Russian Orthodoxy, Nationalism and the Soviet State during the Gorbachev Years, 1985–1991 9780367420093, 9780367817336

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title
Copyright
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Preface
Note on transliteration
Introduction
Chapter 1 Servant of the state or faithful
ally?
Chapter 2 State policy towards the Russian Orthodox Church
Chapter
3 Church–state relations
Chapter
4 The Moscow Patriarchate and the Soviet media
Chapter
5 View from the outside
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Russian Orthodoxy, Nationalism and the Soviet State during the Gorbachev Years, 1985–1991

This book examines how the Russian Orthodox Church developed during the period of Gorbachev’s rule in the Soviet Union, a period characterised by perestroika (reform) and glasnost’ (openness). It charts how official Soviet policy towards religion in general and the Russian Orthodox Church changed, with the Church enjoying significantly improved status. It also discusses, however, how the improved relations between the Moscow Patriarchate and the state, and the Patriarchate’s support for Soviet foreign policy goals, its close alignment with Russian nationalism and its role as a guardian of the Soviet Union’s borders were not seen in a positive light by dissidents and by many ordinary believers, who were disappointed by the church’s failure in respect of its social mission, including educational and charitable activities. Sophie Kotzer completed her doctorate at the University of Leicester.

Routledge Religion, Society and Government in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet States Series Editor

Lucian Leustean is Reader in Politics and International Relations at Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom

This Series seeks to publish high quality monographs and edited volumes on religion, society and government in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet States by focusing primarily on three main themes: the history of churches and religions (including, but not exclusively, Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism) in relation to governing structures, social groupings and political power; the impact of intellectual ideas on religious structures and values; and the role of religions and faith-based communities in fostering national identities from the nineteenth century until today. The Series aims to advance the latest research on these themes by exploring the multi-facets of religious mobilisation at local, national and supranational levels. It particularly welcomes studies which offer an interdisciplinary approach by drawing on the fields of history, politics, international relations, religious studies, theology, law, sociology and anthropology. Religion and Politics in the Orthodox World The Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Modern Age Paschalis M. Kitromilides Orthodox Religion and Politics in Contemporary Eastern Europe On Multiple Secularisms and Entanglements Edited by Tobias Köllner Forced Migration and Human Security in the Eastern Orthodox World Edited by Lucian N. Leustean Religion during the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict Edited by Elizabeth A. Clark and Dmytro Vovk Russian Orthodoxy, Nationalism and the Soviet State during the Gorbachev Years, 1985–1991 Sophie Kotzer

Russian Orthodoxy, Nationalism and the Soviet State during the Gorbachev Years, 1985–1991 Sophie Kotzer

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Sophie Kotzer The right of Sophie Kotzer to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-367-42009-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-81733-6 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Scientific Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

List of figures List of tables  Preface Introduction

vii viii ix 1

  1 Servant of the state or faithful ally? Church–state relations in modern Russian history

12

  2 State policy towards the Russian Orthodox Church

40

  3 Church–state relations: View from the Moscow Patriarchate

59

  4 The Moscow Patriarchate and the Soviet media

80

  5 View from the outside: Russian Orthodoxy in the patriotic and Christian alternative press during perestroika115 Conclusion 142 Bibliography 151 Index165

Figures

4.1 Viacheslav Pietzukh, “Vtoraia Zapoved,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, March 20 1991, 15 4.2 “Veriu,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, March 20 1991, 9 4.3 “Veriu,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, March 20 1991, 9 4.4 “Selskii Batiushka,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, June 26 1991, 6 4.5 Literaturnaia Gazeta, June 7 1989, 1

94 103 104 105 106

Tables

4.1 Themes covered by photojournalism in the Soviet printed press, 1985–199182 5.1 Church–state issues in selected Soviet alternative press, 1985–1991 124

Preface

The in-depth analysis of the interrelations between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), Russian nationalism and the state apparatus during the Gorbachev years (1985–1991) underlines the continuity of the imperial implications of Orthodoxy and church–state interests. This book sheds light on the institutional influence of the ROC on the state and society during this important period. It emphasises mutual church–state interests, which were especially evident in the foreign policy field. Moreover, it adds a new dimension to our understanding of church– state relations during the Gorbachev era by examining their influence on both the domestic and international arenas as well as indicating their likely development in the twenty-first-century Russia. This study highlights the intersection of social, political and ideological factors, particularly as they relate to the influence of Russian Orthodoxy on Russian nationalist movements, thus providing a fuller understanding of the ROC activity, not only as a religious institution, but also as an important factor in the political arena during the perestroika period. An examination of the major characteristics of Gorbachev’s style of leadership, his attitude towards glasnost’, perestroika and the national question clarify the dynamics of the interrelations between the ROC, Russian nationalism and the secular authorities during his times. Furthermore, it examines the way those interrelations influenced the revival of Russian nationalist ideology and shaped the ideological and political scene of the post-Soviet Russia. This book is an adoption of my PhD thesis conducted at the University of Leicester. It uses a wide range of archival material, which is not accessible to researchers nowadays. Chapter 2 uses documents of the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) housed in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (Gosudarstvennyi Archiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii—GARF) and in the Centre for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (Tsentr Khraneniia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii— TsKhSD). Those documents provide a major source of information on the official state attitude towards religion in the USSR. Chapter 4, which analyses Soviet printed press, uses official newspapers, namely Sovetskaia Rossiia (Soviet Russia), Trud (Labour), Izvestiia (News) and Literaturnaia Gazeta (Literary Gazette). These newspapers were chosen to represent different political affiliations and approaches towards glasnost’. Chapter 5, which examines ideology of Russian nationalist organisations, social movements, political processes and social change

x Preface in the USSR during the Gorbachev period, was based on a collection of non-traditional periodicals, press and documentation on social movements in the Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Science in St. Petersburg. Chapter 1 focuses on the relationship between the ROC and state authorities in modern Russian history, accentuating that Orthodoxy is one of the most important components of Russian national identity. Special attention is paid to the influence of Russia’s geopolitical situation on the shared church–state interests. Chapter 2 investigates the change in the official Soviet policy towards religion in general and the ROC in particular. It also highlights the reasons for the shift in the official attitude towards the ROC after the millennium celebrations. Chapter 3 underlines the perspective of the Moscow Patriarchate and examines the dynamics of its development in association with the official Soviet policy. The ROC continued to provide support for the Soviet foreign policy goals, regarding the interests of the state as its own. Thus, it strengthened its position vis-à-vis the state but did not succeed in its social mission. Chapters 4 and 5 examine church–state relations from the media’s point of view: Chapter 4 discusses the way official Soviet media reflected the alteration in church–state relations, focusing on the way it was presented in four major official newspapers. A general picture of church–state relations, depicted by the official printed media, highlighted Gorbachev’s ideological line, which assigned the Church the role of a guardian of both the USSR’s borders and the Russian religious and cultural heritage. Chapter 5 complements this enquiry by investigating the attitude of the Soviet unofficial press towards Russian Orthodoxy and the Moscow Patriarchate. Soviet alternative press criticised the subjugation of the Church to state authorities, claiming that this was a source of its inability to cooperate with Russian society and preserve Russian spiritual traditions and a way of life. I have incurred many debts during my journey to the completion of this work. First and foremost, I would like to thank my main supervisor, Dr. Zoe Knox, for her thoughtful and thorough feedback at each stage of my research, and my associate supervisor, Prof. John Coffey, for his general guidance and valuable inputs. I’m also indebted to my former supervisor from the Hebrew University, Prof. Theodor Friedgut, whose guidance at the initial stages of the research is much appreciated. Special thanks are due to Dr. Aleksei Sergeevich Buevskii, for the insight he provided on the church–state relations in the USSR, Andrei Alekseev, for his invaluable help during my research at the St. Petersburg Institute of Sociology, and the librarians at the Birmingham University Orchard Learning Resource Centre, who assisted with the work on the Baykov Collection of Russian periodicals, without whom the chapter on the Soviet official press could not be written.

Note on transliteration

The Library of Congress transliteration system has been used throughout the dissertation. Established English usage has taken precedence over the Library of Congress system in the spelling of Russian family names: thus Yeltsin, not El’tsin.

Introduction Rethinking the religious renaissance during perestroika

Russia has been from the time immemorial a land of Orthodox Christianity. Her creative national-linguistic core always professed the Orthodox faith. That is why the spirit of Orthodoxy has always defined the deep structure of Russian national consciousness.1

Ivan Aleksandrovich Il’in (1883–1954), who to the end of his life believed in the renaissance of the Russian national idea as a counterbalance to the Bolshevik Revolution, claimed that the strength of the Russian nation lies in religion. Only Orthodoxy has given the Russian people the power to survive the perils of both nature and history, enabling it to establish its own unified state.2 The significance of the analysis of the relationship between nationalism and religion in general, and in the case of Russia in particular, lies in the fact that it allows better comprehension of the nation’s past as well as religion’s role in the social, cultural and political life of the nation. This book investigates the interrelations between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), Russian nationalism and the state apparatus during the period of perestroika (1985–1991). It is of particular importance because of the change in the official attitude towards the ROC during Gorbachev’s period, which altered remarkably the status of the Church in Soviet and post-Soviet Russian society. The subsequent research questions are the most relevant ones in the analysis of the religious renaissance during perestroika: Which processes and actors caused the alteration in church–state relations? Was there any connection between changing church–state relations and the revival of the Russian nationalist ideology? Did the change in the attitude towards the historical past, which was especially evident in literature and mass media, influence the interrelations between the ROC, the Soviet state and Russian nationalism? The prime aim of this study is to analyse the role of the ROC as an actor in the political and social arena during the Gorbachev era and to identify in what ways changing church–state relations and nationalist ideology shaped the ideological and political scene of post-Soviet Russia.

Methodological challenges One of the main methodological challenges the researcher of church–state relations during perestroika faces is critical understanding of the available primary sources.

2 Introduction Moreover, the analysis of those sources poses additional questions. Sonja Luehrmann recently addressed those challenges in Religion in Secular Archives: Soviet Atheism and Historical Knowledge. She pointed out the importance of critical discourse analysis which moves beyond the written material3 and the corroboration of official archival documents with different sources such as “counter-archives,”4 published sources and oral history.5 Chapter 2 is based on the documents of the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) housed in the State Archive of the Russian Federation (Gosudarstvennyi Archiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii—GARF) and in the Centre for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (Tsentr Khraneniia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii—TsKhSD). Those documents provide a major source of information on the official state attitude towards religion in the USSR. Moreover, as Luehrmann rightly emphasised, this documentation was intended to support the official policymaking activity and maintain control of religious expression in the USSR.6 Thus, in order to provide an in-depth analysis of church–state relations during the Gorbachev period and to highlight the influence of political, social and ideological factors on both the Soviet authorities’ attitude towards the ROC and the official voice of the Moscow Patriarchate, sources which supplement these official materials are analysed, including the Soviet press, samizdat material and the ROC own publications. Furthermore, the analysis of the ROC attitude to the Soviet state is challenging since the Moscow Patriarchate’s archives are closed to any unauthorised inspection. Primary sources, such as documents on inner Church life and the functioning of the ROC authorities, are inaccessible. The Central Archive of the Moscow Patriarchate (Tsentral’nyi Arkhiv Moskovskoi Patriarkhii) in Moscow’s Novodevichy Monastery, catalogued and processed during 1980–1990 by professional archivists, is closed to all researchers. Information on the official attitude of the ROC to the state apparatus can be obtained from the Zhurnal Moscovskoi Patriarkhii (Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate), the official publication of the ROC, established in 1931. The journal had also an official English version (3,000 copies) distributed abroad for purely propagandistic needs.7 Another official publication was Vladislav Tsipin’s book, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997 (History of the Russian Church),8 an approved version of the ROC history, published to mark Moscow’s 850th anniversary in 1997. Official Moscow Patriarchate sources, published during the years 1985–1991, pose an additional challenge. It needs to be taken into account that they were subjected to censorship and reflected the official state policy towards religion. Stephen Vella highlights the importance of mass media for historians claiming that newspapers offer a wealth of information about the social, political and intellectual culture which prevailed in a particular time and place.9 The role of the mass media in Soviet society, especially during the reform period, must not be underestimated. It was an integral part of Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost’ and served to advance the process of perestroika. Official newspapers, namely Sovetskaia Rossiia (Soviet Russia), Trud (Labour), Izvestiia (News) and Literaturnaia Gazeta (Literary Gazette), were chosen to represent different political affiliations and approaches towards glasnost’. Thus, the juxtaposition of their changing

Introduction 3 attitudes towards religion in general and the ROC in particular offers an insight into the way official policy towards religion was interpreted, organised and presented to the reader. The intricate puzzle of church–state relations during perestroika could not be explained without the examination of Russian nationalist ideology, its association with Russian Orthodoxy and its role in the Soviet society. Recent theoretical discussions on the nature of Russian nationalism emphasise its ethnic and imperial substance. Emil Pain underlined that Russian Slavophiles developed the concept of Russian ethnic nationalism at the end of the nineteenth century. It was characterised by the notion that Russian people are different from western Europeans in the sense that they aim to preserve autocracy and imperial power rather than values of popular representation. The union of the Russian people was regarded as sacred, and any conquered land should be an inalienable part of the Russian state.10 Pal Kolsto reinforced the imperial nature of Russian nationalism by stating that it is generally focused on state strength and state authoritarianism.11 Speaking of Russian nationalism during Soviet times, Yuri Slezkine stated that, since Russians did not have any clearly defined territory, their own party or national academy, they were identified with the USSR as a whole. Thus, Russian Orthodoxy, being an inseparable part of Russian culture, regained its status as an important part of Russian national identity, especially during Gorbachev’s period.12 It is important to underline that debates on these subjects in the USSR were mostly waged underground. This presents an additional challenge to the analyst, since comprehensive collections of the Soviet unofficial press are quite rare. Material on the ideology of Russian nationalist organisations, social movements, political processes and social change in the USSR during the Gorbachev period can be found in a collection of non-traditional periodicals, press and documentation on social movements in the Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Science in St. Petersburg. Founded in 1989 by Andrei Alekseev, a leading researcher in the Leningrad branch of the Institute of Sociology, the St. Petersburg collection or so-called Alekseev’s archive was intensively replenished through the collections of various public organisations and the private archives of social activists, so that by the mid-1990s it became one of the largest and most representative depositories of material from the Soviet and Russian samizdat, both in Russia and abroad. Until the end of the 1990s, the “Alekseev’s archive” was located in the premises of the St. Petersburg branch of the Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Science. In the late 1990s, its activities were curtailed and the funds conserved. In 2007, the collection was moved to the “Memorial” Research Centre in St. Petersburg and again became available to researchers. The unofficial press sources for Chapter 5 were collected in 1995, when the archive was located in the Russian Academy of Science. This book highlights the intersection of social, political and ideological factors, particularly as they relate to the influence of Russian Orthodoxy on Russian nationalist movements, thus providing a fuller understanding of the ROC activity, not only as a religious institution, but also as an important factor in the political arena during the perestroika period. It does not focus on religious beliefs and

4 Introduction the individual practice of religion. An examination of the major characteristics of Gorbachev’s style of leadership, his attitude towards glasnost’, perestroika and the national question clarify the dynamics of the interrelations between the ROC, Russian nationalism and the secular authorities during his times. Furthermore, it examines the way those interrelations influenced the revival of Russian nationalist ideology and shaped the ideological and political scene of the post-Soviet Russia.

The philosophical content of Gorbachev’s leadership style An analysis of the major political and social changes during the Gorbachev years is very much connected to Gorbachev’s attitude towards Marxist–Leninist ideology, his beliefs concerning the nature of glasnost’ and perestroika and the role he assigned the ROC in moving those ideas forward. The following incident, which took place in 1952, during Gorbachev’s second year at Moscow State University, best portrayed both his style of leadership and the essence of glasnost’ (lucidity13) and perestroika (restructuring). On one occasion, Gorbachev became irritated when an instructor insisted on reading aloud in class page after page of a new work by Stalin instead of analysing and discussing it. Gorbachev and Lieberman wrote an anonymous note to the lecturer, dryly reminding him that everyone in the class could read. When the instructor found it, he was so angry he read it aloud before the class and denounced the author as antisocialist. Gorbachev calmly rose to acknowledge his authorship, pointed out his own communist convictions and his leading role as a Komsomol member, and insisted that he merely disliked the instructor’s pedantic manner of presenting Stalin’s work. Though later criticised by officials for this act of impertinence, Gorbachev was not otherwise disciplined. The lecturer was replaced.14 Gorbachev’s adherence to Marxist–Leninist ideology and the Soviet system on the one hand, and following new tactics to achieve desired goals on the other, underlined the innate dichotomy between reformist and conservative trends during perestroika, which in many ways sealed its fate. Ideologically, Gorbachev continued the line of his predecessors by trying to protect and enhance the unity of the Soviet Empire. However, unlike the Soviet leaders before him, Gorbachev realised that without a major shift of strategy he would not achieve his goal. Gorbachev, in his writing and speeches, often identified perestroika as a revolution. However, it is important to underline that this was not a revolution in a classical sense of the word, which is the forcible overthrowing of an established government or a political system. For Gorbachev, revolution was a continuation of a process began in 1917, and as he pointed out, “not merely a sequel, but an extension and a development of the main ideas of the October Revolution.”15 Gorbachev was a strong believer in Marxism–Leninism. In many of his speeches, he quoted Lenin, and unlike Brezhnev, he seemed to believe in what he was saying, since he aimed to implement Lenin’s ideas.

Introduction 5 During his university years as a law student, he had an extensive education in Marxism–Leninism, since it constituted a heavy proportion of any Soviet university degree programme. And as one classmate cited in a biography subtly pointed out, the educational experience of delving into Marxist and Leninist argumentation provided his beliefs with a theoretical and spiritual core.16 According to Zdenek Mlynar, Gorbachev studied Lenin to appreciate his gifts, not just as a theoretician, but as a master political tactician, a man who knew when to advance and when to retreat, yet who never lost sight of his ultimate goal, which was not just the achievement of communist power in Russia, but its extension throughout the world.17 Even the idea of the term perestroika was designed using the language of Marxist–Leninist ideology. In July 1986, Gorbachev stated that, “a decisive acceleration of the socio-economic and cultural development of the Soviet society involves radical changes, in the way to a qualitatively new state.” Anatoly Cherniaev, a principal foreign policy advisor to Gorbachev, claimed that perestroika was indeed a revolution, but only the Communist Party could be the avant-garde which would lead this kind of revolution forward.18 Gorbachev, however, did not let go of the idea that structural alterations within the Party apparatus could indeed bring about much-needed changes in Soviet society, not taking into account that such alterations could weaken the ideological basis of perestroika. Possibly another reason for clinging to Marxist–Leninist ideology was Gorbachev’s fear of losing the socialist identity of Soviet ideology, which allowed the USSR to become a superpower after the end of World War II. According to his close advisor, he also feared that if he did so, he would never be forgiven by his own people.19 Gorbachev’s inability to distance himself from the postulates of the Marxist–Leninist ideology compelled him to demand that in the Referendum on the Future of the USSR the word “socialist” would not be omitted. The main question the voters had to respond to was whether the USSR should be preserved as a renewed federation of equal sovereign socialist republics. For Gorbachev, the idea of socialist identity was the unifying agent of the Union. He sponsored the March Referendum (17 March 1991) and hoped that despite rising separatism in many parts of the USSR, the majority of Soviet citizens wanted the country to remain unified. Around eighty per cent of the Soviet adult population (148.5 million people) took part in the referendum, and of them, 76.4 per cent voted for the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of an individual of any nationality would be fully guaranteed. Six republics (Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia and the three Baltic republics) did not participate.20 Cherniaev noted that Gorbachev’s unwillingness to sacrifice the word “socialist” in order to preserve the Union initiated the process of its disintegration.21 Moreover, Gorbachev lacked the mechanisms which could move perestroika forward, his only tool being the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza—KPSS), which he no longer trusted to undertake the mission. Thus, it was Gorbachev himself who contributed to the downfall of his most important ally, the KPSS. By introducing changes both in

6 Introduction the Politburo and in the KPSS Central Committee, Gorbachev in fact weakened its ideological apparatus. Egor Ligachev became a “second in command,” after Gorbachev. He was in charge of the CP secretariat and its ideological work. Alexander Yakovlev, a newly appointed CP secretary, was also dealing with the same field. Those appointments led to a serious bifurcation inside the ideological apparatus in the Party. All services and cadre of the “ideological front” were split into two, leading to serious contradictions between socialist and liberal ideological lines. Gorbachev did not interfere in this battle, probably thinking that both politicians would weaken each other. According to Boldin, this conflict finally led to total disintegration of the KPSS and ultimately the destruction of the USSR.22 Cherniaev claimed that Gorbachev had the opportunity to take the situation into his own hands in the autumn of 1990 if he would have the courage to disperse the Party, to alienate himself from the Marxist–Leninist ideology and disintegrate the USSR. In other words, he would have to realise that perestroika in fact means a change of political order.23 The changes Gorbachev introduced in the Politburo and the KPSS together with his firm belief in the Marxist–Leninist doctrine definitely accounted for the ultimate failure of perestroika and shaped his perspective on glasnost’ and his attitude towards church–state relations during that period.

Gorbachev’s perception of glasnost’ The understanding that the unity and further prosperity of the Soviet Empire could only be achieved through different unorthodox means was present in KGB circles several years before perestroika. For Gorbachev, those new means became glasnost’ and an efficient use of the mass media. These new tactics were aimed first of all at the world on the other side of the “Iron Curtain,” wishing to portray the Soviet system as “Socialism with a human face.” Gorbachev himself admitted that his first use of glasnost’ was intended for the Western press and not the Soviet audience. In September and October 1985, he was interviewed by Time magazine and French television.24 In the first interview, he asked for the written questions in advance, but although the answers were prepared in written form, it resulted in a lively open discussion with the journalists.25 His fresh, open style of communication with the press, without reading from notes, was appealing to foreign journalists because it was so different from the style of his predecessors. Gorbachev gave the impression of a skilful politician with a new message. Glasnost’ and New Political Thinking were part of a goal to improve foreign relations with the West and were designed to provide appropriate help for the economic development of perestroika, and in fact, they became its ideological locomotive.26 For Gorbachev, glasnost’ was first of all perceived as a tool for shedding light on and allowing criticism of previously forbidden themes such as Soviet foreign trade (especially arms sales and the trade of natural resources), the Committee for State Security (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti—KGB), statistical data on the economic and social spheres and the ecological situation in the USSR.

Introduction 7 However, the most important shift in Gorbachev’s perception of glasnost’ was in his attitude towards the intelligentsia. In July 1986, after one-and-a-half years in office, Gorbachev first raised the question of the role of the intelligentsia in the process of perestroika. He thought it should provide a strong theoretical basis for perestroika, act as a mouthpiece for glasnost’ and become a source of regeneration of Soviet society. Gorbachev valued the support of the intelligentsia at the beginning of perestroika. However, he did not manage to consolidate the support of its liberal circle. It was convenient for him to work only with the officially organised part of the intelligentsia. Moreover, he was limited by the inability to break loose from his own Marxist–Leninist beliefs.27 According to Cherniaev, Gorbachev was late even with the return of citizenship to Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn,28 the Nobel Prize-winning author who had been stripped of Soviet citizenship in 1974. He was advised to do so by Cherniaev himself, Aleksandr Yakovlev and Georgii Shakhnazarov, and always said during Politburo meetings that he would never agree to it. It was conducted in August 1990 and, according to Cherniaev, should have been done at least two years earlier. Then, it would have been understood as an act of Gorbachev’s will, demonstrating his liberal attitude to the Russian intelligentsia.29 Furthermore, the intelligentsia’s support of glasnost’ and perestroika declined considerably towards the end of 1990. As Judith Deutsch-Kornblatt rightly pointed out, the atmosphere of uncertainty, fear of nearing disintegration and the existing ideological vacuum drew the intelligentsia to search for different solutions, which led to a widespread return to religion and the ROC.30 Glasnost’ and the Soviet intelligentsia failed to educate people to think and speak freely. Even such important developments in the field of glasnost’, as the publication of formerly forbidden dissident and émigré literature, such as Anatolii Rybakov’s Deti Arbata (Children of the Arbat), the screening of banned films and the transfer of books from the special archives to the general collections of libraries, were not able to generate an atmosphere of creative and intellectual growth. Gorbachev noted the deep spiritual crisis of the intelligentsia and its polarisation into liberal and nationalistic camps, very much in accordance with the political atmosphere among the ruling elite.31 The Soviet public became more and more sceptical and apprehensive about glasnost’ and perestroika. The deterioration of daily life because of conditions such as food shortages and the rationing of goods, criminality, ethnic clashes and administrative chaos led to a sharp decline in Gorbachev’s popular authority. According to the All-Union Centre for the Study of Public Opinion, popular approval of Gorbachev sank from fifty-two per cent in December 1989 to twenty-one per cent in October 1990.32 Some prominent intellectuals, such as Evgenii Evtushenko, indicated that glasnost’ led to the inundation in the country by non-professionals in every field and especially among the intelligentsia, thus diminishing its ability to move perestroika forward. The respected and internationally known academician Dmitrii Likhachev called for the moral regeneration of Russian society through developing a culture of memory33 which was closely tied with Russian nationalist ideology and the ROC.

8 Introduction

Gorbachev’s attitude towards religion and the nationality question in the USSR The change in the official attitude towards religion and the intelligentsia during perestroika was caused by the above-mentioned motives: the need to mobilise popular support to move perestroika forward and create a positive image of the USSR in the international arena. Gorbachev wrote very little on his attitude towards religion and the ROC. According to John Anderson, the fear of growing nationalism in the Soviet republics played a major role in his cautious approach towards the process of religious liberalisation.34 His attitude towards religion was still traditional in the Soviet sense, but much less aggressive. Gorbachev understood that war against religion should not entail a war against believers. He believed that religiosity should be channelled along a different course and serve the needs of perestroika. However, he always underlined that the authorities must fight the disintegrating results of religious activities, if such took place.35 The millennium celebrations in 1988 coincided with the nineteenth Party Plenum. Gorbachev realised the problem of prioritising the ROC in such a multinational state as the USSR, and he emphasised during the plenum the need to introduce a change to the church–state relations. Gorbachev’s ambiguous attitude towards religion was reflected also in his attitude towards the nationality question. He did not devote much attention to it as he rose through the ranks. It should be underlined that Gorbachev’s published writings and speeches, prior to his ascension to power, show that he spoke about nationality issues rarely, no more than four times before December 1984, where at the Party Conference he made three comments about the nationality question. First, he called for zero-based budgeting, a direct challenge to the republics’ role in the economy; secondly, he treated the periphery in an undifferentiated way, not giving pride of place to the Union republics over the RSFSR autonomous regions; and thirdly, he appeared to call for an end to affirmative action, arguing that the selection of cadres in both Moscow and the republics should be conducted on the basis of merit and without favouritism.36 In the international arena, Gorbachev’s views were more liberal. During his June 1984 trip to Rome, he claimed that all fifteen Soviet republics should have more power. It was the first time any Soviet official had even admitted there was a nationality problem, much less criticised the concentration of power in Moscow.37 Gorbachev developed his stand towards the nationality question in his book Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World, first published in 1987. He proclaimed his policy on 17 August 1989, shortly before the Supreme Soviet’s long-delayed plenum on the nationality question. In dealing with this issue, Gorbachev constantly emphasised his strong conviction that the present and future of the Soviet Union depended on the consolidation and unity of all its numerous nationalities. During his June 1988 speech to the Party Conference, he stated that it was the patriotic and internationalist duty of every citizen and every communist to cherish and enhance everything that furthers the unity of Soviet society, as the basis for the free development and prosperity of all the people in the USSR.

Introduction 9 Gorbachev also claimed that he was only doing his duty by revitalising Leninist policy towards nationalities. Lenin called for the national autonomy of each ethnic group, together with the international cooperation of all working people.38 Gorbachev believed that it was all in the power of perestroika to correct the mistakes caused by the period of the personality cult under Stalin and the psychology of stagnation under his successors. Moreover, he was positive that the Soviet system was capable of solving inter-ethnic conflicts since it had succeeded in forming a community based on brotherhood, cooperation, respect and mutual assistance. Without it, the USSR would never have had the social, cultural, economic and defence potential that it has then.39 Since from the very beginning Gorbachev’s prime goal was to develop and strengthen the USSR, he was very strict when it came to the possibility of destroying its unity. He continuously repeated that nationalistic and separatist tendencies would not be tolerated. In many ways, it was the ROC that assisted him in this process following its own vested interests to preserve the ecumenical borders of the Moscow Patriarchate. In order to gain full understanding of church–state relations during Gorbachev’s period and their development after the disintegration of the USSR, a multifaceted approach is needed. Subsequent chapters focus on the following issues: the Soviet official attitude towards the ROC, the changes inside the Moscow Patriarchate and the approach of both the official and non-official press. Chapter 1 focuses on the relationship between the ROC and state authorities in modern Russian history, accentuating that Orthodoxy is one of the most important components of Russian national identity. Special attention is paid to the influence of Russia’s geopolitical situation on the shared church–state interests. Chapter 2 investigates the change in the official Soviet policy towards religion in general and the ROC in particular. It also highlights the reasons for the shift in the official attitude towards the ROC after the millennium celebrations. Chapter 3 underlines the perspective of the Moscow Patriarchate and examines the dynamics of its development in association with the official Soviet policy. The ROC continued to provide support for the Soviet foreign policy goals, regarding the interests of the state as its own. Thus, it strengthened its position vis-à-vis the state but did not succeed in its social mission. Chapters 4 and 5 examine church–state relations from the media’s point of view: Chapter 4 discusses the way official Soviet media reflected the alteration in church–state relations, focusing on the way it was presented in four major official newspapers. A general picture of church–state relations, depicted by the official printed media, highlighted Gorbachev’s ideological line, which assigned the Church the role of a guardian of both the USSR’s borders and the Russian religious and cultural heritage. Chapter 5 complements this enquiry by investigating the attitude of the Soviet unofficial press towards Russian Orthodoxy and the Moscow Patriarchate. Soviet alternative press criticised the subjugation of the Church to state authorities, claiming that this was a source of its inability to cooperate with Russian society and preserve Russian spiritual traditions and a way of life. Ivan Il’in in Manifest Russkogo Naroda (The Manifestation of the Russian Nation), quoted in the beginning, observed that the spirit of Orthodoxy defined

10 Introduction national consciousness throughout Russian history and enabled the establishment of the unified state. Thus, Russian spirituality and its national interests were always closely tied together. Religious revival during perestroika and its influence on the ideological and political scene of post-Soviet Russia are part of this process, which could be better understood through the examination of the ROC as an important factor in the political and social arena during the Gorbachev era.

Notes 1 I. A. Il’in, “Za natsional’nuiu Rossiu. Manifest Russkogo Dvizhenia,” http://ivan-article.narod.ru/files/article.pdf (accessed October 12 2016), 6. Ivan Il’in was one of the most widely read and celebrated Russian philosophers of the twentieth century. He stood out among his contemporaries such as N. Berdiaev, L. Shestov and D. Merezhkovskii, for the emphasis he put on the importance of statehood in the social and spiritual revival of Russia. The essay, Za Natsional’nuiu Rossiiu. Manifest Russkogo Dvizhenia, was written in 1937. 2 Ibid. 2. 3 Sonja Luehrmann, Religion in Secular Archives: Soviet Atheism and Historical Knowledge (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 22. 4 Archival collections given alternative perspective, such as Keston Archive, a collection of materials documenting religious persecution under Communist regimes. 5 Ibid. 31. 6 Ibid. 63–64. 7 M. I. Odintsov, Obzor Zhurnala Moskovskoi Patriarkhii za 1986–1988 goda (Moscow: Znanie, 1990). 3. 8 V. Tsipin, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997, Vol. 9 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Spaso-preobrazhenskogo Valaamskogo monastyria, 1997). 9 Stephen Vella, “Newspapers,” in Reading Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century History, eds. Miriam Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann (London: Routledge, 2009). 192. 10 Emil Pain, “The Imperial Syndrome and Its Influence on Russian Nationalism,” in The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–2015, eds. Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016). 50–51. 11 Pal Kolsto, “The Ethnification of Russian Nationalism,” in The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–2015, eds. Pal Kolsto and Helge Blakkisrud (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016). 43. 12 Yuri Slezkine, ‘The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism,’ Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (summer 1994). 443. 13 Glasnost’ almost always is translated as “openness.” The word “lucidity” was chosen since the word glasnost’ originated from the word golos (voice), meaning saying things clearly out loud in a lucid voice. 14 David Aikman, “University Years,” in Mikhail S. Gorbachev: An Intimate Biography, eds. Donald Morrison and Talbot Strobe (London: Time Book, 1988). 65. 15 M. Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World (Glasgow: Fontana, Collins, 1988). 50. 16 Aikman, University Years. 54. 17 Ibid. 54. 18 A. S. Cherniaev, 1991 god—Dnevnik Pomoshnika Prezidenta SSSR (Moscow: Terra Respublika, 1997). 88. 19 Ibid.

Introduction 11 20 “Ob Itogakh Referenduma SSSR, sostoiavshegosia 17 Marta 1991g.: Iz soobschenia tsentral’noi komissii referenduma SSSR,” Izvestiia, March 27 1991. 21 Cherniaev, 1991 god—Dnevnik Pomoshnika Prezidenta SSSR. 403. 22 Boldin, Krushenie Piedestala. 160. 23 A. S. Cherniaev, Shest’ Let s Gorbachevym (Moscow: Progress - Kultura, 1993). 375. 24 Mikhail Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i Reformy, Vol. 1 (Moscow: Novosti, 1995). 316. 25 Ibid. 316. 26 Ibid. 191. 27 Cherniaev, Shest’ Let s Gorbachevym. 277. 28 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (1918–2008), prominent Russian dissident writer, who received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1970 for his books: The First Circle and The Cancer Ward. 29 Cherniaev, 1991 god—Dnevnik Pomoshnika Prezidenta SSSR. 42. 30 Judith Deutsch-Kornblatt, Doubly Chosen: Jewish Identity, the Soviet Intelligentsia, and the Russian Orthodox Church (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2004). 132–133. 31 Gorbachev, Zhizn’ i Reformy. 332. 32 Moscow News, no. 45, November 18–25 1990. 2. 33 Anthony Olcott, “Glasnost’ and Soviet Culture,” in Soviet Society under Gorbachev: Current Trends and the Prospects for Reform, eds. Maurice Friedberg and Isham Heyward (New York: Armonk, 1987). 119. 34 John Anderson, Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and Successor States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 145. 35 Cherniaev, Shest’ Let s Gorbachevym. 93–94. 36 Maurice Friedberg and Isham Heyward, eds., Soviet Society under Gorbachev: Current Trends and the Prospects for Reform (New York: Armonk, 1987). 119. 37 Aikman, University Years. 127. 38 “Platforma KPSS po natsional’noi politike,” Izvestiia, August 17 1989. 1–2. 39 Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World. 118.

1 Servant of the state or faithful ally? Church–state relations in modern Russian history

Was the story of church–state relations in the Soviet pre-perestroika period merely a tale of repression and persecution? The answer to this question is closely connected to the historical legacy of church–state relations in Imperial Russia. The recent historiography of church–state relations in this period has been largely shaped by the different interpretations offered by two leading historians of late Imperial Russia, Gregory Freeze and Richard Pipes. The key point of contention has been whether the Russian Orthodox Church should be characterised as the “handmaiden of the state,” to use Pipes’ evocative phrase, or if it was an institution with rather more independence from the Imperial state. Freeze disputed Pipes’ claim that the ROC was a mere servant of a state, largely because of the Orthodox theology of resignation and submissiveness, claiming that even after Peter the Great’s secularisation reforms the Church preserved its former administrative status and existed as a “parallel institution” to the state apparatus.1 Freeze underlined that even in the early eightieth century there was a divergence of the ROC interests from those of the state, basing his argument on the Holy Synod’s active defence of its institutional interests such as administrative control over monastic lands, properties and finances.2 Moreover, his argument could be reinforced if he took into account important church–state common interests examined by Pipes, for example the need for the state’s support for its efforts in extirpating heresy, protecting Orthodox Christians living under Muslim and Catholic rule and reconquering those parts of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth which once formed part of “Holy Rus’.”3 Pipes also rightly indicated that the whole trend of Orthodox Christianity away from the ecumenical and towards the regional tended to blur the distinctions between church, state and nation.4 He also pointed out that close church–state relations in Russia had deep roots in historical and doctrinal factors, such as the Byzantine idea of “symphonia.” Pipes quoted Emperor Justinian, who defined the idea of symphonia as harmonious relations between secular and ecclesiastical authorities, which in practice meant that, the Emperors participated in some of the most important church functions, including formulation of canon law, summoning of general church councils, and the appointment of bishops. In return, the state used the power at its

Servant of the state or faithful ally? 13 disposal to uphold the decisions of the synods and to maintain on their territory religious orthodoxy. Therefore, imperial authority and church existed in close union and communication with one another, and the one could not be separated from the other.5 Scholars examining how historic relations between church and state have informed the post-communist period have discussed the idea of symphonia.6 Thus, close interrelations between church and state assisted in forming the Russian national idea. Popular opposition to the early eighteenth century reforms, introduced by Peter the Great in his attempt to westernise Russia, facilitated it. He instructed the forceful imposition of western ways of life by commanding Russian nobility to shave their beards and wear western-style clothing. Furthermore, the neglect of the Russian language, the formal abolition of the patriarchal office in 1721 and its replacement by the Holy Synod, and finally the transfer of the Russian New Year from September to January, made Peter appear in the eyes of the common Russian people as the embodiment of the anti-Christ. Therefore, there was a necessity to define a truly Russian spirit, different from the glittering facade of the westernised elite.7 It was best identified by the Russian Orthodox idea of sobornost’ (togetherness). The word derived from the root sobirat’ (to bring together), meaning that, the Church was catholic, not so much because it was spread all over the world as because it brought into one all men, and all in men. In its fellowship each may find the fullest expression of his personality, for it was unity in freedom, as opposed to uniformity and compulsion.8 This religious philosophy of unity was strongly tied to the Russian national character, which renounced individualism and emphasised the organic unity of the Russian family and the peasant community. Those communities were governed by mir, an assembly of elders, which settled controversial matters in accordance with traditional village practice. According to the eminent scholar of Russian religious thought, Nicholai Zernov, the whole of Russia was one large mir, a community of land, faith and custom embracing the entire nation. It was not surprising, therefore, that the word mir means both “peace” and “world” in the Russian language. This sacred unity had its roots in the most important manifestation of Russian culture, i.e. the piety of daily life or bytovoe blagochestie. Zernov claimed that, It was an attempt on the part of the whole nation to find a sacred pattern for its daily life, to incorporate all events and actions in corporate worship. It was also the most powerful link that kept the Russians together... The ritual art of living was expressed in solemn nationwide festivals, in which the Tsar, clergy and people took part, but its manifestations were no less devoutly observed in every Russian home. It controlled the behaviour of the individual as much as did all the official functions of Church and State.9

14  Servant of the state or faithful ally? This national-religious idea of the ROC as an embodiment of spiritual unity and the purity of the human soul, propagated by the Slavophiles, was later used by the Pan-Slavists for the political and military strengthening of the Russian Empire. During the reign of Nikolai I, this idea evolved into the official formula of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality” or as it was also called, a “Theory of Official Nationality,” proclaimed on 2 April 1833 by the Minister of Education, Count Sergei Uvarov. This chapter focuses on the analysis of the interrelations between Russian national sentiment, the ROC and state authorities during the Soviet pre-perestroika period.10 The influence of Russia’s geopolitical situation on church–state relations, which became even more apparent when Russian Orthodoxy was replaced by a new secular ideology, will be emphasised.

Marxist and Leninist attitudes towards religion The Marxist and Leninist approaches towards religion, and especially their differences, are essential for understanding church–state relations from the period immediately following the October Revolution to the outbreak of World War II. Marxist dogma regarded religion as the “opium of the people” and a direct weapon of capitalism. As Lenin wrote in “On Socialist Ideology and Culture,” religion “serves to defend exploitation and stupefy the working class.”11 According to Karl Marx, the social principles of Christianity were especially dangerous since they advocated the necessity of ruling oppressed classes. Moreover, church leadership justified violent acts, claiming them to be either the just punishment of original sin and other sins or trials that the Lord in his infinite wisdom imposed on those redeemed. Furthermore, and far more importantly, Christianity advocated passivity, owing to the belief that the end is near and there is no need to change the status quo.12 Lenin echoed the ideas of Marx and Engels concerning religion in general. Political interests, however, influenced his attitude towards Russian Orthodoxy. As early as 1908, Lenin was ready to admit the vital role of religion in Russian culture. According to the historian Harvey Fireside, he realised that Russian Orthodoxy had more than just a spiritual influence on the Russian people: “The priest lived side by side with the peasant and was tied to him by a thousand circumstances… [he was seen as a] fearless and resolute defender of the peasantry and the people.”13 Therefore, Lenin saw in Russian Orthodoxy an important potentially unifying force that should be incorporated into the revolutionary movement. He realised that for the success of the socialist revolution in Russia a national alliance was needed which would not disrupt the unity of the working class. Lenin certainly did not wish to promote the flourishing of Russian Orthodoxy, but he was also very careful not to promote a war against the Church. John Curtiss claimed that the infrequent references to religion in Lenin’s writings indicated that he regarded it as an issue of minor importance.14 Fireside, on the other hand, asserted that Lenin understood the importance of the national-religious factor and insisted on steering a safe middle passage between the anarchism

Servant of the state or faithful ally? 15 of all-out war against the Church and the opportunism of inaction, or a strict laissez-faire attitude to religion.15 The war against religion seemed to be the greater danger in his eyes as well, as it might in a country where the bulk of the population still proclaimed their loyalty to the ancestral faith. Moreover, Lenin in his writings agreed with Engels and proclaimed that the gradual process of atheistic education would lead to the “dying out of religion,” while waging a full-scale war against it would, on the contrary, antagonise the working class and lead them away from the socialist cause.16

Bolshevism, religion and revolution Shortly before and immediately after the October Revolution, the ROC maintained an extreme anti-Bolshevik attitude. The Church leaders accused Bolsheviks of betraying Russian national interests by aligning them with Germans. Moskovskie Tserkovnye Vedomosti (Moscow Church Gazette) stated that, “the work of the traitors and betrayers who have received German money and who call themselves Bolsheviks had borne its fruit...Those who promised the people all sorts of blessings and called for peace with the Germans have sold Russia.”17 Thus, the Church assumed the responsibility of guarding Russian national interests in the face of foreign threats. The question of the Patriarch’s election was the most important one during the 1917 Local Council. The Patriarch was seen not only as a religious authority but also as a national leader who would protect the interests of Russia during troubled times. Bishop Mitrofan declared at the Council, “When war is going on, a single leader is needed, without whom the troops fall into disunity; we need an instrument of gathering together, of unifying Rus’.”18 It is also important to emphasise that the Bolshevik regime was regarded as an unstable one. It was not a foregone conclusion that the Bolsheviks would retain their tentative hold on power more than several months. Therefore, at the first Local Council meeting in December 1917, it was decided that state laws related to the ROC must be issued in agreement with the Church. The ROC should maintain priority over other confessions, and its property could not be confiscated without the concession of the Church authorities.19 Those decisions were reinforced by Patriarch Tikhon’s denunciation of the Bolshevik regime. He urged believers not to have any connection with the Bolsheviks and even gave strict directions to parents urging them to renounce their children if they were Bolsheviks.20 Despite the fact that Soviet authorities permitted the reinstatement of the Patriarchate, they aimed to restrict its power. The Bolsheviks issued several decrees, which sought to undermine the authority and influence of the Church. The decree nationalising all land was issued on 4 December 1917, damaging the economic interests of the Church.21 The most important decree on the Freedom of Conscience, Church and Religious Societies, issued on 20 January 1918, established the principle of a completely secular state, made religion a private matter and deprived all religious bodies of their property, their legal status, the right to maintain schools and all subsidies from the government. Shortly afterwards, on 16

16  Servant of the state or faithful ally? February, Metropolitan of Kiev Vladimir was barbarously murdered. He was the one who handed to Patriarch Tikhon on 21 November 1917 the staff of Metropolitan Peter, symbol of the patriarchal power. The murder of clergymen who opposed state power continued until 6 March. The ROC reacted immediately. The Holy Synod issued a resolution, which was called to investigate all instances of arrests and murder during religious manifestations. Moreover, on 24 March, Archdeacon Rozov declared anathema on heretics and detractors of the Holy Faith encroaching on church property and killing priests.22 The Local Council hastened to condemn the new legislation in a message complaining of the violence of the persons in power, who were attacking the very existence of the Orthodox Church. The Orthodox faithful were summoned to unite around the churches and monastic cloisters for the defence of Church valuables.23 Patriarch Tikhon condemned the regime’s foreign policy decisions, such as the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, concluding that it was not the peace desired by the Russian people because it left tens of millions of Orthodox believers under foreign domination. At the same time, Tikhon maintained contact with the Tsar and his family in their Tobol’sk imprisonment. When they were killed by the Soviets on the night of 17 July 1918, the Patriarch announced that, “the killing of the Sovereign without a trial was the very greatest of crimes, and ...those who do not condemn this crime will be guilty of his blood.”24 It was clear that Orthodox religious authorities were openly resisting the Bolshevik regime, as far as they believed in its instability. However, it was also evident that Lenin did not wish to abolish the Church despite the hostile behaviour of its leaders. Soviet authorities did close churches or chapels in government buildings and palaces, but few parish churches were closed.25 The Bolsheviks needed the peasantry’s support for the Revolution and closing parish churches could antagonise believers and incite opposition to the Soviet authorities. Even after the October 1918 message of the Patriarch to the Council of People’s Commissars, which accused state authorities of very unjust treatment of the Russian Orthodox Church, including unjustified arrests and executions of the clergy, he was only put under house arrest and no other steps were taken against him. Tikhon probably realised that no harm would befall him and therefore did not even bother to conceal the message.26 At the same time, different trends started to develop inside the ROC. Some clergymen began to recognise the Council of People’s Commissars as the de facto ruler of Russia and started to prepare the ground for possible cooperation in future. In the autumn of 1918, the Moscow Local Council ended its activity. Among its last decisions was a decree concerning the involvement of the ROC in the political life of the country. This decree stated that there would be no such thing as “Church politics,” meaning that church members who might become involved in politics would not voice any political opinion in the name of the Church. Their political activity should not harm its interests.27 Later, in October 1919, Patriarch Tikhon himself, in a letter addressed to the clergy, claimed that the Church must not tie itself to any kind of government or administration. It must stand above politics and must not belong to any political party. In closing, he urged the clergy to follow

Servant of the state or faithful ally?  17 the commandment of the Apostle to keep away from those working for dissension and strife and to refrain from political parties and utterances.28 Patriarch Aleksii II, following the putsch against Gorbachev in August 1991, repeated this message almost word for word. Both historical periods were characterised by political instability, while the Church was using the neutral path, thus securing its position as the central unifying force. The gradual acceptance of the Bolshevik regime by the Church leaders coincided with the consolidation of their power. During the Russian Civil War (1918–1921), Soviet authorities tried very hard to prevent clergy from conducting religious-educational activity. Mikhail Pokrovskii, Vice Commissar of Education, ruled that priests must not teach or have any function at all in any school, and even ex-priests were permitted to teach only with the special authorisation of the commissariat.29 Education was especially important for the Bolsheviks since the future of the regime lay in the right upbringing of the new Soviet generation. Anti-religious activity such as the relic exposure campaign launched on 1 February 1919 was strengthened during the Civil War. Robert Greene explored in depth the subject of the veneration of saints and their relics emphasising how both Imperial and Bolshevik regimes used this popular practice to attain their different ends. In the case of the Bolsheviks, the campaign of “exhumation” was used to shutter popular religiosity.30 The special commission exposed the relics of saints in front of the clergy and believers. If it was found that they were not entirely preserved, this circumstance was presented as a deliberate deception of the masses and used in the anti-religious campaign.31 Nevertheless, the authorities apparently took every precaution not to hurt the feelings of the believers. A good example was the ruling of the Soviet government on the removal of icons from public buildings, which decreed that the process should not resemble an anti-religious demonstration but must be done when as few people as possible were present. Furthermore, the icons so removed were not to be destroyed but should be placed in the already functioning churches.32 In the winter of 1919, the Commissar of Internal Affairs issued a warning stating that communists, when dealing with clergy, must not in any way insult believers and oppress religion and state officials should in no way permit their acts to show a feeling of hostility and scorn.33 Often those directions were not executed properly. In 1919, Sergei Mitskevich34 in a personal appeal to Lenin complained about the unfit behaviour of some revolutionaries, such as “revealing the relics of the saints to the public, smoking in the church and staying with their hats near the altar.”35 On the other hand, the Bolsheviks conducted a very uncompromising policy towards monasteries, which represented the economic power of the Church. In 1920, the Commissariat of Justice defined its policy towards monasteries, calling for “painless but full liquidation of the monasteries, as chief centres of churchmen’s influence, as nurseries of parasitism, and as powerful screws in the exploiting machine of the old ruling classes.”36 From a note written by Felix Dzerzhinskii (head of the Emergency Committee ChEKA) to Martin Latsis (department director in ChEKA), dated December 1920, it is clear that there were plans to destroy the Church. However, Soviet authorities emphasised that it should be done carefully. They thought that attention should be concentrated on the mass of the common

18  Servant of the state or faithful ally? priests: “It is only with the help of this mass that we [the ChEKA] would be able to destroy the Church, through prolonged, intense and painstaking work.”37 The ROC leaders, however, began to accept the Soviet authorities, partly because this was the only way to ensure the continuity of religious practice and partly because of the dawning realisation that the Bolsheviks were gaining increasing support from ordinary people. Patriarch Tikhon’s address to Lenin and Mikhail Kalinin (head of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee from 1919 to 1946) in August 1920 acknowledged that the RSFSR Constitution, adopted on 10 July 1918, proclaimed and guaranteed full freedom of conscience. He also agreed that the principle of church–state separation should guide church–state relations in future, providing the ROC with at least seeming sovereignty.38 The Church officials’ growing acceptance of the Bolshevik regime as the legitimate power, while the Soviet authorities were careful not to destroy the national alliance by provoking the Church against the regime, marked church–state relations during the Civil War period. The Church was needed to perform its historic role as a unifying force. At times when the Soviet authorities were more confident of their survival, anti-religious measures were reinforced. The beginning of this process was evident during the period of the famine and continued throughout the communist period. The calamity of the famine period (1921–1923), which was largely caused by drought, affecting wide areas of the Volga region and some parts of Ukraine, provided the Soviet authorities with a unique opportunity to discredit the Russian Orthodox Church. The Soviet regime had survived the Civil War, which undoubtedly helped to build up its confidence. Therefore, it could now engage in a more straightforward battle against the Church. Church officials, on the other hand, offered to support the state. In a letter of summer 1921, Patriarch Tikhon addressed the people of the world and all Orthodox believers, pleading to help the country, which in better times used to provide for others.39 Although, according to Paul Gabel, he was encouraged by Lenin, through a mediator, to appeal for the foreign aid,40 he most probably did it also of his own accord. State authorities, in return, demanded the surrender of the church valuables to Pomosch Golodaiuschim (Aid for the Starving). Tikhon agreed to surrender only unconsecrated articles. His reaction was followed by a government order of February 1922 allowing the total confiscation of the Church possessions.41 Lenin could not agree to accept voluntary help on the part of the Church, since this action would raise its image in the eyes of the common people. Thus, on 19 March 1922, he distributed among the Politburo members a secret instruction calling for the repression of the ROC, which stated, “The famine is the one opportunity when we can, with great success, defeat our enemy and secure our positions for the decade to come.”42 Soviet policy against the Church concentrated on winning the support of the parish clergy, as illustrated by the letter of Dzerzhinskii to Latsis quoted above, and on the attacks against Church leaders. Thus, Patriarch Tikhon was accused of collaboration with the Karlovatskii Sobor, established by a group of émigré bishops on 21 November 1921 in the Serbian town of Sremskii Karlovatskii. Tikhon legitimised the Sobor while under arrest, authorising the bishops to form a

Servant of the state or faithful ally? 19 temporary diocesan government in the event they lost contact with central Church administration. The Karlovatskii Sobor formed a schismatic Higher Church Administration Abroad, presided over by the reactionary Metropolitan Antonii Khrapovitskii of Kiev and Kharkov.43 John Shelton Curtiss claims that Tikhon’s charge indicated that the “calamity experienced by Russia is the result of the wild, perverted, bloody regime of the butchers of Russia.”44 He adds that Soviet authorities were especially angered by the appeal of Metropolitan Antonii, on the part of the Karlovatskii Sobor, to the Genoa Conference. The message warned the people of the world against collaboration with the Bolsheviks.45 The Soviet government responded with the arrest, trial and condemnation of many churchmen, among them Metropolitan Veniamin of Petrograd and Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev.46 Patriarch Tikhon himself was put on trial and kept under house arrest. In one of his interrogations during the trial, the Patriarch explained his stand without admitting his counter-revolutionary activity.47 Soviet authorities also tried to weaken the Church by creating the Living Church, a movement that gained considerable support among the parish clergy. The Living Church advocated the total surrender of Church valuables to the Soviet authorities. According to the Central Committee’s report on anti-religious activities, from November 1922, Living Church officials promoted a resolution which proclaimed 7 November a religious holiday. In Tambov, on the fifth anniversary of the October Revolution, 4 Living Church bishops, 20 clergymen and 600 laymen participated in the collective prayer, thus demonstrating their loyalty to the Soviet regime.48 The flourishing of the Living Church was interrupted by Tikhon’s statement to the Supreme Court made on 27 June 1923. This was a Declaration of Loyalty towards the Soviet power in which he confessed his counter-revolutionary activity: All my anti-Soviet acts, except for a few inaccuracies, are set forth in the indictment of the Supreme Court. Recognising the correctness of the court in bringing me to trial according to the articles of the Criminal Code indicated in the indictment, I repent of these actions against the state order and ask the Supreme Court to free me from arrest.49 According to Curtiss, Patriarch Tikhon confessed that since “the weight of the evidence shown to him during his imprisonment was so convincing that he, fearing to suffer the fate of Metropolitan Veniamin, listened to the arguments of his captors and secured release by admitting guilt.”50 Curtiss’s explanation, however, seems unlikely. Tikhon probably understood that if the authorities really wanted to harm him they would do so despite the confession. Most probably, he realised his confession was the only way to save the ROC from the growing influence of the Living Church and that the Bolsheviks were going to last for a long time; therefore, they should be accepted as a secular power, which could not be neglected. From that point on, the Patriarch pursued a strictly pro-Soviet policy. The reasons given by researchers concerning the rationale behind the release of the Patriarch indicate that he was probably destined to come to no harm from the very

20  Servant of the state or faithful ally? beginning. According to Fireside, the government “was yielding to mounting protests from abroad over the anticlerical purge...and was causing Britain to threaten withdrawal of her trade mission to the Soviet Union.”51 Gleb Rahr claimed that Lenin was probably not willing to make “a second Germogen out of Patriarch Tikhon.” The latter was proclaimed a martyr and glorified as a saint on 12 May 1913, for his firm stand against the Polish invaders in 1611–1612. According to Rahr, the direct reason for Tikhon’s release was the ultimatum put to the Soviet government by the Archbishop of Canterbury.52 The testament prepared by Tikhon just before his death proved his total loyalty to the Soviet regime and reaffirmed the old tradition of the ROC towards any kind of Russian secular authority. In it, he declared that the Soviet power, which by the will of God had come to head the Russian state, had issued the declaration of separation of the church from the state and of freedom of conscience, which he felt gave the Orthodox Church the necessary rights for its existence. Hence, Tikhon called on the people and clergy to join him in welcoming the workers and peasant’s government. Finally, he called on the clergy to submit to the Soviet authorities, remembering the words of the Apostle, “that there is no power not from God.”53 Patriarch Tikhon’s last will was strictly observed by the ROC leaders who followed him, and the ROC support for the Soviet state was augmented during the Stalin period.

The rehabilitation of the Church before and during World War II In order to understand the change in Soviet policy towards Russian Orthodoxy in the pre-war period, it is important to understand the nature of the Stalinist regime. During this time, the whole concept of the socialist revolution was undergoing a change. The international socialist revolution was made national with the Stalinist idea of “socialism in one country.” Reasons connected with the USSR’s position in the international arena during the 1930s had also fostered a change of policy towards religion. Several foreign threats destabilised the USSR’s international position, calling for inner mobilisation, such were the rising dangers from Germany following the signing of the German–Polish pact in 1934, from Japan after its invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and the fear that western powers (namely Britain and France) would encourage rising German and Japanese militarism to turn towards the USSR. There was also another reason, which undoubtedly encouraged adjustment of the Soviet religious policy. This was the 1939 division of Poland between Hitler and Stalin. In the occupied territories, there were four million Orthodox citizens and approximately 1,200 parishes with their own churches, a theological seminary in Kremenets and four Orthodox bishops. This meant that the number of ruling bishops in the USSR was doubled and that the number of open churches increased by forty per cent compared to the pre-war figure.54 The Soviet authorities were compelled to consider this fact. Moreover, they realised that this great mass of Orthodox believers could be loyal to the Soviet state if allowed to practise their religion with relative freedom. Fireside rightly mentions that if the Church was

Servant of the state or faithful ally? 21 not yet considered in the official eyes to be a positive force, at least it was clearly a lesser evil than non-Orthodox denominations, particularly Catholicism, which could become an ally of the Germans if the question of war arose.55 Thus, Stalin called upon the Patriarchate to bring the churches of the newly acquired territories under its control.56 In doing so, he was aware of the unifying ability of the Church, since the Moscow Patriarchate had always “maintained a clear policy of demanding discipline and exercising authority throughout the lands and among the peoples of the Russian Empire.”57 However, the most interesting and important feature in Stalin’s policy of tolerance towards religion was its theoretical justification given by the communist authorities. Christianity in general was proclaimed a “progressive religion.” Antireligioznik (Antireligious), a journal of scientific methods of anti-religious propaganda, organ of the USSR’s Union of Militant Atheists, was published in Moscow from 1926 until June 1941. Since 1960, it has been replaced by the journal Nauka i Religiia (Science and Religion). It proclaimed on the front page of its first 1939 issue that Christianity was a substantially new religious movement. It did not allow racial or national discrimination. It recognised the dignity of the “abstract man” and asserted the equality of men independent of their social status. Among early Christians, revolt against the existing social order was the rule. Early communities were democratic, and their spirit was revolutionary.58 Moreover, the Christianisation of Russia was no longer portrayed as a reactionary step, since it favoured the advance of culture and laid the foundation of Russian art and literature.59 In addition, Timasheff underlines that the patriotic nature of the Russian Orthodox Church was emphasised. The figure of the Grand Duke Alexandr Nevskii, who protected Rus’ against the invasion of Germans and Swedes, was hailed despite the fact that, “[he] was considered a saint by the Orthodox Church and that many churches and monasteries have been dedicated to him.”60 Theoretical discussion in Antireligioznik article was followed by political activity. Direct, violent attacks against the masses of believers were stopped. Furthermore, Soviet officials underlined that an attempt to liquidate religion was not in the interests of the Soviet state. Now again, as in the period of the Civil War, the Church was viewed as a centralising power very close to the hearts of the Russian people. However, it is important to note that the persecution of the clergy continued, especially following the tension that mounted after the killing of Sergei Kirov, first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee, in 1934. The ROC was accused of taking part in the conspiracy. In November 1937, a lengthy article in Izvestiia reported clerical participation in the widespread plots. A certain Bishop D. was named as an active agent of the German Gestapo engaged in building up a spying and terrorist organisation near Moscow.61 Side by side with the continuation of the anti-religious propaganda, although perhaps on a lesser scale, the Soviet authorities emphasised the importance of Russian traditional art and morality, concepts closely connected with the Orthodox way of life. The tradition of icon painting and restoration was revived by the artisans of the townships of Mstera and Palekha (near Nizhny Novgorod). Moreover, discreditable behaviour of the communist youth was juxtaposed with

22  Servant of the state or faithful ally? the values and behaviour of those who adhered to the old tradition.62 The administration of the new religious policy was, among other things, undoubtedly aimed to enhance patriotic feelings in the hearts of the Russian people. This objective could not be achieved without considerable concessions to the ROC. It is important to accentuate that from the very beginning of the young Bolshevik state’s existence to the end of World War II, the Soviet leaders constantly perceived the importance of Russian Orthodoxy to the national feelings of the Russian people. Their tactics concerning religion consistently considered this fact. At times of foreign threats, as on the eve of World War II, when national unification and an increase of patriotic feelings were needed, the attitude towards the Russian Church was relatively lenient. This led to the strong church–state partnership during the war. During the perestroika period, positive change towards the ROC was dictated by similar motives, the need to mobilise the nation for the goals of perestroika and unification of the USSR. The period of World War II brought out most vividly the patriotic nature of the Moscow Patriarchate, on the one hand, and the growing recognition on the part of the Soviet officials of the immense influence of the Church, on the other. It was mentioned before that the Soviet authorities considerably improved their attitude towards the ROC in the second half of the 1930s. The most outstanding feature in the early war period was the unequivocal patriotism on the part of the ROC. It provided both moral and financial support for the Soviet war effort. At the outbreak of the German attack on the USSR on 22 June 1941, Metropolitan Sergii immediately sent a message to all Orthodox parishes telling of the aggression of the fascist robbers, who again aimed to enslave the Russian people. He reminded believers that their ancestors were able to win wars only because they always remembered their holy duty to their Motherland and faith. Sergii also mentioned that the ROC always shared the fate of the people. He concluded the message by saying that the Church of Christ blessed all the Orthodox participating in the defence of the sacred frontiers of our fatherland.63 On 26 June 1941, during his speech in the Bogoiavlenskii Cathedral in Moscow, Metropolitan Sergii promptly declared that it is the duty of all to defend their country and warned that Christianity would suffer at the hands of the Germans.64 The first active steps taken by the Church were in the form of financial support. On 23 February 1942, the churches and the clergy of Moscow donated 1,500,000 roubles to the Red Army Fund.65 In his speech on 26 June, Sergii also mentioned another very important theme, believers’ behaviour in the German-occupied territories. He admonished the Orthodox “not to commit the sin of lagging in the defence of their country,” and assured them, out of his own knowledge of German nature, that Russian people would soon prove terribly mistaken if they thought the enemy would not attack their sanctuaries or their beliefs.66 The situation in the occupied territories should be given special attention. According to Alexeev, the tremendous religious revival that took place in the USSR territory under German occupation strongly influenced the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards religion.67 German intelligence reports revealed strong attachment of the population to the Orthodox way of life despite the years of

Servant of the state or faithful ally? 23 Bolshevik anti-religious propaganda. It was clear from statements made by various Orthodox believers that they had longed greatly for a church life, which corresponded to their own particular needs.68 As it became clear from the reports of the German Action Groups, the attitude of the military government to the Church was generally sympathetic. German troops in southern Ukraine allowed the reopening of the churches.69 However, the most significant sign of the persistent clinging of the population to the Orthodox way of life was the fact that even Soviet officials and Red Army soldiers in the occupied territories found themselves in very close relations with the Church. According to Alexeev, the number of baptisms increased noticeably. In 1940, 400 children were baptised—more than three times the pre-war number. Even communists and NKVD members had their children baptised.70 The Moscow Patriarchate also conducted a strong pro-Soviet policy in the occupied territories. Both the acting Patriarch and Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev urged their followers to support the partisans fighting the Nazis.71 Moreover, the strong patriotic attitude of the Church was expressed in its attitude towards Stalin. He, as the Great Russian leaders before him, was perceived to be “the anointed leader of the nation, who would lead to victory.”72 According to Steven Merritt Miner, Stalin’s main aim in the borderlands occupation policy was to neutralise and subjugate the Roman Catholic, Uniate and Jewish communities. Moreover, to the end of 1942, the ROC was used to reinforce the Russian Orthodox elements in the western regions. The Moscow Patriarchate consequently claimed jurisdiction over most of the western borderlands, thus helping to impose the Soviet rule and act against the local resistance.73 Soviet religious propaganda in the newly occupied territories and the conduct of the Moscow Patriarchate once again underlined the mutual interests of both parties in the field of Soviet foreign affairs. Soviet authorities showed a somewhat hesitant attitude to the ROC. At first, they were unsure of Metropolitan Sergii’s behaviour if he were to find himself under German occupation. The head of the Russian Church was evacuated from Moscow to Simbirsk (later named Ulyanovsk) on 14 October 1941 despite his illness. At that time, the Germans were positioned near Moscow.74 Nevertheless, the idea that the Soviet authorities were suspicious towards the Patriarch, and therefore evacuated him, seemed somewhat strange if one would take into account Sergii’s earlier patriotic statements. Fireside noted that “persons whose loyalty had been in doubt were executed by the Red Army before it gave up towns to the Germans and some four hundred priests may have been among their number.”75 Later, however, the Soviet authorities gained confidence in the support of the ROC and the situation started to change for the better. Massive anti-religious propaganda was stopped at the time Sergii was evacuated. The main anti-religious journals: Bezbozhnik (Godless) and Antireligioznik (Antireligious) had ceased publication during September and October 1941, respectively, officially because of paper shortages.76 During the Easter of 1942, the curfew in Moscow was lifted so that people could attend night services.77 However, according to Alexander Werth, who visited Moscow during the summer of 1942, Moscow churches had a very poor appearance

24  Servant of the state or faithful ally? and there was no massive attendance on a day-to-day basis.78 Significant change in church–state relations took place only in 1943.

From 1943 to the post-war period According to Alexeev, the major change in the Soviet attitude towards the ROC took place in 1943, the year that marked the beginning of the German army’s retreat. The seizure by the Red Army of territories formerly occupied by the Germans presented the Soviet government with a new situation. Thousands of churches and their congregations, which were re-established during the German occupation, had to be dealt with.79 Perhaps this was one of the reasons for the improvement in church–state relations. However, one cannot ignore the fact that those relations had improved considerably towards 1942. It should also be noted that Stalin had realised the value of Russian Orthodoxy and its contribution to the Soviet war effort. Moreover, the Soviet government regarded the Church as an important foreign policy factor, which could assist in overcoming the mistrust of the western powers towards the Soviet state. The ROC played a major role in the Soviet propaganda operation aimed at preserving the anti-Hitler coalition. Miner notes that Stalin’s justification for the dissolution of Comintern on 22 May 1943 was aimed at persuading American and British public opinion that the advance of the Soviet Army westwards was unthreatening. It was done to counter the claim that Moscow was instructing communist parties in various countries to act in accordance with Soviet foreign policy interests. Furthermore, ROC officials were instructed to re-establish close relations with the Anglican Church.80 Thus, all the above-mentioned considerations accounted for the improvement in the Soviet official attitude towards Russian Orthodoxy in 1943. In August 1943, Stalin received Patriarch locum tenens Sergii, who had recently returned from Ulyanovsk, in the Kremlin, together with metropolitans Nikolai and Aleksii. After the meeting, Stalin announced that there would be no objections from the government to the election of the new Patriarch.81 Moreover, Russian Orthodoxy gained official recognition with the establishment of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church. Its first chairman, Georgii Karpov, sometimes was called by the people Narkombog (People’s Commissar for God) or Narcomopium (People’s Commissar for Opium).82 Together with an official recognition of Russian Orthodoxy, several other concessions were made by the state. First, every effort was made to reintegrate the clergy belonging to the Living Church into the Moscow Patriarchate. Organised theological instruction was permitted again, and “even the rules on the religious instruction of children were greatly relaxed...while religious instruction was not permitted in the public schools…parents had the right to allow the priest such instruction at home.”83 Moreover, after a period of 8 years, the Patriarchate was permitted to print a monthly bulletin, Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii.84 Furthermore, a number of ecclesiastics were officially regarded as national heroes: a medal for the defence of Leningrad was awarded in 1943 to Metropolitan Aleksii and Metropolitan Nikolai of Kiev and a group of clergy from Moscow and Tula were awarded medals for the defence of Moscow in October 1944.85

Servant of the state or faithful ally? 25 The Church, for its part, reinforced the Red Army with moral and especially financial support. The Dmitrii Donskoi tank column was built exclusively with the money donated by the Church. The fact that the Soviet tank column was named after the Russian prince, who won the battle of Kulikovo in the fourteenth century, indicated once again the need for the Russian national idea during periods of crisis. At the beginning of the 1990s, contribution of the Russian clergy to the final Soviet victory over the Germans was accentuated by the Russian nationalistic press. Russkii Vestnik (Russian Herald) wrote that Moscow parishes alone transmitted three million roubles to the Defence Fund. In the besieged Leningrad, the sum reached almost six million roubles.86 The ROC regarded World War II as a Holy War. When in January 1944 the Dmitrii Donskoi tank column was presented to the Red Army, Metropolitan Nikolai addressed the soldiers with the following words: “Chase the hated enemy out of our great Rus’. Let the glorious name of Dmitrii Donskoi lead you to battle for our holy Russian soil. Forward to victory, brother-warriors!”87 Meanwhile, in the rear, the Church was also performing the social role of giving asylum to the homeless. Many houses of worship were transformed into hospitals.88 The total support of Church officials for the Soviet government and especially for Stalin was evident also from an interview given by the Patriarch to Izvestiia after the victory of the Allied forces in 1945. He claimed that, “the most important thing the Russian Orthodox Church did during wartime was to demonstrate to the whole world its complete unity with its government and leaders.”89 This kind of support for the Soviet regime during the war and especially the admiration of Stalin signified a pattern in church–state relations throughout Russian history. From the Muscovite period, the Church was always behind the strong power, which could bring glory to the Russian lands and defend its people and faith from foreign intrusion. Stalin was depicted as a strong leader, much like Ivan the Terrible. Both the Church and the state acted as partners who depended upon each other. Towards the end of the war, close church–state relations continued. The ROC became an aid to the Soviet foreign policy. It assisted the reoccupation of enemy-held territory by dealing with the consequences of the foreign, especially Catholic, religious revival, which had taken place under German occupation.90 In an appeal to the people of the world, the ROC officials declared that people should, “raise their voices against the efforts of those, particularly the Vatican, who are seeking by their utterances to shield Hitlerite Germany from responsibility for all the crimes committed by it.”91 The Russian Church also strengthened its ties with countries in the Near East. Among the first political actions taken by the newly elected Patriarch Aleksii I, was a visit to Cairo, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Damascus and Beirut, in May 1945. This was the first patriarchal visit to the region in the history of the Russian Church.92 These visits, on the one hand, served to secure Soviet political influence in the Middle East, and on the other, widened the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate. Daniela Kalkandjieva analysed the ecclesiastical motives of the Moscow Patriarchate when collaborating with the Soviet state between 1917 and 1948, which also served Soviet foreign policy. She observed that by reinstating the Moscow

26  Servant of the state or faithful ally? Patriarchate’s jurisdiction over local Orthodox communities in the western borderlands during 1939–1941, the ROC restored the integrity of its canonical territory almost to its former imperial borders. Moreover, Kalkandjieva claims that the collaboration of the Moscow Patriarchate with the Soviet state during World War II was necessary to overcome the ROC international isolation. Soviet diplomacy also played an important role in the recognition of Metropolitan Sergii as the legitimate leader of the ROC.93 The Soviet authorities continued with a favourable attitude towards the Church after the end of the war. In the spring of 1947, the Patriarch invited the heads of all Orthodox churches to Moscow.94 This gathering was approved by the state before the assembly of the Conference on European Economic Cooperation in Paris on 12 July 1947, where the Marshall Plan was introduced. The other major event was the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the ROC autocephalous status in Moscow in July 1948. In the immediate post-war period, there was also a marked expansion in theological education.95 Kalkandjieva argues that Patriarch Aleksii I continued to expand the Moscow Patriarchate’s canonical jurisdiction and administrative authority over the Orthodox communities in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, thus assisting Soviet foreign policy goals.96 Stalin’s positive attitude towards the Church was influenced by his realisation that a Russian nationalist revival, which was badly needed during the war period, was not possible without the participation of the Church and his understanding of the valuable assistance of the Moscow Patriarchate in improving the USSR’s international position. Overall, one can say that from 1917 to the early post-war period church–state relations in the Soviet Union were quite complex. The Church accepted the authority of the Bolsheviks only when it had finally realised its strength. Patriarch Tikhon’s address to Lenin and Kalinin in August 1920, where he recognised the principle of church–state separation as a guiding line in church–state relations, was the first instance of open support towards the Soviet regime. The most convincing example of such support was the period of World War II. On the other hand, the Soviet authorities also understood the fact that Russian nationalism and Russian Orthodoxy were strongly intertwined. Therefore, the Church as an institution could not be subjected to total destruction, especially at times of foreign threat and uncertainty. Then, Russian Orthodoxy was mostly needed for the mass mobilisation of the people. During World War II and in the early post-war period, the Soviet government, for the needs of propaganda, used both Russian nationalism and the Church. Towards the end of the war and in the early 1950s, the ROC was particularly useful as an aid to Soviet foreign policy. This tendency continued during Khrushchev’s time, despite the fact that the attitude of the Soviet authorities towards religion worsened considerably.

Khrushchev’s anti-religious policy and Russian nationalism The years when Khrushchev was at the height of his power were characterised by a renewed aggression against religion in general and the ROC in particular.

Servant of the state or faithful ally?  27 The number of active Orthodox parishes in the immediate post-war years was usually estimated somewhere between 20,000 and 22,000. Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign secured the closure of at least half, possibly even as many as two-thirds, of these.97 At first sight, this may come as a surprise since Khrushchev’s domestic policy was known for its relaxation of the strictures of the Stalin years. According to John Anderson, despite Khrushchev’s reformism and general attempt to humanise Soviet society, he never quite reconciled the dilemma of encouraging popular initiative while insuring that it moved in the right direction.98 Furthermore, it is important to underline how Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign influenced the rise of an underground Russian nationalist movement and in what way the ROC motivated renewed interest in Russian heritage and traditions. After the death of Stalin, Soviet authorities gave no clear instructions concerning church–state relations. The Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church together with the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults repeatedly sent the government and the Central Committee proposals for uniting the two bodies. No response was given in either 1953 or 1954.99 At that time, Malenkov appeared as the most influential politician. He retained the office of premier for two years (March 1953–February 1955), during which he was known for his liberal views, especially concerning international relations. He openly opposed nuclear armament, declaring that nuclear war could lead to global destruction. Thus, in the absence of clear guidelines from the Soviet authorities and a generally liberal atmosphere in the Soviet society, a revival of the country’s religious life took place in the second half of 1953. The number of petitions from believers for opening churches increased sharply. In 1953, 990 petitions were submitted, and in 1954, their number grew to 1,361. The Educational Committee of the Moscow Patriarchate took steps to strengthen the financial base of the institutions for theological education and to raise the levels of teaching and training. The number of those wishing to study in institutions for theological education increased each year from the late Stalin’s period. In 1950, the number of applicants was 269; in 1951, 400; in 1952, 496 and in 1953, 560.100 Unlike Malenkov, Khrushchev represented the ideological hardliner even prior to his ascension to the post of General Secretary. This was reflected in his attitude towards religion. He ordered the preparation of the Central Committee’s resolution entitled, “Serious shortcomings in the scientific-atheistic propaganda and the measures for improving it.” It was published on 7 July 1954 in Pravda. The resolution noted that the ROC and various religious sects had intentionally revived their activity and increasingly spread religious ideology among people, thus poisoning their consciousness with a religious narcotic.101 Khrushchev’s religious policy in many ways reflected the tone of the above-mentioned resolution. He initiated the campaign for the tightening of the country’s ideological fabric and the formation of a thoroughly scientific-materialist world view in every Soviet citizen. This process was accompanied by an attempt to consolidate the role of the Party as opposed to that of the government. It also included the reassertion of the Party’s authority in the area of anti-religious propaganda.102 Practices such as the celebration of religious holidays,

28  Servant of the state or faithful ally? often accompanied by many days of drunkenness and by the mass slaughter of cattle, were proclaimed to have a negative effect on workers’ labour discipline and agriculture at times when food supply was especially vital.103 Khrushchev’s emphasis on religion’s harm to agriculture underlined his interest in launching a strong anti-religious campaign among the rural population where religious convictions were still strong. The anti-religious campaign, launched by Khrushchev in 1958, aimed to discourage religiosity and undermine the institutional structures of religious organisations.104 Meanwhile, the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (CAROC) reported that stable church–state relations, in the years 1955–1957, allowed Orthodox clergy to become more active by using various forms and methods such as repairs and beautification of church buildings, establishment of professional choirs, active preaching and personal work among the population. The ROC income increased substantially each year.105 Significant improvements in church–state relations occurred in 1956 when the relics of St. Nikita of Novgorod were returned to the Moscow Patriarchate and in 1957, with the start of the religious service in Alexandro-Nevskaia Lavra in Leningrad. Towards the end of 1957, the ROC possessed 73 parishes and 13,477106 functioning churches. Most of the churches were opened in Ukraine (especially Galicia; this was done to neutralise Catholic and Uniate influence in the region). Only 3,790 churches were opened on the territory of the Russian republic. In 1957, 20 men’s and 37 women’s monasteries were still functioning.107 The negative turn in Khrushchev’s religious policy could also be attributed to his demand for de-Stalinisation. Following the Party’s Twentieth Congress, “items began to appear charging Stalin with neglecting antireligious propaganda and permitting the growth of religion.”108 A resumption of the anti-religious campaign by both party and state agencies was reinforced in 1957 after the defeat of the so-called anti-party group of Central Committee pro-Stalinist members, who attempted to depose Khrushchev in May 1957. Thus, despite the temporary concessions towards believers, the continuity of the struggle against religion was also essential from the standpoint of achieving the general global mission set by Khrushchev’s agenda, i.e. the construction of the communist society. The influence of the de-Stalinisation campaign together with the struggle to restore socialist legality caused uncertainty in the CAROC. Its officials were reluctant to do anything that would disturb the status quo in church–state relations. Party officials, on the other hand, believed that the Council should contribute to the struggle for the communist education of workers.109 An opinion on the necessity to limit activity of the ROC and its influence on the population started to form in the Central Committee in the spring of 1957. Data on the status of the Church, presented by the Council to the Central Committee, evoked concern in the nation’s ideological headquarters. Observations on an increase in the functioning churches, presented to the Council, also attested to such concern. Thus, new tasks were assigned to the CAROC. The most important one stated that the existing ties between church and state must not violate Soviet laws relating to the Church. One of the measures taken to limit the influence of the ROC on

Servant of the state or faithful ally? 29 society was reducing the number of parishes. At meetings between the chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs and the Patriarch in the winter and spring of 1959, the latter consented to “urgent recommendations from the Council for eliminating parishes.”110 Based on proposals from the CAROC and the Finance Ministry, the Council of Ministers on 16 October 1958 adopted a resolution on “Assessing Taxes on the Income of Diocesan Administrations and also on the Income of Monasteries.” The Council of Ministers determined that the assessment of revenue for income taxes by candle workshops of diocesan administrations should be based on a sales price of 200 roubles per kilogram of candles minus production expenses. In addition, they established increased rates of taxation on plots of land used by the monasteries. The resolution also proposed reductions for land held by the monasteries, establishment of “monastic norms” for every monastery and prohibition on use of the hired labour. The situation in many monasteries became desperate due to demands from the CAROC not to accept citizens younger than thirty into monasteries and to eliminate subsidies given without the Council’s consent, combined with the tax increase on buildings. During 1959, more and more churches were closed. Towards January 1960, only 13,008 remained open.111 According to the data of the Central State Archive of the October Revolution, the number of open churches in January 1960 was 12, 963.112 Many hierarchs took part in the anti-religious campaign. An atheistic brochure, written by a former teacher in the Odessa seminary, was published in 1958. Those churchmen who excelled in the process were awarded university degrees in atheism and were appointed to positions in institutions dealing with atheist education.113 An additional tactic used by the Soviet authorities to limit the influence of the ROC on society was changes of personnel. Two men responsible for the maintenance of modus vivendi in church–state relations since 1943 were replaced. Georgii Karpov, who had been president of the CAROC since its inception, was replaced in 1960 by Vladimir Kuroedov, who transformed this Council from an instrument for the control of the Church into a tool of aggressive suppression.114 In June 1960, Metropolitan of Krutitsy and Kolomna, Nicholai was relieved of his duties as the head of the Foreign Department of the Moscow Patriarchate, and in September of the same year, he lost control of the Moscow diocese. In 1961, he was placed under house arrest and shortly afterwards died in hospital.115 Moreover, the controversial 1961 Bishop’s Council demonstrated the most brutal intervention into the internal life of the Church. Irregularities were evident in the convening of the Council. Archbishop Yermogen noted that, the mode of convening a Bishop’s Council by telegram had been unknown to the Church Fathers. Furthermore, some of the most active bishops were removed from the scene beforehand and their court cases were widely reported in the Soviet press.116 According to Archiv Samizdata (Samizdat Archive), the bishops did not know that they were summoned to take part in the Council. Moreover, they never thought

30  Servant of the state or faithful ally? that they would be required simply to sign a document relinquishing control over the administration of the Church.117 The Bishops Council of 1961 was forced by the government to introduce radical reforms in the management of the parishes. One of the main Council’s resolutions was that the religious community would be comprised of no fewer than twenty members. This was done to limit the number of registered religious communities, among which the larger ones consisted of no more than 20–26 members. A certain boundary in the history of church–state relations was crossed in 1961. On 16 March 1961, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted the resolution “On strengthening Control over Obeying Legislation on Cults.” That same day, the CAROC along with the Council for the Affairs of the Religious Cults (CARC) approved instructions “Concerning the Application of Legislation on Cults.” These documents were adopted and implemented under the slogan of a return to Leninist socialist legality. They essentially returned the Church to its situation at the end of the 1930s. Religious organisations were prohibited from any type of charitable activity. Without the Council’s permission, they were prohibited not only from opening institutions for theological education and publishing religious literature but also from organising religious congresses and conferences. All clergy, not only those in parishes, were assessed through income taxes according to Article 19 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Decree from 30 April 1943.118 Along with implementing and planning measures to limit the ROC activity throughout the country, the CAROC intended to increase foreign activity of the Moscow Patriarchate. This was planned to be achieved by widening and strengthening its ties with other churches abroad and using these connections in the fight for peace.119 The ROC was cooperative with Soviet authorities for the same reason Metropolitan Sergii signed his famous declaration of loyalty to the Soviet state in 1927. Namely, this was the only way to secure whatever was left after the new anti-religious campaign. Khrushchev’s doctrine of “peaceful coexistence” was immensely useful in incorporating the Church in international organisations such as the World Council of Churches (WCC). Immediately after joining the body in 1961, it was accepted as the largest single member church. The benefits for Soviet foreign policy were evident almost immediately. On a number of issues, the WCC took a definite pro-Soviet stand, for example, on the Cuban Missile Crisis issue, where officers of the WCC expressed concern over American actions in Cuba, and the WCC position towards the Arab–Israeli conflict.120 Because of Khrushchev’s policy towards religion, the administrative onslaught against the ROC acquired the character of a political war. Between 1960 and 1964, the number of churches and chapels decreased by 5,457 (on 1 January 1960, there were 13,008; on 1 January 1965—7,873).121 According to the archival statistics cited by Davis, in January 1960, the figure of the functioning churches amounted to 12,963, and in January 1965 to 7,500.122 The archive also provided figures for the number of churches that closed in the different regions (oblast’) of the USSR. The greatest losses were in the Ukraine, Moldova, Belorussia, and the Rostov and Krasnodar regions at the eastern end of the Black Sea.123 The same pattern was noted in closing of theological seminaries and monasteries. Eight theological

Servant of the state or faithful ally? 31 seminaries were open on 1 January 1960, and five of them had been closed by 1964—in Kiev, Saratov, Stavropol, Minsk and Volhynia. By the mid-1960s, the ROC had only 18 functioning monasteries in the USSR. Those closed included the Monastery of the Caves in Kiev, the largest religious and cultural centre of the Kievan Rus’.124 Khrushchev’s policy towards religion also derived from the relative self-confidence of the USSR in the international arena, the post-war strength of the Soviet bloc and its newly acquired strategic capabilities. This projection of strength in the international arena in many ways diminished the need of religion as a strong unifying force from within.

Post-Khrushchev’s period and the revival of Russian nationalism After Khrushchev’s removal in 1964, Father Gleb Yakunin and Father Nikolai Eshliman published in samizdat, on 21 November 1965, an open letter addressed to the Patriarch (the attitude of the samizdat press towards the ROC during perestroika will be discussed in Chapter 5). It came as a reaction to Khrushchev’s rigid anti-religious policy. Both churchmen emphasised the idea that they did not wish to set the Church against the state. All they required was that the Church should be allowed to serve the state freely. Moreover, they blamed Moscow Patriarchate officials for failing to defend believers’ rights.125 This letter marked the beginning of open dissent based on religious opposition, which was in its essence close to the human rights movement. This current filled an existing spiritual vacuum and intensified during perestroika, drawing to its circles representatives of the intelligentsia. Additionally, there was also another kind of opposition to the state, which was taking the form of a Russian national and cultural revival also closely connected with Russian Orthodoxy. The emergence of a popular renewed interest in the Russian past and Russian Orthodoxy came as a reaction to the Khrushchev’s policy of internationalisation, which stated that the primary law governing the Soviet people’s development was the continuous strengthening of its unity based on society’s social homogeneity and the movement of all nations and nationalities towards complete unity.126 One should also take into account the growing ideological dissatisfaction with Marxism–Leninism. Furthermore, Khrushchev’s personal attack on Stalin angered many Soviet patriots, since Stalin was perceived as a true leader who had won World War II and raised the USSR to the status of a superpower. Khrushchev also underlined the idea that all Soviet nationalities should be given equal opportunities, thus emphasising the creation of the “new Soviet man.” He introduced the ideological concepts of sblizhenie (the drawing together of nationalities) and sliyanie (merging) into official debate. According to S.E. Wimbush, the process of merging, which included biological assimilation, raised the threat of mixed marriages, racial homogenisation and ultimately national degeneration.127 For many Russians, this process posed a real threat, which meant the unwanted “yellowing” (ozheltenie) of Russian society. Russian nationalists had warned that

32  Servant of the state or faithful ally? “random hybridisation” would lead to the biological degeneration of the Russian nation.128 The process of sliyanie was also very closely connected with an alleged demographic threat, which was facing the Russian nation, namely that Soviet Muslims were making large demographic gains at the expense of Russians and other Slavs. The 1970 census revealed that within several decades Russians would begin to suffer a decline in their absolute numbers; meanwhile, Muslim minorities would continue to experience some of the world’s highest birth rates.129 All of the above-mentioned led to the general feeling that Russian culture and the Russian nation were the first to be sacrificed to the idea of internationalism. The revival of Russian nationalism took the form of a renewed interest in Russian religious art, language, literature, the idealisation of the peasant as the true Christian and research into the role of the ROC in Russian history. The pursuit of old icons became one of the most popular activities connected with the revival of interest in Russia’s past. A large number of books devoted to Russian iconography were published, including the well-known book of Viktor Lazarev, Andrei Rublev i ego Shkola (Andrei Rublev and his School).130 The interest in Russian religious art, on the one hand, was a mere consideration of Russian culture in the ethnographic or aesthetic sense, but on the other, it exemplified deep religious reverence. This is how elderly Russian peasant Pavel in Vladimir Soloukhin’s book, Chernye Doski (Black Boards), described his attitude towards Russian icons: As long as I live, I shall admire them, breathe in their beauty and be nourished by their spirit. I will always remember that they are great works of art, a collection of shells or butterflies is just that and no more, but when you collect Old Russian paintings you are collecting the nation’s soul.131 The so-called Derevenschiki (Ruralists) literary movement, represented by writers such as Valentin Rasputin, Viktor Astafiev, Vasilii Belov and Vladimir Soloukhin himself, aimed to idealise the Russian village and nature against the city bureaucracy and western influence. These writers emphasised that true Russian cultural-religious heritage could be found only in the countryside. A renewed interest in the Russian language was also indirectly connected to religion. Together with the assertion of Viktor Vinogradov that, “the great Russian language has become an inexhaustible source for all the languages of all the peoples of the Soviet Union,”132 there was an emphasis on the ancient vocabulary and terminology found in Church Slavonic. The revival of the Church Slavonic tradition should be seen as another reclamation of historic national tradition, which was considerably developed in the post-Soviet Russia.133 This phenomenon caused an increase in the missionary activity of the Church, Father Dmitrii Dudko being a good example. Starting from the early 1970s, each year he succeeded to baptise around 400 adults, who later became ardent parishioners.134 Anderson claims that Leonid Brezhnev’s decision to adopt a less confrontational approach in dealing with religion reflected a realisation that Khrushchev’s anti-religious campaign had failed to uproot religion.135 Rigid control

Servant of the state or faithful ally? 33 over religious activities continued following the inauguration of Patriarch Pimen in 1971. However, the repression of clergy, the mass closure of churches and aggressive atheistic propaganda were stopped. The USSR Supreme Soviet issued a decree in 1975, which allowed changes to the 1929 resolution, “On religious associations.” A paragraph, which stated that religious associations could not be registered as juridical entities, was removed.136 Religious societies received the right to purchase objects connected with religious rituals, transport and housing. Despite the seemingly stable situation in church–state relations, the number of dioceses belonging to the ROC continued to drop. At the beginning of the 1960s, the Moscow Patriarchate had 73 dioceses, and in 1974, their number fell to 67. The number of bishops amounted to 58, indicating that many dioceses existed only on paper. Between the years 1971 and 1976, the amount of parishes also fell from 7,274 to 7,062. About fifty parishes were closed each year.137 The most urgent problem for the Church was a shortage in human resources. Fewer and fewer priests graduated from theological academies. In 1971, there were 6,234 registered priests and in 1975 only 5,994.138

Religion and Russian nationalism on the eve of perestroika The period towards the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s was marked by the remarkable upsurge of interest in Old Russian books and letters. Russian Orthodox heritage was an especially prominent part of the “culturist” movement. John Dunlop depicted two major nationalist movements prominent in this period, those who worked within the Soviet system and those who refused to do so. Russian Orthodoxy, in one way or another, had an influence on both movements. This was especially true for those who refused to work within the Soviet system such as the Solzhenitsyn-Shafarevich group. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn saw in the revival of the Old Russian cultural heritage the only cure from the many decades of communist rule. In an interview with Dunlop, he named the Russian nationalist upsurge the natsionalno-religiosnoe vozrozhdenie (national and religious renaissance), thus stressing the connection of the movement to historical Old Russia, to the Russian Orthodox Church and to popular mores and traditions.139 Other members of the same movement were Igor Ogurtsov, the founder, leader and principal ideologist of the All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People. Further to the right stood Evgenii Vagin, former head of the ideological division of the Social-Christian Union and the editor of the samizdat journal Moskovskii Sbornik (The Moscow Collection). Religion also played a central role in the thoughts of such people as Orthodox priest Dmitrii Dudko, and the members of the religious-philosophical circles popular at that time in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev. They saw a clear link between the religious rights of the Russian people and the movement for human rights in general. Most of them fought for both the legal and moral rights of believers. Dudko followed prominent religious and political philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev in considering freedom as the basis of religious life. According to him, “only the church can teach us how to love people and our Fatherland.”140

34  Servant of the state or faithful ally? The discussion of these religious circles also extended to the influence of religion on broader social and political issues. Although the main orientation of this nationalistic movement was not a search for any pure religious experience but a pursuit to Christianise the democratic movement, Russian Orthodoxy was undoubtedly the “organising pivot” of this intellectual ferment,141 as Dunlop put it. The second nationalist group of those who were willing to work within the system consisted of such names as Vladimir Soloukhin and Ilya Glazunov. Soloukhin, a writer, was among the first to stress the importance of Russian religious and cultural heritage. He was also one of the founders of the All-Russian Society for the Preservation of Cultural Monuments in the 1960s. Soloukhin’s interest in religion was not a mere aesthetic one. His care for the forgotten churches and other specimens of Russian culture often revealed his deep religious experience. The same could be said about the painter Ilya Glazunov who preached his religious-patriotic convictions in such paintings as “The Return of the Prodigal Son” and “The Mystery of the Twentieth Century.” Glazunov, like Soloukhin, was involved in the struggle to save Russia’s historical monuments.142 The quickly growing popularity of the Society for the Preservation of Monuments clearly reflected the popular interest in the Russian cultural legacy. One year after its formation in 1965, the organisation numbered 1,000,000 participants; by 1972, it had grown to 7,000,000, and as of the summer of 1977 numbered 12,500,000 active members.143 Even the representatives of the so-called National Bolshevism who attempted to foster Russian patriotism without a religious element, in the form of the idea of Soviet Russia as the greatest country in the world, in fact only transformed the old idea of Moscow as the Third Rome. Only the extreme right current of neo-National Socialism or Neo-Nazism was led by pagan and racial considerations and regarded Orthodox Christianity “as a cosmopolitan religion seeking to abolish all distinctions between nations, a form of Judaism for ‘goys’.”144 Perhaps the best way to underline the close ties between Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian cultural and spiritual renaissance on the eve of perestroika would be to cite the closing paragraph from a speech delivered in 1979 by Tatiana Goricheva. She was the editor of “Religion and Philosophy” (a section of the samizdat journal 37), which was the literary organ of a group bearing the same name, founded by the Orthodox Christians in Leningrad in 1976: The discovery of the Church seems to me to be the greatest discovery made within our unofficial culture. The Church is the salvation of all the values which culture has won and acquired. The Church gives freedom and daring, and cures us of all the sicknesses of individualism, instead revealing within us an integral personality oriented towards creativity. We live at a time when a new Christian culture is being created. We can only guess at what it might be like. It does not yet have a language of any masterpieces; but there are some individual creative people, who have inwardly recognised the possibility of a synbook of culture and faith, and who have recognised this possibility as their own mission in the Church.145

Servant of the state or faithful ally? 35 Goricheva at the end of the 1970s spoke about the creation of the new Orthodox culture, linking it to personal creativity and spiritual values. For her, this was the only cure for the ailing Soviet society and a common interest that should generate social solidarity at all levels. The Russian national idea, the ROC and state authorities during the Soviet pre-perestroika period were indeed interconnected by mutual interests echoing the Freeze-Pipes dispute on the nature of church–state relations. The importance of this dispute lies in the fact that both scholars, despite their apparent differences discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in fact complemented each other. Freeze emphasised the autonomy of the ROC as a “parallel” institution, and Pipes underlined church–state mutual interests, such as fighting against heresy, protecting the interests of Orthodox Christians and reconquering Russian territories. Those interests did not alter much during the Soviet period. Lenin admitted the vital role of Russian Orthodoxy and its spiritual influence on the Russian people. He insisted on its incorporation into the revolutionary movement, since he needed the services of the Church as a unifying force. The ROC authorities, for their part, were willing to cooperate with the new regime only when they realised its stability and longevity. The reasons were obvious, as in the Imperial period, the Church needed the assistance of the state to protect Orthodox believers and its own interests from damaging Catholic or Muslim influence. The unifying ability of the ROC and its practice of exercising authority among the people were also very useful for Stalin, especially during World War II. At times of foreign threats, when national consolidation was especially needed, church– state relations improved dramatically. The most salient examples were the unequivocal moral and financial support of the Church for the Soviet war effort and the significant official concessions to the Church such as permitting the Church to engage in educational, social and charitable activities. Both church and state shared common interests and depended upon one another. Most of those interests belonged to the foreign policy field. Thus, at times when the Soviet leadership felt confident in the international arena, such as during Khrushchev’s period, anti-religious policy was resumed. The revolt against Khrushchev’s policy of internationalisation caused the revival of the Russian national idea, closely connected with the Russian historical past and Russian Orthodoxy. The Church was regarded as the embodiment of all spiritual values and Russian national-cultural heritage. The following chapters examine the interrelations between church, state and Russian national movement during the perestroika period.

Notes 1 Gregory Freeze, ‘Handmaiden of the State? The Church in Imperial Russia Reconsidered,’ Journal of Ecclesiastical History 36, no. 01 (1985). 82. 2 Ibid. 87–88. 3 Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (New York: Penguin Books, 1984). 232. 4 Ibid. 224. 5 Ibid. 224–225.

36  Servant of the state or faithful ally? 6 Nicolai Petro, The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture (Harvard University Press, 1997); Zoe Knox, ‘The Symphonic Ideal: The Moscow Patriarchate’s Post-Soviet Leadership,’ Europe-Asia Studies 55, no. 4 (2003). 575–596; N. Leustean Lucian, ‘The Concept of Symphonia in Contemporary European Orthodoxy,’ International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 11, Nos. 2–3 (May–August 2011). 188–202. 7 Nationalism: A Report by a Study Group of Members of the Royal Institute on International Affairs (New York: Reprints of Economic Classics, 1966). 65. 8 N. Zernov, Three Russian Prophets: Khomiakov, Dostoevsky and Soloviev (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1973). 61. 9 Ibid. 10 The mission of the ROC’s social outreach, especially practised by Orthodox St. Petersburg clergy in revolutionary Russia and researched by Jennifer Hedda, is not addressed here. See Jennifer Hedda, His Kingdom Come: Orthodox Pastorship and Social Activism in Revolutionary Russia (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008). 11 V. I. Lenin, On Socialist Ideology and Culture (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962). 92. 12 H. Fireside, Icon and Swastika (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971). 13. 13 Ibid. 17. 14 J. S. Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1953). 22. 15 Fireside, Icon and Swastika. 24. 16 Lenin, On Socialist Ideology and Culture. 94. 17 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 24–25. 18 Ibid. 36. 19 “Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov i Kommunisticheskoe Gosudarstvo 1917–1941, Documenty i Fotografii,” in Opredelenie Sviaschennogo Sobora Pravoslavnoi Rossiiskoi Tserkvi o pravovom polozhenii Pravoslavnoi Rossiiskoi Tserkvi (2 dekabria 1917 goda) (Moskva: Bibleisko-Bogoslovskii Institut Sviatogo Apostola Andreia, 1996). 14. 20 M. I. Odintsov, ‘Gosudarstvo i Tserkov 1917–1938,’ Znanie, no. 11 (1991). 7. 21 Dates prior to February 1918 appear according to Justinian calendar. 22 Mikhail Vostryshev, Patriarkh Tikhon (Moskva: Molodaia Gvardia, 1997). 96, 99–100. 23 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 52. 24 Ibid. 53, 69. 25 Ibid. 54. 26 Ibid. 65. 27 G. Rahr, Plenennaia Tserkov (Frankfurt: Posev, 1954). 8. 28 ‘Arkhiv Patriarkha,’ Sovetskaia Rossiia, no. 18 (January 25 1991). 4. 29 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 78. 30 Robert H. Greene, Bodies Like Stars: Saints and Relics in Orthodox Russia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010). 31 Tsipin, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997. 66–67. 32 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 78. 33 Ibid. 80. 34 Dr. Sergei Ivanovich Mitskevich (1869–1944) studied medicine at Moscow University in the 1880s. After the October Revolution, he worked at the Moscow Department of People’s Education. Later, he became a member of the Istpart (Party history section under the Central Committee) collegium. Mitskevich was active in the scientific workers’ section of the teachers’ union, where he was in charge of the Museum of Revolution. Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Commissariat of Enlightenment: Soviet Organization of Education and the Arts under Lunacharsky, October 1917–1921 (Cambridge University Press, 1970). 313.

Servant of the state or faithful ally?  37 35 “Pismo S. Mitskevicha V. I. Leninu (22 Aprelia 1919g.),” in Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ i Kommunisticheskoe Gosudarstvo 1917–1941, Dokumnety i Fotografii, ed. Ia. N. Schiapov (Moskva: Bibleisko-Bogoslovskii Institut Sviatogo Apostola Andreia, 1996). 41. 36 “Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov i Kommunisticheskoe Gosudarstvo 1917–1941, Documenty i Fotografii.” 83. 37 Odintsov, Gosudarstvo i Tserkov 1917–1938. 24. 38 Ibid. 23. 39 ‘Arkhiv Patriarkha.’ 4. 40 Paul Gabel, And God Created Lenin: Marxism vs. Religion in Russia, 1917–1929 (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2005). 41 P. Anderson, People, Church and State in Modern Russia (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1944). 60. 42 ‘Travlia Patriarkha Tikhona,’ Slovo 1 (1991). 78–79. 43 L. Mitrokhina, ed., Khristianstvo (Moscow: Respublika, 1994). 406. 44 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 109. 45 Ibid. 112. 46 Anderson, People, Church and State in Modern Russia. 60. 47 ‘Travlia Patriarkha Tikhona,’ 81–84. 48 “Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov i Kommunisticheskoe Gosudarstvo 1917–1941, Documenty i Fotografii.” 156. 49 ‘Travlia Patriarkha Tikhona.’ 160. 50 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 162. 51 Fireside, Icon and Swastika. 31. 52 Rahr, Plenennaia Tserkov. 16. 53 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 176–177. 54 W. Alexeev, ‘The Russian Orthodox Church 1927–1945, Repression and Revival,’ Religion in Communist Lands, no. 1 (spring 1979). 31. 55 Fireside, Icon and Swastika. 170. 56 Ibid. 169. 57 Anderson, People, Church and State in Modern Russia. 128–129. 58 N. S. Timasheff, Religion in Soviet Russia 1917–1942 (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942). 116. 59 Ibid. 116. 60 Ibid. 118. 61 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 277–278. 62 Timasheff, Religion in Soviet Russia 1917–1942. 124–125. 63 G. Shtrikker, “Poslanie mitropolita Sergiia v pervyi den’ voiny (22.6.1941),” in Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v Sovetskoe Vremia, Vol. 1 (Moskva: Propilei, 1995). 329. 64 G. Shtrikker, “Rech’ mitropolita Sergiia na molebne o pobede russkogo voinstva (vecherom 26 Iunia 1941 goda v Bogoiavlenskom sobore v Moskve),” in Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v Sovetskoe Vremia, Vol. 1 (Moskva: Propilei, 1995). 330. 65 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 291. 66 Shtrikker, Rech’ mitropolita Sergiia na molebne o pobede russkogo voinstva (vecherom 26 Iunia 1941 goda v Bogoiavlenskom sobore v Moskve). 67 W. Alexeev, “The Russian Orthodox Church under German Occupation 1941–1945” (PhD, University of Minnesota, 1967). 32. 68 Keith Armes, ‘German Intelligence Reports,’ Religion in Communist Lands 5, no. 1 (spring 1977). 32. 69 Ibid. 36. 70 Alexeev, The Russian Orthodox Church under German Occupation 1941–1945. 35. 71 Fireside, Icon and Swastika. 172.

38  Servant of the state or faithful ally? 72 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 291. 73 Steven Merritt Miner, Stalin’s Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945 (Chapel Hill, NC; London: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). 44, 47, 78. 74 Rahr, Plenennaia Tserkov. 43. 75 Fireside, Icon and Swastika. 173. 76 Ibid. 174. 77 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 294. 78 A. Werth, Russia at War 1941–1945 (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1964). 434. 79 Alexeev, The Russian Orthodox Church under German Occupation 1941–1945. 4. 80 Miner, Stalin’s Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945. 96–110. 81 Fireside, Icon and Swastika. 178. 82 Werth, Russia at War 1941–1945. 433. 83 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 294. 84 Fireside, Icon and Swastika. 179. 85 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 295. 86 Hierodiakon Anatolii (Lekhtonen), ‘Vklad v Pobedu,’ Russkii Vestnik, no. 19 (May 3–5 1992). n.p. 87 Rahr, Plenennaia Tserkov. 45. 88 Ibid. 45. 89 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 299. 90 Miner, Stalin’s Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945. 125. 91 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 298. 92 Rahr, Plenennaia Tserkov. 57. 93 Daniela Kalkandjieva, The Russian Orthodox Church 1917–1948: From Decline to Resurrection (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2015). 345–346. 94 Fireside, Icon and Swastika. 186. 95 Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917–1950. 307–308. 96 Kalkandjieva, The Russian Orthodox Church 1917–1948: From Decline to Resurrection. 347. 97 Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976). 40. 98 John Anderson, Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and Successor States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 14. 99 T. Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia (New York: Armonk, 2002). 126. 100 Ibid. 127. 101 Ibid. 128. 102 J. D. Grossman, ‘Khrushchev’s Anti-Religious Policy and the Campaign of 1954,’ Soviet Studies 24 (1973). 375. 103 Ibid. 104 Anderson, Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and Successor States. 7. 105 Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia. 139. 106 This figure is very close to the figure of 13,430 working churches for 1957, stated in the Central Government Archive of the October Revolution—f.6991s, o.2, v.1, d.263, cited in Nathaniel Davis, ‘The Number of Orthodox Churches before and after the Khrushchev’s Antireligious Drive,’ Slavic Review 50, no. 3 (1991). 613. 107 Tsipin, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997. 365–369. 108 Grossman, Khrushchev’s Anti-Religious Policy and the Campaign of 1954. 382. 109 Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia. 143–144. 110 Ibid. 154. 111 Tsipin, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997. 383.

Servant of the state or faithful ally? 39 112 N. Davis, ‘The Number of Orthodox Churches before and after the Khrushchev’s Antireligious Drive,’ Slavic Review 50, no. 3 (1991). 613. 113 Tsipin, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997. 384. 114 G. Simon, Church, State and Opposition in the USSR (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1974). 72. 115 Ibid. 72. 116 M. Bourdeaux and K. Matchett, “The Russian Orthodox Church in Council 1945– 1971,” in Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, eds. B. R. Bociurkiw and J. W. Strong (London: Macmillan, 1975). 43. 117 Michael Bourdeaux, ‘Landmark in the History of the Russian Orthodox Church,’ Religion in Communist Lands 9, no. 1–2 (1981). 24. 118 Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia. 186. 119 Ibid. 156. 120 W. C. Fletcher, “Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy,” in Religion and Atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, eds. B. R. Bociurkiw and J. W. Strong (London: Macmillan, 1975). 182. 121 Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia. 187. 122 Davis, The Number of Orthodox Churches before and after the Khrushchev’s Antireligious Drive. 615. 123 Ibid. 617. 124 V. Tsipin, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997, Vol. 9 (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Spaso-Preobrazhenskogo Valaamskogo monastyria, 1997). 405. 125 Nikolai Eshliman and Gleb Yakunin, “Otkrytoe pis’mo Patriarkhu Aleksiu I ot sviaschennikov Nikolaia Eshlimana and Gleba Yakunina, 21 Noiabria 1965 goda,” www.regels.org/Eschliman-Yakunine.htm (accessed March 2017). 126 M. I. Kulichenko, ‘Osnovnye Zakonomernosti Formirovaniia i Razvitiia Novoi Istoricheskoi Obshchnosti Sovetskogo Naroda,’ Istoriia SSSR 6 (1980). 41. 127 S. E. Wimbush, ‘The Russian Nationalist Backlash,’ Survey 24, no. 3 (1979). 40. 128 Ibid. 42. 129 Ibid. 130 Richard H. Jr. Marshall, “Fifteen Years of Change: A Review of the Post-Stalinist Era,” in Religion and the Soviet State: A Dilemma of Power, eds. M. Hayward and W. C. Fletcher (London: Pall Mall Press, 1969). 4. 131 V. Soloukhin, Searching for Icons in Russia (London: Harvill Press, 1971). 33. 132 Thomas E. Bird, ‘New Interest in Old Russian Things: Literary Ferment, Religious Perspectives, and National Self-Assertion,’ Slavic Review 32, no. 1 (March 1973). 20. 133 Brian P. Bennett, Religion and Language in Post-Soviet Russia (London and New York: Routledge, 2016). 5. 134 Tsipin, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997. 441–446. 135 Anderson, Religion, State and Politics in the Soviet Union and Successor States. 67. 136 Ibid. 441–446. 137 Tsipin, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997. 441–446. 138 Ibid. 441–446. 139 John B. Dunlop, The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983). 18–20. 140 M. L. Gearing, “Neo-Slavophilism and Russian Nationalism in the Soviet Union Since 1960” (University of Oxford, 1986) (accessed September 2014). 108–109. 141 Dunlop, The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism. 26. 142 Ibid. 34. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 ‘Religious Significance of Unofficial Soviet Culture,’ Religion in the Communist Lands 8, no. 3 (autumn 1980). 232.

2 State policy towards the Russian Orthodox Church

On 29 April 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev invited Patriarch Pimen and the members of the Holy Synod to the Kremlin. It was the first meeting between a Soviet leader and the ROC hierarchy for over forty years, since Stalin’s meeting on 4 September 1943 with Metropolitans Sergii, Aleksii and Nikolai. What caused such change in the official Soviet policy towards religion in general and towards the ROC in particular? Was there any shift in the functions of the different institutions in charge of the formation and implementation of the policy towards religious organisations? This chapter will answer these questions and also examine how official propaganda and the new legislation on religion reflected the modification of the official state policy. Special attention will be devoted to the Soviet central authorities’ attitude towards the millennium anniversary of the Christianisation of Kievan Rus’. Research on church–state relations during the pre-perestroika period emphasised the victimised position of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Church was forced to follow the state’s bidding, it was not allowed to engage in religious education and charitable activity, and many churches and monasteries were closed. The perestroika period, on the other hand, was viewed by historians as a sharp change in the official attitude towards the Church, which removed almost all political obstacles that hampered its functioning as an independent institution. The ROC was given the status of juridical entity, and its influence on the formation of Russian culture and identity was highlighted by Soviet authorities. Sabrina Ramet argued that change in Gorbachev’s religious policy emerged on the basis of an underlying commitment to liberalisation, aiming to obtain legitimation of Soviet rule.1 Christopher Marsh agreed with Ramet that Soviet religious policy was dictated by foreign policy goals, claiming that the millennium celebrations were arranged to coincide with the USA–USSR arms summit.2 Recent scholarship on Gorbachev’s foreign policy has indeed indicated its close ties with Soviet national identity as a reformed socialism, open to the outside world. Andrei Tsygankov maintained that Gorbachev’s New Thinking implied the necessity of formulating the USSR’s national interests in a way that would be respectful of world opinion and promote processes of liberalisation and democratisation at home.3 The changing attitude towards religion served this goal.

State policy towards the Russian Church  41 Other historians (such as Jane Ellis, Zoe Knox and Nathaniel Davis) maintained that the shift in the official policy towards religion was dictated by the need to recruit support from the intelligentsia and believers in order to advance the process of perestroika.4 However, the question of church–state mutual interests and especially their influence on the official policy towards religion during perestroika was overlooked. Nevertheless, it is precisely those interests that shaped the nature of church–state relations throughout Russian history and also prevailed after the disintegration of the USSR.

State mechanisms and the formation of the official policy towards religion It is essential to understand how policy towards religion was formed before trying to analyse the change in the official attitude towards religion. After the disintegration of the USSR, the archives of the Communist Party and the KGB (Committee of State Security) were partially opened to the public, shedding some light on the mechanism of the Soviet policy formation towards religion. The Central Committee of the Communist Party was responsible for the development of religious policy. Guided by the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers adopted resolutions regarding the opening of new churches, acceptance to theological schools and other activities. At the beginning of the 1980s, it was guided by an unpublished decree of the Central Committee from 22 September 1981.5 The text of the decree was reconstructed by Russian scholar Larisa Andreeva from the few documents that were released for public inspection by the Tsentr Khranenia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (Centre for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation, formerly the Communist Party Archive). This decree dealt with the strengthening of atheistic education. Among other things, it was determined by the Central Committee of the Communist Party that one of the vice-chairmen of the Council for Religious Affairs should be a KGB officer.6 Therefore, in the sphere of church–state relations, the KGB and the CRA only implemented the policy of the Party. In the KGB, it was the fifth department of the fifth Directorate that dealt with religious matters. The Politburo in 1969 created the fifth Chief Directorate to obliterate political dissent and reinforce control over the general population. It consisted of five departments which gave equal attention to such issues as suppressing nationalism among ethnic minorities, control over unauthorised literature and writers, negation of any negative influence of Russian emigrants and control of the religious situation.7 One of the main functions of the fifth Directorate was to control the activity of religious organisations. Agents were used to achieve the following aims: to attain foreign policy benefits and to control inner church affairs (e.g. prevention of the unwanted liberal activity of Gleb Yakunin).8 More mundane functions of surveillance and registration were left to the Council for Religious Affairs. The Council for Religious Affairs, attached to the USSR Council of Ministers, was established in 1965 as a result of the merging of the Council for the Affairs

42  State policy towards the Russian Church of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults. The CRA dealt with the implementation of the policies towards religion. This included control over the activity of religious organisations, registration and de-registration of religious communities and the opening and closing of churches and houses of prayer. In fact, the CRA mediated between the USSR government and religious organisations through the body of government plenipotentiaries who represented the CRA in all regions, union and autonomous republics.9 Tatiana Chumachenko argues that the Council did not function solely as the organ for control over the ROC activity, since in order to control the Church it had to help revive it and guarantee that religious organisations could conduct normal activities.10 Thus, the Soviet state apparatus had more than one agency which supervised religious life in the USSR. From this brief outline of the mechanism of the policy formation towards religion at the beginning of the 1980s, we can proceed to an analysis of the state policy towards the ROC in the period of perestroika.

From the late Brezhnev period to millennium celebrations (1981–1988) As the former KGB officer Philip Bobkov recounts, suggestions for the liberalisation of church–state relations were made long before Gorbachev’s ascent to power. Bobkov, then a first deputy to the KGB chairman, raised the question of the possible change in church–state relations in 1981, in a speech to leading KGB officials. He claimed that church–state relations were guided by obsolete precepts, stating that, We can no longer regard the believers as second rate citizens. There are many millions of believers in our country, who work very hard in the communist brigades, we have destroyed churches and the monuments of religious culture, and what answer do we receive from the Church? Most of the clergy supported the state, especially during the war.11 Bobkov stated that he was supported by the KGB head Yurii Andropov but not by the leading officials in the Party apparatus. And indeed, while Andropov was in power, a discussion concerning possible changes in the legislation towards religion was renewed. Moreover, the term “anti-religious propaganda” was substituted for the term “atheistic propaganda,”12 conveying a more respectful and less aggressive attitude towards believers. This change, however cosmetic and insignificant, preceded the change in policy towards religion in the second half of the 1980s, and in fact, it was evident also during the Khrushchev and the late Brezhnev periods. Positive attitudes towards believers, as being highly moral people, were also emphasised in the notes released on 22 November 1957 by the Council for the Affairs of the ROC, subordinated to the USSR Council of Ministers, and addressed to the CC of the CPSU. It was mentioned that the rector of the Stavropol Theological Academy expressed in his sermons the idea that the Christian religion not only does not contradict socialist

State policy towards the Russian Church  43 theory, but helps to build the communist society. The same document also highlighted that at the end of each sermon the rector gave special attention to issues of morality, children’s education and attitudes to work and to fellow human beings.13 The CC CPSU decree, “On the Strengthening of the Atheistic Education,” from 22 September 1981, also served as a good example of such a shift. It demonstrated the willingness of the authorities to consider the feelings of believers, and it could also be viewed as part of Andropov’s anti-corruption campaign, which aimed to develop the Soviet economy by raising the general labour efficiency of the citizens. Believers were ideal candidates for supporting such a campaign, since they were generally known as moral people, patriotically oriented and hard working. During Chernenko’s administration, a strengthening of the atheist propaganda was evident. An April 1984 Central Committee plenary meeting, while discussing the question of school reforms, emphasised the importance of the formation of a new citizen with a strong communist consciousness, implying that the Soviet youth should be educated only on the basis of Marxism–Leninism.14 Since Gorbachev was in charge of ideology during the times of Chernenko, he can be seen as sharing those views. When Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he continued the policy of his predecessors, which included tight control over religious affairs together with minor concessions towards the ROC. His policy towards religion was guided by a document, which listed the responsibilities of the CRA. This document was based on the above-mentioned CC CPSU decree, “On the Strengthening of the Atheistic Education.”15 One of the first issues mentioned in the document was the importance of the control and registration of existing religious organisations. The need for the strict implementation of legislation on religious cults was also emphasised. Religious activities such as pilgrimages to holy places were to be restricted, and instead, the CRA should encourage activities of institutions dealing with atheist propaganda. Considerable attention in the document was devoted to the necessity for regular analytical reports on the religious situation submitted at least once a year by the regional plenipotentiaries. Such reports were required to include a detailed analysis of the local press and the way it interpreted the legislation towards religion. The question of church property was also mentioned. The CRA officials were required to transform empty prayer houses into museums and art galleries. A special section in the document was devoted to the improvement of educational work with the clergy, such as lectures on the observance of Soviet legislation concerning religious cults and control over the selection of candidates for theological schools. A large section was dedicated to the continued use of the ROC for the needs of counterpropaganda and foreign policy, such as participation in the struggle for peace and a nuclear anti-proliferation campaign. These requirements clearly indicated the importance of the all-embracing control of the state over religious organisations. However, some hints of a more tolerant attitude towards believers could also be detected. In paragraph 8, it was mentioned that the CRA has to prevent the publishing of any facts that will hurt believers’ feelings. Otto Luchterhandt, in his assessment of the CRA functions at the beginning

44  State policy towards the Russian Church of Gorbachev’s period, underlined the tight control of the Council over religious bodies. In fact, he highlighted that some tasks of the CRA’s control were similar to the tasks performed by the KGB, for example intimidation of and when necessary elimination of successfully working clergy as well as dissidents appearing in the legal religious communities.16 As mentioned before, some concessions towards the ROC were made shortly before perestroika. In Sofrino (near Moscow), a factory for the manufacture of church utensils was reconstructed and reopened in 1980.17 A year later, the Publishing Department of the Moscow Patriarchate was moved to a new building.18 Moreover, the return of the Danilov Monastery to the ROC was promised by Brezhnev to Patriarch Pimen shortly before Brezhnev’s death.19 Official documentation on the return of the monastery was a letter from 1983 addressed to Pimen and signed by the chairman of the CRA Vladimir Kuroedov, in which the latter officially granted the return of the Danilov Monastery together with four hectares of the surrounding land to the Moscow Patriarchate.20 In addition to concessions concerning property return from 1 January 1981, adjustments in taxation were also introduced. In Decree No. 1061, church revenues were categorised as “private income” instead of “private enterprise,” and thus, a tax limit was reduced from eighty-one to sixty-nine per cent, therefore juristically equalising church income with the fees of the doctors, lawyers and other specialists.21 During the first year of Gorbachev’s administration, one of the main problems which occupied the Soviet authorities was the anti-Soviet propaganda disseminated by the Vatican. This issue became even more critical since this propaganda also coincided with the approaching millennium celebrations. In a discussion between Alexander Yakovlev (head of the CC Propaganda Department), Nikolai Ryzhkov (Prime Minister) and Konstantin Kharchev (head of the CRA), which took place on 10 September 1985, it was noted that the Vatican conducted extensive radio propaganda aimed at the Soviet population in Ukraine, intending to revive the Ukrainian Uniate Church.22 Kharchev added that the strong anti-Soviet propaganda was also directed at the Church hierarchy, with the purpose of diverting its leaders from their loyal position towards the Soviet state. Bearing in mind that the West used the approach of the millennium to intensify this propaganda, Soviet authorities had to take countermeasures. In a note from 24 April 1986, Kharchev wrote to the CC of the CPSU, Soviet religious organisations would like to take the initiative to address heads of states and to ask them to stop the usage of atomic weapons, cease the militarisation of space and strive for total disarmament by the year 2000. Soviet religious organisations and not the Vatican should lead the initiative of the peace process.23 Ryzhkov advocated a very balanced approach towards the forthcoming millennium by claiming that no special attention should be given to this event.24 In order to counteract the Vatican’s activities and to oppose religious extremists within the Orthodox community, the KGB sanctioned the publishing of the first issue of the

State policy towards the Russian Church  45 “unofficial” religious journal Slovo (The Word), which reached a wide audience. Among other material, it contained articles on the anti-Soviet activity of Gleb Yakunin. A second issue of the journal was issued in August 1988, following the exposure of yet more religious-extremist activities activated by the western religious propaganda.25 Moreover, the Chernobyl disaster, according to Pospielovsky, was one of the factors which revived religious feelings in the population, thus giving officials another source of concern.26 Researchers such as Nathaniel Davis, Jane Ellis and Zoe Knox confirmed that during the crisis, which the Soviet society suffered after Chernobyl, Gorbachev needed the support of the intelligentsia to go on with the implementation of perestroika.27 In order to “buy” this support, he offered concessions in the sphere of the freedom of worship. Furthermore, official estimates of the number of believers rose constantly. Kharchev, in his interview with Ogonek (Little Flame) in May 1988, gave a figure of 70 million believers, which was roughly a quarter of the USSR’s population,28 thus emphasising that believers’ interests could not easily be ignored, and on the contrary, they should be mobilised for the needs of perestroika. Kharchev understood the futility of the anti-religious propaganda, since the more the Church was persecuted the higher it stood in the eyes of the public. He underlined that believers and atheists have the same history, they all are patriots of the Russian and Soviet land, and therefore, they should be treated as one.29

The millennium celebrations The approaching celebrations of the millennium in 1988 presented a great opportunity for the change in the official policy towards religion. They were designed to combat foreign anti-religious propaganda, thus improving the general image of the Soviet authorities in the international arena. However, there was no official consensus of how, and on what scale, those celebrations should be conducted. In the above-mentioned discussion between Yakovlev, Kharchev and Ryzhkov from 1985, dealing with the measures that should be taken against the anti-Soviet propaganda of the Vatican, Ryzhkov claimed that despite the need to counteract western propaganda, “we should manifest a very calm and balanced approach towards the millennium celebrations.”30 This view was supported by the hardliners at the CPSU Central Committee. Party propaganda director Yurii Skliarov strongly contested Kharchev’s position that the millennium celebrations should be national in scope and tried, unsuccessfully at that time, to get him removed.31 Kharchev, in one of his first interviews with Ogonek, claimed that millennium celebrations were only the beginning of a new phase in church–state relations: “We have to restore the trust of the believers in our state and the Party, and thus we will fortify the movement of perestroika with a great human factor.”32 Gorbachev supported Kharchev’s attitude: the millennium celebrations were indeed national in scope. A lot of attention was given to the external side of the celebrations. State authorities wanted to gain maximum propaganda benefit from the pomposity of the events. The main millennium events in Moscow were

46  State policy towards the Russian Church planned for 5–13 June, and during 14–16 June in Leningrad and Kiev. According to the CRA official report, foreign guests visited the towns of Voronezh, Kaluga, Kalinin, Tula and Yaroslavl’. They surveyed historical monuments, met with local officials and visited church services and concerts of church music.33 The idea that the state pursued not only a religious, but mostly a political aim, was evident by the fact that, before and during the main celebration events, many thematic art exhibitions were opened and concerts of religious music organised. Foreign guests also visited Soviet war memorials.34 The liturgy, which opened the events in Moscow, was attended by over 400 visiting church representatives; altogether there were over 1,500 official guests at the celebrations.35 The concert at the Bolshoi theatre on 10 June was attended by a number of state representatives, including President Andrei Gromyko, Konstantin Kharchev, chairman of the CRA, and Raisa Gorbachev, the wife of the General Secretary. On 11 June, President Gromyko held a press conference, where all the questions were presented to him in advance.36 By minimising the possibility of spontaneity during the discussion, Gromyko indicated that he was not ready to discuss church–state relations in a totally open manner. On 11 June, at the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, honorary awards were given to the ROC clergy and the followers of Staroobriadchestvo, the Old Believers, who refused to accept the liturgical reforms imposed upon the ROC by the seventh Patriarch of Moscow and all the Rus’, Nikon, who served officially from 1652 to 1666. According to the official account, one of the recipients, Metropolitan Yuvenalii, assured the government of the Russian Federation that believers supported and would continue to support the process of perestroika, democratisation and glasnost’.37 Around 14,000 people attended the final liturgy in the Danilov Monastery on 12 June. In the service dedicated to the canonisation of Ksenia Peterburzhskaia (Fool-for-Christ saint who lived in St. Petersburg in the eighteenth century and was famous for her foresight and prayerful help to people), on 14 June in Leningrad, more than 7,000 people participated.38 One of the main church events in the celebrations was the Pomestnyi Sobor (Local Council) of the ROC, which took place at the Monastery of the Holy Trinity in Zagorsk. It is very important to note that Kharchev was not only present throughout all Council proceedings, but was seated at the Patriarch’s right hand, thus showing both the level of government support of the events and acting as a reminder of state control over the Church. The millennium celebrations in Kiev began with a jubilee ceremony at the Taras Shevchenko theatre, hosted by Metropolitan Filaret, chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate Department for External Church Relations, with state officials also present. Large crowds attended the vigil at St. Vladimir’s Cathedral on 14 June 1988 and a liturgy the following morning. A concert, which took place that evening, was broadcast on radio and television. The festivities in Kiev concluded with an open-air service at the statue of St. Vladimir on Vladimir hill. Despite heavy rain, many thousands attended. Some preachers in the crowd, both Baptist and Orthodox, gave “impromptu” sermons: though this was still formally illegal, the militia did not interfere.39

State policy towards the Russian Church  47 On the whole, the millennium celebrations gave the impression of a very carefully structured event. All the outbursts of contradictory spontaneity were very well organised, and everything was foreseen and under control. This fact was clearly underlined in the official report of the CRA on the celebrations in the RSFSR. “Jubilee proceedings in the towns and cities of the Russian Federation never exceeded the initial programme. No instances of disturbance of public order were reported.”40 The KGB report from 1988 also underlined the fact that all of the necessary measures were taken to ensure state security during the events.41 Soviet official sources confirmed that the millennium celebrations were successful from a propagandistic point of view. They were viewed as a continuation of the Leninist policy towards religion, which admitted its vital role in shaping Russian national culture and its ability to act as a unifying force of the Russian people. Thus, the Soviet authorities accentuated the patriotic nature of the ROC and its closeness with the Russian people and history. Moreover, the millennium celebrations also served as a showcase of the new freedoms for the Church in the USSR.

Church–state relations after the millennium As mentioned above, the tendency towards certain concessions to the ROC started before perestroika. However, shortly before the millennium, there was a qualitative shift in the scale and style of the official closeness towards the Moscow Patriarchate. Gorbachev’s famous meeting with the Patriarch on 29 April 1988 was given broad media coverage (the subject of media use by the state towards religious issues will be discussed in depth in Chapter 4). Moreover, it is important to underline Gorbachev’s intention to revise the legislation towards religion on the basis of the Leninist principles of the separation of the church from the state. He also admitted that religious organisations were affected by the tragic events of the personality cult. Gorbachev promised Patriarch Pimen that he would “find solutions for the pressing problems of the Church’s everyday life as a part of the development of democratic principles in the life of our society.”42 This meeting with Gorbachev marked the beginning of general official policy modification towards the ROC and believers in general. More than a year and half after Gorbachev’s meeting with the Patriarch, another historical meeting took place. Shortly before the Malta summit with US President George Bush, on 1 December 1989, Pope John Paul II received Gorbachev in the Vatican. This encounter gave western observers the impression that there would be a reform of Soviet policy towards religion and freedom of conscience. The Washington Post quoted Cardinal Myroslav Lubachivsky, leader of the Ukrainian Catholics in exile, who claimed that the Vatican had insisted on the discussion of the Uniate Church as a precondition for Gorbachev’s meeting with the Pope.43 Moreover, Lubachivsky hoped that this meeting will improve the Soviet authority’s stance towards the Uniates and that Gorbachev would encourage the ROC to adopt a more flexible position during the negotiations concerning the legalisation of the Uniate Church.44

48  State policy towards the Russian Church The Soviet media, on the other hand, portrayed the meeting as a demonstration of support on the part of the Vatican for Gorbachev’s foreign policy and perestroika. This was especially important before the Malta summit and Gorbachev’s intention to “secure the external conditions for the acceleration of perestroika.”45 Furthermore, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Soviet administration was concerned with the anti-Soviet propaganda spread by the Vatican. Thus, Soviet media emphasised the importance of mutual collaboration with the Vatican in strengthening international security and praised the positive assessment of the Pope of perestroika, who claimed that it coincided with the social doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church.46 The transcript of the meeting between the two leaders reveals Gorbachev’s intention to use his audience with the Pope to secure support for the policy of New Thinking and especially European backing for nuclear arms limitations talks. Moreover, he obtained an understanding from the Pope concerning the significance of national values of different European countries, claiming that Western democratic values could not be regarded as a sole source of truth. With regard to the Pope’s concern over freedom of conscience in the USSR and especially religious freedom for Catholics of both Latin and Byzantine traditions, Gorbachev replied that religious issues are a personal matter for Soviet citizens. He asked the Pope to calm the escalation of the conflict with the Uniates in western Ukraine through dialogue with the ROC and respect the Soviet law with regard to the Catholic religious influence on Soviet territory. Unlike Gorbachev’s meeting with Patriarch Pimen, his meeting with the Pope did not have much influence on the official attitude towards the ROC, but it signified Soviet authorities’ general willingness to adopt the Law on “Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations.”47 The moderation of the official policy towards religion was also evident in the instructions given by the CRA to its regional plenipotentiaries. Analytical reports produced by the CRA, drawing on the work of its plenipotentiaries, on the one hand, emphasised the need to incorporate believers in the general effort of perestroika, and on the other, required more tight and efficient control over religious organisations. For example, one of the CRA reports from 1987 noted that many reports submitted by regional plenipotentiaries were too shallow and schematic.48 Soviet officials manifested a clear need for analytical reports which involved an examination of such issues as the nature of preaching, asking to demonstrate close analysis of what was usually said during sermons.49 Much less interest was paid to the conventional functions of the plenipotentiaries such as control over the implementation of the existing legislation on religion and the broadening of atheistic propaganda. Now, the emphasis was on the analysis and control over the dynamics of religious life, and the ability of the plenipotentiary to report on time and possibly prevent any negative outcome in the religious situation.50 Another very important issue, which was also noted as absent from the reports of many plenipotentiaries, was the reaction of the local clergy to the religious propaganda coming from the West. This was true especially for Far East regions (such cities as Vladivostok), where according to Soviet reports, eight foreign radio

State policy towards the Russian Church  49 stations broadcast different programmes connected with religion 24 hours a day. More than eighty-five per cent of all the foreign literature that came to the region from abroad consisted of books on religion.51 In order to withstand that propaganda, Soviet authorities called for a modification in the style of work with the clergy and religious activists. This was done through different forms of encouragement such as the granting of special diplomas to those clergymen who actively contributed to the ROC struggle for peace and by personal meetings and talks with believers.52 The official stance towards the religious situation in the Moscow region could serve as an example of the need for a less bureaucratic and more humane approach towards believers. The CRA officials called for the use of glasnost’ as the best possible means of the state policy realisation towards religion, which advocated for a constant study of believers’ needs and their active participation in resolving issues connected to the region’s religious and social life.53 However, the CRA resolution from 11 October 1988 clearly stated that plenipotentiary apparatus is lacking the necessary depth and efficiency in working with the complaints and applications of the believers.54 Millennium celebrations stimulated the general interest of the population towards religion, which caused Soviet authorities to worry about the growing authority of the Church. Many new religious communities had been registered; there was a rise in baptisms.55 This also somewhat influenced the instructions given to the plenipotentiaries. They were asked to pay more attention to the conflicting situations, connected with the registration of religious societies, and to exercise tight control over the activity of the religious organisations by conducting an in-depth analysis of the religious situation in their regions.56 In order to achieve those goals, regional plenipotentiaries presented the CRA with a series of recommendations, some were aimed at improving their professional status and others clearly asked for a more lenient approach towards religious organisations. They requested the state to provide them with all the necessary literature dealing with the policy towards religion, so their actions and reports would be adjusted accordingly. Moreover, plenipotentiaries emphasised the need to share their experience with each other and, what is no less important, examine the possibility of a rise in salary. Furthermore, they accentuated that the status of the plenipotentiary should be improved both in the eyes of local officials, church authorities and the general public. Thus, during the process of registration of the new religious societies, the wishes of both believers and the general public should be accounted for. The autonomy of the Church’s inner affairs should be respected. The clergy should also be encouraged to take a more active part in the social and economic life of society such as in the formation of cooperatives dealing with the protection of historical sites, distribution of the Bible and charity work.57 Some of the above-mentioned recommendations had a purely bureaucratic character. Others, like the one which advised official authorities to allow the Church to engage in charity and encouraged the clergy to become more socially active, could be seen as quite a significant novelty, taking into account that until 1990 the Law on “Religious Associations” denied believers the right to engage in charity and the right of educational and social activity.

50  State policy towards the Russian Church From 1988, one of the most important responsibilities in the plenipotentiaries’ work became “educational work” with the clergy. This sphere also underwent the most notable change in the state attitude towards religion after the millennium celebrations. Instead of the uniform bureaucratic approach, a more personal touch, which included educational work with the clergy, was propagated. An example of how such work should be conducted was set by the plenipotentiary from the Bashkir autonomous republic. It was based on his educational work with the archpriest Mokhov, father superior of the Ishimbad parish. According to the reports of the previous plenipotentiaries, Mokhov was known for his reluctance to follow the state policy towards religion and for his liking of alcoholic beverages. Moreover, he was influenced by the reactionary priests, with whom he had been in contact before his nomination to the Ufa diocese. It was clear that his position was of great importance to him. Thus, the CRA employee explained to Mokhov that his behaviour was condemned by believers and could lead to devastating results. This work gradually produced some very positive consequences. Mokhov changed his attitude and condemned the nature of foreign religious propaganda in a lengthy article in Sovetskaia Bashkiriia (Soviet Bashkiriia). Moreover, in an interview with one of the republic’s TV stations, he portrayed how the issues of observing the constitutional guarantees of freedom of conscience were implemented in Bashkortostan.58 Plenipotentiaries were also asked to improve their knowledge of the history and dogmas of the Russian Orthodoxy. By using this knowledge in their contacts with the clergy, they could automatically gain more respect, thus creating close personal ties with the priests, so necessary to the efficient educational work.59 Offering help in the solutions of such problems as property return and the registration of religious societies simplified the educational work with the clergy.60 A more lenient approach towards the clergy, improvement in the professional level and status of plenipotentiaries and a more liberal attitude towards the social activity of the Church, in fact, did not change the most important thing, the essence of Soviet policy towards religion, which continued to be centred on close surveillance of religious activity. This change of style was only intended to make this control more efficient, based less on fear and more on the collaboration with the Church. As mentioned above, the return of church property and a more liberal approach towards the registration of religious societies were the most important tactics used to improve church–state collaboration. And indeed, following the millennium celebrations, a lot of progress was achieved in those spheres. In order to avoid negative propaganda, official policy tended to comply with believers’ demands in such cases as the return of small churches and prayer houses. In Ivanovo, four religious women announced a hunger strike on 21 March 1989 demanding the return of the Vvedenskaia church, in which, from 1937 the regional state archive was located.61 This strike was supported by many citizens, including many informal organisations, which emerged following the improvement of the official attitude towards the Church. The major ones were Rossiiskii Narodnyi Front (The Russian People’s Front), Khristianskii Patrioticheskii Soiuz (Christian Patriotic Union) and Khristianskii Informatsionnyi Tsentr (Christian Information Centre). It is important to

State policy towards the Russian Church 51 note that the last two of the above-mentioned organisations were Christian democrats closely connected with the West. Thus, Soviet authorities clearly viewed the crisis as a dangerous precedent, which not only could be followed by other religious organisations in the country but could also lead to a negative anti-Soviet propaganda. Therefore, in this case, in order to avoid future deterioration in the situation, the authorities decided to return the church to believers.62 A lack of finances for the restoration of the ROC property served as a good excuse for delaying its return to believers. The religious community of the Palekh village, famous for its art of miniature painting, demanded the return of Krestovovodvezhenskaia church, which served as a museum of Russian folk art. It was decided that only part of the church would be returned to believers, and the religious community would finance the restoration of the property.63 The return of historical monuments, such as the Valaam and Kursk monasteries, was also on condition that the ROC would provide financial aid for the restoration work.64 The same could be said about the return of the Stephano-Makhrichenskii and Blagovencheskii monasteries. It was promised in 1990 as a special concession before the celebrations commemorating 600 years since the death of Sergii Radonezhskii (a Russian Orthodox monk whose spiritual doctrine and social programmes made him one of Russia’s most respected spiritual leaders). Statistical data provided by the RSFSR CRA states that during the years 1988–1989, more than 500 churches and 13 monasteries were returned to the ROC.65 The most evident change in the official attitude towards believers after 1988 was noted in the number of registrations of new religious communities. According to the data provided by Metropolitan Vladimir, some sixty societies were registered between January 1988 and the end of May of the same year.66 Kharchev gave the figure of 6,800 registered religious societies in March 1988, during his lecture at a Higher Party School in Moscow.67 In January 1989, 7,549 church societies were reported to be registered in the country. Over 900 new societies were registered between January and April 1989, more than had been registered in all of 1988. Between the spring of 1989 and the end of 1991, over 2,000 new Orthodox parishes were recorded.68 Registration of new religious societies and liberalisation towards believers was part of a general politics of democratisation initiated by Gorbachev, but it was also a tool of control over religious life. According to the RSFSR CRA report, 1,370 extremist religious organisations refused registration, among them: Pentecostals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Adventists and the True Orthodox Church, which were subjected to intensified surveillance.69 As already mentioned above, this atmosphere led to the appearance of numerous informal groups, organisations and popular fronts. The attitude of the Russian nationalistic groups towards the ROC will be analysed in Chapter 5, on Russian Orthodoxy in the patriotic and Christian alternative press during perestroika. New legislation connected with civil rights and a certain easing of censorship also accelerated the liberalisation of the Soviet political climate. However, despite those impressive figures, there were problems in the implementation of government policy towards religion, especially in the periphery.

52  State policy towards the Russian Church Tambov regional authorities denied the return of Bogolubskii Cathedral, despite the fact that its return was sanctioned by the RSFSR CRA.70 Boris Yeltsin’s speech on 14 July 1989 at the Supreme Soviet session dedicated to the election of the new KGB chief underlined the importance to review the attitude of the KGB towards the ROC and other religious denominations and prompted numerous applications from believers constantly complaining about the problems of property return. A group of believers from Belgorod complained that town authorities refused to return the local cathedral.71 A similar story repeated itself in Kurgan, Sverdlovsk and Michurinsk.72 Thus, the real change in the official status of the ROC became evident only in 1990 with the revision of the existing legislation on religion, which accentuated the willingness of the Soviet authorities to comply with one of the main demands of the ROC, the change in its official status.

New legislation on religion Until 1990, believers in the USSR were governed by the “Law on Religious Associations” passed on 8 April 1929. This law denied religious associations the status of juridical personality and demanded strict registration rules which involved also a requirement to provide a detailed report on the members of religious groups or associations. Religious associations and groups were denied the right to own property. Possessions acquired as a result of contributions were nationalised immediately. Moreover, religious organisations were denied the right to offer any financial help to their members, a right to be engaged in charity and any right to educational and social activity.73 However, even before perestroika, amendments which granted additional rights to believers were introduced to religious legislation. An amendment to the 1929 law was adopted on 23 June 1975. It allowed the religious associations to manufacture church utensils, to build new prayer houses (in accordance with permission given by the CRA) and (again with permission from the CRA) to practise religion in the open air.74 A new Soviet Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations” eventually came into force in October 1990. It was preceded by two draft versions of the law published in February 1989. One was prepared by the jurist Yuri Rozenbaum of the Institute of State and Law and the other by the CRA.75 Both drafts introduced additional concessions to the last amendments accepted in 1975, such as the right to propound both religious and atheist views and the right to promote either religious or atheist propaganda, prohibition of discrimination on religious grounds and equality for all confessions. In short, both drafts ensured more democratic procedures of registration and celebration of religious rites, but still envisaged a form of continued state oversight of religion.76 The CRA draft echoed Rosenbaum’s with one difference: it raised the possibility of conscientious objection to military service.77 It also called for a more rigid and uncompromising attitude towards religion in the administrative sphere, demanding the restriction of a minimal number of believers to form a religious organisation, restriction on opening schools and limits on property ownership. However, it seemed more liberal in its approach towards religious worship,

State policy towards the Russian Church  53 allowing not only the freedom of belief but also the freedom for propagation and popularisation of one’s convictions. All restrictive suggestions, proposed by the CRA, were finally rejected by the USSR law. The final draft of the USSR Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations was more moderate than the CRA draft in the administrative sphere. However, both drafts allowed freedom of religious worship, equality of all citizens regardless of their attitudes to religion, separation of church from state and the secular character of state education. Moreover, both drafts gave religious associations the status of “juridical personality,” including the possibility to own property, to publish religious literature, manufacture church utensils, engage in charity, carry out cultural-educational work and engage in a political life. By declining the suggestions proposed by the CRA draft, the final USSR law limited the status of the Council. It became an informative and consultative body, whose sole responsibility was to compile an information bank on religious organisations. Specifying the functions of the organisations dealing with control over religious associations, the USSR law pointed out that former CRA employees could take new posts in the executive committees of the local Soviets, which now would be responsible for the control of religious associations. According to Luchterhand, the decision of the new Soviet religious law to allow the CRA to exist, even in a modified form, was an attempt to maintain control and political influence for the ruling centralised powers in the Central Committee and Cabinet bureaucracy.78 Moreover, liberalised USSR law, which provided for the right to perform religious rites in military units and emphasised the right of religious organisations to establish schools, served the needs of the Soviet foreign propaganda by projecting a positive image in the international arena. In short, the new law introduced significant changes regarding all matters concerning the status of religious associations, and especially that of the ROC. It applied equally to all religions and denominations. Ellis argues that members of the ROC played a leading role in both drafting and debating USSR law.79 However, there was no negation of the need for control over religious organisations. Some alterations that were introduced in the new law, concerning the status of the ROC, were also reflected in official atheistic propaganda.

Atheistic propaganda The alteration of the official atheistic propaganda, perhaps more than anything else, highlights the shift in the official attitude towards religion in general and towards the ROC in particular. It also clarifies the nature of the ideological preparation of Soviet people for the change in the official attitude towards church–state relations. Analysis will be based on the monthly popular-scientific journal dealing with the atheistic propaganda, Nauka i Religiia (Science and Religion). It was first published in 1959 and served as a tribune of the scientific atheism in the USSR. Examination of the issues from the years 1985–1987 indicates the continuity of the major themes prevalent in the atheistic propaganda during the pre-perestroika period. They concentrated around such major topics as atheistic education among

54  State policy towards the Russian Church the younger generations, the status of religion and the ROC and the interrelations between Christianity and paganism. Atheistic education among the young was probably the most prominent issue. A need to reverse the growth in the number of believers was clearly felt, though it was never stated explicitly at that point. It was mentioned that atheistic education, especially among schoolchildren, should be much less dogmatic, taking into account the children’s needs. Creative approaches to atheistic education could prevent children from joining theological seminaries.80 It is interesting to note that the ROC was never used as a main target for anti-religious propaganda. Instead, whenever there was a need to launch an open criticism against the Orthodox Church, other denominations, such as the Uniate Church, served as the main objective of the official anti-religious propaganda. The attitude towards the Uniate Church was viewed not in terms of the relations between the centre and the periphery but as a “rival church” a bearer of foreign influence. A good example is an article by A. Babiichuk which called for an open assault on the Uniate Church in Ukraine since it allegedly fostered hostile Western propaganda.81 The efforts to subjugate the Uniates were part of a broader programme of Russification which sought to assert Russian centrality over other parts of the USSR. In general, religion was portrayed as a dangerous force which belonged to the irrational sphere of illusion, fantasy and emotions, and thus completely unrelated to science and technological progress. Practising religion was depicted as a sign of psychological weakness. People who openly declared themselves as believers were characterised as weak people who have difficulty in realising themselves in any other field.82 It was advocated that science has an answer to all the emotional needs of the people including such methods as role-playing and art therapy.83 Religion was also said to have a very negative influence on family ties. A heartbreaking article on how a religious grandmother separated her daughter from her grandson was intended to undermine the moral basis of the Church.84 It was represented as a reactionary force, which together with the Tsarist regime, tried to destroy the revolutionary movement.85 The status of religion was also diminished, by negating the influence of Christianity on the cultural development of the Russian people. Instead, the emphasis was on the Russian pagan past.86 It was stated that Christianity was not solely responsible for the cultural development of Russia.87 Russian Orthodoxy impeded the development of painting and architecture and was not exclusively responsible for the development of literature. Very soon Russia developed its own national epic literature, the best example of which was the poem, Slovo o Polku Igoreve (The Tale of Igor’s Campaign), which invoked the ancient Slavic religion, emphasising the forces of nature and their impact on human lives.88 In his first interview with Nauka i Religiia in 1987, Kharchev claimed that Orthodox Christianity had no special influence on the cultural heritage of the Russian people.89 The real shift in the official atheistic propaganda occurred only shortly before the millennium celebrations. Religion then was portrayed in a more positive light, and it was the ROC that played the leading role. The patriotic activity of the Moscow Patriarchate and its loyalty to the Soviet state was emphasised again and again on the

State policy towards the Russian Church 55 pages of Nauka i Religiia. The journal related the uneasy plight of the clergy in the period of World War II.90 After the celebrations, a known and respected authority in Russian literary history and culture, Dmitri Likhachev, in an interview with Nauka i Religiia, spoke about the important contribution of Christianity in the development of literacy, social life and agriculture in Russia.91 At the beginning of 1991, one could find in the pages of Nauka i Religiia articles dealing with the legislation on religion,92 the rebuilding of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow93 and the influence of the ROC on social and political issues.94 The journal interviewed representatives of the Church hierarchy on very different matters, starting from the commentary on the New Testament and ending with the political activity of the priests and their contribution to legislation.95 In short, the ROC regained its status as a respected institution which had always been loyal to the Soviet authorities. Summing up the change in church–state relations during perestroika, it can be stated that there was no major alteration in the essence of relations, but only in their style and emphasis. Political control over religious activity remained a fundamental part of those relations. Millennium celebrations were planned as a demonstration of the new Soviet freedom of conscience, thus intending to attain two goals: to counteract the massive foreign religious propaganda and to raise the status of the ROC, mobilising believers to the needs of glasnost’ and perestroika. These goals were pursued by the encouragement of a new, less bureaucratic approach towards the believers’ needs and incorporation of Christian Orthodox values into the discussion on Russian national identity. The need for control over religious associations, despite many liberal changes, was also accepted in the new USSR law “On the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations.” However, two most important things that marked the shift in the official policy towards religion were an emphasis on the special status of the Russian Orthodoxy, as a close ally of the Russian and Soviet state, and the changing juridical status of the ROC.

Notes 1 Sabrina Ramet, “Religious Policy in the Era of Gorbachev,” in Religious Policy in the Soviet Union, ed. Sabrina Ramet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 46. 2 Christopher Marsh, Religion and the State in Russia and China: Suppression, Survival and Revival (New York and London: The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2011). 83. 3 Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy, Change and Continuity in National Identity (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013). 51. 4 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness; Knox, Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism; Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy. 5 L. A. Andreeva, “Osobennosti gosudarstvenno-tserkovnykh otnoshenii v SSSR” (PhD, Rossiiskii Nezavisimyi Institut sotsial’nykh i natsional’nykh problem, 1996). 52. 6 Ibid. 104. 7 J. Baron, KGB: The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1974). 84. 8 Ibid. 110. 9 G. Shtrikker, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov v sovetskoe vremia, Vol. 2 (Moscow: Propilei, 1995). 65–66.

56  State policy towards the Russian Church 10 Chumachenko, Church and State in Soviet Russia. 8. 11 Philip Bobkov, KGB i Vlast’ (Moscow: Veteran, 1995). 356–357. 12 Dimitry Pospielovsky, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v 20-om veke (Moscow: Respublica, 1995). 383. 13 Z. Vodopianova, ed., Istoriia Sovetskoi Politicheskoi Tsenzury: Documenty i Kommentarii (Moscow: Rosspen, 1997). 127. 14 Ibid. 382. 15 TsKhSD, f.5, op.84, doc.99, Meropriatia Soveta po Delam Religii pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR po Vypolneniu Postanovlenia TsK KPSS ot 22 Sentiabria 1981g. “Ob Usilenii Ateisticheskogo Vospitania,” 1982. 117–124. 16 Otto Luchterhandt, “The Council for Religious Affairs,” in Religious Policy in the Soviet Union, ed. Sabrina Ramet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 64. 17 Pospielovsky, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v 20-om veke. 357. 18 Ibid. 19 Tsipin, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997. 453. 20 GARF, f.6991, op.6, d.2522, Postanovlenia po Otnoshenii k Religii, 1989. 3–4. 21 Pospielovsky, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v 20-om veke. 357. 22 TsKhSD, f.89, op.25, d.10, O Protivodeistvii Zarubezhnoi Klerikal’noi Propagande v Sviazi s 1000-Letiem Vvedenia Khristianstva na Rusi, 1985. 1. 23 TsKhSD, f.89, op.11, d.46, TsK KPSS, 1986. 4–5. 24 Ibid. 2. 25 Andreeva, Osobennosti gosudarstvenno-tserkovnykh otnoshenii v SSSR. 116. 26 Pospielovsky, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v 20-om veke. 386. 27 Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy. 59; J. Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church; Triumphalism and Defensiveness. 22; Knox, Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism. 184–191. 28 Alexander Nezhnyi, ‘Sovest’ Svobodna,’ Ogonek, no. 21 (1988). 26. 29 GARF, f.a.-661, op.1, d.7, O Provedenii Tserkovnogo Iubileia 1000- Letia Vvedenia Khristianstva na Rusi na Territorii Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1988. 27. 30 O Protivodeistvii Zarubezhnoi Klerikal’noi Propagande v Sviazi s 1000-Letiem Vvedenia Khristianstva na Rusi. 3. 31 Konstantin Kharchev was removed from his office in the summer of 1989. The official explanation said that, “he had not found a common language with the ideological apparat, the ‘neighbours’ [KGB], and the leadership of the ROC” (Ellis, p. 48). Kharchev was also accused of corruption and excessive involvement in the affairs of the ROC and other denominations (Pospielovskii, p. 394). Perhaps Kharchev’s attitude was best expressed by Aleksandr Degtiarev (first deputy of the CC CPSU ideological department chairman): In my opinion the activity of the former CRA chairman reminds us of the behaviour of modern Tarelkin. As we all remember when the process of progress was announced in Russia, Tarelkin was the first one to take the flag and march before it. ‘K Tret’emu razgovory,’ Ogonek, no. 48 (1989). 28–29. 32 Nezhnyi, Sovest’ Svobodna. 27. 33 Kolesnikov, O provedenii tserkovnogo iubileia 1000- letia vvedenia khristianstva na Rusi na territorii Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 19. 34 Ibid. 20. 35 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church; Triumphalism and Defensiveness. 29. 36 Ibid. 29. 37 Kolesnikov, O provedenii tserkovnogo iubileia 1000- letia vvedenia khristianstva na Rusi na territorii Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 21. 38 Ibid. 21. 39 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church; Triumphalism and Defensiveness. 30.

State policy towards the Russian Church 57 40 Kolesnikov, O provedenii tserkovnogo iubileia 1000- letia vvedenia khristianstva na Rusi na territorii Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 22. 41 TsKhSD, f.89, op.51, d.15, Otchet o Rabote KGB SSSR za 1988 g. 1989. 8. 42 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church; Triumphalism and Defensiveness. 28. 43 “Ukrainian Catholics foresee legislation of Church,” The Washington Post, September 23 1989; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post. p. D19. 44 Michael Dobbs, “Ukrainian Prelate Predicts Legalisation of Church,” The Washington Post, November 28 1989, ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post. p. A31. 45 William Taubman, Gorbachev: His Life and Times (London: Simon & Shuster, 2017). 499. 46 In the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Pravda, no. 6, November 29 1989, Current Digest of the Russian Press, No. 44, Vol. 41, November 29 1989. page(s): 25–26; N. Miroshnik, ‘Roman Hours of Big Politics,’ Pravda, no. 4, November 19, Current Digest of the Russian Press, No. 46, Vol. 42, December 19 1990. page(s): 23–24. 47 https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB298/Document%208.pdf, GARF, Yakovlev Collection. f.10063, op.1, d.394. On file at the National Security Archive. 48 GARF, f.a.-661, op.1, d.6, Analiticheskaia Spravka po Otchetam Upolnomochennykh Soveta po Delam Religii ob Itogakh Raboty v 1987 Gody i o Sostoianii Religioznoi Obstanovki v Respublikah, Kraiakh i Oblastiakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1987. 42. 49 Ibid. 43. 50 Ibid. 46. 51 Ibid. 47. 52 Ibid. 48–49. 53 GARF, f.a.-661, op.1, d.4, Spravka o Perestroike v Rabote Apparata Upolnomochennogo po Moskovskoi Oblasti v Realizatsii Gosudarstvennoi Politiki v Otnoshenii Religii i Tserkvi, 1988. 15. 54 GARF, f.a.-661, op.1, d.4, Postanovlenie Soveta po Delam Religii pri Sovete Ministrov RSFSR o Khode Perestroiki v Rabote Upolnomochennogo Soveta po Delam Religii po Chuvashskoi ASSR, 1988. 120. 55 Marsh, Religion and the State in Russia and China: Suppression, Survival and Revival. 94. 56 Kolesnikov, Postanovlenie Soveta po delam religii pri Sovete Ministrov RSFSR o khode perestroiki v rabote upolnomochennogo Soveta po delam religii po Chuvashskoi ASSR. 12–16. 57 Analiticheskaia Spravka po Otchetam Upolnomochennykh Soveta po Delam Religii pb Itogakh Raboty v 1987 Gody i o Sostoianii Religioznoi Obstanovki v Respublikah, Kraiakh i Oblastiakh Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 11–29. 58 GARF, f.a.-661, op.1, d.12, Obzor Materialov o Nekotorykh Aspektakh Vospitatelnoi Raboty so Sluzhiteliami Kultov i Tserkovnym Aktivom v Usloviakh Perestroiki, 1989. 60–61. 59 Ibid. 65, 73–74. 60 Ibid. 64. 61 GARF, f.a.-661, op.1, d.13, Sovet Ministrov RSFSR, 1989. 51. 62 Ibid. 52. 63 Ibid. 10–11. 64 Ibid. 20–21, 27–28, 60–61, 73–74. 65 GARF, f.a.-661, op.1, d.20, Chleny Prezidentskogo Soveta SSSR, Narodnomy Deputatu SSSR, T. Rasputiny V.G. 1990. 42. 66 Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy. 65. 67 K. Kharchev, Russkaia Mysl’, no. 3725 (May 20 1988). 68 Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy. 66, 68, 70.

58  State policy towards the Russian Church 69 GARF, f.a-661, op.1, d.13, Zamestiteliu Predsedatelia Soveta Ministrov RSFSR, Chekhariny E.M. 1989. 4–5. 70 Kolesnikov, Sovet Ministrov RSFSR. 86–87. 71 GARF, f.a.-664, op.1, d.417, Borisu Nikolaevichu Eltsiny, Chleny Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1989. 98–101. 72 Ibid. 90–94, 150–151. 73 G. Shtrikker, “Postanovlenie Vserossiiskogo Tsentralnogo Ispolnitelnogo Komiteta i Soveta Narodnykh Kommissarov o religioznykh obedineniakh (8.4.1929),” in Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v sovetskoe vremia (1917–1991), Vol. 1 (Moscow: Propilei, 1995). 307–310. 74 Shtrikker, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov v sovetskoe vremia. 127. 75 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church; Triumphalism and Defensiveness. 158. 76 Yu Rozenbaum, ‘K razrabotke proekta zakona SSSR o svobode sovesti,’ Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo, no. 2 (1989). 95–98. 77 ‘Novyi Zakon o Svobode Sovesti,’ Moscow News, no. 17 (1990). 1. 78 Luchterhandt, The Council for Religious Affairs. 78. 79 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church; Triumphalism and Defensiveness. 161. 80 V. Iarukin, ‘Po doroge znanii,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 3 (1985). 12–14. 81 A. Babiichuk, ‘Molodezhy ideinuiu zakalku,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 1 (1985). 10–13. 82 E. Baikov, ‘Udivitel’no otkuda eto beretsia,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 11 (1986). 9. 83 A. Belenkaia, ‘Tysiachi putei ty sviazan s mirom,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 7 (1985). 15–19. 84 L. Storozhakova, ‘Oksana ischet syna,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 11 (1986). 10–11. 85 P. Zyrianov, ‘1905 god i tserkov’,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 12 (1985). 12–14. 86 Discussion on Russian paganism, its interrelations with Russian Orthodoxy and the official Soviet propaganda in Stella Rock, Popular Religion in Russia: A “Double Belief” and a Making of an Academic Myth (United Kingdom: Taylor Francis Ltd, 2007). 87 A. Ipatov, ‘Pravoslavie i Russkaia kul’tura: vymysly i deistvitel’nost’,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 7 (1985). 44. 88 Ibid. 45. 89 K. Kharchev, ‘Garantii Svobody,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 11 (1987). 21–23. 90 V. Kononenko, ‘Pamiat’ Blokady,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 5 (1988). 9–13. 91 D. S. Likhachev, ‘Zhivet tol’ko on, narod,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 12 (1988). 28–30. 92 A. E. Sebentsov, ‘Za strokoi zakona,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 1 (1991). 3–4. 93 A. Shapiro, ‘Imeni tvoemu,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 1 (1991). 20–22. 94 S. Zheludkov, ‘S Bogom ili bez Boga,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 1 (1991). 26–28. 95 ‘Obshaia svecha,’ an interview with the chairman of the Union of Orthodox Brotherhood, Father Superior Ioann (Ekonomtsev), Nauka i Religiia, no. 6 (1991). 12–14; M. Odintsov, ‘Khozhdenie po mukam,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 7 (1991). 2–3. (This article deals with church–state relations in the USSR between the years 1954–1960); V. Sorokin, ‘Mogut li byt’ grekhi u sviatogo?’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 7 (1991). 32–35. (The article deals with the problems of canonisation in the ROC); ‘V glavnom – edinstvo, v spornom- svoboda, I vo vsem lubov’’ (an interview with the senior priest of the Troitskii church in the village of Vaulovo, Father Vladimir Lapishnoi), Nauka i Religiia, no. 7. (1991). 40–42; ‘Problemy ostaiutsia’ (an interview with the plenipotentiary of Leningrad and Leningrad region, I.M. Vyshepan), Nauka i Religiia, no. 8 (1991). 2–3; E. Lazarev, ‘Valaam, Rossiia v miniature,’ Nauka i Religiia, no. 9 (1991). 4–9; ‘V pervyi den’ vtorogo tysiachiletia’ (an interview the archbishop of Iaroslavl’ and Rostov, Platon), Nauka i Religiia, no. 10. 1; L. Regelson, ‘Sviashennik v parlamente’ (an interview with the chairman of the RSFSR committee on the freedom of conscious, V.S. Polosin), Nauka i Religiia, no. 11 (1991). 3–5.

3 Church–state relations View from the Moscow Patriarchate

The ROC attitude towards the Soviet state during perestroika was in many ways similar to its attitude towards secular authorities throughout Russian history, and it underlined the mutual interests of both parties. It is possible to trace the desire for a unified Russian state, the defence of the motherland from foreign influence and ecumenical ties with other Orthodox churches back through one thousand years of Russia’s Christian history. Both Russian secular and spiritual authorities have long held these ambitions. Their importance was especially emphasised by the Church after the millennium celebrations in 1988 and the 400th anniversary of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1989. The academic discourse on the subject of the ROC position towards the state during perestroika mainly dealt with the developments, challenges and the role of the Church in the process of the USSR’s disintegration.1 However, the Church’s own voice was not given a central stage in this dispute. In order to understand fully the nature of church–state relations, it is essential to highlight the Moscow Patriarchate’s perspective by juxtaposing it with the official Soviet policy discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter is based on the analysis of the ROC official sources such as Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii and other published official documents, since no other official sources emanating from the Church are available to researchers. The discussion focuses solely on the official position of the ROC and aims to analyse its nature and the dynamics of its development in relation to official Soviet policy. On the 400th anniversary of the Moscow Patriarchate Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii devoted much attention to the historical discussion of the ROC contribution to the defence and security of Russia. It published short notes on all fourteen Russian Patriarchs emphasising their service to Russia and its spiritual and territorial (imperial) needs. Patriarch Germogen, for example, was proclaimed a hero for defending Moscow against the Poles and blessing the people’s insurrection led by Minin and Pozharskii in 1610. Patriarch Ioakim, who led the Church from 1674 to 1690, was praised for introducing strict custom laws which hastened the eviction of the Jesuits from Moscow. The journal also acclaimed the heroic deeds of the Soviet-era patriarchs such as Patriarch Sergii, who instructed the Church to support the Soviet state during the most difficult times of World War II and Patriarch Aleksii I, who promoted publishing the Bible in the Russian

60  Church–state relations language during the 1960s. Aleksii was also an adamant supporter of the USSR’s foreign policy goals, through his personal active involvement in the USSR’s official peacemaking campaign.2 Church–state relations during perestroika continued the pattern of the pre-perestroika period, where the state was the dominant party and furthermore dictated the agenda of the ROC. The Church, however, had its own stakes. The state provided it with the ability to function as the dominant confession in the USSR and the Church, on her part, agreed to Soviet foreign policy goals, since they served Soviet imperial needs and widened the ecumenical borders of the Moscow Patriarchate. The ROC position vis-à-vis the state became more confident only a year after the millennium, and it included recurrent demands as to the ROC financial needs and the acceptance of the new Statute, adopted at the 1988 Local Council. A new Statute, in comparison with the Regulations of the ROC adopted in 1945 and the 1917–1918 Charter, discussed in detail issues concerning the diocesan and parish management and the activity of theological schools and monasteries. It also introduced the periodicity of Local and Bishop’s Councils and the diocesan congregation was restored. The most important change was the overturning of the 1961 Bishop’s Council decision, which did not allow priests to engage in financial and economic activity.3 This chapter focuses on the dynamics of the ROC attitude towards the state during perestroika. It examines the underlying interests of the Church, expressed in such themes as the attitude of Church hierarchs towards the putsch and the disintegration of the USSR, the involvement of the ROC in the implementation of Soviet foreign policy, the ROC ecumenical ties, including relations with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA), theological education, publishing activity and the social role of the Church. Before we proceed with the detailed analysis of the ROC involvement in Soviet foreign policy and the change in its official status, the general transformation of the Moscow Patriarchate’s position towards the state should be underlined. In the previous chapter, the millennium celebrations were identified as a turning point in the attitude of the state apparatus towards the Church. However, the change in the attitude of the ROC officials towards the state occurred only after the inauguration of Patriarch Aleksii II in 1990. Prior to the millennium, Patriarch Pimen and other leading ROC officials such as archbishop Pitirim of Volokolamsk emphasised their total loyalty towards the Soviet state. The claim that communism was closer to Orthodox Christianity than capitalism, because it abides by the idea of symphony, was just one example. This idea, which signified harmonious church–state relations, when both church and state are complementary and exhibit mutual respect and interests, was central to the Russian religious discourse. Since Moscow Patriarchate officials proclaimed they had no interest in political and economic questions, all the issues connected with property return and the registration of new parishes and/or Orthodox societies were willingly left to the state.4 Moreover, church hierarchs were involved in the state propaganda directed against the West. Archbishop Pitirim in 1987 tried to persuade foreign journalists that the Soviet state was a reliable partner, since the government decided to dispose

Church–state relations 61 of the ROC property and an increasing number of churches were restored and opened.5 Patriarch Pimen in his interview from 9 April 1988, confirmed that the “USSR is our civil motherland.”6 During the meeting of the Patriarch and the members of the Holy Synod with Gorbachev on 29 April 1988, ROC officials confirmed again that the Church should not be involved in political and economic issues. The ROC should solely support the state by devoting itself to the spiritual education of believers. The same ideas could be traced in the telegram sent by Patriarch Pimen to Gorbachev on the occasion of the seventy-first anniversary of the October Revolution (3 November 1988), where the Church was portrayed as a provider of moral values such as civil responsibility and patriotism. Thus, Patriarch Pimen did not play any part in stimulating or inaugurating the changes, related to religious education, property return and charitable activity, from which his Church had begun to benefit after the millennium. Moscow Patriarchate’s officials did not change their passive attitude towards the state, even though concessions towards the Church started to be noticeable several months after the millennium celebrations, when the state authorities realised its potential in supporting the goals of perestroika. It was only in the second half of 1990, after the election of Aleksii II, that ROC officials became more assertive in their attitude towards the state. This change of attitude on the part of the Church coincided with the split between socialist and liberal ideological lines within the Communist Party initiated by Gorbachev. The first signs of change indicated support for the goals of perestroika such as a battle against crime and corruption and the spiritual education of the Russian people. On the pages of Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, Church officials started a campaign against non-traditional healers and other non-Christian influences. Those were portrayed as forces of evil, which aimed to avert the people from Christ.7 Aleksii’s II criticism of organised crime in the USSR led to his initiative in arranging a meeting with Prime Minister Ivan Silaev in June 1990, during which such issues as crime, freedom of conscience, business, charity, labour productivity and taxes were discussed. One practical follow-up of the meeting was a joint letter to the Council of Ministers of Tatarstan, requesting the restitution of all churches to the ROC as soon as possible.8 The interests of both state and Church coincided in this matter. Since Tatarstan was a Muslim region, strengthening the activity of the ROC as a national church in the republic gained special importance. The alteration of the Church’s rhetorical style is evidence of a striking shift in the Moscow Patriarchate’s view of the state. On the seventy-third celebration of the October Revolution, Aleksii II wrote a telegram to Gorbachev, which was quite different from the tone of his predecessor’s correspondence with the General Secretary just two years earlier. Pimen’s telegram was written in a strictly Soviet style using accepted ideological paradigms. Aleksii, on the other hand, chose a more philosophical and didactic approach. For him, the anniversary of the October Revolution should become a day of inner contemplation, of remembrance and striving for the union of all Russian people.9 During the ceremony, to mark the return to the city of Leningrad its historical name of St. Petersburg,

62  Church–state relations on 6 November 1991, Patriarch’s political stand became even more insistent. He recalled the words of Veniamin, the Metropolitan of Petrograd, who was murdered by the Soviet authorities at the beginning of the 1920s: “The greatest grief is separation and enmity, but times will come and Rus’ will be united. Let us hope that those words are prophetic.”10 Thus, the ROC ideological support of the state became much more active and substantial. The importance, which Patriarch Aleksii assigned to the USSR’s unity, clearly underlined the interests of the Church in maintaining and expanding its ecumenical borders, and not only those of the state. The involvement of ROC leaders in politics after the millennium could be viewed as an additional sign of the growing active collaboration with secular authorities. Elections to the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR in March 1989 marked a sharp growth in the political activity of ROC officials. Patriarch Pimen was chosen to represent the Soviet Fund for the Defence of Peace; Metropolitan Aleksii was designated as a people’s deputy representing the Soviet Charity Fund; and Metropolitan Pitirim was elected to represent the Soviet Cultural Fund.11 During RSFSR’s republican and local elections in March 1990, half a dozen priests and bishops were elected to the Russian Parliament. Church officials accentuated the fact that their involvement in politics was a sign of their contribution to society, since their support of the state and the process of perestroika was conditioned by the ability of the Church to strengthen the unity of the Soviet state. Moreover, Patriarch Aleksii constantly highlighted the fact that the Church should not make a political alliance with any specific party: “When the Church contracts political marriage with one of the political forces, she may well become a widow in the next generation.”12 According to the Patriarch, the ROC always cared for the moral well-being of the Russian people. In an interview with Izvestiia, Aleksii justified Metropolitan Sergii’s so-called Declaration of Loyalty of 1927, when in the name of the Holy Synod he called for both believers and atheists to become loyal citizens of the Soviet state. This declaration in many ways signified the Church’s internal spiritual solidarity with the Soviet authorities. Aleksii also underlined that it was a necessary act to save the people. Some contents of the Declaration were criticised, as for example the agreement to transfer bishops for reasons of political expediency. According to him, the Church must not be subjected to the state. It should be able to guide the people since it always felt the pains of the motherland, be it Russia or the USSR.13 Patriarch Aleksii was the first person who greeted Yeltsin after his inauguration to the post of the president of the Russian Federation on 10 July 1991. His speech took the form of a moral lesson, where he reminded Yeltsin of his duties to the state and to the Church, including the return of Trinity-St. Sergius Monastery and the necessity of providing financial aid to the Moscow Patriarchate.14 Thus, the shift in the attitude of the Moscow Patriarchate officials towards the state resulted in a more firm and assertive position towards the state, which was rendered as essential both for delivering the social and religious needs of believers and the preservation of the USSR’s unity. The ROC growing support of Soviet foreign policy goals coincided with these aims and the Church’s interests.

Church–state relations 63

The ROC and Soviet foreign policy during perestroika Historically, the Church was always an institution, which through its messianic activity expanded Russia’s borders. One of the prominent examples was that of Saint German, a Russian monk from the Valaam Monastery, who together with the Russian explorer Grigorii Shelikhov went to Alaska to convert the natives to Orthodoxy in the eighteenth century.15 Church officials always emphasised the patriotic mission of the ROC, especially in times of danger, the period of World War II being a salient example. This pattern of church–state relations, in which each party assisted the other with regard to diplomatic and international activity, was pursued and intensified during the period of perestroika. Furthermore, during that period both ecumenical relations and the Moscow Patriarchate’s contacts with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad were in accordance with the interests of the USSR’s foreign policy and those of the Church, which aimed to maintain the USSR’s unity and expand its political and cultural influence on the international arena. Patriarch Pimen, in his opening speech at the meeting of the USSR religious organisations on 18 April 1985, dedicated to the fortieth anniversary of World War II, underlined the immense contribution of the Church to the peacemaking activity during the Cold War. The principal aim of this activity, according to the Patriarch, was to enhance Soviet influence on the international community and to promote security for the Soviet state. Towards the beginning of the Gorbachev era, the fight against the American nuclear threat became one of the most important foreign policy issues which the Church had to deal with. The February 1985 conference, “New Dangers for the Holy Gift of Life and Our Goals” placed the nuclear threat as the main danger for life on earth.16 The sixth All Christian Peace Congress, which took place in Moscow in July 1985, issued a communiqué to the followers of all religions, which depicted the nuclear threat as a direct outcome of the world capitalist economy. Thus, churches should not identify their values with the unjust economic order and support the nuclear arms race.17 US President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) posed such a threat to the Soviet state that the ROC had to deal with this issue, not only on a practical, but also on an ideological (theological) level. From the Christian point of view, SDI was regarded as an embodiment of human pride and unlimited ambition. The official position of the ROC asserted that states that require absolute security only for themselves destroy the holy balance among people and nations.18 The notion of a struggle for peace as an integral part of the Russian national character was presented at the second religious-scientific conference, which took place in Moscow in May 1987. It introduced Prince Vladimir as peacemaker, who stopped the wars of conquest and established stable friendly relations with the surrounding Christian countries. Moreover, by supporting the peace process, the Church fortified its status within the state, thus gaining more freedom of action. Gorbachev’s doctrine of “New Political Thinking” was declared during the conference as a new era in the history of humanity. One of the explanations given by the Church officials for the tight cooperation between the state and the ROC in the

64  Church–state relations field of foreign affairs derived from the historical fact that the Church was willing to make whatever sacrifices were necessary for the well-being of the Russian people and the prosperity of the Russian land. Metropolitan Filaret declared that the Church could not exist without its laymen and their interests. He quoted Patriarch Sergii who, in the Declaration of Loyalty to the Soviet state from 1927, stated that the Church shares both happiness and sorrows of the Russian people.19 The ROC support of Soviet foreign policy intensified after the millennium celebrations. It not only implemented Soviet foreign policy goals but also started to form a new international language of peace or a new ideology, which aimed to complement Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking. One way to do this was to destroy the image of the enemy, usually attached to Western countries, in the Christian and general mass media. According to church officials, material in the media should be presented in a way that would promote the ideas of peace and trust in the international arena. The first international conference, “Churchmen and Journalists: in the Call for Peace,” which took place in Moscow in 1988, called for the promotion of ideas of justice and peace, which, according to the participants, matched the ideas of the New Thinking proposed by Gorbachev.20 This enthusiastic stand of the Church towards the formation of the new ideology complemented Gorbachev’s more liberal and open stand towards the West after the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987. Those liberal ideas propagated by the Church, however, emphasised the pre-eminence of the East over the West, and a clear superiority of the eastern religious traditions. The underlying idea was that eastern religious thought is closer to nature and much more humane than western religious philosophy. The ROC blamed the West for the current ecological crisis and the arms race. According to its theologians, both processes were rooted in the western equation of “Knowledge equals Power” and derived from thirteenth-century “natural theology,” which emphasised a rational approach to the laws of nature and God and the desire to control natural processes. Thus, western scientific and technological progress led to the subjection of nature to human rational rules, therefore causing severe ecological crisis.21 Most of the Soviet peacemaking activity after 1989 was concentrated on Europe and the possible unification of Germany, which was perceived as a threat to the USSR because of the clear understanding that unified Germany would not stay neutral but instead would join NATO immediately. Western Europe was blamed by the ROC officials as responsible for the destruction of the environment because of its consent to receive on its territory, in the middle of the 1980s, new American intermediate-range missiles. As a solution to the “German problem,” a phrase often used by the Soviet political and religious leaders, the Church promoted Gorbachev’s idea of “a unified European home,” in which all the member countries should adhere to the same set of social and moral values.22 The Mulheim Initiative symposium, held in Moscow on 18–22 November 1990, promoted cooperation among the European countries through their churches in the arenas of culture, science, economics and charity. The main issue discussed in the symposium was Europe after the unification of Germany.23 All this was very much in accordance

Church–state relations  65 with the treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), signed in Paris on 19 November 1990. Overall, the ROC support of the Soviet security and the defence of its status as a world superpower added another dimension to the Moscow Patriarchate’s negative attitude towards the disintegration of the USSR, clearly expressed in the ROC attitude during the putsch against Gorbachev.

The ROC and the August putsch Patriarch Aleksii II’s first official reaction to the August putsch against Gorbachev was balanced and restrained. When Aleksandr Rutskoi, vice-president of the RSFSR, approached the Patriarch with the intention of gaining his support for Yeltsin, Aleksii answered positively but denied any written confirmation of his words. There was no direct approach on the part of the Moscow Patriarchate officials to the people. Aleksii’s first official message on 20 August 1991 conveyed the idea that the Church should take a neutral stand and maintain good relations with both sides of the political map for the well-being of people. He questioned the legitimacy of the newly formed State Committee and called President Gorbachev to voice his attitude towards the events.24 This address was signed only by Patriarch Aleksii and sent first to the Conference of the European Churches in Geneva. In Moscow, it was published only eight hours later.25 On the bloody night between Tuesday 20 August and Wednesday 21 August 1991, the Patriarch issued another appeal, in which he implored his fellow citizens to stop the bloodshed immediately.26 According to John Garrard and Carol Garrard, close contacts existed between the Patriarch and the military. The refusal of the Alpha Unit to obey the direct command to attack the Parliament Building was seen by Garrard and Garrard as a reaction to the very strong public stand taken by Aleksii against Alpha’s storming of the television station in Vilnius in January 1991.27 The Patriarch himself attributed the virtually bloodless outcome of the coup to the Mother of God, and many Russians agreed with him. The spontaneous erection of a homemade Orthodox cross after the statue of Feliks Dzherzhinskii was pulled down and quickly removed by police, could serve as a good example. However, the crowd succeeded to leave behind graffiti painted on the black granite, Sim pobedishi (in Church Slavonic, “by this sign shalt though conquer”).28 The most severe threat for the Church was instability or Civil War, which could lead to the disintegration of the USSR. Therefore, when this threat even vaguely became plausible, the Holy Synod emphasised in its message of 22 October 1991 “that change in the state boundaries will not imply change in the borders of the Moscow Patriarchate.”29 The Holy Synod resolution immediately after the putsch alluded to the sufferings of the Church during the Soviet period and emphasised the idea that the Church and the Russian people are the same.30 The event, however, caused a difference of opinion in the Holy Synod. Patriarch Aleksii expressed his support for Yeltsin, but other members of the Holy Synod did not follow him.31 Metropolitan Filaret and Metropolitan Pitirim sympathised with the opposition. Metropolitan Pitirim several years later was criticised by the Church for meeting one of the organisers of the putsch, Boris Pugo.32 This diversity of opinion within

66  Church–state relations the Church hierarchy underlined the uncertainty of which side would triumph and the definite inclination to align with the winning party. The putsch’s failure was used by the Church to strengthen its own position as the only authority, which could bring solidarity to the Soviet society. It was proclaimed as an illegal and anti-Christian act, since it started on the very important Orthodox holiday of God’s Transfiguration. It was also used as a pretext to disqualify the communist ideology itself. The ROC officials claimed that communist ideology would never be a state ideology again in Russia.33 During this time of transition, they were convinced that active participation in the ecumenical movement was one of the most efficient methods to implant the spiritual treasures of the Church outside the USSR and to enhance its influence in the world.

Ecumenical ties of the ROC The development of the ROC ecumenical ties was very much in alliance with its support for the Soviet foreign policy. The ROC joined the World Council of Churches (WCC) at the end of 1961 and since then has become a very active member. The WCC was regarded by the ROC as the main body of the contemporary ecumenical movement. It used the platform of the WCC to promote the goals of Soviet foreign policy. One of its main objectives before 1988 was to become the sole defender of Pan-Slavism in Europe, thus strengthening the USSR’s influence in Eastern Europe.34 After the millennium, and in accordance with Gorbachev’s foreign policy goals, rapprochement with the Orthodox and other churches in the USA and western Europe gained priority. The international conference, “Christianity, State and Society in Modern Russia,” which took place in California in January 1988, was among the first direct contacts with churches in the USA. Towards 1991, when the ROC encountered problems with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in western Ukraine, the idea of Pan-Orthodox unity was voiced again. To reinforce Slavic unity, the Moscow Patriarchate took both theological and political steps. During the World Bible Conference in Minsk, the Byelorussian Orthodox Church was encouraged to begin a new translation of the Bible into the Byelorussian language.35 Furthermore, Patriarch Aleksii’s visit to Istanbul on 12–17 April 1991 aimed to strengthen bilateral relations between the Orthodox churches.36 Aleksii also mentioned the problems of the Orthodox churches in western Ukraine, exerted upon them by the Uniates. To emphasise the importance of Slavic unity, he underlined that Uniates exerted pressure not only on the Russian Orthodox Church, but also on the Bulgarian, Romanian and Czechoslovak Orthodox churches.37 Problems with the Uniates in Ukraine revived the dialogue between local Orthodox churches and the Roman Catholic Church. Relations of the ROC with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) in the last years of perestroika provided a vivid example of the messianic and imperial policy of the Moscow Patriarchate. In the first years of perestroika, the ROC hierarchs constantly emphasised the idea that the Uniates were against Slavic brotherhood and the idea of sobornost’ (togetherness).

Church–state relations 67 Their aim was to destroy the Slavic unity between Russians and Ukrainians, thus threatening to demolish the hegemony of the ROC.38 For ROC officials, the intactness of the Church unity equalled the unity of the Soviet state and its borders. During the millennium celebrations and the Bishop’s Council that followed it, the messianic role of Russia and prevalence of the ROC were constantly underlined. This was a trigger for starting the open conflict in Ukraine, which resulted in the violent seizure of property and other violent acts. The meeting of the coordinating committee of the local Orthodox churches and the Roman Catholic Church, which attempted to mediate in the conflict, took place in Rome in June 1991. It produced recommendations, which in many ways favoured the interests of the ROC. The Committee stated that, Respect for religious freedom should not become a pretext for arbitrary and unilateral actions. Not only pressure of any kind should be excluded, but also the respect for conscience, motivated by authentic faith, was one of the principles guiding the pastoral care of those responsible in both Churches and should be made an object of their consultation. The pastors of both Churches were called upon to urge their communities not only to avoid violence, whether physical or verbal, but also all that may lead to contempt of other Christians and a counter-witness scoffing at the work of salvation which is reconciliation in Christ.39 Thus, the Moscow Patriarchate’s ecumenical activity aimed to fulfil Soviet foreign policy goals and consequently serve its own messianic and imperial ambitions.

Relations with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad The ecumenical activity of the Moscow Patriarchate was not extended towards the ROCA. Furthermore, the schism between the two churches was emphasised by the ROC officials even after the inauguration of Patriarch Aleksii II. In his interview with Komsomolskaia Pravda (The Komsomol’s Truth) published on 6 April 1991, Aleksii blamed the ROCA hierarchs for the division of Orthodox worshippers on purely political grounds: It is easy from the position of bookish moralism to accuse us of paying too great a tribute to the Caesar. But one cannot fail to realise that since the tribute was paid by us, it is us who suffered incomparably greater moral torments and bitterness than our faraway judges.40 Moreover, the ROCA was blamed for unpatriotic behaviour during World War II, namely for its open support of the Nazi regime. Naturally, the official conflict between the two churches aggravated following the ROCA resolution on 16 May 1990 to establish new parishes in the USSR. According to Dimitry Pospielovsky, for the ROCA this was a very significant decision, since it provided the legitimacy

68  Church–state relations of its existence. Once the Moscow Patriarchate was recognised, it would cease to exist as a separate Church and could aim for rapprochement either with the ROC or with other local Orthodox churches.41 Starting from 1990, around forty parishes in Russia and Ukraine joined the jurisdiction of the ROCA.42 Their main motive appeared to have been dissatisfaction with the spiritual leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate. The putsch against Gorbachev, unofficially, brought the two churches closer to each other. On 20 August 1991, RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin issued a radio appeal to the Patriarch asking him to use his authority among all religions and believers, as well as the influence of the Church, not to be bystanders to what was happening. In this, public appeal to the Patriarch Yeltsin accentuated his own role as the prominent and acceptable leader. While the ROC leadership debated its position, Orthodox priests were to be found among the crowds assembled around the White House, the Russian Parliament building, lending their support and giving communion to the soldiers. They included priests from the ROCA as well as those from the Moscow Patriarchate.43 It felt as though, at least for a short while, representatives of both churches were united by one common goal. In many public appearances and interviews, Patriarch Aleksii highlighted the need for mutual repentance. Especially after the putsch, he often called for unity inside Russian Orthodoxy: Church should not be split for political reasons. While we lived in Russia and they in America, this was only a certain division, but not yet a split. But if in one street two churches appear and in each of them the priest, instead of teaching the Gospel, will be busy explaining why his parishioners should not go to the neighbouring church—this will be a split already.44 Final rapprochement between the churches became possible only in 2007, by which time the Russian Federation had become more and more influential politically and financially in the international arena. Problems with the ROCA shed light also on the state of the ROC domestic affairs.

Internal affairs of the ROC The internal affairs of the ROC, unlike its international activity, were not a subject open to the public. Official sources of the Moscow Patriarchate, such as Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii and the documents on the 1988 Local Council (published only in 1990), very carefully started to disclose this issue only in the second half of the 1990s. The inauguration speech of Patriarch Aleksii II was among the first public appearances of the ROC leading hierarchs, which touched upon the issues connected with the Moscow Patriarchate’s domestic affairs. Aleksii underlined that among the main goals of the ROC were such aims as the strengthening of the inner spiritual life of the Church, the revival of monastic life, building new churches, the restoration of old ones and widening of educational activity.45 Documents of the Local Council pinpointed other problems and dilemmas, among

Church–state relations 69 them low church attendance and the poor condition of many churches and prayer houses, and the problems connected with their restoration. A lack of qualified priests, especially in the periphery, and poor church attendance from the beginning of the 1980s were emphasised as the main problems. Moreover, the low educational and moral level of the priests and clergy caused a gulf between the episcopate and their flock.46 Additional challenges identified by Zoe Knox such as internal schisms within the Church and growing competition from non-Orthodox denominations47 further aggravated the inner strength of the Moscow Patriarchate and undermined its ability to implement inner reforms. Furthermore, they were probably one of the reasons for the ROC unwillingness to disclose the state of its domestic affairs. Patriarch Aleksii II in the 1990s often addressed the problem of dissent and divisions within the Church as the most serious one. He acknowledged that this turned people away: People leave us when they encounter unfriendliness, indifference, and frigidity in our parishes, and even in sanctuaries. A cold heart and lack of human warmth in relations with those who cross the threshold of a church, and between ourselves, is a grave pastoral sin. Therefore, the road to restoring strong unity and strengthening the Church lies through our own strengthening in love.48 According to Jane Ellis, the murder of Father Aleksandr Men’, on 9 September 1990, marked a political shift of the ROC to the right and unveiled its inner schism. Father Men’ spoke publicly on ecumenical and pro-Catholic issues. There was an impression that the investigators of his murder were more concerned in getting hold of Men’s writing than in finding his suspects.49 Many felt a spiritual void within the walls of the Church, and the atmosphere of intolerance was evident. Christianised Jews, including Father Men’, were isolated within the Moscow Patriarchate. The common proverb stated, “Zhid kreshenyi, chto vor proshennyi” (“A Christianised Jew equals a pardoned thief”). Thus, the ROC regarded Jews as traitors who, whenever convenient, would leave the Church.50 Patriarch Aleksii did not attend Father Men’s funeral. According to Daniel Wallace, even in his letter, which was read before the burial service, Aleksii was cautious in his praise of Men’, displaying an awareness of the inner controversies within the Church.51 Subsequent analysis of change in the legal status of the ROC, development of its economic department, publishing activity, religious education and the involvement in the social life indicated how the Moscow Patriarchate dealt with the above-mentioned challenges.

Legal and administrative status of the ROC In the previous chapter, new Soviet legislation on religion was discussed in detail. Here, the emphasis will be given to the new Statute of the ROC, accepted at the 1988 Local Council. This document defined the structure and governing system of the Moscow Patriarchate. The formation of the new Statute was imperative

70  Church–state relations since up to 1988 the ROC functioned on the basis of regulations (formally entitled Polozhenie ob Upravlenii Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi), which were formed in great haste towards the end of World War II, on 31 January 1945, as a temporary document. According to the archbishop of Smolensk and Viiazemsk, Kirill, “It did not provide a clear definition of the rights and responsibilities of high hierarchy, local priests and laymen” and thus needed overhauling.52 The project of the new Statute was based on the regulations of the 1917–1918 Local Councils, since they best reflected the structure of the Church government based on the principle of sobornost’ (togetherness). The ROC Statute underlined the dependence of the Church on the state authorities. In its 1988 version, it was stated that the ROC functioned in accordance with state laws and under the auspices of the Council for Religious Affairs.53 However, significant novelties in the new Statute gave more power to the parishes in regulating the governing processes of the ROC. The right of juridical entity was allocated to all units of the Church, starting from the Moscow Patriarchate to the parishes, also including those abroad. Senior priests were allowed to participate in the Local Church Council and could be chosen as its chairman. It was decided that a Bishop’s Council would be convened every two years and the Local Council would be convened every five years. According to the new Statute, only the Patriarch had a life service in the Church and other archbishops must retire at the age of seventy-five. A lot of attention was paid to the process of catechisation, which encouraged the development of the Moscow Patriarchate’s publishing activity. On 22 November 1990, the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church was presented with the draft of the Civil Statute of the ROC, which contained basic provisions for the structure of the Church, its administration and functioning. It also reflected church–state relations in accordance with the USSR law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations.”54 The millennium celebrations and especially the results of the 1988 Local Council strengthened the position of the ROC within the state. According to statistical data on the administrative status of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1986, the ROC had 6,794 parishes.55 Metropolitan Vladimir of Rostov and Novocherkassk disclosed this data in front of the 1988 Local Council plenary session. He underlined the steady increase from September 1987 in the number of parishes. In the first five months of 1988, sixty new parishes were established. The total amount of parishes for the first half of 1988 was 6,893. According to the data released by the Local Council, the ROC had 74 bishops, seven of whom worked abroad, 67 dioceses, 6,674 priests, 723 deacons, 378 deaneries, 21 monasteries and 5 theological schools.56 The process of property return by the state authorities, which started in 1988, did not signify that the process of restoration and opening of the new churches was a smooth one. According to Pavel Adelgeim and Mikhail Zhenochin, some of the most salient impediments were the total passivity of believers and the ROC authorities and lack of priests.57 In many peripheral towns, such as Pskov, the initiative for the restoration of the returned property was undertaken by the secular intelligentsia and not by local believers. Moreover, after the restoration, there was

Church–state relations 71 a problem of finding a qualified priest. This problem was especially acute in the periphery, since state authorities did not allocate any means for helping young priests to settle down. The poor financial situation of the dioceses was an additional impediment.58 Metropolitan Mephodii, of Voronezh and Lipetsk, head of the Financial Department, voiced dissatisfaction with the taxation of the Sofrino factory production and the high taxation on restoration works, especially of the church buildings and historical monuments protected by the state. He claimed that the Church should be allowed to cooperate freely with foreign consumers of Orthodox religious utensils and use foreign currency for its restoration needs.59 Thus, despite the process of property return and concessions regarding the legal and administrative status of the Church, mainly internal and to some extent also external bureaucratic obstacles hampered the processes of the inner perestroika within the Moscow Patriarchate and thus left it still very much dependent upon the state authorities.

The ROC financial situation and activity Information on the ROC finances was guarded meticulously both by the state and the Church authorities. The first data from the official ROC sources was published in 1985 in Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii. It advertised the opening of a bank account in the Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade, to receive foreign donations for the restoration needs of Danilov Monastery (future headquarters of the Moscow Patriarchate).60 The Bishop’s’ Council, which took place during the celebrations of the 400th anniversary of the Moscow Patriarchate, disclosed more hitherto unpublished information of the Church’s financial circumstances. It revealed that most of the Moscow Patriarchate’s expenses went to the Department of External Church Relations, responsible for the implementation of Soviet foreign policy through its inter-Christian and inter-Orthodox relations. A lesser amount was allocated for different social needs, including allowances and pensions. The income for the first nine months of 1989 amounted to 7,843,800 roubles (5,214,056 GBP) and expenses over the same period amounted to 14,707,500 roubles (9,776,603 GBP). The sum of 6,200,000 roubles (4,121,363 GBP) went to the Department of the External Church Relations, 4,507,500 (2,996,297 GBP) for the maintenance of theological schools, not including the newly opened ones in Kiev, Minsk and Tobol’sk. Only 2,700,000 roubles (1,794,787 GBP) were assigned to a hospital ward at the Moscow Theological School and other items, including patriotic and philanthropic activities, the maintenance of patriarchal residents, library and administrative expenses. As of 1 October, the deficit in the Patriarchate’s budget had grown to 1,000,090 roubles (664,795 GBP). Among the material problems noted was that of the ROC pensioners, of whom there were about 4,000 bishops, priests, deacons, readers, employees of church institutions, widows and orphans. Total payment in January 1989 amounted to 2,694,828 roubles (1,791,348 GBP) and 172,871 roubles (114,913 GBP) for allowances. Priests who had served 25 years received fifty roubles (33 GBP) a month and widows and orphans only half as much.61

72  Church–state relations Following agreements concerning the unification of Germany, and because of the difficult economic situation in the USSR, the Moscow Patriarchate received on 18 January 1991 a generous humanitarian gift from the Ministry of Defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. The donation was valued at about 400 million German marks and included medicines, medical equipment and instruments, clothing, foodstuffs and over 200 vehicles allocated out of the Bundeswehr reserves.62 This portrait of the financial circumstances of the Moscow Patriarchate a year after the millennium illustrated the ROC dependency both on the state and on foreign donations. The new Statute aimed to provide greater autonomy to the peripheral parishes and paid a lot of attention to the process of catechisation. In practice, it succeeded to strengthen the administrative position of the Church within the state but failed to overcome such problems as believers’ passivity and the poor educational level of the clergy. The financial activity of the Moscow Patriarchate clearly reflected its main priority—support for Soviet foreign policy and its own status in the international arena and demonstrated its detachment from the believers’ needs.

Publishing activity of the Moscow Patriarchate The Publishing Department played a very important role both in the domestic and foreign activities of the ROC. Established in February 1945, it served both as a press and as the cultural centre of the Moscow Patriarchate and worked closely with the Department of Foreign Church Relations. Between the years 1947 and 1960, Metropolitan Ioann of Krutitsk and Kolomensk, head of the Publishing Department, served also as the head of the Department of Foreign Church Relations. Aleksei Sergeevich Buevskii, one of the leading members of the Department’s editing council, and from 1954 one of the editors of Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, was also one of the founders of the Department of Foreign Church Relations and served as its advisor and executive secretary.63 Similar to the Financial Department, the activity of the Publishing Department before the millennium was dedicated solely to the promotion of Soviet foreign policy. Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii up to 1985 dedicated more than 2,500 items to the peacemaking activities of the Church. In 1988, it had an edition of 35,000 copies, most of which were distributed in the USSR. A few thousand were sent abroad and distributed by the Russian Orthodox missions around the world.64 The Local Council pronounced a shift in the publishing activity of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1988. One of its main goals became the printing of new Bibles and catechisation materials. It was not before 1990 when the Publishing Department, in cooperation with Patriarchal and Synodic Commissions and the United Bible Society, commenced publication of the children’s Bible in Russian and initiated a sociological investigation into the attitude to the Bible in the USSR. It also promoted the translation of the Bible into the Chuvash language.65 It should be noted that the cooperation between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Bible Society was not an obvious one. The decision to restore the Bible Society was reached by the constituent assembly on 17 January 1990 consisting of liberally

Church–state relations 73 inclined intellectuals such as Sergei Averintsev and Aleksandr Men’. The Soviet Bible Society aimed to extend its messianic activity to different ethnic groups in the RSFSR. This goal also served the needs of the Moscow Patriarchate, which through its publishing activity increased its influence in the Russian Federation. Starting from 1990, several new official newspapers such as Moskovskaia Prikhodskaia Gazeta (Moscow Diocesan Gazette), Moskovskii Tserkovnyi Vestnik (Moscow Church Herald) and Pravoslavnoe Chtenie (Orthodox Reading) were published. However, many believers could not subscribe to these religious publications by post, nor buy them in bookstores, and though theoretically they should have been able to find them in churches, in practice a large number were sent to the ROC figures and institutions abroad. Moskovskii Tserkovnyi Vestnik encountered particular problems. The Publishing Department was accused of failing to provide the newspaper with resources, since it placed the paper’s editorial board in a remote place where it was difficult to work because of a lack of equipment and unsuitable conditions.66 Thus, despite the proclaimed shift in the work of the Publishing Department, not much was changed after the millennium. The printing of catechisation material was not sufficient, and the Department served mostly the propagandistic aims of both the ROC and the Soviet state.

Religious education Religious education was one of the most important and problematic missions of the Moscow Patriarchate throughout the Soviet period. By looking at its changing goals during the perestroika years, one can learn about the inner life of the Church and the role it played in Soviet society. Just before the Gorbachev era, Patriarch Pimen personally supervised both the Seminary and the Theological Academy in Moscow. In his speech on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Moscow Theological Academy, he identified the profile of its ideal graduate. It should be a theologian able to cherish the dogmas of the Russian Orthodoxy, influence people and, most important of all, love his motherland, and be one with its people.67 Theological schools encountered numerous difficulties before perestroika. Schools suffered from very limited enrolment. During the years 1972–1974, only 219 priests could be directed to work after finishing their studies in theological academies.68 Towards the end of the 1970s, there was a slight improvement in the physical condition of the schools. State authorities allowed the restoration of the existing classrooms and the building of new ones, thus enabling an increase in the admittance of new students. Limited enrolment and the poor physical conditions of educational institutions inevitably influenced the quality of religious instruction, which became the central issue of discussion at the 1988 Local Council. It was clearly stated that the future of the Moscow Patriarchate depended on the quality of religious education for Church officers and priests. The millennium celebrations and the general positive change towards the Moscow Patriarchate were perceived by Church officials as an opportunity to improve religious education. Improvement in religious education also required the qualified training of lecturers and instructors.69 Those issues were voiced because of the growing need for

74  Church–state relations qualified teachers, especially in Siberia, and a lack of adequate teaching materials. The Archbishop of Smolensk and Viazemsk Kirill commented on the quality of the graduates from the seminaries, stating that “they are totally unprepared for the practical service, unable to preach, answer questions and serve their flock. Being a priest means being a philosopher; know the canon law, liturgy, in short being the leader of the Russian people.”70 Thus, according to Archbishop Kirill, catechisation should be the main subject in the curriculum of the seminary. The opening of new parishes after the millennium brought about the need to enlarge considerably the network of theological educational establishments. In 1989, seminaries were opened in Kiev, Minsk, Tobol’sk and Stavropol as well as inter-diocesan and diocesan theological schools in Smolensk, Minsk, Ryazan, Kishinev, Chernigov, Kolomna, Vologda, Kursk and Omsk. As a result, demand for teachers increased sharply. The Chair of the Education Committee of the Holy Synod, Archbishop Alexander of Dmitrov, claimed in his report at the 1989 Bishop’s Council that theological Academies must undertake the task of the educational and methodological guidance of seminaries and mainly the task of training pedagogical personnel for seminaries and schools.71 Thus, the geographical expansion of new parishes confronted the Moscow Patriarchate with new challenges in the field of religious instruction, which could not be solved solely by improving its position vis-à-vis the state. The issue of religious education became so important that on 22 November 1990, the Holy Synod announced the establishment of the Department for Religious Education and Catechism. Hegumen Ioann Ekonomtsev was appointed head of this Department and released from his duties as deputy head of the Department of the External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate, one of the most important positions in the Moscow Patriarchate. This new department was financed from the central budget of the Church.72 Those resolutions, from 1991 onwards, also led to the opening of the private, church-sponsored, Orthodox schools for general education.73 Education was the biggest challenge of all areas for the Moscow Patriarchate during perestroika. It required vast human as well as financial resources. The ROC mostly succeeded to comply with financial and legislative issues connected with religious education. However, it could not fully challenge the assumptions and pattern of thought that developed in the Soviet society over a period of more than seventy years, due to its poor influence on the Soviet society in general.

Church and society One of the least developed of the Moscow Patriarchate’s areas of activity during the Soviet period was its involvement in the social life of the country. The poor state of religious education and low church attendance hindered the ability of the Moscow Patriarchate to reach out, thus making social activity an impossible mission. Statistics on the level of religiosity in 1983 indicated that most believers visited church irregularly and were not acquainted even with the basic prayers. For example in the Kaluga region, only fourteen per cent of believers

Church–state relations  75 visited church on a regular basis and two-thirds of Orthodox believers could not explain the meaning of the basic Orthodox ceremonies.74 Moreover, even after the millennium, the Church did not immediately begin to deal with its social mission. In October 1990, the Holy Synod Commission identified the revival of religious and moral education, charity, and the establishment of the Union of the Orthodox Brotherhoods, as the most important goals of the Church. Archbishop Kirill, at the second session of the RSFSR Congress of People’s Deputies on 29 November 1990, emphasised that the ROC must lead the process of the spiritual and historical regeneration of society by the revival of parish community, monasteries and farming.75 Furthermore, the most important task of the Moscow Patriarchate was identified as the revival of the Soviet society’s moral foundation. Patriarch Aleksii, in his sermons, often mentioned that economic problems were closely linked with the spiritual and moral state of the people. Significant change in the social activity of the ROC began only in the 1990s. The beginning of this process was marked by such events as the revival of the diocesan press (the first issue of the Blagovest’ newspaper was issued on 20 February 1990), the establishment of the Orthodox Brotherhoods (October 1990), the restoration of the Russian Biblical Society (November 1991) and the founding of the first Orthodox medical school, under the auspices of The Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods. To underline the vital importance of the ROC social activities, on 22 November 1990, the Holy Synod resolved to establish the Department for Church Charity and Social Service. Archbishop Sergii of Solnechnogorsk, Vicar of the Moscow diocese, was appointed Head of this Department and was released from his duties as the representative of the ROC at the World Council of Churches.76 And again, as in the case of the Hegumen Ioann Ekonomtsev, by moving an experienced and trusted archbishop from a very important post, the ROC officials on the one hand accentuated the importance of the new Department and on the other secured administrative control over its activities. The first plenary meeting of the board of the Soviet Charity and Health Fund was held in March 1991 in Moscow. The Fund had undertaken responsibility for the distribution of food and medical aid coming from Germany. It also established contacts with such international charitable associations as Together for Peace (Italy) and Sasakawa Health Fund (Japan). These contacts enabled the local branches of the Fund to render concrete assistance to over 500,000 needy people in the course of the first three months of 1991. However, it was explicitly mentioned in the first plenary meeting that the main attention should be paid to domestic resources. Such resources could be accumulated by organising charitable commercial ventures, such as “Charity Week.” Patriarch Aleksii expressed support for all initiatives of the Fund and confirmed the readiness of Orthodox believers to support any effort directed at serving all who are in need.77 In his interview with Izvestiia on 10 June 1991, Aleksii emphasised the importance of establishing a social protection system, which will follow the European experience of socialism.78 The social activity of the Moscow Patriarchate and

76  Church–state relations the change in its legal status led to some transformation within Soviet society. Young believers, which constituted at the beginning of the 1990s twenty per cent of the churchgoers, and an increasing number of the intelligentsia, joined the ROC.79 Despite the official proclamations, on the importance of the social mission and the establishment of the appropriate administrative units, the ROC failed to place its charitable activity at the centre. Official resolutions were not always implemented by the local dioceses. Most of the funds collected from believers still served the foreign policy needs of the state. The Archbishop of Astrakhan and Yenotaevsk Pheodosii complained that in 1990 his own diocese gave a quarter of a million roubles to the Peace Fund, and only 4,000 roubles to the local hospital and 15,000 roubles to the elderly home.80 The Moscow Patriarchate attempted to reinforce its social authority by consolidating and intensifying its political influence rather than by such social activities as the work with alcoholics, drug addicts, prisoners and orphans. Despite the increase in the ROC activities in the social and educational spheres, one could claim that perestroika barely touched the walls of the Moscow Patriarchate. The ROC continued to provide support for Soviet foreign policy goals, regarding the interests of the state as its own. Moreover, even such concessions on the part of the state as the return of churches and monasteries, the change in the legal status of the Church and the possibility of the educational activity were mostly used by the Moscow Patriarchate in order to strengthen its position visà-vis state authorities. This strategy assured the maintenance and broadening of the ROC influence both inside and outside of the USSR and aimed to safeguard the unity of the state. Russian Orthodox imperial ideology served both church and state interests causing further detachment of the Moscow Patriarchate from believers and impeding its influence on society in general.

Notes 1 Dimitry Pospielovsky, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v 20 –om veke (Moskva: Respublica, 1995); Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness. 2 ‘Vserossiiskie Patriarkhi,’ Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 10 (1989). 10–16. 3 Tsipin, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997. 468. 4 Shtrikker, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov v sovetskoe vremia. 198–199. 5 Ibid. 198–199. 6 Ibid. 223. 7 Georgii Shevkunov, ‘Ne uchastvuite v delakh tmy,’ Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 12 (1989). 44–47. 8 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church; Triumphalism and Defensiveness. 56. 9 Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 12 (1990). 2. 10 Shtrikker, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov v sovetskoe vremia. 301. 11 ‘Soobschenie ob izbranii narodnykh deputatov SSSR ot obschestvennykh organizatsii,’ Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 6 (1989). 4. 12 His Holiness Patriarch Aleksii II, ‘The Church does not Intend to Contract “Political Marriages”,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 9 (1991). 16. 13 Shtrikker, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov v sovetskoe vremia. 318. 14 Ibid. 321–322.

Church–state relations 77 15 Mitropolit Kirill, ‘Pravoslavnyi Factor v Istorii Rossisko-Americanskikh Otnosheniakh,’ Tserkov i Obschestvo, no. 3 (2003). 24. 16 ‘Vstrecha Glav i Predstavitelei Tserkvei i Religioznykh Ob’edinenii SSSR, Posviaschennaia 40-letiu Pobedy v Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine 1941–1945gg,’ Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 6 (1985). 44. 17 Metropolitan Filaret, ‘Obraschenie k posledovateliam drugikh religii,’ Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 9 (1985). 60. 18 ‘Zaiavlenie -“Chas pozdnii-izberite zhizn’, a ne iadernoe samoubiistvo chelovechestva”,’ Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 9 (1985). 67. 19 G. Turusin, ‘Press-konferentsia religioznykh deiatelei Sovetskogo Soiuza, posviaschennaia Mezhdunarodnomy gody mira,’ Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 2 (1987). 45. 20 ‘I mezhdunarodnaia konferentsia “Bogoslovy i publitsisty: prizyv k miru” (Moskava, 11–13 ianvaria 1988 goda)—Poslanie Sviateishego Patriarkha Pimena,’ Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 5 (1988). 46–47. 21 I. Samsonov, ‘Sovremennyi ekologicheskii krizis v svete bibleiskogo-khristianskogo mirovospriatia,’ Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 11 (1988). 53. 22 Metropolitan Kiril, ‘Ecology for the Soul (A Report Given at the European Ecumenical Assembly “Peace and Justice”, Basel, 15–21 May, 1989),’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 5 (1991). 40–48. 23 Ibid. 54. 24 John Garrard and Carol Garrard, “Appendix A: Translated Documents, Announcement of the Holy Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, Alesky II,” in Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008). 255–256. 25 Shtrikker, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov v sovetskoe vremia. 339. 26 ‘Appeal by his Holiness Patriarch Aleksy II of Moscow and All Russia,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 10 (1991). 2. 27 Garrard and Garrard, Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia. 27. 28 Ibid. 31. 29 Tsipin, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997. 503. 30 Ibid. 129–131. 31 Ibid. 133. 32 Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 11 (1992). 9. 33 Moskovskii Tserkovnyi Vestnik, no. 14 (1991). 15. 34 ‘Reshenia III Predsobornogo Vsepravoslavnogo Soveschania: Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ i ekumenicheskoe dvizhenie,’ Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 7 (1987). 53. 35 ‘Communique of the World Bible Conference in Minsk,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 6 (1991). 52. 36 N. Derzhavin, ‘Visit by his Holiness Patriarch Aleksy II to the Ecumenical Patriarch Dimitrios I,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 9 (1991). 8. 37 Ibid. 8. 38 Shtrikker, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov v sovetskoe vremia. 354–355. 39 ‘Meeting of the Coordinating Committee of the Mixed Commission for Theological Dialogue Between Local Orthodox Churches and the Roman Catholic Church,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 10 (1991). 62. 40 ‘The Light in Darkness: Interview Given by his Holiness Patriarch Aleksy II of Moscow and All Russia to Komsomolskaia Pravda Correspondents on 6 April, 1991,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 7 (1991). 3–4. 41 Pospielovsky, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v 20-om veke. 240–241. 42 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church; Triumphalism and Defensiveness. 9, 191. 43 Ibid. 129.

78  Church–state relations 44 G. Alimov and G. Charodeyev, ‘His Holiness Patriarch Alesksy II—I Assume Responsibility for Everything That Has Happened,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 9 (1991). 18. 45 Tsipin, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997. 485–486. 46 Pomestny Sobor Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi: sobranie dokumentov (Moscow: Izdanie Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, 1990). 398–425. 47 Zoe Knox, ‘Postsoviet Challenges to the Moscow Patriarchate, 1991–2001,’ Religion, State & Society 32, no. 2 (2004). 96–101. 48 ‘Sermon Delivered by his Holiness Patriarch Aleksy II after Divine Lithurgy on 10 June 1991, the First Anniversary of his Enthronization,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 10 (1991). 23. 49 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church; Triumphalism and Defensiveness. 113–115. 50 L. Arie, “Evrei i Tserkov,” in Religiia i Demokratiia, na puti k svobode sovesti, eds. A. Bessmertnyi and S. Filatov (Moscow: Kultura, 1993). 107. 51 L. Wallace Daniel, Russia’s Uncommon Prophet: Father Aleksandr Men and his Times (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2016). 300. 52 Pomestny Sobor Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi: sobranie dokumentov. 377. 53 Ibid. 24. 54 ‘Decisions of the Holy Synod,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 4 (1991). 15–16. 55 I. Ivanenko, ed., Novye Tendentsii v Russkom Pravoslavii: Voprosy i Otvety (Moscow: Znanie, 1989). 15. 56 Pomestny Sobor Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi: sobranie dokumentov. 231. 57 P. Adelgeim and Mikhail Zhenochin, “Postroit’ khram, otkryt’ prikhod,” in Religiia i Demokratia, na Puti k Svobode Sovesti, eds. A. Bessmertnyi and S. Filatov (Moscow: Kultura, 1993). 348–352. 58 Ibid. 348–352. 59 Pomestny Sobor Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi: sobranie dokumentov. 372–373. 60 Aleksii, Mitropolit Tallinskii i Estonskii, predsedatel’ Otvetstvennoi komissii po restavratsii i stroitel’stvu v Danilovskom monastyre, ‘Otkrytie tekuschego scheta “Fond restavratsii i stroitel’stva ansamblia—Danilov monastyr’”,’ Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 11 (1985). 39. 61 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness. 89–90. 62 ‘Gift to the Russian Orthodox Church,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 5 (1991). 10. 63 ‘40 Let Izdatel’skomy Otdely Moskovskogo Patriarkhata,’ Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 4 (1985). 9. 64 M. I. Odintsov, Obzor Zhurnala Moskovskoi Patriarkhii za 1986–1988 goda (Moscow: Znanie, 1990). 3. 65 ‘Chronicle,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 5 (1991). 54. 66 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church; Triumphalism and Defensiveness. 75. 67 ‘Sviateishii Patriarkh Pimen o Zadachakh Dukhovnoi Shkoly,’ Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii, no. 1 (1985). 60–69. 68 Tsipin, Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997. 637. 69 Pomestny Sobor Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi: sobranie dokumentov. 234–235. 70 Ibid. 411–412. 71 V. Tsipin, ‘Concerning the Distribution of Graduates from Theological Academies,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 3 (1991). 28. 72 ‘Decisions of the Holy Synod.’ 16. 73 Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness. 84. 74 I. Ivanov, Novye Tendentsii v Russkom Pravoslavii: Voprosy i Otvety (Moscow: Znanie, 1989). 43.

Church–state relations 79 75 ‘Speech Delivered by Archbishop Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad at the Congress of People’s Deputies of the RSFSR,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 3 (1991). 39–40. 76 ‘Decisions of the Holy Synod.’ 16. 77 ‘His Holiness Patriarch Alesky II on the Social Service of the Church,’ Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, no. 7 (1991). 48–49. 78 Alimov and Charodeyev, His Holiness Patriarch Alesksy II—I Assume Responsibility for Everything That Has Happened. 19. 79 A. Bessmertnyi and S. Filatov, eds., Religiia i Demokratia, na puti k svobode sovesti (Moscow: Kultura, 1993). 233. 80 Ibid. 241.

4 The Moscow Patriarchate and the Soviet media

One cannot underestimate the role of the media in Soviet society during the reform period. Gorbachev, unlike his predecessors, used the media not for preserving, but for reforming the system, thus advancing the process of perestroika. It was an integral part of his policy of glasnost’. Viktor Afanasiev, the editor in chief of Pravda, emphasised this role of glasnost’ in a speech on 5 May 1987, stating that It is the duty of all Soviet journalists to translate the policy of restructuring into reality. For us journalists there is no nobler mission, nothing we treasure more than to impart Leninist principles to the masses and to be in the front ranks in the fighters for communism.1 The audience for this unprecedented openness in the Soviet media was primarily an international one. Gorbachev sought to illustrate that the Soviet system was best characterised as “socialism with a human face,” a far cry from its international image upon his accession. The newspapers followed suit. This chapter analyses the internal debate on church–state relations in four different publications: Sovetskaia Rossiia (Soviet Russia), Trud (Labour), Izvestiia (News) and Literaturnaia Gazeta (Literary Gazette). These newspapers were chosen because they represent different political affiliations and different approaches towards glasnost’. Though Pravda (Truth) had a higher circulation, Izvestiia was chosen since it reported on a wider range of issues and was similar to Pravda in terms of orientation towards glasnost’. Sovetskaia Rossiia was first published on 1 July 1956 and on 1 January 1974 became the official press organ of the Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Council of Ministers. In 1986, Valentin Vasil’evich Chikin became its chief editor, and towards the end of perestroika, it was a mouthpiece of the RSFSR Communist Party. According to Brian McNair, a sociologist specialising in Soviet media, Sovetskaia Rossiia was the most aggressive advocate of the conservative position of all the news media during the Gorbachev period, being the voice of Russian nationalism and Orthodox Marxism–Leninism. The editorial board of Sovetskaia Rossiia, in the most spectacular single act of dissent from the reformer’s programme, published on 13 March 1987, the day before Gorbachev was due to

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 81 depart on a state visit to Yugoslavia, a letter by Leningrad college lecturer Nina Andreeva, which denounced critical attacks in the Soviet media on Stalin’s policy. Trud was established on 19 February 1921 as the mouthpiece for the Soviet labour unions. It highlighted labour and economic issues and included other official decrees and orders. Trud was classified by Mary Dejevsky as an official newspaper, which was against glasnost’.2 Izvestiia, established in August 1917, was an official newspaper of the Soviet government, published by the USSR Supreme Soviet. McNair classified it as “the reformist media.”3 Others claimed that its media conduct was motivated by the media policies of the Soviet legislature and government, which displayed intolerance of political dissidents and promoted loyalty and obedience to the state power.4 It could be regarded as an official newspaper loyal to the mainstream ideology of the Soviet authorities. Literaturnaia Gazeta was regularly published from 1929. In 1932, it became the official organ of the Soviet Writer’s Union, the government-controlled organisation responsible for most literary publications and the employment of writers in the USSR. Some researchers characterised it as the opponent of liberalisation tendencies during perestroika.5 In fact, it adopted quite a different approach and became the mouthpiece of the liberal intelligentsia. Under the leadership of its legendary editor from 1962 to 1989, Alexander Chakovskii, Literaturnaia Gazeta became one of the most popular and authoritative newspapers in the USSR. At the beginning of 1990, its circulation amounted to more than six million copies per week.6 Special attention in the discussion will be given to the use of photojournalism, which was used as a tool of ideological propaganda, aiming, “not so much to inform as to indoctrinate, to encourage achievement even when it cannot document it.”7 During perestroika, photojournalism was used in the mass media to achieve the aims of the new ideological line. Moreover, around 1988, it reflected the tendencies dictated by glasnost’. To make the newspaper more attractive and easier to read, the use of pictures was increased during the perestroika period.8 The analysis of the use of photojournalism with regard to religious subjects in general and the ROC in particular confirms these statements. One can speak of a sharp increase in the usage of pictures reflecting all aspects of interrelations between the state authorities and the Church after the millennium. In some newspapers, the use of photos exercised critical journalism which at times was much more eloquent than printed word and pushed the limits of glasnost’. This chapter evaluates how the use of photojournalism in the above-mentioned newspapers reflected their ideological inclination and their attitude towards glasnost’ and perestroika. All subjects analysed in this chapter are covered by photojournalism and reflected in (Table 4.1), which depicts the themes and the number of times they appear in each newspaper. The most popular photojournalism themes were “church–state relations” and “Russian Orthodoxy and historical memory.” There is a clear differentiation between newspapers in their use of photojournalism. Sovetskaia Rossiia and Trud used photojournalism to accentuate historical memory, while the official usage of

82  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media Table 4.1  Themes covered by photojournalism in the Soviet printed press, 1985–1991.

Sovetskaia Rossiia Trud

Church–state relations

Historical Church and memory society

Property return—1

14

Property return—2 Millennium—1 Foreign policy—1 Property return—8 Izvestiia Foreign policy—6 Millennium—5 Official events and ideology—5 Literaturnaia Property return—3 Gazeta Official ideology—3

Total

1

National question in the USSR –

12

3

1

19

16

10

1

51

5

9

3

24

16

photography for the documentation of events connected with church–state relations prevailed in Izvestiia and Literaturnaia Gazeta. During perestroika, the media became a key tool in achieving major changes in public attitudes. Moreover, the printed press was a very important tool for the formation of a new mass consciousness. However, the politics of glasnost’ challenged Soviet political censorship, carried out by Glavlit (the General Directorate for Literature and Publishing), which was established on 6 July 1922. Despite proclamations concerning glasnost’ and democratisation at the beginning of perestroika, censorship activity continued on the same vein. Glavlit directives demanded increased attention to published material and a prohibition on the publication of literature with religious connotations.9 The first signs of change were evident on 13 January 1987, when the CPSU Central Committee issued a decree “On the consolidated list of books subjected to libraries and the bookselling network.” During the period from March 1987 to October 1988, 7,930 previously prohibited publications were returned to general library stocks.10 The period from 1988 to 1991 could be characterised as a turning point in Soviet political censorship. During this time, attempts had been made to reform Glavlit right up until its final dissolution in 1990.11 The Law “On the Press and other Mass Media” issued on 1 August 1990 prohibited political censorship in the USSR and called for the full economic freedom of publishing.12 The demise of political censorship coincided with the rise of a sympathetic approach of the Soviet official press towards the ROC, which was especially evident after the millennium celebrations in 1988. Research on Soviet media during the period of glasnost’ emphasised its impact on the process of Soviet society’s liberalisation and democratisation. Rutger von Seth claimed that the Soviet press was gradually adapted for the needs and interests of the public aiming to establish a critical dialogue with the reader, who was

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 83 treated as an equal.13 Brian McNair complements this idea by underlining that Gorbachev’s liberal information policy served as a tool for promoting social mobilisation, which would move perestroika forward.14 Ellen Mickiewicz claimed that the Soviet media was instrumental in promoting the creation of unofficial groups and associations, which increased labour productivity and encouraged political participation.15 Joseph Gibbs presented a different point of view, which portrayed the press as a tool for promoting solely Gorbachev’s vision of reform by discrediting his political opponents.16 This chapter builds on the above-mentioned research, while treating the official Soviet press mainly as a tool for social mobilisation, and attempts to answer the question: in what way did the portrayal of the ROC in the official Soviet media reflect a change in church–state relations during perestroika? It also explores the extent to which it challenged the boundaries of glasnost’. It analyses the difference between the expectations and the realities of church–state relations, comparing and contrasting the way different newspapers dealt with the subject and determining whether the treatment of the ROC in the media reflected the political affiliation of the newspaper. It will evaluate the following aspects connected with the media’s treatment of the Moscow Patriarchate’s relations with the Soviet authorities: church–state relations and foreign policy goals, the social and political role of the Moscow Patriarchate, the ROC as an agent of historical memory and the interrelations between the ROC and the USSR’s national question.

Foreign policy Church–state relations in the Soviet Union were closely tied with the global mission of the state in the international arena. The ROC espoused and propagated Soviet foreign policy goals. The Department of the External Church Relations was founded in 1946, at the beginning of the Cold War with the aim to promote Soviet peacemaking activity. The ROC joined the World Council of Churches in 1961 to promote the Soviet stand on the nuclear proliferation process. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 2, the decision to celebrate the millennium on a grand scale was closely tied with the increase of western religious influence in the USSR. Therefore, it is not surprising that the coverage of church–state relations in the Soviet media during the early years of perestroika was mainly dedicated to the issue of the ROC contribution to promotion of Soviet foreign policy goals. Izvestiia, being the mouthpiece of the Soviet Council of Ministers, paid much attention to the subject. During the years 1987–1990, it promoted Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking in the area of nuclear proliferation by providing a full account of the roundtable on the theme of General Security and Moral and Ethical Values, organised by the Moscow Patriarchate. The ROC continued to summon international conventions such as the International Global Environmental Forum of religious and parliamentary leaders in Moscow. The Forum sustained the calling of Gorbachev to destroy all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, by tackling

84  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media ecological and cultural issues. Even the heading of the article, “Sdelaem zemnoi dom bezopasnym” (“Let us make our earthly home safe”) suggested the important contribution of the Church, which cares not only for the celestial home, but also for the earthly one.17 Moreover, almost all official interviews with the leading ROC hierarchs, published in Izvestiia, touched upon the theme of the ROC support for Gorbachev’s foreign policy. In his opening address to the Conference of Religious Leaders, Patriarch Pimen mentioned that the idea of nuclear war should be banished forever from people’s consciousness.18 The article, reporting conference proceedings, was illustrated by a caricature of Madonna and the child threatened by US nuclear missiles, thus reinforcing the gravity of the anti-human and anti-religious behaviour of the US military, which initiated a series of underground nuclear explosions. In his New Year Eve interview in the 1988 millennium year, Patriarch Pimen identified Gorbachev’s speech in the United Nations as the most important achievement of the New Political Thinking.19 Moreover, Metropolitan Vladimir of Rostov and Novocherkassk emphasised that the ROC contribution to the development of the New Political Thinking was the most important outcome of Gorbachev’s meeting with the Patriarch.20 Even Patriarch Aleksii II, in his inauguration interview on 16 June 1990, underlined the significance of the ROC contribution to Soviet foreign policy. He followed in the steps of his predecessors and used his authority to promote the preparations for the peace conference in Madrid, which aimed to advance negotiations involving Israel, the Palestinian Authority as well as Arab countries including Syria, Lebanon and Jordan.21 Aleksii echoed Gorbachev’s principle of National Reconciliation, by stating that the ROC has rich experience in cooperation with representatives of both Islam and other religions.22 Izvestiia almost exclusively presented photo coverage of the ROC contribution to Soviet foreign policy. Before the millennium, it printed the picture of the fifteenth-century Novgorod double-sided Icon of the Holy Trinity and Mother of God (Madonna) Odigitri. The icon was purchased by the Rockefeller family in 1969 and returned to the USSR as an American gesture of goodwill before the millennium. The ceremony of return took place in the USSR embassy in Washington.23 On the millennium eve, Izvestiia published photo reportage of Patriarch Pimen receiving the highest award of the World Peace Council for the ROC contribution to peace among nations and nuclear proliferation, thus emphasising wide international approval of the ROC.24 During the millennium year, the Moscow Patriarchate organised exhibitions in Western countries, such as an exhibition in Wiesbaden, “Millennium of Russian Art.”25 To emphasise that the USSR was no longer an “empire of evil,” Izvestiia published photo reportage showing a Christmas prayer in the Tatishchev village Sergiev church, with the participation of a British clergyman, Bruce Carpenter. In the attached interview, Carpenter told the story of his life, how he learned Russian, serving on the British reconnaissance ship in the Baltic and how he used his knowledge of the language to become closer to the Soviet people.26 To the same end, the Publishing Department of the Moscow Patriarchate hosted a mission of delegates from different denominations, members of the WCC, to discuss

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 85 the theme of women and spirituality and the place of women in the modern world. The main message was clear: mothers should not cry anymore and wars should not happen again.27 Trud tackled the issue of the ROC contribution to Soviet foreign policy on a much lesser scale than Izvestiia. It illustrated the official account of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Moscow with the photo reportage of Reagan’s visit to the Danilov Monastery, which took place in June 1988, just before the start of the millennium celebrations. An implicit message was conveyed again: the ROC is an agent of peace, an image especially appealing to Western eyes.28 A few days later, a note was published in an “Answers to the Reader’s Questions” column, promoting the importance of Russian religious heritage. This time one of the readers asked about the history of the Danilov Monastery. The answer mentioned that the Monastery was returned to the church in 1983 and that it is a great monument of Russian history.29 Trud’s coverage of Reagan’s visit to the monastery served as an excellent preparation of public opinion in the lead to the millennium celebrations and foreshadowed the new, positive tone taken towards the Church by the state media. Thus, media coverage depicting the contribution of the ROC to Soviet foreign policy paved the way for the millennium events, which were designed to serve the goals of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking.

Millennium celebrations The coverage of the millennium celebrations, which took place from 5 to 17 June 1988 in Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, Novgorod, Vladimir, Minsk and Lvov and from 18 June to 10 July in all other dioceses, by Sovetskaia Rossiia, Trud, Izvestiia and Literaturnaia Gazeta, was surprisingly low. The millennium celebrations are usually cited by scholars, such as Michael Bourdeaux, as a major turning point in the media’s portrayal of the Church in the USSR.30 However, they mostly refer to the TV coverage of the major official celebration events. Izvestiia had the most extensive coverage with five items dedicated to the subject. Literaturnaia Gazeta, on the other hand, devoted only one article to the impact of the Christianisation of Rus’ on Russian and world culture.31 All four newspapers underlined in their reports the contribution of the celebrations to the needs of perestroika and Soviet foreign policy. The most salient example was the front-page coverage in Trud of Gorbachev’s meeting with Patriarch Pimen. More than twice, Gorbachev underlined the importance of the millennium celebrations for the cause of perestroika and the success of the anti-nuclear campaign. He also claimed to continue the Leninist principles of church–state relations (namely the separation of church from state), which provided the ROC and other religious organisations full freedom of action, despite some deviations during the years of Stalin’s personality cult. This illustrates that there was no sudden shift in the official approach to the Church; Gorbachev himself maintained the distortions of his predecessors even a year into glasnost’. Patriarch Pimen, in reply, underlined the full support of the ROC for the cause of perestroika and the New Political Thinking. He noted, however, that not all the

86  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media problems concerning church–state relations were resolved and voiced his hope that new democratic developments in Soviet society would foster the right solution for all parties involved.32 An interview with Metropolitan of Minsk and Belorussia Filaret, published in Trud just before the start of the festive events, also emphasised the patriotic nature of the ROC, its influence on the development of statehood and legislation in Russia, contribution to the military efforts during World War II and continuous endeavour in the campaign for the nuclear-free world.33 At this stage, the recognition was of the Church’s contribution to the objectives of the Soviet state rather than to the foundation of Russian history and culture. Sovetskaia Rossiia, while reporting on the ceremonial meetings of Moscow and the Moscow regional clergy dedicated to the millennium, emphasised the central place of Moscow, as both the heart of Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church. A clear allusion was made to the Russian imperial idea of “Moscow, the Third Rome,” resurrected as part of an appeal to Russian nationalism in an effort to garner support for the reforms. Patriarch Pimen, at the same meeting, spoke about the process of perestroika within the Church and the obligation of the Church to preserve peace in the world and save Soviet society from deterioration. Metropolitan Krutitskii and Kolomenskii Yuvenalii mentioned the impact of the ROC on the development of European culture and emphasised the influence of Moscow on the cultural and spiritual development of Russia.34 Thus, unlike Trud, Sovetskaia Rossiia recognised the ROC historical role in the development of Russian national identification. Sovetskaia Rossiia concluded its coverage of the millennium events with a report from the international forum, dedicated to the millennium celebrations, in Venice, Italy. The major discussion evolved around the impact of the Christianisation of Rus’ on the development of world culture. It was noted that perestroika cardinally changed church–state relations in the USSR, and it reflected on truly socialist and Leninist principles, such as morality and spirituality. The ROC was portrayed as the major aid to the efforts of perestroika, the improvement of the economy, agriculture and the inner desire of the people to create, fostered by such qualities as diligence and morality: “The Church should be our ally: it teaches respect, morality and tolerance.”35 Izvestiia dedicated considerable attention to the preparations for the millennium celebrations. It started with an official announcement of the planned events in January 198836 and continued with an interview with Patriarch Pimen, in which he underlined the major contribution of the Christianisation of Rus’ to the cultural and spiritual development of the Russian nation, the strengthening of the Russian state and preservation of historical memory. He especially emphasised the input of the ROC to the causes of perestroika and mainly to the principles of morality and labour. The contribution to the struggle for peace and nuclear proliferation was also accentuated.37 Similarly with Sovetskaia Rossiia, in its reporting of the millennium celebrations, Izvestiia also emphasised a major improvement in church–state relations in the USSR and its impact on foreign tourists. It discussed foreigners who attended

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 87 the liturgy in Moscow’s Bogoiavlenskii Cathedral, who were surprised to see a huge crowd there: “We were told that religion is forbidden in the USSR. We are simply amazed by the amount of people who are willing to enter this beautiful cathedral.”38 Foreign guests in Kiev were also reportedly surprised by the bravery of the Kievan citizens, who despite the heavy rain attended all the celebrations, including those in the open air.39 Izvestiia was the only newspaper to provide official photo coverage of the millennium events. It started with an account of the liturgy for the Christianisation of Rus’ in Bogoiavlenskii Cathedral in Moscow. This was one of the first events included in the millennium official celebrations40 and continued by showing the preparations for the holy liturgy in the Danilov Monastery (12 June), dedicated to all Russian saints.41 In Siberia (Tobol’sk), millennium events were marked by an exhibition, “Connection between the Generations,” which displayed articles of church art and peasant life in the Tobol’sk region. The exhibition was organised jointly by the Moscow Patriarchate and the government committee, “Cultural Heritage and Modern Times.”42 Izvestiia chose to complete its photo reportage of the millennium celebrations by commemorating two important moments of the year; one of them was the millennium service and the other, a photo of the victory in a swimming competition.43 Knowing the importance of sporting events for both the USSR’s internal image and external image, one could conclude that millennium events were indeed elevated to the same status. Two years later, Trud honoured the millennium by presenting a contest, initiated by the Moscow Patriarchate, to build the biggest church in the USSR with the capacity of 10,000 believers.44 As this survey demonstrates, media coverage of the millennium celebrations was designed to improve the USSR’s image in the international arena. The scarceness and official tone of reports underlined the fact that church–state relations were still regarded only as a political and not as a social matter. The role of the ROC as an institution with an important social role was recognised only after the adoption of the Soviet Law on “Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations” in October 1990. At this point, the potential of the Church to contribute to reforms, beyond merely acting to improve the USSR’s international image, was not recognised by the Soviet authorities.

Property return One of the most vexed issues in church–state relations was the return of property seised from the Church by the Bolsheviks after the 1917 Revolution. The issue led to a vigorous debate in the USSR, reflected in the major newspapers, which revolved around the following question: which authority would take better care of Russia’s cultural and religious heritage, the Moscow Patriarchate or the state? The subject was first mentioned in 1987, before the millennium, and the main discussion took place from 1989 to 1990. The controversy on the subject continued illustrating its perceived importance to the Church and to the state authorities. Perhaps, not surprisingly, given the different origins and ideological approaches outlined

88  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media earlier, the four newspapers, examined herein, adopted diverse approaches to the issue. Trud and Sovetskaia Rossiia argued for the prevalence of cultural rather than religious heritage, while Izvestiia claimed that only the ROC would be able to restore both the form and the content of Russian religious-historical monuments. Literaturnaia Gazeta adhered to a more liberal balanced position, which on the one hand called for property return and on the other for collaboration between the Ministry of Culture and the Moscow Patriarchate. The preservation of historical and cultural monuments, which also had religious significance, such as Valaam and Solovki archipelago, became the central issue of dispute. According to Sovetskaia Rossiia, the problem became particularly relevant following the return of famous cathedrals formerly occupied by museums. It was especially acute in Leningrad with such iconic buildings as the Saint Isaac Cathedral and the Kazan Cathedral. The newspaper doubted whether Church authorities would be able to take care of such national-cultural treasures, which required constant, expensive maintenance.45 Sovetskaia Rossiia promoted the idea that the state should take prime responsibility for those monuments of religious value, which were in danger of deterioration due to ecological disasters. Such was the case with Makarievskii Monastery, which was at risk of deterioration due to continued filling of the Cheboksary reservoir. The author of the article “Bulldozer in the Monastery Yard” criticised the authorities for not taking care of this object of historical value and suggested that at least part of the monastery should be returned to the church.46 Sovetskaia Rossiia during 1989 continued the theme by portraying the restoration works in the recently returned Tolgskii Monastery, while boasting of being the first newspapers to discuss the complicated history of the monastery.47 During 1990, photojournalism was used by the newspaper to emphasise the return of monasteries, such as the Shamorodinskii women’s Monastery in the Kaluga region,48 the Solovetskii Monastery49 and the Voronezh women’s Monastery in Zadonsk, Lipetsk region.50 Photos portrayed either a dismal condition of the returned property or a grand official reopening, thus emphasising the important role of state authorities in the process of property return to the ROC. Trud adopted a similar position to Sovetskaia Rossiia on the issue of property return. Moreover, it was among the first newspapers to discuss the fate of religious and cultural monuments. In 1987, it pointed its criticism towards the state authorities by claiming that only the Soviet Cultural Fund can preserve Russian folk art and other spiritual treasures,51 thus highlighting the responsibility of the state for its safeguarding. The renovation of churches as cultural centres was viewed as a project aimed at the renewal of the Soviet people’s spiritual life, the same as the building of new monuments in commemoration of World War II.52 The problem of contraband and the stealing of icons and church liturgical items was sharply criticised in the Trud. This phenomenon was compared with a lack of proper care of the Russian historical relics by local museums and to the confiscation of the church treasures by the Bolsheviks.53 The issue of the Kazan Cathedral loomed large. Situated in the heart of Leningrad, on Nevskii Prospect, it stands as a highly visible marker of the Church’s

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 89 relationship with the state. The Cathedral was perceived primarily as a memorial to the Russian victory against Napoleon. In 1932, it was turned into the Museum of History of Religion and Atheism, giving it a symbolic meaning. Trud underlined the confrontation between the church authorities, Leningrad state authorities and workers at the Museum of Religion and Atheism, concerning the return of Kazan Cathedral to the ROC. While appreciating the importance of honouring historical memory by recognising the need to return the Cathedral to the ROC, the need to preserve the museum was also emphasised. The attitude of Metropolitan Ioann of Leningrad and Ladoga, who despite his agreement to cooperate with the museum until a more appropriate arrangement could be found, requested the immediate eviction of the museum from the Cathedral, was sharply criticised. Objects of the religious cult, preserved in the museum, are part of the common heritage, thus they belong to the people of the RSFSR in general and it is important to preserve them, not as religious artefacts, but as a part of the common historical past.54 It is important to underline that the state authorities regarded these religious buildings as having broader cultural importance, even though it was still conducting anti-religious propaganda (albeit on a reduced scale). A critical view of property return to the ROC, especially from museums, was bluntly portrayed in an article about the Kirilo-Belozerskii Museum, which was rented to the Church as a part of the Ferapontov Monastery in the Vologda region. The neglect that church officials demonstrated towards works of art was exemplified by the behaviour of Father Arsenii, who during Nativity of the Virgin day prayers damaged the work of a prominent Russian painter, Dionisii.55 Thus, Trud demonstrated an uncompromising support of the state authorities and their ability to support Russian national and religious monuments. Izvestiia, on the other hand, declared that only the ROC would be able to take proper care of such historical monuments as Valaam Monastery, since only the Leningrad Eparchy and the loving hands of believers would be able to restore this historical and cultural monument to its previous glory, which eventually would be beneficial also for the tourist industry: Workers in black habits, dedicated to the idea that work is prayer, created all the churches, monks’ cells, farm buildings, workshops, gardens and forests with their intricate drainage system and canals. It should be understood that what we have here is a rare unity of form and content and that, in trying to restore the form alone, we end up with dead buildings that no tourist centre or museum can breathe life into.56 In other words, without religious intent and meaning, Valaam’s secular value is reduced. Literaturnaia Gazeta was the first newspaper to arouse public opinion, through the use of photojournalism, for the need for the return of such important Russian

90  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media Orthodox spiritual centres as Valaam Monastery. The photos featured one of the Valaam Monastery churches with a sign on the gate: “Dangerous zone, no passing, restoration works are in progress” and a large delegation headed by the Metropolitan Aleksii II visiting the island.57 The fate of the Solovetskii Monastery was also given much attention by the Soviet media. Founded by the monks Zosima and German in 1436, it became the central citadel of Russian Orthodoxy in the northern part of Russia. The monastery is famous for the 1667 uprising against Patriarch Nikon’s reforms, which initiated the Old Believers movement. Due to its remoteness, from the sixteenth century, Solovki began to be a place of exile and detention. During the years 1923–1939, it was turned into a special Soviet prison and labour camp, which served as a prototype for the Gulag system.58 Izvestiia reported on Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s decision to donate two million roubles of Soviet royalties for the publication of his books, to the Church fund for restoration of the Solovetskii Monastery, which was motivated by his intention not just to restore Solovki in all its glory, but also to breathe life into the monument.59 The idea of reviving Solovki as a spiritual centre of Russia was also supported by Literaturnaia Gazeta, which published an official discussion on the archipelago’s fate. According to general agreement, the island should have a special status, “Russian historical lands” and should be governed by the board of trustees, which would also include both representatives of the ROC and the state authorities.60 The same arguments were applied to other significant centres of Russian Orthodoxy. The official announcement of the decision to turn the entire complex of Kozelsk’s former Optina Pustyn’ Monastery of the Presentation of the Virgin, including its famous hermitage, over to the Russian Orthodox Church, was, according to Izvestiia, provoked by the need to restore Russia’s old spiritual centre.61 The ability of the Church to take care of its property, a task at which government authorities failed entirely, was again emphasised by Izvestiia, following the publication of the Ukraine Republic Council of Ministers’ resolution, to turn over to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church the famous Nearer Caves, which form part of the Kiev Caves State Historical and Cultural Preserve.62 In its discussion of property return to the Church, Literaturnaia Gazeta devoted its main attention to historical-cultural monuments. An appeal signed by the leading representatives of the intelligentsia to the USSR Supreme Soviet, requesting that the cathedrals of the Moscow Kremlin and a number of other famous churches and monasteries in the capital be returned to the Church, was written very much in accordance with the ideological style of Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking. It definitely demonstrated that official intelligentsia was placing great emphasis on the national heritage of the Russian people and that they recognised religious values as an indispensable part of that. The Appeal argues that state assistance should be provided in returning to the ROC all outstanding monuments of religious culture throughout the country and giving them, on a legal basis, the status of church museums (art collections and libraries) and educational and charitable institutions. According to the signatories, such steps on the part of the highest state authorities would be perceived, both inside and outside the USSR,

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 91 as a manifestation of the New Political Thinking and as a sign of respect for the rights of believers and of a further restructuring of relations between the state and the church.63 Following the publication of the Appeal, Dmitrii Likhachev, a Soviet scholar and an expert in Russian language and literature, explained why he signed and supported the petition: Every nation must have its holy treasures, that is why our most valued religious cultural memorials should be returned to the Church and related religious organisations… The property must be returned on the demand of believers and with a demand for its restoration….The return of icons and religious books, should be done only with the agreement from the museums, where they are held.64 The leading representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia quickly corrected the idea of an unmitigated return of religious-historical-cultural monuments to the Church. Sergei Averintsev stated that such places as the Moscow Kremlin should maintain the status of a museum with occasional special religious services held. Thus, he called for collaboration between the Ministry of Culture and the Moscow Patriarchate.65 Literaturnaia Gazeta went even further in its attempt to portray the change in the official attitude towards the Church. Photos featured lessons in the Sviato-Uspenskii Kievo-Picherskii Monastery. The underlining text explained that thirty years ago, on 5 March 1960, Literaturnaia Gazeta published an article about the closing of both the men’s and women’s monasteries in Kievo Pechersk because of the idle and inappropriate behaviour of its inhabitants. And in the summer of 1988, the monastery was reopened and most of the property returned to the Church, signalling that the era of war against the “opium for the people” had ended and an era of peaceful coexistence, not only with foreign countries, but also with the Soviet people, had begun.66 The coverage of property return in all four newspapers aligned to the official position of a more liberal approach towards the Church, which was reinforced by photo coverage of the contribution of the ROC to the goals of the Soviet foreign policy. In June 1991, six months before the disintegration of the USSR, Literaturnaia Gazeta changed its attitude towards the question of who should take care of the Russian cultural-religious heritage. The head of the USSR’s Association of Renovators warned against the indiscriminate return of icons and other valuable objects of art to the ROC, stating that, “Old Russian culture developed within the Church, but today it cannot belong to it exclusively,”67 thus arguing again that secular professionals and state authorities will take better care of religious liturgical property. As mentioned before, most of the attention in the Soviet media was dedicated to the dispute of the return of famous cultural-religious monuments. Only Izvestiia dealt with the implementation of changing church–state relations concerning property return, with regard to the rights and needs of Orthodox believers. The article “Razrushennyi Khram” (“The Destroyed Church”) related to the fate of the

92  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media Chudovo church, Novgorod region, during the pre- and post-revolutionary period. The author blamed both the official Soviet pre-perestroika policy of church–state relations and the contemporary Soviet authorities, who despite perestroika were still unwilling to return the old church to believers. This emphasised the idea that by doing so, Soviet authorities deprived Russian people of the beauty which famously led Prince Vladimir to choose Byzantine Orthodoxy over other religions considered by his emissaries for his lands.68 Izvestiia voiced a critical approach towards the official neglect of believers’ rights in an article which criticised the inefficiency of regional authorities in dealing with the implementation of religious rights in Ivanovo, discussed in Chapter 2. It reported on a hunger strike initiated by four women, part of the governing body of a newly registered religious community, due to the refusal of the local authorities to return the Presentation Church to believers. However, an editorial note was added. It stated the method of protest chosen by the participants in the hunger strike is unacceptable. One would think that their spiritual pastor would have been able to convince the believers to rely on the law and not on “starvation defence” of their rights. Moreover, it is alarming that lately people have attempted to use such “methods” of forceful pressure with increasing frequency, and not just in Ivanovo.69 Izvestiia presented believers and church authorities as radicals, who are unwilling to abide by the law, clearly supporting the state’s imperatives, as was done in the pre-perestroika period. Izvestiia also reported on the petition signed by six hundred believers from the Kungura village, in the region of Perm, appealing to return the Alexander Nevskii church, which was converted by local businessmen to a restaurant. Its return was motivated by a need for the spiritual education of the Russian people. It was considered before that together with the falling domes, peoples’ consciousness would be liberated and citizens would build a better life in which the prayer houses would look bleak. Paradoxically, this did not happen in Kungura where no new building was more beautiful than the church.70 Izvestiia was the first newspaper to use photojournalism on the subject of property return in order to portray the official change of attitude towards the ROC. Photo reportage, published just before the millennium celebrations, depicted the official ceremony of handing over the sacred relics from Kremlin museums to the ROC.71 The picture of another official ceremony for the return of Kievo-Pecherskaia Lavra to the ROC signalled the beginning of millennium celebrations in Kiev. This ceremony took place on 7 June in the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) headquarters.72 The return of Kievo-Pecherskaia Lavra signified a change in church–state relations. The discussion on property return to the ROC echoed the official ideological dispute on the relations between Marxism–Leninism and Russian Orthodoxy. Trud and Sovetskaia Rossiia defended the right of the state to own and take care of religious and cultural monuments, thus emphasising the positive attitude of the official secular ideology to church–state relations, while Izvestiia clearly

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 93 underlined a need for a different ideological path. The balanced approach of Literaturnaia Gazeta projected the essence of the conflict, accentuating the need for collaboration between the church and state authorities.

Election of Patriarch Aleksii II and the coverage of the ROC official events After the death of Patriarch Pimen in June 1990, Metropolitan of Novgorod and Leningrad, Aleksii (Ridiger) was elected the new Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. As with the millennium events, this election was barely covered in the Soviet newspapers. Sovetskaia Rossiia did not publish even a small note. Trud printed a small biographical annotation upon Aleksii II’s election on 7 June 1990,73 while Literaturnaia Gazeta emphasised that upon his election, the new Patriarch received the baton of the Moscow Metropolitan Peter, who in 1326 transferred the Metropolitan’s see from Vladimir to Moscow, thus signalling the unification of Russian lands.74 Izvestiia, on the other hand, dedicated its front-page reportage to Patriarch Aleksii’s II election,75 which was followed by an extensive interview a few weeks later. The newly elected patriarch spoke about changing church–state relations, the ROC role in society, religious education and problems with the Uniates in western Ukraine.76 The newspaper’s editorial board clearly saw in the election of a new Patriarch a good opportunity for the ROC to highlight Gorbachev’s changing attitude towards religion in general and the ROC in particular. It allowed the Moscow Patriarchate a visibility previously denied to it, if only as a voice in full support of the reforms, at a time when they were increasingly under fire from conservatives within the Party and in need of defence. Izvestiia continued to print photo reportages of all major ROC official events, such as the Bishop’s Council dedicated to the 400th anniversary of the establishment of the Patriarchate in Russia in 1989,77 and the opening ceremony of the 1990 Bishop’s Council, which designed procedures for the election of the new fifteenth Patriarch of Moscow and all of Russia.78 Photo reportage of the Divine Liturgy in the Moscow Kremlin Uspenskii Cathedral in commemoration of its 500th anniversary featured the attendance of prominent figures from the Soviet establishment such as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Anatolii Lukianov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Ivan Silaev, and a chairman of Moscow City Council, Gavril Popov. Following the liturgy, the official ceremony of the transfer of the Annunciation Church took place.79 Only as the disintegration of the USSR approached, did Izvestiia change its style and started to use critical photojournalism with regard to the official ideological line, juxtaposing Marxism–Leninism and Russian Orthodoxy. In the rubric, “The unexpected viewpoint,” it published a photo of Lenin’s monument standing in front of the churches in the town of Serdobsk, Penza region.80 Literaturnaia Gazeta, on the other hand, adopted quite a different approach towards the portrayal of the official ideological line, advocating pluralism of ideas and free expression and suggesting that Russian people will probably choose the

94  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media

Figure 4.1  Viacheslav Pietzukh, “Vtoraia Zapoved,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, March 20 1991, 15.

path of Russian Orthodoxy as a prevalent national ideology. A photo of a girl focusing on the painting of a church in the street exhibition was situated on the same page as an interview with the leading scientist from the Institute of Philosophy, entitled, “Kakaia ideologia nam nuzhna?” (“Which ideology do we really need?”). Interestingly enough the interview underlined the fact that current prevalent ideology should be changed: instead of mono-ideology, there should be an interchange of different opinions.81 This call for ideological pluralism came with a warning against the tendency to follow religious ideas blindly. A photo of a drowning church was published, followed by the article named after the second commandment, “You shall not make for yourself an idol” (Figure 4.1).82

Aleksandr Men’s murder The coverage of Aleksandr Men’s murder in the central newspapers, or the absence of it, perhaps more than any other topic portrayed the essence of church–state relations during perestroika. Aleksandr Vladimirovich Men’ was a Russian Orthodox priest of Jewish origin and a prominent theologian, Biblical scholar and writer. He was murdered early on Sunday morning on 9 September 1990 by an axe-wielding assailant just outside his home in the village of Semkhoz, near Moscow, while he was on his way to the morning liturgy. Men’ often spoke against national-ritualistic religion. He advocated openness, tolerance and humility, interpreting these values and perspectives as central to the Russian Orthodox Church. He saw the long-standing schism between church and society as one of the ROC’s primary difficulties and looked for ways to heal it. According to Father Borisov (Aleksandr Men’s follower and known as a symbol of the liberal Russian Orthodox priesthood), despite the fact that Men’ propagated values which correlated with the declared goals of a new form of church– state relations and the aim of glasnost’, two days after his death, all his recorded TV programmes were destroyed. Journalists who had interviewed Father Men’ received calls forbidding them to publish the remaining material.83 This happened after the adoption of the “Press and Mass Media” Law, which apparently prohibited censorship.

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 95 Literaturnaia Gazeta and Izvestiia were the only newspapers which published an item commemorating Father Men’s heritage in the days following his murder. The note in Literaturnaia Gazeta was underwritten by an anonymous group of friends,84 while Izvestiia published an item in Men’s memory, quoting the words of his close friend, Aleksandr Borisov: “the loss of Father Men’ has great spiritual meaning…The battle for Russia and its people has started and like in every battle there are always those who fall first.”85 Borisov hoped then that many others would follow Father Men’ in the fight for religious renewal and ecumenical values within the Moscow Patriarchate. Izvestiia had nothing further to report on the crime, while Literaturnaia Gazeta continued to dedicate itself to the issue despite the problematic attitude of the authorities. On 19 December 1990, it published Father Men’s lecture in Moscow, given on 8 September, a day before he was murdered. This lecture appeared on the front page, in exactly the same place as the first official interview with Patriarch Aleksii II, published by Izvestiia, thus indicating that his voice was no less important than that of the ROC higher hierarchy.86 It could be also interpreted as an implicit call for reform within the ROC structure. Literaturnaia Gazeta continued to publish reviews by well-known Russian religious scholars, such as Archpriest Viktor Potapov, Sergei Averintsev and Nikolai Struve. Father Potapov analysed Men’s writing on the Old Testament.87 The articles of Averintsev and Struve were published to commemorate Father Men’s legacy, a year after his murder. Sergei Averintsev voiced strong criticism towards the authorities, since the killers of Father Men’ were not found, and “there is a feeling that nobody really wants to find the killers, and the matter is dragged on and on.”88 An article by Nikita Struve underlined the fact that Men’ regarded the Orthodox Church not as a national church, but a church which belonged to all people, a universal one.89 Father Men’ was mentioned in the newspapers not only with regard to his murder. At the beginning of perestroika, Trud published an interview with a repentant prisoner, a clergyman (Father Razveev), who had collaborated with the Western media for money. The article’s primary aim was to emphasise how Western anti-Soviet forces used the “catacomb church” (religious communities operating underground) to undermine the unity of the Soviet people. Father Aleksandr Men’ served as an example of an oppositionist underground clergyman, who not only collaborated with the West (many of his writings were published there), but also lied about it. He was portrayed as a model of subversive behaviour. It was emphasised that Men’ chose a religious path only because the institute he worked in was moved to Irkutsk, and he did not want to leave Moscow. Moreover, it underlined his immoral and unchristian behaviour towards his friend’s wife and her children, denying her shelter when she was beaten and expelled from home. It is interesting to note that in the article Father Men’ was often called “Alexander Wolfovich,” an implicit emphasis on his Jewish origin, in tune with the official anti-Semitism prevalent in the pre-perestroika period and a few years before the resurgence of popular anti-Semitism led by such organisations as Pamiat’ (Memory).90

96  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media The expose clearly attempted to alienate other believers from Father Men’. Only those few who were engaged in unsanctioned and unpatriotic behaviour were warned. This article in Trud was the end result of the KGB’s attempts to compromise Father Men’. Its correspondent Nikolai Domekovskii went to interview Razveev in prison, and documentary footage of this interview was presented on Soviet television on 9 April 1986, a few days before the publication in Trud.91 The coverage of Father Men’s murder in the major newspapers served as a salient example of the state’s attitude towards the ROC and especially its liberal wing. It was clear that the official press attitude towards church–state relations did not undergo major changes during the period of perestroika. Moreover, besides Literaturnaia Gazeta, which served as a mouthpiece of the liberal intelligentsia, and to some extent Izvestiia, all other newspapers adopted the official ideological line propagated by both church and state, which portrayed the ROC as a national-patriotic church, working side by side with state authorities, thus clearly marking the limits of glasnost’ and perestroika. The following conclusion can be made about the coverage of church–state relations in the major Soviet newspapers during the perestroika years. On the subject of the ROC contribution to the promotion of Soviet foreign policy, Izvestiia was in the lead, actively advancing Gorbachev’s New Political Thinking. Trud and Sovetskaia Rossiia did so on a much lesser scale, using official events such as Reagan’s visit to Danilov Monastery and the death of Patriarch Pimen to touch upon the issue. Izvestiia was also the leading newspaper in the coverage of the millennium celebrations, which also aimed to promote the causes of perestroika by improving the USSR’s image in the international arena. In the dispute over the question of which authority—the church or the state— would take better care of Russian cultural-religious monuments, Izvestiia propagated the official position of the ROC, claiming that only the church will be able to “breathe life” into those national treasures, while Trud and Sovetskaia Rossiia emphasised their cultural rather than religious values. Literaturnaia Gazeta promoted the intermediate position, trying to bridge the gap between the Ministry of Culture and Moscow Patriarchate. Moreover, reports on Father Men’s murder characterised Literaturnaia Gazeta as an agent of liberal intelligentsia, claiming that ROC should play a central role in healing the troubled Soviet society.

The ROC as an agent of historical memory The print media’s discussion of the place of Russian Orthodoxy in the Russian nation’s historical memory during the perestroika years in many ways echoed its discourse on church–state relations, highlighting the patriotic nature of the Church. The press gave much attention to the topic of historical memory and in particular its national-religious manifestations. The discussion mainly revolved around these topics: Russian Orthodoxy as a basis for national unity; the need to remember the past through the restoration of religious monuments; the revival of Orthodox tradition; and the call for collective repentance as the only tool of national and spiritual regeneration. Historical memory, in relation to patriotic

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 97 and national symbolism of Russian Orthodoxy, was discussed during the very early stages of perestroika, at a time when other issues connected to religion were regarded almost as taboo. At the beginning of perestroika, the Soviet official media treated the subject of Russian Orthodoxy and historical memory by highlighting such issues as Russia’s unique patriotic spirit and the geographical and historical unity of the Russian lands. Sovetskaia Rossiia emphasised patriotic memory by relating the stories of soldiers who defended religious monuments or believers who demonstrated acts of patriotism. Such instances included a Soviet soldier who saved the Sophiiskii Cathedral bells in Novgorod during World War II,92 and a young monk, named Nikita, who fought alone against the Nazis and miraculously saved a brigade of local partisans, these examples demonstrating a triumph of religious spirit over hatred and violence.93 Izvestiia underlined the importance of the national and cultural union of the Slavic people by harking back to the source of the Cyrillic alphabet, or its predecessor Glagolitic alphabet, the oldest known Slavonic alphabet from the ninth century. It published an article which defended the authenticity of the “Kiev’s Glagolic Pages,” that according to an Austrian scientist were forged in the nineteenth century.94 By reverting to the distinctive symbols of Russian culture, such as the Cyrillic alphabet, Izvestiia reflected the discussion, then underway, about the place of the Russian nation in the Soviet federation, in which Russia’s national-religious tradition and Russian Orthodoxy were frequently invoked. Literaturnaia Gazeta relayed the theme of the geographical and historical unity of the Russian lands, using the 800th anniversary of the famous Russian epic, “Slovo o Polku Igoreve” (The Tale of Igor’s Campaign), especially emphasising its religious origin and nationalistic sentiment.95 Such discussion of this Russian epic at the very early stages of perestroika allowed the editorial board of the newspaper to present Russian Orthodoxy in a positive light, similar to the treatment of the ROC during World War II. Literaturnaia Gazeta also accentuated the unifying aspect of Slavonic writing and culture, suggesting that 24 May, a day which marks the birth of the Cyrillic alphabet created by Saints Cyril and Methodius, should become a national holiday.96 Literaturnaia Gazeta was also the first newspaper to address the historical-spiritual role of the most important Russian Monastery, the Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius, founded in 1345 by an acclaimed Russian saint, Sergii of Radonezh. The amount of space allocated to one article on the monastery, published in 1987, was similar to that given to the Communist Party programme and Gorbachev’s speeches. It was not in line with the official ideology prevalent at the beginning of perestroika. This fact is not surprising taking into account the policy of the newspaper’s chief editor, Aleksandr Chakovskii, who advanced such values of glasnost’, as freedom of speech and intellectual discussion. The article also underlined the great patriotic history of the Lavra and its inhabitants and raised important questions such as the role of believers in society and the role of history in the contemporary Soviet world.97 Trinity Lavra, being a prominent spiritual centre of the ROC, was thus an important

98  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media subject of discussion on the role of historical memory in shaping the future of Soviet society. The safeguarding of national historical memory through the restoration of Russian masterpieces of religious architecture and art, thus reinforcing the spiritual strength of the nation, was another issue widely discussed in the mass media in the later stages of the perestroika period.98 Izvestiia published an account of the All-Union symposium on the “Use, Protection and Restoration of Cultural and Historical Monuments,” stating that historical and cultural monuments played a vital role in the communist education of Soviet citizens, thus, placing responsibility for the promotion of awareness to protect and respect the Russian historical past on the Communist Party and other official social organisations.99 Izvestiia also printed an official report regarding the establishment of a new directorate in the Ministry of Culture, in charge of the protection and preservation of historical memorials and monumental buildings. Its director, Sergei Georgievich Petrov, stated that people’s awareness for the need to preserve the national heritage had shifted. More and more volunteers asked to help during the restoration work. One of the main projects, led by the directorate, called Nasledie (Heritage), would complete a full account of the remaining historical memorials. Petrov emphasised that churches and monasteries constituted a major part of these memorials,100 thus highlighting again the importance of the ROC historical legacy. The restoration of old Russian churches, such as the twelfth-century church of Mikhail Archangel in Novgorod, symbolised the striving for the cultural and political unification of Russia.101 The historical heritage of the Church was called upon as the basis for Russian and Soviet national unity and as an important part of national historical memory. However, the issue of safeguarding Russia’s historical past was lagging in the general process of perestroika. One journalist lamented, “we have lost eighty percent of Russian wooden architecture, known in the twentieth century, and those still remaining are in a dire state. Therefore, if no measure will be taken, soon there will be nothing to save.”102 The official neglect of the historical past was vividly portrayed and criticised in Trud, by depicting both spiritual and physical decay in the towns and cities of the Russian north: “the cross had fallen from the deteriorating church in the town of Sol’vychegodsk near Arkhangelsk. In the past it was a prosperous northern town, but now a totally forlorn place.”103 Here, the deterioration of a single church was given as an example of the deterioration of an entire Russian region and its historical memory. The use of photojournalism in Trud likewise depicted the authorities’ inefficiency in dealing with Russian culture and its historical past. This was depicted in photos of the disastrous condition of such important architectural monuments such as Pafnutiev Borovskii Monastery, famous for its history. Archpriest Avvakum, who led the opposition to the reforms instituted into the Church by Patriarch Nikon in the seventeenth century, was interred there, and many renowned aristocratic families buried on its grounds. However, completely disregarding this historical memory, the town authority built a bathhouse inside the monastery grounds.104 To emphasise that nothing appeared to be sacred anymore, Trud

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 99 published a picture of an almost destroyed church on the main street of sovkhoz (Soviet farm) Rossiia, Saratov area, and the adjacent monument to World War II heroes in a pitiful state. A small photo on the side featured a sign asking, “What will be left to our children—ruins?”105 The task of restoring the Russian past fell on the shoulders of simple people, believers and non-believers, those who cared for the land and its traditions. Photo reportage in Izvestiia featured different images of Rostov: a destroyed tombstone from the nineteenth century lying in the middle of the street, churches, impassable roads and a senior priest standing together with the young director of the local sovkhoz in the old neglected cemetery.106 The important role of the ROC in the restoration process was portrayed by the efforts of local clergymen, such as Father Aleksandr, from the village of Undol, who initiated the restoration works in the local church. The photos depict two birches in front of the church’s bell tower and the restorer, Ivan Ivanovich, at work.107 Another instance of photo reportage portrayed Father Vladimir standing on the building site of the Cathedral in Kemerovo, Kuzbass region. The cathedral was the exact copy of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow destroyed in the 1930s.108 Trud emphasised the values of the Old Russia, such as working the land and believing in God by publishing a picture of a ploughman in front of the newly restored Svenskii Monastery near Briansk. In the words of the author, “Since soon the land will be returned to peasants and people are restoring monasteries—may Russia again be rich in spirit, mighty in its heroes, plenty in bread and full with beauty.”109 Literaturnaia Gazeta tackled the same issue in the article dedicated to the old northern Russian town of Tot’ma, which was listed as a historical town alongside places such as Ustiug and Suzdal. It emphasised an urgent need to preserve its architectural monuments, especially due to the new building plan, which would destroy the historical centre of the city.110 The historical memory of the Russian people was given patriotic and religious meaning, being seen as the most essential building block for a better future. Similarly to Trud, Literaturnaia Gazeta underlined the seemingly total indifference of the authorities to the fate and condition of Russian historical memorials. Repair work on the monastery in the Arkhangelsk region performed by the enthusiastic Soviet students was pictured as a new civil philosophy, and religion was viewed as a part of Russian historical heritage.111 As with Izvestiia, Literaturnaia Gazeta accentuated the role of the ordinary Soviet citizens as a key to the revitalisation of both Russian national monuments and national-religious and historical memory, thus criticising the inability of the state to lead the process. Towards the end of perestroika, historical memory was portrayed by the revival of Russian cultural and religious traditions. The prominent ones being: Russian choral music festivals112; the art of bell-ringing113; the revival of long-forgotten religious holidays, such as Pokrov, which symbolised the divine protection of Christians against all enemies114; and Russian Orthodox Christmas,115 held according to the Gregorian rather than the Julian calendar. The Gregorian calendar was introduced by the Bolsheviks on 14 February 1918. This change was advantageous

100  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media to the anti-religious movement, as Sundays and religious holidays became working days. The art of bell-ringing is one of the most essential elements of an Orthodox Church tradition. It was used to summon believers to service, announce the arrival of an important person and proclaim important events. The use of bells in the Russian Orthodox tradition was not only practical, but was considered spiritual. Bells were sometimes referred to as “singing icons,” because they established the acoustic space of an Orthodox Church, just as painted icons defined its visual space. Bell-ringing was also believed to have magical power, the ability to cure the sick and protect against evil.116 Photojournalism during perestroika paid much attention to the revival of the art of bell-ringing in Russia after the millennium celebrations. Sovetskaia Rossiia published a picture of the major custodian of the Irkutsk wooden architecture museum, ringing the bells in the Irkutsk Spasskii church following several decades during which church bells were silent,117 and the photo of a girl, who was one of five bell-ringers in the Museum of Wooden Architecture in Malye Karely, Arkhangelsk region.118 Trud used the theme of church bells, portraying their value as the emissaries of national-spiritual rebirth, which could save Russia from ideological impoverishment and a dire future, by illustrating the interview with a photo of Father Serafim from the Ivanovo region standing in front of a church bell together with two village boys.119 The theme of Russian religious holidays, as an important manifestation of national tradition and historical memory, became prevalent in photojournalism towards the end of perestroika. Most popular was the festival of Orthodox music, which became a tradition in Moscow, since the revival of the first festival in Novgorod during the opening of the millennium celebrations.120 The tradition of church music aimed to bring harmony to the chaotic reality of the late perestroika period. One of the concerts during the second festival in Moscow was transmitted for the first time on national television.121 Other instances of photojournalism dealt with religious holidays by depicting the religious procession before Easter122 or featured a young couple during a religious wedding ceremony underlining the spiritual values of such a ceremony as opposed to a mundane civil wedding.123 The picture of the Easter greeting banner on Tverskaia, one of Moscow’s main streets, was undersigned as follows: Who would think that we will prepare ourselves for Easter, the same way we do for the Red days in our calendar, 7 October and 1 of May. But times change and we, as our elderly say, are changing with them.124 This summarised the essence of the ideological change in the USSR. The theme of repentance, as a part of Russian collective historical memory, appeared less often in the newspapers than such themes as national unity, the restoration of historical memorials and national-religious customs. Trud was the first one, among examined newspapers, to raise the subject of repentance in 1989 via an article connected to the fate of Father Avvakum, who was exiled to Siberia

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 101 and culminated in his being burned at the stake in the village of Pustozersk. Trud’s criticism of the inability to perform a memorial service, since the only church in Pustozersk had been converted to a stable, indicated the need for repentance.125 Trud addressed the same issue again, two years later, emphasising the need for repentance in the memory of those who perished and daring to criticise the mainstream ideology.126 The example of Father Avvakum served as a prototype for religious persecution based on a deviation from the main ideological line propagated by the religious establishment, thus calling for collective repentance and tolerance. The coverage of the theme of Russian Orthodoxy and its connection to historical memory differed between the newspapers. Sovetskaia Rossiia first mentioned the topic of the ROC as an agent of historical memory during the first years of perestroika through the patriotic deeds of both Soviet soldiers and Orthodox clergy. It continued by emphasising the significance of cultural and religious traditions after the millennium and called upon the need for collective repentance towards the disintegration of the USSR. Izvestiia adopted an official tone, underlining the importance of religious-historical memory in promoting the national and cultural union of the Russian people. The restoration of old religious memorials was portrayed as a part of the Soviet citizens’ education. Only in 1990 did it openly call for collective repentance. Literaturnaia Gazeta highlighted the issue of Russian national epic literature in the spiritual unification of the Russian people, while criticising the state authorities for not contributing much to this end. Similar to Literaturnaia Gazeta, Trud joined the criticism of the authorities in their inability to preserve the historical and spiritual core of the Russian nation, accentuating the need to revive old religious traditions and holidays. Both papers presented the importance of historical memory as a task, which could best be performed through the influence of the ROC on Soviet society. Moreover, Trud emphasised the need for collective repentance for religious intolerance, echoing the debates concerning the persecution of Old Believers. The media debate through photojournalism concerning the part of the ROC in the revival of the Russian historical past similarly had its critical tone. It blamed the high authorities of the Moscow Patriarchate, for not being active enough in this process. Trud and Sovetskaia Rossiia brought those issues to public attention.

The ROC and its social and political role The discussion in the media of the social mission of the ROC as an institution, having a vital and indispensable role in society, started following the approval of the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations in June 1990. The new Soviet law regulating the activity of religious organisations in the USSR came into force on 9 October 1990. It represented a fundamental new phase in church–state relations. It did away with many of the old repressive measures which made so many religious activities such as religious education illegal. The government was no longer permitted to fund or support atheism, and all educational establishments were obliged to acknowledge freedom of conscience.

102  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media Religious citizens and organisations were guaranteed equality in all areas of public life, including access to the media. Clergy were specifically permitted to take part in the political life of the country, though religious organisations were not allowed to support political parties or take part in their activity. Students training in theological institutions were permitted to defer military service, making them equal with students in secular education, and soldiers were permitted to attend religious services in their free time. Izvestiia published an interview with a professor at the Moscow Theological Academy, Metropolitan of Volokolamsk and Yurievsk, Pitirim, taken after the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved the first reading of the law. In this interview, Father Pitirim commented on the social mission of the ROC, claiming that the ROC was the only force able to rouse both a single person and society as a whole to unity based on spiritual values, thus accentuating the ability of the ROC to mobilise Soviet citizens to move perestroika forward and preserve the unity of the USSR.127 Patriarch Aleksii, in an interview with Literaturnaia Gazeta, especially emphasised the need of the church to develop moral values and educate the people on the basis of Christian values of brotherhood and charity.128

Charitable activity Patriarch Aleksii identified charitable activity and education as the two main social functions of the Church. It should be given back its traditional spheres of activity, “since time immemorial, churches have opened alms houses, workhouses, sobriety societies, and orphanages where children deprived of parental care could receive a proper upbringing. All of this must be revived.”129 The discussion in the media on the charitable activity of the ROC aimed to underline its importance and legalise the activity of the Church. All the newspapers emphasised the fact that, without the help of the Moscow Patriarchate, new public organisations would not be able to function. The Narcotics Association, created under the wing of the Soviet Charity and Health Fund, was given as a salient example. Members of the clergy would provide spiritual and moral assistance to patients undergoing outpatient and inpatient treatment for substance abuse or participating in Alcoholics Anonymous self-help groups and to their families.130 Moreover, the ROC was depicted as the only organisation able to provide spiritual help for the souls of the prisoners, especially in problematic areas such as a women’s colony in the Briansk region, which had been affected by the Chernobyl catastrophe,131 or to help medical personnel in the peripheral hospitals.132 The work of the Church with state agencies for the good of ordinary citizens was also accentuated. The eparchial directorate in the town Khmelnitskii under Archbishop Antonii closely cooperated with local militia, thus leading to a decrease in road incidents in the area.133 Literaturnaia Gazeta criticised the Moscow municipal authorities for failing to register such an important public organisation as the Brotherhood of Christian Doctors functioning under the patronage of the Moscow Red Cross.134

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 103 The theme of kindness and compassion was depicted by photojournalism featuring church officials and believers taking care of a nursing home for the elderly in Kaluga135 and building churches in the prisoners’ camps. Izvestiia published a photo undersigned, “Religion cures souls,” of a prisoner, Pieter Lozhkin, standing near the altar of his newly built church. According to him, he was a militant atheist in his youth. He felt the urge to build this church with his own hands only while serving a sentence. Since it was built, a local priest had conducted 187 christenings and one wedding there.136 Literaturnaia Gazeta documented the first time in seventy years that a clergyman was allowed to pay a visit to the famous Butyrka prison.137 Besides portraying an optimistic, almost romantic, vision of the ROC as an agent of the social and spiritual regeneration of Russia, Literaturnaia Gazeta expressed uncertainty as to the ability of the Church establishment to change things for the better. In the photo reportage entitled “Veriu” (I believe), it depicted two pictures: one featuring a young boy clinging to a clergyman, as though trying to hide from evil behind his black mantle (Figure 4.2). The second picture depicted a young boy washed by the hands of an old man, as though baptising him (Figure 4.3).138 Both pictures represent a certain dilemma. Will an official representative of the Church be able to protect the boy or should simple people take fate into their own hands and save themselves? This photo reportage was followed by an interview, “A na Kladbische vse spokoino: Ispoved ateista” (Everything is calm in the graveyard: confession of an atheist) with the writer Sergei Kaledyn, who had published a novel, Pop i rabotnik (Priest and the workmen), portraying his own contemplations on the Russian Orthodox Church. Being raised as a Soviet atheist, Kaledyn learned to despise the cross and everything that was attached to it. With time, he became eager to understand what lay behind the closed doors of the Moscow Patriarchate. However, the Church itself felt very unwelcoming. Only a local seminary student helped him to see what church life was like from within. The impression was not a positive one:

Figure 4.2 “Veriu,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, March 20 1991, 9.

104  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media

Figure 4.3 “Veriu,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, March 20 1991, 9.

there was nothing much there… especially not after Father Vladimir Shibaev was forced to leave abroad, and Aleksandr Men’ was killed…I hope my novel will help to find the killers of Aleksandr Men’, because if they will not be found, it means that none of us will be able to sleep peacefully.139 Trud also gave voice to critical journalism by claiming that there was a direct connection between the spiritual revival of the Russian people and the rising price of religious services, such as weddings, baptisms and burial services. “If the ‘gates to heaven’ will be closed with a heavy financial lock, if for the revival of the soul one has to pay and pay much, will we not be disturbing our own recovery?”140 The paper did not hint at the need for possible theological reforms in Russian Christianity. It simply voiced the dissatisfaction of the people with a bureaucratic approach, so characteristic of both church and state establishment, thus doubting the positive influence of the ROC on social and political reality in the USSR.

Religious education Religious education was one of the most problematic subjects for the Soviet authorities. Its projection in the media was emphasised by outlining the problematic implementation of the 1990 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations. Patriarch Aleksii II mentioned this problem in his first extensive interview with Izvestiia. He called for an immediate execution of the law in the field of religious instruction for both children and adults. The patriarch appealed to both the state and church authorities to join forces in the effort of providing immediate extracurricular religious instruction in schools.141 The other problem connected with religious education, raised in the media, was that of a lack of teaching materials. Izvestiia published the proceedings of the meeting organised by the journal Pravoslavnaiia Beseda (Orthodox Discourse) which addressed the Holy Synod, asking to pay attention to the fact that the ROC does not have its own publishing house for printing educational material.142

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 105

Figure 4.4  “Selskii Batiushka,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, June 26 1991, 6.

The use of photojournalism depicting the topic of religious education became relevant after the millennium, paying special attention to the establishment of new theological and Sunday schools. Izvestiia was the first newspaper to publish the picture taken during the history of religion lesson in Leningrad school conducted by a clergyman. The accompanying note emphasised that such lessons, “from the first source” educate better citizens.143 Sunday schools were portrayed as places where children could learn the value of mercy and goodness.144 The Moscow Patriarchate was also complemented for taking care of informal education. Izvestiia published a picture of Father Vladimir, senior priest of the Prizhevalsk Orthodox church, hugging the children of his parishioners in front of the old MIG 15, property of the local aero club, also founded by him.145 The photo of boys lighting candles in the church before they are about to take an exam, published in Literaturnaia Gazeta, and the adjacent article, “When Christ was born” on the one hand drew attention to the importance of the Bible promotion in the USSR, and on the other, related the difficulties connected with its new translation.146 It was argued that only a new generation of educated young priests, such as Father Boris Nichiporov from the village of Konakovo, Tver region, will be able to “drag” the Church from its seventy years of oblivion. The extended photo reportage published in Literaturnaia Gazeta, featured Father Boris lecturing in the University of Tver, in Sunday school surrounded by children, in front of his church and walking in the fields. This last picture depicted Father Boris as a contemporary hero, boldly facing the uncertain future (Figure 4.4).147

Church and politics The issues of charity and religious education, despite the unsupportive attitude of the Soviet authorities concerning their implementation, at least were commonly regarded as the ROC traditional spheres of influence, but not so its involvement in politics. Early instances of photojournalism relating to the involvement of the ROC in politics were dedicated to the first People’s Deputy’s Congress in 1989. Participation of the clergy in politics was interpreted

106  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media as a sign of democratic change. Trud published the picture of a high-ranking ROC priest (name not mentioned) as an illustration to the article, “Nash Democraticheskii vybor” (Our Democratic Choice).148 Literaturnaia Gazeta published a first page photo reportage of the Council proceedings, featuring a clergyman and women deputies conversing during the break-in discussions (Figure 4.5).149 It was mainly Izvestiia and Sovetskaia Rossiia, which cited the official speeches of Patriarch Aleksii II, covered the subject of the ROC involvement in politics. Aleksii based the involvement of the ROC in politics on the 1917–1918 Local Council’s resolutions, which stated that priests were allowed to engage in social and political activity but only as private citizens and not on behalf of the Church.150 To the question of why church authorities refuse to sign a document calling for the cooperation between the ROC and Russian nationalist parties, Patriarch Aleksii was very clear: The Church cannot take part in politics and cannot be connected to any political bloc. I hope the initiative of several members of parliament to unite under a joint group, Soglasie (Agreement), will allow the much needed dialogue we are all longing for…However, if the Church will conduct a political marriage, she may very soon become a widow.151 This interview was given against the backdrop of the attempts by Russian nationalists to enrol the Church in their campaigns, which the Patriarch sought to resist. Moreover, the Church needed to stay neutral for fear that too close an association with the political authorities—as under the autocracy—could lead to its downfall. The media’s discussion of the ROC social and political role had an official connection aiming to mobilise the ROC for the process of the demographic, economic and social rebirth of the USSR.

Figure 4.5  Literaturnaia Gazeta, June 7 1989, 1.

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 107

The ROC and the “national question” Despite the fact that the main political problem facing the Soviet authorities since the beginning of perestroika was the re-emergence of strong nationalist tendencies in many of the non-Russian republics, the national question became one of the prominent subjects of discussion in the media only following the 1989 September Plenum of the USSR Communist Party Central Committee on Nationalities Issues. The Plenum granted union republic Communist Parties the right to have their own party programmes, thus leading to the federalisation of state administration and party affairs in both the USSR and the RSFSR. Much less attention, however, was paid to the relation of the ROC in this matter. Among the examined newspapers, only Izvestiia, Trud and Literaturnaia Gazeta discussed the role of the Church with regard to national disputes in the USSR. They covered issues connected with the religious situation in Ukraine and the rights of different religious groups. The theme of the ROC involvement with the national question in the USSR was also the least covered topic by photojournalism. This is mainly because general media discussion on the national question started only at the beginning of 1990, following the earthquake in Spitak (Leninakan), Armenian Republic in December 1988 and the declaration of the state of emergency in Nagorno-Karabakh in January 1990. Izvestiia voiced the official view, where the ROC was a symbol of national unity, publishing a New Year interview with Patriarch Pimen, who called for the Armenian and Azeri people to find compromise in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.152 Towards the forthcoming Plenum on Nationalities, it published an article titled Khramy Peredaiutsia Veruiuschim (“Churches are Returned to Believers”), praising the return of the famous wooden Petropavlovskii cathedral and the Azimovskii mosque to believers in Tatarstan, thus emphasising the idea that changing church–state relations in the USSR treat equally both Russian Orthodox believers and Muslims.153 Following national disputes in the Georgian republic, Izvestiia published the special official address of Patriarch Aleksii to the Patriarch of Georgia Ilia II, in which he spoke about the necessity to resolve international disputes peacefully. Your Holiness, you know best your people and you will be able to find the right words to explain that Christian belief does not grant the right to hate another human being on a legal basis…Our national churches could not stand above nationalism.154 Izvestiia also continued to publish an official view on the religious situation in Ukraine which consisted of the conflict with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the dispute between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. This resolved the conflict with the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church or the Uniate Church, as it was called following the Union of Brest in 1595, and marked the break of the Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church from the Patriarchate of Constantinople and its union with the Catholic Church. Since not all members

108  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media of the Greek Church in these lands accepted this union, it signalled the beginning of the creation of a separate Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Church in Ukraine and Belarus. As it was mentioned in Chapter 2, Vatican propaganda, aimed at the Soviet citizens in Ukraine at the beginning of perestroika, was among the central considerations of Soviet officials to revive the influence of the ROC towards the forthcoming millennium, both inside the USSR and on the international arena. The Archbishop of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Kirill (head of the Moscow Patriarchate Department of the External Church Relations) in his interview with Izvestiia, warned against the exacerbation of the so-called Uniate problem in some parts of western Ukraine. He also exposed the content of January 1990 talks between representatives of the Roman Catholic Church and the Moscow Patriarchate in the Danilov Monastery in Moscow, as a result of which a set of joint recommendations was drawn up. Following those recommendations, not a single Greek Catholic congregation was registered in western Ukraine. In fact, Archbishop Kirill blamed the Council for Religious Affairs for the unlawful return of the Orthodox churches to the unregistered Uniate communities.155 The revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church was portrayed on the pages of Izvestiia as a positive process, which was attributed to the awakening of the people’s national self-awareness and the elevation of Ukrainian to the rank of state language.156 Izvestiia portrayed the conflict between the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) over the souls of parishioners, in a positive-ironic way. The best example is financial aid given to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church by the football club Dinamo-Kiev, since it assisted the reconstruction of Mikhailovskii Zlatoverkhovii Sobor (Mikhailovskii Golden Top Cathedral) after it was demolished by the Soviet authorities in 1935.157 The use of photojournalism in Trud and Izvestiia underlined the role of the ROC as the chief agent of religiosity and unification. Front-page photo reportage in Izvestiia of the memorial service dedicated to the victims of Stalinist terror near Cheliabinsk featured only an Orthodox priest, despite the fact that it was attended by clergymen from four different denominations.158 Trud published a photo of parishioners building a church, named after Serafim Sarovskii in Cheboksary, the capital of Chuvashia, emphasising that Russian Orthodoxy was back even in the non-Russian parts of the RSFSR.159 It highlighted the predominance of the ROC over other confessions, even where it was a minority faith. Literaturnaia Gazeta, contrary to Izvestiia, presented a very different view of the ROC and its role in the resolution of the USSR’s national question. Latynina’s article, “O chem moliatsia v Khrame Khrista Spasitelia?” (“What they are praying for in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour?”), openly blamed the ROC for letting the ideas of “stylised Orthodoxy” be used in the imperial ideology of the Russian patriotic block, based on Russophobic ideas of the international plot against Russia.160 Literaturnaia Gazeta emphasised religious pluralism and tolerance of different Christian denominations as the embodiment of the common plight of all Soviet people. It published a photo of Seventh Day Adventists being baptised in

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 109 Tumen’,161 the picture showing Catholic and Orthodox priests passing through Andreevskii Spusk (Andreevskii Descent) in Kiev, engaged in peaceful conversation,162 and a picture of Father Ameran from Sachkhere, Georgian republic, standing among the ruins of his church, which was destroyed by the earthquake.163 Summing up the official printed media discussion of the church–state relations and the ROC social and political role, one could say that it broke some stereotypes as to the political affiliation of the discussed newspapers. Sovetskaia Rossiia was regarded as an aggressive advocate of the Russian national conservative position. In fact, it propagated the official ideological line with regard to the right of the state to own and take care of the religious and cultural monuments, emphasising their cultural rather than religious significance. It was the first newspaper to deal with the topic of the ROC as an agent of historical memory through the patriotic deeds of both Soviet soldiers and the ROC clergy. After the millennium, it continued by emphasising the significance of cultural and religious traditions and called upon the need for collective repentance only in 1991, close to the disintegration of the USSR. Trud, similarly to Sovetskaia Rossiia, was not against the reforms propagated by glasnost’. In fact, it could be much better characterised as their mouthpiece. In accordance with the idea of openness and lucidity, Trud joined the criticism of the authorities in their inability to preserve the historical and spiritual core of the Russian nation by accentuating the need to revive old religious traditions and holidays. It was also the only newspaper which defended the interests of simple Soviet citizens, using critical journalism by claiming that there is a straight connotation between the spiritual revival of the Russian people and unfairly high prices for basic religious services. Analysts regarded Izvestiia as a reformist media obedient to state power. However, its treatment of the ROC projected a somewhat different reality. It was the leading newspaper to advance the official ideological line. Izvestiia was in the lead actively advancing Gorbachev’s New Thinking policy by reporting widely on the millennium events, propagating the official position of the ROC and claiming that only the Church would be able to “breathe life” into Russian national treasures. It adopted an official tone, while underlining the importance of religious-historical memory in promoting the national and cultural union of the Russian people. The restoration of old religious memorials was portrayed as a part of the Soviet citizens’ education process. Only in 1990, Izvestiia openly called for collective repentance. It also practised official usage of photography for the documentation of events connected with church–state relations. Literaturnaia Gazeta, on the other hand, was portrayed as an opponent of liberalisation tendencies, being the official organ of the nationalistically oriented Soviet Writers’ Union. However, its reporting of Father Men’s murder characterised Literaturnaia Gazeta as the mouthpiece of liberal intelligentsia, emphasising that the ROC should play a central role in the process of healing Soviet society. It also promoted a balanced approach on the issue of property return, trying to bridge the gap between the Ministry of Culture and the Moscow Patriarchate. Literaturnaia Gazeta, contrary to other newspapers, presented a very different

110  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media view of the ROC and its role in the resolution of the national questions advocating against the use of imperial ideology. It was also the only newspaper which made a brave attempt to challenge the limits of official glasnost’, by allowing an open discussion about the real nature of the ROC and its relations with the authorities. The general picture of church–state relations, depicted by the official printed media, highlighted Gorbachev’s ideological line, assigned the Church the role of a guardian of both the USSR’s borders and the Russian religious and cultural heritage, thus serving the mutual interests of both institutions. Understanding the church–state interrelations during the perestroika period and their social and cultural ramifications could not be complete without the analysis of the unofficial press and its attitudes towards the subject.

Notes 1 Cited in Natalie Gross, ‘Glasnost: Roots and Practice,’ Problems of Communism 69– 80 (November–December 1987). 72. 2 Mary Dejevsky, “Glasnost’ and the Soviet Press,” in Culture and the Media in the USSR, eds. Julian Graffy and Geoffrey A. Hosking (London: Macmillan, 1989). 30. 3 Brian McNair, Glasnost’, Perestroika and the Soviet Media (London and New York: Routledge, 1991). 100. 4 Elena Androunas, Soviet Media in Transition: Structural and Economic Alternatives (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993). 167. 5 Boris Kagarlitsky, ‘The Intelligentsia and the Changes,’ New Left Review, no. 164 (July 1 1987). 13. 6 “O Gazete,” http://lgz.ru/gaz/ (accessed December 2 2017). 7 McNair, Glasnost’, Perestroika and the Soviet Media. 8 Dejevsky, Glasnost’ and the Soviet Press. 27. 9 Arlen Blium, Zakat Glavlita: Kak razrushalas’ sistema sovetskoi tsenzury: dokumental’naia khronika 1985–1991 (St. Petersburg, 1995). 171. 10 Ibid. 179. 11 Olga Voloshenko, Osobennosti organizatsii tsenzury v period perestroiki, www.oboznik.ru/?p=53434. 12 Blium, Zakat Glavlita: Kak razrushalas’ sistema sovetskoi tsenzury: dokumental’naia khronika 1985–1991. 184. 13 Rutger von Seth, ‘The Language of the Press in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia: Creation of the Citizen Role Through Newspaper Discourse,’ Journalism 13, no. 1 (2011). 14 McNair, Glasnost’, Perestroika and the Soviet Media. 101. 15 Ellen Mickiewicz, ‘Mobilization and Reform: Political Communication Policy under Gorbachev,’ Political Science and Politics 22, no. 2 (January 1989). 16 Joseph Gibbs, Gorbachev’s Glasnost: The Soviet Media in the First Phase of Perestroika (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999). 17 “Sdelaem Zemnoi Dom Bezopasnym: Otkrytie Global’nogo Foruma v Moskve,” Izvestiia, January 16 1990, 4. 18 V. Kondrashov, “Konferentsia Religioznykh Deiatelei,” Izvestiia, March 28 1987, 3. 19 “Interview Patriarcha Pimena,” Izvestiia, December 31 1988, 4. 20 R. Armeev, “Gosudarstvo i Tserkov: God Soglasia,” Izvestiia, April 29 1989, 3. 21 “Sviateishii Patriarch Moskovskii i vseia Rusi Aleksiy vtoroi: Vera bez del mertva,” Izvestiia, June 16 1990, 3. 22 D. Velikiy, “Patriarch Aleksiy II Na Blizhnem Vostoke,” Izvestiia, October 4, 3. 23 Izvestiia, December 4 1987, 5. 24 A. Ivanko and G. Charodeev, “Nagrada Patriarkhu Pimenu,” Izvestiia, June 4 1988, 3.

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 111 25 Izvestiia, November 24 1988, 5. 26 B. Moskvichev, “V Rossiu s Luboviu,” Izvestiia, January 11 1989, 7. 27 G. Charodeev, “Zhenschiny i Dukhovnost’,” Izvestiia, July 12 1989, 5. 28 “Ukrepliaem mosty k vzaimoponimaniu,” Trud, June 1 1988, 3. 29 “Danilov Monastyr’,” Trud, June 4 1988, 4. 30 Michael Bourdeaux, Gorbachev, Glasnost and the Gospel (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990). 31 “Dukhovnyi opyt istorii,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, June 8 1988, 2. 32 “Vstrecha Generalnogo Sekretaria TsK KPSS M.S. Gorbacheva s Patriarkhom Moskovskim i Vseia Rusi Pimenom i Chlenami Sinoda Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi,” Trud, April 30 1988, 1. 33 V. Galenkin, “Odna Istoriia Odno Otechestvo,” Trud, June 5 1988, 4. 34 “Torzhestva v Moskve,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, August 17 1988, 2. 35 Vladimir Karpov, “Tysechia Let Spustia,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, December 6 1988, 3. 36 “Desiat Vekov Spustia,” Izvestiia, January 1 1988, 2. 37 Karpov, Tysechia Let Spustia. 3; Vladimir Chertkov, “Tysiachiletie: Beseda s Patriarchom Moskovskim i Vseia Rusi Pimenom,” Izvestiia, April 9 1988, 3. 38 A. Ivanko and G. Charodeev, “Liturgia V Elokhovskom,” Izvestiia, June 7 1988, 3. 39 S. Tsikora, “Tam, Gde Krestili Rus’,” Izvestiia, June 17 1988, 4. 40 Ivanko and Charodeev, Liturgia v Elokhovskom. 3. 41 Iniakin, 1988, 4. 42 A. Kositsin, “Zvoniat Kolokola Soborov,” Izvestiia, July 14 1988, 6. 43 “Mngnovenia, Mngnovenia, Mngnovenia,” Izvestiia, December 31 1988, 7. 44 V. Svirin, “Na Vatmanakh 1000 Let,” Trud, February 9 1990, 4. 45 M. Semeniuk, “Krivoe Vrastanie: Muzei i Tserkov Na Puti Kompromisnykh Reshenii,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, February 13 1991. 46 S. Atafonov, “Buldozer Na Monastyrskom Dvore,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, April 11 1990, 4. 47 P. Nikitin, ‘Vozroditsia Krasota,’ Sovetskaia Rossiia, no. 6 (January 7 1989). 6. 48 S. Strokin, “Khram i Khlam,” Izvestiia, August 5 1990, 4. 49 “Poslushniki na Solovkakh,” Trud, October 20 1990, 4. 50 N. Rogozina, “Vtoroe Rozhdenie Monastyria,” Izvestiia, October 19 1990, 7. 51 G. Yakovleva, “Vernite Muzeiu Dom,” Trud, 1987, 4. 52 A. Loktev, “Shkola Dukhovnosti,” Trud, October 25 1987, 4. 53 V. Belykh, “Vozvraschenie Ikony,” Trud, January 13 1990, 3; Yu Dmitriev, “V Sviatoi Khram s Otmychkoi,” Trud, August 16 1989, 4. 54 D. Struzhentsov, “Tserkov Protiv Muzeia Religii,” Trud, May 16 1991, 6. 55 G. Sazonov, “Otets Arsenii Protiv Arkhangela,” Trud, October 18 1991, 4. 56 “Sud’ba Valaama,” Izvestiia, September 14 1989, 3. 57 “Prechudnyi Ostrov Valaam,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, August 31 1988, 2. 58 L. Mitrokhina, ed., Khristianstvo (Moscow: Respublika, 1994). 440. 59 “Na vosstanovlenie Solovkov,” Izvestiia, April 30 1990, 4. 60 Irma Mamaladze, “Solovki: Piat Vekov i Stalinskie Desiatiletia,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, July 25 1990, 9. 61 R. Armeev, “Vozroditsia Otina Pustyn’,” Izvestiia, February 14 1990. 62 S. Tsikora, “Podzemnyi Monastyr’ Vozvraschaetsia Tserkvi,” Izvestiia, May 14 1990, 6. 63 “Tserkov i Kultura: ‘O Buduschem Nashikh Khramov’,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, March 28 1990, 2. 64 D. Likhachev, “Narod Dolzhen Imet Svoi Sviatyni,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, April 11 1990, 1–2. 65 S. Averintsev, “Doroga K Khramy,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, September 5 1990, 8. 66 S. Kiselev and V. Bogdanov, “Lavra,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, February 7 1990, 11.

112  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 67 Irma Mamaladze, “Spor O Vladimirskoi Ikone,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, February 27 1991, 15. 68 Alexander Nezhnyi, “Razrushennyi Khram,” Izvestiia, September 21 1988, 3. 69 V. Lebedev, “Konfrontatsia: Kto Razreshit Cherezvychainuiu Situatsiu, Slozhivshiiusia V Tsentre Invanovo,” Izvestiia, March 29 1989, 6. 70 A. Nashkov, “Khram Ili Pirogi,” Izvestiia, November 29 1989, 6. 71 “Peredacha Relikvii,” Izvestiia, May 28 1988, 6. 72 S. Tsikora, “Sviatyni Kievo-Pecherskoi Peredany Tserkvi,” Izvestiia, June 9 1988, 6. 73 D. Demidov, “Kariera Patriarkha,” Trud, June 9 1990, 2. 74 “Vybory Patriarcha Aleksiia,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, June 13 1990, 2. 75 G. Alimov and G. Charodeev, “Metropolit Aleksiy—Novyi Patrirakh Moskovsky i Vseia Rusi,” Izvestiia, June 8 1990, 1. 76 “Sviateishii patriarch Moskovskii i Vseia Rusi Aleksii Vtoroi: Vera bez del mertva,” Izvestiia, June 16 1990, 3. 77 G. Charodeev, Izvestiia, October 13 1989, 3. 78 V. Skvartsevich, “Otkrylsia Arkhieerskii Sobor,” Izvestiia, June 6 1990, 6. 79 V. Svartsevich, Izvestiia, September 24 1990, 3. 80 N. Titov, “Neozhidannyi Rakus,” Izvestiia, August 5 1991, 8. 81 “Vernisazh na Iskhode Zimy,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, March 14 1990, 11. 82 Viacheslav Pietzukh, “Vtoraia Zapoved,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, March 20 1991, 15. 83 Between Past and Future: Alexander Men’, Domus Patris, 2010. www.youtube.com/ watch?v=o7UexsNlQA8 84 “Pamiati Sviashennika,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, September 12 1990, 3. 85 A. Vasinskiy, “Po Doroge K Khramu,” Izvestiia, September 12 1990, 6. 86 A. Men’, “Khristianstvo,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, December 19 1990, 5. 87 V. Potapov, “‘Kak Chitat Bibliu’ O Knigakh Aleksandra Menia,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, January 23 1991, 15. 88 S. Averintsev, “Pamiati Aleksandra Menia,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, September 4 1991, 14. 89 Nikita Struve, “Messioner Dlia Plemeni Inteligentov,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, September 4 1991, 14. 90 N. Domekovskiy, “Krest Na Sovesti,” Trud, April 11 1986, 4. 91 Sergey Bychkov, Khronika Neraskrytogo Ubiistva (Moscow: Chekhovskiy Poligraphkombinat, 1996). 254–255. 92 “Spasennye Kolokola,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, July 28 1985, 4. 93 A. Brezhnev, “Monakh Nikita: Pamiati Patriarcha Pimena,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, May 9 1991, 4. 94 S. Tsikora, “Vozvraschenie Slovianskoi Relikvii,” Izvestiia, August 20 1987, 6. 95 D. Likhachev, “Esche Raz V Zaschity Velikogo Pamiatnika,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, August 28 1985, 5; “Besmennyi Pamiatnik Otechestvennoi Kultury,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, October 1 1986, 1–2. 96 E. Vereschagin and V. Vompersky, “O Maiskom Dne Slavianskoi Pismennosti i Kultury,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, May 20 1987, 2. 97 A. Nezhnyi, “Veka Istorii i Chudo Krasoty: Troitse-Sergievoi Lavre -650 Let,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, September 2 1987, 12. 98 R. Armeev, “Pokushenie Na Pamiat,” Izvestiia, April 14 1987, 3. 99 “Sokhraniat Dukhovnoe Nasledie,” Izvestiia, May 18 1988, 3. 100 F. Ivanov, “U Pamiatnikov Poiavilsia Khoziain,” Izvestiia, January 23 1989, 3. 101 V. Troianovskiy, “Khram Zovuschii K Edinstvu Rossii,” Izvestiia, January 13 1989, 2. 102 V. Pigalev, “Trevogi Kizhskogo Pogosta,” Trud, July 26 1988, 4. 103 Yu Lvov, “Khram Bez Kresta,” Trud, August 31 1990, 2. 104 V. Vostrukhin, “Bania V Krame,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, April 18 1989, 4.

Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 113 105 A. Balkovskiy, “Chto My Ostavim Potomkam?” Trud, September 8 1990, 2. 106 “I Blesk i Gordost’ i Pechal’,” Izvestiia, November 13 1988, 6. 107 F. Fomin, “Zdes V Sele Undol,” Trud, October 10 1990, 4. 108 A. Fomin, “I Vnov’ Voznesetsia Khram,” Trud, November 18 1990, 4. 109 V. Galenkin, “Khranite Rossiu,” Trud, June 16 1990, 2. 110 Felix Kuznetzov, “Okhrannaia Gramota,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, January 22 1986, 12. 111 Vasiliy Golovanov, “Vozvrashenie Klio,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, April 6 1988, 13. 112 T. Sakharova, “Glas Dukhovnosti,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, January 23 1990, 4. 113 O. Kolchadze, “Malinovy Zvon,” Trud, June 20 1991, 6; Yu Beliyaev, “Georgievsky Zvon Kremlia,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, May 11 1990, 6. 114 A. Strizhenov, “Batiushka Pokrov,” Trud, October 12 1991, 4. 115 “Nashe Rozhdestvo,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, January 7 1990, 4. 116 Mitrokhin, Khristianstvo. 233–234. 117 V. Orobev, “Kolokol’nyi Golos Sibiri,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, September 27 1989, 6. 118 V. Kovalev, “Zvuchanie Traditsii,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, August 28 1990, 4. 119 V. Kniazev, “Podnimites na Kolokolniu,” Trud, July 1, 1990, 4. 120 V. Kirillov, “O Dobre, Liubvi i Krasote,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, January 3 1991, 4. 121 V. Malukhin, “Zvuchit Pravoslavnyi Raspev,” Izvestiia, January 2 1990, 6. 122 S. Boldin, “Slavianskii Khod,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, April 9 1991, 2. 123 N. Gapaniuk, “Otnyne i Navsegda,” Trud, August 26 1990, 2. 124 Dmitiy Khrupov, Izvestiia, April 6 1991, 1. 125 V. Tolkachev, “Iskry Kostra Avvakuma,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, September 27 1989, 6. 126 S. Turanov and N. Shevtsov, “Kresty Pustozerska,” Trud, August 10 1991, 3. 127 G. Charodeev and G. Alimov, “Sviateishii Patriarch Moskovskii i Vseia Rusi Aleksii Vtoroi: Vera Bez Del Mertva,” Izvestiia, June 16 1990, 3. 128 Oleg Moroz, “Pomozhet Li Nam Bog?” Literaturnaia Gazeta, November 28 1991, 9. 129 Charodeev and Alimov, Sviateishii Patriarch Moskovskii i Vseia Rusi Aleksii Vtoroi: Vera Bez Del Mertva. 3. 130 T. Khudiakova, “Kainovy Pechat’ Snimut s Alkogolikov i Narkomanov Mediki i Tserkov,” Izvestiia, June 19 1990, 6. 131 A. Vasinskiy, “Zhertva Vechernyia,” Izvestiia, August 25 1990, 3. 132 L. Vasil’eva, “Tem, Kto Zhazhdet Dobra i Miloserdiia,” Trud, June 7 1988, 4. 133 S. Kiselev, “Svetskaia Propoved s Tserkovnogo Amvona,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, May 1 1989, 12. 134 E. Zhirkova, “Bratstvo Vrachei-Khristian,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, March 21 1990, 2. 135 I. Podolinskaia, “Den’ Miloserdiia,” Izvestiia, March 26 1990, 3. 136 A. Chepakin, “Vozvraschenie K Khramy,” Izvestiia, March 19 1991, 4. 137 “Sviaschennik V Tiurme,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, August 9 1989, 2. 138 “Veriu,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, March 20 1991, 9. 139 Ibid. 140 A. Makurin, “Doroga V Khram,” Trud, December 7 1991, 2. 141 G. Charodeev and G. Alimov, “Sviateishii Patriarch Moskovskii i Vseia Rusi Aleksii Vtoroi: Vera Bez Del Mertva,” Izvestiia, June 16 1990, 3. 142 R. Armeev, “Pochemu Ne Vykhodit ‘Khram’,” Izvestiia, October 22 1991, 3. 143 S. Kraiukhin, “Sviaschennik V Shkolnom Klasse,” Izvestiia, October 29 1989, 4. 144 V. Utts, Trud, December 6 1990, 2. 145 A. Galeev, “Aeroklub Pri Khrame,” Izvestiia, November 11 1990, 3. 146 I. Foniakov, “Kogda Rodilsia Khristos,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, May 1 1991, 15. 147 “Selskii Batiushka,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, June 26 1991, 6. 148 Trud, May 27 1989, 2.q. 149 Literaturnaia Gazeta, June 7 1989, 1. 150 “Otvet Patriarcha Glavnomy Redaktory Gazety ‘Sovetskaia Rossiia’,” Sovetskaia Rossiia, January 11 1991, 3.

114  Moscow Patriarchate and Soviet media 151 “Patriarch Aleksiy, ‘Tserkov Ne Namerena Zakliuchat Politicheskie Braki’,” Izvestiia, May 28 1991, 3. 152 “Interview Patriarkha Pimena,” Izvestiia, December 31 1988, 4. 153 A. Sabirov, “Khramy Peredaiutsia Veruiuschim,” Izvestiia, August 17 1989, 6. 154 “Slovo Aleksia II K Veruiushim Gruzii,” Izvestiia, February 22 1991, 3. 155 G. Charodeev, “Itogi Arkhiereiskogo Sobora,” Izvestiia, February 3 1990, 3. 156 “Bor’Ba Za Dushu Prikhozhan,” Izvestiia, October 23 1990, 2. 157 S. Tsikora, “Dolgaia Doroga K Khramy,” Izvestiia, June 4 1991, 8. 158 B. Kaulin, “Kolokola Pamiati,” Izvestiia, September 15 1989, 1. 159 Trud, July 7 1990, 2. 160 A. Latynina, “O Chem Moliatsia V Khrame Khrista Spasitelia?” Literaturnaia Gazeta, October 10 1990, 5. 161 “Tumenskii Iordan,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, August 29 1990, 12. 162 “Kiev: Mir i Tishina Andreevskogo Spuska,” Literaturnaia Gazeta, December 5 1990, 10. 163 Literaturnaia Gazeta, May 8 1991, 3.

5 View from the outside Russian Orthodoxy in the patriotic and Christian alternative press during perestroika

The discussion of church–state relations in the Soviet official media did not really challenge the limits of glasnost’. In fact, it was designed to mobilise public opinion and advance Gorbachev’s policy of democratisation. It focused mainly upon issues such as property return, the Russian Orthodox Church’s contribution to Soviet foreign policy and its educational and charitable activity. Its main aim was improvement of the USSR’s international image by projecting a positive image of the Church. It did not touch upon such topics as the schism between the Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA), internal problems facing the ROC and its significance in contemporary ideological discussions. The analysis of the samizdat press, being an important political phenomenon in the USSR, provides a valuable additional dimension to our understanding of the Orthodox Church’s social and political role. The theme of Russian nationalism and samizdat during the perestroika period is not a common one in recent studies. Dimitry Pospielovsky1 discussed the pre-perestroika nationalistic samizdat journals underlining the important role of Russian Orthodoxy in shaping Russian national consciousness. Robert Horvath2 studied the role of dissidents in facilitating ideas of tolerance, thus promoting the development of civil society in Russia. Kevin O’Connor,3 on the other hand, focused his attention on the interrelations between the party apparatus and nationalist intellectuals, represented by the Union of Soviet Writers, claiming that Russian nationalism was instrumental in the failure of perestroika. However, the subject of the ROC, its portrayal in the samizdat press and its influence on the ideological discussion among different patriotic and religious groups during perestroika were not investigated.

Samizdat during perestroika: New samizdat or an alternative press? The name samizdat has a Russian origin. It is traditionally attributed to the poet Nikolai Glazkov, who in the late 1940s invented the term sam-sebia-izdat (self-publishing) for self-published collections of his poems.4 It was only possible to talk about samizdat as a mass phenomenon after Khrushchev’s “thaw,” when a relative freedom of thought was achieved. Khrushchev’s secret de-Stalinisation

116  View from the outside speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956 not only influenced the appearance of the phenomenon but was also considered by the Soviet dissidents to be among the first samizdat texts.5 Samizdat production was based on the author’s typed, uncensored work with several carbon copies, which were disseminated through close friends who in turn would retype and pass on their copies to their circle of acquaintances. It transformed into an important social and political phenomenon towards the end of the 1960s. At the same time, the word samizdat began to be written with a capital letter, such as Gosizdat (official government publishing).6 The appearance of Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago in 1974 and the award of the Nobel Prize to Andrei Sakharov in 1975 brought wide international recognition to Soviet dissident literature, which facilitated the revival of samizdat activity in the mid-1970s, resulting in the production of over approximately 400 items in 1974 and 1975.7 The unofficial press during perestroika in many ways was a continuation of the traditional samizdat of the mid-1960s to the first half of the 1980s. Its resurgence was mainly connected with the ceasing of the mass persecution of publishers and disseminators of samizdat by the central authorities, following the January 1987 plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee.8 Among other issues, this plenum opened a discussion about the mass repressions during the Stalin period and demanded the abolition of restrictions on public meetings, strikes and the establishment of private cooperatives. The publishers and editors of the unofficial press emphasised its connection with the samizdat press during the 1960s and the first half of the 1980s. Many of them were themselves active contributors to the dissident press.9 The establishment of the Independent Press Club, an organisation that united publishers and editors of the unofficial press, played an important role in the distribution and circulation of the alternative press during perestroika.10 There is a terminological discussion among researchers dealing with the question of how to identify the unofficial press of the perestroika period. According to Elena Strukova, “new samizdat” is the most suitable terminology for the alternative political press, especially for the years 1987–1988, since during that period such features of the old samizdat, such as the subsequent replication of publications and the absence of royalties and copyright, were still present.11 However, other researchers (such as Olga Zaslavskaya and Hyung-Min Joo) were more inclined to use the term “alternative press,” since it accentuated the political and ideological discussion of different political groups during perestroika. A content analysis of Arkhiv Samizdata, conducted by Joo, divided its 6,607 items into four categories: literary (1%), nationalist (17%), religious (20%) and political (63%). Joo suggested that samizdat was always a political phenomenon despite its literary origins.12 Since the following chapter analyses political and ideological discussion of the patriotic and religious unofficial press during perestroika, the term “alternative press,” used by Zaslavskaya and Joo, is thus more suitable. The study of the alternative press during the perestroika period involves some methodological challenges. As Zaslavskaya rightly mentioned, there is no single consolidated information about the locations and contents of preserved samizdat materials and no standardised archival approach to processing samizdat

View from the outside  117 documents.13 This chapter is based on the collection of non-traditional periodicals, press and documentation on social movements in the Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Science in St. Petersburg, reflecting the history of political processes and social changes in the USSR and the Russian Federation for the period from 1986 to the present, and the British Library’s collection of the Soviet informal press.

Pre-perestroika period: The dialogue between religion and nationalism Discussion on the interrelations between Russian Orthodoxy and Russian nationalism in the samizdat press during the years 1985–1991 cannot be complete without a review of the Russian nationalist ideology in the 1960s and 1970s, which in many ways reflected the nationalistic-ideological and religious dispute of the perestroika period. Renewed interest in religion in general and the ROC in particular at the end of the 1960s was thought to be dictated by the need to refill the ideological vacuum, created by the virtual destruction of the premises of the official ideology in the course of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation campaign.14 According to Darrell P. Hammer, such factors as the persecution of the ROC during Khrushchev’s period and the ideological principle of “scientific communism,” which placed emphasis on the historical experience of the USSR, also contributed to the growth of Russian nationalism.15 Yanov added that only unique national feeling based on the Russian Orthodox mission of the nation could regenerate and uplift the people from the dust of alcoholism and degradation.16 The activity of such organisations as Rodina (Motherland) and Vserossiiskoe Obschestvo Okhrany Pamiatnikov Istorii i Kultuy (the All-Russian Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments) marked the revival of the Russian nationalist movement at the beginning of the 1960s. Both organisations were supported by the government and functioned as social-cultural clubs aiming to promote the study of historical monuments, ancient Russian art and history. They engaged, on a voluntary basis, in church restoration works.17 Towards the middle of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, one could pinpoint three main trends of Russian nationalistic thought: neo-Slavophile, Christian and the extremist right-wing orientation. The Neo-Slavophile trend was represented by Veche, one of the first “thick”18 samizdat journals in the USSR and the first periodical samizdat, which served as a tribune for Russian Orthodox nationalists. It was published from January 1971 to April 1974 (№s 1–10). Founder and editor of the journals №s 1–9 was a historian and a publicist, former political prisoner Vladimir Osipov. Among the regular contributors to the magazine were Moscow priest Dmitry Dudko, a former political prisoner, writer Leonid Borodin, publicists Gennady Shimanov (who also became head of the “Ultras,” extremist right-wing nationalists), Anatoly Ivanov (alias V. Skuratov—a possible author of Slovo Natsii (Word of the Nation)), Svetlana Melnikova, Mikhail Kudryavtsev and Mikhail Antonov. The magazine published works of art, articles, studies, essays, and reviews of philosophy,

118  View from the outside economics, domestic and foreign policy of Russia before the revolution and the Soviet period. According to Yanov, Veche propagated liberal values and fought against manifestations of the Black Hundredism, anti-Semitism and chauvinism.19 The Christian trend with neo-Slavophile orientation was represented by VSKhSON (All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People), established on 2 February 1964. VSKhSON was Russia’s first relatively large underground organisation in the post-Stalin period whose goal was a violent coup in the USSR. Its members were distinct from the liberal dissidents who fought for civil rights.20 The extremist right-wing orientation was represented by Genady Shimanov, a Russian Orthodox writer. He first became known as the author of Zapiski iz Krasnogo Doma (Notes from the Red House). During the pre-perestroika period, he compiled and published many samizdat collections, such as Pered Smert’iu (Before He Died), Pis’ma iz Rossii (Letters from Russia), Protiv Techenia (Against the Stream), Traktat o Liubvi (Treatise of Love), Priglashenie k Dialogu (Invitation to the Dialogue) and Mnogie Leta (Many Years).21 The following discussion will focus on the attitudes of these ideological trends to such key issues as the stance towards communist ideology and Russian Orthodoxy, the essence of Russian patriotism and church–state relations. All of these topics were of major importance in the alternative press ideological dispute of the perestroika period. The ideological approach towards Marxist–Leninist ideology in many ways shaped the position of Russian nationalistic movements towards Russian Orthodoxy. VSKhSON expressed a pronounced anti-communist position. Aleksandr Yanov regarded it as an anti-national phenomenon by its very nature.22 Moreover, VSKhSON’s programme also underlined the aggressive deterministic and totalitarian nature of the communist ideology.23 Thus, communism can be overcome only through a Christianisation of the entire social life.24 Members of a seminar hosted by Father Aleksandr Men’ in 1969 also renounced the Marxist–Leninist ideology on the pages of samizdat, accentuating its connection with religious Russian messianism, “which reduced Christianity to the instrument of national chauvinism.”25 On the other hand, Veche could not accept the fusion of Russian nationalism with liberal-ecumenical ideas, thus working out a conception of a union between Leninism and Russian Orthodoxy.26 Shimanov took this idea one step further. He valued the totalitarian nature of Marxism–Leninism, regarding it as a Russian national trait and emphasising its religious character. Communism is the Russian form of Protestantism, he argued, and its collapse means the dawn of a renewed Russian Orthodox Christianity. Thus, Marxist ideology must not be forcefully discarded; it should be transformed and outlived.27 All three ideological trends assigned a major role to Russian Orthodoxy in shaping Russia’s national character. VSKhSON drew on Nikolai Berdyaev’s idea of the innate religiosity of the Russian people, underlining the communal and brotherhood nature of the Russian Idea, embedded in the Orthodox notion of sobornost’ (collectiveness).28 Vladimir Osipov and the Veche group regarded nationalism as inconceivable in isolation from Christianity, and Russian nationalism as

View from the outside  119 responsible for the rebirth of Russian national morality and culture.29 The ROC was regarded as the main bearer of Russian traditions and customs. Veche also emphasised the unique religious nature of the Russian people, who have provided even Marxist–Leninist atheist ideology with religious traits and are turning back again to genuine religion.30 Shimanov reinforced the idea of Russia as a chosen nation preserved by God and the conception of the religious nature of Communism, in which the very scope of its activity in opposition to God is transformed into testimony for its having been chosen by God.31 The perception of an almost symbiotic connection between Russian Orthodoxy and Russian national idea by all nationalist movements in the pre-perestroika period did not lead to an equal understanding of reciprocal relations between the ROC and the Soviet state. VSKhSON was an exception. It regarded the ROC historical dependence on the state because of its inability to deal with “Westernism” using its own forces, as an “unhealthy phenomenon,” thus calling for the full independence of the Church from state authorities.32 Veche, on the other hand, asserted that only by being close allies could the ROC and the state secure their positions and flourish. Representatives of the Veche group adhered to the anti-Semitic position, by which the agents of Zionism and Satanism artificially created friction between the Church and the state with the aim of weakening both of them. According to their claim, all the negative processes which took place in the USSR resulted from the fact that the KGB had not exercised adequate surveillance over the “agents” of Zionism and Satanism and did not have the Church as its reliable and faithful ally.33 Shimanov continued to underline the religious essence of the Soviet regime by perceiving it as an unconscious tool of the Lord destined to save Russia by means of its “orthodoxification”: “Only the Soviet regime, having adopted Russian Orthodoxy, is able to begin the great transformation of the world.”34 He believed in the marriage of Christianity and communism, which will produce a sort of theocracy.35 This close alliance between the ROC and the Soviet state was salient during the pre-perestroika Russian nationalist revival. Leninism was regarded as a purely Russian phenomenon, as opposed to the liberal western ecumenism, and the ROC epitomised the essence of the Russian national character, underlining such mutual interests as anti-western influence and USSR’s imperial aspirations. Moreover, Robert Horvath underlined an important debate which was initiated in unofficial Orthodox circles during the beginning of the 1970s. It dealt with the question of whether the Orthodox revival should occur under the signs of Universalist Christianity or Russian patriotism.36 This dispute between the followers of Father Men’, who called for repentance and the renunciation of national messianism, and the Veche group, which offered nationalist responses, in many ways anticipated the discussion in the alternative press during perestroika.

Russian Orthodoxy and nationalism during perestroika On the eve of perestroika, the Soviet Union was a heavily centralised multinational empire in which political power was concentrated largely in the hands of ethnic

120  View from the outside Russians, who constituted fifty-two per cent of the Soviet population according to the 1979 census.37 The Communist Party was a Russian-dominated body which emphasised the primacy of the Russian language while repressing nationalist “deviations” among non-Russians.38 Yet despite this fact, according to O’Connor, the nationalistically oriented intelligentsia distanced itself from the Soviet regime following Gorbachev’s decision to cultivate the support of liberal intelligentsia for the promotion of glasnost’ and perestroika.39 Economic and social instability, uncertainty about the future, the need for daily survival, an increase in the degree of information concerning the historical role of the ROC and a discrediting of the materialistic world view instigated renewed popular interest in religion in general and Russian Orthodoxy in particular.40 Similarly, to the most nationalistic groups during the 1960s and 1970s, the Russian national movement dissociated itself from the communist ideology, while preserving the same common goals such as the revival of Russian national and cultural traditions and education towards respect of Russian national symbolism and history.41 A directory of Russian informal movements and groups, published in 1990, was the first official reference book on the patriotic groups during perestroika. It distinguished between two major trends in the Russian patriotic movement: radical informal groups and the all-Russian patriotic movement. Radical informal groups, which regarded communist ideology and the Bolsheviks as a destructive and anti-national force, fought for the revival of Russian statehood and the resurgence of Russian Orthodoxy as a basis for the nation’s spiritual life. The strong anti-western and anti-Semitic character of those groups was manifested by their call for the exposure of the Judeo-Masonic plot as the basis for the restoration of national and social justice. The all-Russian patriotic movement advocated the revival of the Russian “imperial idea” as a part of Russian statehood within the borders of the USSR, or at least the RSFSR, emphasising the priority of the Russian nation over other nations inhabiting Russian territory. Russian Orthodoxy was seen as an important element of spiritual life, but equal to other ideological principles. It called for the restoration of agriculture and national culture on the basis of Russian traditional and Orthodox values.42 An analysis of the informal press during perestroika revealed two additional major trends, namely Christian and monarchist movements. Religious parties were established in the later stages of perestroika, during the years 1989–1990, based on religious-philosophical seminars and informal publications, which were in opposition both to the ROC and to the state authorities. The establishment of Christian democratic parties was facilitated by the new Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations (October 1990) and the growing need of believers and nationalistic intelligentsia to defend their interests by political means. However, they failed to become the mouthpiece of the broad masses of believers.43 This chapter analyses a wide range of informal press belonging to four categories of patriotic groups: radical informal groups, the all-Russian patriotic movement, monarchist groups and Christian democratic groups. The first category to be examined is radical groups, which propagated anti-Semitic and imperial ideology.

View from the outside 121 Pravoslavnyi Natsional’no Patrioticheskii Front-Pamiat’ (Orthodox National Patriotic Front-Memory) should not be confused with the well-known organisation Pamiat’ (Memory), which generated a great deal of interest in the West. Pamiat’ underwent many schisms from its establishment in 1988 by Vladimir Vasiel’ev. Pravoslavnyi Natsional’no Patrioticheskii Front-Pamiat’ split from the Filimonov-Kvartalov group at the beginning of 1990. Led by A. Kulakov and S. Vorotyntsov, it called on the one hand for the restoration of the monarchy in Russia, and on the other, claimed to continue Stalin’s anti-Zionist policy. The organisation amounted to around 70–80 members. In February 1990, it initiated the alliance of several national-patriotic organisations into Narodno-Pravoslavnoe Dvizhenie (The People’s Orthodox Movement).44 Souiz Venedov (Venedy Union) established by K.V. Sidaryk, a former member of the National Front Pamiat’, started the Leningrad branch, during the spring of 1990, which aimed to unify all Venedy (true Orthodox Christians, communists who were disappointed with Marxism–Leninism, officers of the KGB, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Russian emigrants). Its main goal was fighting for the historical borders of the Russian Empire.45 Due to its radical imperialistic ideology, the Leningrad City Council denied its registration on 5 July 1990, only a few months following its foundation. The organisation published its own newspaper, Rodnye Prostory (Dear Land). Russkaia Partia (Russian Party) also propagated anti-Semitic ideas. Its official newspaper, Russkie Vedomosti (The Russian Herald), was named after a newspaper published in Moscow from 1863 to 1918 and supported by a body of liberal professors. Despite the claim of the Russian Party’s leader and the chief editor of the newspaper, Viktor Korchagin, that his newspaper continued the ideology of the biggest Russian newspaper, closed by the Bolsheviks, it negated the liberal ideological line of its predecessor, propagating instead strong anti-liberal and anti-Semitic views. Soiuz Khristianskogo Vozrozhdenia (Union of the Christian Revival) established in 1990, unlike Souiz Venedov, aimed to preserve the unity of the great multinational Russian republic (RSFSR). Its newspaper Zemschina (The Land) argued for the creation of all-Russian Zemskii Sobor (Land Council) and expressed quite a few anti-Semitic ideas. The All-Russian Patriotic Movement, composed of different nationalistic groups ranging from radical nationalistic ideology to the more liberal views, presented the second category of the informal press. All groups in this classification adhered to the idea of the ROC independence from the state authorities and were against the disintegration of the USSR. Natsional’no Democraticheskaia Partia (National Democratic Party) was established on 3 September 1989. One of its leaders, Evgenii Krylov, was formerly one of the leaders of the faction of constitutional democrats of the Leningrad Democratic Union. Ideologically, this organisation belonged to the radical fringe of the national-patriotic movement. In October 1990, in alliance with the Polish National Party, it signed an anti-Semitic document titled “Declaration on the freedom of peoples.” On 27 February 1991, it participated in the conference, “For the great unified and indivisible Russia.”46 However, only one issue of its first newspaper, Svobodnaia Rossia (Free Russia), was printed. The organisation also

122  View from the outside published another newspaper, Osvobozhdenie (Freedom). Natsional’nyi Patrioticheskii Front-Pamiat’ (National-Patriotic Front Pamiat’—Memory), the original, well-known organisation, was established by Vladimir Vasil’iev on 31 May 1988. Its original name was “The Patriotic Association Pamiat’.” From 1989, it adhered to monarchic ideology and published the newspaper, Pamiat’. Khristianskii Patrioticheskii Soiuz (Christian Patriotic Union) was established by Osipov, Lyzov, Pashin and Zalesskii on 17 December 1988, on the basis of an initiative group “For the spiritual and biological salvation of the people,” and it demanded that all forms of atheistic propaganda sponsored by the state should be stopped and the ROC granted the status of juridical entity. The union was against the disintegration of the USSR.47 It published the journal Zemlia (Land). The Educational Society of Spiritual Rebirth from Irkutsk, which published the newspaper titled Literaturnyi Irkutsk (Literary Irkutsk) during the years 1988– 1993, was among the first organisations of a pronounced Orthodox nature and, in fact, had no equal at that time. The newspaper’s compiler and chief editor, Valentina Sidorenko, poet and writer, created in Irkutsk an educational society of spiritual rebirth with lectures on religious, historical and literary subjects. The newspaper published works of Russian religious thinkers, hitherto unknown to Soviet readers and the works of contemporary authors of a patriotic nature. Over the years, the newspaper almanac published on its pages poems, short stories and articles by writers such as A. Zverev, Anatolii Shastin, Vladimir Sokolov (poet), Vasilii Zabello, Nadezhda Tenditnik, V.A. Nefedov, Anatolii Baiborodin and V. Ginkul. Valentin Rasputin, a prominent Soviet ruralist writer from the Irkutsk region, who emphasised the importance of traditional ways of life, addressing questions of ethics and Russia’s spiritual revival, published twelve essays in Literaturnyi Irkutsk. Among them were such essays as “From the depths of the depths,” about the importance of Orthodoxy for the Russian people, “Dipped afar,” on Sergius of Radonezh and other essays, which continued the tradition of Russian social thought in the late ninetieth and early twentieth century.48 The following organisations in the All-Russian Patriotic Movement propagated more liberal views: the Russian Patriotic Movement Otechestvo (Motherland) established on 31 March 1990, during the conference of all patriotic groups of Leningrad, united members of Pamiat’, the cultural union Vitiaz’, and such organisations as Patriot and the Sergei Esenin club. Otechestvo published the journal Veche, which like its pre-perestroika predecessor propagated the liberal economic and cultural ideas of Petr Stolypin, who played a major role in the economic and cultural progress of Tsarist Russia as well as the revival of the Russian national consciousness.49 Leningradskii Muzhskoi Club (Leningrad Men’s Club), newspaper, Russkoe Osvoboditel’noe Dvizhenie (Russian Liberation Movement), established on 18 November 1990, aimed to revive the Russian original sense of manhood, patriarchal society and the establishment of national and economic structures, which will correlate with Russian national identity. Monarchic organisations first appeared during the second half of perestroika, following the millennium celebrations. They advocated the idea that the true regeneration of Russia was possible only through national repentance, which

View from the outside 123 meant the restoration of the true Orthodox monarchy. Mezhdunarodnyi Forum (An International Forum), during the years 1988–1990, published the monthly samizdat journal Nevskii Dukhovnyi Vestnik (Nevskii Spiritual Herald) with an Orthodox-monarchic ideological orientation. Peterburgskii Monarkhicheskii Tsentr (St. Petersburg Monarchic Centre) was founded in 1990 and registered by the Leningrad City Council on 7 December 1990. Its newspaper Monarkhist (Monarchist) was issued once a month from 1991 and advocated the importance of the constitutional monarchy, claiming that Grand Duke Vladimir Kirrilovich Romanov was the only legitimate heir to the Romanov dynasty.50 Rossiiskii Imperskii Soiuz-Orden (Russian Imperial Union-Order or RIU-O), which published the newspaper Dvukhglavyi Orel (Two-headed Eagle), was a Russian Orthodox-monarchic organisation established in Paris in 1929. Since 1990, the RIU-O took a course of returning to Russia, which caused many misunderstandings in exile. Moscow Russian People’s Militia led by Nikolai Lukyanov was established in the spring of 1990. In January 1991, the first Moscow Department was reorganised into the Department of the Moscow Vladimirovskaia RIU-O branch, headed by Lukyanov himself. The ideological foundation of RIU-O was based on a purely spiritual and religious foundation and on the millennial experience of the Russian Orthodox state. RIU-O called for the restoration of the autocratic monarchy in Russia, grounded on the Orthodox values. The Christian Democratic Movement appeared in 1989 and, as mentioned above, failed to achieve considerable support, due to its liberal-ecumenical world outlook and the cooperation with the West. Many of its members were committed first and foremost to the ideas of traditionalism, monarchism or Russian Orthodox enlightened patriotism.51 Khristianskii Informatsionnyi Tsentr (Christian Information Centre) was established in Moscow in May 1989. From 15 June 1989, the organisation published the journal Khristianskii Informatsionnyi Vestnik (Christian Informational Herald) on the basis of a literary and philosophical journal, Vybor (Choice). The editorial board of the journal was composed of a representative from the Orthodox laity and was governed by the following principles: the rejection of party-political bias opposed to the Orthodox faith and adherence to true freedom of consciousness. The promotion of the spiritual revival of Russia was understood as a moral improvement of society as a whole.52 Rossiiskoe Khristianskoe Democraticheskoe Dvizhenie (Russian Christian Democratic Movement—RKhDD), which published the newspaper Put’ (The Way), was established on 9 April 1990 and became the most influential of the Christian parties and political movements during perestroika. RKhDD aimed to unite Orthodox Christians in the Russian Federation. It was initiated by the editors of Vybor (Choice), Viktor Vladimirovich Aksiuchits and Gleb Aleksandrovich Annischenko together with the followers of Gleb Yakunin. The RKhDD founders believed that, since Tsarist Russia had no party based on Christian ideology, it was one of the major factors which caused the catastrophe of 1917. There were notable ideological differences among the leaders of the party. Priest Gleb Yakunin was a supporter of the “Democratic Russia” and an opponent of the social-patriotic bloc. Another member of the RKhDD duma, the writer Vladimir Karpets, was known

124  View from the outside Table 5.1  Church–state issues in selected Soviet alternative press, 1985–1991. Issues Ideological issues Church–state relations Church and society Reforms within the Moscow Patriarchate Historical memory ROC and ROCA National question in the USSR

No. of articles 77 64 19 13 8 7 6

Notes: The following unofficial newspapers and journals were examined: Rodnye Prostory, Russkie Vedomosti, Zemschina, Osvobozhdenie, Pamiat’, Zemlia, Literaturnyi Irkutsk, Veche, Russkoe Osvoboditel’noe Dvizhenie, Nevskii Dukhovnyi Vestnik, Monarkhist, Dvukhglavyi Orel, Volia Rossii, Khristianskii Informatsionnyi Vestnik, Put’, Referendum and Russkii Kurier.

as an active monarchist. Leaders of the party did not always agree on important ideological issues. Viktor Aksiuchits believed that the most important goal was political power; he wanted to see his party as a massive centrist movement. Gleb Anischenko, on the other hand, propagated the goal of protecting social life from anarchy and lawlessness, while Viacheslav Polosin saw the main aim of the organisation in the protection of Christian values.53 This chapter will also examine liberal-independent samizdat journals. Referendum—Zhurnal nezavisimykh mnenii (Referendum—Journal of independent opinions) was published from 1987 to 1990. Among its authors were well-known writers and public figures of the perestroika period such as Larisa Lisytkina and Grigorii Edelshtein. The journal had a liberal-democratic orientation. It was published twice a month and reached a circulation of 5,000 copies. In addition, Russkii Kurier (Russian Courier) was a weekly newspaper published in Russia during the years 1990–1992 by Aleksandr Glezer, a Russian poet, publisher and collector of unofficial Russian art. The importance of Russian Orthodoxy in the political and ideological discussion in the pages of the Soviet alternative press during perestroika continued the ideological dispute in the samizdat during the pre-perestroika period. A comparison of a similar discussion in the Soviet official media, analysed in the previous chapter, revealed that the alternative media indeed touched upon some key issues such as Russian national self-identification, the need for perestroika within the Moscow Patriarchate and its interrelation with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, which were ignored by the official press. The following Table 5.1 summarises the weight of those issues in the overall debate of the abovementioned newspapers and journals.

Russian Orthodoxy in the alternative press: Ideological discussion Ideological issues were indeed at the centre of debate on the pages of the alternative press during perestroika and not surprisingly so. Despite the call for glasnost’,

View from the outside  125 the Soviet official press failed to produce a meaningful open dialogue on this topic being subjected to interests and goals dictated by state authorities. An ideological discussion in the alternative press dealt with three main issues. The first issue confronted the definition of Russian national identity and the nature of Russian patriotism. The second one emphasised a discussion centred on the question of who was responsible for the crises, which led to the destruction of Russian national identity. Finally, the question of what possible solutions could lead to the regeneration of the Russian nation was raised consistently.

Russian national identity Surprisingly, very few articles dealt directly with the nature of Russian national identity. The Russian ethos was defined by cultural components, such as the unique historical mission of the Russian nation and Russian nationally oriented statehood.54 Almost all patriotic groups regarded Russian culture as an inseparable part of Russian Orthodoxy and Russian patriotism.55 Put’ used Igor Shafarevich’s definition of patriotism as the self-preservation instinct of national individuality, described as the force behind the unity of people, their language, national culture, sense of tradition and religion.56 A true Russian patriot had to have an imperial consciousness based on the idea of Russia, the Third Rome. Thus, Russian patriotism could never be liberal.57 Only the radical Russian Party and Soiuz Venedov regarded the Russian national idea as being completely detached from Russian Orthodoxy. Christianity, which preaches the idea of God’s chosen people of Israel, was regarded as a religion of slaves that stemmed from Judaism. The revival of Russian national faith was associated with the forces of nature.58 Russian Christian spirituality was also closely connected with the idea of Russian Orthodox autocracy (samoderzhavie), which was regarded as the highest moral form of rule. The meaning of samoderzhavie was not only defined by the absolute rule of the Tsar, it rather underlined his independence from other state authorities and parties. The idea of monarch was always formulated in the masculine to underline its statue and importance. The Tsar could not be obeyed to hear the voice of people, simply because he was obeyed to hear only God. However, the quality of the monarchic rule in Russia very much depended on the moral level of Russian society.59 National identity and the moral level of Russian society were built from the continuity of cultural experience. Crisis appeared following the disintegration of traditional spiritual and cultural environment.

Anti-Semitism The answer to the question of who is responsible for the destruction of Russian national identity and its replacement with a new type of collective consciousness stemmed from the identification of the Russian national identity. The imperial nature of the Russian national spirit inevitably pointed to the most important perceived archenemy, the Jews. Informal groups of the perestroika period developed the idea propagated by Veche, which stated that agents of Zionism and Satanism

126  View from the outside interfered in church–state relations. Anti-Semitic articles constituted a very large portion of the ideological discussion (25 out of 77 articles dealt with this subject). Most of the anti-Semitic material was published in Zemschina. Jews were held responsible for the October Revolution. The murder of Tsar Nikolai II and his family was considered a ritual murder, perpetrated by the Jews. Moreover, Jews were regarded as those who plotted with the democrats to destroy the Russian national movement. The perceived responsibility of the Jews for the October Revolution was explained by the innate national hatred of the Russian nation based on the belief that the Jews killed Jesus because of envy, since they believed he was the real Messiah. Moreover, the use of blood for sacrifice was in a way sacrilege by the Jews over the sacred sacrifices of the Orthodox Church.60 The enslavement of the Russian people began in 1917 and continued during perestroika. It was mentioned that the Russian nation lost 6 million people during this period, with a clear allusion to the number of Jewish losses during the Holocaust.61 The murder of Tsar Nikolai II was also displayed as part of the 1917 blood bath. It was portrayed as a ritual murder since clear evidence was found on the wall of the Ipatiev’s house in Ekaterinburg, where the Tsar and his family were murdered. It was an inscription which was claimed to be part of a Kabbalistic ritual used to destroy the future of the Russian nation.62 Much importance was attached to the canonisation of the Romanov Family tortured by the Jews. This was regarded as a first attack of the Church in the fight against its arch adversary, the Jewish nation.63 The radical alternative press also labelled the murder of Father Men’ as an anti-Christian ritual murder.64 It was portrayed as an important link in the “yellow-democratic terror chain.” The Jews regarded Men’ as an arch-traitor, since he converted many Jews to Christianity. Thus, according to the radical patriotic groups, the extreme wing of Zionism and not Pamiat’ members or the KGB were responsible for Men’s murder.65 The putsch against Gorbachev was also regarded as a Jewish conspiracy. The fact that it was carried out on 19 August, the day of the Transfiguration, indicated that satanic Zionists wanted to spoil this sacred holiday.66 Moreover, national-patriotic groups did not welcome the head of the ROC, Patriarch Aleksii II, installed in June 1990. The radicals criticised him for his liberal views, such as his tolerant stand towards the celebrations of Hanukkah near the Kremlin’s walls, while more moderate groups criticised him for his collaboration with the state authorities, which they regarded as being no different from his predecessor, Patriarch Pimen. Aleskii’s silent approval of those celebrations was regarded as a desecration of Orthodox values. The Patriarch’s message to the Jewish people, in which he called them the “chosen people” and accused Russian patriotic organisations of chauvinism, was regarded as an open betrayal of the Russian nation.67 Not only were Jews regarded as the embodiment of the antiChrist and part of the conspiracy against the Russian nation, but cosmopolitans and western-liberals also plotted together with the Jews to destroy the Church and any other form of national Christian statehood.

View from the outside  127

Anti-ecumenism All national-patriotic groups, except Christian democrats, regarded ecumenism as an enemy of the Russian national idea. Thirteen articles in 1991, mostly in the radical newspapers, such as Rodnye Prostory, Pamiat’ and Volia Rossii, were devoted to the blame of ecumenical forces for the crisis, which befell the Russian nation. The Russian patriotic alternative press claimed that ecumenism, especially when propagated by the ruling authorities, was much more dangerous than communist ideology, since it led to the unification of all nations under the leadership of Judaism.68 The alleged symbiotic connection between Judaism and Freemasonry was also emphasised. A discussion concerning the historic origins of the Masonic movement maintained that its activities were centred on the building of the Solomon shrine, meaning the shrine of all humanity.69 Only Russian Orthodoxy could withstand the ecumenical tendencies which aimed to destroy the Church and any form of national Christian statehood. However, the ROC hierarchy was blamed for supporting ecumenical tendencies within the Church. Ecumenical attempts of the Moscow Patriarchate, such as the promise of Metropolitan Pitirim, head of the Publishing Department, to publish the Koran for the Muslim population of the USSR, at a time when there was a great shortage of Orthodox literature, were sharply scrutinised. It was emphasised that Zionist and Masonic forces were behind such attempts.70 Aleksii II was accused of backing ecumenical bishops, who insulted Orthodox believers and praised Catholicism, and those who supported ecumenical visits of their parishioners to the Lutheran community in Western Germany, which in return financed the establishment of an ecumenical centre in the Yosifo-Volotskii Monastery in Volokolamsk.71 There were complaints, voiced by a representative of the clergy, against the “usage” of the ROC by the Communist Party’s Department of Foreign Affairs, which organised tourist visits to monasteries such as Pechersk Monastery in Pskov, thus indicating a possible schism within the Church. Those monks who cooperated with the authorities were labelled “heretics in Orthodox attire.” Moreover, theological schools of the Moscow Patriarchate and the department for the External Church Relations were held responsible for educating ecumenical clergy. Same accusations were addressed to Patriarch Aleksii II, who was appointed by the Communist Party and ecumenical bishops.72 The inner regeneration of the ROC and the strengthening of the Russian state should be advanced by the all-Russian canonisation of martyrs.73 Ecumenical tendencies prevented the identification of Russians as a united and sovereign nation with a unique collective memory and culture.

Anti-communism Marxist–Leninist ideology was regarded as another evil responsible for the disintegration of the Russian national identity. The vast majority of the patriotic groups recognised Marxism–Leninism as a utopian theory which caused the crisis. Discussion on the negative influence of the anti-communist ideology was relatively limited

128  View from the outside (eight articles) in comparison with anti-Semitic and anti-ecumenical issues, probably since most anti-communist resolutions appeared in the programmes of Russian patriotic groups. For instance, the programme of the Russian National Democratic Party suggested proclaiming the October Revolution as an illegal seizure of power. It was claimed that Lenin’s remains should be removed from the Mausoleum, burying them according to Lenin’s own wish, to be near his mother.74 Communist Party officials were accused of collaborating with western-oriented liberals, who grew more apologetic about the “red terror” and negative towards Solzhenitsyn,75 since their hatred of the patriots, who condemned this terror, was larger than their hostility towards “the terror” and its perpetrators.76 The new Russian democratic leaders (Boris Yeltsin and Aleksandr Yakovlev) were blamed for aligning with the West in the attempt to rob Russian people of their natural resources.77 Marxism–Leninism was pictured as not simply an atheist ideology, but as an anti-Christian religion with its own ideals and rituals, which aimed to build an anti-Christian society.78 Lenin’s true attitude towards religion, based on his uncensored private correspondence, was unveiled. He regarded any religious idea as the worst possible sin, which could be equalled to necrophilia. He believed that in the future socialist society there would be no place for religion and the Church, since the Christian world outlook is opposed to the communist morale.79 Only after the disintegration of the USSR did Christian democrats pinpoint the closeness between the radical Russian patriotic ideology and Communism. An attempt to form a union of the patriotic movements, titled Narodnoe Sobranie (People’s Council), suffered from many inner ideological disagreements. Gleb Annischenko, leader of the RKhDD, was not even allowed to make a statement in one of the Council’s rare meetings. In his speech, printed in the article, Annischenko warned against the parasitising nature of the communist ideology, which adapted itself perfectly to patriotic ideology, thus destroying the patriotic camp as a political force.80 Similarities between the communist regime and the traditional monarchic essence of Russian society were also noted. It explained the reason for its survival in the USSR.81

Rebuilding Russian national identity Ideological discussion in the alternative press offered several solutions for the national identity crisis; almost all were closely related to Russian Orthodoxy. Christian democrats and the all-Russian patriotic movement supported solutions, based on the idea of Russian religious-national regeneration, involved regeneration of Orthodox culture and statehood. Monarchist groups saw as the only possible solution for the crisis, the instalment of Russian Orthodox autocracy (samoderzhavie) as an embodiment of the Russian people’s complete connection with their traditional, social and spiritual values. The revival of Russia, based on the purely Russian traditions of a multilayered economy, national philosophy and Russian Orthodoxy, was closely linked with the reconstruction of national historical memory. Radical nationalistic groups, such as the Republican People’s Party of Russia, mainly sustained this idea.

View from the outside  129 The imperial solution, represented by the Eurasian idea of a “Conservative Revolution,” involved the new Christianisation of Russia, through repentance, and then its dissemination to Europe. It was propagated by a small group of radical nationalists led by Aleksandr Dugin, a Russian political activist and writer known for his neo-Eurasian theory which depicted Russia as the only force able to unite Europe and Asia. The radial Russian Party, which regarded Russian Orthodoxy and Christianity as a branch of Judaism, offered a non-religious solution for the regeneration of Russian national consciousness based on Russian heathen culture and tradition. Overall, ideological discussion in the pages of the alternative press during perestroika was identified by imperial and anti-liberal tendencies closely interrelated with Russian Orthodoxy. The path towards the regeneration of Russian national identity was defined in negative terms by aiming to punish those responsible for its destruction, instead of recognising national responsibility for one’s own history, culture and spiritual heritage. This fact explained the unpopularity of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, which openly called for repentance as a basis of national regeneration. Ideological discussion inevitably shaped the approach to other issues discussed in this chapter such as church-state relations, the social role of the ROC, its relations with the ROCA and the reforms within the Moscow Patriarchate.

Church–state relations As mentioned above, nationally oriented statehood was an integral part of Russian national identity. The alternative press underlined the fact that a real union between secular and spiritual power existed only, while Russian rulers supported the Russian Orthodox faith and the Church.82 Since this was not the case during the Soviet period, discussion of church–state relations circulated around the issues of state control over the Church and the Moscow Patriarchate’s tight collaboration with the atheistic state. This criticism originated mainly in Christian democratic circles and the liberal wing of the Moscow Patriarchate. The discussion emphasised total submission of the ROC hierarchy to state power. The Moscow Patriarchate hierarchy was accused of flattery and adulation addressed to Gorbachev. An example of such behaviour was the speech of the Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod, Aleksii, who later became Patriarch Aleskii II, in the Congress of People’s Deputies of the USSR in 1989. Aleksii thanked Mikhail Gorbachev for his address, though it had no reference to the ROC or believers. He then proceeded to compliment perestroika and the processes of democratisation. Any questions concerning the status of the ROC and the rights of believers were absent from his speech. To the question of a journalist from Argumenty i Fakty (Arguments and Facts), regarding what he would like to hear from the deputies, Metropolitan Aleksii replied that all issues concerning religious associations and the Church should not be discussed during the Congress.83 Close church–state collaboration was also demonstrated by the ROC compliance with the USSR’s foreign policy, which opposed western religious influence

130  View from the outside in the USSR. According to the proclaimed state policy, the Moscow Patriarchate ensured its own supply of the Bible and there was no need for any donations from the West. In reality, the cost of the Bible in the USSR was fifteen to twenty times higher than any book printed in the state typography. According to Grigorii Bigel, if the Bible had have been distributed proportionally to the number of parishioners, the estimated number of needed copies would be no less than 1.5 million. The real situation was such that even students of theological academies could not afford to buy the Bible.84 The Church was portrayed as a continuation of a totalitarian state directed not by the Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) but by the KGB ideological department. The newly elected Patriarch was unlikely to change the essence of church– state relations. Patriarch Aleksii II, from the beginning of his career, closely collaborated with the CRA. According to Father Grigorii Edelshtein, a Christian dissident, member of the Moscow Helsinki Group and a close friend of Aleksandr Men’, Aleksii was never really concerned with the needs of believers. The incident, which he witnessed personally, which took place while Metropolitan Aleksii served as a managing director of the Moscow Patriarchate Affairs, underlined this fact. Parishioners from villages in the Vologda region went to Moscow to seek a blessing from the Metropolitan, while other state authorities refused to deal with their request to return the partially destroyed church of Georgii the Victorious. Believers were not even allowed to enter the gates of the Metropolitan’s residence in Chistyi Pereulok. While he accidentally appeared on the staircase about to enter the car, women shouted for blessing. Metropolitan Aleksii entered the car without even glancing at them.85 This incident clearly depicted the distance between the Moscow Patriarchate’s hierarchy and the believers. State authorities continued pre-perestroika policy towards the Church. Believers were expected to reconstruct the returned property at their own expense. This fact contradicted the positive picture, portrayed by the official press, where property return to believers was represented as one of the big achievements of glasnost’. Taxation of the ROC clergy was also criticised. Clergyman with a salary of 400 roubles per month paid a tax of 180 roubles and 600 roubles salary was taxed by almost 50% (280 roubles).86 Members of the initiative group (Church and Perestroika), clergymen, Gleb Yakunin, Nikolai Gainov, Aleksandr Borisov, Oleg Steniaev, and Orthodox laymen, Aleksei Zaleskii and Viktor Popov, issued an appeal on 5 May 1989 to the USSR people’s deputies claiming that state taxation of clergymen and employees of religious organisations was an open discrimination of believers.87 Government control over religious organisations continued even after the abolishment of the RSFSR Council for Religious Affairs in the autumn of 1990. Following its disintegration, People’s Deputies were assigned the responsibility for connection with religious organisations. According to Aleksandr Schipkov, the majority of them were not deputies but government officials, who in the past were either plenipotentiaries or had other experience of working with religious organisations.88

View from the outside 131

Property return The unwillingness of the authorities to implement the principles of glasnost’ and democratisation in church–state relations was especially evident in the sphere of property return. It was widely discussed in the pages of the alternative press and suppressed by the official press. Zoia Likhonravaia, a member of the Petrodvorets region’s religious community, related the difficulties connected with the return of the Archangel Mikhail church to the local religious community. We could not receive a written answer from the authorities for several years. They only told us that there is no possibility to provide the building. We felt that our persistence is not welcomed by the authorities, as though we are asking for something we were not allowed to have.89 This incident clearly demonstrated the abuse of believers’ rights, which were amply advertised by the state authorities, especially after the millennium celebrations. The anti-democratic nature of the Soviet authorities in the sphere of property return was evident even when the appeal came from prominent intellectuals. During the summer of 1990, professors Lev Gumelev and Steblin-Kamenskii from St. Petersburg State University, founders of the university dvatsatka,90 appealed for the return of the old university church which opened in 1819. In 1978, the church was converted to the museum of university history. From August 1988, events organised by the Russian Orthodox Culture society took place inside this museum. Father Vladimir consecrated the main porch of the church on 28 September 1989. Following this event, the museum director forbade the usage of the venue for the purpose of catechisation. Despite continuous petitions from the members of the university religious society, authorities actively impeded the return of the church, voting instead for its conversion to an international business centre.91 Social organisations, such as the Public Reception for the Assistance to Christians (PRAC), headed by Aleksey Zalesskii, appealed to the highest authorities, calling to review the official policy of property return. PRAC forwarded a plea to the Congress of People’s Deputies, signed by thousands of Soviet citizens, among which were prominent figures, known for both their academic and public work, such as Sergei Averintsev (philosopher, writer and historian, a specialist in Christian history) and Igor Shafarevich (famous mathematician, political writer and important dissident figure). The petition demanded the adoption of a legislative act, “All the places of worship to the Church.” According to the request, the return of religious property to the Church, unlawfully taken away from the people, will be of great political importance and have a huge impact on the moral health of the people.92 It was claimed that the return of all churches to believers would not only prove the reality of perestroika, but would save Marxist–Leninist ideology from total discredit.93

132  View from the outside The return of land, churches, monasteries and other valuables to the ROC was also one of the main issues listed in an open letter addressed by the members of the Moscow City Council Committee on Freedom of Consciousness, Religion and Charity to Mikhail Gorbachev, Mikhail Lukianov and Boris Yeltsin. It provided statistics comparing the ROC property before the revolution and at the beginning of perestroika. At the beginning of 1917, the ROC possessed four theological academies, 58 seminaries, 1,250 monasteries, 55,173 Orthodox churches and 25,000 chapels, while in 1986, only two theological academies, four seminaries, 18 monasteries and 6,794 Orthodox dioceses were left. Those who signed the petition claimed that the spiritual, moral and economic degradation of the Russian nation was a direct result of the Soviet anti-religious policy.94 This open letter, published almost in full in Literaturny Irkutsk, was not widely printed in the alternative press and was almost totally ignored by the official one and thus did not generate extensive public debate on the issue.

Religion and politics The involvement of believers and the Russian Orthodox clergy in politics could improve the spiritual and moral condition of the Russian nation and serve as a reliable social shield against totalitarianism. However, Russian patriotic groups could not reach an agreement on this issue. Most patriotic groups were against the involvement of the ROC bishops in politics. One could find those who disapproved of it both among Christian democrats and among radical Russian nationalists. Representatives of the more liberal wing based their argumentation of the decree from 20 January 1918, which claimed that the church is separated from the state; therefore, church officials could not be involved in state politics.95 On the other hand, radical nationalists claimed that religion and politics should not be interrelated since the Church should remain the basis of the Christian world outlook.96 Moreover, they maintained that Orthodox Christianity is incompatible with earthly life. Even the term “social Christianity” is not relevant to Orthodoxy, since it aims for the merging of each human soul with Christ. Thus, there is no need for religious political parties.97 Those who supported the participation of clergy in political life indicated that the all-Russian Local Council permitted bishops to take part in politics only if they represented their own interests and not those of the ROC. This was especially relevant when a certain bishop or clergyman was supported by the people and granted the authority to lead a political or social movement.98 Moreover, the participation of local clergy in the political and social life of their village was thought to have a very positive impact on Russian society as a whole.

Reforms in legislation It was understood by all parties involved in the debate on the dynamics of church– state relations that no real improvement would be possible without changing the ROC legal status. Participants of the conference, “Religious Politics—Problems

View from the outside 133 and Perspectives,” which took place in October 1989, argued for the introduction of severe changes to the Law on Religious Cults for several reasons. Firstly, those alterations were inevitable, since Stalin’s legislation on religious cults from 1929 was still in force. Secondly, the USSR’s constitution did not provide real equality of believers and atheists, thus making it almost impossible to introduce new legislation on the freedom of consciousness, which would comply with international norms and believers’ convictions. Finally, religious societies did not have free access to the mass media and were denied the status of juridical entity.99 The Holy Synod of the ROC called for the formation of a new law, which would stop the direct intervention of the state in the inner affairs of the ROC.100 However, the introduction of the new Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations in October 1990 aroused a new wave of criticism coming from the Christian democrats, who preferred its RSFSR edition. It was claimed that the USSR law in fact restored the Stalinist conception of an agency responsible for religious affairs with executive-distributive power and not a consultative one as the RSFSR law suggested.101 Overall, discussion of church–state relations in the pages of the alternative press presented an upside-down mirror image of the same debate in the official Soviet press. While the latter aimed to underline the positive change in church–state relations, the former did everything to show that this change in fact did not take place and the totalitarian pre-perestroika policy towards the ROC continued despite the official proclamations. Furthermore, the Moscow Patriarchate was openly accused of collaboration with state authorities, thus preventing essential improvements in church–state relations.

The ROC social role Soviet dissidents highlighted the involvement of the ROC in the social life of the Soviet people as the most important activity of the Moscow Patriarchate, long before perestroika. Aleksandr Galich, in an interview with a Swedish journalist conducted in 1975, one year before he was forced to leave the USSR, pointed to religious education as the main goal of the ROC in the USSR. Galich commented that people should be taught the truth of Christian morals and ethics, which are the very basis of belief.102 Paradoxically, the alternative press devoted much less attention to the issue of the ROC social role, than to ideological identity or church–state relations (see Table 5.1). Moreover, the Soviet Law on the Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations, before its revision in 1990, lacked a paragraph concerning religious education in schools and religious service in the army, thus impeding the ROC contribution to the two most important spheres of social life. Mainly, Christian democrats raised the importance of religious education. It was seen as a solution for the moral and spiritual crisis of Soviet society. Literaturnyi Irkutsk cited a lecturer at the Moscow Theological Academy, who defined the popularity of the UFO phenomenon, as “demon’s tricks,” which aim to lead people astray. Only faith and Orthodox consciousness would save

134  View from the outside believers during times of trouble. The UFO phenomenon was used as an embodiment of mass confusion caused by political and social crisis. Again, the only way out would be through the help of Orthodox education.103 The general moral level of Soviet society was also projected on to the sphere of education in general. However, in addition to legal incentives, Soviet authorities voiced other serious reasons such as the unwillingness of parents to finance religious education, the possibility of confrontation between students and teachers on religious grounds and possible infringement of atheist parents’ rights, which seriously interfered with the implementation of religious education in schools.104 Against the background of such obstacles, the Christian democratic press gladly informed its readers of the successful educative and missionary activity of the Church and the establishment of the first independent Russian Orthodox radio station in Moscow which was financed by the Russian Orthodox spiritual and educational association Radonezh.105 A Russian Orthodox priest from the Tver’ parish openly blamed the Moscow Patriarchate authorities, in the pages of Christian democratic press, for their inability to engage in everything that concerned catechisation and charity. According to him, the Church had been disconnected from the mundane world and the life of its people for many years. It was used only for liturgical practice, and the Church authorities blocked any initiative from below. Thus, only through the negation of “Sergianism,” a pejorative term, which arose from Metropolitan Sergius’ so-called Declaration of Loyalty in 1927, would the ROC be able to revive its missionary and charitable activity.106 The ROC was also criticised for its lack of reaction to such grave social problems as the rate of children’s suicides. According to the data supplied by the Ministry of Interior, 60–80 thousand schoolchildren, aged 7–17, were committing suicide each year. People appealed to the Church not to forsake its people and to guard Russian national-spiritual values.107 While the Christian democratic press accentuated the importance of such issues as religious education, missionary activity and charity, radical patriotic groups underlined military service as the most important religious obedience. Defence of the motherland was equal to the defence of Orthodoxy and Holy Russia. In the Tsarist army, the chaplain had a wide spectrum of duties. He was in charge of the spiritual and patriotic education of the soldiers and provided first medical aid for the wounded. The spiritual regeneration of the soldier and of Russian society would be possible only with the reinstatement of the army chaplaincy institute and the unification of people in the ROC.108 The Soviet writer, Vladimir Bushin, in his speech and at a conference for Russian writers, openly reproached Mikhail Gorbachev and his associates for their incapability to pull Russian society out of the current crisis, since unlike the ROC priests, none of them had served in the army.109 Similar to the discussion on church–state relations, the portrayal of the ROC social role in the alternative press was rather critical and pessimistic. As opposed to an analogous debate in the official press, which mainly depicted the ROC as the only force able to awaken Russian society to unity under spiritual and moral

View from the outside  135 values, the alternative press doubted the ability of the Church to do so because of its long-standing submission to the Soviet atheist authorities.

Perestroika within the Church Although the issue of reforms within the Moscow Patriarchate was absent from the discussion in the official press, the alternative press underlined its importance. It was closely associated with criticism of the Church in its total compliance with state authorities and its inner rigidity and alienation from believers. Again, the Christian democratic press pointed out the reasons for the incapability of the Moscow Patriarchate to introduce changes within the Church. The ROC hierarchy, with its immense power of influence, was totally estranged from believers. Moreover, it was not interested in real people. Believers were regarded as mere “objects” that should be saved. There was no openness within the Church. Hierarchs were guarding any kind of information and impeding any open discussion of problematic situations.110 Furthermore, the higher hierarchs’ nominations were done secretly. The archives of both the Holy Synod and the CRA remained closed. While CRA archives were partially opened after the disintegration of the USSR, during the years 1993–1999, Holy Synod archives remained closed. Christian democrats also criticised the unwillingness of the Moscow Patriarchate to name the sum needed for the restoration of the returned monasteries and 697 churches. The sum of financial donations to the millennium celebrations was also unclear, as was the Moscow Patriarchate’s budget as a whole.111 Priests Vladimir Gornostaev and Ioann Mamalyga brought up the issue of administrative arbitrariness and corruption within the Church. Gornostaev broke the illusion of the ROC idealisation, which was a common practice in Russian society during perestroika. In Put’ Moscow Patriarchate bishops were portrayed as an authority which had full power over clerics, especially concerning their employment. They were allowed to move them to a different parish according to their will without providing any motivation.112 Ioann Mamalyga stated that priests could not be appointed to the peripheral parish in Moldova without a bribe of 3,000 roubles. If they desired a position in the Kishinev parish, the price was raised to the sum of 5,000 roubles.113 The ROC lacked institutions that supported the implementation of basic human rights, such as an independent court, thus being a bureaucratic-totalitarian corporation contrary to its true calling of love and collectiveness. The Association “Tserkov i Perestroika” (Church and Perestroika), led by Gleb Yakunin and supported mainly by believers from among the intelligentsia, was dissatisfied with the inertia of the episcopate and the insufficient activity of the Moscow Patriarchate. It did not use the opportunities, offered by perestroika, to meet the needs of the Church and to widen the development of its missionary work. Yakunin called for the formation of the initiative groups of believers, with the main responsibility to manifest the faith sincerely and consciously. The association did not attempt to cause a schism within the Church. It only called for the building of a real dialogue with a young generation of believers, who would not

136  View from the outside tolerate any authoritative instructions.114 Such reforms within the Church as the denial of “Sergianism” (as a false Christianity of the Soviet origin), the election of clergy and the increase in preaching and social activity were of great importance to national regeneration.115 Contrary to Christian democratic voices, radical nationalists appealed to Patriarch Pimen on 9 June 1988, asking him to refrain from any reforms in the language of prayer. They requested that Old Church Slavonic remain the only language of prayer, being an inseparable part of the Orthodox tradition and culture and the cornerstone of the Slavic unity within the ROC. Any attempt to reform the language of prayer would lead to a new split within the Church.116 The ideological discussion on the ROC social role and a need for reforms within the Moscow Patriarchate accentuated the ideological debate between the liberal-ecumenical and radical nationalistic groups, which on the one hand called for repentance and on the other demanded the preservation of messianic nationalistic principles. This duality was also clear in the debate on the interrelations between the ROC and the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA).

ROC and ROCA The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad, or as it was often called, the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia, was formed as a response to Bolshevik anti-religious policy, soon after the October Revolution in 1917. It was officially separated from the Moscow Patriarchate in 1927, after Metropolitan Sergii (Stargorodskii) pledged the Church’s loyalty to the Soviet state. Discussion on the interrelations between the two churches in the alternative press appeared following the expansion of the ROCA to the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1990. The official stand of the Moscow Patriarchate, expressed by Patriarch Aleksii II in an interview with the BBC,117 rejected four conditions placed by the ROCA before any improvement in the interrelations between the churches could be considered. The first condition, placed by the ROCA, concerning the renouncement of the 1927 Declaration, was rejected on the grounds that Sergii signed the declaration to save the Church. The second request dealt with the canonisation of new martyrs, who died before 1927. According to the Patriarch, the investigation of the necessary materials for the canonisation of Metropolitan Vladimir from Kiev, Metropolitan Veniamin of Petrograd and the Great Duchess, Elizaveta Fedorovna, was about to end. He did not mention, however, the most important obstacle, the canonisation of Tsar Nikolai II. Aleksii was also unwilling to consent to the demand concerning the denial of any ecumenical contacts with other Christian denominations. According to him, ecumenical movement was of great help to the ROC in the 1950s and 1960s. This announcement aroused wide disapproval in radical nationalist circles. Aleksii was accused of collaboration with the West and betrayal of the Russian nation. Finally, Patriarch Aleksii scorned any criticism coming from abroad concerning the collaboration of the ROC with state authorities, claiming that, “…Nobody joined the Moscow Patriarchate in its most difficult moments.”118

View from the outside  137 The message of Metropolitan Vitalii, head of the ROCA, published in the monarchic press, was full of the ROC reproach and very similar to the one discussed earlier. He blamed the Moscow Patriarchate for its inability to withstand the rule of the KGB, counter western religious propaganda and save the Russian nation from the inevitable crisis.119 According to Eduard Volodin, a literary and political figure and head of the National Salvation Front, the schism between the ROC and the ROCA underlined the essence of the social and political crisis in Russia. Its real aim, the destruction of the Russian people, was achieved by a progressive Russophobic atmosphere and the disintegration of Russia’s historical and economic ties. A possible solution, according to Volodin, would be the establishment of the Apostolic Church, which would be able to unify and educate the Russian people.120 The Christian democratic press blamed the head of the ROCA, Metropolitan Vitalii, for the refusal to sign an agreement on 12 June 1991, which would allow the RSFSR government to take the role of a mediator in the conflict between the two jurisdictions, following the expansion of the ROCA parishes into the RSFSR territory.121 His denial to sign the document before the “implementation of Holy-Russia’s ideals” was regarded as a betrayal of the Russian national interests. Monarchic and radical nationalistic groups supported the claim of the ROCA and adopted the criticism of the Moscow Patriarchate, which usually came from the liberal wing of the national-patriotic spectrum. The Christian democratic press, however, aligned in this dispute with the official position of the Moscow Patriarchate. Summing up the discussion in the alternative press on Russian national identity and church–state relations, one reaches the following conclusion: as opposed to the positive image of the ROC presented by the official press, the alternative press presented quite a different picture. Although the Russian Orthodoxy was regarded as an inseparable component of Russian national identity, the Moscow Patriarchate was portrayed as an institution unable to lead the nation out of a spiritual and moral crisis, following its total submission to the atheist state. The depiction of the ROC in the ideological discussion on the essence of Russian national identity coincided with the philosophical credo of the different national-patriotic groups. Radical nationalists accused the ROC of ecumenism and a tolerant stand towards the Jews, while Christian democrats blamed it for the total surrender to state authorities. Liberal nationalists accused the Moscow Patriarchate of an inability to revive educational, missionary and charitable activity and bridge the schism with the ROCA. In comparison with the ideological discussion in the official press, the alternative press during perestroika paid much less attention to the importance of historical memory as a continuity of cultural experience. It did not concentrate on the reconstruction of returned churches as a form of preserving Russian cultural and spiritual heritage. Although it advocated granting the ROC the status of juridical entity, it did not believe in the ability of the Moscow Patriarchate to cooperate with Russian society in order to preserve Russian spiritual traditions and a way of life.

138  View from the outside

Notes 1 Dimitry Pospielovsky, ‘The Resurgence of Russian Nationalism in Samizdat,’ Survey 19, no. 1 (1973). 2 Robert Horvath, Legacy of Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, Democratisation and Radical Nationalism in Russia (London: Taylor & Francis Routledge, 2005). 3 Kevin O’Connor, Intellectuals and Apparatchiks: Russian Nationalism and Gorbachev Revolution (Boulder, New York, Toronto, Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2006). 4 Olga Zaslavskaya, ‘From Dispersed to Distributed Archives: The Past and the Present of Samizdat Material,’ Poetics Today 29, no. 4 (winter 2008). 678. 5 Ibid. 682. 6 Ibid. 683. 7 Joo Hyung Min, ‘Voices of Freedom: Samizdat,’ Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 4 (June 2004). 575. 8 E. N. Strukova, Alternativnaia periodicheskaia pechat’ v istorii rosiiskoi mnogopartiinosti (1987–1996) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennaia publichnaia istoricheskaia biblioteka Rossii, 2005). 9. 9 Ibid. 24. 10 Ibid. 25. 11 Ibid. 32. 12 Hyung Min, Voices of Freedom: Samizdat. 575. 13 Zaslavskaya, From Dispersed to Distributed Archives: The Past and the Present of Samizdat Material. 702. 14 Pospielovsky, The Resurgence of Russian Nationalism in Samizdat. 51. 15 Darrell P. Hammer, ‘Vladimir Osipov and the Veche Group (1971–1974): A Page from the History of Political Dissent,’ The Russian Review 43 (1984). 356. 16 A. Yanov, The Russian New Right—Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1978). 17. 17 Pospielovsky, The Resurgence of Russian Nationalism in Samizdat. 52. 18 Russian and Soviet “thick” literary-philosophical journals had a unique “direction” and a two-part structure: literary and political. Soviet “thick” journals such as Novyi Mir (The New World), accentuated the importance of its political part, dedicated to the problems of the social and literary life of the country. “Thick” journals were oriented mainly towards the intelligentsia (T.A. Strukov, A.V. Podchinenov, Tolstyi Zhurnal v Rossii, kak tekst i sverkhtekst, www.km.ru/referats/B8EE89F5E1F040DB900B5247 2385040F). 19 Yanov, The Russian New Right—Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR. 62. 20 A. Yanov, “VSKhSON: The ‘Russian Path’ to Freedom,” Institute of Modern Russia, www.imrussia.org/en/society/754 (accessed October 2014). 21 G. Shimanov, “Gennady Shimanov—Raboty raznukh let,” http://shimanov.narod.ru/ (accessed October 2014). 22 Yanov, The Russian New Right—Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR. 21. 23 John B. Dunlop, The New Russian Revolutionaries (Belmont, MA: Nordland Publishing Company, 1976). 169. 24 Ibid. 245. 25 Horvath, Legacy of Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, Democratisation and Radical Nationalism in Russia. 162–163. 26 Yanov, The Russian New Right—Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR. 84. 27 Ibid. 118. 28 Dunlop, The New Russian Revolutionaries. 61.

View from the outside  139 29 Hammer, Vladimir Osipov and the Veche Group (1971–1974): A Page from the History of Political Dissent. 356. 30 Pospielovsky, The Resurgence of Russian Nationalism in Samizdat. 65. 31 Yanov, The Russian New Right—Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR. 120. 32 Dunlop, The New Russian Revolutionaries. 193. 33 Yanov, The Russian New Right—Right-Wing Ideologies in the Contemporary USSR. 81–82. 34 Ibid. 119. 35 M. L. Gearing, “Neo-Slavophilism and Russian Nationalism in the Soviet Union Since 1960” (University of Oxford, 1986) (accessed September 2014). 125. 36 Horvath, Legacy of Soviet Dissent: Dissidents, Democratisation and Radical Nationalism in Russia. 153. 37 O’Connor, Intellectuals and Apparatchiks: Russian Nationalism and Gorbachev Revolution. 70. 38 Ibid. 70. 39 Ibid. 80. 40 F. G. Ovsienko, M. L. Odintsov, and N. A. Trofimchuk, eds., Gosudarstvenno-tserkovnye otnoshenia v Rossii: opyt proshlogo i sovremennoe sostoianie (Moscow: Akademia Gosudarstvennoi Sluzhby pri Prezidente RF, Fond Natsional’no-Kul’turnogo Vozrozhdenia Narodov Rossii, 1996). 116, 183. 41 Neformal’naia Rossia: o neformal’nykh politizirovannykh dvizheniakh i gruppakh v RSFSR (opyt spravochnika) (Moscow: Molodaia Gvardia, 1990). 59. 42 Ibid. 62–63. 43 Ovsienko, Odintsov, and Trofimchuk, Gosudarstvenno-tserkovnye otnoshenia v Rossii: opyt proshlogo i sovremennoe sostoianie. 150, 160. 44 Panorama, 1990, 7. 45 O. Vitte and others, ed., Natsional’naia Pravaia Prezhde i Teper’: istoriko-sotsiologicheskie ocherki, Prilozhenie k chastiam 1-III (St. Petersburg: Institut Sotsiologii Rossiskoi Akademii Nauk, 1992). 166. 46 Ibid. 197–199. 47 Zemlia 11 (November 1 1989). 175–178. 48 www.pribaikal.ru/irkutsk-item/article/7374.html (accessed March 2015). 49 Vitte and others, Natsional’naia Pravaia Prezhde i Teper’: istoriko-sotsiologicheskie ocherki, Prilozhenie k chastiam 1-III. 175. 50 Monarkhist, 1991, 1. 51 “Programma Khristiansko-Demokraticheskogo Soiuza Rosii,” Vestnik Khristianskoi Demokratii, November 1990, 4–5. 52 Vestnik Khristianskogo Informatsionnogo Tsentra, no. 28 (September 15 1989). 8. 53 S. I. Ivanenko, Yu B. Pischuk and N. A. Trofimchuk, eds., Khristianskie Partii i Samodeiatel’nye Obe’dineniia: sbornik materialov i dokumentov (Moscow: Akademiia Obschestvennykh Nauk pri TsKKPSS, Institut Nauchnogo Ateisma, 1990). 97–98. 54 S. Bakunov, “Stesniatsia V Sredstvakh Ne Nado,” Russkoe Osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie, 1991, 2. 55 Sergey Semenov, “Rossia i Russkie,” Russkoe Osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie, 1991, 3. 56 Igor Shafarevich, “Chto Takoe Patriotism?” Put’, 1991, 1. 57 Aleksei Shiropaev, “Protiv Techenia,” Zemlia, March 1 1990. 58 Russkie Vedomosti, September 1991. 59 Ibid. 60 “Taina Rossii,” Zemschina, 1991. 61 V. V. Sadovnikov, “V Kakuiu Storony Dvizhetsia Narodno—Pravoslavnoe Dvizhenie?” Zemschina, August 1990. 62 Ennel, “Zhertva,” Zemschina, 1991.

140  View from the outside

63 64 65 66

“Apostasia,” Zemschina, 1991. “Aleksandru Meniu,” Zemschina, 1991. Vladimir Osipov, “Zheltyi Terror,” Volia Rossii, 1991, no. 3, 4. Kuzma Zmeiukin, “Pridummanyi Putsch Ili Massonskii Zagovor?” Russkoe Voskresenie, 1991, 4. 67 P. Sharapov, “Patriarch i Politika,” Russkaia Gazeta, 1991, 2. 68 Volia Rossii, 1991. 69 Politika, November 1991. 70 “Obraschenie natsional’no-patrioticheskogo fronta ‘Pamiat’ k uchastnikam 1-go vsetserkovnogo Pravoslavnogo molodezhnogo s’ezda,” Pamiat’, January 1991, 1. 71 “K sobytiam v Pskovo-Pecherskom Monastyre,” Rodnye Prostory, 1991, 3. 72 Georgii Fedotov, “Komy Nuzhny Ecumenicheskie Monakhi?” Vozrozhdenie Rosii, 1991, 5–6. 73 “Voskresenie Rosii,” Polozhenie Del, 1991, 5. 74 Rosiiski Obzor, 1991. 75 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn (1918–2008), prominent Russian dissident writer, who received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1970 for his books: The First Circle and The Cancer Ward. 76 Sergei Kirillov, “Ocherki Literaturno-Politicheskoi Istorii Perestroiki: Nedolgoe Schastie ‘Detei Arbata’,” Rosiiski Obzor, 1991, 55–85. 77 S. Kostromin, “A Byl Li Malchik? Po Povody Izvestnykh Sobytii,” Nakanune, December 4 1991. 78 Viktor Aksiuchits, “Lenin i Religiia,” Put’, 1991, 6. 79 M. Shakhov, “Pravoslavnaia Vera i Vozhd’ Revolutsii,” Pamiat’, January 1991, 9. 80 Gleb Annischenko, “Neproiznessennaia Rech,” Reiting, March 1992, 4. 81 Ya Kuban’, “Russkii Narod, Obschestvo, Gosudarstvo,” Rosiiskie Vedomosti, November 1988. 82 Lev Lebedev, “O Tserkvi, O Rossii, O Sebe,” Slavianskii Vestnik, May 1991. 83 “Svadebnye generaly,” Biliuten’ Khristianskoi Obschestvennosti, 1989. 84 Grigorii Bigel, “Pochemy Patriarkhat Prodaet Knigi Sviaschennogo Pisaniia?” Referendum, January 1988, 14. 85 Georgii Edel’shtein, “Novyi Patriarkh kak Olitsetvorenie Nashikh Problem,” Vestnik Khristianskoi Demokratii, August 1990, 15. 86 “Spetsialnyi vypusk o nalogovom pritesnenii gosudarstvom tserkovnosluzhitelei i Tserkvi,” Vestnik Khristianskogo Informatsionnogo Tsentra, September 1 1989. 87 Ibid. 1. 88 Alexander Schipkov, “Ostorozhno: Roskomreligiia,” Reiting, May 1992, 5. 89 “Mikhailovskii Sobor,” Vestnik Soveta Po Ekologii Kul’tury, November 1988, 4. 90 Dvatsatka—executive body of a religious society in the USSR. 91 Sergei Krylov, “O Khrame v Al’ma Mater,” Khristianskie Novosti, January 6 1991, 17. 92 ‘Vse khramy Tserkvi—Obraschenie na S’ezd narodnykh deputatov o priniatii zakonodatel’nogo akta,’ Biliuten’ Khristianskoi Obschestvennosti (1989). 8–9. 93 “Otkrytoe pis’mo sekretariu TsK KPSS Medvedevy Vadimu Andreevichu,” Biliuten’ Khristianskoi Obschestvennosti, 1989, 11. 94 “Sovetskoe gosudarstvo dolzhno iskupit svoiu vinu pered tserkoviu,” Literaturny Irkutsk, April 1991, 2. 95 Georgii Edel’shtein, “Budet li Patriarkh Golosovat’ za Ateisticheskuiu Propagandu?” Referendum, January 16–31 1989. 96 Yurii Bylychev, “Katastropha,” Ruskii Kur’ier, 1991, 3. 97 Boris Averichkin, “Pravoslavie i Perestroika,” Rosiiskie Vedomosti, March 1988, 40. 98 Viacheslav Polosin, ed., Rossiiskoe Khristianskoe Demokraticheskoe Dvizhenie: sbornik materialov (Moscow: Izdanie Dumy Khristianskogo Demokraticheskogo Dvizhenia, 1990).

View from the outside  141 99 “Konferentsia; Religioznaia politika v SSSR—problem i prespectivy,” Vestnik Khristianskogo Informatsionnogo Tsentra, October 1989. 100 “Zaiavlenie Sviaschennogo Sinoda Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi,” Tserkovnaia Zhizn’ Severo-Zapada, April 3 1990. 101 Gleb Annischenko, “Sovet Umer—Da Zdravstvuet Sovet!” Put’, April 1991, 4. 102 Soty, November 1989, 27. 103 Maxim Kozlov, “Besy i NLO: Tochka Zrenia Pravoslavnogo Khristianina,” Literaturny Irkutsk, August 1990, 13. 104 Arkadii Zheludkov, “Vremia Vybora,” Put’, 1991, 13. 105 Vasilii Allekseev, “V Efire Radonezh,” Put’, 1991. 106 Sergey Popov, “Chego Nam Esche Zhdat’?” Khristianskie Novosti, February 3 1991, 17. 107 P. Shibin, “Ego Sviateishestvu Patriarkhu Moskovskomy i Vseia Rusi Aleksiu II i Sviaschennomy Sinodu Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi,” Russkoe Voskresenie, 1990, 1. 108 N. Kashirin, “Za Veru i Otechestvo,” Polozhenie Del, May 1991, 5. 109 Vladimir Bushin, “Dorogoi Mikhail Sergeevich,” Polozhenie Del, 1991, 3. 110 V. Poresh, “Po Povodu Programmy Dvizhenia ‘Tserkov i Perestroika’,” Biliuten’ Khristianskoi Obschestvennosti, 1989, 35–37. 111 Edel’shtein, Budet li Patriarkh golosovat’ za ateisticheskuiu propagandu? 10–11. 112 Vladimir Gornostaev, “Tserkov i Prava Cheloveka,” Put’, 1991, 5. 113 Ioann Mamalyga, “Tserkovnaia Korruptsia,” Biliuten’ Khristianskoi Obschestvennosti, 1989, 24–25. 114 “Nashi Zaiavlenia i nashi problemy—Rassuzhdenia v sviazi s deklaratsiei gruppy ‘Tserkov i Perestroika’,” Biliuten’ Khristianskoi Obschestvennosti, 1989, 29–30. 115 Vladimir Gornostaev, “Krisis,” Put’, 1991, 12. 116 Sviataia Rus’—Dobrovol’cheskii Natsional’no-Patrioticheskii Zhurnal-Russkogo Naroda, no. 1 (1988). 75. 117 Oleg Nesterov, “Legko Kritikovat’ iz za Rubezha,” Panorama, December 1990, 2. 118 Ibid. 2. 119 Metropolitan Vitalii, “Velikaia Nevidimaia Bran’,” Prestol, 1990, 1. 120 Eduard Volodin, “Novyi Raskol?—Nesostoiavshiiesia Vystuplenie na Vstreche Pravoslavnykh Ob’edinenii Rosii,” Kuban’, 1991, 56–57. 121 Bishop Ilarion, “Otkaz Russkoi Zarubezhnoi Tserkvi,” Put’, 1991.

Conclusion

This book has analysed the processes and actors that caused the dramatic shift in church–state relations during perestroika. Furthermore, it examined the way this change influenced the revival of Russian nationalist ideology and shaped the ideological and political scene of the post-Soviet Russia. A significant number of western researchers, educated in the values of the liberal-democratic tradition, such as Michael Bordeaux, Nathaniel Davis and Jane Ellis, emphasised the potential for liberalisation within the Moscow Patriarchate and its ability to proclaim new values in a post-communist society. The in-depth analysis of the church–state relations during perestroika underlines the continuity of the imperial ideology propagated by the ROC, church–state interests and the increasing detachment of the Moscow Patriarchate from believers. It is significant that the closing stages of writing were done shortly before the hundredth anniversary of the October Revolution, a period of regime change and instability very similar to perestroika. Gorbachev presented perestroika as a “revolution” in socialist thinking, a new beginning. Moreover, both had a huge effect on shaping the church–state relations and Russian national consciousness after the disintegration of the USSR. Russian Orthodoxy is one of the most important components of Russian national identity; thus, the analysis of church–state relations in any period of Russian and Soviet history could not be complete without the understanding of its interrelations with the Russian national idea. The Byzantine idea of symphonia, which placed the Church on an equal footing with the secular state and assumed harmonious relations between the two, was embedded in the Russian national idea and complemented by the concept of Moscow as a Third Rome. The Russian national character and its historical heritage were inseparable from the Orthodox religious values. The revival of Russian nationalism always took a form of an interest in the culture and religion of the Russian past. Throughout Russian history, both the ROC and secular authorities shared mutual interests such as safeguarding the unity of the Russian state, defending it from foreign aggression and promoting imperial ambitions through ecumenical ties. During perestroika, those interests were exemplified by the need to counteract foreign religious propaganda, thus the grand scale celebrations of the millennium of the Christianisation of Rus’ in 1988 and the mobilisation of the masses and especially the intelligentsia to move glasnost’ and perestroika forward. The

Conclusion  143 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations, adopted in October 1990, raised the status of the Moscow Patriarchate since it gave religious associations the status of “juridical personality,” including the possibility to own property, to publish religious literature, manufacture church paraphernalia, engage in charity, carry out cultural-educational work and participate in political life.1 The improvement of the ROC status vis-à-vis the state was evident, especially after the millennium celebrations. This was traced through the analysis of the Soviet press, which depicted the ROC as a major aid to perestroika by underlining its historical role in shaping Russian national identity. The Soviet printed media promoted church–state collaboration in such matters as the return of the masterpieces of religious architecture and art to the Church, claiming that this would restore national historical memory and breathe life into cultural and religious traditions. It also portrayed an idealised image of the Church, as the only institution able to educate people on the base of the Christian values of brotherhood (bratstvo) and charity (miloserdie). Moreover, it called for the immediate execution of the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations, especially in the field of religious instruction for both children and adults. The Soviet press rarely used critical journalism in its portrayal of the Church generally underlining its contribution to the demographic, economic and social regeneration of the USSR. The alternative (samizdat) press openly articulated criticism of the Moscow Patriarchate. It accused the Church leadership of total subjugation to state authorities and compliance with its foreign policy needs. Moreover, the ROC was continually denounced for being unable to foster the important mission of religious education and catechisation because of administrative arbitrariness, corruption and lack of social activity. Alternative press did not believe in the Moscow Patriarchate’s ability to awaken spiritual and moral values in society and preserve Russian spiritual traditions and a way of life. An analysis of the Moscow Patriarchate’s own publications and proclamations on the new era in church–state relations reveals that despite the optimistic tone, there were many challenges for both sides. This was especially evident in such spheres as legislative status of the Church, education, social mission and charitable activity. The new Statute of the Russian Orthodox Church, adopted in 1988, theoretically provided greater autonomy for the dioceses and proclaimed the need for massive catechisation. In practice, by transferring most of the funds collected from believers to the Peace Fund, the Moscow Patriarchate clearly emphasised its main priority, namely strengthening its own status vis-à-vis the state by supporting the goals of Soviet foreign policy. Thus, the public statements of Patriarch Aleksii II concerning the importance of the Church’s social mission and the urgency of developing religious education were not fully realised. New theological schools and academies were opened, but there was a severe shortage of qualified instructors and catechisation material. The Publishing Department of the Moscow Patriarchate served mostly the propagandistic needs of the state. Even the Soviet media criticised the ability of the Church to reach believers, underlining its cold bureaucratic side that raised the price for religious services following the increase in demand, despite the deteriorating economic conditions in the country. It voiced

144 Conclusion a belief that only a new, energetic generation of priests would be able to drag the Church from oblivion. An increasing amount of property was returned to the Church, especially after the millennium celebrations. It did not signify, however, that the process of restoration and opening of new churches was successful. The passivity of local church authorities, lack of priests and most importantly the poor financial situation of the dioceses impeded its completion. Thus, by prioritising the strengthening of its position vis-à-vis the state, the process of perestroika failed to be implemented within the walls of the Moscow Patriarchate causing its further estrangement from believers; similarly to perestroika and glasnost’ within the USSR, which did not succeed to regenerate Soviet society and retain the unity of the state. The essence of church–state relations did not change much from the Russian Imperial past due to the historical legacy of mutual interests related to Russia’s geopolitical situation and the nature of its national identity. Leading Russian analysts of contemporary Orthodoxy contributed to the discussion of the main current issues facing the ROC under Patriarch Kirill in the edited collection, Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ pri novom Patriarche (The Orthodox Church under the new Patriarch) published in 2012. Their examinations point to striking continuities between church–state relations in the late Imperial and Soviet periods and twenty-first-century church–state relations. Valerii Ovchinnikov, historian and a diplomat, who established a special department for working with religious organisations in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, mentions that one of the keys for understanding Orthodox religiosity is acknowledging the dominance of its ritualistic external layer over its evangelical impulses. In the ROC, the religious service is traditionally conducted in Church Slavonic, a language that the masses of population did not understand,2 causing estrangement of believers and perception of religious service as a kind of magic.3 Moreover, the idea of the ROC mission as a patriotic movement for national regeneration reinforced its historical ties with the state, which were developed during perestroika and much reinforced after the disintegration of the USSR. The relationship between church and state under Patriarch Kirill, who was enthroned in January 2009, reveals the continuation and growth of the same processes in church–state relations and in the social and political mission of the Church as were evident during the Gorbachev years. According to Sergei Filatov, senior lecturer of the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences and head of the research project “Encyclopaedia of Modern Religious Life of Russia,” Russian society expected from the new Patriarch to stop the moral and social degradation of the Russian nation and help Russia move towards democracy and modernisation.4 Gorbachev expressed much the same hope when mobilising the Moscow Patriarchate for the needs of glasnost’ and perestroika. One of the most important documents laying out the ideological and social position of the Moscow Patriarchate is the “Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church,” adopted in August 2000.5 According to it, church– state relations should be based on the symphonic idea6 meaning that there should be cooperation and support between the two institutions. The state relies on the

Conclusion  145 Church for blessing and approval of its policy, while the Church counts on the state’s help for providing infrastructure for preaching and catechisation. The document lists the following areas of church–state relations, which embrace almost all areas of social and political life,7 among them: peacemaking activity; concern for the preservation of morality in society; spiritual, cultural and moral patriotic education; charity and mutual development of social programmes; work with mass media; involvement in science, health care and economy. Moreover, the document outlines the ideological goals of the Church,8 which are based on Christian patriotism, implying the active participation of citizens in influencing state affairs and caring for compatriots living abroad. Filatov argues that the so-called Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2005 reinforced the consolidation of church–state ideology around the values of Russian civilisation and the claim of a unique Russian path of development.9 Thus, the social and political ideology of Patriarch Kirill reinstated the idea of Russia as a strong superpower, leading its own national path different from the western democracies.10 Moreover, Kirill depicted the Church’s mission as a patriotic movement of national regeneration of all Orthodox nations.11 Director of the Information-Analytical Centre “SOVA”, Aleksandr Verkhovskii, emphasised that Orthodox nationalism is primarily imperial. After the disintegration of the USSR, the Moscow Patriarchate remained the only structure in Russian society which held a supranational, imperial influence.12 This fact served both church and state interests and became especially true after the reunion of the ROC with the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA) in 2007. Alicja Curanovic agrees with this assessment and adds that the state view of Orthodoxy sees it as a tool for rebuilding the empire. Moreover, she claims that both perceive post-Soviet territory as a Russian sphere of influence and calls for the establishment of an alliance of conservative civilisations, thus creating a global power system in which the domination of the USA will be balanced by the cooperation of new centres, namely Russia, China and India.13 The image of the ROC projected in the post-Soviet official press was in many ways similar to the one portrayed in the official press during perestroika. The Church signified the merging of Orthodox and state interests indicating its role as a symbol of state legitimacy. Roman Lunkin, leading researcher of the Centre on the Study of Religion and Society in the Russian Academy of Science and a director of the Institute of Religion and Law, notes that the ROC is projected in the Russian secular press as a symbol and source of state ideology. He underlines that state politics is based on merging of Orthodox and state interests. The Moscow Patriarchate is also seen as a bridge between the Soviet past and modern Russia and a guardian of Russian culture and spirituality.14 Similarly, to the Soviet official press, the contemporary Russian media also accentuates the theme of the Church’s role in state security. According to Lunkin, it became especially prevalent after the introduction in 2005 of 4 November as a day of national unity, a celebration of Moscow’s liberation from Polish invasion in 1612.15 However, the current Russian secular press portrays also another image of the Moscow Patriarchate, that of an institution detached from society in general and

146 Conclusion believers in particular because of its close identification with state authorities. This image identifies Orthodoxy with pagan national culture connected with traditional beliefs and superstitions.16 Father Georgii Chistiakov claims that the overwhelming majority of churchgoers are attracted by the ritualistic elements of religion, and as a result, faith in God begins to resemble magic.17 Juliet Johnson and Zoe Knox emphasise that this phenomenon results in poor basic knowledge of religious teaching and new age paganism being deeply embedded in Russian culture.18 Furthermore, it accounts for a low percentage of church attendance.19 Russian secular media, similarly to the Soviet media during perestroika, rarely used critical journalism, but wherever the Church was criticised it was for the patriotic image it projected, associated with archaism and conservatism.20 Kirill further isolates the Moscow Patriarchate from society by constantly emphasising in his public sermons the role of the ROC as a stabilising and unifying factor of the Russian world and a source of Russian state security.21 Strong collaboration with the state and reliance on its support for the promotion of its ideological goals prevented the Church from fully attending to its own mission such as social activity and education. Similarly, to his predecessor Patriarch Aleksii II, Kirill aimed at the development of the Moscow Patriarchate’s social services. He was successful on the administrative level. The Synodal Department for Church’s Relations with Society and Mass Media was established on the base of the Department for External Church Relations,22 thus again clearly emphasising Kirill’s priorities—missionary work instead of charitable activities and catechisation. Boris Knorre, assistant professor in the Faculty of Philosophy of the National Research University “Higher School of Economics” and a participant in the project “Encyclopaedia of modern religious life of Russia,” claims that the poor realisation of the Moscow Patriarchate’s social projects is the result of the lack of an organised system of finance distribution. The Moscow Patriarchate does not finance the activity of the missionary centres from its own budget. Most of the budget is allocated to the external activities such as concerts and festivals. Charitable and social work is mainly done on the voluntary basis. Thus, the Youth Department of the Moscow Patriarchate could not manage the coordination of different parish youth centres due to the poor information policies. The department does not even have an Internet site.23 Hegumen Petr charges the ill success of the ROC social projects with the Soviet legacy of poor religious self-organisation.24 Because of its detachment from society, people do not regard the ROC as an institution which engenders moral values. According to the data of the All-Russian Centre for the Research of Public Opinion (Vserossiiskii Tsentr Izuchenia Obschestvennogo Mnenia—VTsIOM) from September 2007, only 1 per cent of the respondents believe that young people learn moral values in the church.25 Another important social mission of the Church is its connection with the army. The ROC regarded military service and military duty as a sacred obligation to the state and society. The subject of military chaplaincy was not discussed during the perestroika period. However, the contribution of the ROC to the military effort during World War II was emphasised by the official press in order to reaffirm the status of the Church in Soviet society.

Conclusion  147 In the post-Soviet period, the need to raise moral and patriotic spirit and strengthen discipline in the army led to the reinstatement of the Institute of Military Chaplaincy in 2009. Anatolii Pchelintsev, chief editor of the journal Religiia i Pravo (Religion and Law), argues that despite the introduction of military chaplains in army units, the influence of the Church on the moral and national-patriotic state of the armed forces remains low.26 He asserts that it could be the cause of the religious and legal illiteracy of the chaplains. Moreover, the cooperation of the Defence Ministry only with the ROC, ignoring all other faiths, has led to persistent intolerance towards non-Orthodox soldiers.27 Unlike western researchers, who underline the pastoral component of military chaplaincy and sensitivity towards pluralism,28 Pchelintsev emphasises deliberate intention on the part of the Church and the state to prioritise Russian Orthodoxy. The army does not permit changing the military oath despite the fact that the words “I swear” contradict some religious denominations. Furthermore, an Orthodox priest is always present during the ceremony of oath taking and sprinkles holy water on all freshly sworn soldiers despite their religion.29 Moreover, there is a desire on the part of the Church to monopolise the historical and cultural heritage of Russia, which was clear during a public protest in March 2017 against the return of St. Isaac’s Cathedral in St. Petersburg to the Moscow Patriarchate. The ROC was lobbying to take control over the Cathedral from the city government, which currently manages it as a state museum. According to the deacon Andrei Kuraev, the Church is being perceived as an enforcement agency, a ministry that has the right to arrest people. There’s an attempt by Patriarch Kirill to offer himself to the state and to the Kremlin as a faithful pillar, a faithful ally. There is an illusion in the Kremlin that they can use this ally to promote the correct electoral behaviour.30 Thus, by strengthening its position vis-à-vis the state and carrying on states’ bidding, the ROC fortifies its status as a main pillar of national ideology actively promoted by the Kremlin. According to Filatov, the ROC authority in the Russian society is built exclusively using state power and administrative resources.31 By relying on the state authorities’ support and funding, the Church hampers the development of one of the most important missions of the Moscow Patriarchate, Orthodox education. Kirill specified that one of the main achievements of religious education is the development of new theological schools. This aim was achieved by means of state financial support.32 Knorre adds that Orthodox education is dependent on state funding and cannot rely on donations.33 Tight church–state cooperation in the field of religious education continued with developing educational programmes and prompting spiritual instruction in secular schools. This was made possible following President Medvedev’s decree On Religious Education in Schools and Military Chaplaincy in 2009. The course Basics of Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics was integrated into the school curriculum in 2011. Ovchinnikov comments that this experiment was poorly prepared and proclaimed ineffective. Irina Papkova

148 Conclusion adds that its failure could be explained by the fact that starting from 1994 the Moscow Patriarchate showed itself unable to construct a coherent vision of Orthodox instruction in public schools, whether it should be voluntary or mandatory and what exactly should be the contents of such education.34 Therefore, not surprising that only thirty-one per cent of parents chose the module Basics of Orthodox Culture, twenty per cent chose the course Basics of World Religions and Culture and around 6 per cent chose the course Basics of the Moslem Religion. Parents complained that study materials were amateurishly prepared and there was lack of professional teachers.35 The ROC after the disintegration of the USSR failed to achieve the challenges of facing society and educating a new Orthodox believer. It succeeded, however, to fortify its position vis-à-vis the state and other religious bodies. Knox notes that demand of the reformist wing in the Moscow Patriarchate concerning changing the language of the liturgy from Church Slavonic to vernacular Russian, strengthening of ecumenical ties with Catholics and Protestants and fostering tolerance and pluralism was not met by the church leadership.36 Instead, anti-western tendencies such as national-spiritual and cultural isolationism prevail. This book sheds light on the institutional influence of the ROC on the state and society during perestroika. It emphasises mutual church–state interests, which were especially evident in the foreign policy field. Lucian Leustean suggests that the evolution of church–state relations in the Orthodox commonwealth might have an impact on contemporary Europe. He adds that Europe is moving towards a new paradigm of church–state relations, in which those states that have a stronger association between religion and politics could have a wider role in the evolution of the European Union.37 This book also adds a new dimension to the understanding of church–state relations in Russia and their influence on both the domestic and international arenas as well as indicating their likely development in the twenty-first-century Russia. Further research on the subject could be done on the ecumenical policy of the ROC in the twenty-first century and the impact of the East European Orthodoxy on the European politics. The ROC will continue to serve as a national unifying factor and strengthen its position as an ideological pillar of the Russian society, as far as the Russian state will adhere to imperial goals. Moreover, the Church might claim in future that its role in the foundation of the Russian state should also be reflected in the constitution. As President Putin notes, 100th anniversary of the February and October revolutions is a good moment for looking back on the causes and nature of these revolutions in Russia…“Let’s remember that we are single people, a united people, and we have only one Russia.”38 He might have added, “and we have only one Church.”

Notes 1 ‘Novyi Zakon o Svobode Sovesti,’ Moscow News, no. 17 (1990). 1. 2 The book of Brian, P. Bennett, Religion and Language in the Post-Soviet Russia (London and New York: Routledge, 2016), discusses the revival of the Church Slavonic

Conclusion  149 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18

19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28

tradition in the post-Soviet Russia especially underlining its use to help redefine Russian notational identity vis-à-vis western culture. Valerii Ovchinnikov, “O Pravoslavnom obrazovanii v Rosii,” in Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ pri novom Patriarche, eds. A. Malashenko and S. Filatov (Moscow: Rosspen, 2012). 262. S. Filatov, “Patriarkh Kirill—dva goda planov, mechtanii i neudobnoi realsnosti,” in Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ pri novom Patriarkhe, eds. A. Malashenko and S. Filatov (Moscow: Rosspen, 2012). 9. “Osnovy Sotsialnoi Kontseptsii Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi.” Moscow Patriarchate, www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/419128.html (accessed October 2017). Ibid. par. II, 2. Ibid. par. III, 4. Ibid. par. II, 2. Filatov, Patriarkh Kirill—dva goda planov, mechtanii i neudobnoi realsnosti. 20. Ibid. 10–11. Ibid. 35. A. Verkhovskii, “Natsionalism rukovodstva Russkoi Pravoslavnoi  Tserkvi v pervom desiatiletii XXI veka,” in Pravoslavnaia Tserkov pri novom patriarkhe, eds. A. Malashenko and S. Filatov (Moscow: Rosspen, 2012). 152. Alicja Curanovic, The Religious Factor in Russia’s Foreign Policy (London and New York: Routledge, 2012). 246. R. Lunkin, “Obraz RPTs v svetskih massmedia: mezhdu miphom o gosudarstvennoi tserkvi i folklorno okkultnom pravoslavii,” in Pravoslanaia Tserkov pri novom patriarkhe, eds. A. Malashenko and S. Filatov (Moscow: Rosspen, 2012). 175–178. Ibid. 180. Ibid. 192. G. Chistiakov, “In Search of the ‘Russian Idea’: A View from Inside the Russian Orthodox Church,” in Religion and Identity in Modern Russia: The Revival of Orthodoxy and Islam, eds. J. Johnson, M. Stepaniants, and B. Forest, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2016). 54. Zoe Knox, ‘Postsoviet Challenges to the Moscow Patriarchate, 1991–2001,’ Religion, State & Society 32, no. 2 (2004); Juliet Johnson, “Religion after Communism: Belief, Identity and the Soviet Legacy in Russia,” in Religion and Identity in Modern Russia: The Revival of Orthodoxy and Islam, eds. J. Johnson, M. Stepaniants, and B. Forest, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Routledge, 2016). Knox, Postsoviet Challenges to the Moscow Patriarchate, 1991–2001. 96. Lunkin, Obraz RPTs v svetskih massmedia: mezhdu miphom o gosudarstvennoi tserkvi i folklorno okkultnom pravoslavii. 196–197. Ibid. 206. Filatov, Patriarkh Kirill—dva goda planov, mechtanii i neudobnoi realsnosti. 24. Boris Knorre, “Sotsialnoe sluzhenie sovremennoi Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi kak otrazhenie povedenchiskikh stereotipov tserkovnogo proshlogo,” in Pravoslavnaia Tserkov pri novom patriarke, eds. A. Malashenko and S. Filatov (Moscow: Rosspen, 2012). Petr Mescherinov, “Sovremennoe tserkovnoe soznanie i svetskie ideologemy iz kommunisticheskogo proshlogo,” in Pravoslavnaia Tserkov pri novom patriarkhe, eds. A. Malashenko and S. Filatov (Moscow: Rosspen, 2012). 126. Ibid. 137. Anatolii Pchelintsev, “Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov i armiia: Opyt istorii i sovremennye problemy vzaimodeistvia,” in Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ pri novom Patriarkhe, eds. A. Malashenko and S. Filatov (Moscow: Rosspen, 2012). 229. Ibid. 245. Stella Rock, ‘Editorial,’ Religion, State & Society 39, no. 1 (March 2011). 2.

150 Conclusion 29 Pchelintsev, Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov i armiia: Opyt istorii i sovremennye problemy vzaimodeistvia. 245. 30 Ivan Watson, Maria Stromova and Antonia Mortensen, “The Rise of the Russian Orthodox Church,” CNN, http://edition.cnn.com/2017/03/30/europe/russian-orthodox-church-resurgence/index.html (accessed October 5 2017). 31 Filatov, Patriarkh Kirill—dva goda planov, mechtanii i neudobnoi realsnosti. 59 32 Ovchinnikov, O Pravoslavnom obrazovanii v Rosii. 277. 33 Knorre, Sotsialnoe sluzhenie sovremennoi Russkoi Pravoslavnoi Tserkvi kak otrazhenie povedenchiskikh stereotipov tserkovnogo proshlogo. 86. 34 Irina Papkova, The Orthodox Church and Russian Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 99, 101. 35 Ovchinnikov, O Pravoslavnom obrazovanii v Rosii. 301–302. 36 Knox, Postsoviet Challenges to the Moscow Patriarchate, 1991–2001. 103–107. 37 Lucian Leustean, ‘The Concept of Symphonia in Contemporary European Orthodoxy,’ International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 11, no. 2–3 (May–August 2011). 189, 198. 38 Shaun Walker, “Tragedy or Triumph? Russians Agonise Over How to Mark 1917 Revolutions,” The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/17/russia-1917-revolutions-legacy-lenin-putin (accessed October 5 2017).

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Index

Page numbers in italics refer to figures. Page numbers in bold refer to tables. Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes. Adelgeim, Pavel 70 Adventists 51, 109 Afanasiev, Viktor 80 Aksiuchits, Viktor Vladimirovich 123–4 Alekseev, Andrei 3 Aleksii I (Patriarch) 25–6, 59 Aleksii II (Patriarch) 60–1, 65, 67–9, 76n12, 84, 90, 93, 95, 104, 106, 126–7, 130, 136, 143, 146 Alexander Nevskii church 92 Alexeev, W. 22–4, 37n54 All Christian Peace Congress 63 all-Russian Local Council 132 All-Russian Patriotic Movement 120–2, 128 alternative (samizdat) press: during perestroika period 115–17; Russian Orthodoxy in 124 Anderson, John 8, 11n34, 27 Andreeva, Larisa 41 Andreeva, Nina 81 Andreevskii Spusk (Andreevskii Descent) 109 Andrei Rublev i ego Shkola (Andrei Rublev and his School) 32 Andropov, Yurii 42 Anglican Church 24 Annischenko, Gleb Aleksandrovich 123–4, 140n80–1n101, 128 anti-communism 127 anti-corruption campaign, Andropov’s 43 anti-ecumenism 126 anti-religious activities 19; by Khrushchev 26, 28 anti-Semitism 95–6, 118, 125 anti-Soviet propaganda 44–5, 48, 51

Antireligioznik (Antireligious) 21, 23 Antonov, Mikhail 117 Arab–Israeli conflict 30 Archangel Mikhail church 130 Archiv Samizdata (Samizdat Archive) 29 art of bell-ringing 99–100 Article 19 of the USSR Supreme Soviet Decree (1943) 30 Association “Tserkov i Perestroika” (Church and Perestroika) 135 Astafiev, Viktor 32 atheism 29 atheistic education 15, 41, 43, 54 atheistic propaganda 42, 53–4 August putsch, ROC and 65 Averintsev, Sergei 73, 91, 95, 112n65, 131 Avvakum (archpriest) 98, 101 Babiichuk, A. 54, 58n81 Baiborodin, Anatolii 122 baptisms 23, 49, 104 “Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church” 144 Basics of Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics 147 believers 42–3, 45, 51–2, 130, 132, 135 bell-ringing, art of 99–100 Belov, Vasilii 32 Berdyaev, Nikolai 33, 118 Bezbozhnik (Godless) 23 Bigel, Grigorii 129, 140n84 Bishops Council: of 1961 29 Bobkov, Philip 42, 56n11 Bogoiavlenskii Cathedral 22, 86–7 Bolshevik Revolution 1

166 Index Bolshevism 15, 34 Bordeaux, Michael 142 Borisov (Father) 94–5 Borisov, Aleksandr 95, 130 Borodin, Leonid 117 Bourdeaux, Michael 39n116, 85, 111n30 Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty 16 Brezhnev, Leonid 32 Brotherhood of Christian Doctors 103 Buevskii, Aleksei Sergeevich 72 “Bulldozer in the Monastery Yard” 88 Bush, George 47 Bushin, Vladimir 134, 141n109 Byelorussian Orthodox Church 66 bytovoe blagochestie 13 Byzantine Orthodoxy 92 Carpenter, Bruce 84 catacomb church 95 catechisation, process of 70, 72 Catholicism 20, 127 Central Committee of the Communist Party 41 Chakovskii, Aleksandr 81, 97 charitable activity 30, 40, 61, 76, 102, 115, 134, 137, 143 Charity Week 75 chauvinism 118, 126 Chernenko’s administration 43 Cherniaev, Anatoly 5–7 Chernobyl disaster 45 Chernye Doski (Black Boards) 32 Chikin, Valentin Vasil’evich 80 Chistiakov, Georgii 146, 149n17 Christian Democratic Movement 123, 129 Christian democratic press 134–5, 137 Christian trend 118 Christianity 12, 14, 21–2, 34, 53–5, 60, 66, 104, 118–19, 125; social principles of 14 “Christianity, State and Society in Modern Russia” conference 66 Chudovo church 91 Chumachenko, Tatiana 38n99–9n118, 42, 55n10 Church: change in official attitude towards 40; historical heritage of 98; as institution 63; perestroika within 135; and politics 105; property return to 50,

70, 87–93, 115, 130–1; rehabilitation before and during World War II 20; revenues 44; social mission of 146; and society 74–6 “Church politics” 16 Church Slavonic 32 “Churchmen and Journalists: in the Call for Peace” conference 64 church–state relations 129–30; from 1943 to post-war period 24–6; Bolshevism, religion and revolution 15; democratisation in 130; evolution in Orthodox commonwealth 148; and foreign policy goals 83; during Gorbachev period 2–3; issues in Soviet alternative press 133; Khrushchev’s antireligious policy 26, 38n102; Marxist– Leninist attitudes towards religion 14; after millennium 47, 50, 59–62; in modern Russian history 12, 25, 41; and nationalist ideology 1; during perestroika 1, 3, 60; post-Khrushchev’s period 31; rehabilitation of Church 20; religion and Russian nationalism 33; return of property issues 87; and Soviet media 80, 83, 91; view from Moscow Patriarchate 59–63, 74, 83, 129, 133, 137 Civil War (1918–1921) 17–18, 21, 65 Cold War 63, 83 Commissar of Internal Affairs 17 Commissariat of Justice 17 Committee for State Security (KGB) 6, 4 communism 60, 118–19, 128 Communist Party 5, 41, 61, 80, 97–8, 107, 116, 120; Department of Foreign Affairs 127 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (KPSS) 5 communist society, construction of 28 Conference of the European Churches in Geneva 65 Conference on European Economic Cooperation in Paris (1947) 26 “Connection between the Generations” 87 “Conservative Revolution” 128 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 65 Council for Religious Affairs (CRA) 2, 28, 56n16, 58n78, 70, 92, 108, 129–30

Index 167 Council for the Affairs of the Religious Cults (CARC) 30 Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (CAROC) 24, 27–30 Council of Ministers 29–30, 41 critical journalism 81, 104, 109, 143, 146 “Cultural Heritage and Modern Times” 87 Curanovic, Alicja 145, 149n13 Curtiss, John 14, 19 Danilov Monastery 44, 46, 71, 85, 87 Davis, Nathaniel 38n106, 41, 45, 142 de-Stalinisation campaign 28 Declaration of Loyalty of 1927 62, 64, 134 “Declaration on the freedom of peoples” 121 Dejevsky, Mary 81 Democratisation 40, 46, 51, 82, 115, 129, 130 “demon’s tricks” 134 Department for Religious Education and Catechism 74 Department of the External Church Relations 71, 74, 83 Derevenschiki (Ruralists) literary movement 32 Deti Arbata (Children of the Arbat) 7 Deutsch-Kornblatt, Judith 7 diligence/morality 86 diocesan administrations 29 “Dipped afar” essay 122 Dmitrii Donskoi tank column 24–5 Domekovskii, Nikolai 96 Dudko, Dmitrii 32–3, 117 Dugin, Aleksandr 128 Dunlop, John 33 dvatsatka 131, 140n90 Dvukhglavyi Orel (Two-headed Eagle) 123 Dzerzhinskii, Felix 17 ecumenism 119, 126, 137 Edelshtein, Grigorii 124, 130 education: atheistic 15, 41, 43, 53–4; charitable activity and 102; religious 73–4, 93, 104–5, 133–4 Educational Committee of the Moscow Patriarchate 27 Educational Society of Spiritual Rebirth from Irkutsk 122

Ekonomtsev, Hegumen Ioann 74–5 Ellis, Jane 41, 45, 56n27, 69, 142 Eshliman, Nikolai 31 Evtushenko, Evgenii 7 “exhumation”, campaign of 17 extremist right-wing orientation 117–18 famine period (1921–1923) 18 Fedorovna, Elizaveta 136 Filaret (Metropolitan) 46, 64–5, 77n17, 86 Filatov, Sergei 78n50–9n79, 144–5, 147 Fireside, Harvey 14, 19–20, 23 “For the great unified and indivisible Russia” conference 121 freedom of conscience 18, 20, 47–8, 50, 55, 102 Freedom of Conscience, Church and Religious Societies 15 Freemasonry 126 Freeze, Gregory 12 “From the depths of the depths” essay 122 Gabel, Paul 18 Gainov, Nikolai 130 Galich, Aleksandr 133 Garrard, Carol 65 Garrard, John 65 Genoa Conference 19 German Action Groups 23 Germogen (patriarch) 59 Gibbs, Joseph 83 Ginkul, V. 122 glasnost’ (lucidity) 2, 10n13; Gorbachev’s perception of 6–7, 80 Glavlit (General Directorate for Literature and Publishing) 82 Glazkov, Nikolai 115 Glazunov, Ilya 34 Glezer, Aleksandr 124 Gorbachev: administration 44; attitude towards intelligentsia 7; attitude towards Marxist–Leninist ideology 4–5; attitude towards religion and nationality question 8–10, 43; August putsch against 65, 68, 126; foreign policy 40; idea of “a unified European home” 64; importance of millennium celebrations 85; leadership style 4–6; liberal information policy 83; meeting with Patriarch 40, 47–8; New

168 Index Political Thinking 63–4, 83–5, 90, 109; perception of glasnost’ 6–7; principle of National Reconciliation 84; socialist identity, idea of 5; supported Kharchev’s attitude 45; used media for reforming system 80 Gorbachev, Raisa 46 Goricheva, Tatiana 34 Gornostaev, Vladimir 135 Gosizdat (official government publishing) 116 Greene, Robert 17 Gregorian calendar 99–100 Gromyko, Andrei 46 Gumelev, Lev 131 Hammer, Darrell P. 117 Hedda, Jennifer 36n10 historical and cultural monuments: preservation of 50–2, 70, 87–8, 90; promoting study of 117 historical memory, ROC as agent of 96–101 Holy Synod 12–13, 16, 65, 74, 105, 132, 135 Horvath, Robert 115, 119 hunger strike, demanding property return 50, 92 Il’in, Ivan 1, 9–10n1 Independent Press Club 116 individualism 13 informal press during perestroika 120 Institute of Sociology, at Russian Academy of Science 3, 117 intelligentsia 7 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, in 1987 64 International Global Environmental Forum 83 internationalism 32 Ioakim (patriarch) 59 Islam 84 Istoriia Russkoi Tserkvi 1917–1997 (History of the Russian Church) 2 Ivanov, Anatoly 117 Ivanovich, Ivan 99 Izvestiia (News) 2, 80–1, 83–93, 95, 97–9, 101–9

Jehovah’s Witnesses 51 Jews 69, 125–6, 137 John Paul II (Pope) 47 Johnson, Juliet 146 Joo, Hyung-Min 116 Judaism 126 “juridical personality” 52–3, 143 “Kakaia ideologia nam nuzhna?” (“Which ideology do we really need?”) 94 Kaledyn, Sergei 103 Kalinin, Mikhail 18 Kalkandjieva, Daniela 25–6, 38n93 Karlovatskii Sobor 18–19 Karpets, Vladimir 123 Karpov, Georgii 24, 29 Kazan Cathedral 88–9 KGB (Committee of State Security) 6, 41, 44 Kharchev, Konstantin 44, 46, 56n31 Khramy Peredaiutsia Veruiuschim (“Churches are Returned to Believers”) 107 Khrapovitskii, Antonii 19 Khristianskii Informatsionnyi Tsentr (Christian Information Centre) 50, 123 Khristianskii Informatsionnyi Vestnik (Christian Informational Herald) 123 Khristianskii Patrioticheskii Soiuz (Christian Patriotic Union) 50, 122 Khrushchev: anti-religious policy and Russian nationalism 26; de-Stalinisation campaign 28, 115–17 Kievo-Pecherskaia Lavra, return of 92 “Kiev’s Glagolic Pages” 97 Kirill (Archbishop) 74–5, 79n79, 108 Kirilo-Belozerskii Museum 89 Kirov, Sergei 21 Knorre, Boris 146 Knox, Zoe 35n6, 41, 45, 69, 78n47, 146, 149n18 Kolsto, Pal 3 Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti (KGB, Committee for State Security) 6, 41, 44 Kommunisticheskaia Partiia Sovetskogo Soiuza (KPSS, Communist Party of the Soviet Union) 5, 116

Index 169 Komsomolskaia Pravda (The Komsomol’s Truth) 67 Korchagin, Viktor 121 Krutitskii (Metropolitan) 86 Krylov, Evgenii 121 Ksenia Peterburzhskaia 46 Kudryavtsev, Mikhail 117 Kulakov, A. 121 Kuraev, Andrei 147 Kuroedov, Vladimir 29, 44 Latsis, Martin 17 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations 48, 52–3, 70, 87, 101, 104, 120, 143 Law on Press and other Mass Media 82 Law on Religious Associations 52 Law on Religious Cults 132 Lazarev, Viktor 32 legal and administrative status of ROC 69, 71 legislation, reforms in 132 Lenin 4–5, 9, 14–18, 20, 26, 35 Leningrad City Council 121 Leningrad Democratic Union 121 Leningradskii Muzhskoi Club (Leningrad Men’s Club) 122 Leninism 119 Leustean, Lucian 148 liberal-independent samizdat journals 124 liberal intelligentsia 96, 109, 120 liberalisation 51, 82 Ligachev, Egor 6 Likhachev, Dmitri 7, 55, 91 Likhonravaia, Zoia 130 Lisytkina, Larisa 124 Literaturnaia Gazeta (Literary Gazette) 2, 80–2, 85, 88–91, 93–7, 99, 101–14n163 Literaturnyi Irkutsk (Literary Irkutsk) 122, 133–4 Living Church 19, 24 Local Council (1917, 1988) 15, 60, 68–70, 72–3, 106 Lozhkin, Pieter 103 Lubachivsky, Myroslav 47 Luchterhandt, Otto 43, 56n16 Luehrmann, Sonja 1–2, 10n3 Lukianov, Anatolii 93 Lukianov, Mikhail 131

Lukyanov, Nikolai 123 Lunkin, Roman 145, 149n14 Malenkov 27 Malta summit 47 Mamalyga, Ioann 135 The Manifestation of the Russian Nation (Manifest Russkogo Naroda) 9 March Referendum (1991) 5 Marsh, Christopher 40 Marshall Plan 26 Marx, Karl 14 Marxist–Leninist attitudes, towards religion 14–15, 119, 127–8 mass media 1–2, 6, 64, 81–2, 94, 98, 132, 145–6 McNair, Brian 80–1, 83, 110n3 media, role in Soviet society 2, 73, 80–110 see also Soviet media Melnikova, Svetlana 117 Memorial Research Centre, in St. Petersburg 3 Men, Aleksandr: murder of 94–6, 126 Mephodii (Metropolitan) 71 Mezhdunarodnyi Forum (An International Forum) 123 Mickiewicz, Ellen 83 Mikhailovskii Zlatoverkhovii Sobor (Mikhailovskii Golden Top Cathedral) 108 millennium celebrations 45–7, 70, 85–7 “Millennium of Russian Art” 84 Miner, Steven Merritt 23–4 mir (assembly of elders) 13 Mitrofan (bishop) 15 Mitskevich, Sergei 17, 36n34 Mlynar, Zdenek 5 Mokhov 50 monarchist groups 128 Monarkhist (Monarchist) 123 monasteries, policy towards 17 morality/spirituality 86 Moscow Kremlin 90–1 Moscow Patriarchate 2, 9, 21–31, 33, 36n6, 40, 44, 46–7, 54, 59–63, 65– 76n12, 80, 83–4, 87–8, 91, 93, 95–6, 101–3, 105; hierarchy 129; publishing activity of 70, 72–3; reforms within 133; and Soviet media 80–3, 90–1

170 Index Moscow Red Cross 103 Moscow Russian People’s Militia 123 Moskovskie Tserkovnye Vedomosti (Moscow Church Gazette) 15 Moskovskii Tserkovnyi Vestnik (Moscow Church Herald) 73 Mulheim Initiative symposium, in Moscow 64 Museum of History of Religion and Atheism 89 Narcomopium (People’s Commissar for Opium) 24 Narcotics Association 102 Narkombog (People’s Commissar for God) 24 Narodno-Pravoslavnoe Dvizhenie (The People’s Orthodox Movement) 121 Narodnoe Sobranie (People’s Council) 128 “Nash Democraticheskii vybor” (Our Democratic Choice) 106 Nasledie (Heritage) 98 National Bolshevism 34 nationalism: and religion 1, 117–19; and Russian Orthodoxy during perestroika 119–20, 123–4 nationality question: Gorbachev’s attitude towards religion and 8–9; ROC and 107–8, 110 Natsional’no Democraticheskaia Partia (National Democratic Party) 121 natsionalno-religiosnoe vozrozhdenie (national and religious renaissance) 33 Natsional’nyi Patrioticheskii FrontPamiat’ (National-Patriotic Front Pamiat’—Memory) 122 Nauka i Religiia (Science and Religion) 21, 53–5, 58n80 Nefedov, V. A. 122 Neo-Nazism 34 Neo-Slavophile trend 117 Nevskii, Alexandr (Grand Duke) 21 Nevskii Dukhovnyi Vestnik (Nevskii Spiritual Herald) 123 “New Dangers for the Holy Gift of Life and Our Goals” conference 63 New Political Thinking, Gorbachev’s 48, 63–4, 83–5, 90, 96 Nichiporov, Boris 105

Nikita (monk) 97 Nikolai I 14 Nikolai of Kiev 23–5 Novyi Mir (The New World) 138n18 nuclear threat issues 63 “O chem moliatsia v Khrame Khrista Spasitelia?” (“What they are praying for in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour?”) 108, 114n160 O’Connor, Kevin 115, 138n3–9n37 October Revolution 19, 29, 36n34, 38n106, 61, 125, 127, 136, 142, 148 Ogurtsov, Igor 33 Optina Pustyn’ Monastery 90 Orange Revolution, in Ukraine (2005) 145 Orthodox Christianity Orthodox education 147 orthodoxification 119 “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality” 14 Osipov, Vladimir 117–18, 122 Osvobozhdenie (Freedom) 122, 133 Otechestvo (Motherland) 122 Ovchinnikov, Valerii 144, 149n3 Pafnutiev Borovskii Monastery 98 Pain, Emil 3, 10n10 Pamiat’ (Memory) 58n90, 96, 121–2, 126 Papkova, Irina 148, 150n34 Patriarch’s election, during 1917 Local Council 15 patriotic and religious unofficial press, during perestroika period 116–17 The Patriotic Association Pamiat’ 122 patriotism 97, 123–5 Pchelintsev, Anatolii 147, 149n26 peace conference, in Madrid 84 Peace Fund 76, 143 “peaceful coexistence” 30 peacemaking activity 63–4, 83 Pechersk Monastery, in Pskov 127 Pentecostals 51 People’s Deputies 62, 75, 79n79, 129–31 perestroika (restructuring) 4–5; change towards ROC 22; within Church 135–6; church–state relations during 1; media during 82; official policy towards religion during 41; reformist and conservative trends during 4; religion and intelligentsia during 8; religion and Russian nationalism on eve of 33–5;

Index 171 religious renaissance during 1–10; ROC and Soviet foreign policy during 63–5; samizdat during 115–17 Perestroika: New Thinking for our Country and the World (1987) 8, 10n15 Peter the Great 12–13 Peterburgskii Monarkhicheskii Tsentr (St. Petersburg Monarchic Centre) 123 Petr, Hegumen 146 Petrograd 19, 61, 136 Petrov, Sergei Georgievich 98 photojournalism 81, 88–9, 92–3, 98; media debate through 101; religious education and 105; themes covered by 82 Pimen (Patriarch) 32, 40, 44, 47–8, 60–3, 73, 77n20–8n67, 84–6, 93, 96, 107, 110n19–14n152, 126, 136 Pipes, Richard 12, 35n3 Pitirim of Volokolamsk 60, 62, 65, 102, 127 Plenum of the USSR Communist Party Central Committee on Nationalities Issues 107 pluralism 93–4, 109, 147–8 Pokrov 17, 99, 113n113 Pokrovskii, Mikhail 17 Polish National Party 121 Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth 12 politics: Church and 105–7; religion and 132 Polosin, Viacheslav 58n95, 124, 141n98 Pomestnyi Sobor (Local Council) 46 Pomosch Golodaiuschim (Aid for the Starving) 18 Pop i rabotnik (Priest and the workmen, novel) 103 Pope John Paul II 47 Popov, Viktor 130 Pospielovsky, Dimitry 56n12, 67, 76n1– 7n41, 115 post-Khrushchev’s period and revival of Russian nationalism 31–3 Potapov, Viktor 95, 112n87 Pravda (Truth) 80 Pravoslavnaiia Beseda (Orthodox Discourse) 105 Pravoslavnyi Natsional’no Patrioticheskii Front-Pamiat’ (Orthodox National Patriotic Front-Memory) 121

pre-perestroika period 117–19 “Press and Mass Media” Law 94 property return, issue of 50–2, 70, 82, 87–93, 130–2 Public Reception for the Assistance to Christians (PRAC) 131 publishing activity of Moscow Patriarchate 72–3 Publishing Department of the Moscow Patriarchate 44, 84, 143 Pugo, Boris 65 Put’ (The Way) 123, 125, 133, 135 radical informal groups 120 Radonezh association 134 Radonezhskii, Sergii 51 Rahr, Gleb 20, 36n27–8n74 Ramet, Sabrina 40, 55n1–6n16 Rasputin, Valentin 32, 122 “Razrushennyi Khram” (“The Destroyed Church”) 91 Reagan, Ronald 63, 85, 96 Red Army 22–5 Red Army Fund 22 Referendum—Zhurnal nezavisimykh mnenii (Referendum—Journal of independent opinions) 124 reforms in legislation 132–3 rehabilitation of Church: before and during World War II 20–3 religion: and Bolshevism 15–20; change in official Soviet policy towards ROC and 40–55; formation of official policy towards 41–2; Gorbachev’s attitude towards 8–10; Khrushchev’s policy towards 30–1; from late Brezhnev period to millennium celebrations (1981–1988) 42–5; Marxist–Leninist approaches towards 118–19, 127, 131; millennium celebrations, in 1988 45–7; and nationalism 1, 117–19; new legislation on 52–3; official state attitude towards 2; and politics 132; and Russian nationalism 33–5 Religion in Secular Archives 2, 10n3 religiosity 8, 17, 28 religious associations and groups 33, 52 religious education 73–4, 93, 101, 104–5, 133–4; issues of charity and 105

172 Index religious-historical-cultural monuments, return of 50–2, 70, 87–93 religious holidays 99–100 religious memorials, restoration of 96–101 “Religious Politics—Problems and Perspectives” conference 132 religious renaissance, during perestroika 1–10 religious revival 10, 22, 25 religious service 143–4 religious societies, registration of 49–50 repentance, theme of 100–1, 128–9 Republican People’s Party of Russia 128 return of church property 50–2, 64 Revolution 16 RIU-O (Russian Imperial Union-Order) 123 RKhDD (Russian Christian Democratic Movement) 123, 128 Rodina (Motherland) 117 Rodnye Prostory (Dear Land) 121, 126, 133, 140n71 Romanov, Vladimir Kirrilovich 123 Rossiiskii Imperskii Soiuz-Orden (Russian Imperial Union-Order or RIU-O) 123 Rossiiskii Narodnyi Front (The Russian People’s Front) 50 Rossiiskoe Khristianskoe Democraticheskoe Dvizhenie (Russian Christian Democratic Movement, RKhDD) 123 Rozenbaum, Yuri 52, 58n76 Rozov, Archdeacon 16 RSFSR Constitution 18 Russia: Christianisation of 21; church– state relations in 12–35; Civil War (1918–1921) 17; socialist revolution in 14; see also specific entries Russian Academy of Science 3, 117, 144 Russian Christian Democratic Movement 123, 129 Russian Christian spirituality 125 Russian ethos 124 Russian National Democratic Party programme 127 Russian national identity 55, 122–5; rebuilding 128–9 Russian nationalism 1, 3–4, 10n10, 26, 31–3, 38n97–9n139, 80, 86, 115, 117–

18, 138n1–9n30, 142; Khrushchev’s anti-religious policy and 26–31, 38n102; post-Khrushchev’s period and revival of 31–3; religion and 33–5 Russian nationalistic thought, trends of 117–18 Russian Orthodox autocracy (samoderzhavie) 125, 128 Russian Orthodox Christmas 99 Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) 1, 11n30–12, 16, 18, 21, 24–5, 27–8, 33, 37n54, 40, 42, 60, 63, 66–7, 86, 90, 93–4, 103, 115, 124, 143–4; as agent of historical memory 83, 96, 101, 109; as aid to Soviet foreign policy 25–6, 60, 62–4, 76, 83–5, 96, 115; and August putsch 65; change in social activity of 75; churches and monasteries returned to 51, 85, 88, 90; contribution to Soviet foreign policy 84–5, 115; ecumenical ties of 59–60, 66; establishment of Council for the Affairs of ROC 24; establishment of radio station 134; financial situation and activity 71–2; under German occupation 22; internal affairs of 68–9; involvement in politics 106, 132; and its social/political role 101, 106, 109; leaders 18, 20, 62; legal and administrative status of 69–71; maintaining anti-Bolshevik attitude 15; national-religious idea of 13–14; new Statute of 143; official events coverage 93–4; property return to 87–93; publishing activity 72–3; relations with ROCA 67–8, 136–8; role in Soviet propaganda operation 24; social role of 133–5; Soviet attitude towards 24; and Soviet authorities 23; and Soviet foreign policy during perestroika 63–5; and Soviet media 82; and state authorities 14, 16, 35; state policy towards 40–55; and USSR’s national question 107–10 Russian Orthodox Church Abroad (ROCA) 60, 63, 67–8, 115, 124, 136–8, 145 Russian Orthodoxy 3, 9, 14, 20, 22, 24, 26, 31, 33–4, 54–5n4, 68, 101; change in Soviet policy towards (pre-war period) 20, 24; as components of Russian national identity 142; ideological

Index 173 discussion in alternative press, dealing with three issues 124; and Leninism 118; and nationalism during perestroika 119–24; and Russian national idea 119; and Stalin 24 Russian patriotic movement, trends in 120 Russkaia Partia (Russian Party) 121 Russkie Vedomosti (The Russian Herald) 121, 133, 139n58 Russkii Kurier (Russian Courier) 124, 133 Russkii Vestnik (Russian Herald) 25, 38n86 Russkoe Osvoboditel’noe Dvizhenie (Russian Liberation Movement) 122, 133 Rutskoi, Aleksandr 65 Rybakov, Anatolii 7 Ryzhkov, Nikolai 44–5 Sakharov, Andrei 113n112, 116 sam-sebia-izdat (self-publishing) 115 samizdat during perestroika period 115–18 samoderzhavie (Russian Orthodox autocracy) 125, 128 Sasakawa Health Fund (Japan) 75 sblizhenie, concept of 31 Schipkov, Aleksandr 130, 140n88 scientific communism 117 “Sdelaem zemnoi dom bezopasnym” (“Let us make our earthly home safe”) 83, 110n17 secular and spiritual authorities 59 “Selskii Batiushka,” Literaturnaia Gazeta 105, 113n147 Sergianism 134, 136 Sergii (Metropolitan) 22–4, 26, 30, 40, 51, 59, 62, 64, 136 Shafarevich, Igor 125, 131, 139n56 Shakhnazarov, Georgii 7 Shastin, Anatolii 122 Shelikhov, Grigorii 63 Shibaev, Vladimir 104 Shimanov, Gennady 117–19, 138n21 Sidaryk, K.V. 121 Sidorenko, Valentina 122 Silaev, Ivan 61, 93 Skliarov, Yurii 45 sliyanie, concept of 31 Slovo (The Word) 45

“Slovo o Polku Igoreve” (The Tale of Igor’s Campaign) 54, 97 sobornost’ (togetherness) 13, 66, 70, 118 social Christianity 132 social mobilisation 83 social role of ROC 129, 133–6 socialist revolution 14, 20 society, church and 74–6 Soiuz Khristianskogo Vozrozhdenia (Union of the Christian Revival) 121 Sokolov, Vladimir 122 Soloukhin, Vladimir 32, 34, 39n131 Solovetskii Monastery 88, 90 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr 7, 11n28, 33, 90, 127, 140n75 Solzhenitsyn-Shafarevich group 33 Souiz Venedov (Venedy Union) 121 sovereignty 18 Sovetskaia Bashkiriia (Soviet Bashkiriia) 50 Sovetskaia Rossiia (Soviet Russia) 36n28, 80–2, 85–6, 88, 92–3, 96–7, 101–2, 106, 109, 111n34–14n150 Soviet authorities 2, 15, 21–3, 26–9, 30, 40, 44–5, 47–9, 51–2, 55 Soviet Bible Society 72–3 Soviet Charity and Health Fund 75, 102 Soviet Cultural Fund 62, 88 Soviet foreign policy: goals, promotion of 83–5; and ROC 63–5 Soviet media 48; coverage of Aleksandr Men’s murder 94–5; coverage of millennium celebrations 85–7; coverage of property return 91–3; Gorbachev used as media for reforming system 80; Moscow Patriarchate and 80–110; photojournalism 81–2; political censorship, demise of 82; promoting creation of unofficial groups 83; ROC and 63; as tool for social mobilisation 83 Soviet Union 8; church–state relations in 83; see also under Russia Soviet unofficial press, during perestroika period 116 Stalin: anti-Zionist policy 121; Khrushchev’s personal attack on 31; legislation on religious cults 43, 132; policy of tolerance towards religion 21; positive attitude towards Church 26;

174 Index realised value of Russian Orthodoxy 24; support of Church officials and 103 state apparatus 1–2, 12, 42, 60 Steblin-Kamenskii, Prof. 131 Steniaev, Oleg 130 Stolypin, Petr 122 Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) 63 Strukova, Elena 116, 138n8 Struve, Nikolai 95, 112n89 suicides, children’s 134 Svobodnaia Rossia (Free Russia) 121 symphonia, idea of 12–13, 36n6, 142, 150n37 Synodal Department for Church’s Relations with Society and Mass Media 146 Tenditnik, Nadezhda 122 theological academies 33, 73–4, 78n71, 102, 129, 131, 147 “Theory of Official Nationality” 14 Third Rome 34, 86, 125, 142 Tikhon (patriarch) 15–16, 18–20, 26, 36n22 Timasheff, N. S. 21, 37n58 Together for Peace (Italy) 75 Tolgskii Monastery 88 Trinity Lavra of St. Sergius 97–8 Trud (Labour) 2, 80–2, 85–9, 92–3, 95–6, 98–9, 100–1, 104, 106–9, 111n28– 14n148 True Orthodox Church 51 Tsar Nikolai II: canonisation of 136; murder of 125–6 Tsentr Khranenia Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (Centre for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation) 41 Tsipin, Vladislav 2, 10n8, 36n31, 38n107– 9n111, 56n19, 76n3–8n45 Tsygankov, Andrei 40, 55n3 Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) 66, 107–8 Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) 66, 107 Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church 108 Uniate Church 44, 47, 54, 108 The Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods 75

unity 13 unofficial press, during perestroika period 116 USSR 2–3, 5–6; bishops in 20; Gorbachev’s attitude towards religion and nationality question in 8–10; national question and ROC 107–10; outbreak of German attack on 22; unification of 22; see also under Russia USSR Supreme Soviet Decree (1943), Article 19 of 30 Vagin, Evgenii 33 Valaam Monastery 63, 89–90 Vasiel’ev, Vladimir 121 Veche group 117–19, 138n15–19n29, 122, 125, 133, 138n15–9n29 Vella, Stephen 2, 10n9 Veniamin of Petrograd 19, 61, 136 “Veriu” (I believe) 103–4, 113n138 Verkhovskii, Aleksandr 145, 149n12 Viacheslav Pietzukh, “Vtoraia Zapoved” (1991) 94, 112n82 Vinogradov, Viktor 32 Vitalii (Metropolitan) 137, 141n119 Vladimir (Prince) 63, 92 Vladimir of Kiev 15, 19, 136 Volodin, Eduard 137, 141n120 von Seth, Rutger 82, 110n13 Vorotyntsov, S. 121 Vserossiiskoe Obschestvo Okhrany Pamiatnikov Istorii i Kultuy (the AllRussian Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments) 117 VSKhSON (All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People) 118–19, 138n20 Vvedenskaia church 50 Vybor (Choice) 123 Wallace, Daniel 69, 78n51 Werth, Alexander 23, 38n78 Wimbush, S. E. 31, 39n127 World Bible Conference in Minsk 66, 77n35 World Council of Churches (WCC) 30, 66, 75, 83 World War II: rehabilitation of Church before and during 20, 22, 25–6, 31, 35

Index 175 Yakovlev, Alexander 6–7, 44–5, 57n47, 111n51, 127 Yakunin, Gleb 31, 39n125, 41, 45, 123, 130, 135 Yanov, Aleksandr 118 Yeltsin, Boris 52, 62, 65, 68, 127, 131 Yermogen (archbishop) 29 Yosifo-Volotskii Monastery, in Volokolamsk 127 Youth Department of the Moscow Patriarchate 146 Yuvenalii (Metropolitan) 46, 86 Zabello, Vasilii 122 Zaleskii, Aleksei 130

Zaslavskaya, Olga 116, 138n4 Zemlia (Land) 122, 133, 139n47 Zemschina (The Land) 121, 125, 133, 140n60 Zemskii Sobor (Land Council) 121 Zernov, Nicholai 13, 29, 36n8 zero-based budgeting 8 Zhenochin, Mikhail 70, 78n57 Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii 24, 59, 61, 68, 71–2, 76n2–7n16 Zionism 119, 125–6 Zverev, A. 122