Russia in Transition : Regional Integration, Media Censorship and Culture Institutes [1 ed.] 9781443863834, 9781443851541

Citation preview

Russia in Transition

Russia in Transition: Regional Integration, Media Censorship and Culture Institutes

Edited by

Feng-Yung Hu

Russia in Transition: Regional Integration, Media Censorship and Culture Institutes, Edited by Feng-Yung Hu This book first published 2013 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2013 by Feng-Yung Hu and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-5154-X, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-5154-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ....................................................................................................... vii Part I: Regional Integration and International Security Chapter One ................................................................................................. 3 Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition? Implications from Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) — The Prospects and Problems in China-Russia Relations with a US Factor Feng-Yung Hu Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 49 Military Crisis in North-eastern Region: Russia’s Role in APR and How Does Russia Look at Kim Jong-Un’s Regime? Feng-Yung Hu Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 79 The Problems of Globalization for Regional Integration: A Russian Perspective Feng-Yung Hu and Vladimir Artemov Chapter Four ............................................................................................ 101 Russia and Regional Cooperation in East Asia after Crisis Ekaterina Koldunova Part II: Media Censorship and Culture Institutes Chapter Five ......................................................................................................111 Russian News Censorship in the Era of Anti-Terror Feng-Yung Hu Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 131 Russian Crisis Communication: Interaction between Federal Television and President Putin in the Beslan Hostage Crisis Feng-Yung Hu

vi

Table of Contents

Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 151 The Relationship between Putin’s Media Reforms and His Ideological Tendency Feng-Yung Hu and Wu Fei Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 163 Social Transformation and Citizen Participation: The Culture Institutes and Advertising in Russia Larisa Fedotova

PREFACE

The book entitled “Russia in Transition: Regional Integration, Media Censorship and Culture Institutes” is an attempt to discuss the context of transition in the period of the last two decades in Russia, and give the panorama of Putin’s ruling ideology in national and social development by examining his regional policy and media policy diplomatically and domestically. Russia is trying her best to be a modern and civilized country where problems hindering the purpose might still exist. Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore the fact that Russia is becoming a normal and new style country in the post-Cold War world and has showed her influence on international agenda. It is time for us to re-examine the country with a new idea and conception to face her in the globalized world. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia as the successor of the USSR suddenly lost the geopolitical superiority and dominant position both in Central Asia and in Southern Asia. In the 90s of the last century, president Yeltsin focused his efforts on democratization and liberalism, establishing the free economic market institutes, and this provided an opportunity for Russia to process the political and economic transformation in order to enter the system of the Western world. From the new millennium, Vladimir Putin and his administration created a national strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region and this strategy is reflected in his foreign policy conducted in CIS and the Far East region of Russia under cooperation and competition with China. In Chapter One, the author tries to analyse the perspectives and problems of SCO to stress that Russia will strengthen her efforts in energy strategy, broadening markets, and establishing security mechanisms, and this will challenge China’s status in SCO where Russia and the Central Asian countries have completed economic and military integration as a whole space. The Russia-China relations will have an influence on US rebalancing policy because China’s territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific region have aroused tension, and this uncertainty will challenge US power in this region. USChina competition makes Russia become a balancer. The Russia-ChinaUS triangle of relationship might decide the future world map concerning

viii

Preface

non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and fighting against terrorists. In Chapter Two, the author tries to understand the role of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region (APR); how Russia looks at North Korea’s threat and uses her possible influence on regional stability. The author assumes that Russia will keep her traditional foreign policy to solve the regional problems and conflicts. The positive approach toward Kim Jong-un’s regime is to restart the Six–Party Talks negotiation through Russia-China’s improved mutual constructive partnership. In the process of resuming multiple talks, the United States and the Western European countries might still play crucial roles in persuading Kim to give up provocation and to go back to the talks. Russia might play the role of insisting on a peaceful solution and reducing nuclear technology use. China might have more influence in her soft power and traditional military power on North Korea. Nevertheless, resuming the peaceful talks and maintaining the Northeastern Asian region will still be processed in the cooperation and negotiation under the framework of understanding among Russia, China, and the United States of America. In Chapter Three, the authors try to stand in the Russian position to understand the psychological aspect of the Russian people facing the strong trend of globalization. In the period of the USSR, the new world information and communication world were established by Russia supporting the developing countries. After the collapse of the USSR, the world came to be dominated by the US-led Western countries. Russia tries to resume its influence by calling for the multiple polarity of the globe, and this idea is supported by China. This cooperation between China and Russia might change the world order again, and this might threaten US traditional interests in Asia, Africa, and South America. The author finds that the political convergence and conflict between Russia and the United States is becoming a more vivid trend in the process of globalization in Putin’s ruling era than economic and cultural function in Yeltsin’s era. In Chapter Four, the author tries to explain the role of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region. This strategy might be fulfilled by developing the Far East region of Russia with the geopolitical superiority in North-eastern Asia and the oil-exporting potential in this region. This idea might be carried out to strengthen Russia’s influence in Asia through her broadening energy market here. The energy strategy is based on the good relationship both with Central Asia but also with China simultaneously. Russia’s AsiaPacific strategy is reflected in consolidating her role in SCO and BRICKS.

Russia in Transition

ix

Russia-China relations and influence are discussed in the first chapter of this book. The perspective of Russia’s Asia-Pacific strategy is connected with the Far East development in different areas. In Chapter Five, the author expresses that media control and news censorship have been coming back, under Putin’s regime, concerning national security issues. The idea is realized by the nationalization of media ownership, the ideology of national security connected with ethics (privacy, human lives, psychology, etc.), and the social responsibility of media. Putin regards terrorism as the most dangerous element in his ruling period. The liberalism and professionalism of the media, which had been formed in Yeltsin’s regime, would challenge Putin’s ruling ability. Putin and media elites have a consensus in professionalism and enterprises for development, but disagreement on how to define the boundary between national security and press liberty to protect human rights and civil society. Therefore, how to limit liberalism and keep professionalism is the compromise between Putin’s administration and liberal media elites. In Chapter Six, the author finds that the Beslan hostage crisis changed media ecology entirely, and media law became the fighting grounds between the government and media. The author attempts to explore the relationship between the Russian state media (television as the main governmental ideological control institute and entertainment tool for the majority audience) and Putin’s administration. The author finds that the state television played the role of reducing the pressure of people’s doubt in crisis and this helped a lot for Putin to solve the problems and complete the rescue job. Putin’s media policy is to control the state media and establish the state media image in the public view. This would help Putin control the public opinion in the policy-making process or in any kind of crisis condition. The freedom of the press might concede to national security under the conception of ethics and social responsibility of the media. In Chapter Seven, the authors analyse the controlling institutes and the supporting point to conduct control and management. The authors find that completing the will of Putin and shaping the ideology for Russian national development determined the media ecology. Thus, the authors aim to discuss Putin’s intention in building nationalism as the new ideology instead of democracy and liberalism. How to control media ownership to propaganda his ideology is an important job for consolidating his power. The commercial media is the bridge and mediator among the government

x

Preface

structures and nongovernmental organizations. The central government takes use of the central and state media to control the local autonomies in Russia. Therefore, Putin needs state media to complete his central management under his ruling will. The vertical control (ownership, technology, printers, management of personnel, budget, etc.) remains a vivid characteristic in Russia. In Chapter Eight, the author uses advertising as the study object to reflect the traditional mentality of the Russian people. The cultural and psychological differences among the regions determined how the Russian people looked at the function of advertisement as the positive cultural and social institutes in their daily life. The author wants to stress that Russia might still be far from civil society; however, the Russian people might have a hope to see the coming of civil society through the media’s social function. The social function of advertisement might be a new direction in Russia because in the past decades, in the Russian mind, advertisement was regarded as a commercial monster and evil from the capitalist world, having a negative image in the Russian world. After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian advertisement market became fast-growing. Because of the state media, television might attract most of the advertisement market. The author has a tender hope to see that advertisement should take the social responsibility for not only selling products, but also building the right conception of a new idea of civil society to protect human rights. So the role of media and advertisement still has creativity and potential, playing the role of cultural institutes for improving the living standard of the public in Russia. In the conclusion, while discussing the reforms and changes of Russia in the past decades, we could look forward to seeing a much more positive role that Russia could play in the world system, and not using the hostile attitude toward the world which was shaped in the Cold War. Nevertheless, how Russia should participate in the international community is still a long road and this needs to be observed and analysed. Peace and stability is the long-term goal of humanity, which will never die. As Shakespeare said in his poem: “From fairest creatures we desire to increase, That thereby beauty’s rose might never die.”

Finally, the author would like to take this opportunity to express her gratitude to the following fellows for their kind promotion and support in the author’s recent research activities and international events: the

Russia in Transition

xi

president of Yuan Ze University—Professor Jin-Fu Chang; the former president of Yuan Ze university and Professor of Tsing Hua University炼 Tsong-Ping Perng; Director of Secretariat and Personnel Office—K. Robert Lai; Director of General Studies of Yuan Ze University炼Professor Lin-Wen Wang; Director of Research and Development at Yuan Ze University炼Professor Hsing-Yi Chen; former Director of Research and Development at Yuan Ze University炼Professor Yi-Ming Sun; former Director of the Office of International Affairs炼Professor N. Allen Yu, Dean of the College of Social Science and Humanity A-Ron Liu; former Dean Deng Wang Hsieh; Professor Chia-Huang Wang; Professor ChangHsian Sun; Professor Ding-shi Wang and Professor Yang-Fang Lin at National Chengchi University, Professor and Dean of Russian Studies Graduate school at Chinese Culture University炼Hsi-mei Li; Professor Jaw-Lin Chen; Professor Ay-moh Wang; Professor Ching-Shan Yang. Thanks to Distinguished Professor of General Education炼Chun-chieh Huang (Dean of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, Director of the Program of East Asian Confucianisms, National Taiwan University), Professor and Director of Institute of Political Science of SINICA—Yu-Shan Wu; Professor Chih-yu Shih, the executive director of the Center for China Studies and Cross Taiwan Strait Relations, with NTU professors’ promotion, the author could be invited into the adjunct faculty and research centre at National Taiwan University. The author also would like to give her sincere thanks to the teachers and research partners at Alma Mater-MGIMO University; they are: the Rector of MGIMO-University炼Anatoly Torkunov; Counselor-Chief for the office of Rectorat and Vice Rector of MGIMO-University炼Artem Malgin; Vice Rector of MGIMO-University—Andrei Silantiev; former chief Professor of International Journalism Faculty and advisor of the dissertation of the author炼Professor Vladimir Artemov; Dean of the School of Political Science at MGIMO-University炼Alexey Voskressensky and his vice Dean Ekaterina Koldunova; President of Journalism School at Lomonosov Moscow State UniversityɡProfessor Yassen N. Zassoursky; senior researcher and Professor Larisa Fedotova; many thanks to the vice president of “Unity for Russia” Foundation (Russia ruling party think tank) and Director of “Russkiy Mir” FoundationɡGeorge Toloraya; many thanks to Professor Victor Cha at Asian Studies Program of Georgetown University, providing an opportunity to conduct research under his supervision for a semester in Washington D. C. Thanks to their help and support, the author could keep research interest and enthusiasm for Russia

xii

Preface

and Russian studies. Here it is deserving to mention Professor Wu Fei; he is an alumni of MSU and Professor at China JiNan University. He is a stable research partner and should always be given appreciation. Thanks to my whole family’s tolerance, I could be dedicated to writing and preparing this work. Frankly speaking, the book could be published to the mass readers mainly thanks to the kind encouragement of the Cambridge Scholars Publishing, therefore, the author takes this opportunity to express the sincerest appreciation for administrator Carol Koulikourdi’s professional, enthusiastic encouragement and her continuous assistance. Without her understanding and kindest help, the author could not have this honour of publishing the book at Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Especially with the researcher being a non-English speaker, having Chinese-speaking nationality, being a Russian language learner and a Russian study researcher, one could imagine how difficult the research might be to conduct through the intercultural, ideological and transnational barriers. Finally, the editor wishes to express her most sincere gratitude to the typesetting manager Amanda Millar, and her professional work to help push the book to press. Nevertheless, the book cannot avoid mistakes and subjective opinions, the responsibility of which will be taken by the author. Feng-Yung Hu (च೹ྻ) Yuan Ze University, Taiwan, ROC

PART I: REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

CHAPTER ONE REGIONAL INTEGRATION: COOPERATION OR COMPETITION? IMPLICATIONS FROM SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO) — THE PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS IN CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONS WITH A US FACTOR1 FENG-YUNG HU

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT COLLEGE OF GENERAL STUDIES YUAN ZE UNIVERSITY (YZU), TAIWAN ADJUNCT RESEARCHER AT NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY (NTU), TAIWAN

In the last decade, China-Russia relations might be examined in the framework of SCO for pursuing their geopolitical, economic and military interests in the trend of regional integration for both China and Russia. After the Soviet Union’s disintegration, these two countries are seeking more positive cooperation for their national security, bilateral trade, counter-terrorism actions, balance of US unipolar power, global participation and governance for a broader range to improve their domestic development simultaneously. With the importance of the Asia-Pacific region in the world economy and the escalation of wars under the uncertainty of North Korea’s nuclear weapons threat with other controversial territorial disputes in East China Sea and South China Sea, China turned out to be the centre and target of the US implementing a rebalancing2 policy toward the Asia-Pacific region in solving these problems. The situation in this region is complicated, for

4

Chapter One

China is rising to become the regional hegemony, and this will challenge the traditional power of the US regional system. China is constructing the conception of a “Chinese dream”3 as the ideology of national growth. China was concerned that America’s renewed focus on its alliances in Asia might be aimed at China and disturb the “Chinese dream” of national rejuvenation.4 Simultaneously, the role of Russia becomes more and more important in the world system and regional governance5. After the global financial crisis, the EU was severely impacted by this and Russia started to focus her eyes on the Asia-Pacific region for the broader market, but at the same time consolidating the traditional sphere in Central Asia as the continuity of her foreign policy. China-Russia’s economic partnership shows their influence on regional development. While Russia is conducting the Asia-Pacific strategy as part of her ‘double-headed eagle’ Eurasian policy by establishing a Eurasian Union 6 modelled as the European Union, Russian influence will be an active factor for China in rebalancing the relationships with the United States. This study is to discover the meaning of SCO for regional integration and its influence on the regional security for the Russia-China-US triangle of relations as well.

Regional Integration for China and Russia In the regional integration studies of the 70s, the regional organization7 was the focus and was studied as the necessary approach for understanding integration in the region. Countries based on the regional organization are working together to achieve the goals of economic, political and military cooperation. Regional integration is the process by which two or more nation-states agree to cooperate and work closely together to achieve peace, stability and wealth. Usually integration involves one or more written agreements that describe the areas of cooperation in detail, as well as some coordinating bodies representing the countries involved8. So, the oneness of unity for states might be regarded as an effective and beneficial way to cooperate. China is isolated by her neighbouring relationships geopolitically and ideologically. SCO members have their common boundaries and need to establish a mutual trust mechanism to maintain their boundary security and develop the boundary trade for better contact and military reduction. Therefore SCO is the most important

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

5

regional security organization for China to maintain his internal and external stability. Russia might have more ambitions to build her Eurasian space for her national demands. SCO has its function of collective security. Collective security is more ambitious than systems of alliance9 security or collective defence for establishing an international collective organization for their common interests regionally and globally. Obviously, China and Russia play more and more important roles in the Asia-Pacific region, where the United States is implementing a rebalancing policy under the Obama administration. At the end of the Cold War, the normalization process was realized by the negotiations between Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping after the ideological fighting and boundary military conflicts in 60s and 70s. The state level relations were more important than the regional interactions. Since the Soviet Union’s disintegration in the early 1990s, the two countries have for the most part acted on the basis of shared interests—particularly in maintaining stability in Central Asia, whose energy supplies are vital for both countries’ economic development.10 After Putin took the presidency in 2000, resuming the former control in Central Asia and balancing the westernized foreign policy toward the East have been the priorities for the Russian Federation. With the strengthened potential influence of the Asia-Pacific countries on the world, how to accelerate the function of the neighbouring regions between the Russian Far East (RFE) and Chinese North East (CNE) has been put on the agenda, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis. Since Putin has returned to the Kremlin in 2012, the tendency of Russia to consolidate the integration in the Central Asian region and broaden the influential sphere in the Asia-Pacific region will complicate the future Russia-China-US relations and other multiple relations concerning the competition of these powers and rebalance among them. With the rise of China, how she will change the regional system in this region has an impact on other national interests and security. China-Russian relations might be the power of equilibrium for the US with their alliances. Therefore, the future perspective relations between Russia and China deserve to be explored prudentially. Despite the fact that Russia and China have contradictions, the SCO and their energy monopoly has disturbed the balance in Asia. Obviously, China’s rise has changed the traditional balance in Asia after the Second World War and this has aroused suspicion and difficulty to integrate with

6

Chapter One

other countries. Reducing economic dependence on China has become a common concern for many countries, and this will challenge China’ economic growth in the future. Therefore, China must think of regional level development as the engine of the whole country’s economic growth and national development. Russia also needs to think about the Far East to be the frontier for integrating Russia into Asia. Economic issues become the prominent factors at a regional level instead of immigrant issues between Russia and China. Russia is a trans-regional great power with some vital national interests in many regions. In addition, Russia is China’s biggest neighbour state. Thus, in terms of region, some strategic overlap cannot be avoided between Russia and China. Among these strategic overlap regions, at least three regions are closed linked with China’s national security. The first strategic overlap region is North-east Asia. Some complicated and sensitive international issues are sparked in this region, such as the North Korean issue, the Sino-Korean-Japanese historical issue, a serial of disputed territory issues, and so on. The second strategic overlap region is Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Strategic overlap regions between Russia and China are also impacting China’s political security.11 At the regional level, the development of economic and other ties between the contiguous Russian Far East (RFE) and Chinese North East (CNE) has lagged behind breakthroughs at the national level. The improving state level relations have been complicated by fluctuations in interregional relations. Economic cooperation and regional development are more prominent, while Chinese migration and associated problems are much less prominent.12 Economy issues of trade and investment are the central concerns in both countries’ media coverage. In both Chinese national and regional media coverage, the first frame emphasizes a combination of Russian natural resources and land, and Chinese expertise, labour, goods and capital. The predominant frame in both Russian national and regional newspapers is the idea that economic cooperation between Russia and China is a necessity for the development of the country’s economy.13 The second salient issue is law and order, which represents the unofficial economy. The Russian national media emphasizes increasing law-enforcement cooperation between China and Russia, particularly

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

7

regarding international organized crime and terrorism, whilst discussing illegal migration into Russia as a serious problem for the country generally. In contrast, China stresses the hard-working of the Chinese workers in RFE.14 The third issue is the regional one. Both sides emphasize that the regional cooperation in the contiguous RFE and CNE is beneficial for both countries because it acts as the engine of economic growth in both countries. The forth concerned level is related to state interaction. China’s media pay more attention to the traditional friendship, which is based on increasing military cooperation and the final demarcation of the Eastern border. The Russian media pay more attention to the military cooperation and confidence-building measures than the border demarcation and territory concession. Therefore, it seems that Russia regards mutual trust and cooperation mechanism building as the preconditions of selling weapons and national resources, however, China focuses more on the concrete benefits which can be obtained by money. The conclusion showed that the treatment of RFE – CNE relations as a priority area in the strategic partnership between the two countries is encouraging. However, whether the document will serve to level regional expectations about cooperation and substantially improve the potential for regionalism in the RFE – CNE in the long term remains to be seen. 15 Traditionally, China relies on Russia to dissolve the international isolation, and this ideological, physiological and geographical intimate relationship easily makes China seek help from Russia. Nowadays, Russia’s attitude toward China in terms of selling weapons and resources deeply influences the balance and stability in Asia. From time to time, China regards the Sino-Russian relations as the cornerstone of maintaining stability and security in Asia. In other words, framing the strategic and constructive partnership between Russia and China is the protective umbrella for China to face the pressure from the United States concerning of territorial disputes in the Taiwan straits, East China Sea and Southern China Sea. Undoubtedly, Russia to some degree plays a supporting and crucial role for China in the face of the American containment in the Asian Pacific region. The island disputes between Japan and China in the East China Sea also irritate China into raising its military proliferation. Japan is another external problem to worsen China-US relations. Russia’s Siberia-Pacific and Sakhalin energy strategies might have the

8

Chapter One

effect of irritating the China-Russia relations. Russia has her own strategy, and the exploration of energy and pipeline building might need to find accord with this strategy. China has no choice but to diversify her energy resources. This problem is more severe in Japan. With little in the way of domestic production of fuel, raw materials, or timber, Japan is more dependent than other major industrial nations on imports of these commodities. The rising energy and raw material prices turned Japan’s near-complete dependence on imports of these products into a source of painful costs16. But Japan’s reliance on energy import might require it to strengthen and improve its relationships with Russia. This means that Russia’s role as the regional mediator in the East-northern region is strengthened time by time. The influence of China is her soft power of economic growth. China is well ahead of Russia and India in the degree of its engagement in the global economy, including the realm of trade and investment flows. Thus, it understandably desires to play the role of the engine of the Asian economy, as well as becoming an "active growth factor" in the global economy as a whole. At the same time, however, China may experience problems in the future as it tries to consolidate positions in global economic relations. It has vulnerable areas, like a scant resource base, together with a lack of affiliation with any integration-minded regional groups. Thus, one may expect to see a marked increase in China's efforts to eliminate or minimize those problems.17 The motivation of economic factors and energy privileges make China and Russia go together easily to conquer the competition in geopolitical interests. Since the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was founded in 2001, the SCO has essentially functioned as a Chinese-Russian condominium, providing Beijing and Moscow with a convenient multilateral framework to manage their interests in Central Asia. The bilateral defence relationship has evolved in recent years to become more institutionalized and better integrated. Nevertheless, the two governments also remain suspicious about each other’s activities in Central Asia, where their state-controlled firms compete for energy resources. Russia plans to continue transforming the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which excludes China, into Central Asia’s primary multilateral security institution. Russian plans to create an EU-like arrangement among the former Soviet republics could irritate Beijing because such a development could impede China’s economic access to Central Asia.18

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

9

Collective Security and Civilization Difference The function of collective security was proposed to avoid a large-scale war happening due to the “Idealism19” theory which shaped the world system after the First World War into the “Realism” theory which was adopted after the Second World War. Realism is an international relations theory which claims that world politics is driven by competitive self-interest20. After the Second World War, the two military defence system camps between the US-led NATO and USSR-led Warsaw Treaty Organization divided the world into bipolarity. After the Cold War ended, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization disintegration, the world became unipolar under the military actions of NATO beyond the UN system, according to Russia and China’s proclamation concerning the 1991 Persian Gulf War. To balance the power, the new collective security organization might meet the demands of national defence and regional security both for Russia and China. Collective security is an approach for striving for maintenance of peace, in which participants assent to any breach of the peace as the concern of all the participating states that will result in a collective action.21 The concept of “collective security” forwarded by men such as Michael Joseph Savage, Martin Wight, Immanuel Kant, and Woodrow Wilson, is deemed to apply interests in security in a broad manner, to “avoid grouping powers into opposing camps, and refusing to draw dividing lines that would leave anyone out.” The term “collective security” has also been cited as a principle of the United Nations, and the League of Nations before that. 22 As a matter of fact, the concept of collective security has a long history of development, albeit in different forms and as such it is not a recent creation. The treaties of Westphalia signed in 1648 to end the wars among the European states, the League of Nations that was established following the end of the First World War, and the United Nations that was established following the end of the Second World War, were basically intended to stop the recurrence of wars that were evident prior to the signing of the treaties. In the earlier treaties such as the Westphalia Treaty, attempts were made to avert future wars by proposing the recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty of states and equal recognition of religions. In the 20th century, the treaties that were signed following the end of the two major world wars tried to come up with permanent organs

10

Chapter One

that were mandated to safeguard peace and security. The principle upon which these organs were formed was that of collective security.23 According to Morgenthau (1948), Organiski (1960), and Neuhold (2000), the following are the main prerequisites: 1. The first important requirement is that the collective must have overwhelming military capacity when compared to the country or the group causing the threat. The collective must be able to demonstrate that the aggressor will face defeat if they resort to force to change the existing system or order. This implicitly means that any state that has the potential to outweigh the military capacity of any collective must not be left out of the collective security system. 2. The members of the collectivity must refrain from taking any unilateral action without the authorization of other members unless the action relates to the basic right of self-defence. This principle of collective security is intended to act as a check on the likely excesses of particular states against others. The challenge to this principle has however been the elusive interpretation of what constitutes the right to self-defence and the frequent manipulation of that understanding to sanction unilateral actions by powerful member states in a bid to defend their interests. 3. The final principle of collective security is the aspect of genuine international solidarity, which implies the demonstration of international oneness. States would then make decisions on the basis of international good and sacrifice national interests so that the common good is realized. This structure of collective security will therefore require material and human resources so as to ensure its objective. 24

Some assume that collective security might be challenged by terrorism and other threats beyond the traditional conception of security. International security asks for more participation of non-governmental organization. International security consists of measures taken by nations and international organizations. 25 International security cooperation usually takes one of two forms. A classical collective security organization is designed to promote international security through regulating the behaviour of its member states. A defensive security organization is designed to protect a group of states from threats emanating from a challenging state or group of states. Both forms of security cooperation bind states to act in concert with respect to threats presented by other states. The emergence of non-state actors such as terrorist or extremist

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

11

organizations challenges traditional forms of collective security. Threats from political extremism, terrorism, and outlaw organizations have grown in visibility during the past decade in the countries of Eurasia.26 In this climate of a shared sense of common threat from non-state actors, and on the background of perceived encroachment from the sole remaining Superpower, the United States, the Eurasian countries returned to the bargaining table. In these circumstances a number of security organizations already in nascent form, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures, and the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), were rapidly expanded and further institutionalized to address the new security challenges.27 After the collapse of the USSR, Russia lost the protection of the collective security system of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and how to establish the new unions with the former Soviet Union States became the imperative missions in the first decade of the post-communist era. By accounting for the deleterious effects of globalization (non-state actors) on world security, Huntington also contributes to our knowledge by updating realism. The title of the book, after all, does not just consist of The Clash of Civilizations, but the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Global politics is increasingly replicating the patterns of diversity and plurality found in domestic politics, with “one crucial difference.” It is all a question of shifting from the chaotic realm of sub-state actors to state actors, moving away from the anarchic state of affairs left by the collapse of Communism. Interestingly enough, one of the best illustrations of how this arrangement would work can be seen in his handling of the Muslim world. This includes protection for their values.28 “Globalization is a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and trans-cultural integration of human and non-human activities.” It is the process of international integration arising from the interchange of world views, products, ideas, and other aspects of culture. Put in simple terms, globalization refers to processes that increase world-wide exchanges of national and cultural resources.29 Advances in transportation and telecommunications infrastructure, including the rise of the Internet, are major factors in globalization, generating further interdependence of economic and cultural activities.30 Globalization is the

12

Chapter One

vast conception and force which makes the world more interactive and dependent. One of the concerned issues is the cultural or civilization conflicts which could damage the traditional ethics and moral principles in a certain community with strong religion. Regional integration is to avoid cultural and religious difference, and to build a common cooperative space for better development. Collective security is to achieve the goal of common interests and security under the conception of regional integration and international security, but neglects the cultural and religious differences which might lead to the conflicts of civilization indicated by Huntington. After the collapse of the USSR, the passive impression exists both in Russia and China around the ideological difference, boundary disputes and illegal trade. Therefore, Yeltsin and Jiang Zeming were anxious to repair bilateral relationships. The “Shanghai Five” cooperative mechanism occurred in this distrusting and unfriendly atmosphere, which began from the ideological debate between Mao and Khrushchev. However, these two countries’ leaders, Yeltsin and Jiang Zeming, have a good personal friendship and this helped improve the bilateral relationship and consolidate the Central Asian region, which suffers from economic and terror crises. Despite Russia and China historically having boundary disputes, Chinese philosophy had a great influence on Russia’s writers and philosophers in the 18-19th centuries, and Russia had influences on Chinese intelligentsia in 19-20th centuries. The Cultural interaction can improve the relationships between these two giant countries with ancient civilizations. From 2007, with the promotion of Russia’s Russkiy Mir foundation31 and China’s Confucius Institute32, these two countries started to hold the Russian National Year in China and the Chinese National Year in Russia, and under this cooperation framework the governmental departments and media enterprises from both counties started to cooperate. The “cultural cooperation and exchange” might avoid cultural conflicts and colonization. Ideological differences and military confrontations in Soviet time reduced bilateral trade and increased the defence budget. Due to the boundary demarcation and disarmament, Russia and China intended to establish a long-term negotiating mechanism, and SCO was established initially for resolving these disputes, then gradually developing toward

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

13

active cooperation in many areas such as conducting military operations for anti-terrorism, improving trade and economic relationships to achieve bilateral trade up to the amount of the symbolic index. Therefore, SCO is anticipated to be based on establishing the mutual trust among these countries. With Putin’s Asia-Pacific strategy and China’s new leadership, SCO will play a more and more crucial role in controlling world energy supply and international military intervention to increase their power in global governance such as in the UN Security Council. It shows that after the global financial crisis the western countries need to take Russia and China’s opinions into consideration, and the relationship between Russia and China in SCO has aroused more and more attention from the outside world. The collective security conception has been deepened in the Cold War period when the world was divided into two parts and bipolar military confrontation was formed. However, after the collapse of the USSR, the Cold War ended and the geopolitical sphere has changed a lot with the whole crisis in Russia. Russia started to consolidate the Central Asian region as her most important Eurasian foreign policy after the liberalization and democratization process in the post-communist era, and improve the relationship with China in the second ruling period of Yeltsin. Russia’s Asia-Pacific strategy was almost formed after Putin returned to Kremlin, but SCO plays an important role in establishing the mutual trust and communication between Russia and China in the past decade. After the global financial crisis and the US withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan, it seems to be that SCO plays a more and more important role not only in regional security for anti-terrorism and drug criminals, but also in the energy trade. The author attempts to analyse SCO from Russia’s political and strategic thinking to see China’s challenges and US factors in balancing the Sino-Russian relationship. This study examined the Russian attitudes toward the SCO and China’s possible responses to them. When talking about the historical disputes on borders between Russia and China, it reminds the bilateral people of the existing problems of national security and national interests with cognitive difference. Both China and Russia have acknowledged that they need to put their disputes aside and strengthen cooperation with each other in order to compete with the United States after the collapse of the USSR. Regional relations between China and Russia decide their competitiveness in the world. They must not fall into the quagmire of fighting in an ideological or geopolitical

14

Chapter One

area and lose their directions and strategies for the long-term national development. History gives them lessons to learn. For meeting the demands of the rising powers, these two countries need to cooperate with each other economically and strategically. How to improve the process of regional integration and improve the long-term relations between China and Russia is the consideration of regional collective security to achieve their global participation and governance for their domestic national development, as well as to promote the living standard and social welfare via national strategic proposals for both China and Russia.

The Short History and Organizational Framework of SCO The SCO, initially a “constructive partnership” in 1994, which was based on the bilateral Sino-Russian security cooperative arrangement and gradually developed into a multilateral framework for strategic partnerships, was upgraded to a strategic partnership in 1996, when the “Shanghai Five” was founded (with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). These states (and Uzbekistan, which became a member in 2001) together with China and Russia allied together to establish the SCO, which was designed to address the issues of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Mongolia (2004), India, Iran, Pakistan (2005) and Afghanistan (2012) are the observer states. Belarus, Sri Lanka and Turkey (2012) are the dialogue partners. SCO's predecessor, the “Shanghai Five” mechanism, originated and grew from the endeavour by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to strengthen confidence-building and disarmament in the border regions. In 1996 and 1997, their heads of state met in Shanghai and Moscow respectively and signed the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions in Shanghai and the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions in Moscow. The topics of the meeting gradually extended from building up trust in the border regions to mutually beneficial cooperation in politics, security, diplomacy, economics, trade and other areas among the five states. Subsequent annual summits of the Shanghai Five group occurred in Almaty (Kazakhstan) in 1998, in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) in 1999, and in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) in 2000.

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

15

On the fifth anniversary of the Shanghai Five in June 2001, the heads of states met in Shanghai and signed a joint declaration admitting Uzbekistan as member of the Shanghai Five mechanism and then jointly issued the Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The document announced the upgrading of the level of cooperation to more effectively seize opportunities and deal with new challenges and threats. In June 2002, the heads of SCO member states met in St. Petersburg and signed the SCO Charter, which clearly expounded the SCO purposes and principles, organizational structure, form of operation, cooperation, orientation and external relations, marking the actual establishment of this new organization in the sense of international law.33 The structure of SCO is the framework of functioning which could be divided into three parts: intergovernmental mechanism of annual summits of state heads, governments heads (Prime Ministers), meetings of heads of ministries or departments; permanent organs of Secretariat and Regional Counter-Terrorism Structures; nongovernmental institutions: SCO Business Council, SCO Interbank Consortiums and SCO Forums. From table 1 of the structure of SCO, it is possible to divide the organization into two parts or functions: affairs and security. The leaders’ summits help promote the directions. The SCO Organizational Structure Chart can be illustrated as per Table 1 (over).34 From the SCO documents, we can see that the SCO time and again is becoming a more functional and effective intergovernmental organization. However, the SCO is influenced by the international situation and Sino-Russian relations. On June 16–17, 2004, the SCO summit, held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and the staff of the Executive Committee of the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure (RCTS) was established and headquartered in Tashkent, where the US built a K-2 Karshi-Khanabad airbase after the September 11th terrorist attacks, but withdrew after the 2004 Velvet Revolution in Georgia. Russian leaders have not hidden their desire to drive the United States out of Central Asia. Moscow, for instance, was instrumental in getting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to adopt an early July resolution that called on the United States to set a deadline for withdrawal from air bases in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In making the call, Russian officials contended that Afghanistan is stabilizing, thus eliminating the strategic rationale for the continuing presence of American forces in Central Asia.35

16

Chapter One

Table 1: The Structure of SCO

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

Table 2: Annual Summit of SCO (Documents)36 SCO Documents of Annual Meetings of States Members and Heads of Governments Annual Summit Important Documents and Action Agendas 2001 1. Statement of the Heads of Governments of the Member Shanghai, States of Shanghai Cooperation Organization China 2. Declaration of the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 3. Shanghai Convention 4. Joint Statement of Heads of State of the Republic of Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzskoy Republic, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 2002 1. Joint Communiqué of the meeting of the Council of St. Petersburg, Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the SCO Member States Russia 2. TIME CHART relationship Shanghai Cooperation Organization with other international organizations and states 3. Statement of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 4. Declaration of Heads of States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 5. Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 6. Joint Statements of the Foreign Ministers of States Parties to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2003 1. Joint Communiqué of the meeting of the Council of Moscow, Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of Shanghai Russia Cooperation Organization 2. Joint Communiqué of the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the SCO Member States 3. Declaration of Heads of States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2004 1. Joint Communiqué of the Council of Heads of Tashkent, Government (Prime Ministers) of Shanghai Cooperation Uzbekistan Organization 2. Tashkent Declaration of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 3. The Regulations on Observer Status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

17

18 2005 Astana, Kazakhstan

2006 Shanghai, China

2007 Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

2008 Dushanbe, Tajikistan

2009 Yekaterinburg, Russia

Chapter One 1. Protocol on Establishment of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group between the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan9 2. Joint Communiqué of the meeting of the Council of Heads of Government / Prime Ministers / SCO 3. Declaration of the Heads of State of the Shanghai cooperation Organization 4. Joint Communiqué meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers - the Shanghai cooperation Organization 1. 1. Joint Communiqué of Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 2. Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 1. Chronicle of main events at SCO in 2007 2. Joint Communiqué of Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 3. Bishkek Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 4. Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 5. Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of the SCO and the CSTO 6. Informational Announcement for the meeting of the Council of foreign Ministers of SCO Member States 1. Chronicle of main events at SCO in 2008 2. Joint Communiqué of Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 3. Dushanbe Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Regulations on the Status of Dialogue Partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 1. Chronicle of main events at SCO in 2009 2. Joint Statement on fighting against infectious diseases in the region of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 3. SCO Joint Initiative on increasing multilateral economic cooperation in the field of tackling the consequences of the global financial economic crisis 4. Joint Communique of Meeting of the Council of the Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the SCO Member States

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

2010 Tashkent, Uzbekistan

2011 Astana, Kazakhstan

2012 Beijing, China

5. Joint Communiqué of Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 6. Yekaterinburg Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 7. Statement by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime 8. Plan of Action of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime Declaration of the special Conference on Afghanistan convened under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 1. Chronicle of main events at SCO in 2010 2. Cooperation between the United Nations and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 3. Declaration of the Tenth Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 4. Joint Communiqué of the Tenth Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 5. Joint Communique of Meeting of the Council of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the SCO Member States Joint Declaration on SCO/UN Secretariat Cooperation 1. Astana Declaration of the 10th Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Joint Communiqué of meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation commemorating the 10th anniversary of the SCO1 1. The Declaration of Heads of SCO Member States on the construction of the region of lasting peace and common prosperity 2. The Resolution on the Strategic Plan of the SCO development for the medium term 3. The resolution of the Statutes of the political and diplomatic measures and mechanisms to respond to the SCO situation that endangers peace, security and stability in the region

19

20

Chapter One 4. The resolution of the Program of cooperation in combating terrorism, separatism and extremism for 2013-2015 years 5. The resolution on the report of the SCO Secretary General on the activities of the SCO in the past year 6. The resolution on the report of the Board of the Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) activity in 2011 7. The resolution on granting observer status to Afghanistan in the organization, 8. The resolution to grant Turkey the status of dialogue partner, 9. The resolution of the SCO Secretary General and Director of the resolution of the Executive Committee of the RATS SCO.

Soon after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian “front-line” states offered over-flight and other support for coalition anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan hosted coalition troops and provided access to airbases. In 2003, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also endorsed coalition military action in Iraq. About two dozen Kazakhstani troops served in Iraq until late 2008. Uzbekistan rescinded US basing rights in 2005 after the United States criticized the reported killing of civilians in the town of Andijon. In early 2009, Kyrgyzstan ordered a US base in that country to close, allegedly because of Russian inducements and US reluctance to meet Kyrgyz requests for greatly increased lease payments. An agreement on continued US use of the Manas Transit Center was reached in June 2009. In recent years, most of the regional states also participate in the Northern Distribution Network for the transport of US and NATO supplies into and out of Afghanistan.37 With the US troops’ withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Central Asian States must take this burden of anti-terrorism and counter-international crimes, and SCO will have to fill the hole of problems left by the US The Central Asian countries suffered from terrorism and corruption which led to the colour revolution to overthrow the ruling governments. The Russia-China-U.S wrestling here has made the region complicated in political reform and transition. The former president of Kyrgyz Akaev was overthrown and fled to Russia, now working as a professor at Moscow State University. He has a political philosophy about the small country implementing his foreign policy

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

21

among the great powers and serving a place where they would be able to cooperate and coordinate their interests. He said: “I have in mind the national conception and we have applied it to our relations with Russia in the first place. Relationships with Russia are high on the list of our country's foreign policy priorities - for me that is very important. Now I would like to dwell on the subject of multi-vectorial diplomacy by which I mean the relationships between my country and the great power triangle: Russia, the US and China. I shall not go here into details of twenty-two centuries of our relations with China. At all times the trends were positive: China is our good neighbor and friend American and Russian bases on our territory appeared precisely as a result of this approach. They serve global and regional security as well as national security of Kyrgyzstan and Russia. This is very important at the time when the leaders of international terrorism remain resolved to attack our countries. We should also bear in mind that the seat of international terrorism in Afghanistan is still smoldering and poisons the atmosphere all over the world.”38

However, Central Asia might play the roles of crucial power in energy supply and anti-terrorism base for international security and regional cooperation. Russia’s president Vladimir Putin has promoted the Eurasian Union for better integration with this region. This regional integration seems to weaken the function of SCO as the energy supply actors and exclude the influence of China. However, since China still has her own soft power and economic capacity, China still has the possibility of making SCO more effective in international and collective security. The weakness of SCO might not be beneficial for regional dialogues aiming at better integration and cooperation.

Russia’s Eurasian Geopolitics and Energy Security Strategy Geopolitics is in. From Beijing to Delhi, Berlin and Paris, geopolitics is now widely used by statesmen, political analysts, and scholars alike. The precise meaning of geopolitics can vary greatly. Analysts and journalists are prone to use the term as simply a synonym for power politics. But for most, geopolitics implies a geographical imperative that in some way conditions patterns of national politics and international

22

Chapter One

relations. It suggests at a minimum that the geography of states – size, location, topography, natural conditions, resource endowment, and so on – is critical in determining both their historical evolution and their prospects for future development. In the past, scholars of geopolitics expressed these imperatives as simple axioms that were supposed to determine the fates of great states in the long run. Today’s geopoliticians are more inclined to be careful, expressing the geographical imperative as multivariate and probabilistic (and therefore less easily falsifiable) propositions. Still, at its root, geopolitics posits that location matters, and matters decisively in the long run.39 Russia’s multipolar policy consumed a great deal of the foreign ministry’s and the president’s energy, most notably during Putin’s first year in office. The rhetoric surrounding it was loud and consistent. And the policy of wooing other continental great powers like China, India, France, and Germany was supplemented by a far more controversial strategy of courting regional US adversaries like Iran and Iraq. While the overall policy could be explained partly by reference to a number of potential near-term benefits – a diplomatic bargaining ploy, a popular move with domestic constituencies, a result of incoherent policymaking institutions, an effort driven by commercial interest and the defence-industrial complex – it was consistent enough to suggest a mild version of the geopolitical heartland logic at work. That is, the policy reflected a belief that Russia could serve as a key broker in fashioning policy coalitions, not power-aggregating alliances, among major Eurasian states in opposition to the United States. Although this strategy was a shadow of the strong geopolitical language used to describe it, its outlines did correspond to the geopolitical premises that inform so much recent Russian thinking.40 Russia has always had an ambiguous relationship with Asia. By reason of its eastward expansion from the 16th century onwards, it incorporated a third of the Asian landmass into what was by culture and history a European country. In both the imperial and communist eras the predominant Russian perceptions of Asia remained rooted in European culture, including the officially sanctioned ideologies of the time. The imperialism of the 19th century and the Marxism-Leninism of the 20th were both derived from Russia's involvement in the European state and class system.41

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

23

However, consciousness of Russia's singular position between Europe and Asia, and the implications of this for its social development and external orientation, have also been constant elements in Russian political culture. There was an inherent element of geographic, as well as cultural, distinctiveness within the Slavophile movement of the 19th century, though this did not imply any preference for Asiatic culture over European culture. The primary reasons for the strengthening of the geopolitical character of the Eurasian concept from the beginning of the 20th century were the changes in the international order, including, in East Asia, the decline of Russia's long-term partner, China, and the rise of Japan. Russian expansion eastward had been driven by the traditional aims of imperialism - economic gain and territorial security - in which it had been markedly successful throughout most of the 18th and 19th centuries. With the demise of the Qing and the defeat by Japan, however, the prospect that the East might pose a threat to Russia, as it had in the pre-modern era, arose once more. The degree to which geopolitical concerns did shape Soviet foreign policy and military doctrine during the Cold War only became open for discussion in the last years of the Soviet Union.42 Central Asia is one of the world's most energy-rich regions. According to a 2008 BP energy survey, the five nations bordering the Caspian Sea--Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia--plus Uzbekistan hold roughly 21.4 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and 45 percent of the world's proven natural gas reserves. In recent years, SCO member states have sought greater energy cooperation. At a 2007 summit, the Russian president and Vladimir Putin called for an "energy dialogue, integration of our national energy concepts, and the creation of an energy club" (Eurasianet). During that meeting, member states agreed to establish a "unified energy market" for oil and gas exports, while also promoting regional development through preferential energy agreements. Some experts are concerned that a potential SCO gas cartel would pose a significant threat, especially if Iran attained full membership. "It would essentially be an OPEC with bombs," David Wall, a regional expert at the University of Cambridge's East Asia Institute, told the Washington Times in 2006.43

24

Chapter One

Over the last several years, the view has grown that the power to ensure access to international energy resources has shifted away from energy consumers to energy producers. The growth of China and India as large consumers of energy, coupled with an inability to develop reliable and affordable alternatives to oil and natural gas, has led to this development. In December 2005-January 2006, when Russia dramatically raised the price of natural gas that it was supplying to Ukraine, many saw an effort to squeeze Ukraine politically and economically to secure Kiev within Russia’s orbit. Moscow’s effort also underscored the shift towards the ability of energy producers to exert pressure on countries dependent upon them for supplies.44 Figure 1: Russia’ Natural Gas Pipelines

(Retrieved from: http://www.eegas.com/fsu.htm)

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

25

The United States and its European allies have begun to discuss the appropriate institutions and policies for ensuring energy security. The Bush Administration introduced a discussion of energy security at NATO in February 2006, with the support of key allies such as Britain and Germany. At the same time, EU governments view energy security in a broad manner, and most believe that political and economic measures are the first steps to ensure access to energy resources. Most EU members are also members of NATO, and energy security may emerge as an issue handled in a complementary manner by the two organizations.45 Figure 2: Major Russian Oil Basins

(Retrieved from: http://dic.academic.ru/pictures/wiki/files/82/RUS_oilmap.gif)

Russia, one of the world's two energy superpowers, is rich in natural energy resources. It has the largest known natural gas reserves of any state on earth, along with the second largest coal reserves, and the eighth largest oil reserves. Russia is the world's fourth largest electricity producer after the USA, China, and Japan. Russia exports 70% of oil produced, about 7

26

Chapter One

million of 10.12 million barrels (1,609,000 m3) a day (2010), the largest net oil export of any country, as well as a major supply to the European Union. The entire Middle East, in comparison, exports 20 million barrels (3,200,000 m3) daily.46 The Energy policy of Russia is contained in an Energy Strategy document, which sets out policy for the period up to 2020. In 2000 the Russian government approved the main provisions of the Russian energy strategy to 2020, and in 2003 the new Russian energy strategy was confirmed by the government. The Energy Strategy document outlines several main priorities: an increase in energy efficiency, reducing impact on the environment, sustainable development, energy development and technological development, as well as improved effectiveness and competitiveness. The main objective of the Russian energy strategy is defined to be the determination of ways of reaching a better quality of fuel and energy mix and enhancing the competitive ability of Russian energy production and services in the world market. For this purpose the long-term energy policy should concentrate on energy safety, energy effectiveness, budget effectiveness and ecological energy security.47 Figure 3: Russia-China Pipeline

(Retrieved from: http://www.sqwalk.com/q/sites/default/files/Russia-China-Oil-Pipeline.jpg )

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

27

The first oil pipeline linking the world’s biggest oil producer, Russia, and the world’s biggest consumer of energy, China, has begun operating in 2010. The pipeline, running between Siberia and the north-eastern Chinese city of Daqing, will allow a rapid increase in oil exports between the two countries. Russian oil has been transported to China by rail. Concentrated in western Siberia, Russia's network of pipelines for oil exports has so far run towards Europe. Russia is expected to export 15m tonnes of oil through the new pipeline each year during the next two decades - about 300,000 barrels a day. The project cost $25bn (£16bn) and was partly financed by Chinese loans. Russia overtook Saudi Arabia as the world's largest oil producer in 2009. China surpassed the US as the world’s largest consumer of energy last year. A second stage of construction on the pipeline is due to be finished by 2014. It will then span a distance of about 4,700 km.48 Figure 4: Eastern Siberian-Pacific Ocean Pipeline

“Energy diplomacy’’ has experienced a vivid renaissance during the last decade. It is particularly the newest consumers that tend to resort to bilateral deals and diplomacy when it comes to securing supply. Yet, while strengthening planning security on produced and contracted volumes, this risk hedging arrangement obviously comes with a cost: it leaves out the price mechanism. This has an important consequence, as the price mechanism plays no role in valuing “energy security.” In theory, some consumers may highly value supply security and be willing to spend money now, thus improving their future security situation. Others may put

28

Chapter One

more value on present consumption and regard potential future supply disruptions as a risk they are willing to accept and for whose mitigation they are not willing to pay. Yet, to the extent the individual “valuation” of energy security is concerned, the price-peg in prevalent gas market arrangements renders price signals meaningless. In fact, it prevents differing preferences from being catered. No European consumer can effectively account for his individual degree of risk aversion and pay less or more for energy security in gas supplies.49 Russia regards energy as a strategic recourse, not merely as commercial goods. The state-run energy company Gazprom plays the role of bargaining. The oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing was proposed to be established in 2003, but with the fighting for pipelines between Japan and China, the starting point turned out to be Taishet. It seems that Russia could patiently wait for the beneficial proposal. China’s part of the oil pipeline was financed by the Chinese government itself, and the loan will be used for the future payments. However, Russia’s opinions show that the public is not satisfied with the low prices and China’s public opinions show that Russia delaying the construction timing and later raising the oil prices damaged the mutual trust between these two countries. So for energy security, China also hopes to diversify the oil supply sources. China’s role in SCO is unsure because China relies on Russia’s and CIS members’ energy, and under the framework of SCO China could only invest huge capital to improve the stability of the energy supply sources. China now is seriously thinking about her energy policy, otherwise she would face a crisis of future economic transformation. Therefore, Russia has her own energy strategy and the directions of SCO might be the argued within China.

US Influence on SCO The U.S. has an influence on SCO’s direction and China-Russia interaction. In Beijing, 2012, the 12th Anniversary SCO Summit was significant because time by time SCO has become the influential regional organization. Both China and Russia do not want to be enemies of the USA, but hope to balance their power after the global financial crisis. Russian analysis stressing the refusal of Iran’s membership application shows the SCO’s unwillingness to be seen as an anti-Western organization, since the US authority considers that Iran’s nuclear weapons program has

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

29

endangered the security of the United States, hence the US has put the sanctions against Iran into action. China attempts to increase its economic influence in the Central Asian region and insists on the principles of territorial dignity, anti-terrorism, and separatism as principles when facing border disputes and regional separatism. China has been poor and weak for a long time and prefers to be an economic power so as to increase China’s image and the national self-confidence of the Chinese people in the world. To transform SCO as the anti-US alliance or energy cartel might damage China-US relations. Russia cares about a stable regime and struggles to fight against drugs and terrorism, which have endangered national security and damaged the prestige of the authority. Putin came back to the regime as the security saver and he had his own ideology, but did not imitate the Western democratic paradigm. Putin has paid more attention to broadening his diplomatic influence on international intervention as part of his global strategy for pursuing superpower status again. Russia has expressed her opposition toward the unilateral resolution by the United States, but is not able to confront them by herself. Russia shows her traditional independent diplomacy to maintain her national interests and it is very important to know that the Russian political thoughts and ideology of anti-imperialism remain functional from the past. Russia’s diplomacy is preventive rather than aggressive, but uses confrontation as a negotiation approach and bargaining chip. Russia believes that the independent diplomacy will enhance her global governance, bring benefits to her domestic economic interests and meet the psychological feelings of national security and national dignity as a whole. The author assumes that Russia will strengthen her economic ties with China and India, and in this situation, Russia may not hope that China has military conflicts with the Asian countries. The SCO will not be the backup force for China, but Russia will express the opposite attitude toward China’s military actions in the Asian-Pacific region. Therefore, SCO might play the role of economic and strategic cooperation, but not military alliance, because Russia needs to open the Asian energy market. Military confrontations in the Asia-Pacific region and establishing military alliance anti-NATO does not help with Russia’s global governance and economic interests in broadening the energy market if the United States

30

Chapter One

take out economic sanctions and geopolitical containment. So producing a real Cold War confrontation is not beneficial for Russia’s domestic development in the whole situation. China is facing challenges in all aspects. Now China is the second biggest economy, but the per capita income is still in the low standard of developing countries because bureaucracy and corruption are eroding the society. In order to support high GDP and industry, China needs the stable energy supplies from SCO members to reduce the risk of relying on the Iranian oil which is under the influence of US sanctions. China is afraid of US economic sanctions and military intervention in the Asia-Pacific region. China also needs SCO’s consumer markets of the daily necessities. In this situation, Russia and China both have mutual economic interests, but China relies on Russia more than Russia relies on China, because after Russia becomes the 156th member of WTO, the diversified goods from the WTO members will reduce China’s goods sold in Russia. Therefore, China might follow Russia’s international intervention actions and offend the United States’ interests. This tendency of moving closer to Russia will arouse an inner fight in the process of transformation of China’s political regime. China’s intelligentsia does not like this tendency, but the Chinese military will not be satisfied with the pro-US intelligentsia. The inner political fight in China will threaten the stability of a new political regime. Now Russia’s independent foreign policy is very practical in helping Putin’s reforms, but China’s foreign policy has not been formed due to the political fights. The “Chinese dream” is also challenged by the US rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific. In order to help the US resolve the problems in Afghanistan and Iran, some want to encourage the US to cooperate with SCO. The United States would benefit from closer cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on a number of fronts. First and foremost, the US could leverage the SCO’s regional legitimacy and knowledge to address the security situation in Afghanistan. The United States could also address Russian and Chinese attempts to check its influence in Central Asia by coordinating with the SCO. Closer cooperation with the organization would allow the United States to work with Russia and China on matters of security, politics, and economics. The United States could also play the internal divisions within the SCO to its benefit through bilateral cooperation with individual member states. Lastly, the SCO could provide

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

31

the United States with a means to further contain Iran as well as a platform on which to engage it diplomatically. The main drawback to US involvement with the SCO is that the US could end up strengthening an organization that is fundamentally anti-Western. Yet this possibility should not dissuade the US from engaging with the SCO. Any strengthening of the SCO that comes from US involvement will naturally include an increase in strategic partnership with the US itself.50 Therefore, from Russia-China-US interactions, SCO will not be developed into a military-aligned organization that is anti-NATO, but will play the role of negotiating economic interests and confirming the geopolitical strategy of security in Central Asia and in the Asia-Pacific region across the whole scale. Military alliance and energy cartel will irritate the US. We do not feel that China could find consensus in foreign policy, but Russia is ready to enter Asia. The collective security and energy security strategy beyond the geopolitical conception for SCO will promote Russia to be the leader since the communist ideological camp has collapsed, and will also be an effective actor in the post-financial crisis era and Georgian war. It seems that Russia is constructing her international security space with regional integration; Russia’s independent diplomacy might be a challenge for the US implementing international intervention. So, will a new Cold War happen between Russia and the United States? Selbi Hanova assumes that the economic factor might play a more important role in anti-western perception of SCO as being created for anti-enlargement of NATO. In fact, enhancement of the economic dimension of cooperation within the organization was frequently mentioned in many official documents of the organization, such as the 2002 SCO Charter and the Astana Declaration of 2005. However, closer examination of the comprehensive energy policies in the region might suggest that “multilateral agreement that integrates energy policy throughout the entire region is a difficult proposition, and that the agreements which have emerged are not products of the SCO, even if they are influenced by the SCO process.” Rather, bilateral agreements between the member countries seem to be dominating, while the SCO serves as a context or framework for such agreements. For Russia it appears that EurAsEc (Eurasian Economic Community) and the CIS fulfil the role of concluding agreements.51

32

Chapter One

Obliviously, China and Russia play the key roles in the Central Asian region, which is a transport hub between Asia and Europe. At the same time, SCO might play multiple roles in energy supply, military defence and anti-terrorism activities. The SCO has formed itself as a regional ally occupying the privileged position in global governance and it will usually be connected and compared with NATO. Under the pressure of NATO’s expansion, SCO plays the role of joint military exercises and recently the role of energy strategy, which is rooted both in the Central Asian region, to meet Russia’s Eurasian strategy, and in the Asian-Pacific strategy following the 2008 global financial crisis. We can see that Russia has launched its global political governance by establishing alliances such as SCO and BRICKS from its Asia-Pacific policy under Putin’s new ruling regime in 2012. The establishment of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the result of Russia and China’s hope to counterbalance the enhancing power of the United States in this region following the 911 terrorist attacks in 2001, which let the USA launch a war into Afghanistan and Iraq. Russia and China felt the USA had intervened into Central Asia and the Middle East. Therefore, these two countries were afraid that the United States would use the anti-terrorist war to expand their military sphere for geopolitical containment. So Russia and China found this to be good timing to establish the quasi-military cooperation organization to contend with NATO’s expansion in this region. Solving border deputes and oil prices are also on the agenda of SCO. So we can see that SCO is regarded as the mechanism to solve the problems of security which are related to geopolitical competence, combating terrorism, defining border disputes and promoting energy supply. The SCO reflects that both Russia and China feel isolated in regional integration and demand mutual trust in the future. Russia recognizes that she could not compete with China in the economic area but Russia is able to be dominant by expanding membership to include Mongolia, India, Iran and Pakistan into SCO. In this situation, SCO will be the multilateral organization to contend with NATO on global political and military issues. In fact, China does not want to provoke the USA to translate SCO as a real military organization but would like to enhance its economic and technological functions to maintain China’s demands. Russia prefers SCO to play a more important role both in political and economic areas for global governance. SCO plays a more and more important role of

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

33

geopolitical strategy in regional security and energy benefits. However, the controversial ideas between Russia and China remain strong.

The Perspectives on SCO Alexei Voskressenski, Dean and Professor at the School of Political Science of MGIMO-University in Russia, thinks that regional cooperation between Russia and China has obviously greatly increased in North-east and Central Asia since their joint leadership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), yet there has been no strategic partnership of Japan or either of these two countries on a comparable level, making, in Russian eyes, the North-eastern economic security nexus shaky and thus detracting from the regional economic cooperation that is key to the rejuvenation of the Russian Far East and Siberia, as well as for Russia entering the East Asian markets. Russia and China established a strategic partnership in order to balance a number of common threats.52 Nicola P. Contessi thinks, from the perspective of the organization’s internal power relations, Russia appears to have acquired a more prominent role, while China, the driving force behind the creation of the SCO, and its leading member in the years following its establishment, appears to have receded to a more discreet role. First, Russia has been boosting its profile in Central Asian security affairs throughout the year 2008-2009 even outside of the SCO. Second, reports suggest that as of 2006, China has allegedly shifted its interest to cooperation in the economic sphere. Moreover, China has traditionally been a cautious actor on the international scene, and the present international juncture may be suggesting the expediency of maintaining a low profile in the face of the financial crisis and security challenges on the home front. A further consideration may be that China is willing to appease Russia on the security front after refusing to endorse its August 2008 Georgian venture. The expansion of the SCO’s areas of responsibility in recent years may have been dictated by this implicit deal. This could suggest that a more accurate reading of the current trend within the SCO may be of an emerging “division of labour” between the two powers in the context of a broader reframing of the organization’s mandate and positioning.53 Alyson J. K. Bailes and Pál Dunay think that, established in 2001 with China, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and

34

Chapter One

Uzbekistan as members, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has remained one of the world’s least-known and least-analysed multilateral groups. It makes little effort itself for transparency and is only patchily institutionalized in any case. The SCO’s founding documents already signalled the special interest of the member states in fighting what they defined as ‘terrorism, separatism and extremism’. Security-relevant areas are the most frequent subjects of working-level meetings, which now include experts on information security, secretaries of national security councils and heads of supreme courts.54 Pan Guang who is the Director of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies Center in Shanghai, the Shanghai Center for International Studies, and the Institute of European and Asian Studies at Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, thinks that the SCO provides a good framework for China to cooperate closely in combating terrorism, extremism, separatism and various other cross-border criminal forces. The primary target of the Chinese anti-terrorism campaign is the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which advocates the independence of Xinjiang and is said to be supported by Osama bin Laden. From the Chinese perspective, it is of particular importance that China has been able, in the SCO framework, to count on the support of the other nine member and observer states in its campaign against ETIM. Moreover, China has also been able to draw support from SCO partners in its efforts to frustrate other conventional or non-conventional security threats and to eliminate or ease the external factors of disruption to China’s stability and development.55 Mikhail Troitskiy, an associate professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University), thinks that, in the economic realm, Russia represents a moderating force vis-à-vis the ambitious Chinese free-trade agenda. Russia endorsed a framework agreement on enhanced economic cooperation among SCO member states in September 2003, and in September 2006 a Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman outlined an extensive list of joint economic projects that Russia would be interested in promoting through the SCO. These included expanding Eurasian telecommunications networks and a transport corridor to connect the Caspian Sea with China through Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan; developing agreements for exports of electrical power from states and regions with a surplus to interested SCO countries; and developing structures to coordinate trade in and transit of hydrocarbons among SCO member states, such as the SCO Energy Club that was

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

35

proposed by Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Shanghai summit in June 2006. However, Russia’s vision of the SCO’s economic ambition falls short of creating the free-trade area that China called for at that summit. This controversy is discussed below in greater detail. The two countries have expanded bilateral trade and negotiated a number of deals in the energy field.56 Simbal Khan says that in March 2009, President Obama presented the draft of a new US policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan, which aimed to address the security slide in Afghanistan with a spate of new strategies. One aspect of this new thinking was to combat the increasing instability by addressing the regional dynamics and engaging the main regional actors. The SCO Special Conference on Afghanistan was held in March 2009 in Moscow. The participation of Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mehdi Akhundzadeh along with the US envoy at the conference was a testament to the fact that cooperation with the SCO offers the US and NATO an acceptable format to bring Iran into the dialogue on Afghanistan. The SCO-Afghanistan Action Plan called for joint operations in combating terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime, and for involving Afghanistan in a phased manner in SCO-wide collaboration in fighting terrorism in the region. The conference reiterated the SCO’s known opposition to the expansion of US military interests in Central Asia, but indicated its willingness to expand cooperation with the US and NATO in Afghanistan, albeit short of sending troops. Interestingly, President Obama announced a shift in US policy emphasis on the same day as the SCO summit, promising greater consultation with Afghanistan’s neighbours. Following this greater interaction, US/NATO have recently signed transit agreements with Russia and Central Asian states which allow for military and non-military supplies to transit their territories en route to Afghanistan.57 Deputy Secretary General of SCO, Konarovskiy, gave the following remarks for the Third Ministerial Conference of the Paris Pact Partners held in Vienna on February 16, 2012: “Continuous armed conflict in Afghanistan caused a serious concern of the SCO member states. The region has not only become a major transit route but also turned into an expanding market for distribution and consumption of drugs of the Afghan origin. Drug trafficking, providing a significant financial support for the forces opposed to Kabul, can pose a serious threat to the stability and national security of the SCO nations. Countering drug trafficking from Afghanistan will remain the SCO’s top priority in the short and medium

36

Chapter One

term including the period after full withdrawal of foreign troops from that country. The Agreement on Cooperation in Combating Illicit Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances and Precursors of 17 June, 2004 laid legal foundations for joint actions by the SCO member states on combating drugs and drug-related crime in general.”58 Alexander Lukin said that in March, 2009, a conference on Afghanistan was held in Moscow, in which the UN secretary-general and representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe took part. Now the SCO is playing an active role in solving the issue. He also said that the fight against drug trafficking is high on the SCO's agenda. Tajikistan had offered to create a centre for fighting drug trafficking in a bid to prevent drugs from Afghanistan from being smuggled into other countries.59 Irina Kobrinskaya, an expert at the Russian Global Economy and International Affairs Institute, told Xinhua Agency, on the eve of the 10th Anniversary SCO Tashkent summit, that common interests inside the bloc include regional security, mainly in Afghanistan. On the one hand, people expect some really breath-taking potential of the SCO as an economic alliance. On the other hand, the fact is that the economic weights of SCO members are too different. Leonid Moiseev, the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's special representative for SCO affairs, told Xinhua that when, five years ago, there was turbulence in Kyrgyzstan, the SCO helped to downgrade the level of adversity there. Now the situation in Kyrgyzstan is rather similar to that in 2005. The SCO plays its role again to decrease the tension on the borders, provide assistance to Kyrgyzstan. Another possible topic for the Tashkent summit would be the admission order for new members, “the first time in the organization's history.”60 According to the different viewpoints of experts and scholars, the perspectives of SCO may be summarised into several points: 1. International security for anti-terrorism: the strengthened SCO will help maintain the security for anti-terrorism. Some experts believe the strongest aspect of the SCO is that it is a convenient place for dialogue on security in Central Asia, including Afghan factors such as drug trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime. Currently, the SCO has been invited to every major international event related to Afghanistan. The western counties could breathe to recover their

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

37

economy. The collective security system of SCO will reduce the international criminals and the United States will focus on economic transformation after the eight years of invasion in Iraq and the global financial crisis. 2. Stable energy security: the SCO might be the stable supplier of energy. Stability in this region could provide stable energy supplies. Nevertheless, Europe and China try to diversify the energy sources and process a green energy strategy. The economic transformation, with ecology protection, will be the new direction for energy security. The SCO members are the energy producers and consumers; they have huge capacity for regional cooperation on labour supply and consuming markets, which will attract more foreign investment and infrastructure export into Eurasian and Asia-Pacific region. The United States sees SCO as a future partnership, and cooperation will make the SCO more transparent and transnational. Anti-terrorism and economic connection will promote SCO as an important institute for international security. 3. Multiple regional economic cooperation: Both Russia and China fear that their internal policies will be heavily damaged by external factors and influences.61 The aim of the partnership as seen by the Russian policymaking community is to strengthen regional economies, economic multilateralism, and also partly the security-economic nexus in North-east Asia through bilateral economic ties, and thus to move the regional North-east Asian agenda from traditional security cooperation to fostering regional economic development. This Russian idea basically corresponds with the idea of a North-east Asian co-prosperity zone. These ideas are extremely important for Russia due to difficulties in envisaging policy ensuring the stable economic development of the Russian Far East and Eastern Siberia and its peaceful entry into the market system of Eastern Asia.62

The Problems of SCO Analysts see the problems in SCO between China and Russia, with their different interests and strategies to develop SCO. The relationship between SCO and the United States also has influenced the direction of SCO for accepting new members. Now both China and Russia do not see the perspective of US participation in SCO, and this will make the United States strengthen their alliance toward the China-Russia collective security

38

Chapter One

institute. This might enhance the conflict between China and the United States. Alexander Lukin, director for the Center for East Asia and SCO Studies at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University), told Xinhua Agency that the SCO's development bank of foundation has still been on paper only. Now the member states consider creation of a special account for the multipartite projects. Until then, these projects will remain stranded. Interest in working with the SCO has been growing in the world, from the European Union to the United States. Lukin said that if the principles can be agreed, the issue of expansion could be mentioned. Iran and Pakistan, currently observers, applied to join. Besides, at the previous summit, new partners for dialogue had been introduced and given to Belarus and Sri Lanka. It shows the growing interest to the SCO in the world. 63 Richard Weitz is a senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. He is the author of, among other works, Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia, and he thinks that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has yet to resolve the problem presented by Iran’s efforts to become the institution’s seventh full member. For the fourth consecutive year, existing SCO governments have declined to accept new full members or formal observers. Instead, the SCO has resorted to proliferating new categories of external association, producing a confusing hodgepodge of members, observers, “guests,” and now “partners.” Although SCO leaders say they are working on procedures to guide the organization’s expansion, it seems that the SCO’s major powers fail to agree on who should join and who should not.64 Ruslan Y. Izimov who is Research Fellow of Department of Foreign Policy Studies, KISI under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, (Almaty, Kazakhstan), shares the same opinions about the range of expansion of SCO.65 Fazal Ur-Rahman, Director of the Institute of China, Pakistan Strategical Research Center, thinks that it is true that in every multilateral organization there are always one or two lead countries, which serve as the mainstay of that organization. In the case of SCO, China and Russia happened to be the core countries. It is also true that the success or failure of SCO would largely depend on the strategic cooperation or strategic competition between these two major players. It would not be out of place

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

39

to suggest that SCO is a bipolar organization and would need a fine balance between the two key players to be effective and to achieve its objectives.66 Wu Fei, the researcher on international issues of Guangdong Provincial government and now Professor of Guangzhou JiNan University, thinks that if SCO turns to be an organization of energy, it will arouse tension in the USA and impact the uprising of China. China and India both get benefits in the trend of globalization, and China is promoting political reform. Democracy and national interest will be the core of US foreign affairs. China, using SCO as the approach to getting energy, will affect US and NATO energy interest and anti-terrorism operations. China will pay more costs in terms of relations with the Unite Sates of America. 67 Several problems of SCO for China will be discussed as follows: 1. Regional competition hinders cooperation for anti-terrorism: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) unites China, Russia and the Central Asian countries; every state member has its own national interests and attitudes toward the military cooperation. China continues to need Russia’s military support both in strategic and technological aspects. China has territorial disputes with her neighbours and faces threats from Japan’s militarism, separatism in Xingjian, and Tibet and Taiwan’s independence. SCO is the framework for China to cooperate with Russia. At the same time as the threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, Russia plays a key role in China’s decisions. All the SCO members are facing the same problems of suffering from terrorism and separatism. The security problem will impact on their national stability and economic development. China regards the terrorism in central Asia as the main source of terrorism connected with the Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Xinjiang. The anti-terrorism cooperation with the central Asian states should be strengthened in the framework of SCO. The situation in Afghanistan is favoured since the US troops withdrew. Collective security integration might meet China and Russia’s demands for international security, but lack of cooperation with the United States might make it difficult for SCO to counter terrorism after the US military withdraw from Central Asia. 2. The difference of economic interests obstruct the unity of policy: China needs the energy import from Russia, Central Asia and Middle East countries. The building of oil pipelines will provide long-term and stable resources for China. The energy cartel in SCO will have the

40

Chapter One

international oil market prices controlled and monopolized by Russia. For Russia, SCO should be the base of enlarging cooperation with the Asia-Pacific region. If China cannot enlarge the free trade cooperation range for the SCO members and make the agreement for the oil prices, there will be neither the prospect of SCO economic prosperity nor of military trust between Russia and China. If the direction and function cannot be confirmed, the function of SCO must be weakened. Russia has strengthened her energy strategy layout and SCO might develop as the energy cartel, which might weaken China’s position and affect international oil prices. The United States and China might suffer from economic loss and this might exacerbate the conflicts between China and Russia. 3. Alliance servers for military confrontation and deterrence: The problem is that China views SCO as its energy and military provider and at the same time as the security umbrella for developing economy and balancing US-Japan union in the Eastern Asian region. SCO will be regarded as a similar military union to NATO. Its non-transparency will arouse doubt in the neighbouring countries. China wants to highlight its international status, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, by replacing the US’s position after the 2008 global financial crisis. Russia will not fight for regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and China-US conflict might be accelerated. The tension between China and the US will not benefit China. The military conflicts of China with other countries also hurt Russia’s economic interests. If China-Russian military cooperation will be the backup for military competition for deterrence, SCO might be limited into the framework of anti-US organization. The functions of SCO being a multiple organization will be weakened as well. 4. Direction of SCO is ambiguous for expansion: Iran’s nuclear program has aroused US sanctions. The relationship with Iran is very sensitive. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has yet to resolve the problem presented by Iran’s efforts to become the institution’s seventh full member. For the fourth consecutive year, existing SCO governments have declined to accept new full members or formal observers. Although SCO leaders say they are working on procedures to guide the organization’s expansion, it seems that the SCO’s major powers fail to agree on who should join and who should not. Since the direction of SCO decides its future development as an international organization, the different attitudes of Russia and the United States toward the problems of Iran, Syria, North Korea and

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

41

other sensitive issues will make SCO the target of US led alliances and this will weaken SCO’s expansion. China will have to choose her position and this will make China stumble and totter in her foreign policy-making process.

Conclusion China’s president, Xi Jinping, put forward a conception of the “Chinese dream”, which is carried out for Chinese rejuvenation following Hu Jintao’s conception of “harmonious society”, protected by the military expansion and that will challenge the US’s traditional sphere in the Asia-Pacific region. Russia’s strategy for regional integration is strengthened by Putin’s ideology of restoring the historic glory of being a power, the idea of which is connected with the implementation of domestic modernization by means of economic growth from conducting her energy diplomacy and constructing the umbrella of collective security for internal development. China-Russia’s regional integration might stabilize the North-eastern Asian region, which is under threat from North Korea’s nuclear weapon proliferation. Russia’s Asia-Pacific policy is to build further close economic ties with the Asian countries, and that will help develop Russia’s Far East. So regional integration based on SCO might function from collective security to economic integration, and that will make Russia and China implement their global governance for achieving their domestic welfare. Now both China and Russia have acknowledged that improving bilateral relations, as the prerequisite for national development, is important. SCO might have perspectives for better cooperation but might face the problem of direction. Undeniably, SCO has become a regional mechanism for collective security and energy cartel monopoly combining Russia, China and Central Asian countries. Russia’s energy strategy will probably hurt Chinese and US economic benefits due to arguing over oil prices and pipeline building. Simultaneously, China-Russia military cooperation will arouse neighbouring suspicion, accelerate regional military competition for deterrence, and might make SCO more isolated from regional cooperation.

42

Chapter One

Russia’s integration policy might also weaken SCO and reduce China’s influence in regional participation and governance. Russia is forming Russia-led groups in the energy and high-tech weapons market to broaden her trade market. The collective organizations such as CIS, CIS CSTO, EAEC or EurAsEC and Eurasian Union are forming over time following the collapse of the USSR. Russia’s foreign policy and global strategy have changed from unifying the former USSR States under the loose framework of CIS to a global integration by establishing the collective security and economic mechanism with the Central Asian countries. Nevertheless, SCO has more of a strategic function than military value for China and Russia’s participation. It will help these two countries have more capacity to communicate and cooperate with each other. Russia will make use of negotiating and cooperating approaches to recover her international status instead of military and ideological confrontation actions which formed in the Cold War. However, since the influence of SCO on international security is going up, Russia’s attempt to process negotiations with the western countries under the framework of the UN Security Council will require Russia-China’s improved relations and mutual trust. In the post-Cold War era, Russia lost her traditional strategic privileges and geopolitical sphere. With the rise of China, Russia will also pay attention to her relationships with China. The China-Russia partnership will help these two countries have more confidence in constructing their rejuvenation. Russia and China must oppose the unipolarity of the United States and advocate going back to the UN Institute to avoid US missile system expansions. This bipolarity between Russia and the United States under the UN Security Council is forming with their different attitudes toward problems in Syria. China often plays a key role in this triangle of relations. SCO might play the role of connecting China-Russia relations and establishing the institute for the US’s possible cooperation in international energy price negotiation and anti-terrorism operations for international security.

Notes 1

Feng-Yung Hu, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO): Prospects and Problems in Russia-China Relations”, Journalism and Mass Communication 3 (2013):101-113. The text in Chapter One is developed on the basis of this paper. 2 US President Barak Obama made a strategic decision to increase the United States’ focus on the Asia-Pacific region by rebalancing US engagements, activities,

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

43

and resources toward this vital region. The President made this plain in his speech before the Australian parliament in 2011: “the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our allies and friends. Our approach is grounded in the proposition that the United States is a historic Pacific power whose economy, strength, and interests are inextricably linked with Asia’s economic, security, and political order…and we are here to stay”. See “Resourcing the Rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific Region”, the White House Blog, April 12, 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/04/12/resourcingrebalance-toward-asia-pacific-region 3 Xi Jinping was elected as the new General Secretary of the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party and Central Military Commission Chairman in charge of military power in 18th Chinese Communist Party National Congress on November 8-14, 2012. In March 2013, Xi Jinping became China's national chairman in the twelfth National People's Congress. On November 29, 2012, Xi Jinping with Politburo members visited the National Museum of China’s "Revival Road" exhibition scene. Xi put forward the conception of the "China Dream" and defined it as the future goal "to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation in modern times is the greatest dream". In March 17, 2013, in the closing session of the Twelfth National People's Congress, the newly elected President of the People Republic of China Xi Jinping mentioned the "China Dream" nine times in his speech. 4 About the problems and challenges of China dreams, see “Chasing the Chinese Dream”, the Economist, May 4, 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21577063-chinas-new-leader-has-been-q uick-consolidate-his-power-what-does-he-now-want-his 5 Regional governance is a concern of the Obama administration for better implementing regional-scale policy. The focus shifted from government to governance and from governmental consolidation to problem-solving. See William R. Barnes & Kathryn A. Foster, “Toward a More Useful Way of Understanding Regional Governance”, a paper for presentation at the September 2012 conference of the European Urban Research Association, Vienna, Austria. Retrieved from: http://brr.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Barnes-Foster-Toward-a-more -useful-way-of-understanding-regional-governance.pdf Regional Governance is the method whereby would-be world rulers intend to control every aspect of our lives. Without the full implementation of Regional Governance, their plan for world dominance cannot succeed. See Jackie Patru, “Regionalism: Sneaking America Into World Government.” Retrieved from: http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/regionalism/sneaking.htm 6 The idea of a Eurasian Union, based on the European Union's integration, was brought to attention in October 2011 by the then-Prime Minister of Russia, Vladimir Putin, but was first proposed as a concept by the President of Kazakhstan,

44

Chapter One

Nursultan Nazarbayev, during a 1994 speech at a Moscow university. On 18 November 2011, the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an agreement, setting a target of establishing the Eurasian Union by 2015. The agreement included the roadmap for the future integration and established the Eurasian Commission and the Eurasian Economic Space, which started work on 1 January 2012. See also “Putin calls for Eurasian union”, RIA Novosti, October 4, 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/world-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=10&dd=04&na v_id=76700 7 Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing", see it in "International Organization" 4 (1970): 607-646. 8 Extension: What is Regional Integration? Retrieved from: http://www6.carleton.ca/ces/eulearning/introduction/what-is-the-eu/extension-what -is-regional-integration/ 9 According to Morgenthau, alliances are necessary function of balance of power operating in a multiple-state system. See Hans Joachim Morgenthau, “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”, New York, Alfred A. Knopf. (1948). 10 Richard Weitz, “Superpower Symbiosis: The Russia-China Axis” , World Affairs 175 (2012): 71-78. 11 Chen Ou, “Russian Political Challenges on China’s Security During Hu Jintao’s Age”, Asian Social Science 7 (2011): 79-85. 12 Jonathan Sullivan & Bettina Renz, “Chinese Migration: Still the Major Focus of Russian Far East/Chinese North East Relations?” Pacific Review 23 (2010): 262. 13 Ibid. 277-278. 14 Ibid. 279. 15 Ibid. 280-282. 16 Thoraas Rawski, “Japan’s Economic Relations with China, Russia, and India: An Introduction”, Eurasian Geography & Economics 53 (2012): 419-421. 17 Vladimir Portyakov, “Russia and Beyond. Russia, China and India in the World Economy”, Russia in Global Affairs 2 (2006): 124-130. 18 Richard Weitz, “Superpower Symbiosis: The Russia-China Axis” , World Affairs 175 (2012): 72-77. 19 Epistemologically, idealism manifests as scepticism about the possibility of knowing any mind-independent thing. In a sociological sense, idealism emphasizes how human ideas—especially beliefs and values—shape society. See John J. Macionis, “Sociology” 14th Edition. Boston, Pearson (2012): 88. 20 John Rourke, Michael, Ryan, ed. “International Politics On The World Stage”, New York, McGraw Hill, (2010): 16.

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

45

For further reading see Ashley, Richard K. "Political Realism and the Human Interests," International Studies Quarterly (1981) 25: 204-36. 21 James Ohwofasa Akpeninor, “Modern Concepts of Security.” Bloomington, Author House, (2013): 24. 22 David S.Yost, “NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security”, London: Leicester University Press (1977): 149. 23 Fiseha Haftetsion Gebresilassie, “Collective security at Stake? Challenges of the Current Collective Security System.” Feb, 2012. Retrieved from: http://aigaforum.com/articles/collective-scecurity-at-stake.pdf 24 Ibid. 25 James Ohwofasa Akpeninor, “Modern Concepts of Security.” Bloomington, Author House, (2013): 24. 26 Gregory Gleason & Marat E. Shaihutdino, “Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia.” International Studies Perspectives (2005) 6: 274. Eurasia is also sometimes used in geopolitics to refer to organizations of or affairs concerning the post-Soviet states, in particular Russia, the Central Asian republics, and the Transcaucasian republics. A prominent example of this usage is in the name of the Eurasian Economic Community, the organization including Kazakhstan, Russia, and some of their neighbours, and headquartered in Moscow and Astana. The word "Eurasia" is often used in Kazakhstan as the name of the continent or region in which that country is located. Now the Russian policy-makers have adjusted the foreign policy to the Eastern and southern Asia. Therefore, Putin’s administration prefers to use the conception of Asia-Pacific instead of Eurasia. It symbolizes that Russia’s foreign policy is tuning his angle from Europe and Central Asia to Asia-Pacific region. The integration with the Central Asia is finished after the global financial crisis. Russian energy market is shrivelling and needs to open up the Asian market. 27 Ibid. 276. 28 Emad El-Din Aysha, “Samuel Huntington and the Geopolitics of American Identity: The Function of Foreign Policy in America’s Domestic Clash of Civilizations”, International Studies Perspectives (2003) 4:128. 29 Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, “Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition”, Geneva Center for Security Policy, June 19, 2006. Retrieved from: http://www.sustainablehistory.com/articles/definitions-of-globalization.pdf 30 Stever, H. Guyford, “Science, Systems, and Society”, Journal of Cybernetics, 2(3) (1972):1-3. 31 About the Russkiy Mir Foundation, visit http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/en/fund/about 32 To know the Confucius Institute, visit http://english.chinese.cn/ 33 See Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) website:

46

Chapter One

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/sco.htm 34 Retrieved from: http://www.sco-ec.gov.cn/crweb/scor/info/Article.jsp?col_no=321&a_no=56546 Retrieved from: http://www.sco-ec.gov.cn/crweb/scor/info/Article.jsp?col_no=321&a_no=56545 Retrieved from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shanghai_Cooperation_Organisation Retrieved from: http://www.sectsco.org/EN/brief.asp 35 Uzbekistan Serves United States with Air Base Eviction Notice. July 31, 2005. Retrieved from: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav080105.shtml 36 Retrieved from: http://www.sectsco.org/RU/index.asp Retrieved from: http://www.sectsco.org/EN/# 37 Jim Nichol, “Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for US Interests”, Congressional Research Service 7-5700 (2012). www.crs.gov, RL33458. 38 Askar Akaev, “Relations with Russia Are a Priority”, International Affairs 6 (2004): 88-94. 39 William C. Wohlforth, “Heartland Dreams: Russian Geopolitics and Foreign Policy”. (See: Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, “Perspectives on the Russian State in Transition”, Princeton University (2006): 265-267.) 40 Ibid. 277. 41 For interpretations of Russian perspectives on Asia in the imperial and communist eras see N. V. Riasanovsky, “Asia through Russian Eyes”, in Wayne Vucinich (ed), Russia and Asia (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1972); John J. Stephan, Asia in the Soviet Conception, in Donald S. Zagoria (ed), Soviet Policy in East Asia (London, Yale University Press, 1982), etc. 42 David Kerr, “The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy”, Europe-Asia Studies 6 (1995): 978-980. 43 Andrew Scheineson, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), March 24, 2009. Retrieved from: http://www.cfr.org/international-peace-and-security/shanghai-cooperation-organiza tion/p10883 44 Bernard Gelb, Jim Nichol, and Steven Woehrel, “Russia’s Cutoff of Natural Gas to Ukraine: Context and Implications”, CRS Report RS22378 (2006):1-6. 45 Paul Gallis, “NATO and Energy Security”, CRS Report RS22409 (2006): 1-6. 46 Retrieved from: http://www.thomaswhite.com/explore-the-world/russia.aspx#recent 47 “The Summary of the Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period of up to 2020”, Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, March 2003. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/russia/events/doc/2003_strategy_2020_en.pdf 48 Russia-China Oil Pipeline Opens, 2 January 2011, BBC News Asia-pacific.

Regional Integration: Cooperation or Competition?

47

Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12103865 49 Andreas Goldthau, “A Public Policy Perspective on Global Energy Security”, International Studies Perspectives 13 (2012): 65-84. 50 Jeffrey Reeves, “US Cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Challenges and Opportunities”, Small Wars Journal, January 16, 2011. Retrieved from: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/648-reeves.pdf 51 Selbi Hanova, “Perspectives on SCO”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 7 (2009): 63-81. 52 Alexei D.Voskressenski, “The Rise of China and Russo-Chinese Relations in the New Global Politics of Eastern Asia”, working paper for the international symposium entitled “Eager Eyes Fixed on Slavic Eurasia: Change and Progress” in Sapporo, Japan, on July 6 and 7 of 2006. 53 Contessi Nicola P., “China, Russia and the Leadership of the SCO: a Tacit Deal Scenario”, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 8 (2010): 101-123. 54 Alyson J. K. Bailes, Pál Dunay, Pan Guang and Mikhail Troitskiy, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization”, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 17(2007):1. Retrieved from: http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRIPP17.pdf 55 Ibid. 46. 56 Ibid. 32. 57 Khan Simbal, “Stabilization of Afghanistan: US/NATO Regional Strategy and the Role of SCO.” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 7 (2009): 11-15. 58 Remarks by M. Konarovskiy, Deputy Secretary General, Shanghai Cooperation Organization prepared for the Third Ministerial Conference of the Paris Pact Partners held in Vienna on February 16, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id=316 59 See the News of Xinhua News Agency, “Interest in Working with SCO Growing: Expert”, June 6, 2010. Retrieved from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-06/08/c_13338931_2.htm 60 See the News of Xinhua News Agency, “SCO Tashkent Summit to Focus on Security, Economic Coordination.” Retrieved from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-06/08/c_13339197_3.htm 61 Alexei D. Voskressenski and Nikolai Maletin, eds., “Asia-Pacific Region and Central Asia: Control the Security”, Moscow, MGIMO (2002). (Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskii region I Tsentral’naia Aziia: kontury bezopasnosti) Alexei D.Voskressenski, ed., “China and the World Politics”, Moscow: ROSSPEN (2001) (Kitai v mirovoi politike ) Alexei D.Voskressenski, ed., “Russia, China and the New World Order in XXI Century and Perspectives”, Moscow: MGIMO (2001) (Rossiia, Kitai i novyi miroporiadok XXI veka: problemy i perspektivy ) 62 Alexei D.Voskressenski, “The Rise of China and Russo-Chinese Relations in the New Global Politics of Eastern Asia”, working paper for the international

48

Chapter One

symposium entitled “Eager Eyes Fixed on Slavic Eurasia: Change and Progress” in Sapporo, Japan, on July 6 and 7 of 2006. 63 See the News of Xinhua News Agency, “SCO Tashkent Summit to Focus on Security, Economic Coordination.” Retrieved from: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-06/08/c_13339197_3.htm 64 Richard Weitz, “The SCO’s Iran Problem.” CACI Analyst, August 19, 2009. Retrieved from: http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5159 65 Ruslan Y. Izimov, “SCO and Regional Security Issues”, Global Review 2 (2012): 14-21. Retrieved from: http://www.siis.org.cn/Sh_Yj_Cms/Mgz/201202/2012711141511A3QW.DOC 66 Fazal Ur-Rahman, “SCO: Problems of Enhancing Economic Cooperation”, Eurasian Intelligence and Strategy (2008). Retrieved from: http://www.eurasiacritic.com/articles/sco-problems-enhancing-economic-cooperati on 67 Wu Fei, “Should SCO be Transformed into an Energy Organization for China Searching Energy”, Takungpao Daily Newspaper, HK炻2006/6/28. (Also see the paper in the collection: Feng-Yung Hu & Wu Fei, Globalization in Russia and China Media Reform, Taipei, Showwe Publishing Company, 2008: 97-102.) (চЎǺֆߚǴ“΢ӝಔᙃࢂցᔈӛૈྍᙯࠠǻ”३ෝȠεϦൔȡຑፕ‫ހ‬໺൞⍪ ໺൞஑ឯЎകǴ2006 ԃ 6 Д 28 ВǶ࣬ᜢЎകҭё‫ـ‬:च೹ྻǵֆߚǴ ȠӄౚΠ ‫߮ޑ‬ύ໺൞ӧӦϯᡂֽǺεϦൔϐ໺൞⍪໺൞ȡ ǴѠчǴ‫࠶ذ‬р‫( ޗހ‬2008)Ƕ) (च೹ྻǴ“߮ᛥථӆԛஙଆǻᚈᓐᡳ‫ޑ‬٥ϼࡹ฼ᆶᏯౣࡘᆢ”ǴѠчǴ‫࠶ذ‬р ‫( ޗހ‬2013)Ƕ)

CHAPTER TWO MILITARY CRISIS IN NORTH-EASTERN REGION: RUSSIA’S ROLE IN APR AND HOW DOES RUSSIA LOOK AT KIM JONG-UN’S REGIME? FENG-YUNG HU

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT COLLEGE OF GENERAL STUDIES YUAN ZE UNIVERSITY (YZU), TAIWAN ADJUNCT RESEARCHER AT NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY (NTU), TAIWAN

The Korean Peninsula is one of the most important regions for the world economy and international security, especially in the post-Cold War period after the Soviet Union collapsed. However, this region is still under threats of war and nuclear weapon attacks, which were severely used by Kim Jong-un, who was the successor of North Korea but who knew Russia less than his father Kim Jong-il. The role of Russia might be seen in the framework of her Asia-Pacific strategy, the direction and content of which need to be explained from the idea of Russia’s Far East development and her diplomacy priority toward the Asia-Pacific region (APR) in the era of Putin’s rule. China and the United States’ attitudes toward East Asia and APR will influence the whole situation in the Korean Peninsula. This chapter is to reflect on Russia’s attitudes toward North Korea’s military threat, her whole-scale ambitions in the Korean Peninsula, to stress the role of Russia for pursuing long term peace in this region, and to suggest taking Russia’s avocation for international security into consideration as part of her approach of peaceful resolutions. The viewpoints from Russian officials, scholars such as Academician Anatoly Torkunov and Professor Toloraya were adopted as the main representatives of Russia. In the crisis of Kim Jong-un’s provocation, Toloraya was interviewed by the majority of the Russian state media. Prof Toloraya

50

Chapter Two

worked as the economic representative both in Pyongyang and Seoul, and now serves as the vice president of the Russian think tank “Unity for Russia” Foundation and is head of Regional Projects Department, Regional Director for Asia and Africa of “Russkiy Mir” Presidential Foundation. Prof Victor Cha is the director of the Asian Study Program of Georgetown University and CSIS, working as consultant to the US president. Comparing their opinions helps understand the possibility of cooperation and reconciling arguments between Russia and the United States.

Introduction: Energy and Economic Motives It is obvious that Russia’s influence on North Korea is increasing after Vladimir Putin came back to the Kremlin again in 2012 and intensively implemented his Russian Asia-Pacific strategy which is connected with the energy pipeline building and exporting plans through the Korean Peninsula. China is the most important consumer of Russia’s energy and all of the Asia-Pacific market will provide potential. After the disintegration of the USSR, Russia should be studied in a new perspective, and Putin’s Asia-Pacific strategy has economic and strategic value, rather than striving for hegemony in this region. This idea should be understood by China and be completed under the good relationship between these two countries. Mutual trust and collective security with China will be the guarantee for Russia promoting the strategy. After the disintegration of the USSR, Russia’s position in the Asian-Pacific region should be studied in a new perspective, and some of the Russian experts believe that Putin’s Asia-Pacific strategy has economic and strategic value, rather than striving for hegemony in this region. This idea might be challenged by China firstly and the tendency for improving the good relationship between Russia and China has been seen in the newly-elected leader of China, Xi Jinping, who conducted his first national official visit in Russia this March. Russian authorities admit that mutual trust and collective security with China will be the guarantee for the promotion of Russia’s strategy. With Russia’s economic and strategic demands in geopolitics, the idea of how to build a win-win model between Russia and China has been reflected in her policy from the viewpoint of the trade cooperation in

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

51

energy and weapons. The “China threat” is not neglected, and remains an influential factor in the Russian central government’s decision-making process, which hinders the speed of development in Russia’s Far East Region. Russia-China’s fuel and energy dialogue was formed in the official visit by former president Medvedev to China in 2008. In 2012 the 8th roundtable was held between Russia and China. The Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Dvorkovich addressed to the participants of “Energy Dialogue of ‘Russia-China’” (ɗɧɟɪɝɨɞɢɚɥɨɝ ‘Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ — Ʉɢɬɚɣ’) stressing that the Russia-China relationship in the energy sphere has strategic values on the basis of economic market principles and strengthening political willingness and mutual trust as a whole.1 Figure 1: Projects of Russian East Siberia-Pacific Pipelines

(Retrieved from: http://www.eurotrib.com/files/3/060322_Russia_China_gas_routes.gif)

Meanwhile, developing good relationships both with North Korea and South Korea will be the first priory for Russia establishing economic cooperation with the Asian countries and integrating into Asia. Regional

52

Chapter Two

integration is the most important foreign policy for Russia in current times. This idea helps Russia consolidate her influential sphere in Central Asia and create a new cooperation model in the Asia-Pacific region. The security and peace in the North-eastern Asian region is imperative for Russia to improve the economic circumstances in the Far East and to promote the Far East as the engine of Russia’s economic development. According to Alexey M. Mastepanov, Head of Fuel and Energy Complex Strategic Development Department of the Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation, the main priorities of Energy Strategy of Russia are as follows:2 1. Completion of structural reform of natural monopolies in fuel and energy complexes, and restructuring of a coal industry; 2. Prolongation of structural modification of branches in fuel and energy complexes, and improvement of the structure of fuel and energy balance; 3. Decreasing of production costs in energy sector, optimization the use of available industrial potential, liquidation of the unprofitable plants, growth of profitability of the others; 4. Forming internal prices for energy resources at a level providing energy sector and fuel producers self-financing; 5. Raising the level (quality) of management in joint-stock companies operated in fuel and energy complexes. According to Lauren Goodrich & Marc Lanthemann, the Putin administration is well aware of the challenges facing the Russian energy sector. Russia's attempts in the past decade to shift away from dependence on energy exports by focusing on industrial development have not been particularly successful and keep the country tied to the fate of its energy sector. Russia's strategy of using its energy exports as both a foreign policy tool and a revenue generator is contradictory at times: To use energy in foreign policy, Moscow must be able to lower or raise prices and threaten to cut off supplies, which is anathema to the revenue-generating aspect. Russia is focusing significant attention and funds on developing connections to the growing East Asian energy markets, diversifying its export portfolio should challenges in the European market continue intensifying. One aspect common to all the strategies Russia is set to pursue for the next decade is the high capital needed to complete them; the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline alone is set to cost nearly $15

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

53

billion. Despite the effects of the financial crisis in 2009, Russia still has vast capital reserves earmarked for these large-scale projects, but these funds are not infinite.3

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Russia borders one of the most problem-stricken areas in Asia, the Korean Peninsula. The crisis here has continued for decades. The pendulum of tension swings back and forth from cold war in parallel with backburner negotiations to the brink of an armed conflict. Development of nuclear weapons was seen in North Korea as a legitimate response to the threat from its adversaries, who, as North Korea is sure, are readying to use nuclear weapons against it. The start of North Korea’s nuclear program dates was back to1952, when at the height of the Korean War a decision was made to create the Atomic Energy Research Institute. The widespread construction of nuclear infrastructure began in the late 1950s. The nuclear program was aided by the USSR, which taught specialists and in the early 1960s supplied the country with a research reactor under an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. It should be noted that the North Koreans produced plutonium at a gas-graphite 5MWe reactor that they had independently, without notifying the USSR, modernized in Yongbyon and developed radiochemical production on their own.4 The proliferation of nuclear weapons, apparently, has been irreversible. Iran is likely to participate in the nuclear weapon powers following India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea The question is, is it possible to stop the chain reaction, for example, in the Arab countries? In the long term, it is not clear whether the denuclearization in Japan and South Korea should be maintained. Increasing the likelihood of the spread of nuclear weapons to the non-state actors, especially unstable countries, threatens international security. Simultaneously, the crisis of proliferation of missile technology is obvious.5

Chapter Two

54

Table 1: Global Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, by Country: 2006 Country Russia United States China France United Kingdom Israel India Pakistan North Korea Total

Estimated No. of Nuclear Warheads 16 000 10 000 200 350 200 100 70–110 50–110 Perhaps 2 27 000

(Retrieved from: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1963312/table/t1/)

The threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons has 3 major aspects:6 1. The development of the capability for producing or acquiring nuclear weapons by countries that do not currently have nuclear weapons (horizontal proliferation). 2. The increase of weapon stockpiles by countries that currently have nuclear weapons, the improvement of technical sophistication or reliability of these weapons, and the development of new weapons, such as “mini-nukes” or battlefield nuclear weapons (vertical proliferation). 3. The acquisition of nuclear weapons or the materials and knowledge by individuals or non-state entities, often termed “terrorists,” to produce nuclear weapons (another form of horizontal proliferation). Nuclear arms non-proliferation is a conflict sphere of the US-Russian relations. Formally, Moscow and Washington jointly press for strengthening the Nuclear Arms Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In fact, differences have emerged between Russia and the United States stemming from their different policies towards outsider states in the international non-proliferation system. Over the past fifteen years the United States has created a number of precedents. In Iraq the United States and its allies

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

55

carried out a military operation on the pretext of confiscating WMDs from a ‘risky regime’. From Iran the United States demanded the curtailing of its uranium enrichment program. From North Korea Washington demanded the elimination of nuclear facilities under the control of the IAEA control and/or the five-party commission.7 In February 2011, Russia’s former deputy minister of defence announced the launch of the State Armament Programme 2020, stressing that the modernization of Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons would be a top priority. According to Professor Dmitry Gorenburg,8 senior analyst in the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies and at Harvard University, Moscow’s decision to focus on nuclear modernization is motivated by several practical and strategic considerations: 1. Outdated nuclear arsenal: The bulk of the arsenal is approaching the end of its service life. 2. Insufficient conventional forces: Russia’s non-nuclear forces cannot, on their own, deter potential conflicts with major powers. 3. Protection: A solid nuclear arsenal would help protect Russia’s interests, including its economic stakes in the Arctic. 4. ‘Superpower’ status: Nuclear forces are one of Russia’s few remaining claims to a prominent position in the international system. Professor Gorenburg supposes that modernization efforts should not be misinterpreted as a serious new threat to NATO. How to find a consensus of nuclear arms non-proliferation remains imperative in reducing the threat of North Korea. Now Kim Jong-un has attempted to shape the hard-line diplomacy without the influence of China and Russia, this could be seen as a reaction of the young leader’s mentality. This mentality might be understood by his taking on a new ruling regime, but the consequence of the military provocation might irritate the United States and their allies, including South Korea and Japan, and will make negotiations unrealized. Russia is trying to show its capacity and willingness to advocate the Six-Party Talks and this signal should be noted by the United States in implementing their rebalancing policy toward Asia. Any misunderstanding between the United States and Russia might harm the benefits of the Korean Peninsula.

56

Chapter Two

The Role of Russia in Asia-Pacific Region The role of Russia becomes more and more important in the world system and regional governance9. After the global financial crisis broke out, the EU was severely impacted by this, and Russia started to focus her eyes on the Asia-Pacific region for the broader market, but at the same time consolidating the traditional sphere in Central Asia as the continuity of her foreign policy. China-Russia’s economic partnership shows their influence on regional development. While Russia is conducting the Asia-Pacific strategy as part of her double-headed eagle Eurasian policy by establishing the Eurasian Union10 modelled on the European Union, Russian influence will be the active factor for China in counterbalancing the relationships with the United States. After Putin took the presidency in 2000, resuming the former control in Central Asia and balancing the westernized foreign policy toward the East has been the priority for the Russian Federation. With the strengthened potential influence of the Asia-Pacific countries on the world, how to accelerate the function of the neighbouring regions between Russian Far East and Chinese North East has been put on the agenda, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis. The tendency of Russia to consolidate the integration in the Central Asian region and broaden the influential sphere in the Asia-Pacific region will complicate the future Russia-China-US triangle of relations and other multiple relations concerning the competition of these powers and rebalance among them. With the rise of China, how she will change the regional system here has an impact on other national interests and security. China-Russia relations might be the power of equilibrium for US with their alliances. Therefore, the future perspective relations between Russia and China deserve to be explored prudentially for both of these sides. So, the oneness of unity for states might be regarded as an effective and beneficial way to cooperate among them. China is isolated by her neighbouring relationships geopolitically and ideologically. In 2000, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, based on the Shanghai Five, organized the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). SCO members have common boundaries and need to establish the mutual trust mechanism to maintain their boundary security and develop boundary trade for better contact and military reduction. Therefore SCO is the most

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

57

important regional security organization for members to maintain their internal and external stability. Russia might have more ambitions to build her Eurasian space for her national demands. SCO has its function of collective security. Collective security is more ambitious than systems of alliance11 security or collective defence for establishing an international collective organization for their common interests regionally and globally. Establishing the regional collective security meets the demands of Russia’s regional integration policy and global governance. Russia has her global strategy to strengthen the role in collective security mechanisms for international security. International security in the Asia-Pacific Region directly affects the vital interests of Russia. Major regional interests of Russia must be the national foreign policy strategy. After all, the scale of priorities of national interests in regional policy is formed in accordance with national priorities and is an integral part of them. According to Professor Kortonov12, at State University, Higher School of Economics, the national foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region is viewed by following the "package" of such priorities as follows: 1. Protecting Russia in participating in a geopolitical community. 2. Using the economic relations with the countries of Asia-Pacific for its solution of social problems, primarily in the Siberian and Far Eastern regions. 3. Strengthening relations with the CIS countries for a broader range of integration, imitating the EU model. 4. Ensuring economic security of Russia in transactions with foreign counterparties. 5. Maintaining a favourable psychological momentum in the perception of the new Russia by demonstration of an independent foreign policy, and maintaining the image of a reasonable, pragmatic, predictable power, focusing efforts on the practical issues of development of the economy, improving the living standards of the population, consequently, the maintenance of stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region. 6. Stimulating a multipolar world structure, ensuring the achievement of global and regional consensus among all interested parties. To avoid breaking apart, it is important to establish the mechanism with the United Nations for maintenance and development of the negotiation process for all, including the military-political and military fields as a factor in the creation of a favourable climate in the relations between

58

Chapter Two

all the countries of the region. 7. Forging stronger economic, military, and technological cooperation, both bilaterally and in the framework of the regional organization. 8. Increasing new directions in the integration processes and mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific region to promote a multi-polar structure of relations in the region, providing independent Russian positions in the new power configuration. 9. Maintaining the proper level of combat capability of the Russian Armed Forces for purposes of self-defence, and to participate in possible joint actions to maintain peace in the region. 10. Using the geo-strategic position of Eurasia to create a political, economic and civilizational "bridge" between East and West. 11. Strictly observing human rights, and without increasing the problem in relation to the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, taking into account their specific features in the approaches to it. The virtual absence (for now) of a direct military threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia from the countries of the region can reduce defence capabilities to a reasonable minimum in the Asian part of the country, which had previously exaggerated with excessive character. The economic opportunity allows Russia to maintain basic military capability but not to solve the problems by force. The loss of Russia’s military weight gives Russia limited influence on solving problems in this region. Therefore, Russia should promote her direction to forge new relationships with the United States, normalize relations with Japan on the Kuril Islands disputes, stabilize good-neighbourly relations with China, rapidly develop comprehensive relations with the two Koreas, and other countries and groups of the Asia-Pacific, particularly with ASEAN, and ensure that they work closely with India.13 The problem for Russia in terms of the APR is the reduction of its political weight, and Russia tries to resume her influence by escalating its economic and other cooperation with the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The vacuum in the post-Cold War is often filled by China and Japan in conjunction with the United States. The uncertainty of collective security, including in connection with the Chinese factor, can lead to negative consequences without a reliable security mechanism. Russia's economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region are potentially enormous, but the lack of progress in this area will inevitably lead to an increase in the isolation of Russia, deepening the negative internal processes, such as

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

59

regional separatism. The politico-military solution to the problems remaining in the Asia-Pacific region requires the creation of a new security system.14 With regard to Obama’s rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region, China regards it as possible containment, especially in the escalating moments of territorial disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The US alliances might hope the United States develops the policy of containing China, but some of the Chinese analysts have suggested the competition-conflict model and proclaimed that the excessive conflicts between China and the United States will not be beneficial for China in realizing her “Chinese dream”, which was proposed by Xi Jinping, when he was elected as the General Secretary of Chinese Communist Party and Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission in November 2012. The growing outright rivalry between the United States and China gives Russia more foreign policy weight, enabling it to assume the role of a balancer. The Pacific will be the centre of world politics and geopolitical rivalry for ten years to come. The main argument is purely geographic. Along Russia’s Arctic coast there runs a potential supply route that may offer competition to those crossing the Indian and Pacific oceans – the Northern Sea Route. Time is ripe for activating its Eastern section. And, of course, Russia may derive mammoth benefits from the economic boom in the Asia-Pacific region. But one has to acknowledge in sad amazement that it is still unable to tap this resource, which offers tremendous development opportunities for the Trans-Baikal region and the whole of the country. The laying of new gas pipelines towards the Pacific Ocean is possibly the sole exception. Clearly, geopolitics and the new world economy require a marked growth of attention to Russia’s East. Finally, the comeback of geopolitics does not cancel the future. A future where the country’s political weight and its ability to influence the outside world to its own benefit will be determined by the quality of human capital, the level of education, healthcare and, lastly, the patriotism of the elites and the population.15 According to Sergei Karaganov mentioned above, it seems to be that Russia has initiated her projects to be integrated into globalization and the world economy after entering WTO and holding APEC, and that will make geopolitics become important. However, Russia is suffering from the problems of raising living standards and improving social welfare

60

Chapter Two

systems including education and health care. The integration strategy into APR still faces the lack of internal development, and the dependence on the Asia-Pacific region to support internal reform is still far from reality. Russia has a more flexible foreign policy to be able to play the role of balancer between China and the United States, but one cannot foresee the prospects in this direction until Russia puts the Far East projects into effect. The role of Russia in the region is still hindered by her domestic problems and determined by whether Russia could overcome the slowness of national development to strengthen her role on the international or regional stage. The main idea of the Russian analysts remains a focus on domestic problems in Russia and her capacity to solve them determines how possible it is that she could have influence in the region. The mental distance and different views between the central government and regional government on Far East development might be the hotbed of regional separatism and impede the integration processes into the Asia-Pacific region.

The Role of Russia in Reconciliation of Korean Peninsula’s Tension From 1st January 2013, Russia officially became the 31st member country of the NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency). NEA Director-General, Luis Echávarri said “The Russian Federation is indeed a major player in the nuclear field, with plant construction and operation, fuel fabrication and research institutes of world renown; it is one of the few countries in the world exporting nuclear reactor technology.16” The role of Russia is double; it is important both in world energy supply and also in world energy safety. North Korean’s energy program was created and supported by Russia. From 1st January 2013, Russia officially became the 31st member country of the NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency).17” The conflict on the Korean Peninsula has a long history. However, this stage, marked by an aggravation of the confrontation, is unique: North Korea presently finds itself directly confronted by the United States. North Korea and the US are the main parties in the conflict. A workshop, held in November 2003 at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and chaired by Academician Yevgeny Primakov, analysed what was

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

61

behind North Korea’s decision to demonstratively resume its nuclear program, together with the position of the US on this issue. The workshop also gave consideration to the interests and the ability of the “second tier” actors – China, South Korea, Japan and Russia – to influence the situation. The participants in the situation analysis included Director of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Anatoly Torkunov, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Professor, Valery Denisov, as well as post-graduate students of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.18 What are Russia’s interests on the Korean Peninsula? Russia is interested in broadening its cooperation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, as it seeks to boost its economic growth rates, develop East Siberia and the Far East, and attract investment into those areas. Moscow needs economic interaction in the region. Continued tensions on the Korean Peninsula would prevent it from achieving these goals. Some of the experts believe that Russia’s influence on the situation in the Korean Peninsula is not great, largely owing to its weak economic presence in the region. Yet, this influence has been increasing to some extent owing to Russia’s political presence there. In particular, Russia acts as a motivator of the multilateral negotiating process. Russia should now take an active part in the multilateral efforts in order to work out a single approach to the peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict.19 Russia-DPRK’s economic interaction is still increasing. Russia attempts to use her energy leverage function to reconcile Korean Peninsula’s tensions. Simultaneously, building a Tran-Siberian railway cross the Korean Peninsula helps Russia to be the bridge of the Asia-Pacific operating centre and the Eurasian Union. Both Russia and DPRK could reduce their economic reliance on China. Several ideas of Russia-DPRK’s relations are delivered as follows: 1. Russia’s Energy Leverage Function Acts: the sharp rise of oil and gas prices has enabled Moscow to utilise its mammoth energy reserves to achieve domestic and foreign policy goals. Russia’s Far Eastern frontier is now turning into the place where energy export becomes a political tool in shaping the country’s relations with regional neighbours. China, the two Koreas, and Japan are hungry for energy, natural resources and, at the same time, strive for economic and political cooperation. In such circumstances, the opportunities offered by trans-national railroads and

62

Chapter Two

pipelines appear to be more powerful than weapons. Given this new leverage and understanding, can Russia exert its soft and hard power upon North Korea in promoting the goals set in the Six-Party Talks?20 2. Energy Demand Helps Promote Regional Security: the nationalisation of the largest Russian oil company, Yukos, in 2004, along with the consolidation of state-owned Gazprom and RAO Unified Energy System in 2005, have further empowered the Kremlin in making single-handed decisions on the directions and length of new pipelines, high-voltage power lines, and railways, literally shaping the new geopolitical landscape in North-east Asia. In this light, the nature of relations between Russia and North Korea will become the key to an ultimate solution for the regional security problem. Cooperation between Russia, North and South Korea in oil, gas and railway construction and exploitation projects can be a good start for reconciliation. No progress in Russian-DPRK relations is possible without close Russian-ROK cooperation.21 3. Russia’s Asia-Pacific Strategy Benefits Far East: Russia’s energy holdings provide Moscow with powerful leverage on the international stage, a status not seen since the end of the Cold War. Expectations about East Siberian energy reserves have risen, especially after April 2006, when Russia started building the $12.5 billion Taishet-Skovorodino-Kozmino oil pipeline. A series of disputes over what route the pipeline would take preceded the final decision. Initially, China’s Daqing was considered as the destination for a shorter and cheaper private-owned pipeline. This plan was lobbied by the then-powerful Yukos CEO, Mikhail Khordokovsky. Nevertheless, the Kremlin and state bureaucracy promptly interfered, sending the beleaguered oligarch to jail and reconfiguring the whole deal in favour of running the pipe to the Pacific coast of the Russian Maritime Province. Russia’s primary goal is to develop its sparsely populated Far Eastern region.22 4. Russia’s Big Asian Strategy Connects Europe and Asia Transportation: The importance of DPRK’s Rajin-Seonbong Special Economic Zone to Russia’s national interests is continuing to grow. The state-run monopoly OAO Russian Railways is currently upgrading its railway connections with North Korea in Khasan-Tumangang, investing at least 1.75 billion roubles ($72 million USD) into this project, and plans to participate in an ambitious plan to rebuild a trans-Korean railway. By connecting Rajin (and the rest of northern Korea) to its Trans-Siberian Railroad, Russia is hoping to benefit from the transit of South Korean and Japanese cargo which could be sent via its territory to Central Asian and European markets. Pyongyang seems to endorse these plans and other Russian

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

63

initiatives, but does not commit any financial resources.23 ġ The problem is that no one knows how to influence Pyongyang. Sanctions are ineffective in ensuring policy change in a country that embraces sanctions and cultivates self-isolation and autarchy. When the United States began its joint naval exercises with Seoul, Pyongyang shut the border to the Kaesong Industrial Park for workers and managers from South Korea. Kaesong is a major source of foreign currency for North Korea, so threats to stop cooperation if tensions escalate should have come from Seoul. But it is Pyongyang that is demonstrating willingness to make sacrifices. Russia’s stance on the Korean issue has not changed for a long time. The Kremlin does not believe in the effectiveness of pressuring Pyongyang and has called for the gradual socialization and international integration of North Korea. Moscow apparently knows that this will be an uphill battle because of North Korea’s siege mentality. Pyongyang does not trust anyone, especially after the failed attempt to make a deal with the United States in the 1990s.24

Russia’s Position from Minister of Foreign Affairs US-DPRK’s confrontation aroused regional tensions again. Precisely at 4 o’clock on March 29th, 2013, in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-un signed an order on the plan to strike the territory of the United States, probably responding to the on-going and routine US-ROK military exercises from March 1 to April 30. Concerning of the DPRK’s military threats to the North-East Asia, Russia has her own consideration of national security and interests. The most proximate explanation is that the North is responding to the on-going and routine US-ROK military exercises this month, and specifically the portion of the exercise reported on March 28 of 2013 in which the US military sent two nuclear-capable B-2s stealth strategic bombers from Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri on a “a long-duration, round-trip training mission”—practice sortie—over South Korea. In addition, the young leader presumably needs to prove his bona fides, and therefore is making as much of the current situation as he can.25 ġ The Minster of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov said the concern of the reactions from the Security Council and the

64

Chapter Two

world community on this event is unipolar action which might escalate the military tension. We should not use this event as the excuse of any geopolitical missions or we would lose control and slip into a vicious circle.26 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said North Korea's nuclear test deserves condemnation and a reaction from the UN Security Council. He also said the six-party talks on the nuclear problem of the Korean peninsula must be restarted soon. “This [nuclear test] must be condemned. It demonstrates that the North Korean leadership has again ignored international law and disregarded the UN Security Council's resolutions, all of which deserves condemnation and an adequate reaction. The UN Security Council will convene within hours to discuss this problem, I understand,” Lavrov said at a press conference in Pretoria.27 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned of a "vicious circle" and told all sides to avoid unilateral actions, the North threatened to “settle accounts” and said it had put missiles on stand-by to hit the US. The US, which flew stealth bombers over South Korea in Mach, condemned the North's “bellicose rhetoric”. White House spokesman Josh Earnest said the rhetoric only deepened North Korea's isolation. North Korean state media reported leader Kim Jong-un “judged the time has come to settle accounts with the US imperialists”.28 “It was important for me to find out what the Americans thought about North Korea, and so when my counterpart was about to say goodbye after discussing the subject of Syria and raising no other subject, I said that it was also important to remain in contact on the problem, on the problem of the Korean Peninsula, in connection with the nuclear explosion that had been carried out by North Korea, and it was at my initiative that we discussed that issue,” Lavrov said. He cited a Russian Foreign Ministry statement issued immediately after the test that condemned it as a gross violation of a UN Security Council resolution, and warned that there would be consequences for Pyongyang, but insisted on avoiding any military action in retaliation for the explosion. He reiterated that the purpose of the six-party talks is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula with security guarantees provided for all states in the region, including North Korea. “Russia and other negotiators stand ready to provide such guarantees, and we will be ready to work for their enshrinement in a decision by the UN Security Council,” Lavrov said.29

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

65

Russia Is Ready for Multiple Talks The director of Modern Korea Study Center of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), George Toloraya, believes that Kim Jong-un hopes to begin negotiations with Washington and Seoul. Toloraya served as the Economist-Representative in Pyongyang and Minister-Counsellor in Seoul. He is also the Vice President of the “Unity for Russia” Foundation (Russia’s ruling party think tank) and head of Regional Projects Department, Regional Director for Asia and Africa, “Russkiy Mir” Foundation. In the interview “Kim Jong-un Dreams to Process Direct Negotiations with USA”30, Toloraya answered the questions of radio Voice of Russia about possible full-scale war in the Korean Peninsula. He said there might be war by accident, but no one needs it at all. He described a young leader, who does not have good enough skills to show hope of being treated well instead of being punished by isolations or sanctions, just like a dog being driven into a corner, it would bite. In his opinion, the aim of Kim’s panicked actions is to make the United States and South Korea compromise and start talks. So, Toloraya thinks the most natural way to escape from the military conflict for peace is to begin the negotiations with North Korea and lure it from the unpredictable and panicked situation. In his opinion, Moscow is worried that some US politicians and generals would use the North Korean threats to start a new allocation and build a missile defence shield, which is directed primarily against China and Russia. Concerning the impact of possible war on the Russian Far East, it could firstly be the nuclear power plants’ reactors if North Korea hit them in South Korea. What could be the worst result? It might the biggest disaster in the 21st century. Toloraya said it is hard to say how much influence Russia might have on DPRK because this young leader studied in Switzerland and he might not be interested in Russian issues. His father Kim Jong-Il was born in Russia and due to his warm feeling toward Russia, the Russian Center of Russkiy Mir Foundation was opened in Pyongyang. At 60% of schools, the Russian language is taught, and this helped improve the relationships between Russia and North Korea. Toloraya said that it is hard to say how the relationship will be between these two counties under Kim Jong-un’s

66

Chapter Two

new regime. It will depend on Russian diplomatic work.31 Toloraya said it not realistic to ask for Kim to give up the nuclear and rocket programs entirely, but perhaps to give him the opportunity to stop the uranium and plutonium production, and to freeze new construction of reactors. He suggested that the Obama administration is able to show the political willingness and financial aid for North Korea to establish a guarantee and conditions. This might allow Kim Jong-un to start economic reforms to reduce the military conflicts and improve the security in this region. For Russia, it is important to ease the tension and promote the economy with North Korea.32 Why is the US, from the Bush administration to the Obama administration, not in a hurry for talks? Toloraya thinks that the United States is playing the game of marginal war. He said: “At the same time initially North Koreans openly declared and called upon Russia and China to be witnesses - that they were prepared to make their nuclear program more transparent and even admit inspectors into the country, provided the US give guarantees of inviolability (suggesting that in this case they will no longer need deterrence weapons). Washington, however, at this stage demonstrated no intentions to issue any guarantees; it declined to enter into negotiations with Pyongyang, despite pressure from Russia, .China, and even Japan and South Korea. Paradoxically, as the crisis unraveled in the end of 2002 early 2003 US showed no marked signs of willingness to learn the truth about the North Korean nuclear program. Instead the US proposed bringing the discussion to the UN with an apparent hope to build a coalition against North Korea when the situation becomes more opportune. The North Koreans interpreted this as the US playing a waiting game until the Iraqi campaign is over and took a new course - not only threatening with creation of nuclear weapons but making practical steps to produce it (it is important in this context that practical actions were taken by DPRK only after it declared walking out of NPT in January 2003).”33

Military Development is for Non-Military Goal The possible main concern is about Kim Jong-un’s consolidation of his power in DPRK. He might take use and development of ballistic missiles

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

67

and anti-American actions to resolve the interior political fighting. Russian Ambassador Gleb Ivashentsov thinks that North Korea’s action is understandable. The development of nuclear power and ballistic missiles is for a non-military goal. The North Korean leader intends to implement independent national policy and obtain financial aid for the reforms. The problem is not only the nuclear weapons but also their dissemination to other countries and organizations out of control. Russia tries to play the role of the bridge between ROK and DPRK for promoting the economic relationships with these two countries. Russia supports the six-talks to normalize the situation in the Korean Peninsula.34 As Professor Victor Cha pointed out in his article “Think Again: North Korea”: Pyongyang conducted a third nuclear test in February, which appears to have been more successful than the previous two. Within President Barack Obama's second term in office, North Korea could well be the third nation (after Russia and China) to field a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile targeted at the United States. They need to read palace politics, reward friends and punish enemies, and manage competing interests that are vying for power. Signing a peace treaty in advance of denuclearization would recognize and legitimize Pyongyang's nuclear status, leaving it little incentive to shed those weapons. North Koreans have said to Victor Cha that a peace treaty is just a piece of paper; why would they give up their cherished nuclear program for that?35

Russia and China move Closer to be anti-US? With Obama’s rebalancing policy toward the Asia-Pacific region, China feels that this is containment and probably hinders the implementation of the conception of the “Chinese Dream”, proposed by the newly elected Chinese leader, Xi Jinping. Russia’s role in balancing US unipolarity was foreseen, and closer China-Russia strategic partnership in collective security might be much more important than before because both China and Russia see the potential in greater cooperation in regional integration for economic benefits and international security for global governance in disputed areas. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first official visit to Moscow ended in over 30 economic agreements being signed, although the nature of the bilateral relationship is political as well. China seeks a partner in the

68

Chapter Two

Asia-Pacific, where rhetoric on the “Chinese threat” is rising, and Russia wants political cooperation, which is lacking in its relations with the US. The critical importance of bilateral relations is evidently understood by both sides. Further proof is in the following passage from the joint statement issued after the talks on March 22-24 in Moscow: “Both countries will decisively support each other on issues relating to their core interests, including matters of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security.”36 China is North Korea's most important political and economic sponsor. However, its influence does not extend far enough to dissuade Pyongyang from conducting missile tests. However, for Beijing, this aborted exchange resulted in a loss of face. In response, China swiftly approved a set of UN sanctions against North Korea. The situation seems to be bringing Moscow and Beijing closer on the issue of countering US missile defence. In May of last year, during the most recent summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Beijing, Russia and China, together with other members of the organization, condemned US plans to deploy missile-defence shields in Europe and Asia. The Kremlin had already declared the missile shield in Europe to be a matter of national security. China, it seems, also harbours doubts that US deployment of land and sea missile-defence components in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines is related exclusively to North Korea's nuclear program.37 In response to North Korea's third nuclear test, conducted on February 12 of 2013, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a new resolution on March 7 to impose additional sanctions on the country. Resolution 2094 is the fifth UNSCR against North Korea since 2006 for the country’s nuclear and ballistic missile activities in violation of previous Security Council resolutions 1695, 1718, 1874, and 2087. Resolution 2094 and other previous resolutions (1718, 1874, and 2087) were passed under Chapter 7, Article 41 of the UN Charter under which measures are limited to those without use of armed forces. Such measures include economic and financial sanctions, restriction and prohibition of travel and other communication methods, and the severance of diplomatic relations. A more serious and harsher resolution would have been for the UNSC to invoke Chapter 7, Article 42 under which UN member countries are allowed to use air, sea, or land forces to enforce sanctions. On March 7, the 15 members of the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution 2094 on the DPRK’s recent move of a third nuclear

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

69

test. North Korea, on February 12 of this year, processed the successful implementation of the third underground nuclear test. Prior to this, North Korea had conducted two nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009. The DPRK immediately said there will be a higher level of nuclear testing for the protection of national autonomy to be carried out comprehensively and decisively.38 Obviously, the sanctions would not make the regime give up their extreme approaches, and oppositely this would make the situation in the region more escalated and tensioned towards the edge of war. Facing the isolation from the international community, Kim Jong-un is playing zero-sum games just like a crazy gambler. In this situation, the military confrontation and arms competition will be encouraged. Russia and China supporting the resolution was to send a signal the world that they insist on the goal of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and not having different opinions with other Security Council members. For Russia, it is important to establish good relations both with ROK and DPRK for economic benefits and long-term strategic stability in Asia-Pacific region. The diplomatic foreign approach is the traditional attitude for Russia implementing the independent foreign policy and not rapidly intervening into other countries’ internal problems on the one hand. On the other hand, Russia does not tolerate bilateral or imperial hegemony using military power to damage the world balance which might harm her national security and geopolitical interests. For China, North Korea is the chessman for her mediating the relationships with the United States and Japan. When Kim Jong-un is strengthening his ruling prestige, China needs to wait for the situation to become understandable and reduce the possible disputes with the new leader. It is not the time for China to intervene in Kim’s setting up of ruling power. North Korea’s intimidating actions will irritate South Korea and Japan firstly, and this will make the United States take action. US military actions will arouse Russia and China, who, together will oppose them. Therefore, China does not want to take any responsibility for North Korea’s confrontation with the United States. Both Russia and China need to put the North Korea agenda into the UN system, and this would strengthen their role for participation in future international affairs. However, neither Russia nor China really would like to take the sanctions

70

Chapter Two

seriously on North Korea, because sanctions will make the US more powerful and reduce the possible negotiations on controversial issues to access peaceful resolution. Kim Jong-un’s tough approach toward the United States also affected internal arguments in Washington D.C. that will examine the actions of Obama’s rebalancing policy toward Asia.

Conclusion In order to realize the Asia-Pacific strategy, the Russian authority will try to use her capacity of foreign policy and economic projects to reconcile the possible military conflicts in the North-eastern region. Russia’s priority in this region is integration. North Korea’s threats will harm the national interests of Russia and China, who have the consensus to solve the regional problems together. Russia-China cooperation in solving North Korea’s nuclear weapons proliferation was deepened after Xi Jinping met with Vladimir Putin in Moscow, where the two countries signed a lot of agreements on the arms trade too. The problem remains unsolved for building a broader international security mechanism in this region, which might require Russia-US consensus as well so as to reconcile the attitude of rivalry between SCO and NATO. The US factor has the key role in determining how far the Russia’s idea of an international security mechanism could be realized. North Korea’s crisis gave the opportunity for multi-party dialogues on international cooperation for anti-terrorism and non-proliferation nuclear weapons horizontally and vertically to other states and non-states. The role of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region is increasing, and this had found her being accepted as the WTO member in August of 2012 and holding the APEC in Vladivostok in September of 2012. The majority of the Russian policy-makers thought of the capacity of Russian integration in diversified areas, including international security, transport corridors, technology innovation, energy resources, space, and so on, as follows: 1. Creating international mechanism for peace and security: Sergei Lavrov, the minister of foreign affairs, thought that for Russia, it is urgent to make efforts with their partners in the Asia-Pacific region to create an international mechanism on the base of international laws for the peace and stability. Russia is ready to work with all the partners to eliminate the barriers of contradictions and achieve these goals.39

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

71

2. Establishing intercontinental transport corridor between Europe and Asia: Igor Ivanov suggested that another priority of Russia is to develop transport capacity in the region between Asia and Europe due to its geopolitical location, but the ability to achieve an intercontinental transport corridor is still far from being fully exploited. Reducing costs and time spent at the border crossing, the implementation of major infrastructure projects (upgrading of ports and airports, transportation corridors) in the format of public-private partnerships - all this will help to expand the areas of contact between Russia and its Asian surroundings.40 3. Supporting innovation for international research centres: Andrei Kostin, president and chairman of board of Foreign Trade Bank “VTB,” emphasized that one of the key areas of cooperation with Russian partners in APEC supports innovation. In particular, already successfully operating in the Russian Federation, several research centres of the largest corporations of the APEC countries, including “Boeing”, “Motorola”, “Intel”, “Samsung”. In the short term, Russia plans to open a number of research units of leading companies in the US, Japan and other Asia-Pacific countries in the innovation centre "Skolkovo", where participants are given unprecedented tax and customs preferences. In addition, they are gradually strengthening the relationship of Russian academic institutions and universities with research organizations APEC countries, which contributes to the acceleration of the formation of a single region of space research.41 4. The application of space technology to solve economic and political problems: Vladislav Lim, head of International Cooperation Company “Record” highly evaluated the perspective of Space economy, in the context of integration processes in the Asia-Pacific Region, is today one of the priorities of Russian foreign policy. Space activities and the practical application of its results can be used in resolving energy, information, food and other human problems, issues of environmental protection, natural resource management, disaster management, etc.42 5. Diversification of exports: Vladimir Lihachev believed from the Russian side, Asian energy markets are attractive from the point of view of diversification of exports, increasing demand access to a wide range of investment opportunities, access to technology, the potential for building economy and industry infrastructure, and companies in Eastern Siberia and in the Far East.43

72

Chapter Two

People can see that the problems in APR have influenced the world politics and world economy. North Korea’s crisis might be examined in the framework of the US-Russia-China triangle of relations. Kim Jong-un’s uncontrolled character might provoke an arms race and military deterrence via the building of an anti-ballistic system by the United States in this region. In the approach to resolving the problem, it is necessary to go back to abide by the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons principles for peaceful resolution under the framework of Six-Party Talks. Neither Russia nor China sees the benefits of war. The international community should not see North Korea from mentality of hatred or it will make the country more isolated from the world. Russia will influence North Korea for her long time assistance in DPRK’s nuclear energy and perspective proposals for economic cooperation, which will help DPRK reduce its reliance on China and develop national development in a more diversified range. For Russia, the continuing conflict between North and South Korea hinders opportunities for cooperation with South Korea, a dynamic and promising state of the critically important East Asian region and a member of the G20, hosting the 2010 summit in Seoul. Over the past two decades South Korea has made progress on the path of liberal-democratic development in the economic sphere, and, following the crisis of 1997-1998, it managed to join the ranks of developed countries with its new industrial economic model. Just then the country started to move towards a post-industrial and innovative model of development. South Korea is taking advantage of all opportunities appearing as a result of the global crisis, and is actively globalizing its economy and successfully expanding foreign trade, particularly with leading world economies.44 It is important to understand the limitations of the leverage Russia has in the region and, even more so, to understand how it can most efficiently use it. According to the suggestions of Vyacheslav A. Nikonov and Georgy D. Toloraya45, the steps that might be taken from the Russian perspective in connection with North Korea and South Korea for long term security and interests in this region are as follows: 1. We should not ignore Russia’s unique political capital, partly eroded, that is its longstanding relations with the North Korean elite, regardless of negative perceptions in Russian society of the North Korean state structure. It has become more important, in connection

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

73

with the process of power succession now in North Korea to a younger generation, which knows much less about Russia. For the US, China and South Korea, Russia’s participation in six-party negotiations is only valued in so much as Russia can influence North Korea. 2. The only sensible path to resolving the nuclear issue is to take into consideration a number of concerns of Pyongyang, with the aim of reducing the significance of the nuclear deterrence factor. If denuclearization takes place without the creation of a stable system of collective security, then the risks of military conflict may actually increase. 3. Further down the road, steps should be taken toward the abandonment of the military nuclear component, when non-military mechanisms providing for the security of North Korea are found, which could include the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons. It would be prudent to launch initiatives to develop a “roadmap” for accomplishing these goals. 4. Moscow should bolster its efforts to preserve its position in North Korea, in particular in the economic and cultural spheres. Participation in sanctions should be examined with Russia’s long-term interests in mind. 5. Looking to the future we see a number of major projects that could be brought to life, for example the linking of the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Korea’s railroad infrastructure. A vivid example could be the revitalization of the project to build a line from Khasan to Rajin to transport containers from South Korea. It would be farsighted to keep on the front burners projects for building power lines across North Korean territory to South Korea, as well as natural gas supply infrastructure throughout the Korean peninsula. Negotiations on denuclearization could also incorporate the construction of an atomic power plant in North Korea, and participation in such a project would require a significant amount of preparatory work. 6. Given the fact that the population and a good portion of the elite has a positive perception of Russian culture and the “Russian World,” it would be appropriate to fully examine our approach to cultural cooperation with North Korea and to implement programs promoting Russian language and culture, particularly considering the fact that some progress has already been made. 7. Russian strategy in relation to South Korea, which is an economic player not only on the regional but also global level, should give priority to the economic component, with the aims of achieving

74

Chapter Two

partnership on equal footing and the participation of South Korea in the long-term development of Russia’s Far East. Russia and China might see the prospect for strengthening their collective security under the framework of SCO which was anticipated to play a broaden role in economic cooperation. The North Korean crisis might irritate the confrontation between Russia-China as strategic partners and the United States with their alliances in the Asia-Pacific region. When Russia implements her geopolitical policy for promoting her role in world economy and as regional balancer, Kim Jong-un’s military provocation will hinder Russia’s national interests. If the United States takes Kim Jong-un’s threat as a serious military threat and locate a ballistic missile system there, it will irritate Russia and China’s intensive reaction. The confrontation in the US-Russia-China triangle of relations might weaken their possible cooperation an-terrorism in Central Asia and encourage Kim Jong-un to take the risk of developing nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip for more financial assistance and to ask for South Korea’s political concession. This will make the North-eastern region become uncertain and out of control, bringing it to the edge of war in this tense situation.

Notes 1

Arkady Dvorkovich, “Russia-China Energy Dialogue: Deputy Prime Minister A. V. Dvorkovich’s Address to the Participants of Energy Dialogue of “Russia-China””, Ministry of Energy of the Russia Federation, June 1, 2012. Retrieved from: http://minenergo.gov.ru/co-operation/china/ (ɗɧɟɪɝɨɞɢɚɥɨɝ Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ – Ʉɢɬɚɣ: Ɉɛɪɚɳɟɧɢɟ Ɂɚɦɟɫɬɢɬɟɥɹ ɉɪɟɞɫɟɞɚɬɟɥɹ ɉɪɚɜɢɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɚ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ Ⱥ.ȼ. Ⱦɜɨɪɤɨɜɢɱɚ ɤ ɭɱɚɫɬɧɢɤɚɦ ɗɧɟɪɝɨɞɢɚɥɨɝɚ “Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ — Ʉɢɬɚɣ”) 2 Alexey M. Mastepanov, “Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation to the Year of 2020”. Retrieved from: http://ec.europa.eu/energy/russia/presentations/doc/energy-strategy2020_en.pdf 3 Lauren Goodrich &Marc Lanthemann, “A New Era For Russia’s Energy Strategy?” Economy Watch, February 14, 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.economywatch.com/economy-business-and-finance-news/a-new-era-fo r-russias-energy-strategy.14-02.html 4 Vyacheslav A. Nikonov (lead), Georgy D. Toloraya (editor), Alexander V. Vorontsov, Alexander Z. Zhebin, Ivan S. Zakharchenko, Grigory S. Logvinov, Vladimir E. Novikov, Alexander A. Pikaev, Igor Sagitov, “The Korean Crisis Management: A Russian Perspective”, Korea Review of International Studies

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

75

(2010): 63-87. Retrieved from: http://gsis.korea.ac.kr/gri/contents/2010_2/13-2-04_Russian.pdf 5 “Russia-US Relations after “Reset”: On the Road toward the New Agenda. The Views from Russia”, Publication of Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, March 10, 2011. (Ɉɬɧɨɲɟɧɢɹ Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ–ɋɒȺ ɉɨɫɥɟ “ɉɟɪɟɡɚɝɪɭɡɤɢ”: ɇɚ ɉɭɬɢ ɤ ɇɨɜɨɣ ɉɨɜɟɫɬɤɟ Ⱦɧɹ. ȼɡɝɥɹɞ ɢɡ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ.) Retrieved from: http://www.svop.ru/public/2011/docs60.htm 6 Victor W. Sidel, MD and Barry S. Levy, “Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Opportunities for Control and Abolition”, American Journal of Public Health, 97(9) (2007): 1589–1594. 7 Alexei Fenenko, “After the Reset”, Russia in Global Affairs, April 15, 2013. 8 Dmitry Gorenburg, “The Modernization of Russia’s Nuclear Submarine Forces”, blog of Dmitry Gorenburg, April 25, 2013. Retrieved from: http://russiamil.wordpress.com/2013/04/25/the-modernization-of-russias-nuclear-s ubmarine-forces/ 9 Regional governance is a concern of the Obama administration for better implementing regional-scale policy. The focus shifted from government to governance and from governmental consolidation to problem-solving. See William R. Barnes & Kathryn A. Foster, “Toward a More Useful Way of Understanding Regional Governance”, a paper for presentation at the September 2012 conference of the European Urban Research Association, Vienna, Austria. Retrieved from: http://brr.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Barnes-Foster-Toward-a-more -useful-way-of-understanding-regional-governance.pdf Regional Governance is the method whereby would-be world rulers intend to control every aspect of our lives. Without the full implementation of Regional Governance, their plan for world dominance cannot succeed. See Jackie Patru, “Regionalism: Sneaking America Into World Government.” Retrieved from: http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/regionalism/sneaking.htm 10 The idea of a Eurasian Union, based on the European Union's integration, was brought to attention in October 2011 by the then-Prime Minister of Russia, Vladimir Putin, but was first proposed as a concept by the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, during a 1994 speech at a Moscow university. On 18 November 2011, the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an agreement, setting a target of establishing the Eurasian Union by 2015. The agreement included the roadmap for the future integration and established the Eurasian Commission and the Eurasian Economic Space, which started work on 1 January 2012. See also “Putin calls for Eurasian union”, RIA Novosti, October 4, 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/world-article.php?yyyy=2011&mm=10&dd=04&na v_id=76700 11 According to Morgenthau, alliances are necessary function of balance of power operating in a multiple-state system. See Hans Joachim Morgenthau, “Politics

76

Chapter Two

Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”, New York, Alfred A. Knopf. (1948). 12 Sergei Kortunov, “National Interests of Russia in APR”, Golden Lion, No. 142-143, (2008). (ɋɟɪɝɟɣ Ʉɨɪɬɭɧɨɜ, “ɇɚɰɢɨɧɚɥɶɧɵɟ ɢɧɬɟɪɟɫɵ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ ɜ ȺɌɊ”, “Ɂɨɥɨɬɨɣ Ʌɟɜ” ʋ 142-143 - ɢɡɞɚɧɢɟ ɪɭɫɫɤɨɣ ɤɨɧɫɟɪɜɚɬɢɜɧɨɣ ɦɵɫɥɢ, (2008).) Retrieved from: http://www.zlev.ru/142/142_13.htm 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Sergei Karaganov, “The Map of the World: Geopolitics Stages a Comeback”, Russia in Global Affairs, May 19, 2013. Retrieved from: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/The-Map-of-the-World-Geopolitics-Stages-a-Co meback-15974 16 NEA Press Release, May 23, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.oecd-nea.org/press/2012/2012-03.html 17 NEA Press Release, May 23, 2012. Retrieved from: http://www.oecd-nea.org/press/2012/2012-03.html 18 See the Publishers’ column: “How Real Is a Nuclear North Korea?” Russia in Global Affairs, February 18, 2004. Retrieved from: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_2585 19 Ibid. 20 Leonid Petrov, “Russia’s Power Politics and North Korea”, International Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs V XVII-2 (2008). Retrieved from: http://north-korea.narod.ru/Russia-DPRK_power_politics_English.htm 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 “Russian Merchants Greatly Increasing in Pyongyang”, Daily NK, April 5, 2007. http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=1871 24 Fyodor Lukyanov, “The Dangers of the Korean Crisis”, Russia in Global Affairs, Publishers’ column, April 10, 2013. Retrieved from: http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/The-Dangers-of-the-Korean-Crisis-15916 25 Victor Cha, “North Korea Threatens to Strike the United States”, CSIS Overview, March 29, 2013. Retrieved from: http://csis.org/publication/critical-questions-north-korea-threatens-strike-united-sta tes 26 See “Putin and Kim Jong-un Scared Half of the World”, TV Rain, Russia (“ȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪ ɉɭɬɢɧ ɢ Ʉɢɦ ɑɟɧ ɕɧ ɧɚɩɭɝɚɥɢ ɩɨɥɦɢɪɚ.”Ɍɟɥɟɤɚɧɚɥ Ⱦɨɠɞɶ, Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ). Retrieved from: http://tvrain.ru/articles/vladimir_putin_i_kim_chen_yn_napugali_polmira-339912/ 27 See the news: “Russia to Insist on Soonest Resumption of Six-Nation Talks on North Korea –Lavrov”, February 12, 2013. Retrieved from: http://english.ruvr.ru/2013_02_12/Russia-to-insist-on-soonest-resumption-of-six-n

Military Crisis in North-eastern Region

77

ation-talks-on-North-Korea-Lavrov/ 28 See the BBC news: “North Korea Tensions: Russia's Lavrov Fears Spiral'”, March 29, 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21974381 29 See the news “Lavrov, Kerry Discussed North Korean Nuclear Test”, February 18, 2013, Interfax. Retrieved from: http://rbth.ru/news/2013/02/18/lavrov_kerry_discussed_north_korean_nuclear_test _23012.html 30 See the interview by the Voice of Russia: “Kim Jong-un Dreams to Process Direct Negotiations with USA.” (Ƚɟɨɪɝɢɣ Ɍɨɥɨɪɚɹ: "Ʉɢɦ ɑɟɧ ɕɧ ɦɟɱɬɚɟɬ ɩɪɨɜɟɫɬɢ ɩɪɹɦɵɟ ɩɟɪɟɝɨɜɨɪɵ ɫ ɋɒȺ".) Retrieved from: http://rus.ruvr.ru/2013_03_29/Georgij-Toloraja-Kim-CHen-In-mechtaet-provesti-p rjamie-peregovori-s-SSHA/ 31 See the interview by the Russkiy Mir Foundation: “George Toloraya: In the Era of Kim Jong-un.” (Ƚɟɨɪɝɢɣ Ɍɨɥɨɪɚɹ: ȼ ɷɩɨɯɭ Ʉɢɦ ɑɟɧ ɕɧɚ.) Retrieved from: http://www.russkiymir.ru/russkiymir/ru/publications/interview/interview0226.html 32 See the interview by the Russian newspaper Russiskaya Gazeta : “Russia Can Launch Satellites DPRK.” (Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ ɦɨɠɟɬ ɡɚɩɭɫɤɚɬɶ ɫɩɭɬɧɢɤɢ ɄɇȾɊ). Retrieved from: http://www.rg.ru/2012/12/16/zapusk-site.html 33 See the article of Toloraya: “Scenarios for North Korea.” Retrieved from: http://world.lib.ru/k/kim_o_i/a971.shtml 34 See the interview by The Epoch Times on Russian Ambassador Gleb Ivanshentsov: “Two Wheels of a Cart or How to Resolve the Korean Question”, August 10, 2012. (“ɉɨɫɨɥ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ Ƚɥɟɛ ɂɜɚɲɟɧɰɨɜ: Ⱦɜɚ Ʉɨɥɟɫɚ Ɉɞɧɨɣ ɉɨɜɨɡɤɢ, ɢɥɢ Ʉɚɤ Ɋɟɲɚɬɶ Ʉɨɪɟɣɫɤɢɣ ȼɨɩɪɨɫ.”) Retrieved from: http://www.epochtimes.ru/content/view/66927/54/ 35 David kang and Victor Cha, “Think Again; North Korea”, Foreign Policy, March 25, 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/25/think_again_north_korea 36 Andrei Ilyashenko, “China Reaffirms Strategic Partnership in Russia.” Special to Russia Beyond the Headlines (RBTH), March 28, 2013. Retrieved from: http://rbth.ru/international/2013/03/28/china_reaffirms_strategic_partnership_in_ru ssia_24385.html 37 Andrei Ilyashenko, “Tensions on the Korean Peninsula Bring Russia and China Closer”, Special to Russia beyond the Headlines (RBTH), April 1, 2013. Retrieved from: http://rbth.ru/opinion/2013/04/01/moscow_and_beijing_need_to_flesh_out_ security_concerns_24491.html 38 See the article "The United Nations Security Council Passed a Sanctions Resolution on North Korean Nuclear Test.” Retrieved from: http://ohsnapnews.com/the-united-nations-security-council-passed-a-sanctions-res olution-on-north-korean-nuclear-test/3783/ 39 Sergei Lavrov, “Russia in APEC: to the New Horizon of Asia-Pacific Integration”,

78

Chapter Two

International Affairs, (2012): 8-22. (ɋɟɪɝɟɣ Ʌɚɜɪɨɜ, “Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ ɜ ȺɌɗɋ: Ʉ ɇɨɜɵɦ Ƚɨɪɢɡɨɧɬɚɦ Ⱥɡɢɚɬɫɤɨ-Ɍɢɯɨɨɤɟɚɧɫɤɨɣ ɂɧɬɟɝɪɚɰɢɢ”, Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɚɹ ɀɢɡɧɶ, ɆɂȾ ɊɎ, (2012): 8-22.) Retrieved from: http://interaffairs.ru/i/2012_rus.pdf 40 Igor Ivanov, “Representative of Russia in APEC: Priorities and Perspectives”, International Affairs, (2012):23-28. (ɂɝɨɪɶ ɂɜɚɧɨɜ, “ɉɪɟɞɫɟɞɚɬɟɥɶɫɬɜɨ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ ɜ ȺɌɗɋ: ɉɪɢɨɪɢɬɟɬɵ ɢ ɩ ɉɟɪɫɩɟɤɬɢɜɵ”, Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɚɹ ɀɢɡɧɶ, ɆɂȾ ɊɎ, (2012): 23-28.) Retrieved from: http://interaffairs.ru/i/2012_rus.pdf 41 Andrei Kostin, “Answer the challenges, Broaden Possibility”, International Affairs, (2012):29-40. (Ⱥɧɞɪɟɣ Ʉɨɫɬɢɧ, “Ɉɬɜɟɱɚɹ ɧɚ ȼɵɡɨɜɵ, Ɋɚɫɲɢɪɹɹ ȼɨɡɦɨɠɧɨɫɬɢ”, Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɚɹ ɠɢɡɧɶ, ɆɂȾ ɊɎ, (2012): 29-40.) Retrieved from: http://interaffairs.ru/i/2012_rus.pdf 42 Vladislav Lim, “Russia-APR: Space Cooperation”, International Affairs, (2012): 41-52. (ȼɥɚɞɢɫɥɚɜ Ʌɢɦ, “Ɋɨɫɫɢɹ - ȺɌɊ: Ʉɨɫɦɢɱɟɫɤɨɟ ɉɚɪɬɧɟɪɫɬɜɨ”, Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɚɹ ɀɢɡɧɶ, ɆɂȾ ɊɎ, (2012): 41-52.) Retrieved from: http://interaffairs.ru/i/2012_rus.pdf 43 Vladimir Lihachev, “East Sector of Russian Energy Strategy-2030”, International Affairs, (2012): 115-126. (ȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪ Ʌɢɯɚɱɟɜ, “ȼɨɫɬɨɱɧɵɣ ȼɟɤɬɨɪ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ ɗɧɟɪɝɟɬɢɱɟɫɤɨɣ ɋɬɪɚɬɟɝɢɢ-2030”, Ɇɟɠɞɭɧɚɪɨɞɧɚɹ ɀɢɡɧɶ, ɆɂȾ ɊɎ, (2012): 115-126.) Retrieved from: http://interaffairs.ru/i/2012_rus.pdf 44 Vyacheslav A. Nikonov (lead), Georgy D. Toloraya (editor), Alexander V. Vorontsov, Alexander Z. Zhebin, Ivan S. Zakharchenko, Grigory S. Logvinov, Vladimir E. Novikov, Alexander A. Pikaev, Igor Sagitov, “The Korean Crisis Management: A Russian Perspective”, Korea Review of International Studies (2010): 78. Retrieved from: http://gsis.korea.ac.kr/gri/contents/2010_2/13-2-04_Russian.pdf 45 Ibid. 83-86.

CHAPTER THREE THE PROBLEMS OF GLOBALIZATION FOR REGIONAL INTEGRATION: A RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE FENG-YUNG HU

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT COLLEGE OF GENERAL STUDIES YUAN ZE UNIVERSITY (YZU), TAIWAN ADJUNCT RESEARCHER AT NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY (NTU), TAIWAN

AND VLADIMIR ARTEMOV

FORMER CHIEF PROFESSOR AT INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISM SCHOOL THE MOSCOW STATE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS UNIVERSITY (MGIMO-UNIVERSITY) OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, RUSSIA

Globalization makes Russia and China become more integrated into the world and their roles in the regions are also anticipated to become enlarged. Facing the US’s rebalancing policy toward the Asia-Pacific region, China stands at the centre of the containment because of the territorial disputes in this region. China’s new leader, Xi Jinping, constructed his conception of the “Chinese dream” and stressed that the idea should be realized with the protection of economic development and military expansion. Russia plays the role of balancer between US and China with US-China’s new type of competition and conflict. With Xi’s first national visit to Moscow, Putin and Xi reached a consensus of maintaining the regional stability and pursuing the international governance with a more rational structure for the participation of new emerging powers. Xi and Obama also had a consensus of constructing a new type of relationship among powers. In this situation, Russia, China

80

Chapter Three

and the United States have the intention to cooperate in a broader range to solve the problems of nuclear weapons proliferation, such in North Korea, Iran and possible dissemination into the hands of terror organizations and even beyond this, for facing global challenges such as climate change. The political convergence and conflict has a more and more vivid trend in the next decade than economic and cultural factors, which had tremendous impact in the past decades. After Putin came to power, his foreign policy goal was to rebuild a world system on the basis of multi-polarity principles and strengthen the function of the Security Council on international security under the framework of the United Nations. Russia sees the trend of globalization as irreversible and tries to participate in the global governance to rebalance the world system which was dominated by the willingness of one state or one group according to the elite of the Russian foreign affairs. Regional integration for cooperation and collective security for international security are the visible directions for Russia implementing her global governance after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Both Russia and China saw the opportunity to rebuild the world order after the global financial crisis in 2008. Russia’s energy export was also impacted by the crisis and how to diversify the economic structure became an imperative mission for the Russian administration. It is obvious that after Vladimir Putin came to the regime, Russia started to resume her traditional status as a power and activate her function of foreign policy to meet the new demands of globalization. The principles of globalization were stated by the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe in 2000 as follows:1 1. The changes that the world underwent in the late 1980s and early 1990s have radically reshaped the environment for the development of international relations, thus opening up a prospect for their global transformation. 2. With globalization, international security is becoming increasingly indivisible. In this context, a political structure of the world order should meet the requirements of its practical implementation. It is important that all States be equally protected against modern risks and threats and bear common responsibility for their elimination. 3. A special role in this process is assigned to the United Nations (UN) which is the single universal mechanism to maintain international

The Problems of Globalization for Regional Integration

81

peace and security. 4. The world order of the 21st century means multipolarity based on integration capabilities of the regions and their interaction in the interests of stability and security. 5. It is necessary, in furtherance of the UN Charter, to develop a package of political and legal measures in this field. The practice of imposing sanctions against a State should be reviewed. 6. The extent of threats capable of destroying international security, plunging the world into a state of chaos and instability remains considerable. These threats include the danger of proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical and other types of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts whose numbers keep growing; the danger of a new spiral of the arms race on a higher technological and information basis; the widening gap between rich and poor countries; organized crime and international terrorism; illicit traffic in drugs; vulnerability of the natural systems, environment, etc. There have emerged conflicts of a new generation, indicative of current structural changes in international relations, which require an adequate response from the international community. 7. These events are developing against the background of globalization that exerts an ever stronger influence on the system of international relations, structure of international, regional and national security.

The Phenomenon of Globalization Globalization is not a single concept that can be defined and encompassed within a set time frame, nor is it a process that can be defined clearly with a beginning and an end. Furthermore, it cannot be expounded upon with certainty and be applicable to all people and in all situations. Globalization involves economic integration; the transfer of policies across borders; the transmission of knowledge; cultural stability; the reproduction, relations, and discourses of power; it is a global process, a concept, a revolution, and “an establishment of the global market free from sociopolitical control.”2 In 1995, Martin Khor, President of the Third World Network 2 in Malaysia, referred to globalization as colonization. Concurrently, Swedish journalist Thomas Larsson, in his book The Race to the Top: The Real Story of Globalization (2001), stated that globalization:

82

Chapter Three “is the process of world shrinkage, of distances getting shorter, things moving closer. It pertains to the increasing ease with which somebody on one side of the world can interact, to mutual benefit, with somebody on the other side of the world.”3

These two different interpretations reflect different perspectives rooted in different world positions.4 The end of the Cold War produced the new expectations of increasing economic and political convergence across nations. The neoliberal concept of globalization anticipated that nations would redefine their interests to fit the standards of the newly emerging and West-defined openness in the world economy (Ohmae 1991; Friedman 1999, 2005)5. Another school expected global political convergence based on developing Western-style democratic institutions across nations (Fukuyama 1989; Mandelbaum 2005) 6 . Many scholars have justifiably criticized these approaches as ethnocentric and unrealistic. Instead of the increased and West-defined policy convergence, new cleavages and divergences emerged in the world. The world of globalization brought new poverty and socio-economic divisions (Murphy 2001) 7 . It created new areas of violence and lawlessness. It reactivated arms races. And it enacted new and intensified some old processes of cultural reformulations and ethnic nationalism (Mansfield and Snyder 2007) 8 . Instead of relying on protection and welfare of Western hegemony, nations often seek refuge in reformulating their interests to better protect their societies and re-adjust to their regional environments (Stalling 1995; Mansfield and Millner 1997; Helleiner and Pickel 2005)9. In both global and regional organizations, nations re-define their interests consistently with their historical pasts and their images of national selves.10 According to Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s way of adapting to globalization has also followed national historical patterns, rather than the expected model of global policy convergence. Rather than becoming wide-open to Western economic and political influences – something that the new Russian leadership had experimented with during the 1990s – it pursued a course of selective openness managed by an increasingly strong and nationalistic state. In economic affairs, the Kremlin insists on the need for Russia to protect its path of development and natural resources. An emphasis on sovereignty indicated the state’s determination to have an upper hand in deciding conditions on which Western companies participate

The Problems of Globalization for Regional Integration

83

in Russia’s economic development. In the world of growing energy prices, the emphasis shifted from providing macroeconomic discipline and tough fiscal policies toward a desire to capitalize on Russia’s reserves of natural gas and oil. As viewed by Vladimir Putin, the role of the energy sector is to work with the state to promote these objectives. According to this perspective, relying on market forces is essential, but insufficient: “Even in developed countries, market mechanisms do not provide solutions to strategic tasks of resource use, protecting nature, and sustainable economic security.”11 The state therefore has to shape policy outcomes by actively seeking to control social resources, coordinating the activities of key social players and assisting the country in finding its niche in the global economy.12 Russia’s experience with the West-initiated globalization has been peculiar. Immediately following the end of the Cold War, Boris Yeltsin’s choice was decisively pro-Western, and he sought to integrate Russia with Western institutions. Since the late-1990s, however, Russia has adopted different priorities and pursued a more selective approach to globalization. In economic and political affairs, the Kremlin insisted on preserving state sovereignty and the right to defend itself against harmful influences from the outside world, as well as promote its own vision of globalization. From an admirer of the West, Russia has emerged as its critic that is actively seeking to expand its presence in global markets and join global institutions while at the same time working to transform these institutions to its advantage.13 Russia’s theoretical engagement with globalization has taken place on two inter-related levels: international and domestic. Externally, Russian scholars of international relations have sought to take issues with Western, especially American, interpretations of globalization according to which globalization benefits those who are willing to accept the rules of the game, rather than challenge them. Internally, Russians have identified at least three different responses to globalization – full acceptance, selective acceptance and radical rejection – and developed theories to justify their responses. Russia’s current intellectual mainstream with regard to globalization includes theories by realist thinkers and critical political economists. These theories correlate with and are partly shaped by the official attitude of selective acceptance of global economic and political rules.14

84

Chapter Three

Table 1: Step of Economic Globalization

Table 2. Components of Globalization of World Economy

The Problems of Globalization for Regional Integration

85

Irina Vladimirovna defined globalization in the scope of the world economy process of integration. She stressed that the globalization of world market has the characteristics of cooperation among different countries, elimination of barriers to goods, technology and services, reduction of differences, dissemination of labour force and convergence of market. The following pictures reflect the process and phenomenon of the globalization of world economy:15 During the 1990s, Russia underwent an extraordinary transformation from a communist dictatorship to a multi-party democracy, from a centrally planned system to a market economy, and from a belligerent enemy of the West to a cooperative partner. This change was as unexpected as exceptional: two decades ago, only an idealist would have imagined the "evil empire" could transform so quickly and peacefully into a democratic and capitalist ally of the West. The unprecedented nature of this switch raises the question of the role of globalization in Russian transition to a market economy. The process of globalization can be understood as the interplay of technological, economic, and political changes, leading to new patterns of trade and investment in the world. As the British-born sociologist Michael Mann puts it, "the term of globalization' refers to the extension of social and economic relations over the globe". The whole planet becomes embroiled in a single set of social and economic relations. How did globalization speed up the transformation of the Russian economic system? What have been the consequences of this process? What relationship does Russia have today with global economy? These are the main issues of this study.16

Disintegration of the World System Since that time, numerous processes and forces have been underway to create a system of international relations that actually include the whole of the planet. To understand the present day situation as it presents itself for us in Russia, one has to look back at the events of the past centuries. First of all it is important to underline that, although the Russian people in Russia are not unanimous in their attitude towards the role that globalization plays or may play in the development of our country, there is an absolute unanimity that it is an objective process which started when people managed to reach faraway lands. In this sense there are two events

86

Chapter Three

we may consider as the opening of the era of globalization. First, Chinggis Khan17 was bridging the East and the West. Secondly, the geographical discoveries of the great fleet under the command of Admiral Zheng He.18 Columbus and Magellan sailed by the Chinese charts. And the Chinese people as the descendants of the pioneers of globalization are approved by the Russian people. Politically, the past 100 years can be divided into three periods. The first period began with World War One, the Russian Revolution and the unfair Treaty of Versailles; then it continued with the first Cold War and ended with Stalinism, Fascism and World War Two. The next period began with the construction of a two-bloc confrontation, the classical Cold War and, simultaneously, the creation of the United Nations and the system of governance over the global economy and finance, which was dominated by the US and the West. This system should have been rebuilt after the defeat of Communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union, which marked the beginning of the third period in the history of the last century.19 However, the international system was never rebuilt to meet the new challenges and opportunities. The West and the US, ecstatic over their new status as winners, decided to leave everything intact. A confused and weakened Russia had nothing to offer. Developing countries were still on the periphery of the world economy and politics. The following decade saw the establishment of a unipolar world based on old institutions. The West decided to preserve NATO – which had lost its main goal – and began to expand the alliance; however, as time went on, NATO became the main source of tensions in Europe, at least in relations with Russia, and predictably began to restore Cold War stereotypes.20 The UN kept losing its influence and effectiveness. Ecstatic over their victory, the winners overlooked the beginning of nuclear proliferation in such countries as India and Pakistan and failed to solve a single problem in the Middle East. Having missed the beginning of the Yugoslav war, they launched an attack on Yugoslavia. The arms control system shattered. The system of governance over international relations and security, established over the previous 50 years, was gradually disintegrating. We have to admit much more. Actually, the end of the Cold War marked the end of a longer stage in global development, which lasted for 400 to 500 years and when the world was dominated by European civilization. This

The Problems of Globalization for Regional Integration

87

domination was consistently led by the historical West. The tone in the global economy was set by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Washington Consensus, whose authors argued that the whole world could only develop according to the super-liberal Anglo-Saxon model.21 Broadly speaking, in modern international relations it is difficult to find a more fundamental issue than the definition of the current stage in global development. This is important for any country in order to correlate a development strategy and a foreign policy with the vision of the world we live in. It seems that a consensus is already being formed on this score, albeit at the level of the expert community both in Russia and abroad. And the major point the most experts come to agree upon is that individual problems of world politics cannot be solved without understanding the “big issues” of global development and without reaching a common vision of them in the international community. Various terms have been proposed to define the content of the emerging world order, among them multi-polar, polycentric and nonpolar. Russia has been consistently advocating that the diversity of the world requires that such collective leadership be truly representative both geographically and civilizationally. Unfortunately, the Cold War experience has distorted the consciousness of several generations of people, above all political elites, making them think that any global policy must be ideologized. And now, when Russia is guided in international affairs by understandable, pragmatic interests, void of any ideological motives whatsoever, not everyone is able to adequately take it.22

The Financial Crisis’ Impact on Russia The world’s increasingly rapid economic growth from the mid-1980s throughout the next 20 years was generally interpreted as the result of applying the Washington Consensus prescriptions. Countries continued to rely on the old, seemingly effective instruments and on the domination of the US dollar. Only Europeans created a local and more or less new system and switched to the euro. The patently unstable political unipolar world could have been rebuilt after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the US. There was a chance to set up a global coalition led – but not dominated – by the United States. By the end of the 1990s, the globalization and the increasing openness of the world economy,

88

Chapter Three

which initially gave benefits mainly to the Old West, became more advantageous to young capitalist countries. Energy-rich Russia was among the countries that gained from this second wave of resource redistribution.23 First, there is no reasonable alternative to a global political architecture relying on the United Nations and the rule of international law. Let us not forget that the UN was created even before the beginning of the Cold War for use in a multipolar international system. In other words, its potential can be fully tapped only now. Second, the global financial-economic architecture was largely created by the West to suit its own needs. And now that we are watching the generally recognized shift of financial-economic power and influence toward new fast-growing economies, such as China, India, Russia and Brazil, the inadequacy of this system to the new realities becomes obvious. In reality, a financial-economic basis is needed that would conform to the polycentricity of the contemporary world. Otherwise, the governability of global development cannot be restored.24 The world financial crisis and the bursting of the asset bubble presented Russia with a double shock. Oil prices collapsed, which had a huge direct impact. And capital was withdrawn from Russia in the flight to safety. Both of these shocks were primarily due to events abroad. The problem for Russia is not its dependence on oil; rather, it is that Russia remains addicted to oil. Russia’s oil and gas give it an unmatched source for generating wealth. The problem is how to restrain the addiction to the ensuing rents. Even under the most optimistic scenario for oil prices, Russia’s growth will be constrained by the same factors that shaped the impact of this crisis. The crisis has reminded us of how thoroughly dependent Russia is on oil and gas. This dependence will continue.25 According to Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes26, rent management is the problem that Russia cannot afford in the global financial crisis: 1. Russia is addicted to the resource rents. This is a point distinct from the first. 2. Russia, like all resource-abundant economies, has a specific system of management of its resource rents. Because of the overwhelming importance of the rents in Russia, the rent management system is a key to the entire political economy. Fundamental changes in the political economy of Russia are necessarily changes to the rent management

The Problems of Globalization for Regional Integration

89

system. 3. What makes Russia unique is the combination of resource dependence with addiction and its specific rent management system. Russia's dependency on exports of oil, natural gas, metals and other raw materials was too large, and today this has created additional shrinkage of demand inside Russia. In this sense, we are observing the curtailment and shrinkage of the sectors that ensured supply and demand domestically in Russia. We are dependent to a great degree on the world economy. That is the part of the anti-crisis package that is related to the easing of the taxation burden. So we adopted a number of measures to support individual industries, such as the auto industry, the aircraft manufacturing industry, shipbuilding, and some others. We are also supporting export industries. We provided additional guarantees to stimulate exports from Russia.27 The crisis had a large influence on the budget. This is related mainly to oil and gas, and the quick shrinkage of GDP. And this shows that Russia is more vulnerable than other countries regarding the structure of its exports, the structure of its own economy, and of course this creates greater need to promote diversification in the coming years. Therefore, taxes will be restructured to stimulate innovation and transferred to technology. We are preparing a major program on energy efficiency and economical use of energy resources. So the questions that were raised, not only during this crisis but before the crisis, where whether or not the IMF is representative of all groups of countries, especially stronger countries like the emerging markets, and whether IMF decisions take account of the interests of all countries. But I think the IMF, the World Bank, and other financial institutions should increase the role of developing and emerging markets to reflect their capacity and role. For Russia and China, the prospects of the US dollar are still important because our investment of our resources is preserved in this market.28 How did Russia cope with the global financial banking crisis? It might be connected with the Russian diplomatic strategy. Russia’s stock market is deeply influenced by US factors because Russia's financial system has also been involved in the US subprime mortgage crisis, with the Russian Central Bank owning US$100 billion of mortgage-backed securities in the two American mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that were taken over by the US government. Investors have also pulled billions of

90

Chapter Three

dollars out of Russia on concerns over escalating geopolitical tensions with the military conflict between Georgia and Russia. American investors withdrew their capitals from Russia, punishing Moscow for the war in Georgia. Concerning the measures against the financial crisis, the Kremlin might adopt more liberal policies to broaden the Russian companies and liberalize the national bank system for investing overseas. Kremlin might also build up a rouble reserve currency region to make Russia another world financial centre compared with US, EU and Asian hegemony like Japan and China. Russia's economy is heavily dependent on energy prices, especially oil which has lost more than a third of its value since its record peak of USD 147 on 11 July 2008. By September 2008, the RTS stock index plunged almost 54%. As noted in the article Market Plummets Despite Oil Cuts, published in the newspaper Moscow Times on 27 October 2008, written by the staff writer Ira Iosebashvili, the government has pledged more than $200 billion to support the economy, including injections of $86 billion into the banking system, after the war with Georgia and falling global markets led to capital outflows since August that have been estimated at more than $60 billion. Under the global financial crisis, the Russian government could process more regulations over the Russian giant companies which are usually called oligarchs. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin criticized Mechel, one of Russia’s leading mining and metallurgical companies, which wiped out billions of dollars of its market capitalization. As the Moscow Times reported on 27 October 2008, in August, Mechel postponed the offering indefinitely, shortly after attacks by Vladimir Putin on its coal pricing policies and accusations of tax evasion which wiped out half the company's value in three trading days. Following Putin's comments and a subsequent anti-monopoly probe, Mechel agreed to cut domestic coking coal prices by 15 percent from September 1 and agreed to pay a fine equivalent to 5 percent of its 2007 coking coal revenues. Mechel plans to revive a preferred share issue and that it would more than double the amount of shares on offer as Global Depositary Receipts. The Kremlin has encouraged Russian companies to invest more actively abroad but this has caused alarm in Western nations, which are traditionally suspicious of Moscow's intentions. As Reuters reported on 8 June 2008, the Russian president Medvedev said Russia is now in the 10th

The Problems of Globalization for Regional Integration

91

year of an economic boom fuelled by soaring prices for its oil and gas exports. Russia is now a global player and understands its role in supporting the global community. Medvedev said other countries had nothing to fear from Russian investment in their companies since it was "neither speculative nor aggressive" but purely based on pragmatism. Russia would soon adopt a plan to become a global financial centre and make the rouble a regional reserve currency, Medvedev said. The Russian leader said that recent Kremlin moves were to liberalize the domestic gas market and reduce taxes on the oil sector which would help stabilize global energy markets. Russia is the world's biggest gas producer and the second-biggest oil exporter. According to Russia’s biggest financial newspaper, Izvestia, on 28 October 2008, the Russian Central Bank will acquire more liberal conditions to invest abroad after the global subprime mortgage crisis. The Russian financial authorities increased the amount of resources allocated to the banks as loans and deposits. Reduction of mandatory banking provisioning rates also enabled the banks to increase the amount of cash. The state budget provided a substantial sum of money to purchase the stock of the most significant companies. As the government reduced taxes for feedstock exporters, it turned out to be beneficial for Gazprom in the first place. Actually, the leadership was initially intent on providing financial support for the big businesses only, which included 275 major companies. Of special interest are refinancing rate transactions conducted by the Central Bank. While central banks worldwide decreased refinancing rates, the Bank of Russia, in contrast, increased it in a deliberate effort to contain inflation processes. During a few months, until January 2009, the Bank of Russia’s cash interventions helped maintain the rouble-USD exchange rate. Over that period the country’s gold and foreign exchange reserves reduced by about $200 billion.29 This may have to do with increased economic crimes. A survey among managers of more than 3,000 companies globally, including 86 leading companies in Russia, found that 71% of companies suffered from economic crimes in 2009. This is the highest level in the world. The world average figure is 30%, for Central and Eastern Europe and BRIC countries it is 34%. Russia leads the world in the number of economic crimes, and frauds have grown in number since the onset of the crisis. Most of the fraudsters are employed with major financial companies and the most typical crime is misappropriation of assets. The course adopted by the

92

Chapter Three

financial authorities gave rise to a symbiosis of a fixed currency exchange rate, super-high profitability of financial assets inside the country and an open capital account. Such a structure makes the Russian financial markets rigidly dependent on the world financial environment, including foreign system risks. The Russian economy has a raw orientation. This fact affects features of financial crisis in Russia. It is obvious that the financial crisis in Russia remains yet to be overcome; moreover, it has aggravated the previous problems. Given this, an intensive influx of short-term investments, alongside the growing feedstock prices, provokes professional players to undertake extremely risky speculations in the stock market. The latter has no self-regulation traditions, that is, the instinct of self-preservation. The Russian financial sector is most likely in for a long period of very high volatility.30 The global financial crisis impacted on Russian domestic budget and exposed the problems in energy export. The Russian government adopted a number of measures to stabilize the domestic economy, including a tax-cut for small and middle enterprises, flexible monetary policy to reduce inflation and devaluation of the rouble to encourage export. However, the international economic circumstance should be taken into consideration for more responsibility for the emerging countries and developing countries relying heavily on the United States and US dollars. The global financial crisis caused Russia and China to adopt fairer systems for their participation. After the crisis, Russia started to create her domestic market for foreign investment and modernization projects. Russia will still rely on the energy economy but simultaneously stimulate the domestic market for self-sufficiency and this will reflect their international integration policy in CIS on Eurasian Commission, Asia-Pacific region on SCO and BRICS for global cooperation.

The Resume: Aftermath of the Crisis Many experts believe, and quite rightly, that the world financial and economic crisis will give birth to new challenges and threats. Specifically, it will affect the socio-economic sphere. It is easy to foresee speedy augmentation of streams of illegitimate migrants seeking jobs in more prosperous countries, especially from Africa due to the prospect of cancelling humanitarian programs of food and medical aid to hunger-plagued lands and victims of regional conflicts. Rise in illegal

The Problems of Globalization for Regional Integration

93

migration is always accompanied by growth of trade in people. The crisis is going to contribute considerably to aggravation of territorial, ethnic and religious clashes in the regions regularly experiencing acute sweet water and food shortage. Inevitable is a striking rise of crime in the countries of European Union, USA and former republics of the USSR. All these and similar problems are of an international dimension and their solution demands working out and introducing new “critical technologies” in politics, economics and law. Russia sees one of the ways out in restructuring of the global financial architecture, reconsidering the role the present day international institutions play, and establishing new ones, including an adequate legal regulation on the basis of well-balanced system of international and national standards of behaviour and activities of the participants of the financial markets. Here we would like to stress an issue of special importance at this juncture, which is so often overlooked or ignored in the context of our numerous hot discussions of the problems of globalization. This is the role the law has played and is to play in the processes of globalization. From an economist’s point of view, the world crisis is, first of all, a result of violation of the laws of economics. At the same time, the crisis testifies to a deformation of the principles of law both in the legislation that regulates economy and in the law application practice in financial and economic spheres. It is absolutely obvious that the lawgivers have failed to timely provide proper law forms (measures of responsibility, inclusive) intended to meet such a crisis. On the other hand, politicians, economists and lawyers have not demonstrated due professionalism having failed to timely anticipate and take necessary steps to prevent this worldwide crisis. The acute crisis has forced countries to start correcting the entire system of global economic governance. The United States and its ideas of the superiority of liberal capitalism and the limited role of the state in the economy have been dealt a hard blow. Faced with a possible severe depression, comparable to the crisis of the late 1920s-1930s, Washington has decided to nationalize failed system-forming financial companies and banks and to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in the economy. This policy is directly opposite to the Washington Consensus ideology, which was so confidently imposed in recent decades on other countries, including Russia. True liberals should have let bankrupt enterprises and the bankrupt policy fail completely and should have made room for the sprouts of a new

94

Chapter Three

economy. The US has been followed by other countries in resorting to “socialist” methods to save failed companies and banks. Reasonable apprehensions have already been expressed that the retreat from the former ideology of super-liberalism may go too far toward an increased state interference and may make the Western economy even less competitive. (We wish these warnings were first heeded by Russia, which is successfully destroying its competitiveness by quasi-socialist and reckless increases of labour costs and by the massive interference of corrupt state capitalism.) It is clear that the global crisis is only beginning and will affect everyone. But it is not clear how and when all countries will jointly start overcoming it. But we should already sum up the preliminary results of the recent developments. The period from August to October 2008 will likely go down in history as the start of the fourth stage in the world’s development over the past century, which began – really, not according to the calendar – in August 1914, closing the door on the splendid 19th century and ushering in the savage and revolutionary 20th century. Actually, the 21st century is beginning right now. This crisis and this new period in world history threaten to inflict inevitable hardships on billions of people, including Russians. Coupled with the aforementioned rapid geopolitical changes, with the collapse of the former system of international law and security systems, and with attempts by the weakening “elders” to stop the redistribution of forces not in their favour, this period may bring a dramatic destabilization of the international situation and an increased risk of conflicts. I would have dared to describe it as a pre-war situation and compare it with August 1914, but for one factor: huge arsenals of nuclear weapons remain, along with their deterrent factor, which makes politicians more civilized. Yet one must keep in mind the objective growth of military danger anyway. The world economic crisis will fix the new redistribution of forces. But it can also change its speed. Quite possibly, the crisis will inflict even more economic damage on new industrial giants, especially at first. External markets, on which their growth largely depends, are shrinking. The super-fat years have come to an end for oil producing countries, as well, including Russia, which has proved reluctant or unable to switch to a new economy and renovate its infrastructure. The matter at hand is not just a deep financial and economic crisis. This is an overall crisis of the entire system of global governance; a crisis of ideas on which global

The Problems of Globalization for Regional Integration

95

development was based; and a crisis of international institutions. We do not think anybody will disagree that this new global crisis could be named a "crisis of confidence", and many dimensional at that. It is a crisis of confidence in the present financial, banking and economic systems. It is a crisis of confidence in Western economy. And it is a crisis of confidence in the liberal doctrine of free market. As President Sarkozy put it, "noninterference is over”. One has but to say just the same about the general attitude towards globalization itself. It cannot be that simple and one dimensional as we have been assuming until quite recently. If globalization is to continue, and it cannot but continue, constitutional and national laws are going to develop as a synthesis with universal human law. There must be a new model of globalization. Not unified, but complex, rich in content, many dimensional, able to bring back true confidence to all the spheres of human life. To politics and culture, to religion and philosophy, to finances and law, as we see it, the only alternative scenario is an eventual prevalence of the dictate of the strong in the form of the world government with an ensuing collapse of the collective institutions and international law as a guardian of everybody’s rights and interests. So, overcoming this overall crisis will require a new round of reforms, the construction of international institutions and systems for governing the world economy and finance, and a new philosophy for global development. This crisis will clear out what has been artificially preserved or not reformed since the end of the Cold War. A new global governance system will have to be built on the ruins of the old one. When this overall crisis is over, its relative beneficiaries will include not only countries that will have been less affected by it, but also those that will have seized the initiative in building a new world order and new institutions. They will have to correspond to the emerging balance of forces and effectively respond to new challenges. One must be morally and politically ready for that period of creation, and already now, despite the crisis, one must start building up one’s intellectual potential so that in a year or several years one could be ready to put forward one’s own, well-grounded proposals for rebuilding the international governance system on a more just and stable basis. As far as Russia is concerned, it has so far proposed a very modest plan for rebuilding the European security system and supported, at last,

96

Chapter Three

the idea to establish a new Concert of Nations as an association of not seven to eight old countries, but 14 to 20 of the most powerful and responsible states capable of assuming responsibility for global governance. We already need to go further and start thinking about the future now – however difficult this might be during a crisis. In Russia there has been going a dispute on the future trends in globalization. The major constructive principles proposed for building the future system could be summarized as follows: 1. Not boundless and irresponsible liberalism, but support for free trade and a liberal economic order coupled with basically stricter international regulation. 2. The goal of development must be progress, rise of productivity and quality of life. Only having achieved progress one may speak about democracy. Democracy comes as a consequence and an instrument of progress. 3. Joint elaboration and coordination of policies by the most powerful and responsible countries able to invest in the overall world progress rather than attempts to establish hegemony by one country, or a struggle of all against all. 4. Collective efforts to fill the security vacuum, rather than create new dividing lines and sources of conflict. 5. Joint solution to energy problems, rather than artificial politicization of the energy security problem. 6. Russia and the European Union must strive not for a strategic partnership in their relations, but for a strategic alliance.

Conclusion People still have a broad scope of views on globalization. Experts are divided over the exact origin of globalization as a ‘business concept’ as it is used today to denote ‘internationalization of industrial processes’ in economies. Some see its origins from the extreme antiquity dating back to the end of the first millennium, when there were various empires such as the short-lived Empire of Alexander the Great and the powerful Roman Empire. Others see the birth of globalization in the second half of the first millennium, seeing its hallmark signs in the ways of trade and expansion of world religions; the third group sees its beginning in the era of great

The Problems of Globalization for Regional Integration

97

geographical discoveries, while the fourth group says globalization started after the industrial revolution.31 Modern globalization is a process of forming a uniform business space and involves economic internationalization of goods, capital, labour force, information, exchange of cultures, management skills, etc. As a powerful unifying factor, globalization forces people to reconsider their attitudes to traditional forms and technologies for development of industrial production. All these factors, taken together, should and can provide steady conditions for ecological, social, and cultural development for all countries and continents.32 The phenomenon of Globalization fosters the conception of a global village where all people are living together without distance. People see the challenges and opportunities from the global vision that all the states have to work together to fight against the crisis and seek security without borders, such as the vacuum of disintegration of the traditional world system of balance, horrible threats from terror attacks, proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, crisis of financial system based on the liberal market without control, crisis of military intervention beyond consensus of the UN system, crisis of dictatorship which violates human rights and leads to bloody conflicts and massacre, crisis of diseases and poverty, crisis of energy depletion and ecology protection, and crisis of climate change and disasters threatening the existence of humanity. Globalization brought problems and prosperity as symbiosis, comprehensively challenging all the human areas, through politics, society, economy, culture and other aspects.

Notes 1

Permanent Representation of the Russian Federation to the Council of Europe Russian Federation, “Concept of the World in the 21st Century”, 2000. Retrieved from: http://www.bits.de/EURA/concept21.pdf 2 P. V. Nikitin and J. E. Elliott, “Freedom and the Market (An Analysis of the Anti-globalisation Movement from the Perspective of the Theoretical Foundation of the Evaluation of the Dynamics of Capitalism by Palanyi, Hayek and Keynes)”, The Forum for Social Economics, (2000): 14, as cited in G. Gaburro and E. O’Boyle, “Norms for Evaluating Economic Globalization”, International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 30, No. 1/2, (2003): 115. 3 Thomas Larsson, “The Race to the Top: The Real Story of Globalization”,

98

Chapter Three

Washington D. C. Cato Institute, (2001): 9. 4 Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, “Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition”, Program on the Geopolitical Implications of Globalization and Transnational Security, June 19, 2006. Retrieved from: http://www.sustainablehistory.com/articles/definitions-of-globalization.pdf 5 Kenichi Ohmae, “The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy”, New York, Harper-Perennial, (1991). Thomas Friedman, “Lexus and Olive Tree”, New York, Brayard, (1999). Thomas Friedman, “The World Is Flat”, New York: Picador, (2005). 6 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, The National Interest 16, (1989). Michael Mandelbaum, “The Ideas That Conquered the World”, New York, Public Affairs, (2005). 7 Craig N. Murphy, “Political Consequences of the New Inequality”, International Studies Quarterly 45, No.3, (2001). 8 Edward D Mansfield,. and Helen V. Milner (eds.), “The Political Economy of Regionalism”, New York, Columbia University Press, (1997). Edward D. Mansfield, and Jack Snyder. “ Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War”, Cambridge: The MIT Press,(2007). 9 Barbara Stallings (ed.) “Global Change, Regional Response: the New International Context of Development. “, New York, Cambridge University Press. (1995). Eric Helleiner and Pickel Andreas (eds.), “Economic Nationalism in a Globalizing World”, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, (2005). 10 Andrei P. Tsygankov, ‘Globalization: A Russian Perspective.’ “In Thinking International Relations Differently, edited by Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney. London, Routledge, (2012): 205-227. 11 The passage is from Putin’s PhD thesis “Mineral Raw Materials in the Strategy for Development of the Russian Economy” defended in 1999 (As cited in Larsson 2006, 58). For various overviews of Russia’s energy thinking and policy, see Hill 2004; Balzer 2006; Larsson 2006; Stulberg 2007. 12 Andrei P. Tsygankov, ‘Globalization: A Russian Perspective.’ “In Thinking International Relations Differently, edited by Arlene B. Tickner and David L. Blaney. London, Routledge, (2012): 205-227. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Irina Vladimirovna, “Globalization of World Economy: Problems and Consequences”, Management in Russia and Overseas, No.3, (2001). (ɂɪɢɧɚ ȼɥɚɞɢɦɢɪɨɜɚ, “Ƚɥɨɛɚɥɢɡɚɰɢɹ ɦɢɪɨɜɨɣ ɷɤɨɧɨɦɢɤɢ: ɩɪɨɛɥɟɦɵ ɢ ɩɨɫɥɟɞɫɬɜɢɹ”, Ɇɟɧɟɞɠɦɟɧɬ ɜ Ɋɨɫɫɢɢ ɢ ɡɚ ɪɭɛɟɠɨɦ, ʋ 3, (2001).) 16 Yuri Fedorov, “Globalisation in Russia: The Challenge of the Transition to the World Economy.” Retrieved from: http://www.studymode.com/essays/Globalisation-Russia-107852.html

The Problems of Globalization for Regional Integration

17

99

Chinggis (Genghis) Khan was born probably in 1167, though Mongol tradition has it that he was born in 1162. He was the founder and Great Khan (emperor) of the Mongol Empire. His descendants went on to stretch the Mongol Empire across most of Eurasia by conquering or creating vassal states out of all of modern-day China, Korea, the Caucasus, Central Asian countries, and substantial portions of modern Eastern Europe, Russia and the Middle East. 18 Zheng He (1371–1433), formerly romanized as Cheng Ho, who commanded expeditionary voyages to Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa from 1405 to 1433. These voyages were long neglected in official Chinese histories but have become well known in China and abroad since the publication of Liang Qihao's "Biography of Our Homeland's Great Navigator, Zheng He" in 1904. 19 Sergei Karaganov, “The World Crisis –A Time for Creation”, Russia in Global Affairs 6, No.4, (2008). (Sergei Karaganov is dean of the World Economics and International Affairs Department at the State University–Higher School of Economics. He is deputy director of the Institute of Europe at the Russian Academy of Sciences; chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy and is chairman of the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs. Karaganov has a Doctorate in History.) 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Sergei Lavrov, “Russia and the World in the 21st Century”, Russia in Global Affairs 6, No. 3, (2008). (Sergei Lavrov is Russia’s Foreign Affairs Minister. This article was written on the basis of his June 20, 2008 speech at the international symposium “Russia in the 21st Century,” organized in Moscow by the Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in partnership with the British think tank Policy Network, and the Alfred Herrhausen Society, within the framework of the latter’s project “Foresight – Forging Common Futures in a Multi-Polar World.”) 23 Sergei Karaganov, “The World Crisis –A Time for Creation”, Russia in Global Affairs 6, No.4, (2008). 24 Sergei Lavrov, “Russia and the World in the 21st Century”, Russia in Global Affairs 6, No. 3, (2008). 25 Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, “Russia after the Global Financial Crisis”, Eurasian Geography and Economics 51, No. 3, (2010): 281–311. 26 Ibid. 27 Alexei L. Kudrin, “Russian Economic Policy and the Global Financial Crisis”, transcript of speech given at an Institute event at The Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 24, 2009. 28 Ibid. 29 Magomet Yandiev, “Aftermath of the Financial Crisis in Russia.” Retrieved from: http://www.opf.slu.cz/kfi/icfb/proc2009/pdf/49_Yandiev.pdf 30 Ibid.

100

31

Chapter Three

Fakhraddin Akhmedov, “Globalization and its economic prospects for Russia”, The Russian Corporate World 5, No. 9, (2010). 32 Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR RUSSIA AND REGIONAL COOPERATION IN EAST ASIA AFTER CRISIS EKATERINA KOLDUNOVA

VICE DEAN AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR SCHOOL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF MGIMO-UNIVERSITY, RUSSIA

The global economic crisis and recent developments in East Asia1 indicate some new features in regional political and economic structure. These changes include a trend towards more close financial and economic cooperation within ASEAN+3 framework, more stable Russian presence in East Asia, as well as a more proactive American line in the region against the background of China’s rising regional economic clout. Consequently the key question is whether the regional structure will still persist as a space2 thus giving a way to the formation of a new kind of regionalism, or whether it will be transformed into a leadership structure. Bearing this question in mind, the paper presents an overview of the new trends in regional development, paying particular attention to the evolution of regional cooperation mechanisms. Taking into account Russia’s chairmanship in APEC in 2012, special attention is paid to the role of Russia in the regional cooperation both within APEC and beyond.

“Spatial” vs. “Leadership” Regional Structure The features of spatial regional structure took shape in the region during the past decades. They implied first and foremost more or less equal participation of various players in the regional processes. Among such players were Japan, China, South Korea, ASEAN countries, the USA, Russia, India, etc. At the same time the region experienced a kind of

102

Chapter Four

“leadership vacuum” 3 . This “vacuum” meant the absence of evident struggle for political leadership among the strongest actors. The core institutionalized regional cooperation mechanisms were forming around ASEAN, thus giving its members (mainly smaller and middle-range states) a chance to preserve their autonomy against external influence. Throughout the 2000s both the political and economic strategy of the main regional players towards each other, as well as the rise of political subjectness of ASEAN member states did contribute to the restriction of political leadership aspirations in East Asia. The political struggle was mitigated to some extent by the regional cooperation driven by the smaller and middle-range actors. At the same time, in the economic sphere the region witnessed two main trends of regionalization and macro-regionalization in the framework of Greater East Asia4. The first one was connected with the development of regional integration groupings (ASEAN, its off-spring like ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+1 mechanisms, APEC to some extent), which in case of success could pretend to form a special regional economic area within the world economy.5 The second trend implied the active rise of regional powers (Japan, China and India) and, as a consequence, their aspiration to organize the regional environment for their own purposes. In other words to meet their economic and partly political goals these states tried to construct a web of special relationships with small and middle-range players. This was done both by formal ways and informal practices. In the case of China, this strategy was aimed at building regional trust through the so-called belt of “good neighbourliness”. China’s image was gradually improved due to the rejection of Chinese support to the anti-government forces in Southeast Asia6 as well as massive financial aid provided by the Asian giant to these states amidst economic crises in 1997-1998 and 2008-2009. The United States in the meantime did not show much desire to get more actively engaged in the regional affairs due to several reasons. In the early 2000s, the main attention was paid to the prolonged conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the Asia-Pacific, George W. Bush’s administration prioritized the traditional system of hub-and-spoke alliances, not regarding multilateral structures as an efficient mechanism of interaction with regional players.

Russia and Regional Cooperation in East Asia after Crisis

103

The situation started to change with Barak Obama’s advent to power. In the late 2000s the US showed more interest in multilateral dialogue in the region. It also became evident that China and the region in general survived the global economic crunch relatively easier than such well-established economic centres as the EU and the United States and even managed to enhance its self-confidence in world politics. This trend of the US’s more active involvement culminated in the idea of ‘America’s Pacific Century’ expressed in the article with this very title by the US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton. The Secretary of state particularly stressed the barest necessity for the United States to profit from East Asian rapid economic growth, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, to demonstrate its will to meet the regional security challenges7. Indeed the unresolved security problems in East Asia seem to keep the United States as well as other main regional players deeply engaged in East Asian security affairs at least for the nearest future. The Korean peninsula problem is still far from its resolution, while the tensions around the contested territories in the South China Sea are getting more pressing. So far it is unclear whether the move from ‘spatial’ towards ‘leadership’ regional structure will mean the rise of only one dominant actor (e.g. China) with all other regional players being hierarchically subordinate to it, or whether this leadership structure will signify the confrontation between several actors. In any case, the US’s main interests will indeed start to shift towards East Asia and the region will witness the rise of leadership ambitions among the major players radical transformations in the regional structure will be hard to avoid.

Regional Cooperation: Post-Crisis Trends and Institutional Changes The institutional changes in East Asia reflect this ambiguity. Certain quantitative and qualitative transformations of regional cooperation mechanisms are in full swing. The evidences can be traced in the new composition of the East Asian summit with Russian 8 and American participation since 2010; in the emergence of China-Japan-South Korea trilateral dialogue (separate from ASEAN+3 mechanism); in the stirring up of Transpacific partnership project; and finally in the multilateralization of

104

Chapter Four

various ASEAN initiatives like Chiang Mai initiative or Asian Bond Markets Initiative9. ASEAN itself seems to have partly depleted its resources of economic integration within the framework of its ten members. No matter how desirable it would be for ASEAN to preserve its autonomy in this process, further economic development is a necessity precondition to enhance macro-regional forms of cooperation first of all with China, Japan and South Korea. Such cooperation has already resulted in the financial surveillance process in the framework of ASEAN+3 finance ministers’ ‘Economic Review and Policy Dialogue’ launched in 2000 and the Asian Bond Market Initiative endorsed in 2003 also within the ASEAN+3 framework. In 2009 as a response to the unfolding economic crisis, finance ministers of ten ASEAN states and China, Japan and South Korea made a decision to create a regional bank of monetary reserves through multilateralisation of the Chiang Mai Initiative10. At the same time China, Japan and South Korea have launched a separate mechanism of trilateral dialogue. Thus from the viewpoint of institutionalized regional cooperation North East Asia started to catch up gradually with South East Asia, historically proved to be more successful in this field. The mentioned trends provoked a growing divergence between the so-called “old” and “new” regional cooperation structures. While the former were created either during the “Cold War” period (like ASEAN) or just at the moment of the collapse of the bipolar system (like APEC or ASEAN Forum for Regional Security) the latter were called into being by the recent changes in the region and global economic turbulence. The emerging contradiction between various types of regional cooperation mechanisms is reinforced by the efforts to substitute some of the established mechanisms with the newer ones. For example, some aspects of trade liberalization agenda are clearly shifting from APEC to Transpacific partnership project while APEC itself is regarded by some experts as an outdated mechanism desperately in need of reform11. However, besides the mentioned contradictions, regional cooperation in East Asia can probably witness some new opportunities in the coming year. Russian chairmanship in APEC could well present one of them.

Russia and Regional Cooperation in East Asia after Crisis

105

What Place for Russia in Regional Cooperation? Opportunities and Challenges Just after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s presence in East Asia significantly diminished. During the early 1990s Russia’s foreign policy decision making environment was dominated by the so-called “integrationists” or “atlantists” who stressed the necessity for Russia to develop closer ties with the West and, ideally, join it. The Asian direction was simply not assigned as much importance as the western direction in that period. Besides, Russia and its regions, including Siberia and the Far East, had experienced serious economic difficulties. In the mid-1990s Russia started to reassert its positions in bilateral and multilateral relations with East Asian partners. However by that time the regional division of labour in which Russia managed to occupy mainly the position of energy supplier was not conducive to the development of Russian Asian regions and did not correspond to the Russian political elite’s vision of the Far East development12. In that period, Russia’s engineering industry products were mainly traded to China among all other regional partners. Due to such a trade structure, the Russo-Chinese economic relations were perceived as complementary. However nowadays this thesis does not fully correspond to the real situation anymore, with Russian export constantly becoming more resource oriented and semi-manufactured goods oriented. Moreover the cheaper labour price in China made it a more attractive partner for other East Asian states from the viewpoint of investments and production transfer13. In the 2000s, with Russia’s engagement in key regional and trans-regional cooperation structures like East Asian Summit, BRIC/BRICS, ASEM and the prospect of APEC chairmanship its institutional presence in the region stabilized and ceased to diminish. Meanwhile in the economic sphere the majority of East Asian states still disregard Russian ability to fulfil the large-scale project in Siberia and the Far East perceiving Russia more as a political actor in the region than an economic partner. However some already active projects like the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline or Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 can manifest Russian abilities in the sphere of regional economic cooperation. Besides, Russia’s long-lasting accession talks with the WTO and Eurasian union project finally ended as success stories. Now Russia seems finally ready for trade

106

Chapter Four

liberalisation and considers starting talks on the FTAs with New Zealand and Vietnam. Russia’s position on the Korean issue has also changed dramatically after the agreement on trans-Korean gas pipeline and railroad construction with the late North Korean leader14. In the case of success, despite all the political risks this project can be a solution to multiple economic and most importantly political-security problems. It would transform North Korea from a rogue state into a self-sufficient partner which would be fitted into a regional cooperation scheme. In the economic sphere this project would create a transport hub of truly interregional scale, connected with the Trans-Siberian railroad. It is worth mentioning that Russia can well integrate its Eurasian infrastructural projects with modern navigation systems like GLONASS, thus adding a genuinely innovative component to this sphere of cooperation. With all these considerations in mind, as many experts note, Russia’s chairmanship in APEC in 2012 presents both opportunities and challenges. There are two mainstream views within the Russian expert community concerning Russia’s agenda for APEC. The first one stresses the necessity to secure continuity in Russia’s agenda which means to emphasise mainly the issues already common to APEC activities like trade liberalisation, economic cooperation, and business-government relations. The second approach, contrary to this, urges the Russian political community to radically review the strategy of Russia’s Asian regions development and even embark upon mega-projects in Siberia and the Far East. Such mega-projects could, for example, include the development of a North Arctic sea route and even the construction of a tunnel under the Bering Strait. Taken all together these mega-projects could be united in the initiative under the working title of Master-plan for Eurasian connectivity open for all willing parties15. In any case, hopefully Russia’s proposals for the APEC summit on transport and logistics, energy security, innovations, education and human capital can not only engage East Asian states into profitable partnerships but also bring APEC’s previously stagnating activities up to date with the current changes in the region and the world.

Russia and Regional Cooperation in East Asia after Crisis

107

Conclusion Post-crisis changes in East Asia have spurred a greater involvement in regional cooperation mechanisms not only of small and middle-range regional players but also actors like Russia, China and even the US. The simultaneous invitation of Russia and the US to the East Asian Summit in 2010 has demonstrated a strategic interest of East Asian states to keep these actors engaged in regional multilateral dialogue. Such multifaceted engagement practiced by various regional institutions can probably serve as a guarantee for the region from radical confrontational trends. Consequently Russia’s successful chairmanship in APEC does correspond not only to Russia’s interests but also to the interests of its East Asian and Asia-Pacific partners. With the shift of both international economic and political dynamism to East Asia, Russia can play a constructive role in the regional cooperation mechanisms balancing the other major players and implementing economic projects of regional scope. The realization of such constructive function, however, is still much dependent on the political will and commitment of the Russian elite.

Notes 1

With the term ‘East Asia’, the paper indicates the region including China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and Mongolia, the eastern areas of Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Brunei. The term ‘Greater East Asia’ includes into analyses India and Central Asia beyond the mentioned states and areas. The notion ‘Asia-Pacific’ includes also the US, India, Australia and Latin American states, which are the members of APEC. 2 Alexei Bogaturov, “Great Powers in the Asia-Pacific: History and Theory of International Relations in East Asia after Second World War (1945-1995)”, Moscow, Konvert-MONF, 1997). (Velikie Derjavy na Tihom Okeane: Istoriya I Teoriya Mejdunarodnyh Otnosheniy v Vostochnoy Asii posle Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny (1945-1995).) 3 Ekaterina Koldunova, “Leadership Vacuum in East Asia: Chances for Smaller and Middle-Range States”, International Process 2 (2011): 70-81. (“Deficit liderstva v Vostochnoy Asii: Shansy Dlya Malyh I Srednih Stran”, Mezhdunarodnye processy, 2(26): 70-81.) 4 Alexei Voskressenski (ed.), “Greater East Asia: World Politics and Regional Transformations”, Moscow, MGIMO-University (2010). (“Bolsha’ya Vostochna’ya Azi’ya: Mirova’ya Politika i Regionalnye Transformazii”,

108

Chapter Four

Ɇɨɫɤɜɚ, ɆȽɂɆɈ-ɍɧɢɜɟɪɫɢɬɟɬ) 5 Shirokov, G. and Salitsky A. (2003), Globalisation and/or Regionalization? (Regionalization and its Types)], Vostok (Orients), 5: 16-29. (“Globalizaciya i/ili Regionalizaciya? Regionalizaciya I yeye Tipy”, Vostok 5 (2003): 16-29.) 6 John Ciorciari, “The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers Since 1975”, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press (2010). 7 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”, Foreign Policy 189 (2011): 56-63. Retrieved from: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/americas_pacific_century 8 Victor Sumsky, “Why We Were not in EAS and Why We Are Invited There Now”, Security Index 2 (2011): 37-44. (Pochemu Nas Ne Bylo v VAS I Pochemu Teper Nas Tuda Zovut) 9 Ekaterina Koldunova, “Post-Crisis Regional Cooperation in East Asia: New Trends and Developments.” Lorenzo Fioramonti (ed.), Regions and Crises: New Challenges for Contemporary Regionalisms, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan (2012). 10 Joel Rathus, “The Chiang Mai Initiative’s Multilateralisation: A Good Start”, East Asia Forum, March 23, 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/23/the-chiang-mai-initiatives-multilateralisa tion-a-good-start/ 11 Discussion at the First Asia-Pacific Forum, Moscow, President Hotel, November 28-29, 2011. 12 Alexei Bogaturov, “Russian Far East in New Geospatial Dimensions of Eastern Eurasia”, World Economy and International Relations10 (2004): 90-98. (Rossiyskiy Dalniy Vostok v Novyh Geoprostranstvennyh Izmereniyah Vostochnoy Evrazii , Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mejdunarodnye Otnosheniya10 (2004): 90-98.) 13 Alexei Voskressenski, “Main Challenges and Risks to Russian Regions’ Relations with East Asia”, see it in “Greater East Asia: World Politics and Regional Transformations, Moscow, MGIMO-University (2010a). (Osnovnye Vyzovy i Riski Vostochnoaziatskih Regionalnyh Otnosheniy Rossii, in Alexei Voskressenski (ed.), Bolsha’ya Vostochna’ya Azi’ya: Mirova’ya politika i Regionalnye Transformazii) 14 Andrei Lankov A, “Russia-North Korea Trade”, East Asia Forum, October 6, 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/10/06/russia-north-korea-trade/ 15 Discussion at First Asia-Pacific Forum, Moscow, President Hotel, November 28-29, 2011.

PART II: MEDIA CENSORSHIP AND CULTURE INSTITUTES

CHAPTER FIVE RUSSIAN NEWS CENSORSHIP IN THE ERA OF ANTI-TERROR1 FENG-YUNG HU

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT COLLEGE OF GENERAL STUDIES

YUAN ZE

UNIVERSITY (YZU), TAIWAN ADJUNCT RESEARCHER AT NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY (NTU), TAIWAN

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has totally entered into a society with democracy and liberty, which is regulated according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation2. The debate between liberalists and nationalists was coexisting and fighting for the mainstream of media policy in Yeltsin’s ruling era. The struggle for media function and role did not stop until Vladimir Putin came to the regime in 2000. Russia experienced ten years transformation in the 90s, when the Russian president Boris Yeltsin implemented westernized policy. At that time, Russian media was commercialized and controlled by the financial and industrial Oligarch. The second Russian president, Vladimir Putin, changed the media system after a series of accidents designated by terrorists in the end of 1999. Therefore, the debate on theories of media was replaced by the conception of responsibility of media in the anti-terror era. It is obvious that Russia has become one of the very countries where extremists and terrorists continue to act rampantly. When Putin took his presidency in 2000, Russia officially entered the anti-terror era. So, after Russia in 1992 started to implement a very liberal media law, in which the freedom of press is protected and censorship is prohibited, how to establish an environment for media activities and news coverage in the new era could be the crucial question for the Russian government. The author found that the regular dialogues between the President and media

112

Chapter Five

representatives for finding mutual understanding during the crisis of crucial events has become the most effective communication model in Putin’s rule in Russia. In this chapter, the author tries to analyse how the Russian government controls the public attitude to treat any kind of anti-terror operations by passing federal laws which stipulate restrictions limiting media activities and coverage. After more than ten years’ political and economic transformation in Russia, Russia has entered an anti-terror era in the ruling period of the Russian president Vladimir Putin 2000-2008, and after that the dual core ruling system with the following president Medvedev and premier Putin. Since the second Chechen War broke out in 1999, the Russian media law system and news coverage of the Chechen War had changed as well. The Russian government regards the Chechen War as a necessary action of fighting against terrorists and maintaining the national interests under the official slogan of national dignity and territorial integrity. The background of the analysis is related to the new amendment to the Federal Law “On Mass Media” and several Laws for anti-terrorism concerning media coverage and reporting after Putin took the presidency and the aftermath of the terror attacks, especially the theatre hostage crisis.

New Media Policy for National Security Any nation state will seek to produce its own version of history. This history – or rather, its interpretation – will be slightly different from that of one’s neighbours. Yet the writing of “national histories” should not proceed from adversely directed historical materials, the philosophy of hatred, or historical claims. Russia today has conscientiously chosen a different path of development, which has nothing to do with Stalinism or post-Stalinist authoritarianism. Today’s Russia does not bear responsibility for the crimes of the past and does not in any way act as an ideological successor to the Soviet Union. For proof of this one only needs to look at the preamble to the Russian Constitution.3 After Vladimir Putin held power in the Kremlin in 2000, he started to implement his enlightenment policy by building up a very severe federal law system. By doing so, any problem will be resolved by the laws. For media activity, in the case of any extremism and terrorism, the authority may have to convene the media leaders and ask them to do good jobs in

Russian News Censorship in the Era of Anti-Terror

113

accordance with the media law and other related federal laws, finding appropriate ways for the media to report crisis events without damaging the authority’s image in handling any operations during extraordinary crisis, war, extremism and terrorism. To implement the idea of media responsibility, the media oligarch, who controlled the media, banks and telecommunication enterprises, became the objective for Putin strengthening his new ruling power. This was the symbol of the end of media commercialization and the start of nationalization of concession with the professional management. The conception of national but public service is the theory idea of Putin’s attitude toward the media. Maintaining a positive communication channel and dialogue mechanism of the authority with media leaders was very important and listed in the president’s agenda. There are four main federal laws signed by president Putin: the Federal Constitutional Law “On Extraordinary Situation” was signed on May 30, 2001; the Federal Constitutional Law “On War Condition” was signed on January 30, 2002; the Federal Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activity” was signed July 25, 2002; and the Federal Law “On the Fight against Terrorism” was signed on March 6, 2006. But how to implement the mission of saving people’s lives may be a crucial problem in a situation without the participation of the public opinion through the media reports. Does the public really believe the government’s decisions in a crisis when they proclaim that there is no sacrifice of innocent victims using the forces? So, all the problems are attributed to the media’s attitudes toward news coverage, and that is why Putin attempts to use a legal way to have anti-terrorism actions implemented more easily. However, this intensive relationship among the authority, media, and the public was established on the basis of authoritarian ruling. On November 1, 2002, the Russian lower house (Duma) massively and rapidly approved amendments to the Federal Law "On Mass Media", less than a week from October 26, 2002, when the Russian special forces used chemical gas to end a three-day Moscow theatre hostage crisis in which at least 128 civilians died. Duma’s legislation immediately caused a protest from the major media leaders who thought the overly broad legislation would drop the country into danger, with no prevention from the

114

Chapter Five

government or society, in the case of a crisis due to a lack of early warning reports by mass media. Under the pressure and the official appeal signed by the Russian mainstream media leaders, president Putin decided to veto the bill in the last minutes before putting it into effect. The Russian media’s high-ranked representatives promised to find ways to cooperate with the government’s anti-extremist and anti-terrorist actions in their coverage. This commitment was the basis of the later Anti-Terrorism Convention, signed by both the media leaders and the Ministers of the press and broadcasting. Table 1. The Communication Model of the Russian Media News Coverage in the Era of anti-Terrorism is regulated by the Russian Federal Laws

The media law system becomes the compromise and negotiation place between the media industrial committee and the Russian government concerning journalists’ access to any first scene to gather information and give the news report in their coverage. The relationship between media and government turned out to be subordinate dependence under the pre-emptive and prosecuting pressure of the stipulations and restrictions of the federal laws. The crisis of Russian Journalism is that the anti-terrorism clauses might be applied so broadly that the journalists could not report important events and it could damage public welfare and national interests. Therefore, the regular dialogues between the President and media representatives and finding mutual understanding have become the most effective communication model in Russia. Due to terror attacks, Russian journalists could report the facts but could not judge the events in an

Russian News Censorship in the Era of Anti-Terror

115

emergency. The media lost their power to argue with the government and were forced to cooperate in fighting terrorism. The media censorship occurred in this area and the media started to pay attention to how to cooperate with the government to process international propaganda against foreign opinions which might hinder or damage Russia’s national interest and security. The media turned their focus from the internal social problems to external international relations. The media became a partner of the government, not bystanders or supervisors. The role of the media changed from Yeltsin to Putin.

Compromise after the Hostage Event One of the controversial and very severe amendments on Media Law stressed broadcasting and printing news "serving propaganda or justifying extremist activities, including statements of people trying to stop an anti-terrorist operation and justification of such" will be regarded as violation of the Law. This amendment opposition indeed has threatened the Russian commercial media professionals who had been used to the freedom of press after the first Media Law born in Russian history and put into effect in the post-soviet Russian territory. In other words, none of the media can doubt or criticize the government’s operation in the anti-extremist process and hardly show their sympathy to the extremists or victims who might be involved into the crisis in order to avoid prosecution in the court. However, once the anti-extremist operation ended, the mass media could have lost their first time to report the right event to the public. The problem is that the media and the government made a compromise due to the negative influence of the criminal process on social psychology. They share the same opinions that the public should be protected from the fear which might be caused by extreme scenes presented through the camera and photographs. But do the public not have the right to know the government’s actions in this situation? What kinds of details of anti-extremist and anti-terrorist operations should not be disclosed and divulged in front of the camera? What actions should journalists not take during a crisis? What kinds of journalistic reports are aimed at stimulating

116

Chapter Five

audience ratings for commercial purposes? Obviously, Putin tries to use legal measurements to solve the constitutional contradictions. In particular, the revised bill would ban the dissemination of information containing statements from people opposed to counter-terrorist operations, in this situation, journalists could not even interview the relatives of the victims and extremists, who might express unsatisfactory words which would be regarded as hampering actions by the amendments. To protect the officials and keep the anti-terrorist operations proceeding smoothly, the media would not be allowed to publish data concerning the specialized methods and tactics of the security forces during counter-terrorist operations, in particular, operations to free hostages, as well as anything promoting or serving the terrorists and extremists. Furthermore, the journalists would be prohibited from divulging information concerning personal data of the security services’ employees and members of the operational headquarters for conducting counter-terrorist operations, as well as those people who render assistance to the Security Forces, without their consent. The Law also bans publishing information on technology for making weapons, ammunition, and explosives. These amendments to Media Law required the authority’s accreditation before being reported, otherwise the media could violate the Media Law and face prosecution in the court. On the other hand, the media cannot report any comments or critiques of those who justify and oppose the counter-terrorism operations. Obviously, the amendments are set for protecting the authority. Some Russian liberal media, opposition parties and non-governmental organizations voiced their concern over the Russian media communication situation after the upper house (Council of Federation) on November 13, 2002, approved a controversial amendment to the Law "On Mass Media"4 that would severely restrict the freedom of the press to cover anti-terrorist operations. Regarding the resolution of the Russian parliament, Grigory Yavlinsky, head of the liberal right-wing Yabloko party in the Duma, said the amendment would "create a basis for the limitation of free speech and the persecution of mass media." The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the non-governmental organization Reporters without Borders also criticized the bill, warning of the risks of censorship. The Journalists' Union general secretary Igor Yakovenko then said on radio Echo Moscow (Ekho Moskvy) that the Law amendments would grant the

Russian News Censorship in the Era of Anti-Terror

117

authorities "enormous freedom of interpretation" amounting to censorship. Igor Yakovenko said the legislation would effectively annul the 12-year-old law on the media, which outlines the basic rights of journalists. The amendments would prohibit the media from distributing information that hinders counter-terrorist operations, reveals tactics used in such operations or reveals information about people involved in them. Most important of all, the crucial and urgent action transferring the media amendments legislation is from the media community’s petition. The media leaders on November 13, 2002, signed a petition urging Vladimir Putin not to sign the controversial bill into Media Law and promised to develop an effective code of behaviour for reporters covering terror attacks and other emergencies. The heads of the leading TV channels, radio stations and other media outlets gathered in Moscow’s Grand Hotel on that day in order to notify the president of their standpoint on the changes to the law on mass media. The Press Ministry’s top officials took their seats close to the chairmen of two leading state-run channels – head of the First Channel, Konstantin Ernst, and the head of VGTRK, Oleg Dobrodeyev; NTV’s Raf Akopov, Irene Lesnevskaya of Ren-TV, the editor-in-chief of the Ekho Moskvy radio station Alexei Venediktov, the editors of Izvestia Mikhail Kozhokin, Pavel Gusev of Moskovsky Komsomolets, and Andrey Vasilyev of Kommersant Daily; the president of the Glasnost Defence Foundation Alexei Simonov sat together with his counterpart from the Union of Journalists Anatoly Bogomolov. On behalf of the entire media community Ernst harshly criticized the amendments that ''can be applied so broadly that they will not have the desired effect''. Konstantin Ernst read out the text of the appeal to the president. Under the pressure from the Russian media giants leaders, Vladimir Putin decided to veto the amendments signed into law. On December 10, 2002, Russian parliamentarians, government officials, and leading media bosses agreed to cooperate on drafting legislation on media coverage of terrorism and antiterrorist operations, this was considered as the compromise between the government and media. Vladimir Putin harshly criticized the actions of certain media during the taking of hostages at the Theatre Centre on Dubrovka at the end of October 2002. This coverage of events was not an error – it was done deliberately “to increase rating, a capitalization to earn money,” the President stressed. The President put a veto on the amendments to the Media Law passed by the State Duma and

118

Chapter Five

approved by the Federation Council and proposed to the Federal Assembly and media heads to find a balance between restrictions in extreme situations and a society that is fully informed on the actions of the state. Despite the criticism he expressed, Vladimir Putin thanked Russia’s journalists for showing a civil position, and for their professionalism.

Regular Dialogues between the President and Media Representatives Another horrible hostage situation was connected with the Beslan hostage crisis which happened on September 1-3, 2004. In September 2004, Putin addressed the World Congress of News Agencies, stressing that journalists must ensure that in no circumstances do their reports from where events are taking place harm people who have become victims of terrorist acts. He also suggested that the information community itself can develop a model of work that would enable the media to act as an effective instrument in the fight against terrorism and would rule out any, even involuntary, possibility of helping terrorists in their aims. Terrorists often make cynical use of the possibilities offered by the media and by democracy in general to launch repeated psychological and information assaults on their audience in order to influence them in their own interests. Vladimir Vasilyev, head of the Duma Security Committee, told journalists that the law stipulates many stages that an order to take down a commercial airliner would have to go through before it could actually be carried out. The bill was introduced by lawmakers in December 2004 after the Beslan hostage siege. In a controversial bid, it initially proposed that the government be given the power to implement a "terrorist threat regime" which would curb civil liberties and press freedoms. Law enforcement authorities would have the power to monitor telephone calls in the area and even confiscate electronic means of communication. The most widely-debated aspects of the bill were provisions regulating the media. But with the "terrorist danger regime" struck down after the bill passed a second reading on February 26, the new law does not restrict press freedoms, while rights activists viewed these changes as concessions. According to this tension between media and government about the media amendments approved by the two houses for anti-terrorism actions, if the bills became law, the Russian journalists and editors should first of

Russian News Censorship in the Era of Anti-Terror

119

all self-censor the content of their news stories in any extreme crisis to prevent themselves from violating the law and being prosecuted. However, from the position of the Russian government, which is responsible for operating all kinds of anti-terror activities, building up a law mechanism would provide the government a legal foundation to negotiate with the media leaders and all the Russian media ought to obey the Laws in case of extreme activities. In this situation, the Russian government could soon recover from influence which might be caused by its anti-terror operations in which innocent hostages might be sacrificed. Any media outlet might have their licenses suspended and be asked to stop their activity by Federal Laws. If we assume that the transparent news coverage is beneficial to people’s judgement of the facts of any event, then the main Federal Laws are used to reduce the media’s critiques and public debate. From this point of view, any anti-terrorism amendment which would be signed into Law on Mass Media might be regarded as a failure of the liberal media or at least as the negotiation and compromise between the government and media which had been used to the free communication environment in the 90s. So this is the obvious characteristic and reflection of the country moving from a totalitarian regime, transforming into a democratic regime, but under the threat of the new authoritative ruling regime. Table 2. Communication model during the rule of Yeltsin

120

Chapter Five

From Freedom of Press to Restrictions in Crisis After the hostage crisis of the Dubrovka theatre siege in October, 2002, the Russian State Duma on November 1, 2002, passed amendments to the Law “on Media” and the Law “on the fight against terrorism”, on the third and final reading. Vladimir Putin vetoed the bill by the petition of the Russian media leaders. It seems to be that arguments occurred between the government and parliament. The reason was that the majority of the parliament was controlled by the middle left and left-wing parties. They advocate for nationalization of media and this aroused the commercial media to oppose them. Putin’s media conception belongs to the conservative parties but he has the power to show the willingness to cooperate with the media leadership and try to keep the professionalism of media activities. Therefore, the new model of cooperation between the president and media elites was formed beyond the law restrictions. Nevertheless, any problem of national security will eventually be attributed back to the jurisdictional solution. The amendments were set up to ban the propaganda of terrorism and extremism. The bill introduced new rules regarding the coverage of anti-terrorist operations. In particular, it prohibits the use of the media “for criminal activities, the disclosure of state secrets, extremist activities, and the distribution of information about the production of techniques of weapons, ammunition, and explosives”. The amendments also prohibited the dissemination through the media “or otherwise” of the information disclosing “special technical methods and tactics of carrying out anti-terrorist operations” and information hampering such operations. The media also should not distribute information aimed at propagating or justifying extremist activities, and justifying resistance to anti-terrorist operations. The bill banned the media from transmitting statements aimed at resistance to anti-terrorist operations. Media outlets are not allowed to disseminate data about members of Special Forces and command centres for such operations, without their consent. The Federal Press and Mass Communications Agency intends to defend the right of the media to cover acts of terrorism, the agency's head, Mikhail Seslavinskiy, has said. "It is impossible to imagine that serious major events cannot be covered by the media until an operational headquarters has been set up and the law-enforcement agencies have

Russian News Censorship in the Era of Anti-Terror

121

commented on them," Seslavinskiy said at a meeting with representatives of art, culture and the media. He said that the first document that he signs as head of the agency will be a repeal of the draft law drawn up by the State Duma proposing that the media should cover acts of terrorism on the basis of official information provided by the law-enforcement agencies. Seslavinskiy was dismissed by Putin because of his liberal position. Nowadays, the theme of terrorism and extremism has so substantially expanded that it is not only closely connected with the social security, but it also has influenced media activity on the basis of the freedom of words and speech, while a legal framework for counteracting hate crime and hate speech is established by the Russian authority. In compliance with the Federal Law on Mass Media is the Federal Law “On the Fight against Terrorism”, Clause 15 of which is better known to journalists and their readers under the title “Informing the Public of an Act of Terrorism.” The duty to provide such kinds of information is not regulated at all. There are, on the contrary, some restrictions. For instance, when conducting an anti-terrorist operation, the public are informed of such activities in form and to the extent determined by the commander of the operational headquarters directing anti-terrorist operations or by a representative of the appointed public relations headquarters. In accordance with part two of Clause 15, it is prohibited to disseminate information: - revealing special technical methods and tactics used in the conduct of anti-terrorist operations; - about events which could hamper the conduct of an anti-terrorist operation and cause a threat to the life or health of those who are either inside or outside the area of conduct of an anti-terrorist operation; - serving as propaganda or justifying terrorism and extremism; - concerning members of special units or operational headquarters responsible for directing an anti-terrorist operation or its conduct or concerning auxiliary personnel. In the area of journalistic activity, the press reacts most strongly to restrictions on the spread of information serving as propaganda or justifying terrorism or extremism. According to the interpretation placed on this by the Press Ministry, propaganda in favour of extremist points of view includes granting media time to Chechen field commanders. Moreover, the authorities view such broadcasts as “an abetment to terrorism” stressed Yelena Kandybina.

122

Chapter Five

In addition to the Federal Law “On Mass Media” and the Federal Law “On the Fight against Terrorism”, the Federal Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activity” was adopted in the summer of 2002 and updated in June 2006. It defines extremist activity (synonymous to extremism, as set out by this law) through a long list of acts of a fairly broad spectrum in terms of their public danger. According to Article 1, Main Definitions, for the purposes of the present Federal Law the following basic concepts are used for extremist activity (extremism), which means activity of public and religious associations or any other organizations, or of mass media, or natural persons to plan, organize, prepare and perform acts aimed at: - forcible change of the foundations of the constitutional system and violation of integrity of the Russian Federation; - undermining security of the Russian Federation; - seizure or usurpation of power; - establishment of illegal armed formations; - exercise of terrorist activity or public justification of terrorism; - incitement to racial, ethnic or religious hatred, and also social hatred associated with violence or with calls to violence; - debasement of ethnic dignity; - exercise of massive disturbances, hooliganism and vandalism motivated by ideological, political, racial, ethnic or religious hatred or animosity, and also motivated by hatred or animosity towards any social group; - propaganda of exclusiveness, supremacy or inferiority of individuals based on their attitude to religious, social, racial, ethnic, religious or linguistic identity; - preventing legitimate activities of government authorities, election commissions, and also legitimate activities of officials affiliated with the above authorities and commissions, combined with violence or threats to use violence; - public slander targeting a person holding an official position in the Russian Federation, or in a subject of the Russian Federation, while on official duty or in connection with his/her official duties, combined with accusing such official of actions listed in this article, provided that the fact of slander has been determined in judicial proceedings; - use of violence against a representative of government authority, or threats to use violence against a representative of government authority or his family in connection with his exercise of official duties; - attempt at the life of a government official or public figure, with the

Russian News Censorship in the Era of Anti-Terror

123

purpose of terminating this person's official or political activity, or as revenge for such activity; - violation of human rights and civil liberties, affliction of harm on health and property of citizens in connection with their convictions, racial or ethnic origin, faith, social status or social origin; - production and/or dissemination of print, audio, audiovisual and other materials (products) designed for public use and containing at least one characteristic listed in this article; - propaganda and public demonstration of Nazi attributes or symbols, or attributes and symbols similar to Nazi attributes and symbols to the point of confusion; -public calls to exercise of the above activity, and also public calls and pronouncements encouraging the above activity, justifying or supporting the exercise of activities listed in this article; -financing the above activity or any other support with planning, organization, preparation or exercise of the above actions, e.g. by providing finance, real estate, education, printing facilities, logistics, phone, fax and other means of communication, information services, and other material and technical means; -an extremist organization is a public [non-governmental] or religious association or other organization effectively liquidated or banned by court for extremist activity, based on grounds provided in this Federal Law; -extremist materials are documents designed for publication or information on other carriers which call to extremist activity, justify or support the need for such activity, including works by leaders of the National-Social Working Party of Germany, the Fascist Party of Italy, and publications, justifying or supporting ethnic and/or racial supremacy, or justifying the practice of military and other crimes aimed at complete or partial extermination of a certain ethnic, social, racial, national or religious group. Therefore, the Federal Law “On Counteracting Extremist Activity” is at least targeted at two parts: one is to punish any media groups or religious associations, using any means including articles, print, audio, audiovisual and other materials (products or documents designed for publication or information on other carriers which call to extremist activity) supporting extremists (including forcing change to the constitution system, violating integrity of the Russian federation, seizing power, establishing the armed formations, exercising or publicly justifying

124

Chapter Five

terrorism, propaganda of exclusiveness, supremacy or inferiority) and planning (by providing finance, real estate, education, printing facilities, logistics, phone, fax and other means of communication, information services, and other material and technical means) the extreme activities that have been indicated in the federal law; the other is for protecting and legitimating official figures and activities in extremist situations (preventing legitimate activities of government authorities, public slander targeting a person holding an official position in the Russian Federation, or in a subject of the Russian Federation, using violence against a representative of government authority and so on). So media reporting falls into the threat of arbitrage. Alexander Verkhovsky, the director of SOVA Center, thinks that this excessively broad definition is combined with excessively tough sanctions against organizations and media outlets (it is important to remember that the law targets primarily groups, rather than individuals). Any organization may be closed by the court, even without prior warning, and its further activity banned in any form, just for one incident of "extremism" (while there is also a procedure for issuing warnings). The same applies to the media - even though you are almost certain to find something which can be labelled as "extremist" among hundreds of articles published by a typical newspaper. Organizations are supposed to publicly denounce the activity of their leader if such activity is found to be extremist. Organizations can be suspended for up to six months in an out-of-court procedure if they are so much as suspected of extremism. Should a suspended group continue its operation, administrative liability may apply; should a banned organization carry on, its members face up to two and its leaders up to three years of prison under article 282-2 of the Criminal Code. In particular, in early 2006 as part of the restrictive amendments of the NGO legislation, someone convicted for extremism cannot participate in NGO activities. The reform of electoral legislation in the autumn of 2006 also made a reference to the concept of "extremism." It goes without saying that extremist activity may cause a candidate to be banned from elections. Besides the Federal law providing legitimate power for the official handling of extremist activities, an anti-terrorism bill that would allow the Russian military to shoot down hijacked airliners was signed into law by president Putin on March 6, 2006. The bill was perhaps the first to define terrorism in legal terms as "an ideology of violence". It

Russian News Censorship in the Era of Anti-Terror

125

gives the Russian Armed Forces the power to fight terrorism at home and across the border.

The Problems of Russian Transformation In 1991 the USSR collapsed, Russia formally entered a post-Soviet Union era in which democratization and liberalization might be the vivid characteristic in the process of transformation. As the American scholar Samuel P. Huntington (1991), tenured professor of Harvard Government Department, wrote in his book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, more than 60 countries have experienced democratic transitions since 1974 as a global trend, and he defines it as the third wave of the democratization which also happened in Eastern Europe and the USSR in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. From this point of view, democratization is one of most important activities which was regarded as part of the wave of globalization, and this phenomenon has enlarged its power from the economic area into the political area concerning the transition of the national regime in these countries. Under the wave of globalization with the characteristic of democratization, Russia changed her political regime and then experienced the crisis of cultural identification and social infrastructural inequality extending to the labour unemployment in the 1900s. Generally speaking, as Huntington defines, the wave of democratization started from the late 1970s with the transitions in Spain and Portugal and then extended to many Latin American countries in the 1980s, and gathered momentum in the 1990s, engulfing Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and some regions of Africa and Asia. But the issue of democracy remains a controversial, even a threatening idea in many countries, for example, in Russia. A lot of new social and economic problems occurred. The rouble lost its value after the Russian currency and market were liberalized. The Russian people lost their jobs and became very poor. In this situation, it is important to know the reason Russia would change her westernized direction after a ten-year reform. I define the feedback of the phenomenon of globalization as the Russian style of globalization consequences.

126

Chapter Five

What views of the impact and results of democratization and democracy might occupy mainstream status in the Russian political decision-making institution? The result of globalization in Russia first had its impact in the transition of the political regime. Yuri Fedorov, professor of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (MGIMO), points out in his paper Democratization and Globalization: The Case of Russia that democratization involves opening up the culture to different ideas and the economy to the global market and global competition. Fedorov stresses the importance of cultural attitudes, and this is what he calls the Russian psyche. The slow progress of democracy in many countries is often attributed to the poor articulation of interests in the political process. Fedorov shows, however, Russia had the opposite situation. Many important groups believe their interests would be threatened if Russia joined the community of democratic countries and the global economy. As I had studied in Russia for many years in the 90s, I agree with the viewpoint of Yuri Fedorov who has shown us the political tradition and characteristics of the Russian psyche in the structure of the Russian political elite. It is very important information for those countries which have experienced or are experiencing the impact of globalization and the process of democratization, that the Russian political elites very clearly understand if the Russian government adopted the westernized policies too much, Russia would have to sacrifice her tradition of culture and many other conceptions which had been formed and completed in Russian society. If the Russian government could not solve the economic problems and living standards of the Russian people, the Russian people would lose their confidence in themselves and in their country. This situation happened in the ten-year period during the process of Russian transition after the Soviet Union collapsed. But how to resume Russian cultural identification and set up the new Russian ideological system were the major missions for the Russian former president Vladimir Putin when he took his Presidency in 2000. Moreover, the following and current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev continues to accomplish Putin’s will. In addition to the political transformation and the crisis of cultural identification in the Russian psyche under the wave of globalization and democratization, Russia experienced the crisis of social infrastructural

Russian News Censorship in the Era of Anti-Terror

127

inequality extending to the labour unemployment in the 1900s. In the paper Russian: Globalization, Structural shifts and Inequality, which was written by the researchers of Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Alexander Vorobyov and Stanislav Zhukov (2000), they analysed the relationship between the liberal economic market and the social policy, especially concerning the labour problems, emphasizing the social shifts and inequality in six sections: post-Soviet social and economic chaos, external liberalization, dual economic structures, shadowization of economic activity, segmentation of labour markets. In the age of the Soviet Union, the communist country adopted the collective economy and national planned economic project. The price of products did not reflect the economic cost. In the 1990s, while President Yeltsin accomplished a very liberal policy in the economic area, the national currency and market were exposed to the world economy market and world prevailing price, the Russian people could not afford the imported products. When the Russian domestic prices of all kinds of resources, including gas and petroleum could not follow world prices, the foreign investors and companies bought these resources at irrelevant prices. After Russia was familiar with the games of the capital economy, in the period of transformation in the 1990s Russian talents were developed and governmental institution had been designed for the liberal economic market, Russia started to adopt her globalized policies. From 2000 up to now, the world prices of petroleum have been going up, and Russia has earned a lot of money and attempted to resume her national competition by editing a welfare budget for improving the living standard of the Russian people. By doing so, the Russian government can build up its political prestige and resume its national identification on the world stage.

Conclusion Russia’s media development could be divided into three periods: the first period was characterized by the process of liberalization and marketization in Yeltsin’s era, and in this period the media groups were forming and involved into politics; the second period of media development was characterized by the nationalization and professionalism in Putin’s first era, and in this period national investment into the concession of state and commercial media for implementation of government policy, the state

128

Chapter Five

broadcasting company was strengthened; the third period of media development was the internetism and internationalism, and in this period the media focused on the international competition and infrastructure of media. After Putin’s reforms, media became more and more reliant on state resources and would like to process the self-censorship of their content. The government pays more attention to the state-run media, especially television and radio. The periodicals and internet are the still liberal platforms for different opinions. However, the concept of anti-terrorism and anti-extremism is widely adopted into all content of the media, including the internet. As the Russian authorities have become more and more aware of the power of the Internet, they seem to plan more and more measures to control it. On 2 August, 2011, Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev called for greater surveillance of the Internet under the pretext of keeping the Russian youth from moving to "extremism". Bloggers have also entered under the authorities' scrutiny with the increase of their presence in social life and of their influence. With much of the Russian media already under control, bloggers have revealed important stories on issues ranging from parking to high-level corruption.5 The media censorship that occurred in the background of anti-terrorism and media started to pay attention to how to cooperate with the government to process international propaganda against foreign opinions which might hinder or damage Russia’s national interest and security. The media turned their focus from the internal social problems to external international relations. The media became a partner of the government, not bystanders or supervisors. The role of the media changed from Yeltsin to Putin. After the hostage crisis of the Dubrovka theatre siege in October, 2002, the Russian State Duma passed amendments to the Law “on Media” and Vladimir Putin vetoed the bill by the petition of the Russian media leaders. It seems to be that argument occurred among the government, parliament and media. The reason was that the majority of the parliament was controlled by the middle left and left-wing parties. They advocate for nationalization of the media, and this prompted the commercial media to oppose them. Putin’s media conception belongs to the conservative parties but he has the power to show willingness to cooperate with the media leadership and try to keep the professionalism of media activities. Therefore, the new model of cooperation between the president and media elites was formed beyond the law restrictions. Nevertheless, any problem

Russian News Censorship in the Era of Anti-Terror

129

related to national security will eventually be attributed back to the jurisdictional solution. .

In contrast to Putin, Medvedev is liberal toward the media. His viewpoint was from the economic market and democracy in Russia. Medvedev said “The government has failed to decrease its presence in the media; it has conversely built up presence in certain ways”. Regional leaders often seek to have their own government mass media, Dmitry Medvedev said in an interview with the Moscow-based Komsomolskaya Pravda daily. He feels that regions could do perfectly well without government-owned media holdings, the more so since Russia has such a powerful federal media resource as the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, which can cover the government stand on any issue anywhere in the country. 6 The ideological difference between Putin and Medvedev would deepen their distance in the future political governance. Under the Putin’s regime, national security plays a preferred role rather than economic and democratic function and this had been confirmed in the hostage crisis. Anti-terrorism remains the central idea in media policy and the communication direction of Russia. News censorship exists, from the aspect of ethics and social responsibility, and this could be realized under the controlling of state media, technology and management. All the measures will be attributed to the Federal law system and communication between media elite and Putin will be the place of negotiation and concession.

Notes 1

Feng-Yung Hu, “Russian News Censorship in the Era of Anti-Terror”, China Media Research 5(2009): 22-30 2 See the Constitution of Russia, visit the website: http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm 3 Anatoly Torkunov, “The Paradox and Dangers of “Historical Policy”, Russia in Global Affairs 3 (2008). 4 See the Law of the Russian Federation “On Mass Media”, visit the website: http://www.ruj.ru/_about/federal_law_quot_on_mass_media_quot.php (Ɂɚɤɨɧ Ɋɨɫɫɢɣɫɤɨɣ Ɏɟɞɟɪɚɰɢɢ “Ɉ ɫɪɟɞɫɬɜɚɯ ɦɚɫɫɨɜɨɣ ɢɧɮɨɪɦɚɰɢɢ”) 5 See the news on website of European Digital Rights, “The Russian Government plans to control the online media”, November 2, 2011. 6 See the news interview of the Voice of Russia, “Government Should Pull out of Russian Media Market – Medvedev”, May 22, 2013. Retrieved from: http://english.ruvr.ru/news/2013_05_22/Government-should-pull-out-of-Russianmedia-market-Medvedev-255/

CHAPTER SIX RUSSIAN CRISIS COMMUNICATION: INTERACTION BETWEEN FEDERAL TELEVISION AND PRESIDENT PUTIN IN THE BESLAN HOSTAGE CRISIS1 FENG-YUNG HU

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT COLLEGE OF GENERAL STUDIES

YUAN ZE

UNIVERSITY (YZU), TAIWAN ADJUNCT RESEARCHER AT NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY (NTU), TAIWAN

The Crisis of the Beslan Hostage changed the Russian media ecology a lot. The freedom of media cannot be the first priority for journalists conducting their report. National security was raised to first place under the principles of rescuing people’s lives. The ratings of the media reflected the attention of a mass audience on any crisis, and the Russian authority of Putin’s regime decided to reduce the impact of media reporting on a crisis. Media leaders asked for professionalism in any circumstance, but they agreed with the government’s conception of ethics and responsibility that cannot be replaced by commercial profits. The media’s concession showed that the new type of news censorship was formed to meet the demands of national security. The relationship between the media and Putin had consensus in anti-terrorism operations.

Crisis, Media Coverage and Putin’s Position on Terrorists On 1st September, 2004, at a southern Russian school in Beslan, which is located near Chechnya where the rebel-insurgents are actively appearing,

132

Chapter Six

there suddenly occurred a hostage tragedy. Thousands of school-children, parents and teachers were captured by gunmen for three days without being allowed food or drinking water. In the process of Beslan’s hostage crisis, the three biggest Russian federal television stations and the central government’s crisis handling techniques spurred disputes around their intentional hiding of the truth regarding how the rescue action was planned and implemented. It is worth mentioning that the Russian Media Union on that day formally announced an urgent statement, emphasizing that they were obeying an “anti-terrorism agreement” signed two years ago, and reaffirming that “in case of any extremity, saving and protecting people’s lives prior to any kind of other civil rights. Freedom of words will be regarded as the most important news principle”. From that statement, we can assume that the logic is: the freedom of words is only part of civil rights, saving and protecting people’s lives comes before it. Obviously, media self-censorship here is the first measure that would be taken into consideration in the crisis. In the circle of the news manipulating process, the government might release some instructive information to influence the reporting direction of the media and tune up the coverage without any authoritarian force. Finally, Putin’s public address on television after the Russian special military force’s shooting action shaped him as a saviour, stabilizing and conciliating people’s emotion. In this paper Putin’s rhetoric skills will be analysed as well in order to see the whole manipulating circle in the news system. We found that after Mr Putin took his position in the Russian presidency, Russian politics from that moment formally entered Putin’s ruling era. One of the most obvious characteristics of the relationship between Putin and television is that Putin’s image on television is as a hero of crisis-handling, and crisis coverage should not be critical of the government but focus on the rescue of the government in any extreme situation. In this paper the Russian media coverage process in the Beslan crisis case is represented and analysed. The Beslan crisis, in which the gunmen had used tactics bearing the hallmarks of past Chechen rebel attacks, gave the president of the Russian Federation, Mr Putin, one of the hardest challenges in his second presidency term in the Kremlin. Putin was slumping in dilemma; should he risk a slaughter by following his past practice of sending troops to end such sieges, or try to save the children by breaking a long-held vow not to negotiate with so-called "terrorists"? In the end, on 3 September the armed

Russian Crisis Communication

133

confrontation between special troops and gunmen was ended by both sides starting to shoot due to two exploded grenades causing many hostages to run out of the building where they were bound with explosive bombs by the terrorists. After this event ended, Putin was trying to influence the media coverage to explain the government’s striking operation in this lengthy hostage crisis. The interactive relationship between Russia’s three biggest electronic media outlets and Putin’s authority caught our attention. In this paper we will see that the main federal television stations, on which the massive audience relies for receiving information, at that time had to cope with the government to overcome the extreme crisis, and at the same time reduce any passive impact on damaging the social solidified atmosphere with Putin’s hero image and prestige in Russia. The news reporting model, in cooperation with the government in an extreme situation, had been set up after this crisis since Putin rebuilt the Russian state and commercial media groups’ territory from his first presidency in 2000. The media became the key instruments to smooth and implement his executive decisions. After the terror had just happened in Beslan, Putin rushed back from a Black Sea holiday to Moscow and cancelled a planned trip to Turkey. At the same time, the gang spoke by telephone in the morning with a well-known paediatrician, Lev Roshal, who helped negotiate the release of children during the deadly Moscow theatre siege in 2002. There was no progress in the talks. The previous hostage tragedy in Moscow was ended with large loss of life. This time, in the process of negotiation, the talk with the gang was again charged by paediatrician Lev Roshal, and he said to the media that the gunmen had rejected offers to deliver food and water to hostages, but they had assured Roshal that the children were still fine. None of the negotiations were successful in the crisis without satisfying the gang’s requirement to release Chechen prisoners. Valery Andreyev, head of the FSB security service in North Ossetia province, had no choice but to answer the questions of journalists “Why did the special troops use force to end the crisis?” Andreyev said, "There is no question at the moment of opting for force. We were intended to have a lengthy and tense process of negotiation." Incidentally, the Chechen rebels staged a similar attack on the Chechen capital, Grozny, just a week before a candidate hand-picked by the Kremlin was elected as regional president. "The planners of the terrorist attacks wanted to make Russians feel the 'Chechen

134

Chapter Six

hand' can reach them in a bus, on the metro, in a plane and in a busy street – anywhere," Kommersant daily wrote. Figure 1: News process in crisis

Figure 2: Triangle of relationships among government, media and the public

Russian Crisis Communication

135

Putin took these Chechen rebels for terrorists and emphasized that any kind of attack to the Russian people would be regarded as terrorism. This connection was confirmed in Putin’s formal speech, televised by all the TV channels at 6 o’clock in the evening on 4 September 2004. The content of speech is analysed in the following part of the paper.

Crisis Reporting Got High Ratings According to the report of a Russian newspaper “Kommersant” on the day of the crisis, the audience ratings of the biggest federal televisions’ evening news rose rapidly higher than popular soap operas. The evening news program “Time” of First Television (TV-1) got the highest audience ratings; second place was occupied by the evening news program “Vestia” of Russian Television (RTR); and the following one was the evening news program “Today” of Independent TV (NTV). The concrete ratings and proportion are shown in the following Table. As we can see, the broadcasting time of the three televisions is arranged separately, and this reduces the direct competition among them, at the same time enhancing the audience’s will to watch and their options. “Time” of First Channel Television (original Social public Television) was regarded as the most authoritative news program brand from the Soviet Union era. Although First Channel TV was experienced the Soviet Union’s collapse, the Russian transformation of Yeltsin’s ruling era, and Putin’s authoritative ruling period, “Time” is still the main information source and reliable news program among the Russian people because of its serious and accurate reporting. The state organs have 51% ownership of First Channel Television and 49% belongs to the personal founder and corporations. Russian Television is the state national media, which was founded by Yeltsin’s order in 1990, playing the role of the federal central government’s propaganda mechanism. In these years the central government was trying to promote the audience ratings of “Vestia” in order to control and influence public opinion. Russian Television is managed by the Russian leading media group, the All Russian National Broadcasting and Television Company (VGTRK), the leader of which is nominated and assigned by the Russian president. Russian Television is the best propaganda channel for the Russian authority since it is not controlled by the Communist Party of

Chapter Six

136

the USSR and the Russian media oligarchs formed in the Russian political transformation process. Russian Television is regarded as the best platform by Putin’s authority in transforming the broadcasting system into a public service system. Due to the limited capital and political motives, the Russian government has no way of implementing the idea immediately. Table: News rating on Beslan crisis Channel

Program

First Channel (TV-1)

Russian Television (RTR)

Audience rating (%)

Proportion (%)

Time

Broadcasting time 21.00

13.26

32.56

Late Time

22.51

10.02

28.14

Midnight Time

00.00

4.9

25.77

Vestia special report

20.00

10.02

27.8

21.59

7.96

20.12

22.59

6.42

18.42

23.59

3.78

19.17

19.00

5.86

19.71

19.57

10.03

27.97

20.55

10,29

26,72

22.00 22.57

7.25 5.18

18.43 14.38

0.30

2.37

20.31

Vestia special report Vestia special report Vestia special report Independent T Today (NTV) Today special report Today special report Country & world Today special report Today special report

Russian Crisis Communication

137

Figure 3: The ratings and proportion of the three evening news programs

The “Today” news program is of the former commercial Independent TV, which belonged to the media oligarch, Gysinskye, who was famous for his fast and sentimental news and reporting independent of the government, and losing his competitiveness in the media market after Putin’s authority started arresting him when he was accused of tax evasion. Now Independent TV is mainly controlled by the state gas corporation “Gazprom”. In the Beslan crisis, Independent TV was the first to release news, without video, concerning a released woman hostage holding a baby. Just several minutes after this, the federal state television, Russian TV, was broadcasting the event entirely in Beslan. Russian TV got first permission to deliver reports using satellite transmission devices. So the government controlled the situation by controlling the broadcasting process and technology. Incidentally, First Channel Television did not set up special reports. People knew little from the television. News reporting was required to not make comments before the situation was clear. Self-censorship existed in this crisis. In other words, national security and national interest were taken into consideration in the first place in this case, and media market benefit and freedom of speech were forced to take second place. In the 90s, Russian media experienced transformation in the process of the political regime’s transition. Under the deregulation of the media policy, Russian media had a lot of space practicing freedom of speech. The

138

Chapter Six

government was often criticised by the commercial media. The authority thought that the first Chechen War was lost by the media’s opposing attitude, which influenced public opinion, asking the central government to sign a peaceful agreement with the Chechen rebels. So far the three federal television stations have not set up an all-day full-run news channel in the Russian language for lack of funds and limited channels on one hand, but most important of all, the government did not want to release the satellite resources so as to keep censorship of media context on the other hand. Take the Beslan case for example, on 1 September 2004 during the hostage crisis, the Russian Media Union, under the control of the media management representatives, announced an urgent statement, emphasizing obedience of the anti-terrorism agreement signed two years earlier, and reaffirming that in the case of any extremity, saving and protecting people’s lives prior to any other kind of civil rights or freedom of speech would be regarded as the most important news principles. In other words, news self-censorship was put into effect. TV news reporting in the crisis was limited by the limited reporting time, the Media Union’s statement for self-censorship, and state control of authoritative, political, economic and juristic procedures.

Theories on Political Rhetoric The role of the president is very important in a nation with a presidential system, which was researched by Denton and Hahn in Presidential Communication, published in 1986. Among nine aspects, including constitution code, institution, multi-role, talent, behaviour, decision-making, system, political course and symbol-cognition, symbol-cognition was regarded as the most important part for the president in political communication. Dan Nimmo, an expert on political communication, considered that “politics is talk”. He suggested that a statesman is known by talking, as well as by his statements. The mass media have always focussed on the speaking and activities of a statesman and of political groups. Incidentally, even silence, as a kind of expression with political motives, might be regarded as a piece of news. Besides, David Bell, in his publication Power, Influence and authority, suggested that there are at least three talking methods with political meaning, as follows:

Russian Crisis Communication

139

ņ Power talk: dominating others’ behaviours with intimidations or promises. ņ Influence talk: influencing others’ behaviours with personal credits and reputations. ņ Authority talk: dominating others’ behaviours with orders. Political talk and communication mean handling political symbolic language skilfully. There are three elements in communication of political symbolic language: symbol, objection that the symbol represents, and the interpretation of the symbol. The relations among them are explained in the picture below, depicted by Ogden & Richards (1923) in The Meaning of Meaning. Figure 4: Interpretation of political symbolic language

The president of the United States always plays the role of debating basically for his policy in the management of a country, as mentioned by Allen Smith and Kathy Smith in their book, The Rhetoric of Political Institution, published in 1990. They also believed that the art of debating or speaking skills are the chief principles, whose functions are most obvious in democratic society. The speech art and political communication that a president possesses are the sources of his supreme powers, which could define, rationalize, legalize, persuade and enlighten something. What the president has said or done hides or communicates something in the political process. His words, behaviours and rhetoric should be calculated and evaluated. Meanwhile, the occasion and scene where words are published should also be taken into consideration. Research of language art could be traced back to Rhetoric, which was written by Aristotle, a famous philosopher of ancient Greece. He defined that language art was the ability of discovering ways to persuade others in any situation, which stresses persuasion with rationality, sensation with emotion, and admiration with morality.

140

Chapter Six

Richard Neustadt (1964) described in the Presidential Power: The politics of Leadership that presidential power is a kind of persuasion within the system of authority-diversion, since the media channel is the most convenient way for a president to clarify and explain decisions. In the case of authority-division and media comment, the president always makes use of debating communication to establish his professional prestige and purchase public support to smooth the execution of decisions. American Scholars Denton and Woodard (1985) summarized in Political Communication in America that personal significant characteristics and public image are necessary for a president, including integrity, maturation, zealousness, resolution, dignity and equanimity as well as wisdom, foresight about the nation's future, abilities to solve problems and judge quarrels with affluent knowledge. In the book Language as Symbolic Action, the author, Burke, considered that a disseminator has two methods to clean up evil. One was self-condemnation and expectation, and the other was transferring evil. At first, a person expects to try harder by way of painstaking effort, doing away with evil, and gaining rebirth. Then, he tries to find a scapegoat, which will be the target spurned by everyone. Burk thinks that the advantage of a scapegoat is to create an outside enemy and reduce the disagreement inside. This view reminds us of that there are many examples about creating public enemies to gain the public’s agreement in our history. Thus, having introduced some conceptions of the above definitions of rhetoric, we would like to analyse the original speeches of Russian president Putin in the following passages. We can study his debating art by making use of theories of symbolic language to see his arrangement of the content framework. We can acknowledge how President Putin called for a fight against terrorism and united the Russian people to overcome the sadness caused by the crisis in Beslan.

Putin’s TV Speech for Finding Massive Support In relation to this self-examination’s asceticism and imputation dualism, we analysed the TV speech addressed by Putin at 6pm Moscow time, September 4th. At the beginning of Putin’s speech, he tried to gain the audience’s sympathy and at the same time to be in accord with him. So

Russian Crisis Communication

141

Putin used self-condemnation communication skills for reducing people’s anger about the victims in the Beslan hostage crisis after the Russian special troops starting firing with the terrorists. Then he gave the attributes of the causes of the crisis, orienting on Chechen rebels as producing the hostage terror in order to threaten all Russian people. Finally, the Russian president asked for unity to support the government in striking terrorists. In his speech we can find Putin’s rhetoric in the political communication process. The public address’s structure could be divided into four parts as follows:

1. Self-Condemnation and Expectation a. Part of Self-Condemnation Putin started his 15 minute televised address with the words: “There have been a lot of melancholy cantos and events in Russian history. We are living in a complex environment formed after a great country’s desegregation, because this great country has lost gradually its ability of adjustment in the quick development of the world. But it seems that we have not prepared well for many changes in our lives. Why? We do not have measures to cooperate with the condition or level of the social development in the political system, because we are living in the period of economic transformation. We are living in an environment in which the interior conflict is acute and there are antagonistic moods among folks in Russia. In fact, these conflicts or antagonistic moods are suppressed by the Soviet Union leaders’ ideology. We stopped paying attention to the state’s safety, and indulged corruption corroding our judicatory and legal system. Besides this, our country had been the strong system to protect our national territory, but now suddenly we cannot protect ourselves from the east to the west. We do not react in time in whatever situations. We showed our weakness.”

Chapter Six

142

b. Part of self-expectation “Now, first of all, I want to express my support and the same feeling to those who lost their children and relatives. Please reminisce the people killed by terrorists in last days.” “No matter how difficult it was, we still kept the core of the great USSR successfully, the new country we called the Federal Republic of Russia.” “We are looking forward to a change, better and better.” “We have spent many years to build up a new, modern and actual boundary protection. And it needs roubles. If we professionally try it out in good time, it will be more effective.” “As the president and the chief executive of Russia, a person swearing to defend the territorial integrity of our country, and as a Russian man, I strongly believe that we have no choice, because these men in front of us are blackmailing and frightening us.” “On this condition, we really can’t and shouldn’t live without vigilance as before. We must build up a more effective security defence system, and require an active action of legal routine department to deal with newly emerged threats.” “It is more important to activate people’s sense of the national danger. The events, which happened in every country, demonstrate that the most effective way to counterattack terrorists is the combination of a strong country and an organized, united citizen society.” “Dear countrymen, obviously, the men who sent gangsters to make odious crime are to corrupt our nation, frighten the Russian people and expand the bloody civil strife in the North Caucasia. At the same time, I want to talk about these following points: Firstly, we will prepare a suit of overall measures focused on strengthening the unity of our country soon.

Russian Crisis Communication

143

Secondly, I think we must build up a new interactive system of military force and connection, which is in charge of controlling the situation of the North Caucasia. Thirdly, we must build up an effective danger solution system, containing new methods to deal with the actions of the legal routine departments. And I especially emphasize that all the enforcement measures will be completely conformed to our Constitution. Dear friends, we experienced the very difficult and humiliating moment together. I want to thank all the people who showed the spirit of endurance and citizen responsibility. With our morality, courage and human unity, we showed powerfully in the past and we will in the future. Tonight, I saw this spirit once more. Although we suffered from tragedy and pain in Beslan, people showed the spirit of how human to be human. We shouldn’t be defeated by the sadness of losing relatives. The purpose of gangsters made us more closely and forced us reviewing many things. Today, we must stand together. Only by this, can we defeat our enemies.”

2. Part of Imputation “It is very difficult and distressing to tell. A horrible tragedy happened on our land. Everyone was really suffering during these last days. Our hearts are fluctuating with the Russian city Beslan. We do not only meet the murders but also the helpless children who have no ability to resist the armed attack. But someone is attacking. ” “Someone is coveting the profits and wants to take a share of spoils and someone wants to pour oil on the fire. There must be the thought that Russia is threatening them because it is a great country which has many nuclear weapons. So we have to clear this mind of doubt.”

144

Chapter Six

“In fact, terrorism is the means carrying one’s point.” “Just as I mentioned many times, we have been attacked by riots or terrorism not only once. The terrorists totally lose their human nature and the crimes they do are unprecedentedly brutal. This is defiance not only to the president, the government and the congress, but also to the whole of Russia and its people.” “Terrorists think they are stronger than us, and they believe they can intimidate us by their brutality. They think they can disintegrate our will and collapse our society. It seems that we have only one choice now, beating back or agree with them. We surrender, destroy them or filch Russia to expect the terrorists can give us peace.” “The problem we are facing now is not attack by individual terrorists, but the threat from international terrorism. In this cruel and large-scale battle, our people’s lives are taken again and again.”

3. The Structure of Speech As we have discussed above in this paper, political speech is regarded as a kind of public communication, which is made of convincing speech, information speech and entertainment speech. Since public speech is a single disseminator to a large audience, with language or non-language manners, the media as a mass communication tool makes the influences of speech greater than in the case of no media. Public communication consists of five programs: construction, arrangement, phraseology, memory, and publication, mentioned by Haper (1979) in Human Communication Theory. The paper divided Putin’s speech into four parts: evil-selfcondemnation-imputation-expectation, including a short leading topic of ascribing evil, self-condemnation about disaster, re-ascribing details, expectation of the end. Construction is simple enough to remember; phraseology is definite enough to show attitudes: firmly to the enemy, while pitying and promising to the people. The publication, coming the day after the disaster finished, reflected Putin’s activeness, power and determination. a. The first part——ascribing evil. Leading topic of ascribing. “It is very difficult and distressing to tell. A horrible tragedy happened on

Russian Crisis Communication

145

our land. Everyone is really suffering during these last days. Our hearts are fluctuating with the city of Beslan, Russia. We do not only meet the murders but also the helpless children who have no ability to resist the armed attack.” b. The second part——self-condemnation. The main part is self-condemnation, alternating with expectation to encourage people and provoke people’s evil-cleaning and re-starting attitudes. c. The third part——re-ascribing evil. Re–ascribing in detail, drawing a clear line between the enemy and us. Take Putin’s words as an example: this is the attack on our country. Terrorists think they are stronger than us, and they believe they can intimidate us by their brutality. They think they can disintegrate our will and collapse our society. It seems that we have only one choice now, beating back or agreeing with them. We surrender, destroy them, or filch Russia to expect the terrorists can give us peace. d. The forth part——expectation. The main part is expectation, companied with self-condemnation. The purpose of putting the expectation in the final part is putting forward the government in advance for solving the problem in order to recover the powerlessness of government against terrorism. Addressing consolation and writing a new page raising hatred for the common enemy is the viewpoint of Putin; the last sentence in Putin’s speech is: “Today, we must stand together. Only by this, can we defeat our enemies.”

4. Action-Symbolic Cognition On 4th September the Russian president Vladimir Putin flew to Beslan, the republic of North Ossetia of southern Russia, where he went to the hospital and visit wounded children immediately. Then he carried on a conversation with the leading official of the anti-terrorism headquarters, who was negotiating with the Chechen terrorists holding hundreds of hostages in the No.1 junior high school of Beslan. Russian State TV channel and First TV channel both broadcasted Putin’s live picture, described previously. The author also watched this video from First TV’s website to analyse Putin’s action-symbolic cognition. First of all, the content of the TV pictures showed that Putin first visited the wounded in North Caucasia hospital, where the school director of No.1 junior high school in Beslan was also cured. Her health condition

146

Chapter Six

was becoming stable. Then, Putin came to the children’s hospital to visit the wounded children who had fallen asleep. In fact from the TV scenes, we could clearly see the facial expression of Putin when he was gently touching a child, showing his care and mercy. That child felt disturbed, and turned over to sleep again. Meanwhile, the TV images were shown without background explanation, you just heard the sound of many cameras taking photographs, and a naked feeling that you can be touched by reporters, the wounded, officials and audiences. From the TV, Putin looked so sad, coming out of the ward, lowering his head. In the following, the content of TV news report was Putin’s classic speech with officials of the anti-terrorism headquarters. It could be attributed as follows: ņThe hostage event influenced the whole of Russia: Putin pointed out that the event was not the first time that North Ossetia was attacked, but terrorists began hurting children. Then Putin turned back to the president of North Ossetia and said to Alexander: the whole Russia felt the pain of you and your republics, and got the same humiliation as you did. The whole of Russia would thank you and pray for you. ņDefine the conception of Russian terrorists: Putin considers the purpose of this event was to spread international enmity and maliciously destroy stability in the Caucasia area. Thus all the participants or co-operators with similar affairs will be taken as terrorists or their gangs. Putin ordered a blockade of the traffic and boundary of North Ossetia for cleaning up the Chechen’s gangsters completely. ņProvide all medical treatment on time to show government’s duty: Putin expressed that Shayegu, who was Russia’s urgent rescue minister, would stay here to deal with carrying the wounded to the hospitals and providing instant rescue. Putin called the name and the first name of Zasuohov and said: we will try our best to rescue the children and help them to get well. We will send the wounded children for treatment as soon as possible and any way you need, as long as it can help the children to get well. No matter if adults or children, we can provide them with any proper place for treatment in our country.

Russian Crisis Communication

147

The president of North Ossetia said to Putin: people are suffering from a tragedy these days; we cannot save the lives taken by the terrorists no matter how hard we try. We are all sad and feel the same as you. But we appreciate the president’s support. From the dialogue between Putin and Zasuohov, according to the negotiation process, Zasuohov who had a short talk with Putin seemed to be hiding a little complaint about innocent lives sacrificed in the Russian government’s lengthy three-day rescue action. For example, Zasuohov did not express appreciation for the national leader’s care, but put it at the end of the speech. He first emphasized that the people had a rough time, and indicated that the medical care could not save the dead. Zasuohov showed some dissatisfaction, which referred to the Russian government’s attitude in dealing with the problem, such as the warranty of the negotiation with the terrorists and so on. Putin also saw the dissatisfaction of Zasuohov, but he replied that special troops OMOH also sacrificed many soldiers in the process of the rescue action. This was the most terrible thing, that special troops lost so many lives in dealing with terror events in the last 20 years. This event came up on us very quickly, just like a storm, and our inner department of special troops showed a brave spirit. It appeared that Putin considered that the evil was the terror event itself, and the disaster was also the unprecedented sacrifice which had happened for the special troops. On that day, there were two planes of the instant rescue department carrying the wounded to Moscow for treatment. It seemed that Putin tried his best to solve the problem of medical care, and this would help him to remedy the problem of the no-compromise policy of the government to treat the terror, in which many hostages had already been sacrificed.

Conclusion In the Beslan hostage crisis, the Russian governmental strategy of manipulating the media was very clear at that time. Although the Russian media showed many views and pictures in reporting the hostage event in time, the Russian government did not take measures to restrict live TV transmission. We also saw from TV news reporting that a female journalist

148

Chapter Six

of First TV was gathering news live when both sides began battling. Putin’s media strategy in this case was the opening of an information channel to show the rescue action in disaster to the whole world. By doing so, on one hand, the Russian government could show its tolerance of not interfering in media interview rights, and on the other hand, let the world see the terrorists’ lack of humanity and the hard work of the special army in the three-day rescue assault. Even America and NATO could not criticize the Russian government at that moment, but expressed their pity and the will to help with the rescue, and left the opposed political problems behind. However, the Russian government controlled the situation by controlling broadcasting technology and licenses. People knew little from the television stations. News reporting was required not to make comments before the situation was clear. Media self-censorship existed in this crisis. In other words, national security and interest were taken into consideration in the first place in this case; the media market benefits and freedom of speech disappeared compared to them. Russian state television played an apparatus role after Putin’s media nationalization process. In the process of Beslan’s hostage crisis, the three biggest Russian federal television stations and the central government’s crisis handling techniques spurred disputes about their intentional hiding of the truth regarding negotiation with the terrorists. From the first day of the extreme situation, the government’s media manipulating mechanism started running. Firstly, Russian Media Union on that day announced an urgent statement, “emphasizing obeying the anti-terrorism agreement signed two years ago, and reaffirming that in the case of any extremity, saving and protecting people’s lives prior to any kind of other civil rights and freedom of speech would be regarded as the most important news principles”. In other words, freedom of speech should not hurt the saving of lives; if that were the case, the media should be regarded as the responsible agent for the sacrifice. So that statement was a crucial signal for media self-censorship at the beginning of the crisis, which led to little detailed TV news being released to the public. This might jeopardize the right to knowledge of the citizens, which is protected by the Russian democratic media law in the format of the freedom of communication in the Russian territory.

Russian Crisis Communication

149

Finally, Putin’s public address on television, after the Russian special military forces’ shooting action ended, was shaping him as a saviour, stabilizing and conciliating people’s emotion. In the 90s, the government was often criticised by the commercial media. The authority thought that the first Chechen War was lost due to the media’s opposing attitude which had influenced the public opinion for asking the central government to sign a peaceful agreement with the Chechen rebels. So Putin’s media strategy has two aspects: on one hand is technically controlling the media resources, such as the ownership and license of broadcasting, and on the other hand is the maintaining of contact with the Media Union and related non-governmental media organizations to influence journalists’ news reporting principles in any extreme situation. In a result, in the process of running news, the news coverage would focus on the event itself and not the comments: more facts, less critiques. The end of the communication process is the public’s positive feedback for the governments’ urgent measures. So the theory of the media function and their role were publicly expressed by Putin many times and this will influence the news principles of Russian media coverage. Theoretical issues still make Russian journalists fall into an ideological dilemma.

Notes 1

Feng-Yung Hu, “Russian Crisis Communication: Interaction Between Federal Televisions and President Putin in the Beslan's Hostage Crisis”, China Media Research 5(2007): 43-52.

CHAPTER SEVEN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUTIN’S MEDIA REFORMS AND HIS IDEOLOGICAL TENDENCY1 FENG-YUNG HU

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR AT COLLEGE OF GENERAL STUDIES YUAN ZE UNIVERSITY (YZU), TAIWAN ADJUNCT RESEARCHER AT NATIONAL TAIWAN UNIVERSITY (NTU), TAIWAN

WU FEI

PROFESSOR OF JOURNALISM AND MASS COMMUNICATION JINAN UNIVERSITY, CHINA

In post-soviet Russia, the Russian media reforms are characterized as the deregulation of national media policy, privatized national-communist party media, and rapid concentration of the commercial-industrial oligarch’s capitalism in the ruling era of Boris Yeltsin in the 90s. Contrary to this, after Putin took office in 2000, nationalizing mass media and multiplying ownership of commercial media to decentralize the Russian oligarchy’s media might be one of the obvious characteristics in the era of Vladimir Putin’s ruling regime. According to these two different media development directions, we assume that the Russian media reforms must be associated with Putin’s ideological tendency in the scope of globalization and national interests. In this chapter the authors first of all analysed the media controlling institutions; secondly, we would like to know what Putin’s ideological tendency is in balancing the different attitudes and positions toward globalization.

152

Chapter Seven

Introduction: Conflicts between oligarch and Putin Vladimir Putin was selected as the Russian president in March 2000, and from that moment Russia formally entered an era of Putin. He is a man with a background in the KGB, but leads the Russian people fighting against the terrorists and separatists in the Russian territory, launching an intensive military campaign in Chechnya during his time in the position of prime minister before the parliamentary election of Duma in 1999 and the Presidential election of 2000. Boris Yeltsin implemented the liberal policy, which was reflected in the freedom of the press, regular elections and free economic market system, but also produced so-called financial-industrial oligarchs who controlled the Russian media and national energy enterprises, which had been privatized in Yeltsin’s governance period. As the successor of Yeltsin, Putin has his own viewpoint of national development, which differs from Yeltsin. Putin expressed publicly that the Russian politicians whom he adores are Peter I and Andropov. In the process of nationalization, Putin on the one hand controls the national energy enterprises which can be a tool for manipulating foreign exchanges and implementing Russian foreign policy, and on the other hand he controls the mass media, especially broadcasting, which can be an effective weapon to shape the new Russian ideological system in the process of his attempt at strengthening the country. In 2004, some editors and journalists of the most popular daily newspaper, Izvestiya, supporting arrested Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former president of the oil company Yukos & bank of Menatep, left the Izvestiya newspaper organization, and the protest event aroused an earthquake in the press. So, if the Russian media elites support Putin’s ideology of national development, it will be a stable factor of the Russian society. The purpose of this paper shows that the Russian media and economic elites still want more power for the self-controlling media under Putin’s media manipulation. We assume that the freedom of the press and media globalization meet Putin’s economic and cultural policy for integration with the European countries. Contrary to this, the Russian political elite tend to adopt a

Putin’s Media Reforms and His Ideological Tendency

153

conservative anti-globalization attitude, because they assert that Russia has rich natural resources and gets nothing from economic globalization. For example, the foundation of the Counter-Oligarchic Front of Russia (COFR) was the first officially anti-globalistic Russian movement. This new organization is headed by the two Left Front leaders, Boris Kagarlitsky and Alexey Nezhivoi. COFR has chosen its first targets, TNK-BP and its partner Alfa Group, headed by Mikhail Fridman, calling them “an example of the most harmful and dangerous oligarchic structure.” We can find these kinds of opinions of anti-globalization in some other articles which were written by Russian intellectuals and politicians, and were published in the Russian newspapers. It reflected the relationships among the Russian president Vladimir Putin, media elites, political elites and intellectuals who make up the mainstream of the Russian policy-making.

Vertical Broadcasting Controlling Institution The mass media reform is going on under nationalization with the stimulation of globalization. In our study we assume that Putin thinks there is not much contradiction between nationalism and globalization, because one crucial factor fostering globalization to solve the contraction is fighting the Russian oligarchies, who basically empower the oil, banking, and communication areas. So, fighting the Russian oligarchies will first of all solve the problems of concentration of commercial capitalism. The national capital will be the main support for media development and a smaller part of the foreign investment would be supply for multiplying the media ownership market. Here there appears a disputed conception, that is, the national media monopoly is protection of national and social interests, but commercial media monopoly is the purloiner of natural resources. The Russian government’s mass media controlling institution can be focused on the three aspects: natural resources, information sources, and governmental subsidies. Concerning the broadcasting controlling institution: Firstly, the government controls and monopolizes the TV towers for broadcasting, in other words, all the national and commercial media corporations rely on the contracts with the national TV tower technological transmitting centre “Octankino” and its distributions in the regions.

154

Chapter Seven

Secondly, the government controls the channels and issuing licenses for broadcasting, in other words, if any broadcasting appliers or owners cannot meet the government’s requirements, the government will not provide or prolong the licenses for broadcasting. So, we can say that the broadcasting is limited to the national broadcasting companies and those commercial broadcasting companies possessing good relationships with the government. The broadcasting market strongly relies on the government’s regulation and control. Thirdly, the leading broadcasting company, the All-Russian National TV and Radio Broadcasting Company, controls the budgets and personnel assignments of all the distributions of the regional and national broadcasting technological centres and companies. In other words, the centralization of media control and management of the federal government is formed and much more strongly reinforced in the ruling era of Putin than in the era of Yeltsin.

Technical Print Controlling Institution After the Russian media were deregulated for free development, in recent years president Putin has given more attention to the management of the media market and organization’s operation. But how to take charge of the media in a democratic way that cannot affect the interests of the media and oligarch may be a big challenge for Putin. In Russia, what was common occurrence in Soviet Russia was that almost all of the media staff and personnel graduated and were recruited from the faculty of Journalism at Moscow State University and foreign news reporters from Moscow State Institute of International Relations. If Putin controls the media in a direct way, then in Journalism faculty classroom-settings, this would make the staff of the media and oligarch combine against the disputed governmental administration, fighting for freedom of the press. So that would be a stupid way to go for the civilian society. One way left for president Putin to control the media was technologically. Concerning print control measures, firstly the government limits the quantity of printing factories and equipment for colour printing to the limited national printers; secondly, the government controls the prices of the newspapers. National printing can give cheaper prices for the domestically produced newspapers, but commercial printing usually uses

Putin’s Media Reforms and His Ideological Tendency

155

imported newspaper, which has a much higher price than the domestic paper. Thus, the newspapers’ printing relies on the national printers. Those newspapers with colour printing get more advertisements and attention from the readers. Since the disaggregation of the Soviet Union, the Russian oligarch ignored having control over the printers and paper factories, because the oligarch considered that it would cost a lot of money updating and renewing the equipment in printers or paper factories. When the government controls the price of news resources and increases the import tariff, the imported newspapers and equipment would add to the cost of production. The commercial newspapers become much more reliant on good relationships with the government, and that will influence media coverage and news content. Since the Soviet Union broke down, the Russian government carried out their first media law that was referred to as the most free media law. But most Chinese media analysts still consider that the breakdown of the Soviet Union and confusion of Russian status was tied to the freedom of the media. Since 1998, in five-year timetables, the Russian government put 2 billion US$ towards updating printer equipment, but all of this money was used in just 30-40 national printers. In return, the national printers must strictly abide by the requirements of the government, which are more strict and serious than those of the government of the Soviet Union. According to the report, the Russian governmental media capital capability was only 6 billion US$, and in 2008 it would be promoted to 7.5-8 billion US$. So we can say that the development of Russian media was not the same as the media market, and it still remains, as a characteristic of the Soviet Union, that we cannot directly see these means. The Russian media law states that building one newspaper only needs one month and not more than 1000US$ for an application, and one TV station should take three months but needs strict auditing by the Ministry of Finance. So, in this situation, the Russian government cannot supervise the media as in the time of the Soviet Union. Printers are an essential element in the production process of newspapers, and they control the profits of newspapers. As in the rules of media law, the Russian government cannot interfere with media operation. So, since 1996 the Russian government began its management of printers. For example, in 2000, Russian printers of different types of ownership

156

Chapter Seven

numbered almost 6000, and after two years increased by 1000 again. But all of these printers were used for private and commercial publications and could only print advertisements and books rather than newspapers. In Russia, printers can be defined as three types: national or central government’s printers, local printers, and non-governmental or commercial. In the national printers, belonging to the Department of print and mass communication of the Russian federation, there exist 37 departments. In 1999, the Department of print and mass communication came out with one policy named Government Supporting Printers, finished in 2000. After the plan was carried out, 3 printers could accept the duty of full-colour printing, and 4 printers could print half-collared newspaper. So, almost all of Moscow’s and local published newspapers are printed by the central government’s printers. Non-governmental printers only print 27% of newspapers which belong to the government. There exist 1100 local printers that take the duty of 31% of local newspapers. This is because the local government wants more independence from the central government. But the problem was local printers’ lack of money for updating equipment. So, the central government’s printers control the print market. In general, the government’s printers do not make up a high number in quantity, but they take charge of most of the printing with money and influence. By now 80% of printers’ equipment needs updating, which still effects the normal development of the Russian newspapers. It is different with big numbers of printers; for the paper factories in Russia only three big companies exist, named Volga, Kandabog, and Salicom paper industry companies. So a monopolized condition is very popular and exists in paper production. Paper is sometimes only at a lower market price when supplied for the government’s printers. Some anti-government magazine organizations sometimes import paper with a lower price and print their magazines from Finland directly, which can avoid interposing from the government. In 2001, three paper companies produced 1.715 million tons of newspaper, much more than the 0.58 million tons in 1997. For the Russian government’s printers, they only use paper with a price of 420-450 US$ per ton, which is lower than the international paper price of 550-600 US$ per ton. But non-governmental newspapers or thise which have bad relations with the government often use a higher price of paper at 620-700

Putin’s Media Reforms and His Ideological Tendency

157

US$ per ton. After 1998’s Russian financial crisis, the price of paper did not change much. Another situation was also very interesting; most government newspapers pay money on credit that can be paid in cash in the middle or at the end of the year. But for small or anti-government newspapers, they cannot get many material benefits, causing most newspapers to go bankrupt. In 2004, Russian media advertisement capability was about 6 billion US$ and newspapers attract 1 billion US$ in advertisement. So we can say that the advertisement market still belongs to those newspapers who have good relations with the government, because of the government’s control of print institutions, printers’ equipment, and paper prices, which determine the existence of the newspapers.

Globalization and Russian Media Development Russian professor R. F. Matveev, in his article “Several methodological and theoretical problems of globalization” (2006), divides the trend and reality of globalization into several aspects: military, religious, ideological, philosophy, juristic, moral, and economic aspects. He assumes that the past historical and empirical experience of globalization presents us more military, religious, ideological, and expansion factors than the juristic and moral aspects. He said the pure economic factor has no meaning in the global process. However, Matveev thinks that “Eurocentrism” and “Christianization” with the expansion of totalitarian aims, make up the essence of globalization. But he still also stressed that every process has its positive and negative aspects, otherwise, we will produce new conflicts and sink into intensive relationships, or even run into catastrophe. From the viewpoint of R. F. Matveev, we are going to understand how the Russian elite estimate the positive and negative impact of globalization on Russian media and cultural identity. From this dichotomy framing globalization, we might see the extremist opinion on each side. Moreover, since Peter I implemented the policy of Europeanization, Russia has been facing a dispute on the route of state development between Europeanization and Slavonization.

158

Chapter Seven

Thus, in the Russian elite there are two attitudes and positions to examine globalization in Russian state development. One direction supports Russia joining the trend of globalization, the obvious action of which is to take the European standard to implement Russian reform, at the same time integrating with the EU and strengthening the Russian political influence on CIS from its joining of NATO. The other direction is to set up a Russian model, not depending on foreign technology or the international trade market, in other words, Russia should build up its own market system separate from the world market system. Influencing Russia, both of these directions exist in the field of the Russian political and media elite. From the viewpoint of building up its own world market system, the Russian president Vladimir Putin, who took part in the SCO in Shanghai, expressed his global energy proposal with the giant energy company Gazprom. Energy resources are the most powerful weapon for Russia implementing its control in the world political and economic system. If we considered several opinions, published in the Russian media, including Russian newspapers, magazines, televisions, radio, agencies and internet, we could better understand how the Russian elite look at globalization, because their viewpoints might influence the Russian policy-makers’ decisions on the Russian state’s direction of development. How did the Russian elite understand the globalization of Russian media? First of all, the Russian media collaborate with foreign media groups in media business to integrate with the world market system and to weaken the Russian financial-industrial oligarch’s control over the Russian media. The Russian media regard the first step or the most visible characteristic of media globalization as the collaboration with foreign media groups in sharing the holding stakes in Russia or setting up a Russian media branch to expand their own presence in other countries. After Vladimir Putin took his post as Russian president in 2000, he began to weaken the financial-industrial oligarch’s control over many important areas, including the media industry and oil business. In the period 2000 to 2002, the process of the Russian private television companies was nationalized. The Russian newspapers Vedomost on 24 December 2002 reported about the revoking of the licenses of the two biggest commercial private television companies, NTV and TV-6. Now the industrial group Gazprom is the owner of NTV. After that, the

Putin’s Media Reforms and His Ideological Tendency

159

Russian government controls the three biggest national and federal TV companies: RTR, TV-1 and NTV. The chairman of the US-Russia Investment Fund, Patricia Cloherty, said that five private Russian broadcasters, including REN-TV, share 36.2% of the national audience today. So how does the government cope with the private broadcasting companies after the end of oligarchy rule? After the Russian government nationalized the biggest and most influential private TV company, NTV, and have cleared up the stakes of media tycoon in First channel TV-1, it seems to be that Putin is preparing to liberalize less than 40% of the broadcasting market to balance the media development. From the news of RTL buying part of REN-TV, letting the biggest foreign media group invest in the Russian media market might be the ideal way to keep the Russian media in collaboration with the world media system. By doing so, on the one hand, the Russian government can reduce the influence of the oligarch on media and politics, especially during the elections. The Russian government is still the owner of the three biggest national-federal TV broadcasting companies, which are the most authoritative source for the massive audience and have occupied more than 60% of the broadcasting audience. On the other hand, the Russian government has no capacity to consume all of the broadcasting market. The joint-stock broadcasting company can solve the problem of capital and at the same time can learn management from the developed media companies and acquire personnel with strong abilities from the foreign media companies. The news resources from the joint-stock companies can be shared as well. It may help Russian media companies build up a more transparent and effective management institution. So collaborate with foreign media groups, especially with the European media groups, is the good way to integrate with the western countries and to balance the Russian simplistic national broadcasting market for enhancing competitiveness. We would like to take as an example, this news source from RIA Novosti about the joint-stock corporate model in media business. RIA Novosti political commentator, Alexander Yurov,2 wrote an article titled “Foreigners move into Russian media business” (2005), saying: “Europe's largest commercial broadcasting holding, RTL, is to buy a 30% stake in the Russian television company REN-TV……. This will give RTL and its

160

Chapter Seven

parent company, the German media giant Bertelsmann, a blocking stake in the Russian channel. If the Russian regulators approve the deal, which would go ahead by the end of the year, this would be the first time a foreign investor has owned a significant share in a Russian television company.” He further wrote “However, when Anatoly Chubais, the prominent Russian politician and head of Russia's largest energy company RAO UES, bought 70% in REN-TV in 2000, it cost him $30 million. And now, under pressure from the state, which wants RAO UES to streamline its non-core assets, the new deal has been initiated. The company is being forced to give up its share in the media business, …… ” The authors think that, with the deal, the Kremlin had the aim of centralizing the information flow in Russia. Yorov wrote “Kremlin must therefore have endorsed the acquisition and that its aim must be to centralize information flows in Russia. Yet this thinking clearly contradicts the processes that are underway in the Russian media market. What some would call the "cleansing" of the Russian mass media has not prevented increased foreign investment in the Russian publishing industry. Last year, the publishing house Axel Springer launched Forbes, Newsweek Russia and Wallpaper in Russia. And since the Finnish company Sanoma Magazines bought over the Independent Media publishing house, Russia has seen collaborative publications by Izvestia and the New York Times and by The Moscow Times and the International Herald Tribune. By the autumn, Russian versions of the Economist (in collaboration with Independent Media) and Business Week (a Rodionov publishing house project) will be on the shelves. Meanwhile, the Russian media is expanding its presence in Europe: the Ekho Moskvy radio station has announced it wants to open a branch in Ukraine, and the business daily Kommersant is launching a local publication there. Vedomosti, another business daily, also has its sights set on Ukraine. So it seems that the main trend in the Russian media business is globalization.” The TV and radio companies have built the public broadcasting station to integrate with the European media institution and European civilization. In Russia, part of the intellectual elite who support Russia integrating with Europe regard themselves as European, and this European cultural identity is obvious in media intellectuals, the media elite, and journalists. The famous Russian media law expert, Mihkail Fedotov, interviewed by Nataliya Rostova of the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta, is the project designer of the Russian national public station draft

Putin’s Media Reforms and His Ideological Tendency

161

saying that Russia should integrate with European civilization, so the Russian broadcasting company VGTRK should let the national television RTR be the public television, which would make national interests agree with the public interest. He thinks that the national interest should not differ from the public interest, and Russia, as a democratic country, should have this characteristic.

Conclusion According to our observations, in the first period of Putin’s ruling regime, we thought that an anti-globalization emotion occurred among the political elite, but the economic elite and media owners preferred greater globalization to attract foreign investments, advanced technology and brainpower talents to run the world market. Putin’s attitude toward globalization as the coordinator and policy-maker was quite important. We observed that Putin kept strengthening the power of the national media in the process of controlling institutions so as to control the media market structure, and at the same time allowed the commercial media to collaborate with foreign media corporations in ownership and staff exchange to weaken the concentration of the Russian oligarchy capitalism that might influence and interfere with the policy-making process. From this point of view, Putin might support the globalization process step by step and make use of globalization to multiply the Russian commercial oligarchy media market, but the national media institutions remain in the role of controlling the media of the mainstream information flow in Russia. In the process of media production industry, the news coverage is the end of that process influencing the public opinions, but technology is the fundamental infrastructure. For Putin, controlling the technological institutions would be much better than content censorship, and amongst them will be a negotiation between the president, political elite and media elite.

Notes 1

Feng-Yung Hu & Wu Fei, “The Relationship between Russian President Putin’s Media Reforms and His Ideological Tendency”, Intercultural Communication Studies 1 (2007): 76-82. 2 Alexander Yurov, “Foreigners Move into Russian Media Business”, RIA Novosti, July 6, 2005. Retrieved from: http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20050706/40855251.html.

CHAPTER EIGHT SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: THE CULTURE INSTITUTES AND ADVERTISING IN RUSSIA LARISA FEDOTOVA

PROFESSOR AT FACULTY OF JOURNALISM MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY (MSU), RUSSIA

In a general meaning, we understand the notion “culture” as all that appeared in society thanks to man’s activities, created by purposeful works of people. Such a definition is close to A. Taylor’s classical words (1871): “Culture or a civilization is a system including knowledge, faith, art, morale, law, customs, and all other skills and habits gained by a man as a member of society”.1 This means that “culture” is behaviour, beliefs, and institutions; it includes what people know, feel, think, make, and do.2 To say more – “culture” is the totality of all kinds of human transformational activities – a man and a society – and the results of such activities as well. It is clear that first and foremost the sociologist approach is realized in such a definition, the way whereby the social object is analysed, taking into account all its social interactions, and at the same time ɚ mechanism of its real function in society. Culture is a complex of factors and causes, formed structure and processes in social life. In such a definition, we stress that culture includes material products and value systems, behavioural patterns and types of activities. We may select the spheres of culture, related to the systems of individual and general needs, which they meet. This is economy and the forms of activities connected with it; the institutes, regulated common social life such as law, state, customs; knowledge and science, ideology, art; religion and so on. So, culture is a product of human

164

Chapter Eight

activities with all the participating social institutes. Such a definition of culture gives us extremely wide borders for discussion of the problem of advertising in Russia. Advertising is analysed as a part of social life, which needs to be investigated from the point of view of economy, policy, and activities of law institutes, mass media and the whole information space, art, etc.

What We Must Take into Consideration? What must we take into consideration when we are discussing the problems of advertising in modern Russia, as in our case? We shall discuss them during recent times, when many changes in contemporary Russian society are taking place. Nevertheless, the foundation for the current advertising industry in our country was laid down in the 20th century, when advertising had mass growth, because the free market began. Even in the USSR, advertising had also become an accepted marketing tool when the country had the task of conducting campaigns in many nations to introduce products around the world. But now we will discuss the advertising problem in Russia, beginning from the 90s, when we had a social system evolution, when the rapid change of economic and political paradigms happened. Let us observe some characteristics of advertising in a situation of creating a free market tendency in modern Russia. In this time advertising becomes a mass phenomenon as a result of the formation of those conditions that caused its appearance in the world’s historical process: - The economic conditions appeared: market economy systems were built. The new principal problem appeared: the promotion of goods and services, national as well as imported. The system of advertising was assisting all members of society to be as effective as possible in business. - The political conditions appeared: conditions when competition became possible in the political programs’ market. During the recent political events in our country from February 6 to March 2 (2012) very sharp and active advertising campaigns in the mass media and in the

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

165

whole of the information space took place between five candidates for the presidential post. - The media ownership has changed: economic tasks were changed and competition appeared; so the relationship between advertising and mass media institutions has changed; the system of mass information channels started to need advertising as a source of being and of economic and political independency. The advertisers became ready to give back part of their income for those mass media institutions which enlarged their efforts as salesmen – placing advertisements of their goods, services, political programs, images, etc. - And last but not least - the demand for mass products appeared: the consumers showed readiness to buy the products, both financially and psychologically. Now the structure is formed where the roles between different social subjects with new functions are distributed: the producers of goods and services. -Are independently going to market; -The advertising professionals - producers of advertising products – representatives of new for Russia professional kind of activities; -The departments of mass informational channels; -The consumer of mass information itself, who becomes counter partner of all the interested subjects enumerated above because he is included in the mass informational space. His inclusion in the system of mass informational channels is an attention advance (payment) for advertisements. The last circumstance explains those social-psychological phone adverts that exists even in the developed countries: the society is aware of the main aggressive characteristic of advertising and opposes it with a sufficiently complex system of regulatory attitudes between counter agents (the producers, the advertising professionals, the departments of mass informational channels): law and so called unwritten laws, morale, public opinion, institutes of civil society etc. The complex system of social subjects interested in regulation seems to be exhaustive and comprehensive. Nevertheless, there is a function which none of the sides enumerated above realizes: for the effective function of this structure the participants must have stable information exchange

166

Chapter Eight

between them: the producers need some information (about formats, about conditions, about degree of effectiveness and so on); those who produce advertisements need to know the targets of their advertisements (the number, their quality – which may be more important – characteristics). The aim is especially pragmatic; to know the situation because it has an influence on the cost. And the next stage of audience knowledge – to know her appraisals, her attitudes to concrete advertisement – for evaluating advertisement effectiveness. The knowledge is given by special institutes – sociological services. During the last twenty years in our country, sociological services have become more professional and the professional structures creating advertisements have also appeared. At first they were net international advertising agencies, who dictated the rules for participants. They even prepared the specialties for the branch – such practice exists till today. They consider it better to prepare personnel by themselves in short-term courses, than re-educating those who finished special educational institutes. Nevertheless, in our country professional education on advertising and public relations is developing and now we have about one hundred institutes with advertising and public relations departments. Practically all technologies and kinds of ads (from transport, to internet advertisements) appeared; plus, in addition to net international advertising agencies, national ones appeared (before the economic crisis in 2008 there were about three thousand altogether); the educational structures organize the effective connections with those who occupy the branch; educational activities in this sphere are being provided with special literature, and are not only being translated. Advertisements make a mass appearance; not only in the mass media, but also in outdoor visual space.

Law Climate of Advertising in a Country The law climate of advertising in a country presents a very important question. Do not impose upon others what you do not desire yourself. —Confucius // Analects of Confucius. Published by Sinolingua, China. 1994. P. 296.

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

167

It is well-known that every social action is regulated by three social institutions: law, professional codes, and participation in that process of the wider population – institutes of civil society, ethics and public opinion. And in Russia such a structure regarding advertising was creating step by step. In 1995, the first Advertising Law was adopted, then - after wide public discussion in press, when suggestions for corrections to the Law accumulated – the second Advertising Law was adopted in 2005. The professional advertising and public relations structures appeared: the Association of Communicative Agencies of Russia (ACAR); some documents in the professional sphere were adopted, where the borders of legal and ethical principles of advertising were marked; the Consumer Society very actively displayed itself; the state structure Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS), which sometimes very actively intervenes in the process of advertising regulation. Concerning the activities of the institutes of civil society,3 they are also noticeable in their attempts to emerge, for instance, against the prevalence of the corporate ethic against the social one. I must mention the press as well, which is also an accumulator of advertising critics, when such occasions occur.

How are the Corporate and Social Interests Interacted? How do the corporate and social interests interact? To identify priorities between corporate ethics in comparison with social ethics, in general we must analyse such problem as “advertising as value resource”. Every culture consists of categories which are used to sort and classify experience. People learn the rules for appropriate behaviour. Norms, laws, customs, mores, expectations, and regulations are all used in some instances as synonyms for rules and used when science analyses the functioning social structure. Rules are instructions to behave in a particular way. Among those rules we must take a view on “value”; that is one of the most important conceptions for analysing society as a functioning structure. In the opinion of American sociologist, T. Parsons, the spreading of values, which are not in conflict with other ones, which are mainly, potentially reconciled, can guarantee consent in society and its stable functioning4. During the discussion, which took place after T. Parsons’

168

Chapter Eight

publications, his critics advanced the idea of dynamics and development of society as a result of collision of different values. The truth, as so often happens, lies between two theories: values or value orientations form a part of the mechanism of social relations, which are united individuals in a functioning “whole”, capable of stability and at the same time of development. How is the capacity for stability appearing in society? Generally speaking, because social relations lead to joint activities of people, which rules pass from one generation to another? In such a case, the society dictates some orientation, which we can group as: ɚ) how one must act and b) how one must not act. The latter is more or less clear: there are bans, taboo, codes, etc.; in principal the society becomes capable of explaining to its members the borders of “non-permitted”. The sphere of “what is permitted” is much larger. The most universal of which is considered as an equivalent of social policy on that question; a classic rule: everything which is not forbidden, is allowed. Of course, in the real life it is more complicated: it is known that in addition to written laws, in every society there are unwritten ones. That is why for normal behaviour (in counterpoise for abnormal) there are special norms, standards, examples, ideals, values as limits - that is, the instructions which help individuals to navigate among the models of behaviour, opinions, modes of thinking, appraisement etc., that are approved by the society. Speaking about values along these lines, research emphasizes that they are not operative instructions, but sufficiently fundamental, steady orientations, formed by the individual themselves during their time in the society, a stable point of view on the world, some reliable picture of the world, which they drew up for themselves and which helps then in their further interrelations with the world, defines their sympathies, their choices in different social situations, the aims of their life, up to concrete ways of behaving. What ways of social broadcasting of values are there in society? I think we must divide them into two groups, taking into account the speed of their spread: broadcasting on long-term waves – mythology, literature, art, proverbs, sayings, school, the educational system as a whole, and so on; and broadcasting on short-term waves – cinema, mass media, and

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

169

advertising. That is we may analyse advertising in unity of understanding the values both of base phenomena and assuming the variants of development. It is a fact that one of the most irrefutable axioms, laying the basis of interrelation of advertisements and mass consciousness; that is, advertisements appeal to value orientations, which are supported by at most all members of society. Advertisements, as we know, reflect values of the society in which they broadcast. Often such a formula is enlarged and the theme of forming new values appears. How does this take place? First of all, support for old values reaches a minimum, reaching a zero level for effective communication, then small changes occur, and only as a third stage, certain conversions. First, supporting the old values, and second, the forming of new values, are important for social structure: to underline the values supported by all members of society, advertising or more complex social information provides stability; at the same time, to form new values, advertising gives a new orientation for society, promoting its transformation. As a rule, in traditional, predominantly rural societies, the first pattern is strong; in industrial, modernization societies the second one prevails. In such a model, we may examine interrelations between corporate and social values of advertising. On the one hand, it is more far-sighted, and more effective in providing symbiosis of corporate and social values in advertising and public relations; on the other hand, advertising tries to destroy old practices, old demands, individual actions of people in order to inculcate into consumers’ behaviour new standards, products or services; that is, it prefers to give priority to corporate values. In the latter case, aspiring to the firm's goals through promotion and distribution polices, the firms undertake “flamboyant”, “extreme”, “provocat[ive]”5 steps. I will mention only some examples. In the centre of Moscow, robots were placed in one the big stores’ window display. They represented “Kama sutra’s poses”. The society’s reaction was immediate: one of the religious organizations promised to write a letter to the Head of the city and there were some other instances. The store immediately removed the robots. Of course, the marketers counted on the effect: the people who were situated near the display window could visit the store and buy something, but for the wider population it was once more a cause to form

170

Chapter Eight

negative attitudes towards advertising in general, and to lower trust in it. But this is not only a Russian practice. The case of the United Colors of Benetton brand may also be mentioned. It found itself once more at the centre of a scandal due to its advertising campaign “Unhate”, directed at propagating tolerance all over the world. The billboards were placed in New York, Milan, Rome, Tel Aviv and Paris. The posters displayed a kiss between the Catholic Pope and Egyptian religious leader, between President of France Sarcoxie and Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel, and so on. Vatican City demanded the removal of the billboards. After a day, Benetton withdrew them. On the day of the start of this campaign November 16, 2011 - the shares of Benetton on the Milan Fond Exchange decreased in price by 10 percent, and the decrease continued the next day too. Not looking at this, the marketers are sure that the campaign was not implemented in vain: about 30% of consumers from the target audience will visit the Benetton stores now. Such actions by Benetton are not rare events. Sometimes the company, in addition to an apology for their creations, has to pay a price with a temporary fall in sales. However, such action it views as having long-term benefits in investment of brand perception by consumers. The main thing is why companies carry out such actions —attracting attention. And attracting attention, as the marketers say, without fail finds its proof in shopping. In the 90s, there was a situation in our country which may be analysed from the point of view of correlation of corporate and social values. Our press had many examples of giving so-called “sneaky advertisements”. Soon the advertisers themselves understood: the trust of the population towards the whole media space - and including this cause - dropped, and posting positive materials about their firms became inefficient. An untrusting population pushed away such materials. It became necessary to change the situation. But if we speak about a low level of audience trust, we can recall these examples. One more example – in Moscow there are so many outdoor ads. The advertisers, for the sake of corporate interests, sought to fit into this space. The urban environment was dotted. The corporate billboards irritated people. As a result, the power decided to give order to the situation. As it turned out, more than half (over 60%) of the billboards and posters were not legal, did not have permissions, or did not pay for the accommodation (i.e. in the city budget, but that is another story). We would like to stress

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

171

that the abundance of advertisements itself played a bad joke on the efficiency of separate advertisement. This is professional knowledge, and this would need to be known by the advertisers. Also, whether society or separate organizations, consumers act as force, actively protesting against such forms of presentation of corporate values. In terms of theoretical development of advertising activities, should views be taken on advertising effects, not only on its efficiency? In the meantime, such a connection of advertisements with the whole social context is not included in the set of obligatory professional qualities of the specialist on corporate communication. And we must be concerned about this in our learning process. We must place this conversation about advertising in the context of the discussion of general businesses climate across the world. It is known that in the last third of the 20th century, businesses have become more and more aware of their social responsibility (advertising is only the most visible and teasing factor). The problem of loss of business confidence was understood at the international level. At the World Economic Forum in Davos (Switzerland, 2003), it was put on the agenda: to improve the global economy and restore its credibility (emphasis by me – L.f.). The Forum’s participants had their own initiatives in this regard. The world's richest man and founder of Microsoft Corporation, Bill Gates, announced that he allocated 200mn dollars to the field of health care, and he called Davos representatives - the political and economic elite - to follow suit. There has been increasing awareness of the declaration and in some places concrete steps were made in this direction. But the society in all countries would like to see more concrete evidence on this point: the at-first American, and later global, movement, "Occupy Wall Street"6, clearly showed this and made it visible.

Attitudes towards Advertising There is something that Russians hate more than the oligarchs and coach football team – it is advertising. —Newsweek. April 2005.

172

Chapter Eight

In general, how did the trends noted by us, with frequent counterbalance between corporate interests and interests in society, impact on attitudes of Russians towards advertising? The first poll by VCIOM (our professional poll institute), was interested in attitudes towards advertising in the population in 1991, and observed the feeling of the masses that “mass media give too much attention to advertising”. This is not surprising. My country, which was in the advertising market before making their own laws in the area, was not in a hurry to follow international standards in the field of advertising, or to follow by far the best examples. Subjectively, consumer audiovisual channels of mass communication – radio and television - feel particularly uncomfortable, because here the act of consumption of information is synchronous to its creation. The dependency of the viewer or listener of this is unlike, for example, the reader of a newspaper who regulates the process of consumption of information himself - if he does not like it, he just lays aside the advertising or skips it. It is fair to note that advertising does not perceive easily anywhere. Thus, according to the international survey, “Roper Starch” (1995), world public opinion towards advertising was made up of such judgments: Advertisers exaggerate the benefits of their products for health – such cases were very, very often Advertisers “brainwash” children Do not provide adequate information on the packaging of the goods Create creative entertainment advertising Sponsor deserving events Provide objective information Respect consumers’ intelligence

72% of respondents agree with these judgments; 70%; 60%; 60%; 45%; 38%; 30%.

Americans are wary of advertising, and rightfully so. In a Gallup survey, respondents ranked advertising 24th out of 25 occupations in terms of ethical standards and honesty, one notch below politicians and one notch above car dealers. Another poll found that 81 percent of the American

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

173

public believes that most advertisements are exaggerated, and 52 percent find them “seriously misleading”.7 Nevertheless if we were aiming to list all countries by the degree of people’s irritation with advertising, all countries would be lined up in a definite order, just as they are based on life expectancy, child mortality, the level of purity of drinking water, and so on. Whenever this may be a different sequence but not very significant variations are: as a rule, society, worried about the purity of drinking water, far ahead of other countries in resolving issues relating to infant mortality. I would say definitely: countries with high social and material comfort, where western patterns of consumption exist, are characterized by the fact that the population has money several times greater than they are spending at a physiological level, and are much more condescending towards this phenomenon of our century - advertising. One of the reasons is that consumers need the information to reach a rational decision. Apparently, the fact that tolerance for advertising is more inherent in the West, is explained with a formula that is familiar to us from the writings on philosophy and social criticism of human beings: perceived need radically changes our outlook on life. I found confirmation of this theory with empirical supporting data. The results of the international study research firm “Roper Starch” from 1995 show that the judgment “Advertising is creative, entertaining” is supported by the following numbers of people in different countries. To understand this difference of opinion, it should be said that the socio-psychological background that exists for advertising in Russia is extremely unfavourable to it. Advertising in our minds was, for a long time, a teasing (tantalizing, annoying) label of “non-our” society, “non-our” life. But it became annoying to us even more, when it penetrated into our daily lives as a mistress. Why, in countries with long-standing markets (or recent – but strong markets), is advertising perception calmer? There is an established social system of control for advertising streams, monitoring is done in three ways: legislation, with the help of professional codes of ethics, and by force of public opinion.

Chapter Eight

174

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

North America (75%) Latin America (68%) Western Europe (60%) Central Europe (40%) The country of former USSR (23%) Middle East (66%) Asia (63%)

The judgment “Marketers Give Accurate Information” is supported by the following numbers of people in different countries:

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

175

1. North America (43%) 2. Latin America (49%) 3. Western Europe (30%) 4. Central Europe (23%) 5. The country of former USSR (9%) 6. Middle East (35%) 7. Asia (46%) Much is being done in this direction in Russia. We have already referred to the adoption of two laws on advertising; there is a multilevel system of decision-making in the field of advertising. In general, with great certainty we can say that so far, communication through advertising in our society is a fact. A consumer's interest in it, in other words, the demand for advertising, has formed. One study by the Levada-Center (professional poll centre, one of the most reliable) (22-25 October 2010) was devoted to a number of problems with advertising (survey on a representative sample of 1600 Russians aged 18 years and older in 127 settlements in 44 regions of the country;

176

Chapter Eight

statistical error does not exceed 3.4%). Only 2% of Russians admitted that advertising affects their preferences when choosing products, while 32% rely on their own experience, 24% choose goods of economy class, and 20% valued high quality. Only 5% could be affected via a good slogan or a colourful wrapper. However, up to a quarter of those surveyed still shop under the influence of advertising “quite often” (5%) and “from time to time” (20%). 40% of respondents said that they never make purchases under the influence of advertising; pensioners said so more often (53%), as did poorer citizens (61%). Most of all, the informative component of advertisements are valued: novelty of the market goods was stated about 31% of the time; the market goods consumer properties were mentioned about 26% of the time, and 20% of the respondents are attracting to advertising spots. Meanwhile, 61% of respondents do not trust advertising rollers; among them the majority are pensioners (69%), people with below average income (70%), and poor people (75%). 30% of respondents trust in advertising only “somewhat”. The credibility of advertising was most talked about by well-to-do citizens (13%) and young people up to the age of 24 years (16%). In general in the sample, credibility in advertising was mentioned by 9% of the total number of respondents. What, above all, influences your family for the purchase of different products? high quality low price famous brand advertising own experience recommendations of friends another

20 24 10 2 32 8 4

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

177

How often do you make purchases under the influence of advertising? quite often 5 From time to time 20 very rare 35 never 40 How much do you personally trust advertising? full confidence 1 basically trust 8 partly trust, partly not 30 mostly don't trust 26 just don't trust 35 The Russian advertising has various claims against it, and still has a lot to do. To analyse the causes of such claims, we will group them as follows: 1. The number of advertisements is set by law, but it has massive sources, especially television, making it painful and forcing the audience to avoid it. The tele-viewing monitoring structures (using audiometers) say that during the commercial breaks there is a massive exodus of audiences - to other channels or to other ways of spending time; we also have the situation of declining audiences of long-term TV, consuming movie via disk. 2. Since initially the Russians were dealing with international advertising, adapted to a Russian-language audience, the still-present “non-our life” adverts have contributed to its rejection. Since the professional structures arose to give us information, the presence of the international advertising was predominant. In the top 10 advertisers in 1996, eight were global, not Russian. What does foreign advertising symbolize to us? What level is its quality? Basically, it is a top notch advertising, based on the values common to all mankind: it is a family, love, friendship, children, maternity, a well-groomed fed generation, a cheerful and pleasant pastime. Nevertheless, especially in the 90s, there was a giant gap between the

178

Chapter Eight

quality of life depicted in advertising, and the way of life that characterized the majority of the population. It could not be understood by the population. After 20 years the gap has decreased somewhat, but it is still significant. In addition, iconic and symbolic paraphernalia of communication can be a barrier to the favourable outcome of the communication if advertising shows signs of neglect or ignorance of such attributes. There is a difference in mentality, and sociologists and culturologists know it quite well. It was not a collision between two literary scenarios: we are dealing with a real clash - at least, a mismatch - of different value systems. In the case of intercultural communication, different models of relations prevailing in a given society are communicated. Here is an example of the difference of value meanings and symbols it has complicated the life of the company “Nike” in China very strongly. The company even had to apologize to the Chinese people for the advertising of sports footwear. In animation reel, American basketball star Lebron Jr. is battling with the master of Kung-Fu and defeats him. Two cute Chinese girls in national dress and two dragons are looking at this picture. The company had time to screen the reel to the provincial TV channels. But thunder broke when the advertising went out on a state sports channel from China. Censors of the state administration of radio, film and television saw the video as disrespectful for the Chinese nation and as blasphemous — dragons are sacred images for China - and the video called "Lebron is in room fear" was banned from the show. This does not mean that the mass consciousness had been triggered in the same way as the formal authority, but the fact is very symptomatic. We can understand the advertising producers who want to adapt foreign language text using another country's folklore. It is clear that the best form of this – as an aphorism, slogan - suit, for example, Russian proverbs and sayings. But if it distorts the true meaning of proverbs or sayings, one can hardly speak of winning points for communication, rather the reverse. In this case, however, repetition of advertising - and this is the practice of advertising over time –negative emotions of native speakers are repeatedly printed. Sometimes in advertising there is nothing from the original meaning of proverbs. I have very many examples of this kind, but it is very difficult to enter into the analysis of sayings: they are translated with difficulty. There is no national culture through its elite media, and

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

179

professional consciousness will not remain indifferent to such a fact. Because the value of national culture is genetically a much more ancient layer than advertising, the national culture will resist to the last. However, the development of international advertising is closely linked to the deeper processes of intercultural integration. The global market, violating national boundaries, demands informational provision. Awareness of the problems, emerging here, must be part of the professional baggage of the specialists of advertising. The place of the advertising communication in these processes must be realized in the intercultural communication between different countries. The powerful processes that make up the individual experience of an individual by communicating with the “other”, in addition to advertising, take place in different channels. This is the practice of multinational companies, and mass media, and those international informational processes such as cinema and book altering, global TV-net, practice of closed-circuit television programming using finished products from other countries (newscasts, documentaries and feature films), and the internet. We have global informatization and the individual’s involvement in the world communications system. The role of advertising in these processes is vast. It partly addresses the lack of information on the social life of people of other countries, private life, about the relations between human beings, models of behaviour, attitudes, tastes and habits, lifestyle in general, the lack of information on which is marked by those interviewed during the sociological case studies. The notion of human unity arises only as a result of the awareness of different countries and different life. It is through this unity that the next step to overcome prejudices against another, the step towards each other, can appear. This is information for reflection and for professionals in the field of advertising, but not only them. The existence of a “foreign”, “import” advertising in the information space of another country is today a worldwide problem. The market has all the features of a cosmopolitan one now, and advertising information is only its shell. And the problems around here are very similar. I would like to refer now to the term “soft power” included in modern scientific work by J. H. Nye.8 He developed the concept of the effect on other countries of the preferences system formed by culture, especially massive, ideology, and overall socio-humanitarian component. Nye talked

180

Chapter Eight

about “hard power” (economic and military power) serving as a means of coercion and “soft power” or “flexible force”, showing that an action of a State to the outside world with the tools of “soft power” may be no less than, if not greater than, that reached by the military or economic means. Under “soft power” Nye took the ability to convince others “to wish for the same that you want”. For example, Lebedeva and For J., building on the concept of “soft power”, referred to the training of national staff in other countries as “soft power” for the Soviet Union and Russia. Now, the share of Russia in the international market of educational services has been significantly reduced. And the international market of educational services becomes an increasingly important arena of competition between countries. There is growing hostility in the area of intercultural and international relations because of the growth of terrorism in the world. This situation can lead to increased opposition to the population of different countries due to the image of “another”. Advertising will feel the effects itself, although it would only be the surface layer of the deeper causes. I suggest that one should listen to different views and choose the sound one to follow, see different things and keep them in mind. Knowledge obtained in this way is reliable, though not as good as innate knowledge. —Confucius // // Analects of Confucius. Published by Sinolingua, China. 1994. P.120

Historical retrospective and the first steps of the Russian society on ways to modernize say that interpenetration takes place, but in any case the behaviour will only result in value changes. Variability of models is great, and advertising contributes to their diversity. There is a good selection from which to choose and try. The right to choose is a major achievement, which Russia has approached at the beginning of the new century. Who we shall be, depends not only on advertising, but also comes from advertising too.

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

181

Advertising Problems A critical approach to problems confronting modern advertising shows some that are very sharp. They reduce the confidence of the public in general advertising; they are forced to evaluate advertising as false, misleading. What are the areas? We list only a few. We will begin this part with a focus on health problems. According to the Russian Medical Association, in industrialized, developed countries, 10-20% of the population suffers from non-quality medicines; in developing countries is 30-40%. In the United States each year about 200 thousand people die from the side effects of medicines. These dreadful figures in many cases are the result of unscrupulous advertising. Medics, running into advertising of products for medical appointments, medical equipment, methods of treatment, prevention, diagnosis, rehabilitation services, cause alarm: in many cases the law on advertising is breached, ethics are defied, and there is even just a lack of common sense. There is a need to expand the list of goods whose advertising should be strictly regulated; drugs, medications, prevention tools would appear in advertising only when specified registration number drug use. Specific requirements for advertising BAD – biologically active additives. This was the problem last time. A frequent scenario in advertising copy was that by using BAD you could cure all diseases, using them promises you health comfort, and they would be much more efficient and safer than traditional tablets. Concern about the advertising of medicines has reached such a level that the health ministers of the European Union specifically discussed this issue and reached a consensus on the advertising of medicinal products by the media. It should be noted that similar processes are happening in different countries. China, for example, began to improve the legislation on advertising of medicinal products. To the Chinese National People's Congress, a draft amendment to the law on medicines was presented. The amendment is a provision prohibiting the advertising of prescription drugs in the media. Their advertising will soon be allowed to be posted only in specialized (medical and pharmaceutical) editions.

182

Chapter Eight

These problems have been at the forefront of public attention, and are the subject of public debate. And this is no accident - the negative effects of such advertising are most dangerous; it sometimes really threatens public health. But the emergence of such problems in the focus of society is a sign of its mental health. And this pledge shows that such advertising will become part of the social phenomena, actively managed by the society. In Russia, advertising of medicines is also regulated by the State. Thus, in recent years, advertising medicines by “people in white coats” were not permitted to not make the advertising better; recently, each advertising message ends with information stating the need to consult further with specialists. It is noteworthy that modern society has a problem connected with health once more. The problem of obesity is now recognized as universal. And experts note that it all starts with advertising on television. “Couch potato” Syndrome is suffering as a result of looking at the TV, eating potato crisps. Children were taught to eat while viewing television programmers. Cinema helped - the habit to crunch popcorn came from there: cinema occurred before television. The Syndrome came to acquire new forms, while the role of snacks gave us chips, coke, chocolate, “džank” (products with much sugar and salt, without useful things). Health officials and public health scholars began to present the health risk that is associates with “džank”. To combat this in England, for example, social advertising on the streets of British cities represented the image of hamburger-filled cartilages and bones. Their aim is to discourage children, thus forcing them to abandon their beloved, but unhealthy food. Major producers of food and beverages have gradually reduced its advertisements of products that promote obesity. The legislation of many countries prescribes the standards for advertising, which in one way or another is addressed to children in connection with the problem of nutrition. But it is clear that this is a case where self-regulation can play a special role of promotional activities. Thus, the Russian offices of six transnational corporations have voluntarily refused to advertise their products in television programs where children under 12 years are not less than half of their audience in the press and on the Internet. They are

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

183

Burger King, DANONE, Ferrero, Nestle, Mars Inc., Unilever, and others. Coca-Cola Co., Kellogg's, Kraft Foods, and PepsiCo. promised to sign the document. But in general the Russian press reports say regarding the problem that not enough is being done.

Right on the Image At present, there has been an increase in the number of violations of the right to an image in advertising. In Russian newspaper “News” (“Izvestia”) we can read: “unscrupulous traders are increasingly using famous Russian symbols in advertising. The most that they risk for it, is a small fine”. The flyers of the store in the town of Nijniy Novgorod displayed “Mother of country is …” (a famous poster of times of great patriotic war “The motherland is calling to fight against the enemy” - LF) calling on people to rally car. The regional department of Federal Anti-monopoly Service (FAS) has brought a case against the advertiser on the grounds of violation of the Advertising Law “that is not to allow the use of insulting words, obscene images, comparisons and expressions, including with regard to cultural objects of national legacy”. The newspaper “News” (“Izvestia”) in its ad campaign, subscriptions in the spring and summer of 2003, were published from the room where there have been famous collage writers of the past (Gogol for example) and public figures, and they kept a number of newspapers so that the name of the newspaper was seen clearly enough. I do not know how the descendants of Gogol would respond, but the descendants of Winston Churchill, who had also been “involved” in this “famous persons” parade, might feel offended. Incidentally, we read in the newspaper that the British airline EasyJet may pay dearly for the photo they used of Manchester United footballer David Beckham for advertising purposes without his knowledge. According to the British “Independent”, the airline placed Beckham’s photo in one of its promotional posters, and did so without the player's consent. Beckham did not leave the incidents without attention and suggested that the airline donate 25 thousand dollars to a children's charity. Already in the year 2011, in May, before the Day of the Town of Saint Petersburg, some posters had appeared in the streets with congratulations to the citizens from the party “United Russia”. The posters had the pictures

184

Chapter Eight

of famous people of Russia: a poet A. Pushkin, a culturologist D. Likhachev, an actor K. Lavrov, a poet I. Brodsky, etc. This caused such strong opposition in society that “United Russia” hastily dismantled the outdoor advertising. Mèlor Sturua, a freelance writer now residing in the United States, noted in the newspaper “News” (“Izvestia”) another curious link of law and advertising. The publication is titled “American Mayhem. Advertising appeals to defy the laws”. Sturua generates a concrete example with advertising couturier C. Klein, the designer jeans. Models were shot in a deliberately unprofessional manner, in the style of porn magazines of the 70s (retro-sex), and were demonstrating the jeans in soft porn poses. Klein has always been at the forefront of the pale, so to speak, the limits of mayhem. But this time, it was generally felt that Klein stepped over the line. In its advertising, they saw visible reasons for child pornography, children of “sex-exploitation”: this was the case for almost all models - no adults or teenagers. Against Klein and his advertising, a powerful coalition was created of the American Family Association, Catholic League and authorities for social security to protect children. They were supported by the press and academic sociologists. Klein withdrew advertising. The scandal of using porn-style advertising for Klein jeans is not an exception, although it is the most loud. The call to violate the rules becomes the rule in advertising in America. The author cites such examples as: “Do as you wish!”— advertising sports products of Group giant “Nike”; “Sometimes you have to strengthen rules!” advertising of the restaurant chain “Burger King”; “If you have a passion for life, there is no taboo. You can violate all the rules!” — advertising of jewellery firm “Best” and alcoholic drink “Don Q”; “Relax, there are no rules of action!”— advertising of the most expensive shops in the United States of “Markus Nimèn”; “When sleeping on our mate races, no rules were welcomed!” - advertising productivity of bedding products in the “Dáil-Hey-Mattres”. This is a very dangerous phenomenon. The law and the set of rules of society more and more come to clash with business. Journalist John Leo warns: “Drumbeat of advertising, appealing to violate rules, is destructive. Our business culture and advertising industry are in a state of war with traditional social values”. Such examples exist in Russian advertising too.

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

185

The Phenomenon of Spam as a New Legal Issue In the late twentieth and early twenty-first century in the field of distribution of advertising the new problem of "century" appears – dominance of spam mail: unsolicited advertising, mailed to users on the Internet (from the word "spam", being a common noun for the image of a situation when someone tries to fill all space with something). In the most computer advanced countries, computer laws against spam are already appearing: a number of European countries and some States of the United States of America have enacted laws providing liability to pay compensation for spammers for sending messages not requested by addressees, without the need to have a document confirming moral or financial harm. In other words, the proliferation of spam itself was outlawed there. The problem relates to Russian users online too: they also state that they want no advertisements. So, distribution of spam violates citizens' right of information. Recipients of spam are forced to spend time reading at least primary parts of their unsolicited messages and removing them. In some cases the proportion of spam in electronic mailboxes can reach several dozen percent. In Russia, the first legislative initiatives have been proposed. A National strategic coalition against spam (2003) was created, to which seven computer companies in Russian entered. The purpose of the Coalition is the development of legal and technological solutions to fight spam, legal prosecution for spammers, and educational work. Specialists insist on acceptance and, above all, consistent application of legislative (legal) measures in the fight against spam. These measures must be complex and not confined to legal sanctions and bans. In the meantime, there is not legislation enabling a spammer to be brought to justice. In recent times, the number of spam has increased by almost three times, which is dangerous for your computer. Advertisements often contain a virus, which help the fraudsters to steal personal information, bank account information and passwords. Such data are given in the press: “The problem of spam in the European Union has been rampant. Out of a total volume of electronic mail, waste mail is from 50 to 80%, described in the report of the European Union. EU Commissioner for media information

186

Chapter Eight

V. Reding called on participating countries to take more stringent measures to combat this phenomenon, as well as Internet security in general. Thus, fines against spammers in the Netherlands enabled a reduction in the level of unrequested correspondence by 85%. Most of the spam in the European Union comes from the USA — 21.6%. The second highest quantity is from China - 13.4%, and third is France - 6.3%”. Recently, this spam technique has been applied to the mobile network: advertising through SMS-messages. Fighting SMS-spam is just beginning. The Japanese were the first who showed concern about it, having the highest SMS popularity. The problem of mobile-spam in America is even sharper. US analysts even claim that the problem of SMS-spam could jeopardize the mobile communications industry system itself. At this time in Russia there is no legislation limiting the negotiable electronic mailings. So far, only every fifth owner of a mobile phone in Russia has a problem with SMS-spam. But analysts suggest that soon unrequested advertising will affect all. And another kind of spam, telephone (fixed line) spam appeared. This “service” is gaining momentum. As lawyers have said, to fight with such a form is practically impossible. In May 2011, the deputies of the State Duma, our parliament, prepared a bill providing for criminal prosecution of spammers. In the document, in addition to the spam business email, there also fall messages on social networks and SMS spam. The document defines the penalties for spam. We are discussing here something in addition to those situations when a news channel is the only a means to advertise its announcement at a certain time or in a certain space. Of course, there are additional facilities, where advertisers use mass media for lobbying their interest. This is a more complex situation. Actually, the legislation of all countries specifically stipulates the conditions under which advertising is allowed. Thus, the recommendations of the British legislation specifically provide that real advertising should be demonstrated as pure advertising; it should be clearly designated as being distinguished, another, otherwise, not related to the drafting of the information channel. Anyway, Western journalism created hybrid forms that lie between advertising and editorial material, which became known in the literature as editorializing (editorial matter + advertising).

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

187

For advertisers it is important. You can, of course, apply to newspapers, which all consist of advertising. But mass newspapers (and mass media in general) could not consist of a single advertisement. People subscribe or buy a newspaper not only (and not so much because of this) because of advertising. The interest of advertisers is to get their advertising in mass sources of information, because this significantly increases the chance of catching the eye of consumers (to be heard, be seen) – and this is the initial threshold (original zero) stage for all other stages, the impact of advertising on consumer. Hidden advertising is dangerous in some circumstances. What do they want in return? This is the main question among many other questions (almost Hamlet’s question). In the case of hidden advertising, the advertised product is supported by the authority, and the credibility of audience in relation to the sources of information, formed by contact of the audience with those sources. The article is signed in the name of a journalist who previously wrote about the difficulties of our economy, about the complexities of the transition period, and about problems with the upbringing of the younger generation. And today he wants to talk with you about the merits of imported brands of tea. This is where the complexity starts. This is the first question. Secondly, it is not without reason that this is called hidden advertising: it is only positive information, knowingly one-way information, on character relationships and lighting. We must know exactly that advertising is. This is a starting point for our relationship: advertising can exaggerate something, promise Golden mountains – but we understand that this is its functional responsibility: praise a product or service to sell. The reverse situation, when we do not know that it is advertising (but the advertiser, and the distributor knows it perfectly well), is - whatever people might say - a banal fraud and prohibited by law. And the Russian press, in the short years of market relations, which we live by today, has a solid experience in the discussion of this issue. Here is an example. In October, 2010, “Radio Russia” gave a review of printed media. This was a brief overview of newspapers that came out that morning. Time was short, and there were many newspapers. And what does the leading speaker select? He has a long and profound talk about the

188

Chapter Eight

benefits of oranges: They have more vitamins than lemons and some of the other citrus fruit, to say nothing about kiwi! It is a charming thing only! Everything is clear! Such fruits have little demand and need to be saved. These are such duties that journalists/professionals working on the main radio channel, consider acceptable. Moot point, I agree. But the same commenter, giving a morning press review March 25, 2011, talks long about the problem of beriberi, and the benefits of vitamins. More complicated cases are not easy to track. The practice of the press in countries with a developed market shows that is not uncommon, when the “partner” relationships have place between advertisers and editors, when the advertiser undertakes to become a regular buyer of newspaper ad space (and it could be very well establish clients!) if the Editorial Office has refrained from any criticism of the (natural or legal) person. But it erodes the basic functions of journalism! Normally, in a society which sets forth prohibitions against advertising, legislation operates in real time and it forces advertisers to take note of them before, rather than after. Selected examples for discussion reflect the essence of the change occurring in Russian society. The discussion showed that a large role belongs not only to the decisions of the law, but corporate initiatives too, which are sometimes a more powerful lever for change. This is an illustration of the idea that corporate interests often depend on the behaviour of the masses (as in the case of commercial and political advertising and the aims of the structures of public relations). The “calculation” of social context (namely the attitudes and behaviour of large segments of the population) not only is important socially, but is also cost-effective. Advertising and public relations activities by definition cannot exist in confrontation with public opinion. Global businesses, and, in general, democracy, came to this idea across the centuries. The Russian experts are in a beneficial situation - they may take account of the world’s experience. The Russian advertising market has only existed for about twenty years, but during this time it became one of the fastest growing markets in the world, and already entered the top ten of world leaders by volume and has become one of the most comprehensive in Europe. In addition, it should be noted that the share of advertising in the country's National gross product is already greater than one percent; this is higher than the world average.

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

189

There are three factors that determine market growth: political stabilization of society, resulting in increased investment, including in advertising (first); growth in purchasing power of the population (second); renewal of the competition in the consumer markets (third). We must add active promotion of brands to local, regional markets, and appearance of new advertisers. And to the extent that these factors will remain “in force”, the advertising market will grow. The most expensive and high-capacity industry in the advertising market, TV ads, in addition to outdoor advertising, has boosted the market since the beginning of the nineties and has held a leading position for over 20 years. The amount of advertising on TV has grown and ended up in second place after the Internet on dynamics of growth. Experts find many explanations for this phenomenon. One of them is that opportunities can more accurately target an audience thanks to the arrival of niche channels. Advertisers can advertise on just some channels at a time. This allows them to reach the maximum number of inhabitants of the country. TV ads are especially effective with the release of new products. In addition, it allows enough time to submit the goods to a wide audience. Small businesses and companies that are concentrated in the regions of Russia cannot afford such a thing, as this is a fairly substantial contribution from their budget. But in order to cover the lack of TV advertising they post promotional information on regional TV channels. Obviously, during the crisis only the really big advertisers have continued to use this niche, whereas, owing to high prices, weak segmentation, and disadvantages of advertising budgets, smaller manufacturers have decided to use another media, increasingly the internet. Now the market of TV advertising still leads.

190

Chapter Eight

Ad Expenditure Trends (in bn) and Dynamics of Growth: Radio

After steady growth in 2009, the market dropped to 6.5 billion roubles. But in 2010 the market grew by 8% and amounted to 6.9 billion roubles. Ad Expenditure Trends (in bn) and Dynamics of Growth: Print press

Of course, the year 2009, after the crisis in 2008, turned out to be one of the most difficult in the history of Russian industry publications: revenues from advertising fell by 44%. But, despite all the difficult circumstances, the leading players of the market retained business. We see a search for new business models.

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

191

Today it is already possible to speak of the improvement of the situation on the market. This confirms the fact of stabilization of draws. Total print runs of Russian press today reaches more than 5 billion copies, and this is about 40 copies per adult resident of Russia per year. In addition, the audience indicators of TNS for 2005-2010, show the preservation of the print mass media audience. Thus, the industry of print media in Russia remains one of the key media players - it has more than 16% of the mass media advertising market. The print mass media maintain their profitability and investment attractiveness. It is daily newspapers who recovered quickly after the crisis. Ad Expenditure Trends (in bn) and Dynamics of Growth: Newspapers

Ad Expenditure Trends (in bn) and Dynamics of Growth: Magazines

192

Chapter Eight

Ad Expenditure Trends (in bn) and Dynamics of Growth: Ads Publication

Ad Expenditure Trends (in bn) and Dynamics of Growth: Outdoor Ads

The market of outdoor advertising, after falling during the crisis of 2008, in 2010 recovered. The growth in 2010 (along with the factor of some economic recovery) was linked to the content – more than 60% of space is for the advertising of tobacco products, which is prohibited on TV, and advertising of mobile communication, which is constantly updated, stimulating consumers to buy new tariffs, and these segments create a very heavy competition.

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

193

Ad Expenditure Trends (in bn) and Dynamics of Growth: Internet Ads

A steady pace of market growth of Internet ads is connected with a) small cost, b) ability to track results of advertising campaign, c) its skill in satisfying the needs of target customers and, d) with viral and guerrilla marketing technologies. Internet users increase in number, communication technologies are evolving, and more and more advertisers are drowning in the crisis period in particular. They are interested in particular in contextual advertising with its opportunity to find thier target audience. The internet is the only segment of the advertising market in Russia which in the crisis period did not fall but continued to grow (although the growth rate has slowed down dramatically). Apparently, it “withdrew” advertisers (small and medium in particular) from the other segments. After reviewing the data, we see the next picture: the stable growth in the advertising market in Russia was badly hurt during the economic crisis, 2008, but almost recovered in 2010. The most prospective and fast-growing market, that of Internet ads, was the only segment, which even in the year of crisis, 2008, had continued growth (data of ZenithOptimedia – source: the magazine “Outdoor” / in Russian “Narujka”, 2011, ɫ.6):

194

Chapter Eight

Table 4 Ad Expenditure mn roubles TV Radio Print press (newspapers, magazines, ads publications) Outdoor Internet Others TOTAL

2009 96 400 9 253 35 600

2010 110 800 10 300 38 000

2011* 133 113 11 536 41 040

25 200 16 200 2 200 184 853

29 700 22 600 3 100 214 500

36 234 34 352 3 720 259 995

The Perspectives The analysis shows that after 2008’s economic crisis, when we had a small flop in advertising budgets, the advertising market has now demonstrated growth in all media. If there is not a second wave of economic crisis (and some economist predict it), the trend will continue, but there may be changes between media types. The share of print press and radio will decline. The IT revolution has been changing the media situation across the world and in our country too. The market of professional specialties will be growing by ascending order of the role of elective technologies in the political life of our country. There is a trend, and it will only increase, by shifting brand promotion to the regions. There may be a very interesting transformation connected with the intention of powers to consolidate administrative parts in the country. Such a thing speaks about the principal point of advertised product – as a rule they will be products of mass demand. The television is going to play a tremendous role in the lives of many people in our country. The sociological analysis showed that the role of TV is the same – it is a very “mass” channel But returning to the start of our discussion, the advertising system must protect the consumers’ rights and interests: to make advertisements more creative and to enlarge their social responsibility. This means raising the social responsibility of those who produce advertising. And this is the task for teachers of such activities; it is our task.

Social Transformation and Citizen Participation

195

Don't worry about being misunderstood but about understanding others. —Confucius // Analects of Confucius. Published by Sinolingua, China. 1994. P. 11.

Notes 1

Dominik Kola, “Political Sociology”, Moscow, All the World, (2001). (Ⱦɨɦɢɧɢɤ Ʉɨɥɚ.“ɉɨɥɢɬɢɱɟɫɤɚɹ Cɨɰɢɨɥɨɝɢɹ”, Ɇɨɫɤɜɚ ,ȼɟɫɶ Ɇɢɪ, 2001.) 2 There are many definitions of the notion “culture”. As one American author said, “it is not because people fail to acquire its “true” meaning but because it has so many overlapping and contradictory meanings of culture”. See: Culture and Cognition: Rules, Maps, and Plans. Ed. by J.Spradley. An Intext Publisher (1972): 6. 3 Civil society — the system independent from the state public institutes and relations, which provides conditions for self-realization of separate individuals and groups, for realization of private interest and necessities, for participation of society in elaborating (working out) the strategy and tactics of social development. 4 Parsons T. is a famous functioning structuralist, whose ideas bring a big contribution to the world sociology of XX century. See: Talcott Parsons, “The Social System”, Glencoe, Free Press (1951): 36-37. 5 So named “Guerrilla Marketing” – Jay Levinson (American marketer, creator of the image of “Mallboro’s cowboy”) thought up in 1983 (this is “shock”, “apatage”, “life placement” marketing). 6 The action of civil protest in New York and other American cities, starting from September 17, 2011. 7 Philip Patterson Ph. and Lee Wilkins, “Media Ethics”, Brown and Benchmark (1994): 55. 8 Joseph Nye, “The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone”, Oxford University Press (2002): 8.Also see “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics”, New York, Public Affairs Group (2004).