Sabine Pass: The Confederacy's Thermopylae 9780292797642

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* sabine pass

number seven

Clifton and Shirley Caldwell Texas Heritage Series

Sabine Pass * the confederacy’s thermopylae Edward T. Cotham, Jr.

u n i v e r s i t y o f t e x a s p r e s s , au s t i n

Publication of this work was made possible in part by support from Clifton and Shirley Caldwell and a challenge grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities. copyright © 2004 by the university of texas press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America First edition, 2004 Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be sent to Permissions, University of Texas Press, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819. The paper used in this book meets the minimum requirements of ansi/niso z39.48-1992 (r1997) (Permanence of Paper).

library of congress cataloging-in-publication data Cotham, Edward T. (Edward Terrel), 1953– p. cm. — (Clifton and Shirley Caldwell Texas heritage series ; no. 7) Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-292-70603-0 (alk. paper) — isbn 0-292-70594-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Sabine Pass, Battle of, Tex., 1863. I. Title. II. Series. e475.4.c68 2004 973.7'35—dc22 2004007808

this book is dedicated to w. c. leroy rodgers

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The Spartans drew back again into the narrow neck of the Pass and formed themselves into a compact body all together and took up their stance. In this place they defended themselves to the last, with their swords, if they still had them, and if not even with their hands and teeth. Then the Persians from in front, piling over the ruined wall, and those who closed in from behind, overwhelmed them with missiles. In honor of the slain Spartans, an inscription was later set up which said: ‘‘Go tell the Spartans, stranger passing by, that here obedient to their words we lie.’’ —The History of Herodotus,

describing the final assault at thermopylae

The capture of the enemy’s fleet in Galveston Harbor . . . was followed by another victory on the coast of Texas, under circumstances so remarkable as properly to be considered marvelous. [I]t is hardly necessary to say that I refer to the battle of Sabine Pass. . . . The success of the single company which garrisoned the earthwork [at Sabine Pass] is without parallel in ancient or modern war. It was marvelous. . . . That battle at Sabine Pass was more remarkable than the battle of Thermopylae. —jefferson davis, describing the battle of sabine pass

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Contents

acknowledgments xi introduction 1 chapter one. Setting the Scene

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chapter two. The Admiral and the Forts 17 chapter three. Attacking Texas 25 chapter four. From Bar to Battle 36 chapter five. Cottonclads with Cannon 46 chapter six. Planning a Victory

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chapter seven. Texas Is the Target

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chapter eight. Sabine Pass as a Stepping-Stone chapter nine. The Navy Makes Its Plans 97 chapter ten. The Expedition Departs

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x * sabine pass chapter eleven. Revising the Plan 110 chapter twelve. ‘‘Hold the Fort at All Hazards’’

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chapter thirteen. Attack of the Gunboats 125 chapter fourteen. Praise and Blame 159 chapter fifteen. The War Ends for Fort Griffin

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conclusion 184 appendix one. Report of Lieut. R. W. Dowling, Company ‘‘F,’’ Cook’s (Texas) Artillery, Concerning the Battle of Sabine Pass 203 appendix two. Annotated List of Sabine Pass Battle Participants appendix three. Union Casualties at the Battle of Sabine Pass notes 211 bibliography 247 index 263

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Acknowledgments

nyone who writes on a subject relating to Texas Civil War history

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must acknowledge the work of many accomplished historians whose labors have made the subject both interesting and accessible. In particular, the contributions of Ralph A. Wooster and Alwyn Barr, two of the best historians that Texas has ever produced, must be singled out as having been particularly important and influential. With respect to the specific subject matter of this book, my research of Dick Dowling’s background was aided enormously by the excellent work done by Rice University historian Andrew Forest Muir. Final preparation of this book was significantly aided by William D. Quick of Nederland, Texas, who was kind enough to read this manuscript and offer many valuable suggestions and corrections. I also gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the many great research libraries and archives listed in the bibliography in connection with the research and writing of this book. I began this project with the expectation that relevant primary materials would appear only in the National Archives and a few libraries in Texas. I was greatly surprised to learn that material about Sabine Pass was to be found in archives spanning the country from Rhode Island to California. Special thanks go to Casey Greene and the staff of the Rosenberg Library in Galveston, who have provided a supportive and convenient place for me to research and write. In addition, I would like to thank Harry Bounds, Lynda Crist, and the other members of the Houston Civil War Round Table, who helped me in many important ways with this project. Ann Caraway Ivins, Dick Dowling’s great-great-grandniece, was also kind enough to share her research on her ancestor and review this manuscript. I would like to thank my assistant, Barbie Tyler, and the staff of the Terry Foundation, who helped with preparation of this book. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Candace, without whose help and support this book would not have been possible.

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* sabine pass

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Introduction

large and excited throng packed the French Opera House in New

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Orleans on an April evening in 1882. Although the stated purpose of the gathering was to conduct a meeting of the Southern Historical Society, it was a far from routine event. The Society’s ordinary business was quickly conducted, and every eye in the standing-room-only crowd strained to witness the arrival of the evening’s principal speaker. Suddenly, from a side entrance, Jefferson Davis emerged into the theater and was escorted up to a place of honor upon the stage. A fifteen-minute standing ovation and a sea of waving handkerchiefs greeted his appearance. The figure who so mesmerized this enthusiastic New Orleans audience was in some ways only a pale reflection of the man who twenty years before had served and suffered as the chief executive officer of the Confederacy. Obviously ill and tired, Davis walked slowly to the stage, leaning on the arm of Governor and former Brigadier General Francis T. Nicholls. This procession was in itself a symbol, for the right arm that Davis leaned on for support was the only one remaining to Nicholls. Governor Nicholls had lost his left arm, as well as his left foot, fighting under the command of Confederate General Stonewall Jackson. This very visible sacrifice to the Southern cause had motivated some of his postwar political supporters in 1876 to successfully nominate ‘‘all that is left of General Nicholls’’ for governor of Louisiana.1 The crowd responded with great fervor to the sight of these two Confederate icons slowly making their way to the stage. After escorting Davis to his chair, Governor Nicholls gave him an impassioned introduction, and the large crowd again surged to its feet to cheer the former president of the Confederate States of America. Davis began his address in a low voice, but quickly warmed to his subject, seeming to gather strength from the adoration of his enthusiastic audience. The preservation of Confederate history, the subject of his New Orleans ad-

2 * sabine pass dress, was a subject with which Davis was intimately familiar. In the past few years, he had personally devoted considerable time and effort to the perpetuation of his view of the war he had unsuccessfully waged. Davis himself had released a book on the history of the Confederate government only the year before his appearance in New Orleans.2 Many in the audience had probably read that book. But on this night they felt privileged to hear firsthand the former president’s unique perspective on the conflict that had so divided America. Pausing to acknowledge the wartime sacrifices of General Nicholls and other Louisianans who had served the Confederate cause, Davis brought the audience to its feet again and again with his unrepentant declaration that their mutual cause ‘‘was so just, so sacred, that had I known all that has come to pass, had I known what was to be inflicted upon me, all that my country was to suffer, all that our posterity was to endure, I would do it all over again.’’ 3 This unapologetic paean to the lost cause of the Confederacy set the theme for his address. Acknowledging that he would not and indeed could not be impartial about the fate of the secessionist cause to which he had unsuccessfully committed his political fortunes, Davis urged his listeners ‘‘to keep the memory of our heroes green,’’ repeatedly invoking what he described as the fundamental nobility of the cause for which he and other Southerners had sacrificed so much.4 Strengthened by the evident passion of his audience, Davis then proceeded to lay before the faithful the names of a whole pantheon of Confederate heroes whom he believed deserved to be memorialized for posterity. In doing so, of course, Davis was treading on both familiar and treasured ground with such an audience. Each mention of such obvious candidates for heroic status as Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson, and Albert Sidney Johnston was instantly greeted with sustained and enthusiastic applause. However, one set of heroes that Davis identified, a small band of determined Irishmen, probably surprised many of the spectators. Drawing on his classical education, Davis first asserted that every schoolboy could recite from memory (an assertion that unfortunately could not credibly be made today) that King Leonidas had commanded three hundred Spartans at the famous Battle of Thermopylae in 480 b.c. Facing overwhelming odds, he recalled, the Spartans under Leonidas had given their lives defending the critical pass at Thermopylae, delaying the seemingly unstoppable advance of Xerxes and his massive Persian horde into the heartland of Greece and buying the Greeks enough time to put together the resources to eventually defeat the invaders. Recalling this classic story of heroism, Davis

introduction

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then presented his audience with a challenge regarding a less familiar battle at another pass: But my friends there are few in this audience who, if I asked them, could tell me who commanded [the Confederate forces] at Sabine Pass. And yet, that battle at Sabine Pass was more remarkable than the battle of Thermopylae, and when it has orators and poets to celebrate it, will be so esteemed by mankind.5 Davis then went on to summarize the events of the Battle of Sabine Pass, which took place on the border between Texas and Louisiana on September 8, 1863. At that battle, Davis recalled, a young lieutenant named Dick Dowling, commanding fewer than fifty Irishmen, stationed in what Davis described as merely a ‘‘mud fort,’’ had defeated thousands of Union invaders in powerful gunboats. What made the Confederacy’s version of Thermopylae even more remarkable than the original, Davis asserted to his New Orleans audience, was that the disparity of numbers and the inequality of arms were even greater at Sabine Pass than the Greeks had faced at Thermopylae. Even more significant, he observed, the resourceful Confederates had actually won the Battle of Sabine Pass without a single casualty, unlike the Spartans at Thermopylae who had been completely annihilated by the Persian forces. While telling his audience the Sabine Pass story, Davis could not resist the opportunity to challenge them to recall its details: Who remembers how the iron-clad fleet came steaming up the river with nothing to oppose it but a mud fort armed with field guns and held by 42 men; how its commander was asked by a comrade what was to be done, and suggested that they had better retreat; but how this gallant man said, ‘‘We will never retreat!’’ How they shook hands with each other and said, ‘‘We will fight to the death!’’ How the iron-clads came steaming in but were repulsed by that gallant little army of 42 men. . . . Now who knows of Dowling? And yet this Dowling I hold higher than Leonidas. It is such events as this that we must preserve.6 This was not the first time that Davis had paid Dowling and his Irishmen such an extravagant compliment. In his lengthy history of the Confederacy published the year before his appearance in New Orleans, Davis had also approvingly described the exploits of Dowling and his men at Sabine Pass, on that occasion characterizing them as ‘‘marvelous’’ and ‘‘without parallel in

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ancient or modern war.’’ He had even gone to the trouble to list in his book what he thought were the names of every man who had served in the fort with Dowling.7 A cynic might suggest that Davis chose to emphasize the part played by Dowling and his men to add an aura of nobility to the cause he had championed. But even though Davis may have chosen to emphasize Dowling’s exploit in part to serve his own historical and political agenda, these were obviously words of sincere praise, the product of years of thought and study. Davis’s comments were even more remarkable in light of the long list of military accomplishments (West Point graduate, Mexican War experience, and former secretary of war) that he brought to his study. This background made him more qualified than the usual politician to pass judgment on a military subject. Davis was not the only prominent figure to make such a tribute. Francis Lubbock, the former wartime governor of Texas, echoed Davis’s assessment in his memoirs, describing the Battle of Sabine Pass as ‘‘one of the most remarkable engagements of the war, resulting in a victory for the Confederate arms that immortalized those who participated in it.’’ 8 Davis and Lubbock are not alone in their assessment of the remarkable nature of the efforts made by a few Texans to defend their coast. Modern historians are slowly but surely coming to join a parade of former Confederate political figures in that same conclusion. Historian Dave Page wrote an excellent history and guidebook titled Ships versus Shore that explored the conflicts in each Southern state between Union ships and forts. In his chapter analyzing the military events in Texas (including the Battle of Sabine Pass), Page observed that ‘‘The Texan defense of the seacoast between 1861 and 1865 proved to be one of the most brilliant unsung feats of any Confederate state during the war.’’ 9 Texas historian T. R. Fehrenbach came to a similar conclusion in his history of the Lone Star State, noting that at Sabine Pass, Dowling and his men ‘‘fought the most brilliant and decisive small action of the Civil War.’’ 10 There was just something about this battle that invited comparisons to famous battles. Like Jefferson Davis, historian Andrew Forest Muir, who wrote a fine study of Dowling and his men in the late 1950s, could not resist the temptation, saying about the Battle of Sabine Pass that ‘‘For bravery this engagement ranks with the Defense of the Alamo, and for military results with the Battle of San Jacinto.’’ 11 As modern historians are beginning to understand, the comparison urged by Davis and others between the battle at Sabine Pass and epic struggles of military history like Thermopylae is perhaps not as big a stretch as it might

introduction

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first seem. In terms of sheer numbers, the fewer than 50 Confederate defenders at Sabine Pass who were pitted against an invading force of more than 5,000 Union attackers does indeed stack up with such great defensive efforts as Thermopylae (300 Spartans and perhaps 6,000 allies against 200,000 Persians), the siege of Malta (9,000 against 60,000), the siege of Rhodes (6,700 against 100,000), the Alamo (188 against 3,000), and Rorke’s Drift (45 against 5,000).12 The reader need hardly be cautioned that the estimates of the contending forces in all of these famous military actions are highly controversial. As we shall see, however, the numbers of attackers and defenders at Sabine Pass are also a matter of some dispute. Even if perfectly accurate, however, numbers can be deceiving, and nowhere is that more true than in warfare. At the time of the American Civil War, technological innovations in weaponry were on the verge of making the raw numbers of troops involved on each side in a battle less of a factor in determining its outcome. But numbers undeniably continued to be of critical importance in determining the fortunes of war, and it could still generally be argued at the time of the Civil War, as Voltaire once famously observed, that ‘‘God is always on the side of the heaviest battalions.’’ 13 This seemingly divine preference for the more numerous force makes all the more unusual the unexpected Confederate victory and defense against seemingly overwhelming odds at Sabine Pass. Although it is usually characterized by historians as odd or unusual, Sabine Pass is not commonly viewed to have been an important battle. In fact, it is rare to see much mention of the battle at all in conventional histories of the war. While meriting a separate chapter in a book titled Strange Battles of the Civil War,14 it is mentioned only in passing in Shelby Foote’s famous narrative history.15 Most military histories of the Civil War ascribe little, if any, importance to the events that took place at Sabine Pass (or elsewhere in the Trans-Mississippi Department for that matter) during that conflict. Typical of this point of view is the entry on the ‘‘Trans-Mississippi Department’’ in the Encyclopedia of the Confederacy, which states that ‘‘although there were numerous minor campaigns and battles in this area, none affected the war’s outcome.’’ 16 It is probably true that nothing that happened in Texas could have affected the war’s outcome in the sense that it could have given the Confederates a victory in the war as a whole. But it is certainly possible to argue that what happened in Texas did matter to, and may have had vital consequences for, the length and conduct of the war. In fact, a good case can be made that Dick Dowling and his fewer than fifty Irishmen at Sabine Pass may actu-

6 * sabine pass ally have influenced the course of the Civil War as much as almost any other small body of troops that served during that conflict. If Dowling and his men had failed and Texas had been successfully invaded starting at Sabine Pass in 1863, additional men and supplies from the Lone Star State would have become largely unavailable to the Confederate war effort. In addition, the course of the war itself might have been very different, not only in Texas but in other strategic parts of the Confederacy. As odd as it may sound at first, the events that took place in Texas were actually the key consideration affecting the timing of Union efforts to capture the port city of Mobile, Alabama, and the bay in which that important city was sheltered. For reasons we will discuss later in detail, plans to capture Mobile were repeatedly put on hold during late 1862 and throughout 1863 as Federal plans to capture cities along the Texas coast were time and again moved to the top of Washington’s list of priorities, with consistently disastrous results. If those plans to gain a foothold in East Texas had succeeded, as they almost did at Sabine Pass, Union resources would have been freed up to be diverted to the capture of Mobile, with significant consequences. Historian Arthur Bergeron, Jr., has persuasively argued that if Mobile had fallen earlier in the war (i.e., earlier than August 5, 1864, when the Union navy finally fought its way into Mobile Bay, or April 12, 1865, when the city of Mobile itself surrendered), it would have ‘‘greatly shortened the life of the Confederacy,’’ noting that ‘‘Mobile’s capture earlier in the war would have proven a serious, if not fatal blow to the Confederacy.’’ 17 If Bergeron’s wellsupported speculation is correct, it seems that the Confederate successes in Texas at places like Sabine Pass, which were the direct cause of the delay in attacking Mobile, must be assigned a military importance that has not heretofore been assigned them, even by the most careful Civil War historian. Events following the Confederate victory at Sabine Pass only confirm the linkage between the events in Texas and Union strategy elsewhere in the Confederacy. In the spring of 1864, for example, General Ulysses S. Grant was forced to once again delay his campaign to capture Mobile while General Nathaniel Banks and a combined army and navy force unsuccessfully launched yet another attempt to invade East Texas, this time with a disastrous campaign up the Red River in Louisiana. Banks himself later noted that this campaign, which cost the Union almost ten thousand casualties and probably prolonged the war, would have been rendered entirely unnecessary if Texas had been invaded successfully in 1863.18 Even General William Boggs, a Confederate staff officer, acknowledged in his memoirs that if the Sabine Pass expedition had succeeded, ‘‘we would have been so completely

introduction

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flanked as to have prevented us from meeting and defeating General Banks [in his Red River Campaign] the following spring.’’ 19 The events in Texas were also significant for reasons other than the effect they had of postponing campaigns against other strategic targets. Potentially even more important were the issues surrounding the effect that a Union conquest of Texas in 1863 might have had on the morale of Texas troops serving in Confederate armies on the other side of the Mississippi.With their homes directly threatened and their families suffering under Union occupation, it is at least questionable whether Texas troops in the East would have continued to serve as effectively and in the same numbers as they actually did. These Texas troops were of critical importance to the Confederate war effort in campaigns from Virginia to Louisiana. On one occasion, at the Battle of the Wilderness in 1864, for example, the timely arrival of the Texas troops saved Robert E. Lee’s army and very probably his life. Lee himself greeted the appearance of the Texans with a cheer, saying to his staff, ‘‘Texans always move them.’’ 20 Even Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee’s principal biographer, called the Texans ‘‘Lee’s favorite shock-troops’’ and observed that the general had said that ‘‘I rely upon [the Texans] we have in all tight places and fear I have to call upon them too often.’’ 21 Lee knew well that Texans were critically important to the Confederate war effort. It is naïve to assume, as many historians implicitly do, that the control of Texas that was at issue at battles like Sabine Pass is somehow unrelated to the way these Texas troops functioned in other theaters of the war. From his position as head of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis realized the importance of the invasion that had been thwarted at Sabine Pass and was convinced, even long after the war, that the Irish defenders who were responsible had not received the recognition they deserved. That may still be the case. The challenge that Jefferson Davis posed to his New Orleans audience about this battle in 1882 is still worthy of consideration today. Does the Confederate triumph at Sabine Pass in 1863 really compare to some of the great battles in military history? Or, is the story of Dick Dowling and his Irishmen merely a legend that grew far beyond its true importance as it became fuel for the flame of the ‘‘lost cause’’ mythology that, fanned by Jefferson Davis and others, swept the South at the end of the nineteenth century? 22 Other questions about the battle, which Davis might have posed to his New Orleans audience but did not, also deserve exploration. How did a much smaller Confederate force manage to win a battle it seemed destined to lose? On the other hand, how did a much larger Union force manage to lose a battle

8 * sabine pass it seemed virtually certain to win? As we shall see, these are related but still different questions, and they have slightly different answers. To begin to answer any of these questions, it is necessary to review the actual events of this battle and separate fact from fiction. That is not an easy task at this distance in history. There is without doubt a great deal of myth and misinformation surrounding the usual account (which Davis repeated to his New Orleans audience) of the battle at Sabine Pass. In fact, there may be more myths per man about the Battle of Sabine Pass than any other Civil War battle. But even stripped of this embellishment, the story of the Pass and its defense during the Civil War is a remarkable one that is well deserving, as Davis urged elsewhere in his speech with respect to the Southern cause generally, of being ‘‘so fully and exactly stated, that the men who come after us may compare and do justice in the case.’’ 23 To ‘‘do justice in the case’’ of a battle like Sabine Pass, however, it is necessary for a narrative such as this one to lay considerable groundwork, and travel fairly far afield. For the events at Sabine Pass had their origins many years before the battle and were set in motion by people who, in almost every instance, were not present at the battle. In the end, however, such a journey is rendered worthwhile by the rich tapestry of people, places, and events that blend together to form the background of the military events at Sabine Pass: the Confederacy’s Thermopylae.

chapter one

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Setting the Scene

n the southeast corner of Texas, where the border between Texas

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and Louisiana terminates in the muddy waters of the Gulf of Mexico, lies Sabine Pass, the tidal outlet for a vast drainage system encompassing almost fifty thousand square miles (Figure 1). A little over ten miles to the north, as if gathering their forces together for a final push to the sea, the Sabine and Neches Rivers flow into and form Sabine Lake, a shallow, brackish lake whose shores have been the site of human habitation for almost two thousand years. Sabine Lake and its passage to the sea through Sabine Pass have formed a convenient highway for trade and commercial activity since ancient times. Not all of that trade fell neatly within legal boundaries. Legend has it that Jean Lafitte used this waterway to smuggle slaves into Louisiana in the early 1800s.1 The country located upriver from Sabine Pass has always been rich in natural resources. While today East Texas is one of the most important oiland gas-producing regions in the nation, what first attracted settlers to the area were the great forests extending from Louisiana into Texas. The very name ‘‘Sabine’’ comes from the Spanish word ‘‘Sabinas,’’ the name given to the cypress trees seen by early explorers at various places along the banks of the river that today bears that name. The name was probably originally given to the Pass by Spanish explorers in the 1500s, when it first started appearing on Spanish maps.2 The rich nature of these timber resources and the potential commercial importance of the rivers flowing out of these forests were readily apparent to the governments vying for sovereignty over the area. Consequently, in a carefully negotiated treaty signed by John Adams in 1819, the United States and Spain agreed that their common boundary would give each country control of one side of Sabine Pass, with the boundary line beginning ‘‘on the Gulf of

figure 1 Map of Sabine Pass Area. Detail from Official Records Atlas, Plate 157.

setting the scene * 11 Mexico, at the mouth of the river Sabine, in the sea, continuing north along the western bank of that river.’’ 3 Early surveys indicated that some of the finest timber on the continent, highly suitable for use in ships’ spars and masts, lay upriver from Sabine Pass.4 As a result, when Texas declared its independence from Mexico in 1836, plans quickly materialized to develop a city and port at this commercially strategic point. The developers consisted of a group of prominent and politically connected speculators including Sam Houston. In some ways, the new city was a developer’s dream. Not only did it have great economic potential, but because it lay directly across the river from the United States, it furnished its settlers a degree of safety (particularly in the event of further trouble with Mexico) that other sites in Texas could not offer. Stressing its natural advantages, Houston and his partners advertised the site as follows: The undersigned have laid out a place called the City of Sabine, on the west bank of the Pass leading from the Bay into the Gulf of Mexico. The attention of the adventurous, the enterprising, and the capitalist, is invited to [this] most eligible point, than which for trade and commerce a better cannot be found west of New Orleans. . . . Nature seems to have intended this point for a great commercial mart.5 The Republic of Texas was not slow in confirming nature’s intent and recognizing the new town’s strategic location. A government customs house was placed near the mouth of the Pass as early as 1837. Expanding commercial traffic caused the new town to prosper in its early years. By 1861, a steam-operated sawmill was in operation, and the town of Sabine City (later renamed Sabine Pass) had become a growing town with a population of about five hundred nonslave inhabitants. The city possessed its own newspaper and post office and could boast of having a doctor, several lawyers, and a variety of hotels, churches, and schools.6 As the darkness of the Civil War loomed on the horizon, commercial traffic through Sabine Pass was brisk and growing rapidly. Wood products like shingles and barrel staves were being exported in large quantities, in addition to more traditional Texas exports like tobacco, cotton, and cattle. River steamers like the Uncle Ben made regular journeys up and down the rivers feeding into Sabine Lake. The Morgan Line of ships also called at the mouth of the Pass on a regular basis to take passengers and freight west to Galveston and east to New Orleans.

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Of potentially even greater importance to Sabine Pass than its shipping connections was the fact that the railroad line designed to eventually connect Houston to New Orleans had reached as far east as the Texas border and a spur line had been extended southward toward Sabine City. This was an interesting railroad on which to travel. One soldier who made the journey remembered that ‘‘It was common to hear the report of guns, as the alligators were plentiful along the railroad track.’’ 7 Possessing both a port facility and nearby railroad connections, Sabine Pass seemed inevitably destined for greatness. It is thus understandable that when the Civil War broke out, both sides recognized the Pass to have at least the potential to be one of the more important strategic points in Texas, second only to the large port city of Galveston and its rail connections at nearby Houston. The fact that it was commercially significant did not mean that control of Sabine Pass was automatically a high military priority. To the contrary, the military planners for both sides had their hands full elsewhere. As part of Winfield Scott’s so-called ‘‘Anaconda Plan’’ for subduing the rebellious South, President Lincoln ordered a massive blockade of the Confederacy’s seacoast in April 1861 in order to strangle commercial trade and cut off support to the Southern war effort. In an odd coincidence, the first Union ship to attempt to enforce this blockade was named the Sabine, which prematurely began blocking Pensacola, Florida, four days before Lincoln’s proclamation was technically effective.8 The Union’s ‘‘Anaconda’’ was initially a relatively nonthreatening serpent. In fact, the blockade was at first no more than a few marks on paper. This was because the North had fewer than fifty ships to blockade more than 3,500 miles of Southern coastline. The Union navy recognized even before the blockade was ordered that there was no hope of patrolling every point along this vast coastline. Given the impossibility of this task, in June 1861 a Blockade Strategy Board was wisely created by the navy to develop some systematic and practical plan to implement the blockade. Under the effective leadership of Commander Samuel F. Du Pont, this board recommended the commonsense approach of devoting primary attention to blockading the main Southern ports of entry, which the Board arbitrarily defined as those ports that could be entered by ships drawing at least twelve feet of water.9 Although the extensive Texas coastline comprised almost one-fourth of the entire Southern coastal boundary, its shallow estuaries, bays, and river outlets did not furnish many points where substantial oceangoing vessels could easily make port. Among Texas ports, only Galveston, at which the blockade commenced on July 2, 1861, met the Blockade Strategy Board’s

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twelve-foot-depth criterion for primary port status. Even Galveston had its limitations as a port. As it barely met the twelve-foot limitation itself, much of the cotton shipped from Galveston before the war had actually been sent east to New Orleans, where it was combined with other shipments in larger vessels to transport internationally. There was therefore a substantial coastal trade between Galveston and New Orleans. Of importance to our story, Sabine Pass was located strategically along this route.10 As the blockade took effect, the importance of Sabine Pass to commerce along the Texas coast gradually became apparent to those whose duties included restricting such activity. In large numbers, blockade runners began to pour out of unguarded Sabine Pass, as through a hole in a dam, a fact that eventually came to the attention of Union authorities. After he initiated the Union blockade at Galveston in July 1861, Captain James Alden of the U.S. Navy wrote to his superiors that nearby Sabine Pass, which he noted had become ‘‘a harbor of some importance,’’ needed to be obstructed as soon as possible in order to effectively block trade between Texas and New Orleans.11 But in August 1861, when the Union’s Blockade Strategy Board convened and issued its detailed recommendations on the blockade for Texas, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles was informed that ‘‘an efficient blockade of Galveston is, in fact, the blockade of the coast of Texas.’’ The importance of Sabine Pass had been dismissed in these recommendations and Alden’s warning ignored because the sandbar at the entrance to the Pass was said to allow only 7½ feet of water clearance at low tide.12 A few months later, yet another survey of the Texas coast was conducted, this time by the Union army’s General Benjamin Butler. Butler, like his predecessors at the navy, concluded that Sabine Pass should be ruled out as a potential invasion route because its shallow entrance presented ‘‘no particular features worthy of consideration, and many obstacles and drawbacks.’’ 13 While Butler’s pessimistic characterization of its shallow water depth was accurate, Sabine Pass was still destined to be a very important port for the Texas Confederate war effort. Nevertheless, Butler’s report, together with the Blockade Strategy Board’s earlier findings, meant that for the time being, there would be no serious Union blockade of Sabine Pass. Like its Union counterpart, the Confederate high command was at first in no hurry to make Sabine Pass the subject of any significant military attention. In June of 1861, Jefferson Davis had requested Captain Walter Stevens, a young army engineer, to make a systematic study of the coast of Texas to determine what places should and could be successfully defended. Stevens, who would later go on to become a brigadier general and give valuable ser-

14 * sabine pass vice as chief engineer in Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, reported to Davis that the town of Sabine City itself ‘‘amounts to very little,’’ and that a small battery of two guns and a company of men would be sufficient to protect the railroad connections north of the city. These railroad connections, he emphasized, were potentially important because they would ultimately, when completed, connect Houston and Sabine Pass with New Orleans by rail.14 As a result of these lukewarm comments by Stevens, at the beginning of the war very little effort was expended by the Confederate authorities to put Sabine Pass into a defensible position. Although Texas officials had recognized as early as March of 1861 that a proper defense of the state’s coast would require erection of at least a sand fort at Sabine Pass, even this suggestion was at first ignored by the busy Confederate military officials then in the process of raising and training armies.15 Sensing that the new central government was not going to be of much help to them, the residents of Southeast Texas decided to do what they could on their own to secure some measure of protection. Like Galveston, the town of Sabine City elected a committee to see to the public safety and began raising a body of men throughout the surrounding communities to serve the Confederate cause. In addition, the committee tried a clever strategy to get the attention of the military authorities. First they petitioned their political representatives at the Secession Convention in Austin to request the new Confederate Congress to formally declare Sabine Pass a ‘‘port of entry’’ for the Confederate nation. Then, in light of this potential status as an official international port, they demanded that the Confederacy quickly build fortifications at that place to protect the new nation’s collector of duties and tariffs.16 The strategy was clever but it did not work.When the port was not created and the forts did not materialize, the citizens residing near Sabine Pass were forced to take matters into their own hands. ‘‘In view of the exposed and defenseless condition of this portion of our state,’’ they recorded, it had become necessary to create a new military unit called the ‘‘Sabine Pass Guards,’’ which they informed state officials was intended solely for ‘‘home defense.’’ To arm this local defense force, they ordered one hundred Sharps rifles and one hundred Colt’s Navy revolvers from New Orleans. Having ordered these small arms, they then managed to convince military officials in Galveston to part with two 18-pounder cannons to replace two small cannons from the Mexican War that had originally been placed near the mouth of the pass. Seizing all of the powder, lead, and other munitions in the area, the Sabine Pass Guards discovered that they still were short of cartridges into which

setting the scene * 15 they could stuff gunpowder. To fill this void, the ladies of the town were solicited to make containers for the powder out of stockings or good domestic cloth. Even after all of these preparations, the Sabine Pass Guards still pronounced their defensive capabilities to be essentially in a ‘‘destitute condition.’’ 17 Local leaders grew frantic as the war began to heat up elsewhere. To respond to this crisis, virtually all of the adult men in the area were pressed into service to help throw together an improvised fortification near the mouth of Sabine Pass. E. I. Kellie, who participated in this construction project, recalled (prophetically, in light of the nationality of the later defenders of this post) that ‘‘They worked us like Irishmen rolling dirt with wheelbarrows.’’ Within weeks a new fort (called ‘‘Fort Sabine’’) was erected. Calling it a fort was probably generous. It was really nothing more than an irregular mound of dirt in the shape of a half moon. At its highest point, Fort Sabine was only about ten feet high. On top of the fort were positioned the two old guns obtained from Galveston. There was still one major problem with this fort. None of the soldiers assigned to garrison the fort had the slightest idea how to load or fire its guns. To meet this need, an old soldier named McArdle was eventually persuaded to come to the fort, instruct the men in their duties, and conduct the necessary drills.18 Despite these improvements, the situation at Sabine Pass still cried out for military attention. It soon became apparent to Confederate officials in charge of Texas that they had vastly underestimated the importance of making a strong defensive effort at the Pass. Commander William Hunter, one of the few representatives of the Confederate navy on the Gulf Coast, reported to his superiors in Louisiana as early as July 1861 that Sabine Pass, which was ‘‘the military pathway from the sea to an important part of Louisiana and Texas,’’ had unfortunately been ‘‘overlooked’’ by military authorities. Even though the Pass did not allow vessels with deep drafts to enter, Hunter acknowledged, local contacts assured him that the sandbar at the mouth of the Pass was so muddy that there was no trouble getting a vessel drawing at least ten feet of water into its extensive water system, except in the winter when prevailing winds lowered this clearance to about seven feet. Noting that an army landed at Sabine Pass could either march or be transported by lightdraft steamer easily up the thirty-five miles to the eastern end of the main railroad line at the city of Orange, Commander Hunter observed that it was only a ten-hour journey from East Texas to Galveston or Houston. In short, he argued, if and when the Union finally attempted to seize Sabine Pass (an action he deemed only a question of time), it would not only cut the vital line

16 * sabine pass of communication between Texas and Louisiana, but also gain a strategically valuable invasion route into either or both of those states.19 Commander Hunter had identified accurately the strategic importance of Sabine Pass, but it would be almost another year before that importance would be recognized and acted upon by either party to the rapidly escalating conflict. In November 1861, a Union army engineer charged with reporting on the status of ‘‘all fortifications upon the shores of the Gulf of Mexico’’ described work being carried out on fortifications guarding the entrance to Galveston Harbor but made absolutely no mention of any work being done at Fort Sabine near the mouth of Sabine Pass.20 For the time being, at least, Sabine Pass would not be the site of much in the way of military activity by either side. Although there was little military activity at Sabine Pass during the first two years of the war, Texans seeking to run the blockade soon realized that the Pass furnished an ideal base of operations for their clandestine activities. While the Union navy devoted most of its attention to Galveston, ships running the blockade experienced little difficulty getting in and out of Sabine Pass. By the fall of 1862, Colonel Xavier Debray, at Confederate headquarters in Houston, would proudly describe Sabine Pass as ‘‘our most important seaport.’’ 21

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chapter two

The Admiral and the Forts

ome men, just by the force of their personalities and their personal

S

charisma, wield influence far beyond their physical presence, affecting people and shaping events well beyond their direct supervision and control. Such a man was David Glasgow Farragut (Figure 2), and one of the numerous events he influenced greatly (even though he was not present) was the Battle of Sabine Pass. It is almost impossible to overstate the contribution that Farragut made to the Union war effort. It is also impossible to overstate the influence that Farragut’s personality and style had on his naval subordinates, particularly those men who were eventually given important military assignments on the Texas coast. Unquestionably one of the greatest figures in American military history, Farragut had an unusually aggressive approach to naval warfare, particularly where it involved combat with shore fortifications. This aggressive approach would have dramatic repercussions throughout the Civil War and in particular would greatly influence events in Texas. Farragut’s views on naval combat had been developed and refined over a lifelong career of naval service. Since his views on warfare would be so important to the events that would ultimately take place at Sabine Pass, it is useful to briefly discuss Farragut’s background to see the probable origins of these views. In the fall of 1812, eleven-year-old David Glasgow Farragut embarked with his foster father David Porter on the Essex to participate in one of the War of 1812’s most daring naval expeditions. The Essex first sailed to the Cape Verde Islands and then to the South American coast. Capturing a series of small prizes, Porter decided to round Cape Horn to the Pacific, where he hunted and captured a series of British privateers and whaling vessels.1 Eventually, Porter was forced to surrender the Essex after a hard fight with two British men-of-war. Porter and Farragut, however, were soon paroled and

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figure 2 David Glasgow Farragut. From Loyall Farragut’s The Life of David Glasgow Farragut.

began the long voyage home on one of the small ships that they had previously captured. To add insult to injury, as they approached New York after dark a small fort opened fire on them, mistaking them for enemies. Fortunately, this return home under fire produced no casualties. What it did produce was an almost religious conviction on the part of the young Farragut that artillery fire from shore fortifications was not a thing to be feared. As he later summarized this experience, ‘‘it was not as awful a thing as was supposed to lie under a battery.’’ 2 This was the last hostile fire that Farragut would endure until the Civil War almost fifty years later. His subsequent naval career up until the time of the war was varied but not particularly impressive. On the one occasion, in 1838, that he was near enough to witness warfare at close range, it was between the French and the Mexicans off Vera Cruz. Guarding the city was Fort San Juan de Ulúa, an impressive fortress located on an island that was widely viewed by military men of the time to be virtually impregnable. As Farragut watched, French naval forces bombarded the Mexican fortress into submission in less than a day. Fascinated by this event, Farragut later visited the

the admiral and the forts * 19 site of the fort and inspected the damage that had been done to its walls and gun positions. In 1847, as the opening act of the most important campaign of the Mexican War, United States forces under Winfield Scott laid siege to the city of Vera Cruz. Based on his observations of the French capture of Fort San Juan de Ulúa in 1838, Farragut had submitted a detailed plan to the secretary of the navy for capturing that fort (still the key to the defenses of Vera Cruz) using a series of naval bombardments. But, although the city was quickly taken by American forces, it does not appear that Farragut’s plan played any part in the strategy that Scott followed. In fact, Farragut did not even arrive at Vera Cruz until after the city had surrendered. Once again, however, he was able to personally observe how a supposedly invincible fort had fallen in the face of a determined and well-planned assault. It was an experience that would shape his approach to naval warfare for the rest of his life.3 At the outset of the Civil War, it appeared unlikely that Farragut would play a very prominent part in the Union naval effort. After all, he was over sixty years old and was arguably of questionable loyalty because of his Southern birth and family connections. He had not seen any action in the Mexican War and had really spent little time at sea in recent years. It is thus understandable that his first assignment was to sit on a board to determine which other active commanders should be retired because of age or disability.4 While Farragut was occupied with this relatively unpleasant administrative duty, the U.S. Navy was having some initial success dealing with Southern forts. In the summer of 1861, an expedition had been sent to the North Carolina coast to respond to Confederate privateers operating out of Pamlico Sound. Two Southern forts guarded Hatteras Inlet, the gateway to the Sound. The Union plan to capture these forts called for the naval forces to bombard them and occupy their attention while army forces landed and attacked them from the shore. This amphibious landing turned out to be a disaster, but the naval bombardment was so successful that both forts surrendered even without the originally planned participation of the army.5 A few months later, Flag Officer Samuel Du Pont forced his way into Port Royal Sound, again silencing with his batteries two substantial Confederate forts mounting more than forty guns. To Union military officials, the results of these engagements clearly favored the ships in what was to become a continuing duel between ships and shore.6 Robert E. Lee, the commander at this time of Confederate forces on the coast of South Carolina, could see the writing on the wall. He reported to his superiors that it was virtually impossible for the Confederates to effec-

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sabine pass

tively protect their entire coast with shore fortifications. Instead, he recommended, the South must concentrate on holding only a few important ports and harbors (like Charleston, Wilmington, and Savannah), while basically abandoning the water’s edge elsewhere to the enemy. The Confederacy’s best chance, he reasoned, lay in fighting Union armies in the interior, away from the support that might be furnished by the enemy’s powerful gunboats. As Lee summed up his strategy, ‘‘[t]he farther [the enemy] can be withdrawn from his floating batteries the weaker he will become.’’ 7 Lee’s advice was accepted without much debate, and the Confederates decided as a matter of policy to limit their defensive efforts on the coast primarily to a few, relatively powerful coastal forts. As a result of the Union navy’s initial successes at Hatteras Inlet and Port Royal Sound, military officials in Washington began to be convinced that even the strongest Confederate shore fortifications would yield when faced with a determined application of naval firepower. Their confidence in this strategy was strengthened even further when Forts Henry and Donelson were captured in Tennessee in February 1862. Once again, however, the ‘‘success’’ of these operations on the western rivers was deceptively limited. In their attempt to capture Fort Donelson, the Union ironclads were badly damaged and had ultimately been forced to withdraw, and it was left up to Union Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant and the land forces to assault and finally subdue Fort Donelson. Although the Union high command did not recognize the warning signs, the events at Fort Donelson demonstrated that even strongly armored gunboats could not easily survive a frontal attack on a well-designed and skillfully defended fortification. This was a lesson that Union naval planners, like their counterparts in the army, were not ready to learn in 1862.8 Now convinced that Confederate fortifications could indeed be neutralized by a strong naval force, Washington eagerly turned its eyes to New Orleans, where two of the most powerful forts in the South—Forts St. Philip and Jackson—flanked the Mississippi River below the city. These masonry forts, joined by a chain stretching across the river, were armed with so many guns that they were considered virtually impassable. Notwithstanding their formidable nature, David Dixon Porter, Farragut’s adoptive brother, had devised a plan for taking the forts and capturing New Orleans. His plan depended on softening up the forts first with an extremely heavy bombardment launched from a flotilla of specially designed ‘‘mortar boats.’’ These small ships, it was hoped, would serve as floating platforms for mortars that could

the admiral and the forts * 21 fire heavy projectiles timed to explode as they rained down inside the walls of the forts. Porter calculated confidently that this fire would be so effective that the forts would be reduced to submission within forty-eight hours after commencement of the bombardment.9 To command the expedition to capture New Orleans, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles chose Farragut. By early January 1862, Farragut had formally received his orders to command the newly formed West Gulf Blockading Squadron, with the Hartford to serve as his flagship.10 Farragut’s new ‘‘West Gulf’’ territory was a vast one, extending from St. Andrew’s Bay in Florida westward to the Rio Grande.11 Although his orders cautioned that ‘‘the importance of a vigorous blockade at every point to be under your command can not be too strongly impressed or felt,’’ Farragut was instructed that for the time being his primary attention must be directed at ‘‘the great object in view, the certain capture of the city of New Orleans.’’ 12 Farragut was more than eager to prove that he was worthy of his new position. On April 18, 1862, Porter assembled his fleet of mortar schooners just below the Confederate forts and opened fire on them with his thirteen-inch mortars. Although Porter had confidently predicted success from his bombardment within forty-eight hours, the bombardment had still made no discernible impact on the enemy’s forts five days later. To make matters worse, the mortar boats were running short of suitable ammunition. It was becoming apparent that this part of the operation was a failure.13 Farragut called a meeting and invited his commanders to discuss the various options open to them. Commander Henry Bell’s diary records that Farragut refused to accept any suggestion that he wait any longer. Instead, Bell noted, Farragut impatiently ‘‘remarked that our ammunition is being rapidly consumed, without a supply at hand and that something must be done immediately. He believed in celerity.’’ 14 The word ‘‘celerity,’’ meaning speed or swift movement, is one that Farragut employed on this and several other occasions during his naval career to sum up his approach to warfare.15 Farragut was well aware of the risk he would be taking by attempting to run, even with ‘‘celerity,’’ by the still-powerful Confederate forts. To maximize his chances of success, he decided to time his attack to begin under cover of darkness at 2:00 a.m. By dawn, the attack was over. Despite the casualties and damage that his ships had suffered, Farragut’s objective (and his place in naval history) had been secured. He had steamed past the forts guarding New Orleans, losing only one out of his fourteen ships and suffering casualties of slightly less than two hundred of the four thousand men

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who are estimated to have been involved in the Union attack. An exultant Farragut reported to his wife that ‘‘it has pleased Almighty God to preserve my life through a fire such as the world has scarcely known.’’ 16 Farragut’s next adventure under fire would come very soon. Shortly after the capture of New Orleans, Farragut headed elements of his fleet up the Mississippi River toward the fortified Confederate stronghold at Vicksburg. Once again, Farragut decided to steam past the enemy’s batteries. Porter’s mortar fleet initiated a preliminary bombardment to soften up the Confederate defenses, and once again that bombardment proved spectacularly unsuccessful. On this occasion, the guns of Farragut’s ships were equally ineffective, with some ships not even firing at all because of poor visibility.17 Although Farragut and most of his vessels eventually managed to pass the batteries of Vicksburg, three of his ships did not make the passage, a failure that the flag officer did not take lightly. When he was informed of the failing commanders’ excuses, Farragut muttered to a nearby midshipman ‘‘that he had been trifled with long enough, and would not stand it any longer. When officers began to fool with him they would find what he was made of.’’ 18 True to his word, Farragut took little time to act. The commander of one of the ships that had stayed behind was relieved of command and sent home several days later.19 The consequences of disobedience had been made very clear to every commander under Farragut’s jurisdiction. In this theater of the war, at least, failure was simply not an option. The success of his expedition at Vicksburg had, if anything, strengthened Farragut’s conviction that the navy had little to fear from Confederate forts. He boasted to his superiors in his official report that ‘‘the forts can be passed and we have done it, and can do it again as often as may be required of us.’’ 20 The confidence that Farragut exhibited was in sharp contrast to the timidity typically exhibited in dispatches sent back to Washington by generals in the Union army. The navy learned swiftly that in Farragut it had not only a hero, but a highly confident commander. It was a message that President Lincoln needed for political reasons to communicate to the public in clear terms. Effective July 16, 1862, Farragut was made a rear admiral, argued sometimes to have been the first admiral in the history of the U.S. Navy.21 Admiral Farragut’s next exploit on the Mississippi would not take place for almost a year, a year during which he was involved in what seemed like an endless parade of social activities and administrative duties. During March 1863, the admiral finally tired of inactivity and decided to assemble a fleet about twenty-five miles north of Baton Rouge for the purpose of running past the formidable Confederate batteries at Port Hudson. His prior ex-

the admiral and the forts *

23

perience running by forts at New Orleans and Vicksburg made him confident—as it turned out, too confident—of success. Lining the east bank of the Mississippi River near Port Hudson was a series of particularly well-designed Rebel fortifications that took strong advantage of their physical location. At this spot, the river made a ninetydegree turn, gouging out a channel near its eastern bank. On the bluffs overlooking this channel the Confederates had erected fortified batteries containing a variety of heavy guns as well as a contingent of field artillery. One of the batteries was situated so that it would lie dead ahead of any ship attempting to come up the river and make the sharp bend at Port Hudson. It was essentially a trap. Farragut would clearly have his hands full attempting to overcome these forts. On March 14, 1863, the admiral assembled his fleet and laid out his plan of action. The Hartford, Farragut’s flagship, would take the lead. Lashed to the port side of each ship would be another lighter gunboat, with the weaker ships sheltered on the opposite side from the main Confederate fortifications.22 At around 10:00 p.m. that evening, the fleet weighed anchor and began its slow movement up the river. Hindered by the strong current coming straight down the river at them, the Union ships at first moved uncomfortably slowly. Dense smoke covered the river as batteries and ships exchanged devastating quantities of shot and shell. Farragut noted that the enemy batteries located high on the bluffs overlooking his ship presented a particular problem, since the only guns that his Union ships could direct at them were the two guns located on the upper, or poop, deck.23 Barely managing to avoid running aground, Farragut’s flagship and its companion eventually managed to make the turn and slip past the Port Hudson batteries. Although Farragut had managed to get his ship and the ship lashed to its side above the batteries at Port Hudson, when the smoke cleared none of the other ships following them had successfully made the passage. Most of the ships left behind had instead suffered significant damage and casualties. To make matters worse, the Confederate forts at Port Hudson had suffered very little damage from the bombardments launched by the Union ships. A clearly depressed Farragut was forced to refer to the action in his official report as a ‘‘disaster.’’ 24 On hearing of the affair, Samuel Du Pont wrote to his wife: ‘‘I am worried about Farragut; he did not know, poor fellow, the difference between running forts and engaging them direct.’’ 25 As events at Sabine Pass would later reinforce, this was a crucial difference. The disaster at Port Hudson took its toll both on Farragut’s health and his morale. After Vicksburg fell to Ulysses S. Grant on July 4, 1863, Farragut

24 * sabine pass felt free (indeed compelled) to return to the North to recover and visit with his family. During this period of recuperation, he visited Washington and offered advice to the naval high command on a wide variety of topics. Farragut greatly impressed Abraham Lincoln, who said to his naval advisors that Farragut was the best appointment that had been made in either branch of the service.26 Farragut would eventually confirm Lincoln’s good opinion of him by forcing his way past the powerful Confederate forts at the entrance to Mobile Bay in August 1864. As Farragut’s fleet approached the entrance to the Bay on that occasion, one of his ironclads encountered an enemy mine (then called a ‘‘torpedo’’) and sank. When the ship ahead of him slowed up to look for more mines, Farragut directed his own ship to pass it on the port side, in the process steering a course that led directly through a mine field. When he was warned of this potential danger, the admiral is sometimes said to have responded: ‘‘Damn the torpedoes. Full speed ahead!’’ 27 There is some question whether Farragut actually made this comment, which is so famously attributed to him, but there can be no doubt that it accurately reflects his whole approach to warfare. Even an acting third assistant engineer on one of Farragut’s ships described what he called the essential ‘‘style of Daddy Farragut’’ in three simple words: ‘‘we rush in.’’ 28 Farragut’s fame as a firm and tenacious Civil War naval commander is great and well deserved. Ignoring danger, he repeatedly took calculated risks that resulted in some of the most important naval accomplishments of the war. That does not mean that he was always successful. On the contrary, his experience at Port Hudson showed just how difficult it was for even the best naval commander to make a successful frontal assault against a strongly fortified enemy battery. The admiral’s keen intellect and many years of experience, however, enabled him on most occasions to choose the manner and timing of his attacks to maximize their chance of success. Farragut’s subordinates quickly learned that their commander demanded and expected of them the same aggressive action that had made him famous. What they could not imitate, sometimes with disastrous consequences as at Sabine Pass, was his almost instinctive ability to accurately size up a risky situation and make it work to his advantage.

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chapter three

Attacking Texas

or more than a year following his encounter with the batteries at Vicksburg, Farragut was preoccupied mainly with administrative duties, including the direction of blockading activities along the Texas coast. It was during this period of inactivity, beginning in the summer of 1862, that Farragut began to feel increasing pressure from Washington to give more attention to the coast of Texas.1 Although his orders had always called for maintenance of a blockade of Texas ports, Farragut was not an advocate of blockading in the sense of keeping ships offshore to watch a particular port. Instead, he believed that the most effective way to blockade such a port was for Union forces to actually seize it. As he wrote to his wife in early 1862, ‘‘You know my idea was always to blockade inside, not outside, and when I show the example I feel satisfied that others will follow.’’ 2 Farragut believed that he had already shown the example by capturing the city of New Orleans. As he accurately predicted, his subordinates assigned to blockading Texas were not long in at least attempting to follow their bold commander’s lead. Lieutenant John W. Kittredge, in charge of blockading ports along the Gulf Coast in the southern part of Texas, decided to follow Farragut’s blockadingby-seizure strategy and confirm his own aggressive reputation by capturing the city of Corpus Christi in August 1862. On August 12 he guided his fleet of small ships, including the steamer Sachem, into Corpus Christi Bay and, after threatening to bombard the city, negotiated a truce that gave its civilian inhabitants forty-eight hours to evacuate the city. During the night of August 15, a small Confederate force under the command of Major Alfred Hobby moved three small smooth-bore cannons into the remains of an old fortification (made of sand and shells and dating from the Mexican War) near the water’s edge and when dawn arrived opened fire on the startled Union fleet.3 By one account the surprised Federals eventually returned fire with al-

F

26 * sabine pass most three hundred shot and shell, in the process, however, doing very little damage to the Confederate gunners or their shelter. In a telling admission in his official report, Kittredge later conceded that he had been forced to repeatedly ‘‘silence’’ the enemy’s guns and that he was eventually compelled to withdraw out of range as night approached.4 Several days later, Kittredge landed a small party with a howitzer and again tried to take the Confederate battery by using this land force to supplement his naval bombardment. Once again, the naval bombardment did relatively little damage to the Confederate fort and earthworks. A timely cavalry charge by the Texas troops eventually caused the Union land party to retreat, and the attempt to take Corpus Christi had failed.5 During this series of attacks, the Sachem was damaged by a number of shots in its hull and riggings because it was the most prominent target. As the scars on the Sachem proved, the Confederates in Texas had served notice on the Union navy that they were good marksmen with artillery pieces. They had also shown themselves willing and able to make effective use of earthen fortifications. Kittredge’s official report in effect conceded the defensive strength of Hobby’s fort, stating that ‘‘considering that the enemy were behind a battery of earthworks and completely sheltered, I consider we have escaped with trifling injury, and the moment we drew them from cover they were made to bite the dust.’’ 6 Despite the failure of Kittredge’s attack, Farragut praised him highly for his actions at Corpus Christi, saying, ‘‘I hope that you and your command will continue to evince the energetic spirit and zeal with which your operations thus far have been conducted.’’ 7 Farragut’s message was clear: be aggressive and don’t back down. It was a message that was not lost on Kittredge or any of his associates along the Texas coast. Kittredge would continue to exercise this ‘‘energetic spirit and zeal’’ urged upon him by his superior for but a short time. About a month after his attack on Corpus Christi, Kittredge was lured ashore at what he thought was an unoccupied house and fell into a Confederate trap. With embarrassing ease, the first of the admiral’s subordinates to follow his commander’s bold lead had turned from aggressor to prisoner. Farragut read about his subordinate’s mortifying capture in a forwarded Galveston newspaper. Putting the best face on the situation, the admiral reported to Washington that Kittredge had ‘‘succeeded very well’’ at Corpus Christi, since the blockaders at least continued to exercise control over the entrance to Corpus Christi Bay.8 Frederick Crocker (Figure 3), the next of Farragut’s protégés to attempt something bold along the Texas coast, was a central character in the events

attacking texas * 27

figure 3 Frederick W. Crocker. From Ohio M.O.L.L.U.S. Papers, Portraits of Companions.

that would eventually unfold at Sabine Pass. Born in North Bridgewater, Massachusetts, in 1821, Crocker had been involved in the whaling trade before the war. These voyages had taken him around the world. In the 1840s alone he went on whaling trips to the waters off Tahiti, Chile, New Zealand, Hawaii, Japan, Guam, and Borneo. When the Civil War broke out, Crocker was commanding the passenger steamer R. R. Cuyler. He was appointed the acting master of that ship in May 1861, when his ship was accepted into the U.S. Navy.9 Crocker first saw action in the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, where in February 1862 he commanded a small gunboat that assisted in shelling Confederate forts on Roanoke Island preceding the U.S. Army’s successful invasion and occupation of that place.10 Two months later, Crocker was placed in command of the Kensington, a small newly commissioned steamer whose main virtue was a condenser used to create and distribute fresh water to other ships in the fleet. Knowing that Admiral Farragut’s blockading force was desperate for water, Flag Officer Du Pont ordered Crocker to report with his ship to the Gulf as soon

28 * sabine pass as possible.11 It took Crocker almost three weeks to reach New Orleans. Part of the delay was caused when the fleet in Key West commandeered his vessel to distribute water for the Union ships stationed there. The remaining delay was caused when the Kensington’s boiler gave out, necessitating some repairs.12 At first, Farragut employed Acting Master Crocker and his ship merely to distribute water, dispatches, and supplies to the various ships in the blockading squadron. But on June 22, 1862, while towing some ships up the Mississippi River to aid in operations against Vicksburg, Crocker and his ships came under fire from a small concealed Confederate battery located on a bluff a few miles above Ellis Cliffs. Crocker calmly returned fire, silenced the battery, and then moved out of range.13 This boldness under fire impressed Farragut, who forwarded Crocker’s report to Washington with approval and began assigning the Kensington to more active blockade duty. Crocker made the most of this opportunity. While stationed off Sabine Pass, on August 13, 1862, he made his first capture: the schooner Troy and its cargo of contraband cotton.14 Crocker’s stock continued to rise in Farragut’s eyes, and in early September he was ordered not only to blockade Sabine Pass but was encouraged to attempt to get possession of it. To help Crocker with this mission, the admiral assigned the schooner Rachel Seaman, captained by Acting Master Quincy Hooper.15 On the morning of September 23, 1862, the Kensington and Rachel Seaman arrived off of Sabine Pass. There, they were joined by the mortar schooner Henry Janes, whose captain, Acting Master Lewis Pennington, decided spontaneously to join Crocker’s force in attacking the crude Rebel fort (Fort Sabine) guarding the entrance to Sabine Pass.16 The first problem facing the Union expedition was how to get its ships into the Pass. The top of the sandbar at the entrance to the Pass was at that time only about eight feet deep. It was apparent that the steamer Kensington, with its heavy machinery and deeper draft, could not easily pass over that obstacle. Crocker and the other captains decided not to risk the Kensington, but to instead sail the two schooners (Rachel Seaman and Henry Janes) over the bar and then use the ships’ launches to transport additional men and guns to the site of the attack. At about 4:00 p.m. on September 23, the wind shifted to a direction that would help push the ships over the bar and into the Pass. The first Sabine Pass expedition was now under way. The Rachel Seaman easily made it over the bar, but the Henry Janes, which drew seventeen inches more water, got stuck in the mud covering the bar. An attempt was made to ‘‘kedge’’ the vessel, a procedure which involved

attacking texas * 29 setting anchors and trying to haul the vessel physically over the obstacle, but the attempt was given up after seven hours when the tide fell, leaving the vessel firmly aground on the bar. As dawn broke on the next morning, Captain Pennington and his ship found themselves in an uncomfortable position. They were still stuck in the mud and could see a few of the enemy moving around in their fort. From his grounded ship, Pennington began to fire his howitzer at the fort, followed shortly thereafter by a barrage from the guns of the Rachel Seaman. In charge of the Confederate defenses at Fort Sabine was Major Josephus Irvine. Born in Tennessee, Irvine had moved with his family to Texas at an early age and had served in the Texas army during the revolution. Committed to the Texan cause, he had participated in the siege of Bexar and the Battle of San Jacinto. He is sometimes said to have been the youngest soldier at the latter battle. With the start of the Civil War, Irvine raised a company that became Company ‘‘C’’ of James B. Liken’s battalion (later reorganized as ‘‘Spaight’s Battalion’’). The Confederate force under Irvine’s command at Fort Sabine consisted of fewer than thirty men, with an additional force of twenty-five cavalrymen about 3½ miles distant from the fort.17 When Crocker’s force attacked, the Confederates returned fire, with most of the shots from both sides falling far short of their targets. One large shell, however, buried itself in the Confederate earthworks, where it exploded, throwing dirt and mud in all directions. As a Houston newspaper later summarized the result, ‘‘some of the boys were injured by the hard chunks of dirt, but not severely.’’ 18 Finally, after five hours of hard work by Pennington’s men, the rising tide permitted the Henry Janes to be hauled over the bar and into the Pass. The extensive oyster shell reefs and narrow channels near the entrance to Sabine Pass made it difficult to maneuver the Union ships close to the Confederate fort, but by 5:30 p.m. Crocker and his men had finally gotten within 1½ miles of it and again commenced firing. This bombardment lasted until about 7 p.m., when it was suspended because the enemy stopped returning fire. Inside Fort Sabine, twenty-eight Confederates had taken shelter as best they could to wait out the Union bombardment. Under the cover of darkness, they emerged from their hiding places to find the walls of the fort and their barracks severely damaged. A wind and rainstorm made conditions even more miserable for the fort’s defenders. Encouraged by the fort’s silence at the end of the day, Crocker decided to try to capture it that very evening and fitted out three boats with howitzers for that purpose. This daring expedition managed to get up the river above the Confederate fort, but although

30 * sabine pass Crocker could see the fort he could not find a channel through the reefs to it and finally gave up the attempt just before daylight.19 Dawn brought the Union expedition a pleasant surprise. Seeing no enemy activity at the fort, Crocker fired three shells into it with no reaction at all. He then went ashore under a flag of truce, only to discover that during the night the Confederates had spiked their guns and evacuated the fort. He then walked toward the town of Sabine City, which was located only about a mile above the fort, intending to demand its surrender. Before he reached it, however, he was met by a delegation of three citizens who informed him formally of the town’s surrender. They also warned that nearly all of the other citizens had evacuated the town due to an epidemic of yellow fever.20 Crocker’s timing in taking Fort Sabine had been very fortunate. Confederate reinforcements including Elmore’s Twentieth Texas Regiment had been sent to support the defenders at Fort Sabine when news of the attack reached Houston, but the reinforcements did not reach the battlefield in time to relieve the garrison and prevent the surrender of Fort Sabine.21 Instead they reached Beaumont only to discover Sabine Pass already in Union hands. To many Texans, the capture of the fort at Sabine Pass under these circumstances was neither a very sporting nor a very impressive accomplishment. In Liberty, for example, the event was described as follows: ‘‘The Yankees came in [at Sabine Pass] and took the little battery, burned what little there was to be found and left before the troops got over there.We had but about ten or a dozen men there. The yellow fever had run all the rest away.’’ 22 The account from Liberty was right in at least one respect. As it turned out, yellow fever had done Crocker’s job of almost emptying the Confederate fort of soldiers even before the Union ships arrived. The army doctors in the area had little experience dealing with the disease and compounded their problems by their unprofessional demeanor. As one resident described the situation, the physicians ‘‘seemed to know little if anything about treating the patients, some getting drunk, and useless (as they were afraid of it) others not knowing what to do.’’ 23 A letter from Sabine City (often referred to simply as Sabine Pass by local residents) at the end of August reported forty cases of yellow fever, with several men dead or dying.24 By the first week in September, the disease had reached epidemic proportions, with between fifty and sixty cases in progress, following closely on the heels of the deaths of twenty-five other victims. A Houston newspaper, blaming the spread of the disease on a man who had run the blockade into Sabine City from Tampico, Mexico, concluded that there could be no question but that the illness was ‘‘raging’’ at Sabine.25 Another

attacking texas * 31 correspondent reported that ‘‘with my knowledge of this fever, if I had never had it, I would sooner face the Yankees in a hard fought battle for six hours than to go to Sabine Pass and remain there the same time.’’ 26 Sabine City was the first major Texas city to be captured by the Union during the war. Its sudden and unexpected loss came as a great shock to most Texans. Many of the residents of Sabine City fled inland, some never to return. Others stayed to protect their houses and businesses from potential destruction at the hands of the dreaded invaders. For the most part, these fears were misplaced. The Union sailors seldom came ashore and rarely entered the town. On the few occasions when they did voyage inland, the targets that were destroyed usually appeared to have some military connection. Of course, this did not stop the inflammatory rhetoric that filled Texas newspapers. As one correspondent from Sabine City warned: The Federals have said that in less than one month every port of Texas will be in their possession. Let our people take warning. Be ready—act like men who are determined to be free, and the haughty invaders will soon learn that the blood of the old heroes of the Alamo and San Jacinto yet courses in the veins of Texans.27 With the aid of a convenient epidemic, the capture of the fort at Sabine Pass had been shockingly easy, costing Crocker not a single casualty. He proudly boasted to Admiral Farragut: ‘‘I have the honor to report the entire success of our expedition to Sabine Pass. The town is in our possession and the battery (consisting of four guns, two of 8,000 pounds and two smaller) entirely destroyed without the loss of a single man on our side.’’ Leaving his two schooners at Sabine Pass, Crocker headed east to the entrance to the Mermentau River, where he found only another small Confederate fort that was both unfinished and abandoned. On his return to Sabine Pass, Crocker’s luck continued and he managed to capture the British schooner Velocity, which had attempted to run the blockade into the Pass, not knowing that it had fallen into Union hands. It had been loaded at Sisal, Mexico, with a cargo of salt, cotton bagging, and large quantities of rope. The blockade runner Velocity was soon turned into a Union blockader.28 While Crocker had been absent on his expedition to Louisiana, Captains Hooper and Pennington had been occupied with their own project back at Sabine Pass. On the evening of September 27, three boats carrying about thirty-three men pulled away from the Union ships and headed quietly up the Pass about twelve miles to the point where Taylor’s Bayou emptied into

32 * sabine pass Sabine Lake. The purpose of this night expedition was the destruction of the railroad bridge that crossed Taylor’s Bayou. Arriving at their objective about 11 p.m., they landed and set fire to the bridge. Captain Pennington reported proudly that the mission was successful, noting that he and his men had departed only ‘‘after seeing the bridge destroyed.’’ By 6 a.m. they had returned to the entrance to the Pass, carrying with them three prisoners and the local mail, all of which had been seized in the process of supposedly destroying the bridge at Taylor’s Bayou.29 Although Crocker had by this time more than satisfied the objectives assigned to him, he was not yet finished. Confident that Sabine Pass was now securely within his control, Crocker once again hurried east to the mouth of Calcasieu Pass and, taking a launch and howitzer, proceeded up the Calcasieu River a distance that he estimated at about eighty miles. There he found and captured the steamer Dan, burning two large schooners and capturing several prisoners along the way. Upon his return to Sabine Pass, Crocker was delighted to learn that while he had been absent, the Rachel Seaman had also captured the schooner Dart attempting to run the blockade. The rapidly increasing number and variety of ships and supplies that Crocker was capturing convinced him that the Rebels must be using Sabine Pass to conduct far more trade than the Union high command had ever had any reason to suspect. As he warned in an additional report, ‘‘The importance of Sabine Pass to the Rebels appears to have been entirely underrated by us; the quantity of goods of all kinds and munitions of war that have been run in here has been enormous, and large quantities of cotton have been exported.’’ 30 After reentering Sabine Pass, Crocker was embarrassed to learn that the large railroad bridge at Taylor’s Bayou had not been destroyed by fire, as he had earlier reported to his superiors. It turned out that the son of the ferryman had arrived in time to put out the fire and save the bridge. Not only was the bridge not destroyed as Crocker had been informed, but only six of its timbers had even been seriously damaged.31 Angered by this failure, and afraid that word of this debacle might get back to Admiral Farragut, Crocker hastily put together another expedition employing the prize steamer Dan and two heavy guns and headed back up the Pass to complete the job. His pilot this time was Union sympathizer James G. Taylor, a local settler.32 As Crocker approached the mouth of the bayou, he shelled a force of enemy cavalry and an approaching train. This provided cover for the crews of two small boats, who went ashore and this time entirely destroyed the bridge. On the way back down the river, Crocker’s force also burned a set of

attacking texas * 33 barracks and two small schooners just for good measure. This raised to ten the number of ships that Crocker had managed to either capture or destroy in less than a month.33 A Beaumont resident sarcastically inquired: ‘‘How is it that the Yankees can make gunboats out of steamers that we consider useless and drive us off? Have all the brave men in Texas gone to the army in Virginia?’’ 34 Texas was indeed beginning to look like an easy conquest. A clearly exuberant Farragut received Crocker’s report and passed it along to Washington with a strong recommendation for Crocker’s immediate promotion. Saying that Crocker’s bold conduct ‘‘meets my highest approbation,’’ Farragut commended his subordinate’s ‘‘energy and management in the whole affair at Sabine Pass and Calcasieu River.’’ 35 Washington agreed, and Crocker was in due course promoted to acting volunteer lieutenant ‘‘for gallant conduct.’’ 36 Once again, the message from Farragut was clear. Like Kittredge at Corpus Christi, Crocker had learned that it took aggressive action, and lots of it, for a member of Farragut’s command to earn promotion and his superior’s approval. The third Farragut subordinate to take action in Texas in 1862 was not nearly as bold a man as either Crocker or Kittredge. Commander William B. Renshaw had been sent to Galveston near the end of September with the remaining vessels of the mortar flotilla. Farragut’s rather vague instructions to him were to ‘‘proceed down the coast of Texas with the other vessels, keeping a good lookout for vessels running the blockade, and whenever you think you can enter the sounds on the coast and destroy the temporary defenses, you will do so and gain the command of the inland navigation.’’ The admiral followed that up with a strong suggestion to make Galveston his target ‘‘if the forts are not too formidable.’’ 37 As it turned out, and as Farragut had strongly hinted, the forts at Galveston would not initially prove much of an obstacle for Renshaw. The Confederate commander of Texas had elected not to seriously oppose the Union navy’s entrance into Galveston Harbor and instead to put up only token resistance when Renshaw’s force arrived and demanded the surrender of the town on October 4, 1862. As Farragut had suggested, Renshaw discovered that the ‘‘formidable-looking battery’’ at the entrance to the harbor possessed only one real gun, the remainder being merely wooden replicas, or ‘‘quakers.’’ 38 Farragut congratulated Renshaw on his relatively easy capture of Galveston, but criticized his decision to allow the Confederates to withdraw their guns under a flag of truce.39 With Renshaw’s conquest of Galveston, things appeared to be going well

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for the Union all along the Texas Gulf Coast. In addition to the actions at Corpus Christi, Sabine Pass, and Galveston, serious attacks were also made at Indianola and Lavaca.40 Farragut reported to Washington with obvious satisfaction that ‘‘I am happy to inform you that Galveston, Corpus Christi, and Sabine City and the adjacent waters are now in our possession.’’ The only thing left to do, he thought, was to garrison the places that had been captured. ‘‘All we want, as I have told the Department in my last dispatches, is a few soldiers to hold the places, and we will soon have the whole coast.’’ 41 Farragut’s bold prediction in October 1862 that he would soon completely dominate the Texas coast proved both premature and inaccurate. Within two months, his plan had begun to completely unravel. First, the Confederates managed to capture several small shore parties sent ashore at a variety of places by Union blockaders, which naturally made all of the officers in charge of blockading forces along the coast cautious and concerned about their security. Next, rumors were passed along by Union spies that huge forces were being readied at concealed locations to attack the blockaders. Frightened by these rumors, the unnerved Union commanders began to pull back in unison all along the Texas coast. At Sabine Pass, for example, Captain Quincy Hooper (who had by that time taken over for Crocker) reported that he had ‘‘received positive information that the vessels in my command are to be attacked immediately by a strong rebel force, consisting of three steamers, aided by a land force with two heavy guns.’’ 42 It is understandable that Hooper was concerned by these rumors. Only a few weeks before, a Union steamer had been attacked one night from the shore by a company of Spaight’s Battalion who fired their muskets at the dim shapes moving on deck. The Federals had retaliated by shelling the town and then landing and burning the sawmill.43 One resident near Sabine Pass was not intimidated by the Union navy’s presence. Catherine ‘‘Kate’’ Dorman operated the Catfish Hotel not far from the Confederate fort at the entrance to the Pass.When yellow fever struck the fort in the fall of 1862, Kate Dorman turned her hotel into a temporary hospital and nursed the victims of the disease with the aid of two friends. After Captain Crocker and his ships captured Fort Sabine, the navy conducted a number of missions to subdue local resistance. The hotel’s dock was a convenient base from which to launch these raids. On one of these missions, the Federals seized a horse and cart belonging to Dorman’s husband and used it to carry a howitzer. As far as Mrs. Dorman was concerned, this was the straw that broke the camel’s back. As a Houston newspaper recorded:

attacking texas * 35 Mrs. Dorman, who witnessed the act, became perfectly enraged, and being one of the bravest women in the Confederacy, gave them such a tongue-lashing as only a brave woman would dare do. She shook her fist at them, and told them she hoped our boys would kill the last one of them before they got back, and if she had 25 men, she could take them and their cannon with them. After the enemy retired to their gunboat, they gave Dorman his horse and cart again, and told him if he did not keep his damned wife’s mouth shut, they would hang him. . . . Mr. and Mrs. Dorman have a large hotel in the place, and the Yanks declare if she does not apologize to them they will burn it. She declares she will see them in the lower regions first, and they may burn it if they choose.44 Encounters like this with the local residents convinced Captain Hooper that the Rebels were preparing to attack him. To avoid being trapped, Hooper moved the schooner Rachel Seaman across the bar and out of Sabine Pass.45 All of Frederick Crocker’s work to capture the Pass had now been undone by a rumor. Even Richard Law, the officer who authorized Hooper’s move out of the Pass, recognized the strategic importance of holding the place he was in effect abandoning: I have directed the commanding officer off the Sabine to send in daily and keep a good lookout for the erection of batteries. From all I have heard the port of Sabine [City], as a point very useful to the rebels, is too much underrated by us. Within six months more than 150 tons of powder have been received at Sabine [City], and large quantities of other war stores.46 When word got back to Galveston of the rumored attack at Sabine Pass, and its subsequent abandonment, Commander Renshaw informed Admiral Farragut that he might well be forced to withdraw from Galveston also. This was the last thing that Farragut wanted to hear. The admiral angrily denounced the whole idea, calling what had happened on the Texas coast ‘‘mortifying’’ and warning that he would not abandon Texas just because rumors had been received that the enemy was making preparations to try to drive them out.47 Farragut’s warning was too little and too late. The opportunity to hold Texas had slipped from the Union’s grasp, and, within weeks of its beginning, 1863 would see the entire Texas coast back in Confederate hands.

*

chapter four

From Bar to Battle

W

e leave the Union attacks against the Texas coast to weave into

our narrative one of the major participants in the Battle of Sabine Pass. His story begins almost twenty years before the battle and almost half a world away. In 1845, a mysterious blight struck the Irish potato crop, setting in motion the Great Famine that devastated the people of the Emerald Isle. It is estimated that perhaps a million people died of hunger and disease resulting from this tragedy. Millions more managed to save their lives only by fleeing to a remote land, America, where they could hope to make a fresh start. In the fifteen-year period between 1845 and 1860, nearly two million people—a quarter of Ireland’s population—boarded ships bound for the New World. The Famine did its worst damage in the western part of Ireland, and it is for that reason that many families from that particular region chose to come to the land of opportunity.1 Ships leaving New Orleans loaded with cotton destined for the textile mills of Liverpool often returned with Irish immigrants bound for the South. This was hardly luxury sailing. The Irish refugees were treated more as cargo than passengers. One of the families that left western Ireland on this grim journey to New Orleans consisted of Pat and Bridget Dowling and their seven children. The Dowlings left their home near Tuam, County Galway, sometime after 1846.2 The eldest son in this family was Richard William ‘‘Dick’’ Dowling, who had been born in 1837.3 In New Orleans, the Irish occupied one of the lowest rungs on the socioeconomic ladder, and newly arrived families like the Dowlings would have faced crowded and difficult living conditions. It is thus understandable that some of the children, including Dick and at least one brother and sister, worked their way to Texas, coming through Galveston and eventually settling in Houston. Little is known of Dick Dowling’s early life. The first official record we have of his activities in Texas is of his marriage to Elizabeth Anne ‘‘Annie’’

from bar to battle * 37 Odlum in Houston on November 30, 1857. Annie Odlum was an excellent match for twenty-year-old Dowling. Her father was Benjamin Digby Odlum, a prominent Irish veteran of the Texas Revolution who had obtained substantial land grants because of his valiant service to the Republic. The marriage elevated Dowling’s status in the community both socially and economically, although the young man had already begun to exhibit the type of commanding character and entrepreneurial ability that would ultimately make him successful in a whole host of businesses and social endeavors.4 As photographs confirm (Figure 4), Dick Dowling was a handsome man whose boyish looks made him look even younger than his actual age. Perhaps to offset his youthful appearance, Dowling grew and cultivated a broad and flowing mustache not long after his marriage. His personal acquaintances credited him with auburn hair, blue eyes, and a fair and rosy complexion. They also said that he had a good sense of humor, was fond of practical jokes, and was never without a smile.5 While he was not overly talkative, there was just something about the young man’s kind and cheerful personality that instilled confidence. S. O. Young, who knew Dowling well, described it this way: ‘‘The Irish swore by him, of course, and his word was law for them, though they were oftener the victims of his jokes than others were. It was as good to hear him laugh at the success of one of his pranks as it was to laugh with him when the joke was played.’’ 6 His sense of humor, good looks, and winning manners made Dowling almost irresistible. One soldier who served with him during the war said, ‘‘He just won every heart and no one could fail to just love him.’’ 7 This engaging personality was indeed an asset to be cultivated, since Dowling had decided shortly before his marriage to enter the saloon business. His first venture was an establishment called ‘‘The Shades’’ because of the trees shading customers who frequented the establishment. It had a bar on the first floor and a billiard parlor on the second. The Shades appears to have been a financial success from its start, judging by the favorable news accounts and the fact that in 1859 Dowling possessed the means to install in the saloon the first gas lighting in Houston. Eventually, however, he closed the billiard parlor upstairs and used the space to host meetings for a variety of organizations, including Houston Hook and Ladder Company No. 1, of which Dowling was a charter member. He also was a private in the Houston Light Artillery, a combined military and social organization that used Dowling’s upstairs meeting room as its armory.8 It was probably here that the young saloonkeeper received his first systematic instruction in firing artillery pieces.

38 * sabine pass

figure 4 Richard W. Dowling Carte de Visite. Courtesy of Edward Clifton Wharton Family Papers, Mss. 1553, 1575, Louisiana and Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, LSU Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

The picture that comes down to us from the few tantalizing details we have about Dowling’s life just prior to the Civil War shows that he was an ambitious man of many interests and many talents. He was selected to serve on the relief committee of his fire company, which was the charitable arm of that organization. We also know that he attended a series of lectures on electro-biology and signed a testament as to the ability of the professor who taught these classes. Finally, we can verify that in 1858, Dowling

from bar to battle * 39 obtained American citizenship, something that few immigrants of his day chose to do.9 At the beginning of 1860, Dowling sold The Shades and opened a new establishment, ‘‘The Bank of Bacchus.’’ When ‘‘The Bank,’’ as it was popularly known, was destroyed by fire several months after opening, Dowling reopened it almost immediately, this time locating it across the street from the courthouse, where it soon drew a tremendous business from judges, lawyers, and litigants. His signature drink was the ‘‘Kiss Me Quick and Go,’’ an extremely popular concoction whose recipe has unfortunately not survived. Tremendously successful at the age of only twenty-three, Dowling extended his growing business empire to include an additional bathing and bar establishment in Houston and a liquor importing business in Galveston.10 When the Houston Light Artillery Company virtually disbanded in 1860, Dowling became an active member of a new military organization known as the Davis Guard (sometimes later referred to as the ‘‘Guards’’ or even the ‘‘Davies’’). Named after Mexican War hero and former Secretary of War Jefferson Davis, this company’s ranks were composed primarily of Irish dockworkers from Houston and Galveston. Most historians who have discussed Dowling’s men have referred to them generally as Irish dockworkers, and, as the preceding sentence suggests, this is for the most part an accurate description. It should be understood, however, that some of the Guards were born in America or England although they came from Irish families. It was also the case that some of these men had skills other than serving as common dock laborers. Later, for example, Dowling would protest that some of his men had been reassigned from his command by Texas officials who required their talents as carpenters, shoemakers, and even tailors.11 An old Irish proverb says that an Irishman is never at peace except when he’s fighting. That was certainly true of the Davis Guard, a wild bunch who even in peacetime fought among themselves for recreation in the absence of any tangible enemy. It took skilled and patient officers to lead such a group. Since these men formed one of Dowling’s core saloon clientele, it is perhaps not surprising that the popular proprietor of that establishment rose quickly in their ranks to become first lieutenant and treasurer of the company, which was commanded by Frederick H. Odlum, his wife’s uncle.12 With the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, Texas began to take the first steps that would lead to secession. Dowling joined in signing a petition demanding that Governor Sam Houston convene the legislature to consider taking action to leave the Union.13 And behind the scenes, action of

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a different sort was being taken by some of the state’s leading citizens. While a convention in Austin was formally considering the issue of secession, a Committee of Public Safety was authorizing an expedition to the Rio Grande to seize the Federal arsenals and supplies in that region. This expedition was placed under the command of legendary Texas Ranger John S. ‘‘RIP’’ Ford.14 Ford lost no time in going to Houston and starting to organize the force that would accompany him to South Texas. One of the first groups to volunteer for the expedition was Captain Frederick Odlum and his Davis Guard.15 Almost immediately, problems developed between the Irishmen and Colonel Ford. Three of the seven companies, including the Guards, were assigned to be transported to the Rio Grande on board the Union, a ship that had been chartered on the spot to serve as a troop transport. Captain Odlum inspected the ship and refused to allow his men on board, claiming that it was unseaworthy.16 Although Colonel Ford was angered by what he viewed as insubordination, Ebenezer B. Nichols, who made the financial arrangements for the expedition, later confided to the Committee of Public Safety that the Union was indeed such a miserable old hulk that he would not trust anything valuable on her.17 Boarding another ship, where they were also housed in relatively poor conditions, the Davis Guard proceeded with Ford down to Brazos Santiago, where they arrived on February 21, 1861. At that place, Ford was able to seize a number of guns and associated equipment and supplies from a United States storehouse. But it would be almost two weeks before the officer at nearby Fort Brown would receive orders to surrender his supplies to the Texans. Throughout this period an uneasy truce existed, during which the Texas troops fortified their position and eagerly prepared to fight their first battle. It was almost a disappointment for the Irishmen when Major Fitz John Porter finally arrived by steamer on March 3, 1861, with orders directing the Union troops to surrender their weapons and leave Texas.18 Although no hostilities developed between the Union troops at Fort Brown and Ford’s force, there was considerable discord within the Texas troops. Not surprisingly, this conflict often involved the Davis Guard. When a new set of troops arrived to reinforce Ford’s men, the quartermaster ordered Captain Odlum’s company of Irishmen to vacate their quarters and move to an inferior place of housing. Odlum objected, correctly noting that he was entitled to his existing place of housing both by virtue of seniority and prior occupation. A ‘‘hot dispute’’ then developed between Odlum and Colonel Hugh McLeod (who was in charge while Colonel Ford was temporarily away) about this situation and McLeod’s refusal to intervene. The

from bar to battle *

41

next day at dress parade an order was read disbanding the Davis Guard due to ‘‘mutinous and disorderly conduct of officers and men.’’ On his return, Colonel Ford eventually rescinded the order and reinstated the company, but the feelings of distrust between the Irishmen and the Texas military hierarchy resulting from this incident would not soon be forgotten.19 The members of the Davis Guard did not see action for quite a while after the Civil War broke out. They were not even formally accepted into the Confederate army until October 26, 1861, when they finally were designated Company ‘‘F’’ of Cook’s Heavy Artillery (sometimes known as the First Texas Heavy Artillery) Regiment. The Irishmen suspected that the delay in assigning them to a point of importance was due to their national origin and religion, and there may well have been some merit to this complaint.20 Anti-Irish sentiment was still very prevalent in Texas. The ‘‘know-nothing’’ movement that had swept the South (including Texas) in the 1850s was an antiforeign, anti-Catholic secret society. Although it had probably ceased to function as a formal organization in Texas by the time of the Civil War, the feelings that had caused its popularity still lingered, particularly in the Houston/Galveston area, where the movement had received good support.21 Whether their suspicions were justified or not, the members of the Davis Guard believed that they were the victims of discrimination. Instead of serving in an important battery, the Guards found themselves spending what seemed like endless months of pointless drilling in Houston and Galveston. Unpleasant as it seemed at the time, however, all of this drilling eventually paid off. The Davis Guard became, over time, what one newspaper correspondent eventually called the best-drilled artillery company he had ever seen, capable of handling cannons like other men might handle rifles.22 One benefit that the Guards gained during this sustained period of inactivity was constant supervision and direction by an extremely able commanding officer. Colonel Joseph J. Cook had graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1848 after being appointed from Alabama.23 Probably because of his military school background, he was a strict disciplinarian. As Arthur Fremantle, a British officer who toured the Confederacy in 1863, later observed, Cook had a reputation as both a ‘‘zealous Methodist preacher and a daring officer.’’ 24 Despite religious differences (most of the Irishmen being Catholics), the Guards respected Cook and steadily improved their artillery skills under his direction. As later events would prove, their ability to handle artillery under difficult conditions eventually rivaled that of the best units in either the Union or Confederate armies. The members of the Davis Guard were an unusual artillery company in

42 * sabine pass one respect. In most other areas of the Confederacy, artillery units were chosen from among the elite of the Southern aristocracy. Like the Guards, they were primarily men from large cities. But that is where the similarity ended. Many other artillery units were made up of men from colleges, ‘‘the better class of young men’’ as one officer proudly described his men. One such company boasted its own glee club; another held mock trials in which its members gave speeches in Latin and Greek.25 By contrast, the Davis Guard included men from among the bottom rung of Texas society. The company’s officers, men like Captain Odlum and Lieutenant Dowling, were competent and intelligent men, but the rank and file of the Guards were mostly laborers, men more likely to deliver a punch than a Latin oration. By September 1861, the Davis Guard had been assigned to occupy a battery located on a small sandbar in Galveston Bay called Pelican Spit.26 Day after day, the Guards continued drilling with their small artillery pieces as the Union blockaders made a series of threats against Galveston in the spring and summer of 1862. Finally, at the beginning of October 1862, the Union navy was ready to make its move against Galveston. As luck would have it, the Davis Guard by that time had earned the assignment of defending the very first fort that would be encountered by the Federal fleet as it steamed into Galveston Bay. It would not be the combat assignment for which they had hoped. As described in Chapter 3, on the morning of October 4, 1862, a fleet of Union gunboats under the direction of Commander William B. Renshaw appeared off Galveston and sent a message ashore demanding the surrender of the town. The Confederate commanders had decided that Galveston could not be successfully defended and elected to put up only a token fight before allowing the enemy to seize the city. Most of the guns had been moved from Galveston Island to the mainland. All of the guns on Pelican Spit were painted logs (called ‘‘quaker guns’’), and the Davis Guard, who occupied the small fort at Fort Point (Figure 5) near the entrance to Galveston Harbor, had only one ten-inch columbiad with which to confront the invaders.27 When the Union fleet began steaming into Galveston Bay, the Guards fired their lone gun across the bow of the lead ship, demanding that it cease its advance. The Federals returned fire, and a shell from an eleven-inch gun fired by the Owasco exploded directly over the Confederate fort, disabling the gun. With their position overwhelmed, Captain Odlum and the Davis Guard spiked their gun and burned their barracks as they retreated through the town in accordance with orders that had been in effect for almost a year.28 Commander Renshaw erroneously interpreted these actions as representing

from bar to battle * 43

figure 5 The Confederate Fort at Fort Point. Sketch by Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell. Courtesy of Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell Collection (Manuscript Collection No. 310, Sketch No. 46) in the Special Collections and Archives Division, Nimitz Library, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.

‘‘a panic in the fort’’ and boasted to Admiral Farragut about the apparent ‘‘ease with which this important capture has been made.’’ 29 The Guards had undergone their first hostile fire of the war and had seen up close the impressive firepower of the Union gunboats. Although they had not been successful in this encounter, it was due to no fault of their own. Being forced to flee, however, must have been extremely frustrating to the Irishmen, who were more than a little anxious to show what they were capable of doing with the artillery with which they had been so diligently drilling. Contrary to the Guards’ wishes, it was not yet time for that demonstration. The arrival of a new Confederate commander in Texas, however, would soon give them the chance to demonstrate both their bravery and their proficiency at handling artillery. Almost as an answer to the Irishmen’s prayers, Confederate Major General John Bankhead Magruder arrived in Houston in November 1862, a month after Galveston had fallen into Union hands. Born in Virginia, Magruder was a West Point graduate who had achieved a reputation as a brave and daring officer with a flair for the dramatic.30 Unlike his predecessor, who had elected to abandon Galveston without much of a fight, Magruder thought that it was imperative that the Confederates regain control of the

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Island City. Consequently, on the evening of December 31, 1862, he launched one of the most unconventional plans of the war in an attempt to recapture it. The plan called for simultaneous nighttime attacks by land and sea against the Union forces in Galveston Harbor. The land portion of the Confederate battle plan included an important role for Colonel Joseph Cook and his artillery. The plan called for Cook’s guns, almost twenty in all, to be stationed at intervals along the Galveston waterfront for a distance of about two-and-one-half miles. Working throughout the night, Dowling and the other men in Cook’s command maneuvered these guns into position and shortly before 5:00 a.m. began firing at the Union fleet in the harbor. Observers said that the Guards fired their guns ‘‘with great gallantry and coolness’’ and remarked at how ‘‘splendidly drilled and disciplined’’ they were.31 The Union gunboats returned fire, leading to an artillery duel that the Confederates began to lose as daylight approached and the Federal gunners could more easily see their targets on the shore.32 The only Union infantry present at the time of the battle was three companies from the Forty-second Massachusetts Regiment, who were barricaded at the end of a wharf. The Confederates planned to capture this position by wading far out into the water on either side of the wharf and, climbing ladders they were carrying with them, assaulting the Massachusetts troops from the rear. Colonel Cook led a force of about five hundred men, including an indeterminate number of men from the Davis Guard, in this highly unusual wading charge. The charge proved unsuccessful when the ladders turned out to be too short to reach the top of the wharf. Notwithstanding this embarrassing failure, Colonel Cook later praised all of the men who participated in this ‘‘desperate affair,’’ saying that ‘‘braver men I never desire to behold.’’ 33 As dawn was about to break, the Confederate land attack was falling apart. The wading charge had failed, and the artillerymen (including the Davis Guard) were in danger of being forced back from the waterfront by the increasingly accurate fire from the heavy guns on the Union gunboats. Just as all seemed lost, the Confederate naval force—two river steamers armored with cotton bales and equipped with a few pieces of artillery and several hundred sharpshooters—attacked the Union fleet from the rear and won the battle for the South. Thanks to these ‘‘cottonclads,’’ Galveston was once again in Confederate hands, a status that it would retain for the rest of the war. Although the Davis Guard’s part of the battle plan at Galveston had not been particularly successful, the Guards had demonstrated both their bravery and their competence at handling artillery. A newspaper correspondent later observed that ‘‘the artillery boys acted nobly and have covered them-

from bar to battle * 45 selves with glory,’’ noting proudly and with obvious surprise that ‘‘the Irish boys surpassed the expectations of their friends.’’ 34 These accolades had come at a cost. Four of the Guards had been wounded in the battle, one of whom later died from resulting complications.35 Given a period of liberty, the Guards returned to Houston to celebrate their achievements and mourn their casualties. Three days following the battle, they proceeded to ‘‘kick up a rumpus’’ on the courthouse square not far from the site of Dowling’s saloon. During the course of this public display, members of the Guards fired a number of gunshots, resulting in the fairly serious wounding of two of the men involved in the celebration.36 News of this disturbance was received poorly at Confederate headquarters in Houston. Something had to be done. Since the Guards had now suffered half as many casualties celebrating their participation in the Battle of Galveston as the company had suffered during the battle itself, the commanding general found it necessary to transfer the Guards away from Houston to a post where he hoped they could not get into as much trouble. The Guards had proven that although they were difficult to control, they were unquestionably good fighters. As we will see in Chapter 5, the scheme that General Magruder had in the planning stages would soon take advantage of both their skill and courage. The Confederates had enjoyed amazing success with their cottonclads at the Battle of Galveston. Easily constructed and readily available, these vessels were almost ideally suited for warfare on the Gulf Coast. Admiral Farragut realized that the success of these cottonclads had ensured that it was only a matter of time before they were used again. Only four days after the Confederate recapture of Galveston, he described his feeling of unease in a candid letter to one of his trusted subordinates. ‘‘There appears to be a vein of ill-luck upon us, so look out for it. They will now be emboldened by their success and try it again.’’ 37 Farragut predicted (incorrectly on this occasion) that the next attempt to ‘‘try it again’’ with cottonclads would come to the east in Mobile. As Farragut expected, the Confederates would indeed use cottonclad warships against the Union navy again, but it would be even sooner and closer than the admiral had expected. The blockade at Sabine Pass was about to be tested.

*

chapter five

Cottonclads with Cannon

hortly after the Battle of Galveston, the Davis Guard was

S

transferred to Sabine Pass to serve in an unusual military operation that was then in the planning stages. Given a brief period of liberty, the Guards resorted to one of their favorite pastimes: buying and trading supplies. One soldier from a nearby unit reported that he had bought two pairs of pants from the Guards using borrowed money. He wrote home that if he had possessed more money, and if the prices charged by the Guards were not so high, he probably could have bought enough goods from them to last several years.1 During the early stages of planning his campaign to recapture Galveston, General Magruder had encountered Captain Armand R. Wier, who was commanding an artillery company along the Sabine River. A loyal and ambitious officer, Captain Wier volunteered to take his guns on board a steamboat and use them to drive away the Union ships blockading the entrance to Sabine Pass. Magruder was impressed with Captain Wier’s bravery, but he was much more interested at that time in recapturing Galveston than in taking on the enemy at what he perceived to be a less strategic place like Sabine Pass. Never one to turn down a good idea, however, Magruder encouraged Wier to revise his plan and, in the meantime, found a place for the captain’s artillery pieces on the two cottonclad steamers that were used in the successful recapture of Galveston on New Year’s Day. The plan worked, and Magruder later acknowledged in his official report that Wier and his company ‘‘had the honor to be the first volunteers for the desperate enterprise of expelling the enemy’s fleets from our waters.’’ 2 Captain Wier unfortunately also had the honor to be among the first killed in the Battle of Galveston when his gun exploded after only a few shots. He and his company never even got to implement his plan to see the entrance to Sabine Pass cleared of Union blockaders.3 But General Magruder

cottonclads with cannon * 47 remembered the proposal and, perhaps as a tribute to Captain Wier, decided to implement it himself shortly after the Confederates had recaptured Galveston. Almost as soon as the shooting at Galveston had ceased, Magruder authorized an attack that would take place at Sabine Pass and would involve the Davis Guard. Threatening the Union blockade at the Pass was now not only convenient, but it also served another of General Magruder’s objectives. If successful, such an attack would not only keep the Union off balance, but might also prevent the enemy from concentrating his forces once again against Galveston. Magruder’s decision to attack the blockade at Sabine Pass was easy. Putting the necessary forces together to actually do it, of course, was more challenging. The first thing to do was to assemble the ships and arms. To put this force together, the general turned to Major Oscar M. Watkins of his staff. As Governor Francis Lubbock later observed, Watkins was by all accounts, although he had many other shortcomings, an ‘‘efficient staff officer.’’ 4 Within days after being assigned to the job, Watkins arrived on the Sabine River near the town of Orange and began to put together a force to attack the Union blockaders.5 On the Sabine River above Sabine Lake, Watkins took charge of two river steamers, the Uncle Ben and the Josiah H. Bell, and began equipping them for battle. The Bell, the larger of the two ships, had been a packet steamer on the Brazos River before the war.6 Built in Indiana in 1853, it was a sidewheel steamer that was 171 feet long.7 The Ben, as it was often called, was a much smaller light-draft steamer of about the same age. It was a versatile craft, which on one occasion had ascended the Sabine River as far as the upper part of East Texas.8 Watkins may have been an efficient staff officer, but he was certainly no sailor. Apparently recognizing his own limitations in that field, the major placed Charles Fowler (Figure 6), an experienced Galveston mariner, in charge of the Josiah Bell. Fowler had accompanied the major to Beaumont at the specific request of General Magruder. Magruder instinctively recognized that Captain Fowler was everything that Watkins was not. Physically tall and impressive, Fowler exuded confidence and experience. K. D. Keith later recalled that Fowler looked ‘‘every inch a Commodore.’’ 9 He was also a popular man and a good leader. After Fowler’s death in 1891, a Galveston newspaper would later observe that ‘‘few citizens have died in Galveston who were more universally respected.’’ He had developed that respect through a lifetime of service and

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figure 6 Captain Charles Fowler. From John H. Brown’s Indian Wars and Pioneers of Texas. Courtesy Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas.

hard work. Born in Connecticut in 1824, Fowler had first gone to sea at the age of fourteen. By the time he was twenty-one, Fowler had become master of his own ship, eventually relocating to Galveston in 1847.10 Fowler’s extensive experience in Texas coastal waters would prove invaluable to the expedition organized by Major Watkins at the beginning of 1863. As it became increasingly apparent that Watkins did not know his way around the deck of a ship, Fowler assumed overall command of managing both the ships in the upcoming battle. Under Fowler’s able direction, the decks of the ships were lined from their hull decks to their cabin decks with double rows of cotton bales, a strategy that had proven successful during the recapture of Galveston.11 A fireman on board the new cottonclad steamer Bell wrote home later that he felt just as safe in his ship as if he were home because ‘‘we will be forted up with cotton.’’ 12 To provide additional protection for the sharpshooters, heavy 14 × 14" timbers were fastened to the floor timbers in the hold of the ship and then extended through the boiler deck to form a breastwork. Although the transformation of these ships into cottonclads took time, at the end of the work the river steamers had been turned into what one observer proudly called ‘‘savage looking gunboats.’’ 13

cottonclads with cannon *

49

Now armored with both wood and cotton, the ships needed some offensive capability. But Watkins and Fowler had experienced difficulty scavenging any heavy guns to place on the new cottonclads. Finally, they managed to secure for the Bell an eight-inch columbiad that had been bored out to create a six-inch rifled gun. All they could find to put on the Ben, however, were two twelve-inch howitzers, which for lack of adequate hardware could not even be securely mounted on the ship. These howitzers finally were attached to the deck with such lightweight bolts that Watkins did not feel comfortable that the guns were sturdy enough even to allow the men to practice firing them before the attack.14 In the end, it really did not matter how the howitzers were mounted since Watkins couldn’t locate much ammunition for them. Terming them essentially ‘‘unserviceable,’’ Watkins later explained that these guns ‘‘were only placed in position to inspire the men with confidence in their boat.’’ 15 Placing sharpshooters on board the two cottonclads at the Battle of Galveston had worked so well that Fowler and Watkins decided to try the tactic again at Sabine Pass. From a variety of units in the Beaumont area they obtained the services of about two hundred men, who were assigned to the Josiah Bell under the command of Captain Matthew Nolan. Nolan was a former Texas Ranger who had served as sheriff of Nueces County before the war. On the smaller Uncle Ben, the Confederates were able to fit only one hundred men from Spaight’s (Eleventh) Battalion, who were placed under the command of Captain George Washington O’Brien. O’Brien was a prominent Beaumont lawyer who had been district clerk for Jefferson County before the war. Spaight’s Battalion was a mixed cavalry and infantry regiment that had been raised in the southeast by another Southeast Texas lawyer, Ashley W. Spaight. In total, there were about twelve hundred soldiers available to Nolan and O’Brien. Since only about one-fourth of these men could be accommodated on the two cottonclads as sharpshooters, the interested men were forced to draw lots for the right to serve in what one participant later described as ‘‘about as nervy a scrap as ever occurred.’’ 16 The Confederates now had assembled their ships, crews, sharpshooters, and artillery. All that remained, it seemed, was to steam down the Sabine River, cross Sabine Lake, and head out through Sabine Pass, where the attack was scheduled to be launched. It was at this point that Major Watkins discovered an unexpected logistical problem with his expedition. The Confederate engineers had done such a good job of obstructing the entrance to the lower Sabine River to prevent Union ships from coming up the river that his cottonclads could not get down the river and over the obstructions into

50 * sabine pass Sabine Lake. They were bottled up in the Sabine River and could do nothing other than wait for nature to furnish them a way out. Finally, on January 18, a strong wind from the southeast caused the tide to rise just enough that the Confederate ships could safely pass over the obstructions and enter Sabine Lake. At this point, it looked like the attack was at long last about to begin. Suddenly, out of nowhere, the strongest winter storm of the season (what Texans today call a ‘‘norther’’) hit, wetting every man on board the ships to the skin. This was more than an inconvenience. Anticipating a battle rather than a lengthy cruise, the men had not thought to bring any extra clothing. They also had brought with them very little additional food. As nature unleashed its full fury, causing water to freeze on the decks, the men were driven to huddle behind their barricades to avoid the full force of the frigid wind. Only by keeping the steam up continuously did Fowler and his men avoid the very real possibility of freezing to death.17 By the 20th of January, the storm had slacked off enough to allow preparations for the attack to continue. A small steamer came up to deliver provisions to the cottonclads, and some of the sharpshooters took that opportunity to leave the expedition because they had become violently seasick in the choppy lake.18 There was now only one more problem. The sailors who had volunteered to serve on the Confederate ships were not accustomed to the brand of military discipline practiced by Major Watkins. Being forced to live in such close proximity to each other and to the major under such severe conditions had led to disagreements and ill will. When it came time for the expedition to finally begin, many of the sailors found themselves confined to the hold of the ship as punishment for what they regarded as ‘‘imaginary offenses.’’ 19 The expedition could not continue with such a high percentage of the crew missing and unavailable for duty. But Watkins would not back down. Finally, at midnight on January 20th, Fowler took it upon his own authority to tell the confined sailors that they were free. Get a few hours of sleep, he advised them. The attack would take place the next day.20 It had taken a week to make final preparations, but on the morning of January 21, 1863, the cottonclad fleet was finally ready to make the attack for which it had been created. Unfortunately, Major Watkins, the commander who had put the expedition together, was in no shape to command it. Watkins apparently had a drinking problem that manifested itself with increasing severity as the date to launch the attack approached.When the time came to actually get under way, ‘‘Watkins was still drunk on Louisiana rum,’’ as Captain K. D. Keith noted in his memoirs.With the major unfit to command,

cottonclads with cannon * 51 none of the sharpshooters or crew was disappointed to see Captain Fowler take full control of the expedition.21 John Drummond, who as a member of the Davis Guard was no stranger to liquid refreshment, stood close to Watkins during the attack, and independently confirmed that Watkins was ‘‘so drunk he was disgusting and no order of his was obeyed.’’ 22 To explain if not justify his unfit condition, Major Watkins apparently remarked to Captain Fowler on the day of the attack that up until today he had ‘‘never smelled any gunpowder.’’ The disgusted Fowler merely replied, ‘‘I’ll give you a chance to smell some today,’’ and went about his duties. Fowler signaled to Captain William Johnson, in charge of the smaller Uncle Ben, that it was finally time to commence their attack.23 Captain Fowler anticipated that his main—and perhaps only—advantage in this fight was going to be the relative speed and maneuverability of his steam engines. As Fowler correctly suspected, his Union opponents in the coming fight would be sailing ships, whose sails provided their only means of propulsion. Knowing that his ships were heavily laden with cotton bales, guns, and men, Fowler had instructed his engineers to do everything possible to get the most speed and power they could out of their engines. A visitor to the engine room noted the full extent of these preparations: Our boats were stocked with fuel, consisting of rich pine knots, several barrels of rosin, and some bacon, so as to be able to make plenty of steam. I clearly remember going in the engine room and noticing that our engineer had the safety valve tied down with monkey wrenches and sledge hammers, so we really could not tell how much steam we had. I returned to the deck, expecting every minute to see us all go skyward.24 As the two Confederate cottonclads steamed out of Sabine Pass at daylight, with the Josiah Bell in the lead, Captain Fowler spotted two Union blockaders lying at anchor offshore. The larger of these two ships, the Morning Light, was slightly larger than the Josiah Bell and mounted eight 32pounder guns. It also boasted a small breech-loading rifled gun called a Butler gun because it had apparently been presented to the ship by Union General Benjamin Butler.25 The second blockader, a small schooner named the Velocity, was the same British ship that had been captured by Captain Crocker four months earlier trying to run the blockade.26 Like the Uncle Ben, it mounted only two brass 12-pounder howitzers.27 Even before the Confederate attack, Commodore Henry Bell had confided to Admiral Farragut that in his assessment, ‘‘the

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schooner Velocity is a miserable little craft, badly found, and scarcely able to keep [out] the sea.’’ 28 When the Union blockaders spotted the Confederate cottonclads steaming toward them at dawn, they quickly set their sails and prepared to make a run for it. But as luck would have it, the wind was light and even the slow Rebel steamers were able to keep up the chase for about twenty miles until they eventually closed to within a little over two miles from the Union ships. As the distance between them narrowed, both sides readied their guns for action. The first shots from both sides were short, and, as the wind began to pick up, it appeared that the Union ships might make good on their escape. The Confederates’ chances looked even dimmer when the rifled gun on board the Bell, which was being aimed and serviced by Dick Dowling and the Davis Guard, developed a serious problem. A shell had become lodged in the barrel of the gun (apparently called ‘‘Annie’’ by the Davis Guard after Dowling’s wife, but referred to as the ‘‘Magruder’’ in some official reports sent back to the general). This shell was stuck and it was difficult to safely fire the gun. Finally, the Bell was forced to slow up, enabling Dowling and Captain Odlum to eventually force the offending shell down into a position where the gun could be fired. By this time the Uncle Ben had caught up, and both ships steamed side by side toward the rapidly escaping blockaders as fast as they could. As if in answer to the Confederates’ prayer, the wind suddenly calmed, and the Rebel cottonclads once again used their steam engines to pull within firing range of the Union sailing ships. Given another opportunity, Dowling showed excellent marksmanship with his rifled gun, which had greater range and accuracy than all but one (the Butler rifled gun) of the eleven Union guns arrayed against him. Fortunately for the Confederates, a shell Dowling directed at the Morning Light early in the battle exploded in such a fashion that it disabled the breech of the Butler rifled gun, as well as taking off the hand of the Union gunner who was assigned to tend it. Showing his excellent skills as a gunner, Dowling made each of his shots count, repeatedly striking the rigging of the larger ship, disabling some of its guns and gun ports, and doing significant damage to the ship’s internal supports.29 As the range between the vessels narrowed to about a thousand yards, the Confederate sharpshooters eventually opened fire on the crippled Morning Light with their small arms, sweeping its deck with deadly fire. Captain John Dillingham, the Light’s Union commander, had issued pikes to his crew to enable them to repel boarders. He had also stationed his own sharpshooters up in the riggings with instructions to try to pick off the Confederate officers

cottonclads with cannon * 53 and gunners if they got the chance. But the withering fire directed at Dillingham’s vessel from the Confederate sharpshooters forced the Union crewmen on deck to take shelter below. The Union sharpshooters up in the riggings fared even worse. Exposed to the fire of the Confederate sharpshooters, they were brought crashing down to the deck ‘‘like so many squirrels out of a tree.’’ 30 As even the Confederates later conceded, Captain Dillingham on board the Morning Light did a good job of fighting with the limited resources available on his ship. Although the Confederates used their steam engines to move behind his stern, he skillfully maneuvered his own ship from side to side as the light wind permitted so that he could fire one broadside after another from the four guns on each side. His gunners, however, were not nearly as proficient as Dowling and the Davis Guard. Although the Union gunners later reported firing approximately eighty rounds of shot and shell, the Confederate ships were found afterward to have suffered very little damage from this encounter. When the pursuing Confederates eventually closed to within small arms range, the Union gunners were driven from their guns below deck by the ‘‘galling fire’’ of hundreds of sharpshooters on the cottonclads. Even then, Captain Dillingham stayed above deck, trying to direct his two rear guns at the enemy. The captain’s cabin at the back center portion of the ship posed an obstacle for firing these two guns, and Dillingham briefly considered firing through his own cabin to try and drive the enemy away. He finally decided that the angle at which the guns would need to be fired to accomplish this task would not do significant damage to the Rebel steamers and abandoned the attempt. Dillingham evaluated his options and concluded that none of them was good. The upper works of his ship had by this time been damaged severely by enemy fire. He had but a few gunners left on deck, and some of his guns were not even functional. By this time, at least one of his crewmen had been killed and nine others were seriously wounded. Reluctantly concluding that he had no other choice, Dillingham ordered his men to throw overboard all of the small arms in their possession and made preparations to surrender. While the Josiah Bell directed its fire at the Morning Light, the two equally matched smaller ships—the Uncle Ben and the Velocity—had been exchanging fire. The Uncle Ben was having difficulty holding up its end of this contest because its two small guns lacked sufficient ammunition and were so poorly mounted that they threatened to come loose after every shot. But eventually, as it became clear that the larger Union ship was essentially help-

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less, both the Federal ships struck their colors and elected to surrender. The ‘‘running fight’’ between the Union and Confederate ships had lasted in total approximately two hours, ending twenty-eight miles southwest of the entrance to Sabine Pass.31 Casualties on both sides were relatively light. In fact, the Confederates actually suffered more casualties after the battle than during it. One Confederate, Andrew McClurg, sprained an ankle when he jumped onto the deck of the Morning Light from a cotton bale on his own ship. The Confederates also suffered one fatality the night following the battle when one of the infantrymen guarding the captured Velocity fell overboard and drowned.32 Fowler and his cottonclads captured more than one hundred prisoners and returned to Sabine Pass with both of the captured Union vessels as prizes. When the fight was over, the still inebriated Major Watkins finally appeared on deck, having spent most of the fight below. There, he attempted to deliver a short speech boasting how ‘‘we’’ had gained a great victory, to the general disgust of the men around him. When Watkins drunkenly called for three cheers for General Magruder, not a man joined him. The silence was uncomfortable. One of the witnesses to this spectacle later recorded that ‘‘the Major was drunk at the time of the engagement and for some time after and would have been so longer had it not been for Captain Johnson of the Ben who threw the whisky overboard.’’ 33 It is at this point that the Confederate strategy began to fall apart. As strange as it may sound, the Confederates did not know what to do with their victory. Major Watkins had apparently been so busy drowning his sorrows that he had given little thought to what he would actually do with the Union blockaders if he succeeded in capturing them. The smaller ship, the Velocity, was easily handled by bringing it across the bar into Sabine Pass, where it was converted to use as a small Confederate transport and gunboat. The Morning Light, however, presented a different problem because of its large size and weight. As a technical matter, the ship appeared to draw too much water (fourteen feet) to cross over the sandbar that lay at the entrance to Sabine Pass. But the bar was composed of extremely soft mud, and local mariners, including the pilot of the Josiah Bell, insisted that, given sufficient time, they could with some effort eventually haul the ship over the bar with help from the two Confederate steamers that had captured it. Anxious to conclude the operation and get back to his administrative duties, however, Major Watkins decided not to even attempt to get the ship into the Pass. He flatly rejected all proposals by volunteers to help. Even Captain Odlum’s suggestion that he would go on board the Morning Light

cottonclads with cannon * 55 personally and at least make preparations to defend it for as long as possible outside of the Pass was also dismissed. Instead, Captain K. D. Keith recorded: Major Watkins waved his sword and, in a drunken, swaggering way, said, ‘‘I am in command of the expeditionary force, and will be obeyed.’’ And [he] used language unfit to write, so we left him alone with the remark that if General Magruder were so foolish as to send such a thing as that to command, the whole thing could go.34 On the next day, January 22nd, the whole thing began to ‘‘go,’’ to use Keith’s words. Acting Master J. D. Childs, in command of the U.S.S. Tennessee, arrived off of Sabine Pass and, not knowing about the events of the previous day, was surprised to see the Morning Light so close to the shore. When Childs approached and attempted to hail the vessel, the few Confederate defenders on board tried to pretend that they were Union crewmen who didn’t have a boat to send over to communicate with Childs. This subterfuge was transparent, however, since Childs could plainly see a boat hanging from the stern davits of the Morning Light.35 When Childs continued to insist on speaking to Captain Dillingham, the Rebels dropped their pretense and admitted that the ship had been captured, with Captain Dillingham now a prisoner ashore. As soon as he heard this news, Childs turned his ship westward and reported this remarkable turn of events to Union authorities off Galveston. The Tennessee’s decision to run and report may well have been a mistake. If Childs had launched an immediate attack as soon as he discovered what had happened, he almost certainly could have recaptured the Morning Light from the small Confederate occupation party that was only guarding it with minimum force while the hungover Major Watkins was deciding what to do next. When Watkins heard about the incident with the Tennessee, he apparently panicked, ordering that the Morning Light be set afire and destroyed the next time any additional Union ships even approached. Accordingly, when two Union ships arrived at Sabine Pass on the afternoon of January 23rd, the Confederates immediately set fire to the Morning Light and reluctantly abandoned their prize.36 Watkins had handled the situation so poorly that he had not even managed to retrieve any of the guns from the Morning Light. At least two of those guns were still loaded, as evidenced by the fact that they discharged shells as soon as the fire reached them.37 In the end, about all that the Confederates managed to salvage from their hard-won prize was its powder magazine,

56 * sabine pass its signal book, and some not very useful nautical supplies.38 As it turned out, however, one additional salvaged item would prove of great value in the future. Although its importance was not realized at the time it was captured, some of the large shot salvaged from the Morning Light would later be put to good use by the Confederates at Sabine Pass. A plainly disgusted Captain K. D. Keith remarked that it was demoralizing to see the expedition’s hard work squandered, particularly by orders of ‘‘a commanding officer [Major Watkins], who had never been out of sight of land, and who consequently knew nothing about a vessel, and was drunk.’’ 39 Despite his failure to make much of a positive contribution to the expedition, Watkins lost no time in taking most of the credit for its success. He enthusiastically, if not modestly, telegraphed his superiors: We met the enemy this morning in the Gulf of Mexico. We whipped them and brought everything to Sabine Pass. I fought them ten guns to our one, my officers and men behaving nobly. We have captured 2 vessels, 1 of them a full-rigged ship, and the other a schooner, 12 fine guns, medical stores, and ammunition in abundance, together with 109 prisoners.40 The version of events reported by Watkins was dutifully passed along to Richmond, and the Confederate Congress responded by passing a resolution commending Watkins and the men who served under his command in the operation that resulted in the capture and ultimately the destruction of the Morning Light.41 As news of the successful Sabine Pass expedition spread throughout Texas, it was received with relief and jubilation. The recapture of Galveston had been marvelous, but now, less than three weeks later, the Confederates had not only freed some of their territory, but had actually taken the battle to the enemy off the Texas coast. To many, this was an even more important accomplishment than the liberation of Galveston. A Swedish merchant in Houston reflected the relief felt by many Texans when he declared the capture of the Morning Light to have been ‘‘the most glorious little affair of the war.’’ 42 Although highly praised in public, Major Watkins knew that there were many people in important positions in the state who were aware that he had done a poor job of managing the expedition. In his later official report, Watkins tried to justify his failure to salvage the guns from the Morning Light, claiming that he just didn’t have any seamen to operate them and that his ar-

cottonclads with cannon * 57 tillerists didn’t have any experience firing guns on naval carriages anyway.43 Some of this rationalization may have been accurate, but it was still true that the Confederates had failed to even attempt to exploit what would turn out to be one of their most important captures of the war along the Texas Gulf Coast. As bad as this episode had turned out for the blockaders, the Union high command realized that the results of this debacle could have been much worse. Admiral Farragut condemned the defenders of the Morning Light and Velocity for surrendering their vessels too quickly, but said that in any event he was very thankful that the Confederates did not manage to save the larger ship’s guns, ‘‘as it would have enabled them to erect a battery of great strength in such a shallow pass.’’ 44 Ironically, in expressing his fears, Farragut had put his finger on exactly the strategy that the Confederates would follow later in 1863 in deploying their guns to good effect in that same ‘‘shallow pass.’’ After returning from their adventure, the Confederates who had served in what was eventually called the ‘‘Sabine Expedition’’ spent a great deal of time and effort dividing up the captured booty. William B. Duncan was eventually summoned to arbitrate disputes between men who thought they had gotten swindled out of their fair share of the captured clothing. Disgusted by this spectacle, Duncan confided to his diary that ‘‘There has been the greatest stealing carried on that was ever known.’’ 45 After dividing up the spoils, the victors paused to reflect on what they had accomplished. Although many had contributed to their success, it was clear to every participant that one man, Captain Charles Fowler, had kept the expedition together and had literally, by the sheer force of his will, steered it clear of the numerous disasters that threatened to sink it. Putting pen to paper, they signed an unusual statement thanking the captain for his valuable service: Aside from everything that you have done for us as individuals or friends, allow us to state that your urbane manners as a gentleman, your gallant and chivalrous conduct as an officer, has won and commands our esteem. Well are we aware of your untiring energy, and the mountains of obstacles that you have overcome in fitting out an expedition which caused a sloop-of-war and an armed schooner of the United States, thirty miles from land, to strike their flags to your squadron. During the action you occupied the most dangerous position on board of your own boat, regardless of your own person. You gallantly walked your post, and although exposed to the galling fire of the enemy’s bat-

58 * sabine pass teries, which belched forth flames of destruction, you never flinched a step. We certainly must appreciate the manner in which you handled your boat; for we are confident that many living today would have to be numbered with the dead had she been managed otherwise.46 This unique tribute to a man who held no formal rank in either the Confederate army or navy was signed by Dick Dowling and each of the other officers who had served on what was termed the ‘‘Sabine Expedition.’’ Only the signature of Major Watkins was conspicuously absent from this document. It was a signature that was probably never solicited and was certainly never missed. The men had in mind a very different tribute for Major Watkins. Dowling wrote a letter of censure relating to Major Watkins, but he was apparently persuaded to withdraw it by his commander. One of Dowling’s men wrote later that if it had not been for Captain Odlum, ‘‘my comrades would have thrown O. M. Watkins in the Gulf of Mexico. He was a disgrace to the whole expedition.’’ 47 With the capture of the Morning Light and Velocity, the Confederate government claimed to have lifted the blockade at Sabine Pass. Secretary of State Judah Benjamin quickly informed foreign consuls of this development and urged merchants to resume normal trade through that port. The lifting of the blockade was, of course, only a temporary matter, lasting only for the few days it took until the next Union gunboats arrived at the Pass.48 Not only did the Union ships quickly resume blockading the entrance to Sabine Pass, but Union forces (unlike the Confederates) actually made some efforts to salvage what was left of the Morning Light’s guns, chains, and anchors.49 After the blockade resumed at Sabine Pass in late January 1863, it gradually intensified as word reached Union headquarters at New Orleans that there might be as many as six steamers blockaded inside the Pass, as well as three British schooners just waiting for a chance to run the blockade.50 The navy was mortified to discover the large amount of commercial traffic that had apparently evaded its blockade during the early years of the war. Admiral Farragut could barely conceal his disgust when he informed the secretary of the navy of the intelligence he had just received: I am informed by a Mr. [G. W.] Plummer, who was the light-house keeper at Sabine Pass under the Federal Government, that these vessels have been in the habit of running the blockade from time to time, notwithstanding the fact that there were United States vessels of war cruising on the coast all the time. They availed themselves of dark nights and

cottonclads with cannon * 59 the impression that our officers appeared to have of the insignificance of the port for some time, and made many voyages to Jamaica, where they changed their nationality and obtained provisional registers. They were again loaded and ready for sea when we took possession of the [Sabine] Pass, but discharged their cargoes, which they sent up to Houston, and the vessels remained at or above Sabine City, where they still are.51 At the beginning of March, the Union blockaders off Sabine Pass reported that they were being threatened by a Rebel ‘‘ram,’’ the generic term that naval officers applied to ships, like the cottonclads, whose primary mode of attack was to strike and then board another ship. Fearing that another incident like the Morning Light’s capture might be at hand, Commodore Henry Bell ordered Lieutenant Commander Abner Read (Figure 7) and the gunboat New London to Sabine Pass to take charge of the operations at that place.52 Read was an efficient officer who had all the aggressive instincts that Admiral Farragut liked in his subordinates. In fact, the admiral would later say that ‘‘Commander Read was one of the most gallant and enterprising officers in my squadron, and the very mention of his name was a terror to the rebels.’’ 53 Read was sent to Sabine Pass to serve as a lesson to the more timid commanders along the Texas coast. True to his reputation, Read quickly made a name for himself at Sabine Pass by capturing a large number of ships attempting to run the blockade. One of these captures was the British schooner Tampico, which carried 112 bales of cotton.54 One of the reasons that Read was so successful at Sabine Pass was that he kept a careful watch on what the Confederate blockade runners were doing up the river. He did this by frequently sending observation parties by boat to the large lighthouse on the Louisiana side of the Pass near its entrance. The seventy-five-foot-tall Sabine Pass Lighthouse (Figure 8), which had been built by the United States government in 1856 (and still stands today), had an unusual series of finlike buttresses at its base to add stability to its foundation on the marshy ground. It had been designed by Danville Leadbetter, an engineer who later became a brigadier general in the Confederate army and chief engineer of Braxton Bragg’s Army of Tennessee.55 Because of its height, and the flat surrounding marsh, the lighthouse had a commanding view and made an ideal observation post. Read quickly began to make almost daily use of the lighthouse as an observation post, in effect extending his blockade. The Confederates also used the lighthouse to keep tabs on the Federals. With the onset of the war, they had ceased to operate the light at its top because it tended to illuminate blockade runners on the dark nights when they

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sabine pass

figure 7 Commander Abner Read. From David D. Porter’s Naval History of the Civil War.

most liked to operate, but the Rebels recognized its continuing value as an observation post. With both sides using the same observation post, conflicts were bound to occur, and they happened with increasing frequency in the spring of 1863. At about 4 a.m. on April 10, 1863, Commander Read sent a boat under the command of Lieutenant Benjamin Day to the lighthouse to scout the positions of the various Confederate ships in the vicinity of Sabine City. Day’s assignment was to spend the entire day surveying the site of the new Confederate fort (then in the earliest phase of construction), as well as charting the enemy’s ships and their movements. From the top of the lighthouse, Day could see the crews of the Josiah Bell and another vessel practicing with their guns. It was a quiet morning, and only sixty to seventy men were moving

cottonclads with cannon * 61 around Sabine City and the ships at its waterfront. At about 2:00 p.m., however, the Union observers were surprised to see a small enemy sloop (the Don Juan) come sailing down the Pass toward their position. The quick-thinking Lieutenant Day ordered his men into hiding behind some tall grass at the entrance to a bayou just north of the lighthouse and waited. The unsuspecting Confederates took a skiff into the shallow bayou and made their way toward the lighthouse.When they got within a few feet of shore, Lieutenant Day and his men simply stood up with their guns pointed at the skiff and demanded the immediate surrender of the four Confederates on board, which was accomplished without a shot. The startled captives included Captain Charles Fowler, who had commanded the Confederate naval attack against the Morning Light in January and who was now serving as commander of the Confederate ships in the Sabine Pass area. Fowler had been on his way to the lighthouse to observe the Union blockaders.56 A captive now, instead of an observer as he had intended, Fowler was sent north, where he was made a prisoner at Fort Warren in Boston Harbor, not far from his Connecticut home. During his captivity he learned that other members of his family, all of whom (unlike Charles) fought for the Union, had been similarly unlucky in their military experience. One of his brothers died from a wound suffered at Fredericksburg. Another was later killed in-

figure 8 Sabine Pass Lighthouse in Approximately 1887. From the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

62 * sabine pass stantly at Gettysburg. Yet a third was wounded four times at Antietam, leading to the loss of his right arm.57 The loss of Captain Fowler was a severe blow to the Confederate war effort in East Texas, where he had long served as a beacon of experience and common sense. The Union did not enjoy their surprise capture very long, however. The Confederates at Sabine Pass realized that they could not permit the Federals to continue to use the lighthouse as an observation post, a point on land through which they could effectively extend the Union blockade inland and spy on the Confederate efforts to strengthen their fortifications. Accordingly, on April 18th, only eight days after Fowler’s capture, the Confederates pounced when Commander Read personally led another observation party of about thirteen men to the lighthouse to again scout the Confederates’ position. Read thought he was safe in making the trip because he had taken a comparatively large landing party consisting of two boats and crews. As he approached the lighthouse, Read studied the shore carefully and saw nothing to alarm him. The only places that an enemy could possibly be concealed, he reasoned, were the lighthouse itself and a small keeper’s cottage nearby. The Union boats landed, and the members of the observation party started walking toward the lighthouse, planning their observation strategy as they walked. Suddenly, from behind the cottage a force of armed Confederates materialized, capturing some of the Union sailors immediately and firing on the remainder of Read’s shore party.58 The Confederates consisted of thirty men from the Twenty-first Texas Volunteer Infantry, who had been ordered to their hiding place by Lieutenant Colonel William H. Griffin.59 To the startled Union shore party, the Confederates appeared to have sixty or seventy men. A running fight ensued as the Confederates chased Read and his men back to their boats, giving a Texas yell. Both sides fired wildly as this chase took place.60 As the Union sailors were frantically attempting to push their boats out of the mud into which they had settled, the Confederates poured volley after volley into them, riddling the boats with holes and causing serious injuries to the men inside. Lieutenant Commander David A. McDermut, the captain of the Cayuga, was mortally wounded. Commander Read eventually managed to make his way back to his ship, only to discover that most of his shore party had been either killed, wounded, or captured. Read himself lost an eye in the engagement, while his pilot, James G. Taylor, was seriously wounded in the hip, scrotum, and thigh.61 Commander Read’s scouting action had been such a disaster that he was required to write a detailed report to Washington explaining its purpose.

cottonclads with cannon * 63 Read attempted to justify his actions on the basis that his real objective was to spot and then capture a light-draft river steamer with which he could have captured additional steamers and eventually supplied the army and navy with captured beef.62 Although it sounds relatively tenuous, this explanation was apparently deemed sufficient, and Read was soon assigned to other important duties in Louisiana commanding the steamer Monongahela. The setback Commander Read suffered at Sabine Pass did not in any way restrain the aggressive instincts that had made him one of Admiral Farragut’s favorite officers. Less than three months following this disaster at Sabine Pass, on July 7, 1863, Read was killed while gallantly engaging Confederate field batteries located on a levee below Donaldsonville, Louisiana. In reporting his loss, Farragut observed that Read had ‘‘perhaps done as much fighting as any man in this war.’’ Lamenting that ‘‘no navy can boast a better officer,’’ Farragut summarized his death as ‘‘a great loss both to the Navy and his country.’’ 63 Although it was not realized at the time, the ambush of Commander Read’s party at the lighthouse would have important ramifications for future military events at Sabine Pass. Never again would the Union blockaders feel comfortable about entering the Pass in order to carefully monitor Confederate movements from the commanding vantage point of the lighthouse. In effect, the Union lost both its eyes and ears at the Pass. The result of this blindness was that when it came time to invade the Pass again in the fall of 1863, the Union knew very little about the new Confederate defenses and what threat they might pose to an invading force. As we shall later see, this lack of reliable intelligence would have dramatic and tragic consequences during the Battle of Sabine Pass.

*

chapter six

Planning a Victory

e will now leave the story of Sabine Pass briefly to discuss some

W

of the men who should probably be considered the unsung heroes of the battle that would eventually take place there. In many ways, these men and their actions are the solution to something of a puzzle. As we have seen, in 1862, Sabine Pass was abandoned by a Confederate force of about thirty men who considered it indefensible. Yet, only a year later, in 1863, another Confederate force only slightly larger would achieve one of the most dramatic and lopsided victories in military history at that same Pass. How is this possible? The answer, of course, has much to do with the bravery of Dick Dowling and his Confederate defenders. But it also has much to do with some men who were not even present at the battle: the Confederate engineers who designed, built, and equipped the fort that Dowling and his men defended. This is their story. The coming of the Civil War found a wide variety of immigrants living and working on Texas shores. Many of these primarily European settlers had greater military experience than the native citizens who inhabited the Lone Star State. In fact, some of these new Texans had fled the Old World precisely because they had participated in civil wars or unsuccessful military conflicts across the Atlantic. Familiar with the maxims of Napoleon, the instructions of Frederick the Great, and the doctrines of Antoine Henri Jomini, these immigrants, many of whom were engineers, had studied the science of warfare and its practical applications under actual battlefield conditions. This experience would prove invaluable.Working behind the scenes for both North and South, these engineers had an enormous impact on the way the Civil War was fought and greatly influenced the results that the armies were able to achieve. Perhaps no place else in the war was this so dramatically demonstrated as in Texas, where two foreign-born engineers made amazing use of the available

planning a victory * 65

figure 9 Ambrotype of Valery Sulakowski. Courtesy of Southeastern Louisiana University, Center for Southeast Louisiana Studies, Hammond, Louisiana.

resources to enable the Confederates to successfully repel invasions on several occasions. Valery Sulakowski (Figure 9) had been born in Poland to a noble family. He had received his military experience during the conflict that developed when Austria rebelled in 1848 against Hungarian rule. He was apparently present at the famous siege of Sebastopol. After the Austrian rebellion proved unsuccessful, Sulakowski emigrated to the United States, where he settled in New Orleans and made a living as a civil engineer. When the war broke out in 1861, the thirty-four-year-old Sulakowski be-

66 * sabine pass came the colonel of the First Polish Regiment (eventually designated as the Fourteenth Louisiana Volunteers).1 A serious and methodical officer, he was described by one soldier as ‘‘a most exacting military commander, disciplinarian, and organizer.’’ 2 Although Sulakowski’s men recognized that he possessed many of the skills necessary to be a good officer, they found his personality to be cruel and autocratic. Relations between Sulakowski and his new regiment continued to deteriorate during the long and tedious journey by train from Louisiana to Virginia. At a stop in Grand Junction, Tennessee, the men attempted to enter a number of establishments selling liquor, which the colonel had declared off-limits. When Sulakowski’s guards tried to enforce his order, a riot broke out. After several rioters were shot, a mob chased some of the officers into a hotel and set it on fire. Although the fire was quickly extinguished, a wild melee developed when the rioters then forced their way into the hotel and destroyed what was left of the furnishings. Into this chaotic situation walked an enraged Colonel Sulakowski, who ordered the men to their quarters and emphasized his insistence on immediate obedience by shooting several men who hesitated to follow his orders. When the smoke finally cleared and the riot was subdued, seven men had been killed and nineteen others had been wounded, serious casualties for a regiment that had not yet even seen the enemy. Sulakowski ordered one of the companies disbanded and secured an order from the Confederate government forcing its officers to resign. Unfortunately, this type of behavior turned out not to be an aberration; a short time later the Fourteenth Louisiana again rioted, with one officer suffering severe wounds from a stabbing and one lady being chased by knife-carrying soldiers whom she had offended by protesting their looting of her store.3 Colonel Sulakowski and his regiment were first assigned to duty in Virginia, where they were placed under the command of General John Bankhead Magruder as part of the defensive force charged with guarding the approach to Richmond. Sulakowski wasted no time in drilling his unruly troops to a state of great precision, to the amusement of neighboring units who could not understand the colonel’s commands because of his pronounced foreign accent.4 General Magruder quickly discovered that Colonel Sulakowski was a talented engineer and put him to work designing the defenses that would protect the peninsula leading to Richmond. These defenses were extremely innovative and took full advantage of the terrain to be defended. One historian has called the fortifications that Sulakowski helped Magruder con-

planning a victory * 67 struct ‘‘some of the most formidable Confederate works of the war.’’ 5 The chief engineer for the Army of the Potomac went even further, calling them ‘‘one of the most extensive known in modern times.’’ 6 Sulakowski apparently enjoyed working for Magruder on engineering projects. He could by now even tolerate the more than occasional wild antics of his regiment.What he could not tolerate was the political nature of service in an army so close to Richmond. Passed over repeatedly for promotion to brigadier general, Sulakowski resigned his command on February 15, 1862, and headed back to the Gulf Coast. His regiment, the Fourteenth Louisiana, received the news of his departure with their customary lack of restraint. They rioted, tore apart a sutler’s establishment, and physically threatened the new colonel.7 General John Bankhead Magruder, Sulakowski’s commander, unsuccessfully urged Confederate authorities to reject the resignation, arguing that Sulakowski was ‘‘an officer of the highest merit.’’ 8 The two officers would not be separated very long, however. When Magruder was transferred to Texas to assume command in the fall of 1862, Sulakowski would rejoin Magruder and become his chief engineer. Magruder lost no time in mobilizing his new command. Within two months of his arrival in Texas he had recaptured Galveston, relying on the engineering department’s tidal calculations to choose the best day to make his attack.9 Sulakowski was not the only talented engineer to serve on Magruder’s staff. In addition to Caleb Forshey, who had helped Magruder devise his plan to recapture Galveston, Julius G. Kellersberg (Figure 10) was chosen by Magruder to serve as chief engineer of the Sub-District of East Texas. Like Sulakowski, Kellersberg was not a native American. Born Julius Getulius Kellersberger in Baden, Switzerland, in 1821, he shortened his last name to Kellersberg when he immigrated to New York in the late 1840s. Kellersberg had trained as a military engineer in Austria, where he had been superintendent of an arsenal south of Vienna. Shortly after his arrival in America, gold was discovered in California, and Kellersberg moved to San Francisco with a host of other ’49ers. While in California, he surveyed the cities of Berkeley and Santa Barbara. Across San Francisco Bay, he also helped lay out the City of Oakland, where he was elected the first city engineer.10 Kellersberg’s last great project before the war was in New York City, where, in October 1860, he was given the task of conducting an engineering study of the early construction work on Central Park. That the Swiss engineer was chosen for such a prestigious project shows the fame he had achieved in his field. Kellersberg liked what he saw in New

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figure 10 Julius G. Kellersberg. No. 68-2696. Courtesy of the University of Texas Institute of Texan Cultures at UTSA, San Antonio, Texas.

York, commenting that the park’s bridges, lakes, roads, and landscapes ‘‘do as much honor to the taste, refinement, and wealth of the metropolis, as credit to its designer and executor.’’ 11 Kellersberg returned to Galveston when the Civil War broke out and tendered his services to the Confederacy, where he was made a captain in an artillery regiment. His first assignment was to supervise construction of the initial defensive works at Galveston, a task that he completed efficiently.12 Satisfied with Galveston for the time being, Kellersberg turned his attention to Sabine Pass. The crude fort there (Fort Sabine) was almost painful for him to look at. In the summer of 1862, Kellersberg (now promoted to the rank of major) surveyed the fort and officially pronounced it inadequate to defend ‘‘a very important point, and in fact the only port from where we receive our powder and other articles.’’ As he summarized its defects:

planning a victory * 69 About 2 miles south of the town of Sabine, and on same side of the river, there is an earthwork [Fort Sabine] thrown up not sufficient to protect the four guns that are in it. The shape and figure [are] also not according to the proper defense, the ground itself about 2 feet too low, and therefore subject to occasional overflow. The location itself is a good one, and has command over vessels that can cross the bar, which has about an average depth of 6½ to 7 feet, with soft, muddy bottom. The armament consists of four guns, of which two are 32-pounders and two 18-pounders. All four are [on] old and unwieldy truck carriages. The powder magazine is not bomb-proof, and also subject to overflows. The whole work is in a dilapidated condition.13 Kellersberg’s dismal assessment was exceedingly accurate. As described in an earlier chapter, less than two months after Kellersberg’s report was written, Fort Sabine was captured easily by a Union naval force under the command of Frederick Crocker. To respond to this threat, Kellersberg was summoned back to the Sabine River, this time to prepare a series of fortifications north of Sabine Pass that would resist any attempt by the Union to go up the Sabine or Neches River above Sabine Lake. His approach was pragmatic, first sinking obstructions at the mouths of the rivers, and then building batteries near the mouth of each river, which, ‘‘if ably manned and defended, can blow anything out of the water that can cross the [sandbar at the river entrance].’’ 14 In November 1862, General John Bankhead Magruder arrived in Texas and quickly announced a plan to recapture Galveston. Kellersberg was instrumental in successfully implementing that plan, apparently assisting to push some of the heaviest guns into position himself during the night of December 31, 1862. Magruder recognized the indispensable contributions made by Sulakowski and Kellersberg, pointing both of them out for special commendation in his official reports.15 The successful conclusion of the Battle of Galveston in the Confederates’ favor did not bring any rest for the engineering staff. To the contrary, they were ordered to immediately make plans to turn Galveston into a fortified city (Figure 11), complete with iron casemates (Figure 12). Sulakowski, a very talented theoretical engineer, drew up most of these plans, which Kellersberg and other engineers on his staff then implemented. This partnership was a highly successful one. Within a few weeks, Galveston had been turned into a fortified city that so impressed Union naval observers that they did not

figure 11 Detail from ‘‘Map of Galveston, Texas Showing the Rebel Line of Works’’ (1865). From the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

planning a victory *

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figure 12 V. Sulakowski’s Plan for an Iron Casemate at Galveston. Courtesy of Jeremy Francis Gilmer Papers (Collection No. 276, Folder 8, Map 144-C), Southern Historical Collection, Wilson Library, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

dare to attack it for the remainder of the war, leaving Galveston as the last major Confederate port. A visiting British soldier termed these fortifications ‘‘ingenious’’ and ‘‘very well constructed,’’ noting that they were built mainly by slaves borrowed from plantations in the area.16 General Magruder realized the magic that his engineers had worked on the defenses of Galveston. Calling Kellersberg ‘‘an engineer of great merit,’’ the general also informed Confederate officials in Richmond that ‘‘if Galveston is saved from the enemy, as I now think it will be, the credit will be due to the services of Colonel Sulakowski.’’ 17 Shortly after completing their innovative fortifications at Galveston in the spring of 1863, Kellersberg and Sulakowski were ordered to turn their attentions to Sabine Pass. In charge of the defenses of Sabine Pass at that time was Lieutenant Colonel William H. Griffin, who was in command of the Twenty-first Texas Infantry Regiment. Griffin was an able soldier, who had attended West Point and served as state engineer for Georgia. Like Kellersberg before him, Griffin recognized as a military engineer that Fort Sabine was a disaster waiting to happen. Griffin wrote to his superiors in mid-April 1863 recommending that the Pass be fortified at a new point that he had taken the liberty to select.18 In response to Griffin’s proposal, Kellersberg

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figure 13 V. Sulakowski’s Plan for Location of New Fort (Lower Left) at Sabine Pass. From the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

was sent to the Pass and confirmed that he agreed with Griffin’s assessment. As Kellersberg had observed the year before when he formally evaluated the Confederate defensive works guarding the Pass, the existing earthwork at Fort Sabine was too low and was poorly designed. Familiar with more elaborate European designs, Kellersberg continued to insist that the shape and figure of the fort were inappropriate and dangerous.19 In addition, the existing fort was located so close to the mouth of the Pass that Union ships could bombard it fairly easily from long range, making it virtually indefensible against a serious Union attack. After a series of surveys and tests, Sulakowski and Kellersberg jointly came up with a design (Figure 13) for a new fort that would take full advantage of the terrain and give the relatively small force defending it a fighting chance against the Union gunboats they would likely encounter. The first change the engineers made (Figure 14) was to relocate the fort about a half mile farther up the river, closer to the town of Sabine City (from which it was less than 1½ miles distant). This would mean that the Union gunboats could not accurately bombard the fort from outside the mouth of the Pass

planning a victory * 73 but would instead have to enter the Pass and approach the fort up the narrow and relatively shallow channels in order to get within effective firing range. In addition to increased distance from the mouth of the Pass, the new site had other important advantages. It was on slightly higher ground and was situated at a point that overlooked the top, or northern, end of an elongated oyster shell reef located in the middle of the Pass. This large reef created a natural barrier that diverted ships coming up the Pass into either the eastern (Louisiana) channel or the western (Texas) channel. Ships coming up either of these two channels would be slowed by the relatively swift current facing

figure 14 Relocation of Fort at Sabine Pass. Based on Map from Official Records, Vol. 26.

74 * sabine pass

figure 15 V. Sulakowski’s Plan for Fort Sabine (Later Renamed Fort Griffin). From the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.

them as the water was constricted into these channels. Additionally, these channels were both shallow and narrow, making them difficult to charge through at the speed that a Farragut-style attack would typically employ. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the new fort was situated on a point of land that jutted out into the Pass. That would mean that its guns were located almost dead ahead of any ships coming up the Pass from its entrance. This feature of the fort’s location would have dramatic consequences in the battle that would shortly test its merit. With its many strategic advantages, the new fort’s location was a substantial improvement over the swampy position that the Union had so easily conquered in the fall of 1862. In addition to placing the fort in a better defensive position, the Confederate engineers also designed it according to the best European models with which they were familiar. It was basically triangular in shape, with the long side of the triangle (facing south and east) having a sawtooth edge providing an elevated platform twenty feet wide on which to place six guns overlooking

planning a victory * 75 the river (Figure 15). This type of design, in which the walls were built in the form of an indented line, was called a ‘‘crémaillére’’ front.20 All of the guns in the fort, with its open design and staggered spacing, were positioned so that they could fire at targets coming up the river and then be turned to the side (Figure 16) to continue firing at any ships that managed to reach the fort. The design of the fort, which would eventually and appropriately be named ‘‘Fort Griffin’’ after the man who had first suggested its construction site, was functional, enabling the defenders to concentrate their fire at an approaching vessel while preventing any attacker coming up the Pass from making effective use of any guns except those located in the bow or front deck area of the ship. This mismatch was an intentional consequence of the fort’s design; in essence, the fort, with its guns in a line perpendicular to the Pass, was an attempt to duplicate, on land, the classic naval maneuver of ‘‘crossing the T,’’ which had been a successful strategy in marine warfare since ancient times. Famous Confederate General Joe Johnston described in his postwar memoirs what he called the ‘‘usual error of Confederate engineering.’’ At most places, he complained, the engineers tended to build immense entrenched camps instead of building more compact forts that could be easily defended by a small garrison. In addition, he noted, the river forts were usually posi-

figure 16 Fort Griffin Field of Fire Diagram. Prepared by Edward T. Cotham, Jr.

76 * sabine pass tioned so that their guns stretched for miles along the water instead of ‘‘being so placed that their fire might be concentrated on a single vessel.’’ 21 Fort Griffin was not subject to any of these errors. In fact, the success that this fort would later enjoy suggests that Johnston’s criticisms of the usual Confederate fort were largely correct. Although Jefferson Davis and others would later refer to Fort Griffin somewhat derisively as a ‘‘mud fort,’’ it is obvious from the care with which it was designed and constructed that there was nothing crude about the new fort that Kellersberg and Sulakowski created. Indeed, Texans who were familiar with its design and construction at the time called it ‘‘a new and very strong fort.’’ 22 It had an inner core of timber and was strengthened with railroad iron (available in the area because of the railroad line that extended down toward Sabine City).23 The Confederate engineers had become adept at using this iron in designing the iron casemates they had installed at Galveston. Using the same techniques they had successfully employed in building the large-scale fortifications at Galveston, Kellersberg and his team of engineers supervised the construction of Fort Griffin, probably at the same general location originally designated by Lieutenant Colonel Griffin. As at Galveston, most of the work was done by slaves, over five hundred of whom were commandeered for the project together with their overseers. Some of these slaves apparently expressed some measure of pride after the war that they had helped construct this famous fort.24 Although Sulakowski’s original design called for a back wall, this part of the fort at Sabine Pass was left unfinished for the time being to allow for a quick getaway, if needed.25 As Union planners in New Orleans plotted their fall 1863 Texas campaign and began the process that would ultimately bring Union forces to Sabine Pass, the Confederates were also busy making their own preparations. Construction on Fort Griffin had begun in the spring, but died down shortly thereafter as other priorities intervened. The ‘‘sappers and miners,’’ as the engineers were called, had completed the basic foundation for the fort by the middle of May, but further work stalled. It would require men—lots of men—to dig and transport the vast quantities of earth and shell called for in Sulakowski’s plan. The troops in the area were not used to this kind of work, and experiments with having them labor on the fort were unsuccessful. At Galveston, the Confederate engineers had obtained the involuntary service of thousands of slaves to build the earthworks surrounding the Island City. But slaves and their overseers had been relatively easy to come by in the Galveston area.

planning a victory * 77 Some of the largest concentrations of slaves in Texas were located not far from the island at plantations in the fertile river bottom country surrounding the Brazos and Colorado Rivers. The area surrounding Sabine Pass, by contrast, was home to relatively few slaves in 1863. A map of Texas in 1860 reflects only a handful of counties in the entire eastern half of the state where the population of slaves was less than a thousand and less than 25 percent of the population. However, as the Confederate engineers soon discovered, Jefferson County and the area surrounding Sabine Pass were in this handful and had the distinction of being one of the few areas in East Texas where slaves were not relatively plentiful. Thus, it is unclear where the Confederate engineers finally obtained all of the slaves necessary to construct the fortifications at Sabine Pass. More than likely, some of the slaves were part of the gangs of railroad workers who had been used as labor since before the war in connection with construction and extension of the railroad into East Texas.26 The Sabine Pass fortifications required more manpower, however, than was available from the small railroad gangs remaining in the area. Where was this additional labor to be obtained? It was a problem that was surfacing throughout the Confederacy. The Confederate Congress had passed legislation in the spring of 1863 giving the military the power to forcibly ‘‘impress’’ slaves for military projects such as building fortifications. But in Texas, General Magruder expressed reluctance to use that power, writing to the governor of Texas in June: I take the occasion also to inform Your Excellency that Congress has passed a law authorizing military commanders to impress property, including slave labor, for the public service. Impressment, when necessary, is, therefore, the law of the land. . . . At least 1,500 slaves are necessary at this moment to work on the fortifications on the coast. I earnestly desire to be spared the painful necessity of using the power which the law of impressment gives me, and am confident that I will not have to apply it in the majority of cases; nevertheless, I will execute it with firmness when necessary, and will give credit to the patriotic for the sacrifices they have made, whilst the public interest will be protected by calling more largely upon those who have been dilatory or who have omitted entirely to contribute their quota to the public defense. A mere inspection of the map should satisfy any holder of slave property that these defenses are absolutely necessary to its security.27

78 * sabine pass Eventually, Magruder overcame his professed reluctance to impress (in effect seize) slaves and obtained the services of between three and five hundred laborers to work on the Sabine Pass fortifications. Expense records that have survived suggest that most of these slaves were transported from the Houston and Galveston areas to work on this project. This must have been extremely difficult and dangerous work. The records that have survived for similar projects in Galveston reflect a large number of fatalities among the slaves who were brought in and forced to build those fortifications.28 Despite these harsh working conditions, the slaves used at Sabine Pass were perhaps fortunate that Kellersberg and the Confederate engineers were placed in charge of overall supervision of the project. On several occasions during the war, Kellersberg complained to his superiors that his workers had insufficient food and clothing and at least attempted to requisition more for them. Such complaints were probably not motivated entirely by moral concerns. Kellersberg was concerned that the slaves’ owners would not make them available for work if they were abused. As he admitted in one letter requesting additional cornmeal rations in 1861, ‘‘They work hard & if such bad policy [underfeeding the slaves] is pursued, we won’t get any more of them.’’ 29 The fact that the work was so difficult, combined with the fact that at times relatively few slaves were available, meant that construction of the new fort at Sabine Pass tended to progress slowly, sometimes crawling to a complete stop. At one point in July, work had been suspended for so long that a local rumor suggested that the plan to build a new fort had been abandoned entirely, to be replaced with a scheme that called for Sabine Pass to be defended by cottonclad steamers alone.30 Construction on the fort eventually resumed with a new sense of urgency when spies reported to Confederate headquarters in Houston that the target of the upcoming Northern invasion was likely to be Sabine Pass. Major Kellersberg was instructed to hurry his efforts to finish Fort Griffin and mount its guns. These preparations were apparent even to the Union blockaders viewing them from outside the Pass through spyglasses. Commodore Henry Bell reported after one inspection trip that although he had sighted few enemy soldiers, he could see enough to tell that the ‘‘forts are greatly increased in their defenses’’ at Sabine Pass.31 Most of the important work constructing Fort Griffin seems to have been done in the heat and humidity of August. Nicholas H. Smith, an engineer from Louisiana who had drawn the terrible assignment of supervising on-site all of the finishing touches on the fort, headed his letters from Fort Griffin with the designation ‘‘Headquarters of the Army of Mosquitoes,’’ noting that

planning a victory * 79 these insects ‘‘are so bad here that it is almost impossible for man or horse to live.’’ Under these conditions, the tasks of driving pilings, building a palisade, and mounting the remaining guns were proving difficult, if not impossible. Smith’s job was made even harder because of the absence of materials and the scarcity of manpower in what he described as this most ‘‘accursed of all places.’’ Lamenting that Colonel Sulakowski was now forcing him to work approximately eighteen hours out of each twenty-four, Smith summarized his views succinctly: ‘‘This place is hell.’’ 32 Appealing to his supervisor and an even higher authority, Smith wrote near the end of August that ‘‘I wish to God you would relieve me of this place.’’ 33 What had caused Sulakowski to put Smith and his engineers through such a grueling schedule was that late in the summer of 1863 the Confederates in Texas received what appeared to be increasingly reliable intelligence that an attack at Sabine Pass was imminent. General Magruder had his staff issue an order only four days before the battle directing Colonel Sulakowski to ‘‘have Sabine Pass and its approaches fortified without the least delay, as it is expected that the enemy will make a demonstration at that point at an early day.’’ 34 This order, which clearly reflects an incomplete understanding of what Sulakowski’s engineers had already accomplished at Fort Griffin, came too late to have much impact on Confederate preparations. Fortunately for the Texans, the engineers had already done their jobs extremely well; Fort Griffin was well designed and its defenders were well trained. Although Fort Griffin was designed to accommodate six guns, the Confederates did not initially have that many guns to move into this battery. Kellersberg’s examination of fortifications in the area produced only two 24pounder guns and two brass howitzers. Kellersberg believed these guns were in acceptable condition, even though it was rumored they had been condemned for further use before the war by the United States Army.35 That still left the fort two guns short. Even more important, the fort lacked any heavy guns. Major Kellersberg agonized over this problem until an unusual potential solution presented itself. A local fisherman happened to mention to the major that when Fort Sabine had been abandoned in September 1862, two of its artillery pieces had been buried after being ‘‘spiked,’’ a procedure that was intended to prevent guns from being used again by breaking off a file or nail in the hole used to ignite the gunpowder. Although the guns had been disabled and buried, Kellersberg thought they might still be of some use and decided to attempt to locate them. After probing the swampy earth at the site of the old fort with long poles for about an hour, Kellersberg located some cannonballs. This convinced

80 * sabine pass him that the fisherman’s story was probably true and that the buried guns might still be there. Eventually, with further excavation, two 32-pounders were unearthed. At first examination, the condition of these guns was not very promising. Filthy and rusted, they did not look capable of being cleaned, let alone fired. One had the trunnion, or mounting pivot, chipped off. The other had a cannonball wedged in it. All Kellersberg could do was hope for the best and send them to the foundry in Galveston. When the guns reached Galveston, Colonel Sulakowski examined them and tried to discourage Major Kellersberg from undertaking any further repairs. The story of the battle at Sabine Pass might have had a very different ending if Kellersberg had listened to this advice from his ‘‘Polish chief,’’ as he referred to Sulakowski in his memoirs. But Kellersberg instead ignored Sulakowski’s advice and continued working on the guns. In fact, he appears to have responded to the challenge by increasing his efforts to rescue his excavated artillery pieces from the scrap pile. Kellersberg knew and appreciated that Sulakowski was a great theoretical engineer, but he also recognized that his superior was not a skilled mechanic. In order to prove that Sulakowski was wrong and promote his own reputation, Kellersberg refused to give up on the formerly buried cannons. As he later described his innovative repair work: The two barrels were carefully screwed off where the trunnions were. I had two strong rings, each 16 inches in circumference and five inches in diameter, molded from the best iron we had. These were carefully and precisely bored out and heated in a slow wood fire until they were a glowing red. . . . The rings were stretched, while still warm, onto the cannon barrels which had the shortest trunnions. Then I twisted a groove ½ inch deep and 1 and ½ inches wide in a barrel in front of the rings; then two rings with a larger diameter than the barrel itself were wrought in iron and were threaded so that they would fit into the groove. When this was done we cut two rings into two halves and stuck them in the threaded groove. Since the diameter of these rings was larger than that of the cannon barrel, we could place the threaded and glowing heavy wrought iron rings on them, and the whole project was accomplished in fine time.36 After clearing the wedged cannonball and the obstacles from the vent holes, Kellersberg’s repair work was complete. Sensing that time was now of the essence, he quickly began the arduous trip back to Sabine Pass to trans-

planning a victory * 81 port the guns to the recently completed fort. During the trip, the guns were painted twice to save time. Arriving at Sabine Pass, Major Kellersberg found the Davis Guard eagerly awaiting the arrival of this new part of their arsenal. While awaiting construction of Fort Griffin and the arrival of the guns, the Guards had been actively practicing their firing drills on board the Josiah Bell. An inspection of the Guards by the chief of marine artillery confirmed earlier reports that ‘‘these men are well drilled and disciplined.’’ 37 They would need to be. Already rumors had reached them that a large Union expedition was soon to be headed from New Orleans to East Texas. As the Davis Guard finished the final touches of mounting the guns Kellersberg had brought with him, the major knew that the moment of truth was probably close at hand. Would the salvaged guns actually work, or had all of Kellersberg’s work been a waste of time? To Kellersberg’s immense relief, the test firings were successful, and the Guards under the direction of their ‘‘energetic lieutenant’’ (as Kellersberg fondly referred to Dowling) quickly became accomplished at firing all of their guns. Kellersberg painted a white line down the barrel of each gun in order to assist the gunners in rapidly aiming the guns at their target. He then had white wooden stakes driven at strategic places in the channel where the enemy’s ships could be expected to face the most navigational difficulties. With practice, Dowling and his gunners became highly proficient at aiming their guns at the various markers and shifting their fire rapidly between them.38 Now that the Guards had larger guns to fire, there was still the vexing problem of ammunition. There was simply no getting around the fact that Dowling lacked sufficient shot of the proper size and weight required for his two new 32-pounders. But once again, the luck of the Irish was apparently with him. While discussing his problem with the commanding officer of the steamer Uncle Ben, Dowling made the surprising discovery that there were between one and two hundred 32-pounder solid shot sitting unused on board that ship. It turned out that these balls had been captured along with the Morning Light, but when the Confederates failed to save the guns from that ship, the balls had simply been placed in the bottom of the Uncle Ben to be used as ballast. Not only were they still there, but the captain was anxious to get rid of them. While Confederate headquarters in Houston handled the administrative chore of transferring the status of the cargo from ballast to ammunition, the young Irish lieutenant made arrangements to come get it if it was needed. It was September 1 when Dowling made this discovery. Only

82 * sabine pass a week later he would find need for all of the ammunition he could muster and more.39 Major Kellersberg left the small garrison of Irishmen at Fort Griffin, convinced that he had done his best to put them in a well-engineered fort with the strongest artillery pieces available. That did not stop him from worrying. The Swiss engineer later confessed that he had spent many a sleepless night worrying about his ‘‘patched-up cannon’’ and whether they could withstand the tremendous stress that would be put on them in any sustained and serious attack.40 The stage had now been set for the Battle of Sabine Pass; it would not take long for the main act in this drama to commence.

*

chapter seven

Texas Is the Target

s the fall of 1863 approached, Union attention was drawn once

A

again to the Gulf Coast of Texas in general and, in particular, to Sabine Pass. Since the Pass had been virtually ignored at the beginning of the war, it is perhaps surprising that it should now become a focal point of Northern attention during what would turn out to be one of the most critical periods of the entire war. In reality, however, Sabine Pass was a far more important objective than it might at first glance seem. The Pass was the intended starting point of a campaign that, if successful, would have restored Texas to the Union and might have crippled the Confederate war effort west of the Mississippi. What makes this choice of military target even more unusual is that the Union military at first had very little to do with selecting it.1 Occupying Texas was certainly not originally at the top of the U.S. Army’s list of strategic objectives. After his success in capturing Vicksburg in July 1863, General Ulysses S. Grant had lobbied for a quick strike against the important Confederate port city of Mobile, Alabama, believing (correctly) that taking Mobile, with its important shipping and rail connections, would do serious damage to the South’s war effort and could divert strength from Braxton Bragg’s Confederate army west of the Mississippi.2 For once, the army and the navy were in complete agreement; Admiral Farragut had also long favored action to seize Mobile.3 This rare display of unanimity in supporting a military objective was to go unsatisfied until 1864, however, because the occupant of the White House and his advisors had other priorities. One reason that President Lincoln felt compelled to occupy at least part of Texas was purely commercial. Since very early in the war, the governors of the New England states and important commercial firms in those states had been lobbying the Lincoln administration to seize and secure an area on the Texas Gulf Coast from which cotton could be shipped to the North to

84 * sabine pass provide the raw material that New England textile mills needed to operate. Governor John Andrew of Massachusetts had written Washington as early as November 1861, for example, urging that the Union war effort ‘‘make its next demonstration upon the coast of Texas, the State easiest to take and hold, with larger public consequences dependent upon such action than any other.’’ Andrew stressed the critical importance of making ‘‘a way out for cotton,’’ noting that the importance of this objective had ‘‘been pressed upon my notice by some of our most practical, experienced, and influential business men.’’ 4 These ‘‘influential business men’’ suffered even more commercial damage as the cotton shortage in New England continued to worsen throughout 1862. As business conditions deteriorated, lobbying efforts increased to find a solution for the problem. By late October even the New York Times had signed on to the effort, urging in a series of editorials that Texas be occupied as a means of obtaining a secure source of cotton. In the fall of 1862, the U.S. Navy occupied Galveston, and the pressure to do something in Texas abated for a brief period, but with the Confederate recapture of that port at the beginning of 1863, the New England commercial interests once again resumed their relentless pressure to gain a foothold in Texas.5 With the surrender of Vicksburg in July 1863, President Lincoln believed that his military forces headquartered in New Orleans were finally able to divert some of their resources to Texas. In essence, Lincoln succumbed to the pressure of the New England commercial interests. This is not to say that the Lincoln administration’s interest in Texas was primarily commercial. Another reason, probably the main reason, that officials in Washington were so anxious to plant the United States flag on Texas soil in late 1863 was fear that another country—France—might be attempting to beat them to it. In the summer of 1863 a French army had occupied Mexico City and installed a puppet regime under the rule of Maximilian. The French consul in Galveston had then written a provocative letter, later published in Northern newspapers, suggesting that Texas might be better off as a separate country.6 This served as a wake-up call to the Lincoln administration, which quickly became the leading proponent of establishing a strong Union presence in Texas to serve as a counterweight to potential French ambitions in and designs on Texas. As President Lincoln explained to General Grant in a letter on August 9 apologizing for his decision not to accept the general’s recommendation to attack Mobile:

texas is the target *

85

I see by a dispatch of yours that you incline quite strongly toward an expedition against Mobile. This would appear tempting to me also, were it not that, in view of recent events in Mexico, I am greatly impressed with the importance of re-establishing the national authority in Western Texas as soon as possible.7 President Lincoln’s interest in Texas may also have had an even more direct and practical political motive. If Texas were restored to the Union, a Unionist government could be reestablished there, and the newly liberated voters would presumably be interested in reelecting the man who had saved them. With a difficult election approaching in 1864, Lincoln may well have considered the liberation of Texas to be an important potential consideration insofar as it tended to lend support to his campaign to win reelection.8 Faced with such strong pressure from the Lincoln administration to plant the Union flag in Texas, General-in-Chief Henry Halleck began to consider his options. The issue of whether to invade Texas was controversial within Lincoln’s cabinet. When Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles first learned of the potential invasion of Texas, General Halleck was still debating between a potential landing at Galveston, as the President was said to favor, or an attack against Mobile, the target favored by virtually all of his military subordinates. Welles was puzzled by all the talk about invading Galveston. If the concern behind the plan was checking French aspirations in Mexico, he asked, would it not make more sense to occupy Indianola, a significant Texas port (now gone) that was farther down the Texas coast and closer to Mexico? Halleck’s confused response to Welles’s query was not reassuring. As Welles described the conversation in his diary: I then asked, if a demonstration was to be made on Texas to protect and guard our western frontier, whether Indianola was not a better point than Galveston. Halleck said he did not know,—had not thought of that. ‘‘Where,’’ said he, ‘‘is Indianola? What are its advantages?’’ I replied, in western Texas, where the people had been more loyal than in eastern Texas. It was much nearer the Rio Grande and the Mexican border, consequently was better situated to check advances from the other side of the Rio Grande. . . . Halleck was totally ignorant on these matters; knew nothing of Indianola, was hardly aware there was such a place; settled down very stolidly; would decide nothing for the present, but must wait to hear from General Banks.9

86 * sabine pass Convinced by now that the plan to attack Mobile had to be put on hold for both political and commercial reasons, Halleck finally sent a coded order directing General Nathaniel Banks (Figure 17), who commanded the Department of the Gulf from his headquarters in New Orleans, to take action to plant the flag in Texas quickly, noting vaguely that ‘‘there are reasons why the movement should be as prompt as possible.’’ 10 Banks, a political general who was most notable for having served before the war as governor of Massachusetts, understood the realities of political pressure all too well. He had also grown up in a New England town dominated by a textile mill and was very aware of the commercial realities that lay thinly veiled behind the pressure to open a ‘‘way out’’ for cotton along the Texas coast.11 Like many of the other officers on General Banks’s staff, Lieutenant Colonel Richard B. Irwin was irritated by Washington’s decision to postpone the attack against Mobile in favor of gaining what he called a ‘‘foothold in Texas.’’ As far as this officer could see, ‘‘Texas had no military value’’ when Banks was instructed to occupy some point within its boundaries. To the contrary, Irwin argued, ‘‘To have overrun the whole State would hardly have shortened the war by a single day.’’ For a variety of reasons, Irwin believed that an attack on Mobile would be a far more productive operation. ‘‘The possession of Mobile . . . would, besides its direct consequences, have exercised an important if not a vital influence upon the critical operations in the central theatre of war; would have taken from the Confederates their only remaining line of railway communications between the Atlantic seaboard and the States bordering on the Mississippi; would have weakened the well-nigh fatal concentration against Rosecrans at Chickamauga and Chattanooga; would have eased the hard task of Sherman in his progress to Atlanta; and would have given him a safe line of retreat in the event of misfortune.’’ 12 For the reasons set forth so well by Irwin, General Banks had for some time favored action against Mobile. As a former politician, however, Banks was accustomed to changing his opinions as required to suit the occasion. When ordered to do so, the general did not miss a beat turning his attention to planning a campaign in Texas. In fact, within a few weeks he had developed enthusiasm for the project and had convinced himself that ‘‘[i]ndependent of any political or diplomatic considerations, Texas presents an arena as important as any portion of the country.’’ 13 Probably because of Welles’s provocative comments about Indianola, General Halleck’s dispatch explicitly left up to Banks the choice whether to begin his Texas campaign at Galveston, Indianola, or ‘‘at any other point you may deem preferable’’ and stated that if the initial attack was to take

texas is the target * 87

figure 17 Nathaniel P. Banks. From the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

place from the sea, ‘‘Admiral Farragut will cooperate.’’ 14 In a separate dispatch sent to Banks a few days later, Halleck explained, probably unnecessarily, that his earlier order to occupy some portion of Texas was ‘‘of a diplomatic rather than of a military character, and resulted from some European complications, or, more properly speaking, was intended to prevent such complications.’’ 15

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figure 18 Map of the Texas Gulf Coast. From Confederate Military History, Vol. 15.

Since the decision to invade Texas was based primarily on nonmilitary considerations, it is perhaps appropriate that the planning of that invasion was left almost entirely to General Banks, a political appointee. Banks noted immediately that the question of exactly which point in Texas to occupy had been left entirely to his discretion. As a politician himself, Banks knew that the freedom to exercise discretion inherently carried with it the potential for second-guessing and criticism. He was very careful, therefore, in his exercise of this discretion. Looking at a map of the Texas coast (Figure 18), Banks began to carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each potential invasion route. One reason that Banks had been given discretion in choosing the place where he would begin his invasion was that there was no clear consensus in Washington about where and how the Texas campaign should proceed. President Lincoln had originally suggested occupation of a point along the lower coast of Texas, obviously concerned primarily with checking the threat of a potential French invasion from Mexico. The first order that Banks received

texas is the target *

89

from Halleck, however, had mentioned Galveston and Indianola as potential invasion routes and did not mention western Texas at all. And when Halleck then clarified his order to Banks a few days later, Halleck had changed his recommended target even more to the east, affirmatively discouraging an attack on either Galveston or Indianola and suggesting instead a movement up the Red River to invade East Texas from Louisiana.16 Left to his own choice of target, General Banks decided to ignore all these confusing hints and instead begin the Union invasion at Sabine Pass, a place that neither Lincoln nor Halleck had even mentioned. Instead of a place near the Mexican border with Texas, as Lincoln had appeared to favor, the expedition was now slated to begin in the most eastern corner of the state. Although in hindsight the choice of Sabine Pass as an initial landing site may seem odd, the general’s reasoning from a military perspective was at least on this one occasion methodical and basically sound. He first eliminated Indianola from consideration because it was too far from his command center in Louisiana and really didn’t lead anywhere of importance because of its lack of railroad connections. Similarly, General Banks eliminated any other place on the lower coast of Texas because he didn’t want to leave a large enemy force and so much distance between his invasion point and the Union command center in New Orleans. At this point in the war, it is understandable that Banks was probably even more sensitive than the average general about dividing his forces in the presence of the enemy. Stonewall Jackson had cemented his place in military history in 1862 by defeating a series of larger forces under Banks’s command in the Shenandoah Valley. Jackson’s tactic of repeatedly striking and defeating the Union forces separately, leaving them no opportunity to concentrate against his smaller army, had apparently made a deep impression on Banks. In warfare, as in politics, experience is a powerful and convincing teacher. It is thus not surprising that by 1863, General Banks was wary of any plan that involved dividing his forces over a great distance with an enemy of unknown strength and ability between them. If he needed a reminder about the problems associated with dividing his forces, Halleck advised him in a separate telegram to ‘‘Be cautious in moving on the Rio Grande. It should be your effort to get between the [Confederate] armies of Kirby Smith and Magruder. Should they unite and get between you and Grant, or between you and New Orleans, they may give you much trouble.’’ 17 This ominous hint was one that Banks could not ignore. The last thing he wanted at this point in the war was ‘‘much trouble.’’ He quickly ruled out any invasion point on the lower coast of Texas.

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figure 19 Line of Operations Proposed by Gen. Nathaniel Banks. From Official Records, Vol. 26.

Looking at the remaining candidates, Banks was sorely tempted to start his invasion at Galveston because of its good harbor and extensive railroad connections. These connections had led his counterpart, General John B. Magruder, the Confederate commander in Texas, to offer his judgment as a career soldier that ‘‘whoever is master of the railroads of Galveston and Houston is virtually master of Texas, and this is not the case with any other part of Texas.’’ 18 Banks would have agreed with this strategic assessment, but was not prepared to tackle the recapture of Galveston directly. Based upon a spy’s survey of the fortifications surrounding the City of Galveston, he had been advised that the city’s defenses were ‘‘too extensive and thorough’’ to be overcome without heavy casualties, not to mention a vast expenditure of military resources.19 Banks finally settled on a plan to take Galveston from the rear, taking advantage of the extensive railroad connections through Houston to provide both his line of advance and his initial line of supply. The route that he intended to follow in his proposed operation against Galveston started at Sabine Pass, as documented in the sketch (Figure 19) that the general obligingly provided to President Lincoln when the wisdom of his chosen invasion

texas is the target * 91 point was later questioned.20 Banks chose to make Sabine Pass the starting point for his invasion not because there was any real military importance to that position, but because he believed it could be captured ‘‘without serious resistance.’’ In the unlikely event that the Confederate position at Sabine Pass provided resistance, a possibility that Banks thought unlikely but could not rule out, a contingency plan called for a landing ten or twelve miles down the coast. In either event, the landing party was not expected to spend time at Sabine City, which was never the principal objective of the campaign. Instead, the landing force was directed to immediately march on Beaumont (or the closer town of Liberty if the fallback landing site down the coast had been chosen).21 After landing in the vicinity of Sabine City and capturing either Beaumont or Liberty, Banks planned for his invasion force to march west along the railroad to Houston, where he intended to fortify his position and establish a shorter line of supply beginning near the mouth of the Brazos River. Within ten days after landing, Banks would later argue, his plan should have resulted in the placement of twenty thousand men in Houston, where, ‘‘strongly fortified, they could have resisted the attack of any force it was possible to concentrate at that time.’’ With Houston under his control, Banks reasoned, Galveston could be attacked from the rear at his leisure. If all had fallen into place as Banks believed it would, the invasion starting at Sabine Pass would have rapidly and efficiently given the Union control of all the principal communication and transportation routes of Texas with minimal casualties. The plan really had nothing to do with Sabine Pass; it was a campaign to take Houston and Galveston and, more broadly, an attempt to seize Texas for the Union and open a western flank for the Northern war effort. Even long after it had failed, Banks was still convinced that if his plan had been properly implemented, it ‘‘would have given us ultimately the possession of the State.’’ 22

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chapter eight

Sabine Pass as a Stepping-Stone

s we are about to explore, the Texas campaign planned by General

A

Banks would prove to be an absolute disaster for the Union. But it certainly did not appear to have any tragic flaws at first. When Banks wrote the final report for his Department of the Gulf in April 1865, he still believed that his original plan to invade Texas through Sabine Pass had been a good one. By that time, the general had spent more than a year and a half sorting through the events of late 1863 and was obviously still having difficulty figuring out just exactly where his plan had gone wrong. Banks still defended his judgment that the Pass was an ideal initial landing point, noting that it was the one place in Texas nearest to his base of supplies in Louisiana and was directly connected to that base through waters that were firmly in Union hands. General Banks recognized that the success of his Texas campaign hinged upon the rapid occupation of Sabine Pass, but argued that at the time he initiated the campaign in 1863 he was fully justified in his belief that such an occupation was not only possible, but would be relatively easy. In fact, he believed that his invasion through the Pass should have been just the first of a whole series of military events that would have led inevitably to the fall of Mobile and ultimately the end of the war. If [Sabine Pass were] suddenly occupied, I regarded it certain, as the enemy’s forces were then disposed, that we could concentrate and move upon Houston by land with 15,000 to 17,000 men before it would be possible for the enemy to collect his forces for its defense. The occupation of Houston would place in our hands the control of all the railway communications of Texas; give us command of the most populous and productive part of the State; enable us to move at any moment into the interior in any direction, or to fall back upon the Island of Galveston,

sabine pass as a stepping-stone * 93 which could be maintained with a very small force, holding the enemy upon the coast of Texas, and leaving the Army of the Gulf free to move upon Mobile.1 As Banks envisioned it, the Texas invasion plan would fall into place like a row of dominoes once the landing at Sabine Pass was successfully completed. The fall of Sabine Pass would lead to the fall of the cities of Houston and Galveston, which would lead to the fall of Texas, which would lead to the fall of Mobile, which would lead ultimately to the end of the war. And of all the things in his invasion plan that could possibly have gone wrong, Banks certainly did not expect to experience any problem with the first step—the landing at Sabine Pass. Indeed, he was highly confident that he had covered all of his bases in planning this earliest part of the mission. He had consulted with the navy, which had repeatedly assured him that the fort at Sabine Pass could be easily taken and had even assigned Frederick Crocker, a capable officer who was one of Farragut’s trusted subordinates, to command the naval force that would support the army’s attack. Banks liked Crocker, viewing him as a ‘‘skillful and brave officer.’’ Moreover, Crocker had shown the good sense to express enthusiasm for the general’s plan to attack Sabine Pass, telling Banks that he was ‘‘anxious to participate in the expedition.’’ 2 Crocker, who knew the target area as well as anyone in the U.S. Navy and had recently received a briefing from supposedly reliable Texas deserters, predicted little, if any, enemy resistance.3 This must have been enormously comforting to Banks, who knew that Crocker had personally surveyed the position in question on many occasions as part of his blockading duties. Even more reassuring to Banks was the fact that Crocker had actually captured the Confederate fort at Sabine Pass only the year before with a much smaller force than he was projected to command as part of Banks’s expedition. All in all, the navy officers he consulted were ‘‘perfectly confident of their success in being able to destroy the enemy’s guns.’’ 4 As far as General Banks could tell, Sabine Pass was one of the safest and most conservative landing sites on the Texas coast he could have chosen. A movement against Sabine Pass, he confidently predicted to General Halleck, ‘‘is safely made with a comparatively small force, and without attracting the attention of the enemy until it is done.’’ 5 Banks’s confidence in his plan apparently also hinged in part on the tales told by an escaped Union prisoner, who had reported that the route through Sabine Pass was the best entrance into Texas for an invading force.6 Banks was not alone in his judgment that Sabine Pass was the ideal place

94 * sabine pass to start an invasion of Texas. Confederate Governor Francis Lubbock feared exactly this sort of move. Admitting that Sabine Pass was ‘‘the most available port for running the blockade’’ in Texas, Lubbock noted that a victory at Sabine Pass ‘‘would have served the purposes of the enemy even better than if he had first moved on Galveston and captured that city, for the reason that had a lodgment been effected at Fort Griffin, the enemy could have perfected organization and equipment and marched into the interior before we could have assembled and confronted him with an opposing force, a movement that he could not have executed from Galveston, as he could have been confined to the island until the whole strength of Texas could have been hurled against him.’’ 7 In making his plans, Banks apparently did not consult directly with Admiral Farragut, who had left for the North on leave at the beginning of August.8 Banks did, however, discuss the plan with Henry H. Bell, a capable officer whom Farragut had left to command the West Gulf Squadron in his place. Bell was highly regarded throughout the navy. A biographer later observed that ‘‘a better officer, a more gallant man, or one more beloved by all who served under him, never trod the deck of a battle ship.’’ 9 Bell was a longtime friend of Farragut’s, and the two men had much in common. Like Farragut, Bell was a Southerner by birth and had married a Southern woman. Bell also shared Farragut’s aggressive naval tactics and contempt for the power of shore fortifications. He had seen them easily destroyed in China before the war and, when the war broke out, had participated actively in Farragut’s actions against the forts at New Orleans and Port Hudson.10 With Bell’s aggressive reputation, it is not surprising that he was eager to participate in an invasion of Texas. Although we have no direct evidence that his superior, Admiral Farragut, was directly involved in planning the Sabine Pass expedition, in a tantalizing letter dated July 30, Farragut noted that he had discussed with Captain Crocker ‘‘a little project on hand for the Sachem, which I think well of,’’ and said he would inform Commodore Bell of his opinion before leaving for the North.11 Whether this project that Farragut thought well of involved Sabine Pass is uncertain—Farragut would later disavow the entire expedition—but the fact that Bell promptly assigned both Crocker and the Sachem to the Banks invasion force when the navy’s help was requested suggests that it may have been connected.12 Whatever the plan’s origin, by the end of August, only three weeks after he had received orders to mount an invasion of Texas, Banks was ready to launch it. Banks did not plan to direct the start of his expedition in person. Instead, he placed General William Buel Franklin (Figure 20) in charge of the roughly

sabine pass as a stepping-stone * 95

figure 20 William B. Franklin. From Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 2.

twenty thousand troops that were to form the core of this expedition. On paper, Franklin looked like a good choice to lead the expedition. Graduated from West Point at the top of his class in 1843 (Ulysses S. Grant was twentyfirst in the same class), Franklin had performed well in the Mexican War and held some important commands during the early stages of the Civil War. He was also a highly competent engineer, who had been given responsibility before the war for a wide variety of projects, including construction of the U.S. Capitol’s dome. The invasion at Sabine Pass would not be General Franklin’s first wartime encounter with Texans. At Eltham’s Landing in Virginia, Texas troops had defeated a force under Franklin’s command that was attempting to flank the Confederates’ position as part of a Union campaign to capture Richmond.13 By the time of the Battle of Fredericksburg, Virginia, in December 1862, Franklin had risen to command the Left Grand Division of the Army of

96 * sabine pass the Potomac. At Fredericksburg, however, the North suffered a disastrous defeat when General Ambrose Burnside ordered repeated assaults against strong Confederate defensive positions. After the debacle, Burnside blamed Franklin for the defeat, accusing him of disobeying orders and demanding his removal from the army. Instead of removing Franklin, President Lincoln relieved Burnside of his command. Although Franklin eventually avoided formal censure, the dispute with Burnside almost destroyed his career.14 He was taken off active duty for a lengthy period and was finally reassigned to the Gulf to serve under General Banks (effectively a demotion), where he assumed command of the Nineteenth Army Corps on August 20, 1863.15 Although rumors continued to swirl about Franklin and his alleged failure to follow orders, he was an experienced and competent soldier, and General Banks undoubtedly felt great comfort in having him to take charge of the vanguard of the invasion force headed for Texas. This same confidence did not extend to all of the men who had served under Franklin. One of these men, the historian for the Fifteenth Maine Regiment, would later say that General Banks ‘‘made a fatal error at the start. He placed Maj. General Franklin in command.’’ 16

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chapter nine

The Navy Makes Its Plans

nlike General Banks, Commodore Henry Bell, who was com-

U

manding the West Gulf Blockading Squadron in Admiral Farragut’s absence, had not received orders from Washington to conduct a major naval action in Texas. When he received a request from General Banks to cooperate in the invasion, however, Bell did not hesitate to lend his assistance. Bell had long regretted his own inability to recapture Galveston after the Rebels had seized it on New Year’s Day of 1863, lamenting at the time that ‘‘it is with a bitter and lasting pang of grief I give [the recapture of Galveston] up.’’ 1 In the Banks expedition, he saw the ideal vehicle for remedying the damage his reputation had suffered at Galveston. Even before the expedition had left for Sabine Pass, Bell had warned the commander of the blockade off Galveston to keep his gunboats ‘‘always ready for going into Galveston Bay, when the army is prepared for that attack.’’ 2 This time, he vowed, the navy would take Galveston and hold it. Like General Banks, Commodore Bell had no fear that the expedition would meet any serious resistance at Sabine Pass. He had assigned Crocker every one of the light-draft gunboats at his disposal, together with the best pilots available. Based on intelligence reports that the defenses ashore were quite modest, Bell went on record predicting an easy victory for Crocker and his gunboats shortly before the expedition’s departure, boldly stating that ‘‘I have no doubt the force is quite sufficient for the object.’’ 3 What was the naval force that both Bell and Crocker believed to be ‘‘quite sufficient for the object’’? It consisted of four shallow-draft gunboats: the Clifton, Sachem, Arizona, and Granite City. Each of these steamers was designed for use in shallow coastal waters. None had been designed or originally intended to be used as a gunboat. The coasts of Texas and Louisiana are naturally indented with numerous bays and estuaries, almost all of which share the characteristic of being

98 * sabine pass exceptionally shallow, particularly at their points of access to the Gulf of Mexico. At the outset of the war, the gunboats that comprised the U.S. Navy’s fleet of warships were deepwater ships, not well suited for navigating this type of shallow environment. This may or may not have been an accident. Some historians have argued that Southern representatives in Congress, aware that their waterways might be threatened in the approaching conflict, had for at least the five-year period preceding the war acted legislatively to prevent any attempt by the navy to add shallow-draft vessels to its fleet.4 To achieve Union strategic objectives in these waters, the navy planners discovered in short order that they would need to improvise. In some cases, the navy was able to convert existing ships like ferryboats into shallow-draft gunboats. In other cases, captured blockade runners were transformed into warships. Naturally, each of these classes of vessels had its own unique advantages and limitations and served with varying degrees of success along the Gulf Coast. The careers of four of these vessels that are important to the story of Sabine Pass illustrate the problems that their crews encountered, as well as the valuable service that they ultimately rendered under difficult circumstances. When the navy realized that it would need to acquire a large number of versatile, shallow-draft vessels for service in the rivers, bays, and estuaries of the South, one of the first target areas of acquisition was the fleet of ferryboats serving Northern ports. These boats could be acquired relatively cheaply, had been designed to handle heavy cargo, and were by design and necessity very maneuverable. They were not fast, however, and had difficulty handling the open ocean. As it turned out, once they had managed the long voyage to the Gulf of Mexico, vessels of this class provided outstanding service to the Union naval effort along the Gulf Coast.5 At 892 tons and 210 feet in length, the Staten Island ferryboat Clifton (Figure 21) was one of the largest ferries acquired by the navy when it was purchased in December 1861. A sidewheel steamer with a paddle wheel on either side, the Clifton was a relatively new vessel that had been built earlier in 1861.6 The first job assigned to the Clifton was serving as part of Farragut’s force in connection with the attack on the forts below New Orleans. Although Farragut on one occasion did order the Clifton to come forward and provide covering fire while his ships steamed past the forts, he did not choose to include that ship in the fleet of vessels with which he actually passed the forts.7 Following the capture of New Orleans, the Clifton next saw action when

the navy makes its plans *

99

figure 21 The U.S.S. Clifton Butting a Fire Raft. Sketch by Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell. Courtesy of Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell Collection (Manuscript Collection No. 310, Sketch No. 15) in the Special Collections and Archives Division, Nimitz Library, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.

Farragut made his passage of the guns of Vicksburg on June 28, 1862. Once again, the Clifton was used primarily in a supporting role, this time being ordered to fire its forward guns at the water batteries to take pressure off Farragut and his gunboats as they tried to run past the Confederate batteries. When the Jackson was disabled, the Clifton was ordered to steam forward and tow it out of danger. In the process of securing a line to the Jackson, however, the Clifton itself came under fire from the Confederate batteries located on the hills overlooking the river. A well-directed shot entered the ship from the front and penetrated the Clifton’s starboard boiler, causing an explosion of steam that engulfed the forward compartments, killing six men and severely scalding many others. Eight men tending the forward pivot gun were forced to jump overboard to escape the deadly steam, and one of them drowned before help could arrive.8 Although the damage to its boiler was repaired relatively quickly, this incident illustrated the Clifton’s vulnerability to fire directed at the vessel from the front, particularly to projectiles striking the ship with a downward trajectory. This was a weakness that would be exploited again with deadly consequences a year later at the Battle of Sabine Pass. Another ship that would figure prominently in the fighting at Sabine Pass was the steamer Sachem. Like the Clifton, the Sachem was not originally built for service in the U.S. Navy. Built in 1844, it was acquired by the navy at a cost of $10,000 in September 1861. The Sachem was a relatively small

100 * sabine pass ship, a little over half the length of the Clifton and employing only a single propeller for propulsion.9 It is thus not surprising that its first use during the Civil War was not as a gunboat. Instead, in March 1862, the Sachem was assigned the duty of escorting the U.S.S. Monitor from New York down to Hampton Roads, Virginia, where it would do battle with the C.S.S. Virginia in the famous first battle between ironclad warships.10 After seeing the Monitor safely to Virginia, the Sachem was assigned to the Coast Survey and steamed to the Gulf of Mexico, where it arrived in April 1862 and was quickly assigned to Farragut’s command.11 For several months, Farragut had been requesting that the Sachem and several other shallowdraft steamers be assigned to his command. Light-draft steamers like the Sachem, he reasoned, which were capable of operating in waters less than five feet deep, ‘‘would be of incalculable service to me in my contemplated operations.’’ 12 After assisting in the capture of New Orleans, the Sachem was next sent to Mobile along with other steamers in the mortar flotilla. While the evaluation of Confederate forts at the mouth of Mobile Bay was in progress, the steamer Clifton ran aground. None of the other gunboats could get into the shallow waters close enough to provide assistance, but the Sachem showed its value by charging in through a hail of fire from the Confederate fort and helping the Clifton escape. The gunners on board the Sachem also showed remarkable ability, on one occasion in the Pearl River shooting a Confederate soldier off the branch of a tree.13 The Sachem and Clifton next saw action together at the Battle of Galveston on January 1, 1863. The Sachem had arrived in Galveston only a few days before the battle. It was broken down and in terrible condition. When the Confederate cottonclads attacked on New Year’s Day, the Clifton was caught off guard and out of position. Its captain, Richard Law, eventually became commander of the Union fleet in Galveston Harbor by default when Commodore William Renshaw was killed while destroying his flagship, the Westfield, which had run aground.14 Unprepared and confused, Law elected to leave Galveston and head back to New Orleans, a decision that infuriated Admiral Farragut to such an extent that he would later subject Law to a court of inquiry. Amos Johnson, the Sachem’s commander, had been ordered to destroy his ship to keep it out of the hands of the Confederates, but had stubbornly ignored these orders and managed to save his ship. Farragut later promoted Johnson for acting with ‘‘uncommon coolness and great courage.’’ 15 Convinced that the Clifton deserved a more daring commander, Farragut replaced Law with Acting Vol-

the navy makes its plans * 101 unteer Lieutenant Frederick Crocker at the beginning of February.16 Once again, Farragut had sent the clear message to his subordinates that aggressiveness was rewarded and caution was punished. The disaster at Galveston had deprived the Union of several of its more versatile shallow-draft vessels, a loss that it could not easily afford if it wished to maintain an effective blockade of the Texas Gulf Coast. Fortunately, several ships had recently been captured attempting to run the blockade that could at least partially make up for these losses. One of these captured blockade runners was the Arizona, which was a sidewheel steamer about two hundred feet in length. Because of its speed and relatively new construction (built in Delaware in 1859), the Confederate government had originally seized this merchant ship at the outset of the war, changed its name to the Caroline, and converted it into a blockade runner operating out of Havana. After the ship was captured in October 1862, the Union changed its name back to the Arizona and equipped it as a shallow-draft gunboat.17 After being formally commissioned at Philadelphia in March 1863, the Arizona was sent to the Gulf to aid with the blockade. Admiral Farragut eagerly anticipated its arrival because it was said to draw only eight feet of water and could operate in the shallow river systems and coastal waters of Louisiana and Texas that his larger and heavier ships could not navigate. The Arizona would soon confirm Farragut’s opinion of its usefulness and versatility. In fact, it had barely entered Southern waters on its way down to the Gulf of Mexico when the Arizona succeeded in capturing a blockade runner, laden with cotton, that had escaped from Charleston.18 When the Arizona joined the West Gulf Blockading Squadron at New Orleans in April 1863, it was first assigned to a naval force led by Commander Augustus Cooke that was cooperating with Union army forces in the Atchafalaya River country southwest of Baton Rouge. Frederick Crocker and the Clifton were also part of this force. On April 20, 1863, the Arizona and Clifton cooperated in attacking Fort Burton, a Confederate fort located at Butte à la Rose, where the Atchafalaya River joins Bayou à la Rose. Captain Crocker in the Clifton and Captain Daniel Upton in the Arizona led the Union attack, with the remaining two gunboats following behind them. There was nothing subtle about the attack. As one engineer on board the Calhoun described it, ‘‘The fight was sharp, and decisive. It was done after the style of Daddy Farragut; we rush in.’’ 19 On this occasion, the Farragut-style ‘‘rush in’’ was successful, and the Confederate fort was captured with its entire garrison of about sixty men. The capture was less dramatic than participants later made it sound. It

102 * sabine pass turned out that the fort mounted only two old siege guns, one 24- and one 32-pounder. The Union gunboats suffered only light damage. Since Captain Crocker had pushed the Clifton ahead in such a ‘‘gallant and dashing manner’’ under fire, he was awarded the flag captured at Fort Burton.20 It was perhaps an omen that, out of all the ships engaged, the Clifton suffered the most damage in what one Union marine called a ‘‘short but decidedly hot contest.’’ 21 The captured blockade runners had worked out so successfully for Union authorities that plans were accelerated to purchase additional ships of this type from the prize courts. One of these new converted gunboats was the English blockade runner Granite City, which had been captured in the Bahamas on March 22, 1863. Bought by the navy out of the New York Prize Court for $55,000 the following month, it was eventually turned over to the command of Acting Master Charles W. Lamson and sent down to the West Gulf Blockading Squadron, where it reported for duty near the end of August 1863.22 As fall approached, the navy began collecting the shallow-draft gunboats that would be used in the approaching operation at Sabine Pass. Led by the Clifton and Sachem, which had by this time seen action from Alabama to the Rio Grande, the fleet would also include the Arizona and the newest arrival, the Granite City.

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chapter ten

The Expedition Departs

eneral Banks issued his formal orders to General Franklin on

G

August 31, 1863, directing him to take about five thousand men (all that could be accommodated on the available transports) and proceed to Sabine Pass to begin the invasion of Texas.1 Franklin was told to expect that the navy would precede the transports and cover the troop landings. In other words, this was intended to be an army operation for which the navy would provide minimal support. Before the expedition would actually leave the Mississippi, Franklin was instructed to meet with Commodore Bell and Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Crocker to iron out the final details of the attack at Sabine Pass. The orders that Banks issued to Franklin were deficient in a number of respects, not the least of which was that they were vague and inconsistent. On the one hand, Franklin was advised of the importance of the ‘‘immediate occupation of some important point in the State of Texas where the Government of the United States can permanently maintain its flag.’’ Recognizing that there might be some potential problem with the planned landing point, however, the orders provided in the alternative that ‘‘[a] landing, if found impracticable at the point now contemplated, should be attempted at any place in the vicinity where it may be found practicable to attain the desired result.’’ These provisions of Franklin’s orders made it sound as though he had no discretion about whether or not to land his ground forces at some point in Texas. But in seeming contradiction to this requirement, the orders also stated in the next paragraph that Franklin was to disembark his troops only ‘‘if you find that the navy has succeeded in making the landing feasible.’’ 2 The confusing and contradictory nature of these orders would cause difficulties for General Franklin and lead to controversy following the battle that was about to occur. Banks would later contend (falsely) that his orders to Franklin had really directed a landing on the coast somewhere other than Sabine Pass,

104 * sabine pass with a landing to be made at the Pass only if it could be done without opposition.3 The truth is that General Franklin was under orders first to land at Sabine Pass, with a landing to be attempted elsewhere on the coast only as a fallback plan. As instructed by his orders from Banks, Franklin proceeded to swiftly assemble his infantry force, mainly New York and Maine troops from the Nineteenth Army Corps. He also rounded up transports to ship these men to Texas. The Seventy-fifth New York Volunteer Infantry, in camp near Labadieville, Louisiana, was surprised to receive sudden orders to take a minimal level of supplies and get ready for a long march. Not knowing their destination, these troops proceeded down the Mississippi to a point opposite New Orleans, where they were equipped with tents and supplies. There, they learned for the first time that their mission was probably to be an extended invasion of Texas. As one member of the regiment recalled the reaction: ‘‘ ‘Good enough,’ so the boys all said and the next morning when orders came to embark on the transport every man was ready and we were soon steaming down the river.’’ 4 To conceal the expedition’s destination from any spies, General Banks equipped some of the ships with pilots who were known to be experienced with the waters of Mobile Bay. These pilots were unloaded, however, before the ships had gone down the river very far. As the Mobile pilots departed, rumors intensified on board the ships that the true mission of the fleet was a surprise attack at Sabine Pass, a prospect that was favorably received by the marines on board the Clifton. ‘‘If the Texans are not wide awake,’’ Henry Gusley wrote in his diary, ‘‘we, no doubt, will give them a bit of a surprise within the next forty-eight hours.’’ 5 As required by his orders, Franklin steamed down the Mississippi and rendezvoused with Crocker and Bell to make final plans. At this conference, the navy’s participation in the proposed attack expanded very broadly. What was originally supposed to be an attack by the army with which the navy was merely cooperating to provide cover, suddenly became an attack by the navy with which the army was merely assisting by providing a few sharpshooters. As Commodore Bell proudly reported to his superiors in Washington while the expedition was preparing to leave, ‘‘It was concerted with General Franklin that the squadron of four gunboats, under the command of Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Crocker, shall make the attack alone, assisted by about 180 sharpshooters from the army, divided among his vessels; and having driven the enemy from his defenses, and destroyed or driven off the rams, the transports are then to advance and land their troops.’’ 6

the expedition departs * 105 This was a critical—perhaps fatal—change in tactics, and its importance cannot be emphasized strongly enough. An attack on Sabine Pass by the army had suddenly been transformed, with little real thought to the consequences, into an attack by the navy with which the army was merely cooperating. Amazingly, this change in plan was apparently negotiated at a time when neither the army nor the navy had a clear or current picture of what awaited them at Sabine Pass. Why did this happen? The answer to this question will never be known for certain, but it probably has its origin in the naval officers’ ambitions, as well as the competition that existed throughout the war between the army and navy. Naval officers like Commodore Bell, whose typical responsibility was supervising the blockade, were eager to exercise their aggressive instincts (learned from the master of such tactics—Admiral Farragut) whenever an opportunity presented itself. And that opportunity seldom presented itself in the Gulf. As historian Rowena Reed observed, ‘‘Although the blockade was lucrative in prize money for officers and crews, it was tedious and undramatic: policing the coast is hardly the stuff of which newspaper headlines, promotions, or national heroes are made.’’ 7 Both Commodore Bell and Captain Crocker had seen how Farragut’s career and national status had been elevated by his triumphs against Confederate shore batteries on the Mississippi. The invasion of Texas, they must have reasoned, was perhaps their last chance to get a share of this glory. It was a glory that General Banks, the reluctant planner of this campaign, was all too willing and eager to share. One thing on which all of the planners of this expedition agreed was the importance of the element of surprise. Bell had stressed that ‘‘all possible secrecy is to be observed’’ and had set up elaborate procedures to prevent the Confederates from even seeing the expedition before the day of the attack.8 The attack was scheduled for dawn on September 7, 1863. On the afternoon of September 4, Bell sent the Granite City (Figure 22) to Sabine Pass with his two most experienced local pilots. Acting Master Lamson, in command of that vessel, carried instructions to the senior officer of the local blockading force warning him about the approaching expedition and ordering his cooperation in preparing for that expedition. One of the most important preparations was that the blockading force was supposed to anchor in the middle of the Pass on the evening of the 6th, showing a light so Crocker and the rest of the Union advance force could rendezvous there during the night in preparation for their attack scheduled for dawn the next morning.9 A comedy of errors prevented these elaborate preparations to preserve the surprise factor from having their intended effect. When the Granite City got

106 * sabine pass

figure 22 Detail from Sketch of the ‘‘Attack on 100 of the 13th Me. by Green’s Texas Cavalry on Matagorda Peninsula 10 Miles above Pass Cavallo, Texas. Dec. 29, 1863—Timely Arrival of the Granite City.’’ Courtesy of John Read Papers (Collection bms Am 2111, pf 52), Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

to Sabine Pass on the afternoon of the 6th, there was no Union blockader present. Commodore Bell had been so concerned about keeping the expedition a secret that he had not given the blockaders at Sabine Pass any advance warning of the expedition for fear that word might leak to the Confederates. Not knowing that anything was up, the Owasco, which was the sole Union blockader on duty, had run short of coal and had gone to the Federal fleet off Galveston to refuel in accordance with normal procedure. The Cayuga, which had been sent from Galveston to replace the Owasco on blockade duty, did not arrive back at Sabine Pass until the morning of the 7th, leaving a relatively short interval when there was no Union ship at all at the blockading station near the mouth of Sabine Pass. It was unfortunately during just that interval—less than a day—that the Granite City made its unexpected appearance.10 Seeing no Union blockader at the mouth of Sabine Pass, the officers and pilots on the Granite City began to worry and imagined that some disaster had befallen it. Some speculated that the Rebels had come out with their cottonclad ships and captured the blockaders as they had done earlier that year with the Morning Light and Velocity. Others feared that the Confederate raider Alabama might have returned, luring the Union blockader out and

the expedition departs * 107 sinking it, as it had actually done with a Union ship (the Hatteras) off Galveston in January 1863. Even now, they worried, the Alabama might be lurking offshore, waiting for an opportunity to come in and add another victim—the Granite City—to its impressive list of captures.11 As darkness approached, imaginations grew increasingly fertile. Ultimately, the crew began seeing phantoms. All it took was for the pilot to report seeing a gray-colored, ‘‘bark-rigged steamer standing to the westward,’’ and Acting Master Lamson, believing it to be the dreaded Alabama, rapidly set a course to the east, where he anchored for the night near the mouth of Calcasieu Pass.12 This left Sabine Pass on the evening of the 6th with no blockader, no Granite City, and, most importantly, no light, to mark the entrance to the Pass. Earlier that day, the advance division of the army’s landing force, under the command of Brigadier General Godfrey Weitzel, had rendezvoused with Captain Crocker and the rest of the naval force off the coast of Louisiana at Barrel-Stake Lighthouse. Dividing almost two hundred sharpshooters among his three gunboats in accordance with Commodore Bell’s plan, Crocker led this part of the expedition westward at a speed carefully calculated to delay its arrival at Sabine Pass until well into the night on September 6th, getting Crocker’s force there in plenty of time to make the surprise attack scheduled for dawn the next day. As it turned out, of course, Crocker was the one who was surprised on this evening, as there was no light and no Union ship to mark the entrance to the Pass. Crocker and his force steamed westward along the coast, moving within close range of the shore to make sure that they would be able to see the Granite City’s light marking the entrance to Sabine Pass. One account suggests that Dick Dowling and his Confederates at Fort Griffin actually saw the signals between Crocker and his ships near midnight as the Union gunboats steamed past the entrance to the Pass.13 Concerned about these unexpected signals from the Gulf, Dowling apparently said something on the order of ‘‘Men, there is something up; we had better go to work!’’ As it turned out, Dowling and the Guards stayed up all night preparing for a Union attack that would not actually occur until two days later.14 As the hours passed and no light marking the entrance to the Pass was spotted, Crocker began to worry that something had gone badly wrong. It was now 3:30 a.m., and, calculating his fleet’s speed and distance covered, Crocker determined that it must have passed its objective at the entrance to the Pass. He finally decided to turn back, fearing that in the fog and the darkness he had simply overlooked both the light and the pass it marked. As

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daylight approached, Crocker found himself off of a pass, but unfortunately it was not the right one. By sheer coincidence, the Federal fleet found itself at the mouth of Calcasieu Pass (thirty miles east of Sabine Pass), where the lookouts finally spotted the Granite City, still not displaying any light, close to the shore. Acting Master Lamson told Crocker about his encounter with the phantom steamer, and Crocker quickly and correctly dismissed these claims as the product of a ‘‘fertile imagination.’’ There was now a real problem, however. While waiting for daylight, Captain Lamson had sent a boat ashore containing his pilot, a local resident. The pilot had been sent to check with his wife to see if he could obtain any information about the Rebel cruiser he thought he had spotted. It was this ‘‘ill-advised’’ shore party that concerned Crocker the most. If the enemy obtained knowledge of Crocker’s expedition from this party, he worried, it could destroy the element of surprise he had worked so hard to achieve. To prevent this possibility, Crocker favored going as fast as possible to Sabine Pass and launching an immediate attack before word of the expedition’s arrival could spread. General Godfrey Weitzel, however, in command of the army’s advance force, preferred to wait until the next morning, giving the Union force the chance to try to attack at dawn in accordance with the original plan. Eventually, Crocker deferred to Weitzel because the army was at least still nominally responsible for this operation.15 The decision to delay the attack, hoping for the element of surprise at a later point, left one problem unresolved. Both Crocker and Weitzel had been sent as part of the advance party of the expedition. Behind them, still on their way from New Orleans, were General Franklin and the bulk of the army’s force loaded on a large number of transport vessels. To preserve the element of surprise, these ships had to be stopped and held back before they could reach Sabine Pass. To intercept Franklin’s force, Crocker now intended to spread out his vessels in a line from the shore, hoping to form a net that would catch Franklin and the troop transports before they passed his position near Calcasieu Pass. But bad fortune seemed to follow this expedition like the caboose on a train. What Crocker did not know was that two of Franklin’s troop transports had already become disabled and required repairs. Then, to make matters worse, while these repairs were being made, General Franklin and the rest of the expedition (except for a few ships that had straggled in the rear) tried to make up for lost time by splitting up and traveling farther from shore, where wind and currents were more favorable. In doing so, they unfortunately managed to steam by the end of Crocker’s line of vessels at Calcasieu

the expedition departs * 109 Pass entirely unseen, arriving at Sabine Pass at about 11:00 a.m. on Monday, September 7. Franklin arrived at the Pass in broad daylight, of course, confidently expecting to find the fort at that place already in Union hands. It was supposed to have been captured at dawn by Crocker and Weitzel. He was greatly puzzled to arrive and eventually learn from the Union blockader Cayuga that not only was the position still in enemy hands, but that Crocker and the advance party had never even arrived. Franklin waited impatiently until about 9:00 that evening, when Crocker and Weitzel finally arrived at the Pass with the gunboats, the rest of what was supposed to have been the advance party, and what to Franklin seemed a very unsatisfactory explanation for why the advance party had arrived last.16 Since the element of surprise had now evaporated, the Union fleet made no effort to hide their lights on the night of the 7th. The crewmen aboard the blockader Cayuga, accustomed to solitary blockade duty, were impressed with the large number of lighted vessels that surrounded them. One man wrote in his diary that this night ‘‘was probably the gayest night Sabine Pass ever saw. In appearance it was more like New York. Every vessel showed all the lights they could and others kept coming in.’’ 17 The troops on board the transports spent a comfortable night at the mouth of Sabine Pass. Their trip over from New Orleans had, on the whole, been a relatively easy one. Unaware of the logistical problems associated with assembling all of the ships at the right place and time, the soldiers were impressed with the pageantry of the expedition. As one New York soldier recorded: The sight was a gallant and inspiring one; twenty-three steam transports and three gun-boats stretching away in two lines over the smooth surface of the Gulf under a cloudless sky; the decks of the vessels and the rigging up to the tops crowded with soldiers, laughing and chatting, and everybody speculating good humouredly upon the events of the coming week.18 This ‘‘good humour’’ would not last very long. Events were coming together in a fashion that would bring disaster to this expedition, a disaster made all the more painful by its sudden and unexpected arrival.

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chapter eleven

Revising the Plan

n the evening of September 7th, the entire Union force finally

O

assembled off of Sabine Pass. The original plan to capture the Rebel fort near the mouth of the Pass (a surprise attack at dawn on the 7th) was now clearly in shambles. The bulk of the expedition had been in plain view of Dowling’s men in the Confederate fort since early in the day. Since a ‘‘surprise’’ attack was by this time impossible, the only question remaining was whether to give up the expedition entirely as an unfortunate failure, or whether to somehow attempt to make an attack the following day and salvage what was left of the invasion plan. Franklin and Crocker considered their respective orders that evening, and each decided independently to go ahead with an attack the next day.Their decisions are entirely understandable given the information available to them. In his original order authorizing the attack on Texas, General Banks had stressed the important political and diplomatic reasons behind this expedition, and Franklin undoubtedly did not feel comfortable abandoning it before it even started. Crocker, on the other hand, was a disciple of David Glasgow Farragut and his aggressive tactics. He had captured Sabine Pass before and certainly believed he could easily do it again this time with the larger force now available to him. This was his big chance to make a name for himself, and he was not prepared to go back to New Orleans and admit defeat without ‘‘going at it with a rush,’’ as he believed with almost religious fervor that Farragut would have wanted him to do. As it turned out, the element of surprise that the Union invaders were so concerned about was of little importance. The Union planners of the Sabine Expedition had originally been more concerned about surprising the Rebel ships, or ‘‘rams’’ as they were called, than the Confederate fort. One provision in Crocker’s orders directed him to concentrate on disabling the rams first and then turn his attentions to the fort. In fact, Crocker was authorized

revising the plan * 111 at his discretion to pass the fort entirely, much as Farragut had done at New Orleans, and to instead engage the Rebel ships first, leaving the fort to be taken by the army.1 The army was content with this assignment. One member of the Seventy-fifth New York Infantry had even observed that, as far as his unit was concerned, the loss of the element of surprise ‘‘made no difference in the matter of attacking them; we had come to take the fort and were confident of success.’’ 2 It is understandable that the navy was more concerned about the threat posed by unseen Rebel cottonclad gunboats than the Confederate fort. After all, within the past nine months, these improvised warships, crude as they might sound today, had driven the U.S. Navy out of Galveston Harbor at the Battle of Galveston, and then three weeks later had captured the Morning Light and Velocity at Sabine Pass. The Union plan to attack Sabine Pass at dawn had originated primarily as a device to catch these now-feared Confederate ships with their ‘‘steam down,’’ meaning that their steam engines were not ready to deliver full power. Catching them in this helpless condition, the Union planners hoped, would mean that the Rebel ships could not attack or even escape. Admiral Farragut himself had prayed for just such an opportunity to deal once and for all with these detested cottonclads, lamenting that there would be no end to these attacks until the navy could cause ‘‘a total destruction of some of them.’’ 3 Both Bell and Crocker saw this Sabine Pass expedition as a golden opportunity. If Crocker played his cards right, he could grant Admiral Farragut’s wish to destroy some of these Confederate ships in a dramatic way that would undoubtedly lead both to fame and another promotion. Dawn broke on September 8 to reveal almost thirty Union ships at the mouth of Sabine Pass. It was a clear and beautiful day, and the Union soldiers on board the transports awoke to a marvelous view of the marshes and estuaries flanking the sandbars at the entrance to the main channel. Although scenic, it was some of the flattest country these men had ever seen. Told by their officers that ‘‘the long sandy beach was Texas,’’ the New York soldiers on the transports looked forward to getting their feet on dry ground again. Only one minor obstacle was said to stand in their way, a small fort defended by a handful of men.4 It looked easy, but as events turned out, that ‘‘small fort’’ proved to be an obstacle they would never overcome. Even before the sun had risen, Captain Crocker and General Franklin consulted with Lieutenant Commander Dana of the Cayuga, the blockader that had arrived from Galveston, about the current state of the Confederate defenses at Sabine Pass. Dana’s information was not encouraging. It

112 * sabine pass turned out that, even apart from the comedy of errors the day before, the Union expedition was never destined to be the complete surprise its planners had originally intended. The senior blockade officer at Galveston later reported that Texas newspapers intercepted by the blockaders had been reporting for almost two months that a Union expedition was being fitted out for the purpose of invading Sabine Pass. These rumors, whether the result of good guesses or accurate espionage, had been the main reason that Major Kellersberg had been rushed from Houston to strengthen the Confederate defenses at Fort Griffin. Commander Dana and the other Union blockaders had watched the construction of the new fort from a distance and were well aware that the batteries had been ‘‘much strengthened,’’ but because the lighthouse observation post at the entrance to the Pass was in Confederate control, the blockaders could not give Crocker any details as to what had been done.5 Concerned about Dana’s report of strengthened defenses at the Confederate fort, Crocker decided to take the Clifton into the Pass soon after daylight on a reconnaissance mission. After steaming across the bar at the entrance to the Pass, he noticed immediately that the fort he had attacked and occupied the previous year was gone. Instead, as he looked up the river closer to town he observed a ‘‘very formidable earthwork, mounting six guns, some of them apparently very heavy, and a small cotton-clad steamer, but, with the exception of a very few in the battery, no troops, and no signs of any, nor of any other fortifications.’’ 6 At about 6:30 a.m., Crocker steamed within easy range of the Confederate fort, deliberately inviting its fire so that he could evaluate the precise range and accuracy of its guns. Since there was no reply to this provocation, he decided to anchor opposite the lighthouse and fire some of his longer-range guns to see if he could draw some return fire. By 7:30, the Clifton had fired twenty-six shells at Fort Griffin, most of which landed either well behind or in front of the fort. One of the first shots, however, came perilously close to a group of Dowling’s men who were cooking some beef for breakfast.7 Although the Confederates later conceded that this firing was ‘‘in excellent range’’ by the standards of the day, none of the fort’s defenders was hurt and the fort itself suffered no material damage. Once again, the Confederates did not fire a single shot, leaving a baffled Crocker no option but to retire with little more information about the capabilities of the foe he was facing than when he had begun his reconnaissance.8 Seeing no immediate threat from the Confederate fort, Crocker signaled to others in the expedition about 8:00 a.m. that it was safe to come over the

revising the plan *

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bar and enter the Pass, which they then started to do with the exception of the Cayuga and some of the larger transports that drew too much water to get over the sandbar at the entrance to the Pass. The tides and wind were not favorable to this sort of movement, and General Franklin found it very difficult to get any transport drawing over six feet of water over the bar. Two hours after this passage commenced, he had managed only to get about seven hundred men, one battery of field artillery, and eight pieces of heavy artillery inside the bar. Another seven hundred men were stranded on a transport that was hard aground on the bar. The passage that had looked so easy on paper to General Banks proved to be exceedingly difficult in practice. Indeed, it took until almost 4:00 that afternoon to get the troops in the seven transports comprising the advance force across the bar and into position to cooperate with any attack. The other transports (about fifteen in number) were still stranded outside of the bar late that afternoon when the battle eventually commenced.9 At about 11:00 a.m., while the Union troop transport movement was still in progress, the small Confederate gunboat Uncle Ben steamed down from Sabine Lake toward the fort to make its own reconnaissance. The Sachem fired a few warning shots at the Ben and the fort, all of which landed once again in back of the fort and missed their targets.10 Thus cautioned, the Uncle Ben retreated back up the river, and the army continued the painstakingly slow process of maneuvering the troop transports over the bar and into the Pass. In the distance, behind the fort, Crocker could see dense clouds of smoke rising into the air. Although this smoke actually originated from burning pine knots, the speculation on board the Union ships was that it was evidence of a whole fleet of cottonclad gunboats awaiting them in Sabine Lake.11 While Franklin and his men were working so hard to get their transports and troops over the bar, a meeting was held at about noon on board the transport Suffolk to settle the final details of the Union plan of attack. The original plan, blessed by Commodore Bell before the expedition left Louisiana, had called for Crocker’s naval force to ‘‘make the attack alone, assisted by about 180 sharpshooters from the army, divided among his vessels; and having driven the enemy from his defenses, and destroyed or driven off the rams, the transports are then to advance and land their troops.’’ 12 That plan, however, had been based on the assumption of a surprise dawn attack and a far less formidable fort than the one that now appeared to be present. It was apparent that the original plan of attack needed to be modified. Since the arms and capabilities of the Confederate fort were still a mys-

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figure 23 Godfrey Weitzel. From Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 4.

tery, it was agreed that the army would now take a more active role during the attack than originally planned. While the gunboats made their attack on the fort, the army was now supposed to land a party of about five hundred skirmishers under the command of General Godfrey Weitzel (Figure 23), who were to move forward and assist in driving the Rebel defenders out of their fortifications. Such an attack was expected to be particularly effective, since it required the fort’s defenders to choose between firing their guns at either the gunboats in the water or the land troops who would be approaching from a different direction. Although Captain Crocker probably did not realize it at the time, placing General Weitzel in charge of the army’s landing party was a terrible mistake. It was not that the twenty-eight-year-old Weitzel was unqualified. He had graduated second in the West Point class of 1855 and had then served with

revising the plan * 115 such distinction in the Engineer Corps that he was brought back to West Point as an assistant professor. He also knew fortifications as well as any man in the Union army, having supervised improvements on the forts below New Orleans for a four-year period before the war.13 Unfortunately, Weitzel’s extensive experience with building and defending forts had made him unusually reluctant to attack them, a phobia that was only reinforced by his experience during the early part of the war. His first position of responsibility had been serving as chief engineer for General Benjamin Butler during the expedition to capture New Orleans. After the navy had bombarded the Confederate forts below New Orleans for almost a week, Weitzel toured the forts—the very forts he had helped construct—and found them to be every bit as strong as before they were first fired upon.14 To Weitzel’s eyes, this proved that properly prepared fortified positions were not easily overcome, even by sustained bombardments from heavy guns. This gave rise to a reluctance to attack forts that would continue to haunt Weitzel throughout the war.15 After serving a brief period as acting mayor of occupied New Orleans, Weitzel had been promoted to the rank of brigadier general and was sent to assist General Banks. During the spring of 1863, Weitzel was placed in charge of a division of troops besieging the Confederate bastion at Port Hudson. There, he had seen the Union make a series of costly and futile assaults on fortified positions, on one occasion suffering nearly ten times as many casualties as the enemy when his men charged across open ground into a storm of Confederate shot and shell.16 Once again, Weitzel observed firsthand the cost and futility of charging a fortified position across open ground. The Sabine Pass expedition was the first major military assignment for Weitzel following the surrender of Port Hudson. It is therefore understandable that he was not eager to start this expedition by sending his forces charging across open ground at a fort of unknown defensive capabilities. Despite his reluctance to accept such a mission, he was finally persuaded. At Crocker’s urging, and with Franklin’s consent, Weitzel agreed to lead the force of infantry that would charge the Confederate fort. The only thing left was to choose the spot where Weitzel and his troops would be landed. At about 1:00 p.m., Weitzel, Franklin, and Crocker went up the river in a small boat to investigate potential landing sites.17 At first glance, none of the potential landing sites looked suitable because of the marshy ground and thick, deep mud that flanked the western bank of the Pass. Finally, the scouting party decided that the only possible landing point was just above the site of the old Confederate fort (Fort Sabine) that

116 * sabine pass Crocker had captured in 1862. At this place, sometimes called ‘‘Old Battery Point’’ in later Union reports, the bank was nearly perpendicular and the water was of sufficient depth that boats could pull close enough to the bank to land troops. Even the conditions at this landing site were far from ideal. As General Franklin later observed: In company with General Weitzel and Captain Crocker I made a reconnaissance of the Texas shore; small boats [would have] grounded in mud about 125 feet from the shore; the shore itself is a soft marsh, and parallel to it, and about 50 feet inside of it is a narrow strip of sand, on which is a road; this road strikes the water and high ground about one-half mile below the fort, at which point there is an old fort. Sailors wading sank into the mud above their knees; soldiers landed with muskets and rations would have sunk to their middles.18 By the time the commanders returned from their tour of the potential landing sites it was already mid-afternoon. Most of the day had been spent in reconnoitering and planning, not to mention the lengthy and difficult process of getting the transports over the bar and into the Pass. Time was running out. If an attack was going to be launched before dark, it would need to be started soon. Finally, just before 4:00 p.m., General Weitzel reported that he had enough troops and supplies in position to carry out his part of the plan. The landing party was loaded on the transport General Banks, the gunboats moved into position, and the commanders and their men waited anxiously for Captain Crocker to give the signal to begin the attack.

*

chapter twelve

‘‘Hold the Fort at All Hazards’’

aptain Odlum, who was in charge of the Confederate defenses sur-

C

rounding Beaumont and Sabine Pass while the colonel of the regiment was away on business, had assigned temporary responsibility for the battery at Fort Griffin to Lieutenant Dick Dowling and the Davis Guard. That he would put fewer than fifty men in such a prominent position shows the faith he had both in Dowling and his men. The orders that Odlum had received from Confederate authorities in Houston permitted him to retreat if confronted by a superior enemy force. Captain Odlum had given similar orders to Dowling, allowing him to abandon the fort and spike its guns if the enemy was about to capture it. Because of the signals that had been observed on the night of September 6, Dowling and his Davis Guard had spent most of that night preparing for an attack the next day, only to discover at dawn that there were still no enemy ships off the Pass. While Crocker and his force were getting organized at Calcasieu Pass, Dowling was explaining to his grumbling men that they had not wasted their time readying the fort in response to the strange signals they had seen the night before. He consoled them, saying, ‘‘Boys, there is surely something brewing, and let us prepare for whatever may come.’’ It was actually with some relief that they eventually witnessed the Union ships start appearing off the Pass later that morning. As the ships continued to arrive in large numbers, however, this sense of relief vanished, and the Guards began to wonder whether their extensive preparations had been extensive enough.1 When the Union invasion fleet began showing up in piecemeal fashion off Sabine Pass on September 7, and made its demonstration during the following morning, it quickly became apparent to Odlum and Dowling that a superior force of the type mentioned in their orders was threatening. Captain Odlum reported to General Magruder in a dispatch that twenty-seven enemy vessels had appeared off of the pass and correctly predicted that this

118 * sabine pass force intended to attack the fort at Sabine Pass by both land and sea. In the face of this almost overwhelming threat, Odlum remained amazingly calm, informing Confederate headquarters in Houston merely that ‘‘If possible I hope the commanding general will send troops here at once.’’ In the meantime, he announced, ‘‘I am determined to hold the pass, if possible.’’ 2 There was one serious shortcoming with Odlum’s declaration that he and his men would hold the Pass. As David Fitzgerald, one of the Davis Guard, later summed up the problem: ‘‘There was not a pound of ammunition in the fort.’’ Since the fort had only recently been constructed, most of the powder was still being stored in a small house some distance away. After Fitzgerald informed Odlum of this error, Odlum instructed a man named John Murphy, who lived at the storage place, to hitch up his wagon and deliver the ammunition to the fort as soon as possible. Murphy proceeded to ‘‘gather up his wagon’’ and follow Odlum’s instructions. As Fitzgerald recalled, this delivery took an unexpectedly long time. ‘‘When I say [Murphy] gathered up his wagon, I mean just what I say. He had taken his wagon apart in order to keep the enemy from stealing it and the different parts were scattered here and there. He [eventually assembled his wagon and] brought the ammunition.’’ 3 It is lucky that the Federals did not attack until after the powder had been shipped to Fort Griffin and placed in its storage chambers. For as it turned out, Odlum’s men would have to ‘‘hold the pass,’’ if they chose to attempt to do so, all by themselves. General Magruder did not have any meaningful reserves available to send to Sabine Pass in time to meet the enemy invasion force that was so rapidly concentrating against it. Near the end of August, Dowling had written to his commander complaining that a significant number of his men were off on detached service. Observing that regulations called for between ninety to one hundred men to service the six guns in his position, Dowling reminded his superiors that his present strength was far less than the seventy-three men that comprised the company even when all members were present. Dowling feared that his present force of fewer than fifty men would not be sufficient if ‘‘hot work’’ were required in a military engagement. In addition to Dowling’s artillery company, there was a small force of cavalry in the area, but the country around Sabine Pass was too swampy to make horses of much use.4 Recognizing that Dowling’s small garrison at Sabine Pass would in all probability be overwhelmed quickly by the coming Union expedition, General Magruder authorized Odlum to use his discretion in deciding whether or not to make a stand at Fort Griffin. It might be better, suggested Magruder, to retreat back toward Beaumont, perhaps choosing to delay the enemy by con-

‘‘hold the fort at all hazards’’ * 119

figure 24 Modern View of the Entrance to Sabine Pass from the Approximate Site of Fort Griffin. Photo by Edward T. Cotham, Jr.

testing their crossing of one or more of the bayous farther from the coast.5 Odlum notified Dowling of these orders, scrawling on the back of the copy of Magruder’s orders forwarded to Fort Griffin that he thought falling back was probably the wisest course but was leaving the ultimate decision to Dowling. ‘‘Use your own discretion about giving battle,’’ he advised.6 And so, it was left entirely up to the young lieutenant to decide whether to stay and fight, or instead to retreat as General Magruder had authorized and Captain Odlum had advised. It must have been unnerving for Dowling and the fewer than fifty members of the Davis Guard who comprised the defenders at Fort Griffin to watch the large enemy force that assembled outside the Pass all day during September 7th and then prepared to attack them most of the next day. Figure 24 illustrates what this view looks like today. When they were not watching the enemy assemble his forces, the Guards spent their spare time, as they always did, smoking their pipes, spinning yarns, or meditating alone in the shade of a few trees located near the fort.7 As he watched his men engage in their

120 * sabine pass usual pursuits around the camp, Dowling wrestled with the issue of whether to stay and fight, which might mean the sacrifice of all of these men, or to retreat and fight another day. It was a difficult decision, and Dowling finally decided that he was not comfortable making it by himself. Aware that his orders would have permitted an honorable withdrawal in the face of such a large attacking force, Dowling apparently decided to take a calculated risk and put the question to a vote. He knew that his men were an independent bunch and fought better if they felt like it was their own decision to do so. He also knew that despite the heavy odds against them, his men would not be inclined to leave the fort they had practiced so hard to defend. Dowling understood that in the back of each man’s mind was the fact that at Galveston less than a year before, they had been ordered to abandon their fort after one shot, only to find themselves fighting and dying to recapture the same spot less than three months later. As it turned out, Dowling had little reason to worry about the outcome of the vote. It wasn’t even close. The men would ultimately vote unanimously to stay.8 The Guards who occupied Fort Griffin with Dowling at this stage in the war were not the same rowdy group that had started the war in such an undisciplined fashion that their commanders had despaired of them. Though they could still hardly be called conventional in matters of military discipline, they showed a seriousness of purpose on this occasion that Dowling respected. He knew what motivated these men. One observer recalled that ‘‘they were men of mature years—very few were young—men of brawn and muscle, quiet in manner if treated right, but woe be to you if you offended one of [them]; you would hear from him in true Irish style.’’ 9 And Dick Dowling knew just the words to persuade these men that ‘‘in true Irish style’’ their honor had been offended. While Captain Crocker deployed his gunboats and prepared to attack, Dowling explained to his company that the enemy and perhaps even their own superiors believed that they were nothing but pushovers. His strategy to resist this large enemy force, he explained, was a simple one. Those who chose to stay and defend the fort were to operate under strict orders not to fire until the enemy’s ships had reached the stakes that had been placed to designate their effective firing range. Then, once the enemy moved within range, they were to fire first at the ships’ wheelhouses in order to disable them.10 He did not need to remind the Guards that there would be little opportunity to evacuate the fort once the firing started. There is unfortunately some confusion concerning the exact nature of the discussion that took place between Dowling and the Davis Guard. Sur-

‘‘hold the fort at all hazards’’ * 121 prisingly, it does not appear that Dowling had to make much of a speech to ultimately persuade the men to stay and tend their guns in the face of such heavy odds against them. If Dowling was uncertain about whether to stay or retreat, his men apparently made that decision an easy one. They quickly elected to stay and fight. There are at least four separate accounts of the way in which this decision to stay and fight was reached. Each of these will be related so that the reader may decide which one sounds the most likely. One dramatic account has the men shouting in response to Dowling’s question whether they wanted to leave: ‘‘No! We prefer to fight while there is a detachment to man the guns.’’ 11 This sounds a little stilted for a group of Irish laborers. More likely sounding is a second account that has Dowling saying simply ‘‘What do we do?’’ to which ‘‘Fight, fight’’ was the unanimous reply.12 A third account by John Drummond has the men shouting ‘‘no’’ in answer to Dowling, but in a slightly different context: Captain Odlum thought it would be best to spike the guns and fall back to the town and sent an order to that effect to Lieutenant Dowling. Upon its receipt he called upon me to get the men in line, which I did. He then read the order which Captain Odlum had given. Murmuring arose among the men, and ‘‘No, no’’ passed along the line. The remark was heard: ‘‘We will stay by the fort until she goes down; and if she goes down, we will go with her.’’ This seemed to have puzzled Dowling as to what he should do, but he never spoke one word. He pulled his memorandum book from his pocket and wrote to Captain Odlum as follows: ‘‘The men are refusing to leave the fort. What shall I do?’’ He turned to me, being the youngest in the squad, saying: ‘‘Will you deliver that to Captain Odlum?’’ I took the note and started on the run back to town, delivered it, and received his reply, as follows: ‘‘Hold the fort at all hazards.’’ 13 Drummond’s account, which sounds plausible, concludes with his return to the fort carrying Captain Odlum’s stirring reply not too long before the Union attack began. When Odlum’s order to ‘‘Hold the fort at all hazards’’ was read to the men, he remembered, it was greeted with loud cheers. The final account, which is the version that the author finds most appealing and in keeping with the spirit and character of the Guards, was provided after the war by Jack White. White, later a city marshal in Houston, recalled

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that as they anxiously watched the Federal fleet assemble on the day of the battle, Dowling gathered his men together and delivered the first and only speech that White ever heard him give: He said, ‘‘Men, you all know that Captain Odlum is in the hospital [in Sabine City] and that I am acting in his place. The Yankees are going to attack us and while I am personally in favor of sticking here and giving them a hot reception, I don’t feel like taking the responsibility of having you all killed or captured, so leave what we shall do to you.’’ At this point one of the men called out, ‘‘Oh hell, Lieutenant, I’d rather fight than walk in the hot sun to Sabine City,’’ and the boys all cheered. So Dowling said: ‘‘That settles it. We’ll fight,’’ and ordered us to man the guns.14 Although we do not know the actual content of any arguments that Dowling may have made to motivate his men to stay and fight, it is likely that part of their motivation originated in the revolution that had led to Texas independence. Dowling’s father-in-law (Benjamin Odlum) had served in the Texas army, and Dowling and his men were undoubtedly familiar with the details of that relatively recent conflict. Dowling hardly needed to remind his men of the large number of Irishmen who had fought and died at the Alamo less than thirty years before.15 He did not need to go to the trouble of lining his men up and drawing a line in the earth as William Barrett Travis is sometimes said to have done before asking for a personal commitment from each of the Alamo’s defenders. As each man at Sabine Pass that day contemplated that famous mission in San Antonio, and the fate that had befallen its defenders, it probably occurred to some of Dowling’s men that in terms of sheer numbers the Davis Guard only had about 25 percent of the men who garrisoned the Alamo. And, to make matters worse, the enemy facing them was much larger than the Mexican force that had killed the Alamo’s defenders. Whether expressly mentioned or not, the Alamo was clearly on the minds not only of Dowling but of the other Guards as they made their collective decision to stay and fight. Dowling’s official report states that the men formally adopted as their motto in the coming battle ‘‘Victory or death.’’ Not coincidentally, these are the closing words in the last letter that Travis sent from the Alamo.16 The first flag used in the Texas Revolution, which originated in the Battle of Gonzales, featured a cannon with the words ‘‘Come and Take It’’ emblazoned on it. This would also have served as an appropri-

‘‘hold the fort at all hazards’’ * 123 ate motto for the Guards as they prepared to make their defense of the six guns in Fort Griffin. Having made their decision, the Guards made their final preparations. Dr. George H. Bailey, the assistant surgeon assigned to the garrison of Fort Griffin, remembered even long after the war the bravery that these men displayed as they calmly awaited the Federal onslaught they knew to be coming. ‘‘No man’s courage can exalt him to more than absolute fearlessness, and that was the condition of Lieut. R. W. Dowling and his men that day.’’ 17 When it became clear that Sabine Pass was about to be attacked, Dr. Bailey was serving as surgeon at the Confederate post near Sabine City. Knowing that a battle was coming, Bailey hurried to Fort Griffin and spread out all of the tools of his profession (a collection of saws and knives) on a table to be ready to treat casualties. Since his medical services were not yet needed, the doctor volunteered to supervise firing one of the guns (gun no. 1), where Dowling’s official report says he ‘‘assisted in administering Magruder pills to the enemy, and behaved with great coolness.’’ 18 There is some confusion about the meaning of Dowling’s remark. Was the lieutenant simply exercising his well-known sense of humor to make a joke about the doctor’s service with the company under the command of General Magruder? Another possible explanation is that the company may have named the gun that Bailey operated the ‘‘Magruder,’’ making the shots he dispensed ‘‘Magruder pills.’’ Supporting this interpretation is the fact that at least one source confirms that in a previous battle the Guards had given the name ‘‘Magruder’’ to one of their longer-range guns.19 Whatever the source of Dowling’s comment about Dr. Bailey and Magruder pills, it reflected high praise for a man who had eagerly gone beyond the call of duty to serve the Confederate cause. What made Dr. Bailey’s voluntary participation in the battle even more remarkable is that he suffered throughout his life with severe asthma.20 Compounding the debilitating effect of that condition was the fact that large artillery pieces generate substantial heat and tremendous quantities of smoke. Operating the guns in Fort Griffin on that hot afternoon, as Dr. Bailey did, must have been torture for a man with breathing problems. Yet, he did not complain and instead went on to tend the enemy’s wounded as soon as the battle concluded. As Dowling later said, the doctor performed his duty and even more than his duty with ‘‘great coolness.’’ 21 Their decision to stay made and endorsed, the Guards faced one last piece of unfinished business. With almost perfect timing, a courier arrived on horseback carrying a small Confederate flag, an emblem that had been miss-

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ing from the new fort. As Drummond reported, ‘‘Dowling received the flag and, waving it over his head while the boys cheered, sprang upon the parapet and shoved the staff with all his force into the sand bank. Bowing his head and waving his hand, he said: ‘Dick Dowling is a dead man before that flag shall come down!’ ’’ 22 If Dowling’s men needed any encouragement, they received it about midday, when Kate Dorman sent the fort’s garrison some beef along with a message advising them that they ‘‘must not fight like men, but fight like devils.’’ She then began a vigil on the rooftop of her hotel, watching the events at the Pass through a telescope with her friend, Mrs. Sarah Vosburg. It was Mrs.Vosburg, a good ‘‘praying woman’’ according to some contemporaneous accounts, who stood beside Mrs. Dorman ‘‘with uplifted hand, asking God to direct the shots.’’ Dowling’s men would soon need to ‘‘fight like devils’’ as Dorman advised, but if Mrs. Vosburg had anything to say about it, they would be doing so on the side of the angels.23

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chapter thirteen

Attack of the Gunboats

aptain Crocker could tell from his reconnaissance that the Con-

C

federate fort stood on a slight promontory overlooking the northern tip of an oyster reef in the middle of the Pass. He could also see that to make their attack, his ships would either have to go up the narrow east (Louisiana) channel or the wider west (Texas) channel in order to reach and ultimately pass the fort. Because it looked to Crocker like the enemy’s guns were elevated and pointed to command one particular place in the Texas channel, it was obvious to him that ‘‘if the gunboats reached that point without diverting [the defenders’] aim they would be almost certainly disabled.’’ 1 In designing his plan of attack, therefore, Crocker built in what he considered a series of effective diversions to conceal from the Confederates where the real attack was to take place. Crocker knew that his own ship, the Clifton, was the best armored of all the Union gunboats in his force. Although it was not a true ironclad (as Jefferson Davis later mistakenly suggested), its bulwarks consisted of a little less than eight inches of solid oak protected by a metal plating of one-half-inch steel.2 This armor would not stand up long to fire from heavy guns, but it was certainly the best-protected ship in Crocker’s force. He intended from the start, therefore, that the Clifton, under his command, would make the main attack on the fort, heading straight into its guns as fast as its steam engines could carry it. There would be nothing subtle about this attack. Like his successful assault at Butte à la Rose, it would be ‘‘done after the style of Daddy Farragut; we rush in.’’ 3 Crocker would time his ‘‘rush in’’ this time, however, to coincide with diversionary movements up the Louisiana channel. Crocker’s plan of attack (illustrated in Figure 25) called for the Sachem to steam rapidly up the Louisiana channel, followed by the Arizona. The Clifton itself would move up the Texas channel very slowly at first, waiting for the enemy to respond to the movement of the other Union ships in the

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Louisiana channel. Crocker intended ‘‘to make a dash upon the battery the moment [the fort’s] guns were turned upon the Sachem and the Arizona.’’ 4 While these attacks were being made by the gunboats up both channels, the Granite City would stay behind the Clifton to screen the landing by General Weitzel’s infantry force near the landing site at the old battery. As Crocker described the final plan that he reached in agreement with General Franklin: While the Clifton was shelling the battery with short-fuze shells the Sachem and Arizona were to advance up the Louisiana channel, and thus compel the enemy to change the training of his guns, when the Clifton was to advance rapidly up the Texas channel and endeavor to obtain a position near enough to the battery to enable the sharpshooters to pick off the enemy’s gunners. . . . The Granite City was to start with the Clifton, and following her up the Texas channel, take up a position just above the old battery and cover the landing of troops at that place from the transport General Banks, which troops were to advance rapidly up the banks toward the enemy.5 Crocker would later claim that his last comment to General Franklin as he left to make his attack was that if he went aground under the battery, a very real possibility given the narrow and treacherous turn in the Texas channel just in front of the fort, the gunboats would be ‘‘entirely destroyed’’ if the army failed to land troops as planned. Replying to the captain’s concern, Franklin once again confirmed to Crocker that the army’s transports would follow the gunboats closely and be prepared to make their landing at the designated site.6 One last piece of business needed to be taken care of before the attack could begin. If all went well, Crocker expected his gunboats to get within fairly close range of the Confederate fort. To take advantage of that position, he decided, in consultation with the army commanders, to assign a small party of army sharpshooters to each of his gunboats. The sharpshooters’ task would be to pick off the Confederate gunners with their small arms as soon as they reached musket range. The men of the Seventy-fifth New York Regiment were delighted to be selected to furnish the party to be assigned to the Clifton. When the regiment was assembled and volunteers were solicited, every man stepped forward one pace to volunteer, and some particularly eager men stepped forward two paces, hoping to gain an advantage in the selection process. The men finally chosen by lot for this job were, according to one of the selected men, ‘‘so jubilant and enthusiastic over what we

figure 25 Crocker’s Plan of Attack. From the Official Records, Vol. 26.

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considered our good luck that it was an open question whether we would be styled picked men from a crack regiment or cracked men from a picked regiment.’’ 7 The sharpshooters were quickly transferred to the gunboats, where they received a warm welcome both from the naval commanders and their crews. The New York men assigned to the Clifton arrived just in time to hear Captain Crocker explain the plan of attack to his crew. As one of the sharpshooters later recalled the captain’s speech: ‘‘Men,’’ he said, ‘‘your duty is plainly before you now; it is unnecessary for me to tell you what I have reason to expect from you; I would merely remind you that you are under the eyes of both the army and navy to-day and also that you are in the immediate presence of a detail of picked men from a regiment that has won the reputation of being one of the best in the department.’’ That fixed it for us; we knew that that was considerable taffy, there always is on such occasions but it tasted all right, we could stand such flattery well enough and I’ve no doubt that every man of us made the resolution that he would show that skipper before night that he had not overrated us.8 At 3:30 p.m., Crocker sent the ‘‘up anchor’’ signal to the rest of his gunboats. Henry Dane, the signalman who received the signal on board the Sachem, knew that this was to be the start of a trying ordeal for his ship. ‘‘We anticipated a thorough pelting and we were in no way disappointed. All of our expectations were fully realized.’’ 9 Ten minutes after Dane had passed along the signal to start, the Clifton began its slow move to the entrance to the Texas channel while the Sachem got under way up the Louisiana channel.10 To provide a diversion, as soon as it had raised anchor, the Clifton began firing at the fort from long range with its forward nine-inch rifled gun. This was intended to confuse the Confederate defenders as the Sachem made its advance up the Louisiana channel. Things went wrong almost immediately. As the Sachem, followed by the Arizona, entered the Louisiana channel, the Arizona went aground on the side of the oyster reef in the center of the Pass. This is not surprising to those familiar with tide and weather conditions in the Pass. Reenactors of the battle report to this day that the prevailing wind from the southeast often makes it difficult to avoid being swept to the west as a boat moves up the Pass. When it became clear that the Arizona had run

attack of the gunboats * 129 aground, a pilot was hurriedly shipped over from the Clifton to help guide the Arizona against the prevailing wind and into the narrow channel. Dowling and his men noticed the movement up the two channels almost immediately after it had begun. Seeing that the ships in the Louisiana channel were approaching at the fastest speed, the Confederates quickly maneuvered their guns to point at their preselected targets in that channel. A more conservative approach would have been to assign half the guns to each channel, but Dowling was so confident that his men could efficiently switch the guns back when it became necessary that he elected to fire all of his guns at the ships in the eastern channel without leaving any in reserve. This strategy almost proved disastrous. As events would later play out, on its first or second discharge one of the howitzers would recoil so severely that it rolled back off of its platform and was out of action for the rest of the battle.11 A neutral observer would have estimated that the odds against Dowling and his small command were getting worse all the time. As the action was getting under way, Captain Odlum, Major Leon Smith, and Dr. Murray (a Scottish physician) approached the fort from Sabine City. An extremely brave and forceful figure, Smith was an experienced mariner to whom General Magruder had awarded the rank of major. He had been placed in command of the ships and marine forces of Texas. Both Odlum and Smith outranked Dowling and technically could have taken command. They were wise enough not to do so, however, and after shaking the lieutenant’s hand allowed him to go on about his business. After staying for about five minutes, these men could see that Dowling had sufficient men to tend the guns he had in operation, and decided that they would just be in the way if they tried to get actively involved. Accordingly, Odlum and another officer left for a short period, returning to Sabine City in order to summon reinforcements and make arrangements for a retreat in the event (highly probable as it seemed at that time) that the Union invasion force was successful in seizing the fort.12 Writers of history (this one included) probably have a tendency to overemphasize the small number of men that Dowling had in Fort Griffin during this battle. Even though regulations called for almost a hundred men to tend the number of guns under Dowling’s command, the fact is that with only six guns the young lieutenant actually had more assistance than he needed for what would turn out to be the short duration of this battle. Not only did Dowling send away several men who arrived at the fort during the battle, but he also kept two men in one of the bombproofs to serve as a reserve force in

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case of injury to the primary gun crews. Two other men were absent on an unusual errand during the battle. Dowling had sent them to return the dinner dishes to Mrs. Kate Dorman because he did not want to risk breaking the dishes if and when the battle took place. He almost certainly would not have authorized such an expedition if he had felt a pressing need for more men.13 The guns at Fort Griffin were located behind a waist-high earthen wall above which the tubes of the guns extended. In the European military terminology of the day, this was called mounting the guns ‘‘en barbette.’’ 14 The advantage of this kind of fortification was that the guns could be rapidly shifted to face in a wide range of directions without the obstruction that would necessarily be present if they were protected by some sort of embrasure or casemate. The disadvantage of this kind of arrangement was that the barrels of the guns, as well as the upper half of each of the gunners, were exposed continually to enemy fire. All too aware of this limitation, Dowling, as the Union attack commenced, ordered his men to lie down or shelter in the bombproofs, where some of the men spent time playing cards until it was time to respond to the enemy’s fire. An observer on the little Confederate steamer Uncle Ben found this lack of visibility disconcerting, noting that as he saw the Yankee fleet approaching the fort, ‘‘I could see no sign of anybody near the fort—no sign of even life.’’ 15 Although the Guards were under strict orders not to return fire until the Federal ships reached relatively close range, this did not mean the men were silent as they awaited the signal to fire. Remarking that it was not in the nature of an Irishman to say and do nothing under such circumstances, Dr. Bailey recalled that the Guards said plenty, but it was apparently language of a character that he could not bring himself to record.16 The commanders of the Union gunboats were confused by the initial lack of action on the part of the defenders in the Confederate fort. Captain Crocker began to wonder if the guns in the fort were all merely ‘‘Quakers’’ (logs painted to look like cannons) and asked a sharp-eyed associate to look through the spyglass and report what he saw. The observer looked through the offered telescope and laughingly commented, ‘‘If they are Quakers, we shall soon see their hearts slipping out; they are training them all on the Sachem.’’ 17 On board the Sachem (Figure 26) over in the Louisiana channel, Captain Amos Johnson’s attention was focused on something other than the Confederate fort. Signalman Henry Dane pointed out to the captain that they were approaching the first of a series of tall poles stuck in the mud on the

attack of the gunboats * 131

figure 26 The U.S.S. Sachem. Detail from Sketch by Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell. Courtesy of Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell Collection (Manuscript Collection No. 310, Sketch No. 29[b]) in the Special Collections and Archives Division, Nimitz Library, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.

Louisiana side of the channel. He suggested (correctly) that these poles or stakes must be aiming marks of some kind placed there by the gunners in the Confederate fort. At first Johnson gruffly ignored where Dane was pointing, declaring confidently that ‘‘Crocker will blow that pile of mud off the point with his nine-inchers.’’ As Dane recalled, the captain’s tune changed as soon as they reached the first pole: The moment we passed the first pole a flash of flame shot from the parapet, a white cloud rose over it, and ‘‘wh-i-ng!’’ went a shell fifty feet [above] our heads. ‘‘Wh-i-ng! wh-i-ng!’’ came two more, thirty feet lower. ‘‘Wh-i-ng! wh-a-ng!’’ went another just above my precious head. Before I could restore myself to a full perpendicular, ‘‘Wh-o-o-ng! chuck!’’ came the fifth, passing through us from side to side, enveloping me in a cloud of splinters and transforming several poor fellows into pincushions.18 As Dane described so dramatically, when the Sachem steamed within 1,200 yards of Fort Griffin, Dowling leaped up and bellowed out, ‘‘Every man to his post!’’ He then gave the order to ‘‘load and fire at will,’’ which was greeted with a cheer. After the men had used their shovels to clear away some of the sand that exploding enemy shells had piled up in front of their

132 * sabine pass guns and wheeled the guns into position, Dowling yelled, ‘‘Commence firing!’’ and the six Confederate guns finally unleashed their full fury against the Sachem.19 The fort’s defenders, who had so patiently withheld their fire all day as the enemy repeatedly provoked them, now made full use of their guns, firing as quickly as they could reload. In their initial eagerness and excitement, however, the gunners fired their first few shots wildly off course. But Dowling quickly got his men settled down and adjusted his aim to take advantage of the preselected, staked-out targets in the Louisiana channel. A ‘‘brisk engagement’’ now commenced between the Sachem and the defenders of Fort Griffin.20 Dowling almost did not survive this brisk engagement. The elevation of the guns at Fort Griffin, like other guns of the period, was adjusted using an elevation screw that changed the angle of the gun barrel. At one point in the battle, Dowling had just adjusted that screw on his largest gun, sighting it with what one onlooker called the ‘‘cool precision of a target practice.’’ Suddenly, a shot from one of the Federal vessels tore over the parapet of the fort, taking the handle off of the elevation screw that Dowling had just adjusted. Less than a second before, Dowling had made his adjustments on that screw and had moved to the side.21 When the Sachem reached a point about halfway up the oyster bank separating the two channels, it ran aground. Normally, in this type of situation, the ship would have dispatched sailors in boats who would have used the ship’s anchor to pull and warp themselves off of the obstruction and into deeper water. On this occasion, however, that was not an option. All of the ship’s boats had been loaned before the battle to the transport General Banks, to be used by Weitzel’s troops in their planned amphibious landing operation over on the Texas side of the channel.22 Now motionless and stuck in the mud, the Sachem was helpless. Coinciding with this unfortunate occurrence was the fact that Dowling and his men had finally gotten their guns properly aimed at the stake closest to the Federal steamer. The Sachem was quickly becoming a death trap. As an observer on board later recalled, ‘‘The Sachem was now deep in the mud and was rapidly being pulverized. We were riddled from stem to stern. Our railings were vanishing, our decks were ploughed and torn and our men were falling in squads.’’ 23 But the worst was yet to come. As the Confederate guns continued to roar, an almost perfectly aimed shot entered the Sachem’s steam engine machinery and burst its steam dome. As its name implies, the steam dome is usually located at the highest

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point of the boiler, where the steam is collected and concentrated prior to being diverted to provide the power that moves a ship’s propeller. The rupture of the steam dome, therefore, sent clouds of steam cascading through the interior of the ship, scalding and killing crewmen where they worked and eventually pouring out the hatches to injure men on deck. Watching from the top of the lighthouse, Lieutenant Commander Dana of the Cayuga saw the Sachem suddenly become ‘‘enveloped in steam.’’ 24 The explosion on board the Sachem started a joyous celebration in Fort Griffin. As if a race had been started, Dowling, Leon Smith, and N. H. Smith ran simultaneously for the fort’s newly installed Confederate flag and, reaching it at the same time, jointly waved it from the parapet as the defenders of Fort Griffin cheered. Despite the fire from Union sharpshooters on board the gunboats, the Confederates in Fort Griffin continued to evidence defiance and fire their guns as fast and accurately as possible.25 Nobody was cheering on board the Sachem, where the impact of the steam explosion had been little less than catastrophic. ‘‘The result was sickening,’’ an observer remembered. ‘‘Men were actually cooked alive! God grant that I may never witness another such scene.’’ 26 Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Johnson, who was in command of the Sachem, later reported that the explosion killed or seriously wounded thirty-two men, including several members of the 161st New York Regiment, who were serving on his ship as sharpshooters. Johnson was not ashamed of his ship or its crew’s performance in this action, claiming that ‘‘My officers and men behaved well during the fight up to the time of the explosion taking place, which seemed to have such demoralizing effect upon the greater part of the crew that many of them deliberately jumped overboard.’’ 27 With the ship aground and its steam engine inoperative, the Sachem was incapable of further movement upstream toward the Confederate fort. Nevertheless, Johnson gave orders for his Parrott gun to continue firing, knowing that Crocker depended on that firing to divert the fort’s attention and provide covering fire for the Clifton as it moved up the Texas channel against the fort. Unfortunately, Johnson discovered that his orders to the gun crew to continue firing could not be obeyed. The gunners had joined the increasing exodus of men who had jumped overboard to escape the dangerous clouds of steam that still shrouded the ship. For the time being, at least, Johnson and the Sachem were helpless, and the stage would shift to other ships and their commanders. Coming up the Louisiana channel behind the Sachem was the Arizona, which had been temporarily delayed when it ran aground entering the chan-

134 * sabine pass nel at the bottom of the oyster reef. At Crocker’s suggestion, local resident James G. Taylor had been sent over to the Arizona to serve as pilot and assist it in making its way up the channel. Before the battle, Taylor had discouraged Crocker from using the Louisiana channel, noting that it was shallow and narrow and that he preferred using the other channel. Now, contrary to his wishes, Taylor had been charged with navigating this treacherous channel with a ship that was not well suited for its dimensions. Howard Tibbits, the captain of the Arizona, was not glad to see Taylor, even after the pilot promptly succeeded in getting the Arizona off its obstruction and moving again. By this time, the Sachem was almost a half mile ahead up the channel. When Taylor exercised his authority as pilot to issue an instruction to speed the ship up to try and catch up with the Sachem, Tibbits snapped at him, ‘‘Keep your mouth shut, you have nothing to say, you said you did not know the channel.’’ Nevertheless, the captain ordered his vessel to pick up some speed, as Taylor had requested.28 Hearing members of the crew shout that the Sachem had exploded, Taylor made his way forward and observed that the lead ship had indeed stopped a short distance ahead, enveloped in a cloud of steam with men jumping overboard in all directions. The captain of the New York troops serving as sharpshooters on board the Arizona requested permission to take a boat forward and attempt to rescue some of the men in the water, and Tibbits finally consented, halting his ship and even backing it up to prevent it from interfering with this rescue mission. Almost as soon as the Sachem had run aground, Captain Johnson tried to signal the Arizona to come up and take his hawser, a thick rope or cable used in towing ships. He anticipated that Tibbits would at the very least attempt to pull his vessel to safety out of the reach of the fort’s guns. When a boat finally reached the Sachem, however, Johnson was surprised to learn that it was not sent to obtain his hawser as requested, but was instead commanded by an army officer on a rescue mission for men who had jumped overboard. Johnson angrily sent instructions back with this boat to direct Captain Tibbits to bring the Arizona forward and haul him out of danger.29 By this time, the Arizona was located at a point where the channel’s width was little more than the width of the ship. To compound its problem, the ship’s engine was beginning to operate poorly because of the heavy accumulation of mud in its boilers. With the narrowness of the channel, there was no way Tibbits could pass the Sachem, and he quickly convinced himself that he had no real option other than backing down the channel. In the meantime, however, the wind and tide had caused the stern of the Arizona

attack of the gunboats * 135 to swing across the channel and run aground. Having seen the Sachem become stuck in the path of the devastating fire of the enemy’s guns, Tibbits began to panic.30 While Tibbits was considering his options, the boat returned from the Sachem carrying some scalded crewmen, two of whom later died. Captain Tibbits did not record the receipt of any orders from the stranded ship ahead of him to go forward and pull it to safety. Indeed, he later contended that even if he had received such orders he could not physically have complied, given the difficulty he experienced getting back out of the channel himself. Ignoring the Sachem’s repeated signals requesting help, Tibbits ordered Taylor to maneuver the Arizona back out of the channel and watched anxiously as the once-maligned pilot proceeded to skillfully accomplish this difficult task. Near the mouth of the channel, Taylor deftly piloted the stern of the ship gently into the mud on the Louisiana shore and managed to turn it entirely around so that he could steer the ship straight ahead as he headed south toward the entrance to the Pass. The action on the Louisiana side of the channel was now over. This portion of the Union attack plan had been a complete failure.31 As the diversionary attack up the Louisiana channel was unsuccessfully winding down, the attack up the Texas channel was just getting started. At first, it appeared that this part of the Union attack might be more successful. When the Sachem and the Confederate fort began exchanging fire, and Crocker could see that the fort’s guns were all trained on the Louisiana channel, he started the Clifton up the Texas channel under a full head of steam. So far, his plan was working perfectly. The Confederates were concentrating on the other channel, and, with any luck, he expected to rapidly move up the Texas channel and silence the enemy’s guns before they could even be turned against him. Unfortunately, this was a battle where the luck was all with the Irishmen who were in the Confederate fort. Every historian who studies this battle must come to grips with the huge disparity in arms between the Union gunboats (mounting twenty-six guns at the time of their attack) and the Confederates at Fort Griffin (mounting only six guns, quickly to be reduced to five guns, on the parapets of their fort). This disparity, however, like the difference in the number of men on each side, is misleading. As discussed before, the Confederates had deliberately sited their fort at the top of the two channels, thus precluding an approaching enemy coming up the Texas channel from aiming any guns at the fort other than the ones located at the front of his ships. Any comparison of arms using all of the guns on the approaching gunboats is misleading because the

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figure 27 The Deck of the U.S.S. Clifton. Sketch by Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell. Courtesy of Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell Collection (Manuscript Collection No. 310, Sketch No. 75) in the Special Collections and Archives Division, Nimitz Library, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.

typical Union gunboat did not mount many guns in the front of the ship. The navy was aware of this problem. Indeed, Admiral Farragut had complained to the secretary of the navy about the absence of forward-facing guns not long before the battle.32 From a drawing of the Clifton’s deck (Figure 27) prepared by its surgeon, we can see that only one gun (a nine-inch pivot gun located in the bow) could easily be fired straight ahead by that vessel. Battle reports confirm that the Clifton was initially utterly unable to bring any gun but its forward pivot gun to bear upon the fort.33 It is, therefore, not terribly surprising that the Clifton’s guns did almost no serious damage to the Confederate fort as it made its charge up the Texas channel. Crocker’s plan had originally called for the Clifton to fire extensively, making a ‘‘dash upon the battery’’ while the enemy’s guns were occupied elsewhere, and in his after-battle reports, Crocker repeatedly described his movement up the channel as ‘‘rapid.’’ 34 To the army officers observing the attack (Figure 28), however, it appeared merely that ‘‘the Clifton steamed slowly up her channel, firing slowly.’’ 35 At first, the Clifton was actually moving so slowly that the Granite City, the ship following behind it, got too close and Captain Crocker had to signal it to back astern and not keep so close to his vessel.36

attack of the gunboats * 137 As the Clifton reached the halfway mark up the Texas channel, Crocker’s plan quickly began to fall apart as the defenders of Fort Griffin disabled the Sachem and had plenty of time to swing their guns around to cover the Texas channel and Crocker’s approaching gunboat. Dowling’s orders from Captain Odlum had been to aim first at the wheelhouses of approaching ships in order to disable their steering and navigation. This objective was accomplished when a fortunate shot from the Confederate battery severed the Clifton’s tiller rope, causing the ship to drift to the left (west) due to the prevailing wind from the southeast. This drift was discovered when a sailor testing the water depth suddenly yelled out a warning that the water was becoming dangerously shallow. To stop this unplanned movement, Crocker ordered the wheel turned hard to the port side to move the ship to the right. When this did no good, he then ordered the ship’s engines to back up. But it was too late. Every sailor and soldier aboard the vessel heard the ‘‘dull groaning sound of the vessel’s keel grinding upon the sand-bar.’’ One of the New York sharpshooters remembered the sense of momentary hope he experienced as he felt ‘‘the quivering of the deck as the entire strength of the engine was brought in play to relieve her, but it was all in vain; we were there to stay.’’ The Clifton had run aground less than five hundred yards below the fort.37 For a time it appeared that running aground might work to Crocker’s advantage. He had always known that it was possible that his ship might run aground as it approached the Confederate fort. What he had hoped, however, was that if he did run aground, it would be close enough that he could

figure 28 ‘‘The Attack on Sabine Pass,’’ September 8, 1863. Sketched by Eyewitness James Ferguson, Co. A, First Indiana Artillery. From Harper’s Weekly, October 10, 1863.

138 * sabine pass continue to use his guns and the small arms of the sharpshooters (members of the Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers) to chase the enemy’s gunners from their gun positions while the army attacked the fort. Unfortunately for Crocker’s plan, the Clifton had run aground a little farther from the fort than the captain had expected. The only good news was that in running aground the Clifton was now in such a position that its starboard side, or ‘‘broadside,’’ was facing the Rebel fort. This worked initially to Crocker’s advantage, since he could now point at least three guns at the fort. The deck was tilted at such an angle that a fourth gun did not have a direct field of fire, but this was soon solved by firing that gun and blowing out the side of the vessel so that the gun did have a clear field of fire.38 This shot through the side of the Clifton apparently gave rise to an erroneous rumor after the battle that Crocker had ordered a shot fired through his own vessel’s machinery in order to keep the enemy from getting his ship in working order.39 Although running aground may have made it easier in some respects for the Clifton to bring its guns to bear on the Confederate fort, it also made the ship an easier target for the fort’s defenders. Once they had dug away some of the breastworks in front of their guns so they could point down low enough to reach the Clifton (which by this time was riding exceedingly low in the water), it was like shooting fish in a barrel.40 Shortly after it ran aground, the Clifton was struck by one shot that hit its smokestack near the top and another that penetrated its steam chest. Like the steam dome on the Sachem, the steam chest on the Clifton was a chamber where steam was concentrated as part of the normal operation of the engine that moved the ship’s paddle wheels. As with the damage to the steam machinery on the Sachem, the rupture of the Clifton’s steam chest led to clouds of steam and hot water, which quickly made the ship’s interior uninhabitable and poured out the top, chasing the sharpshooters from the upper deck and disabling the ship.41 The steam quickly became so dense that the sharpshooters found it impossible to locate their companions without running into them. As the steam began to clear, the Confederates began shooting with such accuracy that every shot sent sections of the heavy bulwarks ‘‘flying across the deck like kindling wood.’’ The thick walls that had seemed like such excellent protection before the battle now became merely clusters of ‘‘flying splinters,’’ killing and mutilating any man unfortunate enough to be in their path.42 The situation was growing increasingly desperate as the Confederates zeroed in their guns on the Clifton and began doing serious damage to the ship (Figure 29) and its crew. Executive Officer Robert Rhodes (Figure 30) was mortally wounded while

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figure 29 The Disabling and Capture of the Federal Gunboats Sachem (Right) and Clifton (Left) in the Attack on Sabine Pass, Texas, September 8, 1863. From The Soldier in Our Civil War, Vol. 2.

bravely trying to rally the Clifton’s crew. While standing at his post, Rhodes was struck by a 32-pound shot that came crashing through a bulkhead, taking off his hip and thigh. When the surgeon came to treat him, Rhodes bravely directed him to go treat someone else who had a better chance of survival. Turning to the Clifton’s master-at-arms, the lieutenant said simply: ‘‘Tell my parents and friends that I fell at my post doing my duty.’’ Contrary to his initial expectations, Rhodes did not die immediately, but instead lingered on for two days following the battle. He died in Beaumont on September 10.43 With Rhodes out of action, Crocker found it necessary to instantly promote Acting Master Benjamin S. Weeks to take his place. It was an unfortunate appointment. Weeks seemed not to know what he was doing and had to be helped even to put out a small fire. Meanwhile, one of the forward guns was hit by a shot, disabling it and wounding a number of crewmen. In addition, the Clifton’s nine-inch pivot gun had been so damaged that the crew was now reduced to firing it using a hatchet to explode the primer. Everywhere Crocker turned, there was damage and death, and he could tell that the fire from the Confederate fort was only ‘‘becoming more and more accurate and deadly.’’ 44 At this point, Crocker knew that his only hope was to hold out until the

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figure 30 Robert Rhodes. From John Bartlett, Memoirs of Rhode Island Officers.

army landed and managed to relieve him by capturing the fort. He and his men continued firing from their disabled ship for almost half an hour, even loading grapeshot in an unsuccessful attempt to drive the Confederate defenders from their guns. Crocker himself went forward both to direct the fire and encourage his men to hold out for just a little while longer. Yelling ‘‘We will stand by this ship as long as there is a splinter left’’ (perhaps an unfortunate choice of words), Crocker was nevertheless successful in receiving one final cheer from his remaining crew.45 While he was in the midst of this brave display, Crocker was approached by Benjamin Weeks (the allegedly incompetent officer whom he had just promoted), who informed the captain that further resistance was futile and that he had assumed authority to haul the flag down to start the process to signal surrender.46 Crocker’s initial response was to curse Weeks and declare that for such a cowardly act the man deserved to die.47 Although initially outraged by his subordinate’s presumption, Crocker eventually had to admit that Weeks had been right. At first he ordered the flag hoisted again, but quickly realized that he had neither the men nor the

attack of the gunboats * 141 guns to continue the fight. Looking around behind him, Crocker was disgusted to observe that the army had never even landed and that the Granite City was not coming to his assistance. Over in the Louisiana channel, he could see the Sachem disabled and the Arizona retreating. Clouds of steam were still billowing out of the Sachem, as well as his own ship, and the water was filled with men who had jumped off both these ships to escape further injury.48 Signals from the Sachem requested a status report from the Clifton. ‘‘We are aground and blown up,’’ was the candid reply from the Union ship’s signalman.49 Seeing no alternative but to surrender, Crocker admitted to his men with a blanched face that the army was not coming to their aid: ‘‘It is no use, boys. . . . I didn’t think they could do it but they have deserted.’’ With a trembling voice, he ordered the white flag of surrender hoisted on the Clifton and began the unpleasant task of destroying both his signal book and official papers. The New York sharpshooters threw most of their guns overboard also to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy.50 Over on the Sachem in the Louisiana channel, Captain Johnson had also begun to destroy his signal book, flood his magazine, and do everything possible to spike and disable his largest gun. Upon seeing the white flag flying on the Clifton, Johnson quickly weighed his options. With tears on his face, he agonized over the decision. ‘‘I don’t know whether to surrender or not,’’ he declared to the officers clustered around him. ‘‘We might get out of this if they would come and help.’’ When it became clear to Johnson, however, as Captain Crocker had already concluded, that no help was to be forthcoming, the Sachem also hoisted a white flag and surrendered.51 It was all over. Some observers estimated that the battle had taken about an hour and a half from start to finish.52 As efficient as ever, Dowling checked the time himself and recorded that from the time he fired his first shot until the surrender of the gunboats only forty-five minutes had elapsed. The time had passed quickly for the Irishmen tending their guns. Dowling had noticed that his men were beginning to tire near the end of the battle and had used the arrival of some observers as an opportunity to send for reinforcements. But the battle had concluded before the requested reinforcements could even arrive.53 The end of the short battle came at the perfect time for the Confederates; their ammunition was almost exhausted, with only forty charges of powder left in the fort.54 By one account Dowling and his men fired a total of 137 shots during the short battle, probably a record rate of fire for a battery of that size. Even such routine safety procedures as swabbing the guns out between shots to prevent

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figure 31 The Surrender Scene at Fort Griffin. From Francis Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas.

explosions while loading had been dispensed with in order to maximize the number of times the guns could be fired. This, in combination with the large number of times the guns were fired in such close succession, made them so exceedingly hot that it was a full day before the guns were cool enough that they could be touched. To give some indication of how hot they were during the battle, two of the men had their leather ‘‘thumbstalls’’ (the leather thumb covers worn by the gunners and placed over the hole through which the powder was ignited) burned off and their flesh seared to the bone.55 The Confederates may have burned their fingers, but these problems were nothing compared to the injuries suffered by the Union attackers. John Read, the paymaster on board the Granite City, watched the surrender of the Sachem and Clifton with disgust and surprise. As the white flag was raised over the Clifton, a small boat from the Sachem made its way slowly toward Read’s vessel. Upon its arrival, Read observed that the injured men it carried were all ‘‘horribly scalded.’’ Noting that these injured men had ‘‘no skin on their bodies,’’ Read remarked that ‘‘their agonies were terrible.’’ One of the scalded men (an engineer) died that night, and another (a fireman) died the following day.56 The white flags had been raised. The only act remaining to be performed in this unlikely drama was the formal surrender (Figure 31). As with many

attack of the gunboats * 143 elements of this battle, there is a dispute about what happened next. One account has Captain Crocker taking a boat ashore to tend to this unpleasant task in person. Finally reaching the fort he had unsuccessfully attacked, the captain mounted the parapet and asked to speak to the commander. Crocker was then astonished to learn that the young Irish lieutenant who stood sweaty and dirty before him was in charge of the tiny force that had defeated him. Another description of this encounter on shore has Crocker asking for the commander, and then responding, after Dowling identified himself as the commander, ‘‘We’ve been treated badly enough today, sir, not to have practical jokes. I’ll have the commander, sir.’’ 57 Dowling was not awed by the uniform of his prisoner. He insisted on returning with Crocker to the Clifton to tour his prize. Accounts conflict as to whether Dowling then chose to formally receive Crocker’s sword to confirm the terms of the surrender.58 The two accounts that have Crocker coming ashore to surrender seem unlikely and staged. Probably more reliable is Mrs. Adele Looscan’s description of events, which was based on conversations with several eyewitnesses to the battle. She indicates that after the battle concluded, Dowling and four other men simply stepped up onto the fort’s breastwork and signaled for a boat to be sent to them from the Clifton. When this boat came as requested, Dowling was then conveyed to the Clifton, where Crocker and the other remaining officers lined up and formally surrendered. Dowling graciously refused to accept the officers’ swords.59 While the celebrations and surrenders were beginning at Fort Griffin, concern was mounting at the Confederate headquarters not too far away in Beaumont. Caleb Forshey, an engineer serving on General Magruder’s staff, had been increasingly anxious about the safety of the Davis Guard. He knew Dick Dowling and was confident that the fiery Irishman would not give up the fort without making a fight. But he also suspected that, as brave as he knew the Guards to be, the fort could not be expected to hold out very long if attacked by the large Federal invasion force that was rumored to be approaching. When the sound of large guns firing drifted up the river to Beaumont, Forshey was ready to give up hope. It was obvious to everyone by that time that a major artillery battle was under way at the mouth of the Pass. Within an hour the sound of the guns trailed off and then abruptly stopped. Forshey was disappointed by this ominous silence, believing that the Irishmen had been defeated and possibly annihilated. Despite his initial misgivings, Forshey had hoped that Dowling could have at least delayed the invasion a little longer. Eventually, gloom turned to jubilation as a courier arrived to

144 * sabine pass proclaim the incredible news that not only were the members of the Davis Guard fine, but that it was the Federals who had been turned back with heavy losses.60 As soon as the Confederate headquarters in Beaumont received word of Dowling’s victory, Major Oscar Watkins (who had performed so ingloriously in the capture of the Morning Light) was sent by train from Beaumont back to Houston with the news. The phrase ‘‘back to Houston’’ is used here in its literal meaning. To avoid delaying the message, the train heading in from Houston was not turned around but literally backed down the line as fast as it could go. In Liberty, Watkins passed the message along to a telegraph operator, who then sent it via code over the wire back to Houston. Anxiously awaiting this message in Houston was General Magruder, who received news of the victory with pride and relief. Watkins himself did not arrive in Houston with details until seven hours later, when he found the streets filled to capacity with a jubilant throng of people reading and rereading the extra edition of a Houston paper featuring huge headlines purporting to tell ‘‘all about the battle of Sabine Pass and Dick Dowling’s brilliant victory.’’ 61 Back at Fort Griffin, the people of Sabine City were already delivering a tangible reward to their Irish defenders.When the firing had begun early that morning, the townspeople had realized in typical East Texas fashion that desperate times required serious cooking. While the battle was in progress, one man slaughtered a cow and delivered it to the town’s women to barbecue. Another man, who possessed the unlikely name of ‘‘Increase Burch,’’ dug up a patch of sweet potatoes and began to cook them. Everybody in the town who was not occupied with these chores seems to have begun to make coffee and bake bread, biscuits, or cake. By the time the battle was over late in the afternoon, a veritable feast was on its way to Fort Griffin. It was delivered by local hotel proprietor Kate Dorman in her buggy. The Davis Guard never forgot this kindness.62 About an hour after the battle was over, as the food was still arriving at Fort Griffin, the Uncle Ben steamed down the Louisiana channel and pulled alongside the Sachem, ‘‘Say, Yanks, do you surrender?’’ a cautious voice called out. ‘‘There is not much of us left to surrender,’’ replied Captain Johnson, ‘‘but what there is you can have.’’ By all accounts, a ‘‘horrible sight’’ greeted the ten men from Griffin’s regiment who constituted the Confederate boarding party. Less than half the Union men left on board the Sachem were able to stand, with wounded and dying men slumped everywhere. To treat the scalded men, the crew had resorted to covering the victims with barrels of

attack of the gunboats * 145 flour and sweet oil. This mixture had combined with the blood to form a thick, slippery paste covering the ship’s decks. In some places, this ‘‘flood of gore’’ coated the deck to the thickness of half an inch.63 Things were equally messy on board the Clifton in the Texas channel. It took a long time for the boats to transfer all of the Union prisoners and wounded to shore. While they waited for transportation, Captain Crocker tried to cheer up one of the New York soldiers who was crying over lost comrades and lost freedom. ‘‘Sergeant,’’ he said philosophically, ‘‘it’s hard luck, it’s the fortunes of war, but you fellows will be all right.’’ The carpenter eased up to the captain and furtively asked permission to set fire to the Clifton’s powder magazine with a time-delayed fuse. The resulting explosion would probably have destroyed much of the ship and anyone unfortunate enough to be on board. At first, Crocker consented to the plan, but later he thought better of it and called the whole plan off, declaring, ‘‘Mr. Fallow, it won’t do come to think, there are too many people here, there has already been too much life sacrificed.’’ 64 When they reached shore, the captives found that they had much in common with the victorious Davis Guard. It turned out that many of the Union sailors were also Irish. Dowling was very conscious that the number of prisoners (about 350 men) far outnumbered the small garrison under his command. He quickly assembled a group of townspeople and militia from the area (mainly men too old for regular service) and pressed them into duty as guards for his captives. The prisoners wasted no time in making fun of the homespun clothes and rusty flintlocks of their outnumbered captors.65 When Henry Dane, the signalman of the Sachem, was introduced to Dick Dowling, he could not resist teasing the young Irishman about the nature of his victory. ‘‘[D]o you realize what you have done, sir?’’ Dane asked. ‘‘No,’’ the blushing Dowling replied, ‘‘I don’t understand it at all.’’ ‘‘Well, sir,’’ explained Dane, ‘‘you and your forty-three men, in your miserable little mud fort in the rushes, have captured two Yankee gunboats, carrying fourteen guns, a good number of prisoners, many stands of small arms and plenty of good ammunition; and all that you have done with six popguns. . . . And that is not the worst of your boyish trick. You have sent three Yankee gunboats, 6000 troops and a general out to sea in the dark. You ought to be ashamed of yourself, sir.’’ 66 While the Irishmen were beginning their celebration in Fort Griffin, what was left of the Union fleet was indeed making its way back to the mouth of Sabine Pass in a panicked and disorganized fashion. The Granite City steamed past the troop transports and over the bar, finally coming to anchor

146 * sabine pass near the wreck of the Morning Light.67 On its way out, the Granite City was hailed by General Weitzel, who pointed out some Union sailors who were still running down the shore after leaping into the water from the deck of the Clifton. ‘‘Look at your men there coming down the beach there,’’ said Weitzel, expecting the gunboat to return and help them. But the Granite City merely steamed on without stopping to help anyone.68 The Union runners were soon rounded up as prisoners by several Confederates in a small boat that Dowling had authorized to chase and capture them.69 During its mad rush to the rear, the Granite City was also hailed by General Franklin, who asked whether that ship intended to stay and protect the unarmed transports. The only reply Franklin received was ‘‘field guns of the enemy will be down on you in five minutes,’’ as the Granite City continued steaming out of the Pass as fast as it could go.70 Lieutenant Commander William Dana, commanding the blockader Cayuga stationed outside of the entrance to the Pass, was appalled to learn that the Granite City had abandoned the ships still inside the bar and ordered Captain Lamson to go back over the bar and lend what assistance he could in evacuating the remaining Union ships and supplies. Lamson responded that he had run aground several times trying to get over the bar on his way out and could not do anything to assist, since darkness was falling. Appalled at this response, Dana requested General Franklin to at least send one of the transports to Galveston to request assistance. Franklin agreed to Dana’s request and the Union fleet sent for help.71 One of the ships inside the bar about which Dana was most concerned was the gunboat Arizona. That ship had experienced great difficulty extricating itself from the Louisiana channel and then developed engine problems as it made its way back to the mouth of the Pass. A false rumor had spread like wildfire on the ship that the enemy was maneuvering field artillery into place to fire on the gunboats, and an atmosphere of general panic had set in.72 Sharing this panic was the Arizona’s captain, Howard Tibbits, who became almost frantic in his efforts to get his ship across the bar and out of the Pass while it was still functioning. One Union soldier who witnessed the Arizona’s mad rush for the southwest entrance to the Pass after the battle remarked that ‘‘such a skedadling you never saw; it looked the most cowardly of any movement that I ever saw and I hope that I shall never see another like it.’’ 73 Desperately searching for the exit at the end of this dreadful performance, Tibbits became frustrated when faced with a group of troop transports blocking his way out of the Pass. He anxiously asked his local pilot, James Tay-

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lor, if the water was deep enough to permit the Arizona to squeeze by the side of one of the transports that was blocking the channel exiting the Pass. Taylor told him that it was not, expressing surprise that the captain of the Arizona would even think of leaving the troop transports without protection. Agitated by now almost to the point of being incapacitated, Tibbits decided to take the risk, declaring: ‘‘I must go out. I can take her out.’’ Tibbits should have listened to his pilot. The Arizona almost immediately ran aground making this cowardly movement and could not be pulled clear of the obstruction until about midnight.74 The Arizona was not the only Union ship that experienced problems getting out of Sabine Pass after the battle. Approximately two hundred thousand rations had to be thrown overboard from the grounded transport Crescent to lighten it enough that it could escape after having run aground. In addition, two hundred pack animals (accounts differ as to whether they were mules or horses) were jettisoned from the steamer Laurel Hill, an action that was later investigated not because it was unnecessary but primarily because no officer would admit to having authorized it.75 Although the Confederates were glad to see the animals and rations being thrown overboard, they ended up not being able to salvage very much of this unexpected bounty. As one Confederate observer later recalled, ‘‘The horses had their halters tied to their forefeet and not one of them lived. [The Yankees] drove axes into molasses and everything of the kind and threw them overboard. Bacon and flour were the only things that came ashore fit to use.’’ 76 And come ashore they did. For a distance of more than thirty-five miles west of Sabine Pass, the beach was later found to be strewn with supplies like bacon, dried apples, and candles. Two horses and the body of a Union casualty from the battle washed ashore as far west as the mouth of the Brazos River. The shore debris was so extensive that coastal residents began to wonder if there had not been a second, even bigger battle fought somewhere else offshore.77 During the night of September 8, the bulk of the battered Union fleet departed for New Orleans. By 8 a.m. the next morning, all of the Union ships had left Sabine Pass, with the exception of the Arizona and Granite City, which had been detained by the senior blockading officer pending further orders from Galveston.78 The reason that these two ships had been retained pending further developments is not hard to guess. Having been victimized once before at Sabine Pass when the Morning Light was captured, the Union blockaders were understandably very sensitive about the presence of enemy steamers up the river they were supposed to be blockading. With both the

148 * sabine pass Clifton and Sachem now in enemy hands also, the blockaders were concerned (as was Commodore Bell in New Orleans) that the Rebels might just turn around and send those ships out with other cottonclad rams and attempt to break the blockade.79 Even the ignominious flight from Sabine Pass did not go well for the Union expedition. An atmosphere of general panic prevailed, and in the chaos that followed the order to leave the mouth of the Pass, the steamer Suffolk ran into one of the transports, causing the steamer to take on so much water that it looked like it might sink. While most of the steamer’s crew transferred to another ship, some troops on board the transport jumped overboard to avoid being trapped on what they feared might be a sinking ship. After these casualties were fished out of the water it was finally time for what was left of the defeated Union fleet to slowly make its way back to New Orleans. Some of these ships did not limp back into the Crescent City until almost four days later.80 While the Union force was departing from Sabine Pass, some of the victorious Confederates were just arriving. Engineers Sulakowski and Kellersberg showed up at Fort Griffin on the morning of September 9th, just thirteen hours after the battle. Hoping to reach the fort before the battle was over, they had traveled all night in a donkey-drawn ambulance wagon, dodging mosquitoes and swamps. At one point, Kellersberg had been forced to restrain his hot-tempered Polish supervisor from shooting the black driver, who had lost his way in the dark. Upon arriving at Fort Griffin, the engineers were understandably proud to see that their fort had protected Dowling and his men so effectively. Kellersberg, in particular, was relieved to see that his ‘‘patched-up cannon had famously withstood the fire.’’ 81 Unlike Kellersberg’s guns, the Union gunboats had not ‘‘famously withstood the fire’’ they had received. Although the Clifton and Sachem had fought valiantly during the battle, the U.S. Navy had little to be proud of after the battle at Sabine Pass. As Admiral Porter would later acknowledge, ‘‘this was rather a melancholy expedition and badly managed.’’ 82 Crocker’s force had failed to take the fort that was its objective, in the process losing two gunboats and suffering many casualties. The U.S. Army had even less room to boast, having not even made an appearance during the battle. Captain Crocker was understandably extremely bitter about the army’s failure to support him, writing in 1865: The reason why the army failed so utterly to cooperate, after having promised so fairly, I have been unable to learn; but it has been since

attack of the gunboats * 149 proven to me that if a single movement toward landing troops had been made, the enemy would have evacuated Sabine Pass and the expedition would have proved a success.83 The question that puzzled Crocker so much both during and after the battle is still something of a mystery today.Why did the army not land troops in accordance with the original plan and attack the Confederate fort? After all, General Weitzel, who was on the transport General Banks with five hundred men, had been following the Granite City during the attack. He was under orders to land just above the site of the old fort and attack Fort Griffin from the land. That was certainly Captain Crocker’s understanding of the plan; he was stunned to find out after making a valiant fight that the army had simply abandoned him and his ships without even attempting to land. Even Dick Dowling was surprised by the U.S. Army’s failure to attack. After the battle, he asked one of the Union prisoners, only half-joking: ‘‘What was the matter with your fellows, anyway? . . . Why didn’t they come up and take us as we expected they would?’’ Unable to offer any good explanation, the Yankee participant in this exchange blamed the Federal exodus on ‘‘a sudden attack of home-sickness.’’ 84 Like Dowling, Captain Crocker wondered long and hard about why the army had failed to make its scheduled appearance. He had plenty of time to think things over. Crocker was a prisoner of war in Texas until February 1865.85 During his long captivity, Crocker puzzled over the reason his plan had gone so terribly wrong. Again and again he asked himself what had happened to the army cooperation he had been repeatedly promised. The Clifton’s surgeon (Dr. Daniel Nestell), who like Crocker was also held as a prisoner at Camp Ford near Tyler, Texas, was equally baffled by the failure of the army to attack immediately on the commencement of the Clifton’s attack, as had been agreed upon before the battle.86 Crocker and the surgeon did not agree on many aspects of this battle, but they did agree that the one nagging question left after the battle was why the army never landed and attacked the fort. It turns out that there is really not a very satisfying answer to this question. General Weitzel later said in his official report that when it came time for him to land, the Clifton was ‘‘in exact range of my proposed point of landing,’’ making it sound like he was in some way blocked or prevented from landing. Weitzel also claimed (falsely) that the Confederates had a battery of field artillery outside the fort with which they were pouring fire into the Clifton. Then, by the time that Weitzel claims he was getting ready to land

150 * sabine pass despite these obstacles, he noticed that the Clifton and Sachem had surrendered, at which point he determined to abort his efforts to make a landing.87 General Banks later accepted this explanation, reporting to Washington that the Clifton had unfortunately run aground ‘‘exactly between [Weitzel] and the point selected for landing, and the attempt was abandoned only when the Clifton and Sachem had surrendered and the Arizona was seen to be aground and helpless.’’ 88 The problem with the army’s explanation is that it was patently untrue. As an examination of the map in the Official Records (Figure 25) confirms, the Clifton had grounded well up the Pass from the proposed landing site and, if anything, would actually have screened the proposed landing site from the fire of the Confederate fort. Despite General Weitzel’s claim to the contrary, Crocker’s ship was in no way an obstacle to the army’s landing. Weitzel’s further claim that the surrender of the gunboats somehow prevented him from carrying out his landing is also a fabrication. Both Union and Confederate sources agree that the crew of the Clifton fought valiantly for at least twenty-five to thirty-five minutes before Crocker surrendered and raised the white flag.89 During this entire time, while the Clifton was aground but still continuing to fight, the army made absolutely no effort to land or lend any aid. General Weitzel’s excuses for not landing his troops apparently originated as a way to cover up his loss of nerve during the battle. At one point, near the end of the battle, the Granite City steamed within hailing distance of Weitzel’s ship and asked if the general intended to land. To the confusion of the officers aboard the Granite City, which had been assigned to cover the army’s landing, Weitzel denied that he had any orders to land. General Franklin’s testimony at a court of inquiry held after the battle was that he did not cancel Weitzel’s orders to land until after the Granite City started to withdraw from the fight. There seems little question, therefore, that the army failed to comply with the plan of attack agreed upon with Captain Crocker before the battle.90 John Read, the paymaster on the Granite City, wrote angrily in his diary after the action that ‘‘By the landing of troops the place might have been easily taken, but to send vessels such as those present, with boilers and machinery all above the water line, to contend against a battery of heavy pieces, was madness in the extreme.’’ Three days after the battle, Read wrote his father to describe the battle. Still convinced that ‘‘the Lone Star must fall,’’ Read begged his father to send him a flask of brandy for ‘‘precautionary’’ purposes.91

attack of the gunboats * 151 Read, like the rest of the navy, felt that the army had essentially abandoned Crocker and his gunboats. The key to evaluating the merits of these complaints about the army’s action—actually inaction—is, of course, what orders General Weitzel was operating under with regard to landing. Was he supposed to land with his ground force and attack the Confederate fort once the gunboats were successful? In that case, his failure to land after the two lead ships had surrendered might be excusable. On the other hand, if his orders, developed in consultation with Captain Crocker and General Franklin, required him to land at some earlier point in the battle while the action was still developing, then his failure to do so was in gross violation of his orders and may well have cost the Union control of Texas. One account of the battle, blindly accepted by some later historians writing accounts of the battle, depicts Weitzel as almost rabid in his desire to land and attack the Confederate fort. In this version of events, which seems to have originated in the pages of the New York Herald and was thereafter reprinted in some Southern newspapers, it was General Franklin who intervened and called off the army’s attack. After learning that his attack had been canceled by his commander, this version alleges, Weitzel ‘‘swore like a pirate and wept like a mother over her dead child, when he was ordered to sail away and leave [the gunboats].’’ 92 When traced to its roots, however, the portion of this account dealing with Weitzel and his orders seems to be a combination of remote hearsay and inaccurate speculation. Neither General Weitzel nor General Franklin in their after-battle reports ever contended that Franklin had canceled his subordinate’s orders to land. To the contrary, Weitzel’s report affirmatively states that he was not ordered to retire until after the gunboats had surrendered, i.e., well after the time that his orders should have kicked in and required his force to land.93 As for cursing the order to retreat, other credible accounts suggest that it was Weitzel’s subordinates who cursed that order, and that it was in reality General Weitzel’s own retreat after refusing to land that they were so vehemently protesting.94 Once again, we are left with the question of precisely when had Weitzel been ordered to land. Answering this crucial question about Weitzel’s orders is surprisingly easy, because we are fortunate to have what a trial lawyer litigating the case might call a ‘‘smoking gun’’ document. In the report that General Franklin delivered to General Banks shortly after the battle, Franklin explained that the plan ‘‘adopted in conjunction with Captain Crocker’’ called for Weitzel to keep near the Clifton with his transport full of infantry, and that he further had instructions to land when the Clifton began its attack on the fort.95

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In the copy of this report included in the Official Records, the copy apparently forwarded on to Washington, Weitzel’s landing orders are discussed relatively generally, with no specific details quoted. But in the original of this report, a copy of which was fortunately preserved in the Nathaniel Banks Papers of the Illinois State Historical Library, Franklin states that Weitzel had been ordered to land ‘‘as soon as the Clifton began to go at full speed.’’ 96 (Quotation marks in original.) The use of these quotation marks means that Weitzel’s orders, apparently the exact wording agreed upon before the battle by the army and navy commanders on the scene, explicitly required him to land as soon as the Clifton started its attack. As the omission of these quotation marks in the version of the report eventually furnished to Washington suggests, Banks knew when he received Franklin’s original report that Weitzel’s orders did not authorize him to do what he actually had done, which was to wait and see how the gunboat attack turned out and then make a decision whether or not to participate depending upon the initial results. Although General Franklin would later argue that he had done all a wise man would have done under the circumstances, he obviously realized that his subordinate’s failure to land opened the army and himself to some potential criticism.97 He tried to diffuse this issue by stressing the muddy conditions in which his men would have been forced to land, noting that ‘‘the enemy’s battery commanded the whole landing and he could, with his battery and gunboats, have destroyed us at any time.’’ 98 This excuse has a factual basis—the landing site was certainly muddy, and the fort’s few guns would have had a clear field of fire—but it in no way justifies the army’s failure even to make an attempt to land. Franklin and Weitzel had personally scouted and approved the proposed landing site. They had also repeatedly committed to Captain Crocker that they would land troops at that landing site at the same time the main naval attack began in order to support that attack. Crocker’s plan depended, as they well knew, on the army’s simultaneous landing and deployment of troops. Their complaints after the battle about the depth of the mud at the landing site ring extremely hollow. General Banks’s staff officers later attempted to justify the army’s inaction by arguing that there simply was not enough time for the troops to have landed and made any difference. As Lieutenant Colonel Richard Irwin wrote in his History of the Nineteenth Army Corps: The place where the Clifton grounded was fairly in range of the beach where Weitzel was expected to land his troops. There may have been a minute, or even ten, during which it might have been possible for

attack of the gunboats * 153 Weitzel, breaking away from the concerted plan, to have thrown his picked men ashore while the attention of the Confederates was fixed upon the Clifton; yet, although this criticism has been suggested by high authority, the point would have been a fine one at best; and under the actual circumstances, with the Granite City in the channel ahead, the Arizona aground, and the guns of the Sachem and the Clifton about to be added to those with which the enemy had opened the action, the problem becomes one of pure speculation. What is clear is that the landing depended upon the gunboats; that these were cruelly beaten before they had a chance to prove themselves; and that nothing really remained to do but what was actually done: that is, to give up the expedition and go home.99 General Banks apparently sensed that lurking behind these weak excuses, the army’s contribution to this battle had not been one of its proudest moments. In private correspondence, Banks blamed the navy for the Sabine debacle.100 In writing about this part of the campaign as part of his official report in 1865, General Banks accurately described the army’s landing effort as ‘‘feeble.’’ 101 When his own selection of Sabine Pass as a landing site was severely criticized following the battle, Banks noted that his original orders to Franklin had directed that troops be landed elsewhere on the coast if for any reason the fort at that place could not be taken. Contrary to these orders, Banks asserted, Franklin had never tried to land at all, instead returning to New Orleans without his troops ever once having set foot on land. Banks even sent to President Lincoln a sketch (Figure 19) showing his proposed campaign route and identifying the alternate landing site he had chosen. ‘‘In my judgment,’’ he explained, ‘‘the army should not have returned, but should have continued to the point indicated for landing upon the coast.’’ 102 In this case, at least, General Banks was probably right. His original orders had clearly required a landing to be made at some other point on the coast if Sabine Pass proved too tough a nut to crack. With the large force at his disposal, General Franklin could almost certainly have landed elsewhere on the coast, taken or bypassed Sabine Pass by land, and used that position as a springboard to reach the railroad to Houston, just as General Banks had originally planned. Even reinforced, the garrison at Fort Griffin could not have withstood such an infantry force very long if Franklin had only chosen to employ it. Franklin chose not to employ it, however, claiming in his report to Banks that he was short on water and supplies and that in any event the enemy’s powerful gunboats and batteries (a tremendous exaggeration) were

154 * sabine pass too much for any force that he could possibly have assembled without the aid of the captured Union gunboats.103 As General Banks correctly sensed, following the debacle at Sabine Pass, there was plenty of blame to go around and few willing recipients. One member of the Union force who had watched the battle from a transport was willing to chalk the whole affair up to bad luck. There were a thousand opinions expressed at the time, bestowing censure promiscuously for this untoward result; but it seems difficult now to declare anybody responsible for it. A parallel case cannot be found in the history of the war; it was the decisive check of a large and well appointed expedition by three or four guns, manned by a single company. Yet there was no reason before the engagement to apprehend any such result, and we are bound to suppose, in lack of positive knowledge to the contrary, that all due fore-thought was taken. The result was unexpected—was humiliating, but, in all probability, inevitable.104 Blaming the defeat of the expedition either on the navy or on bad luck pretty much became the party line for the army. As far as the army’s high command was concerned, the ‘‘unfortunate expedition to Sabine Pass,’’ as it soon came to be called, should simply be swept under a rug and forgotten.105 Unlike the military establishment, the Northern public was far from willing to so easily forget the humiliating defeat that had been inflicted in faraway Texas. Someone was to blame. As New York Tribune editor Horace Greeley later observed, ‘‘Decently managed, this movement could not have miscarried. The troops were abundant and efficient; the weather fine; the sea smooth; and the enemy unwarned of the point of attack.’’ To Greeley, the obvious candidate for blame was General Franklin, whom he accused of being the first American general in history to lose a fleet in a contest with land batteries alone. Never at a loss for strong opinions, Greeley concluded that ‘‘Franklin—finding no place to land where he might not get his feet wet—slunk meekly back to New Orleans; leaving the Texans to exult, very fairly, over a fruitful victory gained against odds of at least twenty to one.’’ 106 General Franklin had certainly done nothing to distinguish himself at this battle. He also realized that he would probably be blamed for the disaster. But Franklin himself claimed that he was proud of his performance. He wrote to his wife less than a week following the battle that ‘‘I did not lose a man except about 100 men who were on the gunboats that were captured, and I have great reason to congratulate myself upon the result. I imagine that

attack of the gunboats * 155 I shall be blamed for it, but I do not consider myself blamable in the slightest degree; so I do not care a copper what the papers say.’’ 107 Another prominent candidate for blame was Nathaniel Banks himself, who had organized and planned the failed expedition. Because he had suffered embarrassing defeats already this year at Galveston and Sabine Pass, it was easy for the public to spot a pattern. Back in Washington, Major General Samuel Heintzelman confided to his journal: ‘‘Neither Banks or Franklin is fit to command an army in Texas. Neither appears to know anything about Texas. That failure at Sabine Pass should not have occurred. There are several officers of the old army [who] have served in Texas and would have known better.’’ 108 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper spoke for many in the North when it reported that ‘‘The movement at last to occupy and hold Texas seems to have been conceived in the same blundering spirit which has hitherto made Texas, in our military annals, synonymous with disaster and disgrace.’’ 109 Faced with such a disaster, Northern newspapers struggled to depict the contest at Sabine Pass as much less one-sided than the actual event. In stories written from General Franklin’s headquarters shortly after the battle, correspondents falsely reported that most shots from the navy’s gunboats had found targets, causing huge holes in the Rebel fort and costing the enemy an enormous number of casualties. The Confederates were terrible gunners, they asserted, who only won the battle because they managed to get in a few lucky shots. One reporter concluded in dramatic fashion: Considering the number of the forces engaged, it is doubtful if any affair of the whole war can compare with the battle of Sabine Pass in obstinacy of fighting, loss of life, and the amount of interest involved. To the enemy it was a matter of life and death, and to the Union forces it was the opening battle of a most brilliant campaign. The enemy retained their prize; but their loss has been undoubtedly without precedent in the annals of the war, and they will, in the midst of their rejoicing, tremble at the thought of a repetition of the attack.110 Wildly inaccurate, this description of the battle points out one aspect of the fight that has long puzzled historians who have studied it. Almost all of the Union observers reported that the navy’s gunboats inflicted tremendous damage on the Confederate fort at Sabine Pass and speculated that the defenders must have suffered heavy losses. After the battle, however, the Confederates reported no casualties of any kind and but little damage to their

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fort. How can this discrepancy be resolved? One explanation, of course, is that the attack had been such a disaster that the Union participants found it necessary to invent some silver lining to this cloud by stressing the casualties that the other side presumably had also suffered. Another explanation, perhaps more plausible, is that on this occasion, as at New Orleans and Port Hudson, the Union navy conveniently overestimated the damage done by its bombardment. This tendency to exaggerate the effect of artillery fire on the enemy was a common problem that afflicted both sides throughout the war and certainly may have contributed to the Union’s misperception of the effectiveness of its fire at Sabine Pass. Although both of these explanations are reasonable, a different and more compelling solution to this puzzle occurred to the author one late summer day while walking the battlefield, looking at some reconstructed modern earthworks near the site of Fort Griffin. Moving over to the water, it was possible to simulate the line of sight of the fort that would have been available to an observer situated on the deck of one of the Union ships. It was about 4:00 in the afternoon (roughly the same time of day and same time of year as the battle), and the first thing that could be observed was that, from the attackers’ point of view, the sun would appear low in the sky and almost directly over the fort, shining into the eyes of gunners viewing the fort. Another problem for the gunners was the fact that from a distance, the relatively short earthworks would have blended into the marshy ground cover and become extremely difficult to spot. Under these conditions, the Confederate fort almost disappeared. It became clear that the chances of accurately estimating the distance and range of the naturally camouflaged fort from the deck of a moving vessel were extremely remote. To compound the problem, there were no obvious landmarks that would have marked the fort from a distance (no prominent trees or brick walls, for example), and a Union gunner would have found it extremely difficult to tell whether projectiles fired from his gun were hitting their intended target or not. A shot that landed in back of the fort, for example, would have sent up a large geyser of earth. But so would a shot that landed either in front of or within the wall of the fort itself. Looking into the sun and then trying to judge where any of your shots were landing in this setting would have been a challenge to confound even the most accomplished artillerist. In short, the Confederate fort was hard to see, hard to hit, and immune to verification that it had been hit. It appears from eyewitness accounts that most of the Union artillery fire was going ‘‘long,’’ meaning that it was landing or exploding behind the Con-

figure 32 Sabine Pass Fortification Including Fort Manhasset, Drawing by J. Kellersberg, October 15, 1863. From the Official Records Atlas, Plate 32(3).

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federate fort. From the viewpoint of the Union gunners, however, such a shot would have been almost impossible to distinguish from a shot exploding on target inside the fort. That the shots were landing consistently behind the fort is confirmed by the testimony of Terence Mulhern and Pat Sullivan, the two members of the Guard who had been sent by Dowling into town to return the dinner dishes. Hearing the battle beginning, they attempted to hurry back from town, but were prevented from reaching the fort by what they reported was a heavy concentration of enemy fire that ‘‘literally raked the earth from fort to town.’’ 111 For this to be true, the fire from the Union gunboats must have consistently been landing in back of the fort, some fire overshooting the fort by a distance of almost a mile. That Dowling’s shots going the other direction were so comparatively accurate can be explained by the fact that (1) the glare of the sun was not a factor firing from that direction, (2) the Union ships stood out on the water as excellent targets, and, most importantly, (3) Dowling’s men took advantage of preselected and premeasured targets (the stakes in the Pass) that took much of the guesswork out of their aiming and firing process. The Union ships had made the mistake on this occasion of steaming into positions where they might as well have painted targets on their decks. Almost as soon as the battle ended, the Confederates realized that this was a mistake their enemy would probably not repeat. The Texans’ elation over their victory would soon turn to fear that the Union forces would return to finish the job they had so poorly started. The Confederates were well aware that their Union adversaries had made a critical error in not simply landing on the coast and approaching Fort Griffin from the west. They could not afford to leave that door open very long. Shortly following the battle, the Confederate engineers were put back to work designing and supervising construction of a new fort located about 7½ miles west of Fort Griffin. The new fort, named Fort Manhasset (Figure 32) after the Union steamer by that name that had been wrecked near that place later in September 1863, was designed to check any Union force that might try to flank Fort Griffin or bypass it to the west and attack Beaumont. As it turned out, the fairly elaborate defenses of this fort would never be tested. After the debacle at Sabine Pass, no other Union force would ever again dare to attack anywhere in the area.112

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chapter fourteen

Praise and Blame

hakespeare wrote in his play Much Ado about Nothing that ‘‘A

S

victory is twice itself when the achiever brings home full numbers.’’ Unlike most battles of the Civil War, the Confederates could actually make that claim after the Battle of Sabine Pass. Captain Odlum’s report on the subject of casualties was both simple and elegant: ‘‘Our loss was, strictly and positively, nobody hurt. Not a single man received even a scratch, and the fort [was] but very slightly injured, and the contents entirely uninjured.’’ Although some of the men suffered burns on their thumbs, and one man was said to have been struck by grapeshot that did not break the skin, Captain Odlum was essentially correct that the Confederates had suffered no material injuries inflicted by the enemy. Calling the battle ‘‘a glorious and honorable little affair,’’ Odlum confessed that ‘‘It does really seem that Providence has kindly favored us in this affair.’’ 1 The side that Providence seemed not to favor in this battle, the Union, viewed the results of the battle quite differently. The actual number of Union casualties (list of known casualties included in Appendix 3) is difficult to estimate because a great number of men were listed as missing. In addition, black men employed on the ships were often not included in the casualty figures. Dowling’s report that the Confederates had captured 350 prisoners is probably closest to being accurate.2 Although the list of casualties attached in Appendix 3 identifies the number of men killed at about 35, Confederate burial parties only reported burying a total of 28 Union dead.3 It is probably accurate, therefore, to sum up the total number of Union casualties (killed, wounded, captured, and missing) from this battle as being close to 400.4 In addition to ships and men, the Confederates captured a large quantity of small arms and ammunition, as well as provisions and medicine.5 There was no report of how many floating animals or rations were salvaged by the Con-

160 * sabine pass federates after being thrown overboard by the Union naval vessels on their way out of the Pass. One of the worst aspects of the battle, from the Confederate point of view, was dealing with the Union casualties after it had concluded. The scene was, as one soldier remembered many years later, ‘‘the most pitiful sight.’’ Because of the steam explosions on board the Clifton and Sachem, a large number of the Union dead had literally been boiled alive. Although the Union surgeon tried to help these burn cases by dumping barrels of flour on them, ‘‘the skin came off their hands and faces like a mask.’’ 6 A member of the burial detail, who helped bury the Union dead in a long trench, declared what a ‘‘fearful task it was to take hold of the scalded corpse[s], your hands would be full of the skin that would slip off of them.’’ 7 The prisoners were eventually rounded up and put on a railroad train to Houston. Ironically, they were finally making the same movement that General Banks had planned for them to make, albeit as captives rather than conquerors. The Texans who witnessed this procession were impressed with the Union men and their—by Texas standards—fancy uniforms. Wright Smith Andrews, who caught the train in Liberty, took the opportunity to talk with a prisoner ‘‘who appeared to be an intelligent man, except for the war.’’ Andrews expressed his frustration that no matter how hard he tried, he ‘‘could not make him understand he was on the wrong side.’’ 8 After counting the losses on his side, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles wrote with obvious restraint that ‘‘the disastrous results and total failure of the Sabine Pass expedition [are] a source of regret.’’ 9 All in all, the U.S. Navy could regret losing two gunboats mounting thirteen guns, together with their crews and accompanying sharpshooters.10 Navy officials in Washington, looking for someone to blame for these dismal results, ordered a court of inquiry to be conducted. The court proceedings were not completed until the spring of 1864. Admiral Farragut reviewed the testimony taken by this court and concluded that although there were grounds to conduct a court-martial against Howard Tibbits, the captain of the Arizona, it would be an inconvenient distraction to do so. Farragut, like the rest of the navy, preferred at least publicly to forget that the Battle of Sabine Pass had ever taken place.11 There was still one naval officer (Captain Crocker) who was not ready to forget the way the battle had been conducted. In addition to the U.S. Army, one of his own crewmen was the target of his anger. Captain Crocker was not in the least complimentary of Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell’s performance as assistant surgeon on the Clifton in the battle. In 1865, when he was re-

praise and blame * 161 leased from prison, Crocker wrote a blistering battle report in which he complained that ‘‘During the engagement the wounded received no attention, as the surgeon was not to be found. It was reported to me that Acting Assistant Surgeon D. D. T. Nestell climbed over outside and got upon the rudder, and there remained during the engagement.’’ 12 This was a shocking allegation, and naval officials in Washington lost no time in requesting an explanation from Dr. Nestell. Nestell responded that he had stayed at his post in the sick bay until men came running in from the fire room yelling ‘‘The boiler has bursted! We will all be scalded, and everybody for himself.’’ At that point, the doctor candidly acknowledged, he was ‘‘seized with the irresistible desire to save my life as well,’’ and joined a demoralized mob streaming toward the rear of the vessel. By this time, Nestell and his group were ducking to avoid the enemy’s shot and shell coming into the ship an uncomfortably small distance above their heads. Men began crying that although the ship had surrendered the enemy was continuing to fire. Terrified by this announcement, Nestell admitted that he then did the unthinkable—he climbed over the side and took refuge on the rudder chain.13 While conceding the main fact in Crocker’s allegation—that he had hidden on the rudder—Nestell maintained that he had stayed frozen in this position of dishonor for ‘‘not longer than one moment.’’ He then heard a voice on board the hurricane deck saying ‘‘Take him to the doctor.’’ Instantly, the doctor reported, his senses cleared and he returned to his place of duty in the sick bay, just in time to receive the first shipment of dying men, for whom he could do nothing but administer ‘‘stimuli.’’ Hardly had he begun tending to this duty when Major Leon Smith and a Rebel surgeon wearing gold braid appeared on the ship and ordered him away from his medical supplies.14 Nestell then stated that he was forced by bayonet along with other officers and men toward a boat moored alongside the Clifton to be taken ashore as prisoners. Someone cried out that the ship was on fire near the powder magazine, urging everyone to hurry off the ship. At this point, Captain Crocker reminded Nestell that it was his duty to see the wounded men safely off the ship. Thus prodded, Nestell turned around and tried to make his way up the gangway against the exodus of men being herded from the Clifton. His progress was eventually stopped, he noted, only when Major Leon Smith forced him back with the point of his sword, swearing at the guards that they should ‘‘shoot any damned Yankee going below.’’ 15 Summarizing his conduct, Nestell argued that while he had succumbed

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momentarily to panic, he had never knowingly neglected to care for the wounded as alleged. His stay on the rudder had been brief, he claimed, and he was ‘‘not conscious of having intentionally compromised my position or my manhood on that occasion.’’ 16 Faced with Nestell’s candid admissions, the navy was uncertain what to do with him. In the end, the navy decided to reach a compromise and simply forget about the matter. Nestell’s appointment as a surgeon was revoked, but he was honorably discharged.17 While the Union was engaged in a search for scapegoats, the Confederates were celebrating the almost miraculous outcome of the battle. Confederate officers in Texas had difficulty in restraining their rhetoric about the incredible victory achieved by Dowling and his Irishmen. Claiming that the Union fleet had possessed fifteen thousand men at the time of the battle, an exuberant General Magruder wrote to his superiors soon after the battle that ‘‘this seems to me to be the most extraordinary feat of the war.’’ 18 Unlike many of his contemporaries, Magruder recognized immediately that much of the credit for Dowling’s victory must be assigned to the engineers who had designed and constructed the fort the Davis Guard defended. In a congratulatory order that listed each of the men who had played a part in the victory, Magruder offered a special tribute to ‘‘that distinguished Engineer and gallant soldier, Col. V. Sulakowski and his officers engaged in this work, to whose skill, under Providence, is to be attributed the safety of every one of the heroic band.’’ 19 As far as General Magruder was concerned, the numbers in the ‘‘heroic band’’ defending Texas needed to grow and grow quickly to respond to the threat of another enemy invasion. Writing for the newspapers, Magruder directed a letter ‘‘To the Men of Texas,’’ requesting them to form into companies and report to Beaumont as soon as possible to repel the next invasion, expected any day at Sabine Pass. ‘‘Almighty God in His divine mercy has given us another signal victory over our enemies,’’ he wrote. Calling Dowling’s company only ‘‘a handful of determined men,’’ Magruder begged Texans to form with them ‘‘a wall of fire and steel against which the foe shall press in vain.’’ 20 One observer who had witnessed Dowling’s ‘‘handful of determined men’’ while the battle was in progress was Leon Smith, a mariner who had been appointed by Magruder to command the Texas Marine Department. Smith, who arrived at Fort Griffin just in time to witness a portion of the attack and wave the flag while standing on the ramparts, could restrain neither his enthusiasm nor his proclivity for the dramatic in his after-battle report:

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For one hour and a half a most terrific bombardment of grape, canister, and shell was directed upon our devoted, heroic little band within the fort. The shot struck in every direction, but, thanks be to God, not one of that noble Davis Guard was hurt. Too much credit cannot be rendered Captain Odlum and his gallant lieutenant (Dowling), who displayed the utmost heroism in the discharge of the duty assigned him— the defense of the fort. The Davis Guards, one and all, God bless them. The honor of the country was in their hands, and they nobly sustained it. Every man stood at his post, notwithstanding the murderous fire that was poured upon us from every direction.21 Dowling’s own report after the battle (text contained in Appendix 1) was a short and relatively modest affair. Thanking his surgeon and engineer, Dowling reserved his main praise for the men of his company, of whom he wrote: ‘‘All my men behaved like heroes; not a man flinched from his post.’’ He also reserved special recognition for Private Michael McKernan, whom he credited with firing the singularly accurate and devastating shot that disabled the Sachem, paving the way for the remarkable Confederate victory.22 Dowling shared his captain’s belief that God had intervened to play a special and direct part in the battle he had so unexpectedly won. He noted that during this one battle every ball his men fired seemed to go precisely where it would do the most good. On the other hand, he observed, the enemy’s bombardment of shot and shell caused not a single injury to him or his men. The only explanation that fit these facts, Dowling maintained, was that God’s special providence had intervened to save his men.23 Dowling was so inspired by this intervention that he later used ‘‘Sabine’’ as the name of one of his sons. The victory at Sabine Pass was regarded throughout the Confederacy not only as proof that God was on the South’s side, but also as confirmation that the Union gunboats were not invincible. This had not always been the consensus of opinion. As Jefferson Davis reflected after the war, ‘‘In the earlier period of the war, the gunboats had inspired a terror which their performances never justified. There was a prevailing opinion that they could not be stopped by land-batteries, or resisted on water by anything else than vessels of their own class.’’ 24 The fact that Dowling and his small band of Irishmen could hold off and then conquer a Union fleet by themselves helped put a stop to this defeatist thinking and inspired Southern forces to lose some of the fear that had earlier inhibited their defensive efforts.

164 * sabine pass The strong performance by the Davis Guard may also have contributed to reducing the anti-Irish sentiments that were still all too common in Texas. A Houston newspaper proclaimed: Let no one hereafter cast any imputations on the honest Irish soldier. He is true to his friends and country, and when the gallant deeds of valor, as was displayed here, are recorded on the page of history, there you will find the names of the heroes of Sabine. They had no property at stake [i.e., they were not slave owners] in the contest, and no other motive than to battle for [their] rights and the sacred rights of the home of their adoption.25 General Magruder traveled to Sabine Pass shortly after the battle to thank the Guards personally for their actions. Upon his arrival at Fort Griffin, the general took off his hat while entering the fort to show his respect for its defenders. Telling the Guards that he had been in the army for many long years, Magruder recalled that he had often fought alongside Irishmen. ‘‘It was useless to say they were brave and faithful,’’ he remarked, for the ‘‘whole world already knew it.’’ Abandoning all pretense of modesty, Magruder then told them that he would personally bring their names to the attention of President Jefferson Davis and was confident that they would soon be honored as ‘‘the greatest heroes that history recorded.’’ It is not surprising that this speech was greeted with loud applause by the Guards and their commander.26 Magruder also won cheers when he informed the Guards that he had authorized them to wear a special new badge on their caps. The new badge consisted of a piece of cloth with a green wreath interwoven with a shamrock. On top of this wreath was a silver Maltese cross and underneath were the words ‘‘Sabine Pass.’’ The men were overjoyed with this new emblem.27 Although proud of his wild Irish troops, General Magruder feared that the attack at Sabine Pass would be only the first of a series of attacks that would soon be suffered by Confederate forts all along the Texas coast. A master at using general orders as propaganda, Magruder quickly issued an order the day after the battle that sought to turn the Davis Guard’s defense at Sabine Pass into a motivational lesson for his other troops: The result of the engagement [that was] had with the enemy’s fleet on the coast of Texas proves that true pluck and resolution are qualities which make up for disparity of metal and numbers, and that no position defended with determination can be carried by the enemy’s gunboats

praise and blame * 165 alone. Should any of the forts on the coast or the forces on land be attacked, the troops need but remember the success of their comrades at Sabine, emulate their courage and skill, and victory will be the result.28 There was one man in the North who would have disputed Magruder’s assertion that Union gunboats could not be successful against Confederate forts. That man, Admiral David Farragut, had made a career out of disproving that assumption. He had also inspired and possibly participated in the early planning of Crocker’s attack at Sabine Pass. When the battle took place, of course, Farragut was not even in the South, having returned to the North to recuperate and receive further instructions. It was his trusted subordinate, Commodore Henry Bell, who had given Crocker his final instructions and authorized the navy’s participation in the expedition. It is evident that Bell’s instructions mirrored Farragut’s usual plan of attack and were merely an extension of Farragut’s style. To say that Farragut inspired and possibly had something to do with the early planning of the Sabine Pass expedition does not mean that he approved of its execution. He did not. When word reached Washington of the failure of the expedition, Farragut was at the navy’s offices. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles recorded in his diary Farragut’s surprise to learn that Commodore Bell had, in the admiral’s absence, authorized an attempt by the navy to ‘‘capture formidable batteries with frail boats, the army as spectators.’’ He also recorded Farragut’s surprising reaction to the news, even before the results of the attack were known: Admiral Farragut was at the Navy Department when dispatches were received from Commodore Bell, stating that the application for cooperation and aid had been made on him [by the army], and how he had answered the call. When Farragut read the dispatch, he laid down the paper and said to me: ‘‘The expedition will be a failure. The army officers have an impression that naval vessels can do anything; this call is made for boats to accompany an army expedition; it is expected the Navy will capture the batteries, and the army being there in force with a general in command, they will take the credit. But there will be no credit in the case, and you may expect to hear of disaster. These boats which Bell has given them cannot encounter batteries; they might cooperate with and assist the army, but that is evidently not the object. The soldiers should land and attack in the rear, and the vessels aid them in front. But that is not the army plan. The soldiers are not to land until the Navy had done

166 * sabine pass an impossibility, with such boats. Therefore there will be disaster.’’ The news of today verifies his prediction.29 In authorizing the expedition to Sabine Pass, Commodore Bell obviously thought that he was doing what his friend and immediate superior—Farragut—would approve upon his return. The plan was not unlike several battle plans and tactics that Farragut himself had successfully used in the past. That Farragut did not approve it, but instead accurately predicted the plan’s failure, requires some explanation. As Welles describes Farragut’s reaction, it is clear that the admiral was not opposed to every plan that might involve gunboats attacking the fort at Sabine Pass. He also did not complain about the officer, Crocker, who had been chosen by Bell to command the attack. This is consistent with the earlier hypothesis that Farragut may have privately discussed with Crocker the general outlines of a potential plan to capture the fort at Sabine Pass and had communicated his approval of that plan to Bell. What Farragut objected to was not the general idea of attacking Sabine Pass, but (1) that the plan Bell approved involved a direct attack on the fort by the particular ships that were assigned (i.e., the Clifton, Arizona, Granite City, and Sachem), and (2) that the success of the plan depended upon cooperation from the army after the navy had taken the lead role. Farragut’s first objection to the ships themselves makes a great deal of sense. Even General Banks later admitted that ‘‘The boats were mere shells, wooden vessels, and they could not stand before the guns of the fort.’’ 30 This same criticism was echoed by Admiral David Porter, who believed that ‘‘the late catastrophe at Sabine Pass should be a lesson to us how we send certain classes of vessels on hazardous expeditions, where if there is a failure, the Navy will bear the blame; if successful, the Army will reap the credit.’’ 31 Both Farragut and Porter were right that, as the results of the battle at Sabine Pass proved, ships like the Clifton and the Sachem were not able to withstand sustained fire from a battery of heavy guns. In addition, the Sachem had long been regarded by naval professionals as a ‘‘miserable steam scow which had come down from a former generation.’’ 32 Farragut, in particular, understood very well the limitations of these two vessels, having seen them in action in his previous campaigns on the Mississippi. Moreover, he had seen the Clifton (the heaviest vessel that Bell had assigned to the Sabine Pass expedition) disabled during his attack on the forts at Vicksburg. The problem with Farragut’s complaint about these ships, of course, is that the existing classes of ironclads drew too much water to get over the bar into Sabine Pass and new lighter-draft ironclads were not yet in production.33 In

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fact, even the weaker ships that were actually used by Crocker experienced great difficulty getting into the Pass. Heavier or more heavily armored ships, although desirable, were not a practical option. Of the light-draft steamers that were actually available, the Clifton, in particular, was one of the best ships in the entire navy for this type of operation.34 Farragut’s second objection, that the army would not cooperate as planned, turned out to be an accurate prediction of the way events eventually played out at Sabine Pass. The strategy that the admiral claimed to favor would have involved simultaneous attacks from land and sea, with the army attacking the forts from the rear. As Farragut correctly anticipated, a plan of attack that called for the army to participate only after the forts were subdued by the navy was doomed to failure. Farragut’s criticism of this element of Crocker’s plan was not entirely fair. The original plan when the expedition left New Orleans for Sabine Pass did call for the first attack to be solely a naval action, as the admiral had speculated. But Crocker, with the consent of the army commanders, had actually changed the plan at the last minute, calling for the army to land and advance while the naval attack against Fort Griffin was in progress. Thus, the plan that Crocker attempted to put into operation was actually far closer to the one Farragut favored than the admiral had assumed when he condemned it. In the end, of course, it really did not matter. The army’s failure to land made the timing of any planned cooperation a moot point. Despite his critical comments in Washington, Farragut did not blame his friend Commodore Bell for the failure of the expedition to Sabine Pass. Instead, he placed the blame squarely, and solely, on the army, writing to Bell that the army ‘‘caused the loss of the soldiers landed at Galveston in disobedience to my advice; they lost the Diana by sending her up the Teche, and no doubt they lost the [Sabine] expedition by not following your instructions.’’ 35 Just as the Union navy chose to blame the army for the disaster at Sabine Pass, the army internally chalked the affair up to the inherent unreliability of actions dependent upon cooperation with the navy. General-in-Chief Halleck observed that ‘‘the failure of the attempt to land at Sabine is only another of the numerous examples of the uncertain and unreliable character of maritime descents. The chances are against their success.’’ 36 General Banks seconded this view, commenting that ‘‘had the army relied upon itself exclusively, the failure at Sabine City would not have occurred.’’ 37 The ‘‘failure at Sabine City,’’ as Banks referred to it, was only a minor affair to many of the Union troops who had been present. In response to an 1883 article in the Southern Historical Society Papers calling Dowling and

168 * sabine pass his men the ‘‘forty bravest men in the Confederacy,’’ Frederic Speed, a staff officer in the Nineteenth Corps, wrote blisteringly: That there was a large Federal force within sight [of Dowling and his men] is true; but with the exception of three gun-boats, the entire force would have proved quite as effective if it had remained at New Orleans, simply from the fact that it was impracticable to land the army, and the naval vessels drew so much water that with the exception of the gun-boats referred to it could not approach nearer than two and a half to three miles of Mr. Davis’s ‘‘forty bravest men,’’ who were as safe from harm in the earth-work as they would have been a thousand miles away. They did not probably know this, and their merit consists in the fact that they did not run away, as most men would have done under the circumstance, before finding out this important fact in the ‘‘engagement.’’ 38 The Confederates’ success in this ‘‘engagement,’’ as Speed contemptuously called it, was the source of some mystery even to the winning side. Although Confederate military officials publicly praised the victors and described the result as a great triumph, they were privately suspicious of the sudden Union retreat, fearing it was merely trickery. When General Richard Taylor heard of the incident, for example, he warned that the Union probably intended to operate against the lower Texas coast, suggesting that ‘‘the attack at Sabine was not intended to be serious.’’ 39 In reply, General Edmund Kirby Smith, who was in command of the Trans-Mississippi Department (which included Texas), echoed Taylor’s skepticism, stating: That an expedition on the scale and with the force ascribed to the expedition at Sabine Pass, and under the command of an officer of Franklin’s rank and character, should have been abandoned without even an attempt to bring its force into action, I cannot believe. It must have been, as you suppose, a demonstration intended to cover some other point of attack. The facts are, however, that the fleet has withdrawn, and the enemy’s plans are not yet developed.40 General Magruder, who was the most vociferous of any Confederate official in his praise of the victory at Sabine Pass, was concerned privately that the enemy would soon return to complete the invasion that Dowling and his men had thwarted. He moved his headquarters temporarily to the new

praise and blame * 169 Confederate steamer Clifton and began urgently soliciting reinforcements.41 Warning General Alfred Mouton in Louisiana that he had only three thousand men at his command to repel an expected invasion force of at least twenty thousand men, Magruder urged Mouton to come to Texas and join forces with him. Otherwise, Magruder declared, a second and this time successful invasion of Sabine Pass was likely to occur, resulting in the separation of Louisiana from Texas and a large-scale invasion of Texas.42 Mouton declined Magruder’s invitation, explaining that he had plenty of problems of his own to confront in Louisiana and that his orders would not permit him to grant the general’s request even if he wished to do so.43 Soon after the Battle of Sabine Pass concluded, the walls of Fort Griffin were strengthened and made higher. The fort was also stocked with some of the guns that Dowling and his men had captured. Finally, General Magruder ordered the sinking of several old vessels below the fort in an effort to obstruct the channels to enemy gunboats.44 All of these precautions turned out to be unnecessary. Spies from Louisiana soon reported that no new expeditions were being fitted out for East Texas. As one Union observer put it, ‘‘from all I can hear from the officers and privates I have talked with, they all think Texas will be a hard road to travel.’’ 45 The second half of 1863 was a time of great stress throughout the Confederacy. The defeat of Robert E. Lee’s army in July at Gettysburg, accompanied at the same time by the surrender of Vicksburg, had made Southern defeat seem to be an increasingly inevitable outcome. To motivate its population, the Confederate government was desperately in search of heroes, and Dick Dowling and his little band of Irishmen made ideal candidates. General Hamilton Bee expressed the sentiments of many when he wrote tendering his ‘‘congratulations on the brilliant affair at Sabine. It has inspirited us all.’’ 46 All across the Confederacy, accounts of the battle (usually exaggerated) were greeted with elation and wonder. In North Carolina, the wife of a prominent planter recorded the excitement with which the battle’s result was greeted: ‘‘The victory at Sabine Pass proves a most brilliant one. Forty-eight men repulsed twelve thousand (12,000), took 385 prisoners without loss to themselves. . . . This is authentic. We can scarce credit it.’’ 47 In Virginia, the results of the battle were first learned from captured Northern newspapers. One soldier with Texas roots wrote home to his family that ‘‘the Yanks admitted that the fire of our batteries was awfully accurate and that there was not a man on the afterpart of the Clifton who escaped being killed or wounded.’’ Imagining the battle in his ‘‘mind’s eye,’’ he declared the capture of the gunboats ‘‘admirable.’’ 48

170 * sabine pass The victory in Texas was also a source of relief to the Confederate military establishment in Richmond. Reviewing the entire course of the war for Jefferson Davis near the end of 1863, Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon stressed the almost miraculous nature of the Confederate victories at Sabine Pass and Galveston, noting that these battles, ‘‘for the results obtained by limited means[,] have rarely been matched in history.’’ 49 Conscious of their potential public relations value, the Confederate Congress passed a resolution declaring that Captain Odlum, Lieutenant Dowling, and every man in Dowling’s unit were entitled to the special thanks of Congress. The Davis Guard’s defense of the fort at Sabine Pass, the resolution proclaimed, represented ‘‘one of the most brilliant and heroic achievements in the history of this war.’’ To officially recognize this accomplishment, the resolution authorized President Jefferson Davis to extend to each of these men ‘‘the gratitude and admiration of their country.’’ 50 Back in Texas, there were those who believed that the brave Irishmen responsible for thwarting the Union invasion of the state were entitled to a more tangible recognition of their heroism. Several benefits were held in Houston to raise funds for the Davis Guard. Friar Felix Zoppa de Connobio also started a drive to raise money for the purpose of providing silver medals to the Guards and their officers. The money to make these medals was quickly raised, and Charles Gottchalk agreed to make them out of a silver coin from Mexico. When they were completed a substantial time later, each man was presented with one of the finished medals (Figure 33), together with a green ribbon from which to suspend it.51 The medals presented to the victors of the Battle of Sabine Pass were simple in both design and execution. On one side was engraved a Maltese cross and the letters ‘‘DG’’ for Davis Guard. On the other side were the words ‘‘Sabine Pass, September 8, 1863.’’ The medals became prize possessions and are exceptionally valuable as relics today. One reason that these medals are so rare is that the Confederacy did not have an official medal. That has led some historians and relic collectors to draw parallels with the Union’s Medal of Honor and to claim, with some accuracy, that the medals awarded to the Davis Guard were the only military medals ever officially authorized in the Confederacy.52 A man who was not technically a member of the Guards, Dr. George Bailey, was also honored highly by Texas and its citizens even long after the war. For the bravery he had exhibited at Sabine Pass, Bailey was voted the ‘‘freedom of the State’’ by the Texas Legislature. He was also awarded a sword and a medal by General Magruder. The sword had been specially chosen to

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figure 33 Sabine Pass Davis Guard Medal. From Collection of the American Numismatic Society, New York, New York.

be among the best of the ones that were taken from the ships that had been captured with the doctor’s aid at Sabine Pass.53 The defenders at Sabine Pass were not the only recipients of the Sabine Pass medal. In response to his kind words of praise, the Guards later sent one of the medals to President Jefferson Davis in Richmond, who prized it highly until he was unceremoniously relieved of it by his Union captors at the end of the war. Davis continued to search for his purloined medal long after the war, with no success. Finally, in 1875, when Davis visited Houston to attend the Texas State Fair, he was presented with a replacement medal by three surviving members of the Davis Guard.54 From his Mississippi home at Beauvoir, Davis continued to search for the original medal that had been presented to him for as long as he lived. Writing to the editor of a magazine for coin collectors in 1880, Davis solicited help in locating the stolen medal, stating that it served as a valued reminder of what he called ‘‘the very remarkable defense of Sabine Pass.’’ 55 When Jefferson Davis spoke in New Orleans in 1882, the former Confederate president still remembered the feisty Irishmen and how proud he had been of the medal they had sent him, explaining to his audience: The State of Texas had honored these men by striking off a medal, on the one side of which was the date and Sabine Pass; on the other the letters D.G., and D.G.—I think you won’t take it as egotism on my part—

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figure 34 Richard W. ‘‘Dick’’ Dowling Wearing His Davis Guard Medal. Courtesy of the Lawrence T. Jones III Collection, Austin, Texas.

stood for ‘‘Davis Guards.’’ The company had done me the honor to take my name, and I was the only honorary member of it; so I have a right to be proud of it.56 The presentation of these medals to Dowling and his men at the end of 1863 marked what might be seen as their high-water mark of the Civil War. For the remainder of the war, Dowling would serve primarily as a walking

praise and blame * 173 recruitment poster, having been designated the recruiting officer for Cook’s artillery regiment. Wearing his Sabine Pass medal (Figure 34), Dowling, with his fame and affable disposition, made a successful recruiter. By the end of the war, Dowling had been promoted to the rank of major, which was the capacity in which he eventually signed his parole. Until the end of the war the Guards continued to garrison a variety of forts along the Texas coast, including Fort Griffin at Sabine Pass. But they would never again participate in a major battle or demonstrate the uncanny prowess handling artillery that had made them legends to combatants on both sides of this conflict. Deprived of any enemy to fight, the Guards grew bored and unhappy. In fact, historian Andrew Forest Muir concluded from an examination of the official muster records that at least eight of the Guards appear to have deserted to the enemy by the end of January 1864.57 That some members of the Davis Guard may have joined the enemy (or, more likely, simply left for home) not long after their most famous encounter with that same enemy at Sabine Pass suggests that it was not particularly love of the Confederacy or hatred of the Union that prompted the men to stay at their post when confronted with what seemed to be an overwhelming attack by Captain Crocker’s gunboats. Instead, it suggests that the Irishmen held together and served as a team on that dangerous afternoon largely out of respect for one another, not to mention the fact that they simply loved a good fight. It is also a tribute to the personal leadership exhibited by Dick Dowling, who was able to motivate this small group of personally undisciplined men to perform extraordinary feats in the face of danger and potential disaster.

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chapter fifteen

The War Ends for Fort Griffin

y the end of September 1863, three weeks after the battle, the situa-

B

tion at Sabine Pass had returned almost to normal. General Magruder had moved more troops to the area, fearing that the Union might attempt to invade through that avenue again. The Union blockaders, on the other hand, viewed the sudden buildup in Confederate troops with alarm, fearing that the Rebels were preparing to use the captured Clifton and Sachem as part of another cottonclad armada that would steam out of Sabine Pass some morning in an attempt to raise the blockade. Like the men who had built Fort Griffin, the soldiers assigned to garrison duty in the vicinity of Sabine Pass continued to find it to be an uncomfortable place to serve, particularly in the evening when the sea breeze would die down. The heat was unpleasant enough, but it was actually the insects that made the place almost uninhabitable. Private Levi Lamoni Wight described his objections expressively, if not artfully, in this fashion: ‘‘There is nothing a goin on hear except fighting and our intir enimy consists of Moskeetos wich is very neumors and the largest I ever saw. Some of them has achule got feathers. They rise in the eavening in sech swarms as to darken the earth. We can look any time and see the Yankey boats but they learnd a leson before we came hear that taught them to stay out of reach.’’ 1 As Private Wight’s letter illustrates, virtually every letter from a soldier stationed at Sabine Pass during the war complained about the virtual plague of mosquitoes that blanketed the place in the evening. One resident recorded that when she first moved to Sabine City, a gentleman told her that if you wanted to see the sun set you had to use a ten-foot pole to make a hole big enough to see the sun. Although she did not believe the story at the time, she later came to believe that it was very near true.2 By the middle of October, the month following the battle, Commander Henry Rolando, on the Union blockader Seminole, reported that he could

the war ends for fort griffin * 175 see the captured gunboats near Sabine City in working order and urgently requested reinforcements.3 Despite repeated requests for help, no reinforcements were forthcoming due to a shortage of working ships in the West Blockading Squadron. Although Rolando’s pleas went unheeded and no additional warships were forthcoming, a variety of supply ships continued to provide fuel and provisions for the small Sabine Pass blockading force. One of these vessels—the coaling schooner Manhasset—was a continuing source of concern to Commander Rolando, who complained to his superiors that its crew was continually supplying liquor to his men as well as coal. Before this complaint could even be received and processed, however, the Manhasset was wrecked and driven ashore in a gale ten miles west of Sabine Pass. Delighted with this gift, the Confederates seized its cargo and crew and used so many of the ship’s timbers reinforcing the fort that they were building in the area that they felt obliged to name it Fort Manhasset (sometimes spelled Manhassett).4 Fort Manhasset was not the only fort in the Sabine City area that received attention after the smoke of the battle had cleared away. Less than a month following the battle, Colonel Sulakowski took another look at Fort Griffin’s defenses and found them wanting. He ordered construction of a ‘‘covered way’’ all around the fort, as well as an abatis made from mesquite trees. He then ordered the planting of sod with tall grass at the edge of the fort’s defenses. This vegetation was intended to be more than a gardening experiment. Sulakowski planned to bury thirteen explosive shells in the newly installed sod at forty-foot intervals. These explosives were to be connected by wires attached to stakes driven in the ground. The wire was to be placed strategically at a height of four inches above the ground and hidden from view. Although he did not give his proposed defenses a name, what Sulakowski was actually ordering was the installation of what today we would call land mines.5 Only a small part of the upgrades to the defenses of Sabine Pass appears to have been completed as Colonel Sulakowski had ordered. These elaborate plans were abandoned when it became apparent that Sabine Pass was not the Union’s invasion route, as General Magruder had feared. General Banks had learned his lesson with respect to underestimating the defenses at Sabine Pass. When his invasion plan was frustrated in such catastrophic fashion at the Pass, General Banks had decided to instead land his force along the lower Texas coast, as President Lincoln had originally suggested. Appearing suddenly off of Brazos Santiago on November 1, 1863, the Union troops landed the next day and quickly occupied Brownsville.6 Paus-

176 * sabine pass ing only long enough to send a letter boasting that the flag of the Union finally flew over Texas soil, Banks continued up the coast, capturing Corpus Christi two weeks later.7 As he moved up the coast, Banks began to rethink his strategy to occupy Texas. He now began to tell Washington that the disaster at Sabine Pass had actually done him a favor because it served primarily to divert Rebel forces to the eastern part of Texas (which was true), making his campaign in the western part of the state almost uncontested.8 Banks made steady progress in his long march up the coast, but it was not fast enough or far enough for his superiors in Washington. Irritated that Banks had once again ignored his earlier advice to mount an expedition up the Red River, General-in-Chief Halleck chided Banks in December for not giving him advance notice before launching his movements against either Sabine Pass or the Rio Grande. Once again recommending action in Louisiana, Halleck further suggested that the current operation under way up the lower Texas coast exposed the Union to the potential for yet another disaster, since Banks had divided his army ‘‘with the enemy between the two parts, ready to fall upon either with his entire force.’’ 9 Banks tried to defend his reasoning and his choice of invasion routes, but by this point he knew he was wasting his time. Halleck was determined to see an operation proceed up the Red River from Louisiana into East Texas, a course he had suggested repeatedly to Banks. Finally, in January 1864, Banks acceded to Halleck’s wishes and began making plans to lead a combined army and navy expedition up the Red River. The expedition on the Texas coast was put on hold, eventually to be dismantled and shipped to Louisiana. Blockade running in and out of Sabine Pass continued throughout this entire period, gradually intensifying as Union victories left fewer and fewer ports still in Confederate hands. Seeking the explanation for this phenomenon, Captain John B. Marchand surveyed the ports along the Texas coast in March 1864. His study confirmed that as a blockade runner’s destination, Sabine Pass had one undeniable physical advantage over all of the other inlets on that coast other than Galveston. ‘‘Sabine Pass has ordinarily 7 feet of water on the bar and is the only one on the coast with [a] muddy bottom; all the rest have hard sand bars. Vessels drawing 10 feet may, under the most favorable circumstances of a southerly gale and heavy swell, be forced through the mud into the [Sabine Pass].’’ 10 To say that ships could get over the bar at Sabine Pass during favorable circumstances did not mean that they were invariably able to do so. This was illustrated when the Clifton, now turned into a Confederate blockade runner after its capture by Dowling’s men, attempted to run out of Sabine Pass on

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figure 35 The Walking Beam of the U.S.S. Clifton, in Riverside Park, Beaumont, Texas. Photograph by Edward T. Cotham, Jr.

the night of March 21, 1864. Maneuvering that large steamer, heavily laden with a cargo of cotton, through the channels over the bar at night proved too difficult even for its experienced Confederate crew. The Clifton ran aground on the west side of the bar, leaving its crew no alternative but to burn the ship after tossing most of its cargo overboard. Seeing the Clifton on fire at dawn, Melancthon Woolsey, the commander of the Union blockader Princess Royal, sent a boat as close as possible to ascertain if anything could be salvaged. All that could be saved, however, was one slightly scorched bale of cotton. The current had swept the rest of the cargo away during the night. For several days, cotton bales and partially burned wood floated down the coast, eventually providing tangible evidence to the Union blockaders off Galveston that the Clifton had finally been destroyed.11 Today, the ‘‘walking beam’’ of the Clifton (Figure 35) is preserved in Beaumont’s Riverside Park as a visual reminder of the thwarted Union invasion effort, as well as the unsuccessful attempt to use the Clifton as a source of military materials for the Confederacy. It is interesting to note that during the same time that the Union was trying to turn captured blockade

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figure 36 Calcasieu Pass. Detail from the Official Records Atlas, Plate 157.

runners into gunboats (e.g., the Arizona), the Confederates were trying to turn captured gunboats into blockade runners (e.g., the Clifton). Less than two months following the destruction of the Clifton, the men in Fort Manhasset near Sabine Pass would have their last military success of the war. Ironically, it would involve some of the same people and ships that had participated with the Clifton in the invasion thwarted by Dick Dowling and his Davis Guard. This time the scene of the events would be Calcasieu Pass (Figure 36), located in Louisiana about thirty miles east of Sabine Pass. Since early in the war, the area around Calcasieu Pass had been a stronghold of Unionists, as well as opportunists who sought to profit by selling supplies to the Union navy. Although the Confederates had built a small fort there at the outset of the war, it had been abandoned by the time Frederick Crocker visited it in September 1862. As the war went on, the absence of Confederate authority in this area made it a convenient source of supplies for the Union navy and a nuisance to the Confederate authorities in Texas and Louisiana. At the end of April 1864, Acting Volunteer Lieutenant Benjamin W. Lor-

the war ends for fort griffin * 179 ing was instructed to take his ship, the Wave, and go to Calcasieu Pass to get additional supplies for the Union navy. Joining him on this mission would be one of the Union ships that had escaped capture at Sabine Pass—the Granite City. Loring’s orders were to assist the army in getting livestock and to use the opportunity to seek out some recruits for the navy from the loyal residents in the area.12 The navy had done this on several previous occasions. It sounded like a simple assignment. This time, however, the mission would turn out to be anything but routine. Arriving at the entrance to Calcasieu Pass, Captain Loring confirmed that the small Confederate fort was empty by following the normal precaution of firing a few shells into it. Receiving no response, Loring then moved up the river about two miles and began negotiating with the local residents for supplies. He also put out the word that the navy was looking for a few good men.13 Word of the navy’s presence traveled farther and faster than Loring could have anticipated, quickly reaching the ears of Colonel William H. Griffin, who was still in charge of the Confederate troops in the area of Sabine Pass. Griffin was tired of receiving reports about the intrusion of these Union ships in what he viewed as Confederate territory and wired his superiors for instructions. The response he received was direct and unequivocal, telling him to organize an attack against the Union expedition at Calcasieu Pass ‘‘at once.’’ With this force, he was instructed, he should ‘‘disperse, defeat, or capture the expedition.’’ 14 The Union sailors at Calcasieu Pass thought themselves perfectly safe. Between Sabine and Calcasieu Passes, they believed, was only impassable marsh. They went to sleep on the night of May 5, 1864, therefore, feeling perfectly secure.15 This would turn out to be a dangerous illusion. To make the immediate attack called for by his orders, Griffin turned to Colonel Ashley W. Spaight and his Twenty-first Texas Infantry Regiment, who were at this time stationed up the old eastern channel of the Sabine River at Niblett’s Bluff. Taking a battery of four small artillery pieces and most of the garrison of Fort Manhasset, Griffin and Spaight hurried to Calcasieu Pass. At dawn on May 6, 1864, Griffin’s guns opened fire at the Federal ships, catching them completely by surprise. Trapped in the narrow channel, with no steam pressure in their boilers, the Federals on board the Wave and Granite City had no choice but to return fire at the Rebels, who were concealed only by the tall prairie grass that lined the river.16 Although the Confederates had skillfully caught the Union ships in the middle of a deadly crossfire and took full advantage of the element of surprise, the gunners on board the Granite City and Wave quickly went to their

180 * sabine pass assigned stations and began returning fire with precision. The Union gunners at Calcasieu had good initial success, unlike their earlier experience at Sabine Pass, managing to disable some of the Confederate artillery pieces. The Confederates discovered quickly that an artillery battle with Union gunboats is better conducted from the relative safety of a fortified position, as they had done at Fort Griffin. Firing from the open prairies surrounding Calcasieu Pass, they learned, exposed both the guns and the crews tending them to the full destructive force of the enemy’s return fire.17 As casualties mounted on both sides, the outcome of the battle appeared in doubt. Eventually, the well-directed fire of the numerous Confederate sharpshooters proved too much for the Granite City to handle, and it surrendered. At this point, the Confederates then turned their full attention to the Wave, concentrating all of their fire at that vessel. This placed the crew of the Wave at a disadvantage because the gunners found themselves unable to return fire for some of the same reasons that had led to the Union disaster at Fort Griffin. As at Sabine Pass, the Confederate fire was directed primarily from a position in front of the Wave, leaving only that ship’s bow guns able to return fire. Only when the ship would fortuitously drift slightly sideways in the current could the broadside guns be directed at the enemy.18 His boilers leaking and his steam drum disabled, Captain Benjamin Loring of the Wave was finally forced to surrender his ship. This ended the battle at Calcasieu Pass, yet another victory for the Confederate garrison near Sabine Pass. Colonel Griffin and his men were elated to learn that they had captured one of the only Union gunboats (the Granite City) that had escaped from Dowling’s fire at Fort Griffin the previous year.19 A correspondent to a Boston newspaper concluded his account of this event by observing that ‘‘The blow is a sad one to the squadron, and Sabine Pass seems to be an unlucky place to operate.’’ 20 Convinced that bad luck could not be blamed entirely for what had happened, Admiral Farragut was furious to receive word of the disaster at Calcasieu Pass. Blaming it primarily on the negligence and cowardice of the ships’ commanders, as he customarily did, Farragut was not satisfied with the written explanations he received from his captains (now prisoners) under a flag of truce. As he sarcastically interpreted these explanations in relaying them back to Washington, the captains of the Wave and Granite City ‘‘had come to the conclusion, as most of those gentlemen do, that there is no danger in the enemy’s country so long as you do not see it.’’ Noting that Captain Lamson of the Granite City had previously been referred to the navy because he had ‘‘acted badly in the Sabine affair,’’ Farragut acknowledged that ‘‘it is very

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mortifying to see my vessels behave so badly.’’ 21 Depressed by the repeated disasters to his west, Farragut was relieved to at long last turn his attention to the east and to the important upcoming campaign to capture Mobile. As the last full year of the war (1864) drew to a close, blockade running through Sabine Pass and elsewhere along the Texas coast reached epidemic proportions as the number of other free Confederate ports continued to dwindle. This illicit traffic did not go without notice. Realizing for the first time the true magnitude of this commercial activity, the Union eventually decided to get in on the act itself, in effect trying to run its own blockade. Strangely enough, it was a renegade Texan who was the chief proponent of taking advantage of this opportunity. Andrew Jackson Hamilton, a Texas Unionist whom Abraham Lincoln had appointed to the positions of brigadier general and military governor of Texas, had after long years of personal lobbying managed to persuade certain key officials in Washington (most notably President Lincoln) that he could be of service to the Union by obtaining cotton from other ‘‘loyal’’ Texans to feed the needs of Northern textile mills. President Lincoln responded to Hamilton’s request by issuing an order dated August 9, 1864, authorizing Hamilton to issue passes to persons shipping cotton out of Galveston or Sabine Pass. These passes, Lincoln’s order provided, would allow the bearer to pass through the blockade with his valuable cargo without being molested or hindered.22 When a copy of the order authorizing these passes was sent to Admiral Farragut, he dutifully forwarded it along to his officers blockading the Texas coast. At the same time, however, he privately branded Hamilton’s operation a ‘‘swindle’’ and referred Lincoln’s order back to the secretary of the navy expressing his concerns.23 When Secretary Welles received from Farragut the president’s order authorizing Hamilton cotton passes, he was as outraged as the admiral had been upon learning of the scheme. Like Farragut, Welles had not been consulted before the order was issued. Also like Farragut, he branded the plan nothing more than a con game and believed that the navy was being set up to assist the perpetrator. Welles confronted the president with his objections to the plan, and an embarrassed Lincoln finally confessed that ‘‘it was one of [Secretary of State William Henry] Seward’s arrangements, that he guessed would come out well enough; but evidently did not himself know, or if he knew was unwilling or unable to explain.’’ Welles was not mollified; he noted in his diary his continued belief that there was ‘‘unmistakable rascality in this cotton order.’’ Welles continued to work to get the order reversed and eventually, several months later, was successful in doing so.24

182 * sabine pass Back in Texas, things were reasonably quiet. While a series of bored Confederate units garrisoned the forts in the Sabine Pass area, the number of other Southern ports open to blockade runners continued to shrink. With Farragut’s capture of Mobile Bay in August, the only significant remaining Confederate ports along the Gulf Coast were all in Texas. With the capture of Fort Fisher in North Carolina in January 1865, the last major Confederate coastal fortification along the Atlantic coast had fallen into the enemy’s hands. It was easy to predict what would happen next. Confederate officials from Virginia to Texas could feel the grinding wheels of the Union military machine turning in the direction of the Texas coast and speculated that the next major point of attack along the coast would be either at Galveston or Sabine Pass.25 At this late stage in the war, it was difficult for the Confederate officials in Texas even to find enough armed men to physically occupy the earthworks at Sabine Pass. In March 1865, Confederate Chief Engineer Henry Douglas surveyed the defenses along the Texas coast and found them so insufficiently garrisoned that he believed they should be treated as if they were already in the Union’s hands. ‘‘I consider the reduction of the defenses of Galveston and of Sabine Pass a work of so short a time,’’ he reported, that ‘‘I shall discuss the question which I now consider it our duty to direct our energies and attention to, regarding those works in the enemy’s possession.’’ 26 The assumption of enemy control of Fort Griffin was not long in becoming an accomplished fact. Desertions to the enemy increased in the spring of 1865 as it became clear that the Confederacy as an independent nation was doomed.27 As General Magruder was in the process of sending representatives to negotiate the surrender of Confederate forces in Texas, he attempted to negotiate a truce under which the Union navy would not attack at Sabine Pass while these negotiations were in progress. Before notice of this truce could even be delivered to the Confederate commander at Sabine Pass, however, the forts at that point were abandoned. Magruder was chagrined to learn from his opponent, Captain Benjamin Sands of the United States Navy, and not through his own rapidly disintegrating chain of command, that the forts in the Sabine City area had been deserted and their guns spiked on May 24, 1865.28 At first, there was no particular hurry on the Union’s part to occupy Sabine Pass. The captain of the steamer Owasco raised the United States flag over Fort Griffin, which he reported as having five bombproofs covered with two feet of solid timber and two layers of railroad iron, the whole of this structure being blanketed by four feet of earth.29 The first unit of

the war ends for fort griffin * 183 Union troops assigned to garrison this captured fort consisted of the Seventyseventh U.S. Colored Infantry Regiment.30 These orders were suspended shortly after issuance, however, and other, white regiments were assigned to the task of occupying Sabine Pass.31 It would have been ironic and appropriate if the first group of Union troops to occupy Fort Griffin had been a regiment of black men similar in number and color to its builders. But it was not to be. The change of assignments and substitution of white occupation troops were probably due to the fact that the Union high command had learned that there was a substantial store of valuable cotton located at Sabine Pass, which as a prize of war could potentially provide a financial benefit to the officers who captured it. General Phil Sheridan hurriedly telegraphed Gordon Granger, who was occupying Galveston: ‘‘Send a small force to occupy Sabine City as quickly as you can. There are several thousand bales of Government cotton there. Let the[se] troops remain until the cotton is gotten out.’’ 32 Faced with this prospect, the Thirtyseventh Illinois Volunteers Regiment was hastily redirected from Galveston to Sabine City to secure the cotton.33 It is perhaps fitting that the Civil War ended for Sabine Pass on something of a commercial note. Throughout the conflict, both sides had repeatedly and almost reluctantly been drawn into a struggle to seize or defend the Pass because of its commercial importance. With the war at long last at an end, the Pass could once again emerge as an outlet for the many products yielded by the rich forests and fields that lined the river system emptying through its flat and marshy entrance.

Conclusion

n the end, Sabine Pass was not destined to be the important port city

I

that Sam Houston and its other founders had envisioned when it was originally established with such high hopes in the 1830s. In the first two decades following the war, however, things appeared to be moving in a favorable direction for the commercial prospects of the town. The railroad that had been destroyed during the Civil War was rebuilt in the early 1880s, and the city gradually regained most of the population that it had lost during the war due to the migration of civilians to the interior. But a hurricane in 1886 almost ruined the town, followed by two more destructive storms in 1900 and 1915. As much as its inhabitants hated to admit it, the city of Sabine Pass was developing the deserved reputation of being too low and exposed to storms, posing too much risk in the minds of entrepreneurs contemplating the establishment of new and expensive business ventures.1 Even after its devastation at regular intervals by storms, there still remained a chance that Sabine Pass might emerge in the early 1900s as a port of some importance. The discovery in 1901 of the Spindletop oil field to the north near Beaumont briefly enhanced the city’s prospects to become a primary commercial outlet for the expanding volumes of petroleum and petroleum products that were to be generated from the giant oil fields of East Texas. But two New York bankers named Kountze, owners of most of the important land around Sabine Pass (and founders of a nearby new town confusingly named ‘‘Sabine’’), refused to sell railroad promoter Arthur Stillwell any land. As a result, Stillwell located his railroad terminus at the north end of Sabine Lake, at a town which he immodestly named ‘‘Port Arthur’’ after himself.2 With the commercial development of Port Arthur, the window of opportunity at Sabine Pass and the neighboring town of Sabine had slammed shut.

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The inhabitants of the sleepy little fishing village at the entrance to the pass were forced to watch helplessly as the towns to its north, Port Arthur, Beaumont, and Orange, grew larger and attracted port facilities and investments that might have been steered to Sabine Pass if events had taken only a slightly different course. As if to pour salt in the wounds it had inflicted, the City of Port Arthur formally annexed the small town of Sabine Pass in 1978, leading to the latter’s elimination as a separately incorporated entity. Today, the city of Sabine Pass is remembered primarily as a historical curiosity. In addition to being the site of the Sabine Pass Battleground State Historical Park, it is also known as the birthplace of one of rock and roll’s early pioneers: Jiles P. Richardson. Richardson, who became famous under the stage name ‘‘The Big Bopper,’’ recorded the hit song ‘‘Chantilly Lace’’ and was killed in the same tragic 1959 plane crash in Iowa that claimed the lives of fellow musicians Ritchie Valens and Buddy Holly.3 Like these three musicians, Fort Griffin was not destined to survive its fame for a lengthy period. The fort that Dowling and his men had defended so tenaciously did not last long after the Civil War. It had never been intended to be a permanent structure, and the materials from which it was constructed (earth, wood, and railroad iron) gradually either were salvaged or disappeared as they were claimed by the river or subsided into the marshy ground on which the fort had been located. Construction activity associated with later fortifications, particularly in connection with twentieth-century defensive measures, also makes it difficult to see any remaining traces of the original fort. Although Texas historians continue to hope that traces of its footprint may someday be uncovered, three separate archaeological investigations have so far failed to locate any tangible remains of Fort Griffin. Tangible remains of the Battle of Sabine Pass do continue to surface from time to time. In January 1902, for example, a dredge working in the Pass began shooting out leather belts, pistols, sword scabbards, knapsacks, brass sword hilts and buckles, as well as various parts of guns and ammunition. Local historians speculated that this material was coming from the site south of Fort Griffin where the Clifton had been disabled.4 Unlike the efforts to find Fort Griffin, the location of the five redoubts comprising nearby Fort Manhasset has been definitively established. In 1970, after a search of several months, prominent local historian and Nederland resident W. T. Block determined the fort’s probable position using wartime correspondence and maps from the National Archives. Following these maps, Block discovered that traces of the original trenches were still visible.

186 * sabine pass Digging down near the mounds where he thought traces of the fort should be found, Block uncovered a number of cannonballs and shells, as well as the crumbling remains of kegs of gunpowder.5 Like Fort Griffin, its most famous defender, Dick Dowling, did not survive the war by a lengthy period. As soon as the war ended, he lost no time in going back into the saloon business, announcing to the public that ‘‘The Bank’’ was back in business, with Dowling acting as its president and cashier. The new Bank dealt in the following ‘‘exchanges’’: Brandy, Rum, Whisky, Champagne, Claret, and Port.6 The Bank’s proprietor was an object of curiosity to the many Union soldiers stationed in Houston to maintain order during the Reconstruction period. On one occasion, an army officer brought several of his friends into Dowling’s bar to see the famous man who had repelled an entire Union invasion at Sabine Pass with only a small company of Irishmen. As a joke, the officer handed Dowling a large-denomination Confederate note to pay for his drinks. But the joke was on the officer. Although he knew the note was worthless, Dowling made no sign of protest but instead accepted the bill and gave the officer his change in gold and silver, refusing to thereafter accept legitimate payment and undo the transaction when the embarrassed officer wished to make good on his debt.7 In addition to signing autographs and operating his bar, as soon as the war ended Dowling resumed his consistent practice of being a responsible and conscientious member of his community. He donated money for a wide variety of social causes and because of his celebrity status was placed in charge of fund-raising for many civic organizations and charities. Although his drinking establishments were successful, Dowling longed to be involved in other, more challenging, enterprises, eventually becoming an owner or stockholder in businesses involved with brick-making, gas lighting, and streetcars. Perhaps his most intriguing investment was a partnership that Dowling formed in 1866 with two other men to obtain oil and gas leases in eight counties. These were some of the earliest oil and gas leases in Texas and covered properties in counties from which large quantities of petroleum would eventually be produced.8 Dowling might well have become one of the most prominent men in Texas had he not had the bad fortune to be living in Houston in 1867. In August of that year, yellow fever made its dreaded appearance in Galveston and quickly spread to Houston, where a good proportion of the residents became ill. As he had proven throughout his life, Dowling was at his best in time of crisis. He responded to this epidemic by nursing the sick and giving out free

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brandy to those suffering from the disease. Dowling himself came down with yellow fever in September, but after appearing to make a recovery, suffered a relapse and died on September 23, 1867.9 He was only thirty years old. In contrast to the young man who died well before his full promise could be realized, Frederick Crocker, Dowling’s adversary at Sabine Pass, ended up living for a lengthy period following the end of the war. As part of the Grant administration, Crocker was sent to South America, where he served as U.S. consul for about ten years. He apparently also was active in the meatpacking business. In 1911, almost ninety years old, he died and was buried in Montevideo, Uruguay.10 Crocker almost certainly went to his grave believing that the army had failed him at Sabine Pass, costing him both fame and freedom, and earning him only a lengthy captivity in Southern prisons. It is ironic, therefore, that of all the men who are associated with the Battle of Sabine Pass, the man who would have the most distinguished postwar career was William Buel Franklin, the army commander who had probably done the least to distinguish himself at that battle. Although he had graduated first in his class at West Point, it turned out that Franklin was not well suited for war. Wounded in the Red River Campaign in Louisiana in 1864, he ended the war with little to show for his service but a cloud of criticism. What Franklin had not accomplished in war, he now sought to accomplish in time of peace. A competent engineer, in the fall of 1865, Franklin sought and obtained the position of vice president in charge of manufacturing at Colt’s Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company in Hartford, Connecticut. Franklin worked for Colt for more than twenty years. Colt was faced with the problem of overcoming the economic obstacles and business slowdown faced by all arms manufacturers following the end of the war. Responding to this challenge, Franklin supervised the retooling and remodeling of Colt’s factories to manufacture a whole new series of weapons, beginning with the Gatling gun in 1866.11 Seven years later, in 1873, the Colt firearms designers under Franklin’s leadership would eventually produce the six-shot .45 caliber revolver, one of the most famous weapons of all time. Used throughout the West, this gun would reach near-legendary status as the ‘‘peacemaker’’ that helped tame the frontier of Texas. In a final bit of irony, although General William Franklin’s attempt to subdue Texas in 1863 had been thwarted at Sabine Pass, and he had been shot by Texas troops in 1864, he would finally make his mark on the state ten years following this rude reception. The guns his factories pro-

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duced would become the standard weapon issued to Texas Rangers and the gun of choice for cowboys throughout the wilder parts of the state for years to come.12 It was sometimes said that the Texas Rangers used Franklin’s guns to follow a policy of shooting first and asking questions later. This same aggressive reputation was earned on the water by David Farragut, who ended the Civil War as unquestionably the greatest naval hero produced by either side. Indeed, his stature after the war was so great that postwar biographers began to refer to him in terms like ‘‘The Union’s Nelson,’’ arguing with some justification that Farragut had proven himself as adept a tactician with modern steam warships as Nelson had done using sailing ships-of-the-line.13 This reputation was given its ultimate reward in 1866 when Congress made him a full admiral, later giving him command of the European Squadron. This command was primarily an honorary one, and Farragut embarked on what would turn out to be a final victory tour of Europe. He was in ill health for the remainder of his life, which ended in 1870 when he died following a heart attack suffered during a visit to the Portsmouth Navy Yard in Maine.14 Farragut is remembered to this day, and justly so, for the aggressive tactics he successfully exhibited in his famous naval exploits during the Civil War. While President Lincoln had trouble on land finding a general who would take the fight to the enemy with the zeal and forcefulness the job demanded, in Farragut he had found early in the war a naval officer who personified those qualities. Farragut had his share of failures also, but they were less publicized and less consequential than those of his army counterparts. At Port Hudson, for example, Farragut managed to get only his lead ship and the ship lashed to it past the Confederate guns, the rest of his force suffering loss or heavy damage. Although at Port Hudson Farragut did succeed in getting at least a couple of ships in position above the forts where they could blockade the mouth of the Red River, even Farragut admitted that on balance that action was a disaster. Along with other commanders in the armies on both sides, Farragut learned during the Civil War an important lesson: that the advent of new more accurate and longer-range weapons had made the direct attack against a well-fortified position difficult to employ successfully. Historians Grady McWhiney and Perry Jamieson presented detailed calculations in their important study, aptly titled Attack and Die, demonstrating statistically that during the Civil War the attacking side in land engagements (usually the Confederates) consistently suffered more casualties.15 At battles like Fredericksburg, Cold Harbor, Malvern Hill, Franklin, and Gettysburg, infantry commanders time and again sent their men in frontal assaults

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against fortified and entrenched positions, only to see them slaughtered in huge numbers with little to show for it. McWhiney and Jamieson argued in Attack and Die that the Confederates made the majority of these costly attacks because it was basically programmed in their blood, almost a genetic by-product of their Celtic heritage.16 Ironically, this same lesson was being learned by the United States Navy on America’s rivers, although the most aggressive of these naval commanders—Admiral Farragut—was of Spanish descent (not Celtic) on his father’s side. Since the admiral was a Southerner by birth, however, his preference for the attack may provide some additional evidence in support of McWhiney and Jamieson’s hypothesis that something in the social fabric of the South made Southerners more prone to aggressive military tactics, whether on land or sea. The U.S. Navy’s much less documented contribution to McWhiney and Jamieson’s hypothesis might well be titled Attack and Sink. At places like Port Hudson, Fort Donelson, Drewry’s Bluff, and Sabine Pass, fleet commanders made the naval equivalent of a frontal charge against strongly fortified Confederate positions, often with the same disastrous results as their land counterparts. Thus, the Battle of Sabine Pass must be seen as more than a quaint aberration or historical fluke; in many ways it is just the most dramatic example of a tactical lesson that the navy was taught repeatedly throughout the war. The Union disaster at Sabine Pass provided concrete evidence that ships, even heavily armed vessels, could not inevitably be assumed to have the advantage in confrontations with shore fortifications. One of the first in the military establishment to learn this lesson, surprisingly enough, was Admiral Farragut, whose aggressive tactics had undoubtedly inspired and influenced the attack at Sabine Pass. But even Farragut had apparently begun to reassess or at least refine that strategy after his experience at Port Hudson. By the fall of 1863, when the debacle at Sabine Pass took place, Farragut had come far enough in his thinking to condemn the attack as bad strategy, particularly given the vessels employed in the attack. When the opportunity finally came in the summer of 1864 to attack the forts at the entrance to Mobile Bay, Farragut realized that the importance of that particular objective justified the risk, but this time he used four ironclad monitors in making the attack. This dramatic attack succeeded even though the admiral ignored the threatening torpedoes (mines) and ordered his ships to enter the bay and engage the enemy forts and ships in a desperate battle. After his narrow success at Mobile, Farragut apparently refined his thinking even further as to when and how ships ought to engage forts. When the navy

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asked his opinion a month later about the wisdom of making an attack up the Cape Fear River near Wilmington, North Carolina, Farragut discouraged the attempt, noting that the draft of the ships assigned to the expedition was too great and the river too shallow to allow the ships to get close enough to the enemy’s batteries to fire their broadside guns.17 If Farragut’s objections sound familiar, it is because the admiral was merely repeating the lesson that he and the rest of the navy had learned the previous year from the disaster at Sabine Pass. The difficulty of making frontal assaults on forts was but the first of many lessons that military strategists learned from the battle at Sabine Pass and other battles on Southern rivers during the Civil War. As Farragut had observed early in the war, river warfare required a different kind of ship with differently placed guns. A warship on a river could not always turn to the side in such a fashion that its guns could deliver a broadside at a target, particularly if it were a target like a fort located ahead of the ship. Since the ship could not always turn to point its guns, the guns must be mounted so that they could independently turn to fire in multiple directions. Much has been made by historians of the unusual design of the U.S.S. Monitor, which participated in the first battle between ironclads at Hampton Roads, Virginia. Actually, the most revolutionary part of the Monitor’s design was not its iron armor (a feature that really did not endure in warship design much beyond the Civil War), but was instead its revolving turret (recently raised from the ocean floor) featuring two large guns. The maneuverability of these guns was a major design advancement that would come to be a central feature of modern naval warfare. Ironclad ships like the Monitor, of course, could never have been a major factor in battles like Sabine Pass because that body of water, like many other rivers in the South, was too shallow to permit such a heavy craft to operate. This was a problem that would plague the Union throughout the war, causing the navy to experiment with a variety of partially armored ships that were often called ‘‘tinclads’’ because of their hybrid nature. Although these lighter ships generally provided good service in shallow Western rivers, there remained a need that went largely unsatisfied throughout the war for a speedy, maneuverable craft that could operate in shallow water. This was a problem that would persist long after the Civil War and is in part the niche that was eventually filled by the PT boats that performed so valiantly in the Pacific theater of World War II. This book began with a famous postwar speech delivered in New Orleans by Jefferson Davis in which the former president of the Confederacy offered

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his assessment that the Battle of Sabine Pass ‘‘was more remarkable than the battle of Thermopylae’’ and was ‘‘without parallel in ancient or modern war.’’ It is up to the reader to judge whether this battle meets the high rhetorical expectations set by Davis, but it is certainly difficult to point to another battle in which so few men defeated so many in the decisive fashion that Dick Dowling and his Irishmen did on September 8, 1863. Comparing a Civil War battle like Sabine Pass, which involved artillery and naval forces, to an epic battle involving hand-to-hand fighting like Thermopylae seems at first to be a mere rhetorical device, devoid of any really meaningful basis for comparison. But, in fact, these battles have more in common than might first be supposed. In 480 b.c., the Persian leader Xerxes chose to lead his forces down the eastern coast of Greece through the pass at Thermopylae as a pathway into the areas bordering Athens and Sparta. He could have led his forces to the west and taken a path through the mountains. He chose instead to take his army through Thermopylae so he could stay relatively close to the coast and the potential support of his ships. Xerxes did not intend to fight a battle at Thermopylae; his Greek opponents chose to make a stand there, forcing a battle, because they knew that its narrow expanse would keep the Persians from bringing to bear their overwhelming numbers. Like Xerxes at Thermopylae, General Banks did not intend to fight a battle at Sabine Pass. It was merely a convenient point from which to launch his strike against Houston and Galveston. Banks chose the most eastern part of Texas to make his invasion for much the same reason that Xerxes had chosen the eastern route into Greece two thousand years before. Sabine Pass was simply the nearest point to his base of support in Louisiana. It was also close enough to the coast to enable the navy to provide logistical support. In both cases, the invasion route made sense when the invasion was launched and was not the product of any clear strategic error. The Confederates at Fort Griffin, echoing King Leonidas and the Spartans at Thermopylae, chose to take advantage of the natural topography of Sabine Pass to allow them to apply all of the limited force they could muster while permitting their opponent to use only a small portion of his force against the defenders. And one of the first things Leonidas and his allies did upon reaching Thermopylae (whose name means the ‘‘hot gates’’) was to take a wall of rocks that was already present in that pass and expand it to make a small fortification to facilitate their defensive scheme. King Leonidas and Dick Dowling share more than just their use of natural earthen fortifications. The traditional speech from a Spartan mother to her son going to war was ‘‘Come

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back with your shield or on it,’’ meaning that he was expected to return home either a victor or dead. This is remarkably similar to the ‘‘Victory or death!’’ motto adopted by Dowling and his men at Sabine Pass. There is one way, of course, in which the Battle of Thermopylae differed significantly from Sabine Pass, and that difference, literally a ‘‘path not taken,’’ is central to explaining the difference in their respective outcomes. After several days of failing to dislodge the Greeks from their defensive position blocking the pass, Xerxes eventually located a goat path that went around the Spartans’ position. A portion of the Persian forces were maneuvered over the path and into the rear of the Greek force. With their position flanked, the writing was on the wall. Leonidas sent the rest of the Greek army away, staying with his Spartans to fight to the death of the last man. Unlike the Persians at Thermopylae, the Union forces at Sabine Pass did not even seriously try to find a way out of the trap into which they had stepped. General Weitzel and his troops never even set foot on land to follow what might have been their own marshy goat path around the flank of Fort Griffin and into its unfinished north wall. If they had taken this route, the battlefield at Sabine Pass might today commemorate the place where Dick Dowling and his Irishmen gave their lives to delay for at least a few hours the Union invasion of Texas. But because this flanking movement was never even attempted, the battlefield today represents one of the clearest instances in military history where a small force has used the leverage of topography and position to inflict a crushing defeat on a much larger and more powerful opponent. Dowling’s fame for this remarkable victory has always been greater in Texas than it was outside the state. A California historian correctly noted in the 1920s that ‘‘There is not a school boy in all Texas who does not know [about Dowling’s battle at Sabine Pass]. And there is not a school boy in all New England who ever heard of Dick Dowling or the Sabine Pass.’’ 18 Reflecting this same level of local interest, Texas historians have consistently been more effusive in their praise of this battle than historians from outside the state. Colonel Harold B. Simpson, for example, had to go even farther back in military history than Thermopylae to find a parallel, concluding that at Fort Griffin, Dowling and his men won ‘‘immortal fame in one of the greatest ‘David-Goliath exploits’ in modern military history.’’ 19 Like Thermopylae, the legendary combat between David and Goliath is in some ways a very instructive comparison. David was able to defeat Goliath by using his artillery (a sling) to overcome the size advantage of his

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opponent. The Confederates at Fort Griffin confronted a different kind of giant, but used their own artillery to even the odds, with equally decisive results. The very fact that military history records so few instances where Davids actually defeat Goliaths leads naturally and inevitably to the question of how such an unusual outcome came to take place at Sabine Pass. As we have seen, the answer seems to involve far more than the fact that Dick Dowling and his men were brave (which they were) or that they were accomplished artillerists (which they also were). Likewise, the outcome of the battle seems to revolve around more than the fact that the Union planners of the battle made some terrible mistakes (which they did) or that the Union army failed to furnish proper support (which it unquestionably did). Finally, although luck seemed to be a commodity in desperately short supply on the Union side in this battle, it is also unfair to suggest that the battle should be chalked up entirely to the intervention of Providence on the Confederate side. The confrontation at Sabine Pass was in a very real sense a conflict between the aggressive naval tactics of Admiral David Farragut and a fort that was the tangible reflection of the hard work and ingenuity of two foreignborn Confederate engineers. Dowling and his determined band of Irishmen were able to defend their fort so successfully only because Colonel Sulakowski and Major Kellersberg had designed and built it in just such a fashion that a small band of men occupying it could apply maximum defensive pressure against a larger attacking foe. It was located at just the right position to allow the defenders to bring all of their resources to bear upon the enemy while preventing the enemy from responding with his full force. Once Crocker and his ships committed to the strategy of charging up the relatively narrow channels at Fort Griffin, Dowling and his men had the Union ships just where they wanted them. They were essentially shooting fish in a barrel. Some of the fish even recognized their predicament. After the war, a member of the 161st New York Regiment named John W. Merwin reflected back on the strange events of the battle in which his regiment had played such an inglorious part. Companies from Merwin’s regiment had formed part of the army’s landing party that never landed. Other companies had served as sharpshooters on the Sachem, Arizona, and Granite City. From Merwin’s vantage point near the entrance to Sabine Pass, it had looked like the Union gunboats (particularly the Sachem) came very close to the Confederate fort. To his credit, Merwin recognized the nature of the trap into which the Confederates had drawn the gunboats and concluded that the conventional wis-

194 * sabine pass dom about who had possessed the upper hand going into this battle may well have been mistaken. As for Dowling and his men, they did good work; and yet I don’t see how they could have done otherwise. The range was close, especially for the Sachem. Even a raw recruit could not very well miss, under all ordinary circumstances, and with veteran artillerymen the Sachem would have been sent under; as it was, a chance shot crippled her in such a way that her further progress was stopped; the same with the Clifton. It may not be out of place to say, as regards Dowling’s numerical force, he had all he needed to work his guns effectively. It was simply a fight between a trio of wooden gunboats fully exposed, at short range, to the concentrated fire of a well-protected battery, whose work was made effective only by two chance shots.20 If Dowling’s men were shooting fish in a barrel, Merwin might have added, it was a barrel into which the Union navy willingly inserted itself. It is easy in hindsight, of course, to suggest that Captain Crocker should never have taken his lightly armored gunboats into what would ultimately turn out to be the devastating field of fire of the Confederate guns. But the aggressive ‘‘Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!’’ instincts that Farragut demanded and cultivated in each of his subordinates made it virtually unthinkable for Crocker and his naval force not to accept the challenge of charging straight ahead into the teeth of such a bombardment. It is also tempting to condemn the whole campaign plan that ended in disaster at Sabine Pass because we know now that it failed in such a spectacular fashion. When General Banks came up with the plan, however, its failure was far from inevitable. With different defenders or fort designers, or even a little bit of cooperation from the army, Crocker’s charge at Sabine Pass might today be hailed as the starting point of the Union’s successful invasion of Texas. In fairness, the invasion plan should at least be evaluated on criteria other than its catastrophic results. The crews on board the two lead vessels fought bravely and skillfully until their ships were disabled. If they had succeeded in their objective, as both Commodore Bell and General Banks were convinced they would, the resulting invasion of Texas might eventually have led to an earlier Union victory, not only in Texas, but possibly in the war as a whole. In the end, what is the real meaning of a battle like Sabine Pass? Is it the greatest military achievement in history, as Jefferson Davis suggested? Or,

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is it instead merely a victory of limited strategic significance whose memory was perpetuated only as a sort of consolation prize by men like Davis who would continue to fight the war in their minds long after it had been decided against them on the battlefield by force of arms? We have discussed the battle’s strategic significance and have explored some of the less tangible impacts that the battle may have had on the way in which the war was fought and ultimately decided. But there may be an even deeper meaning to the Battle of Sabine Pass and the related events described in this book. Whenever the author leads tour groups to the Sabine Pass Battleground State Historical Park, a marvelous park that was created by the State of Texas after a key piece of land was purchased in 1971, the group invariably gathers in the same general area where Fort Griffin once stood. The size of such a tour group, dictated by the size of the typical bus, is approximately equivalent to the number of Confederates who defended that fort. Placing themselves in the shoes of the fort’s Irish defenders, as they are encouraged to do, the modern visitors stare down the Pass toward the Gulf of Mexico much as Dowling and his men would have done in 1863. A period of uncomfortable silence often prevails after they hear the details of the large Union force that assembled near the entrance to the Pass on the afternoon of September 8, 1863, and prepared to attack. The members of the group inevitably shake their heads as they silently contemplate the long list of gunboats, transports, regiments, and artillery pieces arrayed against them. The same question, seldom voiced out loud, occurs almost simultaneously to everyone in the group. ‘‘Where did these men find the courage to stay and face these heavy odds?’’ This leads naturally to the even more personal inquiry: ‘‘Would I have had that kind of courage?’’ In addition to a more personal understanding of the fundamental nature of courage, visitors to the Sabine Pass Battlefield often come away with something more. Joshua Chamberlain, who led his Twentieth Maine Regiment in its own desperate defensive action on the side of Little Round Top at Gettysburg, returned to the site of that titanic struggle in 1889 and elegantly put into words his feelings on revisiting that great battlefield: In great deeds something abides. On great fields something stays. Forms change and pass; bodies disappear; but spirits linger, to consecrate ground for the vision-place of souls. And reverent men and women from afar, and generations that know us not and that we know not of, heartdrawn to see where and by whom great things were suffered and done for them, shall come to this deathless field, to ponder and dream, and

196 * sabine pass lo! The shadow of a mighty presence shall wrap them in its bosom, and the power of the vision pass into their souls.21 What dreams or visions pass into our souls, to use Chamberlain’s memorable words, after visiting the site of Dowling’s triumph and Crocker’s tragedy at Sabine Pass? The answer to this question probably differs for each person, but visitors generally seem to come away with some or all of the following three distinct lessons: First, no matter what the odds seem to be against you, it is possible to win. Second, no matter what the odds seem to be in your favor, it is possible to lose. The third and perhaps most important lesson learned by visitors studying this battlefield is that battles are often won or lost long before they actually take place. Bravery consists not only of knowing when and how to take a stand, but how to be prepared for conflicts before they occur. Hard work and careful preparation are the essential keys to success in war as in all other aspects of our lives. Success in a battle does not always mean defeating the enemy. After Leonidas and his Spartans were killed at Thermopylae, the battle that Jefferson Davis compared to Sabine Pass, a stone lion was set up at that famous Greek pass to honor Leonidas, the king who had inspired his men to sacrifice themselves on that field of battle. Herodotus records that although Leonidas could easily have chosen to abandon that position, ‘‘he thought it disgraceful to quit the post they had come to guard in the first place.’’ He chose instead of leaving the pass to leave his mark on military history.22 Dick Dowling came to that same difficult decision in 1863. The State of Texas, and particularly the people of the City of Houston, never forgot the contribution that Dowling made to their history. On March 6, 1889, the anniversary of Texas Independence, the citizens of Houston presented to Dowling’s daughter, Mrs. Annie Dowling Robertson, a gold medal in a diamond setting. Although fancier than the famous medal presented during the war to her father and the other members of the Davis Guard, the medal’s inscription was similarly simple and direct. On one side it read: ‘‘Presented to Annie Dowling, the daughter of our Hero,’’ and on the other side: ‘‘From Citizens of Houston.’’ The medal was presented at a ceremony in the Texas House of Representatives attended by a large crowd of veterans and government officials. Representative W. B. Hamblin delivered a lengthy address on that occasion in which he said of the medal recipient’s father: ‘‘Honors are the gifts of men; heroism is from the Infinite. . . . When cowards skulk and craven spirits shrink before danger, then does God make heroes and stamp them with His sacred seal.’’ 23

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figure 37 The Richard W. Dowling Davis Guard Monument in Houston, Texas. Photograph by Edward T. Cotham, Jr.

As the years went by, the number of Davis Guard survivors stamped with the divine seal dwindled rapidly. By 1900, there were only a few left, two of whom lived in the Confederate Home in Austin. These two men, Michael Carr and R. C. O’Hara, were treated as heroes, particularly when they returned to Sabine Pass in 1900 to revisit the site of their famous victory.While there, they visited the wreck of the Clifton, as well as the grave of Kate Dorman, which they decorated with flowers. It was a touching ceremony for all involved.24 As it turned out, there would be many more ceremonies honoring the Guards and their accomplishments. Dowling and his men have actually been the subject of at least six separate monuments or memorials, probably the only company in the entire Civil War to be so extensively honored. In 1905, a marble statue of Dowling (Figure 37) was erected in front of City Hall in Houston (later to be moved to its present location near Hermann Park) by a variety of Irish and Confederate heritage groups. The Bayou City had never

198 * sabine pass forgotten the fact that the Davis Guard had saved it from invasion, and it is notable that the statue of Dowling was erected even prior to the statue of Sam Houston, for whom the city was named. A problem surfaced unexpectedly during the long period before the Dowling sculpture in Houston was finished. The few remaining veterans of the Davis Guard, now significantly older and in poor health, disagreed vehemently among themselves as to the names that should be enshrined on the sides of the monument. This is perhaps not surprising, since controversy had followed and threatened to swallow this company since its formation more than forty years before. It turned out that arriving at a list of names to include on the monument involved more than a test of failing memories. It also required resolution of a number of thorny issues. Should names of men be included, for example, if they were not in the fort at the time of battle because they had been sick or detailed elsewhere? What about men who were in the fort but had been safely sheltered in the bombproof chambers at Dowling’s orders? Finally, and most controversially, should the list of names include men who had served in the unit during the battle but later deserted to the enemy? These were difficult issues to resolve, and several competing lists were created. At the last possible moment, a compromise list of names (Appendix 2) was agreed upon that was ultimately inscribed on the Houston monument. That was far from the end of the controversy. Not long after the first monument was completed, a memorial Texas window was added to the Confederate Museum at the ‘‘White House of the Confederacy’’ in Richmond, Virginia. This window listed the name of Dowling and forty-seven men. To add to the confusion, the names on this beautiful window reflect a slightly different list than the one included on the Houston monument.25 In 1924, almost twenty years after erection of the first Dowling statue in Houston, a large granite boulder was finally erected at Sabine Pass by the Daughters of the Confederacy of Texas in honor of ‘‘Dick Dowling and his forty-two Irish Patriots.’’ 26 A decade later, in 1935, Dick Dowling’s daughter Annie helped dedicate a gray-blue granite shaft of marble to the memory of her father in Houston. The unveiling of this monument, located near the site of Dowling’s formerly unmarked grave in St. Vincent’s Cemetery, was the occasion for a large ceremony, at which the local bishop discussed Dowling’s life in moving terms and described him affectionately as ‘‘the playboy soldier.’’ When it was Annie Dowling Robertson’s turn to speak, she recited a poem about the Battle of Sabine Pass and said, ‘‘In honoring [Dowling] you

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figure 38 The Richard W. Dowling Davis Guard Monument at Sabine Pass Battleground State Historical Park, Sabine Pass. Photograph by Edward T. Cotham, Jr.

honor every soldier who fought for the South in the War Between the States as well as those brave boys who fought in foreign wars.’’ 27 The following year, in 1936, a second statue of Dick Dowling was erected, this time at Sabine Pass (Figure 38). Located at the top of a slight elevation near the site of Fort Griffin, the figure of the young Irishman is posed vigilantly and defiantly facing the entrance to the pass that he and his men defended so successfully. This statue differed significantly from the one dedicated more than thirty years earlier in Houston. Based on a photograph taken before the war, the Sabine Pass statue depicted Dowling without a mustache, a change that Dowling’s daughter was said to have favored because she thought the Houston statue made her father look like a walrus. To further confuse matters, the Sabine Pass memorial included a list of names that differed not only from the list on the Houston statue but also from the list of names on the Texas window in Richmond. Most of the changes were simple corrections or clarifications. Other changes, however, inexplicably resulted in the omission of at least one man (David Fitzgerald)

200 *

sabine pass

who was unquestionably present at the battle. Strangely enough, the monument at Sabine Pass (at least the fifth such memorial by the author’s count) would not be the last time that Dowling would be so honored. In 1998, a bronze plaque depicting his face was unveiled in the Town Hall at Tuam, Ireland, not far from the site of his birth more than 150 years before. The young saloonkeeper who had barely lived to see age thirty would undoubtedly have been both proud and amused to see that he and his little band of rowdy Irishmen had now been memorialized no less than six times at locations spanning the oceans.28 To further honor Dowling and his men, a ceremony and reenactment have been held at Sabine Pass almost every year for many years on the anniversary of the battle. This ceremony took on special meaning in 1963 on the hundredth anniversary of the battle. On that occasion, a U.S. Navy destroyer was unexpectedly unable to make its scheduled appearance at the battlefield because of ‘‘shallow water.’’ The irony of yet another navy ship having trouble navigating the waters leading to the site of the Confederate fort was clear to the hundreds of people who had gathered to commemorate the battle. Texas Attorney General Waggoner Carr delivered a speech to this crowd describing the horrors of war that Texas escaped because of the thwarting of an invasion at that battle. Texas women and children did not have to hide from soldiers, suffer persecution or see the immediate horrors of battle. The land remained the scene of planting, plowing, and harvesting. . . . Nor were barns hastily converted into hospitals where the wounded and dying were cared for with crude, improvised methods of relieving suffering . . . these horrible scenes did not occur, to any great extent, because of Dick Dowling and his men at Sabine Pass.29 Like the stone lion that once stood at Thermopylae, the statue of Dick Dowling that will forever guard the entrance to Sabine Pass can only partially capture the proud spirit of the man who commanded there. In the end, it is up to history to record and interpret the full story of what took place there. The ancient Greeks understood this inherent limitation of statues. That is why they later erected near the stone lion honoring Leonidas another small monument at Thermopylae, this one covered with what was perhaps the most moving battlefield dedication ever conceived. It read simply: ‘‘Go tell the Spartans, stranger passing by, that here obedient to their words we lie.’’ 30

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Like the historian Herodotus, who recorded these famous words, Jefferson Davis saw this same sense of honor and duty in the actions of Dick Dowling and his little band of men at Sabine Pass in 1863. In fact, Davis was fascinated by the actions of the Davis Guard, an organization that had been named for him and of which he was an honorary member. ‘‘Wishing to perpetuate the history of an affair, in which I believe the brave garrison did more than an equal force had ever elsewhere performed,’’ Davis eventually wrote in his memoirs, ‘‘I asked General Magruder, when I met him after the war, to write out a full account of the event.’’ Unfortunately, Magruder died before supplying Davis with the detailed account he had requested. All Davis could do to honor these men was to list every one of their names in his book in what he hoped would serve as a permanent literary tribute to their bravery and devotion.31 The 1882 New Orleans speech with which this book opened would not be the last occasion on which Jefferson Davis would call attention to the heroism of the small Confederate garrison at Sabine Pass. In 1884, he was invited to attend the Reunion of Confederate Veterans at Dallas, Texas. Poor health prevented Davis from attending. But in the letter he sent extending his regrets, Davis could not resist making one last mention of the remarkable events at Fort Griffin: ‘‘Rocked in the cradle of revolution,’’ he wrote, ‘‘the history of Texas is full of heroic deeds, from the self-sacrificing band of the Alamo, who gave to their State the example of how men should dare and die to protect the helpless, to the defence of Sabine Pass, which for intrepidity and extraordinary success must, I think, be admitted to have no parallel in the annals of ancient or modern warfare.’’ 32 Perhaps what fascinated Jefferson Davis so much about the men who comprised the Davis Guard was that they were different from most of the heroes whose virtues Davis extolled in his speeches and literary works. That was undoubtedly part of their attraction and charm. Davis saw in the Guards, who were unlike many of the other men with whom he had dealt during the war, men who had never run for political office, men who had never pressured him for a promotion. They were not products of the ‘‘Old South,’’ nor did they fight to defend wealth or large plantations. Probably what interested Davis the most about these men was the fact that he found them difficult to understand or categorize. To some extent, Davis probably saw in these men a symbol of what he viewed to be his own struggle, a few misunderstood men valiantly contending against a larger and more powerful foe. Davis never forgot the Guards’ brave stand in support of the cause he had unsuccessfully championed. Even long after the war, when the memory of

202 * sabine pass other more celebrated actions and higher-profile battlefields had faded, Davis could not resist reminding himself and his now reunited countrymen of the remarkable story of the small band of Irishmen who had once repelled an invasion. As Davis reminded his New Orleans audience in 1882, it was a story as old as time, the kind of tale that recalls legendary events and speaks to something in each of us. It reminds us that occasionally in real life Davids do defeat Goliaths. It also reminds us of the courage of men who throughout history have taken their stands and given their last full measure at places like the Alamo or the Greek pass that Leonidas and his Spartans died defending. It is a story that still has the capacity to both amaze and inspire us. Sabine Pass: the Confederacy’s Thermopylae.

*

appendix one

Report of Lieut. R. W. Dowling, Company ‘‘F,’’ Cook’s (Texas) Artillery, Concerning the Battle of Sabine Pass

Fort Griffin, Sabine pass, september 9, 1863 capt.: On Monday morning, about 2 o’clock, the sentinel informed me the enemy were signaling, and, fearing an attack, I ordered all the guns at the fort manned and remained in that position until daylight, at which time there were two steamers evidently sounding for the channel on the bar; a large frigate outside. They remained all day at work, but during the evening were reinforced to the number of twenty-two vessels of different classes. On the morning of the 8th, the U.S. gunboat Clifton anchored opposite the light-house, and fired twenty-six shell[s] at the fort, most of which passed a little over or fell short; all, however, in excellent range, one shell being landed on the works and another striking the south angle of the fort, without doing any material damage. The firing commenced at 6:30 o’clock and finished at 7:30 o’clock by the gunboat hauling off. During this time we had not replied by a single shot. All was then quiet until 11 o’clock, at which time the gunboat Uncle Ben steamed down near the fort. The U.S. gunboat Sachem opened on her with a 30-pounder Parrott gun. She fired three shots, but without effect, the shots all passing over the fort and missing the Ben. The whole fleet then drew off, and remained out of range until 3:40 o’clock, when the Sachem and Arizona steamed into line up the Louisiana channel, the Clifton and one boat, name unknown, remaining at the junction of the two channels. I allowed the two former boats to approach within 1,200 yards, when I opened fire with the whole of my battery on the foremost boat (the Sachem), which, after the third or fourth round, hoisted the white flag, one of the shots passing though her steam drum. The Clifton in the meantime had attempted to pass up through the Texas channel, but receiving a shot which carried away her tiller rope, she became unmanageable, and grounded about 500 yards below the fort, which enabled me to concentrate all my guns on her, which were six in number—two 32-pounder smoothbores; two 24pounder smoothbores; two 32-pounder howitzers. She withstood our fire some twenty-five or thirty-five minutes, when she also hoisted a white flag. During the time she was aground, she used grape, and her sharpshooters poured an incessant shower of Minié balls into the works. The fight lasted from the time I

204 * sabine pass fired the first gun until the boats surrendered; that was about three-quarters of an hour. I immediately boarded the captured Clifton, and proceeded to inspect her magazines, accompanied by one of the ship’s officers, and discovered it safe and well stocked with ordnance stores. I did not visit the magazine of the Sachem, in consequence of not having any small boats to board her with. The C.S. gunboat Uncle Ben steamed down to the Sachem and towed her into the wharf. Her magazine was destroyed by the enemy flooding it. During the engagement I was nobly and gallantly assisted by Lieutenant N. H. Smith, of the Engineer Corps, who, by his coolness and bravery, won the respect and admiration of the whole command. This officer deserves well of his country. To Assistant Surgeon George H. Bailey I am under many obligations, who, having nothing to do in his own line, nobly pulled off his coat, and assisted in administering Magruder pills to the enemy, and behaved with great coolness. During the engagement the works were visited by Captain F. H. Odlum, commanding post; Major [Colonel] Leon Smith, commanding Marine Department of Texas. Captain W. S. Good, ordnance officer, and Dr. Murray, acting assistant surgeon, behaved with great coolness and gallantry, and by them I was enabled to send for re-enforcements, as the men were becoming exhausted by the rapidity of our fire; but before they could accomplish their mission, the enemy surrendered. Thus it will be seen we captured with 47 men two gunboats, mounting thirteen guns of the heaviest caliber, and about 350 prisoners. All my men behaved like heroes; not a man flinched from his post. Our motto was ‘‘Victory or death.’’ I beg leave to make particular mention of Private Michael McKernan, who, from his well-known capacity as gunner, I assigned as gunner to one of the guns, and nobly did he do his duty. It was his shot [that] struck the Sachem in her steam-drum. Too much praise cannot be awarded to Major [Colonel] Leon Smith for his activity and energy in saving and bringing the vessels into port. I have the honor, captain, to remain, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

R. W. DOWLING, First Lieut., Comdg. Co. F, Cook’s Art., Fort Griffin, Sabine Pass [To] captain f. h. odlum, Commanding Post

*

appendix two

Annotated List of Sabine Pass Battle Participants

ny discussion of the Davis Guard and that company’s defense of Fort

A

Griffin would not be complete without at least a brief mention of the controversy surrounding the number of men that Dowling actually had with him in the fort during the battle. Dowling’s battle report states without equivocation that he had forty-seven men (see Appendix 1). But General Magruder’s report stated that the fort was defended by only forty men. And Dr. Bailey, who seems to have been a very reliable witness, was emphatic in later years that there had only been thirty-eight privates plus three officers (Dowling, Smith, and Bailey), for a total of forty-one men. How can this controversy be resolved? About the most we can say with confidence is that Dowling had fewer than fifty men with him during the battle. This appendix provides an annotated list of possible participants, discussing each man listed on the various monuments and, where available, biographical information. From this list, it seems likely that Dr. Bailey’s number of forty-one is probably closest to accurately describing the number of men that were actually on duty in the fort when the battle began. Why was Dowling’s number slightly larger? He would certainly seem to have had little reason or incentive to inflate his numbers.We will never know the exact reasons for this discrepancy, but there are several possible explanations. For example, Dowling may have included in his larger number Leon Smith, Captain Odlum, W. S. Good, and Dr. Murray, all of whom arrived after the battle began but played very little role in its outcome. Dowling also may have been including the several men that he had sent into town on errands (like returning dishes) or had sent on temporary duty elsewhere. Indeed, he may have believed it necessary to include each of these men in his count in order to preserve their possible claims to a share of the prize money—money that they might all be entitled to for capturing the Clifton and Sachem. Dowling was very familiar with the rules regarding distribution of prize money with respect to captured ships. In fact, he had prepared just such a list to claim prize money on behalf of the Guards in connection with his unit’s capture of the Morning Light earlier in the year. Everything we know about Dick Dowling suggests that he was an unusually

206 * sabine pass loyal and compassionate man, particularly when it concerned the men in his unit. Therefore, it is really not surprising that he may have used the largest number that was consistent with his roster in order to spread the fame and possible economic benefit to all of the men (friends, relatives, and customers) that served in his unit. Outnumbered more than a hundred to one by the Federal invasion force, six or even ten men more or less made very little difference. This controversy was to make matters very confusing when it came time long after the war to identify the unit’s members on a variety of monuments. List of Men Honored on Dick Dowling Davis Guard Monument in Houston 1 1. Patrick Abbott 2 2. Michael Carr 3 3. Abner R. Carter 4 4. Patrick Clair 5 5. James Corcoran 6 6. Thomas Daugherty 7 7. Hugh Deagan 8 8. Michael Delaney 9 9. Dan Donovan 10 10. John A. Drummond 11 11. Michael Eagan 12 12. Patrick Fitzgerald 13 13. David Fitzgerald 14 14. James Fleming 15 15. John Flood 16 16. William Gleason 17 17. Thomas Hagerty 18 18. William Hardin 19 19. John Hassett 20 20. John Hennessey 21 21. James Higgins 22 22. Timothy Huggins 23 23. Timothy Hurley 24 24. William L. Jett 25 25. Patrick Malone 26 26. Alex McCabe 27 27. Patrick McDonnell 28 28. Timothy McDonough 29 29. John McGrath 30 30. John McKeever 31 31. Thomas McKernon 32 32. Daniel McMurry 33 33. Jonathan McNealis 34

annotated list of battle participants * 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

Michael Monoghan 35 Peter O’Hara 36 Laurence Plunkett 37 Maurice Powers 38 Edward Prichard 39 Charles Rheins 40 Michael Sullivan 41 Pat Sullivan 42 Thomas Sullivan 43 Matthew Walsh 44 John Wesley 45 Jack W. White 46 Joseph Wilson

Others Present 47. Lt. Richard Dowling 48. Dr. George H. Bailey 47 49. Lt. N. H. Smith 48 Others Present for at Least Part of the Battle (Not Listed on the Monument) 50. Major Leon Smith 49 51. Frederick H. Odlum 50 52. W. S. Good 51 53. Dr. Murray 52 Other 54. 55. 56.

Members of the Company Not in the Battle Terence Mulhern 53 R. C. O’Hara 54 Patrick Hennessey 55

207

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appendix three

Union Casualties at the Battle of Sabine Pass list of killed, wounded, and missing 1

On Board U.S.S. Clifton killed Robert Rhodes, acting master and executive officer Michael Driscoll, landsman One black man, name unknown Luther D. Hallock, Corporal, Company B, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers George T. Beardsley, Private, Company B, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers Don E. Parker, Private, Company B, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers Henry Raymond, Private, Company A, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers James M. Benedict, Private, Company D, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers William W. Miller, Private, Company G, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers William F. Pray, Private, Signal Corps, Twelfth Maine [listed as wounded in one account] wounded F. J. [also listed as E. L.] Bradley, third assistant engineer William Mahoney, landsman Peter Brown, seaman Thomas McCann, seaman Joe Cross, landsman Morris Powers, second-class fireman E. N. Andrews, Private, Company B, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers E. L. Bradley, Private, Company B, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers Wooden H. Beebe, Private, Company G, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers John J. Campbell, Private, Company G, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers John W. Dana, Lieutenant, Signal Corps missing Twenty-one of the crew, names unknown—primarily black men O. A. Brown, Corporal, Company A, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers A. G. Borden, Private, Company B, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers

union casualties at the battle * 209 R. O. Canfield, Private, Company B, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers Frank Oxford [Olford], Private, Company B, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers Richard Tucker, Private, Company B, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers A. V. Brown, Private, Company G, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers J. [I.] Bump, Private, Company G, Seventy-fifth New York Volunteers On Board U.S.S. Sachem killed John Fraser, Second Assistant Engineer John Monroe [Munroe], Third Assistant Engineer John Williams, seaman William Robinson, fireman Richard Turner, fireman Thomas [John] Sullivan, fireman Thomas Ryan, fireman William Glenn, fireman Calvin Williams, coal heaver Anthony Compton, 161st New York Patrick Hart, 161st New York Adam H. Wilcox, 161st New York George Dodge, 161st New York James M. Snider, 161st New York Abraham Blakely, 161st New York James T. Gannon, 161st New York Orville C. Boorom, 161st New York Mahlon W. Barber, 161st New York Abraham E. Borden, Signal Corps, Third Massachusetts Cavalry Andrew P. Coit, Signal Corps, Third Massachusetts Cavalry Three black men, names unknown wounded John McDonough, landsman Thomas A. Sawyer, 161st New York E. A. Larricus missing Peter Lee, landsman [listed as dead also] Peter Benson, landsman George Houston [Horton], black man [listed as dead also] Henry Brown, landsman [listed as dead also] Randal [Randell] Smith, black man [listed as dead also] Isaac Carter, landsman William Wilson, landsman

210 * sabine pass John Chace, landsman Willis Green, landsman William Lowe, landsman Samuel Smith, landsman John Horton, landsman John Rolles, landsman

Notes

The following abbreviations are used in these notes and in the accompanying bibliography: CAH The Eugene C. Barker Texas History Collection of the Center for American History, University of Texas at Austin CWTI Civil War Times Illustrated DAR Dowling Association Records, Houston Metropolitan Research Center, Houston Public Library, Houston, Texas ETHJ East Texas Historical Journal GDN The Galveston Daily News, The Galveston News, or Galveston News GTHC The Galveston and Texas History Center of the Rosenberg Library, Galveston, Texas HMRC Houston Metropolitan Research Center, Houston Public Library, Houston, Texas NARA National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. OR U.S. War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I unless otherwise noted ORN U.S. Naval War Records Office, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, Series I unless otherwise noted OR Supp. Supplement to the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies PAHC Battle of Sabine Pass and Subsequent Celebrations Collection, Port Arthur History Collection, Port Arthur Central Library, Port Arthur, Texas SHSP Southern Historical Society Papers (Richmond; reprinted, Wilmington, N.C.: Broadfoot Publishing Company and Morningside Bookshop, 1990–1991) SWHQ Southwestern Historical Quarterly TS Typescript

212 * notes to pages 1–7 Introduction 1. Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray: Lives of the Confederate Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1959), 224. 2. Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, 2 vols. (New York: Appleton and Company, 1881). 3. ‘‘A Grand Meeting in New Orleans on the 25th of April in Behalf of the Southern Historical Society,’’ SHSP 10, no. 5 (May 1882): 227. 4. Ibid., 229. 5. Ibid. 6. ‘‘Helping History: A Brilliant Audience Indorses the Southern Historical Society,’’ [New Orleans] Times Democrat, April 26, 1882. 7. Davis, Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, 2:238–239. 8. Francis R. Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas or Memoirs of Francis Richard Lubbock, Governor of Texas in War-Time, 1861–63, ed. C. W. Raines (Austin: Ben C. Jones, 1900), 503. 9. Dave Page, Ships versus Shore: Civil War Engagements along Southern Shores and Rivers (Nashville: Rutledge Hill Press, 1994), 347. 10. T. R. Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans (New York: Collier Books, 1980), 370. 11. Andrew Forest Muir, ‘‘Dick Dowling and the Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ in Lone Star Blue and Gray: Essays on Texas in the Civil War, ed. Ralph A. Wooster (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1995), 191. 12. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3,500 b.c. to the Present (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 26 (Thermopylae), 495 (Rhodes), 500 (Malta), 805 (Alamo), 851 (Rorke’s Drift). 13. H. L. Mencken, ed., A New Dictionary of Quotations on Historical Principles from Ancient and Modern Sources (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 465. 14. Webb Garrison, Jr., Strange Battles of the Civil War (Nashville: Cumberland House Publishing, 2001), 33–40. 15. Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative (New York: Random House, 1974), 3:26. 16. Richard N. Current, ed., Encyclopedia of the Confederacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 4:1605 (entry on the ‘‘Trans-Mississippi Department’’ by Anne J. Bailey). 17. Arthur W. Bergeron, Jr., Confederate Mobile (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 196–197; Arthur W. Bergeron, Jr., ‘‘The Battle of Mobile Bay,’’ Blue and Gray Magazine 19, no. 4 (Spring 2002): 6. 18. N. P. Banks to the Secretary of War, New York City, April 6, 1865, 26 OR 7; Ludwell H. Johnson, Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1993), 278–279. 19. William R. Boggs, Military Reminiscences of Gen. Wm. R. Boggs, C.S.A. (Durham, N.C.: Seaman Printery, 1913), 71. 20. Harold B. Simpson, Hood’s Texas Brigade: Lee’s Grenadier Guard (Dallas: Alcor Publishing Co., 1983), 395–398, quotation from p. 396. 21. Douglas S. Freeman, R. E. Lee: A Biography (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934), 2:418 n. 19.

notes to pages 7–15 *

213

22. Patricia L. Faust, ed., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 448–449 (entry on ‘‘Lost Cause’’). 23. ‘‘A Grand Meeting in New Orleans,’’ SHSP 10 (5): 229. Chapter One 1. This discussion of the geography and history of Sabine Pass is based primarily on Ron Tyler, ed., The New Handbook of Texas (Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 1996), 5:743–744 (entry on ‘‘Sabine Lake’’ by Robert Wooster); and Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors of the War Department, The Ports of Port Arthur, Sabine, Beaumont, and Orange, Texas (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1925), 1–2. 2. Jefferson County Vertical File, CAH. 3. William M. Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776– 1909 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1910), 2:1651. 4. John H. Reagan, Memoirs with Special Reference to Secession and the Civil War (Austin: Pemberton Press, 1968), 323 (speech dated May 19, 1876). 5. ‘‘Proprietor’s Notice Concerning the City of Sabine,’’ City of Sabine, May 1, 1839, The Writings of Sam Houston, ed. Amelia W.Williams and Eugene C. Barker (Austin: Jenkins Publishing Co., 1970), 2:312. 6. W. T. Block, ‘‘Sabine Pass in the Civil War,’’ ETHJ 9 (October 1971): 129. 7. B. L. Aycock, ‘‘The Lone Star Guards,’’ Confederate Veteran 31, no. 2 (February 1923): 60. 8. Faust, Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia, 12–13 (entry on ‘‘Anaconda Plan’’), 67 (entry on ‘‘blockade’’). 9. Stephen R. Wise, Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running during the Civil War (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 13. 10. Ibid., 23–24. 11. J. A. Alden to W. Mervine, Galveston, July 31, 1861, 16 ORN 597. 12. S. F. Du Pont et al. to G. Welles, Washington, D.C., September 3, 1861, 16 ORN 651–655. 13. B. F. Butler to G. B. McClellan, Boston, December 2, 1861, 53 OR 508. 14. W. H. Stevens to J. Davis, Richmond, Virginia, June 12, 1861, 16 ORN 825; Warner, Generals in Gray, 292. 15. Ernest W.Winkler, ed., Journal of the Secession Convention of Texas, 1861 (Austin: Austin Printing Company, 1912), 99, 133. 16. Block, ‘‘Sabine Pass in the Civil War,’’ 130; Winkler, Journal of the Secession Convention, 141, 150. 17. F. W. Eddy to Adjutant General of the State of Texas, Sabine Pass, May 6, 1861, Departmental Correspondence, Second Brigade, Texas Adjutant General’s Department, Archives and Information Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission, Austin, Texas; Jesse A. Ziegler, ‘‘Sabine Pass Scene of Fierce Naval Fight,’’ Houston Post, August 22, 1937; K. D. Keith, ‘‘Military Operations, Sabine Pass, 1861–1863,’’ text of Keith’s narrative reprinted in the program of the Sixty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Texas State Historical Association, April 26 and 27, 1963, Austin, Texas, PAHC.

214 *

notes to pages 15 –22

18. ‘‘Confederate Minister to England Forced to Land Near Sabine after Federal Blockade,’’ transcript of article from Port Arthur News, July 1, 1923, PAHC. 19. J. A. Pratt to W. W. Hunter, New Orleans, July 1, 1861, 16 ORN 829–830; W. W. Hunter to L. Rousseau, New Orleans, July 8, 1861, 16 ORN 831–832. 20. J. D. Kurtz to Secretary of War, Washington, D.C., November 9, 1861, 16 ORN 763–764. 21. X. B. Debray to C. M. Mason, Houston, September 25, 1862, 15 OR 143. Chapter Two 1. James P. Duffy, Lincoln’s Admiral: The Civil War Campaigns of David Farragut (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1997), 7–10. 2. Chester G. Hearn, Admiral David Glasgow Farragut: The Civil War Years (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998), 18. 3. Duffy, Lincoln’s Admiral, 31–34; Hearn, Admiral David Glasgow Farragut, 29–30. 4. Hearn, Admiral David Glasgow Farragut, 41–45. 5. Craig L. Symonds, Historical Atlas of the U.S. Navy (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 82. 6. Ibid., 84–85. 7. Ibid., 84; Freeman, R. E. Lee, 1:610–614; R. E. Lee to S. Cooper, Savannah, January 8, 1862, 6 OR 367. 8. Symonds, Historical Atlas of the U.S. Navy, 88. 9. Duffy, Lincoln’s Admiral, 52–53. 10. G. Welles to D. Farragut, Navy Dept., January 9, 1862, 18 ORN 5. 11. G. Welles to A. D. Bache, Navy Dept., February 8, 1862, 18 ORN 14; G. Welles to W. W. McKean, Navy Dept., January 20, 1862, 17 ORN 56–57. 12. G. Welles to D. Farragut, Navy Dept., January 20, 1862, 18 ORN 7–8; G. Welles to D. Farragut, Navy Dept., January 25, 1862, 18 ORN 9–10. 13. William N. Still, Jr., ‘‘David Glasgow Farragut: The Union’s Nelson,’’ in Quarterdeck and Bridge: Two Centuries of American Naval Leaders (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 128; Hearn, Admiral David Glasgow Farragut, 84–86. 14. H. H. Bell Diary, entry for April 20, 1862, 18 ORN 695. 15. Peter Tsouras, ed., The Dictionary of Military Quotations (London: Greenhill Books, 2000), 73. To give some idea of the degree of speed that it implied, the Latin word celeritas, from which the word ‘‘celerity’’ is derived, also was the origin of the initial ‘‘c’’ used for the speed of light, as in the famous equation ‘‘E=mc2.’’ David Bodanis, E=mc2: A Biography of the World’s Most Famous Equation (New York: Walker & Co., 2000), 37. 16. Loyall Farragut, The Life of David Glasgow Farragut, First Admiral of the United States Navy, Embodying His Journal and Letters (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1879), 234. 17. Duffy, Lincoln’s Admiral, 128–130; Hearn, Admiral David Glasgow Farragut, 143–145. 18. Report of J. R. Bartlett to T. T. Craven, Flag-Officer’s Cabin, June 30, 1862, 18 ORN 603–604.

notes to pages 22 –28 * 215 19. D. G. Farragut to T. T. Craven, Above Vicksburg, July 1, 1862, 18 ORN 605–606. 20. D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, Above Vicksburg, July 2, 1862, 18 ORN 610. 21. W. Faxon to D. G. Farragut, Navy Dept., March 13, 1863, 19 ORN 661; Kenneth E. Thompson, Jr., Civil War Commodores and Admirals: A Biographical Dictionary of All Eighty-Eight Union and Confederate Navy Officers Who Attained Commission Flag Rank during the War (Portland, Maine: Thompson Group, 2001), 60. 22. Still, Quarterdeck and Bridge, 135. 23. Detailed Report of Rear-Admiral Farragut, Off Mouth of Red River, March 16, 1863, 19 ORN 665–668. 24. Ibid., 665. 25. S. F. Du Pont, S. F. Du Pont: A Selection from His Civil War Letters, ed. J. D. Hayes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969), 2:508. 26. Gideon Welles, The Diary of Gideon Welles: Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911), 1:440. 27. Symonds, Historical Atlas of the U.S. Navy, 98. 28. Diary of Acting Third Assistant Engineer G. W. Baird, April 20, 1863, 20 ORN 154. Chapter Three 1. G. Welles to D. Farragut, Navy Department, August 19, 1862, 19 ORN 161–162. 2. Still, Quarterdeck and Bridge, 134, quoting D. Farragut to his wife, March 15, 1862. 3. Norman C. Delaney, ‘‘Corpus Christi: The Vicksburg of Texas,’’ in Raiders and Blockaders: The American Civil War Afloat (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 1998), 156–158. 4. J. W. Kittredge to G. Welles, Off Corpus Christi, August 12–17, 1862, 19 ORN 151–152. 5. Delaney, ‘‘Corpus Christi,’’ 159–160. 6. J. W. Kittredge to G. Welles, Off Aransas, August 20, 1862, 19 ORN 160– 161. 7. D. G. Farragut to J. W. Kittredge, Pensacola, September 6, 1862, 19 ORN 179. 8. F. Crocker to D. G. Farragut, Off Calcasieu Lake, October 2, 1862, 19 ORN 219; D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, Pensacola Bay, October 15, 1862, 19 ORN 253. 9. Frederick Crocker Pension File, NARA; Donald S. Frazier, Cottonclads!: The Battle of Galveston and the Defense of the Texas Coast (Fort Worth: Ryan Place Publishers, 1996), 24; Letter to Edward T. Cotham, Jr., dated August 30, 2002, from Laura Pereira, Assistant Librarian, Kendall Institute, New Bedford Whaling Museum, New Bedford, Massachusetts. 10. Report of Flag-Officer L. M. Goldsborough, Off Roanoke Island, February 18, 1862, 6 ORN 553. 11. S. F. Du Pont to F. Crocker, Port Royal Harbor, April 16, 1862, 12 ORN 746.

216 *

notes to pages 28 – 33

12. W. W. McKean to F. Crocker, Key West, April 29, 1862, 17 ORN 222; F. Crocker to G. Welles, New Orleans, June 1, 1862, 27 ORN 443–444. 13. F. Crocker to D. G. Farragut, n.p., June 27, 1862, 18 ORN 573–574. 14. F. Crocker to G. Welles, Pilot Town, August 30, 1862, 19 ORN 155. 15. D. G. Farragut to F. Crocker, Pensacola Bay, September 9, 1862, 19 ORN 185. 16. Report of F. Crocker, Off Calcasieu Lake, October 2, 1862, 19 ORN 217– 218. 17. Tyler, The New Handbook of Texas, 3:874–875 (entry on ‘‘Josephus S. Irvine’’ by Cooper K. Ragan); X. B. Debray to C. M. Mason, Houston, September 25, 1862, 15 OR 143–144; A. W. Spaight to R. M. Franklin, Beaumont, September 26, 1862, 15 OR 144–145. 18. ‘‘The Affair at Sabine Pass,’’ [Houston] Telegraph (Supplement), October 3, 1862; Report of L. W. Pennington, Sabine Pass, September 29, 1862, 19 ORN 221–222; ‘‘By the Orange Train,’’ [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, September 29, 1862. 19. Ibid.; Report of Q. A. Hooper, Sabine Pass, September 29, 1862, 19 ORN 220. 20. Report of Q. A. Hooper, Sabine Pass, September 29, 1862, 19 ORN 219– 221; Report of L. W. Pennington, Sabine Pass, September 29, 1862, 19 ORN 221– 222; ‘‘Affairs about Sabine,’’ [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, October 8, 1862. 21. A. W. Spaight to R. M. Franklin, Beaumont, September 26, 1862, 15 OR 144–145. 22. Camilla Davis Trammell, Seven Pines: Its Occupants and Their Letters, 1825–1872 (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1986), 164. 23. ‘‘Autobiography of Mrs. Otis McGaffey, Sr.,’’ Yellowed Pages 28, no. 3 (Fall 1998): 8. 24. ‘‘A Letter Dated Sabine, August 22,’’ Bellville Countryman, September 6, 1862. 25. ‘‘The Epidemic at Sabine Pass,’’ [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, September 10, 1862. 26. ‘‘Yellow Fever in Sabine City,’’ [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, September 9, 1862. 27. ‘‘By the Orange Train,’’ [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, October 9, 1862. 28. Report of F. Crocker, Off Calcasieu Lake, October 2, 1862, 19 ORN 217– 219. 29. Report of L.W. Pennington, Sabine Pass, September 29, 1862, 19 ORN 223. 30. Additional Report of F. Crocker, Sabine Pass, October 12, 1862, 19 ORN 224–226; F. Crocker to G. Welles, Pensacola Bay, November 4, 1862, 19 ORN 263– 264. 31. ‘‘Affairs about Sabine,’’ [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, October 8, 1862. 32. Report of Pilot J. G. Taylor, Sabine Pass, January 15, 1863, 19 ORN 229. 33. F. Crocker to D. Farragut, Pensacola Bay, October 24, 1862, 19 ORN 227– 229; List of vessels captured by the expedition, 19 ORN 227; Report of Pilot J. G. Taylor, Off Sabine Pass, January 15, 1863, 19 ORN 229–230.

notes to pages 33 – 37 *

217

34. ‘‘The Dan in Sabine Lake,’’ [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, October 17, 1862. 35. D. G. Farragut to G.Welles, Pensacola Bay, October 28, 1862, 19 ORN 224. 36. Frazier, Cottonclads!, 24. 37. D. G. Farragut to W. B. Renshaw, Pensacola Bay, September 19, 1862, 19 ORN 213. 38. W. B. Renshaw to D. G. Farragut, Off Galveston, October 5, 1862, 19 ORN 254–255. 39. D. G. Farragut to W. B. Renshaw, Pensacola Bay, October 14, 1862, 19 ORN 260–261. 40. Ralph A.Wooster, Texas and Texans in the Civil War (Austin: Eakin Press, 1995), 63, 95. 41. Report of D. G. Farragut, Pensacola Bay, October 15, 1862, 19 ORN 253– 254. 42. Report of Q. A. Hooper, Sabine Pass, December 5, 1862, 19 ORN 392. 43. A. W. Spaight to R. M. Franklin, Beaumont, November 3, 1862, 19 ORN 804. 44. W. T. Block, ‘‘Catherine Magill Dorman: Confederate Heroine of Sabine Pass,’’ W. T. Block website; ‘‘Letter from J. H. to E. H. Cushing,’’ Houston Telegraph, November 5, 1862. 45. R. L. Law to W. B. Renshaw, At Sea, December 7, 1862, 19 ORN 394–395. 46. Ibid. 47. D. G. Farragut to W. B. Renshaw, Off New Orleans, December 12, 1862, 19 ORN 404. Chapter Four 1. Michael Coffey, ed., The Irish in America (New York: Hyperion, 1997), 3–5. 2. James R. Ward, ‘‘Richard W. ‘Dick’ Dowling,’’ in Ten Texans in Gray, ed. W. C. Nunn (Hillsboro, Tex.: Hill Junior College Press, 1968), 36. 3. Most historical sources that discuss Dowling’s early life, including the New Handbook of Texas, erroneously state that he was born in 1838 to parents William and Mary Dowling. Ann Caraway Ivins, an excellent researcher and one of Dowling’s collateral descendants, has reviewed the birth records on-site in Ireland and has confirmed that he was actually born a year earlier in 1837 to parents Pat and Bridget Dowling. Letter from Ann Caraway Ivins to Edward T. Cotham, Jr., dated October 8, 2002. 4. Muir, ‘‘Dick Dowling and the Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 178; Tyler, The New Handbook of Texas, 4:1112 (entry on ‘‘Benjamin Digby Odlum’’ by Mary M. Standifer). 5. Phillip H. Hall to E. G. Littlejohn, Houston, December 1, 1899, Littlejohn Papers, GTHC. 6. ‘‘Dick Dowling, War Time Hero,’’ Houston Chronicle, August 25, 1929. 7. ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, September 3, 1899. 8. Muir, ‘‘Dick Dowling and the Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 179–180.

218 * notes to pages 39 – 44 9. Ibid., 180. 10. Ibid., 180–181; Ward, ‘‘Dick Dowling,’’ 37. 11. R.W. Dowling to F. H. Bailey, Sabine Pass, August 25, 1863, First Regiment Texas Heavy Artillery Regiment Records, NARA. 12. Ward, ‘‘Dick Dowling,’’ 37. 13. [Houston] Weekly Telegraph, November 13, 1860; [Houston] Weekly Telegraph, November 20, 1860. 14. Winkler, Journal of the Secession Convention, 319–324. 15. John S. Ford, RIP Ford’s Texas, ed. Stephen B. Oates (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1963), 318. 16. ‘‘The Davis Guards,’’ [Houston] Weekly Telegraph, March 26, 1861. 17. E. B. Nichols to Committee of Public Safety, Brazos Santiago, March 5, 1861, Sidney Sherman Papers, GTHC. 18. J. S. Ford to J. C. Robertson, Brownsville, February 22, 1861, 53 OR 651– 652; Edward T. Cotham, Jr., Battle on the Bay: The Civil War Struggle for Galveston (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), 10–11. 19. ‘‘The Davis Guards,’’ [Houston] Weekly Telegraph, March 26, 1861; Frank X. Tolbert, Dick Dowling at Sabine Pass (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1962), 30–31. 20. Muir, ‘‘Dick Dowling and the Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 184–185. 21. Tyler, The New Handbook of Texas, 1:150–151 (entry on ‘‘American Party’’ by Roger A. Griffin). 22. Muir, ‘‘Dick Dowling and the Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 185, quoting ‘‘Sioux’’ [W. P. Doran] to editor, Galveston, December 13, 1861, in [Houston] Weekly Telegraph, January 18, 1862. 23. Marcus J.Wright, Texas in the War: 1861–1865, ed. Harold Simpson (Hillsboro, Tex.: Hill Junior College Press, 1965), 130; Joseph J. Cook Military Service Record, NARA. 24. Arthur J. Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States: April–June 1863 (orig. 1863; reprint, Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life Books, 1984), 64. 25. Philip Katcher, Confederate Artilleryman, 1861–1865 (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2001), 5–6. 26. Log of the C.S.S. Bayou City, Galveston, 16 ORN 860, 864. 27. Reports of W. B. Renshaw, Galveston, October 5 and October 8, 1862, 19 ORN 254–261; X. B. Debray to T. S. Moise, Virginia Point, October 5, 1862, 19 ORN 261; J. J. Cook to R. M. Franklin, Fort Hebert, October 9, 1862, 19 ORN 262–263. 28. E. B. Nichols to E. B. H. Schneider, Galveston, December 6, 1861, 4 OR 154. 29. W. B. Renshaw to D. Farragut, Galveston, October 5, 1862, 19 ORN 254– 255. 30. Cotham, Battle on the Bay, 87–99. 31. ‘‘Col. Cook’s Regiment in the Battle of Galveston,’’ GDN, January 23, 1863. 32. This account of the Battle of Galveston is a condensed version of the events described in detail in Cotham, Battle on the Bay, 113–131.

notes to pages 44 – 51 * 219 33. J. J. Cook to D. Landes, Galveston, April 17, 1863, quoted in GDN, May 6, 1863. 34. Report of ‘‘Sioux’’ to editor, [Houston] Weekly Telegraph, January 5, 1863. 35. Muir, ‘‘Dick Dowling and the Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 187. 36. Ibid.; [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, January 5, 1863. 37. D. G. Farragut to J. Alden, New Orleans, January 5, 1863, 19 ORN 490. Chapter Five 1. D. A. Patillo to Sarah Ann, Sabine Pass, February 5, 1863, D. A. Patillo Letter, Museum of the Gulf Coast, Port Arthur, Texas. 2. J. B. Magruder to S. Cooper, Galveston, February 26, 1863, 15 OR 212. 3. Cotham, Battle on the Bay, 125. 4. Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas, 458. 5. Report of O. M. Watkins, Sabine Pass, January 23, 1863, 19 ORN 564. 6. Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas, 458–459. 7. Paul H. Silverstone, Civil War Navies, 1855–1883 (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 175. 8. Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas, 459. 9. K. D. Keith, ‘‘Military Operations, Sabine Pass, 1861–1863,’’ PAHC. 10. John H. Brown, Indian Wars and Pioneers of Texas (orig. 1880; reproduced, Easley, S.C.: Southern Historical Press, 1978), 178. 11. William Wiess, ‘‘First Federal Defeat at Sabine Pass,’’ Confederate Veteran 20, no. 3 (March 1912): 108–109. 12. D. A. Patillo to Sarah Ann, Sabine Pass, February 5, 1863, D. A. Patillo Letter, Museum of the Gulf Coast, Port Arthur, Texas. 13. ‘‘A Historic Event: Capture of the Federal Boat Morning Light,’’ Houston Daily Post, March 23, 1891. 14. K. D. Keith, ‘‘The Memoirs of Captain Kosciuzcko D. Keith,’’ Texas Gulf Historical and Biographical Record 10, no. 1 (November 1974): 60–61. 15. Report of O. M. Watkins, Sabine Pass, January 23, 1863, 19 ORN 565. 16. Wiess, ‘‘First Federal Defeat at Sabine Pass,’’ 108–109; Tyler, The New Handbook of Texas, 4:1098 (entry on ‘‘George W. O’Brien’’ by Judith Linsley and Ellen Rienstra); O. M. Roberts, Confederate Military History, 15:567–569 (biographical entry on G. W. O’Brien); Matthew Givens, ‘‘Famous Shootouts,’’ Corpus Christi Caller Times, September 2, 1998; Ralph A. Wooster, Lone Star Regiments in Gray (Austin: Eakin Press, 2002), 277. 17. ‘‘A Historic Event: Capture of the Federal Boat Morning Light,’’ Houston Daily Post, March 23, 1891. 18. Keith, ‘‘Military Operations, Sabine Pass, 1861–1863,’’ PAHC. 19. ‘‘A Historic Event: Capture of the Federal Boat Morning Light,’’ Houston Daily Post, March 23, 1891. 20. Ibid. 21. Keith, ‘‘The Memoirs of Captain Kosciuzcko D. Keith,’’ 61. 22. Letter of John A. Drummond, Opelousas, Louisiana, May 15, 1903, Elbridge Gerry Littlejohn Collection, GTHC. 23. Wiess, ‘‘First Federal Defeat at Sabine Pass,’’ 108.

220 *

notes to pages 51– 56

24. Ibid., quoting undated account by Abel Coffin, Jr. 25. Silverstone, Civil War Navies, 103; ‘‘The Naval Fight off Sabine,’’ report from the [Houston] Telegraph, January 21, 1863, 19 ORN 571. 26. F. Crocker to D. G. Farragut, Off Calcasieu Lake, October 2, 1862, 19 ORN 218–219; Answers of Bernard Tiernan to Interrogatories in the Prize Court case In the Matter of the Confederate States Schooner called the ‘‘Velocity,’’ Phillip C. Tucker III Papers, CAH. 27. The account of this battle that follows is based on a comparison of the following reports and accounts of participants: Report of Surgeon J. W. Sherfy, Champaign City, Illinois, April 12, 1864, 19 ORN 558–562; Report of O. M. Watkins, Off Sabine Pass, January 23, 1863, 19 ORN 564–566; ‘‘The Naval Fight off Sabine,’’ from the [Houston] Telegraph, January 21, 1863, 19 ORN 570–573; Report of Zack Sabel contained in Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas, 459–460. 28. H. H. Bell to D. G. Farragut, Galveston, January 18, 1863, 19 ORN 538. 29. Report of Surgeon J. W. Sherfy, Champaign City, Illinois, April 12, 1864, 19 ORN 558–562; Report of O. M. Watkins, Off Sabine Pass, January 23, 1863, 19 ORN 564–566; ‘‘The Naval Fight off Sabine,’’ from the [Houston] Telegraph, January 21, 1863, 19 ORN 570–573; Report of Zack Sabel contained in Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas, 459–460. 30. ‘‘The Naval Fight off Sabine,’’ report from the Houston Telegraph, January 21, 1863, 19 ORN 572; ‘‘The Capture of the Morning Light: Statement of the Rebel Officer Who Captured Her to the Editor of the Herald,’’ William D. Quick Collection, Sam Houston Regional Library and Research Center, Liberty, Texas. 31. Answers of William Johnson to Interrogatories in the Prize Court case In the Matter of the Confederate States Schooner called the ‘‘Velocity,’’ Phillip C. Tucker III Papers, CAH. 32. O. M. Watkins to E. P. Turner, Houston, March 14, 1863, 19 ORN 570; Wiess, ‘‘First Federal Defeat at Sabine Pass,’’ 109. 33. Letter from unidentified author to Jacob K. Beaumont, Sabine Pass, January 25, 1863, Jacob K. Beaumont Family Papers, Texas State Archives, Austin, Texas. 34. Keith, ‘‘The Memoirs of Kosciuzcko D. Keith,’’ 62–63. 35. Report from proceedings of a court of enquiry held on board the U.S.S. Tennessee at New Orleans, April 12, 1863, 19 ORN 563–564. 36. Report of Lieutenant-Commander A. Read, Off Sabine Pass, January 26, 1863, 19 ORN 555–556. 37. Ibid., 555. 38. ‘‘Memorandum of articles taken from the Morning Light and brought in by the Schooner Velocity,’’ and ‘‘Contents of two chests belonging to ship Morning Light received from Major O. M.Watkins by C. S. Marshal,’’ February 10, 1864, Phillip C. Tucker III Papers, CAH. 39. Keith, ‘‘The Memoirs of Kosciuzcko D. Keith,’’ 62; J. N. Barney to S. R. Mallory, Galveston, February 13, 1863, 19 ORN 839–840. 40. O. M. Watkins to E. P. Turner, Sabine Pass, January 21, 1863, 53 OR 844– 845.

notes to pages 56 – 62 * 221 41. Joint Resolution of thanks to Major Oscar M. Watkins and the officers and men under his command, May 1, 1863, 53 OR 867. 42. Doris Glasser, ‘‘The Gustav A. Fosgard Diaries,’’ Houston Review 14, no. 1 (1992): 52 (entry for January 27, 1863). 43. Supplemental report of Major O. Watkins, Houston, March 14, 1863, 19 ORN 567–568. 44. D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, New Orleans, January 29, 1863, 19 ORN 553– 554. 45. Diary of William B. Duncan, entry for January 27, 1863, Transcription, Port Arthur Central Library, Port Arthur, Texas (published La Porte, Texas: San Jacinto Museum of History, 1940). 46. Letter of Appreciation to Captain Charles Fowler from men under his command on board C.S. Gunboat Josiah H. Bell, Sabine Pass, January 25, 1863, TS, William D. Quick Collection, Sam Houston Regional Library and Research Center, Liberty, Texas. 47. John A. Drummond, ‘‘Memoirs of John A. Drummond,’’ Yellowed Pages 16, no. 3 (1986): 37; R. W. Dowling to E. P. Turner, Camp Lubbock, February 13, 1863, R. W. Dowling Military Service Record, NARA. 48. Proclamation of J. B. Magruder, Houston, January 21, 1863, 19 ORN 549; J. P. Benjamin to A. Paul, Department of State, Richmond, Virginia, February 7, 1863, 19 ORN 836. 49. D. G. Farragut to Q. A. Hooper, New Orleans, January 30, 1863, 19 ORN 591; Extracts from Private Diary of H. H. Bell, January 26–29, 1863, 19 ORN 741. 50. Extracts from Private Diary of H. H. Bell, January 30, 1863, 19 ORN 742; D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, New Orleans, January 23, 1863, 19 ORN 575–576. 51. D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, New Orleans, January 23, 1863, 19 ORN 576. 52. H. H. Bell to J. R. Mullany, Galveston, March 14, 1863, 19 ORN 664; H. H. Bell to A. Read, Galveston, March 16, 1863, 20 ORN 93. 53. D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, New Orleans, July 28, 1863, 20 ORN 333. 54. A. Read to G. Welles, Sabine Pass, April 3, 1863, 20 ORN 114–115. 55. Joseph Wheeler, Alabama, vol. 8 of Confederate Military History: Extended Edition (Wilmington, N.C.: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1987), 424–426; T. Harrison and Ray Jones, Endangered Lighthouses: Stories and Images of America’s Disappearing Lighthouses (Guilford, Conn.: Globe Pequot Press, 2001), 55– 56; T. Lindsay Baker, Lighthouses of Texas (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001), 71–79. 56. A. Read to G. Welles, Off Sabine Pass, April 10, 1863, 20 ORN 128; Special Orders No. 15, Houston, February 7, 1863, 20 ORN 129; W. R. Scurry to E. P. Turner, Houston, April 19, 1863, 20 ORN 150. 57. ‘‘Commodore Charles Fowler,’’ undated TS, William D. Quick Collection, Sam Houston Regional Library and Research Center, Liberty, Texas. 58. A. Read to G. Welles, Off Sabine Pass, April 18, 1863, 20 ORN 147–148. 59. W. H. Griffin to A. N. Miller, Sabine Pass, April 28, 1863, 20 ORN 151–152. 60. ‘‘The Fight at Sabine Pass,’’ [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, April 24,

222 *

notes to pages 62 –71

1863; Letter from John M. Carson to Editor of Dallas Semi-Weekly News, Cooledge, Texas, September 8, 1909, John M. Carson Letters, CAH. 61. ‘‘Letter from Sabine Pass,’’ [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, April 24, 1863; A. Read to G. Welles, Off Sabine Pass, April 18, 1863, 20 ORN 147–148; A. Read to G. Welles, Off Sabine Pass, April 18, 1863, 20 ORN 148–149; L. H. Kendall to A. Read, Off Sabine Pass, April 19, 1863, 20 ORN 149; List of casualties, April 19, 1863, 20 ORN 149; Log Journal of R. M. Hodgson, U.S.S. Cayuga Records, New York Historical Society, New York City (entry for April 18, 1863). 62. A. Read to G. Welles, Off Sabine Pass, April 20, 1863, 20 ORN 149–150. 63. D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, New Orleans, July 10, 1863, 20 ORN 340– 341; D. G. Farragut to D. D. Porter, Off Donaldsonville, Louisiana, July 9, 1863, 20 ORN 337; T. A. Jenkins to D. G. Farragut, Below Port Hudson, July 9, 1863, 20 ORN 334. Chapter Six 1. Francis C. Kajencki, ‘‘The Louisiana Tiger,’’ Louisiana History 15, no. 1 (Winter 1974): 51. 2. B. L. Farinholt, ‘‘Battle of Gettysburg–Johnson’s Island,’’ Confederate Veteran 5, no. 9 (September 1897): 467; Terry L. Jones, Lee’s Tigers: The Louisiana Infantry in the Army of Northern Virginia (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 7; Valery Sulakowski Military Service Record, NARA. 3. Jones, Lee’s Tigers, 17–18, 31–32; OR Supp. [Part II], 24 [Serial No. 36]:308– 316. 4. Jones, Lee’s Tigers, 30. 5. Ibid., 43; Cotham, Battle on the Bay, 92. 6. Report of J. G. Barnard, Camp Near Yorktown, May 6, 1862, 11 OR 318. 7. Jones, Lee’s Tigers, 43. 8. Carl Moneyhon and Bobby Roberts, Portraits of Conflict: A Photographic History of Louisiana in the Civil War (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1990), 53; Valery Sulakowski Military Service Record, NARA. 9. Cotham, Battle on the Bay, 110. 10. Jack J. Studer, ‘‘Julius Kellersberger: A Swiss as Surveyor and City Planner in California, 1851–1857,’’ California Historical Society Quarterly 47, no. 1 (March 1968), 3–12. 11. Fourth Annual Report of the Board of Commissioners of the Central Park (New York: William C. Bryant & Co., 1861), 121–122. 12. Order No. 34, Galveston, October 11, 1861, 4 OR 117; W. S. Good to S. B. Davis, Galveston, November 22, 1861, 4 OR 148; Julius G. Kellersberg Military Service Record, NARA. 13. J. Kellersberg to X. B. Debray, Harrisburg, Texas, July 30, 1862, 9 OR 729. 14. J. Kellersberg to R. M. Franklin, Harrisburg, Texas, October 18, 1862, 15 OR 834–835. 15. J. B. Magruder to S. Cooper, Galveston, February 26, 1863, 15 OR 217; J. B. Magruder to S. Cooper, Houston, June 8, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 60. 16. Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States, 69. 17. J. B. Magruder to S. Cooper, Houston, June 8, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 60.

notes to pages 71– 82 *

223

18. W. H. Griffin to A. N. Mills, Sabine Pass, April 13, 1863, William H. Griffin Military Service Record, NARA; ‘‘Death of Col. Wm. H. Griffin,’’ [Houston] Daily Telegraph, March 31, 1871. 19. J. Kellersberg to X. B. Debray, Harrisburg, Texas, July 30, 1862, 9 OR 729. 20. B. Allston to E. K. Smith, Houston, October 14, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 320. 21. Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations during the Civil War (orig. 1874; republished, New York: Da Capo Press, 1959), 152. 22. Jesse A. Ziegler, ‘‘Sabine Pass Scene of Fierce Naval Fight,’’ Houston Post, August 22, 1937. 23. H. K. Thatcher to E. R. S. Canby, New Orleans, May 31, 1865, 48 OR [Part 2] 692. 24. Julius G. Kellersberger, Memoirs of an Engineer in the Confederate Army in Texas, trans. Helen S. Sundstrom (n.p.: n.p., 1957), 29–30; Ronnie C. Tyler and Lawrence E. Murphy, eds., The Slave Narratives of Texas (Austin: Encino Press, 1974), 108 (statement of Allen Price). 25. B. Allston to E. K. Smith, Houston, October 14, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 320. 26. Randolph B. Campbell, An Empire for Slavery: The Peculiar Institution in Texas (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 59, 233–234; Robert J. Robertson, ‘‘Slavery and the Coming of the Civil War as Seen in the Beaumont Banner,’’ ETHJ 34 (1996): 17. 27. J. B. Magruder to F. R. Lubbock, Houston, June 4, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 35. 28. Cotham, Battle on the Bay, 149; Kellersberg Military Service Record, NARA. 29. J. Kellersberg to P. O. Hebert, Virginia Point, October 20, 1861, Kellersberg Military Service Record, NARA; J. Kellersberg to A. C. Jones, Houston, August 25, 1864, Kellersberg Military Service Record, NARA. 30. Letter of George Douglas dated May 20, 1862, Sabine Pass, Battle of Sabine Pass and Subsequent Celebrations Collection, PAHC; Dean Tevis, ‘‘Unsung Heroism of Texans: Fate of Large Area of State Including Important Towns of Sabine Pass,’’ June 30, 1934, Texas Biography Scrapbook, HMRC. 31. Extracts from Private Diary of H. H. Bell, 1863, May 21, 1863, 20 ORN 756. 32. Alwyn Barr, ‘‘N. H. Smith’s Letters from Sabine Pass, 1863,’’ ETHJ 4, no. 2 (October 1966): 140–144. 33. N. H. Smith to M. G. Howe, Sabine Pass, August 26, 1863, Milton G. Howe Papers, CAH. 34. W. T. Carrington to V. Sulakowski, Millican, September 4, 1863, 20 ORN 555. 35. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, March 18, 1905; John A. Drummond, ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ Confederate Veteran 25, no. 8 (August 1917): 364. 36. Kellersberger, Memoirs of an Engineer, 30. 37. C. M. Mason to E. P. Turner, Houston, June 24, 1863, 20 ORN 830–831; Keith, ‘‘The Memoirs of Kosciuzcko D. Keith,’’ 63. 38. Kellersberger, Memoirs of an Engineer, 30–31. 39. R.W. Dowling to W. T. Austin, Sabine Pass, September 1, 1863, R.W. Dowling Military Service Record, NARA. 40. Kellersberger, Memoirs of an Engineer, 30–31.

224 * notes to pages 83 – 93 Chapter Seven 1. Kurt H. Hackemer, ‘‘Strategic Dilemma: Civil-Military Friction and the Texas Coastal Campaign of 1863,’’ Military History of the West 26, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 187–214. 2. U. S. Grant, ‘‘Chattanooga,’’ in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War: Grant-Lee Edition, ed. Robert U. Johnson and Clarence C. Buel (orig. 1887–1888; reprint, Harrisburg, Pa.: Archive Society, 1991), 3 [Part 2]: 679–680. 3. Hearn, Admiral David Glasgow Farragut, 171–175. 4. J. A. Andrew to G. V. Fox, Boston, November 27, 1861, 15 OR 412–413. 5. Johnson, Red River Campaign, 13–16, 30–34. 6. Alfred T. Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waters (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883), 185–186; Carland Elaine Crook, ‘‘Benjamin Theron and French Designs in Texas during the Civil War,’’ SWHQ 68 (April 1965): 432–433. 7. A. Lincoln to U. S. Grant, Washington, August 9, 1863, 24 OR [Part 3] 584. 8. Johnson, Red River Campaign, 45–46. 9. Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, 1:391. 10. H. W. Halleck to N. P. Banks, Washington, August 6, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 672. 11. Fred H. Harrington, Fighting Politician: Major General N. P. Banks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948), 130; James G. Hollandsworth, Jr., Pretense of Glory: The Life of General Nathaniel P. Banks (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), 3–4. 12. Richard B. Irwin, History of the Nineteenth Army Corps (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1892), 264–265. 13. N. P. Banks to H.W. Halleck, New Orleans, August 26, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 697. 14. H. W. Halleck to N. P. Banks, Washington, August 6, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 672. 15. H. W. Halleck to N. P. Banks, Washington, August 10, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 673. 16. Ibid.; H. W. Halleck to N. P. Banks, Washington, July 31, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 664. 17. H. W. Halleck to N. P. Banks, Washington, August 28, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 698–699. 18. J. B. Magruder to E. K. Smith, Beaumont, September 26, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 261. 19. N. P. Banks to H.W. Halleck, New Orleans, August 15, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 683. 20. N. P. Banks to A. Lincoln, New Orleans, October 22, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 290–292. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid., 290. Chapter Eight 1. Report of N. P. Banks to the Secretary of War, New York, April 6, 1865, 26 OR [Part 1] 18–19.

notes to pages 93 – 98 * 225 2. Testimony of Major General Nathaniel P. Banks on the ‘‘Red River Expedition,’’ Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War (Wilmington, N.C.: Broadfoot Publishing Co., 1999), 5:317. 3. F. Crocker to H. H. Bell, Brashear City, August 27, 1863, Nathaniel P. Banks Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 4. N. P. Banks to A. Lincoln, New Orleans, October 22, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 290. 5. N. P. Banks to H.W. Halleck, New Orleans, August 26, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 696. 6. J. B. Magruder to J. S. Besser, Sabine Pass, September 11, 1863, 6 OR [Series 2] 282–283. 7. Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas, 508. 8. Farragut, The Life of David Glasgow Farragut, 383–385; D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, New York, August 10, 1863, 20 ORN 442–443. 9. J. T. Headley, Farragut and Our Naval Commanders (New York: E. B. Treat & Co., 1867), 530. 10. The National Cyclopedia of American Biography (New York: James T. White & Co., 1921), 2:103–104; Thompson, Civil War Commodores and Admirals, 33. 11. D. G. Farragut to the senior officer at Berwick Bay, New Orleans, July 30, 1863, 20 ORN 428. 12. H. H. Bell to J. Madigan, New Orleans, August 29, 1863, 20 ORN 493–494. 13. Wooster, Texas and Texans in the Civil War, 55. 14. This biographical material about General Franklin is taken largely from Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Blue: Lives of the Union Commanders (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 159–160; Mark A. Snell, From First to Last: The Life of Major General William B. Franklin (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 197–226; and Faust, Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War, 285 (entry on ‘‘William Buel Franklin’’). 15. General Orders No. 1, Baton Rouge, August 20, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 693. 16. Henry A. Shorey, The Story of the Maine Fifteenth; Being a Brief Narrative of the More Important Events in the History of the Fifteenth Maine Regiment (Bridgton, Maine: Press of the Bridgton News, 1890), 52. Chapter Nine 1. Excerpts from Diary of Commodore H. H. Bell, entry for January 12, 1863, 19 ORN 738. 2. H. H. Bell to J. P. Gillis, New Orleans, September 3, 1863, 20 ORN 506. 3. Report of Commodore Bell, New Orleans, September 4, 1863, 20 ORN 515. 4. Page, Ship versus Shore, 15. 5. A. A. Hoehling, Damn the Torpedoes! Naval Incidents of the Civil War (Winston-Salem, N.C.: John F. Blair, 1989), 27–28. 6. Silverstone, Civil War Navies, 68–69. 7. C. H. Baldwin to D. D. Porter, New Orleans, May 1, 1862, 18 ORN 387– 388.

226 * notes to pages 99 –103 8. C. H. Baldwin to D. D. Porter, Two miles below Vicksburg, June 28, 1862, 18 ORN 643–644; D. D. Porter to D. G. Farragut, Vicksburg, July 3, 1862, 18 ORN 639–641; John R. Bartlett, Memoirs of Rhode Island Officers Who Were Engaged in the Service of Their Country during the Great Rebellion of the South (Providence, R.I.: Sidney S. Rider & Brother, 1867), 298–299. 9. Statistical Data of U.S. Ships, 1 ORN [Series 2] 195; Silverstone, Civil War Navies, 77. 10. H. Paulding to J. L. Worden, New York, March 4, 1862, 6 ORN 679; J. L. Worden to G. Welles, Off New York Harbor, March 6, 1862, 6 ORN 684–685. 11. L. M. Goldsborough to G. Welles, Hampton Roads, Virginia, March 17, 1862, 7 ORN 133–134. 12. D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, Key West, February 12, 1862, 18 ORN 27–28 (two letters with same date and place). 13. D. D. Porter to A. D. Bache, Ship Island, May 16, 1862, 18 ORN 395–396. 14. Proceedings of Court of Enquiry, Off New Orleans, January 12, 1863, 19 ORN 447–450; Cotham, Battle on the Bay, 128–131. 15. D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, New Orleans, January 18, 1863, 19 ORN 446– 447. 16. D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, New Orleans, February 21, 1863, 19 ORN 622. 17. Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships (Washington, D.C.: Navy Department, 1959), 1:61; Report of C. Hunter, Off Pensacola, October 28, 1862, 19 ORN 322; Silverstone, Civil War Navies, 47. 18. D. P. Upton to G. Welles, Off Mosquito Inlet, Florida, March 23, 1863, 13 ORN 780. 19. Extract from the diary of Acting Third Assistant Engineer G. W. Baird, April 20, 1863, 20 ORN 154. 20. A. P. Cooke to F. Crocker, Gunboat Estrella, April 21, 1863, 20 ORN 155; A. P. Cooke to H. W. Morris, Butte-à-la-Rose, Louisiana, April 22, 1863, 20 ORN 153–154. 21. ‘‘Yankee Note-Book,’’ entry for April 23, 1863, GDN, November 18, 1863. 22. Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, 3:134–135; A. G. Clary to G. Welles, Off Eleuthera, March 22, 1863, 2 ORN 133–134; G. Welles to C. W. Lamson, Navy Department, July 20, 1863, 20 ORN 402; Silverstone, Civil War Navies, 64. Chapter Ten 1. There is some confusion about the number of men that Franklin had with him on this expedition. Banks set the number at five thousand. N. P. Banks to H. W. Halleck, New Orleans, September 5, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 286. Admiral David Porter’s naval history of the war describes Franklin’s force as consisting of only four thousand men. David D. Porter, The Naval History of the Civil War (1886; reprint, Secaucus, N.J.: Castle, 1984), 346. Confederate General Magruder, who was prone to exaggeration in such matters, estimated the size of the entire expedition at fifteen thousand men. J. B. Magruder to W. R. Boggs, Beaumont, September 10, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 304. Part of this discrepancy may be attrib-

notes to pages 103 –109 * 227 uted to the fact that the Confederates had received reports from spies, basically accurate reports, that the size of the entire invasion force that Banks was ultimately preparing to send to Texas was fifteen thousand men. Based on the number of transports, the total size of the Union expedition (including the crews of the transports and the gunboats) seems to have consisted of between five and six thousand men. 2. N. P. Banks to W. B. Franklin, New Orleans, August 31, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 287–288. 3. Testimony of Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, 5:4. 4. Henry S. McArthur, ‘‘A Yank at Sabine Pass,’’ CWTI 12, no. 8 (December 1973): 39. 5. ‘‘Yankee Note-Book,’’ entry for September 6, 1863, GDN, December 1, 1863. 6. H. H. Bell to G. Welles, New Orleans, September 4, 1863, 20 ORN 515– 516. 7. Rowena Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), xxxiv. 8. H. H. Bell to J. Madigan, New Orleans, September 2, 1863, 20 ORN 514– 515. 9. Report of H. H. Bell to G. Welles, New Orleans, September 13, 1863, 20 ORN 521; Second Report of F. Crocker, Edgartown, Massachusetts, April 21, 1865 (hereinafter ‘‘Second Crocker Report’’), 20 ORN 544. 10. Statement of Pilot Taylor included in papers of H. H. Bell, undated, 20 ORN 551; J. Madigan to G. Welles, New Castle, Maine, October 15, 1863, 20 ORN 539; J. Madigan to H. H. Bell, New Orleans, September 13, 1863, 20 ORN 524–525. 11. Second Crocker Report, 544. 12. Statement of Pilot Taylor included in papers of H. H. Bell, undated, 20 ORN 551; Second Crocker Report, 544. 13. ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass, Texas: A Confederate Veteran Re-lives Civil War in Memory with Visit to the Old Battleground of Sabine Pass,’’ undated TS, Battle of Sabine Pass and Subsequent Celebrations Collection, PAHC. 14. Mrs. M. Looscan, ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ Texas Magazine 3, no. 5 (November 1897), 188. 15. Second Crocker Report, 544; G.Weitzel to W. Hoffman, On Board Steamer Suffolk, September 11, 1863, 20 ORN 531; Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry [relating to the U.S.S. Arizona] on board the U.S.S. Portsmouth, Case No. 4360, Microcopy No. 273, Roll 171, NARA. 16. Second Crocker Report, 545; G.Weitzel to W. Hoffman, On Board Steamer Suffolk, September 11, 1863, 20 ORN 531; W. B. Franklin to N. P. Banks, On Board S.S. Suffolk, September 11, 1863, 20 ORN 527–528; W. H. Dana to H. H. Bell, Off Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 522. 17. William A. H. Allen Diary, William A. H. Allen Papers, Library of Congress (entry for September 8, 1863). 18. Elias P. Pellet, History of the 114th Regiment, New York State Volunteers (Norwich, N.Y.: Telegraph & Chronicle Power Press, 1866), 150.

228 * notes to pages 111–118 Chapter Eleven 1. Memorandum Order of H. H. Bell to F. Crocker, undated, 20 ORN 517. 2. McArthur, ‘‘A Yank at Sabine Pass,’’ 39. 3. D. G. Farragut to J. Alden, New Orleans, January 27, 1863, 19 ORN 584. 4. Orton S. Clark, The One Hundred and Sixteenth Regiment of New York State Volunteers (Buffalo, N.Y.: Matthews & Warren, 1868), 126; Pellet, History of the 114th Regiment, 151. 5. J. P. Gillis to H. H. Bell, Galveston, September 7, 1863, 20 ORN 517–518; W. H. Dana to H. H. Bell, Off Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 522; J. P. Gillis to H. H. Bell, Galveston, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 518. 6. Second Crocker Report, 545. 7. F. H. Odlum to A. N. Mills, Sabine Pass, September 8, 1863, 20 ORN 557; ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, March 18, 1905; Looscan, ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 188. 8. F. H. Odlum to A. N. Mills, Sabine Pass, September 8, 1863, 20 ORN 557; F. H. Odlum to A. N. Mills, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 557– 558; Report of R. W. Dowling to F. H. Odlum, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 559. 9. Second Crocker Report, 546; Report of W. B. Franklin to N. P. Banks, On Board S.S. Suffolk, September 11, 1863, 20 ORN 528. 10. Report of R. W. Dowling to F. H. Odlum, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 559; F. H. Odlum to A. N. Mills, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 557–558. 11. Ziegler, ‘‘Sabine Pass Scene of Fierce Naval Fight,’’ Houston Post, August 22, 1937. 12. Report of H. H. Bell to G. Welles, New Orleans, September 4, 1863, 20 ORN 515. 13. Warner, Generals in Blue, 548. 14. Farragut, The Life of David Glasgow Farragut, 219n. 15. Rod Gragg, Confederate Goliath: The Battle of Fort Fisher (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 86–89. 16. Warner, Generals in Blue, 548; Faust, Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War, 596 (entry on ‘‘Port Hudson, La.’’). 17. Second Crocker Report, 545; Report of W. B. Franklin to N. P. Banks, On Board S.S. Suffolk, September 11, 1863, 20 ORN 528; Report of G. Weitzel to W. Hoffman, On Board S.S. Suffolk, September 11, 1863, 20 ORN 531; Report of J. G. Taylor contained in extract from papers of H. H. Bell, no date, 20 ORN 551. 18. Report of W. B. Franklin to N. P. Banks, On Board S.S. Suffolk, September 11, 1863, 20 ORN 528. Chapter Twelve 1. ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ Adele Briscoe Looscan Papers, Collection MCO41, Albert and Ethel Herzstein Library, San Jacinto Museum of History, Houston, Texas. 2. F. H. Odlum to A. N. Mills, Sabine Pass, September 8, 1863, 20 ORN 557. 3. ‘‘Dick Dowling and Saint Patrick,’’ Houston Post, March 17, 1905.

notes to pages 118 –126 * 229 4. R. W. Dowling to F. H. Bailey, Fort Griffin, August 25, 1863, First Regiment Texas Heavy Artillery Regiment Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; J. L. Tittle to Jane Tittle, Sabine Pass, July 16, 1863, Private Collection of Jack Tittle, Buena Vista, Arkansas. 5. Drummond, ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 364; Drummond, ‘‘Memoirs of John A. Drummond,’’ 34. 6. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, June 12, 1893. 7. ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, September 3, 1899. 8. G. H. Bailey to E. G. Littlejohn, Phoenix, Arizona, November 17, 1901, Elbridge Gerry Littlejohn Collection, GTHC. 9. ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, September 3, 1899. 10. F. H. Odlum to A. N. Mills, Sabine Pass, September 8, 1863, 20 ORN 557. 11. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, March 18, 1905. 12. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, June 12, 1893. 13. Drummond, ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 364. 14. ‘‘Dick Dowling, War Time Hero,’’ Houston Chronicle, August 25, 1929. 15. John B. Flannery, The Irish Texans (San Antonio: University of Texas Institute of Texan Cultures at San Antonio, 1980), 76. 16. Report of R. W. Dowling to F. H. Odlum, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 560; Joe B. Frantz, ‘‘The Alamo,’’ in Battles of Texas (Waco, Tex.: Texian Press, 1967), 13. 17. G. H. Bailey to E. G. Littlejohn, Phoenix, Arizona, November 17, 1901, Elbridge Gerry Littlejohn Collection, GTHC. 18. ‘‘Dick Dowling, War Time Hero,’’ Houston Chronicle, August 25, 1929; Report of R. W. Dowling to F. H. Odlum, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 559. 19. Report of Zack Sabel contained in Lubbock, Six Decades in Texas, 459– 460. 20. Letter from Mrs. George W. Davis to D. D. Bryan, Oak Cliff, November 11, 1902, DAR. 21. Report of R. W. Dowling to F. H. Odlum, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 559. 22. Drummond, ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 365. 23. ‘‘Commemorating the Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ Confederate Veteran 32, no. 12 (December 1924): 457; Mrs. Hal W. Greer, ‘‘Sabine Pass Battle,’’ SHSP 29 (1901): 318. Chapter Thirteen 1. Second Crocker Report, 545–546. 2. McArthur, ‘‘A Yank at Sabine Pass,’’ 41. 3. Extract from the diary of Acting Third Assistant Engineer G. W. Baird, April 14, 1863, 20 ORN 154. 4. Second Crocker Report, 546. 5. Report of F. Crocker to H. H. Bell, Houston, September 12, 1863, 20 ORN 540. 6. Second Crocker Report, 546.

230 * notes to pages 128 –136 7. McArthur, ‘‘A Yank at Sabine Pass,’’ 40. 8. Ibid. 9. Henry C. Dane, ‘‘A Federal’s Account of the Famous Texan Victory at Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, January 30, 1894. 10. A. Johnson to H. K. Thatcher, New Orleans, March 4, 1865, 20 ORN 553; Report of R. W. Dowling, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 559. 11. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, March 18, 1905. 12. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, June 12, 1863; ‘‘Battle of Sabine,’’ [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, September 16, 1863; Cotham, Battle on the Bay, 107–109. 13. R. C. O’Hara to D. D. Bryan, Austin, March 26, 1903, DAR; List of ‘‘Davis Guards Members of Co. F Present Sep 8th 1863 in fort,’’ DAR. 14. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, March 18, 1905. 15. ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, September 3, 1899. 16. G. H. Bailey to Mrs. M. Looscan, February 19, 1888, Michael Looscan Papers, Collection MCO54, Albert and Ethel Herzstein Library, San Jacinto Museum of History, Houston, Texas. 17. McArthur, ‘‘A Yank at Sabine Pass,’’ 41. 18. Dane, ‘‘A Federal’s Account.’’ 19. Drummond, ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 365; G. H. Bailey to Mrs. M. Looscan, February 19, 1888, Michael Looscan Papers, Collection MCO54, Albert and Ethel Herzstein Library, San Jacinto Museum of History, Houston, Texas. 20. A. Johnson to H. K. Thatcher, New Orleans, March 4, 1865, 20 ORN 553; ‘‘Yankee Note-Book,’’ entry for September 9, 1863, GDN, December 1, 1863. 21. J. Thomas Scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy (orig. 1894; reprint, New York: Gramercy Books, 1996), 525. 22. Dane, ‘‘A Federal’s Account.’’ 23. Ibid. 24. Proceedings of the Court of Inquiry convened on board the U.S.S. Portsmouth off New Orleans, February 25, 1864, Case No. 4360, Microcopy No. 273, Roll 171, NARA. 25. ‘‘Battle of Sabine,’’ [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, September 16, 1863. 26. Dane, ‘‘A Federal’s Account.’’ 27. A. Johnson to H. K. Thatcher, New Orleans, March 4, 1865, 20 ORN 553. 28. Statement of J. G. Taylor in extract from papers of H. H. Bell, undated, 20 ORN 551. 29. A. Johnson to H. K. Thatcher, New Orleans, March 4, 1865, 20 ORN 553. 30. Report of H.Tibbits to H. H. Bell, Sabine Bar, September 10, 1863, 20 ORN 523–524. 31. Statement of James G. Taylor in extract from papers of H. H. Bell, undated, 20 ORN 551. 32. D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, Below Port Hudson, June 15, 1863, 20 ORN 298–299. 33. Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell, ‘‘Narrative of a Union Prisoner in Texas,’’ undated TS, Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell Collection (Manuscript Collection No. 310), Special Collections and Archives Division, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.

notes to pages 136 –14 3 * 231 34. Report of F. Crocker to H. H. Bell, Houston, September 12, 1863, 20 ORN 540; Second Crocker Report, 546. 35. Report of W. B. Franklin to N. P. Banks, On Board S.S. Suffolk, 20 ORN 529. 36. Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry convened on Board the U.S.S. Portsmouth, February 25, 1864, Case No. 4360, Microcopy No. 273, Roll 271, NARA. 37. McArthur, ‘‘A Yank at Sabine Pass,’’ 41; Report of F. H. Odlum to A. N. Mills, Sabine Pass, September 8, 1863, 20 ORN 557; Report of R. W. Dowling, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 559; Bartlett, Memoirs of Rhode Island Officers, 303–304. 38. Second Crocker Report, 546–547. 39. Letter from Thomas Mackey to Uncle, Brashear City, Louisiana, September 19, 1863, Thomas Mackey Letter Collection, John Hay Library, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island; J. P. Gillis to G. E. Fox, Galveston, September 17, 1863, 20 ORN 526. 40. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, March 18, 1905. 41. Second Crocker Report, 546–547. 42. McArthur, ‘‘A Yank at Sabine Pass,’’ 41–42. 43. Bartlett, Memoirs of Rhode Island Officers, 303–304; William D. Quick, ‘‘Lieutenant Robert Rhodes, U.S.N.: The Long Journey Home,’’ Texas Gulf Historical and Biographical Record (November 1989): 15–31. 44. Second Crocker Report, 546–547. 45. McArthur, ‘‘A Yank at Sabine Pass,’’ 42. 46. Second Crocker Report, 546–547. 47. McArthur, ‘‘A Yank at Sabine Pass,’’ 42. 48. Second Crocker Report, 546–547; Report of F. Crocker to H. H. Bell, Houston, September 12, 1863, 20 ORN 540–541. 49. Dane, ‘‘A Federal’s Account.’’ 50. McArthur, ‘‘A Yank at Sabine Pass,’’ 42; Second Crocker Report, 547. 51. Dane, ‘‘A Federal’s Account’’; Report of A. Johnson to H. K. Thatcher, New Orleans, March 4, 1865, 20 ORN 553. 52. L. Smith to E. P. Turner, Sabine Pass, September 8, 1863, 20 ORN 556. 53. Report of R. W. Dowling to F. H. Odlum, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 559–560. 54. Drummond, ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 364. 55. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, March 18, 1905. 56. Diary of John Read (undated memorandum at the rear of the diary), John Read Papers (Collection bMs Am 2111), Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 57. ‘‘Dick Dowling Is Paid Honor at Ceremonies,’’ Houston Chronicle, November 2, 1935. 58. Compare Scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy, 526, with James Farber, Texas, C.S.A. (New York: Jackson Co., 1947), 165. 59. ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ Adele Briscoe Looscan Papers, Collection MCO41, Albert and Ethel Herzstein Library, San Jacinto Museum of History, Houston, Texas.

232 * notes to pages 144 –149 60. Caleb G. Forshey to Mrs. Dorsey, New Orleans, May 9, 1877, Jefferson Davis Papers, Louisiana Historical Association Collection, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans. 61. ‘‘The First News of the Battle,’’ Houston Post, March 17, 1905. 62. ‘‘Confederate Veterans’ Column,’’ GDN, September 3, 1899. 63. Dane, ‘‘A Federal’s Account’’; Letter from John M. Carson to Editor of Dallas Semi-Weekly News, Cooledge, Texas, September 8, 1909, John M. Carson Letters, CAH. 64. McArthur, ‘‘A Yank at Sabine Pass,’’ 43. 65. Scharf, History of the Confederate States Navy, 526. 66. Dane, ‘‘A Federal’s Account.’’ 67. W. H. Dana to H. H. Bell, Off Sabine Pass, October 15, 1863, 20 ORN 537. 68. H. H. Bell to G. Welles, New Orleans, September 22, 1863, 20 ORN 526– 527. 69. ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, September 3, 1899. 70. W. B. Franklin to Wife, St. Charles, September 12, 1863, W. B. Franklin Papers, York County Heritage Trust, York, Pennsylvania (letter transcribed by Mark A. Snell). 71. Ibid.; C. W. Lamson to H. H. Bell, Off Sabine Pass, September 10, 1863, 20 ORN 523; W. H. Dana to H. H. Bell, Off Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 522; Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry on Board the U.S.S. Portsmouth off New Orleans, February 25, 1864, Case No. 4360, Microcopy No. 273, Roll 171, NARA. 72. H. H. Bell to G. Welles, New Orleans, September 22, 1863, 20 ORN 527. 73. Charles Henry Richardson to Lois Wright Richardson Davis, Algiers, Louisiana, September 13, 1863, Lois Wright Richardson Davis Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. 74. Statement of J. G. Taylor in extract from papers of H. H. Bell, undated, 20 ORN 551. 75. Report of W. B. Franklin to N. P. Banks, On Board the steamer Suffolk, September 11, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 297. 76. ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, September 3, 1899. 77. Erika L. Murr, ed., A Rebel Wife in Texas: The Diary and Letters of Elizabeth Scott Neblett, 1852–1864 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 156. 78. W. H. Dana to H. H. Bell, Off Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 522. 79. H. H. Bell to J. Madigan, Off New Orleans, September 11, 1863, 20 ORN 519–520; H. H. Bell to J. Madigan, Off New Orleans, September 11, 1863, 20 ORN 520. 80. Jacob Chandler, Orderly Sergeant, Co. D, 8th New Hampshire Volunteers, quoted in ‘‘Sabine Pass battle version of other side,’’ undated newspaper clipping, Battle of Sabine Pass and Subsequent Celebrations Collection, PAHC. 81. Kellersberger, Memoirs of an Engineer, 31. 82. Porter, Naval History of the Civil War, 347. 83. Second Crocker Report, 548.

notes to pages 149 –153 * 233 84. Dane, ‘‘A Federal’s Account.’’ 85. Frederick Crocker Pension File, NARA. 86. D. T. Nestell, typescript of undated ‘‘Narrative of a Union Prisoner in Texas,’’ Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell Collection (Manuscript Collection No. 310), Special Collections and Archives Division, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. 87. Report of G. Weitzel to W. Hoffman, On Board Steamer Suffolk, September 11, 1863, 20 ORN 531; W. B. Franklin to N. P. Banks, Algiers, Louisiana, September 14, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 298. 88. Report of N. P. Banks, New Orleans, September 13, 1863, 20 ORN 533. 89. Report of R. W. Dowling to F. H. Odlum, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 559; Second Crocker Report, 547; James B. Simpson, ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ Frontier Times 21, no. 11 (August 1944): 421. 90. Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry aboard the U.S.S. Portsmouth, February 25, 1864, Case No. 4360, Microcopy No. 273, Roll 171, NARA. 91. Diary of John Read (undated memorandum at the back) [Folder 11(23)] and Letter to Father, Off Calcasieu Pass, September 11, 1863 [Folder 1(9)], John Read Papers (Collection bMs Am 2111), Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 92. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, September 5, 1897. 93. Report of G. Weitzel to W. Hoffman, On Board Steamer Suffolk, September 11, 1863, 20 ORN 531. 94. Simpson, ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 421. 95. Report of W. B. Franklin to N. P. Banks, On Board S.S. Suffolk, September 11, 1863, 20 ORN 529. 96. Report of W. B. Franklin to N. P. Banks, On Board S.S. Suffolk, September 11, 1863, Nathaniel P. Banks Papers, Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, Illinois. 97. W. B. Franklin to Wife, St. Charles, September 12, 1863, W. B. Franklin Papers, York County Heritage Trust, York, Pennsylvania (letter transcribed by Mark A. Snell). 98. Report of W. B. Franklin to N. P. Banks, On Board S.S. Suffolk, September 11, 1863, 20 ORN 529. 99. Irwin, History of the Nineteenth Army Corps, 270–271. 100. N. P. Banks to wife, September 22, 1863, Nathaniel Banks Papers, Library of Congress; N. P. Banks to the President of the United States (‘‘finished but not sent’’), October 23, 1863, Nathaniel Banks Papers, Library of Congress. 101. General Report of N. P. Banks to the Secretary of War, New York, April 6, 1865, 26 OR [Part 1] 19. In the Nathaniel P. Banks Papers of the Illinois State Historical Library there is a manuscript bearing a handwritten label ‘‘Autobiographical by N. P. Banks.’’ This document appears to be an early draft of at least part of the General Report prepared by Banks in 1865. The portion of this report dealing with the events at Sabine Pass is similar, but not identical, to the Report printed in the OR. 102. N. P. Banks to the President of the United States, New Orleans, October 22, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 290–292, quotation from pp. 290, 292.

234 * notes to pages 154 –162 103. Report of W. B. Franklin to N. P. Banks, On Board the Steamship Suffolk, September 11, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 297. 104. Pellet, History of the 114th Regiment, 152–153. 105. Richard B. Irwin, ‘‘The Red River Campaign,’’ in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, 4:345. 106. Horace Greeley, The American Conflict: A History of the Great Rebellion in the United States of America, 1860–1865 (Hartford, Conn.: O. D. Case & Co., 1867), 2:339–340. 107. W. B. Franklin to wife, St. Charles, September 14, 1863, W. B. Franklin Papers, York County Heritage Trust, York, Pennsylvania (letter transcribed by Mark A. Snell). 108. Excerpts from the journal of Major-General Samuel Peter Heintzelman, U.S. Army, September 25, 1863, OR Supp. 5:542. 109. ‘‘Attack on Sabine Pass, September 8, 1863,’’ Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, October 10, 1863, p. 39. 110. Frank Moore, ed., The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1864), 11:426–429, quotation from p. 429. 111. R. C. O’Hara to D. D. Bryan, Austin, March 26, 1903, DAR. 112. Tyler, The New Handbook of Texas, 2:1109 (entry on ‘‘Fort Manhassett’’ by Robert Wooster). Chapter Fourteen 1. F. H. Odlum to A. N. Mills, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 558. 2. Report of R. W. Dowling to F. H. Odlum, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 559–560. 3. W. H. Dana to J. P. Gillis, Off Sabine Pass, September 13, 1863, 20 ORN 535. 4. L. Smith to E. P. Turner, Sabine Pass, September 8, 1863, 20 ORN 556. 5. F. H. Odlum to A. N. Mills, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 558. 6. ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, September 3, 1899. 7. John M. Carson to Editor of Dallas Semi-Weekly News, Cooledge, Texas, September 8, 1909, John M. Carson Letters, CAH. 8. Civil War Diary of Wright Smith Andrews (entry for September 10, 1863), Sam Houston Regional Library and Research Center, Archives and Information Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission, Liberty, Texas. 9. G. Welles to H. H. Bell, Navy Department, October 9, 1863, 20 ORN 538. 10. F. H. Odlum to A. N. Mills, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 558. 11. D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, Mobile, March 4, 1864, 20 ORN 554. 12. Second Crocker Report, 547. 13. D. D. T. Nestell to G. Welles, New York, May 5, 1865, 20 ORN 549–551. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid., 550. 17. Biographical sketch contained in Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell Collection (Manuscript Collection No. 310), Special Collections and Archives Division, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.

notes to pages 162 –168 * 235 18. J. B. Magruder to W. R. Boggs, Beaumont, September 10, 1863, 20 ORN 561. 19. General Orders No. (unnumbered), issued by command of J. B. Magruder, Sabine Pass, September 13, 1863, Confederate States of America Collection, General Orders folder for 1863, Archives and Information Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission, Austin, Texas. 20. Letter ‘‘To the Men of Texas’’ from J. B. Magruder, Beaumont, September 10, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 307; Special Orders No. (unnumbered), issued by command of J. B. Magruder, Houston, September 9, 1863, Confederate States of America Collection, General Orders folder for 1863, Archives and Information Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission, Austin, Texas. 21. L. Smith to E. P. Turner, Sabine Pass, September 8, 1863, 20 ORN 556. 22. Report of R. W. Dowling to F. H. Odlum, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 559–560. 23. Caleb G. Forshey to Mrs. Dorsey, New Orleans, May 9, 1877, Jefferson Davis Papers, Louisiana Historical Association Collection, Howard-Tilton Memorial Library, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana. 24. Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, 2:240. 25. ‘‘Battle of Sabine,’’ [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, September 16, 1863. 26. ‘‘From Sabine,’’ [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph, September 18, 1863. 27. Drummond, ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 365; George H. Bailey to Mrs. M. Looscan, Sealy, Texas, February 19, 1888, Michael Looscan Papers, Collection MCO54, Albert and Esther Herzstein Library, San Jacinto Museum, Houston, Texas. 28. General Orders No. 154, Houston, September 9, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 306– 307. 29. Welles, The Diary of Gideon Welles, 1:441–442. 30. Testimony of Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, 5:4. 31. D. D. Porter to G. Welles, Cairo, Illinois, October 1, 1863, 25 ORN 441. 32. Account of Henry C. Dane in ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, September 5, 1897. 33. Naval History Division, Navy Department, Civil War Naval Chronology, 1861–1865 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 3:157. 34. Charles Henry Richardson to Lois Wright Richardson Davis, Algiers, Louisiana, September 13, 1863, Lois Wright Richardson Davis Papers, Rare Book, Manuscript, and Special Collections Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. 35. D. G. Farragut to H. H. Bell, New York, October 15, 1863, 20 ORN 629– 630. 36. H. W. Halleck to N. P. Banks, Washington, September 30, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 742. 37. N. P. Banks to H. W. Halleck, New Orleans, October 16, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 768. 38. Frederic Speed to Rev. J. William Jones, Vicksburg, Mississippi, September 27, 1883, ‘‘Sabine Pass,’’ SHSP 12, no. 3 (March 1884): 131.

236 * notes to pages 168 –174 39. R. Taylor to J. B. Magruder, Alexandria, Louisiana, September 15, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 231. 40. E. Kirby Smith to R. Taylor, Shreveport, September 17, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 233. 41. J. B. Magruder letter ‘‘To the Soldiers and Citizens of Texas,’’ Sabine Pass, September 19, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 242–243. 42. E. P. Turner to A. Mouton, Sabine Pass, September 17, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 235. 43. A. Mouton to E. P. Turner, In the field near Opelousas, September 22, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 246–247. 44. S. D. Yancey to E. K. Smith, Sabine Pass, September 22, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 247–248. 45. ‘‘Sub-inclosure’’ to letter from B. P. L. Vinson to J. B. Magruder, Mermenton, October 19, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 341. 46. H. P. Bee to E. P. Turner, Fort Brown, September 18, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 237. 47. Beth G. Crabtree and James W. Patton, eds., ‘‘Journal of a Secesh Lady’’: The Diary of Catherine Ann Devereux Edmondston, 1860–1866 (Raleigh: North Carolina Division of Archives and History, 1979), 478. 48. Edward B. Williams, ed., Rebel Brothers: The Civil War Letters of the Truehearts (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1995), 180 (emphasis in original). 49. J. A. Seddon to J. Davis, November 26, 1863, Richmond, 2 OR [Series 4] 991. 50. Thanks of the Confederate Congress to Captain Odlum, Lieutenant Dowling, and the men under their command, approved February 8, 1864, 26 OR [Part 1] 312. 51. Muir, ‘‘Dick Dowling and the Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 201. 52. Faust, Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War, 211 (entry on ‘‘Davis Guard Medal’’). 53. ‘‘Dr. George H. Bailey,’’ Confederate Veteran 18, no. 5 (May 1910): 244; ‘‘Dr. George H. Bailey,’’ Confederate Veteran 18, no. 7 (July 1910): 342. 54. Faust, Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War, 211 (entry on ‘‘Davis Guard Medal’’). 55. Jefferson Davis to Ed. Frossard, Beauvoir, Mississippi, July 12, 1880, Numisma 5, no. 4 (July 1881). 56. ‘‘Helping History: A Brilliant Audience Indorses the Southern Historical Society,’’ [New Orleans] Times Democrat, April 26, 1882. 57. Muir, ‘‘Dick Dowling and the Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 201–202. Chapter Fifteen 1. Davis Bitton, ed., The Reminiscences and Civil War Letters of Levi Lamoni Wight: Life in a Mormon Splinter Colony on the Texas Frontier (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1970), 130. 2. ‘‘Autobiography of Mrs. Otis McGaffey, Sr.,’’ Yellowed Pages 28, no. 3 (Fall 1998): 7–8.

notes to pages 175 –181 * 237 3. H. Rolando to H. H. Bell, Sabine Pass, October 13, 1863, 20 ORN 614. 4. H. Rolando to H. H. Bell, Sabine Pass, September 23, 1863, 20 ORN 600; H. Rolando to H. H. Bell, Sabine Pass, October 13, 1863, 20 ORN 626; L. Smith to A. Buchel, Sabine Pass, October 5, 1863, 20 ORN 841. 5. V. Sulakowski to J. Kellersberg, Sabine City, October 5, 1863, 26 OR [Part 2] 298–299. 6. N. P. Banks to H. H. Bell, Off Brazos Santiago, November 3, 1863, 20 ORN 647. 7. N. P. Banks to H. H. Bell, Aransas Pass, November 17, 1863, 20 ORN 680– 681. 8. N. P. Banks to H. W. Halleck, Off Brazos Santiago, November 4, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 397. 9. H. W. Halleck to N. P. Banks, Washington, December 7, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 835. 10. J. B. Marchand to D. G. Farragut, Galveston, March 16, 1864, 21 ORN 143; J. B. Marchand to D. G. Farragut, Galveston, March 30, 1864, 21 ORN 158– 160. 11. J. B. Marchand to D. G. Farragut, Galveston, March 30, 1864, 21 ORN 158–160; M. B. Woolsey to J. B. Marchand, Sabine Pass, March 27, 1864, 21 ORN 160–161; J. B. Marchand to P. Drayton, Galveston, March 30, 1864, 21 ORN 161– 162. 12. J. S. Palmer to B. W. Loring, New Orleans, May 4, 1864, 21 ORN 246. 13. B. W. Loring to G. Welles, Washington, February 28, 1865, 21 ORN 256. 14. J. E. Slaughter to J. B. Magruder, Houston, April 30, 1864, 21 ORN 895; J. E. Slaughter to W. H. Griffin, Houston, April 30, 1864, 21 ORN 895. 15. Letter from J. Wesley Bowden to L. Bowden, Calcasieu Pass, May 7, 1864 [Folder 1(9)], John Read Papers (Collection bMs Am 2111), Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 16. Paul C. Boethel, The Big Guns of Fayette (Austin: Von Boeckmann–Jones Co., 1965), 47–69; Alwynn Barr, ‘‘The Battle of Calcasieu Pass,’’ SWHQ 66 (July 1962): 58–67; W. T. Block, ‘‘Calcasieu Pass, Victory, Heroism ‘Equal Dowling’s’ ’’ ETHJ 9 (October 1971): 139–144. 17. ‘‘Battle of Calcasieu Pass,’’ Confederate Veteran 26, no. 12 (December 1918): 516. 18. W. T. Block and W. D. Quick, ‘‘Co. History: Calcasieu Battle, First Hand,’’ Port Arthur News, January 6, 1972. 19. William Terry to P. G. Moeling, Esq., Matamoras, Mexico, May 12, 1865, TS, William Terry Letters, Edith Garland Dupre Library, University of Louisiana at Lafayette. 20. ‘‘The Sabine Pass Disaster—Details of the Capture of the Gunboats Granite City and Wave,’’ Boston Herald, May 30, 1864. 21. D. G. Farragut to G. Welles, Off Mobile, May 23, 1864, 21 ORN 249–250. 22. A. Lincoln to E. R. S. Canby, Washington, August 9, 1864, 21 ORN 644– 645. 23. D. G. Farragut to G.Welles, Mobile Bay, September 15, 1864, 21 ORN 643– 644.

238 * notes to pages 181–188 24. Welles, Diary of Gideon Welles, 2:159–160, 162, 167; John L. Waller, Colossal Hamilton of Texas (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1968), 55. 25. J. F. Belton to J. G. Walker, Shreveport, January 22, 1865, 48 OR [Part 1] 1339. 26. H. T. Douglas to E. K. Smith, Shreveport, March 15, 1865, 48 OR [Part 1] 1425. 27. F. N. Wicker to C. T. Christensen, New Orleans, May 13, 1865, 48 OR [Part 2] 425–426. 28. J. B. Magruder to B. F. Sands, Houston, May 27, 1865, 48 OR [Part 2] 715– 716; B. F. Sands to J. B. Magruder, Off Galveston, May 29, 1865, 48 OR [Part 2] 716. 29. H. K. Thatcher to E. R. S. Canby, New Orleans, May 31, 1865, 48 OR [Part 2] 692. 30. J. S. Crosby to W. T. Sherman, New Orleans, May 29, 1865, 48 OR [Part 2] 651–652; N. P. Banks to C. T. Christensen, New Orleans, May 30, 1865, 48 OR [Part 2] 677–678. 31. Special Orders No. 25, New Orleans, July 3, 1865, 48 OR [Part 2] 1043. 32. P. H. Sheridan to G. Granger, New Orleans, July 7, 1865, 48 OR [Part 2] 1062. 33. F. W. Emery to R. Kennicott, Galveston, July 11, 1865, 48 OR 1072. Conclusion 1. Tyler, The New Handbook of Texas, 5:745–746 (entry on ‘‘Sabine Pass, Texas’’ by Robert Wooster). 2. Ibid., 5:271–272 (entry on ‘‘Port Arthur, Texas’’ by John W. Storey). 3. Ibid., 5:568 (entry on ‘‘Jiles Perry Richardson’’ by Alan Lee Haworth). 4. T. Holtzapple and Wayne Roberson, Sabine Pass Battleground State Historical Park, Jefferson County, Texas: Archaeological Investigations, Archaeological Report #8, Antiquities Permit #21 (Austin: Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, Historic Sites and Restoration Branch, September 1976), 6, 17–18; ‘‘Pumping War Relics,’’ Popular Mechanics, January 11, 1902, p. 2. 5. ‘‘Fort Manhassett Disgorges Huge Treasure of Artifacts,’’ Port Arthur News, August 30, 1970. 6. ‘‘The Bank,’’ Galveston Tri-Weekly News, February 26, 1866. 7. Phillip H. Hall to E. G. Littlejohn, Houston, Texas, December 1, 1899, Elbridge Gerry Littlejohn Collection, GTHC. 8. Muir, ‘‘Dick Dowling and the Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 204–207; ‘‘Dick Dowling and Friends in First Texas Oil Company,’’ Houston Chronicle, October 10, 1937. 9. ‘‘Letter from Houston,’’ GDN, September 26, 1867; Muir, ‘‘Dick Dowling and the Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 206–207. 10. Frederick Crocker Pension File, NARA; Tolbert, Dick Dowling at Sabine Pass, 135. 11. Snell, From First to Last: The Life of Major William B. Franklin, 335–338. 12. Ibid., 335–346. 13. Still, Quarterdeck and Bridge, 145. 14. Ibid., 142–143; Thompson, Civil War Commodores and Admirals, 62.

notes to pages 188 –206

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15. Grady McWhiney and Perry D. Jamieson, Attack and Die: Civil War Military Tactics and the Southern Heritage (University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1982), 13–16. 16. Ibid., xv. 17. D. G. Farragut to G.Welles, Mobile Bay, September 22, 1864, 21 ORN 655– 656. 18. C. D. Ball, Orange County Medical History (Santa Ana, Calif.: A. G. Flagg, 1926), 18. 19. Harold B. Simpson, ‘‘Sabine Pass,’’ in Battles of Texas (Waco, Tex.: Texian Press, 1967), 145. 20. John M. Merwin, Undated newspaper clipping titled ‘‘Sabine Pass: The Reasons That Medal Was Given Miss Dowling,’’ Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell Collection (Manuscript Collection No. 310), Special Collections and Archives Division, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland. 21. General Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain, Gettysburg, October 3, 1889, quoted in Francis H. Kennedy, ed., The Civil War Battlefield Guide (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1990), 287. 22. David Grene, tr., The History of Herodotus (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 548. 23. ‘‘Dick Dowling at Sabine Pass,’’ Confederate Veteran 4, no. 10 (October 1896): 336–337. 24. ‘‘Survivors of Davis Guards,’’ Confederate Veteran 9, no. 2 (February 1901): 76–77. 25. Mrs. R. F. Pray, Dick Dowling’s Battle: An Account of the War between the States in the Eastern Gulf Coast Region of Texas (San Antonio: Naylor Company, 1936), 121–122. 26. ‘‘Commemorating the Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ Confederate Veteran 32, no. 12 (December 1924): 456–457. 27. ‘‘Dick Dowling Is Paid Honor at Ceremonies,’’ Houston Chronicle, November 3, 1935; ‘‘Monument Dedicated to Dick Dowling While 800 Brave Threats of Rain,’’ Houston Chronicle, November 3, 1935. 28. ‘‘Tuam Honours U.S. Civil War Hero,’’ Tuam Herald and Western Advertiser, June 6, 1998; Dick Dowling Statue Records, No. 0019, City of Houston. 29. ‘‘Destroyer Absent as Dowling Paid Tribute,’’ Houston Post, September 8, 1963. 30. Grene, tr., The History of Herodotus, 552. 31. Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, 2:236–239. 32. J. Davis to J. F. Elliot, Beauvoir, Mississippi, July 29, 1884, SHSP 12 (July– August–September 1884): 336. Appendix 2 1. When it came time to erect the various monuments to Dick Dowling and his men, there was tremendous confusion and disagreement about the list of names to include on the monuments. The official service records were incomplete, inconclusive, and sometimes in conflict. As each year rolled by, the list of names of men claiming to have served with Dowling grew. By 1903, John

240 * notes to page 206 Drummond complained that so many men had been claiming to have been in the battle with Dowling that the company of forty had become a company of a thousand men. 2. One list in the Dowling Monument Association Records (DAR) at the Houston Metropolitan Research Center gives this man’s name as ‘‘Patt Alilot.’’ In a letter dated July 8, 1903, Drummond suggests that this man may have been one of the two reserves in the bombproof during the battle. 3. According to Record No. 435 of the Confederate Home Roster in the Texas State Archives, Carr was born in Ireland in 1825. He came to Texas in 1856, where he worked as a ‘‘laborer.’’ He was admitted to the Confederate Home in Austin on February 8, 1888, suffering from rheumatism, and died on February 26, 1901. He was buried in the Texas State Cemetery in Austin. A postwar article in a veterans’ magazine states that he was called ‘‘Mickie’’ by the company. It also says that he was born in the town of Gartlong, County of Meath, Ireland, and came to America in 1848, where he worked on the railroads in seven different states before settling in Texas. According to this source, he was still working on the railroads in the early 1890s, when he was disabled by an accident that sent him into the Confederate Home in Austin. ‘‘Survivors of Davis Guards,’’ Confederate Veteran 9, no. 2 (February 1901): 77. 4. The DAR includes a letter from R. C. O’Hara dated December 11, 1902, containing a list of men alleged to have been in Fort Griffin (the ‘‘O’Hara List’’). The O’Hara List states some confusion about whether this man’s first name was ‘‘Abner,’’ ‘‘Abbert,’’ or ‘‘Albert.’’ 5. He is listed in the Company Roster as ‘‘Patrick Clare.’’ The O’Hara List spells his name as ‘‘Patrick Care.’’ It also states that this man was known as ‘‘Paddy Clare.’’ The Sabine Pass Monument lists him as ‘‘Pat Clair.’’ 6. The Unit Roster shows him to be a corporal. According to one source, on the day before the battle, Corcoran had gone out and removed a stake that marked the edge of the oyster reef about three hundred yards below the fort. It was on this reef that the U.S.S. Clifton ultimately ran aground. Drummond, ‘‘The Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ 365. According to a letter in the DAR from R. C. O’Hara dated November 26, 1902, this man deserted to the enemy. The muster rolls do not confirm this alleged desertion. 7. The Unit Roster shows him to be a sergeant and spells his last name ‘‘Dougherty.’’ One list in the DAR identifies his last name as ‘‘Doherty.’’ 8. In the Unit Roster, his name is listed as ‘‘Hugh Deegan.’’ A list made in Austin in 1900 and contained in the DAR (the ‘‘Austin List’’) spells his last name ‘‘Deigan.’’ 9. One list in the DAR spells this name ‘‘Delany.’’ According to a letter in the DAR from R. C. O’Hara dated November 26, 1902, this man deserted to the enemy. 10. The Unit Roster lists his first name as ‘‘Daniel.’’ In John A. Drummond’s list of names (the ‘‘Drummond List’’) contained in the DAR, this man’s name is spelled ‘‘Dunavan.’’ One list in the DAR identifies this man as ‘‘Don Dunavan.’’ 11. According to a biography in the DAR, Drummond was born March 23, 1844, in Clay County, Missouri. At the age of fourteen he came to Texas with his

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stepmother, working as a ‘‘low-boy’’ on steamboats operating between Galveston and Houston. He ran away from home and joined the Davis Guard under the name John Anderson. He served in the Davis Guard as drummer boy during the war. He was sent to Captain Odlum to obtain orders for Dowling on September 8, 1863. He was in Galveston at the end of the war. After the war ended he returned to his old home in Missouri, where he learned that his father had fought for the Union. He eventually returned south to Opelousas, Louisiana. 12. The O’Hara List spells this man’s last name as ‘‘Eagen.’’ 13. One list in the DAR identifies this man as ‘‘Pat Fitzgerald,’’ which is how he is identified on the Sabine Pass monument. 14. Born in Tralle County, Ireland, Fitzgerald enlisted in Houston on August 13, 1861, as a member of the Davis Guard. Promoted first to corporal and then to orderly sergeant. Became second lieutenant after the Battle of Sabine Pass, when Dowling was promoted to major. Stated after the war that he ‘‘Participated in the capture of ‘Morning Light’ and ‘Velocity,’ and was in the battle of Sabine Pass, Sept. 8, 1863.’’ Mamie Yeary, compiler, Reminiscences of the Boys in Gray (orig. 1912, reprinted Dayton, Ohio: Morningside House, Inc., 1986), 226. John Drummond, in a letter dated March 10, 1904, in the DAR, states that this man was in charge of the number one gun. His pension application was filed September 12, 1921, as No. H-363. He died at the Confederate Home in Austin on September 20, 1927. His name is not included on the Sabine Pass monument. 15. The Unit Roster identifies this man as a sergeant. 16. According to the muster roll, this man deserted on January 8, 1864. 17. Records of the Dick Dowling Camp No. 197 of the United Confederate Veterans spell his last name as ‘‘Gleeson,’’ as does the Unit Roster. One list in the DAR identifies this man as ‘‘Glison.’’ One list in the DAR identifies his first name as ‘‘Williams.’’ 18. On the Sabine Pass monument, this man is identified as ‘‘Tom Hagerty.’’ 19. The Unit Roster lists this man’s name as ‘‘William Hardy,’’ which is how he is identified on the Sabine Pass monument. According to a letter from Mrs. George W. Davis dated November 11, 1902, in the DAR, this man, who lived in Hico, ‘‘was detailed most of the time and was not in the company at the battle.’’ According to a biography in the DAR, he had been born in London, but arrived in Texas shortly before the beginning of the war. He liked Captain Odlum and Dick Dowling, so he joined their company and served as a member of the Davis Guard during the war. After the war, he became a buffalo hunter and went west. He returned to Texas in 1872, where he lived in Lampasas. 20. One list in the DAR identifies this man as ‘‘John Haset.’’ Another list identifies him as ‘‘John Husset.’’ 21. The Unit Roster spells this man’s last name as ‘‘Hennessy.’’ One list in the DAR identifies this man as ‘‘John Henesy.’’ A letter in the DAR from R. C. O’Hara dated March 26, 1903, suggests that this man was sick in the hospital at the time of the battle. In a letter dated Hico, March 27 [no year], William Hardin states that ‘‘Jack Hennessy’’ was the oldest man in the company and was definitely in the fight. 22. There is uncertainty about this man’s presence at the battle. The O’Hara

242 * notes to page 206 List states that he was dead previous to or soon after the battle of the Pass and states that he was a long time in hospital. The Drummond List claims that this man was at the battle but lists his name as ‘‘Jim Huggins.’’ 23. The Sabine Pass monument identifies this man as ‘‘Tim Huggins.’’ 24. This man is identified as a sergeant in the Unit Roster. One list in the DAR lists his first name as ‘‘Tim,’’ which is how he is identified on the Sabine Pass monument. The Austin List spells his last name ‘‘Hurly.’’ 25. Referring to this man as ‘‘Livingston Jett,’’ the O’Hara List states that he was unknown to O’Hara as a member of the company. O’Hara claimed in 1902 when he compiled his list that ‘‘I knew no such person at any time or place.’’ This is curious because John Drummond’s list states emphatically that Jett was a member of the company (as independently confirmed by muster rolls) and present at the battle. In a letter dated July 8, 1903, Drummond suggests that Jett may have been one of the two reserves in the bombproof. One list in the DAR identifies this man’s first name as ‘‘Levingston.’’ A muster roll from December 1863 refers to a desertion by Jett associated with a sick furlough and doctor’s certificate. 26. This man is identified as ‘‘Tim Malone’’ on the Sabine Pass monument. According to the muster roll, he deserted on December 24, 1863. 27. The Unit Roster identifies his first name as ‘‘Alexander.’’ 28. He is identified on the Sabine Pass monument as ‘‘Pat McDonnell.’’ The Unit Roster identifies his last name as ‘‘McDonald.’’ According to the muster roll, this man deserted on December 24, 1863. 29. The Unit Roster identifies this man as a sergeant. According to the muster roll, this man deserted on January 8, 1864. One list in the DAR identifies this man as ‘‘Tim McDonough,’’ which is how he is identified on the Sabine Pass monument. 30. The Unit Roster identifies this man as ‘‘William McGrath.’’ 31. In the Unit Roster, his last name is spelled ‘‘McKeevers.’’ One list in the DAR identifies this man as ‘‘John McKeefer.’’ The Austin List identifies his first name as ‘‘William.’’ 32. His name according to the Unit Roster is ‘‘Michael McKernan.’’ This is also how he was identified on the Sabine Pass monument. He is also listed as a sergeant. Dowling’s official report states: ‘‘I wish to make particular mention of Private Michael McKernan, who, from his well-known capacity as gunner, I assigned as gunner to one of the guns, and nobly did he do his duty. It was his shot hit the Sachem in her steam drum.’’ R. W. Dowling’s Report to Captain F. H. Odlum, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 20 ORN 560. A letter published in the Confederate Veteran calls him ‘‘Tom McKernon’’ and states that he was nicknamed by the boys ‘‘Smasher.’’ Confederate Veteran 1, no. 7 (July 1893): 196. 33. The Unit Roster lists this man’s name as ‘‘McMurray.’’ One list in the DAR identifies his first name as ‘‘Dan.’’ He is listed on the Sabine Pass monument as ‘‘Dan McMurray.’’ According to the O’Hara List, this man was one of the deserters. According to the muster roll, this man deserted on January 8, 1864. 34. The O’Hara List, as well as the Unit Roster, identifies this man as ‘‘John McNealis.’’ One list in the DAR identifies his last name as ‘‘McNeles.’’

notes to page 207 * 243 35. The Unit Roster spells his last name as ‘‘Monaghan.’’ One list in the DAR identifies this man as ‘‘Monahan.’’ Another spells his last name ‘‘Monohan.’’ The Austin List spells his last name ‘‘Monahen.’’ 36. One list in the DAR identifies his first name as ‘‘Pat.’’ This man is sometimes confused with Richard ‘‘R. C.’’ O’Hara, the author of the O’Hara List, who was a member of this company also. The Unit Roster confirms that both Peter O’Hara and R. C. O’Hara (later made a corporal) were members of the company. One postwar newspaper account stated that Peter O’Hara was sick in the hospital on the day of the battle and did not participate in the fight. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, March 18, 1905. According to a letter in the DAR from R. C. O’Hara dated November 26, 1902, this man at some unknown point deserted to the enemy. 37. In the Unit Roster, this man’s first name is spelled ‘‘Lawrence.’’ That is also how he is identified on the Sabine Pass monument. 38. One list in the DAR identifies his first name as ‘‘Morris.’’ 39. In the Unit Roster, his last name is spelled ‘‘Pritchard.’’ This is also how he is identified on the Sabine Pass monument. One list in the DAR identifies his first name as ‘‘Edd.’’ 40. In the Unit Roster, this man is listed as ‘‘Charles Rains.’’ One list in the DAR identifies his last name as ‘‘Reins.’’ The Austin List identifies his name as ‘‘Raines.’’ 41. This man is not listed in the Unit Roster. Referring to this man as ‘‘Mykel Sullivan,’’ John A. Drummond states in a letter dated March (no day) 1904 that David Fitzgerald had reminded Drummond that this man’s name should be added to the list of participants in the battle. He was said to be at his gun during the battle. In a letter dated April 13, 1903, in the DAR, R. C. O’Hara suggests that this man was absent during the battle returning dinner dishes into town. In a later letter, O’Hara states that he was mistaken and that it was instead Pat Sullivan who was absent on this errand. 42. A letter in the DAR from R. C. O’Hara dated February 13, 1903, states that this man did not get back to the fort in time for the battle because he had not returned from an errand to deliver dinner dishes back in town. 43. According to Record No. 23971 of the Confederate Home Roster in the Texas State Archives, Thomas Sullivan was born in Ireland in 1819. He came to Texas in 1860. He was admitted to the Confederate Home on March 10, 1891, suffering from ‘‘old age and general debility.’’ He died on January 31, 1894, and was buried in the Texas State Cemetery in Austin. One list in the DAR identifies his last name as ‘‘Sulivan.’’ 44. The Unit Roster spells his first name as ‘‘Mathew.’’ This is also how he is identified on the Sabine Pass monument. One list in the DAR identifies his first name as ‘‘Matt.’’ The Austin List identifies his last name as ‘‘Welsh.’’ 45. The Unit Roster lists this man’s name as ‘‘John T. Westley’’ and lists him as a corporal. His last name is spelled ‘‘Westley’’ on the Sabine Pass monument. One list in the DAR identifies this man as ‘‘Wistley.’’ 46. The Unit Roster identifies him as ‘‘John White.’’ On the Sabine Pass monument he is listed as ‘‘John W. White.’’ He became a city marshal in Houston after the war. He was serving as a night watchman for a bank when inter-

244 * notes to page 207 viewed by a reporter in 1893. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, June 12, 1893. John A. Drummond states in a letter in the DAR dated March (no day) 1904 that David Fitzgerald had reminded Drummond that this man’s name should go off the list of battle participants because he was ‘‘absent with Mulhern.’’ One account published in the Confederate Veteran suggests that he was present at the battle and fired the shot that disabled the Sachem. ‘‘Remarkable Victory at Sabine Pass,’’ Confederate Veteran 1, no. 6 (June 1893): 172–173. A letter published later claimed that White was a mile and a half away from the fort at a grocery during the battle. Confederate Veteran 1, no. 7 (July 1893): 196. He remained closely associated with Dowling and the battle, however, and when he died in 1896, it was reported that his funeral was perhaps the largest in Houston since the war. History and Roster, Dick Dowling Camp No. 197, HMRC, 49. 47. Dowling’s report states that Assistant Surgeon Bailey was an active participant in the battle, actually commanding one of the guns to administer ‘‘Magruder pills to the enemy.’’ Report of R. W. Dowling, Sabine Pass, September 9, 1863, 26 OR [Part 1] 311. A postwar newspaper account states that Bailey tended Gun No. 1 and went to the surrendered Union gunboats after the battle to help with the enemy’s wounded. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, June 12, 1863. In 1897, Bailey was reported to be living in Anaheim, California. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, September 5, 1897. According to a later report, in 1901, he was living in Phoenix, Arizona. Elbridge Gerry Littlejohn Collection, GTHC. According to a letter from Mrs. George W. Davis dated November 11, 1902, in the DAR, he was at that time living in Mexico for his health. But a letter dated May 30, 1904, in the DAR, places him back in Phoenix. The O’Hara List states that Bailey had relatives at Brookshire, Texas, not far from Houston on the Santa Fe Railroad. 48. Dowling’s report and Leon Smith’s report each confirm that Lieutenant N. H. ‘‘Nicholas’’ Smith, an engineer from Louisiana, was placed in command of two 32-pounders during the battle. 26 OR [Part 1] 308, 310, 311. He helped supervise the construction of Fort Griffin. One record lists him as being in command of ‘‘Smith’s Second Company’’ of the Fourth Regiment of Engineer Troops. 85 OR Supp. 616. 49. Dowling’s report states that Smith visited the fort during the engagement. 26 OR [Part 1] 311. 50. Dowling’s report states that Odlum visited the fort during the engagement. 26 OR [Part 1] 311. 51. Dowling’s report confirms Good’s presence as ordnance officer. 26 OR [Part 1] 312. Major Leon Smith’s report states that Captain Good visited the fort during the engagement along with Smith and Odlum. 26 OR [Part 1] 308. Magruder’s report mentions Good’s presence and states that he was there in his capacity as representative of the ordnance department. 26 OR [Part 1] 304, 306. 52. The [Houston] Tri-Weekly Telegraph of September 10, 1862, refers to Dr. J. G. D. Murray as ‘‘an intelligent practicing physician’’ residing in Sabine City. Dowling’s report mentions the presence of a Dr. Murray who served as acting assistant surgeon. Dowling praises him for going for reinforcements during the engagement. 26 OR [Part 1] 312. A postwar account, which spells the doctor’s name as ‘‘Murry,’’ describes him as a ‘‘fine old Scotch physician’’ who jumped off

notes to pages 207–208 * 245 his pony to enter the fort and offer help to the Davis Guard. ‘‘Battle of Sabine Pass,’’ GDN, June 12, 1893. 53. The Unit Roster identifies him as ‘‘Terrence Mulherran’’ and lists his rank as corporal. According to a letter from David Fitzgerald and R. C. O’Hara dated November 14, 1904, contained in the DAR, Mulhern was reported ‘‘present for duty’’ at the time of the battle but was actually in town when the fight was going on. Another O’Hara letter in the DAR dated February 13, 1903, states that the errand he was on was returning dinner dishes to Mrs. Dorman in town. 54. The DAR confirms that in 1902, R. C. O’Hara was a resident of the Confederate Home in Austin. In a letter dated November 26, 1902, contained in the DAR, R. C. O’Hara stated that he was not in the battle because he had been sent by Dowling to ‘‘perform certain service,’’ during the performance of which the battle took place. A biography in the DAR states that he was born in Muskingum Valley in Ohio in 1836, the grandson of a soldier who had fought with George Washington. He was educated in Zanesville, Ohio, where he made a living as a cabinetmaker, and then came to Texas in 1859. He served with the Davis Guard during the war. After the war, he was a railroad man, schoolteacher, and traveling salesman. In the early 1900s he was a resident of the Confederate Home in Austin. ‘‘Survivors of Davis Guards,’’ Confederate Veteran 9, no. 2 (February 1901): 76. 55. Patrick H. Hennessey (sometimes spelled ‘‘Hennessy’’) is shown as a first lieutenant in the Unit Roster. He was recorded as a second lieutenant at the Davis Guard meeting of September 25, 1860. He was apparently on furlough during the battle. Hennessey was married to Dowling’s sister, Mary. Appendix 3 1. This appendix is based on a comparison of many lists, some conflicting, which are included in Volume 20 of the Official Naval Records, as well as the surgeon’s report (typescript) included as part of the ‘‘Narrative of a Union Prisoner in Texas’’ contained in the Dr. Daniel D. T. Nestell Collection of the Nimitz Library, U.S. Naval Academy. Where names differed or were spelled differently, I have attempted to include all variants. Some men listed as wounded or missing in one account were listed as killed in other lists. Where possible, I have noted these discrepancies. I have referred to certain Union casualties as ‘‘black man’’ or its plural, even where the originals referred to these individuals as ‘‘contrabands’’ or other terms that today seem less than respectful. The casualty numbers in this appendix should be viewed as illustrative only. Discrepancies among the lists make it plain that neither side ever arrived at a thorough accounting of precisely which men fought during this battle or what happened to them.

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Index

Abatis, 175 Abbott, Patrick, 206 Adams, John, 9 Alabama (state), 6, 41, 83–86 Alabama, C.S.S., 106–107 Alamo, 4–5, 31, 122 Alden, James, 13 Ammunition, 81–82, 116, 141, 186 Anaconda Plan, 12 Andrew, John, 84 Andrews, E. N., 208 Andrews, Wright Smith, 160 ‘‘Annie’’ (cannon), 52 Antietam, Battle of, 62 Arizona, U.S.S.: acquisition and early career of, 101; runs aground, 128– 129; at Battle of Sabine Pass, 125– 135; retreat of, 146–147; deficiencies of, as gunboat, 166; steams into Louisiana channel, 203 Army of Northern Virginia, C.S.A., 14 Army of Tennessee, C.S.A., 59, 83 Army of the Gulf, U.S., 92–93 Army of the Potomac, U.S., 67, 95 Artillery fire, 155–157 Atchafalaya River, 101 Atlanta, Georgia, 86 Attack and Die, 188–189 Aurora, Texas, 178 Austin, Texas, 197 Austria, 65, 67

Baden, Switzerland, 67 Bahamas, 102 Bailey, George H., 123, 170, 204, 207 Bank of Bacchus, The, 39, 186 Banks, Nathaniel: effect of defeat on, 6–7; plans Sabine Pass campaign, 86–91; early life and military career of, 86–88; photograph of, 87; map of Sabine Pass line of operations drawn by, 90; and defense of Sabine Pass campaign, 92–93; issues orders to Franklin, 103; and controversy over Weitzel’s orders, 151–153; and campaign on lower Texas coast, 175–176; compared with Xerxes, 191 Barber, Mahlon W., 209 Barrel-Stake Lighthouse, 107 Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 101 Battles. See specific battle names and sites Bayou à la Rose, Louisiana, 101 Beardsley, George T., 208 Beaumont, Texas: comment by resident of, 33; plan to capture, 91; plan to retreat toward, 118; death of Rhodes in, 139; news of battle received in, 143–144; walking beam in, 177; post-war growth of, 185 Beauvoir, 171 Bee, Hamilton, 169 Beebe, Wooden H., 208

264 * sabine pass Bell, Henry: diary of, 21; orders by, 59; inspection trip by, 78; early career of, 94; plans Sabine Pass campaign, 97; issues orders for Sabine Pass campaign, 104–106; Farragut’s communications with, 166–167 Benedict, James M., 208 Benjamin, Judah, 58 Benson, Peter, 209 Bergeron, Arthur Jr., 6 Berkeley, California, 67 Bexar, siege of, 29 Big Bopper, The (Jiles P. Richardson), 185 Blakely, Abraham, 209 Block, W. T., 185–186 Blockade, establishment of by President Lincoln, 12 Blockade duty, 105–106 Blockade runners, 13, 16, 30–32, 101, 176–177, 181 Blockade Strategy Board, 12–13 Boggs, William, 6 Bombardment: of Hatteras Inlet, 19; of forts below New Orleans, 21; of Vicksburg, 22; Sabine Pass, damage done by, 156 Bombproofs, 130 Boorom, Orville C., 209 Borden, Abraham E., 209 Borden, A. G., 208 Boston Harbor, 61 Bradley, E. L. [also listed as F. J.], 208 Bragg, Braxton, 59, 83 Brazos River, 47, 77 Brazos Santiago, 40, 175 Bridge, railroad, 32 Brown, A. V., 209 Brown, Henry, 209 Brown, O. A., 208 Brown, Peter, 208 Brownsville, Texas, 175 Bump, J.[I.], 209 Burch, Increase, 144 Burial of battle casualties, 160

Burnside, Ambrose, 96 Butler, Benjamin, 13, 51 Butler gun, 51–52 Butte à la Rose, Louisiana, 101, 125 Calcasieu Pass: Crocker hurries to, 32; Union expedition stops at, 107–109; map of, 178; Battle of, 178–180 Calcasieu River, 32 Calhoun, U.S.S., 101 California, 67 Campbell, John J., 208 Canfield, R. O., 209 Cannon, ‘‘en barbette’’ mounting of, 130 Cape Fear River, 190 Cape Horn, 17 Cape Verde Islands, 17 Caroline, U.S.S. (Arizona renamed as), 101 Carr, Michael, 197, 206 Carr, Waggoner, 200 Carter, Abner, 206 Carter, Isaac, 209 Casemate, iron, 71, 76 Casualties after Battle of Sabine Pass, 159, 208–210 Catfish Hotel, 34 Cavalry, 26, 106, 118 Cayuga, U.S.S.: wounding of captain of, 62; blockade duty assignment of, 106–109; operations during battle of, 111–113 Celtic heritage, 189 Central Park, New York City, 67 Chace, John, 210 Chamberlain, Joshua, 195–196 Charleston, South Carolina, 20, 101 Chattanooga, Tennessee, 86 Chickamauga, Battle of, 86 Childs, J. D., 55 China, 94 Clair, Patrick, 206 Clifton, U.S.S.: description and early war experience of, 98–99; depiction

index * of, 99; damaged at Vicksburg, 99; runs aground in Mobile Bay, 100; at capture of Fort Burton, 101–102; at Battle of Sabine Pass, 112–142, 194; armor on, 125; depiction of deck of, 136; depiction of capture of, 139; surrender of, 141; deficiencies of, as gunboat, 166; as Confederate steamer, 169; as unsuccessful blockade runner, 176–178; photograph of walking beam of, 177; destruction of, 177; discovery of relics from, 185; wreck of, 197; in Dowling’s report, 204 Coast Survey, U.S., 100 Coit, Andrew P., 209 Cold Harbor, Battle of, 188 Colorado River, 77 Colt’s Navy revolvers, 14 Colt’s Patent Firearms Manufacturing Company, 187 Columbiad, 49 Committee of Public Safety (Galveston), 40 Compton, Anthony, 209 Confederate Home, Texas, 197 Confederate Veterans, Reunion of, 201 Congress, Confederate, 56, 170 Connecticut, 61, 187 Cook, Joseph J., 41, 44 Cooke, Augustus, 101 Cook’s Heavy Artillery (First Texas Heavy Artillery), 41 Corcoran, James, 206 Corpus Christi, Texas, 25–26, 34, 176 Corpus Christi Bay, 25–26 Cotton, 11, 51, 183 Cottonclads, 44–45, 48–49, 78, 111 Cotton passes, 181 Crémaillére, 75 Crescent, transport, 147 Crocker, Frederick: early background of, 26–27; early war career of, 27– 28; first Sabine Pass expedition of,

265

28–31; photograph of, 27; promotion of, 33; assignment of, to Banks expedition, 93; assignment of, to command Clifton, 101; captures Fort Burton, 101–102; receives final orders, 104; and beginning of Sabine Pass expedition, 107–109; at Battle of Sabine Pass, 112–142; surrender by, 143; and anger at army’s failure to land, 148–150; post-war career of, 187 Cross, Joe, 208 Crossing the ‘‘T,’’ 75 Cuyler, R.R., U.S.S., 27 Dallas, Texas, 201 Dan, U.S.S., 32 Dana, Commander, 111–112, 133, 146 Dana, John W., 208 Dane, Henry, 128, 130, 145 Dart, U.S.S., 32 Daugherty, Thomas, 206 David and Goliath, battle between, 192–193, 202 Davis, Jefferson: speech in New Orleans by, 1–4; comments by, 7; requests report on Texas ports, 13; company named for, 39; description of Fort Griffin by, 76; and comments about gunboats, 163; receives honorary Davis Guard Medal, 170–172; speech by, in New Orleans, 190–191; lists names of Davis Guard, 201 Davis Guard (Company ‘‘F’’ of First Texas Heavy Artillery): formation of, 39; mutiny of, 40–41; in Battle of Galveston, 44–45; and Battle of Sabine Pass, 112–142; and number of men at battle, 129–130; number of shots fired by, 141; commended by Smith, 162–163; new badge for, 164; receives thanks of Congress, 170; medals awarded to, 170–173; deserters from, 173; monuments

266 *

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to, 197–198; and controversy about number in Fort Griffin, 205–207 Davis Guard Medal: creation and award of, 170–173; photograph of, 171 Day, Benjamin, 60–61 Deagan, Hugh, 206 Debray, Xavier, 16 Delaney, Michael, 206 Delaware, 101 Department of the Gulf, U.S., 92 Diana, U.S.S., 167 Dillingham, John, 52–53, 55 Dodge, George, 209 Don Juan, sloop, 61 Donovan, Dan, 206 Dorman, Catherine ‘‘Kate,’’ 34–35, 124, 144, 197 Douglas, Henry, 182 Dowling, Annie. See Robertson, Annie Dowling Dowling, Bridget, 36 Dowling, Pat, 36 Dowling, Richard W. (Dick): as mentioned by Davis, 3, 5–6; early life of, 36–39; early Civil War career of, 39–45; photograph of, 38; capture of Morning Light by, 52–58; location of ammunition by, 81–82; spots Union expedition, 107; and orders to hold fort, 117–118; and decision to stay and defend fort, 119–123; narrow escape in battle by, 132; and meeting with prisoners, 145; names son after battle, 163; photographed wearing Davis Guard Medal, 172; as recruiting officer, 173; post-war career and death of, 186–187; and oil and gas leases, 186; fame of, 192; statues of, 197–200; official report of, 203–204; name of, on monument, 207 Drewry’s Bluff, Battle of, 189 Driscoll, Michael, 208 Drummond, John A., 51, 121, 124, 206

Duncan, William B., 57 DuPont, Samuel F., 12, 19, 23, 27 Eagan, Michael, 206 East Texas, C.S.A. Sub-District of, 67 Eleventh (Spaight’s) Texas Battalion, 29, 49 Elliott, G. D., 127 Ellis Cliffs, 28 Elmore’s Twentieth Texas Regiment, 30 Eltham’s Landing, Virginia, 95 Encyclopedia of the Confederacy, 5 Engineer Corps, U.S. Army, 115 Engineers, Confederate, 64–82, 148, 158, 162, 182 Essex, U.S.S., 17 European Squadron, 188 Exact, transport, 127 Fallow (carpenter), 145 Famine, Irish, 36 Farragut, David Glasgow: early life and career of, 17–19; Civil War exploits of, 20–24; depiction of, 18; appointment of, to rank of rear admiral, 22; prediction of cottonclad attacks by, 45; reaction of, to capture of Morning Light, 57; reaction of, to Abner Read’s death, 63; desire of, to attack Mobile, 83; leaves for North, 94; possible involvement of, in Sabine Pass attack planning, 94; orders court of inquiry for Law, 100–101; reaction of, to battle, 165–167; reaction of, to disaster at Calcasieu Pass, 180–181; reaction of, to cotton passes, 181; post-war career of, 188 Fehrenbach, T. R., 4 Ferguson, James, 137 Ferryboats, 98 Fifteenth Maine Regiment, 96 First Indiana Artillery, 137 First (Louisiana) Polish Regiment, 66

index * First Texas Heavy Artillery. See Davis Guard Fitzgerald, David, 118, 199, 206 Fitzgerald, Patrick, 206 Flag, Confederate, 123–124 Fleming, James, 206 Flood, John, 206 Foote, Shelby, 5 Ford, John S. ‘‘Rip,’’ 40–41 Forshey, Caleb, 67, 143 Fort Brown, 40 Fort Burton, 101–102 Fort Donelson, 20, 189 Fort Fisher, 182 Fort Griffin: plans for, as drawn by engineers, 73–74; naming of, 75; field of fire diagram for, 75; construction of, by slaves, 76–78; work on construction of, 78–79; obtaining guns for, 79; garrison spots Union expedition, 107; and Battle of Sabine Pass; 112–142; shipment of powder to, 118; photograph of view from, 119; arrival of flag at, 123–124; number of guns at, 135; depiction of surrender at, 142; camouflage of, 156; abandoned to enemy, 182; archaeological remains of, 185 Fort Henry, 20 Fort Jackson, 20 Fort Manhasset (Manhassett): depiction of, 157; design of, 158; naming of, 175; victory by garrison of, 178–179; location by W. T. Block of site of, 185 Fort Point: Davis Guard at, 42; sketch of, 43 Fort Sabine: original construction of, 15–16; Union capture of, 28–30; defects of, 68–69; change in location of, 71–73; guns unearthed from, 79 Fort San Juan de Ulúa, 18–19 Fort St. Philip, 20 Fort Warren, 61

267

Forty-second Massachusetts Regiment, 44 Fourteenth Louisiana Volunteers, 66–67 Fowler, Charles: and Morning Light expedition, 47–58; photograph of, 48; capture and captivity of, 61–62 France, 18–19, 84 Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, 155 Franklin, Battle of, 188 Franklin, William Buel: placed in command, 94; depiction of, 95; early military career of, 94–96; receives confusing orders from Banks, 103–104; arrives at Sabine Pass, 109; and Battle of Sabine Pass, 112–142; criticized by Greeley, 154; reaction of, to battle, 154–155; post-war career of, 187 Fraser, John, 209 Fredericksburg, Battle of, 61, 95–96, 188 Frederick the Great, 64 Freeman, Douglas Southall, 7 Fremantle, Arthur, 41 Galveston: trade with, 11; blockade of, 12–13; Union capture of, 33–34; Battle of, 44–46, 69, 120; construction of fortifications at, 16, 68–71; depiction of fortifications at, 70; use of slaves at, 71, 76; importance of, as military target, 90 Galveston Bay, invasion of, 42–43 Galway County, Ireland, 36 Gannon, James T., 209 Gatling gun, 187 General Banks, transport, 116, 126– 127, 132, 149 Georgia, 20, 71, 86 Gettysburg, Battle of, 62, 169, 188, 195 Gilmer, Jeremy Francis, 71 Gleason, William, 206 Glenn, William, 209

268 * sabine pass Gonzales, Battle of, 122 Good, W. S., 204–205, 207 Gottchalk, Charles, 170 Grand Junction, Tennessee, 66 Granger, Gordon, 183 Granite City, U.S.S.: early career of, 102; begins expedition to capture Sabine Pass, 105–108; depiction of, 106; at Battle of Sabine Pass, 126– 127; retreat of, 145; deficiencies of, as gunboat, 166; capture of, at Calcasieu Pass, 179–180 Grant, Ulysses S.: delays Mobile campaign, 6; captures Fort Donelson, 20; captures Vicksburg, 23; receives letter from Lincoln, 84; at West Point, 95 Greece, 2 Greeley, Horace, 154 Green, Willis, 210 Green’s Texas Cavalry, 106 Griffin, William H.: at lighthouse skirmish, 62; background of, 71; and naming of fort for, 75; and Battle of Calcasieu Pass, 178–180 Griffin’s Regiment, 71, 144. See Twenty-first Texas Infantry Regiment Gusley, Henry O., 104 Hagerty, Thomas, 206 Halleck, Henry, 85, 89, 93, 167 Hallock, Luther D., 208 Hamblin, W. B., 196 Hamilton, Andrew Jackson, 181 Hampton Roads, Virginia, 190 Hardin, William, 206 Hart, Patrick, 209 Hartford, Connecticut, 187 Hartford, U.S.S., 21, 23 Hassett, John, 206 Hatteras, U.S.S., 107 Hatteras Inlet, Battle of, 19–20 Heintzelman, Samuel, 155 Hennessey, John, 206

Hennessey, Patrick, 207 Henry Janes, U.S.S., 28–29 Hermann Park, 197 Herodotus, 196, 201 Higgins, James, 206 Hobby, Alfred, 25–26 Holly, Buddy, 185 Hooper, Quincy, 28, 31, 34–35 Horton, John, 210 Houston [Horton], George, 209 Houston, Sam, 11, 39, 184, 198 Houston, Texas, 56, 144, 196–197 Houston Hook and Ladder Company No. 1, 37 Houston Light Artillery, 37, 39 Howitzers, 49, 79, 129 Huggins, Timothy, 206 Hungary, 65 Hunter, William, 15–16 Hurley, Timothy, 206 Illinois, 183 Illinois State Historical Library, 152 Impressment, 77–78 Indiana, 47, 137 Indianola, Texas, 34, 85–86, 89 Iowa, 185 Ireland, 36, 164 Ironclads, 3, 24, 100, 190 Irvine, Josephus, 29 Irwin, Richard B., 86, 152 Ivins, Ann Carraway, 217n3 Jackson, Stonewall, 1–2, 89 Jackson, U.S.S., 99 Jamieson, Perry, 188–189 Jefferson County, Texas, 49, 77 Jett, William L., 206 Johnson, Amos, 100, 130–131, 133, 141 Johnson, William, 51, 54 Johnston, Albert Sidney, 2 Johnston, Joe, 75–76 Jomini, Antoine Henri, 64 Jones III, Lawrence T., 172 Josiah H. Bell, C.S.S., 47–50, 52, 53,

index 60; Davis Guard drilling with guns of, 81 Keith, K. D., 47, 50, 55–56 Kellersberg, Julius G. (Julius Getulius Kellersberger): early life and military career of, 67–69; photograph of, 68; treatment of slaves by, 78; location and restoration of guns by, 79–81; location of stakes by, 81; arrives at Fort Griffin, 148; credit due to, 193 Kellie, E. I., 15 Kensington, U.S.S., 27–28 Key West, Florida, 28 ‘‘Kiss Me Quick and Go’’ (drink), 39 Kittredge, John W., 25–26 Know-nothing movement, 41 Kountze brothers, 184 Labadieville, Louisiana, 104 Lafitte, Jean, 9 Lamson, Charles W., 102, 105, 107–108 Landis, transport, 127 Land mines, 175 Larricus, E. A., 209 Laurel Hill, U.S.S., 127, 147 Lavaca (Port Lavaca), 34 Law, Richard, 35, 100 Lee, Peter, 209 Lee, Robert E., 2, 7, 14, 19–20, 169 Leonidas, King (of Sparta), 2–3, 191– 192, 196, 200 Liberty, Texas, 30, 91, 144 Lighthouse. See Barrel-Stake Lighthouse; Sabine Pass Lighthouse Liken, James B., 29 Lincoln, Abraham: blockade proclamation by, 12; impression of, of Farragut, 24; election of, 39; and plan to invade Texas, 83–91; appointment of Hamilton to cotton position by, 181 Little Round Top, Battle of, 195 Liverpool, England, 36

* 269

Looscan, Adele, 143 Loring, Benjamin W., 178–180 Louisiana, 2–6, 63–66, 107, 169 Lowe, William, 210 Lubbock, Francis, 4, 47, 94, 142 Magruder, John Bankhead: assignment of, to command in Texas, 43; planning of Morning Light attack by, 46–47; campaign of, to save Richmond, 66–67; and Confederate engineers, 71; use of impressment by, 77–78; as focus of Banks’ strategy, 89; views of, regarding importance of Galveston and Houston, 90; orders of, to Dowling and Odlum, 117; orders of, after battle, 162–163; visit to Fort Griffin by, 164 Magruder pills, 123 Mahoney, William, 208 Maine, 96, 104, 106, 188 Malone, Patrick, 206 Malta, Siege of, 5 Maltese Cross, 164, 170 Malvern Hill, Battle of, 188 Manhasset, Union transport, 175 Maps: of Sabine Pass area, 10; of Banks line of operations, 90; of Sabine Pass battle, 127; of Calcasieu Pass, 178 Marchand, John B., 176 Massachusetts, 44, 84 Matagorda Peninsula, 106 Maximilian (Emperor of Mexico), 84 McArdle, 15 McCabe, Alex, 206 McCann, Thomas, 208 McClurg, Andrew, 54 McDermut, David A., 62 McDonnell, Patrick, 206 McDonough, John, 209 McDonough, Timothy, 206 McGrath, John, 206 McKeever, John, 206

270 * sabine pass McKernan, Michael, 163, 204 McKernon, Thomas, 206 McLeod, Hugh, 40 McMurry, Daniel, 206 McNealis, Jonathan, 206 McWhiney, Grady, 188–189 Medal, Davis Guard. See Davis Guard Medal Medal of Honor, 170 Mermentau River, 31 Merwin, John W., 193 Methodism, 41 Mexican War, 4, 19, 25, 95 Mexico, 18–19, 84–85 Mexico City, 84 Miller, William W., 208 Mississippi (state), 22, 171 Mississippi River, 20–22 Mobile, Alabama, 6, 83–86, 93, 100 Mobile Bay, 6, 24, 182, 189 Mobile Bay, Battle of, 24 Monitor, U.S.S., 100, 190 Monoghan, Michael, 206 Monongahela, U.S.S., 63 Monroe [Munroe], John, 209 Morgan line, 11 Morning Light, U.S.S.: battle fought by, 51–61; shot taken from, 81; wreck of, 146 Mortar boats, 20–21 Mortar flotilla, 33 Mortar schooners, 21 Mosquitoes, 78–79, 174 Mouton, Alfred, 169 Muir, Andrew Forest, 4, 173 Mulhern, Terence, 158, 207 Murphy, John, 118 Murray, J. G. D., 129, 205, 244–245n52, 207 Napoleon, 64 Neches River, 9, 69 Nestell, Daniel D. T., 131, 136, 149; and conduct of, during battle, 160– 162

New London, U.S.S., 59 New Orleans: Davis speech in, 1–3, 7; trade with, 11, 13; expedition to conquer, 20–22; Dowling family in, 36; forts in, 65; Sulakowski resides in, 94; bombardment of, 104; forts below, 115; troops in, 156; speech by Davis in, 201 New York (state), 104, 111, 127–128, 133–134 New York City, 67–68 New York Herald, 151 New York Times, 84 New York Tribune, 154 Niblett’s Bluff, Louisiana, 179 Nicholls, Francis T., 1 Nichols, Ebenezer B., 40 Nineteenth Army Corps, U.S., 96, 104, 152, 168 Nolan, Matthew, 49 North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, 27 North Bridgewater, Massachusetts, 27 North Carolina, 169, 182 Oakland, California, 67 O’Brien, George Washington, 49 Odlum, Benjamin Digby, 37, 122 Odlum, Elizabeth Anne ‘‘Annie,’’ 36–37, 52 Odlum, Frederick H.: and early action with Davis Guard, 39–40; stops injury to Watkins, 55–58; orders of, to Dowling, 117–119; and fort’s decision, 121–122; casualties reported by, 159; arrives at fort, 204–205; monument list, 207 O’Hara, Peter, 207 O’Hara, R. C., 197, 207 Old Battery Point, 116 161st New York Regiment, 133, 193 Orange, Texas, 15, 47, 185 Owasco, U.S.S., 42, 106, 182 Oxford, Frank, 209 Oyster Reef, 72–73, 125

index Page, Dave, 4 Pamlico Sound, 19 Parker, Don E., 208 Parrott gun, 133 Pass Cavallo, Texas, 106 Pearl River, 100 Pelican Spit, 42 Pennington, Lewis, 28, 31–32 Pensacola, Florida, 12 Persia, 2 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 101 Pivot gun, 139 Plummer, G. W., 58 Plunkett, Laurence, 207 Poland, 65–66, 80 Port Arthur, Texas, 184–185 Porter, David, 17 Porter, David Dixon, 20–21, 148, 166 Porter, Fitz John, 40 Port Hudson, 22–23, 94, 115, 156, 188–189 Port Royal Sound, 19–20 Portsmouth Navy Yard, 188 Powers, Maurice, 207–208 Pray, William F., 208 Prichard, Edward, 207 Princess Royal, U.S.S., 177 PT boats, 190 Quaker guns, 33, 42, 130 Rachel Seaman, U.S.S., 28–29, 32, 35 Railroad, 12, 76, 90, 149, 160 Raymond, Henry, 208 Read, Abner: ordered to Sabine Pass, 59–60; depiction of, 60; at lighthouse skirmish, 62; death of, 63 Read, John, 106, 142, 150 Red River Campaign, 7, 89, 176, 187 Reed, Rowena, 105 Renshaw, William B., 33–35, 42, 100 Rheins, Charles, 207 Rhodes, Robert: wounding of, 138– 139; photograph of, 140; name of, on monument list, 208

* 271

Rhodes, Siege of, 5 Richardson, Jiles P., 185 Richmond, Virginia, 66–67, 95, 170, 198 Rio Grande, 21, 40, 85, 89 Roanoke Island, 27 Robertson, Annie Dowling, 196–199 Robinson, Williams, 209 Rolando, Henry, 174–175 Rolles, John, 210 Rorke’s Drift, Battle of, 5 Rosecrans, William S., 86 Ryan, Thomas, 209 Sabine, U.S.S., 12 Sabine City, Texas: map of area surrounding, 10; founding of, 11; Committee of Public Safety at, 14; surrender of, 30–31; location of fort near, 72; captured gunboats near, 175 Sabine Expedition, 57. See Morning Light Sabine Lake, 11–12, 32, 47–50, 69, 113 Sabine Pass: naming of, 9; map of area surrounding, 10; physical characteristics and early history of, 9–11; railroad connections to, 12, 14; blockade running out of, 13, 16; depth at entrance to, 15; first expedition to capture, 28–31; Union shelling of, 34; Union evacuation of, 35; use of slave labor at, 76–78; entry into, by Union expedition, 112–113; Crocker’s battle plan for, 125–128; map showing battle plan for, 127; depiction of attack at, 137; abandonment of fort at, 182; end of commercial prospects for, 184–185; annexation of, 185 Sabine Pass, Battle of: Crocker deploys forces in, 110–116; Confederates prepare for battle in, 117–124; attack of Union gunboats in, 125–141; surrender at conclusion of, 141– 145; damage to Fort Griffin during,

272 * sabine pass 155–156; casualties resulting from, 159–160; significance of, 194–196 Sabine Pass Badge, 164 Sabine Pass Battleground State Park and Historical Site, 185, 195 Sabine Pass Guards, 14–15 Sabine Pass Lighthouse: and blockade runners, 58–59; photograph of, 61; skirmishes at, 60–63 Sabine River, 9–11, 47, 49–50, 69 Sachem, U.S.S.: at Corpus Christi, 25–26; description and early military career of, 99–101; at Battle of Galveston, 100; charge at Fort Griffin of, 130–134; depiction of, 131; depiction of capture of, 139; surrender of, 141; deficiencies of, as gunboat, 94, 166; steams into Louisiana channel, 203–204 Sands, Benjamin, 182 San Francisco Bay, 67 San Jacinto, Battle of, 4, 29, 31 Santa Barbara, California, 67 Sappers and miners, 76 Savannah, Georgia, 20 Sawyer, Thomas A., 209 Scott, Winfield, 12, 19 Sebastopol, siege of, 65 Seddon, James, 170 Seminole, U.S.S., 174 Seventy-fifth New York Volunteer Infantry, 104, 111, 126–128, 138 Seventy-seventh U.S. Colored Infantry Regiment, 183 Seward, William Henry, 181 Shades, The, 37, 39 Shenandoah Valley, Virginia, 89 Sheridan, Phil, 183 Ships versus Shore, 4 Simpson, Harold B., 192 Sisal, Mexico, 31 Slaves, 9, 71, 76–79 Smith, E. Kirby, 89, 168 Smith, Leon: arrival of, at Fort Griffin, 129; waving of flag by, 133; com-

ments of, after battle, 161–163; in Dowling’s report, 204; name of, on monument list, 207 Smith, Nicholas H., 78, 133, 204, 207 Smith, Randal [Randell], 209 Smith, Samuel, 210 Snider, James M., 209 South America, 17 South Carolina, 19 Southern Historical Society, 1 Southern Historical Society Papers, 167 Spaight, Ashley W., 49, 179 Spaight’s (Eleventh) Texas Battalion, 29, 49 Spain, 189 Spartans, 2–3, 191–192, 196, 200 Speed, Frederic, 168 Spies, Confederate, 112 Spies, Union, 34, 90 Spindletop oil field, 184 St. Andrew’s Bay, 21 Staten Island, 98 St. Charles, transport, 127 Steam dome, 132–133 Stevens, Walter, 13–14 Stillwell, Arthur, 184 St. Philip, Fort, 20 Strange Battles of the Civil War, 8 St. Vincent’s Cemetery, 198 Suffolk, U.S. transport, 113, 148 Sulakowski, Valery: ambrotype of, 65; early life and military career of, 65–67; work of, at Galveston, 69–71; map of new fort at Sabine Pass by, 72–74; arrival of, at Fort Griffin, 148; commendation of, by Magruder, 162; and redesign of Fort Griffin, 175; and credit for victory, 193 Sullivan, Michael, 207 Sullivan, Pat, 158, 207 Sullivan, Thomas [John], 207, 209 Sweden, 56 Switzerland, 67

index * Tampico (British schooner), 59 Tampico, Mexico, 30 Taylor, James G., 32, 62, 134, 146– 147 Taylor, Richard, 168 Taylor’s Bayou, 31–32 Teche (river), 167 Tennessee (state), 66 Tennessee, U.S.S., 29, 55 Texas (state), importance of, in war, 5–7, 86 Texas, Republic of, 11 Texas Coast, map of, 88 Texas Rangers, 40, 188 Texas Revolution, 29, 37, 122 Texas State Fair, 171 Thermopylae, Battle of, 2–5, 7, 191– 196, 200 Thirteenth Maine Regiment, 106 Thirty-seventh Illinois Volunteers Regiment, 183 Thomas, transport, 127 Tibbits, Howard, 134, 146–147, 160 Tinclads, 190 Trans-Mississippi Department, C.S.A., 5, 88 Travis, William Barrett, 122 Troy, Schooner, 28 Tuam, Ireland, 36, 200 Tucker, Richard, 209 Turner, Richard, 209 Twentieth Maine Regiment, 195 Twentieth Texas (Elmore’s) Regiment, 30 Twenty-first Texas Infantry Regiment, 62, 71, 179 Uncle Ben, C.S.S.: early commercial trips of, 11; participation of, in Morning Light expedition, 47–53; at Battle of Sabine Pass, 113; crew of, watching battle, 130; and surrender of Sachem, 144; in Dowling’s report, 204 Union, transport, 40

273

United Daughters of the Confederacy, Texas, 198 Upton, Daniel, 101 U.S. Army, criticized for failure to cooperate, 148–155, 167 U.S. Navy: success of, with southern forts, 19–20; need for shallow-draft vessels by, 98; and frontal naval assaults, 189 Valens, Richie, 185 Velocity, U.S.S.: capture by Union of, 31; fights of, with Confederate cottonclads, 51–55 Vera Cruz, Mexico, 18–19 Vicksburg, Michigan, 22–23, 28, 99, 166, 169 Victory or death (motto), 122, 192, 204 Vienna, Austria, 67 Virginia (state), 7, 95, 169 Virginia, C.S.S., 100 Vosburg, Sarah, 124 Walking Beam, 177 Walsh, Matthew, 207 Washington, D.C., 24–25, 33 Watkins, Oscar M.: and Morning Light expedition, 47–58; and news of Dowling’s victory, 144 Wave, U.S.S., 179–180 Weeks, Benjamin S., 139–140 Weitzel, Godfrey: as leader of army’s advance party, 107–108; depiction of, 114; early life and military career of, 114–115; at Battle of Sabine Pass, 116, 146; excuse of, after battle, 149– 150; exact language of orders of, 151–152; as compared with Xerxes, 192 Welles, Gideon, 13, 21, 85; reaction of, to battle, 160, 165, 181 Wesley, John, 207 Westfield, U.S.S., 100 West Gulf Blockading Squadron, U.S. Navy, 21, 94, 102

274 *

sabine pass

West Point, U.S. Military Academy at, 4, 71, 95, 114–115 Whaling, 27 White, Jack W., 121–122, 207 White House of the Confederacy, 198 Wier, Armand R., 46–47 Wight, Levi Lamoni, 174 Wilcox, Adam H., 209 Wilderness, Battle of the, 7 Williams, Calvin, 209 Williams, John, 209

Wilmington, North Carolina, 20, 190 Wilson, Joseph, 207 Wilson, William, 209 Woolsey, Melancthon, 177 Xerxes (King of Persia), 2, 191–192 Yellow fever, 30–31, 186 Young, S. O., 37 Zoppa de Connobio, Friar Felix, 170