Rules: A Systematic Study 9783110877984, 9789027918536

Table of contents :
PREFACE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS
II. GAMES AND PRESCRIPTIVENESS
III. CONTRASTING NOTIONS
IV. RULES AND THE NATIVE SPEAKER
APPENDIX A. EVERYDAY CONFUSIONS
APPENDIX Β. SOME QUESTIONS FOR BEHAVIORISTS
APPENDIX C. TO WHAT DOES "RULE" ALWAYS REFER?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX

Citation preview

RULES: A SYSTEMATIC STUDY

JANUA LINGUARUM STUDIA MEMORIAE N I C O L A I VAN WIJK D E D I C A T A

edenda curat

C. H. V A N

SCHOONEVELD

INDIANA

UNIVERSITY

SERIES

MINOR 96

1971

MOUTON THE HAGUE

·

PARIS

RULES A SYSTEMATIC STUDY

by

JOAN S A F R A N

GANZ

1971

MOUTON THE HAGUE · PARIS

© Copyright 1971 in The Netherlands. Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague, No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 76-165140

Printed in Belgium, NICI, Ghent.

PREFACE

While there is no need to justify the study of rules to those in philosophy,1 some brief indication of the problems to be treated would not only be of interest but would give some idea of the scope and nature of this work. In this work an attempt is made to provide a criterial or property definition of utterances and inscriptions normally called rules. It is hoped that this definition will select and apply to all and only those linguistic entities which, for independent theoretical reasons, should be called rules. Further, the attempt to provide such a definition acts as a vehicle for the introduction of various philosophical problems associated with rules. A tentative theory of rules, rule-descriptions, and rule-situations is offered, and notions such as following, adopting, and violating rules are analyzed. The technique used to arrive at the characteristics of rules is that of distinguishing the notion rule from closely related notions. Linguistic entities normally called rules are said to have no truth value (to be non-confirmable or not made true or false by positive or negative instances), to be followable (to specify 'see to it'-able procedure), to be prescriptive (to specify what counts as correct or incorrect procedure for activities), to have been adopted (for the appropriate means to have been taken by the appropriate parties so that the linguistic entity is correctly called prescriptive), to remain in force until unadopted, and to be conditional 1

In Appendix A some examples of everyday confusions about the meaning and nature of rules are given. This is done in order to justify, if so doing is deemed necessary, a study of rules to non-philosophers.

6

PREFACE

(to act as critiques for behavior only if certain antecedant conditions have been satisfied, in which case favorable evaluation of behavior is merited if the rule is fulfilled, and unfavorable evaluation of behavior is merited if the rule is not fulfilled). The criteria suggested for a person's (P) following a rule (R) are: (1) Ρ fulfill R, (2) Ρ know R, and (3) Ρ see to it that his behavior fulfills R or try to fulfill R. With respect to which or how many criteria are satisfied by Ρ, Ρ can be accordingly rule-described. For example, if Ρ satisfies criteria (1) and (2), his behavior could be called an according instance of a rule. The prescriptive force associated with rules is suggested to derive not from the linguistic entity itself, but from the critique role of rules for certain activities and/or from an authority having the right to require certain people to conform to certain procedures. It is suggested that for Ρ to be said to have adopted a rule for himself it is necessary that he count his behavior incorrect or evaluate his behavior unfavorably if he recognizes his behavior as not fulfilling the rule. It is further suggested that one can only violate a rule if certain antecedent conditions are fulfilled; merely not fulfilling a rule does not necessarily result in violating it. Lastly, the analysis of rules is applied to the problem of the relation between rules and speakers of natural language. The interest in rule-describing speakers of natural language usually arises from an interest in attempting to explain the ability to extrapolate (i.e. the ability to recognize previously unseen or unheard sentences as grammatical or not, and the ability to produce new grammatical sentences). It is suggested (1) that the ability to extrapolate on linguistic data is a subcase of the ability to extrapolate on experiential data or to be inductive, and (2) that the ability to extrapolate cannot be explained in terms of following rules which is itself an ability in need of explanation. An alternative, experimentally viable course is offered for explaining the ability to speak in terms of investigation of the 'component' skills of extrapolation such as the ability to recognize, remember, imitate, compare, descriminate and the like.

PREFACE

7

A few preliminary remarks are in order with respect to the limits of the inquiry. First insofar as there is any interest in the word 'rule', it is not with any of its verbal uses, but only with its nominal referential use. This restriction of interest to 'rule' as a noun, with referential use calls for explanation. It could be easily agreed that 'rule' is often used in a referential way even when 'referential' is taken to be applicable only when words denote sensorily perceptible things.2 In the sentence Ά rule of chess is: White moves first', 'rule' refers to the inscription 'White moves first'. When handing someone a game booklet, one might sensibly and correctly say, 'Here are the rules for chess', referring to the set of rules included in the section on chess. And if one said, 'The opening move rule in chess needs revision' one would be referring3 to all those rule-tokens which specify the procedure for beginning a game of chess. 'Rule', then, can refer to a single particular rule, a group of different rules, a group of similar rules, and so on. 'Rule' can be used referentially.4 But I would like to make clear that 'rule' also has a non-referential use. Because there is no interest here in the non-referential use of 'rule' is not reason for not being clear that there is such a use and when there is such a use. In 'There ought to be a rule about 2

For our purposes here mirages, hallucinations and the like will not be considered sensorily perceptible physical objects or physical events. Much discussion is needed in order to reserve the word 'reference' for use in respect to sensorily perceptible objects and events, but attempting such an enterprise would leave no space for the issue in question. Instead. I have arbitrarily specified sensorily perceptible objects and physical occurences to be what can be referred to (leaving out hallucinations and the like) and hope that such begging of the ontological question will justify itself by simplifying the problem to be treated and providing a possibility of productive work concerning a limited number of things, namely concerning sensorily perceptible things or the physical side of language. If 'more' is wished to be included or explained, the reader is encouraged to attempt to extend this analysis to such cases to see if and how it legislated in such a wider range of cases. Limiting the ontology here to sensorily perceptible things only restricts the range of interest; it makes no philosophical stand with respect to what is taken to exist or with respect to the possibility of other 'forms' of rules. 3 This is a case of so called general reference. 4 In the first section of Chapter 1, the question concerning exactly what 'rule' refers to will be further considered.

δ

PREFACE

this', 'rule' lacks reference in the sense that there is no sensorily perceptible thing to which it is referring. In this case 'rule' lacks reference in the same way as 'Pickwick' lacks reference in 'Pickwick is a fictitious character'. Similarly, when Max Black writes that rules cannot be identified with any of their formulations, 5 'rules' are being used non-referentially. When it is not recognized that such a use is non-referential, one is tempted to look for an abstract, imaginary, unembodied, or the like 'rule' which is being referred to. But (1) it will not do to look for a rule to refer to over and above any of its formulations, any more than it would do to look for, say, an Adam-style chair over and above any examples of Adam chairs, and (2) we are not here investigating the properties of abstract, imaginary or the like things, but the properties of sensorily perceptible utterances and inscriptions called rules. There are two distinct advantages to so restricting this inquiry. First, this move provides tangible examples for study and second, it avoids muddles caused by failure to distinguish the referential from the non-referential use of 'rule'. 6 A second limitation on this inquiry is the resolve to restrict interest to what the word 'rule' refers to (i.e. denotes) when it refers. This question, " T o what does 'rule' refer?" will be asked shortly, and its answer will determine what is subject for study here. A third restriction on this inquiry is to eliminate all considerations about how 'good' a rule is: whether it is 'adequate', 'appropriate', 'reasonable' and so on. No value judgement made about rules will be of interest. If something satisfies the proposed criteria for being a rule, it will not matter if it is badly expressed, inexplicit, good, bad or indifferent.7 5

Max Black, Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 101. 6 These muddles will be further discussed in Appendix C. 7 Rules need not be 'good' rules to be rules. A rule might require killing your neighbor without cause, stealing, or whatever. If it has been properly adopted it could still be a rule, even if judged morally wrong, atrocious, and so forth. Also, rules need not even be sensible. There are many absurd rules on the books of certain states which, while not followed, are sill rules, For example in Boston, I understand that there is a rule forbidding one to kiss one's wife on Sunday.

PREFACE

9

Lastly, there is no claim to the effect that the analysis is complete or that everything that follows is true. This analysis is offered in the spirit of a tentative attempt to provide a tenable, plausible view of some of the problems in the area of rules. In the attempt to give a tentative approximation of what may someday be a correct view about these matters, some temporary 'solutions' have been offered. So doing is not to imply that all is solved; this was done in order to facilitate a sketch of the whole picture and unfortunately this involved an imperfect painting of some of the parts of the picture. But it is hoped that some coherent and consistent picture of the problems connected with rules is achieved which illuminates some issues, clears up some confusions, and leads to productive thought on these problems in the future.

Rules are rules whether it be absurd, morally wrong, or whatever, to follow them. As C.I. Lewis said in The Ground and Nature of the Right (N.Y., Columbia University Press, 1955, p.77) the question 'of what distinguishes a rule or principle as valid and in itself right, is, of course the deepest-going and the most difficult of all questions concerning right and wrong', and fortunately it is not the question to which we are addressing ourselves here.

TABLE O F CONTENTS

PREFACE

7

I . RULES A N D DESCRIPTIONS

13

1. To What Does 'Rule' Refer?

13

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

15 17 19 23 26 37

Rule-Likeness Are There Syntactic Criteria for Rules? Generality Truth Value Followability Rules as Descriptions

I I . GAMES A N D PRESCRIPTIVENESS

48

1. Games 2. Prescriptiveness a. Introduction b. Evaluation c. Authority 3. Adoption

48 51 51 52 55 65

I I I . CONTRASTING NOTIONS

71

1. Scientific Laws 2. Customs 3. Directions and Instructions

71 80 83

12

4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Commands and Orders Principles Models and Methods Regulations Some More

86 96 98 99 100

I V . RULES AND THE NATIVE SPEAKER

105

1. 2. 3. 4.

105 105 113 116

Introduction Rule-Descriptions of Speakers Grammar-Descriptions of Language Non-Rule-Descriptions of the Ability to Speak

APPENDIX A : EVERYDAY CONFUSIONS

125

APPENDIX B : SOME QUESTIONS FOR BEHAVIORISTS

130

APPENDIX C : T O W H A T DOES " R U L E " ALWAYS REFER?

.

.

134

Bibliography

139

Index

142

I

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

1. TO WHAT DOES 'RULE' REFER?

To what does the word 'rule' refer? To facilitate uncovering this more 'obvious' feature of 'rule', notice the following two example inscriptions. Inscription (1) will serve as an example of something which could be called a rule of chess, when 'White' is taken to mean the player of one set of pieces, and inscription (2) will serve as an example of a description, when 'Black' is taken to be the surname of a particular player. (1) White moves (2) Black moves

first.1 first.

(rule) (description)

First, it can be noted that the rule and the description have at least one thing in common; they are both inscriptions.2 While it can easily be seen to be the case that not all inscriptions which could be rules are actually always functioning as rules, (for example as inscription (2) has been interpreted it is not a rule, yet could be), the question which is of interest here is: Does 'rule' when it refers apply only to inscriptions ? And if it is the case that 'rule' can refer to something other than inscriptions, to what other things can the word refer? 1

The Encyclopedia Britannica calls this a law of chess. Further evidence that 'rule' is correctly taken to refer to inscriptions can be found by looking back at page 9 where examples of such a use of the word are given: this use seems natural and easily understandable for what it is, namely, reference to inscriptions.

2

14

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

It is not so easy a task as it might seem at first to specify, even intuitively, which sorts of things are referred to by the word 'rule' Yet specifying these groups of things is important if we are to have examples for investigation and if we want to be sure that all the things 'rule' can refer to are included as subjects for investigation. But rules are elusive; apart from inscriptions, where does one find them? Let us begin by asking if 'rule' ever refers to behavior. Considering only verbal behavior, it can be seen that under certain circumstances, the utterance of inscription (1) could provide an example of a rule, and that the utterance, taken as a whole, could be a rule. Then, rules can be utterances as well as inscriptions, and 'rule' refers to both utterances and inscriptions. Does 'rule' ever refer to bodily behavior? Behavior can exhibit rules by being in accordance with them, behavior can show rules in actions, and so forth. But does the word refer directly to any bodily actions ? I think not, and there are two reasons why not. First, since any number of rules could be exhibited by some particular series of actions, there are no prima facie grounds for identifying the behavior with any particular rule. 3 A request for articulation of the rule which one might want to claim is 'present' in the behavior is always possible and often necessary. And to be able to sensibly request the rule apart from the behavior gives credence to the contention that 'rule' never refers to actions. Second, and even if it were known that some particular rule is connected with the behavior being observed, there are no grounds for describing the behavior as a rule. Behavior expresses, exhibits, is directed by rules, among other things, and the fact that such relations are necessarily introduced to describe the connection between rules and behavior points to a relation between two distinct things.4 3

A rule could be postulated which is consistent with the behavior and even if the behavior cannot be said to be directed by it, the behavior could at least be said to be exhibiting or expressing this rule. However, there is danger in identifying this rule with the behavior; this is discussed in the second point. 4 In general, finding correct descriptions on the basis of observable behavior is a tricky business. Inferring motives reasons, intentions, and so forth on the basis of observable behavior faces problems similar to those faced by trying to infer rules on that basis. For further discussion of these problems, see Appendix B.

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

15

Because, then, in examining behavior as a possible source of examples, it was found that one could ask for the rule itself beyond the actions, and because the connection between rules and behavior is best described by expressions relating two distinct things, 'rule' cannot be said to refer to bodily actions, and behavior provides no examples of actual rules.5 The 'stronger' philosophical position that when 'rule' refers it ALWAYS refers to linguistic entities is discussed in Appendix C. But it is sufficient for the purpose at hand to establish only that 'rule' can sometimes correctly refer to certain utterances and inscriptions in order to limit the following analysis to such linguistic entities. Henceforth, whenever the word 'rule' is used, it will be taken to be a short way of referring to certain utterances and inscriptions. 2. RULE-LIKENESS

We might not be certain that an utterance or inscription under examination is actually being used legitimately as a rule. For this reason, I propose allowing the analysis to apply to rule-like utterances and inscriptions, or those which could be legitimately used as rules, as well as to utterances and inscriptions which are legimitately being used as rules. Since we are leaving aside the specification of the legitimacy of using an inscription as a rule until a later section, titled 'Adoption', this move of considering rule-like things as well as rules prevents the omission from hampering further progress. 5

Similar situations are present when signs are used to stand for rules, when something symbolizes a rule, when rules are shown in pictures, 'contained' in a progression of numbers, and exhibited in algorithms. Without going through an exhaustive list of the ways in which rules can be related to other things, let me just say that unless the algorithm, symbol, and the like are utterances and inscriptions, they are not rules and cannot be rules. 6 The rule will be considered to be the inscription as a whole, as a complete sentence. The rule is not just separate words but a whole linguistic entity. Also, I will often use only the word 'utterance' or 'inscription' and not both. This does not mean that what is being said applies only to a spoken rule, or a written rule, but only means that the example at hand is of one form or the other.

16

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

The legitimacy of the use, whatever it is, is either assumed accomplished or assumed possible. It must be noted that the analysis will be applicable to rule-like things only with the stipulation that they would fall under the analysis of having the characteristics proposed for rules, once they are legitimately in use as rules. In other words, while the analysis can use rule-like utterances and inscriptions as well as rules as examples, it will not strictly apply to rule-like things until they have been legitimately adopted as rules. But further, I would like to RESERVE the phrase 'rule-like' to apply to linguistic entities, or utterances and inscriptions, which are adoptable as rules.7 This means that number progressions and behavior which exhibit rules or which are rule directed are not rule-like and not adoptable. It also means that some things, like stop signs, which appear rule-like as they can FUNCTION as rules, are not rule-like, and they cannot be adopted as rules. But this decision requires functioning as a rule to be distinguished from being a rule. Certainly things can function as other things without ever being that thing. For example, a king's seal can function as the king's signature (even if the king doesn't do the stamping). It was meant for and is reserved for the pupose of representing and functioning as the king's signature, yet is not the king's signature. The relationship of seal and signature is a symbolic one, much like the relationship of sign to rule. The seal functions as a signature without being one, the sign functions as a rule without being one. The seal is not the king's signature as it does not possess the necessary characteristics of being the king's signature; it is not a hand written inscription of the king. The sign is not a rule as it does not possess the necessary characteristic of being a rule; in the sense under discussion here, it is not an adoptable utterance or inscription.8 7

The notion of adopting will be discussed in Chapter II, 3. It is a rule-symbol, and the adoption involved is the taking of it to stand for the rule that one must stop here. If the rule in question is 'Stop at stop signs', it does not even stand for a rule. It is then a tool employed by the rule-makers for indicating WHERE stopping is required. 8

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

17

There are two further advantages to allowing the analysis to speak about rule-like linguistic entities as well as rules. First, the history of each example need not be sought. We need not check out each example to see if it is in the appropriate context or has been appropriately adopted; we need only look at the utterance or inscription to see if it is capable of being adopted. Second, even though the emphasis here is not so much in the direction of which utterances and inscriptions are CAPABLE of being adopted as rule, but on what they are like once they are adopted, introducing the phrase 'rule-like' provides a basis for comparing rule-like entities with law-like entities and dispositionals.9 Discovering the characteristics of rule-like utterances or inscriptions might illuminate the problem of which hypotheses are law-like or capable of receiving confirmation. 3. ARE THERE SYNTACTIC CRITERIA FOR RULES?

Let us note again that rules and descriptions are similar in that they are both linguistic entities, return our attention to the example inscriptions, (1) White moves (2) Black moves

first. first.

(rule) (description)

and inquire further into their similarities and differences. Are there, or can there be, any syntactic criteria for rules which will serve to distinguish them from descriptions? 9

The treatment of rules in this work will be seen to merge closely with Nelson Goodman's treatment of laws in Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1955) at several points. However, the problem of rule-likeness (what utterances or inscriptions could be adopted as rules) is not so interesting as the problem of law-likeness (what hypotheses could receive confirmation). To determine if any hypothesis is lawlike, one must inquire into its projectibility (conformity with observed conditions, expectancy of being repeatedly applicable and so on). To be adopted as a rule, no conformity to observed regularities is necessary. Rather, rules could require behavior that has never before been seen to be regular, or even performed. But this will again be discussed, and more thoroughly, in Chapter III, 1.

18

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

Notice, first, that both inscriptions are syntactically identical. 10 But even more important, notice second, that along with (2) which could be said to describe a state of affairs in a particular game of chess given the way it has been interpreted, if we look at (1), without reference to its given interpretation and without considering it a rule of chess, we could interpret it also as a descriptive sentence which describes a state of affairs in a particular game of chess. And notice, third, that (2) is as rule-like as (1) in that it could function as a rule as easily as (1) if it were so interpreted.11 The situation is thus the following: inscriptions (1) and (2) which are syntactically identical could both function either as a rule or as a description. Obviously there is nothing about the syntactic features of (1) that makes us call it a rule. And from the fact that not only syntactically identical linguistic entities, but the same linguistic entity, can function as either a rule or a description, it can be seen that there are no syntactic features peculiar to rules and not to descriptions on the basis of which the two can be distinguished. Given that there are no syntactic characteristics which are either peculiar to rules, or which could distinguish rules from descriptions (and other types of linguistic entities), there is no philosophical interest in pursuing the task of syntactically characterizing rules. 12 In view of this I shall use the word 'inscription' to refer to a set of words (or word) which could be used in various contexts with meaning. 'Rule-inscription', or the equivalent, will refer to those inscriptions which have been used as rules in rule-contexts. As will be seen, even the presence of a rule-context will not be determined by linguistic features alone, but is a pragmatic matter Even if inscription (1) were written down twice as (l 1 ), the two inscriptions (1) and ( l 1 ) wouJd not be SYNTACTICALLY more similar than are (1) and (2). 11 It is conceivable that all tokens of a rule-like inscription, i.e., ones that could be used as rules, fail ever to be so used. So, while (2) is not being used as a rule, given the interpretation, this does not mean that it never could be so used, and even if it were never so used, the fact that it could, allows me to count it as rule-like. 12 This position is similar to one held by C.I. Lewis who finds no syntactic distinction between 'is' and 'ought' statements (between descriptive and emotive language), and to one held by Nelson Goodman who finds no syntactic distinction between 'law-like' and accidental hypotheses. 10

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

19

involving the 'qualification' of persons, the nature of activities, and so on.

4. GENERALITY

(1) White moves first. (2) Black moves first.

(rule) (description)

We might attempt to distinguish (1) from (2), or any other descriptive sentence, by saying that (1) attains a higher level of generality than (2), by which could be meant that (1) applies to a larger number of cases than does (2). While (2) applies to some particular games of chess, (1) applies to all legal games of chess. But even if greater universality in this sense succeeds in distinguishing (1) from (2), we have not found a useful criterion for rules as it will not distinguish all inscriptions which are being used as rules from those which are not. It is easy to think of descriptive sentences attaining higher levels of generality applying to more cases than does (1). For example, while (1) applies to all legal games of chess, "People usually breathe" applies to these and many more occurences. But it is not only the case that some descriptions are more general than rules, it is also the case that not all rules attain a high degree of generality or apply to large numbers of cases. Some rules for games are quite specific in what they apply to, and often the relevant situation occurs most infrequently even in legal games for which they are rules. For example, there is a rule in chess called the 'fifty-move rule' which reads as follows: If during 50 moves on each side, no pawn has moved and no capture has been made, either may claim a draw, unless his opponent can demonstrate a forced checkmate or unless the position is one which is known theoretically to require more than 50 moves for a forced win.

One might want to call such a rule general in that it still applies to ALL legal games of chess which after 50 moves are in the above

20

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

position. But then there are problems in determining how many cases of application are needed in order for an inscription to be called general. Consider the following inscriptions : (3) (4) (5) (6)

All All All All

people in the United States are happy. people in Philadelphia are happy. people at the University of Pennsylvania are happy. people in 201 B.H. are happy.

Regardless of whether or not (3)-(6) are true, at what point do we wish to say the inscriptions apply to enough cases to be counted general or universal? If instead of meaning 'application to large number of cases' by 'general', one attempts to make the presence of the word 'all' the sign of generality, the nature of 'all' statements must be examined. In logic, such inscriptions are symbolized by means of universal quantifiers. But even here, it is not difficult to so limit the predicates in their meaning as to limit the range of the statement to very specific cases. If we aJlow 'Px' to mean 'x is a person at the corner of 20th and Pine at 3:45 P.M. on June 1, 1965', and Ή χ ' to mean 'x is happy', the following 'general' or universally quantified statement which translates 'All people at the corner of 20th and Pine at 3:46 P.M. an June 1, 1965 are happy' is a most limited and specific statement. (7) (x) (Px 3 Hx) Is this a general statement? It is universally quantified and it refers to all cases of a certain sort, but it certainly limits the sort most specifically and narrowly. Against the suggestion to make universal quantification the criterion for generality or universal statements, it should be also mentioned that many universally quantified statements are logically equivalent to existentially quantified statements. The following inscription (8) can be symbolized in two ways, each equally correct.

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

21

(8) If anybody is happy, there is someone who is happy. (9) (χ) [(Px.Hx) z> (3y) (Py.Hy)] (10) (3x) (Px.Hx) = (3y) (Py.Hy) The presence of a universal quantifier then, does not in itself guarantee the presence of a universal or general statement. But, further, are all rules couched in purely universal terms? There might be some rules which are not articulated in universal terms. For example: (11) There is one king piece. (12) For each move White makes, Black makes a move, (unless White's move involves a checkmate of Black.)

Symbolized: (13) (3x) (Kx.(y) (Ky = χ = y)) (14) (3x) (Mx.Wx) => (3y) (My.By) Mx — χ is a move, Wx — χ is made by White. Bx — χ is made by Black It seems that generality taken to mean either (a) that the sentence applies to a large number of cases, or (b) that the sentence is universally quantifiable, will not do either as a property of all rules or as a property of no descriptions. Because, first, descriptive inscriptions can also apply to large number of cases. Second, there is no clear criterion for how many cases constitute a large enough area of application to grant the inscription a high degree of generality or universality. And third, some rules are quite specific or apply to a very few special situations. However, we are not yet finished with the suggestion for using generality as a criterion of rule-likeness as it could be held that what is meant by a high degree of generality is not determined by the number of cases that an inscription applies to or by being universally quantifiable, but rather is determined by virtue of an

22

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

inscription's applying to all cases of a certain SORT regardless of how many such cases there are. If this criterion of generality is accepted, (1) is more general than (2) (and rules as a whole are general), because (1) applies to more games of chess than (2), and because (1) applies to all games of chess while (2) does not. But this will not do for two reasons. First, in general, many descriptive sentences apply to all cases of a certain sort. 'People usually breathe' and even example (7) which applies to a very specific case, applies to all cases of that sort. Second, in particular, (1) applies to all legal games of chess while (2) applies to all Blacks who are playing the white pieces in a game of chess. In order to try to 'save' generality from rejection as a distinguishing property of rules, one might want to say that the area of application of (1) is all cases of a well defined activity, while (2)'s area of application is only some cases of this well defined activity. But this will not do as we don't want to return to the old problem of counting cases as a basis for distinguishing (1) from (2). One might try to say, instead, that if an inscription applies to all cases of a well defined activity it is general. But, (a) do all chess rules apply directly to all cases of chess, and if 'indirect' application counts, (b) couldn't some descriptive sentences apply directly or indirectly to all cases of some well defined activity? From all these considerations, I think we have to give up all hope of using high degree of generality or universality, no matter how it is interpreted, as either a distinguishing criterion for rule-likeness or as a characteristic property of rules. However, it does not follow from this conclusion, namely that generality cannot be a criterion of rule-likeness or a common property of rules, that no generalizations are rule-like, In fact, more generalizations than one would, at first glance, think rulelike are capable of being used as rules. For example, 'People stop at stop signs' appears to be simply and solely interpretable as a generality. But given an appropriate context, it could be used as a rule and is therefore rule-like. Such a context might be the following: suppose there was a game having pieces representing people

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

23

and martians, and a board representing the streets of a city. The game might easily include the above inscription as one of its rules, requiring people-pieces to stop at stop signs and perhaps not so requiring of the martian-pieces. Another inscription, which at first sight and out of any context appears most likely to be a generalization about moves in chess games, or a particular description of Mr. White's part in beginning a chess game, is the very inscription chosen to be the 'typical' example of a rule: 'White moves first'. Perhaps such generalization or descriptive interpretations come first to mind and only later does one see this inscription as one which could be adopted as a rule. But regardless of when its rule-likeness is recognized, it is rule-like. There are techniques one could use in order to insure that an inscription is interpreted as a generalization. When the inscription is found out of context, the words 'in general', 'usually', and so forth could be employed. But, in general, generalizations can be rule-like.13

5. TRUTH VALUE

To return once more to the example inscription (1) White moves

first.

(rule)

let us ask what properties it acquires by being used as a rule by asking how (1) as a rule differs from (1) as a description. As a description 'White moves first' can be true or false at different times depending on what happens to be the case in the situation to which it is being applied. But is this the case with 'White moves 13

There are further problems in connection with generality and universality which will not be considered here; for example, are there syntactic signs of universality; can the level of generality be distinguished from the level of abstraction, and so on.

24

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

first' used as a rule? If a description is fulfilled, it is called true; but if a rule is fulfilled, do we call it true? I think not. Similarly if a description fails to obtain it is called false, but if a rule is not satisfied, it does not receive this taint. If there is to be a negative value judgement made, it is made in reference to the actor, not in reference to the rule. Descriptions must wait for the event they are describing to take place before they can be evaluated, as they can be, in terms of truth or falsity. On the other hand, rules are rules before the event, as well as during and after, and are not evaluated at all in terms of truth and falsity. Descriptions are 'in force' once satisfied by being made true or false while rules are 'in force' even before obeyed, and need not be satisfied at all to be rules.14 'White moves first', used as a rule, could be considered to be a description carrying with it a requirement that the description must be satisfied or made true. But even if such an analysis is given to rules, one still cannot simply say that (1) as a rule has truth-value. The 'ruleness' of (1) lies in its second characteristic, namely of requiring that what it describes actually take place, and such a requirement is neither true nor false. It appears that (1) used as a rule is neither true nor false. It could be true or false that 'White moves first' is a rule of chess, or that white moved first in a chess situation, but it is not (1) itself, as a rule, which is said to be either true or false. A consequence following from the fact that rales, unlike descriptions, have no truth-value is that rules cannot be known in the same way as true descriptions are known. It is generally assumed that a minimum condition for knowing that something is the case is that what one is said to know be true. If rules have no truth value, they cannot be known in the sense of 'knowing that S', as a description can. Saying ' I know the rule "White moves first" ' is similar to saying Ί know Jones', and this is usually called knowledge by acquaintance. 14

The grounds on which rules are said to be obeyed will be investigated later. See Chapter 1, 6.

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

25

It might be objected that there is a perfectly usable and sensible sentence which points to our being able to know rules in the sense of knowing that something is the case. (3) I know that white moves first. But this sentence is ambiguous. First, if what the speaker meant was that he knows the rule 'White moves first', then sentence (4) is what he should be saying to make his point. (4) I know that 'White moves first' is a rule in chess. Here the rule is in quotation marks and is known as a rule of chess. The rule does not gain truth-value by virtue of being known as a rule of chess. Or second, the speaker might not be referring to knowing that (1) is a rule of chess but rather be describing something that is the case in chess. Lots of things are the case about chess behavior and chess situations, some of these things are prescribed by the rules. Some are not. If the speaker of (3) is asserting that he knows that Mr. White moved first in some game of chess, (3) is a description which has truth-value, and there is no rule in question at all. A third possible interpretation of (3) is as a general descriptive statement about chess; the speaker knows that in chess the player using the white pieces moves one of his pieces first. It seems to me that on this interpretation (3) is similar to (5). (5) I know that the chess board is the same as the checker board. The rule is not being referred to, rather a regularity about chess situations, (in (5) about chess and checkers) is being asserted to be known. 15 15

More will be said in a later section (Chapter III, 1), about the difference between rule-descriptions and law-descriptions. But again, the rule as such is not asserted to be known; nothing is being said about knowing rules, but rather about knowing features of the situation.

26

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

A similar point is made by Max Black when he says: The sentence, 'The dealer at bridge always bids first' might very well be used to state a general truth about the behavior of bridge players, and would in that use, not be functioning as the formulation of a rule.18 Comparing rules with descriptions has so far yielded the following as a characterization of rules : rules are linguistic entities having no truth value.

6. FOLLOW ABILITY

The question 'How do rules differ from descriptions?', has been answered in terms of rules having no truth-value and descriptions having truth-value. In the hope of uncovering a further feature of rules let us change our example inscriptions and ask what is the difference between (1) White moves

first

(rule)

and (2) The chair is red

(description)

One might suggest that they differ in that (1) describes an action of people, while (2) describes the colour of a physical object. This feature of applying to procedures will later be suggested to be a property of rules and rule-like inscriptions, but it does not serve to distinguish rules from descriptions because 'John stopped at a 16 Black, p. 106.1 will later consider carefully the contention that the inscription, by virtue of being used as a description is no longer a rule-formulation. See Chapter I, 7. The point about the lack of truth-value of rules is dwelt on not only because this property serves to characterize rules and serves as a criterion for distinguishing rules from other linguistic entities, descriptions, but also because this lack-of-truth-value-property will be an important consideration when discussing the relation of rules to speakers of a language.

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

27

stop sign' describes a procedure of someone, yet is not rule-like,17 (capable of being adopted as a rule). Could the distinguishing feature be that rules and rule-like inscriptions apply to ANYONE performing the action? No, as 'In general, people stop at stop signs' is not rule-like. Could it be that what distinguishes rules and rule-like inscriptions from descriptions and non-rule-like inscriptions is that rulelike inscriptions can be interpreted in such a way as to 'bid' people to perform certain actions? 18 We seem to be getting close now, but do INSCRIPTIONS ever bid ? I think not. Inscriptions are tools used by someone who is bidding. But must someone always stand behind a rule and be bidding? I think not. 19 And need someone always be bidden? I think not. It is only necessary to be rule-like, that the inscription be followable. 20 It seems we have found a property of rules and rule-like inscriptions which greatly demands attention. So let us deal now with this interesting problem of followability21 by trying to specify what it means to follow a rule. 17

Hardysays, "If away tobe the better there is, it exacts a look at the worst." This is offered by way of apology for the tedious method of considering unsatisfactory suggestions. 18 But is Ί bid you to open the window', rule-like? The reason why this inscription is not rule-like will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter II, 2; Chapter III, 4 and 5. 19 See Chapter II, 2 for further discussion on this point. 20 Followability is not suggested as a sufficient condition for rule-likeness, but a necessary one. 'Turn left at the corner, John', some commands, instructions and so forth are followable, but not rule-like. Further, 'followability' is used, rather than 'is followed', as not all rules are actually followed, and it is not necessary that a linguistic entity BE followed, in order for it to be a rule. It might be a newly enacted rule, a rule about so unique a situation that the occasion for following it has never arisen, and so on. Such could still be rules, as even if they have never been followed or never will be followed, they are still in form, followable. Also, see comments and footnote in the Preface for a related discussion on not evaluating rules; rules could be absurd, inadequate, morally wrong, and so forth, and therefore not followed. But they are still rules, and in form, followable. 21 It could be asked, 'What sorts of things are followable?'. Answering, 'Rules, commands, models, methods, directions, and the like' is evasive, yet

28

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

I will present or introduce the criteria for saying Ρ (a person) is following R (a rule) without arguing 'up to them'. However, the criteria will be quite thoroughly examined consequently, in order to be justified, explained and illustrated. Ρ is following R if (1) P's behavior fulfills R, (2) Ρ is acquainted with R, (3) Ρ sees to it that his behavior fulfills R. What does it mean for P's behavior to fulfill R ? I propose t o mean by this something intuitively known by virtue of understanding what is meant by saying that P's behavior would be correctly described as satisfying R . 2 2 But, while we often wrongly say that Ρ is following R solely o n the basis of this behavior fulfilling R, when we are being cautious and attempting to be accurate, we require something more to say that Ρ is following R. If P's behavior kept fulfilling R, yet he told y o u he never heard of R, and what's more doesn't want to (and we know him to be honest) we would be forced either to attempt to discover a co-extensive I am not prepared to say much more about this at this time. See p. 31 for the definition of 'followable' Notice that by virtue of being followable, rules are also breakable! An interesting parallel with law-likeness can be mentioned in this connection. If we restrict ourselves to considering utterances or inscriptions, counting foUowability a necessary condition for rule-likeness is similar to counting projectibility a necessary condition for law-likeness. And asking what kinds of things are followable, is similar to asking what kinds of things are projectible. Yet I am not sure that the problem of foUowability can be handled in the same way as the problem of projectibility. It is not so much a problem about "how the world is and has been DESCRIBED and ANTICIPATED in words" (Nelson, Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast [Harvard Univ. Press, 1955], p. 117), but it might be a 'linguistic' problem of another sort, namely a problem about how a linguistic practice is ,or how some linguistic entities are taken to PRESCRIBE and REQUIRE BEHAVIOR. And this feature, the fact that some linguistic entities have associated with them the practice of being followable, or require performance of the behavior specified, is dealt with in Chapter II, 2. 22 What various rule descriptions purport to describe about P's behavior will be discussed in the next section. An attempt to explicate the notion of 'satisfying', would require solving the difficult philosophical problems connected with confirmation of hypotheses. Stopping to resolve these problems here would prevent further progress in explicating rules; 'satisfy', therefore, will be used as a primitive term.

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

29

rule that he knew, or wonder on what basis he was 'regularizing' his behavior. Certainly we wouldn't say Ρ was following R in this case and if absence of knowledge of R on the part of Ρ is taken to be sufficient for denying of Ρ that he is following R, knowledge of R must be necessary for attributing to Ρ that he is following R. 23 But something must be said about the circumstances under which we would say of someone that he knew (in the sense of being acquainted with) something. Unfortunately, no one is at all clear about these conditions. However, instead of waiting for a satisfactory analysis of this subject, I will stipulate what I mean by 'P knows R' and when a theory of knowledge by acquaintance is developed having greater accuracy or adequacy, the criterion offered for knowing here could be adjusted to fit the more adequate theory. In order for us, then, to say that Ρ knows R, it will be necessary that Ρ be able either to articulate R, or articulate a sentence coextensive with R while recognizing that he is not accurately reporting R. This is a rather strict condition for saying that Ρ knows R, but at least we can be reasonably sure that if Ρ can articulate R or something co-extensive with R while recognizing that he is not giving an example of R, Ρ is acquainted with R. To say anything weaker would leave us uncertain as to whether or not an adequate theory would allow such proposed conditions to be sufficient for P's knowing R. Being overly strict in our construal of'being acquainted with R' is the conservative course of action; it limits the number of cases which qualify Ρ as knowing R while it enables a reasonable degree of certainty that it is the case that Ρ is acquainted with R. But while knowing R (and fulfilling R) is proposed as necessary for correctly saying that Ρ is following R, it is not sufficient.24 23

Naturally, P's knowing R is not sufficient for P's fulfilling R, and P's knowing R is not sufficient for following R. In the latter case, Ρ might not fulfill R purposely as he wants to break R. 24 That more than fulfilling R or knowing R is necessary for following R is analogously contended by Wittgenstein when he says : I might see printed words (knowledge) and say words out loud (fulfill) and still not be reading (following) [Philosophical Investigations [New York, MacMillan Co., 1953], p. 66e)

30

RULES A N D DESCRIPTIONS

Consider the following case (the one to come after this parenthetical remark): P's activity fulfills R, Ρ knows R, but Ρ denies he is following R. (He is also honest) There seems to be a further condition required for following R, for if the actor fails to connect his knowledge with his performance, even while 'properly' acting (fulfilling R) and 'sufficiently' knowing (being acquainted with R), I don't think we are justified in overruling him and saying that he was following R. What is involved in making a connection between rules and behavior? It involves P's being acquainted with the rule and P's behavior fulfilling the rule, but also it seems to involve 'doing' something, not AFTER the R-fulfilling behavior, but 'during' it. The best way I can think of to describe this requirement is to say that Ρ must 'see to it' that his behavior fulfills the known R. This is deceptively simple language for a very complex activity but this phrase seems to indicate what is involved in connecting knowledge with behavior when following a rule. Some evidence which favors accepting this phrase, and including it as a requirement for following is: If we say to someone Ύ , see to it that you get home safely', we give a certain responsibility to Y . What is required of Y in order for him faithfully to satisfy this request? More seems to be required of him than just going home. Something more is asked of him by saying 'see to it' than would be asked if we wished him a safe journey. We ask him to T R Y . 2 5 It might be thought that 'see to it' implies success. However, as can be seen by looking at the examples given, what I mean by the phrase is no more than 'try' or 'make a special effort'. A s Nelson Goodman so aptly pointed out, what I mean by 'following a rule' is 'knowing R, trying and succeeding'. The 'success' requirement is carried by the 'fulfilling' criterion, but if 'success' is also 'read

25

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

31

It can be seen that the third criterion for following, 'seeing to it', presupposes and implies the second criterion, 'knowing'. If Ρ does not know R, how could he make any connection between his knowledge and behavior, or see to it that he fulfills R? However, while 'seeing to it' implies 'knowing', 'knowing' does not imply 'seeing to it'. And because later in this section I will distinguish situations on the basis of just knowing versus seeing to it and knowing, I have kept these notions distinct and allowed 'knowing' to be a separate, though implied by 'seeing to it', criterion for following a rule. It might be objected that seeing to it that ones behavior fulfills R does not imply knowing R. Can't a person try to fulfill rules he doesn't know and still be said to be following these rules ? But describing both Pa who knows R and tries to fulfill R, and Pb who doesn't know R but tries to fulfill R in the same way, namely as two cases of following R, ignores an important difference with respect to the positions of Pa and Pb. Consider the positions of Pa and Pb if confronted with a new case ; Pa who knows the rule covering the case could guide his behavior by the rule, while Pb would be best said to have to imitate what others are doing, to try to guess what would be appropriate, or some such thing. Not all cases of trying to do something are cases of trying to fulfill rules; Pb is not trying to fulfill R, but trying to bring his behavior into conformity with those who are, and is best described as such rather than as following a rule. We are now in a position to state the criteria for being followable, and, most simply stated, a followable linguistic entity is one which describes behavior that it is empirically possible to try for and fulfill. Note that contradictory or physically impossible into' the 'see to it' criterion, this is not unhappy. If the notion of success seems to appear twice in the criteria, while it is redundant, it is not wrong, and I apologize for ambiguity. Henceforth, 'fulfilling' can be taken as synonomous with 'success' and 'seeing-to-it' can be taken as synonomous with 'trying'. It should also be noted that the 'see to it' requirement must be satisfied chronologically prior to the 'fulfilling' requirement. One needn't try after one has succeeded.

32

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

behavior can be tried for even if failure is inevitable, but a linguistic entity describing such behavior cannot be followed as it cannot be fulfilled, and if it cannot be followed it is not followable. I would now like to show how the criteria decide whether or not Ρ is following R in several test cases, and see if what the criteria decides corresponds to presystematic descisions. (1) If Ρ knows R, and was seeing to it that his behavior fulfilled R, yet he was not in fact fulfilling R, say, because of something unknown by Ρ about the conditions in which he found himself, would we say that Ρ was following R? (R is not fulfilled yet Ρ is trying to fulfill R.) I think not. We would decide along with the criteria that Ρ was trying to fulfill R, not managing to for one reason or another, and hence was not following R. (2) If Ρ is following R, is he also following co-extensive R 1 's which are unknown to him? Whether or not one takes the position that to follow R is to follow everything implied by R, synonomous with R, equivalent with R and so on, depends on what position one takes with respect to knowing something. If it is maintained that to know S is to know everything implied by S, and so on, then to follow R is to follow R 1 . Similarly, holding that to know S is to know only S, commits one to saying that to follow R is not to follow co-extensive R 1 's. However, if Ρ knows R and R 1 which are co-extensive and sees to it that he fulfills them, the criteria legislate that he is following both R and R 1 . (3) Say that Ρ who does not know R but who on performing activities co-extensive with those picked out by R, constructed R for himself. Could we say that Ρ was really following R? I think not. Knowledge of R must be had, to be following R, before the actions fulfilling R are performed, in order for Ρ to be seeing to it that his behavior fulfills R. (4) If a rule is permissive, that is, if it specifies that some procedures may be executed but need not be executed, would it be

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

33

correct to say that a Ρ follows that rule if he chooses not to execute the procedure specified by the rule ? One might think that if it were granted that Ρ follows R when choosing not to perform the activity permitted by P, that Ρ would be following R without fulfilling it, and hence that the analysis offered for following a rule is inadequate. One could follow a rule without fulfilling it. But let us look more closely at a 'permissive' rule. Is it not the case that a rule reading something like 'If there are no pieces between the king and the castle and if the king will not move into or through chess, one may castle', really says something like the following, 'If the conditions are appropriate either castle or not'. And if such a disjunction is the import of the rule, choosing not to castle is to fulfill one disjunct and to fulfill one disjunct is to fulfill the rule. Therefore, if Ρ considered his position and saw to his behavior, he would not only be following the rule, he would also be fulfilling it. If Ρ does not give a thought to the rule, although he knows it, and just doesn't castle, he would be fulfilling the rule also. And, obviously, if Ρ did castle, he would fulfill, accord with or follow R, depending on his knowledge of R and whether or not he saw to his behavior. In case Ρ either castles or not, however, he fulfills the rule. I think further test cases can be constructed by the reader for himself. But, as further evidence for the adequacy of the criteria for following, I would like to apply the criteria to three further distinguishable cases, (a) to see if the criteria for following do distinguish them, (b) to see how the criteria distinguish them, and (c) to introduce a new three-fold scheme based directly on these criteria for briefly describing these cases. Case a : Pa has learned chess on his own by watching others play. He has never heard, seen, or constructed R (rules for chess). Yet he can play a skillful game. 26 Pa sees to it that his behavior fulfills SOMETHING; I suppose in such cases it is possible to construct some 'move made' generalizations on the basisof the

26

34

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

Case b: P b has long experience in playing chess. H e learned R, but now has played so often that reference to R is n o longer necessary for him to fulfill R by his behavior. His play has become 'habitual' but if asked for R he could articulate them. While playing, then, he never refers to R ; his mind is busy with strategy of the play. Case c: Pc is learning to play chess. H e knows the rules for chess ; he has memorized some accurately and knows the 'gist' of the others. 2 7 While playing, further, Pc makes constant reference to R 2 8 by which I mean he never makes a move without 'checking' that it fulfills R . 2 9 These cases can be diagrammed in the following way, taking ' F ' to mean 'P fulfills R \ Ά ' to mean 'P is acquainted with R ' and 'S' to mean 'P sees to it that his behavior fulfills R'. A n ' X ' indicates a positive satisfying of the criterion.

observed play, and see to it that one's behavior fulfills them. This does not mean that such generalizations are rules or have been adopted as such. 27 Remember that condition A is only satisfied if Ρ can articulate either R or something co-extensive with R while recognizing that he is not accurately stating R. It would be possible for Ρ to verify the exact content of R by looking it up or asking someone, and he could still be said to know R. It is necessary that Ρ be able to articulate at least the 'gist' of R, however, in order for him to qualify as knowing it. 28 'Seeing to it' is quite a stringent requirement; it is applicable only to an active kind of procedure and is only satisfied by deliberate reference, or the like. 29 A further case could be constructed where P's behavior fulfills R, Ρ is acquainted with R, but perhaps some R 1 co-extensive with R. This case is not considered here (it was considered elsewhere) because no NEW linguistic apparatus is necessary for describing this situation. Briefly, it is a case where Ρ is not following R (he accords with R) but might be following R 1 . Incidentally, if it is correct to say of a computer that it can be ACQUAINTED with rules and can SEE TO IT that its BEHAVIOR fulfills rules, then computers can be said to be able to follow rules. (I am uncertain if the words have a legitimate use when applied to computers, however there may be some analogue to the'knowing' and 'seeing to it' of persons for automata.)

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

F Χ

Α

Pa Pb

Χ

Χ

Pc

Χ

χ

35

s

χ

The criteria do distinguish these cases, and further, they do so without any help with respect to new conditions. Each of these three cases has a different 'interpretation' with respect to the criteria; Pa satisfying one condition for following, Pb satisfying two conditions for following and Pc satisfying all three conditions necessary and sufficient for following. The criteria then count only Pc to be following rules, and this is in line with what I would like to say. But what is the best way to characterize the other two cases ? New LINGUISTIC apparatus is called for in order to refer briefly to the differences in these cases. I propose calling Case c, of course, a case of following R, Case a a case of fulfilling R, and Case b a case of acting in accordance with R. The decision that most requires more explanation is, I think, the decision to deny that Pb is following R, involving the decision to describe this case as one in which Pb is acting in accordance with R. To call Pb a case of acting in accordance with R reflects the decision to take the phrase to mean something more than fulfilling R and something less than following R, but this distinguishing of Pb from Pa and Pc is not merely linguistic; the features of each situation can be seen to be genuinely different by looking at the cases and the diagram. The difference is genuine as, remember, while seeing to it implies knowing, knowing R does not imply seeing to it that one's behavior fulfills R. I do not think, further, that such decisions would in any way disrupt ordinary usage if employed, except insofar as it might make the determination of when each term was applicable more difficult. On the contrary, I think such decisions could have purchase and usefulness in 'life' and would serve as some basis upon

36

RULES A N D DESCRIPTIONS

which different cases can be distinguished from each other and described with greater precision. For example, in determining what is required of citizens by the law, all three types of behavior are satisfactory. (Legal laws, it will be seen, are best characterized as rules). Fulfilling, according with and following laws of a country is counted as 'law-abiding' behavior. However, only those following or according with rules would be counted as OBEYING them. As another example, in determining what is required of speakers of natural language, all three types of behavior could be usefully employed as theoretical notions on the basis of which the various situations of speakers can be accurately described. I suggest that this apparatus carries its own justification by making wanted distinctions reflected by genuine difference in the satisfaction of the criteria in different situations, and by being of help in answering practical questions by providing a clearer framework than does our present linguistic apparatus on the basis of which to give an answer.30

30

There is further evidence to support the decision to distinguish according with rules from following rules. Scientific laws can't be followed ; or, to put it in terms of our analysis, we don't see to it that our behavior fulfills laws; we don't have to try (See further discussion of this in Chapter IV, 3). We don't have to see to it that we don't defy the law of gravity, that we keep our heart going and so on. But laws can be accorded with. Introducing the notion of according with a LAW allows us to make even finer distinctions, although we will have to wait for Chapter III, 1 to discuss the distinction between a rule and a law. Notice: it is possible to FULFILL 1. a rule or rule-like linguistic entity (something one could know and see to it that one's behavior fulfilled) 2. a law (something one could know but not see to it that one's behavior fulfilled) ACCORD 1. a rule or rule-like linguistic entity (do know or once knew, and WITH could see to it that one's behavior fulfilled it) 2. a law (do know but neither could one 'decide' to fulfill it or not to fulfill it nor could one see to it that one fulfilled it or not) FOLLOW 1. a rule or rule-like linguistic entity since the notion of following involves not only being ABLE to see to it that one's behavior fulfills it, but also ACTUALLY seeing to it that one's behavior fulfills it (even if one is unsuccessful in the attempt) while laws can be fulfilled and accorded with but not followed.

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

37

In order to distinguish a skillful player (when the rules are known by him) from a new player (when the rules are known by him) the notion of 'seeing to it' was made quite strict. This resulted in denying Case b to be a case of following. I have made a decision to reserve 'following' for cases where the most stringent conditions are satisfied, but I have tried to give intuitive and practical justification for so doing. Following is an activity, which, when all is said and done, is not performed as often as loose usage might have it. 31

7. RULES AS DESCRIPTIONS

Having found two properties of rules which are not properties of descriptions, namely that rules are followable and have no truth value, we can now face the problems which arise when rules are used as, and in descriptions. The main question in this section will be: What could ruledescriptions 3 2 describe or what is the explanatory value of ruledescriptions?; and I would like to suggest that the previous section on following rules provides important distinctions on the basis of which this question can be, at least tentatively, answered. Hence 'fulfilling' and 'according' instances of behavior can fulfill or accord with two things, rules and laws, while 'following' instances of behavior follow only rules. This discussion was introduced prematurely. 31 The point being made here 'arbitrarily' is similar to a point made by A.J. Ayer in The Problem of Knowledge (Baltimore, Md., Penguin Books, 1964, Chapter IV, Part I). Ayer's man who remembers 'habitually' is similar to the man playing chess 'habitually'. Ayer contends that in the case of a man remembering how to do X, the better he remembers, the less he has in mind, '...the better they remember, the less likely it is that they will have any such events in mind; it is only when one is in difficulties that one tries as it were to use one's recollections as a manual. To have learnt a thing properly is to be able to dispense with them.' Ayer, at least, agrees with me that the 'habitual' player, Pb, should be distinguished from the new player, Pc. Pb has 'dispensed' with consultation with the rules Pc is making constant use of. 32 This term might be ambiguous in that it might be interpreted as meaning a description of a rule. However, this is not the intent; as evidenced by the title of this section, the phrase is meant to mean 'rules used as and in descriptions'.

38

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

Given the threefold distinction between following, acting in accordance with, and fulfilling rules, three types of 'positive instances' of a rule (cases where behavior is 'picked out' by the rule or cases where the rule applies to the behavior descriptively) can be correspondingly distinguished. Type 1 : Behavior which is an instance of the rule in that it merely fulfills the rule (which is not known) and which is not being 'seen to' fulfill R can be called a FULFILLING INSTANCE of the rule. Type 2 : Behavior which is an instance of the rule as it fulfills R, which is known, but which is not being 'seen to' fulfill R, can be called an ACCORDING INSTANCE of the rule. Type 3 : Behavior which is an instance of the rule as it fulfills R, which is known, and is being 'seen to' fulfill R can be called a FOLLOWING INSTANCE of the rule. Let me first try to specify at least three significantly distinct types of rule-descriptions (R-descriptions) which line up with the three types of rule-instance behavior first distinguished. Type I R-description: Rules can function as descriptions by relating P's behavior to a rule as a FULFILLING 1 INSTANCE. (I : Rules can function IN descriptions which relate P's behavior to the rule as a fulfilling instance) Type II R-description: Rules can function in descriptions which relate P's behavior to the rule as an ACCORDING INSTANCE.

Type III R-description : Rules can function in descriptions which relate P's behavior to the rule as a FOLLOWING INSTANCE.

RULES AND DESCRIPTIONS

39

I think the term 'rule-description' has been used to refer to all three types of discriptions containing rules, but I am not sure that we have been clear as to what calling something a rule-description can mean. I am suggesting that to call something a rule-description could mean at least three different things in respect to the explanatory power of the description. If one is not clear what one is saying or 'meaning' when one says 'this is a rule description' it is not likely that the different claims made by using rules in descriptions in various capacities would be recognized. I will first consider more thoroughly claims made by a Type I R-description, then Type III R-description, and lastly, the most difficult case, Type II R-descriptions. An example of a rule functioning as a description in a Type I R-description, would be to use Black's example: (1) The dealer at bridge always deals first. What can Type I R-descriptions claim and describe? The situation here is sucb that the linguistic entity has been adopted as a rule but is now being used not as a rule, but as a description of behavior. 33 The only reason there is for correctly calling such descriptions rule-descriptions is that incidentally or accidentally a token of this particular linguistic entity has been adopted as a rule, and now a token appears as a description. When being used descriptively this inscription has no claim to the properties attributed to rules; 3 4 it is not deprived of truth-value for example. The fact that it has A subcase of this type of rule-description occurs when an utterance which is rule-LIKE, namely, which could be adopted as a rule, is used to describe a regularity in changeable behavior. This notion of 'changeable behavior' 'will be examined in Chapter III, 1, and the notion of adoption' will be examined in Chapter II, 3. 34 The question could be asked, 'How could rules function as descriptions?' The answer is that utterances and inscriptions which could be called rules do not function as descriptions, they can be used as descriptions. The linguistic status of utterances and inscriptions arises from their use, or from the context in which they appear on different occasions, and the properties attributable to them are those which are consistent with their use at that time. The answer to the question 'How can rules function IN descriptions?' should be obvious from looking at 'Jones' behavior as fulfilling the rule 'White moves first.' 33

40

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been adopted as a rule adds nothing to its role as a description, nor takes away anything. To make this point clear, look at the situation which is present with the inscription. (2) Black moves first. It is a description, but not a rule-description in sense I, only because there happens to be no incident of a token of this inscription having been adopted as a rule if we look at its past history. (We are assuming here that this is the case.) Look now at (3) White moves first. This could be a rule-description only because it so happens that the linguistic entity 'White moves first' has been adopted as a rule. So rule-descriptions in sense I are no more interesting than any other kind of regularity descriptions. The fact that the inscription has been adopted as a rule does nothing to change the nature of the description or its explanatory value with respect to P. 35 What might lead people to THINK there is a change in descriptive power of a rule-description in sense I, is the interesting situation that while descriptions, when adopted as rules are no longer, normally, called descriptions, rules, when functioning as descriptions could still, normally, be called rules. This leads people to think that some of the inscription's 'ruleness' is being carried over into its descriptive use. But because one happens to speak in this way is no justification for considering the inscription a rule in use. This linguistic entity which happens to have been adopted as rule is 35

While describing Ρ in terms of a Type I R-description instead of a non-rule description makes no difference with respect to the description of P, there is an implied difference in the explanatory claims of rule and law descriptions with respect to the nature of the behavior itself. Rules are foliowable and breakable; laws, it will be contended, are neither followable nor breakable. The implied difference in explanatory power in respect to the nature of the behavior is that a Type I R-description implies that P's behavior is changeable at will. Behavior fulfilling laws is not of this nature. This further implication of changeable behavior is present also when ANY rule-like sentence is used as a description. However, that this behavior is changeable is an added empirical fact about the behavior and not directly relevant to a description of P.

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now being used as a description, and its past history in no way deprives it from being considered as much like a description as 'Black moves first'. Type I 1 R-descriptions are a subcase of Type I. Consider an announcer reporting on a chess game saying, 'White moves first and moves a pawn to K3'. It is completely incidental to the description that 'White moves first' happens to be a rule of chess. All that is being described here, and all that the description implies here, could equally well be expressed by 'Mr. X, who is playing white, began the game by moving a pawn to K3'. So all Type I R-descriptions are indistinguishable from reports or descriptions of behavior, It is not, of course, Type I or I 1 R-descriptions that are the philosophically interesting ones. I only dwell on these senses of 'ruledescription' in order to avoid making the mistake, so often made, of treating such descriptions as making further claims about the situation described than do description-linguistic-entities which have not been adopted as rules, or which do not contain a token of anything adopted or adoptable as a rule. All such descriptions and Type I and I 1 R-descriptions can be characterized alike, as statements of regularities, descriptions of matters of fact, or whatever and the properties attributable to them are those attributable to other statements of regularities, descriptions of matters of fact, or whatever. But now let us turn our attention to the third sense of 'ruledescription' which is of more interest. An example of a description to which 'Type III' applies, namely a description that relates rules to people as what is followed, is : (4) He is following the rule: the dealer at bridge always bids first. Such a rule-description, it certainly could be claimed, does more than just describe overt behavior. Type III R-descriptions claim that P's behavior is a following instance of R, and that, more particularly, Ρ fulfills R, knows R, and sees to it that his behavior fulfills R.

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One might also want to say, by connecting the rule to the person as that which is followed, that such descriptions imply that the behavior is somehow 'motivated' by, 'determined' by, 'governed' by a rule, that the rule is the 'criterion' for the behavior, provides a 'positive' reason for the behavior or whatever. For our purposes it is not necessary to go into the type of relationship claimed to be present by Type III R-descriptions; what is important is that there is a further claim made with respect to explanatory power in the case of Type III R-descriptions36 which is not made by Type I R-descriptions. Let us now try to specify what rule-descriptions of the second type can claim to describe or explain. Type II R-descriptions apply to just those troublesome cases where a person's rule-like behavior is an according instance of a rule, where the person knows the rule, but perhaps because his behavior has become habitual he no longer sees to it that his behavior fulfills the rule. What sort of claim can be made for such a rule-description by way of explaining the behavior? It neither is a mere statement of a regularity noticed, nor does it wholly claim to be an explanation which involves saying that a person is following the rule (as following has been analyzed). It seems to be a description which, however, relates the rule to Ρ by making a knowledge claim.37 Let us specify the nature of such a description in line with the others. Type

36

I R-descriptions —claim to describe only observable, rule-fulfilling behavior.

The further claim will be investigated in more detail in Chapter II, 2 and Chapter IV. 37 It could be said that even if the person's rule-like behavior is not directly attributable to his following the rule, if the behavior deviated from that specified by the rule, the rule could act, not as a positive guide, but as a negative deterrent for behavior which doesn't accord with the rule. So not only do there seem to be valid grounds for distinguishing Type II R-descriptions from those of Type I and Type III, there is an explanatory claim which could be made by a Type II R-description, which while less than the Type III claim is more than a Type I claim.

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Type II R-descriptions — claim to describe observable rule-according behavior and relate the rule to Ρ by attributing knowledge of R to P. Type III R-descriptions — claim to describe observable rule-following behavior and relate R to Ρ in such a way that R can be said to 'determine' or whatever, Β (behavior). Then Type

I R-descriptions are ones in which rules are used, but which are the same as non-rule descriptions and describe only B.

Type II R-descriptions are ones in which rules are used and are used to describe Ρ as well as B, as it is implied that Ρ knows R. Type III R-descriptions are ones in which rules are used, and are used to describe Ρ as well as B, as it is implied that Ρ both knows R and sees to it that his behavior fulfills R. It should be noted that there are cases in which more than one R-description is possible and true; it has nowhere been claimed that a single series of actions cannot be described by many alternative true descriptions.38 In line with this a case might be constructed which further illuminates the issues: Consider: P's behavior is Type III or a following instance of Rl. His behavior could then be described by a Type III Rl-description, a Type II Rl-description, and 38

(a) A case where P's behavior is an according instance of R l and a following instance of R2 (which is co-extensive with R l ) would allow two alternative rule-descriptions, a Type ΙΠ R2-description and a Type II R l description. (b) A case where P's behavior is an according instance of R l and R2 which are co-extensive would be correctly describable by Type II R l - and R2-descriptions.

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a Type I Rl-description. (The types I and II Rldescriptions would be true but less complete as descriptions of the situation). However, the converse does not hold. If the determined facts of the situation only provide evidence that P's behavior is a fulfilling instance of Rl, only a Type I Rl-description is warranted. Rule-descriptions can fail in several ways. First, R-descriptions can be INCOMPLETE. Using a Type I R-description when a Type II or III R-description is possible (when the conditions for their applicability has obtained) is not wrong, but it is not to completely describe the situation. Second, R-descriptions can be INCORRECT. A Type II R-description, for example, claims Ρ knows R, and if such is not the case, the description is incorrect. Third, a R-description can be FALSE when the behavior is not as reported. Needless to say, tricky situations arise when R-descriptions of Type I which do not explicitly relate the rule to the person are offered with the spirit of Type III, namely of implicitly claiming that Ρ is following R. Fulfilling a rule is often taken to be sufficient evidence for saying that a rule is 'guiding' behavior; Type I descriptions are offered with Type III claims. This situation can be remedied by asking people to specify more clearly what claims they mean to make by their description IN their description, and by asking them to be sure they have adequate and correct evidence for so claiming. This is not, I think, an unreasonable request. I further think that if this request were fulfilled, some of the difficulties in deciding whether or not such claims are justified and adequate for particular cases might even be resolvable. A most difficult problem in all this is knowing when the criteria for following are satisfied. In cases where we have no articulated evidence and when we are not privileged to specify the situation with respect to a person's knowledge of the rules, or the 'effort' of the subject, what evidence would suffice to allow us to correctly describe Ρ as knowing a rule or seeing to it that he is fulfilling a rule ? The fact that a person is fulfilling rules is not sufficient for saying

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that he knows them. The behavior of people fulfills innumerable rules that those acting have never been acquainted with, and behavior is describable by innumerable sets of rule-like linguistic entities not known to the performer. In fact, even if a person is not fulfilling a rule, there is not sufficient evidence for saying that he doesn't know the rules. W e frequently break rules we are acquainted with, for example, rules of grammar, rules for the road and the like. Without articulated evidence, it is also a difficult task to determine whether a person is trying to satisfy rules. How would we know he is SEEING ΤΟ IT that his activity accords with the rule, instead of his activity just accidentally being in accord with the rule? Wittgenstein says on this subject: " W o u l d it make sense to say 'If he did something DIFFERENT every day we should not say he was obeying a rule?' that makes NO sense." 39 I take it that Wittgenstein means to say that even if a person acted differently all the time, we would still have no grounds for denying he was following a rule. Conversely, similarity of actions would not always provide sufficient grounds for saying a person was following a rule. All we can tell from behavior, provided his behavior does not include a veridical assertion to the effect that he is following a rule, is whether or not it is a fulfilling instance of a rule. I think we are again faced with a problem which is outside the scope of this paper. The larger problem is : What can be inferred on the basis of observable behavior?, What is an appropriate description of behavior and what sort of evidence is possible for making claims about 'internal states?', How much, or how 'deep' a description is possible of behavior if there is only overt physical behavior as evidence ? The reader is referred to Appendix Β for further discussion of this problem, and no attempt will be made here to specify the kind of evidence needed in order to justifiably say that Ρ is seeing to it that his activities fulfill rules, in short, that he is following rules. I don't think this need make us throw the criteria away; they only 39

Wittgenstein, p. 86.

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face the same problem all descriptions of behavior face. But there could as easely BE criteria for following, even if it is difficult to determine WHEN these criteria are satisfied, as there could be criteria for promising, having intent to harm, etc., (other descriptions of behavior) even though it is equally as difficult to determine when these criteria are satisfied.40 In summary, Type

I R-descriptions claim no more than to be a description of behavior. They assert only that P's behavior fulfills R. 'White labels all green things' would be no more revealing about the situation if the inscription in quotes happens to be a rule.

Type II R-descriptions claim something more than to be a description of behavior. Reference to an inscription which is a rule is made not just accidentally, but in order to relate the rule to the acts in a positive way by making a knowledge claim. It asserts P's behavior fulfills R, and further that Ρ knows R. 41 Type III R-descriptions claim a bit more than to be either just a description of behavior or a description of behavior which is accompanied by knowledge of the rule which the behavior fulfills. Reference to a rule 42 in such 40

Wittgenstein phrases this difficulty in the following way: 'Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language quite strange to you. In what circumstances would you say that people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on.' {Ibid, p. 82) I have tried to specify here the conditions under which it would be correct to say that Ρ was fulfilling, according with, or following rules; I have allowed myself to be in the privileged position of being able to specify which criteria have been satisfied. The theoretical work has been undertaken here; the practical problems of determining whether the criteria have been satisfied in particular cases is left to others. 41 It might be tenable to think that such a description further claims that Ρ will correct his behavior on the basis of the rule, even if it does not claim that P's behavior is a result of seeing to it that the behavior fulfills the rule, but see footnote 43. 42 The description need not explicitly state the relationship but be used in a Type III way.

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a description involves the claim that the rule is so related to the behavior that it is being followed. It asserts that Ρ fulfills R, that Ρ knows R, and that Ρ is seeing to it that his behavior fulfills R . 4 3

43

It might again be tenable to claim further that in so describing Ρ there is not only a claim to the effect that Ρ will correct his behavior, but that his behavior is being 'determined' 'guided', 'produced' or whatever by R. But it is not clear that 'negative correction' can be distinguished from 'positive production'. What exactly is the difference between being restrained by a rule and being determined by a rule? Or again, what exactly is the difference between being deterred from some behavior and being induced to perform some behavior? Remember that some rules specify deterrents to behavior by forbidding certain actions.

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1. GAMES

At this point it would be worthwhile to depart from the technique of distinguishing the notion 'rule' from other notions and discuss the relation of rules to games. Such a discussion is undertaken here not solely in the interest of completeness but because, as will be seen, a further characteristic of rules emerges from considering them in connection with games. Surely there is a connection between rules and games; games 'have' rules, rules might be said to describe games, define games, constitute games and so forth. 1 But merely noting such connections is not very illuminating and does not take us very far in explaining either the nature of rules or that of games. In what capacity, then, do rules apply to games? There is a sense in which rules are relevant to games before anyone begins playing. The rules do not so much 'apply to' as 'specify procedures for' 2 games. 1

Max Black says in this connection: 'it is natural to count the existence and observance of the rules as part of the definition of the system in question'. Black, p. 125). Instead of Black's word 'observance', I prefer 'fulfillment'. Observance, strictly, is not necessary, as games can be played by people who do not know the rules but who merely imitate the practices of others. 2 There are various possible ways of specifying games. If the differences between the standard game of chess, for example, and a version of chess is small, the variant game could be called a version of chess. If the innovations are quite great, a new name might be applied to the game. The rules of many games, football, for example, have changed over the years,

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But by saying that rules specify procedures in games, a whole host of issues arises. (1) It must be noted that while rules specify procedures for games they also define the game and in defining the game, they determine RELEVANT game, e.g. chess, procedures. (2) It follows from (1) that since rules determine and provide criteria for relevant chess procedures, they determine whether or not players are playing. If a person's procedures satisfied the 'essential' rules for chess, the person would qualify as playing chess. This role of qualifying is not peculiar to rules. By virtue of certain facts obtaining or certain events happening, we often conclude that some occurrence or activity is taking place. The fact that certain things occur qualifies the situation as being of a particular sort. For example, if 60 % of the people in a city have the symptoms of a certain disease, there is, ipso facto, an epidemic. Similarly, if people are engaged in executing certain procedures which fulfill the rules of chess, they are, ipso facto, playing chess. (3) It must be strongly emphasized that although satisfying rules for games qualifies people as playing that game,3 this is not the case for all activities for which there are rules. Satisfying the rules of the road might be necessary for driving legally or safely, but is not necessary for qualifying as driving. In view of this, rules cannot be characterized generally as qualifiers for participating in an activity, but as qualifiers for performing activities correctly. The notion of "qualifiers" can be abandoned and the characterization of rules as specifiers of procedures can be supplemented then, to read: rules specify THE CORRECT procedures for activities. and several versions of this game are being played all the time. An obvious case is the difference in rules between amateur and professional football. The fact that there can be several, and changing versions of a game, need not detain us here. What is important is that all people playing a game together, play according to the same set of rules, whatever that set may be. 3 This is because games are activities in which the whole idea is to have your procedures satisfy the rules. Black writes in this connection that 'Games of skill are played for the sake of winning ACCORDING TO THE RULES (if all you wanted was a touchdown, why not shoot the opposing team?).' (Black, p. 124). Satisfying the rules is the point in games.

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(4) It was noted that rules need not specify only those procedures which are required or permitted, they could also specify those procedures which are forbidden in order for an activity to be correctly carried out. For this reason we should say that rules specify the correct OR INCORRECT procedures for activities. Henceforth, the word 'correct' will be used to mean 'correct or incorrect' in the same way as 'truth' can be used to mean 'true or false'. (5) But the phrase 'specifies procedures' might be taken to mean that all rules specify HOW one should correctly proceed. Not all rules actually specify procedures, however, or spell directions for proceeding. For example, if a rule reads 'If a king moves two squares in any one move, the move is illegal', it would not literally be telling you how to proceed. 4 Rules which do not specify how to proceed still indicate something about procedures however, they indicate what procedures count as correct (or incorrect). Despite the fact that not all rules give directions for proceeding, only certain procedures are correct in respect to them; only certain procedures satisfy even 'negative' rules. Since rules can be said to indicate which procedures are correct or incorrect even when they do not specify how one should proceed, it would be best to change the characterization of rules again, this time to read : rides specify what counts as correct (or incorrect) procedure for an activity.5 (6) We noted that in the characterization of rules the word 'games' had to be replaced by 'activities' because even though games might be considered to be paradigm cases of rule activities, Some rules do not tell you how to proceed, but not by telling you what is forbidden, but rather by telling what is permitted though not necessary. F o r example, 'castling is permitted if there are no pieces between the king and the castle, and the king will not move into or through check'. Here, there is a choice, to castle or not to castle. But if one chooses to castle, one can only do so by proceeding in the manner specified as correct by the rule. 5 Many interesting problems connected with games and rules have been ignored as they are tangential to the main argument in this work. Some examples of 'over-looked' problems are: (1) Problems of rule-hierarchies. (2) What should be included in the list of RULES for g a m e s ? (should statements about strategy specifications of equipment, or what counts as winning be included ?) Some of these points are discussed in Ch. III, 4. (3) Under what conditions would we say a game were being played? (If ALL the rules were fulfilled?, s o m e ? , the important ones which are the 'essential 'rules?)

4

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51

rules are relevant to more than games. But what sort of activities are rule activities ? In the same way as analysing what it means to follow a rule helped to characterize 'followability', analysing the relation of rules to game activities helps to characterize rule activities or situations. Most simply stated, rule activities are those for which there are accepted standards for correctness of procedure, but this basic characterization will be explained and extended in later sections when the notions of 'accepted' (adoption) and 'standards for correctness of procedure' (prescriptiveness) are further explicated. Those utterances and inscriptions which are normally called rules have so far been characterized as being followable linguistic entities having no truth value which specify what counts as correct procedure for activities. But while we have found one plausible way of connecting rules with games, as specifyers (and qualifiers) of what counts as the correct procedure, rules are often said to be connected with games (and other activities) in a further capacity. Rules are said to be 'observed', to 'bid', to 'govern', to 'direct', and so forth. In short, rules are claimed to be prescriptive. It is to this claim that we now turn and ask, "What can sensibly be meant by saying that rules are prescriptive?"

2. PRESCRIPTIVENESS

a. Introduction The most mysterious thing about rules is their alleged prescriptive or normative character. However, this property may seem less mysterious if prescriptiveness is distinguished from prescriptive force. By saying that rules are prescriptive I shall mean, not surprisingly, that rules specify what counts as correct 'see to it' -able procedure for an activity. But rules qua inscriptions, do not have prescriptive FORCE. Utterance and inscriptions by themselves do not have the power of requiring, expecting, demanding or

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anything of the like; therefore, talk of 'the prescriptive force of rules' will be elliptical for 'the prescriptive force associated with rules'. Let us now inquire more particularly into the derivation of this force. b.

Evaluation

For the moment, let us ask the following question: 'Why are we more inclined to follow rules than we are to follow suggestions ?' 6 In the game of chess, the rules are of interest to the players because they specify which procedures are chess-wrong and chessnot-wrong for the playing of the game. On the other hand, in chess, suggestions could be made concerning the strategy, techniques of play and so on, within chess-not-wrong procedures. Many strategies would be possible, and which one is chosen depends very much on personal opinion as to effectiveness, judgements about the ability of the opponent, and so on. The point is that VARIOUS strategies fall under the scope of acceptable behavior. And suggestions would pertain to a range of possibilities. The set of rules, however, pertains to the ONE7 correct procedure, pointing to certain sorts of behavior which are necessary to have as fulfilling instances of the rules for chess-not-wrong play. The rules then, 6

Question about the relation between actions and rules appears to me to be similar in kind to questions arising about the connection between belief and statements, knowledge and statements, promising and raising expectations, insulting and hurting someone's feelings, and so on. In short, this is the problem about the relation of linguistic entities and behavior and it is too complex to be adequately treated here. Wittgenstein deals with this problem (Phylosophical Investigations, p. 80 and 139), C.I. Lewis deals with this problem (An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, especially the Introduction and Chapter XII), and so on. It can be seen that my way of handling this problem is to concentrate on rule-situations, not on the linguistic entities. 7 Adding the word 'one' to the characterization is not necessary nor even so dangerous as might be supposed. Certainly rules can be contradictory; one rule for a game might specify some prodecure which another rule counts as wrong. But this is not disturbing as the phrase 'correct procedure' implies that there is only one correct procedure, and the correct procedure might very well be contradictory. This just means it is a rather unsatisfactory specification but it is what counts as correct with respect to an activity nonetheless. See also p. 54.

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provide the one standard or criterion for correct chess procedures. They provide the basis upon which perspective players can evaluate their procedures with respect to playing chess. If one wants to qualify as playing legal chess, one's procedures must satisfy the rules; if one's procedures satisfy the rules of chess we can say that the player obtains a favorable evaluation of his procedures with respect to the game. In chess, then, people are strongly inclined to follow rules, because in order to qualify as playing a legal game, favorable assessment with respect to the rules of chess is necessary. Also, in chess, people are less inclined to follow suggested methods and strategies because there is a greater range of acceptable possibilities with respect to them. It is a promising hypothesis to suggest that the strong inclination to follow rules for all activities rests on rules acting as critiques for behavior or as the basis for evaluation of behavior.8 It should not be thought that everything that can act as a standard or critique for behavior, that is everything which can be used as a basis for evaluation of procedures, is a rule. Suggested methods for doing something could act as a standard for procedures, and activities could be checked against the method. But the method need not be a rule. Acting as critiques is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for being a rule. Procedures and activities can be assessed in terms of rules the performer is not following and does not even know. Even if a performer is not following some particular rules, an observer can still evaluate the behavior on the basis of those rules. But this does not take away from the fact that a performer can ATTEMPT to obtain a favorable evaluation of his behavior by following rules. And we are looking into the incentive to follow rules, not into the various methods possible for criticizing behavior. It is suggested, then, that people are inclined to follow rules in order to obtain something. What can be obtained by fulfilling the rules for activities is favorable evaluation or assessment of proce8

For further discussion of this point see C.I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, 1962), esp. Chapters I and XIII.

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dures as correct. If one wants to be a good member of society, speak grammatically, drive legally, play a game properly, argue validly and so on, the rules for each activity must be fulfilled. This way of looking at the prescriptive force of rules has a distinct disadvantage, however. It rests on the contention that people WANT certain things and recognize that by fulfilling certain rules they can achieve them. However, it must also be remembered that the question asked was 'Why are people inclined to follow rules?' 9 And an answer in terms of wants is compatible with a question in terms of inclinations. Let us return to the original question, 'What is the derivation of the prescriptive force associated with rules?' and answer it in line with the answer to the question about inclinations : by saying that rules have prescriptive power one can mean that rules, by virtue of being prescriptive or specifying what counts as correct procedure for activities, are the basis upon which those in a rule-activity merit either a favorable or unfavorable evaluation of their behavior with respect to the activity. Rules are critiques for behavior and their force, or the 'compulsion' to follow them, arises from their being the basis upon which behavior is evaluated. Rule-situations can be described as ones in which fulfilling rules is the way to merit favorable evaluation of procedures with respect to an activity. Rules lose none of their prescriptive power if they are not fulfilled according to this analysis. If they are not fulfilled, favorable evaluation in respect to a procedure for an activity cannot be obtained, but they remain still as specifiers of what counts as the correct procedure for meriting favorable evaluation. Rules could be 'bad' by being inadequate for providing correct procedures by independent standards of correctness. For example, the rules of inference of some system, judged by independent standards of validity, might fail to insure validity. But what is at issue here is not the adequacy of rules or systems to provide validity but the possibility of achieving favorable evaluation with respect 9 Asking 'WHY do people fulfill rules' is another question entirely and answering this question would not eliminate the problem at hand concerning rules.

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to what is specified as correct for that system. Procedures for work-, ing a proof, which fulfill all the rules of a bad system, can be correct with respect to that system, and receive favorable evaluation whether or not the proof is valid by independent standards. And even if the system of rules is inadequate, rules for that system still have prescriptive force ; favorable evaluation of procedures in that system is still only possible with respect to those rules, no matter how bad they are. In short, utterances or inscriptions called rules can be said to be prescriptive, i.e. to specify what counts as correct or incorrect procedures for an activity, but the prescriptive FORCE is not derived from the inscription. Rather, the force associated with rules derives from their being the basis upon which one can merit favorable evaluation of behavior with respect to some activity. That is, to merit favorable evaluation, one must do what the rules prescribe. c. Authority However, there might be something about the making or makers of rules which provides another source of the 'power' of rules. I would like to look at a suggestion made by Max Black on this subject to see whether it is possible to attribute the prescriptive force of rules to something about their origination. Short reference should be made to the terminology to be used : 'formulating' will be reserved for the activity of articulating rules, 'promulgating', 'adopting' and 'making' will be used synonomously to refer to the activity of bringing rules into force. 10 'Regulation' will be used synonomously with 'rule'. Black contends that 'the primary activity (in respect to rules)... is that of bringing the regulation into force' 11 . He further states that there cannot be instances of enforcing, revoking, or 'consider10

The vast amount of literature on the subject of promulgation of rules in the law is not of value here. The problem is treated there in a highly technical manner peculiar to the problems of the law. Here, 'promulgation' and 'adoption' will be used synonomously; for a detailed specification of what 'adoption' will be taken to mean, see Chapter II, 3. 11 Black, p. 117

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ing' rules unless the primary activity of promulgating them has taken place. 12 I think we can easily agree with Black that enforcing and revoking must wait upon rules being brought into force, whether or not we agree that this chronologically prior activity of promulgating is the basic activity connected with rules.13 Black further says: There runs through this fabric of related cases, I suggest, the connecting thread of a notion of an authority, having the right to require conformity when pronouncing his wishes in set form. It is this, if I am not mistaken, that gives the 'push' that is expressed by such words as 'must' and 'must not' when they appear in the statement of rules in regulation senses. We feel these words as SYMBOLIC SUBSTITUTES FOR PRESSURE EXERTED UPON US. 1 4

One implication of such a position would naturally be that only rules which have an authority behind them requiring conformity to his wishes would be rules with 'push'. This is an unfortunate consequence as it is not clear that all rules have promulgating authorities behind them. When an old government is overthrown, the new government might keep some of the rules promulgated by the old government. But now the PROMULGATING authority is 12 It seems to me that given what Black means by 'considering' rules, this would take place before the 'primary activity' of promulgating them or bringing them into force. Later, he calls the understanding of rules the primary activity of those to whom rules are addressed. (Black, p. 120) Here, by 'primary' he means chronologically first. 13 I think Black makes a mistake when he compares promulgating rules to making moves in chess. He says: "The 'primary activity' of promulgating a rule may be compared to the primary activity of making a promise or even of making a move in chess... as in the end there would be no game of chess, and so no instruction in the game, no aesthetics of chess and so on, unless moves were made..." (Black, p. 117-118). First, there could more easily be no game of chess if there were no rules for it, than if there were no moves made. And in fact, there could be a game of chess with rules (a version of chess) which no one has played nor 'made moves' in; there can be a game of chess even if there is no 'primary activity'. But more important, second, Black confuses the activity of promulgators with the activity of the fulfillers of rules by comparing promulgating with making moves; chess moves are connected with the fulfilling of chess rules, not with the promulgating of them. 14 Black, p. 120

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not behind the rules, someone else's authority is. It might be objected to this that in such a situation, the new government could be said to 'tacitly' re-promulgate the rules by their decision to retain those rules on the books. I would have no argument with this position of construing new authorities as re-adopters, but it is not possible to maintain that all rules have either re-adopting authority behind them, or any authority at all behind them who has the right to require conformity. Black attempts to handle this objection by allowing that not all authority is formal. He allows that not only governments, committees, commissions and the like can formally adopt rules, but also that rules can be INFORMALLY adopted by custom or consent. But is it correct to call a procedure of adoption by consent an authority situation? Is there an authority behind rules made by someone for a private game ? Since everyone has the right to construct private games, everyone could be an authority behind rules. But there would be little sense left to the notion of an authority if everyone has it or is one. And the authority to make rules for oneself is quite different in kind from the authority to require conformity of others. It would be much more preferable to reserve the word 'authority' for formal cases of rule-making (which we will later try to specify) in order topreservesomemeaningfortheword. 15 Further, it would be better to adopt Black's phrase 'enabling conditions' to cover both formal and informal cases of adopting rules. Sometimes the enabling conditions to make rules involve formal election to office, sometimes they only involve a decision to play a game. 15

In fact, the word 'authority' is ambiguous in another way. Let me explain this: grammarians, logicians, creators of games need not be granted formal authority to make rules for their subjects. Suggesting rules for some activity and having them accepted is a way to become an authority. But here 'authority' does not mean something in the nature of a right, but something in the nature of an expert. But I do not think that logicians and the like are granted authority, in the sense of right, to make systems: the idea of an authority to promulgate and require conformity is not relevant to such cases, and they provide an example of cases where there is no authority behind rules.

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And since, as it is contended, not all rules have authorities behind them, the notion of authority cannot account for the 'push' of all rules. It was said earlier that rules can be said to have prescriptive force on the basis of their being critiques for evaluation of behavior. It seems that rules without authority are prescriptive in this sense. But it remains to be seen if rules with authority behind them (those made in formal enabling conditions) can be prescriptive in another sense as well. Again, can the push of rules having authorities behind them derive from that authority? Let us look at the problem from the point of view of those who follow rules, and determine whether in cases where there is an authority behind rules, people follow them not only in order to obtain favorable evaluation in respect to the activity to which the rule pertains, but also, or instead, because they have an obligation to the authority to do what is specified by th authority through rules. What sort of power have authorities in rule-situations? It could not be the power to formulate rules that gives rules a push for those following them. It might derive from the power to promulgate, however. But what is this power to promulgate? It might be merely the power to decide what sort of activity should be required. Doesn't the authority to promulgate rules give an authority the right to specify which procedures shall be written up in the laws ? To derive the push of rules from the right to promulgate alone, would be like deriving the need to take some course in order to get a degree from the right of an administrati on to decide whether 10 or 100 courses are necessary for a degree. We must not derive the need to complete requirements from the right to specify what the requirements are. It would not be correct to say that the prescriptiveness of rules with authorities behind them derives from the right of the authority to determine which procedures are correct. But what other right does an authority have besides the rights to formulate and promulgate rules ? It seems to me that while it might not be a 'he' whose 'wishes' are involved, Black is correct in thinking that an authority has the right to require something from those in its jurisdiction. And people in the jurisdiction of an

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authority, more importantly, have an obligation to that authority. Committees, governments, commissions, and the like not only have the right to set policy through the formulation and promulgation of rules, but have the right to expect that people in their jurisdiction have an obligation to abide by what the authority requires. If this is accepted, rules are prescriptive not only in their being the basis of evaluation of behavior by specifying what counts as the one correct procedure for activities, but also by being the tools used by an authority for calling upon those, who have the obligation to fulfill rules made by the authority, to behave in certain ways. And by virtue of the role of rules as specifiers of what counts as the one correct procedure, they can be employed by authorities, having the right to require they be fulfilled, to inform those obligated to fulfill them which procedures are deemed correct. This can be diagrammed. What is the derivation of the prescriptive force of rules ? Informal Enabling Conditions Formal Enabling Conditions their specifying what counts their specifying what counts as the one correct procedure; as the one correct procedure; favorable evaluation of behavfavorable evaluation of behavior is merited if fulfilled. ior is merited if fulfilled, and their employment by authorities having the right to specify procedures and to require that they be fulfilled. Why must people fulfill rules ? Informal Enabling Conditions Formal Enabling Conditions in order to obtain favorable perhaps to obtain favorable evaluation of their behavior in evaluation and because they respect to an activity. have an obligation to fulfill them. With two very important qualifications then, agree with Black that the push of rules derives from an authority behind them.

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The first qualification is that this is not so for all rules, namely those having no clear authority behind them, and the second qualification is that the authority need not be a 'he' or the original promulgator. The authority behind a rule could be a g oup who gives its authority to a rule adopted by someone else. In answer then to the question 'What accounts for the ability of rules to push?' (which is an animistic question at best), the answer is their relation to activities as specifiers of correct procedure and as the basis for evaluation in non-formal situations, and also or instead, the right of an authority to require conformity. And in answer to the question, 'Why do people follow rules?', the answer is because that is the way to merit favorable evaluation of behavior and, in cases where there is an authority, because people have an obligation to authority to fulfill rules they make. Before moving on, one remark is called for about this 'obligation to follow'. In line with Hart, we must distinguish feeling obliged from having an obligation. It is clear that people can have an obligation to do something without feeling obliged to do it. 16 Since there are two answers to the question about the prescriptiveness of rules, one pertaining to rules without authorities behind them, and one pertaining to rules with authority behind them, we should make an effort to make a sharper distinction between formal and informal enabling conditions. Let us do this by trying to specify what formal enabling conditions are like. Formal authority cannot be distinguished from informal enabling conditions on the basis of how many people are in the scope of the rules. A government's realm might be a very small population. On the other hand, many people might have played a particular game made up in some informal way. Also, a great length of time in existence will not grant a group authority to promulgate and the right to require conformity to rules, nor will shortness of existence deprive a group of authority. The game of Go has been around a good deal longer than some governments. 16

For further discussion of this point see H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law, especially Chapter V. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961)

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However, it does seem clear that authority can be received by certain kinds of formal methods in different cases. Governments can be elected, committees appointed, officials selected, and so on. From these situations one is tempted to suggest that authority is given by the consent of those who elect or appoint. And often consent to abide by rules made is granted by those who appoint. In elections majority consent is needed, in the church loyalty and belief is exacted, and so forth, but in all cases of this sort, those who fall under the rules can grant authority by their consent. But while this is the case in many situations, it will not do to say that authority to promulgate and require fulfilling of rules is always granted by the consent of those willing to fulfill rules. For, in the first place, the authority might be granted or consented to by people who are not going to fall under the scope of the rules. Sometimes baseball commissions are elected by non-players.17 And in the second place, unelected governments or those which merely seize power, have not received consent from the citizens of the state. Does a non-elected government, which doesn't have the consent of the people in its scope have the right to require conformity ? Well, if it is militarily strong it might have the FORCE for enforcing conformity. But does it have the RIGHT to require it ? Does 'might' constitute 'right'? Let us inquire further by asking how one would go about denying ones obligation to follow rules to see whether methods of denying obligation differ in such a way as to distinguish formal from informal enabling conditions. It seems correct to say that in different situations there is more or less difficulty in denying obligation. It is easier to deny obligation to follow one's own moral precepts than those specified by a religious organization to which one belongs. It is easier to deny obligation to follow one's own version of chess than the standard version if one is competing in a chess tournament. Perhaps authorAlso, it is not necessary that all those who have the authority to promulgate later follow the rules they promulgate when in an officia) capacity. Baseball commissioners might never play.

17

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ities are present when it is more difficult to deny obligations to the rules. But how do we measure relative difficulty ? When it is more difficult to deny one's obligations to follow is it not the case that there is a procedure that one would have to go through in order to repudiate the obligation ? In cases where there is an authority, formal procedures are usually specified for how to go about 'getting out' of the scope of the rules. One's own desire to get out of the scope of the rules is not sufficient for so doing; rather, one would have to take steps to remove oneself from the authority and be exempted from the obligation to fulfill rules made by the authority. It should be noted that when authoritative or formal enabling conditions are present, while it is more difficult to change the rules than in informal games and the like, it is not impossible. New rules for football are being made, new stands on birth control have been taken by religious organizations, new rules for taxation have been adopted by governments, and so on. The point is, however, that in tournaments, established religions or reigning governments (cases of formal enabling conditions) channels are specified for changing the rules. 'Unadoption' can be as formal as adoption. One is equally bound to the rules in both authority and nonauthority cases with respect to what counts as correct procedure. The difference is that in authority cases, in order not to be bound, or in order to change the rules, formal steps must be taken, desire to escape obligation is not enough. The way to determine, then, if there are authorities or formal enabling conditions present, is to determine how one could go about denying ones obligation to the rules. If one can do so simply by refusing the obligation, there is no authority behind the rules. If it is necessary to take formal or violent steps, the situation counts as one in which there is a formal authority. I would now like to consider various questions which could be put to the analysis and give answers on the basis of the analysis. The diagram on page 59, would be useful to have in mind. 1. Can people be obliged to fulfill rules having no authority behind them ? The nature of the obligation to fulfill rules with no

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authority behind them is different from an obligation to authority; we might say that one has an obligation to fulfill the rules in the sense that this is the way to merit a favorable evaluation of behavior. But with this qualification in mind concerning the nature of the obligation it is no more necessary to have an authority behind rules in order to have an obligation to fulfill them, than it is necessary to have a transcendant being behind moral precepts in order to have an obligation to be moral. A religion, or transcendant being, could provide an 'extra' source of obligation, or be the only source of felt obligation in cases where people might not recognize their obligation on other grounds. In religion cases, the person has two obligations, to act correctly and to conform to the procedures specified by an authority. Rules can have prescriptive force in the evaluative sense (and people can have obligations towards them in this sense, also) without being prescriptive in the obligation to authority sense. 2. Can you follow rules solely because you are required to do so by an authority, or solely on the basis of having an obligation to authority? Yes, but of course only in the cases where there is an authority behind the rules. However, the fact that there is an obligation to authority does not guarantee that all those in the scope of the authority will fulfill the rules or be aware of their obligations. 3. Does the contention put forth here allow rules to have prescriptive force even if nobody fulfills them ? Yes, and they could have prescriptive force in both the 'evaluative' and 'authoritative' ways. In the evaluation cases, rules can be the basis for evaluation in a particular activity, whether or not anyone enters into that activity. They would remain as specifiers of what counts as correct procedure for anyone who should enter into the activity. In the obligation to authority cases, one can have an obligation and not fulfill it. The obligation is there, whether or not one fulfills it. 4. If behavior fulfills rules, do those so behaving thereby grant the rule prescriptive force? No, not THEREBY. People could be fulfilling all sorts of possible rules, which might have been adopted for another activity. Such behavior does not give those rules the role of specifiers of correct procedure for the activity at hand.

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5. If people follow rules, do they thereby grant the rule prescriptive force? This depends on the circumstances. If the rule is adopted for oneself it might. But attempting to adopt a rule for a game for which you have no right to adopt rules, and even following such 'rules' would not grant the 'rule' prescriptive force. 6. Denying ones obligation to fulfill formally adopted rules would deny the authority behind it, but would denying authority behind rules result in denying ones obligations to fulfill the rules ? Not necessarily. Electing a new government in a continuing government situation might keep the rules promulgated by the old authority in force. We are now in a position to specify more completely what will be meant by saying that a rule has prescriptive force. What will be meant by saying that rules have prescriptive force is that rules provide a 'critique' sort of basis for evaluating behavior, or that rules are used by authorities who have the right to require certain procedures to be executed, The force in the former case derives from the relation of rules to activities ; one must fulfill rules if one is to merit favorable evaluation of behavior with respect to that activity. The force in the latter case derives from the authority behind the rules ; one must fulfill rules that an authority adopts if the authority has both the right to specify correct procedures and the right to require one to conform to those procedures.18 But whatever the force, from whomever it comes, the force is extrinsic to the rule as a linguistic entity. It lies either in the position of those fulfilling rules or in the role of those behind rules. Given what is meant by 'prescriptive' (i.e. specifying what counts as correct 'see to it'-able procedure for activity), the characterization of rules can now read : Rules are prescriptive linguis-

18

The right to make rules will be discussed further in the next section, and it will be seen that this varies from case to case. Sometimes the power to enforce a rule gives one the right to make it as well as to provide the force behind it. An example of this would be a tyrant who makes rules and gives them force due to military strength or whatever. Sometimes, unfortunately, might constitutes right.

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tic entities having no truth value.19 Rules are not said to have prescriptive force; this is a feature of rule-situations.

3. ADOPTION

There has been frequent mention of 'adoption'. Let us now look more closely into this notion. Utterances and inscriptions normally called rules have some properties qua the utterance or inscription, but some features normally associated with rules are features of rule-contexts. For purposes of philosophical investigation of rules, certain inscriptions have been interpreted as rules, but merely calling something a rule is not always sufficient for providing an example of one. To be a rule, the linguistic entity must figure in a certain context; features of the situation are relevant to the status of the linguistic entity. The reason why 'White moves first' is a rule and 'Black moves first' is not a rule, is that the former has been appropriately adopted as a rule of chess in the proper manner while the latter has not. But what is the appropriate method for adopting a rule? Unfortunately, the appropriate maneuvers for providing a rule-giving context for a utterance or inscription, or for bestowing the status of rule on an utterance or inscription, vary according to the situation in question. So that a linguistic entity can become a rule by calling it one in one situation, by consenting that it be so taken in another, by including it in a list of rules in another, by putting it through the legislature in another, by officially promulgating it in another, and so on. The point here is that although the appropriate method for adopting a linguistic entity as a rule depends on the activity and situation in which it is being adopted, in order for a linguistic entity to have the status of a rule, some method appropriate to the situation must have been employed which bestowed this status on 19

The word 'followable' can be omitted from the characterization of rules as it is included in the notion of prescriptiveness. In order to specify CORRECT 'see to it'-able procedures FOR AN ACTIVITY, or to be prescriptive, a linguistic entity must specify 'see to it'-able procedures, or be followable.

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the linguistic entity.20 To adopt a rule appropriate measures must be taken. Investigating which methods for adopting rules are appropriate for each situation in which rules are or can be adopted will not be undertaken here. Such is a task of little philosophical interest, but is rather, a matter of empirical fact. Being able to list all the appropriate adoption procedures for all situations in which rules are adopted would be of factual interest, but not of theoretical interest. Let us leave this task to anyone curious enough to perform it. But there are similar features of all adopting maneuvers which are of theoretical interest. When a rule is adopted, by whatever method appropriate to the situation, the result is that some procedures will count as correct or incorrect in respect to some activity. Who has the right to so stipulate varies, the manner of so stipulating varies, but in every case of appropriately adopting a rule, someone who has the right to, performs some maneuver which is a specification of what will count as correct or incorrect procedure for an activity. Adopting a rule then is for the appropriate means to have been taken by the appropriate people so that an utterance or inscription specifies what counts as correct or incorrect procedure for some activity. Whenever a linguistic entity becomes a rule, it does so by virtue of having been adopted ; it is a necessary condition for being a rule that the linguistic entity has been used to specify what would count as correct procedure by someone having the right to so specify. Discovering the adoption procedure might be difficult in some cases. The rule might have been adopted a long time ago, and so forth. But one can always look for the originator of rules in order to check his rights, one can always look for the adoption procedure to be sure they were correct, and so forth. Failure to discover the originator or the procedures in this situation does not show that it never took place, it only shows a lack of information. Similarly, finding the adoption procedures for 'informal' cases 20

It should be obvious from this that a rule-context is not a matter of linguistic considerations alone; to determine whether a linguistic entity is a rule or not one must look at many features of the situation.

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of adopting rules might be difficult. One such case is a case of adopting a rule for oneself. Some specification is needed in order to elucidate the problem of how one knows if a person has adopted a rule for himself, as although this is a common practice, it is not one we are clear about. Everyone has the right to adopt a rule for himself. But in order for us to say that Ρ has actually adopted a rule for himself, that is that he counts certain procedures correct or incorrect for himself in performing some activity, we have to be sure that he would evaluate behavior favorably if it fulfilled the rule and would evaluate behavior unfavorably if it did not. What conditions must obtain in order for us to say that Ρ does evaluate his behavior in respect to a rule and has, therefore, adopted a rule ? Two things are relevant: P's behavior and P's assessment of his behavior. Let us say that we are asking if Ρ has adopted a rule never to smoke before lunch. Ρ does not smoke before lunch. If Ρ counted his not smoking before lunch correct because it fulfilled the rule, we would allow that Ρ had adopted a rule to that effect. However, if Ρ smoked before lunch, we could still allow that he had adopted a rule not to smoke before lunch if P, realising that his behavior did not fulfill R, gave an unfavorable evaluation to his behavior. If Ρ recognizes that his behavior does not fulfill R and counts his behavior incorrect, even if Ρ fails to fulfill R, he has adopted it. He had adopted a rule that he is breaking. It might happen that a Ρ accidentally, but consistently, fulfills the inscription "Never smoke before lunch." If this were so, and Ρ did not count his behavior incorrect or correct, we would not say that Ρ had adopted a rule to that effect. Accidental fulfilling of an inscription does not count as adopting a rule, for if Ρ were ever to fail to fulfill the rule he would not assess his behavior unfavorably. What is meant here by " P has adopted a rule for himself" is that if P's behavior fulfills the rule, and he knows it does, he evaluates it favorably, and if P's behavior were to fail to fulfill the rule, and he knows it does, he evaluates it unfavorably. Consider the following case: Ρ resolves not to smoke before lunch and would adversely criticize himself if he did smoke before

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lunch, but Ρ always sleeps until lunch. Ρ fulfills the rule, not by virute of trying to, but by virtue of doing nothing. Has Ρ adopted a rule? Yes. The interesting point here is that rules are conditional. The import of a "don't smoke before lunch" rule is: If you are in a position to chose between smoking and not smoking before lunch, don't smoke. Unless one is in the appropriate circumstances, here, behaving, one need not worry about how to proceed or about adverse criticism with respect to not fulfilling a rule. This is also the case with rules not adopted for oneself, or for one's own activities. We shall see in Chapter III, 4 and 5, that rules for activities do not 'apply' unless one is in the activitiy. Can a person take himself to have adopted a rule for himself and be mistaken. I think so. He might not know what it means to adopt a rule, or be mistaken about the notions of adopting" and "rule" and so forth. But so long as he counts actions correct or incorrect on the basis of the rule, he has adopted a rule whether he understands the notions or not. A person could be mistaken about what behavior satisfies a rule he has adopted. If a man said " I ' m adopting the rule 'Play a game of squash every morning'" and dutifully goes to the courts and practices squash, we could say to him that while he has adopted a rule to play squash, because he is PRACTICING squash his behavior does not fulfill the rule. Remember, that the conditions for adopting reads, "If Ρ were to fail to fulfill R, RECOGNIZING that this is so, Ρ would evaluate his behavior unfavorably." Our Ρ above could very well evaluate his behavior unfavorably, once he recognized it as not squash playing, and would be said to have adopted the rule to play squash irrespective of this ignorance of what constitutes squash playing and of his failure to fulfill the rule he had adopted. In this case, when Ρ practices instead of playing, Ρ meets the conditions for having adopted a rule for himself vacuously. So long as a person maintains a rule he has adopted, he cannot both recognize that his behavior fails to fulfill the rule and evaluate himself favorably. Once Ρ fails to fulfill R, recognizes that he does so, yet fails to criticize himself unfavorably in respect to R, we would have to say that Ρ has "unadopted" R.

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It should be strongly emphasized that one can adopt a rule that isn't there. 21 Said boldly this way, this seems to be untenable. But consider the following: In a single person game, the player may make up and adopt rules which he never utters and which he never writes down. Yet not only can he adopt such rules, but he can follow them in a way no different from the way in which articulated rules can be adopted. 22 The questions of interest here are: (1) Is he adopting a rule? (2) Is there a rule? 23 These questions can be answered in the same way as R. Taylor answers similar questions in connection with the existence of goal objects.24 Scheffler calls this the difficulty of the missing goal object, but rather than call this a difficulty, I would prefer to call it a situation to explain. Such situations, further, arise not only with respect to rules and goals, but with fears, apples, wants, and a host of other things. People can search for apples that aren't there. Looking in an empty refrigerator for an apple, while fruitless, is looking, Taylor would answer the above question in terms of apples by saying to (1), "Yes, he is searching for an apple", but to (2) "No, there is no apple there". Similarly, to (1) we can answer "Yes, he is adopting a rule", but to (2) we can answer "No, there is no rule 21

I am indebted to R. Schuldenfrei for calling my attention to this point. Subsequently, I found that W. Quine, in Word and Object makes the same assertions in another connection. If "believes-true", is changed to "adopt as a rule", "believing" is changed to "adopting", and before "procedure" the word "necessarily" is added, the position to be held here is expressed: "It will not do to say that Paul believes-true some utterance that Elmer does not believe-true, for it may happen that no such utterance exists or even will. Believing does not, like saying, produce utterances." (W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960, p. 215.) 22 People can follow rules which aren't there, adopt rules which aren't there, cry for help which isn't there and so on. Further, the fact that someone's behavior is correctly describable by a Type I R-description in no way entails that the rule exists anywhere but in the description. 23 In these two example inscriptions "rule" is being used non-referentially. 24 Richard Taylor, ' 'Purposeful and Non-purposeful Behavior : A Rejoinder' ', Philosophy of Science XVII (1950), pp. 327-332.

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in the sense of 'rule' which is of interest here; there is no utterance or inscription". For further discussion on this point the reader is referred to Israel Scheffler's book, The Anatomy of Inquiry, pp. 113-123.25 The characterization of rules can now read: rules are appropriately adopted prescriptive linguistic entities having no truth value.

25

Israel Scheffler, The Anatomy of Inquiry (New York, Alfred A. Knopf,

1963).

Ill

CONTRASTING NOTIONS

1. SCIENTIFIC LAWS

Let us now return to the technique of distinguishing rules from other things and ask: What can we further learn about rules by trying to distinguish them from scientific laws 71 It can be noticed that copper 'behaves' in such a way as to fulfill certain scientific laws in a way similar to the way a person's behavior fulfills certain rules. In other words, both the behavior of copper and that of people are describable by a Type I R-description. However, in the case of copper, we don't attribute any competence to the material by means of which the material sees to its behavior; nor do we have a desire to inquire into whether or not the material knows the law it's behavior fulfills. In short, copper doesn't FOLLOW the laws of science, and it's behavior is not describable by a Type III R-description (or for that matter a Type II R-description as it has been defined here), while people can follow rules and then their behavior is describable by a Type III R-description. Not only is it the case that inanimate things don't follow scientific laws, animate things don't either. There is a hidden implication in saying that inanimate things don't follow laws to the effect that they would if they could, or don't only because they can't. The point I am making is that scientific laws are not followable, and

1

"Law" and "scientific law" will be used synonomously.

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the reason why inanimate things don't follow laws has nothing to do with the nature of inanimate things, but rather with the nature of laws. It would be no more correct to say that people follow the law of gravity than to say that inanimate things follow it. People don't see to it that they don't defy the law of gravity anymore than they see to it that the basketball they throw at a backboard obeys laws concerning the angles of incidence and refraction. Scientific laws can only be fulfilled; they are neither followable nor breakable. On the other hand enough has been said about rules for me not to have to argue the point that rules are followable and breakable. Followability provides one basis for distinguishing laws from rules; is there another? Let us see whether the use of scientific laws and rules can serve to distinguish laws from rules. Laws of science serve both practical and theoretical purposes. They serve to organize data, capture regularities which can be 'harnessed' for use, simplify, make understandable and so forth. But rules also serve some practical and theoretical purposes. They organize, regularize, simplify, make understandable, and so forth. But laws impose organization on data or pick out regularities observed, while rules impose organization on behavior or 'create' regularities. Scientific laws, by being about observed data, are about 'discoveries' while rules by being about created data, are about 'inventions'. But if this is going to serve as a distinguishing criterion for laws and rules, we must be sure we can distinguish discoveries from inventions. And unfortunately there is a great amount of invention in discovery. We invent, to a large extent, the regularities we choose to see in the world. Which pieces of data we group together and call by the same name, which areas we relate, which we distinguish, are all largely a matter of our own choice and invention. To be sure, our decisions are influenced by many different considerations, such as simplicity, elegance, economy, etc., but just by virtue of noticing that we can CHOOSE even on the basis of these considerations which relations and groupings to make, shows that scientific laws are a matter of invention as well

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as discovery. And conversely, inventions must depend to some extent on what has been discovered to be the case. Playable games don't involve antigravitational moves or suspension of normal human processes necessary for life, at least not intentionally. If we are to find a further distinguishing criterion for laws and rules we must look elsewhere. We said previously that rules define games that they apply to. Perhaps the distinction between laws and rules lies here. Do LAWS define what they are about ? Ordinarily, laws are taken as explaining, rather than defining. But again, if we are using these notions as our distinguishing characteristic we must look more closely at the notions of explanation and definition, and I think we would be hard put to distinguish them. Laws which explain the behavior of copper might also define copper. In fact, when we look for an explanation we are often looking for a definition. Conversely, while rules define games, if we wanted to understand the game or explain it to others we would most likely refer to the rules for that game. So since definitions explain, and explanations define, we have not succeeded in finding a clear distinguishing characteristic on the basis of which laws could be further distinguished from rules. But neither do we stop here. Let us ask under what conditions we might give up a scientific law or change it. If we are trying to explain or define the notion of copper, we might hypothesize something about the material, and look at possible instances of copper to see whether they fulfill the hypothesis. If the instance does not fulfill the hypothesis, and the instance is one which we clearly want to be included under the hypothesis, we change our hypothesis. Is this the case with a rule ? If an instance of behavior does not fulfill the rule of a game which the person is trying to play, do we give up the rule or discount the behavior as an instance of playing the game? I think we would discount the instance. So now we have a feature which begins to look promising as a feature distinguishing laws from rules. In the case of laws, we generally give up the law on the basis of counter-examples. In the case of rules, we generally discount the 'counter-example' from being an instance of the

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rule.2 There are no counter-examples to falsify a rule; laws are made true or false on the basis of instances, rules are not. This relationship between instances and rules or laws leads to a distinguishing criterion which appears to be promising. Scientific laws, which are given up because of counter-examples, are also confirmed or verified by positive cases. For our purposes here, let us say that a confirmation relationship between a hypothesis or law and an instance is one in which the case can strengthen or weaken the law depending on whether it 'truthifies' or falsifies the law. The law has an intimate dependence on the cases and can be adjusted in the light of the character of the cases to be accounted for. An inscription which is non-confirmable, on the other hand, is one which does not adjust to the cases in this way, the case is "dependent" on the inscription. To be sure, rules can be given up or changed, but not by virtue of being disconfirmed or falsified. There is no counter-example to a rule. There is only breaking of rules. Rules are given up for considerations apart from considerations of negative or positive instances ; they are given up if the game plays better another way, better equipment becomes available, new conditions present themselves, problems are avoided, in order to cope with all possible contingencies, and so on. 3 But even where rules are being changed in some sense 2

In the interest of covering the issues of primary importance to this work without having its length unreasonably long, I have greatly oversimplified less important issues. This is a case in point. The conditions under which we give up or change both laws and rules is not so simple a matter as implied here. When a law, for example, encounters a counter example, there is really a choice as to how to treat the matter. One, the law could be given up; two, the instance could be discounted; three, the law could be modified (perhaps a subcase of giving it up), and so on. There are many considerations which could legislate in these matters; one, how anxious one is to include the instance under the law; two, how one feels about letting the law decide the positive cases; three, how the law relates to the rest of the system, and so on. Similarly, but conversely, in a sense rules can be changed or modified on the basis of cases. If it is conflicting in principle, impractical, and so on to follow a rule, it could be 'unadopted'. 3 I hope there is no confusion between a case of confirming the rule itself and confirming that the rules is the one wanted. While you can verify that R1 is a rule of chess this does not confirm Rl.

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in order to 'fit' the cases, the cases do nothing to strengthen or weaken the rule in the sense that the cases neither confirm (make true) nor refute (make false) the rule. Rules are further distinguisable from laws, then, on the basis of there being no confirmation relationships between rules and their instances while there are such relationships between laws and their cases.4 Some consequences of so distinguishing rules from laws will now be discussed. (1) Legal laws, which are followable and non-confirmable are counted as being rule-like, but behavioral rules (such as are found in sociology or psychology), which are not followable and confirmable, are counted as being law-like. Despite this departure from ordinary usage of the words, we need be little disturbed about so classifying legal laws and behavior rules, because the characterization of rules and laws give sufficient grounds for this new grouping and because in compensation for this departure from ordinary usage we gain a clearer understanding of the nature of these inscriptions. There is no need, further, to employ new terminology in these cases so long as the rule-likeness of legal laws and the law-likeness of behavior rules are recognised. (2) This distinguishes the work of a structural linguist, who determines laws about a language which are subject to confirmation, from the work of an English teacher, who teaches rules of grammar for a language, which are prescriptive insofar as that classroom is concerned (test papers will be evaluated on the basis of them), and 4

A question was put to me which I worried for a long time: What is the distinction between rules of use and rules of testing? While I did not have this question in mind when attempting to distinguish laws from rules, I found that the results of this part of the investigation threw light on this question. There is no need to distinguish these two functions of rules, as it is not the case that rules function in both these ways. Any utterance or inscription which is open to change through testing or through empirical evidence is not a rule but a scientific law. Utterances or inscriptions which are rules are changed on different bases, which are numerous, but which are not like a confirmation or counterexample method of change. Rules for use are one thing, rules. What I take to be meant by the phrase "rules for testing" are another thing, scientific laws. And so the two are distinguished.

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which are not subject to confirmation. One inscription can function in two ways here also depending on what context it is placed in. "Singular nouns must take definite articles" could function as a law devised by a linguist, refutable and confirmable; it could be also a rule taught by an English teacher on the basis of which students are marked wrong and sentences graded as ungrammatical. Further on the basis of this criterion, the behavior of an observer of a game who is trying to formulate a description of the game can be distinguished from the behavior of a player who conforms to rules in order to play a legal game. It further distinguishes the law of physics which make possible the invention of a ftying machine, from the rules of safety which help avoid accidents in the air. On the basis of what has been accomplished so far, law-descriptions can be distinguished from rule-descriptions. LAW DESCRIPTIONS

RULE DESCRIPTIONS

Type I L-descriptions

Type I R-descriptions

FULFILLING

FULFILLING

Description of regular behavior in terms of a law (something that cannot be broken).

Descriptions of regular though changeable behavior in terms of a rule (something one could break).

Type II L-description

Type II R-description

ACCORDING

ACCORDING

Description of law-fulfilling behavior which further relates L to Ρ by saying that Ρ knows L

Description of rule-fulfilling behavior which further relates R to Ρ by saving that Ρ knows R.

Type III L-description

Type III R-description

FOLLOWING

NONE, as one cannot see to it that one's behavior fulfills L.

FOLLOWING

Description of rule-according behavior which further relates R to Ρ by saying that Ρ sees to it that his behavior fulfills R.

We have inquired into the explanatory value of rule-descriptions

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and we now are in a position to inquire into the predictive value of rule-descriptions. Nelson Goodman counts a projection as a prediction when "all the undetermined cases of a hypothesis are future cases". 5 He also calls the problem of valid projection a problem of confirmation. The problem of confirmation, or of valid projection, is the problem of defining a certain relationship between evidence or base cases on the one hand, and hypothesis, predictions or projections on the other.® Or again: What we want, indeed, is an accurate and general way of saying which hypotheses are confirmed by, or which projections are validly made from, any given evidence.7 So looking at predictions, in terms of confirmation relationships, there can be no predictive value to rules as rules are not confirmable But I will not leave the matter here, even though I think this answers the question. Rather, I will try to specify more particularly just why rules have little predictive value. "What is the predictive value of rule-descriptions?" If Ρ is known to have been following R 1 , could we confidently predict that his behavior will continue to satisfy a Type III R 1 description? I think not. We could only be secure that our Type III R 1 description would have predictive value (that is that P's behavior will continue to be a following instance of R 1 ) if we are correct in assuming that Ρ will continue to follow R 1 . Now if we are so secure, namely, if we can know Ρ will continue to follow R 1 , and that P's behavior will continue to be correctly describable by our Type III R 1 description, we are assuming just what we are supposed to be predicting. On such a basis, Type III R-descriptions have no predictive value with regard to human behavior.8 5

Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 92. 6 Goodman, p. 87 7 Goodman, p. 87. 8 After all, Ρ can always break rules.

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While on the subject of behavior, a digression in the form of an inquiry into the nature of rule behavior is in order; the characterization of rules as it now stands carries with it certain implications about the nature of such behavior. Implied by numerous aspects of the analysis is the assumption that rule behavior is only exhibited by rational human beings. For example, since "rule" is being used here to refer to linguistic entities, only those with linguistic ability can be acquainted with, and can 'match' their behavior to, such linguistic entities. Further, so far as we know, the type of procedure present in employing critical standards has been manifested only in the behavior of people. A second implication about the nature of rule behavior present in the criteria for rules is that it appears to be a basic assumption that rule behavior is changeable at will or voluntary. The import of the "see to it" or "try" criterion is that rule behavior can be controlled or voluntarily performered at the discretion of the actor. That the responsibility for success lies with the actor is assumed by saying that such behavior can be evaluated for correctness. That the possibility of success lies in the power of the actor is assumed by not counting as rules at all those linguistic entities which specify physically impossible behavior. In short, given the characterization of rules, it is necessary that the power to perform or not to perform what is specified by the rules lies with the actor; rule behavior is voluntary, changeable, controllable. A third implication of the analysis about the nature of rule behavior is that it need not be regular, frequent, consistent, or anything of the like. A rule might only be applicable and satisfied once, it may never be applicable or satisfied, it may be continually broken (with the actor continually castigating himself for his weakness). To again, in this connection now, quote a comment of Wittgenstein "Would it make sense to say 'If he did something DIFFERENT every day we should not say he was obeying a rule?' That makes NO sense.9

9

See also p. 45 and Chap. I, fn. 9.

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To sum up, certain features of rule behavior emerge from the characterization of rules : rule behavior is exhibited only by rational human beings, is controllable ('see to it'-able) and need not be regular. But what exactly is known by learning the rules pertaining to a situation? 10 It could be said that if one knows the rules for some activity one knows (1) the basis on which behavior will be evaluated or what is considered correct procedure for the activity, and most importantly, (2) what those in the activity will behave like IF they are behaving correctly with respect to that activity. It can't be known whether anyone will proceed correctly, but if they do, what their behavior will be like is known. If this means that knowing the rules means being able to predict behavior, it is certainly a very limited kind of predictive value. Much more could be said, and has been said,11 on the topic of rule behavior and the predictive value of rules. What has been said should be sufficient for our purposes, except to remark by way of a summary that (1) rule behavior is changeable and non-regular, (2) behavior is notoriously difficult to predict, (3) rule descriptions might have more explanatory power than laws but they also have less predictive power, and (4) knowing rules is more informative about the nature of activities than about future behavior. Laws and rules have been distinguished on the basis of previously noted characteristics of rules; namely, on the basis that rules are prescriptive (and are therefore followable) while laws are not, and on the basis that rules have no truth value (and are therefore non-confirmable) while laws are confirmable. But while the distinguishing of rules from laws did not reveal further defining properties of rules, the discussion was valuable as the nature of laws has been clarified to some extent, the nature of rule behavior has been clarified to some extent, and rules can be noted to have more explanatory than predictive value with respect to behavior. 10

".. .to learn a rule is not to learn what generally happens", R. Rhees, Symposium: "Can there Be a Private Language?", p. 10. See R. Schwartz, dissertation, for example.

11

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CONTRASTING NOTIONS 2. CUSTOMS

The next group of notions I would like to attempt to distinguish from rules include the following: customs, habits, set forms, observances, uniform or established courses, customary ways, practices, procedures, paradigm cases, wonts, prototype procedures, settled forms, conventional practices. In short, the notions which are listed in the fifth part of the usual definition for rules, having to do with normal, customary or average behavior.12 Notice that all these notions agree in characteristics with rules in that they are followable; in fact, they are rule-like enough for the phrase "as a rule" to be substituted for them in many contexts. But while they are like rules in this repect, these notions greatly differ from the type of rule under discussion in one crucial respect: "rule" is taken to be elliptical for "utterances and inscriptions normally called rules" while "custom" or "habit" does not normally refer to an utterance or inscription, but to some procedure or behavior. Aside from the fact that customs are modes of procedures while rules are linguistic specifications of procedure, there is a further difference between them in that there is less claim to correctness associated with habits and the like. If a man fails to perform habitual actions he is more likely to be surprised or be thrown off stride than to judge himself as having acted wrongly. If there were a negative evaluation made we would then say that he had adopted a rule for himself, not that he had acted out of habit. But while failing to conform to a habit, as opposed to failing to conform to a rule, is less likely to elicit a negative evaluative judgement of behavior, CONFORMING to some habits, namely bad ones, is more likely to elicit a negative evaluation of behavior than would conforming to rules. When in a rule situation for which rules have been properly adopted and are the accepted standards for correctness of behavior, failing to conform to them brings censure while conforming to them brings praise. On the other hand, failing to conform to previously habitual practices is not 12

See Appendix A.

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likely to bring assessment of incorrectness and conforming to some habits is likely to bring censure. It could also be noted that habitual behavior tends to be regular, while rule behavior, it was stated, need not be. The criterion for rule behavior is the attendent assessment made, not its regularity. And it is in respect to the assessment made, not in terms of regularity, that habitual practices are differentiated from rule behavior. And it is in terms of the referents for the two words that "habits" are differentiated from "rules". Black deals with the problem of distinguishing customs from IMPLICIT rules which I think is a more difficult task than I have set for myself. He writes : I do not deny that there may be considerable difficulty in distinguishing the case just described from that in which there was a more habit or custom of saying "queen". But there is one good way of rendering the difference between the cases of following a custom and observing an implicit rule more distinct. Having tentatively decided that the players were observing the rule described, we could then formulate it and offer it to them as an explicit rule. We could say " I see you follow the rule that the attack on a queen must be announced by saying "queen". If they agreed, we could take that as strong evidence that they had been following an implicit basic rule. If it is objected that they might now be adopting a rule which they had previously not been observing, we can incorporate the new test into our notion of an implicit basic rule. We can say that by calling a rule implicit we MEAN, among other things, that if it were formulated and offered for consideration to the persons concerned they 13 WOULD accept it as codifying their previous practice... It must be remembered that behavior can be assessed or described by means of rules not known to the people performing. In the first place, if we accept Black's test as a valid one for determining when people are following implicit rules we could all be following 13

Black, p. 131

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implicit rules of every variety all the time so long as we agree that we are. Further, to describe situations on the basis of the acceptance of the description of those behaving could mean that identical behavior (in identical situations) could be described differently14 if one performer chose to be perverse, was ignorant, or just didn't accept the description as correct. Further, again, if the actors opinion of his behavior becomes the criterion of what he's doing, an actor cannot be wrong about whether or not he is following an implicit rule because his opinion determines whether he is or not. The 'spirit' of this view is contrary to the spirit of philosophical analysis but it is also hard to see how this view makes much sense out of following, or how this provides a clear analysis of the notion 'implicit rule'. In the second place, as far as the meaning for implicit rules goes, I don't see how they would differ from such things as customs, habits, practices and the like which we haven't articulated to ourselves or others. Descriptions of customs can also be accepted as codifying previous practices since nothing is gained by now describing the situation in terms of rules rather than in terms of notions we normally, and I think correctly, employ for describing such situations, I wonder why Black (1) thinks he is distinguishing a custom from a rule, or (2) doesn't see that he has robbed "custom", "practice", "habit" and the like of one of their important uses. I think Black has neither succeeded in distinguishing implicit rules from customs and the like nor in providing a good argument for retaining the notion of implicit rules.15 There are three further points I would like to make before leaving this discussion about customs. First, there is a variant of the word "rule" which refers to activity; "rule-like" can apply to behavior. What distinguishes rule-like behavior from custom-like behavior? In a very real sense, practices, customs, habits and the 14

See Appendix D. This by itself is not undesirable, it is the grounds on which the descriptions differ that is objectionable.

15

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83

like involve rule-like behavior, that is, behavior which is 'see to it' -able. And this is not in the least undesirable. The initial uncertainty about how to distinguish custom-like behavior from rule-like behavior is founded on the fact that custom-like behavior is rulelike. Not only can they not be distinguished, but there is no reason to distinguish them. Further, custom-like behavior is capable of being described by a Type I R-description if it so happens that the behavior is a fulfilling instance of a statement-of-a-custom which has been adopted as a rule or which is capable of being adopted as a rule. Second, even if a statement of a custom has not been adopted as a rule, behavior could be described by, let us call it, a Type III C-description (statement of a custom-description) which could claim as its explanatory value to describe that P's behavior is such that he acts AS IF he were following a rule; P's behavior fulfills C, Ρ knows C and Ρ sees to it that his behavior fulfills C, but what is missing is rule-type assessment of the behavior. The third point that can be mentioned in connection with this group of notions, involves the word "convention" which is included in this group. Rule situations are conventional in that we are trained, or can learn what rules are like, how to 'take' rules, learn when rules are applicable, how to make rules, and so on. Further, rules often specify something that is or has been a conventional practice. But all this does not say that rules are conventions.

3. DIRECTIONS A N D INSTRUCTIONS

We might attempt to distinguish directions 16 from rules on the grounds that directions apply to certain activities, and rules apply to others. But this will not do. Directions for how to get somewhere might be rules for how to get somewhere under other circumstances. If I told you to turn right at the next traffic light, go three blocks and turn left, I would be giving you directions. But if an 16

What is said about directions applies equally to instructions.

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army officer handed you a sheet of paper while you were on maneuvers which gave the 'army way' of going somewhere, you might be in possession of some rules. What activities, directions and rules pertain to will not distinguish them. We might attempt, in the face of this, to distinguish rules from directions on the basis of who gives them to you. But this will not do either. An army officer might give his men directions or rules, depending on any number of factors about the situation. So let us look at the situation, where I think the clue lies. What is the difference in how utterances are related to the activity of getting somewhere when the army officer offers them as directions and when he offers them as rules ? It seems that directions are recommendations for how to proceed to your destination. Directions NEED not be followed in order to get where one wants to be, they are suggestions for how one could get to the destination. When utterances are rules on the other hand, it seems to be required that one proceed in just the way directed. The means for getting there are specified with the expectation that the performer will go by the route stated. Only such performance will count as satisfactory. Noting this is not to note something new about rales. When discussing the prescriptiveness of rules it was contended that rules specify what counts as the correct procedure for going about the activity; now we shall merely try to make more clear what this property of rules involves. If, in order to perform an activity properly one must do it in the way specified, these specifications are rules. If one can be allowed to use any means or perform in any way, despite the recommendations of the utterance, it is a direction. Is then (1) Turn left at the traffic light and walk straight for three blocks. a rule or a direction ? If I offer it to someone on the street it would be a direction. There is no need for him to get there by that exact route, nor do satisfactory results depend in any way on which route he chooses to follow. The important thing is getting there. On

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85

the other hand, if this is included in a list handed to someone who is on a treasure hunt, or who is in a certain kind of car race, he will be judged according to how he got there, not only according to whether or not he got there, and it would be a rule. And again, to give another example, if the army officer gives you or tells you (1) and you are on a planned march, it might be a rule. If on the other hand he is telling you how to get to headquarters, he is giving you directions, recommendations or suggestions for how to get where you want to go. An analogy to this situation can be shown by looking at the following two words: "efficacy" and "efficiency". An efficatious course of action gets the job done, gets you where you want to be without regard to how you got there. An efficient course of action is concerned with getting there in a particular way, getting the most mileage from the least effort. This is not to say that rules are issued in order to prescribe the most efficient course or that they always do prescribe the most efficient course. The point is that rule-situations are ones in which the manner of procedure is as important as the results. Rules prescribe a particular way or manner of proceding which must be fulfilled in order to perform the activity satisfactorily and in order to achieve a positive evaluation of your whole performance, not just the results of your performance. When directions are issued, having only the force of recommendations, it is not important how the activity is achieved, it is only important that the performer somehow achieve the final results or get the job done. Then, in a similar way to the efficacious course of action which does not concern itself with the means of achieving results, directions are recommendations for getting there, but are aimed primarily at getting you there any which way. And in a similar way to the efficient course of action which concerns itself with the means of achieving results, rules prescribe or specify the manner in which the activity should be accomplished in order to get favorable results. In rule-situations how you get there is as important as getting there.

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We can paraphrase Austin 17 and say being a rule does not turn only on what the linguistic entity is like, nor yet on what it means, but on, speaking very broadly, the circumstances in which it is uttered; and the circumstances surrounding a rule, but not a direction, are such that the linguistic entity specifies what counts as the one correct procedure for activities. Rules are prescriptive, directions are not. Unfortunately, the criterion offered here does not distinguish ALL directions and instructions from rules. Consider the following case: (2) Answer two out of three questions in Sections A, B, and C. This instruction or direction written on top of an examination paper must be followed in order to satisfactorily perform the task of taking the exam. Answering a total of six questions from Sections A and Β would not be the proper means by which to achieve positive evaluation of performance. Satisfactory performance on an examination depends on following the instructions given for which questions to answer, how to answer the questions, and so on. Are examination instructions rules? Can they be distinguished from rules ? I think the answer is that they are not rules, and that they can be distinguished from rules, but it will be left until the next section to do so. A further characteristic of rules will be considered when distinguishing rules from commands and orders, and this characteristic will further serve to distinguish examination instructions from rules. 4. COMMANDS AND ORDERS

Commands are, on the basis of the criteria developed so far, rule-like. They are non-confirmable linguistic entities and I think they are prescriptive, i.e. they specify what counts as correct procedure for activities. This means we have to search further for criteria for rules in order to determine when a linguistic entity is a 17

J.L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962), p . l l l .

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rule and when it is a command. While the task here is more difficult than it was, for example, when distinguishing customs and the like from rules, more can be hoped to be gained by pursuing it. Once all notions closely related to rules can be distinguished from rules on the basis of criteria, and of course given sound criteria, we ought to have a fairly clear picture of what rules are like. At least this is the aspiration. Let us take an example of a simple command, see if it is possible to articulate some way or ways in which it differs from a rule, and then go on to see if all commands differ in that respect from rules, (1) Close the door. I think it is clear that (1) is not normally considered to be a rule. But the interest lies in the nature of its difference from rules. A distinction might be attempted on the grounds that closing the door is not a full fledged activity on its own, or in other words it might be contended that commands do not pertain to a specifiable activity. Closing the door is not an activity like taking exams, driving cars or playing games to which rules apply. However, there is great danger in the attempt. The nature of an activity, full fledged or not, is not clear enough to be the basis on which to distinguish commands and rules. For example, army marches, for which commands are given, could be counted as full fledged activities. And there is a whole series of commands such as "eyes right", " t o the left flank, march" and so on, associated as closely with this activity of marching by the ardent military types as chess rules are associated with chess for the ardent players. So, while it might be the case that rules are only associated with well defined activities (although this is not being asserted because activities are not well-defined and it is not certain which activities could be) it is also possible that commands can also be associated with such activities and that, therefore, this will not serve as a distinguishing characteristic. But on the basis of the previous discussion, something which might serve to distinguish commands from rules can be noticed.

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The commands associated with marching, and even example (1), are issued "on the spot" so to speak, and are meant to be followed immediately. On the other hand, rules of chess are long standing and are followed at the discretion of the players, when applicable. Commands pertain to the immediate situation, and even though all the marching commands could be listed, they are not in force unless issued by the proper person at the time when they are to be obeyed. Once obeyed, further, they are no longer in force, while rules can be followed repeatedly. Commands like "close the door" and other imperatives are also "short term" as opposed to rules which are long standing; commands are meant to be followed immediately and only then, while rules are meant to be followed at the discretion of the performer and are repeatedly followable. This criterion might be objected to on the grounds that even though it might be true that commands require immediate following and cease to be in force once this has taken place, under certain circumstances these characteristics are true of rules also. Consider a game made up on the spot, played immediately and abandoned forever. These rules are also followed immediately and cease to be in force after the game is over. But first it could be pointed out that rules, even those issued for the one occasion of playing, COULD be referred to repeatedly. They are in force at least throughout that game and could be followed more than once during the play. Second, even if the rules applied only one time each, when not being followed later, they are still rules. One could still refer back to those rules for that one game by asking if they should be used again, if they need changing. They need not be issued again. But commands would have to be issued again to be in force again. If one wanted to recreate the situation of the command, one would have to issue NEW commands, but if one wanted to play that game, one need not issue new rules. Rules are still rules after having once been followed, but commands are not commands after having once been obeyed. It might be further objected: You say that rules are repeatedly followable, but what about the case of a rule which specifies that it

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only be followed once. To this can be answered that the rule could be in FORCE, i.e. specify what counts as correct or incorrect procedure, despite the fact that what it specifies as correct is only followable once. The import of "repeatedly followable" is "remains in force until unadopted". This characteristic of rules can be included in the list of properties of rules under the notion of adoption. Once a linguistic entity is adopted as a rule it is in force and continues to be a force until it is unadopted. Instructions and directions can be classified fairly neatly as a group of things which differ from rules (and with less overlapping than was previously possible given the criterion formulated in the previous section) by appeal to the characteristics noted about orders and commands. Orders and commands, which are issued for immediate use, are not so related to activities that they "come into force" repeatedly upon ones entering into an activity to which they have applied once. Directions and instructions also have the property of immediate-use, and non-long-standingness in reference to an activity. On the basis of this, examination instructions (or directions) which are issued solely for immediate use need not be counted as rules. However, examination instructions which are to be used over and over again, for example, during the whole semester of one course, could attain the status of rules. Similarly, marching directions (or orders) if issued solely for immediate use do not now have to be classified as rules. Every march requires new commands. And if this feature of rules, namely repeated applicability as this phrase is taken to signify here is accepted, "Hup, zup, thrup, four" is seen not to be rule-like as it does not remain in force. 18 A notion closely related to commands in that of orders. These are very like commands, but unfortunately are even more like rules, as the criterion on which commands have been distinguished 18

It could be mentioned that imperatives and demands share the nonrepeatability characteristic with commands and directions, and therefore they too can be distinguished from rules on this basis.

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from rules will not do to distinguish all orders from rules. Orders need not be only of immediate use; they can be long standing; the expression "standing order" is a familiar one, and standing orders can remain in force. It should be noted that orders are often spoken of as being confirmed. However, this is obviously not a case of testing out the order but rather of verifying what it is, or if it is in force. The fact that orders can be confirmed only gives support to the contention that they are long-standing and rule-like (as opposed to commands which are not, and are not said to be confirmable), and does not give support to any contention that orders are law-like. A clue for distinguishing orders from rules lies with Black's treatment of the distinction between regulations (which he takes to be synonomous with "rule") and orders. An order closely resembles a command, as being a realtively direct communication to subordinates. But a regulation is a relatively indirect and as it were impersonal communication (it might be called an oblique order), not addressed to designated individuals, but published for the sake of informing "anybody who may be concerned" of the conditions stipulated for the performance of certain acts. (Hence failure to receive orders is a sufficient defense against a charge of disobedience, but ignorance of the law is no excuse). An order is like a shot fired at a poacher, a regulation like a fence to keep ANYBODY off the grounds. 19

I think Black has a point in connection with the distinction between rules and orders. Rules do seem to have an impersonal or indirect nature in that they apply to anyone in a particular situation. But I think the emphasis should be more on the difference between a shot and a fence than on the difference between a poacher and the rest of the world. 20 I. The indirectness or impersonality of rules lies not so much in WHO is addressed as in how rules and orders are issued and what they pertain to, as will be discussed. The reason for rejecting the characterization of impersonality in terms of who rules or orders apply to, is that orders issued by army officers also apply to ANYONE 19 20

Black, p. 119. I shall return to the 'shot-fence' distinction later.

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in the regiment, orders issued by school officials apply to ANYONE in the school body, and so on. To stress the 'anyone' feature of rules would require specifying both how many 'anyones' there must be for a rule rather than an order to be present, and the specifying of the nature of the 'anyones' in a rule rather than an order situation Concerning the number of'anyones', "anyone" is an army camp or " a n y " soldier might be greater in number than "anyone" playing chess or " a n y " chess player, and conversely, the number of chess players might be greater than the number of students in a particular school. It would have to be the NATURE of the 'anyones', if ANY feature of 'anyones' would do, which might serve to distinguish rules from orders. But 1 suspect that such an investigation would involve a lot of trouble for little gain ; I doubt that it would be possible to distinguish order-anyones from rule-anyones. II. A second unpromising way of construing the impersonality of rules and the 'personality' of orders is to say that the person issuing orders knows who exactly is to receive them. Orders issued to an army by a commanding officer who does not know all of his soldiers is hardly more personal than rules issued to car owners in a state. Further there in no point in saying that the commanding officer knows any more about his group by virtue of his being able to learn the names of his soldiers by looking them up. An official in the vehicle licensing department also knows that registration fee rules apply to owners of cars in his state, and he also could learn their names by looking in HIS files. III. This does bring up a further interesting feature of orders and commands (which will not be available to us as a distinguishing feature between them and rules, however). This feature is that orders and commands seem to apply to people subordinated to others in some way. Parent-child, teacher-student, officer-soldier, and like relationships seem to be the ones in which orders and commands tend to be issued. But there is a type of subordination present in rule-situations also. Rules of games apply to anyone playing, rules for the road apply to anyone driving, and so on. In order to draw the distinction between orders and rules on the basis of the type of subordination present, would again involve us in the necessity

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of specifying the nature of such types of subordination. And again, I doubt that this will be possible. Captains of teams give orders to players, managers of teams give orders to players, and players are also subordinated to the rules of the game. How is one to characterise the subordination of the players in respect to the captain or manager in distinction from their subordination to the rules of the game? I suggest that we do not pursue the topic from the point of view of who the orders and rules are directed at, or the type of subordination present, but rather from the point of view of the manner of issuing orders and rules, concentrating on the difference between a shot and a fence. While one person is sufficient for firing a shot, can one person build a fence? I'm afraid so, So while one person is sufficient for the issuing of orders, although this is not ALWAYS the case with rules (or fences), one person CAN be sufficient for issuing rules (in the same way as building a fence can be an individual project). While one person is sufficient for firing a shot or building a fence (so that orders cannot be distinguished from rules on the basis of the number of issuers), perhaps the position of that issuer differs in each case. To fire a gun it is necessary to be on the spot while the effectiveness of the fence remains long after the builder has gone. But this is only sometimes. Standing orders need not be issued on the spot, and their effectiveness can remain long after their issuance. Before searching further, let it be remarked that because the variety of situations in which rules and orders are issued are many, the features of these various situations must be taken into account. This necessarily complicates the handling of these problems. Therefore, if the analysis at times seems to be unduly complex, it is because the nature of the subject requires it to be so. We could just call standing orders rules, and let it go at that. But even a complex analysis is preferable to arbitrary solution. Let us again attempt to specify something about the manner of issuing and begin by considering the following two pairs of inscriptions :

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(1) *(2) (3) *(4)

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I order you to X. I rule you to X. Here are your orders. Here are your rules.

* indicates a 'deviant' utterance or inscription. and try a little language analysis. Why are (2) and (4) deviant ? In the first place, (2) seems deviant because it has to do with ruling, which is not at issue here. One doesn't say " I rule you to X " and thereby make a rule. We are not here concerned with Kings and governments in the act of verbally ruling, but in the acts of making rules. Rules are not made solely by saying " I rule you to X " . Rules are made by appropriately adopting them. On the other hand, orders are given by uttering them; inscription (1) is not deviant. Perhaps a standing order is like fitting a repeater to a pistol ; since orders are given, not made, perhaps a standing order is one which can be given repeatedly. I think we have hit something here which could be summed up by saying that rules are MADE (adopted) while orders and even standing orders are GIVEN. What is implied about the difference between rules and orders signified by the former's being made while the latter are given ? One thing implied, which is illustrated by the second pair of inscriptions, is that because orders are given there must be someone who gives them and someone who takes them. (3) is not a deviant utterance. But rules are not given, and trying to verbally 'give' them results in a deviant utterance, viz. (4). Orders are directed at people. Rules are directed at activities. Rules are for chess, for driving, for proof working and so on, and are for the activity rather than the individuals. Therefore, it is necessary that people ENTER into an activity before they must pay attention to the rules for that activity. This point deserves further attention. Rules specify procedures for ACTIVITIES. And people come under the authority, control, or jurisdiction of, come into the scope, extent, realm, sphere, domain of, are encompassed by, etc. the rules for this activity, upon entering into that activity. If you sit down to play chess you are subject to chess rules ; upon

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driving a car, road rules apply to you; if you move into a particular community, you are in the jurisdiction of its laws; if you are working a formal proof, you are under the authority of the rules of inference, and so on. By entering into an activity, the rules for that activity apply to you. This can be summed up by saying that rules are conditional ; they act as critiques for behaviour only if certain antecedent conditions obtain. The conditional character of rules calls for even further discussion. It follows from this that not fulfilling rules can be described differently, depending on whether or not one is in an activity or whether or not the antecedent conditions have obtained. First, if one is in an activity to which a set of rules pertain (or if one is in a position to choose to fulfill or not to fulfill a rule adopted for oneself) if one does not fulfill the rule, one is said to violate the rule. (One doesn't necessarily violate a rule by committing a foul; instead one's behavior might fall under a rule by so doing). However, if one is not in a rule-activity (or not in an activity to which some R pertains) if one does not fulfill R, one is not said to violate R. If one is not in an activity to which R pertains but fulfills R, one could be said to fulfill R vacuously. Violating a rule is not therefore, simply a matter of not fulfilling it; and not all fulfilling of rules results in favourable evaluation of behavior. Second, let us notice that a statement of antecedent conditions are often called regulations. There are regulations about the equipment and so forth that must be complied with before one can be said to be playing a game. Then, if these regulations are not fulfilled, the game cannot be played and the rules cannot be violated. All talk about VIOLATING rules is restricted to cases where one is in an activity or where the regulations have been fulfilled. A consequence of this is that if there is only one "rule" for a game, or if the "rule" constitutes the game and if not fulfilling that "rule" results in not playing the game, it is not a rule but a regulation. Further, since if every conjunct of the rules of chess for example, were not fulfilled, one would not be said to be playing; such conjuncts would not be rules.21 Not every conjunction of rules, therefore, yields a rule. 21

One might ask "Which conjunctions of rules 'constitute' games? and the

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Third, to sum up these findings, if not fulfilling a linguistic entity can never result in violating it, the linguistic entity is not a rule. Let us return now to the rule-order distinction and notice that a second thing implied in the difference between making and giving is something about the role of the issuer, again illustrated by the second pair of inscriptions. The person or persons giving the order bestow the push, and hence someone can SAY (3) without uttering something deviant. Giving orders is like firing a shot in that the person shooting delivers it and is solely responsible for the push. On the other hand, those adopting the rules are not the sole source of push for rules. Once the rule is adopted or made, the relation to activities accounts for some of the push, and once rules are in force, it is not always a pertinent or relevant question to ask who made them. Making rules is like building a fence in that once the fence is built, the fence takes over some of the push ; the fence is a standing preventative of certain actions, and who built it is not always relevant. Therefore, taking the sole credit for the push of rules by trying to verbally 'hand them over' to someone results in ones saying something deviant, viz, (4). A more comprehensive discussion of this point was given in the section on the prescription force of rules. These results can again be mapped out: RULES

1. Made (adopted) 2. For activities 3. Push lies in "critique" property of rules and issuer(s)

ORDERS AND COMMANDS

1. Given 2. To people 3. Push lies in issuer(s)

Nothing new had been noticed by saying that rules remain in force; it has already been said that once rules are adopted they remain in force until they are unadopted. Nor has anything new been noticed by saying that rules are for activities rather than people; rules answer must be that this not only varies from game to game but that there are borderline cases in each game. It would depend on one's judgement as to what is "necessary" in order to say that the game is being played.

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have been called prescriptive, and by this has been meant that rules specify what counts as the correct procedure for ACTIVITIES. However. in this section rules have been further characterized as being conditional, by this it shall be meant that rules act as critiques of behavior only for those in the activity to which the rules pertain. Let us try to include this notion in our characterization of rules, keeping in mind exactly what is meant here 22 by such words as "prescriptive", "adopted" and the like. Rules are appropriately adopted, prescriptive, conditional linguistic entities having no truth value.

5. PRINCIPLES

The word "principle" is often and loosely used as a synonym for "rule", but I suggest that this is neither necessary nor correct. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, principle is desined as a general law or rule as a guide to actions; a fundamental motive or reason of action, especially one closely recognised and followed.23 Let us concentrate on principles as motivational or justificatory guides to action as they can be distinguished from rules on this basis. Principles don't specify the procedures for action as rules do but rather they provide the ideology, justification, motivation and the like for procedures. While rules can be used to justify action their consent is not ideological but methodological. Principles are a matter of policy; rules are a matter of required procedures ; to act from principle is to be policy-directed, to act so as to fulfill (following) a rule is to be procedurally-directed.24 22

As Humpty Dumpty, in Through the Looking Glass, so aptly and proudly declares, "When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less". This is acceptable so long as what one chooses to mean by words is carefully and fully stated. I hope I have done this. 23 Oxford English Dictionary, p. 1585 24 This contradicts a contention of Paul Ziffs in the Appendix to Chapter I of his book Semantic Analysis (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1960,

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Let us then distinguish principles from rules on the following basis : principles are linguistic entities of the nature of a general ideological policy which provide reasons, motives, justifications and the like for actions.25 Rules are utterances or inscriptions of the nature of critiques which specify the necessary procedures for satisfactorily carrying out an activity. One may be tempted to further distinguish rules from principles on the basis that one does not adopt rules for one's own sole use IN THE SAME WAY as one adopts principles for this purpose. Let me spell this out. People can construct private games in which in a sense they adopt rules for themselves. But the rules are not adopted for oneself in the same way as principles are; rules are adopted indirectly for oneself, principles directly. The rules adopted are not for ONESELF as much as for the ACTIVITY. The rules pertain to the activity and anyone entering into the activity (be it yourself solely, yourself with others or just others) becomes subject to those rules. So that while you can adopt rules which, by the by, will be only for yourself, the rules are not constructed FOR yourself, but for a game which only you yourself will play. Hence it is more appropriate to say the rules are for the game and it is the GAME that has been constructed for one's own use, Again, the sense in which one adopts rules for one's sole use is by adopting rules for an activity intended for one's sole use.26 In constructing private games, a person plays two roles ; he first is the adopter of rules and then, upon entering into that game, comes under the scope of those rules and is a follower of rules. He is adopter and follower; 'maker' and subject. p.37) What I argue with is his contention that "rules connect with plans or policies". However, what Ziffsays about rules and natural language, in his very brief discussion of the topic, is greatly in accord with my position on the subject. 25 We are again considering "principles" in a nominal referential way. But people can be guided or directed by principles having no perceptible existence. In such cases, "principle" doesn't refer, and often such words as "beliefs", "views", "theories", and the like are as applicable to such cases as "principles" 26 See the previous section.

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The role of rule-makers can be distinguished from the role of rules. The right to make and adopt rules can be obtained in many ways, one of which is by being the originator of a game. But once the person formulates and adopts rules for an activity, the rules become critiques for behavior with respect to that activity. Then the maker or adopter can easily be, and often is, subject to the very rule he has made. A person's role as a rule-maker does not exempt him from being in the scope of the very rule he has created. Once made, the RULE becomes the "determiner" of correct procedures for an activity, and no matter who enters into that activity he is subject to the control of the rules by being open to having his behavior evaluated in terms of those rules. As a result of distinguishing rules from principles it has been contended : (1) That principles are idealogical guides for behavior; rules are methodological guides. (2) That while rules can in a sense be adopted for one's own use, this can only be done through an activity; one adopts rules for an activity which is for one's own use. (3) That in adopting rules for one's own use through constructing an activity for one's own use, a person plays two roles and is in two positions. When making rules he is an adopter, when and if entering into the activity he is a follower, subject to the rules.

6. MODELS AND METHODS

While I would not like to (and do not intend to) analyze the word "model", 1 think some grounds for distinguishing models from rules can be found. We could tentatively say that models give a design for going about something, as rules could, but models are exemplary rather than prescriptive. Models need not be sentence-like things, but even if they are articulated in words there is no force associated with them. They, rather like directions and instructions, show a

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scheme or procedure which could be followed but need not be followed. Further, models, if they purport to be some sort of isomorphic structure of something else, are confirmable or true or false and might even have predictive value. Depending on how well they depict or reveal the structure of what they are about, they are verified or refuted. No reminder is necessary to the effect that rules are not confirmable, and this provides a further basis for distinguishing models from rules. Not only do models lack prescriptive force but they can be confirmed. In line with models, we might ask about methods. Systematic methods might be confused with rules. When the word "method" is used to refer to a written specification of procedures it might be said to describe a procedure, but does it prescribe it in the way that rules do ? Naturally, if it does it would be called a rule. But if it doesn't, for which I think a case can be made out, methods (even those most like rules) could be distinguished from rules. If one deviates from procedure specified by a rule, one is not qualified as performing correctly. If one deviates from a method, is this the case? I think not. One would be called unmethodical, bad at taking instructions and the like. Therefore, methods are not prescriptive. Needless to say, a verbal articulation of a method for some activity could be adopted as rules for that activity. Non-rule methods describe systematic, strategic, efficient, standard or whatever means for going about an activity without being prescriptive. Saying "it is necessary to abide by the method in order to perform correctly" is equivalent to saying "the articulation of the method has been adopted as a rule(s) and given the status of a rule(s)".

7. R E G U L A T I O N S

The phrase "rules and regulations" is a common one, and because two words are used we could justifiably suppose that two different notions are meant, and needed to describe what follows. But usu-

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ally what follows this phrase is a single list of inscriptions, not distinguished nor easily distinguishable from each other. How does a list marked "regulations" differ from a list headed by the word "rules"? I suggest the difference is a slight one, and suspect that there are times when calling an inscription a regulation is only to further characterize a rule. "Regulation" could be applicable to those rules whose sole purpose is to regulate by which I mean "standardize behavior". Not all rules are intended solely for the purpose of regulation, or actually do regulate. For example, certain social rules might not have the effect of regulating behavior, but of restricting it. Another example, certain game rules might be intended solely for the purpose of providing critiques for behavior. I suggest therefore that regulations are a sub-case of rules, namely those rules intended for the purpose of standardizing behavior. However, regulations are not only used to standardize behavior but to standardize antecedent conditions.27 A regulation might read: the ball is "live" as soon as the whistle blows. Such regulations are not rules, and those which are not rules are those which do not specify what counts as correct BEHAVIOR. Not all rules are regulations; not all regulations are rules or even rule-like. But it is suggested that regulations serve the purpose of standardizing behavior (in which case they are rules), or standardizing situations by specifying antecedent conditions (in which case they are not rules).

8. S O M E M O R E

There is little expectation that more features of rules will emerge from detailed consideration of rules in comparison with other closely related notions. Instead, I will briefly try to indicate how the analysis distinguishes rules from the rest of the notions found in connection with "rule" in the dictionary and thesaurus. (See Appendix A) 27

See chapter III, Section 4.

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To press on then, I suggest that mores can be considered in the same way as customs and practices. The word applies to those customs or habits of a community whose observance is expected a bit more strongly than other practices. Perhaps stronger moral judgement obtains upon breaking a more-type practice, or perhaps scorn or anger follows upon faillure to observe a more. But, essentially, mores seem to me to be little more than a strongly urged practice, urged however more by conduct than by articulation either verbally or in writing. When such practices are observed in the behavior of a society and are given articulation by, for example, anthropologists who are fond of discovering and recording such preserved regularities, they, i.e. statements of mores, could be classed along with scientific laws. The articulation of preserved practices and customs, be they strongly or weakly urged, is of a piece with the articulation of observed regularities in the world. It is suggested then that mores are favored practices which, when given articulation are distinguished from scientific laws only in that their subject matter differs. Unarticulated mores are distinguished from rules in being practices, not linguistic entities. Maxims require a different analysis and classification. These tend to be articulated in some ways and quoted freely to the young or foolhardy by the old or self-righteous. The point is, they are linguistic. Further, they can be followed, and indeed there would be little point in bestowing them on the needy if they could not be. But such features, linguistic character and followability, make them sound uncomfortably like rules. Perhaps maxims are devised as a result of observing human behavior; noting that society works better or people are happier if debts are paid or everyone is honest, might give someone cause to formulate a maxim. But once uttered, maxims are not sociological accounts of the workings of some society, as mores are, but have some sort of prescriptive force associated with them with respect to behavior in the future. And this makes them appear to be even more like rules. It is in this respect however, that a clue can be seen as to how

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maxims differ from rules. The prescriptive force of maxims is advisory; it has not the 'compulsoriness' of rules. To put this in terms of the analysis, while rules specify what counts as the one correct way to perform an activity, maxims specify either the most strategic, most practical, most accepted, or most well thought of and the like, way to perform an activity. But also, maxims are not adopted. They are made up and thrown out to the world in an advisory capacity. Rules on the other hand, once adopted, must be followed in order to qualify at all for some activities, or in order to qualify as performing correctly in others. Maxims provide the best policy; rules specify the only accepted procedure. The following notions, belief, creed, position, view, theory, dogma, tenet, listed in the "rule" entry under the heading "religious" can be dismissed here on the grounds of irrelevancy; such are purely a matter of opinion, while rules are a matter of the facts of a situation. Canons however are not matters of opinion; they are set forth to specify certain required modes of behavior, but what is required is based on religious beliefs, and the authority behind them is a religious organization. They are ecclesiastical laws, and like all laws related to human behavior of a social nature, are classed as rules by the analysis. They differ from social laws only in being issued by the church rather than the state, but canons are rules just the same. Under the heading "mathematics" the following notions can be found: axioms, fundamental truths, self-evident truths, theorems. Certainly, inscriptions to which such words apply purport to set out what is assumed to be the case and not to specify procedures. Neither are they followable or without truth value. They are surely not rules, nor are they claimed to be such except by overzealous lexicographers. The last group of notions to be discussed implies the idea of an average or a standard. The notions of "average", "normal", and "natural", have been associated with rules, but they have been considered to be a property of rules. Usually there is a fairly common idiom which makes us

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tend to take these words as synonyms for "rule", " a s a rule" is often used synonomously with " o n the average", "normally", and "naturally". (And synonomously with "usually", "customari l y " and "often".) But while such notions are related to some sense of the word "rule", it is not with the sense under investigation here. It should be remarked that there is no contention here as to which of the many senses of "rule" is primarily most significant, most usual and so on. Rather, there is only an attempt to restrict inquiry into one specified sense of "rule", namely the one whereby the word refers to certain linguistic entities. These notions can, therefore, be discarded as being synonomous with " r u l e " (in the sense of the word at issue) on the grounds that they do not refer to linguistic entities of any kind. While rules might be used as a standard, or might specify the customary or normal, or average way, there is no point in our so characterizing rules. This notion is already covered by the way in which the prescriptiveness of rules is analyzed, by saying that rules are evaluative critiques for behavior. Rules might be said to specify prototype performances or to express paradigm cases of good behavior. This in no way illuminates anything, damages the analysis, nor need detain us. If one wants to say this, and thereby feel it necessary to include such notions in a property definition of "rule", I do not think it is wholly correct. Something more correct has already been done which I think captures the spirit of what one would be trying to say about rules by using the notions "paradigm" or prototype", or even "standard" or "average". After all, one could describe anything in innumerable ways, but it remains the decision of the definer to decide which description is most accurate, relevant, irredundant, complete and so forth. For my part, I think it would add little to further characterize rules as specifiers of prototype or paradigm procedure; being specifiers of correct procedure is a large enough task. We can now append one last summing up of the characteristics which utterances and inscriptions (Chapter I, 1) referred to by the noun " r u l e " are suggested to have. They:

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(1) have no truth value (Chapter I, 3) (2) are followable(ChapterI,6) or specify 'see to it'-able procedure (Chapter I], 1) (3) are prescriptive or are specifiers of what counts as correct procedure (or means Chapter 111, 3) for performing an activity (Chapter II, 1 and 2, and Chapter III, 4) (4) have prescriptive force associated with them, by which is meant that they act as the basis for the evaluation of behavior (critiques) and are used by authorities having the right to require conformity. Therefore, people can be said to be 'compelled' to follow rules either in order to obtain favorable evaluation of behavior with respect to an activity or because they must conform to procedure required by an authority (Chapter II, 2) (5) must be appropriately adopted or the appropriate means must have been taken by the appropriate persons so that the procedures specified by the linguistic entity count as the correct ones for some activity (Chapter II, 3) (6) are non-confirmable (Chapter III, 1) (7) remain in force until unadopted (Chapter III, 4) (8) pertain to activities and are conditional; they act as critiques for and can only be violated by those in certain activities or in situations in which certain antecedent conditions have been satisfied (Chapter ΙΠ, 4) In short, utterances and inscriptions called rules are appropriately adopted, prescriptive, conditional linguistic entities having no truth-value. Shorter still, utterances and inscriptions called rules act as critiques for behavior in certain situations.

IV

RULES AND THE NATIVE SPEAKER

1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I shall analyze the connection between the rules of a language and the native speakers of that language, and suggest a procedure which might be useful for explaining the ability to speak. 2. RULE-DESCRIPTIONS OF SPEAKERS

I would now like to ask: "What is the explanatory value of a description of speakers in terms of grammatical rules?" and answer this question in terms of the rule-description apparatus suggested in Chapter I, 7. Some preliminary remarks are needed. First, in line with previous practice I will again assume a context-free situation and second, in line with the previous analysis, the type of rule-description at issue will be specified, and only that type's explanatory value will be attributed to it. One way of asking the question about the relation between rules and speakers is: "Is it necessary to be acquainted with the rules of grammar for a language in order to speak that language?" 1 Taking this question at face value the answer is clearly " n o " . Children, in fact most people, are acquainted with few, if any, 1

J. Katz asks "What is known by a speaker who is fluent in a natural language?" "Mentalism in Linguistics", p. 130.

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rules of grammar and yet are able to speak grammatically.2 That the answer to this question is " n o " is even more firmly established when it is noted that it is not even POSSIBLE to know all the relevant rules for English as there is no complete grammar for English. As put, the question is a bogus one, but let us answer it anyway. Assuming, however wrongly, that there is a complete grammar, or one which applies to all grammatical instances, let us ask how a person who knows this hypothetical grammar would be rule described. Not surprisingly, the analysis would legislate that either a Type II or Type III R-description would most accurately describe Ρ depending on whether or not he has to see to it that his behavior fulfills the grammar. Type II R-descriptions would probably apply to adult, highly educated persons who either have "come to think" in a new language or who are native speakers and need not refer to the rules, and Type III R-descriptions would apply to those who know and make constant reference to the rules when speaking. But such cases are hypothetical. The point in raising this bogus question is to afford the opportunity for pointing out that most speakers most of the time are at best described by only a Type I R-description.3 And it is important to note that this rather unambitious connection between rules and speakers is not sufficient for explaining the ability to speak. Yet there are those (e.g. Black, Chomsky, Katz), who would prefer to explain this ability via some connection between rules and speakers, and in order to manufacture some connection phrase the question 2

It would be wrong to hold that knowledge of rules is SUFFICIENT for speaking a language. Knowing rules for a language does not guarantee that Ρ will speak grammatically. P, after all, may not relate his knowledge to his behavior, he maybe dumb (unable to make noise), not interested in speaking grammatically, interested in speaking ungrammatically, and so on. 3 It need not be thought that a person must know the rules in order to be judged (or Type I R-described) in terms of them. We can and do judge behavior in terms of rules not known to the party whose behavior is being judged. For example, African savages are called uncivilized, unruly, and so on in terms of, say, European rules for 'civilization'. The speech of uneducated workmen are judged in terms of, say, Latin grammars for 'grammatical' speech. People are judged in terms of legal laws they don't know; ignorance, after all, is no excuse!

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as put to read instead " I n order to speak a language, needn't one be guided by the rules of grammar for that language, even though such rules are not known to the speaker?" No one would deny that the ability to be grammatical (by which shall be meant the ability to recognize 'new' sentences as grammatical or not and the ability to produce 'new' grammatical sentences without knowing, i.e. being able to articulate, the grammatical rules for the language) is an ability worthy of an explanation. What is denied is that this is an ability capable of being explained in terms of speakers being rule-directed. I will wait until Section 4 of this Chapter to suggest an alternative method to explain this ability; in this Section I would like to examine some of the undesirable consequences which arise from attempting an explanation for this ability which includes reference to being guided by unknown rules. As I see it, the most serious unwanted consequence arising from the rule-directed approach is that it raises more problems than it solves. This happens in two ways; (1) new notions are introduced that are themselves in need of explication, and (2) the context fostered by such treatment is one of unresolvable (untestable) speculation. These points can be illustrated by examining some assertions made by those attempting to explain the ability to be grammatical in terms of speakers being directed by unknown rules. For example, Max Black, after noting that there are no authorities which regulate grammatical rules and no consent to speak similarly, yet there are no arguments about future uses, concludes (against those who conclude from this that there are no rules of language in force at all), that there are unknown rules which guide the use of language. He says It still remains true that in learning a language one also learns the all important notions of relevant controlling rules of usage (and so 'proper' and 'improper' ways of talking and writing). Some of these rules are explicitly formulated. ...But many more are shown in the behavior of the speakers of the language — in their readiness to correct themselves and others their willingness to believe that there is a rule even if they do not

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know what it is, and their endorsement of rules after they have been formulated by an onlooker as adequately formulating the guiding principles of their previous conduct.4 No doubt a good deal more is not subject to explicit rules. But if what I have said about implicit rules stands up to critical examination,5 this is not an insuperable obstacle to the discovery of rules governing the use of language.8 There is confusion here between "governing" and "guiding", two notions introduced which are not sufficiently clear themselves to illuminate the way in which unknown rules are related to speakers. It might be agreed that one can be in some way 'governed' by rules not known to him — not every citizen is familiar with all the laws of his country. But can one be GUIDED by unknown rules ? What could be meant by such an assertion ? Is this a new form of determinism ? Is this a modified form of the platonic view of recollection? And how could one verify this assertion? To say, as Black does, that such rules are shown in the behavior of speakers does not constitute evidence as it is precisely this 'regular' similar behavior which is up for explanation. Similar criticisms regarding the need for further explanation, doubts about verifiability, and the appearance of circularity can be made about the word 'controlling'. Problems also arise with respect to the use of the word 'learn' in this context. And I am not alone in being worried about the use of this word by those making assertions to the effect that speakers 'in some sense learn' unknown rules. When replying to Thomas Green who maintains that one can learn to obey rules without knowing them, 7 John Soltis writes: 2. To say that in SOME SENSE one has learned a rule is not to show that the particular requirements for "learning that" have been met... we should be aware that the notion of "learning" itself is ambiguous 4

The crux of the issue is; how can previously unknown and newly formulated rules GUIDE previous behavior? 5 See Appendix C for critical examination of this and related points. Also see Chapter III, 2 for dicsussion of 'implicit rules'. 6 Black, p. 136. 7 Thomas Green, "Teaching, Acting and Behaving", Harvard Educational Review. (Rail, 1964), p. 509.

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and that there are many possible candidates of different sense to meet the requirement of SOME SENSE... That is, one could (if he agreed with Green) know a rule without having learned it in ANY sense and then proceed to learn to obey a rule (which is obviously different from knowing it). There is, of course, a final possibility, and that is that the "SOME SENSE" which Green refers to is a sense not yet distinguished in the analysis of the concept of learning.8 Similar comments can be made to chose who say speakers " i n some sense know", " i n some sense learn", " i n some sense are directed b y " rules. The advantage I see to Black's and Green's positions is that they answer the question "How are we able to be grammatical without knowing rules?" But however neat and compact this is, is it an ANSWER? The contribution such an 'answer' makes to the problem seems to be the addition of a further mysterious presence in the form of unknown universale or principles and the addition of a further mysterious act accompanying speaking in the form of being guided or directed by these universale. What independent verification can there be for unknown rules or for this extra act of obeying rules which always accompanies and is inseparable from speaking! Noam Chomsky's more sophisticated version of the "learned and guided by unknown rules" answer to the question about our ability to be grammatical takes the following form: The child who learns a language has in some sense constructed the grammar for himself... the speaker's task is to select a particular compatible set of optionel rules. ...It appears that we recognize a new item as a sentence not because it matches some familiar item in any simple way, but because it is generated by the grammar that each individual has somehow and in some form internalized.9 8

John F. Soltis, et al., "Discussion: Teaching, Acting and Behaving", Harvard Educational Review. (1965), p. 192-3. 9 N o a m Chomsky, " A Review of B.F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior", The Structure of Language". Readings in the Philosophy of Language, eds. Jerry Fodor and Jerrold Katz (New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1964), p.p. 576-577.

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Noam Chomsky's 'internalist' theory is also advanced in the hope of explaining the ability to be grammatical, and can be considered a sub-case of the Black/Green theory as all these positions share an important feature: in order to explain the ability to be grammatical via an appeal to grammatical rules it must be posited that the rules are "in us" and directing the production and recognition of sentences; 10 whether this is described as being accomplished by some sort of learning or by some form of internalization is irrelevant. The 'internalist' theory falls prey to the criticisms of the earlier theories, but two further comments can be made. What the 'internalist' must hope is that the structure revealed in language (and set down as grammar) is like the internal structure of speakers. It is probably assumed that the description of the inputed linguistic data and the outputed linguistic data is also a description of the internal structure of people. But does the structure of language correspond to the internal structure of people? Need the structural description of the production of goods be a description of the 'nuts and bolts' part of a machine, or more, BE in the machine producing the goods? What can be concluded from noting that there are different grammars (different 'latin' and different 'transformational' grammars) ? It would be as wrong to conclude from this that people are constructed differently as it is to conclude from there being similar structures in all languages that people are not only constructed similarly but that their similarity consists in having those precise structures in their heads, namely grammars. In the same way as rule behavior need not be regular or similar, regular behavior need not be based on similar rules. Finding regularities about human behavior might point to a similarity in the structure of people, but it need not imply that the DESCRIPTION of the similarity is just what the similarity is. All that one can say on the basis of noting similarities in speech is that there could be something structurally similar about people which enables them to speak in structurally similar ways; it is a 10

An exaggerated form of this position might involve claiming that rules are innate.

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completely different claim to say that the nature of the similarity is the having of similar grammars in their heads. A similar point is made by Nelson Goodman, who in another connection says: Philosophers sometime mistake features of discourse for features of the subject of discourse. ...we sometimes suppose that the structure of the world is the same as the structure of the description. 11

And this point is also made by Paul Ziff in the same connection: To argue that therefore (because the rules of the syntactic system will correspond (more or less) to regularities in the ing natural language) there must be rules in the natural like arguing that roads must be red if they correspond to a map. 12

or semantic cortespondlanguage, is red lines on

The second point that can be made in connection with the 'internalist' theory has to do with explaining how people can fail to be grammatical. In order to have a viable 'internalized' rule account of the ability to be grammatical, the unknown rules must be postulated as generating or being directly responsible for speech; after all, merely having a book of chess rules in one's hand would not account for the ability to play. And if it is necessary to assert that speakers are at the mercy of these 'internalized' rules when speaking grammatically, the 'internalist' rules account would both fail to account for instances when speakers are ungrammatical and would be at variance with the very terms of the account itself. Rules are such that they are, in principle at least, breakable. On the other hand, if this element of "you are guided by unknown rules" is to be avoided, then the proponents of the 'internalist' rule-guided theory would have to explain how it is that we are not guided by them at times. In other words, what breaks down when people don't speak grammatically. And how would hypotheses 11

Nelson Goodman, "The Way the World Is", Review of Metaphysics 14 (1960). 12 Ziff, p. 38.

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about either being guided or not being guided by 'internalized' grammars be verified ? To repeat the main point in this section, grammatical behavior is certainly rule-like behavior, and is rule describable. But it is another matter indeed to assert that grammatical behavior is rule-directed or rule-guided. It would be well to ask those tempted to explain the ability to be grammatical not in terms of rule-likeness but in terms of rule-guidedness the following questions: 1.

What purchase on the situation is obtained by attributing a guiding relation to exist between unknown rules and Ρ (a person speaking) which isn't obtained by a Type I Rdescription ?

2.

What exactly is left out of a Type I R-description, and is a rule guiding account adequate to account for it ?

3.

Shouldn't all regularities in behavior be described in terms of rules guiding P, if some are?

4.

On what grounds would non-rule-guided behavior be distinguished from rule-guided behavior if P's intentions and knowledge of rules is not taken to distinguish them ?

5.

What exactly is the nature of the relation between Ρ and rules which are guiding him while unknown to him ?

6.

Even if the BEHAVIOR is the same in cases where rules are known to Ρ and cases where rules are unknown by P, is the SITUATION the same?

It is hoped that it has been shown that many fruitless controversies arise out of conceiving speaking as a rule-guided activity as well as a rule-describable or rule-like activity. Despite the fact that much argument has taken place within this framework, no progress has been made with respect to specifying in what sense rules not articulatable are known, learned, obeyed, internalized, and so on. Such arguments could go on forever, or at least until there is some evidence

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which could decide the matter. 13 Until that time, let us question this rule-guided presupposition to see if perhaps there is a way in which to explain the ability to be grammatical which would not lead to argument supported only by intuition or prejudice, but which might lead to testable resolvable inquiry. Unfortunately, this problem has become more an emotional issue than an intellectual one. It is not very popular to question basic though unsupported assumptions which have attained the status of self-evident truths. But they must be questioned in order to open the way out of confusion and unproductive controversy. Let us not, then, construe speaking as a rule activity ; attributing the ability to be grammatical to rule-direction is unwarranted and ruledescriptions are unilluminating. Let us say that from the point of view of the ability of speakers, rules have virtually nothing to do with speaking or understanding a natural language.14

3. GRAMMAR-DESCRIPTIONS OF LANGUAGE

Before suggesting an alternative type of explanation for the ability to be grammatical the nature of grammar should be investigated. It might only be due to a linguistic accident that the word 'rule' alone is associated with the word 'grammar' but so doing blinds one to the lack of claimed explanatory power for grammar as 13

As a matter of fact, there seems to be evidence against the rule-guided theory and in support of the position advocated here which is that the ability to be grammatical cannot be accounted for by appeal to guiding rules. PatrickSuppes and Edward Crowther(in "Some remarkson Stimulus-Response Theories of Language Learning", Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., Report 97,1966) write: "But it still also seems true that for purposes of recognizing whether or not a particular expression is well formed, the formal recursive definition itself is seldom used by individuals who work with... a logical language." (p. 19). And more particularly, they write about natural languages that: "...the existence of algorithms for finding proofs or of formal grammar hardly guarantees that subjects do in fact employ these particular algorithms or generative rules, or that the rules even have substantial relevance to the actual method of learning." (p. 21). 14 Ziff, p. 34 (and pp. 34-38 for further discussion).

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rules at the same time as it blinds one from seeing another way to construe grammar, namely as laws. And grammars can be described as laws. Grammars originate as laws; they are originally subject to the spoken language and no one at this stage is subject to them. Grammars are first devised through finding regularities in language behavior and they change as language behavior changes; only secondly can they be adopted as rules to act as standards for correct speech. In fact then, if one wants to use grammars in any capacity in an account of the ability to speak, it would be grammars as laws which might reveal something about human abilities manifested in behavior. Grammars adopted as rules and acting as standards for correct language behavior impose something on behavior; grammars as laws, devised from taking note of speech behavior, describe 'natural' behavior. Contending that grammars can be described correctly as laws of behavior (but which are also rule-like in that they are capable of being adopted later as rules) is not a contention made by myself alone. George Miller and Stephen Isard, in connection with the problem of how to "recognize civilized man as an inveterate rule follower and incorporate his addiction to social practices into a descriptive science" 15 speak of this dual role of grammar. ...linguistic rules describe socially accepted linguistic practices. Sometimes the rules are put forward as normative, as specifying what good usage ought to be, but that is not the intent of most descriptive linguistics, nor do we wish to advocate it here. Linguistic rules need not be normative; it is perfectly possible to consider them simply as a definition of linguistic practices of a given community.16 Wittgenstein also speaks of the descriptive 'law-like' function of grammar: 496. Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfill its purposes, in order to have such-and-such effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of signs.17 15

George Miller and Stephen Isard, "Some Perceptual Consequences of Linguistic Rules", p. 19. 16 Miller-Isard, pp. 19-20. 17 Wittgenstein, p. 138.

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While it can be agreed that grammars function as descriptive laws, it need not be agreed, with Wittgenstein, that they can in no way be used in that capacity to explain the use of language. Grammars can be construed as models of linguistic behavior; they give a description of the linguistic data 'fed' into speakers and a description of the linguistic data 'put out' in terms of 'new' sentences. So construing grammars, as models of language behavior, bestows some explanatory powers upon them, but we must be careful in specifying what this power is.18 It is not yet possible (that is without further evidence) to attribute an internal structure to speakers which exactly corresponds to the structure of grammars. Large 'lumps' of things inside speakers might be 'captured' by grammars in one or another of its features, but we are not in a position to postulate that grammars make enough distinctions or the right kind of distinctions to completely reveal the construction of internal makeup. On the other hand, it might be constructive to construe the matter the other way around, not saying that internal structure is isomorphic to grammar, but that grammar is isomorphic to internal structure. This possibility will be explored later, but it should be noticed that while such a device yields clues or suggests things to look for about speakers, it would still be incomplete as a description of sentence recognition and sentence production. More than a model of structure is needed to account for this complex ability to speak. It appears from this that caution must be exercised in making the proper explanatory use of grammatical laws in explaining the ability to speak. Certainly, grammars as models of speech behavior are useful, but taken alone, they are not sufficient to account for the ability. Noam Chomsky writes on this: A grammar... is essentially a theory of sentences of a language; it specifies this set (or generates it, to use a technical term which has become familiar in this connection) and assigns to each generated sentence a 18

For example, Harris Savin, in "Grammatical Structure and the Immediate Recall of English Sentences" (University of Pennsylvania, National Science Foundation Grant, GS-857) uses grammar as a model for memory retention, but in a carefully restricted way.

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structural description. It is not, however, a model of the speaker or hearer. It neither synthesizes particular sentences, as does the speaker, nor does it recognize the structure of presented sentences, as does the hearer.19 Models of speaking, as Chomsky puts it, are not models of speakers or hearers; models of language, as I have put it, are not models for language speaking ability. What exactly should be added to this model in order to more fully describe what goes on when speakers speak, or what speakers are like so that they can perform this enormously complex feat? What 'psychological' claims can be added to grammar models in order to describe the part of speakers in putting out the grammardescribed language ? Armed with grammars as laws, namely with a powerful descriptive model of what speakers speak, let us inquire further into how speakers are able to speak.

4. N O N - R U L E DESCRIPTION OF THE ABILITY TO SPEAK

I have tried to point out some undesirable consequences which arise from the attempt to explain the ability to be grammatical in terms of 'learning' or being 'guided' by unknown rules. Quite simply, there are problems of clarification, verification and adequate explanation. It might be worthwhile to now inquire into what might count as an adequate explanation for this ability. Since those asking about the ability are usually philosophers, linguists and psychologists and the like, a physiological answer would not be counted as adequate or interesting. Answers in terms of universals or unknown guiding priciples have been rejected as to the extent that such 'explanations' contend that speakers are guided by rules they only add further mystery and further unexplained elements,and to the extent that they admit rules which are unknown they only restate the problem rather than solve it. Since speaking is described 19

Noam Chomsky, "On the Notion 'Rule of Grammar' ", Structure of Language and Its Mathematical Aspects (Providence, R.I., American Mathematical Society, 1961), p. 7.

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as an ability, perhaps it would be useful to attempt an explanation of speaking in terms of abilities. This is no easy task. The ability to speak involves, among other things, the ability to make noise and hear noise, physical processes (as nerve firings, bodily manipulations), having some intelligence, and so on. It seems to involve 'less' than following rules (in the sense that so doing is not necessary for speech) and more than fulfilling laws (in the sense that so doing is not sufficient for explaining the procedure). There is some comfort in noting that other 'natural' abilities also require this variety of description, and are looked on as skills. Perhaps the ability to speak can at least be partially accounted for by grouping it together with the ability to play billiards, ride bicycles, make baskets in basketball, and so on, and by calling speech ability a skill of a high order. I am not alone in describing the ability to speak as a skill. Miller, Galantar and Pribram write: ...the pronunciations of a sentence in a normal manner is a skilled act, acquired after many years of practice. 20

And F.A. Hayek writes in great detail about this idea in precisely the connection in which the interest lies in this work: The most striking instance of the phenomenon from which we shall start is the ability of small children to use language in accordance with the rules of grammar and idiom of which they are wholly unaware. The phenomenon is a very comprehensive one and includes all that we call skills. The skill of a draftsman or athlete which in English is described as "know how" (to carve, to ride a bicycle, to ski, or to tie a knot) belongs to this category. It is characteristic of these skills that we are usually not able to state explicitly (discusively) the manner of acting which is involved. 21

The grouping together of such activities as speaking and playing billiards could be objected to on several counts. It could be said 20

Miller, Galantar, Pribram, Plans and the Structure of Behavior (New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1960), p. 156. 21 F.A. Hayek, "Rules, Perception and Intelligibility", Proceedings of the British Academy

(1961), p. 321.

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that speaking is a 'mental' activity while playing billiards is 'physical'. To this can be answered that speaking also involves physical activity and playing billiards also involves mental activity. But, it could be objected, speaking is PRIMARILY mental while playing billiards is primarily physical. To this can be answered, first, that such a contention is not known to be true, and second, that if it were true there are enough similarities to make the grouping justified. But, it could be objected, speaking is of a more complex and high order than playing billiards. To this it could be answered that if this is so MORE needs to be done in order to explain speaking, but not necessarily something initially DIFFERENT. Another way to put this is that grammar as an explanatory device will have to be supplemented, but that it is not irrelevant, and this has already been noted. Then it could be objected that grammar is different from scientific physical laws in that it is man-made and man-relevant. And to this it can be answered that such is not the case; scientific laws are also man-made and many of them are man-relevant, particularly those in psychology. And then it could be objected that grammar is used as a standard of correctness while scientific laws are only descriptions. This point was answered by noting that although grammars originate as laws they can then be used as rules, but certain psychological laws also take on the role of being standards of correctness for, say, 'normal' behavior. Moreover, correctness or the use of grammar as rules is not at issue here; what is at issue is the explanation and description of the ability to speak which is a 'scientific' enterprise. If it can be allowed that speaking can legitimately be looked on as a skill and grouped toghether with other 'natural' skills, what does this move do for us by way of explaining the ability ? First and very importantly, this puts examination of the ability on a par with the work done in psychology. Speech ability becomes an activity very much in the domain of the psychologists. The 'composite' skills involved in speaking can be investigated and relevant skills such as comparing, recognizing, descriminating, remembering and so on have long been investigated.22 And in so opening up the 22

Examination of these abilities is particularly the work of the psychophysi-

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ability to the critical and experimental eye o f the psychologists, any explanation offered will likely be in terms of testable resolvable theories. A great advantage is gained over the Platonic speculators. 2 3 Second, the problem of the ability to be grammatical (recognize new data as correct or not and produce original linguistic data) can be seen as a subcase of a larger problem, another economical advantage. This ability to be grammatical centrally includes the ability to extrapolate from past t o future cases. Anything achieved by way of explaining the ability to be inductive in general would be likely to illuminate the ability to be inductive in language, and vice versa. But language extrapolation practices are more easily examined than experience extrapolation practices. A s there is a model for it in the form of grammar, let us start there. Without trying to solve the problem of induction or even account for the ability to extrapolate o n language, I would like to further investigate this most important component ability for speaking, the ability to extrapolate, hoping that such an investigation will

cists. For information about their work see Eugene Galantar's work, Contemporary Psychophysics (New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1962). 23 Unless a theory is open to experimental investigation it will forever remain on the speculative level and never get down to describing what might actually account for abilities. As much as possible should be treated experimentally; once 'stuck' notions like following unknown rules could be introduced, but why close a theory to investigation before it is absolutely necessary? Since language speaking is a performance activity, a theory adequate to account for it must be a performance theory i.e. one testable by performance. Again it should be mentioned that grammar alone is not sufficient to provide the theoretical framework for an explanation of language performance. This contention is supported in this connection by the work of Patrick Suppes and Edward Crowther, "Some Remarks on Stimulus-Response Theories of Language Learning" Stanford, Calif., Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Stanford Univ., Report 97,1966). They write: " N o empirical tests of generative grammars have been made, at least not in the detailed fashion that has characterized mathematical psychology during the past decade. Evidently this is because a theory of grammar is not itself a theory of performance, and at present any predictions of performance are based on somewhat hazardous extrapolation, from the formal theory. If the predictions are not fulfilled, one can take refuge by repudiating the informal extrapolation, while still maintaining that the theory of grammar is correct." (p. 15).

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point the way towards a satisfactory explanation of the ability to speak. The ability to extrapolate is closely tied up with the ability to generalize; extrapolation seems to preclude this ability, but generalization ability alone would not be enough to fully describe the process of extrapolation. Answers to the question about the ability to be grammatical, which are in terms of the ability to generalize have been considered too simple on the one hand, and pointless on the other. The grounds on which it has been considered pointless are the following: Talk of generalization in this case is entirely pointless.... It appears that we recognize a new item as a sentence not because it matches some familiar item in any simple way, but because it is generated by the grammar that each individual has somehow and in some form internalized. 24

It appears that we are back to the "in some sense there is extra internal activity" talk, and I hope it has been established that THIS alternative to generalization talk is even more pointless. The grounds on which generalization has been criticized as being too simple are, and have been, well taken: ...a refusal to study the contribution of the child to language learning permits only a superficial account of language acquisition, with a vast and unanalyzed contribution attributed to a step called GENERALIZATION which in fact includes just about everything of interest in the process.25 An answer solely in terms of generalization has been considered too simple, one, because the model for the generalizations has been asserted to be insufficient and in need of supplementation by psychological elements26 (which could include the contribution of the child to language learning, as well as other things), and two 24

Noam Chomsky, "A Review of B.F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior", The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language, Eds. J.A. Fodor and J.J. Katz, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964), p. 576. 25 Chomsky, 1964: p. 578. 26 Also see pages 115-116 on this point.

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because a more intensive look at the more complex central ability required for language production, extrapolation, needs to be and is about to be undertaken. What more can be said about extrapolative language practices, typified by the ability to decide about the grammaticality of previously unseen sentences and the ability to produce previously unheard, but grammatical, sentences? In the first place, grammar, which describes the results of the process, could be looked at in the hope of finding some of the relevant and significant features upon which extrapolation takes place and in order to provide clues for the construction of experiments and empirical inquiry. For example, degrees of departure from the 'standard' form might account for degrees of hesitancy to call a sentence grammatical or not. 27 The structures of language revealed in grammars could point to what to test for in terms of what speakers 'look' for in order to count a sentence grammatical. Once features are determined which somehow provide a basis for decisions about grammaticality, how this feature is recognized could be investigated. Apart from form, grammar points to other things to test; how complex can sentences be? what are the limitations on sentence length ? what seem to be the limits and constraints on language extrapolation? Such studies together with study of such skills as comparing, recognizing, discriminating, remembering, and so on should provide considerable insight into the ability to be grammatical, and to extrapolate on linguistic data. But I think we can look elsewhere (other than to grammars) for useful hints about the ability to extrapolate. Notice that habits can be developed chronologically and logically prior to codification of the rules (or laws) of practice. Some practices might only become habitual after being codified, but many practices become habitual (e.g. smoking) without ever being covered by formulated codes of behavior. Since general statements and formulated codes of practice can wait upon and be determined by the instance, it is not clear 27

Since the laws of language can be seen to capture previous usage, and not be arbitrarily imposed, such laws should reveal something about language practices.

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that grammars provide all the relevant clues for habitual, learned language behavior. Remember, there is no complete grammar for English at the moment. So looking at and investigating the procedures for establishing habits might reveal something further about language practice. There is another more general skill manifested in general behavior that might be illuminating, if understood, for explaining language speaking. I am referring now to the ability to solve puzzles (to recognize patterns) without having a formula or algorithm for the solution. Extrapolative practices of comparative simplicity can be traced in the process of completing simple tasks, and later these practices can be described in an extended way to account for completion of more complex tasks. One simple task which could be investigated, and which illustrates 'having a feeling' for a pattern is the Chinese pyramid block puzzle. I have given this puzzle to many people, and most of them were able to 'solve' it (i.e., complete the task). They made various attempts, worked by trial and error, corrected moves, 'saw the light' of how to proceed at certain stages, said to certain suggestions "Yes, that's good ", or " N o , that won't d o " , and all without having any rule, principle, formula or algorithm in mind when working the puzzle. Judgments of 'good' and 'bad' moves were made opinions as to strategy were held, ideas about "right "and " w r o n g " procedures were expressed, with no algorithms known. The abilities in this case can be likened to many other cases where there is a 'feel' for a pattern although the exact nature of the pattern in not known. Speakers of language must also have this skill, to make adjustments and fulfill patterns when the nature of the pattern is unclear. And if such skills could be investigated and explained, much enlightenment must follow about the use and the nature of such skills as manifested in the ability to extrapolate in language practices. To sum up, it is suggested that in order to explain the ability to speak, the component skills of speaking be investigated, with special attention paid to the central skill, extrapolation. By way of getting further information about this skill, it was suggested that

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grammar be used for indications of relevant investigations, and that the nature of habits and pattern recognition be investigated. This last would include psychological claims and even determine the nature of such claims. As it now stands, the 'skills' method of explaining the ability to be grammatical is not much more informative than the 'ruleguiding' method of explanation. The 'skills' method requires further elucidation of composite skills, such as pattern recognition, extrapolation, and so on, which is no easy task. But it does attempt to explain the ability to be grammatical in the right way, i.e. it has the enormous advantage over the 'rule-guided' method in that it invites testing and experimentation rather than speculation. A second advantage of the 'skills' method is that it aligns the problem of explaining the ability to be grammatical with other, smaller and larger, problems to the economy and mutual edification of both. Work is already in progress in the attempt to understand the composite skills, and in the attempt to understand general inductive practices. Any progress in these areas will throw light on the area of the ability to be grammatical. Another reason why a 'skill' non-answer is preferable to a 'rule-guided' non-answer is that there is less tendency to count the former a full answer on its own ; it should be considered as a series of suggestions for where to look further and what to investigate in order to obtain an answer to the question about the ability to grammatical. The 'rule-guided' method of explanation is itself in need of further investigation but it is not ordinarily counted as such. For example, it is not even in those cases where extrapolation is performed on the basis of known rules that the guidance of the rules accounts completely for the ability to speak. Even then it would be appropriate to speak of further skills such as discrimination, pattern recognition coordination of knowledge and behavior, and so on. In fact, the ability to follow rules is as much in need of further explanation as the ability to speak. Surely one ability does not explain the other. The point of this last chapter can be summed up finally in terms of an analogy. The 'rule-guided' method of explanation is no more an answer to how speakers speak than 'by reading music' is an

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answer to how musicians play the piano. Even though musical notation provides a model for the piece of music, reading that music is just one composite skill to be explained in explaining the ability to play the piano. To say that speakers are able to speak because they are guided by (often unknown) grammatical rules is no more illuminating than to say that musicians are able to play because they are guided by the musical notation. Let us not confuse the ability to follow rules with the necessity for so doing, nor with the necessity for even HAVING rules for all ability activities in order to perform them. We are able to be guided by rules, to learn to follow them and so on, but we exercise these abilities, far less frequently than supposed. And when we do exercise these abilities, noting that we do so does not provide an adequate or even interesting explanation of what we are doing and how we are able to do it.

APPENDIX A

EVERYDAY CONFUSIONS

In the effort to determine what is generally taken to be a rule, a certain amount of 'field work' or research into everyday usage was undertaken. Unfortunately, the results of this investigation were tantamount to finding that no one seems to have a clear notion of what a rule is, or what counts as a rule even in areas where they are in common use. Following is a brief resume pointing out just how unclear the notion of a rule is for everyday usage. (1)

GAME RULES

(Rules for No. 116 Carrom Game Borad, Shampaine Industries, Inc., Ludington, Michigan)

Sometimes the object of the game, or what counts as winning is included in the list of rules for that game: 6. After all the rings have been pocketed, the one whose rings count the most wins the game, (p. 16) Sometimes it is not included with the rules but stated apart from the list of rules, as is the following: The object of the Game is for each player to pocket all the rings he can, the one pocketing the most rings winning the game. (p. 14) Sometimes physical requirements and allowances are listed as rules: 3. Players must not remove the board or their seats while the round is in progress, but a player may change his position in his seat. (p. 52)

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For many games no such specification is deemed necessary. Sometimes hints for the best way to go about the mechanics of the game are included in the list of rules : 7. Each player must keep count of the rings he pockets. The best way is for each player to remove his rings from the pockets after he loses his turn. (p. 14)

Sometimes reference is made to the strategy which would be help ful by suggesting this as a rule for the game: 10. It is considered smart strategy by some players to endeavor to 'blockade' the opponent, especially on the No. 2 board, by occupying as many points as possible with 'doubles' or 'strings', thus creating a broad hurdle for the opponent then must roll high numbers in order to get past the blockade created by the other player. On the other hand, some players prefer to move openly, rapidly and aggressively, pursuing and knocking out any 'singles' that may be available for capture, (p. 57)

If some criteria for game rules could be established, the specifications of a game could be more easily made. Confusion is present as to whether or not strategy and winning should be listed as rules for the game. It is also unclear as to how much information or what sort of requirements should be included in the rules with respect to the physical position or abilities of the players. On what basis is such information included or withheld ? Further, there is no clear notion as to how much should be specified in regard to the mechanics of the games, including the requirements of the players and the requirements of the equipment. (2) RULES FOR THE ROAD (Pennsylvania handbook for drivers) " D o not fail to obey Stop Signs" is listed as a rule for the road, (p. 36) One wonders of this is wrong or merely redundant, because listed under its own heading with the implication of being a law (under these separate headings reference is often made to its being 'unlawful' not to obey) is the following requirement for stopping at through highways and stop intersections. "Vehicles must come

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to a full stop within a reasonable distance before entering a highway marked 'THRU TRAFFIC STOP' or 'STOP INTERSECTION'..." (pp. 27-28) Requirements for dimming the lights are listed both as rules and laws. Rule: "Always dim your lights when 500 feet away from the car coming towards you, or when following or overtaking another vehicle within 300 feet." (p. 37) Law: "The operator of a motor vehicle equipped with multiple beam head lamps may use the higher beam while traveling along the highway except when approaching an oncoming vehicle within 500 feet when a beam which does not project light into the eyes of the oncoming driver must be used." (p. 33) Further, included in the section purported to list the laws of the road are DUTIES ("DUTY TO STOP IN EVENT OF ACCIDENT" and "DUTY TO REPORT ACCIDENTS" [ p . 3 0 a n d p . 3 5 ] ) ; RECOMMENDA-

— a vehicle traveling mountain highways shall be kept under control and as near to right-hand side of highway as reasonably possible. In descending steep grade vehicles should be operated in second or in a lower gear. Vehicle never to be operated with the clutch disengaged (p. 30) FOLLOWING TOO CLOSELY). The operator of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent having due regard to speed, traffic and conditions of the highway." (p. 24); and information about how TIONS FOR SAFETY ("DRIVING ON MOUNTAIN HIGHWAYS

t o INTERPRET TRAFFIC SIGNALS.

I think these examples are sufficient to show that there is great unclearness about what should be counted as a rule for the road and what should be counted as a law. Some requirements are listed as both. Some information is given as a law when it is not clear that it is one. ( 3 ) DICTIONARY LISTING AND THESAURUS INFORMATION

The various 'synonyms' and related terms given by Roget's Thesaurus for the word 'rule', can best be grouped according to the six 'meanings' given the word by the American College Dictionary. This does not correspond to the groupings in the thesaurus

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but makes for a better grasp of the notions by organizing the material offered in the thesaurus. 1. Rules as principles governing things: principle regulation regularity regular order

directive controller governor direction instruction

dictate prescription imperative command

2. Rules as religious order codes: tenet belief precept

dogma canon creed

position view theory

3. Rules as associated with tenure in office: government

dominion

govern

4. Rules associated with mathematical method: axiom theorem self-evident systematic method

universal truth

5. Rules associated with normal occurrences : custom prevalence standing order mores settled measure prototype (type)

conventional observance procedure common practice norm institution principle

set form uniform or established course usual course or procedure habit wont

EVERYDAY CONFUSIONS

pattern, paradigm, precedent, formula, model, standard criterion, measure

129

mean (average, normal, natural, balanced) customary regular constant organization

6. Law statute rubric

ordinance standing order

by-law act

Plato would not be happy with this as a definition of rules, and I'm afraid, neither would we. The closest that the dictionary comes to defining 'rule' is to call it a 'principle governing things'. This is not very helpful as the terms in the definition are as unclear as what is being defined. Similarly, calling a rule a prescription, a norm, a directive, etc. does not explicate the notion itself, but rather introduces more terms to be explicated. We could summarize the results of looking in these two sources by a statement to the effect that rules AFFECT things (moral, religious, social, legal, mathematical systems, actions, behavior, procedures, arrangements) BY governing, controlling, prescribing, organizing, regularizing, standardizing, etc. But while we are given a huge amount of material, some things are left out. No mention is made of the form a rule can take (can it be an utterance, a written inscription, a graph, a progression, a function, a program, a sign, a picture, an example of how to proceed, etc ?) Neither is any mention made of various other functions of rules, aside from their 'prescriptive' function (can it function as a description, explanation, algorithm, definition, etc.?) In summary, we can say that our field work was not very productive. There is confusion of laws and rules, uncertainty as to what should be counted as rules, and scatter-gun techniques used in dictionaries with the hope of hitting on all the various possible uses and occurrences of rules in different areas. Lists are not the essence of analysis. Work needs to be done.

APPENDIX Β

SOME QUESTIONS FOR BEHAVIORISTS

(FROM "THE ADVENTURE OF THE SPECTACLED BAND" BY ROBERT L. FISH)

... I had puttered about for some minutes when suddenly I heard the voice of my friend behind me. "You are quite right, Watney", he chucked. "Conscience is indeed a hard taskmaster." "It most certainly is", I retorted with a touch of asperity; and then I stopped in amazement. "Homes! You have done it again! You have read my mind!" "It was really not too difficult", said he with a smile, and swinging his long legs to the floor and turning up the lamp. " I have been watching you since you entered the room. After removing your overcoat, you went immediately to the sideboard, from whence you removed a bottle of vodka and poured a generous portion into a glass. At that moment you glanced at your pocket-watch, and a look of remembrance cast itself over your features. It was only last evening, as I recall, that you were lecturing me on the dangers involved in drinking before the hour of five, and promising that you would abstain from an earlier tot if I agree to join you in this forbearance." "Following this, you glanced surrepticiously in my direction, and then obviously made up your mind, for I saw you adjust the stem of your watch. You then moved to the clock on the mantlepiece and returned to your glass. But just as you were about to taste it, you shook your head and sadly and poured it back into the bottle.

SOME QUESTIONS FOR BEHAVIORISTS

131

It was at that point I observed that conscience was a hard taskmaster." "An admirable reconstruction, Homes!" I replied in awe. Actually, I had set my pocket-watch with the mantleclock this morning, and only in the course of passing Big Ben today did I note that I was fifteen minutes slow, and I corrected my watch accordingly. I returned home at precisely five, and began to mix myself a vodka martini when I remembered that our timepiece was incorrect. I verified my watch, winding it as I did so, and then proceeded to correct the mantle-clock. When I returned to the business of making my martini, I thought that under the present political situation, my choice of liquor might have an erroneous interpretation placed upon it; and my conscience did indeed bother me when I recalled our brave lads at Balaclava and myself about to partake of vodka! I therfore poured it back into the bottle and was about to open the scotch when you spoke." "The important thing", replied Homes with a twinkle, "is not so much the process as the result. Now that we have determined both the correct hour and drink, I suggest we waste no more time. A long drink for me, if you please, Watney, while I show you a curious message which reached me this afternoon"... This passage from a pastiche on Doyle's Sherlock Holmes by Robert Fish suggests several questions which can be asked of those holding a behavioristic position. Describing behavior solely on the basis of observable evidence is a tricky business. It must have been noted that this passage spoofs the legendary Holmes to whom was attributed extraordinary powers of perception and the ability to draw unerring inferences from what he perceived about the character of people and events. Amusement arises on reading the above because while Fish's Homes hits upon Watney's concluding thought, his inferences based on behavioral evidence about what led up to this thought are wildly inaccurate. It seems that in describing people's behavior we aren't generally in accord with Home's attitude that "the important thing is not so much the process as the results" as Watney is; he is amazed and awed; we are amused.

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SOME QUESTIONS FOR BEHAVIORISTS

This passage, because it is funny, and is funny because Homes' analysis is so askew, points out that for a description of behavior to be adequate more than immediately observable notions may need to be known. A description can fail if it does not attain a certain level or take enough into account and I take it that Homes' description of Watney's behavior fails. This passage then, suggests that the question, "What is the relevant level of an adequate description?" should be put to the behaviorists. In Une with this, the behaviorists must also be asked for an account of an action. We consider Homes' analysis of Watney's actions wrong, but in what way wrong? Was Homes' description only incomplete because he failed to describe Watney's motives and reasons, or worse, does it seem that Homes doesn't know at all what Watney is doing? The second question seems to be the way in which Homes was mistaken, and accounts for some of our amusement. Homes, for all his "keen" observations hasn't a clue as to what Watney was actually doing. Actions, it seems, are comprised of more than physical activities, or what immediately meets the eye, in much the say way as adequate descriptions must often include reference to more than immediate observables. The fact that even with a certain amount of previous knowledge of a behavioristic sort (remember Homes makes reference to Watney's resolve not to drink before five o'clock), and present corroborating evidence (Watney's actions were consistent with Homes' reconstruction), Homes doesn't know what Watney is doing, makes us anxious to ask of the behaviorist not only WHAT is needed, but also HOW MUCH behavioral evidence is needed in order for someone to understand another's actions. If the behaviorists are correct in saying that the sort of evidence Homes had was adequate for his inferences, then he obviously needed more such evidence for accuracy. And if more is needed, how much more? Further, since needing to know everything about a person's behavior and all of this actions in order to understand later performances would be similar to needing a map as large as the area to be mapped in order to find your way, we must now ask the be-

SOME QUESTIONS FOR BEHAVIORISTS

133

haviorist for criteria for wbich behavioral observations are the relevant ones for adequate descriptions of particular cases. Then, even if the behaviorists line is accepted, they can be asked the following questions: (1) What is the relevant level for adequate descriptions? (2)-What is an action or what do we need to know, to know what a person is doing? (3) HOW MUCH observable behavioral evidence is needed for accurate descriptions? (4) What are the criteria for RELEVANT behavioral observations needed for accurate descriptions?

APPENDIX C

TO WHAT DOES "RULE" ALWAYS REFER?

While the contention, that rules are linguistic entities and that it is to linguistic entities that "rule" refers (when it does refer), seems to presume very little, this contention has been questioned. Max Black in a chapter in Models and Metaphors, Studies in Language and Philosophy, called "The Analysis of Rules", 1 writes : A single rule can have many different formulations. We can say that the rule in question is the rule "Pawns shall be promoted on reaching the end of the chessboard" or the rule "Pawns must be replaced by pieces whenever a further move would carry them off the chessboard" or the rule "Pawns reaching the last rank are replaced by pieces"; and these formulations are all different, though several words recur in more than one of them. Again, each of these formulations could be translated into German, or any other language containing names for chess pieces and their moves. In this way we could obtain many more equivalent formulations still more obviously differing from any one the English formulations and yet all of them still formulating the same rule. It follows from this that it would be a mistake to identify the rule about the promotion of pawns with any one of its formulations. For there is the one rule but indefinitely many formulations of it. (p. 101) I think Black's refusal to call rule-formulations rules is both unnecessary and mistaken. There are no disadvantages that I can see to calling each rule-formulation a rule. If there are, say, three 1

Black, p. 101. Henceforth, in this Appendix, since so many references will be made to this article, I shall include the page number in parentheses in the text following the quotations.

TO WHAT DOES "RULE" ALWAYS REFER

135

equivalent or co-extensive rule-formulations, there could be three rules.2 Three terms can be explicated here to aid in a discussion of this point. To say that rules are similar is to say that their formulations (the marks on paper) are 'physically' the same. Rules are coextensive if fulfilling one involves fulfilling the other, but if violating one does not necessarily involve violating the other. (This is discussed in Chapter III, 4.) Rules are equivalent if fulfilling one involves fulfilling the other and if violating one involves violating the other. Rules, which, if you like 'mean' the same thing, are ones which direct some class of people to refrain from or indulge in the same set of actions. There is nothing intrinsicly abhorrent in saying that there are three differently stated rules, (expressed differently by virtue of being stated in different words), which all have the same effect, are the same, 'mean' the same thing, are co-extensive or are equivalent. In fact, since the following example shows such is actually the case, my second point is that it would be wrong not to call each formulation a rule. One state might have the following rule on its books : (4) Registration taxes must be paid on cars. Another state might have the rule: (5) Registration fees must be paid on cars. And a third state might have the rule: (6) License fees must be paid on cars. These rules are co-extensive in that they are each referring to, the one state-required car fee. But each is certainly a full-fledged 2

Rules, it is contended in Section 3 of Chapter II, must be adopted. And so it is assumed here that at least one rule-formulation has been properly adopted, either by a state, in a game booklet, or in some appropriate way when we say that if there are three equivalent or co-extensive rule-formulations there are three rules.

136

TO WHAT DOES "RULE" ALWAYS REFER

rule. To deprive each formulation of the status of a rule would render state legislation impotent. Citizens in all three states must conform to the same action by obeying the rule of their state even if such action is described or expressed differently but coextensively elsewhere. Each rule-formulation acts as and is taken to be a rule on its own, and the fact there are other rule-formulations requiring the same thing but expressing it differently but co-extensively does not render all the rule-formulations impotent, or deny their ruleness, but rather adds just one more rule to those already in existence, or requires one more group of people to pay a car fee. (6) License fees must be paid on cars. Consider the following two cases: (a) State A adds a token of (6), namely (61) to its books. (b) State A has (6) on its books and state Β has (61) on its books. Case (a) is a case of two equivalent rules, case (b) is a case of two co-extensive rules. What justification is there for calling (6) and (61) both rules in case (b), which I think we would, but not calling (6) or (61) a rule in case (a) ? I think there is none. Adding a ruletoken adds nothing NEW to the requirements of state A, but there are fulfledged rules on every state's books which overlap each other, say the same thing, and so on. There are two rules in both cases, and so saying is no more repugnant than saying there are two sentences here: "It is raining", "It is raining." It might be objected : the consequence of allowing each formulation to be a rule would be a great poliferation of rules. Here you are, trying to limit your ontology and you have another rule anytime someone utters a sentence that has been adopted as a rule. But this is not troublesome. It can be answered by saying: One, the interest here is in limiting the QUALITY of things to which 'rule' refers, not the QUANTITY of them. Two, there are probably fewer rules quantitatively, so construing the referents of 'rule', than there would be on Black's construal of the matter. We have no idea, not only of the number, but of the nature or content of those rules

TO WHAT DOES "RULE" ALWAYS REFER

137

over and above their formulations. There could be infinitely many (and at one time infinitely many) rules 'up there' waiting around to be formulated. Three, having numerically many rules does not make analyzing them any more difficult, as would giving them more than one kind of ontological status; in fact by virtue of all rules, or all things to which 'rule' can refer having the same ontological status, analysis is greatly facilitated. In fact, instead of raising a new and more difficult problem, our construal of the matter reduces questions about the extent of the ontology of rules to an old one, namely, how does one count the number of sentences around ? Allowing (6), (61), (6 n ) (and so on) to be three rules is not any different from deciding to allow them to be three sentences. To argue this point from the technique of analogy, the fact that there are many equivalent formulations of rules no more robs each formulation of being a rule than the fact that ashtrays, which in this era of mass production, can be nearly identical, robs each sample of being an ashtray. Each co-extensive, equivalent, or identical formulation of an adopted rule is a rule as much as each identical ashtray is an ashtray.3 3

This error can also be expressed in terms of a confusion about the comparing of things and finding them to be SAME. If there were only one formulation of a rule, I take it Black would not look for another rule over and above it. But if there were another formulation, and it was equivalent to the first, or roughly the same as, the original, he does look on. But I submit that by saying, "this is the same rule as the first" one makes no 'higher' or further ontological claims or commitment, other than acknowledging that there are two rules of the same ontological order. The same situation arises if, say, a dress is copied. The copy does not commit one to the existence of any third thing. The 'same' comparison is as much between the first rule and the second as between the first dress and the second, the comparison of sameness is not between the two rules and some third thing. (This applies equally well to arguments of Plato's). When Black speaks of "the same rule", he does not speak as though there was a use of the word "same" to mean 'similar' or 'equivalent'. He seems to speak in terms of identity and mean there is only one rule which is being expressed variously. But the fact that there are many Adam-style chairs, or 'same' chairs in that they are all similar, should not lead us to postulate the existence of one Adam-chair which is manifested by many Adam non-chairs. If chairs are the same or similar, this neither means they are no longer chairs not that the Adamstyle is a chair. One can certainly speak of one rule with various formulations,

138

T O W H A T DOES " R U L E " A L W A Y S REFER

T o put the matter briefly in terms of the referential sense of 'rule', the licensing fee rule (general reference to all tokens) can have many identical or equivalent formulations, and each such formulation is a rule (singular reference to rule tokens) if one is.

what is wrong is to give 'higher' ontological status to that 'one rule'. What is wrong, in short, is to think that such a use of 'rule' is referential.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

WORKS REFERRED TO IN THE TEXT

Austin, John L., 1962 Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford, Clarendon Press). Ayer, Alfred Jules 1964 The Problem of Knowledge (Baltimore, Md., Penguin Books). Black, Max 1962 Models and Metaphors'. Studies in language and Philosophy (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press). Carroll, Lewis Through the Looking Glass. Chomsky, Noam 1961 "On the Notion 'Rule of Grammar'", Structure of Language and its Mathematical Aspects (Providence, R.I., American Mathematical Society). 1964 " A Review of B.F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior", The Structure of Language: Readings in the Philosophy of Language, eds. Jerry A. Fodor and Jerrold J. Katz (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice Hall). Galanter, Eugene 1962 Contemporary Psychophysics (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston). Goodman, Nelson 1955 Fact, Fiction, and Forecast (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press). 1960 "The Way the World Is", Review of Metaphysics, 14 Green, Thomas F., 1964 "Teaching, Acting and Behaving", Harvard Educational Review. Hart, H.L.A. 1961 The Concept of Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press). Hayek, F.A. 1961 "Rules, Perception, and Intelligibility", Proceedings of the British Academy.

140

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Katz, Jerrold 1964 "Mentalism in Linguistics", Language. Lewis, Clarence Irving 1955 The Ground and Nature of the Right (New York, Columbia University Press). 1962 An Analysisof Knowledgeand Valuation(LaLasse, Illinois OpenCourt). Miller, George Α., Eugene Galanter, Karl H. and Pribram. 1960 Plans and the Structure of Behavior (New York, Henry Holt and Co.) Quine, Willard V.O. 1960 Word and Object (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press). Rhees, R., Symposium, "Can There Be a Private Language?" Russell, Bertrand, 1927 Philosophy (New York, W.W. Norton and Co.). Savin, Harris 1966 "Grammatical Structure and the Immediate Recall of English Sentences" (University of Pennsylvania, National Science Foundation Grant, GS-857). Scheffler, Israel 1963 The Anatomy of Inquiry : Philosophical Studies in the Theory Oj Science (New York, A.A. Knopf). Soltis, John F., R.S. Peters, and James E. McClellan 1965 "Discussion: Teaching, Acting and Behaving", Harvard Educational Review. Suppes, Patrick, and Edward, Crowther, 1966 "Some Remarks on Stimulus-Response Theories of Language Learning (Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences, Report 97) (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press). Taylor, Richard 1950 "Purposeful and Non-purposeful Behavior: A Rejoinder", Philosophy of Science. Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1953 Philosophical Investigations (New York, MacMillan Co). Zifï, Paul 1960 Semantic Analysis (Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press). OTHER WORKS CONSULTED Bennett, Jonathon 1964 Rationality. An Essay Towards an Analysis (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul). Chomsky, Noam, "Three Models for the Description of Language" (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press). Emmet, Dorothy 1966 Rules, Roles and Relations (New York, Macmillan and Co., St. Martin's Press).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

141

Friedman, M. and L.J. Savage, 1948 "The Utility Analysis of Choice Involving Risk", Journal of Political Economy. Guttchen, Robert S. 1965 "To the Editor: Teaching, Acting and Behaving", Harvard Educational Review. Rawls, John, 1955 "Two Concepts of Rules", Philosophical Review. Ryle, Gilbert, 1949 The Concept of Mind (New York, Barnes and Noble). Twadell, A. 1935 "On Defining the Phoneme", Language Monographs.

INDEX

Abilities needed for speaking 6, 118ff Ability to speak 6, 105ff, 116ff a skill 117ff According with rules 6, 35ff Activities 93ff, 97ff (Also see 'Ruleactivities') Adopting rules 5, 6, 15, 16, 65ff defined 66 for activities 8Iff for oneself 67ff, 97 Animals and rule-behavior 78 Antededant conditions (See 'Conditional aspect of rules') "As a rule" 103 Austin, J.L. 86, 139 Authority behind rules 6, 55ff Automata and rule-following 35n Ayer, A.J. 37n, 139 Behavior and rules 14ff, 38ff, 82ff (Also see 'Rule-behavior') Behaviorism 130ff Bennett, J. 140 Black, M. 8, 26, 28η, 30n, 48n, 49n, 55ff, 81, 90ff, 106 107ff, 134ff, 139 Breaking rules (See 'Violating rules') Canons versus rules 102 Carroll, L. 96n, 139 Chinese block puzzle 122 Chomsky, N. 106, 109ff, 115ff, 120, 139, 140 Co-extensive rules defined 135 Commands versus rules 86ff

Conditional aspect of rules 5, 6, 68ff, 82, 94ff Confirmability 5, 74ff (Also see 'Laws versus rules') Consent giving right to promulgate 61, 65 Conventions versus rules 83 Correct or incorrect procedures 49ff Counter example 73ff Criterial definition for 'rule' 5 (Also see 'Summary of analysis') Critiques for behavior 6, 52ff Crowther, Ε. 113n, 119n, 140 Custom-descriptions 83 Customs versus rules 80fF Definition 73 Denying obligation to fulfill rules 61 ff Descriptions of behavior 45, 131ff versus rules 13ff Dictionary definition of 'rule' 127ff Directions versus rules 83ff Discoveries 72fF Emmet, D. 140 Encyclopedia Britannica Equivalent rules defined 135 Evaluation of behavior Experimentally viable 107ff, 118ff Explanations 73 Explanatory value of tions 37ff, 105ff Extrapolation 6, 119ff

13n 6, 52ff answers

6,

rule-descrip-

INDEX Followability 5, 26ff defined 3Iff Following rules 5, 35ff (Also see 'Criteria for following a rule') Forbidding rules 47n, 50 Formal enabling conditions 57ff Friedman, M. 141 Fulfilling rules 6, 28ff, 35ff "Functioning as" versus "being" 15ff Galanter, £.117, 119n, 139, 140 Game rules 125ff Games 48fF Generality as a criterion for rules 19ff Giving up laws 73ff Giving up rules 73ff Goodman, Ν. 17η, 18n, 28n, 30n, 77, 111, 139 Grammar and language 105ff as law 75ff, 114ff as a model 115ff, 121 as rules 75ff, 107ff dual role 75ff, 114fF Green, T.F. 108ff, 139 Guiding by unknown rules 107ff Guttchen, R. 141 Habits versus rules 80ff Hardy, T. 27n Hart, H.L.A. 60, 139 Hayek, F.A. 117, 139 Inanimate things and rules 7Iff Inclination to fulfill rules 52ff Impersonality of rules 90ff Implicit rules 8Iff In force 5, 24, 88ff Informal enabling conditions 57ff Innate rules 110 Instructions versus rules 83 ff Internalizing rules 109ff Inventions 72ff Isard, S. 114 Justification of analysis 5 Katz, J.J. 105n, 106, 140 Knowledge by acquaintance 24, 28ff Knowledge of rules 24ff, 105ff

143

Law-descriptions 25n, 40n, 76 Law-likeness 17, 28n, 36n Laws versus rules 73ff followability 73ff confirmability 74ff Legal laws 36, 75 Lewis, C.I. 9n, 18n, 52n, 53n, 140 Limitations of analysis (See 'Restriction of interest') Linguistic entities (See 'Rules as linguistic entities') Mathematical notions versus rules 102 Maxims versus rules lOlff Methods versus rules 99 McClellan, J. 140 Miller, G. 114, 117, 140 Models versus rules 98ff Mores versus rules 101 Native speakers and rules 6, 105fF Natural language 105ff Nominal referential use of 'rule' (See 'Restriction of interest') Non-existent rules 69ff Non-referential use of 'rule' 7ff Obeying rules (See 'Fulfilling rules' and 'Obligation to fulfill rules') Object of analysis 5, 9 Obligation to fulfill rules 5Iff (Also see 'Inclination to fulfill rules') authority 55ff evaluation 52ff religion 62 Ontological considerations 7n, 136ff Orders versus rules 89ff "Ordinary" use of 'rule' 5n, 125ff Oxford English Dictionary 96 Perceptible existence 7, 8, 97n Permissive rules 32ff, 50 Peters, R.S. 140 Plato 129, 137n Platonic positions 8, 108, 137 Position 102 Predictive value of rule-descriptions 76ff

144

INDEX

Prescriptive force 6, 5Iff Prescriptiveness 5, 5Iff, 84ff Pribram, Y. 117, 140 Principles versus rules 96ff Problems treated 5 Procedures 85 (Also see 'Specifiers of what counts as the one correct or incorrect procedure') Projectibility 17n, 28n, 77 Promulgating rules 55ff, 65 (Also see 'Adopting rules') Property definition for 'rule' (See 'Criterial definition for "rule"') Psychological claims 115ff, 120 Qualifiers for games 49 Quine, tV. 69η, 140 Rawls, J. 141 Reference 7, 97η, 138 Referential use of 'rule' (See 'Restriction of interest') Regulations 55ff, 90, 94 Regulations versus rules 99ff Religious notions versus rules 102 Repeatedly followable 88ff Requiring rules 50 Restriction of interest 7 referent of 'rule' 8, 13ff, 134ff referential use of'rule' 7ff, 138 rules as linguistic entities (See 'Rules as linguistic entities') value judgements of rules 8, 24, 54ff Results of analysis 5 (Also see 'Summary of analysis') Rhees, R. 79n, 140 Right to promulgate 64 Road rules 126ff Rule-activities 5, 51, 54, 93ff Rule-behavior 78ff, 108ff regular behavior 17n, 45, 78 Rule-contexts 18, 65ff Rule-descriptions 5, 6, 37ff defined 6, 28, 38 false 44 incomplete 44 incorrect 44 Rule-formulations 8, 134ff

Rule-likeness 15ff rule-like behavior 82ff Rules as descriptions (See 'Ruledescriptions') Rules as linguistic entities 5, 8,13ff, 18 Rule-situations (See 'Rule-activities') Rules of inference 54ff Ruling 7, 58ff Russell, B. 140 Satisfying a rule 28 Satisfying the criteria 44ff Savage, J. 141 Savin, Η. 115n, 140 Scheffler, I. 70, 140 Schuldenfrei, R. 69n Schwartz, R. 79n Scientific laws (See 'Laws versus rules') "Seeing to it" 5, 6, 30fF Similar rules defined 135 Skills (See 'Ability to speak') Soltis, J. 108ff, 140 Specifiers of what counts as the one correct or incorrect procedure 5, 52 Specifying procedure 48ff Standards versus rules 102 Summary of analysis 104 Suppes, P. 113n, 119n, 140 Syntactic criteria for rules 17ff Taylor, R. 69n, 140 Technique of analysis 5 Thesaurus entry 127ff Truth value 5, 23ff, 74ff Trying (See '"Seeing to it'") Twadell, A. 141 Unadopting rules 5, 61fF, 69 Ungrammaticalness 111 Universal quantification 20fF Value judgements (See 'Restriction of interest') Violating rules 5, 6, 94ff Wittgenstein, L. 29η, 45n, 46n, 52n, 78, 114ÍT, 140 Z i f f , P. 96n, 111, 113n, 140