Sahel : Focus of Hope, Focus of Fear 9781909112424

Citation preview

The Sahel Focus of Hope, Focus of Fear

Published by Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd St James House 13 Kensington Square London W8 5HD Website: http://www.adonis-abbey.com E-mail Address: [email protected] Nigeria: No. 3, Akanu Ibiam Str. Asokoro, P.O. Box 1056, Abuja. Tel: 234 7066 9977 65/+234 8112 661 609 Year of Publication 2014. Copyright © Marcel Kitissou and Pauline E. Ginsberg British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-909112-41-4 The moral right of the author has been asserted All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted at any time or by any means without the prior permission of the publisher

ii

The Sahel Focus of Hope, Focus of Fear

Edited by

Marcel Kitissou and Pauline E. Ginsberg

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface Marcel Kitissou & Pauline E. Ginsberg……………………………….…V CHAPTER ONE France and Mali: The War on Terror in Africa in Theory and Practice Horace G. Campbell………………………………………………..………9 CHAPTER TWO The Economy of Forces: France in the Sahel and the Global Power Play Marcel Kitissou……………………………………………………………33 CHAPTER THREE The Sahel: Caught in a Nutcracker between Interventionists, al-Qaida and its Affiliates Augustine C. Ohanwe................................................................................59 CHAPTER FOUR African Solutions to (Malian) Problems: Pan Africanist vs. Neocolonialist Geopolitical Power Play in the West African Sahel Rita Kiki Edozie ………………………………………………..…………81 CHAPTER FIVE Climate Change, Food Insecurity and Political Crises in the Sahel: Examining the Nexus Ogujiuba Kanayo & Ogbonnaya, Ufiem Maurice…………………....107 CHAPTER SIX The Promise and Challenges of Farmer-Managed Natural Regeneration: A Case Study from Central Senegal Matthew Gates……………………………………………………...……131

iv

CHAPTER SEVEN In the Vortex of Global Currents: the Struggle in the Sahara-Sahel and West Africa against Jihadists, Transnational Criminal Networks, Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism John Bedu Woode………………………………………………….……157 About the Authors...................................................................................184 Index...........................................................................................................189

v

The Sahel: Focus of Hope, Focus of Fear Preface This book grew out of a special issue of African Renaissance titled ‘The Sahel at the Cross-roads’ which appeared in April, 2013. Articles published at that time discussed issues such as corruption and money laundering, the relationship between climate change and conflict, and foreign intervention. Readers who enjoyed the journal articles by Horace G. Campbell, Augustine C. Ohanwe and John Bedu Woode will be interested to find expanded discussions in this work on the topics of weighing the potential terrorist threat from West Africa and the Sahel (Campbell), the opposing forces of interventionists and jihadis (Ohanwe), and the interlocking activities of criminal networks, money laundering and financing of terrorism (Woode). Additional chapters have been contributed by Rita Kiki Edozie, Matthew Gates, Marcel Kitissou, and co-authors Ogujiuba Kanayo & Ufiem Maurice Ogbonnaya. These contributors both broaden and deepen our understanding of the problems and prospects faced by the Sahel in new directions, adding a Pan African perspective to conflict management in Mali (Edozie), an agricultural case study from Senegal (Gates), the respective strategies of France and the US in the Sahel (Kitissou) and the interactive roles of food insecurity, climate change and politics in the Sahel (Ogujiuba & Ogbonnaya). To a large extent, the expansion from journal issue to book format that is The Sahel: Focus of Hope, Focus of Fear was inspired by currentevents, among others, the Tuareg uprising in northern Mali, the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Azawad in Mali’s secessionist territory, the exploitation of Tuareg irredentism by armed non-state groups, some of them affiliated with al-Qaida, and France’s military intervention to restore the status quo ante bellum. Yet not all of the discussion focuses so intently on recent history. Gates’ case study of revival of traditional farming techniques in Senegal provides the background needed to understand more deeply the potential for Africa to feed herself, thus perhaps reducing the food insecurity that Ogujiuba and Ogbonnaya relate to Sahelian political crises in their vi

chapter. Woode’s analysis focuses on the low capacity of regional states to rein in transnational criminal networks, thus making the Sahel and West Africa a virtual enforcement desert wherein money laundering and financing of terrorism can flourish. Why focus on the Sahel? What is its importance? Geographically, the Sahel is a semi-arid corridor that traverses the central-north of Africa covering part or all of ten countries including Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Algeria, Niger, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan and Eritrea. It covers about 3 million square km or 1.1 million square miles. Its population of about 50 million is predicted to double by 2020 and to quadruple by 2050. Due to a combination of drought, political instability and rising food prices, an estimated 18 million people of the Sahel are facing food insecurity, caught in a vicious circle where human behaviors worsen the climate and the climate worsens living conditions. Demographically rich in human diversity, the area brings North Africans and sub-Saharan Africans into contact. Cultures mix, as do indigenous, Islamic and Christian religions, not always comfortably. Weak state structures, the legacy of colonialism, and years of mismanagement are unable to generate the forces and mechanisms needed to resolve ethnic and religious tensions and to ensure political stability and territorial sovereignty. Border zones are increasingly threatening to become stateless territories, vulnerable to trans-national criminal networks (Woode, Chapter 7) and outside intervention (Ohanwe, Chapter 3; Kitissou, Chapter 2). Also examining outside intervention, Campbell (Chapter 1) discusses the ambiguity of western political strategies, questioning the motives of Western powers, particularly France and the U.S. Edozie’s Africanist view (Chapter 4), by contrast, advocates for African Solutions to African Problems in concert with Western powers and international institution such as the U.N. Her optimism about the prospects of African organizations’ problem-solving capacity balances Campbell’s doubts about human motives and, indeed, any prospects of short term conflict resolution. Campbell’s view is shared by Ohanwe whose historical analysis portrays the Sahel as trapped between interventionists and jihadis as he takes the vii

international community to task for not having learned the lessons of history. Kitissou, as if responding to Ohanwe, tries to deconstruct the complexities of interlocking conflicts that involve France, the U.S. and the jihadis. Underlying the overt conflicts and jockeying for power and influence of nation-states, Woode harks back to the Sahel’s long history of serving as a conduit for movement of peoples, ideas, culture, religion and trade. In this regard, too, Gates’ (Chapter 6) practical approach also moves history’s gifts to the region to the fore and the role of non-governmental organizations in his case study of restoration of traditional agricultural wisdom to combat food insecurity in an era of increasing environmental threat. Kanayo and Ogbonnaya’s (Chapter 5) work also addresses climate change and the debate regarding the roles of nature versus culture in producing food insecurity. Publication of this volume does not represent the end of the discussion nor, unfortunately, solution of the complex, intertwined obstacles to Sahelian peace and development. We hope to continue the dialog in many settings and formats from conferences such as the African Studies Association annual meeting and the Cornell University Institute of African Development lecture series as well as the website of the International Consortium for Geopolitical Studies of the Sahel (http://sahelconsortium.worldpress.com) and many other venues too numerous to list. We sincerely thank the contributing authors for their ideas and patience with our requests for revisions, the many anonymous reviewers, and the scholars whose previous publications, presentations and conversation have shaped our thinking. We are especially grateful to Evangeline Ray for her technical assistance and to Jideofor Adibe, editor of African Renaissance and founder of Adonis & Abbey Publishers, Ltd. for his longstanding dedication to Africa and its place in scholarly discourse. Responsibility for errors is our own. Marcel Kitissou and Pauline E. Ginsberg October 14, 2013 Utica, NY viii

CHAPTER ONE France and Mali: The War on Terror in Africa in Theory and Practice Horace Campbell

Abstract The threat of terrorism had been used to justify the war against the people of Iraq in 2003 just as the ‘imminent ‘threat of terrorism in the Sahel has been used as a justification for the French military intervention in Mali in 2013. Of the former colonial powers in Africa, France had for the past fifty years been the most interventionist in Africa. French intervention in the current period is now premised on ‘combating terrorism’ but the history of French militarism in Africa has been one characterized by the need to defend French commercial interests in Africa. France and Britain had come together at St. Malo to pre-empt the expansion of US interests in Africa. However, after the wars in Afghanistan, both societies fell in line only to seek autonomy for action in the military intervention in Libya in March 2011. The aftermath of the Libyan intervention proved to create more destruction and violence and the spillover of the Jihadist actions in Mali proved to be one component of the Libyan intervention. Again, France intervened in Mali, while justifying this intervention on the grounds of fighting the very same elements that NATO had empowered in Libya. France is in a particularly vulnerable economic and political situation in the midst of the depression in Europe and the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. From the moment of the FrancoPrussian war 1870-1871, France had set its sights on Africa to compensate for its diminished status in Europe. Colonial territories gave France the resources to compete inside of Europe but since 2008, the world has changed. Regis Debray now determines that France is now a fourth rate power. In the process of competition and 9

France and Mali: The War…

cooperation with the foreign policy establishment in the United States, France aligned itself to one faction of the military that presumed that the future of the US foreign policy in Africa would be based on the militarization of Africa. The conflation of radical Islam and terrorism had suited the military and political establishment in France and the United States who had acted as patron for some of these elements over the years. However, at a moment when the African economies were changing focus, France found that its policies in Africa were coming up against a confident section of Africa that is now willing to work with the Security Council of the United Nations to challenge the old relationships with colonial powers. Introduction ‘Imminent threat’ is a term used in international law to justify a preemptive military strike. This concept of imminent threat had been articulated prior to the war against the people of Iraq by the George W. Bush Administration when the peoples of the world were bombarded with information that Saddam Hussein possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Ten years after the destruction of Iraq with millions killed or displaced, we now know that the case for war had been presented with dubious evidence. Today, there is a new propaganda barrage from western media sources that Jihadists across the Sahel pose an imminent threat to the United States and Western Europe. In February 2013, U.S. Senator Christopher Coons, chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated in Bamako, Mali that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) poses a ‘very real threat to Africa, the United States and the wider world.’ 1 Who or what is this AQIM? What are its origins? What are their sources of sustenance, finance and logistics? Unlike the Weapons of Mass Destruction that were never found, the designation of groups in the Sahara region as comprising one branch of a worldwide terrorist network has been recreated numerous times over the past decade. Who are the forces that resuscitate this designation of AQIM? These questions are not raised when the excessive publicity about imminent threat is being bandied about in the media in the aftermath 10

Horace Campbell

of the French military excursion into Mali and the standoff at the Amenas natural gas site between Algerian Special Forces and Islamist insurgents. Who were these Islamists who took over this major gas facility? How could they have traveled thousands of miles across the desert undetected? These hard questions were not posed by the Western media. In my study of the NATO intervention in Libya and its aftermath, I have been able to detail the duplicity of France and the United States in arming and supporting elements who in the past had been called Jihadists. 2 Currently (in July 2013) the question can be asked, how can the United States and France be fighting terrorism in the Sahel and supporting these same elements in Syria? This question has been answered in the two volume study by Jeremy Keenan who has documented the complicated networks and overlapping linkages that ties the Algerian military to France and the United States. Those who do not know about the history of the collusion between the US military and extremists since 1992 would be carried away by these incessant stories about terrorism in the Sahel, Al Queda in the Horn of Africa and the spread of Islamic terrorists across the length and breadth of Africa. However, a literature review of the spread of political Islam in North Africa will show great disparities between Anglo-American scholars on the exact origins and sources of support for the formations of Islamic extremists in North Africa who have been designated as terrorists by the State Department of the United States.3 This disparity has been sharpest after the African Awakenings in Tunisia and Egypt and in the aftermath of the NATO intervention in Libya. 4 Because of the very mysterious nature of this region that is called the Sahara, the ‘complex web of regional competition’ has been simplified into a version of terrorist groups that are a danger to humanity. This idea that AQIM was on the verge of taking over Mali and West Africa had been promoted by France to justify the military intervention under the banner of Opération Serval. After these Jihadists seized a number of towns and desecrated important cultural centers, international opinion was sufficiently outraged to mute criticisms of 11

France and Mali: The War…

the French intervention. In the aftermath of the start of this Operation on January 12, 2013, the government of France had been able to mobilize diplomatic and military support from a number of states such as Belgium, Canada, Chad, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States. What was significant was that most members of the Group of 77 did not support the French military action, except for a few states in Africa that were former French colonies. Progressive African opinion was divided over this invasion of Mali as France promoted the idea through a massive propaganda campaign stating that it was ‘invited’ by the government of Mali. Even veteran African intellectuals who opposed western military interventions in Africa became equivocal over the French intervention. 5 Progressive African intellectuals and sections of the international peace movement opposed the Jihadists and were caught in a major dilemma. Was it possible to give France support at this moment, in light of the history of France in Africa? After this ‘successful’ intervention by France, western media outlets were replete with stories that it is the alliance between France and her allies along with the United States that can protect this region of Africa (from Mauritania to Sudan) from being overrun by terrorists. This chapter will contend that the French military intervention at this historical conjuncture is also part of a wider struggle within the Western world and within the foreign policy establishment in Washington.6 Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee who support the expansion of the budget of the Pentagon at a moment of financial crisis pressed the incoming Commander of AFRICOM, General Rodriguez, to spell out how the United States will respond to threats and crisis in Africa in the future. More importantly, in this period of a major crisis in the Eurozone region where France has been designated as a fourth rate power, French military intervention in Africa is crucial to maintain the fiction that France is a major international actor deserving of a special place in the Security Council of the United Nations.

12

Horace Campbell

In the consciousness of the establishment of the United States and France, Africa was and remains a space for great power competition. Now, with the divisions inside that military establishment over its future, and the future projection of military force, Africa is now being conjured again as the scene of instability, violence and terrorism. This chapter argues that it is urgent for policy makers internationally to develop clarity on the issues pertaining to the present militarization of the Sahara and the remilitarization of Africa. Just as how, ten years after the war against Iraq, we know that the WMD threat was fabricated. 7 This chapter argues that there is a similar manipulation underway that downplays the linkages between the U.S intelligence agencies, the Algerian DRS and the Jihadists. 8 From this introduction and the review of literature on the nature of the ‘terrorist threat‘in Africa, the chapter examines the place of Mali and its strategic significance in the current thinking of western military experts. From this analysis, there will be an examination of the history and contexts of the French military interventions in Africa. The conclusion of the chapter will reassert the claim that it is only the unity of the peoples of Africa across the artificial borders that can start to resolve the outstanding questions of the divisions of peoples such as the Tuareg in differing states. Until the unification of Africa, the Tuaregs will be like the Kurds, manipulated by external forces to suit their own interests. Mali and the Traditions of Pan-Africanism and Unity The society of Mali sits at the crossroads of numerous tendencies in Africa. French missionaries had been astounded at the precise knowledge of astronomy of the Dogon peoples and the fractal wisdom that had been displayed by Malian communities. One of the proudest tendencies of Mali has been the intellectual and cultural history that boasts the archive of the Africa’s contribution to the intellectual culture of humanity with one of the oldest of the institutions centered in the city of Timbuktu. It was out of this proud tradition that shepherded the reconquest of the independence of the region of West Africa that had been invaded by France after 1830. 13

France and Mali: The War…

Because of the cultural and political strength of the pre-colonial independent states beyond the Coast of West Africa, the imperial penetration of France beyond the coastal areas could only gain ground after the collective military scramble that resulted in the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. It was at this time when most of the countries that cover the area that is now called the Sahel fell under the control of France. These were from West to east- - Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Algeria, Chad and Niger. Today there are ten countries that are in the region that is called the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Chad, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sudan, and South Sudan.9 After France had been humiliated in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1871, the leaders of the Third Republic became vigorous proponents of colonial expansion in order to bolster the position of France in Europe. It was then that the French military and merchant expanded the campaign to firmly establish French colonial possessions in Indochina, Madagascar, French Polynesia, and large territories in West Africa during the notorious Scramble for Africa, After World War 1, there was a redivision of Africa and the former German territories were awarded to France and Great Britain under a mandate of the League of Nations. W.E. Dubois, the noted African American scholar, wrote on the ‘African Roots of war’ expressing his view that the slaughter in Europe that came to be known as World War I had its roots in the outstanding issues of the Berlin Conference. 10 Myron Echenberg in the book, Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Sénégalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960 has documented for posterity the hundreds of thousands of Africans who died in order to save France in World War I. 11 It was the Senegalese film maker Ousmane Sembene who brought to a wider audience the entrenched racism and the oppression of West African soldiers in the French army in the film ‘Camp de Thiaroye.’ When France was weakened by World War II, the peoples of West Africa organized to regain their independence. It was in this region where there were the loudest calls for the establishment of a United States of Africa - then called Union of Independent African States. 14

Horace Campbell

Soon after the independence of Ghana in 1957, the leaders of Ghana, Guinea and Mali proclaimed a unity based on Pan-African cooperation. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Sékou Touré of Guinea started this union that was later joined by Modibo Keïta of Mali. Mark DeLancey in his bibliographical essay on the ‘The Ghana - Guinea Mali Union’ exposed the deep interest in that elementary Union and the deployment of western intellectuals to understand the internal dynamics of that Pan-African experiment.12 When Guinea decided to go for independence in 1958, Sékou Touré had made a break with the French military system and this break emboldened other societies such as Mali, Benin, the Congo and Madagascar. Western intellectuals and policy-makers denigrated those African leaders who refused to be part of the defense pacts with France. In the period of the Cold War, any African leader who stood for complete independence was branded a communist or subversive element. First Ghana met the fate of the removal of Nkrumah in 1966. Nkrumah later passed away in Guinea in 1972. After the removal of Nkrumah, in 1968 General Moussa Traoré organized a coup d'état against Modibo Keïta, and sent him to prison in the northern Malian town of Kidal. Moussa Traoré with the support of external ‘donors’ dominated the politics of Mali until 1991 when he was removed by an uprising of workers, students and others groups that had fought for the removal of the military from the center of Malian politics. Alpha Konaré had been a youth leader prior to independence and had worked with the groups inside Mali that carried forward the ideas of Modibo Keita. After the overthrow of Traoré, Konaré carried forward the PanAfrican traditions of Mali and went on to become the first Chairperson of the African Union Commission (2003-2008). On the international stage, Konaré worked for peace and integration in the West African region. Among the people of Mali, he understood that the outstanding problems of the place of the Tuareg could not be settled outside of the context of unity. There had been major rebellions by the Tuareg in 1962-64, 1990-95, 2007 and, most dramatically, in 2012. It was in the last rebellion, from January to April 2012, that the open war waged against the Malian government 15

France and Mali: The War…

led to the declaration of an independent state from Mali by the group known as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). Unlike the previous rebellions, the 2012 uprising became enmeshed in the new alliances and movements that were dispersed in the Sahara after the NATO intervention in Libya. The government of Mali led by President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a coup d'état in March 2012 by a military officer who had been trained six times in the United States. The MNLA was however soon superseded by Islamist groups such as Ansar Dine and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA). France had sought to become a patron of the MNLA and the more militant formations such as the MOJWA chased the MNLA from centers such as Gao. By July 2012, MUJWA and Ansar Dine had pushed the MNLA out of all the major cities in Mali. When France intervened in January 2013, the ostensive reason was to remove the ‘imminent’ threat to Mali and the rest of the world by the Islamic extremists in Ansar Dine and MOJWA. The conflation of radical Islam and terrorism suited the military and political establishment in France and the United States who had acted as patron for some of these elements over the years. Prior to the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, political Islam had not yet matured in the Sahel and leaders such as Konaré worked for a regional framework for the demilitarization of the outstanding problems associated with the arbitrary boundaries that had been imposed at Berlin 1884-1885. The first democratic elections after the ouster of Modibo Keita were held in 1992 and Konaré won. Konaré was re-elected for a second term in 1997. He worked hard for African unity, serving as president of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1999 and of the West African Monetary Union (UEMOA) in 2000. At the end of his second term as President, in July 2003, he was elected as Chairman of the Commission of the African Union (AU) at a summit in Maputo, Mozambique. Leaders such as Keita and Konaré were feared by western powers. Meanwhile, France

16

Horace Campbell

maintained a strong military presence in Africa with permanent bases in Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Gabon, Chad and Djibouti. French Military Interventions in Africa One of the many distinguishing features of the relationship between France and Africa has been the ways in which French intellectuals from both sides of the intellectual divide bought into the discourse of military cooperation to seal the extensive networks between sections of French military, industry, academic and commercial entities. 13 There were six major ways for the projections of the exploitative relationships between France and Africa. First, and most important, was the cultural and psychological posture based on the supremacy of Europe and the role of France as the base of enlightenment and civilization, including the revolutionary traditions of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Through cultural institutions, the leading capitalists in France were able to entrench the politico-diplomatic, strategic, and economic interests of the top one percent of French society. The second major form of domination, which reproduced the first, was the financial and commercial ties that protected French commercial operations in Africa. Corruption trials such as those involving the ELF oil company (France’s largest enterprise now part of the Total Group) has contributed to our knowledge of the extent of the corruption of African leaders and the connections between French commercial and military interests in Africa. Judgment in one case in 2003 provided a chilling insight into the nature of the French state, French politics and French imperialism as a whole since the 1960s.In the region of West Africa the operations of the French in uranium mining in Niger has been identified as being strategic to the energy needs of France Third, there was the political alliance between the comprador elements in Africa and the French bourgeoisie. Through cultural institutions such as French schools and universities, the leaders of francophone Africa looked to Paris, disregarding the social needs of their own societies. Whether in dress, diet, speech, or marriage ties,

17

France and Mali: The War…

the African leaders from former French colonies were known to be especially servile to the interests of France. This alliance reinforced the fourth mode, which was to ensure a steady supply of cheap and coerced labor from Africa, working at the bottom of the French economy. The largest numbers of such workers were from the North African states of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and from Mauritania and the other countries of West Africa such as Mali and Senegal. The fifth form of domination was the supply of cheap raw materials, minerals, and food for France. All of these five forms of domination were sealed by the sixth, and possibly the most consistent: French military occupation and interventions in Africa. The deep racism and paternalism of France is openly expressed by leaders as manifested by the statements by Francois Mitterrand at the time of the genocide in Rwanda. A decade later Nicholas Sarkozy made the following speech in Senegal at the Sheikh Anta Diop University: The tragedy of Africa is that the African has not fully entered into history ... They have never really launched themselves into the future. The African peasant only knew the eternal renewal of time, marked by the endless repetition of the same gestures and the same words. In this realm of fancy ... there is neither room for human endeavor nor the idea of progress. 14

The embarrassment of shepherding the genocidaires to Zaire and the aftermath of war and destabilization of the entire Eastern African region had led to a temporary retreat by France with the military intellectuals propagating the view that France was reviewing its military policies towards Africa and was planning to ‘reform’ her security policy in Africa, claiming to mark the start of a ‘new African politics’. Christopher Griffin (2009) wrote a detailed study, French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization. The importance of this study was in the full documentation of how this Grand Strategy was connected by three circles, (a) ‘the national independence of French foreign and defense policy, (b) European defense and (c), a global or geostrategic defense of France’s overseas territories, the DOM-TOM, and other regions and 18

Horace Campbell

states outside of Europe where French national interests were at stake, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa. From the point of view of the peoples of Mali and Africa, the instability that had been generated by the military coup d’ etat in March 2012 required strong action by the African Union that had declared that no state headed by leaders that came to power through a coup could be members of the AU. Despite the now well documented lessons of the catastrophic consequences of the Libyan intervention, particularly the instability that has ensued in Africa (with the deepening military engagements in the Sahara), 15 the momentum for French military activities was driven not only by the Grand Strategy but also by the necessity to draw the political leadership of the United States and the US Africa Command into a closer alliance, with the US underwriting the intervention by France. The alliance and cooperation between the counter-insurgency (COIN) strategists of the US military and the generals of the former colonial power have been well documented and epitomized by the correspondence between General David Petraeus and the late General Marcel Bigeard, 1916-2010. Bigeard was the quintessential colonial officer whose life and exploits followed the colonial and neo-colonial history of France in Indochina and Africa. 16 France and the United States: Competition or Cooperation? For nearly forty years after the decolonization process in Africa, US policy makers had ceded military relations to Africa to the former European overlords. At the end of the Cold War, when the USA was no longer focused on competition with the Soviet Union, the leaders of the United States announced the creation of the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). Alongside this new military engagement with Africa, was the trade regime which articulated as the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). It was in this period that the then Secretary of Commerce of the United States announced that the United States ‘would no longer cede the African market to her European friends or anyone else.’ He had told a dinner party audience that: ‘For many years African business has been dominated 19

France and Mali: The War…

by Europeans while America gets only 17% of the market. We are now determined to reverse that and take the lion’s share.’ France and Britain had responded to the new attention to Africa by the US (especially ACRI and AGOA) by convening the Franco – British Summit at St. Malo, France in 1998. There, a joint declaration on European defense was articulated where it was agreed that, ‘the European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage.’ The St. Malo Declaration laid the foundation for the creation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as the military arm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU. Under this declaration, the French and the British decided in St. Malo to enhance their ‘cooperation’ in Africa. U.S. strategic planners did not readily accept the legitimation of France for its interventionist policies and foreign policy bodies such as the Council on Foreign Relations from time to time gave long treatises on the French military in Africa. This muted response by France and Britain was overtaken by the events of September 11, 2001 when members of NATO were drawn into an alliance with the United States in Afghanistan. When the United States decided to be more competitive with the member states of the European Union by establishing ACRI (the precursor to the U.S. Africa Command), France objected. In a study of the French response to the launch of AFRICOM, Niagale Bagayoko concluded: With the launching of AFRICOM, the French officials are faced with a new challenge: keeping the American hard power as far as possible from what it still considers as France’s exclusive sphere of influence. For this reason, AFRICOM may experience some difficulties in developing strong and constructive relationships with francophone African countries, still closely tied to France.17

Slowly, in observing the unfolding of the hegemonic intentions of then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and Vice President Dick Cheney, France sought to develop a new front through the United Nations to cooperate with UN peacekeeping forces in operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, all the while 20

Horace Campbell

seething that Rwanda had left the umbrella of a francophone country to become an Anglophone one. By the time AFRICOM was established, in 2008, France was in both a cooperation and completion mode with the United States while stepping up its cultural and commercial presence in Africa. French and US: Cooperation and Competition in North Africa and the Mediterranean For decades, France had mooted the idea of the Union for the Mediterranean (a multilateral partnership that encompasses fortythree countries from Europe and the Mediterranean Basin) to extend its power in North Africa. The United States, working through NATO, had kept its options in North Africa open through the establishment of the Mediterranean Dialogue. France had opposed the idea of the African Union and kept open the possibility of Morocco becoming a member of the EU as a way to undermine the Union. France supported Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara and doubled down in its security cooperation with states such as Morocco and Tunisia. It was from within France itself where writers such as Regis Debray was lamenting the fact that France was a fourth rate power by it subservience to the United States.18 As the self-declared gendarme of Europe in Africa, France had been taken aback by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in January 2011. Michele Alliot-Marie, Sarkozy’s Foreign Minister, had spent her Christmas holidays in Tunisia and, when the uprisings began, France offered support to Ben Ali, the leader of Tunisia, in the form of French security forces, who could provide expertise for a Tunisian police force that was beating and killing protesters. However, the removal of the Ben Ali dictatorship was too swift and, soon thereafter, the Egyptian revolution changed the military balance in world politics. NATO panicked, and Sarkozy took the initiative to mobilize for the intervention in Libya. NATO’s intervention in Libya served many purposes but primarily that of securing more access to resources, while gaining a hold on its strategic location between three continents. Very early in the Libyan intervention, the head of a French 21

France and Mali: The War…

private security firm, Pierre Marziali, the president of Secopex, was killed in Benghazi. His death in May 2011 was followed by the killing of the US ambassador to Libya, Christopher Stevens, in September 2012. These two deaths, that of Pierre Marzaili and of Christopher Stevens, had brought to the world the high stakes game that was being played in North Africa and in the Sahara by France and the US. The differences between France and the United States had been exacerbated after the kidnappings, early in the twenty first century, of Western tourists in the Sahara desert. In two volume study on: America’s War on Terror in Africa, Jeremy Keenan documented extensively the role of the Algerian intelligence service in these kidnappings. French newspapers had also drawn attention to how the Algerian government had launched a major diplomatic offensive early in 2003 to obtain financial and military support from Washington. This offensive by Algeria intensified disquiet in France at a moment when both France and Germany had been critical of the buildup for the war against the people of Iraq. France had intervened in Afghanistan as an independent military partner and was initially critical of the U.S.-led ‘Coalition of the willing’ in Iraq. Vigorous reactions from Americans combined with the ‘Freedom fries’ campaign during the Iraq war, led French military establishment to seek open communications and direct contact with the US military. It is in this context that we should grasp the significance of the correspondence between General Marcel Bigeard and General David Petraeus. It was significant that after the French military intervention in Mali in January 2013, the former U.S. ambassador to Mali, Vicki Huddleston, argued that France had boosted al-Qaeda in Mali by paying millions of dollars in ransoms. According to Huddleston, France helped al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to .grow strong.’19 Indeed, France had for decades acted as a patron for the varying rebel groups that came out of the Tuaregs and had kept in close contact with the changing political leadership of the movement for independence of Azawad. The overriding preoccupation of France in this region was in relation to the uranium deposits in Niger. This 22

Horace Campbell

state which borders Mali and is also home to the Tuareg people, provides up to 40 percent of France's uranium consumption. France is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the United States because of its equivocal relationship with Algeria since the period of Algerian independence on the one hand and because of the financial resources available to the US military on the other hand. Figures now produced by varying agencies in the USA shows that in the counter terror offensives, Mali is the largest recipient of US funds amounting to more than half a billion dollars. The aid packages to Mali represent a systematic buildup of the US military involvement in the Sahel region. As far back as November 2009, in his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Africa hearing on 'Counter-terrorism in the Sahel' on 17 November 2009, Secretary of State for Africa, Johnnie Carson, identified Mali – along with Algeria and Mauritania – as one of the 'key countries' in the region for the US counter-terrorism strategy. The Pentagon had started out with the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) but by 2005, the PSI was replaced by the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a partnership of State, Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) meant to focus on improving individual country and regional capabilities in northwest Africa. 20 However, from the evidence provided by the Government Accountability Office of the United States, the large sums of money expended by the United States in Mali since 2005 went to support some of the regional barons who were involved in underground channels that overlapped with the Jihadists. A leader of the so called Jihadists called Iyad Ag Ghaly has enjoyed the support of leaders inside and outside of Mali functioning at one moment as the envoy of Mali in Saudi Arabia. 21 This character gives some indication of the interpenetration between terror, counter terror, the world of drug dealers, kidnappers and organized mafia groups. In his exhaustive study of the changing relationships between the United States and France in the region called the Sahel, Jeremy Keenan has documented how some of the groups that are now being designated as terrorists

23

France and Mali: The War…

were groomed and financed by the World Bank and other ‘developmental’ agencies. 22 Lessons Learnt from the Present Instability in Mali? There are many lessons to be learnt from the role of France, the United States and Britain in North and West Africa. Serious research on the role of the United States in Somalia since 1993 will expose the ways in which that region of the Horn of Africa had been destabilized by external military intervention since 1992. The region of the Sahara is one region where many commentators are arguing that France and the USA intend to make a presence to halt a major influence of China in Africa. One of the most important lessons from Mali is the ability to distinguish between the needs of local people and foreign interests. It is clear that France’s operations pre-empted the deployment of the forces of ECOWAS. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2071 was unanimously adopted on 12 October 2012. This Resolution mandated ECOWAS and the African Union to intervene in Northern Mali to reverse the spiraling militarization. International pundits blamed Africans for their slowness in responding to the takeover of Northern Mali. Experience from Sierra Leone and from Liberia pointed to the capabilities of forces from ECOWAS, especially Nigeria, to eradicate forces of destabilization in Mali. The discussions on political Islam should not divert attention from the real challenges that face the people of Mali and the Sahel. Policy makers internationally cannot be diverted from the fact that the Tuaregs have real grievances all across the region of the Sahel. The challenges of resolving the outstanding questions of selfdetermination and autonomy for the Tuareg in this region cannot be carried out in the context of the present borders. The French intellectuals and military understand this. It is, hence, confusing that France has presented itself as a supporter of the Tuareg while jumping in to fight other sections of the Tuareg. Furthermore, every society in North Africa is threatened by revolutionary uprisings. Inequalities and exploitation of the poor all 24

Horace Campbell

across the region have provided fertile ground for revolutionary openings. Instead mitigating measures to address endemic problems, the US has been perceived, from the time of the launch of the PanSahel Initiative, as partner with repressive regimes in the region of North and West Africa to counter ‘Islamic terrorists.’ Since the intervention of France that African Union has become more aggressive in its plans for the deployment of peacekeepers to Mali. The African Union has advanced it planning for the establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises. The AU has worked closely with the Security Council for the establishment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). “The Council decided to establish the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) by 1 July 2013, and thereby transfer the functions of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) — set up by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in September — to the new entity. The Secretary-General was requested to subsume the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM) into its activities and to appoint a Special Representative for Mali and Head of Mission to assume overall authority for the coordination of United Nations activities. 23 Very few in the West have noticed that China has announced that it will be sending 600 peace keepers to Mali under MINUSMA. Conclusion In the aftermath of the diminution of the US military in Iraq and the quagmire of being bogged down in Afghanistan for 12 years, there are deep divisions with the military and foreign policy establishment about the extent of the terror threat in Africa. From time to time, news outlets carried stories that there are emerging networks between AQIM and Boko Haram in Nigeria. However, in 2012 the White House decided against designating Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), despite the extensive canvasing by some sections of the US government. These divisions were later reflected in the debates in Washington on whether there was a 25

France and Mali: The War…

growth of terror in Africa or not. When Jeh Charles Johnson, the Defense Department’s general counsel gave the speech in Oxford in November to say that the War on Terror is not endless and that there will be a time when this mopping up of terrorists will be a police operation, the New York Times did not give this story the same exposure as European papers. The item was front and center for British newspapers such as The Guardian. In his speech Jeh Johnson held that ‘When that point is reached, the primary responsibility for mopping up scattered remnants of the group and unaffiliated terrorists will fall to United States law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and pressing questions will arise about what to do with any military detainees who are still being held without trial as wartime prisoners.’ ‘I do believe that on the present course, there will come a tipping point — a tipping point at which so many of the leaders and operatives of Al Qaeda and its affiliates have been killed or captured and the group is no longer able to attempt or launch a strategic attack against the United States, such that Al Qaeda as we know it, the organization that our Congress authorized the military to pursue in 2001, has been effectively destroyed. Jeh Johnson did not survive in the Pentagon much longer after this speech. The struggles over the confirmation of Chuck Hagel as Secretary of Defense in the United States was intricately linked to the struggle of whether the CIA and the military can continue to create terrorists and then turn around and fight them. One indication of this tension in the administration was exposed when Senator John McCain questioned Leon Panetta (outgoing Secretary of Defense) on the US military support for those fighting the Assad regime. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in early February 2013, Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta acknowledged that ‘he and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin E. Dempsey, had supported a plan last year to arm carefully vetted Syrian rebels. But it was ultimately vetoed by the White House, Mr. Panetta said, although it was developed by David H. Petraeus, the C.I.A. director at the time, and backed by Hillary Rodham Clinton, then the secretary of state.’24 26

Horace Campbell

The CIA had been using Libya as a base for the recruitment of Jihadists to fight in Syria. Some of the very same groups that had been trained by the CIA are now fighting in Mali. The French had been following closely these debates in Washington and the intervention in Mali was one expedient to shift the balance in Washington in favor of those forces who were arguing that there is an imminent threat from terrorism in the Sahara. Just as how the Obama administration had reasoned that the declaration of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization would provide Nigeria as a magnet for international extremists, so the French policy makers were also aware that French military intervention would inspire local opposition to imperial military intervention. This kind of duplicity is not new in Africa. For the past twenty years, the Pentagon and the CIA has been fighting on both sides in Somalia. France had worked hard to become part of the US counter terror machinery from Djibouti. Before the head of SECOPEX was killed in Libya in 2011, the outstanding achievement of the French military establishment was for SECOPEX to gain a foothold in the lucrative private military contracting business in Somalia. When insiders from the western establishment warn that there is a new phase of a war on terror in Africa, serious policy makers in Africa and beyond should take serious note. It has now been devolved to the integrated East African Community to bring in Somalia and carry out a process of demilitarization. Such a process of demilitarization weakens the hands of those in France and USA who see Africa as a hotbed of terrorism. The present struggles in Mali require new commitment for social and economic transformation in Africa, especially responsible and incorruptible leaders who can resist drug dealers, jihadists and smugglers. It is in Nigeria where the forces of destabilization are most active because these forces understand that a democratic and committed Nigeria will be a major force for unity and emancipation in Africa. Ten years after the war in Iraq, it was revealed that the information on Weapons of mass destruction was based on dubious

27

France and Mali: The War…

evidence. Africa cannot wait ten years to find out if the present evidence on AQIM is based on fact or fiction.

Endnotes “U.S. could resume direct Mali military aid if elections successful,” Report from Reuters, February 16, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/18/usmalirebelsusidUSBRE91H0Q62 0130218 2 Horace Campbell, Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya, Monthly Review Press, 2013 3 See inter alia, Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, I .B Taurus, London 2003, Jeremy Keenan, The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa, Pluto Press, London 2013, Council on Foreign Relations, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), January 24, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/north-africa/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717?cid=otr-partner_sitepbs_newshour, Baz Lecocq and Paul Schrijver, “The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front, “ Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 25, 1, Jan. 2007, International Crisis Group, “Islamic Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?”, Africa Report, 92. www.crisisgroup.org and Akbar Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam, Brookings Institute, Washington, DC 2013, 4 Firoze Manji and Sokari Ekine, the African Awakening: Emerging Revolutions, Pambazuka Books, Oxford 2012. See also Esam Al Amin, The Arab Awakening Unveiled: Understanding Transformations and Revolutions in the Middle East, American Educational Trust, Washington, 2013 5 Samir Amin, “Rescuing Mali from the Islamists,” Pambazuka News, February 14, 2013, http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/86212 for an alternative view see Boubacar Boris Diop, “French intervention 'will cost Mali its independence,' Guardian UK, February 8, 2013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/08/mali 6 In a written testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Gen. David M. Rodriguez, who has been nominated to be the next leader of the Pentagon’s Africa Command, estimated that the U.S. military needs to increase its intelligence-gathering and spying missions in Africa by nearly 15-fold. See “Advance Policy Questions for General David M. Rodriguez, U.S. Army Nominee for Commander, U. S. Africa Command,” Presented to the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 13, 2013 7 Michael Isikoff and David Corn, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War, Broadway Press, New York 2007 8 Jeremy Keenan, The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa, Plurto 2013 9 Steven Zyck1 and Robert Muggah, ”Conflicts Colliding in Mali and the Sahel,” International Jounal: Stability of Security and Development, June 2013, http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article /view/sta.bf/72 10 W.E. B Dubois, “The African roots of War, “ The Atlantic Monthly, vol 115, No 5, May 1915, pp 707-714 11 Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960, Heinemann Books, 1990. See also C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, “France, Africa, and the First World War, “ Journal of African History, xix, i (1978), 12 Mark Delancey, “The Ghana - Guinea - Mali Union: A Bibliographic Essay” African Studies Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 2, Sep., 1966 , 1

28

Horace Campbell

Robin Luckham, “French Militarism in Africa,” Review of African Political Economy, No 24, May 1982, pp 55-84. 14 The speech elicited widespread debate in Africa. http://www.dibussi.com/2007/09/in-his-ownword/comments/page/2/. Interestingly, it was the wife and partner of Konare of Mali who had been one of the severest critics of Sarkozy. 15 See the study of Vijay Prashad, Arab Spring: Libyan Winter, A.K Press 2012 sees also. Francis D J. 2013 The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali. Oslo: Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre; April; 16 All in : The Education of David Petraeus, pp 64 17 Bagayoko, Niagale. French Reactions to AFRICOM: An Historic Perspective. Contemporary Security Policy 30:28-31 April 2009 18 Regis Debray, “Fourth-rank power or independent deterrent? Why France should leave Nato,” Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2013 19 David Blair, “France boosted al-Qaeda in Mali by paying ransoms,” Daily Telegraph, U.K, February 8, 2013 20 RUKMINI CALLIMACHI,” Amadou Haya Sanogo, Mali Coup Leader, Derails 20 Years Of Democracy,” Huffington Post,July 7, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/07/amadouhaya-sanogo-mali-coup_n_1655975.html 21 Peter Beumont, “The man who could determine whether the west is drawn into Mali's war,” Guardian UK, October 27, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/27/mali-one-mandetermine-war 22 Jeremy Keenan, The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa, Pluto Press, London 23 UNSC. Security Council Establishes Peacekeeping Force for Mali Effective 1 July, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2100 (2013). New York: United Nations Security Council; April 25; Available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sc10987.doc.htm 24 Michael Gordon and Mark Landler, “ Senate Hearing Draws Out a Rift in U.S. Policy on Syria,” New York Times, February 7, 2013,http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/us/politics/panet ta-speaks-to-senate-panel-on-benghazi-attack.html?_r=0 13

Reference Ahmed ,Akbar, (2013) The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam, Brookings Institute, Washington, DC Al Amin, Esam, (2013) The Arab Awakening Unveiled: Understanding Transformations and Revolutions in the Middle East, American Educational Trust, Washington, D.C Andrew, C.M and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, “France, Africa, and the First World War, “ Journal of African History, xix, i (1978),

29

France and Mali: The War…

Bagayoko, Niagale.(2009) “French Reactions to AFRICOM: An Historic Perspective.” Contemporary Security Policy 30:28-31 April Broadwell, Paula (2012) All in: the Education of David Petraeus, Penguin Books, and New York. Burke Jason, (2003) Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, I .B Taurus, London Campbell, Horace (2013) Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya, Monthly Review Press, Clayton,Anthony (1988) France Soldiers and Africa, Brassey’s London Delancey, Mark (1966) “The Ghana - Guinea - Mali Union: A Bibliographic Essay” African Studies Bulletin, Vol. 9, No. 2, Sep., Echenberg, Myron (1990) Colonial Conscripts: The Tirailleurs Senegalais in French West Africa, 1857-1960, Heinemann Books. Griffin, Christopher (2009), French Military Interventions in Africa: French Grand Strategy and Defense Policy since Decolonization. Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Keenan, Jeremy (2009), The Dark Sahara: America’s War on terror in Africa, Pluto, London Keenan, Jeremy (2013) The Dying Sahara: US Imperialism and Terror in Africa, Pluto Press, London International Crisis Group, “Islamic Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?”, Africa Report, 92 Isikoff, Michael and Corn, David (2007) Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War, Broadway Press, New York Lecocq, Baz and Schrijver, Paul, “The War on Terror in a Haze of Dust: Potholes and Pitfalls on the Saharan Front, “ Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 25, 1, Jan. 2007 Luckham, Robin (1982) “French Militarism in Africa,” Review of African Political Economy, No 24, May Manji, Firoze and Ekine, Sokari (2012) The African Awakening: Emerging Revolutions, Pambazuka Books, Oxford

30

Horace Campbell

Prashad, Vijay, Arab Spring: Libyan Winter, AK Press, new York 2012 Zyck1, Stephen and Muggah,Robert (2013) ”Conflicts Colliding in Mali and the Sahel,” International Jounal: Stability of Security and Development,June,http://www.stabilityjournal.org/article/view/st a.bf/72.

31

CHAPTER TWO The Economy of Forces: France in the Sahel and the Global Power Play Marcel Kitissou

Introduction Since the 1960s wave of African independence, whenever political arrangements fail to fulfill their intended purposes, the French response to deviant actors has resulted in over 100 French military interventions in Africa with stabilizing consequences in some cases and destabilizing outcomes in others. French logic for intervention has been two-fold: reactionary and preventive. The reactionary mode is to maintain the status quo with France as regional hegemon in subSaharan Africa and as major player in the global arena. The preventive mode is to deter competitors (l’enemi potential) and outside threats to its national interests in the region. It is a model of an economy of forces whereby soft and hard power are combined and deployed to achieve results with maximum efficiency and minimum resources. More than half a century after independence, Francophone sub-Saharan Africa virtually functions as an extension of France’s national territory. This illustrates the fact that actual boundaries of nations depend less on physical size than on influence and the capacity of force projection. France’s role in world affairs exemplifies this assertion. To analyze this phenomenon, this chapter is divided into five sections : France’s Military Resurgence in the Sahel and West Africa that serves as a stepping stone for a larger role in global politics ; History of Geography that explains historical ties between France and the region, and the geographical and geopolitical importance of the region; Trends in France’s Military Interventions where the rationale and decision-making for France’s military interventions in the area 33

The Economy of Forces: France in…

are analyzed; The Sahara-Sahel and West Africa: a Case in Interlocking Conflicts which seeks to sort out the overlapping harmony and clash of interests among the multiple players in the region ; and Lessons Learned and Policy Recommendations, focusing on the dynamic between political stability, democracy and regional cooperation. France’s Military Resurgence in the Sahel and West Africa In 2002, though with a limited goal of removing her nationals from the north of Ivory Coast, France’s Opération Licorne prevented rebel groups from descending to the south of the country and achieving victory. The French 2011 intervention, again in Ivory Coast, led to the arrest and removal from power of President Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to recognize electoral results of the previous year, thus stabilizing the political situation in the country. Such operations illustrate resurgence of the use of the French military might in the region after a period of relative restraint following France’s role in the Rwandan genocide. They preserved France’s national interests and confirmed its status as an ‘African’ regional power. In contrast, the 2011 France-led NATO intervention in Libya was outside France’s traditional zone of influence. It occurred two years after France rejoined NATO, leaving behind a period of 43 years of hiatus. Opération Harmattan, also known as Operation Odyssey Dawn for the US, certainly enhanced President Nicholas Sarkozy’s stature as a global player. It demonstrated willingness to play a leadership role in the Mediterranean Basin as well as in international affairs, enforcing respect for UN norms and combatting human rights abuses perpetrated by the forces of the Libyan Colonel. As it led to Gadhafi’s demise, it further sent a warning to other deviant political players on the African continent. However, Opération Harmattan had unintended consequences: regime change in Libya was a window of opportunity for proliferation of weapons and armed militias, creating the conditions for destabilization of countries in the Sahel and West Africa.

34

Marcel Kitissou

The subsequent influx of hardened Tuareg fighters into northern Mali equipped with heavy weapons from Libya’s arms depots made emergence of the breakaway Islamic Republic of Azawad in April, 2012, possible. Furthermore, the opportunistic hijacking of Tuareg irredentism by Algerian and Mauritanian jihadi groups internationalized Mali’s internal conflict. It introduced more instability in a region already plagued with human trafficking, narco-trafficking and uncontrolled ‘border states’ practically functioning like autonomous entities. This formed the context of France’s Opération Serval in Mali in January, 2013. Opération Serval reasserted France’s political will to remain a hegemon in this part of the world and to project the image of a global player. It, in effect, prevented violent extremists from destabilizing Mali and, perhaps, the West African region. It denied non-state armed groups the possibility of establishing a state in northern Mali and using it as a safe haven from which attacks could be launched against neighboring countries. In so doing, this military expedition reclaimed France’s historic privileges in the region. Support came from the US. Close collaboration with United Kingdom, particularly after the 2010 Franco-British defense agreements, indicated a trend toward an emergence of a European army. France emerged from diplomatic obscurity and achieved geopolitical relevance thanks to its recent military interventions in the Sahara-Sahel, such as the 2011 Opération Harmattan in Libya followed by military intervention in Ivory Coast the same year and the 2013 Opération Serval in Mali. This series of events not only created the perception of France as a player with global clout but also put the region at the center of a global power play. Yet, if the rationale for such operations, past and present, is primarily for the purpose of preserving interests outside the Sahel region, neglecting local grievances that fueled violent conflicts in the first place, they will fail to ensure security and political stability in the long term. This kind of rationale is at risk of producing security architecture overly reliant on external military interventions while promoting a culture of violence, thus weakening local mechanisms of 35

The Economy of Forces: France in…

negotiation, mediation and conflict resolution. Therefore, the establishment of security mechanisms capable of facilitating political stability and regional cooperation requires evaluation of the rationale and consequences of France’s military interventions in the region. This chapter argues that the focus should be on local needs and regional issues rather on geostrategic calculations. It also suggests that such evaluation begin with understanding historical ties between France and its former colonies as well as the role played by history and geography. The History of Geography Writing in 1985 on ‘The French Military Policy in Africa,’ US diplomat and scholar George E. Moose commented that France justified its military role in Africa primarily on the basis of its security and cooperation agreements with its former colonies but, more broadly, by reference to France’s historical ties to and special affinities with the continent (See Figure 1).To illustrate the manner in which the French see their national interests –political and economic- as by destiny tied to those of their African neighbors, he quoted the words of JeanFrancois Poncet, former French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in an address to his country’s parliament in May, 1979: There is undoubtedly no region of the world where the interests and sentiments of France are so profoundly engaged as in Africa. Linked to this neighboring continent by ties of history, geography and culture, and dependent upon it as it is upon Europe for its prosperity and security, France pursues in regard to the continent a policy which is disinterested and courageous …If the government has intervened militarily and with a determination everyone today recognizes, it has been to respond to the requests of weak and unarmed African states obliged to face attacks launched from outside. These actions, limited in scope and duration, have never had any other goal than to permit that freely debated solutions might put an end to tensions and conflicts. The results have conformed to the intentions.1

36

Marcel Kitissou Figure 1: The Sahara-Sahel and West African Region.

2

Retrieved on May 8, 2013 from http://www.bing.com/images/search?q=map+of+france+and+nort h+africa&id=F7CE0110CAA8FD40E8A6BA48D7B14ED9543AE7BD&FORM=IQFRBA#view=deta il&id=F4EC05A30D38B7DEA6AE518FBFBF4F49FC199151&selectedIndex=19

The 1979 statement of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs quoted above can easily apply to France’s military intervention in Mali in January, 2013. The limitation in scope and duration to which he refers can be understood by the strategic equation, S= kF x PsiT, in which S represents strategic action, F represents material forces, Psi represents psychological forces, T represents duration, and k represents a multiplicative factor. In a nutschell, in order to reduce T (duration of the operations), both F (material forces) and Psi (psychological forces) should simultaneously increase. At the same time, the reduction of T minimizes the chances of dissent, opposition, protests or fatigue at home. Total strategy, as General André Beaufre (1966) put it in his book, Stratégie de l’Action, is the art of dialectic of wills use force to resolve conflict.3 It is difficult, however, to square one’s quest for ‘prosperity and security’ with being ‘disinterested.’ One may, on the contrary, argue

37

The Economy of Forces: France in…

that, ‘dependent upon it [Africa] as it is upon Europe for its prosperity and security,’ military gesticulations on the African continent constitute for France a necessity dictated not only geography, history and culture but also by national interests. William J. Foltz (1985) offers a perceptive analysis of the role that Africa has historically played in great powers’ strategic calculations as a consequence of the continent’s geographical location.4 That role has five components: 1) physical obstacle between Western Europe and Asia, 2) defensive posts to protect sea lanes, 3) launching pad for attacks against enemies situated elsewhere, 4) supplier of strategic resources and 5) surrogate terrain for competition among great powers. The following sub-sections of the chapter elucidate these five roles the African continent has historically played in world affairs. Physical Obstacle between Western Europe and Asia The massive landmass of Africa, viewed from both the west and the east, looks like a buffer zone or an obstacle that prevents direct access of Western Europe to Asia and vice versa. Routes were subsequently developed first by Vasco da Gama who sailed around the Cape of Good Hope at the end of the 15th century. Almost four centuries later, the French engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps, by digging the Suez Canal in 1869, significantly reduced sailing duration between the West and the East by joining the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. At the same time, however, the Canal cut North Africa from the Middle East. If the dominant countries in world affairs were located in North Africa and the Middle East (NAME) at the time the Suez Canal was constructed, decision-makers would have rather looked for ways to increase traffic (by tunnels, bridges and other transportation means) within NAME rather separating Africa from the Middle East. Technological prowess combined with suppression of the piracy in the region that had been a response by Muslims of the Maghreb to western domination of the Mediterranean trade and the opening of routes around Africa and through NAME helped the West establish its primacy in world trade.

38

Marcel Kitissou

Protection of Sea Lanes The second role of the continent is protection of sea lanes. Forts along African coasts faced the sea –not inland- and were not for defense against attacks from indigenous people, but to protect commercial routes and provide supplies to sailors. Such strategic calculations explain the presence of the British in South Africa, the conquest of Algeria by France, the establishment of France’s ‘protectorate’ over Morocco, and the Franco-British rivalry over Egypt. Launching Pad Third, parts of Africa have been used as a launching pad against enemies situated somewhere else. Occupation of the ‘launch-pad territory’ is minimal for this role. US strategic calculations during WWII, for example, can illustrate this point: From this rimland, nuclear armed B-36 bombers could strike at Soviet military concentrations if required; war supplies could be pre-stocked with assurance they would not fall into adversary hands; Soviets maritime and naval activities could be kept under surveillance; facilities in North Africa and Middle Africa could be used to transport…equipment into the Middle East; communication and other intelligence activities could be carried out in comparative security; antisubmarine patrols in the Atlantic, the Red Sea, and the Indian Ocean could be facilitated.5

The tense used in the quotation above may make one believe that such statements reflect only strategic hypotheses. Actually, as the Cold War began, the United States enthusiastically annexed North Africa to the rimland as part of its strategy to contain the Soviet Union. 6 In the 1950s, the US built a major strategic base in Libya (Wheelus Field), four air bases in Morocco and, on the east side of the continent, a substantial communications and electronic intercept station in Ethiopia. Other parts of the Sahara-Sahel are not irrelevant to US global strategy. During World War II, the US Air Transport Command flew supplies from the continental United States via an extended route that included stops in such places as the Caribbean, Natal (Brazil), Ascension, Dakar (Senegal), Kano (Nigeria), Khartoum 39

The Economy of Forces: France in…

(Sudan) and Cairo (Egypt) to destinations in the Middle East or even South Asia. The relative importance of theses bases and routes has been altered by changes in geopolitics (the collapse of the Soviet Union for example) and technological progress. The role played by the continent in great powers’ geostrategic calculations makes it an object of both cooperation and competition between the United States and France. Strategic Resource The fourth role of Africa is that of supplier of strategic resources. Colonial enterprise needed to be cost effective in order to have support at home. The use of natives, either through the British ‘indirect rule’ or the French ‘direct rule,’ was both a political and practical necessity. African manpower was a strategic resource as important as conducting trade and having access to strategic raw materials. Initially, France put more emphasis on human resources. African manpower, la force noire, was in demand to compensate for a low birthrate in France, to staff armed forces that could enable the country to recover the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine from Germany and, between the two world wars, to put down rioters and strikers. During World War I some 188,000 West African troops fought in France. Then, when World War II broke out in 1939, some 250,000 African troops fought for la France libre against the Third Reich. The British also raised 470,000 African troops in World War II, some 100,000 of which were involved in the Burma campaign. With regard to raw materials, the US Manhattan Project was fueled by uranium from the Belgian Congo. Subsequently, interest in African strategic resources increased. A 1980 book by Gérard Chaliand, L’Enjeu Africain: Stratégie des Puissances, explains the importance of African minerals in the Cold War context listing Africa as the source of 75% of the world supply of diamonds, 70% of gold, 70% of cobalt, 50% of vanadium, 46% of platinum, 36% of chromium, 30% of manganese, 20% of copper, 20% of uranium, and more. While these resources were essentially concentrated in the southern part of the African continent, i.e. South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Zambia, 40

Marcel Kitissou

none of which were colonized by France, gas and oil, phosphates, iron and uranium were located in the Maghreb and the Sahara-Sahel, i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Western Sahara, Libya, Mauritania and Niger.7 All of these countries, except for Libya and Western Sahara, were French possessions. Therefore, the area is of strategic importance for France. History and geography played a significant role in the development of France’s interest in the region. The Tuareg case should be understood in that context. Contextualizing the Tuareg Case Following the1884-1885 Berlin Conference, that territorialized European occupation of the African continent, the reorganization of the ‘French’ Sahara-Sahel took three phases. In 1912, Le Plan d’Organisation du Sahel was promoted by former military officer and then Reverend Charles de Foucauld. It identified the area of Central Sahara and a Sahara-Sahelian zone. The administrative and military organization of Central Sahara included a concept of Tuareg territory. This concept was then extended to the Sahara-Sahelian area dominated by the Tuareg. In the second phase, the idea of a French Sahara emerged. Entities that composed it received either territorial designation or color classification (White Sahara, the Algerian part; Black Sahara that pertained to Afrique Occidentale Francaise (AOF) and Afrique Equatoriale Francaise (AEF)). Such autonomous territory with its five units (AOF, AEF, Tunisia, Algeria and Morroco), directly dependent on the metropolis, would cover a vast territory from the north of St. Louis, Senegal, to beyond the Tibesti in current Chad. The third phase was to create a common organization, L’Organisation Commune des Régions Sahariennes (OCRS). One of the objectives of OCRS was the creation of a market for French investments. Following the discovery of two important oil fields in Hassi Messaoud and Hassi R’Mel in Algeria in 1956, there was a massive influx of investments. A second objective of the OCRS project, motivated by protectionism, was to cut Algeria from the North of sub-Saharan Africa as a way to monopolize Algeria’s mineral riches. On March 18, 1962, the Evian Accords between France and the Gouvernement 41

The Economy of Forces: France in…

Provisoire de la République Algérienne ended the Algerian war.8 It also put an end to the OCRS project as well as to the prospects of a Tuareg state. Surrogate Terrain The fifth traditional role of the African continent is that of a surrogate terrain. Great powers’ politics should be seen as architecture of complexity and it would be a distortion of reality to reduce it to a single-issue explanation in Africa. The host of the 1884-1885 Berlin conference, the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, encouraged French and British ventures in Africa. His aim was two-fold: to distract France from its obsession with revanche regarding the loss of Alsace and Lorraine in 1871 and to exacerbate the Franco-British rivalry. The African continent, then as now, was a place where great powers were and are, for the sake of national interests, more focused on rivalries among themselves than on local needs. The current debates about China’s presence in Africa are a case in point. In the West, commentators seem to be more concerned about the ‘recolonization’ of Africa by China than assessing the advantages and disadvantages of China’s presence for the people of the continent. Such rivalry is certainly less costly for great powers in Africa than in other more sensitive regions in the world. Furthermore, Africa has a symbolic value. It is viewed as a terra incognita challenging the brave to go where no one has gone before and where a presence enhances a sense of national prestige: Portugal in the 15th, Great Britain in the 19th century, the United States in the 20th century and China in the 21st century. The question raised by William J. Foltz in 1985 still resonates today: Direct confrontations between major powers in Africa produced little more than sound and fury at the time, but they helped destroy the informal rules of the game and contributed to the breakdown of world peace in 1914 and again in 1939.

Now, the questions should be raised as to whether once again great-power rivalry in Africa can destabilize the informal 42

Marcel Kitissou

arrangements on which international peace rests and–more important perhaps to Africans- the playing out of great-power rivalries will lead outside powers to attempt to reassert control over the African continent. 9 The likely response to such questions is embedded in the history of France’s presence in the Sahara-Sahel and the West Africa region. Trends in France’s Military Interventions After 1960, post-independence francophone Africa was tied to France by two principal kinds of relationships. One was informal, even though powerful, cultural links. They were maintained through the French language, education and training programs, both for civilians and the military. Attending schools with French citizens, or having curricula patterned after the French educational system, created a network of affinities among elites on both sides. The formal ties were two-fold: defense agreements and economic ties. These elements contributed to both the rise and the transformation of the FrancoAfrican state or Francafrique. The Rise of Francafrique In 1960, 15 sub-Saharan African countries gained their independence from France. To manage the new era, the Ministère de la Coopération was created in Paris with a department for civilian affairs and a department for military affairs in charge of managing defense agreements. These defense agreements were signed as bilateral treaties and did not constitute anything like a regional military organization such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact. The agreements, similar in writing, gave France the right to station troops in or to transition them through signatory countries. In turn, France guaranteed territorial integrity and military training. Moreover, secret clauses provided France with the right of first purchase of raw materials from Ivory Coast’s cocoa to Niger’s uranium.10 Obviously, military ties could not be separated from economic interests. With

43

The Economy of Forces: France in…

regard to financial arrangements, Senegalese economist Sanou Mbaye (2004) explained the nature of the deal: France's unchallenged political, economic, and military domination of its former sub-Saharan African colonies is rooted in a currency, the CFA franc. Created in 1948 to help France control the destiny of its colonies, fourteen countries--Benin, Burkina-Faso, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Bissau Guinea, and Chad--maintained the franc zone even after they gained independence decades ago.

In exchange for France guaranteeing the CFA franc's convertibility, these countries agreed to deposit 65% of their foreign exchange reserves in a special account within the French Treasury and granted to France a veto over the franc zone's monetary policy whenever this special account was overdrawn. These decisions have had devastating consequences for forty years. 11 As an acronym, CFA has been kept. However, the wording changed after independence from Colonies Francaise d’Afrique to Communauté Financière d’Afrique. In a 1973 speech, the President of Ivory Coast, Felix Houphoet-Boigny, summarized the complexity of the Franco-African relationships in one word: Francafrique. The man himself symbolized both that complexity and synthesis. He was initially affiliated with the French communist party and, thus, hated by the political establishment. He served as minister of health in France and participated in a hotly debated health care reform. Stephen W. Smith (2013) commented that there was no reference publicly made to his skin color or to his birth place during these debates. As he put it, Elite cooperation was the cement of the Franco-African state. As a result of its colonial policy of ‘assimilation,’ Paris has nurtured a subSaharan elite of ‘black Frenchmen’ (women were rarely part of the happy few) who have bought into the normative universalism of French culture and politics. Quite a few had been elected to the French Parliament at a time when ‘colored people’ in parts of the United States were not allowed to use the same public facilities with whites.12 44

Marcel Kitissou

However, the de facto Francafrican state was significantly altered by a series of events that occurred in the 1990s, a decade described by former UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata (2006), in her book aptly titled The Turbulent Decade. The Transformation of Francafrique In an attempt to adjust the policy of France toward the new international environment created by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the perestroika of the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, President Francois Mitterrand redefined the Franco-African relationships at the 16th summit held at La Baule, France, in a speech thereafter known as Le Discours de la Baule (1990). He declared that he was speaking as a global citizen to other global citizens. He denounced the form of subtle colonialism that consisted of lecturing African countries and their leaders all the time and declared that France didn’t want to interfere with domestic affairs. Not only did he promote democracy as a universal principle but he also stated that the functioning of democracy requires ‘a representative system, free elections, multiple parties, freedom of press, independence of the judiciary, refusal of censorship.’13 Following that event, movements broke out in numerous Francophone African countries seeking democratic reforms. They eventually metamorphosed into a wave of Conférences Nationales Souveraines in Togo, Benin, Niger, Mali and former Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Madagascar. In a way, the region experienced what is now described as ‘Arab Spring’ but two decades earlier. Mali’s democracy was born out that movement. The devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 was also a transforming phenomenon. Like the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, it opened up the Franco-African state’s enclave economy. While Le Discours de La Baule did not result in significant reforms of the cooperation structures, the demise of the two co-authors of Francafrique added to their loss of the legitimacy of business as usual: Felix Houphoet-Boigny died in 1993 and Jacques Foccart in 1997. Foccart was the chief advisor for African Affairs to Presidents Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou (196045

The Economy of Forces: France in…

1974). After President Valery Giscard d’Estaing, he was brought back to the same position in 1986 by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac during the two years of ‘cohabitation’ with socialist President Francois Mitterrand. Elected President in 1995, Chirac appointed the 81-year old Foccart to his cabinet as an advisor. More importantly, the 1994 Rwanda genocide destroyed the reputation and legitimacy of the Franco-African state. The government of Francois Mitterrand was accused of having backed the Hutu génocidaires against the Tutsis and moderate Hutus. 14 The combination of these events de facto ended a de facto Francafrique as it was known before the 1990s. Does France’s intervention in Mali in January, 2013, signify a return to pax Franca? Or does such event rather indicate the collapse of the political arrangements that succeeded the old cooperation structures? Military intervention as a show of force is, paradoxically, the result of a political failure. It indicates that the political arrangements in place are no longer strong enough to ensure the continuity of the status quo. In that case, the strategic importance of the region requires a renewed presence of France as a regional hegemon in the Sahara-Sahel and West Africa in order to reposition President Francois Hollande, who succeeded Nicholas Sarkozy, as major player in the global power play. The Sahara-Sahel and West Africa: a Case in Interlocking Conflicts France is not the only global player for whom the Sahara-Sahel and the West Africa region are of strategic interest. The United States is increasingly involved in the region as well al-Qaeda affiliated groups such as le Movement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJOA) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The names of such groups in themselves constitute a political agenda. The Military Presence of the United States in the Region The U.S. phased out its military bases in North Africa in the 1960s. The general pattern that followed seemed to be that the U.S. 46

Marcel Kitissou

responded only to crises and Africa tended to disappear from the Pentagon’s radar screen unless there was a perceived challenge to its primacy in the region. Subsequently, the French perceived it as their responsibility to compensate for the American lack of commitment. As former President Giscard d’Estaing’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louis de Guiringaud, put it in 1979, Africa is the only continent commensurate to the size of France in the scope of its power and the only place where it still can, with 500 men, change the course of history. 15 However, the Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975 rekindled competition with the Soviet bloc. During the 1978 Opération Léopard in the former Zaire (current Democratic Republic of the Congo), the U.S. gave logistical support to France as part of its policy of containment. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, both the 1993 Operation Restore Hope in Ethiopia and the non-intervention in Rwanda in 1994 indicated a return to the usual posture, the former for leading a humanitarian assistance effort and, in the latter case, there was no perceived challenge to US primacy in world affairs. After the Rwanda genocide, the Clinton administration launched the African Crisis Response Initiative in 1996. Under this initiative, the U.S. trained some battalions in Nigeria and Senegal for peacekeeping operations. The landscape completely changed after September 11, 2001 when the East-West competition was replaced by a North-South struggle. In particular, the Bush Administration saw the Sahel as a potential hotbed for international terrorism after defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan. The U.S. thus began to implement measures for a permanent military presence on the African continent. In 2002, it created a combined Joint Task Force for the Horn of Africa (CJTFHOA), a force of about 2,000 troops based in Djibouti. Its tasks include joint military exercises with local forces and a range of civilmilitary operations such as hospital and school renovation. The U.S. also launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative in 2002 (PSI). In June, 2003, the G. W. Bush administration announced a $100 million, 15-month Eastern Africa Counter-terrorism Initiative to expand counter-terrorism efforts with Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 47

The Economy of Forces: France in…

Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. In 2005, the initiative became the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative with a larger scope. Figure 2 shows African countries that are in a counterterrorism partnership with the U.S. With regard to the Sahara-Sahel, all countries in counterterrorism partnership with the U.S. are former French possessions except for Libya and Nigeria. Given that France continues to act as a hegemon in the region, harmony and clash of interests between the two western powers are inevitable. Figure 2: The U.S. initiative in the northwest of Africa overlaps a portion of France’s historic sphere of influence.

16

Retrieved on May 7, 2013 from http://tsa.rmdesignlab.com/wpcontent/uploads/usa.jpg

48

Marcel Kitissou

This military architecture was, in turn, absorbed into Africa Command, created in 2008, and currently based in Stuttgart, Germany, because of African countries’ reluctance to house it given that Liberia’s candidacy was not accepted. There are many other ongoing U.S. military programs, the most recent, as of this writing, being a 2013 agreement to operate surveillance drones from Niger. David Wiley (2012: 152) commented that ‘Globally, since 9/11, the U.S. has built an ever larger security apparatus, almost doubling its military and intelligence budgets to mount what President Bush immediately announced as the Global War on Terror (now named by the Obama administration Overseas Contingency Operations).’ 17 However, the two Sahel ‘Initiatives,’ given their designation, clearly indicate that the Sahel, as a region, is of strategic importance for the US. The Sahara-Sahel countries involved, from Mauritania to Chad, coincide with France’s traditional zone of influence in Africa except for Nigeria, a competitor for regional influence. Meanwhile, increasing activities, networking and cooperation among non-state armed groups in the region, particularly al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, le Movement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa) and others, make it an area contested by many protagonists and create a situation of interlocking conflict. Arrival of Jihadi Militants: A Sahel Emirate? By virtue of history and geography, the Sahel area where Tuareg irredentism takes place and where the presence of jihadi activists is salient overlaps with both France’s traditional zone of influence and the US-led coalition of the willing against terrorism. At the same time, the nationalistic agenda of the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad neither coincides with the interests of France nor with the global ambition of al-Qaeda nor, similarly, do France’s national interests in the region perfectly coincide with the objectives, however complimentary, of the Overseas Contingency Operations of the Obama Administration. The combination of activities of this multiplicity of actors has led to an increased militarization of the 49

The Economy of Forces: France in…

region. A brief historical summary will help clarify the embedded/interlocking conflicts that provoked France’s military intervention. The Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) won election in Algeria in 1992. Political authorities reacted by first annulling the electoral results then by dissolving the FIS and jailing some of its leaders. A civil war broke out. In 1993, the FIS was transformed into AIS (Armée Islamique du Salut) which, in turn, became known as GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé). GIA, initially, had a double agenda: to fight against the Algerian government and to establish an Islamic state in the country. In 1998, as a result of disagreements internal to GIA, the fundamentalist GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat) emerged. The kidnapping of 33 European tourists in 2003 made the GSPC known world-wide. The group imploded in 2006. The following year, 2007, some of its members formed the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) under the leadership of Abdelmalek Droukdal, who pledged allegeance to Osama bin Laden. 18 AQIM entertained two goals: destabilizing the Algerian government in northern Sahel and expanding its influence in southern Sahel as first step (See Figure 3); the second step would consist of reifying Osama bin Laden’s vision of a Grand Sahara as a counter-project to G. W. Bush’s idea of Greater Middle East, a response to Nicholas Sarkozy’s efforts toward the formation of a Mediterranean Union and an alternative to Gadhafi’s United Great Maghreb. The Grand Sahara could be used as a launching pad, one the the traditional roles of Africa, for the conquest of the Maghreb and Europe.

50

Marcel Kitissou Figure 3

19

Retrieved on May 6, 2013 from http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/2010/08/16/on-maps/

Specializations began to emerge among sub-divisions of operation in this geographical space: hostage taking in Niger; bombings and attacks upon military and diplomatic facilities in Mauritania; in northern Mali roughly two functions, detention of hostages and source of supplies and ammunition. These functions required a relatively stable settlement and local alliances; hence, there were marriages between jihadists and local Moorish, Berabish and Tuareg women and creation of networks for drug trafficking. 20 Such an agenda is much more ambitious than the pre-existing Tuareg irredentism and makes a clash of interests inevitable. Its implementation also directly challenges France’s interests and Western security archtecture in the region. Figures 1, 2 and 3 practically overlap. In the face of what can be seen as a major political challenge to global players such as the U.S., France and other Western European countries in the region, the fighing in northern Mali was more trigger than sole cause of France’s direct military intervention. 51

The Economy of Forces: France in…

As in Afghanistan, Islamic jihadists’ first move was to subvert an existing ‘state’ (talibanism) or to opportunistically take over a new one (Islamic Republic of Azawad), then operate within the structures of that state to challenge the international power structure. Given the complexity of this situation of interlocking/embedded conflicts, how and who can cut the Gordian knot? What are the possibilities for solving the interlocking conflicts in the Sahara-Sahel and West Africa and achieving political stability? Lessons Learned and Policy Recommendations The concept of economy of forces discussed in the section of this chapter about France’s military interventions has had relative success in sub-Saharan Africa, not because it is still a region where, with 500 men, one still can change the course of history, but because France’s policy makers skillfully combine soft power (culture and networking among civilian and military elites) and hard power (military agreements and economic ties) in projecting force when and where needed. However, the resurgence of foreign military activities, be they regional (Jihadist groups) or international (primarily France and US) will heavily militarize the Sahara-Sahel and West Africa and render it overly dependent on the use of force to manage conflict. Such an approach has four major consequences: a) it weakens local mechanisms of conflict resolution and promotes a culture of violence; b) it creates the incentive for an arms race within the region, not only to confront new threats, but also to keep military balance between neighboring states; c) this, in turn, will divert funds from development to military expenditures; d) as neighboring states intervene in Mali, they make themselves vulnerable at home. SubSaharan African countries have small and weak armed forces. Their very success in northern Mali is forcing the Jihadists to disperse and regroup forces elsewhere in the region where they may face diminished resistance. With regard to terrorist activities in the Sahara-Sahel and West Africa, there is osmosis between North Africa (Algeria in particular) 52

Marcel Kitissou

and sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, any counter-terrorism measure calls for cooperation with North African states which have significant experience in dealing with terrorism and much stronger armed forces than their sub-Saharan neighbors. Most importantly, excessive focus on foreign threats tends to overlook local grievances that create the conditions for violent conflicts. As Muna Ndulo (2011: 795) pointed out, Very often, conflict is a symptom of an intrastate crisis that is deeply rooted in the following conditions: authoritarian rules; exclusion of minorities from governance; socio-economic deprivation; and weak state structures that lack the capacity to handle normal political and social conflict…Unfortunately, the resources and energies of the international community tend to be mobilized around the symptoms - rather than the causes- of conflicts.’21 It is also important to strengthen democratic processes. According to Afro-Barometer (2013), ‘As of December 2012 [in Mali], a clear majority (62 percent) said that they prefer democracy to other forms political regime. But the proportion that expressed allegiance to democracy was down by ten percentage points from 2008.’ 22 Obviously, the legitimacy of Malian democracy declined when the military coup took place. The diminished legitimacy of Mali’s regime before the coup was also illustrated in an article, ‘Trafic de Cocaine: Une Pièce Negligée du Puzzle Sahélien’ by Anne Frintz in a special edition Manière de Voir of Le Monde Diplomatique, titled À Qui le Crime Profite (August/September, 2013). Frintz reported that, even if the high ranking military officers embezzled the whole defense budget of Mali, they couldn’t afford, collectively, the quantity and quality of the cars they possess.23 Corruption was rampant. And social inequality worsened. That was no guarantee of democracy and political stability. The Brazilian physician, Josué de Castro, in his book The Geopolitics of Hunger (1977), demonstrated the correlation between hunger and the structure of power in a political system.24 Food insecurity, a case of ‘long emergency’ in the Sahel, cannot be separated from countries’ policy choices hence from deliberative democracy.

53

The Economy of Forces: France in…

When exclusion of minorities from governance is addressed, socio-economic deprivation mitigated and participatory democracy established, border ethnic groups such as the Tuareg, can feel part of the national community rather left in the periphery of socio-economic development. In such conditions, regional cooperation can help solve regional problems. Models exist for cooperative mechanisms and fora for border ethnic groups: the Akwasasne at the border between the US and Canada is an example. On a larger scale, a mechanism is offered by the Arctic Council composed of eight member states, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the US. The Inuit Circumpolar Council is a Permanent Participant in the organization for the purpose of consultation with Inuit representatives.25 To establish a ‘Pan Sahel Tuareg Council’ within a regional state organization, France has a unique role to play. It can help with internal negotiations between the Tuareg and their states, within and between countries of the region. It can facilitate regional cooperation within the Sahel and the West African region. And it can promote greater cooperation between countries of the region and North Africa. If, in so doing, it can promote democratic processes, France will be an even greater actor in the global power play than it is now. And so will the Sahara-Sahel and the West Africa region. 1 George E. Moose quoting a French Information Ministry Press Release in ‘French Military Policy in Africa’ in William J. Foltz and Henri S. Bienen (eds.), Arms and the Africans: Military Influences on Africa’s International Relations. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985: 67-68. 2Retrieved on May 8, 2013 fromhttp://www.bing.com/images/search?q=map+of+france+and+nor th+africa&id=F7CE0110CAA8FD40E8A6BA48D7B14ED9543AE7BD&FORM=IQFRBA#view=det ail&id=F4EC05A30D38B7DEA6AE518FBFBF4F49FC199151&selectedIndex=19 3 General André Beaufre, Stratégie de l’Action, A. Colin, 1966. 4 William J. Foltz, ‘Africa in Great-Power Strategy’ in William J. Foltz and Henri S. Bienen (eds.), Arms and the Africans: Military Influences on Africa’s International Relations. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985. 5 William H. Lewis, ‘How a Defense Planner Looks at Africa,’ in Helen Kitchen (ed.) Africa from Mystery to Maze. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1976 quoted by William J. Foltz, ibid.: 5. 6 William J. Foltz, ibid. 5. 7 Gérard Chaliand, L’Enjeu Africain: Stratégie des Puissances. Editions du Seuil, 1980, p. 56

54

Marcel Kitissou

n8 André Bourgeot, ‘Sahara de tous les enjeux,’ in Géopolitique du Sahara, review Herodote, Volume 3, No. 142, 2011: 42-77. 9 William J. Foltz ibid: 9-10. 10 Stephen W. Smith, ‘France in Africa: a New Chapter,’ Current History, May 2013. 11 Sanou Mbaye, ‘How the French Plunder Africa,’ Project Syndicate, January 2004 , Retrieved from http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1073235/posts 12 Stephen W. Smith, ibid: 165. 13 Francois Mitterrand, Discours de La Baule, June 20, 1990. Translation is mine. 14 Krop, p. 1994, Le génocide franco-africain: Il faut juger les Mitterand, Editions Jean-Claude Lattès, Paris. 15 L’Express, December 22, 1979. 16 Retrieved on May 7, 2013 from http://tsa.rmdesignlab.com/wp-content/uploads/usa.jpg 17 David Wiley, ‘Militarizing Africa and African Studies and the U.S. Africanist Response,’ African Studies Review, Volume 55, Number 2, 2012: 152. 18 Yochi Dreazen has a different interpretation of emergence of AQIM. See ‘The New Terrorist Training Ground,’ The Atlantic, October, 2013: 65. 19 Retrieved on May 6, 2013 from http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/2010/08/16/on-maps/ 20 André Bourgeot, ibid.: 58-59. 21 Muna Ndulo, United nations Peacekeeping Operations and Security and Reconstruction, Akron Law Review, Volume 44, No. 3, The Universty of Akron, 2011, 795 22 Afro-Barometer, ‘Crisis in Mali: Ambivalent Popular Attitudes on the Way Forward,’ Paper No. 113, February 2013. 23 Frintz, Anne Frintz) ‘Trafic de Cocaine: Une Pièce Negligée du Puzzle Sahélien’ in Manière de Frintz, Anne (August/September 2013) ‘Trafic de cocaine, une pièce negligee du puzzle sahélien’ in Maniere de voir, Le Monde Diplomatique Voir, Le Monde Diplomatique, August/September 2013. 24 Josué de Castro, The Geopolitics of Hunger, New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1977. 25 Elizabeth Ferris, A Complex Constellation: Displacement, Climate Change and Arctic Peoples,’ Project on Internal Displacement, Brookings-LSE, January 30, 2013.

References Beaufre, A. (1966): Stratégie de l’Action. A. Colin. Bourgeot, A. (2011): ‘Sahara de tous les enjeux,’ in Géopolitique du Sahara, review Herodote, Volume 3, No. 142. Chaliand, G. (1980): L’Enjeu Africain: Stratégie des Puissances (Paris: Editions du Seuil).

55

The Economy of Forces: France in…

De Castro, J. (1977): The Geopolitics of Hunger (New York and London: Monthly Review Press). Dreazen, Y. (2013): ‘The New Terrorist Training Ground,’ the Atlantic, October. Ferris, E. (January 30, 2013): ‘A Complex Constellation: Displacement, Climate Change and Arctic Peoples.’ Project on Internal Displacement (Brookings-LSE). Firth, V. (1985): The Machinery of the Mind (York Beach: Samel Deish Inc.). Foltz, W. J. (1985): ‘Africa in Great-Power Strategy’ in William J. Foltz and Henri S. Bienen (eds.), Arms and the Africans: Military Influences on Africa’s International Relations (New Haven and London: Yale University Press). Frintz, A. (August/September 2013): ‘Trafic de Cocaine:Uune Pièce Negligée du Puzzle Sahélien’ in Maniere de Voir, Le Monde Diplomatique. William H. Lewis, W. (1976): H.‘How a Defense Planner Looks at Africa,’ in Kitchen, H. (ed.) Africa from Mystery to Maze (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books). L’Express (December 22, 1979). Krop, P. (1994): Le génocide franco-africain: Il faut juger les Mitterand (Paris: Editions Jean-Claude Lattès). Mbaye, S. (January 2004), ‘How the French Plunder Africa,’ Project Syndicate, Retrieved from http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1073235/posts Mitterrand, F. (June 20, 1990): Discours de La Baule. Moose, G.E. (1985): ‘French Military Policy in Africa’ in William J. Foltz and Henri S. Bienen (eds.), Arms and the Africans: Military Influences on Africa’s International Relations (New Haven and London: Yale University Press). Ockrent, C. and Comte de Marenches, A. (1986): Dans le Secret des Princes. Paris: Stock. Ogata, S. (2006): The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crisis of the 1990s (W. W. Norton & Company).

56

Marcel Kitissou

Ndulo, M. (2011): United nations Peacekeeping Operations and Security and Reconstruction. Akron Law Review,Volume 44, No. 3 (The Universty of Akron). Smith, S. W. (May 2013): ‘France in Africa: a New Chapter.’ Current History, Wiley, D. (2012): ‘Militarizing Africa and African Studies and the U.S. Africanist Response.’ African Studies Review, Volume 55, Number 2.Figure: 1 map http://www.bing.com/images/search?q= map+of+france+and+north+africa&id=F7CE0110CAA8FD40E8A6B A48D7B14ED9543AE7BD&FORM=IQFRBA#view=detail&id=F4E C05A30D38B7DEA6AE518FBFBF4F49FC199151&selectedIndex=1 9 Figure 2 map http://tsa.rmdesignlab.com/wpcontent/uploads/us a.jpgFigure 3 map http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com/2010/0 8/16/on-maps/

57

CHAPTER THREE The Sahel: Caught in a Nutcracker Between Interventionists Al-Qaeda And Its Affiliates Augustine C. Ohanwe

Abstract Political turbulence and swift foreign military intervention have engulfed the Sahel Region of Africa in recent times. This study x-rays the genesis and dynamics of the conflicts. It aims at admonishing Africa to tighten her girdle and reassert her full influence on the continent. Realizing that the word, ‘intervention’ has varied interpretations, the author dissects the term and places it within the legal and political propriety, before relating it to the on-going interventions in the Sahel. The author is mindful that politics is not a morality play, and that national interest can stir up an intervening power to exploit legal loopholes and ride the crest of humanitarian tide into war. He criticizes the UN, ECOWAS and the African Union for failing to learn lessons from the fall of Roman Empire; hence the Jihadists exploited such weakness to make initial gains in Mali. France, with intelligence and logistical support from allied Western forces, the author argues, has done its bit in the Sahel but contends that the AU and ECOWAS risk being reduced to a rump if foreign interventionists are allowed to control, command and dictate the outcome of conflicts in the region. Introduction The Sahel, particularly the portion closer to the Sahara, is not a beautiful landscape. It is a great, vast and empty flat desert, a sea of sand always swept across by fierce tropical hot winds on daily bases. The governments of this region are feeble. There is drought, poverty and famine. Despite its barren nature, it has gained world attention in 59

The Sahel: Caught In A…

recent time. Watching the conflagration sweeping across the Sahel, one would assert that heaven has been let loose and all the devils relocated to that region. More so, a profound analysis of the way external powers have reacted to the increasing instability in the Sahel would further argue that religious fundamentalisms have replaced communism. Communism was an ideology Western powers dreaded, and they fought it with unrelenting vigor. Recently the Sahel has become an incubating hatchery for Jihadists, a hub for organised criminal networks, illicit mercandise, conflicts, kidnapping for extorting ransoms or as a bargaining tool for freeing imprisoned jihadists. It is an emerging hotbed of instability and insecurity. Like the Viet Cong guerrillas, the actual number of the armed Islamists is unknown – it is in constant flux because of the underground nature of their operation and the way they blend into the civilian population. They have clandestine networks across the Sahel. A roadside shoemaker, a tailor and petty trader could be members of the Jihadists. Prominient politicians and top military officers could also be secret members or sponsors of al-Qaida and its affiliates. Most of the Sahel is povertystricken and has been noted to be sympathetic with the Jihadists. In Guinea Bissau for instance, it has been alleged that most corrupt government officials collude with Jihadists and drug maffias. This prompted the US to label Guinea Bissau as a narcotic state and many top government officials have been implicated. Not only in Guinea Bissau has there been a shady alliance between illicit merchandise and armed insurgents. According to Whitlock (2013), the US government has also warned that it could invoke the use of lethal forces when circumstances warrant to deal with prominient individuals in North Africa for their connection to al-Qaida and its networks. The US views such high profile figures as legitimate political targets either for capturing or killing. The support al-Qaida receives in the Sahel is widespread. The overthrow of President Sidi Mohammed Ould Cheik of Mauritania on 6th August, 2013, was due in part to his behind-the-scene dealings with the Islamic Jihadists in the Maghreb. According to Pitman 60

Augustine C. Ohanwe

(2008:1), it was alleged that he released from prison Islamic extremists who were implicated in attacking Western embassies. The coup plotters that ousted him defined such act an as ‘irresponsible,’ capable of tarnishing Mauritania’s image as a moderate Muslim country. The centrifugal supports being extended to al-Qaida in the Sahel are plenty. Such supports create a very difficult dimension in the war against terror. Lacher (2013:1) has offered us a narrow analysis of the threatening events in the Sahel when he stated, ‘Increasing instability in the Sahel and Sahara region has been a source of growing concern in Europe and the US.’ Lacher limited his fears of Sahel events to the Western world only. By so doing the author of the expression has rendered the fears in the Maghreb region, the grave concern in Nigeria with regard to Boko Haram’s alleged link with Sahel Jihadists, and the healthy fear of a domino effect held by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) inconsequential. Even though the ramifications of events across the Sahel do affect Europe and the US, the turbulence going on there is more than a Western problem. Regrettably, the West has reduced the situation in the Sahel to such a narrow, simplistic political equation, making it possible for the French, UK, Belgium, Germany, Italy, US, Canada to render support to the French-led intervention in Mali and the wider Sahel. According to Schmitt (2013), Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, discussed the issue of Mali and the entire Sahel region with the UN Special Envoy to the region, Ramano Prodi. While Russia offered its support for the French-led forces to drive away the Jihadists, it blamed the West, particularly the French, for being in collusion with the rebels who brought about the demise of the Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi. France is not alone in the Sahel Politics Since the Malian insurgency began in December, 2011, and the subsequent French intervention, many Western nations have supported France. According to Fortin (2013), The UK has given at least two aircraft to France with further assistance pledged by Prime 61

The Sahel: Caught In A…

Minister David Cameron. It is also alleged that the UK has ground troops in Mali, but strictly confined to non-combat activitiesintelligence and logistical assignments. Belgium, Canada, Germany and Italy have also rendered many forms of support to France. Whitlock (2013) holds that the US has not committed ground troops as it did in Somalia, but it is alleged to have its commandos in Mali, Niger and other parts of the Sahel solely for intelligence gathering in a clandestine style. The US has also stationed a drone base in Niger, Mali’s eastern neighbor. The drone base in Niger offers the US a strategic foothold and geopolitical advantage in the Sahel and beyond. The fact that Niger has common borders with Algeria, Mali and Nigeria, three countries waging wars against armed Islamic extremists, puts the US in a good position to monitor extremist modus operandi in those countries. The US officials have stated that the US will not hesitate to equip their unarmed drones in Niger with Hellfire missiles if the Sahel conflict ascends to high gear. Such action tends to remind us about the US drone warfare in Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia. However, the U.S. admitted that, at present, the drones in Niger are limited to surveillance activities over Mali and Niger. And, in order to widen its strategic advantage in the Sahel, the US has acquired another base for its predator spy drones at Agadez in northern Niger. Geographically Agadez is closer to southern Algeria and the southern part of Libya. Both countries are known to harbour arms traffickers alleged to have strong connections with al-Qaida. But the major US drone hub is situated in Djibouti, a French ex-colony in the Horn of Africa. The intervention in the Sahel calls into question the rules governing intervention. For example, a polical scientist argues that ‘to intervene in the affairs of a peaceful Latin American country may be unwarranted, but to intervene in the stormy and horrendous activities of Hitler’s Germany seems entirely justifiable, even mandatory’ (Rosenau, 1969:151). Rosenau’s argument revolves around what he defined as a double standard. That is, an intervention that is generally condemned, but also permitted for a specific reason. It must be 62

Augustine C. Ohanwe

admitted that such a double standard has grave impact on what has been going on in the Sahel Region. We will expatiate on this later. By contrast, the realist school of thought views intervention with a different prism. Morgenthau (1978) argues that it is the law of history that people must engage in expansion by occupying greater expanses of space or perish. Intervention, when viewed from the realist perspective, sees expansion as an attempt by the intervening state to increase its power position. Writing in the same vein, Stohl (1980: 279) quotes Cecil Rhodes as having said, ‘The Empire, as I have always said, is a bread and butter question. If you want to avoid civil war, you must become imperialist.’ The realist view is down to earth, stubborn and greedy in its approach to the international political system. It flouts all the established norms and its ultimate goal is to subordinate internationally accepted codes governing political systems to those of the realist political philosophy. It is this realist extreme view that is at variance with legalistic and moralistic approaches to international politics. As we progress in our analysis, events in the Sahel, particularly Mali, Libya and Cote d’Ivoire, will reveal the school of thought to which the intervening powers belong. In examining these varied interpretations of intervention, we should, I suppose, grasp what international law has stipulated on interventions. Though, in certain cases the realist interpretation of wars and interventions assumes ad hoc superiority over established legal norms. Aron (1981:566) argues that ‘The only thing that can be placed in the scale of balance is the illegality of intervention by regular armies and legality of an appeal for foreign assistance made by a recognised government.’ Aron advances further, stating that, in the eyes of international law, foreign intervention is legal when it is solicited by the legal power within a state. The rivalry of external powers, he argues, takes its course within states, the aim of such external powers, he contends, is to favour those who will call for their help when the right moment comes. Holding unto this argument, one would admit that there abound myriad factors in Africa in general, and the Sahel Region in particular, that have the potential for domestic turbulence 63

The Sahel: Caught In A…

capable of attracting foreign intervention. Such factors are, but not limited to, religious and ethnic/linguistic pluralities as well as simmering tension of marginalization. Other factors are election rigging and border disputes-one of the troubling legacies of colonialism that threatens periodically to erupt into armed conflicts. Most of the states in Africa, including the Sahel, that are bedeviled with conflicts based on the above mentioned factors occupy vital strategic positions or provide important resources to external powers. There is, therefore, the possibility of either foreign powers meddling unilaterally in the internal affairs of these states or obtaining the blessing of the UN to execute their personal agenda. Intervention by foreign powers into Africa might also be due to the way external powers define their security. Within the post-Cold War scenario, the word security conjures up terrorism or Islamic fundamentalism. In the eyes of Western powers and the wider world, the Sahel is seen as a region where narcotic business and terrorist cells controlled by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb would want to establish permanent bases and, when opportunity avails, would unleash attacks against neighbouring states or Western interests. The West sees al-Qaida as a weaverbird skillfully weaving terrorist nests where ever fertile ground abounds. The Sahel is seen as one such nest. While arguing about security, we must also take cognizance of other factors, such as economic interests. Bierce (1911:1, an American writer of the twentieth century, had a cynical view of politics when he described it as strife of interests masquerading as contest of principles.’ We should not therefore assume that armed insurgency is the only motivating factor behind political activities in the Sahel. There could also be an element of mask to disguise the self-interested pursuit of scarce resources. External powers, it could be argued, are not only in the Sahel to drive out the Jihadists. They appear to be motivated by other policy considerations and related needs. Economic and strategic objectives appeared at play in the Libyan and Cote d’Ivore interventions. Mali is not excluded in this equation. It is bordered by many Francophone states where France has huge investments. On Mali’s north is Algeria. Cote d’Ivoire is on the south; 64

Augustine C. Ohanwe

Niger on the east, Guinea on the southwest, and Senegal and Mauritania on the west. France, the main intervening power, has huge investments in all of the Francophone states bordering Mali. Mali itself is rich in minerals. According to Walters (2010), Mali is wealthy in bauxite, iron ore, base metals, phosphate, and gold. These minerals are vital to foreign powers, not excluding France itself. Apart from the mineral rich Mali, its southern neighbour, Niger, possesses vital minerals too. Mason (2010) informs us that France gets 40% of its uranium from Niger for its nuclear power and that France owns the company that extracts uranium in Niger. Lanning and Mueller (1979) state that, Mauritania, another Sahel State bordering Mali, furnishes France with iron ore and copper. Chad, a former French colony, has oil and France also exerts enormous influence there. These countries are vital to France. Most importantly, France welcomes the support of Western allies in the Sahel, particularly the US. However, it is also cautious not to tolerate any form unhealthy competition in the region, particularly in uranium politics in Niger, a region it defines as its post-colonial sphere of influence. French interests in the region need to be understood when we take the above disclosure on board. Based on the above factual assertions, one can argue that the Cold War political equation has found a rebirth within the post-Cold War landscape. During the Cold War, the US and its subordinate allies including France fought the USSR’s communist ideology. Their calculation at that time was that any success achieved in containing communism meant the protection of their economic interests, too. There was no distinction between the containment of communism and the protection of national interests. Both were intertwined. The cold war is deemed as dead. But Western strategic analysts would not want Islamic fundamentalism to replace communism. The West might argue that there is, therefore, a need to avert post-Cold War danger emanating from armed Jihadists. The political calculation is simple: If the situation in Mali is not contained, it could generate a domino effect that could engulf all the Francophone states bordering Mali. Such conflict would not only destabilize the political structure 65

The Sahel: Caught In A…

of these states but would eclipse France’s huge economic interest in the region among other things. Furthermore, the uranium deposits in Niger could fall into the hands of al Qaida, which might sell it to other states. The argument here is vital while exploring and analysing foreign intervention in the Sahel Region. Further, considering international law, it is interesting to note that international lawyers have maintained divergent views on the concept of intervention. Verwey (1986) argues that maltreatment by a sovereign state of its subjects constitutes a iusta causa for permitted war. By this, Verwey accepts and recognizes the right to intervene against a government at the request of the oppressed people and views it as humanitarian intervention. In the eyes of Verwey, such an invitation should be recognized by international law. The difference between the view of intervention as postulated by Verwey above and that of Aron (1981) is that, while Aron stresses that invitation to intervene should flow from a recognized legal power within a state, Verwey attaches much importance on the request of the oppressed people. Most of the intervention in the Sahel Region has been mounted to ‘save civilians.’ Can we, therefore, define the on-going foreign intervention in the Sahel as a humanitarian one? This question is relevant to the situation in the Sahel Region. For instance, the foreign intervention that occurred in Libya was a result of France’s initiative. It did not emanate from the Libyans. Although previous calls from external powers outside Libya for the UN to intervene failed, it was France that re-energized the call. Introducing the call for UN Resolution 1973 (2011), Foreign Minister of France Alain Juppe said, ‘The situation on the ground is more alarming than ever, marked by violent re-conquest of cities that have been released. The Security Council could not stand by and let warmongers flout international legality.’ He went on to say that ‘the world was experiencing a wave of revolutions that would change the course of history’, and that ‘the will of the Libyan people had been trampled upon under the feet of Quadhafi’s regime.’ France’s initiative led to the approval of a ‘No fly zone’ over Libya and the authorization of ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians. After 66

Augustine C. Ohanwe

this resolution, Libya was subjected to heavy bombardment until the demise of Gaddafi. In Cote d’Ivoire’s civil unrest of 2011, the same reason - ‘to protect civilians’- was also advanced. Having obtained Resolution 1975 (2011) France, on 3 April, 2011, launched an offensive against the army of President Laurent Gbagbo until he was captured and detained. The cause of the unrest in Cote d’Ivoire stemmed from an alleged election rigging that could have offered President Gbagbo a second term in office. His opponent, Alassane Ouattara, was accused of electoral malpractice culminating in Gbagbo’s failure to win. But France, its former colonizer, saw it differently and wanted him to surrender power to Ouattara, who was acclaimed to have won the election. The French intervention helped to transfer power to Gbagbo’s political opponent. The fact remains that the ousted President Gbagbo is a nationalist and a renowned intellectual who abhores foreign control over his country under the post-colonial landscape. Such a political posture may have conflicted with that of its former colonizer. It must also be mentioned that France has enormous investment in Cote d’Ivoire, including but not limited to agribusiness, mining, energy, and logistics. Humanitarian reasons premised on ‘to protect civilians’ have manifested themselves in many interventions in the Sahel Region. But Thomas (1994:16) argues that humanitarian interventions in our contemporary time are motivated by political considerations that are totally devoid of humanitarian sentiments. She has reservations about the sincerity of humanitarian intervention because of its abuse for other ends. Her worries echo a statement made at the 1992 First Summit of the Security Council by the Zimbabwe’s Foreign Minister, Shamuyarira. It reads: ‘In the era we are entering, the Security Council will be called more and more with conflicts and humanitarian situations of domestic nature that could pose a threat to the international peace and stability. However, great care has to be taken to see that these domestic conflicts are not used as a pretext for the intervention of big powers in the legitimate affairs of small states

67

The Sahel: Caught In A…

or that human rights issues are not totally used for the purpose of destabilizing other states…’ Ian Brownlie (1986:497) maintains the same line of argument advanced by Shamuyarira above. Brownlie detects flaws in some purported interventions for the evacuation of the citizens of one’s state. Such interventions, Brownlie contends, have not been without some political underpinnings. Using the case of the Grenada episode of 1983 embarked upon by the United States, Brownlie argues that, in that operation, the lives of US citizens in Grenada were not in any danger, but that the physical hazard to lives of US nationals arose as a consequence of invasion. He further argues that the US did not ‘halt its military operation after the evacuation of the United States citizens.’ Brownlie also attempts to compare the US action in Grenada with the Israeli rescue operation in Entebbe, Uganda, and the Indian intervention to end the atrocities in East Bengal. On the Indian and Israeli operations, he posits that other states waived the illegality of their operations, but refused to give positive recognition that their actions were lawful. Philosopher Immanuel Kant (1957) argued that intervention was justified provided it was motivated by the urge to remove a despotic regime and establish a republic in its place. This idea could have inspired the removal of Libya’s strong man, Colonel Gaddahfi. Not minding the transparent difficulties that militate against attaining a consensus on intervention, Thomas (1995) argues that, in spite of lack of consensus on the subject of intervention, it should not be abandoned. She contends that intervention has great impact on violation of sovereignty and that sovereignty constitutes one of the fundamental norms regulating interaction in our international political system. In addition to sovereignty, and flowing from it, she argues, are territorial integrity and the legal equality of states. In sum, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the legal equality of states make up a triad of cornerstones. The respect for these primary rules, she concludes, constitutes the backbone for maintenance of order in the international system.

68

Augustine C. Ohanwe

Was Foreign Intervention in Mali Justified? Based on international law, the recent French intervention in Mali has the imprimatur of the United Nations. In this regard international law lends its support to any military action undertaken by a third party when requested by a legitimate or lawful government. Such action has not violated Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which asks all UN members to ‘refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.’ According to Nanga (2013), it was the interim president of Mali who requested France’s military help and, upon this request, several UN resolutions were made. Louw-Vaudran (2013:1) and Fortin (2013) also confirm that Mali’s interim president Dioncounda Traore made direct appeal to France. The appeal was requested in the wake of joint military ‘assault on the town of Konna, 700 km from Bamako by alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Tuareg-led Ansar Dine and The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA).’ This explanation shows the relationship between a legally permitted invitation and the intervention of a third party to a conflict situation. The intervention in Mali differs markedly from those of Libya and Cote d’Ivoire where the foreign interventionists obtained approval to intervene in order to ‘protect civilians’ invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter to shield their activities. On the Mali situation, we can assert that at least two main factors contributed to the French intervention in Mali, an intervention which relegated the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the role of playing the second fiddle. First, the United Nations adopted Resolution S/2085 (2012) in which it recalled its previous resolutions on Mali and further reaffirmed ‘its strong commitment to the sovereignty of Mali.’ It further emphasized that ‘the situation and entrenchment of terrorist groups and criminal networks in the north of Mali continue to pose a serious and urgent threat to the population throughout Mali, and to the stability in the Sahel region, the wider African region and the international community.’ 69

The Sahel: Caught In A…

The Council tasked the African-led Intervention Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to wade into Mali to help in strengthening its defense and security forces. Regrettably, what could have been an African-led operation ended a French-led one. The flaw in this resolution is that it lacked the force of urgency the scenario in Mali deserved. The UN underestimated the armed insurgency in the Sahel, and was slow to perceive the rebels as firebrand Jihadists. Having reduced the conflict to the level of such simplicity, the UN deferred the deployment of AFISMA for nine month from the date of the resolution. Worse still, there was no funding and logistical support by the UN for AFISMA. According to Louw-Vaudran (2013.1), Resolution S/2085 adopted on 20 December 2012 would have ‘its estimated deployment…in September this year (2013).’ The nine months interval of inactivity was a blank check to the Jihadists. The second factor was that President Blaise Compaore, under the instruction of ECOWAS engaged in negotiation with the Ansar Dine rebels, led by its Tuareg leader Iyad Agh Ghali, ignoring other factions. When the negotiation collapsed, the Tuaregs opted for the establishment of their long sought Islamist State of Azawad. Azawad is the Tuaregs name for the northern province of Mali. They took up arms and made swift gains. The rapidity with which they gained more ground was alarming. It was a poor military calculation to have postponed military deployment in the face of perceived grave threat swirling around Mali. Both the United Nations and ECOWAS/AU wasted much time in unnecessary procrastination, sapping energies that could have been devoted to the emergency situation begging to be attended to. ‘Desperate situations require desperate actions.’ There was no indication that those actors planning for the management of the conflict in Mali read about the reason for the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. If they did, they may have forgotten that the top Roman officials in the court of Nero were ‘effecting policy at the margin’ prior to the Emperor’s final fiddle recital. And as they engaged in such frivolous ceremonies, Rome was engulfed in conflagration.’ The Jihadist caught the joke and took advantage of it. 70

Augustine C. Ohanwe

Louw-Vaudran (2013:1) argues that the former head of diplomacy, Senegalese Cheikh Tidiane Gadio, deplored the lack of speedy response from the United Nations and ECOWAS/AU. His anger against snail speed reaction to the Mali situation was put succinctly. Gadio told Radio France International in an interview that ‘it was a tragedy that we sat in meetings while the Jihadists advanced.’ Mali was caught in the nutcracker between the advancing Jihadists up north and the inaction of the regional body. This glaring threat may have forced Mali’s interim government to turn to France. ECOWAS deployment came embarrassingly too late. In so doing, they unwittingly gave the foreign intervening powers the mandate to dictate the outcome of Mali’s political situation, a mistake that will come to haunt the sub-regional body in not too distant future. Can Foreign Military Intervention Pacify Conflicts in Sahel? When asked about foreign intervention in his country, General Paul Kagame of Rwanda was blunt and straightforward. ‘Outside forces do not solve problems we have in Africa. They come in with little understanding of the situation, or they take side in the conflict.’ (Herald Tribune, 5 May 1994). Kagame is right when we consider some cases such as the Angolan, Somali, Cote d’Ivoire and Libyan conflicts negotiated by some Western powers. Angola does not belong to the Sahel Region. However, it is vital in our study, particularly while analyzing how the intervening powers’ activities in conflict management reveal the interplay between national interests and internal forces – how both variables could conspire to produce amorphous verdict. In 1991, Portugal, Angola’s former colonialist, Russia and the US oversaw the Bicesse Accord, which resulted in cease-fire in the Angolan conflict. Angolans were happy when these three powers assured them that peace would reign and that democracy would be enthroned. But after the presidential election in 1992, Savimbi’s Unio Nacional para Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) was defeated. His defeat generated a melee. According to Brittain (1994), Savimbi got 34.1 percent of the votes; while the government party of Eduardo dos 71

The Sahel: Caught In A…

Santos’ Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) secured 53.7, giving the government party an easy majority of 129 out 229 seats in the National Assembly. But no sooner had the result been released than Savimbi refused to accept it. He immediately galvanized his forces and retreated to his strong hold in Huambo Province in south of Angola and unleashed devastating attacks that consumed the lives of Angolans. He wanted to reverse the people’s verdict via military might. He was out-polled, but he thought he had not been out-powered. Interestingly, when this occurred, there was no pressure from the outside powers, particularly the US and Portugal, to counsel him to soft-pedal and accept the result which, according to Messiant (2004:1), the UN applauded as ‘generally free and fair.’ Rather, the defeat of Savimbi was an embarrassment to all his Western patrons, who had been pretty sure that he would win the election. Then came the intrigue. The appointment of Alioune Blodin Beye of Mali, a close friend of Savimbi, as the UN Special Envoy to Angola was a calculated attempt to offer Savimbi a sympathetic hearing. It was a strategy to shield him from UN sanctions. And this modus operandi was to use diplomatic peace dialogues to ward off UN resolutions that would have had adverse effects on Savimbi for his uncompromising attitude. Brittain (1994:16-17) states that Beye had described Savimbi as a ‘man of peace.’ On a separate occasion, he described the UNITA leader as ‘a man of honour, a man of his words,’ even though Savimbi had reneged on all the tenets of the accords he signed with his political opponent. When the UN was at the verge of imposing sanction on Savimbi, Beye was quick to ask, ‘why sanction someone now in negotiation.’ The revelation above exemplifies how Western negotiators can sacrifice genuine negotiation for peace on the altar of national interest. Another disastrous conflict engagement in Africa by Western powers was in Somalia. On 24 April, 1992, the UN adopted Resolution 751 to establish the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). The resolution mandated the Secretary-general to 72

Augustine C. Ohanwe

establish a security force to be deployed as soon as possible. The mission, when deployed, did not achieve its objectives. On 3 December, 1992, the Security Council adopted another Resolution, 794, which created The United Nations International Task Force (UNITAF), code-named ‘Operation Restore Hope.’ It was an American initiative, authorised by the Security Council and led by the US. Resolution 749 was based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter which viewed the situation in Somalia as a threat to international peace and security and authorised UNITAF to execute the right to use force to implement its mandate. The US offered to send up to 30,000 troops to Somalia, as a part of a UN peacekeeping force. On the ground, UNITAF ended up with 37,000 troops at full strength when added to other forces from Italy, Belgium, Canada and others (Horn of Africa Bulletin, November-December 1994). According to a UN Document, ‘The UN and the situation in Somalia, Reference Paper (1993),’ the inability of UNITAF to fix the military and political situation in Somalia informed Secretary-General Boutrous-Ghali to seek another avenue for the restoration of normalcy in Somalia. He submitted to the Security Council his recommendation to transfer the baton of power from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He noted with regret that, despite the improvement in the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance, a secure environment had not yet been established in Somalia. On 26 March, 1993, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 814 creating an UN-led mission in Somalia. UNOSOM II operated with 38,000 troops and civilian personnel under UN command. UNOSOM II, like its predecessors could not enthrone peace in Somalia. The force withdrew from Somalia in March, 1995. As they were leaving, they could hear the deafening sounds of mortar shells and whizzing sounds of bullets across the horizon reminding them of an unfinished business in Somalia. According to Hammar (1995:59), one of the helicopter pilots, Special Force Sgt. Chen Bell, who supervised the raids on faction leaders’ suspected hideouts, delivered this verdict: ‘The UN pumped in $3billion and has nothing to show for it.’ The US and its allies were in Somalia for 15 months 73

The Sahel: Caught In A…

purportedly to restore political order and feed the starving. Although they achieved some success in feeding the starving, they never came near bringing about institutional stability. Somalia was awash with weapons, clan-ridden and ungovernable as it was when the foreign forces arrived. Until today, Somalia remains a failed state and a veritable vortex of Hell. The mission failed in Somalia due to many factors. But the two main factors were cultural insensitivity and violation of the norm of neutrality. Foreign interventionists were anti-Farra Aideed, an important warlord. Such posture impeded reconciliation efforts and helped to prolong the Somali conflict. The factors that hampered peace in Somalia tally with Kagame of Rwanda’s assertion that foreign interventionists in African conflict scenarios often take sides in the conflict. In Libya, foreign powers’ intervention succeeded in the removal of Gaddafi but rekindled secessionist movements from Benghazi. What foreign intervention achieved in Libya could be defined as ‘military peace’ while domestic anger and turbulence simmer beneath the political surface. Today, Libya is like a volcano. It is free from calm. Libya is another good example of a disastrous foreign intervention in the Sahel Region. External powers often assert that they intervene to bring about regional peace and blossoming of democracy. However, the interpretation of what peace should consist of has been construed as being the supremacy over others by conquest, a conquest that leaves the country worse than it was before the intervening powers waded in. While security and national interest motivate external powers’ intervention in the Sahel, no one talks about poverty and famine in the Sahel. What happened to the camel given to the French President exemplifies the level of poverty in the Sahel. According to Campbell (2013), in February 2013, President Francois Hollande was given a camel by a Malian family in appreciation for French intervention in Mali. The camel’s caretakers slaughtered it for food. In order to repair the damage caused by such an act, the Malian government had to replace it with fatter and nicer looking camel. 74

Augustine C. Ohanwe

A lesson that could be gleaned from this story is one of the sorry states of Mali and the wider Sahel stricken by poverty and food insecurity. None of the intervening powers ever included it in the agenda for discussion. Africanisation of African Conflicts: African Success Story The military intervention in the Sahel is French-led with huge support from allied Western forces. Western forces are also fighting the Islamists in Afghanistan, and fought them in Libya and Iraq. All the operations they commanded became protracted conflicts. Even drone warfare has not brought success. Based on this background, one is forced to query whether Western forces in the Sahel will achieve an enduring peace or whether the conflicts will become a quagmire. While foreign interventions have not yielded positive dividends in Africa, Africa herself has made some commendable strides in conflict prevention and settlement within the continent. One example is Mozambique where, in 1994, African intervention defused a crisis. In that country’s post-conflict polls the rebel leader, Alfonso Dhlakama cried ‘foul’ as a pretext for pulling his RENAMO Party out of the election before it actually began in October, 1994. His move not to participate in the election at the 11th hour raised an ominous signal. The political temperature in Mozambique became high, tilting towards a possible resumption of conflict. In response to the simmering tension, eight Southern African states held a summit meeting in Harare, Zimbabwe. They unanimously reached a decision to send troops to Mozambique should any political party refuse to cooperate with the election or accept the result. The collective threat of the entire sub-region was effective in transforming the boiling tension (Economist, 29 October, 1994). The election was conducted peacefully. That was big credit for the sub-regional bloc. Lesotho is another interesting and successful case where the same sub-regional body used preventive diplomacy to avert smouldering conflict that could have had a domino effect within the sub-region. In August 1994, King Letsie III of Lesotho ousted the democratically elected government of Ntsu Mokhehle. South Africa, Botswana and 75

The Sahel: Caught In A…

Zimbabwe intervened diplomatically and restored the ousted head of government thereby preventing a major conflict. Cultural affinity and traditional African diplomacy helped to fix the political problem. Such diplomatic know-how that remedied the political situation in the above mentioned countries is lacking in foreign powers outside the African continent. Rwanda might not have plunged into anarchy had the peace accord brokered in Tanzania been implemented. In August, 1993 the government of Tanzania, in conjunction with other neighbouring states, reached a peace accord in Arusha between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and president Habyariama, securing a political settlement that involved power sharing. Unfortunately the persons who could have translated the peace accord into practical reality died when their aircraft was shot down in April, 1994, an incident that sparked off the genocide. Even though Rwanda later slipped into anarchy, the fact that Rwanda’s neighbours gathered for the peaceful resolution of the conflict can be seen as a partial success story in that mediators did their best. It is important to add the success of ECOWAS in the West Africa sub-region. The Economic Community of West African States involvement in the Liberian conflict exalted the sub-regional body. ECOWAS was primarily conceived for economic integration, but, when conflict erupted in Liberia, it realized that its economic integration agenda could not work in a political climate of instability and insecurity within the sub-region. It, therefore, called into action its military wing called the Economic Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to check the escalation of the conflict. ECOMOG was the first military organisation of its kind and it created a precedent. Its effort to ‘Africanize’ the management of the Liberian conflict, particularly in the post-Cold War landscape, is a living testimony that Africa has the political will to find a solution to its own problem. In spite of financial and logistical constraints, ECOWAS has used its meager resources to achieve a huge success in the sub-region.

76

Augustine C. Ohanwe

After it had settled the Liberian imbroglio, including the creation of political space conducive for democracy to flourish, it was called upon to address the conflict scenario in the neighboring Sierra Leone. ECOWAS waded in and balanced the political equation too. In Togo, ECOWAS’ mature diplomacy prevented a bloodbath in the aftermath of President Gnassingbe Eyadema’s demise in 2005. The late president’s military loyalists used a constitutional coup to install his son to the leadership of Togo. This system ran at variance with the stipulation of the constitution. ECOWAS made a diplomatic intervention that reversed the trend. Faure Gnassingbe, the son of President Eyadema, was persuaded to organize elections and contest the presidential election in a democratic fashion. He contested and won. That was to the credit of ECOWAS. Conclusion Throughout this work we have explored conflict situations in the Sahel and their comprehensive political matrix, that is, the environments where the conflicts occurred, and a generally relevant set of issues that brought about the conflicts. The matrix also permits us to follow these countries’ conflict dynamics and how the UN, African Union and ECOWAS responded, and, above all, the part played by foreign powers in the conflict scenarios. In Mali, unlike in Libya and Cote d’Ivoire, a legitimate interim government invited France, and it responded. It flew in paratroopers, checked the advances of the Jihadists and invited other foreign powers to assist in both logistics and intelligence. However, one does not have to possess more than the usual quantum of far-sightedness to grasp that the problems in the Sahel are far from over. Gbagbo’s supporters have found sanctuary in the neighbouring Ghana from whence they execute intermittent skirmishes against the government of Ouattara. There are simmering tensions in Libya and this has compelled many Western countries to recall their diplomats from Libya. The conflict in Mali is still raging, but the situation there does not need only a military solution. France can release its paratroopers, but it cannot paratroop down a comprehensive solution to Mali’s situation. 77

The Sahel: Caught In A…

More needs to be done in the area of conflict settlement, reconciliation and unification of the polarized northern province of Mali with the south, followed by enthronement of democracy. It is ECOWAS and African Union, not foreign powers that will tackle such challenges. In a conflict situation that requires mediators, ex-colonists do not always do well as highlighted above due to vested interests. Even if they succeed in bringing about ‘peace,’ it would be more of an ad hoc in nature because the structure of the conflict is left unsolved. France and her Western allies have done their share. A question that requires an answer is: What happens after the French leave the Sahel? Recent turbulence in the Central Africa Republic and that of Mali should be seen as a wake-up call for Africa in general and ECOWAS in particular. One lesson that could be gleaned from both conflicts is the need to inaugurate a standby or rapid deployment force. Such a force can act with dispatch, exploiting its proximity to the conflict location, and dampening the intensification of conflict scenarios within the continent, thereby halting the potential nightmare scenario and the spillover effect any one such situation might generate. A retrospective glance reminds us that Africa has scored commendable credits in conflict prevention and management as articulated in the past success stories above. What is required is for the regional blocs to re-assert their influence on the continent. The sub-regional or continental standby forces, plus eminent men and women from the continent and the warring factions themselves, would work in concert to replace the sound of the rifle. This paper posits that the monumental achievements of ECOWAS and other sub-regional blocs would be undermined if foreign powers were to manage and dictate the outcome of the conflicts raging on the continent

78

Augustine C. Ohanwe

References Aron, R. (1981): Peace and War: A theory of International Relations (Florida: Robert F. Krieger Publishing Co.). Bierce, A. (1911): The Devil’s Dictionary, Albert and Charles Bonn, Inc. A public domain text. Brittain, V. (1994): ‘UNITA: Outpolled but not Outpowered,’ New Statesman, March. 4. Brownlie, I. (1986.): ‘The United Nations Charter and the use of force,’ in Cassese, A. (ed.), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force (Dordrecht: Martinus Publishers). Campbell, J. (2013), ‘French President’s Camel Eaten,’ Council on Foreign Relations website, blogs.cfr.org/campbell/2013/04/10/frenchpresidents-camel-eaten/Apr 10, 2013. The Economist, 29 October, 1994. Fortin, J. (2013): ‘Western Powers Rally Behind French Intervention in Mali.’ International Business Times, January 23. Hammar, J. (1995): ‘After Two Years of Futile efforts, the Troops Pull Out.’ Newsweek, 13 March 1995. Herald Tribune 5 May, 1994. Horn of Africa Bulletin, November – December, 1994. Kant, I. (1957): Perpetual Peace (New York: Liberal Arts Press). Lacher, W. (2013): ‘Organised Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region,’ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 13. Lanning, M. and Mueller, M. (1979): African Undermined (England: Penguin Books Ltd.). Louw-Vaudran, Liesl (2013), ‘French Intervention in Mali: A foreign risky solution,’ 18 January. Mason, B. (2010), ‘Military Coup in Mali’, World Socialist Web. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2010/02/nige-f24.htm Messiant, C. (2004), ‘From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process.’ Conciliation Resources Website. http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/why-did-bicesse-and-lusakafail-critical-analysis 79

The Sahel: Caught In A…

Morgenthau, H. (ed.) (1978): Politics amongst Nations: The struggle for Power and Peace, 5th. Edition (USA: Alfred and Knopf Inc.). Nanga, J. (2013), ‘A neo-colonial intervention under French leader,’ http://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article2906 Pitman, T. (2008): ‘Mauritanian coup chief won’t rule out election run.’ USA Today, August 10. Rosenau, J.N. (1969): ‘Intervention as a Scientific Concept’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 13. Schmitt, E. (2013): ‘New Drone Bases in Niger: Builds US presence in Africa,’ The New York Times, January 25. Stohl, M. (1980): ‘The Nexus of Civil and International Conflict’, in Gurr, T. R. (ed.): Handbook of Political Conflict (London: The Free Press, Collier Macmillan Publishers). The United Nations (1993), the UN and the Situation in Somalia, Reference Paper. Thomas, C. (1994.): ‘Human Rights and Intervention: a Case for Caution,’ in Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 5. Verwey, W. D. (1986): ‘Humanitarian Intervention,’ in Casses, A. (ed.), The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force (Dordrecht: Martinus Publishers). United Nations Charter, Article 2(4). Walters, D. (2010), ‘Mali and its Mining Sector: a Focus on Gold while Minerals Are Unexplored,’ Consultancy Africa Intelligence. http://www.consultancyafrica.com 03 October. Whitlock, Craig, (2013): ‘Drone Warfare: Niger Becomes the Latest Frontier in the US War on Terror’. (2013), the Guardian, March 26.

80

CHAPTER FOUR African Solutions to (Malian) Problems: Pan Africanist vs. Neocolonialist Geopolitical Power Play in the West African Sahel Rita Kiki Edozie

Abstract Titled ‘African Solutions to (Malian) Problems’ after the African Union (AU) Pan-Africanist mantra, the current chapter uses the 20122013 Malian crisis to examine the African Union’s response to one of its members in trouble. In explaining the Malian crisis, we argue that the AU delicately navigates global power hierarchies and negotiates with powerful global institutions in order to attain its own ends in Africa. This intervention style reflects the new genre of African politics whereby, through the AU, Africa’s collective agency is representative of a geopolitical dirigisme used to deploy its legal codes, public policies, projects, programs, human capital, and initiatives to promote Pan-Africanism in a global era. Chapter subsections present the Malian crisis, the Global War on Terror and the AU’s response to Mali, and a concluding discussion on the question of French neocolonialism in Mali. Introduction Dedicated to the crisis in Mali in 2013, the African Union (AU)’s twentieth Ordinary Session, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 27 and 28 January, 2013, began its session with the adoption of the Resolution on Mali. The resolution claimed that on behalf of ‘Africa’, the African Union reiterated its firm commitment to the national unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Mali, noting that the continued occupation of the northern part of Mali by various armed, criminal, and terrorist groups was a serious threat to peace, security, and stability in Mali, in the region, and beyond. The African Union 81

African Solutions to (Malian)…

(AU) went on to reaffirm Africa’s deep solidarity with Mali, a founding member whose commitment to Pan-Africanism and the causes of the continent had never wavered in half a century of independence. The resolution expressed the collective will of Africans’ determination to pool their efforts together to help their sister country to overcome its challenges. The attention to Mali was justified given that, in 2012-13, Mali was a member state undergoing dire crisis whose elements are cultural identity, democracy and society, economic development, and conflict and security. The ‘Malian Resolution’ represents what has now become a standard approach employed by Africa’s African Union to address the continent’s political affairs. Several resolutions have been similarly styled for conflicts in the DRC, Guinea, Somalia, the South Sudan and Sudan, Mauritania, and Mauritius. The Resolution brings to bear key elements of the current chapter’s major research questions: Is the AU relevant to Africa, the Sahel region, and Mali? What is Africa’s role in relation to the presumed sustenance of neocolonialism in the continent in the context of France’s military intervention in Mali, Operation Serval? Responding to these questions using the case of Mali, the chapter reveals the ways that ideology and institutionalism underpin the AU’s capacity to engage in a more expansive and assertive PanAfricanism. This way of examining Pan-Africanism attempts to characterize African countries’ mutual recognition of their common and shared vulnerability as neighbors in a historically integrated continent. Pan-Africanism in this regard captures these countries’ shared commitment to nation-building at the national and regional levels and their efforts to forge pan-continental arenas to achieve political-economic development. Especially in an increasingly militarized world, Pan-Africanism for the AU refers to African countries’ commitment to devising and implementing collective security initiatives for resolving continental conflicts and wars. We use Pan-Africanist theories to understand the AU’s response to Mali. We examine Pan-Africanism in the context of neocolonialism using Nkrumah’s terms whereby Africa continues to struggle with 82

Rita Kiki Edozie

staving off the outward trappings of international sovereignty and a political- economic system that is directed from outside (Nkrumah, 1966). The AU’s ‘African Solutions for African Problems’ (ASAP) mantra, for example, would inform the strategy that the AU would use to mobilize Africans for the establishment of a new ‘global’ African Union out of an old ‘regional’ Organization of African Union (OAU). It would refer to African autonomy and imperative to develop capacities indigenous to African cultures and contexts and public policy solutions for continental affairs. It would invoke a genre of pan-nationalism, a pride and a ‘can do attitude,’ as well as evidence of Africa’s new global engagement. Also, in the area of security, the AU would achieve its goals through Pax Africana. A norm and sub organ of the AU’s security apparatus, Pax Africana would represent the institutional vision through which the peace and security of Africa would have to be assured by Africans themselves (Mazrui, 1969). In Mali, from 2012 to 2013, the AU used ASAP and Pax Africana to delicately navigate global power hierarchies and negotiate with powerful global institutions in order to resolve conflict in Africa, especially in relation to the US’ 2002 Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). In the AU’s doing so, while revealing the multiplicity of processes that may have been attributed to the crisis, we underscore the crisis’ globality as a product of the global War on Terror to understand its solution to the crisis through French intervention. In this regard, we use the chapter to reveal ways that the AU asserted the Pan- Africanist principles of anti-neo-colonialism, self-determination, plural inclusion, and freedom from global marginalization and structural poverty in response to the Malian Crisis. While asserting its radical ‘can-do’ Pan Africanism, we also see how the institution created reluctant, though strategic, albeit asymmetrical, partnerships with the same powerful global forces and institutions that serve to compromise the AU’s interests. In this regard, the current study considers new trends in the practices of neocolonialism in Africa and responses by the AU to inclinations by former colonial powers to control and exploit Africa. 83

African Solutions to (Malian)…

We especially inject new constructivist international relations perspectives to consider Africans’ agency in African global political affairs. Mali’s 2012-13crisis- and the AU’s response- presents an important case study for showcasing Africa’s engagement in current international political affairs in the West African Sahel. Subsequent sections explain the Malian crisis, illustrate the crisis’ context of the Sahel in a global power play, present the AU’s response to the crisis, and conclude with a discussion of the implications of French and UN intervention in Mali vis-à-vis African intervention. Explaining the Malian Crisis: A Historical, Regional, and Global Survey The 2012-2013 Malian Crisis can be characterized in four dimensions. It was a coup, a democratic reversal, a collapse of the state and government, and the eruption of a civil war. The crisis began in March, 2012, when a military coup led by Captain Amadou Sanogo deposed a second and voluntarily term-limited, President Amadou Toumani Touré which ended the twenty year democratic regime. Soon after the coup in the same year, Mali deteriorated into an intractable civil war, whereby Tuareg militants seceded from the country’s northern region and the militants renamed northern Mali the state of ‘Azawad,’ which became a haven for warring Islamic extremist militants and other secessionists. In January, 2013, the crisis made another turn when France militarily intervened into Mali by way of Operation Serval which served to take back the North and its key cities (Gao, Timbucktu, and Kidal) from the Islamic militants. Thus, by January 17, 2013, Mali’s crisis had crystallized into an ‘African problem for an African solution’ when Africa formally and militarily intervened in Mali to support France’s Operation Serval through the deployment of the African Led International Standby Mission in Mali (AFISMA) whose troops were drawn from 21 African countries. Mali’s four-tiered crisis had not been expected and thus plunged the world into debates about an explanation of the crisis. After all, from 1992 to March 2012, Mali had been considered a blossoming 84

Rita Kiki Edozie

democracy based on international freedom ratings. There are three prisms through which one may explain the 2012-13, Malian Crisis. First, there is the structural existence of cultural pluralism manifest as multi-ethnicity and multi-religiosity that can lead to deep divisions. Further, in a developing world country like much of Africa and other regions of the Third World, democracy and development are twin challenges. We refer to this as a democracy-development dilemma. Finally, a Pan-Sahelian African country, such as Mali is on the periphery of intensification of the War on Terror facilitated by growing internationalism, militarism, and interventionism in the region. Each prism presented exposes complex dimensions of Mali’s state-society. The dilemma of Mali’s cultural pluralism and diversity refers to the continent’s deep pre-colonial sub-national pluralism and the problems that have arisen as a result of a colonially imposed ‘nation-state’ heritage manifest in a postcolonial state of affairs. As with other African countries, at the national level, Malian symbols reinforce central aspects of Pan-national African culture through the struggle against colonization, the celebration of Mali's rich history dating back to the Malian Empire, and its long multicultural tradition. For example, contemporary Mali is the site of three of Africa’s most magnificent empires-Ghana (8th -12th centuries), Mali (13th-14th centuries), and Songhai (15th century). And, from 1600 to 1800, present day Mali was also the site for a number of famous African kingdoms and city-states, including Jaara, Segu, Macina and Tukulor. Before taking on the name Mali, a name of a pre-colonial civilization that symbolizes Pan-Africanism when it asserts Africa’s glorious contribution to world history, Mali was sequentially part of the French colony, Soudan; the Malian Federation (Senegal and Mali), and followed the Ghana-Guinea-Mali ‘Union of African States’ in 1961-62. Given this history, the establishment of the independent Mali Republic as we know it today embodies the deep precepts of the aforementioned longue durée and expansive regional and internationalist history in its post-national identity. As such, it is no accident that Mali's flag uses the color symbolism of the Pan-African .

85

African Solutions to (Malian)…

unity movement- green (hope), gold (a reference to one of Mali's natural resources), and red (the blood sacrificed in the struggle against colonization). Mali’s contemporary post-national cultural pluralism reflects this longue-durée African history that spans linguistic, cultural and social influences from North Africa, West Africa, and Mali’s former colonizer, France. Today’s major ethnic groups in Mali are the Mande (e.g., Bamana, Jula, Malinke), who comprise fifty percent of the population and who were the populace of the ancient Malian Empire. There are the Peul or Fulbe who represent seventeen percent and whose ancestry stretches across the Fulani Jihadist routes spanning old migration routes from Northern Nigeria to Senegal. The Voltaic are twelve percent (e.g. Bobo, Senufo, Minyanka); the Tuareg are two percent of the population of Northern Mali and constitute ten percent of the entire country. The Soninke, also Mande, of the ancient Ghana (now Western Mali) Empire are 6 percent, and the Dogon are five percent, together summing to nearly 100% of the population. With regard to religion, there are Christian minorities that make up about five percent of the population along with those who follow traditional African beliefs. However, over ninety percent of people generally follow Sufi Islam. Cultural and religious pluralism metamorphosed into deep ethnic divisions and violent conflict is an important explanation of Mali’s crisis. Deep ethnic divisions and conflict manifest in the unresolved Tuareg national-ethnic question that began with rebellions and state subversions since independence, again in the 1990s, and resuming in 2011. There are contested notions over what percentage of population Tuareg communities constitute in Northern Mali. Making up only 10% of the population, Northern Mali is ideally already a sparsely populated region compared to the South. It is believed that Taureg make up only 2% of this population who reside alongside Arabs, Songhai, Peul, Bella, and others. The CIA Factbook claims contrarily that Tuareg and Moors make up 10% of the Malian population while Malian census statistics state that 3.5% of Malians speak Tamasheq which is the language spoken by Tuareg. We also know that Tuareg 86

Rita Kiki Edozie

are racially diverse with most descending from slavery and are darkskinned and known as the Bella in Songhay. One must consider centuries of Taureg nomadism and identity transformations in nationalism to understand the postcolonial political dominance of the Tuareg communities in Northern Mali evidenced by repeated rebellions and the prominence of groups like the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) which began the fourth rebellion in 2012 (Kone, 2013; Whitehouse, 2013). At independence in 1960, the bulk of the Tuareg community remained outside the web of political relationships and material benefits of the new state. This status caused Tuareg to view the southern Malian leadership with resentment and discontent from the onset (Keita, 1998). Tuareg nationalism would result in an independent state comprised of Tuareg populations from northern Mali, northern Niger, and southern Algeria. The Azawad Republic, the desired end product of Tuareg nationalism, has been a long-time aspiration of Tuareg populations since Malian independence. Reacting against both social and cultural discrimination within broader Mali as well as to the perceived structural discrimination whereby the Tuareg were neglected in the distribution of state benefits and state representation, Tuareg began to wage wars against the state as early as 1963. Thirty years of intense military repression, resource discrimination, exacerbated by drought, and alienation from what would become a hegemonic South, caused the Tuareg to launch their second rebellion against the Malian state in 1990. In response, on January 6th, 1991, the government of Mali and Tuareg military leaders signed the Accords of Tamanrasset in Algeria to address the deep-seated roots of Tuareg dissatisfaction. Features of the agreement included a cease-fire and exchange of prisoners. Taureg military leaders would withdraw insurgent forces to cantonments. The Malian government would reduce its army presence in the north, especially in Kidal, and disengage the army from civil administration in the north. It would also eliminate selected military posts in the North considered threatening to the Tuareg communities, and would integrate insurgent combatants into the Malian army. Finally, the 87

African Solutions to (Malian)…

Malian government would accelerate the ongoing processes of administrative decentralization in Mali as well as guarantee a fixed proportion of Mali’s national infrastructural investment funding (47.3 percent) to northern regions 6,7, and 8 (Keita, 1998).1 Supposedly, the National Pact of Tamanrasset would neutralize the armed threat on both sides, relocate those who were internally displaced within Mali, and repatriate those who had been displaced to Algeria and Mauritania. In decentralizing state control in the region, the agreement called for cultural representation and respect for Tuareg cultural identity. Nonetheless, this sustained state of affairs was complicated by identity fissures that emerged from the global and regional resurgence of ‘political Islam’ especially in Northern Mali. The deep structural underbelly of Mali’s deep divisions and ethnic conflict is political (democracy) and economic (development). Tuareg complained about inequality, uneven development, and exclusion from the Malian democracy. Adam Prezowski contends that democracies with a per capita income indicator of less than $1,000 are not sustainable and are subject to democratic breakdown (Prezowski et al, 2000). At a per capita income of $1,100 by the time of the 2012 coup, Prezowski’s democracy-development conundrum rings true for Mali. The country’s collapse begs the question as to whether there can be democracy without development. A land-locked country twice the size of its colonizer, France, by 1960 when Mali would attain independence, the country embodied both the dilemma of democracy and development, as well as the promise of its own attempts to resolve this paradox. We know that Mali still has mineral resources such as the gold that built its great empires as the country’s largest exports are gold, cotton, and livestock. Yet, over a century as a province in a larger expanse of the French West African colony of which it, given its hinterland status, was not a hub, by its independence, Mali was a poor and underdeveloped country with little potential to regain the wealth of its previous empires. At independence, the majority of Malians were subsistence farmers or pastoral nomads. Life expectancy was forty88

Rita Kiki Edozie

five years. Access to modern education was restricted to a small minority in the south and infrastructure had not significantly been developed. Neither Mali’s founding President Modibo Keita’s socialist modernization plans, nor the liberal market French modernization efforts of Moussa Traoré, helped much to reverse the dire economic statistics of this country. Mali could exhibit little production, little wealth creation, little growth, little individual income, little equitable income distribution and lots of inequality, poverty, and exploitative neo-colonial resource extraction. By 2011 estimates, with a per capita income of $1,100 for a 15,000,000 population size and a Human Development Index (HDI) ranking of 159, Mali remained one of the poorest countries in the world. However, Mali’s democratic development was more successful. The distinctiveness of Modibo Keita’s democratic nationalism had begun through his and other French Soudanese leaders’ participation in the RDA (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain) in their struggle against French colonialism. It produced a socialist brand of democracy consistent with the hybridized and experimental forms of democracy practiced in much of Africa at the time. Liberal democracy came to Mali in 1992 through a third wave, post- Cold War era movement. Surprisingly differently from other countries in Africa, Mali’s democracy was qualitatively rich with sustained political, civil and human rights through 2012. Significantly, the first AU Commission chair, Alpha Konaré (20032008) also served as Mali’s first liberal democratically elected leader from 1992 to 2002. A member of ADEMA-PASJ (Alliance for the Democracy of Mali Party for African Solidarity and Justice), this prodemocracy movement which had begun in 1989 established a democratic era for Mali, the only Muslim country classified as a ‘Free Democracy’ continuously from 1992 through 2012 (Freedom House, 2013) . Mali’s democracy was celebrated as a deliberative democracy (Wing, 2008) 2 , combining the historical legacies of its cooperativevillage style socialist democracy with a National Conference style 1990s transition to democracy. It was an attempt to convene Mali’s 89

African Solutions to (Malian)…

multi-ethnic constituents to build and formulate the new democracy. A participant in the conference reflected Mali’s deep history and diversity in democracy building when he said, In 1236, in [Kurukanfuga] after the fall of Soso, Sundiata and King Aliou, who created a constitution in 4 days that defined the state and external influence. Today, we are in the same situation (Wing, 2008:76). Mali’s national conference represented many sectors of society that came together to debate how to create a more legitimate system of government that would foster the growth of a plural and free press, as well as a governmental regime that was open to dialogue and popular participation. ADEMA ruled with Konaré at the helm until 2002 with the election of former coup leader from Mopti, Amadou Toumani Touré, who had run as an independent candidate. Regrettably, Northerners, and most rural citizens, felt excluded from the Malian democracy (Wing, 2008). As well, the institutional dimensions of democracy in Mali may not have matched the country’s deliberative democratic vibrancy. One red flag was that Konaré’s second term election was a ‘one-party’ victory, as supposedly all sixteen opposition parties boycotted the election in protest against perceived ADEMA party dominance. Amadou T. Touré was also elected as a single ‘no-party’ candidate, supported variably by a number of party coalitions that Touré did not derive his political authority from. This fact weakened the democratic state significantly in the millennium and led to his ousting by a captain’s coup claiming the Touré regime’s ineffectiveness in dealing with yet a third Tuareg rebellion. The weakness of Mali’s institutional democratic regime by the age of the War on Terror in 2002, coupled with the fact that eighty percent of Mali’s economy consists of rural citizens who have been left out of the foreign aid-supported neoliberal market- led economic growth, are factors that explain Mali’s ultimate collapse of democracy in 2012. As such, the crisis can be seen as a product of the Malian state’s inability to manage deep divisions and overcome the democracydevelopment dilemma. Nevertheless, two additional key factors 90

Rita Kiki Edozie

explain Mali’s fast paced resort to outright war by 2013. They are the unresolved Tuareg nationalist question which fostered the arrival of political Islam into the region in the 1990s. This change brought with it, after 9/11 in the millennium, a US War on Terror military operation called the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) to fight ‘Political Islam’ in northern Mali. Since 2006, with most Tuareg feeling that the National Pact commitments had never fully been met by the Malian state, a third Tuareg rebellion led by Ibrahim Ag Bahanga took place and lasted until 2009. Thereafter, Mali became one of four West African Sahelian countries (others are Niger, Mauritania and Chad) that were targeted for the US’s PSI. The US government marked the Sahel as the second most vulnerable site for terrorist insurgencies. The Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) would target Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad as vulnerable to penetration by foreign extremists from border-states in Algeria, Libya, and the Sudan. Algeria’s Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) was seen to be the biggest threat to spreading political Islam in the region, and it was believed that the GSPC had a presence in Northern Mali. The PSI was initially funded at $7.75 million dollars with more than half of its funds channeled to support for defense and security forces in Mali. The initiative’s purpose was to train government troops in the Sahelian countries to resist terrorist activity in the Sahara (Harmon, 2008). The War on Terror targeted the entire region as a site for insecurity and violence that involved simultaneous ethnic wars by militias against the state and state war against non-state militias. PSI initiatives begin to conflate so called Islamic missionaries of Bamako and Kidal – Jama’at al-Tabligh – who Americans claimed held Wahhabi beliefs- and the political Islam promoted by Tuareg notables such as the mayor of Kidal, the traditional ruler of Kidal, and the former head of the Tuareg rebellion, Bahanga, who had become the spiritual leader of Mali’s Tablighis (Harmon, 2008). The 2011 NATO War on Libya further fanned the flames of an already volatile northern region when both armed Tuareg militia, fighting with the then Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, and Islamic jihadist 91

African Solutions to (Malian)…

militias fighting against the Libyan regime siphoned off their newly acquired cache of arms, acquired from both the West and East, including China and Russia, and travelled through familiar crossborder routes back into Mali. Using a military option again in an era of the War on Terror, in 2009, Mali dispatched troops to stop Bahanga, who was exiled to Libya until his return in the summer of 2011. During his time in Libya, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga made contact with Tuareg who served in Muammar Gaddafi’s military, including Mohammed Ag Najm, commander of Gaddafi’s elite desert units. In a 2011 interview with the Algerian newspaper Al Watan, Bahanga said, The disappearance of Al-Qaddafi is good news for all the Tuareg in the region…His departure from Libya opens the way for a better future and helps to advance our political demands. Now he’s gone, we can move forward in our struggle.3 Bahanga was killed in a mysterious car accident, but the uprising to gain control of Northern Mali that took root among many Tuareg is, nevertheless, attributed to him. On the heels of the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in September, 2011, Tuareg fighters began to cross into Mali after emptying several Libyan arms depots to form the Movement National Pour La Liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA). In a short period, the MNLA took control over Northern Mali and named it Azawad. The MNLA faced the immediate challenge of the threat of militant Islamist dominance with some Tuareg joining both Ansar Al Dine, and the violent regional Salafist group linked to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)4. Mali 2012-13 and Global Power Play in the Sahel Climaxing with the 2013 French military intervention at the request of the Malian government and the support of the African Union, the war that began in Mali in 2012 consisted of a similar array of domestic, regional, and global actors that reflect Mali’s deep history. There was the South represented by eighty percent of Mali’s population who are primarily Bamana speaking. Culturally, the South exhibited the ideals of the Malian post-colonial, national state first nurtured by the 92

Rita Kiki Edozie

modernizing socialist, anti-French Pan- Africanist aspirations of the country’s leader, Modibo Keita. In the North, in addition to the Tuareg, there had developed a number of rebel and ethnic groups opposed to the Malian state. From the Maghreb North, there was Ansar Al Dine which sought to impose Islamic law across the country, and which drew from Tuareg militants who returned from Libya after fighting alongside Muammar Gaddafi's troops. The northern Mali based Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) belonged to a network of al-Qaeda's North African wing, with roots in Algeria. The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) was an AQIM splinter group whose aim is to spread jihad to the whole of West Africa. MOJWA advocates Islamic law and, in the past, waged a campaign of violence against Tuareg separatists. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (NMLA) was the secular Tuareg group which sought independence for a homeland they call Azawad. International and regional actors involved in the conflict were ECOWAS, convening an array of former Malian Empire cultures, communities, and identities from Senegal, Mauritania, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Northern Nigeria, and Niger, officially supporting the Malian ‘government’ and state. The AMU (Arab Maghreb Union), convening Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya includes nomadic Tuareg and other Amazigh (Berber) identities and cultures that are also in opposition to their states. While not necessarily supporting the Malian ‘state,’ they supported security in the region. The USA (a new actor) and France (an old and deeply familiar actor) were both key actors in the conflict. Since 2011, the US has earmarked the African Western Sahel as a ‘war on terror region’ and has funneled millions of dollars into covert military operations to achieve its ends in this respect. France, Mali’s former colonial power, while possessing resource interests in the Sahelian region, also still maintained symbolic interests and objectives of French Empire in Africa aligned intricately with the Malian South. Meanwhile, southern Mali has itself developed a hybrid France-Afrique transnational identity. 93

African Solutions to (Malian)…

Like Mali, much of Africa possesses contextual national terrain similar to Mali’s whereby ethnic and religious pluralism and deep divisions, a democracy and development conundrum, and global terrorist networks attracting foreign regional and international wars inform the core elements of their state-societies. What’s more, given the cross-border regional proliferation of the conflict (Algeria, Libya to the North; the West African Sahelian states-Niger, Chad, Mauritania- and the West African Southern region: Senegal, Guinea); a Pan-African response to Mali by Africa’s African Union was required. Given the global context of the Malian crisis, the AU behaved like a supra-state actor for Mali that, on behalf of ‘Africa,’ mediated among the actors in the crisis while it also collaborated with them and took initiatives of its own. Pan-Africanism as an African Solution for Malian Problems The AU Malian Resolution adopted in January, 2013, was drawn from previous templates used by the organization to address African conflicts such as Mali. Through its ‘Mali Resolution’, for example, the AU articulated the Pan-African standpoint and considered the ideological reaffirmation of Africa’s deep solidarity with Mali to commit to African solutions to the Malian crisis. In doing so, the members expressed their determination to pool their efforts together to help their ‘sisterly’ country to overcome its challenges. For AU members, restoration of sovereignty, seen as the commitment to national unity and territorial integrity, was an important rallying point. The Union resolved to restore security and bring peace to Mali by putting down armed militias, criminal, and terrorist groups and they would engage in efforts to restore democracy and economic development in the country. The AU’s response in Mali provides deeper understanding of the AU’s global governance of African dirigisme vis-à-vis the continent’s larger security and development challenges. The AU would both compete and collaborate with ECOWAS in mediating the Malian Crisis and, significantly, had developed pre2012 programs with the Malian government and President Touré that 94

Rita Kiki Edozie

were designed to solve the Tuareg conflict. Post 2012, the AU and ECOWAS suspended Mali from the Union as an incentive to oust the coup leaders and restore a civilian government. With ECOWAS, the AU assisted Mali in restoring the interim ‘civilian’ government to lead the peace plan and prepare for a post-conflict transition. As suprastate, the AU acted as Mali’s chief arbiter at the United Nations. In December of 2012, with ECOWAS and Mali’s partially-restored interim government of national unity, the AU facilitated the successful, collaborative, and joint international diplomaticallyachieved establishment of Resolution 2085 authorizing a 3,500 man African-led International Support Mission (AFISMA) in Mali. To achieve this feat, previously, at the regional level, the AU and ECOWAS had both separately and jointly on occasion deployed their institutional prowess to pressure the military junta to hand back power to the elected democratic regime. The pressure forced the military to retreat and allowed for a new government of national unity to be formed in August, 2012, with interim president Dioncounda Traoré and Cheick Modibo Diarra, who with Traoré led the interim government, as prime minister until he was forced to resign. Interim President Traoré named Django Cissoko, a former senior official in the president's office, to replace Diarra. Cissoko’s first diplomatic moves further illustrate AU legitimacy as he visited President Boni Yayi, 2012-13 chairman of the African Union (AU) stating: I came to Cotonou, not only to deliver a message of goodwill from the Malian people through their leaders to the sub-region, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU, but also to get the opinion of President Yayi on what has been achieved so far, and what remains to be done to resolve the Malian crisis.5

UNSC Resolution 2085 was built on ‘African Solutions for African Problems (ASAP)’ and was inspired by the AU’s own plan for Mali. This included the AU’s ‘Strategic Concept for the Resolution of the Crises in Mali,’ and the harmonized ‘Concept of Operations’ developed under the auspices- and with the support- of the AU, 95

African Solutions to (Malian)…

which covered various aspects of the multi-dimensional crisis facing Mali. As such, in adopting UNSC 2085, the United Nations took note of the final communiqué of the Extraordinary Session of the authority of ECOWAS Heads of State and Government held in Abuja on 11 November, 2012, and of the subsequent communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council on 13 November, 2012, endorsing the Joint Strategic Concept of Operations for the International Military Force and the Malian Defense and Security forces. The AU’s ‘ASAP’ ideology would be underscored in the UNSC resolution when it significantly tackled Mali’s ‘conflict’ by drawing on African values, knowledge, policies, and precedents. It would authorize African efforts in Mali (AU and ECOWAS) in continuing negotiations between diverse Malian groups, in ensuring an inclusive re-democratic transition in Mali, and in the deployment of the African-led international support mission in Mali, AFISMA, to assist the Malian interim government in recovering occupied regions in the north and dismantling the terrorist and criminal networks there. In deploying the African-led international support mission in Mali (AFISMA), the AU would be exercising a light version of Pax Africana. Collective security and policing the continent in a self-determined manner occurred as the AU mobilized its membership to contribute troops to peacekeeping efforts in Mali. Militarily, while AFISMA would not be an exclusive AU force like AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia), it did end up looking more like the evolved hybrid force of UNAMID (Joint United Nations-African Mission in Darfur) with Africans in charge. African agency was exerted as UNSC 2085 mandated that the African Union would be in charge of a multiplicity of military functions through AFISMA, including the European mission to Mali, the African-led mission to Mali, the participation of ECOWAS, and the participation of other regional states and other regional and international organizations. Illuminating again the Union’s supra-state role in addressing the Malian Crisis on behalf of Africa, African Union Ambassador to the Office of the United Nations, Mr. Téte António, responded to the adoption of Resolution 2085. He acclaimed its emergence as a further 96

Rita Kiki Edozie

step in the evolution of the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union. António celebrated the resolution’s enactment as marking a defining moment in the coordinated international efforts to assist Mali to re-establish her unity and territorial integrity, to dismantle terrorism and criminality in the north, and to restore full constitutional order through free, fair, and transparent elections. Incorporating the Malian conflict into the fulcrum of its deliberations at its 20th Annual Summit in January 2013, the AU’s governance style of addressing Africa’s myriad security, development, cultural and social challenges was reinforced and reaffirmed. Pan-Africanist values: ASAP and Pax Africana would be used as cultural signifiers to remind and rally member states around Africa’s key objectives. The Summit’s themes “Pan Africanism and African Renaissance” suggested a renewal and resurgence of ‘African solutions to African problems’ by working hand in hand with a select group of partners who would assist in restoring Mali. Neocolonialism vs. Asymmetrical Interdependency The AU’s response in Mali has come with many challenges that underscore key questions about the international Pan African actor’s relevance, capacity, and national and international legitimacy. With AU-backed French intervention, for example, resolution of the Malian conflict seemed far away from the ideals of African solutions (ASAP) or Pax Africana. Alternatively, the response reflected capacity limitations as well as legitimacy tensions with both contending subregional actors such as ECOWAS as well as international actors like France and the United Nations. As far as capacity is concerned, again at its January, 2013, summit, presided over by the new Pan Africanist leadership of the first female AU Commission chair, Dr. Dlamini-Zuma, the then AU-President Boni Yayi self-criticized the AU’s institutional response in Mali. He complained that deployment of peace-keepers took too long to arrive despite the stark reality that, as a result of the crisis, Africa had been faced with the danger that threatened its very foundations. Showing regret and disappointment at the AU’s inaction, Yayi stated 97

African Solutions to (Malian)…

remorsefully that though the AU had the means to defend itself, it continued to wait. African troops galvanized by the AU’s solicitation and mobilization arrived only after the French had intervened. In terms of regional limitations as well, initial tensions existed between the AU and ECOWAS over which organization had jurisdiction over resolution of the conflict in Mali. This caused a delay in the AU’s more assertive military intervention. The initial squabbling over which regional organization (ECOWAS vs. AU) had jurisdiction over the conflict resolution of Mali-defined as ‘subsidiarity’ (Regional Economic Actor acts first if it has capacity)was eventually set aside with the AU delegating authoritative leadership to-and in collaboration with-ECOWAS. Capacity and jurisdictional tensions also emerged as a result of the AU’s global partnering. In not funding Resolution 2085 and AFISMA, the international community-convened in the UN- disabled AU capacity in Mali as it would not be able to raise the resources to fund a military operation despite UN authorization. It is no surprise that the AU was forced to rely on its wealthy international donors. With France’s GDP of $2.77 trillion dollars (2011 estimates) and a $35,000 per capita income, compared to Africa’s combined $1.8 trillion GDP (2009 estimates) and $1,800 per capita income, the AU’s desire to organize fifty-five countries to collectively contribute a military force and intervention in Mali outmatched the Union’s ability to pull off such a project. The capital-intensive West, which is also the globe’s primary arms and weaponry manufacturer, maintains the monopoly over military resources, and thereby possesses control over global security. Africa’s reliance on Western military resources to maintain the peace in the continent presents the paradox of neocolonialism. With French intervention in Mali in 2013, much of the leftist press characterized the French action as neo-colonial. But the AU’s diplomatic persistence in presenting a moral and legal challenge to the international community may have fostered a model of Pax Africana that can alternatively be described as asymmetrical interdependence. Given the Union’s ambition and resource gap, Pax 98

Rita Kiki Edozie

Africana would continue to compete with Pax Americana’s, and Pax Europa’s global hegemonic agendas exercised through and embodied in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). However, rather than neo-colonialism, inter-dependent Pax Africana indicates the AU’s dirigisme in asserting African agency over the collective security policing of Africa with other actors, sub-regional and international, to ensure that African goals, interests, and outcomes would be achieved. Two factors explain why it is reasonable to be cautiously optimistic rather than pessimistic about the AU’s prospects as a relevant supra-state actor for Africa and the world evidenced by the case of Mali. First is the evidence that the AU’s power exists in its institutionalization of sustained agency and voice. A second factor explains the AU’s global governance style in terms of asymmetrical interdependence rather than merely a side-kick to an increasing neocolonialism of the continent. With the Mali 2012-13 crisis, the AU demonstrated its sustained voice and agency at its January, 2013, Summit when, despite France’s Operation Serval, the AU committed to the organization of a Mali Donor’s conference to galvanize African states to pledge 7,700 troops in the realization of AFISMA to support French and Malian forces. Moreover, regardless of Mali’s crisis, in commemorating fifty years of African co-operation, the AU continued to map out a vision for political and economic union by 2063. Launching Vision 2063 would allow Africans to reflect on half a century of independence and chart a course for the future. The 2013 January Summit demonstrated how sustained institutionalized agency and voice has led to the AU’s simultaneous and overlapping ability to address the Malian conflict while pursuing Africa’s own strategic goals of economic and political union. The Union’s style of addressing Africa’s myriad security, development, cultural and social challenges remains resilient as discussed at its 20th Summit, ‘Pan Africanism and African Renaissance’ and indicated by its conference themes. ‘Pan-Africanism’ is constantly used as a cultural signifier to remind and rally the Summit’s participants around Africa’s key objectives. ‘African Renaissance’ suggested a 99

African Solutions to (Malian)…

renewal and resurgence of ‘African solutions for African problems’ by working hand in hand with a select group of partners who would assist in the process. Regarding neocolonialism and the French factor in Africa and Mali in 2013, it is fair to consider whether the reality of French intervention in Mali rendered the African Union a subordinate partner in the security of the continent and whether or not that experience opens up the continent to becoming a vulnerable site for a continuing- and increased- practice of neo-colonialism. Africa’s own founding Pan-Africanist, Kwame Nkrumah, first coined the term neocolonialism and used it to describe ways that socio-economic and political control can be exercised economically, linguistically, and culturally among formerly-colonized peoples (Nkrumah, 1965). 6 Nkrumah defined it as follows: The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside.7

Neo-colonialism is the practice of granting a sort of independence with the concealed intention of making the liberated country a clientstate and controlling it effectively by means other than political ones.8 Internationally, the term describes the domination-praxis (social, economic, cultural) of countries from the developed world in the respective internal affairs of the countries of the developing world. Despite the de-colonization that occurred in the aftermath of the Second World War (1939-45), the former colonial powers continue to apply existing and past international economic arrangements with their former colony countries and, so, maintain colonial control.9 While it is true that France and other Western powers remain neocolonial in their foreign policy pursuits toward Africa as they continue to be deeply engaged in Africa’s affairs to preserve a high international profile that assures access to strategic resources that further continue highly favorable economic relationships that benefit them more than they do Africa, the question is whether or not the 100

Rita Kiki Edozie

African Union facilitates this process or combats it. In Mali, given France’s own resource and mining interests including oil prospects and the US’s imperial interests in the War on Terror in the Maghrebian and West African Sahelian regions, neo-colonialism explains Western powers’ high profile surveillance of Mali. Indeed, one might argue as well that Mali’s 2012 collapse occurred as a casualty of Western imperial interests in the country. That being said, in 2013, the African Union remains caught in a paradox between neocolonialist interests and its own interest to achieve Pax Africana hegemony and control over Mali in relation to international powers such as France. Unlike the 2011 intervention by NATO in Libya undergird by a UNSC resolution that the AU vehemently rejected as illicit, in Mali, it was the AU that lobbied for and formulated the legal language for the UNSC resolution authorizing international use of force in Mali, ‘Resolution 2085.’ African Union (AU) president at the time (2012-13), Thomas Boni Yayi, praised the ‘remarkable work’ of the French military in Mali, saying its troops were ‘practically saving’ Africa. However, for the AU, with the secession of the north and the threat by militants to take the south of Mali, the military option was the policy of last resource. Moreover, at the time, a military solution could only occur by way of Africa’s dependence on the resource-laden West – in this case, Mali’s former colonizer, France. With ECOWAS headed by a Francophone close French client, President of Côte d’Ivoire, Alassane Ouattara, and the AU led by Francophone Boni Yayi of Benin, regrettably, these ‘regional’ leaders of Africa would lobby France to support their institutions’ efforts to join what they considered a ‘motherly’ nation’s assistance to their ‘sisterly’ nation. Notwithstanding, asymmetrical inter-dependence with France and the UN allowed the AU to provide Mali with concerted and sustained support of Africa’s collective institutional resources and solidarity to assist it in addressing the country’s problems. Moreover, while the AU collaborated with France on the security end, the institution continued its proactive support for an African country in the broader goal of African development, peace, and political101

African Solutions to (Malian)…

economic union. Noteworthy, for example, is the fact that despite its occurrence a day before the 2012 Malian coup, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC)’s Support and Follow-up Group had held a meeting in Bamako on 20th March, 2012. The meeting was organized to facilitate coordinated international action with respect to the situation in northern Mali. This and the February 8, 2013, Support and Follow-up Group (SFG) meeting on Mali in Brussels a year later provide a semblance of the AU’s sustained and intertwined, albeit, asymmetrical, global power model in relation to hegemonic actors in the West. That is to say that while the SFG is an organ of the African Union, with the AU’s permission, the Malian crisis solutions’ group’s third meeting was hosted in Brussels by the European Union (EU) and cochaired by the AU’s Peace and Security Commission as well as the UN’s Political Affairs Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In designating former Burundi president, Pierre Buyoya, the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel and Special Representative and Head of the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA), who also attended the meeting, the AU’s global governance dirigisme on behalf of Africa for Mali affords Africans an opportunity to collaborate with the Malian government on solutions to the country’s conflict while also facilitating the support of the international community for Mali. Especially, this style of institutional forum that the AU has established enables African and Malian stakeholders to take ownership of the efforts to find lasting solutions to the multidimensional crisis facing their country and the African Continent. Nevertheless, asymmetrical interdependence is not an ideal status for the African Union. Global power play between the AU and the United Nations continues to characterize both institutions’ collaborative and competitive engagement with Mali. In April, 2013, the United Nations Security Council established Resolution 2100 launching the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). While MINUSMA would claim to support the political process in Mali in close coordination with the African Union 102

Rita Kiki Edozie

and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), its initial establishment stated that it would take over from AFISMA to help the Malian authorities to implement the transitional roadmap towards the full restoration of constitutional order, democratic governance and national unity which included the holding of elections, confidence building and facilitation of reconciliation at the national and local levels. As a result of MINUSMA’s establishment, AFISMA’s mission struggles to avoid being subjugated by the presence of the UN. In its own revised agenda, the AU claimed that AFISMA is not to limit its activities to Mali as per its requests to the UN through MINUSMA, but that it could spread it to the neighboring states (with their consent) as per its ‘Africa’ mandate. Titled ‘The Operation Mali: United Nations Complicit in Re-colonization of Africa,’ one journalist put it this way on his blog: The Africans are made to refuse the idea of tackling the conflict themselves. The African Mission-AFISMA has failed. One of the reasons – it never got the funds it needed. The United Nations and the donor-states have refused to finance an African mission. But they agree to reverse their stand in case the UN would be a decision maker. At that, the very same AFISMA forces would do the job, but under the command of the international community. 10

Re-colonization seems rather extreme to describe the ‘international community’s’ (through the UN) assertiveness in desiring domination and control of Africa’s problems through the establishment of its own mission in Mali only after France and AFISMA have brought the peace to the country. Conclusion The AU’s ‘asymmetrical interdependency’ in relation to a hegemonic world and its capacity to spread greater Pan-Africanism is not a status of international relations and African foreign policy without consequences and dire limitations. In spite of this, however, because of the AU’s dirigisme in this regard to provide a Pan -Africanist 103

African Solutions to (Malian)…

response to African affairs, we contend that the AU is a preferred global actor in the Continent’s Sahelian region and in Mali.

Endnotes 1 Kalifa Keita, Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1998. 2 Susana Wing, Constructing Democracy in Transitioning Societies of Africa: Constitutionalism and Deliberation in Mali, Palgrave Macmillan, 200. 3 Scott Stewart, ‘Mali Besieged by Fighters Fleeing Libya,’ February 2, 2012, Stratfor Global Intelligence. 4 Scott Stewart, ‘Mali Besieged by Fighters Fleeing Libya’ February 2, 2012, Stratfor Global Intelligence. 5 Global Times, ’Malian PM in Benin to Seek Solution to Malian Crisis,’ December, 28, 2012. Available at: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/752850.shtml. Accessed on 29 May 2013. 6 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, first published: in 1965 by Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd., London. Published in the USA by International Publishers Co., Inc., 1966. 7 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism. London: Heinemann, 1965, ix. 8 Colin Legum, Pan-Africanisms: A Short Political Guide, London, Pall Mall Press, 1962, 118. 9 Jean-Paul Sartre, Colonialism and neo-colonialism, Routledge, 2006. 10 Alexander Mezyaev, (2013), ‘Operation Mali: United Nations Complicit in Re-colonization of Africa,’ 2013. Available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/operation-mali-united-nationscomplicit-in-recolonization-of-africa/5330465. Accessed on 29 May 2013)

References Global Times (2012), ’Malian PM in Benin to Seek Solution to Malian Crisis,’ December, 28. Available at: http://www.globaltimes.cn/co ntent/752850.shtml. Accessed on 29 May 2013. Harmon, S. A. (2008): ‘Radical Islam in the Sahel: Implications for U.S. Policy and Regional Stability,’ in Jalloh, A. and Falola, T. (eds.), The United States and West Africa : Interactions and Relations (Rochester, NY : University of Rochester Press).

104

Rita Kiki Edozie

Keita, K. (1998), Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel: The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle: US Army War College). Freedom House (2013), “Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data” Accessed here . Accessed on September 7, 2013 Kone, K. (2013), ‘the End of Tuareg Apartheid in the Sahel: Fieldsights Hot Spots,’ Cultural Anthropology [Online]. (URL http://culanth.org/fieldsights/328-the-end-of-tuareg-apartheid-inthe-sahel) Legum, C. (1962): Pan-Africanims: A Short Political Guide (London: Pall Mall Press). Mazrui, A. A. (1967): Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Mezyaev, A. (2013), ‘Operation Mali: United Nations Complicit in Recolonization of Africa.’ Available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/ operation-mali-united-nations-complicit-in-recolonization-ofafrica/5330465. Accessed on September 7, 2013 Nkrumah, Kwame (1966): Neo-Colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism; London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, Ltd Nkrumah, K. (1965): Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Heinemann) Przeworski, A. A., Michael, E., Cheibub, J. A. and Limongi, F. (2000): Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Sartre, J.P. (2006): Colonialism and Neo-colonialism (London: Routledge). Stewart, S. (2012), Mali Besieged by Fighters Fleeing Libya [Online] Stratfor Global Intelligence, February 2. Available at http://www.str atfor.com/weekly/mali-besieged-fighters-fleeing-libya). Accessed on September 7, 2013 Whitehouse, B. (2013), ‘Understanding Mali’s “Tuareg problem” [online] Bridges from Bamako February 25, 2013. Available at http://bridgesfrombamako.com/2013/02/25/understanding-malistuareg-problem/ Accessed on September 7, 2013. 105

African Solutions to (Malian)…

Wing, S. (2008): Constructing Democracy in Transitioning Societies of Africa: Constitutionalism and Deliberation in Mali (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

106

CHAPTER FIVE Climate Change, Food Insecurity and Political Crises in the Sahel: Examining the Nexus Ogujiuba Kanayo & Ufiem Maurice Ogbonnaya Abstract The Sahel region has over the years been contending with devastating food insecurity. But the causes of the insecurity and its possible linkage with the prevailing political crisis within the region remain sources of thorny debates among scholars and policy analysts. While some contend that food insecurity in the region is occasioned by climate change and unfavorable climatic conditions such as drought, others blame the situation on political maladministration. Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments, there is a nearly unanimous agreement by scholars that food insecurity is directly linked to the prevalence of revolutionary pressures and political crises in the Sahel as witnessed in the Arab Spring and the 2013 Mali crisis. Against this background, this chapter examined the arguments from the different sides of the divide in an attempt to establish the relationship among climate change, food insecurity and political crisis in the Sahel. The chapter concluded that issues raised will remain a policy debate that may linger for some years to come. Introduction The Sahel traverses 3,860 km from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea across the semiarid region of Africa between the Sahara desert to the north and the savannahs to the south. The Sahel belt varies from several hundred to a thousand kilometers in width, covering an area of just over three million square-kilometers. Over the years however, the usage of the word ‘Sahel’ has been widened to include political

107

Climate Change, Food Insecurity and…

and economic variables. In West Africa for example, the Sahel is used as geo-political entity. In 1973 the Comité Inter Etat de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel (CILSS) (Permanent Interstates Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel) was formed by Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Senegal, to group countries that were then becoming interdependent1. In West Africa, CILSS members cover 5.7 million sq.km of land though Sahel-like terrain and climate is also found in non-CILSS members, particularly the north of Togo, Benin, northern Nigeria and Ghana. In its present contextualization, the Sahel geographically extends from west to east in Africa, covering Senegal, through Mauritania, Central Mali, Burkina Faso, Southern Algeria and Niger, Northern Nigeria and Central Chad, Sudan and Eritrea, to Ethiopia (see Fig.1).

108

Ogujiuba & Ufiem Maurice

Fig. 1:

The Sahel Region: A Belt up to 1, 000 km (620 miles) wide that spans Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea

Source: yourfairfieldcthome.com

Demographically, Ethiopia has the largest population of about 80.71 million inhabitants. The next highest population is the country of Sudan with only 41.35 million people. After these two countries, the populations of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are about 15.37, 15.23 and 14.70 million respectively. Senegal and Chad are all above ten and a half million each with Eritrea and Mauritania at the bottom

109

Climate Change, Food Insecurity and…

with only 4.93 and 3.22 million each. Populations in this area are growing rapidly with some of the highest rates of natural increase in the world. According to the Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture (SFSA) (2013), there will be 100 million people in the region by 2020 and 200 million by 2050 – almost four times the current population. CILSS (2011) estimates that more than half the working-age population in the Sahel is engaged in or dependent on agriculture which is responsible for more than 40 percent of the region’s collective gross domestic product (GDP) (see Table 1). Dry land crops such as millet, sorghum and cowpea, and cash crops such as groundnut and cotton are the predominant agricultural produce. Table 1: The Population and Economic Indicators of the Sahel Region Country

Total Rural Agricultural Population Density Agricultura Population Population Population* l Value (People (Agro. Pop. Added (in millions) (% of total) per Km2) Per arable (% of GDP) land km2)** Ethiopia 80.71 83 78 81 442 46.3 Sudan

41.35

57

53

17

114

28.3

Burkina Faso Niger

15.23

80

92

56

261

33.32

14.70

83

84

12

81

40.03

Mali4

15.37

66.7

70

12.4

NA

40

Senegal

12.21

58

71

63

284

13.4

Chad

10.91

73

68

9

170

12.5

Eritrea

4.93

79

74

49

559

24.3

Mauritani a

3.22

59

51

3

355

12.5

* Agricultural population is defined as all persons depending for their livelihood on agriculture, hunting, fishing and forestry. It comprises all persons economically active in agriculture as well as their non-working dependents, not exclusively rural population. **Arable land includes land defined by the FAO as land under temporary crops, temporary meadows for mowing or for pasture, land under market or kitchen gardens, and land temporarily fallow. Source: Heinrigs (2010)

110

Ogujiuba & Ufiem Maurice

The countries in the Sahel share similar climatic conditions, the Sahelian climate, which is typically an arid and unstable environment. This is a most problematic environmental zone because it is hard to operate agriculture with very little precipitation. The Sahel area is a predominately sparse savannah vegetation of grasses and shrubs. It only receives between four and eight inches of rainfall a year, which is slowly decreasing. The rainfall it receives falls mostly between the months of June and September. The people of the region have a lot in common in terms of culture and livelihood. Their livelihood strategies include agriculture, livestock herding, fishing, short and long-distance trading, and a variety of urban occupations. Farming in this region is almost entirely reliant on three to four months of summer rainfall, except along the banks of the major rivers, lakes, and other seasonal water courses, where some irrigation activities are undertaken. Livestock herding is a very important aspect of life and constitutes the major source of income in some areas (Kandji, Verchot & Mackensen, 2006). In the late 1960s the Sahel was mired in a prolonged and devastating drought that further reduced the region's normally meagre water supplies, shattered its agricultural economy, contributed to the starvation of the people, and forced the mass migration southward of many people. Although subsequent rainfall and international relief efforts helped, drought and famine affected the Sahel again in the mid-1980s and early 1990s. In August, 2008, the United Nations’ humanitarian coordination in Chad announced that about 30,000 persons had been affected by floods in the south of the country. Again in 2011, drought in the region began with failed rains in late 2010 and mid-2011 and has inflicted heavy damage to the region’s ecosystems and agro-ecosystems, threatening the lives of about 18 million people. For instance, in Ethiopia, 75,000 persons were reported to have been severely hit by the drought. By August 2011, the peak of the drought, the Red Cross reported that more than thirteen million people were in need of food assistance. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) reported that more than 320,000 111

Climate Change, Food Insecurity and…

children were suffering from severe malnutrition in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somalia. The situation in Somalia was particularly grave as four million people, more than half of the country’s population, were in crisis. Of these, 750,000 resided in Bay, officially declared a famine zone. Since mid-2011, thousands are known to have died, especially infants and children, due to severe and acute food shortages (Potts, Zulu, Whehner, Castillor & Henderon, 2013). The causes of food crisis and insecurity in the Sahel have been the focus of thorny scholarly and policy debates. While some link the crisis to environmental and climatic factors such as drought (UNDP, 2012), others have argued that the crisis is caused by governance issues such weak state institutions and ineffective state policies and programmes (Ogujiuba, Ogbonnaya & Omoju, 2012). Another source of debate in the literature is whether the prevailing political crisis in the Sahel is occasioned by the recurrent food insecurity or vice versa (Onuoha & Thurtson, 2013). This chapter is part of the debate. It reviews the arguments from the different sides of the debate in an attempt to establish the interplay among climate change, food insecurity and political crisis in the Sahel. 2. Food Insecurity in the Sahel: Statistical Facts Haddad and Essa (2012) have presented country by country graphic analysis of the drought in the Sahel countries with Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger most affected (see Figure 2). According to them, Chad’s situation is made worse with instability ushered in by political crisis in neighbouring Libya, delayed government response to the crisis and logistical issues. Production of cereal was reduced by 50 percent in comparison with 2010's output. A total of 3 to 4 million people were affected. As one of the countries affected by low rainfall and crop failure, Niger is also among the most affected countries. Even before the current crisis, Niger had endured an alarming rate of malnutrition, with the MSF (Medecins Sans Frontières) reporting severe acute malnutrition among 330,000 children in 2010 and 307,000 in 2012. The numbers are rising and

112

Ogujiuba & Ufiem Maurice

currently, in mid-2013, between 2 to 3 million people are affected by the crisis. Burkina Faso has a history of poor harvests, with severe repercussions for malnutrition in children across the country. The current drought has only exacerbated the conditions on the ground. The World Food Programme reports that crops across 40 percent of the country have failed, while grain production has decreased by 16 percent causing about 3 million people to be threatened by the crisis. In Mali, prices of millet and sorghum grain rose significantly after harvests in 2012 were 25 percent lower than in 2011. Political instability, following the coup d’état of 22 March, 2012, and the breakup of Northern Mali into the self-proclaimed State of Azawad have further aggravated the humanitarian crisis in the country. The UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that more than a million children face acute malnutrition, with as many as 146,000 people displaced into Niger, Burkina Faso and Mauritania under deteriorating circumstances. On the whole, over 3 to 4 million people are under threat of hunger and humanitarian crisis in the country. In Mauritania, harvests have taken a hit while pastoralist farmers have battled to find grazing land under harsh weather conditions across the country. Mauritania already suffers from widespread poverty, low levels of development and poor access to healthcare, all of which is set to enflame the repercussions of the drought. The south-eastern parts of Mauritania are said to be the most affected with a total of about 700,000 under threat. In Senegal, farmers in rural communities have been severely affected by erratic rainfall and poor weather conditions, endangering the lives of over a million people in the country. The implication of this is that food/nutritional crisis is wide spread in the region. In 2012, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reported that with more than one in four of its 85 million people undernourished, Sub-Saharan Africa remains the world’s most food-insecure region. There are more than 15 million people at risk of malnutrition in its Sahel region alone-stretching from 113

Climate Change, Food Insecurity and…

the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea-and an equal number in the Horn of Africa remain vulnerable after last year’s (2011) food crisis in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia (UNDP, 2012:32). Figure 2: Food Security Conditions in the Sahel April-June, 2012

Source: Adapted from Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) (2012)

3. Food Insecurity in the Sahel: A Review of Contending Explanatory Variables Scholars have considered the problem of food insecurity in the Sahel in particular and Africa in general from divergent and varied perspectives. While some have examined the issue in relation to climatic conditions, environmental issues and agricultural productivity, others have thought along the line of institutional inadequacies such as lack of adequate funding for research, low human capacity and poor state patronage as causative factors. 114

Ogujiuba & Ufiem Maurice

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2012), International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (2012), Rena (2005), Benson (2004), and Bouis and Hunt (1999) have argued that food insecurity especially in the Sahel is caused by dwindling agricultural and food productivity which in itself is occasioned by unfavourable climatic conditions and related environmental issues. In fact, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (2012) asserted that rain shortfalls in the Sahel in 2011 have clearly shown the devastating impact of climate-related shocks on food security while Sasson (2012:2) pointedly stated that The key cause of food insecurity is inadequate food production. Since the global food crisis of 2007–2008, there has been an increasing awareness throughout the world that we must produce more and better food; and we should not be derailed from this goal, despite some relief brought by the good cereal harvests in 2011–2012. This is particularly true in sub-Saharan Africa …. Explaining the consequence of unfavorable climatic conditions on food security in the Sahel, the United Nations in 2007 projected that ‘zones struck by drought … might increase from 60 million to 90 million hectares from now to 2060…’ and that ‘the number of people suffering from malnutrition might increase up to 600 million from now to 2080’ (Sasson, 2012). This projection was predicated upon the fact that severe drought was as of then inflicting heavy damage to the Sahel’s ecosystems and agro-ecosystems, threatening the lives of tens of millions of people. The drought continued up to mid-2011 and by August, 2011, at the peak of the drought, more than thirteen million people were in need of food assistance in the region (Williams & Funk, 2011). Headey (2012) and Rena (2005) have also attributed food crisis in the Sahel to climate change and volatile food prices. According to Headey (2012), adverse weather situations caused by climate change have created food insecurity, urban and rural poverty and chronic malnutrition. Williams and Funk (2011), drawing evidence from around the world, submitted that food insecurity is occasioned by climatic 115

Climate Change, Food Insecurity and…

change. According to them, climate change and global warming are considered major threats to agriculture and food production and have had immense negative impact on global food security. For instance, in 2011, there were earthquakes in Japan, New Zealand, and Turkey, major floods in Pakistan, Southeast Asia, and Australia, and significant drought in the Horn of Africa and parts of the Sahel which have negatively impacted on food productivity. Finally, in 2012, Oxfam International reported that the 2011-2012 food crises in the Sahel which affected over 18 million people in the region were caused by drought, a failure of several crops, and sharp rises in food prices (Oxfam International, 2012). From the foregoing arguments it can be deduced that food insecurity in the Sahel is caused by climate change, rain shortfalls, drought, inadequate food production and food price volatility. Valid as the arguments may seem, they have raised certain fundamental questions. First, how are these variables interrelated? The authors just listed the variables without establishing any logical connections among them. An explanation of the connections among climate change, rain shortfalls, drought, inadequate food productivity and food price volatility would have enhanced the beauty and robustness of the arguments. But this is lacking. Secondly, apart from climatic conditions, what other factors can cause food crisis? The authors did not provide this because their analytical framework was narrowed only to a single perspective: environmental and climate-related factors. In other words, no attempts were made to consider the possibility of food insecurity in the Sahel being caused by factors other than the ones listed. No mention is made of demographic variables like population growth in the region. Yet it is reported that population growth in the Sahel is among the highest in the world. On average, the population of the Sahel doubles every 25 years (EU, 2013). That there is a direct relationship between population growth and food crisis has long been established in the literature (see Hopfengerg and Pimentel, 2001). Another group of scholars has argued that the causes of food insecurity in the Sahel are not limited to environmental and climate116

Ogujiuba & Ufiem Maurice

related factors (Houreld, 2012; Collard, 2012; IFAD, 2011; Aziz, 2001). To this group, the causes of the crisis are varied and range from institutional factors to governance issues such as political corruption, low government patronage and public investments in agriculture, inadequate funding for research and development and poor/low human capacity, inconsistent state policies and programmes as well as leadership perception and interpretation of external stimuli. Aziz’s (2001) paper, ‘The Impact of Corruption on Food Security,’ concerns standards of behavior in the government sector as well as in international business transactions that have impacted negatively on the implementation of sustainable food programmes and projects in the region. He further asserted that the destructive nature of corruption manifests itself in that: 1. Decisions by public functionaries are not made for public benefit, and 2. High cost, complex and prestigious projects undertaken by the state are invariably favored over cost-efficient, community-based initiatives using appropriate technology. In their works, Houreld (2012) and Collard (2012) have cited instances of corrupt activities by government officials within the Sahel that have exacerbated food crisis and insecurity. According to Houreld (2012), in Somalia, the U.N. budgeted $1.5 billion in 2012, partly to prevent a return of famine. But a large amount of food sent by the U.N. to the Somali capital during the 2011 famine never reached the starving people it was intended for. Some of the World Food Programme supplies, according to him, went to the black market and some to feed livestock. He further stated that one warehouse full of rations was looted in its entirety by a Somali government official and, across the city, feeding sites handed out far less food than records indicate they should have. Similarly, Collard (2012) reported that in Egypt, Yussef Wali (former Agriculture Minister) was sentenced to 10 years in prison in 2011 for a deal that saw thousands of hectares of public lands for agricultural purposes, 117

Climate Change, Food Insecurity and…

worth 208 million Egyptian Pounds misappropriated. Also, the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reported that, in 2012, the international community spent $90 million feeding hungry people in the Sahel. In 2013, humanitarian agencies are calling on donors to provide $1.6 billion in aid, even though the 2012 harvest was better than that in 2011 (IRIN, 2012). This is because the funds have either been misappropriated or diverted into private use by officials of the governments of the receiving countries. Establishing a relationship between government patronage and food crisis in Africa, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2011) stated that declining public investment in agriculture, especially in the developing world, is at the root of the crisis. For instance, in 1979, official development assistance (ODA) to agriculture was 18 per cent of total ODA. By 2009, it was just 6 per cent. In developing countries, government investment in agriculture also fell in this period, by one third in Africa and by as much as two thirds in Asia and Latin America. In Africa, for instance, agriculture remains the mainstay of national economies. It employs about 90 percent of the rural workforce, 60 percent of the total (urban plus rural) labour force, and accounts for as much as 40 percent of export earnings and provides over 50 percent of household needs and income. As of 2003, however, the sector received the least attention from national governments (UNECA, 2007; NEPAD, 2009). This failure to invest in agriculture has continued to aggravate the lingering food crisis. Food insecurity in the region has also been linked to institutional inadequacies such as poor funding for agricultural research and development and low human capacity. According to Pardey et al. (2006) and Office of Development Effectiveness (ODE) (2008), with the large number of universities of agriculture and related research institutes in Africa, solutions to food crisis and insecurity should be readily and steadily proffered. But this is not the case because the universities and research institutions are not adequately funded. Thus, their research efforts in this direction have not been productive. In 2000, global agricultural Research and Development (R&D) 118

Ogujiuba & Ufiem Maurice

spending was US$36.3 billion, of which 37 percent was conducted by the private sector and 63 percent, or about US$23 billion, by the public sector. Ninety-three percent of the private research was conducted in developed countries. On the other hand, public agricultural R&D grew faster in the developing world, and is increasingly concentrated in China, India and Brazil. In stark contrast, public agricultural research in Sub-Saharan Africa grew at only about one percent per annum in the 1990s, and in 2000 was around US$1.6 billion. Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest share of private agricultural R&D spending in the world-only 1.7 percent of already low public spending. Of total agricultural research spending, donors provide about 40 percent (in some countries 60 percent). Only five African countries-Nigeria, South Africa, Botswana, Ethiopia and Mauritius-are paying the recurrent budget of their National Agricultural Research System (NARS) from national resources. Collectively these data point to a disturbing development-a growing divide regarding the conduct of agricultural R&D-and, most likely, a consequent growing technological divide in agriculture. On the relationship between food insecurity and government policies, Bird, Booth and Pratt (2003) and Mkandawire (2009:2) have argued that food and nutritional crisis and insecurity arise due to the failure of government policies, programmes and institutions. For instance, in 2003, African heads of government through the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), adopted the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). In the framework of the African Union (AU), all member states committed to generate at least 6 percent growth in the agricultural sector and to invest at least 10 percent of their national budgets to that end. As of 2008, which was the target year, only 7 countries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Malawi, Niger and Senegal) had exceeded the target of allocating 10 per cent of their national budget to agriculture. Also, only 9 countries (Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, DRC, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania) have exceeded CAADP’s targeted 6 per cent 119

Climate Change, Food Insecurity and…

agricultural growth rate which is to be achieved by 2015 (Mkandawire, 2009; NEPAD, 2013). The consequence of poor or nonimplementation of policy programmes has been the persistent food crisis and insecurity not just in the Sahel but in the entire African continent. From the arguments made, the following conclusion can be reached: beyond the natural phenomenon of unfavourable climatic conditions, food crisis and insecurity in the Sahel is caused by variables including political corruption, low government patronage/public investments in agriculture, inadequate funding for agricultural research and development, low/poor human capacity and lack of political will by the state to effectively implement policies and programmes. However, even these arguments are not without their shortcomings. First, they are weak and shallow and lack specific details and the required robustness. For instance, the authors failed to clearly show how corruption, low public investments in agriculture or government inability to implement policies has caused food insecurity either in the Sahel or any other part of Africa. Using institutional data and statistical figures to support the argument would have added to the validity of the submissions. Second, the failure or outright refusal of the authors to point out that policy makers have little no or control over the outcome of unfavourable climatic conditions that result from climate change is obvious. Otherwise, a more plausible argument would have tilted towards governments’ failure to effectively manage the outcome of climate change in the Sahel. Be that as it may, both the climate alone and the climate plus schools of thought have provided us with analytical frameworks from which scholars, policy analysts and state actors can critically examine the causes and consequences of food insecurity in the Sahel in particular and Africa in general.

120

Ogujiuba & Ufiem Maurice

4. Food Insecurity and Political Crisis in the Sahel Another argument identified in the extant literature, but not yet dealt with here, is whether the prevailing political crisis in the Sahel is caused by recurrent food insecurity or vice versa. From the Republic of Chad, where complex political and military crises that are rooted in domestic factors lasted between 2005 and 2010, to Sudan, where the union of religion and identity shaped the course of its recent history of conflict, and Ethiopia-Eritrea, whose 30-year armed struggle for independence ended in 1993, political crisis and instability have been an enduring feature among the countries in the Sahel (Crisis Group, 2009). On the one hand, Solana (2008), Oniang’o (2009), Heinrigs (2010), Brooks (2012), Onuoha and Thurtson (2013), and Rekawek (2013) have asserted that prolonged food/nutritional crisis has occasioned political crisis in the region. According to Oniang’o (2009:4), in the Sahel, conflicts may occur for a variety of reasons including inter-tribal resource competition. Onuoha and Thurston (2013) and Rekawek (2013) have also observed that Mali has experienced a recurring pattern of ethnic Tuareg-led rebellion against the state that is rooted in feelings of neglect and marginalization by the state, especially in times of drought while Bellemare (2011) has observed that the Arab Spring especially in North Africa was associated with food crisis which began at the end of 2010 and saw food prices increase by 40 per cent between January, 2010, and February, 2011. The overriding impression from the various arguments especially Solana (2008) and Heinrigs (2010) is that climate change causes food crisis which in turn occasions conflicts and threatens national security and Africa is identified as one of the continent’s most vulnerable to climate change because of multiple stresses and low adaptive capacity. Thus, climate change is defined as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instabilities and is therefore likely to cause growing international insecurity (Solana, 2008).

121

Climate Change, Food Insecurity and…

Also, others have argued that protracted political crises in some states in the Sahel that are rooted in multiple factors such as the Cold War, ethnic antagonisms and rent-seeking behaviour, among others, have resulted in political and economic instability. This has manifested in the form of violent change of government, armed insurgency, cross-border raids, inter-ethnic and religious crises and outright civil war as witnessed in Sudan, Ethiopia/Eritrea, and Chad and currently in Mali. The argument here is that this situation does not give room for continuity of political regimes and policies. This is because, as regimes are in continuous flux, crises intensify and state policies are abandoned. Thus, political instability and policy discontinuity result in abandoned agricultural and food security projects which result in food crisis (Kron, 2011). In summary, the proposition deducible from the arguments above is that there is a direct relationship between food insecurity and political crisis in the Sahel. But whether political crisis is caused by food insecurity or vice versa remains a policy debate that may linger for some time to come. One variable that is conspicuously absent in the analysis is the prevailing chronic poverty which may be a cause of aggressive behaviours amongst the less privileged. Yet the Sahel states rank at the bottom of the 2011 UN Human Development Index (Niger ranks 186, Burkina Faso 181, Chad 183, Mali 175, and Mauritania 159 out of the 187 countries listed). This notwithstanding, the arguments have provided us with an analytical prism from which the prevailing crisis in the Sahel can be considered. 5. Concluding Policy Recommendations Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments in the literature on the relationship among climate change, food insecurity and political crisis in the Sahel, there are certain valid conclusions that can be drawn: The Sahel region is presently mired in devastating food/nutritional crisis rooted in unfavourable climatic conditions amongst other variables;

122

Ogujiuba & Ufiem Maurice

1. Political crisis rooted in multiple factors, as currently being witnessed in Mali, has been a recurrent issue in the Sahel; 2. Whether political crisis is caused by food insecurity or vice versa, the Sahel will remain at the centre of policy debate that will dominate scholarly and policy discourse for a long time; and 3. Conditions in the Sahel call for the development of new policy strategies to ensure a reversal of the current trend in the region. These strategies will among other things include the following. 4. Development of environmental conservation and enhancement plans that are essential to building sustainable food security system; 5. Ensure improved funding for agricultural research and development. This will encourage Research and Development (R&D) in agriculture, provision of agricultural extension services to farmers and enhance or facilitate their access to technologies. Research should also be geared towards mitigating the causes and effects of climate change and environmental degradation on agricultural activities in Africa; and 6. Efforts must be geared towards the enthronement of good governance in the Sahel. Good governance here involves discouraging corrupt or inefficient practices, efficient and effective management of public resources by public office holders and promoting sustainable food security, agro-oriented public policies and ensuring inclusive economic growth.

List of Acronyms AU

African Union

CAADP

Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme Comité Inter Etat de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel European Union Food and Agriculture Organization Gross Domestic Product

CILSS EU FAO GDP

123

Climate Change, Food Insecurity and…

GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFPRI International Food and Policy Research Institute IRIN Integrated Regional Information Networks MSF Medecins Sans Frontières NARS National Agricultural Research System NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development ODA Official Development Assistance ODE Office of Development Effectiveness SFSA Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNECA United Nations Economic Commission on Africa UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNOCHA United Nations Office for Coordination Humanitarian Affairs

of

Endnote 1 Some of these areas are not located within the semi-arid zone but are prone to drought and susceptible to adverse climatic conditions. 2 2006 3 2003 4 2010 (Institut National de la Statistique du Mali)

References Aziz, T. A. (2001), ‘The Impact of Corruption on Food Security. Paper presented at a Panel Discussion on Governance and Food Security: Acting in the Public Interest? Organized by International Food Policy Research Institute, Bonn, Germany, September 4-6 Bellemare, M. F. (2011): ‘Rising Food Prices, Food Price Volatility, and Political Unrest,’ Stanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, United States. 124

Ogujiuba & Ufiem Maurice

Benson, T (2004): ‘Africa’s Food and Nutrition Security Situation: Why are We Here and How Did We Get Here?’ International Food and Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 2020 Discussion Paper 37. Bird, K. Booth, D and Pratt, N. (2003), ‘Food Security Crisis in Southern Africa: The Political Background to Policy Failure,’ Forum for Food Security in Southern Africa, Overseas Development Institute. Available at www.odi.org.uk/foodsecurity-forum Bouis, H. and Hunt, J. (1999): ‘Linking Food and Nutrition Security: Past Lessons and Future Opportunities,’ Asian Development Review 17: 168-213. Brooks, N. (2012), ‘Climate, Development and Conflict in the Sahel: A Review.’ A Paper prepared to support the study on Climate Change, Water and Conflict in the Niger River Basin, by International Alert and the University of East Anglia and funded by USAID. Collard, R. (2012): ‘Crony Capitalism undermines Egyptian Food Security,’ The National, April 12. Retrieved January 9, 2013 from http://www.thenational.ae/arts-culture/crony-capitalismundermines-egyptian-food-security. Comité Inter Etat de Lutte contre la Sécheresse au Sahel (CILSS) (2011): ‘Statement on the Agricultural and Food Prospects in the Sahel and in West Africa.’ Banjul: The Gambia, September 16. Crisis Group (2009): ‘Chad: Powder Keg in the East,’ Africa Report N°149-15 April. European Union (2013): ‘Factsheet: The European Union and the Sahel,’ March 14, Brussels, Available at; http://www.consilium.eur opa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132802.pdf Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) (2012), ‘Sahel Drought Situation,’ Report No. 5 Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Niger. Available at http://siteresources.worldba

125

Climate Change, Food Insecurity and…

nk.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/Sahel_DroughtSituation_Report_2 0120401.pdf Haddad, M. and Essa, A. (2013): ‘Interactive: Mapping the Sahel Drought,’ Aljazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactiv e/2012/06/2012618145252317756.html Headey, D. (2012): ‘Déjà vu in the Horn of Africa,’ 2011 Global Food Policy Report, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, DC. Heinrigs, P. (2010): ‘Security Implications of Climate Change in the Sahel Region: Policy considerations,’ Sahel and West African Club (SWAC)/Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Hopfenberg, R. and Pimentel, D. (2001): ‘Human Population as a Function of Food Supply,’ Minnesotans for Sustainability. Retrieved from www.oilcrash.com/population.htm Houreld, K. (2012): AP Exclusive, ‘How Somalia Famine Aid Went Astray,’ Associated Press, Deseret News, and Saturday March 17. Retrieved January 9, 2013 from http://www.deseretnews.com/artic le/765560647/AP-Exclusive-How-Somalia-famine-aid-wentastray.html Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN): ‘Sahel: malnourished to remain above one million in 2013,’ IRIN, 20 December2012. Available at: http://www.irinnews.org/Report/970 93/Sahelmalnourished-to-remain-above-one-millionin-2013. Last accessed 3 February 2013. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (2012), 2011 Global Food Policy Report. IFPRI, Washington, DC. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (2011): ‘Horn of Africa: The Rains will Fall in 2015, 2016, or 2017, But Must We Also Fail?’ Retrieved on June 11, 2012 from www.ifad.org/media/press/2012/48.htm. Kandji, S.T., Verchot, L. and Mackensen, J. (2006): ‘Climate Change and Variability in the Sahel Region: Impacts and Adaptation Strategies in the Agricultural Sector,’ UNEP/ICRAF. 126

Ogujiuba & Ufiem Maurice

Kron, J. (2011): ‘Protests in Uganda over Rising Prices Grow Violent,’ the New York Times, April 21. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/2 2/world/africa/22uganda.html?_r=1). Mkandawire, R. (2009), a Review of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme: A Focus on Achievements. Paper presented at Pretoria, South Africa on 19-20 February. NEPAD (2009): Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP): ‘A New Vision for Africa Agriculture.’ Available at www.nepad-caadp.net/... NEPAD (2013): Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP): ‘Coordinating Agriculture and Food Security.’ Available at http://www.nepad.org/foodsecurity/agricul ture/about Office of Development Effectiveness (ODE) (2008): ‘Food Security in Africa: Towards a Support Strategy for Australia.’ Australian Government: www.ode.ausaid.gov.au Ogujiuba, K., Ogbonnaya, U.M and Omoju, E.O. (2012): ‘Food Security, Policies and Institutions in Africa: Prospects for a Revolution,’ Journal of Economic Cooperation and Development, 33 (4), 87-115. Oniang’o, R. (2009), ‘Food and Nutrition Emergencies in East Africa: Political, Economic and Environmental Associations,’ IFPRI Discussion Paper 00909, International Food Policy Research Institute. Onuoha, F. C. and Thurston, A. (2013), ‘Franco-African Military Intervention in the Mali Crisis and Evolving Security Concerns,’ Aljazeera Centre for Studies Report, 19 February. Oxfam International (2012): ‘Food Crisis in the Sahel: Five Steps to Break the Hunger Cycle in 2012.’ Joint Agency Issue Briefing, May 31, 2012. Available at: http://www.oxfam.org/files/ib-food-crisissahel-31052012-en.pdf

127

Climate Change, Food Insecurity and…

Pardey, P., Jenni, J., Julian, A., Stanley, W, Bonwoo, K., Era, B., Terry, H., and Paul, G. (2006), Science, Technology and Skills, Rome, Science Council, Mimeo. Potts, M., Zulu, E., Wehner, M., Castillo, F. and Henderson, C. (2013): ‘Crisis in the Sahel: Possible Solutions and the Consequences of Inaction.’A Report following the OASIS Conference (Organizing to Advance Solutions in the Sahel) hosted by the University of California, Berkeley and African Institute for Development Policy in Berkeley on September 21, 2012, published, April 9, 2013. Rekawek, K. (2013): ‘Mali’s Political Crisis and Its International Implications,’ Bulletin No. 53 (386), The Polish Institute of International Affairs, May 22. Rena, R. (2005): ‘Challenges for Food Security in Eritrea: A Descriptive and Qualitative Analysis,’ African Development Review, 17 (2), 193 – 212, September. Sasson, A. (2012): ‘Food Security for Africa: An Urgent Global Challenge, Agriculture & Food Security, 1(2) doi:10.1186/2048-70101-2. Solana, J. (2008), ‘Climate Change and International Security.’ Document prepared by the High Representative and the European Commission for the European Council. Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture (SFSA) (2013): ‘The SahelRegion,’http://www.syngentafoundation.org/index.cfm?pag eID=47 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2012), African Development Report 2012: Towards a Food Secure Future, UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa, New York. United Nations Economic Commission on Africa (UNECA 2007): Economic Report on Africa, ‘Accelerating Africa’s Development through Diversification,’ Addis Ababa. United Nations Economic Commission on Africa (UNECA) and African Union (AU) (2009): Economic Report on Africa, ‘Developing African Agriculture through Regional Value Chain.’ Addis Ababa.

128

Ogujiuba & Ufiem Maurice

Williams, A. P. and Funk, C. (2011), ‘A Westward Extension of the Warm Pool Leads to a Westward Extension of the Walker Circulation, Drying Eastern Africa”, Climate Dynamics 37 (11-12), 2417-2435

129

CHAPTER SIX The Promise and Challenges of Farmer-Managed Natural Regeneration: A Case Study from Central Senegal Matthew Gates

Abstract Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration (FMNR) is an agroforestry system first developed in Niger in the 1980s. Through this method, farmers allow shrubs that sprout from existing root systems during the annual dry season to remain standing instead of clearing them as they normally would, pruning them intensively into small trees. As a result, trees remain standing throughout the year, anchoring the soil with their root systems, but managed in such a way as to make them minimally disruptive to field crops in terms of both space and shading. In 2007, World Vision began to promote FMNR in the Kaffrine region of central Senegal. The project has since exceeded expectations substantially, leading to over thirty thousand hectares of cultivated land using this system. In principle, the practice of FMNR is very similar to traditional management of agricultural parklands in the Sahel. Due to intensive cultivation over the past century and a half and the introduction of animal traction power for deep tillage, the density of trees left standing dropped, greatly reducing the resilience of the parkland agroecosystems region-wide. From January to March of 2011, extensionists and farmers were interviewed about their practice of FMNR and benefits they obtained. Data obtained by the Kaffrine office of the Senegalese Department of Waters and Forests (Eaux et Forêt) indicate a significant difference in the species composition of young saplings under FMNR management as compared to more mature trees left standing in fields under 131

The Promise and Challenges of…

traditional land management practices. The data indicate that, although FMNR leads to the proliferation of a wide range of tree species, it heavily favors a handful of species for their regenerative abilities, rather than their cultural uses or specific soil benefits. Although extension of FMNR has surpassed initial expectations, some problems still exist. In particular, due in part to two consecutive years of extremely good rains, significant misperceptions persist about the real benefits of FMNR, with many people overattributing good harvests to the practice. Further, well-intentioned conservation laws and a lack of property norms that allow anyone to cut wood and herd animals nearly everywhere during the dry season often make it difficult for farmers to exploit FMNR trees. Continuing extension effort should focus not only on increasing the density of trees in fields, but also on the particular advantages of certain species and utilize traditional knowledge. Introduction 1.1 What is FMNR? Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration (FMNR), or Regeneration Naturelle Assistée (RNA), as it is known in French, is an agroforestry system developed in Niger in the early 1980s. It began initially through experiments done by staff members at the Mardi Integrated Development Project (MIDP), an initiative of the international Christian aid group Service in Mission (SIM). FMNR is not an entirely new system. It draws heavily on coppicing and other treemanagement practices long used in Sahalian parkland systems. Through both farmer-to-farmer extension and the backing of several NGOs, notably World Vision and the Desert Community Initiative (DIC), as well as the Nigeran national forestry service, FMNR is now practiced to some extent on roughly half of all cultivated land in Niger (Tougiani et al., 2008). As the technology is expanded to other Sahelian countries, instructive insights may be gained from the nearly three decades of FMNR practice in Niger. 132

Matthew Gates

FMNR could best be described as a modification of traditional parkland management systems, developed specifically in response to extreme ecological constraints. Each dry season, in the absence of agricultural activity, shrub-like growths of a variety of tree species sprout from intact root systems (Figure 1). In FMNR management, farmers then prune back shrub-like saplings by selecting a single branch to nurture into a tree trunk. Trees are aggressively pruned so as to prevent their interfering with or over shading-crops (Figure 2), rather than being simply removed in preparation for plowing before the onset of the rains. Thus, saplings under FMNR management (Figure 3) are easily distinguished from unmanaged shrubs (Figure 4). They consume far less ground space and need not be removed from fields prior to tilling. The objective is to maintain a critical root density to prevent wind erosion, while simultaneously providing practitioners with usable firewood and other agroforestry products. Leaf litter also contributes to soil fertility.

133

The Promise and Challenges of…

Figure 1: Vegetative regrowth of Piliostigma reticulatum (foreground) beside a fully-grown, unmanaged shrub of the same species. Behind the man pictured is the trunk of a Piliostigma that has been pruned into a single tree trunk through FMNR management. (Photo by author)

Figure 2:

Managing Guiera senegalensis in Sotto, ADP Kattiote (Photo by author)

134

Matthew Gates

Figure 3: Guiera senegalensis saplings under FMNR management (Photo by author)

135

The Promise and Challenges of…

Figure 4: Unmanaged annual regrowth of Guiera senegalensis. This is typically cleared bus from fields prior to tilling, but regrows after crops are harvested. (Photo by author)

The literature suggests that the presence of trees in agricultural fields provides a number of beneficial effects on soil. Various species commonly used in FMNR in the region have been shown to increase the biological activity of arbuslcular mycorrhizal fungi that mineralize phosphorus (Bernatchez et al., 2008). The roots of some leguminous trees, such as Acacia albida and other Acacia species, are 136

Matthew Gates

often colonized by rhizobial bacteria that fix atmospheric nitrogen. There are also indications that root systems of these trees help to prevent top soil erosion (Breman & Kessler, 1995) and can aid agriculturally-useful rainfall interception and harvest (Samba et al., 2001). Moreover, the decomposition of residues from trees contributes to phosphorus and even nitrogen levels in soils. Unfortunately, there do not seem to have been any quantitative long-term studies on the specific effects of FMNR specifically on soils. Large quantities of below-ground tree biomass often exist, even in apparently barren fields, and can be used to rapidly regenerate trees. A survey of above and below-ground biomass of Guiera senegalensis and Piliostigma reticulatum taken at various locations in the Senegalese Peanut Basin reveal that, due to annually cutting back the aboveground growth as a part of field clearing practices, below-ground biomass often exceeds above-ground biomass by as much as four or five-fold (Lufafa et al., 2009). Table 1. Above and below-ground biomass of G. Senegalensis and P. retiucltatum at sites in the Senegalese Peanut Basin, measured in tons per hectare (Adapted from Lufafa et al., 2009)

1. G. Senegalensis Location Keur Asanulo Keur Mandiema Keur Matar Aram Keur Ibra Fall Ndiagne Thilla Ounte

Aboveground biomass 0.391 0.386 0.512 0.658 0.462 0.319

137

Belowground Biomass 1.79 1.831 2.405 2.327 1.665 1.665

-1.

The Promise and Challenges of…

2. P. retiuculatum Location Sikatrou Sanguel

Aboveground biomass 0.228 0.369

Belowground biomass 2.358 3.737

The fact that so much of the biomass of the two species in question, both of which are commonly regenerated under FMNR management practices in the Kaffrine region, is below ground suggests that, under proper management conditions, a great deal of above-ground biomass could be quickly generated from these belowground storage roots. In field tests, it has been demonstrated that 80% of Piliostigma reticulatum biomass, including ligneous biomass, is decomposed within the eight month dry season. The presence of these shrubs, the appropriate management of their residues and their subsequent decomposition stimulate biological activity in soils, which, in turn, improves soil structure (Diack et al., 2000). Although decomposing Piliostigma reticulatum residues do not facilitate nitrogen fixation, at least in the short term, they provide a rapid increase in the availability of soluble PO4 (Iyamuremye et al., 2000). FMNR is a strategy to encourage the growth of these common species within agricultural fields and to exploit the residues of their management for both household needs and soil inputs. FMNR is a no-cost, low-labor system. It is very adaptable to the needs of individual farmers. It significantly enhances soil quality and promises tangible increases in crop yield within a few years of adoption, even for extremely poor farmers who can afford no fertilizer at all. Although most Senegalese farmers tend to use lower tree densities (40-50 trees per hectare), successful fields in Niger have been maintained with densities as high as 120 trees per hectare (Tougiani et al., 2008).

138

Matthew Gates

1.2 FMNR in the Context of World Vision Senegal Since 2000, FMNR has found a regional institutional advocate in World Vision, which has piloted programs in several Sahelian countries, including Senegal, Chad, Mali, and Mauritania.

Figure 5: ADPs of the Kaffrine Region (Worldvision staff, photo of wall map by author) World Vision’s first tentative foray into FMNR promotion in Senegal was a small gardening project in the Jessum valley (ADP Nguer) 1 in which women involved in a dry-season gardening project practiced FMNR regeneration in the garden, in the hopes that farmers would see the benefit and begin to adopt FMNR on a wider scale. Ultimately, adoption outside the garden was negligible. In 2007, the Australian-funded Senegal Food and Livelihood Enhancement 139

The Promise and Challenges of…

Initiative (SFLEI) began promoting FMNR in the ADPs of East Kaolack, Nguier and Thiappy, located in Diourbel Region. In October of 2008, World Vision began more aggressive promotion of FMNR, eventually expanding it to all other ADPs in the newly-created Kaffrine region, under the auspices of a new Australian-funded initiative called ‘Beysatol,’ the name of which is derived from a Wolof aphorism meaning ‘farm your field.’ Beysatol is only active in the Kaffrine region, one of four geographical regions in which World Vision Senegal operates. The two objectives of Beysatol are the enhancement of food security and promotion of environmental sustainability (Beysatol Proposal). FMNR constitutes a significant portion of Beysatol’s mandate. Other activities include apiculture, dry season gardening, cereal banks, and Jatropha curcas planting for anticipated sustainable energy projects. As Beysatol and SFLEI presently run conterminously, and most the SFLEI staff are presently working for Beysatol, it is often difficult to tease out where one initiative ends and the other begins. However, SPFLEI is set to end in 2013. For all practical purposes, however, in the Kaffrine Region, at least with regard to FMNR, SFLEI can be regarded as the initial phase of a project that was more or less subsumed by Beysatol in 2008. Both Beysatol itself and the FMNR program in Kaffrine region are in their infancy, dating from 2007 and 2008, respectively. The oldest programs are located in the Departments of Khoungel and Birkilane, on the eastern and western extremes of the Kaffrine Region respectively. It is there that results are beginning to become apparent. World Vision’s operations within the Kaffrine region are divided into geographical and administrative zones called ADPs (Association pour le Development de la Population), each of which employs two rural extensionists, or animateurs. For maps of each ADP in the Kaffrine Region and a map of their locations relative to each other, please see Figure 5. The different ADPs are at different stages in the FMNR extension. Two ADPs, Nguer and East Kaolack, began preliminary activities in 2007, and then initiated all-out promotions in 2008. Others, Kottiote, Dioukhul, and Ngonik, began preliminary activities in 2008 and full promotion in 2009. The remaining two ADPs, Mabo 140

Matthew Gates

and Malem-Hodar, began preliminary sensitizations in 2009 and fullout extension in 2009. The funding life of Beysatol is, however, set to expire in 2013. The rate of FMNR adoption has been considerable. In the village of Korky Bambara (CR Touba Mbalé), for instance, where the majority of farmers are unable to afford any fertilizer whatsoever, seven people began experimenting with FMNR in 2008. That number grew to 25 in 2009. In 2010, the entire village began using FMNR management practices. Adoption is, of course, a matter of degree. Most farmers say they are in the process of implementing FMNR on some of their more distant fields, as well as increasing the density of trees on fields where they have already begun to use FMNR management practices. All FMNR fields are works in progress. 1.3 The Historical and Agro Ecological Context FMNR Adoption in Senegal In order to understand the adoption of FMNR in Senegal, it is essential to understand its deep synergies with traditional agroforestry practices of the parkland system. For centuries, Sahelian peoples have cultivated elaborate agro-ecosystems called parklands. Although localized variations on the parkland system are innumerable, the system is broadly defined by fields of annual agricultural crops under the ‘discontinuous cover’ of tree species, which are specifically cultivated and managed for the production of ‘timber and non-timber forest products’ (Boffa, 1999). As the concept of ‘agro-ecosystems’ has come into academic agricultural discourse relatively recently, the dynamics of parkland systems have been understudied and do not make a great deal of intuitive sense to the casual outside observer. For this reason, large post- independence agricultural development programs have often overlooked the complex benefits of these systems, and actively discouraged maintaining high tree densities in agricultural fields. Although the ‘Peanut Revolution’ set the stage, sociologically and agriculturally, for

141

The Promise and Challenges of…

significant changes in rural Senegal, it was the post-independence national agricultural extension programs that ushered in fundamental changes to the way that agriculture was practiced by the majority of rural Senegalese, changes that set the stage for the present ecological crisis. Two large agricultural extension services, Societé d'Aide Technique et de Coopération (SATEC), a French organization which operated in Senegal from 1965 to 1975, and Societé de Developpement et de Vulgarisation Agricole (SODEVA), a Senegalese government program which ran from 1975 to 1990, encouraged the use of animalpowered deep tillage, distributed subsidized fertilizer (Oya, 2006), and encouraged farmers to reduce the number of trees left standing in agricultural fields, with the exception of Acacia albida and Coryla pinnata (interview with Keba Keur Lione, March 10, 2011). With the expansion of cultivated land and the reduction of natural forests, it became desirable to bring trees used for fuel, lumber, food, and medicine out of the forest and into the field. Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration, in tandem with traditional knowledge about tree uses, offers a good way of both growing these trees in a sustainable and accessible way and strengthening at-risk soil through the ecosystem services they provide. The Sahalian parkland system of a few decades ago depended on a variety of species cultivated for their unique echo-system services and a variety of secondary uses. The extent to which trees regenerated through FMNR can achieve a similar utilitarian diversity will affect the ultimate efficacy of FMNR in restoring soils and increasing agricultural production in the region. 1. METHODS In order to get a sense the proportions of tree species being regenerated through FMNR, I examined the results of a census of FMNR trees undertaken by Beysatol extensionists in conjunction with a GPS survey of the fields of FMNR practitioners undertaken by Eaux et Forêts in April, May and June of 2010. Although not all FMNR fields were included in the survey (there were plans to finish the task in 2011), the surveys provide a broad sampling of the fields for every 142

Matthew Gates

ADP. The species index provides quantitative data, which, taken in conjunction with the qualitative information from farmer interviews, provides an interesting picture of what tree species farmers are managing at what densities. Because the surveys also include data on the density and species of mature trees, they provide interesting insights into the current state of parkland agriculture in the region notwithstanding the spike in the number and density of smaller trees due to FMNR. The differences between the data, in regard to both density and relative species proportions, of FMNR trees and mature trees could suggest ways in which FMNR might complement or become integrated in the ongoing evolution of the parkland system. To supplement this quantitative information, I conducted a series of interviews and accompanying site visits with FMNR practitioners, extensionists, and Beysatol project coordinators, during the period between January 20 and March 10, 2011. As each ADP in the region began its FMNR program at a different time, I interviewed a number of farmers in ADPs at each step in the extension process, hoping to understand generally what was affecting farmer’s decision making with regard to density and species selection at different stages of FMNR establishment. As I wished to speak with adopters with varying degrees of dedication, I visited some villages in the company of World Vision extensionists, talking primarily to people they introduced to me. I visited other villages by myself, speaking with whoever wished to speak with me. My interviews were generally in the form of free-flowing conversations done during visits to farmers’ FMNR fields. During the interviews I asked how they had learned about FMNR, how the practice had impacted their crops and soil, and what secondary household products they derived or hoped to derive from the practice. I also asked about their perceptions of changes that had occurred in local agriculture and ecosystems over the courses of their lives. In interviews with extensionists, both World Vision project coordinators and project partners in civil service organizations, I asked what methods they used to extend FMNR technology, what worked, or did not work and the reasons for these successes and 143

The Promise and Challenges of…

failures. During my stay in Kaffrine, I also had the chance to interview Peter Wesston who, at the time, had oversight of all Australian-funded World Vision projects in Senegal, Chad, and South Sudan. As he had been involved, to varying degrees with FMNR projects in Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, I asked him a number of broader questions about how he perceived Beysatol’s work in the context of global FMNR. 2. RESULTS As stated previously, in May and June of 2010, World Vision and Eaux et Forêts undertook an extensive survey of trees standing in agricultural fields. A small sample of this data from Communauté Rurale Saly Escale (ADP East Kaolack) provides a quantitative picture of some of the differences and potential synergies between FMNR management and traditional agroforesty practices. The ten most common species found in each category are as follows. The implications of this data will be discussed at length in the next section. Species

Number of trees

Cordylla pinnata Piliostigma reticulatum Combretum glutinosum Pterocarpus erinaceus Sclerocarya birrea Anogeisus leiocarpus Azadirachta indica Adansonia digitata Prosopis africana Sterculia setigera

1,570 264 197 116 115 111 95 93 91 82

Percentage trees 47.6% 8.0% 6.0% 3.5% 3.5% 3.4% 2.9% 2.8% 2.8% 2.5%

of

total

Table 2: Frequency of the ten most common species of adult trees in agricultural fields in CR Saly Escale (Translated and adapted from Ndour et al., 2010).

144

Matthew Gates

Species

Number of trees

Combretum glutinosum Piliostigma reticulatum Ziziphus mauritiana Guiera senegalensis Sclercarya birrea Cordyla pinnata Acacia albida Adansonia digitata Acacia nilotica Terminalia avicennoides

14,777 14,331 1,196 637 297 97 88 72 33 26

Percentage trees 46.4% 45.0% 3.8% 2.0% 0.9% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%

of

total

Table 3: Frequency of the ten most common species of trees under FMNR management in CR Saly Escale (Translated and adapted from Ndour, et al. 2010.

3. DISCUSSION 4.1 Species Composition The species composition of mature trees left in fields is the result of a much more conscious selection process than FMNR provides. In the data on mature trees from CR Saly Escale (table 2), the only species heavily favored by conventional parkland agroforestry in both volume and percentage was Cordylla pinnata, at 1,570 trees or 47% of total trees. Adansonia digitata was, in terms of total number of trees, only slightly favored by conventional parkland agroforestry with 93 mature trees, versus 72 regenerated trees. However, this species (A. digitata) composed a much larger percentage of the total number of mature trees than of saplings under FMNR management (2.8% versus 0.23%). The second most common species of mature tree was in fact the second most common species of FMNR tree, Piliostigma reticulatum. Diospyros mesphiliformis was also somewhat favored by conventional parkland agroforestry, with 13 adult trees, but only 145

The Promise and Challenges of…

three regenerating trees (Ndour et al., 2010). A total of 54 species of adult trees and 52 species of regenerated trees were identified in the survey. Thus, although traditional agroforesty and FMNR both tend to favor certain species, trees under both systems of management engaged a broad spectrum of naturally occurring species, with most being managed under both systems. The predominant shrub species that sprout in fields and that are maintained in the FMNR style are Combretum glutinsom, Piliostigma reticulatum and Guiera senegalensis. FMNR species indexes from 702 fields in 38 villages in CR Saly Escale (Table 3) seem to confirm this. Two extremely common species, Combretum glutinosum and Pilostigma reticulatum, constitute 45% and 46% respectively of all trees (Ndour et al., 2010). Guiera senegalensis is more prevalent in areas further west in the region. These trees are not nearly as favored by the traditional parkland system in the area, as evidenced by their much lower percentage of the mature trees indexed. These are tree species that regenerate most quickly and reliably from rootstocks, rather than seeds, due in part to their unique allometry, in which a large portion of their biomass is concentrated in the roots. As such, they comprise the majority of trees in young agricultural fallows throughout the Sahel region. Being grazed upon actually increases their below-ground biomass by inducing more multiple regeneration sites, causing more shrub-like, lateral growth (Breman & Kessler, 1995). A survey of the species and relative ages of trees in different land use zones around sixteen villages in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Senegal indicates that, of 110 species indexed, 105 were found in the smallest diameter class (under 5 cm) and 38-54 were found in the intermediate diameter classes (5-80 cm), whereas only 21 species existed in the largest diameter class (over 80 cm). The different diameter classes are indicative of the relative ages of the trees. While the younger diameter classes were dominated by certain ‘colonizing species,’ particularly in agricultural or post-agricultural land use zones, they also displayed a broader spectrum of represented species, while the larger diameter classes represented mostly trees highly 146

Matthew Gates

valued for the products gathered from them (Kindt et al., 2008). Thus, the fact that the preponderance of FMNR trees consist of only a handful of species does not necessarily indicate that FMNR is not contributing to overall tree biodiversity. Maranz (2009) argues convincingly that the massive reduction in precipitation (20-40%) over the past half century killed off the mesic, Guinea and Sudan zone tree species that characterized the traditional parklands, resulting in the dominance of more drought-tolerant, truly Sahelian species. This hypothesis would seem to be supported by the preponderance of Piliostigma reticulatum and Combretum glutinosum in the aforementioned survey of FMNR species in CR Saly Escale. Keba Gueye of Soto (interview on February 25, 2011) identified the death of his Cordylla pinnata trees as an initial source of worry over the state of his fields. Other farmers also describe a high rate of mortality in the Cordylla pinnata trees in recent decades. Although synergies certainly exist between FMNR and traditional parkland agroforestry, the trees being regenerated in the largest numbers by FMNR represent a shift toward more drought-tolerant species than have been traditionally relied upon. This change in the relative species composition of commonly available trees will force people to rely upon different tree species for silvicultural products than they have traditionally. 4.2 Why and How Do Farmers Adopt FMNR? FMNR encourages farmers to treat trees as a crop. Farmers value and often select certain species for the tree products they produce, including fruit, fuel wood, and construction and fencing materials. Many of the other ten most common FMNR species listed in Table 3 are often cultivated for their products, including Ziziphus mauritiana (3), Adansonia digata (8) and Cordylla pinnata (6) for fruit, as well as Scerlocarya birrea (5) and Acacia nilotica (9) for medicine. Yet another principle aim of FMNR is to persuade people to grow and manage traditionally under-valued species. High value, sought-after species simply do not sprout quickly enough and in great enough density to

147

The Promise and Challenges of…

maintain soil health. Guiera Senegalensis, Combretum glutinsom, and Piliostigma reticulatum all serve a purpose. There is a traditional Wolof saying that goes, ‘ten Cordylla pinnata trees, one metric ton of grain’ (fuki dimbu, fuki mbam-literally, ‘ten donkeys’ weights’). Optimal harvests, however, require a greater density of trees than can be obtained from Cordylla pinnata alone. As Peter Weston put it, ‘if you envision your ideal selection of tree species for a field, this, by definition is not the selection you will get from FMNR’ (interview on February 24, 2011). Despite the preponderance of rapidly- regenerating tree species in their fields, FMNR practitioners are interested in discussing the varieties and merits of less common species. It would be wrong to suppose that FMNR practitioners use no species selection whatsoever. The initial decision to adopt FMNR is often made with an acute consciousness of the value of certain species. There are two essential goals of a well-functioning agroforestry system: sufficient tree density to ensure maximum benefit to field crops in the system and proper selection of tree species to provide desired silvicultural products. Consistent with these goals, most FMNR practitioners deliberately aim to both increase density and improve species selection. Occasionally, practitioners initially cultivate only high-value species, but later expand to include more common species, as the benefits of having trees in fields becomes apparent. Practitioners often have prior experience in planting high-value species for fruit or live fencing through the extension efforts of World Vision (interviews with Jessum and Wendè in February, 2011), Eaux et Forêts, Trees for the Future (interview with Soto in February, 2011), or the Peace Corps (interview Jatta Fakha in March, 2011). Having seen both the benefits and frustrations of tree planting, many are eager to experiment with root-stock regeneration. For example Yarrow Camera, an ‘early adopter,’ began experimenting with FMNR in 2007 and now works as an animateur for World Vision in the Communauté Rurale Saly Escale. Camera began FMNR in more far-flung fields, but is now expanding it to the field directly behind his compound, a challenge due to the 148

Matthew Gates

ubiquitous presence of ruminants close to the village. The field contains two mature Tamarindus indica, a mature Acacia albida and several Zisiphus mauritiana, Magnifera indica and Anacardium occidental that Camera planted within the past decade. In approximately one quarter of the area of the field, he began managing Piliostigma reticulatum in the FMNR manner last year. He hoped to expand that to the rest of the field in 2013. Promisingly, a large number of Acacia albida, the most desired of FMNR species, has sprouted. Under Magnifera indica, Anicardum occidental and Zisiphus mauritiana trees, Camera maintains no fewer than three bee hives and derives significant income from both fruit and honey. The pairing of native trees, managed in the FMNR style, with planted exotics, as well as the selection of more desirable FMNR species, are the mark of an agroforesty practitioner refining his system to meet a broad spectrum of household needs. Often, however, initial species selection is in favor of more common species and subsequent decisions expand the regeneration activities to less common species. Keba Gueye of Soto, for instance, began experimenting with Piliostigma reticulatum regeneration of his own accord in 2005 out of a sense of alarm when his last two Cordylla pinnata trees died. It was only when Beysatol began working in his APD (Kattiote) in 2009 that he began to experiment with regenerating other species (interview on February 25, 2011). In July 2010, he had 29 Piliostigma, eight of them mature, one mature Diosypros mesfiloformis, one regenerating Acacia albida, two mature Adansonia digitata, one Comretum micanthrum, one regenerating Mauer angolensis, and five mature Zisiphus mauritiana, spread over 4.36 hectates (World Vision and Eaux et Forêt staff, 2010). He has since added Balanyties aegyptea, Cassia sieberiana, Securidaca longipeduculata and Heeria insignis (interview on February 25, 2011). A commonality of many early adopters seems to be that, prior to learning about FMNR, they experimented with both tree planting and regeneration out of concern for the health of their soil. Triggers for this concern were often the death of long-standing agroforesty trees, 149

The Promise and Challenges of…

or the lack of available forest products. The concern caused by this realization is the great ‘teachable moment’ in agroforestry. As Peter Weston maintains, the irony of FMNR is that it is not appealing until, ecologically, it is almost too late (interview on February 24, 2011). This concern for the future, much more than any single one of the myriad of extension methods Beysatol uses to put out its messages is the ultimate driver of decision making. FMNR allowed practitioners to greatly expand what they thought possible in terms of both species selection and tree density within their fields. 4.3 Suggestions for Future Extension Efforts As explained previously, the presence of trees under FMNR management in agricultural fields has the potential to facilitate the formation of soil organic matter (SOM) and the nutrient mineralization. The trees themselves, however, are only one piece of the puzzle when it comes to increasing soil fertility. The residues of crops and trees alike must themselves be managed to facilitate beneficial decomposition. If leaf litter is simply burned, as it often is, then much of the potential benefit of FMNR trees in not being effectively harnessed. At present Beysatol focuses nearly all of its FMNR extension efforts on tree pruning and offers virtually no education on residue management. Significant misperceptions exist about the real benefits of FMNR among both practitioners and extensionists, some of whom erroneously attributed the uncharacteristically abundant rains in 2009 and 2010, and ensuing good harvests, at least in part, to FMNR. The real pace of soil and climatic improvement is, needless to say, much more incremental. As the rains in 2011 were reportedly very poor, one wonders what effect this might have had on popular perception of FMNR. Extensionists need to educate farmers on a deeper level about the effect of trees on soil health in order to avoid misperceptions of the effect that FMNR is having. Methods can be found to deepen the understanding of even illiterate farmers on basic concepts of soil health. 150

Matthew Gates

4. CONCLUSION There is no single ‘right’ way to practice FMNR. Its successful extension and the realization of its full benefits will require a cooperative model of farmer-run and farmer-centered experimentation and extension. The successful role of development organizations in the process will require a strong spirit of respect for and engagement with practitioners. World Vision’s involvement in the region has a five year time limit. Beysatol will end in 2013. The ultimate success of FMNR in the region will depend not on its funding but on adoption of the program by rural communities, the strength of farmer-to-farmer extension, and the institutional support of Senegalese organizations such as Eaux et Forêts. Sahelian parklands are complex, dynamic agro-ecosystems that have evolved to fit human needs over the course of many centuries. Recent developments, such as introduction of animal draft tillage, have changed them dramatically, resulting in rapid soil degradation over the past half-century. Of course, a major concern is the narrow number of species that make up the bulk of regenerated trees in the region. A combination of climate change and the puissance of existing root systems have caused a small spectrum of colonizing species to dominate at least early efforts at tree regeneration through FMNR in the Kaffrine region. Practitioners often select for more valued species from among the trees that initially regenerate. This selection is probably not enough to recreate the species balance of the old parkland system. The ultimate success of FMNR promotion in the region will depend on the ability of farmers to create a new agroforestry system within these constraints. The present ecological crisis in the region is certainly a dire one, but the genius of Sahelian peoples has prevailed in harsh circumstances before. FMNR, if extended as an organic, if somewhat drastic, progression in the parkland system, one that utilizes and respects traditional knowledge, has the potential to make that system even more resilient, allowing it to address uniquely modern adversities. 151

The Promise and Challenges of…

1 Associations pour le Development de la Population (ADPs) are the geographical and administrative units around which localized World Vision programs are organized in Senegal. For the relative positions of the ADPs in the Kaffrine Region, see figure 5.

References Bernatchez, F., Jeannotte, R., Begg, C.B.M., Hammel, C., & Whalen, J.K. (2008): ‘Soil fertility and arbuslcular mycorrhizal fungi related to trees growing on smallholder farms in Senegal,’ Journal of Arid Environments, 74: 1247-1256. Boffa, J.M. (1999): ‘Agroforestry parklands in Sub-Saharan Africa,’ FAO Conservation Guide, number 34 (Rome: FAO). Breman, H. & Kessler, J.-J. (1995): ‘Woody plants in agro-ecosystems of semi-arid regions,’Springer-Verlag, 1-60: 114-219 (Berlin). Diack, M., Sene, M., Badiane A., A.N., Diatta, M. & Dick, R.P. (2000): ‘Decomposition of a Native Shrub Piliostimga reticulatum litter in soils of semiarid Senegal,’ Arid Soils and Rehabiliation, 14: 205-218. Imyamuremye, F., Gewin, V., Dick R.P., Diack M., Sene M, Badiane & Diatta M. (2000): ‘Carbon, nitrogen and phosphorus mineralization potential of native agroforestry plant residues in soils of Senegal,’ Arid Soil Research and Rehabilitation, 14, 4: 359-371. Kindt, R., Kalinganire, A., Larwanou, M., Balem, M., Dakou, J.M., Bayala, J. & Kairè, M. (2008): ‘ Species accumulation within land use and tree diameter categories in Burkina Faso, Mail, Niger and Senegal,’ Biodiversity Conservation, 17: 1883-1905. Lulafa A., Dièdhiou, I., Ndiaye, N.A.S., Sénè, M., Kizito, F., Dick, R.P. & Noller, J.S. (2009): ‘Allometric relationships and peak-season community biomass stocks of native shrubs in Senegal’s Peanut Basin,’ Journal of Arid Environments, 73: 260-266.

152

Matthew Gates

Maranz, S. (2009): ‘Tree mortality in the African Sahel indicates an anthropogenic environment displaced by climate change,’ Journal of Biogeography, 36: 1181-1193. Ndour, B., Sarr, A. & Mbaye, A. (2010): ‘Projet BEYSATOL/SFLEI: Rapport des Activities, Août-September-Octobre, Institute Sénégalais de Reserches Agricoles (Dakar, Senegal). Oya, C. (2006): ‘From state dirigisme to liberalization in Senegal: four decades of agricultural policy shifts and continuities,’ The European Journal of Development Research, 18: 2: 203-234. Tougiani, A., Guero, C. & Rinaudo, T. (2008): ‘Community mobilization for improved livelihoods through tree crop management in Niger,’ GeoJournal 74: 377-389. World Vision and Eaux et Forêts Staff (2010): ‘GPS survey of FMNR fields and species indexes,’ internal document (Kaffrine, Senegal). Supplementary Bibliography Arbonnier, M. (2000): Arbres, arbustes et lians des zones sèches d’Afrique de l’Ouest, Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agrononmique pour le Dévelopment (CIRAD), Musée National d’Histoire Natrurelle, Union Mondiale pour la Nature (UICN), (Montpellier, France). Brunken, U., Schmidt, M., Dressler, S., Janssen, T., Thiombiano, A. & Zizka, G. (2008): ‘West African plants - A Photo Guide,’ Forschungsinstitut (Senckenberg, Frankfurt/Main, and Germany). Accessed on December 18, 2011at: http://www.westafricanplants.s enckenberg.de. Berhaut, J. (1975): Flore illustrée du Sénégal (nine volumes), Grouvernement du Sénégal, Ministére du Déleloppement Rural et de l’Hydraulique, Direction des Eaux et Forêts, (Dakar, Senegal). Centre de Suivie Ecologique (year unknown) : Cartes d’occupation du sols. Centre du Suivre Ecologique (Dakar, Senegal). Dossa, E.L., Deidhou, S., Compton J.E., Asstigbesste, C.B. & Dick, R.P. (2010): ‘Spatial patterns of P factions and chemical properties in

153

The Promise and Challenges of…

soils of two native shrub communities in Senegal,’ Plant and Soil, 327: 185-198. Dossa, E.L., Khouma, L., Diedhou, I., Sene, M., Kizito, F., Badiane, A.N., Samba, S.A.N., & Dick, R.P. (2009): ‘Carbon, nitrogen and phosphorus mineralization potentials of semiarid sahelian soils amended with native shrub residues,’ Geoderma, 148: (3-4): 251260. Eberling, B., Touré, A. & Rassmussen, K. (2003): ‘Changes in soil organic matter following groundnut-millet cropping at three locations in semi-arid Senegal, West Africa,’ Agriculture Ecosystems and Environment, 96: 37-47. Franke, R.W. & Chasin, B. H. (1980): ‘Seeds of famine: ecological destruction and the development dilemma in the West African Sahel.’ Allanheld, O. and Co., 33-97, (Montclair, New Jersey). Gijsbers, H.J.M. Kessler, J.J. & Knevel, M.K. (1994): ‘Dynamics and natural regeneration of woody species in farmed parklands in the Sahel region (Province of Passore, Burkina Faso),’ Forest Ecology and Management, 64: (1): 1-12. Maydell, H.-J., von (1990): ‘Trees and shrubs of the Sahel: their characteristics and uses,’ Margaf (Weikersheim, Germany). Moore, C.G. (1983): ‘Improving soil productivity in the Senegalese peanut basin: a farming systems analysis,’ MS Thesis: 56-121 (Cornell University, College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, Ithaca, NY) Samba, S., Arona, Ndiaye, Camirè, Claude & Margolis, H.A. (2001): ‘Allometry and rainfall inception of Cordylla pinnata in semi-arid agroforestry parkland, Senegal,’ Forest Ecology and Management, 154: 277-288. Stroorvogel, J.J., Kempen, B., Heuvelink, C.R.M. & de Bruin, S. (2009): ‘Implementation and evaluation of existing knowledge for digital soil mapping in Senegal,’ Geoderma, 149: 161-170.

154

Matthew Gates

Appendix 1: French Terms Divisions of Land Administration in Senegal (in descending order of size) Region Department Arondissment Communauté Rurale (ADPs, it should again be noted, are unofficial divisions used by World Vision. Most are roughly equal to two Comunauté Rurals in size. Cfa (cfa franc) - Communitaire Financial African franc- the common currency of Senegal, Mali, Niger, Togo, and Burkina Faso. At the time of writing, 500 cfa francs was approximately equal in value of one US dollar. Appendix 2: Dates and Locations of Interviews and Observations (all 2011) January 22- Keur Ali Lobè, Koumbida Sosè January 22- Korky Bambara January 26- Caravan de Sensibilization January 27-30- Ecological survey (1/27 interview in Koumbida Makata) February 31- February 1- Caravan de Sensibilization February 2- Korky Bambara February 4- Koumbida Peul, Koumbida Socè œ February 5- Wendè, Mbadè Wolof February 7- Kaffrine (Andrè Jiatta) February 8-9- Caravan de Sensibilization February 10- Keur Lion Lobè, Keur Lion Ramattan February 11- Ngodiba (Omar Ndao) February 17 – Ndiba Ngaihen (Aliou Sisè of Mabo) an Firgui (Aliou Dem) February 22- Soto February 23- Soto, Jessum February 24- Kaffrine (Peter Weston) 155

The Promise and Challenges of…

February 25- Soto February 26- Keur Mbouki March 1- Mpeuleup, Jatta Fakha March 2- Kaffrine, Pierre Njay March 4- Ngui March 5- Mabo, Diamafada March 8- Keba Keur Lione March 9- Keur Lione Ramattan

156

CHAPTER SEVEN In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The Struggle in the Sahara-Sahel and West Africa against Jihadists, Transnational Criminal Networks, Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism John Bedu Woode The events which culminated in the January, 2013, French intervention in Mali are the latest in a long train of conflicts that have marked the history of the Sahara-Sahel region of West Africa. Owing to its location at the critical fulcrum for much of the commercial and cultural intercourse between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, the region is often contested ground for prevailing global currents, the results of which tend to reverberate throughout West Africa. These historical antecedents continue to shape the socio-economic and geopolitical contours of the region including the current influx of fundamentalist Salafi (as opposed to Sufi) Islamic ideology, and the use of the historical commercial geography and practices of the region for transnational criminal enterprises as a means of financing the avowed jihadist goal of establishing an Islamic caliphate and the imposition of strict Sharia law across the region (Polgreen, 2013). The possibility of an Islamic caliphate that is potentially hospitable to sworn enemies of the West such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has increased tensions and drawn Western powers into the contest for the Sahara-Sahel. The Sahara-Sahel is a conduit for trade (both licit and illicit) and a crossroads of cultures and religions dating into antiquity. Ancient scholars such as Pliny the Elder as well as later travelers like Ibn Batuta (Beagon, 1992; Bently, 1993) inform us of the great movement of people and commerce from one side of the continent to the otherwith caravans of gold, slaves, ivory and tropical goods moving from West Africa to the great Mediterranean ports and the Arabian Peninsula. In return the caravans brought back salt from the mines in 157

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The…

North Africa as well as goods from Europe and beyond – thus, giving birth to what became known as the Great Trans-Sahara Trade. The trade routes that transected the vast expanse of the Sahara desert were already established from ancient times (Figure 1). Indeed, the volume of trade was of sufficient magnitude and importance to the Roman Empire, for example, that in the time of Emperor Hadrian, he sought to ensure its security as well as to regulate and derive tax revenue from it through the construction of the Fossatum Africae (the African Trench) which stretched across Northern Africa (Everitt, 2009). But it was not only the Romans who placed great importance on the trans-Saharan trade routes. The routes were strategically located by watering holes, desert oases and places that facilitated the logistics for the gathering and distribution of goods. Control of such key arteries of trade soon gave rise to city-states which eventually became empires known for their wealth and influence. By the late seventh and early eighth centuries, several powerful kingdoms and empires had sprung up in the Sahara-Sahel with most centered around the Niger River bend. The empire of Ghana (which gives its name to the modern West African nation of Ghana) is regarded as the earliest of these wealthy West African empires, flourishing well into the eleventh century. In The Book of Routes and Kingdoms, the eleventh century Andalusian geographer and historian, Abu Ubayd Al Bakri, described Ghana as being known to North Africans as the ‘Land of Gold’ and was said to ‘possess sophisticated methods of administration and taxation, large armies, and a monopoly over notoriously well-concealed gold mines’ (The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000). Under increasing military pressure and incursions by the Arabic Almoravid (Al Murabitun) dynasty of Spain and northwestern Africa, the influence and power of Ghana eventually waned (Levtzion & Hopkins, 2000). Successive empires came into being in the region included Mali (twelfth to fourteenth centuries) and Songhai (fifteenth to sixteenth centuries). Arab traders and their religion greatly influenced the growth of these early kingdoms as well as the eventual denouement 158

John Bedu Woode

of their power (Eisenstadt, 1988). Arab explorations, establishment of centers of education and institutions of culture such as those found today in Timbuktu, Mali, along with the aggressive propagation of their religion-sometimes at the point of the sword-were instrumental in establishing the ‘cultural norms which would continue into the present day in the Sahel’ (Norman, 2012:1). While the Al Moravids sowed the early seeds of Islam in West Africa, it was mainly the Sufi Islamic sect who, under the banner of the Tijaniyyah (or theTijani jihad), spearheaded the spread of Islam across the region, taking in modern day Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Guinea, Burkina Faso, the northern areas of Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Nigeria and Sudan in the east (Figure 2). Thus, these long ago and often violent encounters across the Sahara between the largely animist native West Africans and the Islamist Arabs from North Africa, the Mediterranean and the Arabian Peninsula significantly shaped and still animate the socio-political landscape of the Sahara-Sahel region. The religious wars waged by the native Fulani Islamists (the Fulani jihads) in the early nineteenth century cemented the place of Islam in the Sahara-Sahel.

159

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The… Figure 1: Trans-Sahara Trade Routes circa 1250-1500

Source: Roland Anthony Oliver and Anthony Altmore, Medieval Africa, 1250-1800 (New York, NY & Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 92.

What was the rationale for these religious wars which spelled the end of the Sahelian empires of West Africa and continue even today to exert centrifugal force on the established national order in the 160

John Bedu Woode

modern states of the Sahara-Sahel? Chroniclers of the life of Al Hajj Umar al Futi Tal, a prominent figure in the Fulani jihads, offer the following: ‘He combined the greater holy war (jihad al-akbar) against the ego-self (nafs) with the lesser war of arms (jihad al-asghar) in the hope of establishing a Muslim empire of justice and peace in West Africa’ (Wright, 2013:1). The objective of overthrowing the existing form of governance to usher in a new order that is solicitous of the welfare of the people has over time served as the motive for many revolutions and rebellions in West Africa. However, the ensuing events, including the Tuareg rebellion of 2012, which precipitated the crisis leading to the 2013 intervention by France, have often ushered in unforeseen consequences which have proven to be more deleterious than the conditions they sought to ameliorate. It is worth noting that the recent violent efforts by the Salafists (with their strict fundamentalist interpretation of Islam) to gain ascendancy represents yet another upheaval in a region that has, over centuries, evolved a syncretic accommodation with the relatively liberal codes of Sufi Islam. The sudden and violent insistence by the Salafists on a new orthodoxy has been wrenching for the people in the region. For example, in the wake of the Islamist takeover of the city of Gao in Northern Mali, Omar Ould Hamaha, a leader of the Ansar Dine militant group, was quoted as saying-‘…Sharia does not require a majority vote. It's not democracy. It's the divine law that was set out by God to be followed by his slaves. One hundred percent of the north of Mali is Muslim, and even if they don't want this, they need to go along with it’ (Thiolay, 2012:40-41). As a direct result of the Tuareg rebellion of 2012 (later hi-jacked by various militant Islamic factions), West Africa, a region whose history is fraught with ‘wars of liberation,’ is again witnessing another such conflict financed and fueled by predatory criminal activity upon the very people in whose name and for whose ‘liberation’ the war is supposedly being waged. From 1989 through 2003, ‘blood diamonds’ or ‘conflict diamonds’ came to symbolize the tragic circumstances in which the mineral resource of the land was 161

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The…

used to finance the terror perpetrated against the people by rebel elements in their efforts to unseat incumbent governments deemed unworthy of the people. Thus, diamonds mined in the war zones, often by impressed labor, were sold to unscrupulous foreign interests and the proceeds used to finance the protracted conflicts that raged in the Mano River basin of West Africa for over a decade. Amnesty International (2013) reports that ‘profits from the trade in conflict diamonds, worth billions of dollars, were also used by warlords and rebels to buy arms during the devastating wars in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sierra Leone. Wars that have cost an estimated 3.7 million lives.’ While the current conflict in the Sahara-Sahel has so far not been shown to involve large quantities of contraband diamonds, evidence suggests that the Islamist militants, who until recently held sway over wide swaths of the region, are actively engaged in illegal activities, including kidnapping, murder, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, cigarette smuggling, bribery and corruption-the proceeds of which are then laundered to finance and sustain their avowed aim of imposing fundamentalist Islam in the region (Frintz, 2013). Despite a growing framework of regulatory and enforcement mechanisms [ECOWAS’ Intergovernmental Action Group Against Money Laundering or GIABA, Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF)] as well as commitments to regional and international treaties aimed at interdicting transnational criminal networks and their ability to engage in money laundering, West African governments have so far been unable to effectively combat the laundering of the proceeds of cross-border criminal activity and to prevent the use of such funds in waging the bloody conflicts that perennially beset the region. There is little doubt that the violent events that began in January, 2013, in the Sahara-Sahel now have the attention of the rest of the world, especially Europe and the United States. Observers (Lacher, 2012; Leymarie, 2010) had earlier warned that the slow but steady southward drift of radical Islamists into the wild ungoverned 162

John Bedu Woode

precincts of the Sahara-Sahel as a result of the Algerian government’s continuing crackdown on militants within its borders would, in time, embroil other countries whose national borders converge in the Sahara-Sahel. When the Algerian militant group known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) changed its name to Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to formally align itself with global Al Qaeda, the alarm bells in most Western and African capitals, while not silent, remained relatively muted. That is no longer the case. Alarmed by increasing evidence that the Islamists who had been in control of Northern Mali were about to overrun the rest of the country, France, the former colonial power in the region, launched a pre-emptive military intervention to not only halt the Islamist offensive, but also to dislodge them from areas in the north where they had imposed strict Sharia law on the populace. The daring attack on Algeria’s In Amenas gas field by Islamist militants at the onset of the French offensive resulted in the abduction and killing of several foreign workers including Americans and Europeans. An Al Qaeda affiliated group in the region later claimed that the attack was in retaliation for Algeria permitting France to use Algerian airspace in the offensive against the Islamists in Mali (Chikhi, 2013). For its part, France as far back as June, 2012, indicated that it would not stand idly by while the area drifted towards lawlessness and chaos. According to Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius-‘we have had Afghanistan, there should not be a Sahelistan’ (Europe 1, 2013)-a clear reference to the vast ungoverned provinces which attracted Islamist militants and terrorist groups to Afghanistan before the U.S. invasion in 2001. The January 28, 2013, signing of a Status of Forces Agreement between the United States and Niger ‘paves the way legally for US forces to operate on its (Niger’s) soil’ (Guardian.com, 2013: 1) including a base for American surveillance drones, thus underscoring the seriousness with which the West now views the situation in the Sahara-Sahel as well as the realization that Western military presence in the region may have to continue into the foreseeable future. 163

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The…

Although France has begun the process of withdrawing the bulk of the 4,000 troops it sent to Mali during Operation Serval, it plans to keep about 1,000 soldiers in Mali to support the multi-national stabilization effort under the umbrella of the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). The MINUSMA was established by Security Council resolution 2100 on April 25, 2013, to support political processes in Mali and to carry out a number of security-related tasks. Anticipating continued volatility in the region, the UN Security Council Resolution establishing the peace force for Mali also authorized possible re-intervention by France should the peacekeeping forces face ‘imminent and serious threat’ (MacFarquhar, 2013:1). The evolving situation in the Sahara-Sahel will continue to be assessed from multiple vantages in the hopes of bringing a measure of stability and quiescence to the area. Nevertheless, the focus of the West and African regional powers must telescope beyond the immediate exigency of removing Al Qaeda militants from the territory they control. The focus must be broad and flexible in order to fully comprehend and address the unique contours of conditions in the region which enable and sustain the spread of militancy, the genesis of which is often attributed to the on and off rebellions by the ethnic Tuareg to carve out an autonomous enclave in the Northern part of Mali. The effort by the Tuareg to achieve an ethnic homeland and political self-determination has been ongoing since Mali’s independence from France in 1960 and currently finds its expression in the rebel Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA) which unleashed the current sequence of unhappy events engulfing the Sahara-Sahel. The generative conditions for the crisis in the Sahara-Sahel are many and wide spread across an area which encompasses the southern portion of the world’s largest desert, the Sahara (3.3 million square miles or approximately 25 percent of the African land mass) and a large swath of West Africa, including the countries of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, parts of Nigeria and parts of Senegal. Away from the national capitals and major cities, the already 164

John Bedu Woode

critical humanitarian situation in the sparsely populated hinterlands, long ignored by the national governments, is now quite dire as millions in the area suffer from extreme poverty and food insecurity exacerbated by violence attendant to ethnic rivalries, a growing population of young people, competition for scarce resources and limited avenues to legitimate economic opportunities (Guterres, 2012). Into this governance vacuum have stepped non-governmental actors who until recently ‘roam uncontested; terrorist and criminal organizations exploit safe havens to plan and conduct attacks and traffic in weapons and other illicit materials’ (VOA.gov, 2013: 1). Abdelkader Abderrahmane (2012: 1) informs us that ‘indeed for many years now, terrorists and drug traffickers have been synergizing their respective illegal activities, transforming the Sahel into a narcoterrorist zone. As a result, the Sahel has become a dangerous crossroads for drugs, crime, terrorism and insurgency’ (Figure 3).

165

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The… Figure 2: The Sahara-Sahel

Source: New York Times February 1, 2013

166

John Bedu Woode Figure 3: Pre-French Intervention Areas of Concern in Mali – Cities/Oases and Major Events 2001-2009

Map: Anneli Botha, Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism, ISS Monograph Series, no. 144, June 2008, 72.

While AQIM and other Islamist militants in the region make a show of the banner of fundamentalism, Spencer (2013) contends that their role in the burgeoning transnational criminal activity in the Sahara-Sahel has become a raison d’etre: 167

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The…

despite their recent military ventures, AQIM and other Al-Qaeda-inspired groups, such as the Malian Tuareg Ansar Eddine or the recently formed Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), are better seen as the instigators of the past decade’s upsurge in regional criminality rather than as a united ‘franchise’ in pursuit of Islamist goals. As demonstrated by the internecine quarrels that provoked the formation of breakaway militias by the now notorious Moktar Belmoktar, these groups appear to be far from united. They may now close ranks under concerted international pressure and the attendant publicity attracted to their cause. What they will still compete over, however, is control over the trans-regional networks of crime they have collectively established. The accumulation of wealth-rather than al-Qaeda’s jihadist appeal-is what has succeeded in tipping the regional balance away from the Sahel’s weak and ineffective governments towards a wider array of light-footed and well-funded non-state actors (p.1).

Spencer’s perspective is further collaborated by Aissatou Fall’s analysis of how putative liberation movements in West Africa have evolved from their originally espoused ideological goals into mainly criminal enterprises. In Understanding The Casamance Conflict: A Background, Fall (2010: 31) describes the agenda of the long-standing umbrella organization fighting for the autonomy of the Southern Senegalese province of Casamance, Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) ‘as having moved from independence claim to a greed agenda favored by the circulation of money within the maquis, corruption of some of the factions, and a flourishing war economy based on cannabis cultivation and drug trafficking, arms and several other types of trafficking in goods along the borders with Guinea Bissau and The Gambia.’ Much like their counterparts further south in the forested environs of the Senegalese Casamance, the Islamist militants in the Sahara-Sahel are reaping considerable wealth from kidnapping Europeans and other foreign tourists as well as providing protection for a fee to the transnational drug traffickers who use the unpoliced deserts as a trans-shipment point to Europe and beyond. The UN Office on Drug Crimes or UNODC (2007) ‘estimated that some 27% (or some 40 tons) of the cocaine consumed annually in Europe is presently transiting West Africa. This amount is worth about US$ 1.8 168

John Bedu Woode

billion at wholesale level.’ Many of these shipments pass through the Sahara-Sahel on their onward journey to Europe and beyond. UNODC also reports that in 2012 alone the transactions involving cocaine translated into more than $500 million in local profits which were laundered and spent in West Africa. In addition to its protection-for-fee service, AQIM has reportedly raked in about $70 million in ransom money from kidnappings since 2006 (Goita, 2011). Other security experts estimate that the group has been paid around $130 million in ransom payments (Money Jihad, 2011). In a region of extreme poverty, this flood of cash has enabled AQIM, especially the faction formerly led by Abdelhamid Abu Zeid (killed on February 22, 2013, by Chadian Forces in the Adrar des Ifoghas Mountains of Northern Mali) to carry forward their jihadist project through bribery, co-option of officials and easy recruitment of child soldiers. Kustusch (2012) estimates that ‘AQIM spends around $2 million each month on weapons, vehicles, and payoffs to families whose children join local katibas, or combat branches … the network pays families in northern Mali around $600 per child soldier, followed by monthly payments of $400 if the child remains engaged in active combat.’ Indeed, Magharebia, a regional online magazine, reported in an October 11, 2010, feature article that AQIM has become so financially successful that it is providing funds back to the global Al Qaeda network. The large sums of money generated by the illicit yet synergistic relationship between the jihadists and the transnational criminal organizations cannot find full purchase or serve its intended purposes unless it finds its way into the formal economy. This is usually achieved through money laundering. Money laundering (ML) is a means of concealing the proceeds of criminal activity and, in the case of terrorism, a means of funding. According to Moodley (2008), this engenders a complex challenge for governments to effectively link criminal activity with the proceeds thereof on one hand and on the other to track the flow of funds into terrorist activity in order to identify sponsors of terrorism. 169

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The…

The International Monetary Fund (IMF 2010: 1) stipulates that ‘Money laundering is a process by which the illicit source of assets obtained or generated by criminal activity is concealed to obscure the link between the funds and the original criminal activity.’ Ezeani (n.d.) argues that in the case of West Africa, ML activities have thrived especially because of weak or poor controls, the increasing use of electronic and instant money transfer methods and the carrying on of most commercial transactions outside the formal economy. Furthermore, the fact that most financial transactions in the region are cash-based contributes to the prevalence of ML. Although it is intertwined with ML and shares the underlying feature of criminality, the Financing of Terrorism (FT) presents a different challenge to its suppression. Unlike ML, FT generally involves financial flows originating from legitimate activities to support illegitimate activities (Gardner, 2007). While ML aims at concealing the origin and ownership of funds generated through illegal means, FT, on the other hand, involves direct or indirect financing of criminal acts of violence or intimidation of populations. Thus, FT conceals the destination of the funds. Generally speaking then, ML involves rendering illegitimate funds legitimate while FT tends to the reverse-legitimate funds converted to illegimate use. That is, until the situation in the SaharaSahel flipped the script on the financing of terrorism. Gardner’s analysis of FT had been generally true until the intense post 9/11 efforts at combating FT through the international banking and financial system took hold. The terrorists, therefore, had to adapt their fundraising methods. No longer did FT flow predominantly from the activities associated with legitimate practice of Islamic charity as dictated by the Quranic edicts of Zakat (almsgiving), Sedekah (donations) and Waqf (religious endowment). The intense surveillance brought to bear on the Islamic charities through mechanisms like the 2001 U.S. Patriot Act with its extra-territorial reach severely constricted the financial flows to Al Qaeda and other global jihadist groups. Alternate means of financing had to be found – aided by the timely and convenient issuance of fatwas by sympathetic 170

John Bedu Woode

islamist clerics such as Sheik Yusuf al-Qaradawi (sometimes called the ‘Theologian of Terror’) endorsing and granting religious dispensation to acts committed against or at the expense of the infidels-even if the Quran itself specifically proscribes such activities as haram or forbidden. Religious dispensations notwithstanding, these criminal activities and their concomitants exact tremendous tolls on the societies in which they are committed. ML is critical to the ability of any organized criminal enterprise. An uninterrupted flow of funds is required to maintain operations. But in their efforts to obtain funds, criminals, be they arms, drug and human traffickers, terrorists, blackmailers, credit card or advance fee swindlers, employ methods and techniques that have direct and often deleterious effects on the economic and social fabric of the societies in which they operate. According to McDowell and Novis (2001:1) ML has a: Corrosive effect on a country’s economy, government, and social well-being. It distorts business decisions, increases the risk of bank failures, takes control of economic policy away from the government, harms a country’s reputation, and exposes its people to drug trafficking, smuggling, and other criminal activity. Given the technological advantages money launderers now employ, a high level of cooperation is necessary to keep them in check.

In the face of such grave threats and high costs to national security and dislocations in the socio-economic fabric entailed by the transnational criminal activities ranging over their national borders, why haven’t the governments in West Africa so far been able to stem the practice of money laundering and the use of the proceeds for terrorism and the sustainment of regional conflicts? On a functional level, the governments in West Africa, much like their counterparts elsewhere in the world, have joined the growing global effort to combat ML and FT under the general rubric of AML/CFT-AntiMoney Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism. The gravity of the situation in West Africa prompted the ECOWAS community to underscore its concerns in the preamble to

171

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The…

the ECOWAS ‘Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security:’ Convinced that cross-border crimes, the proliferation of small arms and all illicit trafficking contribute to the development of insecurity and instability and jeopardize the economic and social development of the sub-region [and] … that these phenomena constitute serious social and economic problems which can only be resolved within the framework of increased and wellcoordinated multilateral cooperation (p. 2)

Realizing the increasingly deleterious effect that organized transnational criminal activity and the associated laundering of huge sums of money was having on the stability, security and sustainable economic development of the region, ECOWAS began a series of steps in the 1990s to confront the emerging threat. In October, 1998, the ECOWAS Heads of State and Government concluded their 21st Summit in Abuja, Nigeria, with a declaration titled Community Flame Ceremony-The Fight against Drugs to galvanize the region into action. Among the actions taken was the establishment of the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA). Established as a specialized institution within ECOWAS, GIABA (2012: 1) ‘is responsible for the strengthening [of] the capacity of member states towards the prevention and control of money laundering and terrorist financing in the region.’ There was a clear recognition of the need for concerted regional action to prevent what Alldridge (2008) termed ‘regulatory arbitrage,’ moving money from one jurisdiction to another to take advantage of the least restrictive regulatory environment for laundering. The goal was therefore quite simple: if all the states in the region adopted and enforced the same regulatory regime, criminals would have a tougher time laundering the proceeds of their activities. At a 2005 meeting of the GIABA Ministerial ad hoc committee in Abuja, Nigeria, comments made by Mallam Nuhu Ribadu offered a succinct summary of the idea: ‘at this point in the war on money laundering, we need a crossborder collective action for effectiveness. If you do something on your own side and leave the others, you can be rest assured that there will be a spillage. There will be no success. The criminals easily move to 172

John Bedu Woode

another country where they may not have the capacity to deal with the crime. The world must come together to have one common strategy or capacity, one common platform…’ (Obayuwana, 2005:1) To date the governments of West Africa have committed themselves to the goals of GIABA and multiple global agreements such as the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the Vienna Convention); the 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention); 1999 UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism; the 2003 UN Convention Against Corruption and the FATF 40+9 Recommendations. So far, however, they have been unable to effectively counter the double scourge of ML/FT as measured by the official results of the Mutual Evaluations GIABA has conducted of its member countries. As part of the effort to harmonize the global AML/CFT effort, the Mutual Evaluation, an intensive peer review process developed under the auspices of the World Bank, IMF and the Paris-based FATF is used to assess the efficacy of a nation’s AML/CFT processes against the FATF 40+9 Recommendations which are generally seen as the global AML/CFT standard. GIABA’s goal is to use the Mutual Evaluation process to foster the creation of conditions conducive to the implementation of a uniform and effective AML/CFT regime across West Africa. A cursory review of the published Mutual Evaluation reports of the ECOWAS countries indicates that in West Africa the relevant conditions are very much in their infancy and will therefore require careful nurturing to come up to the same level as those that obtain in the developed countries. The chart that follows indicates how the countries in West Africa performed on the five key indicators deemed to hold the core principles of the FATF 40+9 Recommendations. The results show that the countries in the region are in the main not up to the mark in meeting the global standards. Senegal is the only country in the region whose aggregate performance score is Largely Compliant and acceptable. 173

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The… Table: Avg. Compliance Ranking of GIABA Member Countries

Rank

Country

Avg.Compliance

Compliance Level

1 2 3 4 5 5 6 7 7 7 8 9 10 10 11

Senegal Gambia Niger Nigeria Benin Togo Burkina Faso *Cote d’Ivoire Ghana Mali Cape Verde Liberia Guinea Bissau Sierra Leone *Guinea Conakry

0.67 0.40 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.14

Largely Compliant Partially Compliant Partially Compliant Partially Compliant Non Compliant Non Compliant Non Compliant Non Compliant Non Compliant Non Compliant Non Compliant Non compliant Non Compliant Non Compliant Non Compliant

Note: *Assessment based on KnowYourCountry Reports. GIABA Mutual Evaluation Reports were unavailable at the time of writing. Source: Compiled by author from GIABA Reports

In measuring performance on the Mutual Evaluation an assessment of Non-Compliant (NC) is scored as zero, Partially Compliant (PC) at 0.33, Largely Compliant (LC) at 0.67 and Compliant (C) at 1.0 respectively. It is important to note that on the specific criteria concerned with combating the financing of terrorism [Member states enact CFT regulations criminalizing terrorist financing with special attention to legislation freezing and confiscating terrorist assets – (FATF Special Recommendations I, II, III, V)], the performance results were also not up to the mark as 7 of the 15 ECOWAS countries had overall performance score of zero or Non-Compliant. Senegal again came in ahead in this section of the evaluation with two scores of Partially Compliant and two of Largely Compliant. The remaining seven countries came up with a patchwork of Partial Compliance. 174

John Bedu Woode

The relatively low compliance scores indicate that, as a group, the ECOWAS countries are far from being fully compliant with the global AML/CFT standards. The performance scores ranging from 0.31 through 0.14 earned by 11 of the 15 ECOWAS countries fall far short of the goal of full compliance and are thus indicative of the enormous task facing GIABA and West Africa as a whole in combating the twin scourges of ML/FT. Many reasons have been adduced to explain the poor regional performance. In addition to the weaknesses listed above, other challenges militate against the effective implementation of AML/CFT in West Africa, namely: 1. Environmental Challenges: Large porous and unsecured borders tend to favor the activities of Transnational Criminal Organizations who engage not only in the commission of the predicate crimes to ML and FT but also take advantage of the disparate laws and regulatory environment among the countries to engage in ‘regulatory arbitrage’ and low levels of awareness of money laundering among officials and the majority of the citizenry. 2. Nature of the Economy: Most financial activities in the region are cash based and therefore transactional records related to the movement of funds are rudimentary, therefore allowing prevalence of informal/black markets and heavy reliance on alternative remittance systems or informal value transfer systems. As currently constructed, the global AML/CFT regime relies significantly on the tracing of financial flows through financial and banking systems. 3. Technological Changes: West Africa, like the rest of the world, finds itself immersed in the wave of globalization and the surging speed of technological applications in financial transactions. While the use of these emergent transactional technologies provides a measure of anonymity for criminals in the movement, transfer and exchange of illicit funds and has become an area of concern for regulators, the formal financial 175

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The…

and banking networks remain significant conduits for the transfer of illicit funds (Shehu, 2011). One of the salient features of the region which continuously appears as an inhibitory factor in GIABA’s effort to aggressively implement a uniform AML/CFT regime across West Africa is the issue of low capacity. The FATF characterizes a low capacity country (LCC) as being a low-income country faced with the following challenges: 1. Competing priorities for scarce government resources: LCCs suffer from acute competition for scarce governmental resources, meaning AML/CFT implementation must compete for limited resources with high priority issues affecting basic living conditions in the country. 2. Severe lack of resources and skilled workforce to implement government programs: [Mutual] Evaluation reports to date suggest that within LCCs government agencies in general suffer a severe lack of both material and human resources, which has a detrimental impact on the effective implementation of AML/CFT measures. 3. Overall weakness in legal institutions: The legal and institutional framework in LCCs tends to be weak and lack technical resources. 4. Dominant informal sector and cash-based economy: The majority of economic activity takes place in the informal sector. Most transactions, large and small, are settled in cash and the infrastructure for use of other methods of payments is not fully developed. 5. Poor documentation and data retention systems: LCCs lack adequate documentation and data retention systems, and there are serious impediments to basic customer identification, verification and record keeping. 6. Very small financial sector: LCCs are characterized by a very small financial sector with a limited exposure to the international financial system. 176

John Bedu Woode

Given the acknowledged lack of resources and how far they have to go to achieve acceptable performance in the Mutual Evaluations, it would be unrealistic in the short to medium term to expect the countries in West Africa to quickly ramp up their national systems to fully meet the requirements of the global AML/CFT regime. The multiplicity of competing priorities for meager national budgets imposes too great a challenge for these countries to be able to marshal the amount of resources required for an accelerated implementation of the standards. The pace at which the still highly cash-based and informal national economies grow to engender increased formalization of the banking and financial systems will also affect the level of performance since about half of the FATF standards pertain to a developed financial sector. The FATF itself admits to the saliency of this challenge ‘… [Since] the FATF standards presume a level of formality in the economy’ (FATF, 2000: 5). For the LCCs, this represents a veritable Catch 22 situation, in the sense that the very thing that they are in dire need of (money) in order to be able to put into place the requisite measures to prevent the misuse of their economies is what is being taken out of their national coffers in huge amounts through money laundering, embezzlement and other forms of high corruption by public officials, transnational criminal organizations and other non-state actors like the jihadists currently waging a campaign of terror in the Sahara-Sahel. Implementation of the global AML/CFT standards requires strong political commitment not only to begin but also to maintain the pace of reforms. This places a lot of the burden on high government officials and political leadership to assure its realization. However, among the major factors that militate against the implementation of the FATF standards in West Africa, the problem of endemic corruption and official malfeasance along with the seeming lack of political will to effectively deal with the problem stands paramount. Corruption in official circles and in the private sector overshadows and impedes the effort to counter ML/FT in West Africa. It is fair to assume that corruption manifests itself all over the world, but the 177

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The…

corrupt practices that obtain in West Africa are pervasive from the ordinary man and woman in the street to the corridors of power where it is has evolved a most brazen and pernicious form. As a result, most of the states in West Africa are perennially ranked by Transparency International (2012) in the lower echelons of global indices for poor governance and corruption. The compliance levels recorded in West Africa’s first round of mutual evaluations are very low when compared to what obtains in the more developed economies. Nevertheless, by getting all the countries in the region to agree to commit to the very rigorous requirements of the Mutual Evaluation, GIABA has set the region on a unified path towards dealing with the threat of ML/FT. In Globalization and its Enemies, Daniel Cohen argues that whenever a traditionalist civilization comes into contact with a more assertive one, the former is more likely to be adversely affected, not because the latter is ‘more advanced’ but rather because the interloper is ‘protected against the perverse effects of its (own) systems’ ( 2006:4). Situated at the pivotal center between North Africa and subSaharan Africa, the Sahara-Sahel, to the present day, has experienced centuries of such contacts-some of which have not inured to the welfare of the region and have rather engendered much dislocation in Sahelian society. The powerful new global currents discussed in this chapter will no doubt also leave their mark on the Sahara-Sahel. The arrival of Salafist Islamic ideology, along with the violence perpetrated by its adherents is a major challenge to the syncretic brand of Islam long practiced by the majority of Muslims in the region. The determination of the Western powers to check the growth of anti-Western sentiments will see their continued military presence in the region. Conveniently located halfway between Latin America and Europe, the largely unsecured Sahara-Sahel has of late become the entrepôt of choice for the Latin American drug cartels on their way to the lucrative drug markets of Europe. The burgeoning drug trade and attendant influx of large sums of illegal cash has exposed the region

178

John Bedu Woode

and indeed all of West Africa to many of the pernicious effects of money laundering enumerated by McDowell and Novis (2001). Against this background of seemingly unending encounters with powerful global currents which have often convulsed and created unwelcome dislocations in their society, the people of the SaharaSahel and West Africa in general have found ways to adapt and cohere their indigenous systems to the new. An optimistic outlook leads this observer to conclude that concerted action by the West African states, in tandem with assistance from well-meaning international partners, would go a long way in helping combat the pernicious effects of these encounters. Such unity of action is already on display in the cooperative effort among ECOWAS, the United Nations, France, the United States and other countries to ensure political stability and to create the conditions for economic development in the region.

References Abderrahmane, A. (2012), ‘The Sahel: A Crossroads between Criminality and Terrorism,’ Actuelles de L’Ifri [Online] Available from: http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=7401. Accessed on February 2, 2013. Alldridge, P. (2008): ‘Money Laundering and Globalization,’ Journal of Law and Society, 35 (4), 437-463. Amnesty International (2013), ‘Conflict Diamonds.’ Amnesty International USA [Online]. Available from: http://www.amnesty usa.org/our-work/issues/business-and-human-rights/oil-gas-andmining-industries/conflict-diamonds. Accessed on February 28, 2013. Beagon, M. (1992): Roman Nature: The Thought of Pliny the Elder (Oxford: Clarendon Press).

179

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The…

Bently, J. (1993): Old World Encounters: Cross-Cultural Contacts and Exchanges in Pre-Modern Time (New York: Oxford University Press). Botha A. (2008), Terrorism in the Maghreb: The Transnationalisation of Domestic Terrorism, ISS Monograph Series, no. 144, June 2008, 72. Figure 3. Available from: http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstre am/123456789/30987/1/MONO144FULL.pdf?1 Chikhi, L. (2013), ‘Dozens Held after Islamists Attack Algerian Gas Field,’ Reuters [Online] Available from: http://www.reuters.com/ar ticle/2013/01/16/us-algeria-kidnap-idUSBRE90F0HB20130116. Accessed on February 2, 2013. Cohen, D. (2006): Globalization and its Enemies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). ECOWAS website, [Online] Available from: GIABA website. [Online] Available from: http://www.ecowas.int/ Europe 1. (2012), Laurent Fabius: ‘Non au Sahelistan,’ Europe 1[Online] Available from: http://www.europe1.fr/International/Fa bius-non-au-Sahelistan-E1-1159723/. Accessed on February 10, 2013. Eisenstadt, S.N. et al. (1988): The Early State in African Perspectives (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill Publishers). Everitt, A. (2009): Hadrian and the Triumph of Rome (New York, NY: Random House). Ezeani, R. (n.d), ‘Impact of International and Domestic Laws on Money Laundering Activities in the ECOWAS: A Legal Perspective’ [Online]. Available from: http://aeandelegal.com/dyn amicdata/flash/MONEY%20LAUNDERING%20in%20Ecowas%20 reviewed.pdf Fall, A. (2010): ‘Understanding the Casamance Conflict: A Background,’ KAIPTC Monograph No.7. FATF website, [Online] Available from: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/ Frintz, A. (2013), ‘Drugs: The New Alternative Economy of West Africa,’ Le Monde Diplomatique [Online]. Available from: http://mondediplo.com/2013/02/03drugs. Accessed on February 12, 2013. 180

John Bedu Woode

Gardner, K. (2007): ‘Fighting Terrorism the FATF Way,’ Global Governance, 3, 325-345. GIABA website, [Online] Available from: http://www.giaba.org/giaba /giaba_whatfor.php Goita, M. (2011), ‘West Africa’s Growing Terrorist Threat: Confronting AQIM’s Sahelian Strategy,’ African Center for Strategic Studies [Online] Available from: http://africacenter.org/2 011/03/asb_11_eng/. Accessed on February 10, 2013. Guardian.com.UK (2013), ‘US Signs Deal with Niger to Operate Military Drones in West African State’ [Online]. Available from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/29/niger-approvesamerican-surveillance-drones. Accessed on February 12, 2013. Guterres, A. (2012): ‘Why Mali Matters,’ The New York Times, September 4. IMF Website.,[Online] Available from: http://www.imf.org/external/n p/leg/amlcft/eng/aml1.htm. Accessed on February 10, 2013. Kustusch, T. (2012), ‘AQIM’s Funding Sources-Kidnapping, Ransom, and Drug running by Gangster Jihadists. 361Security.com [Online ]. Available from: http://www.361security.com/2/post/2012/11/aqi ms-funding-sources-kidnapping-ransom-and-drug-running-bygangster-jihadists.html. Accessed on February 20, 2013. Lascher, W. (2012): ‘Organized Crime and Conflict in the Sahel-Sahara Region,’ The Carnegie Papers, September. Levtzion, N. and Hopkins, J., eds. (2000): Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West Africa (New York, NY: Marcus Weiner Press). Leymarie, P. (2012), ‘The Sahel Falls Apart,’ Le Monde Diplomatique [Online] Available from: http://mondediplo.com/2012/04/05sahel. Accessed on February 12, 2013. MacFarquhar, N. (2013): ‘U.N. Votes to Establish Peacekeeping Force for Mali,’ The New York Times, April 25. Magharebia (2010), Al-Qaeda Looks to Sahel for New Funding Sources. Magharebia.com [Online] Available from: http://www.m agharebia.com/cocoon/awi/xhtml1/en_GB/features/awi/features/2 010/11/10/feature-01. Accessed on February 20, 2013. 181

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The…

McDowell, J. and Novis, G. (2001), ‘The Consequences of Money Laundering and Financial Crime,’ Economic Perspectives, U.S. Department of State. [Online] Available from: http://usinfo.state.g ov/journals/ites/0501/ijec/state1.htm. Accessed on June 16, 2010. Money Jihad (2011), ‘Dinner Interrupted by Gun-wielding Kidnappers,’ Combating Terrorist Financing [Online] Available from: http://moneyjihad.wordpress.com/tag/aqim/.Accessed on February 12, 2013. Moodley, M. (2008): ‘The Extent and Security Implications of Money Laundering in South Africa,’ Strategic Review for Southern Africa, 2, 65-86. Metropolitan Museum of Art - New York (2000), Department of Arts of Africa, Oceania, and the Americas: ‘The Empires of the Western Sudan: Ghana Empire,’ in Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History, New York http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/ghan/hd_ghan.htm Norman, I. (2012), ‘The Sahel - A Brief History of its Empires and Peoples.’ Takouba Research Society [Online] Available from: http://takouba.org/sahel-peoples-culture-intro/. Accessed on May 24, 2013. The NY Times (February 1, 2013), ‘Islamists’ Harsh Rule Awakened Ethnic Tensions in Timbuktu. Figure 2. Available from:http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2013/02/01/world/afric a/01mali.html Oliver, R.A. and Altmore, A. (2001): Medieval Africa, 1250-1800 (New York, NY & Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press). Obayuwana, O. (2005), ‘West Africa: ECOWAS to Step up Action on Money Laundering,’ The Guardian (Nigeria), May 4. Available fromhttp://www.afrika.no/noop/page.php?p=Detailed/9703&print =1 Polgreen, L. (2013): ‘Islamists’ Harsh Rule Awakened Ethnic Tensions in Timbuktu,’ the NY Times, February 1. Shehu, A. (2011), ‘Implementation of UNSCR 1373 (2001) in West Africa: Issues and Challenges,’ presented at UNCTED Meeting, New York, U.S.A., September 28.

182

John Bedu Woode

Spencer, C. (2013), ‘Combating Terror Across the Sahel,’ Chatham House [Online] Available from: http://www.chathamhouse.org/m edia/comment/view/188675.Accessed on February 12, 2013. Thiolay, B. (2012), ‘Le djihad du ‘Barbu rouge’,’ L'Express: 40–41, October 5. [Online] Available from: http://www.lexpress.fr/actuali te/monde/afrique/mali-le-djihad-du-barbu-rouge_1170056.html Transparency International website, [Online] Available from: http://www.transparency.org/ UNODC West and Central Africa Website, [Online] Available from: http://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/index.html. Accessed on February 12, 2013. VOA.gov. (2013), ‘Conditions In The Sahel Deteriorating.’ [Online] Available from: http://editorials.voa.gov/content/conditions-insahel-deteriorating/1576147.html. Accessed on February 10, 2013. Wright, Z. (2013), Tijani Scholars, The Tariqa Tijaniyya., http://www.tijani.org/scholars/ Accessed on May 24, 2013.

List of Abbreviations AML AML/CFT

AQIM CFT DRC ECOWAS FATF FT FSRB GAFI

Anti-Money Laundering Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism. The global effort against money laundering sees the two as a single connected endeavor Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Combating the Financing of Terrorism Democratic Republic of Congo Economic Community for West Africa States Financial Action Task Force Financing of Terrorism FATF-Style Regional Body Groupe d’Action Financiere sur le Blanchiment de Capitaux (French Acronym for FATF) 183

In The Vortex of Blobal Currents: The…

GIABA

Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa GSPC Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat IMF International Monetary Fund LCC Low Capacity Country MENAFATF Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force MER Mutual Evaluation Report MFDC Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de la Casamance (Movement of the Democratic Forces of Casamance) MINUSMA Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali ML Money Laundering ML/FT Money Laundering/Financing of Terrorism MLNA Azawad National Liberation Movement MUJAO Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa NGO Non-Governmental Organization TCO Transnational Criminal Organization UN United Nations UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

NOTES ON THE AUTHORS Augustine C. Ohanwe: is an independent researcher. He holds a Ph.D. in International Politics. Horace Campbell: is Professor of African American Studies and Political Science at Syracuse University. Campbell is also the Special Invited Professor of International Relations at Tsinghua University, Beijing. He is the author of Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya: Lessons for Africa in the Forging of African Unity (Monthly Review Press, New York 2013). Dr. Campbell has published widely, more than a dozen monographs and over thirty book chapters. His most important book Rasta and Resistance: From 184

Marcus Garvey to Walter Rodney is going through its sixth edition. He has written on Reclaiming Zimbabwe: The Exhaustion of the Patriarchal Model of Liberation (David Phillip South Africa and Africa World Press, New Jersey 2003) and Pan Africanism, Pan Africanists and African Liberation in the 21st Century, (New Academia Publishers 2006). He has also published Barack Obama and Twenty First Century Politics: A Revolutionary Moment in the USA (Pluto Press, London 2010). John Bedu Woode: a native of Sekondi-Takoradi in Ghana, West Africa, is an independent researcher and currently a manager in Global Trade Controls with a major multinational aerospace corporation in the United States. As an International Regents Scholar, he received his B.S. in Business Administration from Missouri State University, Springfield, Missouri in 1979. He also holds an M.S. (Political Science) and an MBA (International Finance). He received his Ph.D. in Interdisciplinary Studies with emphasis in Public Policy from Union Institute & University, Cincinnati, Ohio in 2012. His primary research focus is the intersection of globalization, international trade policy, international financial controls, multinational regulatory regimes and their impact on Africa’s development. Rita Kiki Edozie: is Professor of International Relations and African Affairs at the James Madison College of Public Affairs and is Director of African American and African Studies (AAAS) at Michigan State University. Professor Edozie earned her PhD in Political Science at the New School for Social Research, New York City and was the Deputy Director of the Institute of African Studies at Columbia University (2001-2003). She is author of People Power and Democracy: the Nigerian Prodemocracy Movement (2002), Reconstructing the Third Wave of Democracy: Comparative African Democratic Politics (2008), Reframing Contemporary Africa: Politics, Culture, and Economics in a Global Era (2009), The African Union's Africa: New Pan African Initiatives in Global Governance (2014), and forthcoming Malcolm X 185

and the Black Studies Discipline: Discourse, Race, Identity and Blackworld Struggle (2014). Dr. Edozie is also author of several journal articles and book chapters in the comparative politics of Africa, global development, democratization, and Pan-African studies. Marcel Kitissou: is a Visiting Fellow with the Institute for African Development at Cornell University and a founding member of the International Consortium for Geopolitical Studies of the Sahel (http://sahelconsortium.wordpress.com). His research focus is on the interface of local and global politics. He has widely published on issues pertaining to China’s politics, political violence, food security and political stability, and the politics of water in Africa. He serves on the Editorial Board of Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd. and on the Advisory Board of the Southern African Journal for Policy and Development. Kitissou is a life-long advocate for social justice and human rights and currently serves on the Board of Directors of Amnesty International-USA. He holds a PhD in Political Science from Syracuse University, a doctoral degree in Contemporary History from the Institut d’Histoire at the University of Bordeaux, and a Diplome d’Etudes Supérieures Specialisées in Defense Policy from the Faculté de Droit, des Sciences Economiques et de Gestion (School of Law, Economics and Management) at the University of Nice. Matthew Gates: was born in Utah in 1982 and grew up variously in New Hampshire, Western Kenya, Indiana and Pennsylvania. His interest in agriculture was sparked by childhood visits to his grandfather’s dairy farm in upstate New York and by working summers on a produce farm in high school. In 2005, he earned a BA in philosophy and the history of mathematics at St. John’s College in Annapolis, Maryland. His life took a dramatic turn in 2006, when, after working for a year as a legal transcriptionist, he began an assignment as an agroforestry extension worker with the United States Peace Corps in Yongo, a small village in central Senegal (Arrondissement Medina Sabakh, Region de Kaolack) where he remained for the next three years, helping farmers and plant fruit and 186

live-fencing trees, as well as undertaking a village sanitation project. In 2012 he completed a master’s degree in international agriculture and rural development at Cornell University’s College of Agriculture and Life Sciences, for which he returned to Senegal to do the primary research upon which this book chapter is based. He would particularly like to thank Peter Hobbs, his former advisor at Cornell, for is invaluable assistance and patient reading of the original version of this research, as well as Charles Bakhoum of World Vision Kaffrine for his assistance and mentorship during the research process. In recent years, Mr. Gates has worked in the New York State wine industry and run a small produce farm in Pennsylvania. He currently lives in Rwanda where he directs a conservation tillage program for the Mennonite Central Committee in cooperation with five small Rwandan NGOs. He hopes to continue to work for sustainable soil management through agroforestry and conservation tillage practices in the future. Maurice Ogbonnaya: is a Security and Public Policy analyst at the National Institute for Legislative Studies (NILS), National Assembly, Abuja-Nigeria. He holds a, M.Sc. Degree in International Relations from University of Calabar, Cross River-Nigeria. His research interests include security studies, public policy and legislative practice. He has published in reputable Journals and contributed in book chapters in these areas. Ogbonnaya has participated in local and international seminars and conferences organized by Nigerian Society of International Affairs (NSIA), African Institute for South Africa (AISA), University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, amongst many others. Ogujiuba Kanayo: is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for Legislative Studies (NILS), National Assembly, AbujaNigeria. He is also affiliated to the Department of Statistics and Population Studies at the University of Western Cape, South Africa. Ogujiuba holds PhD in Development Economics from University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His research interests are in public policy, public 187

sector economics, economic theory and legislative practice. Ogujiuba has attended several international conferences and has published over 40 articles in both local and international journals. He has also contributed several book chapters in his areas of research interest. Pauline E. Ginsberg: PhD, Professor Emerita of Psychology at Utica College in upstate New York, also taught at the University of Nairobi including a Fulbright Fellowship in 2002. She co-edited The Handbook of Social Research Ethics (Sage, 2009) with Donna M. Mertens and has published on the topics of cross-cultural research methodology, US and Kenyan mental health systems, and adolescent development. A long-term volunteer at the Mohawk Valley Resource Center for Refugees, she designed and carried out internal research projects in addition to being involved in service delivery.

188

Index Cold War, 39, 40, 64, 65, 76, 89, 122 A

Compaore, Blaise, 70 Comprehensive African Agriculture

Addis Ababa, 81, 128

Development Programme, 119, 123

Afghanistan, 47, 52, 62, 75, 163

Cornell University Institute Of African

Afisma, 70, 84, 95, 96, 98, 99, 102, 103

Development, Viii

African Renaissance, Vi, Viii, 97, 99

Cote D’ivoire, 67

African Solutions For African Problems,

Côte D’ivoire, 93, 101

83, 95

Council On Foreign Relations, 79

African Studies Association, Viii African Union, 59, 69, 77, 81, 82, 83, 92, 94,

D

95, 96, 100, 101, 102, 119, 123, 128, 185 Aideed, Farra, 74

De Gaulle, Charles, 45

Algeria, Vii, 39, 41, 50, 52, 62, 64, 87, 88, 91,

Democratic Republic Of The Congo, 45, 47, 162

93, 94, 108, 163

Dirigisme, 81, 94, 99, 102, 103, 153

Al-Qaeda In The Islamic Maghreb, 46, 49,

Djibouti., 47

50, 64, 69 Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf, 171

E

Ansar Dine, 69, 70, 161 Arab Spring, 45, 107, 121

Economic Community Of West African

Arusha, 76

States, 61, 69, 76, 95, 102, 103 Economic Monitoring Group, 76

B

Edozie, Rita Kiki, Vi

Berlin Wall, 45

Entebbe, 68

Bismarck, Otto Von, 42

Eritrea, Vii, 47, 108, 109, 110, 119, 121, 122, 128

Black Sahara, 41

Evian Accords, 41

Boko Haram, 61 Botswana, 75, 119

F

Boutrous-Ghali, Boutrous, 73

Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration,

C

131, 132, 142

Campbell, Horace G, Vi, 79

Folt, William J, 38, 42, 54, 55, 56

Chad, Vii, 41, 44, 49, 65, 91, 94, 108, 109,

Francafrique., 43, 44

110, 111, 112, 121, 122, 125, 139, 144,

Franco-British Defense Agreements, 35

159, 164

Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa, 33

China, 42, 92, 119, 186 Chirac, Jacques, 46

189

97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105,

G

106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 121,

Gabon, 44

122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 139, 144,

Gadhafi’s United Great Maghreb, 50

146, 155, 157, 158, 159, 161, 163, 164,

Gbagbo, Laurent, 34, 67, 77

167, 169, 174, 181, 184

Germany, 40, 49, 61, 62, 124, 153, 154

Mediterranean Basin, 34

Ghana, 77, 85, 86, 108, 119, 158, 159, 174,

Mitterrand, Francois, 45, 46, 55, 56

182, 185

Morocco, 39, 41, 93

Global War On Terror, 49, 81

Movement For Oneness And Jihad In West

Gnassingbe, Faure, 77

Africa, 49, 69, 93

Grand Sahara, 50 Great Britain, 42

N

Great Trans-Sahara Trade, 158

National Agricultural Research System,

Greater Middle East, 50

119, 124

Guinea Bissau, 60, 108, 168, 174

National Movement For The Liberation Of Azawad, 87, 93

H

National Pact Of Tamanrasset, 88

Hollande, Francois, 46, 74

Nato, 34, 43, 91, 101, 184

Horn Of Africa, 47, 62, 73, 79, 114, 116, 126

New Partnership For Africa’s

Houphoet-Boigny, Felix, 44, 45

Development, 119, 124

Huambo Province, 72

New Zealand, 116 Niger, Vii, 41, 43, 44, 45, 49, 51, 62, 65, 66,

I

80, 87, 91, 93, 94, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113,

Islamic Republic Of Azawad, Vi, 35, 52

119, 122, 125, 131, 132, 138, 144, 146, 152, 153, 155, 158, 159, 163, 164, 174, 181

J

Nkrumah, Kwame, 82, 83, 100, 104, 105 North Africa And The Middle East, 38

Jihadists, V, 52, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 70, 71, 77, 181

O K

Obama Administration, 49 Office For Coordination Of Humanitarian

Kagame, Paul, 71, 74

Affairs, 113, 124

Kanayo, Ogujiuba, Iv, Vi, Viii, 107, 187

Ogbonnaya, Ufiem Maurice, Vi

Kitissou, Marcel, Vi, Vii, Viii

Ohanwe, Augustine C, Iv, Vi, Vii, Viii, 59,

Konaré, Alpha, 89, 90

184 Opération Harmattan, 34, 35

M

Opération Licorne, 34

Mali, Iv, Vi, Vii, 35, 37, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 53,

Operation Restore Hope, 47, 73

55, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 70, 71, 72,

Operation Restore Hope In Ethiopia, 47

74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85,

Operation Serval, 82, 84, 99, 164

86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96,

Opération Serval, 35

190

T

Organization Of African Union, 83 Oxfam International, 116, 127

Taureg, 86, 87 Touré, Sékou, 84, 90, 94, 154

P

Traoré, Moussa, 89, 95

Pan-Africanism, 81, 82, 85, 94, 99, 103

Tuareg, Vi, 35, 41, 49, 51, 54, 69, 70, 84, 86,

Pax Africana, 83, 96, 97, 98, 101, 105

87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 104, 105, 121,

Pentagon, 47

161, 164, 168

Pompidou, Georges, 45

Tuareg Irredentism, Vi, 35, 49, 51

Poncet, Jean-Francois, 36 U

Prodi, Ramano, 61

United Nations, 69, 70, 72, 79, 80, 95, 96, 97,

R

99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 111, 113, 115, 124,

Ray, Evangeline, Viii

128, 173, 179, 184

Roman Empire, 59, 70, 158

United Nations International Task Force,

Rwandan Genocide, 34

73

Rwandan Patriotic Front, 76 V S

Vasco Da Gama, 38

Sahara-Sahel, V, 34, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 46, W

48, 49, 52, 54, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 170, 177, 178, 179

War On Terror, Iv, 80, 83, 85, 90, 91, 101

Sahara-Sahelian Zone, 41

Western Sahara, 41

Sanogo, Amadou, 84

White Sahara, 41

Sarkozy, Nicholas, 34, 46, 50

Woode, John Bedu, V, Vi, Vii, Viii, 157, 185

Savimbi, Jonas, 71, 72

World Food Programme, 113, 117

Senegal, Iv, Vi, Vii, 39, 41, 44, 47, 65, 85, 86,

World Vision, 139, 140, 151

93, 94, 108, 109, 110, 113, 119, 131, 139,

World War Ii, 39, 40

141, 144, 146, 152, 153, 154, 155, 159, 164, 173, 174, 186

Y

Somalia, 62, 72, 73, 74, 80, 82, 96, 112, 114,

Yayi, Boni, 95, 97, 101

117, 126

Yemen, 62

South Sudan, Vii Sudan, Vii, 40, 82, 91, 108, 109, 110, 121,

Z

122, 144, 147, 159, 182 Syngenta Foundation For Sustainable

Zakat, 170

Agriculture, 110, 124, 128

Zimbabwe, 67, 75, 76, 185 Zuma, Dlamini, 97

191