Russian Practices of Governance in Eurasia: Frontier Power Dynamics, Sixteenth Century to Nineteenth Century 0367196751, 9780367196752

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of figures
List of maps
Acknowledgements
List of abbreviations
Introduction
Part I The Russian institution of protectorate
1 Patterns of power and authority
2 The Russian politics of ulus
Part II Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations
3 Uneasy encounters
4 From patronage to protection ( protektsiia)
Part III Placing the Qazaqs under Russia’s protection
5 The Qazaq Junior Horde and Russia
6 The new Jungar offensive and its impact
7 From protection to confirmation (konfirmatsiia)
Part IV Between Russia and the Qing
8 After the fall of the Jungars
9 The Qazaq oath-taking ceremony
Part V Staying on the imperial fringe
10 The establishment of the Bokei Horde
11 The politics of Qazaq deputations
Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

Russian Practices of Governance in Eurasia

This book analyses the role of the mobility factor in the spread of Russian rule in Eurasia in the formative period of the rise of the Russian Empire and offers an examination of the interaction of Russian authorities with their nomadic partners. Demonstrating that the mobility factor strongly shaped the system of protectorate that the Russian and Qing monarchs imposed on their nomadic counterparts, the book argues that it operated as a flexible institutional framework, which enabled all sides to derive maximum benefits from a given political situation. The author establishes that interactions of Russian authorities with their Kalmyk and Qazaq counterparts during the mid sixteenth to the mid nineteenth centuries were strongly informed by the power dynamics of the Inner Asian frontier. These dynamics were marked by Russia’s rivalry with Qing Chinese and Jungar leaders to exert its influence over frontier nomadic populations. This book shows that each of these parties began to adopt key elements of existing steppe political culture. It also suggests that the different norms of governance adopted by the Russian state continued to shape its elite politics well into the 1820s and beyond. The author proposes that by combining key elements of this culture with new practices, Russian authorities proved capable of creating innovative forms of governance that ended up shaping the nature of the colonial Russian state. An important contribution to the ongoing debates pertaining to the nature of the spread of Russian rule over the numerous populations of the vast Eurasian terrains, this book will be of interest to academics working on Russian history, Central Asian/Eurasian history and political and cultural history. Gulnar T. Kendirbai is adjunct assistant professor of history at Columbia University, NY, US.

Central Asian Studies

Soviet Orientalism and the Creation of Central Asian Nations Alfrid K. Bustanov Soviet Nation-Building in Central Asia The making of the Kazakh and Uzbek nations Grigol Ubiria The Afghan-Central Asia Borderland The State and Local Leaders Suzanne Levi-Sanchez Kyrgyzstan – Regime Security and Foreign Policy Kemel Toktomushev Legal Pluralism in Central Asia Local Jurisdiction and Customary Practices Mahabat Sadyrbek Identity, History and Trans-Nationality in Central Asia The Mountain Communities of Pamir Edited by Carole Faucher and Dagikhudo Dagiev Critical Approaches to Security in Central Asia Edited by Edward Lemon Russian Practices of Governance in Eurasia Frontier Power Dynamics, Sixteenth Century to Nineteenth Century Gulnar T. Kendirbai Practices of Traditionalization in Central Asia Edited by Judith Beyer and Peter Finke For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ asianstudies/series/CAS

Russian Practices of Governance in Eurasia

Frontier Power Dynamics, Sixteenth Century to Nineteenth Century Gulnar T. Kendirbai

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Gulnar T. Kendirbai The right of Gulnar T. Kendirbai to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Kendirbai, Gulnar, author. Title: Russian practices of governance in Eurasia : frontier power dynamics, 16–19th century / Gulnar T. Kendirbai. Description: Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Central Asian Studies | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2019049473 Subjects: LCSH: Asia, Central—Politics and government. | Asia, Central—Annexation to Russia. | Asia, Central—Colonization— History. | Imperialism. | Political culture—Russia—History. | Nomads—Asia—History. Classification: LCC DK858 .K46 2020 | DDC 958/.03—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019049473 ISBN: 978-0-367-19675-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-429-20389-3 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

FOR MY FAMILY

Contents

List of figuresix List of mapsx Acknowledgementsxi List of abbreviationsxiii Introduction

1

PART I

The Russian institution of protectorate9   1 Patterns of power and authority

11

  2 The Russian politics of ulus22 PART II

Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations45   3 Uneasy encounters

47

  4 From patronage to protection ( protektsiia)

74

PART III

Placing the Qazaqs under Russia’s protection101   5 The Qazaq Junior Horde and Russia

103

  6 The new Jungar offensive and its impact

118

  7 From protection to confirmation (konfirmatsiia)

134

viii  Contents PART IV

Between Russia and the Qing151   8 After the fall of the Jungars

153

  9 The Qazaq oath-taking ceremony

171

PART V

Staying on the imperial fringe185 10 The establishment of the Bokei Horde

187

11 The politics of Qazaq deputations

210

Conclusion

221

Index224

Figures

  2.1 A Kalmyk mobile Buddhist temple, khurul 36   3.1 A Kalmyk tent (from Pallas, P. S.: Reise durch verschiedene Provinzen des Russischen Reichs, 1771–1776) 48   3.2 Annushka, a portrait of a baptized Kalmyk girl, a serf and pupil of Varvara Sheremetova, daughter of Count Sheremetov (1713–1788) painted by I. Argunov in 1767 (Kuskovo) 61   4.1 A Kalmyk noblewoman 85   4.2 A Torghut temple tent (from Pallas P. S. Sammlungen historischer Nachrichten über die mongolischen Völkerschaften, 1776) 88   5.1 Qazaq men (from Pallas P. S. Sammlungen historischer Nachrichten über die mongolischen Völkerschaften, 1776) 104   7.1 Plan of a house for Sultan Qaratai sketched by Russian authorities146   7.2 Sultan Colonel Akhmet Janturin (1810–1851), ruler of one of the three parts, into which the Junior Horde was divided by the 1824 reforms (photo was taken in the 1840s) 147   8.1 Sultans of the Middle Horde with Chingiz Valikhanov (great grandson of Khan Ablai) in the centre, Omsk 1891 162   8.2 A Kirgiz [Qazaq] Khan with his wife 163 10.1 Types of Kirgizs [Qazaqs] under Russian rule (Salyq Babazhanov is the last on the right side) 201 11.1 A delegation of Qazaq nobility to the imperial court 212 11.2 A delegation of Qazaq nobles 214 11.3 A sketch of the golden medal to be rewarded to Sultan Gazy 216 11.4 A sketch of the inscriptions (in Russian and Chagatai) to be engraved on Gazy’s golden medal: “For Sultan Gazy, son of Sultan Bokei, for loyal service, 1805” 216 11.5 A prescription of an ointment for Sultan Aryngazy 217 11.6 A portrait of Sultan General Major Baimukhamedov, member of a Qazaq delegation from the Junior Horde, who participated in the coronation of Alexander II in 1856 (painted in 1889 by S. Alexandrovsky) 218

Maps

  3.1 Eurasia in the eighteenth century (from M. Khodarkovsky: Russia’s Steppe Frontiers, 2002)   3.2 “Map of All the Waterless and Difficult Country of the Mountain Steppe, 1696–7” by S. Remezov (from Baddeley, J.: Russia, Mongolia, China . . ., 1919, vol. 1); on his map’s upper-right part, Remezov indicated “The Great Kalmuck road from Ayuka to Raptan”, “Kalmuck road” and “The great road of Kazak Horde” 10.1 Eurasia in the nineteenth century (from M. Khodarkovsky Russia’s Steppe Frontier, 2002)

57

59 188

Acknowledgements

Any book is a product of the contributions that many people made in direct or indirect ways. This book is no exception. Over the period of its long gestation, I was lucky to benefit from the generosity of various institutions and the extraordinary expertise and advice of excellent scholars. My teaching term at Columbia University (since 2004), along with the presentations of some parts of the book at a number of conferences, workshops and other academic venues, including Columbia’s history workshop run by Professor Richard Wortman, proved instrumental for clarifying the directions of my own research. I feel especially indebted to my students and my teachers – the late Mark von Hagen, Richard Wortman, Nathaniel Knight, Jane Burbank, and Edward Lazzerini – for their invaluable feedback and invariable support over the whole period of my stay in the US. I have also immensely benefited from the sharp and scrupulous editing and advice of Elizabeth Bachner, my editor. It has been a tremendous pleasure to work with her throughout these years of working on my book. I also thank Routledge’s senior editor Dorothea Shaefter and her colleagues, including the anonymous readers of the manuscript, for their highly professional, welcoming and encouraging attitude. My special thanks go to the members of the former and current staff of the Harriman Institute as well, including the late Catherine Nepomniashchy, Timothy Frey, Alexander Cooley, Ronald Meyer, Alla Rachkov, Barbara Singleton, Kevin Laney and Peter Sinnott, for their generous financial and logistical support that enabled my stay and research in the libraries and archives of Qazaqstan, Russia, and New York, including the universities of Indiana and Stanford. I also found much-needed support from my Qazaq colleagues in Almaty, including the employees of the Central State Archive of the Republic of Qazaqstan Bolat Zhanaev, Marziia Zhylysbaeva, and others, who generously shared their expertise and materials with me and assisted with my research in all possible ways. I am also grateful to the historian Aitzhan Nugmanova, who kindly assisted me in obtaining and identifying the majority of the photographs reproduced in this book. My special thanks go to my German colleagues and dear friends Prof. Dietrich Beyrau and Margarete and Alois Payers as well. I am grateful to the editors of the Indiana University Press for allowing me to reprint two maps from the book by Michael Khodarkovsky Russia’s Steppe

xii  Acknowledgements Frontier. The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800 (2002) and to the book’s author for his remarkable work on drawing up these maps. I am also grateful to the Brill Publishers for granting me the permission to reproduce parts of my article “Inner Asian Frontiers of China and the 1771 Kalmyk Exodus”, Inner Asia, vol. 20, 4 (2018), pp. 261–289, in this book. This book would have not been possible to accomplish without the strong and steady encouragement of the members of my family: my sisters Alma Kunanbaeva and Anara Kendirbaeva, my brother-in-law Izaly Iosifovich Zemtsovsky and my nephew Jantuar Ertaev. I dedicate this book to them and my late parents – my father Törebek Kendirbaev and my mother Bates Kazieva – who taught me how to combine my intellectual endeavours with discovering a new intellectual home on the opposite side of the Atlantic.

Abbreviations

RGIA: The Russian State Historical Archive TsGARK:  The Central State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan KRO-1: Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVI-XVIII vekakh (Sbornik dokumenov i materialov), ed. Shakhmatov, V. F. et al, Alma-Ata: Akademiia Nauk Kazakhskoi SSR, 1961 KRO-2: Kazakhsko-russkie otnosheniia v XVIII-XIX vekakh (Sbornik dokumentov i materialov), ed. Dzhangalin, M. O. et al, Alma-Ata: “Nauka”, 1964

Introduction

This study seeks to contribute to the ongoing debates pertaining to the nature of the spread of Russian rule over the many nomadic populations of the vast Eurasian terrains. It is the argument of this book that exploring the Russian state’s interactions with the people of its steppe frontiers through the prism of mobility provides important insights into the rise of the Russian Empire in its formative period that preceded the outset of the era of nationalism in the 1820s. Historians have long established that unlike Russia’s western borders, the operation of its steppe frontiers was marked by its mobile nature. Unlike their counterparts in the Americas, who became preoccupied with “legal and cultural reordering”1 in order to legitimize their authority and policies, the Muscovite state found itself facing the daunting task of organizing a defence of its frontier lines in the aftermath of the fall of the Golden Horde, the so-called zaseki, to protect its borderland populations from nomadic attacks. Over the period from the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries, the state failed to protect its people and to take hold of its own runaways, who tended to flee beyond the frontier lines to escape the state’s control. Instead, the state followed its runaways, by moving the defensive lines deeper into foreign territories and placing the people there under Russian rule.2 The mobile dynamics of Russia’s steppe frontiers were also facilitated by the nomadic populations’ lifestyle, which precluded their development of a sense of territorial sovereignty. Largely due to the impact of the Russian state school, proponents of the statist approach have portrayed the state’s policies towards non-Russian populations as informed by the dynamics of domination and submission and “divide and rule”. Accordingly, they have tended to overestimate the Russian state’s military and other capabilities, highlighting the appropriation of non-Russian lands and resources followed by the imposition of “bureaucratization” and “administrative rule” as the most essential aspects of Russia’s imperial enterprise. In tune with this outlook, adherents of the nationalist approach have embraced the resistance/ accommodation paradigm that views the non-Russian colonized as victims of mistreatment and manipulation on the part of the Russian colonizers.3 Debates about the nature of Russian/non-Russian interactions split Soviet historians and some of their post-Soviet successors into two camps. Historians of the Soviet era promoted the concept of voluntary joining (dobrovol’noe

2  Introduction prisoedinenie), since it complied with the official ideology of the friendship of the Soviet peoples.4 Their successors, in contrast, embraced the conquest (zavoevanie) paradigm in order to attune their narratives to well-known postcolonial themes.5 After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a group of leading western historians of imperial Russia endorsed what they called the revisionist approach to studying the role of the Russian state, which Jane Burbank framed as bringing the state “back into imperial Russian history but without the state school, and, most important, not in isolation as an agent”.6 With respect to the state’s interactions with its provincial nobility, this implied, in the words of Valerie Kivelson, “to some extent a negotiated relationship, not a single unilateral imposition by the strong on the weak”.7 This vision became translated into a number of pioneering studies produced by these and other historians who have explored the state’s participatory agency.8 In quite the same fashion, historians of the early Ottoman, Qing and European states embraced a similar outlook, by pointing to negotiation strategies adopted by their rulers and officials towards establishing interactions with their subjects.9 The alternative strategies adopted by these states, however, unfolded against a background strongly informed by paternalistic conceptions of power, which Richard Wortman with respect to the Russian case describes as monarchical nationalism, implying a personalized, political bond established between the Russian monarchs and their subjects. Exemplified in court ceremonies and reinforced through a belief in the divine origin of the monarchs’ title, these scenarios of monarchical love further endorsed the monarchs’ absolute power.10 Ottoman and Qing ruling strategies exhibited the same patrimonial endorsement of the superior status of Ottoman sultans and Qing emperors. Imbued with the paternalistic spirit of Confucianism, the Qing emperors, for example, presented themselves as universal rulers “who ruled a world of peoples”.11 The Qing tributary system featuring a set of rewards, which they imposed on foreign rulers, implied that these rulers voluntarily recognized their subordinate status.12 A closer examination of Kalmyk, Jungar and Qazaq leaders’ interactions with Russian and Qing authorities from the perspective of the mobility factor paints a different picture. Despite the widely endorsed images of Russian and Qing monarchs as benevolent protectors, and the hierarchical kinship terms characteristically used to describe relationships within steppe political culture, the dynamics of their actual interactions defied any Weberian concept of patrimonialism, in which a ruler wielded an arbitrary and authoritarian power, sanctified by tradition, and his subjects obeyed him without question.13 Instead, as we shall see, all of these partners maintained an effective balance of power, by entertaining what Owen Lattimore called the elementary techniques of frontier control, the ancient frontier strategy, towards each other. Lattimore attributed the original use of the techniques to the Jurchid, the ancestors of the Manchus. These techniques involved preventing each party from prevailing over other parties by consolidating power in their hands and, in so doing, maintaining a favourable balance of power. In Lattimore’s own words, “when subsidized chiefs

Introduction  3 of an auxiliary tribe seemed to be acquiring too much power, they switched their favor to another tribe, thus creating new tribal feuds, keeping old ones alive, and preventing tribal unity”.14 Lattimore contended that not only the rise of Chingiz Khan to the status of the supreme Mongol leader but also “the sound theory that the Manchus could hold China in peace if the Mongols were unable to unite” were predicated on the use of “the elementary techniques of frontier control”.15 As this book will demonstrate, due to the interplay of these techniques, interactions of the Kalmyk and Qazaq nobility with their Russian and Qing patrons became hazardous and unpredictable, transforming the Inner Asian frontiers into openly contested zones over the major part of the period under consideration. Russia’s ongoing disputes with the Mongol, Jungar and Qing rulers over placing frontier populations under its control contributed to the turbulent dynamics of the frontiers. The use of “the techniques” by Russian and Qing higher authorities reveals that they proved capable of establishing new relationships with their nomadic counterparts by elaborating on sets of distinctive policies and practices, which built on and replicated the evasive nature of nomadic power relations. The nomads’ established power dynamics unfolded as personal and nonbinding relationships of servitude based on a tributary allegiance between a ruler and his nobility, on the one hand, and the ruling nomadic class and ordinary nomads, on the other. Each nobleman and his subjects alike persisted with using the strategy of “voting with one’s feet” to maintain a flexible space for political decision-making. They viewed the space as providing them with ample opportunity to manoeuvre, allowing them to effectively balance authority between themselves and their masters. Since nomadic communities could act as an independent and well-trained military force, nomadic history teems with examples of their disobedience to their rulers who had violated the principle of balanced authority or lost to their rivals by simply wandering off. Faced with the dilemma of being either abandoned or removed by force, the nomadic rulers invested in consensusbuilding as their most effective ruling strategy. As we shall see, this interplay of nomadic power relations, in fact, was what allowed the Russian and Qing authorities to interfere with Kalmyk and Qazaq leadership policies. The fluid nature of nomadic power relations was largely due to the mobility factor that underpinned all aspects of the operation of nomadic societies, including the dynamics of nomadic political negotiations. William Honeychurch explored, in his recent study, the crucial role of long-distance migrations undertaken by nomadic rulers in shaping the operation of Inner Asian statecraft. Attracting large numbers of followers in these migrations enabled rulers to significantly undermine their rivals and maintain a desirable balance of power in their favour. The business of long-distance migrations entailed undertaking raids and campaigns that promised lucrative spoils in the form of not only captured populations and large numbers of their livestock but also access to pasturelands. Given the strong exposure of nomadic communities to the often-unpredictable ecological conditions of their habitat, this access became especially crucial, not only at times of ecological disaster but also during social conflicts. Thus, those who were in command of mobility were ultimately also in command of pastures and people. Each

4  Introduction ruler’s number of followers directly determined the scope of his ability to take independent political action. Like Lattimore, William Honeychurch characterizes mobility not as “an impediment to complex organization” but as “both a tool of resistance and a new way to strategically enmesh individual families and communities in unequal relationship”.16 The importance of this mobility factor that underpinned the operation of the Russian protectorate system has not yet been adequately integrated into analyses of Russian authorities’ interactions with their nomadic partners. The system operated as a flexible institutional framework, which enabled both sides to derive maximum benefits from a given political situation to ensure that steppe leaders and their subjects perceived properly balanced relations of power based on building consensus and negotiation. In exchange for acknowledging the tsar’s senior status, stopping attacks on his subjects and not collaborating with his enemies, as well as delivering hostages and yasak, the tsar offered the nomadic rulers his protection, access to land and free trade. In addition, he secured the leaders’ autonomous status over their land and domestic affairs. The protectorate mechanisms thus enabled the tsar to intervene in nomadic rivalries by promising military assistance and protection to one party against their rivals and to grant privileges in the form of legal access to land, free trade, ranks and titles. This intermingling operated as leverage for imposing restrictions on the nomads’ free movements and migrations, which entailed assigning lands; taking control of commercial, migratory and pilgrimage routes; and constructing forts in nomadic territories (often initiated by nomadic nobles themselves). The forts were connected with each other and, in this way, came to form borders that separated nomadic populations from each other and from Russian settlements. By having a profound impact on corrupting the customary workings of the nomads’ leadership structures, these policies ever-more strongly imposed Russian decision-making on their leaders. The Russian and Qing protectorate policies and practices born from shared security concerns assimilated the ancient patterns of nomadic/sedentary interactions characteristic of the region, including appointing rival nomadic chiefs as auxiliaries, as well as employing them as guides and protectors of caravan trade and imposing tributes on them. Within the protectorate framework, the nomadic leaders committed themselves to participating in joint military campaigns, delivering hostages of noble origin and paying tributes. They were also expected not to collaborate with any enemies of their senior Qing and Russian patrons. Regardless of Qing and Russian authorities’ inclination to view the nomads as their subjects, as well as their complaints and threats provoked by the nomads’ violations of negotiated patronage conditions, both groups of authorities tended to adopt a pragmatic and flexible stance in the end. They were careful not to overemphasize facts of violation, and they often showed their readiness to renegotiate new agreements. Apart from playing rival nomadic rulers against each other, the protectorate system could also be used as a legal pretext for punishing recalcitrant nobles and creating new allies and, in this way, keeping a desirable balance of power in Russia’s or the Qing’s favour. The Russian officials’ adherence to traditional steppe political mechanisms can be explained by a number of factors. Apart from the challenges of placing

Introduction 5 nomadic populations under its rule, the Muscovite state also suffered from a chronic lack of workforce, military, economic and material resources that persisted throughout the major part of the period of interest. This state of affairs prevented officials from establishing control over frontier interactions, let alone unleashing large-scale military or colonization campaigns. Implementing these campaigns in Siberia was additionally complicated by the lack of infrastructure, the remoteness of Siberian regions and their severe climate. One should also take into consideration the period of economic and social crisis known as the Times of Troubles (1598–1613), from which the Muscovite state was slowly and painstakingly recovering. It is therefore no wonder that Russian rulers continued to entertain the steppe political mechanisms towards their nomadic counterparts under Peter I and his successors, the westernization of the country undertaken under these rulers notwithstanding. The use of “the elementary techniques of frontier control”, for example, allowed the Russians to keep their eye on balancing power in their favour while sparing their human and material resources to a considerable degree. The advocates of the statist approach have also tended to underestimate “the perennial Mongol threat” that seems to have loomed large in the minds of imperial authorities. This was due not only to Mongol domination in the past but also to the still-formidable workforce, resources and superb mobile and military skills of contemporary Khalkha Mongol, Jungar, Kalmyk, Qazaq and other nomadic armies. As we shall see, the Jungar, Kalmyk and Qazaq nomads proved capable of manufacturing gunpowder and using firearms. The Jungars were among Russia’s main rivals, challenging both Russia’s superiority and the Qing’s superiority in terms of firearms, not only by being able to buy and use rifles and canons but also by learning how to manufacture them. My research presents additional evidence of Russian officials’ concerns about their soldiers’ abilities to successfully confront their Qazaq and other nomadic adversaries in the open steppe, given the latter’s superior speed and manoeuvring skills, complicated by the lack of supply and communication difficulties. To better highlight the peculiar workings of the Russian protectorate system, it is important to contrast them with policies known as indirect rule (sometimes also described as a hub-and-spoke structure)17 and legal pluralism that formed the essential parts of Western and Ottoman imperial strategies. The policies and practices of indirect rule implied ruling the colonized populations through establishing patron–client relations with their elites, which entailed making them economically dependent on their metropolitan patrons. The British, French and other Western powers practised this style of governance in some of their colonies, which transformed them into their protectorates.18 The protectorates of Khiva and Bukhara established by the Russian state in the second half of the nineteenth century in Central Asia were patterned after these protectorates.19 In turn, policies of legal pluralism, as explained by Lauren Benton, operated according to the principle of the “centrality of cultural identities to legal politics”20 that played a key role in securing the Western powers’ “legal” access to foreign economic resources, land, labour and taxation. According to Benton’s research, the Spanish colonial borders separating Christian Europeans from the hazardous

6  Introduction lands of the “wild” Indigenous peoples came to operate as “simply a more visible example of the many ‘borders’ separating groups with different legal and cultural status within the empire”.21 In contrast, the production of common juridical space and legal boundaries under the Russian protectorate system drew on the region’s ancient mechanisms of interaction that eschewed highlighting religious, cultural or racial distinctions. Strikingly, neither a civilizing rhetoric buoyed by clearly articulated territorial, economic, cultural and religious interests on the part of higher Russian officials nor geographical and ecological factors seem to have played a role in the “natural” expansion of Russia’s Eurasian frontier lines towards the non-Russian territories over the greater part of the imperial period. These dynamics seem to have strongly resonated with the spread of Qing rule on the opposite side of the frontiers. As Lattimore has remarked, “From the earliest beginnings of Chinese history until the end of the nineteenth century there was never any such decisive spread, either of colonization or by the assimilation of the steppe peoples”.22 By highlighting the many structural similarities between Qing and Russian authorities’ interactions with their nomadic counterparts, which originated in the ancient mechanisms of steppe political culture, this study seeks to contribute to bridging the still-enduring gap separating the research of historians of the imperial Qing and Russian periods and, in so doing, reinforce their colleagues’ argument that the frontier factor played a crucial role in fomenting the rise of both empires. I use protectorate as a generic term to designate the distinctive policies and practices that governed relationships between Russian and Qing authorities and their nomadic counterparts in the period under consideration. As the book progresses, I will show that these policies evolved towards better integrating Kalmyk and Qazaq nomads into the fabric of the Russian Empire, which ultimately entailed imposing stricter control over their free movements. Accordingly, I use the terms patronage and confirmation to highlight these policies’ initial and final stages.

Notes 1 Benton, L.: Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 263 2 Sunderland, W.: Taming the Wild Field: Colonization and Empire in the Russian Steppe, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, pp.  24–34; Khodarkovsky, M.: Russia’s Steppe Frontier: The Making of a Colonial Empire, 1500–1800, Bloomington/Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2002, pp. 47–50 3 Rieber, A.: The Struggle for the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Rise of Early Modern Empires to the End of the First World War, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014; Suny, R.: Rehabilitating Tsarism: The Imperial Russian State and Its Historians. A Review Article, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 31, no. 1 (January, 1989). 4 Kichikov, M.: Istoricheskie korni druzhby russkogo i kalmytskogo narodov. Obrazovanie kalmytskogo gosudarstva v sostave Rossii, Elista: Kalmytskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1966; Erdniev, U. E. et  al. (eds.): Dobrovol’noe vkhozhdenie kalmytskogo naroda v sostav Rossii, Elista: KGU, 1985; Moiseev, V.: Dzhungaro-kazakhskie otnosheniia v XVII – XVIII vekakh i politika Rossii, Vestnik Evrazii, vol. 2 (2000), pp. 22–43, and others.

Introduction 7 5 Zuev, A. C.: Russkie i aborigeny na krainem severo-vostoke Sibiri vo vtoroi polovine XVII –pervoi chetverti XVIII v., Novosibirsk: NGU, 2002; Khudiakov, Iu. S.: “Zavoevanie” ili “dobrovol’noe prisoedinenie”? (discussionnye voprosy istorii Iuzhnoi Sibiri v svete analiza sovremennoi “drevnekhakassakoi mifologii”), Vostok: Afro-aziatskie obshchestva: istoriia i sovrenemennost’, vol. 6 (2003); Trepavlov, V. V.: Byl li Kazakhstan rossiiskoi i sovetskoi koloniei? Rossiiskie vesti, vol. 5 (2001); Idem: “Dobrovol’noe vkhozhdenie v sostav Rossii”: torzhestvennye iubilei i istoricheskaia deistvitel’nost’, Voprosy istorii, vol. 11 (November, 2007), pp.  155–163; Masanov, N. E., Abylkhozhin, Zh. B. and Erofeeva, I. V.: Nauchnoe znanie i mifotvorchestvo v sovremennoĭ istoriografii Kazakhstana, Almaty: “Daĭk-Press”, 2007; Nikitin, N. I.: Istoricheskoe znachenie territorial’nogo rosta Rossii, Petrov, Iu. A. et al. (eds.): Rossiiskoe gosudarstvo ot istokov do XIX veka: territoriia i vlast’, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2012, pp. 428–455 6 Burbank, J.: Revisioning Imperial Russia, Slavic Review, vol. 52, no. 3 (Autumn, 1993), p. 561 7 Kivelson, V.: Autocracy in the Provinces: The Muscovite Gentry in the Seventeenth Century, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, p. 10 8 Burbank, J.: Russian Peasants Go to Court: Legal Culture in the Countryside, 1905– 1917, Bloomington/Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004; Kollmann, N.: Crime and Punishment in Early Modern Russia, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012; Kivelson, V.: Cartography of Tsardom: The Land and Its Meaning in Seventeenth Century Russia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, and others. 9 McKay, R.: The Limits of Royal Authority: Resistance and Obedience in Seventeenth-Century Castile, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; Monod, P.: The Power of Kings: Monarchy and Religion in Europe, 1589–1715, New Heaven/London: Yale University Press, 1999; Barkey, K.: Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008 10 Wortman, R.: Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, in two vol., 1995–2000; Keenan, E. L.: Muscovite Political Ways, Russian Review, vol. 45, no. 2 (April, 1986), pp. 124–146 11 Burbank, J. and Cooper, F.: Empires in World History: Power and Politics of Difference: Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010, pp. 194–213 12 Fairbank, J. K. (ed.): The Chinese World Order: Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968 13 Weber, M.: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York/London: The Free Press/Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1968, Part III, Chapter III 14 Lattimore, O.: The Geography of Chingiz Khan, The Geographical Journal, vol. 129, no. 1 (March, 1963), pp. 5–6 15 Idem: The Historical Setting of Inner Mongolian Nationalism, Pacific Affairs, vol. 9 (1936), p. 390 16 Honeychurch, W.: Inner Asia and the Spatial Politics of Empire: Archeology, Mobility, and Culture Contact, New York: Springer, 2015, p. 66 17 Barkey, K.: Empire of Difference, pp. 9–10 18 On indirect rule and the patron–client system, see Newbury, C. W.: Patrons, Clients and Empire, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2003; Gellner, E. and Waterburry, J. (eds.): Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies, London/Duckworth/ Hanover, NH: Center for the Mediterranean Studies of the American Universities Field Staff, 1977; Kettering, Sh.: Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986; Eisenstadt, S. N.: Patrons, Clients and Friends, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984; Fisher, M.: Indirect Rule in India, Delhi/New York: Oxford University Press, 1991; Johnson, A. J.: Morocco: French and Spanish Protectorates, 1903–1914, Shillington, K. (ed.): Encyclopedia of African History, London: Routledge, 2005, and others.

8  Introduction 19 Becker, S.: Russia’s Protectorates in Central Asia: Khiva and Bukhara, 1865–1924, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968 20 Benton, L.: Law and Colonial Cultures, p. 24; Idem: A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010 21 Idem: Law and Colonial Cultures, p. 101 22 Lattimore, O.: Inner Asian Frontiers of China, New York: American Geographical Society, 1940, p. 37

Part I

The Russian institution of protectorate

1 Patterns of power and authority

This chapter explores the nature of so-called shert agreements that were negotiated by Muscovite rulers with their non-Russian counterparts in the aftermath of the fall of the Golden Horde. Historians have proposed different terms for describing these relationships, including patronage, protectorate, patron–client, patron– vassal and sovereign–vassal, which tend to obscure their unique nature. The lack of clarity relating to the status of the non-Russian rulers seems to have been the main source of the existing disparity among historians. For example, Vadim Trepavlov believes that rather than turning the nonRussian rulers into the tsar’s subjects, these relationships reflected an imbalance of power and the two sides’ actual strategic and tactical interests. In exchange for the tsar’s protection, his non-Russian vassals were expected to pay a yasak tax, provide hostages (amanat) of noble origin, participate in joint military campaigns and avoid collaboration with their patron’s enemies. As Trepavlov has explained, the vassal’s status in this setting “meant personal responsibilities of noble rulers with respect to the Muscovite tsars, personal service to the tsar, for which they were rewarded salaries”.1 In the eighteenth century, these interactions began to unfold under the umbrella of protectorate relations, because the Russian rulers began to view their foreign partners as their subjects, despite the fact that the partners continued to consider themselves free vassals and therefore frequently violated their agreements.2 Another Russian historian, N. A. Mininkov, also describes the relationship between the Don Cossack leaders and the Muscovite state before they swore allegiance to the tsar in 1671 as a voluntary and mutually beneficial agreement between a patron and his vassals. During this period, the Muscovite state had refrained from either imposing its own administration or taxation or any other obligations on the Don Cossack rulers, who considered themselves free clients of the tsar and received payments and benefits from him for executing his specific tasks. After they swore allegiance to the tsar, the Don Cossacks began to lose their freedom and independence, because they took upon themselves certain obligations that ultimately turned them into the tsars’ subjects. In particular, they lost the right to choose their allies and their freedom to undertake independent military missions. Mininkov does not use the terms protectorate or patronage to describe this relationship’s nature either before or after the 1671 Act.3 B. B. Kochekaev

12  The Russian institution of protectorate and V. I. Basin, in turn, have described the relationships of the Nogai and Qazaq nobility with their Russian patrons as protectorate relationships, with elements of vassalage.4 Trepavlov links subjecthood status ( poddanstvo) to placing the non-Russian rulers and their populations under a common Russian legal and administrative system and the introduction of symbols of a common state and taxation.5 However, none of his criteria can be applied to the relationships of Kalmyk and Qazaq rulers with their Russian patrons. As Basin has shown, the act of swearing allegiance by the rulers of all four Qazaq hordes to the Russian throne did not significantly change their interactions with Russia. Throughout the major part of this period, they continued to violate their signed agreements and act as independent rulers and therefore were repeatedly asked to swear allegiance to the Russian throne. Although Basin describes these relationships in terms of protectorate, he highlights the fact that until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Qazaq populations of all four hordes had neither paid regular taxes, participated in Russia’s military campaigns nor fulfilled any other duties in favour of the Russian state. This, however, did not prevent both sides from viewing the Qazaqs as subjects of the Russian monarchs. Basin believes that the integration of the Qazaqs into Russian imperial structures began first in the second half of the nineteenth century, after they were placed under all-imperial laws and introduced to Russian administrative-territorial principles of ruling.6 Brian Boeck has argued along similar lines by stating that the Don Cossacks’ oath of allegiance to the tsar in 1671 did not substantially alter the nature of their interactions with him. In addition to retaining their complete local autonomy and economic subsidies, the Don Cossacks continued to openly defy the tsar’s orders and formed temporary military alliances with his enemies. Under the pressure of limited resources and confronting its Ottoman rivals, Muscovy also refrained from imposing its will on the Don Cossacks.7 Within this context, Boeck has remarked that: The whole question of the loyalty oath deserved reconsideration. . . . Although it was an important symbolical act there is little evidence that the oath radically changed the relationship between the Don and Moscow. Hence it would be better to examine what the oath meant to both sides.8 By citing frequent violations of negotiated agreements by nomadic rulers, Michael Khodarkovsky and other historians concluded that these relationships had been marred by mutual misconceptions and misrepresentations stemming from “larger structural incompatibilities between the Russian and indigenous societies”.9 If the Russian side perceived the negotiated agreements in terms of placing the non-Russian rulers under Russian rule, the rulers themselves viewed them as non-binding voluntary agreements, which they could abandon any time in favour of other rulers. A closer examination of the interactions between Kalmyk and Qazaq rulers and their Russian patrons, however, suggests a more complex situation.

Patterns of power and authority  13 In fact, both sides frequently violated conditions of their agreements, with the Russian side unwilling (and often unable) to render protection and military assistance, while the Kalmyk and Qazaq rulers resisted delivering their hostages and yasak. In addition, both sides invested in playing each other off by cooperating with each other’s enemies. By viewing their negotiated agreements as a mutually beneficial cooperation based on the recognition of an existing imbalance of power, both sides demonstrated their familiarity with the basic rules of doing politics in the steppe. To gain better insights into these dynamics, I will proceed with a close examination of the workings of nomadic power relations.

Nomadic power dynamics and their entanglements During the Russian traveller and scholar Aleksei Levshin’s visit to the Qazaq Steppe in 1820–1822 he found himself puzzling over the workings of Qazaq power relations. The behaviour of both noble and ordinary Qazaq nomads seems to have undermined his idea of how societies functioned: All neighbors of the Kirgiz-Kaisaks [Qazaqs] have been ruled by monarchical and despotic regimes, all peoples related to them have been living in slavery, worthy of pity, but they display the absence of any familiarity with the notion of subordination, they seem to have been unfamiliar even with the notions of a subject and a master. A quite curious phenomenon from the point of view of politicians!10 In Levshin’s view, the most serious flaw in Qazaq power dynamics was the dearth of strong Qazaq rulers who were capable of establishing peace and order by imposing laws on their subjects. He concluded that Qazaq power relations were chaotic. Another Russian visitor to the Qazaq Steppe, M. Krasovsky, was struck by the power of local leaders, tribal judges and elders, whose influence seemed to have far exceeded that of their overlords.11 These and other accounts suggest a distinct perception of properly balanced power relations on the part of all segments of Qazaq society, one that eschewed any centralization of power under a single leader. In this setting, to be ruled was to be provided with ample opportunity for manoeuvring or free decision-making, which also entailed being treated as equals. In other words, nomadic leadership was conditional on protecting the right to make independent political decisions. Accordingly, each nobleman and his subjects invested in maintaining their right to free movement to balance power in an effective way. The customary nomadic power relations unfolded therefore as personal and non-binding relations of servitude on the basis of a tributary allegiance between a ruler and his nobility, on the one hand, and the ruling nomadic class and ordinary nomads, on the other. This had the effect of loosening the social boundaries separating nobles from commoners, including the boundaries that sustained hierarchies in the ruling nomadic class itself. Subsequently, relationships among members of the nomadic ruling class

14  The Russian institution of protectorate and between them and their subject populations came to unfold mainly as mutually beneficial partnerships. Among other things, this was due largely to the relative economic independence of noble and ordinary households. Despite the strong exposure of their economies to the often-unpredictable conditions of the arid and semi-arid zones of the Eurasian Steppe, the economic well-being of the nomadic ruling class did not directly depend on income from their subjects. Members of the nomadic nobility did not practise regular taxation. Each nobleman, including the supreme ruler, lived off of his own livestock, while his subjects paid tributes in acknowledgement of their patron’s protective role. Depending on their livestock holdings, wealthy households hired commoners, usually their impoverished relatives, to graze their animals, but the job was not labour-intensive and could also be implemented by women and children. As mentioned earlier, apart from sustaining a necessary balance in the nomads’ daily interactions with their precarious ecological and climatic conditions, the mobility factor had a straightforward impact on shaping the very workings of nomadic leadership structures. The long-distance migrations undertaken by ambitious nomads could lead to the formation of new, independent political bodies. One such pivotal movement occurred around 1459, when the Chingizid sultans Gerei and Janibek, the descendants of Juchi, Chingiz Khan’s older son, left the Ulus (domain) of Shaiban (known also as the Khanate of Nomadic Uzbeks) ruled by Abulkhair, Juchi’s other descendant. In the company of tribes subordinated to them, the sultans migrated to the territories known as the Ulus of Mogulistan, which corresponded to the southern and southeastern regions of modern Qazaqstan. At that time, Mogulistan was ruled by another Chingizid offspring, Khan Esen Buka, the representative of the Chagataid branch of Chingiz Khan’s ruling house. The new patron accepted Gerei and Janibek and their people hospitably, allotting them territories located in the western part of his Ulus. In the meantime, the sultans’ following continued to grow due to other discontented sultans and their followers, who had left Abulkhair and joined them, so that by 1465/1466, the sultans proclaimed themselves independent rulers of the new political confederation of tribes that came to be known as Qazaqs.12 Interestingly, the unruly sultans and their subjects figure in medieval chronicles under the name “Uzbek-Qazaqs”, where “Qazaq” was used to mean a brigand, unruly and insubordinate. James Scott, the author of the celebrated study The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (2009) has likened the status of the East Asian hill populations, who had emigrated to their states’ outskirts (called Zomia) in the preindustrial era, to the status of the Kalmyks and the Cossacks under Russian imperial rule. All these populations invested in maintaining their right to make independent political decisions to keep their states “at arms’ length”,13 and ended up re-emerging as distinct ethnic communities. Scott’s remark, however, points to a different power setting, against which the East Asian communities decided to emigrate, one that capitalized on the control vs dependency principle. He writes, “But it is crucial to understand that what is being evaded is not a relationship per se with the state but an evasion of subject

Patterns of power and authority 15 status”.14 He describes this power setting as informed by what he calls the state effect. By creating “the shatter zones of human shards of state formation and rivalry” in the uplands “beyond the grasp of valley states”,15 the runaway South Asian communities in fact reinvested in their marginal status vis-à-vis their states and, by so doing, reinforced the states’ centrality, especially as these communities proved in the end incapable of withstanding the economic and technological competition with their states, let alone rendering an effective military resistance against the states’ encroachment on their territories. In effect, the states’ central status proved beneficial for asserting their dominance over their runaways with a renewed vigour and sophistication. Although Gerei and Janibek also capitalized on their right to free political choice, their decisions were prompted by a different power dynamic, one that, to paraphrase Honeychurch, opted to strategically enmesh Abulkhair and his dynasty in an unequal relationship.16 Unlike the South Asian communities, who invested in the escape-as-survival strategy, the sultans proved able to challenge the Shaibanid rulers after Abulkhair’s death, by returning and placing his populations under the sultans’ power. As we shall see, the Kalmyk and Cossack leaders also engaged the Russian state in political negotiations in their favour and often proved successful in doing so. In effect, their leaders enjoyed an autonomous status, with the state allowing them to run their domestic affairs independently and exempting their people from taxation. Hence, the state’s interactions with the Cossack and Kalmyk leaders were regulated by criteria other than control and dependency. Due to their adherence to these criteria, Russian imperial policymakers in fact contributed to the formation of these communities as distinct political bodies. The next section takes a closer look at these criteria, by tracing their origin to the ancient nomadic institution of co-ruling.

Protectorate as co-ruling Framed as bringing the non-Russian populations and their leaders under the tsar’s exalted arm ( priniat’ pod vysokuiu ruku), the Russian protectorate mechanisms assimilated features that were akin to the operation of the ancient steppe institution of co-ruling. This institution’s operation opted for establishing an effective balance of power by means of sharing it between a senior ruler and his junior nonRussian co-rulers, in such a way that it was perceived by all partners as beneficial in any given political situation. Trepavlov and other historians, who investigated the nomadic institution of coruling, date its operation to the period from the third century BCE to the thirteenth century CE, which was marked by the rise and fall of powerful Eurasian nomadic empires.17 According to their research, it functioned by dividing nomadic territories, populations and armies into eastern (left) and western (right) parts or wings and centre and placing them each under a ruler, usually a close relative: brothers, or a son and his father. The senior ruler’s domain could also be divided into three or more parts and placed under several junior co-rulers. Generally, nomadic rulers

16  The Russian institution of protectorate entertained mechanisms of co-ruling for pursuing their strategic and tactical interests that implied mainly forming military alliances against a third party. These relationships operated as flexible and non-binding alliances negotiated by partners who considered themselves equal to each other but had a stake in cooperation in a given political situation. They therefore took upon themselves specific rights and obligations with respect to each other. Although in practice the junior co-ruler preserved full freedom to run his own foreign and domestic affairs, in theory he and his patron viewed the junior co-ruler’s subjects and territories as a continuation of the patron’s domain and populations. The junior co-ruler was therefore expected to share incomes from his populations with his patron and to participate in joint military campaigns in exchange for the protection offered by his senior partner. The status of rulers, however, could easily change, following permanently fluctuating political and economic situations in the nomadic world, including the personalities of the rulers themselves. A charismatic junior co-ruler would then challenge his less charismatic and powerful suzerain, by refusing to obey his orders and trying to refashion the established status quo or by abandoning the relationship altogether. The separation of the Ulus Juchi, the domain of Chingiz Khan’s older son, and the rise of the Golden Horde under Juchi’s charismatic son Batu can serve as an example. The Juchid khans’ junior status vs their senior partners, the Great Mongol khans, was associated with the Western orientation and the colour white.18 Members of the ruling Chingizid dynasty adopted the principle of divided authority to regulate their relationships with elites subjugated to them, including Russian princes. As a rule, the Mongols did not interfere with their junior partners’ domestic affairs, mainly imposing on them demands that they provide soldiers and pay tributes. In the aftermath of the fall of the Golden Horde, the Muscovite rules followed these principles, by imposing yasak on the non-Russian nobility, assigning land to them and granting honourable ranks and privileges and issuing royal charters (gramota), which replaced the Mongol yarlyks. The tsars thus acted within the Eurasian/Mongol political tradition that greatly facilitated viewing them as heirs of the Chingizid khans in the eyes of these nobles. It was around this time that they evoked the status of the Juchid khans, by calling Ivan IV ak patsha (white tsar) and associating his domain’s location with the west. In so doing, they linked the tsar’s rise to the rise of the Golden Horde under Batu, Juchi’s charismatic son, in the mid thirteenth century.19 The tsar’s emerging senior status entailed securing his non-Russian partners’ access to land and military assistance, settling their conflicts and speaking on their behalf in international negotiations, as well as rewarding them with ranks and titles. Apart from paying tribute (yasak) and providing hostages (amanat) of noble origin, the non-Russian rulers were expected to participate in joint military campaigns and avoid collaboration with their patron’s enemies. Given the fluid structures of nomadic power relations described earlier, these rulers had a stake in cooperating with the Russians: it strengthened their status with their own rivals and subjects and provided them with access to land and free trade, and their

Patterns of power and authority 17 participation in joint military campaigns promised numerous captives and rich spoils. The voluntary character of shert agreements thus contributed to the legitimization of Russian rule in new territories in the period from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries.20 Khodarkovsky has shown that over this period, the state negotiated shert agreements with the nobility of the disintegrated Golden Horde, Siberia, the North Caucasus and the Far East, including the Kalmyk, Northern Alaskan and other foreign elites.21 The Muscovite state negotiated temporary military alliances with nomadic chiefs in the fashion of steppe politics long before it ventured into the business of empire building. In the period from the fall of the Golden Horde in the fifteenth century to the rise of Moscow in the mid sixteenth century, the tsars occupied a transitional status, acting as senior rulers with respect to the rulers of some of the successor states of the Golden Horde and as junior partners to others. The wellknown research of V. V. Vel’iaminov-Zernov demonstrates that during this period, Russian medieval authors interchangeably used the titles of khan, tsar, prince and tsarevich in relation to the rulers of the Kasimov Khanate and the successor states of the disintegrated Golden Horde. Oftentimes the titles of tsar and tsarevich were used in combination with “service” as “service tsarevichi” (sluzhilye tsarevichi). One can propose that this usage signalled the outset of the process of downgrading the meaning of khan as a title, which began to be associated with the tsar’s high-ranking non-Russian service nobility—the more so as the unfolding of the process led to the adoption of the practice of appointing puppet khans to the Kasimov and Astrakhan thrones by the tsars. Initially described as slaves (kholopy) in early Russian documents, the status of Russian and non-Russians subjects of the tsar evolved into poddannyi (subjects) in the seventeenth century. Rather than designating slaves, both terms were used to connote personal loyalty to the Russian monarchs until under Peter I the term poddannyi evolved to acquire the meaning of service to the state.22 As we shall see, however, the cooperation of the Kalmyk and Qazaq rulers with their Russian patrons under Peter I and his successors retained its initial meaning of personal loyalty to the Russian monarchs. Interestingly, Vladimir Dal’ indicated in his Dictionary of the Living Russian Language that the archaic meaning of the words póddaten’ and poddán’e that predated the term poddanstvo (subjecthood) had denoted a comrade, a colleague or an apprentice and been used to express personal loyalty.23 While placing the non-Russian populations under their rule, Russian authorities displayed a creative approach to applying the co-ruling system, by employing some its principles and skipping others, as well as by elaborating on new practices to further enhance the legitimate character of their rule. For example, the Don Cossacks were not asked to deliver hostages (amanat) or to pay yasak taxes. The Kalmyk population, who at the request of their leaders were placed under the tsar’s protection in the beginning of the seventeenth century, were also exempted from payments of yasak and delivering noble hostages in exchange for their participation in all major Russian wars in the century. The Qazaq elites, in turn, neither paid yasak nor participated in joint military campaigns but were

18  The Russian institution of protectorate asked to deliver their nobles as hostages. In addition, Russian authorities upheld the Chingiz principle of sovereignty, to which the Qazaq rulership adhered, in accordance with which only descendants of Chingiz Khan’s family had the right to claim the superior power status for themselves. The Muscovite tsars adopted Byzantine practices of co-ruling for running their domestic affairs as well. For example, in 1449, Tsar Vasily II appointed his son Ivan as his co-ruler, who, in turn, appointed his sons Ivan, Dmitry and Vasily as his respective co-rulers. Tsar Boris Godunov also shared his power with his son Fedor, by appointing the son as his co-ruler.24 The Byzantine co-ruling practices, however, intended, in the words of George Ostrogorsky, “to exalt the emperor and to emphasize his supremacy over all other rulers”.25 Ostrogorsky stated in his classical study that the co-ruling practices of the Byzantine emperors opted for securing succession by one of their offspring, whom the emperors designated as their co-rulers. Each co-ruler was given a crown, an imperial title and other privileges, including the depiction of his name on the coinage besides the name of the ruling emperor. Accordingly, the emperor’s domain was no longer divided into two or more bodies with autonomous junior co-rulers appointed to rule them.26 Hence, in contrast to the steppe co-ruling practices, the Byzantine system in fact opted out the creation of alternative seats of power that could challenge the acting rulers’ status quo. This suggests that the Muscovite rulers were well informed about the distinct workings of the two co-ruling systems, since they proved careful about entertaining the steppe co-ruling mechanisms exclusively in their relationships with the non-Russian populations of their steppe frontiers, including the Cossacks. The dynamics of Muscovy’s interactions with the Cossacks can well illustrate the workings of these mechanisms. The Russian state not only granted and protected the Cossacks’ junior autonomous status but also provided them with land and distributed ranks, titles and other privileges among their nobility. Cossack leadership strategies intersected at a point of negotiating and sustaining a workable balance between domination and submission, a balance that sought to achieve all members’ aims and was contingent on the unpredictable and oftentimes-dangerous conditions of the steppe frontier. Maintaining leadership in these communities required the leaders to cooperate with other members rather than merely impose their will. Social status, including estate, class and rank, had much less significance for the Cossacks than their leaders’ ability to unite other Cossacks to successfully pursue their aims. Early Cossack communities were known for their egalitarian social life, which kept their leaders from enjoying unrestricted authority. Instead, the leaders found themselves under the close surveillance of their fellow Cossacks, who could easily dismiss and replace them with any other member if they failed to meet their expectations. Muscovy’s interactions with the Cossacks unfolded against the unpredictable and dangerous conditions of the steppe frontiers, coupled with the Cossacks’ own limited material and workforce resources. The Don Cossacks, for example, depended on the state’s supply of grain, gunpowder and weapons to have the upper hand over the more numerous nomadic populations of the lower Don region. This notwithstanding, they periodically switched their allegiances to the Ottoman,

Patterns of power and authority 19 Crimean and local nomadic rulers. Confronting the Ottoman Empire with its own limited resources, the Russian state oftentimes preferred compromise to conflict, “and even in the face of insubordination acted as a reliable partner and patron of its Cossack agents. . . . Since they were free people, not subjects, the tsar was neither responsible for punishing them nor accountable for their actions”.27 Under these conditions, the Don Cossacks enjoyed full freedom in running their domestic and foreign affairs, by deriving “substance from delicate balance between raiding, trading, ransoming, and government subsidy”.28 Hence, the Muscovite rulers had a stake in protecting the Cossacks’ independent status, which, in effect, limited the rulers’ ability to exercise unrestricted power. The Cossacks, in turn, took advantage of their independent status to derive privileges from the Muscovite state. All players in the strategically important region of the lower Don, including the Don Cossacks, the Russian state, the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean and other local non-Russian populations seem to have been well versed in the principles of sustaining an effective balance of power, which enabled the Don Cossacks to maintain their independent status with respect to all those players. Neither the Ottoman nor the Russian rulers interfered with the Don Cossacks’ local economies: “to them what mattered was that Cossacks and Tatars kept the lower Don region a place of contestation”.29 As the remainder of the book will show, this very vision informed Russian and Qing authorities’ frontier policies, which largely contributed to transforming the Inner Asian frontiers into contested porous zones. To better highlight the distinct nature of the Muscovite state’s negotiations with the Cossacks, one can cite the case of the Ottoman bandits investigated by Karen Barkey, who fulfilled services for the Ottoman state similar to those fulfilled by the Cossacks for the Muscovite state. Both the Cossacks and the bandits shared independent standing towards their respective states, while the latter depended on the members of their groups to consolidate power in their frontier regions. Members of both groups considered themselves free clients of their patrons and therefore rebelled against them if they failed to reward them with salaries, accolades and privileges. Yet if the Ottoman bandits threatened their patrons with secession, the Cossack rebellions usually were directed not against the tsars but rather against their central and local officials. This difference is all the more striking if one keeps in mind that the bandits represented the marginalized groups of Ottoman peasantry who were considered the subjects of Ottoman sultans. The Cossacks, in contrast, were not viewed as the subjects of the tsars but rather emerged as a peculiar community, one that had grown out of the steppe political environment and the precarious conditions of Russia’s Eurasian frontiers. Moreover, if the Ottoman bandits strove to be integrated into the Ottoman bureaucracy, the Cossacks jealously protected their autonomous status. When some Cossack groups periodically rioted against the state, others preferred to side with it, if they had a stake in doing so: “Even as Russia consolidated its position in the steppe and incorporated the region into its imperial borders, the Don Cossacks maintained a separate juridical existence with the Russian body politic for centuries”.30 In contrast, the Ottoman bandits became involved in “intra-elite” rivalries among themselves while

20  The Russian institution of protectorate competing for lucrative positions in the Ottoman administration.31 According to Barkey’s research, these dynamics traced their origins to the “slave-servant” system that had operated in the previous sixteenth century, known as the Classic Age of the Ottoman Empire. Subsequently, the Ottoman style of negotiating with the bandits featured, in addition to granting privileges and rewards, the specific institutionalized practices of bargaining and rotating the bandits after appointing them as state officials.32

Notes 1 Trepavlov, V. V.: “Belyi Tsar”. Obraz monarkha i predstavleniia o poddanstve u narodov Rossii XV-XVIII vv., Moscow: “Vostochnaia literatura” RAN, 2007, p. 186 2 Ibid., pp. 138, 147–153, 160–170 3 Mininkov, N. A.: Donskoe kazachestvo v epokhu pozdnego Srednevekov’ia (do 1671 g.), Rostov-na-Donu: RGU, 1998, pp. 279–294, 319–320 4 Kochekaev, B. B.: K voprosu prisoedineniia Nogaiskoi Ordy k Rossii, Izvestiia AN Kaz SSR, vol. 6 (1969), p. 59; Basin, V. I.: Rossiia i kazakhskie khanstva v XVI – XVIII vv. (Kazakhstan v sisteme vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi imperii), Alma-Ata: “Nauka”, 1971, p. 260 5 Trepavlov, V. V.: “Belyi Tsar”, pp. 134–137 6 Ibid., pp. 250–275 7 Boeck, B.: Capitulation or Negotiation: Relations Between the Don Host and Moscow in the Aftermath of the Razin Uprising, Kappeler, A. (ed.): Die Geschichte Russlands im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert aus der Perspektive seiner Regionen, Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, 2004, p. 393 8 Ibid., p. 385 9 Khodarkovsky, M.: Russia’s Steppe Frontier, pp.  74–75; Trepavlov, V. V.: Kalmyki i Rossiia v XVII-XVIII vv.: poddannye, vassaly ili soiuzniki? Komandzhaev, A. N. et  al. (eds.): Kalmyki v mnogonatsional’noi Rossii. Opyt chetyrekh stoletii, Elista: “Dzhangar”, 2008, p. 69 10 Kozybaev, M. K. et al. (eds.): Levshin, A. I.: Opisanie kirgiz-kazach’ikh ili kirgiz-kaisatskikh, ord i stepei, Almaty: “Sanat”, 1996, p. 374 11 Krasovsky, M.: Oblast’ sibirskikh kirgizov, vol. III, St. Petersburg, 1868, p. 2 12 Urunbaev, A., Dzhalilova, R. P. and Epifanova, L. M. (transl.): Mukhammed Khaidar Dulati: Tarikh-i-Rashidi, Almaty: Sanat, 1999, p. 108 13 Scott, J.: The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia, New Heaven: Yale University Press, 2009, pp. x, 162 14 Ibid., p. 330 15 Ibid., pp. 7, 137, 281 16 Honeychurch, W.: Inner Asia and the Spatial Politics of Empire, p. 66 17 Trepavlov, V. V.: Sopravitel’stvo v Mongol’skoi imperii (XVIII v.), Allsen, Th. T., Golden, P. B., Martinez, A. P. and Noonan, Th. S. (eds.): Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi. 10 (1998–1999), Wisebaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, pp.  249–278; Skrynnikova, T. D.: Struktura vlasti mongol’skikh kochevnikov epokhi Chingiz Khana, Kradin, N. N. and Bondarenko, D. M. (eds.): Kochevaia al’ternativa sotsial’noi evoliutsii, Moscow: Institut Afriki RAN/Tsentr tsivilizatsionnykh i regional’nykh issledovanii RAN, 2002, pp. 204–218; Golden, P. B.: Imperial Ideology and the Sources of Political Unity Amongst the Pre-Činggisid Nomads of Western Eurasia, Schamiloglu, U. et al. (eds.): Archivum Eurasia Medii Aevi, vol. II, Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1982, pp. 37–76 18 Trepavlov, V. V.: Gosudarstvennyi stroi Mongol’skoi imperii XIII v. Problema istoricheskoi preemstvennosti, Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura, 1993, pp. 75–79

Patterns of power and authority 21 19 Trepavlov, V. V.: “Belyi Tsar”, p. 30 20 Ibid., p. 138 21 Khodarkovsky, M.: Russia’s Steppe Frontier, p. 68; see also: Sherstova, L. I.: Russkie v Sibiri XVII veka: mental’nye i sotsio-kul’turnye transformatsii, Shilovsky, M. V. (ed.): Problemy sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo i kul’turnogo razvitiia Sibiri XVII – XX vv. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov, Novosibirsk: Ripel, 2005 22 Gerasimov, I. (ed.): Novaia imperskaia istoriia Severnoi Evrazii, Kazan’: “Ab Imperio”, 2017, part one, pp.  42–43; Kamensky, A.: Poddanstvo, loial’nost’, patriotism v imperskom diskurse Rossii XVIII v.: k postanovke problemy, Ab Imperio, vol. 4 (2006), pp. 78–79 23 Boduen-De-Kurtene, I. A. (ed.): Tolkovyi slovar’ zhivogo velikorusskogo iazyka Vladimira Dalia, third edition, St. Petersburg/Moscow: Tovarishchestvo M. O. Volf, 1903–1909, pp. 434–435 24 Ostrowski, D.: The Mongol Origin of Muscovite Political Institutions, Slavic Review, vol. 49, no. 4 (Winter, 1990), p.  540; Rakhimzianov, B.: Nasledie Zolotoi Ordy v formirovanii rossiiskogo gosudarstva, Cahiers du Monde russe, vol. 46, no. 1–2 (janvier–juin, 2005), p. 36 25 Ostrogorsky, G.: The Byzantine Emperor and the Hierarchical World Order, The Slavonic and East European Review, vol. 35, no. 84 (December, 1956), p. 12 26 Idem: History of the Byzantine State, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1969, p. 107 27 Boeck, B.: Imperial Boundaries. Cossack Communities and Empire-Building in the Age of Peter the Great, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 24 28 Ibid., p. 4 29 Ibid., p. 53 30 Ibid., p. 2 31 Barkey, K.: Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994, pp. 233–242 32 Ibid., Chapter 7

2 The Russian politics of ulus

The nomads’ perceptions and practices of linking authority to land were informed by the general belief that God granted land to all humans and therefore all had equal access to it. This belief found its manifestation in the nomads’ established practices of gaining access to land – by the right of first seizure and by means of military conquest. The belief seems to have had such a self-evident and steadfast character that it was not even specifically addressed by Chingiz Khan’s famous Yasa code of regulations, including the known Qazaq, Kalmyk and other nomadic laws. Not surprisingly, these perceptions and practices precluded turning land into a commodity in the minds and practices of the nomads. The Finnish traveller Gustav Ramstedt had during his visit to Mongolia in 1898–1912 the following conversation with its inhabitants: I happened to say that ground is often purchased. This awoke still greater astonishment and people asked me how you went about buying ground. When a Mongol buys something, he takes it with him, whether it is an object or an animal: “Earth cannot be bought, since you can’t take it along with you”, said the Mongols. They pressed me to find out how sale of ground really transpires.1 The fact that land, due to the very nature of the nomadic economy, represented a flexible category in the nomads’ everyday life actually enhanced, rather than diminished, the importance of gaining legal access to it. Under the strong exposure of nomadic economies to the often- unpredictable and often-hazardous climatic conditions of their habitat, securing access to pasturelands was critical not only in times of ecological and political disaster but also in peaceful and climatically favourable times, when livestock reserves tended to grow exponentially. It was against this background that receiving land from a ruler came to operate as the third way of gaining legal access to land, which in this capacity was transformed into ulus or appanage lands. Providing groups of nomadic populations with access to land operated thus as a strategy for imposing relations of dependency on them. The practice came to unfold as one of the manifestations of the principle of collective sovereignty of a ruling nomadic family, in accordance with which the family’s head had to distribute lands and populations placed under his

The Russian politics of ulus  23 rule among his relatives and nobility. According to Tursun Sultanov, each adult Chingizid prince had the right to his share (inju) in populations and lands, along with a certain number of artisans and a portion of agricultural land that were placed under Mongol rule. The transformed service-based appanage lands were called by the ancient Turkic words ulus, el and yurt (velayet), which were also used for the designation of their populations.2 The concept of ulus thus represented the practical manifestation of the nomadic concept of land as belonging to all humans in principle but distributed by their rulers in accordance with the social hierarchies they had established. Emerging at the intersection of space, power and mobility, the ulus politics revealed a distinct way of linking land to sovereignty, one that prioritized accessing land over owning it. Although all conquered lands and their populations in the Mongol Empire were considered the property of the ruling Chingizid family, it was in fact the supreme right and duty of Chingiz Khan and his successors, the Great Mongol Khans, to distribute them among family members and nobility in accordance with their ranks. In contrast to appanages granted by sedentary rulers to their vassals, the nomadic practices of assigning ulus lands were counterbalanced with the right of grantees to migrate freely and, in so doing, maintain their independent status. The Great Mongol Khans provided members of their nobility with yarlyks that served as legal documents proving their right to use lands and rule over their populations. The grantees, in turn, took over the task of distributing the land and people within their appanage territories. Generally, they enjoyed freedom in the organization of their domestic issues, including forming their own army and collecting tributes and gifts from their populations. In its essence, therefore, ulus remained a mobile unit. Not only could ulus be granted by a patron to another son, relative or vassal, but its population could also leave the territory any time in protest against their actual ruler, when they were under threat or due to environmental and climatic pressure, and when they were displaced by other, more-powerful tribes. M. M. Batmaev has noted that a Kalmyk ulus consisted of appanage lands either granted to or inherited by its ruler, which could be (but was not necessarily) associated with a certain territory.3 The Story of the Oirats from the seventeenth century reports that some Oirat leaders lost their ulus populations due to hard drinking, illnesses and murdering members of their families; taking away their populations’ livestock; and their becoming too sly, proud or envious, which, as a result, provoked discontent among their relatives and ulus populations alike.4

The Muscovite Ulus politics By virtue of their senior status and in compliance with the ulus logic, the Mongol khans viewed the Russian territories as a continuation of their own domain. In that capacity, these territories figured in medieval Russian sources as the Russian ulus, while their rulers, the Russian princes, were referred to as ulusniki (holders of ulus).5 Trepavlov has shown that the distribution of pasturelands, water resources and forests among the subjugated populations, including imposing yasak on them and mobilizing their men for an army, were considered the prerogative of

24  The Russian institution of protectorate the rulers of the Golden Horde, which they expressed in their written permissions (yarlyk). These policies effectively transformed the lands of the Muscovite princes into the ulus appanages granted to them in return for their services.6 By legitimizing, in this way, the princes’ right to use their lands and rule over those lands’ populations, the khans’ policies eventually contributed to the emergence of the princes as major landowners. In the aftermath of the fall of the Golden Horde, the khans’ policies were upheld first by the Kazan khans and, after the 1552 conquest, by the Muscovite tsars. According to Trepavlov, in certain parts of post-Mongol Eurasia, the act of land distribution became associated with “the oriental state tradition”, which stipulated that the use of land was considered legitimate “only if it was granted by a monarch”.7 Russian protectorate practices integrated the ulus strategy as one of the conditions of shert agreements negotiated between Russian and non-Russian rulers. Considering their non-Russian junior co-rulers’ lands their inheritance by patrimonial inheritance, the descendants of the Muscovite princes acted in compliance with the ulus principle. They granted these lands to their junior co-rulers in exchange for their voluntary submission and services and, in so doing, legitimized the latter’s access to their lands. The grantees, in turn, came to view the tsar as their senior patron and, hence, as a legitimate arbiter, who was in charge of settling their land issues involving the distribution of pastures and other possible land conflicts and in charge of protecting them from their rivals and enemies in return for their services. For example, before the Nogai noble Ismail’s death, he bequeathed his children to commission Ivan IV with the distribution of nomadic grazing territories (“who should occupy what ulus”) among his subject populations. Similarly, during the dissolution of the Nogai Horde in 1620s, the Nogai noble Ian-Mukhammad issued a charter, in which he tasked Tsar Mikhail “to point out” to the rival Nogai murzas Tinmametov and Ishterekov where they should graze their livestock.8 Ivan IV was known for granting land to the Bashkir rulers and rewarding their nobles with ranks and titles. These Bashkirs viewed their relationship with Russia as voluntary, and Ivan IV granted them an autonomous political regime.9 In the first half of the eighteenth century, the Russian authorities and their Bashkir counterparts cited charters issued by Ivan IV around 1555, in which the tsar had granted the Nogai lands to the Bashkir population. The charters served as legal proof of the Bashkirs’ legitimate use of their lands, which they, with the backing of Russian troops, protected against the Nogais, who had attempted to reclaim them.10 To legitimize their access to the local lands in the period preceding the rise of Muscovy, the Bashkirs had placed themselves under the khans of the Golden Horde, the Kazan and Crimean khans, the Nogai rulers, Siberian Khan Kuchum “and other Muslim rulers” respectively.11 No wonder that despite the frequent violations of negotiated agreements by the Russian and non-Russian sides, both sides nevertheless stuck to their land regulations whenever they had a stake in making them work.

The Russian politics of ulus 25 As the cases cited earlier suggest, the most serious consequence of entering a Russian protectorate relationship for non-Russian rulers was the change in the status of their lands, which, in accordance with the ulus workings, were transformed into the tsars’ patrimonial legacy. The new status entailed not only the tsars’ legal access to their junior partners’ lands but also his right to revoke lands and grant them to his other junior partners. Moreover, since the patron’s rule extended to the vassals of his vassals, in accordance with the principle “a vassal of my vassal is my vassal”, the tsars came to view the latter’s land as another extension of their domain. It was in this context that the ulus strategy provided a blueprint for the unfolding of Russia’s imperial enterprise as the “gathering of the lands of the Golden Horde”. Among other things, Russia’s ulus politics can explain the paradox of transforming non-Russian populations into subjects of the tsar and their lands into his patrimonial legacy without placing both under Russian imperial structures. For example, Trepavlov has pointed out that although by the mid seventeenth century, the tsar already had been declared “the heir, ruler and owner” of the Kabarda and Iver regions in northwestern Georgia, the integration of these regions and their populations into the empire did not begin until the two subsequent centuries.12 Informed by this vision, the status of Siberia as a colony remained uncertain until the demise of the Russian Empire itself, according to Anatoly Remnev.13 He contended that economically, before the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway (1891–1916), the region had represented “a big geographical corps”.14 The frontiers’ expansion towards the southern and eastern non-Russian regions was not immediately followed by the colonization of these territories by Russian settlers. Boeck and David Moon have shown that the large-scale agricultural settlement of the open steppe in southeastern Russia did not start until the eighteenth century.15 The immigration of Russian peasants to Siberia in large numbers started in 1678 and continued until 1897, according to Moon. During this period, the proportion of the Russian peasantry living in Siberia increased from 1.3 per cent to 7.5 per cent. However, “Well over a third [of that number] migrated between 1871 and 1896”.16 Sunderland dates the state’s involvement with a systematic colonization policy, which targeted mainly Russian peasants, by the early 1800s.17 Accordingly, the resettlement of the Qazaq Steppe regions (a considerable part of which comprised territories in Western Siberia) began mainly during this period.18

Into Siberia Russia’s protectorate relationships informed by the ulus strategy proved especially instrumental in fostering the spread of Russian rule in Siberia, where the tsar’s footing remained precarious in the period under consideration. Along with gaining access to local lands, seeking furs and searching for minerals, the protectorate relationships negotiated with local rulers in Siberia fostered establishing Russia’s commercial links with China, by employing the rulers’ subjects as guides and protectors of Russian envoys and merchants.

26  The Russian institution of protectorate In G. F. Miller’s magisterial work on Siberia, he wrote that long before Ermak’s conquest, the Muscovite tsars had claimed sovereignty over parts of the Siberian lands and their populations after placing their local rulers under the tsars’ protection and imposing yasak on them. Following the successful campaigns of Tsar Ivan Vasil’evich (d. in 1505) and his son Vasily Ivanovich, the populations of the northern parts of Siberia adjacent to the Rivers Ob’ and Konda were paying tribute to both tsars by the beginning of the sixteenth century.19 Subsequently, the tsars’ successors took an active part in the internecine wars led by the local Chingizid rulers, who strove to resurrect the legacy of the Golden Horde by centralizing power in their hands. For example, in 1480, Seid-Ibrahim Khan negotiated a military alliance with Ivan III against the khan of the Big Horde Akhmad. After Ivan IV placed the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates in the 1550s under his rule, the khan of the Siberian Khanate Edige asked the tsar to place him and his subjects under his protection as well. Among other things, Edige sought to solicit Ivan IV’s military assistance against his rival, the Siberian khan Kuchum. However, neither side stuck to the conditions of the shert agreement that they formed in 1555. The tsar refrained from rendering military assistance to the khan, and the tributes that the khan sent to the Muscovite court were insignificant and irregular. During the same year, the Siberian Taibugid rulers also placed themselves under Ivan IV against Kuchum.20 Following these events, Ivan IV included the additional title of “the ruler of all Siberian lands” in his previous title.21 The tsar soon proved the new title with his deeds, by issuing a charter two years later, in which he granted lands along the Siberian River Kama to the Russian entrepreneurs, the brothers Stroganovs. Ivan IV’s actions demonstrate that by virtue of placing the Siberian khan Edige under his “high arm”, the tsar began to view the khan’s lands as the continuation of his own domain. The 1558 charter was followed by a series of new charters, which allowed the brothers to build settlements and forts on those lands, explore the lands’ natural resources and hire the Cossacks for protection. One of the tsar’s charters granted the lands along the Siberian Rivers of Lozv, Tavda and Tobol controlled by Kuchum to the Stroganovs. The tsar’s decision was motivated by the fact that that these lands had belonged to his vassals, the Taibugids.22 Trepavlov has shown that in the 1550s, the Stroganovs initiated the construction of a defensive line along Kama to protect themselves from attacks by the local Nogai population.23 The brothers came to view the lands as their own property (votchina), and at some point, they began collecting yasak from the neighbouring non-Russian populations and sending it to Moscow.24 After defeating Edige, Kuchum expressed an analogous desire to become Ivan IV’s junior partner. The new vassal was also given a positive response, which was followed by the appearance of Russian settlements in the Ural region, which had been controlled by Kuchum. The Russian side considered Kuchum’s attacks on these settlements, including the Stroganovs’ properties, a violation of Kuchum’s vassal obligations. To protect their properties from Kuchum’s attacks, the brothers hired Ermak, the former Don Cossack.25 Ermak defeated Kuchum and captured the latter’s capital of Sibir’ (Isker). Remarkably, after Kuchum’s defeat, the state initiated the construction

The Russian politics of ulus 27 of a number of forts in the area, including Tiumen (1598), Tobol’sk (1587), Tara (1594), Verkhotur’e (1598) and Turinsk (1600).26 Citing the far-reaching consequences of Ermak’s campaigns and a small number of his soldiers, S. V. Bakhrushin described the subjugation of the Siberian Khanate by Ermak as “an unexpected surprise”.27 Yet to other Siberian nomadic rulers and the subjects of the last Siberian khan Kuchum, the event seems to have been one in the series of defeats and victories, in which they all had been involved on a more or less regular basis, especially given that after his victory, Ermak presented himself as Kuchum’s heir, who had acted on behalf of the Russian tsar, which finally convinced Kuchum’s subjects and other Siberian rulers to pay yasak to the tsar. As the Stroganovs and Ermak affairs show, the Russian monarchs quickly learned that placing non-Russian leaders under their protection provided them with the chance to gain access to the leaders’ lands. Despite their growing military superiority, the Muscovite rulers continued to refer to the legal mechanisms of the protectorate system to advance their rule in Siberia. Ivan IV’s initial reaction to the news about Ermak’s successful military campaigns against Kuchum was dissatisfaction and concern about the brutal character of the campaigns that, the tsar believed, could prevent him from establishing his power on a firm footing in Siberia. In particular, they could damage his image as a protector, which had been established under Kuchum.28 According to Peter Perdue, the Qing also used the system of land appanages to place the nomadic Mongol rulers and their populations under their rule: The Qing successfully competed for Mongol support by offering their aid in settling disputes over pasturelands, thus winning many of the Eastern Mongols to their side. Khalkhas who accepted the emperor’s suzerainty acknowledged the right to allocate pastures and levy troops and horses from them, in return, receiving honorary titles, access to marriage to the Manchu nobility, and food and economic goods.29 Russia’s drive towards Siberia has been commonly explained as a result of the insatiable thirst of the Russian state for precious furs, which formed the main source of revenue for the state’s treasury.30 Yet as Mark Bassin has found, by the mid seventeenth century, Russia had lost its leading positions in western markets, where it had effectively bargained its furs for precious metals, including gold and silver.31 Subsequently, its rulers began to view their cooperation with Siberian nobles as facilitating their access to natural resources controlled by these nobles and as establishing their commercial relations with China. With this in mind, from 1609 to 1617, the Tomsk voevoda dispatched several expeditions to the Mongol Altan khan to place him under the tsar’s protection. The expeditions’ members were also tasked with inquiring about deposits of precious metals in the territories under Altan and with finding new sources of fur supply and directions of roads leading to China.32 In 1647, Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich(1645 -1676) commissioned several servicemen to hand over his generous gifts to the Mongol noble

28  The Russian institution of protectorate Turokai in exchange for accepting the tsar’s offer of protection. The servicemen were to persuade Turokai to pay yasak to the Russian state and to provide them with information concerning the deposits of silver and gold in his lands.33 A year later, the tsar sent his envoy to the Khalkha Mongol Khan Tsetsen and tasked him with obtaining information about the deposits of silver in the territories under his control in exchange for generous gifts, which the envoy carried for the khan. Tsetsen accepted the gifts and told the envoy that he had been receiving silver from China. The khan took advantage of the envoy’s request in order to propose his own plan: Tsetsen agreed to allow the envoy to cross his territories in the direction of China and send silver to the tsar under the condition that he, along with his people, would be placed under the tsar’s protection. Other envoys of the tsar learned that the local Khalkha Mongol populations had been exchanging their animals along with fox and sable furs for Chinese silver as well.34 In 1649, the tsar dispatched his envoys to the Mongol khan Sechen, who was a tributary of the Qing, with a similar aim of bringing Sechen and his populations under the tsar’s protection.35 The Kalmyk taisha Ablai, who had been under the tsar’s protection, in turn, agreed to provide Russian merchants with his soldiers to accompany them on their way from Tobol’sk to China and back. The taisha also agreed to provide the merchants with food, horses and foraged goods.36 The expeditions to Western Siberia led by Ivan Bukhholz in 1715 and Major-General I. M. Likhachev in 1719 were also sent to investigate the local deposits of gold and other ores.37 The Mongol nomadic populations continued to play an intermediary role in boosting trading operations between Russia and China until the mid-nineteenth century.38 Some nomadic nobles succumbed to the tsars’ offer of protection and, in so doing, ultimately opened their lands to the construction of Russian ostrogs and forts and to mining, which was followed by the growth of the Russian population and administrations in their areas. Others, however, resisted and were attacked by the tsars’ servicemen and the Cossacks. Those nobles and populations who suspended delivering yasak to the Russian state also became targets of attacks by the tsars’ men. Among these groups were the Altai tribes of Teles and Ker-Sagal, who were punished in 1633 and 1643 respectively by the tsars’ servicemen sent from the Russian town of Kuznetsk.39 Similarly, despite several punitive expeditions sent to the Chukchi populations in 1648–1659, their rulers did not agree to place their populations under Russian protection and sent irregular or small amounts of yasak. However, the Iukagir, Yakut and Tungus populations followed the local Finno-Ugric, Tatar and Tuvinian populations by placing themselves under the tsar’s high arm on their own initiative.40 Hence, not all non-Russian nobles resisted the growing Russian presence in their territories. Some of these men welcomed, and in some cases even initiated, the construction of Russian forts and the rise of sedentary Russian settlements and towns. They came to view the forts as places where they could find refuge from being harassed and persecuted by their own rivals and enemies. In 1756, under the threat of a new Jungar offensive, the leaders (zaisans) of some Altai tribes moved their populations to the vicinity of the Ust’-Kamenogorsk fort with the aim of becoming subjects of the Russian tsar and soliciting his protection.41

The Russian politics of ulus 29 Other non-Russian nobles who cooperated with the Russians saw the growing Russian presence in their territories as an opportunity to improve their people’s economic conditions, which had deteriorated as a result of the disruption of their trading links with agrarian communities in the aftermath of the fall of the Golden Horde. By encouraging the establishment of Russian trading posts in their regions, these nobles hoped to gain access to agricultural and manufactured goods, including tea, paper, fabrics and gunpowder in exchange for their livestock and animal products. For example, the Oirat Mongol population bartered their horses, livestock, animal products and furs for Russian fabrics, leather and metal. The Buryats also welcomed the appearance of Russian trading posts, where they bartered their furs, livestock and animal products for silk, cotton fabrics, weapons and other metal items, grain, bread, sugar, tea, tobacco and alcohol. Their ability to obtain these items had become limited because of the loss of their access to Chinese and Central Asian markets in the late 1500s and the early 1600s.42 Other nomadic rulers placed themselves under the tsar to get employed as border guards. For example, after the Nerchinsk Treaty was negotiated in 1689, some local Mongol tribes voluntarily placed themselves under the tsar by taking a shert oath. They were employed as border guards on the Russian side and assigned lands along the local rivers of Selenga and Dzhida.43 With time, some Russian ostrogs, forts and settlements grew into flourishing trading hubs, which replaced the ancient trading posts that had operated under the Mongol khans and their successors. These trading posts came to connect Siberia not only with Mongolia and China but also with Korea and Japan.44 The growth of Russian urban and rural populations in Siberia led to an increased need for horses and animal products. Nomadic horses were highly valued for their endurance. Russian immigrants employed horses for the transportation of bread, wheat, rye, salt and other goods, as well as for sending their envoys to other towns, including Moscow. The growing Russian peasant population needed horses to work their fields, while the Cossack and other service-based urban groups required them to fulfil their state duties. The unfolding of the ulus strategy in Siberia was accompanied by the Muscovite state’s rising sense of territoriality that resonated with the rise of early modernizing states in Europe and elsewhere. Transmitted by the early Muscovite maps, the new vision came to manifest, among other things, in what Kivelson calls “nested sovereignty” that implied “constituting native peoples in spatial, political, and cultural terms as distinctive units that could pay homage to the Christian tsar”. By indicating the geographical locations inhabited by various Siberian indigenous “tsardom” (tsarstvo), “land” (zemlia) and ulus, and classifying their inhabitants as pacified and non-pacified, the vision strove to assign territorial dimensions to these communities’ locations, which entailed imposing control over the local populations’ free movements.45 This complies with Alison Smith’s recent study, in which she argues that the spread of Russian rule in Siberia was accompanied by a growing awareness on the part of Russian officials of the importance of controlling movements. This pertained not only to the migrations of its own subjects but also to control of

30  The Russian institution of protectorate trade to, from and within Siberia.46 Reinforced through policies of Peter I and Catherine II,47 the Russian state’s rising sense of territoriality ended up consolidating Kalmyk, Qazaq, Cossack and other communities into distinct political and ethnic bodies. The state proceeded with assigning specific territories to them and protecting their autonomous status throughout the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, and in so doing, it transformed them into buffers.48 K. N. Maksimov believes that the assignment of permanent territories to the Kalmyks by the Russian state in the Volga region in the mid seventeenth century fostered the rise of the Kalmyk Khanate and a Kalmyk nation, since the state consolidated not only various Mongol groups but also Nogai, Turkmen and other communities and placed all of them under the rule of Kalmyk khans.49 G. O. Avliaev has also argued that Russia’s protective policies prevented the Kalmyks from enslavement and destruction by Qing China and enabled them to develop their state-like structures.50 One can suggest that it was predominantly during this period that the Oirat kinship bodies who had immigrated in the beginning of the seventeenth century to Siberia adopted the name “Kalmyks” and came to form a political and cultural community, distinct from other Oirat groups, who had stayed behind in Jungaria and elsewhere.51 Under Russia’s protective policies, the Kalmyks were able to develop a unique Kalmyk ethnic and cultural identity that found its manifestation in the formation of a distinctive Kalmyk language (e.g. the famous epic Jangar) and the Kalmyk tradition of Buddhist literacy,52 including Kalmyk historical literature and original folk art such as crafts, paintings, decorative art and national garments.53

The protectorate ceremony Rather than a code of laws or formal regulations, the Russian protectorate system functioned as a set of institutionalized practices centred on enhancing the symbolic aspects of the tsars’ senior status. It was within this context that authorities introduced a system of gifts and rewards, which the non-Russian nobles and ordinary people alike saw as a symbol of sharing power. The top frontier officials never missed the chance to periodically distribute gifts among members of the Kalmyk and Qazaq nobility.54 They also assigned these nobles annual salaries, gave them ranks and titles, built them free houses and sent them free clothes, food and medicine, all of which symbolically reinforced their belief that the Russians were sharing power and leadership with them. Importantly, the authorities avoided highlighting the monarchs’ Orthodox Christian affiliations, which emphasized the divine origin of their status and title. Instead, they began to endorse images of the tsars as maternal or paternal figures, which were further reinforced through the use of kinship terms characteristic of steppe political culture. The fatherly image of the tsar bolstered by the paternalistic vocabulary and conveyed in his charters and related rituals strikingly contrasted with the image of him as a godlike, almost-mystical and distant conqueror, a hero and the defender of the Orthodox Church that was endorsed by the Russian court during the coronation ceremony of the Russian monarchs.55

The Russian politics of ulus  31 In contrast, the ceremony held under the protectorate umbrella incorporated the Kalmyk and Qazaq native, Buddhist and Islamic rituals, which included scenes of each non-Russian noble professing love and personal devotion to the tsar.56 Through these rituals, the tsar came to be perceived by the nomadic nobility as the first among equals in a given political situation, and this added legitimacy to his rule in the eyes of noble and ordinary nomads alike. Paradoxically, the Russian monarchs’ protective role was also reinforced through their alien ethnic and cultural backgrounds, which facilitated viewing them as impartial arbiters who could be trusted to resolve the nomads’ own conflicts. The Kalmyks’ established practices of conflict resolution, for example, involved not only their tribal courts, represented by tribal judges and sometimes by their charismatic khans, but also their wives’ uncles, whom they viewed as unbiased third parties, because they were not related to them through common paternal kin.57 Apart from adding a personal dimension to the nature of these partnerships, the use of kinship terms signalled both sides’ awareness of their actual balance of power. After raiding the Russian border territories in 1533, the Crimean Khan Safa Girei wrote to the Russian tsar Vasily III: “I was your son some time ago, but you refused my love – and [as a result] so many woes fell on your head”.58 After the conquest of Kazan in 1552, Ivan IV resisted the attempts by the Nogai nobility to call themselves his father or brother, because he did not consider his status equal to theirs. He instructed his ambassadors not to negotiate any agreements with them if they used the names of father for themselves and son for the tsar, even if they called themselves the tsar’s brothers. Catherine II figured in the samples of Turkic folklore investigated by Trepavlov as the fair, generous and powerful “grandmother-tsarina” (ana batsha).59 It is well known that during the Muscovite period, the Russian court integrated many elements of steppe political culture into its ceremonial and diplomatic etiquette. The officials designated the procedures of elevating these partners to the ranks of viceroy and khan as open public events, to which they invited not only all other nobles but also huge crowds of ordinary people and, in so doing, turned the ceremony into a guest party – the nomads’ established norm of socialization, which facilitated viewing the Russian monarchs as generous, powerful and hospitable hosts. Along with integrating many elements of the nomads’ own rituals, Russian authorities developed new practices, rituals and norms of etiquette to enhance the monarchs’ senior status. One of them required non-Russian nobles to stand up and remove their hats when a monarch’s name was mentioned. Central authorities instructed their envoys to be persistent and courageous while imposing this and other norms on the nobles, and show friendliness and gentleness towards them. Because of the gifts’ crucial role in facilitating socialization, authorities integrated them into the protectorate procedures and the collection of yasak (tribute). The symbolic aspect of the act of bringing the non-Russian rulers under the tsar’s “exalted arm” found its material justification in the generous gifts (pominki and zhalovanie), which the tsar’s envoys distributed among his would-be subjects.

32  The Russian institution of protectorate According to L. Sherstova’s data, the collection of yasak from the local populations in Siberia by Russian authorities followed the ancient nomadic pattern of exchanging gifts between a patron and his subjects. The authorities turned the collection into public feasts that were accompanied by sophisticated sacral rituals, during which they distributed costly fur coats, fabrics and other luxury goods among the non-Russian populations, which were viewed by the latter as having been given to them in exchange for their voluntary donations (alman). Often the costs of the Russian gifts exceeded the value of the voluntary donations by several times.60 The distribution of gifts was to follow certain patterns; in particular, it had to reflect the social status of the grantees. The officials’ display of generosity operated within the confines of the steppe politics of gifts that required the reaffirmation of a patron’s superior powerful status and his protective role with respect to his junior partners on a regular basis. Khodarkovsky estimated the value of tribute and taxes received by the Crimeans in the first half of the seventeenth century alone as having reached one million rubles.61 The argument about “structural incompatibilities between Russian and indigenous societies” advanced by Khodarkovsky and other historians stemmed, in their opinion, from the lack of comprehensive communication between the two sides, leading to “a series of misnorms, misunderstandings, and deliberate misrepresentations” caused mainly by the shortage of qualified interpreters.62 Yet Irina Erofeeva has investigated that the quality of letters translated from Qazaq into Russian greatly improved after the state established a translation school in 1740 and attached it to the Orenburg Frontier Commission. An analogous school was opened in Omsk in 1798. Although few letters’ contents had been deliberately manipulated by translators, the Russian translations of the majority of the letters sent by the Qazaq nobility in the period from the eighteenth century to the first half of the nineteenth century correctly reproduced their contents.63 In addition, this perspective largely underestimated the role of oral communication, on which, as we shall see, both sides embarked to convey their most important messages to each other, since both seem to have developed a certain apprehension towards written documents. Among other things, this was due to unsafe roads, where their envoys were often captured, robbed or even killed and their letters eventually confiscated. They therefore preferred either to send their most confidential information through their envoys in oral form or to meet with their peers in person. Strikingly, they seem to have had no problems making sense of their oral messages’ true contents. Personal trips undertaken by subjugated rulers to the Mongol court were one of the signs of their subordinated status vs that of their Mongol patrons. These trips had even greater significance if the rulers sought the khans’ approval of their titles. They had to travel a long way to the Mongol capital Karakorum to express their loyalty to the Great Khan in person. Their frequency of travel to the Mongol court demonstrated their degree of loyalty to the Mongol khans and guaranteed the bestowal of the khans’ support. According to Paul Silfen, the Muscovite ruler Ivan Kalita travelled nine times and his son Semeon five times to the Mongol

The Russian politics of ulus  33 court. Each time, they brought along sumptuous gifts.64 As we shall see, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, the Qazaq rulers and their Russian patrons embarked on enacting the practice in the modified form of dispatching delegations of Qazaq nobles to the imperial court in St Petersburg at the state’s generous expense. The practice complied with the Mongol-Tatar diplomatic culture, in accordance with which the Russian state covered all expenses spent on their trips, including their accommodation in the capital.65 Elements of this culture were also incorporated into reception procedures held by the court’s officials for nomadic delegations visiting the capital.66 Generally, the authorities largely entrusted their onsite representatives to establish diplomatic relations with local rulers and make ad hoc decisions on the basis of their familiarity with local customs and mores. These men, in turn, hired local Cossack, Tatar and Bashkir men as their translators and envoys to promote the tsar’s agenda in Siberia and elsewhere. The Tatars and the Bashkirs shared common Turkic origin and Islamic affiliations with the majority of the indigenous populations in Siberia and the Qazaq Steppe. Russian officials in Siberia (voevodas) frequently clashed with each other over the right to supervise the shert procedures and sometimes initiated the procedures on their own. They also treated non-Russian envoys whose masters had violated the agreements badly.67 The ways both sides handled their envoys (with food, transportation, gifts, etc.) pointed to the relationships’ actual condition: in conflict situations, both sides’ envoys could be beaten or denied reception and held captive for several months and even years. Before proceeding with a closer examination of Russia’s relationships with the Kalmyk and Qazaq ruling elites, I address some distinct features that set the operation of power relations in their communities apart. As we shall see, these very features had a profound impact on shaping Russia’s Kalmyk and Qazaq elite politics.

Peculiarities of Kalmyk and Qazaq power relations The famous eighteenth-century German traveller P. S. Pallas observed that when compared with the ordinary Kalmyks, “who had so many small rulers above them, every Kirgiz [Qazaq] lives as if he were a free master”. He therefore came to believe that the Qazaqs represented a lesser threat to Russia than did its other enemies.68 Another contemporary traveller, I. G. Georgi, also pointed to the unrestricted freedom that both the noble and ordinary Qazaqs had enjoyed.69 Given these accounts, one can propose that the distinctive features just mentioned were due to a number of legislative initiatives introduced by the higher echelons of the Mongol nobility in the first half of the seventeenth century. Stipulating, among other things, a stronger attachment of ordinary Mongols to their nobles, these initiatives were linked to the spread of Tibetan Buddhism among the eastern (Khalkha) and western (Oirat) Mongol populations that began around this time. The fall of the Mongol Yuan dynasty in China in the mid fourteenth century reignited rivalries between the eastern Khalkha Mongol elites and their adversaries,

34  The Russian institution of protectorate the western Oirat Mongol leaders, who, among other things, resented the dynastic Chingizid principle. Hostilities emerging between the two leadership camps allowed the Manchus, the new rising power in Inner Asia, to place the southern Mongol populations under their rule in the 1630s. Members of the western and eastern Mongol nobility found themselves under pressure to unite their forces against the growing Manchu threat. Tibetan Buddhism, which by that time had been embraced mostly by the top Mongol elites, came to be used by those elites as an effective tool facilitating the centralization of power over their noble and ordinary subjects alike. This view strongly resonated with the stance of Tibetan spiritual authorities, who saw spiritual and secular powers as inseparable and therefore promoted centralizing power under the Mongol leadership as facilitating the spread of Buddhism among their populations. It was in light of this mutual interest in cooperation that both sides began to reward each other with spiritual and secular ranks. The practice unfolded within the priest–patron institutional framework that had regulated interactions of the Tibetan spiritual establishment with their Chinese and Mongol counterparts. Pamela Crossley has shown that the Qing had also invested in strengthening the Mongols’ spiritual affiliations with Tibetan Buddhism: “the institution of Dalai Lama provided a focal point, at which the Qing could control the political climate of both Mongolia and Tibet”.70 The V Dalai Lama Sodnom Jamco (1617–1682) took an active part in drafting a code of Mongol customary laws at a meeting, with the participation of the Khalkha Mongol khan Altyn, in 1577. The laws envisaged settling conflicts between the western and eastern Mongols by spreading Buddhism among them and addressing the issue of the khans’ runaways.71 The runaways issue was also articulated by the authors of the so-called Eighteenth Steppe Laws adopted by the eastern Mongol nobility in the period 1603–1639. Some laws spelled out measures preventing individuals and communities from leaving their masters and imposed various degrees of punishments on them.72 The Code of Laws adopted at the congress of the western and eastern Mongol nobility held in 1640 presents the most telling example of the nobility’s growing concern about their runaways. Under the growing Manchu treat, the authors of the code attempted to unify both groups of the nobility, by linking the moral norms of Buddhism to the requirements for political consolidation. Initiated by the V Dalai Lama, the important Oirat religious leader Zaia Pandita and the Jungar leader Erdeni Batur Khuntaiji, the congress gathered the most influential members of the nobility, including the Kalmyk Torghut leader Kho-Urliuk and his elder son, Daichin. The Torghut leaders were believed to have brought a copy of the congress’ decisions to their lands in the Volga region.73 Among other things, the 1640 Code of Laws stipulated that runaway communities were to be returned to their previous masters. If their new masters refused to return them, they had to be brought to a tribal court, while the runaways adopted by their new masters were to be taken from them by force. Their new masters were to be fined 20 horses and two camels for each runaway individual.74 Those who detained the runaways should be rewarded with livestock, while their

The Russian politics of ulus  35 masters should be fined with the payment of nine kinds of livestock. Individuals who brought the runaways back were to be rewarded with a horse and a sheep.75 Those nobles who left the battlefield were to pay a fine of 100 pieces of armour, 100 camels and 1,000 horses, in addition to 50 tents of their people, who were to be taken from them.76 The nobles were also to be punished for organizing independent military campaigns, robbing other nomads’ households or taking away their property. Severe fines were also imposed for insulting the higher secular and spiritual nobility or damaging their property, in the form of the payment of 100 pieces of armour, 100 camels and 100 horses.77 The code also imposed various fines, starting with the fine of 81 heads of livestock on various groups of lesser nobles, who were charged with collecting livestock from ordinary nomads if they failed to deliver the collected livestock to their masters.78 E. V. Dordzhieva has found that following the 1640 Code of Laws, members of the Kalmyk nobility distributed their subject populations among their descendants “for feeding”.79 Since the well-being of the Kalmyk nobility became directly dependent on the size of their ulus populations, the nobles, especially close relatives, often found themselves involved in disputes over these populations, which oftentimes ended in direct military confrontations.80 According to Georgi, the Kalmyk khans imposed an annual tax of one-tenth of livestock holdings on their subjects, in addition to food supplies and taxes collected for the clergy. The taxes could be increased during times of war and on other occasions, including to fund noble weddings. Georgi remarks that despite being heavily burdened by these taxes, the ordinary Kalmyks, who were generally treated harshly by their nobles, strove to fulfil their obligations.81 By stipulating the concentration of power in the hands of the secular and spiritual Mongol nobles, the provisions of the 1640 Code of Laws further contributed to corrupting the Mongol customary power structures. The ongoing rivalry among the Kalmyk and other Mongol elites for keeping their ulus populations and increasing their numbers by adding their rivals’ uluses and foreign populations show that the top nobility’s status and economic well-being became closely linked to their ability to wield control over the lesser nobility and ordinary nomads. Dordzhieva’s account shows that although the populations could leave their masters (noyons) for a number of reasons, the masters had unlimited power over their ulus populations: they could not only increase taxes but also sell, release and grant their subjects as gifts. In addition, the status of noyons and zaisangs (the nobles of lesser status than noyons, who ruled over smaller units of ulus populations) was hereditary. The noyons distributed parts of the ulus populations (aimaks) among zaisangs, whom they could appoint and dismiss.82 Zaisangs collected taxes from every 40 tents, while shulenga (lesser nobles) collected taxes from every 20 tents.83 Noble Kalmyk women could also inherit their fathers’ ulus populations if they did not have brothers. In some cases, they could also inherit their deceased husbands’ ulus populations. However, noble widows without children lost their right to claim and rule over populations who formed an ulus.84 Moreover, the Kalmyk nobles practised giving substantial numbers of ulus populations as dowry to their

36  The Russian institution of protectorate betrothed daughters. In fact, this state of affairs greatly facilitated Russian authorities’ interference with Kalmyk disputes by distributing and redistributing their populations among rival parties, oftentimes at the latter’s requests, as well as interfering with their marriages.85 In the wake of the implementation of the new regulations, the Mongol Buddhist clergy emerged as a wealthy and powerful landowner class. They employed ordinary nomads as serfs (shabiners), whom they received as gifts, along with rich donations in livestock, from the wealthy nobles, to work their lands and function as servants in their households.86 Accordingly, the spread of Lamaism among the Kalmyks was accompanied by the formation of the highly stratified Kalmyk religious class represented by the wealthy religious elites (lamas, gelungs and others), on the one hand, and their serfs, on the other. Most of the influential Oirat Buddhist men, including Zaia Pandita, took over the role of peacemakers, who settled conflicts involving various Mongol groups.87 Kalmyk religious elites were often integrated into diplomatic missions to lead negotiations with Russian and other foreign rulers.88 Apart from controlling the nobles’ runaways, the spread of Lamaism among the Mongols had an additional impact on curtailing their free movements. The effect was largely due to the emergence of networks of Buddhist monasteries that came to occupy large territories, where their establishments employed a free labour force of shabiners.89 On the basis of archival research, A. A. Kurapov was able to identify at least 12 monasteries constructed in the Kalmyk territories in the seventeenth century, some of which began to operate as mobile monasteries (khurul) before being transformed into stationary monasteries.90 In contrast, neither the famous Code of Qazaq tribal laws Jeti Jargy of Khan Tauke (seventeenth century) and other known Qazaq laws nor the spread of Islam among the Qazaqs had a significant impact on restricting their free movements, which ultimately implied that the Qazaq power and leadership structures largely retained their habitual operation patterns during the period under consideration. As the available historical evidence suggests, the Qazaq nobles usually employed their impoverished relatives and war captives (qul), while the shrewdest rulers, in addition, relied on their private bodyguards (telenguts), who came

Figure 2.1  A Kalmyk mobile Buddhist temple, khurul

The Russian politics of ulus  37 to comprise their private armies. The telenguts mostly represented the khans’ Bashkir, Kalmyk, Karakalpak, Persian, Russian and other captives, who had voluntarily submitted to them in exchange for their protection. The telenguts could also include the khans’ impoverished relatives and communities (auyls), along with other marginalized groups and individuals. The Qazaq telengut institution traced its origin to the ancient Mongol institution of nökör or nököd, whom Chingiz Khan had employed as his personal bodyguards. In essence, the telenguts were free men who, along with their families, formed distinct aulys that accompanied the khans during their seasonal migrations and, along with military duties, provided their masters with other services, ranging from operating as their messengers and envoys to doing various household tasks. Since the telenguts’ numbers and loyalty were instrumental for reinforcing the khans’ independent status and attracting tribal leaders, the khans catered to their telenguts by undertaking frequent raids and campaigns and distributing generous gifts among them.91 The Qazaq noble families did not practise giving populations as dowry to their betrothed daughters, whose dowries usually featured large numbers of livestock, along with a tent, clothes and household items. Yet to maintain their numerous herds, wealthy Qazaq families were compelled to cooperate with their less-fortunate tribespeople, especially during recurring ecological disasters, including jüt,92 as a result of which they could often lose up to 70 to 80 per cent of their livestock literally overnight. Despite these frequent ecological disasters, many wealthy Qazaq families, especially those of aristocratic Chingizid origin, were able to quickly recuperate their livestock by investing in practising various forms of mutual assistance. Hence, rather than exposing the well-being of the Qazaq nobility to incomes stemming from their ordinary compatriots, both groups became engaged in various forms of mutually beneficial cooperation.93 Apart from dividing the rulers into two groups, the Chingizid and tribal ruling camps, Qazaq leadership practices eschewed establishing clear-cut hierarchies within each camp like those that governed the workings of the Kalmyk leadership structures. Instead, the interactions between the members of the two ruling camps, as well as within each camp, had a flexible and non-binding nature. In other words, unlike their Kalmyk counterparts, the Qazaq Chingizids were not in a position to interfere with the tribal leadership politics on all levels of the Qazaq social organization. More specifically, they could not impose punishments on perpetrators without soliciting agreements from their tribal leaders.94 The Qazaq khans could appoint their sons as heads of tribal units, but only upon those units’ request or after soliciting their elders’ approval. By strongly exposing both camps to their constituencies’ choices, these dynamics put pressure on the leaders themselves to comply with their constituencies’ expectations. Hence, despite the hierarchies established within each ruling camp, the true power was in the hands of the camps’ most charismatic men. The requirement of securing one’s followers’ recognition equally pertained to members of the higher echelon of the Qazaq ruling class represented by khans and sultans, who derived their authority from their Chingizid origins. As soon as they failed to do so, their followers could easily replace them or abandon them

38  The Russian institution of protectorate altogether. Vasily Radlov observed that the Qazaqs obeyed their khans only if they benefited from the khans’ protection and their campaigns provided them with access to pastures and bounty.95 Yet Qazaq tribal laws preserved the privileges and rights of the Chingizids, by stating that “khanga qarsylyq – qudaiga qarsylyq” [resistance to a khan equals resistance to God].96 The laws also exempted the Chingizids from corporal punishment and from the oversight of their legal issues by tribal judges. In addition, the laws introduced certain rules of etiquette to be observed by others in the presence of a khan or a sultan, including seating them on a thin white felt, greeting them by kneeing on one leg and so on.97 The fluidity of the Qazaq leadership system precluded the proper formalization of the Qazaq tribal nobility as a class, whose members shared common interests in relation to their rulers and subjects alike. Rather, each nobleman tended to consider himself an autonomous ruler, who could abandon his patron any time if he stopped viewing their relationship as beneficial. The fluidity of the Qazaq leadership structures found its expression, among other things, in the fluidity of titles of the Qazaq nobility. Although the Chingizid aristocratic class of rulers (aq süyek, white bone) retained their hereditary status, the titles of the Qazaq tribal nobility (qara süyek, black bone), including bi (customary judge), batyr (hero), bai (the rich) and aqsaqal (an elder, a leader of small political units) never acquired a stable hereditary status. A son of a bi was the likeliest to follow in his father’s footsteps because he had learned from his father, but to be able to do so, the son had to secure his tribespeople’s recognition. Similarly, the Qazaqs called batyr anyone who distinguished himself as a fearless and brave soldier and used the name of aqsaqal to refer not only to elderly men and leaders of their communities but also those who gained their tribespeople’s respect through their wisdom and acts of justice. Georgi also observed that the Qazaqs did not have great respect for their rich, since anyone could become wealthy.98 These dynamics of Qazaq power relations prevented Russian imperial authorities from employing the Qazaqs as soldiers, distributing groups of their populations among their nobles or interfering with their marriages. It was in this context that Qazaq Khan Abulkhair admitted in a 1738 conversation with the Orenburg Governor V. N. Tatishchev that although he had wished to serve the Russian monarchs like the Kalmyk khan Donduk Ombo and receive their rewards, he would have been unable to impose his will on his subjects as Ombo could.99 Under these circumstances, as we shall see, the authorities capitalized on implementing policies and practices that opted to better attract the rulers’ nobles and the latter’s ordinary subjects to the rulers.

Notes 1 Krueger, J. (ed. and transl.): Ramstedt, G.: Seven Journeys Eastward, 1898–1912. Among the Cheremis, Kalmyks, Mongols and in Turkestan and to Afghanistan with 52 Photographs by the Author, Bloomington, Indiana: The Mongolia Society, 1978, p. 85 2 Kliashtornyi, S. G. and Sultanov, T. I.: Gosudarstva i narody Evraziiskikh stepei. Drevnost’ i srednevekov’e, 2nd edition, St. Petersburg: Peterburgskoe Vostokovedenie, 2004, p. 211

The Russian politics of ulus  39 3 Batmaev, M. M.: Sotsial’no-politicheskii stroi i khoziaistvo kalmykov v XVII – XVIII vv. Monografiia, Elista: Kalmytskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 2002, p. 122 4 Sharab, G.: Skazanie ob oiratakh. Kalmytskaia letopis’, Badmaev, A. (ed.), Lytkin, Iu. (transl.): Kalmytskie istoriko-literaturnye pamiatniki v russkom perevode, Elista: Kalmytskii NIIIaLI, 1969, pp. 150–151 5 Trepavlov, V. V.: “Belyi Tsar”, p. 91; Rakhimzianov, B.: Kasimovskoe khanstvo, 1442– 1552. Ocherki istorii, Kazan’: Kazanskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 2009, p. 53; Halperin, Ch. J.: Russia and the “Mongol Yoke”: Concepts of Conquest, Liberation, and the Chingizid Idea, Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi, vol. II (1982), p. 103; Gerasimov, I.: (ed.): Novaia imperskaia istoriia Severnoi Evrazii, part one, pp. 198–199 6 Gerasimov, I.: (ed.): Novaia imperskaia istoriia Severnoi Evrazii, part one, pp. 213–215 7 Trepavlov, V. V.: “Belyi Tsar”, p. 145 8 Ibid., p. 87 9 Ibid., pp. 145–147, 149–150 10 Trepavlov, V. V.: Tiurkskie narody Povolzh’ia i Priural’ia, Kappeler, A. (ed.): Die Geschichte Russlands im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert aus der Perspektive seiner Regionen, pp. 288–291; Zhalovannnye gramoty tsaria bashkiram, Ufa: Kitap, 2007 11 Trepavlov V. V.: “Belyi Tsar”, p. 145 12 Idem: Formirovanie sistemy otnoshenii mezhdu tsentrom i natsional’nymi okrainami v Rossii (XVI-XX veka), Sakharov, A. A., Mikhailov, V. A. and Kolodnikova, L. P. (eds.): Rossiia v XX veke. Problemy natsional’nykh otnoshenii, Moscow: “Nauka”, 1999, pp. 116–117 13 Remnev, A.: Rossiia i Sibir’ v meniaiushchemsia prostranstve imperii XIX – nachalo XX, veka, Miller, A. (ed.): Rossiiskaia imperiia v sravnitel’noi perspektive, Moscow: Novoe izdatel’stvo, 2004, pp. 286–319; Idem: Koloniia ili okraina? Sibir’ v imperskom diskurse XIX veka, Karpachev, M. D. et al. (eds.): Rossiiskaia imperiia: strategii stabilizatsii i opyty obnovleniia, Voronezh: Izd’vo VGU, 2004, pp. 112–147 14 Idem: Rossiiskaia vlast’ v Sibiri i na Dal’nem Vostoke: kolonializm bez ministerstva kolonii – russkii Sonderweg? Aust, M., Vilpius, R. and Miller, A. (eds.): Imperium Inter Pares. Rol’ transferov v istorii Rossiiskoi imperii (1700–1917), Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2010, p. 155 15 Boeck, B.: Containment vs. Colonization: Moscovite Approaches to Settling the Steppe; Moon, D.: Agriculture and the Environment on the Steppe in the Nineteenth Century, Breyfogle, N., Schrader, A. and Sunderland, W. (eds.): Peopling the Russian Periphery: Borderland Colonization in Eurasian History, London/New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 41–60, 83 16 Moon, D.: Peasant Migration and the Settlement of Russia’s Frontiers, 1550–1897, The Historical Journal, vol. 40, no. 4 (December, 1997), pp. 867–868 17 Sunderland, W.: Peasants on the Move: State Peasant Resettlement in Imperial Russia, 1805–1830s, Russian Review, vol. 52, no. 4 (October, 1993), p. 473 18 Bekmakhanova, N. E.: Mnogonatsional’noe naselenie Kazakhstana i Kirgizii v epokhu kapitalizma (60-e gody XIX v.-1917 g.), Moscow: Nauka, 1986 19 Vainstein, S. I. and Bat’ianova, E. P. (eds.): Miller, G. F.: Istoriia Sibiri, Moscow: “Vostochnaia literatura” RAN, 1999, vol. 1, pp. 200–207 20 Iarkov, A. P.: Kuchum i Ermak: dva stsenariia sibirskogo frontira i ikh otrazhenie v sud’bakh musul’man, Tiurkologicheskie issledovaniia, vol. 2, no. 1 (2019), p. 80 21 Nesterov, A. G.: Formirovanie gosudarstvennosti u tiurkskikh narodov Urala i Zapadnoi Sibiri v XIV-XVI vv., Nasilov, D. M. (ed.): Desht-i-Kipchak i Zolotaia Orda v stanovlenii kul’tury evraziiskikh narodov. Materialy mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoprakticheskoi konferentsii, 10–12 aprelia, Moscow: ISAA pri MGU, 2003, pp.  114, 118–119 22 Iarkov, A. P.: Kuchum i Ermak: dva stsenariia sibirskogo frontira i ikh otrazhenie v sud’bakh musul’man, p. 80

40  The Russian institution of protectorate 23 Trepavlov, V. V.: Sibir’, Trepavlov, V. V. (ed.): Russkie v Evrazii XVII-XIX vv. Migratsii i sotsiokul’turnaia adaptatsiia v inoetnicheskoi srede, Moscow: Institut Rossiiskoi Istorii RAN, 2008, p. 56 24 Bakhrushin, S. V.: Ocherki po istorii kolonizatsii Sibiri v XVI i XVII vv., Moscow: Izdatel’stvo M. i S. Sabashnikovykh, 1927, p. 100 25 Bergholz, F. W.: The Partition of the Steppe: The Struggle of the Russians, Manchus and the Zunghar Mongols for Empire in Central Asia, 1619–1758. A Study in Power Politics, 1993, pp. 20–26; see also: Bakhrushin, S. V.: Ocherki po istorii kolonizatsii Sibiri New York: Peter Lang, v XVI i XVII vv., p. 152 26 Collins, D.: Russia’s Conquest of Siberia: Evolving Russian and Soviet Historical Interpretations, European Studies Review, vol. 17, no. 1 (1982), p. 33 27 Bakhrushin, S. V.: Ocherki po istorii kolonizatsii Sibiri v XVI i XVII vv., p. 153 28 Vainstein, S. I. and Bat’ianova, E. P. (eds.): Miller, G. F.: Istoriia Sibiri, vol. 1, p. 233 29 Perdue, P.: Military Mobilization in China, Russia, and Mongolia, Sneath, D. and Kaplonski, Ch. (eds.): The History of Mongolia, vol. III, Folkestone: Global Oriental, 2010, pp. 658–659 30 Witzenrath, C.: Cossacks and the Russian Empire, 1598–1725: Manipulation, Rebellion, and Expansion into Siberia, London/New York: Routledge, 2007, p. 5 31 Bassin, M.: Expansion and Colonialism on the Eastern Frontier: Views of Siberia and the Far East in Pre-Petrine Russia, Journal of Historical Geography, vol. 14, no. 1 (1988), p. 8 32 Bergholz, F. W.: The Partition of the Steppe, p. 98 33 Zlatkin, I. Ia. and Ustiugov, N. V. (eds.): Russko-mongol’skie otnosheniia 1636–1654. Sbornik dokumentov, Moscow: Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1974, pp. 315–322 34 Ibid., pp. 330, 340–341 35 Bergholz, F. W.: The Partition of the Steppe, p. 109 36 Ibid., pp. 397–399 37 Forsyth, J.: A History of Siberia: Russia’s North Asian Colony, 1581–1990, Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 59 38 Stern, D.: Myth and Facts About the Kiakhta Trade Pidgin, Stolberg, E-M. (ed.): Siberian Saga: A History of Russia’s Wild East, Frankfurt am Main/New York: P. Lang, 2005, pp. 63, 71–72 39 Samaev, G. P.: Prisoedinenie Altaia k Rossii (istoricheskii obzor i dokumenty), GornoAltaisk: “Ak Chechek”, 1996, pp. 20–21 40 Zuev, A. S.: Russkie i aborigeny na Krainem severo-vostoke Sibiri vo vtoroi polovine XVII-pervoi chetverti XVIII v., pp. 71–82 41 Samaev, G. P.: Prisoedinenie Altaia k Rossii, p. 41 42 Bergholz, F. W.: The Partition of the Steppe, pp. 59, 101 43 Shagdurova, I. N.: Inkorporatsiia mongol’skikh narodov v sostav buriatskogo naroda, Vostok. Afro-aziatskie obshchestva: istoriia i sovremennost’, vol. 2 (2012), p. 38 44 Stolberg, E-M.: Interracial Outposts in Siberia: Nerchinsk, Kiakhta, and the RussoChinese Trade in the Seventeenth/Eighteenth Centuries, Journal of Early Modern History, vol. 4, no. 3–4 (2000), pp. 322–336 45 Kivelson, V.: Cartography of Tsardom, pp. 188, 190–191, 203 46 Smith, A. K.: Movement and the Transformation of Siberia in the Eighteenth Century, Sibirica, vol. 16, no. 2 (Summer, 2017), pp. 44–67 47 Sunderland, W.: Imperial Space: Territorial Thought and Practice in the Eighteenth Century, Burbank, J., von Hagen, M. and Remnev, A. (eds.): Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930, Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007, pp. 33–66 48 O’Rourke, S.: From Region to Nation: The Don Cossacks 1870–1920, Burbank, J., von Hagen, M. and Remnev, A. (eds.): Russian Empire, p. 221; Kohut, Z.: The Ukrainian Elite in the Eighteenth Century and Its Integration into the Russian Nobility, Banac, I.

The Russian politics of ulus 41 and Bushkovitch, P. (eds.): The Nobility in Russia and Eastern Europe, New Haven/ Columbus, OH: Yale Curriculum on International and Area Studies, 1983, pp. 63–65; Kappeler, A.: The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History, Harlow, England/New York: Longman, 2001, pp. 63–64; Barrett, Th.: At the Edge of Empire: The Terek Cossacks and the North Caucasus Frontier, 1700–1860, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999, Chapter Three; Katanaev, G. E.: Kirgizskii vopros v Sibirskom kazach’em voiske, Omsk, 1904, p. 10 49 Maksimov, K. N.: Kalmykia in Russia’s Past and Present. National Policies and Administrative System, Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008, pp. 61–63 50 Avliaev, G. O.: Proiskhozhdenie kalmytskogo naroda, Elista: Kalmytskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 2002, p. 6 51 The Qazaq Historian Mukanov believes that the name qalmaq/Kalmyk stemmed from the Turkic root qal, meaning “leave”, “getting separated”, which began to be used for the designation of the new political Mongol body. Mukanov, M. S.: Iz istoricheskogo proshlogo. Rodoslovnaia plemen kerei i uak, Almaty: “Qazaqstan”, 1998, pp. 48–49 52 The rise of the Kalmyk Buddhist written tradition is usually linked to Zaia Pandita, the Oirat Buddhist monk, who studied in Tibet from 1617 to 1639. He is known as the author of the Oirat script todo bichig, which he used to translate major Buddhist texts into Mongol language. He paid several visits to the Volga Kalmyks. Zlatkin, I. Ia.: Istoriia Dzhungarskogo khanstva, Moscow: Nauka, 1983, pp. 156–157, 178, 393–394 53 Avliaev, G. O.: Proiskhozhdenie kalmytskogo naroda, p. 248; Kichikov, M.: Istoricheskie korni druzhby russkogo i kalmytskogo narodov, p. 134 54 KRO-1, p. 251 55 Wortman, R.: Rule by Sentiment: Alexander II’s Journey Through the Russian Empire, The American Historical Review, vol. 95, no. 3 (June, 1990). 56 Kappeler, A.: The Russian Empire, pp. 135–138 57 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, in five parts, Astrakhan’: Kalmytskii Oblastnoi Ispolnitel’nyi Komitet, 1926–1932, parts 3–4, p. 142 58 Rakhimzianov, B.: Kasimovskoe khanstvo (1445–1552 gg.), p. 153 59 Trepavlov, V. V.: Istoriia Nogaiskoi Ordy, M.: “Vostochnaia literatura” RAN, 2001, pp. 181, 192–193, 629–631; Idem: “Belyi Tsar”, p. 59 60 Sherstova, L.: Tiurki i russkie v Iuzhnoi Sibiri: etnopoliticheskie protsessy i etnokul’turnaia dinamika XVII – nachala XX veka, Novosibirsk: Institut Arkheologii i Etnografii SO RAN, 2005, pp.  72–73; Croskey, R. M.: The Diplomatic Forms of Ivan III’s Relationship with the Crimean Khan, Slavic Review, vol. 43, no. 2 (Summer, 1984), p. 265 61 Khodarkovsky, M.: Russia’s Steppe Frontier, p. 223 62 Ibid., pp. 74–75 63 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov. Sbornik istoricheskikh dokumentov v dvykh tomakh, Almaty: Abdi Company, 2014, vol. !: Pis’ma kazakhskikh pravitelei.1675–1780 gg, pp. 55–57, 65–67 64 Silfen, P. H.: The Influence of the Mongols on Russia: A Dimensional History, Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1974, p. 53 65 Kushnerik, R. A.: Diplomaticheskoe iskusstvo Rossii i dzhungarskoe khanstvo (XVIIXVIII vv.), Komandzhaev, A. N. et al. (eds.): Kalmyki v mnogonatsional’noi Rossii. Opyt chetyrekh stoletii, Elista: “Dzhangar”, 2008, p. 348 66 See: Iuzefovich, L.: Kak v posol’skikh obychaiakh vedetsia, Moscow: “Mehdunarodnye otnosheniia”, 1988 67 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii. XVII-XVIII vv. Dokumenty i materialy, book one, Moscow: Nauka. Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1989, pp. 170, 338, 330 68 Asfendiiarov, S. D. and Kunte, P. A. (eds.): Proshloe Kazakhstana v istochnikakh i materialakh, book I (V v.do n.e. – XVIII v.n.e.), Almaty: “Kazakhstan”, 1997, p. 229

42  The Russian institution of protectorate 69 Dmitriev, V. A. (ed.): Georgi I. G.: Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh v Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov, ikh zhiteiskikh obriadov, obyknovenii, odezhd, zhilishch, uprazhnenii, zabav, veroispovedanii i drugikh dostopamiatnostei, St. Petersburg: “Russkaia simfoniia”, 2005, pp. 238–239 70 Crossley, P.: A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, p.  325; see also: Elverskog, J.: Our Great Khan: The Mongols, Buddhism and the State in Late Imperial China, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006; Moses, L.: The Political Role of Mongol Buddhism, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977 71 Tserempilov, V. B. and Tserempilov, D. V.: Iuridicheskie pamiatniki Mongolii, Chimitordzhiev, Sh. B. et al. (eds.): Mongolovednye issledovaniia. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov, vyp. 3, Ulan-Ude: BNTS SO RAH, 2000, p. 55 72 Nasilov, A. D. (transl.): Vosemnadtsat’ stepnykh zakonov. Pamiatnik mongol’skogo prava XVI-XVII vv., St. Petersburg: Peterburgskoe vostokovedienie, 2002, p. 80 73 Komandzhaev, E. A.: Evoliutsiia zakonodatel’stva u kalmykov v XVII-XIX vv., Elista: Izdatel’stvo Kalmytskogo Universiteta, 2002, pp. 14–16 74 Golstunsky, K. F.: Mongolo-oiratskie zakony 1640 goda, dopolnitel’nye ukazy Galdan-Khun-Taidzhiia i zakony sostavlennye dlia volzhskikh kalmykov pri kalmytskom khane Donduk-Dashi, St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1880, p. 36 75 Ibid., p. 59 76 Ibid., p. 37 77 Ibid., pp. 36–39; see also: Dalykov, S. D. (ed.): Ikh Tsaaz (“Velikoe ulozhenie”). Pamiatnik mongol’skogo feodal’nogo prava XVII v., Moscow: “Nauka” Glavanaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1981, pp. 14, 17; Sergeev, V. S. and Sergeev, B. V.: Ugolovnoe i grazhdanskoe pravo kalmykov XVII-XIX vekov (istoriko-pravovye ocherki), Elista: “Dzhangar”, 1998, pp. 25–32 78 Dalykov, S. D. (ed.): Ikh Tsaaz (“Velikoe ulozhenie”), p. 17 79 Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII-nachale XX veka, Moscow: Prometei, 2007, p. 104 80 Lytkin, Iu.: Materialy dlia oiratov, Badmaev, A. V. (ed.): Kalmytskie istorikoliteraturnye pamiatniki v russkom perevode, p. 84 81 Dmitriev, V. A. (ed.): Georgi I. G.: Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh v Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov, ikh zhiteiskikh obriadov, obyknovenii, odezhd, zhilishch, uprazhnenii, zabav, veroispovedanii i drugikh dostopamiatnostei, p. 399 82 Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII-nachale XX veka, p. 153; Batmaev, M. M.: Sotsial’no-politicheskii stroi i khoziaistvo kalmykov v XVII – XVIII vv., pp. 169–181 83 Komandzhaev, E. A.: Evoliutsiia zakonodatel’stva u kalmykov v XVII-XIX vv., pp. 88–89 84 Ibid., p. 120 85 Ibid., pp. 188, 285–288 86 Dordzhieva, G. Sh.: Buddhism i khristianstvo v Kalmykii. Opyt analiza religioznoi politiki pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi imperii (seredina XVII – nachalo XX vv.), Elista: Dzhangar, 1995, pp. 29–31 87 Badmaev, A.: Rol’ Zaia Pandity v istorii dukhovnoi kul’tury kalmytskogo naroda, Elista, 1968, p. 13 88 Kurapov, A. A.: Buddizm i vlast’ v kalmytskom khanstve XVII-XVIII vv., Astrakhan’/ Elista: “Dzhangar”, 2007, pp. 78–215 89 Lattimore, O.: Inner Asian Frontiers: Chinese and Russian Margins of Expansion, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 7, no. 1 (May, 1947), p. 39 90 Kurapov, A. A.: Buddizm i vlast’ v Kalmytskom khanstve XVII-XVIII vv., pp. 75–77 91 Bekmakhanov, E.: O zavisimykh feodal’nykh kategoriiakh – rabakh i tuilengutakh (pervaia polovina XIX veka), Aryn, E. M. et  al. (eds.): E. Bekmakhanov: Collected

The Russian politics of ulus  43 works in seven volumes, vol. 5: Collected academic articles, Pavlodar: “Eko” GOF, 2005, pp. 36–46 92 Jüt referred to a condition when, after periods of sudden thaw, pastures were covered with layers of ice and animals could not reach the grass underneath. 93 Qazaq practices of mutual assistance included sauyn, jurtshylyq, jylu, and agaiynshylyq, see: Zimanov, S. Z.: Obshchestvennyi stroi kazakhov pervoi poloviny XIX veka, Alma-Ata: Izdatel’stvo AN Kaz. SSR, 1958, pp. 119–124 94 Kadyrbaev, A.: Pravovye i kul’turnye vzaimosviazi kalmykov Dzhungarii i Povolzh’ia, khalkhastsev s kazakhami: XVII-XVIII vv., Bulletin of the Kalmyk Institute for Humanities of the Russian Academy of Sciences, vol. 33, no. 5 (2017), p. 8 95 Radlov, V. V.: Iz Sibiri. Stranitsy dnevnika, Moscow: Nauka, Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1989, p. 340 96 Zimanov, S. Z.: Politicheskii stroi Kazakhstana kontsa XVIII i pervoi poloviny XIX vekov, Alma-Ata: Izdatel’stvo AN Kaz. SSR, 1960, p. 109 97 Kliashtornyi, S. G. and Sultanov, T. I.: Gosudarstva i narody evraziiskikh stepei, p. 470 98 Dmitriev, V. A. (ed.): Georgi I. G.: Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh v Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov, ikh zhiteiskikh obriadov, obyknovenii, odezhd, zhilishch, uprazhnenii, zabav, veroispovedanii i drugikh dostopamiatnostei, p. 242 99 Zhanaev, B. T. et  al. (eds.): Istoriia Kazakhstana v dokumentakh i materialakh. Al’manakh, vyp. 2, Astana: TOO “Obshchestvo invalidov – Chernobylets”, 2012, pp. 66–69

Part II

Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations

3 Uneasy encounters

By the late sixteenth century, when the first Oirat immigrants appeared in Western Siberia, their population consisted of the Torghut, Derbet and Khoshout groups. Each group operated as a large independent political body – ulus or a loose confederation of smaller groups represented by aimaks, khotons and otoks and organized on the principle of fictive and true kinship affiliations. These smaller groups were united under various leaders (taishas), who, depending on the sphere of their influence, were distinguished as chief (big) and less powerful (small) taishas. Each taisha and members of his nobility (noyons and zaisangs), who had subjugated themselves to the taishas, ruled over their own populations. S. K. Bogoiavlensky estimated the initial number of the Kalmyk immigrants as made up of 80,000 Kalmyk soldiers and 200,000 other Kalmyks.1 The time of their immigration coincided with the spread of Russian rule over Western Siberia, which was marked by the imposition of yasak on the local nonRussian populations and the construction of the Russian towns of Tara, Verkhotura, Cherdyn, Tobol’sk and Tiumen’. In 1606, after getting embroiled in skirmishes with local Russian soldiers, the Torghut taisha Kho-Urliuk, whose population numbered about 50,000 people2 sent his envoys to Tara to request that they allow him and his people to wander along the Kamyshelov and Irtysh rivers and enable them to barter in the Russian towns. The taisha also requested that Tara officials curb Russian attacks of his population. Following the emerging favourable constellation of power, the tsar ordered his local men to send envoys to Kho-Urliuk, who were to convey the tsar’s offer to place the taisha and his subjects under the tsar’s protection. Otherwise, the Kalmyks had to leave the land of the tsar’s subject population that they had occupied. The two envoys, the Cossack Tomilka Alekseev and the Tatar Urdubai, who had been sent to Kho-Urliuk, also demanded, in the name of the tsar, that the Kalmyks stop attacking the tsar’s subject populations. In the meantime, some of those populations had subjugated themselves to Kho-Urliuk and paid yasak to him. The tsar’s inability to protect his own subjects produced a damaging effect on his image in the Kalmyks’ eyes. It must have been for that reason that Kho-Urliuk and his Kalmyks not only ignored the tsar’s offer and demands but even murdered both his envoys.3

48  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations

Figure 3.1 A Kalmyk tent (from Pallas, P. S.: Reise durch verschiedene Provinzen des Russischen Reichs, 1771–1776)

This tragic outcome notwithstanding, the tsar repeatedly ordered his Tara officials to send their servicemen to most of the important taishas, including KhoUrliuk. This initiated the arrival of the second, more numerous Kalmyk delegation of 20 people to Tara in 1607. This time, the Kalmyk envoys represented the five Derbet taishas and about 120,000 nomads under their rule4 whose requests to the tsar were similar to those conveyed by Kho-Urliuk’s envoys.5 The tragic outcome of the earlier encounter had a sobering effect on the tsar, reminding him of his precarious foothold in Siberia by the time of the Kalmyk immigration, which ultimately precluded an open military confrontation between the newcomers and his men. Tsar Vasily Shuisky therefore adopted a cautious tone in his subsequent charters. According to O. V. Boronin, the Russian population of Tara consisted of 320 people in 1594.6 A. N. Baskhaev has estimated that no more than 100–200 Russian people found themselves facing 120,000 Kalmyk soldiers in the 1620s in Siberia.7 V. I. Vernadsky’s data from 1636, in turn, indicated that there were 8,000 subjects of the tsar and 200,000 subjects of the Derbet Kalmyk noble Dalai Batyr alone, including the latter’s army of at least 10,000 soldiers.8

Uneasy encounters 49 In the period 1607–1648, the Russians and the Kalmyks negotiated a total of 12 shert agreements.9 Yet the tsar’s weak power in Siberia and the Kalmyk leaders’ perception of properly balanced relations of power meant frequent violations of these agreements by both sides. The Kalmyk leaders continued to get entangled in conflicts over free pasturelands with Russian and non-Russian subjects of the tsar. They viewed each successful Kalmyk campaign against their rivals as providing them with the legitimate right to challenge the established status quo and hence, reconsider their vassal status vis-à-vis the tsar. The Kalmyk taishas resisted paying yasak and delivering hostages and occasionally attacked the tsar’s subjects, while the Muscovite authorities repeatedly failed to provide the Kalmyks with protection from their neighbours’ incursions.10 Regardless the relationship’s actual status quo, the tsar persisted in his offer of protection to the Kalmyk and other nomadic rulers. Another strong motivation for the tsar’s repeated attempts to establish cooperation with the Kalmyks was the Siberian Russian populations’ need for Kalmyk horses and livestock. Bringing the Kalmyks under the tsar’s exalted arm also protected Central Asian merchants, the so-called Bukhartsy, when they visited Russian towns. To keep away the warlike Kalmyks, trade was first organized in special spots and not allowed in Russian towns. While he was establishing his relationship with the Kalmyks, the tsar also offered his protection to their enemy, the Khalkha Mongol leader Altyn Khan. During the negotiation of a 1607 agreement, his officials offered to guard the khan against his enemies provided he voluntarily placed himself and his populations under the tsar. The Russian envoy did not meet with the khan, who was campaigning against the Jungars. The tsar’s second mission to Altyn in 1616 conveyed the same message to the khan, who, in turn, indicated his interest in military and commercial cooperation by sending two delegations to the tsar. In particular, the khan asked for military assistance against the Jungar leader Khara Khula and for free trade in Russian towns. He also asked that the Russians send military experts to teach his subjects how to produce gunpowder and firearms. The tsar was willing to provide Altyn with protection and allow free Mongol trade but declined his request for military experts and munitions. The tsar’s persistence in offering his protection also strongly resonated with the changing dynamics of the Inner Asian frontiers that were marked by the consolidation of power under the Jungar Choros leader Khara Khula. In 1619, to maintain a beneficial balance of power, the tsar sent his envoy to Khara Khula, who was Altyn’s enemy, with the offer of voluntary submission, which resulted in Khara Khula’s sending his own envoys to the tsar. Ironically, the tsar met with Khara Khula’s and Altyn’s envoys on the same day in 1620. At the request of both groups, the tsar placed their masters under his rule and reassured the envoys with promises of his assistance and protection.11 By offering protection to these rival nomadic groups, the tsar opted to weaken each group and keep them separated in order to maintain a desirable balance of power in his favour. At the same time, he and his officials strove to keep these groups strong enough to transform their territories into buffer zones to prevent Russia’s direct confrontation with China.

50  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations During the 1620s–1630s, Russian–Kalmyk relations continued to fluctuate, with both sides renegotiating new shert agreements and then violating their conditions. During this period, the Kalmyks got involved in disputes over pasturelands with the local Qazaq, Nogai, Mongol, Bashkir and Tatar populations and occupied their lands. They subjugated the Bashkirs and the Nogais, imposed yasak on them and negotiated temporary military alliances with the descendants of the Siberian khan Kuchum, the enemy of the tsar, and with their own former enemies, the Mongols.12 Moreover, in cooperation with the Siberian Tatars, the Kalmyks devastated Tara and Tiumen in 1634. They defeated the Mongols, who had repeatedly acted as their enemies and placed the Kyrgyz, the former vassals of the Khalkha Mongols, under Kalmyk rule.13 No wonder the deteriorated condition of the Kalmyk–Russian relationship resulted in the collapse of Russian power in the southern regions of Western Siberia during the 1620s–1630s, according to V. D. Puzanov, which led to the refusal of numerous local Turkic populations to deliver yasak to the tsar.14 Despite their failure, the agreements had far-reaching consequences: along with providing the Kalmyks with legal access to land and barter, they contributed to sustaining the split status quo of the Oirat leadership and, hence, to keeping a desirable balance of power in Russia’s favour. The royal charters’ one important provision, which allowed the Kalmyks to roam not only in locations that they had requested but also “anywhere they wished”,15 reveals that rather than providing the taishas with more or less clearly defined borders of their new habitats, the tsar was more concerned with preventing them from returning to Jungaria and reuniting with their Oirat brethren. As for the immigrated Kalmyk leaders themselves, they seem to have had no interest in either returning to Jungaria or sticking to locations pointed out by the tsar. Rather, they viewed the option of placing themselves under the tsar mainly as a strategy for gaining access to Russian markets. As a rule, they sent their envoys to Russian authorities from the vicinity of Russian towns, where they roamed. Since these locations tended to frequently change due to the Kalmyks’ seasonal migrations and also repeated skirmishes with their rivals,16 the taishas usually did not stay in these territories. According to Bogoiavlensky, although the Kalmyks were engaged in permanent wars with local populations, they led the fiercest wars among themselves, not over access to pasturelands but because of their rivalry for leadership.17 A closer examination of the long-distance migrations undertaken by the Torghut, Derbet and other immigrated Oirat nobles reveals that these migrations were strongly motivated by the reasons mentioned earlier. In 1607, despite the tsar’s positive response to his request to roam in the upper reaches of Irtysh and Kamyshelov, the next year, Kho-Urliuk separated from other Torghuts and (along with his followers) moved first to the vicinity of the River Emba and later on to the vicinity of the River Iaik. In 1621, he separated again and moved to the Volga region.18 Similarly, in 1618, the Derbet leader Dalai was near Lake Alakol, far away from his initial location near Tobol’sk, from where he had sent his envoys to request that the town’s authorities allow his Kalmyks to graze their livestock

Uneasy encounters 51 in the town’s proximity. Dalai was generally considered the most powerful leader among the immigrated Kalmyk taishas, but not all of them recognized him as such.19 The separation of Kho-Urliuk from Dalai began in the late 1620s, in the wake of which Kho-Urliuk migrated to the Volga region.20 In the aftermath of their successful military campaigns against the region’s Nogai population, who were considered the tsar‘s subjects, by the 1630s, the Torghuts occupied lands along the Volga. Their leaders ignored Muscovy’s warnings against resuming attacks on the Nogais and its orders about returning to their initial habitat in the upper reaches of Irtysh. Regardless of the Nogai leaders’ appeals for assistance, the tsar repeatedly proved incapable of defending his subjects.21 The Astrakhan voevodas, who had only 573 musketeers (strel’tsy) under their command in 1632, declared that they were unable to protect the Nogais against the numerous Kalmyk forces.22 Apart from the tsar’s insufficient soldiers, his reluctance to lend assistance was strongly motivated by the renewed consolidation of Jungar power under Kara Khula’s son Batur Khuntaij (1635–1653) in the 1630s. Remarkably, along with demanding that the Torghuts return to Siberia, and after he had learned about their immigration to the Nogai lands in 1627, the tsar ordered his local men to settle the immigrants in these lands to prevent their return to Jungaria.23 In the following decades, the Russians proved largely incapable of controlling the Kalmyks’ unrestricted movements. During the 1630s–1640s the geography of the Kalmyk migrations covered the vast terrain stretching from territories in the upper riches of the Siberian Rivers of Irtysh, Ishim, Tobol, Iaik and the vicinity of Tara, Tobol’sk and Tiumen’ in the east to lands in the Volga region in the west and the deserts of Karakum bordering the Bukharan Emirate in the south.24 By the 1630s, Daichin and his brothers Elden and Lauzan had established themselves in the vicinity of Astrakhan. In this period, Daichin found himself facing the hostility of the Derbet taishas and the Qazaqs, which prompted him to resume negotiations with the Russians. The Russians insisted that the Kalmyks should leave the Volga region and deliver hostages, for which they would be granted free trade in Astrakhan. The Kalmyks refused to provide hostages, arguing that the Kalmyks were children of Chingiz Khan and viewed territories in the vicinity of Astrakhan as having been placed under their ancestor. To a Russian envoy sent from Astrakhan to Daichin upon the latter’s request, Daichin replied that the Kalmyks had never given hostages, had never been subjects of anybody and had always roamed anywhere they wished. He agreed to negotiate new agreements, repeated his requests for free trade and promised to deliver hostages in exchange for permitting his Kalmyks to cross the Volga to undertake campaigns against the Nogais and the Crimeans. Daichin’s dialogue with the Russian envoy Onochin shows that both argued within a framework provided by the ulus workings. Onochin was sent by the tsar after the Kalmyks appeared in the Volga region. The envoy reproached the taisha for participating in the recent Kalmyk attacks on Russian towns and capturing Russian and non-Russian subjects of the tsar. Daichin replied that those attacks had been carried out by his brother Lauzan and other nobles, over whom he did

52  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations not have authority. He admitted, however, that some of his subjects had joined Lauzan’s people without his being aware of their decision. When Onochin cited Daichin’s predecessors, whom he described as having been the obedient servants of the tsar, Daichin disagreed, arguing that Onochin had told a lie: the Kalmyks had never been servants of any ruler, and they were not afraid of anybody except God. Onochin, however, seems not to have been convinced by Daichin’s reasoning. He pointed out that Daichin and his population had occupied the tsar’s lands because their previous inhabitants, the Nogais, were the tsar’s subjects. Daichin again disagreed with Onochin, arguing that Land and water are from God. The land that we have occupied was the land where the Nogais used to wander; it was neither the tsar’s land, nor the Bashkirs’ land. We came and defeated the Nogais, who became our subjects, and there was no other land except this land to use as our pasturelands, and we found no Russian settlements on this land.25 Daichin’s logic was straightforward: since neither the Nogais themselves nor their Russian patrons could successfully protect their claims to the land, the Kalmyks should be considered the current masters of the former Nogai lands. In addition, unlike in Western Siberia during the initial Kalmyk immigration, Daichin’s Kalmyks did not encounter any Russian settlements on the Nogai lands. In 1635, Daichin’s father Kho-Urliuk returned to the upper riches of Emba, from where he sent 3,000 soldiers to Daichin, while he left to campaign in Urgench and Khiva. A year later, Kho-Urliuk unexpectedly moved towards Tobol’sk and sent his envoy to the town’s authorities with the request to trade. A Russian envoy who found Kho-Urliuk roaming in the sands of Karakum learned from the Torghut leader that his Kalmyks had preferred their barter in Bukhara to their commercial operations in Russian towns, which had prompted Kho-Urliuk to abandon his location in these towns’ proximity. In addition, by moving between Bukhara and Siberia, he hoped to avoid a conflict that was unfolding between his son Daichin and the Derbet leader Dalai.26 In 1636, Daichin confirmed to the Russians that the Derbet taishas Dalai and Chokur were his enemies. Bogoiavlensky also stated that the Kalmyks had viewed their barter operations with Bukharan merchants who, among other things, supplied the Kalmyks with arms (odnoriadka), as very profitable. The rising Jungar leader Batur Khuntaiji, who was married to Kho-Urliuk’s daughter, promoted the idea of a Jungar–Kalmyk reunion among the Kalmyk nobility. He also embarked on establishing friendly relations with the Russians, by viewing his policies as indispensable in consolidating his own power and securing Russian and Kalmyk backing in confrontations with his Jungar, Qazaq, Khalkha Mongol and Qing rivals.27 In 1635, Batur Khuntaiji sent his envoys to Tara to negotiate peace, free trade and the exchange of captives.28 In 1647, he was placed under the tsar and granted free trade.29 After spending the winter of 1639 in Karakum, Daichin first moved to the vicinity of Tobol’sk and Ishim and in the summer of that year returned to the

Uneasy encounters  53 Volga, where he joined his father to attack Samara. One of Kho-Urliuk’s sons sent a letter to Russian officials suggesting that they should take control of the Volga region, while the Kalmyks would take charge of territories adjacent to the Iaik.30 The Torghuts themselves, however, seem to have been unwilling to stick to the plan. In 1642, Daichin’s son Daian Erki crossed the Volga and suddenly attacked Astrakhan. The next year, Daichin’s brother Lauzan initiated a new attack on Astrakhan. To the Russian protests, Lauzan replied that the Kalmyks had always wandered anywhere they wished and threatened that he would move to the vicinity of Samara and Saratov and send his envoys to Central Asia.31 Relations between the Torghut and Derbet leaders further worsened after KhoUrliuk’s daughter left her husband, Dalai’s son, and returned to his father in 1642. Her husband attempted to reclaim her but was defeated by Kho-Urliuk, who added the son-in-law’s 7,000 tents to his own following. Viewing the act as the violation of the 1640 Code of Law, Kho-Urliuk’s other son-in-law, Batur Khuntaiji, started a war against Kho-Urliuk, which compelled the latter to leave for the lands between Volga and Iaik.32 Two years later, however, Batur Khuntaiji capitalized on his close family ties to Kho-Urliuk to decline the Russian suggestion about participating in a joint campaign against Kho-Urliuk.33 In 1644, the Torghuts suffered a defeat from the joint forces of Kabardinians and Nogais, during which Kho-Urliuk and his three sons were killed.34 In this very year, the Torghuts helped the Manchus conquer Beijing, according to N. N. Pal’mov.35 In the 1640s, the Torghuts were at war with the Khoshuts as well. The Khoshut leader Kundelen Ubashi sent his envoys to Ufa with his request to be placed under the tsar. He also promised that he would fight the Torghuts if they did not obey the tsar. A Derbet taisha proposed a similar request to Tobol’sk officials, to which he added the request to allow him and his population to roam in the town’s proximity.36

The Rise of the Torghut ruling dynasty The negotiation of a new series of shert agreements between the Torghut leadership and the Russians in the period from the 1640s to the 1670s was set in motion by the rise of new hostilities among the leading Kalmyk, Jungar and other Oirat men, as well as between them and their Russian and non-Russian rivals. In the 1650s, Daichin was also at war with his own three brothers, whose followers he added to his own population after having defeated all three of them. Following the defeat, his brother Eden fled to Jungaria.37 Daichin’s son and successor Monchak adopted this very policy against his own nobles and again against the Derbet and Jungar nobility, which prompted the Derbet nobles Dugar and Bok to leave Monchak for the Don in 1666–1667.38 In 1664, Monchak proposed that Russian authorities construct forts near the Don and the Iaik to protect him and his population from the Jungars.39 It should come as no surprise that under the rise of these new hostilities, both Daichin and Monchak resumed their negotiations with the Russians. The agreements negotiated in the period of the 1650s and the 1660s spelled out the

54  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations conditions of military alliance between the two sides. The emergence of the new trend was prompted by two important factors: Russia’s growing power under the centralized authority of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and the rising Jungar threat. In exchange for Kalmyk participation in Russian wars, the tsar assigned the disputed Nogai territories to the Kalmyks as their permanent pastures and allowed them to wander near Russian towns, as well as along both banks of the Volga and, in compliance with the 1655 royal charter, “anywhere they wished”.40 The Kalmyks preserved their autonomous status, continuing to handle their own domestic issues, land and trading privileges. The agreements replaced the payment of yasak with military service and exempted the Kalmyk traders in the cities of Astrakhan, Tsaristyn, Saratov and Samara from paying fees. Both sides also agreed on the construction of a fort on the River Om’ to protect the Kalmyks from attacks by the Khalkha Mongols.41 The 1657 agreement put a ban on causing any damage to the Kalmyks on the part of Russian, Bashkir and other subjects of the tsar. In the same year, the Kalmyks were called to participate in a war in the Crimea. Other conditions listed in the new agreements were similar to those of the earlier agreements, including obedience to the tsar, non-collaboration with the tsar’s enemies and the cessation of Kalmyk attacks on Russian and non-Russian subjects of the tsar. The Kalmyks were also to return Russian captives and fugitives and secure the safety of Russian envoys.42 Daichin cited this agreement when he refused to cooperate with the Crimeans.43 The new agreements guaranteed the Torghut leaders’ independent status in settling their legal issues. The leaders preserved their right to supervise the Zargo, the Kalmyk customary judicial institution: they chose their candidates for the Zargo and approved the institution’s decisions. Members of the Zargo were in charge of distributing winter and summer pastures, exchanging letters with the Russian government and issuing instructions for the Kalmyk nobility.44 In 1661, the state established the Kalmyk Prikaz to administer Kalmyk military affairs. By acting in his own name and in the name of his father and his nobles, Monchak took an active part in enabling the negotiation of the new agreements. For the first time, he and other influential Kalmyk leaders swore allegiance to the tsar in person and agreed to put their personal stamps on the negotiation of the 1657 agreement45 and to send noble hostages. Unlike the earlier procedures, which had been entrusted to local Cossack and Tatar servicemen, this time the Russian side was represented by the tsar’s higher officials, including the d’iak of the Kazan Prikaz I. S. Gorokhov and Prince Cherkassky. According to V. T. Tepkeev, in 1657, Monchak sent taisha Kulachi as amanat to the Muscovite court.46 As a matter of fact, these new agreements contributed to the rise of Daichin (1644–1661) and his heirs, his son Monchak (1661–1669) and his grandson Aiuka (1696–1724). Muscovy further invested in reinforcing Daichin’s emerging leadership status by acknowledging that Daichin had been granted the title of khan by the V Dalai Lama, despite the fact that Daichin himself had refused to accept it. The Russian government also acknowledged the title of khan granted to Daichin’s grandson, Aiuka, by the VI Dalai Lama Tsan’ian Jamtso (1683–1706) in 1690.47

Uneasy encounters 55 It was not coincidental that the timing of the acknowledgement, seven years later, concurred with the rise of the new Jungar leader, Tsevan Rabtan (1697–1727), that began after the death of his predecessor, Goldan Boshoktu Khan (1671–1697), in 1697.48 The relationship between the two sides continued to unfold largely within the co-ruling framework that was largely facilitated by the fact that the assignment of lands in the Volga region did not significantly curtail the Kalmyks’ free movements across the southern frontier and elsewhere. For example, during the negotiations of the 1655 agreement, the Kalmyks sent their envoys to the Qing and to Persia, which forced the Russians to make concessions.49 In 1660, the Torghuts undertook a new attack on the Nogais and captured 4,000 of their people.50 This prompted the Russians, who were facing a war with the Crimea, to negotiate a new agreement with Daichin. The agreement committed Daichin to participating in joint military campaigns, not collaborating with Russia’s enemies and sending war spoils to Russia. Daichin complied with the two first conditions but distributed the spoils obtained during the Crimean campaigns among his nobility.51 In the 1660s, the Kalmyks continued to operate in a familiar fashion, by undertaking periodic attacks on the Bashkirs, the Mari and the Chuvash. They cooperated with the Tatars and the Cherkess to attack Pensa52 and, in 1662, joined the Bashkirs, who revolted against the Russians. The violation of the negotiated agreements by the Torghut leadership, however, did not prevent the Russians from addressing Monchak (who, in the meantime, had replaced his father) as khan and sending him generous gifts in 1664. The Russians also allowed Monchak to roam in the Don to facilitate the joint operations of his Kalmyks and the Don Cossacks in Azov, Kuban and the Crimea.53 Under Aiuka, Monchak’s son and successor, who turned out to be the most powerful Torghut leader, some Kalmyk groups joined the Cossack rebellions led by Stepan Razin and attacked Samara in 1670.54

Aiuka’s ascent to power Aiuka’s ascent to power was facilitated by a new political order that emerged in the wake of the immigration of the Khoshut leader Ablai and his followers to the Volga region, following Ablai’s defeat by Galdan Boshoktu Khan in 1671. Ablai, who was married to one of Daichin’s daughters, attempted to replace his father-inlaw by defeating him and the Derbet leader Daian Ombo and placing both leaders’ populations under his authority. He then presented himself to the Russians as a new Kalmyk leader. Yet the Russians demanded that Ablai stop his attacks and place himself under the tsar or, otherwise, leave the region. With the assistance of the Derbets and his own relatives, Aiuka was finally able to defeat Ablai and reclaim his grandfather’s and his own populations. A year later, after the victory, Aiuka’s allies, including his uncle Dugar and Derbet leaders Baka and Solom Tseren, left Aiuka for the Don, where they cooperated with the Don Cossacks.55 Aiuka adopted the familiar leadership pattern, collaborating with his Russian patrons or his Kalmyk, Jungar and other rivals, including the rivals’ enemies, whenever he found it beneficial. For example, in 1673, he collaborated with the

56  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations Ottoman, Persian and Crimean rulers, despite swearing allegiance to the tsar in the same year, which ostensibly precluded this type of collaboration. Two years later, Aiuka accused Russian authorities of failing to prevent their Bashkir and Cossack subjects from attacking the Kalmyks, and he threatened to leave Russia and find better places to stay.56 In an act of retaliation, in 1681, he attacked the Bashkirs and other Russian subject populations of the Volga and Ural regions. Some of his own nobles also found it appropriate, from time to time, to test the limits of the khan’s power. In so doing, a group of his nobles and their subjects participated in the Bashkir uprisings of 1705–1711, which were directed against Russian rule, while other noblemen, following Aiuka’s and Peter I’s orders, fought against the Don Cossacks on the Russian side.57 Aiuka was known as having negotiated four shert agreements with the Russians: in 1673, 1677, 1683 and 1697.58 Like his predecessors, he seems to have followed Russian orders mainly if the proposed Russian campaigns promised rich spoils, because only then was he able to impose his will on his noble and ordinary subjects alike. This might explain his decision to send an insufficient number of his soldiers to the Azov campaign in 1674, who finally ended up abandoning the campaign altogether. Instead, in 1675–1676, his Kalmyks collaborated with the Tatars and undertook regular attacks on Russian towns, capturing their inhabitants. In the 1680s, the Kalmyks, along with the Bashkirs, also raided the Russian populations of the Ufa and Kazan regions. At the Russians’ request, in 1706, Aiuka’s soldiers took part in the suppression of a riot in the city of Astrakhan, which was followed by the Kalmyks’ robbery of Russians who lived in the area.59 Aiuka’s Kalmyks also participated in the suppression of the Cossack riots led by Ataman Bulavin in 1707–1709, during which some Kalmyk groups cooperated with the Cossacks and attacked the Russians.60 The next year, Aiuka sent 20,000 Kalmyks to participate in the Russian-Ottoman war, which ended with the Kalmyks defeating the Tatars and the Kubans and capturing their plentiful livestock.61 A year later, however, Aiuka refused to campaign against the Bashkirs at the Russians’ request, citing the Kalmyks’ common origin with the Bashkirs stemming from the time of Chingiz Khan and an agreement that both sides had negotiated with each other.62 This argument about the Bashkirs’ common origin with the Kalmyks, however, did not prevent them from taking part in the suppression of the Bashkir revolts against the Russians in 1710.63 Despite the periodic resistance of his own, Derbet and other nobles, Aiuka proved capable of centralizing power in his hands with the help of his Russian patrons to emerge as the most capable and shrewd Kalmyk ruler. He seems to have imprinted his grandfather Daichin’s advice in his mind. Daichin instructed his grandson: If you want to become a noyon (ruler), you must learn the conditions under which you must act as an equal towards your subjects, when you can impose your will on them, and when you should care for them like a mother caring for her child.64 Aiuka’s unrestricted behaviour notwithstanding, the government of Peter I did not interfere with Kalmyk administrative, social, legal and cultural structures. It

Uneasy encounters 57 benefited from employing the Kalmyk soldiers against Russia’s enemies65 and from exchanging Russian goods for Kalmyk horses and animal products. In accordance with their 1697 agreement, the Russians allowed Aiuka to attack the Crimea and Kuban, which was framed as a defence of Russia’s southern frontiers. To this end, Aiuka was assigned an annual salary of 1,000 rubles and given canons, gunpowder and lead. In addition, the Kalmyks were allowed to roam near all Russian cities and were promised protection and military assistance.66 At Aiuka’s request, Peter I’s government placed a detachment of 600 Russian soldiers headed by D. E. Bakhmet’ev under Aiuka. Later on, the khan proved able to insist on the removal of Bakhmet’ev, whom Aiuka suspected of being a Russian spy.67 Aiuka and his nobles also requested that Russian authorities construct bridges and provide boats to enable the Kalmyks and their livestock to cross the rivers.68 In 1711, the allure of rich spoils prompted Aiuka to follow Peter I’s advice that the khan and his Kalmyks should move to the Don and spend the winter there to stop the raids of the Don Cossacks and the Nogais and to prevent the Crimean Tatars from possibly uniting with the Kuban Nogais, which would provide the Kalmyks with the opportunity to resume their attacks on the Nogais.69 In 1714 and 1717, the Kalmyks also fought against the Kubans and at some point collaborated with the rival Crimean leader Bakhty Gerei to ravage local Russian settlements. The Kalmyk incursions into Kuban continued in the 1720s and the 1730s.70 While promoting the Torghut leaders, the Russian government was careful to maintain its mediating role in order to prevent them from prevailing over other ambitious Kalmyk men. The Astrakhan governor A. P. Volynsky kept this perspective in mind when he instructed the Russian Board of Foreign Affairs that without keeping a proper balance between Aiuka and other Kalmyk nobles, it

Map 3.1 Eurasia in the eighteenth century (from M. Khodarkovsky: Russia’s Steppe Frontiers, 2002)

58  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations would be difficult to place all of them under Russian protection.71 For his part, the Astrakhan governor P. M. Apraksin made Aiuka swear in 1708 and 1710 that he would not leave Russia for Jungaria and, in addition, assigned lead, gunpowder and 1,000 rubles to be paid annually to the khan.72 The Russians adopted this same balance of power strategy towards the role of the Jungars. Siberian governor M. P. Gagarin repeatedly warned the tsar about the danger of a possible defeat of the Jungars by the Qing, which might result in the disadvantageous situation of having the Chinese as Russia’s immediate neighbours.73 The Qing embarked on entertaining the balance of power strategy as well, first by elevating Batur Khuntaiji’s successor Galdan Boshoktu to the status of khan in 1678 and later, in 1703, by offering protection to the latter’s rival, Tsevan Rabdan.74 The Kalmyk and Jungar nobility were also preoccupied with balancing power among themselves in an effective way, by investing in the practice of establishing close marital ties. Aiuka was born from the marriage of Daichin’s son Monchak to a daughter of Jungar leader Batur Khuntaiji. Until the age of eight, he was raised by his maternal grandfather, Batur Khuntaiji, in Jungaria before his other grandfather, Daichin, brought him to the Volga region.75 Aiuka was married to Darma Bala, the niece of Jungar leader Tsevan Rabdan, and married one of his own daughters to Tsevan. Aiuka’s other daughters were given in marriage to Derbet leader Cheter and a Khoshut leader.76 The establishment of close family ties with the Derbets proved instrumental for preventing their attacks,77 while the marriage of Aiuka’s daughter to Tsevan Rabdan enabled Aiuka to bring the remaining Torghuts in Jungaria to the Volga in 1699, according to A. V. Tsiuriumov.78 Tsevan Rabdan, in turn, married Aiuka’s daughter to reinforce his position against his uncle and rival Galdan Boshoktu Khan, with whom Aiuka preferred to maintain peace.79 Tsevan Rabdan also proposed marrying one of his daughters to Aiuka’s son Tseren Donduk.80 Aiuka’s relations with Galdan Boshoktu Khan worsened soon after Aiuka’s sister Dorzhi Rabdan, who was married to Khoshut leader Ochirtu (Tsetsen Khan), fled Jungaria for the Volga in 1678 and joined Aiuka, following the defeat of her husband by Galdan Boshoktu Khan. Aiuka ignored the latter’s demand that he return Dorzhi Rabdan and the 1,000 families who had followed her and whom Aiuka had added to his own population.81 Aiuka described his relations with other Jungar leaders, who, along with their 3,000 followers, immigrated to the Volga in 1686, as hostile, and asked the Russians to supply him with gunpowder and lead.82 The condition of the Kalmyk–Jungar relationship further deteriorated after Aiuka’s son Sanzhip, following a conflict with his father, left the Volga region for Jungaria in 1701 in the company of 15,000 Kalmyk families, where he joined Tsevan Rabdan. Tsevan placed Sanzhip’s followers under his rule and sent him back to the Volga. According to Tsiuriumov, the conflict prevented the Kalmyks from participating in the Jungar campaign against the Qazaqs.83 After the 1701 conflict, Aiuka asked Russian authorities to mediate a peace agreement with his son. At some point during the unfolding of the conflict, Aiuka crossed the Iaik and found refuge with the Iaik Cossacks, who protected him at the order of Peter I.84

Uneasy encounters 59

Map 3.2 “Map of All the Waterless and Difficult Country of the Mountain Steppe, 1696–7” by S. Remezov (from Baddeley, J.: Russia, Mongolia, China . . ., 1919, vol. 1); on his map’s upper-right part, Remezov indicated “The Great Kalmuck road from Ayuka to Raptan”, “Kalmuck road” and “The great road of Kazak Horde”

Aiuka’s attempts to centralize his power with the assistance of his Russian patrons had a triggering effect on his subjects, who alienated themselves from him. Some of his noble and ordinary subjects responded by abandoning him and seeking refuge in Cossack and Russian settlements, where the ordinary Kalmyks put themselves up for hire for various jobs, registered with the Cossack and other Russian estates and occasionally converted to Orthodox Christianity. Pal’mov noted that unlike his predecessors, who had been able to consolidate power mainly for the purposes of conducting campaigns and organizing defensive manoeuvres, Aiuka was the first Kalmyk khan who attempted to expand his influence over both his noble and common subjects at all times, demanding that they remain consistently obedient to him.85 The shert agreements negotiated under Aiuka in 1673, 1677 and 1683 stipulated that only those Kalmyk runaways who did not convert to Orthodox Christianity were to be returned to Aiuka, while the baptized Kalmyks were to be left in Russian settlements.86 The 1697 shert, in turn, imposed a fine of 30 rubles on voevodas to be paid to Aiuka for each runaway Kalmyk thief if the voevodas provided them with shelter and convinced them to convert to Orthodox Christianity.87

60  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations Aiuka warned Astrakhan governor A. I. Golitsyn that if his subjects continued leaving him, he would no longer be able to serve the Russian state. Following this warning, in 1717, state officials forbade their local men to accept Kalmyk runaways. However, the instruction was not to be applied to those who had voluntarily converted to Christianity. The baptized Kalmyks, in turn, were not allowed to persuade other Kalmyks to convert. The nobles responded to the officials’ reluctance to return the baptized Kalmyks by bringing their runaways back by force. Aiuka’s men, for example, destroyed a settlement and a church, which the government had constructed for his 76 runaway subjects on the River Tereshke, and forced the runaways to return. After this incident, the officials decided to settle the runaways in the Kiev guberniia, so as not to irritate Aiuka any more.88 Similarly, in 1730, with the plan to attack his baptized compatriots, Aiuka’s grandson Dosang assembled a group of 103 men. The violent encounter ended up leaving two baptized Kalmyks killed and 32 converts taken into captivity by Dosang’s men.89 Rather than converting the Kalmyks to orthodoxy in a straightforward fashion, Russian state and church authorities invested in the strategy of offering protection and other incentives to baptized Kalmyk runaways, including exemption from criminal and legal persecution and the repayment of their debts to their masters. In addition, the runaways received land, money, clothes and gifts. The runaway Kalmyks were usually registered with the Don, Ural’sk and Terek Cossack communities and assigned various services, such as defending frontier lines and facilitating post operations, for which they received salaries. The government’s initiatives to encourage the baptized Kalmyks to keep their new religion, however, proved largely unsuccessful in the end. Both the noble and ordinary Kalmyk converts showed little interest in practising Christianity, let alone learning more about its tenets. In fact, they continued to secretly perform their Buddhist rituals while taking advantage of the lucrative incentives offered by the government. The noble Kalmyk converts, in addition, hoped to use conversion as a means of prevailing over their rivals and reinforcing their authority over their subjects. Pal’mov wrote that the rival Kalmyk nobility showed their readiness to convert to orthodoxy provided that their populations would be returned to the nobles.90

The Inner Asian frontier dynamics The problem of runaway populations came to constitute the core of all Russian, Qing, Jungar and other diplomatic missions dispatched in the period under consideration, including the negotiations of the two Sino-Russian Treaties, the 1686 Nerchinsk Treaty and the 1727 Kiakhta Treaty. What is remarkable is that neither of these treaties contributed to achieving any of their ultimate goals, including the demarcation of borders between Russia and China.91 Along with the lack of geographical knowledge, this was largely due to the perception that power was workforce, a belief that prevailed in both nomadic and preindustrial agrarian societies.92 Based on this perception, the frontier nomadic populations, including

Uneasy encounters 61

Figure 3.2 Annushka, a portrait of a baptized Kalmyk girl, a serf and pupil of Varvara Sheremetova, daughter of Count Sheremetov (1713–1788) painted by I. Argunov in 1767 (Kuskovo)

the Buryats and Yakuts, depending on circumstances, kept switching alliances to Russian, Qing, Khalkha Mongol, Jungar and other local authorities, which often entailed abandoning their previous territories and moving to new ones. Russia’s withdrawal from the Amur Basin, as stipulated by the Nerchinsk Treaty, therefore further exaggerated the uncertain status of these populations. Because the Jungar,

62  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations Mongol, Russian and Qing disputes about sovereignty over the local populations persisted through the periods preceding and following the fall of the Jungars in 1758, they shaped the operation of substantial sections of the Inner Asian frontier as porous contested zones. The Sino-Russian military conflict of 1685–1686 precipitated the negotiation of the Nerchinsk Treaty. The Qing demanded to destroy Russian forts built in the vicinity of the River Amur and concentrated their army there. The Khalkha Mongols, who had placed themselves under the Qing against the Jungars, fought on the Chinese side with the aim of reclaiming sovereignty over the Buryats, who, in the meantime, had placed themselves under the tsar.93 From the 1640s to the 1680s, the Mongols undertook regular raids against Russian settlements in Siberia and sent several missions to the tsar with the demand to seize collections of yasak from their Buryat and Kyrgyz subjects. They also requested that the tsar send soldiers and firearms to use against the Jungars, which, as a rule, were ignored by the Russian side.94 The Mongols stopped their attacks only after facing the Jungar offensive. For his part, Jungar leader Galdan Boshoktu Khan suggested to the head of the Russian delegation to Nerchinsk, F. A. Golovin, a joint military campaign against the Mongols to restore Russia’s control over the Amur region. During the negotiations, Boshoktu proposed that the Russians rebuild their forts and agreed to return Russia’s former subjects who had placed themselves under him. However, he refused to return his own former subjects, who had been placed under the Russians and then switched back to Boshoktu. The Qing warned the Russians against cooperation with the Jungars. They made clear that they would consider such cooperation a violation of the Nerchinsk Treaty and send their army against the Russians.95 Largely reluctant to participate on either side and concerned about possible effects of the Sino-Jungar conflict on Russia’s own ambitions in the region, Russian authorities chose to maintain a neutral position. As we shall see, the politics of neutrality, to which the Russian, the Qing, the Jungars and their nomadic counterparts frequently reverted, proved an effective strategy for keeping a desirable balance of power in their relations with each other. The Russian official stance was expressed in a 1734 memorandum: “To keep the Jungars from attacking Russian settlements in Siberia without interfering with their war against the Qing in order to motivate the Qing to seek our assistance, which would greatly benefit us”.96 Despite the discontent among the Russians, the Qing, the Mongols and the Jungars relating to the legal status of the local frontier populations, all sides invested in developing commercial operations with each other. Under Batur Khuntaiji and Galdan Boshoktu Khan, the Russian and the Jungar sides exchanged all together 43 diplomatic missions.97 The Chinese–Oirat commercial operations also steadily expanded from the 1650s on. The Qing accepted Boshoktu’s missions in 1672 and 1673, which restored tributary relations between the two sides.98 In 1682– 1683, Sino-Jungar relations improved before plunging into a period of wars in the 1690s.99 During this period, Boshoktu sent several delegations to the tsar (1689, 1690–1692, 1694–1696) with generous gifts and requests for Russian armies,

Uneasy encounters  63 and he received the tsar’s gifts.100 Due to the neutral stance that Russia officially adopted after the Nerchinsk Treaty (1689), however, all of these missions ultimately failed to achieve their main goal of persuading the Russians to cooperate against the Qing. It was mainly for this reason that the government invariably refused to meet Jungar leaders’ requests to send them troops and military experts and to sell them arms, gunpowder and munitions. It also remained aloof to the Jungar protests against the Russian policy of collecting yasak from former Jungar subjects. Instead, Russian officials repeatedly offered Boshoktu the option of placing himself under Russian protection, which entailed free trade. The emerging new Jungar leader, Tsevan Rabdan, also engaged in playing the balance card by seeking Russian cooperation against his rival, Boshoktu, and against the Qing and by sending his envoys to Russia in 1691. After the Qing defeated his rival in 1697, Tsevan sent his envoys in 1699 and 1701 to Peter I with the demand that the Russians demolish the forts that the Russians had built in the upper reaches of Irtysh and that they cease the collection of yasak from his Kyrgyz, Altai and Tuvan subjects.101 In 1703, he again protested against the construction of Russian fortresses along the upper reaches of Irtysh, after which Tsevan’s Kyrgyz subjects, in cooperation with the Uruiankhai people, attacked the Kuznetsk ostrog.102 Tsevan’s relationship with the Kangxi emperor worsened in 1703–1707, after he refused the emperor’s offer of protection.103 In 1703, Qing envoys visited him, suggesting that he place himself under their emperor, which included receiving a charter, a stamp and an annual salary, along with the privilege of free trade, but the Jungar leader declined the suggestion, explaining that his people had strongly resisted establishing relations with the Qing: Now they offer a title and a rank but next year they would demand that we should adopt their rules of living, which entails being divided into divisions and groups [assigned to specific territories- G. K.]. This would ultimately lead to the destruction of us as people. Rather than being motivated by true love, they pursue their political aims in the first place.104 Tsevan dreamed about creating a Mongol unity, by uniting the Jungars and the eastern Khalkha Mongols against the Qing.105 The new confrontation of the Jungars with the Qing prompted Peter I to speed up the construction of forts in southwestern Siberia in 1713–1715, which ultimately became targets of attacks by local populations.106 The Jungar–Qing wars in 1715–1722 led Tsevan to renew negotiations with the Russians. In 1720, he sent his envoys with the request that he be placed under the tsar, under conditions similar to those negotiated between Aiuka and the Russian government, in exchange for sending 20,000 Russian soldiers to him and building a fort in the vicinity of Lake Zaisan. He also asked the tsar to allow him and his people to use pastures in the upper reaches of Irtysh. Despite the Qing’s warnings about Tsevan’s “ungrateful and shameless” nature,107 Peter I approved all of Tsevan’s requests and even ordered the destruction of the newly built forts, in case

64  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations Tsevan voluntarily placed himself under the tsar. To finalize the procedure, Peter I sent his envoy, Captain Ivan Unkovsky, to Tsevan in 1721. By the time of the envoy’s arrival, however, Tsevan had changed his mind. The change was due to a temporary peace agreement, which he had negotiated with the Qing after the death of the Qing emperor in 1722. Accordingly, Tsevan attempted to restore his former power over the local populations and expressed his interest mainly in reclaiming his runaway subjects and developing trade relations with Russia.108 The Qing responded to the Russian–Jungar initiatives by constructing forts on their eastern border with the Jungars in the 1720–1730s.109 They also put restrictions on their trade with Russia, and they renewed their demands about the delimitation of borders between Russia and their Khalkha Mongol subjects. The Qing also expressed their desire to construct a fort on the upper reaches of Irtysh.110 In the end, neither the Qing nor the Russians proved capable of persuading Galdan Boshoktu Khan and Tsevan Rabdan to place themselves under Qing or Russian protection. In spite of periodic defeats by the Qing, the Jungar Khanate reached its height of power under Galdan Boshoktu Khan and his successor Tsevan Rabdan.111

The patronage ceremony The ceremony of placing the Kalmyk rulers under the tsar’s exalted arm began with handing over royal charters (gramota) sealed by a golden stamp, along with so-called shert records (shertovye zapisi) by the tsar’s servicemen to Kalmyk and other non-Russian leaders. The records contained descriptions of shert conditions, which were to be translated and read in the rulers’ language in the presence of their nobles. The tsars’ envoys also handed over lists with detailed inventories of the quantity and value of royal gifts (rospis’ podarkov) and were careful to observe that gifts intended for the tsar were of equal quantity and value. With time, the Kazan Prikaz began preparing separate copies of royal charters that were addressed to specific Kalmyk taishas, along with written copies of oaths, obviously with the aim of reinforcing the taishas’ personal commitment to upholding shert conditions. The Kalmyk leaders preferred not to participate in the oath-taking procedures in person and avoided putting their signatures or stamps in shert agreements that they negotiated with the Russians, rightly viewing the procedures as imposing restrictions on their right to make decisions freely. Russian authorities, in turn, instructed their envoys to persuade the taishas to give the best truth (lit. dat’ luchshuiu pravdu), meaning the taishas’ personal participation in the procedure. They also insisted that oath takers integrate their own ancient rituals into the procedure and described the strongest among those rituals as drinking gold (lit. pit’ zoloto). The expression stemmed back to the ancient ritual of brotherhood (seventeenth century) involving two unrelated men who came to call themselves brothers after having drunk water mixed with each other’s blood. Later on, the drink was replaced with wine or water with pieces of gold in it, which was believed to symbolize clarity of intention and loyalty to the oath.112

Uneasy encounters 65 The Russians’ enthusiasm about introducing the act of oath taking led them to expose facts of violation, using them as a legal pretext for punishing the alleged perpetrators. The authorities therefore welcomed the incorporation of shamanist, pagan and Buddhist/Lamaist rituals into the oath-taking procedure. During the 1661 negotiations, for example, Monchak kissed images of Buddha and Buddhist religious books, licked a knife’s edge and took it to his throat. Monchak swore that if he violated the agreements, he should be cut by his enemies.113 Since these rituals were usually performed between individual nomadic leaders, their integration into the shert procedures added an intimate character to establishing relations between the tsar and each individual member of the nomadic nobility. The ceremony’s next stage involved distributing generous royal gifts (zhalovanie and pominki) in the name of the tsar among the Kalmyk nobility by the servicemen. The Kazan Prikaz instructed Tarsk voevoda I. V. Massal’sky that his servicemen were to comply with the Kalmyks’ social ranks while distributing royal gifts among them: they should hand over robes and hats to the nobility and fabrics to their subjects. The servicemen should wear clean clothes and turn the act of distribution into a generous feast by offering food and drinks to all participating Kalmyks.114 If the Kalmyk envoys intended to meet with the tsar in Moscow, they were to be provided with protection, transportation and food and, in addition, given appropriate clothes. As mentioned earlier, Russian authorities elaborated on certain norms of etiquette that came to combine elements of the steppe ethical code with new rituals and patterns of behaviour. From the steppe norms of hospitality, officials borrowed the ritual of asking questions about the health and well-being of the tsar and the taishas, including members of their families. Both sides paid great attention to the order of asking, since this was perceived by them as properly reflecting an actual balance of power. Russian envoys felt insulted if their hosts did not start negotiations by asking about the health and well-being of the tsar, as did some of their hosts with respect to their rulers. Yet the Russian envoy’s requirement that their noble Kalmyk and other hosts must stand up and take off their hats at the mention of the tsar’s name was a Russian innovation. Pal’mov believed that the ritual was introduced in 1676.115 Depending on the actual balance of power, the hosting side either complied with or ignored the requirement. Russian envoys who were sent to Mongol rulers were instructed that while imposing their demands on these rulers, they should keep in mind their “great rulers’ kissing the cross” (velikikh gosudarei krestnoe tselovanie), instead of succumbing to their fears.116 For example, the Mongol khan Altyn refused to participate in person in the negotiation of a shert agreement with the tsar and ordered his brother and brother-in-law to participate in the procedure in his name. He did so despite the fact that he himself had initiated the procedure, by sending his envoys to Tomsk in 1633–1634 with his request to be placed under the tsar. In response, the tsar sent his envoy Druzhina and another envoy to Altyn with gifts. In his follow-up letter, Altyn wrote that he was ready to comply with the negotiated shert conditions, including payments of tribute and participation in joint military campaigns, as well as willing to place his Kyrgyz subjects under

66  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations the tsar. Altyn, however, complained that Druzhina had appropriated the tsar’s gifts (zhalovanie), had not accepted his and his mother’s gifts intended for the tsar and had been rude to them and Altyn’s other nobles. Altyn then asked the tsar to dispatch other envoys and resend royal gifts, which he listed in his letter.117 In response, the tsar promised to send more gifts if Altyn kept his word and participated in person in negotiating his new agreements with the tsar. The tsar also ordered that Druzhina be whipped and thrown into jail.118 In his response, however, Altyn refused to be called the tsar’s kholop (slave), explaining that he viewed himself as equal to the tsar. He promised to stick to the conditions of the shert agreements signed by his relatives and appreciated the punishment of Druzhina. This time, Altyn showed his interest in the nature of the Muscovite state and the manufacture of church bells and was wondering whether he could make use of them. He also asked the tsar to assist his envoys in reaching Jerusalem and to send him foreign physicians, artisans and watches, which he intended to use for military purposes. The court’s officials responded that Jerusalem was far away and that the tsar could not send foreign physicians, because they were not his subjects. As for Russian artisans, the officials excused themselves by explaining that because the artisans could not speak Mongol, they would be useless for Altyn’s purposes, as would the watches, because there were no people among Altyn’s subjects who could operate them.119 Yet during Russian envoy Vasily Starkov’s visit with Altyn in 1638, the khan refused to stand up and take off his hat at the mentioning of the tsar’s name, which was imposed by the envoy. One of the khan’s nobles, a certain Dural, contended that the envoy had not asked for the khan’s well-being either and added, “You do not have any business to do here and therefore go back to where you came”. He reminded Starkov of Altyn’s superior leadership status due to the khan’s Chingizid origin and at one point even threatened to kill the envoy.120 Daichin refused to take an oath in person and use his stamp during the 1658 negotiation procedure. He also did not get up and take off his hat at the request of the Russian envoy Gorokhov.121 His charismatic grandson Aiuka, in turn, considered himself equal to Peter I and therefore refused to take an oath of allegiance and send hostages to the tsar.122 However, he agreed to stand up and take his hat off during the negotiations of one shert agreement with the Russians.123 Jungar leader Galdan Boshoktu Khan, who was interested in establishing cooperation with the Russians against the Mongols, was first to ask the Russian envoys about the tsar’s well-being during their 1692 visit and also got up and took off his hat at the envoys’ request.124 His nephew Tsevan Rabdan, who strove to secure Russian cooperation against his uncle, in turn, kneeled while accepting a royal charter in 1702, but he did not get up when he asked about the tsar’s well-being and did not take off his hat.125 However, his successor, Senge, refused to follow a similar etiquette, arguing that he had been unfamiliar with it. To the repeated demands of the Russian envoy Vasily, Senge angrily replied, “You’ve come to teach me! I told you that we are not familiar with these customs!” He then threw the fabric sent by the tsar as a gift to him to the middle of his yurt. Senge reminded Vasily that he had sent his envoys to the tsar not for the sake of placing himself under the

Uneasy encounters 67 tsar but for negotiating the return of his subjects who had been hiding in Russian forts, and he threatened to attack these forts. Senge’s behaviour thus reflected his frustration with respect to the aforementioned unsettled debates with the Russians involving sovereignty over the local frontier populations.126 As these examples suggest, the norms of the etiquette imposed by the Russian envoys were not of mandatory character, but rather were performed by their hosts only when they had a stake in enacting them. On the whole, Russian frontier officials showed a great deal of awareness towards treating Kalmyk and other non-Russian leaders and their envoys with respect. Royal charters to local Siberian authorities invariably mentioned friendliness and solicitude (derzhat’ privet i lasku), which they were instructed to display towards non-Russian leaders and their envoys. The Tobol’sk voevoda I. S. Kurakin, for example, reported to the tsar in 1616 that the local Russian noble, a certain Fedor Korkodinov, had abused the Kalmyk envoys, who had been visiting him, by depriving them of their sheep and not offering food, which, Kurakin warned, could significantly harm the tsar’s mission and image. Kurakin suggested that he would restore the tsar’s good name by paying the envoys from the state’s funds under his disposal. In contrast, the envoys of Kalmyk noble Dalai Batyr, who visited the tsar in 1618, were treated with the all signs of respect that the Muscovite court usually displayed towards foreign ambassadors. In particular, they were greeted by the tsar’s personal guards (strel’tsy), who were dressed up in festive clothes. Some guards lined up along the envoys’ path, while others stood on the porch or inside the Prikaz, where the tsar accepted them.127

Written vs oral correspondence In general, the nomadic attitude towards written words was ambivalent. Because of the perishable nature of paper, the contents of written documents, including tsarist charters, were not viewed by the Kalmyk taishas as having the capacity of imposing their authors’ will. V. M. Bakunin remarked that the shert agreements signed by Aiuka in 1677 and 1684 had been written in Russian, and Aiuka had signed them without understanding their specific contents.128 In addition, as N. I. Veselovsky remarked, written agreements did not have any meaning in Asia, because they restricted freedom of action.129 Moreover, the written words were suspected of having the capacity to distort the true course of events and conceal the truth. One Kalmyk noble was quoted as saying that “After having learned how to write, we learned how to lie”.130 Due to the lack of translators from Mongol, Kalmyk, Oirat and other Inner Asian languages that persisted until the end of the seventeenth century, shert charters were initially written in Russian and then translated into Tatar. The word shert, the Tatar modification of the Arabic shart that penetrated the Russian diplomatic vocabulary during the period of the Golden Horde, was unfamiliar to the Kalmyk leadership. As A. M. Dzhalaeva has shown, the Kalmyks did not understand charters written either in Tatar or in Russian, which the Russians sent to them. The charters could occasionally be translated into Kalmyk by some envoys,

68  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations many of whom, as a rule, represented the tsar’s Cossack or Tatar servicemen, or by the taishas’ own men who knew Russian or Tatar. The poor quality of the translations produced by these men, however, did not contribute to making the charters’ contents more comprehensible for the Kalmyks.131 Against this background, both sides resumed their communication in both written and oral forms.132 This might explain why Mongol khan Altyn was able to receive the desired items from the tsar, which he had listed in a 1617 letter written in Mongol, including three silver vessels, pearls, two or three good sabres and 200 rifles (pishchali). Being unable to translate his letter, the officials ordered his envoys to convey the letter’s contents in oral form, which the officials then recorded.133 Generally, both sides seem to have been well aware of the power and speed of oral communication in the nomadic world. For example, Khan Altyn, who strove to keep his relations with the Russians in secret, ordered his subjects to refrain from sharing any related information with other nomads.134 Russian envoys, in turn, during their visits to the Jungar and other nomadic leaders, engaged themselves in intelligence gathering by interviewing the leaders’ subjects. Informed about this aspect of their mission, Tsevan Rabdan ordered his subjects not to talk with the tsar’s envoys.135 To intimidate the Qing, Galdan Boshoktu Khan spread rumours about the participation of Russian soldiers in his campaign against the Mongols in the period preceding the negotiation of the Nerchinsk Treaty.136 As a rule, after their arrival, the non-Russian envoys were interviewed by local authorities about their bosses’ requests and intentions “apart from listy” [a written letter]. The bosses themselves preferred to send their most significant information through their envoys in oral form in addition to written documents by indicating in these documents that their envoys had been currying important oral messages.137 The voevodas wanted to make sure that they correctly understood the letters’ contents even after the letters had been translated into Russian. They therefore asked the envoys to reproduce the letters’ contents in oral form and to share their personal experiences. For example, after none of the Astrakhan governor’s officials could translate Aiuka’s letter, which his envoy Cherkes brought in 1717, the envoy proved capable of explaining the letter’s contents to the governor verbally.138 The envoys of Tsevan Rabdan were also asked by local Russian officials to transmit Tsevan’s request in oral form, because the officials could not make sense of Tsevan’s letter, which the envoy had brought to them in 1721, even after having translated it.139 Employees of the Kazan Prikaz must have been aware of this state of affairs, because they displayed a remarkable ingenuity in enhancing the royal charters’ appearance, by using valuable kinds of paper, golden letters and stamps and by placing the charters in special cases decorated with inscriptions, precious metals and stones. In their letter sent in 1633, the employees asked the tsar which size of paper, colour of ink (white, red, or golden) and language (Russian or Tatar) they should use to compile a royal charter that was to be handed to the Mongol Khan Altan.140 The Kalmyk apprehension about written words, however, did not apply to Buddhist written texts. The Kalmyks treated them much like amulets and other

Uneasy encounters 69 sacred objects that were believed to possess magical powers capable of protecting humans from various ailments. It was in this context that the Kalmyk taishas integrated the practice of putting little statues of Buddha and the Dalai Lamas’ charters on their heads during most important events of their lives, including the act of swearing allegiance to Russian rulers. Touching these items was believed to ward off misfortune, evil eyes and other bad omens. Bakunin, who observed the 1731 Buddhist ceremony of the nomination of Tseren Donduk as khan, remarked that rather than out of respect for the Dalai Lama’s authority, the ritual of touching Tseren Donduk’s and his nobility’s heads with the Lama’s charter stemmed from the Kalmyks’ belief in the spiritual powers of the charters as physical objects. Subsequently, Bakunin came to view Aiuka’s act of taking his hat off and letting a strong rain fall on his head as an evocation of this belief. When Bakunin asked Aiuka for an explanation, the khan replied that he considered the rain the heaven’s blessing and therefore believed that, in so doing, he would allow his body to receive it.141

Notes 1 Bogoiavlensky, S. K.: Materialy po istorii kalmykov v pervoi polovine XVII veka, Istoricheskie zapiski, vol. 5 (1939), p. 87 2 Chimitordzhiev, Sh. B.: Vzaimootnosheniia Mongolii i Rossii v XVII-XVIII, Moscow: Nauka, 1978, p. 16 3 Zlatkin, I. Ia. and Ustiugov, N. V. (eds.): Russko- mongol’skie otnosheniia, 1607–1636. Sbornik dokumentov, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo vostochnoi literatury, 1959, p. 29 4 Chimitordzhiev, Sh. B.: Vzaimootnosheniia Mongolii i Rossii v XVII-XVIII, p. 19 5 Zlatkin, I. Ia. and Ustiugov, N. V. (eds.): Russko- mongol’skie otnosheniia, 1607–1636, p. 24 6 Boronin, O. V.: Dvoedannichestvo v Sibiri XVII-60-e gg. XIX vv., Barnaul: “Azbuka”, 2004, p. 44 7 Baskhaev, A. N.: Istoriia Kalmykii i kalmytskogo naroda s drevneishikh vremen do kontsa XX veka, Elista: Dzhangar, 2012, p. 124 8 Bormanshinov, A.: Kalmyk-Oirat Symposium, Philadelphia, PA: Society for the Promotion of Kalmyk Culture, 1966, p. 22 9 Kolesnik, V. I.: Poslednee velikoe kochev’e: Perekhod kalmykov iz Tsentral’oi Azii v Vostochnuiu Evropu i obratno v XVII i XVIII vekakh, Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura RAN, 2003, pp. 48–49 10 Ibid., pp. 104–114; Kichikov, M.: Istoricheskie korni druzhby russkogo i kalmytskogo narodov, pp. 52–55 11 Zlatkin, I. Ia. and Ustiugov, N. V. (eds.): Russko-mongol’skie otnosheniia, 1607–1636, pp. 94–96 12 Puzanov, V. D.: Voennye faktory russkoi kolonizatsii Zapadnoi Sibiri, konets XVI-XVII vv., St. Petersburg: Aleteilia, 2010, p. 79 13 Ibid., pp. 93–94 14 Ibid., pp. 80–93 15 Ibid., pp. 22–23 16 Bogoiavlensky, S. K.: Materialy po istorii kalmykov v pervoi polovine XVII veka, pp. 61–62, 67–68, 74–75, 77–78, 80, 88 17 Ibid., p. 87 18 Ibid., p. 56 19 Ibid., pp. 57–58 20 Ibid., p. 72

70  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations 21 Gribovsky, V. V. and Sen, D. V.: “Kubanskii vektor” vo vzaimootnosheniiakh kalmykov i nogaitsev v pervoi treti XIII v., Komandzhaev, A. N. et al. (eds.): Kalmyki v mnogonatsional’noi Rossii, p. 172 22 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii: problemy politicheskikh vzaimootnoshenii, Elista: “Dzhangar”, 2007, p. 57 23 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii, book one, pp. 71–72 24 Bogoiavlensky, S. K.: Materialy po istorii kalmykov v pervoi polovine XVII veka, pp. 67–68, 70 25 Zlatkin, I. Ia. and Ustiugov, N. V. (eds.): Russko-mongol’skie otnosheniia, 1636–1654, pp. 354–358 26 Ibid., pp. 71–75 27 Ibid., pp. 89, 111, 133; Bergholz, F. W.: The Partition of the Steppe, p. 47 28 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii, book one, pp. 84–85 29 Zlatkin, I. Ia.: Ocherki novoi i noveishei istorii Mongolii, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo vostochnoi literatury, 1957, pp. 18–19 30 Bogoiavlensky, S. K.: Materialy po istorii kalmykov v pervoi polovine XVII veka, pp. 78–79 31 Ibid., p. 80 32 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, pp. 41, 47, 60, 63 33 Zlatkin, I. Ia.: Istoriia Dzhungarskogo khanstva, p. 111 3 4 Bogoiavlensky, S. K.: Materialy po istorii kalmykov v pervoi polovine XVII veka, p. 82 35 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, parts 3–4, p. 1 36 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, pp. 64–65 37 Khodarkovsky, M.: Where the Two Worlds Met: The Russian State and the Kalmyk Nomads, 1600–1771, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 96 38 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, pp. 76–78 39 Khodarkovsky, M.: Where the Two Worlds Met, p. 99 40 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, p. 89 41 Kichikov, M.: Istoricheskie korni druzhby russkogo i kalmytskogo narodov, p. 46 42 Kolesnik, V. I.: Poslednee velikoe kochev’e, pp. 78–79 43 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, pp. 90–91 44 Idem: Reforma Zargo i evoliutsiia instituta khanskoi vlasti, Ochirova, N. G. et al. (eds.): Mongolovedenie. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov, no. 2, Elista: “Dzhangar”, 2003, p. 165 45 Kolesnik, V. I.: Poslednee velikoe kochev’e, p.  80; Pal’mov, N. N.: Ocherk istorii kalmytskogo naroda za vremia ego prebyvaniia v predelakh Rossii, Elista: Kalmytskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1992, p. 118 46 Tepkeev, V. T.: Kalmyki v Severnom Prikaspii vo vtoroi treti XVII veka, Elista: ZAOr NPP “Dzhangar”, 2012, p. 250 47 Trepavlov, V. V.: Kalmyki i Rossiia v XVII-XVIII vv.: poddannye, vassaly ili soiuzniki? p. 64 48 Zlatkin, I. Ia.: Istoriia Dzhungarskogo khanstva, p. 172 49 Khodarkovsky, M.: Where the Two Worlds Met, p. 92 50 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, p. 91 51 Pozdneev, A.: Astrakhanskie kalmyki i ikh otnosheniia k Rossii do nachala nyneshnego stoletiia, Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia, part CCXLIV, St. Petersburg, 1886, p. 149 52 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, p. 114 53 Khodarkovsky, M.: Where the Two Worlds Met, p. 99 54 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rosiii, pp. 109–113

Uneasy encounters 71 55 Batmaev, M. M.: Vnutrenniaia obstanovka v Kalmytskom khanstve v kontse XVII v, Buchinova, L. S. et  al. (eds.): Iz istorii dokapitalisticheskikh i kapitalisticheskikh otnoshenii v Kalmykii, Elista: Kalmytskii NIIIaLI, 1977, pp. 42–43 56 Kolesnik, V. I.: Poslednee velikoe kochev’e, pp. 94, 105; Ustiugov, N. V., Zlatkin, I. Ia. and Kusheva, E. N. (eds.): Ocherki istorii Kalmytskoi ASSR. Dooktiabr’skii period, Moscow: Nauka, 1967, p. 140 57 Puzanov, V. D.: Voennye faktory russkoi kolonizatsii Zapadnoi Sibiri, konets XVI-XVII vv., pp. 112–113 58 Ustiugov, N. V., Zlatkin, I. Ia. and Kusheva, E. N. (eds.): Ocherki istorii Kalmytskoi ASSR, pp. 185–187, 238 59 Popov, A. P.: Kratkie zamechaniia o privolzhskikh kalmykakh, Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniia, Part XXII, Otd. II (April, 1839), pp. 150–152 60 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, pp. 156–157 61 Ibid., p. 134 62 Ibid., pp. 132–133 63 Ibid., p. 158 64 Badmaev, A. (ed.): Kalmytskie istoriko-literaturnye pamiatniki v russkom perevode, p. 31 65 In 1672, Aiuka sent 5,000 Kalmyks to the Azov and other Russian campaigns. In 1677, the Kalmyks participated in the Russian Ottoman War in the North Caucasus. In 1696, at the request of Peter I, Aiuka sent 3,000 Kalmyks for the participation in the second Azov campaign. The influential Kalmyk noble Dorzhi Nazarov wrote to Empress Catherine I in 1722 that at her order, he had defeated the Bashkirs, the Turkmens and the Karakalpaks. Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII – nachale XX veka, pp. 159–160 66 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, pp. 103–104; Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .” Rossiia i narody Severnogo Prikaspiia v XVIII veke, Moscow/St. Petersburg: AIRO-XXI/Dmitrii Bulanin, 2005, p. 107; Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII – nachale XX veka, pp. 159–160 67 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, pp. 109–110 68 Suseeva, D. A. et al: Russkie perevody XVIII veka delovykh pisem kalmytskikh khanov i ikh sovremennikov: teksty i issledovaniia, Elista: Izdatel’stvo FGBO UVPO “Kalmytskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet”, 2013, pp. 544, 585, 591 69 Khodarkovsky, M.: Where the Two Worlds Met, pp. 147–149 70 Ibid., p. 161 71 Dordzhieva, E. V.: Iskhod kalmykov v Kitai v 1771 g., Rostov-na-Donu: KGU, 2002, p. 266 72 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, parts 3–4, pp. 20–21 73 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii, book one, pp. 235–236 74 Bergholz, F. W.: The Partition of the Steppe, p. 245; Baskhaev, A. N.: Istoriia Kalmykii i kalmytskogo naroda s drevneishikh vremen do kontsa XX veka, p. 209 75 Zlatkin, I. Ia.: Istoriia Dzhungarskogo khanstva, p. 111 76 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, pp. 164, 167–168; Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 1, p. 11 77 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, p. 164 78 Ibid., p. 86 79 Batmaev, M. M.: Kalmyki v XVII – XVIII vekakh. Sobytiia, liudi, byt. V dvukh knigakh, Elista: Kalmytskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1993, p. 187 80 Moiseev, V. A.: Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg XVIII vv.). Dokumenty i izvlecheniia, Barnaul: Azbuka, 2006, p. 40 81 Besprozvannykh, E. L.: Kalmytsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XVIII veke, Volgograd: VGU, 2008, p. 55

72  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations

82 83 84 85

Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, p. 851 Ibid., p. 42 Batmaev, M. M.: Kalmyki v XVII – XVIII vekakh, pp. 178–179 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, parts 3–4, p. 18 86 Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi imperii, vol. 1, sobr. 1, N 540, pp.  923–927; vol. 2, sobr. 1, NN 672, 990, pp. 80–84, 495–499 87 Ibid., N 1541, p. 329 88 Dordzhieva, G. Sh.: Buddizm i khristiansto v Kalmykii, pp. 34, 36 89 Orlova, K. V.: Istoriia khristianizatsii kalmykov. Seredina XVII – nachalo XX v., Moscow: Vostochnaia literatura RAN, 2008, p. 52 90 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 2, p. 201 91 Frank, V. S.: The Territorial Terms of the Sino-Russia Treaty of Nerchinsk, 1689, Pacific Historical Review, vol. 16, no. 3 (August, 1947), pp. 265–270; Tolmacheva, M.: The Early Russian Exploration and Mapping of the Chinese Frontier, Cahiers du Monde Russe, vol. 41, no. 1 (janvier–mars, 2000), pp. 41–56; Ivanov, A.: Conflicting Loyalties: Fugitives and “Traitors” in the Russo-Manchurian Frontier, 1651–1689, Journal of Early Modern History, vol. 13, no. 5 (2009), pp. 333–358 92 Scott, J.: The Art of Being Not Governed, p. 68 93 Zlatkin, I. Ia.: Ocherki novoi i noveishei istorii Mongolii, pp. 34–37 94 Bergholz, F. W.: The Partition of the Steppe, pp.  83–86, 112–113, 218; Chimitordzhiev, Sh. B.: Vzaimootnosheniia Mongolii i Rossii v XVII-XVIII vv., pp. 37–38, 77, 80 95 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii, book one, pp. 191–193, 215–217 96 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke. (Ocherk vneshnepoliticheskikh otnoshenii), Barnaul: AGU, 1998, p. 70 97 Kushnerik, R. A.: Russko-dzhungarskie diplomaticheskie otnosheniia (nachalo XVII – 50-e gg. XVIII v.), Barnaul: AGU, 2008, pp. 55, 62 98 Bergholz, F. W.: The Partition of the Steppe, p. 248 99 Duman, L. I. (ed.): Vneshniaia politika gosudarstva Tsin v XVII veke, Moscow: Nauka, 1977, p. 193; Bergolz, F. W.: The Partition of the Steppe, pp. 252–253 100 Chimitordzhiev, Sh. B.: Vzaimootnosheniia Mongolii i Rossii v XVII-XVIII vv., pp. 121–122 101 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke, pp. 8–12 102 Idem: (ed.): Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg XVIII vv.), pp. 15–19 103 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v., Moscow: Nauka, pp. 79–80; Bergholz, F. W.: The Partition of the Steppe, p. 297 104 Idem: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v., pp. 79–80 105 Ibid., p. 92 106 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke, pp. 16–17 107 Idem: Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg XVIII vv.), pp. 22–23 108 Kushnerik, R. A.: Russko-dzhungarskie diplomaticheskie otnosheniia, pp. 90–96 109 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii, book one, p. 16 110 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v., pp. 84–85 111 Ibid., p. 65 112 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii, book one, p. 330 113 Maksimov, K. N.: Rol’ sherti v pravovoi inkorporatsii kalmykov v rossiiskoe poddanstvo; Kurapov, A. A.: Buddiiskaia obshchina na etape vkhozhdeniia kalmykov

Uneasy encounters  73 v sostav Rossii, Komandzhaev, A. N. et  al. (eds.): Kalmyki v mnogonatsional’noi Rossii, pp. 87–88, 223–225 114 Zlatkin, I. Ia. and Ustiugov, N. V. (eds.): Russko-mongol’skie otnosheniia, 1607– 1636, pp. 26–27 115 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, parts 3–4, p. 12 116 Gurevich, B. P. and Moiseev, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii, book one, p. 145 117 Zlatkin, I. Ia. and Ustiugov, N. V. (eds.): Russko-mongol’skie otnosheniia, 1636–1654, p. 34 118 Ibid., p. 21 119 Ibid., pp. 31–44 120 Ibid., pp. 107–133 121 Kolesnik, V. I.: Poslednee velikoe kochev’e, pp. 83–84 122 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, p. 70 123 Kolesnik, V. I.: Poslednee velikoe kochev’e, p. 104 124 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii, book one, pp. 215–217 125 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke, p. 14 126 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F.(eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii, book one, pp. 147–150 127 Zlatkin, I. Ia. and Ustiugov, N. V. (eds.): Russko-mongol’skie otnosheniia, 1607– 1636, pp. 46–47 128 Ibid., p. 103 129 Kushnerik, R. A.: Diplomaticheskoe iskusstvo Rossii i Dzhungarskogo khanstva (XVII-XVIII vv.), p. 349 130 Badmaev, A. (ed.): Kalmytskie istoriko-literaturnye pamiatniki v russkom perevode, p. 31 131 Dzhalaeva, A. M.: Politika Rossii v otnoshenii Donskikh kazakov i kalmykov v XVII veke, Komandzhaev, A. N. et al. (eds.): Kalmyki v mnogonatsional’noi Rossii, pp. 132–133 132 Maksimov, K. N.: Rol’ sherti v pravovoi inkorporatsii kalmykov v rossiiskoe poddanstvo, p. 72 133 Shastina, N. P.: Russko-mongol’skie otnosheniia XVII veka, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo vostochnoi literatury, 1958, pp. 25–28 134 Zlatkin, I. Ia. and Ustiugov, N. V. (eds.): Russko-mongol’skie otnosheniia, 1636–54, p. 58 135 Veselovsky, N. I.: Posol’stvo k ziungarskomu khun’-taichzhi Tsevan Rabtanu kapitana ot artillerii Ivana Unkovskago i putevoi zhurnal ego za 1722–1724 gody, St. Petersburg, 1887, p. XII 136 Kushnerik, R. A.: Russko-dzhungarskie diplomaticheskie otnosheniia, p. 67 137 Suseeva, D. A. et al. (eds.): Russkie perevody XVIII veka delovykh pisem kalmytskikh khanov i ikh sovremennikov: teksty i issledovaniia, pp. 195, 221, 238, 235, 293, 299, 305, 333, 336, 342, 351, 525, 554, 614; Suseeva, D. A. et al: Pis’ma khana Aiuki i ego sovremennikov (1714–1724 gg.): Opyt lingvosotsiologicheskogo issledovaniia, Elista: APP “Dzhangar”, 2003, pp. 74–77, 82, 87, 90, 92, 95–96, 99, 117–119, 121, 124–131, 136, 141, 143, 156, 158–159 138 Suseeva, D. A. et al. (eds.): Russkie perevody XVIII veka delovykh pisem kalmytskikh khanov i ikh sovremennikov: teksty i issledovaniia, p. 284 139 Veselovsky, N. I. (ed.): Posol’stvo k ziungarskomu khun’-taichzhi Tsevan Rabtanu kapitana ot artillerii Ivana Unkovskago i putevoi zhurnal ego za 1722–1724 gody, p. XII 140 Zlatkin, I. Ia. and Ustiugov, N. V. (eds.): Russko-mongol’skie otnosheniia, 1607– 1636, p. 199 141 Bakunin, V. M.: Opisanie kalmytskikh narodov, a osoblivo iz nikh Torgoutskogo, i postupkov ikh khanov i vladel’tsev. Sochinenie 1761 goda, Elista: Kalmytskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1995, p. 104

4 From patronage to protection ( protektsiia)

Russia’s ever-growing interference with Kalmyk leadership policies in the aftermath of Aiuka’s death in 1724 marked a new stage in the evolution of the Kalmyk– Russian relationship. Along with appropriating the right to nominate new Kalmyk rulers, Russian officials took over the practice of distributing Kalmyk ulus populations among the rival nobility and intermingled with Kalmyk dynastic marriages. The succession rivalry that followed Aiuka’s death was predated by a conflict among the khan’s close relatives, which Aiuka himself had orchestrated. After the death of his older son Chakdorzhab, whom he had named his heir, Aiuka nominated Tseren Donduk, his son born from his Jungar wife Darma Bala, introducing him to Peter I at one of his private meetings with the tsar.1 Other members of the khan’s family viewed his decision as violating the established succession pattern, in accordance with which Chakdorzhab’s older son, Dosang, had to be nominated by the khan as his successor. The emerging conflict ended up splitting the nobility into two hostile camps. A military confrontation between them, as well as among Dosang and his brothers, resulted in Dosang’s losing his people to his brothers and Tseren Donduk, including the latter’s followers. Astrakhan governor A. P. Volynsky managed to establish peace between the rival parties, which he credited to the peacemaking role of the empress, by making Tseren Donduk promise that he would return Dosang’s and his brothers’ ulus populations to their former masters. To facilitate the return, Volynsky ordered that these populations be permitted to cross the Tsaritsyn Line. Captured livestock would not be returned, but Dosang’s former rivals were put in charge of “feeding” Dosang and his brothers and their families. If the rivals refused to do this, Dosang and his relatives were to be maintained by the imperial court. Volynsky used the opportunity to persuade Dosang that if he converted to Orthodox Christianity, the people he had lost to his rivals would be returned to him. Although Dosang refused to convert, he reassured the governor that he would be a loyal servant of the empress. His rivals, in turn, accused Volynsky and V. Beklemishev of staging the conflict with Dosang and appealed to the empress to replace both officials.2 Volynsky saw the situation as favourable for interfering with Kalmyk leadership policies in a more straightforward fashion. To replace the deceased khan, Volynsky picked Aiuka’s nephew Dorzhi Nazarov as a successor. Peter I’s government approved of his decision and instructed him to prevent Aiuka’s widow

From patronage to protection (protektsiia ) 75 Darma Bala from marrying her favourite, Donduk Ombo, or any other Kalmyk noble except Dorzhi Nazarov.3 After Nazarov removed himself from the rivalry, Volynsky chose Tseren Donduk. Before making his final decision, Volynsky consulted with the influential Kalmyk nobles Zamian and Shukur Lama, both of whom expressed their doubts about Tseren Donduk’s leadership abilities. Regardless of their critical stance, Volynsky seemed to have listened to Shukur Lama, who had pointed out that the majority of the Kalmyks would follow those leaders who would stay in territories near the Volga, the Don and the Iaik.4 For his part, Zamian in his earlier conversation with Volynsky had reassured the governor that the Kalmyks would not be able to find a quieter and more peaceful place other than the Volga.5 Tseren Donduk’s low prestige in the eyes of the overwhelming majority of the Kalmyks, including his own mother, made him the most likely candidate to stay in the Volga region under Russian protection. The two nobles’ outlooks seem to have expressed the prevailing Kalmyk mood, given that other influential nobles, including Darma Bala, who sent two missions to their Jungar relatives in 1725 and 1726–1727, proved less successful at promoting the option to leave Russia for Jungaria.6 Interestingly, already in 1701, Aiuka’s son Chakdorzhab admitted to Peter I that he was not about to leave the Volga region, where he could wander happily.7 This suggests that by the 1730s, the Kalmyks had come to view the Volga region as a strategically convenient location, where they could carry out undisturbed raids and campaigns against the neighbouring populations, including the Nogais, the Qazaqs, the Crimeans, the Kuban Tatars and the Don Cossacks, along with the local Russians and North Caucasians, but also occasionally, collaborate with each of these populations against the rest. Bogoiavlensky’s remark that Nogai lands were of lower quality than the Kalmyks’ previous habitats in Siberia for grazing livestock reinforces this proposition.8 Most importantly, the new Kalmyk habitat allowed the Torghut leadership to maintain their status in the accustomed way, by undertaking periodic incursions into remote and neighbouring lands and their people, which often proved profitable for the Kalmyks. Apart from delivering large numbers of livestock, the campaigns enabled the leaders to increase their followers’ numbers by placing foreign populations under their rule. For example, after defeating the Nogai and other Tatar populations, Aiuka and other Kalmyk nobles integrated them into their own followings.9 In addition, the rulers imposed tributes on these populations and occasionally traded or exchanged their members for their own captives. Aiuka was said to have collected tributes from the defeated Turkmens.10 The remote Russian campaigns against the Swedish and other regular armies, despite generous Russian payments in cash and gifts, did not promise much booty and therefore were much less popular with all Kalmyk groups.11 In 1731, the new Russian empress, Anna Ioanovna, approved Tseren Donduk for the title of khan. The circumstances of his approval were precipitated by the escalation of a new Sino-Jungar conflict. Earlier that year, the Qing suffered a defeat by the Jungars,12 which motivated them to send several missions to Russia to persuade the Kalmyks and Shono Lauzan, the son of Tsevan Rabdan and Aiuka’s daughter, to fight against the Jungars.13 This time, the Qing authorities sought

76  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations to take advantage of Shono’s conflict with his father, in the aftermath of which Shono had fled Jungaria in 1726 and found refuge among the Volga Kalmyks.14 The Qing even promised the title of khan to him.15 Shono revealed the Qing’s intentions to Beklemishev and asked him for advice. Beklemishev suggested that Shono should not trust the Qing but should write a letter to the empress requesting protection. Shono followed this suggestion but also wrote a letter to the Qing, asking for protection and assistance in enabling his journey to China.16 In his letter to the empress, Shono wrote, “At this moment I do not have either father or mother and am ready to follow your orders”.17 He placed himself under the empress against his brother Galdan Tseren18 and at the order of the empress was also allotted pasturelands.19 The formal excuse for sending a Chinese delegation to Russia in 1731 was to congratulate Anna Ioanovna on her ascent to the throne. Members of the delegation also requested that the empress allow them to visit Tseren Donduk. The court officials informed the envoys that the Torghut leaders had been subjects of the Russian throne “from time immemorial” and therefore they were not in a position to make independent decisions concerning their foreign affairs. The envoys were surprised to learn about the status of the leaders but, nevertheless, persisted with their request. Finally, the officials gave up and summoned the translator Bakunin to bring the envoys to Tseren Donduk. At the same time, the officials hurriedly dispatched another envoy, who carried a royal charter, a sabre, a suit of armour, a sable coat and a sable hat covered with brocade to Tseren Donduk, along with separate charters addressed to his mother and Shukur Lama. On 1 March 1731, the empress ordered the Astrakhan governor, I. P. Izmailov, to hold a ceremony declaring Tseren Donduk khan, for which the governor received 300 rubles. Bakunin, in turn, was ordered to slow down the Chinese envoys’ trip, so that the envoys would not meet with Tseren Donduk before the approval ceremony. Bakunin carried out this mission superbly. As a result, the newly appointed khan declined the Qing emperor’s request, due to his recently sworn loyalty to the Russian empress.20 To secure Russia’s neutrality, the members of the Chinese delegation at some point suggested that the Qing court might share the Jungar land with the Russians after the defeat of the Jungars. The Russian officials wished the Qing every success in their struggle against the Jungars and politely responded that they did not need land, but for the sake of keeping friendly and peaceful relations with the Qing, they could accept the offer.21 In spite of the Qing’s overtures, the Russian Board did not allow a new Qing delegation to visit the Kalmyks in 1732.22 Remarkably, in his letter addressed to the Qing emperor, Tseren Donduk did not mention the name of the empress, adding it only after Beklemishev had demanded that he include it.23 Pal’mov wrote that both the Qing emperor and Tseren Donduk commissioned their envoys with conveying their “oral suggestions”, in addition to carrying their letters.24 In 1735, the VII Dalai Lama Galsan Jamtso (1708–1757) approved Tseren Donduk’s title of khan.25 The rise of the new Kalmyk leader Donduk Ombo (1735–1741), Tseren Donduk’s charismatic cousin and rival, was largely facilitated by the Kalmyks’ ability to make undisturbed movements across Russia’s southern frontiers. Before the

From patronage to protection (protektsiia ) 77 appointment of Tseren Donduk as khan in 1731, Ombo mobilized the Kalmyks to campaign in Kuban against local Tatars and Russians, which he undertook alongside the rival Kuban leader Bakhty Gerei despite the protests of the Ottomans and Russians.26 After defeating Tseren Donduk’s army of 10,000 soldiers in 1731, Ombo left for Kuban with 30,000 Kalmyks.27 In so doing, he invested in the accustomed business of long-distance migrations to put pressure on the Russian government towards reconsidering its nomination of Tseren Donduk. The empress sent a set of letters to Tseren Donduk, his mother, Shukur Lama and Ombo, in which she expressed her sadness and disappointment with Ombo’s disobedience. She threatened the recalcitrant cousin with punishment by sending an army under the command of General Boriatinsky. To this, Ombo replied that he was not afraid of the Russian army. At the same time, Anna’s officials sent off letters to the Crimean khan and the Ottoman administration, in which she warned against welcoming Ombo and his following. General Boriatinsky, who had about 14,000 soldiers at his disposal, failed to prevent Ombo and his ever-growing following from emigrating to Kuban.28 Instead, the general suggested pitting the Qazaqs against the Kalmyks.29 The Astrakhan authorities Izmailov and Beklemishev were charged with finding suitable pastures for Tseren Donduk, his mother and Shukur Lama, who had found refuge in the Russian town Tsaritsyno, and with protecting them from the Don Cossacks and other Kalmyks.30 Despite the Crimean and Ottoman officials’ assurances, the Russians soon learned that the Crimean khan had employed the Kalmyks in his campaign against Persia. In 1729 and 1733, the Russians went so far to contemplating plans to kill Donduk Ombo.31 Tseren Donduk pursued his own independent Crimean policy, rendering assistance to Bakhty Girei at some point, accepting an Ottoman delegation in 1734 and sending his ambassadors to Persia and China.32 In the meantime, Ombo’s Kalmyks began suffering shortages of local pastures in Kuban, which pitted them against the local populations and stirred tension with the Crimean khan. Subsequently, in 1732–1733, Ombo initiated correspondence with Tseren Donduk, which paved the way to restoring negotiations with the Russians. The Russian court sent its envoy, Danila Efremov, to Ombo with a charter that conveyed the promise not to punish him if he, along with his followers, agreed to return to the Volga region. The act of sending the envoy signalled Russia’s acknowledgement of Ombo’s leadership status.33 Despite the invitation to stay in the Crimea proposed by the Crimean khan in 1735, Efremov managed to persuade Ombo to return to the Volga region in this very year.34 Upon his return, the empress appointed him as the major steward (glavnyi upravitel’) of the Kalmyk people and assigned him an annual salary of 3,000 rubles, along with a supply of flour, which he received in the period of 1735–1741.35 In 1736, Ombo sent his Kalmyks to participate in the Azov campaign, together with the Don Cossacks and the Kuban Tatars, which led to the invasion of the Crimea.36 Although the campaign ended up bringing the Kuban Tatars under Russian rule, Ombo was allowed to collect tributes from them for himself.37

78  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations The Kalmyks’ alienation from the Jungars caused by the sudden death of Tsevan Rabdan in 1727 further reinforced Ombo’s willingness to cooperate with the Russians and his general orientation towards the Crimea.38 Tsevan Rabdan’s son and heir Galdan Tseren accused his half-brother Shono Lauzan and Ombo, whose sister was married to Shono, of his father’s murder.39 Ombo agreed to cooperate with the Russian government on terms similar to those that had been established between his grandfather Aiuka and the Russian state. Russian officials were also forced to meet Ombo’s demands to remove his rivals from the Kalmyk political scene. These rivals’ ulus populations, along with the populations of Darma Bala and her son Galdan Danzhin were placed under Ombo.40 He also remarked that after the Russians’ approval, he would get the approval of the Dalai Lama, in accordance with the Kalmyk custom. The empress reassured Ombo that his senior status would be promoted and that he would have full power over the populations who had joined him.41 After Ombo’s soldiers had contributed to Russia’s successful military campaigns,42 the empress elevated him to the status of khan in 1737. Ombo was rewarded with the corresponding regalia, including a royal charter, a banner, a sabre on a belt, a fur coat decorated with golden brocade and a sable hat.43 A year later, after his approval as khan, Ombo appealed to his Russian patrons for assistance in reconciling the khan with his rival son and nobles. After Ombo’s death in 1741, the officials also interfered in a rivalry between Darma Bala and Ombo’s widow Jan.44 The Russian side’s readiness to comply with Ombo’s demands was strongly motivated by the reinvigoration of Jungar power under Tsevan Rabdan’s successor Galdan Tseren (1727–1745), among other things.45 Galdan Tseren did not recognize the Kalmyks’ submission to Russia. To the Russian demand about returning 15,000 Kalmyk families, who fled with Aiuka’s son Sanzhip to Jungaria in 1701, his envoys declared that these Kalmyks had not been subjects of the tsar but rather part of the Jungar people, and therefore, the Russians could not demand their return.46 Regardless of the Jungar stance, in 1730, the board instructed the vice-governor of Siberia, General A. Bibikov, about the necessity of treating the Jungar envoys in a friendly manner, because of their benefits to Russia. The general was told to use all possible means for bringing the Jungar leader under Russian protection.47 Galdan Tseren did not recognize the tsar’s sovereignty over the three Qazaq hordes either. The expansion of Jungar power towards the Qazaq Steppe and Central Asia began under Batur Khuntaiji and steadily grew under his successors.48 It reached its climax under Galdan Tseren, who had exerted his influence over Eastern Turkestan by the first half of the eighteenth century. Galdan promised the influential nobility from all three Qazaq hordes that he would restore their control over the Central Asian markets. In this period, some Qazaq nobles from the Qazaq Junior Horde and the Qazaq Middle Horde pledged their allegiance to the Russian throne, which was welcomed by Russian authorities as a way of achieving a desirable balance of power between the Qazaq leadership and Galdan Tseren. The Qazaq leaders’ new status, however, did not prevent the board from approving Galdan’s proposal to undertake a joint military campaign against the Qazaqs

From patronage to protection (protektsiia ) 79 in 1734.49 While protesting against the Jungar attacks on the Qazaqs in 1743, the board admitted that Russia had been unable to defend the Qazaqs, which produced a damaging effect on the image of the tsar and proceeded to resolve the conflict in a diplomatic way. The board’s members acknowledged Galdan’s sovereignty over the Qazaq Senior Horde and therefore demanded that Galdan return the goods of a Russian caravan that had been taken away by the Qazaqs of this horde in 1738.50 Galdan Tseren strove to secure Russia’s neutrality by showing his readiness to cooperate. In 1733, he asked Russian authorities to send their experts to teach his people the production of canons, firearms and fabrics. To this end, he even sent his men to local Russian enterprises (zavody). The Russians agreed to send only textile workers and placed the Jungars who had been sent by Galdan under poorly qualified military experts. The Jungars reacted by secretly learning much-needed skills during their stays in Russian cities as members of Jungar diplomatic missions. During their sojourns, they also secretly bought sables, firearms and other military munitions from local Russian merchants.51 In addition, they employed Johan Gustaf Renat (1682–1744), the Swedish artillery officer, who supervised the manufacture of Jungar canons and arms.52 In 1742, Russian envoy Gladyshev learned from a Jungar envoy that the Jungars had 3,000 canons, which they carried on their camels.53 The Jungars also bought arms from the Bukhartsy (Central Asian merchants), who smuggled them from Russia.54 When the Qing negotiated a peace agreement with Galdan Tseren in 1740,55 the board responded by not allowing Galdan Tseren’s envoys to visit Donduk Ombo, to whom the envoys had carried Galdan’s letters about friendship and cooperation.56 The Qing also strove to isolate the Jungars from the Khalkha Mongols, forbidding the Jungars to send their caravans through the Khalkha Mongol territories.57 In 1742, Galdan Tseren replied to Russia’s restrictive policies by demanding to demolish Russian forts built in the upper reaches of Irtysh. Under Galdan Tseren’s predecessor, Tsevan, the Jungars destroyed the Bikatunsk (Biisk) fort and imposed yasak on the local populations.58 In 1717, at the Jungars’ demand, the Russians were forced to demolish the fort Iamyshevskaia.59 Galdan Tseren’s subjects were also about to attack other Russian forts and local Russian enterprises. The Russians retaliated by sending their troops to the region and ordering the Orenburg Governor I. I. Nepliuev to mobilize the Qazaqs against the Jungars.60 The Russians also demanded that Galdan Tseren stop taking tribute (alman) from the local population of the Baraba Tatars, because “they have been Russian subjects and paid yasak from time immemorial”. The Jungar leader responded that the Baraba Tatars had been Jungar subjects before the appearance of the Russians in the area and that the Russians had imposed their yasak on the Baraba Tatars by force.61 Galdan’s independent tone was strongly motivated by his confidence in his army of 80,000 soldiers that would find resistance from no more than 3,000 local Russian soldiers.62 Galdan Tseren, following in the footsteps of his predecessor, Tsevan Rabdan, strove to unite the western and eastern Mongols against the Qing by appealing to their common Chingizid origin and nomadic lifestyle. Similar to his predecessor,

80  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations he was aware of the damaging impact of the Qing khoshun system on the economic, social and political structures of eastern Khalkha Mongols that introduced territorial units among them. He was also critical of the Qing practice of rewarding titles to their nobility. In one of his letters addressed to them, he presented himself as a champion of the Mongol cause: “Therefore we lead this struggle. I struggle for the independence of all Mongols”. His appeal, however, was lost on these leaders, because they began to suspect him of authoritarian ambitions aimed at concentrating power in his own hands at the cost of their independence.63

The roads to Tibet Apart from pursuing their religious and political aims, members of the Kalmyk and other Mongol nobility travelled themselves and sent their envoys to Tibet to meet the nobles’ medicinal needs and promote their commercial interests. As a rule, the Mongol emissaries carried large numbers of livestock, which they traded for Buddhist religious items, medicine, food, tea, silk and silver on their way to Tibet and in Tibetan cities. To reach their destination, Kalmyk travellers to Tibet usually used two main routes: the so-called southern or steppe route that was controlled by the Qazaqs and the Jungars and a different route that crossed territories under Russian and Chinese control. They considered the steppe route more beneficial, because it was shorter and less painstaking. The availability of the steppe route, however, directly depended on the Kalmyk leaders’ actual relationships with their Qazaq and Jungar counterparts. Since these relationships tended to fluctuate frequently, Kalmyk travellers found themselves forced to take the alternative route, which Russian and Qing authorities used as leverage for imposing control over their travels and, in this way, exerting political pressure on the Kalmyk leadership. The authorities were able to exert this pressure beginning in the first decade of the eighteenth century. Until that time, both the Kalmyk nobles and their envoys seem to have had no difficulties travelling along the steppe route. For example, Kho-Urliuk and his son Daichin participated in the congress of the western and eastern Mongol nobility held in Jungaria in 1640.64 Daichin, too, most likely used this route while travelling to Tibet in 1645–1647; he was reported to have participated in a military confrontation between the Jungars and the Khoshuts that took place in Jungaria at that time.65 Aiuka’s envoys to Tibet, who brought him the title of khan in 1690, also seem to have used the steppe route, just as did Aiuka’s nephew Arabzhur, who set off on a spiritual pilgrimage in 1698. On his way back, however, he chose to travel through Chinese territories due to the 1701 Kalmyk–Jungar conflict. This prompted the Qing authorities to invite Arabzhur to their court in Beijing, where he was shown signs of high honour and even granted land in one of China’s provinces.66 Arabzhur’s prolonged stay at the Qing court prompted Aiuka to turn to Peter I  in 1709 with the request to send his envoys to that court to negotiate his nephew’s return, which was approved by the tsar. This was followed by the visit of Qing envoys to Aiuka in 1714.67 This visit prompted the Russian government’s

From patronage to protection (protektsiia ) 81 suspicion about the Kalmyk leaders’ interactions with the Qing, the Jungars and the Tibetan spiritual authorities alike. The growing Russian apprehension about Kalmyk–Tibetan affairs resulted from the Qing’s attempts to win over the Kalmyk leadership in their confrontation with the Jungars, using the Dalai Lama’s influence.68 In spite of the Russian Senate’s warning against collaborating with the Qing, Aiuka welcomed the Qing delegation and accepted the Qing emperor’s charter that was handed to him by the emperor’s envoys.69 Although the envoys failed to persuade Aiuka to cooperate with the emperor against the Jungars, Peter I forbade the khan to send his delegations to China.70 Aiuka, however, did not seem to have serious intentions to collaborate with the Qing. While he provided the members of the Chinese delegation with a warm welcome, he made it clear in his conversation with them that he could not violate his commitments to his Russian patrons. Aiuka thus employed the familiar balance of power strategy, by playing his Russian and Chinese patrons against each other to secure his independence not only from these patrons but also from his Jungar relatives.71 Eager to prevent a possible Kalmyk–Qing coalition against the Jungars, Russian authorities remained suspicious about the intensification of Kalmyk–Qing relations. Subsequently, in 1714, they did not allow a Kalmyk delegation to Tibet to cross Russian territories. Three years later, the Russian government also ignored analogous requests advanced by other Kalmyk nobles, including Darma Bala. One exception was made for a Tibetan delegation who visited the Kalmyks in 1719. The delegation included the future Kalmyk religious leader Shukur Lama, who was commissioned by the VII Dalai Lama to convey his message about the Kalmyks’ return to Jungaria.72 The rise of the new Kalmyk–Qazaq hostilities in the 1720s allowed the Russians to tighten their control over the Kalmyks’ pilgrimage routes.73 This came to manifest in their demands that the Kalmyks reduce their numbers of envoys and the quantity of goods they carried. The Kalmyk delegation sent to Tibet in 1729 to obtain the title of khan for Tseren Donduk was allowed to include only 41 members and take a restricted quantity of goods. Tseren Donduk and Shukur Lama were not permitted to join the delegation. At the same time, the Russians committed themselves to securing financial support and providing the embassy’s members with protection.74 After establishing their control over Tibet in 1721,75 the Qing also invested in extending their control of Kalmyk and Jungar pilgrimage routes. They invited members of the 1729 Kalmyk delegation to the Qing court, where the emperor offered them the option of using the steppe route in exchange for the Kalmyks’ cooperation against the Jungars. On their way back, the Kalmyk envoys were arrested and interrogated by the Russians, who also confiscated letters signed by the VII Dalai Lama that the envoys had been carrying with them. As it turned out during the interrogations, the head of the delegation, the Kalmyk Lama Namki, following in the footsteps of his predecessors, Aiuka’s envoys to the Qing court, had declared to the Qing emperor that rather than viewing themselves as subjects of the tsar, the Kalmyks considered themselves his military allies. In addition, the Russian officials learned that Darma Bala had entrusted one of the delegation’s

82  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations envoys with transmitting her message verbally to the VII Dalai Lama about replacing Tseren Donduk with her other son, Galdan Danzhin.76 In 1737, the Qing emperor did not allow a Kalmyk delegation dispatched by Donduk Ombo to Tibet to cross territories under his control. The emperor viewed the delegation’s members as Russia’s subjects and argued that he would negotiate his permission only with the Russian government.77 Russian authorities, in turn, questioned the envoys about the mission’s true aims upon their return. According to Pal’mov, this revealed that Ombo had charged the envoys with conveying his request in oral form about appointing one of his sons from his Kabardinian wife Jan as his heir to the VII Dalai Lama. The board used the evidence as an excuse to declare that from that time on, not the Dalai Lama but only the Russian monarch was in a position to elevate the Kalmyk nobles to the status of khan.78 Tsiuriumov’s data, however, shows that Ombo had informed Russian authorities about his choice of his son Randul before sending his representatives to Tibet.79 Curiously enough, the delegation of 60 Kalmyk men sent by the last Kalmyk khan, Donduk Dashi, in 1755, did not encounter any difficulties with either travelling to Tibet or visiting the Qing court. They, however, were not able to meet with the VII Dalai Lama, who by the time of their arrival had passed away.80 One can propose that the delegation’s undisturbed travels were largely due to the changed dynamics of the Kalmyks’ relations with their Russian and Qing patrons under Dashi, which will be addressed later. Dashi’s representatives turned out to be the last Kalmyk delegation to Tibet: according to Arash Bormanshinov, starting in the mid 1750s, the Kalmyk nobility stopped sending regular missions there.81 As for their Jungar counterparts, before the establishment of the Qing control of Tibet in 1721, they seem to have had no difficulties in communicating with the Tibetan spiritual authorities either. The V Dalai Lama was known to have granted a spiritual title of Erdeni to Batur Khuntaiji in 1635 and a title of Boshoktu (Precious) to his successor Galdan in 1679.82 After 1721, the Jungar nobility sent three delegations to Tibet: in 1740, 1743 and 1748–1749. In 1750, the Qing emperor denied the Jungars’ request to send a fourth delegation.83 If the emperor’s Kalmyk policies were oriented mainly towards establishing military alliances with the Kalmyks against the Jungars, then in his Jungar policies, the emperor invested in highlighting their shared Buddhist spiritual background. Despite the emperor’s initial intention to limit the size of the Jungar delegation to 100 people dispatched by Galdan Tseren in 1740, it retained its original number of 300 members. In 1745, Galdan’s son and successor, Tsevan Dorzhi, was allowed to visit Tibet to perform religious rituals to mark the one-year anniversary of his father’s death. In his conversation with Tsevan Dorzhi, the emperor mentioned the numerous rewards that he had given to Galdan in exchange for his loyalty. The emperor praised Tsevan’s initiative to strengthen Tibetan Buddhism among his compatriots and promised financial support and protection, assigning his envoys to the delegation and suggesting that Jungar lamas could be trained in Beijing. After the assassinations of Galdan Tseren’s successors, the emperor refused to allow any subsequent Jungar delegations to visit Tibet. He capitalized on the fact that the

From patronage to protection (protektsiia )  83 assassinations violated the main principle of Buddhism, expressing his concerns about the future of Tibetan Buddhism among the Jungars.84

Donduk Dashi, the last Kalmyk Khan After the death of Donduk Ombo in 1741, the Russian government appointed his cousin and rival Donduk Dashi as viceroy. The unfolding of Dashi’s reign was strongly shaped by the changing dynamics on Russia’s southern frontier, which began with the closure of the Don Steppe frontier by 1739.85 Although Ombo’s widow Jan was still able to flee from the Volga for his relatives in Kabarda in 1742 to resist her rival Kalmyk relatives and the Russians,86 under Dashi and especially under his heir and son Ubashi, Kalmyk movements across the southern frontier and their interactions with Kuban and the Crimea became significantly restricted.87 The closure of the strategically important steppe frontier in the Don region after the end of the Russo-Ottoman War in 1739 allowed the Russians to partition the steppe (Dikoe pole) and increase the tsar’s power over the Don Cossacks, which meant limiting their interactions with the steppe nomads.88 In addition, the Russian government constructed forts to the south of the Kalmyk grazing lands, which precluded any interaction between the Kalmyks and the Crimeans. The situation in the North Caucasus also changed after the Persian Nadir Shakh had established his rule in this region, including some territories on the Caspian shore in 1734–1742. In compliance with the Treaty of Belgrad that was negotiated at the end of the Russo-Ottoman War in 1739, Kabarda was declared a neutral zone. One of the propositions of the Belgrad Treaty forbade the Kalmyks to attack subjects of the Ottoman sultan. Subsequently, Ombo’s widow failed to secure the support of both the Persian rules and the Crimean rulers, which led to her returning to Russia and converting to orthodoxy.89 The changing frontier situation, along with the outcome of the rivalry, might have made an essential impact on shaping Dashi’s style of ruling. He found it increasingly difficult to maintain his leadership status in the manner of his predecessors, by undertaking long-distance raids and campaigns. In addition, he was not allowed to add the uluses of Tseren Donduk, Donduk Ombo and Galdan Danzhin to his populations.90 In 1755, after his conflict with the Astrakhan governor V. N. Tatishchev (1741–1744), Dashi was contemplating the idea of moving to Persia or Kuban,91 but this never came to fruition. No wonder Dashi proved to be a loyal servant of the Russian government, to whom he owed his leadership status and protection from his cousin Donduk Ombo. On several occasions, he sought to secure Empress Elizabeth’s personal interference in settling conflicts with his nobility and sent his son Asarai as a hostage to the Russians.92 The empress approved Dashi for the title of khan in 1757. At Dashi’s approval ceremony, his son Ubashi, whom the khan had chosen as his heir, was appointed viceroy. During the ceremony, Dashi received a sabre on a belt and a hat.93 At his request, Russian authorities constructed a fort and a house for him for hibernating during wintertime.94

84  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations Dashi’s ever-growing dependence on his Russian patrons drastically reduced his ability to make independent political decisions, which led to the growing impoverishment of his population and hence the deterioration of the khan’s status in the eyes of his subjects. The issue of Kalmyk runaways, whose numbers steadily grew, increasingly cast a shadow over Ombo’s and Dashi’s terms. If in 1723 there were about 2,000 impoverished families, then in 1741, their number reached 10,000 families, who made up one-third of the entire Kalmyk population.95 Many Kalmyk runaways chose to work as shabiners at wealthy Kalmyk monasteries or to study Buddhism to become monks. Tatishchev noted that to sustain themselves, 10,000 ordinary Kalmyks had become members of the Kalmyk Buddhist clergy.96 Ombo and Dashi responded by introducing strict measures aimed at fighting the growing criminality, including theft, among their subjects.97 In 1753, Dashi requested that state officials assist him in returning his runaway subjects. His request prompted the promulgation of a decree, in accordance with which only those of his subjects who had fled after 1736 were to be returned, while the runaways who had left before that date were to be left alone. In the wake of the implementation of the decree, 1,515 people were returned to Dashi.98 Besides Orthodox Christianity, some Kalmyk runaways chose to convert to Islam or to other Christian denominations. In 1750, Dashi asked Nepliuev to return his subjects who had adopted Islam and lived among the Tatars. While investigating the case, authorities ran across 854 Kalmyks who had embraced Catholicism, Lutheranism and even Armenian/Gregorian Christianity. Following the investigations, the authorities moved the Kalmyk adepts of the “wrong” Christian denominations to Stavropol’-on-Volga, where they settled down the Orthodox Kalmyks, obviously with the aim of correcting their deviations. K. V. Orlova notes that by the 1770s, the number of baptized Kalmyks made up 27,917 people. They came to comprise eight settlements established in locations beyond the Volga region.99 As for the Kalmyk nobility, it was mainly during this period that they began to view the tsar, in the words of E. V. Dordzhieva, as “a protector, a living embodiment of God and connected everything taking place in the empire with his name”. In particular, they linked the Russian monarch’s protective role to resolving the nobles’ most important issues, including inheritance, receiving payments from their Russian patrons, the loss of their populations to Russian settlements and persecution on the part of the khan and local bureaucrats.100 The royal charters of 1743 and 1744 ordering Dashi’s Kalmyks to attack the Qazaqs101 reveal that under his term the Russians continued to view the Kalmyk habitat in the Volga region largely as a protective buffer zone. At the same time, they kept a watchful eye on maintaining the khan’s role in the balance of power, issuing two secret charters (in 1744 and 1745) that allowed the Derbet Kalmyks to separate from the Torghuts and migrate to the Don.102 This was followed by a ban that prohibited the Kalmyks from crossing the Tsaritsyn Line imposed by Russian authorities in the 1750s.103 The long gestation period between the appointment of Dashi as viceroy in 1741 and his approval as khan in 1757 suggests that the empress was most likely

From patronage to protection (protektsiia ) 85

Figure 4.1  A Kalmyk noblewoman

motivated by considerations similar to those that prompted her predecessor to appoint Tseren Donduk as khan in 1731. Just as in the last case, Dashi’s approval was sought to prevent possible cooperation of the Kalmyks with either side in the renewed confrontation between the Qing and the Jungars that began in 1755 and ended with the defeat of the Jungars in 1758. Dashi himself, however, adopted a neutral stance towards the conflict, ignoring Galdan Tseren’s 1745 letter about cooperation and, instead, turning to Russian authorities for permission to send his envoys to Tibet,104 which he attributed to his desire to pursue purely religious and medicinal aims. Among the influential Kalmyk nobility, it was Darma Bala who continued to cherish the hope of returning to Jungaria. In 1745, she sent a letter to Galdan Tseren, asking him to enable her and her people to go back.105 The Russians found out about the request by intercepting a letter to her from her younger brother, seizing it from the envoys of the khan of the Qazaq Middle Horde Ablai, who had been carrying it to her, and putting her under house arrest.106 Following the death of Galdan Tseren in 1745, the Qing and Russian authorities, including Qazaq Khan Ablai, interfered with the ensuing power struggle among the Jungar nobility that culminated in a rivalry between Amursana and Davatsi. All three parties intermittently supported the rivals and, in so doing, precipitated the fall of the Jungar Khanate. Despite Dashi’s reluctance to assist the

86  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations Jungars against the Qing, some his nobles joined the Qing, while others fought on the side of Amursana and Davatsi.107 Generally apprehensive about free Kalmyk and Jungar movements, Russian authorities nevertheless curbed themselves from openly obstructing the movements, so as not to antagonize either the migrants or the Qing.108 In 1753, when Jungar noble Namki-Dorzhi and 10,000 families who followed him asked the Russian government to join the Kalmyks in the Volga region, the state instructed Nepliuev that if the Jungars appeared on the bank of the Irtysh, Nepliuev should neither permit to move nor prevent them from moving to the Volga region. This, as Pal’mov believed, was aimed at weakening the Jungars without jeopardizing Russia’s relations with the Qing.109 The Russian stance is well explained by the condition of the Russian army stationed in Southern Siberia in 1750, which numbered about 10,000 soldiers.110 Reluctantly accepted by local Russian officials, all Jungar refugees were ordered to be sent to the Volga region and placed under Donduk Dashi.111

The Kalmyk protectorate ceremony The ceremony of Tseren Donduk’s induction as viceroy held in 1724 featured new rituals enacted by Russian authorities within the protectorate system. By this time, both sides had abandoned the practice of negotiating shert agreements and no longer included officially bringing the non-Russian rulers “under the tsar’s exalted arm” in their proceedings. This notwithstanding, the Russian authorities continued to excel at enhancing the image of powerful and generous Russian monarchs in the perception of noble and ordinary Kalmyks alike. The Kalmyks also seem to have become aware of the importance of enhancing the symbolic aspect of their status as being under protection of mighty and generous Russian monarchs, by integrating Russian luxury and other items into important and less-important events of their life. For example, to entertain the Qing envoys, in 1714, Aiuka asked the Russians to send him musicians, soldiers, Russian food, drinks, drums and furniture.112 His nobles also asked to send Russian physicians, fireworks experts, medicine and luxury items to demonstrate the power, wealth and benevolence of their Russian patron. The unfolding of the ceremony for Tseren Donduk’s appointment as viceroy in 1724 was designed to illuminate these very qualities of Empress Anna Ioanovna. In Bakunin’s description, it began with the salutation of Tseren by soldiers of two Russian regiments, who lifted their arms. Volynsky opened the ceremony by saying that Her Majesty had sent him to restore peace and order among the Kalmyks that had deteriorated after the death of Aiuka, for the people’s own benefit. To this end, Tseren was to serve as viceroy, before a new khan would be nominated. Volynsky ended his speech by congratulating Tseren and wishing him to serve the Russian government with loyalty. The viceroy thanked him and promised to meet with the empress’s and the governor’s expectations, and then his nobility congratulated and embraced him. However, the newly appointed khan did not put either his signature or his stamp under the text of the oath but asked Shukur

From patronage to protection (protektsiia ) 87 Lama to follow the procedure.113 The ceremony was wrapped up with a generous feast thrown by the Russian side, for which a bull and several sheep were slaughtered. All of the people in the audience were treated to the feast and offered honey and wine in addition to other kinds of cooked meat.114 Remarkably, in his letters addressed to Volynsky, Tseren called the governor his older brother.115 As mentioned earlier, in 1731, the empress elevated Tseren Donduk to the status of khan. To mark his elevated leadership status, during the ceremony, he was rewarded the set of items, including a royal charter, a sabre, a suit of armour, a sable coat and a sable hat covered with brocade. Volynsky suggested these items in his earlier conversation with Peter I, by proposing that with time these items would become associated with the status of a supreme leader in the Kalmyk eyes.116 The 1731 ceremony reveals a considerable input by Russian authorities, who were under pressure to make ad hoc urgent decisions. The Astrakhan governor Izmailov put up the text of the oath, which mentioned the khan’s and his subjects’ royal service to the empress, by following her orders under conditions similar to those that both sides had negotiated under Aiuka. The Buddhist ceremony for Tseren’s appointment as khan was observed by Bakunin in 1735. He wrote that the Kalmyks pitched two large tents, one for Tseren and his nobles and the other for the display of Buddhist items. The latter tent was surrounded by about 300 Buddhist monks, who performed Buddhist ritual music accompanied by bells. After Tseren entered his tent with his female relatives and other nobles, Shukur Lama handed him the items sent by the VII Dalai Lama, including a charter, two banners, a hat, a robe and a belt, to which a knife, a sabre, a rifle and a bow with arrows were attached. All of the participants stood up when Shukur Lama first put the VII Dalai Lama’s charter on his own head and then put it on a table. He then put the robe on Tseren and proceeded to recite the charter’s contents in the Tungus language. After finishing reciting the charter, he touched the heads of Tseren and all the members of his nobility with it. He recited the charter’s contents in Kalmyk to the people standing outside the tent and touched the heads of the noble outsiders with it, while the VII Dalai Lama’s envoys touched the heads of the commoners with the charter. After completing this part of his mission, Shukur Lama returned to the tent occupied by Tseren and his nobility and congratulated the khan, putting a white scarf made of Chinese silk over Tseren’s shoulders. The nobility followed in his footsteps, congratulating the khan and exchanging similar scarves among themselves. Bakunin remarked that the Kalmyks usually performed this ritual during their celebrations of the Kalmyk New Year. The Buddhist monks continued the ceremony by chanting Buddhist songs and playing their instruments. The khan left his tent, put the belt on his waist and headed towards another tent with the Buddhist images on display. Before entering it, he took off his belt and stayed inside for a while, praying. The ceremony ended with a generous feast, to which all participants were invited. During the first visit of Russian envoy Efremov to Donduk Ombo, the Kalmyk noble host refused to stand up and take off his hat while accepting the charter from the envoy, explaining that he was not familiar with the custom. He went on to comment that the charter was only a piece of paper written by human hands and

88  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations

Figure 4.2 A Torghut temple tent (from Pallas P. S. Sammlungen historischer Nachrichten über die mongolischen Völkerschaften, 1776)

therefore was not worthy of a special ritual. He refused to feed Efremov and his companions and even prohibited his subjects to sell livestock to them. In addition, Ombo declared that he wished to hear the charter’s conditions from the empress herself. Despite Efremov’s input, he was unable to deliver the empress’s charter during this visit with Ombo and returned carrying it. Yet other Kalmyk nobles demanded that the Astrakhan governor Volynsky provide them with a proof in the form of royal charters, showing that his orders had been based on the empress’s decisions. Darma Bala, for example, demanded that Volynsky show her the empress’s charter proving the appointment of her son Tseren Donduk as viceroy. Volynsky was compelled to present her with a fabricated version.117 Astrakhan Governor Zhilin left the description of the 1757 ceremony of the approval of Donduk Dashi as khan. According to his description, on the chosen day, the governor sent his son, an officer and six grenadiers along with his carriage to accompany Dashi and his nobles. The Kalmyk delegation featured the future

From patronage to protection (protektsiia ) 89 khan travelling in the governor’s carriage and his wife travelling in another carriage to the governor’s place. Their noble following, including Ubashi, were on horseback. When Dashi came out of the governor’s carriage, 150 Russian soldiers saluted him. The ceremony began with the recitation of the royal charter by the governor, during which Dashi and Ubashi got up and kneeled towards the east. They then swore allegiance to the empress, while facing a Buddhist image and repeating the text of the oath after the governor. This was followed by Dashi and his son putting the Buddhist image on their bodies and their signatures and stamps beneath the text of the oath. The governor’s officials went on to recite the contents of the royal charter and the oath to the Kalmyk nobles in the presence of Dashi and Ubashi, who kneeled and bowed three times facing east. Dashi then handed the charter to one of his nobles, who, along with two Russian officials, read it aloud for the Kalmyks who had gathered in four locations. The newly appointed khan received the items symbolizing his new status: Bakunin put a sabre on the khan’s waist; Colonel Iunger put a hat on the khan’s head; and the governor’s nephew held a white banner, which had also been granted to the khan. According to Zhilin, the banner featured the title and name of the empress depicted in golden letters at the top, with the Russian coat of arms in the form of two eagles with golden crowns beneath the empress’s name. The coat of arms displayed the image of St George defeating a snake and the image of Epistle Andrei Pervozvannyi with a golden crown engraved in the middle of the coat. The banner’s shaft also displayed the engraved images, including the coats of arms of Kiev, Astrakhan, Kazan and Siberian guberniias, as well as the empress’s name written in golden Kalmyk letters. On the back were the empress’s name written in Russian letters and an inscription saying that the banner was granted to Dashi on the occasion of his appointment as khan in 1757. Dashi commissioned his noble Taia to hold the banner in front of his tent, so that the people outside could see it. Taia was also charged with displaying the aforementioned royal gifts – the sabre, hat and fur coat – to the Kalmyk audience. The ceremony ended with a military guard firing their arms, after which the governor distributed gifts among 20 Kalmyk nobles and treated all participants (about 10,000 people) to generous meals. At the khan’s request, the ceremony included drumming and military music. The noble Taia held the banner in front of the khan and his procession as they left for their camps after the ceremony ended. At Dashi’s invitation, the celebrations continued at his camp three days later. Along with generous meals, the guests were treated to various kinds of entertainment, including wrestling and fireworks. The newly appointed khan distributed titles to his nobles and granted exemptions from punishments and other amenities. By the end of the festivities, Dashi informed the governor that he was planning to mark the event by erecting a stone stele with inscriptions in Russian and Kalmyk at the ceremony’s site, and Zhilin promised to assist him. Despite Zhilin’s original plan to leave on 3 May 1757, he was compelled to stay in the khan’s place for two more days.118

90  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations

The 1771 exodus The removal of the Jungars from the political scene of the frontier encouraged Catherine II’s government to interfere with Kalmyk leadership policies in a more decisive fashion. In her 1762 charter issued after Dashi’s death in 1761, Catherine II approved his son and heir Ubashi as viceroy. The charter proposed that all Kalmyk groups have equal representation in the Zargo, the traditional Kalmyk court, whose head was to be elected by the viceroy, while its new members would be chosen by the viceroy in consultation with existing members. Unresolved cases were to be settled by the viceroy with a Russian official. If they failed to resolve them, the cases were to be sent for a final review by the Russian Board. Since Ubashi’s predecessors, as a rule, had chosen their own candidates for the Zargo and personally approved its decisions, historians have been quick to suggest that his decision to leave Russia was triggered by Catherine II’s reform.119 However, they seem to have underestimated the degree of the institution’s deterioration that began in the decades preceding Catherine II’s reform. As Bakunin observed, under Aiuka, the Zargo operated as the highest legislative and consultative organ that enabled interactions between the Russian government and the Kalmyk nobility.120 Its members determined winter and summer pastures, corresponded with tsarist officials and drafted instructions for the nobles.121 The Zargo’s membership usually had not exceeded eight people, including representatives (zaisangs) of most influential nobility loyal to the khan; two Buddhist clergy; clerks; and envoys. Aiuka settled most important issues and introduced the specific post of bodokchei to settle conflicts between Russians and Kalmyks.122 The Zargo was convened twice a year, in spring and fall. Not only the khan but also his nobles had their own zargos.123 In contrast, under Aiuka’s successors, not all important nobles had their representatives at the Zargo, which prompted the successors to appoint their own men and the latter’s children to represent these nobles. Donduk Ombo even appointed ordinary Kalmyks to these positions, which offended some of his nobles.124 In addition, Ombo and Dashi introduced new codes of tribal laws that stipulated that nobles and ordinary nomads would receive severe punishments for all kinds of wrongdoing. Pal’mov wrote that Tseren Donduk’s nobles had not obeyed him.125 These observations reveal that Aiuka’s successors were in fact less capable of exerting their authority over influential members of their nobility than he had been. Against this background, the Kalmyk noble Iaman wrote to Astrakhan governor A. P. Volynsky in 1724 that It does not matter who becomes a khan. All that he gains is a title and a rank. He will continue to live from incomes stemming from his own ulus population, similar to other nobles who rule their ulus populations independently. The khan does not have the business of interfering with them; if he does, no one will listen to him.126 This account suggests that the Kalmyk nobility’s separatist aspirations that arose under Aiuka were heightened under his successors. Ombo responded by adopting

From patronage to protection (protektsiia ) 91 an authoritarian style of rule towards his recalcitrant nobles and their subjects, which, in effect, further alienated these groups from him and ever-more strongly put him at the mercy of his Russian patrons. Although Catherine II’s reform of the Zargo limited some aspects of Ubashi’s power, it reinforced the viceroy’s status at the same time, extending his power to all Kalmyk groups, including the old rivals of the Torghuts, the Derbets. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the reorganization of the Zargo, some Derbet leaders and their populations promptly moved to the Don region.127 In Ubashi’s letters to Russian authorities, he complained about these nobles, pointing out that they had repeatedly failed to show up at the Zargo’s meetings and had refused to obey its orders. For example, in his letters of July 22 and September 19, 1765, Ubashi wrote that the rival nobles had obeyed only their own judges and resisted the rulings of the reformed Zargo. Ubashi had invited one of these nobles, the Derbet leader Tokmit, to the Zargo meetings, by sending, three times, his envoys to Tikmet. The latter not only ignored Ubashi’s invitations but even beat up his envoys. Remarkably, in these letters, Ubashi invariably cited the reformed Zargo as the sole institution with the legal authority over all Kalmyk groups. He therefore did not approve of the decision of Governor N. A. Beketov to allow a certain Kalmyk noble, Shereng, to cross the Volga during summer, which went against one of the Zargo’s decisions.128 In these letters, Ubashi also complained about local Russians who had occupied portions of Kalmyk grazing territories and stolen Kalmyk animals. Historians have cited Ubashi’s complaints as evidence that Kalmyks were losing pastures to Russian settlers. The viceroy also mentioned a Russian-imposed ban on Kalmyk fishing. Following his complaint, in 1769, the governor, Beketov, lifted the ban and ordered that the Kalmyk fishing in local lakes should not be disturbed.129 A more careful examination of available sources suggests that by the time of the Kalmyk emigration in 1771, the numbers of Russian and other non-Kalmyk populations settled on Kalmyk lands did not represent a serious threat to the Kalmyk grazing habitat. Willard Sunderland’s data shows that the settlement of the late Kalmyk habitat in the steppes south of the Black Sea began first in the aftermath of Russia’s victorious war against the Ottoman Empire (1788–1791). Catherine II’s territorial and resettlement reform, in turn, was implemented from 1782 to 1795, after the Kalmyk emigration.130 In addition, it was carried out mainly in the regions north of the Black Sea, including Kuban and the Northern Caucasus. During that period, only 18 per cent of all immigrants settled in the Lower Volga region that included the Saratov and Astrakhan provinces, with the latter province constituting the late Kalmyk habitat.131 Moreover, Trepavlov has argued that the resettlement of the Lower Volga was considered undesirable and therefore not implemented before the Kalmyk emigration in 1771.132 The establishment of another autonomous nomadic body, the Qazaq Bokei Horde, by Russian officials in the late Kalmyk habitat in 1801, can further challenge the credibility of the theory that land was the central causal factor in the exodus. The construction of the Tsaritsyn Line (1717–1720) that connected the middle Volga with the middle Don did not seriously affect the Kalmyk seasonal migrations

92  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations across the Volga from its so-called meadow or left bank to the opposite or right bank and back. Initially, the Tsaritsyn Line was constructed at the request of Ismail, the ruler of the Nogai Horde, to prevent his subjects from leaving him.133 In time, it was used to protect the Kalmyks from their enemies and to protect the growing Russian population on the inner side of the Tsaritsyn Line from incursions by the Kalmyks and other nomadic populations.134 Despite Volynsky’s attempts to use the Tsaritsyn Line as leverage for putting pressure on the rival Kalmyk nobles in the aftermath of Aiuka’s death, he proved incapable of preventing Donduk Ombo and his large following from emigrating to Kuban. Due to its location but also an insufficient number of Russian soldiers, the lack of food and fodder, the Tsaritsyn Line also proved useless for curtailing the periodic Kalmyk migrations, which they undertook during the time under consideration and beyond. For example, the Derbet nobles and their populations continued to migrate between the Volga and the Don until the beginning of the nineteenth century.135 Dordzhieva has mentioned a secret charter attributed to the VII Dalai Lama that was circulated among the Kalmyks on the eve of the exodus, calling the Kalmyks to return to Jungaria. She has also noted a new imperial order that tasked Ubashi with sending 10,000 Kalmyks to an upcoming Russian campaign, which frustrated him and his Kalmyks. By this time, both the Kalmyk nobles and ordinary men felt exhausted by their frequent participation in Russia’s wars.136 In addition, the arrival of the imperial order coincided with a conflict that had been unfolding between Ubashi and the Russian General de Medem, under whose command Ubashi and his Kalmyks had been placed. The viceroy felt insulted by the general’s arrogant conduct and reacted by ordering his Kalmyks to withdraw their participation in the campaign. After receiving the imperial order, two weeks before the exodus, Ubashi publicly declared to his people that the Russian state had demanded that he send his son and the sons of other Kalmyk nobles as hostages and had threatened to employ ordinary Kalmyks as soldiers in its military campaigns.137 After this declaration, Ubashi made the fatal decision to emigrate. Without underestimating the impact of the factors just listed, I  argue that Ubashi’s decision was motivated, in the first place, by the contemporary conditions of Russia’s southern frontiers and Inner Asian frontiers. If the southern frontiers by the time of the exodus had been effectively closed due to the RussoOttoman War, in which, as mentioned, the Kalmyks participated, the Inner Asian frontiers continued to operate as contested borderland territories. This was largely due to Qing authorities, who in the period following the defeat of the Jungars in 1758 until the Kalmyk emigration in 1771, used the former Jungar territories largely as buffer zones, protecting their own core populations and territories from Qazaq, Kyrgyz and other frontier nomadic populations. They therefore largely restrained themselves from resettling these territories with their own populations. The Qing adhered to similar policies towards their frontier territories in the Far East as well. Although the Nerchinsk Treaty (1689) secured their presence in the vicinity of Amur, these territories remained largely undeveloped until the mid nineteenth century, which allowed the Russians to regain control over the Amur region by this time.

From patronage to protection (protektsiia )  93 After the fall of the Jungars, in the period 1760–1762, the Qing established chains of mobile guiding outposts, so-called karuns, in their newly acquired territories. The karuns’ territories facing the Qing’s proper lands came to be designated as the karuns’ inner territories, which the Qing reserved for those nomadic communities who had voluntarily placed themselves under Qing control. Since these communities’ allegiance tended to fluctuate, the karuns eventually came to demarcate the Qing’s virtual rather than territorial borders. This complies with L. J. Newby’s research, showing that until 1864, the Qing’s northwestern frontiers had remained “an abstraction”, due to the karuns that represented “limits of the Qing legal jurisdiction but not territorial limits”.138 In other words, in the period of interest, Qing authorities largely neglected to establish clear territorial demarcations of their new domain, which as Newby remarks, “left ample room for maneuver and misunderstanding” on the part of the Qing and the populations on their northern frontiers.139 The Qing frontier situation became additionally complicated by the fact that, as B. P. Gurevich remarked, the Qing themselves had a vague idea of the geographical borders of the former Jungar lands.140 Newby’s conclusions strongly support the findings of V. A. Moiseev, according to which, after the fall of the Jungars in 1758, the Qing established three types of military outposts in the territories bordering Qazaq and Kyrgyz pastures and the Mountainous Altai: 1 Permanent posts that were established on the borders of the Qing Empire proper 2 Mobile or seasonal posts 3 Temporary posts that were set up to prevent the nomads from entering Chinese territories.141 The vague territorial dimension of the last two types of posts reveals that in the period 1758–1881, vast portions of the Inner Asian frontier continued to operate as permeable frontier areas. This condition continued to entice the Kalmyk and other nomadic leaders to invest in their accustomed ways of maintaining their leadership status. As we shall see, in the decades following the destruction of the Jungars, Qing authorities invited Qazaq Khan Ablai and other Qazaq nobles to occupy the former Jungar territories, provided that they placed themselves under the Qing. Given that the Kalmyk and Qazaq leadership camps were usually well informed about each other’s affairs, Ubashi and his nobles, like their Qazaq counterparts, seem to have become intrigued by the prospect of occupying the former Jungar lands. They decided to reach their destination despite its remoteness and the hostility of the Qazaqs and other nomads who controlled territories on their way. Strikingly, while approaching the former Jungar pastures, the fleeing Kalmyks and their Qazaq persecutors did not encounter any Russian or Chinese guards but met with a Chinese army that stood on the bank of a river, where both groups at some point arrived.142 The Qing must have received the news about the fleeing Kalmyks and sent their soldiers to protect the runaways.

94  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations Contemporary Qing accounts reported that the runaway Kalmyk leaders had at first hesitated to become the Qing emperor’s subjects, which had been imposed on them as the condition for gaining access to the former Jungar lands. Yet facing the terrible losses of their population and livestock, which they had suffered on their way to China, the nobles finally found themselves compelled to accept the condition.143 Only about one-third of the emigrated Kalmyk population, whose overwhelming majority represented the Torghuts, reached their final destination in China due to the loss of their people to military skirmishes with the Cossacks, the Bashkirs and the Qazaqs, who had been sent by the government to bring them back, and starvation caused by the shortage of livestock and water. Dordzhieva has estimated that the number of emigrated Kalmyks made up more than 180,000 people, or about 70 per cent, of the whole Kalmyk Volga population, of whom only 75,000 people were able to arrive in China.144 If the Don Cossacks chose to transform themselves from the tsar’s free servicemen into his subjects and, in so doing, facilitated the closure of the Don Steppe frontier in 1739, Ubashi and his nobles acted on the basis of the well-established nomadic custom of showing resistance and discontent when imperial authorities attempted to limit their free movements. In addition, the young Kalmyk leader used the emigration as a tool for reinforcing his status vis-à-vis those nobles who had hesitated to acknowledge him or had dismissed his leadership abilities. In a way, by leaving Russia for the former Jungar lands, Ubashi and his nobles continued the more-than-150-year-old practices of their ancestors, who had moved to Russia in search of pastures, free markets and reinforced leadership identities. This allows us to contend that throughout their stay in Russia, the Kalmyks were, in fact, able to preserve the basic features of their sociopolitical organization. The Kalmyk exodus prompted Catherine II to abolish the Kalmyk Khanate, along with the titles of khan and viceroy, and place the Kalmyk customary institution of Zargo under the state’s control. Yet her successor, Paul I, restored the institution of viceroy, appointing the Derbet noble Chigai Tundutov as viceroy of the Kalmyk people in 1800 and sending him the symbols of superior power, including a sabre, a suit of armour and a sable coat. Dordzhieva’s research suggests that the new stage of the Kalmyk–Russian relationship continued to unfold largely within the protectorate framework: the new Kalmyk leader was granted executive powers and was put in charge of providing troops on demand and keeping peace and order among his subjects.145 The abolition of the viceroy institution after Tundutov’s death in 1803 was followed by the introduction of a number of provisional institutions that largely preserved the Kalmyk population’s autonomous status.146 Under Alexander I, the Zargo institution was placed under the Astrakhan governor; it was finally abolished in 1847.147 The integration of the Kalmyks into all-Russian economic, social and political structures began first with the promulgation of The Rules on the Administration of Kalmyk Population in 1825. Among other things, the rules reinforced the Kalmyk nobility’s status, allowing them to impose higher taxes on their subjects, part of which was to be spent on the maintenance of their local administrations.148

From patronage to protection (protektsiia ) 95 As the remaining chapters of the book will show, Russia’s policies towards establishing relations with the Qazaqs, the Kalmyks’ old adversaries and collaborators, retained their core protective nature while evolving towards imposing a stronger control over their free movements.

Notes 1 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, parts 3–4, p. 105 2 Bakunin, V. M.: Opisanie kalmytskikh narodov, a osoblivo iz nikh Torgoutskogo, i postupkov ikh khanov i vladel’tsev, pp. 44–45, 47, 72; Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 1, p. 603; parts 3–4, pp. 123–151, 230, 338 3 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 1, p. 603, parts 3–4, pp. 209–210 4 Ibid., parts 3–4, pp. 288–296 5 Batmaev, M. M.: Kalmyki v XVII – XVIII vekakh, p. 347 6 Khodarkovsky, M.: Where the Two Worlds Met, p. 186 7 Batmaev, M. M.: Kalmyki v XVII – XVIII vekakh, p. 347 8 Bogoiavlensky, S. K.: Materialy po istorii kalmykov v pervoi polovine XVII veka, p. 93 9 Aiuka ruled over 100,000 Kalmyks and 30,000 Nogai Tatars, Bakaeva, E. P. and Zhukovskaia, N. L. (eds.): Kalmyki, Moscow: Nauka, 2010, p. 47 10 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, parts 3–4, pp. 14–15 11 Khodarkovsky, M.: Where the Two Worlds Met, pp. 223–224 12 Moiseev, V. A. (ed.): Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg XVIII vv.), p. 57 13 Idem: Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke, pp. 60–64 14 Idem (ed.): Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg XVIII vv.), pp. 55–56, 70; Idem (ed.): Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke, pp. 53–54. Galdan Tseren’s own son in-law Lauzan Tseren fled Galdan for the Volga region in 1731 in the company of 30,000 people, Ibid., pp. 55–56 15 Idem (ed.): Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg XVIII vv.) (Ocherk vneshnepoliticheskikh otnoshenii), p. 6 16 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 1, pp. 213–216 17 Ibid., p. 226 18 Ibid., p. 234 19 Ibid., pp. 225–226 20 Kolesnik, V. I.: Poslednee velikoe kochev’e, p. 126 21 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii, book one, pp. 278–281 22 Moiseev, V. A. (ed.): Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg XVIII vv.), p. 65 23 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 1, p. 180 24 Ibid., p. 187 25 Kurapov, A. A.: Buddizm i vlast’ v Kalmytskom khanstve XVII-XVIII vv., p. 156 26 Khodarkovsky, M.: Where the Two Worlds Met, pp. 189–190 27 Bakaeva, E. P. and Zhukovskaia, N. L. (eds.): Kalmyki, p. 51 28 Ibid., p. 87; Ustiugov, N. V. et al. (eds.): Ocherki istorii Kalmytskoi ASSR, p. 190 29 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, pp. 228–229 30 Ibid., pp. 72, 121–122 31 Ibid., pp. 203, 218, 224

96  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations 32 Dordzhieva, E. V.: Iskhod kalmykov v Kitai v 1771 g., p. 29 33 Bakunin, V. M.: Opisanie kalmytskikh narodov, a osoblivo iz nikh Torgoutskogo, i postupkov ikh khanov i vladel’tsev, p. 131 34 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, pp. 203, 218, 224 35 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, p. 57 36 Khodarkovsky, M.: Where the Two Worlds Met, p. 209 37 Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII – nachale XX veka, p. 284 38 Bormanshinov, A.: A Secret Kalmyk Mission to Tibet in 1904, Central Asiatic Journal, vol. 36, no. 3–4 (1992), p. 168 39 Moiseev, V. A. (ed.): Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg XVIII vv.), p. 40 40 Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII – nachale XX veka, p. 285 41 Bakunin, V. M.: Opisanie kalmytskikh narodov, a osoblivo iz nikh Torgoutskogo, i postupkov ikh khanov i vladel’tsev, pp. 126–127 42 Ombo sent 40,000 Kalmyk soldiers to the Russian Ottoman War of 1735–39, Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII – nachale XX veka, p. 164. According to N. N. Pal’mov, in 1736, Efremov paid Ombo 10,000 rubles for the Kalmyk contribution to a successful campaign in Kuban, Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 1, p. 242 43 Kolesnik, V. I.: Poslednee velikoe kochev’e, p. 128; Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, p. 72 44 Ustiugov, N. V. et al. (eds.): Ocherki istorii Kalmytskoi ASSR, pp. 193–194 45 Moiseev, V. A. (ed.): Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg XVIII vv.), pp. 58–59 46 Ibid., pp. 68–69 47 Ibid., p. 47 48 Tsevan Rabdan placed Tibet under his rule in 1716–1718, Ibid., pp. 59–60 49 Kushnerik, R. A.: Russko-dzhungarskie diplomaticheskie otnosheniia, p. 113 50 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke, pp. 110–113 51 Ibid., pp. 95–99 52 About Renat see: Moiseev, V. A.: Novye materialy o Renate, Rossiia, Sibir’ i Tsentral’naia Aziia (vzaimodeistvie narodov i kul’tur). Materialy II regional’noi konferentsii, 26 oktiabria 1999 g., Barnaul: Az Buka, 1999, pp. 22–27 53 KRO-1, pp. 194–195 54 Moiseev, V. A. (ed.): Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg XVIII vv.), p. 165 55 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii, book one, p. 17 56 Moiseev, V. A. (ed.): Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg XVIII vv.), pp. 73–76 57 Chimitordzhiev, Sh. B.: Rossiia i Mongoliia, Moscow: Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1987, pp. 77–78 58 Moiseev, V. A. (ed.): Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg XVIII vv.), pp. 66–70, 77–79 59 Zlatkin, I. Ia.: Istoriia Dzhungarskogo khanstva, pp. 226–228 60 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke, pp. 113–122 61 Idem (ed.): Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg XVIII vv.), pp. 20–21 62 Modorov, N. S.: Rossiia i Gornyi Altai: politicheskie, sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie i kul’turnye otnosheniia (XVII-XIX vv.), Gorno-Altaisk: GAU, 1996, p. 64 63 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII- pervoi polovine XIX v., p. 95

From patronage to protection (protektsiia ) 97 64 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, p. 59 65 Bogoiavlensky, S. K.: Materialy po istorii kalmykov v pervoi polovine XVII veka, p. 79; Kurapov, A. A.: Buddizm i vlast’ v Kalmytskom khanstve XVII-XVIII vv., p. 86 66 Bergholz, F. W.: The Partition of the Steppe, pp. 297–299; Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 1, pp. 13–14 67 Kurapov, A. A.: Buddizm i vlast’ v Kalmytskom khanstve XVII-XVIII vv., p. 99 68 Moiseev, V. A. (ed.): Russko-dzhungarskie otnosheniia (konets XVII – 60-e gg. XVIII vv.), p. 16 69 Kolesnik, V. I.: Poslednee velikoe kochev’e, p. 119 70 Bergholz, F. W.: The Partition of the Steppe, p. 300 71 Palmov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 1, pp. 24–47 72 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, pp. 143–147. According to A. A. Kurapov, under Aiuka the Kalmyks sent four embassies to Tibet: in 1702, 1704, 1709 and 1715. Kurapov, A. A.: Buddizm i vlast’ v Kalmytskom khanstve XVII-XVIII vv. p. 102 73 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, p. 142 74 Kurapov, A. A.: Buddizm i vlast’ v Kalmytskom khanstve XVII-XVIII vv., pp. 132–140 75 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, p. 148 76 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 1, pp. 81–88 77 Kurapov, A. A.: Buddizm i vlast’ v Kalmytskom khanstve XVII-XVIII vv., p. 172 78 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 1, p. 240 79 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, p. 169 80 Ibid., p. 273 81 Bormanshinov, A.: A Secret Kalmyk Mission to Tibet in 1904, p. 168 82 Bergholz, F. W.: The Partition of the Steppe, p. 47; Zlatkin, I. Ia.: Istoriia Dzhungarskogo khanstva, p. 172 83 Perdue, P.: Tea, Cloth, Gold, and Religion: Manchu Sources on Trade Missions from Mongolia to Tibet, Late Imperial China, vol. 36 (2015), pp. 8–18 84 Khafizova, K. Sh.: Kitaiskaia diplomatiia v Tsentral’noi Azii (XIV-XIX vv.), Almaty: “Gylym”, 1995, pp. 223–233 85 Boeck, B.: Imperial Boundaries, p. 23 86 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, pp. 250–251 87 Ibid., pp. 268–269, 290, 300 88 Boeck, B.: Imperial Boundaries, p. 249 89 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, pp. 62, 251 90 Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII – nachale XX veka, p. 287 91 Tsuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, p. 257; Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII – nachale XX veka p. 287 92 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 2, pp. 199–200; Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII – nachale XX veka, p. 287 93 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 1, pp. 238–243 94 Idem, Ocherk istorii kalmytskogo naroda za vremia ego prebyvaniia v predelakh Rossii, p. 76 95 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 2, pp. 124–125 96 Quoted in: Batmaev, M. M.: Kalmyki v XVII – XVIII vekakh, p. 214 97 Ibid., pp. 125–130 98 Orlova, K. V.: Istoriia khristianizatsii kalmykov seredina XVII – nachalo XX v., p. 61

98  Kalmyk–Russian protectorate relations 99 Ibid., pp. 70–72, 77 100 Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII – nachale XX veka, pp. 248–249 101 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, pp. 261, 264 102 Ibid., pp. 264–265 103 Batmaev, M. M.: Kalmyki v XVII-XVIII vekakh, p. 353 104 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, p. 272 105 Batmaev, M. M.: Kalmyki v XVII-XVIII vekakh, p. 269 106 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, p. 273 107 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii, book two, p. 81 108 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke, pp. 143–144 109 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 2, p. 170 110 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII- pervoi polovine XIX v., p. 103 111 Ibid., p. 225 112 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, parts 3–4, pp. 22–30 113 Ibid., p. 321 114 Ibid., part 1, pp. 41–42 115 Suseeva, D. A. et al: Russkie perevody XVIII veka delovykh pisem kalmytskikh khanov i ikh sovremennikov: teksty i issledovaniia, p. 623 116 Batmaev, M. M.: Sotsial’no-politicheskii stroi i khoziaistvo kalmykov v XVII-XVIII vv, p.  240; Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, p.  69; Trepavlov, V. V.: Kalmyki i Rossiia v XVII-XVIII vv.: poddannye, vassaly ili soiuzniki? p. 62 117 Bakunin, V. M.: Opisanie kalmytskikh narodov, a osoblivo iz nikh Torgoutskogo, i postupkov ikh khanov i vladel’tsev, pp. 69, 101–103, 126–127, 139–150, 301 118 Nefedov, N.: Podrobnye svedeniia o volzhskikh kalmykakh, St. Petersburg, 1834, pp. 77–88 119 Dordzhieva, E. V.: Iskhod kalmykov v Kitai v 1771 g., pp. 36–40 120 Batmaev, M. M.: Kalmyki v XVII-XVIII vekakh, p. 167 121 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Reforma Zargo i evoliutsiia instituta khanskoi vlasti, p. 165 122 Bakunin, V. M.: Opisanie kalmytskikh narodov, a osoblivo iz nikh Torgoutskogo, i postupkov ikh khanov i vladel’tsev, p. 146 123 Avliaev, G. O.: Proiskhozhdenie kalmytskogo naroda, p. 272 124 Bakunin, V. M.: Opisanie kalmytskikh narodov, a osoblivo iz nikh Torgoutskogo, i postupkov ikh khanov i vladel’tsev, p. 147 125 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, part 2, pp. 94–95, 98–100 126 Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII-nachale XX veka, p. 342 127 Burchinova, L. S. and Orekhov, I. I. (eds.): Pis’ma N. N. Pal’mova Kh. B. Kanykovu, Elista: Kalmytskii NIIIaLI, 1968, p. 25 128 Tserengiin Surenzhav: Torguudyn Uvsh khany Zakhidluud (XVIII zuun). Pis’ma namestnilka Kalmytskogo khansta Ubashi (XVIII v.), Ulaanbaator: “Ekimto”, 2014, pp. 51–52, 62–63, 67–68, 110–111, 116, 120–121 129 Tsiuriumov, A. V.: Kalmytskoe khanstvo v sostave Rossii, p. 316 130 Sunderland, W.: Taming the Wild Field, pp. 56–57, 77 131 Kabuzan, V. M.: Emigratsiia i reimigratsiia v Rossii v XVIII – nachale XX veka. Moscow: “Nauka”, 1998, p. 31 132 Trepavlov, V. V.: Kalmyki i Rossiia v XVII-XVIII vv.: poddannye, vassaly ili soiuzniki? p. 664

From patronage to protection (protektsiia ) 99 133 Trepavlov, V. V.: Istoriia Nogaiskoi Ordy, p. 8 134 Pal’mov, N. N.: Etiudy po istorii privolzhskikh kalmykov XVII i XVIII veka, parts 3–4, p. 156; Bakunin, V. M.: Opisanie kalmytskikh narodov, a osoblivo iz nikh Torgoutskogo, i postupkov ikh khanov i vladel’tsev, p. 41 135 Bormanshinov, A.: Prolegomena to a History of Kalmyk Noyons (Princes) I. Buzāva (Don Kalmyk) Princes, Mongolian Studies, vol. 14 (1991), pp. 41–80 136 In the eighteenth century the Kalmyks participated in the two Russian-Ottoman wars (1735–1739 and 1768–1774), the Russian war with Sweden (1741–1743) and the Seven Year War (1756–1763). 137 Dordzhieva, E. V.: Iskhod kalmykov v Kitai v 1771 g., pp. 39–40, 63 138 Newby, L. J.: The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khokand c. 1760–1860, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2005, pp. 31–32 139 Ibid., p. 29 140 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v., p. 177 141 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia i Kitai v Tsentral’noi Azii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.-1917g.), Barnaul: AGU, 2003, p. 43 142 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, p. 262 143 Besprozvannykh, E. L.: Kalmytsko-kitaiskie otnosheniia v XVIII veke, p. 185 144 Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII – nachale XX veka, pp. 311–312 145 Ibid., pp. 226–227 146 Ustiugov, N. V. et al. (eds.): Ocherki istorii Kalmytskoi ASSR, pp. 185–187, 238. See also: Dordzhieva, G. Sh.: Buddizm i khristianstvo v Kalmykii, p. 48; Erofeeva, I. V.: Istoricheskii opyt Rossiiskogo gosudarstva po inkorporatsii nomadov, Erofeeva, I. V. and Masanova, L. E. (eds.): Fenomen kochevnichestva v istorii Evrazii. Sbornik materialov mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferentsii, Almaty, 19–20 dekabria 2005 g., Almaty: Kazakhstan, 2007, p.  109; Rudenko, N. N.: Politika Rossiiskoi imperii v otnoshenii “nerusskikh okrain” v nachale XIX veka (na primere narodov Zakavkaz’ia i Kalmykii), Komandzhaev, A. N. et al. (eds.): Kalmyki v mnogonatsional’noi Rossii, p. 337 147 Dordzhieva, E. V.: Traditsionnaia kalmytskaia elita v prostranstve Rossiiskoi imperii v XVIII – nachale XX veka, pp. 315, 317 148 Deev, S. Iu: Formirovanie sistemy nalogooblozheniia u kalmykov v XIX veke, Komandzhaev, A. N. et al. (eds.): Kalmyki v mnogonatsional’noi Rossiii, pp. 276–281

Part III

Placing the Qazaqs under Russia’s protection

5 The Qazaq Junior Horde and Russia

Peter I’s vision of the Qazaq Steppe as representing “a gate and keys to all Asian countries and lands” has been frequently highlighted by historians as the main motivation behind Russia’s advance towards the region in the eighteenth century. In accordance with this vision, Peter instructed his loyal follower, the Tatar murza Kutlug-Mukhammed Tevkelev, to place the Qazaqs under Russia’s protection at any price, even if the cost of the endeavour would exceed “one million rubles”.1 Often cited by historians, this quotation has overshadowed the Russian ruler’s equally significant concern recollected by Tevkelev that related to the emigration of 15,000 Kalmyk families to Jungaria led by Aiuka’s son Sanzhip in 1701, following a conflict with his father.2 By reinforcing the status of Jungar leader Tsevan Rabdan to a considerable degree, the event highlighted the crucial role of the Qazaqs and their territories as a buffer, protecting Russia from the threat of Jungar attacks. Before the rise of the Jungars in the first decades of the seventeenth century, Qazaq–Russian diplomatic relations were rather sporadic. After the rise, they acquired a more systematic character. In 1616, Russian envoys informed the tsar that the Jungars had placed the Qazaq Senior Horde and the Kyrgyz under their rule.3 In the period from the 1620s to the 1640s, the Qazaqs waged periodic wars against the Jungars that intermittently concluded with temporary peace agreements between the two sides. Aside from his regular assaults against the Qazaqs in the period 1635–1652, the Jungar leader Batur Khuntaiji also attacked the Kyrgyz, the Uighurs and other populations in the Semirech’e region.4 At some point, the Qazaqs helped his successor Galdan Boshoktu Khan ascend to the Jungar throne.5 This notwithstanding, he invaded Qazaq encampments in the 1680s under the pretext of introducing Buddhism among them.6 In the period 1686–1693, Qazaq Khan Taukel sent five missions to Moscow to endorse his idea to create a military alliance against the Jungars.7 In 1692, Taukel’s successor Kaip also sent a letter to Peter I suggesting military cooperation against the Jungars and establishing commercial relations.8 For his part, Tsevan Rabdan attempted to mobilize the Qazaqs against his rival Boshoktu.9 Soon, however, he started a war against Qazaq Khan Tauke in 1698– 1699 in retaliation against Tauke’s raids of the Jungars and their trading caravans. In addition, Tauke’s Qazaqs railed against two important Jungar missions, one of

104  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection

Figure 5.1 Qazaq men (from Pallas P. S. Sammlungen historischer Nachrichten über die mongolischen Völkerschaften, 1776)

which was bringing Tsevan’s bride Seterzhab, the daughter of Aiuka, to Tsevan. Another mission was bringing Tauke’s son, who had been kidnapped by Boshoktu and sent to Lhasa, back to his father at Tauke’s request.10 Conflicts between the Qazaqs and the Jungars continued to unfold in the first decades of the eighteenth century, with both sides intermittently raiding each other in 1702, 1708 and 1710. The confrontation between the two sides in 1716 and 1717 finally led to Tsevan Rabdan’s defeat of the Qazaqs,11 which forced the Qazaqs to move to near the late Kalmyk territories in the Volga region. Khan Kaip and Sultan Abulkhair from the Junior Horde asked Siberian Governor Gagarin for help in reclaiming 1,500 Qazaqs horses that had been embezzled by the Bashkirs.12 They also sent their envoys to the governors of Kazan and Ufa.13 In 1723–1725, Tsevan Rabdan invested in his success by renewing his attacks on the Qazaqs of the Senior Horde and Middle Horde and ended up with Tashkent, Sairam and Turkestan under his rule.14 Tsevan’s sudden death in 1727, which was followed by a new Jungar–Qing war, enabled the Qazaqs to retaliate against the Jungars in 1728–1729.15 After the 1720s Jungar attacks, the Junior Horde moved further north to the vicinity of the Caspian Sea, near the Rivers of Emba and Iaik, including the territories of the Karakalpaks in the low riches of the Syr Darya, whom Abulkhair eventually placed under his protection. The population of the

The Qazaq Junior Horde and Russia 105 Middle Horde also moved to the north, near the Siberian Rivers of Iaik, Tobol and Ishim.16 By the time under consideration, the Qazaq khans and sultans ruled over one or several clans or tribes and seldom over one or two, let alone all three hordes or jüzes (literally hundreds), including the Uly (Senior), the Orta (Middle) and the Kishi (Junior) Jüzes that represented large confederations of clans with specific territories. Sultanov believes that the jüzes emerged from the ulus system that initially formed the organization of Qazaq society.17 Each clan had at its bottom an extended family of three generations (ata balasy), followed by the larger kinship units of taipa (tribe, Russian plemia) and ru (clan or kin, Russian rod) in the middle and the top of the hierarchy. The extended family formed an auyl, the elementary unit of Qazaq social organization, whose members were related to each other through real kinship ties, while the larger units of taipa and ru represented fluid groups, whose members’ kinship affiliations with each other were fictional. Each Qazaq clan (ru) usually united members of several tribes (taipa) who claimed descent from a common ancestor. These true and fictive kinship groups were ruled by members of the tribal aristocracy.

The rise of Abulkhair Sultan Abulkhair distinguished himself in the wars against the Jungars in the 1720s. After Kaip’s death, he emerged as the senior ruler of the Junior Horde, which enabled him to establish control over Tashkent and Turkestan.18 In 1706, Abulkhair made his first attempt to establish diplomatic relations with Russian officials. He sent a letter to the officials complaining about the Bashkir and Kalmyk assaults, which had resulted in the murder of some his people, including his nephew, and the kidnapping of other Qazaqs, along with their livestock.19 The next year, however, Abulkhair participated in a Bashkir anti-Russian riot, and they elected him their khan two years later. During this time, some populations of the Inner Horde and Middle Horde also elected Abulkhair to be their khan. His title was approved by the Bukharan emir, who sent him a charter and a stamp.20 In 1718, Abulkhair sent a letter to Peter I, in which he suggested establishing trade and a military alliance against the Kalmyks.21 The tsar and his officials, however, ignored this proposal. In 1724, Abulkhair defeated the Jungars and regained his rule of Turkestan, but he lost the city to the Jungars again the next year.22 Following this defeat, in 1725–1726, he sent two missions to the empress asking her to place him and his people under her protection against the Bashkirs, the Cossacks and other local populations, who were considered her subjects, which entailed legalizing his subjects’ access to these populations’ lands. Both missions, however, proved unsuccessful.23 Before Abulkhair’s mission, in 1724–1725, a group of Qazaq and Karakalpak elders dispatched their delegations to the Russian court and local Russian officials but also had little success turning the officials’ attention to their requests. More specifically, the elders asked for permission to graze their livestock in the territories located along the rivers of Iaik, Ilek and Tobol.24

106  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection After being elected commander of the Qazaq resistance against the Jungars in 1726, Abulkhair proved able to launch two successful campaigns against them in 1727 and 1729.25 He brokered a peace agreement with Galdan Tseren but refused to send amanats to him. Abulkhair also ignored Galdan’s request to arrange a marriage between his son and heir Tsevan Dorzhi and Abulkhair’s daughter.26 After the Bashkirs resumed their attacks on the Qazaqs in 1730, Abulkhair decided to reinvest in his earlier efforts, sending a new delegation to St Petersburg. After his two final victorious campaigns against the Jungars, followed by his peace agreement with them, Abulkhair’s new initiative finally caught the attention of the court’s officials. In his letter addressed to the empress, Abulkhair asked her to protect his people from Bashkir invasions in exchange for his loyal service, payment of yasak and sending hostages: conditions that were similar to her agreement with the Bashkirs. He also promised to return Russian captives and informed her that he had made peace with the Kalmyks and the Jungars.27 According to A. Sabyrkhanov, before sending his delegation, Abulkhair had assembled members of his nobility to discuss this issue with them. Despite the fact that the majority of his nobles disapproved of his plan, he decided to move forward with it.28 Apart from protection, the khan also hoped that placing himself under the empress would reinforce his status with his own subjects and rivals. This, in turn, would contribute to restoring the unity of all three hordes that had eroded after the death of the most recent powerful Qazaq khan, Tauke. In her 1731 charter, Empress Anna approved Abulkhair’s request and proposed the conditions, under which she was willing to place him and his people under her protection, including their voluntary payment of yasak, their participation in joint military campaigns and their agreement to ensure the safety of Russian trading caravans that crossed the territories of the Junior Horde. Abulkhair was also to curb his subjects’ raids against the empress’s subject populations, including the Bashkirs, the Kalmyks and the Cossacks, and to return Russian and other captives. The Russian Board sent a delegation of 70 people headed by Kutlug-Mukhamed Tevkelev to Abulkhair that featured ten soldiers, ten Ufa nobles, ten Iaik Cossacks and 30 noted Bashkirs. The board charged Tevkelev with arranging an official procedure of taking oath to the Russian throne by Abulkhair and his nobles. Tevkelev was instructed to restrain from imposing the requirements of either delivering hostages (amanats) or paying taxes (yasak) on the horde’s nobility. He was also to keep detailed records of the geographical, economic, military and social conditions of the region and its nomadic Bashkir and Qazaq inhabitants.29

Tevkelev’s mission Tevkelev stayed in the Junior Horde from 3 October 1731 to January 1733. In his journal, he wrote that, initially, he had been compelled to hide the true purpose of his mission and his identity, by secretly meeting with the khan at night in the open steppe and dressing himself in poor Qazaq clothing. During his first meeting with Tevkelev, Abulkhair confessed that in his letter to the empress, he had referred to

The Qazaq Junior Horde and Russia 107 the will of his people without having obtained his nobles’ approval. In so doing, he hoped that his request would finally attract the empress’s attention. Tevkelev brought the royal charter and gifts with him when he met with Abulkhair’s nobles the next morning. Abulkhair had advised him that without first generously rewarding his nobles, it would be difficult to explain his visit’s true aim to them. After reciting the contents of the charter in the presence of the khan and his nobility, who were standing during the recitation, Tevkelev handed the charter over to the khan. Tevkelev reassured the nobles that the empress had been pleased to place the khan and his army under her protection and hoped that they would serve her loyally. The nobles responded to Tevkelev’s announcements with complete silence, and Tevkelev returned to his tent while the nobles divided his gifts among themselves. Tevkelev’s announcements had the effect of splitting Abulkhair’s nobility into two camps: one faction was angry with Abulkhair’s initiative and threatening to kill him and Tevkelev, and the other became attracted to Tevkelev’s cause. The former camp continued to threaten and attack Tevkelev throughout his stay in the horde despite his strenuous efforts to persuade them of the mighty power of the Russian state and its ruler and despite the generous gifts that he regularly distributed among the nobles. The hostile party considered Tevkelev a spy, who had been sent by the Russians to investigate the Qazaqs’ lands, their military capacities and their populations in order to turn them into a vulnerable target for possible Russian attacks. They therefore strove to preclude Tevkelev’s communication with the court. While facing the hostile nobles’ repeated threats, Abulkhair declared in a moment of despair that if the Junior Horde would not come under Russian protection, at least he, his family and his nobility would be protected by the Russians and provided with military assistance, which would enable him to restore his status among his people. In his journal, Tevkelev confirmed that Abulkhair’s initiative had been dictated primarily by his desire to reinforce his own rule over his subjects and rivals and to assign a hereditary status to his status. Tevkelev also indicated that the Qazaqs had manufactured gunpowder and saltpetre but did not have canons. They did not manufacture any weapons, but they bartered their sheep and horses for them with Bukharan and Khivan merchants. Unlike the Bashkirs, who used bows instead of arms, the Qazaqs preferred to use arms in their battles.30 After losing their connection with Tevkelev, members of the Russian Board decided that his mission had failed and sent 1,000 rubles to the Ufa voevoda to ransom him from the Junior Horde. In the meantime, Abulkhair convinced his Karakalpak subjects to follow in his footsteps, by placing themselves under Russian protection, which had the effect of reinforcing Abulkhair’s position among his nobles and, hence, saving Tevkelev’s life, which resulted in increasing the numbers of the Qazaq advocates of his mission.31 Thanks to his diplomatic and linguistic skills reinforced through his Turkic and Muslim backgrounds, including the backing of his Qazaq supporters, Tevkelev finally succeeded in having Abulkhair and his 27 elders swear their allegiance to the empress.32

108  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection The khan agreed, in his letter sent to the empress in 1731, to pay a yasak of 4,000 foxes and send one of his sons as a hostage (amanat) to the Russian court. He also promised to prevent his people from attacking the Kalmyks and the Bashkirs, to return hostages and secure the safety of Russian caravans and to participate in Russian military campaigns. Abulkhair also reassured Tevkelev that he would bring the Bukharan emir, Khivan khan Abulfeiz and Sultan Barak from the Middle Horde, all of whom had been allegedly under his rule, under Russia’s protection, and that he would do the same with other rulers.33 In December 1732, Abulkhair dispatched a large delegation headed by his son Eraly, who arrived in the capital on January 1734. Eraly gave a speech thanking the empress for placing his father and people under her protection. In his followup speech, Vice-Chancellor Osterman reassured the delegation’s members that the empress would render protection, while Abulkhair and Eraly should stick to their oaths by demonstrating their loyalty and service to her.34 In 1734, Khan Jolbars from the Senior Horde also sent his envoy to Ufa and was placed under Russian protection in 1738.35 Amid the rivalry among the Kalmyk nobles that followed the appointment of Tseren Donduk as viceroy in 1731, one of these nobles, Dorzhi Nazarov, invited Abulkhair to participate in a joint campaign against Tseren Donduk and the Russian settlements in 1732. In Nazarov’s letter to Abulkhair, he jibed at the Russians’ military skills by likening them to mice that he could take by their ears and give to the Qazaqs. Nazarov believed that it was largely due to the Russians’ settled way of life and their main source of living, which they derived from their engagement with agriculture. Nazarov also sent his envoys with the same invitation to the rulers of the Middle Horde.36 To demonstrate his loyalty to the empress, Abulkhair followed Tekelev’s advice to ignore Dorzhi Nazarov’s invitation. Instead, he suggested unleashing a campaign against Nazarov’s Kalmyks on the empress’s orders. Yet members of the hostile party, along with some nobles from the Middle Horde, responded to Nazarov’s invitation and assembled 20,000 soldiers. In the end, without obtaining the court’s approval, Abulkhair’s Qazaqs attacked the Kalmyks of Dorzhi Nazarov and embezzled 3,000 Kalmyk horses.37 Tevkelev also convinced Abulkhair of the benefits of having a Russian fort constructed on the confluence of the Rivers Or’ and Iaik. Abulkhair wrote in his 1733 letter to the empress that along with developing commercial activities between the two sides, a fort constructed on the isthmus of the River Or’ would strengthen his status and hence Russia’s rule over his subjects and the neighbouring populations. He asked the empress to dispatch 2,000 workers to build the fort.38 Apart from the reasons listed in Abulkhair’s letter, Tevkelev saw the proposed fort as an effective means of curtailing any independent Qazaq movements. In his 1732 report to the board, he pointed to the Qazaq nobles’ frequent requests for permission to wander along the Iaik.39 Access to rivers and other natural sources of water supply all year round played a crucial role in the Qazaqs’ nomadic economy. In addition, Qazaq nomads traditionally used the rushy banks of the rivers to protect their livestock from severe winter storms. Tevkelev’s choice of location

The Qazaq Junior Horde and Russia 109 was therefore not accidental. He observed that the isthmus had been used by the Qazaqs for crossing to the opposite side of the river, where they grazed their livestock during wintertime. One of the advantages of using these territories included access to the local rivers. In contrast, the lands in the Qazaqs’ current territories lacked natural water resources, which compelled them to dig wells and use them to provide water for their livestock. The wells, however, often proved insufficient. Given the crucial role of winter pastures in the Qazaq nomadic economy, Tevkelev noticed that a Russian fort constructed in this location would ultimately make their leaders dependent on Russian decision-making and hence keep them attracted to placing themselves under Russian rule. With the construction of Orenburg, the Iaik’s bank facing Russia came to be called the inner, right or Russian side, while its opposite bank was designated as the outer, left or steppe side. Tevkelev’s other argument in favour of the construction of the fort was that it would enhance the security of the Russian cities of Samara, Syzran’ and Cheremshan, because the Cossack and other servicemen stationed there would prevent the Qazaqs from crossing the river and besieging these cities. As for its potential ability to boost Russia’s commercial operations, Tevkelev suggested that the fort could replace the remote Bukharan and Khivan markets by offering Russian merchants the option of selling their goods at much lower prices. Merchants who travelled to Bukhara and Khiva could also stay at the fort temporarily and hire the local Qazaqs as travel guides. The fort could also be used as a site for holding Qazaq hostages (amanats) instead of sending them to remote Russian cities, including the capital.40

The Kirillov Expedition Anna’s government used Abulkhair’s request to advance Russia’s presence in the region. In 1734, her government established the Orenburg Frontier Expedition, appointing I. Kirillov as its head and dispatching him (along with Tevkelev) to investigate the region’s economic resources. Before leaving the capital, Kirillov was instructed to choose a place for constructing a fort and to use the opportunity to invite the rulers of all three hordes or their nobility to the site, where they would swear allegiance to the empress. The empress gave him three charters to bring to the rulers, informing them about her plans for the construction of the fort and notifying them that an expedition headed by Kirillov and Tevkelev had been dispatched for this purpose. She also expressed her benevolence towards the rulers and asked them to keep her updated on their conflicts, so that she would be able to render assistance.41 Kirillov was further instructed that since the Qazaqs were an independent people, two ultimate strategies – intimidation and rewards – should be applied to them to bring them under Russian rule. If the Qazaqs and their khans wished to wander near the new spot, they were to be allotted special territories for grazing their livestock, but they were not to be allowed to cross the Iaik to its opposite side. If the nobles desired, Kirillov was to construct free houses for them along with mosques and to put guards at their houses for the sake of not only saluting

110  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection but also protecting them. In place of taking amanats from the nobility, Kirillov should establish a court with two or three Russian representatives and children of the Qazaq nobility at its head and attach guards to them. The court’s members were to settle legal disputes in accordance with Qazaq traditions. To serve the Orenburg Frontier Expedition, Kirillov should hire members of Tatar and Mesheriak nobility along with ordinary Teptiars and Bobyls. The former were to be paid with fabrics and money, while the latter with money and bread. After completing the fort’s construction, Kirillov should hire the Bashkirs or the Qazaqs to guide a caravan, which he should dispatch to Bukhara. He had to convince Abulkhair that the construction of the fort was undertaken upon his request, for his protection and to assign a hereditary status to his title. The khan was expected to provide accurate accounts of the deposits of minerals, gold and other metals in territories under his control. Kirillov was also charged with establishing a wharf and a fleet on the Aral Sea “in order to master that sea” and buying horses from Abulkhair. The secret part of the instructions ordered Kirillov to establish control over the Bashkir and Qazaq populations. Kirillov should use their existing conflicts to pit them against each other, in order to spare using Russian troops. Accordingly, if Abulkhair asked for Russian military support for his proposed campaign in Khiva, Kirillov should give him gunpowder and firearms but encourage the Bashkirs and the Tatars to assist him in his campaigns (if they were willing) instead of providing him with regular Russian forces. Kirillov should also invest in fostering Abulkhair’s conflict with the local Aral’sk people, but not interfere with the war that had been unfolding between the Qing and the Jungars. This would force the Qing to ask for Russian assistance from the Kalmyks, Russia’s subjects, which would put Russia in a beneficial position.42 Kirillov was also ordered to collect information about the Jungars’ domestic life and their interactions with the Qazaqs, including details about the balance of power within their nobility and their ambitious plans involving Siberia. Kirillov also should persuade the Jungars’ Siberian subjects to stop paying yasak to their leader.43 Before reaching their destination, the Orenburg Frontier Expedition’s members were attacked by the Bashkirs, who opposed the construction of the fort. Despite their attacks, the members reached the isthmus of Or’, where on 15 August 1734, Kirillov laid down the foundations of the proposed fort. The construction of the fort began in 1735 with the festive ceremony attended by Abulkhair’s sons, relatives and influential nobles, including the Orenburg Frontier Expedition’s members and the Mishari servicemen from Ufa.44 As Kirillov’s report to the empress reveals, he viewed the construction of the fort not only as an opportunity to boost trade with the Asian states but also as a chance to consolidate Russia’s presence in the region by gaining access to the local land. Apart from constructing a wharf on the shore of the Aral Sea, he urged the empress to accept the Qazaqs of the Senior Horde under her “exalted arm”. In compliance with the ulus logic, Kirillov argued that this would enable the Russian government to place the rich Badakhshan province under its rule, because the Bukharan emir, who ruled over this province, had submitted himself to some Qazaq khans from the Senior Horde. Moreover, Kirillov pointed out in his report

The Qazaq Junior Horde and Russia 111 the rich deposits of lead, silver and gold in the Syr Darya region that by that time were under the control of Abulkhair and Russia’s Karakalpak subjects.45 Among other things, Kirillov reported to the empress that there were many thousands of Russian captives held by the Qazaqs, whom they sold at the Bukharan and Khivan markets.46 Most importantly, Kirillov’s report highlighted the significance of placing the aforementioned populations, including the Kalmyks, the Bashkirs and the Qazaqs, under Russian rule, citing Galdan Tseren’s claims of sovereignty over the people of Siberia and Central Asia, backed by his army of 80,000 soldiers who had been equipped with firearms. This army had not only defeated the Qazaqs but had also been successfully fighting the Qing, who were forced to ask the Russians for the Kalmyks’ assistance. If it was not for his war with the Qing, Galdan would have placed Badakhshan, the region with the rich deposits of gold, under his control, which would ultimately turn him into Russia’s strong enemy. Kirillov believed that only through promoting local conflicts would Russia be able to play these populations off against each other and, in this way, both spare its own men and effectively place all of them under its rule. Placing the Qazaqs under Russian rule was therefore paramount to pitting them against Galdan and weakening him without using the Russian military. Kirillov reminded the empress that Galdan had recently treated Russian envoy Major Ugriumov with great honour and agreed to release several hundred Russian captives, which had never happened before. This change in Galdan’s behaviour, in Kirillov’s view, was due to Russia’s protective role towards the Qazaqs. Kirillov suggested reinforcing the Qazaqs’ role as a buffer against both the Jungars and the Qing. If the Qing repeated their request for the Kalmyks’ assistance against the Jungars, the Russians could offer their armies or their other non-Russian subjects’ armies and, in exchange, ask the Qing to pay with gold or to restore the former Russian territories in the Amur basin to the Russians. Kirillov also remarked that it would be difficult for the Qing to get assistance from the Kalmyks because they were separated by territories inhabited by large numbers of strong Qazaq hordes, who were hostile to the Kalmyks.47 In response to Kirillov’s report, Anna ordered him to hire Bashkir and Qazaq individuals and send them as spies to the Qazaqs to investigate their relations with the Jungars.48

Qazaq–Russian relations in the 1730s Neither the Russian nor the Qazaq sides stuck to the conditions listed in the 1731 royal charter. Russian officials proved reluctant to provide Abulkhair with their military assistance and instead embarked on playing off their newly sworn nonRussian subjects against each other, while Abulkhair proved incapable of stopping his tribespeople’s attacks against Russia’s subject populations, including raids of their caravans. In actuality, no yasak payments were reported as having been collected from the Qazaq nobles, who had signed the 1731 Treaty. In his 1734 letter to the empress, Abulkhair gave his unruly and wild subjects, who did not obey him and had recently pillaged a Russian caravan, as an excuse

112  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection for his failure to pay yasak.49 In addition, in this year, the Qazaqs of the Junior Horde lashed out against the Russian Sakmarsky settlement and, two years later, found themselves embroiled in conflicts involving the Ural’sk Cossacks and the Kalmyks. In 1737, they also repeatedly inveighed against the Kalmyk and Russian populations, including the Russian merchants. Kirillov was busy pacifying the Bashkirs, who resumed their resistance to Russian rule.50 In Anna’s 1736 letter, she promised to forgive Abulkhair for not sending foxes and for his failure to prevent the plunder of the Russian caravan, provided that he would ask her forgiveness and vow to prevent his subjects from committing such acts in the future. After all, the plunder might have happened without him being aware of it.51 For his part, Abulkhair informed the empress about 2,040 Qazaq horses that had been stolen and sold by the Kalmyks to the Russians. This led his subjects to disobey him, call him a liar and question his motives for placing them under the empress. In this letter, Abulkhiar also proposed exchanging his runaways for Russian captives.52 Finally, in 1737, Abulkhair mobilized his followers to retaliate against the Kalmyks by taking advantage of the participation of their men in the Russian war against Sweden. They allied with Kuban Tatars to raid Donduk Ombo’s ulus and kidnapped more than 2,000 people, along with their livestock. Ombo complained in his letter to the empress about the recent Qazaq attacks. He also sent a letter to Abulkhair, demanding that he return the religious books and images that had been embezzled by the Qazaqs.53 The Russian Board reciprocated by demanding that Abulkhair return the kidnapped people and the stolen items. Empress Anna also sent a letter to Abulkhair and ordered V. N. Tatishchev, the new head of the Orenburg Frontier Expedition (1737–1739), to negotiate the issue with the khan in person. In the end, all these initiatives proved ineffective. Under Tatishchev, the Orenburg Frontier Expedition was renamed the Orenburg Frontier Commission in 1737. In the aftermath of Abulkhair’s attacks, Ombo’s son Galdan Normo turned against his father and attempted to ally with the Qazaqs against him. Ombo once again turned to his Russian patrons for assistance, but they declined, using their lack of sufficient military forces as an excuse. Instead, they encouraged Abulkhair to participate in a new oath-taking procedure to prevent his alliance with the Kalmyks.54 Tatishchev’s successor, V. A. Urusov (1739–1741), also confessed that in the case of a new Qazaq offensive, he would be able to render assistance only to Ombo himself, but not to his subjects. At the same time, the central government admitted that Russia could benefit from the continuing hostility between the two populations.55 In 1740, Ombo mobilized his Kalmyks against the Qazaqs, restoring his population and adding 200 Qazaq families, along with their livestock.56 To compensate him for his losses, in 1737, Anna’s government approved Abulkhair’s offer to assist her officials in pacifying the rioting Bashkirs. Abulkhair decided to use this opportunity to propose that his son Qojakhmet be appointed khan to the Bashkirs. Tatishchev prevented this by sending Abulkhair generous gifts and convincing him to return to the steppe. A year later, the Bashkirs rioted again and invited Abulkhair to become their khan. He married a Bashkir

The Qazaq Junior Horde and Russia  113 woman and began showing hostility to Russia. He appeared in Orenburg with a large band of Bashkirs and responded to a Russian official, who had demanded that he abandon the Bashkir rioters: “The city is mine and was established for me, I will cut off the heads of those who disobey me”. In addition to his words, he threatened the official with his sabre. Nevertheless, Tatishchev kept himself from being rude to the khan, striving instead to settle the conflict in a diplomatic way.57 Again, he proved capable of convincing Abulkhair to abandon his alliance with the Bashkirs, by sending him even-more-generous gifts. Tatishchev also got Abulkhair, his son Nuraly and their nobility to swear allegiance to the empress, inviting them to Orenburg in 1738.58 Initially, Abulkhair resisted visiting Tatishchev. He considered his status higher than Tatishchev’s and thought that meeting with him might damage his reputation. After Tatishchev reassured him that he was representing the empress, Abulkhair agreed to visit the town and take the oath. As the unfolding of their relationship in the decade following the 1738 meeting shows, both sides’ perception of their relationship was informed mainly by the workings of the co-ruling system discussed earlier in this book, despite the use of the word kholop (slave) in the text of the oath taken by Abulkhair. He stayed in Orenburg for a month, during which he committed himself to handing over Russian captives, including those captured by other Central Asian rulers. In exchange, the khan asked that his son Eraly, who had been held as amanat in Orenburg, be replaced with his other son, Qojakhmet, and expressed his desire that his wife Bopai be sent to the capital. Abulkhair also requested that Tatishchev put him in charge of accompanying and protecting the trading caravans that traversed the territories under his control.59 During the meeting, Tatishchev invested in establishing friendly relations with Abulkhair and his nobles by distributing generous gifts worth about 2,000 rubles among them and agreeing to replace Eraly with Qojakhmet. He also paid several informal visits to the khan’s camp. For his part, Abulkhair continued to express his gratitude to the governor for his reasonable suggestions and explanations.60 Following in Abulkhair’s footsteps, his sons Nuraly and Eraly, along with 56 nobles from the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde, took the oath of allegiance to the empress.61 The rulers of the Middle Horde, Khan Abulmambet and Sultan Ablai, were also invited by Tatishchev to the 1738 meeting in Orenburg to take the oath, but they refused to come, citing the remoteness of their grazing territories.62

Mobility and the caravan trade By becoming the hub of Russia’s trade with Central Asia’s major trading centres, Orenburg was the beginning of the realization of Peter I’s vision of the Qazaq Steppe as the transitional zone for Russian trade caravans that crossed the steppe between Russia and these centres. This had the important effect of reinforcing local Qazaq elites’ cooperation with their Russian patrons. It was only with these elites’ approval that Russian caravans were allowed to cross the territories under their control.63 The realization of Peter I’s vision thus entailed the Qazaq leadership’s investment in the ancient practice of providing their logistical support in

114  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection guiding and protecting Russian and other trading caravans. In a 1738 letter to the empress, Abulkhair expressed his desire to accompany the Russian caravans departing from Orenburg for Tashkent. He also informed her that Khan Jolbars from the Senior Horde had a similar request and had asked him to convey it to her.64 According to the official data, items valued at more than four million rubles were sold at the trading posts of the Orenburg Line in the period 1745–1754.65 Unlike their Russian trading partners, the Qazaq merchants trading at the Russian forts of Ural’sk, Omsk and Ust’-Kamenogorsk did not pay fees.66 Thanks to their Turkic and Muslim backgrounds, they were also exempted from paying fees at Central Asian markets. Russian merchants benefited from their cooperation with the Qazaqs, who also provided them with their services of guiding caravans and of loaning them their nomadic horses that were best adapted to endure the precarious steppe conditions. Qazaq–Russian cooperation, however, turned out to be no guarantee of the safety of the caravan trade, since some of those nobles and their subjects came to view the trading caravans as an easy source of riches, both by imposing fees on merchants and by taking possession of their goods. Ultimately, therefore, having the upper hand over the growing caravan trade contributed to the rise of contested spaces of power, involving members of the Qazaq nobility and Russian authorities. Against the ever-shrinking range of free nomadic movements, the advent of caravan trade seems to have provided the nobles with an additional blueprint for investing in their customary way of maintaining their status, which entailed undertaking raids and campaigns. Petr Rychkov, the head of the Orenburg Frontier Commission in 1758–1759, astutely observed that In front of everyone’s eyes, publicly, the Kirgiz [Qazaqs] prepare themselves for undertaking a plunder and then return with items of which they took possession. The Kyrgyz [Qazaqs] are not ashamed of these actions a bit and do not consider that these actions could besmirch them. On the contrary, they are proud of having masterminded such actions, which they view as demonstrating their outstanding courage and bravery. Their most powerful nobles even assemble such bands on their own initiative for the sake of undertaking raids of the neighboring populations. The Karakalpaks and other inhabitants of the Aral area, including inhabitants of Tashkent have always been victims of these pillages.67 Given this account, it’s no wonder that all of the measures, both friendly and punitive, that authorities took to prevent these raids failed in the end. For example, the Qazaqs of the Senior Horde pillaged a caravan that had been dispatched to Tashkent under an agreement with Abulkhair. The attackers not only embezzled goods worth 20,000 rubles but also captured its travellers, including the Russian envoy Major Miller.68 Urusov negotiated the incident with Abulkhair’s sons Nuraly and Eraly during the latter’s visit in Orenburg in 1740. The brothers

The Qazaq Junior Horde and Russia 115 claimed that the leadership of the Junior Horde had no influence on the affairs of the Qazaqs from the Senior Horde and promised to find and punish the culprits and to return the goods.69 It was clear, however, that the Junior Horde’s leadership did not always have the upper hand over their own subjects, who had pillaged two caravans before the arrival of Tatishchev’s successor, Urusov, in 1739.70 Abulkhair declined Urusov’s invitation to participate in the 1740 meeting, citing his deteriorating health and how remote Orenburg was from his actual wandering territories. Nuraly and Eraly conveyed their father’s request that the Russians build a fort on the Syr Darya and send him several canons to use against the people of Khiva. Urusov refused to send canons, under the pretext that he needed them for the newly constructed forts. He, however, agreed to dispatch engineers to map the territories in the vicinity of the Syr Darya.71 If stopping the Qazaqs from robbing caravans proved an unmanageable task for officials, assigning land under the provisions of a number of agreements that they had negotiated with Abulkhair in the 1730s turned out a much-more-effective measure of curbing his and his nobles’ free movements. Following these agreements, the officials began to regulate the land situation in the territories situated along and between the Iaik and the Volga. After the negotiations with the Qazaq delegation sent to St Petersburg by Abulkhair in 1733, the government assigned territories along the middle and upper reaches of the Iaik to Abulkhair’s subjects. It proceeded with allocating all territories on the left bank of the Iaik to the Qazaqs of the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde, turning the river into a natural border separating the Qazaq pastures from the Bashkir, Kalmyk and Cossack lands, which, to a certain degree, discouraged these populations from undertaking raids against each other.72 In addition, the authorities allowed these Qazaqs to use the right bank of the river during winter. To prevent conflicts with the Iaik Cossacks, in 1738, the government went on to allocate separate hunting territories on the right bank of the river to the Qazaqs. Erofeeva has pointed out that in the 50 to 130  years following the 1738 government regulations, some influential leaders of the Junior Horde continued to refer to them as proof of their legitimate use of these territories in their disputes with the Orenburg administration.73

Notes 1 KRO-1, p. 31 2 Ibid., p. 574 3 Zhumadil, A. K.: Kazakhsko-dzhungarskie voenno-politicheskie otnosheniia v XVI – pervoi treti XVIII vv, Almaty: Qazaq universiteti, 2015, p. 12 4 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v., pp. 26–27 5 Zhumadil, A. K.: Kazakhsko-dzhungarskie voenno-politicheskie otnosheniia v XVI – pervoi treti XVIII vv, pp. 13–14, 34–37, 39 6 Ibid., pp. 40–42 7 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. I, pp. 90–92 8 Ibid., p. 92 9 Ibid., p. 50

116  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection 10 Zhumadil, A. K.: Kazakhsko-dzhungarskie voenno-politicheskie otnosheniia v XVI – pervoi treti XVIII vv., p. 51 11 Ibid., pp. 53–58 12 Ibid., pp. 95–96 13 KRO-1, pp. 18, 25–27 14 Zhumadil, A. K.: Kazakhsko-dzhungarskie voenno-politicheskie otnosheniia v XVI – pervoi treti XVIII vv., p. 59 15 Ibid., pp. 65–66 16 Erofeeva, I. V., Masanova, L. E. and Zhanaev, B. T.: Istoriko-kul’turnyi atlas kazakhskogo naroda, Almaty: Print-S, 2011, pp. 39–40 17 Kliashtornyi, S. G. and Sultanov, T. I.: Gosudarstva i narody evraziiskikh stepei, pp. 283–290 18 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. I, pp. 98–99, 105–106 19 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 105–106 20 Ibid., vol. I, p. 102 21 Ibid., pp. 105–106 22 Ibid., pp. 98–99, 105–106 23 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia – Kazakhstan: sovremennye mify i istoricheskaia real’nost. Sbornik nauchnykh i publitsisticheskikh statei, Barnaul, 2001, pp. 104–105 24 Erofeeva, I.: Khan Abulkhair: polkovodets, pravitel’ i politik, Almaty: “Sanat”, 1999, pp. 137–139 25 Erofeeva, I. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. I, pp. 98–99, 105–106 26 Ibid., pp. 100–102 27 KRO-1, pp. 35–37 28 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary (Qazaqtyn Kishi Jüzine qatysty mälimetteri negizinde), Almaty: “Gylym”, 1970, pp. 38–39 29 KRO-1, pp.  40–44; Erofeeva, I.: Khan Abulkhair: polkovodets, pravitel’ i politik, p. 196 30 Ibid., pp. 45–86, 99–100 31 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, vol. II, Tver’, 1902, p. 10 32 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary, pp. 38–39 33 KRO-1, pp. 37–38, 45–47 34 Kraft, I. I.: Sbornik uzakonenii o kirgizakh stepnykh oblastei, Orenburg: Tipolitografiia P. N. Zharikova, 1898, pp. 26–28 35 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary, p. 45 36 KRO-1, p. 90 37 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, pp. 202–203 38 KRO-1, p. 98 39 Ibid., p. 94 40 Ibid., pp. 99–100 41 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 14–16 42 KRO-1, p. 116 43 Moiseev, V. A.: Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi XVII-XVIII vv., Alma-Ata: “Gylym”, 1991, p. 97 44 Kliashtornyi, S. G. and Sultanov, T. I.: Gosudarstva i narody evraziiskikh stepei, p. 302 45 KRO-1, pp. 109–114 46 Ibid., pp. 107–114 47 Ibid.

The Qazaq Junior Horde and Russia 117 48 Ibid., p. 115 49 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. I, pp. 112–113 50 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, p. 21 51 KRO-1, p. 124 52 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. I, pp. 118–119 53 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Rytsar’ “zvaniia chesti”. Kazakhskii batyr Bogenbai Karabatyruly, Almaty: Servise Press, 2017, pp. 148–150 54 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, pp. 210–212 55 Ibid., pp. 216–217 56 Erofeeva, I. V.: Rytsar’ “zvaniia chesti”, pp. 148–150 57 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 23–25 58 Erofeeva, I. V.: Rytsar’ “zvaniia chesti”, pp. 156–160 59 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 26–28 60 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), Orenburg: Orenburgskii Gubernskii Statisticheskii Komitet, 1896, p. 39 61 Kraft, I. I.: Sbornik uzakonenii o kirgizakh stepnykh oblastei, pp. 40–43 62 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, p. 29 63 Narbaev, K.: K voprosu o karavannykh putiakh i marshrutakh ekspeditsii v Vostochnom Kazakhstane vo II polovine XVIII – 1 polovine XIX vekov, Izdenis/Poisk, vol. 3 (2004), p. 143 64 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. I, p. 133 65 Mikhaleva, G. A.: Torgovye i posol’skie sviazi Rossii so sredneaziatskimi khanstvami cherez Orenburg, Tashkent: “Fan”, 1982, p. 33 66 Asfendiiarov, S. D. and Kunte, P. A. (eds.): Proshloe Kazakhstana v istochnikakh i materialakh, book I (V v.do n.e. – XVIII v.n.e), Almaty: “Kazakhstan”, 1997, p. 201 67 Ibid., p. 219 68 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), p. 39 69 Ibid., pp. 51–52 70 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, p. 32 71 Ibid., pp. 34–36 72 Sultangalieva, G. S.: Zapadnyi Kazakhstan v sisteme etnokul’turnykh kontaktov, Ufa: RUNMTS Goskomnauki Respubliki Bashkortostan, 2001, pp. 18–19 73 Erofeeva, I.: Khan Abulkhair: polkovodets, pravitel’ i politik, p. 212

6 T  he new Jungar offensive and its impact

In the period 1739–1741, Jungar leader Galdan Tseren unleashed a new offensive against all three hordes, which had a profound impact on shaping the unfolding of Qazaq–Russian relations throughout the remainder of the century. After brokering a peace agreement with the Qing in 1734, Galdan placed the Senior Horde under his rule. In 1739, the Jungars defeated the Middle Horde, and Galdan placed Eastern Turkestan under his rule in the 1740s. Following the defeat, Khan Abulmambet (1739–1771), Sultan Ablai (1711–1780) and Sultan Barak (–1750) from the Middle Horde sent their amanats to Galdan, while the Senior Horde paid a horse from each tent to the Jungars in 1744.1 According to a contemporary account, in this year, the Jungars held 30 Qazaq amanats. Russian authorities were compelled to accept the ambiguous status of Khan Jolbars from the Senior Horde, who had pledged loyalty to both the Russian throne and the Jungars (called in Russian dvoedanstvo) but were against his peers from the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde to follow his suit. The loss of the Central Asian cities of Sairam, Turkestan, and Tashkent to the Jungars produced a serious blow to the economy of the Qazaqs, who had used these cities’ environs as favourable winter pastures for centuries. In 1695, the Qazaq nobles under Tauke established control over 32 settlements in the Syr Darya region.2 As ancient centres of trade, these Central Asian cities also attracted the Qazaqs with their agricultural markets. Along with imposing regular taxation on merchants, farmers and artisans, their rulers gained wealth by directly appropriating agricultural and other produce.3 Abulmambet and Ablai came to view the situation as favourable for establishing an effective balance of power between the empress and Galdan Tseren, by swearing allegiance to the empress in 1740 and placing themselves under her protection.4 Their decision was also largely due to the migration of their populations to the proximity of the Russian military lines, following the latest Jungar attacks. According to Moiseev, 400 members of the nobility of the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde placed themselves under Russian rule in the period 1738–1740.5 For his part, Abulkhair switched his allegiance to Galdan, but he tried to conceal his ongoing negotiations with the Jungar leader from his Russian patrons.6 Unwilling but also unable to render proper military assistance against the Jungars, Russian authorities decided to invest in placing primarily diplomatic pressure

The new Jungar offensive and its impact 119 on both the Qazaqs and the Jungars. Moreover, after receiving the news about the upcoming Jungar campaign against the Qazaqs of the Middle Horde in 1739, central authorities ordered their local men to secure protection of Tara, Tomsk, Kuznetsk, and Krasnoiarsk, but failed to inform the horde’s rulers.7 On top of that, the Siberian governor Buturlin reassured the Jungar envoys, whom he had met in St Petersburg in 1741, that he would not allow the Qazaqs fleeing from Jungar attacks to cross to the inner side of the Siberian Line.8 In 1740, the senate ordered Urusov to send gunpowder to Barak and Janibek Batyr, but not to send them canons and arms. Two years later the senate instructed the governor to allow Abulkhair and his people to hide in the Russian forts, but not to allow the khan to station his army there.9 No wonder all Qazaq requests for military assistance against the Jungars were, as a rule, ignored by them. Among other things, the aftermath of the latest Jungar offensive contributed to the widening of a gap between Abulkhair and the Middle Horde’s rulers. Because they traced their lineage to the senior branch of the Chingizids, the rulers considered themselves higher-status than Abulkhair. Urusov’s successor Nepliuev believed that Abulkhair’s sense of inferiority had strongly motivated him to remain loyal to the empress. He observed that Abulkhair had never called himself khan, despite his ambitious nature, but, instead, used the title bagadur (hero) to sign his letters.10 One can, however, propose that the growing alienation between Abulkhair and his counterparts in the Middle Horde was mainly due to their alliance with Galdan Tseren, which enabled them to restore their control over the territories along the Syr Darya and around the Central Asian cities. Reportedly, in 1744, Galdan placed Turkestan under Seit Khan, Abulmambet’s nephew.11 The English merchant Gok, who visited Orenburg in 1742, informed that Galdan had ordered Abulmambet and Sultan Batyr to stay in Turkestan along with their nobility and send him their amanats and tributes (one fox fur per family).12 Although Abukhair, like his rivals, strove to play off his Russian and Jungar patrons against each other, in the end, he seems to have given preference to maintaining his Russian status over cooperation with the Jungars.13 Apart from his rivalry with the Middle Horde’s nobility, the remoteness of territories controlled by the Jungars further complicated his chances of getting access to these territories, by establishing more or less stable relations with Galdan. His Russian orientation became reinforced after he had failed to establish himself in Khiva and its environs. In 1740, Khivan citizens offered Abulkhair the Khivan throne after having found themselves facing the prospect of being conquered by the Persian army of Nadir Shah. After ascending to the throne for a short period of time in 1741 with the help of the local Uzbek, Qazaq and Karakalpak nobility, Abulkhair declared to the Russian envoy D. Gladyshev: “I thank God that Khiva is now under the protection of her majesty, and that I am now the khan here”.14 He strove to create the impression that he was supported by his Russian patrons, writing to Nadir Shah: “If you are in peace with the White Khan-Padishah, you are in peace with us, if you are not, then you are at war with us as well”. After Nadir Shah’s army invaded Khiva, Abulkhair and his son were forced to flee the region.15

120  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection This state of affairs prompted Abulkhair to search for alternative options of getting access to pasturelands, including building a fort on the River Emba with Russian assistance to gain access to the territories along the Syr Darya. With this in mind, in 1739, Abulkhair presented the empress with a proposal, in which he argued that the new fort would allow her government to place the populations of Turkestan, Khiva, and Tashkent under her rule and offered his services for accomplishing the job, but failed to get the empress’s approval.16 In the meantime, Abulkhair’s Qazaqs began to cross the Iaik to its inner side, where they clashed with the Kalmyks. Despite Urusov’s strenuous efforts, hostilities between the Kalmyks and the Qazaqs continued, including their joint attacks on local Cossack and Russian settlements. After Ombo’s death in 1741, 3,000 Qazaqs crossed the Iaik and assaulted the Kalmyks.17 In the end, both sides ended up brokering a temporary peace agreement with each other without any Russian officials present, which prompted the officials to suspect that Ombo’s widow Jan might be planning to join the Jungars. The officials instructed Urusov to station the Iaik Cossacks near Jan’s Kalmyk uluses, to prevent them from crossing the Iaik. At the same time, the authorities admitted that stationing their soldiers in the region would be complicated by the absence of sufficient supply at the local forts and the severe frost.18 In 1742, Abulkhair complained to the Russian envoy Urakov about Russia’s inability to stop Kalmyk, Bashkir and Cossack raids. This was followed by his raids of the Kalmyks, during which his Qazaqs kidnapped 300 Kalmyk people and took possession of their livestock. In response, the board’s members allowed Donduk Dashi to send his army to fight the Qazaqs, and allotted 10 pounds of free gunpowder and lead to him.19 Dashi also asked the board to provide him with canons to use against the Qazaqs. The board’s members had only four small canons sent to him.20 Empress Elizabeth responded to the Qazaq-Kalmyk conflicts by sending a charter to Abulkhair, in which she admonished the khan and declared that he should establish peaceful relations with the Kalmyks.21 But the Siberian governor L. Ia. Saimonov responded by implementing more tangible policies. In 1741, he banned the Qazaqs from crossing the Iaik to its right bank. The ban was explained as a preventive measure against the rise of possible conflicts between the two populations.22 Following the board’s instructions, in 1742, Nepliuev banned the Qazaqs from roaming near the Iaik, as well as from crossing the river, in order to prevent their conflicts with the Cossacks. The Kalmyks were also not allowed to cross the Volga.23 The authorities’ hard line policies reciprocated with Abulkhair’s unsuccessful attempts to get access to winter pastures in the Syr Darya and Khivan regions, which increased their chances of making the khan more compliant. Abulkhair complained that some influential tribal leaders and their people had abandoned him. The leaders reproached Abulkhair for putting them under Russia’s protection, because none of his requests, including access to pasturelands had been met by his Russian patrons.24 Abulkhair was not allowed to cross to the river’s right bank also under the pretext that the grass on that side had to be kept intact so that Russia could maintain regular and irregular armies there.25

The new Jungar offensive and its impact 121 These policies, along with the authorities’ continued refusal to provide Abulkhair with protection, finally led to a conflict between the khan and Nepliuev. The immediate pretext of the conflict was Nepliuev’s refusal to replace Abulkhair’s son Qozhakhmet, who had been held as amanat in Orenburg, with his other son Chingiz, born from a Kalmyk woman, which Abulkhair had proposed during his meeting with the governor in 1742. The idea of the meeting had originated with Nepliuev. After hearing from Abulkhair that two Jungar envoys were visiting him, Nepliuev decided to use the opportunity to invite the khan, his nobles and the two envoys to Orenburg to make Abulkhair and his nobles swear allegiance to Empress Elizabeth, the new Russian ruler. The Jungar envoys had brought Abulkhair a letter from Galdan Tseren, which threatened the khan with war if he failed to send Galdan hostages and tributes.26 Abulkhair accepted Nepliuev’s invitation and arrived in Orenburg with the two Jungar envoys and his relatives and nobles. During the meeting, 155 nobles in total from the three hordes swore allegiance to the empress, including the khan and his two sons, Eraly and Qojakhmet.27 Nepliuev welcomed the Jungar envoys by addressing their ruler Galdan Tseren as Russia’s good neighbour. He, however, made clear to them that after swearing allegiance to the empress, Abulkhair would be not in a position to regulate his foreign affairs without consulting her. The Jungar envoys, in turn, argued that after Galdan had defeated them, some Qazaq rulers including Abulkhair had acknowledged their submission by sending him their amanats. Nepliuev reminded the envoys that Abulkhair, Abulmambet and his nobles had taken an oath of allegiance to the empress 12 years ago, which precluded their submission to any other rulers, as well as sending their amanats to these rulers. The envoys expressed their satisfaction with Nepliuev’s explanation and agreed to convey this information to Galdan, by commenting that the Qazaqs were a distrustful people, who catered to both the Russians and the Jungars, but, in fact, thought only about their own benefits.28 During the meeting, Nepliuev assured Abulkhair that the Russian state would do its best to keep the Jungars at bay. In turn, the khan expressed his hope that the empress would render her protection from the Jungars and reassured the governor of his loyalty. The Russian military parade that followed the oath-taking procedure greatly pleased the khan, because, among other things, it demonstrated the empress’s grandeur to the Jungar envoys, under whom Abulkhair had placed himself and his people.29 In his conversation with Nepliuev, the khan asked for an army of 3,000 soldiers to reinforce his status with his followers, as well as to punish those who acted against the empress’s interests. Nepliuev urged him to use peaceful means to establish order among his subjects. Abulkhair also raised the issue of his people’s access to the pasturelands near the Russian forts in winter, and Nepliuev responded that this might provoke conflicts between the Qazaqs, the Iaik Cossacks and the Kalmyks.30 Abulkhair also expressed his desire to pass his status to his son and to have the honourable title of tarkhan bestowed on his two nobles. To his great satisfaction, Nepliuev promised to meet the last two requests.31

122  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection Along with refusing to replace Abulkhair’s son Qojakhmet with his other son, Nepliuev proved also reluctant to cooperate with Abulkhair against his rivals, the rulers of the Middle Horde.32 His reluctance was in line with his generally negative stance on the concentration of power under a single Qazaq leader. He warned central authorities not to promote Abulkhair’s family, which could lead other Qazaqs to unite and follow them.33 One striking episode from the 1755 Bashkir resistance to Russian rule reveals Nepliuev’s strong adherence to the power balance strategy. To reignite hatred between the Qazaqs and the defeated Bashkirs, who had been hiding among them, Nepliuev allowed the Qazaqs to keep the Bashkirs’ women and children for themselves but hand over their men to the Russians. He also pitted the Tatars, Bashkirs, Kalmyks, Cossacks, and Mesheriaks against the Bashkirs, by promising generous rewards to them.34 Before the 1742 meeting, Abulkhair had suggested that the governor teach Abulmambet, Barak, Batyr and other influential nobles from the Middle Horde a lesson about possible consequences of their cooperation with Galdan Tseren by holding them as amanats in Orenburg. Abulkhair believed that holding these rulers in this condition would help him take control of their followers. In 1741, he informed Nepliuev that Abulmambet and Barak had sent him envoys seeking his advice about whether to send their amanats to the Russian court, and Abulkhair had answered that they should.35 But Abulkhair misinformed Abulmambet, who had set off for Orenburg to participate in the 1742 meeting, by spreading a rumour that if Abulmambet showed up in the town, he would be held there as amanat by the Russians. Abulkhair also destroyed Sutan Batyr’s letters to Nepliuev.36 After learning about the rumour, Abulmambet abandoned his trip and returned to his camp.37 In his 1743 letter to the empress Abulkhair complained about Nepliuev, who did not trust the Qazaqs and had not allowed him to exchange Qojakhmet, as well as have a house in Orenburg. Moreover, the governor refused to place a Russian army at Abulkhair’s disposal to facilitate replacing the Karakalpaks under the empress. His subjects had reproached him for giving his son as amanat to the Russians, by pointing to other non-Russian subjects of the empress, who had restrained themselves from investing in the practice. Abulkhair promised to fight Russia’s enemies, provided he would be allowed to exchange his son and be put in command of 40,000 Russian soldiers.38 He also complained to the empress that Urusov and his officials had shown more respect to Abulmambet and Ablai than to his own sons during the 1740 meeting.39 In 1743, Abulkhair orchestrated raids against the Kalmyks and the Astrakhan merchants40 and also threatened to move to Iran and place himself under Nadir Shah.41 On another occasion, he threatened to leave for Kuban if the Russians would not protect him from the Jungars.42 Yet in a letter sent after the 1742 meeting, Nepliuev addressed Abulkhair as a friend and a buddy (priiatel’) and advised him against placing himself under the Jungar leader and sending his son as amanat. He reminded Abulkhair that, unlike Galdan, the empress had never asked him to send her a tribute and had always allowed him and his people to wander anywhere they wished. Nepliuev included a kaftan, a fox fur and fabrics for

The new Jungar offensive and its impact  123 Abulkhair with the letter.43 If, under Urusov, 165 sultans and elders of the Junior Horde swore allegiance to the empress in 1740,44 after Nepliuev’s arrival in the region, 250 nobles from the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde took the oath of allegiance to the Russian throne and received royal charters in 1742.45 In 1744, Elizabeth’s government created the Orenburg guberniia and appointed Nepliuev as its first governor.46 In the wake of the escalation of Nepliuev’s conflict with Abulkhair, Nepliuev asked the senate’s members to place the regular troops from the Astrakhan, Kazan and Ufa guberniias at his disposal in order to use them against Abulkhair and Abulkhair’s followers and suggested stationing them in Russian settlements near the forts.47 A year later, Nepliuev presented his so-called reserve plan to the senate’s members, in which he suggested placing 2,000 Bashkirs, 500 Meshcheriaks, 300 Stavropol Cossacks, 800–1,000 Ural’sk Cossacks and 1,000 Volga Kalmyks under his command against the Qazaqs and allotting 15,000 rubles to provide them with food and supplies. Donduk Dashi received a royal charter allowing him to campaign against the Qazaqs under Nepliuev’s command.48 Subsequently, in a memorandum addressed to the central authorities, Nepliuev suggested reducing the number of gifts to be handed to the Qazaq nobles and abandoning the practice altogether in the future.49 At this point, he became convinced that the only successful strategy for bringing the Qazaqs under Russian rule should be “neither love nor fear”, but cutting (rezat’) them off.50 Yet, in the end, the senate resolved to settle Abulkhair’s conflict with Nepliuev peacefully. They sent Tevkelev to remind Abulkhair of his voluntary decision to place himself under Russia’s protection. The envoy was also told to highlight the empress’s generous and benevolent nature, which motivated her not to allow the Kalmyks and the Cossacks to spill the blood of innocent Qazaqs. She did so in spite of her awareness of the Qazaqs’ continuing plunders of Russian caravans. Regardless of these attacks, the empress had decided to settle their conflicts peacefully, by dispatching Tevkelev to Abulkhair in the hope that he would prevent his subjects from committing criminal acts. Otherwise, the empress could get angry and mobilize her numerous soldiers, as well as the Cossacks, the Bashkirs and the Tatar Mesheriaks, against the Qazaqs. How, then, would the Qazaqs defend themselves? Tevkelev was also ordered to let Abulkhair know that Nepliuev had informed the court about all of the criminal acts that the Qazaqs must have committed without the khan being aware of them.51 Regardless of the senate’s peaceful intentions, Abulkhair enticed his nobles in 1746 to wander off from the Russian lines, by threatening them with possible Russian attacks. Yet this time his nobles did not listen to him, saying that he could leave wherever he wished but that they would stay in their current places. Abulkhair also tried to persuade the Orenburg officials that they should not allow their Qazaq visitors to leave the town, using all possible means to create the impression that the Russians treated the Qazaqs like their enemies. Abulkhair also suggested that the officials should orchestrate thefts of Qazaq livestock (baranta) and asked that they keep his suggestions secret from central authorities. At the same time, Abulkhair encouraged his followers to renew their attacks on the

124  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection Kalmyks and the Russians, which led the Qazaqs to kidnap about 700 people and steal their livestock. The khan was ordered to return both the people and the animals, but he refused.52 Following these events, in 1747, the senate’s members suggested replacing Abulkhair with one of other nobles, but their colleagues on the Russian Board disagreed, pointing out that “Since the Kirgiz-Kaisaks [Qazaqs] elect their khans in accordance with their custom, the Russian side cannot interfere. Abulkhair became khan thanks to his slyness and origin”.53 The board’s members also dismissed Nepliuev’s suggestion to use the Kalmyks, the Bashkirs, the Cossacks and the Russians to discipline the Qazaqs, pointing out that due to the Qazaqs’ sizable population but also the forts’ poor munitions, the Bashkirs and the Cossacks would not be able to meet the task. Rather than using force, the Kalmyks and the Cossacks should be using good regulations (dobrye rasporiadki) to discipline the Qazaqs. They should not be allowed to wander near Russian settlements, yet at the same time, they should be prevented from wandering off to remote locations, which would increase the risk that they would seek protection from other rulers. In 1747, Elizabeth issued a secret order that neither weapons, gunpowder, flint nor lead were to be sold to the Qazaqs.54 Finally, in 1748, Abulkhair was allowed to exchange Qojakhmet for his son Aichuvak, on the condition that he would release Russian captives and return their livestock and household items, cease his anti-Russian propaganda and persuade his nobles to send their amanats to the Russians. In turn, Abulkhair demanded that the empress issue a special charter, which would address the scale of damages inflicted by his Kalmyk enemies.55

Miller’s mission During the 1741 Jungar campaign, Sultan Ablai from the Middle Horde was captured by the Jungars. After the 1742 meeting with Abulkhair, Nepliuev was ordered to dispatch an envoy to Galdan Tseren to reaffirm Russia’s status as “elder brother” to the Qazaq populations of the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde and to demand Ablai’s release. The government also decided to increase the actual numbers of soldiers stationed at the forts and to initiate the construction of new forts.56 Major Miller, sent by Nepliuev to Galdan Tseren, was instructed to explain to the Jungar ruler that if he wished to remain on good terms with Russia, he should stop assaulting the Qazaqs and stop demanding amanats from them, because their populations had been placed under the empress’s protection. Nepliuev told Miller that if Galdan argued that the Qazaqs had voluntarily placed themselves under his rule, he should explain that Galdan might have not known about the Qazaqs’ Russian status, because the Russian side had not informed him. For their part, the Russians were not aware that the Qazaq rulers had placed themselves under the Jungars, nor were they aware of the proximity of Jungar lands to Qazaq encampments. The Qazaq rulers’ decision to provide Galdan with their hostages (amanats) could therefore be justified by their desire to keep their subjects

The new Jungar offensive and its impact 125 protected. If Galdan and his nobles, in turn, complained about Qazaq raids, Nepliuev instructed Miller to explain that there were not only bad people but also good people among the Qazaqs. Because of their few bad people, the Jungars should not blame the whole Qazaq population and attack them without informing the empress about their campaigns. Nepliuev also told Miller to ask Galdan to release Ablai and other Qazaq captives. If the Jungar ruler demanded that the Qazaq rulers reciprocate by freeing Jungar captives, Miller should inform him that the rulers had already been ordered to do so. Miller should also propose the idea of establishing a correspondence between Galdan and the Russian court, for the sake of maintaining security and peace on the borders. Nepliuev urged Miller to stay out of any negotiations about the borders’ delineation (by mentioning his lack of general geographical knowledge and his limited prerogatives) and to avoid any negotiations concerning the Kalmyks. Nepliuev told Miller that when he met Qazaq nobles and ordinary people on his way to see the Jungar leader, he should explain that the mission’s main goal was protecting them from possible Jungar campaigns.57 On his way to see Galdan, Miller met with a number of the influential Qazaq nobles from all three hordes, including Abulkhair. He followed Nepliuev’s instructions, convincing them that their status under the empress would guarantee protection from Jungar incursions, and that they would not be forced to submit to the Jungar leader and send their amanats to him. Instead, they should rely on the empress, who “would always defend her loyal subjects and not allow their annihilation”, to which the leaders responded with gratitude and satisfaction.58 During his meeting with Miller, Abulmambet declared that he had not yet received any assistance or protection from his Russian patron, while Galdan had restored his rule over Turkestan and 30 other locations in Central Asia. The khan explained to the Russian envoy that if he had not sent his son to Galdan, he would have invaded his Qazaqs. To this, Nepliuev suggested keeping a balance of power by pitting Abulmambet’s two influential nobles, Barak and Batyr, against the khan. For his part, Abulkhair confirmed his loyalty to Russia and his willingness to maintain friendly relations with the Jungars at the same time.59 Galdan Tseren refused to meet with Miller, arguing that the rulers of all three Qazaq hordes had placed themselves under his rule. He seems to consider his status at least equal to (if not stronger than) the power of the Russian ruler and therefore refused to accept Miller’s visit. Galdan’s influential noble Sary Manzhi handed over his letter addressed to Nepliuev, in which he wrote that if both Qazaq hordes had been under Russia’s protection, as the governor had claimed, why then had Russian officials allowed their Qazaq subjects to raid the Jungars, given the friendly relations that had been established between the Jungars and the Russians? If Nepliuev wished to maintain these relations in the future, he should not create the impression that the Qazaqs had been Russia’s subjects.60 In 1742, the senate ruled that the Qazaqs should be sheltered in Russian forts to protect them from Jungar raids but admitted that the military presence at the forts was most likely insufficient.61 A year later, the senate’s members passed a resolution to persuade the rulers of the Middle Horde and those of the Junior

126  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection Horde to leave the Jungars. Nepliuev could promise Russian military assistance in the event of a new Jungar offensive. Since this prospect seemed implausible, his promise to provide soldiers might cause Russia to lose credibility in the eyes of the frontier populations. Therefore, the senate decided to put diplomatic pressure on the Jungar leadership, by explaining to the Jungar envoys who visited the capital that the Qazaq rulers were under Russian protection. Nepliuev was also ordered to let Galdan know about Russia’s demand to leave both Qazaq hordes in peace. However, the Jungars could take amanats from the Qazaqs if this contributed to promoting peaceful relations with them.62 After issuing this order, in 1745, the senate’s members went on to broker an agreement of peace and friendship between Russia and Galdan Tseren.63 After receiving Abulfeiz, son of Abulmambet, who was sent to Galdan as amanat from his father, Galdan agreed to release Ablai. Ablai used this as an opportunity to praise Miller and the empress in public for his release and to accuse his tribespeople of failing to make any corresponding efforts.64 After Ablai’s release, he and Galdan became friends.65 During his 1743 visit to the Middle Horde, Russian envoy Lapin learned that before letting Ablai go, Galdan had given him a golden tent, a coat covered with golden brocade and another tent made of iron, along with other precious items.66 Most importantly, in exchange for receiving Ablai’s son as amanat, the Jungar leader established Ablai’s control over Tashkent, Turkestan and other Central Asian cities. Ablai’s followers were seen wandering in territories controlled by the Jungars. Galdan also suggested to Ablai that they arrange marriages between the children of the Jungar and Qazaq nobles. He rebuked Ablai for submitting to Russian protection. Since the Russians were a sedentary people, Ablai’s Qazaqs, after placing themselves under their rule, would inevitably become impoverished “like the Kalmyks and the Bashkirs”.67 Galdan wrote the following in his letter to Abulkhair: When Abulkhair kneels before the white ruler, he turns himself into Galdan Tseren’s enemy. We, the Kalmyks [Jungars] and the Kaisaks [Qazaqs] are the eagles and therefore will not kneel before the crow [the Russian empress], because they are a cart people [sedentary], while we are the Uzbeks [nomadic]. If you trust the Russians, our Kalmyks [Jungars] will fight you all the time.68 The Russians were soon informed that the Jungars had been planning attacks on the Ust’- Kamenogorsk fort and the Kolyvano–Voskresensk enterprises (zavody). They stationed 5,000 soldiers near the Iamyshevskaia fort and in the other two spots they stationed 16,000 soldiers, in addition to 6,000 soldiers stationed on both banks of the Irtysh. Because of Galdan’s death in 1745, these plans never came to fruition.69 After his death, the Jungars resumed their raids against the population of the Middle Horde. During one such raid in 1751, they kidnapped 3,000 Qazaqs and embezzled their numerous livestock, which prompted the rest of the horde’s population to migrate to the Siberian Line region.70

The new Jungar offensive and its impact 127

In the aftermath of Abulkhair’s murder The rivalry between Abulkhair and Barak from the Middle Horde over establishing their control of the caravan routes in the Syr Darya region finally culminated in Barak’s murder of Abulkhair in 1748. Abulkhair’s people were reported to have pillaged the caravan sent to Barak by Qazaq Khan Kaip, khan of Khiva and son of Abulkhair’s rival Sultan Batyr. The caravan was carrying gifts for Barak’s daughter, who had been betrothed to Kaip. In response, Barak attacked Abulkhair’s Karakalpak subjects, which led to the fatal confrontation between the two nobles.71 Barak explained that he had murdered Abulkhair because of the frequent assaults that he and his followers had committed on Jungar commercial caravans that had been traversing the region on their way to Russia. He was, however, found not guilty by a court of influential tribal judges representing all three hordes, who limited themselves to imposing a huge ransom on him.72 After killing Abulkhair, Barak, accompanied by 3,000 Qazaqs, left for the border regions to seek protection from the Jungars.73 Interestingly, when Abulkhair’s son Eraly demanded that the leaders of the Kerei clan from the Middle Horde, who had been placed under his rule by his father, extradite Barak, the leaders not only refused to follow his order but also threatened Eraly with his own life. Under this threat, Eraly was finally forced to suspend his rulership.74 At the suggestion of the Russian Board’s members, Nepliuev did not interfere with the conflict between Abulkhair’s family and Barak, despite the family’s urging him to take immediate revenge on the murderer.75 To prevent Barak’s possible alliance with the Jungars, Nepliuev decided to secretly dispatch an envoy to Barak to reassure him of Russia’s support. The envoy was instructed that in his conversation with Barak, he should avoid mentioning Abulkhair’s murder and instead strive to establish a friendly relationship with him – for example, by asking him about his well-being. To people he might meet on his way to see Barak, the envoy should explain that he had not been aware of the murder, and he should not reveal his mission’s true goal and destination. If Barak showed his readiness to cooperate, the envoy should let him know that Nepliuev approved of his action and convince him of the empress’s benevolence, without letting Abulkhair’s survivors know about any of this. Nepliuev also sent a letter to General Kinderman, asking for his support in presenting the envoy’s trip as having been initiated by the general himself.76 After the murder, Barak sent his envoys to Galdan Tseren’s son and successor, Tsevan Dorzhi, but because the Jungar leader was planning his marriage to Abulkhair’s daughter, Barak ultimately failed to secure his protection from Abulkhair’s sons.77 Barak also sent his envoys to Nepliuev to affirm his loyalty to the empress. In his letter, he wrote that Nepliuev should trust his envoy, who was about to tell the true story of Abulkhair’s murder in more detail in oral form.78 In his conversation with the governor Abulkhair’s son Nuraly conveyed his family’s request to build a mausoleum in his father’s graveyard. Although the governor did not approve of the idea, the board’s members decided not to upset Nuraly. They suggested that Nepliuev should build a small building, employing

128  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection no more than 50 people, so as to finish the work during the summer. The members proposed that by endorsing his request, Nuraly in fact strove to divert their attention from his plans to marry his half-sister to Tsevan Dorzhi to help him capture Barak and reinforce his own status. Nuraly also hoped that with the Jungar leader’s assistance, he would be able to install himself in Turkestan and exchange captives with Tsevan. First, Nuraly kept his negotiations with the Jungar leader secret from Nepliuev, who was ordered to prevent the proposed marriage at any cost. To implement the order, Nepliuev dispatched the translator Guliaev to Nuraly.79 During his meeting with Nuraly, Guliaev tried to influence him by pointing out, among other things, that the khan was about to give his half-sister into marriage to a pagan worshipper.80 The governor also allowed some of Nuraly’s elders to graze their livestock near the Iaik in 1748–1749. If they wished, they could also cross the river to its opposite side, provided that they would deliver hostages and pay fees with their livestock.81 In his 1750 letter to Nepliuev, Nuraly admitted that he had promised his half-sister for marriage to the Jungar leader but was not going to proceed with his plan without the empress’s approval.82 In the end, the marriage did not take place, because of the death of the bride and the murder of the Jungar leader by his rivals.83 As for Barak, he died in 1750. According to one version of events, he was poisoned by Tsevan Dorzhi’s people at Nuraly’s request.84

Abulkhair’s affair and its effects By the mid eighteenth century, some Russian officials had come to believe that there was no use in having the Qazaqs under Russian protection given the ongoing Qazaq raids of Russian subjects and trading caravans. Nepliuev’s successor, Rychkov, cited 1,182 captives of various nationalities who had been released from the Qazaq captivity in the period 1742–1754. He also stressed that the Qazaqs did not pay taxes in addition to being granted free trade.85 For his part, Georgi highlighted the fact that the Qazaq rulers had been granted land and an independent status. The only signs of their dependence on Russia were that they sent hostages and received salaries.86 As for the Qazaq side, although the Qazaq leaders’ status under Russian protection proved in the end useless with respect to providing them with their patron’s military assistance, the land provisions negotiated between Abulkhair and the Russian officials in the 1730s seemed to set in motion the sense of a territorial sovereignty with the khan’s subjects, which they linked to placing themselves under Russian rule. During his visit to the Middle Horde after Abulkhair’s murder by Barak in 1748, Russian envoy Guliaev heard from the elders of the Alshyn clan that they were about to join the Junior Horde, declaring to Janibek Batyr, “You and your people from the Middle Horde have always been inclined to cause troubles, we therefore decided to place ourselves under Nuraly to be able to wander along the river of Ilek and the Russian forts”.87 Nuraly, who had replaced his father as khan in 1749, also warned his subjects that if they did not follow his orders, they would be compelled to find an alternative shelter and other pasturelands.88 Despite their failure to control the Qazaqs’ periodic attacks on caravans, officials seem to have moved closer to achieving their goal of controlling independent

The new Jungar offensive and its impact 129 Qazaq movements by constructing forts in the Qazaqs’ grazing territories. Thus, Tevkelev’s prediction about using a fort to control these movements proved accurate. By restricting the nomads’ movements to a degree, the advent of the forts discouraged them from undertaking mutual attacks. Apart from Orenburg, under Kirillov, Urusov and Nepliuev a number of fortresses, forts, redoubts and settlements were established in Qazaq grazing territories. By the 1730s, the Samarskaia, Iaitskaia, Orenburgskaia and Uiskaia military lines featured 114 forts that had been constructed along the bank of the Iaik, stretching from its isthmus to Orenburg. These lines came to operate as the territorial borders that separated the Bashkir lands from those used by the populations of the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde.89 Under Nepliuev, the government constructed four new military lines, including the Ural’sk, Orenburg, Ishim and Irtysh lines. In this way, by the mid eighteenth century, the populations of the Qazaq Junior Horde and the Qazaq Middle Horde had found their pasturelands effectively surrounded by 46 forts and 96 redoubts all together.90 According to Rychkov, to prevent the Qazaqs from crossing the river and harassing the Kalmyks, in 1747, the government stationed 3,350 Ural’sk Cossacks at the forts constructed along the Iaik.91 During the 1739–1741 Jungar offensive, the government used the forts as shelters that provided the Qazaqs with protection. In 1742, its officials issued a decree to increase the forts’ military personnel and to allow Qazaqs fleeing from Jungar attacks to find refuge there.92 Subsequently, the board’s members instructed its local men that if the Qazaqs asked for protection against the Jungars, they could find refuge in Orenburg. At the same time, the board’s members admitted that they would need to move the three regular detachments that had been permanently stationed in Astrakhan to the region and station them in the Russian settlements near Orenburg. Nepliuev was also ordered to allow the Qazaqs to cross to the inner side of the Iaik. He argued against the government’s plan to station the Russian regular armies there, claiming that they could not effectively operate under the steppe conditions and therefore would be of little help in fighting the Jungars.93 Because the construction of the forts was motivated by the desire to control nomadic movements in the first place, the choice of their territories oftentimes proved incompatible with established engineering standards. In addition, the forts were poorly connected with each other and suffering from chronic depopulation.94 Because of being periodically flooded, under Tatishchev the initial site of Orenburg was moved towards the Iaik’s lower reaches, where the construction of a new fort began in 1739. The fort’s site came to be called Orsk. Orenburg was moved in 1742 for the third, and last time to its current location.95 Apart from suffering from a chronic shortage of people and food and from severe frost, Orenburg and the other forts became targets of regular attacks by the Bashkir and other local populations from their very inception.96 Since the territories surrounding the forts proved mostly unsuitable for agriculture, food, including bread, was supplied by Russian towns in Siberia, which was complicated by the lack of proper roads and infrastructure.97 Abulkhair complained about his three-day stay in the Orsk fort in 1742, when he had been fed dry grains and felt hungry all the time, which ultimately made

130  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection him the butt of his nobles’ jokes.98 Five years later, Nepliuev reported on the forts’ underpopulated condition and their poor fortification. He highlighted the importance, under these conditions, of pitting the Kalmyks, the Iaik Cossacks, the Bashkirs, the Meshcheriaks and other local non-Russian populations against each other to avoid using Russian soldiers.99 The population of the seven forts of the Irtysh Line, the construction of which began in 1716–1720, was reported as having been made up only 489 Cossacks in 1725.100 N. G. Apollova’s research accounts for all together 3,408 people who inhabited the forts and settlements of the Ishim Line in 1744.101 Similarly, according to the data of Zh. K. Kasymbaev, the military population of the three forts of the Siberian Line, including the forts of Semipalatinskaia, Ust’-Kamenogorskaia and Zhelezinskaia, made up 720 people in 1744. They had 35 canons at their disposal. The number of regular and irregular soldiers stationed at the forts of the Siberian Line comprised about 10,000 people in 1750. In 1772, the number of the whole population of the Semipalatinkaia fort comprised only 549 people. Their number had slowly grown by the late 1780s to comprise 900 people.102 Despite the growth of the Qazaqs’ dissatisfaction following the withdrawal of their grazing lands for the construction of new forts, their nobles came to view the forts as places where they could find refuge from their own and other enemies. They therefore asked Russian authorities to build new forts in their territories. In 1742, Abulmambet turned to the empress with his request to construct a fort and supply him with bread.103 Unable to protect his people from Qazaq attacks, Donduk Dashi asked the Russians to construct two forts for protection against the Qazaqs, where he intended to station his soldiers.104 Abulkhair’s sons Eraly and Nuraly and his other nobles also asked Russian authorities to build forts for their personal safety.105 The influential tribal leader Bogenbai Batyr, in turn, mentioned in his conversation with Tevkelev that the Siberian and Ural’sk Cossack forts had protected his subjects from Bashkir, Kalmyk and Jungar raids. During one such raid, Abulmamet and his nobles also found refuge in Orenburg. Bogenbai Batyr declared that after Tevkelev had placed them under Russia’s protection, the Qazaqs gained access to permanent pastures and, thanks to the construction of Orenburg, became wealthier as a result of gaining access to Russian manufactured goods.106 Abulkhair and his nobles also requested free houses, which they came to view as providing them with both protection and a space for hibernation during winter.107 The idea of constructing free houses for the Qazaq nobility and supplying them with free bread was promoted by some officials as a way of keeping them attracted to the Russian military lines. General Saimonov, for example, believed that accustoming the Qazaqs to consuming bread on a daily basis would motivate them to wander near Orenburg and other Russian forts. Otherwise, the general warned, they might search for other rulers to provide them with protection.108 Subsequently, the authorities organized the regular delivery of free bread and flour to the leadership of both hordes, including Ablai, Nuraly, Aichivak and their nobility.109 Nepliuev also came to believe that if the Russians supplied the Qazaq khans with salaries and free bread, they would keep their subjects obedient to them. In his view, both salaries and bread would take on a symbolic meaning in the eyes of their subjects, affirming their khans’ status as being protected by the empress,

The new Jungar offensive and its impact  131 which would prevent the subjects from electing their own khans. In 1749, at Nuraly’s request, Nepliuev sent him wheat, flour and grains.110

Notes 1 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v., pp. 62, 64–65 2 Moiseev, V. A.: Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi XVII-XVIII vv, pp. 55, 137 3 Pishchulina, K. A.: Prisyrdar’inskie goroda i ikh znachenie v istorii kazakhskogo khanstva v XV – XVII vekakh, Uskenbai, K. Z. et al. (eds.): Pishchulina, K. A.: Ocherki istorii kazakhskogo khanstva. Sbornik statei, Almaty: Institut istorii i etnografii im. Ch. Ch. Valikhanova, 2016, pp. 93–94 4 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia – Kazakhstan: sovremennye mify i istoricheskaia real’nost’, pp. 21–23 5 Idem: Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi XVII-XVIII vv., p. 140 6 Idem: Rossiia – Kazakhstan: sovremennye mify i istoricheskaia real’nost’, p.  41; KRO-1, p. 255 7 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii XVII-XVIII vv., book one, pp. 298–299 8 Moiseev, V. A.: Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi XVII-XVIII vv., p. 117 9 Idem: Rossiia – Kazakhstan: sovremennye mify i istoricheskaia real’nost’, p. 44 10 Margulan, A. Kh. (ed.): Kazakhstan v epokhu feodalizma. Problemy etnopoliticheskoi istorii. Sbornik statei, Alma-Ata: “Nauka”, 1981, pp. 418–424 11 Moiseev, V. A.: Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi XVII-XVIII vv., p. 136 12 KRO-1, p. 210 13 Moiseev, V. A.: Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi XVII-XVIII vv., p. 133 14 KRO-1, pp. 178, 202, 299 15 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. I, p. 139 16 Ibid., p. 135 17 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, p.  36; Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, pp. 218–219 18 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, pp. 218–221 19 Ibid., pp. 224–225 20 Ibid., pp. 223–224 21 Ibid., p. 222 22 Ibid., pp. 234–235 23 Ibid., pp. 262–263 24 Ibid., p. 306 25 Ibid., p. 248 26 Moiseev, B. P. and Kim, G. F.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii XVIIXVIII vv., book one, pp. 304–303 27 Dobrosymslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, p. 42 28 Asfendiiarov, S. D. and Kunte, P. A. (eds.): Proshloe Kazakhstana v istochnikakh i materialakh, book I (V v.do n.e. – XVIII v.n.e), pp. 308–311 29 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), pp. 63–64 30 KRO-1, pp. 40–41 31 Ibid., p. 251 32 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. I, p. 102 33 KRO-1, pp. 109, 424 34 Zapiski Ivana Ivanovicha Nepliueva (1693–1773), St. Petersburg: Izdanie A. S. Suvorova, 1893, pp. 150–157 35 KRO-1, pp. 193–197

132  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection 36 37 38 39

Ibid., pp. 228–253 Ibid., p. 245 Ibid., pp. 298–299 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. I, p. 143 40 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), p. 78 41 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynystary, p. 53 42 KRO-1, pp. 193–197 43 Ibid., p. 197 44 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . .”, p. 134 45 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), p. 78 46 Apollova, N. G.: Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi Kazakhstana s Rossiei v XVIII – nachale XIX v., Moscow: AN SSSR, 1960, p. 125 47 KRO-1, p. 294 48 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 54–55 49 KRO-1, p. 319 50 Zhanaev, B. T. et al (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo Khanstva, 1801–1852 gg. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov, Almaty: “Daik-Press”, 2002, p. 900 51 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, 70–71 52 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), p. 83 53 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, pp. 136–137 54 Ibid., p. 232 55 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), p. 87 56 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke, pp. 106–111 57 KRO-1, pp. 222–227 58 Ibid., pp. 256–262 59 Ibid., p. 270 60 Moiseev, V. A.: Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi XVII-XVIII vv., p. 149 61 KRO-1, pp. 199–200 62 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia – Kazakhstan: sovremennye mify i istoricheskaia real’nost’, p. 48 63 Ibid., pp. 49–50 64 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke, pp. 107–111 65 Suleimenov, R. B. and Moiseev, V. A.: Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka (O vneshnei i vnutrennei politike Ablaia), Alma-Ata: “Nauka”, 1988, p. 38 66 KRO-1, p. 289 67 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia – Kazakhstan: sovremennye mify i istoricheskaia real’nost’, pp. 47–48 68 Quoted in: Moiseev, V. A.: Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi XVII-XVIII vv., p. 128 69 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), pp. 81–82; Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, pp. 223–224 70 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, p. 109 71 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia – Kazakhstan: sovremennye mify i istoricheskaia real’nost’, p. 33 72 Ibid., p. 34 73 Kraft, I. I.: Sbornik uzakonenii o kirgizakh stepnykh oblastei, p. 49 74 Zimanov, S. Z.: Obshchestvennyi stroi kazakhov pervoi poloviny XIX veka, Alma-Ata: AN KazSSR, 1958, pp. 208–209 75 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynystary, p. 61 76 KRO-1, pp. 395–403 77 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 82–83 78 KRO-1, p. 489; Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, p. 83 79 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 96–98

The new Jungar offensive and its impact  133 80 Moiseev, V. A.: Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi XVII-XVIII vv., pp. 207–208 81 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary, pp. 70–74 82 KRO-1, p. 494 83 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), p. 90 84 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, p. 84 85 Asfendiiarov, S. D. and Kunte, P. A. (eds.): Proshloe Kazakhstana v istochnikakh i materialakh, book I (V v.do n.e. – XVIII v.n.e), p. 306 86 Ibid., pp. 299–301 87 Margulan, A. Kh. (ed.): Kazakhstan v epokhu feodalizma, p. 428 88 KRO-1, p. 494 89 Sultangalieva, G. S.: Zapadnyi Kazakhstan v sisteme ethnokul’turnykh kontaktov, p. 24 90 Kliashtornyi, S. G. and Sultanov, T. I.: Gosudarstva i narody evraziiskikh stepei, p. 302; Erofeeva, I.: Khan Abulkhair: polkovodets, pravitel’ i politik, pp. 263–264 91 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), p. 84 92 Basin, V. Ia.: Rossiia i kazakhskie khanstva v XVI-XVIII vv., p. 170 93 KRO-1, pp. 198–200 94 Basin, V. Ia: Politika Rossii v Mladshem i Srednem Zhuzakh v kontse 50-kh i v 60-kh godakh XVIII veka, Izvestiia AN Kaz SSR, seriia obshchestvennaia, vol. 3 (1968), p. 43 95 Kliashtornyi, S. G. and Sultanov, T. I.: Gosudarstva i narody evraziiskikh stepei, p. 302 96 Kraft, I. I.: Sbornik uzakonenii o kirgizakh stepnykh oblastei, p. 36; Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 20–21 97 Apollova, N. G.: Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi Kazakhstana s Rossiei v XVIII – nachale XIX v., p. 139 98 KRO-1, pp. 276–277 99 Ibid., pp. 341, 346 100 Galiev, V. Z. et al (eds.): Istoriia kolonizatsii Kazakhstana v 20–60-kh godakh XIX veka, Almaty: Mektep, 2009, p. 157 101 Apollova, N. G.: Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi Kazakhstana s Rossiei v XVIII – nachale XIX v. p. 132 102 Kasymbaev, Zh.: Pod nadezhnuiu zashchitu Rossii, Alma-Ata: “Kazakhstan”, 1986, pp. 45, 50, 57 103 KRO-1, p. 186 104 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, pp. 213–214 105 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. I, pp. 57–58 106 KRO-1, pp. 383–389 107 Ibid., pp. 298–299 108 Ibid., pp. 189, 345 109 Margulan, A. Kh. (ed.): Kazakhstan v epokhu feodalizma, p. 678 110 Ibid., p. 482

7 From protection to confirmation (konfirmatsiia)

The flexible workings of Qazaq power relations enabled Russian authorities to fall through the cracks inflicted by their interference with these workings. The cracks cut across the traditional division of the Qazaq ruling camp into non-tribal and tribal leaders, by regrouping them along new lines. If the noble loyalists began to view cooperation with the Russians as the way of preserving and strengthening their privileged positions, their counterparts adhered to the opposite opinion, considering it a threat to their established leadership status. Russian policies filled in the emerging gap by creating contested spaces of power and pitting the two rival camps against each other. The Russian I. P. Shangin, who travelled across the Qazaq Steppe in the 1780s, observed that the Qazaqs had less respect for the khans appointed by Russian monarchs than for the khans that they had elected themselves.1 Russian-oriented Qazaq nobles adopted the practice of sending their complaints to higher Russian officials, often including requests for access to specific pasturelands. During Levshin’s work at the archives of the Orenburg and Omsk Frontier Commissions in the 1820s, he found numerous files with this type of complaint that had been sent by Qazaq nobles in the previous century.2 One of the emerging contested spaces of power was the practice of having Russian nobles confirm newly elected Qazaq khans, which came to be called konfirmatsiia (confirmation). This procedure linked becoming khan with swearing allegiance to the Russian throne and implied that the legitimacy of the title directly depended on the goodwill of Russian patrons. After Abulkhair’s murder, the Russian Board’s members instructed Nepliuev to send an envoy to Abulkhair’s widow Bopai to express his condolences and to convince her and her family that for the sake of their and their subjects’ wellbeing, they should elect their own ruler, but not confirm him as khan without the empress’s approval.3 Envoy Guliaev was also to let them know that they could wander near the Russian forts and even settle there in case they were threatened by their enemies and that they could visit St Petersburg if they desired.4 Upon his return, Guliaev reported that Nuraly’s election in 1748 had violated some important Qazaq customs, including the mandate that the election of a khan by Chingizid and tribal nobles must take place in the open steppe with the participation of as many people as possible, noble and ordinary alike. In contrast, Nuraly

From protection to confirmation  135 was elected in his tent by the representatives of only ten kinship groups, and a total of 1,000 people participated in the festivities that followed his election.5 After the election, Bopai, Nuraly and some nobles sent their letters to the empress, Nepliuev and Tevkelev, asking the Russians to confirm Nuraly as khan of the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde and to issue a special charter with a golden stamp on it.6 Nuraly committed himself, in his letter, to protecting caravans, but he asked the empress to reward him with the right to taxing them. The next year, Nuraly dispatched his delegation to the capital, where its members received a royal charter, the corresponding regalia and the gifts from court officials that were to be handed over to the khan during a special ceremony.7 Empress Elizabeth confirmed Nuraly as Abulkhair’s successor by her charter on 26 February 1749.8 Nuraly’s envoys received money and fabrics and left St Petersburg for Orenburg accompanied by Russian soldiers. Captain Markov, who accompanied the delegation, carried the items valued at 2,000 rubles, including the text of the oath, a patent, a sabre, a sable coat decorated with brocade, a hat made of black fox fur and a brocade fabric, which were to be handed over to Nuraly and his mother during the ceremony. In the empress’s order, due to the complexities of the situation, she approved Nuraly, similar to his father, as a “Kirgiz-Kaisak khan” instead of the khan of the Junior Horde or both hordes. The order explained that appointing Nuraly as the khan of the Junior Horde might provoke resistance on the part of certain groups in the horde’s population, whereas making him the khan of both hordes might put Russia in a conflict situation with the Jungars. Although the rulers of the Middle Horde had sworn allegiance to the Russians in 1740, the empress was aware that they had sent their amanats to the Jungars. She did not oppose this action, but she was against the rulers of the Junior Horde adopting the practice. The Jungars therefore should leave these rulers in peace.9 By the time of the charter’s issue, court officials were informed that following Nuraly’s election, a significant part of the horde’s southeastern population had elected Sultan Batyr, who was on friendly terms with Barak, Abulkhair’s murderer, as their khan.10 Batyr also sought the approval of his title by the empress, by asking Nepliuev for permission to send his envoys to the capital. The board’s members, however, instructed Nepliuev that Batyr should not be approved, because he had not been elected by the whole population of the horde and lacked the governor’s backing. Therefore, instead of calling himself khan, Batyr should establish peaceful relations with Nuraly. The members were well aware of the fact that the long distance between the regions inhabited by the horde’s southern populations and Russian military lines made these populations much less attentive to their decisions. Notwithstanding the court’s instructions, Batyr sent his son Kaip to Orenburg in 1750 to offer his services for providing caravans with better protection by redirecting their actual travelling routes. Instead of crossing territories controlled by Nuraly, they should cross territories under Batyr’s control to prevent Nuraly and his brother Adil from collecting fees from merchants. In response, Nepliuev admonished Batyr to live in peace with Nuraly and reminded him about Nuraly’s and his nobles’ promise to provide the merchants with security.11

136  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection After the election, Nepliev congratulated Nuraly by sending him a letter with gifts for him, his mother and his brothers. In his report to the board, however, Nepliuev wrote that Nuraly felt uncertain about his status and did not trust his people. His brothers strove to establish themselves in Khiva and the Middle Horde, while his mother advised him to go to Khiva and put one of his brothers in power there. Considering these plans, Nepliuev stressed the importance of keeping a balance of power between Abulkhair’s sons and their rivals, so as not to allow any one of them to prevail.12 Nuraly’s confirmation ceremony took place in 1749 on the left bank of the Iaik, near Orenburg. During the weeklong celebration, there were gunshots and rockets fired, generous feasts and military parades. Nepliuev used this opportunity to renegotiate the issue of stopping Qazaq raids on Russian subjects and caravans. He reminded the khan of his father’s promise to return Russian captives. Nuraly approved of the issue and stated that he would be able to keep the promise if he were provided with Russian troops. The troops would also help him take revenge against his father’s killer, Barak. Nepliuev declined this request, suggesting that the family should wait and see because, among other things, it was not easy to locate Barak. In addition, the appearance of a large Russian army against a single person could frighten Nuraly’s subjects and, in so doing, further endanger the situation. He also reminded Nuraly that only the empress had the authority to make such decisions. Nepliuev also reminded Nuraly that the population of the Middle Horde had friendly relations with Russia. Therefore, the khan and his family should settle their problems peacefully and without the interference of Russian authorities. Each time that Nuraly broached the subject of military assistance, Nepliuev refused, but he did promise Russian support if the conflict between the family and Barak escalated.13 Nuraly decided to show his discontent about Nepliuev’s reluctance to meet with his requests, by demanding that Adil be replaced by his half-brother Chingiz. After this demand was also ignored by Nepliuev, Nuraly ordered his subjects to move away from the Russian forts. He declared that his subjects would raid Orenburg, and he would not prevent them from undertaking these raids, including their raids of caravans: The Qazaqs will then consider me not only their khan but also a holy man. Now they do not want to obey me, precisely because I’ve been wandering near the Russian lines and serve Russia loyally. Due to Nepliuev and Tevkelev, I am not a khan but a shepherd of horses. God will punish them for that. Let the Jungars, the Bashkirs, the Kalmyks, and other hordes [populations] surround me. Even under those conditions I will be able to find another place to stay, rather than live under such heavy burden.14 Despite the rising tension between him and Nepliuev, Nuraly finally decided to dispatch his son Piraly as amanat in 1750. Two years later, Piraly was replaced by his brother Mukhametaly, who was also held as amanat in Orenburg for another two years, before being replaced by Nuraly’s other son, Janaly. In 1767,

From protection to confirmation  137 Nuraly also dispatched his son Ablai as amanat to the Russians.15 Nuraly and his father’s investment in the practice of sending their sons as amanats to the Russians attests to his family’s growing dependence on their Russian patrons as a way of keeping their subjects attracted to the khans. Notably, the elders of the Alshyn tribe from the Middle Horde declared to Barak, Abulkhair’s murderer, that since he had killed the khan, who had secured pastures for his people, he should replace Abulkhair’s son Aichuvak with his own son to secure the Qazaqs’ access to pasturelands.16 Similarly, a Cossack visitor to the Junior Horde witnessed an elder saying that the Qazaqs had benefited from Abulkhair’s placing his people under the empress’s protection and sending his son as amanat, to the Russians, because this had allowed the Qazaqs to gain access to pasturelands and manufactured goods.17 No wonder Nuraly continued with the practice despite some of his sons’ deaths during their stay as amanats. According to Apollova, in the period 1734–1757, Abulkhair and Nuraly sent eight amanats to the Russians despite the fact that sometimes they were not required to do so. The khans’ strategy, however, had its risks: they failed to meet their subjects’ expectations and, in so doing, provoked their criticism followed by the deterioration of the khans’ power status.

Tevkelev’s and Rychkov’s reports Against the new political landscape of the frontier spelled out by the removal of the Jungars by the Qing, the new heads of the Orenburg Frontier Commission, Tevkelev and Rychkov, elaborated on their vision for Russia’s policies towards the Qazaqs, which they proposed in the reports that they prepared for the Russian Board in the 1750s. Since both men were hailed as experts on Qazaq issues, their suggestions were taken into consideration by higher state officials. It is therefore worth taking a closer look at their reports. Among other things, their reports reveal both authors’ keen knowledge of the intricate patterns of Qazaq power organization. For example, they wrote that following these patterns, the Qazaq leaders, like their Jungar and other nomadic counterparts, might aspire to place the local frontier peoples under their control in order to potentially transform themselves into Russia’s enemy. Significant historical evidence suggested that if the Qazaq leaders had been alienated from Russia, they might create unions with other nomads and re-emerge as Russia’s serious enemy. As the example of Galdan Tseren demonstrated, the nomads could get backup when their most shrewd and brave leaders managed to place other nomads under their rule. Galdan used these strategies to place the three hordes under his rule and, in so doing, turned himself and his population into Russia’s most dangerous neighbour. Following in the footsteps of Siberian Governor Gagarin, Tevkelev warned that Russia should avoid having the Qing as their immediate neighbours. It was therefore important to prevent their cooperation with the Qazaqs and use the latter to stop the Qing and Mongols from establishing themselves in the former Jungar lands.18

138  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection Tevkelev and Rychkov believed that to extend Russia’s influence over the Qazaq leadership camp, authorities should consider that the Qazaqs valued their freedom more than anything else and therefore obeyed their leaders only if they needed protection or intended to undertake raids. Since all of them were inclined to benefit from taking spoils, they often undertook raids on their own initiative without their leaders’ approval. Their rulers therefore often proved incapable of not only imposing tributes on their subjects but also punishing them. The only way the rulers could influence their subjects was through displaying their generosity and wisdom towards their followers. This, however, did not always guarantee that the rulers would gain their subjects’ recognition and obedience either. As an example of a charismatic Qazaq ruler, Tevkelev and Rychkov cited Sultan Ablai from the Middle Horde, who thanks to his generosity towards his nobles, had been acknowledged by them as their undisputed ruler. Given the unbinding nature of Qazaq power relations, Tevkelev and Rychkov assumed that all Qazaq nobles could be easily pitted against each other and placed under Russian control by implementing the politics of rewards among them. This strategy could also be applied to the Qing by pitting the Bashkirs, the Qazaqs and other frontier populations against them. In fact, in both men’s view, this was the only effective strategy for placing the Qazaq leadership under Russia’s rule. They pointed out that the Qing had also embarked on implementing these politics, rewarding the most influential Qazaq figures with ranks, charters, money and gifts and inviting them to use the former Jungar pastures. It should be explained to the Qazaq rulers that, unlike the Russians, the Qing treated their subjects in a cruel manner, while local Russian officials should be instructed to distribute expensive gifts to the Qazaq nobles on a regular basis, no matter the cost. Tevkelev and Rychkov argued that assigning salaries to Qazaq rulers was an important means of keeping them attracted to their Russian peers, since they themselves did not collect any revenues from their subjects. If the khan received a salary, he would be compelled, according to their custom, to distribute it among his nobles, which would keep his nobles obedient to him.19 The authors again argued in favour of promoting internecine wars and rivalries among the nomadic leaders as the only effective strategy for bringing them into submission, pointing out that the Qing’s use of this strategy greatly helped them destroy the Jungars. To reinforce their argument, the authors also mentioned the Qazaqs’ superior military skills. This pertained not only to their rulers’ ability to mobilize their men at a speed unthinkable for the Russians but also to their warfare tactics. For example, each Qazaq soldier had several horses, which they replaced during a battle. They could also retreat at a high speed, so Russian soldiers often proved incapable of chasing them. In addition, the soldiers also faced the risk of perishing, along with their horses, after finding themselves without supplies of food and fodder in remote steppe regions. Tevkelev and Rychkov expressed their reservations with respect to placing both hordes under a single ruler, which had been suggested by some authorities with the aim of introducing order and discipline among their populations. Given the workings of Qazaq power relations, they viewed this policy as risky

From protection to confirmation  139 and unrealistic and defended the balance of power strategy. They proposed that in the future, the Qazaq khans, like the Kalmyk rulers, should be appointed by Russian rulers without being elected by their nobles, which would make them entirely dependent on their Russian patrons. The authors’ other suggestions pertained to the construction of forts and houses for the Qazaq nobility, where they could stay during their enemies’ attacks and take over the maintenance of the forts. The forts could be equipped with some munitions, along with 20–30 soldiers who could speak Tatar. Tevkelev mentioned the newly constructed forts, including Orenburg, that had proved instrumental in complicating easy cooperation between the Qazaqs and the Bashkirs. Both officials also reported that 2,253 Russian and other non-Russian subjects of the empress had been recently released from Qazaq captivity.20

The ban strategy under Nuraly Because the authorities continued to invest in the strategy of imposing bans on the Qazaqs’ migrations to the Iaik’s inner side as a way to keep power, the scale of Nuraly’s and his nobles’ ability to roam freely significantly shrank. This trend was further reinforced by a number of additional factors. Migrating to lands under Jungar control grew ever-more implausible due to the escalating power struggle among the Jungar nobles, which became further complicated after the Kokand had defeated them and their conflict with the Qing intensified between 1753 and 1755. As mentioned earlier, Nuraly’s attempts to establish marital ties with Jungar leader Tsevan Dorzhi, to whom he had promised his half-sister, failed. Nuraly’s other option, using lands in the Syr Darya region and around Khiva also became unlikely due to the domination of these territories by Nuraly’s rivals Batyr and his son Kaip, who became khan of Khiva in 1756. Batyr, his son and their descendants continued to control the territories between the Aral Sea and the low Syr Darya in the 1760s and the 1770s.21 Nuraly also failed to establish relations with the Bukharan and other Central Asian rulers, while his connections with the Qing in the periods preceding and following the destruction of the Jungars in 1755–1758 were rather sporadic, due to the remoteness of Qing territories and markets, among other things. Under these circumstances, Nuraly invested in his father’s idea about having a fort constructed on the Emba as a means of reinforcing his status and providing his access to the Syr Darya region, which he reintroduced, time and again, over the period of three decades, from the 1760s to the 1780s.22 Since in the end he failed to secure his peers’ support for this idea, Nuraly came to view migration to the inner side of the Iaik as the only credible option for securing his and his populations’ livestock in wintertime. Against the dramatically changing dynamics of the frontier marked by the new Jungar–Qing confrontation, the government allowed Nuraly and those of his nobles who had assisted in delivering the runaway Bashkirs to cross the Iaik. Yet in 1756, the officials put a general ban on crossing the river for both the Qazaqs and the Kalmyks, to prevent possible conflicts between the two populations, including conflicts with the Cossacks.

140  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection In the meantime, Nuraly’s Qazaqs began to display signs of poverty that forced some of them to sell their children.23 This trend was accompanied by the rising number of Nuraly’s runaways. 1,396 runaways all together, mostly of the Kalmyk and Persian origin, were reported to have fled the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde in the period 1748–1754.24 Nuraly’s envoys, whom the khan sent to the capital in 1756, failed to negotiate the issue in his favour. In a 1757 order, the empress renewed the ban.25 Nuraly responded by threatening to wander off, along with his population,26 and dispatched two missions to Russia, one in 1757 and another in 1762, to renegotiate the latest ban. His elders demanded that he wander off, and they began to leave him.27 Regardless of his unsuccessful attempts to renegotiate the issue with Tevkelev, in 1757, Nuraly decided to cross the river on his own initiative.28 Between the mid 1750s and the 1760s, his Qazaqs got involved in continuous skirmishes with the Kalmyks,29 amid which both sides proved able, at some point, to establish friendly relations with each other, which Pal’mov believed was intended to facilitate the Qazaqs’ emigration to Kuban. The Russian Board instructed its local representative, Spitsyn, to prevent the unfolding of this amiable relationship, including the practices of arranging mixed marriages between the two populations. In the 1750s, the Kalmyks found protection from their enemies by fleeing to Qazaq territories, while Donduk Dashi’s Kalmyks found themselves engaged with conducting secret trade with the Qazaqs. In the late 1750s, Dashi informed Russian officials about the Qazaqs’ desire to abandon their status under Russia’s protection. He suggested a joint military campaign against the Qazaqs but failed to get the officials’ approval.30 Finally, Nuraly decided to make the Russian ban strategy work to his own advantage, by imposing fees of one horse and one sheep on those Qazaqs who intended to cross the river. In this way, his children collected 210 horses from the Qazaqs of the three kinship groups within the period of one year.31 In addition, Nuraly encouraged the Iaik Cossacks to imprison the Qazaqs who had crossed the river without paying the fees. The Cossacks, in turn, imposed their own payments on these Qazaqs as the condition for their release, which they then shared with Nuraly and some of his nobles.32 Ablai and his influential elder Kulsary from the Middle Horde were also reported to have imposed fees on the Qazaqs crossing the Irtysh to the inner side.33 To compensate for their lack of mobility, Nuraly and his brothers began undertaking systematic raids of trading caravans. No wonder that the issue of caravan security continued to persist. Tevkelev noticed that Nuraly and his brothers were in conflict with each other over this issue.34 To compel the Russians to listen to his demands, Nuraly did not allow caravans travelling to Russia to cross any territories under his control.35 He contended that only those Qazaqs who disobeyed him were plundering caravans and kidnapping merchants or other subjects under Russian rule.36 In the aftermath of the defeat of the Jungars in 1758, followed by the Qing efforts to expand their influence over the populations of the former Jungar lands, Tevkelev and Rychkov allowed the Qazaqs to cross the Iaik, to prevent their

From protection to confirmation 141 collaboration with the Qing.37 Nuraly complained to both men about the unjust treatment of his Qazaqs by their Russian patrons when compared to the treatment of the Kalmyks. Although the latter had been placed under Russian rule by force (sic!), they got better benefits and more respect than the Qazaqs, who had still failed to make the empress attentive to their leaders’ requests, in spite of the fact that the latter had voluntarily submitted themselves to the Russians.38 Nuraly complained in his 1759 report to Prince M. Vorontsov about his subjects who had left after learning about the 1757 ban. In despair, he suggested that without his people, he would be compelled to abandon his job and stay in a house built for him by Russian authorities by the Emba River.39 Nuraly also resumed his negotiations with the authorities about the ban, this time reassuring the empress that he was ready to ally with the Russians against the Qing.40 Despite Nuraly’s complaints, in 1759, the new Orenburg governor, A. P. Davydov, renewed the 1741 ban.41 Subsequently, Nuraly’s nobles came to disapprove of his methods of ruling, so they sent their envoys to St Petersburg and local Russian authorities with their complaints.42 Among other things, they reproached the khan for imposing fees and for delivering his sons as amanats to the Russians, arguing that even with these practices, along with guiding Russian caravans and their general readiness to fight for the Russian monarchs, they still felt unprotected by their Russian patrons. For example, they still were not allowed to cross the Iaik.43 In 1762, Nuraly swore allegiance to Catherine II by using the Qur’an and putting his signature and stamp on a sheet of paper featuring the text of the oath. He used the opportunity to voice his Qazaqs’ discontent relating to the ban and added that because of the discontent, he felt unsafe travelling to Orenburg. His subjects disrespected and despised him. He was therefore unable to comply with the demand of delivering Russian captives.44 When Nuraly asked her to appoint one of his sons viceroy so that this son would succeed him as khan, Catherine II made it clear in her 1768 order that her government would prefer to promote Abulkhair’s descendants, not exclusively Nuraly’s sons.45 The envoys that Nuraly sent to St Petersburg in 1771 achieved little with respect to soliciting the empress’s consent to provide him with Russian soldiers to reclaim the Qazaq livestock that the Kalmyks had embezzled.46 No wonder Nuraly and his nobles took advantage of a royal order that charged them with bringing back Ubashi and his followers, who had fled the Volga region for Jungaria. Orenburg Governor I. Reinsdorp, like his predecessor Nepliuev, allowed the Qazaqs to keep the women and children of the runaway Kalmyks for themselves.47 In 1774, the governor suggested that the board’s members reward Nuraly and his brothers Eraly and Aichuvak with special charters to mark their active contribution to the 1771 event.48 During the Kalmyk exodus, the Junior Horde’s Qazaqs began to migrate to the Iaik’s inner side on their own. This prompted the officials to take control of their migrations by issuing permits to Qazaq migrants who had shown their loyalty to the regime. These Qazaqs were allowed to use lands on the inner side in winter in exchange for their payments and delivering amanats.49

142  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection Nuraly’s Qazaqs voluntarily crossed the Iaik during the Pugachev revolt that was unfolding in the region in 1773–1775 as well. Eventually, Nuraly and his brother Dosaly cooperated with Pugachev, who in Nuraly’s words had promised “land, water, bread, money, gunpowder, and lead” to the khan.50 Nuraly finally switched to the Russian side, this time asking the empress to send him soldiers and canons so that he could fight against Pugachev,51 whom he called a thief. He assured the empress that he would never violate his oath to her, and that he would strive to annihilate Pugachev and his brother Dosaly, and he reminded the empress that his subjects were wild and frivolous.52 His Russian patrons, however, ignored his request.53 In 1785, Nuraly wrote to Igel’strom that he had lost his people’s trust, and they had left him and wandered off.54 The charismatic elder Syrym Datov took advantage of the growing dissatisfaction with Nuraly on the part of the horde’s influential nobility. Syrym distinguished himself as the leader of the Qazaq resistance to the policy of dispatching punitive expeditions to Qazaq nomadic camps (auyls) by frontier officials known as the frontier or governmental baranta. Under the pretext of punishing the nomads for their attacks on Russian settlements and their enslavement of Russian people, these detachments often ended up plundering peaceful communities and embezzling their livestock. It is no wonder that, with time, the practice turned into a lucrative source of profit for the officials. Syrym mobilized the Qazaqs to retaliate against these practices in order to launch their own raids against Russian forts, settlements and caravans.55 Syrym and his followers called Nuraly the Russian khan and accused him of opening up Qazaq grazing territories to the Russians, thus making the Qazaqs more vulnerable to Russian attacks. Syrym called upon the nobles to establish their own relations with Russian authorities.56 In 1785, Syrym encouraged a group of discontented nobles to hold a meeting, during which the nobles put up a petition in which they proposed depriving Abulkhair’s descendants of the privilege of being appointed their rulers and suggested Kaip, the son of Abulkhair’s rival Batyr, as their khan. They also asked for permission to graze their livestock near the Russian forts of Sakharnyi and Gur’ev in winter. The petition was signed by 55 elders, who represented 16 kinship groups of the Junior Horde. The elders sent their representatives to Orenburg to let its officials know about their decision. Following the meeting, the government assigned the requested territories to 70,300 Qazaq families as their pastures.57 Syrym’s call for the nobles to establish their independent relations with the government thus began to bear fruit.58 To pacify Syrym’s rioters, at Nuraly’s request, state officials dispatched 3,462 soldiers, who ended up arresting only 43 innocent Qazaqs. The rioters retaliated by kidnapping 176 Russians. Similarly, other two Russian detachments, featuring 2,760 regular soldiers and 1,250 Cossacks sent by the government to restore order among the Qazaqs, were able to arrest only 213 Qazaq women and children, whom they later exchanged for Russian captives.59 The new Orenburg governor, Osip Igel’strom, and his colleagues began to view the situation as favourable for abolishing the khanship in the Junior Horde. Accordingly, Catherine II gave an order to dismiss Nuraly and approved the idea of placing the Junior Horde under the jurisdiction of the Frontier Commission. She

From protection to confirmation  143 also approved Igel’strom’s idea to introduce so-called raspravas, administrativeterritorial units, into the Junior Horde.60 At the same time, the empress refrained from proposing Kaip, whose influence was growing among the horde’s southern populations, as the horde’s new leader, ordering her officials to first investigate his true authority with the rest of the horde’s population. Her stance reflected her government’s general strategy of keeping the horde’s leadership divided and, hence, dependent on Russian decision-making.61 In 1786, the government established the Frontier Court, featuring six Russian and seven Qazaq members, in addition to four Russian clerks and two translators, and charged the members with using Russian laws as a basis for settling cases involving the Qazaqs and the Russians.62 The government sent Mukhamedjan Khusainov, Mufti of the Orenburg Spiritual Administration, to the horde’s nobility to implement this reform. The Mufti was charged with publicizing Igel’strom’s appeal to Syrym’s rioters to cease their riots and make sure that they were aware of his threat of punishment.63 In 1785, on the eve of the implementation of his reform, Igel’strom allowed 45,000 Qazaq families to cross the Iaik. A year later, Russian officials imposed a fee of one copeck for each camel, to be paid by the Qazaqs crossing the river to its opposite side.64 Igel’strom’s reform opted to place the horde’s population under their elders, who were to be equally represented in the raspravas. Established in 1786–1787, the raspravas proved a failure, however, because from their inception, the elders refused to participate in them.65 Instead, in 1787, they sent their envoys to St Petersburg to transmit their request to allow them and their people to cross to the inner side of the Ural (the former Iaik). Apprehensive of the riots orchestrated by Syrym that by this time had reached dangerous proportions, the government agreed to meet with their request.66

The Junior Horde after Nuraly Nuraly ruled over a period of 30 years, during which on average 175 Russian people were kidnapped annually. In 1784, Nuraly asked the Russians for permission to go to Mecca and to increase his salary. Two years later, he fled to Ufa, where he died in 1790. After Nuraly’s death, Syrym resumed his attacks on Russian forts. After Nuraly’s death, Catherine II’s government selected Eraly as his older brother’s successor. The election of Eraly took place in 1791 near the Orsk fort in the presence of the Orenburg governor, General A. A. von Peutling. Syrym and his elders sent a letter, in which they expressed their disapproval of the government’s choice, to which Peutling replied that despite their resistance, the election would take place. After the election, central authorities established the Khan’s Council, whose six members were chosen by Igel’strom. They represented the horde’s three main clans and were assigned annual salaries. Peutling spent about 7,000 rubles on the ceremony, including the costs of Eraly’s envoys to the capital, whom the khan dispatched in 1792 to obtain the empress’s approval.67 In the aftermath of Eraly’s confirmation, Syrym and his nobles declared that they were not against the descendants of Abulkhair being appointed as khans

144  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection but against Eraly, who by that time had become an old and incapacitated man, and they proposed that Eraly’s son Jaltyr should replace his father.68 After having failed to receive the officials’ approval, Syrym and his supporters resumed their attacks on the Russian forts. This time, Syrym agitated against establishing any relations with the Russians and sent his envoys to ask for assistance from the Khivan and Bukharan rulers. He ended up declaring war against Russia in 1792. In 1797, Eraly’s successor, Esim, who had been appointed by authorities, was murdered by his rivals. Despite the murder, the authorities continued with the practice of appointing old, incapacitated and unpopular men as khans, who, in the end, proved incapable of imposing their will on their compatriots. At the suggestion of the Orenburg military governor, General N. N. Bakhmet’ev, Paul I abolished the Frontier Court and established the Frontier Commission in 1799. This change, however, did not prevent the Qazaqs from raiding Russian settlements and pillaging caravans. Within the year, the Qazaqs had raided the largest caravan that had been dispatched to the area so far, seizing goods worth 295,000 rubles. Thus, up until this point, all of measures undertaken by the government for the sake of preventing the Qazaqs’ plunder of caravans had proven useless.69 Aichuvak, who succeeded Esim, explained that the recent plunder of the Russian caravan was because the authorities had failed to address the continuous assaults on his Qazaqs by the Bashkirs and the Uralsk Cossacks. In his own words, Of course, Russian merchants are not to be blamed for this negligence, however, we decided, despite the risk of being severely punished, to capture their caravan in the hope that following an investigation, we would be able to voice our own concerns. Aichuvak suggested appointing a couple of Russian officials to settle his people’s conflicts with the Ural’sk Cossacks and the Bashkirs.70 The new khan, Jantore, Aichuvak’s son, was strongly opposed by the horde’s nobility. After Jantore’s confirmation, Nuraly’s son Sultan Qaratai and Batyr’s descendant Sultan Aryngazy emerged as the new strong opponents of the Russians’ interference with the Qazaq power politics. Subsequently, Jantore was murdered by Qaratai’s followers in 1809.71 In 1817, the horde’s southeastern Qazaqs informed Orenburg Governor P. K. Essen about the election of Aryngazy as their khan.72 In the aftermath of Jantore’s murder, during the period 1809–1812, Orenburg Governor G. S. Volkonsky suggested placing the administration of the Junior Horde under the control of the restored Khan’s Council, which included the khan as its head; six nobles, each representing one of the horde’s major tribes; two representatives from Orenburg’s Tatar community; and a clerk.73 The emperor appointed Nuraly’s son Bokei as the Khan’s Council’s head in 1811 and assigned him an annual salary of 300 rubles.74 Since the Khan’s Council, like its predecessors, proved to be an ineffectual institution, Qaratai was able to consolidate power in his own hands and operate as the actual ruler.

From protection to confirmation 145 Volkonsky had Jantore’s brother Shirgazy replace his murdered brother. Subsequently, Alexander I appointed Shirgazy khan of the Junior Horde in 1811. In Alexander I’s charter, he approved the division of the horde’s population into two political bodies, the Junior Horde and the Bokei Horde, which he believed reflected the will of the nobility and the ordinary people. Along with the charter, the court sent an engraved sabre, a sable coat and a hat made of black fox fur to be given to Shirgazy during his confirmation. Volkonsky spent more than 10,000 rubles on the ceremony. Like Jantore, Shirgazy proved to be an unpopular and weak khan. Qaratai disapproved of his appointment. In 1813, 1815 and 1816, Qaratai and his followers resumed their assaults on the Qazaqs and the Russians. The officials repeatedly failed to arrest and punish him or his followers. In the end, Volkonsky gave up and offered Qaratai to make him khan of the Turkmens after the death of their khan Piraly in 1815, but the sultan refused by pointing to Piraly’s sons. He also promised to promote Qaratai to khan of the Bokei Horde after Bokei’s death in 1816. By this time, the costs incurred from Qazaq pillages of caravans had reached 1,500,000 rubles. Helpless at convincing Qaratai to cease his raids of caravans and Russian military lines, the authorities decided to pardon him in 1818. After he was pardoned, Qaratai’s behaviour changed: he ceased his raids and handed over his captives. To get Qaratai on the Russian side, General Essen, who replaced Volkonsky in 1817, invited him to Orenburg, where he showed him high honours and respect.75 In 1811, the state had continued the construction of the Novo-Iletskaia Line that connected the Volga and Ilek rivers and settled it with the Orenburg and Ural’sk Cossacks. The new line had the effect of restricting the use of local land by the Qazaqs of the Tabyn clan from the Junior Horde, whose leader, Jolaman Batyr, headed the resistance to the Russians in 1822–1840.76 By an 1823 order, Alexander I placed the Junior Horde under a special commission headed by a khan; three sultans or elders; and three mullahs. In 1824, the officials went on with implementing their long-term goal: the abolition of the khanship in the Junior Horde. This entailed the division of the horde’s grazing territories into three parts and placing them under the ruling sultans, including Qaratai, who were appointed by the government. Qaratai and the two other sultans were invited to Orenburg, where they stayed for more than one and half months at the state’s expense of 2,574 rubles, which included gifts, free food and wine. All three sultans swore their allegiance to the Russian throne and were given royal charters, sabres and banners decorated with the state coat of arms and were assigned monthly salaries of 100 rubles and a supply of buckwheat flour. The authorities also placed scribes and 200 Cossacks under the command of their officers at each sultan’s disposal. There were, however, no special celebrations held on this occasion. All three sultans came to be accepted by their constituencies as their rulers.77 The last khan of the Junior Horde, Shirgazy, fled to Khiva, where Khivan Khan Allakula acknowledged him as khan of the Junior Horde under the condition that he admits his vassal status. The Khivan khan also awarded gifts to Shirgazy and his nobles. Backed by Allakula, Shirgazy incited the Qazaqs to disobey the

Figure 7.1  Plan of a house for Sultan Qaratai sketched by Russian authorities

Figure 7.2 Sultan Colonel Akhmet Janturin (1810–1851), ruler of one of the three parts, into which the Junior Horde was divided by the 1824 reforms (photo was taken in the 1840s)

148  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection Russians. Subsequently, he joined groups of the horde’s population, who elevated him on a piece of white felt rug and proclaimed him their khan. Until his death in 1845, Shirgazy did not give up his hopes of reclaiming the title of khan of the Junior Horde. He resumed his negotiations with the Orenburg officials on this issue, but they limited themselves to rewarding him 500 rubles in 1836 and assigning an annual pension of 100 rubles to members of his family after his death.78 In 1821, Aryngazy was invited to St Petersburg and then exiled to Kaluga, where he died in 1833.

Notes 1 Shangin, I. P.: Dnevnye zapiski v kantseliariiu Kolyvano-Voskresenskogo gornogo nachal’stva o puteshestvii po Kirgiz-Kaisatskoi stepi, Barnaul: “Azbuka”, 2003, p. 134 2 Kozybaev, M. K. et  al. (eds.): Levshin, A. I.: Opisanie kirgiz-kazach’ikh ili kirgizkaisatskikh ord i stepei, p. 365 3 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), pp. 87–88 4 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary, p. 62 5 Margulan, A. Kh. (ed.): Kazakhstan v epokhu feodalizma, p. 428 6 Ibid., pp. 408–415 7 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary, p. 62 8 RGIA, f. 1291, op. 81, d.28 ll. 2–3 9 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 87–89 10 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia – Kazakhstan: sovremennye mify i istoricheskaia real’nost’, p. 44 11 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 100–102 12 Margulan, A. Kh. (ed.): Kazakhstan v epokhu feodalizma, pp. 417–424 13 KRO-1, pp. 450–468 14 Ibid., p. 104 15 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, pp. 58–59 16 Ibid., pp. 426–427 17 Ibid., pp. 432–434 18 Suleimenov, R.: Vzaimootnosheniia s Rossiei, Abzhanov, Kh. M. et al (eds.): Ramazan Suleimenov. Collected Works in Two Volumes, vol. 1, Almaty: “Izdatel’stvo Eltanym”, 2015, pp. 88–89; Suleimenov, R. B. and Moiseev, V. A.: Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka, p. 83 19 Moiseev, V. A.: Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi XVII-XVIII vv., p. 194 20 KRO-1, pp. 552–566, 571–591 21 Viatkin, M.: Batyr Srym, Almaty: “Sanat”, 1998, pp. 142, 149, 151, 155–158 22 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. II, pp. 152, 172–173, 252, 263 23 KRO-2, pp. 173, 180–181, 187; Viatkin, M.: Batyr Srym, p. 164 24 Apollova, N. G.: Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi Kazakhstana s Rossiei v XVIII – nachale XIX v., p. 385 25 KRO-1, pp. 547–548 26 Ibid., pp. 540–546 27 Margulan, A. Kh. (ed.): Kazakhstan v epokhu feodalizma, pp. 155–156 28 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Zemel’naia politika tsarskogo pravitel’stva v Mladshem Zhuze vo vtoroi polovine XVIII veka, Izvestiia AN Kaz SSR, seriia obshchestvennaia, vol. 2 (1968), p. 43 29 Ibid., p. 90

From protection to confirmation 149 30 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, pp. 238–239, 241 31 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary, p. 102 32 Ibid., p. 103 33 Ibid., p. 92 34 Margulan, A. Kh. (ed.): Kazakhstan v epokhu feodalizma, pp. 155–156 35 Basin, V. Ia: Politika Rossii v Mladshem i Srednem Zhuzakh v kontse 50-kh i v 60-kh godakh XVIII veka, p. 48 36 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. II, pp. 133–134 37 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Zemel’naia politika tsarskogo pravitel’stva v Mladshem Zhuze vo vtoroi polovine XVIII veka, pp. 43–44, 77–78 38 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. II, p. 84 39 KRO-1, pp. 599–601 40 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary, p. 79 41 Idem: Zemel’naia politika tsarskogo pravitel’stva v Mladshem Zhuze vo vtoroi polovine XVIII veka, pp. 43–44, 77–78 42 Ibid., p. 103 43 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. II, pp. 100–101 44 Margulan, A. Kh. (ed.): Kazakhstan v epokhu feodalizma, pp. 639–641 45 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 144–145 46 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary, p. 92 47 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. II, p. 206 48 KRO-2, p. 63 49 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary, pp. 101–102 50 KRO-2, pp. 19–22 51 Ibid., pp. 25–26, 41 52 Ibid., pp. 51–52 53 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. II, p. 224 54 Apollova, N. G.: Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi Kazakhstana s Rossiei v XVIII – nachale XIX v., pp. 404 55 KRO-2, pp. 127, 139 56 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. II, p. 260 57 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary, pp. 107–108 58 KRO-2, pp. 111–112 59 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 182–183 60 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary, pp. 108–109 61 Viatkin, M.: Batyr Srym, pp. 190–198 62 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, p. 183 63 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynystary, p. 105 64 KRO-2, p. 146; Sabyrkhanov, A.: Zemel’naia politika tsarskogo pravitel’stva v Mladshem Zhuze vo vtoroi polovine XVIII veka, pp. 46–47 65 KRO-2, p. 149

150  The Qazaqs under Russia’s protection 66 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary, p. 112 67 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 202–207 68 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynastary, pp. 120–122 69 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 206–207, 215–218 70 RGIA, f. 1291, op. 81, d. 4, ll. 106–112 71 RGIA, f. 1291, op. 81, d. 28, l. 8 72 Apollova, N. G.: Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi Kazakhstana s Rossiei v XVIII – nachale XIX v., p. 411 73 Ibid., d. 18, l. 102 74 Masevich, M. G.: Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana (so vremeni prisoedineniia Kazakhstana k Rossii do Velikoi Oktiabr’skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii), Alma-Ata: AN Kaz SSR, 1960, pp. 47–50 75 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 253–254 76 Jetpisbai, N. Y.: Jolaman Tilinshi uly bastagan ult-azattyq köterilis, Otan tarikhy, vol. 4, no. 80 (2017), pp. 120–142 77 Ibid., pp. 266, 271–274 78 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, 253–255, 261–263, 291–293

Part IV

Between Russia and the Qing

8 After the fall of the Jungars

The Middle Horde’s proximity to the Jungar lands shaped the volatile and unpredictable nature of its rulers’ interactions with their Jungar neighbours and, later, their Qing neighbours. Thanks to placing themselves under their Russian, Jungar and Qing patrons, their nobility, unlike their counterparts in the Junior Horde, were able to exercise a much wider range of movement and hence maintain their independent status with respect to all patrons. After the horde’s nobles had pledged loyalty to Galdan Tseren, the Orenburg Commission sent translator Urazlin to Abulmambet in 1742 to convince the khan that he and his subjects should not surrender to Galdan but rather should find refuge in the Orsk and Orenburg forts and in the other forts along the Iaik. They, however, were not allowed to cross the Iaik if the Jungars resumed their attacks. The envoy was also to find out about ongoing conflicts among the horde’s nobility and investigate each noble’s status within the horde’s population. He carried special charters to hand to Abulkhair and other influential nobles, including Barak and Batyr.1 In the meantime, the horde’s most influential figure, Sultan Ablai, began to view the rivalry among the Jungar nobility that unfolded in the aftermath of Galdan Tseren’s death in 1745 as increasing his chances of regaining control of the former Qazaq lands and invited Nuraly to campaign in Jungaria.2 In 1751, Ablai welcomed the rival nobles Davatsi, the direct descendant of the founder of the Jungar Khanate Batur Khuntaiji, and Amursana, who had fled to Ablai after being defeated by Lama Dorzhi, Galdan Tseren’s successor.3 Ablai benefited from employing his personal bodyguards, the so-called telenguts, who came to form his personal army. Given that Ablai’s grandson Sultan Kenesary (1802–1847) inherited 1,000 men as part of his grandfather’s telenguts, one can assume that Ablai had a formidable personal army at his disposal that greatly facilitated the implementation of his independent foreign and domestic policies.4 Nepliuev also warmly welcomed both Jungar runaways and suggested that they should pay a visit to the empress. Tevkelev was instructed to reassure Davatsi about Russia’s willingness to promote him to khan. In addition, both nobles could choose their accommodations in Russia, including the imperial court. At the same time, central officials ordered their local colleagues to prevent Davatsi from cooperating with the Qazaqs. Ablai responded by not allowing the Russian envoy

154  Between Russia and the Qing Iakovlev to meet with Davatsi. Davatsi’s supporters in Jungaria still hoped that he would return and become their leader. Lama Dorzhi threatened Ablai with war if he refused to hand over the runaways. Iakovlev thought that Ablai should meet with Lama Dorzhi’s demand to prevent the war, but Ablai ignored his advice, knowing that Russia’s interference with his Jungar policies would inevitably diminish his power to shape them in his own favour.5 Eventually, Davatsi and Amursana defeated and killed Lama Dorzhi, and in 1753, Davatsi was proclaimed Jungar khan. At the beginning of Davatsi’s term, Ablai promoted him against his rivals, but later on, he switched his support to Amursana (Davatsi’s former ally), who, in the meantime, had begun to challenge Davatsi’s status. Despite Davatsi’s defeat of Ablai and Amursana in 1754, Ablai mounted several successful campaigns against him later in the year. According to Moiseev, about 5,000 Qazaq soldiers had participated in military campaigns in Jungaria in 1753.6 Amursana, in turn, decided to try his luck by securing the Qing emperor’s backing against Davatsi. The emperor used Amursana’s request as a pretext for launching a victorious military campaign against the Jungars in 1755. The emperor appointed Amursana as the commander of the northern divisions of his army, while Salar, a Jungar noble, was put in charge of the army’s southern divisions. The Qing also employed other Jungar military men, including Derves Tseren, Tseren Unbashu and Tseren Mueke. After witnessing the Jungar nobles commanding the Qing army, the majority of the Jungar population decided not to show any serious resistance to the Qing, which greatly contributed to bringing the campaign to its speedy, victorious outcome. During the campaign, the Qing strove to convince the Jungars that they had come to restore peace and order among them, by punishing Davatsi, whom they described as evil. During the campaign, Davatsi was captured and brought to the royal court in Beijing. As for Amursana, the emperor ordered him killed on the spot if he resisted. Although Amursana was able to escape, his attempts to mobilize his compatriots against the Qing ultimately failed. He was compelled to flee Jungaria again and, for the third time, to find refuge with Ablai, who promised him the Jungar throne. Later, Ablai refused to hand over Amursana to the Qing at their command, citing his Russian status of being protected by the empress, which effectively pitted him against the Qing.7 The Russians decided not to interfere in the power struggle between Amursana and Davatsi, given that the former did not stem from the ruling Choros house and therefore had little chance of consolidating sufficient support from his people to enable him to ascend to the Jungar throne.8 In 1756, the Qing sent their first delegation to Ablai, informing him of the Jungars’ defeat, offering to form an alliance with him against the remaining Jungars and giving him the option to place himself and his people under the Qing. But the envoys had proven unable to reach their destination when the leaders of the Altai and Uriankhai populations would not allow them to cross their territories.9 Ablai defeated the Qing army in 1756 but placed himself under the Qing after losing to them in 1757.10 In this year, Abulfeiz, son of Abulmambet, confirmed that Ablai had become the emperor’s son, while his Qazaqs were now the emperor’s

After the fall of the Jungars 155 albatu (subjects).11 Tevkelev reported to the Russian Board that Nuraly’s brother Eraly had participated in Ablai’s successful campaign against the Qing in 1756.12 During the 1756 war, Ablai was seriously wounded. After the Qing defeated him in 1757, he broke his alliance with Amursana.13 The defeat entailed his loss of access to the former Jungar territories, which the Qazaqs of the Middle Horde used as their winter pastures under Galdan. This compelled them to move near the Russian forts on the Siberian Line and hence made them vulnerable to Russian frontier officials’ rules about their access to lands on the inner side of the Irtysh. This time, Ablai’s elders decided to hand Amursana over to the Qing, who had begun encroaching into their territories in search of him. Amursana attempted to establish relations with Russian authorities and expressed his desire to place himself and his followers under Russian protection. The empress agreed to grant his request provided that he and his followers would join the Volga Kalmyks. In order not to complicate Russia’s relations with the Jungars, she did not allow the Jungar refugees to wander along the Siberian Line. Amursana, however, died from smallpox in the suburbs of Tobol’sk in 1757.14 Curiously, after Ablai’s defeat, the Qing suggested establishing trading posts to enable commerce between the two sides, to which Ablai responded that only the chief Qazaq khan, Nuraly, the khan of the Junior Horde and Russia’s vassal, to whom Ablai had submitted himself, was in the position to make decisions on this issue and suggested that the Qing should consult him. Although Nuraly expressed his willingness to assist Ablai if the Qing continued threatening him and demanding that he deliver Amursana, he decided to consult Nepliuev on this issue in the end. The governor, in turn, reported to the Russian Board that Nuraly would be able to assemble an army of no fewer than 30,000 soldiers against the Qing.15 Ablai’s interference with the rivalry between Amursana and Davatsi put him in the spotlight of Russian and Qing frontier policies. From the perspectives of these policies, Ablai’s population and their territories came to replace the Jungars’ role as a buffer, with the potential to challenge both imperial powers’ claims of sovereignty over the frontier populations. After his 1757 defeat by the Qing, Ablai sent his first delegation to the Qing court to negotiate a peace agreement. During this negotiation, Ablai’s envoys made clear that in the case of a war between Russia and the Qing, he would not support either side.16 At the same time, in his letter to the Qing emperor, Ablai expressed his and his population’s desire to be exposed to Chinese civilization and become Qing subjects, which was met with the emperor’s great satisfaction. In addition, Ablai offered his assistance in capturing Amursana and allowed the Qing to cross any territories under his control.17 The emperor invited Ablai to use the former Jungar pastures and established an elder brother–younger brother relationship between himself and Ablai. He also suggested that Ablai act as a mediator so that the Qing could establish diplomatic and trade relations with Nuraly and promised that he would not demand that Nuraly dispatch amanats to the Qing court. With his letter, the emperor included numerous gifts that were packed and carried by ten camels. In response, Ablai dispatched 1,000 horses, including 50 pacers, to the emperor. The Qing emperor catered to Ablai by promising that he would not demand amanats from him either,

156  Between Russia and the Qing provided that he switched his alliance to the emperor. He even promised to assist Ablai with reclaiming his amanats who had been held by his Russian patrons. Yet Ablai’s nobles refused to move to the former Jungar lands. The emperor also offered these lands to Abulmambet and Nuraly and promised to grant beneficial trading conditions to their people.18 In 1757, the senate ordered Nepliuev to take measures aimed at reinforcing the underpopulated Russian forts in Siberia against possible casualties caused by the conflict between Amursana and the Qing, by hiring an additional 500 local peasants, who were to be released after the danger was over.19 A year later, the board’s members suggested to their colleagues in the senate that the Qazaqs and the Bashkirs could be deployed against the Qing in addition to 1,000 Iaitsk Cossacks and regular Russian armies, who were to be dispatched to the forts. Subsequently, Nuraly was sent a charter committing him to assemble an army (“as many people as possible”) and told to place himself, along with his brothers Eraly and Aichuvak and other nobles, under the command of Tevkelev or Rychkov. The empress reminded Nuraly of his promise to provide his soldiers in the case of a Qing offensive.20 During the escalation of the Qing-Jungar conflict, the Russians became apprehensive about the Qing attempts to extend their power over the local Siberian populations.21 In 1758, the board’s members instructed their local men that people hostile to Russia should not be allowed to occupy the former Jungar territories.22 The Orenburg governor, A. Davydov, was ordered to pit the Qazaqs against the Qing and the Khalkha Mongols from time to time in order to prevent these populations from establishing themselves in the former Jungar lands. The governor was also advised not to allow the Qazaqs to cross the Iaik or roam in the vicinity of the town of Iaitsk.23 In 1758, the Qing emperor rewarded Ablai with the title of prince and promised to treat him as his son. Ablai, however, proved reluctant to abandon territories near the Russian forts and therefore continued to insist on his loyalty to the empress. Given Ablai’s hazardous behaviour, the board’s members decided to dispatch Tevkelev to Ablai to prevent his further cooperation with the Qing. Tevkelev also had to convince Nuraly to fight against the Qing. The Qing informed the Russians that Ablai had placed himself and his followers under their rule. They emphasized that, unlike the Russians, they did not impose taxes or tributes on foreign rulers who had agreed to place themselves under their rule. Nor had they demanded hostages or made these rulers swear an oath of allegiance but instead rewarded them with generous gifts.24 However, Ablai refused to comply with the Qing demand to fight the Russians if they refused to deliver Amursana, and he repeatedly referred to his status of being under Russian protection.25 Ablai explained establishing his diplomatic relations with Russia to the Qing as “a mere conclusion of peace”.26 He explained to Russian envoy Arapov that he had been motivated by considerations of security and promised that he would not get alienated from Russia. Yet he refused to meet with Tevkelev and instead sent his own delegation to St Petersburg to reassure the empress that he was loyal to her.27 Ablai wrote that he had failed to meet with Tevkelev’s envoy because he

After the fall of the Jungars 157 was expecting a visit from Qing envoys, but he also seized the opportunity to ask Tevkelev to help assign him a salary, citing the salaries of the nobles from the Junior Horde.28 Despite his assurances of his loyalty to Russia, Ablai sent a second delegation to the Qing court in 1758. Moreover, in the same year, under the pretext of searching for Jungar runaways at the Qing’s request, he and his followers assaulted the Uriankhai and the Altai clans, kidnapped their people and embezzled their livestock. Since by this time the Uriankhai and the Altai had been considered the subjects of the Russians and the Qing respectively, these raids ended up angering both of Ablai’s patrons. The Qing emperor demanded that Ablai cease his attacks and return the kidnapped people and their stolen livestock.29 The Russians protested against Ablai’s cooperation with the Qing, pointing out that it violated the 1727 Treaty, to which the Qing responded that Ablai himself had initiated the relationship. They, however, made clear that they were not against Ablai placing himself under the Russians. Although the Russians did not agree with this state of affairs, they used their desire to keep peace with the Qing to justify their failure to render assistance to the Qazaqs during the Qing offensive. The Russians decided to elevate Ablai by confirming him as khan, but Ablai did not cooperate and refused to dispatch his amanats to them. The lack of reciprocity, however, did not hold Catherine II from assigning Ablai 300 rubles as an annual salary and ordering 212 pounds of bread sent to him.30 In spite of the Russian protests against his cooperation with the Qing, Ablai continued to send his envoys to the Qing in 1759–1762.31 On the occasion of Peter III’s ascendance to the throne in 1761, the rulers of the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde received royal charters. Given Ablai’s connections with the Qing and a conflict that was unfolding between Nuraly and the Orenburg governor, Davydov, Russian officials decided to refrain from imposing the procedure of oath taking on the Qazaq nobles.32 The officials also adopted this approach after the ascendance of Catherine II to the throne in 1762. The Qazaq rulers, however, with the exception of Nuraly’s brother Eraly, took the oath on their own initiative. After Eraly was threatened that he would be deprived of his royal salary, he agreed to take the oath. After the coronation of Catherine II, the nobles were awarded special medals. This did not prevent them – including Abulmambet, his son Abulfeiz, Ablai, Nuraly and Batyr – from sending their envoys to China the same year.33 In 1764 and 1776, Abulmambet and Ablai dispatched new missions to China.34 In 1761, Qing envoys visited Ablai with numerous gifts to convey their emperor’s promise to grant him and his people access to the former Jungar pastures, provided that they would place themselves under the Qing. Russian envoy Gordeev, who visited the Middle Horde the same year, reported that the Qing had tried to convince Ablai that they and the Qazaqs descended from the tribe of Chingiz Khan – unlike the Russians, who were of alien origin. Despite the Qing’s efforts to win Ablai and his Qazaqs over to their side in the case of a war against the Russians, Ablai and his nobles made it clear to the Russian envoy that they would remain neutral. Ablai declared that he would not violate his oath to the empress.

158  Between Russia and the Qing He was also heard saying to his nobility that the Qazaqs had not yet seen any benefits from the Qing, and therefore, they should stick with the Russians. According to a 1764 report from General I. Shpringer, however, Ablai had been sending an annual tribute of 300 white horses to the Qing emperor.35 Some of Ablai’s influential nobles were against his cooperation with the Qing, including Kulsary, who informed Russian officials that Qazbek, an influential elder, had not allowed the Qing envoys to cross his territories to visit Ablai in 1762, while another Qazaq noble killed 30 Qing envoys who had attempted to visit Ablai in 1763.36 In addition, in 1770, the Qypshaq clan, who had been under Ablai’s rule, left him and stole 2,000 of his horses. These setbacks notwithstanding, Ablai seems to have been able to concentrate enormous power in his hands, by acting, among other things, in compliance with the logic of “the elementary techniques of frontier control”. According to the account of Ablai’s great grandson and prominent Qazaq scholar Shoqan Valikhanov (1835–1865), he admonished his sons that if they wished to maintain their leadership status, they should keep their nobility in disparity and conflict and never settle their issues. Valikhanov puzzled over Ablai’s amazing ability to subdue his nobles, who had kept challenging Ablai’s status, “in accordance with the ancient custom”.37 Despite the emperor’s refusal, some Qazaq groups voluntarily migrated to Jungaria during wintertime, where they clashed with the Qing guards stationed at the karuns. In 1762, the Qing emperor demanded that Ablai, Abulmambet, Nuraly and Eraly send their amanats to him. After the nobles refused to participate in the Qing emperor’s campaigns to place the Central Asian cities of Samarkand, Tashkent and Bukhara under his rule, the emperor responded by limiting Qazaq trade to only two spots in Eastern Turkestan: Chuguchak and Kuldzha. In addition, in 1763, the Qing emperor banned the Qazaqs from wandering along the Rivers of Chu, Talas and some neighbouring areas. Yet the emperor honoured Ablai’s request to confirm him as khan. This did not prevent Ablai from taking the oath of allegiance to the Russian throne for the second time in 1762.38 The Qing responded by allowing the Qazaqs to pay a symbolic tribute for grazing their livestock in the former Jungar pastures during wintertime.39 Ablai was reported to have paid one horse and one cow of every 100 horses and cattle and one sheep from every 1,000 sheep to the Qing annually.40 Orenburg Governor Davydov was adamant about not allowing the Qazaqs to graze their livestock on the inner side of the Irtysh. He did not allow Ablai and Kulsary to cross the river, despite Ablai’s numerous requests. In 1764, the government banned the Qazaqs from crossing the Irtysh. Yet Abulmambet’s son Abulfeiz was allowed to cross.41 Davydov’s stance encouraged Ablai to invest even more strongly in fostering his relationship with the Qing. Concerned about the rulers’ collaboration with the Qing, the board’s members instructed the Siberian governor, General von Frauendorf, to explain to Ablai that the steppe lands across the Irtysh were not suitable for grazing his people’s livestock. Ablai, however, was to be allowed to wander near the Russian forts, while some of his nobles who showed loyalty to Russia, including his adversary Kulsary could cross the Irtysh during harsh winters with heavy snow.42

After the fall of the Jungars 159 After the Jungars’ defeat, the Qing emperor sent his armies to Altai and Siberia to extend his rule over the local populations, which prompted them to flee for Russia and place themselves under Russian protection. Ultimately, the unfolding of the frontier situation brought both expanding imperial powers to the brink of a war against each other.43 In 1763, Catherine II ordered the construction of additional forts on the Irtysh and the southern Altai to protect the Altai populations from the Qing.44 At the end of the 1760s and the beginning of the 1770s, Ablai invested in his independent status by attempting to create a coalition with the Afghan Akhmad Shah against the Qing who were advancing towards the urban Central Asian regions.45 In addition, he found himself engaged, along with Abulfeiz, in raiding the Kyrgyz and fighting Kokand ruler Irdana. Ablai periodically asked his Qing and Russian patrons for military assistance when he conducted these campaigns, but all his requests, as a rule, were ignored by both of his patrons.46 To maintain his role as arbitrator, the Qing emperor suggested that Ablai reconcile with his enemies instead of using weapons against them. In 1768, the Orenburg governor warned the higher state officials that Ablai had been planning to raid the forts on the Siberian Line and suggested using Ablai’s soldiers against the Jungars and the Qing.47 A year later, Ablai reaffirmed his loyalty to Russia and explained his connections with the Qing mainly by his desire to receive gifts from them.48 Throughout his relationship with the Qing, Ablai never missed the opportunity to reassure Russian officials about his loyalty to the empress, in spite of the fact that some his nobles disapproved of his policies.49 Ablai’s Central Asian policies resonated with the aspirations of the Russian state aimed at stopping the Qing from extending their rule into the region. In 1759, the Russian government ordered Tevkelev and Rychkov to send an envoy to Eastern Turkestan and Bukhara, to entice the Bukharan ruler to ally with them against the Qing.50 After learning about Akhmad Shakh’s Muslim coalition against the Qing in the beginning of the 1760s, Russian officials assured him of their support.51 In a 1769 letter sent to Reinsdorp, Ablai listed the conditions under which he was willing to send one of his sons as amanat to the Russians. He proposed that his son be accommodated in the Petropavlovsk fort and treated the way the state treated its generals. His son should be allowed to see the empress in person and provided with an army for his protection to use as he saw fit. As for Ablai himself, he should be provided with 10,000 solders to use them against his non-Qazaq enemies, in addition to 500–1,000 soldiers to use against his own rivals. Ablai’s envoys to Russia should be guaranteed support and protection, while the honorary title of tarkhan was to be assigned a hereditary status and bestowed on his heirs. In addition, Ablai should be granted the right to replace his son with his other sons every two or three years, to provide each son with ten servants from his own population and to have his people protected from attacks by Russian subjects. There should be a trading post for Ablai’s people established at the site, where his children were held, and his Qazaqs should be allowed to cross to the inner/ Russian side of the Siberian Line.52

160  Between Russia and the Qing The translator Arapov, who visited Ablai in 1770, reported that Ablai had refused to send amanats to the Russians, because 70,000 Qazaq horses had been stolen by the Bashkirs. Despite his attempts to turn the Russian officials’ attention to this theft and his requests for help in getting the horses back, no corresponding measures had been undertaken on the Russian part. Arapov learned that Ablai had taken the advice of one of his nobles to send envoys to the Ottoman court.53 Despite Nuraly’s invitation to chase the runaway Kalmyks, who had fled the Volga region for China in 1771, Ablai did not become actively involved in the campaign. Nuraly explained to Russian officials that Ablai’s behaviour had been motivated by his desire not to jeopardize his relations with the Qing, who had asked him to set the Kalmyks free.54 Ablai also cooperated with Pugachev by assembling 40,000 followers to take part in the joint raid of the Zverinogolovskaia fort and three other forts and kidnap their people.55 After Abulmambet’s death in 1771, Ablai was elected khan of the Middle Horde. He, however, did not seek the empress’s confirmation following his election. Only when he found himself in need of military assistance in 1778 did he send his envoys, headed by his son Togum, to the capital to obtain the empress’s approval. He claimed that the nobles of all three hordes had proclaimed him their khan.56 Despite his claim, the Russian Board’s members recommended to Catherine II that for the sake of maintaining stability on Russia’s borders, it would be beneficial for each Qazaq Horde to have an independent ruler.57 Following their advice, the empress sent a charter in 24 May 1778, confirming Ablai as khan of the Middle Horde and ordering her emissaries to give him the charter, along with an engraved sabre, a sable coat and a hat made of black fox fur, during a ceremony held in the Petropavlovsk fort.58 The Russian state also continued building him a wooden house by the River Ishim.59 The seven-year gap between Ablai’s election in 1771 and his request to the empress for confirmation in 1778 suggests that he had come to view his status as equal to hers. In protest against being repeatedly denied Russian military assistance, Ablai refused to take part in the confirmation ceremony that had been scheduled to be held at the Troitsk fort or Orenburg in 1778. In response, the Russian government suspended his salary and began searching for a possible rival among his nobles who could challenge his status. The officials resumed supporting Ablai’s rivals by allowing them to implement baranta against Ablai and his followers.60 Ablai retaliated by not allowing the Russian envoys to visit his populations.61 According to a 1774 report, he not only refused to accept the royal charter and regalia but also was rude to the Russian envoy who had carried the charter to him. He openly demonstrated his loyalty to his Qing patron, refused to deliver Russian captives and did not prevent his subjects from pillaging Russian caravans. Moreover, following his assaults on the Kyrgyz, Ablai moved to the suburbs of Turkestan.62 Yet the translator M. Bekchurin reported to Reinsdorp in 1779 that Ablai had been loyal to the Russian throne and justified his continuous correspondence with the Qing by his desire to protect his people.63 Another Russian observer, I. G. Andreev, reported that the Middle Horde’s population of about 70,000 people possessed numerous weapons.64

After the fall of the Jungars 161 Apart from their goal to gain access to the former Jungar pastures, Ablai’s and his nobles’ cooperation with the Qing was also driven by their need to establish a commercial relationship. The great distance between Orenburg and the Middle Horde’s grazing territories motivated the horde’s nobility to ask Russian authorities to establish trading posts in the forts of the Siberian Line.65 The aftermath of the fall of the Jungars provided the nobles with the additional lucrative option of benefiting from trading with the Qing. Ablai’s status under the Qing stimulated the development of trade between the two sides. Thanks to the efforts of Ablai, Abulfeiz and Qabanbai Batyr, by the 1750s and into the 1760s, the Eastern Turkestani cities of Urumchi, Tarbagatai, Kuldzha and Kashgar had emerged as major trading posts, where the Qazaqs and the Qing bartered with each other, mainly horses and silk.66 Nomadic horses were especially welcomed by the Chinese.67 In 1772, the Qazaqs bartered 12,484 horses, 4,692 caws and 134,801 sheep for Chinese silk, tea, fabrics and other items.68 A number of distinctive features marked the development of Qazaq–Qing commercial operations. Since the Qing government forbade private trade, these operations were conducted exclusively by Qing officials. Like the Russians, the Qing rewarded Qazaq merchants with free trade.69 The Qazaq merchants took advantage of the privilege by operating as intermediaries on behalf of Russian merchants who were denied access to the Qing markets. The Russian merchants therefore often disguised their true identities by putting on Asian clothes and pretending to be Muslim merchants.70 Russian merchants also frequently found themselves at the mercy of Qazaq sultans when they wanted access to the Chinese markets, because in accordance with another Qing regulation, only caravans dispatched and guided by Qazaq sultans were allowed to cross Qing borders. Ablai and other Qazaq sultans took advantage of these regulations by abusing their privileges: they not only raised costs for their services but also often embezzled the merchants’ goods.71 The Qing also strictly forbade selling to the Qazaqs any items made of metal.72

The Middle Horde after Ablai Thanks to Ablai’s policies, the Middle Horde’s population enjoyed independence until his death in 1781 and beyond. Following his death, the horde’s northern populations elected Vali, Ablai’s elder son, as their khan. The election was held in the open steppe during Ablai’s funeral in accordance with the established Qazaq ritual and with the participation of about 5,000 people. After Vali finished reciting the text of the Qur’an after an invited mullah, he was seated on a piece of white felt and raised by his elders. His nobles then tore his outer garments into small pieces, which they took with them after the election, while Vali was dressed in the new clothes that had been especially prepared for this occasion. He was then seated on a horse and taken to a tent, where he received congratulations from his nobles. This was followed by a week of celebrations that were accompanied by games, horse races, music and generous meals. A Russian envoy, who was allowed to visit the khan only once, described Vali as a proud, stubborn, arrogant, inconstant and unreliable ruler.73 Among other things, the envoy’s impression must have been due to Vali’s aspiration to follow

162  Between Russia and the Qing his father in catering to both the Russians and the Qing and, in this way, maintaining his independent status.74 In 1781, Catherine II granted Vali’s request to confirm him as khan of the Middle Horde.75 Vali received a royal charter brought to him by a Russian official in the presence of his brothers and nobility. His brother Chingiz read the charter and then handed it over to Vali, after which Vali asked the official to read the charter aloud to the people who were present. The proceedings ended with Vali pledging his loyalty to the Russians.76 After the Russians, the Qing also approved Vali as khan and held a special ceremony. The Russians held their own confirmation ceremony in the suburbs of the Petropavlovsk fort in 1782.77 Vali refused to ally with the Qing against Russia in 1785, explaining that his father had instructed his children to build peaceful relations with Russia. As an additional explanation, he pointed out that he did not have many followers, and that he could not fully trust them.78 Vali asked the Russian government to increase his salary, which was 300 rubles.79 In 1788, Catherine II allowed the Qazaqs of the Middle Horde to cross the Irtysh. Her son and successor, Paul I, confirmed the permission in 1799, framing it as “giving shelter to those nobles from the Middle Horde who intended to place themselves under Russian protection”. Within the year, more than 15,000 families crossed the river to the inner side to take up what came to be framed as “eternal wandering” (vechnaia kochevka)80

Figure 8.1 Sultans of the Middle Horde with Chingiz Valikhanov (great grandson of Khan Ablai) in the centre, Omsk 1891

After the fall of the Jungars  163 Vali’s assurance of loyalty to Russia notwithstanding, in 1800, he pillaged a caravan guided by the Qazaqs of the Junior Horde, who were under the rule of Sultan Bokei from the Junior Horde, and took possession of its goods, which were worth 8,084 rubles. In his letter to General-Major Lavrov, Vali explained his action as in compliance with established Qazaq practices, in accordance with which he considered the stolen goods a due that the Qazaqs of this Horde owed to him, so he refused to return them.81 Vali also insisted on his right to collect fees from travelling merchants and was reported to have contemplated leaving Russia for China in 1805.82

Figure 8.2  A Kirgiz [Qazaq] Khan with his wife

164  Between Russia and the Qing Like Vali, other nobles from the Middle Horde also came to view the option of subjecting themselves and their followers to both the Qing and the Russians as a way to maintain their independence, while still gaining generous rewards from both their patrons. For example, upon the request of Ablai’s grandson Altynsary, the Qing emperor agreed to bestow the title of khan on him in 1828.83 In 1800, Jochi, son of Abulfeiz, also requested that the Qing emperor restore his hereditary title of van, which had been bestowed on his grandfather Abulmambet. In 1768–1772, Jochi had the privilege of meeting the Qing emperor in person.84 Abulfeiz’s other son, Bopu, and the son of Sultan Shaniiaz, Kambar, in turn, sent a letter to Russian officials in 1830 expressing their desire to place themselves under Emperor Alexander I. In their letter, the nobles explained that their loyalty to their Russian and Qing patrons was motivated by their desire to prevail over their rivals.85 Vali’s son Gubaidulla also invested in establishing good relations with Russian authorities and the Qing authorities in hopes of being promoted to khan of the Middle Horde by both of them.86 In 1824, at his request, he was appointed the head of the Kokchetav okrug, one of the new administrative-territorial units introduced in the horde in 1822, by swearing his allegiance to Russia, kissing the Qur’an and pledging his loyalty to Alexander I. A year later, however, Gubaidulla sent his envoys to the Qing, asking them to grant him the title of van, and the Qing sent a mission to hold his confirmation ceremony,87 but Russian frontier officials did not allow the delegation to visit him and arrested him for committing treason against the state. He was, however, soon forgiven by the emperor and released.88 The outlook of Alexander I and his officials strongly resonated with the Qing approach in terms of benefiting from playing off the Qazaq nobles against each other. To further weaken Vali’s status with his people, in 1814, the state appointed Bokei, son of Barak, as the khan of the Middle Horde. His title was approved by the emperor in 1816 and confirmed in 1817.89 After Vali’s death in 1819, some officials suggested postponing the election of a new khan in the Middle Horde. They proposed that the election take place only with the state’s approval. Some of these officials even proposed the abolition of the khanship in the Middle Horde altogether.90

Mobility, sovereignty and military lines A closer look at the Russian military lines reveals that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, some aspects of their operation had come to resemble the operation of the Qing karuns. They both imposed limitations on previously unrestricted nomadic movements in order to make Qazaq rulers more vulnerable to the conditions imposed on them, urging them to submit to Qing and Russian control. In both cases, the option of gaining access to the pasturelands under the patrons’ control drove the rulers to acknowledge their patrons’ sovereignty and demonstrate personal loyalty to them. The Qazaqs’ status under Russian protection gave them the option of using the inner territories across the Ural and the Irtysh for their “eternal wandering”, which did not affect the basic principles of their social

After the fall of the Jungars 165 organization. In contrast, as the case of the Khalkha Mongols demonstrates, submission to protective status under the Qing entailed reshaping the nomads’ sociopolitical organization along the lines informed by the so-called banner system (khoshuns), the basic administrative-territorial pattern of Qing social organization that combined civic and military functions. By creating formidable impediments to free Mongol movement, the system dealt a significant blow to the customary mode of operation of Mongol leadership practices.91 The Middle Horde’s rulers seem to have been well aware of these policies given the ever-growing number of their nobles who strove to cross to the Irtysh’s inner side to provide their livestock with pastures during wintertime, which entailed recognizing the sovereignty of the Russian ruler. One of these nobles, Sultan Khudamendi, suggested to the Russian emperor in 1804 imposing a fee of one head from each 500 heads of his population’s livestock as the condition for crossing to the inner side of the Irtysh. He also asked the emperor to help him reclaim his subjects who had been taken prisoner by the Russians and to start dispatching Russian caravans, which he promised to provide with protection, from the Iamyshevskaia fort to his people’s grazing territories.92 In 1798, the emperor ordered General Gorchakov to accept the Qazaqs, along with their livestock, for “eternal wandering” near the Omskaia fort. These Qazaqs had sworn on the Qur’an that they would remain within the Russian borders.93 According to a 1806 report by General Lavrov, 1,783 Qazaqs had crossed to the inner side of the Siberian Line to engage themselves in “eternal wandering” between the forts of Ust’-Kamenogorskaia and Omskaia.94 General G. I. Glazengap reported that there were 10,000 Qazaqs wandering along the Siberian Line in 1807.95 According to Lavrov’s other report, the total number of the Middle Horde’s Qazaqs, who had moved to the inner side of the Siberian Line in the period 1808–1810 made up about 8,000 people.96 Other Qazaq nobles and their followers who had been allowed to the inner side of the Siberian Line, including Sultan Taten Urusov expressed their desire to return to its outer side to be able to graze their livestock in summertime there. To support his request, the sultan explained, “If I had freedom of movement, other Qazaqs would express their desire to obey me. Keeping them under my rule will facilitate placing them under the Russian tsar”. Urusov also asked authorities to assign him a salary, build him a free house on the Siberian Line near the Iamyshevskaia fort and bestow titles on his brother and nobles.97 Urusov’s explanation did not seem to have convinced Lavrov, who argued that allowing the sultan’s and other nobles’ populations to cross to the outer side of the Siberian Line might incite conflicts between them and their compatriots, who were “wandering outside the Russian borders”. It would be much more difficult for Russian authorities to prevent these conflicts, since the outer Qazaqs, as a rule, showed less vulnerability to Russia’s influence. The general suggested issuing tickets for the Qazaqs willing to cross to the outer side. As a measure aimed at increasing Russia’s influence over the inner Qazaqs, Lavrov suggested accustoming them to agricultural work and, to this end, sending them tools and seeds.98

166  Between Russia and the Qing Lavrov’s enthusiasm must have been inspired by Sultan Shanshar from the Middle Horde, who had admitted to Glazengap that after his population had moved to the inner side of the fort of Semipalatinskaia and put themselves in eternal subjecthood (vechnoe poddanstvo) to Russia, they lived in a state of permanent peace that, unlike the conditions on the outer side, enabled them to conveniently use the local lands to practise their traditional nomadic lifestyle. On the outer side, they had suffered from the regular thefts of their livestock, which ended up inflicting damage on their economies. For the privilege of living on the inner side, the sultan suggested to the general that they would pay a one-ruble fee for each their people, provided that they would be exempted from rendering any other services to the tsar. Sultan Shanshar also asked the Russians to build a house for his family, along with a mosque and a Muslim school for 30 students on the bank of the Irtysh between the forts of Semipalatinskaia and Krivoi, and to increase his salary so that he would be able to maintain the school. Shanshar also asked the authorities to arrange for him to visit the capital. The emperor approved all of his requests and ordered Lavrov to start the construction work. He also ordered that Shanshar be provided with a special charter, in which the emperor assured the sultan of his royal protection and benevolence.99 Other Qazaqs, however, seem to have had reservations about the option to migrate to the inner side, which would eventually lead to a loss of freedom manifested in the imposition of taxes and duties on them similar to those fulfilled by the Cossacks to the Russian state. Citing these reservations in his 1809 report, Glazengap came out in favour of supporting Sultan Shanshar and his followers’ initiative, despite the symbolic fee they offered. The general also believed that those Qazaqs, who had moved to the inner side, enjoyed prosperity, peace and order, which led to the growth of their population and livestock. These Qazaqs’ improved life conditions were also due to their ability to combine agricultural work with their nomadic livestock breeding. In addition, imposing state fees on these Qazaqs would allow the Russians to document their true numbers. The general also suggested developing agricultural skills among the Qazaqs who had crossed to the inner side, to enable them to settle down. By so doing, these Qazaqs would learn that their nomadic economy demanded much more territory than would working land in settlements. He expressed his hope that with time, the whole Middle Horde population would cross to the inner side of the Siberian Line, remain there forever and abandon their desire to return abroad (zagranitsa). For the moment, only a specific number of Qazaqs should be allowed to cross the Siberian Line, so that they would have enough land for wandering. This pertained especially to the poor Qazaq families, who should be released from paying fees, for three years. Since the Qazaqs would most probably still practise their nomadic lifestyle, a census should be conducted among them every seven years to get their numbers in order to inquire about their movements. Their sultans could be charged with collecting the fees and handing them over to Russian officials on the Siberian Line.100 The accounts in this chapter suggest that the operation of the Siberian Line and other Russian military lines in the period under consideration resist description in the traditional terms of depriving Qazaq nomads of their grazing lands for the sake of settling these lands with Cossack, Russian and other non-Qazaq populations.101

After the fall of the Jungars 167 As I argued in the previous chapter, unlike the lands on the country’s western borders, the lands taken for the construction of the Russian forts in the Qazaq Steppe often proved unfit for pursuing agricultural work. Given that these lands’ nature was complicated by Russia’s chronic lack of workforce, it is no wonder that the forts’ underpopulated condition persisted until the mid-nineteenth century. As we have seen, the forts’ inhospitable environment also complicated the Russian state’s attempts to station its regular and irregular armies there for prolonged periods of time. It seems therefore reasonable to assume that rather than depriving the nomads of their lands, the advent of the lines came to play another, no-lesssignificant role: imposing Russian control over their free movements.

Notes 1 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v., pp. 74–75; KRO-1, pp. 217–219 2 Suleimenov, R. B. and Moiseev, V. A.: Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka, pp. 56–58 3 Moiseev, V. A.: Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi XVII-XVIII vv., p. 209 4 Bekmakhanov, E.: O zavisimykh feodal’nykh kategoriiakh – rabakh i tuilengutakh (pervaia polovina XIX veka), p. 41 5 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke, pp. 138–140 6 Ibid., p. 224 7 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v., pp. 127–134 8 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke, p. 155 9 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v., pp. 126–127 10 Suleimenov, R. B. and Moiseev, V. A.: Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka, pp. 61–62 11 Noda, J. and Onuma, T.: A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty, Tokyo: The University of Tokyo, 2010, p. 12; KRO-1 p. 255 12 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII-XVIII vv, book two, pp. 76–77 13 Noda, J. and Onuma, T.: A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty, pp. 94–96 14 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia i Dzhungarskoe khanstvo v XVIII veke, pp. 162–166 15 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII-XVIII vv., book two, pp. 76–77 16 Suleimenov, R. B. and Moiseev, V. A.: Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka, pp. 62–65 17 Asfendiiarov, S. D. and Kunte, P. A. (eds.): Proshloe Kazakhstana v istochnikakh i materialakh, book I (V v.do n.e. – XVIII v.n.e), p. 312 18 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII-XVIII vv., book two, p. 83 19 Ibid., pp. 72–73 20 Ibid., pp. 98–101 21 Sabyrkhanov, A.: Qazaqstan men Rossiianyn XVIII gasyrdagy qarym-qatynystary, p. 75 22 Suleimenov, R. B. and Moiseev, V. A.: Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka, p. 91 23 KRO-1, p. 594 24 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 126–127 25 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII-XVIII vv., book two, p. 107 26 Noda, J.: The Kazakh Khanates Between the Russian and the Qing Empires: Central Eurasian International Relations During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2016, p. 70

168  Between Russia and the Qing 27 Suleimenov, R. B. and Moiseev, V. A.: Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka, pp. 89–90; Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII-XVIII vv., book two, pp. 127–128 28 KRO-1, pp. 567–568 29 Suleimenov, R. B. and Moiseev, V. A.: Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka, pp. 71–72 30 Ibid., pp. 92–94 31 Asfendiiarov, S. D. and Kunte, P. A. (eds.): Proshloe Kazakhstana v istochnikakh i materialakh, book I (V v.do n.e. – XVIII v.n.e), p. 315 32 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, p. 137 33 Ibid., pp. 138–139 34 Asfendiiarov, S. D. and Kunte, P. A. (eds.): Proshloe Kazakhstana v istochnikakh i materialakh, book I (V v.do n.e. – XVIII v.n.e), p. 316 35 KRO-1, pp. 621, 650, 665, 668, 676–677 36 Apollova, N. G.: Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi Kazakhstana s Rossiei v XVIII – nachale XIX v., p. 419 37 Margulan, A. Kh. et al. (eds.): Ch. Ch. Valikhanov: Collected Works in five volumes, Alma-Ata: AN KazSSR, 1961, vol. 1, p. 430 38 Noda, J. and Onuma, T.: A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty, p.  12; Suleimenov, R. B. and Moiseev, V. A.: Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka, p. 98; Ploskikh, B. M.: Istoriia Kyrgyzstana v trudakh B. P. Gurevicha, Moiseev, V. A. (ed.): Aktual’nye problemy Tsentral’noi Azii i Kitaia: istoriia i sovremennost’. Sbornik nauchnykh statei pamiati B. P. Gurevicha, Barnaul: “Azbuka”, 2006, p. 38 39 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia – Kazakhstan: sovremennye mify i istoricheskaia real’nost’, p. 88 40 Asfendiiarov, S. D. and Kunte, P. A. (eds.): Proshloe Kazakhstana v istochnikakh i materialakh, book I (V v.do n.e. – XVIII v.n.e), pp. 187–188 41 Apollova, N. G.: Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi Kazakhstana s Rossiei v XVIII – nachale XIX v., pp. 356–57 42 KRO-1, pp. 659–663 43 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia – Kazakhstan: sovremennye mify i istoricheskaia real’nost’, p. 30 44 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII-XVIII vv, book one, pp. 19–20 45 Suleimenov, R. B. and Moiseev, V. A.: Iz istorii Kazakhstana XVIII veka, pp. 102–106 46 Ibid., pp. 106–114 47 TsGA RK, f. 2300, op. 10, d. 325, ll. 3, 14 48 KRO-1, p. 689 49 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v., pp. 127–134 50 Ibid., p. 181 51 Ibid., p. 186 52 KRO-1, pp. 694–695 53 Ibid., pp. 702–703 54 Novoletov, M.: Kalmyki (istoricheskii ocherk), St. Petersburg, 1834, p. 51 55 KRO-2, pp. 70–71 56 Ibid., pp. 86–87; Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 154–155 57 KRO-2, p. 88 58 Ibid., pp. 90–91; Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII-XVIII vv., book two, p. 199 59 KRO-1, p. 255 60 Asfendiiarov, S. D. and Kunte, P. A. (eds.): Proshloe Kazakhstana v istochnikakh i materialakh, book I (V v.do n.e. – XVIII v.n.e), p. 304 61 Kraft, I. I.: Sbornik uzakonenii o kirgizakh stepnykh oblastei, p. 53

After the fall of the Jungars 169 62 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, p. 157 63 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII-XVIII vv., book two, p. 200 64 Andreev, I. G.: Opisanie Srednei Ordy Kirgiz-Kaisakov, Almaty: Gylym, 1998, p. 68 65 Apollova, N. G.: Ekonomicheskie i politicheskie sviazi Kazakhstana s Rossiei v XVIII – nachale XIX v., pp. 298–301, 318–319; Moiseev, V. A.: Dzhungarskoe khanstvo i kazakhi XVII-XVIII vv., p. 187 66 Noda, J. and Onuma, T.: A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty, p. 15 67 Ibid., p. 25 68 Siaotzia Chzhao: Ob otnosheniiakh mezhdu Tsinskoi imperiei i kazakhskim khanstvom (vtoraia polovina XVIII  – nachalo XIX vv.), Nasilov, D. M. and Sadykova, Zh. S. (eds.): Ot Tiurkskogo elia k Kazakhskomu khanstvu. Mezhdunarodnaia nauchnoprakticheskaia konferentsiia, Moskva 15–17, noiabria, 2015, p. 208 69 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v., p. 212 70 Noda, J.: The Kazakh Khanates Between the Russian and the Qing Empires, pp. 240–241 71 Ibid., pp. 235–240 72 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v., p. 176 73 KRO-2, pp. 105–106 74 Noda, J.: The Kazakh Khanates Between the Russian and the Qing Empires, p. 32 75 KRO-2, pp. 103–104 76 Ibid., p. 105 77 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. II, p. 287 78 Gurevich, B. P. and Kim, G. F. (eds.): Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII-XVIII vv., book two, p. 206; Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. II, p. 296 79 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. II, p. 297 80 Kasymbaev, Zh.: Pod nadezhnuiu zashchitu Rossii, pp. 59–60 81 RGIA, f. 1291, op. 81, d. 12, l. 135, d. 17b, l. 108 82 Gurevich, B. P.: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii v XVII – pervoi polovine XIX v., p. 225 83 Ibid., pp. 75–80 84 Ibid., p. 64 85 Ibid., pp. 81–85 86 Moiseev, V. A.: Rossiia – Kazakhstan: sovremennye mify i istoricheskaia real’nost’, p. 12 87 Noda, J. and Onuma, T.: A Collection of Documents from the Kazakh Sultans to the Qing Dynasty, p. 72 88 Aseev, A. A.: O vystuplenii Gubaidully Valikhanova protiv administrativnykh reform v Srednem zhuze. 20-e g. XIX v. (K istokam vosstaniia Kenesary Kasymova), Moiseev, V. A. (ed.): Rossiia i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v Tsentral’noi Azii (regional’nyi aspect). Sbornik nauchnykh statei, Barnaul: AGU, 2001, p. 63 89 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. II p. 462 90 Ibid., pp. 182–183 91 Rawsky, E. S.: The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions, Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1998, Chapter 2 92 RGIA, f. 1291, op. 81, d. 12, ll. 32–35 93 Ibid., d. 19, ll. 1–2

170  Between Russia and the Qing 94 Ibid., d. 20, ll. 1–2 95 Ibid., d. 29, l. 25 96 Ibid., l. 16 97 Ibid., d. 12, l. 40 98 Ibid., d. 17b, ll. 104–105 99 Ibid., d. 29, ll. 9–14 100 Ibid., ll. 1–4 101 See: Abdirov, M. Zh: Zavoevanie Kazakhstana tsarskoi Rossiei i bor’ba kazakhskogo naroda za nezavisimost’ (Iz istorii voenno-kazach’ei kolonizatsii kraia v kontse XVI – nachale XX vv.), Astana: Elorda, 2000; Abdirov, M. Zh: Istoriia kazachestva Kazakhstana, Almaty: Kazakhstan, 1994; Galiev, V. Z. et al (eds.): Istoriia kolonizatsii Kazakhstana v 20–60-kh godakh XIX veka; Kasymbaev, Zh.: Pod nadezhnuiu zashchitu Rossii, 1986

9 The Qazaq oath-taking ceremony

The well-established Qazaq ritual khan talau (robbing khan) that was performed during the election of khans articulated, in symbolic form, the ebb and flow of nomadic power relations. During this ritual, the nobility would tear the clothes of a newly elected khan into small pieces and take them away, along with his livestock. As a rule, the khan’s herds were returned with many more livestock after the election. The ritual played out as a vivid demonstration reminding an elected khan that the principles of shared authority and consent were indispensable conditions for establishing effective power relations with his people – nobles and ordinary subjects alike. Traditionally, the election unfolded as a festive public ceremony, in which huge crowds of people participated. As we shall see, this same message came to constitute the core of the protectorate ceremony, which Russian authorities created to establish relations with Qazaq leaders. The gift politics reinforced the paternal and maternal images of Russian monarchs, whose willingness to share their power with their Qazaq counterparts were translated into parental acts of giving generous gifts to their beloved, though oftentimes unruly, Qazaq children. Framing the relationship in kinship terms also served the purpose of giving it an intimate meaning that was intelligible to both sides. For example, during Abulkhair’s 1742 meeting with Nepluiev, Abulkhair was quick to liken his relationship with the empress to one between a mother and a son.1 His wife Bopai signed her letters to Tevkelev by calling herself his daughterin-law,2 while their son Nuraly called Nepliuev his older brother and uncle.3 For their part, central authorities invariably instructed their local frontier men that they should show “proper kindness and good manners” (nadlezhashchee prilaskanie i dobrye manery) towards the non-Russian elites who had been brought under Russian protection.4 Higher Russian authorities never failed to reward Qazaq nobles visiting the capital or other Russian cities with generous gifts. Being well acquainted with these practices, in 1784, Nuraly asked the central authorities to raise his annual salary by considering it his patron’s gift.5 On one occasion, he publicly expressed his anger with Governor Davydov, who had not only failed to present him with gifts but also insulted him with his arrogant behaviour during his visit to Orenburg in 1759.6 Since gifts revealed the giver’s power status, which could be interpreted based on the type of gift, its quantity and monetary value, the gift politics in the Qazaq

172  Between Russia and the Qing context were used as a leverage by both the Russian authorities and the Qazaq nobles to attract their subjects and secure their loyalty. Apart from prestige, this perspective can better explain the Qazaq nobles’ insatiable hunger to receive gifts from their patrons. Given the norms of Qazaq governance, Qazaq rulers not only refrained from collecting revenues from their subjects but also were expected to share their items with them. It was in this context that Abulkhair’s son Eraly explained during his meeting with Tatichshev in 1738 that in accordance with Qazaq custom, the khan was required to hand over to his nobles all of the gifts that he had received.7 Similarly, his older brother Nuraly’s request to be given a salary was motivated by the fact that he had not collected any revenues from his subjects, in addition to having been mandated by the Qazaq custom to give his nobles anything they wished.8 Keeping these practices in mind, Russian officials developed a system of socalled secret salaries and gifts, where a certain amount of both were given to the khans in secret. For example, they arranged that part of Nuraly’s 600 rubles salary, which was assigned to him in 1755, would be paid in secret.9 This state of affairs made some authorities believe that the Qazaq khans’ economic condition was poor, so they should be supplied with free clothes, food and medications. When the Qazaq nobles made requests to Russian officials, they usually asked for items that were not easily obtainable under their life conditions, which would enhance both their own and their patrons’ images in their subjects’ eyes. For example, Abulkhair asked Empress Elizabeth on the occasion of his daughter’s upcoming marriage to dispatch musicians with drums and send dishes, cherry liqueur mixed with wine and honey, beaver furs for his wife, medications and flour.10 To impress his elders during an upcoming meeting with them, Abulkhair also asked Nepliuev to send various fabrics, three red hides, a black fox fur, four buckets of wine, six pounds of wheat flour, a pound each of sugar, tea and German black pepper, cloves and other spices.11 Abulmambet, in turn, asked Nepliuev to send him medications for heart problems and one good tent.12 Following suit, Abulkhair’s widow asked Nepliuev to provide her with a camel, fabrics, gold, silver, a Russian coat (kaftan) and three suits of armour for her husband’s funeral.13 In 1751, she also sent a letter to Tevkelev to ask for fabrics, medications, ginger, pepper, two or three beaver furs, eye drops, tobacco, two buckets of vodka and a winter coat for her daughter, adding that these items had always been sent to her husband when he was alive.14 On the occasion of his sister’s marriage, Nuraly asked Nepliuev for silk, gold and silver jewellery, vodka, a cast iron kettle and hunting birds. On another occasion, he asked the governor to send him pearls, coral, a big mirror, two razors and a leather suitcase.15 Like the Kalmyk nobles, Qazaq leaders often showed apprehension about sharing their most important information in written form with their Russian and other peers. Therefore, they often committed their envoys to convey this information in verbal form. For example, Khan Tauke wrote to Peter I that his envoy, along with this letter and some gifts, carried an oral message for the Siberian voevoda.16 In 1713–1714, Khan Kaip also charged his envoys to the Ottoman court with

The Qazaq oath-taking ceremony  173 transmitting the most important information related to his military conflicts with Kalmyk Khan Aiuka in oral form, along with bringing his letter to the sultan.17 Abulkhair wrote to Tevkelev that he had wished to talk with him in secret during his upcoming visit. He admitted that he had been unable to express all of his thoughts and feelings in his letter and therefore commissioned his envoy to convey them in oral form.18 Similarly, Abulmambet wrote in his letter sent to Nepliuev in 1747 that Abulmambet’s envoys had been carrying verbal information, which the khan preferred to share with Nepliuev.19 The nobles mistrusted some of the scribes that the Russians assigned to them, because they collected intelligence information to report back to the authorities. Abulkhair complained about one of them, who had sent unauthorized letters in his name and informed Russian officials about his affairs.20 Also, as Russian envoy Gladyshev remarked, Qazaq leaders had trouble making sense of Russian letters. Even when they were understood, the letters rarely influenced the leaders’ decisions that tended to be unpredictable and constantly changing. Gladyshev suggested keeping a Russian representative attached to the leaders to monitor their decisions.21 High-ranking Russian officials seem also to have relied on oral communication in order to convey their most confidential information. For example, in the secret part of the empress’s instructions for Kirillov, she suggested that he should provide his Bashkir and Qazaq spies with oral instructions and avoid putting them on paper.22 Another striking example was the oral messages from Nepliuev and the Siberian governor to the Qazaq rulers. If in their letters to these rulers both officials warned them about some possible dangers of their cooperation with the Qing, then in their oral messages, they cited the example of the Jungars, to whom the Qing had first catered but then destroyed. Their envoys were to explain to the rulers in oral form that although Russia and the Qing were on friendly terms with each other, the Qazaqs, by virtue of being under Russian rule, had been saved and protected by the Russians.23 In addition to exchanging letters with their masters, Russian frontier officials conducted oral interviews with Qazaq envoys for the sake of obtaining more detailed information. For example, they learned from Abulkhair’s envoys, who had brought his letter to Empress Anna in 1730, that the population of the Qazaq Junior Horde and the Qazaq Middle Horde together comprised about 40,000 tents and that Sultan Barak and Khan Abulmambet and Khan Abulkhair were their leaders.24 When Abulkhair and his nobles first swore allegiance to the empress in 1731, there were no special rituals. As noted earlier, the khan received the royal charter from Tevkelev in the presence of his nobility in his tent, and during one of his lunches with Abulkhair and his nobility, Tevkelev handed over the regalia, including a sabre, a sable coat and a hat.25 In contrast, the oath-taking procedure held by the head of the Orenburg Commission, Tatishchev, in 1738 was designed as a spotlight of a special ceremony, regulated by a detailed protocol created by Russian officials especially for this occasion. To add spiritual weight to the oathtaking procedure, the protocol’s items stipulated the participation of a Muslim religious figure, an akhun.

174  Between Russia and the Qing In I. I. Kraft’s description, the protocol’s 14 items run as follows:   1 Upon Abulkhair’s arrival at a camp pitched for him, Tatishchev should send an envoy to find out and record the number of his followers. The counsellor then should dispatch a major and a captain accompanied by a detachment to the khan’s camp. On their way to the camp, military musicians should play their horns and beat their kettle drums. To the procession should also be added 12 richly decorated pacers.   2 The major should announce to the khan and his followers that the detachment and the pacers had been sent to salute the khan.   3 The procession to the ceremony’s spot should be headed by 24 grenadiers and followed by a Cossack sergeant, an equerry with the pacers and a regiment of dragoons (whose members should continue playing their music and beating their kettle drums). The procession should be led by the khan on horseback, followed by the major, the translator, the Qazaq participants, a corporal and 24 grenadiers in the order listed.   4 When the khan approached the spot at the distance of about 10.5 metres, the commander of a Cossack guard of honour should shout: “Present arms! Play music!”   5 On his way to Tatishchev’s camp, the khan should pass the artillery and the Sergievsky detachment, during which nine large canon shots should be fired.   6 When the khan arrived at the camp, the major and the sultans should follow him without lowering their arms, while others should follow him with their arms lowered.   7 On his horse, the khan should be met by the Cossack sergeant Belosel’sky. The engineer major Rostislavsky should meet the khan in the middle of the camp, while Colonel Tevkelev should meet the khan at the entrance to Tatishchev’s tent. Tatishchev should remain in his tent throughout the whole procedure. The khan, his sultans and his nobility should enter the tent, while their followers should remain outside.  8 Upon entering the tent, the khan should salute her imperial majesty and announce his desire to adopt the Russian poddanstvo, after which Tatishchev should congratulate the khan and assure him of the empress’s willingness to protect him and his people. He should also add that Russian laws required his taking the oath of allegiance to the empress. After taking the oath, the khan and Tatishchev should embrace each other, take each other’s hands (“in accordance with their traditions”) and sit in two chairs decorated with golden brocade – the khan on the right and Tatishchev on the left [of the empress’s portrait]. There should be a table between them covered with an expensive Chinese carpet, and the portrait of the empress should be hung above the table.   9 The sultans and lieutenants should be seated in chairs covered with velvet, while other Russians should take stools. The Qazaq participants of the ceremony should remain seated on the carpet. The oath-taking procedure should be held by an invited akhun in a special tent covered with carpets. While

The Qazaq oath-taking ceremony 175

10 11

12

13

14

taking the oath, the khan and his sons should kneel on a golden Persian carpet, after which the khan should put his stamp and signature beneath the text of the oath. The khan’s nobles should follow suit by taking the oath in a large tent in Tevkelev’s presence. The khan, sultans and colonels should be invited to a lunch arranged in the large tent, while the other nobles should be treated to lunches arranged for them outside the tent. They should receive mutton, beef, bread, wine, beer and honey. The translator Bogdanov should stay with Tatishchev, and the translators Maksiutov and Iaraslan should remain in the large tent, while the akhun should stay in the tent covered with the carpets. During the lunch, the participants should raise seven toasts accompanied by 83 gunshots. The toasts should be raised in the following order: for the wellbeing of the empress (21 gunshots), for her family (17 gunshots), for the victorious Russian arms (13 gunshots), for the well-being of the khan and his people (nine gunshots), for his wife and sons (seven gunshots) and, finally, for the well-being of all those rulers who wished to place themselves under the empress (seven gunshots). The participants could then continue drinking; however, their toasts should not be accompanied by gunshots. Upon his return to his camp after the lunch, the khan should be accompanied by a procession that should follow the order described in item 3. If the khan expressed his desire to stay in his camp, two big and two small tents were to be pitched for him and his people. The tents were to be covered by carpets and guarded by the captain and a detachment. In the latter case, musicians should stand at the entrance of the khan’s and Tatishchev’s tents, playing their music and beating their drums.26

By addressing each stage of the ceremony and assigning specific roles to its actors, the protocol’s minutes reveal that the officials planned to turn the ceremony into a public spectacle that highlighted the generous act of gifting. This included upholding Qazaq norms of hospitality by turning the ceremony into a lavish guest party – the Qazaqs’ customary socialization pattern – thrown as a show of favour by their generous and benevolent Russian hosts. The ceremony integrated the bestowal of the honorary title of tarkhan on the Qazaq nobles into the tradition of hosting all of the people, noble and ordinary alike, who expressed their desire to participate in the event. The Russians reinforced the nomads’ perception of them as generous benefactors by frequently distributing gifts among the nobles; serving generous meals during the ceremony, to which all participants were invited; and arranging various forms of entertainment, such as military parades, fireworks, music and dances. Tatishchev’s account of his 1738 meeting with Abulkhair creates the impression of an encounter between two close friends. He wrote in his journal that Abulkhair arrived with 50 people. Following the protocol, Tatishchev greeted Abulkhair by embracing him and taking his hands in the “customary Qazaq manner”. Throughout the meeting, which featured lunches, dinners, heavy drinking and various

176  Between Russia and the Qing forms of entertainment, both Tatishchev and Abulkhair continued to embrace, kiss each other and take each other’s hands. Abulkhair even wept when it came to replacing his son Eraly with his other son Qojakhmet, saying that he had been handing over his son to his brother Tatishchev in the hopes that the counsellor would educate his son and protect him “from all bad things”. Abulkhair expressed his admiration of Peter I when he saw his portrait, saying that the Russian tsar had been a remarkable ruler (padishakh) and a warrior, who had no equals. During the musical performance that was arranged for him and his nobles, he asked to play a military march in honour of the Russian ruler. He also expressed his curiosity about the operation of canons, adding that his subjects had taken possession of several Jungar canons but did not know how to use them. As for Tatishchev, throughout the meeting, he continued to distribute generous gifts among Abulkhair’s nobility, following the order of their ranking. At some point during the meeting, Abulkhair asked Tatishchev not to display to his nobility those gifts that were intended for him and his sons. Despite Tatishchev’s generosity, Abulkhair’s nobles expressed their dissatisfaction with the number of gifts. After discovering that he had run out of gifts by the end of the meeting, Tatishchev was forced to give away his own items, including a carpet, handkerchiefs, dishes, his personal fur coat and his hat. His ingenuity culminated on the last day of the meeting, which he knew would provide Abulkhair and his sons with the opportunity to ask for additional gifts when they visited him in his space. Since at that point he had already run out of his own personal items, he decided to forestall the disaster by leaving his tent “as if going for a walk” to meet Abulkhair’s sons in a neutral space in the open steppe and ending the meeting in the khan’s tent. According to A. I. Dobrosmyslov’s account, at first Abulkhair refused to sign the oath, which he figured would make him a slave, but he agreed to sign after he was told that it would make his name well known throughout the great country of Russia. On his part, Tatishchev reassured the khan that his name would be known not only in Russia but also all over Europe. Abulkhair also expressed his satisfaction with his nobles’ drunken brawls over the gifts that Tatishchev had distributed among them, pointing out to Tatishchev that their fight had attested to the rise of the empress’s status and hence his own authority in their eyes.27 The officials created a separate protocol for the arrival of Abulkhair’s sons Eraly and Nuraly at the meeting site, which roughly followed the main protocol. Rychkov’s description of the 1738 meeting provides additional insights into its unique nature. After taking the oath, Abulkhair delivered a speech, in which he praised the empress as “a bright sun in the sky that superseded all other suns”, while Tatishchev was a moon that was reflecting her majesty’s, the sun’s, shining. Although the khan did not see her with his eyes, he sensed her splendour and benevolence with his heart. He likened her protective mission to the wings of a strong eagle and expressed his gratitude and readiness to serve her loyally as an obedient son and a submissive slave. He also congratulated the counsellor upon his arrival in the steppe and expressed his feelings of love and friendship towards him. Tatishchev, in turn, reassured the khan of the empress’s benevolent attitude and her readiness to render maternal protection to Abulkhair and his people. He

The Qazaq oath-taking ceremony 177 then suggested that Abulkhair should confirm his readiness to serve the empress by taking the oath and reassured him that he considered him his “friend and brother” and felt love and friendship for him. After they both sat at the table, the counsellor invited Abulkhair to take the oath, to which the khan replied that he had already taken it but was ready to repeat it. They spread a golden carpet, on which the khan kneeled and repeated the oath in Tatar after an invited mullah. He kissed the Qur’an and received a sabre from Tatishchev. After about 150 nobles and ordinary Qazaq participants from the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde congratulated the khan, they all were invited to a lunch, during which Tatishchev and Abulkhair discussed Qazaq–Russian relations and the administration of the horde.28 Tatishchev’s successor, Urusov, also left a description of his 1740 meeting with Abulkhair’s two sons, Nuraly and Eraly, including Khan Abulmambet and Sultan Ablai from the Middle Horde. Urusov wrote in his journal that the generous meals served for Abulkhair’s sons and their guests featured the Qazaq national dish, beshbarmaq, beer and wine. After the guests finished raising the prescribed number of toasts accompanied by the appropriate number of canon shots, Urusov took the opportunity to explain to the sultans the meaning of the toast raised for the victorious Russian arms. He connected it to Russia’s recent victory over the vast Ottoman army, which forced the Ottomans to make peace with Russia. The general also mentioned the victorious Russo-Polish war that had preceded the Russo-Ottoman War. The general’s explanation prompted Nuraly to praise the empress and the Russian army and express his and his subjects’ readiness to fight on the Russian side. His brother Eraly, in turn, recollected that during his stay in the capital, he had visited the royal court and the Kronstadt, where he had seen the Russian fleet and its ships participating in maritime battles and other Russian “miracles”. The general proceeded by treating the sultans and Janibek Batyr to tea and coffee and offered them precious gifts, including sabres, black fox furs and valuable fabrics, for which they all expressed their gratitude. While giving the nobles their sabres, the general stressed that they should use them against the empress’s enemies. The next morning, Urusov ordered food sent to the sultans and gifts to the nobility. During their visit, the sultans and their nobles kept expressing their surprise about various European items, including the variety of food that they had been offered and the precious silver dishware, in which it had been served. Apprehensive about being deprived of their gifts by their nobles, the sultans asked Urusov to keep their gifts with the general and took only their sabres with them. During the meeting with Urusov, Abulkhair’s sons Nuraly, Eraly and Qojakhmet and their 106 nobles swore allegiance to the Russian throne. At a generous lunch served for 74 people, the participants raised toasts following the order indicated in the protocol.29 The visit of Abulmambet and Ablai, who had arrived several days later with their numerous followers, was also arranged in accordance with the basic protocol. After learning of their arrival, Urusov dispatched his official to greet them and ordered a big tent and food sent to them.30 In his conversation with both nobles, Urusov kept reassuring them of his friendly and loving attitude towards them.

178  Between Russia and the Qing Both nobles handed their letters to Urusov written in the Chagatai language and sealed with their personal stamps. Khan Abulmambet, in his letter, called the empress his mother protector, whose fame had spread over all of the eastern countries. He congratulated her on her remarkable victories over Russia’s enemies and wished her well-being and future victories. Abulmambet expressed his desire to place himself and his populations under the empress’s rule and promised to remain her loyal servant for years to come. Urusov reassured both nobles that the empress had been satisfied with the khan’s decision and promised to extend her motherly protection and benevolence to them, their families and their subjects. To confirm their words and comply with Russian laws, Urusov invited the khan and the sultan to take the oath of allegiance to the Russian throne. At some point during the meeting, Ablai remarked that they would learn Russian rituals and excused himself and the khan for sitting with their hats on, to which Urusov responded that he did not feel offended, because he considered the khan and the sultan the loyal servants of the empress. The general remarked that both nobles had removed their hats during the oath-taking procedure, but because the temperature outside had dropped since then, it was fine with him that they had been sitting with their hats on. Ablai asked whether he could call Urusov his elder brother, which was welcomed by the general. On this day, a new group of 165 nobles from the Junior Horde also swore allegiance to the empress. Most of the important nobles received sabres and valuable fabrics. The next day, Urusov ordered additional fabrics and food sent to Abulmambet, Ablai and the elders from the Junior Horde, who had taken the oath the day before. He also sent winter coats to Eraly and Nuraly upon their request. Khan Abulmambet expressed his curiosity about a globe he had seen in Urusov’s tent and, more generally, about the nature of geographical knowledge, and the general promised to provide him with information. The nobles were also shown how to use artillery, gun shots, rockets and fireworks. During the dinner, they were rewarded with gifts, including gifts for their wives. The next day, Urusov visited the nobles’ camp. Ablai, who had come up to greet the general, found himself seated in Urusov’s carriage. The general brought vodka, beer and wine with him, which they consumed in the khan’s tent. Before leaving, Urusov gave suits of armour to Abulmambet, Ablai and their two nobles. The khan, who was seeing Urusov off, was soon forced to return to his tent, because his nobles had entered it and started taking the general’s gifts. During the meeting, Urusov regularly sent food to Abulkhair’s two sons, Abulmambet, Ablai and their nobles.31 Although Nuraly and Eraly were also invited to participate in the festivities, they declined the invitation, citing their father’s urgent call to return to the steppe and leaving without saying goodbye to the general. Rychkov believed that their hasty departure was due to a rumour spread by Abulkhair that they would be detained as amanats by the Russians in Orenburg to replace their brother Qojakhmet.32 Abulkhair accepted an invitation from Urusov’s successor, Nepliuev, to visit Orenburg in 1742. During his stay, he swore allegiance to the Russian throne for the third time. It seems like his earlier meeting with Tatishchev in 1738, along with the visits of his sons, Abulmambet and Ablai in 1740 had produced a desirable effect on his subjects. Before his arrival in Orenburg, Abulkhair suggested

The Qazaq oath-taking ceremony 179 to General-Lieutenant L. I. Saimonov that his officials should receive him with “horns, soldiers and music” to help discipline his frivolous subjects and give imperial orders to them.33 In Abulkhair’s letter to the Orenburg Frontier Commission, he further elaborated on this perspective, by suggesting that its members should chose a location not far from the Orsk fort as a possible spot for holding the meeting. He, however, advised them not to show up at the location, preferring the participation of the Russian military instead, so that my stupid Kirgiz [Qazaq] people, while watching the reception, will witness the benevolence of the ruler under whom I have placed myself. The honor shown to me by the Russian army in this way would contribute to increasing their obedience.34 The 1742 meeting followed the established procedure, featuring generous meals, gifts, canon shots, toasts and a military parade.35 The cost of gifts handed by Nepliuev to Abulkhair, his two sons and nobility amounted to more than 2,000 rubles. The Jungar envoys, who had arrived in Orenburg with Abulkhair and his following, also received gifts and were given food and horses. Nepliuev visited Abulkhair’s camp in person, where he continued his negotiations with the khan.36

The confirmation (konfirmatsiia) ceremony As mentioned earlier, the practice of having Russian monarchs confirm elected khans marked the next stage in the evolution of Qazaq–Russian protectorate relations. Among other things, it featured the introduction of a new item, the so-called patent, which was added to the regalia of a confirmed khan as an additional proof of his reaffirmation in his status by the empress. The patent’s contents were written on a sheet of oil paper that was stamped with a golden seal and decorated by painters, who used large amounts of golden ink. Nuraly’s patent, in addition, was wrapped in a piece of golden brocade decorated with golden lace and a golden tassel. The contents of the royal charter were also written on a sheet of oil paper of the size of one arshin (about 28 inches) with the state emblem and the title of the empress written in golden Russian and Tatar letters. Nuraly’s charter was also wrapped in a piece of golden brocade with a stripe of taffeta sewn along the middle.37 According to Zhanat Kundakbaeva’s research, the patent’s original text was commissioned by the senate and written in Russian. It was then sent to the Russian Board’s members, along with a special richly decorated sheet of paper called the Alexandrov Big Sheet, which was of the size of the patent. The board’s members put a Tatar translation of the patent’s Russian text on the Alexandrov Big Sheet and sent both items back to the senate for the patent’s final approval. Apart from the patent, other innovations relating to the confirmation procedure featured portraits of the Russian monarchs that were given to the newly confirmed khans, along with sabres with their names engraved on them.38 Officials continued to strongly adhere to the earlier patterns of holding the ceremony in a friendly and noncommittal manner. For example, Nepliuev greeted Nuraly in accordance with “the Qazaq custom” during Nuraly’s confirmation

180  Between Russia and the Qing ceremony in 1749, embracing him and taking his hands. Nuraly responded by saying that their true friendship had been planned by God in the heavens. After Nepluiev finished reading the contents of the patent in Russian and Tatar aloud, Nuraly kissed the Qur’an and put his stamp beneath the text of the oath. He then took the oath of allegiance to the empress and received his regalia, including the patent, which he also kissed and lifted above his head, as music played and seven canon shots were fired. After the oath-taking part of the ceremony was over, all of the participants were invited to generous meals with enough alcohol so that they all got drunk. Nuraly asked the governor to distribute gifts among more than 1,000 members of his following, regardless of their size, by pointing out their important symbolic role. In spite of the two carts full of gifts, including free medications that Nepliuev distributed among them, the nobles found the number insufficient, which prompted Nuraly to ask Nepliuev to arrange an additional cart. Nuraly also asked for additional gifts for himself, reminding the governor that he would be compelled to give them to his nobles. More specifically, he would be expected to tear the brocade fabric that he had received as a gift from Nepliuev into small pieces. He and his brothers also asked Nepliuev not to display their gifts to their nobles. At the khan’s request, during the ceremony Nepluiev bestowed the honorary title of tarkhan on Nuraly’s 20 nobles. Janibek Batyr, who arrived with 40 nobles and 60 ordinary people, also asked Nepliuev to reward his nobles with gifts, expressing his willingness to be deprived of gifts for himself and his sons so that his nobility could have them.39 Nepliuev reported that 100 nobles and about 500 ordinary Qazaqs from the Junior Horde had participated in the confirmation ceremony. According to his observation, some of Nuraly’s nobles believed that they had been invited to Orenburg to be held as amanats, for which the officials had also stationed the Russian army in the town.40 The governor used the opportunity to give a speech to the Qazaq participants emphasizing the benefits of their status under the empress’s protection. He reminded them that before placing themselves under Russian protection, the Qazaqs had been deprived of access to pasturelands and Russian markets and therefore were forced to obtain necessary items at the remote markets of Bukhara and Khiva. In addition, they were perpetually in danger of being harassed by their enemies. Today, after placing themselves under Russian protection, they would benefit not only from being protected by the empress but also from using the pastures of their choice, along with trading privileges. Nepliuev stressed that the Qazaqs’ improved condition had been due, in the first place, to Abulkhair, who had placed himself under the empress’s protection of his own will, so that his people would enjoy peace, freedom and security, along with the access to convenient pastures, which they had never experienced before. By the end of his speech Nepliuev called for the nobles to be obedient to Nuraly, who had replaced his father, and to love him, which was met with the nobles’ approval. To highlight the empress’s benevolence towards the Qazaqs, Nepliuev did not hesitate to mention the value of the special items that Nuraly had received, including the cost of the ceremony. He underscored that Nuraly, unlike his father, Abulkhair, and especially Sultan Batyr, represented a new type of khan, given that Batyr had been elected

The Qazaq oath-taking ceremony 181 khan merely by being raised on a piece of felt rug by his nobles. If they refused to obey Nuraly, the nobles would come up against the empress and hence become her enemies. The governor admitted that he had promoted Nuraly’s confirmation and therefore considered himself to be in charge of assisting him. He called for the nobles to return Russian captives and stolen livestock, and they agreed. Among other things, Nepliuev reminded the nobles about the recent Qazaq attacks against the Kalmyks that had provoked the empress’s anger. Yet out of her benevolent nature, the empress had decided to forgive the Qazaqs and allowed both sides to keep the stolen livestock. Nepliuev and Nuraly continued to discuss the issues that Nepliuev raised in his speech as they rode in Nepliuev’s carriage outside of the city at the end of the ceremony.41 Despite being initially allotted 1,000 rubles,42 Nepliuev spent a total of 2,380 rubles and 69 copecks to hold the ceremony, which also included the cost of gifts, food and salaries.43 By spending this money, he opted to surpass the Qazaq rulers’ capacity for displaying generosity to their subjects. He believed that, in so doing, he would challenge their old idea of authority and the related practice and replace them with a new idea of leadership, one that highlighted the Russian monarch’s approval as its indispensable attribute.44 The ever-weakening power status of Nuraly’s successors contrasted with the authorities’ investment in embellishing the visual attributes of their insignia items. The items became richly decorated with gold and other precious metals and stones, including pieces of precious fabric. For example, a royal charter given to Aichuvak in 1798 instructed that his patent had to depict a two-headed eagle painted with the order of Andrew the Apostle on its breast and a suit of armour depicting an image of St Sergei. The six major coats of arms featuring the Kievan Rus’, Vladimir, Novgorod and the tsardoms of Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberia that were associated with the emperor’s royal title were to be depicted on both sides of the eagle and on the charter’s upper rim in natural colours and on the charter’s special spot that mentioned Aichuvak’s confirmation as khan.45 Other items to be granted to the khans were also to be richly decorated. A sable coat was to be covered by silver brocade and decorated with golden flowers and golden buttonholes; to a hat made of brocade and decorated with black fox fur was to be added a golden tassel, while a sabre was to be attached to a golden belt. The sabre was to be decorated with precious stones of red amber, emerald and amethyst and feature engraved inscriptions in golden Russian and Tatar letters. The sabre’s sheath was to be covered with green velvet and gold and placed into a case covered with fine flexible leather (morocco) with white satin inside.46 The sabre given to Khan Jantore had the following inscription: “By God, the Gracious, Emperor Alexander I awards this sabre to his subject Jantore, the sultan of the Junior Kirgiz-Kaisak [Qazaq] Horde as a sign of his confirmation as khan, September 1805”.47 The rules written in About Election Rituals and the Confirmation of KirgizKaisak [Qazaq] Khans (Ob obriadakh vybora i podtverzhdeniia Kirgizkaisatskikh khanov v ikh dostoinstve) promulgated by the senate in 1792 envisioned a stronger role in Qazaq leadership practices, by placing the election of

182  Between Russia and the Qing Qazaq khans under Russian control. In particular, the rules charged the governor with choosing a day and a location in the open steppe near Orenburg where the election should take place. Three months before the election, the governor had to inform the horde’s nobility about his choice. After arriving in Orenburg three days before the election, the governor should send an officer and a translator, along with a sufficient number of guards to members of the nobility to invite them to Orenburg, where, upon their arrival, they should be greeted by officers and translators and entertained with polite conversation in a large room. The governor should then enter the room with all of his employees and give a speech announcing that the election would be held because of the empress’s concern about the well-being of the Qazaq people and in compliance with the nobles’ will to elect their own ruler. In his speech, the governor should also convey the empress’s hope that the electors would choose their ablest man, a candidate who already had proven his loyalty to the imperial throne and his willingness to work for his people. Therefore, the electors could be confident that their nominee would be approved by the empress. Tribal nobles, Russian officials and ordinary participants should all be treated to meals and drinks after the speech and throughout the day of the election. The beginning of the election was to be signalled by three gunshots, after which an officer accompanied by soldiers should visit the nobles’ camp to invite them to the site of the ceremony, then return to Orenburg to invite the governor. After the empress’s will as expressed in her charter was announced to the public, the governor should invite the nobles to proceed with the election. He and his officials should move away from the site so as not to disturb the election process. The governor should also order his men to pitch a special camp and decorate a tent with carpets for the elected khan. After the election, the electors should delegate their representatives to the governor to inform him about the result, which should be marked by firing 50 canon shots. The governor should then send an officer to congratulate the newly elected khan and invite him and his nobles to a lunch to be arranged in Orenburg. After returning to Orenburg, the governor should send two carriages, an officer, 20 dragoons and 20 Cossacks to bring the khan and his nobility to Orenburg. Upon entering the town, the procession’s members should be saluted by the town’s guards. While entering the governor’s house, the Qazaq members of the procession should be greeted by the governor and his officers, dressed in their most festive attire. The 1792 rules reduced the number of toasts to be raised during the lunch to four but raised the number of canon shots that were to be fired during the ritual.48 The election and confirmation of Jantore in 1805 were held in accordance with the basic guidelines provided by the 1792 Rules. Volkonsky spent 13,000 rubles on the ceremony, instead of the initial 10,000 rubles that he had requested, because of the unexpectedly high number of Qazaq guests who continued to arrive at the site.49 The officials did not consider Jantore a wealthy man who could afford to live on the income from his subjects. They decided to send him bread and assign him an annual salary of 1,000 rubles that was to be spent on guest parties and gifts for his nobles.50 In 1811, despite Volkonsky’s strenuous efforts to reconcile the two rival groups of the horde’s nobility, each camp elected their own khan to succeed Jantore:

The Qazaq oath-taking ceremony  183 Jantore’s brother Shigazy, and Bokei, son of Nuraly. The nobles, who elected Shirgazy, also ignored Volkonsky’s attempt to stop them from performing the customary Qazaq confirmation ritual, leaving the election spot and performing the ritual in the steppe. Their opponents also wanted to perform the ritual, but their candidate, Bokei, was under the influence of the officials and refused to participate in it.51

Notes 1 KRO-1, p. 245 2 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. 1, p. 210 3 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 12, 36–37 4 KRO-1, p. 326 5 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, p. 902 6 Ibid., p. 898 7 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Kazakhstana v dokumentakh i materialakh, vyp. 2, p. 65 8 Margulan, A. Kh. (ed.): Kazakhstan v epokhu feodalizma, p. 537 9 Asfendiiarov, S. D. and Kunte, P. A. (eds.): Proshloe Kazakhstana v istochnikakh i materialakh, book I (V v.do n.e. – XVIII v.n.e), p. 305 10 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. I, p. 179 11 Ibid., p. 153 12 Ibid., p. 357 13 Margulan, A. Kh. (ed.): Kazakhstan v epokhu feodalizma, pp. 473–474 14 Erofeeva, I. V. (ed.): Epistoliarnoe nasledie kazakhskoi praviashchei elity 1675–1821 godov, vol. I, p. 229 15 Ibid., vol. II: pp. 36–37 16 KRO-1, pp. 15–16 17 Vasil’ev, A. D.: Perepiska kazakhskogo khana Kaip Mukhammeda s osmanskim sultanom Akhmedom III v nachale XVIII v., Seidumanov, Zh. et al (eds.): The Indelible History of the Great Steppe: Materials of the International Scientific and Practical Conference, September 11, 2015, Astana: Tsentr razvitiia knizhnoi torgovli, 2015, pp. 39–40 18 KRO-1, pp. 374–376 19 Ibid., p. 357 20 Ibid., pp. 278–279 21 Ibid., p. 183 22 Ibid., p. 116 23 Ibid., pp. 550–551 24 Ibid., pp. 35–37 25 Ibid., pp. 42, 56 26 Kraft, I. I.: Sbornik uzakonenii o kirgizakh stepnykh oblastei, pp. 38–40 27 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 26–28 28 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), pp. 36–38; KRO-1, p. 127; Erofeeva, I.: Khan Abulkhair: polkovodets, pravitel’ i politik, pp. 226–227 29 Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 34–36 30 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), p. 51 31 KRO-1, p. 151 32 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), pp. 52–54 33 KRO-1, p. 191 34 Ibid., pp. 201–202

184  Between Russia and the Qing 35 36 37 38 39

Dobrosmyslov, A. I.: Turgaiskaia oblast’, pp. 42–43 Rychkov, P. I.: Istoriia Orenburgskaia (1730–1750), p. 65 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, pp. 88–89 Ibid., pp. 88–90 Zhanaev, B. T. et al (eds.): Istoriia Kazakhstana v dokumentakh i materialakh, vyp. 2, pp. 108–154 40 Ibid. 41 KRO-1, pp. 228–253 42 Margulan, A. Kh. (ed.): Kazakhstan v epokhu feodalizma, pp. 444–447 43 KRO-1, pp. 475–481 44 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: “Znakom milosti E. I. V. . . .”, pp. 82–83 45 RGIA f. 1291, op. 81, d. 18, l. 23 46 Ibid., ll. 30–31, 44 47 Ibid., l. 45 48 Chistiakov, O. I. and Novitskaia, T. E. (eds.): Zakonodatel’stvo Ekateriny II, vol. 1, Moscow: “Iuridicheskaia literatura”, 2000, pp. 853–859 49 Ibid., l. 90 50 Ibid., ll. 95–96 51 Masevich, M. G.: Materialy po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana, pp. 47–50

Part V

Staying on the imperial fringe

10 The establishment of the Bokei Horde

The formation of the Bokei Horde offers yet another striking example of the crucial role of unrestricted movement in maintaining the nomadic rulers’ status and their followers’ well-being. In 1801, in the wake of the escalating rivalry with the khan of the Junior Horde Jantore, Sultan Bokei, Nuraly’s son, sent a letter to Astrakhan Governor-General K. F. Knorring, in which he expressed his old desire to become a subject (poddannyi) and a son of the wise Russian emperor, by placing himself and his people under the emperor’s rule. Notably, Bokei viewed subjugation to the emperor as a necessary condition for gaining permission to emigrate with his population to the former Kalmyk lands.1 In his letter, Bokei also asked that the emperor provide him with a Cossack detachment and place the administration of his population under the head of the Astrakhan Cossack Army, P. S. Popov, whom he described as a reasonable, decent and good-hearted man. Bokei pointed out that the idea to emigrate to the former Kalmyk lands had originated with Popov and expressed his belief that Popov would always provide him with support. Bokei was open to Popov’s idea for a number of reasons. Apart from the horde’s unstable internal political situation, its population continued to suffer from raids by the neighbouring Kalmyk, Turkmen and Cossacks populations and the periodic natural disasters that befell them during the winters of 1795–1796 and 1800–1801, which finally forced some of their groups to follow Bokei to their new habitat.2 Their rivals, including the followers of Jantore and Bokei’s rebellious brother Qaratai refused to leave and threatened to kill Bokei and his brother Shigai, because they saw the emigration option as contingent on becoming the tsar’s subjects. In 1808, Volkonsky sent a team of 25 Ural’sk Cossacks to protect Bokei’s followers from the rivals who continued to raid them after their emigration.3 Tsar Paul I responded that he had accepted Bokei and his subjects “with pleasure” (prinimaiu k sebe okhotno) and allowed Bokei and his people “to wander anywhere they wished”. He ordered that Bokei be awarded a golden medal with his picture engraved on it, and he promoted Popov to the rank of major-general for his outstanding service.4 Popov sent 30 Cossacks to assist Bokei and his subjects with their move.5 On his part, Knorring suggested that he would send a Cossack team to assist Bokei with finding suitable pasturelands.6 In 1808, Volkonsky

188  Staying on the imperial fringe

Map 10.1 Eurasia in the nineteenth century (from M. Khodarkovsky Russia’s Steppe Frontier, 2002)

commissioned Ataman General Major D. M. Borodin to construct a bridge so that Bokei’s people and their livestock could cross the Ural, for which Bokei thanked the ataman.7 Following Bokei’s example, the tribal leader Teliap Kaibashev also initiated a correspondence with the Ural’sk Cossack administration to get the tsar’s permission to emigrate to the Ural’s inner bank, which entailed placing his more-than-athousand followers under Russian protection. The authorities, however, declined his request, citing the lack of necessary data relating to the territories in question. Yet they granted an analogous request submitted by the tribal elder Qojaev, whom they allowed to wander in the Astrakhan steppes.8 Strikingly, neither Paul I  nor Bokei referred to the fact that back in 1731 Abulkhair had already subjected the Qazaqs of the Junior Horde to Russian rule, and after Bokei’s aforementioned letter to Knorring, the tsar’s officials conducted additional archival research that showed that parts of the populations of the Qazaq Junior Horde and the Qazaq Middle Horde had indeed been considered Russian subjects since at least 1743.9 This, along with the vaguely defined territorial borders of the future Bokei habitat, suggests that both sides perceived their relationship as a strategic alliance, from which both sought to derive benefits under the given economic and political situation. Bokei sought to secure his followers’ legal access to pasturelands and Russian protection from his rivals. Paul I, in turn, like Tsar Shuisky, aimed to transform these territories into a buffer, by assigning them to Bokei and his followers. In tune with this outlook, in his memorandum for the tsar in 1819 Count

The establishment of the Bokei Horde 189 K. V. Nessel’rode, the employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, highlighted the importance of the Bokei population’s nomadic livestock and animal products, such as furs, skins and animal fat for the growth of local Russian industries. The horde’s nobility also provided merchants, who had been crossing the Qazaq territories between Russia and the Central Asian cities, with logistical support, including guiding and protecting their caravans.10 As we shall see, rather than intermingling with the Qazaqs’ customary social structures, the authorities’ policies for the Bokei largely focused on regulating their movements between the outer (Trans-Ural) and the inner (Bokei) territories. Noticeably, all three rulers of the horde, Bokei, Shigai and Jangir, were asked to provide statistical data about the growth of their populations, their livestock and the dynamics of their migrations on a regular basis. The authorities placed the horde’s domestic affairs under the centralized authority of its khans.11 Like the Qazaqs of the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde, the Bokei Qazaqs were spared having to participate in Russian military campaigns and were not required to pay any monetary tribute to Russia. Voluntarily acknowledging their vassal status with respect to Russia and expressing their loyalty to the Russian throne seemed to have been their only responsibilities as subjects of the tsar.12 By placing a permanent Russian military detachment of 200 soldiers at the khans’ disposal and creating the Khan’s Council in 1827 that included the most influential tribal elders of the horde, the government contributed further to centralizing the khans’ power. Bokei and his successors – his brother Shigai and his son Jangir – concentrated their economic, legislative, judicial and administrative powers, distributing pasturelands among their elites, collecting fees on a regular basis and introducing rules regulating their populations’ commercial and confessional activities. In light of this concentration of power, Salyq Zimanov believed that the political system of the Bokei Horde functioned as a monarchy, which only nominally depended on its patron, the Russian state.13 Following the Kalmyk example, the Russian government granted the new political body the status of khanate and, in 1808, placed it under the Astrakhan civil governor and the Orenburg Frontier Commission. Since 1819, the Bokei territories and populations were referred to as the Bokei Horde (Bukeevskaia Orda) in official Russian reports, while the name Inner Horde (Vnutrenniaia Orda) was added after 1824.14 The Bokei rulers considered themselves khans of the Junior Horde until 1828, when the head of the Orenburg Frontier Commission, G. F. Gens, suggested that Jangir, Bokei’s heir, call himself khan of the Inner Horde. According to Erofeeva, Russian official records referred to Bokei’s subjects as “the population of the Junior Horde subject to Bokei, who wander in the Ural’sk and Astrakhan steppes”.15 Comprised of 183 households or 740 people, including Sultan Bokei, his brother Shigai and their families, the first Qazaq immigrants found their new habitat covered with thick and rich vegetation and inhabited by various wild birds and animals, in addition to the abundant fish that they could find in local rivers. It was no wonder that a year later, 30,000 new migrants from the Junior Horde had already joined Bokei’s followers. Tsarist sources mentioned that the poor condition of the

190  Staying on the imperial fringe first Qazaq migrants had considerably improved after staying in the new lands due to the growth of their herds, which attracted the remaining Qazaqs of the Junior Horde to immigrate to the Bokei territories.16 The increase in livestock was so significant that the Bokei Qazaqs began to barter animals for items offered by the neighbouring populations. According to Bokei’s data, in the period 1801–1814 the Bokei Qazaqs bartered 41,242 horses, 16,302 cows, 277,000 sheep and 14,066 goats.17 Despite the severe winter of 1813–1814, his population was able to retain the two million heads of livestock in their possession.18 Yet the initial unclear territorial dimensions of the new Qazaq habitat prompted conflicts over the local land between Bokei’s subjects and their neighbours, including about 30,000 Kalmyks, the local Tatar populations and the Ural’sk Cossacks. The Bokei Qazaqs also found themselves involved in land conflicts with the local Russian peasants and fishers, including the two big Russian landowners, Prince N. B. Iusupov and Count I. A. Bezborodko, whose private lands granted to them under Catherine II in 1772 and 1775 were located on the Caspian shore.19 This situation enabled the authorities to arbitrate numerous land conflicts involving the landowners and the populations mentioned earlier. Those among these populations who had lost their livestock were to report their losses to the Orenburg governor and the Orenburg Frontier Commission. While taking advantage of this opportunity, Bokei and his successors benefited from the bureaucratic chaos created by the uncertain administrative status of their territories. In addition to the Astrakhan civil governor and the Orenburg Frontier Commission, under which they had been formally placed, they found themselves involved in a lengthy bureaucratic correspondence with the Orenburg military governor and the Cossack Ural’sk Administration. The Bokei rulers found the situation favourable for playing these authorities against each other. After the 1803 order, the former governor of the Astrakhan province, General P. D. Tsitsianov, commissioned General I. I. Zavalishin to conduct land-surveying work in the disputed Bokei territories. Given that Bezborodko’s and Iusupov’s private lands would be transmitted into the state’s property over time, Zavalishin assigned these lands to the Bokei Qazaqs, creating a long-lasting conflict between the Bokei nobility and the landowners, which remained unresolved until the dissolution of the Bokei Khanate in 1845. Moreover, Zavalishin’s work evoked suspicion on the part of the Bokei Qazaqs, who viewed his activities as a sign of their possible conscription into the Russian army and transformation into Russian peasants. Their suspicion was reinforced by the arrival of a Cossack detachment that had been placed under the khan’s command. Subsequently, in 1803–1804, more than 5,000 Qazaq families migrated back to the Trans-Ural region, so that only about 1,500 Bokei families remained with Bokei in the new habitat.20 In addition, in compliance with Zavalishin’s recommendations, officials established four defensive lines (kordonnaia strazha) and put 529 Kalmyks and 868 Cossacks on these lines to operate as guards. What is striking to note is that following Bokei’s complaints, Russian authorities replaced Zavalishin with Popov.21 Regardless of this and other temporary setbacks, the Qazaqs from the Junior Horde continued to immigrate to the Bokei territories.

The establishment of the Bokei Horde 191 Zavalishin’s work had laid the basis for the promulgation of the Regulations about the Allotment of Lands to the Kalmyks and other Nomadic Populations in the Astrakhan Province [O naznachenii zemel’ kalmykam i drugim kochuiushchim narodam v gubernii Astrakhanskoi] signed by the tsar in 1806. The regulations contained a detailed description of the territories and their boundaries to be used by each population in the region and introduced tickets for the Qazaq immigrants from the Junior Horde. The tickets were to be issued by the Orenburg Frontier Commission at the request of their nobles and stipulated the establishment of defensive lines separating the Bokei lands, Kalmyk lands and Tatar lands.22 On 17 July 1808, the tsar ordered Volkonsky and Astrakhan Governor L. A. Kozhevnikov to establish three outposts along the Ural for the Qazaqs immigrating to the Bokei territories and to station soldiers there to operate as guards. Tickets issued by the Orenburg Frontier Commission were to indicate the specific Bokei locations where the immigrated Qazaqs should graze their livestock in winter. The tickets were to be issued only to their nobility, by request. Each immigrating kinship group was to provide four hostages (amanaty) of noble origin to be held at the Orenburg Frontier Commission until they returned to their original lands. All Qazaq immigrants who failed to show their tickets were to be punished and returned to their places of origin by force. The tsar proposed that the Qazaqs could immigrate only in the period starting in late autumn, when the river got covered with ice, and ending in March. The tsar also ordered the construction of additional defensive lines to protect the local populations from each other’s attacks.23 After moving to the region, Bokei was charged with regulating conflicts between his own subjects and the Qazaqs of the Junior Horde. He imposed payments for tickets on the latter, allowing them to immigrate to the territory of his horde and turned the practice into a lucrative business until it was taken over by officials of the Orenburg Frontier Commission. The Orenburg Frontier Commission’s members were also charged with issuing monthly tickets at the cost of 15 copecks for the Bokei Qazaqs leaving the horde for Russian and Cossack settlements, where they got themselves hired for work.24 In compliance with the 1808 order, the border guards established by the Orenburg Frontier Commission held the influential Qazaq figures as hostages (amanats) in case their tribespeople had committed robbery, baranta or other criminal acts during the winter grazing seasons.25 According to a report from an employee of the Orenburg Frontier Commission, S. I. Sozonovich, they held 17 Qazaq hostages for two months in 1808.26 The immigration pattern established under Bokei began to slowly shift under Shigai, Bokei’s successor, as a growing number of Bokei Qazaqs returned to their initial habitat in the Trans-Ural region. Apart from the land-surveying work, this trend was due to the growing poverty of some Bokei groups. One account indicated that in 1815, 200 Qazaq children had been sold by their parents to denizens of the Khivan Khanate over the course of only one month in exchange for rye bread.27 In 1820, Alexander I ordered the Orenburg governor to allow the Qazaqs to leave for the Orenburg Line and hire themselves out there. The Orenburg

192  Staying on the imperial fringe Frontier Commission issued 1,919 tickets, all together worth 11,761 rubles, for Qazaqs leaving the Bokei Horde in search of work.28 The land situation continued to deteriorate under Jangir, Bokei’s heir, due to not only the ongoing land conflicts with the neighbouring populations but also the overuse of Bokei lands by the horde’s population, which finally resulted in transforming them into sands. Under Jangir, the mass migrations of the Qazaqs from the Junior Horde to the territory of the Bokei Horde had gradually ceased. By this time, the population under Jangir’s rule was reported to have comprised more than 100,000 people, or 21,000 nomadic households.29

The last Bokei khan, Jangir Shigai ruled as a regent until Bokei’s son, Jangir, who had been nominated by his father as his heir, reached adulthood. After ascending to the Bokei throne by an 1823 decree of Alexander I, Jangir also succeeded in securing his position for his son, Sakhib-Gerei, by making the Russian government legalize the hereditary nature of the Bokei khanship.30 But Jangir happened to be the last khan. He ruled until his death, in 1845, after which the Russian state abolished the Bokei khanship and began to slowly integrate its population and territories into the Russian Astrakhan province. Jangir embodied a new type of Qazaq leader, whose parents had become increasingly aware of the benefits of a Russian education in enabling their children to have successful careers. He was a striking example of how these leaders had no difficulties in combining their Russian educational backgrounds with their traditional Qazaq upbringings. Jangir received his elementary Islamic instruction at home from a mullah. At the age of seven or eight, he was placed in the home of Astrakhan Governor S. S. Andreevsky, where he received a Russian education. Jangir knew Russian, Persian and Arabic and could write in Chagatai (the old Uzbek literary language), which was referred to as Tatar in Russian imperial sources. Bokei and Jangir were directly appointed by Emperor Alexander I and his successor Nicholas I. Their confirmation ceremonies in 1814 and 1824, respectively, were held in compliance with the guidelines provided by the 1792 Rules. The Orenburg governors Volkonsky and Essen announced the will of the emperors and handed the royal charters and patents, along with corresponding regalia, to the khans.31 The Orenburg Commission spent about 10,000 rubles on Jangir’s confirmation ceremony, which, among other things, featured generous treats and the distribution of valuable gifts to the khan and all of the guests.32 By this time, authorities seem to have become determined to spend generous sums turning events of lesser importance into great public festivals. According to Colonel Berg, Volkonsky turned the beginning of the construction of a house in Ural’sk into a public feast, to which he invited the nobility of the Junior Horde and the Bokei Horde, including Sultan Qaratai. The feast featured games, races and a gymnastic show and concluded with the distribution of valuable gifts to 420 members of the Bokei nobility.33 Jangir periodically asked Essen and Nessel’rode

The establishment of the Bokei Horde  193 to reward his nobles with medals and military ranks.34 Following his requests, in 1826, the Ministry of International Affairs awarded golden medals on Alexandrov and Annensky bands to Jangir’s nine nobles, including his translator, and promoted his Cossack sergeant (uriadnik) to the rank of officer.35 Jangir exceeded his father in distinguishing himself as a loyal servant of the Russian throne and was duly rewarded by the Russian monarchs. He was decorated by three orders: a golden medal on the Andreev ribbon (1823) and two orders of Holy Anna of the first degree (1832, 1839). He was also elevated to the rank of major-general (1840), despite having never served in the Russian army36 The state placed a permanent detachment of 100 Astrakhan soldiers and 25 Ural’sk Cossacks at Jangir’s disposal and stationed them on the horde’s defensive lines to operate as border guards. The Khan’s Council included 12 tribal judges, each representing the horde’s large kinship unit, whom Jangir personally chose and who were then approved by the Orenburg Frontier Commission. Legal cases not exceeding the value of 30 rubles were placed under his and the Khan’s Council’s jurisdiction, whose members used Qazaq tribal laws as the basis for their examination. Cases exceeding the value of 30 rubles, including theft, murder, debauchery and robbery, were placed under the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Frontier Commission’s members, who were to settle them in compliance with all-imperial Russian laws.37 By the end of his term, Jangir personally appointed judges and heads of large and small kinship groups (ukaznye starshiny/licensed elders), whom the Orenburg Frontier Commission approved in their titles and put on the payroll. In so doing, he engendered the rise of new groups whose members came to relate to each other through sharing common economic interests rather than through tracing their origin to common ancestors.38 According to Zimanov, Jangir united smaller kinship groups with larger administrative groups and placed them under sultans. In this way, he created 15 administrative groups out of the previous 17 kinship groups, and then he gradually reduced their number to 12 by the mid 1830s. The Orenburg governor provided the sultans with stamps and certificates that approved them in their status. Each group headed by a sultan featured a judge and an esaul, who were appointed by the khan. It was subdivided into smaller groups headed by elders who were also appointed by Jangir and approved by the Orenburg Frontier Commission. The elders were put in charge of regulating seasonal migrations, collecting taxes and keeping peace and order among their constituencies. By the 1840s, the horde numbered more than 200 elders appointed by Jangir.39 The sultans settled legal issues with the permission of the khan, who served as an appeal court for unresolved cases. With the exception of criminal cases, the khan settled the rest of the cases. Jangir encouraged his sultans to impose the ziaket and sogum taxes on their constituencies at the annual cost of 500 rubles, which the sultans considered their salaries.40 Jangir paid the salaries of the majority of his staff’s members from his own funds, including his two clerks’ annual salaries of 1,000 rubles (500 rubles for each clerk). To be able to maintain his administration, Jangir introduced the Islamic tax ziaket and transformed the voluntary donation known as sogum into

194  Staying on the imperial fringe an obligatory tax. He also introduced several other mandatory taxes, including a felt tax, a wool tax, a hay tax and a tax collected from the Qazaqs selling their livestock at the fairs. Jangir established a number of mandatory duties such as the maintenance of his postal service and his 14 envoys (esauls), who served as intermediaries between his officials and Russian officials. Following in his father’s footsteps, Jangir appropriated the practice of issuing tickets for the Qazaqs immigrating from the Junior Horde.41 Jangir also issued the monthly and bimonthly tickets valued at 15 and 30 copecks, respectively, for his subjects who intended to leave the horde for Astrakhan and other Russian cities.42 Jangir raised and reduced taxes on a whim and punished those Qazaqs who had failed to pay them, by imposing fines on them. He exempted mullahs, members of his nobility whom he had elevated to the status of tarkhan and impoverished nomads (baigushi) from taxation.43 Other privileged groups included members of his telengut community who served as his personal guards and army.44 As Bokei’s ruling elites grew richer, their constituencies grew poorer and began selling their children and leaving for Russian settlements in search of work, where they occasionally converted to Christianity.45 In order to escape Jangir’s taxes, 730 Bokei Qazaqs were reported to have registered with the Cossacks in 1843.46 In 1822, each Bokei family had in their possession 267 heads of livestock, but in 1840 and 1860, their livestock possessions had dwindled to 153 and 37 heads respectively.47 Not surprisingly, the horde’s demographic situation continued to fluctuate under Nicholas I (1825–1855) as well. Subsequently, the reimmigration of the Bokei population to the Trans-Ural region that had begun to come to prominence under Shigai further increased under Jangir: 10,930 Bokei households were reported to have returned to their initial homeland in the Trans-Ural region in 1825.48 The remarkable growth of the population and their livestock under Bokei finally led to a shortage of pasturelands and the overuse of the horde’s territories by the constantly growing population, who found themselves trapped with their livestock and surrounded by other populations. As a result, by the late 1830s, the Bokei lands had started to slowly turn into sands.49 Under the pressure of the growing shortage of pasturelands, Jangir asked the Samaran governor to permit his populations to graze their livestock in territories under his control.50 Jangir used the argument about introducing his subjects to a sedentary way of life when, two years later, he sought the commissioners’ approval for his plan to allot the Bokei lands as private property for his nobility.51 Shigai and Jangir contributed to the escalation of the conflict with Bezborodko and Jusupov by initiating the building of their houses in the landowners’ territories. Bezborodko responded to Jangir’s plan to have a house built on his land by taking him to court. In a letter to Nessel’rode, Berg suggested supporting Jangir against Bezborodko, because Jangir’s subjects had been enjoying such peace and prosperity under his rule. Berg also mentioned Jangir’s excellent knowledge of both his native language and Russian, as well as his initiative to educate noble Qazaq children, including his own, at the Nepliuev Cadet Corps. The colonel stressed that building a house for Jangir could have an additional civilizing effect

The establishment of the Bokei Horde 195 on him and his subjects, encouraging them to transition into a settled way of life. By pointing to the striking differences between the Junior Horde and the Bokei Horde, Berg argued that thanks to being in a Christian environment, the latter had become more civilized and prosperous. Berg advocated for the unification of the two hordes by having the Junior Horde’s Qazaqs emigrate to the Bokei lands. He argued that by weakening Shirgazy, the khan of the Junior Horde, this emigration would ultimately allow Russia to control Qazaq leadership practices in the future. In the end, Jangir decided to avoid the court procedures and chose a location in the centre of the Bokei lands called Naryn/Ryn Sands (Naryn/Ryn peski) for his proposed house. Estimated at the value of 36,102 rubles, the construction of his house began and was completed in the summer of 1827 despite the limited number of builders during the summertime and the absence of high-quality wood on the steppe, pointed out by G. S. Karelin, the retired military officer, who had been charged with supervising the construction work.52 The khan also had a house constructed for him on the bank of the river Torgun, where he and his family stayed during the summer.53 He also had a house in Astrakhan, a commercial pavilion in Saratov, and a stand in Orenburg.54 The Cabinet of Ministers saw the Bokei nomads’ livestock as essential for developing local Russian industries, and in 1833, after consulting with the Orenburg military governor and the foreign, military and financial ministers, they came up with the new Regulations About the Allotment of Lands to the Ural’sk Cossacks and the Kirgiz [Qazaqs] (O nadelenii zemliami voiska Ural’skogo i kirgizov Vnutrennei Bukeevskoi Ordy), which proposed limiting the amount of land that the local Cossacks could own and allowing the Bokei Qazaqs to use parts of their territories for pasturing their livestock. The regulations framed the decision as the “administration of people who have been allowed by the imperial order to use the steppe lands adjacent to land properties of Russia’s authentic subjects” (ustroistvo narodov, dopushchennykh vysochaishim poveleniem na kochevoe obladanie stepiami primykaiushchimi k vladeniiam prirodnykh rossiiskikh poddannykh).55 What is striking is that by citing the 1801 order of Paul I in their land disputes with Bezborodko and Iusupov, both Bokei and Jangir reproduced the old scheme of things informed by the workings of the ulus politics that the Bashkirs and the Nogais had entertained in the previous two centuries. As discussed earlier, in their land disputes with Russian officials and their neighbours, they cited Ivan IV’s charters granted to them by the tsar to confirm their legal access to local lands.56 In addition, to catch up with the sedentarization discourse, Bokei promised to use these lands to bring his followers into a settled way of life by establishing Qazaq settlements and a school and selling flour to them.57 Jangir also used the discourse to add more weight to his requests. In his petition to Alexander I, which he handed in during his visit to the capital in 1839, Jangir mentioned his plan to establish ten sedentary Qazaq settlements on Iusupov’s and Bezborodko’s private lands.58 Some higher Russian officials expressed their apprehension with respect to the civilizing impact of a settled way of life on the Qazaqs. For example, the two Orenburg governors, Perovsky and P. P. Sukhtelen, argued that the Qazaq

196  Staying on the imperial fringe nomadic livestock breeding invigorated Russian trade and therefore should not only be preserved but also promoted by the Russian state: both the Russian merchants and the Qazaq nomads could benefit from exchanging grain, manufactured goods, livestock and animal products. Curiously enough, the Orenburg officials succeeded in preventing the Qazaqs of the Junior Horde from farming, by imposing a ban on their agricultural activities, which lasted until the mid nineteenth century.59 In 1831, Sukhtelen suggested collecting Qazaq tribal and Islamic laws from Jangir in order to adjust them to Russian laws and on this basis compile a code of laws, which his sultans and tribal elders could use in their legal practices.60 Four years later, Jangir presented Perovsky with a collection of Qazaq tribal laws.61 In a similar fashion, in a report titled Benefits from the Kirgiz [Qazaqs] [Pol’za ot kirgizov], the Orenburg Frontier Commission stated that Although the state does not receive any direct monetary income from the Kirgiz [Qazaq] people, the latter contribute to the growth of Russian capital, by exchanging and selling their livestock for Russian manufactured items and agricultural produce. They also provide Russian caravans with guidance, which promotes Russia’s trade with Central Asia.62 In contrast to these arguments, the advocates of Qazaq sedentarization, including Senator F. I. Engel’, who investigated the Bokei Khanate in 1827,63 argued that the Qazaqs’ transition to a settled way of life and their engagement with farming were the only ways of overcoming their poverty and dependency on nature. He, however, expressed less-radical views towards reforming the Qazaqs’ legal life. Given that they were afraid of Russian courts and tried to avoid them at any cost, in his 1828 memorandum, Engel’ suggested leaving the Qazaqs’ civic issues to their tribal courts, while placing their criminal cases under Russian courts to examine in accordance with imperial laws. In the last case, Qazaq litigants were to be provided with a translator who knew Russian language and laws.64 Following earlier practices, the proponents of Qazaq sedentarization initiated the distribution of bread and flour among the Bokei population, which they viewed as having the potential to bring them into a settled way of life.65 One visitor to the Bokei Horde remarked that Qazaq–Russian trade relations contributed to a crosscultural influence, with the Qazaqs building their winter dwellings in a Russian way, hiring the Russians to mow hay for winter, eating bread and porridge and using carts and sledges.66 The Russian ethnographer and educator A. E. Alektorov also mentioned a growing dependence of the horde’s population on manufactured and agricultural goods, including tea and coffee, for which they exchanged large numbers of their livestock.67 As we have learned from the previous chapters, in response to the pressure of the dramatically shrinking range of their free movement, the Torghut Kalmyk nobility led by Ubashi left the Astrakhan steppes for China in 1771. After finding himself in analogous circumstances, Jangir, in contrast, became a strong advocate of his people’s transitioning to a sedentary way of life. Jangir’s house built for him by the Russian government in the Naryn/Ryn Sands served as the administrative

The establishment of the Bokei Horde 197 centre of the horde as well as his residency, the Khanskaia Stavka. The khan’s house was soon surrounded by the houses of his elites and wealthy merchants. The Russian visitor M. Ia. Kittary accounted for 89 houses that had been built in the Khanskaia Stavka by 1849. The khan’s house had a European design, with a balcony propped up by six white columns and decorated with a wooden fender and another six thin columns. Its interior and the adjacent buildings were furnished with European furniture. Kittary also mentioned a telescope and four globes, featuring the earth, the sky and two moon globes, along with portraits of the emperor, Jangir and Sakhib-Gerei, Jangir’s son and heir. The rooms of the khan’s house were richly decorated with weapons, revealing his special passion for them.68 Another visitor noted that the European furniture in Jangir’s house had been brought from St Petersburg at the khan’s order.69 The khan’s family lived in six houses, while his bureaucrats had four houses. The remaining houses were occupied by different families: Russian (13 houses), Kazan Tatar (ten houses), Armenian (two houses), Astrakhan (five houses), Qazaq (41 houses) and Cossack (two houses).70 The head of the Orenburg Frontier Commission, G. F. Gens, was a strong believer in the civilizing effect of a settled way of life on the nomadic Qazaqs.71 In fact, Jangir consulted with Gens about whether to turn the Bokei lands into his nobles’ private property.72 With Gens’s approval, between 1830 and 1845, Jangir issued 1,517 deeds to these nobles, all together four million desiatinas or twothirds of the horde’s entire territory.73 In his letter to State Secretary V. I. Korneev, Jangir asked for permission to turn 860 desiatinas of these territories into his own private property.74 Jangir’s elders, in turn, rented their lands to their constituents, who paid with money and livestock.75 In this way, Jangir’s and his nobles’ tax policies became closely linked to their land policies, because they rented land parcels only to those groups whose members were able to pay regular taxes in the first place.76 The deteriorated land situation, along with Jangir’s violation of the nomadic principle of voluntary donations, finally spurred discontent and protests from a considerable part of the horde’s population. Apart from the deteriorated condition of the horde’s lands, its population suffered from the epizootics that befell them in 1816, 1820, 1827 and later on. In 1827, they were reported to have lost 10,500 camels, 280,500 horses, 75,480 heads of cattle and 1,012,000 sheep, worth 13,000,000 rubles.77 The secret emigrations of the Bokei Qazaqs to the Trans-Ural region led by Sultan Kaipgali Ishimov and other rebellious nobles, sometimes facilitated by local Cossack officials, increased in 1827–1829.78 The horde’s other charismatic men, including the tribal elder Isatai Taimanov and the poet Mukhambet Utemisov, also took advantage of the population’s growing discontent, by mobilizing them against the khan in the period 1836–1837. Taimanov and his followers demanded the restoration of the Qazaq legal system on the basis of Qazaq tribal and Islamic laws and called for the dismissal of Qaraul Qoja, Jangir’s most influential noble.79 Before suffering a defeat in 1937 by a joint army commanded by Lieutenant Geke that included 700 Cossacks and 400 Jangir soldiers, the two leaders’ followers

198  Staying on the imperial fringe also attacked the neighbouring Kalmyk population, Karakalpak population and Kundurov Tatar population.80 Despite this defeat, the discontented groups of the horde’s population resumed their riots in 1842–1843 under the leadership of Abbas Koshaev, Musa Aibulatov, Laubai Manataev and other men, who had enticed them to leave the horde for the Trans-Ural region.81 Regardless of the growing discontent of the horde’s population with their ruler, trade between them and the Russian and Central Asian merchants reached its most active stage under Jangir. The seasonal fairs established under Jangir in 1833 turned into lucrative trading posts with the participation of Qazaqs, Kalmyks, Turkmens, Russians, Central Asians, Tatars and Cossacks. The largest fair, which operated twice a year in fall and spring, was established in the Khanskaia Stavka. Jangir’s nomadic subjects exchanged large quantities of livestock and animal products, including wool, animal skin and fur for manufactured and agricultural goods brought to the fair by Russian and Central Asian merchants. According to an 1824 report, the Bokei Qazaqs sold 100,000–150,000 heads of their livestock to Russian merchants annually. The Russian and Central Asian merchants, in turn, brought animals bartered from the Qazaqs to Central Asian and Russian cities.82 In 1827 alone, the Russian merchants were reported to have brought 400,000 sheep and 3,000 horses to Russia, including animal products valued at 2,925,000 rubles.83 Jangir personally put up rules for holding the fairs in his residence and imposed fees on the merchants.84 His other regulations included requiring passports for the merchants and employing a Cossack detachment and so-called market sultans (bazarnye sultany) to keep order at the fairs. Jangir also ordered his men to treat merchants with respect and not to abuse them.85

Jangir, Islam and modernity Jangir’s promotion of the Islamic cause provides additional evidence of the strong independence of the Bokei khans, because it came at a time when the official outlook on Islam was changing. Increasingly, Islam was portrayed as intrinsically hostile to Christianity and Russian statehood. Under the impact of this outlook, the institutionalized form of Islam established under Catherine II and the role of Tatar mullahs in promoting it among the nomadic Qazaqs came under scrutiny.86 One important outcome of this scrutiny was that the Bokei Qazaqs were not placed under the Orenburg Spiritual Administration.87 Subsequently, officials imposed a ban preventing Tatar mullahs from visiting and proselytizing among the nomadic Qazaqs. Yet under both Bokei and Jangir, Tatar mullahs retained their privileged status and the civilizing role entrusted to them by Catherine II and her officials, who saw Tatar mullahs and merchants as having a beneficial impact on the Qazaqs, by encouraging them to take up a settled way of life. Following this perspective, the horde’s Tatar population came to be viewed by the Bokei leadership as playing an important role in mediating “Europe” to the khanate’s nobility and ordinary folk alike. In 1811, Bokei sent a letter to Minister of Foreign Affairs Count N. P. Rumiantsev, asking him to legitimize the status of the Tatar mullahs, who had

The establishment of the Bokei Horde 199 immigrated with his people and had been living among his Qazaq subjects, by providing them with state licences.88 For his part, Jangir promoted the training of Qazaq young men at the higher institutions of Islamic learning in Ufa, Kazan, Orenburg and Astrakhan, including Central Asia, which led to a gradual replacement of Tatar mullahs by their Qazaq successors. Interestingly, Russian visitors to the horde described its Qazaq mullahs as friendly and not fanatical. Some of them spoke Russian, while others expressed their desire to learn Russian. As a rule, all of them included prayers for the well-being of the tsar and the royal family, in their official prayers.89 Jangir’s second marriage to Fatima signalled his joining the ranks of the imperial Muslim elites who adhered to the state-run institution of Islam introduced under Catherine II. Fatima was the daughter of Mukhamedjan Khusainov, the Mufti of the Orenburg Spiritual Administration established under Catherine II in 1788.90 Jangir reproduced the workings of this institution acting as a higher religious authority. In that capacity, he introduced official positions for an akhun and mullahs and personally appointed them. Strikingly, his mullahs were not asked to pass the examinations required by the Orenburg Spiritual Administration. The Muslim clergy lived on generous donations from Jangir and his nobles. Each of about 139 mullahs in the horde was put in charge of 170 nomadic households.91 Jangir justified the introduction of the Islamic tax ziaket by referring to the Qur’an. Jangir presented himself as a devoted Muslim by participating in public prayers in a mosque, built in his residence, which was based on a European design that he had sketched himself. When the akhun was absent, he led the prayers alone.92 Clearly at odds with established Muslim practices, Jangir’s behaviour points to a peculiar idea of Islam, with which he came to affiliate himself. Stemmed from the contemporary Tatar-educated Muslim groups, it typically dismissed nomadism as a sign of a cultural and social “backwardness”. Under the impact of these challenges, Jangir began to view practices associated with the imperial institution of Islam as instrumental for overcoming Asianism (aziatizm), which he associated with the Qazaqs’ economic, social and cultural “backwardness”. Jangir’s promotion of official Islam therefore neatly complied with his other enlightening initiatives, including bringing his native folk to a sedentary way of life, developing their commercial activities and introducing them to a reformed Muslim education. Within this framework, Jangir promoted the introduction of Western-style medicine, forestry and progressive methods of animal breeding. In an 1825 letter to Essen, Jangir described his plans for opening a hospital and a drugstore in the horde and for educating Qazaq individuals about vaccinating themselves against measles and, to this end, inviting a Russian expert from St Petersburg.93 The first doctor appeared in the horde in 1841.94 Jangir also showed his interest in promoting oriental studies, by financing the publication of Muslim religious books and exchanging letters on the issue with the noted Russian orientalist, Kazan University professor A. K. Kazimbek. On one occasion, Jangir sponsored the publication of 2,000 copies of a unique Muslim manuscript. He also bought 60 manuscripts in Arabic, Persian and Chagatai for Kazan University, which contributed to nominating him the university’s

200  Staying on the imperial fringe honorary member in 1844. Finally, Jangir founded the first-ever Qazaq ethnographic museum, which was on his estate.95 Jangir’s devotion to Islam was not in conflict with his tolerance for other faiths. Although the khan encouraged the building of a Russian church for the Russians in the Khanskaia Stavka, he refrained from donating his personal funds. As he himself explained, he had not wished to jeopardize his authority with his followers who could react negatively to his donation.96 Jangir’s most remarkable legacy was his vision of a “European education” for Qazaq children. A closer look reveals that Jangir’s idea preceded the Russian Muslim reformist movement known as jadidism by several decades. The movement was initiated by the Crimean Tatar educator and enlightener Ismailbek Gaspirinsky (1851–1914) in the 1880s. Like Gasprinsky, Jangir linked acquiring scientific knowledge to studying the tenets of Islam, serving the tsar and the common home country, the Russian Empire. He felt unhappy about the system of Muslim instruction known as homeschooling that the Tatar mullahs had practised under his father Bokei and in the earlier decades of his own rule. In compliance with the system, heads of wealthy families invited a mullah to teach elementary Arabic and Qur’an recitation to their children between ten and 15 years of age. In contrast, the Muslim school established by Jangir at the Khanskaia Stavka in 1841 was designed to introduce its students to a “European education”. Jangir designed his school as a preparatory step that would enable its graduates to continue their study at Russian institutions of higher learning. He solicited support from the Orenburg Frontier Commission and ran the school at his own expense. In a letter to his relative Chuka Nuraliev, Jangir wrote the following: I am confident that you use appropriate aspirations and reason to persuade your relatives, friends and anyone else about great benefits of learning the sciences. We will greatly benefit from having individuals with the knowledge of Russian who will be appointed to administrative positions as well as from having our own Kirgiz [Qazaq] veterinarians. There are no greater benefits than those derived from investing in the education of [Qazaq] natives.97 Jangir’s school had two Russian and Tatar departments. Similar to the curriculum of jadid schools proposed by Gasprinsky, the curriculum of the school listed as its subjects Arabic, Tatar and Russian languages; Russian grammar; Islam; arithmetic; geography; and history. Jangir enrolled his two sons and the children of some members of his nobility, whom Jangir had persuaded to educate their sons, in the school.98 The teaching at the school was offered on a regular basis: it lasted from the beginning of October until May. Students were divided into two groups: boarding and day students. Jangir took over the maintenance of the boarding students and the school’s teachers, paying for teacher salaries, lodging and food and providing textbooks for the students.99 The school’s first Russian teacher was the veterinarian Konstantin Ol’denkop, who taught Russian, arithmetic and geography. Ol’denkop proved to be a skilful and dedicated teacher, who taught at the school for ten years. The Tatar teacher, the mullah Khakim-Mukhammad Aminev, whom Jangir had invited from Kazan,

The establishment of the Bokei Horde 201 taught oriental languages and Islam. Both teachers not only were paid by Jangir but also received generous gifts from the khan. The textbooks used for Russian instruction included Concise Russian Grammar by Vostokov, Arithmetic by Malinin, two volumes of Russian History by Ustrialov and Concise Reading by Galakhov. Although the school had only 12 students in 1841, by the 1850s, its enrolment had increased to 30 students, which met the goals of the original enrolment plan. Jangir personally oversaw the students’ annual exams. The khan regularly appealed to higher Russian authorities, including Tsar Nicholas I, for assistance in enabling his young men to continue their studies at Russian institutions of higher learning. In response, Nicholas I permitted the Bokei youth to enrol in the prestigious Nepliuev Cadet Corps, as well as the imperial institutes of forestry, road communications, civil engineering and medicine.100 Fatima seems to have influenced Jangir in his civilizing endeavour. Like her husband, she combined a Russian educational background with her devotion to the Muslim faith. She was educated in “a European way” in Orenburg, where, along with studying Western languages, she learned music and dance. She knew German and French, spoke Russian and led the worldly life of a wealthy woman. The couple’s four sons were educated at the most privileged Russian educational institutions, while their two daughters received European instruction at home from German and English governesses.101 A contemporary writer who contributed to the Russian newspaper Russkii invalid in 1844 wrote about the “deep respect” that anyone who visited Jangir’s school felt towards the khan, “who was born and brought up in the depth of this very steppe land and amid its wild population, where now he has been striving to introduce these changes under the protection of the emperor and the government”.102 Jangir’s son Ibragim, who had graduated from the school, enrolled in the prestigious Page Corps in St Petersburg. The Bokei Horde’s most prominent figures included the lawyer Baqytgerei Kulmanov, who was elected deputy of the First Russian Duma (1905), and Salyq Babajanov, one of the first Qazaq historians and ethnographers.

Figure 10.1 Types of Kirgizs [Qazaqs] under Russian rule (Salyq Babazhanov is the last on the right side)

202  Staying on the imperial fringe Jangir’s children seem to have followed in their parents’ footsteps by combining “Europe” with their Muslim Qazaq backgrounds with ease. American traveller Eugene Schuyler, met one of Jangir’s sons by chance in 1873 on a train from Moscow to Saratov, when the son was returning from his pilgrimage to Mecca. For most of the trip, the son, who seemed to Schuyler like a European gentleman, was immersed in reading a novel in French.103

The language of “love and affection” Bokei’s and his nobles’ correspondence with their Russian peers reveals that the paternalistic language widely employed by their predecessors in the previous century had new overtones by the beginning of the nineteenth century. It became marked with the language of personal affection and attachment, with both sides making frequent references to love, fondness and amity. Tsar Alexander I emphasized in his 1803 instructions to the Orenburg governor that love and affection (laskovost’), properly balanced with justice and rigour, should constitute the important attributes of a successful rule over the uncivilized peoples.104 In tune with the tsar’s instructions, War Minister A. I. Gorchakov wrote to Bokei expressing his satisfaction with the khan’s decision to dispatch a delegation to the Russian court and highlighting the “trust and love” between the two sides.105 During the last years of his life, Bokei showed interest in the outcome of the 1812 Patriotic War and initiated donations from his people to support Russian soldiers.106 In his letter to the emperor, he wrote that he had brought his people the news of Napoleon’s defeat by reading them a translated version of the royal manifesto, then leading a collective prayer in a mosque in gratitude to and for the health of Alexander I.107 After Popov’s death, Bokei sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs I. A. Veidemeier, in which he described Popov as the father, protector (otets-poktrovitel’) and defender of his people: Akh, Your Majesty, similar (or even stronger) to the loss of his children by a tender and caring father, or the loss of its skillful commander (polkovodtsa) by a state, we, I and my subject Kirgizs [Qazaqs], who have been living here, in the steppes of the holy Russia, feel about the loss of our dearest Pavel Semenovich Popov. Not surprisingly, we cry, mourn, and will mourn, like small children, for the loss of Pavel Semenovich, as we do when we mourn for the departure of our deceased relatives. We have become orphans after having lost our protector, we are hapless people, unless Your Majesty will take care of us. He asked Veidemeier to replace Popov with Vasily Filipych Skvortsov, noting the respect and sympathy that Popov and his fellow Qazaqs had felt towards Skvortsov. Bokei added that no high ranks, but qualities of soul (svoistva dushi) have the true influence on the peoples’ hearts. If it [the soul] is kind, if it is compassionate

The establishment of the Bokei Horde  203 (sniskhoditel’na) about other souls, the people are thriving. That, in my opinion, is what works the best.108 Like Bokei, Astrakhan Governor-General Knorring believed that Popov had established a trusting relationship with the Qazaqs and maintained peace among them by acting with care (laska), being persuasive, conducting himself well and giving good advice.109 The Astrakhan civil governor, Prince D. V. Tenishev, in turn, believed that Popov’s influence and sympathy with the Qazaq nobility and Bokei in particular were largely due to his mastery of “the politics of gifts”, which the governor believed could easily win any Asian heart.110 Following in the footsteps of their predecessors, Popov and other higher Russian officials, as a rule, did not hesitate to satisfy Bokei and his nobles’ requests and used any suitable occasion to reward them with medals, ranks, fabrics, weapons, robes and hats.111 Interestingly, both friends, Popov and Bokei, died in May 1815. The Orenburg governor, Volkonsky, wrote the following in his letter to Bokei’s widow: Please accept my sincere condolences on the passing away of your husband, whom I sincerely loved. Allow me, my highness (milostivaia gosudarynia) to express my sincere sorrow about the loss of your beloved dearest spouse, the loss, which I and the state share with you. I’d like to assure you that it will always be my pleasure to secure your well-being, by mediating your requests to the higher imperial throne.112 Upon the request of Bokei’s widow, Volkonsky reassured her that he would support Bokei’s heir and son, Jangir; preserve her husband’s pension of 300 rubles; and keep the Cossack detachment at her disposal.113 Jangir, Fatima and their Russian and non-Russian peers further invested in entertaining the language of personal affection and sympathy, which effectively contributed to promoting a friendly and easy tone in their private correspondence. The couple developed close and intimate friendships with these peers, exchanging gifts, asking them to send clothing and medicine, sharing family news relating to health and everyday life and congratulating them on Russian holidays, including New Year’s Day. Jangir, for example, seems to have had no reservations about asking Essen to lend him 400 rubles to cover his expenses for marrying Fatima, which he promised to return with interest.114 Similarly, Fatima easily made friendships with European women, including the wives of Russian officials and travellers who visited her home, with some of whom she continued to stay in touch. Fatima’s Russian friends, in turn, sent her 200 bottles filled with Caucasian mineral water and gifts like oranges, which were rare on the steppe. In his letter to G. S. Karelin, a bureaucrat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Jangir’s advisor,115 Jangir mentioned that his wife was happy to learn about Karelin’s desire to visit the khan’s family with his wife, with whom Fatima hoped to become friends. Jangir closed his letter by passing on Fatima’s request for two servants, ten arshins of wine-coloured satin and seven arshins of white damask. Jangir included a dog, horses and other presents with his next letter to Karelin and, in turn, asked his friend to buy him a good

204  Staying on the imperial fringe Bukharan robe and gunpowder. The head of the Orenburg Frontier Commission, Gens, was also one of Jangir’s good friends, with whom the khan was connected not only through business issues but also through mundane things. At Gens’s request, Jangir helped his sick father travel to Piatigorsk for treatment. After Gens’s father died, he was planning to send his mother to the khan’s home in hopes that she would recover from her loss and improve her own health.116 Jangir also quickly became friends with the Astrakhan governor, I. S. Temiriazev. His son Sakhib-Gerei visited Temiriazev’s family, while Temiriazev’s wife dispatched the gymnast Lamberger to entertain the khan’s family and visitors at a fair that was held in 1842.117 While studying at the Page Corps in St Petersburg, Sakhib-Gerei was also spending weekends and holidays at the house of State Secretary Korneev, yet another of Jangir‘s friends, who taught him mathematics, French and music during these visits. His wife, E. Korneeva, made suggestions to help Fatima get an accurate medical diagnosis and find a proper physician. Fatima followed Korneeva’s advice.118

In the aftermath of Jangir’s death Both Jangir and Fatima died in 1845. After their death, the government replaced the Bokei khanship with a Provisional Council that functioned until 1854. It appointed Jangir’s brother Adil as its head, and placed one Russian and two Qazaq representatives under his rule. On 22 July 1847, Nicholas I gave an order to bestow the title of prince on Jangir’s son and heir, Sakhib-Gerei. He spoke in favour of the preservation of the horde’s autonomous status and ordered local officials to report directly to him on the horde’s issues.119 In 1853, a Russian representative replaced Adil as the Provisional Council’s head. By this time, the Provisional Council featured two Russian and two Qazaq representatives, a secretary and 18 other clerks who were charged with various paperwork and translation tasks.120 Officials saw the task of taking care of Jangir’s progeny as their most important priority. They enrolled Jangir’s sons in the Page and Nepliuev Corps and placed his daughters under the care of Fatima’s brother, Amirjan Guseinov, who was appointed as their trustee. The tsar was personally concerned with the future of Jangir’s three daughters and expressed his reservations about Guseinov’s role.121 A special commission estimated Jangir’s actual property as having comprised one million rubles. The officials decided to spend 80 per cent of the sogum and ziaket taxes collected after Jangir’s death on the maintenance of the Provisional Council and Jangir’s family.122 In 1860, the territory of the horde was divided into seven parts, with a sultan or an influential tribal elder charged with collecting taxes and maintaining peace and order at the head of each division. The elders were elected by their communities and approved by the Provisional Council. Each elder was provided with an assistant and two clerks to conduct their business correspondence in Russian and Tatar. Additionally, the government provided the sultans with couriers.123 The migrations of Qazaq groups between the Bokei and the Trans-Ural territories continued to fluctuate in the aftermath of Jangir’s death.124 In 1851, items

The establishment of the Bokei Horde 205 worth 1,342,435 rubles were sold at the two seasonal fairs established in the territory of the Bokei Horde by Jangir.125 In 1852, the Cabinet of Ministers decided to open a permanent fair in the Bokei Horde.126 If in 1845 there were 1,000 Russian merchants, who came from 15 Russian guberniias to trade at the fair at the Khanskaia Stavka, their number grew to more than 2,500 people in 1847 and to 2,000 people in 1851.127 In the period 1848–1895, the Ministry of Education took over the maintenance of Jangir’s school, spending 1,404 rubles annually. Six years later, the Russian Council decreed that they would open seven additional elementary schools for Qazaq and Russian children in the territory of the horde at the state’s expenses. The number of children enrolled in each school was to be limited to 25, while the teaching and administrative personnel were to be reduced to one person. The teaching at these schools was to be based on the Lancaster method, and writing and reading were to be instructed in both Russian and Qazaq. Students would learn how to translate both languages and study the four rules of arithmetic. Alektorov wrote about the growing popularity of these schools with the Qazaq population, including an additional girls’ school.128 In 1895, Jangir’s school celebrated its 50-year anniversary.129 To commemorate the date, Tsar Nicholas II (1894–1917) commissioned members of his staff to publish a special album with photographs documenting the gradual progression of Russian education in the Bokei Horde over the period 1841–1895.130 In 1852, the Russian government established the first hospital in the horde that had two departments, one designed for treating Russian exiles and the other to serve the horde’s Qazaq population. The popularity of Russian medicine grew gradually, so that by 1887, when Alektorov visited the horde, the hospital featured 12 beds and employed two doctors, including two assistants and a midwife.131 Despite the fact that the area was increasingly covered with sand, in 1851, Jangir’s residency, the Khanskaia Stavka, had 152 houses.132 Thus, Jangir’s legacy continued to endure despite Orenburg and Samaran Governor-General V. A. Perovsky’s opposition. Perovsky argued in his 1852 report that both Jangir and his father, along with their subjects, had benefited from the Russian state’s generosity. Bokei emigrated from the Junior Horde in order to escape a rivalry with his own brothers and emerge as an independent ruler in the new territories. His population, too, took advantage of the opportunity to thrive in their new habitat thanks to the abundance of pastures with rich vegetation and water resources. Bokei’s son Jangir also ruled as an independent and strong leader, who, thanks to Russia’s protection, managed to enrich himself and his elites. As proof, Perovsky cited Jangir’s distribution of state lands into private property for himself and his elite, which led to the impoverishment of their population and their protests. Perovsky argued that Jangir had operated not as the emperor’s subject but as an independent ruler, whose power was not limited by any outside power. In Perovsky’s opinion, the concentration of administrative, legal, legislative and economic powers in Jangir’s hands, including the regulation of his subjects’ spiritual life, had the potential of undermining the Russian state and grazhdanstvennost’ in general.

206  Staying on the imperial fringe Perovsky’s opposition to the mandatory tax system that Jangir had introduced – in particular, the imposition of the Islamic tax ziaket – also reflected the changing spirit of the time. The governor viewed the spread of Islam among Jangir’s nomadic subjects as the most harmful part of his legacy, especially since the unsophisticated Qazaq nomads who had been still practising their pagan rituals before Jangir’s rule had only a vague idea about Islam and could have been easily converted to Orthodox Christianity.133 Alektorov also believed that before Jangir came to power, his compatriots were “very bad Muslims”. Among other things, they settled their conflicts with the assistance of their elders (aqsaqals) and tribal laws, without using Islamic sharia law. During his visit to the khanate in 1887, Alektorov observed that in the aftermath of Jangir’s death, the Bokei mullahs’ status had significantly deteriorated: they had been trying only issues involving Qazaq inheritance and marriage, while their colleagues, the customary judges (bi) and other tribal elders (aqsaqals) took over the rest of the cases.134 Perovsky believed that the population of the Bokei Horde did not need khanship any longer and suggested integrating them and their territories into the all-Russian administrative and territorial system, then integrating its two major groups, the nobility and ordinary nomads, into the Russian estate (soslovie) groups of the Russian nobility (dvorianstvo)135 and state peasants respectively. He was against the possible appointment of Jangir’s son Ibragim (after the death of Ibragim’s brother Sakhib-Gerei in 1849) to the post of head of the Provisional Council, warning that this appointment could reinstall the Bokei dynasty. Tsar Nicholas I  approved all of Perovsky’s suggestions.136 This was followed by the integration of the Bokei Horde’s territories into the Russian Astrakhan province. In 1901, the state celebrated the centenary of the creation of the Bokei Horde. According to the local newspaper Turgaiskaia gazeta, the three-day celebration took place in the Khanskaia Stavka and featured, among other things, a display of portraits of deceased emperors, starting with Paul I.137 The advent of the Bokei Horde shows that until the mid nineteenth century, the security of Russia’s steppe frontiers remained the top priority of its officials. Until this time, these frontiers continued to operate as porous contested regions, which, as we have seen, largely facilitated the Qazaq leadership of the Middle Horde to play their Russian and Qing authorities off against each other.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 28–29 Ibid., pp. 10–16 Ibid., pp. 929–930, 941 Ibid., p. 30 Ibid., p. 918 Ibid., p. 916 Ibid., pp. 136–137 Ibid., pp. 914–918 Ibid., p. 916 Ibid., pp. 204–206

The establishment of the Bokei Horde 207 11 12 13 14

Ibid., p. 932 Zimanov, S. Z.: Rossiia i Bukeevskoe khanstvo, Alma-Ata: “Nauka”, 1982, pp. 41, 98 Ibid., p. 91 Erofeeva, I. V.: Vnutrenniaia, ili Bukeevskaia, Orda v pervoi polovine XIX v.: Istoriia i istoriografiia, Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 4–7 15 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 8–9 16 Ibid., p. 892 17 Shakhmatov, V. F.: Vnutrenniaia Orda i vosstanie Isataia Taimanova, Alma-Ata: AN Kaz SSR, 1946, p. 68 18 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, p. 942 19 Shakhmatov, V. F.: Vnutrenniaia Orda i vosstanie Isataia Taimanova, pp. 30–31 20 Ibid., pp. 921–922 21 Ibid., pp. 173, 921–922 22 Ibid., pp. 58–84 23 Ibid., pp. 148–152 24 Ibid., pp. 6, 14, 94 25 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 927–928 26 Ibid., pp. 155–158 27 Zimanov, S. Z.: Rossiia i Bukeevskoe khanstvo, pp. 13–14 28 KRO-2, pp. 185, 189–196 29 Ibid., p. 11 30 Ibid., p. 582 31 Zhanaev, B. T. et al (eds.): Istoriia Kazakhstana v russkikh istochnikakh, vyp. 1, pp. 102–103 32 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 237–244 33 Ibid., p. 248 34 Ibid., pp. 292–294 35 Ibid., p. 294 36 Ibid., p. 582 37 Ibid., p. 857 38 Shakhmatov, V. F.: Vnutrenniaia Orda i vosstanie Isataia Taimanova, p. 20 39 Zimanov, S. Z.: Rossiia i Bukeevskoe khanstvo, pp. 126–128 40 Ibid., p. 372 41 Shakhmatov, V. F.: Vnutrenniaia Orda i vosstanie Isataia Taimanova, pp. 65–67 42 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, p. 794 43 Ibid., p. 782 44 Shakhmatov, V. F.: Vnutrenniaia Orda i vosstanie Isataia Taimanova, p. 175 45 Ibid., pp. 84–129 46 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, p. 542 47 Ibid., p. 882 48 Ibid., p. 917 49 Kharuzin, A.: Stepnye ocherki (Kirgizskaia Bokeevskaia Orda) Stranichki iz zapisnoi knigi s 13 fototipnymi tablitsami, Moscow: Tipografiia A. A. Levenson, 1888, pp. 11–13 50 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 319–320 51 Ibid., pp. 338–340 52 Ibid., pp. 246–248, 257–258, 303–305 53 Shakhmatov, V. F.: Vnutrenniaia Orda i vosstanie Isataia Taimanova, pp. 42–43 54 Zimanov, S. Z.: Rossiia i Bukeevskoe khanstvo, p. 133 55 Ibid., pp. 341–347 56 Trepavlov, V. V.: “Belyi tsar”, pp. 82–83, 145–149 57 Shakhmatov, V. F.: Vnutrenniaia Orda i vosstanie Isataia Taimanova, p. 34; Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, p. 176 58 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 374–378

208  Staying on the imperial fringe 59 Masanov, N.: Kochevaia tsivilizatsiia kazakhov (osnovy zhiznedeiatel’nosti nomadnogo obshchestva), Almaty/Moscow: “Sotsinvest”/”Gorizont”, 1995, p.  229; Zhanaev, B. T. et al (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, p.  957; Shakhmatov, V. F.: Vnutrenniaia Orda i vosstanie Isataia Taimanova, pp. 40–41 60 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, p. 331 61 Ibid., pp. 360–361 62 Zimanov, S. Z.: Rossiia i Bukeevskoe khanstvo, p. 32 63 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 304–305 64 Shakhmatov, V. F.: Vnutrenniaia Orda i vosstanie Isataia Taimanova, pp. 40–41 65 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, p. 747 66 Ibid., p. 850 67 Ibid., p. 892 68 Ibid., pp. 838–848 69 Ibid., p. 858 70 Zimanov, S. Z.: Rossiia i Bukeevskoe khanstvo, p. 45 71 Shakhmatov, V. F.: Vnutrenniaia Orda i vosstanie Isataia Taimanova, pp. 40–41 72 Ibid., p. 49 73 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, p. 812 74 Ibid., p. 622 75 Shakhmatov, V. F.: Vnutrenniaia Orda i vosstanie Isataia Taimanova, pp. 48–49 76 Ibid., p. 20 77 Ibid., pp. 57–58 78 Ibid., pp. 437, 523, 525–526, 531, 539, 568 79 Shakhmatov, V. F.: Vnutrenniaia Orda i vosstanie Isataia Taimanova, p. 129 80 Ibid., pp. 178–190, 203 81 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 437, 523, 525–526, 531, 539, 568 82 Ibid., p. 255 83 Zimanov, S. Z.: Rossiia i Bukeevskoe khanstvo, pp. 39–40 84 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 361–368, 404 85 Ibid., pp. 341, 349–350, 361–368, 389–390 86 Crews, R.: For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia, Cambridge, MA/London: Harvard University Press, 2006, Chapter 4 87 Frank, A.: Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia: The Islamic World of Novouzensk District and the Kazakh Inner Horde, 1780–1910, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2001, pp. 274, 287 88 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, p. 171 89 Voskresensky, A.: Shkol’nyi al’bom Bukeevskoi Ordy, Kulkenov, M. (ed.): Bukeevskoi Orde 200 let, Almaty: “Olke”, 2001, book 3, p. 180 90 Frank, A.: Muslim Religious Institutions in Imperial Russia, pp. 274, 287 91 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, p. 861 92 Ibid., p. 844 93 Ibid., p. 256 94 Ibid., p. 890 95 Ibid., pp. 390, 416–417, 432–436 96 Ibid., pp. 408, 418, 857 97 Zimanov, S. Z.: Rossiia i Bukeevskoe khanstvo, p. 143 98 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, p. 888 99 Ibid., p. 699 100 Zimanov, S. Z.: Rossiia i Bukeevskoe khanstvo, pp. 143, 149–150 101 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 428, 858 102 Ibid., p. 830 103 Ibid., p. 875 104 Ibid., pp. 928–929 105 Ibid., p. 938

The establishment of the Bokei Horde 209 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129

Ibid., p. 937 Ibid., pp. 178–179 Ibid., pp. 186–187 Ibid., pp. 914–918 Ibid., p. 85 Ibid., pp. 182–184 Ibid., p. 940 Ibid., p. 189 Ibid., pp. 252–253 Ibid., p. 330 Ibid., pp. 606–607 Ibid., pp. 612–613 Ibid., pp. 623–625 Ibid., pp. 749–751, 767 Ibid., pp. 882–883 Ibid., pp. 745–746 Ibid., p. 821 Ibid., p. 884 Ibid., p. 744 Ibid., p. 783 Ibid., p. 333 Zimanov, S. Z.: Rossiia i Bukeevskoe khanstvo, pp. 39–40 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 888–889 Ivanov, I. S.: Dzhanger Khan Vnutrennei Kirgizskoi Ordy, Kulkenov, M. (ed.): Bukeevskoi Orde 200 let, book 2, p. 521 130 Voskresensky, A.: Shkol’nyi al’bom Bukeevskoi Ordy, in: Ibid, book 3, pp. 172–174 131 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, p. 890 132 Ibid., p. 857; Zimanov, S. Z.: Rossiia i Bukeevskoe khanstvo, p. 45 133 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 808–824 134 Ibid., pp. 887–888 135 Jangir’s both sons, Sakhib-Gerei and Ibragim were granted the title of prince by the Russian state. 136 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 808–824 137 Ibid., pp. 943–944

11 The politics of Qazaq deputations

Along with rewarding the Qazaq elites with medals and promoting their military ranks, Russian officials also elaborated on the practice of sending their delegations to the capital at the state’s generous expense. These visits were designed to expose Qazaq elites to the grandeur and splendour of the Russian Empire and evoke their respect for and admiration of their affluent and benevolent rulers, which was displayed, for example, in the lustre and magnificence of their royal palaces. The civilizing effect of these trips on representatives of the “savage” population also entailed their participation in sightseeing, including visits to theatres, museums, educational institutions, agricultural farms and industrial spots.1 Most importantly, by attracting them to Russian settlements, these visits, along with Russian markets, proved yet another means for the Russians to leverage control over the Qazaq nobles’ free movements. Given that the nobles often became annoyed and felt bored precisely with the civilizing aspects of their trips,2 it is reasonable to suggest that they developed their own idea about the very meaning of these visits. Similar to how they viewed ranks, medals and generous gifts, they came to view their trips to the capital as a gratifying act of power sharing by their Russian patrons. The symbolical aspect of the act came to manifest in the largess, esteem and magnanimity with which Russian officials arranged their trips. The officials took it upon themselves to organize their entire trips, creating itineraries and providing guidance, protection, lodging, clothing, horses, food and fodder. The nobles’ sojourns in the capital entailed their participating in royal balls and other court events, where they were able to observe the wealth and brilliance of the royal palaces manifested, among other things, in the royal silver and golden dishes. While staying in St Petersburg, the nobles also found themselves engaged with various entertaining activities that ranged from the theatre and public festivals to visiting the Russian baths. In addition, they received generous gifts from the monarchs themselves and were given money for daily expenses. The idea of arranging these visits as a means of attracting the Qazaq nobility to the metropolitan culture must have been inspired by Eraly’s meeting with General Urusov in 1740, when Urusov suggested that if Eraly’s mother expressed a wish to visit the capital to meet with the empress in person, he would arrange her trip and allot the money.3 Although Eraly’s mother did not take the opportunity to

The politics of Qazaq deputations 211 visit the capital, his niece Toikara, Nuraly’s daughter, and her husband followed Urusov’s advice, by travelling to the capital in 1799. Their three-day visit was estimated to have cost the state treasury 2,708 rubles and 99 copecks. This sum included their travel expenses of 592 rubles and 99 copecks, along with the purchase of a house valued at 1,000 rubles, where the couple stayed during their visit. The rest of the money was spent on the couple’s visits to imperial balls, a theatre and an imperial china factory and their participation in the maslennitsa (the Russian winter carnival), during which they rented sleds. To enable the couple’s participation in the royal balls, court officials arranged for luxury European clothing to be sewn for each of them: crimson and brocade outfits with galloons attached. Toikara’s husband’s costume, for example, was sewn from five arshins of linen and 13 arshins of green velvet. His attire also featured a brocade beshmet (quilted jacket), a hat and two sables. Throughout their visit, the couple stayed in a newly furnished house with renovated windows. Officials also hired a servant who knew Tatar, a cleaning woman, and a coach with two harnessed horses. Toikara was granted a private audience with Emperor Paul I, during which she received a brilliant ring worth 600 rubles and a gift of 400 rubles from the emperor, who also assigned her an annual salary of 150 rubles.4 Toikara’s brother, the Khivan Khan Piraly, followed in his sister’s footsteps by visiting the capital three years later, where, in addition to investitures linked to his status, he received 55 arshins of fabrics of various colours; furs of two foxes, four beavers, and ten otters; ten pounds of tea; and other items.5 The nobility of the Middle Horde seem to have also been impressed by Toikara’s visit, and sent requests to dispatch their delegations to the court, which, as a rule, were met by the emperor. For example, in an 1802 letter to Alexander I, Ablai’s son Churakai suggested dispatching his nobles to the court to negotiate restoring his salary, which had been suspended by officials three years ago, and to ask the court to send a detachment of 100 Russian soldiers to facilitate his rule over his unruly subjects.6 Sultan Juma Qudaibergenov, who claimed sovereignty over the horde’s 34 kinship groups, also submitted a similar request to the emperor in 1802, when he proposed sending a mission that included two sultans and two elders to the capital to negotiate with the emperor about a recent robbery of the Russian caravans by Qazaqs from the Junior Horde, including planning measures to prevent such acts in the future. Both nobles’ requests were approved by the emperor.7 Subsequently, the local authorities assigned a police officer, a translator and three others to accompany Juma Qudaibergenov’s delegation and to put up a list of necessary expenditures to be spent on clothing, food, horses and fodder.8 On 22 March 1803, the police officer informed the authorities that two days ago the delegation headed by the corporal of the Orenburg Cossack army, Shubin, had safely arrived in Orenburg. Before leaving the town, the delegation’s members received 864 rubles to buy 15 horses, five carriages and food for 40 days and to cover possible repairs of their carriages and all other unplanned expenses.9 In addition, the five men, who were to accompany the nobles, were instructed to provide them with all necessary items, protect them from the possible embarrassments of others

212  Staying on the imperial fringe

Figure 11.1  A delegation of Qazaq nobility to the imperial court

and treat them with respect, friendship and courtesy. If the nobles got sick, they should be given medicine and taken to a doctor in one of the settlements on the way to the capital.10 The nobles’ trip resulted in restoring one sultan’s pension of 300 rubles and awarding another sultan a rank and a corresponding pension. The people who had accompanied them were also awarded ranks and medals. The sultans were informed that they would be allowed to send their delegations to the capital in the future to report on possible assaults of Bashkirs and Qazaqs from the Junior Horde.11 At their request, the sultans were rewarded with sabres and other gifts, for which they expressed their gratitude.12 The authorities also granted the requests listed in the letter that Juma Qudaibergenov had sent with the delegation’s members. The sultan asked for a golden watch worth 300 rubles, a pension, 13 arshins of brocade and ten arshins of fabrics.13 Upon leaving St Petersburg, the sultans and their nobles were given various precious gifts: each sultan received a brilliant ring worth 300 rubles, 16 sable furs and 300 rubles, while each of their elders received a black fox fur, 150 rubles and precious fabrics. As for their five companions, each of them received fabrics and 40 rubles, while the police officer and Shubin were given 100 rubles and 80 rubles respectively. On their way back, the sultans complained about the police

The politics of Qazaq deputations  213 officer Khusainov’s improper behaviour, which was immediately reported to the emperor. The emperor ordered that the officer be discharged and sent to Orenburg to explain himself.14 According to the officials’ data, the cost of the delegation’s stay in the capital from 20 April to 20 June came to 2,768 rubles, which also included the costs of their gifts.15 This amount exceeded the initially estimated sum by 267 rubles and 59 copecks. The excess money was spent on the delegation’s visits to the theatre, bathhouses, the Petergoff Palace and the glass and china factories and on watching the launch of air balloons and other activities.16 With the emperor’s approval, the delegation’s members made a second trip to the capital from 10 September to 22 September in the same year. This time, the state’s expenditures on their transportation and stay in the capital totalled 2,708 rubles and 49 copecks.17 Kundakbaeva has pointed out that due to the considerable increase in the number of Qazaq requests for trips to the capital by the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs commissioned Orenburg Governor Volkonsky to institute special rules regulating these visits. Volkonsky proposed that only those nobles who were truly respected by their followers and had shown loyal service to the Russian throne should be allowed to dispatch their delegations to the capital.18 Accordingly, in their letters to the Russian authorities in the fall of 1803 that asked to dispatch their sons and brothers to the capital, the three sultans from the Middle Horde – Bokei Altybaev, Khudamendi and Taten Urusov – mentioned their loyal service to Russia, for which they had been awarded ranks and salaries. The sultans wrote that they wished to congratulate the emperor on his ascendance to the throne and wanted to introduce their relatives to him in person. In Khudaimendi’s letter, he asked the emperor to grant a salary and rank to his son Gubaidulla and to one of the other nobles who was included in the delegation.19 Following the emperor’s approval, a delegation that included the sons of Bokei and Khudaimendi, a brother of Taten, their five elders, three service people, a police officer and a translator arrived in the capital in January 1805.20 Upon their arrival, the members were escorted to the court in two carriages, where they were introduced to the emperor and the empress in person. The emperor allowed them to kiss his hand and then introduced them to the empress, who also allowed them to kiss her hand. Afterwards, the nobles received gifts and were treated to tea. The members thanked the emperor and his officials and promised to serve the emperor loyally. Then they were brought back to the house that had been rented for them for their stay in the capital.21 The emperor granted every request of each of the three sultans and their sons. Bokei’s son Gazy, for example, asked for a rank, a salary and a golden stamp, along with ranks for his nobles and their Russian companions.22 In response, the emperor awarded him a medium-sized golden medal on a scarlet band and a sabre with the following inscription: “To Sultan Gazy, for loyal zeal (vernopoddanicheskoe userdie)” for his service of guiding Russian caravans. Estimated at the value of 105 rubles and seven copecks, the medal also featured inscriptions in Russian and Tatar on both sides.23 Gazy’s father, Bokei, was assigned an annual salary and

214  Staying on the imperial fringe also awarded a golden medal, along with a golden stamp, a brilliant ring and valuable fabrics.24 In addition to the gift of 600 rubles, Gazy, Gubaidulla and Taten’s brother were given brilliant rings worth 300 rubles each and other valuable gifts, including 12 pairs of sable furs, 39 arshins of brocade and 15 arshins of fabric.25 On top of that, the minister of finance assigned an annual salary of 200 rubles to Taten, 150 rubles to his brother, 100 rubles to Gubaidulla and 75 rubles to Gazy. Their nobles and the Cossacks who accompanied them were also assigned smaller salaries and awarded ranks.26 The final calculation revealed that the state spent 8,357 rubles and 14 copecks on the delegation’s trip, which was four times the initial budget.27 The delegates’ 40-day stay, including the cost of their gifts came to 2,043 rubles and 50 copecks. These moneys were spent on the theatre, payments to Cossack military personnel, service people, porters, translators and laundry services and on candles, dishes, food and fodder.28 The expenses also included purchases of clothing, shoes and other items from Russian merchants for the delegation’s members, valued at almost 1,000 rubles.29 Another strikingly high figure cited in the archival sources is 2,541 rubles and 14 copecks spent on bringing the delegation back home.30 However, the authorities declined Sultan Churpsei’s 1809 request to send his delegation to congratulate the emperor. He was told that the emperor had ascended to the throne eight years ago and that the proposed trip could turn into a long, tedious and costly enterprise. In addition, members of his delegation could find themselves facing dangerous obstacles. The sultan was advised to submit his requests in written form instead, in order not to burden the state treasury with undesirable expenses. The local authorities were instructed to explain this state of affairs to the sultan and his nobles in an appropriate manner and to reward them with well-suited gifts.31

Figure 11.2  A delegation of Qazaq nobles

The politics of Qazaq deputations 215 As the following cases demonstrate, the authorities’ dismissal of Churpsei’s request was most likely due to the fact that in their view, the sultan was not an important figure in terms of his power status with his own population and his loyalty to the Russian state. The request that Sultan Sydyk, son of Ablai, submitted to the board’s members in 1810 was also dismissed under the pretext that the maintenance of an earlier delegation of nine Qazaqs sent by Sultan Shanshar from the Middle Horde had cost the state about 7,000 rubles. Therefore, the board’s members suggested to the emperor that instead of dispatching Sydyk’s delegation to the court, his nobles should be awarded suitable gifts and salaries. In 1811, the emperor assigned an annual pension of 150 rubles to Sydyk and rewarded him with a charter, a golden medal on a crimson band and valuable fabrics.32 Other cases demonstrate that the imperial authorities also used the Qazaq delegations’ visits as a means of weakening the impact of the Qing on the nobility of the Middle Horde, including the status of those Qazaq nobles who had cooperated with them. It was in this context that in 1806 General Lavrov advised the emperor to grant the sultans from the Middle Horde, Sultan Kambar and Sultan Suyuk, permission to dispatch their sons to the court. The general wrote that given both sultans’ powerful status with their followers, they could be effectively pitted against Vali, Ablai’s son, who had shown his loyalty to his Qing patrons. Moreover, the proposed visit could contribute to compromising the Qing’s influence on the sultans, who had catered to them by allowing them and their populations to use territories under Qing control.33 The requests of the last khan of the Junior Horde, Shirgazy, submitted in 1814 and 1816 were also approved by the authorities, who framed their decision as follows: “The emperor, out of his love, which he had always felt towards him [Shirgazy] and his people allowed him and his sons to visit St. Petersburg”. Among the reasons that had motivated their decision, the authorities listed Shirgazy’s loyal service to the Russian throne, for which the khan had been assigned a salary. They also noted that the khan had a remarkable number of supporters among the horde’s population, who traded their numerous livestock with the people on the Russian military lines. The authorities also recollected that Shirgazy’s predecessor, Khan Jantore, who had been murdered by his rivals, had been denied a visit to the capital. This could explain Shirgazy’s desire to negotiate issues relating to the horde’s administration with the emperor in person and his enhanced apprehension of written words. The authorities’ decision must have also been influenced by Shirgazy’s reference to his visit to the grave of Holy Mary, which he mentioned in his 1816 letter, to whom the khan had prayed (!) to enable his visit. To add even more weight to his request, Shirgazy also mentioned Napoleon Bonaparte in his letter. By describing the French emperor as an arrogant upstart who had emerged from nowhere, “from the lowest social strata”, Shirgazy must have alluded to the emperor’s and his own noble origins. Shirgazy therefore believed that Napoleon had ascended to the French throne by virtue of his shy and perfidious nature. After achieving his goal, Napoleon became proud to such a degree that he dared to direct his hostile arms against the true imperial ruler Alexander I: “But Your Majesty destroyed the evil and, in this way, deprived his enemy of dignity”. In the khan’s letter, he also mentioned the five mosques and five schools that he had established at his own expense.

216  Staying on the imperial fringe The maintenance costs of Shirgazy’s and his eight companions’ visit to the capital in 1820 was estimated to have reached 7,335 rubles, 3,335 rubles of which were spent on the delegation’s monthly stay in the capital.34 During their stay in a rented flat upgraded with new furniture, the khan and his son received 15 and ten rubles respectively each day, while their nobles and servicemen each received two to three rubles a day each. The officials also arranged for dishes, firewood, candles and food to be purchased for the delegation’s members. The khan received a sable

Figure 11.3  A sketch of the golden medal to be rewarded to Sultan Gazy

Figure 11.4 A sketch of the inscriptions (in Russian and Chagatai) to be engraved on Gazy’s golden medal: “For Sultan Gazy, son of Sultan Bokei, for loyal service, 1805”

The politics of Qazaq deputations 217

Figure 11.5  A prescription of an ointment for Sultan Aryngazy

coat covered with blue velvet, a hat made of the same velvet and decorated with a beaver fur, a crimson cap made of brocade and a dagger decorated with precious stones. His son and nobles also received clothes and money.35 In 1814, Khan Bokei from the Bokei Horde was also allowed to send his delegation of five members to the court to congratulate Alexander I on his defeat of Napoleon. He used the opportunity to submit a request to the emperor to award his delegation with golden medals and military ranks: “So that they could put the signs of your royal benevolence around their necks and make them visible to the khanate’s whole population”.36 During their sojourn, the members of the delegation met with the emperor, Empress Maria Fedorovna and other members of the royal family. All members of the delegation were given gifts and money and supplied with carriages.37 Commenting on Bokei’s delegation in a local newspaper, his friend Popov accentuated the imperial benevolence that the members of the delegation had experienced during their visit, which, as Popov argued, served as a strong guarantee of a peaceful life for the populations under the emperor’s rule. Another article published on the occasion highlighted the gratitude that the rule of Alexander I had evoked not only on the part of civilized Europeans but even in the hearts of the remote, uncivilized and untamed populations. The author mentioned that after the delegation’s return, its members and the horde’s other elites and common folk had participated in the collective prayer led by Bokei, during which they had prayed for the well-being and health of the monarch and his family. The author wrote that after the prayer, the khan had distributed gifts to all of the people in attendance, including the poor Qazaqs, among whom he had ordered to distribute rye bread.38 Jangir made several trips to the capital, along with trips to Kazan and the Caucasus. Although his friend Karelin viewed Jangir’s trips to St Petersburg as unnecessary and costly, the emperor, as a rule, approved all of Jangir’s requests.39 He, his

218  Staying on the imperial fringe

Figure 11.6 A portrait of Sultan General Major Baimukhamedov, member of a Qazaq delegation from the Junior Horde, who participated in the coronation of Alexander II in 1856 (painted in 1889 by S. Alexandrovsky)

wife and some their nobles were invited to participate in the coronation of Nicholas I in 1825, during which they (together with other high-ranking guests) received valuable furs.40 Jangir and his son also took part in the royal wedding ceremony of Nicholas I’s daughter Maria to Duke Leichtenberg. The French guest Marquis Astolphe de Custine noticed Jangir, whom he described as “a Tatar khan”, among

The politics of Qazaq deputations 219 the many guests of the tsar who filled the church. Standing behind the emperor in a long robe and a pointed hat decorated with golden threads, Jangir’s appearance created an ambiguous image of a semi-submissive but semi-independent subject of the tsar in the eyes of the French: This little oriental prince, who was put by the conquering politics of his higher protector in an extraordinarily ambiguous situation, considered the tsar’s permission to enroll his son, whom he has brought with him to St. Petersburg, with the tsar’s pages a blessing that will guarantee his son’s career. In his words, Jangir came to embody “a defeated power” that emerged as a shadow of the power triumphant, with the latter unwittingly evoking in his mind “the grandeur of Rome”.41

Notes 1 Sukhikh, O. E.: Imperiia napokaz, ili imperskii opyt vospitaniia vernopoddanicheskikh chuvstv u kazakhskoi znati v XVIII-XIX vv., Suvorova, N. G. (ed.): Aziatskaia Rossiia: liudi i struktury imperii. Sbornik nauchnykh statei. K 50-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia professora A. V. Remneva, Omsk: OGU, 2005, pp. 142–154 2 Nebol’sin, P. I.: Puteshestvuiushchie kirgizy, Russkii vestnik, vol. 19 (1860); Remnev, A. and Sukhikh, O. O.: Kazakhskie deputatsii v stsenariiakh vlasti: ot diplomaticheskikh missii k imperskim reprezentatsiiam, Ab Imperio, vol. 1 (2006), pp. 146–147 3 KRO-1, pp. 135–168 4 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: Priobshchenie k novym formam sotsial’noi kommunikatsii kazakhskoi elity: posol’stvo Toikary-khanum v Sankt Peterburg 1798/1799 gg., Otan tarikhy, vol. 2, no. 78, 2007, pp. 133–134 5 RGIA f. 1291, op. 81, d. 13, l.31 6 Ibid., d. 9, ll. 3–4 7 Ibid., d. 10, ll. 2–8 8 Ibid., l. 42 9 Ibid., ll. 8–9 10 Ibid., ll. 12–13 11 Ibid., l. 48 12 Ibid., l. 143 13 Ibid., l. 92 14 Ibid., ll. 104–108 15 Ibid., ll. 119–124 16 Ibid., l. 142 17 Ibid., ll. 146–151, 159–160 18 Kundakbaeva, Zh. B.: Priobshchenie k novym formam sotsial’noi kommunikatsii kazakhskoi elity: posol’stvo Toikary-khanum v Sankt Peterburg 1798/1799 gg., pp. 132–133 19 RGIA, f. 1291, op. 81, d. 17b, l. 45 20 Ibid., d. 12, ll. 1–7, 32 21 Ibid., d. 17b, ll. 139–140, 158 22 Ibid., l. 67 23 Ibid., ll. 158–166 24 Ibid., ll. 110–130 25 Ibid., ll. 129–131 26 Ibid., ll. 174–180 27 Ibid., ll. 2–3

220  Staying on the imperial fringe 28 Ibid., ll. 55–76 29 Ibid., ll. 117–118 30 Ibid., ll. 85–88 31 Ibid., d. 27, ll. 1–4 32 Ibid., d. 41, ll. 3–26 33 Ibid., d. 19, l. 45, d. 17b, ll. 7–10 34 Ibid., d. 52b, ll. 65–68 35 Ibid., ll. 12–29, 44, 65–68, 176, 342 36 Zhanaev, B. T. et al. (eds.): Istoriia Bukeevskogo khanstva, pp. 182–184 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., pp. 939 39 Ibid., pp. 330–331, 373–374 40 Ibid., p. 293 41 Ibid., p. 828

Conclusion

In tune with the changing political landscape of nineteenth-century Europe, which entailed new understandings of space, political authority and norms of governance, in the 1820s, the government placed the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde under the governance of new administrative-territorial units patterned after Russia’s local administrations. The new reforms stipulated the abolition of the khanship in both hordes and the imposition of mandatory taxes on their populations. Yet like the reforms that were implemented among the remaining Kalmyk population in the Volga region around this time, the new legislative initiative had little effect on changing the nature of the Qazaq–Russian relationships that continued to unfold largely within the protectorate framework. Like before, the Chingizid and the most influential tribal nobles retained their privileges of being appointed heads of the new units and collecting taxes. The division of the territory of the Middle Horde into okrugs, the Russian type of administrative-territorial units, and the establishment of prikazy by the Regulations on Siberian Kirgiz [Ustav o sibirskikh kirgizakh] promulgated by the state in 1822 prompted protests on the part of Sultan Kenesary Qasymov, Khan Ablai’s grandson and other Qazaq nobles, who demanded the restoration of the protectorate relations that had been established under Kenesary’s grandfather. The fact that Kenesary was able to mobilize more than 25,000 people representing all three hordes and unleash what turned out to be the most lasting revolt in the history of the Qazaq resistance to Russian rule (1837–1846)1 proves that by the time under consideration, the Qazaq Chingizids, along with their most influential tribal nobility, had largely preserved their privileged positions, the corrosive side effects of the imperial policies implemented in the previous century notwithstanding. In the mid nineteenth century, the Russians first placed the population of the Senior Horde, who had been under the rule of Kokand khans, under their rule. Russia’s advance towards Central Asia’s sedentary regions enabled this takeover, setting in motion the closure of Russia’s Eurasian/Inner Asian frontiers, which in fact allowed the Russians to gain a foothold over all three Qazaq hordes. It began with the closure of the eastern part of the frontier, including the Amur River basin, which the Russians controlled, according to the Treaties of Aigun (1858) and Beijing (1860). This was followed by Russia’s southwards advance towards the Qazaq Steppe that culminated in the conquest of Central Asia’s oasis

222  Staying on the imperial fringe regions. The advance began with the destruction of the Kokand fort Ak Meshit by the Russian army led by General V. A. Perovsky in 1852 and culminated in the conquest of Tashkent in 1865, followed by the conquests of the Bukharan Emirate in 1868 and the Khivan Khanate in 1873. In 1864, Russian Foreign Minister A. M. Gorchakov explained that Russia’s southwards advance had been necessitated by the closure of its southeastern frontiers, which entailed placing local nomadic populations under Russian rule.2 In 1859, in the wake of these events, the government removed the Qazaqs of the Junior Horde and the Middle Horde from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and placed them under the Ministry of Inner Affairs. This was accompanied by the construction of Russian forts in the region of Semirech’e (Southern Qazaqstan) that were effectively connected with the Orenburg and Siberian Military Lines.3 In 1867, Alexander II commissioned the establishment of the Turkestani governor-generalship, to be comprised of the Syr Darya and Semirech’e regions. The next year, his government came out with the so-called Provisional Statute, which spelled out the division of the Qazaq Steppe territories into four oblasts (provinces, named Ural’sk, Turgai, Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk) and 16 uezds (smaller administrative-territorial units) and placed all of them under a uniform system of taxation and administrations headed by military governors.4 What is striking is that the Provisional Statute followed the ulus logic by declaring the Qazaq lands the state’s property given to the Qazaqs for public use (obshchestvennoe pol’zovanie).5 This study has argued that the mobility factor played a major role in the preservation of basic features of the Kalmyk and Qazaq economic, social and political structures at least until the first decades of the nineteenth century. It can therefore provide further evidence in favour of nomadism being a political choice, in the first place, rather than the product of some specific ecological and climatic conditions of the Eurasian Steppes. Under the sway of the latter theory, historians have tended to explain the nomads’ long-distant migrations as motivated primarily by the shortage of pasturelands (zemel’naia tesnota) and the resulting struggles among various nomadic communities,6 overlooking mobility as the key factor in shaping the source base of nomadic power and prosperity. In this regard, it is worth citing Bogoiavlensky’s remark that his archival data had not supported the assumption that conflicts over land had been the main reason for rivalry among ambitious Kalmyk men.7 In addition, as we have seen, the Jungar and other nomadic leaders strongly identified themselves with their traditional nomadic lifestyle, which they considered superior to the sedentary way of life of the Russians and the Chinese. This study has demonstrated that their stance ultimately spelled out the defensive nature of Russia’s steppe frontiers that prevailed throughout the formative period of the rise of the Russian Empire and beyond. It was against this background that the Russian protectorate system came to function as the intelligible framework that enabled transforming the nomadic leaders’ populations and lands into protective buffers.

Conclusion  223 While highlighting the impact of steppe political culture on shaping the operation of the Russian protectorate institution, I have attempted to avoid measuring this impact by merely considering which nomadic practice the Russians adopted versus those they discarded.8 Rather, by integrating the key factor of mobility, I have opted to open a new window into problematizing the dynamics of Russian–non-Russian interactions to facilitate, among other things, overcoming the pragmatism paradigm that originates in the aforementioned perspective. Although Russian authorities were well versed in the game of steppe politics, their interactions with their Kalmyk and Qazaq counterparts prove their ingenuity in adjusting and modifying those rules to set forth their own game. By tapping into the intricate and hazardous nature of these interactions that, as we have seen, often ended up producing unpredictable and undesirable outcomes, this book has painted a dynamic and versatile picture of the formative period of the rise of the Russian Empire – a picture that challenges conventional concepts of colonial and imperial and offers new, alternative insights into the dynamics of colonizer–colonized encounters.

Notes 1 Masanov, N. E. et al: Istoriia Kazakhstana. Narody i kul’tury, Almaty: “Daik-Press”, 2001, p. 186 2 Cited in: Geyer, D.: Russian Imperialism: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policy, 1860–1914. Leamington Spa/New York: Berg Publications, 1989, p. 89 3 Masanov, N. E. et al: Istoriia Kazakhstana, p. 185 4 Masevich, M. G. (ed.): Materiay po istorii politicheskogo stroia Kazakhstana, pp. 281– 316, 319–340 5 Ibid., p. 337 6 Zlatkin, I. Ia.: Istoriia Dzhungarskogo khanstva, p. 67 7 Bogoiavlensky, S. K.: Materialy po istorii kalmykov v pervoi polovine XVII veka, pp. 87, 93 8 See, for example: Vernadsky, G.: The Mongols and Russia, New Heaven/London: Yale University Press, 1953; Keenan, E.: Muscovy and Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe Diplomacy, Slavic Review, vol. 26 (1967), pp. 548–558; Halperin, Ch.: Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History, Bloomington/Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987; Idem: The Tatar Yoke, Columbus, OH: Slavica, 1986; Ostrowski, D.: Muscovy and the Mongols: CrossCultural Influences on the Steppe Frontier, 1304–1589, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998; Trepavlov, V. V.: Zolotaia Orda v XVI stoletii, Moscow: Kvadriga, 2010; Nasonov, A. N.: Mongoly i Rus’ (Istoriia tatarskoi politiki na Rusi), Moscow/ Leningrad: AN SSSR, 1940; Kappeler, A.: The Russian Empire, p. 23

Index

Note: page numbers in italics indicate figures. Ablai (Khoshut leader) 55 Ablai (Kalmyk leader) 28 Ablai (khan of the Middle Horde) 55, 85 – 86, 93, 113, 118, 122 – 126, 130, 137 – 138, 140, 153 – 161, 177 – 178 Abulfeiz (son of Abulmambet) 108, 126, 154 – 155, 157 – 159, 161 Abulkhair (Shaibanid khan) 14 – 15 Abulkhair (khan of the Qazaq Junior Horde) 38, 104 – 115, 119 – 131, 134, 137, 141, 153, 171 – 180 Abulmambet 113, 118 – 119, 121 – 122, 125, 130, 153, 156 – 160, 164, 172 – 173, 177 – 178 Adil 135 – 136, 204 Aibulatov, Musa 198 Aichuvak 124, 137, 139, 141, 144, 156, 181 Aiuka 54 – 60, 63, 66 – 69, 71n65, 74 – 75, 78, 80 – 81, 86 – 87, 90, 92, 97n72, 103, 173 Akhmad (khan of the Big Horde) 26, 159 Akhmad (Afghan Shah) 159 akhun 174 – 175, 199 Ak Meshit fort 222 Akmolinsk province 222 Alakol (lake) 50 Alekseev, Tomilka 47 Aleksei Mikhailovich 27 – 26, 54 Alektorov, A. E. 196, 205 – 206 Alexander I 94, 145, 164, 181, 191 – 192, 195, 202, 211, 215, 217 Alexander II 222 Alexandrov Big Sheet 179 Allakula 145 – 148 Alshyn tribe 128, 137 Altai tribes 28, 63, 157 – 159 Altan/Altyn (Khalkha Mongol khan) 27, 34, 49, 65 – 66, 68

Altybaev, Bokei 213 – 214 Altynsary 164 Aminev, Khakim-Mukhammad 200 – 201 Amur River basin 61 – 62, 92, 111, 221 Amursana 85 – 86, 153 – 156 Andreev, I. G. 160 Andreevsky, S. S. 192 Anna Ioanovna 75 – 76, 86 – 87, 106, 111 – 113, 173 Annushka 61 Apollova, N. G. 130, 137 Apraksin, P. M. 58 Arabzhur 80 Aral Sea and people 110, 114, 139 Arapov 156 – 157, 160 Argunov, I. 61 Armenian/Gregorian Christianity 84 Aryngazy 144, 148, 217 Asianism (aziatizm) 199 Astrakhan (town) 51, 53 – 54, 56, 129, 182, 195 – 199; Khanate 26; province 91, 123, 188, 191 authority patterns 11 – 21 Avliaev, G. O. 30 Azov 55 – 56, 77 Babajanov, Salyq 201, 201 Badakhshan region 110 – 111 Baimukhamedov 218 Bakhmet’ev, D. E. 57 Bakhmet’ev, N. N. 144 Bakhrushin, S. V. 27 Bakhty Gerei 57, 77 Bakunin, V. M. 67, 69, 76, 86 – 87, 89 – 90 banner system (khoshuns) 165 ban strategy 139 – 143 Baraba Tatars 79

Index  225 Barak 108, 118 – 119, 122, 125 – 128, 135 – 137, 153, 173 baranta (barymta) 123, 142, 160, 191 Barkey, Karen 19 – 20 Bashkirs 24, 33, 50, 54 – 56, 94, 104 – 106, 108, 110 – 113, 115, 120, 122 – 124, 126, 129 – 130, 136, 138 – 139, 144, 156, 160, 195, 212 Basin, V. I. 12 Baskhaev, A. N. 48 Bassin, Mark 27 Batmaev, M. M. 23 Batu (khan of the Golden Horde) 16 Batyr (sultan of the Qazaq Middle Horde) 119, 122, 125, 127, 135, 139, 142, 153, 157 Bekchurin, M. 160 Beketov, N. A. 91 Beklemishev, V. 74, 76 – 77 Belgrad Treaty 83 Belosersky 174 Benton, Lauren 5 – 6 Berg 192, 195 Bezborodko, I. A. 190, 194 – 195 Bibikov, A. 78 Bikatunsk (Biisk) fort 79 Boeck, Brian 12, 25 Bogdanov 175 Bogenbai Batyr 130 Bogoiavlensky, S. K. 47, 50, 52, 75, 222 Baka 55 Bokei (son of Barak) 164 Bokei (son of Nuraly) 144, 163, 182 – 183, 187 – 192, 195, 198 – 199, 202 – 205, 217 Bokei/Inner Horde (Bukeevskaia/ Vnutrenniaia Orda) 53, 91, 105, 145, 187 – 209, 217 Bopai 113, 134 – 135, 171 Bopu 164 Bormanshinov, Arash 82 Borodin, D. M. 188 Boronin, O. V. 48 Boriatinsky 77 Buddhism 30, 33 – 34, 60, 65, 68 – 69, 82 – 84, 87 – 89, 103 Buddhist monasteries 36, 36 Bukhara protectorate 5; Emirate 51 – 52, 109 – 110, 139, 158 – 159, 180 Bukhartsy (Central Asian merchants) 49, 52, 79 Bukhholz, Ivan 28 Bulavin 56 Burbank, Jane 2 Buryats 29, 61 – 62

Buturlin 119 Byzantium 18 caravan trade 113 – 115, 145 Catherine I 71n65 Catherine II 30 – 31, 90 – 91, 94, 141 – 143, 157 – 160, 162, 190, 198 – 199 Catholicism 84 Chakdorzhab 74 – 75 Cherdyn 47 Cheremshan 109 Cherkassky 54 Cherkes 55 Cheter 58 China 3, 25, 27 – 29, 157, 161 Chingiz Khan 2 – 3, 16, 18, 22 – 23, 37, 51, 56, 121, 157 Chingiz (son of Abulkhair) 136 Chingiz (brother of Vali) 162 Chingiz (great grandson of Ablai) 162 Chingizid dynasty 14, 16, 23, 134 – 135, 221 Christianity 74, 84, 206 Chokur 52 Chu (river) 158 Churakai 211 Churpsei 214 – 215 Chuvash 55 Code of Laws (1640) 34 – 35, 53 confirmation (konfirmatsiia) 6, 134 – 150; ceremonies 179 – 183, 192 – 193 Confucianism 2 correspondence: language of “love and affection” 202 – 204; written vs oral 67 – 69, 172 – 173 Cossacks 18 – 20, 28, 33, 54, 56, 58, 60, 94, 105 – 106, 109, 120, 122 – 124, 130, 140, 142, 145, 187, 190,195, 197 – 198, 203, 214 Crimean khans 24; population and region 51, 54 – 55, 57, 75, 77 – 78, 83 Crossley, Pamela 34 Daian Erki 53 Daian Ombo 55 Daichin 34, 51 – 58, 66 – 67, 80 Dal’, Vladimir 17 Dalai Batyr 48, 50 – 53, 67 Dalai Lama 34, 54 – 55, 69, 76, 78, 81 – 82, 87, 92 Darma Bala 58, 74 – 75, 78, 81 – 82, 85, 88 Davatsi 85 – 86, 153 – 155 Davydov, A. P. 141, 156 – 158, 171 de Custine, Astolphe 218 – 219 de Medem 92

226 Index deputations 210 – 220, 212, 214, 218 Derbets 47 – 53, 56, 58, 84, 91 – 92 Derves Tseren 154 Dobrosmyslov, A. I. 176 Don (river) 53, 55, 57, 75; region 91 – 92 Don Cossacks 11 – 12, 17 – 20, 26, 55 – 56, 75, 77, 83, 94 Donduk Dashi 82 – 90, 120, 123, 130, 140 Donduk Ombo 38, 75 – 78, 82 – 84, 87 – 92, 96n42, 112, 120 Dordzhieva, E. V. 35, 84, 92, 94 Dorzhi Rabdan 58 Dosaly 142 Dosang 60, 74 Druzhina 65 – 66 Dugar 53, 55 Dural 66 dvoedanstvo 118 Dzhalaeva, A. M. 67 – 68 Eden 53 Edige 26 education 200 – 201, 205 Efremov, Danila 77, 87 – 88, 96n42 Eighteenth Steppe Laws 34 Elden 51 ‘elementary techniques of frontier control’ 2 – 3, 5, 158 Elizabeth 83, 120 – 121, 123 – 124, 135, 172 Emba (river) 50, 104, 120, 139, 141 Engel, F. I. 196 Eraly 108, 113 – 115, 121, 127, 130, 141, 143 – 144, 155 – 158, 172, 176 – 178, 210 – 211 Erdeni Batur Khuntaiji 34, 51 – 53, 58, 62 – 64, 78 – 79, 82, 103, 153 Ermak 26 – 27 Erofeeva, Irina 32, 115, 189 Esen Buka 14 Esim 144 Essen, P. K. 144 – 145, 192 – 193, 199, 203 eternal wandering (vechnaia kochevka) 162, 164 – 166 Eurasia 1 – 8, 24, 57, 188, 221 – 223 European education 200 – 201, 205 Far East 17 fairs, seasonal 198, 204 – 205 Fatima, wife of Jangir 199, 201, 203 – 204 Finno-Ugrics 28 von Frauendorf 158

Frontier Court 143 – 144 frontier dynamics 1, 19, 60 – 64, 83, 92 – 94, 119, 190 Gagarin, M. P. 58, 104, 137 Galdan Boshoktu 55, 58, 62 – 64, 66 – 68, 103 – 104 Galdan Danzhin 78, 82 – 83 Galdan Normo 112 Galdan Tseren 76, 78 – 82, 85, 106, 111, 118 – 122, 124 – 127, 137, 153 Gaspirinsky, Ismailbek 200 Gazy 213 – 214, 216 Geke 197 Gens, G. F. 189, 197, 204 Georgi, I. G. 33, 35, 128 Georgia 25 Gerei 14 – 15 gift politics 64 – 65, 171 – 172, 176, 179 – 180, 192 – 193, 203, 214 Gladyshev, D. 79, 119, 173 Glazengap, G. I. 165 – 166 Godunov, Boris 18 Godunov, Fedor 18 Gok 119 Golden Horde 1, 16 – 17, 24 – 26, 29, 67 Golitsyn, A. I. 60 Golovin, F. A. 62 Gorchakov, A. I. 165, 202 Gorchakov, A. M. 222 Gordeev 157 Gorokhov, I. S. 54, 66 governance: protectorate co-ruling 15 – 20, 113; Russian 1 – 8, 221 – 223 Gubaidulla 164, 213 – 214 Guliaev 128, 134 – 135 Gur’ev 142 Gurevich, B. P. 93 Guseinov, Amirjan 204 Halperin, Ch. 223n8 Honeychurch, William 3 – 4 hostages (amanat) 11, 16 – 18, 106, 108 – 110, 113, 118, 121 – 122, 124 – 126, 136 – 137, 141, 155 – 160, 178, 180, 191 Iaik (Ural’sk) Cossacks 58, 115, 112, 120 – 121, 128 – 129, 130, 140, 144, 156, 187, 190, 193 Iaik (Ural) river 50 – 51, 53, 58, 75, 104 – 105, 108, 115, 129, 140 – 141, 143, 153, 164, 188, 191 Iaman 90

Index  227 Iamyshevskaia fort 79, 165 Ian-Mukhammad 24 Iaraslan 175 Ibragim 201, 206 Igel’strom, Osip 142 – 143 Ilek (river) 105, 145 immigration tickets 165, 191, 194 Inner Asian frontier dynamics 60 – 64, 92 – 93 Irdana 159 Irtysh Line 130; river 47, 50 – 51, 63, 126, 164 – 165 Ishim Line 130; river 51 – 52, 105, 158, 160, 162 Ishimov, Kaipgali 197 Islam 36, 84, 198 – 202, 206 Islamic law 196, 206 Ismail 24, 92 Iukagirs 28 Iunger 89 Iusupov, N. B. 190, 195 Ivan III 26 Ivan IV 16, 24 – 27, 31, 195 Iver region 25 Izmailov, I. P. 76 – 77, 87 jadidism 200 Jaltyr 144 Jan 78, 82 – 83, 120 Janaly 136 – 137 Jangar 30 Jangir 189, 192 – 206, 217 – 219 Janibek 14 – 15 Janibek Batyr 119, 122, 125, 128, 135, 139, 153, 157, 177, 180 Jantore 144 – 145, 181 – 182, 187, 215 Janturin, Akhmet 147 Jerusalem 66 Jeti Jargy 36 Jochi 164 Jolaman Batyr 145 Jolbars 108, 114, 118 Juchi 14, 16 Jungars 2 – 3, 5; fall of 62, 85, 153 – 170; gift politics 179; offensive 62, 118 – 133; Qing wars 63 – 64, 86, 104 – 105, 156; roads to Tibet 82 – 83; uneasy encounters 28, 49, 50 – 55, 58, 63 – 64, 79 Junior Horde 157, 163, 189 – 191; confirmation ceremonies 180; deputations 215, 218; relations with Russia 78 – 79; under Russia’s protection 103 – 117, 123, 125 – 126, 129, 135 – 137,

140 – 148, 153, 155, 157, 173, 177, 180 – 181, 188, 191, 195, 221 – 222 Jurchid 2 jüt (epizootics, ecological disasters) 37, 43n92, 197 jüzes 105 Kabarda region 25, 83 Kaibashev, Teliap 188 Kaip 103 – 105, 127, 135, 139, 142 – 143, 172 – 173 Kalita, Ivan 32 – 33 Kalita, Semeon 32 – 33 Kalmyks 85, 120 – 124, 190; co-ruling practices 17 – 18; exodus (1771) 90 – 95; great road 59; last Khan 83 – 86; nobles 33, 85; patterns of power and authority 12 – 13; pilgrimage routes 81; power relations 2 – 3, 33 – 38; Prikaz institution 54; relations with Russia 45 – 99; runaways 84; Russian protectorate ceremonies 30 – 31, 86 – 89; tents 48; tribal laws 90; ulus politics 23, 30, 120; Zargo institution 54, 90 – 91, 94 Kama (river) 26 Kaluga 148 Kambar 164, 215 Kamyshelov (river) 47, 50 Kangxi 63 Kappeler, A. 223n8 Karakalpaks 104 – 105, 107, 111, 114, 119, 127, 198 Karakorum 32 Karakum (sands) 51 Karelin, G. S. 195, 203 – 204, 217 – 218 Kashgar 161 Kasymbaev, Zh. K. 130 Kazan University 199 – 200; khans 24; Khanate 26, 31, 181; Prikaz 54, 68 Kazimbek, A. K. 199 Keenan, E. 223n8 Kereit clan 127 Ker-Sagal tribe 28 Khalkha Mongols 5, 28, 33 – 34, 50, 54, 62 – 63, 79, 156, 165 Khan’s Council 143 – 144 Khanskaia Stavka 189, 193, 197 – 198, 200, 205 – 206 khan talau (robbing khan) ritual 171 Khara Khula 49 Khiva protectorate 5 Khivan Khanate 109 – 110, 119 – 120, 136, 139, 144 – 148, 180, 191, 222

228 Index Khodarkovsky, Michael 12, 17, 32 Khoshuts 47, 53 kholopy (slaves) 17, 20, 66, 111 – 113 Kho-Urliuk 34, 47 – 48, 50 – 53, 80 Khudamendi 165, 213 khurul 36, 36 Khusainov, Mukhamedjan 143, 199, 212 – 213 Kiakhta Treaty 60 – 61 Kindermann 127 kinship terms 171 Kirillov, I. 109 – 111, 129, 173 Kittary, M. Ia. 197 Kivelson, Valerie 2 Knorring, K. F. 187 – 188, 203 Kochekaev, B. B. 11 – 12 Kokand 139, 221 Kokchetav okrug (district) 164 Kolyvano–Voskresensk enterprises (zavody) 126 Korkodinov, Fedor 67 Korneev, V. I. 197, 204 Korneeva, E. 204 Koshaev, Abbas 198 Kozhevnikov, L. A. 191 Kraft, I. I. 174 – 175 Krasnoiarsk 119 Krasovsky, M. 13 Krivoi fort 166 Kuban (region) 55, 57, 77, 83, 91 – 92, 122, 140 Kuban Nogais 57 Kuban Tatars 56 – 57, 75, 77, 112 Kuchum 24, 26 – 27, 50 Kulachi 54 Kuldzha 158, 161 Kulmanov, Baqytgerei 201 Kulsary 140, 158 Kundakbaeva, Zhanat, 179, 213 Kundelen Ubashi 53 Kurakin, I. S. 67 Kurapov, A. A. 36, 97n72 Kuznetsk 28, 119 Kyrgyz 50, 62 – 63, 65, 103, 159 – 160 Lama Dorzhi 153 – 154 Lamaism 36, 65, 69 Lamberger 204 Lancaster method 205 land management 190 – 192, 222 language of “love and affection” 202 – 204; kinship terms 171 Lapin 126

Lattimore, Owen 2 – 3, 6 Lauzan 51 – 53 Lauzan Tseren 95n14 Lavrov, 163, 165 – 166, 215 legal pluralism 5 Levshin, Aleksei 13, 134 Likhachev, I. M. 28 Lower Volga region 91 Lutheranism 84 Maksimov, K. N. 30 Maksiutov 175 Manataev, Laubai 198 Manchus 2, 34, 53 Mari 55 Maria Fedorovna 217 market sultans (bazarnye sultany) 198 Markov 135 Massal’sky, I. V. 65 medals 157, 192 – 193, 203, 210 – 212, 216, 217 Mesheriaks 122 – 123 Middle Horde 153 – 167; deputations 211 – 215; relations with Russia 78 – 79; under Russia’s protection 104 – 108, 113, 115, 118 – 119, 122, 123 – 129, 135 – 138, 140, 157, 173, 177, 188 – 189, 221 – 222; sultans 162 Mikhail (tsar) 24 military lines 164 – 167 military outposts 93 Miller, G. F. 26 Miller (Russian envoy) 114, 124 – 126 Mininkov, N. A. 11 Mishari 110 mobility 1, 113 – 115, 164 – 167, 223; Buddhist monasteries (khurul) 36, 36; great road 59; guiding outposts (karuns) 93; pilgrimage routes 81; roads to Tibet 80 – 83 modernity 198 – 202 Mogulistan 14 Moiseev, V. A. 93, 118 Monchak 53 – 55, 58, 65 Mongol Empire 3, 22 – 23, 29, 32 – 33, 49 – 50 Mongols 3, 28, 30, 50, 62, 80, 137; language 67 – 68 Moon, David 25 Mountain Steppe 59 Mukhametaly 136 – 137 Muscovites 18 – 19, 23 – 25, 31 Muslims 159, 173

Index  229 Nadir Shah 83, 119, 122 Namki 81 – 82, Namki Dorzhi 86 Napoleon 202, 215 – 217 Naryn/Ryn Sands (Naryn/Ryn peski) 195 – 196 Nasonov, A. N. 223n8 Nazarov, Dorzhi 71n65, 74 – 75, 108 Nepliuev, I. I. 79, 84 – 86, 119 – 131, 134 – 136, 141, 153 – 156, 171 – 173, 178 – 181 Nepliuev Cadet Corps 194 – 195, 201, 204 Nerchinsk Treaty 29, 60 – 63, 68, 92 Nessel’rode, K. V. 188 – 189, 192 – 193 Newby, L. J. 93 Nicholas I 192 – 194, 201, 204 – 206, 218 – 219 Nicholas II 205 Nogai Horde 24 – 26, 30 – 31, 50 – 52, 55 – 57, 75, 92, 195 nomadic power relations 13 – 15, 171 North Caucasus 17, 75, 91 Novo-Iletskaia Line 145 noyons (masters) 35, 56 nökör/nököd 37 Nuraliev, Chuka 200 Nuraly (son of Abulkhair) 113 – 115, 127 – 131, 134 – 143, 153 – 160, 171 – 172, 176 – 181 oath-taking ceremonies 171 – 184 Ochirtu (Tsetsen Khan) 28, 58 Oirats 23, 29 – 30, 33, 50 – 51 okrugs (administrative-territorial units) 221 Ol’denkop, Konstantin 200 – 201 Om’ (river) 54 Omsk 32, 114, 134, 165 Onochin 51 – 52 Or’ (river) 108, 110 oral correspondence 67 – 69, 172 – 173 Orenburg 109, 113 – 114, 119, 121 – 123, 129, 134 – 136, 139, 141, 144 – 145, 153, 160 – 161, 171, 178 – 179, 182, 195, 199, 211 Orenburg Frontier Commission 32, 112, 137 – 139, 142 – 144, 153, 179, 189 – 193, 200 Orenburg Frontier Expedition 109 – 112 Orenburg Line 114, 191 – 192, 222 Orenburg Spiritual Administration 143, 198 – 199 Orlova, K. V. 84

Orsk 129, 143, 153, 179 Orthodox Church 30, 59, 74, 84 Osterman 108 ostrog 28 – 29, 63 Ostrogorsky, George 18 Ottoman Empire 2, 12, 18 – 20, 83, 91 Page Corps 201, 204 Pallas, P. S. 33, 88 Pal’mov, N. N. 53, 60, 65, 76, 82, 86, 90, 140 patron-client relations 5, 11 – 12 patronage 2, 6, 64 – 67, 74 – 99 Paul I 94, 144, 162, 187 – 189, 195, 206, 211 Pensa 55 Perdue, Peter 27 Perovsky, V. A. 195 – 196, 205 – 206, 222 personal bodyguards (telenguts) 36 – 37, 153 Peter I 5, 17, 30, 56 – 58, 63 – 64, 66, 74 – 75, 80, 87, 103 – 105, 113, 172, 176 Peter III 157 Petropavlovsk fort 160, 162 von Peutling 143 pilgrimage routes 81 Piraly 136 – 137, 145, 211 poddannyi (subjects) 12, 17, 166, 174 politics of gifts 31, 64 – 65, 171 – 172, 176, 179 – 180, 192 – 193, 203, 214; Qazaq deputations 210 – 220; ulus 22 – 43, 195, 222 Popov, P. S. 187, 190, 202 – 203, 217 power: Kalmyk relations 33 – 38; nomadic relations 13 – 15, 171; patterns of power and authority 11 – 21; Qazaq relations 12 – 13, 33 – 38, 134 – 150 “proper kindness and good manners” (nadlezhashchie prilaskanie i dobrye manery) 171 protection (protektsiia): of Kalmyks 74 – 99; of Qazaqs 101 – 150 protectorate(s): ceremonies 30 – 33, 86 – 89; co-ruling practices 15 – 20, 113; Kalmyk–Russian relations 45 – 99; Russian institution 4, 6, 9 – 43; French and British 5 Provisional Council 204 Provisional Statute 222 Pugachev 142, 160 Puzanov, V. D. 50 Qabanbai Batyr 161 Qaratai 144 – 145, 146, 187, 192 – 193

230 Index Qaraul Qoja 197 – 198 Qasymov, Kenesary 153, 221 Qazaqs 37 – 38, 50, 75, 104; Bokei Horde see Bokei Horde (Bukeevskaia Orda); caravan trade 114 – 115; co-ruling practices 17 – 18; deputations 33, 210 – 220, 212, 214, 218; eternal wandering (vechnaia kochevka) 162, 164 – 166; Inner Horde (Vnutrenniaia Orda) 105, 189; Junior Horde see Junior Horde; jüzes 105; khans 37 – 38, 163; khan talau (robbing khan) ritual 171; leadership practices 37 – 38; Middle Horde see Middle Horde; oath-taking ceremonies 171 – 184; power relations 12 – 13, 33 – 38, 134 – 150; protectorate ceremonies 30 – 31; Provisional Council over 204; Qing commercial operations 161; relations with Russia 2, 50, 78 – 79, 94, 111 – 113; runaways 140; between Russia and the Qing 153 – 170; under Russia’s protection 101 – 150, 221; Senior Horde 79, 103 – 105, 110 – 111, 114 – 115, 118, 221; social customs 175 – 176, 179 – 180; trade relations 161, 196; types under Russian rule 201; ulus politics 25, 32, 105 relations with Jungars 103, 105, 118; relations with Kalmyks 84, 94, 105 Qazbek 158 Qing Empire: commercial operations 28 – 29, 104, 161; frontier dynamics 92 – 93; guiding outposts (karuns) 93, 158, 164; Jungar–Qing wars 63 – 64, 156; khoshun system 80; military outposts 93; relations with Middle Horde 155 – 156, 215; relations with Russia 75 – 76, 79, 151 – 184; roads to Tibet 80 – 82; ruling strategies 2 – 6; ulus politics 27, 30; uneasy encounters 62 – 64 Qojaev 188 Qojakhmet 112 – 113, 121 – 124, 176 – 178 Qudaibergenov, Juma 211 – 212 Qur’an 141, 161, 164, 180, 199 Qypshaq clan 158 Radlov, Vasily 38 Ramstedt, Gustav 22 Randul 82 Razin, Stepan 55 raspravas (administrative-territorial units) 143 Regulations about the Allotment of Lands to the Kalmyks and other Nomadic

Populations in the Astrakhan Province (O naznachenii zemel’ kalmykam i drugim kochuiushchim narodam v gubernii Astrakhanskoi) 191 Regulations About the Allotment of Lands to the Ural’sk Cossacks and the Kirgiz [Qazaqs] (O nadelenii zemliami voiska Ural’skogo i kirgizov Vnutrennei Bukeevskoi Ordy) 195 Regulations on Siberian Kirgiz (Ustav o Sibirskikh kirgizakh) 291 Reinsdorp, I. 141, 159 Remezov, S. 59 Remnev, Anatoly 25 Renat, Johan Gustaf 79, 96n51 rites and rituals: confirmation (konfirmatsiia) ceremonies 179 – 183, 192; khan talau (robbing khan) 171; oath-taking ceremonies 171 – 184; patronage ceremonies 64 – 67; protectorate ceremonies 30 – 33, 86 – 89 Rostislavsky 174 royal charters (gramota) 16, 58, 64, 179, 181 Rules on the Administration of Kalmyk Population (1825) 94 Rumiantsev, N. P. 198 – 199 runaways 1, 84, 140 Russia: ban strategy 139 – 143; governance in Eurasia 1 – 8, 221 – 223; institution of protectorates 6, 9 – 43; Kalmyk relations 45 – 99; military lines 164 – 167; “proper kindness and good manners” (nadlezhashchee prilaskanie i dobrye manery) 171; protection (protektsiia) 74 – 99; protectorate mechanisms 15 – 20; Qazaq protection 101 – 150; Qazaq relations 111 – 113; Qing relations 60, 151 – 184; ulus politics 22 – 43; relations with Jungars 62 – 63 Russian-Ottoman War 71n65 Rychkov, Petr 114, 128 – 129, 137 – 141, 156, 159, 176 – 178 Sabyrkhanov, A. 106 Safa Girei 31 Sakharnyi fort 142 Saimonov, L. Ia. 120, 130, 178 – 179 Sairam 104, 118 Sakhib-Gerei 192, 197, 204, 206 Sakmarsky fort 112 Salar 154 salaries 157, 172, 193 – 194 Samara 53 – 55, 109 Samarkand 158

Index  231 Sanzhip 58, 78, 103 Saratov 54, 91, 195, 202 Sary Manzhi 125 Schuyler, Eugene 202 Scott, James 14 – 15 Sechen 28 sedentarization 196 Seid-Ibrahim Khan 26 Seit Khan 119 Semipalatinskaia fort 130, 166, 222 Semirech’e region 103, 222 Senge 66 – 67 Senior Horde 79, 103 – 105, 110 – 111, 114 – 115, 118, 221 service tsarevichi (sluzhilye tsarevichi) 17 Seterzhab 104 shabiner (serf) 36, 84 shamanism 65 Shangin, I. P. 134 Shaniiaz 164 Shanshar 166, 215 Sheremetov 61 Sheremetova, Varvara 61 Shereng 91 Sherstova, L. 32 shert agreements 11 – 21, 24, 26, 29, 33, 49, 53, 56, 59 – 60, 64 – 68 shert records (shertovye zapisi) 64 Shigai 187, 189, 191 – 192, 194 – 195 Shirgazy 145 – 148, 182 – 183, 195, 215 – 217 Shono Lauzan 75 – 76, 78 Shpringer, I. 158 Shubin 211 – 212 Shuisky, Vasily 48, 188 – 189 Shukur Lama 75 – 77, 81, 86 – 87 shulenga (lesser nobles) 35 Siberia 5, 17, 25 – 30, 33, 47 – 52, 63, 75, 86, 110, 159, 181 Siberian Line 119, 126, 130, 155, 159 – 161, 165 – 166, 222; Khanate 26 Silfen, Paul 32 – 33 Skvortsov, Vasily Filipych 202 Smith, Alison 29 – 30 social customs 171, 175 – 176, 179 – 180, 202 – 204 sogum 193, 204 Solom Tseren 55 sovereignty 164 – 167 Sozonovich, S. I. 191 Spitsyn 140 Starkov, Vasily 66 State school 1 – 2 Stavropol’-on-Volga 84 Stroganovs 26 – 27

Sukhtelen, P. P. 195 – 196 Sultanov, Tursun 23 Sunderland, Willard 25, 91 Suyuk 215 Sydyk 215 Syr Darya region 104 – 105, 111, 115, 118 – 120, 139, 222 Syrym Datov 142 – 144 Syzran’ 109 Tabyn clan 145 Taia 89 Taibugids 26 Talas (river) 158 Taimanov, Isatai 197 – 198 taisha (ruler) 7, 47 – 49, 53, 64 – 65, 67 – 69, 119 Tara 27, 47 – 48, 50 – 52 tarkhan, 159, 175, 180 Tarbagatai 161 Tashkent 104 – 105, 114, 118, 120, 126, 158 Tatars 19, 28, 33, 50, 54 – 56, 75, 84, 110, 122, 190, 198 Tatishchev, V. N. 38, 83 – 84, 112 – 113, 115, 173 – 178 Tauke 36, 103 – 104, 106, 118, 172 – 173 Taukel 103 taxes 193 – 194, 206 telenguts (personal bodyguards) 36 – 37, 153 Teles tribe 28 Temiriazev, I. S. 204 temple tents 88 Tenishev, D. V. 203 Tepkeev, V. T. 54 Tereshke (river) 60 Tevkelev, Kutlug-Mukhammed 103, 106 – 109, 123, 129 – 130, 135 – 141, 153 – 157, 159, 171 – 175 Tibet 80 – 83, 85 Tibetan Buddhism 33 – 34, 82 – 83 tickets 165, 191, 194 Tikmet 91 Times of Troubles 5 Tiumen’ 27, 47, 50 – 51 Tobol (river) 51, 105 Tobol’sk 27 – 28, 47, 50 – 51, 53, 155 Togum 160 Toikara 211 Tomsk 27, 65, 119 Torghuts 34, 47, 50 – 55, 57, 75, 84, 88, 91, 94, 196 trade 80 – 83, 113 – 115, 145, 161, 196 Trans-Siberian Railroad 25 Treaty of Aigun 221

232 Index Treaty of Beijing 221 Treaty of Belgrad 83 Trepavlov, V. V. 11 – 12, 15 – 16, 24 – 25, 31, 91, 223n8 tribal laws 196, 206 Troitsk fort 160 Tsaritsyn Line 54, 84, 91 – 92; city 77 Tseren Donduk 58, 69, 74 – 77, 81 – 83, 85 – 88, 90, 108 Tseren Mueke 154 Tseren Unbashu 154 Tsevan Dorzhi 82, 106, 127 – 128, 139 Tsevan Rabdan 55, 58, 63 – 64, 66 – 68, 75 – 76, 78 – 79, 103 – 105 Tsitsianov, P. D. 190 Tsiuriumov, A. V. 58, 82 Tundutov, Chigai 94 Tungus population 28; language 87 Turgai province 222 Turinsk 27 Turkestan 104 – 105, 118 – 20, 125 – 126, 158 – 161 Turkmens 30, 75, 145, 187, 198 Turokai 27 – 28 Tuvinians 28, 63 Ubashi 83, 89, 90 – 94, 141, 196 – 197 Ufa 53, 56, 110, 143, 199 Ugriumov 111 Uighurs 103 ukaznye starshiny/licensed elders) 193 ulus politics 22 – 43, 105, 110, 195, 222; domain 14, 16; population 47, 51, 112, 120 uneasy encounters 47 – 73 Unkovsky, Ivan 64 Urakov 120 Ural’sk province 222; region 26; town 114 Urazlin 153 Urdubai 47 Uriankhai tribes 63, 157 Urumchi 161 Urusov, Taten 165, 210 – 211, 213 – 214 Urusov, V. A. 112, 114 – 115, 119 – 120, 122 – 123, 129, 177 – 178, 210 Ust’-Kamenogorsk fort 28, 114, 126, 130, 165 Utemisov, Mukhambet 197 – 198 Uzbek-Qazaqs 14 Vali 161 – 164, 215 Valikhanov, Chingiz 162, 215 Valikhanov, Shoqan 158 van 164

Vasily II 18 Vasily III 26, 31 Veidemeier, I. A. 202 velayet 23 Vel’iaminov-Zernov, V. V. 17 Verkhotur’e 27, 47 Vernadsky, G. 223n8 Vernadsky, V. I. 48 Veselovsky N. I. 67 Volga (region and river) 30, 50, 53 – 55, 58, 75, 83 – 84, 86, 91 – 92, 104, 115, 120, 141, 145, 160, 221 Volkonsky, G. S. 91, 144 – 145, 182 – 183, 187, 191 – 193, 203, 213 voluntary joining (dobrovol’noe prisoedinenie) 1 – 2 voluntary tribute (alman) 32, 79, 111 – 112 Volynsky, A. P. 57 – 58, 74 – 75, 86 – 87, 88, 90, 92 von Peutling, A. A. 143 Vorontsov, M. 141 votchina 26 war captives (qul) 36 Weber, Max 2 Wortman, Richard 2 written vs oral correspondence 67 – 69, 172 – 173 Yakuts 28, 61 yarlyk (gramota) 16, 23 – 24 Yasa code of regulations 22 yasak (tribute) 11, 13, 16 – 18, 23, 26, 28, 31 – 32, 49 – 50, 54, 62 – 63, 79, 106, 108, 110 – 112 Yuan dynasty 33 yurt 23 Zaia Pandita 34, 36, 38n52 Zaisan (lake) 63 zaisangs (lesser rulers) 35, 90 Zamian 75 Zargo 54, 90 – 91, 94 zaseki 1 Zavalishin, I. I. 190 – 191 Zhelezinskaia fort 130 Zhilin 88 – 89 ziaket (Islamic tax) 103, 193 – 194, 199, 204, 206 Zimanov, Salyq 189, 193 Zomia 14 Zveringolovskaia fort 160