Safety Crimes 9781843926726, 1843926725, 9781843920861

Table of contents :
Content: Cover
Safety Crimes
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
List of tables and figures
List of abbreviations
Foreword
Chapter 1 Introducing safety crimes
Chapter 2 Mapping occupational death and injury
Chapter 3 Obscuring safety crimes
Chapter 4 Discovering safety 'crimes'
Chapter 5 Differentiating safety crime from 'real' crime in law
Chapter 6 Assimilating safety crimes
Chapter 7 Regulating safety crimes
Chapter 8 Punishing safety crimes
Chapter 9 Conclusion: making sense of safety crimes
Sources of further information
References
Index.

Citation preview

S a fe t y C r i m e s

C rim e and Society Series Series editor: Hazel Croall Published titles Sex C rim e (second e d itio n ), by Terry T h o m a s Burglary, by R.I. M aw b y A rm ed Robbery, by Roger M atth ew s C ar C rim e, by Claire C o rb e tt Street C rim e, by S im on H allsw orth H ate C rim e, by N a th a n Hall Fraud, by Alan Doig M urder, by S han i D ’C ruze, S a n d ra Walklate a n d S a m a n th a Pegg Safety Crim es, by Steve T om bs an d Dave W hy te

T h e royalties from this b o o k will be d o n a te d to H az ard s M agazine ( h t tp : /w ww.h a z a rd s .o rg /) and the C e n tre for C o r p o r a t e A ccountability ( h tt p ://w w w .c o rp o ra te a c c o u n ta b ility .o r g /)

Safety C r i m e s

Steve T o m b s and Dave W h y te

WILLAN PUBLISHING

P u b l i s h e d by

Willan Publishing Culmcott House Mill Street, Uffculme C ullom pton, Devon EX 15 3 AT, UK Tel: + 4 4 (0)18 84 840337 Fax: + 4 4 (0 )1 8 8 4 840251 e-mail: [email protected] website: www.willanpublishing.co.uk Published simultaneously in the USA and Canada by Willan Publishing c/o ISBS, 920 NE 58th Ave, Suite 300, Portland, Oregon 97213-3786, USA Tel: + 0 0 1 (0)50 3 287 3093 Fax: + 0 0 1(0 )5 03 208 8832 e-mail: [email protected] website: www.isbs.com © Steve Tombs and Dave Whyte 2007 The rights o f Steve Tombs and Dave Whyte to be identified as the authors of this book have been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act o f 1988. All rights reserved; no part o f this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise w ith o u t the prior written p erm ission o f the Publishers or a licence permitting copying in the UK issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd, Saffron House, 6 - 1 0 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. First published 2007 Hardback ISBN 978-1-84392-086-1 Paperback ISBN 9 7 8-1 -8 43 92 -0 85 -4

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this b o ok is available from the British Library

Project managed by Deer Park Productions, Tavistock, Devon Typeset by Pantek Arts Ltd, Maidstone, Kent Printed and bound by T.J. International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall

Contents

A ck n o w ledgem en ts L ist o f tables a n d figu res L ist o f a b b revia tio n s Forew ord b y R ory O ’N eill

C hapter 1 In tro d u cin g safety crim es

vii ix xi x ii

1

C hapter 2 M apping occupational death and in ju ry

37

C hapter 3 O bscuring safety crim es

65

C hapter 4 Discovering safety ‘crim es’

87

C hapter 5 D ifferentiating safety crim e fro m ‘real’ crim e in law

109

C hapter 6 A ssim ilating safety crim es

125

C hapter 7 Regulating safety crim es

144

C hapter 8 P unishing safety crim es

167

C hapter 9 Conclusion: m aking sense of safety crim es

196

Sources o f fu rth e r in form ation

211

References

217

In d ex

242

A c k n o w le d g e m e n t s

We wish to reco rd p u b licly o u r th a n k s to th o s e w h o have offered unsw erving s u p p o r t for the rather unfashionable criminological concern which forms the subject m atter o f this book, as well as for their c o n stru c ­ tive criticism . Joe Sim , F ra n k Pearce, L au reen Snider, P ad dy H illyard. A nne Alvesalo, Sim on P em berto n, Roy C olem an, Jonny Burnett, Pete Gill, C o u r t n e y Davis, G a ry Fooks, Erja V irta, Kas W achala an d A n d rew W attcrs o n are ow ed debts o f g r a titu d e for th eir advice an d insights on material contained herein. We are privileged to th in k o f all o f these people as friends as well as colleagues. O u r th a n k s also go to the m a n y p eop le who have atten ded the various m eetings o f the E u ro pean G ro u p for the Stu dy o f D ev ian ce and Social C o n tro l , w hich has co nsistently given us space to air arg u m en ts expressed here; particular m e n tio n a m on gst these should go to A ndrea B ec km ann , for her friendship, and for h er w ork in sustaining the ‘British’ section o f the aforem ention ed organisation. For his ready acceptance o f the litany o f promised, then missed, deadlines over the past years we are grateful for the su p p o rt o f Brian Willan for this p roject - in even taking on the text, he has d o n e s o m e th in g w hich m o st publishers o f criminology texts would n o t have. And m uch m ore than a no d o f appreciation is also d u e to Hazel Croall who, as series editor, has read every w ord o f this book, providing su p po rtin g yet detailed feedback, w ith ­ ou t which any o f its current failings would have been far greater. T his b o o k could n ot, quite literally, have been w ritte n w ith o u t those people w ho devote their lives to struggling aro u n d those issues which we have o n ly d a re d to a t t e m p t to d escrib e a n d a c c o u n t for h ere. N o ta b le am o n g st these in term s o f both the extent o f their co n trib u tio n and their c o m ra d e sh ip have been John Bamford, Hilda Palmer, Rory O ’Neill, and A n n e a n d Tim Jones. Special th a n k s go to D avid B erg m an a n d to the

Safety C rim es

(past and present) staff, board members, volunteers and supporters of the Centre for Corporate Accountability; the CCA’s particular role within the struggle for safer w orkplaces - to provide the bereaved with a path through the to rtu ou s bias and lack of acknowledgement of the criminal justice system - is a vital and humbling one. As with any venture that spans a period of years, we could not have w rit­ ten this without the support, love and sacrifices on the part o f those who share ou r lives. Lyn and Patrick, th at’s you. Kathrin, that’s you. Thanks. Finally, we’d like to put on record that what is here is the result of a working relationship and a friendship that has been, and will remain, invaluable to both of us. This text, for all its omissions and weaknesses, is much more than the sum of its parts.

L ist o f ta b le s a nd figu res

Tables

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

9

10 11 12

13 14

Key causal issues highligh ted in case-studies R ep orted m a jo r injuries R ep orted o v er-th ree day in juries Injuries to m e m b e r s o f the public R ep o rte d fatal injuries Fatal in juries re p o r te d to all en forcing a u th o rities by in d u s try 1 9 9 6 /97 -2 00 4/0 5, in cidence rates per 100,000: em ployees Fatal in juries re p o r te d to all en forcin g a u th o rities by in d u s try 1 99 6/97 -2 0 0 4 /0 5 , incidence rates p e r 100,000: self-em ployed N o n -fatal m a j o r injuries re p o r te d to all enfo rcing auth o rities, in ciden ce rates p e r 100,000, by in d u s tr y 1996/9 7-20 04 /05 : em ployees N o n -fa ta l m a j o r injuries re p o r te d to all enfo rcing auth o rities, in ciden ce rates p e r 100,000, by i n d u s tr y 1996/9 7-20 04 /05 : self-em ployed Injuries to em ployees by o c c u p a tio n 2 0 0 4/0 5(p), in ciden ce rate p e r 100,000 em ployees R e p o rted fatal in juries to all w orkers and rates per million w orkers, 1996-2005 H o m ic id e s in E ngland and Wales, 1 995-2005 and rates o f h o m ic id e s p e r m illion p o p u la tio n , E ng land and Wales, 1995-2003 P ro s e cu tio n s by insp ecto rates, 1 975-1983 an d 199 6/9 7 -2 00 4/0 5 Fatalities resulting in p ro s e c u tio n in the UK

32 41 41 41 43 51 51

52

52 53 91

91 99 103

Safety C rim e s

Figu re s

1 2 3 4 5 6

X

Cases p ro s e cu te d an d notices issued by the UK H ealth and Safety Executive Total e n fo r c e m e n t notices issued by UK a u th o ritie s HSE p ro s e c u tio n s a nd co nv iction s Average fine following c on viction o f a safety offence in the UK Average fines following w o rk -relate d fatalities in th e UK A n n u a l total o f all UK health an d safety fines

97 98 101 174 175 178

L ist o f a b b r e v ia t io n s

ATP BCS CCA CPS D PP DWP HASAW Act HSC HSE ILO IM O LFS LOSC M IC ODPM OECD OSD RoSPA SOLAS SME TSR UCC UCIL

A u to m a tic Train P rotectio n British C rim e Survey C en tre for C o r p o r a t e A ccountability C ro w n P ro secu tio n Service D irecto r o f Public P ro secu tio ns D e p a r t m e n t o f W o rk an d Pensions H e alth an d Safety at W o rk Act (1974) H e alth an d Safety C o m m is s io n H e alth an d Safety Executive I n t e rn a t io n a l L a b o u r O rg an is a tio n I n t e rn a t io n a l M a r in e O rg a n is a tio n L a b o u r Force Survey L a b o u r O nly S u b -C o n tr a c tin g M ethyl Iso-C yanate Office o f the D e p u ty P rim e M inister O rg a n is a tio n for E c o n o m ic C o - o p e r a t io n an d D e v e lo p m e n t O ffshore Safety Division Royal Society for the P re ven tio n o f A ccidents Safety o f Life at Sea Small- a n d M e d iu m -s iz e d E nterprise T e m p o ra ry Safe Refuge U n io n C a rb id e C o rp o r a t io n U n io n C arb id e o f India Lim ited

F o re w o rd

R o ry O ’Neill

The date 23 March 2005 was a business-as-usual day for BP, Britain’s largest private firm. The board was feted as a m odel o f corporate probity, and was delivering soaring profits and share prices. The global chief executive Lord Browne - the poster boy for caring, successful business - had even d one the seemingly m iraculous and given the petroleum giant a green tinge. But a 'corporate blindsp ot’ on safety left this safe bet for shareholders less safe for the workforce. It was 23 March 2005 w hen the Texas City refinery explosion exposed the deadly flaws in BP’s b o a rd ro o m strategy. Fifteen died and 170 were injured in a blast which razed large sections o f the plant. T h ere was n o th i n g u n iq u e a b o u t events at BP, except the c o m p a n y ’s size and profile g u aranteed the disaster would p erh ap s c o m m a n d closer scrutiny from the m edia and authorities. O n e investigation rep ort noted it had failed to learn the lessons o f previous incidents, particularly a series o f serious safety offences in 2000 at its G r a n g e m o u t h plant in Scotland. A n oth er reported it had slashed costs, all part o f its ‘cheque book m e n t a l­ ity’ towards safety. But at all times it had d o n e w h at com p a n ies are first and foremost required to do - to be as profitable as possible. This b o o k is c o n c e rn e d w ith the n a tu r e o f p r o d u c t io n a n d h ow this im p a c ts on the d ecisio ns m a d e in b o a r d r o o m s . It also deals w ith how infrequently these decisions, however deadly, lead from the b o a rd ro o m to the co u rtro o m . It is no t filled with stories o f comic b o o k villains with no concern for the consequences of their actions, portrayin g safety crimes as bad deeds by bad people. Lord Browne no m ore set o u t th at m o r n in g to kill 15 workers th an he set o u t to stop it. But b o a rd ro o m decisions made with a key objective o f m axim ising profit have consequences, and safety can be a casualty. Nice guys can kill you. In fact, this b o o k sets o u t to deal w'ith o nly a fraction o f this killing. W o rk - re la te d h ealth p r o b l e m s , n o t ‘safety ’, have for d eca d e s b een the bigger w orkplace killer. We sh o uld re m e m b e r th at jobs in service-sector Britain may for the cu rren t w orking generation becom e safer, b u t remain just as deadly th ro u g h causing illness. More o f us are in work than at any time in history.

Fo re w o rd

E x p o s in g th e lin k s b e tw e e n b o a r d r o o m b e h a v i o u r a n d d e a th s a n d injuries at w ork requires in f o r m a t io n s p a n n in g an u n u su ally b ro a d range o f disciplines, from business to c rim in a l law, in d u s tria l relations to i n d u s ­ trial safety an d e c o n o m ic s to sociology. It m ay be this co m p lex ity th a t has m e a n t th a t being h u r t at w o rk is n o t recognised as a c rim e o f violence in H o m e Office statistics, d e sp ite the lo catio n o f t h e c rim e b ein g th e on ly m a j o r feature dis tin g u ish in g it from o th e r acts o f violence. We d o n ’t k n o w h o w m a n y p e o p le are killed o r in j u r e d as a re s u lt o f w ork. We do kn ow official figures are su b s ta n tial u n d e re s tim a te s . As the a u th o r s here establish, th e m a j o ri ty o f w o rk -re la te d d e a th s are excluded from the official statistics. T h e systematic exclusions inclu de road traffic a c c i d e n ts in w o r k ti m e , d e a th s r e p o r t a b l e to ag e n c ie s o t h e r th a n the w o rk p la c e safety w a tc h d o g th e H ealth a n d Safety Executive (H S E ) a n d local a u th o r itie s , o r d e a th s while w o rk in g a b ro a d o r arisin g fro m e x p o ­ sures while w o rk in g abro ad . Tot these up an d you reach a total in excess o f 1,600 d eath s a year - at least seven tim es the officially reco rde d level. Exam ples o f recent death s at w o rk th a t d o n ’t c o u n t in official o c c u p a ­ tional fatality statistics in clu de the seven w orkers killed on 23 D e c e m b e r 2006 w h e n a h e li c o p te r c a r r y in g rig w o rk e rs, all UK re s id e n ts , c rash ed over th e M o r e c a m b e Bay gas field. T h e d e a th s were investigated by the Civil A v iatio n A u th o rity . T h e d e a th o f b u s d riv e r M ic h a e l H a llin a n in D e c e m b e r 2 00 5, t r a p p e d b e tw e e n tw o b u s e s , ag ain e s c a p e d th e w o rk d ea th records. It’s th e sam e sto ry for L loyd’s Bank w o rk e r Lucy W ilso n, 23, w h o c o n tra c te d a liver infection while tra in in g call cen tre w orkers in India o n a s h o r t w o rk trip for the c o m p a n y , s u c c u m b i n g to th e disease w ith in th ree weeks o f h e r re tu rn . Even d eath s th a t sh o u ld be in c lu d e d by H S E ’s criteria frequ ently miss o u t, because the d o c to r s c h arged w ith m ak in g the rep o rts so m e tim e s fail to see b e y o n d the fatal injury to the deadly workplace. T h u s, even in term s o f ‘safety’, the price is greater th a n it m ig h t at first seem . T h ere are also health care and welfare costs, h e a rta c h e and p overty fo r b e re a v e d fam ilies, t r a u m a fo r i n j u r e d w o rk e rs . T h o m a s C o r r h a d alm o st all his righ t ear severed at the Luton IBC van factory while fixing a m a c h in e . Six years later, in May 2002, he to o k his o w n life aged 37 after su fferin g h e a d a c h e s , ti n n i t u s a n d severe d e p re s s io n . H is jo b killed h im and d evastated his family, b u t you w o n ’t see th a t reflected in any w o r k ­ place fatality statistics. This all has im p lic atio n s for p rev en tio n . If you d o n ’t c o u n t the bodies, the b o d ie s d o n ’t c o u n t. W h e n a llo c a tin g reso u rces a n d d e c id in g p u blic health p riorities, over 1,600 w o rk place in ju ry dea ths each year will c o m ­ m a n d a m o r e serio u s res p o n se from g o v e r n m e n t th a n H S E ’s artificially deflated h eadline figure o f fewer th a n 250 w o rk er d eath s a year.

Safety C rim es

Social class defines those who will die or be injured. By HSE’s own esti­ mates, ‘process, plant and m achinery operators’ are about ten times more likely to die or suffer a serious injury at work as ‘managers and senior officials’. Workers, th o u g h , are bla m ed . N ot dissim ilar to Union C a rb id e ’s response following the Bhopal gas leak, a rep ort released by BP within two m o nth s of the March 2005 Texas City blast alleged it was ‘surprising and deeply disturb in g’ mistakes by workers that led to the explosion. In response, the firm was accused o f ‘corporate scapegoating’, a charge c o m ­ pletely vindicated in su bseq uen t reports which instead highlighted the culpability of the global BP board. The idea o f the accident-prone worker, a myth which has been exam ­ ined and discredited so thoroughly the language should sound quaint and archaic, is, in the words o f Canadian academic Bob Sass, ‘a dead horse that w on’t lie dow n’. Blame-the-worker behavioural safety systems are growing in popularity, pu ttin g the focus on the individual worker rather than on the m a n a g e m e n t-d e sig n e d , op era ted , supervised and p ro fit-o rie nted system that placed them at risk. T h rou gh threats an d incentives workers are coerced into not reporting injuries. In the US, they call it ‘blood-inpocket syndrome’ - d o n ’t report it, hide the injury until you get home. Safety crimes are sanitised with the use of blame-free language - disas­ ters, abuses, scandals. T hey are ‘accidents’, despite there being no th in g accidental in the decisions and circumstances that caused them to occur. They are called anything but ‘crimes’. By contrast, there’s plenty o f language to suggest the problem is over­ stated or the creation o f vested interests. We talk o f ‘am bulance chasers’, but when factories explode there’s no equivalent criticism o f ‘ambulance fillers’. W hen deaths occur, they are the product o f ‘freak’ accidents, not the wholly predictable outcom e o f the way the job was designed and executed. Deaths in trenches or in falls aren’t the everyday and obvious outcom e of a m an agem en t neglect o f basic, simple safety procedures, but are ‘one in a million’ tragedies, apparently unforeseen and unstoppable. The police con­ clude, with unseem ly haste and usually long before any form o f credible investigation has taken place,‘there are no suspicious circumstances’. As this rigorous examination of the evidence demonstrates, there is a long distance from the boardroom to the co u rtroo m . Managers, directors and those appointing them accept without question there is a direct co r­ relation between b o a rdroo m decisions and the com p a n y ’s perform ance. Large pay packets, bonuses and pensions can all be justified because there is a straight line from the guiding hand o f the board to the productivity and profitability of the firm. But when things go wrong and workers die or are injured, then that guiding h an d is not raised in an admission of guilt. It is hard to reconcile the two positions.

xiv

Fo re w o rd

O f course, w h en it co m es to dealing w ith legal liability, th e b o a r d r o o m do es have c e rta in a dv anta ge s. For starte rs, c o m p a n y d ire c to rs d o n o t o n the w hole lo ok like th e p o p u la r p e rc e p tio n o f a crim inal. Stereotypes p o in t to yobs a n d yoofs a n d spivs, b u t th e c o rp o r a te crim inals, how ev er y obbish a n d anti-social their b o a r d r o o m behav iou r, ju s t d o n ’t lo ok th e part. It’s n o t th a t these bosses are w i t h o u t fault. Investigations cited in this b o o k sug gest in at least tw o o u t o f th r e e w o r k p la c e fatalities th e r e is a clear c r i m i n a l case to an sw er. B ut th e h ig h e r y o u get up th e c o r p o r a t e ladder, the m o r e likely you are to have the cash a n d c o n n e c tio n s - actual, class a n d cu ltu ral - to play and win th e legal g am e, as b la m e is ‘mystified an d o b s c u r e d ’. T he crim in a l justice system denies a lm o st all o c c u p atio n al in ju ry v ic tim s a n d bereaved relatives an a d m is s io n o f c u lp a b ility by the g u ilty p a r t ie s o r a d ay in c o u r t . R edress is n o r m a l l y o n ly a vailab le t h r o u g h c o m m o n law c o m p e n s a t i o n claim s, w h ic h , if th e y go to c o u r t , ca n p r o v i d e an a d m i s s i o n o f n e g lig e n c e o n a b a la n c e o f p r o b a b i li ti e s ( r a t h e r t h a n a c r i m i n a l o ff e n c e ). C o m m o n law c o m p e n s a t i o n cases requ ire c o m p a n ie s to answ er for th e ir unsafe an d u n h e a lth y b e h a v io u r 40 times m o r e frequ ently th a n HSE p ro secu tio n s. HSE - the default workplace safety police - is far m o re likely to seek infor­ m al solutions a n d m easures in response to clear evidence o f a safety crime. H SE’s strategy p uts a n e w e m phasis o n v o lu n tary measures, e d uc atio n a nd s u p p o r t, backed u p by an a r g u m e n t th at the real b e n c h m a r k is im p ro v in g health and safety perform ance. This is patently an im p o rta n t goal - although the evidence suggests there are few g ro u n d s for com placency o n this count, and it cannot, in any case, be the only goal. Q uiet en co urag em ent ignores the role o f deterrence. It also dismisses n o tion s o f justice and fairness. C rim in a l breaches o f safety law have to be viewed in the co n te x t o f the drive by successive g o v e rn m e n ts to lift regu latory b u r d e n s from business. HSE has a d o p t e d a b u s i n e s s - fri e n d ly p e rs o n a , w h ich c o u ld reflect b o th directives from ce ntral g o v e r n m e n t a n d the ‘c a p tu r e ’ o f the o rg a n isa tio n by bu siness interests, w ho over tim e have skewed its o u tl o o k a nd w o rk to be closer to th a t o f th e busin ess world. A n d so all the m a jo r in dicators o f w orkp lace safety e n fo r c e m e n t action p lu m m e t : p ro s ecu tio n s , convictions, notices, in s p ecto r c o n ta c t tim e a n d inspections. C o m p a n ie s , m ea n w h ile, o p t into v o lu n ta ry ‘c o m p l ia n c e ’ p r o g r a m m e s , ev ading regu lato ry a tte n tio n because their reported in cid en t rates are low. T hese p r o g r a m m e s are w id e s p r e a d in the US; g o v e r n m e n t - e n c o u r a g e d v a r i a t i o n s o n th e t h e m e a re n o w a p p e a r i n g in th e U K. V o l u n t a r y a p p ro a c h e s have the clear p o ten tial to u n d e r m i n e regulation. A nd regu la­ tio n is m o r e t h a n a b e n c h m a r k ag ain s t w h ic h e r r a n t c o m p a n i e s can be ju d g e d a n d p u n is h e d . It also in c lu d e s the p ackag e o f righ ts available to w orkers to raise c o n cern s, to call for in f o r m a t io n a nd to d e m a n d action.

XV

Safety C rim e s

If safety r e g u l a ti o n is w e a k e n e d , e it h e r by d e r e g u l a ti o n o r by an in c r e ­ m e n t a l shift ta k i n g m o r e a n d m o r e c o m p a n i e s in t o th e w o r ld o f self-re gu latio n, th en these w o r k e r s ’ righ ts co u ld be w eak ened by stealth. This has created the space for c o m p a n ie s, particu larly large c o m p a n ie s, to create th eir o w n wholly v o lu n ta ry a nd self-enforced ‘eth ic al’ alternative to t r a d i t i o n a l e n f o r c e m e n t . C o r p o r a t e social r e s p o n s ib i li ty a n d e th ic a l tr a d in g arc b u z z w o rd s in th e b o a r d r o o m . T h ey are also great PR w ith o u t th e d is c o m fo r t o f external policing. HSE has o b ed ien tly e m b r a c e d this m o d e l o f v o lu n ta ry com plianc e. BP, th e firm w ith the ‘c o rp o r a te b l i n d s p o t’ on safety, w ho se global b o a r d was savaged in 2006 a n d 2007 in r e p o r ts after the Texas City e x p lo s io n a n d w hich was the re c ip ie n t o f B rita in ’s big gest safety fine in 2002, was still featured in 2007 on H S E ’s c o rp o r a te social responsibility w ebpages as an exa m ple o f go od ‘direc to r lea d e rsh ip ’. Yet c o m p a n ie s them selves can be victim s o f u n d e r- e n fo rc e m e n t. G o o d firm s th a t invest in p re v e n t io n a n d w h o give a g reate r p r i o r it y to safety suffer a c o m p e t it iv e d is a d v a n ta g e c o m p a r e d to th o s e w h o o n ly e x p e n d tim e a n d effort in the unlikely instance th ey are caught. It is a system th at en co u ra g e s the g oo d to be n o t so go od an d the b ad to stay bad. W h e n c o m p a n ie s c o m m i t safety c rim es they are n o t in th eir o w n te rm s necessarily dy sfun ctional; in fact, th ey are acq u ittin g m o s t o f th eir duties exactly as their legal c o n s titu tio n requires. C o m p a n i e s are co n stitu te d to m a x im ise profits fro m c o m m e rc i a l activities, a n d failure to do this is an offence for w hich sh are h o ld ers can an d do d e m a n d redress. T h e system o f c o rp o r a te law a n d go ve rna nce rew ards pro fit an d gives p r i m a r y oversight to sha reh old ers, a g ro u p w h ose prin cip al co n c ern is the size o f those p r o f ­ its. Like m u g g e rs, c o r p o r a ti o n s d o n ’t set o u t to h u r t you , they ju st w a n t the m o n e y an d accept s o m e o n e m ig h t, w h e n th in g s go w ro n g , get h u r t in the process. T h eir guilt, th o u g h , can be shockingly apparent. T he fire an d explosions at Piper Alpha, th e sinking o f the H erald o f Free Enterprise a n d the de ath o f s tu d e n t S im on Jones at S h o reh am dock were, in the w ords o f the a u th o r s o f this b o o k , ‘all crim es th at could be traced back to the carefully p la n n e d deci­ sions o f acc o u n tan ts a n d m a n a g e rs’. These crimes, they add, are ‘c o m m itte d in cold b lo o d ’ a n d are often ‘c o m m itte d in o rd e r to advance financial goals o r m a i n t a i n p ro f ita b le sy stem s o f p r o d u c t i o n ’. As US w o r k o rg a n i s a ti o n exp ert C harley R ichardso n o f th e University o f M assachusetts Lowell p uts it: ‘T h ey are killing us by diligence, n o t negligence.’ It is the legal ‘co ntrolling m i n d ’ d o c trin e th at affords c o rp o ra te m uggers a n ear im p e rm e a b le defence. T h e ‘c o rp o ra te p erso n ality ’ w hich faces safety charges enjoys all the rights o f a real flesh-a nd -b loo d perso n , w ith o u t sim i­ lar responsibilities. T his is useful to com panies, as the c o rp o ra te p e rs o n has

xvi

Fo re w o rd

o n e clear defining trait - greed. C o rp o ra tio n s are first a n d fo rem o st a b o u t m a k i n g m o ney . Safety responsibilities, in legal a n d b u sin ess if n o t m o r a l te rm s, are a lesser c o n c e rn . T h e d u tie s are n o t abso lu te . T h e law says an e m p lo y e r m u s t d o w h a t is ‘re a s o n a b ly p r a c tic a b le ’ to e n s u r e w o rk is safe a n d healthy. T h e law as it stands is n o t g oo d at laying liability at the d o o r o f c o m p a n ies - it leaves too m u c h ‘reasonable’ wriggle ro o m an d the v olu m e a n d s o m e t i m e s v i g o u r o f e n f o r c e m e n t a c ti o n is low. It is s in g u la rly illsuited to m ak in g directors a n d top m anag ers liable for safety crimes. W hile th e r e ’s little chance o f b eing caug ht, th e r e ’s little incentive to be law abiding. Insp ection backed by e n fo r c e m e n t is the m o s t successful way to secure c o m p lia n c e . T h is effect w o u ld be am p lified if fines w ere m o r e closely related to the gravity o f the offence o r ability to pay. P u n i s h m e n t , o f co u rs e , is n o t a s o lu ti o n to c rim e , b u t it s h o u l d be a p ossible c o n s e q u e n c e o f it. It c o u ld deliver b o th a d e t e r r e n t effect a n d , ju st as crucial, a reco gn itio n th at lives at w o rk are i m p o r t a n t , and h a r m ­ ing w o rk in g pe op le is, like o th e r acts o f violence, a serious crime. Recent experiences suggest it will take bigger, b ette r targeted penalties to s p u r change at m a jo r com panies. For BP, it t o o k nearly tw o years, three crit­ ical re p o r ts , in t e n s e m e d i a scru tin y , a $ 2 1 m fine, s e r io u s p r e s s u r e f r o m c o r p o r a te re s p o n sib ility lo b b y in g g r o u p s a n d a g en eral c o n c lu s io n fr o m critics th a t th e re p u t a ti o n o f the c o m p a n y a n d its g o ld e n c h ief executive Lord Brow ne was ‘d o w n th e toilet’ before it conceded in F eb ru ary 2007 that p r o d u c t io n a n d safety priorities h a d b e e n in conflict in th e r u n - u p to the Texas C ity e x p lo s io n , a n d t h a t th is w as a p r o b l e m t h a t m u s t n o w be addressed by b e tte r in v es tm e n t in safety a n d by less em p h asis o n p r o d u c ­ tion. L ord B ro w ne said th e Texas City blast ‘was a w a te r s h e d ’ th a t w o u ld ‘forever c h a n g e B P ’. B ut tw o w o rk e rs h a d died at th e sa m e p la n t ju s t six m o n t h s before. P rio r to Texas City, BP already h a d m o r e fatalities th a n its m a jo r US c om petitors. D eaths alone were n o t e n o u g h to c hange BP’s m in d . Back in the w orld o f ‘real’ crim es, bosses can an d do sp e n d tim e b eh in d bars. In O c to b e r 2006, Jeffrey Skilling, E n r o n ’s ch ief executive, was s e n ­ te n c e d to 24 ye ars in a US jail for c o r p o r a t e fr a u d . T h e co lla p se cost w o rk ers their job s a n d p e n sio n s, a n d investors th eir fo rtu n e s. T h e sa m e c o m p a n y had been responsible for d e a th s in the UK, b u t faced the usual fines. It was Jeff Skilling w h o flew in to the UK after th ree w o rk e rs died a n d o n e was serio usly in j u re d in an A u g u st 2001 exp lo sio n at th e c o m ­ p a n y ’s Teesside p o w er plant. His c o m m e n t then: ‘We pledge to w o rk w ith the a u th o r itie s to en sure it never h a p p e n s again anyw here.’ T h is w a sn ’t the p l a n t ’s first death or its first explosion. T he c o m p a n y n o t its exe cutives - h a d b e e n p r o s e c u t e d succ essfully o n tw o p r e v i o u s o c c a sio n s, o n c e after a w o r k e r w as killed in th e p l a n t ’s c o n s t r u c t i o n in 1992, a n d on ce in 1998 after a w o rk e r received h o rrific b u r n s in an e x p lo ­

Safety C rim e s

sion. T h e re w ere all the signs o f a d y sf u n c tio n a l c o m p a n y , b u t the b o o k w o rk lo o k e d OK a n d E n r o n c la im e d its fin an ces were g o o d , so n o o n e looked too closely. W ork er d eath s d o n ’t h u r t sh areholders. Directors rem ain effectively i m m u n e from safety law. An average o f 11 a y ear faced c o u r t a c tio n for w o rk p la c e safety c rim e s in th e d e c a d e u p to D e c e m b e r 2005; ju s t 11 w e re jailed. In 2005 alo n e , i n s p e c to rs fr o m th e an im al welfare b o d y the RSPCA secured 31 p rison o r su s p e n d e d sentences for anim al cruelty. This was d o w n from 44 in 2004. It investigated 110,841 c o m p la in ts a n d s ecu red 2,071 co n v ictio n s o f 1,031 d efen d an ts. O n every co u n t, th e RSPCA massively o u tp e r f o r m e d the HSE, th e h u m a n cruelty at w o rk w atchdog. If th ere is a slow re co g n itio n th a t w ork p lac e inju ries a n d fatalities are o fte n th e re s u lt o f c o r p o r a t e safety c r i m e s , th is h a s n o t c o m e a b o u t because o f the e m erg en ce o f new evidence. T he evidenc e has always been th ere a n d th e case has always b een w a te rtig h t. T h e reason this is o n the a g e n d a at all is b e c a u s e th e r e h as b e e n a c a m p a i g n to p u t it th e re . Bereaved fam ilies, tr a d e u n i o n s , c a m p a i g n a n d a d v o ca cy o r g a n i s a ti o n s like th e H a z a r d s C a m p a i g n , th e C e n t r e for C o r p o r a t e A c c o u n ta b i lit y , D isaster A ctio n , I n q u e s t, Fam ilies A g ain st C o r p o r a t e Killers (F ack), the C o n s tr u c ti o n Safety C a m p a ig n an d the S im o n Jones M e m o ria l C a m p a ig n have all called for legislation, for action and for accountability. T h ey have an u n a n sw e ra b le case. Despite tech no log ical advances an d the decline in m o r e ob viously h a z ­ a r d o u s in d u s tr i e s like m a n u f a c t u r i n g a n d m i n i n g , s o m e new t r e n d s in m o d e r n p r o d u c t i o n arc p la cin g a large slice o f th e w o rk fo rc e at greater risk. M o re o f us are n ow c o n ti n g e n t w o rk ers - t e m p o r a r y a n d insecure, w ith few rig h ts a n d little scop e to o b je c t to safety ab u ses. T h e b e n efits sy ste m is g e tt in g m e a n e r a n d sic k n e ss s y s te m s m o r e p u n i t i v e , so th e p r e s s u r e to stay in w o rk , h o w e v e r h a z a r d o u s , c o u ld be in c r e a s i n g . W o rk in g longer, h a r d e r a n d faster are n o t h a z a rd s dealt w ith u n d e r the c u r r e n t e n f o r c e m e n t m o d e l , b u t they are th e e m e r g in g p r o b l e m s o f the tw enty-first ce n tu r y workplace. W o r k p l a c e h e a lt h a n d safety is n ’t a b a tt le w o n ; it is b a re ly a b a ttle started. Rory O ’Neill H azards m aga z ine ( http ://w w w .h a za rd s.o rg) M ay 2007

C h apter I

Intro du cing safety crim es

In tro d u c tio n

If y o u w ere to sto p o n e h u n d r e d p e o p le in th e stree t a n d ask th e m to list, in th e i r o p i n i o n , th e five m o s t s e r io u s c ri m e s in B ritain today, it’s a very safe b e t t h a t in th e vast m a j o r i ty o f re s p o n se s n o fo r m o f c o r p o r a t e c rim e w o u ld fe atu re. T h is is n o t to be d is p a r a g in g o f p o p u l a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g s o f c r i m e , for th e s e w ays o f seeing are socially c o n s t r u c te d . So, ch eck t o d a y ’s n e w s p a p e r s fo r r e p o r t s o f political d is c u ssio n s o r H o m e Office s t a te m e n ts o n law a n d o rd e r : ag ain , c o r p o r a t e c r i m e will be a b se n t. N o w s c o u r th o s e n e w s p a p e r s m o r e t h o r o u g h l y , a n d t r y to fin d c o r p o r a t e c r i m e s to rie s c o r p o r a t e c r i m e m a y be cov ered, b u t is u nlik e ly to be given p r o m i n e n c e , n o r d is c u sse d in th e la n g u a g e re serv ed fo r ‘re a l’ c rim e , a n d is m o r e likely to be fin a n c ia l ‘s c a n d a ls ’, in specialist se c tio n s far fr o m th e h e a d li n e - g r a b b in g n ew s pages. C h e c k y o u r T V g u id e for t o d a y ’s v ie w in g , a n d search for c o r p o r a t e c r i m e cov erag e a m o n g s t w h a t will n o d o u b t be a great d e al o f fictio nal, real-life a n d d o c u m e n t a r y p r o g r a m m e s o n c r i m e - a n d it w o u ld be a s u r p r is e to find m u c h , if any. N o w if c o r p o r a t e c r i m e - in essence, c rim e s by c o r p o r a t i o n s in p u r s u i t o f t h e i r le g i ti m a t e g o a l s 1 - is relativ ely in v isib le, t h e n th is in v isib ility is even m o r e m a r k e d for s o m e o f th e su b c a te g o rie s cov ere d by th is g en e ra l te r m . O n e su c h s u b - c a te g o r y - safety c r i m e s 2 - is th e su b ject o f this text. S afety c r i m e s - w h i c h we d e f i n e as v i o l a t i o n s o f law b y e m p l o y e r s t h a t e ith e r d o , o r have th e p o te n t ia l to, cause s u d d e n d e a th o r in j u r y as a result o f w o r k - r e l a t e d a c ti v it ie s - a re , w e s h a ll a r g u e t h r o u g h o u t t h i s b o o k , u b i q u i t o u s , h av e d e v a s t a t i n g p h y s i c a l ( a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l ) effects, a n d c a r r y w i t h t h e m e n o r m o u s f i n a n c i a l a n d s o c ia l c o n s e q u e n c e s . D e s p it e th is , su c h c r i m e s r e m a i n relativ ely in v isib le at th e level o f p o litic a l a n d

I

Safety C rim e s

p o p u la r co nsciou sn ess. In d e e d , w h ere events th a t m a y be re p re se n te d as safety crim es do e m erge in such contexts, they ten d n o t to be rep resen ted as s u c h : i n s te a d , th e y a re likely to b e v ie w e d as a c c i d e n ts , d is a ste r s, tragedies, an d so on. Even less forgivably, safety crim es as an area o f focus is also o b s c u r e d by the o v e r w h e lm in g focus o f c rim in o lo g ic a l teac h in g , research an d w riting. It is this relative invisibility th a t is the cen tral rationale for this text. We are c o n c e r n e d h e re w ith h o w th is is ach ie v ed , w h y this is th e case, a n d w ith the co n se q u en ce s o f such crim es being ob sc u red . F urth er, we wish to e x am in e the role played by in s titu tio n s a n d processes in m a in ta in in g defi­ n itio n s o f crim e from w hich safety crim es are m argin alised. A n d , finally, we seek to set o u t s o m e o f th e c o n d i t i o n s for o v e r c o m i n g th is relative invisibility. T h a t is, we ask in w h a t ways m i g h t g o v e rn m e n ts , the m e d ia, th e law a n d c r i m i n a l ju s ti c e sy s te m , a n d , i n d e e d , c r i m i n o l o g i s t s , ta ke safety crim es m o r e seriously - a nd w h at m i g h t the effects be o f any e m e r ­ gen t focus u p o n this w id esp re ad area o f offending. If the invisibility o f safety c rim e s is a central, r e c u r r e n t th e m e o f this b o o k , th e n p e rh a p s o u r first task is to p u t so m e safety c rim e s before o u r r e a d e r s’ eyes: w h a t are safety crim es, w h a t do th ey lo o k like, w h a t fo rm s do th ey take, w here do th ey occur, w h a t co n seq u en ces do th ey have, w ho are the ir victim s, a nd ho w does law a n d its agencies re s p o n d to th em ? For this re a s o n , th e b u lk o f this c h a p t e r is d e v o te d to a series o f b r i e f case s t u d ie s o f su ch c rim e s , to e s tab lish c o n t o u r s o f th e a l l - t o o - u n f a m i l i a r p h e n o m e n o n w ith w h ic h the b o o k is d ealin g. P r i o r to t u r n i n g to these cases, we seek briefly to m a r k o u t the terrain o f the b o o k t h r o u g h a defi­ n itio n o f safety crimes.

W h a t are safety c r im e s ?

As we have in d icated above, safety crim es, as used t h r o u g h o u t this text, are a subset o f c o rp o r a te crim es. A n d o u r u n d e r s ta n d in g o f th e latter fol­ lows w h a t has by n o w b e c o m e a fairly sta n d a rd definition , based u p o n the w o r k o f K r a m e r (1 9 8 4 ) , C li n a r d a n d Yeager (1 980: 16), S c h r a g e r a n d S h o rt (1978), a n d Box ( 1983). T h u s, by ‘c o rp o r a te c r i m e ’, we m ea n Illegal acts o r o m issio n s, p u n is h a b le by the state u n d e r a d m i n i s t r a ­ tive, civil o r c rim in a l law w hich are the result o f deliberate decision m a k in g or culpable negligence w ith in a legitim ate fo r m a l o rg a n is a ­ tio n. T hese acts o r o m isio n s are based in legitimate, fo rm al, business o rg a n is a tio n s , m a d e in a c c o rd a n c e w ith th e n o r m a ti v e goals, s t a n ­ d a r d o p e r a t i n g p r o c e d u r e s , a n d / o r c u l t u r a l n o r m s o f th e o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d are i n t e n d e d to b e n e f i t th e c o r p o r a t i o n itself. (Pearce a n d T o m b s 1998, 107-1 10) 2

Intro du cing safety crim es

We can, for the p u rp o s e s o f this text, sim p ly replace c o rp o r a te c rim e with safety c rim e in this d e fin itio n . A n d this d e fin itio n h as a series o f useful characteristics, to w hich it is w o rth d ra w in g im m e d ia te a tte n tio n . S afety c r i m e s m a y c o n s t i t u t e v i o l a ti o n s o f th e H e a lth a n d Safety at W ork Act 1974, the p r i m a r y piece o f safety legislation in the UK, w hich is a c rim in a l statute. Equally, however, th ere is legislation gov ern ing o c c u p a ­ ti o n a l safety t h a t falls b e y o n d th e c r i m i n a l law. W i t h i n th e a b ov e d e fin itio n , th e n , th r o u g h reference to illegal ra t h e r th a n c rim in a l acts, it avoids th e restriction th a t follows from the fact th a t m a n y laws, enforced by a d m i n is tr a t iv e b o d ie s t h r o u g h th e civil c o u rts , also re g u late a c tio n s w h ic h cause in ju rie s to specific in d iv id u a ls o r w h ic h u n d e r m i n e social i n s ti tu t io n s . In d e e d , fo llo w in g S u t h e r l a n d , th e c o n t e n t o f laws a n d the n a t u r e o f legal d i s t i n c t i o n s s u c h as t h o s e b e tw e e n c r i m e s , t o r t s a n d a d m in is trativ e sa nction s, b etw een acts m ala in se an d m ala p ro h ib ita , are co n v e n tio n a l, t i m e - b o u n d social p r o d u c t s w ith o u t an in trin sic s u b s t a n ­ tive m e a n i n g th a t tr a n sc e n d s th eir social or historical contexts; w h a t acts o r o m i s s i o n s c o n s t it u te c r i m e m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d in te r m s o f c o n t i n ­ gency (Lacey 1995). T h u s, we extend o u r defin itio n o f crim e b ey o n d th a t p r o s c r i b e d by c r i m i n a l law o r i n d e e d t h a t w h ic h h as b e e n p ro c e s s e d t h r o u g h the legal system. S e c o n d , t h r o u g h re fe re n c e s to n e g lig e n c e a n d th e u se o f t h e p h r a s e ‘o m issio n o r c o m m is s io n , th e d efinitio n avoids the tr a p o f a rgu in g th a t for co rp o r a te c rim e in general - a n d safety crim e in p a rtic u la r - to exist there m u s t b e actus rea a n d m e n s rea ( ‘k n o w i n g m i n d ’). G ive n th e o r g a n i s a ­ tional locus o r o rigins o f safety c rim e, to e m p h a sise eith er an illegal act o r a n in te n tio n is o fte n i n a p p r o p r i a t e , fo r tw o re a s o n s . First, eac h t e r m is a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c a n d individ ualising, a n d by definition is p ro b lem atic in its ap plication to a co rp o r a te entity w hich is m o r e th an , o r different to, the s u m o f i n d i v id u a l h u m a n a c to rs. S e c o n d , i n t e n t i o n im p lie s a relatively u n p ro b le m a tic link b etw ee n an act o r o m issio n a n d its c o n seq u e n ce - yet this simplistic causal seq u en cin g leads to a n o b s c u rin g o f th e c o n s tru c tio n a n d m a in te n a n c e o f a situ atio n o r contex t w hich, as a con seq uen ce, is fer­ tile g r o u n d fo r v io l a ti o n s . A n y fo c u s u p o n safety c r i m e s re q u i r e s us to ex am ine these in te r m s o f th eir organisational production. O n th e f o r m e r p o in t , it has be en a rg u e d th a t ‘m o s t c o r p o r a te c rim es c a n n o t be e x p la in e d by the p e rv e rse p e rs o n a litie s o f th e ir p e r p e t r a t o r s ’ (B ra i th w a it c 1984: 2), a n d th is claim calls in t o q u e s t i o n th e p ro c liv ity w ithin individualistic liberal or b o u rg e o is cu ltu res to locate th e source o f evil d e e d s in evil p e o p le (ib id .; see also S h ra g e r a n d S h o r t 1977: 410, S n id e r 1993: 61). C o r p o r a t e a n d safety c r i m e s c an be p r o d u c e d by an o r g a n is a tio n ’s s tru c tu re , its culture, its u n q u e s t io n e d a ss u m p tio n s , its very m o d u s o p e r a n d i , a n d so on. T h u s to u n d e r s t a n d such p h e n o m e n a m u s t n o t o b s c u r e h u m a n agency, b u t d o e s re q u i r e a sh ift fro m a b s t r a c t e d , ato m ised ind ividu als to a c c o u n t for agency in the context o f structu res.

3

Safety C rim e s

T h e d e fi n it io n o f safety c r i m e u sed in this text is, th e n , an explicitly inclusive one. T h a t is, th r o u g h o u t this text we discuss as crim es m a n y acts a n d o m issio n s w hich have n o t been subject to any fo rm al judicial process; thu s these are p h e n o m e n a w hich have n o t been in terro g a te d as, let alone proven to be, vio latio n s o f th e crim inal, o r ind eed any o th e r form o f law. To fail to do o th erw ise w o u ld lead us into the stu d y o f w hat Braithwaite called c lass-based a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f c ri m i n a l ju stice, th e r e b y o b s c u r in g precisely the m o s t useful insights o f S u th e rla n d re gardin g the class-biased d e v e lo p m e n t o f law a n d its differential im p le m e n ta t io n (see C h a p te r 4). O t h e r issues r e g a r d in g o u r d e f i n it io n o f safety c rim e s , a n d th u s the scope o f this text, req uire b rie f clarification. First, we sh o u ld em p h a sise th a t we focus h ere u p o n safety ra th e r than health. W hile the c o m m o n ly - u s e d p h ras e ‘health and safety’, a nd the very o b je c t o f leg islatio n in th is area, o fte n re in fo rc e s th e in t im a te l y lin ked n a tu r e o f these two concepts, c o n sid e ra tio n o f each raises so m e c o m m o n , b u t m a n y distinct, p h e n o m e n a . Violations against w o rk er o r pu blic safety are - usually - im m e d ia te ly a p p a r e n t th r o u g h n e a r-m iss, in ju ry o r even d eath ; v io la tio n s o f o c c u p a t io n a l h ea lth law often involve a m u c h m o r e co m plex an d contestable causal chain, the key factor often being a state o f affairs ra th e r th a n an event, such as lo n g - te rm exp osu re to a no x io u s s u b ­ stance o r e n d u ra n c e o f a u n h e a lth y m o d e o f w o rk in g w hich can p ro d u c e cancer, stress o r arth ritis m u c h later in o n e ’s life. T his causal co m p lex ity m a k e s th e b u r d e n o f p r o o f a difficult o n e for v ic tim s o f su ch c ri m e s involving, n o t least, often c o n f o u n d i n g resort to co m p le x a nd often c o n ­ tr a d i c t o r y scientific claim s. Similarly, th e im m e d i a t e visibility o f safety offences as o p p o s e d to health offences m e a n s th at it is the fo r m e r that are m u c h m o r e likely to result in fo r m a l e n fo r c e m e n t actio n o n the p a r t o f regulators - rare th o u g h any form o f such actio n is. Partly related to this is the fact th a t if o c c u p a tio n a l in ju ry data is in c o m p le te a n d p ro b lem atic, to say the least, as we shall see in C h a p te r 2, th a t relating to o cc u p a tio n a l ill-health is a lm o st n o n -u tilis a b le - p ro b l e m s o f m e a s u r e m e n t beset the area o f o c c u p a t io n a l h e a lth to a far g rea ter ex te n t th a n th a t o f o c c u p a ­ tio n al safety. A n d , again p e r h a p s relatedly, th ere is also a sense in w hich m e etin g legal duties to p ro v id e a safe w o rk in g e n v ir o n m e n t im p o ses less costs in te rm s o f changes to w o rk o rg a n isa tio n , practices an d so on than dealing w ith less tangible ill-health effects. N o n e o f this is to relegate occupational health crimes below th at o f safety crimes in social im p ortan ce. But it is to say th at there are im p o r t a n t differ­ ences, so th a t an ad equ ate tr e a tm e n t o f each w ou ld require a m u c h longer text th a n can be presented here. Further, n o n e o f this should im ply that there are n o t c o m m o n causes o f occupational safety an d health crimes - each can be u nd ersto od , for example, th r o u g h m a n y o f the causal factors o r character­ istics o f acute deaths as set o u t in the table at the e n d o f this chapter.

4

Intro du cing safety crim es

Se co n d , we s h o u l d clarify th a t while o u r focus is u p o n safety crim es, n e ith e r the legal du ties th at are b eing violated by these, n o r the effects of such v io latio n s, are restricted to w o rkers. T h u s, for ex am p le, the H ealth a n d Safety at W ork Act 1974 ex tend s the d u ty o f care ow ed by em plo yers n o t sim p ly to e m p lo y e e s a n d the self-e m p lo y e d , b u t also to th e general p u b lic as well as o th e r s , such as s u b - c o n t r a c t o r s , n o t in d ir e c t e m p l o y ­ m e n t b u t likely to b e affected by th e c o n d u c t o f th e e m p l o y e r ’s u n d e r t a k in g (sections 3 -5 ) . T h is is a reco gn itio n th a t whilst the victim s o f safety c ri m e s are o fte n e m p lo y e e s , no a c tu a l n o r m e t a p h o r i c a l fa c to ry fence can exist t h a t p ro te c ts m e m b e r s o f th e p u b lic fro m d e cis io n s an d o m issio n s w ith in c o m p a n ie s th a t p r o d u c e offences w ith actual or p o t e n ­ tially d a n g e r o u s effects. A n d th e force o f th is legal r e q u i r e m e n t is u n d e r- sc o re d in so m e o f the cases selected for c o n sid eratio n below. T h u s, for ex am p le, while th e gas leak at B ho pal killed e m p loy ees at the U n io n C a r b id e p la n t , a r g u a b l y far g r e a t e r d e v a s t a ti o n w as w r o u g h t u p o n th e local c o m m u n it y , w here tens o f t h o u s a n d s were exposed to the gas, a n d to th e s u r r o u n d i n g n a tu r a l e n v ir o n m e n t , m u c h o f w hich rem ain s despoiled to th is day; th e v ic t im s o f th e failu re to e n s u r e a safe sy stem o f w o rk ab o ard th e H erald o f Free Enterprise were m o stly c o n s u m e rs , th at is, p a s ­ sen g ers; a n d th e f o u r d e a th s w h ic h a ro s e as a re s u lt o f th e fa u lts o f Transco to w o rk safely were o f a fam ily to w h o m the c o m p a n y s u p p lie d gas. Business o rg an isatio n s su pply go ods o r services; those to w h o m those g o od s o r services are su pp lied , o r w ho live in the p ro x im ity o f areas w here so m e o f th a t p r o d u c t i o n o r su p p ly is u n d e r t a k e n , are just as likely to be victim s o f safety crim es as w orkers. Finally, it re m a in s h ere to be stated th a t t h r o u g h o u t this text we view safety c r i m e s as c r i m e s o f violence. T h o u g h th is is n o t a n o r i g in a l a p p ro a ch , it is, as we shall see, o n e w hich, in the context o f a cadem ic c r i m ­ in ology a n d general re p re se n ta tio n s o f o ccu p a tio n a l injuries, a rarity. For us, this lack o f crim ino log ica l a tte n tio n to safety crim es as crim es o f v io ­ len ce is less a q u a li ty o f th e la t t e r p h e n o m e n a , m o r e a fa ilu re o f th e discipline to reflect u p o n lo n g -sta n d in g , b u t ontologically weak, a s s u m p ­ tions. T h u s o n ce o c c u p a tio n a l injuries are view ed n o t as accid ents b u t as in c i d e n ts w h ic h are n o t o n ly largely p r e v e n t a b le , b u t w h ic h th e law re qu ires to b e p re v e n te d , th e n th e y fall w ith in the a m b i t o f c rim in olo gy . T h e n , if we co n sid e r these illegalities in te r m s o f th eir p o te n tia l o r actual c o n seq u en ces - in j u r y a n d d e a th - we realise th a t these loo k re m a rk a b ly sim ilar to th e results o f those events th a t m o s t m e n a n d w o m e n , as well as p o lic y -m a k e rs, p olitician s, a n d a cad em ics, d e e m to be ‘p r o p e r ’ violence. M o s t crucially, these la t te r c o n c e p t i o n s o f v io le n c e are, as we shall see, based u p o n an im plicit association o f violence w ith the inter-pe rson al a n d w ith i n t e n t i o n , b o t h q u a litie s t h a t a re o fte n a b s e n t fr o m safety c rim e s.

5

Safety C rim e s

T h a t safety c rim e s are c rim e s o f (actu al o r p o te n tia l) vio le n c e is, for us, unequivocal; yet to reach this con clusio n o n e m u s t generally m o v e b ey o n d crim inology, to u n d e rs ta n d in g s o f violence dev elo pe d in o th e r disciplines. O n e su ch h o listic u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f v io le n c e has b e e n d e v e lo p e d by Jamil Salmi w h o, following G a ltu n g a m o n g s t o thers, h as set o u t a sy stem ­ atic analytical f r a m e w o rk w h ich aim s to explore a variety o f d im e n s io n s o f th is p h e n o m e n o n ; he t h e n id e n tif ie s th e p a t t e r n s a n d re l a ti o n s h ip s linking the va rio u s m a n ife statio n s o f violence to th e prevailing e co n o m ic, social a n d political p ow er s tru c tu re s in an effort to establish a c c o u n ta b il­ ity. Salm i sets o u t fo u r b ro a d cate gories o f violence, an d indicates a series o f typ e w ithin each category. First, he id e n tif ie s ‘D ire c t V i o l e n c e ’, t h a t is, d e li b e r a t e i n j u r y to th e integrity o f h u m a n life, w hich includes h o m ic id e , b ru ta l acts a n d restric­ tions or physical co n strain ts. It is w ith in , th o u g h n o t e n c o m p a ssin g all of, this category o f violence th at the o v e rw h e lm in g m a jo rity o f c rim i n o lo g i­ cal research proceeds. H ig hligh ting in te n t th r o u g h reference to deliberate in ju r y (S a lm i 2004: 56), this w o u ld ex c lu d e m o s t f o r m s o f d e a th s a n d injuries associated w ith w orking. Seco n d , S alm i n o te s ‘In d ire c t V io le n c e ’, n a m e ly in d ire c t v io la tio n s o f righ ts to su rv ival; th is in c lu d e s th e su b - c a te g o rie s o f vio len ce by o m i s ­ sio n , w h ic h ‘d ra w s o n th e legal n o t i o n o f n o n - a s s i s t a n c e to p e r s o n s in d a n g e r ’ (ibid. 57), an d m e d ia te d v i o l e n c e ,‘w hich is the result o f a d elib er­ ate h u m a n i n t e r v e n t i o n in the n a t u r a l o r social e n v i r o n m e n t w h o s e h a r m f u l effects are ind ire ct a n d often d elay ed ’ (ibid. 58). In the co ntex t o f a discussion o f the latter, Salm i con siders the m e d ia te d violence generated th r o u g h th e cap italist p r o d u c t i o n p rocess, n o ti n g the te n d e n c y to w a rd s h e a lth a n d safety effects w h ic h is an effect o f th e i n h e r e n t d e sire o f em p loy ers to m in im is e ‘u n p r o d u c t iv e ’ e x p e n d itu re s (Salmi 1993: 56). T h i r d , he refers to ‘R epressive V i o le n c e ’, t h a t is th e ‘D e p r i v a t i o n o f F u n d a m e n t a l R igh ts’ w hich inclu des violatio ns o f social, civil and p o liti­ cal r i g h ts . T h is w o u l d i n c o r p o r a t e as s t u d ie s o f v io le n c e m u c h o f th e b u rg e o n i n g literature a r o u n d h u m a n rights an d their vio lation s - a litera­ tu re ded ica ted to co n sid e rin g issues w h ich i f ‘n o t com ple tely ig n o red by crim in o lo g y as a d iscip line’ re m a in s ‘a m in o r i ty p u r s u i t ’, a n d for the m o s t p a rt a very recent o n e at th a t (C a rr a b in e et a i, 2004: 352). F o u rth , a n d finally, Salmi identifies ‘A lienating V iolence’ - ‘D e priv atio n o f “ H ig h e r ” R ights’ - based o n ‘the a s s u m p ti o n th at a p e rs o n ’s well-being d o e s n o t c o m e exclusively fro m fulfilling m a te ria l ne ed s, th e n o ti o n o f alien atin g violence refers to d e n y in g a p e rs o n the righ t to psychological, e m o tio n a l, c u ltural, o r intellectual in teg rity ’ (2004). T his includes a lie n a t­ ing living a n d w o rk in g c o n d itio n s , social o stracism an d eth n o c id e (Salmi 1993, following G a ltu n g 1981).

6

Intro du cing safety crim es

C a te g o rie s o f ‘in d ire c t v io le n c e ’ a n d ‘alie n a tin g v io le n c e ’ are p a r t i c u ­ larly i m p o r t a n t in t h i n k i n g a b o u t safety c r i m e s , as th e y d ir e c t o u r atte n tio n to the ‘relations o f d o m i n a ti o n , a n d th e violences th a t are c o n ­ d o n e d as p a rt o f the “n o r m a l ” a n d “ h e alth y ” f u n c tio n in g o f a society such as o u r s ’ (Catley 2003: 5). Safety crim es, as we will argue at v ario us p o in ts in th is tex t, re s u lt fro m th e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d w o r k i n g regim es th a t c a rry d eadly c o n se q u e n c e s for so m e w o rk e rs a n d m e m b e r s o f t h e p u b lic . It is this t h a t clearly p u ts safety c r i m e s o n th e t e r r a i n o f ‘in d i r e c t v i o l e n c e ’, since safety c r i m e s are th e h u m a n c o n s e q u e n c e s o f m e d i a te d v iolence, inflicted in directly th r o u g h w o rk in g . T h e c o n c e p t o f ‘alienating v iolen ce’ is relevant for safety crim es since it allows us to move from the level o f th e individ ual to structural violence, t h a t is, violence th at is p ro d u c e d system ically or stru c tu r a lly as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f a v arie ty o f key o rg a n is a tio n a l o r social in s ti tu t io n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s . Key in s titu tio n s th a t p r o d u c e violence stru ctu rally an d systemically in th e co n tex t o f w ork i n c l u d e l a b o u r m a r k e t s , th e o c c u p a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e a n d th e l a b o u r p ro c e s s, th e u n e v e n d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o w e r w i t h i n a n d a r o u n d w o rk o r g a n i s a t i o n s , th e c o r p o r a t e f o r m p e r se, a n d c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s o f th e state, su ch as c r i m i n a l ju s tic e a n d legal system s, re g u l a to r y b o d ie s a n d G o v e r n m e n t m in is trie s. At v a rio u s p o in t s t h r o u g h o u t this text, we will th erefo re co n sid er h o w those o rg an isatio n s a n d in s titu tio n s play a role in m e d ia tin g the c o n d itio n s o f in direct violence, a nd in the s t r u c tu r a l p r o ­ d u c tio n o f violence. This is how we a p p ro a c h the case studies th a t follow.

C a s e s t u d i e s in s a f e t y c r i m e Introduction: using case studies

The case study approach has been, an d remains, particularly im p o rta n t in all forms o f co rp orate crim e research. There are several reasons for this general tend en c y to p ro d u ce case studies. First, in alm ost all jurisdictions there is a lack o f consolidated co rp o rate crim e statistics th a t form basic raw material w ith w h ic h c o rp o r a te c rim e research ers m i g h t w ork . F urther, projects designed to generate large scale quantitative data w ith which th en to w o rk are extremely expensive and thus require funding - b u t such fun din g is unlikely to com e fro m either g ove rn m en ts o r em ployers, each o f w hich are likely to find c o r p o r a te c rim e research u n attra c tiv e ; such fu n d i n g has th u s b een extremely rare, is n o w virtually n o n -ex isten t (Snider 2003), and there have been very few such large scale surveys (see Slapper and Tombs 1999: 3 7-41). T h u s there is a te n d e n c y in c o rp o ra te crim e research to w ards studies o f discrete crimes o r g rou ps o f crimes. Typically, these crimes have been largescale in n a tu r e , th a t is, involving significant a m o u n t s o f financial loss, or

7

Safety Crim es

large numbers of victims (most commonly, consumers, employees, or local residents), or with particularly symbolic political or popular effects. These studies go beyond stating the ‘facts’ of particular cases, but generally involve detailed post hoc social scientific reconstruction of events and processes sur­ rounding a particular crime or group of crimes; somewhat differently, some of these studies are based upon intimate, after-the-event accounts by whis­ tle-blowers or investigative journalists. The result is generally a detailed case history which facilitates understanding of the processes by which corporate crimes emerge, occur, and are responded to. Albeit presented in truncated and outline form, this is precisely one of the tasks of the cases here. Case study research within corporate crime does have advantages. First, a series of discrete case studies can provide an overall insight into the enorm ous range of offences in which corporations and organisations can and do become implicated, from the well-known to the obscure, from the ‘trivial’ to the more obviously serious. Second, taken together, this work reinforces the fact that business offending results from almost every busi­ ness activity, in almost every area of economic activity, amongst corporations and organisations of all sizes. Third, a series of case studies, each of which is ostensibly quite different in terms of industrial and geo­ graphical location, the key actors involved, the scale and n ature of consequences, and so on, may generate recurrent themes from which at least tentative generalisations can be generated. As Braithwaite has argued, case studies - producing a ‘qualitative understanding of the con­ tours o f corporate crimes and how they u n fo ld ’ - are ‘most likely to advance our understanding of corporate crime as a social p h en om en on ’ (Braithwaite 1984: 8, 7; see also Coleman 1987: 429). The construction of case studies of offences (and of types of offence or offending industries), often involves trawling for evidence and source material beyond the confines of the discipline o f criminology. Research on, and evidence concerning, corporate crime, needs to be collated from a range o f disciplines which have no explicit concern with either of what Garland has called the Lombrosian or governmental projects, and out of which contemporary criminology has emerged (Garland 1994). Thus the sources upon which we draw in constructing our cases, and indeed which we use more generally throughout this text, are not primarily criminologi­ cal, indeed criminological sources are often in little evidence here. Studying safety crime means moving well beyond criminology, drawing upon literature in business, management and organisational studies, eco­ nomics, history, political economy, politics, and sociology, and which makes reference to substantive areas of study such as industrial relations,

Introducing safety crim es

business ethics a n d /o r studies in the social responsibility o f business, s tu d ­ ies o f regulation, science-technology policy, studies o f co rp o rate failures, disasters a nd crises, a nd studies o f social m ov em ents a nd activist politics. O f course, care m u s t be taken in in te rp re tin g cases, since, as we have already n o ted here, using an d w orking with case studies, particularly in the context o f safety crimes, raises issues o f reliability. T h u s it is i m p o r ­ t a n t to n o te th a t in c o n tr a s t w ith o t h e r m e t h o d s used in the social sciences, case studies rely u p o n sources o f evidence c o m m o n ly derived from investigative journalists an d whistleblowers rather than sources that can m ore easily be represented as ‘h a r d ’ academic research (although, see George and B ennett 2005). D e p e n d e n c y u p o n investigative sources and w histleblowing therefore invites charges o f politicisation, polem ics, and m oralising (for a som ew h at scathing attack aro u n d precisely such points, see Shapiro 1983). Moreover, each o f the events described o f course raise specific issues th a t relate to very specific, c o n ti n g e n t, c ir c u m sta n c e s. Having said this, in several o f the cases highlighted, the failure to heed the w arnin gs o f w histleblowers an d c o n ce rn ed m e m b e rs o f the public were key features o f the c ircu m stances leading to the crim e. O ften investiga­ to r s ’ an d w histleb lo w ers’ voices are ig n o red un til after the event. T hu s, alth o u g h we have to recognise th at those voices m ay n o t be com pletely im partial, this is no reason to continu e to ignore them . Indeed, the great trag edy is th a t it often takes a fatal in c id e n t to sit up and take w h istle ­ blowers and o th e r marginalised sources o f w arning seriously. C onclusions draw n from any particular case study may n o t necessarily apply beyond the specifics o f the case; ‘the use o f a case study can be d im in­ ished by a belief that the findings may be idiosyncratic’ (B ryman 1988: 88). The cases (at least those of incidents) presented here are atypical, most safety crimes are m u n d a n e ra th e r th a n exceptional, do n o t result in deaths, let alone multiple fatalities; most are n ot subject to any investigation, let alone legal proceedings; most do n o t register at all in terms of publicity. These very characteristics com bine to make such incidents, which occur every day up and dow n the UK and, in fact, across the globe, simply invisible and thus not am enable to study. T he fact that m o st o f the cases presented here are n o t typical therefore does not u nderm ine their usefulness as case studies, for, as we have argued above, to present a case study is not to claim representative­ ness. Further, to echo Braithwaite, above, there is still m u c h to learn from surveying these cases. It is im portant, therefore, not to draw general rules cast in stone from cases, b ut rather to identify co m m o n themes and features o f cases to enable us to open up questions about the circumstances o f causation which might shed some light upon how we might achieve m ore effective p re­ vention. This at the very least makes th e m social facts th a t are w o rthy o f critical attention.

9

Safety Crim es

Why these as opposed to other cases? Several criteria informed our choice of cases, but two are worth highlighting. First, to construct a case requires that one knows about it and that one can find out more about it in other words, it requires a level of visibility that most safety crimes, m u n ­ dane and routine as these are, simply never achieve. Notwithstanding this obvious but important limitation for presenting a range of case studies, we have sought here to include the most infamous and internationally-recognised cases, alongside some which caused barely a ripple beyond the im mediate vicinity within which they occurred, or the group of people most immediately affected. Second, taken collectively, we have sought to illustrate safety crimes in all their variety. Thus, in the following, there are cases where one or several workers are the victims, and others where the victims are or include consumers, local communities and/or the natural environment. Third, the cases illustrate a range of organisations as offend­ ers - from the large m ultinational conglomerate through to smaller companies to those operating at the borders of the legal/illegal economy. Fourth, we have sought to include cases where legality arises intentionally alongside those where the key issue appears to be that of negligence. Fifth, and finally, an industry focus was taken, in the case of the construction industry, to highlight how the structure and culture of a sector can be, at the very least, crime-facilitative. O u r first case study, then, focuses u po n an industry which appears potentially criminogenic, at least if occupational deaths and injuries are an index of safety offences, namely the construction industry. Six further cases focus upon discrete 'events’, setting out briefly the circumstances surround­ ing: the gas leak at the Union Carbide Chemical plant in Bhopal, India; the capsizing of the cross-Channel passenger ferry the Herald o f Free Enterprise; the fire and explosion on the Piper Alpha oil installation; the death of Simon Jones; the gas explosion in Larkhall, Scotland that killed a family of four; and the deaths of 23 Chinese cockle pickers at Morecambe Bay. And a final case study focuses on an ongoing series of safety violations at the Sonae Chipboard factory in Kirkby, Merseyside. In sum, these cases repre­ sent a range o f incidents and contexts, the scale o f deaths and injuries produced, their visibility, their industry, and even their geographical loca­ tion. All have been subject to some kind of legal process which places them firmly within the principal concern of this book: safety crimes. U K construction

Key causal issues highlighted in this case include: casualised, sub-contracted and increasingly m igrant workforce; long and complex supply chains; legal/illegal business relationships; aggressive management; market pressures; industry norms; problems in regulatory processes (see Table 1).

10

Introducing safety crim es

As the Health and Safety Executive’s3 most recent annual report notes, the construction in dustry is probably the last remaining heavy industry o f any size in Britain. It employs 2.2 million people, an d contributes up to 10 per cent o f GDP, making it the single biggest industry. And it is a growing indus­ tr y with significant labour turno ver which, according to the C on stru ctio n Industry Training Board, ‘needs at least 87,000 recruits a year’ (Construction Skills Network, 2006). But it is also rather a peculiar sector - and these pecu­ liarities tend to combine to make its workforce particularly vulnerable. The in d u stry is characterised by a large n u m b e r of com panies, m o st of them small, which are linked th r o u g h complex systems o f su b -c o n tracting a nd long su p p ly chains. E ighty-five p er cen t o f the w o rk in the in d ustry is do n e by supply chain organisations, the m ajority o f w hich are regional small- and m ed iu m -sized enterprises (SMEs). This makes locat­ ing responsibility an d accountability, training, an d un io n isa tio n all very problem atic issues. S elf-em ploym ent is significant in the sector, and it is grow ing, given the spread o f ' L a b o u r O n ly S u b -C o n tr a c tin g ’ (A nderson and Rogaly 2005: 33, and passim). High levels o f su b-co ntracting , agency w ork ers, LOSC ( L a b o u r O n ly S u b - C o n tr a c ti n g ) a n d s e l f-e m p lo y m e n t com e together to give the con structio n in d u stry the highest p ro p o rtio n of fu ll-tim e self-em p lo y ed w o rk ers o f any in d u s t r y in the UK (L o n d o n Assembly Health and Public Services C o m m itte e 2005: 10). There are substantial n u m b e rs o f m ig ra n t workers from the EU acces­ sion countries w orking in the construction in dustry in London, especially w orkers from P oland an d the Czech Republic. New arrivals m ig h t well have difficulty u n d e r s ta n d in g health and safety b riefings re p o r tin g processes or their rights at w o rk .4 Employers may also em ploy them ille­ gally, b o th as a m e a n s o f re d u c in g costs a n d as a way o f driv in g do w n labour conditions in general on a site or a job. More generally, the industry has a highly mobile workforce. C o n stru ctio n workers tend to move from project to project and this may m ean th a t injuries often go u n re p o r te d , while it also means workers receive little or no safety training (ibid.). There is a large informal c onstruction sector, with som e £4.5 billion to £10 billion c o n s t r u c ti o n w o rk n atio n ally u n d e r t a k e n ‘cash in h a n d ’. C o m p a n ie s w h o do n o t pay th eir taxes are also likely to have a ‘less safe w o rk in g e n v i r o n m e n t’ for their w orkers; further, th e in fo rm al e c o n o m y creates m arket co nd itio ns that p u t ‘pressure on legitimate builders to cut corners in ord er to co m pete for w o rk ’ (ibid.: 10). It is, therefore, a highly casualised industry, a nd casualisation is a m ajor source o f danger for w o rk ­ ers: according to th e H ealth a n d Safety C o m m is s io n ,3 the a n n u a l inju ry rate to workers with short job tenure (less th a n six m on th s) is 5.7 times that for w o rke rs w ho se jo b te n u r e is at least five years (H ea lth a n d Safety

11

Safety C r im e s

C o m m is s io n , 2003a: 3), w hile over o n e in five o f all re p o r ta b le injuries are s u s ta in e d b y w o rk e rs w h o have b e e n w ith a n e m p lo y e r fo r less t h a n a year (ibid.). F u rth e r, we k n o w t h a t th e risk o f d e a th a n d in ju ry is far g rea ter for self-e m p loy ed w o rk e rs (see C h a p t e r 2). Little w o n d e r, given th e above, th a t th e H SE h as c h a ra c te rise d th e n a tio n a l c o n s t r u c ti o n i n d u s t r y in th e follow ­ in g way: ‘n o e n t r y th r e s h o ld , h ig h ly f r a g m e n t e d , i t i n e r a n t a n d c a s u a lis e d ’ ( L o n d o n A ssem b ly H e a lth a n d P ub lic Services C o m m i t t e e 2005: 10). Little w o n d e r , to o , t h a t c o n s t r u c t i o n is also o n e o f th e U K ’s m o s t d a n ­ g e r o u s s e c t o r s . T h e s e c t o r h a s a fatal i n j u r y ra te o f o v e r five t i m e s th e a ll - i n d u s tr y average, a n d is th e s ecto r w ith th e h ig h e s t n u m b e r o f d e a th s ( H e a l t h a n d S a fe ty C o m m i s s i o n 2 0 0 5 a : 1 3 ).6 T h e n u m b e r o f w o r k e r s killed in th e c o n s t r u c t i o n s ec to r each year in B ritain h a s r e m a i n e d in th e re g io n o f a r o u n d 7 0 - 8 0 since 1996/97. In L o n d o n th e c o n s t r u c t i o n sector e m p l o y s 5 p e r c e n t o f L o n d o n ’s w o rk e rs , b u t a c c o u n t s for 50 p e r c e n t o f fatal in ju rie s a n d n e a rly 20 p e r c e n t o f m a j o r in ju rie s in th e c ity ’s w o r k ­ p la c e s ’ ( L o n d o n A ss e m b ly H e a lth a n d P u b lic Services C o m m i t t e e 2005: 1). M o r e o v e r , th e h ig h level o f s e l f - e m p l o y m e n t d ra s tic a lly u n d e r m i n e s r e p o r t i n g rates - by u p to 95 p e r cent. Yet even th e r e p o r t e d figures, if a vast u n d e r - e s t i m a t e , o b s c u r e even g re a te r levels o f risk for s o m e w o rk e rs w i t h i n th e s e cto r. As th e S o u t h e r n a n d E a s te r n R e g io n a l T r a d e s U n i o n C o n g r e s s ( 2 0 0 5 ) h a s r e c e n t l y n o t e d , ‘W h a t m u s t also b e t a k e n in t o a c c o u n t is t h a t u p to a th ird o f w o rk e rs w ith i n the se c to r are e m p l o y e d in office a n d d e s k - b a s e d w o rk a n d , as such , are n o t su b je ct to c o n s t r u c t i o n s p e c ific h a z a r d s . As s u c h , a c c i d e n t r a t e s as a p e r c e n t a g e o f th e t o t a l c o n s t r u c t i o n w o rk fo rc e s h o u l d be c o n s id e re d w ith th is in m i n d ’. T h u s th e ra te o f fatal a n d s e r io u s i n j u r y v aries sig n ific a n tly b e tw e e n o c c u p a t i o n s w i t h i n th e i n d u s t r y . T h e m o s t d a n g e r o u s t r a d e s i n c l u d e steel e r e c t o r s ( 4 1 .2 ) , c r a n e d r i v e r s ( 3 2 . 8 ) , r o o f e r s a n d c l a d d e r s ( 2 4 .6 ) a n d s ca ffo ld e rs/s teep le -jac k s ( 2 1 .2 ) .7 T h e m a i n causes o f fatal in ju ir e s are: falling t h r o u g h fragile ro o fs a n d r o o f lig h t s ; fallin g fr o m l a d d e r s , sc a f fo ld s a n d o t h e r w o r k place s; b e i n g s tr u c k by excavators, lift tr u c k s o r d u m p e r s ; b e in g s t r u c k by falling loads a n d e q u ip m e n t; a n d b e in g c ru s h e d by co llap sin g s tru c tu r e s ( w w w .h s e . g o v .u k / c o n s t r u c t i o n ). In o t h e r w o rd s , th es e are i n c i d e n ts w ith m u n d a n e , a n d h i g h l y p r e v e n t a b l e , c a u s e s . As th e e m p l o y e r s ’ b o d y , th e F e d e r a t i o n o f M a s t e r B u il d e r s , p u t it, ‘t h e r e is n o t h i n g i n t r i n s i c a b o u t c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t sug gests t h a t s o m e b o d y h as to die ... [yet th e] c u lt u r e h a s b e c o m e so e n g r a i n e d in t h a t c o n s t r u c t i o n is d a n g e r o u s , t h e r e f o r e s o m e o n e is alw ays g o in g to get h u r t ’ (cited in L o n d o n A s s e m b ly H e a lth a n d P ub lic Services C o m m i t t e e 2005: 1 0 -1 1 ). W h i l e we w o u l d re s ist a r g u m e n t s w h i c h r e d u c e d t h e levels o f i n j u r y a n d d e a th in any i n d u s t r y to ‘c u l t u r e ’ (see Beck a n d W o o lf so n 1999), w h a t

12

Introducing safety crim es

the above does p o in t to is that co nstru ction is n o t intrinsically dangerous, ra th e r the source o f risk for workers being fo u nd in the organisation of the sector an d in w ork th erein . These are socially c o n stru c te d , an d can and do vary between time and place. A similar p o in t has been m ad e about the very different ‘safety’ records o f the N orwegian an d UK offshore oil in d u s trie s, a very useful c o m p a r is o n since it sp ans effectively the sam e w o rk in th e sam e c o n te x t, t h a t is, the N o r t h Sea w h ich , w hilst clearly inhospitable, is n o t in herently d an g ero u s in the sense that it necessarily p r o d u c e s high n u m b e r s o f w o rk e r d e a th s an d in juries. T h u s Ryggvik (2000) suggests th at im p ro ved offshore safety in N orw ay is particularly the result o f rights for u n io n representatives to stop work w hen they feel safety is jeopardised, as well as the m ainten ance o f strong offshore un ion s with a comprehensive netw ork of trade u n io n - a p p o in te d safety represen ­ tatives; this is in m arked con trast to the striden t anti-trad es un ion ism of the UK sector (Whyte 1999a). The very scale o f the in dustry (both in terms o f n um bers employed and worksites), the high level o f sub-contracting and self-employment, the rela­ tively short-term nature o f many construction projects, and the scale o f the informal eco no m y make the w ork o f the HSE particularly difficult in this sector (L o n d o n Assembly H ealth an d Public Services C o m m itte e 2005). Research using HSE internal data for the years 1996-2001 fo u n d a 52 per cent decline in the n u m b e r s o f inspection contacts across the sector (U nison/C entre for C o rpo rate Accountability 2002). Notices and p ro secu­ tions are in decline across the sector. T h u s data for the m o st recent year, 2003/04-2004/2005, shows a decline in all formal enforcement activity in the co nstru ctio n industry: from 3,487 notices in 2003/04 to 2,481 in 2004/05 (from 798 to 548 im provem ent notices, from 33 to 20 deferred prohibition notices, and from 2,656 to 1913 im mediate prohibition notices), an overall fall o f alm ost 40 per cent (adap ted from www.hse.gov.uk/statistics /enforce/index-ld.htm). Data for the same years also shows a fall in offences prosecuted in the industry (from 617 to 550 in 2004/05) and in convictions secured (from 418 in 2003/04 to 396 in 2004/05).8 Yet th ese tr e n d s fly in the face o f ev id en c e o f the scale o f o ffen d in g across th e c o n s t r u c ti o n in d u s try : the su bje ct o f fr e q u e n t e n f o r c e m e n t ‘blitzes’ by the HSE, one such blitz in M arch 2005, for example, saw 214 enforcem ent notices issued and w ork stopped on 244 sites in the course of 1,170 visits which had been heavily publicised in advance (Trades Union Congress 2005a). In O cto ber 2005, targeted inspections o f 1,379 c o n tr a c ­ tors, fo c u sin g on falls from low h e ig h t in th e in d u s try , led to 134 pro h ib itio n notices and 36 im p ro v e m e n t notices being issued related to w o rk in g at h e ig h t (w w w .h s e .g o v .u k /c o n s tr u c t io n / f i to u t). A 2003 blitz, involving 1,429 site visits, resulted in 332 p ro h ib itio n a n d 82 i m p ro v e ­ m e n t n o tice s b ein g served. T h ir t e e n p o te n t ia l p ro s e c u tio n s w ere also

13

Safety C rim e s

n o te d . As in a blitz earlier in the sam e year (Ju ne 2003), HSE co n c lu d e d th at ‘O n c e again, over a th ird o f c o n s t ru c ti o n sites were well below s t a n ­ d a r d ’ (H ealth an d Safety Executive 2003a). R a ther in dicating a high level o f safety c rim e across the sector, a recent re p o r t u p o n the in d u stry , d ra w n u p h avin g taken evidence from a range o f i n t e r e s t e d p a rt ie s , h as n o t e d th e e x is ten ce o f a ‘c o m b a t i v e c u l t u r e ’ w ith in c o n stru c tio n : Several o rg a n i s a ti o n s id e n tif ie d a ‘c o m p e t it iv e c o m b a t iv e c u l t u r e ’ w ithin the industry, in w hich the cause o f safety p ro b lem s is ob scu red as c o m p a n i e s seek to avoid financial o r legal penalties. T his cu ltu re tends to reduce re p o rtin g o f injuries b o th o n sites an d to HSE. O thers n o ted a persistent c om placency a b o u t w ork er injury, (cited in L o n d o n Assembly H ealth an d Public Services C o m m itte e 2005: 10) T h ere are g oo d reasons, th en , for th in k in g th a t the c o n s tru c tio n in d u s try is crim in o g en ic. Bhopal, D e ce m b e r 1 9 8 4

Key causal issues highlighted in this case include: pow er a n d reach o f m u lti­ n a tio n a l corporation s; 'd e ve lo p e d ' versus ‘d e v e lo p in g ’ e c o n o m y sa fety standards; poor design, m a intenance, a n d m a nagem ent; global m a rk e t pres­ sures; victim blam in g ; p o w er to c ir c u m v e n t/p re v e n t legal processes; safety and en viro n m en ta l offences; long-term victim isation - lack o f com pensation (see Table I ). In B hopal, India, a chem ical p lant, o p e ra te d by U n io n C a rb id e o f India Lim ited (U C IL ), a sub sid iary o f U n io n C arb id e C o r p o r a t io n (U C C ) , used highly toxic ch em icals, in c lu d in g m eth y l iso-cy ana te (M IC ), to p r o d u c e pesticides. O n the n ig h t o f S u n d a y D e c e m b e r 2, 1984, w a te r e n te re d an M IC storage tan k setting in process an e x o th e rm ic reaction. Soo n, a c o c k ­ tail o f p o is o n o u s gases, v a p o u rs an d liquids, in clu d in g up to forty ton s o f M IC , was sp ew in g into the a tm o s p h e r e .9 T h e I n d i a n G o v e r n m e n t initia lly p u t th e n u m b e r o f a c u te d e a th s at 1,700, a figure su b s e q u e n tly revised to 3,329. T wenty years after the leak, in 2004, A m n e sty In te rn a tio n a l estim ate d that there had been over 7,000 su c h d e a th s , w ith 15,000 p e o p le h a v in g sin ce d ie d fr o m l o n g e r - t e r m effects. A b o u t 100,000 ‘s u r v iv o r s ’ will n e v e r w o r k again. T h e se ‘h u m a n ’ effects do n o t begin to a c c o u n t for the e n v ir o n m e n t a l da m a g e caused by the leak - a n d still being caused, since D ow C h em ical, the w o r l d ’s largest c h e m ic a l c o m p a n y w h ich effectively t o o k ov er U C C in 2001, refuses to accept any responsibility for ‘cleaning u p ’ th e affected s u r ro u n d in g s .

14

Introducing safety crimes

Union Carbide C orporation worked hard at influencing both public opinion and the legal process through a series of largely spurious argu­ ments about the incident, the nature of the Indian company, and the Bhopal plant and its employees. These included claims that: Bhopal’s safety standards were identical to the standards at UCC’s plant in Institute, West Virginia; it had an excellent safety record, and the design of the p lant’s Standard Operating Procedures - U C C ’s responsibility - was basically sound; the production of MIC in India, the siting of the plant and the qual­ ity of the materials used, were all the responsibility of UCIL and the Indian State; UCIL was an independent company responsible for its own affairs; India’s ‘cultural backwardness’ was responsible for the poor maintenance and management, poor planning procedures and the inadequate enforce­ ment of safety regulations; and, later, that the accident was due to sabotage, on the part o f ‘Sikh extremists’ and then an errant tea-boy. These are classic strategies in the naming of an event as an ‘industrial accident’. When the leak occurred, key safety features were either inoperable or inadequate to their task: the vent gas scrubber was turned off, the flare tower was inoperative, and hoses that m ight have doused the gas had insufficient water pressure to reach the stack from which it was escaping. Further, while the storage tanks should have been refrigerated, the refriger­ ation unit had been turned off to save $50 per week. There are also serious questions that need to be addressed regarding the plant design itself. Plant instrumentation was inadequate to m onitor norm al plant processes. The refrigeration plant at Bhopal, even when working, was not powerful enough to cool all the MIC stored there, and the vent gas scrubber and flare tower were only designed to deal with a limited type of emissions. In these respects, Bhopal was demonstrably inadequate and inferior to Institute. Nevertheless, even with this inferior technology, far fewer people would have died if: the plant had not been sited near shanty towns; there had been adequate risk assessment, modelling and monitoring of discharges, and emergency planning and management; plant personnel, local medical services and the state and national government had known more about the nature and effects of the deadly gaseous emissions - in the immediate aftermath of the leak, UCC refused to divulge any infor­ mation about the chemical content of the leaked substances, making it very difficult to properly treat victims. Further, UCC clearly owned and controlled UCIL; UCC owned 50.9 per cent of UCIL and exercised significant control over it. UCIL’s produc­ tion and marketing strategies were dictated by the corporate strategies of UCC; UCC had dictated how and which chemicals were produced and stored; UCC m onitored safety procedures and UCIL was forced to rely upon UCC for technological assistance and updates. Indeed, UCIL’s

15

Safety C rim e s

p r o d u c t io n o f the pesticides Temik an d Sevin too k place u n d e r c o m m o d i ­ fied c o n d i t i o n s : th e y w ere to be p r o d u c e d a n d sold in su c h a way th a t s u b - d i v i s i o n s o f th e c o m p a n y s h o w e d a n o r m a l p r o f ita b l e r e t u r n on in v e s tm e n t. It is q u e s tio n a b le w h e th e r it was possible for U CIL to d o so safely. A n d m a r k e t c o n d it io n s w ere ch an g in g : follo w in g tw o d e c a d e s o f hu g e g ro w th , the pesticides m a r k e t in India h a d b e c o m e extrem ely c o m ­ p e titiv e by th e e n d o f th e 1970s, a n d by th e b e g i n n i n g o f th e 1980s p e s tic id e d e m a n d in I n d i a h a d all b u t c o lla p s e d . T h u s t h e i n d u s t r y b e c a m e ch aracterised by h a rs h e r a n d increasing levels o f c o m p e titio n . W h a t is clear is th a t U C C seem s to have been responsible for b o th the acts o f c o m m is s io n a n d o m i s s i o n t h a t cre ated th e B h o p a l disaster. T h e c o n te n tio n s m a d e by U C C co n c e rn in g the Bhopal disaster in its p ublicity an d its legal a r g u m e n ts d o n o t stand up to scrutiny. O n v is itin g B h o p a l in th e a f t e r m a t h o f th e leak, W a r r e n A n d e r s o n , U C C ’s C E O , w as a r r e s te d - b u t relea se d days later, n e v e r to r e t u r n to In d ia . A l t h o u g h , in D e c e m b e r 1991, th e C h i e f M a g i s tr a te in B h o p a l o rd ered A n d e rs o n an d the c o m p a n y to a p p e a r in c o u rt o n charges o f c u l­ p a b le h o m i c i d e , n e i t h e r a p p e a r e d a n d are listed as ‘p r o c l a i m e d a b s c o n d e r s ’. O verw h elm ing ly, legal activity cen tred o n civil suits for c o m ­ p e n satio n - a n d , following a flurry o f such suits, the In dia n G o v e r n m e n t a ss u m e d legal pow'ers to secure d am a g e s in M arch 1985 o n b e h a lf o f vic­ tim s w h o w ere n o t c o n s u lte d . T h e in itial s u m d e m a n d e d by th e In d i a n g o v e r n m e n t was $3.3 billion; in 1989, U C C a n d the In d ia n g o v e r n m e n t reached an o u t - o f - c o u r t se ttle m e n t o f $470 m illion. T his r e n d e r e d U C C i m m u n e from all litigation, in clu d in g crim in a l charges. T he m o n e y was to c o m p e n s a te the families o f the 3,329 d eath s an d 20,000 seriously injured officially recognised by the In d ian g o v e rn m e n t. But the m o n e y has still has n o t been fully d is trib u te d . U n io n C arbid e, no w o w n e d by D ow C h em ic al, paid o u t £ 250m in c o m p e n s a tio n to resi­ d e n ts in 1989, b u t o n ly a p a r t o f th a t su m has b e e n d is tr i b u te d . In July 2004, In d ia ’s S u p rem e C o u r t o rd e re d the g o v e rn m e n t to d is trib u te m o n e y held in the b a n k , cu rre n tly w o r th £ 17 4m , to the 566,876 B hop al survivors a n d relatives w h o s e c la im s have b e e n su ccessfu lly l o d g e d . As late as S e p te m b e r 2004, a r o u n d U S$330 m illio n r e m a in e d h eld by th e Reserve Bank o f India. The H erald o f Free Enterprise, M a rc h 1 9 8 7

Key causal issues highlighted in this case include: m a rk e t pressures; in d u stry norm s; system atic fa ilu re to heed w arnings; poor design, m a in ten a n ce, and m anagem ent; victim blam ing; a n d failings in legal a n d regulatory processes (see Table 1).

16

Introducing safety crim es

T he Herald o f Free Enterprise was one o f the largest roll-on, roll-off (roro) sea ferries - so-called because vehicles drive in through the bow an d out th r o u g h the stern at the destination. But w hen using the Belgian p o r t o f Zeebrugge, where tu r n a ro u n d time was longer than on other routes due to the design o f loading facilities, it was co m m o np lace to leave the p o rt with the bow doors op en - even th o u g h it was the formal responsibility o f the assistant b o su n to see th e m closed (Boyd 1992). T h u s w hen the ferry left p o rt, w ith its b o w d o o rs o p e n o n M arch 6, 1987, w ater b eg an to flood through the open b ow d oors across the main car deck, which, as with other ro-ro ferries, lacked dividing bulkheads. The Herald quickly becam e unsta­ ble, an d capsized in ab o u t 90 seconds. T he sea was calm and there was only a light breeze, 193 passengers and crew m em b ers died.10 T h e C h a n n e l betw een E ng lan d and c o n tin e n ta l E uro pe is on e o f the w o rld ’s busiest waterways. D u ring the 1980s, passenger ferries were facing the threat o f new co m p etition. Sealink UK Ltd had been privatised by the n e o -lib e ra l T h a tc h e r G o v e r n m e n t in 1984, o p e n in g the m a r k e t up to greate r c o m p e t it io n b e tw e e n o p e ra t o rs . R e d u c tio n s in crew n u m b e r s , m o de rn isa tion o f p o rt facilities to speed ferry t u r n a r o u n d time, building o f new, larger ro-ro ferries, and a range o f cut-price fares began to ch arac­ terise the m a rk e t. A nd, after 1986, such tr e n d s were e xacerb ated w hen British and French G o vernm en ts agreed to c onstruct the C han ne l Tunnel, to be operative by 1994. The findings o f the C o u rt o f Form al Investigation into the Herald c a p ­ sizing, held in 1987, were re m a rk a b l e for th e ir c o n t e n t an d ton e. It is w orth q uo tin g one key, and infam ous, passage at length: ... a full investigation into the circ u m sta n c e s o f the disaster leads inexorably to the conclusion th at the un derly in g or cardinal faults lay h igher up in the company. The Board o f Directors did no t a p p re ­ ciate th e ir resp o n sib ility for th e safe m a n a g e m e n t o f th e ir ships. They did no t apply their m ind s to the question: W h at orders should be given for the safety o f o u r ships? The directors did n o t have any p ro p er co m p re h e n sio n o f w hat their duties were. There appears to have been a lack o f th o u g h t ab ou t the way in w h ich the H era ld o u g h t to have b een o rg a n iz e d for the D o v e r - Z e e b r u g g e r u n . All c o n c e r n e d in m a n a g e m e n t , from the m e m b ers o f the Board o f Directors dow n to the ju n io r s u p e r in te n d ­ ents, were guilty o f fault in th a t all m u s t be reg ard e d as s h a rin g responsibility for the failure o f m a n a g e m e n t. From top to b o tto m the b od y co rp orate was infected with the disease o f sloppiness .... It

17

Safety Crim es

is only necessary to quote one example of how the standard of m a n ­ agement fell short __ It reveals a staggering complacency. (Department of Transport 1987: Para 14.1) The disaster had significant legal consequences. The inquest held later in 1987 into the capsizing returned verdicts o f ‘unlawful killing’ - despite the coroner instructing such a verdict inadmissible - and created the possibility of a criminal prosecution. A manslaughter case - against P&O European Ferries, owners of the Herald, and seven individuals - did follow, b ut the judge closed proceedings before the prosecution had finished presenting its case on the basis that the legal test under current manslaughter law would not be met in this case. Indeed, whilst avoiding criminal sanction, the chair­ man of P&O European Ferries, Sir Jeffrey Stirling, became Lord Stirling in Prime Minister Thatcher’s 1990 resignation honours. This case was significant for several reasons. It had a symbolic signifi­ cance, in several respects: due to the sheer scale of the tragedy, due to the images of it that pervaded the media of this enormous, everyday piece of technology capsized, and also due to the irony of its name - Herald o f Free Enterprise - so that its sinking could be viewed as emblematic of the prob­ lems created for public and worker safety by a Government-led enterprise culture which seemed to valorise profit and risk taking. Further, in the fail­ ure of the prosecution, the problems of successfully holding large, complex organisations to account for the production of death was raised up political and popular agendas. The ensuing outcry was one factor leading, in 1996, to new proposals for a new law on ‘corporate killing’ - though at the time of writing, this has still to pass through the UK parliament. Design changes to ro-ro ferries had been called for in 1985, following the capsizing of the vessel European Gateway off Harwich in 1982. Six people were killed in that incident. Following Zeebrugge, the United Nations body, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) convened a special confer­ ence and eventually passed the Safety of Life at Sea Regulations (SOLAS 90). Regulation 8 of SOLAS 90 states that all ro-ro ferries must be able to stand up right long enough for passengers to evacuate. Although this applied automatically to vessels built after April 1990, it did not apply to those built before that date - it was argued that the cost of installing bulk­ heads on existing craft would, if passed on to passengers, increase fares by up to 35 cents per ticket. The standards agreed as suitable in SOLAS 90 were repeatedly postponed. They came into force in October 2005. Yet ro-ro ferries seem inherently unsafe. Between 1989 and 1994, Lloyds register recorded 4,583 lives lost at sea - a third of which, 1,544, were lost in incidents involving ro-ro ferries, despite these being but a small fraction of the w orld’s fleet. Then, infamously, on 28 September,

18

Introducing safety crim es

1994, the ro-ro ferry Estonia capsized in the Baltic sea killing - officially 852 people (small children were n o t registered as passengers so the toll cou ld have b een significantly m o r e ). W ater e n te re d the vessel th r o u g h defective bow doors. M ost o f these people died in the vessel because they did n o t have sufficient time to get on to the u p p e r deck. Six weeks after this sinking, a rep ort from the D e p a rtm e n t o f T ra n sp o r t’s M arin e Safety Agency discovered that of the 107 ro-ro ferries it had inspected, bow d oo r faults were fou nd in one in three vessels. In 2002, P8cO a n n o u n c e d a w idespread reorganisation, cutting its fleet o f ships from 24 to 17 and ending several ‘u n e c o n o m ic rou tes’ - including services from Dover to Zeebrugge. P8cO’s ferry services director, G raeme D u n lo p , stated at th at time, eight years after the o p en in g o f the channel tu n n e l that, ‘We knew the tu n n e l was going to open and we knew it was going to grab a share o f the m arket. O u r strategy was to increase the size o f the market, so we each got a slice o f a bigger pie’. Piper Alpha, July 1 9 8 8

Key causal issues highlighted in this case include: casualised/sub-contracted labour; aggressive m anagem ent; in d u stry norms; system atic failure to heed w arnings; political econom y o f speed; global m a rk e t pressures; fa ilin g s in legal and regulatory processes (see Table 1). A ro un d 10 p.m. on 6 July, 1988, a scries o f explosions tore th rou gh the O cciden tal-o w ned Piper Alpha oil p ro d u c tio n p latform in the N o rth e r n Sector o f the British N o rth Sea. O ne h u n d re d and sixty seven were killed on Piper Alpha; 61 workers survived. T hirty bodies were never recovered from the N o rth Sea after O ccidental declined to pay for the excavation of the platform from the sea bed. Subsequent accounts o f events following the explosions indicate a high degree o f m a n a g e m e n t c o n tr ib u tio n to the events. N egligent em ergency provision and u nd er-m ain tain ed critical safety systems m ade a catastrophic situ ation worse: em ergency lighting failed; there were hardly any torches available to the crew; each o f the lifeboats was located in the same section o f the platform , which also hap pen ed to be inaccessible; an d no provision h ad been m ad e for an alternative escape route to the sea. M ost people on the platform gathered at the emergency m uster point, the acco m m o datio n module, which due to its location above the gas compression m o du le also hap pen ed to be one o f the areas on the platform m ost exposed to fire and explosion. The accom m od atio n m odule, constructed from w ood an d fibreglass, quickly began to bu rn. The water deluge system - the platform ’s m ain defence against fire - failed. W h en two life rafts were launched, they failed to inflate. The standby safety vessel, a converted fishing boat, had no m e d ­

19

Safety C rim e s

ical supplies to treat survivors as th ey were pulled from the sea, a n d the Tharos, O ccidental’s state-of-the-art floating fire engine, could n o t m uster sufficient water pressure to reach the flames. O c c id e n tal’s senior m a n a g e m e n t h ad been w a rn e d by their own c o n ­ sultants th at the p latfo rm w o u ld n o t w ith s ta n d p ro lo n g e d ex p o su re to high intensity fire. It was a w a rn in g th a t they chose to ignore since the c o m p a n y ’s assessm ent o f the risk o f such an incident occu rrin g did not justify the expense o f refitting the platform with high-grade fireproofing. The sequence o f events th at followed the initial explosions illustrate the strictly o b se rv e d ‘p r o d u c t i o n first’ d ic t u m o f o ffsh ore m a n a g e m e n t. M a n a g e m e n ts on p la tfo rm s co n n e c te d by the sam e pip eline chain , the Tartan and the Claymore, declined to sh u td o w n p ro d u c tio n , and instead continu ed to feed the blaze with oil as they obediently awaited perm ission for a costly c losu re o f th e p ip e lin e from s en io r m a n a g e m e n t o n s h o r e . There was no p rosecution o f Occidental, a firm that already had a c rim i­ nal record for killing one o f its workers in Septem ber 1987. Piper Alpha, ra th e r th a t being u n d e rs to o d as a one-off, u np red ictable event, sh o u ld be u n d e r s to o d as th e c u lm in a t io n o f a generalised safety crisis in the industry. T he origins o f this crisis are in the failure o f b o th the regulatory system an d the operating oil c om panies’ m a n a g e m e n t regimes. Also o f key significance was the political econom y that ensured the oil was to f u n c tio n as th e m o t o r o f th e n eo -lib eral r e s tr u c t u r i n g o f the UK econom y in the 1970s and 1980s. This had three principle effects. First, as Carson (1982) argued, the conditions within which British oil policy devel­ op ed are best d escribed as ‘th e political e c o n o m y o f sp e e d ’ w h ereb y the speedy d e v e lo p m e n t o f an in d u s tr y - central to offsetting B ritain ’s ec o ­ nom ic decline in the 1970s - came at great cost to the workers, m easured in abnorm ally high rates o f injury and death in the sector (11 times the fatal­ ity rate in th e c o n s t r u c ti o n i n d u s tr y an d n early nin e tim es th e rate in mining). A related effect was regulatory acceptance, the ‘institutionalisation o f tolerance’ o f this appalling toll, indicated by the legal anomalies, jurisdic­ tional gaps, and low level o f resources available to the regulatory regime. Second, the particular features o f the lab ou r process in the offshore oil sector were a m a jo r c o n tr ib u t o r y factor. The use o f casualised an d s u b ­ co n tr a c te d l a b o u r was quickly e stab lish ed by the offshore drilling and operating com p anies in the early years of the industry. The legacy o f this s t r u c tu r e was th a t, over the years, the p erc e n ta g e o f o ffsho re w o rk ers employed as sub -co n tracto rs has rem ained at between 80 per cent and 90 per cent. In the pre-P ip er Alpha period, w orkers were usually employed on sh o r t-te rm con tracts th at often lasted no longer th an a few weeks or m o n th s, and c ontained few c o n tractual rights. Trade u n io n organisation was v irtually u n h e a r d of. Brutal m a n a g e m e n t styles e n su re d th a t those

20

Introducing safety crim es

w ho were fo u n d to have trad e u n io n sy m p ath ies, or those w ho vocally expressed c o n c ern s a b o u t safety were ro u tin ely ‘N R B d ’ (told they were no t required back). Eighty three per cent o f workers on bo ard Piper Alpha on the night o f the disaster were su b -co ntra cted . The m arginalisation of w o rk ers’ expertise and knowledge o f safety in the offshore m a n a g e m e n t regime was to have catastrophic consequences. In the m o n t h s preceding the disaster, m a n a g e m e n t ignored a series o f reports o f gas leaks by w o rk ­ ers on the P ip e r A lpha. O n the day o f the disaster, two w o rk ers h ad c o m p lained a b o u t a gas smell. A ltho ug h one received p erm ission by the pla tfo rm safety officer to d o w n tools, m a n a g e m e n t h ad a p p a re n tly declined to interfere with w ork routines and con d u c t an investigation. T h ird, the co ntractu al su b o r d in a tio n o f workers as a result o f the off­ shore labour m arket structure had been exacerbated by a chain o f events in the m arket which shook the industry in the mid-1980s. The collapse o f the OPEC cartel q u o ta system in 1985 (the average oil price per barrel p l u m ­ meted from m ore than $30 in N ovem ber 1985 to aro u n d $10 in April 1986) ha d a dram atic effect on the industry. In o rd e r to defend profit levels, oil companies slashed their o perational budgets by between 30 and 40 per cent across the board. T h e im pact on the workforce was devastating. Wage levels fell dramatically an d 1986 saw u p to 22,000 jobs lost in the industry. The operators’ response to the oil price crash had far reaching im plications for workplace safety in the industry. Funding allocated to ensuring the regular maintenance o f plant equ ip m e n t suffered the same fate. Fatality and injury rates rem ain abn orm ally high in the industry, and, despite the in trod uc tio n o f som e limited im p rov em en ts to hardw are and, a new regulatory regim e following the official in q u iry into the disaster, th e w o rk fo rc e re m a in s largely casualised an d lacks tr a d e u n i o n safety rights. In the years since Piper Alpha, the w orkforce has rem ained un d er pressure as a result o f successive cost-cutting exercises aim ed at re cu p erat­ ing the costs resulting from Piper Alpha. Sim on Jones, April 1 9 9 8

Key causal issues highlighted in this case include: inter-firm relationships; casualised/sub-contra cted labour; g o v e rn m e n t su b -co n tra ctin g o u t o f e m p lo ym en t responsibilities; changes in welfare state; failings in legal and regulatory processes (seeTable 1). In April 1998, Sim on Jones signed on for casual work in Brighton with a local e m p l o y m e n t agency, P e rs o n n e l S election. A c co rd in g to E m m a Ainsley, a friend, Sim on had taken the job ‘to get the dole o f his b ack’. 11 Sim on was required to register with an e m p lo y m en t agency, Personnel S electio n, w h o se jo b it was to find him w o rk . U n d e r the Job Seekers A llow ance sc h e m e - p a r t o f New L a b o u r ’s b r o a d e r Welfare to W ork

21

Safety C rim e s

strategy - cla im a n ts m u s t c o n tin u a lly d e m o n s tr a t e availability for and willingness to work; these conditions make refusing offers o f w ork liable to lead to a w ithdrawal o f state ‘benefits’. S im on ’s first job with Personnel Selection was at S horeham Docks, w orking for E u ro m in Limited, a D utch cargo co m p an y . He w en t to w o rk in a s h i p ’s h o ld , u n lo a d i n g its cargo. W ithin an h o u r o f arriving for his first day o f work, he was dead. His head had been cru sh ed an d partially severed w hen a three to n n e ‘c r a n e ’ grab closed a r o u n d i t . 12 T h e grab sh o u ld n o t have b e en there; it certain ly should n ot have been open. The w ork required chains which should have b een fastened to a h o o k instead. C h a n g in g b ack b e tw e e n a grab a n d a h o o k costs tim e an d th ere fo re m on ey. Ten weeks p ri o r to th e in cid ent, un d e r M r M artell’s in struction, the chain had been welded to the inside of the grab so that the crane could be used for either p urp o se w itho ut delay (Kelso 2001). After S im o n ’s death, co-workers were im mediately required to clear up blood and debris from the bags o f aggregates that were being shifted in th e h o ld , a n d th e n to c o n ti n u e w o rk in g . E m m a Aynsley has since said that Im m e d i a te l y th a t me a n d S i m o n ’s fam ily f o u n d o u t th a t he was w orking inside o f a ship we all felt, as his m o th e r pu t it, this wasn’t an a c cid e n t, b ecause a c c id e n ts are th in g s th a t are av oid able an d Sim on should never, ever have been p ut in that situation. As one o f the cam paigners in the Simon Jones M em orial C am paig n said s u b s e q u e n tly , in a strik in g ly clear analogy, it was like asking s o m e o n e w ith o u t a driving licence to drive an articulated lorry. No prosecution was ever taken against Personnel Selection, th ough they are covered by the legal requirem ent to ensure the suitability o f work which they assign o r offer. Initially, the CPS also declined to prosecute Euromin, the firm for which the stu den t was w orking (at just over £4 per hou r). This is despite the fact that o n visiting the scene o f the death, the HSE issued two Prohibition notices - regarding the use o f the crane - a nd an Im provem e nt notice requiring the training a nd supervision o f new workers. A protracted and high-profile cam paign by the S im on Jones M em orial C am paig n developed. This involved a range o f m ethods: lobbying via let­ ters an d p h o n e calls; w hen the CPS and D P P initially declined to proceed with any case against E urom in o r James Martell, legal pressure from lawyer Louise C hristian - an d an eventual judicial review o f the decision n o t to pro se cu te; a n d v a rio u s fo rm s o f dire ct a c tio n , such as o c c u p y in g the D ep a rtm e n t o f Trade an d Ind ustry a nd the offices o f Personnel Selection, picketing the CPS offices a n d closing Southw ark Bridge an d the road o u t ­ side the headquarters o f the HSE in L o n d o n .13 In M arch 2000, at judicial review, tw o h igh c o u rt jud ges o v e rt u r n e d the decisions o f the D P P an d

22

Introducing safety crim es

CPS n o t to p ro s ecu te . T h e y sta te d th a t th ese h a d b o th b eh av ed ‘i r r a ­ tion ally’ by c o n clu d in g th a t there was n o realistic chance o f conviction, an d that their decision was based u p o n a m isinterpretation o f the law; they were d irected to recon sider ‘w ith d is p a tc h ’ (B rooks 2001). In D e cem b e r 2000, the D P P reversed its decision an d a n n o u n c e d that James Martell and E u r o m i n L im ited, w ere to be trie d for m a n s la u g h t e r a n d c o r p o r a te manslaughter. O n 29 November, 2001, Martell an d E uro m in were cleared o f m a n s la u g h t e r; E u ro m i n was fined £50,000 for tw o H&S offences. D u rin g the trial the judge described E u ro m in ’s a n d M r M artell’s a ttitude to safety as ‘ab so lu tely d e p lo r a b le ’ a n d as giving ‘w h o lly in sufficient th o u g h t a nd atten tio n’ to safety. He also stated that the m eth o d o f attac h ­ ing bags to a h o o k welded to the grab should never have been used (ibid.). Despite this, in his s u m m in g up the judge em p hasised M a rte ll’s good character and, typically in cases o f business offending where prosecutions are rare so that there is a high chance that com panies and individuals will have no previous convictions, his ‘clean reco rd ’. Speaking outside the Old Bailey after the verdict, Tim Jones, S im o n ’s b ro th er, criticised the judge for accepting M artell’s claims o f good character: M artell w ho, from the w itness stan d , said he w ou ld willingly send one o f his ow n sons or his own d au g h ter to work in the same co n d i­ tions that killed my b ro th e r - is that his idea o f a good character? He said th at because M artell had no previous convictions, th at he was unlikely to offend again, and that because he had no previous c o n ­ victions, th at m ade him a good character, (see also Brooks 2001) In m an y ways, S im o n ’s d eath was a ro u tin e killing. H u n d re d s o f workers a n d m e m b e rs o f the public die each year in Britain in w ork-related inci­ dents. Rarely do these deaths make the headlines - unless they come in the form o f ‘disaster’ that is, a multiple-fatality incident. But if it was routine, t h e n S im o n ’s d e a th was also ex ceptional in several ways, certainly in its a fte rm a th in te r m s o f th e c a m p a ig n th a t was f o u g h t by th e M e m o ria l C am paig n (friends, family, safety campaigners); an d in successfully forcing the D P P a n d CPS to a b o u t - t u r n o n th eir refusal to p ro secute, it was far fro m ro u tin e. A nd, even th o u g h th e case ‘failed’, a p ro s e c u tio n for manslaughter following a death at w ork is rare indeed - at the time o f w rit­ ing there have been only a b o u t 40 cases taken against individuals a n d /o r companies in English and Welsh legal history;14 most have been unsuccess­ ful (see w ww .corporateaccountability.org/manslaughter/cases/m ain.htm). T h e S im o n Jones M e m o r ia l C a m p a i g n based th e ir fight a r o u n d the issue o f casualisation - a grow ing feature o f w o rk in g life in neo-liberal B ritain. For the c a m p a ig n , c a su a lisa tio n tra n sla te s into p e o p le bein g ‘forced into low paid jobs w ith little or no train in g , no job security, no

23

Safety C rim e s

sick pay a n d no holiday pay m e a n s bigger profits for c o m p a n i e s ’. As on e o f th e c a m p a i g n e r s s t a t e d , ‘Ten years ago, if y o u w ere g o in g to w'ork in a d o c k , you w o u ld h a d to have s o m e tr a in i n g a n d k n o w le d g e . N o w ad ays, w ith th e g r o w th o f c a s u a l is a tio n , th e sea rc h for c h e a p a n d th r o w a w a y labour, you have peop le w h o are d o in g w ork o n docks th at they have no tr a in i n g to d o ’. C asualisation , s h o r t- t e r m e m p l o y m e n t , a n d agency w o rk are all c o m m o n features o f the d ereg ulated la b o u r m ark et. T h ey are also fu rth e re d by a benefits system w hich forces claim an ts to take w o rk - even w o r k fo r w h ic h th e y are p a t e n t l y ‘u n f i t ’ - o n t h r e a t o f w i t h d r a w a l o f financial s u p p o r t from the state. Finally, the role o f P erso nn el Selection acting as the ‘m i d d l e - m a n ’ betw een the state an d E u ro m in - is also s y m p ­ to m a ti c o f a state c o n t r a c t i n g o u t its fu n c t io n s to th e p riv ate sector. In sh o rt, S im o n ’s death is only explicable in the co ntex t o f neo -liberalism . It was q u ite literally n e o -lib e r a lis m th a t, to refer bac k to E m m a A ynsley’s w o rd s , a b o v e , ‘p u t [ S im o n ] in t h a t s i t u a t i o n ’; p r i o r to n e o - l ib e r a lis m S im o n Jones sim ply co uld n o t have been w here he was to lose his life: in the heyday o f the welfare state, th ere w o u ld have been no c o m p u ls io n to w o rk in exchange for benefit e n title m e n t, no role for private c o m p a n ie s in fin d in g th a t w o rk , and n o ch an ce o f h im w o rk in g on th e dock s w ith o u t h a v in g b e e n ce rtif ie d as c o m p e t e n t to do so u n d e r th e n a t i o n a l D o c k L a b o u r S ch em e (Lavalette a nd K ennedy 1996). In o th e r w ords, a lth o u g h a r o u t i n e killing, S i m o n ’s d e a th is o n ly c o m p r e h e n s i b l e in th e c o n te x t o f w id e r social, p o li ti c a l a n d e c o n o m i c t r e n d s . T h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y w h ic h e x p o sed S im o n Jones to c ir c u m s ta n c e s th a t led to his d e a th was created t h r o u g h s tru c tu r a l factors. Transco, D e c e m b e r 1 9 9 9

Key causal issues highlighted in this case include: p o o r design, m aintenance, and m anagem ent; m arket pressures; system atic failure to heed warnings; victim blaming; failings in legal a n d regulatory processes (see Table 1). O n the 22 D ecem ber, 1999, A n d rew a n d Janette Findlay a n d th eir c hil­ d r e n Stacey a n d D a ry ll w ere killed w h e n a gas e x p lo s io n c o m p l e te l y d e s t ro y e d th e i r h o m e at 42 C arlisle R o a d in L ark h a ll, S c o tl a n d . W h e n investigators tu r n e d up at the wreckage o f the h ou se, they closed the ‘slam s h u t ’ system to close o ff the su p p ly o f gas into the site o f the e x plo sion , b u t gas fires c o n t i n u e d to b u r n as a re s u lt o f ‘gas c o m i n g u p fro m th e g r o u n d ’ ( B BC News, 18 F ebruary, 2005). Readings taken at the fro n t o f the h o u se registered 100 p e r cent gas. T h e exp losio n was conclusively fo u n d to have b een c aused by a leaking iro n gas m a in w hich was su b s e q u e n tly f o u n d by investigators to have been severely c o r r o d e d a n d h a d a total o f 19 leaks (ibid.). Gas leaking from the m a in s h ad fo u n d its way u n d e r the kitchen o f th e h o u se an d ignited.

24

Intro du cing safety crim es

T h e p ro s e c u tio n in a s u b s e q u e n t c o u r t case alleged th a t T ransco h a d failed to p ro p e rly m o n i t o r its o w n records w hich sh ow ed th at the m a in s h a d leaked 27 tim es. It was also r e c o r d e d t h a t escapes o f gas at Carlisle R o ad h a d b e e n r e p o r t e d on 13 o c c a s i o n s b e tw e e n July 1988 a n d D e c e m b e r 1999. In a s u b s e q u e n t case on th e 22 O ctob er, 2000, a couple in D u n d e e w ere killed in a gas e x p lo s io n c a u s e d b y a f r a c t u r e d iro n gas m ain , the o p e ra tio n an d m a in te n a n c e for w hich Transco was responsible. D e s p ite th e close s i m i la r i ty w ith th e L ark h all e x p lo s io n , n o c r i m i n a l charges were laid against the c om p an y. Instead, the c o m p a n y cam e to an a g re e m e n t w ith the HSE the following year o n a new timescale for replac­ ing cast iron m a in s p ip in g (H ealth a n d Safety Executive 2004a). Faulty gas m a in s are likely to c o n tin u e to cause sim ilar in cid ents in the UK. M o s t iron gas m a in s date from th e V icto rian a n d p re - w a r eras. T he p re v io u sly n a tio n a lis e d B ritish Gas b eg an to replace th e c o r r o d i n g iron m a i n s in th e 1970s a n d since p ri v a ti s a ti o n , th is has p r i m a r i l y b e e n the re s p o n s ib ility o f T ran sco , th e single la rgest gas s u p p l y c o m p a n y . In the 1980s, T ra n s c o b e g a n r e p l a c in g th e p i p e l in e sy stem w ith ir o n d u c ti le m a in s w hich were s u b s e q u e n tly also f o u n d to be at high risk o f co rro sion . B r i t a i n ’s c o r r o d i n g sy stem o f gas m a i n s have n o t b e e n h e lp e d by T ransco’s failure to b o th replace an d m a i n ta i n its pipeline netw o rk . In the y ear fo llo w in g th e L a rk h a ll e x p lo s io n , T ra n s c o w ere critic ise d by th e in d u s try reg ulato r O fgem , for failing to reach its target to replace c o r r o d ­ ing pipelines by 29 p e r cent (H o d g e 2002). In 1997, Transco laid off 1,000 m a in te n a n c e w orkers. F o u r years later, it a d m itte d th a t it n e ede d a p p ro x i­ m a t e ly 1,000 m o r e w o r k e r s to m a i n t a i n th e safety o f the gas s u p p l y n e tw o rk (Lawrence 2001). In early 2002, Transco a n n o u n c e d a 17 p e r cent re d u c tio n in its staff, cuts that a m o u n t e d to the loss o f 2,400 jobs. In F eb ru ary 2002, Transco be c a m e th e first c o m p a n y in Scotland to be charged w ith culpable h o m ic id e , the Scottish eq uivalent o f the offence o f c o rp o r a te m a n s la u g h te r in E n glan d a n d Wales. T h e p ro s e c u tio n h ad p r o ­ ceeded o n th e basis o f a H igh C o u r t ruling th a t it was n o t a re q u ire m e n t in Scots law for an in d i v id u a l to first be id en tified b efo re the c o m p a n y c o u ld be f o u n d g u ilty o f c u lp a b l e h o m i c i d e (see th e H era ld o f Free Enterprise case). H owever, a C o u r t o f A p peal ruling dismissed the C r o w n ’s case th a t c o rp o r a te liability could be im p u te d by aggregating several dec i­ sio n s t h a t to o k place in th e c o m p a n y in sev era l d if f e r e n t m e e t i n g s by d ifferen t c o m p a n y officers. T h e C o u r t o f A ppeal effectively rule d t h a t a c o rp o r a te h o m ic id e case in Scotland also rests o n the p rin ciple o f id en tifi­ c a tio n a n d d is m i s s e d th e c h a rg e o f c u lp a b le h o m i c i d e ag a in s t T ran sco (see w w w .c o rp o ra te a c c o u n ta b i li ty .o r g / m a n s la u g h te r - s c o t .h tm ). T h e fail­ u re o f the c o r p o r a t e h o m i c i d e case, th e first o f its k in d in S c o tl a n d , a p p ears to have severely d e n te d th e p ro s p e c t o f s u b s e q u e n t cases o f c o r ­

25

Safety C rim e s

p o r a t e h o m i c i d e b e in g p ro s e c u te d , even in cases o f sm a ll o r m e d i u m ­ sized firm s w h ere id en tification w o u ld be less o f an obstacle. T here have b een n o a tt e m p t s to p ro s ecu te such a case since. In D e c e m b e r 2004, the Scottish Executive a n n o u n c e d their in te n tio n to in tro d u c e a new offence o f c o rp o r a te killing. A lth o u g h the h o m i c id e case failed, th e t h o r o u g h n e s s o f th e c o rp o r a te h o m i c id e in vestigation b etw ee n th e HSE a n d the police revealed serious failings in th e c o m p a n y ’s m a n a g e m e n t o f risk to th e p u b li c . T h is was i m p o r t a n t in a the s u b s e q u e n t p r o s e c u tio n o f Transco for b re a c h in g the H e a lth a n d Safety at W o r k Act at L ark h all. In th is case, th e c o m p a n y a tt e m p t e d to a ttrib u te b lam e for the e xplosion n o t to th eir o w n failings, b u t to a leak inside the h o use. It was an a tt e m p t to deflect responsibility th a t was n o t looked u p o n favourably by the c o u rt. S en tencin g Transco in the H ig h C o u r t, L ord Calloway noted : the c o m p a n y have ch osen to a t t e m p t to b la m e the ex p losion on an in te rn a l p ipe leak (th at is, s o m e th i n g for w hich they are n o t r e s p o n ­ sible) despite o v e rw h e lm in g ev iden ce to the c o n tr a r y in c lu d in g the views o f th e ir o w n em ployees o n the site after the explosion. T h ere w as n o e v id e n c e at all in th is case t h a t s u c h an i n t e r n a l leak h a d occ u rred . T h a t aspect o f th e defence by the c o m p a n y serves only to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t th e c o r p o r a t e m i n d o f T ra n sc o h as little o r no re m o r s e for this tra g e d y w h ic h , th e y o u g h t at least no w to accept, was exclusively o f the ir ow n creation ( BBC N ews, 25 A ugust, 2005). T he c o m p a n y ’s records falsely s ho w ed th a t the m a in s o u tsid e th e Findlay’s h o u s e in L a rk h a ll h a d b e e n re p la c e d by p la s tic p ip e s ( B B C F ro n tlin e Scotland, 29 N ov e m b er, 2000). T h e c o m p a n y w as fin e d £15 m i ll io n , a re c o r d fine fo r a h e a lt h a n d safety offence, w hich Calloway d escrib ed as ‘... an a p p ro p r ia te p enalty for a serious failure over m a n y years o f o n e o f o u r privatised utilities, a c o m ­ pa ny in w h o m the pu blic p u t their faith an d to w h o m th ey pay su bstan tial s u m s o f m o n e y to en su re th e safe tr a n s p o r t a t i o n o f th e ir fuel’. T h e fine, despite its size, equ ate d to less th a n 2 p er cent o f the c o m p a n y ’s p o st-ta x profits for th e p rev io us year. In any case, because the c o m p a n y is able to cho ose how to spread the cost o f th e fine, the b u r d e n could be passed on to its c o n s u m e r s o r w o r k e r s in th e fo r m o f h ig h e r c h arg es o r jo b cuts. Following the im p o sitio n o f the fine, a c o m p a n y sp o k e s p erso n declined to apologise for its c rim e (T he Observer, 28 A ugust, 2005). M o re c a m b e Bay Cockle Pickers, February 2 0 0 4

Key causal issues highlighted in this case include: pow er a n d reach o f m u lti­ n a tio n a l corporatio n s; c a su a lise d /su b -c o n tra c te d labour; legal/illegal

26

Intro du cing safety crim es

business relationships; system atic fa ilu re to heed w arnings; victim blam ing; global m a rket pressures; changes in welfare state; failings in legal a n d regula­ tory processes (see Table 1). O n 5 F e b r u a r y 2004, 23 cockle pickers w ere d r o w n e d at M o r e c a m b e Bay o n th e Lancashire coast. This was the w o rst single in d u s tria l disaster in Britain since Piper Alpha. T h e d ead were all i m m i g r a n t w o rk e rs from C h in a w ho ha d been p u t to w o rk o n the highly profitable cockle beds of the Fylde coast. Two o f the b od ies were never fo u n d . T h e tides in M o r e c a m b e bay are n o t o r i o u s l y q u ic k a n d th e area was k n o w n for difficult c u rr e n ts a n d q u ick s an d s. O n the day o f the disaster, the tide tim e s allowed on ly three h o u r s o f w o rk before d usk. Because o f hig h tides a n d w e a th e r forecasts, m o s t o f th e British g r o u p s o f cocklers h ad left th e Bay at 5 p.m., th e tim e th a t the C h inese w orkers arrived. T he C h in e s e cocklers w ere o rg a n ise d by a ' g a n g m a s t e r ’, Lin L iang Ren, w h o was responsible for feeding a nd h o u sin g th e cocklers an d su pp lyin g th e m w ith w a t e r p r o o f clothes an d tools. O n the n ig h t o f the disaster, Lin Liang Ren drove the cocklers across the m u d flats, several miles from the shore. T h e cocklers were c a u g h t in the d a rk in the m id st o f rapid ly rising tides a n d alth o u g h they m a n a g e d to use m o bile p h o n e s to call the shore, only o n e w o rk e r was resc ued fro m th e w ater. In M a r c h 2006, Lin Liang Ren was c o nv icted for th e m a n s la u g h t e r o f 21 cockle pickers. T h e L iverpool Bay Fishing c o m p a n y that b o u g h t the cockles from Lin to sell on to larger p ro d u c e r s was cleared o f facilitating the crime. T h e re h a d been several clear w a rn in g s th a t h a d gone u n h e e d e d . In June 2003, th e local M P G eraldine S m ith had w ritten to the H o m e Office with co n c e rn s th a t in e x p e rie n c ed C hin ese cocklers were bein g em p lo y e d o n a fifth o f the wages o f British w orkers a nd that they were being exposed to d an g ers th at ex perien ced cocklers w o uld n o t allow. A n ear miss, w h en 40 w orkers h a d to be rescued just six weeks before th e disaster was re p o rte d a n d widely k n o w n a b o u t. A lth o u g h the d a n g e rs to w hich C h in e se co c k ­ lers were being exposed h ad been b r o u g h t to the atte n tio n o f the in d u s try association resp on sib le for issuing p e r m it s (the N o r th Wales a n d N o r th W est Sea Fisheries C o m m i t t e e ) , n o a ctio n was ta k e n by th e i n d u s t r y to lim it those risks ( Liverpool D aily Post, 7 D ecem b er, 2005). An o n g o i n g d i s p u t e b e tw e e n B ritis h a n d C h in e s e g an g s o f co ck le rs in tensified d u r i n g th e m o n t h s a n d weeks leadin g u p to th e disaster. T he d is p u te was p a r t ly a b o u t th e te r r it o r i a l rig h ts to w o rk th e bay, b u t was also fuelled by the a s s u m p ti o n th at C h inese lab o u rers were m o r e likely to take risks th a n locally-established cocklers. In the week before the disaster, b uy ers were b eing asked by British cocklers n o t to pu rc h a s e cockles h a r ­ vested by C h inese gangs ( H e rb e rt an d N ash 2004).

27

Safety C rim e s

T h e key legislative r e s p o n s e to the M o r e c a m b e Bay d is a s te r w as the G a n g m a ste rs (Licencing) Act w hich passed into law in July 2004. T h e Act w as s u p p o r t e d by th e g o v e r n m e n t , th e tr a d e u n i o n s , all o f th e m a j o r s u p e r m a r k e t s a n d th e N a tio n a l F a rm e rs U n io n . T h e new law stip u la te d t h a t ‘g a n g m a s t e r s ’ (e m p lo y e r s t h a t o rg a n i s e g an g s o f c asu a l l a b o u r e r s , n o rm a ll y p a id o n a p ie c e -w o rk basis, in th e a g ric u ltu ra l in d u s tr y ) m u s t no w form ally register w ith the G a n g m a s t e r s Licensing A u th o ri ty before they can op erate. T h e Act created a skeleton reg ulatory s tru c tu r e for gang labour, b u t it did n o t specify a legal m i n i m u m for safety c o n d itio n s , t r a i n ­ ing o r h o u s in g for i m m i g r a n t w orkers. In th e UK re g u la to ry system, the HSE is r e s p o n s ib l e for m o n i t o r i n g safety s t a n d a r d s in b o t h illegal a n d legal enterprises. In practice, however, HSE has n e ith e r th e resources n o r th e p olitical will to in s p ect an d investigate u n re g iste re d e n te r p ris e s an d seek c o m p lian ce or take e n fo r c e m e n t action in this sector. In the i m m e d i ­ ate a f t e r m a t h o f M o r e c a m b e Bay, the H SE c a rr ie d o u t in s p e c ti o n s a n d d re w u p safety g u i d a n c e fo r th e c o c k lin g in d u s t r y . Yet th e r e g u l a t o r y agency lacks the capacity to p rov id e a susta ined regu lato ry presence in the ag ricu ltu ral in d u s tries in w h ich i m m i g r a n t w ork ers are c o n ce n trate d . T h e T rades U n io n C o n g ress (T U C ) estim ate s th a t a r o u n d 2.6 m illion i m m i g r a n t w orkers c u rre n tly w o rk in the UK and th a t only 1 per cent o f new ly i m m i g r a n t w o rk e rs are m e m b e r s o f tr a d e u n i o n s (T ra des U n io n C o n g re ss 2003a). Lack o f tr a d e u n i o n m e m b e r s h i p is c o m p o u n d e d by a lack o f rights to m in im a l financial s u p p o r t. I m m i g r a n t w orkers are th e r e ­ fore easily r e c r u it e d in t o th e m o s t c a su alise d , low p a id a n d d a n g e r o u s w o rk . T h e T r a n s p o r t a n d G e n e r a l W o r k e r s ’ U n i o n e s t im a te s t h a t after a c c o m m o d a ti o n a n d travel, s o m e m i g r a n t w orkers earn as little as 78p per h o u r a n d it is n o r m a l fo r w ages to be p aid below th e legal m i n i m u m ( B B C N ew s, 25 F ebrua ry , 2004). It is likely th a t m o s t o f th o s e t h a t died ha d to been forced to w o rk in the in d u s try in o rd e r to repay the expenses o f th eir passage to the UK. A ccording to evidence revealed in co u rt all o f th o s e w h o d ie d h a d b e e n s m u g g le d in to B rita in a n d s o m e o w e d u p to £ 2 0 ,00 0 to p e o p l e - s m u g g l e r s ( T h e G u a rd ia n , 25 M a r c h , 2 0 0 5). In this sense, th e ir p o s itio n as w o rk e rs can be describ ed as ‘i n d e n t u r e d l a b o u r ’. T he im m e d ia te respo nse o f the UK g o v e rn m e n t was to b lam e th e w orkers for c o m in g here to w o rk in the first place. H o m e Secretary C harles Clarke a n d o t h e r g o v e r n m e n t m i n is te r s a rg u e d t h a t an ID card system w o u ld have p ro te cted m i g r a n t w orkers like those w h o were killed at M o r e c a m b e Bay b e c a u s e it w o u l d have p r e v e n t e d th e m e n t e r i n g th e c o u n t r y a n d r e m a i n i n g h e re u n d e t e c t e d ( T h e T im es, 20 D e c e m b e r , 2 0 0 4 ). C l a r k e ’s re s p o n s e e c h o e d t h a t o f th e ta b l o id n e w s p a p e r s in B rita in w h ic h e x p la in e d th e c ause o f th e d is a ste r as th e rise in illegal i m m i g r a t i o n as o p p o se d to the absence o f any safety controls. M o r e c a m b e Bay was th e r e ­ fore read as an ‘im m i g r a t io n ’ o r ‘a sy lu m ’ p ro b le m , ra th e r th a n a failure o f the health an d safety regime.

28

Introducing safety crimes

A dramatic change in market conditions in the global market for cock­ les also helps us u nd erstan d the b roader economic pressures which speeded up the harvest. In 2002, an oil tanker, the Prestige, sunk off the west coast of Spain resulting in a massive oil slick. There was a subsequent banning of all fishing and shellfish harvest along the western and n o rth ­ ern coasts of Spain which created a rise in the demand for cockles in the Spanish market. The Spanish company Conservas Dani bought a familyrun firm based in Wales, Jones, in 2002 which had previously preferred to deal with established cocklers. Conservas Dani’s arrival in Britain intensi­ fied demand and created new opportunities for gangmasters employing Chinese workers (Herbert and Nash 2004). The Morecambe Bay disaster can therefore be understood as resulting partly from pressures linked to changes in global markets and the role of transnational corporations in intensifying those markets. The risks to workers in Morecambe Bay remain acute. In March 2006, more than two years after the disaster, the Royal National Lifeboat Institute reported that half of its 100 emergency call-outs in the Morecambe Bay area since the 2004 disaster were cockling related (BBC News, 24th March, 2006). Sonae

Key causal issues highlighted in this case include: state support for invest­ m ent o f company; frequent offending ('recidivism ’); safety and environmental offences; failings in legal and regulatory process; aggressive management; perceived conflict between safety and jobs (See Table 1). In 1999, the Duke of E dinburgh opened a chipboard factory, ru n by Sonae UK, in Kirkby, Merseyside. As well as being the world’s largest m an u ­ facturer o f wood panels, Sonae - a Portuguese-based conglomerate - has major commercial interests in retail, telecommunications and a range of services. The new factory was located in Northwood, a poor ward in a poor town (Kirkby) in a poor borough (Knowsley). For example, in the Office of Deputy Prime Minister’s list of the worst wards in the UK for employment in 2000, three wards in Knowsley - Longview, Princess and Northwood were listed in the worst six, while on the Index of Multiple Deprivation, which includes indices for crime, health, housing, education and access to local services, Longview was fourth, Princess eighth and Northwood twen­ tieth. Little w onder that the plant - employing 200-plus workers - was established with the financial and political backing o f several public authorities, including Knowsley Borough Council, nor perhaps that it was awarded a grant of £1.95 million, by Peter Mandelson, as Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. The new factory had enorm ous economic, social and political significance for a regenerating town and region.

29

Safety C rim e s

However, since its o p e n in g , the p lan t has been beset by health c on cerns a m o n g w orkers a n d by e n v ir o n m e n t a l fears a m o n g residents, a n d in deed a series o f legal a c ti o n s a g a in s t it. F or e x a m p l e , in 2003, th e c o m p a n y received a fine o f £37,000 after pleading guilty to five p o llu tio n offences.15 A lo n g s id e these p r o b l e m s , th e p l a n t also h as an e x tr e m e l y p o o r safety record - u p o n w hich this case stu dy shall focus. A listing o f key in cidents a n d e n f o r c e m e n t action illustrates this clearly, while also m a k in g it h a rd to resist th e c o n c lu s io n th a t , if th e O xfo rd English D ic tio n a ry d efin es a re c id iv ist as ‘o n e w h o h a b i t u a l l y re lap ses in to c r i m e ’, t h e n t h a t la bel app lies to S o n ae - even if it is a lm o s t e n tire ly reserv ed, in p o p u l a r a n d acad em ic usage, to ind ivid ual, lower-class offenders. As early as A p ril 2000, th e HSE h a d in s t i t u t e d a p r o s e c u t i o n after a S o n a e e m p lo y e e , Ian F a ir c lo u g h , h a d b e c o m e t r a p p e d in th e c la m p in g m e c h a n ism o f a D ieffenbacher hydraulic press. H e suffered serious crush in juries to his arm a n d chest w h e n he en tered th e line to release a tra p p e d b o a rd and b e c a m e tr a p p e d h im self w h en the line activating the b o a rd was re leased . S o n a e w as fin e d £ 1 5 ,0 0 0 a n d o r d e r e d to p ay £ 16 ,7 0 3 costs (Liverpool Echo, 25 F ebruary, 2003). M r Fairclough was off w o rk for m o r e t h a n th r e e m o n t h s , was left w ith a d is a b ility d o w n his r i g h t side a n d th ree years later, at th e tim e o f th e p ro s e c u tio n - still n e e d e d tr e a t m e n t for p o s t t r a u m a t i c stress d is o rd e r. T h e ju d g e said: ‘It is i m p o r t a n t th a t firm s such as S onae do n o t sacrifice safety for profits. In this case, m o r e care sh o u ld have been taken an d m o r e p r e c a u tio n s p u t in place to ensure such accidents do n o t h a p p e n ’ (ibid.). Between O c to b e r 2000 an d April 2001, six o v e r-th ree -d a y in juries and seven m a jo r in ju rie s 16 at the site were re p o r te d to the HSE. In April 2001, M ichael M c N a m a r a broke a leg after he c a u g h t it in a piece o f m a c h in e ry he was try in g to un block . O n 20 M ay 2003, Sonae was fined £35,000 and o rde red to pay £6,417.90 in costs, following successful p ro s e c u tio n by the H SE for tw o offen ce s u n d e r th e H e a l t h a n d Safety at W o r k Act 1974 related to this in cid en t. Ian C o n n o r from the HSE said: It is a lesson n o t just for S o nae, b u t for all e m p lo y e rs to assess the risks an d m a k e sure p ro p e r safeguards are in place, as well as m a k in g sure em ployees are adeq uately tr a in e d a n d sup erv ised ... T h e c o m ­ b i n a t i o n o f a lack o f s a f e g u a rd s w ith th e la ck o f t r a i n i n g an d su p e rv isio n left this an a cciden t w aiting to h a p p e n . 17 In S e p te m b e r 2001, there was a large fire at th e factory, to w hich seventy fire fig h te r s a t t e n d e d . In th e early h o u r s ( a r o u n d 5.15 a .m .) o f 17 D e c e m b e r 2001, there w'as an explosion followed by a fire at the p lant. No o n e was in jured (Liverpool Echo, 17 D ecem ber, 2001). T h e n , in June 2002,

30

Intro du cing safety crim es

th e r e w as a n o t h e r d u s t e x p lo s io n at th e S o n a e p la n t . W o r k e r Jo h n T h o m a s ’s life was ‘saved ’ w h e n firefighters to o k h im from the fire, th o u g h he was taken to hospital ‘seriously ill’ (Liverpool Fxho, 3 June, 2002) with ‘h e a d , ch est a n d b a c k i n j u r i e s ’ (L iverp o o l D a ily Post, 27 July, 2002 ). He s u b s e q u e n tly recov ered . O n 10 July 2006, S o n ae was fined £70,000 an d o r d e r e d to p ay £ 77 ,0 4 6 co sts at L iv erp o o l C r o w n C o u r t after p le a d i n g guilty to a charge arising from this incid ent. At the con clusio n o f the case, th e HSE n o t e d t h a t as well as M r T h o m a s b e in g in j u r e d , ‘m a n y o th e r s were placed at risk a n d very sub stantial d a m a g e was caused to the p r e m ­ ises’. HSE I n s p e c t o r T im B e a u m o n t , w h o h e a d e d u p th e in v e s tig a tio n , a d d e d , ‘T h e basic p r o b l e m u n c o v e r e d b y o u r in v e s tig a tio n w as t h a t d u r i n g the design a n d c o n s tru c tio n o f th e factory in 2000, S onae did n o t tak e an o v e rall view o f safety in c o n n e c t i o n w ith th e m a n u f a c t u r i n g process.’18 Safety ‘p ro b l e m s ’ c o n ti n u e d after the two fires a n d explosions in 2001. O n 14 June 2002, a w o rk er was ru n over at the p la n t by a reversing forklift tr u c k . T h is led to a H SE p r o s e c u t i o n in D e c e m b e r 200 4 , w h ic h re s u lte d in a fine o f £1 2,00 0 a n d costs o f £ 1 3 ,0 9 9 . 19 In a d d i t i o n to th e in c id e n ts n o te d above an d th e fo u r HSE p ro s e c u tio n s , th e HSE has also tak en fo r m a l e n f o r c e m e n t action at a q uite staggering rate given w h a t is k n o w n a b o u t th e p re fe rre d m o d u s o p e r a n d i o f th e HSE an d its in s p e c ­ to rates (see C h a p te rs 4 a n d 7):20 • in M ay 2001, an im p r o v e m e n t n otice was issued on w o rk in c on fin ed spaces; • in S e p te m b e r 2001, a p r o h i b it io n n otice was issued o n th e w o o d chip fuel feed area following an explosion; • in N o v e m b e r 2001, an i m p r o v e m e n t notice co n c e rn in g a u to m a ti c selfpropelled tran sfer carriages was issued; • a p r o h i b i t i o n n o ti c e w as issue d o n 25 Ju n e 200 2 , p r o h i b i t i n g th e re s ta r t in g o f the p la n t involved in a re c e n t ex p lo s io n u n ti l a suitable a n d su ffic ie n t a s s e s s m e n t o f the risks a ss o c ia te d w ith th is p l a n t w'as carried out; • also in June 2002, an im p r o v e m e n t notice o n the safe use o f ind ustrial lift tru c k s was issued.21 A fu r th e r five p ro h ib itio n notices were served o n the p lan t betw een 11 July 2002 a n d 15 O c to b e r 2002.22 T h e n , in O c to b e r 2003, a w orker becam e tr a p p e d for a r o u n d an hour, 50 feet in th e air after b e in g c a u g h t in a c o n v e y o r b elt ( L iverpool Echo, 28 O ctober, 2003). H e suffered serious leg injuries ( Liverpool Echo, 29 O ctober, 2003). By O c to b e r 2003, Knowsley C ou ncil were re p o rte d as giving Sonae

31

Safety C rim e s

'42 days to im prove o r face a £50,000 fine’ - an d the following s u m m e r local M P George H o w a rth d e m a n d e d the closure o f the factory ( Liverpool Echo, 30 July, 2004). T he factory co ntin u es to operate.

S a f e t y c r i m e s in o u t l i n e

T he above cases have been p re sen ted schem atically only. But in p rese ntin g t h e m , n o t o n ly have we be en able to m a r k o u t th e b r o a d te r r i t o r y w ith w h ich th is text is c o n c e r n e d , b u t we have also b e g u n to h ig h lig h t so m e key, r e c u r r e n t th e m e s w h ic h seem to arise in an y p o st hoc analysis o f a specific safety crim e. T hese are p rese n te d in o utlin e form in Table 1.

Table 1

Key causal issues highlighted in case studies

Case

Key Issues Highlighted

UK Construction

casualised, sub-contracted and increasingly migrant workforce long and complex supply chains legal/illegal business relationships aggressive management market pressures industry norms problems in regulatory process

Bhopal

power and reach of multinational corporations ‘developed’ versus ‘developing’ economy safety standards poor design, maintenance, management global market pressures victim blaming power to circumvent/prevent legal process safety and environmental offences long-term victimisation - lack of compensation

Herald of Free Enterprise

market pressures industry norms systematic failure to heed warnings poor design and maintenance, management victim blaming failings in legal and regulatory processes

32

Intro du cing safety crim es

Table 1

continued

Case

Key Issues Highlighted

Piper Alpha

casualised/sub-contracted labour aggressive management industry norms systematic failure to heed warnings political economy of speed global market pressures failings in legal and regulatory processes

Simon Jones

inter-firm relationships casualised/sub-contracted labour government sub-contracting out of employment responsibilities changes in welfare state failings in legal and regulatory processes

Transco

poor design and maintenance, management market pressures systematic failure to heed warnings victim blaming failings in legal and regulatory processes

Morecambe Bay

power and reach of multinational corporations casualised/sub-contracted labour legal/illegal business relationships systematic failure to heed warnings victim blaming global market pressures changes in welfare state failings in legal and regulatory processes

Sonae

state support for investment of company frequent offending recidivism safety and environmental offences failings in legal and regulatory processes aggressive management perceived conflict between safety and jobs

We w ish finally to e m p h a s is e th a t d esp ite these cases s p a n n i n g m o r e th a n 20 years, n o n e o f th e m re m a in a m a t te r o f history. T he c o n s tru c tio n in du stry, at least in the UK, is b o o m i n g , an d c o n tin u e s to kill an d injure d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e n u m b e r s . M a n y o f th e v ic tim s o f B h o p a l c o n t i n u e to suffer in te r m s o f a p o llute d e n v ir o n m e n t , inability to w o rk , lack o f c o m ­ p e n s a t i o n , a n d i n a d e q u a t e access to m e d i c in e s . T h e p o s t - P i p e r A lp h a r e g u l a t o r y re g i m e r e m a i n s lax, a c o s t - c u t t i n g , b u ll y in g e n v i r o n m e n t

33

Safety C rim e s

re m a in s the n o r m o ffsh ore, an d in ju rie s an d d e a th s c o n ti n u e . As we w rite,23 the story o f the sinking o f an o th e r ro-ro ferry unfolds, this time in the Red Sea, off Egypt, with som e 1,000 people dead - and m an y ‘ro - ro ’ ferries c o n ti n u e to sail the seas. T h e S im on Jones M e m o ria l ca m p a ig n c o n ti n u e s to fight aga inst c a su a lisa tio n a nd for effective c o r p o r a te m an slaughter legislation, the latter being a fight th at had really begun fol­ lowing the sinking o f the Herald o f Free Enterprise, and an issue on which successive C o n se rv a tiv e th e n L a b o u r G o v e r n m e n t s have ‘c o m m i t t e d ’ themselves, b ut have yet to in tro d u ce.24 M igrant workers in the UK c o n ­ tinue to be exposed to risks on a daily basis. Transco has been im plicated in s im ilar fatalities fo llow ing th e L arkhall ex p lo s io n . T h e S o nae p la n t co ntin ues to operate, and to attract criticism for stand ard s o f safety and e n v ir o n m e n t a l m a n a g e m e n t. N o n e o f th ese in c id e n ts is h is to ry in the sense that they have left th ou sand s o f grieving relatives. The themes set o u t in figure 1will recur th r o u g h o u t the following c h ap ­ ters - and we shall re tu rn to th e m in detail in C hap ter 9, o u r concluding chapter. O f course, these c o m m o n them es are refracted differently in spe­ cific case studies, have m o re or less significance a nd c o m b in e w ith o th er context-specific factors. But taken together, these cases indicate causes that reside in systems o f m an agem ent, in features o f wider industry and market contexts which provide the c o n ditio ns from w hich those crimes are p r o ­ d uce d , a n d in systems o f law a n d reg ula tion , w hich create o p p o r t u n i t y structures for such offences. This is n ot to deny the role o f contingent fac­ tors. But o v erw h elm in g ly th e cases d e m o n s tr a t e - as will be explored empirically an d theoretically th ro u g h the chapters that follow - that to rep­ resent these, o r safety crimes in general, largely in terms o f ‘accidents’, o r by a ttr i b u ti n g a key causal role to in div id ualised ‘h u m a n e r r o r ’, sim ply obscures rather than facilitates understanding, even if this mystification has particular benefits for certain social groups. If, then, this text is ab ou t re n­ d e rin g visible th at w h ich is o b scu red , as we n o te d above, t h e n it is also ab ou t engaging directly an d critically with the mystifications that separate off the p h e n o m e n a with w hich we are concerned from crime, law' and order agendas. To these ends, then, the structure o f the book is as follows. Having in d i­ cated w h at safety crimes look like in the above cases, we tu rn , in C hapter 2, to m ap occupational deaths and injuries, using various data to indicate the scale and distribution o f these p h e n o m e n a , o f which safety crimes are a subset. C h a p te r 3 then assesses the ubiqu itou sness, pow er and signifi­ cance o f a series o f related a rg u m e n ts which cast these deaths and injuries so m a p p e d as accidents - th a t is, as qu ite d is tin c t from c rim es. In this chapter we also raise key questions a b o u t the failure o f crim inology as an academic discipline to in corporate safety crimes into m ainstream u n d e r ­ stan d in g s o f violence. C h a p te r 4 th en con sid ers the extent to w hich we

34

In t ro d u c in g safety c rim e s

c a n e s t im a te th e scale o f o f f e n d in g fr o m th is p o o l o f d e a th a n d i n j u r y d a ta . W h il e d e f in itiv e a n s w e r s a re i m p o s s i b le to r e a c h , w e c o n c l u d e t h a t s a f e t y c r i m e s r e p r e s e n t a t l e a s t a s g r e a t a c r i m e p r o b l e m as t h o s e c r i m e s o f v io le n c e u p o n w h ic h th e H o m e O ffice ty p ic a lly fo c u s e s, n a m e ly c r im e s o f i n t e r - p e r s o n a l v io le n c e r e c o r d e d t h r o u g h o fficial c r i m e d a ta . C h a p t e r s 5 - 8 t u r n t o f o c u s u p o n t h e le g a l, r e g u l a t o r y a n d c r i m i n a l j u s ­ t i c e a p p r o a c h e s a n d r e s p o n s e s to s a f e t y c r i m e s . S p e c if ic a l ly , C h a p t e r 5 s e t s o u t , l a r g e l y t h r o u g h a n h i s t o r i c a l f o c u s , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c r i m i n a l la w i n w a y s t h a t r e - p o s i t i o n e d s a f e t y c r i m e s a s d i s t i n c t f r o m ‘r e a l ’ c r i m e s ; C h a p t e r 6 th e n e x a m in e s th e p o ss ib ilitie s fo r r e - a s s im ila tin g safety c rim e s i n t o e x i s t i n g s t r u c t u r e s o f c r i m i n a l la w . H o w e x i s t i n g s a f e t y l a w is e n fo rc e d em p irically , a n d h o w w e can u n d e r s ta n d su c h m o d e s o f e n fo r c e ­ m e n t t h e o r e t i c a l l y , is t h e s u b j e c t o f C h a p t e r 7, a n d

in c o n s i d e r i n g

r e g u l a t o r y e n f o r c e m e n t t h e o r e t i c a l l y w e a r e a ls o a t t e m p t i n g t o g r a s p t h e p r o s p e c t s fo r , a n d l i m i t s o f, c h a n g e s in s u c h p r a c t i c e s . S i m i l a r l y , C h a p t e r 8 c o n sid e rs th e e m p iric a l a n d th e o re tic a l d im e n s io n s o f p u n is h in g a n d s a n c tio n in g c o r p o r a tio n s a n d e m p lo y e rs fo llo w in g successful p ro s e c u tio n fo r safety c rim e s . F in a l ly , o u r c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r s e t s o u t t o t h e o r i s e t h e n a t u r e o f s a f e t y crim es, b o th th r o u g h u sin g th e fra g m e n ts o f c rim in o lo g ic a l th e o risin g t h a t c a n b e t u r n e d to s u c h a t a s k , a n d b y t h e n d e v e l o p i n g a f r a m e w o r k b e y o n d c r i m i n o lo g y t h r o u g h w h ic h safety c r im e s can b e b e tt e r u n d e r ­ s t o o d . T h i s s c h e m a t i c p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m y o f s a f e t y c r i m e s s e e k s a ls o t o s e t o u t t h e p a r a m e t e r s o f a n y m o r e e f f e c ti v e c o n t r o l . F o r t h a t , u n a s h a m e d l y , is t h e a i m o f t h i s b o o k : t o r e n d e r s a f e t y c r i m e s m o r e v i s i b l e n o t s i m p l y to k n o w t h e m b e t t e r , b u t t o p r e v e n t t h e m a n d r e s p o n d t o t h e m in w a y s t h a t m in im is e a n d m itig a te th e e x a c e rb a tio n o f social in ju stic e th a t th is b o o k d e m o n s t r a t e s is t h e i r c e n t r a l e ff e c t.

N otes

1 See Tombs and Whyte, 2006. 2 Note that although safety is often used in the couplet ‘health and safety’, the focus of this book is upon crimes of occupational safety not health. Crimes against occupa­ tional health do, o f course, share some characteristics with safety crimes - yet are sufficiently distinctive to warrent separate treatment. 3 Throughout the rest of this book, the acronym HSE will be used instead o f ‘Health and Safety Executive’ except in references to publications, where the full name will be used. 4 Southern and Easter Regional Traders Union Congress (2005). 5 Throughout the rest of this book, the acronym HSC will be used instead o f ‘Health and Safety Commission’ except in references to publications, where the full name will be used.

35

Safety Crimes

6

It also has an ‘especially p o o r ’ (H ealth and Safety C o m m i s s i o n , 2005a: 13) record on

7

T h e figu res in brack ets in d ic a te a c c id e n t rates per 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 for the GB as a w h o le

8

These co m p a re to all industry averages w hich saw a 25% fall in all en fo rcem en t notices

ill-health. 2 0 0 3 /0 4 (Sou thern and Easter Regional Trades U n io n C ongress, 2 00 5). issued by HSE in the sam e years, a 26% decline in p ro secu tion s instituted and a 24% decline in con v iction s secured w w w .h se.g o v .u k /sta tistics/en fo r ce/in d e x .h tm . 9

Case co m p lied from the fo llo w in g sources: A m n e sty International 2004; Cassells 1993; Everest 1985; Pearce and T om bs 1998, Shrivastava 1992.

10 B ergman 2000; Boyd 1992; Crainer 1993; D e p a r tm e n t o f Transport 1987; Wells 1993. 11 All u na ttrib u ted q u o tes , and m u ch o f the material u p o n w h ich this case is based, is taken from the c a m p a ig n ’s website; see w w w .s im o n jo n e s .o r g .u k . T h a n k s to the c a m ­ paign for p erm ission to use this material extensively, and to S im o n ’s brother, T im , and mother, A n n e for their help in checking this material. 12 T h e ‘c r a n e ’ was in fact an excavator w h ic h had b een m o d i fie d for use as a crane by w e ld in g h o o k s o n to the grab. 13 M any o f these actions, and the w ork o f the cam p aign in general, is d o c u m e n t e d in the film . N o t T h i s T i m e -

T h e S t o r y o f t h e S i m o n Jones M e m o r i a l C a m p a i g n ; sec

w w w .sim o n jo n e s.o r g .u k /n e w v id e o .h tm for details. 14 There has just been on e an a lo g o u s case u n d er Scottish law, a charge o f culpable h o m i ­ cide against Transco follow in g the deaths o f four p eop le on D e c e m b e r 22, 1999 when an ex p losio n destroyed a family h o u se in Larkhall. The case was dism issed by the trial judge in 2003. 15 ‘S o n a e U K fin ed £ 3 7 ,5 0 0 for p o ll u t i n g b r o o k ’ (6 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 3 ) , at h t t p : / / w w w . letsrecycle.co m /m ateria ls/w oo d /ne w s.jsp ?sto ry = 2 66 7. 16 D efin itio n s o f these categories o f injury arc given in Chapter 2. 17 h t t p :/ /w w w .a b e r t a y tr a i n in g . c o . u k / H o m e P a g e /h e a l th n e w s . a s p . 18 ‘Fourth HSE fine for Liverpool c o m p a n y after e x p lo s io n ’, G o v e r n m e n t N e w s Ne t wo r k , Press R elease, G N N ref 1 3 5 4 0 6 P - see h t t p : / / w w w .g n n . g o v .u k / C o n t e n t / D e t a i l . a s p ? ReleaseID = 2 13291 & N ew sA reaID = 2 .

19 Source: HSE p rosecutions database - see http://w w w .hsc-databases.co .u k /p ro secu tio n s/ case/case_details.asp?SF=CN&SV=F 170000429. 20 See http ://w w .h se-datab ases.co .u k /n o t ic e s/n o tic e s/n o t ic e _ list .a sp ? rd o N T yp e= & N T = & SN = F&EO = L IKE&SF=R N& SV = S o n a e & S T = N & x = 15&y= 14, and also see C hapter 4 o n the differences b etw een the three types o f no tice issued by HSE inspectorates. 21

Hansard. H o u s e o f C o m m o n s Written Answers - see h ttp ://w w w .p u b lication s.p arlia­ m e n t s k /cgi-b in /n e w h t m l_ h l? D B = sem ukparl& ST EMM E R =en & W O R D S = so n a % 2 0 n otic& A L L = son a e& A N Y = n o tice& P H R A S E = & C A T E G O R IE S = & SIM P L E = & S P E A K E R = &CO L O U R = r e d & S T Y L E = s& A N C H O R = 2071 Owl 9.h tm l_ w q n 6 & U R L = /p a /c m 2001 0 2 /c m h a n s r d /v o 0 2 0 7 1 0 /te x t /2 0 7 1 0 w l9 .h tm # 2 0 7 1 Owl 9.htm l_ w q n 6.

22 So u rce:

h t t p : / / w w w .h s e . g o v .u k / n o t i c e s / n o t i c e s / n o t i c e _ l i s t . a s p ? r d o N T y p e = & N T =

8cSN= F&EO = L IK E 8cS F =R N & S V =S on ae& S T =N & x= 19&y= 12. 23 The Ferry sank on 3 February, 2006. 24 The C orporate M anslaughter and H o m ic id e Bill 2006 was passing through the parlia­ m e n t a r y p r o c e ss as this b o o k w as in its p r o d u c t i o n stage (M arc h 2 0 0 7 ) , b u t was su b je c t to in t e n s e c o n tr o v e r s y , an d threats to p u ll it by the H o m e Secretary. See h ttp ://w w w .co rp ora tea ccou n tab ility.o rg/m an sla u gh ter/refo rm p ro p s/m ain .h tm

36

Chapter 2

M apping occupational death and injury

In tro d u c tio n

In c o n t e m p o r a r y societies, w o rk ro u tin ely kills w o rk ers and m e m b e r s o f the public th r o u g h acute in ju ry a n d c hro nic illness. T h e scale o f this r o u ­ tine killing - d e a th s o ccu r across all ind ustries, all types o f c o m p a n ie s - is alm o st in c o m p re h e n s ib le . A lth o u g h the focus o f this text is u p o n safety, so th a t we are c o n c e rn e d here w ith de ath s from acute in ciden ts, a useful context for o u r c o n sid e ra tio n s in this c h a p te r is the In te rn a tio n a l L ab o u r O rg a n is a tio n (ILO) estim ate th a t, at a bare m i n i m u m , 2.2 million w orkers die each year th r o u g h w ork -re lated “a ccid en ts’ an d diseases (In te rn a tio n a l L a b o u r O rg a n is a tio n 2005: 1). T h is m e a n s th a t a n n u a lly th e re are m o r e th a n 5,000 w o rk -related dea th s every day, while for every fatality there are a n o th e r 5 00 -2 ,0 0 0 injuries, d e p e n d in g on the type o f job. O f th e 345,000 w ork ers estim ated by the ILO to have died in in cid ents (as o p p o s e d to o c c u p a tio n a l diseases a n d exp osu res) at the w orkplace in 2002, by far the greatest n u m b e r , alm o st 220,000, were in Asia, w ith C h in a h av in g by far the h ig h e s t n u m b e r o f d e a th s o f any o n e A sian c o u n t r y 73 ,595 - w ith th e s e c o n d h i g h e s t n u m b e r b e in g In d ia (48,176).* In E u ro p e, Russia is th e state w ith the h igh est ab so lu te n u m b e r o f o c c u p a ­ tional fatalities - a lm o st 7,000 - followed by Turkey, U krain e, Poland and R o m a n ia . For W oo lfso n, flexibilisation - or, as he p u ts it, th e creatio n of ‘a d e r e g u l a te d lo w -c o s t, lo w -w a g e e c o n o m y , w h e re l a b o u r (p r e f e r a b l y “u n io n - f r e e ”) is c o m p reh en siv ely s u b o r d in a te d to the n eeds o f c a p ita l’ is the key to u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h y th e states o f th e f o r m e r Soviet U n io n m o s tly have safety records p o o r e r th a n the rest o f E urope: ‘figures show th at, as a w ho le, C e n tr a l a n d East E u ro p e a n s are th ree tim es as likely to die at w o rk th a n th ose in the EU-15 (9.6 per 100,000 p e rs o n s in e m p l o y ­ m e n t c o m p a r e d to 3 .4)’ (W oolfson 2005).

37

Safety Crim es

Britain is not, then, one o f the most dangerous places to work in Europe. Nor, however, is it one of the very safest, a claim that could be sus­ tained precisely because of our lack o f knowledge of the actual level of injuries within nations and the lack of utilisable data for com parison between nations (see Eurostat 2001; European Commission 2002). More recently, HSE has undertaken international comparisons of fatality and injury data across EU mem ber states and the US for the year 2000, and was able to conclude that while Britain was one o f the safest places, it was being caught up by other nation states (Health and Safety Executive 2000a). The fact of Britain’s safety record deteriorating in relative terms is borne out by a recent EU survey which concluded that ‘Accidents at work are generally decreasing, b u t not in all M em ber States’. Thus, while ‘Between 1998 and 2001, serious accidents decreased by 6 per cent in the EU and fatal accidents by 21 per cent’, this decrease being replicated across some of the newly acceded states such as Poland, Slovakia and Denmark, it was noted that, ‘Despite this general downwards tren d in most of the Member States, the incidence rate of serious accidents increased in Sweden (+13 per cent, between 1998 and 2001), the United Kingdom (+10 per cent), Spain (+6 per cent) and Ireland (+5 per cent)’.2 Such comparisons are fraught with difficulty, and comparative analysis o f injury data requires a whole series of factors to be taken into account, b ut such data do rather undermine the HSC and Government’s long-term complacency regarding its safety record compared to other European nations. In this chapter - which seeks to map the scale and distribution of occupa­ tional death and injury in Britain - we begin by setting out these officially recorded deaths and injuries, and note at the same time some of the data’s limitations. From there, we seek to reconstruct fatality data, to arrive at a more utilisable figure for occupationally-related deaths than that recorded by HSE. The remaining sections of the chapter then consider the distribution of these deaths and injuries, noting their variation in terms of differential vul­ nerability, and paying particular attention to gender and ethnicity.

U s i n g official injury d ata T h e m o s t c o m m o n m e a s u r e m e n t o f o c c u p a t i o n a l ‘s a f e t y ’ is r e c o r d e d i n j u r y d a t a ; d a t a f o r t h e U n i t e d K i n g d o m are k e p t by t h e H S E a n d ar e c u r re n tly collated u n d e r the R e p o rtin g o f In ju ries, D isease and D a n g e r o u s O c c u r r e n c e s R e g u la ti o n s 1995 ( R I D D O R 19 95), w h i c h p lace a legal d u t y u p o n e m p l o y e r s to n o t i fy th e H S E o f in j u r i e s ( a n d s o m e ‘d a n ­ g e r o u s o c c u r r e n c e s ’) w h i c h a r e t h e n c a t e g o r i s e d as ‘f a t a l ’, ‘m a j o r ’,3 a n d ‘o v e r t h r e e - d a y ’ i n j u r i e s , w h e r e ‘i n c a p a c i t y f o r n o r m a l w o r k [lasts] fo r m o r e t h a n t h r e e d a y s ’.

38

M apping occupational death and injury

U nfortunately for those who w ould seek to m ake use o f injury data (and o f interest in the context o f an em ployer’s legal d u ty to rep o rt injuries) each category o f n on -fatal injury data m ain tain ed u nder RIDDOR is subject to significant under-reporting, a phenom enon high­ lighted over 30 years ago by the R eport o f the Robens C om m ittee on Safety and Health at W ork (Robens 1972: 135, and C hapter 15, passim ). Although m ajor injury data are m ore reliable than data for over three-day injuries, each data set is subject to processes o f u n d er-rep o rtin g w hich render them somewhat unreliable as measures of occupational injury (see Nichols 1997). In the late 1980s it was estimated that official data record on average just over 40 per cent of injuries which are notifiable to HSE, and just 10 per cent of injuries to the self-employed (Stevens 1992). M ore recently, HSE has begun to make use o f the regular Labour Force Survey. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a survey o f som e 60,000 private h o u se h o ld s in Britain, based u p o n a systematic r a n d o m survey design, and carried out by the Office for N ational Statistics. Since 1992 it has been c o n d u c te d on a q u a r t e r l y basis, a n d HSE has asked fo u r q u e s tio n s on ( n o n - f a ta l ) w o rk p lac e in ju rie s at each w i n t e r - q u a r t e r survey since 1993/94; HSE data are available for 1989/90, and th en for each year from 1993/94 onw ards. LFS data are o f interest in th eir o w n right, since they indicate a w idespread failure on the p a rt o f em ployers to m eet the legal d u ty to r e p o r t in cidents, an offence u n d e r safety law. LFS data indicate that 'only one q u a rte r o f reportable n on-fatal injuries to employees’ and ‘less than 5 per c e n t’ in the case of self-employed workers, are reported by e m p lo y e rs (H e a lth a n d Safety C o m m is s io n 1998: 1). T h ese rates vary betw een 11 per cent in ‘Finance and Business’ an d 17 per cent in 'Hotels and R estaurants’ to 62 per cent in 'Public A dm inistration and D efence’ to 86 per cent in ‘E xtrac tio n and Utility S u p p ly ’.4 W h iche v er estim ates are accepted, it is clear that reporting rates are extremely low. It has also been c o n c lu d e d recently th a t ‘sm all firm s are m o r e likely to u n d e r - r e p o r t or n o t r e p o r t at all’ (D an iels and M arlo w 2005: iv). Yet while th e LFS is a p o te n tia lly useful a d ju n c t to, a n d i m p r o v e m e n t u p o n , d ata collected u n d e r R ID D O R in te rm s o f a measure o f injuries, it is som ew h at u nreli­ able, given th at there are just fou r q u e stio n s asked at the end o f a very long survey on a range o f e m p lo y m e n t issues (Pickvance 2006).5 Generally, rates o f m a n d a t o r y r e p o r tin g w hich ap pea red to im pro ve briefly at the en d o f the 1990s are no w in decline again (D an iels an d M a rlo w 2005: 2 - 3 ) . M o reo ver, given shifts in levels o f n o n - r e p o r t i n g ,

39

Safety C rim e s

these levels o f u n d e r - e s ti m a t e re n d e r any l o n g i tu d i n a l analyses virtually im p ossib le - a task already m a d e difficult by the fact th at there have been several changes in re p o r tin g re q u ire m e n ts since 1974 (see N ichols 1997). Given the recognised ‘p o v e rt y ’ o f m i n o r an d m a j o r in j u r y d ata, the v a r i­ able social p ro c e s se s o u t o f w h ic h th e y are p r o d u c e d , a n d th e sh iftin g legal cate gories into w hich th ey are o rg anise d, these need to be read w ith a w hole series o f caveats in m i n d a n d th u s treated w ith ex trem e cau tio n. For o u r p u rp o s e s th e y are useful in telling us som eth in g a b o u t th e sheer scale o f the p ro b lem th at we are ind icatin g, the d is trib u tio n o f dea th s an d in juries by sector a n d so o n, an d for m ak in g so m e in f o rm e d ju d g e m e n ts a b o u t any tre n d s in the ir incidence. We can m ak e several b rie f ob serv atio n s o n th e data pre sente d in Tables 2 -1 0 . First, an d n o t at all a p p a re n t from the da ta prese n te d in the tables, the m a j o r i t y o f th e in ju rie s r e c o r d e d by th e HSE are s u s ta in e d by m e n ra th e r th a n w o m e n - m e n are th ree tim es m o r e likely to sustain a m ajo r in ju ry , a n d a b o u t t w o - a n d - a - h a l f ti m e s m o r e likely to s u s ta in an o ver th r e e - d a y i n j u r y ( H e a lt h a n d Safety C o m m i s s i o n 2001: 5 6 ) 6. To so m e extent, o n e m ig h t expect this on the basis o f p ersistent g en dered o c c u p a ­ tional segregation, at least horizontally. HSE research has co n c lu d e d that: T h e h ig h e r in ju ry rate in m e n is partly explained by th e o ccu p a tio n s, h o u r s o f w ork , a n d o th e r job characteristics. However, after allowing for these ch aracteristics o f jobs, m e n c o n tin u e to face a h ig h e r risk o f r e p o rtab le in ju ry th a n w o m e n . M en face a 35 per cent h ig h e r risk o f r e p o r ta b l e in ju ries th a n w o m e n ( n o t ex plain ed by the jobs held by m e n and w o m e n ). (H ealth a n d Safety C o m m is s io n 2001: 56) This raises the issue o f possible peculiarities in the risks faced by w o m e n , a n d s u b s e q u e n t ‘official’ a tt e n ti o n acco rd e d to these. We re t u r n to these issues in a later section.

Second, taking the data in Tables 1-3 together, it is clear that there are large absolute num bers of m ajor injuries - around 30,000 such injuries to all work­

ers in any given year - and over three-day injuries, up to and in some years above 130,000 recorded injuries across British workplaces. Workplace injury is far from an uncom m on experience. Table 4 indicates that there is also an absolutely high n um ber o f injuries sustained by m em bers o f the public in any one year, even though m ovem ent between years is an erratic one.

40

Table 2

Reported major injuries+ 96/97

Employees (number) 27964 Rate per 100,000 employees 127.5 Self-employed 1356 Rate per 100,000 self-employed 38.4 All workers 29320 Rate per 100,000 workers 115.1

Table 3

97/98 29187 127.6 815 23.3 30002 113.8

99/00

28368 121.7 685 20.3 29053 108.8

28652 116.6 663 19.7 29315 104.9

00/01

01/02

27524 110.2 630 19.2 28154 99.6

28011 110.9 929 27.8 28940 101.2

01/02

02/03

03/04

28113 111.1 1079 32.3 29162 101.9

04/05

30689 120.4 1283 33.9 31972 109.3

30541 117.9 1251 33.0 31702 107.1

03/04

04/05

R e p o r t e d o v er t h r e e - d a y in ju ries 96/97 127286 580.1 2282 64.6 129568 508.7

97/98 134789 589.2 984 28.1 135773 514.8

98/99

99/00

00/01

132295 567.3 849 25.2 133144 498.8

135381 550.9 732 21.8 136113 487.3

134105 536.9 715 21.8 134820 477.1

02/03

129655 513.5 917 27.5 130572 456.7

128184 506.5 951 28.4 129135 450.7

131017 514.2 1114 29.5 132131 451.5

121779 471.7 1143 30.2 122922 415.2

I n ju rie s to m e m b e r s o f t h e p u b l i c

Non-fatal *

96/97

97/98

98/99

99/00

00/01

01/02

02/03

03/04

04/05(p)

35694

28613

23800

25059

20839

14834

12793

13679

14316

P is Provisional * Injuries which result in the injured person being taken directly to hospital (Health and Safety Commission 2005a: 21). i Injury data presented in the tables in this chapter is based upon HSE and HSE data, in addition to personal communication with HSE Statistics Unit, 26/10/2006, 20/04/2006. See www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/causacc/tables.htm, Health and Safety Commission 2000,2003,2005a, 2006b; Health and Safety Executive 2003b.

Mapping occupational death and injury

Employees (number) Rate per 100,000 employees Self-employed Rate per 100,000 self-employed All workers Rate per 100,000 workers

Table 4

98/99

Safety Crim es

Third, Tables 2 and 3 both indicate that the recorded differences in fatality rates between workers and the self-employed (above, and Table 6) clearly do not hold with respect to injuries: Table 2 indicates that the rate of recorded major injuries to employees is some three to six times higher than that for the self-employed. This is clearly a reporting effect - if a self-employed worker dies then this is likely to be recorded, whilst an injury, even a major injury, is not, since there is no financial or other incentive to do so. Similar observations are relevant for the disparities in Table 3, and here we would expect the disparities in rates to be even greater given the far lesser serious­ ness of injuries. The data in Tables 2 and 3, then, need to be read in terms of non-reporting, bearing in mind the observation above, that only between 5 and 10 per cent of injures to the self-employed are actually reported. Fourth, it again seems that over the time period covered there are no unequivocally clear, discernible trends, certainly given the problems of vari­ able levels of reporting. In terms of those trends, we can see from Table 2 that there has been a small decline across the period in the rate of reported injury to both employees and the self-employed; there are slight decreases in rates across the period for both employees and the self-employed - though again, we would stress that the data for the self-employed are almost nonutilisable given that they are subject to up to 95 per cent under-reporting. N o w , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e e n o r m o u s p r o b l e m s in d e t e r m i n i n g a c c u ­ rate figure s fo r the n u m b e r s o f o c c u p a t i o n a l in ju rie s , o n e c o n s i s t e n t claim h as b e e n t h a t t h e r e c o r d i n g o f fatal in j u r i e s is at least reliable ( H e a l t h a n d Saf ety C o m m i s s i o n 1996: 1, 1997: 1; N i c h o l s 1989: 543, 1994: 104, 1997: 126). I n d e e d , the d a t a o n fatal in j u r i e s r e p r e s e n t s the m o s t reliable av ail­ a b le d a t a o n o c c u p a t i o n a l i n j u r y , p e r h a p s e v e n h a v i n g b e e n i m p r o v e d r e c e n t l y w i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f n e w r e p o r t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s in 1995. H o w e v e r , as we sha ll see b elo w , th e s e d a t a ar e far f r o m c o m p l e t e .

Data for the reporting year 1996/97 is the first to be collected under new reporting requirements, RIDDOR 1995. Of interest in the context of the dis­ cussion regarding definitions o f ‘violence’ that is to follow in Chapter 3 is that the new regulations had introduced an expanded definition of occupational fatalities, including inter-personal violence against employees and new cate­ gories of reportable occupational fatalities among members of the public by introducing the ‘vital’ test o f ‘arising out of or in connection with work’ (Health and Safety Executive 1996: 14) in determining what injuries should be recorded as occupational. This phrase is intended to cover ‘the manner or conduct of an undertaking’, ‘the plant or substances used for the purposes of the undertaking’, and ‘the condition of the premises used by the undertaking or of any part of them’ (ibid.: 14). This new, more inclusive, definition simply renders reporting requirements consistent with the substance of the HASAW Act 1974, which requires an employer to ‘conduct his undertaking, in such a

42

Mapping occupational death and injury

way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that persons not in his employment, but who may be affected, are not exposed to risks to their health and safety’. Under this expanded definition, a total of 593 fatal occupa­ tional injuries were recorded for 2004/05.7 Table 5 p r o v id e s a b r o a d o v e rv ie w o f o c c u p a tio n a l d e a th s t h a t have b e e n r e c o r d e d sin c e th e s e n e w r e p o r t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s w e r e i n t r o d u c e d . Sever al o b s e r v a t i o n s can b e m a d e a b o u t t h e d a t a p r e s e n t e d t h e r e i n . Table 5

R e p o rte d fatal in ju rie s

96/97 97/98 98/99 99/00 Employees (num ber) Rale per 100,000 employees Self-employed Rate per 100,000 self-employed All workers Rate per 100,000 workers Members of the p u b lict Total (workers + public) t

207

212

188

162

00/01 213

01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 206

183

168

172

0.9 80

0.9 62

0.8 65

0.7 58

0.9 79

0.8 45

0.7 44

0.7 68

0.7 51

2.3 287

1.8 274

1.9 253

1.7 220

2.4 292

1.3 251

1.3 227

1.8 236

1.3 223

1.1

1.0

0.9

0.8

1.0

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.8

367

393

369

436

444

393

396

374

370

654

667

622

656

736

644

623

610

593

HS E ty pically n o t e s t h a t a b o u t t w o - t h i r d s o f fatalities to m e m b e r s o f t h e pu b l i c are the re sult o f su ic id e o r t res pa ss o n t h e railways. O f co u rs e, t hes e, as all H S E d at a , exc lu de fatalities fr om w o r k rela ted ro a d traffic in ci de nt s.

First, when these data are presented, HSE refer not to deaths including those to members of the public, but rather utilises what has been labelled a ‘head­ line figure’ (Health and Safety Executive 1997; Tombs 1999a), referring only to totals of workers (employees and the self-employed). Now, it should be noted that deaths to members of the public are consistently high. But HSE’s justification for omitting these from the headline figure is presumably based on some claim that these are not ‘real’ workplace deaths - in fact, a signifi­ cant number of these deaths are suicides, and HSE typically notes that about two-thirds of fatalities to members of the public are the result of suicide or trespass on the railways. Nevertheless, this is a rather curious sleight of hand by HSE, since these deaths are reported to and recorded by them as occupa­ tional fatalities, and they may well constitute failures of employers to meet legal duties.8 In any case, such ad hoc alterations to what constitutes legiti­ mate injury data are not made in the opposite direction - that is, by

43

Safety C rim e s

counting in deaths which are clearly occupational, b u t which are n o t cov­ ered by HSE’s remit. The m ost notable example in this context are the 1,000 or so fatal injuries sustained whilst driving each year - there is now almost universal agreem ent that these are occupational fatalities, b u t they are not reportable under RIDDOR, and are never referred to as possible ‘additions’ by HSE when their headline figures are released (see below). Second, these totals are historically low figures. Clearly w o rk is far safer in Britain th a n it was in the era o f early in d u s trialisatio n w h e n th e factory i n s p e c t o r a t e was e s ta b lis h e d a n d d e s c r ib e d , fo r e x a m p l e , in M a r x ’s Capital Volume 1, o r Engels’s The Condition o f The Working Class. Further, it is possible to argue th at the HASAW Act (1974) gave a p a rticu lar i m p e ­ tu s to th is l o n g - t e r m i m p r o v e m e n t , n o t least sin ce th e C o m m i t t e e o f In q u iry th a t u ltim ately led to th e Act a n d th e chan ges it in tr o d u c e d had itself b een e s ta b lish e d in th e c o n te x t o f s o m e rises in i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y rates (D aw so n et al. 1988: 9). H owever, it w ou ld be w ro n g to a ttrib u te too m u c h to the Act per se. As N ichols has arg u ed , a crucial factor to be taken into a c c o u n t in this lo n g - te rm im p r o v e m e n t was the relative stren g th o f la b o u r vis-à-vis capital (N ichols 1997: 122, a n d passim ). Further, the lo ng term d o w n w a rd tren d seem ed to be an instance o f a ‘secular te n d e n c y ’ for fa ta lity ra te s to fall across in d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s d u e to a d v a n c e s in m edical care, im p ro v e m e n ts in c o m m u n ic a t io n and tr a n s p o r t , know ledge regardin g safer w o rk in g practices, a n d levels o f in v estm ent in te ch no lo gy (ibid.: 128). M o re latterly, a n d m o r e specifically, in ju ry rates have declined partly as a result o f changes in the o c c u p a tio n a l s tru c tu r e in British w o r k ­ places; HSE has n o te d , for e xam ple, that c o n s tru c tio n is p ro b a b ly th e last r e m a i n i n g h eav y i n d u s t r y o f an y size in B rita in ( H e a lt h a n d Safety C o m m i s s i o n 2005a: 13). Since th e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f th e HASAW Act in 1974, for ex am p le, e m p l o y m e n t has shifted significantly fro m m a n u f a c ­ t u r in g to services: three m illio n job s in m a n u f a c t u r i n g have g on e, while the service sec to r n o w em p lo y s m o r e th a n th r e e - q u a r t e r s o f the British w ork fo rce c o m p a r e d w ith tw o -th ird s o f w orkers in 1974. T h ir d , w ith in th e d a ta p r e s e n te d in Table 5, th e ab so lu te figures in d i ­ cate s m a ll d e c lin e s in th e n u m b e r s o f fa talities to e m p l o y e e s , th e self-e m p lo y ed an d m e m b e r s o f the p u b lic over th e n in e - y e a r p e rio d . In n o n e o f these categories, however, is there a clear yea r-o n -y ear decline in the ab so lute n u m b e r o f fatalities. As also ind icated in Table 2, the rate o f no n -fatal injuries has also seen a sm all decline in this p eriod. F o u r t h , it s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t th e ra te o f fatalities for th e selfem p lo yed is higher, an d typically a b o u t d o u b le , the rate for em ployees an issue that is discussed below in term s o f the relative v uln erab ility o f the self-em ployed vis-à-vis em p loy ees.9

44

M appin g occupational death and injury

Finally and m ost im portant o f all, whilst those figures m ight allow us to m ake som e very general year-on-year com parisons in the perio d since RIDDOR was in tro duced, the problem is th at their usefulness is lim ited because they cannot be regarded as representing anything close to the full picture o f deaths and injuries at work in Britain. W hilst fatal injury data are clearly more utilisable than other injury data, because o f the relatively lower chances that fatalities will not be reported, and wrhile the requirem ents o f RIDDOR 1995 are an improvement, there are considerable anomalies within the construction of those figures that render them grossly incomplete. N ow, if th ere are p ro b l e m s re g a rd in g fatality d ata, this can at least be re c o n s tru c te d a n d , as we shall a rg u e in C h a p te r 4, it can also be used to say s o m e th i n g a b o u t th e level o f safety crimes. But any su ch r e f o r m u l a ­ ti on s w o u ld still exclude th e vast m a jo rity o f p o ten tial safety crim es, since inciden ts th a t result in fatalities rep resent on ly a sm all m in o r i ty o f w o r k ­ place in ju rie s, re c o r d e d o r o th e r w ise . We have also n o te d th a t th e re are e n o r m o u s p ro b le m s o f u n d e r - r e p o r t in g o f n o n -fata l injuries, w hilst v a ri­ ab ility in r e p o r t i n g ra tes o v er ti m e m a k e s an y l o n g i t u d i n a l analysis difficult, if n o t im possible. In ju ry data does, however, re m a in o f some use for us. First b ecause it again indicates the sheer scale o f the p h e n o m e n o n w ith w hich this text is c o n c ern ed . A n d , secon d, because we can say so m e­ thing a b o u t th e relative d is tr i b u ti o n o f injuries. T h e la tter p o in t will be p icked u p again later in the chap ter. For the tim e being we discuss h ow the available data can be m o r e usefully co n stru cte d .

R e c o n s t r u c t i n g o fficia l d a t a

T h e gap in a c c o u n t in g is b est illu s trate d by th e stark c o n tr a s ts b etw een the consistently h ig h er in jury rates a m o n g s t the self-em ployed in th e c o n ­ tex t o f fatal i n j u r y w h ic h are n o t r e p e a t e d w h e n we lo o k at n o n - f a t a l in ju ry data, w here the c o n tr a st w ith data on fatalities is clear. Official data show s that b eing self-em ployed m akes a w orker a b o u t twice as likely to be fatally in jured, w hilst at the sam e tim e, b ein g self-em ployed m akes it four to five tim es less likely th a t a w orker will sustain a m a jo r in ju ry (Tables 2 a n d 5). This is, o f course, a re p o r tin g effect a n d can only be explained by u n d e r s t a n d i n g th e relative difficulty w ith w h ich fatalities as o p p o s e d to in juries can be h id d e n . In c ru d e te rm s, it is m o r e difficult to hide a b o d y th a n it is to hid e a b ro k e n wrist. H a v in g n o t e d th is d i s t i n c t i o n , we s h o u l d be c arefu l n o t to s im p ly a s s u m e t h a t fatality d a ta are infallible. I n d e e d , we can id e n tif y at least th r e e s e p a r a te p r o b l e m s w ith H S E - p u b l i s h e d d a ta o f fatalities w h ic h r e n d e r t h e i r use p r o b l e m a t i c , a n d an y c la im s r e g a r d in g t h e i r ‘v i r t u a l ’ co m p lete ness sim ply w ro ng .

45

Safety C rim e s

First, the coverage o f R I D D O R 1995 c o n t i n u e s to exclu de sig nificant n u m b e r s o f o c c u p a tio n a lly -c a u s e d d e ath s, for w hic h th ere do exist offi­ cially collected data. S om e o f these o m issio n s are at the very least c u rio u s - n o tab ly fatalities relating to the su pp ly a n d use o f flam m a b le g as10 - b u t th e least excusable, a n d n u m e ric a lly m o s t significant, is th e exclusion o f ro ad traffic fatalities w hich involve ‘at w o r k ’ vehicles. RoSPA (1998) esti­ m a t e d t h a t th e r e are 8 0 0 - 1 ,0 0 0 su c h fatalities p e r a n n u m (see also Bibbings 1996), HSE a n d the D e p a r t m e n t o f T ra n s p o r t have e stim ated up to 20 such fatalities a week, in d icatin g ju st in excess o f 1,000 p er a n n u m (H e a lth a n d Safety E x e c u t i v e / D e p a r t m e n t for T r a n s p o r t 2 0 03 ), w hile a recent stu d y c o n firm e d th e n u m b e r o f d eath s at th e highest figure in th at range, 1,000, c o n c lu d in g th a t ‘B ritain’s ro ads are th e c o u n t r y ’s m o s t d a n ­ g e r o u s w o r k p l a c e ’ (T ra d e s U n i o n C o n g r e s s 20 0 5 b ; see also C a m p b e l l 2005). In c o r p o r a ti n g existent, o m i tt e d d a t a 11 increases the total o f o c c u ­ p a t i o n a l d e a th s fr o m th e H S E ’s r e c o r d e d fig u re o f 593 fo r 2 0 0 4 /0 5 to so m e w h e re close to 1,700 d e a th s .12 Second, the data m a i n ta i n e d u n d e r R ID D O R w ith respect to o c c u p a ­ ti o n a l fatalities r e m a i n in t e r n a l ly i n c o h e r e n t . A n o m a l i e s arise, in p a r t ic u l a r , fro m i n c o n s is t e n t r e p o r t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s d e p e n d i n g u p o n : w he re a fatality occurs; the leng th o f tim e be tw een s u s tain in g th e in ju ry an d death (and here there is a d isju n c tio n betw een the regu la tory r e q u i re ­ m e n t a n d its actua l o p e r a t io n ) ; an d w h e th e r the fatal in ju ry is su stain ed by an em p lo y ee , a self-em p lo y e d w orker, o r a m e m b e r o f the pu blic . To p ro v id e an illu s tra tio n o f a situ a tio n b o r d e r i n g on a b s u r d ity : in 2005 a farm w o rker, h avin g c o m p lete d his shift, was being given a lift o n the back o f a tra c to r w h en he fell, an d died - b u t sincc his d eath o ccu rrc d outsid e w o rkin g h o u rs , it did n o t get reco rd ed as an o c c u p a tio n a l fatality (‘W ork D eaths are O ff the R ec o rd ’, H azards, 93, 2006: 31). T h e net effect o f such a n o m a lies is to o m i t significant, b u t u n q u a n tifia b le , n u m b e r s o f relevant fatal in juries (see T o m b s 1999a: 3 5 6 -9 ) . T h i r d , a n d finally, R I D D O R reflects an u n d e r - r e c o r d i n g o f fatal injuries d u e to social processes o f u n d e r - r e p o r t i n g . 13 Before a d e a th can be registered, a valid certificate giv ing the cause o f d e a th m u s t be c o m ­ pleted a n d signed by a registered m edical p ra c t it io n e r w h o a tt e n d e d the deceased d u r i n g h e r/h is last illness; if a d e a th is s h o w n to be ‘v io le n t or u n n a t u r a l ’, the C o r o n e r is r e q u i r e d by law to c o n d u c t an in q u e s t. Two studies (Start et al., 1993 a n d 1995) have high ligh ted the inability o f b o th h ospital clinicians a n d general p ra c titio n e rs to recognise so m e categories o f rep ortable deaths. T he first (Start et al. 1993) in dicated th at in d ivid ual clinicians at all grades sho w ed a variable a p p reciatio n o f the different ca t­ egories o f cases w hich sh o u ld be re p o rted , b ein g m istaken in u p to 60 per ce n t o f in d i v id u a l cases. In d e e d , ‘D e a th s re s u ltin g from a c c id e n ts w ere o fte n u n r e c o g n i s e d ’ (ib id .: 1039). In a s e c o n d s t u d y in v o lv in g g e n e ra l

46

M appin g occupational death and injury

p ra c titio n e rs (Start et al. 1995), only 3 per cen t recognised all those deaths w hic h sh o u ld be re p o r te d for fu r th e r investigation; d eath s from ind ustrial o r d o m e s t i c ‘a c c i d e n t s ’ w e re re c o g n i s e d as cases r e q u i r i n g re f e rra l by fewer th a n h a lf o f all general practitio n e rs. Both studies indicate th a t cer­ tifying d o c to r s te n d to c o n sid e r o n ly the e v e n tu a l cause o f d e a th ra th e r th an the seq uen ce o f events leading to death (ibid.: 193). T h e re can be no d o u b t th a t the p u b lish e d fatality data are inad equ ate: they proje ct on ly a m i n im a l n u m b e r o f o c c u p a tio n a lly -c a u se d d e a th s in Britain on an a n n u a l basis. However, from the p o in ts o f critiq ue th a t we raise above, it is clear t h a t these d a ta are liable to so m e re c o n s tr u c t io n , th r o u g h resort to other, official m e asu res o f o c cu p a tio n ally -c au sed fatali­ ties. It r e m a i n s clear t h a t i n c o n s is t e n c ie s w i t h i n th e r e p o r t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t s th em selves, a lo n g w ith v a rio u s social p ro cesses o f u n d e r ­ re p o r tin g , m e a n th a t the H S E ’s ‘h e a d li n e ’ figure - th a t w hich is t r u m p e t e d in press releases b u t is m erely a c o m b i n a ti o n o f fatal injuries to w ork ers a n d the self-em ployed re q u ire d by law to be re p o r te d to a n d reco rded by HSE - is a d ra m a tic u n d e r- e s tim a te o f the n u m b e r s killed in w ork -re lated inciden ts in the UK each year. For 2004/05, the h ead line figure w o u ld be 223 - the figure for ‘All W o rk e rs’ (see Table 5). T h e actual figure is s o m e ­ w here betw een 1,600 and 1,700. This m o r e accurate figure w o u ld include: de ath s to m e m b e r s o f the public (rec ord ed u n d e r R ID D O R ) , totalling 370 in 2 0 0 4 /0 5 (see Table 5); d e a th s i n c u r r e d w h ils t d r i v in g a n d ‘at w o r k ’, a b o u t 1,000 p e r a n n u m ; an d a sm all n u m b e r o f m iscellaneous categories, such as fatalities relatin g to th e su p p ly a n d use o f fla m m a b le gas (23 in 2005), an d those arising in the course o f sea fishing (10 fatalities in 2004) a n d m e r c h a n t vcsseling (20 fatalities in 20 04 ) in B ritis h w a te rs o r on British vessels at sea (M a rin e A ccident Investigation B ran ch 2005: 27, 19). In o t h e r w o rd s , to o b t a i n a m o r e a c c u r a t e figu re o f officially re c o r d e d o c c u p a tio n a l fatalities, we need to apply a m u ltip lie r o f betw een seven or eight to the h ead lin e figure. H a v in g a t t e m p t e d to r e c o n s t r u c t th e d a ta m o r e usefully, we w o u ld argue th at a figure b etw een 1,600-1,700 d eath s is w ork able as a m in im u m estim a te o f a n n u a l d eath s from s u d d e n injuries. T h e re are, however, two m o r e m a jo r caveats to be m a d e . T he first is th a t this figure, as we re m in d re a d e r s t h r o u g h o u t th e b o o k , d o e s n o t in c l u d e th e d e a th s c a u s e d by i n d u s tr i a l illnesses a n d e x p o su res. As we in d ic a te d in the i n t r o d u c t i o n , the total figure for death s caused by w o rk in the UK is likely to be in the tens o f t h o u s a n d s . O u r 1,600-1,700 th erefo re represents a m i n im a l figure o f a sm all su bset o f the to tal d e a th toll. T h e seco n d is on e th a t all social scien tists will be fa m ilia r w ith , n a m e l y t h a t q u a n ti ta t iv e d a ta , let alon e ‘o ff ic ia l’ sta tistic s, a lo n e can allow us to m a k e o n ly v ery r u d i m e n t a r y o b s e r v a tio n s a b o u t any social p h e n o m e n o n (see Levitas 1996). Statistics

47

Safety C rim e s

m ay allow us to m ak e so m e c o m p a r is o n s across tim e an d m ay allow us to m ak e so m e estim ates a b o u t scale and incidence, b u t they can tell us very little a b o u t m o r e c o m p le x social features o f d e a th s a n d in juries at w ork. T h ey can tell us little a b o u t th e processes by w hich d eath s an d injuries are so cially d i s t r i b u t e d o r a b o u t th e p ro c e s se s t h a t p r o d u c e d e a t h s a n d injuries in the first place. N o r can they tell us an y th in g a b o u t the d ifferen­ tial social impacts o f d e a th s a n d in juries a m o n g s t dif ferent sectors o f the p o p u la t io n . W h a t the p re c e d in g d a ta fail to convey is th e fact t h a t risks faced at w o rk are n e ith e r evenly n o r r a n d o m l y d is trib u te d : n o t on ly are such d eaths, in juries an d illnesses u n eq u a lly d is trib u te d , b u t this u n e q u a l d is tr i b u ti o n m irro r s w e ll-k n o w n s tru c tu r a l inequalities w ith in n a tio n s b e tw e e n re g i o n s , social classes a n d c o m m u n i t i e s - as well as b e tw e e n natio ns.

D im e n s io n s o f vu ln erab ility

T here are good theoretical reasons a n d som e empirical evidence to indicate th at these deaths, injuries an d illnesses d isproportionately fall u p o n m em b ers o f the lowest socio-econom ic groups. If we ask who gets killed an d injured, the answ er is to be fo u nd in certain m a n u a l occupations - an d is c o m p r e h e n ­ sible in trad ition al class te rm s (see Table 10). T h u s, for example, HSE data indicate that ‘process, plant and m ach ine operatives’ are 15 times m o re likely to in c u r a rep ortab le in ju ry th a n ‘m an ag e rs an d sen io r officials’, and m o r e th an ten times m o r e likely th an those in ‘professional occu p atio ns’. H isto ric a lly , t h e n , it is p e r h a p s u n s u r p r i s i n g t h a t th e key so u r c e o f o p p o s itio n to w orkplace risks has been organised labour, and a key p o li ti­ cal tactic has b e e n to seek m o r e effective re g u l a ti o n , at b est r e g u l a ti o n involving w o rk e rs’ representatives them selves - in o th e r w ord s, struggles to se c u r e safer a n d h e a l t h i e r w o rk p la c e s have h is to ri c a ll y b e e n classic stru gg les o n the p a r t o f la b o u r a n d its allies to a tt e n u a te m a n a g e m e n t ’s right to m a n a g e a n d e x p ro p ria te s u r p lu s value. This is a key e x p la n a to ry factor in the lo n g - te r m h istorical tre n d to w a rd s safer w o rkp lace s w ith in in d u s t r i a l i s e d e c o n o m i e s . It also h e lp s to e x p la in w hy th e r e is no ineluctable tre n d to w ard s safer w o rk in g , s o m e h o w associated w ith i n d u s ­ tr ia l is a t io n , b e n ig n e m p l o y e r s o r th e e n l i g h te n e d state - e le m e n ts o f a s o -calle d W h ig v e rs io n o f h is t o r y w h e r e b y c a p italism b e c a m e p r o g r e s ­ sively m o r e h u m a n e . R a th e r, p o i n t i n g to th e s tru g g le s o f o r g a n i s e d labour, historically a n d c o n te m p o ra n e o u s ly , indicates that fluctu atio ns in levels o f w o r k p la c e safety can p artially , b u t crucially, be re la ted to th e stre ng th o f o rg anised la b o u r or, m o r e accurately, the streng th o f balances o f forces betw een states, capital an d la b o u r .14

48

M appin g occupational death and injury

T hese p o in ts being m a de, th e n , there can be no d o u b t th at the relative decline in tra d e u n io n m e m b e r s h i p an d the e rosio n o f a ran g e o f rights held by w o rk ers in the p o st-w a r liberal d e m o cracies has m o r e recently re ­ s h a p e d th e b a la n c e o f p o w e r b e tw e e n c a p ita l a n d la b o u r . T h e in te rn atio n alisa tio n o f neo-liberalism has p r o f o u n d ly rep o s itio n ed la b o u r m a r k e t s a n d l a b o u r p ro c e s s e s in fa v o u r o f c a p ita l, p a r t i c u l a r l y in th e d e v e lo p i n g w o rld , a n d this has h a d p r o f o u n d i m p l i c a ti o n s for th e way th a t n a tio n states im ag in e an d act o u t th e ir relatio nsh ip to n a tio n a l an d t r a n s n a t i o n a l capital. T h e se re la ti o n s h ip s are in creasin g ly c r e a tin g a n d in te n s ify in g jo b in s e c u r it y - a n d all t h a t a c c o m p a n ie s it, in c l u d in g th e in creased likelihood o f exp o su re to w o rk p lace risk an d h a r m . For e x a m ­ ple, as D o o g a n ’s an aly sis o f l a b o u r t u r n o v e r in th e UK in th e 1990s in d i c a te s , w h ile l o n g - t e r m e m p l o y m e n t a c tu a lly increased fo r skilled, m a n a g e r ia l a n d p ro f e ssio n a l g r o u p s , jo b t u r n o v e r in c re a se d ‘a b so lu te ly a n d relatively in ele m e n ta r y o c c u p a tio n s in lower skilled o c c u p a tio n s an d absolutely in low skilled agricu ltu ra l j o b s ’ ( D o o g a n 2001: 432). Such specifics are crucial in te r m s o f th e p r o d u c t i o n a n d d is trib u tio n o f w o rk p lac e h a r m . HSE research, based u p o n UK L a b o u r Force Survey re t u r n s , has f o u n d sig nificant c o rr e la tio n s b e tw ee n in ju ry rates a n d job ten ure. T hu s: th e rate o f in ju ry to w o rkers in their first six m o n t h s is over d o u b le t h a t for w o rk e rs w h o have b e e n w ith an e m p l o y e r for at least a year (H ealth an d Safety Executive 2000b: 3), a co rrelatio n th a t ho lds after a llo w in g fo r o c c u p a t i o n s a n d h o u r s o f w o r k (H e a lt h a n d Safety C o m m i s s i o n 2001: 62). Even m o r e strikingly, h ig h e r rates o f in j u r y are associated w ith sh o r te r w o rk in g weeks, so th at ‘those w o rk in g less th a n 16 h o u r s per week have d o u b le the rate o f in ju ry c o m p a r e d w ith those who w o rk 3 0 -5 0 h o u rs p e r w eek’ (ibid.: 4). T h u s, ‘[w ]orkers on a low n u m b e r o f weekly h o u r s have s u b s ta n ti a ll y h ig h e r ra tes o f all w o rk p la c e in j u r y th a n those w o rk ing lo n g e r h o u rs , and the rate gets lower as the n u m b e r o f weekly h o u r s in c re ases’ (ibid.: 61). A gain, this h o ld s even after allow ing for o th e r jo b characteristics (ibid.).

Now, there is an obvious issue here ab o u t the extent to w hich people learn on the job, b u t such facts should also raise concerns about the exac­ erb atio n o f vulnerability th ro u g h casualisation o f w ork: te m p o rary and p a rt-tim e w orkers - w orkers w ho are likely to enjoy far fewer form s o f em ploym ent protection than those in full-tim e, p erm an en t e m p lo y m e n tare, once all o th e r factors have been co n tro lled for, m o re likely to be injured at work. To these conclusions we can safely add that child workers, hom e-w orkers and those w orking ‘illegally’ are at the sam e tim e likely to face extrem e risks whilst also being invisible to alm ost a n y ‘official’ consid­ era tio n s o f the d istrib u tio n o f in ju ry an d disease. A nd th e converse o f these arg u m e n ts is th a t th e safest w orkplaces in th e UK are th o se w ith

49

Safety Crim es

strong trade unions and effectively functioning, union-backed safety rep­ resentation. This has been confirmed in numerous research studies. What the most recent studies have found is that strong worker representation in the workplace has a markedly beneficial im pact upon health and safety performance (Walters et al. 2005) and that trade unions are the key organ­ isations in providing this support. Strong trade union representation reduces injury rates dramatically, by perhaps as much as 50 per cent (Reilly et al. 1995). Moreover, a review of the research confirmed the consistency of those findings on an international basis (James and Walters 2002). This review of evidence underlines two points. First, at the level of the w ork­ place, the crucial risk controls are those that are exerted by well-organised workers themselves. This suggests that rather than having been made redundant in the current phase of capitalism, ‘traditional’ forms of labour organisation remain just as im portant as they have ever been. Second, it suggests that were a de-institutionalisation process to occur, it would, quite literally, have catastrophic affects. Despite the efforts of employers in par­ ticular sectors to remove negotiations around safety from the sphere of industrial relations, this strategy has only had limited success (see for example, Woolfson et al. 1996). Regardless of the relative decline in trade union membership, trade unions and other ‘traditional’ forms of worker organisation remain crucially im portant to the mitigation of risks in the workplace. Safety conditions remain institutionalised in collective b a r­ gaining agreements in the UK. Thus if there are clear roles for a range of campaigning groups and NGOs in seeking to intervene in safety politics,15 these complement, rather than substitute for, ‘old’ forms of collectivism. T h i s p o i n t also h e l p s u s to e x p l a i n d i f f e r e n c e s in r i s k o f d e a t h a n d i n j u r y in t e r m s o f s e c t o r as o p p o s e d to o c c u p a t i o n . A b o u t h a l f o f t h e fatalities i n c u r r e d by e m p l o y e e s in B r i t a i n o c c u r in t w o o f th e m o s t c a s u ­ a lise d s e c t o r s - c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d ‘a g r i c u l t u r e , f o r e s t r y a n d f i s h i n g ’ w h i c h , a l o n g w i t h ‘r e c y c l i n g o f s c r a p a n d w a s t e ’, a ls o h a v e t h e h i g h e s t i n j u r y rates to e m p l o y e e s ( H e a l t h a n d Saf ety E x ecu tive 2 0 0 4 b ) . Tables 6 - 9 p r o v i d e s o m e d a t a o n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f v a r i o u s t y p e s o f i n j u r y a c r o ss d i f fe r e n t se c to rs o f the e c o n o m y . It is clear f ro m these tables t h a t th e m o s t d a n g e r o u s se c to rs in t e r m s o f fatal a n d n o n - f a t a l in j u r i e s to e m p l o y e e s are a g r i c u l t u r e , c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d t h e e x t r a c t i v e i n d u s t r i e s . In p a r t i c u l a r , the relative d a n g e r o u s n e s s o f a g r i c u l t u r e a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n is b o r n e o u t s t r i k ­ ingly in t h e d a t a for fatal in j u ri e s to t h e s e l f- e m p l o y e d , p r e s e n t e d in Table 7. C o m p a r i n g t h e d a t a h e r e w i t h t h a t in Table 6, we fin d t h a t , o n aver ag e, a c r o s s all i n d u s t r i e s , b e i n g s e l f - e m p l o y e d m a k e s y o u t w i c e as lik ely to i n c u r a fatal in jury . It s h o u l d also b e n o t e d t h a t t h e r e ar e n o clear d o w n ­ w a r d t r e n d s in an y o f t h e se c to ra l fatal i n j u r y rates h ere.

50

Table 6

Fatal injuries reported to all enforcing authorities by industry 1996/97-2004/05, incidence rates per 100,000: employees 1996/97

A griculture, h unting, forestry and fishing Extractive and utility supply M anufacturing C onstruction Services All industries Table 7

1997/98

1998/99

1999/2000

2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

7.6

6.7

5.4

4.53

4.7

7.9

7.3

2.8

7.0

4.2 1.3 8.2 0.4 0.9

7.9 1.3 5.7 0.4 0.9

4.7 1.6 4.4 0.3 0.8

3.1 1.0 5.5 0.2 0.7

4.6 1.2 6.5 0.4 0.9

6.9 1.3 5.3 0.3 0.8

1.6 1.2 4.9 0.3 0.7

5.1 0.8 4.3 0.4 0.7

1.3 1.3 4.8 0.3 0.7

Fatal injuries reported to all enforcing authorities by in d u stry 1996/97-2004/05, incidence rates per 100,000: selfem ployed

A griculture, h unting, forestry and fishing Extractive and utility supply M anufacturing C onstruction Services All industries

1997/98

1998/99

1999/2000

14.3

8.7

15.0

13.0

2.3 3.0 0.7 2.3

10.3 2.7 3.1 0.5 1.8

13.0 2.2 2.8 0.4 1.9

13.7 1.2 3.2 0.5 1.7

2000/01

19 1.8 5 0.4 2.4

2001/02

11 0.4 2.9 0.2 1.3

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05

12.9

21.3

14.7

0.5 2 0.4 1.3

0.4 1.2 2.5 0.3 1.8

0.4 1.7 0.4 1.3

Mapping occupational death and injury

1996/97

Table 8

Non-fatal m ajor injuries reported to all enforcing authorities, incidence rates per 100,000» by industry 1996/97-2004/05: employees

Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing Extractive and utility supply M anufacturing C onstruction Services All industries

1996/97

1997/98

1998/99

1999/2000

2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05 (p)

256.9

222.3

205.6

224.4

213.9

238.5

262.5

235.2

228

315.1 206.4 403.0 90.8 127.5

282.7 216.1 382.3 88.4 127.6

246.8 201.5 402.7 83.7 121.7

244.1 204.1 395.9 79.3 116.6

267 194.2 380.9 75.3 110.2

222.9 194.9 356.1 79 110.9

222.7 194.3 354.9 80.7 111.1

228 194.1 327.7 94.5 120.4

232.5 192.3 299.4 93.4 117.7

p is provisional

Table 9

N on-fatal m ajo r injuries reported to all enforcing authorities, incidence rates per 100,000, by industry 1996/97—2004/05: self-employed 1996/97

Agriculture, 40.9 hu nting, forestry and fishing Extractive and 211.7 utility supply M anufacturing 41.7 C onstruction 104.9 Services 13.7 All industries 38.4 P is P rovisional

1997/98

1998/1999 1999/2000

2000/01

2001/02

2002/03

2003/04

2004/05(p)

32.3

36.9

41.0

34.5

54.4

43.2

42.7

41.8

780.8

441.5

532.7

67.2

41.4

140.7

84.8

106.4

35.7 65.4 4.6 23.3

35.2 56.5 5.1 20.3

25.9 57.7 5.3 19.7

22.9 62.7 4.9 19.2

44.4 79.5 8.5 27.8

45.5 99.1 9.3 32.3

46.8 97.8 12.8 33.9

39.9 89.4 13.2 32.9

Table 10

Injuries to em ployees by occupation 2004/05(p), incidence rate per 100,000 em ployees * Fatal

M ajor

M anagers and senior officials Professional occupations Associate professionals and technical occupations A dm inistrative and secretarial occupations Skilled trade occupations Personal service occupations Sales and custom er service occupations Process, plant and m achine operatives E lem entary o ccupations! All occupations

0.3 0.1 0.3

43.0 52.3 66.9 29.1 226.3 112.7 83.9 408.8 200.6 117.7

-

1.6 0.1 -

3.0 1.2 0.7

O ver three-day 89.2 138.4 335.3 80.6 746.1 516.0 316.8 1733.7 943.8 469.0

All reported injuries 132.5 190.9 402.5 109.8 973.9 628.8 400.7 2145.4 1145.6 587.4

P is Provision * Source: www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/employment/index.htm t The elementary occupations category includes occupations non specified above in agriculture, construction, plant processing and services.

Ln

Mapping occupational death and injury

O ccupation

Safety C rim e s

Now, in te r m s o f relative d a n g e r across different sectors, on e p o in t needs to be m a d e h ere re g a r d in g levels o f ' i n h e r e n t ’ d an g er, the k in d o f a r g u ­ m e n t s t h a t s u p p o r t glib a s s e r t i o n s su ch as th e p h r a s e ‘o c c u p a t i o n a l h a z a r d ’. W hilst it is accepted th a t there m ay be g reater risks to be faced on a bu ild in g site th a n in an office, for ex am p le, the idea th a t certain o c c u p a ­ tio n s are so in h e r e n tl y d a n g e r o u s t h a t th e y necessarily p r o d u c e certa in levels o f in ju ry c a n n o t be su sta in ed . T h u s w ith in c o n s t r u c ti o n it is clear t h a t th e r e are m o r e o r less d a n g e r o u s w ays in w h ic h w o r k i n g can be org a n ise d - a c ru d e b u t clear illustration o f this can be w itn essed in the o f t - m a d e o b s e r v a tio n th a t the c o n s t r u c ti o n w o rk in p r e p a r a ti o n for th e Sydney O ly m p ic s in 2000 p r o d u c e d no fatal in ju ries a m o n g s t c o n s t r u c ­ ti o n w o r k e r s , w h ile t h o s e in A t h e n s in 2004 p r o d u c e d s o m e 40 p lu s ( M c C a r tn e y 2005). T h e co n tr a st b etw een these tw o co ntexts is generally, a n d plausibly, e xp lain ed by, o n the o n e h a n d , th e stre n g th o f Australian c o n s t r u c t i o n u n i o n s a n d th e legal r i g h ts th e y have s e c u r e d in te r m s o f w o r k p la c e safety, a n d , o n th e o th e r , th e o v e r w h e l m i n g re lian ce in th e A th e n s p ro je c t u p o n casualised, n o n - u n i o n , m i g r a n t la b o u r (A u stralian B ro a d c astin g C o m p a n y 2004; BBC R adio 4 2004). For c o n s id e ra tio n s o f th e o rg an isatio n o f d a n g e r w ithin a different in du stry, the studies by b o th C a rso n (1982) an d W oolfson an d colleagues (1996) o f w ork org a n isa tio n in the UK o ffshore oil in d u s try are instructive. In dee d, these la tter studies also d e m o n s t r a t e th a t, in a sec to r th a t has d r a w n la b o u r from th e high u n e m p l o y m e n t areas o f S co tla n d a n d N o r t h e r n E n g la n d , th e id ea th a t w o rk e rs ex c h a n g e e x p o s u r e to risk for h ig h e r wages is also m o r e m y t h th a n reality (see also M o o r e 1991). T h u s s t r u c t u r a l v u ln e r a b ility in the w o r k p la c e a n d e c o n o m i c m a r g i n a l i s a t i o n have m u t u a l l y r e i n f o r c i n g effects that m anifest them selves in te r m s o f ex p o su re to w orkplace risks. G e n d e r, e th n ic ity and p a tte rn s o f risk

W h ile ‘d a n g e r ’ has t r a d it io n a l ly bee n associated w ith m ale o c c u p a t io n s ( H a r r i s o n 1993), an d d e sp ite th e fact t h a t re s e a rc h h as m o s tl y ig n o r e d w o m e n s ’ o c c u p a tio n a l h ealth a n d safety issues (Szockyi a n d F ran k 1996: 17), t r e n d s in th e d a ta in d i c a te th a t th o s e areas in w h ic h w o m e n are o v e r - r e p r e s e n t e d , n o t a b l y serv ices, are t h o s e w h ic h e x h ib i t b o t h p e rs is te n tly h ig h , a n d risin g , ra tes o f in ju rie s a n d ill- h e a lth (see C raig 1981; L a b o u r R esearch D e p a r t m e n t 1996). I n d e e d , b o t h p o p u l a r a n d a c ad em ic u n d e rs ta n d in g s or c o n sid e ra tio n s o f the re latio n sh ip s b etw een ‘r i s k ’ a n d w o rk views these t h r o u g h th e p rism o f (d e clin in g ) h a z a r d o u s an d m ale d o m i n a te d o c c u p a tio n s ( m in in g , s h ip b u ild in g , heavier fo rm s o f m a n u f a c t u r i n g , a n d so o n ) , so t h a t m u c h w o r k w i t h i n th i s a re a (see below ) has highly, if im plicit, m a sc u lin ist c o n n o t a t i o n s . 16 T h a t there are

54

M appin g occupational death and injury

b o t h g e n d e r a n d e t h n i c b o t h g e n d e r a n d e t h n i c d i m e n s i o n s to this u n e q u a l victim isatio n is evidenced in the w o rk o f John W re n c h (W ren ch 1996; Lee a n d W r e n c h 1980; W r e n c h a n d Lee 1982; see also B oris a n d P rueg l 1996). An O E C D r e p o r t recently n o te d th a t ‘H istorically, w o rk e n v i r o n m e n t re s e a rc h has largely c o n c e r n e d i n d u s t r y w o rk , t h u s th e m ale w o r k e r ’ (T ra d e s U n i o n C o n g r e s s 2 0 0 2 ). So if th e r e is v ery little so cial scien ce w hich focuses u p o n o c c u p a tio n a l safety (N ichols 1997), w o rk w hich does exist tend s to focus p r e d o m in a n t ly u p o n m e n ’s w ork. As T G W U n a tio n al o rga niser D iana H o lla n d said: H ealth a n d safety p ro b le m s are often associated w ith heavy industry, a n d jo b s m a i n l y d o n e by m e n , yet a c c i d e n ts o c c u r in all ty p e s o f w o r k p la c e a n d m a n y w o m e n face h a z a r d s at w o rk . O f te n it is th e least o b v io u s e n v ir o n m e n t s th a t can be m o s t d a n g e r o u s as risks go u n d etec ted and can develop into health an d safety p ro b le m s (Trades U n io n C on gress 2003b).

Yet as we indicate throughout this book, occupational death and injury are routine and ubiquitous phenom ena. So, if, as we noted above, 95 per cent of rep o rted fatalities are sustained by m en, an d if in 2004/05 m en were 2.5 tim es m ore likely to suffer a rep o rted no n -fatal in ju ry th a n w om en (www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/tables/tablel lc.htm ), these observations obscure a mass of relatively hidden victim isation suffered by female workers. Thus, as H arrison has noted, if we confine ourselves to letting these over­ all figures ‘speak for them selves’, we ‘m iss o th e r im p o rta n t issues’ (1993: 258). This confirm s o u r need to move from beyond a purely quantitative overview o f occupational injuries. In the specific case o f the relatively low n um ber o f injuries sustained by w om en, H arrison observes that this should not detract from an analysis of those industries where injuries are incurred by w om en since ‘we w ould fail to appreciate the significance o f injuries and disability and possible consequences for w om en’s lives’ (ibid.: 258), includ­ ing particularly acute financial disadvantage (ibid.: 260). Yet there is a p rio r issue here, on e w hich reap p ears c o n te m p o r a n e o u s ly in relation to, for ex am p le, stress a n d m u scu lo sk e letal d iso rd ers, b o th o f w hich are n o te d below. Each o f these categories o f ‘ill-health’ is c u rren tly a site o f c o n t e s t a t i o n , 1' w ith c a m p a i g n e r s a rg u i n g t h a t th e y are in fact m a tte r s o f o c c u p a tio n a l injury/safety. T his b o th u n d e r-sc o re s a n d devel­ ops the p o in t m a d e in C h a p te r 1 th a t safety is n o t health. T h e re is a close re la tio n s h ip b etw e e n these d iffere n t c atego ries o f d e t r i m e n t a l effects in cau satio n as we n o te d , b u t there is also a close relatio n sh ip in their m a n i ­

55

Safety C r im e s

fe s tatio n s. T h u s a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f w o m e n ’s safety is o n e way to a d d re s s th e p r o b l e m a t i c d i s t i n c t i o n b e tw e e n ill- h e a lth o n th e o n e h a n d , a n d an in j u r y o n th e o t h e r - since w o m e n e x p e ri e n c e less o f th e la t te r b u t m a y e x p e rie n c e m u c h m o r e o f th e f o r m e r, even if th ese effects are u n r e c o r d e d . F or e x a m p le , w o m e n c o n s t it u te o f 80 p e r cen t o f ‘clea n ers a n d d o m e s t i c s ’ ( t h e G u a r d ia n , 28 F e b r u a r y , 200 6: 4 ), a n d a re t h u s e x p o s e d to a w h o l e series o f c h e m ic a l h a z a rd s , b io log ical h a z a r d s a n d physical ag e n ts (noise, v i b r a t i o n ) a n d n o x i o u s s u b s ta n c e s , yet th e t r a n s l a t i o n o f e x p o s u r e s in to n o tifie d cases is negligible. In d e e d , th e ve ry c o u p le t, w ith an im p lie d d is ­ t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n , ‘h e a l t h a n d s a f e t y ’ m a y itse lf i n c o r p o r a t e a g e n d e r e d div isio n ( H a r r i s o n 1993). It h as n o w b e c o m e c o m m o n p l a c e w ith i n tr a d e u n i o n circles to refer to th e ‘g e n d e r g a p ’ in o c c u p a t i o n a l safety. Such c o n s i d e r a t io n s are all th e m o r e salient given th a t , in G re a t Britain fo r e x a m p le , w o m e n n o w c o n s t it u te 46 p e r c ent o f th e w o rk fo rc e (E q u a l O p p o r t u n i t i e s C o m m i s s i o n 2005: 8), b u t m a n y t e n d to w o r k p a r t - t i m e this is th e case fo r 44 p e r c ent o f all w o m e n w o rk e rs ( c o m p a r e d w ith 11 p e r c e n t o f m e n ; ibid.). F u r t h e r , w o m e n are th r e e t i m e s m o r e likely t h a n m e n to b e h o m e w o r k e r s , th e y te n d to stay w i t h th e s a m e e m p l o y e r fo r s h o r t e r p e r i o d s , a n d over a th ird stay w ith an e m p l o y e r for less t h a n tw o years. T h e s e are all c h a ra c te ristic s o f p a r t ic u l a r vu ln e ra b ility . F em ale v u l ­ n e ra b ility at w o r k a n d in th e l a b o u r m a r k e t is f u r t h e r u n d e r - s c o r e d by th e fact t h a t w o m e n r e m a i n u n d e r - p a i d c o m p a r e d to m a l e c o u n t e r p a r t s : f e m a le f u l l - t i m e a v e ra g e h o u r l y e a r n i n g s a re 19.5 p e r c e n t lo w e r t h a n e q u i v a l e n t m a l e e a r n i n g s ; f e m a le p a r t - t i m e a v e rag e h o u r l y e a r n i n g s 40 p e r c e n t lo w e r t h a n e q u i v a l e n t m a l e f u l l - t i m e e a r n i n g s ( T r a d e s U n i o n C o n g re s s 2005c: 1). M o re o v e r, v ertical s e g re g a tio n , th e u n d e r - r e p r e s e n t a ­ t i o n o f w o m e n at h i g h e r levels in o c c u p a t i o n a l life, r e m a i n s e n t r e n c h e d . A c c o rd in g to the G o v e r n m e n t ’s W o m e n a n d E q u ality U n it, w o m e n c o m ­ p r i s e 30 p e r c e n t o f m a n a g e r s in E n g l a n d , w h ile j u s t 4 p e r c e n t o f d i r e c t o r s h i p s are h e ld by w o m e n ; w o m e n m a k e u p 73 p e r c e n t o f m a n ­ a g ers in h e a lth a n d social services, yet c o n s t i t u t e o v e r 80 p e r c e n t o f th e w o rk fo rc e ; th e y a c c o u n t for ju s t 6 p e r c e n t o f m a n a g e r s in p r o d u c t i o n . 18 H o r i z o n t a l s e g r e g a ti o n also h a s i m p l i c a t i o n s fo r v i c t i m i s a t i o n to safety c ri m e s - if less o b v io u s ly so. W o m e n ’s e m p l o y m e n t re m a in s grossly o v e r ­ r e p r e s e n t e d in v a r i o u s s e r v ic e o c c u p a t i o n s - 84 p e r c e n t o f w o m e n e m p lo y e e s w o r k in th e service se c to r ( E q u a l O p p o r t u n i t i e s C o m m i s s i o n 2005: 9). If w o m e n d o n o t w o r k in tr a d it io n a l ly d a n g e r o u s o c c u p a t io n s , t h o s e a re a s o f w 'ork in w h i c h t h e y p r e d o m i n a t e a re c h a r a c t e r i s e d by g e n d e r-sp e c ific , a n d less visible, risks. For us, th e r e are clear safety c o r r e ­ la tes o f t h i s s k e w e d d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p o o r l y p r o t e c t e d w o r k . M o r e o v e r , w o m e n w o r k e r s still e x p e ri e n c e th e classic d o u b l e b u r d e n , a f u n c t i o n o f

56

M appin g occupational death and injury

th e ir c o n t i n u i n g to b e a r p r e d o m i n a n t re s p o n sib ilitie s for c h il d - r e a r in g a n d d o m e s tic la b o u r (D oyal w ith Pennell 1979: 216). T h e T U C reg ula rly surveys its safety re p re se n ta tiv e s to id en tify w h at p r o b l e m s , c a u s e d o r m a d e w o rs e by w o r k , are b e in g raised by w o m e n w o rk e rs (T rad es U n io n C o n g re s s 200 2). Successive su rv ey s have f o u n d stress to be th e m o s t f r e q u e n t l y id e n t if ie d is sue ( i b id .). Stress affects w o rk in g w o m e n m o r e than m e n , a n d is a fu n c tio n o f vulnerability. As the ILO has n o te d , T h e relation betw een gender, w o rk a n d stress is com ple x a n d v a r i e d ’ (ibid.). Factors w h ich exacerbate w o m e n ’s ex p o su re to stress in c lu d e low pay, repetitive, m o n o t o n o u s w ork, low a u t o n o m y a n d a lack o f con tro l, o v e r- d e m a n d i n g jobs an d greater total w o rk lo a d , a n d e m p l o y ­ ers’ failures to a c c o m m o d a te family responsibilities. A fter stress, th e m o s t r e c e n t T U C s u r v e y rev ealed 63 p e r c e n t o f w o m e n citing m a n u a l h a n d lin g as the m o s t p ro b le m a tic safety issue, r e i n ­ fo r c in g p re v i o u s su rv e y s ‘s h o w in g t h a t w o m e n at w o r k are e x p o s e d to heavy lifting. M a n y w o m e n w o rk in jobs w here fr e q u e n t m a n u a l h an d lin g is e x p e c te d ’ (ibid.). T h i r d in th e list are re p e titiv e s t r a in i n j u r i e s (R S I), w h ic h are also k n o w n as w 'o rk-related u p p e r lim b d iso rd ers. Fifty th r e e per ce nt o f the safety reps identified this category as a p ro b le m caused o r m a d e worse by w o rk . T h is figure is h ig h e r th a n th e 37 p e r c e n t w h o iden tified RSI as a p r o b l e m fo r m e n a n d w o m e n w o r k e r s in th e 1998 T U C Safety Reps Survey, an d reinforces the view th a t w o m e n are at p artic u la r risk o f re p e t­ itive s t r a in in ju rie s : t e l e p h o n e o p e r a t o r s , ty p ists a n d D isp la y Screen F .qu ipm en t w o rk ers, packers, s u p e r m a r k e t c h e c k o u t o p e r a t o r s a n d light a s s e m b ly w o r k e r s are all o v e r w h e l m i n g l y a ss o c ia te d w ith RSI. A large T U C affiliate th a t org anises in the p ublic sector has previously stated th at W o m e n are at p a rtic u la r risk o f develo ping w o rk related u p p e r limb d is o r d e r s ( W R U L D s ) ... . W o m e n o fte n have to w'ork at repetitive tasks, w o rk in g lo n g shifts o r on piece rates. W o m e n are also m o r e likely to be p u t u p o n . Bad e m ploy ers (an d low wages) force w o m e n w o r k e r s in t o n o t ta k i n g b re a k s ; w o r k i n g lo n g e r h o u r s in p o o r l y design ed w orkplaces; a n d n o t c o m p la in in g . W o m e n w orkers are also less likely to be able to rest once they get h o m e : instead o f recovering they often have to do th e h o u sew o rk , (ibid.)

W om en also suffer m ore back pain at w ork than m en - yet they are less likely than m en to take tim e off. A HSE poll also found w om en were less likely to tell their bosses they were in pain. F orty-nine per cent o f female w orkers said they suffered from recurrent back pain, com pared to 40 per

57

Safety C rim e s

cent of men. But women who suffer from back problems take an average of 10.4 days off per year, com pared to their male colleagues who take 33 days sick leave per year for back pain. HSE’s Elizabeth Gyngell said: ‘In 2004, 205,000 women took time off work to recover from back injuries, and no doubt many m ore suffered in silence’ (Trades Union Congress 2005d). M u scu lo sk eleta l d is o rd e rs are the m o s t p re v a le n t re c o r d e d form o f o c c u p a t io n a l in j u ry in B ritain - over 1 m illio n cases are re p o r te d by workers p er year (w w w .h s e .g o v .u k /m s d /in d e x .h tm ). Incidence rates for these c o n d it io n s - low b ack p ain , jo i n t in ju rie s a n d repetitive strain in ju ries o f v a rio u s so rts - are slightly h ig h e r for w o m e n th an for m e n (w'ww.hse.gov.uk/statistics/causdis/m usc.htm ). It is o f interest th at these are classified as ill-health, and do n ot figure in injury data. T h o u g h long contested by m edicine and the law, and often dismissed as the com pla int o f the malingerer, these injuries - to the hands, the back, the a rm and the s h o u l d e r - v ary from acu te p ain , to c h ro n ic , l o n g - te r m , progressively intensifying pain, to d is fig u r e m e n t and crip plin g. A list o f the p o p u la r n a m e s asso ciated w ith so m e o f th ese in ju rie s says s o m e th i n g o f th e ir association with w om en: ‘typist’s cram p, w ash er-w o m an ’s wrist, m o t h e r ’s sh o u ld e r’ (H uws 1987: 50-1 ). If we add to that list a term th at emerged in A ustralia in th e 1970s - ‘e th n ic w r is t’ - th e n it is clear th a t th ese are injuries associated with poorly protected, marginalised workers.

W omen also experience significant levels of inter-personal violence in the workplace. British Crime Survey estimates of violence at work - threats and assaults - indicate that m en and wom en face sim ilar levels o f risk of being assaulted at work, but that women had a higher risk of being threat­ ened (www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/causdis/violence.htm). And HSE’s survey of self-reported working conditions reveal ‘a greater proportion of females than males reported ever being physically attacked (8 per cent com pared with 6 per cent) or threatened (18 per cent compared with 15 per cent) in their current jo b ’ (ibid.). While BCS data indicate that ‘protective service occupations’ have the greatest estimated rates of assaults and threats, these are followed by ‘health and social welfare associate professionals’ - which tend to be female jobs. Employers have a legal duty to risk assess to prevent violence, and this assessment m ust account for the specific risks faced by female workers. Com pliance w ith and enforcem ent of this duty is poor (Trades Union Congress 2002). Given the peculiar nature o f w o m e n ’s vulnerability to certain kinds of injuries, the legal requ irem ents for employers to assess risks should often in clude a g e nd ered elem en t. However, recent survey evidence indicates the failure o f employers to meet their legal duties in this respect. Thus, of employers’ responses to problem s raised by w o m e n workers, this evidence

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c o n c lu d e s th a t: 26 p e r c e n t o f e m p lo y e r s alw ays take th e p r o b l e m s se ri­ o u s l y ; 56 p e r c e n t o f e m p l o y e r s s o m e t i m e s t a k e t h e m s e r i o u s l y ; 12 p e r c e n t o f e m p lo y e rs rare ly take th e m seriously; a n d 3 p e r c e n t o f e m p lo y e rs n e v e r tak e t h e m se rio u s ly (ib id .). T h u s , o n ly in o n e o u t o f f o u r cases d o e s m a n a g e m e n t alw ays tak e th e p r o b l e m s r a ise d b y w o m e n w o r k e r s s e r i­ ously. T h e p a r t i c u l a r h e a lth a n d sa fety c o n c e r n s o f w o r k i n g w o m e n n e e d to b e e f f e c t i v e l y a d d r e s s e d a n d t a k e n s e r i o u s l y o n all o c c a s i o n s b y all e m p lo y e rs. T w e n ty seven p e r c e n t o f risk a s s e s sm e n ts h ave n o t a d d re ss e d w o m e n ’s c o n c e r n s , a n d 41 p e r c e n t h a v e o n l y p a r t l y a d d r e s s e d t h e m . So in less t h a n t h r e e o u t o f t e n c a s e s a r e e m p l o y e r s f u l l y a d d r e s s i n g t h e r i s k s f a c e d b y w o m e n w o r k e r s d e s p i t e t h e l e g a l r e q u i r e m e n t t o d o so ( i b i d . ) . T h i s is as li k e l y t o b e b o r n e o f a n i m p l i c i t a s s u m p t i o n o f ‘t h e w o r k e r ’ as bein g m ale ra th e r th a n o u t o f any co n scio u s d isc rim in a tio n ; b u t w h atev er t h e r e a s o n , t h e e f fe cts a r e t h e s a m e . T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e w h e r e w o m e n a n d m e n are p e r f o r m in g th e s a m e tasks, w o m e n c o u ld be p laced at g reater risk o f in ju ry t h a n m e n b e c a u s e th e jo b e q u i p m e n t a n d p e r s o n a l safety e q u i p m e n t a r e d e s i g n e d t o f it t h e a v e r a g e m a n ( S m i t h a n d M u s t a r d 2 0 0 4 ) . I n it s r e s p e c t , o n e c o u l d c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e l a t i v e i n v i s i b i l i t y o f w o m e n ’s s a f e t y i s s u e s is e x a c e r b a t e d b y e m p l o y e r s ’ s a f e t y c o m p l i a n c e e f f o r t s , in t u r n r e p r o d u c i n g w o m e n ’s i n v i s i b l e v i c t i m i s a t i o n .

T he association between vulnerability a nd victim isation is further h ig h ­ lighted in recent H S E -sp o n so re d research ex a m in in g the experiences o f different e th n ic g r o u p s o f w o rk -re la te d stress (S m ith et al. 2005). Nationally, HSE estimates that ab out half a million people in the UK expe­ rience work-related stress at a level they believe is m aking th em ill, with a total o f 12.8 million w orking days lost to stress, depression and anxiety in 2003/4. Stress, o f course, has m ultiple causes, b u t is generally experienced m o re greatly by those w ho are least able to exert any control o r influence over workplace d e m a n d s placed u po n them . It is, then, a classic disease o f workplace marginalisation and vulnerability. Sm ith et al. fo un d a ‘signifi­ c an t c o rr e la t io n ’ b etw een w o rk stress a n d ethnicity. In s u m m a r y , th ey concluded th at ‘ [ r ]acial d iscrim ination, particularly in co m b in a tio n with gender and ethnicity, was identified as having a strong influence o n w ork stress . . . certain w ork characteristics were also associated w ith w ork stress: h igh er effort rew ard im b alan ce, g reater jo b d e m a n d , a n d lower c on tro l over w o rk were all associate d w ith w o rk stress’ (ibid.: viii). P u t simply, despite p o p u lar m yths a b o u t stress being associated w ith high flying c or­ p o ra te executives, if you are a m i n o r i t y - e t h n i c fem ale, lo w d o w n th e occupational hierarchy w ith little or no control over your work, an d b oth over-worked a n d un der-paid, then you are likely to be subject to this form o f o c c u p a t io n a l disease. U n d e r s t a n d in g e x p o su r e to a n d v ic tim is a tio n

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Safety C rim es

from risk, and differential responses to and public knowledges o f this vic­ tim isation , th u s requires an u n d e rs ta n d in g o f various form s of class-race-g end er articulations. Such an u n derstan din g requires d e c o n ­ structing traditional representations o f workplace risk and hazards. G lo b a lly , a p a r t i c u l a r l y h e a v y to ll o f d e a t h a n d i n j u r y o c c u r s in d e v e l ­ o p i n g c o u n t r i e s w h e r e l a r g e n u m b e r s o f w o r k e r s a r e c o n c e n t r a t e d in p r i m a r y a n d e x t r a c t i o n ac t i v i t i e s s u c h as a g r i c u l t u r e , l o g g i n g , f i s h i n g a n d m i n i n g ( T ak ala 20 02 : 2 - 3 ) . T h i s u n e q u a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f ri s k is f u r t h e r e x a c e r b a t e d b y t h e s t r u g g l e to s e c u r e s a fer a n d h e a l t h i e r w o r k ­ p l a c e s in d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s h a v i n g as o n e effe ct t h e r e l o c a t i o n o f ri s k a n d h a z a r d to d e v e l o p i n g e c o n o m i e s - c r e a t i n g a k e y a d v a n t a g e for T r a n s n a t i o n a l C o m p a n i e s in t h e i r ab i l i t y to ‘e x p o r t ’ h a z a r d o u s w o r k f r o m m o r e t o less r e g u l a t e d c o n t e x t s e c o n o m i e s ( C a s t l e m a n 1979; Ives 1 9 85 ). T h e clas sic a n d m o s t i n f a m o u s m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h is w a s t h e B h o p a l ‘d i s ­ a s t e r ’. W h i l e t h e g as l e a k w a s t h e r e s u l t o f a c o m b i n a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d c o s t - c u t t i n g d e c i s i o n s ( P e a r c e a n d T o m b s 1 9 9 8 ) , t h e v e r y fact t h a t M I C w a s o n - s i t e a t all in B h o p a l w a s t h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f su c c e s s fu l r e s i s t ­ a n c e b y F r e n c h c h e m i c a l w o r k e r s to a p r i o r U n i o n C a r b i d e i n t e n t i o n to s t o r e a n d u se M I C at its p l a n t in B eziers, F r a n c e ( i b id . ) .

The long and still largely unsuccessful struggle o f the victims o f the Bhopal gas leak to gain compensation for hum an and environmental suffer­ ing also indicates a further structural inequality associated with global risk distribution: for the economic consequences o f death, injury and disease associated with working are also differentially distributed. Thus, for exam­ ple, occupational health and safety com p ensatio n schem es differ enormously - while workers in Nordic countries enjoy nearly universal cov­ erage, ‘only 10 per cent or less o f the workforce in m any developing countries is likely to benefit from any sort o f coverage. Even in many devel­ oped countries, coverage against occupational injury and illness may extend to only half the workforce’ (Takala, cited in Demaret and Khalef 2004). Finally, to talk o f deaths and injuries is not merely to refer to physical h arm s. O ccu pation al injuries - however ‘m i n o r ’ - have widespread, if largely unrecognised, financial, psychological, as well as social effects. However, it is the financial costs o f injuries and ill health which have been the focus of recent attention by official organisations and interest groups. Thus the HSE and governments have, for over a decade now, sought (erro­ neously - see Cutler and James 1996) to argue the ‘business case’ for improved health and safety (Health and Safety Executive 1993; Davies and Teasdale 1994; H ealth and Safety C o m m is s io n /D e p a rtm e n t of Environment, Transport and the Regions 2000), seeing the costs to com pa­ nies o f in ju rin g and causing illness as a lever to raise stan dard s of

60

Mapping occupational death and injury

compliance! In this context, it has been estimated that the costs o f injury and ill health is £18 billion a year (see, for example, H ealth and Safety C o m m is s io n /D e p a rtm e n t o f E n viro nm ent, T ran sp o rt and the Regions 2000, passim). Yet one o f the contradictions w ithin such an a rg u m en t is that employers do not actually meet the costs o f workplace injuries and ill­ ness: most of the £18 billion cost o f workplace injury and illness is paid for by the government and the victims. Indeed, notwithstanding the con tem ­ porary prevalence o f claims about a ‘compensation culture’, currently fewer than one in ten workers entitled to compensation for a work-related injury or disease actually receive this (Pickvance 2005). Even the HSE itself esti­ mates that employers, who cause the health and safety risks, pay between £3.3 billion an d £6.5 billion (Trades U n io n Congress 2003c). In oth er words, costs associated with injuries and ill health represent a socialisation o f the costs o f private p ro d u ctio n , in effect a massive red istrib u tio n of wealth from the po o r to the rich. That is, through sup porting the cost of industrial in jury benefit, health and oth er social services, paying higher insurance prem ium s, paying higher prices for goods and services so that employers can recoup the costs of downtime, retraining, the replacement of plants an d so on, private in d u s try is subsidised on a massive scale by employees, taxpayers and the general public. This in tu r n has k n oc k-on effects on go vern m en ts’ ability to use revenue from general taxation for more socially productive purposes. Su ch b a ld sta tis tic s o f d e a t h s o r lo ss es to c o r p o r a t e p r o fits o r G D P m a s k a w i d e a r r a y o f s e a r i n g , b u t less q u a n t i f i a b l e , so c ia l a n d p s y c h o l o g i ­ cal h a r m s , f a m i l i e s a n d c o m m u n i t i e s ar e s u b j e c t e d to t r a u m a in t h e e v e n t o f d e a t h a n d i n j u r y . C h i l d r e n lo se m o t h e r s a n d f a t h e r s , s p o u s e s lo se p a r t ­ n e r s , s p o r t s t e a m s lo se c o a c h e s a n d p l a y e r s , c h u r c h a n d s o c i a l c l u b s lo se t h e i r m e m b e r s , a n d w o r k e r s lo se t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s - to t h e e x t e n t t h a t s u c h p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d s o c i a l c o s t s a r e i m m e a s u r a b l e . M o r e o v e r , s u c h l o ss e s a n d h a r m s h a v e effe cts a c r o s s g e n e r a t i o n s , so t h a t , f o r e x a m p l e , c h i l d r e n w h o e x p e r i e n c e p o v e r t y f o l l o w i n g t h e d e a t h o f t h e m a i n w a g e e a r n e r are t h e m s e l v e s m o r e likely t o g r o w u p in c o n d i t i o n s o f r e la tiv e i n s e c u r i t y , a c o n d i t i o n t h e n m o r e likely to b e e x p e r i e n c e d by t h e i r o w n o f f s p r i n g . 19 It r e m a i n s to b e n o t e d t h a t t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r a u m a h e a p e d u p o n t h e b e r e a v e d is o f t e n m a g n i f i e d g r e a t l y b y t h e c o n s i s t e n t i n a b i l i t y o f t h e sta te , t h r o u g h t h e c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e s y s t e m , to p r o v i d e ‘a n s w e r s ’ as to w h y s o m e ­ o n e w h o l e a v e s f o r w o r k e i t h e r d o e s n o t r e t u r n , o r r e t u r n s in a c o n s i d e r a b l y less fit c o n d i t i o n - d e s p i t e c e n t r a l e l e m e n t s t o l a w ’s o w n s t a t e d ‘p r o m i s e ’ b e i n g , firs t, to p r o v i d e m e c h a n i s m s f o r b r i n g i n g t h e p e r ­ p e t r a t o r s o f illegal h a r m s to a c c o u n t , a n d , s e c o n d , i n d e e d i n c r e a s i n g l y , to p ro v id e redress for victim s o f su c h h a r m s (T o m b s 2004).

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C o n clu sio n

T h e d a ta t h a t has b een review ed in th is c h a p te r ind icate t h a t n o m a t te r h o w i n c o m p l e t e th e officially r e c o r d e d d e a t h s a n d i n j u r i e s c a u s e d by w ork, the toll is u n d o u b te d l y huge. T h e reco n s tru c tio n o f UK fatality data presen ted here p ro d u c e s a m i n im a l estim ate o f 1,700 people killed a n n u ­ ally. H o w e v e r, th is ex ercise still tells us relatively little a b o u t h o w v ictim is a tio n is d is trib u te d . In a global o r even E u ro p e a n co nte xt, as we have p o in te d ou t, the UK m ay n o t rep re se nt an e xem plar case, b u t it is by n o m e a n s th e m o s t d a n g e r o u s c o u n t r y in w h ic h to w o rk . T h e a n n u a l dea th toll o f peo ple caused by w o rk globally rivals th e death toll caused by wars and dwarfs the death toll caused by acts o f te r ro rism , no m a t te r how b ro ad ly ‘te r r o r i s m ’ is defin ed (I n te rn a tio n a l L ab ou r O rg an is a tio n 2005). To the in ad eq u a cie s o f the h e a d lin e figures o n dea th s and injuries, we can ad d m a jo r in adeq uacies in o u r kn ow ledg e o f ho w de ath s an d injuries at w ork are d is trib u te d . Yet o u r review o f the lim ited co nclu sion s that we can d ra w from existing d a ta a n d the few' e m p iric a l stu d ies th a t exist on th e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f v ic tim is a tio n p ro v id es a p o w e rfu l illu s tra tio n o f the exten t to w hich po sitio n in the w o rk place, s o c io -e c o n o m ic g ro u p , g en der an d eth nicity s tru c tu r e the risk o f b ein g inju red o r killed. M oreover, w hen it co m es to a b so r b in g the social a n d ec o n o m ic costs o f d eaths an d injuries at w ork , it is the m o s t v u ln e ra b le th a t b e a r th e greatest b u r d e n . N o n e o f this is revealed in any o f the officially p u b lish ed da ta sets; preciou s little is revealed in g o v e r n m e n t- f u n d e d research into the subject. M o re m eaningfully, this dis cussion has urg ed us to explore h ow e x p o ­ sure to risks th r o u g h w o rk p r o d u c e s a hig hly c o n c re te m a n i fe s t a ti o n o f w h a t has b een called the s t r u c tu r in g o f v uln erab ility (N ichols 1986) - it is o n e o f the m e a n s by w hich the p oorest, m o s t d isa d v an tag ed p eople in o u r society are f u r th e r, system atically d is c r im in a t e d ag ain st in te r m s o f the quality, longevity, even preserv atio n o f their lives. At the sam e tim e, as is often the case w ith s t r u c tu r e d inequalities, these e x p o su re s r e m a in rela­ tively in v isib le, f u r t h e r e x a c e r b a t i n g social, e c o n o m i c a n d p o litic a l m a rg in alisatio n o f those w h o face th e m .

62

M a p p in g o c c u p a tio n a l death an d injury

Notes 1

F u rth e r d e ta ils can be fo u n d at I n te r n a tio n a l L a b o u r O rg a n is a tio n (2 0 0 5 ) a n d at w w w .co rp o ra tc ac co u n ta b ility .o rg /in tc rn a tio n sl/d ca th s/tab le s/su m m ary /m a in .h tm

2

S ource: w w w .e u ro p a .e u .in t/ra p id /p re ssR e le a se sA c tio n .d o ? re fe re n c e = S T A T /0 4 /5 5 & fo rm a t= H T M I.& a g ed = 0 & la n g u ag e = E N & g u iL an g u ag e = en . See E u ro stat, P o p u latio n an d Social C o n d itio n s ,‘W ork and health in the EU - A statistical p o r tra it’. E u ro stat is the Statistical Office o f the E uropean C o m m u n ities.

3

HSE n o te th a t exam ples o f m ajo r injuries in clu d c ‘fractu res (cxccpt to fingers, th u m b s or toes), a m p u ta tio n s, d islo ca tio n s (o f sho u ld er, h ip , knee, sp in e) an d o th e r in ju ries leading to resu sc ita tio n o r 2 4 -h o u r a d m itta n c e to h o sp ita l’ (so u rce w w w .hse.gov.uk/ sta tistics/so u rces.h tm ).

4

M o reo v er, even th is rec o g n ised level o f u n d e r - re p o rtin g still in p rin c ip le ex clu d es th re e p o te n tia lly s ig n ific a n t - if so m e w h a t o v e rla p p in g - areas o f o c c u p a tio n a l injuries, nam ely those in c u rred by w orkers in the illegal econom y, as well as by ho m eand child-w orkcrs (see, for exam ple, O ’D o n n ell an d W hite 1998, 1999).

5

In the su p p le m e n tin g o f officially-recorded data w ith self-rep o rt data via the L ab o u r Force Survey, th e re is so m e s im ila rity w ith th e H o m e O ffic e’s d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e British C rim e Survey as a self-report, victim isatio n survey aim ed to overcom e som e o f the p ro b lem s associated w ith recorded crim e statistics an d the so-called h id d en figure o f crim e; it is clear, how ever, th a t the tw o exercises are very differently reso u rced , and a ttra c t very d iffe ren t levels o f p o litical c o m m itm e n t. It sh o u ld also be n o te d th a t in 2005, the HSE co n d u c te d its first W orkplace H ealth and Safety Survey, co m p leted by 996 e m p lo y e r re s p o n d e n ts , a im in g to ‘re c o rd h e a lth a n d safety c o n d itio n s acro ss British w orkplaces’. O n e aim o f this is to su p p le m e n t reco rd ed in ju ry d ata. A w orker survey is p lan n ed for 2006 (w w w .hse.gov.uk/statistics/ p d f/w h assn o tcs.p d f).

6

T his calculation is m ade u p o n the basis o f a co m b in atio n o f rep o rted in ju rie s u n d e r

7

R ID D O R and self-reported in ju ry th ro u g h the L ab o u r Force Survey. T h o u g h n o t a p p a re n t from the data in the table, over 95 p er cent o f fatal in ju ries to w o rk e rs in any o n e year are o v e rw h e lm in g ly su s ta in e d by m en (H e alth a n d Safety C o m m issio n 2001: 5 6 -7 ).

8

As is just as likely to be the case w ith the on e h u n d re d plus an n u a l fatalities to m e m ­

9

bers o f the public th at are n o t suicides on railways. M oreover, sell'-em p lo y m en t has g row n d ram a tic ally in recen t years, risin g from ju st over 2 m illio n

w o rk e rs in

1974 to a c u r r e n t to ta l o f a ro u n d

3.8

m illio n

(w w w .h se.g o v .u k /statistics/e m p o ly m en t/in d ex .h tm ). 10 T he n u m b e rs o f fatalities relatin g to the su p p ly an d use o f flam m ab le gas are hardly irre le v a n t in th e c o n tc x t o f th e overall to ta l o f fatalities. In th e five re p o rtin g years betw een 2000 and 2005, 33, 26, 25, 18 and 23 such d eath s respectively were rep o rted to HSE (w w w .hse.g o v .u k /statistics/tab les/tab leg sl.h tm ). 11 Also excluded are inju ries rep o rtab le u n d e r sep arate m e rc h an t sh ip p in g , civil aviation a n d a ir n a v ig a tio n le g isla tio n ; in ju rie s to m e m b e rs o f th e a rm e d forces; a n d fatal in ju rie s to the self-em p lo y ed arisin g o u t o f accid en ts at p rem ises w hich th e in ju re d p erso n either ow ns o r occupies (source: w w w .h se.g o v .u k /statistics/so u rces.h tm ).

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12 F o r a m o r e d e ta ile d tr e a tm e n t o f th e r e c o n s tr u c tio n o f fa ta lity d a ta , see T o m b s 1999a. 13 T h a n k s to G a ry S la p p e r fo r firs t b r in g in g th e s e p o in ts to o u r a tte n tio n . 14 W e s h a ll r e t u r n to th e s e a r g u m e n t s r e g a r d in g w h a t S n id e r ( 1 9 9 1 ) h a s c a lle d th e d y n a m ic s o f r e g u la to r y r e fo rm in C h a p te r 7. 15 F o r e x a m p le , th e S im o n Jo n e s m e m o r ia l c a m p a ig n ( w w w .s im o n jo n e s .o r g .u k ) o r th e C e n tr e fo r C o r p o r a te A c c o u n ta b ility ( w w w .c o r p o ra te a c c o u n ta b ility .o r g ). 16 W e a c k n o w le d g e b o th th a t th e re a re e x c e p tio n s to th is c r itic is m , a n d th a t th e c ritic is m a p p lie s to o u r o w n w o rk . 17 F o r e x a m p le , th e firs t c a m p a ig n in g aim o f th e UK N a tio n a l S tre ss N e tw o rk , p a r t o f th e H a z a r d s C a m p a ig n , is f o r ‘th e r e c o g n itio n o f s tr e s s - r e l a te d illn e s s as a n i n d u s t r i a l in ju r y ’ (U K N a tio n a l W o rk S tre ss N e tw o r k 2 0 06: 3). 18 S o u rc e : w w w .w o m e n a n d e q u a lity u n it.g o v .u k /w o m e n - w o r k /w o m e n _ to p .h tm 19 T h a n k s to P a d d y H illy a rd fo r firs t p o in ti n g o u t to u s th is p a r tic u la r d im e n s io n o f th e h a r m s a s s o c ia te d w ith o c c u p a tio n a l in ju r y a n d ill h e a lth .

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Chapter 3

O b s c u r in g safety crimes

In tro d u c tio n

In p re v io u s c h a p te rs - th r o u g h a b r i e f c o n s i d e r a t io n o f a series o f case studies w ithin the ru b ric o f safety crim es, a n d th en th r o u g h p res en tin g a range o f d ata regarding the scale and d is trib u tio n o f o c c u p atio n al d eath s a n d injuries - we have indicated th a t in objective, if sheer physical, te rm s, d e a th s a n d in j u r i e s at w o r k r e p r e s e n t a s i g n if i c a n t social p r o b l e m . O f co u rse, as we have e m p h a s is e d , this d oes n o t necessarily m e a n t h a t this social p r o b l e m is re c o g n i s e d p o p u l a r l y n o r p o litica lly : t h a t is, su c h in juries a n d d e a th s m a y r e m a in relatively invisible, o r if visible, be p e r ­ ceived as n e i t h e r a s i g n ifi c a n t social n o r i n d e e d a c r i m e p r o b l e m ; a n d each o f these is in fact the case. T h e a n o m a ly a p p a r e n t here - a significant toll o f d e a th a n d in ju ry w hich seem s to barely register as a social o r crim e p r o b l e m - n e e d s f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . In s h o r t , h o w is it t h a t safety crim es are o b sc u re d from view? The very fact th at these deaths and injuries tend n ot to be co u n ted as

crim es w ith in official d ata is one in a series o f in tim ately linked social processes th ro u g h w hich their existence and n atu re is obscured and dis­ torted. Law and legal processes play a key role in rendering such events as separate from real crim e, and we consider these in sub seq u en t chapters. Here, however, we note som e of the general processes related to their m ore general invisibility from crim e, law and order discourses, before focusing in p articu la r u p o n a key elem ent o f this invisibility, nam ely the ways in w hich safety crim es are represented b o th as accidents, an d then as p h e ­ nom ena that im ply various degrees o f culpability on the p art o f victims.

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T h e in visib ility o f sa fe ty c r i m e s

At th e b r o a d e s t level, safety c rim e s r e m a in socially, politically, a n d a c a ­ d e m i c a ll y inv isib le in ways w h ic h m i r r o r th e in v isib ility o f c o r p o r a t e c r i m e s in g e n e ra l. T h u s th e r e is an a r r a y o f so cial p ro c e s s e s t h a t c o n ­ tr ib u t e to re m o v in g such offences fro m d o m i n a n t d e fin itio n s o f ‘crim e, law and o r d e r ’ (Slapper and T o m bs 1999).

Here, w hat has been increasingly recognised as ‘the politics o f law and order’ is clearly im portant (Hale 2004; Downes and M organ 2002; Brake and Hale 1992). Generally, as law and order has becom e a politicised area, then law and order discourses have draw n various events and processes onto the terrain of crime, expanding the reach of the crim inal justice system. But this ‘n et-w idening’ (C ohen 1985) has no t extended to safety crim es. Here, the effect has been quite different: in simply not considering occupational deaths and injuries w ithin crime, law and order discourses, the difference between the form er and real crim e has been fu rth e r cem ented. M ore generally, beyond this rhetorical level, there are a whole series o f ways in which political processes exclude safety crimes from considerations o f crime, law and order. Firstly, it is clearly G o v e r n m e n t s th a t fo rm ally define crim e , th a t pass o r b lock legislation, th a t fu n d e n f o r c e m e n t bo dies, th a t sen d fo rm al and in fo rm a l signals to th e ways in w hich laws are to be enforced, a n d so on. T h e se c o n s i d e r a t io n s , to the e x te n t th a t th e y deal w ith th e passage a n d im p le m e n ta t io n o f th e law, will be dealt w ith in a later chapter, w here we co nsid er the m y riad ways in w hich law separates ou t safety offences from ‘real’ crim es ( C h a p te r 5). But here we m ig h t also a d d so m e fu r th e r - p e r ­ h a p s d is p a r a te - o b s e r v a tio n s w h ich p o i n t to th e d e - c r im in a li s a t io n o f safety o ffe n c es t h r o u g h p o litic a l p ro c e s se s. I n s tit u ti o n a ll y , th e G o v e r n m e n t d e p a r t m e n t th a t deals w ith c r i m e is th e H o m e Office; the office o f state th a t covers safety reg ulatio n is (currently) the D e p a r t m e n t o f W o rk a n d P e n s i o n s - n o t exactly s y n o n y m o u s w ith c r i m e - f ig h t in g . R u n n in g the H o m e Office - th a t is, being H o m e Secretary - is n ow o n e o f th e high est profile G o v e r n m e n t offices, ra n k i n g close to C h a n c e llo r an d F o re ig n S e c re ta ry in sen io rity . R e s p o n s i b il it y fo r h e a lt h a n d safety, by c o n tr a s t, is lo c a te d at j u n i o r m i n is te r level, w ith i n th e DW P. A f u r t h e r c o n trast is fo u n d in the level o f political stability afforded to these differ­ e n t areas. F ro m th e e le c tio n o f th e first Blair G o v e r n m e n t in 1997, to 2007, th re e L a b o u r G o v e r n m e n t s have seen ju st fo u r m in is te rs r u n n i n g th e H o m e O ffice (Straw', B lu n k e t t, C la rk e a n d R e i d ) 1; in 200 7, L ord McK enzie b e c a m e the seven th m in is te r resp on sib le for safety a nd health at w ork in seven years, and the n in t h since L a b o u r cam e to p o w er in 1997. L ong before Lord M cK en zie’s a p p o i n t m e n t , u n io n s , safety c a m p a ig n e rs , RoSPA a n d even the Institu te o f D irectors b e m o a n e d the lack o f m in is te ­

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rial c on tinu ity , p r o m p t i n g the h ard ly radical In s titu tio n o f O c c u p a tio n a l Safety a n d H e a lth to n o te h o w th is g a m e o f ' p a s s the safety p a r c e l’ . . . ‘begs the q u e stio n o f h o w seriously the g o v e r n m e n t takes safety, w h e n it still h a s n ’t delivered on its m anifesto c o m m i t m e n t s ’ (Jolliffe 2004: 2).2 O f co u rs e , a key p r o d u c t o f th e lack o f p o litic al p r i o r i t y a tt a c h e d to safety o ffen din g is the very p ov erty a n d p au city o f data in this area w hich was the focus o f the p rev io u s chapter. If, as M ag uire notes, ‘a salient fea­ tu re o f alm o st all m o d e r n fo rm s o f discourse a b o u t c rim e is the em p h asis placed u p o n te r m s associate d w ith its q u a n tific a tio n a n d m e a s u r e m e n t ’ (M agu ire 1994: 236), th e n it is hardly su rp ris in g th a t n e ith e r safety c rim e in p a rtic u la r n o r c o rp o r a te crim es in general ‘feature in . . . debates a b o u t th e “crim e p r o b l e m ’” (N elken 1994: 355; G reen 1990: 27). T h is sep aratio n o f safety c rim es from the p ro p e r sph ere o f crim e, law an d o rd e r politics is reflected in, an d in tu r n reinforced by, th e sheer t o r ­ re n t o f c ri m i n a l justice legislation a im e d at th e u su al ‘su s p e c ts ’. T h u s it has b e e n e s tim a te d th a t th e p e r i o d o f L a b o u r G o v e r n m e n t s since 1997 has seen over 50 pieces o f c rim e a n d im m i g r a t io n legislation pass th r o u g h P a rliam en t (H illyard 2006), while it has been generally claim ed th at over 1,000 new c rim in a l offences h ad been created up to M ay 200 5.3 N o n e o f these o f c o u rs e has im p i n g e d u p o n safety c rim e s - w ith th e o n e m a j o r piece o f legislation in this area, new legislation to m ak e it easier to p r o s e ­ cu te c o m p a n i e s for c o r p o r a t e m a n s l a u g h t e r , ta k in g ten years fro m the p o i n t at w h ic h it first a p p e a r e d in L a b o u r ’s m a n i f e s t o to th e p o i n t at w hich it a p p e a re d in Pa rlia m e n t for de bate (see also C h a p te r 6). If we leave the sphere o f fo r m a l politics, it is also clear th a t in any case lo n g - sta n d in g c o n s tru c tio n s o f c rim e a n d the c rim in a l create obstacles to busin esses an d bu sin ess p eo p le b eing viewed in sim ilar ways to c o n v e n ­ ti o n a l o ff e n d e rs : t h u s th e r e is also a s ig n if i c a n t lack o f fit b e tw e e n offend ers in the sphere o f safety crim es, an d those in the co n te x t o f c o n ­ v e n ti o n a l crim es. In te r m s o f b u sin e ss o r g a n i s a ti o n s , c o r p o r a t i o n s m a y have been g ra n te d the status o f legal p ersons, b u t they do n o t eq ua te with p o p u la r im ages o f real p ers o n s, let alone ‘c r i m i n a l’ ones; similarly, d ire c ­ tors o f an d m a n a g e rs w ith in th e m sim p ly do n o t fit o u r p o p u la r im ages o f o ffen d ers (see Lacey 1995: 21). In d iv id u a l b u sin ess o ffen d ers sim p ly do n o t ‘loo k the crim in al ty p e ’. A lth o u g h any first year s tu d e n t o f c r i m i n o l ­ ogy can articulate a series o f critiques o f L o m b ro s ia n categories, th e idea th a t c rim in als look a certain way - o r at least do not look certain w'ays - is, in o u r view, e n o r m o u s l y p o w e rfu l . W h e n th e p h o t o g r a p h s o f six m e n (fo u r from the f o r m e r line o p e r a t o r R ailtrack an d tw o from the c o n s t r u c ­ tion firm Balfour Beatty) a p p e a re d o n the fro n t o f n atio n a l a n d regional n ew sp ap ers on the day th a t th eir trial for m a n s la u g h t e r charges following th e H atfield tra in crash c o m m e n c e d (T uesday F e b r u a r y 1, 2005), it was im m e d iately a p p a re n t th at they simply did n ot look like killers.

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M oreover, if it has historically jarred to th in k o f businesses an d business p eople as offenders, this has b e c o m e even m o r e th e case u n d e r the e m e r ­ gence to d o m i n a n c e o f n e o -lib e ra lis m , w h ere th e leg itim acy affo rd ed to businesses an d business peo ple has been significantly a u g m e n t e d (Snider 2000; T o m b s 2001). Indeed, m o r e recently, far from being pote ntia l c r i m i­ nals, b u s i n e s s p e o p le are th o s e w h o m we are s u p p o s e d in c r e a s in g ly to aspire to be, role m o d els o f sy noptic societies, a n d even - as in the case o f s o m e like B r a n s o n , S u g a r a n d T r u m p - c ele b ritie s. C o r p o r a t i o n s a n d th o s e w h o w o r k w ith i n t h e m , t h e n , are v iew ed q u it e d if fe re n tly to th e objects o f ‘t r a d it io n a l’ c rim e con cerns; ‘c o n v en tio n al c rim in a ls’ tend to be represen ted as a b u r d e n u p o n society in a way th a t c o r p o r a ti o n s will n o t be. Further, w he re b usiness o rg an isa tio n s engage in c rim in a l activity, this te n d s to be cast as involving tec h n ic al in f r in g e m e n ts o f law, ra t h e r th a n real c rim e s . Finally, a n d c rucially, as we have a r g u e d e ls e w h e r e w ith re s p e c t to c o r p o r a t e c r i m e s in g e n e ra l, o ffen ces are r e p r e s e n t e d as an a b e rr a tio n from th e ir ro u tin e , legitim ate activities - a p o in t we shall take up below w ith respect to the p o w e r o f the language o f accidents. These a s s u m p tio n s , an d th e general co n tr a st w ith ‘real’ crim e a n d ‘real’ c r i m i n a l s , are re fle cted in a n d re in f o r c e d by th e m e d i a . W h e t h e r we s u r v e y fic ti o n a l o r d o c u m e n t a r y - s t y l e t r e a t m e n t s o f c r i m e o n TV, o r n e w s p a p e r a n d o t h e r p r i n t m e d i a c o v e ra g e o f th e issues, we find t h a t while there m ay be so m e atte n tio n to safety c rim e - specialist d o c u m e n ­ ta r y p r o g r a m m e s , fo r e x a m p l e - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f c r i m e c o n v e rg e to p ro d u c e ‘b la n k e t’ c o n c e p tu alis atio n s reg ard ing ‘la w - a n d - o r d e r ’ th a t r e i n ­ force d o m i n a n t s te re o ty p e s o f c rim e a n d th e c r i m i n a l (C h ib n a l l 1977). T h u s, as w ith c o rp o r a te crim es in general, w here safety c rim e is covered, its presence is vastly o u tw e ig h e d by tr e a tm e n ts o f co n v e n tio n al crim e, it is treated in lower profile outlets or form ats, an d is often re presen ted in the r a t h e r s a n i ti s in g la n g u a g e o f s c a n d a ls , d is a ste rs, a b u s e s a n d a c c i d e n ts rath er th a n as c rim in al activity (T o m b s an d W h yte 2001). T h e p o i n t h e re is n o t, o f co u rs e , to claim t h a t th e m e d ia creates o u r im ag es, ways o f seein g a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g : th e s i tu a t io n is m u c h m o r e c o m p le x th a n that. But o n e o f the reaso ns why th e m e d ia is p articu larly po w erfu l in the co n tex t o f c o rp o r a te crim es in general a n d safety crim es in p a r t i c u l a r , is b e c a u s e the se a lr e a d y seem for m a n y o f us to be far re m o v e d from o u r i m m e d i a te ex perien ce. A n d this is p a rtly an effect o f the re latio n sh ip b e tw ee n the o ffe n d e r a n d the victim in m a n y c o rp o r a te offences. In m o s t f o r m s o f t r a d i t i o n a l c r i m e th e r e is, o r m u s t at so m e p o in t be, a degree o f p ro x im ity betw een o ffend er an d victim . By con trast, w ith safety c r i m e s , th e r e are f r e q u e n tl y e n o r m o u s d is ta n c e s b e tw e e n o ffend er a n d victim , in te r m s o f b o th space a n d tim e - m a n y o f the o p e r ­ ating c o n d itio n s on Piper A lpha o r at B ho pal or the ship o n w hich S im o n Jones was w o rk in g were d e te r m i n e d m a n y miles away in th e U nited States

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o r H o l l a n d , b y ' f a c e l e s s ’ m a n a g e m e n t s in U n i o n C a r b i d e o r O c c i d e n t a l P e t r o l e u m o r E u r o m i n L i m i t e d . , w h o h a d n o c o n t a c t , let alone a n y rela­ tio n s h ip , w i t h t h e w o r k e r s o r p a s s e n g e r s w h o w e r e t o d i e as a r e s u l t o f d e c i s i o n s t a k e n - o r n o t t a k e n - s o m e t i m e in t h e p a s t ( s e e C h a p t e r 1). I n d e e d , m a n y v ic tim s o f b o t h c o r p o r a te a n d safety c rim e s m a y n ev er b e a w a r e o f t h e i r s t a t u s as v i c t i m s ( C r o a l l 2 0 0 1 ; M e i e r a n d S h o r t 1 9 9 5 ) . A r e s p o n s e to s u s ta in in g a n in ju r y at w o r k m a y b e to c h id e o u rse lv e s to be m o r e c a r e f u l i n t h e f u t u r e - w'e a r e a t l e a s t as l i k e l y t o b l a m e o u r s e l v e s (b e lo w ) r a th e r th a n t h i n k th a t we m a y be th e v ictim o f an offence. A n d e v e n if p e o p l e a r e , o r b e c o m e , a w a r e o f t h e i r s t a t u s as v i c t i m s , a c t i n g u p o n t h i s a w a r e n e s s is o f t e n e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t . W h i l e it is a n i s s u e o f h e a l t h r a t h e r t h a n o f sa fety , i f w e r e t u r n t o a s b e s t o s - c a u s e d d i s e a s e s , t h i s m u c h is clear. T h u s , t h e a s b e s t o s - i n d u s t r y t r i e d t o s u p p r e s s i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t illh e a l t h e f f e c t s f o r o v e r 1 00 y e a r s b y c o - o p t i n g t h e m e d i c a l c o m m u n i t y , a tta c k in g c ritic al sc ien ce a n d f u n d i n g in d u s t r y - f r i e n d l y re se a rc h , b y f o r m ­ i n g a p p a r e n t l y ‘i n d e p e n d e n t ’ l o b b y i n g g r o u p s , a n d t h r o u g h q u i t e s i m p l e a n d r o u t i n e c o v e r - u p s , m a n i p u l a t i o n o f d a ta , a n d ly in g to w o r k e r s a n d r e g u l a t o r s ; a n d t h e n G o v e r n m e n t s fa ile d to s u p p o r t v i c t i m s in t h e i r e f f o r t s to s e c u r e c o m p e n s a t i o n .

Finally, even if aware o f their victim isation, it m ay be perfectly rational for injured workers or their bereaved families not to act o n this - for ex am ­ ple, to a tt e m p t to p u r s u e the issue o f any crim in a l offence h a vin g b een c o m m it te d . For o n e th in g , HSE a n d its in s p e cto ra tes, w hile fo rm ally charged w ith re s p o n d in g to co m p la in ts, are n o to r io u s ly re lu c ta n t to be seen to take the side o f workers since they have been ad a m a n t since their fo rm ation that they do n o t b eco m e involved in 'industrial relations issues’ - and, as we shall see, operate on the basis o f there being a natural ‘identity o f in te rests’ b etw een em p loy ers a n d employees on the issue o f safety at work. T h u s the chances o f ‘success’ o f w o rkin g t h r o u g h fo rm al channels are slim in d e e d . A n d against this n e e d to be b a la n c e d th e re actio n s o f em p lo y ers to th o s e raising safety c o m p l a in t s - w h ic h can ran g e fro m intim id atio n th ro u g h to b arrin g an employee from a whole ind u stry (see T ombs and W hyte 1998). Finally, the w idespread focus u p o n beh av io urbased safety schem es (see below) a n d th eir links to ‘n o - a c c i d e n t’ b o n u s schemes w ithin workplaces an d com panies acts as a n o th er powerful disin­ centive against acting u p o n o n e ’s recognition o f possible victimisation. Now, n o n e o f the v arious m e c h a n ism s w hereby safety crim es are r e n ­ dered relatively invisible are particularly rem arkable in isolation. W h a t is crucial, however, is their mutually reinforcing n a tu r e - that is, they all work in th e sam e d ire ctio n a nd to the sam e effect, re m o v in g th ese crim es from ‘crime, law and o rd er’ agendas. Moreover, they operate alongside a powerful set o f discourses which create injuries within the context o f the workplace as som ething always/already distinct from crimes - that is, as accidents.

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O cc u p a tio n a l

accidents

It re m a in s c o m m o n , in deed u b iq u ito u s , to refer to in cid en ts th a t lead to d eath o r in ju ry at w o rk as ‘a c cid en ts’. T h is term is a n eu tral, ‘an a e sth e tis­ i n g ’ o n e ; by c o n t r a s t , a lt e r n a t iv e te r m s , s u c h as i n d u s t r i a l k illin g, w o u n d i n g , o r violence, w o u ld c a rr y w ith th e m q u ite different c o n n o t a ­ tio n s an d logically be related to q u ite different legal, political an d social r e s p o n se s. T h e l a n g u a g e o f a c c id e n ts in fects a lm o s t all s t a t e m e n t s a n d d o c u m e n t s on the issue o f w ork place d e a th s a n d in juries, o n th e p a rt o f G o v e r n m e n t s , re g u la to rs, N G O s , a c a d e m ic s a n d even tr a d e u n i o n s a n d c a m p a i g n i n g g r o u p s . T h u s , fo r e x a m p l e , in his F o r e w o r d to the G o v e r n m e n t ’s flagship strategy d o c u m e n t , Revitalising Health a nd Safety, D e p u t y P r i m e M i n i s t e r P re s c o tt refers to th e ‘tra g ic rail a c c i d e n t ’ at L adb ro ke Grove - an in cid en t still subject to a crim in al legal investigation at th a t ti m e 4 (H ealth a n d Safety C o m m is s io n / D E T R 2000: Fo rew ord, and passim ). A m a jo r HSE re p o r t o n 30 years o f health an d safety legislation a n d e n f o r c e m e n t p r e s e n t e d a s e l f - c o n g r a t u l a t o r y tab le h e a d e d ‘T h e Decline in Fatal A ccid ents’, despite the fact th a t HSE does n o t record acci­ dents, o n ly fatal i n j u r i e s (H e a lt h a n d Safety E xecu tiv e 2004c: 5) - a n o m e n c l a tu r e re p e ated by a c ad em ics w h e n th ey speak o f this area, even w h e n they claim aw areness o f so m e o f its p r o b l e m a t ic im p lic a tio n s (see H u tte r 2001: 50, passim ). As we n o te d at th e o u ts e t to C h a p te r 2, the ILO has rec orde d h ow th e n u m b e r o f ‘fatal o ccu p a tio n a l a ccid en ts’ is increas­ ing in te rn a tio n a lly (I n te rn a tio n a l L ab o u r O rg a n is a tio n 2005: 1).

Now, these o b servations are n o t raised in any p o in t-sc o rin g fashion. The p o in t is th at all o f those w ho com m ent u p o n safety incidents in the w orkplace tend to fall easily at tim es into using the language o f accidents including ourselves, we are sure - and this indicates its ubiquitousness, its pervasiveness, its all-too-easy com m onsensical appeal. T he language o f accidents is b o th socially available an d socially p rio ritised . A nd it is for these reasons, an d as a preface to o u r d iscussion here, we also need to make clear that this language is n o t generally used consciously. At the same tim e, though, we m ust recognise that at tim es use o f this language is the result o f conscious corporate m anipulation, b o th generally and in relation to specific events (Wells 1993: 40). As Wells notes, and as is particularly of relevance given the n atu re o f victim isation in the case o f m any form s o f safety crim es, th e fu rth e r rem oved th e h arm s they cause are fro m th e public experience, then the easier is such m anipulation (ibid.: 40). But o f m o r e interest to us are the ways in w hich the use o f p a rtic u la r f o r m s o f la n g u a g e n e e d n o t be u n d e r s t o o d sim p ly , o r p e r h a p s even largely, as th e re s u lt o f c o n s c i o u s m a n i p u l a t i o n , since ‘T h e social c o n ­ s t r u c t i o n o f b e h a v i o u r a n d e v e n ts re s u lts fr o m a c o m p l e x i n t e r a c t i o n

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betw een a n u m b e r o f factors, in clud ing cu ltu ral pred ispo sitio ns, m edia re p resen tatio ns, and legal rules, decisions, an d p r o n o u n c e m e n t s ’ (Wells 2001: 11). T h a t is, we need to k now s o m e th in g o f how this language is sustained and, further, w hat its pow er an d effects are.

O ne observation that needs to be m ade is that the applicability o f the term accident can be sustained partly due to the low level of investigation of industrial injuries, near-misses, and so on, as we shall see in Chapter 4. This systematic lack of analysis of the causes of workplace incidents is one of the key mechanisms by which the ideology of the accident can persist, both for the very lack of scrutiny of actual causes and also because the fact of an investigation immediately raises a particular incident as unusual, and thus anom alous, or, in Mathiesen’s (2004: 37-48) terms, ‘isolated’. In m u tu ­ ally reinforcing fashion, of course, the lack of investigation itself is partly based upon the idea of the ‘accident’: in their study on the police investiga­ tion of safety crimes, Alvesalo and Jauhiainen (2006) found how incidents were often described and defined as accidents, with the contributory negli­ gence of the victim emphasised; such constructions influenced police work, and were used as reasons not to proceed with a crime investigation. In o u r view, then, the p re d o m in a n c e o f the language o f accidents (and associated te rm s like tragedy) - along with derivatives reserved for m u l ti­ ple fatality in ciden ts such as disaster - to refer to w orkplace deaths and injuries carries w ith it several, reinforcing, sets o f im p lic atio ns, each o f w hich even in iso lation ren d ers it less ra t h e r th a n m o r e likely th a t the events and processes th us obscured can be viewed as crimes:

First, the term ‘accident’ carries with it implications regarding intentionality, or the lack of it, which are crucial in the context of safety and health crimes. Thus Goldman notes that what she calls ‘accidentality term s’, provide us with an account o f the m ental elem ent - inten tion , will, desire, deliberation, p urpose, etc. - in som e event. W h e n describing som e in cident or process as an ‘a c cid en t’, or having ‘o c c u rred /b e en do n e accidentally’ rather than ‘deliberately’ or ‘intentionally’, we c o n ­ flate in f o r m a t i o n n o t ju s t a b o u t c a u s a tio n , an d p e rh a p s (if p e rtin e n t) degrees o f culpability an d fault to be im p u te d , b u t also a b o u t the e le m e n t o f c o n sc io u sn e ss th a t i n t r u d e d into the event (G old m an 1 9 9 4:5 1-2). As we shall d em o n s trate in C hapters 5 and 6, the concept o f intent enjoys significant legal status - and, relatedly, for som e it is a key distinguishing c r ite r io n betw'een c o n v e n ti o n a l ( ‘real’) c rim e a n d c o r p o r a te c rim e (m erely technical offences). Below, in this chapte r, w'e shall also set o ut how it is in fact problem atic when set against co m m o n -se n s e stand ards of

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m o r a l seriou sness. For now, it is e n o u g h to say th a t, given th a t in t e n t is d e e m e d intrinsic to crim e, o r at least to serious crim e, th en to ascribe to d e a th s an d in juries a status im p lying a lack o f in ten t, that is, ‘a c c id e n ta l’, is im m e d ia te ly to o bscure an in ter-related set o f issues a r o u n d seriousness, crim inality, fault, c au satio n, an d so on. Second, the la ng u ag e o f ‘a c c id e n ts’ is o n e w hich focuses u p o n specific events, ab stracting th e m from a m o r e co m p r e h e n sib le con text (Schcppele 1991). It evokes discrete, isolated a n d r a n d o m events, processes, systems a n d carries w ith it c o n n o t a t i o n s o f th e u n fo r e se e a b le , u n k n o w a b l e an d u n p r e v e n t a b le , desp ite the fact th at any e x a m i n a ti o n o f a ran ge o f in c i­ de n ts reveals c o m m o n , systematic, foreseeable a n d e m in e n tly preventable causes a n d con sisten t lo cations o f responsibility. Such la nguage is on e way o f p e r f o r m i n g th e t e c h n i q u e s o f is o la tio n re f e rre d to a b o v e, fo llo w in g M ath iesen , whilst it also already helps to p r e - e m p t furth er, an d certainly critical, scru tin y - or, scrutin y o f certain kinds. T h u s ‘If accidents are dis­ crete, u n f o r e s e e n a n d c h a n c e events . . . th e n it b e c o m e s difficult to see th e m as social events, as socially c o n te x te d ’ ( H a rris o n 1993: 255). In these uses o f a p p a re n tly in n o c e n t, or n eu tral, linguistic te r m s w hich in fact c a rr y e n o r m o u s social a n d p o litical m e a n i n g , th e r e are s trik in g parallels h ere w ith M a t h ie s e n ’s recent, a n d brilliant, analysis o f political repression in advanced capitalist eco n o m ies. W hilst accepting th at in such efforts physical coercion still has key roles to play, M athie se n em phasises ‘silen t s ile n c in g ’. S ile ncin g is th e c re a tio n o f a c q u ie sc e n c e to d o m i n a n t ways o f u n d e r s ta n d in g the world: Silence in this sense is a c o n t i n u u m , from silence despite d is a g re e ­ m e n t (g r u d g in g ly y ou go alo ng ) to silence as an accep tin g a ttitu d e (y o u a c c e p t th e s t a n d p o i n t , n o t even n o t i c i n g t h a t s ile n c in g has ta k e n place, o r at least n o t ta k i n g th e fact o f sile n c in g se rio u sly ). (M ath iesen 2004: 9) T he silent ele m e n t o f th e silencing process refers to th e creation o f a c q u i­ escence ‘th r o u g h a process w hich is q u iet rath er th a n noisy, h id d e n rath er th a n seen, n o n -p h y s ica l ra th e r th a n physical’ (ibid.). A n d th e s e are p rec isely th e ways in w h ic h th e p ro c e s s e s p o i n t e d to above op erate. In d e ed , a key illustration o f silent silencing for M athiesen is afforded by the capsizing o f the A lexan der Kielland, an oil installation in th e N o rw e g ia n N o r th Sea, in 1980, w hich resu lted in 123 d e ath s . For M a t h i e s e n , th e scale o f th is e v e n t w as o n e w h ic h p o s e d f u n d a m e n t a l q u e stio n s regardin g the ex traction o f oil from the N o r th Sea, th a t is, as an eve nt it b e c a m e a challenge to a u t h o r i t y a n d to a key e c o n o m ic activity. To so m e extent, th e n , the inc iden t is sim ilar to the fire a n d explosion on P ip er Alpha in July 1988 (a th rea t to oil p r o d u c t io n a n d th u s to th e British

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e c o n o m y ) , t h e ca p s i z i n g o f t h e Herald o f Free Enterprise (a t h r e a t to p a s ­ s e n g e r f e rr y se rvices w i t h i n a n i n c r e a s i n g l y c o m p e t i t i v e m a r k e t , a n d to a large c o n g l o m e r a t e , P & O ) , t h e gas leak at B h o p a l ( w h i c h p u t i n t o f o c u s t h e activ ities o f c h e m i c a l s c o m p a n i e s a c r o ss t h e d e v e l o p e d a n d d e v e l o p ­ in g w o r l d s ) , o r t h e se ries o f t r a i n c r a s h e s t h a t b e s e t t h e U K in t h e 1980s a n d 1990s ( w h i c h , b y t h e late 1990s, finally t h r e w t h e n e t w o r k in to ch a o s , t h i s l e a d i n g e v e n t u a l l y to t h e d e m i s e o f R a i l t r a c k ) . In t h e c a s e o f t h e A l e x a n d e r K i e lla n d , su c h w a s t h e t h r e a t p o s e d , c l a i m s M a t h i e s e n , t h a t a c o n c e r t e d r e s p o n s e w as r e q u i r e d : b e c a u s e p e o p l e ’s p e r c e p t i o n o f t o ta lity o r c o n t e x t is d a n g e r o u s to an a c tiv ity like oil e x t r a c t i o n it b e c o m e s i m p o r t a n t fo r t h e r e p r e s e n t a ­ tives o f t h e activity to p u lv erise t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s w h i c h p e o p l e b e g i n to see (ibid .: 37). Silencing th r o u g h p u lv e ris a tio n - w h ic h b e c o m e s 'm o r e i m p o r t a n t the m o r e ex ten s iv e a n d s e n s a t i o n a l t h e e v e n t is’ ( i b id .) - r e q u i r e s a series o f t e c h n i q u e s to b e d e p l o y e d , a n d f o r u s t h e s e a r e u s e f u l w h e n t h i n k i n g a b o u t t h e w ay s in w h i c h p o w e r d eals w i t h t h e m u n d a n e , r o u t i n e i n d u s ­ trial d e a th s a n d in ju rie s a n d th e ac u te ev en ts th a t e r u p t in to p u b lic c o n s c i o u s n e s s f ro m t i m e to tim e.

Most crucially, the event in question needs to be isolated. Pulverisation through isolation encompasses a series of techniques in the form of mes­ sages through mass media and political discourse. O f particular interest in the context of this discussion is that for Mathiesen this firstly entails the event being ‘individualised’, that is, the event is 'm ade into som ething unique, something incomparable, and something quite special, individual and atypical’, far too exceptional for any generalised lessons to be drawn or arguments made (ibid.: 38). The event may also be ‘normalised’. Although this may seem contrary to individualisation, it is perfectly comprehensible as a complementary technique: for normalisation can only proceed effec­ tively if the event is pulled out of a regular, familiar context and placed into another; and within this other context - the high risk industry or the inher­ ently dangerous activity or, we would add here, the at-risk worker (below) - then this apparently unique event becomes entirely usual, relatively typi­ cal and ordinary. The event may also be ‘split up’, by which it is meant that the event is reduced to a series of loosely connected, relatively minor details of an incident - often technical in nature - which are thereby torn from their systemic context and their systematic relationship with this context; thus post-Piper discussions could come to revolve endlessly around by the availability of Temporary Safe Refuges, post-Zeebrugge by technical ques­ tions of ro-ro ferry design, or train safety by the cost and merits of Automatic Train Protection systems.

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N o w these a r g u m e n t s are i m p o r t a n t in th em se lv es. B ut w h a t is also crucial a b o u t th e m , for us, is how' M a th ie s e n ’s claims regard in g isolation are crystallised th r o u g h the la nguage w hich sits at the h e a rt o f discussion - official, political, acad em ic or p o p u la r - o f o ccu p a tio n a l safety, n am ely the la nguage o f accidents. A n d it is to a fu rth er, m o r e specific c o n s id e ra ­ tion o f th e n a tu r e and p o w er o f such la nguage th a t we now tu rn .

V ic tim b la m in g and the accid e n t-p ro n e w o rk e r

If the la nguage o f accidents carries w ith it a w hole series o f c o n n o ta tio n s , th e r e is o n e f u r t h e r set o f c o n s e q u e n c e s to be d is c u sse d h e re , in s o m e de tail, w h ic h revolve a r o u n d th e issue o f v ic tim b l a m i n g . T h e basis o f v ic t im -b l a m in g discourses is to be fo u n d in the idea o f ‘a c c id e n t-p r o n e n e s s ’ w h ic h , in th e c o n t e x t o f o c c u p a t i o n a l safety, h as a v ery specific history. Sass a n d C r o o k (1981) n o te th a t th e te r m ‘a c c i d e n t p r o n e ’ was first coined in 1926,5 w h e n studies c o n d u c te d in the UK c o n c lu d e d th at ‘v arying ind iv idu al susceptibility to “accid en ts” is an extrem ely im p o r t a n t factor in d e te r m i n in g the [accident frequency] d i s t r i b u t i o n ’ (ibid.: 183). Latterly, G rayson an d G o d d a r d set o u t its m e aning: A c c id e n t p r o n e n e s s is g e n e ra lly u sed to m e a n th a t a c c i d e n ts are caused by a few individuals w h o te n d to have a large n u m b e r o f acci­ d e n t s - a n d t h a t th ey have r e p e a t e d a c c i d e n ts no m a tte r w h a t p reca u tio n s the e m p lo yer takes ( G r a y s o n a n d G o d d a r d 1976: 17, e m p h as is ad d e d ). A c cordin g to these d efin itio n s, th e n , a c c id e n t p r o n e n e s s is a ‘q u a li ty ’ o f ind iv id u als, s o m e th i n g associated w ith p e rs o n a lity types, p e rs o n a l c h a r ­ acteristics a n d / o r lifestyles, a n d a ‘q u a lity ’ th a t th ey b rin g w ith th e m into th e w o rk p la c e . A n d it is w ith th e e m e r g e n c e o f th is n o t i o n o f a c c id e n t p ro n e n e s s th a t we can perceive so m e k in d o f fo u n d a t io n or basis for the p re v a le n c e o f th e p le t h o r a o f a r g u m e n t s ( a n d tactics) th a t can be s u b ­ s u m e d u n d e r the practice o f w o rk er/v ictim b lam in g . We also see the basis for a w h ole series o f p ro fe ssio n a l/'e x p e rt’ in te rv e n tio n s into the w orkplace w h ic h a d d r e s s n o t d a n g e r o u s w o r k o r g a n i s a t i o n o r p l a n t , b u t w h ic h a tt e m p t to m o d ify th e b e h a v io u r o f w orkers. In this, th ere is p e rh a p s an a n a lo g y to be d r a w n w ith the ‘b i r t h ’ o f c rim in o lo g y , as d o c u m e n t e d by Foucault, this taking on a p artic u la r form o n the basis o f a specific d e fin i­ tion o f th e p ro b lem to be treated:

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[An individual] steals because he is poor, certainly, b u t we all know th at all the p o o r d o n ’t steal. So, for th at individual to steal, then there m ust be som eth ing w rong with him . This so m ethin g is his character, his psyche, his education, his unconscious, his desires. A nd with that th e d e l i n q u e n t is h a n d e d over to a pena l te ch no lo gy , th a t o f the p riso n, and a medical technology, if n o t o f the asylum, at any rate th at o f specialised supervision (Foucault 1977 : 12). Thus, as n ot all w'orkers are involved in accidents, despite w orking in the same en v ir o n m e n t as colleagues, then so m e o f them are defined as acci­ d e n t- p r o n e (or a v ariation u p o n this - lazy, stup id, careless, an d so on) just as the p o o r w ho steal are defined as ‘c rim in al’ or ‘crim in o g en ic’, since no t all the p o o r steal. The fault is n ot in the system which m ain tain s the p o o r in poverty, just as it is no t in the w'orking en v iro n m e n t which p res­ ents hazards to a workforce. Fifty years after th e ‘d is c o v e ry ’ o f a c c i d e n t- p r o n e n e s s in stu die s by G re e n w o o d a n d o th e rs, the R o ben s C o m m it te e - wrhose r e p o r t largely d e te r m i n e d the n a tu r e a nd sub stan ce o f the 1974 H ealth an d Safety at W ork Act - itself explicitly r e c o m m e n d e d th at g o v e rn m e n t address this problem in its approach to health and safety regulation. According to the pa rtic ular version o f this concept c o nta ine d in the C o m m it te e ’s Report, the single m o st im p o rta n t reason for accidents at work was w orker apathy (Robens 1972: 1). Asserting that ‘Safety is mainly a m a tter o f the day-today attitudes and reactions o f the in d iv id u a l’, it con clu de d th at accident prevention should focus u p o n the fostering o f safety awareness (ibid.: 12). T h us the Robens C o m m ittee pin p o in te d those workers involved in, or close to the scene of, i n d u s tr i a l acc ide nts, r a t h e r th a n u n h e a lt h y and unsafe w o rk in g c o n d itio n s , as th e lo cus o f p o te n t ia l im p r o v e m e n ts in industrial health and safety.

There is no intention here to enter into a critical com m entary upon the original studies conducted by Greenwood and others on the distribution o f accidents am ong a particular cohort o f workers - this has been done m ore than adequately elsewhere (Sass and Crook 1981). W hat is im p o r­ tan t for o u r purposes is to note the shift in the use of, o r reference to, accident-proneness. This ‘concept’ is no longer used in any specific sense, as originally developed - th at is, referring to w orkers w ho have been ‘show n’ statistically to be more likely than others to have accidents. Rather, it has come to be used in a much m ore generalised, vague b ut highly func­ tional fashion - w orkers as a w hole are viewed as a group o f people predisposed tow ards accidents, th ro u g h incom petence, carelessness, apathy, recklessness, and so on. Accidents are linked with workers. Those on the scene o f accidents are held, almost automatically, as responsible. In

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a generalised sense, then, ‘workers’ become the problem at the heart of occupational safety - and this in tu rn is the basis for worker, and often victim, blam ing in discourse and practice a ro u n d occupational safety (and, moreover, this set of tactics is one amongst a variety o f strategies by which the victims o f social problems in general are held responsible for their plight - see Ryan 1971; Goodey 2005: 96-9). Where a worker is blamed (either explicitly or implicitly) in practice, this tactic will at times involve resort to one or several characteristics - that they are incompetent, lazy, apathetic, inattentive, careless, reckless, and so on. Crucially, although the notion of risk is directly invoked, it is seen not as something that exists apart from, and thereby imposing itself upon, the worker; rather, risk is viewed as something which originates in / is brought on by the behaviour of workers. Thus the most obvious consequence of accident-proneness and worker/victim blaming is the diversion of attention from the fact that risks are built into the very system of capitalist produc­ tion, and subsequent lack of emphasis upon the nature of the workplace, the processes involved therein, and their particular rationales. If the focus on the aftermath of an incident were not to be upon workers but shifted to employers - to their employment practices (levels of training, or pressures in terms of the speed or intensity of work, for example), or to the design of the workplace and/or the job - such attention may logically lead to either cost implications, to redress the lack of investment in plant or people, or have legal ramifications, or both. As Robertson notes, ‘The use of the word “accident” to describe when a worker is injured or killed hides the fact that often this is a result of a criminal act by the employer . . . . Words are being used to change the way we deal with health and safety’ (2004: 6). T h is s tr a te g y h a s a l o n g h isto ry . D o r a n h a s a r g u e d t h a t t h e v ery c o n c e p t o f a n i n d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n t w as ‘r e o r g a n i s e d ’ by o fficial d i s c o u r s e t h r o u g h t h e ear ly F a c t o r y Acts, so t h a t these e v e n ts labelled a c c i d e n t s b e c a m e s e p ­ arated from w o rk e rs’ o w n exp erien ces o f the b r o a d e r p ro b le m o f th eir health ( u n d e rs to o d w ith in the o rg a n isa tio n o f p r o d u c tio n ), and b e cam e s u b j e c t to r o u t i n e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( o b s e r v a t i o n , r e c o d i n g , c o d i f y i n g ) b y fa c to ry i n s p e c t o r s ( D o r a n 1996; see also W a t t e r s o n 1991). T h is r e o r g a n i ­ s a t i o n itself c r e a t e d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y fo r t h e e m e r g e n c e o f t h e sta tis tic a lly recorded u n avoidable accident, su b seq u en tly situated w ithin discourses o f risk a n d in s u r a n c e r a th e r t h a n n e g lig e n c e , c u lp a b ility o r c r im in a lity ( D o r a n 1996; D e f e r t 1991; E wald 1991). M o r e g e n e r a l l y in t h e c o n t e x t o f o c c u p a t i o n a l sa fety t h e id ea o f a c c i ­ d e n t - p r o n e n e s s h a s b e e n d e p l o y e d q u i t e explicitly also to in voke e v e n t s o r p h e n o m e n a in w h i c h v i c t i m s ar e i m p l i c a t e d , via th e i r carelessn ess, a pathy , o r l ife s ty le s ( a l c o h o l o r d r u g a b u s e , p o o r s l e e p i n g h a b i t s , a n d so o n ; T o m b s 19 91). T h a t is, v i c t i m s b e c o m e c o m p l i c i t in t h e i r v i c t i m i s a t i o n -

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so th a t th ey are eith er to be b la m e d or at least n o t to be viewed as i n n o ­ c e n t.6 T h u s R o b e rts o n re p o r ts how, in 2000, th e British M edical Journal r e p o rte d th a t it w o u ld no lon g er use the w o rd ‘a c c id e n t’ in its pages, since this was ‘i n a p p r o p r ia te ’: ‘it arg ued th a t “m o s t in juries a n d th eir p re c ip ita t­ ing e v e n ts are p r e d i c ta b l e a n d p r e v e n t a b l e ”. It a d d e d t h a t b y u sin g the w ord “a c c i d e n t” we were e n c o u r a g i n g v ic t im - b l a m in g an d red u c e d s u p ­ p o r t for th o s e w'ho s u r v iv e d ’ ( R o b e r t s o n 2004: 6). Such a s s u m p ti o n s o f resp on sibility are m a d e all too easy by the prevalence o f v ic t im -b l a m in g strategies th a t have e m e r g e d a r o u n d , an d c o n ti n u e to clo u d , c o n s i d e r a ­ tions o f o c c u p a tio n a l d eath s a n d injuries. T h u s the term ‘a c c id e n t’ b o th invokes a n d reinforces re sort to an in d i ­ vidualising lens for view ing a n d ‘u n d e r s t a n d i n g ’ safety incidents, a n d this lens exten ds to quasi-legal a p p ro a c h e s to su ch events. Law’s co m p lex re a ­ son ings in relation to defin in g crim e, while n o t exclusively focused on the i n d i v i d u a l , h av e an i n d i v i d u a l i s i n g effect w h ic h e x te n d s b e y o n d th e n o tio n o f in te n t per se. T h u s, even w h ere in ten t is n o t the issue in d e te r ­ m i n i n g legal liability - such as in th e case o f c o r p o r a te m a n s l a u g h t e r th e n the indiv idu alisin g eth o s o f c rim in a l law has m ilita ted against such successfu l p r o s e c u t i o n s , w h ils t in c o n te x t s w h e re th is c h a rg e h as b e e n ra is e d , s u c h as fo llo w in g th e Z e e b r u g g e o r S o u th a l l ‘d i s a s t e r s ’, th e n charges o f m a n s la u g h te r have been raised against relatively low-level in d i­ vid uals on the scene o f th e in cid en t - namely, th e assistant b o s u n o r the tr a in d riv er (see T o m b s 1995, S la p p er a n d T o m b s 1999: 3 0 - 4 , 1 0 1 -1 0 7 , a n d C h a p te r 10, passim). T hese legal re sp o n ses are rein fo rced by, a n d th em selv es reinforce, the im m e d i a te ‘c o m m o n s e n s e ’ a p p eal o f a c c i d e n t- p r o n e n e s s . T h is is clearly i l lu s tr a t e d in m e d i a c o v erag e o f th e r e c e n t d is a s te r s in th e UK. In the i m m e d i a t e a f t e r m a t h o f m a n y o f these in c i d e n ts , th e r e e m e r g e d initial p o p u la r a tt ri b u ti o n s o f b la m e directed against ind ivid uals on the scene o f these ‘a c c id e n ts’. In such cases, the p o w er a n d a p p eal o f a ccid e n t p r o n e ­ ness is o n ly d i m i n i s h e d t h r o u g h th e lo n g d e ta il o f a p u b li c i n q u i ry , at w hic h th ere is (o fte n) a c o m p le x tra c in g o f even ts s u r r o u n d i n g an in c i­ d e n t in o r d e r to arr iv e at its ‘f u n d a m e n t a l ’ c a u s e ( s ) , lo c a te d w ith i n m anag erial an d o rg an isatio nal systems.

Such inquiries m ay be contrasted w ith the general lack o f a search for ‘fundam ental’ causes following m inor, ‘day-to-day’ incidents, causes thereby rem aining obscured. Hughes has noted h o w ‘social attitudes to safety tend to blam e an individual for his ow n death th ro u g h carelessness o r bad luck’, whereas following disasters there is at least m ore likelihood that there will be a public focus upon ‘m anagem ent’ o r ‘systems’ (Hughes 1984 :15). T hese types o f a r g u m e n t, th e n , are espo used (and believed) n o t only by th o s e in d i v id u a l s a n d g r o u p s t h a t m a y have a v ested in t e re s t in seeing th e ir ac ce p ta n c e - in p a rtic u la r, here, we th i n k o f e m p lo y e rs w h o , were

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w o rk e rs n o t th u s b la m e d , m i g h t find th em selv es b e in g held resp on sib le for a m u c h la r g e r p r o p o r t i o n o f in d u s t r i a l a c c i d e n ts w ith the p ossib le c o n s e q u e n c e o f c o m i n g to be c o n s i d e r e d as b l a m e w o r t h y - b u t in d e e d also by o th e r g ro u p s w h o have, or have h a d , a direct interest in indu strial health a n d safety - in particular, here, we refer to g o v e rn m e n ts a n d their a p p o in t e e s , b u t also to h e a lth a n d safety ‘e x p e r t s ’ o r p ro fe ssio n a ls a n d , m o s t s u r p r is in g ly , to s o m e w o r k e r s t h e m s e l v e s (L e o p o ld 1985: 265; W atterson 1988:2 93 ). T h e practical n a tu r e a nd effects o f the ideology o f a cc id e n t-p r o n e n e ss a n d w o rk e r-b la m in g are p e rh a p s m o s t clearly exemplified in the reactions o f U n io n C a r b id e C o r p o r a t i o n (U C C ) to th e gas release at B ho pa l (see C h a p te r 1) - in this p a rtic u la r case, the ‘i n c o m p e t e n t ’ w o rk e r is invoked a lth o u g h , th r o u g h the use o f racist a n d im perialist stereotypes, this m o r e specifically be c o m e s th e i n c o m p e te n t Indian w o rk e r (Everest 1986: 107). T h u s in a tte m p ts to ‘exp lain’ the c irc u m stan ces s u r r o u n d i n g the accident, U C C refused to c o u n t e n a n c e any su g g e s tio n th a t the m e th y lis o c y a n a te leak m a y have re s u lte d fro m f u n d a m e n t a l i n a d e q u a c i e s in th e B h o p a l p l a n t ’s basic d esig n , state o f m a i n t e n a n c e , staffing levels, a n d so o n . In fact, U C C claim ed, variously, th a t the leak h a d been cau sed by: a failure on the p a rt o f o p e ra to rs to co m p ly w ith basic safety pro c ed u re s; a purely m istak en in t r o d u c t io n o f w'ater into an M IC storage ta n k by an u n w ittin g employee; an act o f terro rism by Sikh extremists; a n d , m o s t recently, an d it a p p e a r s ‘d e f i n it iv e l y ’, an act o f s a b o t a g e by a d i s g r u n t l e d e m p lo y e e . M o re generally, U C C cast th e In d ia n w o rk e rs (a n d , in d e ed , g o v e r n m e n t r e g u l a to r s ) as te c h n o lo g ic a lly u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d , a n d in c a p a b le e it h e r o f u n d e r s ta n d in g o r a d h e rin g to basic safety p ro c e d u re s (ibid.). It is n o t the in t e n ti o n h ere to e n te r into a d is c u ssio n o f the causes o f th e B ho pal disaster, n o r to en gag e in a d e ta ile d c ritiq u e o f U C C ’s final version o f the ‘sabotage th e o r y ’.7 It is sufficient to state here th at, alth o u g h it to o k U C C nearly th r e e - a n d - a - h a lf years to develop this ‘t h e o r y ’, th e idea o f sabotage as th e m a i n cause o f the accident had been m o o t e d by U C C in the im m e d ia te a fte rm a th o f the tragedy; th u s there is a real sense in w hich U C C assumed sabotage to be the cause o f the disaster a nd th en set o u t to p ro v e in d e ta il h o w th is c o u ld have b e e n th e case (see, for e x a m p le , Kalelkar 1988: 557, e m p h a s e s a d d e d ). U C C is n o t exceptional. But the B ho pal disaster is p articu larly in terest­ ing fo r us, b e c a u s e th e a l m o s t a u t o m a t i c re s p o n s e s o f U C C to th e ‘a c c i d e n t ’, p lu s th e d iffic u ltie s e n c o u n t e r e d s u b s e q u e n t l y by th o s e a t t e m p t i n g to o p p o s e su c h ‘c o m m o n - s e n s i c a l ’ a c c o u n t s o f its cau ses , attest to th e significance - th at is, the d e e p -r o o te d n e s s an d pervasiveness - o f th e c o n c e p t o f ‘a c c i d e n t - p r o n e n e s s ’; a n d this is so even w h ere the i n c i d e n t h a s b e e n su b je c t to as m u c h pub licity , in v e s tig a tio n , a n d even c o u rt hearing s, as has this one.

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In general, then, the most im portant consequences of the ideological thrust of'accident-proneness’ is to assign responsibility for, and identify the objects of im provem ent in relation to, industrial injuries. Accepting the nature of the workplace and work processes as given means that the management of safety becomes a task of controlling the potentially haz­ ardous actions or omissions of workers. Further, the predominance of the notion of accident-proneness m eant that only certain types of experts entered the field of safety and health (those concerned with health sciences and the law, rather than, for example, engineers or designers of work organisation); moreover, this ideology remained virtually unquestioned by these experts, so that the very expertise which they possessed, which might in fact have proved to be a resource upon which workers could draw in the course of struggles over health and safety, was very often exercised upon workers, in the sense of being used to justify an ever-increasing regulation of the details of their behaviour, both inside and outside the workplace (Lessin and O ’Neill 2002).8 The issue becomes behaviour m odification through control of workers rather than modification of dangerous work­ places - and, coupled with reward programmes for ‘accident-free’ working, through creating a culture of non-reporting of industrial injuries, such programmes have in-built tendencies to appear‘successful’ (ibid.). At a ‘m acro’ level, then, the acceptance that most ‘accidents’ are caused by workers has key implications in terms of the necessary level and nature of regulation: that companies do not necessarily need to be subjected to m o re strin g en t state regulation in the sphere of health and safety, but rather should be left, to a large degree, to self-regulation. As Harrison has put it in her historical analysis of the role of the idea of an accident in fac­ tory regulation, it is ‘a m eans o f dealing with the difficulty for factory administration of directly interfering with employers’ interests’ (Harrison 1993: 269). Such approaches within both the US and the UK, then, need to be linked to the increasingly s trid e n t logic o f self-regulation being espoused in many parts o f the advanced capitalist world. In short, victim blaming and the ‘concept’ of accident-proneness are analogous to other key elements of capitalist ideology - they individualise structural issues. At a ‘m icro’ level, then, companies, being left to self-regulation, and defin­ ing the pro b le m s of health and safety in terms of their w orkforce, can engage in a stricter disciplining of, and control over, the behaviour of that workforce, so th at in div id ual w orkers find them selves subjected to increasing levels o f regulation over the minutiae of everyday behaviour in the workplace (and, indeed, outside of the workplace, too). The recent reem ergence o f beh aviou r-b ased safety p ro g r a m m e s (Lessin and O ’Neill 2002) - essentially forms of behaviour modification which cover a range o f te chn iq ues from dis ciplining to tr a in in g - also involve a form of

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responsibilisation o f i n d i v i d u a l w o rk e rs . As re c e n t c r i m i n o l o g y has d e m o n s tr a t e d in th e c o n tex t o f c rim e co n tro l, resp on sib ilisation o f i n d i ­ viduals is integral to a rea lig n m e n t o f the sta te’s responsibilities. T h e p o s s ib le p in c e r - l ik e c o m b i n a t i o n o f th e s e m a c r o - a n d m i c r o ­ effects is s t u n n i n g l y e x e m p lif ie d in n ew r e g u l a t o r y p ra c t ic e s w h ic h im p o s e tickets (akin to p a rk i n g tickets) for h ealth an d safety vio latio ns. D iscussing this new practice in O n ta rio , G ray has arg u ed th a t u n d e r ‘n e o ­ liberal self-re gu latio n, w o rk e rs are essentially forced to police their ow n hazards th r o u g h in d iv id u al re spo nsibility’, a n d th a t such an a p p ro a c h is a key e x a m p l e o f th e d if f u s i o n o f e m p l o y e r r e s p o n s ib i li ty a n d b la m e w o r th in e ss for unsafe w o rk in g co n d itio n s. T h e ticketing p r a c ­ tice n o t only directly polices w orkers in health an d safety, b u t it also forces w o rk e rs to p ra ctic e in d i v id u a l respo nsibility. W o rk e r s m u s t n o t only enforce regu latio n them selves to avoid unsafe w o rk (a p h y s ­ ical h a r m ) , b u t th e y m u s t also be c a u t i o u s o f h e a lt h a n d safety tickets (a financial h a r m ) (G ray 2006: 879). In d eed , a stu dy o f the ration ales for the types o f violatio ns to w hich tic k ­ ets m i g h t be a t t a c h e d f o u n d t h a t th ese w'ere all o f a ‘clea r a n d v is ib le ’ n a tu r e , and th at th ey excluded b o th ‘o rg a n isa tio n a l facto rs’ and ‘o rg a n isa ­ tio n a l/m a n a g e r ia l d e c is io n -m a k in g ’ (Gray, 2006). This, th e n , rep resen ts a cle a r b l u r r i n g o f r e s p o n s ib i li ty for u n s a f e c o n d i t i o n s , as well as ‘th e n o ti o n o f w h o is a h ealth a n d safety o ff e n d e r ’ (G ray 2006: 888). A n d its very existence is, if n o t w holly ex p la in ed by, logically related to, ideas o f a c c i d e n t-p r o n e n e s s an d associated tactics o f victim b lam in g .

S a fe ty c r im e s as vio le n c e ?

Now, if safety crim es te n d to be o b scu red , r e n d e r e d (relatively) invisible, while the p h e n o m e n a to w hich this label p o in ts are in fact m isrep re se nted as ‘a ccid en ts’, then on e issue raised is th e ex tent to w hich acad em ic social science has so u g h t either to address this m i sre p re se n ta tio n , o r to b ri n g to light a relatively h id d e n social p ro b le m - each, surely, key ra tion ale s for a c a d e m i c in v e s ti g a ti o n . Since o u r p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e r n h e r e is w ith th e excavation o f crim es, th e n the ob v io u s discipline to w'hich we m ig h t tu r n is c r i m i n o l o g y , in o r d e r to assess h o w safety c r i m e s are c o n s i d e r e d th erein . Now, o n o n e level, this q u e ry can be an sw ered very cu rtly - for if c r i m i n o l o g y h as h is to r i c a ll y m a r g i n a l i s e d th e c r i m e s o f th e p o w e rfu l , th en it has paid p articu larly scant a tte n tio n to safety crim es. For us, while th is is h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g , it is in o n e r e s p e c t v e ry c u r i o u s - fo r w i t h i n

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c r i m i n o lo g y th ere is a sig n ific an t level o f a tt e n ti o n d e v o te d to th e p h e ­ n o m e n o n o f violence in general. Yet if it is w ith in this ru b r ic o f ' v i o l e n t c r i m e s ’ t h a t we w o u l d a r g u e safety c r i m e s s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d , an y survey o f c rim ino logical w'ork on violence w o u ld co n clu d e th a t such c o n ­ sid era tion s are n otab le for their absence. In s h o r t,9 while there are ob viously e n o r m o u s epistem ological, th e o r e t ­ ical a n d political differences b etw een the v a rio u s a p p ro a c h e s to violence ta k e n w ith i n w h a t s t a n d s fo r a c a d e m ic c r i m i n o lo g y , th e s e a p p r o a c h e s share, v irtu ally w i t h o u t e x c ep tio n , ce rtain cha racteristic s or, m o r e a c c u ­ rately, a s s u m p t i o n s - a s s u m p t i o n s w h ic h esse n tia lly ru le o u t an y c o n sid e ra tio n o f safety crim es. T h u s crucial w ith in the definition s o f v io ­ lence d e p lo y e d o r in c l u d e d w i t h i n th e s e a p p r o a c h e s are tw o c e n tr a l a s s u m p ti o n s : first, a p r i m a c y g r a n t e d to i n t e n ti o n ; a n d , se c o n d , a focus u p o n in divid ual as o p p o s e d to collective sources o f violence, a n d th u s the centrality o f violence as in te r-p e rso n a l as o p p o s e d to structu ral. Now, in te n t enjoys significant legal status - while, relatedly, for so m e it is a key d is tin g u ish in g c riterio n betw e en c o n v e n tio n a l ('re a l’) crim e an d c o rp o r a te crim e (m erely technical offences) (see Pearce a nd T om bs 1998: 231). H owever, it is w o r th n o ti n g h ere th a t the n o ti o n o f in t e n t p r e s u p ­ poses, a n d th e n concretises, a m o r a l h ie ra rc h y w h ich, o n c e e x a m in e d , is c o u n te r c o m m o n -se n s ic a l. T his p o in t was first m a d e - to th e best o f o u r k n o w le d g e - by R e im a n in a sim p le b u t s t r ik i n g fa s h io n . R e im a n c o n ­ tr a s ts th e m o tiv e s (a n d m o r a l c u lp a b i li ty ) o f m o s t acts r e c o g n i s e d as i n t e n ti o n a l m u r d e r w ith w h at he calls the in d ire c t h a r m s on th e p a r t o f a b s e n t e e killers, by w h ic h he m e a n s , fo r e x a m p l e , d e a th s w h ic h re su lt w here em plo yers refuse to invest in safe p lan t o r w o rk in g m e t h o d s , w here m a n u f a c t u r e r s falsify safety d a ta fo r new p r o d u c t s , w h e re illegal d i s ­ ch arges are m a d e o f toxic s u b s ta n c e s in to o u r e n v i r o n m e n t , an d so on. R eim an notes that in te n tio n a l m u r d e r e r s c o m m it acts w hich are focused u p o n on e (or, rarely, m o r e th a n one) specific in dividual, a p o in t w hich we k n o w h o ld s for c o n t e m p o r a r y B r it a in , d e s p i te m o r a l p a n ic s a b o u t 's t ra n g e r d a n g e r ’10; th u s in such cases the p e r p e t r a t o r - w h o m in m a n y respects fits o u r arch ety pal p o rt ra it o f a c rim in a l - ‘does n o t show general d isd a in for the lives o f h e r fellows’ (R eim an 1998: 67). R eim an c o n trasts such fo rm s o f in te n tio n al killing w ith the dea th s th a t result from ‘in d ire c t’ h a rm s . For R e im a n, the relative m o r a l culpability o f the in te n tio n a l killer a n d the m i n e executive w h o cuts safety c o rn e r s is q u ite d is tin c t a n d , he argues, c o n tr a r y to (ind eed diam etrically op p o site to) th at a r o u n d w'hich c rim in a l law operates. T h u s the m in e executive w a n te d to h a r m n o - o n e in particular, b u t he knew his acts were likely to harm someone - an d once s o m e o n e is h a r m e d , the victim is so m e-

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one in particular. . . . there is no m o ral basis for treating one-on-one harm as crim in a l and indirect harm as merely regulatory. (R eim an 1998: 67 -7 0, original emphases) Thus, Reiman concludes, offenders o f in tentional, o n e - o n - o n e h a rm are less likely to represent so m e generalised th r e a t to o th ers th a n the m ine executive. T h e re a s o n in g is co n v in c in g , a n d p o in ts to in d ifference or ‘in direct’ h arm as at least, if not m ore, culpable than in tention and ‘direct’ h arm s - with im plications for how these are treated by any crim inal ju s ­ tice system (see Pem berton 2004). Yet the greater m oral culpability th at is attach ed b o th legally an d p o p u la r ly to acts o f in t e n ti o n can also allow' those implicated in corp orate crimes to rationalise away the consequences o f their actions - techniques o f neutralisation m ade possible th ro ug h, and su p p o rted by, key institutions such as the media, formal political debate, an d so on (see above, also Slapper a nd Tombs 1999: 105-7, 1 18-22; and C hap ter 5 passim). If intent is central to d o m i n a n t legal an d academ ic u n d e rs ta n d in g s of violence, also significant is the p rim a c y attached to e x p lan a tio n s at the level o f the individual. As Salmi has w ritten, the ‘usual trea tm e n t o f vio­ lence’ is infected w ith ‘[e]xcessive in dividualisation’, ‘attrib u tin g solely to individual factors actions that cannot in reality be accounted for in individ­ ual terms. By so doing, the possibility o f a causal link between the violence observed and the su rro u n d in g social structure is systematically dismissed’ (Salmi 1993: 8). Rather, focus rem ains u p o n ‘the individual and the é ra d i­ ca tio n o f such d e p lo r a b le b e h a v i o u r ’ (C atley 2003: 4). T his is u n s u r p ris in g in advanced capitalist societies, since analysis at this level coheres entirely with the eth os o f ind ividu alism u p o n w hich such soci­ eties are m ain tain ed. Certainly once o n e ab an d o n s an epistemological c o m m it m e n t to in d i­ vid ualism , th e n m o r e e n c o m p a s s in g d e fin itio n s an d c o n sid e ra tio n s o f violence b ecom e possible. For example, a m o n g the w o rk on the issue o f w orkp lace violence, th a t o f Bowie stan d s o u t, since he has s o u g h t to develop the category o f ‘organisational violence’, an d although this is p a r ­ tially limited by som e c o m m itm e n t to intention, it is far m o re useful than o th e r d efin itio n s o f violence. T h u s, for Bowie, o rg a n isa tio n a l violence ‘involves organisations knowingly placing their workers o r clients in d a n ­ gerous o r v iolent situ a tio n s o r allowing a clim ate o f a buse, bu llyin g or harassm en t to thrive in the w orkplace’ (Bowie 2002: 6). If this still retains so m e c o m m i t m e n t to in te n tio n , it at least moves b e y o n d sim ple u n d e r ­ stan d in g s o f indiv idu al action, n o t least because it acknow ledges h o w a general o rg a n isa tio n a l d e m e a n o u r o f g e n e ra tin g o r tu r n i n g a b lin d eye

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tow ards violence can be fostered 'in a growing econom ic rationalist climate o f decreasing job security, massive retrenchm ents an d expanding u n e m ­ ploym ent that pitted w orkers and unions against em ployers’ (ibid.: 9). O f particular interest for us is that Bowie also notes that such violence is m uch h arder to recognise due to the tendency to ‘blam e’ (ibid.: 6) individuals, and to develop strategies for responding to violence which are ‘based on a pathology m odel o f “m ad, bad or sad” em ployees o r clients an d patients who are seen as individually responsible for the violence occurring at w ork’ (ibid.: 8). Similarly, Hills, in in t r o d u c i n g a collection o f case histories o f ‘c o r p o ­ rate vio lence’, defines this p h e n o m e n o n as Actual h a r m a n d risk o f h a r m inflicted on c o n su m e rs, w orkers, a nd th e general public as a result o f d ecisions by c o rp o r a te executives or m a n a g e r s , fro m c o r p o r a t e n eg lig en ce, th e q u e s t for p ro f its at any cost, a n d wilful v io la tio n s o f he alth , safety a n d e n v ir o n m e n t a l law's (Hills 1987: vii). T h r o u g h the cases presented in this collection, and in his final c o n s id e ra ­ tio n s re g a r d in g these, Hills c o n c lu d e s t h a t su ch v io le n c e is u n d e r s t o o d ‘n o t in the p a th o lo g y o f evil individ uals b u t in the c u ltu re a n d stru c tu r e o f la rg e -sc a le b u r e a u c r a t i c o r g a n i s a t i o n s w i t h i n a p a r t i c u l a r p o litic a l e c o n o m y ’ (Hills 1987a: 190). H ills’s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f violence seem s to shift b e y o n d b o t h i n t e n ti o n a n d ind iv id u als. T hese shifts b e y o n d i n t e n ­ tio n can also be d i s c e r n e d in s o m e o th e r , r e c e n t c r i m i n o l o g i c a l w o rk w h ich, if n o t explicitly co u c h e d in th e lang ua ge o f violence co uld be re ­ fr a m e d as su ch - we are t h i n k in g in p a rtic u la r h ere o f a variety o f w ork w ith in the ru b r ic o f ‘g re en ’ c rim in o lo g y (Lynch an d Stretesky 2003; W hite 200 3), w ith in w h ic h we w o u ld in c lu d e th e sy stem a tic ( s t a te - c o r p o r a t e ) e x p l o i t a t i o n o f w h o le classes o f p e o p le (W a lters 2 0 0 6). I n d e e d , across such w ork, the use o f ‘v io lence’ starts to resem ble so m e o f the c h a ra c te ri­ s a t io n s o f th e H o l o c a u s t , o f g e n o c id e , a n d o f o t h e r f o r m s o f state v io le n c e , a n d even in this very fact, the m a r g i n a l i t y o f su c h m o d e s o f a rg u m e n ts to, an d sub stantive focus w ith in , crim in o lo g y be co m e s a p p a r ­ e n t. So if th e ( p a r tia l) t r a n s g r e s s i n g o f th e b o u n d a r i e s o f d o m i n a n t u n d e r s ta n d in g s o f v iolence by Bowie an d Hills are n o t u n iq u e , th ey are, w ith in c rim inology, extrem ely rare. All to o often, o ne m u s t m ove bey o n d crim in o lo g y - as we did in C h a p te r 1, w h ere we utilised briefly the w ork o f S alm i - to arrive at m o r e ac curate ways o f d escribing , analysing, then the o risin g a b o u t violence.

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C o n clu sio n

We have sought to dem onstrate in this chapter how safety crimes are system­ atically obscured through a series o f m utually reinforcing processes. At the broadest level, safety crimes rem ain socially and politically invisible in ways which m irror the invisibility of corporate crimes in general. Thus there is an array o f social processes that co n trib u te to rem oving such offences from dom inant definitions of crime, law and order’ (Slapper and Tombs 1999). T h e o b sc u r in g o f the c rim in a l aspect o f safety crim es has b een crucially g e n e ra te d a n d s t r e n g th e n e d h istorically a n d c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s l y by the idea o f the a c c id e n t-p r o n e w orker, w h ich in tu r n legitimates strategies o f v ictim b la m in g , th a t is, assign ing re s p o n sib ility for, a n d id e n tify in g the objects o f im p r o v e m e n t in relation to, in d u s tria l injuries o n to individuals r a th e r th a n the n a tu r e o f the w o rk p lace, w o rk processes, m a n a g e m e n ts , cultures o f an i n d u s tr y or sector, a n d so o n - th a t is, the very causal fac­ to r s we h ig h l i g h t e d as c ru c ia l in p r o d u c i n g safety c r i m e s in o u r p re s e n ta tio n o f case stud ies in C h a p te r 1. T h e id eo log y a n d practices o f a c c id e n t-p r o n e n e ss th u s need d is m a n tlin g if we are to tr eat ‘a ccid e n ts’ as (p o ten tial) safety crimes. In d e ed , o n ce o c c u p a tio n a l injuries are view ed n o t as ac cid ents b u t as in c i d e n ts w h ic h are n o t o n ly largely p r e v e n t a b l e , b u t w'hich th e law requires to be p re v e n te d , then th ey fall w ith in the a m b i t o f c rim inology. T h e n , as we have a r g u e d in this text, if we c o n s i d e r the se illegalities in te r m s o f th e i r c o n s e q u e n c e s - i n j u r y a n d d e a th - we realise t h a t these look rem a rk ab ly sim ilar to the results o f those events th at are d e e m e d as ‘p r o p e r ’ vio len ce. How'ever, as we have seen in the la tter se ctio n o f this chapter, d o m i n a n t c rim ino log ical co n ce p tio n s o f violence are based u p o n an im p li c it b u t t e n a c io u s l y - h e ld a ss o c ia tio n o f v io le n c e w ith b o t h th e i n t e r - p e r s o n a l a n d w ith i n t e n t i o n , b o t h q u a litie s t h a t are o fte n a b s e n t from safety crim es. T h a t safety crim es are crim es o f (actual or poten tial) violence is, for us, un equiv oca l; yet to reach this co n clu sio n o n e m u s t g e n ­ erally m o v e b e y o n d c rim in o lo g y , to so m e w ell-accepted u n d e r s ta n d in g s o f violence w hic h allow us to m o ve bey o n d the in te rp e r s o n a l and i n t e n ­ tion, an d w ith in w hich safety crim es clearly fall. It is th e v ery o r g a n i s a t i o n a l lo c u s o r o r i g i n s o f safety c r i m e w'hich m a k e s th e e m p h a s i s u p o n e i t h e r an illegal act o r a n in te n tio n u su a lly i n a p p r o p ria te , for two reasons. First, each te rm is a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c an d in d iv id u a lis in g , a n d by d e f i n it io n is p r o b l e m a t i c in its a p p li c a ti o n to a c o rp o r a te en tity w hich is m o r e th a n , o r different to, the su m o f in divid ua l h u m a n actors. Second, in te n tio n in p a rtic u la r im plies a relatively u n p r o b ­ le m a tic lin k b e tw e e n a n act o r o m i s s i o n a n d its c o n s e q u e n c e , yet this sim p listic ca u sal s e q u e n c i n g leads to an o b s c u r i n g o f th e c o n s t r u c t i o n

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Obscuring safety crimes

a n d m a i n t e n a n c e o f a s i tu a t i o n o r c o n t e x t w h ic h , as a c o n s e q u e n c e , is fe r­ tile g r o u n d for v io la tio n s . W e re ite r a te a p o i n t we ha ve m a d e several tim e s in th is text: an y fo c u s u p o n safety c r im e s re q u ir e s us to e x a m i n e th e se in t e r m s o f th e i r o rg an isa tio n a l p ro d u c tio n . In C h a p te r 2, we s o u g h t to set o u t th e e x te n t o f o c c u p a tio n a l d e a th s a n d injuries across British w orkplaces; we m a d e clear at th a t p o in t, how ever, th a t w e w e r e s p e a k i n g o f i n c i d e n t s r a t h e r t h a n c r i m e s p e r se - t h a t is, n o t all d e a t h s a n d in ju r ie s a re th e re s u lt o f safety c rim e s . In th is c h a p te r , w e have f u r t h e r c o n s id e r e d th e n a t u r e o f t h e s e p h e n o m e n a , a n d p a v e d th e w a y for c o n s id e rin g s o m e o f these d e a th s a n d injuries as safety c rim es, in d e e d c rim e s o f violence. In th e follo w in g c hap ter, C h a p t e r 4, w e t u r n directly, t h r o u g h a c o m b in a ti o n o f th eoretical a n d e m p iric a l a r g u m e n ts , to an a t t e m p t to reveal th e e x te n t o f c o r p o r a te v iolence in th e f o r m o f safety crim es.

Notes 1

And had not Blunkett resigned following the nanny/passport/Kimberley Clarke row, he may have continued in the office, thus lending even greater continuity to this Office.

2

Safety is n o t o f course u n iq u e in som e o f these respects; prisons, for example, have been presided over by a long line o f ju n io r ministers since 1997. However, the prisons m in iste r is located w ithin the H o m e Office. Moreover, as we argue t h r o u g h o u t this section, the key issue is n o t a b o u t any specific elem en t o f the processes we describe, b u t the fact th at they are all mutually reinforcing. Such figures are difficult to establish beyond do u b t, o f course. This claim began to cir­ culate on the basis o f a calc ulation m ade by the Liberal D e m o c ra ts Press Release at w w w .lib dem s.org.u k/sto ry.h tm l?id = 8180 an d also BBC N E W S /P O L IT IC S , May 12, 2005, at h ttp ://n e w sim g .b b c.co .U k /l/lo w /u k _ p o litic s/4 5 4 1 3 7 7 .stm . Given the source o f this claim it needs to be treated with particular caution - b u t it rem ains that there is no d o u b t that a great deal o f new crim inal offences have been created, w hether or not these can actually be counted in four figures. In fact, it was only in 2005 th at it was finally decided by the CPS th at no individuals would face charges over the 1999 Ladbroke Grove rail crash which claimed 31 lives, the CPS citing ‘insufficient evidence’: Netw ork Rail, formerly Railtrack, did face crim i­ nal charges u n d e r the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 (BBC News, D ecem ber 6, 2005, h ttp ://n ew s.bbc.co.U k/l/hi/uk/4504696.stm ). A lthough w ith o u t being n a m e d formally, claims which a m o u n t to accident proneness were in circ u latio n well before th e n ; see, for ex am p le , H a rri s o n 1993, on facto ry inspection at the tu r n of the nin eteenth century. And thus not deserving o f the state’s su pp ort. C on trast with New L ab o u r’s (claimed) c h a m p ion ing o f the victim as being at the centre o f the crim inal justice system. The form er has been dealt with exhaustively, m o st adequately in Everest 1986; Jones 1988; M oreho use an d S ubram an iam 1986; and Shrivastava 1992, while the latter has been attem pted in Bergman 1988 and Bhopal Action G rou p 1988. See, m ore generally, Pearce and Tombs 1998: 194-219.

3

4

5

6 7

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8

In the p revious chapter, we referred to recent research findings th a t a b o u t 1,000 deaths on th e roads are actually w ork -related fatalities, co n clu d in g th a t ‘B ritains ro ad s are the c o u n try ’s m o st d a n g e ro u s w o rk p lace as u n d e r-p re s su re w o rk ers, stru g g lin g to m eet deadlines an d suffering fatigue from long h o u rs, beco m e a d an g er to them selves and o th e r s ’ (T ra d e U n io n C o n g re ss 2 0 0 5 b ). In re sp o n se to th is, a C ra n fie ld S ch o o l o f M a n ag e m en t ex p ert on d riv er b e h a v io u r said: ‘C o m p an ie s n eed to c o n d u c t p sy c h o ­ logical p rofiling of em ployees to see w ho has a ten d en cy to w ard s aggression o r th rill seeking’ (C am pbell 2005).

9

A d e ta ile d e x a m in a tio n o f th e ta k c n -fo r-g ra n tc d a s s u m p tio n s w ith in c rim in o lo g y reg ard in g w h at c o n stitu te s v io le n t crim es - an d th e im p lic a tio n s these a ssu m p tio n s have fo r any p o te n tia l c rim in o lo g ic a l fo cu s u p o n safety c rim e s - can be fo u n d in Tom bs, 2006.

10 BCS figures for 2002/03 show th at ‘In over half o f v io len t in cid en ts the o ffen d er/s were k n o w n to th e victim in so m e way; in o n e -th ird o f in c id e n ts th ey w ere k n o w n w ell’ (Sm ith and Allen 2004: 11).

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Chapter 4

Discovering safety‘crimes’

In tro d u ctio n I n C h a p t e r 2, w e e x p l o r e d t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h w e c a n t r e a t o f fi c i a l s t a t i s ­ t ic s o n d e a t h s a n d i n j u r i e s a t w o r k as a c c u r a t e , a n d a r g u e d t h a t , w h a t e v e r t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f t h e d a t a , it is c l e a r t h a t o c c u p a t i o n a l i n j u r i e s c o n s t i t u t e a m a j o r soc ial p r o b l e m . W e h a v e also a r g u e d t h a t in ju rie s a n d d e a t h s at w o r k a r e g e n e r a l l y m i s r e p r e s e n t e d w h e n c a s t as ‘a c c i d e n t s ’ - a l a b e l t h a t h a s a se rie s o f p r o b l e m a t i c sp e cific c o n n o t a t i o n s a n d so c ial effects. B u t o u r c o n s id e r a tio n s th u s far h av e n o t e s ta b lis h e d th e e x te n t to w h ic h , o c c u p a t i o n a l d e a t h s a n d i n j u r i e s c a n b e r e g a r d e d as c r i m e s .

Now, it is i m p o r t a n t to be clear th at in the co n te x t o f a tr e a tm e n t o f safety crimes, we c an no t assume that all injuries are the result o f som e v io­ lations o f the law. This assum ption is m ad e even in two o f the best pieces o f w ork w ithin criminology that raise the issue o f safety crimes: Box’s (1983) classic chapter on ‘C orp orate C rim e ’ in Power, Crime and Mystification, and R eim an’s (1979) similar, US-based discussion in The Rich G et Richer and the Poor Get Prison. These classic texts o f critical criminology each contain im p o rta n t, and at the tim e o f pu blication largely novel, insights into the p ro b le m o f safety crim es - yet they can also be criticised for treating in th eir d ata all w orkp lace injuries a n d d e a th as crim es. T h a t is, in th eir attempts to criticise d o m in a n t un derstandings o f the crime pro blem , they seek to include w ithin the category o f crim e p h e n o m e n a such as o c c u p a ­ tional injuries and ill health. Yet, while we certainly agree with the need to reform ulate d o m i n a n t co n stru ctio n s o f ‘c rim e ’, there is a danger in using the te rm ‘c rim e’ too loosely, w ith o u t g ro u n d in g it in the real processes o f law enforcement a nd criminalisation. T he danger, which these authors run into, o f allowing subjective o p in i o n s to lead o u r analysis (a nd th u s

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exposing our work to the charges o f ‘moral entrepreneurship’: Shapiro 1983). A generally applicable definition of crime cannot be anything that we merely feel is wrong or distasteful. ‘Crime’, if it is to retain any meaning at all, must always be related to the material processes and institutions of criminal justice. To put it bluntly, just because someone is killed or injured at work does not necessarily mean death or injury is the result of a crime this needs to explored then demonstrated, rather than assumed or asserted. O ur previous comments notwithstanding, a key message from the work of Box and Reiman is that the very notion of crime is contested. An im por­ tant way of approaching crime as a contested concept has been developed by European writers who come from the ‘abolitionist’ perspective (Bianchi and van Swaaningen 1990; de Haan 1990). Abolitionists such as Hulsman (1986) point out that ‘crime’ has no intrinsic, objective property: it has no ontological reality outside the social institutions and processes that define it. What we know as crime should be understood as merely the types of behaviour and conduct that the state defines as worthy of control and p u n ­ ishment: some forms of harm ful conduct are deemed worthy of control and others are not. This is a point that we will return to in the conclusion where we will argue that - counter to the received wisdom in criminology the criminalisation of safety offences is entirely consistent with this per­ spective. The point to bear in mind at the m om ent is that crime is a relative concept which is defined in relation to the process of making and enforcing the criminal law. It is this point of critique that provides a starting point for understanding both why most injuries and deaths at work are not crimi­ nalised and how criminal law and criminal justice institutions perpetuate our understanding of them as ‘accidents’ or ‘technical offences’, and there­ fore not really crime at all. U n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e p r o c e s s o f c r i m i n a l i s a t i o n r e q u i r e s us to b r o a d e n o u r h o riz o n o f in q u iry b e y o n d a n a rro w co n s id e ra tio n o f state-defined c r i m e . T h e f o r m s o f c o n d u c t t h a t are c r i m in a li s e d in so c iety can b e c o n ­ si d e re d as p a r t o f a w i d e r s p e c t r u m o f social h a r m s ( H illy a rd et al. 2 00 4). It is p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t w h e n we ar e d e a l i n g w i t h c o r p o r a t e h a r m to c o n s i d e r t h a t c o n d u c t w h i c h is d e f i n e d as c r i m e will o n l y ev er r e p r e s e n t t h e tip o f t h e iceberg ( W h y t e 2 0 04). T h e i n t e n t i o n o f th is c h a p t e r , h o w e v e r , is to show' t h a t t h e m a r g i n a l i s a ­ t i o n o f sa fe ty c r i m e s w i t h i n m a i n s t r e a m c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e d i s c o u r s e a n d p r a c tic e c a n n o t be ju s tif ie d w i t h r e fe ren ce to t h e d e f i n i ti o n o f c r i m e set by t h e c r i m i n a l ju stice sy stem itself. At t h e s a m e t i m e , w'e w o u l d a r g u e t h a t to e n g a g e o n t h e t e r r a i n o f c r i m e a n d c r i m i n a l j u s t i c e , w e n e e d to r e t a i n s o m e w o r k a b l e d e f i n i ti o n o f ‘c r i m e ’. D e s c r i b i n g all i n j u r i e s a n d d e a t h s at w o r k as c r i m e s m a y h av e s o m e j u s t i f i c a t i o n , b u t it r e d u c e s o u r a p p r o a c h to c r i m e to a l ab ellin g o r a m o r a l i s i n g exercise.

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Discovering safety ‘crimes’

We do not seek to resolve the contradictions that underpin the notion of crime here (although we will say something more about those contradic­ tions in Chapter 6). The important thing for the purposes of this book is to recognise that ‘crim e’ is a term that has no settled meaning, but that it always carries an ascribed, or socially constructed meaning. We recognise that the harms that result in criminalisation are not fixed in time, but are subject to prolonged struggles over their definition and enforcement. We also recognise that the process of criminalisation is not fixed either. Thus, as we shall see in Chapters 6 and 7, we can find at different moments in his­ tory movements both to criminalise and to decriminalise safety crimes.

U s i n g official c r i m e figure s?

Despite their well-documented limitations, ‘official crime statistics’ remain p red om inan t as a ‘descriptive m e d iu m ’ (Maguire 1997: 139) in crime debates, constituting at least a starting point for almost all efforts to quan­ tify the extent of various forms of offences. The particular concern of this chapter is with the availability - or otherwise - of official data on safety crimes, that is, infractions of a legal duty placed upon an employer or a cor­ porate entity, this legal duty defined within the framework of the criminal law, most notably the Health and Safety at Work Act (HASAW Act) 1974. Even a c u r s o r y e x a m i n a t i o n o f ‘n o t i f i a b l e o f f e n c e s ’ f o r E n g l a n d a n d W a le s r ev eals t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h t h e i r f o c u s is a l m o s t ex clusiv ely u p o n ‘c o n v e n t i o n a l ’ c r i m e s . H o m e O f f i c e d a t a c o l l a t e d u n d e r t h e c a t e g o r y ‘V i o l e n c e a g a i n s t t h e p e r s o n ’ i n c l u d e s t h e f o l lo w in g c a t e g o r i e s a n d s u b ­ c a te g o r ie s o f v i o l e n t o f f e n c e s : 1

• Homicide, including: murder, premeditated and unlawful killing of another person; manslaughter, unintentional killing of another person; infanticide, intentional killing of an infant under 1-year-old by a mother suffering from post-natal depression or other post-natal disturbance. • Causing death by dangerous driving : killing a n o t h e r p e r s o n by d r i v i n g a m o t o r ve hicle d a n g e r o u s l y o n a r o a d o r in a p u b l i c place.

• Causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs: k illing a n o t h e r p e r s o n b y i n a t t e n t i v e d r i v i n g , t h e d r i v e r h a v i n g r ecen tly c o n s u m e d a l c o h o l o r d r u g s .

• Causing death by aggravated vehicle taking: k il l i n g a n o t h e r p e r s o n by d a n g e r o u s o r careless d r i v i n g o f a s to le n m o t o r v eh icle o n a r o a d o r in a p u b l i c place. • More serious wounding or other act endangering life: v icio u sly i n t e n d i n g to ca u s e g r i e v o u s b o d i l y h a r m to a n o t h e r p e r s o n .

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• Other more serious violence offences, including: attem pted murder, attem pting to kill anoth er person in a prem editated and unlawful manner; threat or conspiracy to m urder; stating an intent to kill or solicit, encourage, endeavour, or persuade som eone to do so; child destruction, intentional killing of an unborn child capable of being born alive by its mother; endangering railway passengers, placing railway pas­ sengers in danger by interfering in any way with the railway system. • Less serious wounding, including: maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, with or without a weapon’ and ‘assaulting someone and causing him or her actual bodily h arm ’; racially or religiously aggravated other wounding, ‘maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm, with or without a weapon’ and ‘assaulting someone and causing him or her actual bodily harm, where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence’; common assault (includes some m inor injury); com m on assault (no injury), ‘assaulting another person where the victim receives a minor injury or ... no injury’; racially or religiously aggravated common assault, ‘assaulting another person where the victim receives no injury and there is a racial or religious motive to the offence’; harassment, ‘putting people in fear of vio­ lence; also continual, persistent attacks causing alarm or distress’; racially or religiously aggravated harassment, ‘putting people in fear of violence; also continual, persistent attacks causing alarm or distress where there is a racial or religious motive to the offence’; possession of weapons, ‘being found in possession of an object or instrument’, and assault on a consta­ ble, ‘when a police officer is assaulted in the course of his or her duty’. Now, none of the above categories - as diverse and all-encompassing as they appear to be on first reading - include occupational injuries. One obvious category for including records of safety crimes is that covering homicide, manslaughter and violent crime. However, the crime of manslaughter in England and Wales has been legally and socially constructed in a way that renders it inapplicable to corporate offences/offenders, not least because of the centrality of mens rea (‘knowing m in d ’) to this offence (see Chapter 7). Perhaps a more fruitful source of data on safety crimes is the offence cate­ gory of manslaughter (culpable homicide in Scotland). The problems in attempting to apply this charge successfully to both the corporate entity and/or individual employers are well-known (see Slapper and Tombs 1999; Tombs and Whyte 2003a), and given that, at the time of this book going to press, at the end o f January 2007, just fourteen successful manslaughter prosecutions for safety offences have been recorded,2 such data are unlikely to make much of an impact in the relevant Home Office data column. And the sub-categories of wounding and assault might also legitimately include reference to infractions of the criminal law which resulted in injury (fatal

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D isc o v e rin g safety ‘crim e s’

o r otherw ise) to an em ployee or m em ber o f the public. Again, this is not actually the case. O ne of the m ost striking aspects o f legal - not to m ention political and academ ic - treatm ents o f violence is the general absence o f the p ro d u c tio n o f violence by c o rp o rate activities (Wells 1995; Pearce and Tombs 1992; Tombs 2006), an issue upon which we focus in C hapter 3. Despite the problem s w ith w orking with the available death and injury data (see C hap ter 2), the com plete absence o f safety crim es from m a in ­ stream crim e figures urges us to draw com parisons, no m atter how crude, between hom icides recorded in the H om e Office notifiable offences and deaths and injuries at work. First, in term s o f deaths, it is possible to co m ­ pare th e n u m b e rs o f people killed at w ork w ith th o se reco rd ed by the H om e Office as hom icides (that is, m urder, m anslaughter and infanticide). N ow , fr o m th e s e d a ta we can m a k e several o b s e r v a t i o n s . In itially it a p p ears th at on e is m o r e th an twice as likely to be a victim o f h o m ic id e in E n g lan d a n d Wales th a n to die as a result o f an acute w 'o rkplace-related in cid en t. However, against this we need to b e a r in m i n d th a t the fatality data above is for w orkers on ly - th a t is, it excludes m e m b e r s o f the public. F u rth e r, as we in d ic a te d in C h a p t e r 2, the h e a d li n e figure th a t Table 11 uses only cap tu res so m e w h e r e b etw een o n e-s ev en th to o n e -e ig h th o f the o c c u p a t i o n a l fatalities w h ic h w'e k n o w a b o u t for th e m o s t re c e n t year, 2004/05. O n th e basis o f these q u a lific a tio n s, b e in g a v ictim o f a w o rk related fatality looks m u c h m o r e likely th an being a victim o f ho m ic ide.

T ab le 11 R e p o r t e d fatal in j u ri e s to all w o r k e r s a n d rates p e r m i l l io n w o r k e rs , 1996-20053 1996/ 1997

1997/ 1998

1998/ 1999

1999/ 2000

2 00 0/ 2001

2 00 1/ 20 02

2 00 2/ 2003

2 00 3/ 2004

2004/ 2005

287 11

274 10

253 9

220 8

292 10

251 9

227 8

236 8

223 8

T ab le 12

H o m i c i d e s in E n g la n d a n d W ales , 1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 5 a n d rates o f h o m i c i d e s p e r m i l l io n p o p u l a t i o n , E n g l a n d a n d W ales , 1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 3 4

1996

1997

1997/ 1998

1998/ 1999

1999/ 2000

2000/ 2001

2 00 1/ 2002

2 00 2/ 2003 s

678 11.4

735 11.0

731 11.9

744 12.6

763 13.2

849 15.1

863 15.7

1043 19.3

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Safety Crim es

A similarly crude, but instructive, comparison can be made in terms of injuries. According to the 2003/04 British Crime Survey, there were a total of 2,780,000 violent offences in England and Wales, and 4.1 per cent of people experienced a violent incident, half of which resulted in no injury.6 Smith and Allen (2004: 1) noted that ‘The majority of violent crimes involve no significant injury to the victim and about half (51 per cent) involve no injury at all. In the 2002/03 BCS, 11 per cent resulted in medical attention from a doctor and 2 per cent in a hospital stay’. In terms of risk of violence, respondents to the 2002/03 BCS were calculated to be at a 4.1 per cent - or 41 in a thousand - risk of being a victim of violent crime (ibid.: 6). If we tu rn back to Tables 2 and 3 in Chapter 2, we can indicate some illuminating comparisons with violent crime recorded by the BCS. In terms of the injury data, we need to recall the high levels of under-report­ ing, particularly am ongst self-employed workers and particularly for m inor injuries, b ut even if we take the over three-day injury rate for all workers (that is, employees and the self-employed), we find a rate of 415.25 per 100,000 for the most recent year (2004/05). Putting this in per­ centage terms, this means that 4.15 per cent of workers have reported an injury that caused them to be absent from work for three days or more this compared to 4.1 per cent of BCS respondents citing their victimisa­ tion to violent crime. What is important here is to recall that over half of the latter incidences of violence resulted in no injury at all, and only 11 per cent resulted in any form of medical attention.7 Then, if we turn to the data in Table 2, in Chapter 2, we find the percentage of workers experienc­ ing a m ajor injury - defined by HSE as ‘fractures (except to fingers, thumbs or toes), amputations, dislocations (of shoulder, hip, knee, spine) and other injuries leading to resuscitation or 24-hour admittance to hospi­ tal’ - standing at 1 per cent (100.3 in 100,000). This can be compared with the less than 0.4 per cent of BCS respondents (11 per cent of the 4.1 per cent who experienced violence) needing medical attention. The com par­ isons are crude, unsatisfactory, beset by methodological and statistical problems, so that the exact figures are almost meaningless - but they are broadly indicative o f a rather undeniable conclusion, namely that work is more likely to be a source o f violence in Britain than those ‘real’ crimes recorded by the Home Office. The absence of safety crime data from Home Office statistics outlined above is significant in terms of the separate ontological status accorded to safety crime. The fact that the safety crime count is not published by police forces or by the government departm ent responsible for crime, but by a separate agency, reinforces the exclusion of safety crime from mainstream debates on crime. Constructing safety crime as something that has to be acted on and counted n ot by police forces, n o r by the H om e Office or Scottish Executive, b u t by regulatory agencies, reinforces the idea that

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Discovering safety ‘crimes’

safety crime is not 'real crime’. The institutional segregation of safety crimes by the state therefore has profound implications for how we think about safety crimes. Further, this means that we must look to what those agencies do if we are to discover more about how safety crime is actually defined: it is in investigative, administrative, enforcement and juridical processes that crime is recognised and defined (Alvesalo 2003a). Normally in criminal justice systems we can find a distinction made between regulatory offences and crimes o f violence. While it is important to recognise that regulatory offences are a sub-category of criminal offences, it is also important to recognise the features that distinguish them from other (mainstream) criminal offences. There are three features of the regulatory process that act upon the definition of safety crimes. First, the investigation and prosecution of safety crimes is in the remit of regulatory authorities rather than police forces. This procedural feature of safety crimes differenti­ ates those offences immediately from the mainstream criminal justice system. This has an important bearing upon how safety crimes are regarded by their perpetrators, victims, and the wider public. If the police are not involved in the investigation of safety crimes, then those crimes are less likely to be socially constructed as ‘real’ crimes. It is their enforcement by a special­ ist organisation, the HSE, that is the most important factor in distinguishing regulatory offences from other criminal offences. In England and Wales, the relatively rare investigation and prosecution of safety crimes as manslaughter (as opposed to Health and Safety at Work Act) cases involve the police in col­ laboration with the regulatory authorities. Second, this process of administrative differentiation also places responsibility for a huge number of offences in the hands of a relatively small agency. The average workplace can expect a visit approximately every 20 years (Centre for Corporate Accountability 2004: para 3.30). This limits the extent to which safety crimes can be identified and processed, since offences will generally only come to the attention of HSE inspectors during investigations, routine inspections and ‘blitzes’ (discussed below). The third feature that allows us to distinguish between regulatory crimes and crimes of violence is the way that the criminal law has developed specific procedures for dealing with safety crimes. Regulatory offences often involve the use of low level pre-court penalties or administrative notices which can be issued by inspectors on the spot (nor­ mally improvement notices and prohibition notices). This automatically creates a question about whether we can described such offences, dealt with outside the normal rules of criminal procedure, as 'crimes’. Closely related to the previous point is that regulators very often seek to deal with many of the offences they come across informally. We pick this point up later in the chap­ ter in a discussion of compliance approaches to regulation.

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Safety C rim e s

T h e g a p b e t w e e n ‘e n f o r c e a b l e ’ a n d ‘e n f o r c e d ’ c r i m e

We set o u t o u r definition o f safety crimes earlier as ‘infractions o f a legal d u ty placed u p o n an e m p lo y e r o r a c o r p o r a te entity, this legal d u ty defined w ithin the fram ew ork o f the criminal law. Yet, the p o ints m a d e in the precedin g section hig hlig h t the fact that, very often, the differential tre a tm e n t o f safety crimes - the inform al way that safety crimes are often dealt with by regulatory agencies - produces a gap b etw e en the b reac h e s o f c ri m i n a l law th a t are u n c o v e re d by the a u th o r it ie s on the o n e h a n d , a n d the b re a c h e s th a t are pro cesse d an d reco rd ed as such on the other. In de ed, it was this p o in t th at p r o m p te d Edwin Sutherland to argue for a broad definition o f white-collar crime. It is w o rth exploring this arg u m e n t in a little detail here.

In a series of papers, articles and a book published between 1940 and 1949s Sutherland developed the concept o f ‘white-collar crim e’ - ‘a crime com mitted by a person of respectability and high social status in the course o f his occupation’ (Sutherland 1983: 7). He thus challenged the stereotypi­ cal view of the criminal as typically lower class since ‘powerful business and professional m en’ also routinely com m it crim es. C rim inal acts are n ot restricted to those dealt with in crim inal courts. O ther agencies such as juvenile courts may deal w ith ‘violations o f the crim inal law’ and some offences can be dealt w ith by either crim inal courts or civil courts. Some individual white collar offenders avoid criminal prosecution because o f the class bias of the courts - although businessmen could often be charged as accessories to such crimes as bribery unlike politicians they usually escape prosecution - but more generally they are aided by ‘the power o f their class to influence the im plem entation and adm inistration of the law’. Thus the crimes of the upper and lower classes ‘differ principally in the im plem enta­ tion o f the crim inal laws that apply to them ’ (Sutherland 1940: 35-37). Given that ‘upper class’ criminals often operate undetected, that if detected they may not be prosecuted, and that if prosecuted they may not be con­ victed, Sutherland argued that the crim inally convicted are far from the closest approxim ation to the population of violators. In his 1945 article ‘Is “W hite-C ollar C rim e ” C rim e?’ Sutherland set ou t to p rod uce a m ore encom passing and abstract definition o f crime. C rim e requires the ‘legal description o f an act as socially injurious and legal p r o ­ vision o f a penalty for the act’ (Sutherland 1945: 132). Notice that while Sutherland holds on to the law in his definition o f crime, he extends rele­ vant bodies o f law beyond the crim inal law. He recognised that m an y laws which are enforced by administrative bodies th ro u g h the civil courts also regulate ac tio n s w h ich cause in ju ries to specific in d iv id u a ls o r w hich u n d e r m i n e social in s titu tio n s, and they also ro utin ely im p o se pun itiv e sanctions. Moreover, contra the view th at such acts are merely ‘technical violations and involve no m o r a l cu lp ab ility ’ in fact they arc ‘distribu ted

94

D isc o v e rin g safety ‘crim e s’

a lo n g a c o n t i n u u m in w h ic h th e m ala in se are at o n e e x tr e m e a n d the m ala p ro h ib ita at th e o t h e r ’ (ibid.: 139). T h e c o n t e n t o f laws a n d su ch legal distin ctio n s are them selves social p ro d u c ts (S u th e rla n d 1945). In o th e r w ords, S u th erlan d argues th at crim es are illegalities w hich are c o n tin g en tly differentiated from o th e r illegalities by v irtu e o f the specific a d m in is tra tiv e p ro c e d u r e s to w hich they are subject. T h e corollary o f this is th a t ‘successful’ c rim in alisatio n o f th e illegalities o f th e po w erfu l w o u ld p r e - e m p t th e m from arg u in g th at th eir illegalities are m e r e l y ‘re g u la to ry offences’, merely m ale prohibita. A n d there are persuasive a r g u m e n ts th at it m atters b o th practically a n d ideologically w h e th e r s o m e th i n g is defined as a c r i m e o r a civil offen ce: t h a t is, to be s u b j e c t to o n e r a t h e r t h a n a n o th e r set o f p ro c e d u re s has im p o r t a n t differential effects.9 S u t h e r l a n d ’s a r g u m e n t r e g a r d in g th e m o s t a p p r o p r i a t e d e f i n it io n o f c r i m e - itself essen tially an a r g u m e n t for i n c o r p o r a t i n g c o r p o r a t e a n d w hite collar offences into the stu dy o f crim e - is a detailed one, m u c h of w h ich m u s t be read alo n g s id e th e re s p o n s e s o f his critics, n o t least th e legalistic, a n d w ell-k n o w n , re sp o nse from Paul T appan (1 9 4 7 )1°. T h e re is n o t th e sp ace to fully re h e a r s e th is d e b a te h ere . M o s t f u n d a m e n t a l l y , t h o u g h , S u th e r la n d raises th e cru cial issue o f ho w th e relative p o w e r o f different social g ro u p s affects w h at b ecam e crim ina lised a n d w hen: E m b e z z l e m e n t is u su a lly th e ft fro m an e m p l o y e r by an e m p lo y ee, a n d th e e m p lo y e e is less cap a b le o f m a n i p u l a t i n g social a n d legal forces in his ow n in terest th a n is the em ployer. As m ig h t have been ex p e c te d , th e laws r e g a r d in g e m b e z z l e m e n t w ere f o r m u l a t e d lo n g b e fo r e laws for th e p r o t e c t i o n o f in v e s to rs a n d c o n s u m e r s . (S u th e rlan d 1940: 36) N o r is th e ‘m e a n i n g ’ o f law clo sed n o r s i m p l y to be read o ff fro m th e avow ed in t e n t i o n s o f legislators. T h u s he n o te s h o w th e S h e r m a n a n t i ­ t r u s t le g is la tio n , w h ile ‘e n a c t e d p r i m a r i l y b e c a u s e o f fear o f th e c o r p o r a t i o n s ’, w as m o s tl y u sed as th e b asis for c r i m i n a l p r o s e c u t i o n s against trad es u n io n s in its first th irty o r so years (S u th e rla n d 1983: 57). F u r t h e r , h e d e m o n s t r a t e d th e c o n t i n g e n t n a t u r e o f th e d i s t i n c t i o n betw een c rim in a l an d o th e r offences by tra cing the genealogy o f the laws regulating c o m p e titio n (a n titru s t), false advertising, la b o u r relations, an d in f rin g e m e n ts o f paten ts, copyrights, an d tra d e m a rk s. Each: ... has a log ical basis in th e c o m m o n law a n d is an a d a p t a t i o n o f c o m m o n law to m o d e r n social o r g a n i s a t i o n . False a d v e r t is i n g is re lated to c o m m o n - l a w f r a u d , a n d i n f r i n g e m e n t to larceny. T h e N atio n al L a b o u r Relations B oard Law, as an a tt e m p t to prev ent c o e r­ cio n , is re lated to th e c o m m o n - l a w p r o h i b i t i o n o f re s tr i c ti o n s o n

95

Safety C rim e s

freed om in the fo rm o f assault, false i m p r i s o n m e n t a n d e x to r tio n . For at least tw o cen tu ries p r i o r to the e n a c t m e n t o f the m o d e r n a n t i ­ t r u s t laws, the c o m m o n law was m o v in g again st re s tra in t o f tra d e , m o n o p o l y an d u n fair c o m p e titio n . (S u th e rla n d 1945: 133) T h u s th ere are g o o d reason s for s u s p e c tin g th a t th e dif ferential a p p lic a ­ ti o n o f law, the d e v e l o p m e n t o f d if fe re n t legal c a te g o rie s , a n d d is ti n c t e n f o r c e m e n t m odu s operandi for ‘stre e t’ a n d c o rp o r a te offen ders are n o t rooted in any intrinsic differences in the offences per se. Finally, S u th e rla n d is qu ite clear th at the differential in te rp re ta tio n an d e n fo r c e m e n t o f law against w hite-collar crim e is partially based u p o n the fact th at legislators, judges a n d a d m i n is tra t o rs w ithin the crim in al justice system are e ithe r subject to th e m aterial a n d ideological influence o f b usin e s s - p e o p le , o r s h a r e c o m m o n id e o lo g ic a l a n d / o r c u l t u r a l w o rld v ie w s (S u th e rla n d 1945: 137-8). C o n c o m ita n tly , w h en w h a t S u th e rla n d calls the ‘s t a t u s ’ o f b u s in e s s p e o p le d eclin es, so th ey b e c o m e m o r e p r o n e to the d e v e lo p m e n t o f rig o ro u s e n f o r c e m e n t o f laws d esign ed to regulate their anti-social c o n d u c t (ibid.). S u th e r la n d th e re fo re a p p r o a c h e d th e p ro b l e m s o f a c c o u n t in g for the u n d e r - e n f o r c e m e n t o f w h ite - c o ll a r c r i m e by e m p h a s i s i n g w h a t is ‘e n fo r c e a b le ’ ra t h e r th a n w h a t is actually en forced. By d o in g so he m a n ­ aged to retain a ro b u s t n o tio n o f ‘c r i m e ’ - a n d the location o f the d eath s an d in juries that can be logically described as crim e w ith in this definition - w hich allowed h im to legitim a tely ask q u e s t io n s a b o u t th e ab sen ce o f w hite-collar c rim e from m a i n s t r e a m c rim e c o n tr o l agendas. He is th e r e ­ fore d eriving his definition o f w hite-collar c rim e from the ‘g a p ’ been w hat could be enfo rced a n d w h a t actually is enforced.

E n f o r c i n g t h e la w

An alternative a p p ro a c h to S u th e r la n d ’s em p h a s is u p o n the ‘enforcea ble’ w o u ld be to link d efin ition s o f crim e m u c h m o r e closely to the crim inal, o r at least to a fo r m a l legal process. For e x a m p le , a d e fi n it io n o f safety crim es cou ld read as follow's: acts o r o m issio n s w hich are dealt w ith by a c rim in a l justice agency (i n c lu d in g reg u lato ry agencies w ith e n f o r c e m e n t pow ers) using an e n fo r c e m e n t p ro c e d u r e specified in crim in al law'. T h e use o f th e w o r d s ‘e n f o r c e m e n t p r o c e d u r e ’ is s ig n if i c a n t h e re because, as Figure 1 indicates, e n fo r c e m e n t notices issued by the UK HSE are a m u c h m o r e f r e q u e n t re s p o n s e to safety c ri m e s t h a n p r o s e c u t i o n . T h is d e fin itio n excludes b re a c h e s o f th e law th a t are dis cov ered b u t are n o t processed by crim in al justice agencies. T h e weakness o f this a p p ro a c h to safety crim e s, th e r e fo re , is t h a t it d e p e n d s u p o n th e a g e n c y ’s or, at a

96

D isc o v e rin g safety ‘crim e s’

m icro -level, the in d iv id u a l fr o n t line in s p e c to r ’s, decisio n to take actio n o r n o t a g a in s t safety c rim e s . In a given year, if e n f o r c e m e n t n o tic e s o r p ro s e c u tio n s for safety crim es are lower th a n the prev io us year, this is n o t necessarily because fewer crim es have been c o m m it te d , b u t is m o r e likely to be du e to c h a n g es in e n f o r c e m e n t practices, p rio rities, resources, an d so on. T h is certainly creates a d efin itio n a l w eakn ess, b u t the stren g th o f this a p p ro a c h is th a t it allows us to rem ain m o r e clearly w ithin th e d efin i­ tional b o u n d a r i e s o f th e crim in al justice system.

E nforcem ent data, then, m erely represent an index o f offences against health and safety legislation that have - in differing ways - been subject to processing by regulatory agencies; th at is, unlike injury data, enforcem ent data needs no reconstruction before we can speak u n p roblem atically o f safety crimes (at least on the definition of safety crimes used here). We must, however, keep in m ind the key caveat that such data may tell us less about the volume of crim e uncovered and m ore about the enforcem ent practices and p riorities of inspectorates. (O n this as a m ore general problem w ithin criminological research see Coleman and M oynihan 1996: 32-9). As we n o te above, breach es o f safety law' are m o r e likely to be m e t by th e issuing o f variou s notices ra th e r th a n p ro s e c u tio n . T h is w orks o u t at a ratio o f a r o u n d n ine ad m in is tra tiv e notices issued by all enfo rc in g a g e n ­ cies (H SE and local a u th o ritie s) to every p ro s e c u tio n , a p re tty con sistent m ea sure over th e past five years o r so. T h e figure below rep resents recent tren d s in HSE e n fo r c e m e n t activity.

F ig u re 1

C ases p r o s e c u t e d a n d n o tic e s issued by t h e UK H e a l t h a n d Safety E x e c u t i v e 11

97

Safety C r im e s

T h e first t h i n g to n o te fro m F igure 1 is th e c o n siste n tly large gap b e tw e e n e n f o r c e m e n t n o t i c e s a n d p r o s e c u t i o n s . N o t i c e s t e n d to be is s u e d fo r lesser, b u t h a r d l y n o n - s e r i o u s offences, as th e fo llo w in g q u o t a t i o n , fro m th e m o s t re ce n t H SE O ffe nce s a n d P enalties r e p o r t m a k e s clear: A p r o p o r t i o n a t e a p p r o a c h is ta k e n to an y b re a c h e s , so in less se rio u s cases, th e i n s p e c t o r will e x pla in h o w th e d u t y h o l d e r is n o t c o m p l y ­ ing w ith th e law a n d ad vise t h e m h o w to p u t th e p r o b l e m r i g h t ... W here the breach o f the law is m o re serious, th e in s p e c to r m a y serve a n o ti c e to th e d u t y h o ld e r . ( H e a l t h a n d S afety E xe cu tiv e 2005: 4 - 5 , e m p h a s is a d d e d ) T h r e e t y p e s o f n o t i c e m a y b e is s u e d . A n i m p r o v e m e n t n o t i c e r e q u i r e s b r e a c h e s (o f fe n c e s) to b e r e m e d i e d w i t h i n a sp e c ifie d p e r i o d o f ti m e ; a deferred proh ibition n o tic e is an o r d e r t h a t a c e rta in piece o f p l a n t o r type o f w o r k a c ti v it y will be s h u t dow 'n u n le s s a b r e a c h is r e c tif ie d w i t h i n a s p e c i f ie d p e r i o d ; an i m m e d i a t e p r o h i b i t i o n n o t i c e - th e m o s t s e r i o u s e n f o r c e m e n t o r d e r - effects an i m m e d i a t e c lo s u re o f a w o r k s i te , p a r t o f th a t w o rk site , o r p a r t ic u l a r w o r k p ro c es s u n til a c o m p a n y c o m p lie s w ith legislation o f w h ic h it is in b re ach . O n th e b a sis o f th e a b o v e , t h e n , let a l o n e in t e r m s o f w h a t we k n o w q u a lita tiv e ly a b o u t h o w in s p e c to r s actu a lly e n fo r c e th e law (see C h a p t e r 7) - t h a t is, o n th e basis o f a gen eral re lu c ta n c e to use any k in d o f fo r m a l e n f o r c e m e n t a c t i o n - it is clear, t h e n , t h a t th e to t a l n u m b e r o f n o ti c e s is sued in any o n e year d o e s p ro v i d e a m i n i m a l in d i c a ti o n o f th e n u m b e r s o f safety c ri m e s for t h a t p e ri o d . 14000 12000 10000

8000 6000 4000 2000

0

Figure 2 98

T o ta l e n f o r c e m e n t n o t i c e s i s s u e d by U K a u t h o r i t i e s 12

D isc o v e rin g safety ‘crim e s’

Now, again to be clear, these data tell us som ething about enforcem ent but, certainly on a year by year basis, are n o t indicative o f the scale o f safety offending. T hat is, they tell us less about the num bers o f offences encoun­ tered by in sp ecto rs, m u ch m o re a b o u t changes in en fo rce m en t policy, resources, year-on-year priorities, and so on. R e tu rn in g to Figure 1, the second thin g to n o te from this g ra p h is the recent steep decline in b o th e n fo r c e m e n t notices issued, a n d p ro s e c u tio n s laid by, th e H S E . We c a n t h u s o b s e r v e a r e d u c t i o n o f 42 p e r c e n t in e n f o r c e m e n t no tices issued over th e m o s t rece n t five years a n d an even steeper r e d u c tio n o f 49 p er cent in pro se cu tio n s.

P r o s e c u t in g safety c r im e

W h a t m a k e s th is d e c lin e even m o r e s t r ik i n g is t h a t it s h o u l d be read w ith in the c o n te x t o f h istorically low a b so lu te n u m b e r s o f p r o s e c u tio n s tak en . T h is m u c h is in d ic a te d b y th e d a ta p r e s e n te d in Table 13 below , w hich c o m p a r e s p r o s e c u tio n data for n in e years from 1975, ro u g h ly the p e r i o d since th e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f H S C / E 13 - w ith th e n in e y e a r s ’ d a ta betw een 1996/97 an d 2004/05. T ab le 13 Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

P r o s e c u t i o n s by i n s p e c t o r a t e s , 1 9 7 5 - 1 9 8 3 a n d 1 9 9 6 / 9 7 - 2 0 0 4 / 0 5 14 HSC/F,

LA

Total

Year

HSE

I.A

Total

1588 1327 1623 1671 1373 1443 1260 1427 1366

78 106 97 335 211 307 291 296 261

1666 1433 1720 2006 1584 1750 1551 1723 1627

1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999 /2 0 00 2 000/01 2 0 0 1 /0 2 2 00 2 /0 3 20 03 /0 4 2 00 4 /0 5

1490 1627 1759 2115 1973 1986 1659 1720 1320

n/a 506 424 412 401 350 330 410 332

n/a 2133 2183 2527 2374 2336 1989 2130 1652

It is clear that there is a slightly higher level o f prosecutorial activity in the second than in the first period, notw ithstanding the sharp drop in the m ost recent year for which confirm ed data is available (2004/05). W hat is im p o r­ tan t for us here, however, is that we find across the years 1975-2005 b o th relatively consistent and absolutely low num bers of total prosecutions. This rough consistency that Table 13 points to in the two periods is even m ore rem arkable w hen one considers changes in a whole range o f relevant variables across that 30-year period. These include, in no order o f priority:

99

Safety C rim e s

• d r a m a t i c c h a n g e s in th e m a c r o - p o l iti c a l clim a te , from th e e s t a b li s h ­ m e n t o f H S C /E d u r i n g th e h i g h - p o i n t o f c o r p o r a t i s m , t h r o u g h th e laissez-faire e c o n o m ic s o f T h a tc h e r is m , to the c o n t e m p o r a r y a n tip a th y to any regu latio n o f business on the p a r t o f New L abour; • w aves o f b o t h r e s o u rc e r e t r e n c h m e n t a n d p e r i o d s o f in c r e a s e d resources; • v ario us shifts in e n fo r c e m e n t priorities; • s i g n ifi c a n t c h a n g e s in th e e c o n o m i c s t r u c t u r e , n o t a b l y a shift fro m m a n u f a c t u r i n g to se rv ices, as well as a m u s h r o o m i n g of, a n d h ig h t u r n o v e r a m o n g , sm all businesses; • a massive g ro w th o f se lf-em p lo y m en t; • ch an g es in e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e , m e a n i n g th a t this 3 0-ye ar p e rio d has w itnessed several bu siness cycles; • c h a n g e s in th e o r g a n i s a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n , s u m m e d u p by m a n y in term s o f ‘P o st-F o rd ism ’; • an in c r e a s e in th e a b s o l u te v o l u m e o f law to be e n f o r c e d , m u c h o f w hich has been E U -in sp ired. If n o t h i n g else, the above data p o in ts to the e n d u r i n g sta tus o f p r o s e c u ­ tion as the ‘last r e s o r t’ for reg u lato rs (H a w k in s 2002). If th ere is a m o r e recent decline, this is likely to be a result o f th e re-assertion o f a concerted p o lic y o f d e - r e g u l a t i o n o n th e p a r t o f th e L a b o u r g o v e r n m e n t t h a t is b e g in n i n g to u n d e r m i n e HSE e n f o r c e m e n t s trate g y u n d e r in te n sify in g b u d g e ta r y pressures (a n d we will discuss this in m o r e detail in C h a p te r 7). T h e way th a t safety crim es are processed before they are con sid ered for p r o s e c u tio n is crucial to u n d e r s t a n d i n g rates o f p ro s e c u tio n . R egulators generally d o n o t investigate o r re s p o n d form ally to all b reaches o f the law. Just as w h e n a c rim e is re p o r te d to the police, at so m e p o in t there will be a d e c is io n ta k e n by th e r e g u l a t o r a b o u t w h e t h e r a r e p o r t e d i n c i d e n t is w'orth taking action over o r n o t. As we have already seen in this chapter, m o s t safety crim es in the UK, if they are acted u p o n in the first place, are dealt w ith using a d m in is trativ e notices. In o th e r w ords, w here inspecto rs o p t for fo r m a l e n f o r c e m e n t m e a s u re s, these te n d o v e rw h e lm in g ly to be p ro c e d u re s th a t fall s h o r t o f p ro s e c u tio n . Ind eed , in all categories, in c l u d ­ ing the m o s t serious in juries a n d d eaths, only a m i n o rity o f cases end up being p ro s ecu ted in the courts.

100

Discovering safety ‘crimes’

Figure 3

HSE p r o s e c u t i o n s a n d c o n v c t i o n s 13

F i g u r e 3 d e m o n s t r a t e s a p a r a l l e l d e c l i n e in p r o s e c u t i o n s t a k e n by H S E a n d c o n v i c t i o n s fo r h e a l t h a n d sa fe ty o ffen c es in t h e c o u r t s .

According to HSC enforcement policy, prosecutions are used where there is 'sufficient evidence to provide a realistic case of prosecution.’ (ibid.: 12). Official policy statements such as this, however, mask the complexities of the prosecution process. Indeed, it is clear that the proportion of prosecutions to recorded injuries is very low indeed. To get an idea of this, we can set the total number of prosecutions, 652, against the level of recorded injuries for the same year, as set out in Tables 2-5, in Chapter 2. There we noted that for 2004/05, there were 593 fatalities to workers and mem bers of the public, 31,702 major injuries to employees, 122,922 over three-day injuries to employees, and 14,316 non-fatal injuries to members of the public reported, even allowing for the various elements of under-reporting that were dis­ cussed. Thus, the ratio of total prosecutions to recorded injuries of varying severity (169,533 in total) is just in excess of 1:100.16 If, as we argue in Chapter 2, that some two-thirds of injuries sustained in relation to work can be defined as 'crimes’ then the ratio of prosecutions to recorded criminal injury appears very low indeed.17 F o r m a l e n f o r c e m e n t d a t a t h e r e f o r e r e c o r d o n l y a tin y p r o p o r t i o n o f an as y et u n q u a n t i f i a b l e level o f s a f e t y o f f e n c e s . T h e b e s t t h a t c a n b e sa id r e g a r d i n g t h e e x t e n t o f sa fe ty c r i m e s o n t h e b a s is o f o f fe n c e d a t a is t h a t t h e l a tte r p r o v i d e s an a b s o l u te ly m i n i m a l i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e v o l u m e o f th e

101

Safety C rim e s

former. These data can therefore really only get us closer to u nd erstan d in g w hat the HSE do, as o pposed to estim ating the scale o f safety crimes. Low prosecution rates are to some extent driven by low detection. Thus, for example, som e reported deaths are still n o t investigated, despite a HSE co m m itm en t to investigate all work-related fatalities. According to one analy­ sis by the Centre for Corporate Accountability (CCA), in the five-year period 1996/97-2000/01,75 worker deaths and 212 deaths to mem bers o f the public were n ot investigated (Unison/Centre for Corporate Accountability 2002). In cases o f the m o st serious o f n on-fatal injuries, defined as ‘m ajo r in juries’, between 1996/7 an d 2000/01, the percentage investigated alm ost dou bled from 11 per cent to 19 p er cent, with an increase in the actual n u m b e r of m ajor injuries investigated from 2,532 to 4,335; however, this increase still m e a n t that, in 2000/01, 81 per cent o f m ajor injuries were n o t investigated. Indeed, looking at the whole five-year period, som e o f the injuries to the m o st vulnerable workers rem ained un-investigated: there was no investiga­ tion into 905 of the 1,144 reported major injuries to trainees, or into 126 of the 164 injuries to those involved in w o rk experience. Moreover, still by 2000/01, som e o f the m o s t serious a m o n g the m a jo r injuries were n o t investigated, including: 72 ‘asphyxiations’ (44 per cent o f the total), 31 ‘elec­ trical shocks’ (35 per cent o f the total), 333 ‘b u rn s’ (57 per cent o f the total) and 418 ‘am pu tation s’ (41 per cent o f the total; ibid.). In short, most safety crimes - including m a n y o f the m ost serious crimes - rem ain undetected and outside the radar o f the criminal justice system. T his ev ide nc e also p o in t s clearly to a c o n s id e ra b le v a ria tio n in the chances o f an incident being prosecuted across industry, region and type o f incident. The research cited above fou nd th at 67 per cent o f deaths of workers were prosecuted in 1998/99 c om p ared with 11 per cent o f m ajor injuries. The large variation o f prosecution across sectors is indicated by the finding th at in the m a n u f a c tu r in g and c o n stru ctio n industry, 12 per cent o f m ajo r injuries that were investigated were prosecuted. In agricul­ ture, the com p arab le rate was 7 per cent and in the extraction industries (including the oil an d gas in du stry), it was 3 per cent. The rep o rt fo und m ajo r discrepancies across regions. In Wales, for example, 20 per cent of m a jo r injuries were pro secuted , and in the West M id lan ds, the rate was 6 per cent. A lth ou gh o u r concern here is with safety crim es ra th er than the m uch larger figure o f occupational illness and ill health (see C hapter 1), it is w o rth n o tin g th at only 1 per cent o f in d u s trial diseases investi­ gated by HSE were pro secu ted .18 T hose v ariations im m ed iately alert us to the central role that the d is­ cretion o f the inspector and the pro secuto r has in those cases. In England a n d Wales the d ecisio n to p ro s e c u te (w ith the exc eption o f c o r p o r a te m an slaughter cases where the decision rests with the Crow n Prosecution

102

D isco ve rin g safety ‘crim es’

Service) is norm ally m ad e by the HSE. In Scotland, the decision is made by the P r o c u r a t o r Fiscal after c o n s id e rin g the ev id enc e from an HSE investigation. HSE data set o u t in Table 14 below highlights starkly how this discretion can result in a variation o f prosecution rates over time. It is rarely the case that the failure to prosecute is merely d ow n to insuf­ ficient evidence. It is the under-investigation o f safety crimes and the lack o f resources d ed icated to insp ectio n th a t are the key factors in keeping detec tio n rates low. It is likely, th en, th at the very recent fall in rates of prosecution that we can see in Table 14 is directly related to a recent fall in inspection. As O ’Neill (2006) has noted, the rate o f inspection in the Field O p era tio n s Division o f the HSE (the largest division in the inspectorate and one with comparatively high average rates o f inspection) has reduced dram atica lly so that prem ises th a t could have expected on average one inspection every 6.99 years in 2001/02 could only expect one inspection per 10.84 years in 2004/05. The data here indicates how a shift in prosecutorial decisions can p r o ­ duce d ram atic changes - here, a decline - in absolute n u m b e r s and in the p r o p o r tio n o f fatalities that result in a prosecution. T ab le 14

Fatalities resulting in prosecution in the UK19

Year o f fatality

2000/01 20 01/02 20 02/03

Fatalities re p o rt e d to HSE

N u m b e r o f offe nders p r o secu ted

% Fatalities resu lting in p r o s e c u tio n

350 278 256

149 85 68

43 31 27

At this point, it is im portant to recall our discussion in Chapter 2, where it was shown that the actual num ber of fatalities caused by working is seven to eight tim es the num ber o f fatalities reported to HSE. Given th at very few of the fatalities that are in this revised figure are likely to be subject to prosecution, the ‘real’, underlying rate of fatalities resulting in prosecution is likely to be m uch lower than the figures in Table 14 indicate.

E s t im a t in g safety c r im e

If this discussion indicates that, due to und er-record ing , under-investigation and u nd er-en fo rc em en t, it is alm ost impossible to estim ate the scale o f offending in any complete sense, then an app roach is to a tte m p t to esti­ m ate the p r o p o r tio n o f injuries and deaths (discussed in C h apter 2) that m ig h t be defined as ‘c r i m e s ’. G iven the acute p ro b le m s w ith reco rd in g

103

Safety C rim e s

i n j u r i e s also d is c u s s e d also in C h a p t e r 2, o u r m o s t r o b u s t , alb e it still hopelessly i n c o m p lete, m eas u re o f safety crim es is fatality data. At least we k n o w p r e t ty a c c u ra te ly w h ic h fatalities are i n c l u d e d in th e figures a n d w hich are ex clud ed. Using this d a ta as a ba se line allows us to say so m e­ thing a b o u t the p r o p o r tio n o f HSE recorded fatal in juries w hich m ig h t be th e result o f safety crimes. First, th e r e are th r e e ty p e s o f q u a s i - 'o f f i c ia l’ e v id e n c e n o w available w hich allow so m e - albeit tentativ e - c o n c lu s io n s o n the v o lu m e o f this m o s t egregious form o f safety crim e, nam ely: a series o f special investiga­ ti o n s in to g r o u p s o f fatalities u n d e r t a k e n b y H SE in th e 1980s; a n o w co nsid erable stock o f C o m m is s io n s o f In q u iry into a w hole series o f d is­ a sters t h a t o c c u r r e d in th e U K; a n d a series o f (H S E ) A c c id e n t In vestig ation R ep o rts, c o m p r is i n g o n e - o f f b u t h ig h ly d etailed e x a m i n a ­ ti on s o f p a rtic u la r incidents. T hese have been discussed elsewhere (T o m bs 1999b: 8 0 - 2 ) , suffice to say here th a t each a tte m p ts to locate responsibility for in ju rie s a n d in c id e n ts , a n d the focus o f each is m a i n ly o n fatalities. T h e data presen ted in th ose v ariou s sources ten d s to th e con clu sio n that in the clear m a jo rity o f cases o f w ork pla ce fatalities - in so m e tw o o u t o f three fatal injuries - th ere is at least p r i m a facie evidence o f violations o f d u tie s placed u p o n e m p lo y e rs by th e HASAW Act, a n d th u s at th e very least a c rim in a l case to answer. This general co n c lu sio n - based u p o n evi­ den ce ind icatin g a tt ri b u ti o n o f responsibility for the fatalities in q u estio n - also h olds in the case o f dea th s at w o rk whilst driving, w ith em plo yers failing to m e e t th eir legal d u ties to p ro v id e safe systems o f w o rk , a n d to red uc e risks 'so far as is reason ably p ra c ticab le ’, w here they are re q u irin g e m p l o y e e s to d riv e as p a r t o f th e i r e m p l o y m e n t . Key ca u sa l fa c to rs in fatalities include: the failure to co n sid er safer, alternative m e a n s o f t r a n s ­ p o r t o r in dee d routes; the setting o f unsafe schedules, jo u r n e y tim es and d is ta n c e s; failures to m a i n t a i n vehicles a d e q u a te ly ; failures to invest in vehicles w ith a d d itio n a l safety features; a n d the lack o f specialised t r a i n ­ ing o n o ffer fo r r e g u l a r d riv e rs (RoSPA 1998; see also C a m p b e l l 2005, Trades U n io n C ongress 2005b).

To the above quasi-official evidence we m ight add a growing weight of academic research which attests to the fact that workplace deaths m ight use­ fully be explored as crimes, even in the absence o f any legal process. While there has been relatively little attention to corporate crim e in general within British crim inology, the w ork th a t has been developed has often taken health and safety offences against employees as its focus.20 W ithin this it is possible to discern w ork which provides an indication o f the scale o f such offending, though n o t in any com plete quantifiable sense. M uch o f this work takes the form o f case studies which re-create sociologically specific cases which were not dealt with adequately via the crim inal justice system.

104

D isc o v e rin g safety ‘crim e s’

T h u s w o rk by B erg m an (1991, 1993, 1994), C a rso n (1982), Pearce an d T o m b s (1 9 93 , 1997 ), T o m b s (1 9 9 5 , 1996 ), T o m b s a n d W h y te (1 9 9 8 ), S lap p e r (1 99 3 ), W o olfso n et al. (1 99 6 ), W o o lfso n a n d Beck (1 99 7 ), an d W h yte (1 999a), for exam ple, has all taken so m e aspect o f safety c rim e as o n e fo cu s, a n d all a tt e s t to th e fact t h a t th e a c tu a l level o f c o r p o r a t e o ffen din g n o t on ly far o utw e igh s th a t recognised by official data, b u t is in so m e generalised sense c o m p a r a b le to co n v en tio n a l offending. Exc eption al w ith in this t r a d it io n are th e few a t t e m p t s to re-analyse a series o f d e a th s th a t have been p roce sse d (or n o t) t h r o u g h the c rim in a l justice system. N otable h ere is the w o rk o f David B erg m an an d th e w ork o f G a ry Slapper. B ergm an (1991, 1994) re-analysed a su bset o f w orkplace deaths, b o th in te r m s o f th eir causes a n d also by exp loring the actual legal processes th a t did or did n o t follow each o f th e m - w ith p a rtic u la r refer­ ence to the te n d e n c y o f th e ‘n e a r o p a q u e filte r’ o f th e HSE ‘p re v e n t in g th e s e cases fr o m ever r e a c h i n g th e C P S ’s o v e r - c a u t i o u s s c r u t i n y ’ (B e r g m a n 1994: 2). T h u s , h is r e - a n a ly s is o f 28 d e a t h s in th e W est M id la n d s b etw een 1988 a nd 1992 co n c lu d e d that: F o u r s h o u l d have r e s u lte d in a m a n s l a u g h t e r p r o s e c u t i o n . Seven s h o u ld have b een referred to the police for a c rim in a l investigation a n d s u b s e q u e n t l y to th e C r o w n P r o s e c u t i o n Service. E ig h t w ere in ade qu a tely investigated by the e n fo r c e m e n t au th o ritie s a n d req uire f u r t h e r in v e s ti g a ti o n . Five s h o u l d h av e r e s u lte d in a p r o s e c u t i o n u n d e r health a n d safety law. (B e rg m an 1994: 90) In only fo u r o f the 28 cases was th e legal process fo u n d ad equ ate. T h e only c o m p a r a b le w o rk to th a t o f B erg m an is S la p p e r’s Blood in the B a n k , w h ic h is based a r o u n d a d e taile d analysis o f 40 cases o f d e a th at w ork, following these th r o u g h the in q u e st process.21 For the record, juries r e t u r n e d verdicts o f ‘a cc id e n ta l d e a t h ’ in 33 o f these cases a n d d e a th by ‘m i s a d v e n t u r e ’ in a n o t h e r five. T h u s th e r e was an essentially c o m m o n finding in 38 o f the 40 cases, or in 95 per cent o f them - a figure c o n s id e r­ ably h ig h e r th an th at for verdicts in all inq uests (th a t is, for all suspicious deaths, dea ths in custody, an d so o n ), w h ere the eq uiv alen t figure is ab o u t 48 per cent (Slapper 2000: 98) - th at dea ths were caused b y ‘ac cid en ts’ or ‘m i s a d v e n t u r e ’. O f th e r e m a i n i n g tw o cases, o n e saw a n o p e n v e rd ic t r e t u r n e d , w h ile in th e o th e r , d e a th w as f o u n d to be th e re s u lt o f ‘th e b re a k d o w n o f safety p ro c e d u re s a n d lack o f su p e r v isio n ’. T he responsible c o m p a n y - British Gas - was fined £2,000 in this case, follow ing a HSE p ro s e c u tio n u n d e r health a n d safety law (ibid.: 2 4 2 -3 ) . Such p ro s e c u tio n s - th a t is, for b reach es o f h ealth an d safety law - followed in 13 o f the 40 cases e x a m i n e d in S l a p p e r ’s b o o k . All w e re su ccessfu l a n d re s u lte d in

105

Safety C rim e s

fi n e s , r a n g i n g f r o m £ 5 0 0 t o £ 5 0 , 0 0 0 . T e n o f t h e 13 f i n e s i m p o s e d w e r e for £ 10 ,0 0 0 o r u n d e r. T h r o u g h his re-a n aly sis o f these d e a th s , S la p p e r arg u es t h a t in 24 o f t h e 4 0 c a s e s , d e a t h s w e r e a t t r i b u t a b l e to:

the pressures o f the profit driven economy. Thus, the w ork practice being used, the disregard for safety e q u ip m e n t o r training, were the result n o t o f ignorance b ut o f unwillingness or inability to pay the nec­ essary extra in order to ensure th at the w ork would be safe, (ibid.: 164) S u c h a c o n c l u s i o n i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e m i g h t b e a f a r h i g h e r lev el o f c r i m i ­ n a l c u l p a b i l i t y t h a n is i n d i c a t e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t , t o d a t e , t h e r e h a v e o n l y e v e r b e e n 14 s u c c e s s f u l p r o s e c u t i o n s f o r c o r p o r a t e m a n s l a u g h t e r f o l l o w ­ i n g a w o r k p l a c e d e a t h in E n g l a n d a n d W a l e s , a n d n o e q u i v a l e n t c o r p o r a t e h o m i c i d e c a s e s in S c o t l a n d . T h e e v i d e n c e d o c u m e n t e d in t h i s s e c t i o n r e i n f o r c e s t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f r e t a i n i n g S u t h e r l a n d ’s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t is e n f o r c e a b l e a n d w h a t is e n f o r c e d . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e S l a p p e r a n d B e r g m a n s t u d i e s d i s c u s s e d h e r e a t t e m p t t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e sc a l e o f s a f e t y c r i m e w h i l s t b e i n g g u i d e d c a r e f u l l y b y a p r e c i s e le g a l r e a s o n i n g : t h e u n - e n f o r c e d c r i m e s h i g h l i g h t e d b y t h o s e a u t h o r s a r e o n l y d e f i n e d as c r i m e s w i t h c l o s e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e c r i m i n a l law . S o , e v e n s t a y i n g w i t h i n t h e s t r i c t p a r a m e t e r s o f c r i m i n a l l e g a l r e a s o n i n g , t h e c o n c l u s i o n is t h a t m o s t o f t h e d e a t h s a n a l y s e d c a n b e r e g a r d e d as s a f e t y c r i m e s .

C o n clu sio n

In previous chapters we have d em on strated , first, that there are significant nu m b e rs o f deaths and injuries caused by w orking and, second, that these are m isu n d e rsto o d if cast as ‘accidents’. In this chapter, we have arrived at so m e sense o f the scale o f offending related to these deaths a nd injuries, that is, to discover the extent o f safety crimes. From this exercise, we can draw several conclusions. First, that the scale of such offending is not captured in ‘official’ crime statistics - if safety offences are crimes then these are separated ou t from the ‘real’ crimes recorded by the H o m e Office. Second, this separation o f safety (and, m ore generally, m ost corporate) crimes from real crimes is subject to historical dispute, and having im portant contem porary resonances, remains central to debates around, and obstacles to furthering, safety crimes as a legitimate area o f criminological study. Third, we foun d that in this area (as in m any others), studies o f the activities o f enforcement bodies did not produce reliable estimates o f crime per se.

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T h a t said, we have also insisted th a t th e re is e n o u g h available evidence q u a n tita tiv e a n d q ua lita tiv e - to justify several f u r t h e r c o n c lu s io n s. M o st fund am entally , we have a rg u e d th at b e in g a v ictim o f w o rk place violence is m o r e likely t h a n b eing a v ic tim o f ‘c o n v e n tio n a l’ violence. But if th e re is a significant c rim e p ro b le m here, o n e at least c o m p a ra b le w ith the crim es o f violence u p o n w h ic h th e c rim in a l justice system, its political m asters, a n d in d e e d c rim in o lo g ists focus th e ir o v e rw h e lm in g a tte n tio n , it re m a in s rela­ tively invisible. T h u s, political a n d p o p u l a r d iscussions o f c rim e in general, a n d c rim e s o f violen ce in p artic u la r, d o n o t in c lu d e safety crim es. A n d at th e sam e tim e, as th e p re v io u s c h a p te r indicated, w h e n we talk a b o u t w o r k ­ place injuries, it is n o t to invoke c rim e o r violence, b u t to im p ly a lm o s t the op po site: n a m e ly th a t these injuries are s o m e h o w ‘a c c id e n ts’, to th e e xtent th a t the latter te rm s re m a in p r e d o m i n a n t in academ ic, policy a n d p o p u la r discourse for referrin g to those p h e n o m e n a w ith w h ic h this c h a p te r in p a r ­ ticular, a n d this b o o k in general, is con cerned . If w e h a v e e s ta b lis h e d th u s far th a t o c c u p a tio n a l d e a th a n d in ju r y r e p ­ r e s e n t a s ig n ific a n t, y e t m y s tifie d o r o b s c u r e d , c r im e p r o b le m , th e n a key, r e m a in in g a im o f th e te x t is to c o n s id e r h o w th is c r im e p r o b le m m ig h t be r e c o n s tr u c te d t h r o u g h law a n d th e c r im in a l ju s t ic e s y s te m . A n d it is to th e s e ta sk s th a t th e b o o k n o w tu r n s as a b a sis f o r c o n s id e r in g th e re f o rm in th e tr e a t m e n t a n d p e r c e p tio n o f su c h c rim e s .

Notes 1

F o r t h e s a k e o f c o m p l e t e n e s s , also l i s t e d a r e a s e r i e s o f o f f e n c e s u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g ‘O t h e r ’, i n c l u d i n g e n d a n g e r i n g life at sea, c r u e l t y to o r n e g l e c t o f c h i l d r e n , a b a n d o n i n g a child u n d e r t w o y ears, ch ild a b d u c t i o n , p r o c u r i n g illegal a b o r t i o n a n d c o n c e a l m e n t o f b i r t h . See w w w . c r i m e s t a t i s t i c s . o r g . u k / o u t p u t / P a g e 7 8 . a s p .

2

T h o s e f i g u r e s a r c n o t m a d e p u b l i c in o f f i c i a l d a t a s o u r c e s . T h e f i g u r e s w e u s e a r c d erived

from

the

m o n ito rin g

w ork

of

CCA

(see

h ttp ://w w w .c o rp o ra te

a cco u n ta b ility .o rg /m a n sla u g h te r/c a se s/c o n v ic tio n s.h tm ). 3

T h i s t a b l e is a d a p t e d f r o m T ab le 5, C h a p t e r 2. T h e a b s o l u t e n u m b e r s ar e n o t w h o l l y c o m p a t i b l e in t h e se nse t h a t H S E d a t a c o v e r s S c o t l a n d also. H o w e v e r , t h e k ey p o i n t o f t h e c o m p a r i s o n is w i t h r e g a r d to rates.

4

In a n y o n e year, s o m e o f t h e cases initially r e c o r d e d as h o m o c i d e b y t h e p o lice will be r e o m o v e d f r o m t h e s e r e c o r d s as t h e p o l i c e o r c o u r t s s u b s e q u e n t l y d e t e r m i n e t h a t n o h o m i c i d e h a s t a k e n p l a c e (see C o t t o n 2 0 0 4 : 4 ). F o r t h e p u r p o s e s o f t h e s e t a b l e s , t h e h i g h e r - i.e. o r i g i n a l - fig u re h a s b e e n r e t a i n e d .

5

T h i s fig ure i n c l u d e s t h e 172 r e c o r d e d v i c t i m s o f D r H a r o l d S h i p m a n .

6

h ttp ://w w w .c rim e sta tistic s .o rg .u k /o u tp u t/P a g e 6 3 .a sp .

7

As S m i t h a n d A l l e n n o t e , ‘t h i s is n o t t o s u g g e s t t h a t w o r r y a b o u t v i o l e n t c r i m e is u n j u s t i f i e d ’ ( S m i t h a n d A llen 2 00 4: 1). T h e p o i n t is m a d e h e r e fo r sake o f a c r u d e b u t , in o u r view, h ig h l y i n s t r u c t i v e c o m p a r i s o n .

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8 9

10

11 12 13 14 15 16

T he original year o f p u b licatio n o f S u th e rla n d ’s classic text W h ite-C o lla r Crime, n o t to be published in its full, ‘u n c u t’ version, u n til 1983; see Geis an d G off 1983: x -x i. It is in such a c o n te x t th a t D avid N elken h as re m in d e d us th a t ‘th e to p ic o f w h itecollar crim e illustrates the possibility o f divergence betw een legal, social an d political defin itio n s o f crim in ality - b u t in so d oing it rem in d s us o f the artificiality o f all d efi­ n itio n s o f c rim e’ (N elken 1994: 366). For a detailed discussion o f the debate betw een S u th erlan d an d T appan, an d th e sig­ n ific a n t im p lic a tio n s o f th e ir c o n tra stin g p o sitio n s for tre a tin g ‘c o rp o ra te c rim e ’ as crim e, see Pearce and Tom bs 1998: 83-124. T he source for this data is H ealth and Safety C o m m issio n (2006a) 2005/2006 data are provisional. Based u p o n d ata deriv ed from H ea lth an d Safety E xecutive (2005) an d H ea lth an d Safety C o m m issio n (2006a). 2005/2006 data are p ro v isio n al (p ). H SC was established by the HASAW Act 1974, w hile the HSE, as an am alg a m a tio n o f existing in spectorates, form ally cam e into being on January 1, 1975. Source o f d ata for 1975-1983 is D aw son et a l 1988: 228. Source o f data is H ealth and Safety C om m ission (2006a) 2005/2006 data are provisional. T his is indicative only. For th e m o st p art, it is n o t possible to refer to th e p ercentage o f injuries w hich result in a p ro sec u tio n , since any p ro secu tio n arising from an in ju ry is likely to take place in a su b se q u en t year to th a t in w hich th e in ju ry itself is recorded, w hile HSE does n o t g enerally m ake available raw d ata w ith w hich to trace th ro u g h th e se lin k ag es. H ow ever, see th e CCA ’s an aly sis o f p ro s e c u tio n s fo llo w in g d e a th s, m a jo r in ju rie s , a n d o th e r c a te g o rie s o f in c id e n ts (U n iso n C e n tre fo r C o rp o ra te A ccountability 2002). HSE has since begun to p resen t rates o f p ro sec u tio n s follow ing investigated w orkplace deaths.

17 We sh o u ld add a provisos here: w hile these data cover safety a n d health offences, the data are still utilisable for us since we know th a t h ealth offences are far less likely to resu lt in p ro se c u tio n . For ex am p le, a CCA analysis o f all HSE p ro s e c u tio n s fo r th e th ree years 1 9 9 6/97-1998/99 fo u n d th a t th ere w ere o nly 11 p ro sec u tio n s in to ta l for breaches involving o cc u p atio n al health (cited in Tom bs 2004: 172). O n this basis, it is likely th a t th e o v erw h e lm in g m a jo rity o f th e cases th a t reach c o u rt relate to safety ra th e r th a n h ealth offences. Sim ilarly, th e above p o in ts do n o t in c lu d e referen ce to d a n g e ro u s o c c u re n c e s, re sp o n d in g to w h ich a p p e a rs to be cru c ial to p re v e n tio n in H SE ’s ow n term s, and those o f th e R obens system o f self-reg u latio n (see C h a p te r 7). T he sam e CCA analysis referred to above fo u n d th a t in th e th ree -y e ar p erio d u n d e r e x a m in a tio n , less th an 4 per cent (39 recorded d an g ero u s o ccurences o f a total o f 927) resulted in a p ro sec u tio n (ibid.). 18 All fig u res cited h ere are fro m 1998/99. T h e full an aly sis can be fo u n d in U n iso n /C en tre for C o rp o rate A ccountability (2002). 19 Source o f d ata is H ealth and Safety Executive (2005). 20 T h e re is no sim p le e x p la n a tio n for th is, b u t so m e p la u sib le e le m e n ts o f o n e; see Slapper and T om bs 1999: 4 5 -6 . 21 A su m m a ry o f the cases is included in an ap p e n d ix (S lapper 2000: 2 4 0 -6 8 ).

108

Chapter 5

Differentiating safety crime from ‘real’ crime in law

In tro d u c tio n

H o w have safety crim es develop ed in relation to the m a in stre a m crim inal legal process? T h is is the first o f tw o c h a p te rs th a t focuses u p o n v a rio u s d im e n s i o n s o f this q u estio n . This c h a p te r discusses th e way in w h ich the law h as s o u g h t to de al w ith safety c rim e s , o n o n e h a n d as ‘r e g u l a t o r y ’ offences, a n d o n the other, as ‘crim es o f v io len ce’. T h e qu estio n o f ho w the c ri m i n a l legal p roc ess deals w ith safety c rim e s im m e d i a te l y raises q u e s ­ ti on s o f power. In n in e t e e n th - c e n tu r y Britain, th e very first crim in a l laws th a t were i n t r o d u c e d to p ro te c t w o rk e rs fro m un safe w o rk in g p ractices, th e F a cto ries Acts, p ro v e d d ifficult to i m p l e m e n t b e c a u s e o f th e s t a te ’s in s titu tio n al failure to im p o se c rim in a l status on m e m b e r s o f the w ealthy class o f fa c to ry o w n e rs. T h is sto ry p ro v id e s a key focus o f this c hap te r. T h e fate o f th e F a c to r y Acts is also a s t a r t i n g p o i n t fo r th is c h a p t e r b e c a u s e it illu s tra te s a p e r e n n i a l p r o b l e m for t h o s e w h o a rg u e fo r th e c rim in a lisa tio n o f safety offences: how can a c rim in a l justice system th at is designed to deal w ith lower class offenders be m ob ilised to p u n is h the relatively po w erfu l in divid uals a nd o rg a n isa tio n s (directors, se n io r m a n ­ agers a nd c o m p a n ie s) w ho c o m m it safety crimes? We a p p ro a c h this c h a p te r from a perspective that views the law n o t as a n a k e d i n s t r u m e n t o f p o w e r t h a t is alw ays u sed to c o n t r o l s u b o r d i n a t e g r o u p s , b u t as a c o m p l e x a n d o fte n c o n t r a d i c t o r y sy stem o f ru le s a n d practices th a t ultim ately a im s to m a i n ta i n and stabilise th e existing social o rd e r (Lacey 1994). We th erefore take a perspective th at is ro ote d in c riti­ cal legal studies an d n e o -M a rx is t a p p ro a c h e s to th e law (G rigg-Spall and Ireland 1992) as o p p o s e d to in s tru m e n ta lis t a p p ro a c h e s (w hich view law sim ply as a direct expression o f the will o f the ru lin g class) o r liberal legal

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s c h o la rs h ip (w hich views law as an ex p re ssio n o f c o n s e n s u a l social values). In o rd e r to u n d e rs ta n d the p articu lar c o n tr a d ic tio n s th a t lie at the heart o f the crim inal law, N orrie (2001 ) argues that we have to explore how the law developed at very particular m o m e n ts in history and how its sh a p e is d erive d from the d e v e lo p m e n t o f social rela tio n s at tho se m o m e nts. The dev elop m en t o f law as it might apply to corpo rate o ffend ­ ers in safety c rim e s is c h a ra c te ris e d by N o rrie as a process o f differentiation - w hereby c o rp o ra te deviance is strictly segregated - and assim ilation - w hereby c o rp o ra te deviance is dealt with by ad ap tin g the existing c ri m i n a l law rules th a t ap p ly to in d iv id u a ls. D iffe re n tia tio n implies the creation and d ev elo p m en t o f a separate sphere o f regulatory law and assimilation the re-shaping o f co rpo rate liability to integrate co r­ porate offenders into the mainstream crim inal process. The criminal law has created a different process for dealing with safety crimes as regulatory offences on one h an d and as crimes o f violence on the other. This, and the following, chapter is concerned with the legal reasoning b eh ind w h at we m i g h t call a ‘b i f u r c a t e d ’ m o d e l o f c rim in a l process. In this c hap te r, we focus on th e ways in w hich safety crim es are d iffe ren tia ted from ‘re al’ crime, while o u r next chapter considers som e o f the details of, and o b sta ­ cles to, an assimilation o f safety crimes into law, a process w hich grants them the status o f ‘real’ crimes. We begin this chapter by su m m arisin g the history o f the criminalisation o f safety offences, before tu r n in g to explore the con tradictions and d ilem m as that processes o f criminalisation create in present day crim inal justice systems.

T h e F a c t o r y A c t s : t h e f ir st s a f e t y c r i m e la w s

The first legislation to intervene in the organisation of factory production came in Britain, in 1802, in the form o f the Health and M orals of Apprentices Act, designed specifically to regulate the working conditions of ‘Poor Law’ apprentices in the textile industry. Then, from 1831 onwards, a series of Factory Acts were passed - regulating the hours and conditions of young workers and women, extending across industries and workplaces of different sizes, until the consolidation of existing legislation in the Factory Act of 1878. Although largely concerned with limiting the working day, the debates that framed the emergence o f this legislation were dom inated by concerns about the horrific rate of injuries and deaths by ‘overwork’ of fac­ tory w orkers, and particularly children. A ccounts o f those conditions published at the time reveal that children were forced to work shifts, som e­ tim es in excess o f 24 hours, in overcrow ded, filthy and dangerously confined spaces. In Karl M arx’s (1887/1954) account o f the emergence of the laws aimed ostensibly at curbing the industrial carnage experienced in

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nineteenth-century Britain, masters of the cotton, silk, and mining indus­ tries are revealed as merciless and murderous. Children as young as two were forced into labour in the lace industries and the average labourer in some industrial towns might not be expected to live past their teens. D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d t h e r e e x i s te d w h a t C a r s o n h a s t e r m e d a ‘l o g i c o f e n f o r c e m e n t ’ ( C a r s o n 1979: 4 4 - 7 ) . If t h e p e r i o d b e t w e e n 1802 a n d 1831 h a s b e e n c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a law t h a t was ‘a l m o s t e n tir e ly i n e f f e c tu a l ’ (ibid.: 4 0), w i t h t h e n e w law ‘c o n t r a v e n e d o n a s u b s t a n t i a l sc ale’ so as to m a k e it 'a d e a d l e t t e r ’ ( C a r s o n 1981: 136), several s o m e w h a t d i s p a r a t e s o u r c e s o f p r e s s u r e fo r m o r e effe ctiv e law a n d e n f o r c e m e n t e m e r g e d . C e r t a i n l y in t h e d e b a t e s a r o u n d th e p assage a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e Acts in t h e r u n u p to a n d t h e n f o l lo w in g t h e 1833 F a c t o r y Act ( t h e l a tte r c r e a t i n g th e fa c­ t o r y i n s p e c t o r a t e in t h e f o r m o f f o u r p a i d i n s p e c t o r s ) , t h e r e w a s a b r i e f m o m e n t d u r i n g w h i c h t h e r e w as a real i m p e t u s to use t h e c r i m i n a l law to c o n t r o l t h e h u m a n c a r n a g e p r o d u c e d as a r e s u l t o f B r i t a i n ’s i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n - in p a r t i c u l a r ‘to f o s t e r a p u b l i c i d e n t i t y o f u n a m b i g u o u s c r i m i n a l i t y for th e d e l i n q u e n t ’ f a c t o r y o w n e r ( C a r s o n 1974: 129). A viable class society

Karl Marx’s analysis of the emergence of the Factory Acts proposes that the carnage in the factories had created an urgent need for the state to use the law to control factory owners who demonstrated little respect for the rule of law. First, Marx argued that there was an intensification of class conflict between the ruling class and those who worked in the factories. This level of conflict was played out at a level that was threatening the efficient organisa­ tion o f production. Second, it became clear the industrial system of production could not be trusted to regulate its own rampant physical abuse of labour, and thus threatened the long-term viability of the factory system. The following passage summarises concisely Marx’s analysis of regulation as necessary both to dissipate conflict and to check the greed of the factory owners from exhausting its most valuable commodity. These Acts curb the passion o f capital for a limitless draining of labour power, by forcibly limiting the working day by state regula­ tions, made by a state that is ruled by capitalist and landlord. Apart from the working class movement which daily grew more threaten­ ing, the limiting of factory labour was dictated by the same necessity which spread guano over the English fields. The same blind eagerness for plunder that had in one case exhausted the soil, had, in the other, torn up by the roots the living force of the nation. (1887/1954: 229)

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Safety Crim es

The legal protections for workers enshrined in Factory Acts therefore origi­ nated in the need to resolve a contradiction inherent in capitalism: the relentless dem and for profit in the short term threatened to exhaust the capacity for sustaining profits in the long term. Marx therefore argues that the general impulse to regulate is not simply the result of a consensual or philanthropic decision to make work more humane, but that it is in the very conditions of the factory, the ‘dens of misery in which capitalistic exploita­ tion obtains free play for the wildest excesses’, that the need for regulation is created (ibid.: 460). Carson later summed this process up by arguing that the Factory Acts helped ensure a ‘viable class society’ (Carson 1980a). T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e F a c t o r i e s A cts w a s c e n t r a l to t h e p r o c e s s o f i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n itself. C rucially, t h r o u g h l i m i ti n g t h e le n g t h o f t h e w o r k ­ in g day, f a c t o ry o w n e r s w e r e force d to c o n s i d e r ways o f e x t r a c t i n g g r e a t e r v a l u e f r o m e m p l o y e e s in s h o r t e r w o r k i n g h o u r s a n d u n d e r o s t e n s i b l y ‘s a f e r ’ w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s . T h e clas s o f f a c t o r y o w n e r s as a w h o l e w as i m p e l l e d to d e v e l o p t e c h n o l o g y t h a t w o u l d e n a b l e t h e o f fs e t t i n g o f costs i n c u r r e d b y r e g u l a t i o n . R e g u la ti o n t h u s gave cap ital t h e i m p e t u s to r e v o ­ l u t i o n i s e p r o d u c t i o n in o r d e r to g u a r a n t e e its o w n e x p a n s i o n . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , t h e n , t h e F a c t o r i e s A cts h a s t e n e d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e f a c t o r y s y s te m a n d e n c o u r a g e d t h e m o n o p o l i s a t i o n o f c a p i t a l ( t h e l a tte r b e c a u s e t h e i n c r e a s e d n e c e s s i t y fo r a g r e a t e r o u t l a y o f c a p i t a l f o rc e d t h e s m a ll e r f a c t o ry o w n e r s o u t o f b u s i n e s s ( M a r x 1 88 7 /19 54 : 4 4 7 - 8 ) ) .

Thus, for Marx, through the imposition of a minimal level of protection for workers, the state played a crucial role in forcing the qualitative leaps in the nature of capital investment and concentration of production that were crucial to the development of the factory system - so effecting the real rather than the formal subsumption of labour. In imposing upon capital conditions of production that were required for what in retrospect was a crucial shift in the development of capitalism, the state helped to establish the conditions of existence and further development of capitalism while apparently acting against the interests of individual employers. It is no casual turn of phrase, then, when Marx refers to this period of early factory regulation (1846-1867) as both ‘epoch-making’ and constituting the arrival of'the millennium’ (Marx 1954/1887: 268). Struggles for criminalisation T h r o u g h o u t his a c c o u n t , M a r x tak es a g r e a t deal o f care to u n d e r l i n e t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y p olitics at w o r k w i t h i n t h e ‘b o u r g e o i s i e ’ ( r u l i n g class) in the r e f o r m p r o c e s s . T h e c o m p a s s i o n a t e t o n e o f t h e c o n c e r n s e x p r e s s e d by w e a lth y r e f o r m e r s p e p p e r M a r x ’s p r e l u d e to th e e m e r g e n c e o f th e F a c to r y Acts. H e r e w e f i n d d i s c o n t e n t s w e l l in g a m o n g s t m e m b e r s o f t h e r u l i n g class, i n c l u d i n g m a g i s t r a t e s w h o c o m p a r e c h i l d r e n w o r k i n g in t h e lace t r a d e to slaves in V i r g i n i a , a l o n g s i d e e s t a b l i s h m e n t n e w s p a p e r s s u c h as

I 12

Differentiating safety crime from ‘real’ crime in law

The Times con dem ning the cruel tre atm ent of factory operatives. The government’s own reports to the Childrens’ Employment Commissioners on the occupational health of workers in the potteries, match making and paper industries are cited throughout. Those reports document in grue­ some detail the physically and morally degenerating conditions of work: vulnerability to disease; low life expectancy; and the mutilation of chil­ dren, many suffering stunted growth and premature aging. A succession o f Inspectors’ reports are quoted for their sustained con­ dem nation of the Factory masters and this co ndem nation appears to intensify over the years following the Inspectorate’s establishment. In par­ ticular, Capital draws out the different positions adopted within and between different branches of the state. When the Home Secretary eventu­ ally appealed to the Inspectorate to treat factory owners who were in breach of the 1844 Act leniently, via a H om e Office circular, the Inspectorate refused. The internal divisions within the Factory Inspectorate are also prominent in Marx’s account. The least punitive of the four factory inspec­ tors, J. Stuart is singled out for allowing the relay system to flourish in Scotland, whilst in England, the Inspectorate continued 'their legal p ro ­ ceedings against the pro-slavery rebellion’ (Marx 1887/1954: 273). The analysis of the Factory Acts developed by Marx, and latterly Carson, both emphasised the importance of struggles around the enforce­ m ent of those laws. It is notable that in both of those au tho r’s accounts, it was often the case that bitter struggles between employer and factory hand intensified after the passage of legislation. For example, the factory owners mobilised against the 1844 Act coming into full force in 1848 with an unrem itting lobby of Parliament and appeals to the workforce that their jobs were at risk. Their assault was also directed at the Factories Inspectorate who were denounced as 'a kind of revolutionary com m is­ sioners . . . ruthlessly sacrificing the u n hap py factory workers to their humanitarian crochet’ (ibid.: 270). Marx discussed at length conflicts over the implementation of a ‘relay system’ by the Factory masters. The relay system, introduced to exploit loopholes in the Factory Acts, enabled mas­ ters to circumnavigate the legal limits on the working day by employing workers concurrently across different shifts. The introduction of the relay system represented the manufacturers’ ‘revolt’ against government (ibid.: 397). In response to this revolt the factory workers held protest meetings across Yorkshire and Lancashire, creating a counter revolt so ferocious that the Factories Inspectorate ‘urgently warned the government that the antagonism of classes had arrived at an incredible tension’ (ibid.: 276). The relay system was finally abolished by the Factory Act of 1850. Marx is rarely given credit for producing a subtle analysis of state power, but as this discussion shows, his description of the state during this period rejects a crude instrumental notion of the state’s relationship with the factory owning class or indeed a crude characterisation of class struggle.

Safety Crim es

T h e e m e r g e n c e o f strict liability o ffe n c e s

Any zeal for criminialisation in those debates at the birth of the Factories Acts was to fade fast. The courts from an early point had used their preroga­ tive to avoid conviction where it could be shown that the offence was not wilfully or grossly negligent. They also tended to impose the m inim um penalties. Just over two thirds of convictions between 1836 and 1842 resulted in a minim um £1 fine (Carson 1979: 50). The discretion being exercised in the courts indicated a major problem of political will to enforce the law. Proposals for imprisonment as punishment for the most serious offences were rejected in the framing o f the 1833 Act. The newly formed inspec­ torate actually lobbied on occasion for a repeal of the most onerous parts of the law having being advised to co-operate closely with employers so as to make the new law acceptable to them (ibid.: 11-13). The problem the Inspectorate faced was that factory inspectors were being formally required to criminalise what was normal within the factory system ... to criminalize a body of men not on the periphery of moral life, such as displaced or poverty-stricken workers, but men who were at the centre of the emerging political and social order (Norrie 2001: 85). Given the routine nature of breaches of the Acts, a response that prosecuted each and every offence would have resulted in a ‘collective criminalization which extended far beyond some opprobrious minority’ (Carson 1979: 48). With the courts in the main unwilling to embark upon a collective crimi­ nalisation of the ‘respectable’ class of factory owners, the Factories Inspectorate very quickly learned to apply the law selectively. They did this by adopting a system of bargaining and low-level sanctions. Inspectors were given powers to exercise their own discretion, and the Inspectorate powers to devise regulations, which normally imposed an administrative responsibility upon employers (such as keeping time-books, certificates of employees age and so on). Criminal prosecution only came after initial attempts to persuade had failed. Inspectors actually drafted a bill (that was in the event never implemented) to introduce a system of on-the-spot fines to pre-empt criminal proceedings to ease the tricky task of dealing with individuals o f high social standing. Despite Hawkins’s (2002) failure to consider this history, this is in fact the very origin o f ‘a strategy of last resort prosecution’ (Norrie 2001: 85) with which his work is centrally concerned (see Chapter 7). It is significant that the decision to prosecute came after inspectors had decided that there was some clear intention on the part of the factory ow ner to com m it an offence. This Carson describes as the incorporation of the criminal law concept of mens rea into inspectors’ deci­ sions to prosecute (Carson 1979: 52-3).1

114

Differentiating safety crime from ‘real’ crime in law

At the same time as the notion of intentionality (and therefore moral blameworthiness) was informally introduced into the investigation process, the legislative reforms of the 1844 Factory Act diluted the normal mens rea requirem ent in criminal process. Specifically, the 1844 Act deemed an employer ‘guilty in the first instance’ and required the employer to ‘prove his due diligence’ in defence of any case (Carson 1980b: 164), thus reversing the traditional requirement in criminal law to identify mens rea before guilt can be established. This change enabled a second class type of offence to be effectively created within which breaches of the Factory Act would inevitably fall. And this offence - since it did not require a state of mind to be demonstrated and carried low-level administrative penalties in the first instance - was more easily constructed as an ‘administrative breach’ or a ‘technical offence’, rather than an unambiguously criminal offence. This is essentially why strict liability offences came to be regarded as something other than ‘real crimes’. The 1844 Act therefore took a major step towards the concept o f ‘strict liability’ offences which removed the label of criminal from Factory Act prosecutions and thus enabled such prosecutions to be more acceptable to the magistrates who were asked to impose sanctions against members of their own social class. The courts - by ensuring that a separate, lower level of offence was created - assisted in decriminalising breaches of health and safety law in the eyes of the law and thereby legiti­ mated the conventionalisation of those crimes in the workplace. ‘Community settlement’ and regulation T h e an alysis d e v e l o p e d by M a r x , C a r s o n , a n d N o r r i e id en tifies class c o n ­ flict as t h e m o t o r o f t h o s e h i s t o r i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t s . T h is c a n be c o n t r a s t e d w i t h lib eral p e r s p e c ti v e s o n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f law w h i c h p r o p o s e t h a t this p e r i o d was less o n e o f st r u g g l e a n d m o r e s i m p l y o n e o f a h u m a n i t a r ­ i a n r e s p o n s e t o e x p l o i t a t i o n . C h a n g e s in t h e law, f r o m a l i b e r a l p e r s p e c t i v e , a r o s e n o t f r o m t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s c r e a t e d by t h e s y s t e m o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d the struggles th a t arose fro m th o se c o n tr a d ic tio n s , b u t f ro m an a l m o s t n a t u r a l p r o c e s s o f f i n d in g an o p t i m a l level o f l a b o u r effi­ c i e n c y . F o r e x a m p l e , in C l a r k e ’s o v e r v i e w o f t h e e m e r g e n c e o f ‘t h e r e g u l a t o r y s o c i e t y ’, t h e r e is n o s e n s e o f w h a t t h i s c o n f l i c t o r s t r u g g l e m e a n t in r e l a t i o n to t h e r e g u l a t o r y o u t c o m e :

technology, the means to success of industrialisation, brought with it new dangers. In deep mines and factories contracted workers were subject to appalling degradation and exploitation and suffered increasingly from the hazards of new industrial processes. After some opposition, the first Factory Acts were introduced. Their requirements for safer working conditions were respected, on the whole, by the larger manufacturers, but ignored by many of the smaller ones, who could not afford to implement their provisions. (Clarke 2000: 13)

Safety Crim es

S uch a c h a r a c t e r i s a t i o n c o n t a i n s m a n y o f th e a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t infect c u r ­ r e n t d e b a t e s r e g a r d i n g r e g u l a t i o n : t h a t it e m e r g e d as p a r t o f s o m e u n f o l d i n g , h u m a n i s i n g r e s p o n s e to d a n g e r s c r e a t e d b y ‘t e c h n o l o g y ’; t h a t t h e le g i t i m a c y o f t h e law is g e n e r a lly r e s p e c te d by t h e r e g u la te d ; a n d t h a t w h e r e r e g u l a t i o n s ar e f l o u te d , this t e n d s to b e o n t h e p a r t o f m a r g i n a l , less r e s p o n s i b l e , u s u a l l y ‘s m a l l ’, c o m p a n i e s .

Bartrip and Fenn have similarly argued that the Factory Acts emerged from a general consensus that efficient legislation, and its enforcement, rely upon achieving a balance between the benefits of doing business and its ‘harm ful concom itants’ (Bartrip and Fenn 1980a: 178). Safety crimes because they result from the general m om entum of progress - ‘differ from other crimes’ (ibid.), and thus require a different regulatory response; occa­ sional ‘failures’ to enforce the criminal law were in fact a function of the constraints within which inspectors were working, so that ‘there is no need to look beyond’ such constraints ‘to explain the evolution of their policy’ of enforcement (ibid.: 183); the constraints were ‘a reflection of the resources that the com m unity was prepared to devote to enforcement taking into account not only efficiency considerations, but reluctance to erode laissezfaire principles and advance the bureaucratic state’ (ibid.: 182); and, as the Inspectorate’s practices evolved, it gained ‘a more realistic appreciation of what could be carried out in an imperfect world’, (ibid.: 184) C a r s o n ’s r e j o i n d e r to B a r t r i p a n d F e n n i d e n t i f i e d in t h e F a c t o r y Acts n o t a ‘b a l a n c e ’ b a s e d u p o n a c o m m u n i t y s e t t l e m e n t , b u t an o n g o i n g c o n ­ flict b e t w e e n p r o - r e g u l a t o r y f o rc e s a n d t h e e c o n o m i c e x i g e n c i e s o f t h e e m e r g i n g o r d e r:

who exactly is meant to have been making all these rational co m m u­ nity choices between lost production levels o f ‘acceptable’ criminality, gains to the community and the like? ... O f course the early factory inspectors were operating u nd er constraints; o f course they were compelled to balance factors like rigorous enforcement against others such as lost production; but the constraints, I suggest, emanated from something rather more tangible than some ephemeral ‘com m unity’ sitting down to do its cost-benefit analysis on factory conditions. Rather ... they stem m ed from a collision between the im petus towards regulation, on the one hand, and basic structural and ideo­ logical features of the new order on the other. (Carson 1980a: 190) T h e o u t c o m e o f t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n a n d e n f o r c e m e n t o f th e F a c t o r y Acts ( w h e t h e r r e a d in t h e d i f f e r i n g h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t s as ‘c o m m u n i t y s e t t l e ­ m e n t ’ o r ‘c o n f l i c t ’) can h a r d l y b e in d i s p u t e .

I 16

Differentiating safety crim e from ‘real’ crim e in law

T h is p e rio d o f th e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the F ac to ry Acts re p r e s e n te d a s e m in a l m o m e n t in th e d e v e l o p m e n t o f safety law, o n e in w h ich th e r e were m o m e n t s o f a real possibility o f an assim ilation o f safety crim es into a w id e r system o f c r i m i n a l law. T h r o u g h a c o m b i n a t i o n o f n ov el law, e m e r g e n t f o r m s o f e n f o r c e m e n t , a n d th e d e v e l o p m e n t o f a ra tio n a le in th e c o u rts for tre atin g these crim es in p a rtic u la r ways, th a t m o m e n t was lost, a n d safety c rim e s were segregated into a d iffe re n tia te d ca te g o ry o f ( ‘strict liability’) offences. A nd this creation o f a distinct category o f ‘re g u ­ la to ry ’ law in n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Britain was to set an e n d u r i n g p a tte rn w hich has been followed in m a n y ju risd ic tio n s since.

D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g lia b i li t y f o r s a f e t y c r i m e s

T h e c a te g o r y o f s tr ic t liab ility o ffen ces t h a t e m e r g e d at th e e n d o f th e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y facilitated th e d if fe re n tia tio n o f r e g u l a to r y offences a n d m a i n s t r e a m c rim es o f violence. In the UK, this d is tin c tio n e n d u re s , a n d is m a d e b e tw e e n th o s e o ffences t h a t are p r o s e c u t e d as b r e a c h e s o f h e a lt h a n d safety law, u n d e r h e a lt h a n d safety leg isla tio n ( r e g u l a t o r y offences) an d offences th a t are p ro s ecu ted as c o m m o n law crim es o f v io ­ lence. T h e m o s t s ig n ific a n t c a te g o ry o f th e la tte r g r o u p o f offences are ‘c o rp o r a te m a n s l a u g h t e r ’ offences w h ich are p ro s e c u te d in E n g lan d an d Wales using the rules o f m an s lau g h ter, rules th at have been developed to apply to cases involving d eaths that result from the in v o lu n ta ry o r n eg li­ gent actions o f individuals. T h is is n o t to im ply th a t each o f tho se types o f offences can be regarded wholly separately in law. B oth are c rim in a l offences. R egu lato ry offences are d efin ed as c rim in a l offences b ecau se, like o th e r crim es, th e y involve p ro s e c u tio n by the state, they requ ire a p re - d e te r m in e d sta n d a rd o f p r o o f to be d e m o n s t r a t e d to th e c o u rt, a n d th e state im p o se s a p e n a lty th a t is linked to the p o te n tia l social c o n se q u e n c e s o f the offence. T h o se are the m o s t i m p o r t a n t characteristics th at d e te r m i n e w h e th e r a given legal p r o ­ ced ure is ‘c r i m i n a l’ o r n o t.2 Offences a gainst regu lato ry law are governed by c ri m i n a l r a t h e r th a n civil law. It is this featu re o f th o s e offences th a t m e a n s t h a t in s tr ic t l a w - b o o k t e r m s we can d e s c r ib e safety c ri m e s unequivoca lly as crim es. This is i m p o r t a n t since: ‘discussions o f co rp o r a te crim e often ig nore alto g eth er the possibility th a t co rp o r a te activity m ig h t b re a c h n o t ju s t the r e g u l a to r y cod es b u t the c r i m i n a l law “c o d e ” it s e l f’ (Wells 2001: 1 1). N ow, w hile it is i m p o r t a n t to reco gn ise th a t re g u la to r y offences are a s u b - c a te g o r y o f c r i m i n a l offences, it is also i m p o r t a n t to re c o g n ise th e fe a tu re s t h a t d is ti n g u is h th e m fro m o t h e r ( m a i n s t r e a m ) c r i m i n a l offences. It is to this task th at th e c h a p te r no w turns.

I 17

Safety C rim e s

Inchoate offences

N orm ally regulatory offences are defined in relation to a breach o f law rather than the specific outcom e of that breach. Crim es o f violence, on the o th e r han d , are defined by the result or outco m e o f any crim in al act or om ission, that is, strictly in relation to the harm that has been caused. Thus a co rp o rate m a n slau g h ter or h om icide charge is only relevant in cases w here som eone has died, w hile a com pany or an individual can generally be prosecuted for a breach o f regulatory law regardless o f w hether som e identifiable h arm has resulted. T hus, regulatory law ‘fails to distin g u ish those com panies w hich have caused death and injury from those com p a­ nies w hich may be unsafe but w hich have not yet caused h arm ’ (Bergman 2000: 39). Liability th a t is a ttrib u te d w ith o u t any reference to the h arm caused is know n in legal term inology as inchoate liability. T h e re m o v a l o f th e pre senc e o f a h a r m in in c h o a te offences has been justified by the idea th a t the p r i m a r y p u r p o s e o f the law w h e n it co m es to safety c rim e s is to p r e v e n t th e h a r m o c c u r r i n g in th e first place, r a t h e r th a n to p u n i s h w r o n g d o i n g . (Wells 2001: 5 - 6 ) . T h is p ro ce ss o f d i s c o n ­ nectin g h a r m from offence is crucial in re fram in g the ‘c r i m i n a l’ n a tu r e o f th e offence. S o m e n o t i o n o f ‘h a r m ’ has always b e e n a c e n tr a l n o t i o n in m o d e r n c r i m i n a l ju s tic e s y s te m s .3 If we e x a m i n e all o f th e e sta b lish e d c r i m i n a l law t e x t b o o k s , we find t h a t th e n o t i o n o f p re v e n t in g h a r m to in d iv id u als an d to the p u blic features in any disc ussion o f th e fo u n d i n g princ iple s o f the c rim in a l law (see, for exam ple, S m ith a n d H o g a n 2002: 16 -1 7 ). T h e h a r m p rinciple, as set o u t by John S tu a rt Mill ( ‘the only p u r ­ pose for w h ich p o w e r can be righ tfu lly exercised over any m e m b e r o f a civilized c o m m u n i t y , a g a in s t h is will, is to p r e v e n t h a r m to o t h e r s ’; 1859/1962: 135) was, for early liberal theorists, a p re c o n d itio n for justify­ ing the use o f th e sta te ’s coercive p ow e rs over the in d iv id u a l. H a r m as a basis for c rim in a l justice in te rv e n tio n re m a in s significant in so far as m ost c rim in a l acts are in so m e way c o n n e c te d to the h a r m s th at they p ro d u ce. In cases w h ere the ‘h a r m ’ is se p a r a te d from th e ‘c r i m e ’, we b egin to lose sigh t b o th o f th e gravity th a t is a tta c h e d to th e offence a n d , at the sam e tim e, o f the legitim ate basis for state interv en tio n . Social c o n d e m n a t i o n o f offences u n d e r the HASAW Act 1974 m a y be w e akened sim ply because the offence is n o t d e te r m i n e d by the seriousness o f the in jury o r the h a r m th a t results. Because th ere is no charge o f c o r p o ­ rate in ju ry o r c o rp o r a te killing u n d e r the HASAW Act, it m e a n s th a t the Act g e n e ra lly is n o t r e g a r d e d as o n e d e s i g n e d fo r p u n i s h i n g s e r io u s h a r m s . R a th e r, it is seen as a s t a tu t e w h ic h a im s to p r e v e n t a ra n g e o f u n s p e c i f ie d h a r m s b e f o r e th e y occ u r. B ut t h o s e u n s p e c i f ie d h a r m s , b e c a u s e th e y have n o label a tt a c h e d to th e m w h ic h d ra w s a t t e n t i o n to th e ir s tatu s as a ‘c r i m e ’ o r to th e seriou s c o n s e q u e n c e s o f the c rim e , are

I 18

Differentiating safety crim e from ‘real’ crim e in law

th erefore m o r e difficult to c o m p r e h e n d as crim es. Safety offences th at use the in ch o ate m o d e are describ ed n o t as ‘grevious b od ily h a r m ’, or ‘assau lt’, b u t in stead as ‘b re a c h e s’ o f the relevant statute. T h e effect o f all o f this is a d e e p e n i n g o f th e d i f f e r e n t ia t e d c h a r a c t e r o f re g u l a to r y o ffen ces a n d a rein fo rc e m e n t o f the general a ss u m p tio n th a t they are ‘n o t real c rim e s ’. H aving m a d e this p o in t, it is i m p o r t a n t to note th a t the inch oate form does n o t shap e the entire response o f the c rim in a l justice system to safety violations. T h u s, in th e UK, th e HSE sets a m i n i m u m th r e sh o ld in the c ri­ te ria t h a t d e t e r m i n e w h ic h in j u r i e s will be in v e s tig a te d . S o m e s e r io u s in ju rie s are in vestigate d a n d s o m e are n o t. A c c o rd in g to th is policy, all d e a t h s at w o r k are in v e s tig a te d - t h o u g h th is in fact m e a n s d e a th s to em ployees (see C h a p te r 2) - as are all a m p u t a ti o n s , serious m u ltip le frac­ tu r e s , c r u s h in j u r i e s le a d i n g to i n t e r n a l o r g a n d a m a g e , h e a d in j u ri e s involving loss o f consciousness, b u r n s o f m o r e th a n 10 p e r cent, blin din g, scalping a n d asp hyxiation. T h e assessm ent o f h a r m also u n d o u b te d l y fea­ tures in the sen ten cin g process. We will n o te in C h a p te r 8, how, th r o u g h case law, it has b e e n e s tab lish ed t h a t th e c o u r t s s h o u l d c o n s i d e r h ig h e r p e n a ltie s if the o u t c o m e has b een a serio u s injury, ill h e a th , o r a d eath . Typically the h ighest fines im p o se d u n d e r th e H ealth an d Safety at W ork Act are those th a t involve fatalities. In effect, b o th reg u lato r (in decisions to p r o s e c u t e ) a n d th e c o u r t s h e re are w o r k i n g w i t h i n a f r a m e w o r k o f in c h o a te offences b u t are a pp lying h a r m - b a s e d o r resu lt-b ased decisions w h en it co m es to investigation an d sen ten cin g respectively. Corporate liability

R e g u la to ry c rim e s a n d c rim e s o f vio len ce are also d is tin g u is h e d by th e way in w hich the crim in a l law has develop ed specific p ro c e d u re s for d e a l­ ing w ith safety c rim e s . W h e n safety c r i m e s are p ro c e s s e d as c r i m e s o f violen ce (for e x a m p le c o r p o r a te m a n s la u g h t e r a n d c o r p o r a te h o m i c id e cases), th e ru le s o f liability closely a p p r o x i m a t e th e n o r m a l ru le s o f a tt ri b u ti n g liability for in te r-p e rso n a l or ‘m a i n s t r e a m ’ crim es o f violence. O n th e o t h e r h a n d , r e g u l a t o r y offe n c es g e n e ra lly im p ly a m e t h o d o f a tt ri b u ti n g liability th a t has been designed for the p u rp o s e .

We have already noted the crim inal justice system’s pre-occupation with in d iv id u a l cu lp ab ility for safety crim es. T he ce n tral p ro b lem w ith the

crim inal law’s m ethodological individualism for o u r discussion here is that responsibility for safety crim es can rarely be m eaningfully attrib u ted to on e o r several specific indiv id u als, as is the case w ith in te r-p e rso n a l crimes. Safety crim es often result from a series o f decisions m ade at differ­ ent levels of the organisation. In the case of Piper A lpha (see C hapter 1), the decision to reduce the m aintenance program m e on the platfo rm and at the same tim e push the production system beyond its capacity was cru-

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Safety Crim es

cial to the genesis of this safety crime. The decisions that led to this state of affairs were made at various levels in Occidental’s corporate hierarchy. They were also directly the result o f poor management-w'orkforce rela­ tions and the lack of any formal worker representation which could force management to respond to workers’ complaints about safety on the plant (Woolfson et al. 1996; Whyte 1999a; Tombs 1990). Thus the killing of 167 workers on the Piper Alpha platform cannot be understood in terms of the result o f a decision of any one individual. The cause of the Piper Alpha disaster, as is often the case with other safety crimes, can only meaningfully be understood in terms o f its organisational causation or production. T h e r e are a v a rie ty o f ty p e s o f e m p lo y in g o r g a n is a tio n t h a t can be i m p l i c a t e d in safety c r i m e s : c o r p o r a t i o n s , g o v e r n m e n t a n d p u b l i c se c to r organisations, charities an d associations and various o th e r fo rm s o f u n i n ­ c o rp o ra te d organisations. T h e co n s titu tio n o f public sector o rganisations is g en erally g o v e r n e d by p u b l i c law a n d the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f p r i v a t e s e c t o r o r g a n i s a t i o n s b y c o r p o r a t e law. H o w ev er, m o s t o r g a n i s a t i o n s h av e sim i l a r safety re s p o n s i b i li t i e s in r e g u l a t o r y law. In g e n e r a l, r e g u l a t o r y law a p p lie s to b o t h p u b l i c a n d p r i v a t e se c to r o r g a n i s a t i o n s .

For Glasbeek (2005), however, there is an im po rtan t distinction to be made between corporations and other types of organisation. What makes corporations different is that they are constituted, socially and legally, for one primary purpose: to maximise profits from commercial activities. This means that law reformers must recognise corporations as a special case. Corporations will make profits in whichever way they can and this includes cutting corners and exposing workers to risk (unless there are restrictions in place which can limit such exposures). Law reformers, however, tend to work within a consensus perspective (see C hapter 7) and work on the assumption that good safety is in the best interests of all organisations. For Glasbeek, lumping all organisations together in one category supports a very specific approach to criminalisation. The prim ary aim is to find reforms that will deal with the complexity o f organisations rather than those that seek to change the institutional basis o f the corporation and limit the murderous effects of the pursuit of profit. This is a point that has resonance with N orrie’s (2001) argument on the removal of motive from the criminal process. Motive - in this case, profit motive - is irrelevant to the process of establishing liability for a crime. By obscuring the profit motive, the law ‘serves another u nm ention ed purpose: it supports the status quo in respect of occupational health and safety regulation’ by pre­ serving the consensus view that safety crimes are generally ‘accidents’ rather than the avoidable consequences of an industrial profit-maximising process. Thus, the consensus view' o f safety crime and how to regulate it (see Chapter 7) is preserved: ‘when it comes to the risks of any for-profit activity, the employer is in the best position to know what they are likely to be and how they could be minimised’ (Glasbeek, 2005: 25). 120

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H aving m a d e the p o in t th a t there is g o o d reason for c o rp o r a ti o n s to be treated as a special case, it re m a in s the case th a t safety crim e s - albeit in different fo rm s a n d for different m o tiv atin g factors - are c o m m it te d by a range o f different types o f o rg anisation s. In the UK, p a rt o f the de bate on th e fo rm t h a t a new offence o f c o r p o r a t e m a n s l a u g h t e r m i g h t ta ke has revolved a r o u n d the e x te n t to w h ic h c r o w n b o d ie s ( i n s t i t u t i o n s w h ic h rep resen t the state such as g o v e r n m e n t m inistries) sh o u ld be held r e s p o n ­ sible for c rim in a l offences. It is the desire to en su re th at c row n bo dies and n o n - i n c o r p o r a t e d bod ies do n o t re m a in e x e m p t from p ro s e c u tio n w hich has led to calls for the law to be re f o rm e d to allow all types o f o rg a n i s a ­ ti o n to be h eld a c c o u n t a b le . T h e i m p l i c a t i o n o f G la s b e e k ’s a r g u m e n t , however, is th a t the law m u s t be sensitive to th e c o n stitu tio n o f different o rg an isa tio n a l fo rm s an d therefore be sensitive to th e u n d e rly in g reasons b e h in d th e o rg a n isatio n al p ro d u c t io n o f safety crimes. T h e a r g u m e n t th a t p r o f i t - m a k i n g c o r p o r a t i o n s s h o u l d be tr eate d as special cases is s u p p o r te d by th e fact th at, as we shall see in the following c h ap te r, c o r p o r a t i o n s are able to fall b ack u p o n a legal p r in c ip le w hich p ro te c ts th e m from liability k n o w n as 'c o r p o r a t e p e r s o n a lit y ’. In d e e d , it m ig h t be said th at the p ro b le m s th a t have bee n historically created by the p roc ess o f a s s im ila tin g c o r p o r a t i o n s in to th e m a i n s t r e a m c r i m i n a l law stem from th e special sta tu s th a t c o r p o r a t i o n s are given; a s ta tu s w hich enables the c o rp o r a ti o n to o w n p r o p e r ty fo rm ally an d to m ak e profits for th e in div idu als th a t in reality ow n an d co n tro l th e m , w ith o u t th o se in d i­ v id u a l s i n c u r r i n g full liab ility for any h a r m s t h a t th e y m a y c ause vicariously t h r o u g h the c o rp o r a tio n . In o th e r w ords, c o rp o r a ti o n s present specific p ro b le m s for the crim in alisatio n o f safety crime. Principles o f corporate liability

A key p e r i o d in th e d e v e l o p m e n t o f s tric t liab ility offen ces - o u t l i n e d a bo ve - w as u n d o u b t e d l y th e s t ru g g le to i m p l e m e n t th e F a c to r y Acts. However, this is n o t to im p ly th a t th e co n c e p t o f s trict liability was only dev elo pe d for the p u r p o s e o f dealing w ith safety crim es. As Wells (2001: 68) n o t e d , th e c o n c e p t in th e n i n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y w as ' m o r e c o m m o n l y fo u n d in the area o f m o rals, m i n o r s an d d r i n k ’. Yet the co nce pt does have a p r o p e r t y th a t m akes it p artic u la rly a m e n d a b le to c o rp o r a te offend ing . In strict liability offences, it does n o t m a t te r if the accused is an individual o r an organ isation : the absence o f m etis rea ensures th a t either the o r g a n i­ s a t io n o r th e i n d i v i d u a l ( o r b o t h ) c o u ld be h eld liable w h e r e r e le v a n t ca u satio n is sh ow n . N orm ally, however, it is the c o rp o r a ti o n th a t is p r o s e ­ c u te d for safety crim es. In this sense, the legal cate g o ry o f strict liability has allowed law e n fo rce rs to avoid a c e n tral d il e m m a in d eb ate s a r o u n d th e crim in a lisatio n o f safety crimes: sh o u ld the law focus on the o rg a n isa ­ ti o n o r o n an i n d i v i d u a l w ith i n th e o r g a n i s a ti o n ? H isto ric a lly , th e

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d e v e l o p m e n t o f d iffe re n tia te d fo rm s o f liability for safety c r im e s has fo c u se d p r e d o m i n a n t l y u p o n h o w to a t t r i b u t e liab ility to t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n t h e i n d i v i d u a l s w h o c o n t r i b u t e to o r g a n i s a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n m a k i n g ; we shall see in t h e f o l lo w in g c h a p t e r t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h r e g u l a ­ t o r y o f fe n c e s in t h e U K t h a t a p p l y to d i r e c t o r s a n d s e n i o r m a n a g e r s are i ll-d e s ig n e d for th is p u r p o s e .

Methods for im puting liability to corporations generally use m echa­ nisms that impose criminal responsibility for the conduct of employees of the corporation upon the corporation itself. Although the meaning of the term changes according to the context in which it is applied, ‘vicarious lia­ bility’ is norm ally used to imply that the corp oratio n’s liability can be imputed using the conduct of one or more of its employers. A pure form of vicarious liability would enable the actions of any employee at any level of the organisation to be imputed to the corporation. Some selective forms of vicarious liability restrict this mechanism only to a specified group within the organisation. It is often said that US law uses a system of vicarious lia­ bility. Normally what is being referred to here is a very particular form of vicarious liability known as respondeat superior which applies in the US Federal Courts. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, corporate liabil­ ity can be triggered by the criminal conduct o f any employee of the corporation, as long as the conduct occurred within the scope o f their employment (that is, the employee was conducting a work-related activity) and the conduct was intended to benefit the corporation (see Gobert and Punch 2003: 55-9; Wells 2001: 132-6). There are two main problems with this doctrine. The first is that the relative ease with which respondeat supe­ rior can be used to attribute liability means that the courts have developed a relatively low level of punishment, in other words, a similar effect to the dif­ ferentiation of strict liability cases. Vicarious liability cases in the US courts are regarded as part of a system of rules that do not fall squarely within the parameters of the criminal law. The second is a more conceptual problem that raises questions about whether vicarious liability can fully capture the corporate nature of the offences it is used to prosecute. Although respondeat superior represents a relatively broad method of attributing liability, it still relies u po n identifying the conduct of an individual who can be said to have triggered corporate liability. This may, particularly in complex organi­ sational structures, be difficult, in spite of the fact that this individual can be at any level of the organisation. Vicarious liability-based systems there­ fore do not take us closer to a meaningful attribution of the offence to corporations because they constitute a form of liability in which the indi­ vidual remains central to the establishment of fault. T h i s l a t t e r p r o b l e m r e m i n d s us t h a t w h e n t h i n k i n g a b o u t c o r p o r a t e c r i m e it is alw ay s n e c e s s a r y to u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e

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offence, the c o rp o ra tio n , and the individuals who make up the c o r p o r a ­ tion. U n de rstan din g these relationships accurately is necessary if we are to reverse a s itu a tio n in w hich c o r p o r a t i o n s c o n ti n u e to escape c rim in a l re spo nsib ility (Kaye 1992). At the b e g in n i n g o f this chapte r, we asked: how can a crim inal justice system that is designed to deal with lower class offenders be mobilised to p u n is h the relatively pow erful individuals and organ isatio n s (directors, senior m an ag e rs an d co m p an ie s) w ho c o m m it safety crimes? At the end o f the chapter, the question has becom e rather m o r e co m p lex: ho w do we use a b o d y o f law d e sign ed for in d iv id u a l offenders w hen we are dealing with a form o f crim e th at very often can only m eanin gfully be a ttrib u te d to collective action and collective deci­ sion m aking, perh aps at m ultiple levels in the co rp orate organisation?

C on clu sio n

T h e o rig in s o f a d iffe re n tia te d system o f law for safety c rim e s can be traced to the m o m e n t at which the crim inal courts saw the p u n is h m e n t of th e w ealthy o r the r u lin g class as s o m e h o w b e y o n d th e ir rem it. T h e process o f law reform an d the process o f law im p le m e n ta t io n re m a in s guided by a logic o f social o rdering - o f m ediating over conflict in a way th at will n o t d isturb the status quo. We c a n n o t escape the fact that a n ec­ essary, key logic o f cap italist social o rd e r s is to m a i n t a i n the p re d o m in a n c e o f capital - and its institutional form , the c orp o ration - in social relations. It is this fact above all else th at shapes the crim inal law’s relationship to safety crimes (Slapper 1993; Glasbeek 1989).

The process of differentiating law identifies an enduring paradox in the crim inalisation o f safety crim es. In the case o f the Factory Acts, a new principle o f liability that em erged after protracted struggles aro u n d the im plem entation and enforcem ent o f the crim inal law enabled a second class of crimes to be created which would never be able to attract the same level of m oral opprobrium or condem nation attached to other crimes of violence. The effect of ‘strict liability’ in the case of the Factory Acts was not to make the crim inalisation process any easier, b u t to differentiate safety offences as a distinct category of crimes. This process o f differentia­ tion is deepened by the creation o f separate systems o f policing and punishm ent that apply to safety crimes. Because strict liability offences are not regarded as ‘real’ crimes, the public relations consequences o f regula­ tory offences and the relatively low-level sanctions imposed by the courts (if those cases actually reach the courts) are absorbed rather more easily by convicted corporations and individuals. There is a very crude principle o f law reform in op eration here: if you make the route to establishing liability easier, th en it is the instinct o f the

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c o u r t t o i n t e r p r e t a l o w e r d e g r e e o f s e r i o u s n e s s a n d t h e r e f o r e a t t a c h a less severe p u n i s h m e n t to th e o ffe n c e . L o w e r th r e s h o ld s o f lia b ility im p ly a relativ e ease w ith w h ic h p r o s e c u tio n s fo r sa fe ty c r im e s can b e se c u re d . H o w e v e r , t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y o f e a s i e r c r i m i n a l i s a t i o n is o f f s e t b y t h e l a c k o f re so u rc e s th a t in v estig atin g a n d p ro s e c u tin g a u th o ritie s can d ra w u p o n , t h e r e s o r t t o le ss p u n i t i v e p r e - c o u r t s a n c t i o n s , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l o w r a t e s o f p r o s e c u t i o n fo r safety c rim e s . T h is effect h ig h lig h ts a n i n h e r e n t c o n t r a ­ d i c t i o n in t h e le g a l r u l e s t h a t h a v e b e e n d e v e l o p e d t o h o l d c o r p o r a t i o n s a c c o u n ta b le . P u t sim p ly , a p ro c e ss o f d é c r im in a lis a tio n h a s o c c u r r e d at t h e s a m e t i m e as t h e r u l e s o f p r o s e c u t i o n b e i n g d e v e l o p e d in a w a y t h a t m a k e s it e a s i e r t o c o n v i c t . I f w e a r e e f f e c t i v e l y t o c r i m i n a l i s e c o r p o r a t e c rim e s, th e n th e m o s t o b v io u s c o n c lu s io n to d ra w fro m th is c o n tr a d ic tio n is t h a t w e s h o u l d s e e k t o a s s i m i l a t e s a f e t y c r i m e s i n t o t h e s y s t e m o f c r i m i ­ n a l law . Yet, d e v e l o p i n g t h e la w in t h i s d i r e c t i o n h a s a ls o b e e n b e s e t b y a s im ila rly p e r p le x in g c o n t r a d i c t i o n : if w e are to fu lly c r im in a lis e sa fe ty c r im e s , d o e s th is m e a n t h a t w e h a v e to a s s im ila te s a fe ty c r im e s i n t o a s y s t e m t h a t h a s n o t b e e n d e s i g n e d f o r t h e p u r p o s e ? It is to t h e k e y l e g a l issues raised by th is q u e s tio n th a t w e n o w tu r n .

Notes 1

In c rim in a l cases, the latin p h rase s actus reus an d m en s rea are used to d escrib e th e basic elem ents o f a crim e. For a crim e to have been co m m itted , th ere needs to be p res­ ence o f crim in al c o n d u c t or th e physical cause o f a crim in al event (the actus reus ) and an identifiable in d iv id u al w ith a crim in al state o f m in d ( mens rea). A ctus reus is often referred to as the ‘physical’ elem ent o f the crim e an d mens rea as the ‘m e n ta l’ elem en t

2

o f the crim e. T he literal tran slatio n s o f mens rea is ‘k n o w in g m in d ’. T he term is used in a legal sense to m ean th at in te n t or know ledge on the p a rt o f the o ffen d er is required before a crim e can be said to have occured. By c o n tra st, civil law cases involve no p ro sec u tio n , b u t are in essence ap p lica tio n s to the c o u rt by private citizens for ad ju d icatio n s to be m ad e on a balance o f p robabilities. T here is no ‘accused’ in a civil c o u rt case; c o u rt decisions arc n o rm ally m ade to e sta b ­

3

124

lish liability on one side o r the other, betw een the p la in tiff (th e p erso n ap plying to the c o u rt for a se ttlem en t) an d the ap p e lla n t (th e p erso n w ho defends h im /h e rse lf against the case m ade by the p lain tiff). Even if, far from dealing w ith the m o st pressing public h arm s, the crim e th a t is g en er­ ally dealt w ith by the a p p a ra tu se s an d te ch n o lo g ies o f crim e c o n tro l involves a few, highly individualised h arm s (H illyard e t al. 2004).

Chapter 6

Assim ilating safety crimes

In tro d u c tio n

In th e p r e v i o u s c h a p te r, h a v in g i n t r o d u c e d N o r r i e ’s (2001 ) d is ti n c ti o n b etw een th e processes o f d iffere n tia tio n a n d a ssim ila tio n , we c o n sid e re d the historical basis for the fact th a t safety crim e s are n o t regarded as real c rim es in law. T h u s we arg u ed th a t o rg a n isa tio n s a n d th e ir direc to rs are rarely e x p o se d to th e s a m e c r i m i n a l c o n tr o ls o r level o f p u n i s h m e n t as relatively lo w e r s t a tu s in d i v i d u a l s ( S a n d e r s 1985). O f f e n d e r s w h o are responsible for c o m m it ti n g safety c rim es are generally regarded as socially u sefu l a n d re s p e c ta b le , a n d o fte n - b e c a u s e o f th e i r sta tu s, w e a lth a n d o t h e r r e s o u rc e s - e n jo y s o m e m e a s u r e o f in f lu e n c e ov er p u b li c p olic y decisions. M oreover, e m p lo y in g o rg an isatio n s, a n d th eir in d iv id u al d ire c ­ to r s a n d s e n i o r m a n a g e r s , are in s u la t e d by a s e p a r a te set o f ru le s t h a t g uid e c rim in a l p ro s e c u tio n for safety crim es. In this ch apter, we t u r n to e x a m i n e a p roce ss o f a s s im ila tio n , w h e re b y c o r p o r a t e d e v ia n c e is dealt w ith by ad a p tin g the existing crim in a l law rules th a t apply to individuals. O n th e face o f thin gs, a process o f assim ilation allows c o rp o r a te c rim e in c lu d in g safety crim e - to be treated as ‘real’ crim e. H av ing said this, the process o f assim ilating crim es o f the p ow erfu l m o r e generally is on e that is r a r e in any c r i m i n a l ju s tic e sy s tem . N o n e t h e l e s s , it is a p ro c e s s th a t deserves p artic u la r ex p lan a tio n in this text in o rd e r to co n sid er the p o t e n ­ tial for safety c rim e to be dealt w ith effectively by a legal system th a t is d esigned to deal w ith the crim es o f the relatively powerless.

The first, and perhaps m ost fundam ental, problem w ith the assim ilation o f safety crim es in to th e m a in strea m crim in al legal process is th a t th e crim in al law in the w estern legal ju risd ic tio n s has been d esigned w ith lower-class individual offenders in m ind. The rules o f mens rea th at have

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been developed in W estern jurisdictions tend to involve several levels of culpability. This is necessary because it is not always the case that individu­ als can be said to have clearly intended the consequences o f their actions. In safety crimes, it is not often the case that an act or omission is intended to injure or kill. Often in those cases, risks to workers or the public m ight be created w ith o u t any clear in ten tio n to kill or m aim . Cases o f safety crim es therefore norm ally imply a lower level o f culpability than intent. Safety crimes are more likely to result from the reckless or careless disregard for the consequences of taking risks. In m ost Western legal systems, this distinction can be characterised as the essential difference between ‘m urder’ and ‘m anslaughter’. The offence of m urder normally implies intent to kill, whereas m anslaughter normally implies that a death has arisen from reckless, u n inten tio n al conduct. In such cases, the test for crim inal liability is norm ally that the risk was fore­ seen or was foreseeable. In other words, the risk should have been foreseen by any reasonable person. In English law, the test is th at risk m ust have been serious and obvious enough for it to have been appreciated by the accused and that the accused was capable of appreciating the risk. However, if m an slaug hter has been a frequent analogy draw n u p o n by academ ics and safety cam paigners alike - and indeed has been one route that the c rim in alisatio n o f safety crim es has followed - there are o th e r p r o p e r tie s o f safety crim e s th at m a k e th e m a p p e a r r a t h e r m o r e like m u r d e r th a n m a n s la u g h te r. It is possible to arg ue th a t, a lth o u g h their consequences tend to be u n in te n d e d , safety crimes are often co m m itte d u n d e r conditions that o f greater p re-m e d itatio n and p lanning than m any m urders. As we have seen in C h apter 1 (and we develop this discussion in th e co n c lu s io n ), the typical causes o f safety crim es can often be linked directly to the d e m a n d s o f cost-driven m anage rial regimes. T h u s aggresive m a n a g e m e n ts , pressures u p o n employees th r o u g h tim e or resource constraints, inherently dangerous ways o f w orking established as standard o p e r a t in g p ro c e d u r e s , in a d e q u a te tr a in in g , p o o rly d esign ed or m a i n ­ ta in ed e q u i p m e n t , the absen ce o r lack o f r o b u s tn e s s o f basic safety eq u ip m en t, and the use o f casualised, overw orked or under-qualified staff can all be u n d e r s t o o d as c o n s e q u e n c e s o f p ro f it- m o t iv a t e d decisio ns m ade, or cultures set, by m an ag e m en ts. In C h a p te r 1, we saw how deci­ sions to cu t the m a i n t e n a n c e b u d g e t on P ip e r A lpha, to decrease the h a r b o u r t u r n a r o u n d tim e in P&O c h a n n e l sailing o r to p u t u n tr a in e d staff into high risk work, as in the case o f Sim on Jones, were all causal fac­ to rs in th o s e crim es. In th o s e te r m s, th ey were all crim e s th a t can be traced back to the carefully p lan n e d decisions o f a cco u n tan ts and m a n ­ agers. N otw ithstan din g the stereotypes o f crime fiction, m ost m u rd ers do no t tend to arise from p rem ed itated , calculating plans, b u t are often the

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result o f a p atte rn o f violent inte rac tion s, c o m m o n ly betw een individuals w h o k n o w each other. Safety crim es on the o th e r h a n d are, by d efin itio n, c o m m i t t e d in cold b l o o d a n d often are c o m m i t t e d in o r d e r to ad v an ce financial goals or m ain ta in profitable systems o f p ro d u c t io n . We therefore n e e d to t h i n k t h r o u g h carefully th e d is ti n c ti o n s b e tw e e n safety c rim e s a n d o th e r types o f crim es o f violence - d is tin ctio n s th a t we began to draw o u t in C h a p te r 3. At the very least, however, it is perfectly plausible to s u g ­ gest t h a t th e d i f f e r e n t ia t e d t r e a t m e n t o f safety c r i m e s is n o t a c o n s e q u e n c e o f p ro p e r tie s i n h e r e n t to such offences w hich r e n d e r th e m less b lam ew orthy . As we n o ted in C h a p te r 3, following R eim an, it m ay be re a s o n a b le to a ttach a h ig h e r de gre e o f m o r a l b la m e w o r th i n e s s to such crim es. In o t h e r w o rd s, it is th e c o n c ep ts a n d categories th a t are used in m a in s tre a m law, an d the distinctive a p p ro a c h e s th a t have been a d a p te d to safety c r i m e , r a t h e r t h a n th e c h a r a c t e r i s ti c s o f th e o ffen ce p er se, t h a t stan d in the way o f crim in alisatio n o f safety offences.

A c ts and o m issio n s

In cases o f safety crim es, th e c o n c ep t o f ‘k n o w le d g e ’ is likely to be defined as an i n d i v i d u a l ’s aw a re n e ss o f th e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f ta k in g a p a r t ic u l a r risk in th e w o rk p la c e . So if a m a n a g e r k n o w in g ly allow s e m p lo y e e s to w o rk from a heig ht w ith o u t a safety harn ess, then it m ig h t be argued th at s u f fic ie n t m en s rea is p r e s e n t to allow th e i n c i d e n t to be d e fi n e d as a crim e. But a safety c rim e rarely arises directly as a result o f a positive deci­ sio n . Safety c rim e s are m o r e likely to re s u lt fro m in d iffe r e n c e , a n d th e failure or refusal to p ro vide a d e q u a te p ro te c tio n from h a r m . In the case o f w orkp lace safety, offences te n d to be caused by failures to co m p ly w ith the m i n i m u m legal r e q u i r e m e n t s , w h e r e th e d e a d ly effects o f t h o s e are entirely predictable. Safety crim es m a y often be the result o f m a n a g e m e n t failure to do s o m e th i n g th ey sh o u ld have d o n e to p ro tect w orkers a nd the public. In o th e r w ords, safety crim es ten d to be p r o d u c e d by acts o f o m is­ sion, r a th e r th a n acts o f com m ission. A c r i m i n a l o m i s s i o n is g e n e ra lly m o r e d iffic u lt to p in d o w n th a n a c rim in a l act. It m a y often be m u c h h a rd e r to identify the lack o f action on the p a rt o f a p a rt ic u l a r m a n a g e r o r b o a r d r o o m , th a n it is to identify an act that creates a serious risk to w o rk ers o r the public. O f course there are so m e cases w h e re o m issio n s are clear. In the Lyme Bay case, it was rela­ tively easy for the p ro s e c u tio n to sh o w th a t the accused , Peter Kite, was aware o f the c o n se q u e n c e s o f his in action s. In D e c e m b e r 1994 the c o m ­ p a n y c o n c e r n e d , O LL Ltd, b e c a m e th e first c o m p a n y in E nglish legal h is to ry to be convicted o f h o m ic id e . Peter Kite, its m a n a g in g director, also

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b e c am e the first d ire c to r to be given an im m e d ia te c ustodial sen ten ce for a m a n s la u g h te r co nv ictio n arising from the o p e ra t io n o f a business. Both Kite a n d the c o m p a n y were f o u n d guilty on fou r c o u n ts o f m a n s la u g h te r arising from the death o f fo u r teenagers w h o d ro w n e d in Lyme Bay while o n a c a n o i n g trip o r g a n i s e d by OLL. Kite w as s e n t e n c e d to th r e e years i m p r i s o n m e n t , a n d th e c o m p a n y w as fin e d £ 6 0,0 00 . B ut th e case was arg uably atypical o f c o rp o r a te h o m ic id e scenarios. In this case, there was evidence th a t the risks ha d been m a d e clear to him by em ployees a n d that he h a d c h o s e n to ig n o re th o s e risks. T h e key e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d to the c o u r t was a letter from a p re v io u s e m plo y ee w a rn in g Kite o f the serious risks o f loss o f life created by c o m p a n y p roc edu re s. W i t h o u t this evidence, th e c o u rt m ay n o t have fo u n d it easy to convict. By con tra st, in the case o f the Transco Larkhall explosion in 1998 (see C h a p t e r 1), th e n e g le c t o f th e gas p ip e l i n e sy ste m t o o k plac e o v er a n u m b e r o f years a nd the failure to take action to u p g ra d e the system was identified as the responsibility o f a n u m b e r o f in div idu als in a n u m b e r o f c o m m i t t e e s a n d w o r k i n g g r o u p s . U ltim ate ly , t h e n , th e case ag a in s t the c o m p a n y did n o t p ro ce ed because th e C ro w n did n o t iden tify o n e i n d i ­ v i d u a l w ith s u f fic ie n t a u t h o r i t y a n d r e s p o n s ib i li ty fo r th e o ffen ce to trigger c o rp o r a te m ens rea. T hese p o in ts being m a d e , we m u s t e m p h a s ise th a t there is no necessary an ta g o n ism b etw een the c rim in a l law as it is c u rren tly organ ised, an d the c rim in alisatio n o f o m issio n. As Jefferson (2001: 132) has n o te d , i f ‘English law tr a d itio n a lly d oes n o t always h o ld a p e rs o n g uilty for failing to a c t’, th e re ‘are e x c e p tio n a l cases’, an d these ‘e x c e p tio n s have g ro w n in recent years’. T h u s, discussing a series o f ‘established ex cep tio n s’, Jefferson n otes the following, o f p artic u la r interest to, and relevance for, us: failure to p e r ­ fo rm a d u ty im p o s e d by c o n tr a c t; failure to p e r f o r m a d u ty im p o s e d by law; and the u n w ittin g - th at is, w here there is n o m ens rea - creatio n o f a d a n g e r o u s s i tu a tio n , since this creates a d u ty to p u t th a t s i tu a t io n rig h t (ibid.: 1 3 2 -4 1 ) . M o reo v er, he n o te s t h a t , ‘Since d e a th m a y be cau sed by o m i s s i o n , so also m a y th e lesser s t a t u t o r y o ffen ce o f c a u s i n g g rie v o u s bo dily h a r m w ith in t e n t’ (ibid.: 135).

Now', there is no doubt that som e o f the specific claims m ade by Jefferson may be contested, the relevant case law being open to differing interpreta­ tions. But w hat his discussion absolutely clarifies is that there is no necessary technical im pedim ent in crim inal law to dealing with crimes o f omission. In turn this indicates that there is space for judicial developm ent an d /o r legal reform , so that the lack o f such developm ent or failure to reform is less a technical or legal issue, and m ore a political or ideological one.

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C o r p o r a t e crim in a l p erso na lity

In regulatory law, as we have seen in the discussion of the history of the Factory Acts in the previous chapter, the test of mens rea was removed to produce a new principle of liability, thereby differentiating corporate from individual offending. The effect of this legal invention of strict liability was to sidestep the thorny issue of assimilating safety crime into the system of criminal rules that apply to individuals. The convenience of strict liability was that it removed the ‘mental element’, or the need to retain a concept of intent, and therefore it could eventually be applied relatively unproblematically both to corporations and to individuals. But strict liability was not to remain as the only basis for attributing liability in safety crimes. As case law developed throughout the twentieth century, the courts developed a method of using the rules of individual liability in relation to corporations. In essence, what happened was that the criminal law' principle of mens rea was reshaped to enable liability to be imputed to organisations and collec­ tive entities. As part of this process of reform, the law contrived a way of manufacturing a ‘corporate criminal personality’. The corporate criminal personality is analogous to, but significantly more complex than, the legal personhood ascribed to the corporation in corporate law. In the latter, the concept of limited liability allows for cor­ porations to be granted a separate ‘personality’ which is distinct from the individuals and organisational processes that comprise the corporation. Corporate personhood allows the financial liability of shareholders and managers to be limited because those liabilities are deemed to be held by separate legal entity in the ‘person’ of the corporation. Limited liability thus disconnects the corporate person from the persons that make up the corporation. The principle of limited liability is therefore the defining fea­ ture of the m odern corporation. Limited liability effectively reduces exposure for investors in the event of financial losses being incurred by the corporation. The principle of limited liability which protects corporations in Western systems of law ensures that ow'ners (normally shareholders) are not responsible for the financial liabilities of the corporation (Glasbeek 2002; Spencer 2002). If senior managers take a series of decisions that plunge the company into debt, managers or owners of the company usu­ ally will not be held liable for that debt. Investors can only lose the shares they invested in the first place, nothing more. In legal terminology, this protection for owners is knowrn as the ‘corporate veil’. In human rights law, corporations can claim the same ‘rights’ (to life, privacy, freedom of expression, and so on) as can individuals. The principal effect of the fic­ tional legal form of the corporate person is to protect the property rights of capital and to encourage the reproduction and accumulation of capital by corporations.

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At the same time as corporate personhood is held in company law to be a fixed legal state in which the limited liability corporation is protected by the same rights as any individual, the criminal law constructs a parallel but very different conceptualisation of corporations. The corporate crimi­ nal personality is b rou g h t to life only after an individual within the organisation is first implicated in the offence. This legal principle is cap­ tured in the relatively new doctrine of corporate mens rea.

T h e identification d o c t r i n e

Whilst mens rea can be said to be a relatively new doctrine, the notion of collective or group liability is an old one. In twelfth-century England, com ­ munities were held collectively liable for murder. As Wells notes, in medieval thinking, the individual was regarded as being inseparable from group and community membership. Now7, the individual has been abstracted 'from the complex of relationships, such as nationality, class, or occupation, by which she was previously defined’ (2001: 72). The enlightenment notion of the autonomous, rational self-interested individual therefore precipitated a shift in the way we think about both individual and collective liability. This methodological individualism - which became embedded in eighteenthand ninteenth-century English law - has had profound consequences for how the courts developed a concept of corporate liability. The concept of corporate mens rea, which evolved in the English courts and was followed by other c o m m o n law jurisdictions th r o u g h o u t the twentieth century, assumes that a corporation can not be held liable for a crime unless an individual within the organisation with sufficient knowl­ edge of the offence and with the necessary responsibility and authority in the organisation can first be identified. In other words, corporate mens rea depends upon identifying a particular ‘controlling m in d ’ within the organization that can be said to be responsible for the offence. There is a long and complex case history of the evolution of corporate mens rea and we are therefore wary of over-simplifying the issues (see Wells 2001; Slapper and Tombs 1999: 26-35; and Gobert and Punch 2003: 59-69). Having noted this as a word of caution, a good illustration of the origins of principle applied for determining who are the people representing the 'controlling minds’ of the corporation is summed up in a dictum of Lord D enn in g’s in the 1957 case of H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. L td .v . T.J. Graham & Sons: A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and a nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions from the

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centre. Some o f the people in the c om pa ny are m ere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot be said to represent the m ind or will. Others are directors and m a n ­ agers who represent the directing m ind and will o f the company and control what it does. The state of m ind o f these managers is the state of m ind of the company and it is treated by the law as such.1 L a tte rly in a k ey cas e, V i s c o u n t D i l h o r n e in t h e case o f Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass d e f i n e d t h e c o n t r o l l i n g m i n d : ... w h o is in a c t u a l c o n t r o l o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f a c o m p a n y o r o f p a r t o f t h e m a n d w h o is n o t r e s p o n s i b l e t o a n o t h e r p e r s o n in t h e c o m ­ p a n y f o r t h e m a n n e r in w h i c h h e d i s c h a r g e s h is d u t i e s in t h e s e n s e o f b e i n g u n d e r h is o r d e r s . 2

The 'id entification d o c tr in e ’ can be u n d e rs to o d as an extension o f the n otio n o f ‘corporate personality’ since it establishes the corp oration as a separate entity from the directors and managers that make decisions on behalf o f the corporation. Yet it departs from ‘corporate personality’ in so far as it establishes a com plex an d often difficult-to-establish route to establishing the organisation’s criminal state which, unlike the concept of corporate personality, rests on the identification o f an individual’s acts or omissions. The key problem that has been experienced in a succession of cases is the difficulty of actually identifying one individual who can be said to co nstitute the c ontrolling m in d o f the organisation. This individual m ust also be shown to have been grossly negligent and to have been aware that the risk of causing death is bo th serious and obvious. Although in a series o f cases in the 1980s the courts failed to make the basis for prosecu­ tion clear, it seems that this test remains a tough one (for a discussion of the complexities o f this debate, see Hartley 2001; and Bergman 2000). R e f e r r in g b a c k to t h e L y m e Bay ca se o u t l i n e d a b o v e , t h e relatively s m a ll size o f t h e c o m p a n y O L L L td m a d e it r e a s o n a b l y easy to i d e n t i f y a n i n d i ­ v i d u a l w h o c a n b e s a id t o h a v e b e e n t h e ‘c o n t r o l l i n g m i n d ’. T h e case fo r the p r o s e c u tio n w as b o lstered by the ev id en ce o f a letter fro m th e f o rm e r e m ployees th a t in d isp u ta b ly m a d e the m a n a g in g d ire c to r aw are o f the r isk s in q u e s t i o n ; s e r i o u s risk s t h a t , as t h e p r o s e c u t i o n w a s a b l e to sh o w , w e r e n o t s u b s e q u e n t l y a d d r e s s e d w i t h a n y u r g e n c y . B e t w e e n t h e O L L Ltd p r o s e c u t i o n a n d A p ril 2 0 0 6 , six m o r e c o m p a n i e s h a v e b e e n c o n v i c t e d fo r c o r p o ra te m a n s la u g h te r. M o st o f th o se c o n v ic tio n s have b een against very s m a l l c o m p a n i e s . 3 As S u l l i v a n ( 2 0 0 1 : 3 3 ) h a s n o t e d , t h e law as it s t a n d s ‘e n s u r e s t h a t , de facto, l i a b i l i t y is c o n f i n e d to s m a l l c o m p a n i e s ’ (see also D u n f o r d a n d R idley 1996). H e r e we fin d an in c re a s in g ly g la r in g iro n y : w h i l e t h e v e r y size a n d c o m p l e x i t y o f l a r g e o r g a n i s a t i o n s h a v e b e e n k e y

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features in producing disaster, those sam e features have rendered the id e n ­ tification o f a controlling m ind , and th us co rp orate prosecution, virtually impossible (Tombs and W hyte 2003a). The most notable challenges to the identification do ctrin e came in the P&O case (see C ha p te r 1) and th en in the prosecution o f Great Western Trains over the Southall train crash, where, in 1997, six people died and som e 150 were injured after an InterC ity passenger train plo ughed into a freight train. In the latter case, the Crow n tried to argue that the doctrine o f identification no longer applied and that it was possible to consider the co n d u ct o f the ‘c o m p a n y ’ as a whole rather th an the c o n d u c t o f an in d i­ vidual ‘controlling m i n d ’. The trial judge however ruled that: T here is, I accept, som e a ttra ctio n in the fact th a t gross negligence manslaughter, involving as it does an objective test rath er th an m ens rea in the strict sense o f the exp ression , is in so m e ways closer to sta tu to ry offences o f the k ind in the cases relied on by M r Lissack than it is to the o rd inary run o f criminal offences. But I do n ot think this is a go o d rea son for no lo n g er h avin g to look for a d irec tin g m i n d in th e c o m p a n y to identify w h ere the fault o c c u rre d . In my ju d g m e n t it is still necessary to look for such a directing m in d and id entify w h ose gross negligence it is th a t fixes th e c o m p a n y w ith criminal responsibility.

Accordingly, I conclude that the doctrine of identification which is both clear, certain and established is the relevant doctrine by which a corpo­ ration may be fixed with liability for manslaughter by gross negligence. As a result of this ruling, the Attorney General asked the Court of Appeal for a clarification of the law on this point. In Attorney General’s Reference No 2/1999, the court held that the Trial judge was correct and that ‘the identifica­ tion principle remains the only basis in com mon law for corporate liability for gross negligence manslaughter’. In other w'ords, at least as we write,4 mens rea remains a pre-requisite for corporate manslaughter cases to proceed. T h e c o r p o r a te m ens rea a p p r o a c h was d e v e lo p e d in o r d e r to allow org anisatio ns to fit w ithin a b o d y o f law th at, as we have seen earlier in this ch a p te r, is u n d e r p i n n e d by m e t h o d o lo g i c a l in d iv id u a lis m . T his attem p t to resolve a con trad ictio n th ro w n up by the criminal law has also created a new internal contradiction: th at organisational prosecutions arc ultim ately d e p e n d a n t u p o n the case against an individual. As Tim Kaye has rem arked, ... it is a very strange form o f legal personality which says th at a p e rs o n is legally re sponsible only w h en s o m e o n e else is guilty as well’ (1992: 354; see also Neocleous 2003: 84).

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T h e p rin cip le o f a g g r e g a t i o n Safety c r i m e s , like m a n y c o r p o r a t e c r i m e s in g en e r a l, are rare ly i m p u t a b l e to t h e a c t i o n s o f o n e i n d i v i d u a l o r a g r o u p o f i n d i v i d u a l s a c t i n g a l o n e . T h e p r i n c i p l e o f a g g r e g a t i o n p r e s u m e s t h a t c o r p o r a t e mens rea c a n be i m p u t e d to an o r g a n i s a t i o n b y c o m b i n i n g t h e acts o r o m i s s i o n s o f several d if fe r e n t a g e n t s o f th e c o r p o r a t i o n across m a n a g e r i a l levels o f th e o r g a n i ­ s a t io n a n d a c r o ss ti m e . C l a i m s t h a t a p r i n c i p l e o f a g g r e g a t i o n m i g h t a p p l y in law h a v e b e e n r a i s e d in a r g u m e n t s h e a r d at t w o l a n d m a r k t r ia ls , t h e P & O case in E n g l a n d a n d the T ra n s c o case in S c o tla n d . C o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e d o c t r i n e o f i d e n t i f i c a t io n , in o r d e r to es tablis h th a t P & O itse lf w as gu ilty o f m a n s l a u g h t e r , th e p r o s e c u t i o n h a d to first p r o v e t h a t o n e o f its c o n t r o l l i n g d i r e c t o r s o r s e n i o r m a n a g e r s w a s g u i l t y o f m a n s l a u g h t e r . W h e n t h e p r o s e c u t i o n a g a i n s t five s e n i o r e m p l o y e e s c o l ­ l a p s e d , t h e case a g a i n s t t h e c o m p a n y i n e v i t a b l y w e n t t o o . F u r t h e r r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t h e c r i m i n a l r e s p o n s i b i li t y o f c o r p o r a t i o n s w ere set o u t in a H i g h C o u r t r u l i n g w h i c h in effect p r e c l u d e d t h e a g g r e g a t i o n o f f a u l t f ro m se vera l d i r e c t o r s as b e i n g s u f f ic ie n t to i n c r i m i n a t e t h e c o m p a n y . O n this m a t t e r , B i n g h a m L.J. r u l e d that:

Whether the defendant is a corporation or a personal defendant, the ingredients of manslaughter must be established by proving the nec­ essary mens rea and actus reus against it or him by evidence properly to be relied on against it or him. A case against a personal defendant cannot be fortified by evidence against another defendant. The case against a corporation can only be made by evidence properly addressed to showing guilt on the part of the corporation as such.5 If this sounds complex, that’s because it is. But we can cut through the cir­ cularity of the arg um ent to some extent if we retain some no tio n of a simultaneous process o f assimilation and differentiation. Wrhat Lord Justice Bingham is arguing here is that if we apply the norm al rules of criminal process, the courts would not usually allow the actions of one individual to contribute to another’s guilt. By doing so, the precedent that has followed this case has effectively fixed the notion of corporate personhood firmly in the arena of criminal law. In other words, he is therefore assimilating very narrowly the corporation into the criminal process. Because often corpo­ rate killing involves aggregation, for reasons indicated above, the precedent set here has ensured that a great many cases will not be heard in front of a criminal court. This ruling shows therefore that attempts to assimilate cor­ porations into a system of law designed for individuals can actually have the effect of differentiating safety crimes. This is the paradox that the law

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has created w ith the d o c trin e o f id entification, on e which o the rs have po in ted out, stems from Bingham having ‘kn otted h im self’ in a circular argum ent (Slapper, personal interview cited in Hartley 2001). It is this par­ adox that, as Kaye (1992: 349) observes, makes the crim inal law look decidedly‘schizophrenic’ when it is applied to the corporation. T he key advantage in the principle o f aggregation is that individual states o f m in d can be ad ded togeth er in o rd e r to p ro d u c e a c o rp o rate guilty mind. The P&O ruling following the sinking of the Herald o f Free Enterprise denied the legal integrity o f this principle an d a very similar endpoint was reached by the court in the Transco case (see Chapter 1). In the latter case, the failure to review and replace dangerous piping by the firm took place in several meetings at different levels o f the organisation which spanned a n um b er o f years. The prosecution’s novel argum ent that such decisions an d n o n -d ecisio n s could be aggregated across tim e to im p u te co rp o ra te liability was also den ied by the court. T he case was widely know n as ‘Scotland’s Herald of Free Enterprise’, a title which has an unintended, but pointed, double meaning. The P&O and Transco cases highlight im po rtan t contradictions in the law as it applies to corporations. First, they highlight a general paradox. O rganisational crimes are very often m ore easily co m m itted because of the diffusion of responsibility and blame that occurs in large org anisa­ tions. Complicity in crimes of a bureaucracy or an organisation is much more amenable to techniques of neutralisation on the part of individuals involved, quite simply because they may be able to p o in t to m u ltiple causes at several levels o f the organisation. The very same features of an organisation that make safety crimes m ore likely, then, are the features that prevent the perpetrator being held culpable for m an slau gh ter/ho m i­ cide in a crim inal court. Second, these cases also denied the possibility that the actions of different individuals at different stages of the decision­ making process could be aggregated to produce organisational fault. Yet, as we have seen already in this chapter, there is a contradiction in c o m ­ pany law, whereby corporations arc constructed in a very specific way that enables the various c o m p o n e n t s o f the o rg anisa tio n and its decision m ak in g processes to be considered as a singular whole. The P&O and Transco rulings reveal an inherent bias in the law’s concept of corporate p e rs o n h o o d . In those cases, the idea th a t the c o rp o r a tio n could be regarded as a integrated decision-maker for the purposes of criminal co n ­ duct was effectively rejected. The courts dispensed with the principle of aggregation at the point when its application would implicate the c o m ­ pany in a serious crime. The law, in other words, grants the corporation a singular, human-like identity that protects it from the legal liabilities that hu m an beings cannot escape - yet this singular identity apparently does not apply when the corporation is being held to account for its crimes.

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G e n e r a l i s i n g c o r p o r a t e lia b ilit y

To this p o in t, we have been e x a m in in g h o w th e crim in a l law in E n glan d an d Wales6 has developed a form o f c o rp o r a te liability for m an slaug hter. Yet we m ig h t extend o u r d elib era tio n s b ey o n d deaths, to co n sid er how the law m i g h t proceed against c o rp o r a ti o n s for crim es o f violence resulting in in juries s h o r t o f death. N o w th ere is n o reaso n, theo re tically at least, why c o rp o r a te m en s rea c o u ld n o t be a p p lie d to a w h o le ra n g e o f c rim e s o f v io le n c e c a u se d by c o r p o r a t i o n s ( s u c h as c o r p o r a t e e n d a n g e r m e n t o r c o r p o r a t e a ss a u lt offences; B e rg m a n 2000). In practic e, o f co urse, p r o s e c u tin g a u th o r it ie s have n o t bee n m i n d e d to b r i n g such cases. If th e r e is no d o c tr in a l legal reason for this, th e n th e e x p lan a tio n o f such a lim ited a p p ro a c h to a ssim i­ la t io n m u s t lie s o m e w h e r e b e y o n d th e legal pro c es s. In E n g la n d a n d Wales, th e r e h as b e e n no s u s ta in e d p u b lic d e b a te a b o u t c o r p o r a t e v i o ­ lence bey o n d the high profile ‘disaster’ cases. T h e idea th a t c o r p o r a ti o n s can be held liable for all c rim in a l offences is by n o m e a n s a new one. In the 1699 ed ition o f G eorge M acK enzie’s Law and C ustom es o f Scotland in M atters C rim inal, a text th a t is recognised as th e first a tt e m p t to codify th e c rim in a l law in S cotland , th e a u th o r , w h o was S c o tla n d ’s m o s t senio r ju rist o f th e tim e, discusses w h e th e r a collec­ tive b o d y o f people o r an ‘in c o r p o r a t i o n ’ can c o m m i t a crim e o r n o t. His c o n c lu s io n was th a t, u n d e r c e rta in c ir c u m sta n c e s, i n c o r p o r a t i o n s co u ld in d eed c o m m i t c rim e a n d c o u ld be p u n is h e d for th o s e crim es, a n d th at ‘ru le rs ’ o f the i n c o r p o r a t io n - the individuals responsible for th e in c o r p o ­ r a t io n ’s c rim e - s h o u ld be likewise p u n is h e d . S o m e have specu lated that h a d it n o t been for th e 1707 Act o f U n io n , Scots law u n d e r M acK en z ie’s in fluence w o uld have been codified. H ad this tr a n sp ire d , it is possible that a general princip le o f co rp o r a te liability m ig h t have featured in S c o tla n d ’s c rim in a l code since the early e ig h te e n th ce ntu ry . O f co u rs e this d id n ot tra n sp ire . A m o r e recent D ra ft C r im in a l C o d e p u b lish e d by the Scottish Law C o m m is s io n (Clive et al. 2003) notes t h a t ‘the existing law on c o r p o ­ ra te liab ility is n o t s a t i s f a c t o r y ’ a n d a rg u e s t h a t c o r p o r a t i o n s as ‘legal p e rs o n s ’ sh o u ld be liable for a range o f offences in the c rim in al code. S om e jurisd iction s, such as France, have so u g h t to in tro d u c e co rp o r a te c rim in a l liability based u p o n rigid prin ciples o f c o rp o r a te m ens rea (Wells 2001). In C a n a d a , the C-45 Bill, in tro d u c e d by a reform process triggered by th e W estray d is a s te r in w h ic h 26 m i n e r s d ie d , cre a te d a new w ay o f a t t r i b u t i n g c r i m i n a l liability for o rg a n i s a ti o n s . T h e r e f o r m e d C r im in a l C o d e in C a n a d a allowed ‘o r g a n i z a t i o n s ’ to be p ro s e c u te d for an y o f the c rim in a l offences set o u t in the C rim in a l C o d e - n o t ju s t involving deaths.

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It c o v e r s , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e o f f e n c e o f ' c a u s i n g b o d i l y h a r m b y c r i m i n a l n e g l i g e n c e ’ as well as f i n a n c i a l a n d o t h e r o f f e n c e s w h i c h go b e y o n d t h e realm o f sa fe ty c r i m e s . At t h e t i m e o f w r i t i n g , t h e r e f o r m s in C a n a d a are relatively n e w a n d have ye t to b e fully te s te d b y t h e c o u r t s .

A particularly interesting attem pt to create a novel form of corporate liability know'n as the ‘corporate culture m o d el’ has been developed recently in Australia. U nder the Australian Federal Crim inal Code Act (1995), liability can be attributed to a corporation if its board o f directors or a senior manager intentionally, knowingly or recklessly carried out the relevant conduct. Intention, knowledge or recklessness can be also attrib­ uted to a corporation where it is established either that a ‘corporate culture existed within the body corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance with the relevant provision’ or where the corpora­ tion failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that ensured legal compliance. Corporate culture is defined in the Act as ‘an attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate gen­ erally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities takes place’.7 In the corporate culture model, liability can be im puted where the individual who committed the unlawful act reasonably believed that an authoritative member of the corporation would have authorised or permitted the commission of the offence. An authorisation or permission can be established by proving that, on the one hand, the board of direc­ tors, or a high managerial agent of the body corporate, directly authorised, or implied authorisation, or permitted the commission of the offence. On the other hand, the authorisation or permission can also be established by proving that a corporate culture existed within the body corporate or that the body corporate failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that required compliance with the relevant provision. Effectively, then, in the corporate culture model, there is no need to show that any one person acting within the corporation was negligent. Negligence can be found in the conduct o f the corp oration viewed as a whole. This is reflected in Section 2 of Section 12.4 of the Act which states that ‘fault element may exist on the part of the body corporate if the body corporate’s conduct is negligent when viewed as a whole (that is, by aggregating the conduct of any number of its employees, agents or officers)’.8 It is also worth drawing attention to recent, novel attempts in Italy to develop a model of corporate criminal liability - albeit one generated in the context o f efforts to pursue financial rather than safety offences. In March 2002, legislation was passed to create two types of corporate liabil­ ity. One invokes crimes committed by the head of a corporation, and thus is not far removed from the principle of identification. Much more signifi­ cant, however, is a second, ‘innovative element’, which has established the

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concept o f ‘structural negligence’ (G obert and Punch 2003: 111). This refers to the negligence of a corporation as an organisation or entity, thus rooting liability in ‘organisational fault’ (ibid.: 110). In defending itself against any prosecution, and to demonstrate due diligence, a corporate body must show that it had considered the possibility of an offence and had put into place measures to avoid this outcome. A clear implication is that ‘the company needs to have established guidelines and control systems that take into account the risk of the offence being committed. If it has not, then it will be found to be “structurally negligent”. ‘It is not enough that the company has set up a generic control system’ (ibid.: 111). This again is an innovation which attempts to reflect the actual nature and functioning of the m odern corporation - and, though not developed for the purpose, there is no reason why it could not apply to safety offences. In the Netherlands, where there has been a specified principle of corporate liability in the Dutch Penal Code since 1976, the courts have very slowly and tentatively moved towards establishing organisational criteria for attributing liability and fault. The Dutch approach is based upon the two principles of ‘power and acceptance’ developed in case law. Corporate liability in the Netherlands rests upon showing whether the defendant (the corporation) had the necessary power to determine whether an employee acted in a partic­ ular way; and whether the corporation normally accepted such conduct (Field and Jorg 1991: 163-64). The concepts of power and acceptance p o i n t n o t to t h e j u d g m e n t o f i s o l a t e d p o s i t i v e acts by i n d i v i d u a l s , b u t to c o n t i n u i n g collective processes. B o th su g g e st m o r e t h a n ju s t a g e n e r a l i s e d v a l u e j u d g e m e n t : o u g h t t h i s to h a v e b e e n a l l o w e d to h ap p en ? T h ey req u ire co n crete e x a m in a tio n o f the re latio n sh ip b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l s a n d c o r p o r a t e g r o u p s a n d a f o c u ss in g o n c o r p o ­ rate d e c is io n m a k i n g p ro cess es, (ibid.: 166) T h is p r o d u c e s , in p r i n c i p l e at least, t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t c o r p o r a t e c r i m e s are p r o d u c e d b y o n g o i n g m a n a g e r i a l p r o c e s s e s t h a t are r o u t i n e l y t o l e r ­ a te d , t h u s a c c o u n t i n g fo r t h e fact t h a t , as we n o t e ab o v e , c o r p o r a t e c r i m e s o f t e n ste m f r o m o m i s s i o n s r a t h e r t h a n c o m m i s s i o n s . Yet Field a n d J o r g ’s d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c o r p o r a t e liab i l i t y in t h e N e t h e r l a n d s also raises si m i l a r t e n s i o n s as t h o s e d i s c u s s e d a b o v e in r e la tio n to i d e n t i f i ­ c a t i o n . A l t h o u g h t h e ‘p o w e r a n d a c c e p t a n c e ’ m o d e l allow s us to a g g reg ate a se ries o f d e c i s i o n s m a d e ( a n d n o t m a d e ) in t h e b o d y c o r p o r a t e a c r o ss t i m e a n d in a r a n g e o f d i f fe r e n t s i t u a t i o n s , t h e r e r e m a i n s a n e e d to i d e n ­ tify w h e r e liability rests fo r t h e g e n e r a l p ra c t i c e s o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n . T h e d iv isio n o f w h e r e t h e p o w e r lies in t h e c o r p o r a t i o n ( o r in A n g l o - d o c t r i n a l t e r m s , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n th e ‘h a n d s ’ a n d t h e ‘b r a i n ’ o f t h e c o r p o r a ­ t i o n ) is n o t f o r m a l l y m a d e .

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A de fa cto c o r p o r a t e veil

So far, this chap ter has argued that the ‘identification d o c tr in e ’ conjures up a rath er odd conceptualisation o f the relationship between the c o r p o ­ ration and the individual. For the purpo ses o f identifying the defendant, the identification do ctrin e separates the organisation from its constituent parts (its workers and its senior m an agers and directors). The co rpo rate entity, as in c o rpo rate law, is envisaged as a separate person. This c o r p o ­ rate person enjoys the same protections and rights as an individual (it has recourse to appeal, to the provisions of the H u m a n Rights Act and so on) b u t it do es n o t have the sam e liabilities as in d iv id u als. T he law insists up o n the identification o f a rational, free-acting and thin kin g individual w ho can be said to possess the necessary m ens rea before a c o m p any can be regarded as guilty.

This has resulted in two key effects. First, reluctance on the part of the CPS to prosecute for corporate manslaughter indicated by the low num ber o f prosecutions taken, and second, the failure of som e high profile, and apparently clear-cut, cases. Each of these likely consequences was illustrated starkly in October 20059 when Network Rail and Balfour Beatty were fined an unprecedented total of £13.5m for breaches of health and safety regula­ tions related to the Hatfield train crash in 200010 (Balfour Beatty’s fine was later reduced from £10 million to £7.5 million on appeal). Earlier, Balfour Beatty and five rail executives had faced charges of corporate manslaughter, only for the case to be halted by the judge due to a lack o f evidence. Two weeks later, the CPS decided not to proceed with manslaughter charges fol­ lowing the Potters Bar train crash,11 on the grounds th at there was no realistic prospect of conviction; yet in 2004, Network Rail and Jarvis had accepted legal responsibility for claims arising from the crash, to provide com fort and assistance’ to the victims. T h ere is no little irony here w h en we con sid er the p o in t m ad e in the p re v io u s c h a p te r th a t the c ri m i n a l law a n d its g u id in g p rin c ip le s are designed to deal with individual offending. T he crim inal justice process takes so m e o d d twists an d tu r n s in o r d e r to g u a ra n te e th at in d iv id u a l d ir e c to r s a n d s e n io r m a n a g e rs are u nlikely to be held liable for safety crimes. This is u nderlined by a clear preference for corporate as oppo sed to individual prosecutions in regulatory cases. Normally, it is the o rg a n i­ sation, rath er th an its senior officials, that is prosecuted for safety crimes. A nd in m o s t cases, the c o m p a n y faces a fine w h ich , as we will see in C hap ter 8, is neither particularly punitive n o r likely to secure a d eterrent effect. We will also argue in this chapte r that the debate on criminalising safety crimes quickly loses its m ean ing if we only con centrate on the legal process o f law itself w i th o u t c o n s id e rin g the fo rm o f p u n i s h m e n t an d

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w h a t it aim s to achieve ( D u n f o r d a n d Ridley 1996; Wells 2001). We will also set o u t why the use o f fines against c o rp o r a ti o n s is n o t a p articularly effective m e a n s o f p u n is h m e n t . T h e key p o i n t is th a t c o rp o r a ti o n can act as a con v en ie n t shield for the key decision m ake rs in the c o rp o r a tio n . T he c o rp o r a ti o n can effectively ab so rb the p u n i s h m e n t , n o rm a lly in the form o f a fine, w h ile its d ir e c t o r s a n d s e n i o r m a n a g e r s are relatively rarely exposed to san ction . Between 1980 a n d 2004, only 11 directors were c o n ­ victed for m a n s la u g h te r. O f th ose, five were im p r i s o n e d , o n e received a c o m m u n i t y sentence a n d five were given s u s p e n d e d sentences. T he av er­ age c u sto d ial s e n ten ce was two an d a h a lf y e a rs .12 We can say, therefore, th a t ju s t as th e n o ti o n o f c o rp o r a te p e r s o n h o o d erects a veil w hich p r o ­ tects b o th the o w n ers a n d the sen io r officers o f the co m p an y , a c o rp o ra te veil also exists in a de facto sense w h e n it co m es to safety crimes. T h e UK g o v e r n m e n t ’s C o r p o r a t e M a n s l a u g h t e r a n d C o r p o r a t e H o m ic i d e Bill (see n o te 4) explicitly d en ie s the p ossib ility o f in d iv id u a l liability. Section 16 o f th e Bill specifically excludes offences th a t will apply to in d iv id u a l s a n d n o te s th at: ‘an in d i v id u a l c a n n o t be f o u n d g u ilty o f a id i n g , a b e t t i n g , c o u n s e l i n g o r p r o c u r i n g an o ffe n c e o f c o r p o r a t e m a n s l a u g h t e r ’. T his clause is p articu larly in terestin g since m o s t crim in a l offences can be p ro s ecu ted if s o m e o n e has been co m plicit in the crim e by aidin g an d abetting. It is significant in the con text o f this d ebate th a t the I n s t i t u t e o f D ir e c t o r s m o v e d f r o m o p p o s i t i o n to th e G o v e r n m e n t ’s r e f o rm p r o p o s a l s to v o c if e r o u s s u p p o r t fo r a c h a n g e in c o r p o r a t e m a n s l a u g h t e r law (see, for e x a m p le , The S a fety a n d H ealth P ra ctitio n er, D e c e m b e r 2002: 4) in 2002, ju s t as the G o v e r n m e n t ’s p o s itio n ch an g ed . By c o n tr a s t, th o s e g r o u p s w ith an in te re st in th e p r o t e c ti o n o f w o rk e rs a n d m e m b e r s o f the p u b lic (such as tr a d e u n i o n s a n d victim s o rg a n i s a ­ tions) a rgu ed equally vociferously for in d iv id u al liability. T h e Bill’s rejection o f an in div idu al offence co n tra sts w ith the position taken by the C a n a d ia n g o v e r n m e n t w hich n o ted th at u n d e r th eir new leg­ islation a c o rp o r a te executive o r b o a r d m e m b e r can also be liable u n d e r the C rim in a l C o d e for a iding o r ab ettin g an offence, c ou nselling a person to be a p a r t y to an o ffe n c e , o r b e in g an ac c e ss o ry a fte r th e fact to an offence.13 T h e A ustralian C apital T erritory (A CT) enacted a sep arate in d i ­ v id u a l offence in the C rim e s (In d u stria l M a n s la u g h te r ) A m e n d m e n t Bill 2003 to allow for the p ro s e c u tio n o f ‘sen ior officers’ if th ey negligently or recklessly cau sed th e d eath o f a w orker. S e nio r officers face a m a x i m u m pe n a lty o f 25 years’ i m p r i s o n m e n t if th ey are c o n v ic te d .14 P ro secu tion s o f directo rs u n d e r regu lato ry law in the UK are also rela­ tively rare. In th e ten years u p to D e c e m b e r 2005, H SC have calc u lated th a t , u n d e r th e HASAW Act, ‘p r o c e e d i n g s have b e e n b r o u g h t ag a in s t a to ta l o f 1 1 1 d i r e c to r s , o f w h ic h 86 w ere c o n v ic t e d a n d 11 w ere j a i l e d ’ (H ealth a n d Safety C o m m is s io n 2005c: 2); m oreo ver, these p ro s e c u tio n s

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h a d ‘d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y i m p a c t e d o n sm all f i r m s ’ (H e a lt h a n d Safety C o m m i s s i o n 2 0 0 5 d , p a r a 5.2). S im ila rly lo w levels o f p r o s e c u t i o n are re v e a le d in rese arc h by th e C CA w h ic h sh o w s t h a t , in th e th r e e years betw een 2002/03 a n d 2004/05, there were on ly 28 co nv ictio ns o f c o m p a n y d i r e c t o r s fo r b r e a c h i n g th e HASAVV A c t .15 In th e c o n t e x t o f th e to ta l figure o f c o n viction s for h ealth a n d safety offences ( a r o u n d 1,000 a year on average), c o n vic tion s o f directors re p rese n t less th a n 3 p e r cent o f all health an d safety pro sec u tio n s. We can therefore identify a n o th e r feature o f th e de fa c to c o r p o r a t e veil w h ic h p r o t e c ts b o t h th e o w n e r s a n d th e se n io r officers o f the c o m p a n y ; a veil th a t is created in the ap plication o f reg ulatory law. T h ere are a w hole set o f separate issues relating to the failure to p ro s e ­ c u te d i r e c to r s for HASAW Act o ffences. T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t re a s o n ap pe ars to be th a t the law does n o t specify duties for ind iv id u al directors. This arises from the e m p h a s is in health a n d safety law u p o n the duties o f ‘em p lo y e rs’, a term th at the co u rts have consistently in te rp re te d as m e a n ­ ing the c o m p a n y r a th e r th a n the in d iv id u al directo rs o f th e co m pan y. In o th e r w o rds, the d uties placed u p o n c o m p a n ie s generally d o n o t im p o se duties o n directors. Section 37 o f the HASAW Act does allow for c o m p a n y directors to be p ro s e cu ted if an offence has arisen from t h e ‘c o n s e n t’, ‘c o n ­ n i v a n c e ’ o r ‘n e g l e c t ’ o f th e d ir e c to r . H o w e v e r, th e a b s e n c e o f p o sitiv e safety d u tie s placed u p o n d ir e c to r s m ak es the av o id an c e o f p ro s e c u tio n relatively easy because there is n o o n u s on the in d iv id u al d ire cto r to take an y a c ti o n to e n s u r e th e law is n o t b ro k e n . T h is relates d ir e c tly to th e p o in ts we have already m a d e a b o u t acts an d o m issio n s in this chapter. It m ig h t be relatively easy to p ro sec u te a d irecto r for c o m m it ti n g a c rim in a l act. But an o m issio n th a t leads to a c rim e - w hich is a m u c h m o r e likely form o f culp ability for safety crim es - does n o t necessarily im p ly a breach o f Section 3 7 .16 T h e significance o f this lo o p h o le in failing to p rov id e a d e ­ q u a te in centives for d ire cto rs to m a i n ta i n a safe w o rk p lac e is c o n firm e d by a co m p re h e n siv e review o f e vidence o n th e effectiveness o f health and safety r e g u l a ti o n . T h is review, M a k in g C o m p a n ie s Safe: W h a t W o rks? (Davis 2004), identifies the need to close the c u rr e n t legal lo op ho les that e n a b le d ir e c to r s to ‘a b ro g a te all r e s p o n s ib ilitie s for e n s u r i n g t h a t th e ir c o m p a n ie s co m p ly w ith the law a n d o perate safe systems o f w o r k ’ (ibid.: 28; em p h as is in the original).

A set o f proposals on directors’ duties proposed by G lazebrook argues that a tighter form of directors’ liability could be secured by the adaption o f directors’ liability clauses, no t only in the HASAW Act, b u t in a range o f regulatory statutes. T his w ould involve the creatio n o f new offences o f causing death or serious injury by breaching safety regulations (including the Environm ental Protection Act and N uclear Installations Act, as well as

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the HASAW Act). The offences w ould be pinned to directors by asserting that ‘[e]very person who is (or has the duties of) a director o f a corporation is u n d er a duty to prevent the com m ission o r co n tin u an ce o f scheduled offences by the co rp o ratio n ’ (G lazebrook 2002: 420). In these proposals, breaches of those offences would carry sentences o f up to ten years. W h a t is ra th e r o d d a b o u t the c u r r e n t d e b ate a b o u t a c c o u n ta b ility for d ir e c t o r s a n d s e n i o r m a n a g e r s is t h a t p r o p o s a l s to im p r o v e d i r e c t o r s ’ a cco un tab ility are generally split betw een th ose w ho advocate th e creation o f a new crim e o f violence, an d those w h o w o u ld a m e n d existing regula­ to ry law. In the UK, ind iv idu al acco u n tab ility is always po sed as a choice b e tw e e n th e c r e a t io n o f a n e w c r i m e o f v io le n c e t h a t can m o r e easily a ttrib u te liability for safety c rim e s to in d iv id u al directo rs o r senior m a n ­ agers, o r a m e n d m e n t s to th e HASAW Act. In o th e r w o rd s, th e d e b a te is always fr a m e d in te r m s o f a choice b etw een d ifferentiatio n a n d assim ila­ tion. T h ere is no logical reason n o t to seek reform by b o th routes (see, for e x a m p le , Hall a n d J o h n s to n e 2005). In m o s t ju r is d i c ti o n s , d ir e c to r s are g ra n te d the o p p o r t u n i t y in law to hide b e h in d the de facto c o rp o r a te veil t h a t is e re c te d by c r i m i n a l law. D e a lin g effectively w ith safety c ri m e s m e a n s th a t we m u s t a d a p t the law to deal w ith th e full range o f obstacles th at lie in the ro a d to a c cou ntability for directo rs a nd se n io r m anag ers.

C o n clu sio n

For Glasbeek (2005), th e choice facing law refo rm ers seeking to assimilate safety crim es into th e m a in s tre a m o f crim es o f violence can be expressed as a choice b etw e en c o r p o r a te p ers o n a lity -b a s e d m e t h o d s o f a tt r i b u ti n g liability (such as c o rp o r a te m ens rea) and th e cre atio n o f a new basis for liability w hich stretches the b o u n d a r i e s o f the id en tification d o c trin e . As we have d e m o n s t r a t e d , te c h n i c a l legal p r o b l e m s a p p e a r to b e se t b o t h a p p r o a c h e s . In s u m , the c o u r t s have t e n d e d to c o n s t r u c t an e x tr e m e l y rigid r o u t e to th e f o r m e r , a n d th e la t te r r o u t e h a s te n d e d to le ad to a w aterin g d o w n o f the crim in a l status o f the offence a n d the offender. This does n o t m e a n , however, th at it is b ey o n d o u r im a g in a tio n to develop laws w hich seek a new a p p r o a c h to c o rp o r a te liability w h ich do n o t d e c r i m i ­ nalise safety crim es. T he ro u te to law reform in C a n a d a , alth o u g h it also c o n ta in s so m e p o ten tia l flaws, is im p o r t a n t b ecause it explicitly a tte m p te d to find this balance. In this a n d the p re v io u s c h a p te r we have d iscu ssed the h is to ric a l an d technical processes o f ‘a ssim ilatio n ’ a n d ‘d if fe re n tia tio n ’ in the c ri m i n a li­ sation o f safety offences. This historical perspective in s tru cts us th a t there is n o th i n g ‘n a t u r a l ’ or ‘h a n d e d d o w n ’ a b o u t the c rim in al law. Rather, the

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c r i m i n a l law evolved in r e s p o n s e to a n e e d to m a i n t a i n a p a r t i c u l a r social o r d e r a n d to m e d i a t e in c o n flic ts th a t t h r e a t e n to d i s r u p t th a t o rd e r. T h e a r g u m e n t s o f C a r s o n , M a rx , a n d o t h e r s 17 are n o t s im p ly t h a t th e c r im in a l law r ig id ly a n d reflexively d e f e n d s th e in te r e s ts o f th e r u l i n g class to th e e x c lu s io n o f o t h e r g r o u p s . To m a i n t a i n o r d e r effectively, i n s t i t u t i o n s o f th e law also n e e d to re ta in p la u sib le c la im s to e q u ity a n d fairn e ss - a n d o n th i s b a s is a l o n e , p o w e r f u l m e m b e r s o f s o c ie ty c a n n e v e r b e c o m p l e t e l y e x e m p t e d fro m sy ste m s o f c r im e c o n tr o l . T h u s it is m o r e a c c u r a te to see th e i m p u l s e o f W e s te r n legal s y ste m s n o t s i m p ly as o n e w h ic h p r o te c ts th e p o w e r f u l , b u t o n e w h i c h e s t a b l i s h e s a n d m a i n t a i n s a p a r t i c u l a r s o c ia l o r d e r , or, in th e w o r d s o f C a r s o n , a ‘viable class s o c ie t y ’. T h is a n d th e p r e v io u s c h a p te r have m e r e ly p r o v i d e d a n o v e rv ie w o f th e in t r ic a t e d e b a te s a n d f in e r p o i n t s o f law a n d p o lic y t h a t c o n t r i b u t e to th e p r e d o m i n a n c e o f c a p ita l in m o d e r n liberal d e m o c r a c ie s . A n d if th is c h a p te r h a s s o u g h t to d e m o n s t r a t e w ays in w h ic h , a n d th e e x te n t to w h ic h , r e f o r m in law in th is a rea m i g h t b e s e c u r e d , it is to a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f r e g u l a tio n t h a t w e m u s t n o w t u r n in o r d e r to f u r t h e r e x p lo re th ese possibilities.

Notes 1 II.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. Ltd v. T.J. Graham & Sons [1957] IQB 159, at 172. 2 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass ([1972] AC 153), at 171. 3 T h o se figures are n o t m a d e pu blic in official d ata sources. The figures we use are derived from the m o n i t o r i n g w o rk o f CCA (see h t t p :/ /w w w . c o rp o r a te accountability.org/m anslaughter/cases/convictions.htm). 4 The long awaited C o rp o rate M an slau ghter Bill was finally intro du ced in Parliam ent on the last day o f the 2005/06 session. A stated aim o f the Bill is to remove the p rin ci­ ple of identification, even if this may n o t be its actual effect, at least in practice; see w w w .c o rp o ra t e a c c o u n ta b i li ty . o r g / m a n s la u g h te r /r e f o r m p r o p s /m a in .h t m for a detailed, critical appraisal o f the G o v e rn m e n t’s proposals. 5 Rv. H M Coroner for East Kent ex parte Spooner (1989) 88 Cr. App. R 10 at 17. 6 In Scotland, where there has never been a successful equivalent co rp o ra te h om icide offence, the Transco case has effectively p u t Scottish law on p ar with th e law o f England and Wales. 7 Section 12.3 o f the Australian Federal C rim inal C ode (1995). Full text o f this section o f the code is available at the Australian A ttorney G en era l’s website: h ttp://scaletext. law.gov.au/htm l/pasteact/l/686/0/PA 000730.him . 8 Full text o f this section o f the code is available at the Australian A tto rn ey G e n e ra l’s website: http://scaletext.law.gov.aU/htm l/pasteact/l/686/0/PA000740.htm . 9 So urce o f the follow ing discu ssio n an d all q u o t a t i o n s is BBC N ews, Safety on the Rahvays, at w w w .new s.bbc.c o.uk/l/hi/in_depth/uk/2004/safety_on_the_railw ays/. 10 In O cto ber 2000, four people were killed and a fu rth er 102 were h u r t when a GNER train derailed at Hatfield, H ertfordshire; a broken rail was found to be the ‘substantial’ cause o f the accident.

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11 In May 2002, seven people died and 76 were injured when a WAGN service crashed at Potters Bar in H ertfordshire, the triggering cause being a faulty set o f points. 12 Figures derived from w w w .co rpo rate acco un tab ility .org /d irec tors/c on viction s/m an slau gh ter/m ain .h tm . 13 Full text o f the Act can be o b ta in e d at: h ttp ://w w w 2 .p a rl.g c .c a /H o u se P u b lic a tio n s/ Publication.aspx?pub = bill& doc=C-45&parl=37&ses=2&language=E. 14 Full text o f the Act can be ob ta in ed at: w w w .c o rp o ratea cco u n tab ility .o rg /d l/In te rn ational/australia/A CTM anslaughter03.pdf. 15 Available o n lin e at w w w .c o rp o ra tc a c c o u n ta b ility .o rg /d ir e c to rs /c o n v ic tio n s /sa f e ty / m a in.h tm . 16 For a m o re detailed analysis, see the CCA briefing at w w w .co rp o ra teac co u n tab ility . o rg /directors/duties/law .htm . 17 For example, T h o m p s o n s classic W higs and H unters (1975).

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Chapter 7

Regulating safety crimes

Introduction

A succession of British Ministers have declared that the aim of the Labour Government is to make the UK the most business-friendly environment in the world.1 Such claims are normally accompanied by the phraseology of ‘burdens on business’ and ‘red tape’ to refer to law regulating economic activity, with the unquestioned implication being that such ‘burdens’ and ‘tape’ should be reduced as far as possible. In the UK, such terms have entered the political lexicon to such an extent that they are used ubiqui­ tously when the regulation of safety crime, and other aspects of corporate activity, is debated in political circles. As Blair argued in a 2005 speech, this has clear implications for safety regulation and enforcement, ‘We cannot guarantee a risk-free life’, adding: ‘We cannot respond to every accident by trying to guarantee ever more tiny margins of safety. We cannot eliminate risk. We have to live with it, manage it. Sometimes we have to accept: no-one is to blame’ (cited Hazards, 91, August 2005). To regulate to eliminate risks, he continued, means that ‘we lose out in business to India and China, who are prepared to accept the risks’. Notwithstanding that it is no collective ‘we’ who face risks, but very particular groups of workers (see Chapter 2), this claim also rather obscures the fact that China and India each have occupa­ tional fatality rates more than ten times that of Britain (ibid.). W i t h i n th i s s e n t i m e n t r e s i d e s a n a s s u m p t i o n t h a t to b e s u c c e s s f u l in t h e m o d e r n , g l o b a l i s e d w o r l d , sta te s h a v e to c o m p e t e a g a i n s t each o t h e r to a t t r a c t c a p ita l. T h e B ritish g o v e r n m e n t , like m o s t lib eral d e m o c r a c i e s a c r o s s t h e w o r l d , h a s a c c e p te d t h e ‘r e a l i t ie s ’ o f a g l o b a l i s e d w o r l d o r d e r. N o m a t t e r h o w c o n t e s t e d t h e idea o f g l o b a l i s a t i o n is, t h e r e ar e t w o m a j o r a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t ar e m a d e w h e n t h e id ea o f g l o b a l i s a t i o n is a c c e p te d as a h e g e m o n i c ‘t r u t h ’ o r a ‘n e w o r t h o d o x y ’ ( G o l d b l a t t 1997: 140). T h e first is t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t G o v e r n m e n t s n o w e x e r t less p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l o v e r

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econom ies - econom ic m a n a g e m e n t is relegated to the task o f over-seeing th e o p e r a t io n o f ‘free’ m a r k e ts - and over the key acto rs in these econom ies, namely corp o ra tio n s and, m o st significantly, multi- or tr a n s ­ na tional co rpo ratio n s. The second is th at this is an inevitable process, or to recall Margaret T h a tc h e r’s w o r d s , ‘there is no alternative’. N either are convincing, since governm en ts still do a great deal o f reg u­ lating. If we consider th at regulation is m u ch m o re than som ething state agencies ‘d o ’ to business, then the totality o f go vern m e n t regulatory activ­ ity m u s t be view ed t h r o u g h a m u c h w id e r lens (B aldw in et al. 1998). G o ve rn m en ts are continually in tro du cing , refining and enforcing a c o m ­ plex web o f re g u la tio n s th a t do m u c h m o r e th a n c o n tr o l h a r m f u l c o rp o r a te activities. G o v e rn m e n ts set the rules o f e n try to markets, the rules th at allow m ark ets to fu n c tio n efficiently, an d establish the in f ra ­ s tr u c tu r e an d th e legal fr a m e w o rk th a t allows c o r p o r a ti o n s to e m p lo y workers, to p rod uc e and exchange goods and services, to invest, speculate an d so on. O f course, since this ch apter is a b o u t safety crim e, it specifi­ cally addresses the regulation o f co rpo rate harm . But at the same time, it is i m p o r t a n t to b ear in m i n d th a t safety c rim e r e g u la tio n is p a r t o f a m uch larger system o f rule making and enforcement. T h e r e c o n s tru c t io n o f g o v e r n m e n t c o n tro ls o n the h a r m s caused by business as ‘b u rd e n s’ on business o r as ‘unnecessary red tape’ is a c o m m o n th em e in c o n te m p o ra r y debates o n the regulation o f safety crimes. It is a them e that is sustained by particular theoretical claims vis-à-vis the nature o f corporate offending, the relationship between employing organisations a n d their employees, an d ultimately ab ou t how we u n d ers tan d the role o f business activity in society. This chapter begins by providing an in tro d u c ­ tion to the way in w'hich such theoretical claims u n d erp in the approach to regulation adopted in the UK, and examines how they shape the regulation o f safety at a workplace level, before tu r n in g to explore the range o f th e o ­ retical explanations that inform o u r understan din g o f safety regulation. In essence, this chapter shall explore the origins o f consistent under-enforcem e n t that we d o c u m e n te d in C h apter 4.

R e g u la tio n -in -a ctio n : d im e n s io n s o f u n d e r -e n f o r c e m e n t

The key, overarching piece o f relevant legislation in the UK is the Health an d Safety at W ork Act 1974 which is u n d e rp in n e d by the philosophy o f self-regulation. The Robens C o m m ittee, which sat betw een 1970-1972 to review the existing state o f occupational safety (and health) legislation in the UK, c o n c lu d e d th at the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l defect o f the s t a tu t o ry system was that there was too m uch law. This resulted in ‘a p athy ’ a m ongst those at work, since ‘people are heavily co nd itio ned to think o f safety . . .

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as . . . a m a tte r o f detailed rules im p o sed by external agencies’ (R obens 1972: 7). Moreover, Robens argued that safety is an area in which there is a far greater ‘identity o f interests’ between the ‘two sides’ o f ind ustry than m o st o th er aspects o f w orkplace relations. C o nclu ding that the ‘p rim a ry re s p o n s ib i li ty ’ for im p r o v i n g o c c u p a t io n a l safety lay ‘w ith th ose w ho create the risks and those who w ork with th e m ’ (ibid.: 152), the Robens C o m m ittee urged the establishm ent of a ‘m ore effectively self-regulating system’ (ibid.). R o b en s’ re c o m m e n d a tio n s c o nce rn ing the n a tu re o f this s elf-reg ulating system w'ere fo rm alised in the s u b s e q u e n t HASAW Act 1974, and later p ro v id ed a m o d e l for o c c u p a tio n a l safety legislation in C an ada and a n u m b e r of Australian states. According to R obens’ version o f self-regulation, th en , crim in a l law an d its e n fo r c e m e n t has a f u n d a ­ mental, b u t minor, role to play in ensuring occupational health and safety protection - the principal responsibility for achieving protection is to be left to those w ho create an d work with the risks, n am ely employers and employees (see T ombs 1996). W ith o u t entering into detailed discussion o f the Act here (see Dawson et al. 1988), it is im p o rt a n t to highlight key elements o f the self-regulatory philosophy, developed by R obens, su b s eq u en tly institution alised by the HASAW Act. R eg u la to ry in s p e c to ra te s, b r o u g h t to g e t h e r u n d e r the u m b rella o rg anisation o f the HSR, were n ot conceived o f as any kind o f ‘police force’ for industry. Rather, em ployers an d employees sho uld c o ­ o pe ratively self-regulate (R o b e n s 1972: 1 8 -1 9 ) , th r o u g h fo r m a l an d i n f o r m a l s t r u c tu r e s , w hile th e HSE an d its in s p e c to ra te s d is s e m in a te advice, encouraging and overseeing compliance (ibid.: 80). Key elements o f this regulatory ap pro ach are the use o f negotiation and bargaining on the p art o f regulators to raise, incrementally, general stand ards o f safety m a n a g e m e n t rath er than to ensure compliance with detailed, prescriptive regulations. Emphasis is u p o n prevention, which is represented as distinct fro m p u n itiv e m o d e s o f r e g u la tio n (Pearce an d T o m bs 1990). Nevertheless, Robens was clear th a t ‘flagrant offences call for the quick and effective application o f the law’ and that e n forcem ent should be ‘rig­ o rou s where necessary’ (R obens 1972 : 80). The HASAW Act certainly ushered in som e significant im provem ents to existing safety legislation (Pearce and Tombs 1991: 422), yet in fundam ental respects it r e m a in e d w e dd ed to lo n g - s ta n d in g a ss u m p tio n s reg ard in g appropriate m odes o f regulation (Nichols 1990: 330). Critics unsurprisingly rejected its assumption o f a fundam ental unity o f interests within the w ork­ place, and urged the establishm ent o f so m e thin g akin to a safety policing agency (Nichols and A rmstrong 1973; W oolf 1973). But despite its a s s u m p tio n s o f a basic m u tu a lity o f interests betw een e m p lo y e rs a n d em p lo yees, even th e s e lf-re g u la to ry p h il o s o p h y o f the

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HASAW Act 1974 rec o g n ised the like liho od o f s o m e n o n - c o m p li a n c e with safety regulations, and the need to force compliance u p o n employers. This pressurising role was assigned mainly to trades u n ion s w ithin w o rk ­ places, and to regulators as a source o f external pressure. However, this also m e a n t th a t if e ith er o f th ese sh o u ld b e c o m e u n a b le ad eq u a te ly to fulfil their role, then self-regulation could give way to deregulation. First, then, this philosophy places an e n o rm o u s on us u p o n the balances o f power - within and beyond workplaces - betw een capital and labour. At the policy level, s e lf-reg u latio n is linked to a system o f tr ip a r t is m , w hereby em ployees an d e m p lo yers d e te r m in e policy w ithin the HSC th o u g h this is clearly an organ isation in w hich e m ploy ers’ interests p r e ­ d o m in ate (Dalton 2000). At the level o f workplaces, the balance o f power is intim ately related to the level and strength of the w orkers’ organisation, no t least because subsidiary legislation grants formal roles to trade un ion representatives in the org anisatio n o f health and safety. This is a crucial p o in t, since the m o st well-cited, an d widely accepted, finding regarding safety protection at work is that it is best delivered by strong, active trades u n io n s w o rk in g t h r o u g h safety c o m m it te e s a n d safety rep re sen tativ es (James an d Walters 2005: 9 8 -1 0 2 ) - w ith HSC finding th a t w orkplaces w h ere th ese c o n d it io n s are in place e x p e rie n c e over 50 p e r cen t fewer injuries th an those where such co nd itio ns are absent (ibid.: 99). Second, in terms o f the functions o f law, it m ust be clear that any system o f self-regulation is predicated u pon a range o f credible enforcement tech­ niques to w hich regulators have access a nd w hich allow an escalation o f sanctio ns if the regulated b od y fails to co-operate. Such an en fo rce m en t philosophy, however, can only effectively function where three conditions are met: (i) th a t insp ectors actually have a credible presence (to inspect routinely, to investigate incidents) w ithin workplaces; (ii) that escalation to w ard s greater p un itiv en ess o n th e p a r t o f in spec tors is possible and, where the circumstances d e m a n d it, likely; an d (iii) that sanctions formally at the disposal o f b o th regulators and, then, the courts are credible ones. Yet both historically an d currently, it is difficult to see any o f these conditions o f existence o f a Robens-style enforcement philosophy actually in place.

E x a m in in g the w o r k o f H S E in s p e c t o r s 3

It is notoriously difficult to gain a detailed insight into what HSE inspec­ tors actually do. Frequency o f inspection has always been a th o rn y issue in relation to the en forcem ent o f safety law. U n der-inspection is, as we note in C h a p te r 4, a p rim a ry factor in keeping detection rates low. In its evi­ dence to the Robens C o m m ittee, the T UC had ‘rem ind ed Robens that the ILO in 1961 had r e c o m m e n d e d that w orkplaces sho uld be inspected at

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least a n n u a l l y ’ (ci t ed in D a w s o n et al. 1988: 224) , a level o f i n s p e c t i o n t h a t is v e r y far f r o m t he o r i g i n a l t ar get , w i t h e m p l o y e r s b e i n g i n s p e c t e d a n y ­ w h e r e b e t w e e n o n c e e v e r y t e n a n d o n c e e v e r y 20 y e a r s . As w e s a w in C h a p t e r 4, l ow rat es o f i nve s t i g a t i o n s af t er i n c i d e n t s h a v e b e e n r e p o r t e d to HS E r e m a i n s a n o t h e r r e c u r r e n t i ssue o f c o n t e n t i o n .

Thus the HSE has never been granted the resources to act as any kind of police force for industry. At April 1, 1976, after the formal establishment of HSE, there was a total of 3,282 HSC/E staff in post (including temporary staff). This rose to a peak of 4,226 total staff in post in 1979, before begin­ ning an almost year-on-year decline up to 1990, when resources were increased, leading to a new peak of 4,545 staff being reached in 1994. Since that time, numbers have fluctuated, but total staff has never surpassed that 1994 total. At 1 April 2005, there were 3,903 staff in post. O f course, it should be emphasised that, in any one year, a minority of these staff are actually inspectors, the rem ainder being engaged in a range of sup po rt functions. Budget pressures have begun to force resources even lower. A further 250-350 posts are to be lost by 2008, and this, combined with real terms decline in HSE’s grant since 2002, means that ‘HSE will by 2008 have lost around 17 per cent of the staff it had in 2002 when comparing like with like’ (Trades Union Congress 2006). Just as the only way to relieve the pressure on front-line HSE staff is to reduce their responsibilities and reduce the am o un t of work they do, the ability of HSE and its inspectorates to do w'hat they are legally charged with is dependent upon the volume and range of regulation to be enforced, the loss or addition of new areas of enforcement responsibilities, and the n u m ­ bers and types of workplaces4 across which law' is to be enforced. There is therefore a close relationship between the structure and style of the regula­ tory regime and the resources available to do the job of regulating. Low r at es o f i nv es t i gat i ons may i n d i c a t e a l ow level o f a c t u a l o f f e n d i n g - so t h a t , f or e x a m p l e , t h e vast m a j o r i t y o f o c c u p a t i o n a l i n j u r i e s d o n o t o c c u r as a r esul t o f safet y of fences. T h i s does , as we a r g u e d in C h a p t e r 4, fly in t h e f ace o f a l m o s t all e x i s t i n g a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e o n t h e scal e o f safet y c r i me s . M o r e o v e r , gi ven t he level o f d i s c r e t i o n o f e n f o r c e m e n t of fi ­ cers, h e r e as in o t h e r a r e a s o f c r i m i n a l j us t i c e , t h e e v i d e n c e o u t l i n e d in C h a p t e r 4 is m o r e p l a us i bl y a refl ect i on o f t h e g e n e r a l e n f o r c e m e n t s t r a t ­ e g y o f H S E ( W h y t e 2 0 0 6 ) a n d t h e c o n s t r a i n t s p l a c e d u p o n it b y i ncr eas i ngl y scarce r esour ces .

When HSE do conduct investigations in the course of routine, proactive inspections, or following incidents that have been reported to them, their primary, often sole, concern is with locating source problems and recom­ m ending remedial measures, if they deem any are required, in order to prevent future occurrence of such an event. The HSC’s enforcement state­

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ment notes that ‘[g]iving information and advice, issuing improvement or prohibition notices and withdrawal or variation o f licences or other authorisations are the main means w'hich inspectors use to achieve the broad aim o f dealing with serious risks, securing compliance with health and safety law and preventing h a rm ’ (Health and Safety Comm ission 2004a: 4). Rarely do inspectors seek to gather evidence or information upon which any future prosecution might be based. In other words, the HSE inspection mindset is not one that is geared towards the detection of ‘crime’ or ‘criminals’. Bergman noted that inspectors consistently fail to examine the role of senior company officers in relation to deaths at work, since they ‘are not viewed as potential criminals whose conduct requires investigation’(Bergman 1994: 97). More generally, it is w'idely accepted that inspectors neither enter premises in order to seek out violations, nor respond to the vast majority of observed or known offences by resort to formal enforcement action. Except in the case of the most egregious safety offences, enforcement action is only invoked where processes of persua­ sion, negotiating and bargaining, often over a very protracted period, have proven ‘unsuccessful’. Law' is, indeed, the ‘last resort’ (Hawkins 2002) - a point noted in Chapter 5 and one to which we shall return below. HSC’s recently (2004) launched Strategy for Workplace Health and Safety in Great Britain to 2010 and Beyond - a rather bland do cu m ent of very little substance - further downplays the role of formal enforcement in the w'ork of the HSE inspector, dedicating tw'o paragraphs o f its 17 pages to this issue. This is one index of what appears to be a shift in HSE enforce­ m ent practice further towards greater voluntarism . Evidence of such a shift is also to be found in a discussion paper by HSE’s then D eputy Director-General, Justin McCracken, urging a shift of emphasis to ‘educate and influence’, so ‘using a smaller proportion of [the HSE’s] total front line resource for the inspection and enforcement aspects of [HSE’s] work’. Opposed to the general direction in HSE enforcement policy, a July 2004 Parliamentary Select Committee added the recommendation that ‘the HSE should n ot proceed with the proposal to shift resources from inspection and enforcement to fund an increase in education, information and advice’, the central component of HSE’s new enforcement strategy. ‘The evidence supports’, it continued, ‘that it is inspection, backed by enforcement, that is most effective in motivating duty holders to comply w'ith their responsibili­ ties under health and safety law’ (ibid., para 142). Now, despite the Select C ommittee’s findings, and a major meta-review of existing research that concluded that law enforcement is a necessary if not sufficient condition of effective safety protection (Davis 2004), the Governm ent has remained committed to a path away from already meagre levels of enforcement, and towards even greater focus on ‘advice’ and ‘education’.5 As an internal HSC

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paper, entitled Becoming a modern regulator (dated March 23, 2004) noted, ‘there has been deregulatory pressure from within government to reduce burdens on business, be clearer about the benefits of regulation, and more sympathetic to business needs’, adding that ‘HSE has responded positively to the debate’ (cited in Hazards 88, October-Decem ber 2004). Here there truly are echoes of the response of the first Factory Inspectors to the advice from Government that, in the context of enforcing the 1833 Factory Act, they should co-operate closely with employers so as to make the new law acceptable to them (see Chapter 5). Subsequently, the Government and HSC launched a complementary set of initiatives around regulation and enforcement. The Hampton Review established by the Treasury in 2004 to ‘consider the scope for reducing administrative burdens on business by prom o ting a more efficient approach to regulatory inspection and enforcement without reducing regu­ latory outcom es’6 - published its report in March 2005, tellingly entitled Reducing Administrative Burdens: Effective Inspection and Enforcement.7 The Hampton Report called for more focused inspections, greater emphasis on advice and education, and in general a removal of the ‘burden’ of inspec­ tion from most premises, and, with full acceptance by the Government, ‘were aimed at promoting effective, risk-based enforcement’. Also in March 2005, the Cabinet Office’s Better Regulation Task Force published its review of regulation, Less is More: Reducing Burdens, Improving Outcomes .8 The recom m endations of these reports came together in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill,9 which was published in January 2006. The new Bill aims to ‘enable delivery of swift and efficient regulatory reform to cut red tape’ (Cabinet Office News Release January 11,2006). In t hi s fiercely a n t i - r e g u l a t i o n pol i t i cal co n t e x t , H S C h a d l a u n c h e d , in July 2 0 05, its o w n r evi ew o f r e g u l a t i o n , u n d e r t he r u b r i c o f ‘a d e b a t e o n t he c aus es o f r i sk ave r s i on in h e a l t h a n d sa f et y’, a n d , in t he w o r d s o f safet y m i n i s t e r L o r d H u n t , cal led for ‘a c o m m o n s e nse a p p r o a c h to risk m a n a g e ­ m e n t ’. T h u s ‘excessive r i sk av e r s i o n d o e s d a m a g e t oo. It hi t s o r g a n i s a t i o n a l efficiency, c o m p e t i t i v e n e s s , r est r i ct s p e r s o n a l f r e e d o m s a n d d a m a g e s t he c a u s e o f p r o t e c t i n g p e o p l e f r o m real h a r m ’. S i mi l a r l y , H S E D e p u t y D i r e c t o r G e n e r a l J o n a t h a n Rees a d d e d t ha t ‘H S E ’s a p p r o a c h to r e g u l a t i o n is v e r y m u c h b a s e d o n s e n s i b l e r i s k m a n a g e m e n t . Ri s k is u b i q u i t o u s . S o m e d e g r e e o f r i s k w h e t h e r f i n a n c i a l , e n v i r o n m e n t a l o r in t e r m s o f safet y is n e c e s s a r y for p r o g r e s s ’.10 U n s u r p r i s i n g l y , t h e n , t his r e c e n t p e r i o d h a s seen a r e n e w e d i n t er es t in e x p e r i m e n t s a i m e d at r e p l a c i n g ‘t r a d i t i o n a l ’ m o d e s o f r e g u l a t i o n - t h a t is, i n s p e c t i o n . A m o n g t he e x p e r i m e n t s in shifts f r o m e n f o r c e m e n t t h a t have b e e n r ol l ed o u t b y H S C / E in t h e p a s t year are t he f o l l o w i n g : 11

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•

H S C ’s i n t e r v e n t i o n st rat egy, a S e p t e m b e r 2005 R e p o r t , c o m m i t t e d HS E to p i l o t i n g ‘ways t o i dent i f y a n d r ec ogni s e g o o d p e r f o r m a n c e ’, m e a n i n g t h a t in e x c h a n g e for c o m m i t m e n t s to i ns t i t ut e cer t ai n safet y m e a s u r e s , c o m p a n i e s can gai n e x e m p t i o n f r o m i n s p e c t o r s ’ visits; • H S E ’s d r a f t ‘s i mp l i f i c a t i o n ’ pl ans , p u b l i s h e d in N o v e m b e r 2005, set o u t H S C / E ’s ‘d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o d e v e l o p l e g i s l a t i o n t h a t is e a s y t o u n d e r ­ s t a n d a n d c o m p l y wi t h to hel p s e cu re s t r o n g e r c o m m i t m e n t f rom b u s i n e s s ’, s u p p o r t i n g a ‘r i s k - b a s e d , t a r g e t e d a p p r o a c h t o e n f o r c e m e n t ’; • in O c t o b e r 2 0 0 5 , t h e H S E , in c o - o r d i n a t i o n w i t h l o c a l a u t h o r i t i e s , l a u n c h e d a Large O r g a n i s a t i o n s P r oj e ct Pi l ot ( L O P P ) , w h i c h m a y pr ove a key, f u l l y - b l o wn sel f - r e gul a t i ng a l t er nat i ve to e n f o r c e m e n t , a n d w h i c h at t he pi l ot st age co v e r e d a b o u t 1 mi l l i o n wo r k e r s ; • a D e p a r t m e n t o f T r a d e a n d I n d u s t r y ’s ( D T I ) e n f o r c e m e n t pi l ot , b e g u n in J u n e 2 0 0 5 , w h i c h u s e s a ‘t r af f i c l i g h t ’ s y s t e m in w h i c h b u s i n e s s e s w h i c h h a v e d e m o n s t r a t e d e x c e l l e n c e in h e a l t h a n d s a f e t y a n d f o o d s t a n d a r d s are n o l o n g e r s u bj e c t to i n s p e c t i o n .

There is evidence that this shift away from enforcement is beginning to bite. A sharp dow n-turn in enforcement activity (outlined in Chapter 4) has been accompanied by a reduction in inspections. In the Field Operations Division of HSE, the inspection rate has fallen from an average workplace inspection every 6.99 years to every 10.84 years between 2001/02 and 2004/05. With a reduction in scheduled inspections, and other visible shifts away from enforcement activity, it is inevitable that fewer safety crimes will be brought to the attention of regulatory authori­ ties, never m in d the courts. Low rates o f pro secution for safety crimes outlined in Chapter 4 can be largely explained by both the acceptance of the importance of industry’s commercial ‘imperatives’ by the HSE (Tombs and Whyte 1998), and its view of itself as a body which must co-operate with and advise industry (Pearce and Tombs 1998). The H ampton Agenda and the associated policy shift further towards a model of self-regulation is driving down levels of prosecution and other enforcement activity. The problem of regulatory under-enforcement is therefore likely to get much worse. The effect is that self-regulation gives way to deregulation, and, as we have seen in C hapter 4, m ore and m ore safety offences effectively become decriminalised. G o v e r n m e n t r e s o u r c i n g c o m m i t m e n t s w h i c h e n s u r e t h a t t h e r e ar e f e w e r H S E i n s p e c t o r s t h a n t r af f i c w a r d e n s in c e n t r a l L o n d o n ( T r a d e s U n i o n C o n g r e s s 2 0 0 6 ) a n d c o n c o m i t a n t l o w levels o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n a n d i n s p e c t i o n , wi l l r e d u c e ye t f u r t h e r t h e p o o l o f i n c i d e n t s u p o n w h i c h i n s p e c t o r s can i n t e r v e n e . B e y o n d t h e i ssue o f ‘vi si bi l i t y’ o f safet y c r i me s , t h e d i s c u s s i o n set o u t h e r e r ai ses m a j o r q u e s t i o n s a b o u t h o w t h i s shi f t

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away from enforcement towards self-regulation, persuasion and bargain­ ing can be legitimised. It is to a consideration for the various theoretical understandings of, and justifications for, regulatory ‘under-enforcement’ set out in this chapter and in Chapter 4 that we now turn.

H o w and w h y is law e n f o r c e d ? T h e o r i s i n g r e g u la t io n

The picture above - of consistent under-enforcement of safety law and the push for more, rather than less, enforcement activity - is typical. There now exists a mass of studies - mostly nationally based, though with some useful cross-national comparative studies also, some on safety in particu­ lar, but many on other forms of regulation of business activity - regarding the practices of a whole range of regulatory bodies. O f the few, broad gen­ eralisations that can be drawn from these studies about the practices and effects of regulatory enforcement agencies, non-enforcement of law is the most frequently found characteristic (Snider 1993: 120-4).12 Now, within this literature, where the concern is regulatory enforcement per se, 13 it is generally recognised, and here this is particularly the case with regard to ‘social regulation’, that across both business sectors and discrete areas o f legislation, one mode of enforcement predom inates, namely a compliance-oriented approach. Indeed, some have argued that there is a generalised convergence across enforcement bodies, jurisdictions, bodies of law, and so on, towards such an enforcement approach (Hutter 1997: 243). Within this enforcement mode, as we shall see in the following sec­ tion, regulators overwhelmingly enforce through persuasion - they advise, educate, bargain, negotiate and reach compromises with the regulated. If we have demonstrated, to this point, the fact of regulatory u n d e r­ enforcement, we still have to explain why, rather than simply report that, for instance, regulators are so reluctant to prosecute even when detected offences are deemed serious and sufficient evidence of those offences has been gathered (Hawkins 2002). Regulation needs to be theorised rather than simply described; and, as we have indicated in Chapters 5 and 6, part of this theorisation is understanding its emergence in an historical per­ spective (for example, it was in our discussion of the early Factory Acts that we were able to co m prehen d the historical basis for a strategy of prosecution as last resort on the part of the factory inspectorate). Indeed, a wide range of explanations for, and ways of thinking about, the p h e ­ nom enon o f ‘regulatory under-en fo rcem en t’ have been developed over the past 150 years or so. We will now consider the most influential per­ spectives that have been developed in this body of work.

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C o n s e n s u s th e o r ie s o f re g u la tio n

First, we wish to consider a variety of perspectives grouped together under the umbrella term ‘consensus’. While there are clearly differences between these, they all share a series of fundamental, pluralist assumptions, includ­ ing the idea that power in m odern social orders is dispersed rather than concentrated, that a variety of interests can be mobilised to influence the formal political agenda (which is where effective power lies), and that while the basic contours of these social orders are supported by a general social consensus, social change, through mobilisation of interests, is possible (see Pearce 1976: 38-41). In effect, these are liberal theories of regulation. O n e p e r s pe c t i ve t h a t has b e e n l oosely d e s c r i b e d as t he ' pu b l i c i n t e r e s t ’ a p p r o a c h ( f or d i s c u s s i o n s see F r e n c h a n d Phi l l i ps 2000; Ba l d w i n a n d Cave 1999; O g u s 1994) l o o k s at r e g u l a t i o n as a p r o c e s s t h a t o c c u r s as a p r o t e c ­ tive s t a t e r e s p o n s e t o t h e p u b l i c ‘g o o d ’ b e i n g t h r e a t e n e d . I n t hi s per s pec t i ve, s y s t e ms o f r e g u l a t i o n are t h e o u t c o m e o f d i a l o g u e b e t we e n a r a n g e o f d i f f u s e c o m p e t i n g i n t e r e s t s . R e g u l a t i o n is c o n c e i v e d o f as t he o u t c o m e o f an o p e n a n d u l t i ma t e l y b e n e v o l e n t d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r oc e s s t ha t r eaches a c o n c l u s i o n af t er w e i g h i n g u p t he p r o s a n d c o n s i nvol ved in i m p o s i n g n e w r e s t r i c t i o n s u p o n b u s i n e s s . T h e a s s u m p t i o n in p u b l i c i n t e r e s t m o d e l s is t h a t a c r o s s - i n d u s t r y c o n s e n s u s i n v o l v i n g r e l e v a n t s t a k e h o l d e r s ( g e n e r a l l y u n d e r s t o o d as w o r k e r s , e m p l o y e r s a n d g o v e r n ­ m e n t ) is r e q u i r e d f or a sys t em o f r e g u l a t i o n to wor k.

A body of work produced from a consensus perspective has been devel­ oped by a group o f researchers mainly based in the Oxford School of Socio-legal Studies (Baldwin 1995, 1997; Black 1997; Hawkins 1984, 1997 and 2002; Hawkins and Thomas 1984; Hutter 1988, 1997, 2001). According to this ‘compliance school’ of regulation, the most successful regulatory strategies are likely to be those involving persuasion, bargaining, and com­ promise between regulator and regulated. ‘Self-regulation’14 is therefore to be encouraged, since corporations do not respond particularly well to indeed they are more likely to be alienated by - the full force of the criminal law. From this perspective, corporations have the capacity to act as good corporate citizens, capable of responsible and moral decision-making. Therefore, regulators must appeal to the better nature of corporations by nurturing co-operative relationships with managements. Compliance writ­ ers argue that building a consensus around appropriate forms of corporate crime control is a pre-condition of effective regulation. For compliance styles of regulation to work, they must secure the broad agreement and political support of the ‘regulatory community’. When a consensus is achieved and maintained through a close relation­ ship between regulators and regulated, businesses can be expected to self-regulate effectively (H utter 1988; 1997). To those ends, strict

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application of the law is inappropria te for corporations (Bardach and Kagan 1982), and it is therefore important from this perspective that regu­ lators are flexible and use discretion in determining which rules to apply (Black 1996; Hawkins 1996a; Lange 1999). Thus, according to Hawkins (1990: 461): ‘[g]iven the vast numbers of regulatory violations, many of which would be widely regarded as minor, others o f which would be seen as serious or even potentially disastrous, and given the scarcity of regulatory resources, a more discriminating approach to regulatory enforcement is needed’. Consensus theories thus support the view that regulatory officials must act as consultants rather than police (Pearce and Tombs 1990). Now, on one level, the characterisation of the approach to enforcement on the part of inspectors entailed in this perspective is an accurate one in descriptive terms - witness the detailing of such attitudes in Hawkins’s recent study o f prosecutorial decision-m aking in HSE (Hawkins 2002). Thus, from this viewpoint, the under-enforcement of safety law that we described in the earlier sections of this chapter is inevitable, since it is a reflection of organisational mission and values, refracted through organisa­ tional cultures. However, the compliance school goes further than this, arguing not only is such an approach to enforcement inevitable, but that it is both necessary and desirable. In other words, they move from describing, usually through inspectors’ own rationalisations, a situation as is to arguing that this is how things m ust be and indeed how they should be, slipping between the empirical and the normative. Thus the majority of texts in this area both document the predominance of this approach, and endorse (some version of) this as the most appropriate enforcement approach. A variant upon these arguments, but one which shares many of their basic assumptions, is to be found in the volum inous work o f John Braithwaite and a series of colleagues over the past 20 years.15 This influen­ tial work, whilst recognising that there are a range of options along the regulatory continuum, argues that 'monitored’ or enforced’ self-regulation is the most pragmatic regulatory outcome (Braithwaite 1982; Braithwaite and Fisse 1987). Braithwaite is in favour of compliance strategies, but only when the threat of tough sanctions remains an option to regulators (Braithwaite 2000). In one of the most sophisticated arguments for self-regulation, Braithwaite and Fisse argue from the starting point that state regulators will never have the resources to enforce regulatory law effectively, whilst adding that internal regulators enjoy certain technical and social advantages over those on the outside (Braithwaite and Fisse 1987). Self-regulation is described and prescribed as being based upon a ‘carrot and stick’ approach: where self-regulation proves ineffective, the next preferred regu­ latory tactic is to move to ‘enforced self-regulation’, this requiring a company to develop a tailored set of rules by which it intends to comply

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w ith law w hich, o nce a p p ro v e d by external reg ulators, w o u ld th en be ‘e n f o r c e d ’ internally. W h e re evidence o f n o n -c o m p li a n c e em erges, the potential o f punitive external intervention rem ains (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 102-16).16 Strategies o f en fo rcem en t are thus conceived o f in term s o f a pyram id, where n o n-c om pliance leads to the invoking o f ever m ore interventionist or punitive m o d e s o f en fo rcem en t on the part o f regulators. In essence, this is an increm entalist an d c o m p lia n c e-o rien ted strategy based on the p rin c ip le o f d e te r re n c e . T h e issue o f d e te r re n c e is also c o n sid e re d at length by B raithw aite h e re in , an d elsewhere. In general, B raithw aite argues that there are so m e contexts in w hich d e te rre n t-b a se d strategies work, whilst in o thers these are simply co u n ter-pro du ctiv e. Thus, d e te r­ rence m u st be ‘integrated into a strategy that tries persuasion f i r s t . . . then in capacitation where deterrence fails’ (Braithwaite 2000: 114). Regulatory agencies are best able to do their job w h en they are ‘ben ign Big G u n s ’ th a t is, w h e n th e y view c o r p o r a te acto rs as b o th r a t io n a l a n d m o r a l actors, b u t assum e the latter until proven w ro ng, th us em ph asising p e r ­ suasion an d self-regulation until the p o in t at which greater punitiveness becomes necessary. Increasingly allied to a rg u m e n ts a ro u n d self- and enforced self-regulation are d e s c r ip ti o n s of, o r p r e s c r ip t io n s re g a r d in g , the u tility of ‘g o a l - o r i e n t e d ’ over prescrip tiv e ( ’c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l ’) legislation. W hile the latter is said to specify the m eans o f securing co m pliance, the form er entails an agency negotiating ‘the substantive regulatory goal with in d u s try , leaving the in d u s t r y d isc re tio n an d resp o n sib ility o f ho w to achieve this goal’ (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 38). This process o f n eg o ­ tiation, based u p o n a dialogue or conversation both dep end s up o n , b u t is also o n e way o f ach ie v in g , sh a re d , in f o r m e d in t e r p r e ta ti o n s (an d the no rm s, values, and conventions that give rise to th em ). T h u s , ‘interpretive’ o r ‘re g u la to r y ’ c o m m u n it ie s allow m u t u a l u n d e r s ta n d in g to be secured w ith o u t further resort to rules. ‘C o nsensus’ has been a d o m i n a n t guiding principle for regulatory policy in the UK, b u t also in virtually all capitalist economies. Thus, for example the Robens p hilosophy that, as we have n o ted earlier in the chapter, p r o ­ vides the fo un datio ns for UK Health and Safety regulation (and, indeed, in oth er jurisdictions), is based u p o n the idea that there is a natu ral affinity betw een sen ior m anag ers a n d workers on w orkplace safety (N ichols and A rm stro ng 1973; see also Nichols 1990). T here is therefore an im p o rta n t link between theory a n d policy to be observed here. Consensus theories o f regulation ten d to reflect the d o m i n a n t th em es in ‘official’ d o c tr in e an d policy on controlling safety crime. As a result, we m ig h t say that consensus theories analyse the reg ulato ry process from a perspective th a t i n c o r p o ­

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rates many of the assumptions that governments, regulatory officials and businesses use to inform policy. This conflation between what ‘is’ and what ‘ought’ to be renders consensus and compliance theories relatively difficult to criticise (consensus theorists can always deflect criticism by saying they are merely describing rather than prescribing; see Hawkins 1990 for an example of this defence). Despite this tautological insulation from cri­ tique, consensus and compliance theories have been exposed to sustained criticism. Five of those main criticisms can be summarised as follows. First, some commentators argue that there is little empirical evidence for the claims of consensus theories about the desirability of self-regulation (Dawson et al. 1988; Smith and Tombs 1995). Indeed, while its desirability is often based upon the undesirable nature and effects of the enforcement approach with which it is contrasted - so called ‘punitive’ enforcement the case against strict enforcement regulation is always made hypotheti­ cally, since it has never been tried in practice over a sustained period (although see Alvesalo and Tombs 2001; Alvesalo 2003b). At the same time, there is a significant body of official evidence that contradicts the feasibility of self-regulation, not least in post-disaster inquiry reports. Thus, for exam­ ple, Lord Cullen’s enquiry into the Ladbroke Grove train crash identified shortcomings in the enforcement of health and safety legislation. Criticisms by then Director General of HSE Jenny Bacon went beyond the issues of HSE resources, and she identified a lack o f vigour in the HSE Railway Inspectorate’s regulatory duties and the ‘placing of too much trust in the duty holders [employers]’ (Cullen 2001: para.10.18). Second, critics argue that consensus models fail to recognise how the con­ centration of power in business organisations impacts upon strategies of control of safety crime. Although some consensus models take some account of the wider social and economic frame within which regulatory strategies are shaped (for example, Grabosky 1997; Hawkins 2002), this is too easily relegated to one am ong a num ber of factors, and certainly the immense resources of financial and political power that (particularly larger) corporations draw upon to bargain with governments and with regulators are glossed over in such models of regulation (see Hawkins 1984: 192). Third, consensus models see conflicts over regulation as a peripheral rather than central feature o f regulation. C orpo rate or organisational resistance to regulation is precipitated by small nu m bers o f malicious deviants or ‘bolshie types’ (Hawkins 1996b: 312). Workers and popular movements against corporate crime are also characterised as peripheral, and rarely warrant more than a passing mention in many of those texts. Accounts of regulation from this perspective too easily forget two lessons from history. On one hand (as we saw in the case o f the emergence of the Factory Acts) historically, businesses and their representatives have fought

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bitterly in opposition to regulation when it is not in their clear interest. To this we can add a large contemporary body of evidence that demonstrates how companies obfuscate, lie, cheat and make threats to disinvest, often engaging in fierce public relations campaigns and behind-the-scenes polit­ ical maneouvres to avoid regulatory reform (Monbiot 2000; Tombs and Whyte 1998; Woolfson et al. 1996; Tweedale 2000). On the other hand, consensus models fail to recognise that regulatory controls have often been established only after long and bitter struggles by organised groups of workers and other social movements. A recent example of this tendency is exhibited by Hawkins in his book Law as Last Resort (2002). In this text, the only nod to the significance of social movements that support progres­ sive social regulation is found in one reference to Ralph Nader (Hawkins 2002: 14), and even then, this is to set up a crude (and misleading) link between his own criticisms of co m m an d and control regulation and Nader’s attack on corrupt regulation. The book fails even to make mention of organisations such as Hazards or Disaster Action, or other high profile public/trade union organisations, that have consistently, often very effec­ tively, campaigned for more effective regulatory enforcement. The cases of Simon Jones, Sonae, Bhopal, and the Herald o f Free Enterprise (as we saw in Chapter 1) are all further testimony to the importance of local, national and indeed international protest m ovem ents in pursuing enforcement and/or prosecution in particular cases of safety crimes. F o u r t h , b e c a u s e it is m y o p i c w h e n it c o m e s to thi s a s pe c t o f t he r e g u l a ­ t o r y d y n a m i c , c o n s e n s u s t h e o r i s t s ar e h i g h l y s e l ect i ve a b o u t t h e ‘c o n s e n s u s ’ t h e y d e s c r i b e . As Da v i s h a s a r g u e d in t h e c o n t e x t o f t he UK , t he c r i m i n a l law h a s failed to reflect t he g r o w i n g c o n s e n s u s in p u b l i c s u p ­ p o r t f o r g r e a t e r c o r p o r a t e a n d m a n a g e r i a l a c c o u n t a b i l i t y f or d e a t h s at w o r k ( Davi s 2000: 18). F i f t h, t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t c o r p o r a t i o n s ar e e s s e n t i a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e , m o r a l , d e c i s i o n m a k e r s u n d e r p l a y s b o t h t he r o u t i n e a n d p er vas i ve n a t u r e o f c o r p o r a t e o f f e n d i n g a n d t he fact t h a t soci al r e g u l a t i o n is of t en a d o p t e d a f t e r c o r p o r a t i o n s h a v e c o m m i t t e d t h e l eas t r e s p o n s i b l e , r e c k l e s s a n d m o s t s oc i a l l y d a m a g i n g act s. M o r e o v e r , t h i s a s s u m p t i o n o b s c u r e s t h e t e c h n i q u e s o f ‘creat i ve c o m p l i a n c e ’ t h a t c o r p o r a t i o n s use s ys t emat i cal l y to a v o i d t h e l aw ( M c B a r n e t a n d W h e l a n 1991; M c B a r n e t 1988) . Fi nal l y, it r a t h e r s i d e - s t e p s t h e sina qua non o f t h e c o r p o r a t i o n - t h a t it is legal l y b o u n d t o m a x i m i s e pr of i t abi l i t y f or its s h a r e h o l d e r s . Neo-liberal theories of regulation

Neo-liberal theorists, most closely associated with the Milton Friedman’s Chicago School of Economics, argue that, in general, states have an interven­

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tionist tendency that obstructs the efficient regulation of economic activity. Neo-liberals argue that we are over-regulated. Thus, within this general per­ spective, better safety protection should be secured not through legal regulation and its more adequate enforcement, but through the natural, invisible, disciplining hand of the market. Market mechanisms are constructed as more appropriate and efficient means o f allocating resources and exerting control on participants in m ar­ kets than governments. Neo-liberal market logic holds that workers enter employment after freely agreeing contractual terms with employers. The risks that workers are exposed to will have a nominal value in those nego­ tiations, and employers will find an optim um level of safety provision that is necessary to attract workers on competitive wages (Moore 1991). Where this optimal level is not reached, then an excess of injuries and the subse­ quent reaction within the labour market will naturally adjust to eschew employment in a particular firm, or encourage premiums to be paid for ‘danger’. This market adjustment results in higher prices than competitors for similar good or services, and thus a loss of business. Thus, the working of the market, left freely to operate, will correct the original ‘error’. No state intervention can achieve optimal efficiency so perfectly. However, if neo­ liberals are opposed to legal interventions by the state b u t are broadly supportive of the individual’s right to seek legal redress, so, if the market mechanisms fail workers or consumers, then compensation can be p ro ­ vided by the civil law resort to litigation. The neo-liberal economic perspective is of course associated with the policies of the Thatcher and Reagan governments of the 1980s, but latterly has been em bedded in subsequent governments in the US and the UK albeit in a range of slightly modified forms (Jessop 2002). A key element of the neo-liberal ideology that took hold o f political systems in the late 1970s and 1980s was the institutionalisation o f ‘deregulation’ as a centre­ piece of economic policy. In fact, this was a highly selective deregulation. Whilst states actually expanded their capacity for intervention in social life (for example criminal justice and penal systems in most western states grew rapidly in the same period), some forms of social regulation were deemed unsustainable and damaging to the economy. It was the Reagan and T hatcher governm ents that first used the language o f ‘red tape’ or ‘burdens on business’. In the UK, a Deregulation Unit was established at cabinet level,17 with the remit to spark a ‘bonfire o f controls’, to take place in concert with a mass privatisation of publicly owned industries. W hat followed in the US, UK and in other prom in en t OECD countries was a twin pronged attack upon the legislative safeguards governing some forms o f anti-social business activity, perhaps most notably worker safety. This took different forms in different states, depending upon the level of resist­

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ance m et from pro-regulatory forces (see below). W hethe r ultimately material or ideological in character, deregulation became the order of the day. And neo-liberal, deregulatory tendencies have been given further impetus as neo-liberalism has, over the past quarter of a century, achieved an international predom inance as the ‘one best’ way o f organising economies - a process that is signified by the term globalisation, to which we shall return, below. Thus an increasingly im p o rtant arena where we find the influence of neo-liberal ideas is in the global trade regime. Latterly, this ideology has supported the coerced expansion of privatisation and attacks on safety standards and other regulatory protections in the developing world (Michalowski and Kramer 1987; Tombs and Whyte 2003b). Thus, for example, the W^orld Trade Organisation has forced the repeal of food, envi­ ronmental and workplace safety regulations where they have been deemed to impede ‘free trade’ (Peet 2003; Wallach and Sforza 1999). Yet it is im por­ tant to note that despite its seemingly unassailable position in world politics, neo-liberal free market ideology has never been implemented in its purest form. Rather, it has provided a set of guiding principles of minimal interference and enterprise promotion. The following three criticisms can be made about the neo-liberal per­ spective. First, neo-liberal explanations of regulation have been criticised roundly for refusing to recognise that capitalist markets - especially those structured along the lines of neo-liberal prescriptions - fail to protect us because they create and support a concentration of power and informa­ tion in the hands of a small elite (Chomsky 1999; Pearce and Tombs 1998: 17-25; Snider 2003). The need to earn a living, combined with lack of choice and intense com petition in job markets, forces many people to work in unsafe workplaces. Second, even the ‘freest’ of markets do not and cannot operate w ithout the active intervention o f states (Jessop 2002; Moran and Wright 1991; Soros 1998: 36-42). As the economic sociologist Karl Polanyi once argued, even nineteenth-century laissez faire economic principles had to be enforced by the state (1944/1957: 139). States establish the market conditions, rules and infrastructures within which businesses operate. If we recall the argument in the introduction to this chapter, states do a great deal to ‘regulate’ industry and commerce - to maintain its steady progress - even where safety crime controls are weak. A third point follows this critique of ‘market freedom’. Markets are never likely to be truly ‘free’ since even the most profit-oriented businesses themselves often recognise that regulation is in their long-term interests. Large firms in particular are generally unwilling to subordinate themselves to the vagaries of the market (Pearce 1976: 82-4). Even under the most extreme versions of neo-liberal capitalism, then, regulation (even social regulation) cannot disappear altogether - not least

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for some of the very same reasons that the Factory Acts needed to be ush­ ered in at the birth of fully-fledged industrial capitalism (see Chapter 5). Yet, neo-liberalism has been highly effective in its assault upon workers’ safety and pollution standards and in attacks upon the funding of regula­ tory agencies. On this point, some neo-liberal theorists argue that government regulation, especially in monopoly industries, has a tendency to produce a corrupting influence between large companies and state regu­ lators (Peltzman 1976; Stigler 1971). State regulation will only ever produce unequal and unfair competition in the market place, because it encourages a mutually re-inforcing relationship between governments and big busi­ ness. In this sense, this body of theorists, sometimes known as the 'law and economics’ movement, has similarities to another perspective on regula­ tion: ‘capture theory’. Capture theories of regulation

Capture theories characterise governments and state regulatory agencies as vulnerable to ‘capture’ by big business. Regulatory capture theory’s most well known exponent is Marver Bernstein (1955) who conceptualised the regulatory process as a ‘life cycle’ where regulatory agencies tended to go through various stages of maturity. In essence, his argument was that regu­ latory agencies are b orn out o f a general concern about some social problem which appears amenable to a regulatory solution - and, in the early stages, although they tend to be outmanoeuvred by business, regula­ tory agencies retain a certain zeal (or a strong political will in favour of regulatory control). This zeal ebbs away as the agency reaches maturity, and in ‘old age’ is debilitated to the point of emasculation in its final ‘capture’ by industry. Capture is achieved by a mixture of intense corporate lobbying, the consolidation o f elite interests in public and private sectors, and a ‘revolving door’ of personnel between regulator and regulated. The impli­ cation of capture theory is therefore that regulation is counterproductive, since it has an inherent tendency to institutionalise corporate influence. Once the capture process has been set in motion, regulatory agencies are doomed to intervene on behalf of the corporations they regulate, and ulti­ mately to advance the interests of big business. O t h e r a d v o c a t e s o f ‘c a p t u r e ’ d e p a r t f r o m life cycle t h e o r y a n d s i m p l y a r g u e t ha t i n a d v a n c e d stages o f c a p i t a l i s m t he st at e a n d its a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a p p a r a t u s e s will b e c o m e c o l o n i s e d a n d u l t i m a t e l y c o n t r o l l e d b y large c o r ­ p o r a t i o n s . T h i s pe r s pe c t i ve h a s b e e n us e d wi del y to e xpl a i n t he c o r p o r a t e m a n i p u l a t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t in a so- cal l ed ‘g l o b a l i s e d ’ w o r l d o r d e r (see, for e x a m p l e , Sklai r 2001) . T h u s , N o r e e n a H e r t z ’s wi d e l y a c c l a i m e d b o o k , Silent Takeover , a r g u e d t h a t c o r p o r a t e p o w e r is n o w u n a s s a i l a b l e , si nce ‘G o v e r n m e n t s are n o w like flies c a u g h t in t h e i nt r i c a t e w e b o f t he m a r k e t ’ ( 2001: 140). T h e i n f l u e n c e o f u n e l e c t e d , p r o - b u s i n e s s ‘e x p e r t s ’ u p o n U K

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g o v e r n m e n t ( t h r o u g h t h e i r r ol e in p o l i c y ci r c l e s a r o u n d t h e P r i m e Mi n i s t e r a n d t he Tr eas ur y, o r via a p p o i n t m e n t t o t he H o u s e o f Lor ds ) , t h e c o l o n i s a t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t t h i n k t a n k s b y b u s i n e s s a n d t he p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f g o v e r n m e n t - i n d u s t r y d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p a r t n e r s h i p s all p r o v i d e us w i t h s t r o n g e v i d e n c e o f a ‘c a p t u r e ’ t e n d e n c y in c o n t e m p o r a r y B r i t a i n ( M o n b i o t 2 0 0 0 ) . A n d t hi s i n c r e a s i n g l y i n c e s t u o u s r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n b u s i n e s s a n d g o v e r n m e n t elites h a s spi ll ed over i n t o t h e r e g u l a t o r y field.

If one thinks back to the evidence o f under-enforcement set out at the beginning of this chapter, we are presented with a powerful case for cap­ ture. But the degree to which the government-industry relationship in any capitalist social order is best described in terms of capture remains ques­ tionable. For one thing, at the empirical level, many, if not most, of the agencies to which this approach might be applied have hardly had any (early) period of zealous enforcement - the factory inspectorate, for exam­ ple, almost immediately reached accom m odation with the interests of (large) manufacturers and the sympathies of a class-conscious magistracy, as we described in Chapter 5.18 Further, theoretically, this approach over­ simplifies the role of governments as the instruments or pawns of business. The regulatory process is constructed as uni-directional, with decision­ making power moving from business down through states and societies. Three points flow from this critique of capture theory. First, it denies or underplays the possibility for resistance, and - like consensus theories marginalises the centrality of social movements against corporate crime (Kramer 1989). Capture theories view the potential impact of social move­ ments on the regulatory system as minim al since, if, as capture theory argues, regulatory agencies are doomed to lurch from one captured state of existence to the other, there is little point in pro-regulatory movements focussing their efforts on regulatory policy. Second, it cannot explain why at particular moments, ‘stricter’ regulation that is clearly antithetical to the immediate interests of corporations - but is in the long-term interests of capital as a whole - can be introduced (Marx 1887/1954; Carson 1979; Stolberg and Harris 2003). Third, capture theory can’t explain why over time, regulatory agencies can revert to more punitive strategies, even after the point at which they appear to have been captured, or that there may be variations in enforcement policy within agencies (Hutter 2001). All of this is not to say that the capture thesis does not have any concep­ tual value, or that ‘capture’ does not happen to government agencies at particular moments (for example, Carson 1980c; 1982). The value of cap­ ture theories is that they are able to highlight systematic bias in regulatory agencies. An alternative approach is to point to the ‘balance of social forces’ in any regulatory regime. That is, to look at the balance of power between dominant and sub-dominant groups. Few would disagree that in capitalist societies states tend to act in ways that promote dominant business inter­ ests above other interests. A second value of capture theories is that they 161

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can explain how regulatory regimes can facilitate corporate crimes by establishing the framework for collusion between industry and govern­ ment officials. In capitalist social orders, the relationship between business and state agencies is bound have a mutual, even symbiotic, political ten­ dency. Indeed, this p oin t is recognised to some extent by each of the perspectives that we have reviewed so far. Consensus theorists accept that regulatory settlements often favour big business. For neo-liberals, over­ concentration of power in the hands of business elites is highlighted as a serious threat to market democracy. For capture theorists, the colonisation of the state by business is inevitable in regulated market societies. So, one point that these perspectives all recognise (albeit to varying degrees) is that state regulation has a tendency to favour organised business interests. What is missing from each of those perspectives, however, is a detailed understand in g o f how regulation is also used by relatively powerless groups to resist c orporate power and oppose business interests. To the extent that it does occur, regulatory capture’ is a process that is never com ­ plete. Regulatory agencies remain vulnerable to external pressures from labour and from public pressure and popular campaigns. This latter point, on the significance of conflict and resistance, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of Marxist, neo-Marxist and radical approaches (grouped together here as ‘critical approaches’) on regulation and safety crime. Critical approaches to regulation

Before we examine this latter point, it is worth noting that the capture thesis is often attributed to Marx and to Marxist analyses that over­ simplify the capitalist state as an instrum ent of ruling class domination. Such critiques often trot o ut the well worn quote: ‘The executive o f the m od ern state is b ut a committee for managing the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’19 (Marx and Engels 1968/1890: 37). This quote is usually deployed not to examine why or on what basis Marx might have devel­ oped such a view o f the state, but - reproduced devoid o f context20 - to demonstrate the extent to which Marx held to a rudimentary or primitive understanding o f the state. O ur earlier discussion in Chapter 5 of Marx’s analysis of the Factory Acts passages noted a subtle understanding of the fragmented and often contradictory way in which regulation develops. In stark contrast to his intellectual reputation as an ‘instrumentalist’ or ‘eco­ nomic deterninist’, Marx portrays the British state as contradictory and institutionally divided over the struggle for regulation. Regulation is passed in the midst of bitter struggles against legal intervention by the fac­ tory owners themselves, and capital at some points is itself divided over its opposition to regulation. Although the significance of Marx’s analysis for thinking about the complexity of the capitalist state - and in particular the importance of his observations for understanding the regulatory process -

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has rarely been acknowledged, it is his insistence on viewing regulation and its enforcement as an outcome of the struggle between antagonistic class interests that has endured in critical and neo-Marxist analyses of reg­ ulation. A num ber of writers have drawn upon this tradition of viewing struggles and conflict between economic groups or social classes as central to understan din g the regulatory process (Carson 1979; Davis 2000: 14-18). Mahon (1979) draws upon the work of the Greek Marxist Nicos Poulantzas, arguing that the state is an ‘unequal structure of representa­ tion’ which absorbs and dissipates conflicts between opposing interests. This has the effect o f m aintaining the long-term stability o f the social order. Regulatory agencies are created following particularly contentious conflicts of interests precisely because conflict needs to be absorbed and dissipated. In turn, regulatory agencies ensure that particular business interests are subordinated to the long-term interests of capital as a whole. This is why we might expect tough regulatory responses after a prolonged campaign against, or public debate over, an issue of corporate crime. It is also why we m ight expect to see regulation im plem ented against the wishes of business at particular times (Wilson 1980; Woolfson et al. 1996). At times some bids from pro-regulatory forces are irresistible. For exam­ ple, the Offshore Safety Division (OSD) of HSE was established as a new regulator for the offshore oil in dustry un d er the rabidly pro-business Conservative governments of the 1990s. The OSD was formed after the m om ent of political exposure precipitated by the Piper Alpha disaster and the subsequent campaigns of industrial action for safety rights for workers on North Sea oil platforms (Woolfson et al. 1996). This reinforces the cen­ tral point of the critical and neo-Marxist thinkers, then, that regulatory controls can be most effectively fought for at times when the state - indeed the social order - is vulnerable to pressure from subordinate groups. C o n s i s t e n t w i t h t hi s anal ysi s, s o m e a c a d e m i c w r i t e r s h a v e h i g h l i g h t e d t h e c e n t r a l i t y o f ‘p r o - r e g u l a t o r y f o r c e s ’ in s e c u r i n g d e m a n d s f o r t i g h t e r r e g u l a t i o n , a n d in e n s u r i n g t he effective e n f o r c e m e n t o f t he law. T h u s , for S n i d e r for e x a m p l e , r e g u l a t i o n is bes t u n d e r s t o o d as a di al ect i cal pr ocess , d e t e r m i n e d by t h e o u t c o m e o f s t r u g g l e w i t h i n t w o sets o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s , n a m e l y t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n st ates a n d capi t al s, a n d t h e r el a t i o n s h i p b e t we e n st ates a n d t h e i r b r o a d el ect or at es. T h u s key f act ors in i de n t i f yi ng r e g u l a t o r y o u t c o m e s ar e: t h e i n t e r e s t s a n d s t r e n g t h o f v a r i o u s f o r c e s w i t h i n capi t al , t h e n a t u r e a n d s t r e n g t h o f v a r i o u s p r o - r e g u l a t o r y g r o u p s , a n d t h e i nt er est s w i t h i n a n d s t r e n g t h o f l ocal a n d n a t i o n a l st ates ( S n i d e r 1991). T h i s i ndi c a t e s t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e level o f r e g u l a t i o n at a n y o n e t i me is b o t h an e m p i r i c a l a n d t he or e t i c a l task.

Such an approach coheres with a wider body of neo-Marxist and critical literature that views the law as a site of struggles over the definition of ‘crime’ and over who constitutes the legitimate objects of crime control.21

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Thus, the emergence of the UK Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill was only possible due to the combined efforts of workers groups, victims and relatives campaigns, supported by the work o f critical academics and lawyers. Although, as we indicated in Chapter 6, the cam ­ paign for an effective corporate killing law has been by no means ‘successful’, what this story does indicate is that struggles for stricter regu­ lation can make progress - and gain widespread popular support - even in the face of hostile economic and political conditions. Indeed, the watered down form that the Bill has taken suggests a process of government medi­ ation between pro-regulatory forces and corporations and their representatives, albeit one which has taken unequal account of the co m ­ peting demands of these groups. T h i s vi ew o f t he st ate as an u n e q u a l s t r u c t u r e o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t h e r e ­ f ore al l ows us to see h o w spa ces f or c h a l l e n g i n g p o w e r are n o t necessari l y cl osed d o w n o r c a p t u r e d , n o m a t t e r t he i nt e n s i t y o f a p r e va i l i ng p r o - b u s i ­ ne s s i de o l o g y . To r e t u r n t o t h e p o i n t r a i s e d at t h e s t a r t o f t h i s c h a p t e r , d es p it e t he c u r r e n t r h e t o r i c o f n e o - l i b e r a l d i s c ou rs e , a d i m i n u t i o n o f sa f e t y s t a n d a r d s is n o t a n e c e s s a r y o r i n e v i t a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e o f g l o b a l c o m p e t i t i o n . S t a t e s as r e g u l a t o r s r e m a i n d o m i n a n t p l a y e r s in, i n d e e d essent i al to, t h e f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e g l oba l e c o n o m y ( Jessop 2002) .

C onclusio n

O f the four perspectives on regulation that we have explored here, it is the consensus perspective - underpinned by the idea that effective regulation is best secured by building a consensus around the regulatory community - that remains dominant in Western regulatory systems. But we should not necessarily think that the perspectives that underpin regulation are dia­ metrically opposed, or operate in a mutually exclusive way. It appears that in the case of health and safety, the rise of neo-liberalism as an organising political ideology in Western democracies remains unchallenged by the consensus approach. As Hawkins has noted, via the idea of the ‘surround’ within which regulation proceeds (Hawkins 2002: 48-9, and passim); macro economic and political factors play an im p ortant role in shaping inspectors’ world-views. This throws light on the supine response of HSE to the Government’s deregulatory messages, and also indicates that inspec­ tors increasingly enter their bargaining and negotiation with employers with some sense of the greater power of capital, the increased urgency of threats to relocate investment abroad, or the realities of diminished state capacities under conditions of deregulation and privatisation, and so on. U nder neo-liberal conditions, in other words, punitive enforcement becomes less feasible, and co-operative or compliance-oriented

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approaches become much more likely. And it is here that we can see again - a coherence with policy, since the current and recent British Governments are, for all their deregulatory rhetoric, probably less inter­ ested in the removal of law per se (which, as Thatcher found in the 1980s, invites political confrontation), but much more interested in changing the terms o f that enforcement, towards greater compliance-type techniques which imply less actual impact upon business.22 The prospects for worker protection are not good if this analysis is accurate. If consensus theories have accommodated and provided intellectual legitimacy to the ‘deregula­ tio n’ strategies p ro m oted by neo-liberals, then capture theories cohere with a different set of neo-liberal claims. Capture theorists, on the left and the right of the spectrum, share the idea that in the current social order, there is no alternative to the trium ph of the market over state regulation. TINA (there is no alternative) is essentially the normative equivalent of capture theory’s resignation to the corruption of state regulation by the market. Capture theory is therefore unable to produce an alternative to the domination of the regulatory system by corporate interests. O u r discussion in this chapter, however, raises the possibility that an analysis of struggles for regulation is of a complexity that moves us beyond a bilinear struggle between state and capital. The complex struggle for reg­ ulation is not resolved only in the formal political arenas of government. Neither is it resolved at the level of the regulatory agency or even the indi­ vidual workplace. As we argued in Chapter 5, the rule of law in capitalist societies is as much about social order maintenance as it is about control efforts per se. Crucially, states continue to set the rules of the market nationally and trans-nationally (Underhill 1994) and reconstruct regula­ tory and infrastructure systems when markets break down (Alvesalo and Tombs 2001). In other words there is clearly room for manoeuvre on the part of states as to how to regulate and enforce - requiring us again to con­ front the specificities of balances of power within concrete social orders. If bo th capture and consensus theories are compatible, in different ways, with the current political mantra o f ‘there is no alternative’, then critical approaches open up considerations of precisely what alternatives do exist - and how they might be pursued and secured.

Notes 1 2

See, for example, Osier 2002, p a s s im . The Safety Representatives and Safely C om m it te e (SRSC) Regulations 1978, and tellingly the one part of health and safety legislation of this period that caused real political controversy (Walters 1987: 48).

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3

This chapter d o e s n o t f ocus u p o n the wor k o f Local Author i t y inspectors, k n o w n as Envi ronme nt al Health Officers (F.HOS). But it s houl d be noted that these have signifi­ cant worker safety e n f o r c e me n t f unct i o ns in a l mo st 1.2 mi llion establishments.

4

For exampl e , since 1974, the n u mbe rs , and rapid turnover, o f small busi nesses in the

5

See, for exampl e , the G o v e r n m e n t ’s Response to the Select C o m m i t t e e Report, in the

UK has increased exponentially. form o f a letter from the Secretary o f State for Work and P e nsi o ns , publ i she d as an A p p e n d i x to the H o u s e o f C o m m o n s Wo rk and P e n s i o n s C o m m i t t e e . G o v e r n m e n t R es p o n s e to the C o m m i t t e e ' s F ou r t h R e p o r t i n t o t h e W o r k o f the H e a l t h a n d S a fe t y C o m m i s s i o n a n d Executi ve. H C 1137. Lo n d o n : the Stat ionery Office; and Health and Safety C o m m i s s i o n 2004b. 6

Hampton

(2005)

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Available at www. ca b i n e t o f f i ce . go v . uk/ re g ul a t i o n/ do cume nt s / pdf / br_ a c t _ r ev i ew. pdf .

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www . p u b l i ca t i o n s . parliament. u k / p a / c m 2 0 0 5 0 6 / c m b i l l s / l 1 l / c n / 0 6 1 1 l x —. htm.

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w ww . h s e . go v . uk / p r e s s / 2 0 0 5 / e 0 5 0 9 4 . ht m. Qu o t at i o n s from this source. 11 Source: Risks, no 235, D e c e m b e r 1, 2005, p5.. 12 Wh i l e this h ol ds as a generali sati on, it r emai ns a generalisation; there are i mp o r t a n t national differences in e n f o r c e me n t strategies across differences spheres o f regulatory activity (Snider 1991). 13 As o pp o s e d , for e xampl e , to studies o f regulatory policy f ormation. 14 A m o d e l o f regulation whe re c o r p o r a t i on s arc trusted to m o n i t o r and cont r ol their o w n c o mpl i a n c e with the law under a mi ni mal i s t regulatory framework. 15 See Braithwaite 2000 for an excellent overview o f this work. 16 G u n n i n g h a m and J o hnst o ne ( 1 9 9 9 ) have recently d e v e lo p e d this m o d e l in order to argue for a ‘twin track’ approach to regulation. 17 The fore- runner o f what is n o w k n o w n as the Better Regulation Executive, referred to earlier in the c h a p t e r as l ea d i ng the r e vi e w o f r e g u l a t i o n w h i c h resul ted in the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill (2006) . 18 By cont ras t , s o m e have argued that in the US, the O c c u p a t i o n a l Safety and Heal th Admi ni strat i on did begin life with a zealous approach to enf or ce me nt , even if this was m o r e expressive t han s y m b o l i c (Calavita 19 8 3 ) , so that here a capture t h e or y based u p o n a life-cycle approach mi gh t have s o m e w h a t mo r e force. 19 M ar x ’s term for the ruling class o f property owners. 20 T h e s t a t e m e n t wa s m a d e in his p o l e m i c a l p ol i t i c al p r o g r a m m e , M a n i f e s t o o f t he Co m m u n ist Pa rty. 21

T h e s a m e i ssues are at stake in c a m p a i g n s to h o l d war c r i mi n a l s to a c c o u n t at the International Crimi nal Court, for the criminal isation o f viol e nce against w o m e n and in campai gns for the décriminal isat ion o f drug use.

22 In the UK n o w , any p r o p o s a l for law reform w h i c h ma y affect b u s i n e s s m u s t be a cc o mp a n i ed by a ‘Regulatory Impact As s e s s me n t ’ wh i c h sets o u t in detail - and costs - the potential impacts that the ne w law and its e n f o r c e me n t ma y have up o n business.

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Chapter 8

Punishing safety crimes

Introduction

This chapter is concerned with how the perpetrators of safety crimes are dealt with after they have been found guilty in a criminal court. Before starting our discussion of how court sanctions and punishment are applied in the context of safety crimes, we begin with a couple of important back­ ground issues that need to be borne in mind when reading this chapter. First, it is likely that in most jurisdictions, safety crimes do not attract the most punitive response from the state when compared with other forms of white-collar and corporate crime. Bernie Ebbers, the World Com Chief, was sentenced to 25 years in jail in July 2005 for his part in the corruption that brought down his business empire; and, in October 2006, Jeffrey Skilling, the Enron Chief Executive, was sentenced to 24 years in jail for his part in those frauds. No employer to our knowledge has ever faced such a lengthy sentence for killing - let alone injuring - in the workplace. This can be partly explained as a function of the differentiated way in which states respond to different forms of crime. Large scale crimes of corruption sub­ vert and threaten the sm ooth operation of legitimate markets in the way that safety crimes generally don’t. Therefore it is the former types of crime that may produce more punitive state responses than other forms of white collar and corporate crime (Slapper and Tombs 1999), although as we indi­ cated in the previous chapter, safety crimes and the popular opposition that they often generate can present a crisis of stability for the social order. It is at those m om ents that law reformers, legislatures and courts are more receptive to arguments for more punitive responses. T h e s e c o n d t h i n g to b e a r in m i n d is t h a t t hi s b o o k is c o n c e r n e d wi t h safety crimes , a n d t h e r e f o r e we i n c l u d e n o c o m m e n t a r y o r anal ysi s in r e l a ­ t i o n to t h e role o f civil p r o c e e d i n g s in t h e p u n i s h m e n t o f c o r p o r a t i o n s . A

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b ro a d d is tin c tio n b etw een civil a n d c ri m i n a l p r o c e d u r e can be m a d e as follow s. T h e f o r m e r n o r m a l l y in volves an i n d i v i d u a l in i t i a t i n g a case against a n o th e r ind ivid ual or a private c o rp o r a ti o n to seek c o m p e n s a tio n . T h e latter involves an in fra c tio n o f the c rim in a l law n o rm a lly ( a lth o u g h n o t always) in itiated by a representative o f th e state. T h e difference in the g ra v ity o r s e r io u s n e s s w ith w h ic h each legal p r o c e d u r e is g e n e ra lly reg a rd ed can be illu strated by e x a m in in g th e tech nical cha racteristic s o f each p r o c e d u r e . C r im in a l c o u r t s m a k e a decisio n o n the guilt o r o t h e r ­ wise o f th e d e fe n d a n t; if guilt is p ro v en , the c o u r t will n o rm a ll y im p o se crim in a l penalties. Civil cases deal w ith the allocation o f costs a n d d a m ­ ages to o n e p a r t o r th e o t h e r a n d n o r m a l l y involve a d e c is io n a b o u t w h e th e r o r n o t the r e s p o n d e n t m u s t pay dam ages. In m o s t civil cases, the p la i n ti f f o r a p p li c a n t seeks d a m a g e s for a p e r s o n a l in j u r y ag ain s t th e m (w hich may include disease, im p a i r m e n t o f physical or m e n ta l co n d itio n , o r d ea th , w here the actio n is initiated by the bereaved). Very few d am ag es cases actually ever reach th e c o u rts since the vast m a jo rity are subject to o u t - o f - c o u r t se ttlem en ts (H a r p w o o d 1993: 18.1). Personal in ju ry actions ag ain s t c o r p o r a t i o n s are n o to r io u s l y difficult to w in since c o r p o r a t i o n s have the resou rces to delay p ro ce ed in g s; th e re are co n sid e ra b le risks for th e plaintiff, since poten tially hu ge c o u rt costs have to be paid for by the losing party, costs w h ic h are usu ally m u c h m o r e easily a b s o r b e d by the d e fe n d a n t, certainly if the d e fe n d a n t is a large c o rp o r a tio n . These factors c o m b i n e to e n c o u ra g e plaintiffs to settle o u t o f co u r t for a red uce d c o m ­ p e n s a t i o n s u m r a t h e r t h a n se e k in g full c o m p e n s a t i o n in the c o u r t s (H a rris 1984). In c rim in a l cases, the relatio nship b etw een the tw o parties is entirely different. T h e state p u n is h e s c rim e on b e h a lf o f us all, w hereas ind ivid uals p u rs u e civil action on b e h a lf o f themselves. T he fact th a t p u n ­ is h m e n ts can be im p o se d in the crim in al co u rts o nce an accused is fo u n d guilty fu r th e r disting uishes c rim in a l p ro c e d u r e from civil p ro c e d u re . No m a t te r ho w p un itiv e the latter m ay often appear, it is c rim in a l cases th at im p ly th e sta te ’s rig h t to p u n is h , an d by e x te n s io n , th e serio u sn es s w ith w hich the state regards crim in a l behaviour. This p o in t im m ediately alerts us to h o w the crim inal law acts as a m e c h ­ a n is m o f social ce n su re ( S u m n e r 1990), o r as M ath ie se n (1990) p u t it, a ‘message fro m th e state’. T h e crim inalisation o f c o n d u c t by th e State carries a gravitas a n d social o p p r o b r iu m th a t is n o t c o m p arab le w ith th e cases th at are p u r s u e d in th e civil c o u r t s s im p ly b e c a u s e th e State, r a t h e r t h a n th e individual, acts as the accuser an d the p ro s e c u to r o n b eh alf o f its citizens. T h e a r g u m e n t r u n n i n g t h r o u g h th is b o o k is t h a t n o t all c ri m e s are tr e ated by th e state equally; as a result, th e social o p p r o b r i u m ca rr ie d by legal c e n s u r e varies across d iffe re n t c r i m i n a l offences a n d c h a n g e s ov er tim e a n d place. Discussions in p re vio us chapte rs have detailed h o w safety crim es c a m e to rep resen t a dif ferent class o f offence. O n o n e h a n d , safety c rim es are very often segregated in law as ‘r e g u la to r y ’ o r ‘a d m i n is tr a t iv e ’

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offences, and on the other hand, they tend to be exposed to ‘compliance’ rather than ‘strict enforcement’ styles of policing. Moreover, as Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have indicated, the seriousness with which safety crimes are treated is not fixed. This chapter explores how safety crimes are currently treated, and how they might be treated differently, by the courts. It starts by exam­ ining how safety crimes fit with the key theoretical perspectives that have been developed to justify contemporary forms of punishment, before going on to describe how safety offences are dealt with in the UK. The final sec­ tion of this chapter will then propose a range of alternative penalties and sanctions for safety crimes.

T h e o r i e s of p u n i s h m e n t a nd safety c r im e s

The observation that deterrence theory is much more applicable to safety crimes when compared with ‘mainstream’ crimes has become c o m m o n ­ place in the study of white-collar and corporate crime (Sutherland 1983; Chambliss 1967; Geis 1996; Pearce and Tombs 1998). Deterrence theory is based upon the idea that individual conduct - deciding, for example, whether or not to commit a criminal act - is shaped by the costs and bene­ fits that might arise from the conduct. Individuals therefore make a rational calculation that weighs the chances of being caught and the severity of the punishment against the ‘benefits’ of committing a crime. It is a perspective that is neatly summed up in Jeremy Bentham’s idea of homo economicus, the self-interested, rational thinking ‘economic m an’. In theoretical terms, deterrence theory has been most com m only challenged on two counts. First, rational choice depends upon the subject having perfect knowledge of the risks of being caught. Second, rational choice depends upon individu­ als’ being capable of exercising rational judgement. Generally, the model is applied to those who are least capable of acting rationally. Pierre Bourdieu (1998: 83), referring to the capacity of lower-status populations to mobilise and improve their conditions of existence, has made this point: T h e u n e m p l o y e d a n d t he cas ual i sed wo r k e r s , h a v i n g s uf f er e d a bl o w t o t h e i r c a p a c i t y to p r o j e c t t h e m s e l v e s i n t o t h e f u t u r e , w h i c h is t he p r e c o n d i t i o n f or all s o - c a l l e d r a t i o n a l c o n d u c t s , s t a r t i n g w i t h e c o ­ n o m i c c a l c u l a t i o n . . . ar e scarcel y c a p a b l e o f b e i n g mo b i l i s e d ... in o t h e r w o r d s , a r e a s o n e d a m b i t i o n to t r a n s f o r m t he p r e s e n t by r e f e r ­ e n c e t o t h e p r o j e c t e d f u t u r e , o n e n e e d s s o m e g r a s p o n t h e p r e s e nt . T h e a b i l i t y to a ct r a t i o n a l l y , in o t h e r w o r d s , is s e v e r e l y c o m p r o m i s e d w h e r e p e o p l e d o n o t have an y c o n t r o l ov er t h e social c o n d i t i o n s t h at s h a p e t hei r p r e s e n t a n d t hei r f ut ur e.

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Conversely, co m pan ies a n d their sen ior officers do have som e m o tiv a ­ tion to co n sid er the long te r m conseq uen ces o f th e ir decisions, a n d the costs o f p u n is h m e n t to their business a n d their social position. They are m u c h m o r e likely to c o m m it crim e only after m ak in g a reasoned assess­ m e n t a n d choice to act rationally. C o r p o r a t i o n s are ‘fu tu re o r i e n t e d ’ (Braithwaite 1989). Moreover, a lth ou gh m o s t individuals do n o t possess the inform ation necessary to calculate rationally the probability o f detec­ tio n a n d p u n i s h m e n t , large b u re a u c r a ti c o rg a n is a tio n s do have the resources to d eploy sop histicated in f o rm a tio n g ath erin g systems a n d to call u p o n lawyers an d accountants. Both com panies an d their directors do make calculated decisions, n o t based u p o n perfect knowledge, b u t based u p o n a range o f knowledge resources available to th em w hich allow th em to make calculated decisions. Chambliss (1967) argued th at deterrence can a p p ro p riate ly be used against w hite collar offenders because th ey satisfy two conditions. First, they do n o t have a c o m m it m e n t to crime as a way o f life; and second, their offences are instrum enta l rather th a n expressive. In o th er words, the crimes they c o m m it are less likely to be s p o n ta n e o u s or e m otion al as we m igh t find in m a n y ‘street’ crimes, b u t are often the result o f calculated risks taken in b o a rd r o o m s . O rg an is atio n s a n d th e ir senio r officers use co st-b e n e fit analysis to assess th e im p lic a tio n s o f strategic decisions as a rou tin e procedure. T h e r e a r e s o m e k e y e x a m p l e s h e r e . P e r h a p s t h e m o s t i n f a m o u s c a s e is the decision to proceed with the p ro d u c t i o n o f the Ford Pinto, despite c o r p o r a t e k n o w l e d g e o f a l e t h a l d e s i g n flaw, b a s e d o n t h e c a l c u l a t i o n t h a t t h e e x p l o s i o n s t h a t w o u l d f o l l o w i m p a c t u p o n t h e f ue l t a n k w o u l d c a u s e a p r o j e c t e d t o t a l o f 180 d e a t h s a n d 180 s e r i o u s i n j u r i e s . O n t h e c o m p a n y ’s re ck o n in g, each d ea t h w o u l d cost t h e m $200,000, each in ju ry $67,000 an d e a c h c a r $ 7 0 0 . T h u s w h i l e t h e t o t a l c o s t o f a l l o w i n g t h e d a n g e r o u s c a r to l eave t h e p r o d u c t i o n l i ne w a s $ 4 9 . 5 m , t h e c o s t s o f d e s i g n c h a n g e w e r e e s t i m a t e d at $ 1 3 7 m ; t h e c o m p a n y t h e r e f o r e d e c i d e d to p r o d u c e a n d m a r k e t t h e c a r w i t h t h e f a u l t . D o w i e ’s i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o t h e F o r d P i n t o r e v e a l e d t h a t i n f act 5 0 0 p e o p l e h a d d i e d as a r e s u l t o f P i n t o e x p l o s i o n s ( D o w i e 1 9 7 7 ) . T h i s t y p e o f c a l c u l a t i o n is al s o u s e d w h e n f i r m s c o n s i d e r m a j o r s a f e t y i n v e s t m e n t s . T h e B r i t i s h R a i l wa y s B o a r d a n d R a i l t r a c k , u s e d a c os t - b e n e f i t c al cu l a t i o n to d e c i d e a ga i n s t i nst al li ng t h e A u t o m a t i c Tr ai n P r o t e c t i o n ( A T P ) s y s t e m . T h e c o m p a n y ’s e s t i m a t i o n w a s t h a t t h e s y s t e m w o u l d c o s t a p p r o x i m a t e l y £ 1 4 m p e r h u m a n l i fe s a v e d . T h e c o s t o f i n ­ s t a lm e n t greatly exceeded the

p r o j e c t e d e c o n o m i c v a l u e o f t h e lives t h a t

w o u l d b e s a v e d ( £ 3 m p e r l i f e) . T h e c a l c u l a t i o n w a s b r o u g h t i n t o s h a r p r e l i e f b y t h e L a d b r o k e G r o v e t r a i n c r a s h i n 1999 . H a d A T P b e e n i n s t a l l e d , it w o u l d m o s t l i kel y h a v e s a v e d t h e l ives o f 31 p e o p l e k i l l e d a t L a d b r o k e G r o v e ( W h y t e 19 99b) .

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T h o s e ar e p e r h a p s t h e m o s t d r a m a t i c a n d e x t r e m e e x a m p l e s o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g in b u s i n e s s c o n t e x t s a n d it is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e t h a t we w o u l d n o t e x p e c t to see thi s level o f anal ysi s in t he e v e r y d a y dec i s i o n s t h a t b us i n e s s e s m a k e . Ho we v e r , it r e m a i n s t he case t h a t bus i n e s s e s d o r o u t i n e l y m a k e d ec i s i o n s b a s e d u p o n t h e p r o j e c t e d cost i mp l i c a t i o n s o f a p a r t i c u l a r act i vi t y o r st rat egy. In o t h e r w o r d s , p e r p e t r a ­ t or s o f safet y c r i m e s are b e t t e r e q u i p p e d a n d m o r e likely t o b e r a t i ona l l y f o c u s e d u p o n t he f u t u r e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e i r poli ci es, s t r at egi es a n d t he wa y t h a t t h e y o r g a n i s e t h e i r activities.

Deterrence theory is the bedrock of contemporary western systems of criminal punishment. However, saying that deterrence theory underpins our approach to punishment is not to say that it is the only philosophical basis that we find influential in systems of punishment. Deterrence theory is typically contrasted with retribution or ‘just deserts’ theory, the latter conceiving of punishment as a means of repaying society for transgressing rules. The basis for this philosophy is not that citizens do act rationally, but that they should act rationally. It is also u n d e rp in n e d by the liberal assumption that the State’s rules are there to benefit all. If some choose to break the rules, it is norm al to achieve some kind of pecuniary advantage over others. Therefore, punishment should be conceived of as repaying a debt to society. Penal theorists like Andrew von Hirsch (1976/1996) also argue that the just deserts perspective clarifies the appropriate penalty for the crime and therefore improves transparency and accountability in the penal system. Murphy (1973/1995) has criticised just deserts from a simi­ lar position to that outlined above, namely that the retributive conception of justice masks an inherent contradiction: because repaying a debt to society means the least to those who are the least well positioned within the social structure, p un ish m en t which seeks retribution is likely to be least effective when applied to the social groups which are, overw helm­ ingly, the principal target of contemporary criminal justice systems. R e h a b i l i t a t i v e t h e o r i e s o f p u n i s h m e n t ar e b a s e d u p o n t h e i d e a t h a t p u n i s h m e n t s h o u l d m a k e i n t e r v e n t i o n s t h a t ar e likely to t r a n s f o r m t he c r i m i n a l i n t o a l a w - a b i d i n g c i t i z e n . R e h a b i l i t a t i o n a i m s to r e f o r m t h e c r i m i n a l a n d r e - i n t e g r a t e t h e m i nt o t he c o m m u n i t y . J o h n Br a i t h wa i t e has d e v e l o p e d p e r h a p s t h e m o s t i nf l ue n t i al per s pec t i ve o n r e h a b i l i t a t i o n over t he pas t 20 year s o r so. H e a r g u e s t h a t r e h a b i l i t a t i o n fails to w o r k be c a u s e o f t e n p u n i s h m e n t s ar e d i s c o n n e c t e d f r o m t h e s oc i al e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t t h e y seek to c h a n g e . In o r d e r to r e c o n n e c t t he o f f e n d e r t o t he c o m m u n i t y t h a t h e o r s h e h a s o f f e n d e d a g a i n s t , B r a i t h w a i t e ’s ( 1 9 8 9 ) ‘r e i n t e g r a t i v e s h a m i n g ’ t hesi s p r o p o s e s t h a t p u n i s h m e n t is less likely to w o r k by e x c l u ­ s i o n a r y o r s t i g m a t i s i n g p r a c t i c e s , t h a n if t h e o f f e n d e r h a s a c h a n c e o f b e i n g r e - i n t e g r a t e d i n t o soc i et y. I n f l u e n c e d b y f o r m s o f p u n i s h m e n t

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f o u n d in J a p a ne s e a n d in M a o r i c ul t ur e , Br a i t h wa i t e a r g u e s t h a t a pr ocess o f p ubl i c s h a m i n g can facilitate t he r e - i n t e g r a t i o n o f t he o f f e n d e r i n t o t he c o m m u n i t y . T h e c r i t i c i s m t h a t h a s b e e n l e ve l l e d a g a i n s t r e i n t e g r a t i v e s h a m i n g is t h a t it is d i f f i c u l t t o r e - i n t e g r a t e i n d i v i d u a l s o f l o w s o c i al st a t us , si nce t he y are likely to be in a social p o s i t i o n t h a t is d i s c o n n e c t e d f r o m t h e ‘c o m m u n i t y ’ d e a l i n g o u t t h e p u n i s h m e n t in a n y case a n d will t h e r e f o r e n o t neces sar i l y r e s p o n d to a p r oc e s s o f s h a m i n g . Howe ve r , w h a t is i n t e r e s t i n g f or t he p u r p o s e s o f t he a r g u m e n t h e r e is t h a t f or Fisse a n d B r a i t h wa i t e ( 19 8 3 ) t h i s p r i n c i p l e o f r e - i n t e g r a t i o n can b e m o s t effective w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h o r g a n i s a t i o n s a n d i n d i v i d u a l s o f h i g h s t a t u s in t h e c o m m u n i t y , si nce t he y have a gr e a t deal to lose in t e r m s o f r e p u t a t i o n . 1

A final justification for punishment that is commonly applied to western criminal justice systems is incapacitation (Greenwood 1983). In the case of the most dangerous or persistent offenders, prison or intensive monitoring can be used to remove an individual from the social environment he or she is deemed to be a danger to. Incapacitation is therefore normally achieved by long prison sentences. Aside from the brutalising effect that long prison sentences have on those that are subjected to them, the key problem with this approach is that it disconnects the criminal conduct from the motiva­ tions or conditions that give rise to the crime in the first place and instead superimposes upon the offender another set of harsh and brutalising con­ ditions. Incapacitation in the context of safety crimes might take a different form. Incapacitation of organisations can be achieved by isolating a partic­ ular activity or part of the organisation where offending is identified, or by targeting the whole organisation and intervening to physically prevent it from comm itting criminal activities. A fuller discussion of the ways in which this can be done is provided below. Incapacitation of senior m a n ­ agers or directors who are found guilty of safety crimes can be achieved by prison of course, but this is problematic because it does not deal with moti­ vation or causation, and, in capitalist social orders, only a tiny minority of criminal directors and senior managers are ever likely to be given prison sentences. We might propose a more viable form of incapacitation that does not aim to remove the offender from society altogether, but only from the community he or she is a danger to. By disqualifying criminal directors and senior managers from holding high office in an organisation, we can ensure that they will be incapacitated and at the same time retain a clear connection between the punishment and the specific conditions that give rise to the crime. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that effective incapacitation might be achieved by withdrawing the privilege to make profits in the case of the corporation, or the privilege to hold high office in the case of an individual who is the target of the sanction. Incapacitation in this context is therefore better understood as incapacitation of privilege

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(since it is from a position of privilege that safety crimes are committed), rather than isolation from the social body. In short, then, there is reason to expect that each of the key philosophies of punishment discussed above can be appropriately applied in the use of sanctions against companies and high status individuals. The theoretical bases of each of those philosophies of punishment are challenged when we take into account the social status and relative position of privilege/depri­ vation held by those that are punished. Deterrence is com prom ised because lower status individuals are least well placed to exercise rational choice. Retribution is compromised because the concept of the social con­ tract means little to those that have little to gain from fulfilling their part of the social contract in the first place. Rehabilitation is compromised by the false hope of self-improvement when re-integration into society may mean little more than re-integration into the conditions that led one to commit criminal acts in the first place. Incapacitation is compromised because it seeks merely to disconnect offenders tem porarily from the social body. When it comes to dealing with safety crimes committed by relatively pow­ erful offenders, however, the key problems in each of those cases might be negated by the relative privilege or relatively higher social status o f the offender, particularly if the form of pu nishm ent can be shaped in a way that takes account of this position of power and privilege. In t heor y, all o f thi s a p p e a r s r elatively u n p r o b l e m a t i c . Bu t we s h o u l d be v e r y c a r e f u l a b o u t o v e r s i m p l i f y i n g s y s t e m s o f p u n i s h m e n t . It is n o t e n o u g h to say in s o m e g e n e r a l way ‘c r i m i n a l s a n c t i o n s w o r k ’, be c a u s e t he effectiveness o f t h e p u n i s h m e n t is likely to var y so m u c h d e p e n d i n g u p o n t h e r e c e p t i v e n e s s o f t h o s e p u n i s h e d , t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t l ed to t h e of fence, t he l i kel i hood o f f u t u r e p r e v e n t i o n a n d so o n . We t h e r e f o r e n e e d g r e a t e r t h e o r e t i c a l c l a r i t y t h a t a l l o w s us to see w h i c h t y p e s o f p u n i s h ­ m e n t s m i g h t be m o s t effective w h e n a p p l i e d to specific c r i m i n a l of fences a n d w h e n a p p l i e d a g a i n s t speci fi c p e r p e t r a t o r s . In t he case o f s a n c t i o n s t h a t se ek d e t e r r e n c e , t h e a i m is to c r e a t e e i t h e r a g e n e r a l o r i n d i v i d u a l effect o f d i s c o u r a g i n g c r i m e by m a k i n g t he cost s t o o h i gh. I n t h e case o f r e t r i b u t i v e p u n i s h m e n t , t he a i m is to e n s u r e t h a t t he i n d i vi d u a l r epays a d e b t to s oci et y t ha t is c o m m e n s u r a t e wi t h t he of fence. In t he case o f r e h a ­ b i l i t a t i o n , t h e a i m is t o r e f o r m t h e i n d i v i d u a l . In t h e cas e o f i n c a p a c i t a t i o n , t he a i m is physi cal l y to p r e v e n t t he p e r p e t r a t o r f r o m c o m ­ m i t t i n g c r i m e agai n. It is t he d e g r e e to w h i c h t h o s e a i m s o f p e n a l t h e o r y m i g h t be m e t t h a t t he rest o f thi s c h a p t e r seeks t o u n r a v e l b y c o n s i d e r i n g , first o f all, h o w safet y c r i m e s are c u r r e n t l y p u n i s h e d , a n d s e c o n d , h o w this sys t em o f p u n i s h m e n t m i g h t be r e f o r m e d .

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F in e s and safe ty c r im e s

M o s t offences t h a t are p r o s e c u te d , in c l u d in g th e m o s t s e r io u s c rim e s , will, if th e p r o s e c u t i o n is su cces sfu l, i n c u r a fine. Fin es f o llo w in g h e a lt h a n d s afety c o n v i c t i o n s are n o t o r i o u s l y low. T h is is p a r t l y b e c a u s e , a l t h o u g h th e h i g h e r c o u r t s are p e r m i t t e d to i m p o s e an u n l i m i t e d fine, th e m a x i ­ m u m t h a t c a n b e i m p o s e d b y th e M a g i s t r a t e s C o u r t s is £ 2 0 ,0 0 0 . S ince m o s t s a f e ty c r i m e s in E n g l a n d a n d W ale s a re p r o s e c u t e d in th e M a g i s tr a te s C o u r t s , th e av era g e fine r e m a i n s low. A l t h o u g h , as F ig u re 4 b e lo w s h o w s , th e r e h a s b e e n a s h a r p t r e n d u p w a r d s in th e size o f fines im p o s e d for safety c r i m e s o ver th e p a s t eig h t years, th e av erage r e m a i n s u n d e r £ 1 4 , 0 0 0 . T h e UK T r e a s u r y ’s r e v ie w o f e n f o r c e m e n t ( H a m p t o n 2005) c o n c lu d e d t h a t fines in th e M a g is tr a te s C o u r t s w ere o fte n to o low to e li m i n a te th e e c o n o m i c b en efits d e riv ed fr o m law b re a k in g .

Figure 4

Aver ag e f i ne f o l l o w i n g c o n v i c t i o n o f a safel y of f e n c e in t he U K 2

F igu re 4 s h o w s th e average fine in c o n v ic t io n s o f cases ta k e n b y th e Field O p e r a t i o n s D ivisio n (F O D ) o f H S E (w h ic h c o m p r is e s a r o u n d 60 p e r c e n t o f total c o n v ic tio n s ). It s h o w s a stead y rise in level o f fines im p o s e d b y th e c o u r t s . A n o t h e r w ay t h a t th is d a t a c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d is by t a k i n g a w ay s o m e o f th e larger fines t h a t te n d to skew the figures. T h u s , H S E h as p u b ­ lis h e d a fig u re t h a t e x c lu d e s all fines o v e r £ 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 ( w h ic h a d d e d u p to o n ly 13 c o n v ic tio n s in 2 0 05 /0 6 ). T h e average for all H SE h ealth a n d safety co n v ic tio n s fo r 2 0 0 5 /0 6 w h e n re m o v e d o f th o s e 13 c o n v ic tio n s w as £6,219. 174

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As we m i g h t ex p ect, th e fines fo r offences t h a t re s u lt in a fatality are higher. This partly reflects the gravity o f th e offence, b u t it also reflects that fact th a t those offences are m o r e th a n twice as likely to be h eard in a high er c o u r t ( U n i s o n / C e n t r e fo r C o r p o r a t e A c c o u n ta b ility 2002: 15). F igu re 5 below sets o u t the level o f average fine for a p ro secu tion following a fatality.

£ 50,000 £ 4 5,000 £ 4 0,000 £ 3 5,000 £ 3 0,000 £ 2 5,000 £ 2 0,000 £ 15,000

£ 10,000 £ 5,000 £0

1

_ _

1999/00

Figure 5

_L_

2000/01

2001/02 2002/03 2003/04

Aver age fines f ol l owi n g w o r k rel at ed fatalities in t he U K

As th is fig ure d e m o n s t r a t e s , th e average fine for a fa ta lity has risen steadily in recent years. T h e first issue th at we sh o u ld n o te in relation to this data is th a t it tells us very little a b o u t th e real im p a c t o f fines u p o n the offender. We k n o w from the p re c e d in g d iscu ssio n th at m o s t o f the c o n ­ victed p a rtie s are c o m p a n i e s , b u t this is a b o u t all t h a t we do k no w . We have n o way o f k n o w in g , for e xam ple, w h a t those fines are in relation to the tu r n o v e r o r the p ro fits o f the firm th a t has bee n fined. O f co u rse, a fine o f £ 45,000 is u nlik ely to m a k e an im p a c t o n a large t r a n s - n a t i o n a l firm , w h e n c o m p a r e d w ith , say, a sm all fam ily p a r t n e r s h i p . H av in g said this, we can id entify at least five h ig h profile cases in volving large firm s since 1999 th a t have a ttracted fines o f over £ l m . In 1999, B alfour Beatty was fined £1.2m for the collapse o f a tu n n e l d u r i n g the c o n s tru c tio n o f a new rail link to H e a th ro w a ir p o rt (a record fine for an in c id en t th at d i d n ’t involve a d eath ). Also in 1999, G reat W estern Trains were fined £1.5m for causing the S outhall train crash that killed seven an d injured 150. In 2002, BP were fined £ l m for causing an explosion at its G r a n g e m o u t h plant. In

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2005, the gas c o m p a n y T ransco was fined £15m for killing a family o f four in a gas exp losion (see C h a p te r 1). In 2006, Balfour Beatty was again fined a rec o rd -b re a k in g a m o u n t . T h e c o m p a n y was o rd e re d to pay £ 10m for the c a u sa tio n o f fo u r d eath s a n d 102 in juries in the Hatfield crash (later cut to £7.5m o n appeal). Fines o f this m a g n i tu d e , w h en con sid ered alongside the u p w a rd trend in dic ated in Figures 4 and 5 above, a p p e a r o n the face o f th in g s to i n d i ­ cate a g ra d u a l acc e p ta n c e by th e c o u r t s th a t h ig h e r p e n a ltie s s h o u l d be i m p o s e d for safety offences. A system t h a t is a lm o s t exclusively re lia n t u p o n a system o f fines, how ever, is likely to r e m a in p ro b l e m a t ic for five m a in reasons. First, if we take the large fines n o ted above, th ey are very often n o t p a r ­ tic u la r ly large w h e n ta k e n in c o m p a r i s o n w ith th e p r o f its o f th e c o m p a n i e s th ey seek to penalise. T h e y are even less sig nifican t w h e n set against the a n n u a l tu r n o v e r o f a c o m p a n y - tu r n o v e r being the a p p r o p r i ­ ate fig u re if o n e w a n ts , for e x a m p l e , to m e a s u r e th e i m p a c t o f any p a r t ic u l a r fine w h e n c o m p a r e d to a fine again st an in d iv id u a l based on h is /h er a n n u a l in c o m e. As we have n o te d already in C h a p te r 1, th e £15m record fine for a health a n d safety offence in the UK levied o n Transco Pic in A ug ust 2005 a m o u n t e d to less th a n 2 p e r c e n t o f the p re v io u s y e a r ’s after-tax profit. A n o th e r way o f e xpressing th e value o f the fine is as 0.16 p e r cent o f tu r n o v e r for 2004, e q u atin g to a fine o f £40 for s o m e o n e e a r n ­ ing £25,000 a year. This record fine for such a grave offence h ard ly d e n te d th e c o m p a n y ’s re v en u e. In relative te r m s , it is typ ically low er th a n th at im p o s e d by local a u th o r itie s u p o n local citizens w h o allow their dogs to foul p u b lic spaces. A n d , o f co u rse, th e p ro b l e m o f th e low level o f even 'r e c o r d ’ fines is exacerbated w h en the chances o f p ro s e c u tio n , as we have already seen in p re v io u s c h a p te rs, are r a t h e r low. T h u s, it m i g h t be said th a t a fine even at this record level, m ig h t have very little im p a c t u p o n the m a n a g e m e n t o f an org an isatio n unless it kn o w s th a t e ithe r the chances o f b e in g c a u g h t, o r the size o f the fine, a m o u n t to to o g reat a risk to take. Even th e h ig h e s t levels at w h ic h fin es are i m p o s e d at th e m o m e n t are hardly likely to p ro v id e a d e te r re n t to offending, or to p u t it a n o th e r way, can hardly pro vid e an incentive to be law abiding. S e c o n d , b e c a u s e o f th e t e n d e n c y for the av erage fine to be relatively low, fines certainly have m o s t acute effect o n the sm allest firms. It is small firm s th a t, as we have seen in C h a p te r 6, are m o s t readily p ro s e c u te d for th e offence o f c o r p o r a te m a n s la u g h te r. T h e re fo r e th e c u r r e n t system o f p u n i s h m e n t fo r safety c r i m e s can be said to be in e q u i ta b l y a p p lie d to o rg a n isatio n s d e p e n d in g u p o n th e ir size.

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Third, because safety crimes are constructed using the ‘inchoate m ode’ (see Chapter 5), fines are primarily related to the gravity of the breach of health and safety/corporate manslaughter law, as opposed to the outcome of that breach. In case law, it has been established that the courts should also consider higher penalties following a health and safety breach if the outcome has been a serious injury, ill heath, or a death, but this is very often a secondary consideration of the courts.4 This means that fines do not nec­ essarily correspond to the harm caused and may appear derisory when they are imposed to punish debilitating injuries or deaths. In the Transco case, the size of the fine was ostensibly not related to the fact that the firm had killed a family of four in their own home, rather the presiding Judge Lord Calloway noted that fine was imposed on the company because of the seri­ ousness of the offence, and because of the lack of remorse shown by the firm’s representatives (a justification that is consistent with R v H o w e -se e footnote 4 - since prompt admission of responsibility can be considered a mitigating factor in sentencing such cases in the UK). F o u r t h , b e c a u s e f i nes ar e l e vi e d o n t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n gener al l y, r a t h e r t h a n t a r ge t e d at a p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p wi t h i n t he c o m p a n y , t h o s e cost s c a n be a b s o r b e d by t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n as it sees fit. T h e cos t s o f ev e n t he l ar ges t fine m i g h t be offset ag ai ns t a p a r t i c u l a r b u d g e t h e a d i n g ( t he y m i g h t r esul t in c u t s to r u n n i n g o r m a i n t e n a n c e cost s t h a t m a y ev en w o r s e n t h e m a n ­ a g e m e n t o f s a f e t y in a n o r g a n i s a t i o n ) , o r t h e y m a y b e p a s s e d o n to c u s t o m e r s a n d cl ients in t h e f o r m o f pr i ce rises, o r to s u p p l i e r s b y r e d u c ­ i ng t he m a r k e t va l u e o f a p r o d u c t . T h e costs o f fines m a y even be pas sed o n to w o r k e r s - t h o s e m o s t e n d a n g e r e d by safet y of fences - in t he f o r m o f wa ge c u t s o r a dver s e c h a n g e s in w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s .

Fifth, fines are wholly counter-productive when they are applied to public sector or government organisations. The effect on such organisations is simi­ lar to that set out in the previous point, since, as Fisse (1990) argues, fines in this context simply result in ‘some budgetary shuffling with money deducted from one arm of government passing back into general revenue’ (cited in Clarkson and Keeting 1994: 243). Since those organisations are funded by public revenues, the effect of fining public sector organisations is ultimately that the costs of organisational offending are transferred to taxpayers. If t h e s y s t e m o f f i ne s u s e d t o p u n i s h c o r p o r a t e o f f e n d e r s f o r sa f e t y c r i m e c a n h a r d l y b e s e en to i m p o s e a b i n d i n g p e n a l t y o n i n d i v i d u a l f i r ms a n d p u b l i c s e ct or o r g a n i s a t i o n s , a m e a s u r e o f t h e i r m o r e g e n e r a l p u n i t i v e ­ ness is i l l ust r at ed neat l y b y Fi gur e 6, bel ow, w h i c h sets o u t t he t ot al val ue o f fi nes f or safety c r i m e s t o Bri ti sh i n dus t r y .

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F ig u r e 6

A n n u a l to ta l o f all UK h e a l th a n d safety fine s5

We should read this figure with caution, since the data is from the Field Operations Division of the HSE and although it is the largest division, it represents only around two thirds of the annual convictions in cases laid by HSE and excludes data from chemicals, mining, railways and offshore industries, sectors that have historically attracted higher than average fines. Even with this proviso in mind, though, the HSE FOD data repro­ duced here is worth commenting upon since the total figure reproduced here does not approach anything close to a sum that might be described as a ‘burden’ imposed upon business. In fact, the total penalty imposed for safety crimes in the UK in 2004/05, outside of the four sectors noted above (£8,442,340) more or less equates to the combined value of pensions that the top dozen FTSE 100 directors will receive every year when they retire (approximately £8,810,000; Labour Research Department 2006). Think back to the discussion at the start of this chapter on the key theo­ ries of punishm ent: deterrence, retribution, incapacitation and rehabilitation. Most clearly, the system of fines that we have at present fails as a form o f deterrence largely because the penalty is very often, in both absolute and relative terms, set at a derisory level. Relatively low levels of fine mean that this form of penalty fails as an adequate repayment to soci­ ety for the harm that those crimes incurr. Neither can it be said that fines have the ability to incapacitate offenders, since few are pitched at a level that threaten the continuation of the business. Lastly, the fine as a one-off penalty, unless it has lasting effects (for example if it produces some adverse publicity for the organisation) or is sufficiently harsh, provides no ongoing incentive to organisations to adjust their policies or practices. In other words, fines in this form do not necessarily encourage rehabilitation.

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R e t h in k in g p u n is h m e n t fo r safety c r im e s

A startin g p o in t for th in k in g a b o u t ho w we m ig h t m a k e fines m o r e effec­ tive is to r e t u r n to o u r five c ri ti c is m s o f th e c u r r c n t sy stem o f fines o u tlin e d above: 1 U n le ss th e o r g a n i s a t i o n faces a h ig h c h a n c e o f b e in g c a u g h t a n d receives a p o te n tia lly d e b ilita tin g fine, th e r e exists no in cen tive to be law abiding. 2 Fines are n o t related to the gravity o f the offence. 3 Fines d o n o t c o rr e s p o n d to ability to pay an d therefore ten d to penalise the sm allest firms. 4 T h e cost o f fines c an be a b s o r b e d a n d r e d i s t r i b u t e d by c o n v ic te d org anisatio ns. 5 T h e effect o f fining public sector org a n isa tio n s is c o u n te r -p ro d u c tiv e . T h e c h a p te r n ow tu r n s to an ex p lo ratio n o f h o w reform s to the system o f p u n i s h m e n t m ig h t address each o f tho se criticism s in tu r n . Accounting for the ch a n ce s o f being caught

It is i m p o r t a n t at this p o in t in the dis cu ssio n to recognise that there is a d is tin c tio n to be m a d e b etw ee n th e o rie s o f in d iv id u a l an d general d e te r ­ rence. S en tencin g can have the aim o f either d ete rrin g the fu tu re c o n d u c t o f the in d iv id u al or c o m p a n y being sen ten ced , o r sentences can be aim ed at s e n d i n g a m e s sa g e to c o m p a n i e s a n d d ir e c to r s m o r e g e n e ra lly th a t c rim in a l c o n d u c t will n o t be tolerated by the state. Given the low rates o f detectio n for safety crim es, th e general d e te r re n t effect is crucial for o p t i ­ m isin g th e r e t u r n on the resou rces d e d ic a te d to the p r o s e c u tio n process a n d th e m o r e g e n e ra l aim o f p r o m o t i n g c o m p l i a n c e ( B e r g m a n a n d Fooks, f o r th c o m i n g ). In b o th cases, we m ig h t expect th e o rg a n isa tio n to m a k e a sim ila r c a lc u la tio n th a t a im s to a n sw e r the q u e s t io n : is it likely th at an offence will be detected at all? In the case o f in d iv id u a l deterrence, the q u e stio n is: will the p u n i s h m e n t p rev en t the o rg an isatio n from c o m ­ m i tt in g the sam e, o r sim ilar, offences again? E ith e r way, th e calc u la tio n will be m a d e n o t only on the basis o f the severity o f the p u n is h m e n t , b u t also on the chances o f b eing caught. O n e p ro p o s al to deal w ith p ro b lem 1, n o te d above, t h e n , is to en su re th a t fines are m o d e r a te d so as to reflect the chances o f b ein g caught. As Etzioni (1993) p o in ts o u t, the detectio n rate fo r th e c r i m e in q u e s t i o n is c ru cial. As n o t all c ri m e s are d e te c te d a n d p u n is h e d , fines sh o u ld be raised as detec tion ratios decrease. An o rg a n is a ­ ti o n m i g h t c a lc u la te t h a t it h a s, say, o n ly a o n e in te n c h a n c e o f b e in g cau gh t. T h e o rg an isatio n m ay also calculate th a t the likely fine has a value

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to the c om pan y o f the average fine for a safety offence in the courts. But the value o f th at fine to the o rg an isa tio n , since it only has a one in ten change o f being caught, w ould effectively be a tenth o f the value that the courts are likely to im pose.6 Such calculations are o f course b o u n d to be based u po n rather contrived assu m ption s and projections. But as we have seen earlier in this chapter, this is very often how organisations, p a rtic u ­ larly p ro f it- m a k in g c o rp o r a tio n s , do make, o r strive to make, decisions ab o u t org anisatio nal or business strategy. At th eir h e art lies an effort to reach an accurate assessment o f the chances o f detection, prosecution and c o n v ictio n . Etzioni p re s e n ts ev id enc e (ibid.: 1 53 -4 ) to sh ow th a t only a b o u t one in 50 co rpo rate crimes is detected. A ssum ing the rational cal­ culation o f co rp oratio ns, fines w ould th us have to be multiplied by 50. Fines reflecting the gravity o f the offence

Dealing with prob lem 2 would m ean refocusing the way that safety crime offences are generally p u n is h ed . Specifically, it w o u ld m e a n a shift away from the inchoate m o de w ithin which those offences are currently located. As we saw in C h ap ter 5, an assessment o f the gravity o f the h a rm caused does feature in the investigation an d in the sentencing process. To argue for a shift towards a consideration o f the h a rm done w ould therefore merely be to argue that we should move the system a little further in the direction it is already goin g in. T h u s we m i g h t r e c o m m e n d a m i n i m u m p e n a lty to be linked to an offence in w h ich e n d a n g e r m e n t was p a rtic u la rly acute or where a m i n o r injury, a m a jo r in jury o r a death had been caused. T hose m i n i m u m sentences w o u ld be app lied alongside th e existing m i n i m u m sentences referred to above. A com bination o f the gravity o f the offence and the chances o f being caught m ig ht b ring the system o f fines closer to the kind o f rational decision m aking th at m ight incentivise organisations not to b reak th e law. R a th e r th a n m o v in g to w ard s a d e terren ce m o d e l, this approach w ould be in line with a retributive model, with the penalty fixed to sum th at w ould indicate the appropriate penalty for the offence. An accurate assessm ent o f the costs o f safety crimes to society is, just like any oth er type o f crime, very difficult to achieve. For example, in the case o f a street robbery, we may be able to pu t a price on the loss in curred by the item stolen, b u t there is also a range o f hid de n costs: pe rha ps the victim has been physically or psychologically dam age d, for example, and may need m edical o r welfare s u p p o r t. Safety crim es raise similar p r o b ­ lems. The scale and the im pact o f safety crimes (as we saw in C hapters 2 and 3) suggest that the external costs, those costs never b o rn e by o ffend­ ing c o m p a n ie s or th eir officers, are huge. These in clu d e m ed ica l costs, funeral expenses, the loss of incom e to an individual or a family caused by lo n g -term illness or disease, before even th in k in g a b o u t the huge lo n g ­

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te r m e m o t i o n a l a n d phy sical c osts t h a t are b o r n e by v ic t im s a n d the bereaved. O n ce we begin to a d d those costs on , any fines th a t could c o m e close to a c c o u n tin g for the tr u e costs o f serious safety crim es w o uld m o s t p ro b ab ly be far too high to expect any b u t the largest o f c o m p a n ie s to pay. Unit fines

If fines w e re r e f o r m e d a lo n g th e lines o f a r e t r i b u t i v e o r ju s t d e s e r ts penalty, th en , this w o u ld still raise key p ro b le m s o f ineq uitable sen ten cin g a n d the lik elihood o f b a n k ru p tc y . It is likely th at the sm allest c o m p a n ie s w o u ld be m o r e acutely p e n a lise d a n d th e larg est firm s w o u ld be m u c h b etter placed to absorb a n d re d istrib u te the costs. An alternative p rop osal to deal w ith th e p ro b le m o f un eve n im p a c t across large a n d sm all c o m p a ­ nies is to establish a system o f u n i t fines t h a t is lin ked to ability to pay. T h is is c o n s i s te n t w ith c u r r e n t s e n t e n c in g g u id elin e s . F or e x a m p le , the gu idelines issued to m ag istrates in E n g lan d an d Wales stipu late that: 'In all cases w ith c o rp o r a te offenders, the c o m p a n y ’s financial circu m stan c es m u s t be carefu lly c o n s i d e r e d ... T u r n o v e r , p r o f i t a b i l i t y a n d li q u id i ty sh o u ld all be con sid ered ... If the c o m p a n y does n o t p ro d u c e its acco un ts, the c o u rt can ass u m e th a t th e c o m p a n y can afford to pay w hatev er fine it i m p o s e s ’ (M agistrate s A ssociation 2001: 3) T h e p ro b le m is th a t fines are a pp lied hig hly in c o n s iste n tly across the c o u n t r y (see U n i s o n / C e n t r e for C o r p o r a t e A c c o u n ta b ility 2002; H a m p t o n 200 5). S e n te n c in g gu id e lin es have n o t in th eir p re s e n t form p ro d u c e d consistency. T h e CCA has set o u t a f o r m u la for a u n it fine th a t w o u ld take ac c o u n t o f the gravity o f the offence a n d ability to pay. In this fo rm u la, the c o u rts w o u ld set a percentage at a level so m e w h e r e in the ran ge o f 5 p er cent to 15 p e r c e n t th a t w o u ld reflect th e s e r io u s n e s s o f th e offence. T h e level w o uld be set accord in g to th e degree to w hich the c o m p a n y was culpable o f an offence a n d the degree o f h a rm caused. T h u s, a high degree o f cu l­ pability a nd a high degree o f h a r m w o u ld place the c o m p a n y to w ards the h ig h e r e nd o f th a t scale. This percentag e could th en be applied to an aver­ age o f e ith e r the f i r m ’s tu r n o v e r o r p ro fit to d e t e r m i n e the level o f fine (C en tre for C o r p o r a t e A ccountability 1999). O n e p ro b le m w ith im p o sin g u n it fines is th a t sentencers c u rren tly have very little k n o w le d g e a b o u t th e finan cial sta tu s, o r in d e e d o t h e r i m p o r ­ t a n t a s p e c ts o f th e o f f e n d e r t h a t m i g h t affect th e s e n t e n c e . C u r r e n t ly , D a vid B e r g m a n h as n o t e d th a t, w h e n s e n t e n c in g c o n v ic te d c o m p a n i e s , th e c o u rt s d o n o t have access to the sa m e level o f d etail o f b a c k g r o u n d i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t th e o ff e n d e r in c o m p a r i s o n to o t h e r c rim e s . Social i n q u i r y r e p o r t s for th e la t te r are likely to i n c l u d e e d u c a t i o n a l details, i n c o m e a n d e x p e n d i t u r e . O f te n i n q u i r y r e p o r t s will also be f u r n i s h e d

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w ith an assessm e nt o f the o f f e n d e r’s likely resp on se to p ro b a t io n . Yet, in safety c rim e cases: No po lice officer o r sim ila r p e r s o n gives e v id e n c e a n d th e r e is no d o c u m e n t available to the c o u rt sim ilar to the social in q u iry rep o rt. T h e c o u r t r e m a in s u n a w a r e o f th e m o s t basic i n f o r m a t i o n on the c o m p a n y - its tu rn o v e r, a n n u a l profits, h is to ry o f relatio nship w ith th e r e g u l a t o r y a g e n c y o r its g e n e ra l h e a lt h a n d safety re c o rd . (B erg m an 1992: 1312) B e rg m a n , in a rg u i n g for h ig h e r fines, adv oc ates th e use o f ‘c o r p o r a te in q u iry ’ reports detailing essential financial a n d safety in fo rm ation . H e cites as a m od el the system in the United States u n d e r w hich a federal pro b atio n officer is required to u n de rtak e a pre-sentencing investigation into each c o n ­ victed co m p a n y to help the co u rt decide a n ap propriate level o f fine. Equity fines

P ro b le m 4 set o u t above - th e ease w ith w h ic h the cost o f fines can be ab so r b e d a n d red istrib u ted by convicted o rg an isatio n s - raises th e q u e s ­ tion that setting an a p p ro p r ia t e level o f fine for a c o m p a n y m a y be futile in any case, since m a n a g e rs a n d directors can sim ply pass on th e b u r d e n to c o n s u m e rs , sha re ho lders o r workers, especially in the largest firms. O n e so lu tio n developed by Coffee (1981) is to im po se fines u p o n the value o f th e firm , r a t h e r t h a n u p o n its r u n n i n g costs. T h is p r o p o s a l fo r ‘e q u it y fines’ p ro po ses that o ffen din g c o m p a n ie s w o u ld be o rd e re d to issue a set n u m b e r o f new shares in th e firm , to be c o n tro lled by a s ta te -c o n tro lle d c o m p e n s a ti o n fu n d . T h e a r g u m e n t is th a t this process, w h ich effectively dilutes the value o f shares held by th e o w n ers o f the c o m p any , w o u ld n o t p e n a lis e th e m o s t v u l n e r a b l e g r o u p s , since th e fu n d s for i n v e s t m e n t w o u ld n o t be d e p le t e d , m e r e ly re - a ll o c a te d to th e c o m p e n s a t i o n f u n d from existing shareholders. T h e m a jo r criticism o f equity fines is th a t th ose w h o are penalised, the s h areh o ld ers , are likely to have little kn ow ledg e o f th e offen d in g a n d are n o t in a p o s itio n to in flu en ce th e d a y -to -d a y de cision s m a d e by a c o m ­ p a n y ; e q u it y fines th e r e f o r e ta r g e t i n n o c e n t s h a r e h o l d e r s (see, for e x a m p le, C roall an d Ross 2002: 541). T his criticism is c o u n te r e d by the a r g u m e n t th a t it is ultim ately sh a re h o ld ers w ho benefit from the proceed s o f crim es c o m m it te d by the c o m p a n y in their n a m e . F urther, a system o f e q u it y fines s h o u l d e n c o u r a g e s h a r e h o ld e r s to take an active in tere st in th e degree to w h ich th e ir firm c o m p lie s w ith the law a n d pressu rise the c o m p a n y to en su re it is law abiding. To this en d, Glasbeek (1989) has s u g ­ geste d t h a t e q u it y fines m i g h t be s t r e n g t h e n e d to a p p ly to m a j o r sh areh old ers: those sh a re h o ld ers w ith sufficient e q uity to exert su bstan tial

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influence o r co n tr o l over the affairs o f the c o m pa ny . A fo rm u la to define w h o m ig h t be c on sid ered a m a jo r sh are hold er, Glasbeek notes, is already a p p lic a b le in ex istin g c o r p o r a t e s ta tu te s in C a n a d a . Such a f o r m u la , he suggests, could also be applied to p a re n t c o m p a n ie s an d h o ld in g c o m p a ­ nies w here it is a sub sidiary th a t has c o m m it te d th e crim e. To this, we m ig h t add , there is no reason w hy e qu ity fines co uld n o t be b ased u p o n th e typ e o f g r a d u a t e d fo r m u la th a t we d escrib e above; th u s they cou ld be set at levels th at reflect the se riousn ess o f th e offence an d the ability o f the c o m p a n y to pay. Beyond financial penalties a nd ‘p u re ’deterrence

T h e fifth p ro b le m , th a t o f sen ten cin g o rg an isatio n s that are in th e public sector, im m e d ia te ly d e m a n d s th a t we need to lo o k b e y o n d th e realm o f financial penalties, sim ply b ecause o f the c o n tr a d ic tio n s th at are raised by state jud ic ia ries p u n is h in g p ub lic a u th o r itie s w h en the costs will be paid for o u t o f public fu nds. In any case, if o u r aim is the reform o f o rg a n isa ­ tion - a nd the provision o f incentives to o rg an isa tio n s to be law a b iding t h e n p e r h a p s we n e e d to be t h i n k i n g m o r e im a g in a t iv e l y b e y o n d th e realm o f deterrence. D e t e r r e n c e h a s alw ays b e e n a ttr a c t iv e to w h ite collar a n d c o r p o r a t e crim e scholars, sim ply because the positivist a s s u m p ti o n th a t lies b e h in d dete rrenc e th e o r y (th a t ind iv id u a l action is shap ed by a ration al calculus a n d therefore p ro d u c e s a relatively easy so lu tio n to the crim e p ro b lem for w hich crim e experts can take credit) pro p o s es sim ilar re m ed ies for crim es in th e suites as m a i n s t r e a m c r i m i n o lo g y has p r o p o s e d for c rim e s in the streets: all we have to do is rem ove the gain to be m a d e from crim e and we will eradicate the crim e. U n fo rtu n a te ly there are several reasons to expect that th ings m ig h t n o t q uite be as easy as this. F irst, d e c is io n m a k e r s w o r k w ith i n w h a t h a s b e e n called ' b o u n d e d ’ rationality. This m e a n s th at o th e r factors b eyo nd e c o n o m ic calculus tend to sh ap e th e ir decisio ns. T h e y m a y be in flu e n c e d , for e x a m p le , by w h a t th eir peers expect o f th e m o r by w h a t they perceive as n o r m a l practice in an in du stry , or they m ay m ak e decisions for very specific reasons th a t are related to th e s t r u c t u r e o r p ra c t ic e s o f th e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l b u r e a u c r a c y (B erg m an an d Fooks fo r th c o m in g ). This suggests th at financial c o n s i d e r­ atio ns m i g h t never fully c a p tu re th e d e c is io n -m a k in g process. S econd, even if we co uld assum e th a t decision m akers even in the m ost p r o f i t - o r i e n t a t e d o r g a n i s a ti o n s d o s t r u c t u r e th e i r a c tio n s a n d in a c tio n s according to a carefully w orked th r o u g h calculus, then because o f the p r o b ­ lem o f id e n tif y in g th e t r u e costs o f c r i m e c a p tu r e d by externa litie s, this calculus c ould never be expected to p ro d u c e a 'p u r e ’ fo rm o f deterrence.

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Third, and following the previous point, we should be wary of relying u p o n financial costs, pa rticularly since the actuarial science o f costbenefit analysis can never be an exact one. The rational calculations made by corporate accountants do not always p roduce rational results (as we saw in the examples of Ford and Railtrack cited above). The risk is that an o rg a n isa tio n ’s o r its senior m a n a g e m e n t’s c o m m it m e n t to the law is reduced to a figure on a balance sheet by financial penalties, regardless of whether this figure is accurate or not (on this point, see Becker 1968). Fourth, a problem arises that Coffee (1981) has described as ‘the deter­ rence trap’. Introducing fines that would be large enough to truly act as a deterrent would mean that most corporate offenders, if they were caught, would simply end up bankrupt. For Coffee, this is pointless since those that are penalised by bankruptcy are generally not those that are responsible for safety crimes. It is workers through job losses and clients and contractors through unpaid bills that are generally penalised by bankruptcy. This effect, termed ‘spillover’ by Coffee, is one o f the reasons that led him to develop his proposals for equity fines, but it also gives us reason to think that nonfinancial penalties m ig ht be necessary w hen p u n is h m e n t is aim ed at reform ing rather than destroying co rp orate offenders. Flaving said this, there may well be firms or organisations th at society deem s so beyond reform and so criminogenic that we would not wish them to continue in existence. In such cases, several solutions have been proposed. Incapacitation

The corporate death penalty is the ultimate sanction against an organisa­ tion. In cases where the organisation is p u t to death, com panies would effectively be nationalised or put into the h and s of a receiver (as is the case in b ank ru p tcy procedures in m any jurisdictions). Braithwaite and Geis (1982) argue for sentences which might fall sho rt o f the corporate death penalty, such as lim iting the c h arter o f a c o m p an y to prevent it from continuing the criminal aspects of its operations, or w ithdrawing its licence to operate in a particular sphere of activity. The option to n atio n­ alise is attractive because it can limit the spillover effect o f job losses or economic harm to a particular section o f the community. In other words, it avoids victimising the most vulnerable populations. The transferral of a company to a new parent company with an established law abiding record m igh t provide an o p tion here. A co rp o ratio n may also be barred from engaging in a p articular form o f econom ic activity or p ro hib ited from operating in particular geographical regions (Moore 1987: 395-6). A sim ­ ilar and less p e r m a n e n t o p tio n that has been suggested has been the freezing or confiscation of the assets of a company.

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Simi larly, it is c o m m o n in o t h e r t y p e s o f w h i t e col l ar c r i m e s t h a t s e n i o r m a n a g e r s a n d d i r e c t o r s ar e di s q u a l i f i e d f r o m h o l d i n g h i gh office, e i t he r p e r m a n e n t l y o r f or a set p e r i o d o f t i m e . T h i s w o u l d s e e m t o p r o v i d e a m e a n s o f i n c a p a c i t a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l s f r o m c o m m i t t i n g s i mi l a r c r i m e s in t h e f ut ur e . T h e we a k n e s s o f us i n g t hi s r e s o r t excl usi vel y is t ha t t he o r g a n i ­ s a t i o n c a n eas i l y f i n d s o m e o n e t o t a k e t h e p l a c e o f t h e d i s q u a l i f i e d d i r e c t o r ; t h e r e m o v a l o f o n e o r m o r e i n d i v i d u a l s wi l l n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e f o r m o r g a n i s a t i o n a l b e h a v i ou r . As Levi ( 2 0 0 0 ) has p o i n t e d o u t , it is also t he case t h a t thi s c a n be relat i vel y easily c i r c u m n a v i g a t e d by i n d i v i d u a l s w h o have a c o n t r o l l i n g p o s i t i o n in t h e i r o w n f i r m, si nce t he y m a y s i mp l y es t abl is h a p a r t n e r s h i p ( r a t h e r t h a n an i n c o r p o r a t e d f i r m) a n d c o n t i n u e to c o n d u c t bus i ne s s .

One final means of incapacitation is to exclude companies - and direc­ tors - from bidding for central or local Government contracts. The role of government as a customer of private business firms is significant and, fol­ lowing the recent waves of privatisation in the UK and beyond, a growing one; thus governments have considerable leverage that could be wielded in order to exclude those with convictions, or poor safety records, from bid­ ding for, or receiving, Government work; or, somewhat less bluntly, such information could at least be used as one factor to discriminate between bids. This would both operate as a form of disqualification and potentially force companies to take a future-oriented, bottom line view in the day-today management of safety and compliance with legal requirements. Rehabilitation

Lofquist (1993) draws an im po rtan t distinction between ‘market-based sanctions’ and ‘politics-based sanctions’. The former are founded upon the assumption that corporations are unitary, rational profit-maximising enti­ ties, and that crime results from these characteristics. So, corporate crime control might be more appropriately achieved by increasing the costs of safety crimes above their potential benefits. The latter are founded upon the assumption that organisations are complex, differentiated entities, simultaneously in pursuit o f different and often conflicting goals. Safety crimes can therefore be understood as emanating from the structural char­ acteristics o f the organisation. Punishments that are aimed at altering organisational structures and procedures in order to improve internal accountability and law observance might therefore be more appropriate (ibid.: 165; see also Piquero et al. 2005). Some have argued that p un ish­ ments are more feasible and more likely to be effective if their aim is the reform o f the criminogenic structures, policies and practices of profitmaking organisations. As we have seen in Chapter 6, the focus upon the criminal features of the organisation is an approach that has been adopted

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in Canada and advocated in Australia, where in the case of the latter, the national penal code allows for prosecutions on the basis of a criminogenic ‘corporate culture’. We might in some cases expect responses that seek to change the corporate culture, or organisational rehabilitation, to be more valuable than a simple deterrent effect. The concept of organisational rehabilitation, however, raises a series of other issues. As the case studies in Chapter 1 demonstrate, safety crimes very often arise from defective control systems, insufficient checks and bal­ ances within the organisation, and p o or co m m unication systems or authoritarian managerial regimes. These failings are sometimes deliberate, and made to facilitate the commission of offences or the avoidance of detection, and sometimes the failings are inadvertent. Either way, it may be possible for court orders to force corporations to correct criminogenic polices and practices. Rehabilitation, according to Braithwaite and Geis, is a more workable strategy with corporate crime than with mainstream crime because organisational structures are more easily reformed - they are more malleable - than human personalities. As they argue, ‘a new internal com ­ pliance group can be put in place much more readily than a new superego’ (1982: 310). Moreover, Croall (2005) points out that since corporate penal­ ties are a response to corporate ‘fault’, it is appropriate that penalties are directed at the underlying circumstances of this fault in the organisation. Corporate probation, she suggests, is likely to be effective in this respect. C o r p o r a t e p r o b a t i o n , a n e s t a b l i s h e d p u n i s h m e n t u s e d in t h e US c o u r t s , i nvol ves i m p o s i n g a spe ci f i ed set o f c o n d i t i o n s o n t h e c o n v i c t e d c o m p a n y . C o r p o r a t e p r o b a t i o n m i g h t i nvol ve, f or e x a m p l e , t h e i n t r o d u c ­ t i o n o f spe ci f i ed s afet y p r o c e d u r e s a n d / o r t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f speci al i st safet y staff. T h e first t i m e p r o b a t i o n was u s e d agai ns t a c o r p o r a t i o n in t he US wa s in 1971 w h e r e t h e oil c o m p a n y A R C O wa s o r d e r e d to d e v e l o p an oi l - s p i l l r e s p o n s e p r o g r a m m e d u r i n g its p r o b a t i o n p e r i o d ( L o f q u i s t 1993) . U n d e r US s e n t e n c i n g gui del i nes , c e r t a i n m a n d a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e p r o b a t i o n ar e n o w spe ci f i ed. If a c o m p a n y c o m m i t s a f u r t h e r c r i m e d u r i n g p r o b a t i o n , it m u s t p a y a fine o r r e s t i t u t i o n o r it m u s t e n g a g e in a p r o g r a m m e o f c o m m u n i t y servi ce. In t h e US s ys t e m, r e g u l a t o r y officials act as p r o b a t i o n officers a n d r e p o r t to t he c o u r t o n w h e t h e r o r n o t c o n d i ­ t i o n s o f p r o b a t i o n h a v e b e e n satisfied. C o u r t o r d e r s , k n o w n as ‘p u n i t i v e i n j u n c t i o n s ’, h a v e b e e n p r o p o s e d as a m o r e s t r i n g e n t f o r m o f c o r p o r a t e p r o b a t i o n . T h e p o i n t o f p u n i t i v e i n j u n c t i o n s is t h a t t he f o r m o f r e m e d i a l a c t i o n r e q u i r e d by t h e c o u r t s is l i n k e d v e r y c l o s e l y t o t h e p r o c e s s o f t r i g g e r i n g a c r i m i n a l p e n a l t y if t h e i n j u n c t i o n is b r e a c h e d . P u n i t i v e i n j u n c t i o n s t e n d al so t o s p e c i f y t h e p e r s o n n e l r e s p o n s i b l e f o r e n s u r i n g t h e i r c o m p l i a n c e ( Cr oal l 2005) . In t h e US, o f f e n d e r s ’ r e h a b i l i t a t i o n p r o g r a m m e s f or s e n i o r officials in t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n w h o ar e c o n v i c t e d o f sa f et y c r i m e s n o r m a l l y i nvol ve a

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r a n g e o f p r o f e s s i o n a l s w h o e n c o u r a g e t h e o f f e n d e r t o f ace u p t o t h e im pact and thus u n d e r sta n d the consequences of his/her behaviour. H o w e v e r , t h e use o f s u c h p r o g r a m m e s can be q u e s t i o n e d si nc e, if we a c c e p t t h a t o f t e n t he s e n i o r of f i cer s w h o c o m m i t s a f et y c r i m e s ar e likely to b e in a m u c h b e t t e r p o s i t i o n t o a p p r e c i a t e t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e i r a c t i o n s f or t h e m s e l v e s a n d f or o t h e r s ( t h e y w o u l d f or e x a m p l e n o r m a l l y be sufficiently e x p e r t to a p pr ec ia te , p r i o r to th e offence, exactly w h a t d a m a g e , loss o r i n j u r y c o u l d f ol l ow f r o m t h e i r w r o n g f u l c o n d u c t a n d w h y it is w r o n g ) , t h e n s u c h p r o g r a m m e s m a y b e o f l i m i t e d val ue.

Restitution fo r safety crimes

Some comm entators have noted the possibility o f com m unity service as a means o f corporate recompense for the damage caused to the individual, the family and the community. Punch (1996) has pointed out the advan­ tages o f corpo rate c o m m u n ity service (for example m aking a com pany lend an executive to a charity for a year), and direct compensatory orders which enable the punishm ent to be designed to offset the costs of the crime to the victim. Corporate com m unity service is a remedy that is widely used in the US courts, as is the imposition o f comm unity service upon individu­ als associated w ith o rganisational crimes. Often the courts design c o m m u n ity service in a way that allows the organisation or individuals within the organisation to contribute to the com m unity using their special­ ist skills. It is this latter feature of com m unity service for safety crimes that has often exposed such penalties to criticism for their inappropriateness. Thus, for example, in August 2006, a former President o f a sewer company was sentenced to seven years probation and 840 hours com m unity service by an Arizona court after he had been found guilty o f homicide and reck­ less end ang erm en t for causing the death o f an employee, James Gamble, who was poisoned by sewer gas whilst unblocking a sewer tank. The court found that the main cause o f the death was that the air had not been ade­ quately tested, and crucially that workers were not properly trained in the correct procedures for entering sewer tanks or in the proper rescue proce­ dures. The com m unity service, the court ordered, should be spent teaching safety classes. This caused controversy since the victim had died precisely because the com pany had failed to provide the necessary safety training. Critics argued that the co mpany was clearly not capable of providing this training to the necessary s tan d a rd / Shaming provisions P u b l i c s h a m i n g p r o v i s i o n s , s u c h as p u b l i s h i n g a n a d v e r t i s e m e n t i n a n e w s p a p e r th at publ icl y a n n o u n c e s a c o n v i c t i o n for safety cr im es , or b e i n g o r d e r e d t o s h o w a s i g n d e t a i l i n g t h e c o n v i c t i o n o u t s i d e a f i r m ’s p r e m i s e s , h a v e b e e n u s e d in s ever al j u r i s d i c t i o n s .

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For B r a i t h wa i t e a n d Gei s ( 1982: 301) , t h o s e p u n i s h m e n t s c a n act as a d e t e r r e n t s i m p l y b e c a u s e ‘[ c o r p o r a t i o n s a n d t hei r offi cers are g e n u i n e l y af r a i d o f b a d p u b l i c i t y a r i s i ng f r o m t h e i r i ll egi t i mat e act i vi t i es’. Publ i ci t y o r d e r s b y t h e i r n a t u r e are d e p e n d a n t u p o n h o w t h e i r me s s a ge is c o m m u ­ n i ca t e d a n d t h e m e d i u m t h r o u g h w h i c h t hi s m e s s a g e is c o m m u n i c a t e d . T h i s m i g h t b e p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t w h e n t h e y ar e a p p l i e d t o s a f e t y c r i me s , si nce p u b l i c i t y o r d e r s d e p e n d u p o n p u b l i c r e a c t i on. Publ i c r e a c ­ t i o n a g a i n s t s o m e sa f et y c r i m e s - t h o s e t h a t i nvol ve n o i n j u r y o r d e a t h p a r t i c u l a r l y - m a y be m o r e di fficult to se cure pr eci sel y b e c a u s e o f p r o c e s s e s o f d é c r i m i n a l i s a t i o n t h a t s a f e t y c r i m e s ar e v u l n e r a b l e to ( D u n f o r d a n d Ri dl ey 1996: 15). C o m m u n i c a t i n g a s t r o n g m e s s a g e o f t he s e r i o u s n e s s o f t he o f f enc e m a y be all t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t in t h e c o n t e x t o f safet y c r i me s . As Levi ( 20 0 2 ) has n o t e d , t hi s t y p e o f p e n a l t y is likely t o be m o r e ef f ect i ve w h e n it is a p p l i e d t o l ar ge h o u s e h o l d n a m e c o m p a n i e s , si nce t h e y are t h e c o m p a n i e s t h a t have t h e m o s t to lose in t e r m s o f r e p u ­ t a t i o n . H o w e v e r , it is s i g n i f i c a n t in t hi s r e s p e c t t h a t Fisse ( 1 9 7 1 ) a r g u e s t h a t p u b l i c i t y o r d e r s a n d s i mi l ar t e c h n i q u e s o f s h a m i n g rely less o n p u b l i c r e a c t i o n t h a n o n t h e r e a c t i o n s o f b u s i n e s s execut i ves, official p e r s o n s a n d ‘o p i n i o n l ea d e r s ’.

Publicity orders can impose punitive burdens on management which are more difficult to quantify and therefore less calculable than fines. Ultimately, publicity orders are more likely to affect the organisation’s rep­ utation than have a lasting im pact on a chief executive or a director. Therefore, those are punishments for which the costs will always be dispro­ portionately borne by the organisation rather than by individual senior managers. A related requirement that has been used in the US in particular is the requirement that a senior manager/director appears in court during the trial and sentencing process where it is an organisation that is being prosecuted so that the company or organisation’s senior officers are not allowed to use the shell of the organisational form to remain anonymous. The requirem ent for a h u m a n face to be given to the corporation in court is significant since it takes a major leap of the imagination to con­ ceptualise how the corporation can exhibit an emotional response such as shame. The internalisation o f shame by the corporation rather than the individual is more likely to be realised in a completely different way and it more likely to be internalised as a measure of the extent to which bad p ub ­ licity costs companies in the long term. Shaming itself may therefore be regarded as a financial deterrent to companies as opposed to an emotional response capable of allowing individuals to contemplate the consequences of their offending. It may also be the case that precisely because they are less quantifiable than fines and the fact that their long-term effects are less amenable to quantification, reputational penalties can impose greater punishment and deterrence than mere economic sanctions.

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Friedrichs (1998: 13) however, has a rgu ed that ‘sophisticated public relations operations have the means to transform attempts to sham e cor­ porations to their advantage, or at least to neutralise those efforts’. In other words, this is a form of p u n ish m en t that may be easily countered by the larger corporations with large public relations departments, or those that can afford to hire PR firms. At least two further problems are associated with this sanctioning strategy. O ne is that it requires firms to have some visibility - o r indeed engage in direct business with - the general public. Yet often the public fails to identify which firms are the source o f goods or services they might purchase - how many o f us would be aware, for exam­ ple, that Dixons is actually part o f a European multinational company that includes Currys, PC World and the Link, companies to w hom we might as consumers direct our business were there to be any reaction to the public ‘sham ing’ o f Dixons. Second, even in the event of effective shaming, if the impact o f reputational damage is to lose custom, then this requires choice - however, for those w ho buy petrol, and m ight w ant to respond to the public shaming o f a leading retailer, they would find not only little choice (petrol all emanating from one of the big five oil giants), bu t they would also find there is little to choose between any o f these in their long-term safety management/compliance record, for example. Towards a sentencing mix?

Differentiating between those different aims of p u n ish m en t (deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation and incapacitation) does not imply that those philosophies of pun ishm en t produce mutually exclusive solutions to the p un ishm ent o f safety crimes. As the preceding discussion indicates, there are likely to be cases where deterrence is no t likely to be achieved (not least if p u nish m en t comes be regarded simply as the ‘a d d -o n ’ cost of co n­ d u ctin g business); equally, there are likely to be cases where the m ost appropriate ‘just deserts’ is impossible to establish, or where rehabilitative aims are simply not appropriate. If we imagine that the penalties imposed for safety crimes might not be merely restricted to a financial deterrent, then there is reason to thin k th at we can co m b in e deterrence and just deserts to good effect. But because the real value of the external costs gen­ erated by safety crimes is unlikely to be quantifiable, we will always need to have the option to either seek rehabilitation or, in the worst cases, inca­ pacitation. This suggests that the most effective way of dealing with safety offences is by deploying a ‘mix’ of sentencing options that could be made available to the courts (Croall and Ross 2002). In other words, because of the complexities of the way that safety crimes are produced and the c o m ­ plexities that we face in seeking to prevent future crimes taking place, we have to think about the most appropriate ‘sentencing mix’. This is not to say th at each p un itiv e aim sho uld be given equal weight. Indeed,

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Braithwaite (2002) has suggested an adaption of his pyramid of enforce­ m e nt along the lines of a sentencing mix. Here, he recom m ends restorative justice as the first resort at the bottom of the pyramid, then if this fails, regulators should appeal to the rational capacities of offenders and impose deterrent penalties. Where those fail and the offender is deemed an ‘incompetent or irrational actor’, then incapacitative penalties should be imposed. All of the evidence that we have points to the relatively high chance of securing deterrence where financial penalties are appropriately a p p o r­ tioned and where those penalties are most clearly targeted (for detailed overviews of this evidence, see Davis 2004 and Bergman and Fooks forth­ coming). For this reason, we would argue that a system of fines that reflects both the gravity of the offence and the ability of the offender to pay seems to be the most justifiable and the most likely to achieve deterrence. In cases where the organisation has the necessary capital to sustain equity fines, we see no good reason why this penalty should not be levied on investors. The fact that the punishment of investors is hardly likely to find favour in capi­ talist social orders, where a range of legal protections are already afforded to the owners of businesses (and here we refer the reader back to our dis­ cussion o f corporate personality in Chapter 6) does not mean that we should not continue to argue for equity fines as a likely means of achieving results. After all, we do not consider the interests of those that profit most from law breaking when framing punishments for any other crime. It is also im portant not to underestimate the importance of attaching moral condemnation to punishment and the way that this might supple­ m ent purely in stru m en tal p u n ish m en ts such as effective fines or reforming the structures and policies of the organisation. As Bergman and Fooks have noted, the key weaknesses of those instrum en tal approaches is that they fail to comm unicate and transm it the requisite m oral o p p ro b riu m that is central to the process of criminalisation. Publicity orders thus are im portant as supplementary penalties, since they provide a different function: ‘as a sanction that can work to reaffirm the moral importance of meeting the terms of legal duties under health and safety legislation, publicity orders represent a potentially powerful means of reinforcing the normative basis of compliance with health and safety regulation’ (Bergman and Fooks, forthcoming: npn). Sentencing individuals

Thinking about the most appropriate ‘sentencing mix’ also returns us to the question of whether we punish the individual or the organisation. If this chapter has concerned itself almost exclusively with corporate and organi­ sational penalties, this is merely because o f the infrequency with which

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individuals are punished for safety crimes. Yet, again we might raise issues a b o u t the extent to which this is driven by the discretionary decision of investigators and prosecutors. HSE prosecution policy currently notes that the regulator will seek to prosecute individuals using the same evidence test noted above, and instructs inspectors t h a t '... prosecuting individuals will be w arranted where there are substantial failings by them , such as where they have shown wilful or reckless disregard for health and safety require­ ments, or where there has been a deliberate act or omission that seriously imperilled their health and safety or the health and safety of others’ (Health and Safety Executive 2003c: 2). The policy also emphasises that decision to prosecute also rests u p o n a ‘public interest test’, so that investigators must ask themselves: would prosecution be in the public interest? Either due to the evidential test, or the public interest test, or a combination o f the two, however, individual prosecutions are relatively rare. For the individual the m axim um penalty for a su m m ary health and safety offence in the UK is six months im prisonm ent or a £5,000 fine or both. Yet, as we noted in Chapter 6, it rem ains overw helm ingly the c o m p an y th a t is p u n is h ed for safety crimes. To recap, we reported that in the ten years up to D ecember 2005 only 86 directors were convicted and 11 jailed for breaches o f health and safety law. We also reported that between 1980 and 2004, 11 directors were convicted for the com m on law offence of manslaughter. O f those, five were im prisoned, one received a c o m m u nity sentence and five were given sus­ pended sentences. Fisse and Braithvvaite (1993) argue in favour of corporate criminal lia­ bility b u t arc also conscious o f the need in m a n y cases to p u n is h or discipline individuals within the corporation. Geis and D im ento (1995: 84) conclude that punishing the individual and the corporation offers the best chances o f securing d eterrence, b u t speculate that results ‘m igh t more readily be achieved by concentrating all criminal resources on indi­ vidual malefactors’. It is at the p u n is h m e n t stage of the criminal process that the de facto corporate veil discussed in Chapter 5 comes to life. For if it is companies rather than their senior officers that pay the penalty for c o m m ittin g crim e, the only penalty to senior officers is th at their re p u ta tio n as managers may be damaged. But if the individual responsible is not prose­ cuted for, or directly implicated in, the crime, then this is hardly likely to affect their managerial reputation. It is equally arguable that im prisoning directors will n o t really make an im p act u p o n levels o f safety crime because c o m p an ies will always be able to find so m e o n e willing, in exchange for the right sort of rem uneration, to take very high-risk deci­ sions. The US p h e n o m e n o n of ap pointing a ‘vice president in charge of going to jail’ (B raithwaite 1984) th us th rea ten s to u n d e r m in e the

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effectiveness o f p u n i s h m e n t . If we accept the p rin c ip le o f corporate or organisational p u n is h m e n t, a principle th at allows organisational offences to be regarded as conceptually in d e p e n d e n t from the offences com m itted by the individuals w ithin the c o rp oratio n, this does not m ean that we are left with an e ith er/o r choice. Segregating organisational from individual p u n is h m e n ts merely gives us the o p p o rtu n ity to use either or to use both. As we have seen, there is reason to think th at neither on their own can be effective a n d , follow ing a lo n g - s ta n d i n g t r a d it io n o f research in w hite collar and corpo rate crime we w ould argue in m ost cases an ap prop riate sentencing mix directed against both co rpo ration s and individuals will be the only way to make the p u n is h m e n t stick.

C o n clu sio n

As the previous section in this chapter has argued, the complexities o f the m otivations a nd factors that encourage safety crimes d e m a n d an a p p ro p r i­ ate punitive 'm ix ’. This is n o t to undervalue the centrality o f pu n ish m en ts th a t aim to p rov id e a necessary d eterren t. Safety crim es arise very often from reasoned an d cost-bala nced decisions. T he prin ciple o f d eterrence therefore m u st be placed at the h eart o f any punitive strategy if it is likely to have any effect in preventing future offending at all. P u n is h m e n t in o ther w ords, w here rational decision -m ak ing has resulted in a crime, has to be constituted in a way th at makes crime unattractive to offenders. It is the principle o f ‘less eligibility’, or the idea that the material c o n d i­ tions o f an o ff e n d e r’s p u n is h m e n t are regulated to a level far below the con dition s experienced by the average no n-crim in alised citizen, that has historically u n d e r p i n n e d th e a p p lica tio n o f d e te rre n c e th e o r y (R usche 1933/1980). Since the im prison ed p op ulation tends to be overwhelm ingly c o m p r is e d o f th o s e from the lo w er social s t r a t u m , the c o n d it io n s o f i m p r i s o n m e n t m u s t be seen to im p o se m o r e h a r d s h ip th a n the social c o n d it io n s n o r m a ll y e x p e rie n c e d by the low est stra ta o f society. T his p rinciple o f less eligibility, as we have seen, does n o t apply to offenders associated with safety crimes (also M u n ro 2006). Ruche and K irchheimer noted in their classic work P unishm ent and Social Structure that the ge n ­ eral principle o f ensuring that p u n is h m e n t negates the proceeds o f crime was never a p p lie d in re latio n to th e reg u la tio n o f fa cto ry safety (1939/2003: 174), and they reproduce data from French labour law viola­ tio n s to d e m o n s t r a t e this p o in t. T h e ir a r g u m e n t is th a t the system o f p u n is h m e n t encourages rather than discourages offending in the case of safety crimes. As we have seen in relation to o u r discussion o f the form th a t p u n i s h m e n t takes in the case o f the UK, th e ir basic a r g u m e n t

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remains prescient. As Rusche (1933/1980) has argued, the existence of a principle of less eligibility is necessary because the form that punishment takes is always related to structural inequality. Punishment is less related to crime, as we have already seen in our discus­ sion of the historic origins of the criminal law, than to the defence of a particular social order, one that is based upon unequal relations of property (see also Rusche and Kirchheimer 1939/2003: 5). Safety crimes, just like many forms of mainstream crime, ultimately arise from unequal social rela­ tions of power. As we have seen in Chapter 2, those are offences that tend to victimise disproportionately the most vulnerable groups in society precisely because of their subordinate position in the labour market, and more gener­ ally, the social hierarchy. In Chapter 6, we argued that the processes of law reform and implementation of the law are intimately connected to a process of social ordering; a process that is geared towards maintaining the status quo. In capitalist social orders, maintaining the status quo means ensuring the predominance of capital and therefore the right of its institutional form, the corporation, to remain profitable. To this we can also add that maintain­ ing the status quo ultimately means ensuring that other key institutions such as branches of the state and public sector enterprises are not funda­ mentally underm ined by the criminal law. It is those rules of th um b that have historically ensured that safety crimes - and the forms of sanction that are used to punish them - are differentiated from ‘real’ crimes. lust as the magistrates of the nineteenth century found ways of reconstructing offences against the Factory Acts as less blameworthy, a range of judicial techniques continue to u nderm ine the seriousness with which the courts deal with safety crimes (Bergman and Fooks forthcoming). So what docs the preceding discussion tell us about the form that p u n ­ ishments for safety crimes should take? First that the p u n is h m en t of safety crimes, if it is to be effective, must overcome the major contradic­ tion that we point to above: it must challenge, rather than reinforce, the conditions that give rise to safety crimes in the first place. Some of the suggestions outlined above seek to do so, but ultimately criminal law and a system of p u n is h m e n t can no t achieve the b roader aim of social (as opposed to criminal) justice. The key problem with relying merely on punishment as a panacea for crime is that the conditions that give rise to crime in the first place cannot be changed by the way that we punish the small minority of offenders that end up in court. Punishment can never, therefore.be seen as the solution to crime. Some forms of pu nishm ent can provide a general deterrence against particular forms of offending if organisations and their senior officers cal­ culate that it will not be worth their while to continue to commit safety crimes. Punishment in the courts can also send an im portant expressive message from the state to assert social disapproval of such offending.

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P u n i s h m e n t can also b e ta r g e te d so as to p r o d u c e less ta n g ib le , b u t n o n e th e le s s effective results, su ch as re i n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e m o r a l i m p o r ­ tan ce th a t s h o u l d be a tta c h e d to safety crim es. T h e re are also, as we have seen, p u n i s h m e n t s th a t ca n go s o m e w ay to r e p a irin g th e social d a m a g e th a t a p a rt ic u l a r c rim e has inflicted. Finally, as we have a r g u e d here, th e p a r t ic u l a r f o r m s th a t p u n i s h m e n t take are likely to be a great deal m o r e effective if th e y are d e sig n e d to take in to a c c o u n t th e specificities o f th e c rim e a n d th e offen d er in safety crim es ( n o t least a rec o g n itio n th a t th ey are very often highly profitable crim es c o n d u c te d fro m b e h in d the c o r p o ­ rate veil). It sh o u ld also be a d d e d th a t the discussions th a t we have h a d in this ch ap te r are n o t merely theoretical, since versions o f each o f the p u n i s h ­ m e n t s dis cu ssed in this c h a p te r (w ith th e ex ception o f e q u ity fines) have been, o r are currently, in use in the US, C an ad a, Australia o r E urop e (ibid.). I n d e e d , an y review o f b o t h li te r a t u r e a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r a c t ic e s in relation to the sen ten cin g o f c o rp o r a ti o n s a n d / o r ind ivid uals involved in c o r p o r a te c r i m e m o r e g en erally attests clearly to the fact t h a t th is is an area in w hich there now exists a range o f im aginative p roposals, so m e o f w hich have been i n t ro d u c e d in lim ited fashion, oth ers o f w hich re m a in at th e p ro p o s a l stage (C roall 2005). T h ese s a n c tio n s each have th e ir d r a w ­ ba cks, n o n e is a p a n a c e a , a n d ea ch is m o r e o r less a p p r o p r i a t e for p a r t ic u l a r ty p es o f c o r p o r a t i o n a n d fo llo w ing specific f o r m s o f offence (S lapp er a n d T o m b s 1999). Ultim ately, while th e re are clearly e n o r m o u s difficulties in de veloping effective sanc tion s in the case o f c o rp o r a te crim e th ese te n d to be p o litic a l r a t h e r t h a n te c h n i c a l (L o fq u ist 1993, E tz io n i 1993). Again, the key issue is the political refusal to tr eat c o rp o r a te c rim e in general, a nd safety crim e in particu lar, as real crim e. T his reference to the politics o f safety crim e r e m in d s us that, while the i m p o r t a n c e o f th e f o r m s o f p u n i s h m e n t a d o p t e d by an y given so c iety sh o u ld n o t be u n d e re s tim a te d , th e key features o f societies th a t p r o d u c e safety crim es rem ain , as this b o o k has indicated, located in the o rg a n is a ­ tion o f p r o d u c t io n (C h a p te rs 1, 2 an d 3) an d th e political c o n s tru c tio n o f th e f o r m o f re g u l a ti o n d e s i g n e d to c o n t r o l safety c r i m e s ( C h a p t e r 7), ra th e r th a n the o u tc o m e o f the c rim in a l justice process. It is those central fe atu res o f th e p r o d u c t i o n a n d c o n tr o l o f safety c rim e s t h a t urge us to recon side r the centrality o f political eco no m y , r a th e r th a n the p e rip h eral a m e l io r a ti o n o f p a r t ic u l a r c rim e s t h a t m i g h t be p ro v i d e d by r e f o r m i n g system s o f p u n i s h m e n t . It is to a d e v e lo p m e n t o f this political e c o n o m y a p p ro a c h to u n d e r s ta n d in g the p r o d u c t io n o f safety crim es th a t o u r c o n ­ clud ing c h a p te r turn s.

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Notes 1

A p ra c tic e for w h ic h th e r e are clearly lim its; see, for e x a m p l e , T o m b s 2002.

2

S o u rc e o f d a t a is H e a lth a n d Safety E xecutive

(20 0 5 ).

3

S o u rc e o f d a t a is H ea lth a n d Safety Executive

(20 0 5 ).

4

R v H ow e a n d Son (E n g in e e rs ) Ltd [199] All F.R 249.

5

S o u rc e o f d a ta is H e a lth a n d Safety E xecutive

6

(2 00 5 ).

It is w o r t h n o t i n g in th e c o n t e x t o f o u r d is c u s s i o n a b o v e t h a t if th e c h a n c e o f b e in g p r o s e c u t e d f o r a d e t e c t e d d e a t h is 29 p e r c e n t , a n d t h e n u m b e r o f d e t e c t i o n s is b e tw e e n j a n d | o f the t r u e figure o f p e o p le w h o are killed b y w o r k i n g , th e n in fact the c h a n c e s o f b e in g p r o s e c u te d for killing a w o rk e r, n e v e r m i n d for less s e r io u s offences, is likely to be a g re a t deal less t h a n o n e in ten .

7

Sec w w w . o c c u p a t i o n a l h a z a r d s . c o m / a r t i c l e s / 1 5 5 1 6 .

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Chapter 9

Conclusion: making sense of safety crimes

Intro d u ctio n

Safety crimes are a significant crime problem, as we have sought to d e m o n ­ strate throughout this text. Yet, despite this, we have also indicated various ways in which political, social, legal and regulatory processes combine to obscure their nature, extent, scale and consequences. This social construc­ tion of safety crimes as something other than a crime problem extends to the discipline o f criminology which, through its definitions o f ‘crime’, ‘vio­ lence’ and ‘policing’ further marginalise such p h e n o m en a - yet a central theme of this book is that safety crimes are a proper and legitimate focus of analysis for criminology. Indeed, it is a remarkable feature o f criminology that this is the first text in the discipline devoted to this subject. It remains for us to consider the extent to which, theoretically and empirically, safety crimes might be placed upon the criminological agenda. We saw in the previous ch apter how there are good theoretical and empirical reasons for at least considering the application of classicist or ‘rational choice’ forms of reasoning to the area of corporate crime c o n ­ trol. W hilst the ratio na l choice perspective p re-dates m o d e r n criminology, as we have noted, it has made an indelible m ark up o n the d e v e lo p m e n t of d eterrence perspectives. To argue, as we have, that ra tio nal choice th e o r y is m o re applicable to safety crim es tha n to the types o f crim es to which it is n o rm ally applied, assum es b ro adly two things a b o u t safety crimes. First, that safety crimes result from profitseeking (see, for exam ple, Grayson and G o d d a rd 1976; N ichols and Arm strong 1973; Woolfson et al. 1996; Work Hazards Group 1988). And, second, th at safety crim es are p ro d u c e d th r o u g h the fu n c tio n in g of rational, profit-maximising entities.

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C o n clu sio n : m aking se nse o f safety crim es

In fo r-p ro fit org a n isatio n s, the claim th at a c c u m u la ti o n (to sustain or e x p a n d p ro fita b ility ) u ltim a te ly takes p r i o r i t y over safety - in d e e d , any o th e r goal - w ith in a c o r p o r a ti o n seem s in co n tro v ertib le. T h u s it w o u ld be lu d ic ro u s to ig no re the d y n a m ic te n d e n c y to acc u m u la te w ith in a c a p i­ talist sy s te m , since th is p r o v i d e s th e raison d ’être o f th e p r i v a te c o r p o r a ti o n . However, the p rim a c y o f a c c u m u la ti o n does n o t m e a n that th ere c a n n o t be s o m e c o n g r u e n c e b etw e e n o c c u p a t io n a l safety a n d effi­ c ie n c y / p r o f i t a b i l i t y w i t h i n a given o r g a n i s a t i o n . T h e r e is n o n e e d to accept u n c ritically a b u sin ess case for im p ro v e d sa f e ty 1 o r to ac cep t th e tenets o f c o n se n s u s th e o r y (see C h a p te r 7) to recognise tha t, u n d e r c e r­ ta i n c o n d i t i o n s , th e r e is s o m e c o in c i d e n c e o f in te re s ts b e tw e e n a c c u m u l a t i o n a n d safety, a n d b e tw e e n c a p ita l a n d la b o u r . To p o se a m u t u a l exclusivity b e tw een safety an d profitability leads to a m i s u n d e r ­ sta n d in g o f th e causes o f ind u strial in juries in general, a n d safety crim es in p articular, a n d - crucially - an u n d e r - e s ti m a t io n o f any p ro s p e c ts for th eir p rev en tio n . Such a view for ex am ple fails to ac c o u n t for the fact th at s o m e c o m p a n i e s m a n a g e safety m u c h m o r e effectively th a n o th e r s , an d are also in so m e cases a m o n g th e w o r l d ’s m o s t p ro fita b le c o r p o r a t i o n s , a n d th a t safety m e a s u r e s ov er an d a b ov e th o s e r e q u i r e d by the law are t a k e n by s o m e c o m p a n i e s at c e r t a in ti m e s , a n d so o n . M o r e o v e r, th e s a f e ty -p r o fits d i c h o t o m y d o w n p la y s i m p o r t a n t p o in t s a b o u t the way in w hich profitability is calculated. For e xam ple, a c o rp o r a ti o n th at engages in l o n g - te r m c a lc u la tio n s o f p ro fita b ility is m o r e likely to p ro v id e safer w o rk p la c e s t h a n o n e d ri v e n by s h o r t - t e r m ra tio n a l it ie s . Equally, large o rg a n isatio n s engaged in a range o f m o r e a n d less h a z a rd o u s activities are able to subsidise im p ro v e d safety in so m e aspects o f their o p e ra tio n s, and even to sustain lo s s-m a k in g un its, for so m e (albeit n o t indefinite) p eriod o f ti m e (P earce a n d T o m b s 1997). Finally, s o m e v e r s io n s o f the s a f e ty -p r o fits d i c h o t o m y te n d to pose an overly ratio n alistic c o n c e p t o f c o rp o r a te m a n a g e m e n ts , safety efforts, a n d th e p r o d u c t io n o f in d u s trial injury. In o t h e r w o rd s, th e r e is an im p li c a ti o n , at least, t h a t d e a th s a n d injuries can sim ply be a ttrib u te d to acts o r o m issio n s based u p o n ( f in a n ­ cial) c a lc u la ti o n . W h ile th is m a y be so in s o m e cases, it is clearly n o t ap p lic a b le to all safety c rim e s. M o reo v er, to a t t r i b u t e ra t io n a l it y to th e c o r p o r a t i o n is to r c c o g n is c t h a t th is is its raison d ’être, r a t h e r t h a n a d escrip tio n o f ho w real c o m p a n ie s actually o p era te at all times; as we have seen in o u r case studies, m a n a g e m e n ts often m a n a g e poorly, so th a t cal­ cu lation s are either n o t m a d e or, if they are m a d e , are in fact e rro n e o u s. It sh o u ld also be ad d ed , o f course, th a t safety crim e s m ay also be p r o d u c e d in the co n tex t o f n o t- fo r- p ro fit o rg an isa tio n s (see C h a p te r 6). For these reasons, th e n , w'hile th e re is an u ltim a te and inevitable ‘t r u t h ’ to th e a r g u m e n t th a t p ro fit m a x i m i s a t io n w ith in capitalist e c o n o m ie s is th e m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l cau se o f safety c rim e s, we n eed to m o v e b ey o n d

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th is level o f a naly sis if we are to e x p lo r e fully h o w safety c r i m e s are p ro d u c e d . It is to the use - the p o te n tial an d lim ita tio n s - o f c rim i n o lo g i­ cal t h e o r y ( b e y o n d th e r a t i o n a l c h o ic e p e rs p e c tiv e ) in f u r t h e r i n g th is u n d e r s ta n d in g , t h a t we no w tu rn .

C r i m i n o l o g y , t h e o r y a n d safety c r im e s

V arious fo rm s o f in d iv id u al positivism th a t e m e rg e d after the h e yd ay o f th e e ig h teen th - a n d n in e t e e n th - c e n tu r y classicist th eorists so u g h t to id e n ­ tify th e ‘a b n o r m a l i t i e s ’ t h a t e it h e r p ro p e l le d in d iv id u a l s in to c r i m e , or e n s u r e d th a t th e y were m o r e p re d isp o se d to c o m m i t t i n g c rim e th a n th e general p o p u la tio n . Now, th ere have been so m e a tte m p ts to apply an in d i­ v id u al positivist type analysis to c o rp o r a te crim e, th o u g h these have been m a r g in a l to crim in o lo g y , c o n d u c te d m o stly w ith in b u sin ess o r m a n a g e ­ m e n t stu d ie s. T h e s e have t e n d e d to seek to id e n tif y th o s e ‘p e r s o n a l i t y ’ facto rs a ss o c ia te d w ith p e o p le w h o su cceed in p ri v a te c o m p a n i e s , a n d te n d to h ig h lig h t fe atu res su c h as b e in g in n o v a tiv e , a m b i t i o u s , sh re w d , aggressive, i m p a t i e n t , a n d p o s s e s s in g a ‘m o r a l fle x ib ility ’ (see S n id e r 1993). M o r e recently, h o w e v e r, a n d sq u a r e ly w ith i n a ‘c r i m i n a l j u s ti c e ’ fr a m e w o rk , Babiak an d H are (2006) have e x a m in e d th e role o f th e ‘p sy ­ c h o p a t h ’ in c o rp o r a tio n s . As H a re has claimed, T h e w o rld o f u n fe e l in g p s y c h o p a t h s is n o t lim ite d to th e p o p u l a r im a g e s o f m o n s t e r s w h o steal p e o p l e ’s c h il d r e n o r kill w i t h o u t rem orse. After all, if you arc b rig h t, you have been b r o u g h t up with g o o d social skills, a n d you d o n ’t w a n t to e n d u p in p r i s o n , so you p ro b ab ly w o n ’t t u r n to a life o f violence. Rather, y o u ’ll recognise th at you can use y o u r p sy c h o p ath ic ten d en c ie s m o r e legitimately by g et­ ting in to p o s itio n s o f p o w e r an d c o n tr o l. W h a t b e tt e r place th a n a co rp o ra tio n ? (H are, cited in H ilp e rn 2004) Now, we do n o t need to accept pseu do-scien tific categories such as ‘psy­ c h o p a t h ’ (see also B a k a n 2 0 0 4 ), n o r th e th e o r e t i c a l f r a m e w o r k o f in d i v id u a l p o sitiv ism , to see h o w c e rta in q u alitie s are likely to be b o t h v a lu e d w ith i n th e c o r p o r a t e w o r ld , w h ile at th e s a m e ti m e i n d i v id u a l s possessing such characteristics m ay also be m o r e likely to be involved in c o rp o r a te illegalities, e ith er as lead in g figures or as in d iv id u als p re p a re d to t u r n a b li n d eye to o r g a n i s a t i o n a l illegality.2 If c o r p o r a t i o n s seek to recruit p artic u la r types o f people, a n d if it is the case th a t the h ig h e r one goes up the c o rp o r a te h iera rch y the m o r e likely are certain characteristics to be presen t, valued a n d a c cen tu ated , th e n we need to k n o w s o m e th i n g

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a b o u t the culture and fu nctioning o f the co rp o ra tio n itself, as well as the env iro n m en ts w ithin which it operates, to u nd ersta n d how its employees, from the m o s t senio r d o w n w ard s, act, think , rationalise, a n d so on. For exam p le, to u n d e r s ta n d how Bhopal was p r o d u c e d requires m o re than u n d e r s ta n d in g the action s an d o m issio n s o f W arren A n d e rso n ; on the o th e r h a n d , A nderson clearly typified m any o f the qualities valorised by corp orate America, and th us requires som e place in an overall story o f the p ro d u ctio n o f th o u s an d s o f deaths. In this context, it is im p o rta n t to bear in m in d that very often there is an alm ost total lack o f m eaningful differ­ ences betw een co rpo rate offenders and co rp o rate n on -o ffen de rs (Snider 1993: 61; see also Virta 1999; W eisburd and W aring 2001). If a myopia towards corporate offenders has been a hallm ark o f individ­ ual po sitiv ism s, so to o has th is b een th e case w ith th e vast ran ge o f sociological positivisms th at have co m e to d o m in ate criminological t h e o ­ rising since the 1930s. Here, however, we c om e to som e notable exceptions. As a crim in o lo g ic a l th e o r is t w o rk in g w ith i n th e C h icag o School, Sutherland him self attem p ted to develop a general, sociological, th eo ry o f crime causation, claiming that ‘differential association could explain b o th upper-class and lower-class crimes: crim e arises from an excess o f defini­ tio n s favo urab le to law v io latio n over d e fin itio n s u n fa v o u r a b le to law v iolation. C rim in a l activity - m otiv a tio n s, post-hoc ra tion alisation s an d actual techniques o f com m ission - is, like all behaviour, learnt. This learn ­ ing, and exposure to different definitions regarding the appropriateness or otherwise o f certain behaviours, emerges o u t o f o u r various associations and these associations vary by frequency, d uration , priority and intensity. M o re ov er, we kn ow , on the basis o f d o c u m e n t e d ev iden ce, in sid er accounts, and, indeed, reasonable inference, that within certain c o r p o r a ­ tions o r even industries, certain fo rm s o f activity are prevalent, b o th in term s o f k n o w in g h ow to engage in th e m an d k n o w in g why on e m u s t engage in them . So presum ably if this holds for legal activity, it holds for illegal activity too. For exam ple, in the cockling in d u s try off the n o r t h ­ w estern coast o f E n glan d, o n e m u s t ass u m e th at ‘everyone k n o w s ’ th at there is available a pool o f illegal labour, and how to draw upon this, just as in the con stru ction industries of m an y o f o u r regenerating u rb an cen­ tres, it is c o m m o n kn ow le dg e th at th ere are a rm ie s o f m ig r a n t la b ou r, where the pick up points and times to collect these each day are, and how these should be treated to conceal th em from any external authority, and so on. F u rth e r, an d crucially, there m ay also be generalised kn ow led ge w ithin a particular sector that ‘everyone is doing it’ - which n ot only p r o ­ vides a m otiv ation , since n ot to do it is to place o n e ’s own w orkplace or c om pan y at a competitive disadvantage, b u t also that to do it is so g en er­ alised th at it is acceptable, not really crim inal.3

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Differential association is a problematic concept, and has been subjected to stringent criticism (Taylor et al. 1973: 125-30). It is of interest, however, precisely because it attempted to incorporate corporate crime within a gen­ eral theory o f crime. O ther variants of sociological positivism have not sought to do so in such an explicit manner, yet there still remain elements or forms of these modes of explanation that can be or have been utilised by subsequent theorists to explain incidences of corporate crime. Notable here is Mertonian strain theory and its central concept, anomie. For example, Passas (1990) has linked deviant behaviour to the disjunction between institutionalised aspirations and the accessibility to legitimate opportunity structures. Although M erton saw these p hen om e na as confined to the lower classes, Passas argues that there is no compelling reason why anomie theory cannot be applied to high-class and corporate deviance: As t h e m e a n i n g a n d c o n t e n t o f suc cess goals v a r y f r o m o n e p a r t o f t h e s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e t o a n o t h e r , s i m i l a r d i f f i c u l t i e s in a t t a i n i n g d i v e r s e l y d e f i n e d g o a ls m a y b e faced b y p e o p l e in t h e u p p e r so c ial r e a c h e s t o o ; t h e y a r e , t h e r e f o r e , far f r o m i m m u n e to p r e s s u r e s t o w a r d s d e v i a n c e (ibid.: 158).

O f course, the pressures to succeed exist for businesses and organisations in terms of maximisation of profit, growth and efficiency. These goals may have to be obtained by all or any means, particularly when the continua­ tion of the corporation is at stake and key actors have come to equate the furthering of their own ends as largely dependant on the prosperity of the firm, an attitude underpinned by the system of financial rewards which apply to senior management, not least bonus and share schemes linked to stock market performance. Structural pressures and strains may be applied both to those at the top as well as to employees, and the employment of deviant methods may be the only possible way of dealing with problematic situations, or may be perceived as such (see Box 1983). Finally, in this whistle-stop tour of criminological perspectives, various forms of critical and radical criminologies - including Marxisms and fem­ inisms - have made im p ortant contributions to our body of knowledge regarding corporate crime causation. Notable here are: Stuart Hills’s edited collection Corporate Violence (Hills 1987b), precisely because it consists of a series o f empirical and theoretical case studies o f the ways in which injury and death are produced systematically by the drive for profit; Crimes of the Powerful (Pearce 1976), where it is argued that corporations act systematically to control the markets within which they operate, often criminally, and often doing so with the connivance of the (here, American) state; and Szockyi and Fox’s (1996) anthology o f analyses of the myriad ways in which corporations exploit constructions of gender to victimise female consumers, workers and recipients of health care.

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T h e p r o c e s s e s w h i c h r e s u l t in d e v i a n c e a n d a n o m i e t h r iv e in an e n v i ­ r o n m e n t d o m i n a t e d by c o n c e r n s o f cos ts a n d b e n e f i t s a n d ar e r e i n fo r c e d b y t h e s t r u c t u r a l p r e s s u r e s g e n e r a t e d w i t h i n a c a p ita list m o d e o f p r o d u c ­ tio n . S o m e t i m e s t h e c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n m a r k e t p r e s s u r e s a n d c o r p o r a t e c r i m e are e a s ily s e e n . C o m p a n i e s o f t e n e n d u p c o m m i t t i n g c r i m e s o r m a k i n g te r r i b l e reckless e r r o r s b e c a u s e t h e y ar e d e s p e r a te ly e n d e a v o u r i n g to a c q u i r e , retain o r r e-g a in a s i g n i f i c a n t slice o f t h e m a r k e t , as w as clearly t h e case w i t h t h e Herald o f Free Enterprise. T h u s , as we have se en t h r o u g h ­ o u t t h i s tex t, b u t es p e c i a l l y in r e l a t i o n to t h e ca se s t u d i e s in C h a p t e r 1, t h e r e are clear s t r u c t u r a l p r e s s u r e s u p o n a n d w i t h i n o r g a n i s a t i o n s w h i c h se em to p r o v i d e a c r u c i a l m o t i v a t i o n for sa fe ty c r i m e - as a d e s ira b le , o r ev en ‘n e c e s s a r y ’, r e s p o n s e to t h e d e m a n d s o f p r o fita b ility . T h is o p p o r t u n i t y - m o t i v a t i o n is clear ly h e i g h t e n e d w h e n th e s e s t r u c t u r a l p r e s s u r e s are faced in c o n t e x t s w h e r e w o r k e r s ar e relatively w e a k o r v u l n e r a b l e .

B e y o n d c rim in o lo g y

One obviousness that emerges from this brief appraisal o f criminological theory, and indeed throughout the text, is that understanding safety crimes requires us to look far beyond the individual on the scene - the ship’s assis­ tant bosun who did not check whether the ferry’s bow doors were closed before leaving port, the chemical plant worker who attached the hose to the tank, the shipping manager who sends a young man to unload cargo. This is to deny neither human agency, nor that individuals at times act (or fail to act) in ways that are decisive triggers for safety crimes. Individual, low-level employees at times may act in violation of safety law, behave stupidly, care­ lessly, recklessly, and so on. Having said this, as we have argued throughout this text, and in particular in Chapter 3, the extent to which safety incidents and safety crimes are represented as being the effects of one or several lowlevel individuals acting in such ways is both enormously exaggerated, and indeed ideologically and strategically so. To examine incidents and offences in terms of individuals is to fail to ask the question, what kind of organisation or process is it that allows the actions or inactions of one or several low level employees unintentionally to cause significant physical harm, as is often the case? Here, we can usefully turn to Charles Perrow’s (1984) Normal Accidents. Perrow begins his text by outlining, and not entirely dismissing, conventional’ explanations for acci­ dents - not least 'operator error’, lack of attention to safety features, lack of operating experience, and so on - but goes on to argue that there are more basic and im portant contributory factors to the failures of systems (ibid.: 63). This more fundam ental p h e n o m en o n is the very nature o f the processes and organisation that characterise some forms of production.

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T h u s Perrow claim s th at, for exam ple, chem ical plan ts are based on c om p lex ra th e r th an linear reactions, the f o r m e r bein g in te ra c tio n s ‘in which one c o m p o n e n t can interact with one or m ore o th er co m p o n e n ts outside o f the n o rm a l p ro d u c tio n seq u en ce’ (ibid.: 7 7 -8 ). Indeed, c o m ­ plex systems are increasingly the n o rm in certain in du stries given their ‘advantages’ over linear systems: Com plex systems are m ore efficient (in the narrow terms o f p r o d u c ­ tion efficiency, which neglects accident hazards) th an linear systems. T h e re is less slack, less u n d e r u t il is e d space, less to le ra n c e o f low q uality p e rf o rm a n c e , and m o r e m u l tifu n c tio n c o m p o n e n t s . From this p o in t o f view, for design and hardw are efficiency, complexity is desirable, (ibid.: 88) Moreover, according to Perrow, som e industries which are based on c o m ­ plex ra th e r th a n linear reactio ns are also ch ara cterised by ‘ti g h t ’ ra th er th an ‘loose’ coupling. T ight c oupling suggests that: delays in processing are n ot possible; little slack is possible in supplies, eq u ip m e n t and p e rs o n ­ nel; there are limited possibilities o f sub stitu tion o f these resources; and there is an absence o f designed-in buffers and red un dan cies (ibid.: 96). In oth er words, the n atu re o f disasters and ‘accidents’ (for Perrow), and the n a tu r e o f safety crim es (for us), is m is u n d e r s to o d by re m a in i n g at the level o f the individual; one m u st focus u p o n the n ature o f the system of which the individual is a part. T he actions, inactions, decisions, a n d so o n o f individuals m u s t th ere­ fore be placed in th e s t r u c tu r e s w ith i n w h ic h th ey o p e ra te - a n d this m eans taking cognisance o f their im m ed iate w orkgroup, their workplace, their o rgan isatio n/co m p any as well as, b eyond these, a far w ider complex o f factors. This highlights the need to move beyond individualised or envi­ ro n m e n ta l explanations, to engage in the theoretical a n d em pirical w ork required to develop an u n dersta nd ing o f safety crimes. A nd the urgency o f developing such a w ide-ranging explanatory framework has been raised by som e c o m m e n ta to rs o n corp o rate crime, w h o have emphasised the need to incorporate explanatory variables w hich range from the m icro (individ­ ual) th r o u g h to the macro (socio-structural) levels (C olem an 1987; Pun ch 2000; V aughan 1992, 1996). As w ith th e o r y -b u ild in g in c o rp o ra te crim e research in general (Cressey 1989), theoretical dev elop m en t here rem ains at an early stage, a lthough there are n ow a n u m b e r o f bo ok-length studies which a ttem p t to use som e o f this range o f factors. These include studies o f safety crimes in the offshore oil in du stry (W hyte 1999a, Woolfson et al. 1996), corporate crime in the asbestos (Tweedale 2000), chemicals (Pearce and Tombs 1998) and p harm aceutical (Braithwaite 1984) industries, c o r­ p o r a t e m a n s la u g h t e r (S lap pe r 2000), c o r p o r a te a n d state illegalities

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Conclusion: making sense of safety crimes

associated with the fateful launch o f the Challenger space shuttle (Vaughan 1996), and a national case study in the micro/macro control of ‘e conom ic’ crime (Alvesalo 2003b). All o f those latter studies integrate analyses of systematic features in the production of corporate crimes. The same features can be identified in the case studies that we set out in Chapter 1. Here we organise those features into three levels. F irs t, a t t h e m i c r o - l e v e l o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d o f i n t e r - p e r s o n a l r e l a ­ tio n s , we n e e d to take a c c o u n t o f in d iv id u a l p e r s o n a lity a n d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , n o t least in t e r m s o f t h e k i n d s o f p e r s o n a l i t i e s t h a t ar e r e c r u i t e d o r e n c o u r a g e d w i t h i n t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n , as well as ‘i n d i v i d u a l ’ f a c t o r s t h a t a r e s o c i a l l y c o n s t r u c t e d as r e l e v a n t s u c h as r a n k / p o s i t i o n w i t h i n h i e r a r c h y , age, g e n d e r , a n d e t h n i c i t y . S h i f t i n g to t h e level o f t h e i m m e d i a t e w o r k - g r o u p o r s u b - u n i t w i t h i n t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n , we m u s t take a c c o u n t o f in te r - p e r s o n a l d y n a m ic s ( a n d p a rtic u la rly th e p o ssib ility o f ‘g r o u p t h i n k ’), t h e c u l t u r e o f th e w o r k - g r o u p ( a n d th e e x t e n t to w h i c h this c o h e r e s o r c l a s h e s w i t h t h e c u l t u r e o f t h e w i d e r o r g a n i s a t i o n ) , a n d its l o c a t i o n w i t h i n t h e ov erall o r g a n i s a t i o n , b o t h s t r u c t u r a l l y a n d g e o g r a p h i ­ cally - t h a t is, is it relatively a u t o n o m o u s o r h ig h l y s u p e rv i s e d ? Is it p a r t o f o n e lar ge o r g a n i s a t i o n a l c o m p l e x , o r is it g e o g r a p h i c a l l y isolated?

Second, at what might be called the meso-level, there are also key sets of issues to be raised in relation to the organisation itself. At this level, we need to understand something of its organisational structure, its internal lines of decision-making and accountability, its geographical scope of operations, and the nature, volume and complexity of internal transactions. Issues of organisational culture must also be addressed: is the organisation risk taking or risk averse; it is gendered; is it authoritarian; and is it one where a blame culture predominates? Crucially, we must also enquire into what kind of management is either valorised or deemed acceptable by the organ­ isation; and related to this point are issues concerning workforce organisation, notably the existence, and strength, both of trade unions, as well as of safety reps and safety committees. O f further relevance are the very products or services that are the focus of the organisation: are these opaque or transparent, are they sold to consumers or other organisations, is their production labour intensive or capital intensive? Perhaps most obvi­ ously, we need to know something of the economic ‘health’ of the company, and of specific organisational units, as well as the ways in which, and the time-scales across which, profitability is calculated. Finally, t h e r e a r e k e y se ts o f q u e s t i o n s t o b e b r o a c h e d r e g a r d i n g t h e m a c r o - e c o n o m ic , p o litical a n d social e n v i r o n m e n t s w ith in w h ic h the o r g a n i s a t i o n o p e r a t e s . A m o n g s t t h e s e e x t r a - o r g a n i s a t i o n a l f e a t u r e s are: t h e n a t u r e o f t h e m a r k e t s t r u c t u r e ; t h e size a n d s c o p e o f t h e m a r k e t ; t h e p r e d o m i n a n t f o r m o f i n t e r - o r g a n i s a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h i n an y given m a r k e t ; t h e m a t e r i a l a n d i d e o lo g ic a l state o f r e g u l a t i o n ; t h e m o r e g e n e r a l

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n a t u r e o f s t a t e - b u s i n e s s r e l a ti o n s h ip s ; th e d o m i n a n t fo r m o f p o litic a l e c o n o m y , a n d c o n c o m i t a n t so c ie ta l v alu es , in c l u d i n g th e n a t u r e a n d d e g re e o f p r o - o r a n t i - b u s i n e s s s e n t i m e n t . T h u s an u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c h a n g in g levels o f o ccu p a tio n a l ‘safety’ requires a tten tio n to factors which in c l u d e th e fo llo w in g : th e a b ilities o f c a p ita l to re lo cate w i t h i n a n d b e y o n d n a t i o n a l b o u n d a r i e s , a n d th e r e b y to e x p o r t h a z a r d a n d risk; tr e n d s in la b o u r m ark ets a n d e m p l o y m e n t p atte rn s, n o t least a tte m p ts to im it a te m o d e l s o f flexibility c la i m e d to exist in th e US a n d Ja p a n ; th e n a tu re of, a n d changes in, c o n tr a c tu a l a rr a n g e m e n t s a n d m e t h o d s o f pay ­ m e n t; an d th e i n t r o d u c t io n o f new tech no log ies an d new fo rm s o f w'ork o rg a n isa tio n , p artic u la rly in te r m s o f the im p a c t o f these u p o n w o r k e r s ’ skills an d fu nc tion s. Crucially, as th e case studies on P iper A lpha, Bhopal, M o r e c a m b e Bay a n d th e Herald o f Free Enterprise illustrate m o s t clearly, we need to gain an u n d e r s ta n d in g o f the n atio n a l a nd in te rn a tio n a l eco ­ n o m i c co n d itio n s th a t shape o rg an isa tio n a l strategies. W h e t h e r e x a m i n e d in is o la t io n , o r in t h e i r c o m b i n a t i o n t h r o u g h a tt e m p t s to concep tu alise th e range a n d relative i m p o r t a n c e o f such fac­ to r s in te r m s o f an o v e r a r c h i n g f r a m e w o r k , th e p r o d u c t i o n o f safety crim es therefo re needs to be con ceptualised at a range o f m icro, m eso an d m a c r o levels. A n d this r e q u i r e m e n t , for an in te g ra te d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f th e s e c o m p l e x levels o f analysis, takes us b e y o n d c ri m i n o lo g y . I n d e e d , even in o u r b rie f dis cussion o f classicisms, an d in d iv id u a l an d sociolo gi­ cal p o sitiv ism s, it is clear th a t we n e e d e d to m o v e to w a rd s d is c ip lin a ry areas su c h as o rg a n i s a ti o n t h e o r y a n d o r g a n i s a ti o n stu d ies, e c o n o m ic s , an d political science in o r d e r to fully u n d e r s t a n d h o w c o r p o r a te crim e s are p r o d u c e d in any given society. T h is ta sk in fact re q u i r e s a p o litic a l e c o n o m y (Gill an d Law, 1988: xviii) o f safety c rim e s, o n e w h ich u n d e r ­ s ta n d s th e ir p r o d u c t i o n th r o u g h p rev ailin g sy stem s o f e c o n o m i c , social a n d political o rg a n i s a ti o n , d o m i n a n t value system s a n d beliefs, a n d the d ifferen tia l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f pow er. F u rth e r, th e in teg rated h is to rical a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l focus o f p o litica l e c o n o m y forces us to re c o g n ise th a t we c a n n o t u n d e r s ta n d safety crim es in the UK w ith o u t so m e u n d e r s ta n d in g o f how' these, first, have em erged , a n d , secon d, fit w'ithin b r o a d e r m a r k e t processes th a t are increasingly played o u t globally. If we re tu rn to the case o f S im o n Jones, we see ju s t h o w vital a b r o a d e r political e c o n o m y is to glean a full u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the p r o d u c t i o n o f safety crim es. T h u s , we find th at just as changes in the la b o u r m a r k e t s u m m a r i s e d u n d e r the label casualisation explain w hy he was able to w o rk in a high risk in d u s tr y w ith n e ith e r tra in in g n o r su p erv isio n , we need to t u r n to an analysis o f a w el­ fare state u n d e r r e c o n s tru c tio n to u n d e r s ta n d w h a t led h im to be w o rk in g at all. R e m e m b e r th a t S im o n Jones was a stu d e n t, taking a year o u t before c o m p l e t i n g his d e g re e p r o g r a m m e . He h a d sig n e d u p w ith P e rs o n n e l

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C o n clu sio n : m aking se nse o f safety crim es

Selection, in the w ord s o f his friend, to ‘get the dole off his b a c k ’. His being in th e place w h e re he c o u ld be killed was p a r t ly th e re su lt o f a b e n e f i t system w h ich , u n d e r th e guise o f e n c o u ra g in g p eo p le to w o rk , penalises th e m fo r failing to d o so, p a r t ic u l a r ly in th e case o f y o u n g p e o p le . For so m e , these m a y be ta k e n - f o r - g r a n te d facts o f life. But it was n o t always so, a n d in d ee d th e state o f affairs is b o t h recent an d can o n ly be u n d e r ­ stoo d in the con text o f m acro-level social processes, on b o th n a tio n al and in te rn a tio n a l levels.

A t h e m a t i c p o lit ic a l e c o n o m y o f s a fe t y c r i m e s

U n d e rs ta n d in g the com plexities o f safety crim es th erefo re m e a n s th a t we n e e d to m o v e b e y o n d c r i m i n o l o g i c a l t h e o r y a n d ta k e a c c o u n t o f th e m icro , m e s o a n d m a c r o processes t h a t we n o t e d in th e p re v io u s section. O n e way to develop a systematic analysis o f safety crim es is to fo rm u la te a m o r e th e m a tic analysis o f the m aterial th a t we have discussed in this bo ok . This is th e p o in t at w hic h we can beg in to m a k e m o r e sense o f th e th em es th a t w ere sketched o u t in Table 1, in C h a p te r 1, a n d to ask, in particular, h o w d o they help us to u n d e r s ta n d th e in cid ence o f (an d various reactions to) safety crimes? To this en d, we can identify six key features in the p r o ­ d u c t i o n o f safety c rim e s t h a t e m e r g e fr o m o u r analysis o f safety c rim e s t h r o u g h o u t this text a n d elaborate u p o n o u r initial analysis in C h a p te r 1. I . W o rk e r’s vulnerability to victimisation

T h e cases raised variou s factors related to th e n a tu r e o f w orkforces, w hich m a y also be view ed as th e objects o f m a n a g e r ia l pra c tic e s a n d cu ltu re s. W h e n g r o u p e d together, we find a key th e m e is th at w orkers at plants or in sec tors w h e re safety c rim e s o c c u r are d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y likely to be casualised, s u b - c o n tr a c t e d a n d / o r increasingly m i g r a n t w orkforces. This is n o t to claim th a t these are the only w o rk e rs w h o are v ic tim s o f safety c rim e s - v ic t im is a tio n by su c h c rim e s is u b i q u i t o u s - b u t as we saw in C h a p te r 2, for exam ple , vulnerability is often a ch aracteristic o f those w ho are v ictim ised by such crim es. M ore generally, v u lnerability in relation to d e a t h a n d in ju ry , let a lo n e safety c r i m e s p e r se, is a f u n c t i o n o f th e s t r e n g t h o f w o r k e r s in r e l a ti o n to m a n a g e m e n t s . As we also n o t e d in C h a p t e r 2, research ev iden c e o v e rw h e lm in g ly p o in t s to th e fin d in g th at the safest w o rk p la c e s are th o s e w o rk p la ces th a t have s tro n g tr a d e u n io n r e p r e s e n ta t io n (Jam es a n d W alters 2002; Reilly et al. 1995; W alters et al. 2005) suggesting th a t the relative streng th o f w orkers in the w o rk place is the key factor in the a m e lio r a tio n o f the risk o f safety crimes.

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2. The nature o f management First, there are features about the companies themselves, in terms of how they are managed, how workers are treated, and the standards o f m anage­ m e n t th at can be regarded as ‘acceptab le’. Flere we find n u m e r o u s references to aggressive managements, and to managements who ensured that w arnings, usually from below, were being systematically ignored. Moreover, we identify a generalised lack of m an age m e nt accountability for safety crimes. M an age m en t decisions and failures to heed w arnings are subject to very little external counter-balancing in terms of regulation. Indeed, through processes of victim blaming, those providing warnings and who were ultimately to pay a high price for these being ignored - arc often cast as the problem itself. As we saw in Chapter 3, these claims both pro du ce and are in tu rn s u p p o rted by generalised discourses of victim blam ing via the notion o f the ‘acc id en t-p ro n e’ worker. Moreover, as we noted, this victim blaming can have long-term consequences, leading, for example, to a lack o f compensation for victims. Further, we find m anage­ ments who design or maintain plant badly - that is, managers who do not manage very well. And this is further reflected by the fact that am ong the cases in Chapter I we find several instances not just of safety crimes but of env iro n m en tal offences, and of com panies that frequently offend or sectors where recidivist em ployers app ear to be c o m m o n p la c e . T h u s managerial practices - and the cultures within which these are embedded - are crucial in understanding the production of safety crimes. 3. Inter-organisational factors If the relationship between workers and managers is the key factor in deter­ mining the risk o f safety crimes being produced, then this is also related to features in the labour market that enable work to be sub-contracted or sub­ divided between organisations. There is strong evidence that points to a weakening o f workers’ position in relation to the labour market through casualisation and sub-contracting and their vulnerability to workplace risks (Mayhew and Q uinlan 1998; Mayhew et al. 1997). That is, workplace bal­ ances o f pow er are related to, th o u g h n o t simply d e term in e d by, w ider social relations of power. Clearly, this needs to be understood in an extraorganisational context. Beyond the organisational structures and cultures of companies, there are key mfer-organisational features which seem to emerge consistently. These include the ways in which different parts of the same firm relate to each other (parent-subsidiary relationships, for exam­ ple, in the case o f Bhopal, and agency-contractor relationships, in the case of Simon Jones and Piper Alpha), how different firms were linked to each o th e r w ithin o r across particular sectors, p erhap s in te rm s o f long and complex supply chains, o r indeed in te rm s o f systematic relationships between legal and illegal businesses (in the case of Morcambe Bay).

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4. Market factors A further group of factors, both cultural and organisational, is located at the level of the market or industry in question. These include the norms that predominate in an industry for what is acceptable or even ‘required’ in terms of how production of goods and services is organised - characterised, for example, in the ‘political economy of speed’, alongside a series of (more or less real, but perceived in any case) market pressures, operating locally, nationally, and internationally, or even globally. Thus in each of the cases examined in Chapter 1, particular features of a market create quite specific demands for profitability, speed or cost-cutting. This location of the problem of workplace safety in the market has been developed by Moore (1991). He examined the creeping casualisation of the organisation of work in a number of industries and, in the context of a deregulated economy and the reasser­ tion of the supremacy of the market, describes the result as ‘cash-nexus carnage’. As others did before him did (for example, Nichols and Armstrong 1973; Carson 1980c), Moore sees the intensification of increasingly unfet­ tered markets as the greatest threat to the health and safety of workers, thus offering the combination of opportunity plus motivation for safety crimes. 5. Law and regulation A k e y g r o u p o f f a c t o r s to h e c o n s i d e r e d in a n y e x p l a n a t i o n o f s a f e t y c r i m e s is lo c a t e d in law a n d r e g u l a t i o n . O c c u p a t i o n a l sa fe ty is r e g u l a t e d in a w a y t h a t , as we f o u n d s y s te m a tic a lly t h r o u g h o u r d i s c u s s i o n in th is text ( p a r t i c u l a r l y in C h a p t e r s 6, 7 a n d 8), t h e r e are c o n s i s t e n t f a ilin g s in o r p r o b l e m s w i t h legal c a t e g o r i e s a n d r e a s o n i n g , o n g o i n g r e g u l a t o r y o v e r ­ sig ht, a n d in p o s t - e v e n t legal a n d r e g u l a t o r y processes. B ut even b e f o re we can u n d e r s t a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y law a n d e n f o r c e m e n t w i t h r e g a r d to o c c u ­ p a t i o n a l sa fety , w e n e e d to r e c o g n i s e t h a t t h e b a s e s o f t h e s e a r e t o be f o u n d in t h e ways in w h i c h legal s y s t e m s have b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d e i t h e r to s e p a r a te o u t sa fe ty c r i m e s f r o m real c r i m e s , o r even to d e n y t h e n o t i o n o f sa fety c r i m e s . T h u s , lo w levels o f i n s p e c t i o n , d e t e c t i o n , f o r m a l e n f o r c e ­ m e n t a n d s a n c t i o n s e n s u r e t h a t sa fety o ffen c es ar e r e g a r d e d as less se ri o u s t h a n o t h e r c r i m e s o f v i o l e n c e , a n e n d u r i n g p h e n o m e n o n t h a t a c t s to r e d u c e t h e social o p p r o b r i u m t h a t is a t t a c h e d to t h o s e c r i m e s . C rucially, t h e w a y t h e s t a t e r e s p o n d s to s a f e t y c r i m e s s h a p e s t h e w a y t h a t t h o s e c r i m e s are to l e r a t e d f ro m the b o a r d r o o m to t h e w o r k p l a c e .

6. Unequal distribution of power This takes us, finally, to a common theme of this text, namely power, one which clearly links o ur discussions on the production of safety crimes, their representation, and their regulation, but which also can be seen as a

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p a r t ic u l a r q u ality t h a t a ccrues to busin esses in re latio n to states, o th e r organisations a n d p op ulation s. T h u s we fo u n d in the cases in C h a p te r 1 an d the discussion o f ‘stru ctu red vulnerability’ in C hap ter 2, h ow changes in social policy th r o u g h th e s t r u c t u r e o f th e welfare state, as well as changes in state form s an d public policy m o re generally, have aug m e nte d th e leverage enjoyed over p o p u la tio n s a n d states by private capital. This may be seen locally, as in local a n d / o r n atio nal state s u p p o r t for invest­ m e n t by an offending c om pa ny in a particular locale, or in the conflict this appears to raise between safe jobs or no jobs at all, o r m o re generally in the pow er o f business to circumvent, o r prevent resort to, legal processes. And, finally, a nd to reassert the international d im en sion o f the p h e n o m e n a with w hich we are dealing in this text, the significance o f the power and reach of m u ltinational corporations, a n d their ability to trade o f f ‘developed’ versus ‘d e v e lo p in g ’ e c o n o m y safety sta n d a rd s, illustrates th e in sid io us ways in w hich u neq ual pow er relations can act to encourage safety crimes.

C o n c lu s io n

T he co nstitu ent them es o f a political econom y o f safety crimes, sketched above, do n o t fit well with the way th at crim in o lo g y and law con stru cts these p h e n o m e n a . If we have already discussed previously, a n d in this chapter, various aspects o f the ways in which crim inology acts to obscure safety crimes, we have also poin ted in C hapters 5 -8 to the ways in which safety crim es are c o n stru c te d t h r o u g h law a n d its app lica tio n to th em . O ne feature th a t unites b o th crim in o lo g y a n d law in this respect is that they b oth reject political eco no m y explanations in favour o f a highly in d i­ v id u alised e x p la n a tio n o f ‘a c c i d e n ts ’ at w ork, w h ich sep arate s o u t the p h e n o m e n a with which we are concerned from ‘real’ crimes. To illustrate, as we saw in C hap ter 7, health and safety law is u n d e rp in n e d by a p h ilo so ­ p h y th a t asserts a n a tu r a l id e n t it y o f interests b etw een w o rk e rs an d m a n a g e m e n t in th e o rg a n i s a ti o n o f w o rk p lace safety. T his idea is e nshrined in the Robens Report which formed the basis o f the Health and Safety at W ork Act (1974). Particularly im p o rta n t points are m ade in this respect a b o u t R o b en s’s conviction th a t ‘safety is m ain ly a m a tte r o f the day to day attitudes and reactions o f the ind ivid ual’ (R obens Report: para 13). Robens had argued th at the key p roblem in effective safety org anisa­ tion was ‘w orker a pa thy ’: the reluctance o f workers to play an active role in p re ven tin g ‘ac cid ents’. Indeed, he argued th a t if safety lavs' was s t r u c ­ tured in a rigid and prescriptive way, and if state regulators ad op ted strict e n f o r c e m e n t policies, th e n this m i g h t d is c o u ra g e w o rk ers fro m being involved in tak in g a p p r o p r i a t e a c tio n to p re v e n t ‘a c c i d e n ts ’. In o th e r

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Conclusion: making sense of safety crimes

w o r d s , for R o b e n s , s t r i c t e r e n f o r c e m e n t m i g h t a c tu a lly e n c o u r a g e r a t h e r t h a n p r e v e n t sa fety c r i m e s . A n t h o n y W o o lf , h o w e v e r , p o i n t e d o u t in his c r i t i q u e o f t h e R o b e n s R e p o r t t h a t t h e w e a k n e s s o f t h e ‘n a t u r a l i d e n t i t y o f i n t e r e s t s ’ p h i l o s o p h y is p r i n c i p a l l y l o c a t e d in its i n a b i l i t y t o g r a s p t h a t ‘n e a r l y all a c c i d e n t s are t h e i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t o f u n s a f e w o r k i n g s y s t e m s w h i c h c o u l d t h e m s e lv e s b e m a d e safe b y t h e e m p l o y e r s , b y a c o m b i n a t i o n o f h a z a r d analys is, p l a n n i n g , t r a i n i n g a n d s u p e r v i s i o n ’ (1 9 7 3 , ib id.: 90). W o o l f q u e s t i o n e d R o b e n s ’s a s s u m p t i o n s o n a p a th y , a r g u i n g th at: ‘if they ar e false, as I be lieve t h e m to be , t h e role e n v is a g e d by R o b e n s for law a n d o r d e r e n f o r c e m e n t will itself h a v e to be e x a m i n e d ’ ( ib id . 89). If th i s text h a s d e m o n s t r a t e d o n e t h i n g , t h e n it is t h a t , m o r e t h a n 30 y e a r s a f t e r W o o l f ’s a s s e s s m e n t o f R o b e n s , e n f o r c e m e n t a r o u n d sa fe ty c r i m e s r e m a i n s w holly in adequate.

A fundamental question that has not been stated, but is at least implicit throughout much of this book, is whether, given the manifest failure of the criminal justice system to prevent crime (Hillyard and Tombs 2004), we should or could expect things to be any different when it comes to safety crime. But for us this is perhaps the wrong way of posing a potentially sig­ nificant question. For, although the State has indeed failed, particularly in relation to under-enforcement, to talk only of State failure in the face of rising crime rates encourages us to think of the State in a particular way: that the State has lost control over society. This may be true, but a more useful way of thinking about State power is how it operates through society. The State is not simply an open system, vulnerable only to the demands of the most powerful or effective lobbying by interests groups. States in capi­ talist social orders are precisely that: capitalist states. States pursue policies that privilege the interests of capital over labour, reinforce unequal gender relations, and reproduce racist and other forms of social divisions. But, although social divisions are manifestly reinforced and exacerbated by the State, State institutions, as we noted in Chapter 7, also remain (unequal) structures of representation. The stability of the social order is only guaran­ teed after struggles between different groups are absorbed by the State. This involves not simply a process of ruling over sub-dominant groups, but also a compromise that secures the legitimacy of the rulers and consent of the ruled. One consequence of this process is that State institutions remain vul­ nerable to counter-hegemonic demands. If the recent history of capitalist societies has taught us anything, it is that the struggle against Statecorporate power is most effectively resisted by collective opposition from workers and from other popular movements in workplaces, at sites of con­ sumption and on the streets. So whilst there is a case for bringing the State back into our understanding of how best to oppose power, we must at the same time recognise the pivotal position that workers and the public have in struggles against safety crimes (Tucker 1990).

209

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Both the under-enforcement of regulation and the absence of controls for serious corporate harm provides us with a perfect illustration of Lacey’s (1994) point that we cannot take ‘crime’ for granted. Neither can we take its enforcement for granted. The criminal justice system remains pre-occupied with a relatively limited n u m b e r of interpersonal crimes. With the key exception of the so-called ‘war on terror’, Home Office priorities have been, and remain, a limited nu m b er o f ‘headline’ crimes of interpersonal vio­ lence, p roperty and public ‘nuisance’. And criminology by and large obediently falls into line behind this ‘official’ version of what constitutes the crime problem (Hillyard et al. 2004; Walters 2003). The law’s embedded bias, which - as we saw in Chapter 5 - is historically inscribed, forces us to think about a m uch more profound question in relation to regulation: whether under capitalist social orders, State regulation can ever adequately guarantee our protection? Can workplace deaths and injuries ever be suffi­ ciently harnessed in states that see as their primary aim the encouragement of private profit maximisation and capital growth? Given that under-regulation and an absence of safety crime controls appears to be as much an embedded feature o f capitalist social orders as safety crime itself is, our greatest challenge is perhaps not simply to reform or tinker with the means we have to control individual corporations. A m uch greater and more pressing challenge is to seek an alternative means of organising production regimes that will neither encourage nor sustain the routine killings and injuries committed by employers.

N otes 1 2

3

For the HSE Better Business strategy, see www.hse.gov.uk/betterbusiness/large/index.htm. One has only to watch Wall Street to see that the personality traits that helped to make Gecko a success were the same characteristics that allowed him , through a com bination o f intention and negligence, to break the law. This is also one example o f ‘techniques of neutralisation, which are crucial to understand­ ing motivation in the context of corporate crime: see Box 1983; Slapper and Tombs 1999.

210

S o u r c e s of fu rth e r in fo rm a tio n

A l m o s t all o f t h e k e y t e x t s - b o o k s , c h a p t e r s , j o u r n a l a r t i c l e s , r e p o r t s w h ic h deal w ith safety e ith e r fro m a c rim in o lo g ic a l o r social science p e r ­ s p e c t i v e h a v e b e e n c i t e d in t h i s b o o k . W e w ill n o t r e h e a r s e t h e s e in d e t a i l h e r e , save to p o i n t a g ain to a few key ite m s. O u r d is c u s s io n o f th e s e f o l­ low s th e s t r u c t u r e o f th e b o o k . N u m e r o u s case s tu d ie s o f sa fety c r im e s exist - t h o u g h th e s e are o v e r ­ w h e l m i n g l y w r i t t e n f r o m t h e U S a n d t h u s t h e s e l e c t i o n o f s u c h c a s e s is a ls o b i a s e d e i t h e r t o w a r d s t h e i r o c c u r r e n c e in t h e U S o r t o U S - b a s e d c o m ­ p a n ie s . T h is sm a ll cav ea t a sid e, m o s t c o lle c tio n s o f case s tu d ie s o f c o r p o r a t e c r i m e s c o n t a i n s o m e e x a m p l e s o f s a f e t y c r i m e s , b u t se e in p a r ­ tic u la r a u s e fu l se le c tio n o f cases acro ss v a r io u s c h a p te r s o f H ills (1 9 8 7 b ), P earce a n d S n id e r (1 9 9 5 ) a n d T u ck er (2006).

T he relative invisibility o f safety offences has been considered, in terms of the various elements o f this legal, political and social process, in Bergman (1991), Glasbeek a n d R ow land (1979), Glasbeek (1989), M cM ullan an d McClung (2006), Tombs (1999b, 2000) and Tombs and Whyte (2001). Two classic texts in which safety crimes are considered - however briefly - in the context o f an excellent general critique o f the biases o f criminal justice sys­ tem s a nd representations o f the crime pro blem towards the crimes o f the relatively powerless are Box (1983) and Reiman (1998). Efforts to d o cum ent the actual scale o f death, injury and safety crimes are very rare - n o t least because o f the p rob lem s o f access to data. For this reason, despite it now being a little dated, the w ork un dertaken by David Bergman and the CCA remains seminal here (see, in particular, Bergman 1993, 1994 and 2000; and Unison/CCA 2002). A m ore forensic approach to a m u c h smaller selection o f cases (all involving legal responses to work-related death) can be fou n d in Slapper (2000), a key text for understanding the failures o f the criminal ju s­ tice system to treat safety crimes as crimes.

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The classic texts on the emergence o f law with respect to health an d safety are u n d o u b te d l y th ose by C a rso n (1970a, 1970b, 1974, 1979, 1980a and 1980b); see also the critique offered by Bartrip and Fenn (1980a, 1980b, and 1983). For an historical discussion that bears similarity in approach to that o f Carson, albeit in a Canadian context, see Tucker (1990). An excellent gen­ eral con text for u n d e r s ta n d in g the n a tu r e a n d historical em erg ence o f con tem po rary law and legal systems can also be found in N orrie (2001). O n re g u la tio n , a d eb ate often referred to is th a t a r o u n d the relative stren gth s an d m erits o f a ‘c o m p l ia n c e - o r ie n t e d ’ versus a m o re p unitive r e g u la to r y a p p r o a c h - see H a w k in s (1990 and 1991), and Pearce and T o m bs (1990 an d 1991). For critical, an d m o re recent, c o m m e n ta r y on the debate, see Davis (2004), H o pk in s (1994), Johnstone (1999) and Gray (2006). O n the regulatory mix, the work o f Braithwaite and colleagues is currently d o m in a n t: see Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), G u n n in g h a m and Johnstone (1999), Haines (2005) and Johnstone (2003). For a typology of approaches to regulation, see W hyte (2004). Hawkins (2002) is a fascinat­ ing study, b ased u p o n rare in s id e r access, o f the d e c is io n - m a k in g processes employed by safety inspectors in the UK as to w h ether or not to p ro s e c u te for safety offences. T he classic piece on re g u la to r y refo rm in c lu d in g a specific d isc ussion o f safety re g u latio n - re m a in s S n id e r (1991). O n the sanctioning o f safety offenders, the m ost useful - and still very recent - overviews are set o ut by Croall (2005) and the C C A .1 A general political eco no m y o f occupational safety is set ou t in Nichols (1997), th o u g h this is n ot organised a ro u n d safety crimes per se. A ttem pts to a ccount for the p ro d u c tio n o f safety crimes in an integrated fashion e n c o m p a ssin g the v ariou s levels and e lem en ts o f analysis th a t we have argued m u s t be p art o f any ad equ ate a ccou nt - can be fo u n d in C arson (1982), Davis (2000), W hyte (1999a), W oolfson et al. (1996), Pearce and T om b s (1998), S la p p er (2 00 0), V au g h an (1996), a n d , t h o u g h c o u c h e d s o m e w h a t differently, an excellent an d concise d iscussio n o f the w ide ra nge o f factors to be ta ken into a c c o u n t in any causal e x p la n a tio n o f safety crimes is set o u t in Pun ch (2000). Beyond these texts, jou rn als and boo k chapters, for us the key source of critical in f o r m a t io n on the state o f British safety - and on e w hich fre­ quently discusses safety crimes in particular - has long been, and remains, Hazards magazine. Hazards aims to look b eh in d the c om pa ny safety hype, and provide practical tools for w orkplace safety representatives to prevent safety crim es. Using a global n e tw o r k o f u n io n safety c o r r e s p o n d e n ts , Hazards provides the best first p o rt o f call for info rm a tio n on safety and safety crimes. It can be accessed at w ww .hazards.org/.

212

S o u rc e s o f fu rth e r inform ation

M ore generally, there is, o f course, a great deal o f in f o rm a tio n available electronically. T here are few, if any, websites d evoted to safety crim es per se, b u t there are, first, m a n y d evo ted to issues o f safety a n d , second, to c o r­ p orate c rim e in general ( a m o n g the latter, those w ith th e best coverage o f safety crim es are listed). O n ‘safety’ a n d safety crim es, see the following:

w w w .h a z a rd s c a m p a ig n .o rg .u k

T h e H a z a r d s C a m p a i g n , a n e t w o r k o f r e s o u rc e c e n tr e s a n d c a m ­ pa ig n ers on health a n d safety at w o rk, an d th e best source o f safety con tac ts an d c a m p a ig n in g g ro u p s in f o r m a t io n in the UK.

w w w . c o r p o r a t e a c c o u n t a b ilit y . o r g

T h e C e n tr e for C o r p o r a t e A cco un tability, a c h a rity c o n c e r n e d w ith the p r o m o ti o n o f w orker a n d public safety, pro vides free advice to vic­ tim s o f safety c rim es, c a m p a ig n s a r o u n d law a n d e n fo r c e m e n t , a n d un d ertak es related research, m u c h o f w hich is available at the site.

w w w . t u c . o r g . u k / h _ a n d _ s / in d e x . c f m

T h e h ealth a n d safety section o f the Trades U n io n C ongress website. N ote, in p articular, th e new sletter Risks, w hich can be accessed from this site.

w w w . w o r k s m a r t . o r g . u k / r ig h t s / v i e w s e c t i o n . p h p ? s e n = 9

Advice o n h ealth a n d safety law p ro v id e d to w o rk e rs by the Trades U n io n C ongress.

w w w . la b o u r n e t . n e t / d e f a u lt . a s p

L a b o u rN e t a im s to be in the fo refro n t o f using the resources o f the in te rn e t to p ro v id e c o m m u n ic a t io n s , news a n d in f o r m a t io n for the la b o u r m o v e m e n t, seeking to s tre n g th e n o rg anised labour. T h e re are excellent sections on safety.

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w w w . io s h . c o . u k

Website o f the In s titu tio n o f O c c u p a tio n a l Safety and H ealth w hich is the UK professional b o d y for h ealth a nd safety p rac titio n ers. T he In s tit u ti o n o f O c c u p a t i o n a l Safety and H e a lth 's stated a im s arc to regulate an d steer th e pro fession an d p ro v id e m e m b e r s a n d g ro u p s o utside the o rg an isatio n w ith gu idan ce o n h ealth an d safety issues. For sites d evoted eithe r specifically, or w ith useful m a terial o n , co rp o r a te c rim e in general, a nd w ith so m e useful coverage o f safety crim es, see the following:

w w w .co rp w a tc h .o rg

C o r p o r a t e W atc h (US) tr acks illegal a n d u neth ica l c o rp o r a te activity, a n d b u s i n e s s - i n d u s t r y r e la tio n s . Its p a r e n t o r g a n i s a t i o n is th e T r a n s n a t i o n a l R eso u rce a n d A ctio n C e n t e r (T R A C ), b a se d in San Francisco.

w w w .c o rp o ra te w a tc h .o rg

C o r p o r a t e Watch (U K ) tracks sim ilar fo rm s o f c o rp o r a te activity to the US jo u r n a l o f the sam e n a m e (above), b u t is in d e p e n d e n t o f and un related to the US p u b lic atio n .

w w w . e s s e n t ia l. o r g

M u l t i n a t i o n a l M o n i t o r , p u b l i s h e d by E sse n tial I n f o r m a t i o n , Inc., tracks c o rp o r a te activity, especially in the ‘T h ird W o rl d ’, focusing on th e e x p o rt o f h a z a rd o u s substances, w orker health an d safety, la b o u r u n io n issues a n d th e e n v ir o n m e n t.

w w w .c o rp o ra te p re d a to rs.o rg

Here you will find 'Focus on the C o r p o r a t io n ', a weekly c o lu m n on illegal a n d u n e t h i c a l c o r p o r a t e a ctivity, p o s t e d by tw o N o r t h A m erica n journalists/activists.

214

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h t t p : / / p a u ls j u s t ic e p a g e . c o m / e lit e - d e v ia n c e . h t m

An ex cellen t s o u r c e o f c o r p o r a t e c r i m e m a t e r i a l, a n d m a n y links, m a i n t a i n e d by P aul L e ig h to n , c o - a u t h o r o f R e im a n 's T he Rich get Richer an d the Poor Get Prison.

w w w .n a d e r.o rg

T h e N ad er Page. T h e site o f Ralph N ader, lo ng tim e US a n ti-c o r p o rate cam pa ign er, this site seeks to fu r th e r the ability o f c o n s u m e rs to be h e ard an d to have a real voice a n d a significant role in the legisla­ tive and reg ulato ry d e c is io n -m a k in g processes.

w w w .m o th e rjo n e s.co m

M o t h e r Jones is an i n d e p e n d e n t n o t- fo r- p ro fit U S -based c a m p a ig n ­ ing site a n d m a g a z in e w h o s e ro o t s lie in a c o m m i t m e n t to social justice i m p le m e n te d th r o u g h first rate investigative rep o rtin g .

w w w . c it iz e n . o r g

P u b lic C itiz e n , an o r g a n i s a t i o n t h a t c a m p a i g n s fo r o p e n n e s s a n d d e m o c r a t i c a c c o u n t a b i l i t y in g o v e r n m e n t ; fo r th e r i g h t o f c o n ­ su m e rs to seek redress in the c ou rts; for clean, safe a n d su stainab le en ergy sources; for social an d e c o n o m ic justice in trad e policies; for s t r o n g h e a lth , safety a n d e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o t e c ti o n s ; a n d for safe, effective an d affordable p re s c rip tio n dru g s an d health care. ‘Official’ in f o r m a t io n o n health an d safety can be f o u n d at the following sites, each o f w hich also has p le nty o f useful links:

w w w .h se .g o v .u k

T h e H e a lth a n d Safety E xecu tiv e, c o n t a i n s an i n c r e a s i n g ly u se fu l b o d y o f i n f o r m a t i o n ; see especially s e c tio n s o n E n f o r c e m e n t , th e (s e arc h a b le ) N otice s a n d P ro s e c u tio n s d a ta b a se , Statistics, A n n u a l R eports, Local A uth orities, a nd Press Releases.

215

Safety Crim es

h ttp ://u k.osh a .e u .in t

European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, established by the EU to collect, analyse and promote OSH-related information, with the stated aim of making Europe's workplaces safer, healthier and more productive, and in particular to promote an effective prevention culture.

w w w .o sha.go v

O c c u p a t i o n a l S af ety a n d H e a l t h A d m i n i s t r a t i o n , US e q u i v a l e n t to H S E , its s t a te d a im is to p r e v e n t w o r k - r e l a t e d in j u ri e s , illnesses a n d d e a t h s for ev e r y A m e r i c a n w o r k e r.

w w w .cd c.gov/nio sh /h om e pa ge .h tm l

The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, a US federal agency responsible for conducting research and making recommenda­ tions to the US government on work-related injury and illness.

w w w .ilo .org

T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a b o u r O r g a n i z a t i o n , a U N agency, sets, p r o m o t e s a n d s u p e r v i s e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a b o u r s t a n d a r d s , a n d is t h e U N 's m a i n so u r c e o f e x p e r tise a b o u t w o r k e r s ' r i g h ts a n d c o n d i t i o n s , so cial p r o ­ te c t i o n a n d l a b o u r law.

N ote 1

216

See, in particular, ‘Sentencing Issues’ briefing at: www.corporateaccountabiiity.org/rb/sentencing/sentencing.htm, downloaded, December 3,2006.

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