Russia in Central Asia: Policy, Security and Economics : Policy, Security and Economics [1 ed.] 9781608767939, 9781606928806

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Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Russia in Central Asia: Policy, Security and Economics : Policy, Security and Economics, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated,

Copyright © 2009. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Russia in Central Asia: Policy, Security and Economics : Policy, Security and Economics, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated,

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RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA: POLICY, SECURITY AND ECONOMICS

No part of this digital document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means. The publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this digital document, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information Russia in Central Asia: Policy,This Security and Economics Policy, andclear Economics, Nova Science contained herein. digital document: is soldSecurity with the understanding thatPublishers, the publisher is not engaged in

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RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA: POLICY, SECURITY AND ECONOMICS

VLADIMIR PARAMONOV ALEKSEY STROKOV AND

OLEG STOLPOVSKI TRANSLATED BY MERVYN BROWN

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

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Copyright © 2009 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers’ use of, or reliance upon, this material.

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Paramonov, Vladimir. Russia in Central Asia : policy, security, and economics / Vladimir Paramonov, Aleksey Strokov, and Oleg Stolpovski. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. HISBN H%RRN 1. Russia (Federation)--Relations--Asia, Central. 2. Asia, Central--Relations--Russia (Federation) I. Strokov, Aleksey. II. Stolpovski, Oleg. III. Title. DK857.75.R8P38 2009 303.48'247058--dc22 2009010238

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.  New York

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CONTENTS List of Acronyms

vii

List of Tables

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

Introduction

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Policy Security Economic

xiii xiv xv xvii

Chapter 1

Russian Foreign Policy in Central Asia First Stage (1992-1995) Second Stage (1996-1999) Third Stage (2000 to the Present Day)

1 1 10 17

Chapter 2

Russian Security Relations with Central Asia Multilateral Cooperation Bilateral Cooperation

27 27 40

Chapter 3

Russian Economic Relations with Central Asia Present State of Trade Links Main Problems in Economic Relations Main Recommendations and Possible Prospects: Theory and Practice

69 70 78

Conclusions

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83 87

vi Annex

Contents Bilateral Trade of Russia with Central Asian States Russia Kazakhstan Russia Kyrgyzstan Russia Uzbekistan Russia Turkmenistan Russia Tajikistan

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Index

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95 95 97 100 102 104 107

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LIST OF ACRONYMS ATC BTC CACO CIS CPC CSTO CST EurAsEC GUAM GUUAM ICMEC FSB NATO OSCE RSFSR SCO TAPOiCh USSR UES WTO

Anti-terrorist Centre (of the CIS) "Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan" oil pipeline Central Asian Cooperation Organisation Commonwealth of Independent States Caspian Pipeline Consortium Collective Security Treaty Organisation Collective Security Treaty Eurasian Economic Community Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldavia Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldavia Intergovernmental committee for military and economic cooperation (of the EurAsEC) Federal Security Service (of the Russian Federation) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Tashkent Chkalov Aircraft Plant (Uzbekistan) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Unified Economic Space World Trade Organisation

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LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Table 2. Table 3. Table 4. Table 5. Table 6. Table 7. Table 8. Table 9. Table 10. Table 11. Table 12. Table 13. Table 14. Table 15.

Trade between Russia and Central Asia, 1991-1995 Trade between Russia and Central Asia, 1996-1999 Trade between Russia and Central Asia, 2000-2008 Trade between Russia and Central Asia, 1991-2008 Trade between Russia and Central Asian states, 2007-2008 Trade between Russia and Kazakhstan, 1991-2008 The structure of the trade between Russia and Kazakhstan, 2007 Trade between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, 1992-2008 The structure of the trade between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, 2007 Trade between Russia and Uzbekistan, 1992-2008 The structure of the trade between Russia and Uzbekistan, 2007 Trade between Russia and Turkmenistan, 1997-2008 The structure of the trade between Russia and Turkmenistan, 2007 Trade between Russia and Tajikistan, 1991-2008 The structure of the trade between Russia and Tajikistan, 2007

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am very thankful to God and also to my parents and teachers, as well as to my friends and partners – Mr Bakhtiyor Ziyamov, Dr Aleksey Strokov and Mr Oleg Stolpovski, who’s help and support in writing this book were most important. I am grateful to UK Academy of Defense, Advanced Research and Assessment Group and personally to Ms Anne Aldis, Ms Hannah Sanderson and Mr Mervyn Brown for several years of cooperation in the area of publication of the research papers on the topic that finally gave me and my partners the opportunity to write this book. My special thanks to our new publisher, Nova Science, and its President and Editor-in-Chief Dr Frank Columbus as well as to Dr Alexei Voskressenski, who recommend me to start work with Nova Science Publishers, Inc. I dedicate this book to the old and new generations of analysts, experts and policy-makers from Russia and Central Asian states who able to understand the genuine of common and long-term interests of the mentioned countries, and therefore do everything best for better life of common peoples of the post-Soviet space.

Vladimir Paramonov Tashkent, Uzbekistan. April 2009

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INTRODUCTION Times occur in the history of any country at which life itself forces it to make the decision to undertake a thorough review of its strategy. This usually happens when the old strategy has run its course or has proved to be deeply flawed. We believe that Russia today is at such a point. The main reason for this is the ever more obvious crisis in the Russian foreign strategy. The foundations of this strategy were laid immediately after the disintegration of the USSR, when the Yeltsin's Russia started rapidly to shed the “burden” of the post-soviet republics. In many ways that’s why the period in Russian history which began with the disintegration of the Soviet Union will no doubt one day be described as a "Time of Troubles", like the one at the beginning of the 17th century, when the whole system of state power in Russia collapsed and Moscow's position in the world became much weaker. Today Putin’s and Medvev’s Russia is once again having trouble finding its place in a rapidly-changing world. The analysis of the steps being taken by Russia in the Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan)1 in the areas of policy, security and economic is one of the best illustration of these.

1

"Central Asia" is taken to mean the area in central Eurasia comprising five states – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – that emerged as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. This definition is somewhat provisional, as there are some geographical peculiarities as well as demographic and other complications in the region. On the other hand, it is a useful label to cover five countries with similar socio-political systems and economies which retain close links with each other and have a great influence on each other in internal and external affairs, in economics, politics, and of course in matters of security.

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POLICY During the post-Soviet period, Russian policy in Central Asia has undergone several changes, ranging from total indifference to the countries of the region, in the early 1990s, to the present-day level of cooperation with them, particularly in institutions and in the oil and gas sectors. Nevertheless the impression remains that Russia has still not been able arrive at a coherent strategy towards Central Asia, where the role of the region in the scheme of Russia's national interests is clearly defined. At the beginning of the 1990s, Moscow regarded Central Asia as a sort of appendix, without which the process of reforming the Russian economy and aligning Russia with Western economic and military-political systems would proceed more easily and quickly. The policy at this stage was to free Russia from "the burden of the national republics". The indifferent attitude of the pro-Western Yeltsin government towards Central Asia was one of the main reasons why the states of the region began to lose faith in Russia and its policies and to make increasingly obvious attempts to re-align their international connections. From the mid 1990s, however, there were ever-increasing signs that Russia was trying to develop a fundamentally new foreign policy. The importance of the region in Russia's national priorities increased considerably when "multipolarity" became the main plank of Russian foreign policy in 1996. Russia planned to strengthen its position as a Eurasian great power in Central Asia mainly by improving cooperation in the defence and security sectors, and also by exploiting its monopoly in the transport sphere, particularly for the transit of Central Asian energy products to external markets. But the inconsistencies and contradictions in Russian policy actually exacerbated the lack of trust in Russia in the republics of the region. By 2000, when Yeltsin relinquished the presidency, the only tangible results of Russian policy in Central Asia were political support for the Russian military presence in Tajikistan, some cooperation with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in the export of hydrocarbons and various declarations about the need to develop closer cooperation. After the accession to power of Putin and his team in 2000 Moscow's foreign policy began to be more clearly focussed. The multiple declarations began to be matched by action for the first time. Yet the results of Russian foreign policy in Central Asia have not yet been an unambiguous success. On the one hand, Russia has succeeded in putting the brakes on the centrifugal tendencies of the region, in strengthening its own position and in overcoming the lack of trust. Clearly Moscow has now brought to its Central

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Asian policy more flexibility, pragmatism, stability and consistency. This has been made possible largely by its growing understanding of the strategic importance of the area and by the allocation of more funds for foreign policy purposes. On the other hand, Russia has still not been able to fill the geopolitical vacuum in the area, still less the geo-economic one. The impression is growing that it still understands the "strategic importance" of the region mainly in terms of its own revival as a "great power" and its desire to secure its own energy interests.

SECURITY Russia has gradually become more aware of the importance of Central Asia to its own security, and now has an interest not only in preserving the buffer status of the region but also in not allowing other states to strengthen their position there. To achieve these strategic objectives it has been necessary to push for cooperation in security matters through bilateral and multilateral arrangements.

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Multilateral Cooperation Multilateral cooperation is seen primarily within the framework of such organisations as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The most important of these institutions in the context of Central Asian security appear to be the CSTO and the SCO. The main value of the CSTO for Russia and the post-Soviet countries is that for now it is the only institution which has a specifically military dimension. The steps being taken by Russia to strengthen the CSTO and to convert it into a military and political block are consistent with the Kremlin's policy for the postSoviet space, the main aim of which is to increase Russia's influence. Also evident are Russia's efforts to add a military-political dimension to the SCO. It would be to Russia's advantage to strengthen its security position in Central Asia further by involving the military resources of China and the other members and observer countries of this organisation. It can be assumed that Russia will continue to push for cooperation within the framework of these two organisations. The SCO is seen by Russia as the most convenient vehicle for establishing a security partnership which involves Beijing but not Washington.

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It must be said, however, that multilateral cooperation has not yet borne much fruit, and that the prospects for future cooperation are far from clear. This is mainly due to conflicts of interests between the individual countries concerned. It is essential for the interests of both Russia and Central Asia to build up mutual trust. The accent at present on political grandstanding and short-term cooperation projects, such as demonstration exercises, reflects the fact that it is easier to state lofty aims than to cooperate in practice. Multilateral cooperation has so far amounted to a relatively cheap and effective means for Russia to project its geopolitical influence. The development of full, genuine economic links is highly problematical for Russia. From today's perspective the most promising way ahead seems to be to develop bilateral security cooperation between Russia and each of its Central Asian opposite numbers, giving both sides more room for manoeuvre in protecting their national interests.

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Bilateral Cooperation Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the development of new approaches by Russia to bilateral security / defence cooperation with Central Asian countries has been rather slow and tortuous. In the 1990s, although relationships between Russia and each state of the region were supposed to be on the basis of partnerships, there was not much military cooperation between them, mainly because of political and economic factors within Russia itself. The Central Asian countries attracted the interest of a number of other military powers, especially the USA, the NATO countries and China. This in turn weakened Russia's position in the region, and its military presence there reduced considerably. By the mid-1990s, however, it had become clear that if Russia attempted to disengage from the region, this would only encourage trends there which would not be in Russia's interests. In the worst case, serious instabilities could lead to the fall of the existing secular regimes and to international conflicts directly threatening Russia's interests. In the late 1990s there were some signs of a revival of Russia's interest in the region, and Russia's approach became more consistent and coherent. This was largely due to the following factors: the deteriorating military and political situation on the southern borders of the CIS, notably in Afghanistan; a rapid growth in activity by Islamist organisations, stirred up from Afghanistan, and

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including armed incursions in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan; and the strengthening position in the region of foreign powers, especially the USA and NATO countries. When a new generation of politicians came in the Kremlin, headed by Vladimir Putin, it became possible for Russia to embark on a revival of cooperation. That is was done on the basis of strengthening bilateral military ties was characteristic of his team. The present defence relationships between Russia and the individual countries of Central Asia are generally characterised by mutual trust. This avoids the international squabbles and ambitions which come to the fore in more multilateral contexts. Furthermore, bilateral cooperation includes more specific and practical forms of interaction.

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ECONOMIC Following the disintegration of the single economic space of the Soviet Union, the non-competitiveness of the Russian and Central Asian economies was starkly revealed. This was particularly apparent in the state of their trade links. Economic cooperation between Russia and the countries of Central Asia is hampered today by the absence of decisive, coordinated actions in the fields of industrial production and transport communications. To achieve competitiveness on the global market, Russia and the countries of Central Asia need to bring the idea of a single economic space to fruition, not only by political declarations but by real action in terms of cooperation in various sectors of the economy. There are, however, many obstacles to progress in this area. One of the main obstacles is the haste with which Russia and some of the Central Asian countries are trying to join the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This could kill off industrial integration between Russia and Central Asia even before it is born. Another obstacle is the complicated geopolitical situation in / around Central Asia. These factors make it difficult to tap the potential of integration in transport communications in central Eurasia – between Russia, the Central Asian republics and other countries. In general in the post-Soviet period a fairly strong legal basis has been established between Russia and the countries of Central Asia, regulating nearly all aspects of their relationships. The practical realisation of all these agreements and treaties, however, depends mainly on the level of trust between Russia and the countries concerned, and on how prepared they are to take account of Russia's interests in the region.

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Chapter 1

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA

1

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To examine the variations in Russia's policy towards Central Asia, it is convenient to divide the post-Soviet period into three phases: the first stage covers the early 1990s, a time when Russia virtually ignored Central Asia while pursuing the illusory objective of trying to integrate itself with the West; the second stage was the end of the 1990s, when there was a radical rethink about its foreign policy going on in Russia, including its policy towards Central Asia; the third stage began in 2000, when Vladimir Putin and his team came to power in the Kremlin. In this period Moscow has made a more concerted effort to bring the region within its sphere of influence as a way of enhancing Russia's international status.

FIRST STAGE (1992-1995) When the Soviet Union collapsed, in December 1991, the new ruling elite, headed by Boris Yeltsin, proceeded to dismantle the political and economic legacy of the Soviet Union, thus destroying the foundations of the former Soviet state system. Right up until the middle of the 1990s, Yeltsin's Russia had no discernible policy towards the Central Asian region or to the post-Soviet space in general. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which emerged in the

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wake of the Soviet Union was not seen by the Russian leadership as being an engine for integration, but rather as merely a mechanism for supervising the disintegration of the Union with the minimum of conflict and bringing about a kind of "civilised divorce". The new Russian rulers were of strongly liberal ideological orientation. They regarded the West as being the yardstick of civilised values, and felt that Western interests, particularly those of the USA, were the same as their own long-term national interests. So the main, almost the only, thrust of Moscow's foreign policy at the beginning of the 1990s was to try to make the country an integral part of the European-Atlantic community. The implementation of this strategy, which still influences many Russian politicians today, is associated with the actions of prime minister Yegor Gaidar (during 1992 and 1993) and foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev (from 1992 to 1996). Although Yegor Gaidar was replaced as prime minister in 1993 by Viktor Chernomyrdin, the former head of the Russian energy company "Gazprom", the Russian concept of foreign policy stayed the same. The arch-economic planner Chernomyrdin busied himself mainly with internal economic issues2 and played virtually no part in developing foreign policy, except of course insofar as the interests of Gazprom were concerned.

Russia's Policy in Central Asia At the beginning of the 1990s, Moscow regarded Central Asia as a sort of appendix, without which the process of reforming the Russian economy and aligning Russia with Western economic and military-political systems would proceed more easily and quickly. The policy at this stage was to free Russia from "the burden of the national republics".

Security and Military Cooperation This Russian indifference was clearly seen in the regional security area, as Yeltsin’s Russia left the countries of Central Asia on the whole to their own devices to cope with the threats emanating from civil war-torn Afghanistan. It is well-known that in 1992 Russia declared itself to be the legal successor of the Soviet Union, thereby assuming responsibility for the treaty obligations of 1

This chapter was prepared on the base of following research paper: V Paramonov and A Strokov, The Evolution of Russia’s Central Asia Policy, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the UK, 08/21(E), June 2008.

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Russian Foreign Policy in Central Asia

3

the Soviet Union towards Afghanistan, of which the main one was expressed in the "Friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation" treaty signed by the Soviet Union and Afghanistan in Moscow in 1978. Furthermore, Russia had taken on treaty obligations to the Central Asian countries, mainly via the "Collective security" treaty signed in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, in 1992.3 In spite of this and other obligations, Russia stopped giving any assistance to the government in Kabul. In effect the Yeltsin administration betrayed Afghanistan and turned away from the "Afghan problem", which was and is not only a regional but also a global problem resulting from Soviet-American confrontation at the time of the Cold War. It is easy to see why, in these conditions, with practically no international support, the legal government of Afghanistan, headed by Mohammad Najibullah,4 was unable to control events in Afghanistan, although it lasted quite a long time, from the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989 until 1992. When the Najibullah government fell, in 1992, Afghanistan entered a new phase of civil war, the most intensive and destructive yet. This laid the foundations for Afghanistan's transformation into the "heroin factory" of the world and a base for international terrorist organisations. It is possible that if the Yeltsin administration had not ignored these problems, the situation in Afghanistan would have developed in a much better way. At the same time, in the early 1990s, Russia significantly reduced its levels of military cooperation with the countries of Central Asia. The much-trumpeted plans to create a collective security system in Central Asia (and in the CIS as a whole) came to very little in practice. The same situation applied in Russia's bilateral security arrangements with the countries of the region. The one important exception to this, standing out from the general context of Russian policy at the time, was the activities of the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division in Tajikistan and the Russian border troops in some of the countries of the region. It was largely due to the efforts of Russian forces in the early 1990s that the civil war in Tajikistan (1992-1996) did not result in the destabilisation of the whole Central Asian region. 2

This may be the very reason why he survived so long as prime minister, from 1993 to 1998. The Collective Security Treaty was signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia. Byelorussia, Azerbaijan and Georgia joined the treaty in 1993. The treaty was to remain in force until 1999, when the parties would decide whether its life should be extended. 4 Mohammad Najibullah was the head of the government of Afghanistan from 1987 to 1992 and the leader of the "Watan" ruling party (known before 1987 as the "People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan"). 3

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On the whole, however, the Yeltsin administration tried to distance itself from events in Central Asia. Without the political will and support of the Kremlin, the Russian troops were left to the vagaries of fate, and the very presence of Russian troops in the region became less and less meaningful. Moscow was unable either to prevent the escalation of the internal conflict in Tajikistan, or the flow of drugs from Afghanistan, or the increasing military presence in the region of other countries. When, for example, at the end of 1994, NATO began its "Partnership for Peace" programme, Russia made no serious attempts to coordinate a united approach to the programme.

Economic Aspects At the same time as destroying the unified Central Asian defence and military zone which in practice still existed after the fall of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin's Russia did its best to destroy the unified economic zone as well. A notable example was Yegor Gaidar's policy of forcing the republics out of the rouble zone. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, in 1992 and 1993, the Russian rouble had remained the standard currency in the countries of Central Asia. The Central Asian countries themselves remained extremely keen to preserve a unified trade and currency system with Russia. In 1993, however, Russia expelled the states of the region from the rouble zone, leaving them with no currency.5 The overall result of Gaidar's economic policy was the virtually complete destruction of the unified trading and currency system that had existed between the post-Soviet states until 1993. This in turn led to the destruction of the close economic links between Russia and the Central Asian countries. In 1992-1993 the volume of trade between Russia and the countries of the region fell to about a tenth of what it had been in 1991 (from about 60 billion dollars to about 6.3 – 6.7 billion dollars), and in 1994-1995 it remained at the same low level.

5

In Soviet times, currency had been issued only in Moscow. Moscow also made all the monetary policy decisions.

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Table 1. Trade between Russia and Central Asia, 1991-19956 Year

Volume of trade, millions of US dollars

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

59226 6360 6750 6143 7679

Russian exports to Central Asia, millions of US dollars 33785 5767 4703 3771 4230

Russian imports from Central Asia, millions of US dollars 25441 593 2047 2372 3449

Russian trade balance, millions of US dollars 8344 5174 2656 1399 781

Institutional Cooperation With cooperation in defence and economic matters practically destroyed, Moscow's efforts to detach itself from the Central Asian countries (and the other post-Soviet countries) were replicated in their total lack of interest in developing cooperation between institutions. Due to the fact that Russia's main, and virtually only, foreign policy alignment was now Euro-Atlantic, the CIS was virtually only a paper organisation right from the start of its existence. Furthermore, initiatives to develop new formats of cooperation between the post-Soviet states were not welcomed by the Kremlin. In 1994 Moscow ignored the attempt by the president of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbaev, to form a Eurasian Union, although this initiative might even in those days have given a boost to re-integration processes between Russia and the countries of the region, as well as the post-Soviet space as a whole.

Results of Russian Policy This indifferent attitude towards Central Asia was one of the main reasons why the states of the region began to lose faith in Russia and its policies and to make increasingly obvious attempts to re-align their international connections. 6

In this and subsequent tables the trade between Russia and the countries of Central Asia has been calculated by adding together the bilateral trade figures, on the basis of information provided by the national statistics offices of the Central Asian countries, please see annex. The data for 1991 is given in Soviet roubles in the original sources, as all the countries concerned were still in the Soviet Union then. In this table they have been calculated in US dollars, using the conversion rate for the Soviet rouble to the dollar established by the USSR State Bank on the basis of equal purchasing power (i.e. 1 US dollar = 0.78 rouble).

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This was not so much about the anti-Russian sentiments of the ruling elites, although these clearly existed in some states, as about doubts whether Russia could be relied on. These sentiments, in conditions where destabilisation of the region was a real possibility, were reinforced by the difficulty of transforming the economic, political and social processes in the Central Asian countries, which suffered much more than Russia did from the breakdown of the economic links within the postSoviet space.7 After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the small scale of the economies of the Central Asian countries and their weakness in the manufacturing sector were vividly displayed. This was largely due to the special place Central Asia8 had occupied in the economic system of the Soviet Union. In Soviet times the economic activity of the region was aimed mainly at satisfying the demand from other Soviet republics (mainly Russia) for raw materials, and to a lesser extent to the production of manufactured goods. A significant proportion (more than 75%, according to some estimates) of consumer and industrial goods in the region were supplied from other countries of the former Soviet Union, mainly from Russia. Since for the Central Asian countries import costs within the Soviet Union were much higher than export costs (the cost of manufactured goods being higher than the cost of raw materials), the republics of the region received regular subsidies from the centre, which were vital for their social development. Furthermore, the policy of division of labour practised in Soviet times, and the division of work on a territorial basis, had resulted in practically all the industrial enterprises in Central Asia being in a state of strong structural and technological inter-dependency with areas of Russia and with other post-Soviet states. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the destruction of its system of economic control, and the cutting-off of the region from the Russian trade and currency system, caused the collapse of the close links which had previously existed between the states. Then the geographical isolation of the Central Asian states began to play a big part. Independent experts reckon that the "costs of

7

For example, see following research paper: V Paramonov and A Strokov, Disintegration of the Soviet Union and its consequences for Uzbekistan: economic and social spheres, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the UK, 06/11(E), April 2006. 8 The region at that time was "Sentralnaya Asia and Kazakhstan".

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7

transportation of goods from these landlocked countries are more than 50% higher than the costs of transporting goods from countries with coastlines".9 In these difficult conditions whole branches of industry proved to be nonviable, the economic situation deteriorated sharply and there were penalties in the social sphere. This amounted to a serious fall in the standard of living, particularly in the years immediately after independence, with consequences of a rise in social tension and mass emigration by well-qualified specialists. In view of the chronic instability of Afghanistan, it would not be an exaggeration to say that at the beginning of the 1990s the states of the region were close to destabilisation, and in the case of Tajikistan there was actual civil war. If there had not been a breakdown of the formerly unified economic, defence and institutional zone, it is possible that the civil war in Tajikistan and many other unpleasantnesses could have been avoided.

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Policies of the Central Asian Countries The Central Asian countries reacted indignantly to the Kremlin's "new foreign policy", seeing it as a kind of betrayal. This was a natural reaction to the actions of a fraternal country with which they had grown up within the family of a common state for more than 100 years: first the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union. After Russia's hasty departure (one could even say "flight") from the area, the Central Asian countries were forced to form new international links (economic, political, military, etc.) to replace the old ones, which in Soviet times were primarily with Russia (the former RSFSR).

Economic Aspects Unlike the other post-Soviet states, the countries of Central Asia were keen to preserve a common trade and monetary system with Russia, with a common currency and close economic links. Uzbekistan was particularly insistent in negotiations with Russia about retaining the use of the Russian rouble on its territory. In the end, however, all the countries of the region were obliged to introduce their own currencies and create new national economic systems practically from scratch. In the first few years of independence, the most pressing issues for the 9

Eva Molnar, Lauri Ojala, Transport and Trade facilitation Issues in the CIS 7, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan: paper for the Lucerne Conference of the CIS-7 Initiative, 20-22 January 2003, p.39.

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Central Asian states, apart from Tajikistan, were the choice of economic policy and the choice of external economic partners. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, following Russia's example to a certain extent, banked on liberalising their economies as much as possible, attracting foreign (mainly Western) investment and speeding up the privatisation of their industrial enterprises, usually into foreign (mainly Western) hands. Kazakhstan was particularly active in this respect, selling off strategic assets (in essence, whole sectors of the economy) such as mining and metallurgical complexes and hydrocarbon deposits. The large chromium deposits in Kazakhstan, the only ones in the whole of the CIS, were sold to Japan,10 and a number of Western companies acquired a significant proportion of the hydrocarbon deposits on the Kazakhstan part of the Caspian Sea shelf.11 Kyrgyzstan, in its turn, sold its largest gold mine, "Kumtor", to the Canadian Cameco company. This has become the only stable industrial enterprise in the country, accounting for more than 40% of the value of Kyrgyzstan's exports. In contrast, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, although also keen to attract foreign investment, refrained from over-hasty liberalisation of their economies and declined to sell off their strategic assets. These two countries retained government control over their economies and implemented more socially-oriented internal policies, giving more protection to socially vulnerable sections of the population. In particular, they continued to subsidise a number of essential goods. Turkmenistan actually provided its people with free gas, water and electricity.

Institutional Cooperation While they were developing new external economic links, the countries of the region also tried to improve their institutional cooperation, without Russian participation. In 1993 Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on the "intensification of economic integration in the period 1994-2000", and in 1994 Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement on "the formation of a unified economic area".12 Tajikistan joined this agreement in 1998.

10

Chromium is a metal of vital economic and strategic importance. It is an indispensable component of most types of steel used in modern industry. Without the use of ferro-chrome alloys, manufacturing in mechanical engineering works would grind to a halt. 11 The largest deposit, "Kashagan", was sold to the Italian ENI, British Gas, Total (France), Royal Dutch Shell, ConocoPhillips (USA), Exxon Mobil (USA) and Inpex (Japan). 12 In 1998, at the request of Uzbekistan, this agreement was realised within the framework of the Central Asian Economic Community, which became the "Central Asian Cooperation Organisation" in 2002.

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Security and Military Cooperation As Russia was weakened internally and showed little interest in developing cooperation with the countries of Central Asia in defence and security matters, the states of the region (apart from Tajikistan) placed a lot of stress on finding other partners. This was due largely to the fact that after the fall of the Soviet Union the Central Asian countries were very weak militarily and economically, and needed external guarantors of regional security and foreign assistance in building up their national armed forces. As apart from Russia the only likely partners were member countries of NATO, the states of the region began to foster their relationships with the North Atlantic alliance. At the end of 1994, the Central Asian countries signed agreements with Brussels to adhere to the NATO "Partnership for Peace" programme.13 Soon after this, in 1995, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan formed a joint Council of Defence Ministers, whose main function was to coordinate cooperation with NATO. The Central Asian battalion "CentrAsBat" was formed by personnel from the three countries in the same year. This battalion carried out training within the framework of the "Partnership for Peace". It would not be an exaggeration to say that in the early and mid-1990s the consequences of Russia's new foreign policy were catastrophic. The direct result of this failure was the creation of a geopolitical vacuum, not only in Central Asia, but in the whole of the post-Soviet area. "Catastrophic" would be the quintessence of the feelings and the mood with which Russia approached the mid-1990s. These feelings deepened when it was realised that the ally and strategic partner, the yardstick by which all others were measured – i.e. the West – was totally unmoved by the enormous concessions Russia had made, almost unprecedented in Russia's history over more than 1000 years. Firstly, Russia never did become part of the Euro-Atlantic community. The internal reforms in Russia were not conspicuously successful and did not result in a Russian "economic miracle". Furthermore, in playing the part of an acquiescent vassal of the West, Moscow lost its ability to have any serious influence on Western countries. At the same time, Russia lost a good deal of its international authority and its regional status. The result was, according to Russian experts, that "in the mid-1990s Russia was much more isolated and vulnerable than the Soviet Union had been".14 13

Turkmenistan participated in the "Partnership for Peace" programme, but in accordance with its policy of neutrality it only cooperated with NATO in humanitarian programmes. 14 S Rogov. Three years of trial and error for Russian diplomacy. Moscow, 1995, p.10.

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Secondly, by the mid-1990s Russia had in practice "lost" Central Asia, not only from the political point of view but also in defence and economic matters. Russia now had significantly less access to the vital raw material resources of the region,15 which in Soviet times had been one of the main pillars of the industrial might of the RSFSR, and by the mid-1990s had attracted the eager attention of other countries, especially Western countries. Thirdly, in Central Asia itself, a feeling of alienation from Russia developed. The Yeltsin administration's policy of "getting rid of the burden of the national republics" provoked outbursts of anti-Russian feeling in the countries of the region, pushing them to act more decisively in throwing off the mantle of the "little brother". In the mid-1990s, in an acknowledgment of the total failure of the Russian foreign policy strategy, a change of heart began to be apparent both among Russia's ruling elite and in Russian society as a whole. On the one hand, in policyforming and academic circles in Russia, irritation grew at the policy of the West, which showed no sign of cooperating with Moscow's wish to integrate more closely with the Euro-Atlantic alliance. On the other hand, the Yeltsin administration was already being forced to face up to sharp criticism within Russia of its policies. It is clear that under powerful pressure from the opposition and public opinion, the Yeltsin government was obliged to make substantial changes to both its internal policies and its foreign policy. Thus on 8 September 1995 at a press conference Boris Yeltsin declared his unhappiness with the work of the Russian foreign ministry, including its head. This was largely the reason for the retirement in January 1996 of the Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and his replacement by Yevgeny Primakov.

SECOND STAGE (1996-1999) From the middle of the 1990s there were ever-increasing signs that Russia was trying to develop a fundamentally new foreign policy in general and a new policy in respect of the post-Soviet space in particular. The importance of the region in Russia's system of national priorities increased considerably when the

15

Significant stocks of non-ferrous metal ores (more than 2/3 of the stocks of the former Soviet Union) were concentrated in Central Asia, as well as hydrocarbons and practically the entire stock of textile raw materials (cotton, wool, silk) and the associated light industries of the former Soviet Union.

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concept of "multipolarity" became the main plank of Russian foreign policy, as announced officially by the new Foreign Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, in 1996. In contrast to the early 1990s, the main aim of Russia's foreign policy was publicly stated as being to become an independent centre of power, and the task of integrating with the Euro-Atlantic community was relegated to a secondary level (although it was not removed from the foreign policy agenda of the Yeltsin administration). It is clear that it was Primakov himself, first as Foreign Minister (1996-1998) and then as Prime Minister (1998-1999) who set the tone and the direction of Russia's re-thinking of its role in a changing system of international relationships and at the same time of the importance of Central Asia and the whole of the postSoviet space. Before his arrival at the top political positions, Primakov had had unique experience of government work as the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service. He was very sceptical about the prospects of Russia integrating with the West. Furthermore he believed that some Western countries were trying to exploit Russia's weakened influence in the world in general and in the post-Soviet area in particular. In one of his books he commented: "the leaders of a number of Western countries are actively working to prevent Russia from having a special role in stabilising the situation in the former Soviet republics and to hinder their rapprochement with Russia".16

Russia's Policy in Central Asia Pursuit of the "Primakov doctrine" required Russia to increase its "regional influence" (this was identified by Primakov as a high priority at a press conference soon after taking up his appointment as Foreign Minister).17 Russia began to see Central Asia in this light as it tried to strengthen its position as the regional Eurasian great power. Russia planned to achieve this aim mainly by improving cooperation in the defence sector and in questions of security, and also by exploiting its monopoly in the transport sphere, particularly for the transit of Central Asian energy products to external markets. Russia in its weakened and reduced circumstances did not really have other options. In view of the difficult economic and political situation in Russia at the time, this approach to

16 17

Y Primakov. Years in high politics. Moscow, 1999, p.133. L Aron. 'Foreign policy doctrine in post-communist Russia and its domestic political aspects', USA and Canada journal (Russia), № 2, 1999, p.48.

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cooperation was far more acceptable, affordable and achievable for Russia than developing full economic links would have been.

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Security and Military Cooperation During the later 1990s, Russia began to attach increasing importance to the stability and security of Central Asia. This was mainly due to the increasingly clear understanding in Russia that there was a threat to its own security from radical Islam. At the end of the 1990s Islamic radicals were virtually in full control of Afghanistan (after the defeat of the Northern Alliance in 1998) and of the Chechnya (after the withdrawal of Russian forces in 1996). In view of the increase of terrorist activity in Russia itself and the escalation of the conflict in the north Caucasus, Moscow became aware of the link between the destructive forces working inside Russia and those in Afghanistan and a number of countries in Central Asia. Moscow's big success in the late 1990s was its resolution of the civil conflict in Tajikistan by diplomatic means and in cooperation with other interested countries (primarily Iran and Uzbekistan). Economic Aspects In the late 1990s Russia continued to ignore the development of economic cooperation with the countries of Central Asia. The clearest evidence for this is the fact that in the second half of the 1990s the volume of trade between Russia and the Central Asian countries reduced even below the level it was at in the early 1990s. In the period 1996-1999 the trade turnover virtually halved, from 7.2 to 3.7 billion dollars. And because of the shortage of hard currency in Russia and the countries of the region, in many cases the trade between them was carried out on the basis of barter. Table 2. Trade between Russia and Central Asia, 1996-1999 Year

Trade turnover, millions of US dollars

1996 1997 1998 1999

7244 6833 5411 3695

Russia's exports to Central Asia, millions of US dollars 3920 3402 3165 1903

Russia's imports from Central Asia, millions of US dollars 3324 3431 2246 1792

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Russia's trade balance, millions of US dollars 596 -29 919 111

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Russian Foreign Policy in Central Asia

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So it would not be an exaggeration to say that the second half of the 1990s continued to see the process of fragmentation of the post-Soviet area which had started under the Gaidar government in 1992. The only difference was that there were some signs of a revival of cooperation in the oil and gas sectors. This cooperation was with Kazakhstan, on the transportation of oil from Kazakhstan to the foreign market, and with Turkmenistan on conveying Turkmen gas to Russia or via Russia to other countries. But these activities can hardly be considered as amounting to full economic relations. In fact Russia often used this "cooperation" for its own political purposes, finding it to be a useful way to exert pressure on the countries concerned, as Russia had an absolute monopoly on the transit of Kazakh oil and Turkmen gas. So even this limited cooperation with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in the later 1990s was a mixed blessing. On the one hand, Moscow demonstrated that it was keen to reserve the right to convey Central Asian hydrocarbon fuels across its own territory and oppose the construction of pipelines bypassing it. In this way it would strengthen its position in the region.18 On the other hand, Russia could often not resist the temptation to try to retain its monopoly position in the transiting of hydrocarbon fuels from Central Asia. This was obvious when Gazprom blocked the transit of natural gas from Turkmenistan, or when Ashgabat itself stopped exporting its gas. And there were occasions when Russia imposed limits on the quantity of gas it allowed to pass through its territory for export from Kazakhstan.

Institutional Cooperation The Yeltsin administration showed no more inclination to advance institutional cooperation with the countries of the region than it had at the beginning of the 1990s, confining its cooperative activities to the CIS framework. But by the end of the 1990s the CIS had become ineffective, and any relations Russia had with the Central Asian countries were on a purely bilateral basis.

18

In 1996 the then head of Gazprom, Rem Vyakhirev, said: "Gazprom will not allow gas to be exported from Turkmenistan by routes other than through Russia" and that "will make the transit of Turkmen gas (through Russia) beneficial for both countries". In 1998 Russia signed an agreement with Kazakhstan on "construction work for the Caspian pipeline consortium", under which Russia undertook to invest in the construction of pipelines from West Kazakhstan to Novorossiisk, to increase the capacity of the existing "Baku-Novorossiisk" and "MakhachkalaNovorossiisk" pipelines and to construct new terminals at the port of Novorossiisk.

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Results of Russian Policy

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Russia's way of making grand declarations about its plans for Central Asia, which were never translated into practical actions, met with a cool reception in the Central Asian countries themselves. On the one hand, the inconsistencies and contradictions of Russian policy in the region could only undermine yet further the faith the Central Asian countries had in Russia, especially as the administration in Russia was still the same as the one that had made it clear quite recently that it regarded the region as "useless". Furthermore, the Central Asian states were becoming increasingly aware of Russia's economic and even military weakness, as demonstrated in the failure of the first campaign in Chechnya (19951996). On the other hand, the Central Asian states were obliged at this time to concentrate on their own many internal problems, including the critical position of their industries after the loss of their traditional links, difficulties in the social sphere, the inflammatory activities of religious extremist organisations, etc.19 Because of these factors the Central Asian countries were sceptical about the prospects for cooperation with Russia. For this reason, and because of Russia's inconsistent and contradictory behaviour, Russia's Central Asian policy in the late 1990s was completely unproductive.

Policies of the Central Asian Countries The countries of the region, giving up on the idea of receiving any substantial assistance from Russia in their development, began to rely increasingly on their own resources and on the hope of working with various international organisations and foreign donors.

Economic Aspects As Russia did not want and in practice was not able to develop full economic relations with the countries of Central Asia, the states in the region began to try and achieve economic relations with other countries, mainly countries outside the former Soviet space. Precisely because of Russia's inconsistencies, as seen in its periodic attempts to dictate conditions for the export of hydrocarbon fuels and its low regard for the interests of the Central Asian countries themselves, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan were pushed to take decisive action to diversify the 19

Such as "Hizb-ut-Takhrir" and the so-called "Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan".

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export routes for their energy resources. It was in the late 1990s that both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan turned definitively to a strategy of diversifying their international contacts in the oil and gas sectors as much as possible. The authorities in Turkmenistan acted particularly decisively. In 1997 they commissioned the "Korpezhe – Kurt-Kui" gas pipeline,20 for pumping natural gas to neighbouring Iran. At the same time, Ashgabat started lobbying for the construction of gas pipelines through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India, and under the Caspian Sea to the Caucasus and Turkey. Likewise in 1998 Kazakhstan started work on the technical and economic plans for an oil pipeline with its neighbour, China. Work also started on the possibility of supplying hydrocarbon fuels to the West.

Institutional Cooperation By the mid-1990s the CIS had fulfilled its original function of supervising a "civilised divorce" between the former Soviet republics. It did not, however, find a new role. The Central Asian countries, therefore, finally convinced that Russia had no wish to breathe new life into the CIS, began to seek institutional links at the international level. By1996 all the countries of the region, apart from Turkmenistan, had joined the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Soon after this, in 1998 Kyrgyzstan joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Although Moscow did not pay particular attention, this step marked an important change: henceforth the conditions of membership of the WTO would limit Bishkek's freedom to protect its national economy from external competition and to participate in regional integration initiatives. Then in 1999 Uzbekistan joined the "GUAM" organisation (an alliance between Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldavia), which became known as "GUUAM" when Uzbekistan joined it.21 This organisation, which has US political support, emerged as a sort of competitor to the CIS, or a "counter-CIS". It is clear why many western analysts believed that the members of the GUUAM were "trying to find a way of enhancing their political, economic and military 20

This pipeline is 200 km long and has a pumping capacity of 8.5 billion cubic metres per year. It was built by the Iranian national oil construction company and commissioned in 1997. In 2007 it was working at virtually full capacity: in that year about 8 billion cubic metres of gas were pumped through it. 21 The formation of the GUAM organisation was announced officially at the Council of Europe meeting in Strasbourg on 10 October 1997. When it was announced at the 25th anniversary meeting of NATO in Washington in April 1999 that Uzbekistan was joining the organisation, it changed its name to GUUAM.

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prospects, to enable them to neutralise Russia's influence in the CIS to some extent".22

Security and Military Cooperation There were mixed reactions in Central Asia to Russia's policy on military cooperation. Tajikistan, for example, cooperated with Russia to the extent of agreeing to grant the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division the status of a military base. This arrangement was not however put on a legal footing in the late 1990s. At the same time the Yeltsin administration did substantial harm to its relations with Uzbekistan, where there was a strong reaction to Russia's virtual sabotage of the rapid intervention arrangements in the summer of 1998 (when the Taliban were approaching the border between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan). In 1999 Uzbekistan, along with Azerbaijan and Georgia, refused to extend the collective security treaty. This move was clearly not only a reaction to Russia's action or inaction, but also a form of insurance against Russia's inability to guarantee urgent military assistance in critical situations. Thus in the late 1990s Russia found itself unable to strengthen its position in Central Asia and fill the so-called "geopolitical vacuum" which it had been largely responsible for creating. There were many reasons for Russia's foreign policy failure in Central Asia. Firstly, there was no unanimity in Russian ruling circles on the key elements of a national long-term development strategy, including a foreign policy strategy. There was increasingly a feeling that in trying to strengthen its position in Central Asia, Russia's main goal was to recover its international status and the image of a "great power". Russia still did not understand the importance of the Central Asian region for its own long-term vital interests, particularly its economic interests. Secondly, in the late 1990s, Russia's ability to achieve its foreign policy objectives was significantly limited by a number of other problems, such as its lack of financial resources, a serious economic crisis,23 the absence or weakness of associated institutions and a sharp increase in internal problems (social problems, the war in Chechnya, etc.). Thirdly, these factors were exacerbated by the difficult political situation inside Russia at that time, evidenced by the stream of resignations and 22

See for example Splidsboel-Hansen F. 'GUUAM and the Future of CIS military Cooperation', European Security, Vol. 9, № 4, Winter 2000, pp.92-106. 23 In the late 1990s the Russian economy was in deep crisis. The decline of industry and agriculture, the vast expense of the war in Chechnya, increasing problems in meeting foreign debt repayments and the exhaustion of the gold reserves all helped to limit Russia's scope for activity in Central Asia or any other part of the post-Soviet area.

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appointments of prime ministers. In the period 1996-2000 there were five different prime ministers: Chernomyrdin (resigned 1998), Kirienko (1998), Primakov (1998-1999), Stepashin (1999) and finally Putin (1999-2000). So even if there was a gradually growing understanding of the importance of the postSoviet area, including Central Asia, Russia's policy of strengthening its positions in the area was characterised by inconsistencies and contradictions right up until the end of the 1990s. Largely for these reasons, Russia was chronically unable to surmount the barrier of alienation between itself and the countries of Central Asia (and the rest of the CIS) which had been raised in the earlier part of the decade. By 2000, when Boris Yeltsin relinquished the presidency, the only tangible results of Russian policy in Central Asia were political support for the Russian military presence in Tajikistan, some cooperation with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in the export of hydrocarbons and various declarations about the need to develop closer cooperation with each other. Nonetheless, the later 1990s were a formative period in Russian history, in that it was during this period that Russia had a critical re-think of its internal and foreign policies, including its relations with Central Asia, and of its true place in the world. At the end of the 1990s there were few in the Kremlin administration who still cherished illusions about the chances of Russia integrating with the West.24 At the same time, the significance of Central Asia and the rest of the postSoviet space for Russian interests was becoming more clearly understood by people at the top in Russia.

THIRD STAGE (2000 TO THE PRESENT DAY) The accession to power of Vladimir Putin and his team in 2000 was a turning point for Russia. Moscow's foreign policy began to be more clearly focussed on making Russia one of the centres of modern foreign relations and of the global economy. The concept of the "multipolar world", propounded by Yevgeny Primakov, remained at the heart of this. But there is no doubt that Putin and his team made a big contribution to the process, not only in formalising the doctrine,

24

President Yeltsin made the following apologetic and revealing comment on television on 31 December 1999: "our hopes have not been fulfilled".

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but also in taking practical steps to implement it in a new foreign strategy for Russia.25 In order for Moscow to make the transition from words to action, there had to be adequate funds, as well as administrative and other assets, in the Kremlin. On the one hand, thanks to the new administrative structures and personnel policies introduced by Vladimir Putin, which brought some order into the government administration system and to the regions of Russia, there was now less unpredictability about Russia's foreign policies. On the other hand, then there was an extremely welcome rise (until September 2008) in world prices for the main Russian exports, i.e. raw materials, particularly oil and gas. This was providential for Russia. Firstly, it was helpful in resolving the numerous domestic problems (which were in any case the main focus of the Kremlin's attention in the first years of Putin's presidency). Secondly, some financial resources could now be devoted to developing new directions in foreign policy. These directions became clear when Moscow realised that recovering Russia's positions in Central Asia and other parts of the post-Soviet area26 was an indispensable step in strengthening Russia's international status. From this point of view, Central Asia began to be considered as a place where the new elements of foreign policy, such as pragmatism and flexibility, could be put into practice. This was made easier by the fact that since the collapse of the Soviet Union the Central Asian countries had maintained, on the whole, friendly relations with Russia.

Russia's Policy in Central Asia Compared with the 1990s, Moscow's foreign policy activity in Central Asia was much more vigorous, and the multiple declarations about the "need to develop closer ties of cooperation" began to be matched by action for the first time.

25

In 2000 the Ministry for CIS Affairs, which really only existed for presentational purposes, was disbanded and replaced by a Directorate within the Foreign Ministry, headed by the former head of the Foreign Intelligence Service V. Trubnikov. This department was made responsible for coordinating the work of various Russian authorities, notably the Foreign Ministry and the security organisations, in deciding the direction of future Russian policy towards the post-Soviet countries. 26 In 2000, in practically all his public pronouncements, Vladimir Putin stressed that the post-Soviet CIS countries were Russia's top priority in terms of foreign policy.

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Institutional Cooperation The fundamental shift in Russia's policy in Central Asia was marked by the decisive actions taken to develop institutional cooperation. Moscow concentrated on finding new ways and formats for integration, rather than re-invigorating the old ones, such as the CIS, which nevertheless retained its function as a sort of political club. Russian policy proved to be very flexible, in that Moscow encouraged several integration institutions simultaneously: the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), the Unified Economic Space (UES), the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). The Eurasian Economic Community proved to be the most effective institution. The "Formation of the Eurasian Economic Community" treaty was signed in 2000 in Astana (Kazakhstan) by Russia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The formation of EurAsEC gave a boost to the expansion of cooperative activities between the countries in the community. In 2002 EurAsEC's Integration Committee established a "Council for Transport Policy". The main task of this council was to coordinate the activities of national transportation organisations, and to ensure that goods vehicles and passenger vehicles could transit the territory of member states without hindrance. In 2003 EurAsEC was granted the status of an observer at the United Nations General Assembly. Another indication of the success of its initiatives was the accession of Uzbekistan to the organisation in 2006. In 2006-2007 some progress was made in moving towards a customs union for the member states. The presidents of Russia, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan signed a package of documents in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) in October 2007, setting out the legal basis.27 Russia, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan had reached preliminary agreement on signing these documents at an extraordinary session of the EurAsEC International Council in Sochi (Russia) in August 2006. The Unified Economic Space is almost defunct. A "Formation of a Unified Economic Space" treaty was signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Byelorussia in Yalta (Ukraine) in 2003. Since the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine in 2004, however, and the subsequent political crisis in the country, still not fully resolved, the UES has looked rather like a still-born institution. The Central Asian Cooperation Organisation has merged with EurAsEC. CACO was formed in 2002 from the Central Asian Economic Community which 27

The documents signed were as follows: a "Customs Union Commission" treaty; a "Creation of a unified customs space and formation of a customs union" treaty and a protocol on "the procedure for enacting international treaties which lay down the legal basis for a union, acceding to them and withdrawing from them".

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had been formed as long ago as 1998, its members being Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Russia joined CACO in 2003, and Uzbekistan joined EurAsEC in 2005, thus making CACO a de facto component of EurAsEC. The Collective Security Treaty Organisation was formed on the basis of the Collective Security Treaty (CST),28 but proved to be a far more active institution than the original one. At Russia's initiative, the CST was transformed into the CSTO in Moscow in 2002. Also in 2002, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Byelorussia and Armenia accepted the constitution of the CSTO in Chisinau (Moldavia). In 2004 the CSTO was awarded the status of an observer at the UN General Assembly. Uzbekistan joined the CSTO in 2006. Another important event for the CSTO took place at the Heads of State summit meeting in the autumn of 2007 in Dushanbe (Tajikistan). The main result of this meeting was an agreement that the CSTO would cooperate with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, thus forming the basis of a powerful military and political bloc in the post-Soviet area with the additional strength of China.

Security and Military Cooperation Development of cooperation with the countries of the region in defence and security matters is probably regarded by Moscow as the main vehicle for projecting its influence in the region, which is in line with the Kremlin's new foreign policy objective to raise its global status. The first step Moscow took to implement its policy of practical cooperation was the formation of the CIS regional anti-terrorist centre for Central Asia in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) in August 2001, which was staffed by personnel from the security services of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The most activity in the defence and security spheres today is seen in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Moscow has learned its lesson from its mistakes in the 1990s, which led to an almost complete cessation of activity under the CST signed in Tashkent in 1992, and has begun to pay far more attention to encouraging the cooperation of the states of the region with Russia. In 2002 Moscow offered CSTO member countries favourable terms for training their military personnel in Russian military training establishments. They were also offered the chance to acquire Russian weapons and military equipment for CSTO units at internal Russian market prices. Soon after that, in 2003, Russia 28

The Collective Security Treaty was signed by Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia in Tashkent in 1992. Byelorussia, Azerbaijan and Georgia acceded to this treaty in 1993. The treaty was to cover the period up to 1999, after which the signatories were to decide whether it should be extended. In 1999, however, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia declined to extend the life of the treaty.

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opened a military air base in Kant (Kyrgyzstan). This base became a component of the CSTO's collective rapid reaction force. Also in 2003, Russia initiated within the framework of the EurAsEC the signature process for the multi-lateral "Cooperation in the defence of the external borders of EurAsEC member states" treaty. From 2004 onwards Moscow stepped up its cooperation activities within the CSTO organisation and put them on a more systematic basis. In 2004 the annual "Rubezh" ("Border") exercises started, aimed at countering threats to regional security. The first joint "Rubezh" exercises were conducted in 2004 in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Subsequent exercises were "Rubezh-2005" in Tajikistan, "Rubezh-2006" in Kazakhstan and "Rubezh-2007" in Tajikistan. Russia today is pushing even harder for both bilateral and multi-lateral forms of cooperation, with Moscow assuming the role of coordinator in the process of setting up a regional security system. Thus at the CSTO summit meeting in Dushanbe in 2007, at Moscow's initiative, two packages of documents were signed which laid the foundations for the creation of a mechanism for CSTO peacekeeping activities and allowed for more cooperation in defence equipment supply matters.

Economic Aspects Compared with the 1990s, there is now noticeably more activity by Russian business in the economic sphere in Central Asia. Moscow's main strategic interests are, of course, in the oil and gas sectors, where most of the Russian investments are. The biggest activity is in those countries of the region which have large hydrocarbon deposits (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). Here Moscow's efforts are directed towards location of deposits and transportation of oil and gas. Russian companies, especially Gazprom, are also increasingly active in developing the market for petroleum-based products (especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). The development of cooperation in the oil and gas sectors is seen by Moscow not so much as a mechanism for increasing its influence in the region as a means for increasing its own energy security. Russia's increasing demand for Central Asian hydrocarbons is due to the modernisation of its own energy sector, to the need to fuel its own economic growth and to enable it to meet its own export obligations. Although Russia does have oil and gas deposits of its own, many of them are rather inaccessible or unprofitable, being in the Arctic, Siberia or the Far East. Other than in the oil and gas sectors, however, Russia's activity in the economic sphere has not changed very much since the 1990s, with Moscow still not paying much attention to the development of full economic links. One of the

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main indicators of the extremely low level of Russia's economic activity is the state of trade and economic relations, which although they have developed over the course of the last eight years are still at a low level compared with where they were in Soviet times. In the period 2004-2007 the states of the region only accounted for 4% of Russia's foreign trade, which is not much more than in the 1990s. And in the period 2000-2002 the trade between Russia and Central Asia stayed in the band 5.4 – 6.4 billion dollars, about the same as the average level in the mid-1990s. There has only been a significant increase in trade since 2003. But this is not really an indication of significant development in the volume of trade, because there are considerable effects of increased import and export costs due to the weakness of the US dollar.

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Table 3. Trade between Russia and Central Asia, 2000-2008 Year

Volume of trade, millions of US dollars

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

6469 5924 5464 7088 10463 13227 14869 21787 29267

Russian exports to Central Asia, millions of US dollars 2730 3517 3492 4520 6103 7525 7982 13489 16144

Russian imports from Central Asia, millions of US dollars 3739 2407 1972 2568 4360 5702 6887 8298 13123

Russian trade balance, millions of US dollars -1009 1110 1520 1952 1743 1823 1095 5191 3021

Furthermore the share of the Central Asian countries in Russia's foreign trade has remained very low. In 2003-2008 (the period of the most vigorous and sustained growth in trade) the trade between Russia and Central Asia virtually quadrupled, from 7 to 29 billion dollars, but the region's share of Russian foreign trade decreased, falling from 3.96 to 3.88%. Another important indicator is that about 30-40% of the trade between Russia and Central Asia is in the hydrocarbon sector.

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Results of Russian Policy When Boris Yeltsin and his team departed from the political scene and the gradual overhaul of the Russian administration was under way, Central Asia began to realise that in comparison with the late 1990s it was now receiving different signals about Moscow's willingness to move to more decisive actions in terms of political, economic and military rapprochement. When Russia then redefined the position of the region in its foreign policy priorities, and took a number of specific steps and initiatives, especially in matters of institutional cooperation, the Central Asian states began to see Moscow as a much more significant factor in their own foreign policies.

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Policies of the Central Asian Countries At the beginning of the 21st century the Russian dimension gradually became a more important priority in the foreign policy considerations of all the Central Asian countries. In the case of Uzbekistan this was apparent after the Andijan events in May 2005, and in the case of Turkmenistan after the death of President Saparmurat Niyazov and the accession to power of Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov in January 2007. The Central Asian countries were aware and are still aware of their need for cooperation with Russia in order to kick-start the process of economic integration and to create a stable system of regional security.

Institutional Cooperation It is therefore not surprising that it was in the field of institutional cooperation that Russia achieved the most positive and rapid results. Traditionally the countries which were most involved with Russia in terms of institutions were Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This applied particularly in the vital transport and energy sectors. Thus since 2002, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been working with Russia, within the framework of the Council on Transport Policy of the EurAsEC integration committee, on the question of creating unified tariffs, increasing the flow of goods, simplifying customs procedures and forming trans-national transport and goods forwarding corporations. In 2003 at the international council of the EurAsEC a document was signed on "the energy policy principles of the countries of the Eurasian Economic Community". In this document the member countries expressed their intentions to work together for rational use of energy resources and to create a common EurAsEC fuel and energy complex. In 2005 the EurAsEC countries agreed on the

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creation of a customs union. Many agreements have already been made within the community on transport and communications.29 But the major political breakthrough for Russia was Uzbekistan, which had had particularly cool relations with the Yeltsin administration and had been fostering strategic links with the USA since the mid 1990s. However in 2002 Uzbekistan announced that it was suspending its membership of the GUUAM organisation, and soon after that, in 2004, it signed a "strategic partnership" treaty with Russia and in 2005 an "allied relations" treaty. In January 2006 Uzbekistan announced its withdrawal from the GUUAM organisation and joined EurAsEC. Russia also had political success with Turkmenistan, which was made possible by the policy of the new leadership of that country which was aimed at reducing its international isolation. The president of Turkmenistan took part in the summit meeting of the Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in August 2007, and then hosted the summit meeting of the Prime Ministers of the CIS in Ashgabat in November 2007.

Security and Military Cooperation Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had traditionally sought to cooperate with Russia in military and security matters. In 2004 the Central Asian countries virtually formed a unified defence zone with Russia. In 2004, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan agreed in principle to modernise their air defence forces with Russian assistance, and granted Moscow long-term rights to use strategic military facilities on their territories. The most important of these were the "Baikonur" cosmodrome in Kazakhstan, the "Sary-Shagan" anti-missile test range in Kazakhstan, the "Nurek" space communications centre in Tajikistan and the naval weapons test range on Lake Ysyk-Kol in Kyrgyzstan. In 2006 Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement with Russia which would allow military equipment support worth 27 million dollars to be provided to Kyrgyzstan free of charge in the period 2006-2008. In 2007 Russia agreed to provide Tajikistan, free of charge, with the equipment and ammunition of the 201st Russian military base, amounting to a major reinforcement of the army of Tajikistan.

29

These were as follows: an agreement on "unified conditions for transit through the territory of states of the customs union"; an agreement on "simplified customs procedures for goods transferred between member states of the customs union"; a protocol on "unified IT procedures for customs checking of goods and vehicles"; a protocol on the "organisation of the exchange of information on the movement of goods and vehicles between the customs authorities of EurAsEC member states".

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In 2005 Uzbekistan also changed tack in the question of military and security cooperation with Russia. In that year Uzbekistan decided that the American air base, which had operated near Karshi since 2001, should be withdrawn, and in June 2006 Uzbekistan joined the CSTO.

Economic Aspects Nevertheless the Central Asian countries' expectations for economic cooperation have not yet been realised. As mentioned above, apart from in the oil and gas sectors Russia has not been very active on the economic front. And the fact that Moscow still shows little interest in developing more meaningful economic links but regards the region as merely a supplier of hydrocarbons not only undermines the entire Russian Central Asia policy but pushes the Central Asian countries to seek other economic partners. The Central Asian countries, just as in the 1990s, are continuing their efforts to diversify their foreign economic links, and are pursuing a more balanced economic policy in relation to Russia. This is particularly apparent in questions of collaboration in the oil and gas sectors, the main vehicle for economic cooperation these days. On the one hand, the countries of the region are developing close links with Russia in the oil and gas sectors. There are already well-developed legal arrangements, both at bilateral and multi-lateral levels, and the operations of Russian companies are increasing in scale. On the other hand, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, countries with significant stocks of hydrocarbons, are not reducing their efforts to diversify their foreign connections in the oil and gas sectors and are trying to reduce their dependence on Russia. Thus Kazakhstan is proposing to send not less than 20% of its oil exports to its neighbour China via the recently-commissioned "Atasu – Alashankou" pipeline by 2015.30 At the same time Kazakhstan is planning to pump at least 25% of its oil exports to Europe via the "Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan" pipeline.31 Kazakhstan has already undertaken to provide Europe with an annual quantity of 7.5 million tonnes of oil via this pipeline.32

30

The 962 km "Atasu-Alashankou" oil pipeline was commissioned in mid-December 2005. It was planned to export about 10 million tonnes of oil a year to China initially (so far the level has only reached about 3 million tonnes), increasing eventually to 20 million tonnes a year. 31 The foreign companies which invested in the BTC pipeline are now lobbying for a share of the Kazakh oil to be pumped through it. For the pipeline to be profitable it has got to pass at least 50 million tonnes a year, and Azerbaijan cannot supply this quantity by itself. 32 In June 2006 an agreement was signed in Almaty between the governments of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of Azerbaijan on the transportation of oil from Kazakhstan via the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan to the world market via the BTC pipeline. The Kazakh oil was to be

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Turkmenistan is also planning to export at least 40% of its gas by 2010, bypassing Russia, including 10% for Iran, via the "Korpezhe – Kurt-Kui" pipeline, which is already operating, and envisaging the possibility of extending this route to Turkey and beyond, and about 30% to China, via the territory of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, through a pipeline which is planned to be in service in 2009.33 The possibility of participating in the Trans-Caspian and TransAfghanistan pipeline projects is also being studied in Ashgabat. In general, in spite of the major changes in Russia, mostly positive, during Vladimir Putin's presidency (2000-2008), the results of Russian foreign policy in Central Asia have not yet been an unambiguous success. On the one hand, Russia has succeeded in putting the brakes on the centrifugal tendencies of the region, in strengthening its own positions and in general overcoming the lack of trust which had accumulated during the 90s. Clearly Moscow has brought more flexibility, pragmatism, stability and consistency to its Central Asian policy. This has been made possible largely by its growing understanding of the strategic importance of the area and by the allocation of more funds for foreign policy purposes. On the other hand, Russia has still not been able to fill the geopolitical vacuum in the area, still less the geo-economic vacuum. Moscow has still not understood the importance of developing full economic links with Central Asia. The impression is growing that it still understands the "strategic importance" of the region mainly in terms of its own revival as a "great power" and its desire to secure its own energy interests. Furthermore the extreme tardiness, caution and lack of initiative by the Russian foreign ministry and many analytical and research organisations (and there are very few of them in Russia focussing on Central Asia), and the lack of analytical studies of the region or any demand for them, have also contributed to the failure of Russia to form a coherent policy towards Central Asia. As a result there have not been substantial steps in terms of forming closer economic links between Russia and the countries of the region, other than in the oil and gas sectors. The Central Asian countries, for their part, continue with their efforts to diversify their foreign connections, contributing to increasing competition in this geo-economic and geopolitical space.

supplied by tankers to the Sangachal terminal in Azerbaijan, and from there via the pipeline to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.. 33 An agreement on "Implementation of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline project and the sale of gas" was signed in April 2006 in Beijing by the governments of Turkmenistan and China, in which Turkmenistan undertook to supply China with up to 30 billion cubic metres of natural gas annually once the pipeline was in service. The construction of this pipeline is being financed by China. The Chinese Ministry of Economic Planning ratified this project in September 2006.

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Chapter 2

RUSSIAN SECURITY RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA 1

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Central Asia has always been of particular importance to Russia by virtue of its strategic geographical location. Only when Moscow had stable positions in the region was she able to exert much influence in the development of a favourable balance of forces and interests in Eurasia. It is apparent that the achievement of these strategic objectives is directly linked to a push for multilateral and bilateral cooperation between Russia and the countries of Central Asia in the security sphere.

MULTILATERAL COOPERATION Multilateral cooperation between Russia and the states of Central Asia takes place within the framework of organisations like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and a number of groupings within these organisations.

1

This chapter was prepared on the base of following research papers: V Paramonov and O Stolpovski, Russia and Central Asia: Multilateral Security Cooperation, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the UK, 08/08(Е), March 2008; V Paramonov and O Stolpovski, Russia and Central Asia: Bilateral Cooperation in the Defence Sector, Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Defence Academy of the UK, 08/15(Е), May 2008.

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Vladimir Paramonov, Aleksey Strokov and Oleg Stolpovski Multilateral cooperation takes the following forms: elaboration of common concepts and strategic approaches to national and international security (e.g. by signing inter-governmental treaties and agreements, by multilateral high-level discussions and by the creation and financing of international executive organs); carrying out multilateral training exercises by units of the armed forces to establish practical procedures to be adopted in case of the emergence of a real threat to national or regional security; multilateral cooperation by the countries' security structures in existing international anti-terrorist organisations to counter international terrorism and extremism, drug trafficking and other trans-national threats; taking the first steps towards multilateral cooperation in preserving and expanding the links between industrial organisations involved in the manufacture of military hardware.

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The Commonwealth of Independent States Security cooperation between Russia and most post-Soviet states, including the countries of Central Asia, started within the format of the CIS. A declaration "on the non-employment of force or the threat of force in the relationships between CIS member states" was signed in Kiev (Ukraine) on 20 March 1992. The heads of state decided to create a CIS "Council of Ministers of Defence", and in 1992 a CIS united armed forces military command structure was set up. In May 1992 a "Collective Security" treaty was signed in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) by six of the CIS countries: Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This agreement provided for mutual security support in the event of threats from outside the area. Byelorussia, Azerbaijan and Georgia assented to the treaty later. This treaty was not signed by Ukraine, Moldavia and Turkmenistan. CIS "Collective Peacekeeping Forces" were deployed in Tajikistan during the civil war there in 1992-1996, representing the first attempt to set up regional security mechanisms specifically for Central Asia. In accordance with the decision of the council of heads of state of the CIS countries, the troops deployed there were Russia's 201st Motor Rifle Division and a battalion each from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. According to Central Asia's leading security specialists, "the collective peacekeeping forces played an important role

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in stabilising the situation and preventing the conflict from spreading into neighbouring Central Asian countries".2 The protection of state borders also posed an urgent requirement for multilateral cooperation between the countries of the CIS. The destruction of the once centralised USSR border security system led to an increase in trans-border criminal activities at the external borders of the CIS, especially those parts bordering on Afghanistan. This led to the formation in 1992 of an integrated coordinating body, the CIS "Council of Border Troops Commanders". "Thanks to joint efforts and to the leading role of Russia, the former Soviet republics were able to maintain a stable border defence system. Russia, within the CIS, took on most of the responsibility for setting up border protection structures for Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan."3 Another practical realisation of multilateral security cooperation was the creation in 1995 of the CIS Joint Air Defence System,4 the main functions of which were to coordinate the airspace defence of the region and to coordinate the actions of CIS countries, by agreement, to repel an airborne attack. There was an annual exercise "Comradeship-in-arms" involving the air defence organisations of the national armed forces of the CIS countries. Furthermore, within the framework of the CIS, attempts were made to organise multilateral cooperation to maintain the links between the industrial enterprises of the former Soviet military-industrial complex. To do this a CIS "Inter-state Commission for Military and Economic Cooperation" was created in 1993 as a working group of the council of heads of government of the CIS. This organisation was tasked with resolving problems of specialisation and cooperation 2

L M Bondarets, 'Military and political aspects of integration in Central Eurasia', Cooperation and Integration Projects for Central Asia: Comparative Analysis, Possibilities and Prospects, Bishkek: Aleksandr Knyazev Foundation (Kyrgyzstan) and Central Asia and Caucasus Institute (Russia), 2007, p.92. 3 V Yu Letov, 'The historic role of the border troops of Russia in ensuring the security of the southern borders of the CIS', Cooperation And Integration Projects For Central Asia: Comparative Analysis, Possibilities And Prospects, Bishkek, op.cit., p.105. 4 Armenia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine were the founder members of the CIS Joint Air Defence System when it was set up in 1995. Since 2000, Georgia and Turkmenistan have played very little part in the system. Since that date also, Ukraine and Uzbekistan have stopped taking part in joint training exercises. At present operational information on the air picture is exchanged between the central command posts of Russia, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. The forces of Russia, Armenia, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan contribute to the routine manning and military preparedness of the CIS Joint Air Defence System. ('The sky above the CIS. The post-Soviet states exchange cooperation with Russia for partnership with NATO countries' Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Russia), 28 February 2002).

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in the development and manufacture of military hardware, cooperation in the creation of joint integrated structures, storage of mobilisation equipment, and questions of transfer of technology from the military to the civilian sector of the economy. This branch of multilateral cooperation was not developed further, however, mainly because only six states participated in it: Russia, Byelorussia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.5 A major cause of the Kremlin's loss of interest in multilateral cooperation with the countries of Central Asia was Yeltsin's policy of shedding the burden of their security concerns. Cooperation in the CIS framework increasingly became a mere formality, consisting mostly of official meetings and declarations of intent. In this situation the commander-in-chief of the united forces of the CIS began to be regarded as an unnecessary supranational arm of military control in many CIS states, let alone someone who could "call the shots with the Council of Heads of Government".6 In time this post was replaced by the CIS "Military Cooperation Coordination Headquarters" which had considerably fewer powers and capabilities.7 After a period of cooled relations between Russia and the countries of Central Asia during most of the 1990s, an attempt to consolidate the efforts of the CIS states in the security area was the signature in 1999 by the CIS Council of Heads of State of a treaty on "Cooperation by the member states of the CIS in the fight against terrorism". Although this document was the legal basis for cooperation by the security organisations of the CIS countries in detection and prevention of terrorist actions, it also acted as a substantial stimulus for the development of more widespread cooperation.

The CIS Anti-Terrorist Centre The agreements made between the CIS states in 1999 to combine their efforts in the fight against international terrorism came to fruition in 2000, when the CIS Anti-terrorist Centre (ATC) was set up. The main roles of this organisation were to be:

5

'Allies in the defence industry: an interview with V Semerikov, deputy general secretary of the CSTO', Voyenno-promyshlennyy kurier (Russia) 8 May 2007, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2007.182.articles.names_01 6 Ibid. 7 From 1 January 2006, by decision of the CIS Council of Defence Ministers, the CIS Military Cooperation Coordination Headquarters ceased to exist. Kazakhstan had proposed this as long ago as 2004.

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to develop plans for cooperation in the struggle against international terrorism; to coordinate cooperation of special security forces and police forces; to participate in the preparation and conduct of anti-terrorist exercises; cooperation in carrying out search operations; creation of a specialised database. The ATC began its work using the capabilities of the special anti-terrorist units of the law enforcement structures and security organs of the CIS nations.8 In view of the situation developing in the Central Asian region and the detection of tendencies of the leaders of the "terrorist international" to direct their attentions there, the Central Asian region was a primary area of interest for the ATC. A Central Asian branch of the ATC was therefore set up in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) in August 2001. This organisation is still working today, manned by personnel from the security services of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. This organisation, together with the security forces of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia, keeps an eye on the security situation in the Central Asian region with a view to countering international terrorism. The CIS ATC takes an active part in the annual "South – Anti-terror" exercise in Central Asia. The main aims of these exercises are to increase the preparedness of the security organs, special forces and other security structures of the CIS member states for rapid and adequate response to terrorist threats, and practical exercising of procedures in cooperation between the participants in joint antiterrorist actions. Its activities take place under the auspices of the CIS Council of Heads of Security and Special Services of the CIS States and in close cooperation with the Councils of Defence Ministers, Ministers of the Interior, commanders of border troops and the prosecutor-generals' coordinating council. Decisions on matters of principle are made only by the CIS Council of Heads of State.9 In general it seems that in spite of the favourable image given by numerous official conferences and the high-sounding declarations made at them, the CIS executive organs have not made progress in establishing an active security system. 8

S I Reva, 'The CIS Anti-terrorist Centre in the international security system', Cooperation And Integration Projects For Central Asia: Comparative Analysis, Possibilities And Prospects, Bishkek, op.cit., pp.100-104. 9 Uzbekistan occupies a special position in relation to the CIS ATC. Although Uzbekistan takes part periodically as an observer in the "South - Anti-terror" exercises run by the ATC, it does not take part in the work of the operational group of the centre in Bishkek and does not contribute to its running costs.

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The main reasons for this are that they have not yet succeeding in overcoming the legacy of the Yeltsin "policy" and that the various CIS states have differing views on the potential threats to national and regional security. It can therefore be confidently predicted that it is only a matter of time until many CIS organisations like the CIS Council of Ministers of Defence wither away. The only exception is probably the Central Asian branch of the ATC which in general has acted positively and now acquired useful experience. But overall, in matters of developing multilateral cooperation, the main focus of attention will probably continue to be the supranational regional organisations, i.e. the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.

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The Collective Security Treaty Organisation A "Collective Security Treaty" (CST), involving Russia and the countries of Central Asia, was in force in the 1990s and proceeded, like most things in the CIS format, mainly on the basis of declarations which were never translated into practical actions. It therefore became unpopular with some of its members, and in fact Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia withdrew from it in 1999. Russia took the initiative to revive this treaty. It was decided at the meeting in Moscow on 14 May 2002 to convert it into a full-blown international organisation, the "Collective Security Treaty Organisation" (abbreviated to CSTO). The member states (Russia, Byelorussia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) ratified the statutes of the treaty and the agreement on its legal status on 2 September 2003, and on 2 December 2004 the organisation was granted observer status at the United Nations General Assembly. Uzbekistan joined the organisation in August 2006, thus considerably strengthening its Central Asian component. The highest organ of the organisation is the Collective Security Council, comprising the heads of state of the CSTO countries. Between sessions of the full council, a Standing Council concerns itself with questions of coordination and execution of decisions taken by the full council. The Standing Council is composed of representatives nominated by the member states. The other main organs of the CSTO are: the Council of Foreign Ministers: a consultative and executive body concerned with cooperation between member states on foreign policy matters;

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the Council of Defence Ministers: a consultative and executive body concerned with cooperation between member states on defence matters, including manufacture of equipment and cooperation in military technology; the Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils: a consultative and executive body concerned with cooperation between member states on practical security matters; the CSTO Joint Staff: a permanent body of the CSTO and the Council of Defence Ministers, responsible for planning and executing CSTO decisions on military matters.10 Back in the days of the Collective Security Treaty, the Collective Security Council took the decision to set up a Collective Rapid Deployment Force for Central Asia, involving contingents from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The force was to be up to 1500 strong, supported by the Russian Air Force.11 In 2003 a detachment of the Russian Air Force, acting as a component of the CIS Rapid Deployment Force, was stationed at the Kant air base in Kyrgyzstan. In 2004, on Moscow's recommendation, the Council of Defence Ministers decided to increase the size of the Collective Rapid Deployment Force to 4000 men. The main emphasis at the moment is on developing the areas of joint control, communications and reconnaissance. Since 2004 the CSTO has carried out an annual exercise, called "Rubezh" (Frontier), in a Central Asian country, aimed at providing a counter to regional security threats. The first exercise, "Rubezh-2004", took place in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with the participation not only of contingents from the Collective Rapid Deployment Force but also operational units from the Russian Interior Ministry and Border Troops. The next exercise, "Rubezh-2005", was held in Tajikistan, followed by "Rubezh-2006" in Kazakhstan,12 and "Rubezh-2007" in Tajikistan.13 10

CSTO website, http://www.odkb.org The decision to set up the Collective Rapid Reaction Force for Central Asia was taken at the session of the Collective Security Council of the CSTO at Yerevan (Armenia) in May 2001. It was decided that the force would comprise a battalion each from Russia (to be drawn from the 201st Division, based in Tajikistan), Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, plus reinforcements. The total size of the force would be about 1500 military personnel. Coalition forces would be deployed to the territory of any member state of the CSTO in the event of a threat to its security. 12 The theme of "Rubezh-2006" was joint planning and collective security operations in the coastal area of Kazakhstan, so Russian naval infantry units and ships of the Russian Caspian Sea 11

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Since 2003, special forces and border troops of the CSTO nations have also participated in regular anti-narcotics operations (operation "Kanal"). In the period 2003-2006 as much as 48 tonnes of narcotics, including both psychotropic and hard drugs,14 and about 540 tonnes of drug precursor materials were confiscated during these operations.15 In 2004 Russia, with a view to strengthening cooperation between CSTO member states, called for the abolition of the CIS intergovernmental committee for military and economic cooperation (the "ICMEC"), proposing that the work of this body should be organised under the auspices of the CSTO. Russia claimed that this change to the format of the ICMEC's activity would enable it to make more effective use of its experience of privileged-partner cooperation and create more favourable conditions for improving military and economic cooperation. This initiative was supported by all the other states, and on 15 September 2004 the CIS council of heads of government abolished the ICMEC as a CIS organisation. On 23 April 2005 the presidents of the Treaty member states (Russia, Byelorussia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) signed a decree creating the CSTO intergovernmental committee for military and economic cooperation (still referred to as the "ICMEC"). The aim of this committee was to unite and coordinate the efforts of member states of the organisation to deepen and improve cooperation, to integrate more closely and to tackle problems of military and economic cooperation and cooperation in military technology in a more systematic way. To make the ICMEC effective, its CSTO national working groups were chaired by government ministers, deputy ministers or other leaders of branches of the defence industry, and the members of the groups were drawn from senior staff

Flotilla took part in it as well as the Collective Rapid Deployment Force. The exercise involved about 2500 military personnel, more than 60 armoured vehicles, about 50 artillery pieces and mortars, more than 35 aircraft, including helicopters, and 14 warships and naval supply ships ('"Rubezh" in the Caspian Sea area', Independent Military Review (Russia), 25 August 2006). 13 The active phase of exercise "Rubezh-2007" was conducted on the Liaur test range, 20 km north of Dushanbe, on 6 April 2007. More than 500 military personnel from Russia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan were involved, with about 50 armoured vehicles, a flight of Su-25 aircraft and a flight of Mi-24 helicopters. An operational group from the Armed Forces of Uzbekistan took part for the first time ('Counter-attack from "Rubezh-2007"', Voyenno-promyshlennyy kurier (Russia), № 13, 4-10 April 2007, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2007.179.articles.army_02). 14 In 2003 - 1974 kg, in 2004 - 10702 kg, in 2005 - 11251 kg, in 2006 - 23993 kg. 15 'No NATO reaction to our proposals: interview with Nikolai Bordyuzha, CSTO General Secretary', Voyenno-promyshlennyy kurier (Russia), № 3, 24-30 January 2007, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2007.169.articles.names_01

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in the ministries and departments concerned with the military-industrial complexes of the CSTO member states. The ICMEC considers and works on the basis of recommendations aimed at resolving the following problems:

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maintenance of special expertise and cooperation in the manufacture of weapons, military vehicles, support equipment and spare parts; development and execution of long-term programmes for military and economic cooperation, and of general rules for cooperation in resolving problems of improving manufacturing quality and the standardisation of military hardware; agreement on customs regimes and procedures for supplying or transporting military and dual-use equipment; making proposals for the conduct of joint development and evaluation trials for the development and updating of military hardware; development of integrated principles and integrated running of joint enterprises for the development, production, modernisation and disposal of weapons and military hardware.16 Important decisions for the future development of cooperation between CSTO members were taken at the CSTO heads of government summit meeting in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) on 6 October 2007. Two sets of documents, tabled by Russia, were signed. These documents set out the organisation and principles of peacekeeping activities within the CSTO framework and improvements in the regulatory and legal activities of the ICMEC. The first set of documents comprised an "agreement on peacekeeping activities", a provision on "collective peacekeeping activity", a provision on "an operational working group for preparing peacekeeping activities" and a provision on "the head of a CSTO peacekeeping mission". In particular, the agreement on peacekeeping forces meant that peacekeeping brigades with international status could be formed. The idea of forming collective peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the CSTO had been put forward by the Russian leadership as long ago as 2003, but it met with instant opposition from Moscow's partners. In December 2005, Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, was obliged to call the foreign ministers and ministers of defence of all the CSTO member states to the Kremlin, 16

'The post-Soviet defence industry: interview with V Semeryukov, CSTO General Secretary', Voyenno-promyshlennyy kurier (Russia), № 16, 25 April - 8 May 2007, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2007.182.articles.names_01

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to "clarify" the position to them in person. The package of documents tabled by Russia at the Minsk summit in June 2006 was not signed, however.17 The second set of documents included a protocol concerning "mechanisms for provision of military assistance to CSTO member states in the event of aggressive action or the threat of aggression" and a plan for the re-equipment of the Central Asian collective rapid deployment forces with modern weapons and equipment, which would be provided at internal Russian prices. It is clear that the main value of the CSTO for the post-Soviet space is that it is the one specialised regional security institution with a military dimension and with the organisational and political muscle to stand up to present threats and challenges, and at the same time is "not encumbered with additional concerns (such as political or cultural matters)".18 This organisation makes sense and is attractive to its members, including Russia which sees it as a vehicle for strengthening its position in Central Asia. In spite of having already demonstrated its worth, however, the CSTO faces a number of problems, including those mentioned below. Firstly, as rightly noted by some of the leading experts in the area, "if the CSTO wants to play a part in the organisation of collective security, it cannot avoid paying attention to issues such as the development of political components, dealing with conflicts on the territory of its member states, carrying out preconflict monitoring activities, developing conflict-preventing techniques and sanctions and organising negotiations and post-conflict settlements. So far, judging by the passivity of the CSTO during the events in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in 2005, it has got some way to go".19 Secondly, the only fully-trained military units in the collective rapid reaction forces are the Russian ones. The deterrence value of the forces of the other states is psychological rather than military.20 The collective peacekeeping forces resolution passed in October 2007 has so far not been given practical effect. In November 2007, however, there were discussions in the CSTO Joint Headquarters on subjects such as manning and structure of the collective peacekeeping forces and the priorities for re-equipping them with modern weapons and equipment, 17

'The CIS presented with a pact. Russia unites the post-Soviet space', Kommersant newspaper, Russia, 8 October 2007. 18 K L Syroezhkin, 'Cooperation between CSTO and SCO', Documents For The 4th Annual Conference On "Concepts And Approaches To Regional Security: "Cooperation In Central Asia - Experience, Problems And Prospects", 7 June 2006. Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies (KISI) under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty, 2006. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid.

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comprehensive logistic support, and the training of military and civilian personnel. To update themselves on training methods, a number of experts visited № 53 special training department for peacekeepers in the "Vystrel" Defence Academy of the Russian Federation.21

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The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is an international organisation which includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The SCO was founded on the basis of agreements on strengthening trust in the military sphere and on mutual reductions of armed forces in border areas, signed in 1996 and 1997 by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia and Tajikistan (the so-called "Shanghai Five"). The creation of the SCO was formally announced in Shanghai (China) on 15 June 2001 at a meeting of the heads of six governments. At a summit meeting in St Petersburg (Russia) the SCO Charter was adopted. This charter is the basic founding document which defines the roles, aims and principles of the organisation, its structure and main areas of activity. Since December 2004 the SCO has had the status of an observer at the United Nations General Assembly. In 2004 and 2005 Mongolia, India, Pakistan and Iran became observers at the SCO. The SCO is a wide-ranging cooperation organisation, covering questions such as regional security and countering trans-national threats. This activity is coordinated, in accordance with the decision of the Tashkent SCO summit in 2004, by means of regular meetings of the secretaries of the national security councils of the member states of the organisation and meetings of the heads of security departments. To coordinate the activities of security forces in countering international terrorism, a Regional SCO Anti-terrorist Structure was set up in 2004 with its headquarters in Tashkent (Uzbekistan). This headquarters is manned by representatives from the security departments of Russia, the Central Asian countries and China. The Council of this organisation meets twice a year to take decisions of a mandatory type concerning all aspects of its activity. Practical cooperation between the defence departments of the SCO member states takes the form of various joint activities involving the troops of the nations' 21

'The CSTO puts on "blue helmets"', Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier (Russia), № 46, 28 November 4 December 2007, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive .2007.212 articles chronicle_01

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armed forces. In August 2003 the first joint anti-terrorist exercise, "Cooperation2003", was conducted in the border regions of Kazakhstan and China.22 In July 2004 and November 2005 there were seminars in China for the defence departments of the SCO member states.23 In August 2007, straight after the SCO summit in Bishkek, there was a military demonstration and exercise (codenamed "Peace Mission 2007") on the Chebarkul' test range in the Chelyabinsk oblast', involving about 7500 military personnel and more than 1200 vehicles, the largest exercise yet.24 It is also significant that after this exercise, which was attended by the heads of state of all the SCO countries, President Vladimir Putin spoke of the possibility of carrying out similar large-scale exercise on a regular basis. Studies are under way in SCO departments on draft agreements on the organisation and execution of future anti-terrorist exercises and on personnel training for the SCO national contingents. It is also being proposed that the observer states, India, Iran, Pakistan and Mongolia, should cooperate within the SCO framework. So it is clear to see that Russia has an interest in developing the military and political arms of the SCO, seeing this as a method of strengthening its own position in Central Asia and bolstering security in the region by involving the military potential of China and other countries. The future development of relations between Russia and the Central Asian countries belonging to the SCO is however still clouded by a number of important issues. Firstly, the reaction by the Central Asian members of the SCO to Russia's initiatives to strengthen the military component of the organisation has not been unambiguous. At the Dushanbe SCO summit in October 2007, none of the delegations responded positively to the Russian proposals on the military concept of the organisation made as long ago as 2005. Furthermore, membership of the 22

This exercise involved more than 1000 military personnel from Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, supported by military vehicles and aircraft. 23 V A Shchipkov, 'The Shanghai Organisation: a new structure for the world to live in harmony, justice and peace', Bezopasnost': Foundation for National and International Security (Russia), Moscow, 2006, p.12. 24 Participating in "Peace Mission 2007" were 4700 Russian troops, drawn from the 76th Airborne Division, the 34th Motor Rifle Division from the Volga-Ural Military District, aircraft from the 5th Air Army of the Russian Air and Air Defence Forces, units of MVD troops, the Chief Directorate for Punitive Operations, FSB border forces and other Russian security departments. China contributed more than 1700 troops from the Chinese National Liberation Army. The Central Asian countries were represented by 100-strong units of assault troops from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan and by a "Skorpion" special forces unit of 30 men from Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan only sent observers to the exercise ('The spirit of Shanghai "in the fight against terrorism. Heads of SCO governments pleased by actions of troops in exercise "Peace Mission 2007"', Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kurier (Russia), № 32, 22-28 August 2007), http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2007.198.articles.army_01

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SCO has not stopped the states of the region from developing military ties with the USA and NATO. This position seems to be driven by the desire of the Central Asian members of the SCO, balanced as they are between Russia, China and the West, to give themselves more diplomatic room for manoeuvre in the pursuit of their national interests. Secondly, all the Central Asian member states of the SCO are at the same time members of the CSTO, so there is some duplication of the mechanisms for military cooperation with Russia. It also seems that the CSTO set-up, which excludes China and is therefore more focussed on the local "post-Soviet" problems and where there is a certain level of trust between Russia and the Central Asian countries, may be a more favourable forum than the SCO for the resolution of specific problems. Thirdly, it is clear that the leading position in the SCO is held by China rather than Russia, and Beijing is not about to relinquish this leadership to Moscow. Furthermore, China sees the role of the organisation as being primarily in the trade and economic spheres and is resistant to the idea of forming a military alliance based on the organisation, especially as at the moment there is no strategic concept for the military role of such an alliance. Against whom would it be directed? against the USA and NATO? It is clear that this is impossible in view of Russia's generally westward-looking foreign policy (although the SCO is often quoted both in Russia and in the West for propaganda purposes) and the close economic interdependency between China and the West; against trans-national threats (international terrorism, extremism, the drugs business, etc.)? To counter these, the SCO needs cooperation with the West, the USA and NATO. Neither side has made specific efforts in this direction. Obviously the SCO as a recently-formed organisation has yet to undergo the test of time. Much will depend on its ability to strengthen its analytical capabilities, as distinct from its political and propaganda capabilities. For the SCO, as indeed for Russia, it is vital to develop new non-standard solutions, such as asymmetric solutions, to the present security threats, as it is becoming more and more difficult to counter them by traditional military means, and in some cases it is impossible to do so.

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In general the most important mechanisms for participation by Russia in the formation of a regional security system in Central Asia have been the CSTO and the SCO. Russia will continue to stimulate interaction with Central Asia under the auspices of these two organisations. Furthermore the SCO is seen by Moscow as the most useful vehicle, along with Beijing but excluding Washington, for the creation of a regional security system. Although the results of multilateral cooperation between Russia and the countries of Central Asia directly under the auspices of the CSTO and the SCO have only been limited, the prospects for their development in the future are far from clear. This is due firstly to differences between member states of these organisations. Years may be necessary to eliminate these differences, and this process can only be accelerated if there is strong political will on the part of all the member states of the CSTO and the SCO. No less important is the need for these two organisations to attract and employ substantial intellectual resources. The accent at present on political grandstanding and short-term cooperation projects, such as demonstration exercises, reflects the fact that it is easier to state lofty aims than to cooperate in practice. In reality, Moscow sees multilateral military cooperation merely as a cheap and reasonably effective way of increasing its own geopolitical influence. This form of cooperation does not cost as much as developing full-blooded economic links. But Russia has problems precisely in this area. From today's perspective the most promising way ahead seems to be to develop a bilateral format of cooperation between Russia and each of its Central Asian opposite numbers, giving both sides more room for manoeuvre in protecting their national interests.

BILATERAL COOPERATION The present bilateral security / defence relationships between Russia and the individual countries of Central Asia are generally characterised by mutual trust. This avoids the international squabbles and ambitions which come to the fore in more multilateral contexts. The bilateral relationships include the following specific features: military cooperation (conduct of joint exercises; training for military personnel from Central Asian countries in Russian military training establishments; use by Russia of military and research facilities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan);

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cooperation in external border protection (this was particularly intensive in the 1990s; now it is mostly in the form of consultation, and concerns primarily Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan); cooperation in defence equipment supply (supply by Russia of military equipment and provision of services and after-sales service); cooperation in defence research, development and manufacturing (placing by Russia of orders for military equipment in Central Asian companies, establishment of joint ventures for the manufacture and repair of military equipment, conduct of joint research and development work); cooperation in space activities (primarily between Russia and Kazakhstan).

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Russia Kazakhstan Kazakhstan is Russia's closest military and political ally in the Central Asian region. It was, in 1992, the first CIS country with which Russia concluded a "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" treaty. This treaty envisages the creation of a joint military and strategic space, joint use of military bases, firing ranges and other military facilities in the event of a threat to Russia or Kazakhstan. Another fundamental bilateral document is the declaration of "eternal friendship and alliance for the 21st century" of 6 July 1998. In addition to these documents, the mutual security of the two countries is assured in a wide range of subjects in the "military cooperation" treaty of 28 March 1994 and more than 60 bilateral documents and agreements signed since then. Nevertheless, there was a period of cooling-off in the relations between Russia and Kazakhstan in the mid-1990s, and during this period the military cooperation documents and agreements which had been signed were largely neglected. Defence cooperation and trust between Moscow and Astana only became a reality when Vladimir Putin came to power.

Military Cooperation Since Russia and Kazakhstan became independent, the defence establishments of both countries have worked as partners, holding regular working meetings at various levels to agree a common line to take on a number of issues of mutual concern in respect of security and military cooperation.

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Additions and amendments to the basic agreements are produced at regular meetings at ministry and departmental level. A key instance of military cooperation was the signing in January 2004 by the ministers of defence of Russia and Kazakhstan of an agreement on joint planning for the employment of military force in the interests of preserving the national security of both countries.25 In 2007 Moscow and Astana were discussing the construction of a joint automated operational planning system for air forces, air defence forces and ground troops.

Training of Military Personnel An important element in the military cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan is the training in Russia of officers from Kazakhstan on favourable terms. In the period 1993-2006 more than 2500 citizens of Kazakhstan received training at training establishments of the Ministry of Defence, the FSB (Federal Security Service), the Foreign Intelligence Service and the Emergencies Ministry. This number constitutes about one third of all CIS citizens who have received military or other specialist training in Russia.26 In 2002 Moscow and Astana agreed that Kazakh citizens would be trained in common programmes with their Russian counterparts in accordance with the latest developments in military doctrine. Kazakhstan is also content that its specialists studying in Russian military training establishments generally satisfy the requirements of the Kazakhstan armed forces both in respect of the training methods and of the results achieved. Furthermore, when a system of national military education was introduced in Kazakhstan, it took account of Russian experience. In particular, the existing Kazakh military training establishments were re-modelled on Russian lines. Instructional staff from Russian military training establishments have visited the National defence university of Kazakhstan on a regular basis since 2003.27 25

An agreement between the ministries of defence of Russia and Kazakhstan on joint planning for the employment of military force in the interests of preserving the national security of both countries was signed in Moscow on 16 January 2004 and came into force on 17 May 2005. M Sh Gubaidullina, B Zh Somzhurek. Formation of the legal basis for military and political cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, Information and Analysis Centre, Moscow State University (Russia). Moscow, 2007. 26 A Tsyganok. 'Heirs of the empire. Military cooperation by CIS countries', "Central Asia" information and analysis site (Russia), 10 February 2006, http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php4?st=1139813760 27 "What we need is a small, mobile army". Interview with M. Altynbaev, Deputy Minister of Defence, Kazakhstan, "Liter" daily public and political newspaper (Kazakhstan), 28 January 2007, http://www.liter.kz/site.php?page=2&lan=russian&newsdate=2007-1-01

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Use of Military Facilities The most important former Soviet military facilities in Russia's "near-abroad" are on the territory of Kazakhstan, and they continue to be of great importance to Russia's defence capabilities today. There are bilateral agreements enabling Russia to rent seven of these important facilities in Kazakhstan for its own use. The total land area of the facilities being leased to Russia is 11 million hectares. № 5 State Trials Range of the Russian Ministry of Defence (the "Baikonur" cosmodrome). Situated in the Qyzylorda region of Kazakhstan. There are also several areas in the republic where the first stages of Russian rockets can land. This is still the only cosmodrome for launching Russian large manned space rockets of the "Soyuz" or "Proton" types to put orbiting objects into orbit. In fact 70% of all Russian space launches take place at "Baikonur".28 The "Baikonur" leasing agreement was signed by Russia and Kazakhstan on 20 December 1994 for a 20year term. In 2004 the term was extended to last until 2050. № 929 State Flying Trials Centre of the Russian Ministry of Defence (named after V Chkalov). The headquarters of this unit is in Akhtubinsk in the Astrakhan oblast' of Russia, but the trials ranges (numbers 85, 171 and 231) are in Atyrau and West Kazakhstan regions. This centre is used for trials of new weapons and for weapon firing training for Russian Air Force and Naval aviators.29 Facilities of № 4 State Inter-service Trials Range of the Russian Ministry of Defence: the "Kapustin Yar" range in Astrakhan oblast', Russia; 20 Independent Trials Range and two measurement points (IP-8 and IP-16) are located in West Kazakhstan region and are used for trials of missiles and other ammunition.30 № 10 State Trials Range of the Russian Ministry of Defence (the "SariShagan" range). This range is situated in the Qaraghandy, Zhambyl, Aqtöbe and Qyzylorda regions of Kazakhstan. This range occupies an area of 80,000 square kilometres, extending more than 250 km from north to south and 600 kilometres from east to west. This range is used for trials of air defence (anti-missile and anti-aircraft) missiles and 28

M Lukin, 'All the Russian bases', Kommersant-Vlast' newspaper (Russia), № 19, 21 May 2007, http://www.kommersant.ru/document.aspx?docsid=766827 29 'Trials ranges strengthen military alliance', Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 14, 1218 April 2006, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2006.130.articles.cis_02 30 Ibid.

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Vladimir Paramonov, Aleksey Strokov and Oleg Stolpovski strategic ballistic missiles. A specially-equipped route (the "Kapustin Yar – Sari-Shagan" route) was set up for ballistic missile flights.31 № 11 State Trials Range of the Russian Ministry of Defence (the "Emba" range). Located in Aqtöbe region, Kazakhstan. Used for research and trials of in-service air defence weapons and for training firings.32 Independent Radar Node of the Third Independent Missile and Space Defence Army of the Space Forces of the Russian Armed Forces ("Balkhash-9") is part of an integrated missile-attack warning system. Located in Priozersk, by Lake Balkhash. This facility is also used for recording technical data from trials of missile systems on the "SariShagan" range.33 Independent Regiment of the Air Transport Branch of the Russian Air Force. Based at an airfield in Kostanai. This unit looks after the air transport requirements of the facilities listed above.34

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Cooperation in External Border Protection Under an agreement signed in 1995, Russia and Kazakhstan cooperate in the protection of Kazakhstan's borders. This cooperation takes the form of a permanent exchange of information about the situation on the border, especially at crossing points and other areas of activity by border troops. The border protection authorities of both countries regularly carry out joint special operations to detect and intercept illicit drug-trafficking or illegal migration activities, especially in the area to the north of the Caspian Sea and near the Chinese border.

Cooperation in Defence Equipment Supply In the first few years after becoming independent, Kazakhstan had no need to purchase arms and military equipment for its armed forces, as it inherited from the Soviet Union practically all the weapons and equipment which formerly belonged 31

Under a reorganisation in 2006-2007, № 10 Range ("Sari-Shagan") became a structural unit within № 4 State Central Interservice Range of the Russian Ministry of Defence (M Lukin, op.cit.) 32 Under the 2006-2007 reorganisation, № 11 Range ("Emba") became a structural unit within № 4 State Central Interservice Range of the Russian Ministry of Defence. It was also awarded the status of № 5580 Trials Base (ibid.) 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid.

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to the Central Asian Military District,35 which included the territory of the Kazakh SSR. Furthermore, in the period 1992-1998, in compensation for the withdrawal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons,36 as well as 35 Tu-95 MS strategic bombers, to Russian territory, Russia provided Kazakhstan with ten Su-27 fighters, several MiG-29s and Su-25 ground-attack aircraft and three S-300 P air defence missile units.37 By the end of the 1990s, however, the armed forces of Kazakhstan had begun to feel the need to update their equipment, which was now wearing out. In February 2000 the Russian company Rosvooruzhenie signed an agreement with the Kazakhstan state company Kazspetseksport covering the main areas of cooperation in defence equipment supply between Moscow and Astana. In January 2001 a bilateral defence equipment supply committee was set up. Russia began supplying Kazakhstan with modern weapons and equipment, as well as supporting equipment and spare parts. On 1 January 2004 an agreement came into force enabling Kazakhstan to purchase Russian arms on favourable terms and at Russian internal prices. In 2006 a contract was signed for Kazakhstan to buy 80 armoured personnel carriers from Russia in the period 2007-2008 for about 20 million dollars.38 At the end of 2006 Russia concluded an agreement with Kazakhstan to supply 12 Mi17 multi-role helicopters and light Ansat helicopters as reinforcements for the national armed forces of Kazakhstan (in 2003 a contract had already been signed for the sale to Kazakhstan of 14 Mi-17 helicopters for 63 million dollars).39 There are plans for yet another contract, on privileged terms, to supply a further

35

The armed forces of the Central Asian Military District stationed in Kazakhstan were as follows: the headquarters of the 40th Army (which had been withdrawn from Afghanistan in 1989) and the First Army Corps, 68th Motor Rifle Division, 78th Tank Division, 37th Air Assault Brigade, 44th Rocket Brigade, 645th Artillery Regiment, 962nd Rocket Artillery Brigade; there were also three major equipment-holding bases: №s 5202, 5203 and 5204 (each holding a division's worth of equipment for use in case of mobilisation: one for a tank division and two for motor rifle divisions), an air defence corps and an air force group. 36 Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 104 SS-18 land-based strategic rockets (with 1400 nuclear warheads) and 240 cruise missiles with nuclear warheads were based in Kazakhstan. M.Sh.Gubaidullina, B.Zh. Somzhurek. Formation of the legal basis for military and political cooperation between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, Information and Analysis Centre, Moscow State University (Russia). Moscow, 22 August 2007. 37 'Is Kazakhstan drifting away from Russia? The search for new allies', Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 45, 30 November-9 December 2005, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2005.112.articles.cis_01 38 'Azerbaijan buys "new" old Russian weapons again', "Zerkalo" information website (Azerbaijan), 15 August 2007, http://www.zerkalo.az/print.php?id=22125 39 Ibid.

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batch of these helicopters, which are manufactured by the Kazan helicopter factory in Tatarstan, Russia.40 In addition, at the MAKS aviation salon in August 2007, Russian and Kazakh representatives signed new contracts worth more than 60 million dollars.41 The agreements cover repair and modernisation work to be carried out in Rzhev, Russia, on ten Mig-31, MiG-29 and Su-25 aircraft, i.e. most of Kazakhstan's air assets. These contracts also covered the supply of modern simulators and other aircrew training equipment. Astana has also indicated that it is interested in modernising its national air defence system by purchasing the modern S-300 PMU2 "Favorit" and S-400 "Triumf" missile systems from Russia.42 Moscow has also repeatedly made proposals offering practical assistance to Kazakhstan's Caspian Sea Fleet including the construction of shipbuilding facilities and other elements of the shore infrastructure, and offering navigational and hydrographic information.43 Kazakhstan is considering purchasing new warships and patrol craft in Russia to reinforce its Caspian Sea Fleet. These vessels would be built at Zelenodolsk (Tatarstan, Russia). Astana, as Moscow's closest military and political ally, has priority in the acquisition of the new types of weapon and military equipment which undergo trials on the ranges in Kazakhstan leased to Russia.44

Cooperation in Defence Research, Development and Manufacturing Kazakhstan has significant potential in the defence manufacturing sector, which can be useful to Russia. In particular, there are several industrial enterprises which used to be part of the Soviet military-industrial complex.

40

Ibid. 'MAKS-2007: major contracts for the Volga area', "AviaPort.Digest" information website(Russia), 28 August 2007, http://www.aviaport.ru/digest/2007/08/28/127218.html 42 'Kazakhstan intends to construct a new air defence system based on the Russian "Favorit" and "Triumf" missile systems: interview with M. Altynbaev, Kazakhstan's Deputy Minister of Defence', Interfax news agency (Russia), 22 August 2007. 43 'Partnership for peace', Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper (Russia), № 81, 6 May 2004. 44 At a meeting of the Security Council of Kazakhstan in February 2007 a national defence strategy was adopted for the medium term (up to 2015), envisaging a programme of equipment replacement and modernisation for the national armed forces, purchasing the new arms and equipment specifically from Russia. 41

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"Granit" Joint Stock Company, located in Almaty. In the Soviet era this company was involved in the testing and maintenance of air defence systems.45 Mashinostroitel'ny zavod Kirova (Kirov mechanical engineering works), located in Almaty. This company manufactured torpedoes.46 "Ural'sky zavod "Zenit"" Joint Stock Company, in Ural'sk. This company manufactured minesweeping equipment, mine-hunters and spare parts for torpedoes.47 ZIKSTO Joint Stock Company (formerly Kuibyshev mechanical engineering works), in Petropavlovsk. Manufactured anti-ship mines.48 "Zavod Kirova" Joint Stock Company (Kirov factory), in Petropavlovsk. Manufactured naval communications equipment.49

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After the collapse of the Soviet Union these firms stood practically idle, merely fulfilling individual orders for the Russian Ministry of Defence under inter-governmental agreements. Moscow and Astana both have an interest in preserving cooperation in defence production and the skills of these firms, and are looking at ways of reviving these facilities by means of new orders both for the Russian Navy and for joint export to third countries. In 2007 Russia and Kazakhstan started to draw up specific plans to translate this mutual interest into practical action.

Cooperation in Space Activities In 2004-2005 agreements were signed which set up the legal basis for formalising the cooperation between Moscow and Astana in joint space research and exploitation, and in the development of the associated high technology. A joint Russian-Kazakh project was initiated for the construction of the "Baiterek" rocket centre at the "Baikonur" cosmodrome. On 18 June 2006 the first Kazakh communications satellite "Kazsat" was launched. This satellite was assembled by

45

'Still partners in deficit. Developing defence equipment cooperation between Russia and the CIS', Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 13, 4-10 April 2007, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2007.179.articles.geopolitics_02 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid.

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Russian specialists at the Khrunichev factory.50 Another joint project is under way at the moment, under which Kazakhstan, with Russian assistance, will put a group of seven satellites into orbit, to be integrated into the Russian global satellite navigation system "Glonass". Another promising avenue for cooperation between Russia and Kazakhstan in the space sector is the production of space payloads with nuclear-electric propulsion systems. A joint project group was set up in March 2006, comprising specialists from the Russian space rocket company "Energiya" and the National nuclear centre of Kazakhstan.51

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Russia Kyrgyzstan The legal basis for cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan is based on more than 120 treaties and agreements covering various aspects of bilateral cooperation. Cooperation in the defence area is based on the "friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" treaty signed on 10 June 1992, the "cooperation in the defence sector" treaty dated 5 July 1993, the agreement "on cooperation in defence equipment supply" dated 25 August 1999 and the "security cooperation" agreement dated 5 December 2002. At the beginning of 2007 more than 40 documents were signed between Russia and Kyrgyzstan in the defence and security areas.

Military Cooperation In the early 1990s Russia played a major role in the construction of the national armed forces and other parts of the security apparatus of Kyrgyzstan. Although in principle there was a defence partnership between the two countries, this did not amount to much in practice. This was not only Russia's fault: there were also inconsistencies and changes of direction in Bishkek regarding their national security system.

50

'Russia's ambassador to Kazakhstan visits Baikonur', "Kazinform" news agency (Kazakhstan), 28 December 2006. 51 T Zhantikin, 'Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia in the energy sector', Proceedings of international conference "Prospects for a strategic partnership between Kazakhstan and Russia, Institute of World Economics and Politics, the "First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan" Foundation, Almaty, 2006, pp.41-43.

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Following the armed incursion by Islamist radicals in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 1999, and with the coming to power in Russia of Vladimir Putin, cooperation between Moscow and Bishkek in the defence sector jumped to a completely different level. There started to be more regular contacts between the security organisations of the two countries, and there was now close cooperation between them, particularly in the coordination of the struggle against international terrorism. It was no accident that a regional CIS anti-terrorist centre was opened specifically in Bishkek in August 2001, on the initiative of the Russia, as well as a headquarters for the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian Region. In 2002 a "security cooperation" agreement was signed by Russia and Kyrgyzstan. In recent years there have been regular joint training activities involving antiterrorist forces of both countries. In particular, during the joint exercise "Yug2006", which took place in October 2006 near the town of Osh, in Kyrgyzstan, Russian and Kyrgyz special forces developed procedures for repulsing an attack by a theoretical enemy in the form of a band of international terrorists making an incursion into Kyrgyzstan.52 In order to acquire practical skills, units of the air defence forces of Kyrgyzstan carry out joint firing exercises with Russian units on the "Ashuluk" range in Astrakhan oblast' in Russia almost every year. Russian specialists also assist Kyrgyzstan's military personnel to organise the control of their air defence systems to maintain them at a high alert state.53

Training of Military Personnel Military personnel from the armed forces of Kyrgyzstan undergo training at Russian military training establishments at privileged rates. During the period 1992-2007 more than 800 specialists from Kyrgyzstan received training at Russian military training establishments. More than 40 senior officers of the Kyrgyzstan armed forces have graduated from courses at Russian defence academies, including the General Staff Academy, since 2000. Since 2006,

52

In total about 400 troops and more than 50 military vehicles were involved in this exercise, including Su-25 ground-attack aircraft from the Russian "Kant" air base. The Russian side was represented by a task force from the Russian Ministry of Defence and by a detachment from the 12th Special Forces Brigade from the Volga-Ural military district.'We do not leave our allies in the lurch - exercise "Yug-2006" in Osh, southern Kyrgyzstan', Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 39, 11-17 October 2006, http://www.vpknews.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2006.155.articles.army_01 53 Ibid.

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officers from the Kyrgyzstan Air Force have also been undergoing flying training camps at the "Kant" air base.54

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Use of Military Facilities Russia leases five major military facilities in Kyrgyzstan. 999th "Kant" Air Base of the 5th Army of the Russian Air Force and Air Defence Forces.55 This base is located in the town of Kant in the Chuy region of Kyrgyzstan, 20 kilometres from Bishkek. This base accommodates a Group from the Russian Air Force which is capable of carrying out a wide range of missions in the event of a serious external threat to a Central Asian country.56 The number of Russian armed forces personnel stationed at this base doubled in the first half of 2007.57 Su-25 ground-attack aircraft, L-39 trainers and army helicopters are permanently based here.58 The number of aircraft at this base changes constantly. Note that when flying from this base Russian aircraft are permitted to use other local airfields in the event of a deterioration in the weather or in other unforeseen circumstances. 954th Anti-submarine Weapon Trials Establishment "Koi-Sary" of the Russian Navy, located in Karakol in the Ysyk-Kol region, on the eastern shore of Lake Ysyk-Kol. Also based here is the Russian-Kyrgyzstan joint enterprise "Ozero", which carries out development work and trials on new and in-service torpedoes. This base was acknowledged to be Russian property under an agreement signed between Russia and Kyrgyzstan on 5 June 1993.59

54

'Russia will provide Kyrgyzstan with free military assistance until 2008: interview with I. Isakov, Minister of Defence, Republic of Kyrgyzstan', Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper (Russia), 31 May 2007. 55 Back in the days of the Collective Security Treaty (1992), the Collective Security Council took the decision to set up a Collective Rapid Deployment Force of Central Asian Region, involving contingents from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The force supported by the Russian Air Force. In 2003 a detachment of the Russian Air Force, acting as a component of the CIS Rapid Deployment Force, was stationed at the Kant air base in Kyrgyzstan. 56 'Interceptor fighters for Kant. Russia to modernise its air base in Kyrgyzstan', Voennopromyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 8, 1-7 March 2006, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2006.124.articles.cis_01 57 Interview with Colonel V. Nosov, Base Commander, "Kant" Air Base, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Russia), 25 August 2007. 58 Ibid. 59 M Lukin, op.cit.

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338th Communications Centre of the Russian Navy, in Kara-Balta (Chaldovar) in the Chuy region. This centre enables the headquarters of the Russian Navy to communicate with submarines and surface ships patrolling in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It is also used for electronic surveillance activity by the headquarters of the Russian Navy.60 1st Automatic Seismic Station and 17th Radio-seismic Laboratory of the Seismographic service of the Russian Ministry of Defence. These are located in the Tian Shan mountains in the Ichke Suu and Majluu Suu districts. They monitor nuclear weapon trials activities, especially in China and South Asia. Both these units are part of the verification regime for the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.61 The heads of the Ministries of Defence of Russia and Kyrgyzstan reached an agreement in 2005, under which these stations began to pass information to the national seismological institute and the Emergencies Ministry of Kyrgyzstan, to enable them to monitor the seismological situation both in Kyrgyzstan and the surrounding areas.

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Russia plans to increase its military presence in Kyrgyzstan, mainly by increasing its manpower numbers and equipment strength at the "Kant" air base. The additional air assets will be front-line aircraft of the following types: Su-27, MiG-29, L-39 combat trainers, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters.62

Cooperation in External Border Protection Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia took on the responsibility for helping Kyrgyzstan to protect its borders with China and setting up a national border troops service. To this end appropriate bilateral agreements were signed on 5 December 1992 to enable a group of Russian border troops (Osh, Naryn and Karakol detachments) with a total strength of 5000 men. As well as protecting the more than 1000 km long border with China, the Russian border troops also exercised border protection duties at the "Manas" International Airport in the capital city of Kyrgyzstan.

60

Ibid. Ibid. 62 Interview with Colonel Nosov, Base Commander, "Kant" Air Base, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Russia), 25 August 2007. 61

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During the civil war in Tajikistan, when there was a lot of activity by drug runners, the Russian border troops also looked after a number of points on the Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border. At the end of 1997, Kyrgyz border forces took over the responsibility for these posts. Russian border troops continued to protect the state border between Kyrgyzstan and China until 1999, when at Bishkek’s request this responsibility also passed to Kyrgyzstan. Practically all the equipment used by the Russian border forces was handed over to Kyrgyzstan free of charge.63 After the withdrawal of the Russian border troops, only a task force from the Russian FSB border service remained in Kyrgyzstan.64 Under the agreement, this force assists the Kyrgyzstan border forces in a consultative role, helping to resolve organisational and technical problems and assisting with the training of border protection specialists. But after only a few years of independent border monitoring using their own forces, in May 2007 the parliament of Kyrgyzstan voted to "hand the border protection task back to the Russian border forces".65

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Cooperation in Defence Equipment Supply This aspect of military cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, like all the others, has been through cycles of change. In the mid 1990s it was in decline, and then it revived at the beginning of the present century. In the period 2001-2005 Russia provided Kyrgyzstan with weapons and equipment to a value of tens of millions of dollars. In 2003, for example, the Ministry of Defence of Kyrgyzstan was provided with a batch of modern infantry weapons66 and special equipment for special forces worth about 3 million dollars.67 In 2004 the armed forces of Kyrgyzstan received from Russia ten KamAZ trucks, spare parts for soft-skinned and armoured vehicles, an Mi-8MTV 63

'Russian border forces leave Kyrgyzstan', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie (Independent Military Review) supplement to Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Russia) 17 April 2002. 64 In March 2003 the Russian Federal Border Troops were incorporated into the Federal Security Service (FSB). Their official title is now "The Border Service of the FSB of the Russian Federation". 65 'Kyrgyzstan contemplates inviting Russian border troops to come back', ITAR-TASS news agency (Russia), 25 May 2007. 66 "Abakan" assault rifles, "Pecheneg" machine guns and "Gyurza" pistols. 67 'Diversification of suppliers to Kyrgyzstan’s army gathers pace', Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 17, 12-17 May 2004, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2004.34.articles.weapon_01

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helicopter and an air defence radar system, fully overhauled and updated at Russia’s expense. Since 2005 Russia has been providing Kyrgyzstan with military equipment to the value of 4.5 million dollars annually as its rent for the use of military bases in the country.68 In 2006 the Ministries of Defence of Russia and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement for the supply to Kyrgyzstan of free military aid worth more than 27 million dollars in the period 2006-2008.69 Even before the end of 2006 Russia had supplied Kyrgyzstan with four Mi-8MTV and Mi-24 combat helicopters,70 plus ten KamAZ trucks and spare parts for soft-skinned and armoured vehicles. Furthermore since the beginning of 2007 Russia has been assisting Kyrgyzstan with the modernisation and life extension of its military aircraft and helicopters. One of the main projects for development of Russian-Kyrgyz defence cooperation in the near future is the updating of Kyrgyzstan’s air defence systems and the replacement of obsolete equipment with the more modern S-300 PMU-2 "Favorit" missile system.71

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Cooperation in Defence Research, Development and Manufacturing On the basis of the intergovernmental "cooperation between defence research, development and manufacturing firms" agreement signed in 1994, some military equipment is manufactured in Kyrgyzstan to satisfy Russian orders. In order to coordinate these activities, a Rosoboronexport mission has been operating in Bishkek since 2003. The most important producers of defence equipment in Kyrgyzstan from Russia’s point of view are several firms. "Dastan" Joint Stock Company, in Bishkek. This is the only company in the CIS which has been manufacturing the VA-111 "Shkval" rocket 68

'Playing to win. Russia, the USA and China are now in open competition for the right to invest in the economy of Kyrgyzstan', Moskovskie Novosti newspaper (Russia), No. 33, 24 August 2007. 69 Ibid. 70 'Russia will provide Kyrgyzstan with free military assistance until 2008: interview with I. Isakov, Minister of Defence, Republic of Kyrgyzstan', Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper (Russia), 31 May 2007. 71 'Diversification of suppliers to Kyrgyzstan’s army gathers pace', Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 17, 12-17 May 2004, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2004.34.articles.weapon_01

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Vladimir Paramonov, Aleksey Strokov and Oleg Stolpovski torpedo since the Soviet era, as well as proximity fuses and guidance and homing systems for use by the Russian Navy.72 "Ozero" Russian-Kyrgyz Joint Venture (in which Russia owns 95% of the shares). Located in Karakol by Lake Ysyk-Kol. Involved in development and trials of new torpedoes; in the period 1999-2000 this firm developed the "Shkval-E" export version of the "Shkval" torpedo.73 "Ainur" Joint Stock Company and Bishkek Stamping Works, in Bishkek. Manufactures cartridge cases for infantry weapons.74 "Zhanar" Joint Stock Company, in Bishkek. Former manufacturer of computer equipment for military aircraft; has been producing border protection equipment such as radar beam and magnetometric sensors for alarm systems since 2002.75

It should be noted that many of the items produced by industries in Kyrgyzstan have considerable export potential. Moscow and Bishkek are therefore working on options for joint production of these goods for export to third countries. This mainly concerns the manufacture of naval weapons to enable Russia to fulfil major contracts to build ships for India and China.76

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Russia Tajikistan The legal basis for cooperation between Russia and Tajikistan is expressed in more than 150 treaties and agreements covering various aspects of cooperation, including cooperation in the defence sector. Two of the main ones are the "cooperation in the defence sector" treaty of 25 May 1993 and the "cooperation between allies in the 21st century" treaty of 16 April 1999.

72

'Kyrgyzstan, Russia and the control of "Shkval" ', Kommersant newspaper (Russia), No. 204, 1 November 2004. 73 Ibid. 74 'Kyrgyzstan prepares to transfer ownership of military-industrial complex companies to Russia', "INTERFAX" news agency (Russia), 8 November 2002. 75 'Kyrgyzstan starts manufacturing high-tech border protection equipment', "INTERFAX" news agency (Russia), 13 September 2001. 76 'Diversification of suppliers to Kyrgyzstan’s army gathers pace', Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 17, 12-17 May 2004, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive. 2004.34.articles.weapon_01

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Military Cooperation After Tajikistan gained independence, Russia played an active part in setting up its new national defence organisation. Cooperation between Russia and Tajikistan grew to a climax at the beginning of the 1990s, when a civil war started in Tajikistan (1992-1996). Russia in fact shouldered the main burden of supporting the security forces of Tajikistan during this period and seeking a peaceful outcome to the war. In 1993, in accordance with a decision by the CIS heads of state, the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces were established in Tajikistan, based on the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division. In this way Russia provided a kind of guarantee for peace in Tajikistan against the threat of escalation of tension in the country and the whole region, in view of the on-going military and political instability in neighbouring Afghanistan. When the CIS Collective Peacekeeping Forces were disbanded in 2000, Moscow and Dushanbe agreed that a Russian force based on the 201st Division and some logistics units would remain in the country. With the loss of the unified air defence system of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan found itself unable to protect its own air space. Russia therefore assisted Tajikistan in the creation of its own air defence system, allocating about one million dollars for this purpose. In 2000 Tajikistan’s first air defence battalion was combat-ready, and since 2001 detachments of the national air defence forces have regularly taken part in firing exercises on the Russian "Ashuluk" range in Astrakhan oblast’.77 Nevertheless, the period 2001-2004 is characterised by a falling-off in the cooperation between Tajikistan and Russia. Against a background of increasing activity by the USA and other Western countries in the region, Tajikistan’s leaders decided to review the position regarding the presence of Russian troops in the country. This manifested itself most clearly in protracted negotiations about the status and conditions of use of the Russian 201st Division. Dushanbe also put more stress on speeding up the programme for taking over the protection of the state borders with Afghanistan and China, and the withdrawal of the Russian troops. A new stage in the relationship between Tajikistan and Russia can be said to have started in the autumn of 2004, when during a state visit to Dushanbe by Russian president Vladimir Putin there was a breakthrough in dealing with the 77

M A Shovkoplyas, 'Present problems in the defence cooperation between Russia and Tajikistan', "Istoria tadjiksogo naroda" website (Tajikistan), http://www.history.tj/shovkoplas1.php

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problems that had arisen. Following this, the leaders of Russia and Tajikistan signed a whole series of bilateral treaties and agreements, including an agreement on the terms of the stationing of Russian forces in Tajikistan.

Training of Military Personnel In the period 1993-2007 more than 500 citizens of Tajikistan received training leading to officer status. About 50 senior officers attended higher qualification courses at military academies, including the Russian General Staff Academy.78

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Use of Military Facilities At the present time there is treaty agreement for a substantial Russian contingent to be stationed in Tajikistan. This contingent comprises more than ten military units and detachments from various branches of the armed forces. 201st Military Base (formerly 201st Division). This comprises the following units: o Headquarters of 201st Division, 92nd Motor Rifle Regiment, 998th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment, 1098th Air Defence Missile Regiment, 783rd Independent Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare Battalion, 1058th Communications Unit, 212th and 252nd Independent Communications Battalions, 295th Psychological Operations Unit and a number of auxiliary detachments; these troops are stationed in Dushanbe; o 191st Motor Rifle Regiment, stationed in Kurgan-Tyube; o 149th Motor Rifle Regiment, stationed in Kulyab.79 670th Air Group and 303rd Independent Helicopter Squadron, based at Aini airfield near Dushanbe. These units provide combat support to Russian and Tajik troops in the event of combat operations in Tajikistan. These units are equipped with six Su-25 ground-attack aircraft and 12 Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters. 78

V Dubovitsky, 'Relations between Russia and Tajikistan over the past 15 years: situation and prospects for the future', "Fergana" information website (Russia), 3 April 2007. 79 Supplement to Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan on the properties, the number of land areas and their boundaries allocated to the Russian military base, and their locations on the territory of Tajikistan, published by Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Moscow, No. 42, 18 October 2004, pp.41-45, http://www.garant.ru/hview.php?pid=67079&ssid=32&dt=federal&mail

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1109th Independent Electro-optical Unit of the "Nurek" Space Surveillance system (Object 7680 "Okno").80 This unit is located in the Sanglok mountains near Nurek at a height of 2200m above sea level. Its task is to detect ballistic missiles when they are launched and to track them on their trajectories at all altitudes above Eurasia, North and Central Africa and the adjoining waters of the Indian, Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.81 Some experts believe that this unit, positioned where it is, carries out its mission as effectively as does the US ground-based electrooptical deep space surveillance (GEODSS) system which is located at four equally-spaced sites on the equator, in the USA, on Diego Garcia island, in South Korea and in Hawaii.82 In addition to the facilities mentioned above, Russia is planning to build a modern military hospital in Dushanbe, fitted out with the latest equipment. The finance for this project has already been approved by the Russian government.

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Cooperation in External Border Protection From the moment when Tajikistan acquired its independence, Russia has played an active role in protecting its borders while building up its own national border protection force. The Group of Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan consisted of the Kalaikhub border forces command post and five detachments: the Pyandzh, Moscow, Khorog, Ishkashim and Murgab detachments, each of which had 11-13 border patrols and responsible for a particular sector of the border. The costs of maintaining this force and protecting the border were borne almost entirely by the Russian federal budget. The Russian border troops played a significant role in containing the civil conflict in Tajikistan. It was largely due to their efforts that the commanders of the united Tajik opposition were never able to supply their forces adequately with weapons and ammunition in the Pamir regions opposed to Dushanbe from bases in Afghanistan. 80

'In accordance with an inter-governmental agreement, the "Okno" electro-optical unit has been transferred to Russian ownership to reduce Tajikistan’s debts to Russia', PRIME-TASS agency (Russia), 18 May 2006, http://bit.prime-tass.ru/news/show.asp?topicid=17&id=39634 81 M Lukin, op.cit. 82 V Georgiev, 'The "Okno" electro-optical system in Tajikistan now de jure Russian', "Fergana" information website (Russia), 17 April 2006, http://news.fergana.ru/detail.php?id=4474633639628

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In 2000, however, at the initiative of the Tajiks, the process began of handing over sections of the border to the national border forces, and this process was completed at the end of 2004. In accordance with the "cooperation on border problems" agreement of 16 October 2004 the only Russian troops left are some military advisers from the Border Service of the Russian FSB cooperating in the establishment of the Tajik border forces and acting in a consultative role in the organisation of border security.

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Cooperation in Defence Equipment Supply Tajikistan is the only country in Central Asia which inherited practically no equipment from the Soviet Army. In contrast to the national armed forces of other Central Asian republics, which were created on the basis of units formerly comprising parts of the Central Asian Military District (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) and the Turkestan Military District (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan), the Tajik armed forces were formed from the so-called "National Front", who were effectively partisans.83 Most of the military equipment in Tajikistan remained under the control of the Russian 201st Division. Thus in the civil war conditions which had arisen in Tajikistan, Moscow began to render material assistance to the government forces, making regular supplies of weapons and ammunition both from the stocks of the 201st Division and directly from Russia, and Russian technical specialists assisted with the repair of military equipment damaged in combat. Immediately after the end of the civil war, in the period 1999-2001, S-125 air defence radars and missile systems were repaired in Russian factories and handed over to the air defence forces of Tajikistan.84 Following President Putin’s visit to Dushanbe in autumn 2004, there was a notable increase in activity in the cooperation between Russia and Tajikistan in 83

The "National Front" was created in 1992 when the situation in Tajikistan became critical and power in Dushanbe was seized by a coalition of representatives of radical Islamic groups, Badakhshani mountaineers and so-called democratic forces. The main component of the National Front was ethnic Tajiks from Kulyaba, supported by ethnic Uzbeks, men from Gissara and some from Leninabad in the north of the country. The National Front supported the government forces, in fact were the main part of them, in armed resistance to the Islamic opposition. The founders of the National Front are considered to have been S. Kenzhaev (the former Speaker of the Tajik parliament) and S. Safarov (a Kulyaba authority on criminal law). When there was a peaceful settlement between the government and the opposition, in 1996, the National Front ceased to exist. 84 M A Shovkoplyas, op.cit.

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military equipment supply. In the period 2005-2006 Moscow provided Tajikistan with free military aid worth more than 26 million dollars. In autumn 2006 alone, the Tajikistan Air Force received four Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters and four L-39 combat trainer aircraft,85 and in 2007 another two Mi-24s were delivered.86 In October 2007 an agreement was reached for the free transfer of part of the equipment and ammunition of the 201st Russian Base over to Tajikistan in 2008. It can thus be said that the army of Tajikistan has been considerably reinforced. In particular, the 201st Russian Base has about 160 T-62 and T-72 tanks, 160 BMP Infantry Fighting Vehicles and 140 BTR Armoured Personnel Carriers. Tajikistan will also take ownership of the divisional artillery, comprising three battalions of D-30 howitzers (72 guns), nine batteries of 81-mm and 120-mm mortars (72 mortars) and their ammunition, and air defence weapons, mainly hand-held SAM systems of the "Igla" type, but also "Shilka" and "Osa" self-propelled air defence weapons, a total of about 30 pieces.87 The Ministries of Defence of the two countries are also considering the possibility of setting up a regional centre in Tajikistan for the repair and modernisation of armoured vehicles and artillery systems.88

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Cooperation in Defence Research, Development and Manufacturing Russia and Tajikistan have a shared interest in several organisations which were formerly part of the Soviet military-industrial complex. These organisations are located in the Sughd (former Leninabad) region in the north of the country. The main ones are the 6th Vostokredmet mining and chemical complex in Chkalovsk,89 where uranium enrichment takes place, and uranium mines in Taboshar, Adrasman and Naugarzan-Chigrik.90 A 5-million dollar

85

V Dubovitsky, op.cit. 'Military assistance at Moscow’s expense', Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 42, 31 October-6 November 2007, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2007.208.articles.cis_0 87 Ibid. 88 'Tajikistan and Russia have drafted seven documents on defence cooperation', ITAR-TASS news agency (Russia), 1 October 2004. 89 'Rakhmonov makes peaceful overtures to Russia. But is it time for him to be replaced by Ubaidulloev?', Kommersant newspaper (Russia), № 100, 4 June 2004. 90 'Uranium for the mujaheddin', Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper (Russia), 28 August 1993. 86

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intergovernmental agreement was signed in 2006 for Russian specialists to salvage the solid rocket fuel residue from the manufacturing facility in Taboshar.

Russia Uzbekistan The legal basis for relations between Russia and Uzbekistan is expressed in more than 200 treaties and agreements covering various aspects of cooperation. Defence cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan is based primarily on the "friendship and cooperation" treaty of 30 May 1992, the agreement on the "principles of mutual logistic support for the armed forces" of 2 March 1994, the treaty on the "further intensification of cooperation in the military equipment and defence spheres" of 11 December 1999, the "strategic partnership" treaty of 16 June 2004 and the treaty on "alliance relationships" of 14 November 2005.

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Military Cooperation In the first few years following the independence of Uzbekistan, the relations between Russia and Uzbekistan were fairly active and were based on partnership. It is not surprising that it was Russia and Uzbekistan who were the initiators of the CIS "collective security" treaty signed in Tashkent in May 1992. This treaty was the first attempt at creating a security system in the post-Soviet space. When the civil war in Tajikistan started, Moscow and Tashkent coordinated their efforts to assist the government forces in Tajikistan. In the mid to late 1990s, however, largely due to the policies of the Yeltsin administration, the bilateral military cooperation between the two countries was more a question of paper cooperation than practical cooperation. Uzbekistan signed a number of parallel agreements on military cooperation with the CIS countries and with some foreign countries. In 1999, Uzbekistan decided not to continue to take part in the CIS "collective security" system. When Vladimir Putin came to power in Russia there were positive moves in the bilateral relations between the two countries, including military cooperation. Against a background of increasing disillusionment with US policy in Afghanistan and in Central Asia as a whole, Uzbekistan aligned itself with Russia in 2005. Moscow and Tashkent agreed to cooperate actively in modernising and reorganising the armed forces of Uzbekistan, re-equipping them with modern weapons, training Uzbek officers in Russia and taking joint measures in respect of combat training.

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The first joint tactical exercise by the special forces of Russia and Uzbekistan was held on the "Farish" mountain training range in Djizzak region in 2005. Similar exercises were held in 2006 on the Russian North Caucasus Military District range in Krasnodar district. The defence departments of the two countries agreed to carry out annual joint training of their air forces and air defence forces on the "Ashuluk" range in Astrakhan oblast' from 2008 onwards.91

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Training of Military Personnel Since 1992 more than 250 Uzbek officers have received training in Russian military colleges, academies and specialist institutions, and the number of Uzbek future officers undergoing training in Russian military training establishments has grown steadily since 2005.92 Use of Military Facilities There are no military facilities in Uzbekistan that the Russian Ministry of Defence is leasing. The "strategic partnership" treaty, however, did envisage the joint establishment of a military air base for use by the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. Article 8 of that treaty, in the interests of security, maintaining peace and stability and to counter external aggression, provided for Russia and Uzbekistan to offer each other the right when necessary to use military facilities on their territory, subject to separate agreements. Furthermore in October 2007, the leaderships of the two defence departments considered the possibility of using Uzbek territory (the desert regions of the Ustyurt Plateau) as landing sites for the spent stages of Russian RS-20 ballistic missiles, fired for test purposes from the "Baikonur" cosmodrome in Kazakhstan.93

Cooperation in Defence Equipment Supply Uzbekistan inherited a considerable logistics infrastructure from the Soviet Union's Turkestan Military District. For this reason, in the early years of 91

'Uzbekistan and Russia cement plans for future defence cooperation', INTERFAX (Russia) news agency, 30 October 2007. 92 'Collective security under the spotlight - Russia and Uzbekistan widen the base of their military cooperation', Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 43, 12-17 November 2007, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2007.209.articles.cis_01 93 'Space plans for two. Anatoly Serdyukov strengthens the security belt on Russia's southern borders', Rossiiskaya Gazeta (Russia), 30 October 2007.

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independence, the national armed forces of Uzbekistan did not experience critical shortages in the military equipment and weapons areas. Based on the agreement on the "principles of mutual logistic support for the armed forces" of 2 March 1994, in the early and mid-1990s Russia's main logistics activities with Uzbekistan were supplying Uzbekistan with ammunition and providing facilities for repairing military equipment under guarantee (in Russian firms). In 1999-2000, however, when there was a growth in activity by Islamic radicals, the Uzbek army, particularly the special forces, began to be conscious of their need for modern infantry weapons. In December 1999, during an official visit to Uzbekistan, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signed the treaty on the "further intensification of cooperation in the military equipment and defence spheres", which, in addition to closer cooperation between the Ministries of Defence and the armed forces of the two countries in the areas of strengthening security and the mutual struggle against international terrorism, provided for an increase in the range of military equipment to be provided by Russia. In early 2000 Russia started to supply Uzbekistan with the necessary equipment, mainly assault rifles, sniper rifles, light machine guns and night vision devices. When Russia and Uzbekistan entered into this new phase of their alliance, the range and volume of military equipment supplied increased considerably. By the end of 2006, according to the Russian Ministry of Defence, the volume of defence equipment supplied to Uzbekistan had reached several tens of millions of dollars. The main items of equipment were modern infantry weapons, ammunition, spare parts for armoured vehicles, air defence systems and aircraft repair.94 In 2006 alone, several Uzbek An-12 military transport aircraft were repaired at Russian factories.95 The Ural Optical and Mechanical Plant started servicing the electro-optical equipments for the MiG-29, Su-27 and Su-24 aircraft in the Uzbekistan Air Force.96 In May 2007 Russia agreed to supply the air defence units of the land forces of Uzbekistan with "Strela" and "Igla" man-portable SAM systems.97

94

'The changing of the guard. Russian troops in Uzbekistan. Russia and Uzbekistan to expand their cooperation in defence equipment supply', Kommersant newspaper (Russia), 23 November 2005, http://www.kommersant.ru/document.html?docId=629202 95 'Collective security under the spotlight - Russia and Uzbekistan widen the base of their military cooperation', Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 43, 12-17 November 2007, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2007.209.articles.cis_01 96 'The Ural Optical and Mechanical Plant negotiates defence equipment supply cooperation with the Uzbekistan Air Force', "Regioni" news agency (Russia), 22 April 2003. 97 'Uzbekistan and Russia make plans for defence cooperation', INTERFAX news agency (Russia), 30 October 2007.

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Cooperation in Defence Research, Development and Manufacturing On the basis of the inter-governmental agreement on "cooperation in defence research, development and manufacturing" of 26 January 1994, the manufacturing links between Russia and Uzbekistan did not cease completely, but it is true that they experienced high and low periods of activity. This is particularly true of the aviation sector.

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The Tashkent Chkalov Aircraft Plant (TAPOiCh) is located in Tashkent. Since the Soviet era it has been the lead plant for the assembly of the Il76 military transport aircraft and its variants, comprising the major part of the transport fleet of the Russian Air Force. From the mid-1990s to 2001 TAPOiCh received practically no orders for the construction of new Il-76 aircraft, but the plant continued to service Il-76s both in Tashkent and by sending representatives out to Russian Air Force units. The production capacity of the factory was only restored, partially, by the requirement to supply India with six Il-78 aircraft under the terms of a joint RussianUzbek-Indian contract in which Rosoboronexport plays a leading part. This contract is worth 150 million dollars. Since 2003 the links between TAPOiCh and the Russian aircraft manufacturing industry have improved, particularly with the Ilyushin Aircraft Construction Company, and new orders have led to a corresponding increase in the utilisation of TAPOiCh's capacity. In 2003 the Russian Volga-Dnepr Air Transport company signed a contract with TAPOiCh for the construction of two Il-76 TD-90VD aircraft, with an option to undertake the modernisation of 15 aircraft of the same type. In addition, Rosoboronexport placed orders with TAPOiCh for the construction of Il-76MD/78MK aircraft for third countries (in 2005, for the assembly of 34 Il-76 and 4 Il-78 aircraft for the Chinese Air Force98 and in June 2007, for two Il-76MF aircraft for Jordan99). In October 2007 Moscow and Tashkent agreed that TAPOiCh would assemble a large batch of military reconnaissance aircraft based on the Il-114. Russia plans to acquire a total of 28 of these aircraft by 2015. The first eight, due 98

For a number of reasons, however, the deadline for fulfilment of this contract was extended and part of the production was shifted to Russia (the Ulyanovsk Aircraft Plant). 99 'Sergei Ivanov's Uzbek dimension. Moscow and Tashkent's plans for energy and aviation sectors reach the treaty stage', Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 26, 11-17 July 2007, http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1184133060

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to start being delivered in 2008, have already been paid for. This new reconnaissance aircraft is a version of the Il-114-300T military transport aircraft, fitted with modern photographic and radar equipments. This aircraft will replace the An-30 reconnaissance aircraft which have been in service with the Russian Air Force for more than 30 years.100 At the beginning of February 2008 the presidents of Russia and Uzbekistan signed an agreement in Moscow on the integration of the Tashkent Chkalov Aircraft Plant and the Russian United Aircraft Corporation.

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Joint Russian-Uzbek enterprise UzRosAvia. This firm was founded on the basis of inter-governmental agreements signed in Tashkent in March 2007. The material assets of this joint venture are located in the aircraft repair facility in Chirchik, in the Tashkent region. The firm will repair and service Mi-8 and Mi-24 military helicopters. Russian organisations will own not less than 51% of the capital of the firm. The founders of the firm will be the Russian Oboronprom and Rosoboronexport, and on the Uzbek side, TAPOiCh and the Uzmakhsusimpeks company. According to Russian officials, "this will be the first such joint venture in the aircraft industry in the CIS".101

Cooperation in Space Activities In 1996 Russia and Uzbekistan signed an inter-governmental agreement to work together on space research and exploitation using the "Sirius" laser optical system at the high-altitude Maidanak observatory. This observatory is on the western summit of Mount Maidanak (2650 m above sea level), 55 km to the south of Kitab in the Kashkadarya region of Uzbekistan.102 This site is of interest to the Russian Ministry of Defence as an element in the overall missile-attack warning system.

100

'Collective security under the spotlight - Russia and Uzbekistan widen the base of their military cooperation', Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 43, 12-17 November 2007, http://www.vpk-news.ru/article.asp?pr_sign=archive.2007.209.articles.cis_01 101 'Russia and Uzbekistan set up joint venture', RIA Novosti news agency (Russia), 10 March 2007. 102 'The Maidanak high-altitude observatory', Ulugbek Astronomical Institute of the Uzbekistan Academy of Science website, 2006, http://www.astrin.uzsci.net/rus/maidanak/

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Russia Turkmenistan Cooperation between Russia and Turkmenistan in defence matters has so far been of a different character to the cooperation between Russia and the other countries of Central Asia, due to the special place which Ashgabat has occupied since Turkmenistan acquired its independence. 103 Turkmenistan is the only country in the post-Soviet space which does not belong to any military or military-political alliance. On 31 July 1992, Russia and Turkmenistan signed a treaty on "joint measures to create the armed forces of Turkmenistan", by which Moscow guaranteed the security of Turkmenistan. Under the treaty, the numerous units of the air force and air defence forces of the former Soviet armed forces, as well as the border troops, remained under Russian jurisdiction, but the other land forces of the former Turkestan Military District – four motor rifle divisions – were to be handed over to the Turkmenistan Ministry of Defence in the course of the next ten years. During this transitional period Moscow took the obligation to provide Ashgabat with assistance in the form of military equipment and would pay compensation for stationing Russian troops in the country. To coordinate the efforts of both countries in the defence sector, a task force from the Russian Ministry of Defence operated in Ashgabat from 1992-1994. The force comprised a communications battalion, a communications centre, a guard company and an independent transport squadron. In 1994 an operational group of the Russian Federal Border Service was also established. This group, totalling 3000 men, comprised the 170th Air Regiment, the 46th independent border patrol boat flotilla and an NCO training establishment. The personnel of this group cooperated with the Turkmen border troops to protect Turkmenistan's borders with Iran and Afghanistan.104 In 1994, however, after relations between Moscow and Ashgabat cooled, the joint command was disbanded. In 1999 the Turkmenistan leadership also reviewed the border cooperation question and asked for Russian border troops to be withdrawn. Turkmenistan then virtually ceased to have any defence cooperation with Russia until the middle of 2006. To support its armed forces, Turkmenistan cooperated closely with Ukraine, Georgia, and especially Turkey.

103

The section on Turkmenistan was prepared primarily on the basis of the following material: T Tsyganok, 'Military gas neutrality. There will be no fundamental changes in Turkmenistan's politics', Voenno-promyshlenniy kurier daily (Russia), № 50, 27 December 2006-9 January 2007, http://www.vpk-news.ru/default.asp?pr_sign=archive.2006.166.main 104 Ibid.

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When Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov came to power in Turkmenistan in 2007, Ashgabat began to show signs of a willingness to revive cooperation with Russia, at least in the defence equipment sector. In 1997 the Russian Special communications systems, automation and control research institute accepted an order from Turkmenistan to develop an integrated control system for the national armed forces of Turkmenistan. Ashgabat has also expressed an interest in purchasing Russian military equipment, particularly the MiG-29, with which it plans to replace the obsolete aircraft in its air force.105 The attendance by the president of Turkmenistan at the 7th meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in 2007, is an indirect indication of some willingness by Ashgabat to participate in some regional projects. It is possible that this could lead to closer cooperation between Russia and Turkmenistan in the defence sector.

In general, since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the process of developing new approaches by Russia to bilateral security / defence cooperation with the countries of Central Asia and defining their role and place in the system of national interests has been long and difficult. This was particularly the case in the 1990s, when Russia's actions in the region were of a purely reactive character, i.e. Russia reacted to events and had no control over them. Furthermore Russia's attitude to Central Asia changed several times, which led to a considerable reduction in Moscow's influence. Russia's military presence in the region also reduced, with the loss of most of the military bases of the former Soviet Union in Central Asia. By the mid-1990s, however, it had become clear that if Russia attempted to disengage from the region, this would only encourage trends there which would not be in Russia's interests. In the worst case, serious instabilities could lead to the fall of the existing secular regimes and to international conflicts directly threatening Russia's interests. The Russian ruling elite came to understand that any further surrender of Russia's positions in Central Asia would be against many of its long-term interests. And the events of 1999 and 2000 in Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan demonstrated that there was a real threat to Russia's security from its southern borders.

105

'Armenia and Turkmenistan buy Russian military command systems', RosBiznesKonsulting (RIA-RBK) news agency, 22 August 2007, http://www.top.rbc.ru/economics/22/08/2007/114480.shtml

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When a new generation of politicians came to power in Moscow, headed by Vladimir Putin, it became possible for Russia to embark on a revival of cooperation. That is was done on the basis of strengthening bilateral military ties was characteristic of his team. What distinguishes Russia from Western countries is that it does not link its military assistance to political conditions. Nor does Russia seek to influence opponents of existing ruling elites or to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries of the region under the cover of human rights organisations, etc. Russia plans to use these favourable strategic circumstances to strengthen its position in the region. Developing bilateral security / defence cooperation looks like a more cost-effective instrument of policy for Moscow than, for example, developing full economic relations. In particular, Moscow continues to have an interest in using the military facilities left behind on Central Asian territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as these facilities are important to the defence capabilities of Russia itself. Transferring these facilities to Russian territory would be prohibitively expensive, and in many cases, simply impossible. From these pragmatic considerations, it is more favourable to Russia to maintain them in the states of Central Asia, paying rent for them in military equipment and weapons. This approach also enables Russia to maintain a military foothold in many Central Asian countries, while ensuring that Russian military standards prevail in the armed forces of the countries of the region. Clearly, Russia has a great interest in maintaining and encouraging the development of manufacturing links with the companies in the Central Asian countries that were formerly part of the Soviet military-industrial complex. If these links are ruptured, or even weakened, there are serious consequences for the production of a host of types of weapons and military equipment at Russian factories. If defence equipment cooperation between Russia and Central Asia continues to develop, it will become an increasingly important factor in strengthening bilateral, and possibly multi-lateral relationships. It could be just what is needed for Russia to cement its longer-term position in the Central Asian region.

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Chapter 3

RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA

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1

Politics, security and economics have been closely intertwined in the rich history of relations between Russia and Central Asia.2 Trade between Russia and Central Asia had its origin in the early days of the Great Silk Road. Economic relations between Russia and Central Asia have had special significance since the second half of the 19th century. These countries have twice been integrated in single economic zones: first that of the Russian Empire, then that of the Soviet Union. When the Central Asian region was under the economic influence of the Russian Empire, from the 1860s to 1917, the countries of Central Asia had good access to Russian markets, and Russian investment flooded into the region. Central Asia began to escape from its economic and geographic isolation. Strong trade links were forged. States formed on the territory of modern Central Asia, however, lost much of their independence, particularly in respect of external economic affairs. As Central Asia strengthened its economic links with Russia, so its links with other countries weakened. In general, when Central Asia was part of the Russian Empire it remained an under-developed and purely agrarian region, functioning mainly as a source of cotton, silk and wool for the Russian textile industry. The second phase of Central Asian integration with Russia, which lasted from the formation of the Soviet Union until 1991, also had both positive and negative 1

This chapter was prepared on the base of following research paper: V Paramonov and A Strokov, Russia and Central Asia: Current and Future Economic Relations, Conflict Studies Research Centre, 06/31(E), July 2006. 2 In the historical context the terms "Central Asia" and "Russia" mean the states which existed at the time on the territory of the modern Central Asia and Russia.

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aspects. On the one hand, the Soviet period was a time of unprecedented economic growth, both for Russia and Central Asia. On the other hand, the countries of Central Asia found themselves confined in the rigid economic (as well as political and ideological) framework of the Soviet system, with its centralised planning and control of the distribution of all resources. The links formed between the Soviet republics sometimes made little economic sense (there was even an official Soviet term: "planned loss-making enterprises"). This exceptionally close integration in the Soviet period has resulted in the economies of Russia and Central Asia (and other CIS countries) remaining interdependent today. The sudden disappearance of the Soviet command system, inefficient though it was, led to economic collapse, as at the beginning of the 1990s there was no alternative (market-based) system to replace it, and one could not be created immediately. Today Russia and the countries of Central Asia are faced with the need to enter a new phase of closer economic cooperation – for the third time in history. It would be logical to think that the present economic interdependence of these countries would stimulate and intensify cooperation across a wide range of activities. There are however no signs of this happening.

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PRESENT STATE OF TRADE LINKS The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 had a profoundly negative effect on trade relations between the Russian Federation and the Central Asian republics. The volume of trade between Russia and the countries of the region fell between 1991 and 1992 on average by a factor of 9 – 10, for example:3 with Uzbekistan – by a factor of 27; with Kyrgyzstan – by a factor of 26; with Tajikistan – by a factor of 20; with Turkmenistan – by a factor of 17; with Kazakhstan – by a factor of 5.2.

3

Calculated on the basis of data from the national statistics organisations of the Central Asian countries.

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Table 4. Trade between Russia and Central Asia, 1991-20084 Year

Volume of trade, $US millions

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

59226 6360 6750 6143 7679 7244 6833 5411 3695 6469 5924 5464 7088 10463 13227 14869 21787 29267

Russian exports to Central Asia, $US millions 33785 5767 4703 3771 4230 3920 3402 3165 1903 2730 3517 3492 4520 6103 7527 7982 13489 16144

Russian imports from Central Asia, $US millions 25441 593 2047 2372 3449 3324 3431 2246 1792 3739 2407 1972 2568 4360 5702 6887 8298 13123

Trade balance in Russia's favour, $US millions 8344 5174 2656 1399 781 596 -29 919 111 -1009 1110 1520 1952 1743 1823 1095 5191 3021

After the sharp fall in 1992, the annual volume of trade between Russia and Central Asia remained generally stable, albeit at a low level, in the period 19932003, from 5.4 to 7.7 billion dollars. An exception was the year 1999, when it fell again to two thirds or even half of this level following the 1998 economic crisis in Russia.

4

The volume of trade between Russia and the Central Asian republics is calculated by adding together the bilateral trade volumes, on the basis of data from the national statistics organisations of the countries of Central Asia. The information from 1991 is quoted in Soviet roubles, as at that time all the above-mentioned countries were part of the Soviet Union. In this table they have been converted into US dollars, based on the exchange rate which was quoted by the USSR State Bank on the basis of equal purchasing power (i.e. $1 US = 0.78 of a rouble).

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Since 2004 the volume of trade has been increasing. This can be explained by the following: an increase in the cost of many goods, especially raw materials, combined with a fall in the value of the US dollar; growth in the real volumes of trade, due to an increasing trend to integration between Russia and Central Asia. In comparison with the average levels for the period 1992-2003 the trade volume is now between 50 and 100% higher.

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The Importance of Russia and Central Asia to Each Other There is a considerable imbalance in the importance of this trade for the various countries involved. For Russia the trade with Central Asia is not particularly significant. The following figures give the percentage of Russia's overall foreign trade balance contributed by individual Central Asian countries in the period 1992-2008, amounting to a total of between 1.5 and 4.19%: Throughout the post-Soviet period the trade balance between Russia and Central Asia has been predominantly in Russia's favour, largely because Russian exports to the region have been mainly finished products (machinery, equipment, chemical products,5 etc.) with high added value, while exports from Central Asia to Russia have mainly been raw materials (energy resources, ferrous and nonferrous metals, chemical raw materials,6 textile raw materials, minerals, etc.) with low added value. The trade balance was the other way round only in the years 1997 and 2000. In 2000 this was probably because that was the time when many Central Asian states were repaying part of their debt to Russia and reducing their imports. Because of a shortage of hard currency they paid partly in goods, thus increasing their export figures. Kazakhstan – between 0.9 and 2.9%; Uzbekistan – between 0.2 and 0.75%; Kyrgyzstan – less than 0.22%; Turkmenistan – about 0.2%; Tajikistan – less than 0.12%. 5

Highly processed chemical products such as plastics, paints and dyes, synthetic resins and other products of organic synthesis.

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In the figures for 2008, none of the Central Asian countries appears in the list of the top ten foreign trade partners for Russia: Kazakhstan occupied 11th place (the third highest place among CIS countries, after Byelorussia and Ukraine); Uzbekistan occupied 30s place (the fourth highest place among CIS countries, after Byelorussia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan); Turkmenistan was in the 50s (the sixth highest place among CIS countries, after Byelorussia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Moldavia); Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are in the 60s (Kyrgyzstan is eighth among CIS countries, after Byelorussia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Moldavia, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan ninth).

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Russia, on the other hand, has been an important trading partner for the countries of Central Asia throughout the post-Soviet period. In the years 19922008, trade with Russia was on average 16 to 26% of the foreign trade of these countries. The proportion of Russian trade to total foreign trade for individual countries was as follows: Kazakhstan – between 23 and 29%; Kyrgyzstan – between 22 and 29%; Uzbekistan – between 15 and 18%; Tajikistan – between 4 and 13%; Turkmenistan – between 2 and 10%. In 2008, Russia was the most important trading partner for Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan,7 the second most important (after Netherlands) for Tajikistan. The 2008 figures show essential increase in Russia's share of the trade with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, but some decrease in Russia’s share of the trade with Kazakhstan, against a background of Russia's increased trade with all the countries of the region.

6 7

Mineral fertilisers, primary products of crude oil refining, various minerals, gas condensate, etc. According to official statistics of these Central Asian countries. If China's shuttle trade with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is included (virtually ignored by the statistics organisations of these two countries), China is no less an important trading partner for them than Russia.

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Table 5. Trade between Russia and Central Asian states, 2007-2008 Country

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Кazakhstan Кyrgyzstan Uzbekistan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Total

Trade between Russia and country named, $US millions

Russia's share of foreign trade of country named, %

Named country's proportion of Russia's foreign trade, %

2007 14720 1175 4160 602 1130 21787

2007 18.06 33.10 29.21 13.80 11.86 19.25

2007 2.66 0.21 0.75 0.11 0.20 3.93

2008 16513 1852 3819 1071 6012 29267

2008 14.97 34.40 20.01 22.69 37.40 18.82

2008 2.19 0.25 0.51 0.14 0.79 3.88

This is related mainly to the general strengthening of economic links between all Central Asian countries and Russia, to which the noticeable political rapprochement between Russia and Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan has made a big contribution. In the case of Turkmenistan, it is largely due to the dependence of this country's natural gas industry, its main foreign currency earner, on Russia, not only for transportation of the gas but also for equipping and manning the gas extraction plants and local transportation system. Russia's most important trading partner in Central Asia is Kazakhstan, followed by Uzbekistan. Trade with Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan is still practically insignificant for Russia, being hardly noticeable even within the context of Russian-Central Asian trade links. In the period 1992-2008 the trade between Russia and Kazakhstan accounted for the lion's share,8 between 65 and 78% of all the trade between Russia and the Central Asian countries, with Uzbekistan having between 11 and 23%, Kyrgyzstan between 4 and 6%, Turkmenistan between 2 and 5% and Tajikistan between 2 and 4% (for bilateral trade please see the annex).

Trade Balance between Russia and the Countries of Central Asia In the period 1992-2008 Russian exports to Central Asia exceeded imports from the region by an average of 48% annually. For individual countries this trade balance was as follows: 8

A major component of Russian-Kazakh economic relations is the extraction, processing and transportation of hydrocarbon, other fuels and energy complex in general.

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Turkmenistan – 146%; Tajikistan – 86%; Kyrgyzstan – 78%; Kazakhstan – 53%; Uzbekistan – 24%.

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The figures for 2008 continue to show a favourable trade balance for Russia in its trade with the countries of Central Asia. Russian exports to this region increased by 19.6% ($2.655 billion) compared to the previous year, and imports increased by 58.1% ($4.825 billion), reaching a level of $13.123 billion. In the case of Uzbekistan, Russian exports and imports almost equalised, and Turkmenistan managed to reduce its negative trade balance considerably, thanks mainly to its supplies of gas to Russia. In 2008 Russian exports to Central Asia exceeded imports from the region by an average of 23% ($3.021 billion). For individual countries this excess was as follows: Tajikistan – 250%; Kyrgyzstan – 132%; Kazakhstan – 63%; Uzbekistan – 8%; Turkmenistan – minus 136%.

Structure of Trade Between Russia and Central Asian States Analysis of the structure of the trade between Russia and the countries of Central Asia shows the dominant role of raw materials,9 which account for more than 50% of the total trade. Finished products,10 on the other hand, account for only 30%. The balance (of less than 20%) comprises services.

“Barter” of Raw Materials In 2007 the proportion of raw materials in the exports from the Central Asian countries to Russia was about 78% (energy resources – more than 55%, ferrous

9

Energy resources, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, chemical raw materials, textile raw materials, minerals, etc. 10 Machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, chemical products, etc.

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and non-ferrous metals – about 14%, chemical raw materials – about 6% and precious metals – about 3%). This ratio for individual countries was as follows: Turkmenistan – more than 97% (mainly natural gas – more than 95%); Tajikistan – about 92% (mainly cotton – more than 88%); Kazakhstan – about 84% (energy resources – 62%, ferrous and nonferrous metals – 15%, chemical raw materials – 7%); Kyrgyzstan – about 88% (precious metals11 – 49%, minerals – 23%, textile raw materials12 – 5.4%, ferrous and non-ferrous metals – 10.2%); Uzbekistan – about 80% (cotton – 18.7%, energy resources – 37.8%, non-ferrous metals 17.2%, chemical raw materials – 6.6%).

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The proportion of raw materials in the exports from Russia to the countries of Central Asia in 2007 was about 24% (energy resources – about 11%, ferrous and non-ferrous metals – about 13%, minerals – about 0.5%). The ratio for individual countries was as follows: Kazakhstan – about 27.5% (energy resources – 14.3%, ferrous and nonferrous metals – 13.2%); Kyrgyzstan – about 3.4% (mainly minerals); Uzbekistan – just over 24.1% (ferrous metals – 22.4%, energy resources – 1.7%); Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – insignificant. At the same time, the large volume of raw material “bartering” reflects the continuing strong interdependence, including structural and technological interdependence, in various sectors of the national economies of these countries. This applies particularly to the energy sector. Energy “barter” plays a significant role in the trade between Russia and Kazakhstan, for example. Petroleum extracted in Kazakhstan (apart from that produced from the Tengiz oilfield) has rather too high a sulphur content to be suitable for refining in Kazakh refineries, as they are designed for refining sulphur-free petroleum. Kazakhstan therefore exports a significant proportion of its petroleum to Russia, receiving in return petroleum which can be refined at Kazakh refineries.

11 12

Mainly gold. Primarily leather and wool.

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There is also a considerable “barter” trade in coal between Russia and Kazakhstan. Thus coal from the Kuznetsk basin in Russia is delivered to the north-east frontier districts of Kazakhstan, while coal from the Ekibastuz field in Kazakhstan is supplied to the neighbouring Russian provinces. Furthermore there is an extensive exchange of electricity between the northern districts of Kazakhstan and the neighbouring Russian provinces, as the towns (and enterprises) of these areas were all linked to the same electrical supply grid in Soviet times. It is also noteworthy that the vast majority of Russian investments in Kazakhstan are in the energy sector. The biggest project for Russian companies in this sector is the famous Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which is intended for transporting petroleum from Russia and western Kazakhstan to the world market via a terminal at Novorossiysk on the Black Sea coast. Total investments by Russian companies over the period of this project could amount to about 1.1 billion dollars. Another example of the interdependence of Russia and the countries of Central Asia is the purchase from each other of raw materials which are not available in adequate quantities in their own countries. In particular, Uzbekistan supplies Russia with cotton, natural gas, and tungsten and molybdenum concentrates, and receives from Russia aluminium and the raw materials required to support the iron and steel industry.13 Furthermore, Russia exports various raw materials to the Central Asian region in exchange for natural gas (supplies of natural gas to Russia are paid for partly in hard currency and partly in various Russian goods, including raw materials). Without Central Asian gas Russia would be hard pressed to meet both its own domestic requirements and its obligations to supply gas to Western and Eastern Europe. And in the future, Russia will become increasingly dependent on these supplies from Central Asia. On the other hand, the countries of Central Asia can currently export their gas only via the Russian pipeline system and can maintain their gas extraction and transportation facilities only with Russian help.

Trade in Finished Products Although the economies of both Russia and the countries of Central Asia are dominated by raw materials, there is a higher proportion of finished products in the exports from Russia to Central Asia than there is in the opposite direction.

13

The Bekabad Steel Factory relies on scrap metal or imported raw materials, as there are no iron deposits in Uzbekistan which have been industrially exploited.

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The figures for 2007 show that finished products accounted for almost 61% of all exports from Russia to Central Asia (machinery and equipment – about 43%, chemical products14 – more than 10%, foodstuffs and other products – more than 8%). The finished products proportion (in Russian export) for individual countries was as follows: Turkmenistan – almost 100%; Tajikistan – about 90%; Kyrgyzstan – about 75%; Uzbekistan – about 65%; Kazakhstan – about 56%. The proportion of finished products in the exports from the Central Asian countries to Russia was about 7.5% (machinery and equipment – just over 4%, foodstuffs and other products – about 3.5%), and from individual countries as follows:

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Uzbekistan – about 15.7%; Kazakhstan – about 5.9%; Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan – practically non-existent. In summary, although finished products occupy a bigger share of the exports from Russia to Central Asia than in their imports from the region, the overall picture of raw material-dominated economies of Russia and the countries of Central Asia is obvious.

MAIN PROBLEMS IN ECONOMIC RELATIONS The current pattern of trade relations between Russia and Central Asian states is evidence of deep-rooted problems in the economies of the countries concerned, mainly related to poor competitiveness. This became especially clear following the collapse of the Soviet Union and is due to both structural and geographical factors.

14

Plastics, paints and dyes, synthetic resins, synthesised organic products, etc.

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Problem 1: Poor Competitiveness of Russian and Central Asian Economies The poor competitiveness of the economies of the Central Asian countries goes back to the Soviet era, when the Central Asian republics were seen primarily as suppliers of raw materials to the other republics, mainly Russia, and rather less as manufacturers of finished products. In the Soviet era, labour was divided between the republics, and the industries of Central Asia still reflect the strong structural and technological inter-dependence which evolved in that period. There are thus simply no alternatives, in many cases, to the links which exist between the economies of the Central Asian region to the economies of Russia and other CIS countries. This particularly applies in high-technology fields such as mechanical engineering, aircraft construction and electronics. These would be unable to operate without supplies of components, most of which have come traditionally from other former Soviet republics, principally Russia. The Central Asian transport network and energy complex were also developed on a regional basis, or even an all-union basis, rather than a national one.15 The geographical isolation of the region is another difficulty. The landlocked nature of Central Asia means it is remote from the main flows of international trade and finance. The poor competitiveness of the Russian economy is due to some extent to the same structural, technological and geographical factors. The Russian economy, however, is far bigger than any of the Central Asian ones, and many Russian enterprises had and still have dependence on domestic links rather than on inter-state ones. The breakdown of the economic system of the USSR has correspondingly caused less pain in Russia than in the countries of Central Asia. A much more important factor contributing to Russian poor competitiveness is the fact that the country's industrial centres are often in unfavourable locations: severe climatic conditions, vast distances between enterprises, limited access to international maritime trading routes. For an example, because of the long cold winter the organisation of any economic activity in Russia, including the production of raw materials, the building of enterprises, the operation of productive capacity and infrastructure and labour costs significantly more than in many other countries. Russia currently 15

For example, the Central Asian gas transportation system was important for the Soviet Union as a whole. It provided gas for industrial and domestic consumers, not only in Central Asia but in many industrial zones in Russia and nearly all the industrial areas in Ukraine. Similarly the electrical supply system was significant for the Soviet Union as a whole, while the water supply system was of region-wide significance.

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consumes five to six times as much energy per unit of GDP as the European countries and 12 to 16 times as much as the USA and Japan,16 since the leading transnational corporations locate their manufacturing in places with much more favourable climates and use energy-saving technologies. Some calculations by experts from the Brookings Institute are extremely revealing in this respect, according to which a one degree reduction in the socalled “per capita temperature index” (the average air temperature in the coldest month of the year in those regions where the overwhelming majority of the population and the most energy-intensive production units are located) leads to an actual drop of 1.5-2% in GDP and a 3% reduction in the economic growth rate.17 Given that the mean temperature of the coldest month (January) in Russia is from 15 to 35° lower than in tropical countries, one can see what a heavy financial burden the notorious Russian winter places on the effectiveness of economic activity in Russia. The “cold tax” that the Russian economy pays to nature every year currently stands at around $250 bn, and was roughly three times as much in the Soviet era. A further problem is that most Russian enterprises do not use modern energy-saving technologies. Moreover, the large overland distances between economic actors, Russia’s limited access to the main sea lanes, and the underdeveloped state of its merchant navy all have a strong negative impact on the effectiveness of the economy. Hence Russia loses out in the global economy in terms of transport costs. Sea transport, which is much more economic than transport by land, is the principal means of carrying freight in the world economy. The carriage of freight is at least 10 to 15 times cheaper per tonne-kilometre by sea than by land. This is not just because dry cargo vessels and tankers consume much less fuel per tonnekilometre than lorries or locomotives. Land routes – roads, railways and pipelines – require additional outlays to keep them in working order, whereas sea arteries do not. Moreover, carriage by sea avoids the need to pay duty, unlike overland transportation, which usually involves transit through several countries. Russia transports almost all of its freight by land (mostly by rail and pipeline), and it cannot do otherwise. But in a climate of globalization the enormous overland distances significantly undermine the competitiveness of the economy, pushing up production costs, since they increase expenditure on carriage, construction of transport infrastructure, maintenance charges, and the like. 16

See, for example, N Iogansen, 'Resources for the 21st Century', Itogi, No 4 (346), Moscow, 28 January 2003, pp.22-26. 17 F Hill, K Geddy, 'The Siberian cold: how Russia’s geography is slowing economic reform', Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’, No 12, 2003, pp.74-88.

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All this means that there are considerable energy, material and financial expenses involved in the organisation of any production activity on the territory of Russia.18 It has to be noted that some of the factors underlying the fundamental non-competitiveness of the Russian economy in the world market are also characteristic of the Central Asian states. However, overall economic conditions in the Central Asian region are a good deal better than Russia’s. In terms of its climate the southern part of Central Asia (especially the territory south of the 43rd parallel – some of the southern oblasts (districts) of Kazakhstan, much of Uzbekistan, and all of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan), has definite advantages over Russia. Winter here does not last above a month to a month and a half, and is much warmer than the Russian winter. The average temperatures in the coldest month (January) vary from +1°C to +4°C, and those in the warmest month from +28°C to +32°C, with mean annual temperatures in the range from +17°C to +20°C. These temperatures are 15-20° higher than the equivalents in Russia, and this means that the profitability of any Russian production enterprise can immediately be increased several-fold without major capital investment through a big reduction in expenditure on energy and capital construction. Since Central Asia is cut off from the world’s sea lanes, freight here as in Russia is carried overland. There are, however, at least two circumstances which make the transport system in the southern part of Central Asia more profitable than Russia’s and which hence objectively dictate Russia’s interest in the region. Firstly, all the economic actors in Central Asia are closer together than is the case in Russia. The distances separating them are measured in tens or hundreds of kilometres and not in thousands, as in Russia. This is due to the fact that a large proportion of Central Asia is desert or mountains and accordingly most built-up areas were built close to one another, at oases or in foothills. Secondly, in the hot, dry climate of the southern Central Asia region transport infrastructure costs much less to operate than in Russia. Rail beds and road surfaces last longer, and accordingly less has to be spent on preventive maintenance and capital repairs. The cost of building transport communications is also lower than in Russia. Moreover, Central Asia is much closer than Russia to the southern seas and therefore to one of the world’s busiest crossroads for trade and economic development. Given a single “Russia - Central Asia” economic space (with no customs duty levied when crossing the borders of member states), capital 18

V Paramonov and A Strokov, Russia's new Strategy: Regionalization versus Globalization, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defence Academy of the UK, 04/14, May 2004, pp.3-8.

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investment in the south of the Central Asia region would yield much higher profits than the cold, boundless expanses of Siberia and the Far East. In general, the poor coordination of economic activity between Russia and Central Asia after the collapse of the USSR means that their processing industries are unable to function effectively. These countries will continue to have raw material-dominated economies because there are no decisive steps being taken to make their economies more efficient by improving inter-state cooperation in general. All this also reflects the evident weakness of cooperation between Russia and the countries of Central Asia in the fields of industry and transport communications.

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Problem 2: Poor Industrial Cooperation The weakness of inter-state industrial cooperation is the result of the failure of Russia and the countries of the region to appreciate, or perhaps even to understand properly, the importance of and mutual advantage to be gained by regional integration, especially in high-tech industries such as mechanical engineering, aircraft construction and electronics. As a result, the raw material-dominated economies of these countries looks set to be maintained, contrary to their longerterm aspirations for complex and systematic economic development. Russia, for example, in its dealings with Central Asia, continues to place stress on the extraction of energy resources and their transportation to world markets: petroleum from Kazakhstan and natural gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Plans for cooperation between Russia and Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan mainly centred on the exploitation of the vast hydro-electric generating potential of these two countries for export of electricity to world markets.

Problem 3: Poor Cooperation in Transport and Communications The Central Asian region is geographically remote from the main foreign trade routes of Russia, which either go westward to Europe or eastward to China and the Asia-Pacific region. Therefore Central Asia for Russia is a bit of a dead end in terms of transportation, and not at all suitable as a freight transit route.

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In Soviet times, there was an enormous volume of freight transport between the Russia (then RSFSR) and the Central Asian republics19 due to the huge output from busy branches of industry based on the division of labour between the republics. These days, with most industrial enterprises in Russia and Central Asia standing idle, the volume of freight transport between them has fallen to a very low level. At present the Central Asian countries use Russian transport routes (mainly railways and pipelines) for their export and import, but Russia hardly has any need for the transport services of the Central Asian countries for its foreign trade (mainly the export of minerals and energy resources to world markets). Thus the fragmentation of the post-Soviet economic space tends to maintain the economic cooperation between Russia and Central Asia at its present low level. This is particularly clearly seen in the existence of the numerous trade barriers between Russia and the countries of Central Asia. These barriers have a particularly negative effect on the links between Russia and those Central Asian countries which do not have a land frontier with Russia – i.e. all of them except Kazakhstan. This to some degree explains why the figures for Russian-Kazakh trade are so high a proportion of Russia's overall trade with Central Asia.

MAIN RECOMMENDATIONS AND POSSIBLE PROSPECTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE The following factors provide a basis for future development of RussianCentral Asian economic cooperation: Russia and the countries of Central Asia have long been parts of an integrated economic system, and their economies are still mutually complementary and interdependent; it is in the interests of both Russia and the Central Asian countries to reduce the raw material-dominated economies and adapt to the processes of globalisation. 19

In 1976 the traffic on the Central Asian (Sredneaziatskaya) railway system comprised more than 77 billion freight tonne-kilometres and 5 billion passenger-kilometres. The mean traffic density was about 13 million tonne-kilometres per kilometre (Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, Moscow, 1978, Vol 24. Book 1, p.366). The "Central Asian (Sredneaziatskaya) Railway" was the official title of the former Soviet railway administration covering the area of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and the southern part of Kyrgyzstan. This administration had its headquarters in Tashkent.

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Recommendation 1: Cooperation in Industrial Production

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Cooperation between Russia and the countries of Central Asia in many areas of industrial production is vital if these countries wish to improve their competitiveness. In theory, this could be achieved by creating joint holding companies, primarily in the processing and high-tech industries. It would be sensible to transfer many technological facilities, especially high energyconsuming ones, to the Central Asian countries as they have their own sources of energy and minerals, more favourable production conditions than in Russia, such as cheaper labour, lower energy costs of production and cheaper construction costs. The most promising areas of activity in which joint Russian-Central Asian holding companies could operate would seem to be the following: textile industry (in view of the fact that 90% of the materials used in the former Soviet textile industry came from Central Asia); mechanical engineering (especially production of agricultural machines and machines for the textile industry, but also aircraft construction and electronics); agricultural production (the Central Asian climate enables some crops to be grown which either cannot be grown in Russia at all, or are grown much less profitably); non-ferrous metallurgy (Central Asia is the main source in the CIS for many non-ferrous metals, including chromium and manganese);20 nuclear energy (almost all the potentially-profitable uranium deposits in the CIS are in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan). All these areas could be of great economic interest, in view of the much lower production costs in Central Asian countries than in Russia. In practice, however, there are complications in the way of realisation of this recommendation. These are due to the likelihood that Russia and Kazakhstan will hasten to join the WTO (Kyrgyzstan has been a member of the WTO since 1998, Turkmenistan has not yet applied for membership and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are not in a hurry to join). 20

It has been estimated that ore reserves of commercially important non-ferrous metals (chromium, molybdenum, tungsten, copper, lead, zinc, vanadium, aluminium, manganese, cobalt, nickel, cadmium, mercury, antimony, bismuth, tin and uranium) in the five Central Asian republics amount to about 62% of the reserves in the former Soviet Union and exceed the reserves in the Russian Federation by a factor of 2.2 - 2.5. V Paramonov and A Strokov, ibid. p.9.

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It is likely that Russia and Kazakhstan joining the WTO prematurely would have a negative effect on industrial cooperation between Russia and the Central Asian countries. Joint Russian-Central Asian holding companies would initially need some protection from world competition. While Russia and all Central Asian countries except Kyrgyzstan are outside the WTO, this protection can be provided by measures such as tax and customs duty concessions, but if Russia and Kazakhstan join the WTO it will become more difficult to implement these measures. Russian-Central Asian industrial integration could actually be strangled at birth.

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Recommendation 2: Cooperation in Transport and Communications There are considerable prospects for economic cooperation between Russia and the countries of Central Asia in projects to develop transportation routes towards South Asia. In theory, this would enable the communication networks of Russia, Central Asia and South Asia to be linked by the shortest route. This would radically reduce the time required for land transportation of goods from the European parts of Russia and from Central Asia to Pakistan and India. Furthermore, it would also provide Russia and the countries of Central Asia with direct access to South Asia markets, boosting the flow of goods on the route "Russia Central Asia Afghanistan Pakistan India". It is clear that the construction of communication routes across Afghanistan would be good for economic links between different parts of the Russian Federation and the Central Asian states and would transform Central Asia from being the transportation backwater it is today to being a major communications hub. Cooperation in this sphere between Russia, Central Asia and South Asia would also make investment in Russia and Central Asia a more attractive proposition for world capital, thus overcoming at least in part the problem of poor competitiveness in Russia and the countries of Central Asia contributed to by their geographical positions. In practice, however, there are many factors which could obstruct this process. The first of these is the complicated geopolitical situation in / around Central Asia. The second group of factors is the poor transport infrastructure of Afghanistan, and another is the devastated economic position of that country. There are no railways in Afghanistan, and the road network is in poor condition

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and of totally inadequate capacity. The main routes between Afghanistan and neighbouring countries are also in very poor condition.21 Furthermore, there is at present no guarantee of long-term stability in Afghanistan, particularly in view of the rising tensions in the international situation in the Middle East and concerning Afghanistan's neighbour, Iran. There are also other problems which could have a bearing on the implementation of this recommendation, such as the relations between India and Pakistan and between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore the above recommendations can probably be regarded as a theoretically ideal scenario, but one which could only be realised if many other conditions were met.22

21

V Paramonov and A Strokov, The Economic Reconstruction of Afghanistan and the Role of Uzbekistan, Conflict Studies Research Center, Defense Academy of the UK, 06/22 (E), June 2006, p.4-5. 22 The analysis of these conditions is outside the scope of this book.

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CONCLUSIONS During most of the post-Soviet period, Russia's policy in Central Asia has been unsystematic, and it has evolved spontaneously, largely by trial and error. In the early 1990s the Yeltsin administration's foreign policy was based on the rather forlorn hope that Russia could be integrated into the Euro-Atlantic community. Central Asia was largely irrelevant to this ambition. However, notwithstanding criticisms that Russia's behaviour towards Central Asia in the early and mid 1990s, and even at the end of them, was inconsistent, the military presence maintained by Russia there has contributed a good deal to the prevention of upsurges of tensions in the region. In the later 1990s, when Russia's attempts to join the West had become a fiasco, there was a lot of re-thinking of Russian foreign policy, and the Kremlin began to pay more attention to its eastern flank, including Central Asia. In particular, Moscow has been interested in preserving the buffer status of Central Asia and preventing other states, primarily the USA, from strengthening their own positions there. When a new generation of politicians came to power in Russia, Russian foreign policy became more pragmatic and focussed on the restoration of the country's former status as one of the world centres of power. Moscow decided that to achieve this it must consolidate the CIS, and especially its energy resources, under the aegis of Russia. In this context it is easy to see why Central Asia acquired more significance in Russian foreign policy. In the area of security Russia seems to have adopted an intelligent tactic towards the Central Asian countries in encouraging military cooperation with them, and this policy has been very successful. This policy is well adapted to the political and economic capabilities of Russia. Its also important that in terms of security the Central Asian states had hoped for a great deal more from cooperation with the West, particularly the USA, especially after the appearance of military

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bases of the US-led international anti-terrorist coalition in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Disappointed that from that quarter the pursuit of deeper political reforms has been linked with harsh criticism, most Central Asian countries now hope that Russia will help them to establish an effective system of regional security through bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Firstly, none of the states in the region feel fully secure, being neighbours as they are to Afghanistan, one of the most unstable places on the planet. A weak government in Afghanistan, a shattered economy, widespread corruption and the presence of armed bands not under Kabul's authority are the main reasons why there continues to be chaos in that country which could spill over into neighbouring countries at any time. In these conditions the Taliban movement and its allies in other radical groups form focal points for extremism, while there is inexorable growth in the production of drugs and in the volume of drugs trafficked from Afghanistan to its neighbours. Experts have pointed out, with justification, that "in a number of Central Asian countries there is a real and growing threat that their regional elites and corrupt representatives of the forces of law and order will be transformed into mere protectors of the drugs business and the powerful drugs syndicates".1 Secondly, in conditions where there are unresolved social and economic problems, which in the Central Asian countries are a legacy of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there is a strong trend towards the growth in influence of various religious extremist organisations,2 in spite of a package of measures being taken to detect them and counter their activities. Thirdly, there are so many questions over borders, territory and natural resources between the countries of Central Asia that disagreements are likely to continue, with the potential to lead to international confrontations. On the whole, however, the Central Asian dimension was and remains a secondary matter in the Kremlin's list of strategic priorities. Moscow has still not understood that Central Asia is important not only for raising Russia's status in the world, but even more importantly for the effective and comprehensive economic development of Russia itself. More than anything, this is about maintaining and advancing its abilities in industrial innovation in a globalised economy. The most glaring evidence of this is the fact that notwithstanding the observable process of political rapprochement between Russia and the countries of the region, the

1

Z Dadabaeva, 'National priorities of international cooperation for achievement of stability in Central Asia', Security of Central Asia: New Challenges, Threats And Risks, Moscow: Centre for Strategic and Political Research, 2006, p.52. 2 Such as "Hizb-ut-Tahrir", the "Islamic Movement of Turkmenistan" and others.

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Conclusions

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international EurAsEC organisation still has not achieved its main aim: the creation of a fully-developed economic community. Russia's increased political and security activities in the region, however, unsupported by adequate development of economic cooperation, is unlikely to guarantee that the process of rapprochement between Russia and Central Asia, observable today, cannot be reversed. Furthermore, if economic links stay at the present low level, the Central Asian countries are bound to want to develop links with global centres of economic power other than Russia. The rich mineral resources of the region will sooner or later be a magnet for much fiercer competition between strong powers and economic groupings than there has been so far. It is not a foregone conclusion that Russia, with its raw-material based export economy and its weakened industrial and technological position, would win this competition. It seems that Russia's glaring underestimation of the strategic importance of Central Asia is largely due to poor analysis of the situation and lack of specialist knowledge of the area which have taken root in Russia because of ideas that the region is some kind of "economic burden" that it would be better not to take on. But the most important point is missed here: the figures for "unprofitability" and "need for subsidies" of the Central Asian republics were artificial even in Soviet times, due to the inefficient economic policy and the way economic activity was organised. Nonetheless, the thinking of the Russian ruling elite and even academic circles, and of Russian society as a whole, is dominated by the idea that Central Asia is useless from the economic point of view. But this region could be highly profitable for Russian business, bearing in mind the availability in the area of all kinds of industrial raw materials, and even more importantly, the production conditions, which are more favourable than in Russia: cheaper labour, lower construction costs, manufacturing capacity to be exploited, as well as an existing transportation and energy infrastructure. From the perspective of today, however, it is extremely difficult to forecast how economic relations between Russia and the countries of Central Asia will develop. This analysis has been approached at two levels: the theoretical level (i.e. what ought to be done?) and the practical level (what is actually happening?). Closer cooperation between Russia and the countries of Central Asia in industrial production and transport communications would enable their economic links to be radically improved, in terms of finished goods, and the trade would increase in volume. This is not only a logical and advantageous step, it is vital for the long-term development of all the countries concerned.

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For Central Asia, cooperation with Russia across a range of issues would have the potential to provide the following benefits: development of the high-technology enterprises inherited from the former Soviet Union (mechanical engineering, aviation, electronics, etc); intensive development of the agricultural sector, which has the potential, with its advantages of climate, to be more competitive, and hence more attractive to investors, than the Russian agricultural sector; opening up the vast Russian market to Central Asian countries; resolution of the "hidden unemployment" problem in Central Asia, particularly acute in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.

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For Russia there would be the following advantages: restoration and redevelopment of many industrial enterprises which are important to Russia but are hardly viable except in connection with the countries of Central Asia;3 more efficient use of processing plant (e.g. raw material refining); solving the shortage of labour resources by mobilising labour from the Central Asian countries to develop zones in Russia such as Siberia and the Far East.4 It is thus possible that the improvements in cooperation between Russia and Central Asia seen recently could be the prelude to a more extensive programme of integration in industrial production and transport communications. The combined resources of the energy sectors of Russia and Central Asia could be a driving force for the development of high-technology and processing industries in all the countries concerned. Two other important circumstances dictate that Russia will inevitably forge a strategic policy of regionalization in conjunction with Central Asia.

3

The textile industry, for example. Russia has practically no textile raw materials of its own, and the climatic conditions there are not conducive to the development of these resources. The raw resources for the Soviet Union's textile industry were produced in Central Asia. But it is not in the interests of the Central Asian countries to operate primarily as a supplier of textile raw materials to Russia, as in Soviet times. That is why the reconstruction and development of the Russian textile industry depends on its technological cooperation with similar industries in Central Asia, based on a mutually advantageous division of labour.

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Conclusions

91

Firstly, Russia’s gravitation towards integration with Central Asia is dictated by current trends which are leading to regionalization of the world market. Today this process is happening in America, Europe and Asia, as it leads to reduced production costs, since various obstacles to the movement of commodities and capital are partially or wholly removed in free trade areas. Moreover, it is very telling that even those countries which are, unlike Russia, winners from globalization, are pushing hard to shape regional markets. As far back as 1994 the USA set up NAFTA with Canada and Mexico. Now the USA is directing its efforts to extending the free trade area over the entire Western hemisphere. The example of the European Union needs no commentary. It is likely that Eurozone industry will rely on the resources of the African continent. Moreover, it is also highly probable that if Russia drags its feet, some of the post-Soviet East European states such as Ukraine, Moldova and even Belarus will sooner or later join the EU. China, likewise, is currently actively pursuing a policy of establishing a common market with the South-East Asian states, and the idea of a single currency for China and the ASEAN countries is being puffed with increasing insistence. If such a zone were established, bringing together countries with a total population of 1.7 bn, then it might possibly “swallow up” Australia too. And if Russia delays with Central Asia, that region might also be partially or wholly drawn within the orbit of Chinese economic influence. Proceeding on the basis that the Russian economy is naturally uncompetitive, it is clear that Russia will scarcely be able to join in even any regional economic project involving the EU, ASEAN, NAFTA or the like. The only role that Russia could play in these markets is that of a supplier of raw materials and some types of arms and military equipment. Even the latter could not be kept up for long in view of the depletion we are seeing of the raw material resources and engineering base of the Soviet MIC. If, therefore, Russia does not wish to remain on the sidelines of key trends in world development, it will be compelled to follow the example of the advanced countries and build a free trade area within a common economic space in the CIS, in which the Central Asian republics will be the most valuable partners for Moscow. Secondly, economic integration in the post-Soviet space as a whole and between Russia and Central Asia in particular is dictated by Russia’s own historical experience.

4

In view of the present unfavourable demographic situation in Russia, this factor would be vital to Russia's economic recovery.

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92

Vladimir Paramonov, Aleksey Strokov and Oleg Stolpovski

According to some Russian scholars, the economic and thus the political demise of the Russian Empire in 1917 was a direct result of the policy of Nicholas II’s government of integrating the country into the world economy.5 After the Russian currency became fully convertible in 1897, with the entry into circulation of the “golden rouble” and capital enabled to move freely out of the country, events in Russia began to unfold on the same lines as in the 1990s: a mass outflow of capital ensued, resulting in the destruction of the economy and the impoverishment of the overwhelming majority of the population of Russia (and also of the minority nationality fringes of the Russia Empire). At that time the process of economic enfeeblement went on for some 20 years, so that by 1917 the country had an enormous foreign debt, an economy in tatters, and almost no gold reserves. The First World War only accelerated the process. And if we look at the reason for the emergence of the Soviet Union in 1922 in a purely economic light, it was because after the fall of the Russian Empire Russia was of no use to anybody in the world market and had no other choice than to form a regional market under the name of the USSR. That this market took the form of a unitary communist state is a chance factor and is due to the fact that it was Communists who came to power. If, however, other political forces had come to power after 1917, they too would have inevitably set about reestablishing the common market of the former Russian Empire. This was dictated not by any ideological considerations, but by the need to survive of a Russia cut off from the world market. That the ideology and political structure of the state that was established in the process might have hypothetically been very different is quite another matter. In the same way, if modern democratic Russia fails at the present time to take decisive steps to limit its involvement in the world market and to foster regionalization in the CIS, and above all with Central Asia, these steps will most probably be taken later, but by other forces that will come to power in Moscow against the background of an inevitable national economic crisis. These forces, however, may prove no less radical than those which created the Soviet Empire. Therefore, in view of the history of cooperation between Russia and Central Asia, it can safely be said that further expansion of their economic cooperation is a necessary condition not only for the development of the Central Asian region but also for a radical improvement in the efficiency and competitiveness of the Russian economy.

5

See A P Parshev, Why Russia isn’t America, NTs “FORUM”, Krymskiy-Most 9D, Moscow, 1999, pp.135-150.

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Conclusions

93

Should Russia continue its policy of full-scale globalization, then we believe there can only be one alternative to the recommendations outlined above, namely disastrous consequences for Russian statehood, comparable in scale to those that led to the Communist revolution in 1917. The future of relations between Russia and Central Asia depends mainly on Russia. In the post-Soviet space only Russia, with its economic and geopolitical strength, could take on the role of being the locomotive of development of the Central Asian countries. What is more, Russia can only be secure in Central Asia if it is as active in developing the region's economic, scientific and technical progress in the 21st century as it was from the later 19th century until the collapse of the Soviet Union. The more this is recognised the more we shall be able to talk of a fundamental change in Russian strategy, and its approaches towards Central Asia in particular. On the other hand, Moscow has to bear in mind that many Central Asian countries have come to recognise the strategic position they occupy and their ability to affect the security and integrity of Russia, and they are prepared to exploit the international competition factor in their own national interests. The fact that parochial interests dominate and will probably continue to dominate over the development of genuine common interests is a legacy of the parlous situation which these states found themselves in after the collapse of the USSR, which was an era of crisis and struggle for survival in during a turbulent time in the development of a new world order. At the moment, spurred by the challenges of the world financial crisis, quite favorable conditions for critical review of previous, extremely ineffective format of Russian policy in general and a policy in respect of the Central Asia in particular has been appearing. However, in order to use those favorable conditions Russia must become driving-forces of the regional economic integration (especially that of real sectors of the economies, industrial and innovational development) and become suppliers of advanced knowledge and technology. Will modern Russia be able to play such an important role like it had played for more than 100 years?

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Annex

BILATERAL TRADE OF RUSSIA WITH CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

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RUSSIA KAZAKHSTAN In 2007, trade between Russia and Kazakhstan amounted to 14.7 billion dollars, a growth of 38% over the previous year (approximately 18% of Kazakh and 2.6% of Russian trade). The volume of Kazakh exports to Russia amounted to 5 billion dollars (10.6% of Kazakhstan’s exports and 2.5% of Russia’s imports), whereas Russian exports to Kazakhstan were approximately 9.6 billion dollars (28.8% of Kazakhstan’s imports and 2.7% of Russia’s exports). Over 84% of Kazakhstan’s exports to Russia were attributable to raw materials (sources of energy 62%, ferrous and non-ferrous metals 15%, chemical production 7%). The range of goods exported from Russia included engineering and metalworking production (approximately 38%), foodstuffs (approximately 7%) and other goods.

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96

Vladimir Paramonov, Aleksey Strokov and Oleg Stolpovski Table 6. Trade between Russia and Kazakhstan, 1991-2008

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Year

Exports from Russia to Kazakhstan, $m

Exports from Kazakhstan to Russia, $m

1991 1992 1993 1994

Volume of trade between Russia and Kazakhstan, $m 22096 4229 4075 3934

13246 * 2579 2496

8850 * 1496 1438

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

5133 4808 4257 3777 2489 4444

2767 2324 1969 2166 1351 2660

2366 2484 2288 1611 1138 1784

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

4446 4027 5235 8124 9480 10675 14720 16513

2779 2634 3273 4645 5106 5864 9653 10246

1667 1393 1962 3479 4374 4811 5067 6267

Sources: data for 1992-2001 Asian Development Bank, referring to the national statistic of Kazakhstan (Key Indicators of Developing Asia and Pacific Countries, Asian Development Bank, 2002); data for 2002-2008 – Economist Intelligence Unit, referring to the national statistic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan: Country Reports, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, June 2003, June 2004, June 2005, June 2006, June 2007, March 2008, February 2009). Note: (*) – there are no data for exports and imports for 1992.

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97

Table 7. The Structure of the trade between Russia and Kazakhstan, 2007

Chemical production Ferrous and non-ferrous metals Energy sources Machinery and equipment Foodstuffs and other consumer goods Other Total

Exports from Kazakhstan to Russia $m Share, % 365 7.2

Exports from Russia to Kazakhstan $m Share, % 1042 10.8

775

15.3

1274

13.2

3157 111

62.3 2.2

1380 3649

14.3 37.8

187

3.7

724

7.5

472 5067

9.3 100

1584 9653

16.4 100

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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, referring to the Republic of Kazakhstan Statistics Agency (Kazakhstan: Country Report, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2008).

RUSSIA KYRGYZSTAN Table 8. Trade between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, 1992-2008 Year

Volume of trade between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, $m

Exports from Russia to Kyrgyzstan, $m

Exports from Kyrgyzstan to Russia, $m

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

8202 317 344 202 206

5860 223 230 143 92

2342 94 114 59 114

1996

309

175

134

1997

290

191

99

1998

265

181

84

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98

Vladimir Paramonov, Aleksey Strokov and Oleg Stolpovski Table 8 (Continued)

1999

180

101

71

2000

191

126

65

2001

148

87

61

2002

197

63

134

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

273 416 535 602 1175

97 150 378 410 812

176 266 157 192 363

2008

1852

1295

557

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Sources: data for 1992-2001 – Asian Development Bank, referring to the national statistic of Kyrgyzstan (Key Indicators of Developing Asia and Pacific Countries, Asian Development Bank, 2002); data for 2002-2008 – Economist Intelligence Unit, referring to the national statistic of Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyzstan: Country Reports, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, June 2003, June 2004, June 2005, June 2006, June 2007, March 2008, February 2009).

In 2007, trade between Russia and Kyrgyzstan amounted to about 1.2 billion dollars, a growth of 95.2% over the previous year (approximately 33.1% of Kyrgyz and 0.21% of Russians trade). The volume of Kyrgyz exports to Russia amounted to 363 million dollars (approximately 34.9% of Kyrgyzstan’s exports and 0.18% of Russia’s imports), whereas Russia’s exports to Kyrgyzstan were 812 million dollars (approximately 32.3% of Kyrgyzstan’s total imports and 0.23% of Russia’s exports). Exports from Kyrgyzstan to Russia included raw materials for textiles (mainly ferrous and non-ferrous metal waste (approximately 10.2%), leather and wool – (approximately 5.3%), precious metal (approximately 49%). The range of exports from Russia included machinery and equipment (approximately 54.4%), chemical production (approximately 17.4%), foodstuffs and other consumer goods (approximately 3.6%).

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99

Table 9. The Structure of the trade between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, 2007

Chemical production Precious metal

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Ferrous and non-ferrous metal waste and scrap Raw minerals Raw leather and wool Machinery and equipment Consumer goods and foodstuffs Other Total

Exports from Kyrgyzstan to China $m Share, % -

Exports from China to Kyrgyzstan $m Share, % 141 17.4

177

48.7

-

-

37

10.2

-

-

83 19

22.8 5.3

28 -

3.4 -

-

-

442

54.4

-

-

29

3.6

47 363

13.0 100

172 812

21.2 100

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, referring to the Ministry of Economic development and trade of the Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyzstan: Country Report, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2008).

In 2008, trade between Russia and Kyrgyzstan amounted to about 1.8 billion dollars, a growth of 57.6% over the previous year (approximately 34.4% of Kyrgyz and 0.25% of Russians trade). The volume of Kyrgyz exports to Russia amounted to 557 million dollars (approximately 31.2% of Kyrgyzstan’s exports and 0.18% of Russia’s imports), whereas Russia’s exports to Kyrgyzstan were 1.3 billion dollars (approximately 36.1% of Kyrgyzstan’s total imports and 0.29% of Russia’s exports).

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Vladimir Paramonov, Aleksey Strokov and Oleg Stolpovski

RUSSIA UZBEKISTAN

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Table 10. Trade between Russia and Uzbekistan, 1992-2008 Year

Volume of trade between Russia and Uzbekistan, $m

Exports from Russia to Uzbekistan, $m

Exports from Uzbekistan to Russia, $m

1991 1992 1993 1994

30785 1136 1889 1602

18654 * * 828

12131 * * 774

1995

1710

902

808

1996

1784

1191

593

1997

1886

963

923

1998

1091

617

474

1999

687

264

423

2000

937

335

602

2001

928

401

527

2002

913

532

381

2003

1149

691

458

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

1379 2060 2347 4160 3819

767 1048 1203 2110 1980

612 1012 1144 2050 1839

Sources: data for 1992-2001 – Asian Development Bank, referring to the national statistic of Uzbekistan (Key Indicators of Developing Asia and Pacific Countries, Asian Development Bank, 2002); data for 2002-2008 – Economist Intelligence Unit, referring to the national statistic of Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan: Country Reports, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, June 2003, June 2004, June 2005, June 2006, June 2007, March 2008, February 2009). Note: (*) – there are no data for exports and imports for 1992-1993.

In 2007, trade between Russia and Uzbekistan, at 4.1 billion dollars, grew by more that 77% compared to the previous year (approximately 29% of Uzbek and 0.7% of Russia’s trade). The volume of Uzbek exports to Russia amounted to 2 billion dollars (23% of Uzbekistan’s exports and 1% of Russia’s imports), whereas Russia’s exports to Uzbekistan were 2.1 billion dollars (39% of Uzbekistan’s imports and 0.6% of Russia’s).

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101

Uzbekistan’s exports to Russia included energy sources (37.8%), cotton (18.7%), non-ferrous metals (17.2%), machinery and equipment (10.9%), foodstuffs (4.8%). The range of exports from Russia included chiefly engineering products (approximately 48.2%), chemical products (approximately 10.3) and foodstuffs (approximately 7.2%). Table 11. The structure of the trade between Russia and Uzbekistan, 2007

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Cotton Chemical production Non-ferrous and ferrous metals Energy sources Machinery and equipment Foodstuffs and consumer goods Other Total

Exports from Uzbekistan to Russia $m Share, % 383 18.7 135 6.6

Exports from Russia to Uzbekistan $m Share, % 217 10.3

353

17.2

473

22.4

775 223

37.8 10.9

36 1017

1.7 48.2

98

4.8

152

7.2

83 2050

4.0 100

215 2110

10.2 100

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, referring to the Republic of Uzbekistan State Statistics Committee (Uzbekistan: Country Report, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2008).

In 2008, trade between Russia and Uzbekistan, at 3.8 billion dollars (approximately 20% of Uzbek and 0.5% of Russia’s trade). The volume of Uzbek exports to Russia amounted to 1.8 billion dollars (16% of Uzbekistan’s exports and 0.6% of Russia’s imports), whereas Russia’s exports to Uzbekistan were 1.9 billion dollars (25% of Uzbekistan’s imports and 0.4% of Russia’s exports).

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102

Vladimir Paramonov, Aleksey Strokov and Oleg Stolpovski

RUSSIA TURKMENISTAN

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Table 12. Trade between Russia and Turkmenistan, 1997-2008 Year

Volume of trade between Russia and Turkmenistan, $m

Exports from Russia to Turkmenistan, $m

Exports from Turkmenistan to Russia, $m

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

6799 394 301 172 273

4578 * * 117 206

2221 * * 55 67

1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

189 221 140 211 603

155 164 111 167 *

34 57 29 44 *

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

189 182 229 285 832 890 1130

153 165 204 242 687 563 458

36 17 25 43 145 327 672

2008

6012

1790

4222

Sources: data for 1992-2001 – Asian Development Bank, referring to the national statistic of Turkmenistan (Key Indicators of Developing Asia and Pacific Countries, Asian Development Bank, 2002); data for 2002-2008 – Economist Intelligence Unit, referring to the national statistic of Turkmenistan (Turkmenistan: Country Reports, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, June 2003, June 2004, June 2005, June 2006, June 2007, March 2008, February 2009). Note: (*) – there are no data for trade for exports and imports for 1992-1993 and 2000.

According to the figures for 2007, the trade between Russia and Turkmenistan, at 1.1 billion dollars, shows a growth of 27% on the previous year (approximately 12% of Turkmen and 0.2% of Russia’s trade). The volume of Turkmen exports to Russia has not exceeded 672 million dollars (10.3% of Turkmenistan’s total exports and 0.3% of Russia’s imports), and imports from Russia amounted to 458 million dollars (15% Turkmenistan’s total imports and approximately 0.12% of Russia’s exports).

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Bilateral Trade of Russia with Central Asian States

103

Exports from Turkmenistan to Russia have included mainly energy sources (approximately 95%) and cotton and other types of raw materials for textiles (approximately 2%). The range of exports from Russia has included mainly engineering and metalworking production (approximately 82%) and foodstuffs (7%).

Table 13. The structure of the trade between Russia and Turkmenistan, 2007

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Cotton and other types of textile raw materials Energy sources Machinery and equipment Foodstuffs and consumer goods Other Total

Exports from Turkmenistan to Russia $m Share, % 13 1.9

Exports from Russia to Turkmenistan $m Share, % -

642

95.5 -

376

82.1

-

33

7.3

2.6 100

49 458

10.6 100

15 672

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, referring to the Turkmenistan National Institute State Statistics and Information (Turkmenistan: Country Reports, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, March, 2008).

According to the figures for 2008, the trade between Russia and Turkmenistan, at 6 billion dollars, shows a growth of 400% (!) on the previous year (approximately 37% of Turkmen and 0.8% of Russia’s trade). The volume of Turkmen exports to Russia has reached about 4.2 million dollars (36% of Turkmenistan’s total exports and 1.3% of Russia’s imports), and imports from Russia amounted to 1.8 billion dollars (40% Turkmenistan’s total imports and approximately 0.4% of Russia’s exports).

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104

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RUSSIA TAJIKISTAN

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Table 14. Trade between Russia and Tajikistan, 1991-2008 Year

Volume of trade between Russia and Tajikistan, $m

Exports from Russia to Tajikistan, $m

Exports from Tajikistan to Russia, $m

1991 1992 1993 1994

3854 193 141 233

2122 * 78 187

1732 * 63 46

1995

357

262

95

1996

154

75

79

1997

179

115

64

1998

138

90

48

1999

128

83

45

2000

294

135

159

2001

193

116

77

2002

145

103

42

2003

202

177

26

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

259 320 355 602 1071

183 203 250 456 833

76 117 105 146 238

Sources: data for 1992-2001 – Asian Development Bank, referring to the national statistic of Tajikistan (Key Indicators of developing Asia and Pacific Countries, Asian Development Bank, 2002); data for 2002-2008 – Economist Intelligence Unit, referring to the national statistic of Tajikistan (Tajikistan: Country Report, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, June 2003, June 2004, June 2005, June 2006, June 2007, March 2008, February 2009). Note: (*) – there are no data for exports and imports for 1992.

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105

According to the figures for 2007, the trade between Russia and Tajikistan, at 602 million dollars, shows a growth of 70% on the previous year (approximately 13.8% of Tajik’s and 0.1% of Russia’s trade). The volume of Tajik exports to Russia has not exceeded 146 million dollars (9% of Tajik’s total exports and 0.07% of Russia’s imports), and imports from Russia amounted to 456 million dollars (16.6% Tajik’s total imports and approximately 0.12% of Russia’s exports). Exports from Tajikistan to Russia have included mainly cotton (approximately 88%) and aluminium (approximately 4.4%). The range of exports from Russia has included machinery and equipment (approximately 70%) and foodstuffs (approximately 20%). Table 15. The structure of the trade between Russia and Tajikistan, 2007

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Exports from Tajikistan to Russia

Cotton Aluminum Machinery and equipment Foodstuffs and consumer goods Other Total

$m 129 6 -

Share, % 88.3 4.4 -

Exports from Russia to Tajikistan $m Share, % 320 70.2

-

-

93

20.3

11 146

7.3 100

43 456

9.5 100

Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, referring to the Republic of Tajikistan State Statistics Committee (Tajikistan: Country Report, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, March 2008).

According to the figures for 2008 the trade between Russia and Tajikistan, at 1 billion dollars, shows a growth of 80% on the previous year (approximately 22.7% of Tajik’s and 0.14% of Russia’s trade). The volume of Tajik exports to Russia has not exceeded 238 million dollars (16% of Tajik’s total exports and 0.08% of Russia’s imports), and imports from Russia amounted to 833 million dollars (26% Tajik’s total imports and approximately 0.2% of Russia’s exports).

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INDEX

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A academic, 10, 91 achievement, 29, 90 acute, 92 administration, 3, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 62, 85, 89 administrative, 18 Afghanistan, xvi, 2, 3, 4, 7, 12, 15, 16, 26, 31, 47, 57, 59, 62, 67, 68, 87, 88, 89, 90 Africa, 59 African continent, 93 aggression, 38, 63 agrarian, 71 agricultural, 86, 92 agriculture, 16 aid, 55, 61 air, 21, 24, 25, 31, 35, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 55, 57, 60, 61, 63, 64, 67, 68, 82 Air Force, 35, 45, 46, 52, 61, 64, 65, 66 Aircraft, vii, 65, 66 alienation, 10, 17 allies, 47, 51, 56, 90 alternative, 72, 94 alternatives, 81 aluminium, 79, 86, 107 amendments, 44 analysts, xi, 15 antimony, 86 Arctic, 21

armed forces, 9, 30, 31, 39, 40, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 54, 58, 60, 62, 64, 67, 68, 69 Armed Forces, 36, 46 Armenia, 3, 20, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 68 Army, 40, 46, 47, 52, 60 arteries, 82 ASEAN, 93 Asian countries, xvi, xvii, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 31, 39, 40, 41, 42, 69, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 95 assault, 40, 54, 64 assets, 8, 18, 48, 53, 66 ATC, vii, 32, 33, 34 Atlantic, 2, 59 Australia, 93 authority, 9, 60, 90 automation, 68 availability, 91 aviation, 48, 65, 92 Azerbaijan, vii, 3, 15, 20, 25, 30, 34, 47, 75

B ballistic missiles, 46, 59, 63 barrier, 17 barriers, 85 barter, 12, 78, 79 batteries, 61 Beijing, xv, 26, 41, 42

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Index

108 Belarus, 93 benefits, 91 betrayal, 7 bilateral relations, 42, 62 bilateral trade, 5, 73, 76 birth, 87 bismuth, 86 Black Sea, 79 border security, 31, 60 Boris Yeltsin, 1, 10, 17, 23 breakdown, 6, 7, 81 Brussels, 9 BTC, vii, 25 buffer, xv, 89 Byelorussia, 3, 19, 20, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 75

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C CACO, vii, 19 cadmium, 86 Canada, 11, 93 capacity, 13, 15, 65, 81, 88, 91 cargo, 82 Caspian, vii, 8, 13, 15, 25, 26, 35, 46, 48, 79 Caspian Pipeline Consortium, vii, 79 Caspian Sea, 8, 15, 25, 35, 46, 48 Caucasus, 12, 15, 31, 63 cement, 63, 69 Central Asia, 1, iii, v, vi, vii, ix, xi, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 51, 52, 60, 62, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97 chaos, 90 Chechnya, 12, 14, 16 China, xv, xvi, 15, 20, 25, 26, 39, 40, 41, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 75, 84, 93, 101 chromium, 8, 86 circulation, 94 CIS, vii, xv, xvi, 1, 3, 5, 7, 8, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,

36, 38, 43, 44, 49, 51, 52, 55, 57, 62, 66, 72, 75, 81, 86, 89, 93, 94 citizens, 44, 58 civil war, 2, 3, 7, 30, 54, 57, 60, 62 civilian, 32, 39 Co, v, vii, xv, xvi, 2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 46, 48, 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67, 68, 84, 86, 87 coal, 79 cobalt, 86 Cold War, 3 collaboration, 25 Collective Security Treaty, vii, xv, 3, 19, 20, 29, 34, 35, 52, 63 Collective Security Treaty Organisation, vii, xv, 19, 20, 29, 34, 63 colleges, 63 commander-in-chief, 32 Commonwealth of Independent States, vii, xv, 1, 29, 30 communication, 87 community, 2, 9, 11, 19, 24, 89, 90 compensation, 47, 67 competition, 15, 27, 55, 87, 91, 95 competitiveness, xvii, 80, 81, 83, 86, 87, 94 competitor, 15 complications, xiii, 86 components, 38, 81 concentrates, 79 conflict, 2, 4, 12, 31, 38, 59 confrontation, 3 construction, 13, 15, 26, 44, 48, 49, 50, 65, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 91 consumer goods, 99, 100, 103, 105, 107 consumers, 81 contracts, 48, 56 control, 3, 6, 8, 12, 32, 35, 51, 56, 60, 68, 72 conversion rate, 5 cooling, 43 copper, 86 corporations, 23, 82 corruption, 90 cost-effective, 69

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Index costs, 6, 22, 33, 59, 81, 82, 83, 86, 91, 93 costs of production, 86 cotton, 10, 71, 78, 79, 103, 105, 107 Council of Europe, 15 Council of Ministers, 30, 34 covering, 39, 47, 50, 56, 62, 85 CPC, vii, 79 criticism, 10, 90 crops, 86 crude oil, 75 cruise missiles, 47 CST, vii, 20, 34 CSTO, vii, xv, 19, 20, 21, 25, 29, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42 currency, 4, 6, 7, 12, 74, 76, 79, 93, 94 Customs Union, 19 cycles, 54

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D database, 33 death, 23 debt, 16, 59, 74, 94 debts, 59 decisions, 4, 34, 35, 37, 39 defence, xiv, xvi, xvii, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 20, 21, 24, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69 deficit, 49 definition, xiii Democratic Party, 3 density, 85 deposits, 8, 21, 79, 86 desert, 63, 83 destruction, 4, 6, 31, 94 detachment, 35, 51, 52 detection, 32, 33 deterrence, 38 distribution, 72 division, 6, 47, 85, 92 divorce, 2, 15 donors, 14 draft, 40 drug trafficking, 30 drugs, 4, 36, 41, 90

109

duplication, 41 duties, 53 dyes, 74, 80

E East Asia, 93 Eastern Europe, 79 economic activity, 6, 22, 81, 82, 84, 91 economic cooperation, vii, 12, 25, 36, 37, 72, 85, 87, 91, 94 economic crisis, 16, 73, 94 economic development, 83, 84, 90 economic growth, 21, 72, 82 economic integration, 8, 23, 93, 95 economic policy, 4, 8, 25, 91 economic problem, 90 economic reform, 82 economics, xiii, 68, 71 elaboration, 30 electricity, 8, 79, 84 electronic surveillance, 53 Electronic Warfare, 58 emigration, 7 employment, 30, 44 energy, xiv, xv, 2, 11, 15, 21, 23, 26, 50, 65, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 91, 92, 97, 103, 105 enterprise, 8, 52, 66, 83 EurAsEC, vii, 19, 21, 23, 24, 90 Eurasia, xiii, xvii, 29, 31, 59 Eurasian Economic Community, vii, 19, 23 Euro, 5, 9, 10, 11, 89 Europe, vii, 15, 25, 79, 84, 92 European Union, 93 exaggeration, 7, 9, 13 exchange rate, 73 execution, 34, 37, 40 exercise, 31, 33, 35, 36, 40, 51, 63 expertise, 37 exploitation, 49, 66, 84 exports, 5, 8, 12, 18, 22, 25, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107 extraction, 76, 79, 84

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Index

110 extremism, 30, 41, 90 Exxon, 8

G

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F failure, 9, 10, 14, 16, 27, 84 faith, xiv, 5, 14 family, 7 Far East, 21, 84, 92 February, 31, 44, 47, 48, 66, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106 federal budget, 59 Federal Security Service, vii, 44, 54 feelings, 9 feet, 93 ferrous metals, 78, 86, 103 fighters, 47, 52 finance, 59, 81 financial crisis, 95 financial resources, 16, 18 financing, 30 firms, 49, 55, 64 First World, 94 flank, 89 flexibility, xv, 18, 26 flight, 7, 36 flow, 4, 23, 87 foodstuffs, 77, 80, 97, 100, 101, 103, 105, 107 foreign assistance, 9 foreign investment, 8 foreign policy, xiv, xv, 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 26, 34, 41, 89 fragmentation, 13, 85 France, 8 free trade, 93 freedom, 15 freight, 82, 83, 84, 85 friendship, 43, 50, 62 FSB, vii, 40, 44, 54, 60 fuel, 21, 23, 62, 82 full capacity, 15 funds, xv, 18, 26

Gaidar, 2, 13 gas, xiv, 8, 13, 15, 18, 21, 25, 26, 27, 67, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 84 Gazprom, 2, 13, 21 GDP, 82 generation, xvii, 69, 89 geography, 82 Georgia, vii, 3, 15, 16, 20, 30, 31, 34, 67 global economy, 17, 82 globalization, 82, 93, 94 Globalization, 83 God, xi gold, 8, 16, 78, 94 government, xiv, 3, 8, 10, 11, 13, 18, 25, 26, 31, 36, 37, 39, 40, 59, 60, 62, 90, 93 gravitation, 92 greed, 64 ground-based, 59 groups, 36, 60, 90 growth, xvi, 21, 22, 64, 72, 74, 82, 90, 97, 100, 101, 104, 105, 107 growth rate, 82 guidance, 56 guns, 54, 61, 64 GUAM, vii, 15, 16, 24

H hands, 8 hard currency, 12, 74, 79 harm, 16, 40 harmony, 40 Hawaii, 59 heart, 10, 17 height, 59 helicopters, 36, 47, 52, 53, 55, 58, 61, 66 helmets, 39 hemisphere, 93 heroin, 3 high tech, 49 high-level, 30 high-tech, 56, 81, 84, 86, 92

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Index hips, 11, 36, 42 hospital, 59 host, 69 hub, 87 human, 69 human rights, 69 humanitarian, 9 hydro, xiv, 10, 17, 21, 25, 84 hydrocarbon, 8, 13, 14, 15, 21, 22, 76 hydrocarbon deposits, 8, 21 hydrocarbon fuels, 13, 14, 15 hydrocarbons, xiv, 10, 17, 21, 25

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I ICMEC, vii, 36, 37 id, 4, 6, 14, 47, 59 ideology, 94 illusions, 17 implementation, 2, 88 imports, 5, 12, 22, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107 independence, 7, 57, 59, 62, 64, 67, 71 India, 15, 39, 40, 56, 65, 87, 88 Indian, 53, 59, 65 indication, 19, 22, 68 indicators, 22 industrial, xvii, 6, 8, 10, 30, 31, 48, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 95 industrial production, xvii, 86, 91, 92 industry, 7, 8, 16, 32, 36, 37, 65, 66, 71, 76, 79, 84, 85, 86, 92, 93 inflammatory, 14 infrastructure, 48, 63, 81, 82, 83, 87, 91 inherited, 46, 60, 63, 92 innovation, 90 instabilities, xvi, 68 instability, 7, 57 institutions, xiv, xv, 5, 16, 19, 23, 63 insurance, 16 integration, xvii, 2, 5, 8, 15, 19, 23, 31, 66, 71, 72, 74, 84, 87, 92, 93, 95 integrity, 95 intentions, 23 interaction, xvii, 42

111

interdependence, 72, 78, 79 international relations, 11 international terrorism, 30, 32, 33, 39, 41, 51, 64 international trade, 81 intervention, 16 interview, 32, 36, 37, 48, 52, 55 investment, 8, 71, 83, 84, 87 investors, 92 Iran, 12, 15, 26, 39, 40, 67, 88 iron, 79 irritation, 10 Islam, 12 Islamic, 12, 14, 60, 64, 90 island, 59 isolation, 6, 24, 71, 81

J Japan, 8, 82 joint ventures, 43 Jordan, 65 jurisdiction, 67 justice, 40 justification, 90

K Kant, 21, 35, 51, 52, 53 Kazakhstan, vi, ix, xiii, xiv, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 60, 63, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 97, 98, 99 Korea, 59 Kyrgyzstan, vi, ix, xiii, xvii, 3, 8, 9, 15, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 60, 68, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 99, 100, 101

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Index

112

L labour, 6, 81, 85, 86, 91, 92 land, 45, 47, 58, 64, 67, 82, 85, 87 landlocked countries, 7 large-scale, 40 laser, 66 law, 33, 60, 90 leadership, 2, 24, 37, 41, 67 leather, 78, 100, 101 liberal, 2 liberalisation, 8 likelihood, 86 links, xiii, xvi, xvii, 4, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 42, 65, 69, 71, 72, 76, 81, 85, 87, 91 lobbying, 15, 25 location, 21, 29 logistics, 57, 63 London, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107

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M machinery, 74, 80, 100, 103, 107 machines, 86 magnet, 91 maintenance, 37, 49, 82, 83 manganese, 86 manpower, 53 mantle, 10 manufactured goods, 6 manufacturer, 56 manufacturing, 6, 8, 37, 43, 48, 55, 56, 62, 65, 69, 82, 91 maritime, 81 market, xvii, 13, 20, 21, 25, 72, 79, 83, 92, 93, 94 market prices, 20 markets, xiv, 11, 71, 84, 85, 87, 93 material resources, 10, 93 measurement, 45 measures, 62, 67, 87, 90 Mediterranean, 26

membership, 15, 24, 40, 86 men, 35, 40, 53, 60, 67 mercury, 86 metallurgy, 86 metals, 74, 77, 78, 86, 97, 99, 103 Mexico, 93 Middle East, 88 migration, 46 military, vii, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, 2, 3, 4, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 25, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 89, 93 military aid, 55, 61 mineral resources, 91 minerals, 74, 75, 77, 78, 85, 86, 101 mines, 49, 61 mining, 8, 61 minority, 94 missiles, 45, 47 missions, 52 modernisation, 21, 37, 48, 55, 61, 65 Moldavia, vii, 15, 20, 30, 75 Moldova, 93 molybdenum, 79, 86 monetary policy, 4 Mongolia, 39, 40 monopoly, xiv, 11, 13 mood, 9 Moscow, xiii, xiv, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 29, 34, 35, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 51, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 82, 85, 89, 90, 93, 94, 95 mountains, 53, 59, 83 multilateral, xv, xvi, xvii, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 42, 90 muscle, 38

N NAFTA, 93 narcotics, 36 national economies, 78 national interests, xiv, xvi, 2, 41, 42, 68, 95

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Index national security, 39, 44, 50 nationality, 94 NATO, vii, xvi, xvii, 4, 9, 15, 31, 36, 41 natural gas, 13, 15, 26, 76, 78, 79, 84 natural resources, 90 navigation system, 50 Navy, 49, 52, 53, 56 Nazarbaev, 5 Netherlands, 75 network, 81, 87 nickel, 86 Niyazov, 23 non-ferrous metal, 10, 74, 77, 78, 86, 97, 99, 100, 101, 103 North Atlantic, vii, 9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, vii nuclear, 47, 50, 53, 86 nuclear energy, 86 nuclear weapons, 47

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O obligation, 67 obligations, 2, 21, 79 obsolete, 55, 68 oil, vii, xiv, 13, 15, 18, 21, 25, 27, 75 opposition, 10, 37, 59, 60 optical, 59, 64, 66 orbit, 45, 50, 93 ores, 10 organ, 34 organic, 74, 80 orientation, 2 OSCE, vii, 15 ownership, 56, 59, 61

P Pacific, 53, 59, 84, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106 pain, 81 paints, 74, 80 Pakistan, 15, 39, 40, 87, 88 paper, 2, 5, 6, 7, 62, 71 parents, xi

113

partnership, xv, 24, 31, 50, 62, 63 partnerships, xvi passenger, 19, 85 peacekeeping, 21, 30, 37, 38 peacekeeping forces, 30, 37, 38 penalties, 7 per capita, 82 periodic, 14 petroleum, 21, 78, 79, 84 Petroleum, 78 pipelines, 13, 15, 82, 85 planning, 25, 26, 35, 44, 59, 72 plants, 76 plastics, 74 play, 6, 38, 93, 95 police, 33 political aspects, 11, 31 political crisis, 19 political instability, 57 politicians, xvii, 2, 69, 89 politics, xiii, 11, 67 poor, 80, 81, 84, 87, 91 population, 8, 82, 93, 94 post-Soviet area, 9, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20 post-Soviet states, 4, 5, 6, 7, 30, 31 power, xiii, xiv, xv, 1, 5, 11, 16, 17, 23, 26, 43, 51, 60, 62, 68, 69, 73, 89, 91, 94 powers, xvi, xvii, 32, 91 pragmatic, 69, 89 pragmatism, xv, 18, 26 preparedness, 31, 33 presidency, xiv, 17, 18, 26 president, 5, 24, 37, 57, 68 President Vladimir Putin, 40 pressure, 10, 13 prevention, 32, 89 preventive, 83 prices, 18, 20, 38, 47 Primakov doctrine, 11 primary products, 75 privatisation, 8 producers, 55 production, xvii, 6, 37, 49, 50, 56, 65, 69, 81, 82, 83, 86, 90, 91, 92, 93, 97, 99, 100, 101, 103, 105

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Index

114

production costs, 82, 86, 93 productive capacity, 81 profitability, 83 profits, 84 proliferation, 53 propaganda, 41 property, 52 proposition, 87 propulsion, 50 prosecutor, 33 protection, 8, 31, 43, 46, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 87 protocol, 19, 24, 38 Psychological Operations, 58 public, 10, 18, 44 public opinion, 10 pumping, 15 purchasing power, 5, 73 Putin, xiii, xiv, xvii, 1, 17, 18, 26, 37, 43, 51, 57, 60, 62, 64, 69

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R radar, 55, 56, 66 radical, 1, 12, 60, 90, 94 rail, 82 range, 24, 36, 40, 43, 45, 46, 51, 52, 57, 63, 64, 72, 83, 91, 97, 100, 103, 105, 107 raw materials, 6, 10, 18, 74, 77, 78, 79, 81, 91, 92, 93, 97, 100, 105 reality, 42, 43 reception, 14 reconstruction, 92 recovery, 93 redevelopment, 92 reduction, 68, 82, 83 refining, 75, 78, 92 reforms, 9, 90 regional, 2, 3, 9, 11, 15, 20, 21, 23, 30, 34, 35, 38, 39, 42, 51, 61, 68, 81, 84, 90, 93, 94, 95 regional integration, 15, 84 regular, 6, 36, 39, 40, 43, 44, 51, 60 reinforcement, 24 relationships, xvi, xvii, 9, 11, 30, 42, 62, 69 rent, 45, 55, 69 repair, 43, 48, 60, 61, 64, 66

research, xi, 2, 6, 26, 29, 42, 43, 46, 49, 55, 65, 66, 68, 71 research and development, 43 reserves, 16, 86, 94 resins, 74, 80 resistance, 60 resolution, 12, 38, 41, 92 resources, xv, 10, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23, 42, 72, 74, 77, 78, 84, 85, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93 retirement, 10 rifting, 47 Royal Dutch Shell, 8 RSFSR, vii, 10, 85

S sabotage, 16 sales, 43 sanctions, 38 satellite, 49 SCO, vii, xv, 29, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 sea level, 59, 66 search, 33, 47 secular, xvi, 68 security, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, 2, 3, 9, 11, 12, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 50, 51, 57, 60, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 71, 89, 91, 95 Security Council, 34, 35, 48, 52 security services, 20, 33 seismic, 53 Self, 58 sensors, 56 series, 58 services, 20, 33, 43, 77, 85 settlements, 38 Shanghai, vii, xv, 20, 24, 29, 34, 39, 40, 68 shape, 93 shares, 56 shortage, 12, 74, 92 short-term, xvi, 42 Siberia, 21, 84, 92 sign, 10, 32, 36, 37, 39, 40, 45, 47, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67 signals, 23

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Index signs, xiv, xvi, 10, 13, 68, 72 silk, 10, 71 single currency, 93 single economic space, xvii sites, 59, 63 skills, 49, 51 social development, 6 social problems, 16 South Asia, 53, 87 South Korea, 59 Soviet Union, xiii, xvi, xvii, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 18, 46, 47, 49, 53, 57, 63, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 80, 81, 86, 90, 92, 94, 95 Soyuz, 45 specialisation, 31 spheres, 6, 20, 41, 62, 64 stability, xv, 12, 26, 63, 88, 90 stages, 45, 63 standard of living, 7 standards, 69 state borders, 31, 57 statehood, 94 statistics, 5, 72, 73, 75 statutes, 34 steel, 8, 79 steel industry, 79 stimulus, 32 stock, 10 storage, 32 strategic assets, 8 strength, 20, 53, 94 stress, 9, 57, 84 submarines, 53 subsidies, 6, 91 sulphur, 78 summer, 16, 51 suppliers, 54, 55, 56, 81, 95 supply, 21, 25, 26, 36, 43, 47, 48, 50, 55, 59, 61, 64, 65, 79, 81 surveillance, 53, 59 survival, 95 synthesis, 74 systems, xiii, xiv, 2, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 56, 60, 61, 64, 68

115

T Tajikistan, vi, ix, xiii, xiv, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 52, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 92, 106, 107 Taliban, 16, 90 tangible, xiv, 17 tankers, 26, 82 tanks, 61 TAPOiCh, vii, 65, 66 tariffs, 23 task force, 51, 54, 67 teachers, xi technology, 32, 35, 36, 49, 81, 92, 95 television, 17 temperature, 82 tension, 7, 57 terminals, 13 territorial, 6 territory, 7, 13, 19, 24, 26, 35, 38, 45, 47, 58, 63, 69, 71, 83, 90 terrorism, 30, 32, 33, 39, 40, 41, 51, 64 terrorist, vii, 3, 12, 20, 30, 32, 33, 39, 40, 51, 89 terrorists, 51 textile, 10, 71, 74, 77, 78, 86, 92, 105 textile industry, 71, 86, 92 textiles, 100, 105 The Economist, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107 theory, 86, 87 thinking, 11, 89, 91 threat, 12, 30, 35, 38, 43, 52, 57, 68, 90 threat of force, 30 threatening, xvi, 68 threats, 2, 21, 30, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 41 time, xiv, 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 25, 32, 34, 36, 38, 41, 58, 61, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 87, 90, 94, 95 tin, 86 title, 54, 85 trade, ix, xvii, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 22, 41, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85,

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Index

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116

91, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107 trading, 4, 75, 76, 81 traffic, 85 training, 9, 20, 30, 31, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 48, 51, 54, 58, 62, 63, 67 trans, 23, 30, 31, 39, 41 transfer, 32, 56, 61, 86 transformation, 3 transition, 18 transnational, 82 transnational corporations, 82 transport, xiv, xvii, 11, 23, 46, 64, 65, 66, 67, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 91, 92 transport costs, 82 transportation, 7, 13, 19, 21, 25, 76, 79, 81, 82, 84, 87, 91 treaties, xvii, 19, 30, 50, 56, 58, 62 trend, 74, 90 trial and error, 9, 89 trucks, 54, 55 trust, xiv, xvi, xvii, 26, 39, 41, 42, 43 tungsten, 79, 86 turbulent, 95 Turkey, 15, 26, 67 Turkmenistan, vi, ix, xiii, xiv, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 17, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 60, 67, 68, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 90, 92, 104, 105 turnover, 12

U UES, vii, 19 UK, xi, 2, 6, 29, 83, 88 Ukraine, vii, 15, 19, 30, 31, 67, 75, 81, 93 UN, 20 UN General Assembly, 20 unemployment, 92 unforeseen circumstances, 52 unhappiness, 10 United Nations, 19, 34, 39 unpredictability, 18 updating, 37, 55

uranium, 61, 86 uranium enrichment, 61 USSR, vii, xiii, 5, 31, 73, 81, 84, 94, 95 Uzbekistan, vi, vii, ix, xi, xiii, xvii, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36, 38, 39, 40, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 92, 102, 103

V vacuum, xv, 9, 16, 26 values, 2 vanadium, 86 vehicles, 19, 24, 36, 37, 40, 51, 54, 55, 61, 64 vessels, 48, 82 vision, 64

W war, 2, 3, 7, 16, 30, 54, 57, 60, 62 water, 8, 81 weakness, 6, 14, 16, 22, 84 weapons, 20, 24, 37, 38, 45, 46, 47, 54, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 69 Western countries, 9, 10, 11, 57, 69 winter, 81, 82, 83 withdrawal, 3, 12, 24, 47, 54, 57 wool, 10, 71, 78, 100, 101 working groups, 36 World War, 94 writing, xi WTO, vii, xvii, 15, 86, 87

Y yield, 84

Z zinc, 86

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