Routledge Library Editions: Development Mini-Set E: Development and the Environment 9780415584142, 9780203840351, 9780415592963, 9780203838921, 0043330274

Table of contents :
Volume Cover
Volume 1
Cover
Half Tile
Title
Copyright
Original Title
Original Copyright
Contents
Preface
Notes
List of tables
List of contributors
Environmental policy in China: a model for Third World countries?
Environment and development
Chinese philosophies and strategies for development
Environmental policy and planning in China
The possibilities and constraints of policy implementation: learning from China?
Conclusion
References
PART I Chinese philosophies and strategies for development
1 On the reactions of Chinese culture against the Western challenge: the other side of modernization
East Asian culture and Western influence
Materialism, dialectic, and Chinese philosophy
The development of materialism and dialectic in Chinese history and philosophy
The Chinese response to the Western challenge
Notes
References
2 The Chinese path to development
Introduction
The distribution-growth oscillation hypothesis
A view of post-revolutionary Chinese history
Why this distribution-growth oscillation?
Ten implications
How does political ethos relate to political reality?
Epilogue 1986
Notes
References
3 An essay on reproduction: the example of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
Reproduction destroyed through development: some examples from the People's Republic of China
Attempted formulation of the reproduction paradigm
Final conclusions
Acknowledgements
Notes
References
4 Shortage of land resources as a factor in development: the example of the People's Republic of China
Purpose of this chapter
The global dimension
The example of the People's Republic of China
Conclusions
Notes
References
PART II Environmental policy and planning
5 The origins of environmental management in China
China's organization for environmental protection
Environmental protection guidelines and policies
Environmental legislation
Scientific research, monitoring, and assessment of environmental protection
Notes
6 Economic reform and its impact on the environment in China
The structure of industry in China
Industrial reform in China
Conclusions and implications for environmental protection in the People's Republic of China
Notes
References
7 Agriculture and environmental protection in China
Introduction
Pest management in China
Biogas in China
Conclusion
Notes
References
8 Rural ecodevelopment policy in China and the origins of economic adjustment
The political and economic milieux of ecodevelopment policy
Agricultural production as a basis for economic readjustment
Implementation of rural ecodevelopment policy
National-level support for ecodevelopment planning
Prospects and dilemmas
Notes
References
9 Agriculture as a component of China's modernization strategy
Challenges to Chinese agriculture
The scope of the reforms
Preliminary results
Problems
Part of the solution: an ecologically sound technology
Agriculture-a separate entity in China's modernization?
Learning from China?
Summary
Notes
References
10 Energy and environment in China
Energy use in the People's Republic of China
Pollutant emissions and their causes
Consequences of urban air pollution
Deforestation
Further problems
Prospects
Acknowledgements
Notes
References
11 The operational contexts between developmental, environmental, and settlement policies
Propositions
The relationship between environmental crisis and settlement structures
The environmental factor in town planning and building construction in ancient China
Industrial settlement structures as a symbol of the ignoring of environmental dependence and as the leading factor in the environmental crisis
Modern China as the first country to come back to strategies of an integrated environment, settlement, and landscape development policy
Specific political and developmental frames of reference regarding the model schemes under discussion
Limitations
Notes
References
PART III The possibilities and constraints of policy implementation: learning from China
12 The implementation of national environmental policies in developing countries
The policymaker and the implementation problem
Environment and development: issues and policies
Implementation: theory and empirical analysis
Rules of thumb and analytic routine
Guiding principles for improved implementation
Notes
References
13 The Natural Resources Program of the United Nations University: three case studies of an integrated approach in China
Energy systems in rural communities
The Hengduan Mountain Project
Long distance water transfer in China
Summary and outlook
Notes
References
14 Large-scale biogas technology in China: dissemination among developing countries
Two early biogas-related programs in China sponsored by United Nations organizations
An overview of the recent state of biogas development in China
Production of biogas from large-scale digesters in Sichuan Province
Notes
15 Biogas in Iran: learning from China?
Origins of biogas in Iran
Recent experiences with biogas in Iran
Experience with biogas after the Revolution
The current crisis in Third World biogas technology
References
16 From central provision to local enablement: new directions for housing policies
Three thresholds
What housing policy?
"The poor have done far more for themselves than the better-off have done for them"
The need for a new balance
Notes
17 The rural habitat: main focus of appropriate technologies for rural development
Rural development
Problems of implementation
Appropriate development
Objectives of appropriate technology
New cooperation
Research and experiments
Participation and self-organization
Learning from China?
References
18 The environment: what the Powers That Be care two hoots about
Introduction
Counter-culture
Weaponization and the environment
The nuclear fix in the East
The mythology of power
Notes
References
Conclusion: learning from China?
Notes
References
Index
Volume 2
Cover
Half Title
Title
Copyright
Original Title
Original Copyright
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
List of tables
1 African environments and resources: an overview
Introduction to the African environment
Concepdons and misconceptions about the African environment
Introduction to development issues in Africa
Conclusions
2 The African environment: an historical overview
Geologic and geomorphologic background
The history of climatic change
The impacts of climatic change on land-water relationships
Conclusion
3 The patterns of political change: relationship to the environment
Precolonial
Colonial period
Independence
Population
Urbanization
Sedentarization
Rural populations
Agricultural crops and change
Livestock
Industrial growth
Land disturbance
Water-air pollution
Water and energy sources
Transport systems
Summary
4 Tropical rainforest environments
Introduction
General population prospectives
Current trends in areal coverage of rainforest
The macroclimatic characteristics: a brief introduction
Microclimate
Vegetation attributes
Soil properties of rainforest areas
Hydrology of rainforest areas
Rivers of the rainforests
Human activities: resource use
Summary
5 The dry areas
Introduction
The deserts: myth and reality in environmental conditions
Important environmental processes in dry areas
Patterns of resource use in dry areas
6 The savanna and dry–forest environments
Introduction
Climate
Other factors in the savanna and dry-woodland ecology
Farming and grazing in the savanna: an overview
East Africa: a case study of the savanna
Conclusion
7 The highlands
Introduction
The highlands of eastern and central Africa
Characteristics of highland environments
Rural population in the highlands
River basins and some impacts of development
Conservation practices within highland river basins
Agroclimatologic zones: a Kenyan Highland example
General conclusions
8 Extratropical and southern Africa
Definitions and purpose of this chapter
The Mediterranean area
Extratropical southern Africa
9 Water: a scarce resource
Introduction
Precipitation and water-balance patterns
River characteristics
African lakes
Swamps
The Sudd and Jonglei Drainage Project
Summary
10 Urban and industrial growth
General population growth in Africa
Urban population growth in Africa
Industrial growth
Distribution and classification of cities
Summary and conclusions
11 Minerals, industry, and the environment
Introduction
Minerals, mining, and the environment
Industries and the environment
Summary
12 Environment and development in Africa: a review and prospect
Introduction
The general characteristics of the African environment
Historical patterns of resource use
Special issues related to ecologic zones in Africa
Urban Africa
Water systems
Trends in African development
Critical development and environment issues for Africa
Environment and development in Africa: the next two decades
References and Bibliography
Index
Volume 3
Cover
Half Title
Title
Copyright
Original Title
Original Copyright
Contents
SERIES EDITORS' PREFACE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Dedication
INTRODUCTION
1 Political economy and the environment
2 Global resource problems
3 Environmentalism and development
4 Rural poverty and the environment
5 Environmental conflict and development policy in rural Mexico
6 Technology and the control of resources
7 Development and the environment: a converging discourse?
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX

Citation preview

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: DEVELOPMENT

LEARNING FROM CHINA?

LEARNING FROM CHINA? Development and environment in Third World countries

Edited by BERNHARD GLAESER

Volume 23

First published in 1987 This edition first published in 2011 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 1987 B. Glaeser and contributors Printed and bound in Great Britain All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 13: 978-0-415-58414-2 (Set) eISBN 13: 978-0-203-84035-1 (Set) ISBN 13: 978-0-415-59296-3 (Volume 23) eISBN 13: 978-0-203-83892-1 (Volume 23) DOI: 10.4324/9780203838921 Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and welcomes correspondence from those they have been unable to contact.

Learningfrom China? Development and environment in Third World countries

Edited by

BERNHARD GLAESER Wissenschajtszentrnm Berlin for Socialforschung (WZB) , Environmental Policy Research Unit

London ALLEN & UNWIN Boston

Sydney

Wellington

© B. Glaeser and contributors, 1987

This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. No reproduction without permission. All rights reserved.

Allen & Unwin, the academic imprint of Unwin Hyman Ltd PO Box 18, Park Lane, Hemel Hempstead, Herts HP24TE, UK 40 Museum Street, London WCIA lLU, UK 37/39 Queen Elizabeth Street, London SEI 2QB Allen & Unwin Inc., 8 Winchester Place, Winchester, Mass. 01890, USA Allen & Unwin (Australia) Ltd, 8 Napier Street, North Sydney, NSW 2060, Australia Allen & Unwin (New Zealand) Ltd in association with the Port Nicholson Press Ltd, Private Bag, Wellington, New Zealand First published in 1987

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Learning from China?: environment and development in Third World countries. 1. Man - Influence on nature - China 2. Man - Influence on nature - Developing countries 3. China - Economic conditions - 19764. Developing countries - Economic conditions I. Glaeser, Bernhard 330.951'05 HC427.92 ISBN 0-04-333027-4

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Learning from China? Papers from an international conference entitled "Environment and Development in Third World Countries: Leaming from China?" held in West Berlin, 10/31-1112/83. Includes bibliographies and index. 1. Environmental policy - China - Congresses. 2. China - Economic policy - 1949- Congresses. I. Glaeser, Bernhard. II. Title: Environment and development in Third World countries. HC430.E5L43 1986 338.951 86-20647 ISBN 0-04-333027-4 (alk. paper)

Set in 10 on 11 point Bembo by Nene Phototypesetters Ltd, Northampton and printed in Great Britain by Billings and Sons Ltd, London and Worcester

Preface In the period from 1980 to 1983, the International Institute for Environment and Society (lIES) of the Science Center Berlin conducted a research project on "Environmental Policy in the People's Republic of China and Technological Development." This study was complemented by the visit of an environmental delegation to China, which aimed to encourage cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the People's Republic in the environmental field; three publications resulted from the study. 1 The project was rounded out and brought to a conclusion with the convening of an international conference entitled "Environment and Development in Third World Countries: Learning from China?" held in West Berlin between October 31 and November 2, 1983. The participants at this conference were D. Betke, F. von Bismarck, N. Boschmann, A. Brandt, J. B. Carmichael, B. Chakraverty, R. Ernst, W. M. Feng,J. Galtung, B. Glaeser, E. Hagemann, E. Hahn, T. Hoppe, J. Horberry, W. Kinzelbach, J. Kiichler, W. Manshard, P. Neunhauser, R. Pestel, S. Peterlowitz, W. Schenkel, H. Schreck, D. Senghaas, U. E. Simonis, N. Singh, P. Spitz, P. Sundarraj, J. F. C. Turner, R. G. Wagner, and C. L. Yu. The scope of the "China conference" was twofold: first, to present and discuss some of the most important aspects of the environment in the People's Republic and Chinese development policy; secondly, to assess some of the possibilities for implementing specific measures on the Chinese model in other countries of the so-called Third World. In particular, the scope of the meeting included the areas of industrialization, food production, energy use, and landscape and settlement planning. What is it that the Chinese model or the Chinese experience has to offer, which can be useful for or perhaps successfully implemented in other countries of the Third World? The focus was clearly more the South-South than the North-South relationship and, thus, included specialists in various fields of development in the Southern Hemisphere in addition to China experts and representatives from institutions in the North, notably from some United Nations agencies. The conference had, in part, a "workshop character"; that is, rather than just presenting the results of the whole project, it attempted to examine issues by incorporating open discussion and encouraging more subjective views and analyses as to whether specific Chinese solutions could or could

Vlll

PREFACE

not be implemented in different political, socioeconomic, or environmental settings. The conference papers and other contributions written as a result of the conference discussions that followed are presented in this volume. I should like to take this opportunity to gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance given to me in the technical editing and preparation of this book by Ms Mary Elizabeth Kelley-Bibra. Her care, skills, and devotion to the task as well as her insights and suggestions contributed greatly to the overall quality of the final manuscript. I am highly indebted to her. Bernhard Glaeser Berlin 1986

Notes 1 Bernhard Glaeser (ed.), Umweltpolitik in China: Modernisierung und Umwelt in Industrie, LandwirtschaJt, und Energieerzeugung (Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1983); Bernhard Glaeser (ed.), Okologie und Umweltschutz in der VR China: Eindriicke und Eifahrungsberichte einer Umweltdelegation (Bochum: Brockmeyer, 1982); Ekhart Hahn, Umweltbewuflte Siedlungspolitik in China (Frankfurt: Campus, 1983).

Contents Preface

Notes List of tables List of contributors

page vii VI11

xv XVI

Environmental policy in China: a modelfor Third World Countries? BERNHARD GLAESER Environment and development Chinese philosophies and strategies for development Environmental policy and planning in China The possibilities and constraints of policy implementation: learning from China? Conclusion References

1 2 4 5 8 9

PART I Chinese philosophies and strategies for development

1 On the reactions of Chinese culture against the Western challenge: the other side ofmodernization

13

YU CHEUNG-LIEH East Asian culture and Western influence Materialism, dialectic, and Chinese philosophy The development of materialism and dialectic in Chinese history and philosophy The Chinese response to the Western challenge Notes References

13 14 16 27 29 30

x

CONTENTS

2 The Chinese path to development JOHAN GALTUNG Introduction The distribution-growth oscillation hypothesis A view ofpost-revolutionary Chinese history Why this distribution-growth oscillation? Ten implications How does political ethos relate to political reality? Epilogue 1986 Notes References

3 An essay on reproduction: the example ofXinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region THOMAS HOPPE Reproduction destroyed through development: some examples from the People's Republic ofChina Attempted formulation of the reproduction paradigm Final conclusions Acknowledgements Notes References

4 Shortage ofland resources as afactor in development: the example ofthe People}s Republic ofChina DIRK BETKE and JOHANNES KOCHLER Purpose of this chapter The global dimension The example of the People's Republic ofChina Conclusions Notes References

32 32 33

34 42 44 46

48 49

54

56

59 68 74 76 77 81

85 85 86

87

101 102

104

PART II Environmental policy and planning

5 The origins ofenvironmental management in China WU ZIJIN China's organization for environmental protection Environmental protection guidelines and policies Environmental legislation Scientific research, monitoring, and assessment of environmental protection Notes

111 112 113 115 116 119

CONTENTS

6 Economic reform and its impact on the environment in China

Xl

120

YU CHEUNG-LIEH The structure ofindustry in China Industrial reform in China Conclusions and implications for environmental protection in the People's Republic ofChina Notes References

7 Agriculture and environmental protection in China

120 121 124 126 126 127

RUDOLF G. WAGNER Introduction Pest management in China Biogas in China Conclusion Notes References

8 Rural ecodevelopment policy in China and the origins of economic adjustment

127 128 137 141 141 143

144

BERNHARD GLAESER and PAUL STEIDL-MEIER The political and economic milieux ofecodevelopment policy Agricultural production as a basis for economic readjustment Implementation of rural ecodevelopment policy National-level support for ecodevelopment planning Prospects and dilemmas Notes References

9 Agriculture as a component ojChina's modernization strategy

144 146 146 154 154 157 160

162

ERNST HAGEMANN and ROBERT PESTEL Challenges to Chinese agriculture The scope ofthe reforms Preliminary results Problems Part of the solution: an ecologically sound technology Agriculture - a separate entity in China's modernization? Learning from China? Summary Notes References

162 163 165 167 168 169 170 171 171 172

CONTENTS

XlI

10 Energy and environment in China

173

WOLFGANG K. H. KINZELBACH Energy use in the People's Republic ofChina Pollutant emissions and their causes Consequences of urban air pollution Deforestation Further problems Prospects Acknowledgements Notes References

11 The operational contexts between developmental, environmental, and settlement policies

173 177 178 180 181 182 182 183 183

185

EKHARTHAHN Propositions The relationship between environmental crisis and settlement structures The environmental factor in town planning and building construction in ancient China Industrial settlement structures as a symbol of the ignoring of environmental dependence and as the leading factor in the environmental crisis Modem China as the first country to come back to strategies of an integrated environment, settlement, and landscape development policy Specific political and developmental frames of reference regarding the model schemes under discussion Limitations Notes References

185 185 186 187 188 191 191 192 192

PART III The possibilities and constraints of policy implementation: learning from China

12 The implementation ofnational environmental policies in developing countries

195

JOHN HORBERRY The policymaker and the implementation problem Environment and development: issues and policies Implementation: theory and empirical analysis Rules of thumb and analytic routine

195 196 199 201

CONTENTS

Guiding principles for improved implementation Notes References

13 The Natural Resources Program of the United Nations University: three case studies ofan integrated approach in a~

X111

204 206 206

D

WALTHER MANSHARD Energy systems in rural communities The Hengduan Mountain Project Long distance water transfer in China Summary and outlook Notes References

14 Large-scale biogas technology in China: dissemination among developing countries

208 210 213 216 217 217

219

JACK B. CARMICHAEL Two early biogas-related programs in China sponsored by United Nations organizations An overview ofthe recent state ofbiogas development in China Production ofbiogas from large-scale digesters in Sichuan Province Notes

15 Biogas in Iran: learningfrom China?

219 221 221 224

225

M. TAGHI FARVAR Origins ofbiogas in Iran Recent experiences with biogas in Iran Experience with biogas after the Revolution The current crisis in Third World biogas technology References

16 From central provision to local enablement: new directions for housing policies

225 227 228 231 232

234

JOHN F. C. TURNER Three thresholds What housing policy? "The poor have done far more for themselves than the better-off have done forthem" The need for a new balance Notes

234 237 238 238 239

CONTENTS

XIV

17 The rural habitat: main focus ofappropriate technologies for rural development

240

ANDREAS BRANDT Rural development Problems ofimplementation Appropriate development Objectives ofappropriate technology New cooperation Research and experiments Participation and self-organization Learning from China? References

18 The environment: what the Powers That Be care two hoots about

240 240 241 242 243 244 245 245 246

248

NARINDAR SINGH Introduction Counter-culture Weaponization and the environment The nuclear fix in the East The mythology ofpower Notes References

248 251 256 261 265 267 268

Conclusion: learning from China?

269

BERNHARD GLAESER Notes

276

References

276

Index

277

List of tables 1.1 2.1 3.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4

The historical development of Chinese philosophy page 17 Phases in Chinese development and economic indicators 47 Negatively affected crops and pasture areas in Xinjiang 77 from 1949 to 1982 Projected changes in world land use and land productivity 88 Causes of recent desertification in North China 93 Composition ofland resources in Chi~a (official) 95 Composition ofland resources in China (unofficial) 95 Sample land surveys for various administrative units in China, 1979 97 Primary energy consumption of the People's Republic of China in 1979 174 Estimated end use of energy in the People's Republic of China in 1979 174 Currently available energy resources of the People's 175 Republic ofChina Data on the air quality of Chinese cities 179

List of contributors Dirk Betke Institutefor Environmental Economics, Technical University Berlin, West Berlin, Germany Andreas Brandt Eco Region, Associationfor Research and Consultancy, West Berlin, Germany Jack B. Carmichael United Nations Development Organization (UNIDO), Vienna, Austria M. TaghiFarvar Centerfor Ecodevelopment Studies and Application (CENES T A), Teheran, Iran and International Unionfor Conservation oJNature & Natural Resources (IUCN), Gstaad, Switzerland Johan Galtung DepartmentoJPolitics, Princeton University, Princeton, NewJersey, USA Bernhard Glaeser Wissenschajtszentrum Berlinfor Socialforschung (WZB), Research Unit: Environmental Policy (previously International Institutefor Environment and Society), West Berlin, Germany Ernst Hagemann German Institutefor Economic Research (DIW), West Berlin, Germany EkhartHahn Society for Ecological City Planning, West Berlin, Germany Thomas Hoppe Institutefor Environmental Economics, Technical University Berlin, West Berlin, Germany John Horberry Environmental Resources Ltd., London, United Kingdom Wolfgang Kinzelbach Institutefor Hydraulic Engineering, University ofStuttgart, Stuttgart, Federal Republic ifGermany

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

XVll

Johannes Kuchler

Institutefor Environmental Economics, Technical University Berlin, West Berlin, Germany

Walther Manshard

United Nations University, Tokyo,Japan

Robert Pestel

Heinrich Hertz Institutefor Communication Technology, West Berlin, Germany N arindar Singh

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Paul Steidl-Meier

Casassa Chair ofSocial Values, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, California, USA

John F. C. Turner

Housing and Local Development (AHAS), London, United Kingdom RudolfG. Wagner

John K. Fairbank Centerfor East Asian Research, Harvard, Cambridge, Mass., USA WuZijin

The Permanent Mission ojthe People's Republic ojChina to the United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, Kenya

Yu Cheung-lieh

East Asian Seminar, Free University Berlin, West Berlin, Germany

Environmental policy in China: a model for Third World countries? BERNHARD GLAESER Environment and development Environmental policy in China may be imbedded in its overall strategy for economic development. Official Chinese statements claim, for instance, that environmental policy is an integrated part of the nationwide strategy for modernization (Glaeser 1982, Glaeser 1983, Hahn 1983). "Ecodevelopment," the term coined by Maurice Strong, first Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in Nairobi, pertains to the integration of environment and development in a national (or regional) strategy (Glaeser 1984). Third World countries are, however, not only "developing," they are also "peripheral" as far as their participation in world market trade and their dependence on the industrialized countries, the "centers," are concerned; in many cases, they are merely suppliers of raw materials or unprocessed agricultural goods for developed economies. The example of European development shows that some of the European countries (e.g. Germany) built up their economies in the 19th century by withdrawing from, rather thanjoining, the international market system for a certain period of time (Senghaas 1982). Until recently, China has also dissociated itself from the international world market scene, but it is, at present, opening up to foreign contacts, mainly towards Western technology. This strategy applied by China has been generally termed "autocentered development" (Senghaas 1980). On the other hand, China is not a uniform entity. It is comprised of many provinces, some as large as medium-sized countries, whose respective levels of development are widely varied. In fact, the international center-periphery relationship is, in some sense, replicated on a smaller scale within China. The objective of this volume is to assess the Chinese "model" from the environmental as well as the developmental viewpoint. The

DOI: 10.4324/9780203838921-1

2

ENVIRONMENT AL POLICY IN CHINA

implications of the findings are then to be discussed - that is, consideration is given to the chances [or implementation of some specific policies, strategies, or measures based on the Chinese model, in other developing countries.

Chinese philosophies and strategies for development Part I opens the book with a series of contributions on Chinese development strategies, looking at their relation to traditional culture and philosophy as well as their relation to material and physical conditions. In Chapter 1, Yu Cheung-lieh presents an historical overview of Chinese philosophy. His thesis is that China's materialistic and dialectical tradition can be observed in terms of a profound, unbroken historical continuum which allowed China to reject Western idealism and embrace Marxism as the ideological basis for her development strategies after "liberation" in 1949. Hence, China's adoption of European dialectical materialism should be regarded as an organic enlargement of Chinese philosophy rather than "westernization." Mao Zedong's thinking is thus seen as the most influential product of China's historical continuity and philosophical development: the Chinese Marxist revolution aimed at a developmental paradigm which was "modernization," not "westernization. " In Chapter 2, Johan Galtung attempts to lead us down "the Chinese path to development" and some of its variations, despite the "Western veil" that probably subconsciously serves as a cognitive filter. Galtung's challenging thesis is that China is, at present, in a "pragmatic" phase of development as opposed to the previous "dogmatic" phase, the Cultural Revolution. He argues that Chinese history has been a history of "progressive oscillation" between distribution-oriented and growthoriented policies. Hence, the path to development is dialectical, synthesizing two contradictory strategies over a single course of history. Oscillation is a feature of Chinese history; it can be expected to continue. There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that present policies along with the present pragmatic phase of modernization should not also come to an end, with a "new cultural revolution, but, of course, different from the preceding one" budding in its wake. Self-destructive tendencies become more prevalent, and the negative aspects of development processes become more and more manifest. According to Thomas Hoppe in his contribution (Ch. 3), this is due to the Western development paradigm which represents an economically oriented idea of change, centered on increases in commodity production and wage labor. Instead, Hoppe argues, the paradigm of "reproduction" should become paramount. Above all, nature and

B.GLAESER

3

production fundamentals, society, economy, and national cultural identity must be reproduced before any notable "gains" can be made or "extended reproduction" achieved. Extended reproduction must constitute something more than gains within the development paradigm. Elements averse to reproduction of the whole must be weeded out. Primary importance is attached to the viability of local spheres and to the sustainability of "production" processes. The problems ofland use in Xinjiang are used to illustrate the author's points. Land-use problems relate to the dialectics of environment and development; in developing countries, these represent the fundamental physical conditions. Shortage or loss of agricultural lands has created developmental and environmental problems throughout the world. Among these are (a) overpopulation and underdevelopment, (b) the uncontrolled use of soils not well suited for agriculture, and (c) an increasing dependency on the world food market. Dirk Betke and Johannes Kuchler take up these globally pressing issues in Chapter 4. The People's Republic was selected as the subject of their case study because, as the authors claim, China is one of the few countries in which all these problems exist. The results are eye-opening. Although shortage of land has been a constant issue of importance throughout Chinese history, today the People's Republic is one of the few countries in which the main forms of soil loss and land destruction exist simultaneously: (a) (b)

loss of agricultural lands due to the accelerated expansion of the urban-industrial system, in most cases, irreversible; loss of soil resulting from inappropriate use of agricultural lands soil erosion, desertification, salinization.

Owing to the vagueness and inconsistency of available data, it is rather difficult to get a clear picture of the quantitative dimension of the land shortage problem. Recently, the Chinese authorities have attempted to establish a comprehensive policy for the protection ofland resources. The various efforts undertaken include: (a) (b) (c)

improvements in the amount and quality of information on the actual state of China's land resources, the establishment of a sound legal and administrative framework for the protection of soil resources, and integration of soil conservation into the general economic policy.

This new approach includes various scientific, technical, legal and economic measures; and it is precisely this combination which accounts for the authors' optimism about the probable success of the new approach.

4

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA

Environmental policy and planning in China Part II of this book explores environmental policy and planning in the People's Republic of China. In Chapter 5 we are told that environmental planning and policy are absolutely in line with and part of the present development and modernization policy in the People's Republic. Wu Zijin, engineer and long-time representative of the Environment Protection Bureau of the Ministry of Urban and Rural Construction and Environmental Protection (formerly the Environment Protection Bureau of the State Council), gives an account of the origins of environmental management in China, its historical evolution since the Stockholm Conference on Human Environment in 1972, and further organizational and legal developments. Wu's account provides a good illustration of dialectics in Chinese modernization policy (analogous to those developments discussed by Galtung in Ch. 2) whereby development and environment are harmonized and reconciled. Following along the grand lines of Chinese development strategy and all the implications for the environmental situation, the remaining chapters in this part of the book turn their attention to some of the consequences of those sectoral policies most important for the process of development - that is, industrialization, food production, energy use, and settlement planning. In Chapter 6, Yu Cheung-lieh takes a critical look at Chinese industrial development. The food production issue and related research in the areas of pest control and biogas production are taken up by Rudolf Wagner in Chapter 7, who examines the apparently contradictory positions taken by "ecologists" and "modernizers." The manner in which the Chinese tend to oscillate between both perspectives can be traced to China's political traditions and political structure, including the rigid vertical information flow which precludes any lateral exchange of information from base to base. Two main reasons for some of the failures of Chinese rural environmental policy in the late 1970s are examined by Bernhard Glaeser and Paul Steidl-Meier in Chapter 8. These are lack of political control and financial bottlenecks. Differing, if not contradictory, national- and local-level policies are evaluated. With the reintroduction of household sideline production and especially under new systems of household contracting in the early 1980s, a breakthrough in productivity was initiated, accompanied by rising incomes. These additional incomes have created a growing demand for industrial and consumer goods, and have thus provided new means for China's ongoing modernization, as Ernst Hagemann and Robert Pestel point out in Chapter 9. This growth can only be sustained if the technologies chosen are ecologically sound. The

B. GLAESER

5

framework of the household contract system with individual responsibility provides a symbiosis of traditional farming wisdom with modem agricultural technology. Long-term success will depend heavily on this symbiosis as well as on growing rural incomes. Wolfgang Kinzelbach in Chapter 10, stresses the relationship between some of China's most prominent environmental problems and energy supply and use. Urban air pollution is the result of highly inefficient coal combustion processes. Deforestation and soil erosion in rural areas can be traced to the gathering of firewood and the stripping of some vegetation covers for fuel. Other problems examined by Kinzelbach include ash disposal and marine oil-pollution. Whereas the control offuture pollution in cities and industrial centers will depend on the technologies employed, the prospects for controlling pollution in the countryside are less predictable and less optimistic. The more optimistic "China watchers" claim that this has already partially been achieved. In Chapter 11, Ekhart Hahn considers China as "a model for a new development strategy which integrates_ modernization and industrialization with ecodevelopment." He argues that modem China learned this lesson from ancient China, claiming that the construction of individual buildings or complete towns conforms to the laws of Feng Shui, translated as the laws of "wind and water." Thus, modem China became the first country since its industrial revolution to recognize the central importance of an integrated development, environmental, and settlement policy. An example of this policy is illustrated by the concept of the "integrated settlement unit" - an inhabited area which includes towns and rural parts, and incorporates both industry and agriculture. This policy encourages the development of small- and medium-sized towns; it promotes the development of satellite townships as a means of curbing the growth oflarge cities and the tendency towards centralization.

The possibilities and constraints ofpolicy implementation: learning from China? Part III of this book takes up the subject of policy implementation, with a view to other developing countries and the possibilities of their learning from China. In general, governmental policies in developing countries, designed to ensure that development is environmentally sound and sustainable, face enormous implementation barriers. Any model of implementation that would help to improve policy making on the basis of actual outcomes and experiences needs to take into account both international and domestic factors that influence the source of the problem and the interests surrounding any public intervention.

6

ENVIRONMENT AL POLlCY IN CHINA

Environmental policies, if they are to correct the damaging and unsustainable development patterns that affiict so many developing countries, must treat implementation as a major problem to be solved. In other words, knowing the nature of the problem and the conceptual solution makes little difference without the capacity to implement the policies in the face of conflicting interests and uncertainties, and without analyses of the results of current efforts. In many ways, environmental policies combine the tactics of changing organizational behavior with practical experimentation in the field. In Chapter 12, John Horberry takes up "the implementation of national environmental policies in developing countries." His contribution proposes an analytical framework for policy makers to use as a guide to thinking about opportunities and barriers. It concerns three main groups of factors. First, the international political and economic frame that dominates those patterns of development and resource usage that cause environmental stress and loss of natural resource productivity. Secondly, the governmental and institutional frame that mediates the conflicting interests around development decision making and control in developing countries. Thirdly, the local socioeconomic and physical factors that shape the analysis and management of environmental problems in the field. If policy makers can determine what are the main factors in each of these areas, that surround the particular environmental problem at issue, they will select more appropriate methods of intervention, seek to negotiate and tactically manage the critical interests involved. They will also adapt policy interventions to suit the practical opportunities to influence the problem, on the bases of continuing experience. Each of these areas is likely to influence implementation opportunities and barriers in different ways; (a) (b) (c)

the international relationships will influence the resource use and development priorities; the governmental organization will affect decision making, and coordination of development planning and control; local conditions will determine practical options for managing and responding to particular problems and proposed corrective measures.

Two instances of international cooperation in which China has been involved, including joint projects in the area of resource exploitation, energy use, and pollution control are also included in this section. In Chapter 13, Walther Manshard reports on international cooperation between the People's Republic of China and the United Nations University. His contribution takes a critical look at some of the

13. GLAESER

7

UNU's operations within its program on resource policy and management, based on three research projects carried out in China: (a) (b) (c)

an integrated energy project in the Po River delta in South China, a research survey and reconnaissance project from the margins of eastern Tibet, and a project on the possibilities oflong distance water transfer from central to North China.

As one "lesson to be learned," the author emphasizes that in the field of appropriate technology, and particularly the area of renewable energy, cooperation with India would be reasonable and could prove fruitful. He also points out that environmental planning is hardly possible without access to reliable data. Finally, the author argues the need for improved environmental impact assessment in the area ofland use and water management policy in China. In Chapter 14, Jack Carmichael takes up the subject of biogas technology. Although it constitutes only a minute share of China's total energy budget, biogas development may be one way for alleviating some of the environmental degradation in rural regions by providing a reasonable substitute for firewood. Carmichael describes some of UNIDO's efforts in this area. Interestingly enough, UNIDO stresses the development of large-scale communal biogas digesters. This is generally contrary to local biogas policy in China, which tends to favor and promote small, individual family units. In Chapter 15, M. Taghi Farvar points out that biogas technology was almost certainly known in Iran from around AD 1600, before knowledge of it had vanished altogether, to be subsequently reintroduced in the 20th century by China and India. The Chinese model on which Iran's biogas production is based at present is considered unsatisfactory for several reasons: production efficiency is low, storage capacity is insufficient, and production technology is much too labor-intensive. Farvar's contribution makes a case for the development of more efficient and reliable models to be employed in Iran before any significant investment is undertaken. The author notes that the Indian model has already received renewed attention in Iran, with India being considered as a prospective partner for joint ventures in biogas technology development. Local conditions and local options are the main point of John Turner's contribution in Chapter 16: he discusses housing policies and policy implementation in Third World countries. Turner's key argument is that local organizations are the only ones which have the capacity to carry out local action economically. Does this imply that governments ought not to build houses if they wish to improve local (low-income housing) conditions? The "new generation of policies,"

8

ENVIRONMENTAL POLiCY IN CHINA

about which the author speaks, must be based on locally selfdetermined, self-organized, and self-managed programs. Governmental decrees and legislative acts in response to the demands of the people must be administered by decentralized agencies and local authorities. John Turner's plea for decentralized planning is complemented by Andreas Brandt's contribution in Chapter 17, which looks towards appropriate technologies as means to solving the problems in rural areas of the Third World. Brandt stresses the fact that local implementation must be determined by the local sociocultural context and by the need to preserve the local ecological system. A new kind of cooperation based on traditional skills, knowledge, and expertise must incorporate newly developed techniques or revitalize the use offorgotten materials to draw a link between tradition and the soaring problems of modem reality. What can be learned from China? That concepts of decentralization, cooperation, and employment of traditional knowledge must be combined with the growing interest among the highly industrialized countries in energy self-sufficiency and environmentally compatible housing. In Chapter 18, Narindar Singh takes up a global perspectiye on modem science and the environmental issue from an enlightened, Third World point of view. Singh first of all stresses the point that humankind, as part of "one living system" but unlike any other species of living thing, has the unique power of total self-destruction as well as the power to destroy the whole biosphere through the misuse or abuse of nuclear power and petrochemicals. The policy makers of this globe continue to preempt resources and divert them into the making of such wares and weapons as can only spell lingering paralysis or sudden incineration. However, irrespective of the ideology to which they may claim to be committed, the wielders of power anywhere and everywhere are interested, above all, in keeping this power. But what they have to do in order to remain entrenched happens to be inexorably depletive of the habitat of humankind. In fact, such depletion and the concentration of power are but two sides of the same coin. It follows that the evolving crisis of ecology bespeaks nothing but the total destruction of the legitimacy of concentrated power.

Conclusion Such is, unfortunately, the politico-ecological situation of this globe. Is there anything that we can do about it - in the Eastern or Western politicosphere? Is there a sound paradigm of ecopolitics to which the powers of this world can adhere and which they can easily follow? China is sometimes considered just such a paradigm.

B. GLAESER

9

In the concluding essay of this book, Bernhard Glaeser takes up various arguments, pro and con, reflecting on the potential for learning from China. It is argued that China does not offer the one and only paradigm, the panacea for all problems. Like other countries in other areas, China has been successful at dealing with some of the aspects of ecodevelopment and related problems, for example in promoting economic development at a basic-needs level without losing sight of the ecological foundations of development. This does not imply that China's recent history and efforts necessarily provide the perfect model for other developing countries. However, is does mean that other countries would be well advised to seek cooperation and try to develop an interchange with China, since they are likely to benefit to some extent from such an exchange, particularly in those areas where China has proven expertise in successfully tackling environmental problems within the context of ecodevelopment.

References Glaeser, B. (ed.) 1982. Okologie und Umweltschutz in der VR China: Eindriicke und Eifahrungsberichte einer Umweltdelegation. Bochum: Brockmeyer. Glaeser, B. (ed.) 1983. Umweltpolitik in China: Modemisierung und Umwelt in Industrie, Landwirtschaft und Energieerzeugung. Bochum: Brockmeyer. Glaeser, B. (ed.) 1984. Ecodevelopment: concepts, projects, strategies. Oxford: Pergamon. Hahn, E. 1983. Umweltbewuftte Siedlungspolitik in China. Frankfurt: Campus. Senghaas, D. 1980. Wirtschaftsordnung und Entwicklungspolitik. Pliidoyer fur Dissoziation. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Senghaas, D. 1982. Von Europa Lemen. Entwicklungsgeschichtliche Betrachtungen. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

PART I

Chinese philosophies and strategiesJor development

DOI: 10.4324/9780203838921-2

1

On the reactions of Chinese culture against the Western challenge: the other side of modernization YU CHEUNG-LIEH

East Asian culture and Western influence The expansion of Westem civilization since the 19th century was, and is still, a considerable challenge for the rest of the world. Reactions of various cultures against this challenge have been quite different. Some of them have reacted passively; some have even lost their cultural identity. But one exception to this is the East Asian culture comprising countries such as China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. All these countries have reacted against the challenge very actively ever since the beginning, causing the West to gradually lose its superior position as a challenger. (a) Japan has now become one of the leading industrial countries. It is economically second only to the United States; and it is the most successful of those capitalist countries which do not belong culturally to the West. (b) China is on the way to becoming a powerful socialist country. It will surely playa more important role in influencing the world's development, which has been essentially monopolized by the West for almost two centuries. (c) Even the impressive economic growth in Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong should be mainly regarded as part of the active reaction of East Asian cultures, for over 90 per cent of their combined populations are Chinese. (d) The most decisive, active reactions have been the wars in Korea and Vietnam in which China participated strongly, and through which the expansion of American capitalism as the extension of European imperialism has been halted almost completely in East Asia.

DOI: 10.4324/9780203838921-3

14

CHINESE CULTURE v. WESTERN CHALLENGE

All this shows clearly that East Asian culture reacted differently from, for instance, the Indian and Arabic cultures; not only to survive the challenge, but to consciously renew itself through the challenge by adopting Western ideas and technology in the sense of modernization. Of course, this modernization does not mean merely adoption in a peaceful way. It is also a violent process in which part of the old cultural structure must be reformed or even destroyed by force in order to make enough room for new things. Japan could be industrialized successfully only after a painful Meiji reform in 1868, namely after the Japanese political system had been changed fundamentally. China's industrialization could only begin after two radical revolutions in 1911 and 1949, respectively. Neither similar reforms nor similar revolutions have occurred in other cultural areas, because reaction against the Western challenge there has been passive and limited to just surviving the challenge. In such cases, the cultures in question might keep their old cultural structure without much destruction, but this leaves very little space for the adoption of new approaches. The reason for this can probably be found in traditions in which passivity has always been more highly valued than activity, because of religious beliefs, for instance. To be active in this world, however, is the very political tradition of East Asian culture. Though religion is important in this cultural area, it has never played such a dorninant role in East Asian history as it has, for example, in India. The active reaction of East Asian culture leading ultimately to successful modernization should be seen as a continuation of East Asian cultural tradition; namely, the philosophical tradition of materialism and dialectic. Since the home of this tradition is in China, the following discussion will mainly focus on Chinese philosophy and its impact on China's modernization.

Materialism, dialectic, and Chinese philosophy Both materialism and dialectic are in fact deeply rooted in Chinese philosophy, a fact which has unfortunately been ignored by many people in the East and in the West for quite a long time. Even the doctrines of Confucius are basically more materialistic than idealistic. His main concern was for a good society and good human relations in the world in which we are living and not in that world after our death: "If you don't know enough about life, why should you know about death?,,1 More important, he cared even less about spirits and deities: "One sacrifices to the spirits as if the spirits were present,,,2 but it is important "to do one's duties earnestly and, while respecting spiritual

YU CHEUNG-LIEH

15

beings, to keep distance from them. "3 This is a clear expression of the flexibility of Confucius' attitude towards religion, which has influenced Chinese intellectuals for more than 2,000 years. To Confucius, even the category "Heaven" is, in many cases, a "Heaven of nature" and by no means purposive: "Does Heaven speak? The four seasons pursue their courses, and all things are continually being produced, but does Heaven say anything?"4 Apparently, God or any transcendent deity was absent in Confucius' concept, which was just a natural order moving by means of its own forces. This concept of the universe hindered considerably the appearance of absolute theological philosophy in China. This provided enough room for the development of materialism and dialectic, although idealism, i.e. modified Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism, was dominant in China until 1911. Another impressive rational approach in this concern can be found in the commentaries to I]ing (The Book ojChanges), namely, the so-called I Zhuan, by unknown Confucianists in the Period of Warring States (480-222 Be). According to their interpretation, the universe is nothing but continuous change. In the very beginning, there was Tai-Ji (the Great Ultimate) which engenders the two forces Yin (the passive element) and Yang (the active element). The interaction of Yin and Yang is the natural force which makes change possible. The Great Ultimate, Tai-Ji, is here by no means a spiritual being, but rather a substance, i.e. a unit comprised of two contradictory elements, Yin and Yang. Through the natural operation of these two forces, all things will be produced. This interpretation reduced the complex cosmos to the simplest formulation in such a materialistic and dialectic way that it was surely one of the most comprehensive cosmological concepts 2,000 years ago. Taoism, embodied in a book of only 5,000 words, the Tao de Jin by Lao Zi, is even more materialistic and dialectic than Confucianism. The first philosophical category in connection with ontology, "Tao," was created by Lao Zi: "There was something undifferentiated and yet complete, which existed before Heaven and Earth. Soundless, and formless it depends on nothing and does not change. . . . I do not know its name; I call it Tao.,,5 Again, Tao is neither god nor creator: in it, all nature works by itself Therefore: "Tao produced the One. The One produced the Two. The Two produced the Three. And the Three produced the ten thousand things. The ten thousand things carry the Yin and embrace the Yang, and through the blending of the material force (Qi) they achieve harmony."6 The One should be understood as the Great Ultimate; the Two are Yin and Yang. Through their interaction, as mentioned before, all things (the ten thousand things) will be produced: this is the Three. This shows a natural process from simple to complex, but without any help from spiritual beings or any

16

CHINESE CULTURE

v.

WESTERN CHALLENGE

act of creation. Here, we see the fundamental similarity in the Taoist and Confucianist concepts of the universe, both of which built up the materialistic foundation of classic Chinese philosophical tradition. However, the significance of Taoism is its dialectic. Lao Zi's statement: "reversion is the action of Tao,,,7 should be understood to mean that it is only the opposition of forces within Tao which causes the action of Tao. It is the most remarkable dialectic interpretation of the movement from the very beginning without the action (first push) of any transcendent deity. Furthermore, in Tao deJin, Lao Zi claimed: "All things in the world come from being. And being comes from non-being," and "being and non-being produce each other."8 This means that both of them are in a unity of contradiction. Applying this in practice, every single thing in the world is a unit ofcontradiction, which moves and changes continuously through the contradictory forces within itself Mao Zedong said exactly the same thing some 3,000 years after the death of Lao Zi in his essay On contradiction in 1937: "There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development.,,9 Therefore: "The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. "10 Here, we see clearly the profound continuatiQl1 of the materialistic and dialectic tradition of Chinese philosophy, which enabled China to reject Western idealism but to accept Marxism for modernization. In this case, the adoption of European dialectical materialism should not be regarded as "westernization," but as an organic enlargement of Chinese philosophy. Mao Zedong's thoughts are, in fact, a product of this enlargement which is, and will continue to be, very influential in China for quite some time. In Europe, the dialectical way of thinking broke down for more than 2,000 years, roughly speaking, between Heraclitus and Hegel. In China, it developed throughout the whole of history, but it was not formed into a theoretical system because China's scientific and economic development has been slowing down since the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368). Moreover, most of the Chinese philosophers emphasized dialectic one-sidedly, so that there was less room left for speculation and hypothesis in their discussion, which is, to some extent, anti-scientific. We presume that this is why the Chinese are more practical and less interested in abstractions such as logic and mathematics; thus, the development of theoretical science was neglected in China.

The development ofmaterialism and dialectic in Chinese history and philosophy The continuous development of materialism and dialectic in the history

17

YU CHEUNG-L1EH

of Chinese philosophy can be illustrated chronologically as shown in Table 1.1 Of course, this list does not include all the Chinese materialists, but most of the famous philosophers representative of specific periods in the long Chinese history are accounted for here. The list also shows the continuation of the development of Chinese materialism and dialectic from the Zhou Dynasty (1111-249 BC) to the Qing Dynasty (1644-1910). Among the philosophers mentioned, five will be dealt with here, but then only briefly, because of the limited scope of this essay. They are Xun Zi (298-238 BC), Wang Chong (AD 27-1(0), Zhang Zai (1020--1077), Wang Fu Zhi (1619-1692), and Zai Zhen (1723-1777). Xun Zi was the most convinced materialist in the Chinese classic tradition and a rational Confucianist at the same time. But he went far beyond Confucius. To Confucius, the category "Heaven" is pure nature, devoid of any intuitionism or mysticism. In Xun's concept, Table 1.1

The historical development of Chinese philosophy.

Historical period 1111-249BC 580-500 BC 551-479 BC 480-222 BC 29~238BC

280-233 BC 145-88 BC 53 BC-AD 18 40 BC-AD 32 AD 27-100 180-220 450-550 773-819 772-842 1020-1077 1021-1086 1143-1194 1150-1223 1465-1547 1474-1544 1619-1692 1635-1704 1659-1733 1723-1777

Historical person LaoZi Confucius XunZi Han Fei Zi Si Ma Qian YanXiong Yuan Tan Wang Chong Fan Zhang Tong Fan Zhen Liu Zong Yuan Liu Yu Xi Zhang Zai Wang An Si Chen Liang Ye SIll Luo Qin Shun Wang Ting Xiang WangFu Zhi Van Yuan Li Kong Zai Zhen

Historical work

IJin Tao deJin LuYu I Zhuan XUllZi HanFei Zi ShiJin TaiXuall XinLun LWI Heng Chml,\! V1lII ShellMei L,m FmJian Lun TimlLull Zhallg Mmg Hong Fall Zhuall LOllg Chaall Well Ji Xi Xueji Y,m KIIIl Zhiji W,mg Shijia Chan,qji Zhang Zi Chmg MfIlg Zhu Zhu Zi Vu Lei Ping LIIIl jill Zhllall Zhu Meng Zi Zi Yi Shu Zheng

18

CHINESE CULTURE v. WESTERN CHALLENGE

there is no place for supernatural forces over humans, but rather for humans over nature! In his famous work On Nature, he argued: Are order and chaos due to Heaven? I say, the sun, the moon, the stars, planets, and auspicious periods of the calendar were the same in the time of Yu as in that ofChieh. Yet, Yu brought about order while Chieh brought about chaos. Order and chaos are not due to Heaven!l1 Further, Xun Zi was the only writer in the Chinese classic tradition, who emphasized human effort over nature so definitely. The following quotation shows how he argued materialistically 2,000 years ago, when the influence of mysticism was enormously strong: Instead of regarding Heaven as great and admiring it, why not foster it as a thing and regulate it? Instead of obeying Heaven and singing praise to it, why not control the Mandate of Heaven and use it? Instead oflooking on the seasons and waiting for them, why not respond to them and make use of them? Instead ofletting things multiply by themselves, why not exercise your ability to transform (and increase) them? Instead of thinking about things as things, why not attend to them so you won't lose them? Instead of admiring how things come into being, why not do something to bring them to full development?12 Obviously, to Xun Zi, Heaven is not purposive. Nor is it the ultimate power which controls human destiny. So, Xun distinctly criticizes an idealistic theory where events are conducted by a purposive heaven, and according to which rulers are appointed. Xun Zi was a magistrate for only a short time, after which he taught until his death, but his influence was quite considerable in the Qin Dynasty (221-206 Be), because two of his students were also ministers of Qin. One of these was the famous legalist, Han Fei, who helped Qin to build up a centralized political system which lasted almost unchanged until modem times. Wang Chong lived at a time when Confucianism had been the supreme doctrine in China for more than a century. The rationalistic Confucian theory was modified into a state ideology and, to some extent, a theological one. Therefore, Wang was the first to rise in revolt againt the degenerate, mysterious, and superstitious Confucian doctrine. Wang Chong also emphasized that Heaven was not an entity that could be personalized by anyone, in any form. According to his theory, there is nothing but the material force (Qi) which produces all things spontaneously. In his work, Balanced inquiries, he stated: The activities of Heaven consist in the giving forth and distributing of the material force. . . Heaven moves without the desire to produce things, and

YU CHEUNG-LiEH

19

yet things are produced of themselves. That is spontaneity. When material force is given forth and distributed without the purpose of producing things, yet things are produced of themselves, that is non-action. What do we mean when we say that heaven is spontaneous and takes no action? It is material force. It is tranquil, without desire, and is engaged in neither action nor business ... 13

This is very reminiscent ofLao Zi and Taoism: "Tao invariably takes no action, and yet there is nothing left undone.,,14 In fact, Wang Chong was very close to Taoism, but he went beyond his predecessor, Lao Zi: "When the Taoists talk about spontaneity, they do not know how to recite facts to prove their theory of practice. "15 So he explained with facts that Heaven is not purposive, yet things are produced by themselves: The way to Heaven is to take no action. Therefore, in spring it does not act to start life, in summer it does not act to help growth, in autumn it does not act to bring maturity, and in winter it does not act to store up. When the material force of Yang comes forth itself, things naturally come to life and grow. When the material fQrce of Yin arises of itself, things naturally mature and are stored up. 16

This interpretation is new, but not advanced, for basically the natural forces here are still Yin and Yang, and through their interactions the four seasons evolve. But, it is important that Wang Chong's argument opposed the existence of any deity, and, above all, that it was aimed against the government's intention to deify even Confucius. More important, however, is Wang's theory of the nonexistence of spirits or of souls after death. This theory was very influential throughout the whole of Chinese history. The well-known discussion on "Form and spirit" in China, for instance, was initiated by Wang. In his essay, A treatise on death, he stated definitively: Man can live because of his vital forces (Qi). At death, his vital forces are extinct. What makes the vital forces possible is the blood. When a person dies, his blood becomes exhausted. With this, his vital forces are extinct, and his body decays and becomes ashes and dust. What is there to become a spiritual being?17

An impressive example given by Wang disavcwing the existence of the soul draws an analogy between life and fire: When a fire is extinguished, its light shines no longer, and when a man dies, his consciousness has no more understanding. ... After his fire is extinguished and the light disappears, only the candle remains. After a man

20

CHINESE CULTURE v. WESTERN CHALLENGE

dies, his vital forces become extinct but only his body remains. To say that a man has consciousness after death is to say that a fire still has light after the fire is extinguished. . . .18 Wang Chong's critical spirit strongly influenced a great number of Chinese scholars. This enabled the further development of materialism, especially in the Wei-Jin period (AD 220-240), at a time when Buddhism was becoming more popular in China. Fan Zhen, for instance, was the most well-known of the materialist philosophers who energetically attacked Buddhism during this period. Wang Chong was no doubt a materialist, but his theory was less dialectical than it was empirical. Zhang Zai, unlike Wang Chong, was a philosopher who built up his theoretical system very dialectically. Among his publications, Ximing (Western inscription) and Zheng Meng (Correcting youthful ignorance) are the most important works. The latter, finished shortly before his death, contains his dialectical interpretation: If Yin and Yang do not exist, the One [the Great Ultimate] cannot be revealed. If the One cannot be revealed, then the function of the two forces will cease. Reality and unreality, motion and rest, integration and disintegration, and clearness and furbidity are pairs of different substances. In the final analysis, however, they are one. 19 And moreover: Only after the One is acted upon will it begin to penetrate through Yin and Yang. Without the two forces, there cannot be the one. . . . Material force moves and flows in all directions and in all manners. Its two elements unite and give rise to the concrete. Thus the multiplicity of things and human beings are produced. In their ceaseless successions, the two elements of Yin and Yang constitute the great principles of the universe. 20 Zhang's concept of the universe is basically not new, but the interpretation of it no doubt represents an advance which goes beyond the interpretations of his predecessors. Zhang pointed out for the first time the inner relation between the "Two" (Yin and Yang) and the "One" (the Great Ultimate). That means that the existence and the function of the Two are mutually dependent on the existence of the One. On the other hand, if the Two do not exist, there will be no One, so that one includes two, and two are within one. He states: "In the final analysis, however, they are one." This can also be interpreted -in modem terms, whereby one is a unit comprising two contrary elements through which movement and change are then possible. As a materialist, Zhang attacked Neo-Confucianism, a mixed

YU CHEUNG-LIEH

21

doctrine of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism; and he also criticized Taoism, although he was very close to it. He argued: If we realize that the Great Vacuity (the Great Ultimate of Taoism) is identical with material force, we know that there is no such thing as non-being .... The doctrine of those superficial and mistaken philosophers who draw the distinction between being and non-being is not the way to investigate principle to the utmost. 21

Zhang's critique focused on the premise of Lao Zi that "being comes from non-being." Since to Zhang "there is no such thing as non-being," all things are produced merely through integration and disintegration of material forces: If material force integrates, its visibility becomes effective, and physical form appears. If material force does not integrate, its visibility is not effective, and there is no physical form. ... The integration and disintegration of material force is to the Great Vacuity as the freezing and melting of ice is to water. 22

Instead of interaction, Zhang introduced for the first time the terms "integration" and "disintegration", which are, at any rate, more rational, so that the Taoist concept was actually refined by him to a great extent. More important is Zhang's dialectical interpretation, which is no less scientific than that of Engels or of Hegel, for example: In its original state of Great Vacuity, material force is absolutely tranquil and formless. As it is acted upon, it engenders the two fundamental elements of Yin and Yang, and through integration gives rise to forms. As there are forms, there are their opposites. These opposites necessarily stand in opposition to what they do. Opposition leads to conflict which will necessarily be reconciled and resolved. 23

It must be noted that Zhang was the first philosopher to realize that if there are forms (things), there are opposites (contradictions) and conflicts within things themselves. About 1,000 years later, Mao Zedong, under the influence of Marxism, could not state it better than Zhang: "There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development. "24 Yet, Zhang did not know how conflict could necessarily be resolved. In accordance with the advanced dialectic trom the West, two contradictory aspects could, under certain circumstances, coexist in a unity; and each could also, under given conditions, be transformed into its own opposite. This is what we call "identity." The importance is

22

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not the identity, but, as Mao emphasized, "the struggle between these aspects determines the life of all things and pushes their development. "25 Here we see Lenin's influence on Mao clearly: The unity (coincidence, identity, equal action) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is absolute, just as development and motion are absolute. 26 Most of the Chinese philosophers before Mao recognized that development is absolute, and that even identity is possible. Yet, they could not know that the struggle is as absolute as development. Therefore, to those philosophers, the conflict could only be reconciled in a peaceful way, not through struggle; "hence it could not fully explain the world and was supplanted by metaphysics. "27 Before Mao, it was not possible for Chinese philosophers to combine dialectic and materialism organically because of the backwardness of Chinese scientific and economic development. Only after adoption of dialectical materialism was the problem of how to treat conflict within things fmally solved - namely, through the struggle between the two aspects. Again, the significance of the enlargement of Chinese philosophy through the adoption of new ideas from Europe is evident here. For instance, identity, in which two contradictory aspects could, under given conditions, be transformed into their own opposites, is an idea which doubtlessly originated in Western thought but is well-known in China too. In Tao de jin, we can read that "calamity is that upon which happiness depends; happiness is that in which calamity is latent. ,,28 This means that neither state of being is isolated, but rather that both are interconnected, and that each can be transformed into its opposite if conditions are right. Another example comes from Ban Gu, a famous historian during the Han D~asty: "Things that oppose each other also complement each other." 9 This statement was interpreted by Mao Zedong in more modem terms: This saying is dialectical and contrary to metaphysics. "Oppose each other" refers to the mutual exclusion or the struggle of the two contradictory aspects. "Complement each other" means that in given conditions the two contradictory aspects unite and achieve identity. Yet struggle is inherent in identity and without struggle there can be no identity. 30 Ban Gu, of course, did not emphasize the struggle; he was a historian who lived almost 2,000 years ago. Nevertheless, that Mao quoted him in order to explain Western dialectic shows how extensively and actively the adoption of Marxism was going on in China!

YU CHEUNG-UEH

23

Such examples are not rare in Chinese philosophy. For instance, Shao Yung, a philosopher in the Song Dynasty (AD 960-1279), argued in his essay on Supreme principles governing the world some 900 years ago: Yang cannot exist by itself; it can exist only when it is supported by Yin. Hence, Yin is the foundation of Yang. Similarly, Yin cannot alone manifest itself; it can manifest itselfonly when accompanied by Yang. Hence, Yang is the expression of Yin. 31 In 1973, Mao Zedong said in his essay, On contradiction: "The fact is that no contradictory aspects can exist isolated. Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its existence. "32 Principally, Mao and Shao meant the same thing. In fact, it is difficult to say whether Mao was more influenced by Lenin or by Shao Yung! It is worthwhile to point out that Zhang Zai was also a convinced Confucianist, although his approach was dialectical and materialistic. As a conservative magistrate, however, he opposed the reforms of Wang An Si (1021-1086), whose philosophical concept was as materialistic as his own. This shows clearly that a rational Confucianist could at the same time be a materialist. To some extent, there was no distinctive polarity between idealism and materialism in China as there was in Europe. In any case, Zhang Zai's most important contribution was his excellent dialectic interpretation which was virtually unknown in the rest of the world during his time. Wang Fu Zhi was just 33 years old when the Manchus conquered China, forcing him out of his employment. He spent the rest of his life writing, and he was one of the most respected materialistic philosophers in China up to modem times. In his works, he emphasized the importance of material form (Qi) in order to attack the idealistic principle (Li) ofNeo-Confucianism. For Wang Fu Zhi, Qi was identical with Li, but he insisted that Qi was prior to Li. He argued, "The world consists only of concrete things. "33 Therefore, Qi is not only a "thing" in the philosophical sense, but it is also the concretion of materiality. For Wang, Qi and Li depend on each other dialectically; hence, Li is by no means abstract and isolated as interpreted by the Neo-Confucianists. Wang said: Let us investigate principle (Li) as we come into contact with things (Qi), but never set up principle to restrict things. 34 because: At bottom, principle is not a finished product that can be grasped. It is invisible. The details and order of material force are principle that is visible.

24

CHINESE CULTURE v. WESTERN CHALLENGE

Therefore, the first time there is any principle is when it is seen in material force 35 .

So Wang Fu Zhi formulated his famous premise, "principle depends on material force, "36 and leveled the criticism at the Neo-Confucianists that they "have scarcely understood ~rinciple, they set it up as a generalization for the whole world ... " 7. Wang argued further: As there is a concrete thing, there is always its principle in it, and there has never been a principle independent of a concrete thing.38

On the basis of this concept, he also attacked Taoism and Buddhism: Lao Zi was blind to this and said that the way (Tao) existed in vacuity. But vacuity is the vacuity of concrete things. The Buddha was blind to this and said that the way existed in silence. But silence is the silence of concrete things. 39

In this, Wang Fu Zhi indeed went beyond other materialistic philosophers before him, including Zhang Zai whom he greatly admired. Like Zhang, Wang also dismissed Lao Zi's non-being, but he did so more philosophically: There will really be nonbeing only when there is nothing which can be described as nonbeing. Since nonbeing is so called, it follows that it is merely a denial of being. . . . Those who speak of nonself do so from the point of view of the self. If there were no self, who is going to deny the self? It is obvious that to speak of nonselfis to utter extravagant and evasive words. 40

The significance of his contribution is that apart from the term "concretion," he also introduced for !he first time the category "function" in connection with his argument on substance: All functions in the world are those of existing things. From their functions I know they possess substance. . . . Both substance and function exist, and each depends on the other to be concrete. Therefore, all that fills the universe demonstrates the principle of mutual dependence. 41

The reason he emphasized function was to show that substance (Qi) is in any case prior to principle (LI), for function can be seen, heard, and felt by humans, but function can never function without substance. Nowhere in the history of Chinese philosophy is function stressed so strongly as in the philosophy of Wang. As we have seen, the term for "ultimate" was developed from Tai-Ji, and Tao to principle, the term for "operation" (of material force) from

YU CHEUNG-L1EH

25

interaction, and integration to function. Nevertheless, there is no God or creator of any kind to be found in this philosophical development. When Wang said, "all functions in the world are those of existing things" and "as there is a concrete thing, there is always its principle in it," he meant that function is identical with principle - but he did not stop there like most Chinese philosophers. He went further: "Both substance and function exist, and each depends on the other to be concrete." Obviously, Wang's interpretation was new and advanced, for what he really sought was the "concretion" of materiality and its function in the daily reality. Unlike many Chinese philosophers, he rejected the restoration of the political system, because to him the concrete things of his day were different from those of the past, so that the past could not be a pattern for the present. As mentioned before, Zhang Zai was the one who opposed reform of any kind, while Wang emphasized progress and evolution, although both of them were convinced materialists. Zai Zhen, one of the greatest materialistic philosophers in China, carried on the revolt against Neo-Confucianism during the Qin Dynasty. His most important work is the Commentary on the meanings of terms in the book of Mencius in which he continued the attack on the idealistic "theory of mind" of Neo-Confucianism with force, emphasizing, at the same time, that one should investigate principle (Li) through the critical and objective study of things and not by introspection of the mind as the Neo-Confucianists did. In this connection, Zai stated: If we seek what is necessary and unalterable in Heaven, Earth, men, things, events, and activities, we shall find the principle in them to be perfectly clear and evident. But if we exalt it and glorify it, not only calling it the principle of Heaven, Earth, men, things, events, and activities, but instead calling it omnipresent principle, regarding it as if it were a thing; the result will be that even until their hair turns white, students will be at a loss and will not be able to find this thing. 42

Apparently, Zai was opposed to the abstract learning of the NeoConfucianists, who were still very influential during his time. Zai Zhen was not only a philosopher, he was also interested in mathematics and astronomy. Methodologically, he insisted that "investigation of things" (Ge Wu) must be based on evidence, and he refused to accept anything without evidence, that is, anything abstract or transcendental. Thus, he denied that principle (Li) is prior to material force (Qi) for, without the latter, there would be no evidence for the existence of the former.

26

CHINESE CULTURE

v.

WESTERN CHALLENGE

By the time of Zai, Neo-Confucianists were more sophisticated in their arguments than before, even though their idealistic standpoint remained unchanged. For instance, the most famous NeoConfucianist, Zhu Si (113~ 12(0), used both categories, principle and material force, dualistically. Nevertheless, principle was still prior to material force for Zhu: There is principle before there can be material force. But it is only when there is material force that principle finds a place to settle. This is the process by which all things are produced.... Fundamentally, principle cannot be interpreted in the sense of existence or nonexistence. Before Heaven and Earth came into being, it already was as it is. 43

The dualist argument of Zhu Si was in fact inconsequent. He was obviously influenced by Wang Fu Zhi's famous premise, "principle depends on material force." For Zhu, principle was nothing more than spiritual being, one term merely replacing the other. He stated, for instance: "The Great Ultimate is nothing other then principle. . . The principle is one, but its manifestations are many. "44 Against this, Zai Zhen argued: They said the substance (of principle) is one, but (in function) it has a thousand manifestations .... Actually, they got this idea by imitating the Buddhists who say that 'universally manifested, it includes the whole realm oflaw; collected and grasped, it is a single speck of dust. ,45

Doubtlessly, the doctrine of the One and the Many originated with Buddhism, but it has since been adopted by the Neo-Confucianists to replace the category "Heaven." When Zhu Si said that principle is one but that its manifestations are many, he meant that principle is identical with the Great Ultimate; hence, it is the One. Zai Zhen criticized Zhu, claiming that even Confucius and Mencius "have never designated a One in a vacuum and told people to understand and seek it," and "since principle is that of things, it can be discovered only after things have been analyzed to the minutest detail. "46 But according to the "theory of mind" of Neo-Confucianists, only "the mind embodies all principles and responds to all things. The mind embodies principle and issues it forth. "47 This means, "there is no principle outside the mind; principle is within the mind. "48 Zai opposed this view vehemently, maintaining that "since the mind contains all principles, they should be described in terms of number. There must be an explanation whether it is One or innumerable. "49 Zai's critical spirit and his materialistic arguments have had a great influence on Chinese scholars until recent times. In any case, Zai was the

YU CHEUNG-LIEH

27

last of the great ones to attack Neo-Confucianism so strongly, for as Neo-Confucianism degenerated more and more during the Qing Dynasty, so did other forms of idealism in China.

The Chinese response to the Western challenge We have now taken a brief look at the continuous development of Chinese materialism and dialectic from ancient to modem times (from around 1110 Be to about AD 1900). Unfortunately, this impressive development was given far too little attention by intellectuals in China before 1949. In other parts of the world, most Western scholars of Chinese history and philosophy have concentrated their interests and efforts on Confucian ethics and Taoist mystics, for example, to the almost complete neglect of the other side of Chinese philosophy. They have, therefore, not been able to explain to their own satisfaction why China was able to adopt Marxism, although works of other Western philosophers were imported simultaneously. Nor could they understand that Chinese philosophy was never as dogmatic and theological as European philosophy in medieval times, so that in China there was always enough room for the development of materialism and dialectic. One exception to this was Joseph Needham. On the adoption of Marxism, he stated: In my view, the leading philosophical thinkers of China throughout the ages would have welcomed dialectical materialism most warmly if they had known of it. The perennial philosophy of Chinese culture was from the beginning an organical materialism which left very little place for idealistic systems. . . . So it was not in the least surprising that the Chinese intelligentsia adopted dialectical materialism with such unanimity. 50 On the basis of traditional heritage, China has been very active in facing the challenge from the West over the past 100 years. The works of Mill, Spencer, Montesquieu, and Huxley were translated into Chinese. The ideas of Schopenhauer, Kant, Nietzsche, and Marx, among others, were imported. Famous philosophers such as Dewey and Russell even lectured in China. But all this was not aimed at westernizing: it was aimed at modernizing China. As far as philosophy is concerned, we see that China adopted Marxism mainly in order to reconstruct her own philosophy, which was then to become the guideline for Chinese revolution and modernization. In this connection, two persons in modem Chinese history stand out as examples: Dr Sun Yatsen, the founder of the Republic of China (1911), and Mao Zedong, the founder of the People's Republic of

28

CHINESE CULTURE v. WESTERN CHALLENGE

China (1949). Sun tried very hard to combine Western liberalism and Confucianism. This failed, however, because there was no traditional foundation for accepting transplanted ideas such as liberalism and democracy in China. On the other hand, and on the basis of Chinese philosophical tradition, Mao was able to take over dialectical materialism and apply it organically to Chinese practices. He was therefore successful in revolution and in the reconstruction of Chinese philosophy. In addition to his essay, On contradiction, another of the important works of Mao is On practice. Here, Mao reinterpreted one of the most relevant theories in the history of Chinese philosophy, that of the relation between knowing (Zhi) and doing (Xing). For the NeoConfucianists, e.g. Wang Yangming (1472-1528), knowing and doing are one and the same thing. Traditional Confucianists emphasized doing, which means that knowing and doing correspond to each other and have equal importance. The traditional debate in China has focused on the problem as to which aspect should be regarded as easier to exercise. The classics claimed, "It is not difficult to knOw, but difficult to act." Dr Sun Yatsen claimed to the contrary, "It is difficult to know, but easy to act." Apparently, none of them were quite right, because knowing and doing are neither one identical nor two separate things; rather, they are related in a unit, as Mao emphasized dialectically: "To discover truth (knowing) through !'ractice (doing), and through practice to verify and develop truth. "5 According to Mao, in the past, both the identity and the separation of knowing and doing resulted from treating knowledge independently from practice: Before Marx, materialism examined the problem of knowledge apart from the social nature of man and apart from his historical development, and was therefore incapable of understanding the dependence of knowledge on social practice.... The truth of any knowledge or theory is determined not by subjective feelings, but by objective results in social practice. 52

Mao connected knowledge with social practice by emphasizing that the former is determined by the latter. Thus, Mao went even beyond Zai Zhen, for instance, who insisted only that investigations be based on evidence. Therefore, under the influence of Marxism, Mao went further than any of his predecess.ors: "The knowledge which grasps the laws of the world, must be redirected to the practice of changing the world. ,,53 The traditional question of whether knowing is easier than doing, or whether doing is prior to knowing was of no importance for him. More important for Mao was the application of knowledge to the practice of

YU CHEUNG-LIEH

29

revolution and production - in short, to the modernization of China. The adoption of Marxism in China should not simply be regarded as an ideological guide for the revolution. In fact, it has enabled the Chinese to pay more attention to social practices (especially to the practice of production), which have been neglected in China for centuries. Political and economic developments in China during the past 33 years have fluctuated greatly, reflecting precisely this extraordinary process of cognition - "discover the truth through practice and again through practice verify and develop the truth" - in which millions of Chinese have participated. Thus, there has been very little room left for any kind of abstract concepts, metaphysical ideals, or subjectivism in China since 1949. Although it is true that China has not been free of mistakes in the course and pursuit of her modernization, the reaction against the Western challenge was never so active and rational as it is today.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

See RenJi-Yu (1979) pp. 61-83; especially pp. 77 & 78. Ibid. ; compare also J ames Legge (1966). Ibid. Ibid. See Chan Wing-Tsit (1970), p. 152. Chan's translation should be regarded as the best among other such works available. This essay has, therefore, relied heavily on passages from his book. Ibid. p. 160 Ibid. p. 140 Ibid. p. 160. See Mao Zedong (1965), p. 313. Ibid. Chan (1970), p. 119. Ibid. p. 122. Ibid. pp. 297-8. Ibid. p. 158. Ibid. p. 298. Ibid. Ibid. p. 300. Ibid. p. 302. Ibid. p. 505; compare also Derk Bodde's translation ofFung Yu-Lan (1953) pp.478-9. Chan (1970), p. 505. Ibid. pp. 503-4. Ibid. pp. 503-4. Ibid. p. 506.

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CHINESE CULTURE v. WESTERN CHALLENGE

24 25 26

Mao (1965), p. 313. Ibid. p. 316. See V. I. Lenin, On the question of dialectics, quoted here in Mao (1965), p.341 Mao (1965), p. 315. Chan (1970), p. 167. Mao (1965), p. 343. Ibid. Chan (1970), p. 489. Mao (1965), p. 338. Chan (1970), p. 693. Ibid. p. 698. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. p. 697. Ibid. p. 696. Ibid. p. 717. Ibid. p. 637. Ibid. pp. 638-9. Ibid. p. 720. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. p. 721. See Needham (1969) p. 156. Mao (1965), p. 308. Ibid. p. 295 Ibid. p. 304.

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

References Bodde, D. 1953. A history of Chinese philosophy, vol. 2. Princeton, N.].; Princeton University Press. Chan Wing-Tsit 1970. A source book in Chinese philosophy. Princeton, N. ].; Princeton University Press. Legge,]. 1966. Thefourbooks. Taipeh. Mao Zedong 1965. Selected works of Mao Tse- Tung, vol. I. Beijing. Needham,]. 1969. Within the four seas - the dialogue oj East and West. London: Allen & Unwin. Ren Ji-Yu 1979. History oj Chinese philosophy, vols I-IV (in Chinese). Beijing. Ren Ji-Yu 1981. Discussion on the history oj Chinese philosophy (in Chinese). Shanghai. Selected works ofdebates on philosophical problems since 1949 in China (in Chinese). 1983. Jilin.

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Selected works of discussions on Chinese atheist thought (in Chinese). 1980. Jiangsu. Yearbook of Chinese philosophy 1982 (in Chinese). Shanghai. Zhan Jian-Feng 1982. Lao Zi: his life, book and discussions on Tao (in Chinese). Hubei. Zhang Fa-Nian 1981. Some new ideas about Chinese philosophy (in Chinese). Tai Yuan.

2

The Chinese patll to development ]OHAN GAL TUNG

Introduction Nobody has a right to complain that China is very capable of surprising us Westerners - conservative or radical, liberal or Marxist, both or neither. 1 China has always had this capacity because of our penchant for trying to understand China on our terms. Whether dubbed "inscrutable" or "mischievous," dominated by "oriental despotism" or the "Asiatic mode of production," China still usually refuses to make sense. Sometimes it seems so scrutable and obvious, and then, suddenly; the veil is drawn - not necessarily over China, but over our Western eyes. This author certainly does not claim to be an exception. The Western veil is probably there regardless of many efforts at least to become aware of its structure as a cognitive filter. Consequently, the following should be read as one person's effort to scrutinize the inscrutable. 2 After a Cultural Revolution that delighted the Western left, both because of its egalitarian rhetoric and because of its many important social experiments, China now seems to be embarking on a capitalist road 3 not very different from that which was so violently denounced during the Cultural Revolution. The step from a distribution-oriented system, distribution of both power and material goods for consumption, to a growth-oriented system, for the production of material goods and services, seemed to be a very quick one indeed. Why? When China was so clearly on the correct path, the Western left asks, how could it so suddenly make "the great leap backward" (Bettelheim), embarking on the wrong path? The right asks, how could a society so hopelessly lost in rigid "dogmatism" suddenly become so beautifully "pragmatic"? A possible anwer: perhaps because the Chinese have a different concept of what constitutes a "path" and, for that reason, an entirely different concept of what constitutes a development strategy. Why should their underlying concept of development be similar to ours, so clear-cut and contradiction-free?4 This is the idea to be pursued.

DOI: 10.4324/9780203838921-4

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The distribution-growth oscillation hypothesis There are three basic theses in this chapter, and they can be presented as follows: (a)

Chinese history, from the victory of the revolution in October 1949, can be seen as a progressive oscillation between distribution - and growth-oriented policies, with changing goals that are tried and implemented with lags. (b) This oscillation will continue in the foreseeable future. Just as the policies initiated by the Cultural Revolution came to an end, the present policies will come to an end. (c) This should not be seen merely as the result of trial-and-error politics, but as the outcome of a Chinese view of "development, " consistent with Sinic civilization as a whole.

This chapter, then, is devoted to these three hypotheses. Although some similar points may be made about history before 1949,51 shall not attempt to explore these for many reasons, significant among which is that the Marxist component, with its emphasis on both distribution and the Western idea of progress, had not, at that time, been incorporated into Sinic civilization (as I now assume it to be). Moreover, my immodesty in trying to make some predictions about China into the 1980s, perhaps also the 1990s, will at least be tempered by a refusal to go any further. By the year 2000, so many other things will have happened in the world as a whole, and in China in particular, that this mode of analysis will certainly be much less relevant. Today, however, the whole world, including China, is talking (and has been doing so for some time) about growth and distribution sometimes also, fallaciously, about redistribution, as if there had been distribution before. Often the rhetoric about growth with distribution or, conversely, distribution with growth. But what is the meaning of that crucial, little preposition, "with"? It has to be defined in social space, in geographical space, and in time. Thus: Does it mean that a small elite will enjoy continued economic growth, and the rest ofsociety will distribute what is left among themselves? Does it mean that a part of the world, e. g. that part that refers to itself as the "first," will enjoy continued growth, and the rest, e. g. the "third," will distribute what is left to it? Does this possibly make use of the social-space method just mentioned, in which Third World elites grow, and Third World masses distribute the (very) little that is left after the First World, in cooperation with Third World elites, has achieved some measure of growth? And what about time? Do the processes of growth and distribution take place at the same time, hand-in-hand, or one after the other,

34

CHINESE PATH TO DEVELOPMENT

sequentially? Is there a synchrony or diachrony in this; and, in the latter case, what comes first, growth or distribution? It takes little empirical and/or theoretical insight to see that the slogan "growth with distribution" will take on a very different color depending on the precise answer to these queries about the little word "with." But this is not the place to spell that out. 6 Rather, it will be assumed that when the Chinese talk about social space in this connection, they mean all of China. When they talk about geographical space, they are uninterested in the rest of the world and, again, mean all of China. When they talk about time, they mean sequentially; starting with distribution, then growth, and then distribution again, and then growth again.

A view of post-revohttionary Chinese history In short, the idea is that the Chinese think and act in terms of a mental image something like that illustrated in Figure 2.1, with changing (1985)

-------- ? I I

1966-69 1976

1949

1958

Distribution (socialism)

Figure 2.1 The distribution-growth oscillation hypothesis for development policies.

emphasis on the goals pursued. Specific years, from tRe 30 years of the history of the present (Communist) Chinese dynasty (first ruler: Mao Zedong; second: Deng Xiaoping or Hua Guofeng), have been given for the crucial turning points in the twisting, oscillating developmental policy. It should be pointed out immediately that the "curve" is not correctly drawn. It can be assumed both that when there is growth, there is a loss in distribution gained in preceding phases (a typical leftist hypothesis), and that when there is distribution, there may be some loss in the growth or accumulation level obtained in preceding phases, at least according to the way that growth is usually measured (an equally

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35

typical rightist hypothesis). For these reasons, the vertical lines should tilt towards the left, and the horizontal lines should tilt downward; but this does not affect the central point in the reasoning about political ethos and emphases in various periods. Briefly stated, the view of post-1949 Chinese history implied by this figure is as follows. The immediate task after the revolution was distribution, primarily in the countryside, since the landowner-peasant relation was seen as the basic internal contradiction in the system - to be handled once the external contradictions (relative to Japanese and other forms of imperialism, and relative to their allies such as Chiang) had been done away with. This contradiction was antagonistic and could only be resolved through recourse to violence. As a result, there was distribution of land or, rather, "access to land as a means of production." This was a rather basic form of distribution leading to a process that went through many phases of ever-higher levels of collectivization (through the three forms of cooperatives, for instance). The focus was on distribution rather than on "growth" in this period, but there was no doubt that the level of material consumption for the masses would go up because human and other resources were not shunted off in the wrong directions, i.e. they were not wasted or underutilized. Above all, a structure emerged in which control over (most of) the surplus produced was located in the countryside. The year 1958 is then seen as a turning point, the "Great Leap Forward," a call for growth, albeit in a decentralized fashion, e.g. backyard iron furnaces, and the People's Communes established in August 1958. At this point, relations with the Soviet Union started cooling considerably, but the technology imparted by them, and the social structure needed to handle that technology, had started to become operational. Together with what was left of prewar, pre-devastation technology, there was certainly a basis for a leap, even a big one. In this phase, then, there was not only little distribution, but a significant decrease in it as new types of class contradictions started to emerge and become more and more clearly felt. Maybe it should be pointed out that by "distribution" I do not have a narrow, economistic concept in mind, such as "income distribution" (distribution of the means of consumption); rather, I am thinking of a concept that would include this as well as power and privilege in general- including power over the means of production - which, in turn, includes the power to participate in decision making about production. The response to that situation was the Cultural Revolution of 1966--69. What it was all about seems relatively clear: it was not primarily a cultural revolution; it was above all a structural revolution. Structurally it was concerned with five parallel contradictions between the people in general and the old and new elites 7 , and with the effort to

36

CHINESE PATH TO DEVELOPMENT

overcome those contradictions by setting up five alternative structures (see Fig. 2.28). Certainly much more can be said about the content of the Cultural Revolution, 9 but this is sufficient for the present purpose. A heavy barrage of rhetoric was directed against the five elites, particularly the first three. How many were persecuted, hunted, vilified, and hurnilated; how many were treated worse than that (thrown into prison or reschooling camps, even tortured and killed), we do not know. My own hunch is that the first number is very high, the second not so high. 10 The basic strategy seems to have been not to throw all of the elites out and put others (with a different social background and/or ideology, the famous "correct line," the "mass line") in their place, but to build an alternative structure that existed side by side with the old one in a very uneasy balance: here in favor of the new, there in favor of the old. (What was shown to visiting foreigners was the new - how representative that was we had no way of knowing.) This coexistence is, in itself, an interesting phenomenon. No doubt, many of the cultural revolutionaries would have gone much further and eliminated the old (if they had been able to do so), had they known what would come after the death of Mao. That this was a major distribution, bringing totally new groups into power, is beyond doubt, at least at the local level. Possibly it created something approaching a power vacuum at the top. There was also a very classical aspect of class struggle in this. The five old elites tended to be veterans of the Long March, people who must have felt they deserved a reward for their lifelong struggle for the revolution. But they were also the descendants of the old Ch'ing dynasty, Manchu upper classes - taller than ordinary Chinese, with a different physiognomysomewhat like the Castilian relative to the Andalusian. 1 Zhou Enlai is a major example of the fact that these two categories were not mutually exclusive. Those contesting them were younger. There were women and girls among them. They were not veterans (with the rather important exception of Mao himself). They were from other parts of China - origins other than Shanghai were particularly important. They often had less education. 12 What they were protesting against is very clear. They did not want Chinese society to close itself again, serving a small elite, the "new Mandarins, " most of whom would be recruited from the elite university in Beijing, Beita (like the corresponding Japanese elites from Tokyo University, Todai). Thus, much of their struggle was the Chinese version of what later occurred elsewhere around the world, called the "student revolt" by its participants and sympathizers, "student unrest" by its detractors. It started in China before it started in Europe.

better 10,000 with 30 workers than 30 with 10,000 workers; job relations of new kinds

(zi Ii geng sheng); People's Communes; average size about 10,000

Figure 2.2

small factories

I

state capitalists (heavy industry)

local self-reliance

I

bu reaucrats (particularly in Beijing)

decentralized, tunnels, guerrilla style defense

People's Liberation Army

top military

Five parallel contradictions in Chinese social formation.

new patterns of recruitment; 3 years of study, 18 months theoretical, much practice, no exams

informal education

I

intelligentsia professionals (universities, artists)

all over; not proportionately representative, but made to articulate contradictions clearly

I

revolutionary committees

top party (gerontocratic)

38

CHINESE PATH TO DEVELOPMENT

In passing, it should be noted that the ideology of the Cultural Revolution avoided the two important fallacies of the liberaleconomistic and the Marxist-revolutionary West: that of identifying distribution with distribution in consumption (including the means to consume money in a monetized economy), or with distribution in access to means of production only. The five contradictions in Figure 2.2 should be seen as pointing to this, but going far beyond it. The struggle against the classical enemies, latifundistas and capitalists, was over. The rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution often presented them as if they were on their way back into power. But in discussions, 13 such stands were quickly given up in favor of a more structural analysis. A new structure was seen to be forming, that could pave the way for the re-emergence of private landownership and private capitalism. However, it was also bad in itsel( Why? Because it gave challenging tasks to the few and degrading, routine jobs to the many, so in the narrow sense "politics came into comand," not economics. "Never forget the class struggle" became another key slogan. Let us note in passing that in this kind of reasoning, this capacity to see contradictions in many places, there is both Daoism and Marxism: Daoism in taking it for granted that there will be contradictions; Marxism in seeing their class character. Of liberalism there was little, and that was at the root of the problem. This lack ofliberalism was among the factors ultimately leading to the decline and fall of the Cultural Revolution. Freedom was restricted and not only for the old elites: • • •

little freedom to move, except for short journeys - enforced settlement; little freedom to choose one's own occupation - mass-meeting decisions; little freedom to enjoy Chinese classical culture.

Freedom was presumably traded for equality, and classical Chinese culture was depicted as reactionary, both in concept and style. Political and civil human rights, in the Western sense, were threatened or nonexistent. But in addition to that, the whole experiment was short on growth. A key factor here, definitely, was the inability to find a technology that would be both efficient and compatible with the basic tenets of the Cultural Revolution: something that the people themselves could not only handle, but also maintain and repair; something that they could even invent and develop further so that they would not be dependent on the decisions made by bureaucrats, on the administration and fmancing of state capitalists, or on the research and professionalism of the intelligentsia - not to mention the roles of the top military and top party

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people. This was a difficult bill to meet, and there is only one relatively unambiguous example that did meet it: acupuncture. Of course, in this phase, the Chinese never argued that such people's technology should alone rule the ground - their argument was always that of "walking on two legs. " But both legs should be healthy; neither should be dragging, limping behind the other. Acupuncture came out of the Chinese womb. It could be people-handled and developed further, and it was efficient, like all technologies, up to a point. But with some important exceptions, mainly in agrotechnology, the main way in which people could participate and be creative was by being on constant call to repair disintegrating ageing machinery with no spare parts available, a task demanding much ingenuity. Obviously this will work for some time, but, after that, enthusiasm will wither away; or the machines will break down completely; or new machines, less in need of wire-and-tape ingenuity, will be put in their place. None of these was compatible with the ideals of the Cultural Revolution. The next phase, predictably, became a phase of growth, not distribution. It could be called the "counter-revolution," but I prefer a less high-sounding term, the "current phase." What the major driving force would be is easily seen: the same set of five contradictions that propelled the Cultural Revolution into being (also a rather highsounding term; maybe the "preceding phase" would be better?), but in reverse. Of course those elites wanted to get back into power, and of course their strategy for doing so was to point, correctly, to the shortcomings of the preceding phase (and there were many more shortcomings than those that can be summarized under the headings of "lack of freedom" or "inefficiency"). The timing was also relatively obvious: right after the death of Mao Zedong. Mao was identified with the preceding phase; he had clearly been active at its onset as a necessary (but hardly sufficient) condition. The other necessary condition at that time was the activity of thousands and thousands of youths - among them, that famous assistant professor in philosophy at Beita. The crucial role played by technology was quickly grasped by the new forces. As is well known, they started ordering all kinds of technology for the four modernizations with frenetic speed (Aseniero 1980). Technology would strengthen the elites because it was bureaucracy-dependent, capital-dependent, and research-dependent rather than participation, labor, and creativity-dependent; it was also deemed to be efficient. At the same time, some measures were taken to increase the freedom of the Chinese people - how much and for how long remains to be seen. In short, the new people in quest of power were riding on two powerful waves: the five elites who wanted to come back, and popular discontent with the excesses and shortcomings of the Cultural Revolution. They were quickly rewarded. The classical

40

CHINESE PATH TO DEVELOPMENT

structures hardened, and the military got not only technology, but also a war with their socialist neighbor, Vietnam. 14 The party became the focus of attention again. What about the Gang of Four - the si ren ban - about which it is often said, "and Mao makes five,,?15 I consider this a propaganda exercise, an effort to personalize a class struggle by pointing to the probable excesses of some people rather than to the crucial issues, thereby mystifying the whole politics of Chinese development. It is doubly insulting, not only to those whose political intelligence is grossly underestimated when being told such stories, but also to the storytellers themselves, so long as the listener behaves as if he believes that the storytellers believe their story. The whole effort to personalize events and to see post-1949 Chinese history as a stage on which everything that happened was the result of the power play between the drama tis personae, the Chinese leaders, can lead us seriously astray. There are much deeper forces at work. But that does not mean that some of the leaders could not articulate some of these forces better than others nor that they could not sometimes serve as catalysts. After all, that is what politics at the level of the leaders is about. But the basic contradictions are not here. They are located much deeper, in the social formations themselves. Having said this, it should be noted that there seems to have peen some division of labor between those old friends Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. The former was better, more in the forefront, in the distribution phases; the latter, more in the growth phases (including being invoked, post-mortem, as some kind of patron saint of the current phase). Maybe this should be regarded as a complement rather than as a display of conflict. The case of Lin Piao was different - he probably came too close to the Soviet Union, the arch enemy. The case ofLiu Shaochi was also different. Denounced as "China's Khrushchev," as "hidden traitor, renegade, and scab" during the Cultural Revolution, he passed away. Had he not, he might, like Deng, have been reinstated in the current phase. Thus, there also seems to be a pattern for Chinese leaders to oscillate - in contrast to Soviet leaders who have but one peak in their power career, never two or more. The program of the current phase is predictable to the point of tedium. To run Figure 2.2 backwards, from right to left: there will be abolition of the revolutionary committees; strong emphasis on heavy military technology; reintroduction of a very classical university pattern, with examinations and scholastic emphasis in the pattern of recruitment; a tendency towards bigger factories and heavier industrial technology, with more specialization; and a return to the solid power base for the administration in Beijing, with no more excursions into the communes for some months for those bureaucrats in need of "remolding of their personalities. "16 Possibly the autonomy of the

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41

People's Communes will also gradually dissolve with a return to the old administrative units, and to more private land ownership and marketing - thus eroding the People's Communes from above and below. No doubt, this will lead to growth and to decreased equality in distribution, both of power and of material goods. The lower level may come up somewhat, although that is unlikely. The top will no doubt be able to accumulate those goods that now come into China and are produced by China. In this, we can also clearly see a third factor, in addition to inefficiency and lack of freedom, positively motivating the current phase (not negatively, like the struggle to get back into power). This is the rapidly growing awareness of the international system, after the opening up in 1971; the fear of being left behind by the flow of all the glittering growth of the "First" (and even "Second" and "Third") World on an island all by themselves, with lofty ideals but little more. Along with all of this, there is an increasing feeling of living in a dangerous world where small bands of guerillas and hide-out tunnels look grossly out of touch, out of proportion, and incongruous relative to the means of destruction sported around the globe by the superpowers. Instead of trying to fix blame, one might try to understand. But in so doing, and this is the second hypothesis, we can also see clearly how this current phase may come to an end and what the next phase will look like. It will come to an end because of increasing class contradictions (the five mentioned and possibly some new ones, for none of the five were resolved in the preceding phase), decreasing distribution, increasing inequality, and, ultimately, sheer exploitation of the masses. This will take the classical form. To pay the bill incurred to the rest of the world, China has to export at very competitive prices. To do that, savings have to be made. To make savings, workers have to be paid badly. But since workers have to live in order to produce, they must also be fed to reproduce, which, in turn, means that peasants have to be paid badly. Whether directly or indirectly exploited; whether the exports are manufactured goods, semi-manufactured goods, or agricultural outputs; the net result is the same: the peasants will have to pay. Sooner or later they will think, then say, then shout, then rally around the slogan, "We have been through this before, haven:t we?" They have, indeed, includinp the modern form characterized by inflation and mass une~ployment. 7 When will this happen? In answering this, let me refer, only half facetiously, to "Galtung's Law of the duration of post-1949 phases in Chinese development": after about nine years. The period from 1949 to 1958 was nine years; from 1958 to 1967, nine years; from 1967 to 1976, nine years. Projecting into the future, therefore, that should give us the year 1985. 18 Around that time, give or take a few years, we can expect a

42

CHINESE PATH TO DEVELOPMENT

new turning point. The ethos of growth will have petered out because of the revolts and discontent caused by the inequalities it has engendered. There will be new demonstrations in that square in Beijing. Coca-Cola bottles will be smashed against the MacDonald's Hamburger Gapan, Inc.) stands, recently introduced in the People's Republic so that the Chinese can grab a fast meal without wasting too much time that could otherwise be used more productively. The Gang of Four will be rehabilitated. Mao will come up, and Zhou will go down, and so on and so forth. Hopefully, the new leaders will have done their homework and will be able to supply some good answers to the problems of an efficient people's technology, i.e. how to combine equality with more freedom, not less, and how to cope with the rest of the world as an economic, political, military, social, and cultural challenge. Thus, a new ph;l.se will have begun.

Why this distribution-growth oscillation? This brings me to the third and final point: that this is not merely a zigzag course run by a rat in a maze, receiving electric shocks when it runs too far in either direction; nor it is necessarily a conscious strategy concocted by some political supermind, but rather a direct expression of a very Chinese way of conceiving of things. In so saying, there is also an effort being made to explain the phenomenon. It is hence assumed that Sinic civilization can be seen in terms of components that, in China, come together in an eclectic or syncretic, but also synthesized, even synergistic amalgam 19:

• • • •

Confucianism,20 with its emphasis on the state, the family, the golden past, nonmanual work as the best, some individual mobility - examinations; Buddhism (mahayana), with its emphasis on the sharing of merits, collectivism, restraint, equality - some kind of organic solidarity; Daoism,21 with its emphasis on the small, on a golden future, and the contradiction in everything - dialectics; Westernism, with its emphasis on progress and goal-directedness, "time's arrow," with two branchesliberalism with an emphasis on competition, individualism and capitalist efficiency - accumulation, institution building, checks and balances; Marxism, with its emphasis 011 contradictions between classes, solidarity, revolutions, anti-imperialism.

The assumption is that China is the only place in the world where all of this can be found, in ratios that vary over time and space and from

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GALTUNG

person to person, but always there in some kind of combination beyond the coexistence of what, to the Western mind, would be highly contradictory, even irreconcilable elements. No element would be completely absent. The concrete implication of this assumption as a contribution to explaining the Chinese pattern of development is obvious: within the context of Sinic civilization, the zigzag pattern is not only legitimate, but looks normal, natural. The growth dimension receives its legitimation both from Confucianism and from Western liberalism. The distribution dimension receives its legitimation both from Buddhism and from Western Marxism. In addition, Daoism gives a high degree of legitimacy to a major instrument of distribution, decentralization down to the small unit, the commune 22 - a major reason why communism looked like "commune-ism" in China during the period of the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, the dialectic itself, the oscillation (even in relatively rapid succession measured by social time) between emphasis on distribution, then on growth, and then on distribution again, finds its basis in Daoism. It should be pointed out how different this would be (if it is a correct interpretation) from Western thought on development - according to whether one is either in the liberal or in the Marxist camp, thus favoring either the vertical or the horizontal inclination, and seeing the other as wrong. To this it may be objected that there is room for distribution within liberal thinking (social democracy), and there is room for growth within Marxist thinking (the Soviet Union constituting an example of this, with its emphasis on "catch up and overtake" from the very beginning). This is true, but it would generally lead to the two types of images of the development pattern shown in Figure 2.3. Obviously, these would, at most, represent one turning point on the Chinese curve. What the Chinese seem to do is to incorporate both models and link them together in an endlessly twisting snake of a curve.

Liberal model growth first then distribution

Marxist model distribution first, then growth

G

G

o Figure 2.3

o

Two Western models of the distribution-growth relationship.

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CHINESE PATH TO DEVELOPMENT

Ten implications (a)

According to this picture, let me now try to draw some implications. Admittedly simplified and overdrawn, the Chinese strategy of development, the Chinese "model," is neither that of "distribution first" nor" growth first, " but a zig zag course making use of both of them. For that reason, it makes little sense to say that they have betrayed their model; they are in a different phase of it. 23 Since the current phase is more similar to what has happened in the West (both in its Western and Eastern parts, including the European socialist countries), it has been disregarded as a part of the Chinese "model, " because human perception tends to focus on contrast and ignore similarity. The Chinese have to be exotic! But then, it may also be that they are just better, just more creative in the distribution phases than in the growth phases; and more imitative in the latter than in the former. 24 (b) Absolutely crucial in the total scheme, what indeed makes it revolutionary, was an initial distribution phase. The Chinese practiced the dictum, "distribution first, then growth. "25 If they had started with growth, the conventional model, any later attempt at distribution would probably have been skimpy indeed. Chiang would have done that, and China would have been a poor carbon copy of its East and Southeast Asian neighbors. It would have been too big to replicate the Taiwan exercise. (c) Among the concrete social mechanisms leading to the dramatic (and dramatized) turning points, there are things easily recognizable from other societies. Distribution with little or no growth leads to shared poverty and discontent. Growth with little or no distribution leads to increased inequalities and the general emergence and sharpening of class contradictions and discontent. Where the Chinese differ (and that is the basic thesis) is in the interpretation of this, in my view, related to basic characteristics ofSinic civilization. (d) In a sense, it is already in the mother book of Chinese thought, the I Ching. First, contradictions are normal; the world is like that, nothing is perfectly perfect or imperfect. Secondly, contradictions will crystallize, sharpen, and mature with time. Thirdly, they will give birth to something new which, in turn, is contradictory, and so on, ad infinitum. As a consequence, correct politics is to realize this, not fight it by trying to put a lid on the cauldron of contradictions (this is what the Chinese accuse the Soviet Union of doing), but try to lead and use these tremendous forces. Since one will never escape from the Yin-Yang nature of reality, it is better to work with it than against it.

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(e)

45

More particularly, the Chinese leaders seem to make use of the turning points for energizing the population, mobilizing it, dynamizing it. The turning points are dramatic, but they are also dramatized, to some extent, staged; denigrating the preceding phase, personalizing (in order to avoid blaming China in toto), scapegoating. No doubt, mistakes can be made in wrongly assessing when the time is ripe, but a correct assessment, according to this type of thinking, will have built-in rewards because it will work with the forces of a contradiction at the point of maturation. (f) From this, it follows that they may also build into the phases an excessive amount of imbalance to ensure that there will be sufficient contradictory raw material to draw upon. 26 This they have certainly done in the present phase, for which the prediction is that there will be a new cultural revolution, but, of course, different from the preceding one. This is the doctrine of recurring revolution (not "permanent revolution," for that would be a contradictio in adjecto). As is well known, Mao had already predicted the current phase, and that his name would be used in vain after his death. 27 (g) Does this mean that the Chinese have a double mind about what they do? That they are not only "inscrutable," but even "mischievous"? Leaving aside these two adjectives which relate to Western misunderstandings or, rather, the total failure to understand, the answer may be "yes and no." No, in the sense that when the Chinese are in this or that phase, they believe fully in what they do. Yes, in the sense that their faith is not in eternity, not even in their own lifetime, but they believe in that period. It is the correct line at the correct time. With the turning point also comes a tum in faith, conviction, and the concrete social program. From a Western point of view, where faith is for life as a part of an individual's personality, this looks strange and leads to accusations of acting. No doubt, the two perspectives are related to the difference between Buddhist rebirth and the Christian idea of eternal salvation or condemnation; the difference between shifting identities in cosmic time and one single identity frozen in eternity. 28 (h) Not everybody will be able to make the turns, and some will do it too well. Those most closely identified with the preceding phase will have to wait in the corridors (often very unpleasant corridors) of history until they can be taken out of the mothballs when their phase comes again. It has been pointed out that there was a possible division of labor between Mao and Zhou - but, no doubt, Zhou was a Maoist, and Mao a Zhouist, and both of them fundamentally, deeply Chinese. It should be noted that to give to all a chance

46

(i)

(j)

CHINESE PATH TO DEVELOPMENT

for a second, even a third "life," these phases would have to be short, given the limited human lifespan. But could there not be a "locking in" this time, with deeply entrenched elites with modem technology at their disposal to suppress revolts? It is possible, particularly if Western or Japanese imperialism comes into play again. In that case, the contradictions will be antagonistic and only resolvable by (much) violence, according to Mao. But if the situation remains in Chinese control, the hypothesis here is that, after some years, the new leadership will be weakened in their fight for their privileges by feeling deep down in their Chinese souls that "our time is up," and they will give in to the next generation of emerging forces. So, the Chinese will continue "deceiving" those friends who identify with them only in every second phase. More particularly, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan are in for great disappointments, as they rush in to make quick economic and political profits. And the rest of us would be wise to realize that although we are not Chinese, we nevertheless have very much to learn, perhaps particularly in terms of levels of subdety and complexity, not only from individual Chinese, but also from that remarkable depository and receptacle of insight, the Sinic civilization.

How does political ethos relate to political reality? How does all this relate to some of the economic indicators we have for China for this period? Obviously, it would certainly not be expected that the empirical indicators of economic growth and distribution should follow Figure 2.1. That figure is about political ideas, goals, programs, ethos (and a very crude version at that) not about political reality. Economic reality would at best lag behind. The ethos ofa period may focus on distribution, but with a view to achieving growth through the release of creativity, and may, in fact, do just that. The next period may focus on growth by curbing distribution efforts, but may not achieve growth because the potential is somehow exhausted or because curbing distribution may have the opposite effect. Or, there may be external factors at work, not captured by the frame ofanalysis of Figure 2.1 at all. But, most basically, one would assume a lag. Once proclaimed, and "ethos" takes time to be translated into concrete politics which, in tum, take time to be translated into economic facts. Table 2.1 lists some data, unfortunately only on the growth dimension since the US sources consulted29 are silent (uninterested?) about any distribution dimension.

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Table 2.1 Phases in Chinese development and economic indicators. Indicator GNP (in billions of 1977 US dollars) GNP per capita agricultural production (1957 = 100) industrial production (1957 = 100) trade with communist countries (in millions ofUS dollars) trade with noncommunist countries (in millions ofUS dollars)

Year

1967

1976

153 233 108 142 2,380

188 238 118 202 830

342 355 148 502 2,345

1,385

3,085

10,915

1949

1958

54 101 54 20 350* 860*

* Figure given is for 1950, not 1949. It is very clear from the first four lines in Table 2.1. that the four indicators show little growth during the second phase, the first part of which was exactly the "Great Leap Forward," but more growth in the first and third phases - actually more in the first than in the third. It is beyond the scope of this article to reason why; no doubt, the causal nexus is a very complex one. The data are, at least, compatible with many other hypotheses and with combinations of them. It is also interesting to see that whereas trade with "noncommunist countries" (a US category) expanded significantly during that period, trade with "communist countries" did not. The data show that in this field, so directly independent of decisions, data are very sensitive to policy, without lag. The ratio between the two lines of trade figures tells the story quite convincingly. Should the data really prove to be compatible with the lag hypothesis (which is not the same as confirming that hypothesis), then a rather important consequence follows. The conclusion would stand much more strongly if the same finding held for indicators ofdistribution, viz. that the distribution was particularly inegalitarian in the distribution­ oriented periods and not in the growth-oriented second phase (not to mention the fourth phase for which we, at present, have no data because this phase is not yet over). The idea is simply this: a campaign stresses what that phase is particularly weak on. This could be because a problem was neglected in the preceding period, and that shows up in the following period; or because the preceding period tried to handle the problem, and some positive results of that show up in the succeeding period so that one can focus on another problem instead. In either case (and the two explanations do not exclude one another), we get a certain one-sidedness in the ethos of the period, and that one-sidedness produces a factual one-sidedness that, in tum, will reinforce the one-sidedness of the ethos of the subsequent period.

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One condition for this, however, is that the counter-cyclical moves of political ethos and political reality have, roughly speaking, the same wavelength. That they must, to some extent, have the same amplitude is obvious: the worse the distribution-growth situation, the greater the amount and strength of the work needed to set it right. One might assume, however, that this will also, to some extent, adjust the wavelengths to each other. As the focus on the dimension neglected in the preceding phase starts bearing fruit, that emphasis will be tuned down and attention will be drawn to the dimension neglected in the present phase. And, thus, a new political ethos is ushered in! In this particular case, with a wavelength of about nine years. How does all of this compare to a development strategy with a constant political ethos, whether of the liberal or Marxist variety, or some kind of social democratic variety emphasizing "growth with structural change?" The problem with that is that even if the political ethos is constant, political (in this case, its economic aspect) reality is not. It will change because the systems are open, even if they are not subjected to the oscillations brought about by constant or oscillating one-sidedness. In the Chinese case, this would be a part of the world behaving as it is expected to behave. There is a dialectic in reality and a dialectic between reality and ethos, so there must be a dialectic in ethos as well. But, in the Western case, there may perhaps be more of a tendency to hang on to an ethos once accepted without seeing that after being self-fulfilling, it may become self-denying. At that point (and we are at such a point in Western history right now, indeed!), frustrations set in, accompanied by frantic efforts to make reality conform to or to bring about dramatic changes in ethos. These efforts give the West some of its strength, perseverance, as well as some of its weakn~ss, doggedness as well at total reversal, Umwertung aller Werte. And the corresponding Chinese pattern gives China some of its strength, flexibility, as well as its weakness, a certain fatalism, "let us correct for that next time. "

Epilogue 1986 1985 has come and gone, and the Second Cultural Revolution, or something similar, has still not taken place in the Kingdom of the Middle. Of course, in a prediction of the kind made in this chapter, written initially in 1978, one could add "plus or minus two years" as a cautious margin. However, I am not going to defend my prediction that way; I have quite a different line of defense. I see the basic problem of the Chinese as being that of combining

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capitalism and socialism. In private conversations, I have often heard Chinese saying something like this: Capitalism is very dynamic and good at creating growth. Nervertheless, capitalism has the tendency to make some people very rich and others very poor; it is bad at distribution. Socialism is much better at distribution, but has a tendency to become undynamic. Hence, we need both. This sort of reasoning, I think, is far less prevalent in Western thought and attitudes, except among some social democrats. The problem is, how can socialism and capitalism be combined? This chapter explores one possibility: over time, using socialism for distribution and capitalism to achieve growth. Social democracy offers another approach, but a less dramatic one. A third option would be to resolve the problem on a spatial basis, making one part of the country capitalist and the rest socialist. This is, to some extent, what I think has happened. The Chinese have an expression for this: j guo, lieng zj (one country, two systems). By opting for this approach to the problem of ecleticism, they have certainly outwitted development thinkers in the West. Their plans include not only the establishment of special economic zones (and integration plans for Hong Kong and Taiwan within the People's Republic, leaving their economies basically capitalist) but also "walking on two legs," both socialism and capitalism, in theory and in practice. How far this can be done remains to be seen. What can be argued, then, is that the eclecticism hypothesis holds, even if the tack is new - a spatial rather than a temporal approach to the problem. In short, China is still full of surprises, precisely because China is China. 30

Notes As an example, just consider some of the headlines in newspapers around the world that did look somewhat confusing when they first appeared: "Japan to help in modernization of Chinese ports" (Asahi Evening News, January 22, 1979) - it was through control of the infrastructure that Japan started controlling China to a large extent in the 1930s; "Capitalist class resurrected in fast modernizing China" (Asahi Evening News, January 26, 1979); "Cinco Guardias Rojos, ejecutados en Peking" (El Pais, November 17, 1978); "China tells of 1O-year old gap in science graduate study" (International Herald Tribune, December 22, 1979); "Peking to print Bible" (New Straits Times, September 1, 1979); "Peking opens doors to advertising by foreign companies" (New Straits Times, September 1979): "Unemployment is China's major problem" (New Straits Times, September 19, 1979); "The unemployment problem in China: working hours should be cut" (ibid.); "Hard workers to earn more in new pragmatic

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3 4

5 6

7

8

CHINESE PATH TO DEVELOPMENT

China" (Asahi Evening News, January 23, 1980); "China, US consider setting up hot line" (International Herald Tribune, February 11, 1980); "Visitors' views of China's gains seen as overstated" (New York Times, March 27, 1980) - referring to three articles, published by the New York review ofbooks, by N.N. Eberstadt reappraising the material progress held to have been made by China; "China clears Liu of Mao charges on education" (International Herald Tribune, January 28, 1980). And so on and so forth. These are given only as examples of what the West has now become accustomed to, but this was certainly not the case before 1977; the whole ethos and political reality at that time was quite different. My first effort to come to grips with China, together with my wife, Fumiko Nishimura, resulted in the book Kan vi laere av kineserne? (learning from the Chinese people) (1975) published in Norwegian, Danish, Swedish, and German in the Federal Republic of Germany. It reflects the period of the Cultural Revolution, although in no way pretending to reflect more than its ideology and its idealized examples. It keeps the future very much open-ended, with a list of eight major contradictions in the China of the early 1970s. The second effort is still going on. A short trip to Beijing in November 1978 was very useful, as were many discussions with Chinese intellectuals and others on "what is going on now." This essay was originally written in 1978, and the Epilogue serves to bring matters up to date. For one discussion of this, see Aseniero (1980). For an exploration of this, see Galtung (1980). The general orientation toward contradiction is seen as a very basic feature of a civilization. Occidental civilization is seen as hostile to contradictions, as wanting to overcome them, to get rid of them. The theme of an oscillation between good emperors and bad emperors is a significant one in Chinese history and historiography. See, for two different approaches, Adelman (1979, and her many important articles on distribution and growth), and Galtung (forthcoming). The part referring to timing as an element of strategic thinking and action was actually presented at the first workshop of the Goals, Processes and Indicators Development Project (GPID), UN University (Geneva, March 15-16, 1979). These elites are found, of course, not only in China, and they playa key role in the history and practice of development. For an analysis, see Galtung (1979b). In that analysis, "police" is added to the other five. There are some reasons to believe that the Cultural Revolution was not sensitive enough to the role that the police might play, and that this contradiction was never challenged as effectively as the other five. "Regeneration through own efforts. " I became interested in the origin of this term or concept and. wrote to the East Asian History of Science Library to get "some material or references that can clarify the origins of the concept long before Mao Tse-tung made such fruitful use of it." I received the following reply from the librarian, Dr. Michael Scott, so full of valuable information that I am reporting from it, while noting that it represents Dr. Scott's personal (but obviously very well-informed) opmlOn:

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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

51

The Taoist school of thought traditionally preached detachment from the world. But Taoists advocated such detachment for the kings, not only for the people. Moreover, kings were never, I think, supposed to be self-sufficient in material terms. Taoist, and later Buddhist, monastic establishments were often founded in wild and isolated parts of China. To some extent, they may have been self sufficient. But this self-sufficiency, if such it was, depended on large areas ofland and perhaps on the labor of servants. There are many tales of hermits, often Taoists, living alone in the backwoods. But these tales are often obvious fantasy. In addition, Taoist hermits traditionally practised medicine, and prepared and administered drugs, perhaps in exchange for money or goods. And in any case, holy men, whether Taoist or Buddhist, were not averse to gifts. To sum up these points: to the best of my belief, there is no explicit doctrine of material self-sufficiency in ancient Chinese philosophy, or in the classical tradition of literature. In practice, the traditional Chinese country community was largely self-sufficient in material terms. This self-sufficiency has sometimes perhaps been exaggerated. For a sober discussion of realities, one might consult Buck (1930) and Tawney (1932). Mao Tse-tung's native province, Hunan, is in the hinterland. In Mao's early years, it was little affected by western inroads into China, and was still predominantly agricultural. In his youth, then, Mao would perhaps have accepted the traditional degree of self-sufficiency as the natural state of affairs. In Quotations from Chairman Mao, the "little red book" of the Cultural Revolution, the earliest cited use of the phrase (zu Ii kellg shellg dates from January 10, 1945. At that time Mao and his forces were still at Yenan. Throughout the Yenan years, owing to inevitable pressures of war and to economic blockade, self-sufficiency had been the key to survival. In other words, the circumstances in which Mao first advocated (zu Ii keng shellg made this doctrine a statement of practical necessity. The popular tradition of Chinese literature often refers to "making do" and to an implicit acceptance of material self-sufficiency. The San Yell collections of early colloquial short stories would perhaps provide material. So might longer works such as Sall-kuo yell-i and Shui-hu (All Men are Brothers), in Pearl Buck's translation. Now Mao was well acquainted with popular literature. This literature might, therefore, have been one source of this doctrine of tzu Ii keng shellg. But I think there is a far more direct intellectual inspiration for Mao's doctrine. This intepretation, in my view, is the debate on how China should reform and adapt herself, materially, intellectually, and politically, to the Western world. This debate had begun soon after China's defeat in the Opium War. It culminated in the May 4th Movement of 1919. Mao himself took part in that Movement.

52

9 10

11

12 13 14

15 16

17

CHINESE PATH TO DEVELOPMENT

The key question in the debate was this: to what extent should China accept Western technology and institutions? One of the answers that was given was that Western learning should be applied only in material matters; in institutional and ideological matters, China should retain her traditional ways (Hsi Hsiieh wei yung, Chung hsueh we pen). However, the range of opinion was broad. And as Chow Tse-tsung (1960, pp. 327-32) points out, one of the concepts in circulation was "self-contentedness" (chih-tsu). In this, perhaps, there is a real link between Mao and an earlier intellectual current. But probably not at the present time. The distance from the event needed for a more objective assessment is certainly too short, particularly in China. Thus, it would have been hard to conceal massive killings during that period, and, right now, the assessment of the Cultural Revolution is much too much in the hands of those whose vested interest it is to blackball it as much as possible. This class aspect is not much spoken of in articles and discussions in China, yet it seems to be extremely powerful. To the traits mentioned could be added calligraphy and other residues of upper-class Chinese style. The first wall posters after the death of Mao were, reportedly, written in beautiful calligraphy. The starting point, though, was a young female assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Beijing. Some examples of such discussions were given in Galtung (1975). With more distance, it might be possible to see other reasons for that war, not only internal ones. As a foreign policy instrument, it certainly was not a very successful one, and it might even have become a disastrous one for China if they had not backed down in time. To "teach Vietnam a lesson" has been tried unsuccessfully by Japan, France, and the United States only during the last generation, and somehow this must have had an impact on China. The subtitle of the book by that title (Lotta 1978) is Mao Tse-tung's last great battle, a very interesting collection of documents. When this was said to the present author by a Beijing bureaucrat in the fall of1973, it sounded very much like ''I'm going on a trip. I'm going to the dentist." - something a little bit out of the ordinary, but not that much; part of a routine, but not exactly pleasant; some kind of duty. There are many press reports about those phenomena in China in the current, fourth phase. The problem is that the statistics are not necessarily too reliable. But that these two phenomena should belong to the general syndrome against which the coming, fifth phase would be a reaction seems rather obvious. So, when the Los Angeles Times (November 16, 1979) reported "Chinese finally get a taste of inflation - food up 33%," it was certainly be expected. It should be noted, however, that the allegation in the text that "the peasants will have to pay" goes counter to recent evidence of increased state expenditure for fmancing communes and other agricultural undertakings to the tune 00.7 billion yuan in 1978, a 52 per cent increase over 1977; and also counter to drastic increases of

to

J.

GALTUNG

53

government purchasing prices for grain and 17 other major agricultural products (see Beijing Review 1979, no. 9, p. 5). 18 And maybe there is already a premonition of it in a key person in the current, fourth phase, Deng Xiaoping. But his present plan, revealed in the Bangkok Post, is to retire from hyperactive service, to become an adviser or consultant, by 1985 (quoted from the Economist, February 16, 1980, p. 37). It might be added that the year 1985 fits rather well with the theory presented in this article. 19 This is the basic point in the theory of cosmologies put forward by Galtung (1980). Oriental cosmologies tend to be more additive, combining elements from different cultures or even civilizations, than occidental cosmologies which tend to be more pure, more altemative. Hence, what is stated here is nothing but an exercise in the additivity of basic civilizational patterns. 20 In The analects of Confucius, translated and annoted by Arthur Waley (1938), the reader will find almost everywhere the gems of wisdom he believes will be there, but there is no doubt where the wisdom is located: Book II, 14: A gentleman can see a question from all sides without bias. The small man is biased and can see a question from only one side. Book XII, 7: [B] ut a people that no longer trusts its rulers is lost indeed [no mention that the rulers might also be lost in that case). 21

See Lao Tsu (1972), especially the famous Chapter 80: A small country has fewer people Though there are machines that can work ten to hundred times faster than man, they are not needed Though they have armour and weapons no one displays them Men return to the knotting of rope in place of writing Their food is plain and good, their clothes fine but simple, their homes secure They are happy in their ways Though they live within sight of their neighbours And crowing cocks and barking dogs are heard across the way Yet they leave each other in peace while they grow old and die.

22 23 24

It is difficult to see, however, that Daoism had some kind of federal

concept in linking communes together; rather, they looked like they were isolated, far apart from each other. Some of the empirical implications of this are explored in the last section of this article. This is a point made by colleagues from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The small unit, very puritan, hard working, and good at distribution has a long tradition in Chinese history and is also something relatively unique, if not necessarily stable over a longer time period. Chinese colleagues also pointed out that through time, it may well be that China will be better at handling bigger units, so that meaningful distribution can be achieved in bigger units than the communes, which were a major stage for enacting norms of distribution during the first and

54

25 26

27 28 29 30

CHINESE PATH TO DEVELOPMENT

third phases considered here. This may be true, but it may also be true that with bigger units come, more or less inevitably, various types of social pathologies, known from other parts of the world: centralization, peripheralization of the rest, growth of bureaucracies, corporations, and intelligentsia; party, military, and police machineries to protect them, and so on. In other words, the prediction here would certainly be that a possible fifth phase with focus on distribution would also be a phase emphasizing smaller units again. This is the point emphasized equally, although for different reasons, by Galtung (1979b) and Adelman (1979). Thus, they would not try distribution with growth in an effort to pursue a course along the G-D line in Figures 2.1 and 2.3, feeling that this would be to strive for a balance out of touch with social reality, and that one might lose the dynamizing impact of maturing contradictions. In this, of course, there is a similarity to the sayings ofJesus Christ before his death. This theme is developed further in Galtung (1979a). Data compiled from US Congress (1978, Table 2) and US Central Intelligence Agency (1976-77, p. 9). I am indebted to Oliver Lee and Henry Au for their advice. An earlier version of this article appeared in Review, V, 3, Winter 1982,

460-86.

References Adelman, I. 1979. National and international measures in support ofequitable growth in developing countries. Paper read at the Workshop of Alternative Strategies and Scenarios of the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project of the United Nations University, May 29-30. Aseniero, G. 1980. China'sfourmodernizationprogrammes: an economic, security, and ideological analysis. Geneva: GPID. Buck, J. L. 1980. The Chinese farm economy. Shanghai: Willow Pattern Press, and Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Buck, P. (trans.) 1937 All men are brothers (2 Vols). New York. Chow Tse-tung 1960. The May Fourth movement. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Galtung, J. 1975. Kan vi laere av kineserne? Oslo: Gyldendal. Galtung, J. 1979a. Eschatology, cosmology, and the formation of visions. Paper read at the Workshop on Visions of Desirable Societies of the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project, Mexico, May 25-28. Galtung, J. 1979b. Global goals, global processes and the prospects for human and social development. Geneva: GPID. Galtung, J. 1980. Five cosmologies: an impressionistic presentation. Geneva: GPID. Galtung, J. Towards a theory of strategies of development. In Development: alternative strategies and scenarios, Aseniero, G. (ed.). In prep. Lao Tsu 1972. Tao te ching. London: Wildwood. Lotta, R. (ed.) 1978. And Mao makes 5: Mao Tse-tung's last great battle. Chicago: Banner Press.

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55

Tawney, R. H. 1966. Land and labour in China. New York: M. E. Sharp. (Originally published in 1932, London: Allen & Unwin.) United States Central Intelligence Agency 1976-77. China: balance of trade. In China: international trade. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee 1978. Chinese economy post Mao. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Waley, A. (trans.) 1938. The analects ofConJucius. London: Allen & Unwin.

3

An essay on reproduction: the example ofXinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region THOMAS HOPPE

Scientific paradigms 1 are not easy to replace. They come to dominate our thinking, directing our discussions and research along specific tracks, and we become increasingly less aware of the axioms and preconceptions we employ. In the case of the "development" paradigm, I believe the negative consequences of its domination have reached an acute stage. Although development schemes have in many cases produced results in terms of growth, all too often the destructive elements outweighed the constructive elements and the general balance proved to be negative. This is especially so when we consider the environmental impacts of development and phenomena such as the destruction of cultural identity. Indeed, by stretching the term "desertification" beyond its natural scientific sense, we could also speak of the desertification of society and of the human inner world resulting from many development schemes. Looking closely, we can see that the necessity for criticizing the paradigm of development has already made itself felt in many fields, and it is my contention that this paradigm is in the process of being abandoned in favor of a new paradigm which I shall call "reproduction".2 The formulation and operation of this new paradigm has already begun. In fact, often that which is taken to be "development" is in fact "reproduction," although it may be diminished reproduction. The necessity of controlling the effects of development has already been acknowledged and acted on. "Environmental protection" came into being in order to repair what development has destroyed in nature. The natural environment, however, is not the only area in which damage is being done; in other areas, there is no such mechanism for protection. In addition, we must bear in mind that "environmental

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protection" is a child of the development concept and as such is not in a position to attack the evils of development at their roots. In some fields, the formulation and use of the reproduction paradigm has already begun. Ecology, environmental protection, and nature conservation - in fact, all conservation movements and traditional agricultural systems - are based on the paradigm of reproduction. Terms such as "material, and energy cycle," "food chain," "conservation of genetic potential," and "conservation of soil fertility" all represent important instrumental concepts pointing less to linear growth than to cyclic processes. Practical methods used to analyze reproductive cycles include, for instance: (a) (b) (c)

(d)

carrying-capacity analyses for livestock breeding, to calculate how many head of cattle can be kept on a certain area of land without harming the reproduction process of the plant cover; fishing quotas to work out how many tons of fish can be fished without endangering the independent regeneration (reproduction) of fish stocks in a particular area; resource economy, a relatively new field of research, subdivided into two areas: renewable and nonrenewable resources (the first area is directly concerned with cyclic processes of self-regenerative resources such as wind, soil, or water; the latter focuses on the analysis of the cyclical processes undergone in raw materials or waste recycling); Environmental Impact Analysis (EIA), a prognostic methodology for forecasting the consequences of development schemes in specifically defined areas, designed to hold negative consequences to a minimum - a central feature of this methodology is that EIA' s are always appended to development projects: their purpose is to preserve existing natural conditions as far as possible under the impacts of given development schemes.

Even within development theory, starting points for the formulation of a reproduction paradigm can be found. This is especially so wherever attempts are made to do justice to the requirements of both ecology and development, for instance in agricultural-development planning based on the tenets of "ecofarming" and "ecodevelopment." Ecodevelopment is strongly influenced by the generally accepted aims of development. Nevertheless, it does represent a turning point: [EcodevelopmentJ is designed to help people define their real goals for growth and to utilize their own available natural resources and human skills to achieve these goals with patterns of growth that are sustainable, that will not destroy either the natural resource base upon which continued

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AN ESSAY ON REPRODUCTION

development depends, or the traditions and value systems of the people concerned. 3 In brief, ecodevelopment is a style of development that, in each ecoregion, calls for specific solutions to the particular problems of the region in the light of cultural as well as ecological data and long term as well as immediate needs. Accordingly, it operates with criteria of progress that are related to each particular case, and adaptation to the environment, as postulated by the anthropologists, plays an important part. Without denying the importance of exchanges it tries to J;eact against the predominant fashion of allegedly universalist solutions and panacea-type formulas. Instead of placing too much emphasis on external aid, it relies on the capabilities of human societies to identify their problems and devise their own original solutions to them, though drawing on the experiences of others. It rejects passive transfers and the spirit of imitation, and gives pride of place to self-reliance. It avoids the pitfalls of extreme ecologism and suggests on the contrary that a creative effort to benefit from the margin of freedom offered by the environment is always possible, however great the climatic and natural restraints may be. This is amply borne out by the differences between cultures and human achievements in comparable natural environments. But success depends on a knowledge of the environment and on the will to create a lasting balance between man and nature. The setbacks and disasters in which certain societies have foundered offer equally eloquent evidence of the high price that has to be paid for inability to organize the relationship between man and nature. 4

The important elements of ecodevelopment theory which differ from "simple" growth theories are: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

its orientation towards basic human needs (basic needs strategy); the priority given to local resources (self-reliance); environmental compatibility, conservation of existing resources, and preference for renewable resources; sociocultural suitability; special ecological techniques.

In addition to these, the requirements of ecofarming include principles such as:

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

suiting land use to the special fragility of tropical, arid, or semi arid ecosystems; the avoidance of negative external effects such as soil erosion; the guarantee of sustained production; modelling on the existing natural ecosystem; copying the basic natural ecological pattern. 5

Both ecodevelopment and ecofarming are understood to be strategies for the alleviation of poverty of the rural masses. Traditional, local methods of agriculture are not written off as backward, but indeed

59

T. HOPPE

sought after as models and revived. (This reproduction. )

IS

also an aspect of

Ecofarming is related to the local or neighbouring autochthonous methods and therefore promises good adaptability. In areas where indigenous methods have been forgotten or were absent, ecofarming is better suited to the mental attitude of the population than the methods of industrial agriculture. 6

Carrying-capacity analyses, fishing quotas, ecodevelopment, and ecofarming schemes are primarily confined to limited, small spatial units; their starting point is rural. Is it possible to transfer these concepts, emerging as they have within the rural context, to the urban-industrial context, even to the level of national economy? My discussion of this subject is divided into three main sections: (1)

(2) (3)

Some examples from the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in the People's Republic of China illustrating the destruction of reproduction through development; an attempted formulation of the reproduction paradigm through comparison and contrast with the development paradigm, especially considering some of the apparent pitfalls of the latter; conclusions; Xinjiang's future.

Reproduction destroyed through development: some examples from the People's Republic of China With the following examples from the Uighur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang, I wish to cite cases which show environmental destruction, exhaustion of resources, or desertification resulting from development. What is the point of development when, at the same time, or indeed as a result of it, resources are exhausted, environmental potentials are destroyed and the reproductive forces of a given local sphere are diminished?

The disappearance oflakes in arid regions My first ex:ample describes a case in which a reproductive corpus falls into a state of gradual desolation during a development scheme (see Fig. 3.1). Rivers in the arid zones of Inner Asia are commonly used to such a large extent for the irrigation of arable land that the lakes into which they flow gradually dry up and become salt marshes. The best known

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Commission for Integrated Survey of Natural Resources of Academia Sinica is itself a complex undertaking, both logistically and administratively. It is apparent that there is strong Chinese commitment to integrated research and to the ecologically sound management of renewable natural resources. The primary problems for natural resource management in the Hengduan Mountains are as follows: (a) (b)

(c)

(d)

The rapid population growth since 1946, which is continuing. Over-exploitation of natural resources, especially during the "Great Leap Forward" and the "Cultural Revolution," leading to devastating deforestation, loss of topsoil, soil erosion and gullying, and the effects of these on the hydrologic regime and river sediment load. These problems, while evident in many areas of China are especially severe on the long, steep slopes of the Hengduan Mountains. Downstream effects are believed to include aggravated flooding and siltation in the Cheng-du Basin, one of the most important rice-producing areas of China; however, the implied causal effects are by no means substantiated. The Hengduan Mountains are peopled by at least 27 different national minorities, which makes concerted response to the above stated problems politically complex.

Massive efforts towards reforestation are currently being undertaken. In some areas, progress has been quite impressive. This includes the widespread use of various species of native pine, and attempts to preserve some of the remaining areas of primitive forest. However, progress has been hindered by unregulated overgrazing, the lopping and cutting of seedlings, and a lack of successful planting of seedlings over wide areas that have been eroded down to the C-horizon (subsoil). There are extensive areas, for instance, that have the appearance of full desert regions despite the ample monsoon rainfall. The most critical socioeconomic-ecological factor is continued rapid population growth and the diminishing ratio of available arable land per unit of population on the moderate to steep slopes. It should be noted, however, that the Hengduan region, from a human point of view, is an "old landscape." The preliminary Academia Sinica and UNU reconnaissance in 1982 revealed several areas which have clearly undergone extensive deforestation and population out-migration. A comparison to older photographs taken in 1931-32 showed that there has been little change in the vegetation cover and in abandoned barley terraces over the past 50 years. In other areas, deforestation is both recent and on-going. This indicates a high degree of complexity and demonstrates

W. MANSHARD

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the need for careful landscape evaluation both as a step toward scholarly contributions and as a basis for rational resource management. The primary goal of Chinese research efforts in the Hengduan Mountains is to provide a sound scientific basis for a rational response to the problems outlined above. This operation falls effectively into the conceptual framework of the UNU's Highland-Lowland Interactive Systems project which places strong emphasis on the study of the productive use of marginal arable and grazing lands; thus, Chinese collaboration on the UNU's Agro-Forestry Systems project could be expected. Several specific areas have been identified for possible future study. Although these areas are not necessarily representative of the whole, complex Hengduan Mountain region, they are worthy of detailed investigation in their own right. Each individual area presents a special set of resource development problems which justifies the research effort proposed. In addition, detailed investigation of these areas should result in valuable contributions to the present body of scientific data; and, if these are treated as case studies, they could also prove valuable for the in-field training of young scholars. Three areas were chosen from the northern, Sichuan territory; two from the southern, Yunnan region. Perhaps the most important area - one which should be afforded the highest priority - is the area encompassing Lijiang and Tong Tien counties, including the great upper gorge of the Yangtzi and the Yulongxue Shan Massif In addition, four general themes have been identified. These are considered critically important areas of study for the Hengduan Mountain regions: (a) (b) (c) (d)

forest cover and its changes through time; present and future management; water: variations in flow, highland-lowland relationships, resource development opportunities; soil erosion: rates, causes, methods of mitigation, sources, transfers, areas of deposition; population: characteristics and trends, land use and agricultural practices.

Long distance water transfer in China The United Nations University (Tokyo) was invited to organize an international group of experts, under the leadership of Dr Asit Biswas, to receive the various alternative plans proposed for a massive interregional water transfer project in the People's Republic of China. 5 The largest river in China is the ChangJiang (Yangtzi) in the south of

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UNU NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAM

the People's Republic. It has an annual flow volume of980 billionm3 and is the largest river in the world. The Chang Jiang's annual flow constitutes 38 percent of the total national flow in China. If the availability of good soil coincided with an abundance of water, there would be no major problem for intensive agricultural development. Unfortunately for China, this is not the case. In southern China, there is an abundance of water but not enough cultivable land; in northern China, the situation is exactly the reverse. In the northwestern part of the country, the land is of very high quality but cannot be cultivated due to lack of water. There has been considerable discussion in recent years about the prospects for directing water from the water-abundant regions in the south to the deficient areas in the north. Currently, two plans exist for a gigantic water transfer scheme which, if and when it is carried out, will undoubtedly be the largest water redistribution undertaking ever carried out in human history. This scheme will radically alter the water distribution pattern in China. From the three options, the West Route, the Middle Route, and the East Route, we here consider only the latter two, the middle and eastern. Water conservation departments have carried out initial studies on the transfer of water from the middle and lower reaches (Middle Route and East Route, respectively) of the ChangJiang. The basic objective of both the Middle and East Route is to carry water to the Huang-HuaiHai plains. The Middle Route will deliver water to the western part of the plains; the East Route is designed to supply the eastern part. The Middle Route will divert water directly from the Chang Jiang at the Sanxia Reservoir. Water will also be diverted from the eastern end of the Danjiangkou Reservoir on the Han River, a tributary of the Chang Jiang. It will then be diverted northward, crossing the Fengcheng Divide via Baofeng and Yu counties. The canal will then proceed north to Beijing. The total estimated length of the Middle Route is l,265km. The Middle Route would provide an additional 23. 7 billionm3 of water for industrial, mining, and municipal purposes. The East Route will pump water from the Jiangdu Station further downstream on the Chang Jiang. The water will flow northwards along the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal, crossing several lakes. It will then cross Huang He and flow along the Grand Canal to Tianjin. The length of the East Route is estimated to be 1,150km. A major technical problem of the East Route concerns the local topography. The highest point of the route is at the Huang He, where the water level is 40 m higher than the pumping station in Jiangdu. In order to carry the enormous volume of water involved, it is proposed to lift it in 15 steps, with a total delivery lift of65 m. The number of major pumping stations that will have to be built is ten, with a total installed

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capacity of nearly 1 millionkW and an annual electricity consumption of 3-5 billion W. It has been proposed that 30 billion m 3 of water be pumped from the Chang Jiang during dry years; this quantity would fall to 14 billionm3 during average years - nevertheless an enormous quantity by any account. When completed, the East Route will provide irrigation, both new and improved, for 64 million mu (1 mu = approximately 3 hectares) of land; and an additional 2.7 billion m 3 of water will be available for industrial use, mining, and municipal needs. The Middle Route has one major advantage over the East Route in that no pumping will be necessary. This means no complex pumping stations have to be designed and constructed, and energy requirements will be substantially less. The projects proposed have both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side, benefits accruing from the project will be many, the most important of which is increased agricultural production. Providing better water control will increase the yields of all types of crops significantly. Current estimates indicate that the irrigated area can be increased by 4.3 million hectares with the East Route and by another 5.3 million hectares with the Middle Route. The major beneficiaries of the East Route will be the provinces of Hebei (1.33 million hectares), Jiangsu (1.23 million hectares), and Shangdon (1.17 million hectares). Similarly, the Middle Route would increase irrigation in Henan and Hebei provinces by 2.61 and 2.16 million hectares, respectively. Another important benefit will be the availability of 7,400m 3 of supplemental water for industrial, domestic, and navifational use provided by the Middle Route, and an additional 2,700 m by the East Route. The water transfer scheme could, however, have some adverse social and environmental impacts. A major problem anticipated is the salinization of the irrigated areas resulting from water diversion. Such difficulties have been encountered in other countries, e.g. Egypt, the Sudan, and Pakistan, with newly irrigated lands. If the ground water level cannot be effectively controlled by good drainage after water transfer, the extent of salinization is bound to increase, resulting finally in reduced agricultural production. Another anticipated problem is potential northward migration of the dreaded snail fever, schistosomiasis. Thirty years ago, some 7 million Chinese were affiicted with this disease. Since that time, the extermination of snails has reduced the number of affiicted persons by some 70 percent. Currently, the northernmost point of snail fever is Baoying County in Jiangsu Province. There is a danger that schistosomiasis may spread further northward with the transferred water. A number of studies seeking ways to mitigate the negative environ-

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UNU NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAM

mental and social impacts oflarge water diversion projects are currently being carried out. It is anticipated that another 2-4 years of additional work will be necessary. In view of the number and severity of problems encountered elsewhere with very large water development projects, such precautions are obviously essential.

Summary and outlook What are our lessons, so far? Obviously, one has to be rather cautious in deducing any lessons to be learned from China's experience. In the first place, there have been staggering political changes affecting outlook, policy, and implementation, of which we are all aware, and there has simply not been enough time to justify any sweeping generalizations along these lines. For this reason, we can only attempt to draw some very tentative conclusions on the basis of experiences with the three projects briefly outlined here. Considering, first, renewable energy (e.g. biomass, biogas) in China and its obvious limitations, it will be useful to draw a comparison to "appropriate technology" developments in India. Worldwide, India and China have had the greatest experience with biogas: China has over 15 million biogas units, and India has about 100,000. In India, where·the spread of biogas technology is often propagated, certain sociocultural problems have surfaced. As is well known, dried cow dung is used extensively by the poorer people who possess no livestock at all. If biogas production were to increase, there is some danger that the richer farmers will use more of this dung, to which no one holds legal title, for themselves. This, in tum, could lead to greater social polarization with results similar to those of the "Green Revolution." The Social Science Council ofIndia has therefore proposed some collective arrangements for biogas use. It remains to be seen how successful these measures might be, because, interestingly enough, the success of Chinese biogas production is not so much based on collective structures but rather on the individual family. After the Cultural Revolution, small private gardening and pig rearing was encouraged again, and this policy greatly influenced the expansion ofbiogas in China. The lessons from our second example, the Hengduan Mountains Project, are more limited. This project does show, however, that a proper institutional arrangement, i.e. the creation of a commission concentrating on the exploration and survey of natural resources (under the umbrella of the Chinese Academy of Sciences), can and will have a very positive impact on future environmental planning. Lack of reliable data has been one of the greatest difficulties for natural resource use and management in China (Ruddle & Wu Chanjun 1983).

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Thirdly, as far as the Long Distance Water Transfer Project is concerned, it is clear that a great deal remains to be done to optimize the use ofChina's land and water resources on a sustainable basis. While the political will and the engineering capability is there, the environmental consequences for land, climate, water quality, human settlement, etc. are far from being clear. The Resource and Policy and Management Program of the United Nations University has seen it as one of its objectives to assist Chinese scientists and decision makers in this wide field.

Notes 1 Compiled and modified from Shearer (1980a), p. 9. 2 For a full account see Shearer (1980a); and Shearer (1980b) pp. 436-7. 3 One important improvement is the floating cover type ofbiogas digester. This model, which is seen to hold great promise, consists ofa cylindrical pit and a gas-holding cover made of a bamboo frame covered with asphalt and a plastic sheet. In addition to being easier to construct, clean, and operate, a major advantage is the 20-25 percent improvement in biogas productivity of this model over the common dome-type Chinese digester. This increase in productivity results from the possibility of increasing the sludge concentration by 10 percent without risk of clogging the digester. The newest components being tested for introduction into the system are solar water heaters of the simple pond type, which are built directly on to the roofs of the residences. Made of cement, sand, black paint, and glass, and measuring 0.72m2, these devices can preheat 301 of water to 50-60°C in summer, saving 45-60 percent of the biogas required for domestic water heating on an annual basis. The impact of using a comprehensive biogas-solar energy system can be understood from test results which indicate that a 5.5m3 biogas digester and a O.72m 2 pond-type solar water heater can supply 90 percent of the energy previously provided by firewood for a family of four. An additional loop is being added to the ecological cycle of this rural production system. Instead of using the mud from the fish ponds immediately as fertilizer, it is planned to use this, first, as a substrate for growing several crops of mushrooms and earthworms. This will not only provide additional income, but it will actually improve the fertilizer quality of the soil. 4 After an unpublished draft report by D. J. Ives, UNU Project Coordinator, Highland-Lowland Interactive Systems Project, 18 October 1982. 5 This summary was compiled from Biswas (1983a), p. 6. Compare Biswas (1983b).

References Biswas, A. 1983a. Water where its wanted. In Development Forum 8/9.

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Biswas, A. (ed.) 1983b. Long distance water tranifer: a Chinese case study and international experiences. Dublin: Tycooly. Ruddle, K. and Wu Chanjun 1983. Land resources of the People's Republic qf China. Tokyo: United Nations University Technical Series. Shearer, W. 1980a. The renewable energy activities of the UN University - an integrated approach. Development Forum, November. Shearer, W. 1980b. Beispiel fUr ein integriertes Energie-Agrar-System in Siidchina. Geographischer Rundschau 34,436-7.

14

Large-scale biogas technology in China: dissemination among developing countries JACK B. CARMICHAEL 1

Two early biogas-related programs in China sponsored by United Nations organizations

FAO/UNDP, 1977 2 The first in a series of study tours organized under a joint program of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations and the United Nations Development Programme (FAO/UNDP Programme) in cooperation with the People's Republic of China took place from April 28 to May 24, 1977. Its purpose was to acquaint senior staff from developing countries with practices in the recycling of organic wastes in agriculture in China and to exchange experiences. The study group consisted of 20 participants - 17 from countries in Asia, Africa, and the Near East, and three from the FAO. In all, 17 nationalities were represented. With excellent cooperation from their Chinese hosts, the group travelled extensively in the provinces of Jiangsu, Guangdong, Shanxi, Hebei, and in the area of Shanghai. The study tour emphasized the practical aspects and applicability of the methods studied in China. The report of the tour discusses various aspects of organic recycling, visits to agricultural institutes, and production brigades, and it offers suggestions for follow-up activities on the experiences gained in China. Discussions on biogas technology emphasized design, construction, and the efficiency of household-sized units. Some brigades were noted to have adopted a collective approach and built larger plants to supply gas for distillation units and for small internal combustion engines to power pumps and generators.

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LARGE-SCALE BIOGAS TECHNOLOGY IN CHINA

UNEP,1979 3 From July 28 to August 25, 1979, a training seminar was organized by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the Environmental Protection Office of the State Council (EPOSq of the People's Republic of China in the technology, construction, and operation ofbiogas-fertilizer systems. The Ministry of Agriculture on behalf of the Biogas Development Office of Sichuan Province cooperated in conducting the seminar. The objectives of the seminar were to increase the environmental awareness and the managerial, technical, and scientific expertise of a group of professionals from developing countries in: (a) (b) (c) (d)

(e)

management of wastes,

reuse and recycling of resources,

production ofbiogas and consumption of sludge as fertilizer, improvement of environmental health conditions in rural areas, and environmentally sound management practices.

A representative from each of 18 countries - Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cyprus, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Granada, Guatemala, India, Iraq, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Samoa, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Upper Volta - and three staff members from UNEP participated in the seminar. Lectures, visits, demonstrations, and construction exercises were prepared by Chinese experts with the assistance of technically trained interpreters. In addition to the governmental institutions previously mentioned, contributions were made by the Chengdu Institute of Biology, Academia Sinica, the Southwestern Institute of Architectural Design in Sichuan Province, the Sichuan Institute of Agricultural Machinery, the Institute of Soil and Fertilizer and the Academy of Agricultural Science Research in Sichuan Province, the Sichuan Institute of Anti-parasitic Diseases, and by skilled technicians from counties surrounding Chengdu. Introductory field visits were held in Beijing. The three-week core of the seminar took place in Chengdu, Sichuan. Field trips were followed by a two-week training course of lectures, demonstrations, and the construction of three biogas digesters. In all, the group visited 11 production teams within people's communes and in two agroindustrial establishments. Participants were shown several different systems, scales, designs, and techniques ofbiogas production and use.

J. B. CARMICHAEL

221

An overview ofthe recent state ofbiogas development in China4 By mid-1980, there were more than 7 million family biogas digesters of 8-10m3 capacity each in the rural areas of China. These benefit about 30 million peasants. Additionally, more than 36,000 larger scale digesters have been built in recent years by people's communes and production brigades, state farms, pasturelands, and by wineries, bakeries, and confectioneries. The biogas thus generated is used to drive internal combustion engines, to pump water for irrigation, for grain processing and fodder cutting, as well as for drying agricultural products and generating electricity. Digester sludge is utilized in farming, by fisheries, and by mushroom cultivators. According to incomplete statistics, by the end of 1979, 617 small, biogas-fuelled electricity generating stations, with a total capacity of 5,069kW, had been built. Pilot projects to treat urban sewage effluent and nightsoil through anaerobic fermentation in digesters were carried out in cities in Guangdong, Shandong, Shaanxi, and Jiangsu provinces.

Production ofbiogas from large-scale digesters in Sichuan Provinces Among the most significant applications of biogas generation Sichuan Province have been: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)

III

the conversion of diesel engines to run on biogas-diesel fuel, the use ofbiogas from a I,2oom3 digester to generate power, the compression ofbiogas into cylinders for truck fuel, the use ofbiogas to flue-cure tobacco, the kiln-drying of tiles using biogas fuel, the synthesis of dichloromethane and trichloromethane using biogas.

Results of these projects were reported to the United Nations Industrial Development Organization by the Sichuan Provincial Office for Biogas Development.

Conversion ofdiesel engines to run on a biogas-dieselfuel mixture The Sichuan Institute of Agricultural Machinery successfully converted diesel engines to run on mixtures of biogas and diesel fuel. The fuel system of the original engine was maintained; however, a biogas-air carburetor was installed between the air filter and the intake of the

222

LARGE-SCALE BIOGAS TECHNOLOGY IN CHINA

diesel engine. The institute reported that some biogas-diesel engines had already been in operation without any obvious signs of early wear or serious corrosion. This indicates that the hydrogen sulfide contained in the biogas (50-300mgm3 in Sichuan Province) does not have negative effects, even during relatively long periods of engine operation. The biogas-diesel engines have been used for pumping, power generation, rice husking, and wheat milling. By the end of 1979, there were 514 biogas-diesel engines reported to be in operation in Sichuan Province. These represented a combined horsepower of 5,542. As a concrete example of savings from the use of a biogas-diesel engine, one brigade in the Xiangyang Commune required only 8 percent of their agricultural income to pay for the diesel fuel consumed in a biogasdiesel engine which powered equipment for husking rice, milling wheat, and pulverizing fodder. In contrast, three other brigades in the same neighborhood used the same type of engine but powered exclusively with diesel fuel; on the average, 40-45 percent of the agricultural incomes of these brigades was needed to pay for the diesel fuel.

Use ofbiogasfrom a 1,200m3 digester to generate power The Chengxian§ Brigade of the Benniu Commune in Jiangsu Province built a 1,200m biogas digester whose fuel was used to run a 75 horsepower diesel engine. The engine was attached to a 40 k W electricity generator. Output power was used to run a distillery and a brick kiln. The income resulting from these industries constituted more than half of the total income of the brigade.

The compression ofbiogas into cylindersfor truckfuel The Rongxian County distillery in Sichuan Province built a 2,OOOm3 digester which uses high temperature fermentation but without stirring. The spent mash from distillers' grains is converted with an efficiency approaching 100 percent to produce biogas. A power plant with a capacity of 120kW is run using biogas from the digester. Construction is underway to triple the output of the power plant. Estimates are that only three years will be required to recover investment costs in the power plant. Furthermore, the distillery has compressed biogas into cylinders which have, in tum, been used to fuel the trucks which haul sludge from the digester into the countryside to be applied to the land. The four trucks of the distillery travel a distance of720km daily and are fuelled entirely by 240m3 ofbiogas. This represents an annual saving of nearly 50 tons of gasoline.

J.

B. CARMICHAEL

223

The use ofbiogas to flue-cure tobacco Since 1976, counties in Anhui and Sichuan provinces have successfully used biogas to flue-cure tobacco. This application has reduced costs previously expended in purchasing coal or charcoal. Furthermore, a higher quality tobacco can be generally achieved from biogas fluecuring because a more uniform temperature distribution can be maintained, and the heating beds on which the tobacco rests can be brought up to the required temperature more quickly. The need for human labor input is also reduced when biogas is used because no one is required to tend the coal or charcoal fire. Forty person-da ys otherwise required to transport coal and tend the fire are saved during the biogas flue-curing of one ton of tobacco. Even the design of the curing house can be simplified when biogas is used. Air quality in the neighborhood will also improve because emissions of smoke will be greatly reduced. The same technology described above can be applied to the drying of rice, other grains, and potatoes. With slight modifications, the technology can be applied to greenhouse agriculture, specifically, to the growing of rice seedlings and vegetables. Silkworms can also be raised using biogas as a source of uniform heat.

Kiln-drying tiles using biogas The Taiping Commune in Sichuan Province has experimented extensively since 1975 on kiln-drying tiles using biogas fuel. Since the kiln-drying of tiles with biogas takes less time than when wood or charcoal is used as a fuel, the production rate for a kiln is increased by 50 percent to a 100 percent improvement. Furthermore, fuel costs per tile are reduced by one-third when biogas is used. Fewer personnel are needed to operate a biogas-fuelled kiln since there is no need for anyone to tend the fire as when wood or charcoal is used. Finally, tile drying with biogas results in a more uniform temperature in the kiln and a higher quality final product.

Synthesis ofdichloromethane and trichloromethane using biogas The Manyang Alcohol Distillery, in Henan Province had six years experience in large-scale biogas generation when they began production of dichloromethane and trichloromethane from biogas in 1972. The two digesters of 2,OOOm3 each produce an average daily gas yield of 6,000-8,OOOm3 using distillers' grains as raw materials. The annual outputs of chemicals are 700tons of dichloromethane and 230tons of trichloromethane. The digested liquid in the biogas reactors is used as a fermentation

224

LARGE-SCALE BIOGAS TECHNOLOGY IN CHINA

medium for the production of vitamin B 12. About 1 g of crystalline vitamin B12 is extracted daily from the digested liquid. The organic chemicals and the vitamin B12 meet the quality specifications prescribed by the national government.

Notes 1 The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of UNIDO. 2 FAO 1977. China: recycling oj organic wastes in agriculture. FAO Soils Bull. 40. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 3 UNEP (1981). Biogas Jertilizer system. Technical report on a training seminar in China. UNEP Reports and Proceedings Series, 2. Nairobi: United Nations Environment Programme. 4 UNIDO (1980). Biogas development in China. In Technical consultations among developing countries on large-scale biogas technology in China. UNIDO ID/WG.32112. Vienna: United Nations Industrial Development Organization. 5 UNIDO (1980). Biogas utilization (Sichuan Province). In Technical consultations among developing countries on large-scale biogas technology in China. UNIDO ID/WG.321/6. Vienna: UNIDO.

15

Biogas in Iran: learning from China? M. TAGHI FARVAR

Origins ofbiogas in Iran It is now virtually certain that the first known application of biogas technology in the world was in a public bath house designed and built some four centuries ago by the well-known Iranian engineer, poet, and mystic master, Sheikh Bahaii (Mohammed Ameli, son of Hussein 154&-1622 AD). Sheikh Bahaii lived and worked at the height of the material culture ofIran under the Safavid Dynasty. Among his many well-documented achievements is the intricate, vast network of water supply and distribution from the Zayandeh River to the town of Isphahan and the surrounding countryside. This network still forms the basis oftoday's water distribution system in much of the area. The Sheikh's bath house is located in the heart of old Isphahan, then capital of the Safavids, a town which displays many medieval wonders ofIranian architecture and technology. Figure 15.1 shows the schematic position of the public bath, with its immersion tub, the biogas fermentation chamber, and the sewers conducting the human wastes from the cathedral Uame') mosque to the underground chamber. All Iranian public baths used to be of the immersion tub variety, comprising a warm room containing a large tub of water, heated from below, in which many people could bathe simultaneously. Bathers would first wash and soap themselves outside the tub, withdrawing water from the tub, using a bowl or a built-in faucet. For their final cleansing and ablution, they would enter the tub. Entrance to the warm bath was provided through a cold bath, a sort of locker room, and dressing room. Of the numerous public baths in Iran, the Sheikh's bath is the only one commonly known to have operated on a large burner known as "the candle". Unlike all other baths, the fire room otthis one had none of the pervasive black soot nor any visible smoke. The "candle" always burned clean. It would be hard to find anyone in all of Iran who has not heard of the Sheikh's bath in Isphahan, considered to be one of the wonders ofIran's cultural heritage. It was Dr. Morteza Rahbani (1982a & b) who uncovered the

DOI: 10.4324/9780203838921-19

digestion chamber

spent slurry (as liquid fertilizer) to out-of-town agricultural fields

sewage inlets gas tube

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THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

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WOMEN'S BATH HOUSE

MEN'S BATH HOUSE

sewage

SYROPER'S MOSQUE

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sewage canal from Isphahan's Cathedral Mosque (= 300 m)

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Figure 15.1 Schematic diagram of Sheikh Bahaii's bath house, illustrating the world's first known application ofbiogas in Isphahan, Iran, c. 16th century (drawing is not to scale).

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shops

M. T. FARVAR

227

mechanism of the bath house. By studying the site and interviewing old residents of the area, he was able to discover the remains of the network of sewers leading to the underground fermentation chamber. This chamber was about 3.5 m wide by 7 m long, built of solid brick, with a vaulted roof Air and water tightness was easily achievable in those days by using an organic cement called sarooj, a mixture of lime, egg white, and bamboo dust. Although the burner was destroyed a century or so ago, apparently by archeologists attempting to discover its mechanism, it and the gas pipes could have been made of either ceramic or lead, as both types were constructed in Iran at that time. The immersion tub is still in place (Rahbani 1983, personal communication). The hot water system has been replaced by showers, as in most other immersion baths, following a rule decreed by the Ministry of Health. Another interesting aspect of this system was that the spent slurry from the fermentation process was led away out of town to be used as fertilizer for fields of legumes which have traditionally surrounded Isphahan. In fact, the use of human fertilizer is too old and wellestablished a technique, particularly in Isphahan, for the slurry to have been discarded. Everyone in the neighborhood who was interviewed by Dr Rahbani confirmed this aspect. Further details of this relic remain to be discovered by actual excavation, proposed but not carried out. But the evidence collected so far by Dr Rahbani leaves little room for doubt as to the accuracy of his overall conclusions.

Recent experiences with biogas in Iran The Sheikh's bath house is known to have worked for many generations. Unfortunately, this great application ofbiogas technology was not popularized by its inventor, following in the traditions of those days which were based on professional secrecy among master builders and artisans. The next known application of biogas in Iran had to await its reinvention in India and China. It was adapted and introduced into an integrated development project via the appropriate technology movement in 1974. Details of this project are presented in Farvar and Bajracharya (1980). In this region of Iran, where aridity and settlement of nomads have left little of the original climax forests of oak and Pistacia spp., dried animal dung is virtually the only fuel. In spite of the country's generous endowment in fossil fuels, little gets to the village level; ifit does, it is used for lighting lanterns rather than for cooking. It

228

BIOGAS IN IRAN: LEARNING FROM CHINA?

is in this region ofIran where the greatest potential lies for innovation in renewable energies. The initial experimentation with floating cover "Indian-type" biogas demonstrated the inappropriateness of this technique despite widespread local enthusiasm. On the technical side, this was due to cold winters which effectively reduced gas production to insignificant levels. But a more serious problem was presented by social considerations. In Iranian villages, the distribution of cow dung is inequitable among households of differing social status. The spreading of this technology on a single-family basis would have meant its eventual adoption by no more than a handful of well-to-do villagers - precisely those who have no energy problem. This is also true in India, where this type ofbiogas originated. Initial dialogue with peasants led to the conclusion that if the right technology could be found, communal biogas would be acceptable to everyone in the village. Owing to the increased heat efficiency of biogas, the right formula seemed to be as follows. (1) (2)

(3)

To pool all the dung resources in one central plant. To distribute the resulting gas equitably to all the households, even those who lacked dung. (The fact that in tribal regions of Iran almost everyone is linked to the rest of the community by close kinship ties helps this willingness to "go communal. " Practically all of the Zagros region is tribal in this sense.) To withdraw the rich organic fertilizer after digestion in proportion to the original contribution.

Experimentation with biogas technology and village studies were continued by the group at Bu-Ali Sina University of Hamadan, but further actual applications had to wait until after the Iranian Revolution.

Experience with biogas after the Revolution The Revolution in Iran stimulated interest in biogas and other renewable energies in two major ways. First, the major force behind an imitative style of development, purposely based on fossil fuels was removed. A national ideology of self-reliance favored the development of appropriate technologies. Secondly, the production of oil and its derivatives was drastically curtailed. Internally, this was due to a deliberate commitment to move away from nearly exclusive dependence on petroleum, and externally, to the boycott by the West and the war with Iraq. As a result of the Gulf War, Iranian oil exports, which had already been reduced to about 2 million barrels per day from the prerevolution levels ofabout 6 million barrels per day, further dwindled

M. T. FARVAR

229

to a mere 400,000 barrels per day or less (press reports). Furthermore, refined petroleum products for domestic consumption were largely produced in Abadan refinery (the world's largest, providing some 1 million barrels per day). When the Abadan refinery was destroyed irreversibly in the war, the country was forced to rely on imported kerosene and gas-oil. Great shortages have been experienced by everyone, even though oil products are now imported - costing $45 per barrel plus transport, only to be sold with great subsidy for some $4.5 per barrel (one-tenth the cost at source, even without taking into account the transportation and overhead costs). If we use the unofficial (real market) exchange rate for the dollar, in addition to the costs of transport, we arrive at a 99 percent subsidy estimate, paid mostly with hard currency. Such a calculation would rriake any renewable source of energy, even the most expensive, quite competitive by comparison, if only proper public accounting procedures were used by the government. So far, a number of institutions of research and experimentation have attempted to build biogas plants. Most of the early ones were repetitions of the floating cover Indian variety. Due to the great degree of de Jacto decentralization and lack of coordination of responsibilities after the revolution, little sharing of experiences took place. Only one plant has been constructed at the village level in recent years. Twenty plants are being constructed in Ham province in western Iran. These have been undertaken by experts associated with CENESTA, the Center for Ecodevelopment Studies and Application of Tehran. The first of this series, a 20m 3 fixed-dome digester built in Upper Kolm, a village in the hinterland of Ham, has been supplying gas to a roadside village tea shop since the summer of 1982. It was built with bricks, using a modified conical brick dome of 20° slope, constructed without support (van Buren 1979). It can be regarded as the adaptation of a Chinese model. Epoxy paint was used successfully for final waterand gas-proofing. Kolm is located about 33°N at an altitude of900m above sea level. The relatively low production of gas in the winter is acceptable because less traffic calls at the truck stop at this time of year. From a technical construction point of view, this model is easy for local semi-skilled masons to build and is a significant improvement over the earlier Indian model. The underground construction results in relatively good protection against cold weather. For this reason, somewhat larger models (22 & 30m 3) were designed and constructed for limited communal operation in the warmer villages ofsouthern Ham (altitude 600--700m), to supply up to five families each. As the completion of these 20 digesters took a long time, due to budget cuts imposed by the war effort, no definitive evaluation is yet possible. However, based on preliminary results from Kolm, we can consider

230

BIOGAS IN IRAN: LEARNING FROM CHINA?

this adaptation of the Chinese model as still unsatisfactory, for the following reasons. (a)

The overall efficiency of production is extremely low, ranging from "_,,

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Figure 3.4 Distribution of European colonies within Africa in 1914 (from Hallett 1974).

Colonial impacts on Africa In Africa, revenue for the colonial power was primarily raised from mineral, foodstuffs, or animal-hide exports. From a colonial perspective, agriculture was the major resource for most of Africa. Thus a major interest of colonial administrators was agricultural development. To develop surplus commodities 79

POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

from each colonial unit was a major priority. This meant increasing yields and introducing new crops for those products that could be exported. No single strategy by any colonial power was universally applied throughout the continent to increase agricultural output. Existing conditions, both in the mother country and in Africa at the advent ofcolonial occupation, required flexible policies. But three major models for increasing exports evolved. One was largely to take advantage of the peasant farmer already farming the lands. Through market incentives (profit) or tax policy the African farmer was encouraged to grow a percentage of crops that could be exported. A second model was to displace Africans from ownership of their lands, or to use lands not occupied by Africans. On these lands plantations (estates) were established that used European managers and African labor to produce almost solely export crops. In South Africa a variant of this model was used in that, instead of using only African labor, East Indians were encouraged to immigrate into the area and become the source of plantation labor. The third model was again either to displace Africans from land ownership or use nonoccupied areas, and to use settlers (European immigrants) as farmers. Each of these models with their resulting agricultural change had impacts upon the environment. But in spite of the colonial desire to produce exports from the rural sector it is important to remember that the overwhelming majority of African farming and herding was done by the indigenous people making their own decisions. Only in southern Africa and the Maghrib (the lands north of the high Atlas Mountains in Morocco to southern Tunisia, including northern Algeria) did African farmers produce fewer foodstuffs than the combined outputs of colonial administered developmental schemes, plantation agriculture, and immigrant (settler) farmers. The environmental impact of colonization was different in the major geographic units (north, south, central, east, west) because ofdifferences in trading patterns, settlement patterns, the timing of the beginning of colonization, the particular colonizing power, and the length of the colonial period. For example, although the colonial period was longer in West Africa than in East Africa, the European impact on the land was greater in East Africa. In West Africa the large European farm was the exception in the prevailing colonial policy, whereas in large areas of the Kenyan Highlands and to a lesser extent in Tanganyika it was the accepted practice. The different colonial impacts in the various geographic units add to the complexity of understanding the diversity in African environments. WEST AFRICA

Both the French and British tried to introduce plantations in West Africa. By and large, most of these projects failed for two reasons. First, the high mortality of European personnel prevented a large permanent managerial class from becoming established. Second, it was found to be more economical to obtain African products through trade. Although the French were more in favor of plantation development than the British, peasant production was dominant everywhere. In West Africa, as a whole peasant agriculture was the safest way to meet the needs ofthe colonial powers, both from a political and an economic perspective.

80

COLONIAL PERIOD

European investment here was largely limited to government, roads, railroads, and ports - all ofwhich were oriented toward export growth. Prior to 1945, little effort was expended on improving the agriculture ofthe African peasant farmer. Subsistence crops, such as yams and cassava, were oflittle interest to the colonial powers, with the possible exception of the Germans in Togo and Cameroon. Yet revenues from export crops increased dramatically during this period with minimal technological help and investment from the colonial country. From an agricultural perspective, the major impact during this period was the change over from subsistence economies oriented toward local areas to cashcrop and subsistence economies where a small percentage of crops were grown for cash or bartered foreign goods. The change to a partial cash economy results from a diverse set of events due to colonial actions. Some of these actions were the reduction of tribal warfare and the introduction of health services. These changes lowered death rates and population grow'th occurred. With the limited introduction ofnew agricultural technologies, land shortages began to appear in West Africa. Two responses to this emerging land pressure were: the African farmer began to grow cash crops to help purchase some of his needs, and the beginning of wage labor. Other stimuli resulting in the increase oflands under cash crops were the need of Africans to raise their income to pay colonial taxes and the desire of the people to purchase European goods or services. Dalton describes some effects of these changes in agriculture that in the colonial period resulted in most West African farmers having a cash component or income as "growth without development". As the bulk of the farmers' time and labor was used for their subsistence crops, often they could only cultivate enough cash crops to pay their taxes and to purchase the most basic goods. Nevertheless, in total, West African peasant agriculture produced large quantities ofexport crops during this period much to the advantage of the colonial powers. The major export crops of West Africa were peanuts, gum, cocoa, palm oil, and rubber. Other significant exports were timber, hides, and gold. It was the peasant farmer who produced most ofthese crops, with the exception ofrubber. Gum and peanuts were primarily crops of the dry areas, whereas cocoa, palm oil, and rubber were from the humid areas. Gum production was concentrated along the desert fringe, the semi-arid areas in West Africa, such as Mauritania. Peanuts were centered in the drier portions of the savanna areas. After the introduction of the peanut from America during the colonial period, there was a sudden expansion in peanut production both for domestic consumption and export. From almost zero production in 1830, in Gambia and Senegal production rose to over 40,000 tons between 1875 and 1900. Likewise, the area of peanu~ production expanded all the way into northern Nigeria from the Gambian and Senegal areas. In French-controlled ports alone over 100,000 tons of peanuts were exported in 1900. The rapid growth of peanut production resulted in people migrating into Gambia, an area previously not heavily populated, from a 700 km wide surrounding area. This migration into peanutproducing areas and consequent population growth was widespread in these areas throughout West Africa. Thus in these dry savanna areas a relatively low, scattered population was replaced by a far larger rural population during the colonial era. Much marginal land was brought under cultivation, and environmental stress resulting from human activities began to become evident. For 81

POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

instance, in Senegal, severe soil degradation began in the 1920s. This lowered the area's overall soil fertility with the result that peanut yields generally decreased. In some specific locations it is now impossible to grow peanuts because ofsevere soil erosion. Cocoa, like peanuts, was an American crop in origin. It was first cultivated in West Africa on Fernando Po (Bioko, Equatorial Guinea) on plantations, using much imported labor from the mainland, especially eastern Nigeria. But its major growth occurred as a peasant farmer crop in the more humid portions of the mainland from Nigeria westward. The largest area ofcocoa cultivation was In Ghana (Gold Coast), Nigeria, and Ivory Coast. As cocoa requires large labor inputs, population dynamics of growth and seasonal migration were set into motion by this cash crop. The introduction of cocoa into West Africa encouraged population growth -largely through migration - into the forest country. Also, the labor demands during the harvest encouraged seasonal migration between the savanna and semi-arid zones of West Africa. From zero exports in the 1890s, West Africa accounted for about two-thirds ofthe world's exports by the end of the colonial period. Rubber production in West Africa was largely concentrated in Liberia and Nigeria. In West Africa, rubber production began to be important during the 1920s after the decline ofwild rubber. In Liberia it resulted in an economy almost completely dependent on this plantation crop, whereas in Nigeria the rubber crop was secondary to palm oil in the eastern and southern portions of the country. Growth in the production of palm oil occurred in the early phases of colonization; by the 1880s exports from Nigeria were over 30,000 tons per year. With the introduction of peanuts, palm-oil production stabilized. But palm-oil production remained important throughout the whole colonial period within the humid zones of West Africa. Today it remains a peasant farmer crop in almost all areas. CENTRAL AFRICA

Within this area the French, Belgians, Spanish, and Portuguese established colonies, but the major colonial powers were France and Belgium. By far the largest area fell within the domain of the Belgians. Unlike other colonies, the Belgian Congo (Zaire) became affiliated with Belgium, not through the initial actions of its government, but by the manipulations of King Leopold. During the early stages of the King's involvement, the areas under his control for all practical purposes were governed as his private empire; for all practical purposes the King's private Congo state was run as a company government with forced labor and labor taxation. The company government was structured as an interlocking conglomerate, with various companies having specific monopolies of production within a given areal sphere. Different companies controlled rubber collection, mineral export, agricultural exports, and transport. The overriding criterion for each individual "corporation" within the King's "conglomerate" was profit. Thus the area comprising the Belgian Congo did not develop as a single entity during this stage. For example, the railway systems developed to export mineral wealth from the Katanga area exited through foreign countries (Fig. 3.3), as this was the least expensive route for export. 82

COLONIAL PERIOD

Most all other colonial powers attempted to control commerce through the development of transport solely within their areas of territorial control. The major transport in the western Belgian Congo utilized the Congo River, focusing on Stanleyville (Kinshasa) where rapids made overland transport necessary for the movement of goods for export. Rubber was an early agricultural export, but primarily it was wild rubber collected through the use of forced labor. By 1913 exports dropped to almost zero owing to the competition from plantations outside Africa. In response to the rejection by the British government of the Lever Corporation's request to establish a palm-oil concession in British West Africa (the British favored peasant farmer production), 1. 9 million acres (770,000 ha) ofland were provided to the Lever Corporation in the Belgian Congo. Here palm oil was grown as a plantation crop and became the Congo's major agricultural export. The French in central Africa governed three colonies: Gabon, Moyen Congo (People's Republic of Congo), and Ubangi Shari (Central African Republic). Together these colonies were referred to as French Equatorial Africa. Nowhere was the population large within this area. Gabon became an export center for timber and minerals. Revenues generated in Gabon were used to defer costs in the other two French colonies, a practice that ceased after independence. In Ubangi Shari, the French decided that cotton should become an export crop. Because it was not economical, the colonial government had to resort to forced cultivation. To avoid this coercion, farmers left the countryside for towns; thus the agricultural potential of the countryside was lowered. In addition to cotton, coffee plantations were established in the 1920s to help offset the loss of revenue with the decline ofwild rubber. To export crops from the interior ofthis colony, transport as far as Brazzaville was by river, then by rail to Pointe Noire (Gabon). Nowhere is the impact of colonial policies more evident than in the building of the Pointe Noire-Brazzaville (Congo-Ocean) railroad, since the railroad between Kinshasa and Matadi (Belgian Congo) already built could have been used, but ofcourse this was not on French territory. Thus Moyen Congo was an area of important capital investment for the French, owing to its location between Gabon and the Central African Republic. Although in Moyen Congo investment was primarily in transport, not production, the country relied on river transport, not the railroad. The largest export from this colony was timber but, being the poorest colony ofFrench Equatorial Africa, its primary revenues came from outside its territory, primarily either France or Gabon. SOUTHERN AFRICA

Beginning in the mid-1600s, the Dutch established a limited number of settlements in South Africa around the Cape Town area, largely to provide supplies and rest for ship crews engaged in trade between Europe and the Dutch East Indies. But by 1700 the Dutch settlers were producing more foodstuffs than required by the passing ships. In addition, the settlers had started to move inland and to become active in both livestock raising and agriculture. By 1795, when the British occupied the Cape peninsula for the first time, over 17,000 Dutch settlers were living in the area. In 1815 a European peace settlement gave British sovereignty to the Cape Colony. In response to a set ofcomplex events resulting

83

POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

from the establishment of British rule in the Cape Colony, between 1835 and 1941 about 6000 Afrikaners, the descendants of the original Dutch settlers, moved inland beyond the Cape Colony area of British control first into Natal and later (1839-40) beyond the Vaal River into what became the Transvaal Republic, Orange Free State (Fig. 3.5). These were humid subtropical areas that were favorable environments for agriculture and grazing. For the Afrikaners it was indeed fortunate that at this date, when they had to find new lands to farm owing to the British abolition of slavery, these areas had become temporarily depopulated through some recent major disturbances among the indigenous groups (the Mfecane). By the 1840s, numerous European settlements had been established in the area between the Orange River and the Soutpansberg Mountains in the north. In this migration the Afrikaners gradually came into conflict with the Sotho Kingdom, which occupied an area where African farmers were producing grain surpluses of wheat, sorghum, and corn. To protect themselves from the Afrikaners, the Sothos asked for and obtained protection from the British government for their homeland. But by the time the British protected this area (1868), Basutoland (Lesotho) had lost a large portion of its productive lands to the Orange Free State. Basutoland was left with mostly mountainous terrain and only a small amount ofarable land. This series ofevents represents a process that occurred in various variant forms throughout southern Africa, namely the best lands became occupied by people of European descent so that the African population was forced to exist on a limited resource base. One result

Figure 3.5 Settlement patterns in South Africa moving from Cape Town into the interior (from Cole 1961).

84

COLONIAL PERIOD

was that the Africans were forced to work for the Europeans to make a livelihood. Besides the Whites and Africans, East Indians and other immigrants came to South Africa to provide needed labor. The labor was required to help on the farms and to build the railroads, as well as to help extract mineral wealth once it was discovered (1867 diamonds, 1886 gold). Originally, Afrikaner agriculture and pastoral activities were largely self-subsistent, but gradually they became commercially oriented, especially in terms ofsugar cane, grapes (wine), maize, and cattle. Yet it was always highly dependent on the use of African labor. Beginning around 1867, the economy started to develop its mineral wealth; it eventually produced an array of mineral products, including gold, coal, and diamonds. With the best potentially productive lands controlled by the Afrikaner and English population, the Africans became the major providers oflabor in South Africa. This is especially true in the mineral sector. It was during the colonial period that the use of African labor throughout all economic sectors became established. This labor gradually evolved from just coming from the local area to draining all of southern Africa. As early as 1900, Nyasa (Malawi) men were migrating into South Africa to work either on farms or in mines. Like the Dutch, the Portuguese entered southern Africa very early. They first arrived in what is present-day Angola in 1483; and they reached Mozambique during 1498. In the early years of Portuguese contact, the primary interest was not the establishment of colonies but commercial exploitation. To accomplish this end, the Portuguese took advantage of the rivalries that existed among the Africans and made various trade agreements with local people. In Angola, slaves, ivory, gold, and wild rubber were the major commercial interests; in Mozambique the initial interest was to establish coastal defense centers to protect their trade in the Indian Ocean, as well as gold exports from the inland Shona areas (Zimbabwe, northern South Africa). As late as the early 1800s over 80 percent of the revenue derived from these southern Portuguese colonies was from the slave trade. Not until the mid-1800s was there any attempt to encourage European settlements for agricultural activities and to reorient the Angolan economy from slavery to agriculture. Then the initial endeavor was to attempt to grow both cotton and coffee on plantations. With the American Civil War, the cotton plantations eventually became profitable, but coffee's profitability was still greater. By the 1600s, in Mozambique there were large tracts of land under the ownership of a few families. Many estates were over hundreds of square kilometers; some included over a thousand square kilometers but, as in Angola, slaves were the dominant export through the early 1800s. Despite the large land holdings, Mozambique never became an exporter of significant quantities of foodstuffs, except cashew nuts. The colonial period for these two areas did not end until 1975. By that date, even though over 50 percent of exports from Angola were agricultural, less than 3 percent of the land was cultiv~ted. The dominant export crop, coffee, came both from plantations (15 percent), and small farmers. Sisal, another export, was a plantation crop, but maize was a small-farmer crop. Livestock, coming largely from the drier southern portion of the colony, was produced both on large land holdings and by small herders. 85

POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Mineral exports, which almost equalled agricultural exports by independence, did not become of major importance until the late 1940s. Although land concentration was extreme in Mozambique early in the colonial period, the colony never became a major agricultural entity. The greatest source of revenue at the end of the colonial period was derived from the service sector. This was led by the revenue from the use of the rail system and port facilities for mineral exports originating in the surrounding countries. The British interest in southern Africa, outside of South Africa, Botswana (Bechuanaland), and Swaziland did not begin until the late 1800s. The British arrived in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe and Zambia) in 1889 and 1890, and in Nyasaland (Malawi) in 1891. During the colonial period the attraction of the various southern African lands was not at all equal. This is reflected in the settlement patterns ofthe Europeans. In Nyasaland as late as 1921, less than 1500 Europeans were in the country, and at independence only about 7000 Whites were living in the country. As a result, a large component of the economy remained in the domain of the small farmers. But primarily because of tax laws, especially the hut tax, the inhabitants in Nyasaland by the turn ofthe 20th century were forced into entering the cash economy. The lack of capital investment and economic opportunity throughout the country, but especially in the north and central parts, contributed to the initiation of the migration of Nyasa men toward Southern Rhodesia and South Africa in order to raise revenue. From a colonial perspective, the crucial resource ofNyasaland was its labor force. And of major importance was its contribution to the economies of the British colonies of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In 1959, just prior to independence, over 163,000 men were estimated to be working outside the country in other areas of southern Africa. The commercial agriculture that did evolve during this period was concentrated solely in the southern portion of the colony. Europeans produced tea and flue-cured tobacco, whereas coffee, cotton, maize, peanuts, and types of Turkish tobacco were largely grown by small farmers. Northern Rhodesia, like Nyasaland, never attracted many Europeans. But at independence about 75,000 Europeans were living in the country, many ofthem working in the mining industry. Those that did settle in the country became concentrated along the Lusaka-Livingstone railroad line. It was here that the commercial farmers produced the two major crops of maize and peanuts. To a very large degree the small African farms were subsistence enterprises and, as a result, were not export oriented. The major export and the largest cash employment in the country were related to the copper industry centered around Kitwe. Likewise, it was the copper industry that allowed the railroad to be economi~ally viable. Thus the commercial agriculture that was dependent on the railroad was likewise dependent on the success of the mining sector of the economy. This copperbelt area was the second zone of important expatriate settlement. Southern Rhodesia was the most attractive country for the British, and it attracted the largest number of European settlers. But even here the White population was always less than 5 percent of the total population. From 1887 until 1923, when it was a colony, the area was administered by the South African Company. The land policy that evolved under this administration resulted in a concentration of the European settlers, including those from South Africa, on 86

COLONIAL PERIOD

o •

Cattle Corn

... Tobacco •

Tea

~ African Areas

D

European Areas

Figure 3.6 European farming areas, major crops, and railroads in Zimbabwe. (Modified from Hance 1975.)

the best potential agricultural lands. In the productive lands ofthe highveld and highlands, the Europeans displaced the Africans. As a result of this land policy they controlled 76 percent ofthe high-potential area. For the country as a whole, 40 percent of the European lands have good agricultural potential, but only about 10 percent of African lands are of equal quality. In addition, capital investment, both private and government, was concentrated in the areas of European occupation. The belts of European settlement are roughly parallel to and centered upon the railroad lines (Fig. 3.6). One result ofthe land policies that evolved during the colonial period was that cash agriculture became almost completely controlled by the White settlers whereas African agriculture became largely subsistence. Given the advantages ofcontrolling the best lands as well as being in the area with the lowest transport costs, the Whites controlled the modern economic sector ofthe country. Maize was, and still is, by far the largest crop, both for the Africans and the Europeans; however, for the Whites it is a cash crop. Also tobacco, cotton, tea, wattle (used in tannin), and sugar became important cash crops. Besides good agricultural lands, Southern Rhodesia had large mineral wealth, including chrome, copper, gold, and coal. The mining industry evolved in a similar way to commercial farming, with Whites comprising the management and Africans providing the labor. Besides local labor, migrant labor, primarily from either Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland, was also employed.

87

POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE ENVIRONMENT EAST AFRICA - THE COLONIAL PERIOD

In contrast to West and Equatorial West Africa where European trading centers evolved into colonial spheres ofinfluence, the European entry into East Africa is both more recent and abrupt. European involvement in East Africa began in the 1870s when Stanley passed through this area. Prior to this date the area was under "Arab" influences, but the Arab contacts had only a modest political character except in Zanzibar. In the late 1880s the major colonial powers in East Africa, the Germans and British became established. The Germans occupied Tanganyika and the Ruanda-Urundi area (Rwanda-Burundi), the British occupied Kenya, Uganda, and Zanzibar and part of Somalia. In East Africa the French were limited to Djibouti and Madagascar while the Italians established themselves in Eritrea and Somaliland, and later in Ethiopia. Kenya and Tanganyika became the areas of dominant interest for the British and Germans, and in both areas they established commercial agricultural products relying on European and imported labor. The Germans, to open up the interior for commercial agriculture, built railroad lines from the coast ofLake Tanganyika (Dar es Salaam to Kigoma). An important impact of this economic venture was the creation ofa labor shortage that required East Indians to be imported for labor. Many remained after the end of the railroad construction to play an important role in East African life. With the commercial establishment ofsisal plantations, much farmland was displaced from traditional food production. This required the Africans that previously farmed these lands to either enter the cash ec;onomy or move to different areas. The Germans were the managers of the plantations, and Africans and Indians supplied labor. During the German period, the dominant export crops became sisal and cotton. To a large degree, Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi) was not of major interest, but even here coffee became a major export crop during the colonial period. However, this crop remained within the domain of the peasant farmer. At the conclusion ofWodd War I, Tanganyika was mandated to the British and Belgium administered Ruanda-Urundi as a separate province of the Congo. Both Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi, being protectorates, received less investment than if they had remained as colonies, and their economies stagnated. Ruanda-Urundi's prime role was to complement the Belgian economic activities existing in the neighboring Belgian Congo. Kenya eventually became the major area of interest for the British. But in 1886, when the Anglo-German agreement was signed, East Africa was divided into a German and a British sphere, and it was the Ugandan portion, not the Kenyan l;mds, that were of paramount importance to the British (Fig. 3.7). The British interest in Uganda was based on the government's desire to deny the control oflands within the entire Nile Valley to any European power (Germany, France) possessing the technical ability to regulate the flow of the Nile waters. This was their strategic policy to protect British rule in Egypt. Between 1888 and 1895 the Imperial British East Africa Company established posts in the main coastal centers and at selected interior locations between Mombasa and Lake Victoria (Fig. 3.7). In 1895 the British government took direct responsibility for its East African lands. The East African Protectorate (EAP) included all lands between the Rift Valley and the coast; the Uganda Protectorate included all lands west of the Rift Valley. In 1902 the EAP acquired the eastern portions of the 88

COLONIAL PERIOD

ITALIAN SPHERE Of: I.

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