. Indeed, as the recession in the k in g d o m spiralled, the exasperation of the H ijazi-led new elites w ith ‘the trad itio n a l royal system of a c q u irin g and d istrib u tin g w ealth ’, w ith the S au d s’ governm ent o f the k ingdom as a feudal fiefdom , a n d w ith th eir h a n d lin g of the econom ic crisis m arkedly increased.56

The military as a component of the new elites T h e m o dernisation a n d ex p an sio n of the S audi arm ed forces since the 1960s m ade the H ouse of Saud even less dep en d en t o n the trad itio n al pow er brokers. It also reduced, by the 1970s, the im p o rtan ce of the lightly arm ed, u n d iscip lin ed an d inefficient N atio n al G uard, the conservatives’ source of pow er. Y ounger m em bers of the ru lin g elites increasingly jo in e d the arm ed forces, especially the air force, and m any were ap p o in te d to key p o sitio n s in the latter. 119

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Yet, despite the enorm o u s investm ent in the 1970s and 1980s, largely in in frastru ctu re for the S audi arm ed forces (w hich enriched m any Sauds), an d to a lesser degree in the air force, the Saudi m ilitary rem ained weak an d inefficient. T hey were also dep en d en t on a poly g lo t host of foreign advisers, technician s an d m ercenaries. T h e ir weakness an d inefficiency was m ade a p p a ra n t even in border clashes w ith the Yemens. T h e m u lti-b illio n , system atic, q u alitativ e an d q u an titativ e u p g ra d in g of the arm ed forces p lan n e d w ith A m erican h elp , p articu larly since the m id-1970s,” necessitated the recru itm en t of m any thousands of bettereducated officers, an d skilled N C O s, w hich the oligarchy was incapable of providing. T h e ch ro n ic shortage of suitable N ajdis an d related tribesm en to h an d le the progressively m ore sophisticated w eapon sys­ tems, an d ap p reh en sio n a t tu rn in g its arm ed forces in to a 'foreign le g io n ’, forced the regim e to e n list educated H ijazis and technically skilled A l-H asa Sunnis. By setting u p extensive security services an d a p p o in tin g m any royal officers to key positions, an d em plo y in g n u m e r­ ous foreign advisers an d security experts (A m ericans an d E uropeans) an d foreign m ercenaries, the regim e h o p ed to reduce the possibility of a m ilitary co u p .58 P lan s to in tro d u ce universal (m ale) com pulsory m ilitary service, reiterated by P rince S u ltan possibly o w ing to the pressure of the m iddle class, were repeatedly p o stp o n ed because the regim e preferred to keep the arm ed forces sm all, loyal an d m anageable, th ro u g h selective recruitm ent. T h e arm y, u n lik e the trusted N atio n a l G u ard , moreover, is largely kept in m ilitary tow ns in the peripheries of the kingdom . T h e likelihood of an em ergence of ‘free officers’ in the Saudi arm ed forces in the 1980s was m in im al in view of the system of checks an d balances in stitu ted by the rulers, the elaborate security services an d the substantial benefits enjoyed by officers an d ran k s.59 Nevertheless, the gradually increased nu m b ers of m iddle-class officers add an o th er d im ension to the tensio n betw een the new elites an d the ru lin g class. T h e w ar w ith Iraq (1990/1) dem onstrated, m oreover, the ineffectiveness of the Saudi m ilitary, despite the en o rm o u s sum s invested in it. T h is has shaken all classes of Saudis an d the pressure for universal com pulsory service is now co m in g even from the ranks of the ulam a. As revenue from oil a n d o th er sources fell sh o rt of the g o v ern m en t’s expenditures, an d the k in g d o m ’s financial reserves c o n tin u ed to erode in the second h alf of the 1980s, the exasperation of the m iddle-class elites w ith the Sauds was rising. T h e new ly cem ented alliance of the regim e w ith the u lam a, for w h ich the king opted in the face of the Ira n ian threat and the econom ic crisis, fu rth er exacerbated the new m iddle-class elites’ dissatisfaction, as did the ‘S au d i-isatio n ’ of the central an d provincial governm ent at a tim e o f g ro w in g u n e m p lo y m en t am o n g the new intelligentsia. A pprehensive of the ram ifications of change in the k in g ­ d o m ’s pow er structure, the ahl al-hal w a’l-'aqd, m oreover, were even less 120

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likely, in the existing circum stances, to g ran t the m iddle class p articip a­ tion in decision-m aking w hich, they feared, could lead to the erosion of the Sauds’ hegem ony. Yet, as lo n g as the w ar between Iran an d Iraq continued, as did Shi'ite subversion in the kingdom , the Saudi new elites and the p o p u latio n as a w hole closed their ranks behind F ahd’s govern­ m ent, together w ith the whole of the royal family.

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8

SAUDI ARABIA AND T H E I R A N - I R A Q WAR

BACKGROUND E xisting in the shadow of Iran and Iraq - the two Persian G ulf giants Saudi A rabia, w ith a p o p u la tio n of abo u t six m illion, attem pted to walk the tightrope between the two after the British forces evacuated the region in 1971. Despite its power, em anating from oil w ealth, R iyadh constantly felt insecure. It m aintain ed close relations w ith W ashington, invested heavily in defence and, from 1976 on, strove to establish an Arab G ulf co­ operation alliance w ith Kuwait, B ahrayn, Q atar, the UAE and O m an, excluding Iraq. Its endeavours to create a conservative regional pact, however, m et w ith o ppo sitio n from G u lf states an d members of the Saudi oligarchy and were criticised by Arab nationalists, as contradictory to the sp irit of pan-A rabism . In the late 1960s and 1970s, Saudi A rabia resented the S hah’s h ig h ­ handed policy in the G u lf w hich, w hile aim ed at curbing Moscow’s influence and its local allies’ subversive activities in the G ulf, furthered Ira n ’s n ational, and the S h ah ’s personal, am bitions in the region. Riyadh was even m ore apprehensive about Iraq ’s pan-A rab socialist-B a'thist aspirations.1From 1979 onw ard, however, K hom ayni’s Shi'ite fundam en­ talist regime, determ ined to export its revolutionary message to its Arab neighbours - all w ith large S hi'ite m inorities - posed the greater threat. Indeed, the Saudi-W ah h ab i state, w ith a large S hi'ite com m unity in its oil-rich Eastern Province, felt particularly vulnerable. N otw ithstanding efforts to diversify its economy, Saudi A rabia rem ains largely dependent on revenue from oil and oil-related exports. T h e Eastern Province’s oppressed S hi'ite p o p u latio n , largely barred from governm ent em ploym ent and only m inim ally sharing in their country’s w ealth and privileges (u n til the mid-1980s), was especially receptive to Iran ian propaganda. T h e latter, from 1979, questioned the very legitim acy of the Saudi regim e and its rig h t to protect Islam ’s holy shrines. As discussed above,2 Saudi A rabia experienced social, religious and 125

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p o litical u n rest in the late 1970s. F urtherm ore, in the struggle for pow er w hich erupted in the royal fam ily after 1975, b o th conservatives an d the ‘y o u n g er’, ‘n a tio n a list’ princes, objected to the S udayris’ pro-A m erican policy an d stance in O PE C , w hich they claim ed served W estern, rather th an Saudi an d A rab, interests. F a h d ’s u n p o p u la r pro-A m erican policy was discredited by the C am p David agreem ent a n d the fall of the S hah of Iran. T h e first caused the collapse of the conservative m oderate cam p in the Arab L eague an d the ex p u lsio n from it of Egypt. T h e second led to the rise of K hom ayni’s fu n d am en talist regim e a n d seriously eroded A m erican prestige and credibility in the region. D eterm ined to export its revolution, T eh ran , m oreover, directed subversive p ro p ag a n d a an d activities ag ainst R iyadh a n d the G u lf’s other A rab regim es w ith sizeable S h i'ite citizenry. T h e Ira n -Ira q w ar w h ich eru p ted in Septem ber 1980 could n o t have h appened at a m ore o p p o rtu n e m o m en t for R iyadh. Saudi A rabia was in a state of disarray. D espite vast investm ents in defence since the late 1960s, the S audi arm ed forces were weak an d incap ab le of p ro tectin g the k ingdom ag ain st Ira n ia n o r Iraq i aggression. S audi relations w ith the US were still shaky. N o tw ith sta n d in g the ch ange in the ad m in istratio n in W ashington, R iyadh was do u b tfu l if it could c o u n t o n A m erican assistance.3 As the Iraq i arm y rolled in to Iran, lured in to a destructive eight-year w ar by Saddam H u ssay n ’s belief th at T e h ra n ’s Islam ic rev o lu ­ tionary regim e was a b o u t to collapse, R iyadh was free to p u t its house in order ju s t before it faced the econom ic crisis of 1983-9. Shortly after the w ar broke o u t Saudi A rabia, n o tw ith sta n d in g past differences, declared its unreserved su p p o rt for its ‘sister’ Iraq. Fahd, it is believed, was inform ed in advance by Saddam H ussayn of his in ten tio n to invade Iran an d at least approved, if n o t encouraged, the Iraq i p lan. By this tim e T e h ra n ’s vicious an ti-S au d i p ro p ag an d a an d subversive activi­ ties were b e g in n in g to have an im p act o n the k in g d o m ’s an d the G ulf p rin cip alities’ S hi'ites. An Ira n ia n p lo t in 1981 to overthrow B ahrayn’s ruler, in v o lv in g S hi'ites from A l-H asa train ed by T eh ran , caused serious concern in R iyadh reg ard in g its regim e’s security. T h e Ira n -Ira q w ar diverted the atte n tio n of the tw o G u lf g ian ts from Saudi A rabia a n d was, therefore, w elcom ed by R iyadh. It enabled Fahd to consolidate his pow er in the royal fam ily an d to deal w ith the k in g d o m ’s m ost pressing problem s. T h e w ar, moreover, eroded the pow er of the radical Arab cam p an d caused B aghdad to woo the conservative Arab countries and, eventually, to im prove its relations w ith W ashington. T h e w ar also provided the Saudi regim e w ith a golden o p p o rtu n ity to im prove its im age in the k in g d o m an d in the Arab w orld, badly tarnished in the late 1970s. F ahd attem p ted to foster a n Arab consensus o n the Ira n Iraq w ar by b rid g in g the differences betw een Iraq an d Syria an d by 126

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reb u ild in g the pow er of the m oderate Arab cam p w ith E gypt returned to the Arab fold. C o g n isan t of the stro n g an ti-A m erican sentim ents in the Arab w orld an d in the k in g d o m , Fahd, especially after the events of 1978/9, was careful to avoid any im pression th at he was p ro m o tin g A m erica’s interests. Im m ediately after the ou tb reak of the Ira n -Ira q war, he ap p lied to P resident C arter for h e lp b u t indicated his a p p reh en sio n lest such aid be interpreted by Arab n atio n alists as an in v itatio n to establish a US m ilitary presence in the k in g d o m o r in the G ulf. T h e five AWACS w hich W ashington despatched to S audi A rabia, based at D h ah ran , were ad m ira ­ bly suited for the situ atio n . T h ey indicated, on the one h and, W ash­ in g to n ’s new d eterm in atio n to su p p o rt its allies and, from a m ilitary p o in t of view, were h ig h ly visible an d useful. O n the o th er h and, they necessitated only a lim ited A m erican presence in the kin g d o m and did n o t aw aken the w rath of the fu n d am en talists as did the massive American-W estern presence in the k ingdom a decade later. Soon afterw ards, R iyadh acquired five AWACS of its ow n to replace the ones carrying the A m erican em blem . N one the less, this was a m ean in g fu l d ep artu re from the Saudi trad itio n al vocal rejection of any A m erican presence in the G ulf, based on ap p reh en sio n a b o u t the reaction of Arab n atio n alists and its ow n conservatives an d new elites. In A ugust 1981, Fahd a n n o u n ced an eig h t-p o in t p la n to resolve the A rab-Israeli conflict, w hich was soon ab andoned w hen it m et w ith Syrian an d P L O o p p o sitio n , in favour of a w atered-dow n resolution adopted at the 1982 Fez su m m it. Yet, after his succession in Ju n e 1982, w hen victorious Ira n ia n forces penetrated Iraq, and T eh ra n increasingly lashed o u t a t the Arab co untries w hich su p p o rted B aghdad, Fahd declared o n several occasions th a t the Ira n -Ira q conflict overshadow ed the A rab -Israeli one because it m ore seriously threatened the Arab world. W hile basically w ish in g to focus Arab a tten tio n on the G u lf w ar, F a h d ’s policy aim ed, as w ell, a t w in n in g A m erican sym pathy an d the US C ongress’s ap p ro v al of Saudi m ilitary requirem ents. E arlier, in February 1981, the Ira n -Ira q w ar enabled the Sudayris to establish the G CC , co m p risin g Saudi A rabia, K uw ait, B ahrayn, Q atar, the UAE an d O m an. A lth o u g h it was officially an econom ic an d cu ltu ral co-operation o rg an isatio n , R iyadh strove to tu rn the G CC in to a regional defence o rg an isatio n w hich w o uld co-ordinate the in tern al security activities of its m em bers.4 Ironically, K uw ait was the m ost reserved abo u t the G C C and jo in ed its m u tu al defence agreem ent only at the en d of 1986. It also co n tin u ed to object vociferously to any form of US presence in the G ulf. T h e conservative faction of the S audi oligarchy, led by P rince A bdallah (crown prince in 1982) w ho h ad befriended Syria, challenged the S udayris’ policies. T h is faction ap proved at first of the Islam ic zeal of the 127

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new Ira n ia n regim e a n d adm ired its anti-W estern an d anti-Israeli stance. B ut as T e h ra n escalated its verbal attacks o n the Sauds a n d the W ahhabi establishm ent, the conservatives tu rn ed th eir backs o n T e h ra n an d o pted for a n eu tral policy in the G u lf war. T h e y ounger a n d better-educated th ird -g en eratio n Saudi princes, led by Saud al-Faysal, alw ays advocated th a t th eir country strengthen its ties w ith the ‘n a tio n a list’ Arab cam p an d im prove its relations w ith Moscow - at the expense of its relatio ns w ith W ashington. Sym pathetic at first to Ira n ’s rev o lu tio n a n d its anti-A m erican, anti-Israeli policy, they opposed its fu n d am en talist character. T h ey also advocated th at R iyadh rem ain n eu tral in the G u lf w ar a n d o pposed its involvem ent w ith the conserva­ tive GCC. T h is cam p was critical, as w ell, of the S udayris’ o il policy w hich, it claim ed, served W estern interests by g lu ttin g the m arket and com m ended Ira n ’s dem an d th a t O P E C reduce p ro d u ctio n to raise oil prices.

IR A N - I R A Q WAR A N D SA U D I POLICY - STA GE ONE (1981-6) T h ree interrelated objectives d o m in ated F a h d ’s considerations in fo rm u latin g his G u lf policy: the need to protect the kingdom ; the w ish to m ain ta in the regim e’s stability a n d to u p h o ld the Sudayri hegem ony in R iyadh; and, lastly, the k in g d o m ’s d edication to Islam ic and Arab solidarity. M atters were som ew hat com plicated by disagreem ent w ith in Al Saud over F a h d ’s policy, an d , w ith in the G CC an d o th er Arab countries, over the q u estio n of solidarity w ith (Arab) Iraq fig h tin g (Persian) Iran. M ajor constraints, som e in h eren t a n d som e the resu lt of new econom ic an d p o litical dynam ics, were also taken in to account by Fahd. Forem ost was Saudi A rab ia’s sparse p o p u la tio n an d the weakness of its arm ed forces in relatio n to its vast area. T h e k in g d o m ’s v u lnerability was fu rth er increased by the fact th a t its econom y (and th a t of all the G CC countries), and ultim ately its stability, were largely dependent o n its oil revenues. Indeed, all Saudi oil was located in the Eastern Province (u n til 1989, w hen the discovery of new oil fields south of R iyadh was disclosed) w ith its large S h i'ite p o p u la tio n ju s t across the P ersian G u lf from Iran. Moreover, from the first days of the w ar the Ira n ia n navy d o m in ated the G u lf a n d the Straits of H orm uz, the o nly o u tlet for the reg io n ’s oil an d sh ip p in g in general.5 T h e Saudi stance reg ard in g the G u lf w ar seemed consistent. R iyadh unreservedly su pported Ira q from the o utbreak of the w ar in Septem ber 1980 a n d th ro u g h o u t its e ig h t years. In 1981, w hen the tide began to tu rn ag ain st B aghdad, R iyadh an d K uw ait began to subsidise Ira q ’s w ar effort an d to h e lp it logistically to resist Iran (and thus to protect themselves). 128

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At the sam e tim e they repeatedly attem pted to appease T e h ra n an d su p p o rted or in itiated various efforts to term inate the w ar th ro u g h Islam ic or T h ird W orld m ed iatio n o r U nited N atio n s intervention. In reality, R iy ad h ’s policy was prag m atic, influenced by the fortunes of the w ar an d th eir effect on Saudi interests. An o utcom e of the Saudi regim e’s golden ru le of shura an d ijm a ' (co n su ltatio n an d consensus), it reflected as well the different o p in io n s w ith in the Saudi ru lin g class. In the final analysis, R iy a d h ’s policy was determ ined by Fahd and his inform al m ajlis al-shura, d o m in ated by his Sudayri brothers. A staunch advocate of Arab (m oderate) solidarity since the 1970s and fearing Ira n ’s extrem e fu n d am en talism , F ahd could n o t b u t su p p o rt Iraq, especially w hen the tide tu rn ed ag ain st it at the end of 1981. T h e Saudi people, sensitive to any external th reat to A rab territory, largely sy m p ath ­ ised w ith Iraq a n d disagreed w ith dem ands for a m ore n eu tral stance in the G u lf w ar, as advocated by Arab radicals an d elem ents w ith in the Saudi ru lin g class an d intelligentsia. A lth o u g h M uslim s, the Iran ian s were ‘ab h o rred ’ S h i'ites a n d aroused m em ories of h istoric co n frontations betw een A rabs an d Persians, S u n n is and Shi'ites. Iran ia n S hi'ite fund am en talism , based o n Im am K hom ay n i’s p rin c ip le of ‘G overnance of the J u r is t’ (vilayat fa q ih ), was an ath e m a b o th to the W ahhabi u lam a an d to the Saudi new elites. T h e Iran ian s, m oreover, antag o n ised the Saudi p o p u la tio n by p o litical dem o n stratio n s d u rin g the h ajj season (starting in 1981) in Islam ’s h o liest towns. Such events caused the great m ajo rity of Saudis rath e r to coalesce b eh in d th eir rulers and the u lam a an d to su p p o rt F a h d ’s G u lf policy. Iraq h ad been a m ost troublesom e n eig h b o u r to A rabia’s conservative regim es before 1980 an d twice (1960, 1973) had attem pted to annex K uw ait, w hose territory, it asserted, was h istorically hers. N or did B aghdad renounce its m ilita n t B a'th ideology, its claim to be the van g u ard of socialist pan-A rabism in the G u lf o r its alliance w ith ‘a th e ist’ Moscow. T h u s, a lth o u g h R iyadh constantly advocated en d in g the G u lf w ar th ro u g h nego tiatio n s, it was n o t totally displeased (u n til the b eg in n in g of 1986) w ith the stalem ate in the b attle fro n t w hich exhausted both com batants. Furth erm o re, as B aghdad becam e m ore dependent on its conservative n eig h b o u rs’ aid it courted R iyadh, im proved its relations w ith the US and, ironically, considering its crusade to expel E gypt from the Arab cam p in 1978/9, it g rad u ally cam e to su p p o rt Saudi endeavours to b rin g E gypt back in to the Arab fold. W hen th in g s began to go badly for B aghdad at the end of 1981, the w ar w ith Iran was portrayed by Iraq as a new ‘Persian invasion of the Arab w o rld ’ an d it clam oured for h elp from its Arab sister states. R iyadh and its G C C allies also becam e increasingly w orried a b o u t T e h ra n ’s subver­ sive activities a m o n g their S h i'ite subjects. Hence, Saudi A rabia solicited the good offices of the IC O (Islam ic Conference O rg anisatio n ), the n o n ­ 129

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aligned countries an d the U N to end the w ar. At the sam e tim e, together w ith K uw ait, S audi A rabia expanded financial a n d logistic assistance to Iraq (total cost ab o u t 40 b illio n dollars). K uw ait was exceptionally valuable to Iraq because T e h ra n had blockaded Ira q ’s o nly o u tlet to the sea an d b ro u g h t its oil exports to a virtu al stand-still, n o t to m en tio n its su pply of w ar m aterial. Its n e ig h b o u rs’ financial help was crucial because B aghdad was incap ab le of c o n d u c tin g a protracted w ar w ith o u t it, as it was u n ab le to ex p o rt its oil. T o add in su lt to in ju ry , ‘sisterly’ B a'th ist Syria under H afiz al-Assad n o t only su p p o rted Iran b u t also stopped the flow of Ir a q ’s oil to its M editerranean term inals th ro u g h the p ip elin e crossing its territory. W ith a stalem ate em erg in g in the G u lf w ar between 1982 a n d 1983, after Iran h ad reconquered all the territory it had lost to Iraq, the Saudis in term itten tly encouraged new m ed iatio n attem pts to end the war, b u t to no avail because Ira n ’s dem ands inclu d ed the rem oval of P resident Saddam H ussayn from office. T h is period, moreover, w itnessed risin g tension in the Saudi royal fam ily follow ing F a h d ’s succession. S ubsequently, in ad d itio n to endeavours to appease T e h ra n an d lu k e­ w arm attem p ts to im prove relatio n s w ith it (and w ith Moscow6), R iyadh also increased its efforts to bridge the differences am o n ^ the Arabs co n cern in g the Ira n -Ira q w ar an d E gypt’s reh ab ilitatio n . A lth o u g h it was obliged, together w ith K uw ait, to increase aid to B aghdad, R iyadh was n o t displeased w ith the no -w in situ a tio n in the war. T h e th ird phase of the w ar, b eg in n in g in 1984, was signalled by increased Ira n ia n efforts to p enetrate Ira q ’s h e artlan d a n d to cause its S h i'ite (Arab) m ajority p o p u la tio n to rise ag ainst Saddam H u ssay n ’s S u n n i m in o rity regim e. It was also h ig h lig h ted by Ira q ’s lau n ch in g , in M arch 1984, of tanker w arfare aim ed at u n d e rm in in g Ira n ’s ability to su stain its w ar effort. T h is developm ent soon began to have an im p act on Saudi A rabia a n d K uw ait, w hose sh ip p in g becam e the target of T e h ra n ’s retaliatory attacks (May a n d Ju ly 1984 an d February 1985) because of the tw o co u n tries’ g ro w in g a id to Iraq. R epeated Ira n ia n v io latio n of K uw aiti an d S audi territo rial w ater an d air space cu lm in ated in Ju n e 1984 w hen S audi F-15s shot dow n tw o Ira n ia n F-4s w hich app ro ach ed the k in g d o m ’s E astern Province.8 T h e low -profile treatm ent of such incidents was typical of the k in g d o m ’s tim id policy. It was related, as w ell, to the G C C ’s efforts, spearheaded by the UAE an d O m an , to im prove relatio n s w ith Iran. Yet, sim ultaneously, R iyadh w ished to indicate clearly to T e h ra n the ‘red lin e ’ w hich, if transgressed, w ould cause Saudi A rabia to h it back. O bviously, in such an event the Saudis ho p ed for US m ilitary in terv en tio n , b u t W ash in g to n ’s G u lf policy was still am bivalent.9 W ith its large P alestin ia n co m m u n ity a n d its p a rliam en t d o m in ated by a n a tio n a list-fu n d a m e n ta list g ro u p , a n d h o stin g a large an d the only 130

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Soviet em bassy in the G C C , K uw ait frequently an d vociferously co n ­ dem ned US M iddle E astern policy an d A m erican ‘p lo ts’ in the G u lf.10 R iyadh, also, overtly rejected any su p erp o w er’s presence in the Persian G u lf b u t covertly im p lo red A m erican statesm en an d d ip lo m ats to m a in ta in a strong presence ‘over the h o rizo n ’, m ean in g in the A rabian Sea and at their D iego G arcia base, in case of an emergency. Despite increasin g fin ancial difficulties, the Saudis co n tin u ed as well the co n ­ stru ctio n of a h u g e m ilitary infrastructure, far beyond the requirem ents of th eir in co n seq u en tial arm ed forces. In a d d itio n , P rince B andar ibn S ultan (the m in ister of defence’s son) was a p p o in te d am bassador to W ash in g to n to liaise directly betw een the Sudayris an d the US govern­ m ent, thus bypassing Saud al-Faysal, the m in ister of foreign affairs." N o tw ith stan d in g Iran ia n attem p ts to assassinate K u w ait’s am ir an d to sm uggle w eapons in to Saudi A rabia in 1985, R iyadh, in ad d itio n to en co u rag in g m ediatio n attem pts, stepped u p its efforts to appease T e h ra n . T h is policy was w elcom e to the advocates w ith in the Saudi ru lin g class of a m ore n eu tral stance in the G u lf war. In so far as the k in g d o m ’s G u lf policy was entrusted to P rince N a ’if, the ‘creato r’ of the G CC, a n d to K ing Fahd, w ho co-ordinated w ith Saddam H ussayn, the person in charge of relatio n s w ith Iran was Saud al-Faysal. T h u s, in May 1985 the latter visited T e h ra n recip ro catin g visits to R iyadh by Iran ian m inisters an d officials.12 Indeed, the regent, P rince A bdallah, was also recruited to h elp im prove relatio n s w ith Iran, u tilisin g his special connections w ith Syria, Ira n ’s forem ost friend in the Arab cam p. T o w in T e h ra n ’s good w ill an d W a sh in g to n ’s favour, R iyadh, th ro u g h P rince B andar, parad o x ically becam e involved in 1985/6 in W ash­ in g to n ’s attem p t to im prove relatio n s w ith T e h ra n an d to free the A m erican hostages th ro u g h a lim ited su p p ly of arm s to Iran, w hich led to its in volvem ent (still n o t fully know n) in the Ira n -C o n tra fiasco. Saudi A rabia n o t only facilitated the flying of A m erican w eapons to Iran b u t itself sold the latter badly-needed refined oil p ro d u cts.15 O n its part, T e h ra n replaced its p ilg rim ag e director w ho had enraged the Saudis, and in 1986 intervened w ith the Lebanese H izbollah to free a Saudi d ip lo m at abducted in B eirut.14 Yet, all the S audi efforts to end the Ira n -Ira q w ar were doom ed because T e h ra n insisted th at Iraq be p ro n o u n ced the aggressor in the w ar an d th at Saddam H ussayn be rem oved from pow er in Baghdad. T h e relative stalem ate in the Ira n -Ira q w ar cam e to an end in February 1986 w ith the conquest by Iran of the Faw P en in su la, the larger p a rt of Ira q ’s P ersian G u lf coast, a n d by renew ed Iran ia n efforts to take Basra. Ira n ia n soldiers were now v irtually p o sitio n ed on K u w ait’s border, a short distance from S audi A rab ia’s E astern Province an d its oil fields. T e h ra n , thereafter, often threatened R iyadh an d K uw ait th a t it w ould attack them unless they ceased th eir massive fin an cial an d logistic 131

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assistance to Iraq. T h e Ira n ia n s now occasionally violated K uwaiti territory an d escalated th eir attacks o n b oth co u n tries’ tankers. Iran ian backed subversive S h i'ite g ro u p s also intensified their terrorist activities in K uw ait an d in S audi A rab ia’s Eastern P rovince.15 B aghdad ’s in ab ility to sto p T e h ra n an d co u n ter the religious zeal of the ‘h u m a n w aves’ tactic of the Ira n ia n R evolutionary G u ard an d Basji volunteers terrified R iyadh (and K uwait). A Saudi n ig h tm are was th at an Ira n ia n victory w ould p ro d u ce a fu n d am en talist S h i'ite regim e in B aghdad. A lternatively, th a t Iran w o u ld co n q u er K uw ait an d invade Saudi A rab ia’s E astern Province, o r sabotage its o il fields w ith the h elp of local Shi'ites. All alo n g , T e h ra n had the ab ility seriously to dam age the Saudi oil industry o r to sto p the passage of tankers an d ships g o in g to and from its ports. Such a radical step, it was widely believed, w ould cause a strong A m erican reaction. Yet, in view of W ash in g to n ’s p o o r track record, R iyadh was u n certain if it was truly w illin g to act ag ain st Iran. Even if the US were to intervene, R iyadh feared th a t such intervention w ould com e too late to prevent the e ru p tio n of u nrest in the k ingdom and the d estruction of its o il industry. All this also p ro m p ted R iy ad h ’s appeasem ent policy tow ards T e h ra n a n d led to the relatively frequent m eetings betw een Saudi an d Ira n ia n p ersonalities in 1985/6. T h e co n q u est of Ir a q ’s Faw P e n in su la by Iran in 1986 was, undoubtedly, a tu rn in g p o in t in R iy a d h ’s policy concerning the Ira n Iraq war. It now becam e im perative for Saudi A rabia an d K uw ait to term inate the w ar as soon as possible, by all m eans, before it could spill over in to their territories. As T e h ra n refused to agree to an u n co n d itio n al cease-fire, R iyadh a n d K uw ait were determ ined to strengthen th eir an d Ira q ’s ability to resist T e h ra n ’s pow er an d to gain universal Arab su p p o rt for their p o sitio n .16 E g y p t’s re h ab ilita tio n an d in clu sio n in the G C C ’s defence p lan s now becam e m ore desirable th an ever before. F urtherm ore, alth o u g h W ash in g to n began to suffer the results of the disclosure of its dealings w ith T e h ra n (the ‘Ira n g a te ’ fiasco), K ing Fahd ag ain turned to the U n ited States for low -profile help. H is request received im m ediate atten tio n . Shocked in to actio n by W a sh in g to n ’s n ear success in im p ro v in g its relations w ith T e h ra n , still considered the m ost im p o rta n t strategic asset in the region, Moscow, despite the o p e n in g of a new era in U S-U SSR relations, increased its efforts to w in Ira n ’s (and the G CC co u n tries’) friendship. T h u s, the Soviet deputy foreign m inister, Gregory K ornyenko, visited T e h ra n in A ugust. Shortly afterw ards, Ira n ’s deputy foreign m inister, M u h am m ad Jaw ad L arijan i, arrived in Moscow to discuss p o litical a n d econom ic agreem ents betw een the tw o co un tries.17 N o tw ith stan d in g Ir a n ’s endeavours to u n d erm in e K uw ait’s stability an d attacks o n K uw aiti an d S audi sh ip p in g , R iyadh continued, in line w ith its tim id trad itio n al policy, to avoid co n fro n tatio n w ith T e h ran an d 132

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to keep its criticism low-key. At the sam e tim e, it stepped u p its efforts to purchase sophisticated w eapons in the W est and, in 1986, secretly acquired from C h in a CSS2 ballistic m issiles w ith a range of a b o u t 1,650 m iles. U n w illin g ly at first, R iy ad h facilitated Ira q ’s air strikes ag ainst Ira n ia n oil term inals n ear a n d beyond H o rm u z.18 Even earlier Saudi A rabia hesitantly began to im prove its relatio n s w ith the Soviet U nio n , a step w elcom ed by som e y o unger princes an d the nationalist-oriented elem ent in the intellig en tsia. F o llo w in g the establishm ent of d ip lo m atic relatio n s betw een M oscow an d the UAE an d O m an (1985), Soviet officials began to visit R iyadh and o th er G C C capitals. An ad d itio n al factor w h ich m ade the conclusion of the G u lf w ar a p rio rity for R iyadh was the severe recession experienced by the k ingdom as a result o f the sh arp decline of oil sales and prices, w hich affected the Saudi ex p en d itu re bud g et (slashed from over 90 b illio n dollars in 1982 to 37.5 in 1987, w hile revenue from oil declined from 108 b illio n dollars to 17.8 b illio n dollars in the sam e p erio d ).19 T h u s, as previously m entioned, m any S audi businessm en a n d en trep ren eu rs faced g ro w ing cash-flow difficulties or w ent b a n k ru p t. In asm u ch as R iyadh endeavoured to protect the ‘low er-incom e’ Saudis from h ard sh ip , it reduced, by various m eans, som e subsidies on consum er goods a n d increased in direct taxa­ tion. By m id -1987, R iyadh took steps to curb the g row th in the n u m b er of students in dom estic a n d foreign universities an d its ex p en d itu re on them . M any graduates were u nable, m oreover, to find w ork, follow ing the g o v ern m en t’s decision in 1987 to freeze the h irin g of new em ployees.20 C oncerned about restless, unem ployed in tellig en tsia an d a dissatisfied m idd le class, K ing F ah d h o p ed th at, if the w ar was ended, Saudi A rabia cou ld disco n tin u e its m u lti-b illio n aid to B aghdad and be better able to restrain b o th O P E C an d n o n -O P E C producers. In the m eantim e, Ira n ’s co n q u est of the Faw P e n in su la generated fear in all classes of Saudis. W hile the oligarchy closed its ranks b eh in d K ing Fahd, the p o p u la tio n tightened its belts an d generally ad justed to the new situ atio n and, h o p in g for better days, su p p o rted the regime. R iy ad h ’s relations w ith T e h ra n in O P E C were, at best, strained. W hile Iran w ished to m axim ise o il revenues by red u cin g p ro d u ctio n an d raisin g prices, Saudi A rabia firm ly believed th at reasonable oil prices an d co­ o p eratio n betw een producers an d consum ers in the in d u strial countries were essential for lo n g -ran g e m arket stability an d its ow n security. R iyadh also w ished, u n til the en d of 1986, to penalise n o n-O P E C producers w ho increased th eir o u tp u t an d g lu tted the m arket at O P E C ’s expense. K ing F a h d ’s policy, w hich , after 1986, dram atically reduced the price of o il, was considered by Iran an d Arab n atio n alists a betrayal of the p roducers’ interests in order to benefit the W estern econom y. T h e Saudi o il policy, in co n ju n c tio n w ith Ir a q ’s a ir offensive, may have aim ed, as 133

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w ell, at reducing Ira n ’s revenues from o il drastically an d th u s coercing it to agree to peace term s acceptable to Ira q .21 T h e ‘fair share of the m ark et’ policy, w hich caused oil prices to collapse to a b o u t n in e d ollars a barrel in the last m o n th s of 1986, threaten ed Saudi A rab ia ’s econom ic stability an d stan d ard of living. T h is caused g ro w in g d isco n ten t in the Saudi aristocracy an d m iddle class. F a h d ’s com petence as a ru ler was q u estio n ed by m any. Some even o pined th a t he, as h ad been the case w ith Saud, sh o u ld be replaced by a m ore capable m em ber of the fam ily o r th a t the Saudi governm ent system sh o u ld be reform ed. T h e m onarch, o n his p art, fired Y am ani a n d agreed to a p ric in g a n d q u o ta form ula for O PE C , acceptable to T e h ra n a n d the o th er m em bers w hich, by the b e g in n in g of 1987, som ew hat stabilised oil prices at a b o u t 12-13 d ollars a barrel.22 By this tim e, R iy a d h ’s ability and w illingness to subsidise B ag h d ad ’s w ar effort had m arkedly d im in ish ed .23 F o llo w in g the Iran g ate fiasco, T e h ra n becam e m ore receptive to M oscow ’s w ooing. Senior Soviet an d Iran ian officials visited each o th e r’s cap itals a n d it was ru m o u re d th a t in a d d itio n to discussing econom ic and p o litic a l agreem ents, M oscow was w illin g to sell T e h ra n sophisticated arm s. T h a t, together w ith the c o n tin u ed Ira n ia n insistence on peace co n d itio n s unacceptable to Iraq, an d Ira n ’s increasing belligerence in the G ulf, caused K ing F ah d to explore ag ain the possibility of A m erican help. F o llo w in g F aw ’s co n q u est a n d freq u en t Ira n ian threats ag ain st K uw ait an d R iyadh in 1986, the Saud an d A l-Sabah rulers began seriously to consider Ir a q ’s previously rejected strategy to de-escalate the G u lf conflict by in te rn a tio n a lisin g it th ro u g h superpow er involvem ent. T rad itio n a lly suspicious of M oscow, R iyadh was re lu ctan t to ad o p t a strategy th at could advance Soviet interests in the area. Hence, w hile Saudi A rabia a g ain vocally condem ned the g reat p ow ers’ involvem ent in the G ulf, P rince B andar w as discussing w ith W ash in g to n o p tio n s to co u n ter the Ira n ia n threats an d Soviet a sp iratio n s in the region. T h e second p a rt of 1986 w itnessed intensified Iran ian attem p ts to c o n q u er Basra, Ira q ’s second largest city. T e h ra n an n o u n ced its in te n tio n to lau n ch a new ‘fin a l’ offensive ag ain st Iraq at the en d of the year. O n its p a rt B aghdad escalated its strategic b o m b in g of Iran p ro p er an d its oil in s tallatio n s in the G ulf. T h ese developm ents, an d the S au d i-K u w aiti su p p o rt for them , led T e h ra n to intensify its retaliatory attacks o n th eir sh ip p in g a n d its an ti-S au d i p ro p ag an d a. As the m orale of the Iraq i arm y an d p o p u la tio n was generally believed to be at a low ebb, R iyadh feared th a t if Iran were to la u n c h its m uch-heralded offensive, Iraq i resistance m ig h t collapse. T o c o u n ter T e h ra n ’s p ro p ag a n d a attacks ag ain st the Saudi regim e a n d his ow n piety, K ing F ahd, inter alia, adopted the title of ‘Servant of the tw o H oly S h rin es’, instead of ‘H is M ajesty’, an d fu rther strengthened the au th o rity of the u la m a ’s M orality Police. 134

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T h e ru m o u red agreem ent on the sale of Soviet sophisticated arm s to Iran caused ap p reh en sio n in Saudi A rabia. So d id T e h ra n ’s increasing in tim id a tio n of K uw ait an d Iran ian -sp o n so red sabotage incidents in the k ingdom in the second p art of 1986. Subsequently, K uw ait’s ruler, Shaykh Ja b ir al-S abah, g iv in g in to lengthy Saudi pressure, dissolved in m id -1986 K uw ait’s p a rliam en t, w hich had been dom in ated by nation a list-fu n d am en talists (it was previously dissolved in 1975 a n d re­ established in 1980), an d later signed the G C C ’s m u tu al defence pact. M ost im p o rtan t, in co n su ltatio n w ith R iyadh a n d in defiance of Iran, K uw ait decided a t year’s end to seek the superpow ers’ help. A G C C su m m it m eetin g held in T a ’if (Saudi A rabia) at the b e g in n in g of 1987 ap proved K u w ait’s ch arte rin g of three Soviet tankers w hich M oscow u n dertook to protect, and its in te n tio n to n egotiate a sim ilar agreem ent w ith W ash in g to n . H ow ever, w hen inform ed th a t the US did not have any tankers, K uw ait agreed to register its ow n tanker fleet in the US an d reflag it to enable A m erica to pro tect it in the G ulf. T h is was a total reversal of K uw ait’s a n d R iy ad h ’s oft-repeated rejection, m eant to please Arab n atio n alists, of any superpow er presence in the G ulf. It was also a serious challenge to T e h ra n ’s hegem ony in the Persian G u lf and, indirectly, a rebuff to M oscow ’s asp iratio n s in the region. By san ctio n in g K uw ait’s p la n , the Saudi-led G CC de facto adopted Ira q ’s strategy to in tern a tio n a lise the G u lf conflict. K ing Fahd w ho was aw are of, if n o t deeply involved in, the fo rm u latio n of K uw ait’s p lan from its inception, h ad secretly desired a m ean in g fu l A m erican presence in the region all along . T h e K uw aiti schem e now enabled the Saudi and K uw aiti rulers to seek A m erican protection a n d presence in the G u lf w ith relative im p u n ity an d w ith m in im a l Soviet involvem ent. R iyadh, nevertheless, cynically co n tin u ed , in 1987, to declare its displeasure at K uw ait’s decision to invite the US navy to the G u lf.24 W hile K uw ait’s pro p o sal was bein g debated by the G C C in December 1986 a n d Jan u a ry 1987, H ish a m Nazir, the new Saudi petroleum m in is­ ter, visited Moscow, ostensibly to w in Soviet su p p o rt for the latest O PEC agreem ent aim ed at stab ilisin g oil prices, w hich was obviously welcomed by the Soviets. N azir’s visit was m eant as well to signal R iy ad h ’s w illingness to im prove relatio n s w ith M oscow, gauge M oscow ’s reaction to the K uw aiti p la n an d learn d etails a b o u t S o v iet-Iran ian negotiations. A lth o u g h b oth R iyadh a n d Moscow w ished to end the Ira n -Ira q war, th eir m otivations were d iam etrically opposed. Moscow, w ish in g to develop friendly relatio n s w ith b o th T e h ra n an d B aghdad, could g ain n o th in g from the p ro lo n g a tio n of the conflict. T h e Soviet U n io n preferred to refocus A rab a tten tio n o n the A rab-Israeli conflict, w here it could benefit from its pro-A rab stance. In contrast, R iyadh w ished to draw A rab atte n tio n to the G u lf w ar an d away from the A rab-Israeli conflict. N or d id R iyadh w ish to see the USSR rep lacin g the US in 135

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T e h ra n o r g a in in g a fo o th o ld in the G ulf. R ath er R iyadh w ished to free B aghdad from M oscow's ‘stra n g leh o ld ’ an d draw it in to a m oderate proW estern axis a lo n g w ith E gypt a n d Jordan.

E N T E R T H E S U P E R P O W E R S - STA G E TW O (1986-8) A new stage in the Ira n -Ira q w ar began in M arch -A p ril 1987 after W ash in g to n h ad officially agreed to p rotect the reflagged K uw aiti tankers a n d despatched a pow erful arm ad a to the A rabian Sea. P rudently, Saudi A rabia a n d K uw ait refused to g ra n t facilities to the A m erican fleet, w hich reached the area by m id -1987. Besides bases leased from B ritain in O m an, Am erica was covertly g ran ted som e su p p o rt facilities by b o th Saudi A rabia an d K uw ait. In ad d itio n to the AWACS based in D h ah ran , the US navy used large flo atin g platform s, anchored off K uw aiti an d Saudi territorial w ater, as service depots for its w arsh ip s.25 R iyadh also approved B ah ray n ’s decision to enable the US to u p g rad e its sm all naval base there, near Ras T a n u ra o n the Saudi m a in lan d an d n o t far from K uwait. T e h ra n , in the m eantim e, escalated its attacks o n K uw aiti an d Saudi ships. In May, a Soviet freighter was shelled an d a Soviet tanker h it a m ine. S hortly after his re tu rn to M oscow from a to u r of O m an, UAE, K uw ait a n d Iraq on 2 Ju n e , th e Soviet d eputy foreign m inister V ladim ir Petrovsky strongly criticised T e h ra n .26 N one the less, a few weeks later, M oscow p rag m atically renew ed its attem pts to w in Ira n ’s friendship. R iyadh now felt sufficiently secure to a d o p t a m ore bellicose stance in its relations w ith Iran, a b a n d o n in g its trad itio n al tim id a n d h esitant foreign policy. It intensified its effort to w in Arab consensus to coerce Iran to end its ‘aggressio n ’ ag ain st its Arab neighbours. E x p lo itin g Syria’s econom ic crisis, it tried to entice D am ascus away from T e h ran , p ro m isin g President Assad generous fin an cial aid.27 T h e escalation in the ‘tank er w ar’ a n d W a sh in g to n ’s a n d M oscow ’s involvem ent in it, m ore­ over, p ro m p ted the Security C o u n cil to produce o n 20 Ju ly R esolution 598, w hich called u p o n Iran an d Iraq to declare a cease-fire. T h e C ouncil agreed, as w ell, to ‘m eet a g ain as necessary to consider fu rth er steps to ensure co m p lian ce’.28 B aghdad im m ediately acquiesced b u t T e h ra n delayed its answ er, ag ain d em a n d in g th a t Iraq first ad m it to bein g the aggressor a n d th at Saddam H ussayn be rem oved from office. As Iran did n o t com ply w ith the Security C o u n c il’s resolution, W ash in g to n proposed th a t th e C ou n cil declare a m andatory arm s em bargo ag ain st it. T h e pro p o sal was blocked by the Soviet (and C hinese) delegate, c la im in g th a t d ip lo m atic m eans were n o t exhausted, th u s sho w in g the U SS R ’s d ispleasure w ith the S audi-A m erican h a n d lin g of the situ atio n . Indeed, the Ira n ia n deputy foreign m in ister L arija n i signed in M oscow in Ju ly a general agreem ent for econom ic an d p olitical 136

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co-operation betw een Iran an d the Soviet U nion. T h e tw o sides also condem ned the US naval presence in the G u lf and ‘an o n y m o u s’ Soviet officials expressed concern over Ira q ’s co n tin u ed air attacks on Iran, despite the Security C o u n c il’s call for a cease-fire. T h e deterio ratio n of relatio n s betw een R iyadh an d T e h ra n cam e to a clim ax o n 30 Ju ly w ith the bloody suppression in Mecca of a violent d em o n stratio n by Iran ia n pilg rim s. At the day’s end, 408 people, largely Iran ian s, w ere dead an d m any m ore w ounded. P u ttin g the blam e squarely o n T e h ra n , R iyadh rejected claim s th at its security forces had indiscrim inately opened fire o n the rioters near Islam ’s holiest shrines. O n th eir p art, Ira n ’s leaders claim ed th a t a ‘S audi-A m erican p lo t’ was responsible for the m assacre.29 Indeed, som e evidence indicates th a t the incident was n o t a sp on tan eo u s one. Ira n ia n dem o n stratio n s accom panied by rio tin g a n d sabotage attem pts h ad occurred in Mecca in previous years.30 Yet, they never caused the Saudis to react so violently. T h is tim e R iyadh n o t o nly b ro u g h t before­ h an d to Mecca u n its of its special forces an d N atio n al G uard bu t, it is claim ed, a Jo rd a n ia n a n ti-terro rist b attalio n was also positio n ed there.31 ‘A m ateu r’ p h o to g rap h ers, ‘fo rtu ito u sly ’ present at the site of the rio tin g , conveniently su p p lied the Saudis w ith video film of the event, released im m ediately to T V netw orks an d show n all over the M uslim world. T h u s, it seems th a t the in cid en t may have been orchestrated by a m ore confident an d assertive R iyadh, in ten t on sto p p in g Iran ian p o litical and subversive activity in its territory an d on w in n in g Arab a n d M uslim su p p o rt for its policy. H ereafter, R iyadh n o longer attem pted to appease Iran or hide its efforts to coerce the latter to end the G u lf w ar on terms acceptable to Iraq .52 W hen they were in form ed of w hat had h ap p en ed in Mecca, angry Ira n ia n crow ds storm ed the Saudi embassy and caused the death of a Saudi d ip lo m at. A new wave of terrorist activities eru p ted in Saudi A rabia a n d K uw ait.33 S im ultaneously T e h ra n directed a vitriolic p ro ­ p ag an d a crusade ag ain st R iyadh, c h allen g in g the H ouse of S au d ’s legitim acy an d su itab ility to serve as the g u ard ian of Islam ’s holy shrines. T h e Saudi regim e, described by A yatollah K hom ayni as ‘in fid el’, was also accused of serving A m erican an d Israeli interests in the region (an accusation repeated by A rab S u n n i an d S h i'ite radicals in 1990/1). T h is c am p a ig n was accom panied by threats to p u n ish Saudi A rabia for its ‘sin s’ an d for its su p p o rt, together w ith K uw ait, or Iraq. At hom e, K ing Fahd endeavoured to project a n even m ore p io u s im age by g ra n tin g a d d itio n a l au th o rity to the u lam a an d red u cin g the profile of W estern, especially A m erican, presence in the kingdom . H e also exerted him self to w in the S h i'ite co m m u n ity ’s favour th ro u g h accelerated developm ent, by liftin g d iscrim inatory restrictions an d by g ran tin g am nesty to p o litical prisoners. F a h d ’s son, M uham m ad, the Eastern 137

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P rovince’s governor, con v in cin g ly dem onstrated the reg im e’s d eterm i­ n a tio n to crush w ith a n iro n fist an y p lo t ag ain st it. T h u s, Saudi S hi'ites hardly reacted to the Mecca m assacre. 4 O n the o th er han d , the H izbollah a n d its offshoots stepped u p their terror cam p a ig n ag ain st S audi targets w orld-w ide. T h e Ju ly 1987 Mecca riots, follow ed by v iolent Ira n ia n threats ag ain st Saudi A rabia, served fu rth er to consolidate K ing F a h d ’s regim e. T h e Saudi oligarchy a n d m odern elites, w ho coalesced b eh in d the k in g im m ediately after the co n q u est of the Faw P en in su la, now fully endorsed his assertive policy vis-à-vis Iran an d h is endeavours to w in A rab and W estern su p p o rt to end the G u lf war. As the econom ic recession deepened an d o il revenue declined in 1987 to a b o u t 18 b illio n a n d gov ern m en t e x p en d itu re to less th a n 37 b illio n dollars, all classes of Saudis a n d the private sector of the econom y experienced increasin g h ard sh ip . A m ong o th er things, the ad m in ist­ ratio n reduced subsidies an d allo catio n s to h ig h e r ed ucation a n d fu rther lim ited the h irin g of university g raduates by the ad m in istratio n an d governm ent agencies. A lth o u g h the g o vernm ent even attem pted to cu t subsidies for foodstuffs a n d services, F ah d p ru d en tly co n tin u ed to protect the standard of liv in g of ‘low er-incom e’ Saudis. T h e m onarch, fu rth ­ erm ore, instructed ad m in istrato rs to im prove services to citizens a n d to h an d le th eir requests m ore efficiently.55 All the above n o tw ith stan d in g , the great m ajo rity of the S audi masses an d intellig en tsia, n o t to m en tio n the ru lin g class, were su p p o rtiv e of the regim e’s policy as they felt threatened by the P ersian S h i'ites’ pow er, now practically next door. Nevertheless, criticism of the b ehaviour, avidity an d ‘c o rru p tio n ’ of m em bers of the artistocracy was q u ite com m on am o n g the in tellig en tsia an d younger, better-educated, ‘n o n -co n fo rm ist’ u la m a .56 E x p lo itin g the w idespread co n d em n a tio n of Iran in the M uslim w orld, R iyadh w ished to w in A rab endorsem ent for its to u g h a n ti-Ira n ia n stance. It ag ain attem p ted to entice D am ascus away from T e h ra n an d to bridge Syria’s differences w ith Iraq . It also endeavoured to persuade D am ascus to atten d an A rab su m m it w h ich it w ished to convene an d w hich it ho p ed w ou ld decide to boycott Iran a n d b rin g E gypt back in to the Arab fold. W hile C row n P rin ce A bdallah ap tly ‘lobbied’ Syria, A lgeria a n d the UAE, P rin ce Saud al-Faysal, failin g to persuade the Arab L eague’s foreign m in iste rs’ m eeting in T u n is in A ugust to a d o p t a strong a n ti-Ira n ia n resolutio n , m anaged, nevertheless, to get the m eeting to request the Security C o u n cil to take im m ediate steps ag ain st Iran for disregarding its reso lu tio n .37 A lth o u g h the m assive A m erican presence in the G u lf altered the regional balance of pow er a n d lim ited Ira n ’s o p tio n s, it soon becam e a p p a re n t to R iyadh th a t its p ro b lem s were n o t over. In Ju ly , Iran 138

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captured the H ajj O m ran heights in K urdistan. Shortly afterwards it launched an abortive offensive from M ehran in the direction of Baghdad. T e h ra n ’s defiance of W ashington was dem onstrated by its m in in g of m aritim e routes used by the US navy. A reflagged Kuwaiti supertanker in the first escorted convoy h it a m ine on 26 July. US prestige was further dam aged in m id-O ctober w hen the Iranians fired Scud missiles at Kuwait harb o u r on two consecutive days, h ittin g an American tanker on the first and dam aging a decoy target on the second. Yet, w hen asked about the m atter w hile visiting R iyadh, Secretary of State Schultz advised Kuwait to com plain about the m atter to the Security C ouncil as T eh ran had attacked K uw ait’s territory, no t covered by its agreem ent w ith the US.58 T h e GCC, som ew hat disillusioned w ith W ashington’s attitude, despat­ ched a high-level delegation to Moscow in September, followed by K uw ait’s foreign m inister accom panied by senior officials. Both m is­ sions, particularly the K uw aiti, requested Moscow to use its influence to stop Ira n ’s attacks on K uw ait and to su p p ort a UN arm s em bargo against T eh ran , w hich the Soviets had lo n g opposed. At the begin n in g of October, a flotilla of arm ed Iran ian speedboats penetrated S;- di territorial w ater and was chased aw., ' y the Saudi air force and navy. L ater in the m onth, a Saudi offshore oil field near Kuwait was sabotaged by a pro-Iranian S hi'ite u nderground group. W hen Iran escalated its attacks on Saudi and K uwaiti tankers in retaliation for Iraqi strikes against its oil installations, R iyadh unsuccessfully requested the US, B ritain and France to protect its tankers on a basis sim ilar to the K uw aiti arrangem ent w ith W ashington. As the situation continued to deteriorate, the Saudis again pressured W ashington and other members of the Security C ouncil to declare an arm s em bargo against Iran. Such efforts were doom ed to failure because the Soviets were displeased w ith the Saudi support for the Pax Americana in the Gulf. R iyadh again attem pted, therefore, to activate its Arab and M uslim sisters. T h e m eeting of the Arab League’s sum m it in A m m an in November 1987 was an im p o rtan t achievem ent for Saudi diplom acy. T h ro u g h R iyadh’s efforts, the G u lf w ar now became the focus of Arab interest, rather than the A rab-Israeli conflict, som ething R iyadh had sought to bring about since the early stages of the Ira n -Ira q war. A lthough Egypt was n o t readm itted to the League as R iyadh wished, each Arab country was now free to resum e unilaterally its relations w ith Cairo. T hus, shortly after the sum m it, Saudi A rabia and the other Arab states, w ith the exception of Syria, Libya and Algeria, jo in ed the ones w hich had already resum ed their relations w ith Cairo, despite the fact that Egypt had not rescinded its peace accords w ith Israel. O n the other hand, alth o u g h the sum m it agreed to m on ito r Iranian ‘aggression’ closely, and to reconvene if T eh ran were to threaten its Arab neighbours’ security, Syria managed 139

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to block any decision to a d o p t concrete m easures ag ain st Iran. D am ascus undertook, nevertheless, to persuade T e h ra n to agree to a cease-fire. R iyadh was aw are of M oscow ’s d ispleasure w ith its exclusion from the ‘p o lic in g ’ of the G ulf. C onvinced th a t the Security C ouncil cou ld n o t act w ith o u t its co-operation, a n d fearing th a t the M o sco w -T eh ran rappro­ chem ent w o u ld enable T e h ra n to o b tain Soviet w eapons, a n d p a rtic u ­ larly Scud m issiles, the Saudis despatched a high-level delegation, led by P rince Saud al-Faysal, to M oscow in February 1988. N ot by chance, the o th er senior m em ber of the delegation was Prince B and ar ibn S ultan, the S audi am bassador to W ash in g to n , a k now n a n ti­ co m m u n ist, w ho was considered the S udayris’ special emissary. T h is visit, undoubtedly, in dicated R iy a d h ’s fru stratio n w ith A m erica’s in ab ility to b rin g the Security C ouncil to im p lem en t R esolution 598. Yet, the S audis also w anted reassurances th a t Moscow was still com m itted to m a in ta in in g stability in the G u lf a n d was n o t sellin g w eapons, especially the longer range a n d m ore accurate Scud-B m issiles, to T eh ran . Feted by Moscow, the delegation m et w ith the to p Soviet leadership. T h e Saudis were assured of M oscow ’s frien d sh ip for Saudi A rabia an d the Arabs in general, a n d of its c o n tin u ed su p p o rt for R esolution 598, b u t they were also told of M oscow ’s d ispleasure w ith the A m erican naval presence in the G u lf an d of the need to replace it w ith a U N force w h ich Moscow w ould co-sponsor.S9 R iyadh was n o t h ap p y w ith A m erica’s ‘em barrassing pressure to do the p o litically im possible an d collude openly w ith W ash in g to n . . . an d . . . successfully resisted p o litical pressures to allow US forces b asin g rig h ts on Saudi so il’.10 R elatio n s betw een the tw o countries deteriorated at the b eg in n in g of 1988 as a resu lt of the U S ’s ‘special re la tio n ’ w ith Israel d u rin g the R eagan ad m in istra tio n a n d its refusal to sell Saudi A rabia a d d itio n al F-15s a n d o th er sophisticated w eapons. R iyadh was also angry ab o u t W ash in g to n ’s reaction to the disclosure th a t it had secretly obtained C hinese b allistic missiles. Subsequently, the US am bassador in R iyadh was practically declared persona n o n grata a n d was replaced in A pril to prevent fu rth er d eterio ratio n in U S -S au d i relations. Yet, realis­ in g the US C ongress’s g ro w in g an g er w ith its policy, R iyadh quickly endeavoured to repair its relatio n s w ith A m erica.41 T h e visit to M oscow of such a high-level Saudi delegation gave rise to ru m o u rs a b o u t the re-establishm ent of d ip lo m atic relatio n s betw een the Soviet U n io n a n d Saudi A rabia. A lth o u g h u n tru e, the ru m o u rs greatly annoyed the S audi u la m a an d were q uickly denied by R iyadh. N everthe­ less, this visit a n d the rap id ly im p ro v in g relations betw een Moscow an d the G C C signalled the o p e n in g of a new era in S oviet-S audi relations and were w elcom ed by the S audi n a tio n a list-n e u tra list cam p. Above all, they indicated R iy ad h ’s d eterm in atio n to end the G u lf w ar as soon as possible. 140

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L A S T S T A G E - SA U D I ARABIA A N D IRAN (1988-9) February and M arch 1988 saw the renew al of the ‘w ar of the cities’, w ith Iraq a n d (to som e degree) Iran terro risin g each o th e r’s p o p u latio n s w ith R ussian-m ade Scud-B m issiles. T h is was follow ed by an Ira n ia n offensive in K urdistan, w hich tu rn ed o u t to be T e h ra n ’s last. Ira n ia n forces, m oreover, frequently violated K uw aiti territorial w ater and, on one occasion, landed on its B ubyan Island. As B aghdad intensified its air strikes ag ain st Ira n ia n o il targets, T e h ra n , in tu rn , escalated its attacks on Saudi an d K uw aiti tankers. T h is an d the failure of Syria’s m ediation efforts and T e h ra n ’s scath in g attacks o n R iyadh over its new ‘p ilg rim s’ q u o ta ’ policy w hich perm itted o nly 45,000 Iran ian s to p articip ate in the hajj (com pared w ith 150,000 in 1987), produced a sh arp S audi reaction. T h e Saudi-sponsored IC O in its a n n u a l m eeting in A m m an strongly condem ned Iran for its 'u n -Islam ic b eh a v io u r’ a n d refusal to negotiate peace w ith Iraq. Ira n ’s co n tin u ed ‘b ru ta l’ pressure to rescind R iy ad h ’s decision concern­ in g the p ilg rim s’ q u o ta, its repeated attacks on Saudi tankers an d the b o m b in g of Saudi oil in stallatio n s by S h i'ite saboteurs caused K ing Fahd on 26 A pril to break off relatio n s w ith T eh ran . T h e Saudi m onarch declared o n th is occasion th a t any Ira n ia n aggression ag ain st the k in g d o m w o u ld be m et w ith force; R iyadh m ig h t even use its Chinesem ade m issiles.42 T h is bellicose stance, so atypical for R iyadh, was u n doubtedly pro m o ted by the reassu rin g US presence in the G u lf an d the belief th a t T e h ra n was nearly exhausted an d its arm y a b o u t to collapse. A pril 1988 saw the o p e n in g of the final stage in the Ira n -Ira q war. In a surprise attack w hich m et w ith m in im al resistance, Iraq recaptured the Faw P eninsula. T hereafter, th e in itiativ e passed in to B aghdad’s hands. In ad d itio n , the R eagan a d m in istra tio n was now ready to take its gloves off an d teach T e h ra n a belated lesson for p ast h u m iliatio n s. T h u s, renewed Ira n ia n m in in g of the G u lf’s n av ig atio n routes, w hich caused dam age to the USS R oberts on 14 A p ril, led to the d estruction by US forces of two oil platfo rm s used by Ira n ’s R evolutionary G uards. F ollo w in g additional incidents, the US navy destroyed ab o u t half of the Ira n ia n navy. W ash in g to n ’s new aggressiveness was also reflected by its decision to extend its p rotection to neu tral ships in the G u lf if they were attacked in the vicinity of a US w arship. (A US navy sh ip m istakenly shot dow n an Ira n ia n passenger p lan e w ith heavy loss of life, believing th a t it was a war plane.) T e h ra n ’s ability to o perate in the G u lf was th u s practically nullified. R epeated Iraq i victories in May, Ju n e a n d Ju ly , fo llow ing the total collapse of Ira n ’s m ilitary an d logistical infrastructure, forced A yatollah K hom ayni to accept reality. T e h ra n inform ed the U N Secretary G eneral o n 18 Ju ly th at it was ready to accept a cease-fire u nconditionally. 141

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Ironically, R iyadh was now com pelled to persuade Saddam H ussayn to agree to h a lt the Iraq i offensive. T h e cau tio u s and far-sighted Saudis, u n lik e Iraq, d id not w ish to fu rth er h u m iliate Iran and thus perpetuate the ‘P ersian -A rab w a r’. P resident H ussayn, how ever, agreed to the cease­ fire only after Iran acquiesced in o p e n in g im m ediate peace n egotiations w ith Iraq. A cease-fire was declared on 20 A ugust. O nce the w ar was over, Iran q uickly re-established d ip lo m atic relations w ith K uw ait and endeavoured to im prove its relations w ith the o th er G CC countries. In tu rn , K ing Fahd ordered the Saudi m edia in O ctober 1988 to stop th eir attacks on Iran. R elations betw een T e h ra n and R iyadh slowly im proved, despite the execution by Saudi A rabia of four Saudi S h i’ites responsible for sabotage activities.45 T h is process was som ew hat accelerated by the decline of oil prices, w hich b o th sides w ished to h alt, and because R iyadh a n d K uw ait ag ain began to fear Ira q ’s am b itio n s in the region. T h u s, for instance, an Ira n ia n delegation was invited by R iyadh in M arch 1989 to atten d a n Islam ic conference to debate Salm an R u sh d ie’s Satanic Verses. Yet, w hile Fahd preached tolerance, the Iran ian s w anted R u sh d ie ’s blood. Indeed, Ira n ’s relations w ith Saudi A rabia ag ain deteriorated over the m atter of R iy ad h ’s p ilg rim s’ qu o ta, over w hich Im am K hom ayni w o uld n ot com prom ise. Iran, in add itio n , con tin u ed to strengthen its ties w ith Moscow, h o p in g to counterbalance the W estern presence a n d influence in the G u lf region an d to acquire sophisticated w eapons w hich the USSR was ready to sell both for p olitical a n d econom ic reasons. A m ajor factor w hich influenced Ira n ’s foreign policy after A ugust 1988 an d well after K h o m ay n i’s dem ise in Ju n e 1989, was the struggle for pow er betw een the do g m atic an d the p rag m atic radical Ira n ia n leader­ ship. T h e first, w h ich co n tro lled the da'wa office responsible for religious p ro p ag an d a an d cland estin e activities abroad (trad itio n ally so in S h i'ite em pires), was led by Ali A kbar M ohtashem i, the pow erful in terio r m inister, by A yatollah M ontazeri, Im am K h o m ay n i’s ousted h eir (respon­ sible for the da'wa office), an d by K h o m ay n i’s son A hm ad. T h is faction strongly opposed any n o rm alisatio n of relations w ith the ‘in fid el’ G u lf regim es an d the West. T h e second faction, led by the wily H ashem i R afsanjani, the pow erful m ajlis speaker, an d the arm ed forces’ comm ander-in-chief, P resident K h am en a’i (later elected heir to K hom ayni), and foreign m in ister V ilayeti, was m ore realistic an d pragm atic. T h e hajj issue, and the b eh ead in g in R iyadh in Septem ber 1989 of sixteen largely K uw aiti S hi'ites accused of a b o m b in g incident in Mecca in Ju ly d u rin g the hajj period an d m asterm inded by an Ira n ia n d ip lo m at in K uw ait, ag ain increased the tension between T e h ra n and R iyadh. T h is, and o th er Iran ia n -in sp ire d terrorist activities in the w orld44 occur­ rin g after K hom ayni’s d eath were probably in itiated by the radical and d ogm atic Ira n ia n leadership, w hich rem ained loyal to K ho m ay n i’s 142

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teachings an d w hich so u g h t to u n d erm in e the still shaky governm ent of P resident R afsan jan i elected in A ugust. Indeed, the Ira n ia n radical and anti-W estern o p p o sitio n to R a fsa n ja n i’s regim e enjoys m ajority su p p o rt in the clergy-dom inated Ira n ia n m ajlis an d u n til m id -1992 retained, some of its pow er b o th abroad an d in Iran , w here it con tin u es to m asterm ind clandestine o p eratio n s a n d p o litical assassinations in the M iddle East an d E urope.1 Yet, R a fsa n ja n i’s p rag m atic governm ent is itself engaged in sp reading m ilita n t fu n d am en talism in the Arab w orld (Sudan, A lgeria an d L ebanon), su p p o rts the ‘jih a d ’ ag ain st Israel, and is developing, at great cost, n u clear an d o th er u n co n v en tio n al capabilities as well as co nventional m ilitary pow er. Faced w ith the eno rm o u s task of reb u ild in g Ira n ’s ru in ed econom y, w ith severe u n em p lo y m e n t an d sp ira llin g in flatio n an d w ith an em pty treasury, R afsanjani w ished to increase T e h ra n ’s revenue from oil. A b an d o n in g Ir a n ’s u n realistic haw k ish stance in O PE C , he su pported m oderately h ig h er O P E C oil prices w hile safeguarding pro d u ctio n q u o tas an d co -o p eratin g w ith R iy ad h 's p ru d e n t p ro d u ctio n an d p ric in g policy aim ed at increasin g dem an d for oil by stab ilisin g prices. Iran also w ished to restore its oil p ro d u ctio n capacity to the level attain ed before the anarchy follow in g the Islam ic revolution. T h a t necessitated su b ­ stan tial foreign capital. W ell aw are th a t T e h ra n ’s involvem ent in in te r­ n a tio n al terrorism an d its im age in the w orld frightens off p o ten tial foreign investors, R afsan jan i has been en d eav o u rin g to im prove Ira n ’s im age. In the final analysis, e x p a n d in g Ira n ’s oil industry for the benefit of the Ira n ia n people, R afsan jan i believes, sh o u ld h e lp T e h ra n to resum e its d o m in a n t p o sitio n in the G ulf, an d possibly in the Islam ic w orld. K ing F a h d ’s govern m en t em erged from the Ira n -Ira q w ar m ore stable an d confident an d w ith its pro-A m erican policy vind icated .16 F ah d ’s policy even seemed to have produced a pow erful, m oderate Arab block in co rp o ratin g , in ad d itio n to Saudi A rabia, Iraq , E gypt an d Jo rd an . In 1989, m oreover, w ith dem an d for oil b e g in n in g to rise and prices tem porarily increasing, it appeared th at the k ingdom was b eg in n in g to em erge o u t of the acute recession w hich it had suffered since the mid1980s.'7 T h u s, R iy a d h ’s lead in g p o sitio n in the Arab w orld and in O P E C seemed assured. D espite periods of ten sio n w ith T e h ra n , R iyadh exerted itself to convince B aghdad after A ugust 1988 th at it sh o u ld a b an d o n its extrem e dem ands u p o n Iran an d sign a peace agreem ent w ith it. Still ap p re h e n ­ sive a b o u t T e h ra n ’s regim e, on the one h an d , an d a g ain an x io u s a b o u t Sadd am ’s ‘p an -A rab ’ am b itio n s, on the other, R iyadh endeavoured to m a in ta in am icable relatio n s w ith B aghdad an d to im prove its relations w ith T e h ra n . Above all, Fahd co n tin u ed to n u rtu re Saudi A rabia’s relations w ith W ash in g to n an d the West generally an d to acquire ad d itio n al sophisticated w eapons. 143

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O n 16 February 1989, Ira q established the Arab C o-operation C ouncil (ACC) w ith Jo rd an , C airo an d Yemen. Observers believed, at first, th at the ACC was p a rt of a ‘m oderate pro-W estern ax is’ em erging o u t of the Ira n -Ira q war. B ut R iyadh was u n d er no illusions a b o u t this so-called econom ic co-operation o rg an isatio n .1 T h u s, after the US decided to w ithdraw m ost of its naval force from the region, as well as two of the four AWACS lent to R iy a d h ,,n Saudi A rabia tacitly approved an increased A m erican naval presence in the G ulf.

C O N C L U S IO N Even before Iraq invaded Iran , R iyadh was concerned w ith the im pact of T e h ra n ’s p ro p ag an d a an d subversive activities on the Saudi people, an d p articu larly on the re g io n ’s S h i'ite p o p u la tio n . After the w ar broke out, R iyadh also feared the consequences it m ig h t have on its o il industry, the k in g d o m ’s life-line. O nce the tide tu rn ed ag ain st Iraq, K ing Fahd encouraged M uslim o rg an isatio n s an d T h ird W orld countries to m ediate betw een the two com batants. F o llo w in g R iy ad h ’s custom ary role of ‘peace b ro k er’ in the Arab w orld, Fahd unsuccessfully so u g h t to u n ite the polarised Arab cam p in su p p o rt of B aghdad. Yet, R iyadh considered the extended w ar as favo urin g its interests. W hile the G u lf giants were bleeding each other, K ing Fahd w on w ide su p p o rt for his policy an d consolidated the regim e’s p o sitio n both at hom e and in the Arab cam p. R iyadh increased its efforts to end the Ira n -Ira q w ar th ro u g h m edia­ tion in 1984, after Iraq lau n ch ed the ‘tanker w ar’ an d Iran attem pted to penetrate Ira q ’s heartlands. H owever, the S audi-initiated m ediation efforts were still half-hearted and doom ed to failure because Iran insisted th at Iraq be branded the aggressor and th a t Saddam H ussayn be rem oved from office. R iyadh was n ot altogether displeased w ith the stalem ate in the battlefields. Between 1984 an d 1986 the Saudi regim e also endeavoured to im prove its relations w ith T e h ra n an d to co-ordinate its activities w ith W ash­ in g to n , h o p in g , inter alia, to w in its favour. K ing Fahd thus became involved in W ash in g to n ’s ‘arm s for hostages’ n egotiations (the Irangate fiasco) and, tem porarily, R iy ad h ’s relations w ith T e h ra n som ew hat im proved. T h e Saudi attitu d e co n cern in g the Ira n -Ira q w ar dram atically changed follow ing the conquest of the Faw P en in su la by Iran in February 1986. R iyadh and K uw ait now feared th at the w ar could spill over in to their territories or seriously affect th eir S h i'ite m inorities. T h a t, an d M oscow’s attem pts to replace W a sh in g to n ’s influence in T e h ra n , considered by both superpow ers the re g io n ’s m ost im p o rta n t strategic pow er asset, now m ade it im perative for R iyadh to end the w ar quickly. T h e fact th at ‘P ersian ’ S h i'ite soldiers were now positio n ed near the W ahabbi 144

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k in g d o m ’s n o rth ern border caused the Saudi oligarchy, the u lam a and new elites to coalesce b eh in d K ing Fahd. T h e serious econom ic recession, the results of w hich caused h ard sh ip s to Saudis of all classes, did n o t erode the su p p o rt of the S u n n i masses for the regim e. O n his part, K ing Fahd p ru d en tly protected, as far as he could, the standard of liv in g of io w e r-in c o m e ’ Saudis by largely m a in ta in in g the k in g d o m ’s extensive w elfare system an d subsidies. In a d d itio n , F ah d p am pered the u lam a and expanded the activity of th eir M orality Police. T h e regim e successfully used the ‘carrot-and-stick ’ fo rm u la in treatin g its S h i'ite subjects and thus, th ro u g h o u t the Ira n -Ira q w ar, the S audi S hi'ites never truly threatened the co u n try ’s security. W hile in creasin g its fin an cial an d logistic assistance to Iraq, R iyadh strove to b rin g the Security C o u ncil to coerce T e h ra n to agree to a cease­ fire. Sim u ltaneously, it in tensified its efforts to b rin g E gypt back in to the A rab fold an d to u n ite the Arab co untries to resist the P e rsia n ’ threat to Eastern A rabia. L astly, S audi A rabia and K uw ait now believed th at the m ost likely way to de-escalate the G u lf conflict was to in tern atio n alise it. F ahd covertly co-ordinated w ith the US R iy a d h ’s p o litical efforts in the G u lf and, it seems, co-operated w ith A m erica’s efforts to settle the A rabIsraeli conflict. T h e latter was n o t ju s t to please W ash in g to n b u t m ore because he w ished to focus A rab atte n tio n on the ‘P ersian th rea t’ w hich un d erm in ed his regim e’s stability. D espite trad itio n al ap p reh en sio n of A rab n a tio n a list reaction, R iyadh also facilitated the presence in the G u lf of an A m erican ‘a rm a d a ’, to the g reat co n stern atio n of T e h ra n an d Moscow and radical Arab nationalists. T h e US naval presence in the G u lf com pletely changed R iy ad h ’s tim id an d am b iv alen t policy vis-à-vis Iran. T h is policy was replaced by a new assertive stance w hich , inter alia, was responsible for the harsh su p ­ pression of the Mecca riots in Ju ly 1987. T h e riots fu rth er u nited all Saudi S u n n is b eh in d F a h d ’s regim e and increased Saudi A rab ia’s self-confidence. T h e Mecca riots help ed tu rn m ost Arabs ag ainst Iran an d focused their atte n tio n o n the G u lf w ar. T h ey helped stem any re m a in in g criticism in the kin g d o m a n d the Arab w orld co n cern in g the US presence in the G u lf and facilitated E g y p t’s reacceptance by the Arab cam p. At hom e, they strengthened the o lig a rc h y ’s an d the p eo p le’s su p p o rt for K ing F ah d ’s policy. S audi d ip lo m atic efforts to de-escalate the Ira n -Ira q conflict may n ot have been very successful u n til 1987. N one the less, they helped gradually to isolate T e h ra n and, in Ju ly 1987, p roduced Security C ouncil R esolu­ tion 598. T h a t, the tig h te n in g of the em bargo on Iran , an d the US naval presence in the G ulf, ra th e r th an Ira q ’s m ilitary perform ance, practically b ro u g h t Iran to its knees in Ju ly 1988. W ash in g to n ’s rap id ly g ro w in g dependence o n im ported oil reinforced 145

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the traditional US policy of safeguarding the Saudi regime. O n his part, in spite of occasional disagreem ent w ith America over arm s sales and W ash ington’s M iddle East policy in relation to Israel, K ing Fahd was determ ined to continue to n u rtu re Saudi relations w ith the US. These relations assumed additional im portance in view of R iyadh’s renewed concerns over Iran and Ira q ’s renewed am bitions in the region.

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9

PRELUDE TO THE I R A Q - K U W A I T CRISIS

SA U D I E C O N O M Y A N D SO C IETY IN T H E A F T E R M A T H OF T H E I R A N - I R A Q WAR At the b e g in n in g of 1988, after five years of econom ic recession, there was still no sign of im pro v em en t in the S audi econom y. T h is was reflected by the 1988 budget, an n o u n c ed at the end of December 1987. E xpen d itu re rem ained at 37.6 b illio n d ollars, w h ile revenue from oil, projected at 18.4 b illio n , was by year’s end o nly a b o u t 16.5 b illio n (the low est since the mid-1970s). T h e projected b ud g et deficit was a b o u t 10 b illio n dollars. As the k in g d o m ’s liq u id assets h ad sh ru n k dram atically since 1982, R iyadh decided to la u n c h an o th e r in te rn a l bo n d issue of a b o u t 8 b illio n dollars, rath er th a n co n tin u e to draw on the re m n a n t of its fin an cial reserves.1 In his bu d g et speech delivered o n 30 D ecember 1987, K ing Fahd told his n a tio n th a t he w o uld curb sp en d in g , ‘alth o u g h an u n su itab le p o litical situ atio n in the G u lf region necessitates fu rther m ilitary sp en d ­ in g ’ (30-35 p er cent of each year’s budget). H e also prom ised to protect the S audi people from any h a rd sh ip resu ltin g from the econom ic crisis. Yet, it was clear th a t if o il prices rem ained depressed S audi A rabia w ould n o t be able to finance its h u g e b u d g et deficit. G o vern m ent ex p en d itu re o n subsidies for ag ricu ltu re an d a variety of com m odities a n d services, in 1987, am o u n ted to 3 to 4 b illio n dollars. In a d d itio n , R iyadh was sp en d in g m any b illio n s o n its extensive welfare services, the like of w h ich were n o t to be fo u n d elsewhere. T hese subsidies an d services were a p illa r of the p atern al relatio n s betw een the regim e and the S audi people. B ut, as the k in g d o m ’s oil revenue was n o t likely to rise, an d R iyadh was no lo n g er w illin g to draw u p o n its reserves, it preferred to reduce its su b stan tial subsidies for gasoline, electricity, basic food­ stuffs, airp la n e tickets a n d som e services. A sim ilar a ttem p t in 1985 ‘was scaled back . . . fo llo w in g a p u b lic o u tcry ’.2 Sensing p o p u la r discontent, K ing F ahd, at the b eg in n in g of 1988, ag ain rescinded his g o v ern m en t’s decision. A p la n to tax the incom e of foreign em ployees, w h ich caused m any to threaten to leave the kingdom , 147

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was also cancelled.5 Indeed, d u rin g a m eeting w ith Saudi notables shortly afterw ards, Fahd declared th a t his governm ent w o uld endeavour to alleviate the h ard sh ip suffered by the citizens an d w ould im prove the stand ard of the services provided to the p o p u la tio n by b o th the central g o v ern m en t’s a d m in istratio n an d th at of the provinces. Moreover, the regim e established three funds to subsidise ag ricu ltu re, industry an d real estate. T h e latter, for instance, g ran ted Saudi citizens w ish in g to b u ild houses on lan d granted by the g o vernm ent w ith o u t charge interest-free loans, w hich were p artly forgiven if rep aid o n tim e.4 N o tw ith stan d in g the g o v ern m en t’s efforts, the per capita incom e in S audi A rabia, a b o u t 11,000 dollars in the early 1980s, declined to 7,0008,000 dollars by 1989.5 T h e p rivate sector of the S audi econom y c o n tin u ed to suffer from the p ro lo n g ed recession. B ankruptcies were com m on an d m any businessm en a n d entrepreneurs defaulted on paym ents of loans received from Saudi and foreign banks. As W estern-type banks were n o t viewed sym pathetically by shari'a courts because they charged interest, little could be done by them to retrieve u n p a id debts. In tu rn , the banks, especially foreign ones, were relu ctan t to lend m oney to Saudis. Hence, SAMA established a three-m an b an k in g com m ittee (the N egotiable In stru m en ts C om m ittee) to deal w ith non-p ay m en t of debts an d thus bypass the shari'a courts. T heoretically, this body had the a u th o rity to take serious steps ag ain st defaulters. Yet, apprehensive of c o n fro n tin g the shari'a courts, especially w hen the debtor was related to the royal fam ily o r had friends in h ig h p ositions, the new com m ittee d id little to solve the p ro b lem .6 A nother elem ent in the p o p u la tio n w hich seriously suffered from the econom ic crisis, was the tens of tho u san d s of h ig h school an d university graduates. M ost could n o t find em ploym ent in the coveted governm ent service, w hile the priv ate sector, suffering from the econom ic recession, could n o t provide a viable alternative. Yet, a claim th a t unem ployed students were responsible for a wave of crim es in the Eastern Province was either u n tru e o r related to S h i'ite terrorist activities in th a t region.7 A ddressing students at U m m al-Q u ra U niversity (Mecca) in O ctober 1988, K ing F ahd, in view of the increased u n em p lo y m en t am o n g Saudi graduates, 70 p er cent of w h o m held degrees in Islam ic studies an d liberal arts, called u p o n graduates to jo in the arm ed forces an d security services. T h e m onarch advised them , u p o n term in atio n of th eir service, to o p t for technical train in g . K ing F ah d told his audience th a t en ro lm en t at m ilitary academ ies of all kinds had substan tially increased. H isham Nazir, the Saudi petro leu m m inister, also focusing on the p roblem of g rad u ates’ un em p lo y m en t, encouraged grad u ate students to jo in on e of the various branches of the oil industry. H e also claim ed th a t the policy of S audi-isation was being accelerated in order to provide ad d itio n al jobs for g raduates.8 148

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G enerally speaking, it seems th at by 1989, despite the difficulties they faced, S audi graduates, w ith the exception of som e from the Islam ic universities, adjusted to the new situ a tio n a n d did n o t con stitu te a challenge to the reg im e’s stability. T h ey now so u g h t em ploym ent w herever av ailable a n d were ready to accept low er-paid jobs, even in rem ote provinces, as lo n g as they did n o t entail m an u al work. Indeed, the S audi p o p u la tio n as a w hole adapted itself to the ‘h a rd s h ip ’ resu ltin g from econom ic recession.9 T h is ad ap ta tio n was cushioned by the g o v ern m en t’s efforts to m ain ta in its generous w elfare system and m ost of the subsidies w h ich preserved a n acceptable standard of liv in g for the S audi p o p u la tio n . T h e reg im e’s policy was facilitated by further d raw in g on the k in g d o m ’s lim ited liq u id reserves in a d d itio n to in tern al b o rro w in g th ro u g h bo n d issues an d in d irect b o rro w in g from foreign b an k s.10 T h a t, a n d the Ira n ia n th reat em phasised by the Mecca carnage in 1987 a n d S h i'ite terrorist activities, w hich were viewed as a serious threat to the S u n n i m ajority, were the m ain reasons for the k in g d o m ’s stability a n d the w ide-based su p p o rt for the Al Saud regim e despite the recession. In so far as the pow er stru g g le w ith in the royal fam ily was largely co n tain ed after 1983, the S audi oligarchy coalesced b eh in d K ing Fahd, particu larly fo llo w in g Ir a n ’s con q u est of the Faw P en in su la in 1986 and the Mecca rio tin g in 1987. N o tw ith stan d in g the arm istice signed betw een Iran an d Iraq in Ju ly 1988, R iyadh still felt insecure because B aghdad a n d T e h ra n had failed to reach a peace agreem ent. N o t o nly d id the S audi regim e becom e the target o f a new wave of S h i'ite fu n d am en talist terrorism an d p ro p ag an d a, b u t it was b ecom ing increasingly ap p rehensive co n cern in g Ira q ’s renew ed a m b itio n s in the A rab cam p an d aggressive policy in O PEC . Moreover, d u rin g 1989 despite, o r p e rh ap s because of, signs of recuperation in the k in g d o m ’s econom y, som e disco n ten t was becom ing evident in the ranks of the in tellig en tsia co n cern in g th eir n o n -p artic ip a tio n in the k in g d o m ’s policy -m ak in g and the increased influence of the u la m a .11 O n the o th er han d , the conservatives were dissatisfied w ith th eir co u n try ’s relations w ith the U nited States an d resentful of foreign cu ltu ra l influence o n the ‘S audi way of life’, attrib u ted p artly to W estern-trained technocrats. Both m odernists a n d conservatives deplored the S auds’ involvem ent in b u si­ ness a n d the com m issions system w hich enriched them , as w ell as their ostentatious lifestyle an d excesses.12 Above all, now th a t the Iran ia n threat had receded, Saudi businessm en a n d p eople as a w hole were becom ing increasingly displeased w ith the lengthy econom ic crisis and the govern­ m e n t’s h a n d lin g of it. A cutely aw are of the co rrelatio n betw een the econom y an d the c o u n ­ try’s stab ility ,15 K ing F ah d frequently visited arm y units, academ ies and universities in the k in g d o m ’s different regions. In his speeches, he repeatedly underscored the trem endous developm ent achieved by the 149

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kingdom , m ade possible by oil revenue. Indeed, in O ctober 1988, the Saudi governm ent an n o u n ced a special developm ent p la n for the years 1989-93 w ith the follo w in g targets: 1 T o co n tin u e to develop the k in g d o m ’s defence forces an d ‘to strengthen loyalty o f citizens'. 2 '. . . to increase the state’s revenues p ro vid in g this does n ot lead to undesirable social or econom ic effect . . .’. 3 T o im prove the perform ance a n d efficiency of the governm ent a d m i­ n istratio n , ‘w hich w ill lead to reducing g o vern m en t expenditure w ith o u t affecting the level o f services . . . to citizens’. 4 T o increase the activity of the private sector in the n atio n al economy. 5 T o achieve a balanced developm ent a m o n g the various regions of the kingdom . 6 T o encourage the priv ate sector to provide job o p p o rtu n ities for citizens. 7 T o replace non -S a u d i m a n p o w er w ith Sa u d i m a n p o w er.14 E vidently, the regim e believed th a t its stability in the 1990s depended on its ability to revive the co u n try ’s prosperity an d developm ent, w hich w ould benefit all Saudis. T h a t clearly depended on the state of the oil m arket and on oil prices.

OPEC AN D T H E OIL MARKET (1987-90) F o llo w in g the 1986/7 o il crisis, w hen prices sank to a b o u t 9 dollars a barrel, Saudi A rabia ab an d o n ed its crusade for a ‘fair share of the m ark et’, largely aim ed ag ain st n o n -O P E C producers. At the December 1986 O P E C su m m it, R iyadh was one of the m ain p ro p o n en ts of the decision to lim it the o rg a n isa tio n ’s total p ro d u ctio n to 15.5 m .b.d. (32.5 m .b.d. in 1980/1) an d to set a reference price of 18 dollars a barrel. T h is decision caused prices to rise to 12-13 d ollars a barrel by the b e g in n in g of 1987, an d even h ig h er w hen it becam e evident th a t O P E C ’s m em bers had actually reduced their p ro d u ctio n to the prescribed lim it. Shortly afterw ards R iyadh declared its determ in atio n n o t to serve any longer as O P E C ’s ‘sw ing p ro d u cer’, an d grad u ally raised its share of O P E C ’s p ro d u ctio n to nearly 25 per cent, eq u iv alen t to its share of the ‘n o n -co m m u n ist w o rld ’s proven reserves’.15 S ubsequently Saudi oil p ro ­ d u ctio n , w hich at one p o in t in 1987 h ad sh ru n k to u n d er 3 m .b.d. from 10 m illio n in 1979, rose by mid-1988 to 4.35 m .b.d. R iy a d h ’s insistence on achieving a 25 per cent m arket share of O P E C ’s total p ro d u ctio n , w hile o th er m em bers of the o rg an isatio n also exceeded their quotas, caused oil prices to rem ain un d er 15 dollars a barrel in the second half of 1987. O il rose to a b o u t 16 dollars in the b eg in n in g of 1988 only to collapse again to a b o u t 12 dollars a barrel shortly afterw ards o w in g to a g lu tted m arket.16 150

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In view of the k in g d o m ’s grave fin an cial situ atio n the Saudi governm ent im p lo red its O P E C partn ers to observe th eir p ro d u ctio n q u o tas so th at the price of oil w o u ld rise to as close to 18 dollars a barrel as possible. Such a price ceiling did n o t c o n trad ict the k in g d o m ’s lo ng-range oil policy based o n its e no rm ou s proven reserves,17 w hich necessitated low oil prices to enco urag e h ig h er co n su m p tio n . By this tim e, moreover, nonO P E C producers, w hose o u tp u t had peaked, were eager to co-operate w ith O P E C to h elp raise oil prices. How ever, R iy ad h ’s efforts in the first h a lf of 1988 to m a in ta in O P E C ’s p ro d u ctio n d iscip lin e in order to raise oil prices did n o t succeed. T h is was largely due to Ira q ’s refusal to p a rtic ip a te in O P E C ’s q u o ta agree­ m ents as lo n g as it was n o t g ran ted a q u o ta e q u al to th at of Iran (2.3 m .b.d.). Ira q ’s p ro d u ctio n , w h ich was m arg in al in the early stages of its w ar w ith Iran, rose by 1988 to nearly 3 m .b.d., com pared to its 1.3. m .b.d. q u o ta. T h is was facilitated by th e co n stru ctio n of tw o pipelines from its no rth ern (K irkuk) fields to the M editerranean via T u rk ey (capable of carrying a b o u t 1.9 m .b.d.) an d an o th er, from its sou th ern (R um ayla) field to the S audi T ran s-A rab ian p ip elin e, th ro u g h w hich it was allow ed by R iyadh to p u m p a b o u t 500,000 barrels daily. B aghdad was also truck in g 200,000-300,000 barrels daily th ro u g h Jo rd a n to the p o rt of A q ab a.Ifi Ir a q ’s claim to a h ig h er q u o ta was based on its p ast p ro d u ctio n and possession of over 10 per cent of the w o rld ’s proven reserves. B aghdad claim ed, m oreover, th a t new o il discoveries in central Iraq m ade it second o nly to S audi A rabia as far as ‘p ro v e n ’ reserves were concerned. S up p o rted by Saudi A rabia an d K uw ait, its d em and was finally accepted by O P E C ’s ex traordin ary m eeting in S pain in O ctober 1988 w hen B aghdad was g ran ted a 2.3 m .b.d. q u o ta - eq u al to th a t of Ira n .19 O nce Iraq jo in ed O P E C ’s q u o ta arran g em en t in December 1988 and endorsed O P E C ’s new p ro d u c tio n ceilin g of 17.5 m .b.d., oil prices rose sharply to a b o u t 17-18 dollars a barrel. Ironically, B aghdad now began to play the role of O P E C ’s p o licem an , a tte m p tin g to persuade o ther mem bers, especially its sm all G u lf neig h b o u rs, to restrain their p ro d u c ­ tion in order to achieve O P E C ’s reference price. Indeed, Issam S halabi, Ira q ’s m in ister of petro leu m , forecast at the end of 1988 a revival of O P E C ’s influence on oil prices a n d declared th a t his cou n try ‘w ould pu rsu e a policy of m ax im izin g revenue from o il’.20 Yet, prices ag ain fell to less th an 15 dollars a barrel by the second q u a rte r of 1989 because both K uw ait an d the UAE were p ro d u c in g nearly twice their q u o ta of u n d er 1 m .b.d. at a tim e w hen dem an d for oil had seasonally declined. K uw ait a n d the UAE argued that, as in the case of Iraq, they were entitled to a q u o ta of a t least 1.5 m .b.d., reflecting K u w ait’s 10 per cent, an d the U A E ’s claim ed 5-10 per cent, share of the ‘w o rld ’s proven reserves’, n o t to m en tio n th e ir respective existing p ro d u ctio n capacity. T h e ir over-production , an d th a t of o th er O P E C m em bers, m ore th an 151

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offset the c o n tin u o u s gro w th of dem an d for O P E C ’s oil, resu ltin g from a revival in the w o rld ’s econom y an d the fact th at non-O P E C co u n tries’ p ro d u ctio n had peaked. D ividing the increm ental d em and for its oil, O PEC , at the V ienna su m m it in Ju n e , increased K u w ait’s q u o ta to a b o u t 1.1 m .b.d. an d the U A E ’s to a b o u t 1 m .b.d., a b o u t 10 per cent h ig h er th a n in the past. A lth o u g h b o th coun tries rejected this decision, K uw ait’s pow erful petro leum m inister, ‘Ali Al K halifa al-A dabi, and his UAE co u n terp art, M ana al-U tayba, prom ised th at th eir countries w o uld ‘so m ew h at’ reduce their p ro d u ctio n , w hich was still nearly twice th eir q uota. T h e oil m arket rem ained un stab le in the com ing m onths, w ith prices flu ctu atin g w ell u n d er O P E C ’s 18-dollar ceiling. Nevertheless, in view of the constantly risin g dem an d for O P E C ’s oil, and despite the o p p o sitio n of its price haw ks, the o rg an isatio n decided in Septem ber to raise its p ro d u ctio n ceiling to 20.5 m .b.d., b u t d id n o t deal w ith the thorny p roblem of in d iv id u al quo tas. T h u s, by the b eg in n in g of O ctober, O P E C ’s m em bers were p ro d u c in g nearly 23 m .b.d. and, subsequently, in spite of seasonal an d in crem ental rise in dem and for O P E C ’s oil, prices rem ained betw een 16 an d 17 d ollars a barrel, a price considered in su f­ ficient by m ost m em bers of the o rg an isatio n in view of th eir financial d ifficulties.2' Finally, after O P E C raised its p ro d u ctio n ceiling to about 22 m .b.d. in its N ovem ber su m m it in V ienna, K uw ait was granted the 1.5. m .b.d. q u o ta w hich it had requested, an d the UAE 1.1 m .b.d. Iraq and Ira n ’s q u o tas were raised to 2.9 m .b.d. and Saudi A rabia’s to 5.1 m .b.d. O P E C ’s oil prices now tem p orarily rose to 18 d ollars.22 It was evident th at O P E C 's price haw ks, led by A lgeria, w ho strove to drive oil prices u p by red u cin g the o rg a n isa tio n ’s total p ro d u ctio n were, Iran excluded, m em ber co untries w ith lim ited reserves, some no longer able to produce even th eir full q u o ta. Yet, as dem and for O P E C ’s oil co n tin u ed to rise, Iraq an d S audi A rabia, each for its ow n reason, also began in 1989 to advocate increasing O P E C ’s 18-dollar reference price. T h is policy was strongly resisted by K uw ait (supported by the UAE), w hose petro leu m m in ister adm itted at the b e g in n in g of 1990 th at his country was in ten tio n a lly exceeding its q u o ta in order to prevent a rise of O P E C ’s reference price. Because of its vast proven reserves, he claim ed, K uw ait’s policy was long-range, aim ed at en co u rag in g a steady rise in the w o rld ’s dem and for oil (a policy endorsed by Saudi A rabia u n til the end of 1988).23 In February 1990, S addam H ussayn personally contacted the rulers of Saudi A rabia, K uw ait and the UAE a b o u t the need to safeguard O P E C ’s p ro d u ctio n q u o tas a n d to raise its oil price. A m eeting between the oil m inisters of Iraq, K uw ait an d Saudi A rabia, held in K uw ait at the b eg in n in g of M arch, failed to overcom e the differences am o n g them . O n F ah d ’s instructions, H ish am N azir im m ediately flew to B aghdad to

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discuss w ith Saddam H ussayn a fo rm u la w h ich w ould be acceptable to O P E C ’s p ricin g com m ittee scheduled to m eet in V ienna on 16 M arch.21 T h e V ienna m eeting, too, failed to reach agreem ent. By A pril O P E C was p ro d u c in g over 24 m .b.d., w hile its p ro d u c tio n ceilin g was a b o u t 22 m illio n , an d oil prices h ad p lu n g ed to 15 d ollars a barrel. A nother m eeting of the Saudi, K uw aiti an d the U A E ’s o il m inisters, convened by K ing Fahd in Jedda in m id-A pril, failed to persuade K uw ait and the UAE to curb th eir p ro d u ctio n , an d o il prices declined to less th a n 15 dollars a barrel. An em ergency O P E C m eeting held in G eneva on 1 an d 2 May d id n o t produce concrete results despite Iraq i threats ag ain st ‘qu o tabusters’.2 D esperately in need of funds, B aghdad was h o p in g to benefit from b oth O P E C ’s increasing m arket share an d h ig h er oil prices. Frustrated, in a speech delivered on 2 A pril 1990 Saddam H ussayn accused ‘certain G u lf regim es’ of being im p licated in a ‘P ow ers’ (i.e. the US) conspiracy’ to u n d erm in e Ira q ’s econom y an d ‘stab b in g it in the back’.26 Iraq advocated the ad o p tio n by O P E C of a reference price of 25 dollars a barrel, w hich it claim ed was ‘eco nom ic’ as far as the in d u stria l coun tries were co n ­ cerned.27 W hile disagreeing w ith Saddam H u ssay n ’s ‘co n sp iracy ’ theory an d his d e n u n cia tio n of the US, K ing Fahd was exasperated, as well, by K uw ait’s an d the U A E ’s obstinacy, a lth o u g h they were fo llo w in g the policy he had previously advocated. T h is policy assum ed th at ch eap o il w o uld en co u r­ age increased co n su m p tio n , u n d erm in e altern ativ e energy sources an d benefit producers w ith su b stan tial oil reserves. Yet R iyadh was m ore attu n ed to Saddam H u ssay n ’s a sp iratio n s an d g ro w in g belligerence. F urtherm ore, h av in g practically exhausted its fin an cial reserves and suffering from ch ro n ic b u dget deficits, Saudi A rabia now opted for a short-term rem edy to h e lp m ain ta in the reg im e’s stability. S audi A rabia’s exp en d itu re b udget betw een 1987 a n d 1990 rem ained steady at a b o u t 37.5 b illio n dollars, of w hich a b o u t 35 per cent was allocated to defence. R evenue from oil, w hich declined in 1988 to ab o u t 16.5 b illio n , rose to a b o u t 18.5 b illio n in 1989 an d was projected to rise to over 22 b illio n in 1990.28 As m entioned above, the k in g d o m ’s substantial budgetary deficit in 1988 was largely financed by draw in g u p o n its previously accum ulated liq u id assets. In th a t year R iyadh also floated an 8 -b illio n -d o llar in tern al b o n d issue. A dditional b o n d issues in 1989 an d 1990 were also m eant to finance budgetary deficits. F urtherm ore, R iyadh, for the first tim e, indirectly borrow ed in 1989 a b o u t 600 m illio n dollars from a co n so rtiu m of G u lf banks for its developm ent fu n d an d seriously attem pted to reduce g overnm ent expenses.29 As d em an d for O P E C ’s oil was constantly risin g in this period, R iy ad h ’s oil policy was focused o n m a in ta in in g its share of ab o u t 25 per cent of O P E C ’s total p ro d u ctio n . For this purpose, probably, Saudi 153

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A rabia announced in 1989 th at its ‘proven’ oil reserves now exceeded 250 billion barrels, about 80 per cent m ore than its previous estimate. A nother target of the Saudi oil policy since 1989 was again to increase its production capacity to over 10 m.b.d. for w hich R iyadh budgeted 15 billion dollars (1989-94).50 A lthough the k ingdo m ’s econom y slowly began to recuperate in 1989 and its G D P rose by 3.2 per cent, it was still only half of the peak of 147.5 b illion dollars in 1981.31 Determ ined to increase further its revenue from oil now that dem and was steadily grow ing, Saudi A rabia in m id-1989 joined Iraq and Iran, as well as other O PEC members, w ho w ished to increase the org an isatio n ’s reference price by at least 10 per cent (Iraq dem anded that the price should be raised to at least 25 dollars a barrel). Indeed, already in May 1989, w hile endeavouring to persuade O PEC m em bers to observe their quo ta, K ing Fahd declared th at if they were to do so, there was no reason why oil should not reach 26 dollars a barrel by the b eginning of 1990. Im m ediately afterwards, H isham Nazir, his petroleum m inister, explained th at the kin g did no t m ean that O PEC should p u sh prices up by curbing production bu t that prices w ould go up th rough ‘a free play of m arket forces’ and ‘a rise in d em and’.33 R iyadh’s relations w ith K uwait began to deteriorate shortly after the end of the Ira n -Ira q war. Forem ost am ong the reasons for this develop­ m ent was the fact that K uwait continued to underm ine oil prices by grossly exceeding its O PEC allocation. Before it was granted its requested q uota of 1.5 m .b.d. in November 1989, K uwait excused its excessive production by claim ing th at its q u o ta was no t in correct pro p o rtio n to its reserves and production capacity. Yet, w hen it again over-produced at the beginning of 1990, K uw ait’s petroleum m inister, Shaykh ‘Ali al-Khalifa, ignored R iyadh’s reasoning an d insisted th at lower oil prices would, over time, benefit producers w ith large reserves.34 Kuwait, furtherm ore, was the most successful O PE C producer in developing its international dow nstream operations (th ro u g h its Q8 oil com pany) an d its income from investm ents in the industrial countries accounted for a sizeable part of its total revenues. N otw ithstanding Saddam H ussayn’s strong w arning to ‘quota-busters’ in the Arab League’s Baghdad sum m it at the end of May (see below), K uw ait and the UAE continued to exceed their q uotas significantly. Subsequently, O P E C ’s oil price declined in Ju n e to about 14 dollars a barrel. Saudi A rabia’s projected budget deficit of abo u t 6 b illion dollars for 1990 (to be financed th ro u g h an additional bond issue),35 could thus have been increased by an ad ditional 4.5 billion. Such a developm ent w ould have gravely underm ined the kingdom ’s hopes for the economic recuperation essential to preserve the regim e’s stability. Saudi Arabia, therefore, joined Iraq and Iran in exerting massive pressure on Kuwait 154

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and the UAE to abandon their oil policy and to help raise oil prices by observing their respective quotas. T o appease the G ulf giants, Shaykh ‘Ali Al Khalifa, responsible for the E m irate’s oil policy for m ore than a decade, was replaced in a cabinet reshuffle on 23 Ju n e by a technocrat, Dr R ashid Salim Al-’Umayri. Shaykh'A li, appointed m inister of finance could, nevertheless, still influence his cou ntry’s oil policy. Indeed, shortly after his appointm ent, Dr Al-’U m ayri declared that there was n o reason to change the E m irate’s oil policy.56 Yet, Sa’du n H am adi, Ira q ’s deputy prim e m inister, w ho carried a strong letter of w arn in g from Saddam H ussayn to both Kuwait and the U A E’s rulers, declared after a m eeting w ith K uw ait’s Amir on 26 Ju n e that he was told by the latter th at it was K uw ait’s ‘keen interest to abide by its O PE C q u o ta (1.5 m .b.d.) in order to safeguard O P E C ’s interests’. H am adi added that Iraq believes that ‘25 dollars per barrel is a fair price’.” In view of the situatio n in the oil m arket an d the ap p ro ach in g O PEC sum m it (26 July), Saudi A rabia invited the petroleum m inisters of Kuwait, the UAE, Iraq and Q atar to attend an emergency conference in Jedda on 11-12 July. D uring two days of deliberations, chaired indirectly by K ing Fahd th rough H isham Nazir, K uwait an d the UAE capitulated and agreed to su p p o rt an O PEC p roduction ceiling of 22.5 m.b.d. (com pared w ith 24 m illio n produced in June), strictly to observe their quotas, and to su p p o rt a proposal to raise O P E C ’s reference price. Im m ediately after the m eeting, both Kuwait and the UAE began to reduce their production, causing O P E C ’s oil price to increase to about 16.5 dollars a barrel.58 O P E C ’s G eneva sum m it on 26-7 Ju ly was am o n g the shortest ever, because the fram ew ork for its decisions had been agreed u p o n at the Jedda m eeting two weeks earlier. T h e 22.5 m.b.d. production ceiling was adopted unanim ously and all O PEC mem bers undertook strictly to observe their quotas. Furtherm ore, to please Iraq, w hich dem anded a 25dollars-a-barrel price, O PEC , led by Saudi A rabia an d Kuwait, agreed to a 21-dollar reference price, instead of their proposed 20 dollars a barrel.59 W hile successfully protecting w hat was considered a reasonable price at a tim e w hen the w orld econom y was believed to be recuperating, Riyadh badly needed the additional revenue to cope w ith internal developm ents in the kingdom .

G O V E R N M E N T , ELITES AND IN T E R N A L SECURITY ( 1988 - 90 ) T h e wide su p p o rt for K ing F ah d ’s governm ent am ong all classes of Saudis w hich emerged in the mid-1980s was still in evidence in 1989, despite the prolonged econom ic crisis. Even the leftist Arab press 155

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g ru d g in g ly conceded the universal su p p o rt for K ing F a h d ’s regim e, the cessation of the pow er struggle w ith in the ru lin g fam ily an d th at '. . . Saudi A rabia could be considered one of the m ost stable states in the reg io n ’.40 T h o u g h the new elites’, p articu larly its n atio n alist, antiA m erican p art, an d ‘n o n -co n fo rm ist’ y o ung u la m a ’s criticism of the regim e was increasing, it was offset by the religious establish m en t’s trad itio n al alliance w ith Al Saud an d the la tte r’s pow er. Iranian-directed subversion an d threats related to the h ajj ‘q u o ta ’ also helped consolidate p o p u la r su p p o rt for K ing F ah d ." Yet, u n d er the surface, the regim e’s stability was b eing challenged by b oth external an d in tern al forces. In the first m onths of 1989, Persian G u lf and inter-A rab p olitics and the trad itio n al struggle betw een conservatives an d m odernists began ag ain to un d erm in e the ru lin g o lig arch y ’s solidarity. A yatollah K hom ay­ n i ’s death in J u n e an d Ira q ’s renew ed involvem ent in regional politics caused the faction in the ru lin g class, led by Saud al-Faysal, to advocate ag ain the im provem en t of relatio n s w ith Iran. A nother faction, led by C row n P rince A bdallah, w ished to strengthen relations w ith the Arab w orld and Syria in p articu lar. Both were u n h a p p y w ith F a h d ’s close relations and co-operation w ith W ashington. T h e Sudayris, no longer able to afford to buy th eir Arab n e ig h b o u rs’ goodw ill and uneasy a b o u t Saddam H u ssay n ’s aspiratio n s, c o n tin u ed to develop, th ro u g h Prince B andar, low -profile relatio n s w ith the US (and covertly w ith the A m er­ ican Jew ish com m unity ) an d encouraged A m erican ‘over the horizon' presence in the region. T h ey also increased efforts to cultivate C airo ’s frien d sh ip an d to have Saudi A rabia play the m ediator role in the Arab cam p. O verall, F ah d ’s prestige a n d the cohesiveness and pow er of the Sudayris were still sufficient to c o n tain their rivals w ith in the royal fam ily and to m a in tain , at least outw ardly, its u n ity .42 An u rb an e m on arch w ho preferred H ijazi tow ns, w ith th eir ‘soft cosm o p o litan society’, to R iyadh in the N ajdi heartland, ‘w ith its m ore direct abrasive society’,43 F ahd was well aw are of the risin g influence of m ilitan t, fu n d am en talist u la m a an d of the conservative character of the m ajority of Saudis. T h e appeal of the form er increased in this period o w ing to the h ard sh ip suffered by low er-incom e Saudis in the m ajor tow ns an d in p arts of the ru ra l areas ow in g to the econom ic recession.44 H ence, a lth o u g h su rro u n d ed by reform -advocating W estern-trained technocrats an d personally w illin g to g ran t the intellig en tsia lim ited p artic ip a tio n in policy-m aking, Fahd was careful n o t to antagonise the religious establishm en t and their conservative supporters. A m ong other things, the costly N atio n al C onsultative Assembly b u ild in g , whose con stru ctio n had been com pleted in 1986, was used o nly for ex h ib itio n s an d sim ilar purposes. T h e establishm ent u lam a an d their M orality Police, m oreover, seemed to gain m ore pow er as the ageing m onarch 156

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c o n tin u ed to depend o n them for leg itim isatio n an d to m ain tain the regim e’s stability. T h e liberal in tellig en tsia, su p p o rted by y o u n g princes desiring a truly m odernised Saudi A rabia, privately ad m itted their d isillu sio n m en t w ith F a h d ’s costly ‘m o d e rn isa tio n ’ policy, w h ich they considered a ‘n o n ­ p o licy ’. N evertheless, they rem ained relatively weak. T h e m ajority of the ex p a n d in g educated m iddle class, largely the p ro d u ct of dom estic universities, is conservative by n a tu re a n d does n o t w an t ‘rad ic a l’ changes in the ‘Saudi way of life’. T h ey agreed, however, w ith the lib erals’ criticism a b o u t the w asteful an d costly achievem ents of the k in g d o m ’s m o d ern isatio n w hich, m any believed, benefited US an d E urop ean eco­ nom ies m ore th an Saudi A rab ia’s. T h e sam e ap p lied , they asserted, to the Saudi arm ed forces, train ed by a h o st of foreign experts, w hich rem ained w eak a n d in co n seq u en tial, despite the en o rm o u s investm ent in it. T h is, they claim ed, was the in te n tio n of the regim e, w hich refused to establish a universal m ilitary service in the kingdom . ' F a h d ’s pro-A m erican policy, vindicated d u rin g the Ira n -Ira q w ar, was still u n p o p u la r in 1990. T h is was an o utcom e of the U S’ special relations w ith Israel a n d due to the fact th a t m any educated an d sem i-educated Saudis believed that W estern interests were n o t co m p atib le w ith A rabM uslim aspirations. Above all, to conservative Saudis, the US represents m aterialistic, C h ristian ‘in fid el’ values an d pow er, w hich challenge Islam ic values an d M uslim pow er. H ence, S audi relations w ith W ash­ in g to n betw een 1988 a n d 1990 seemed occasionally strained, largely as the result of R iy ad h ’s w ish to dem onstrate, to its n atio n alist intelligentsia a n d u lam a, its independence of A m erican policy o r its displeasure w ith A m erica’s su p p o rt of Is ra e l/6 W hile Saudi A rabia’s S u n n i m ajority, w ith n egligible exceptions, consolidated its ranks b eh in d the regim e u n til an d after the end of the Ira n -Ira q w ar (A ugust 1988), the sam e co u ld n o t be said abo u t the k in g d o m ’s S hi'ites. T h e Mecca m assacre (Ju ly 1987) and its afterm ath, F a h d ’s decision to lim it the n u m b er of the Ira n ian p ilg rim s, the struggle for pow er in T e h ra n an d S hi'ite-sponsored terrorist activities in the k ingdom , each exacerbated the tension betw een Saudi A rabia an d Iran and affected the Saudi S h i'ite p o p u la tio n . Security m easures were b o l­ stered in the k in g d o m ’s different provinces, p articu larly in the Eastern one. Suspected m em bers of S h i'ite clandestine an d leftist organisations were rounded u p for in terro g a tio n a n d m any were arrested. T h e latter inclu d ed Saudi p o litical exiles, w ho h ad returned to th eir country follow ing a general am nesty declared by R iyadh at the b eg in n in g of 1988. Indeed, the g ro w in g n u m b er of p o litical prisoners in the Eastern P rovince necessitated the co n stru ctio n of a new p riso n in A l-H asa. T h e security services were also greatly expanded an d th eir tra in in g im proved w ith A m erican h e l p / 7 157

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T e n sio n betw een T e h ra n an d R iyadh over the hajj q u o ta in 1988, a m ajo r cause for the e ru p tio n of acts of sabotage in m ajo r oil an d o ther in d u strial in stallatio n s in the Eastern Province, resulted as well in the extension of terrorist activities, largely by foreign Shi'ites, to H ijaz.48 T h is wave of violence cu lm in ated in the k illin g of three policem en in A l-Q atif by a local H izbollah (P arty of G od) cell w hich intended to attack oil installatio n s an d governm ent offices. E n d o rsin g once ag ain the historical allian ce betw een ‘state a n d c h u rc h ’ in S audi A rabia, the C ou n cil of the Assembly of Senior U lam a (M ajlis H a y’at K ibar al-'U lam a), convened in T a ’if (H ijaz) between 20 a n d 24 A ugust, produced a fatw a p e rm ittin g the execution of terrorists w ho destroyed pro p erty an d h u m a n lives an d u n d erm in ed the security of the state.4 F o llo w in g the issue of th a t fatw a fo u r Saudi Shi'ites, responsible for the k illin g of the three p olicem en in A l-Q atif, w ho underw ent tra in in g in Iran an d later sm uggled explosives in to the kingdom , were p u b licly executed. Shortly afterw ards, several m em bers of the Lebanese H izbollah responsible for b o m b in g incidents in the H ijaz an d R iyadh, w hich resulted in several deaths, were also executed.50 N o tw ith stan d in g c o n tin u ed attem p ts to im prove relations w ith T e h ra n and Arab radical states, the Saudi regim e was determ ined to suppress any m ilita n t o p p o sitio n g ro u p , w hether fu n d am en talist or leftist, S h i'ite or S unn i. H ence, a wide-scale h u n t for m em bers of such g ro u p s began at the end of 1988 an d m any were arrested. Indeed, even a verbal attack on a gov ern m en t official, o r ‘sp read in g ru m o u rs’, becam e a crim in al offence p u n ish a b le by im p riso n m en t.51 T h e death of A yatollah K hom ayni in J u n e 1989, w hich exacerbated the struggle for pow er in T e h ra n , an d the 1989 hajj season gave rise to a new wave of S h i'ite terrorist activities in Saudi A rabia an d ag ain st Saudi targets an d d ip lo m ats abroad. T w o bom bs exploded near the G ran d M osque in Mecca on 10 July, cau sin g the death of several p ilgrim s. Subsequently, a b o u t 30 m em bers of a K uw aiti-dom inated S h i'ite terrorist g ro u p called ‘T h e Arab Fury G en eratio n ’ were arrested. O f the 19 K uw aitis w ho were fou n d g u ilty of involvem ent in the Mecca incident, 16 were p u b licly executed in Septem ber an d three were given p riso n sentences. D u rin g the trial, it becam e evident th a t the new ly re­ established Ira n ia n em bassy in K uw ait had co-ordinated the activities of this g ro u p an d su p p lied it w ith explosives an d w eapons. T h e beheading of the K uw aiti S hi'ites caused general co n stern atio n in th eir country. A lth o u g h the K uw aiti governm ent did n o t publicly criticise R iyadh, relations between the two countries fu rth er deteriorated.52 O ffshoots of the Lebanese H izbollah a n d o th er extrem ist S h i'ite g roups took revenge for the execution of the S h i'ite terrorists by b o m b in g Saudi targets an d assassinating Saudi d ip lo m ats in the M iddle East, S outh East Asia and E urope.58 It also becam e evident th at m ilita n t S u n n i 158

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fu n d am en talist g ro u p s were directly, o r indirectly, bein g su p p o rted by T e h ra n , o r were co-op eratin g w ith A rab S h i'ite fu n d am en talist o rg an isa­ tions, su p p o rted by the Ira n ia n Da'wa. T h e E gyptian auth o rities, for instance, arrested at the b e g in n in g of A u gust a fu n d am en talist terrorist g ro u p w hich had been train ed by S audi S hi'ites based in D amascus. T h e g ro u p , com posed of 52 E gyptians an d 4 Saudis an d Iran ian s included university professors, doctors an d students, som e of w hom converted to S h i‘ism .M Saudi S u n n i, largely tribal, 'n eo -fu n d am en talists’, allegedly b e lo n g in g to a g ro u p called ‘T h e M artyr Ju h ay m a n ibn Saif a l-‘U tay b i’, trained abroad and later incarcerated in Saudi A rabia, were said to have entered the k in g d o m via Y em en.55 A g ro u p of E gy p tian fundam entalists were also arrested by the Saudi a u th o rities in the H ijaz an d extradited to Egypt. O th er A rab -S u n n i fundam entalists, some Sudanese an d some N o rth A fricans, w h o h ad fo u n d refuge in th e H ijaz, were also expelled to th eir respective countries, b u t n o t before p ro d u cin g neo-Ikhw an an d ‘n eo -fu n d am en talist’ disciples in the k in g d o m .56 It seems th at the H ijaz, w hich had been in the past a haven for Arab and o ther M uslim B rothers (Ikhw an), had becom e since the 1970s, particu larly follow ing the success of the Ira n ia n Islam ic revolution, a centre of activity of Arab m ilita n t fu n d am en talist gro u p s.57 A pprehensive ab o u t the g ro w in g influ en ce of such g roups am o n g the k in g d o m ’s younger conservative p o p u la tio n in the 1980s, the Saudi security services closely w atched them an d incarcerated th eir m em bers, in c lu d in g ulam a, teachers, businessm en, a d m in istrato rs and Saudi-A ram co em ployees.58 Such steps, coupled w ith tig h ter security m easures in stitu ted by R iyadh d u rin g the conflict w ith B aghdad, and the S h i'ite clandestine g ro u p s’ decision tem porarily to sto p th eir o p eratio n s ag ain st the Saudi regim e d u rin g the Iraq crisis, were p robably responsible for the absence of serious an ti-g o v ern m en t an d anti-A m erican terrorist activities in the k ingdom betw een A ugust 1990 and A pril 1991.59 G enerally speaking, the in te llig e n tsia ’s discontent and subversion by S h i'ite fu ndam entalists o r tiny leftist g ro u p s in the 1980s was relatively in sig n ifican t. U ndoubtedly, the m ost serious challenge to the Saudi regim e u p to A u gu st 1990 em anated from the pro lo n g ed econom ic recession. B usinessm en, en trepreneurs, unem ployed graduates and, above all, the Saudi masses, w ho co n tin u ed to suffer from the econom ic crisis despite R iy ad h ’s o p tim istic prom ises, began to q u estio n F a h d ’s ability to deal w ith the situ atio n an d increasingly criticised the beh av io u r of m em bers of Al Saud. N o tw ith sta n d in g the m o n arc h ’s reiterated declara­ tions in 1989 th a t the econom ic crisis was over, the Saudi p eople did n ot sense the change. T h is was w hy R iyadh needed quickly to increase its oil revenue a n d w hy it reversed its o il p ric in g policy. Increased revenue, the regim e believed, was also essential to its ability to m anoeuvre in interA rab politics. 159

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S AUDI ARABIA A N D I N TE R - A R A B AFFAIRS R iy ad h ’s influence in the A rab w orld was a n o utcom e of its o il w ealth. G enerous d o n atio n s to M uslim , especially Arab, countries enhanced Saudi A rab ia’s p o sitio n in this g ro u p an d enabled it to play the role of arb itra to r in A rab an d M uslim p olitics. But, as its oil revenue and fin an cial reserves rap id ly declined in the 1980s, R iy ad h ’s ab ility to g ran t aid to its p o o r co-religionists an d n eighbours, Iraq excluded, rapidly dim inished. By the late 1980s, even its aid to the ‘co n fro n tatio n co u n ­ tries’, i.e. Syria, Jo rd a n , Ira q (the P L O excepted) an d to Egypt, d w indled to a trickle. N aturally , this seriously reduced Saudi in fluence in Arab politics. S audi A rabia had played a m ajo r role in the G C C since its in cep tio n in 1981. As a result of its coaxing, the G CC becam e a m u tu al defence o rg an isatio n w hich even K uw ait, despite previous reservations, jo in e d in 1986. Even earlier, Saudi A rabia an d K uw ait had closely co-ordinated th eir policies co n cern in g the Ira n -Ira q war. Yet it was K uw ait, rath er th an R iyadh, th a t overcam e its ap p re h en sio n of pan-A rab n a tio n alist and S h i'ite reactions a n d facilitated the massive A m erican naval b u ild -u p in the G u lf in 1987. As discussed above, Saudi relations w ith K uw ait grad u ally deteriorated in the last m o n th s of 1988 p artly because of the E m irate’s oil policy. W ith its 30 per cent S h i'ite p o p u la tio n K uw ait rap id ly im proved its relations w ith Iran after the latter agreed to an arm istice w ith Iraq a n d the two co u n tries reopened th eir em bassies in each o th e r’s capital. K uw ait city thereafter becam e a base for an ti-S au d i terrorist o perations. T h e conserva­ tive Saudi regim e also viewed w ith displeasure K u w ait’s renew ed ex p er­ im en tatio n w ith ‘dem ocracy’ a n d its co m p etitio n w ith it for the role of a ‘peace b roker’ in the A rab cam p .60 T h e E m irate, n o longer en dorsing R iy ad h ’s su p p o rt for a stro n g US naval presence in the G ulf, insisted on the rem oval of an A m erican flo atin g base from its territorial w ater and deflagged several of its A m erican-registered tankers. T o add in s u lt to in ju ry , K uw ait, w hich hosted a G u lf football to u rn a m e n t in 1989, tactlessly chose as the em blem for these gam es the im age of tw o horses, sym bolising its victory over a S audi in v ad in g force in 1920;61 th is caused R iyadh to boycott the gam es. Lastly, the execution of the K uw aiti S hi'ites responsible for bom bin g s in Mecca in Ju ly 1989 fu rth er strained relations betw een the tw o countries. T o offset their w eakness b o th K uw ait an d Saudi A rabia com peted for the role of a m ediator in the Arab cam p, especially w ith regard to the civil w ar in L ebanon. M ost a n n o y in g to the Saudis was the fact th at, from m id -1989, w hen Saudi A rabia desperately needed ad d itio n al incom e, K uw ait (and the UAE) caused oil prices to decline th ro u g h over­ p ro d u ctio n . H ence, the Saudis allied them selves o n this m atter w ith Iraq 160

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(and Iran), and, even earlier, disreg ard in g the G C C m u tu a l defence pact, signed tw o non-belligerence pacts w ith B aghdad in M arch 1989. Indeed, R iy ad h ’s lukew arm co-operation w ith B aghdad before A ugust 1990 may have been a c o n trib u tin g factor to Ira q ’s invasion of K uwait.

I R A Q ’S R E G I O N A L A SP I R A T I O NS R E- EM ER GI N G Saddam H ussayn em erged from the w ar w ith Iran w ith enorm ous prestige an d self-confidence and a pow erful an d seasoned arm y. Still devoted to the B a'th p a rty ’s pan-A rab ideology, the Iraq i president aspired to establish Ir a q ’s hegem ony in the G ulf, if n ot in the Arab w orld as a w hole. H ence, he strove to reh ab ilitate h is co u n try ’s econom y quickly an d was determ in ed to stren g th en fu rth er his m ilitary pow er an d p o litical clo u t th ro u g h the ra p id ex p an sio n of Ira q ’s conventional and un co n v en tio n al w eapons ind u stry an d arsenal. T h e w ar w ith Iran h ad p ractically driven Iraq to bankruptcy. It owed 35-40 b illio n dollars to its G u lf benefactors an d m ore th a n th at to its Soviet, French an d o th er arm s suppliers, to foreign trade partners, contractors an d banks.62 In so far as its rich G u lf n eig hb ou rs now refused to h elp finance Saddam H u ssay n ’s plan s, B aghdad was practically u n ab le to o b tain credit abroad. W ith O P E C ’s oil price a ro u n d 15 dollars a barrel in 1988, Ira q ’s petro leu m in d ustry was g en eratin g a revenue of abo u t 12 b illio n dollars an n u a lly , hard ly sufficient for a n a tio n of 17 m illio n people w ith am b itio u s econom ic developm ent an d m ilitary program m es an d an enorm ous foreign debt. T h u s, the Iraq i leader opted to m axim ise his c o u n try ’s revenue by e x p a n d in g its oil p ro d u c tio n an d export capacity a n d by increasin g oil prices. Aware th a t Ir a q ’s dem ands in the peace negotiatio n s w ith Iran were unrealistic, R iyadh, a lth o u g h it tried privately to m itig ate them , publicly sided w ith B aghdad. It also co n tin u ed to g ran t Iraq som e financial assistance from the sale of the n eu tral zone’s oil; an d w hen Saddam H ussayn attended the T a ’if Islam ic conference in 1988, he was received w ith the highest hono u rs. In ad d itio n R iyadh was in stru m en tal in the R eagan an d especially in the B ush a d m in istra tio n s’ decisions greatly to increase, from 1988, the Office of A g ricu ltu re’s C om m odities C redit C orp o ratio n s guarantees to Iraq to help reh ab ilitate its econom y. Yet, Saudi su p p o rt for Iraq was b o m of sheer p o litical necessity. T h e Sauds well rem em bered that before Ira n ’s ‘Islam ic rev o lu tio n ’ B aghdad was considered the regional pred ato r an d its B a'th ist regim e was an ath e m a to the W ahhabi ulam a. By 1989 Saddam H ussayn fully realised th a t the b i-p o la r w orld order, w hich previously he had shrew dly exploited, was rap id ly chan g in g . H is old ally the Soviet U n io n , n o lo n g er a superpow er, had different priorities; he could n o t c o u n t on its h e lp to achieve his am b itio n s. Yet 161

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Saddam was determ ined to c o n tin u e to b u ild u p his m ilitary industry and pow er despite his fin an cial difficulties. T h u s, he even diverted funds from the US credit gu arantees to his w eapons developm ent p rogram m e and p aid w ith A m erican w heat for arm s obtain ed from Soviet-bloc countries. T h is was revealed in the o n g o in g US C ongress' investigation of the Banca N azionale del L avoro (BNL) A tlan ta bran ch , w hose m anager enabled Iraq to use A m erican guaran teed a g ricu ltu re credit to the tu n e of a b o u t 5 b illio n dollars for different purposes. Exasperated by K uw ait’s an d Saudi A rab ia’s refusal to co n tin u e their financial su p p o rt to Iraq an d th eir objection to its jo in in g the GCC, Saddam H ussayn was the d riv in g force b eh in d the form ation in B aghdad, on 16 F ebruary 1989, of the Arab C o -operation C ouncil (ACC) together w ith the rulers of E gypt, Jo rd a n an d N o rth Yemen. A lth o u g h ostensibly an econom ic co-operatio n o rg an isatio n , the ACC was a strange collection of un eq u als, w ith different types of regim e. As a p olitical body, it was m eant to co u n terbalan ce the Saudi-led GCC. T h e o nly factor com m on to all the ACC m em bers was th eir need for financial aid, w hich the G CC countries were no lo n g er w illin g , o r able, to g ra n t.63 N ot w ish in g to an tag o n ise the Saudis, the ACC p artners, particu larly Egypt, exerted them selves to convince R iyadh th at the o rg an isatio n was purely an econom ic one, n o t aim ed ag ainst the kingdom . H ence T a h a Y assin R am ad an , the Iraq i p resid en t’s deputy, arrived in R iyadh on 25 February to ex p lain the n atu re an d aim s of the new o rg an isatio n . N o tw ith stan d in g , R iy a d h ’s an d its allies’ suspicions of the ACC were exacerbated w hen Ira q ’s leaders reverted to trad itio n al B a'thist slogans, increased th eir pressure on K uw ait co n cern in g territorial an d financial claim s an d intensified th eir involvem ent in the Lebanese an d A rabIsraeli conflicts.61 T h e Saudi ru lers’ uneasiness fo llo w in g the emergence of the ACC was to be expected. T hey resented K ing H u ssay n ’s role in in itia tin g this alliance, were angry at the in clu sio n in it of Yemen, w hich they considered to be in th eir ow n back yard, an d were displeased by C airo ’s p a rticip atio n in this body. Above all, they were apprehensive of B agh dad’s asp iratio n s in the region. F o llo w in g President M u b arak ’s visit to R iyadh at the end of F ebruary to e x p lain the A CC ’s aim s, K ing Fahd an n o u n ced his in te n tio n to visit C airo at the end of M arch. Yet, follow ing deliberation s in the royal fam ily, Fahd flew first to B aghdad on 25 M arch to m eet w ith Saddam H ussayn and, the next day, signed w ith the Iraq i ru ler tw o non-aggression pacts. C onsidering all the help that R iyadh h ad rendered to Iraq d u rin g its w ar ag ainst Iran, it seems strange th at the two ‘fra tern a l’ co u n tries needed such pacts. Yet, rem em bering Ira q ’s subversive activities in the A rabian P en in su la in the 1970s and aw are of S addam ’s renew ed pan-A rab am bitions, R iyadh now needed reassurance co ncernin g B aghdad’s future in te n tio n s.65 162

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In the com ing year R iyadh endeavoured to drive a wedge between Egypt and Iraq, responded positively to Syria’s efforts to overcome its isolation and supported Damascus against Iraqi attem pts to underm ine its position in L ebanon. Indeed Saddam ’s efforts to eject Syria from L ebanon at the Arab L eague’s sum m it m eeting in Casablanca in May failed, largely ow ing to R iyadh’s behind-the-scenes intervention. Further, a Saudi-initiated conference of Lebanese leaders convened in T a ’if in A ugust, led to the 24 October T a ’if pact to end the Lebanese civil war and essentially recognised Syria’s hegem ony in Lebanon. Lastly, after A yatollah K hom ayni’s death in Ju n e 1989, Riyadh, follow ing its GCC allies, renewed its efforts to im prove relations w ith T eh ran thus hoping, inter alia, to offset Ira q ’s pow er in the region.66 Saudi suspicions concerning the ACC in general, and of Saddam H ussayn’s aspirations in particular, were exacerbated follow ing an ACC sum m it in San'a in Septem ber 1989. There, the Iraqi delegation, using traditional B a'thist term inology, endorsed the forthcom ing unification of the two Yemens - anathem a to Riyadh. Hence, by the end of 1989, as Saddam H ussayn’s pan-A rab am bitions became m ore evident, Prince Bandar, the Sudayris’ am bassador in W ashington, declared that he expected the US to protect his country if attacked. H e described Iraq ‘as the m ost im m ediate potential th reat’ to Saudi Arabia ‘because of its ideology’ and because of historical border problem s between the two countries. Iraq, he added, considered itself the local superpow er and the vanguard of pan-A rab ideology.67 T h e ACC m eetings and sum m its in the year follow ing its inception provided Saddam H ussayn w ith a platform to further his pan-Arab am bitions and efforts to establish Iraq as the leading M iddle East power. T h e ACC’s A m m an sum m it in the last week of February 1990, which focused on the ‘th reat’ to the Arab countries from the im m igration of Soviet Jews to Israel, was a crucial one. It not only enabled Saddam to appear as the cham pion of the pan-A rab and Palestinian causes, bu t also openly to attack an ‘A m erican-Z ionist conspiracy’ aim ed at u nderm ining Iraq ’s efforts to acquire ‘technology’ and to develop a sophisticated w eapons industry. T h e Iraqi president b luntly challenged the continued American naval presence in the G ulf and involvem ent in its affairs. He also called upon the Arab countries ‘to w ithdraw their investm ents in the U nited States u n til it stopped its aggressive policy against the Arabs, its activities to prevent Iraq from acquiring technology and its su p p o rt for Israel’. Indirectly, he criticised the G ulf rulers for co-operating with America and serving its interests.68 Obviously, in addition to challenging the US, this was a challenge to both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. D eterm ined to expedite the developm ent of Iraq ’s conventional and unconventional m ilitary industry, Saddam H ussayn, using part of Ira q ’s oil revenue and credit obtained by devious means (largely from the US),

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expanded in E urope an d in A m erica the netw ork w hich acquired, by all possible m eans, factories, m achinery, p arts, chem icals an d technology for that industry. All the above, how ever, necessitated resources beyond those available to Iraq. T h u s, the refusal of both K uw ait an d R iyadh to renew th eir massive fin an cial aid to Iraq once Iran no longer posed a threat to it may have caused Saddam to contem p late K uw ait’s (and possibly Saudi A rab ia’s) a n n e x atio n as early as 1988. Ira q ’s efforts to acq u ire advanced technology an d com ponents for its conventional an d u n co n v en tio n al w eapons industry did n ot escape the atte n tio n of som e US g o vernm ent officials an d agencies (for instance the C IA ’s detailed report from 4 S eptem ber 1989, according to N Y T , 2 A ugust 1992) an d of Israel. T h u s, the p urchase of ‘insecticide factories’ and chem icals in W est G erm any, an d the acq u isitio n of ‘du al p u rp o se’ m achinery, foundries an d co m p o n en ts of different types, claim ed to be for Ira q ’s ag ricu ltu re, oil an d o th er industries, in A m erica a n d Europe, b u t truly intended for S ad d am ’s m issile an d unco n v en tio n al w eapons industry, began to unravel in 1989 a n d the b e g in n in g of 1990/° T h e BNL scandal (the extent of w h ich a n d the Bush a d m in istra tio n ’s appeasem ent policy tow ards B aghdad has p artly em erged th ro u g h the investigation of the US C ongress’ b a n k in g com m ittee led by R epresentative H enry G onzalez in 1992), follow ed by the assassination in B elgium of D r Bull, the C an ad ian developer of the ‘su p er g u n ’, supposedly capable of firin g chem ical, bacteriological a n d n u clea r shells at targets ab o u t a tho u san d m iles aw ay,7' opened a p a n d o ra ’s box. In fo rm atio n concerning the procurem ent, in E u ro p ean countries, of different item s for Ira q ’s poison gas an d m issile industries and, above all, for n uclear facilities cam e to light. In A pril 1990, B ritish custom s confiscated sw itch in g devices to be used as triggers for nuclear bom bs, sm uggled o u t of A merica a n d destined for Baghdad. T h is fu rth e r vindicated claim s th at Iraq was rap id ly developing its nuclear capab ility , a m atter strongly refuted by B aghdad an d conveniently ignored by UN agencies an d m any of Iraq 's ind u strial trade partners u n til A ugust 1990. Israel p o in ted ou t, moreover, th at despite his financial difficulties Saddam had n o t dem obilised his onem illio n -stro n g arm y fo llo w in g the 1988 cease-fire w ith Iran. T h e efforts co-ordinated by the A m ericans thereafter to foil Iraqi m ilitary asp iratio n s so enraged Saddam H ussayn th a t they triggered his accusations in the A m m an conference ab o u t a n ‘A m erican-Z ionist co n ­ spiracy’ aim ed at h a ltin g Ira q ’s ‘scientific advancem ent’. Soviet Jew ish im m ig ra tio n to Israel, w hich g ained m om en tu m at the end of 1989, aw akened stro n g em o tio n al o p p o sitio n in the Arab w orld. Arab p o litician s an d jo u rn a lists claim ed th at the wave of Jew ish im m i­ grants w ould accelerate Jew ish settlem ent in the occupied territories and h elp Israel’s ‘e x p a n sio n ism ’ in the M iddle East. Yet, above all, this m ig ratio n seemed to end lo n g -stan d in g A rab hopes th a t the P alestin ian s’ 164

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h ig h b irth rate w ould eventually subm erge the Jew ish state. C oupled w ith h u rt prid e an d anti-A m erican sentim ents prevalent am o n g Arab n atio n alists an d fu nd am en talists, th is becam e a vehicle for Saddam ’s regional an d pan-A rab asp iratio n s. M ost A rabs approved of Saddam H u ssay n ’s efforts to change the balance of pow er in the M iddle East and to acq u ire ‘a m ilitary o p tio n ’ ag ain st Israel. An A rab nu clear capability to offset Israel’s alleged capability was (and still is) desired by several Arab leaders. B ut only Saddam was o n the verge of achieving it w hen, in 1981, Israel destroyed his T am u z nuclear reactor a n d com plex, and ag ain in 1991, as revealed by the findings of the U N insp ectio n teams. Saddam H ussayn, previously, did n o t hesitate to m ake in d iscrim in ate use of u n c o n v en tio n al w eapons a g ain st Iran a n d the Kurds. T h u s, som e Arab leaders w ho previously su pported him , and the US from the second p art of 1989, suspected that he was capable of ex p lo itin g his u n co n v en tio n al capability, in clu d in g a nuclear one, as leverage to achieve his asp iratio n s in the region and, possibly, in the w orld.

IRAQ, P AN- AR AB I S M A N D T H E G U L F OIL In interview s follow in g the A m m an su m m it (February 1990), Saddam reiterated his call to end the A m erican naval presence in the G ulf. A presence, one source claim ed, w hich ‘prevents K uw ait from re tu rn in g to the Arab fo ld ’.72 T h u s, R iyadh becam e even m ore concerned abo u t S add am ’s intentions. T o allay Saudi anxiety, Saddam H ussayn p ru d en tly accepted F ah d ’s in v itatio n to visit the k in g d o m and e x p lain his po sitio n . An Iraqi sum m ary of this visit (17-18 M arch) claim ed th at besides co n d em n in g the d anger of the im m ig ra tio n of Soviet Jew s to Israel, the p u rpose of the Iraq i p resid en t’s visit was to refute, ‘in the m ost frank and friendly m anner, allegations w h ich had reached K ing Fahd and the Saudi go v ern m en t’ (about his aspirations?). T h e talks also touched ‘on bilateral relatio n s . . ., the advancem ent of security in the region (the American naval presence?) and the prev en tio n of any attem p t to u n d e rm in e’ it.7S A m ore vitriolic attack by Saddam H ussayn o n America, the West and Israel on 2 A pril follow ed the execution of T h e Observer’s correspondent, Farzad Bazoft, w ho attem p ted to investigate an ex plosion in an Iraq i n uclear in stallatio n an d was accused of spying for Israel. Saddam asserted th at there was an ‘A m e rican -B ritish -Z io n ist’ p lo t to prevent Baghdad from o b ta in in g advanced m ilitary technology an d th a t the ‘Pow ers’ were ‘falsely accusing Iraq of developing n uclear b o m b s’. A d m ittin g that B aghdad possessed chem ical w eapons, he threatened ‘to b u rn half of Israel, if the latter attacked Iraq or the A rabs’. D eriding A m erica’s capability as a superpow er, he p o in ted o u t the US vuln erab ility to the ‘oil 165

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w eap o n ’. L astly, he underscored an o th er 'conspiracy’ to un d erm in e Ira q ’s econom y by red ucin g the price of oil a n d threatened those w ho were h e lp in g it.71 T h e escalation of S ad d am ’s bellicose rhetoric a n d references to the G u lf c o u n tries’ oil policy an d th eir US ties caused grave concern in R iyadh an d C airo. President M ubarak, w ho did n o t relish p lay in g second fiddle in the Arab leadership an d d id n o t w ish for an A rab-U S co n fro n tatio n n o r a n o th e r ro u n d of w ar w ith Israel, flew to B aghdad shortly after S addam ’s 2 A pril speech. H e tried to restrain his Iraq ally a n d to p o stp o n e the Arab L eag u e’s su m m it on Soviet Jew ish im m ig ratio n , w hich Saddam p la n n e d to convene in B aghdad. M ubarak had R iy ad h ’s blessing for both goals; like him , F ahd was convinced that Saddam H ussayn on his hom e field, m a n ip u la tin g the Arab m asses’ m inds, w ould control the su m m it an d ex p lo it it for his ow n aim s and for selfa g g ra n d is e m e n t/’ It did n o t take M ubarak lo n g to realise th at the Iraq i president was determ ined to hold the su m m it in B aghdad. H e becam e convinced as well th at Saddam H ussayn, carried away by his ow n rhetoric, was ready to lead the Arabs to a co n fro n tatio n w ith the U nited States over its M iddle East policy an d its ‘em barg o ’ on the transfer of m ilitary technology to B aghdad. M ubarak, therefore, arran g ed in the m iddle of A pril for visiting US senators, led by R obert Dole, to meet Saddam in B aghdad an d listen to his grievances ag ain st the US, w hich m any Arabs shared. O n this occasion the Senate’s rep u b lican m in o rity leader w ho was close to P resident B ush apologised to Saddam H ussayn for a Voice of America attack on h im for h u m a n rig h ts violations an d the gassing of thousands of his K urdish citizens. Even before the May Arab L eague su m m it in B aghdad, w hich again established S addam ’s claim to pan-A rab leadership, the Iraq i leader’s defiance of the US had m ade him a hero of the Arab masses w ho had craved such a leader ever since N asser’s death. T h e fact th a t Saddam was a cruel tyrant was irrelevant, for he rekindled in the A rabs’ hearts a sense of p rid e an d a feeling of pow er. In a speech o n 18 A pril, the Iraq i president ag ain em phasised Ir a q ’s ‘d u ty ’ to p rotect all the Arabs ag ainst any aggressor. H e also claim ed for Iraq the role of a ch am p io n of non-alig n ed states ag ain st the superpow ers a n d the leadership of the Arabs in their lo n g -stan d in g conflicts w ith the ‘Persians and the Jew s’.'6 M any A rabs w elcom ed S ad d am ’s defiance of the w orld an d his attem pts to counteract ‘the sham eful an d prev ailin g im age of Arab w eakness’. T h e Arab press, even in E gypt, repeatedly praised the Iraq i leader’s stand ag ain st Israel and the W est an d fully su pported Saddam in the face of w hat was portrayed as a W estern-inspired cam p aig n ag ainst h im .77 A lth o u g h the Saudi a n d o ther m oderate Arab rulers feared the outcom e of 166

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S addam ’s fiery rhetoric, they were incap ab le of c h allen g in g h im because, like Nasser, he inspired p o p u la r Arab sup p o rt. T h e extraordinary Arab L eague su m m it convened in B aghdad on 28 May 1990 was m eant to discuss the Soviet Jew s’ im m ig ratio n to Israel. T h is su m m it m arked the clim ax of S ad d am ’s endeavours to attain recognition as a pan-A rab leader. H e m anaged to overshadow his rivals, M ubarak a n d Assad (w ho d id not atten d the sum m it) an d his bellicose stance reg ard in g A m erica an d Israel, w hich w on p o p u la r Arab sup p o rt, was adopted by the sum m it. M u b arak ’s m oderate ap p ro ach , a rg u in g th at im p ro v in g relations w ith W ash in g to n w o uld cause A m erica to coerce Israel to atten d a peace conference a n d re lin q u ish the occupied territories, was ignored even by the m oderate Arab leaders w ho covertly su pported it.78 As the conference’s host, Saddam delivered the keynote speech, whose in tro d u ctio n dw elt on the u n ificatio n of the tw o Yemens w hich took place on 22 May (a slap in R iy ad h 's face). M uch of the speech was devoted to the im portance of Arab solidarity an d of pan-A rabism . In the nam e of the Arab masses Saddam called u p o n the Arab rulers to u n ite in com m on action and policy an d indirectly dem anded th a t the pro-W estern oil regim es reverse th eir policy an d su p p o rt ‘those capable of leading the A rabs’. A u n ited Arab n atio n , he asserted, w o uld persuade America to stop its su p p o rt of Israel and accept Arab dem ands. Saddam also had his ow n axe to grind. H e stressed the need to co nfront ‘A m erican im p erialism ’, w a rn in g th a t w eakness in the general Arab stance vis-à-vis foreign pow ers ‘cou ld m anifest itself in g ra n tin g facilities to th e m ’. T h e Arabs, he said, sho u ld w ith h o ld th eir resources (oil) and w ealth (investm ent) from those w ho are fig h tin g us o r ‘o p p o sin g o u r scientific a n d technological p rogress’. H is attack o n Israel an d its A m erican benefactor was entw ined w ith strong criticism of the GCC m em bers’ u n w illin g n ess to su p p o rt B aghdad w hile co-operating w ith the US.79 U ndoubtedly, Saddam H ussayn moved, at the B aghdad sum m it, one step closer to a regional role. Yet, his rivals, M ubarak and H afiz al-Assad, w ho in the m eantim e overcam e their differences, could also c o u n t on the su p p o rt of the conservative Arab rulers led by K ing Fahd. O bliged to atten d a su m m it they did n o t w ish to take place, F ahd an d M ubarak were now even m ore concerned a b o u t Saddam ’s am b itio n s an d apprehensive a b o u t his co n fro n tatio n al attitu d e tow ards A m erica an d Israel. In the su m m it’s closed sessions they ch allenged Saddam over his policy, w hich could p u sh the region in to w ar an d chaos. O n his p a rt the Iraq i president took to task the ‘q u o ta-b u sters’ an d th eir low oil price policy, c laim in g th at ‘. . . this is in fact a k in d of w ar ag ain st Ira q ’.*0 T h e G C C sum m it, w hich m et in T a ’if in the first week of Ju n e d id not reflect the G u lf ru le rs’ anxiety over S addam ’s accusations a few days 167

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earlier. R ather, in the o p e n in g speeches, tribute was p aid to the Baghdad su m m it a n d the K uw aiti d elegation cong ratu lated the tw o Yemens on their u n ific a tio n .sl N one the less, R iyadh was disturbed by S addam ’s latest accusations and greatly concerned as well a b o u t developm ents in Yemen. U nified Yemen h ad a p o p u la tio n of 12-13 m illio n citizens, com pared w ith Saudi A rab ia’s six m illio n an d its m ilita n t rep u b lican regim e was unfriendly to the ‘reactio n ary ’ Saudi m onarchy w hich had opposed the Y em ens’ u n ificatio n . N early two m illio n Yemenis, m ore­ over, were em ployed in the kin g d o m , m ainly low -paid m an u al labourers. T h e Saudis were also w orried a b o u t B aghdad’s ex p an d in g relations w ith S an 'a an d the fact th at Iraq i officers were tra in in g the Y emeni arm y. Above all, large sections of the border regions betw een Saudi A rabia and the new Yemen, c o n ta in in g sizeable oil resources, rem ained undefined, a m atter that in the past had caused m any clashes between Saudi A rabia and b o th Y em eni re p u b lic s /2 C o m m em o ratin g the 22nd anniversary of the Iraq i B a 'th ’s revolution, Saddam H ussayn delivered a speech o n 17 Ju ly w hich constitu ted the o p e n in g shot of the Iraq i co n q u est of K uw ait. Most of the speech was an ex p an sio n o n his 28 May attack on Israel, un d ersco rin g Ira q ’s present m ilitary -scien tific cap abilities, a n d the alleged ‘Z io n ist-A m erican B ritish conspiracy’ to deprive Iraq of m odern technology. Yet, tow ards the end of his speech, Saddam referred to an ad d itio n al ‘im p erialistZ ionist co nspiracy’ aim ed ag ain st Ira q ’s econom y an d scientific advance­ m ent th ro u g h the redu ctio n of oil prices. Saddam claim ed th at ‘a decline of every d o llar a barrel in oil price resulted in a d ro p of one b illio n dollars in Ira q ’s a n n u a l revenue’. As O P E C ’s oil price ‘fell in recent years from 27 dollars or 28 dollars a barrel to the cu rren t level’ Iraq has been losing 14 b illio n dollars annually . ‘C ertain Arab oil regim es’, Saddam added, ‘were co-o p eratin g w ith A m erica, w ho w ishes to co n tro l Arab oil an d buy it as cheaply as possible an d th u s u n d erm in e Arab cap ab ility a n d power. T h e US, w hich w ill need to im p o rt increasing q u a n titie s of Arab oil, is striv in g to ensure its flow to i t . . . a n d to increase its strategic oil reserve. T h a t w ould g u aran tee its p o sitio n as a sup erpow er able to co n tro l the in stig atio n of wars . . . an d w hen a n d how to im pose stability . . .’. ‘T h e convergence of interests betw een (the) US . . . an d the policy of certain Arabs w ho trade in oil an d politics - som e of w hom are oil m inisters and som e of w hom are at a h ig h er level - constitutes the m ost im p o rta n t feature of th is subversive p o licy .’ ‘ . . . T h e U nited States an d Israel w ould then be o u t to start wars . . . w ith o u t w orrying a b o u t a p o ten tial h a lt to the flow of oil to A m erican an d o th er w orld m arkets [referring to the ‘oil w ea p o n ’ strategy]’ . . H ence, the policies p u rsued by certain Arab rulers are A m erican-inspired an d d etrim ental to the interests of the Arab n a tio n . . . they . . . have th ru st their poisoned

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dagger in to o u r b ack .’ F inally, Saddam threatened to p u n ish the traitors and the 'q u o ta-b u sters’.a, In a letter to the A rab L eag u e’s Secretary G eneral on 16 July, w hich was im m ediately released to the Iraq i m edia, T a riq Aziz, Ira q ’s foreign m inister, m e n tio n in g K uw ait an d the UAE, b u t not Saudi A rabia, by nam e, asserted th a t they h ad deliberately und erm in ed Ira q ’s econom y by exceeding th eir O P E C q u o ta s an d thereby depressing oil prices. H e also claim ed th a t K uw ait had encroached on Ira q ’s territory and its R um ayla oil field an d ‘sto len ’ from it 2.4 b illio n d o lla rs’ w orth of oil, an d th at K uw ait refused to w rite off the sum s it had len t to Baghdad d u rin g the war. ‘We register’, co n tin u ed T a riq Aziz, ‘Ira q ’s rig h t to get back the stolen am o u n ts . . . T h in g s have developed to a level w hich we can no longer ig n o re.’84 R esp o n d in g to the Iraq i letter, K uw ait on 19 July n o t only rejected the Iraq i claim s b u t accused B aghdad of repeatedly v io latin g its territory. T h e K uw aiti governm ent called for Arab L eague m ed iatio n betw een it and Iraq. Subsequently, Shazli Klaybi, the L eague’s Secretary G eneral, visited b oth K uw ait an d Baghdad. K ing F ahd and President M ubarak telephoned the Iraq i an d K uw aiti rulers o n 20 July, u rg in g them to settle their differences am icably. Yet, on the sam e day the Iraq i g overnm ent-controlled press viciously attacked K uw ait’s rulers for su p p o rtin g ‘A m erican an d Z ionist conspiracies’ ag ain st Iraq .85 Iraq, im m ediately after its independence, had invaded K uw ait in 1961 and 1973 an d had never renounced its claim s to K u w ait’s territory. Even d u rin g the w ar w ith Iran , w hen K uw ait’s an d Saudi A rabia's financial and logistical su p p o rt saved Iraq, Saddam occasionally revived som e of Ira q ’s territorial claim s ag ain st K uw ait. Such claim s focused on the strategic B ubyan a n d W arba Islands, w hich block m ost of Ira q ’s narrow P ersian G ulf coast. T h e peace n egotiatio n s betw een Iraq an d Iran were stalled by the b eg in n in g of 1989 because of B aghdad’s insistence on full control of the S hatt-al-A rab a n d oth er territorial concessions by T eh ran . T em p o rarily d esp airin g of o p e n in g its ports alo n g the Shatt-al-A rab, Iraq undertook in mid-1989 a m ajor project of re h a b ilita tin g and ex p an d in g its oil term inals a lo n g its P ersian G u lf coast. In O ctober 1989, Iraq an nounced the b eg in n in g of the c o n stru ctio n of a m ajor po rt at U m m Q asr at the head of K hor A bdallah, w hich it shares w ith K uw ait. T h is a n n o u n c e ­ m ent coincided w ith the term in atio n of the con stru ctio n of the IPSA2 p ip elin e from Ira q ’s R u m ay la fields th ro u g h Saudi A rabia to a term inal so u th of Y anbu on the R ed Sea. W ith an in itial capacity of 800,000 barrels daily, the p ip elin e was projected eventually to carry 1.5 m .b.d. of Iraqi oil to the w o rld ’s m arkets. Iraq revived its territo rial claim s ag ain st K uw ait, p articu larly concern169

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ing B ubyan and W arba, at the b eg in n in g of 1989 an d even more forcefully in the second p a rt of the year and also requested a 10-billiondollar loan. Kuwait, on its part, decided to b uild a town on Bubyan and connect it to K uw ait p roper by a causeway in order to establish its sovereignty over the island. In the face of m o u n tin g Iraq i hostility, Shaykh Sa‘d Al A bdallah alSabah, K uw ait’s crow n prince and prim e m inister, visited Baghdad in February 1989, attem p tin g to solve K uw ait’s border problem s w ith Iraq. H is visit was followed in May by a visit from K uw ait’s defence m inister, Naww af Al A hm ad al-Sabbah, whose efforts also failed. T h e tension between the two countries seemed to abate after the visit to Baghdad in Septem ber of K uw ait’s A mir, Shaykh Jab ir, w hen, it was claimed, Iraq did not press its territorial dem ands, n o r its request for a 10-billion-dollar loan.87 An incursion of Iraqi forces in to Kuwaiti territory at the end of 1989, however, suspiciously coincided w ith B aghdad’s disclosure of its in ten tio n to deepen and widen Khor A bdallah. Subsequently, in the first m onths of 1990, Ira