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Role Of Ballistic And Cruise Missiles In International Security [1st ed. 2023]
 3031480627, 9783031480621

Table of contents :
Introduction
Motivation
Conclusion
Contents
1 Theoretical Understanding of Role of Missiles in International Security
Structural Realism
Offensive Realism
Conclusion
2 Technological Aspects of Missile: Missiles and Warheads
A Theoretical Framework to Eplain the Relation Between Missiles and Warheads
Missiles and Nuclear Warheads
Missiles and Non-nuclear Payload
Conclusion
3 Role of Ballistic and Cruise Missiles in International Security
Comprehensive National Power (CNP)
National Security
Combat Capability
Coercive Diplomacy and Force Projection
Deterrence and Stability
Psychological and Weapon of Terror
Foreign Policy and Decision Making
Stature and Prestige
Conclusion
4 Why States Desire for Missile Systems?
Threat Perception
Defence Budget
Geostrategic Needs
Technological Needs
Political Requirements
Foreign Policy
Why States Give Up Missile Capabilities: Case Study of South Africa
Conclusion
5 Historical and Contemporary Missile Development: Nuclear Weapon States, Regional Powers and Other Powers
Early Firepower
Global Powers
The United States
Russia
Britain
France
China
Conclusion
Regional Players: Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Israel
Iran
Turkey
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Yemen
Qatar
UAE
Iraq
Libya
Egypt
Algeria
Sudan
Morocco
Non-state Actors
Hezbollah
Hamas
ISIS
Conclusion
Regional Players: South Asia/North East Asia/Asia Pacific
South Asia
India
Pakistan
Regional Players: Asia Pacific/North East Asia
North Korea
South Korea
Japan
Taiwan
Australia
ASEAN Countries
Vietnam
Philippines
Indonesia
Malaysia
Thailand
Singapore
Myanmar
Other Powers
Europe
Central Asia
Africa
Latin America
Conclusion
6 Survivability of Nuclear Missile Forces and Contemporary Debates
First Strike and Role of Missiles
Counter-Strike/Second-Strike Capability and Role of Missiles
Making a Nuclear Missile Force Survivable
Case Study: China
Conclusion
7 Can the World Do Without Missiles?
Complete Disarmament
Arms Control
Role of Missiles in a Post-Covid-19 Global World
Credible Minimum Deterrence and ‘No-First Use’: The Ideal Answer to Global Stability
Steps to Reduce Threat from Missiles
Conclusion
Conclusion
Index

Citation preview

Role Of Ballistic And Cruise Missiles In International Security Debalina Ghoshal

Role Of Ballistic And Cruise Missiles In International Security

Debalina Ghoshal

Role Of Ballistic And Cruise Missiles In International Security

Debalina Ghoshal Kolkata, India

ISBN 978-3-031-48062-1 ISBN 978-3-031-48063-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48063-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Introduction

The role of ballistic and cruise missiles becomes a mandatory topic to study in the present scenario, owing to the fact that most states aspire to acquire such capabilities. The Syrian crisis and the Ukraine War bear testimony to the fact that missiles are weapons for combat and coercive diplomacy in addition to strengthening deterrence. Offensive capabilities strengthen a state’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis their adversaries as well as in the region where they are situated. Ballistic and cruise missile capabilities strengthen a state’s combat capability and deterrence posture, strengthen stability and are currency of power and prestige. Amid these factors, this project, Role of Missiles in International Security, studies the varied aspects of cruise and ballistic missiles. The book is divided into six chapters for a holistic yet simplistic understanding of how ballistic and cruise missiles strengthen international security. Through these chapters, this book aims to study not just historical and present developments in missile technologies among states and non-state actors but also what drives them to develop and possess such capabilities and how states seek technological sophistication to strengthen their offensive capabilities. The book also tries to understand the various complexities that prevent arms control or disarmament of missile systems. While books on missiles have been penned, this book offers an understanding of how missiles play a crucial role in international security by attempting to deal with subject matters from a holistic point of view v

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covering some of the crucial aspects that determine the role of missiles in international security. Given the present scenarios of Ukrainian War or the Syrian crisis or even the Houthi attack in Yemen, it is beyond the intellect capability to conclude whether missiles add to or undermine international security as what adds to security and strength for one state becomes a threat to security for another. This book explains these nuances but draws limitations to concluding whether missile strengthens or undermines security. Hence, in its way, the book leaves further scope for scholars to work on these aspects and draw more conclusions to refine research on such an important and crucial issue.

Motivation In an anarchical world order, states will continue to develop sophisticated weapon systems to strengthen both their combat and deterrent capability, while also try to increase their political leverage in the international system and influence strategic goals. Missiles are ideal weapon systems that ensure a state these advantages. Today, ballistic and cruise missiles are not just available to developed states but developing states are also acquiring them. States are aspiring to acquire most advanced missile capabilities and hence, seeking for technological sophistication in missile technology. This aspiration is so strong that for some states even coercive diplomacy or other stick approaches like imposing sanctions have failed to act as a deterrent to prevent them from acquiring missile capabilities. It is in this context that the book discusses in each of its chapters the various nuances and conceptual and technological perspectives surrounding missile forces and how they contribute or prove detrimental to international security. Chapter 1 on Theoretical Understanding of Role of Missiles in International Security discusses the path of structural realism and its branches— offensive realism and defensive realism—to comprehend the relevance of missile systems in strengthening global security. The effort has been to keep the chapter as simple as possible for enabling even those without an International Relations background to fathom the concepts. The global system today is anarchic and structural realism builds upon the fact that the anarchic structure of the global order is the major reason for insecurities among states that could lead to situations of crisis, conflict and even war. Thus, despite deterrence, war is a possibility at any time. States are driven by the motivation of survival, self-help and security dilemma in the anarchic world order.

INTRODUCTION

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Chapter 2 on Technological Aspects of Missile: Missiles and Warheads aims to understand the relation between missiles and warheads—both strategic and tactical gains that they could provide taking structural realism into account. The chapter explains both the theoretical and technological aspects. It explains how security dilemma and quest for survival not just lead a state to developing missile systems but also the type of warheads that could strengthen the credibility of the missile systems, and other related technologies the states could employ on their missile capabilities. These decisions also depend largely on its security dilemma owing to the threat environment the state is subjected to. Anarchy is integral to structural realism and under anarchy states are concerned with relative gain and maintaining their balance of power. This concern that other states would cheat and the greed to achieve relative gains by state can lead a state to develop lethal capabilities to negate its concerns and also to further its interests of achieving relative gains. Chapter 3 on Role of Missiles in International Security discusses how missiles can be used for combat capabilities by providing examples of them being used in conflict situations, how they strengthen deterrence, how they could be used as ‘weapons of terror,’ and how they are used by states to prevent nuclear blackmailing or coercive diplomacy. The chapter also studies how states use missile systems to prevent themselves from cowtowing to demands of greater powers with examples of Iran and North Korea and pursue their own capabilities. The chapter also explains how missiles enhance the prestige and status symbol of states in regional and international platform. All this is explained from the paradigm of structural realism with special focus on ‘security dilemma’ that best suited to comprehend this paper. Chapter 4 on Why states acquire missile system though appears similar to the above chapter, it however, delves into factors that affect a state’s decision to acquire missile capabilities. The chapter also delves into reasons why states can also give up these capabilities with the help of a case study on South Africa. The chapter discusses how if ‘security dilemma’ could lead a state to develop missile capability, the same ‘security dilemma’ could also lead a state to disarm such capabilities when states feel possessing such capabilities could decrease rather than increasing a state’s security vis-a-vis other states in the region and also globally.

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Chapter 5 on Historical and Contemporary Missile Development Approaches discusses the historical developments of missile program and also studies the recent developments in missile capabilities of the states. The chapter discusses the five main powers—the United States, Russia, China, France and Britain. However, no study on missiles and its role in international security can be complete without understanding how and why regional powers develop such capabilities. Hence, the chapter is also sub-divided into regional powers and their missile capabilities for broader understanding. These sub-chapters discuss missile development in the Middle East and North Africa region, South Asia, North East Asia and Asia Pacific. The chapter theoretically argues why these states, permanent fives and also regional powers, have progressed with their missile capabilities and will continue to only modernise their capabilities. The chapter also deals with non-state actors in the region and their missile capabilities and how states proliferate such systems for their own strategic benefits. Chapter 6 on Survivability of Nuclear Missile Forces and Contemporary Debates discusses how states with nuclear capable missiles must develop survivability options irrespective of their nuclear doctrines. However, it also argues that missiles that are conventional capable must also be survivable to strengthen their deterrence capability and prevent being wiped out by an enemy attack. The chapter is explained taking into account ‘structural realism’ and broadly draws the inferences from the paradigm of ‘security dilemma.’ The chapter argues on the lines of balance of power, ‘security dilemma,’ the quest for survival and self-help in anarchic world order that mainly lead a state to acquiring missile forces that are survivable. Chapter 7 On Can the World do Without Missiles? discusses the nuances of complete disarmament of missile capabilities and arms control regimes and also discusses the various possibilities of ensuring stability for both nuclear and conventional and unconventional1 capable missile systems. Those that argue in favour of disarmament or even arms control would also do so from the perspective of structural realism and argue on the basis of maintaining ‘balance of power,’ security dilemma, state survival

1 Given the deterrent value of nuclear weapons, its yield and psychological impacts,

the author has assigned nuclear weapons as a separate category of weapon systems from unconventional weapons.

INTRODUCTION

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even if they do not consciously mention these terms. Amid the Covid19 crisis, it becomes crucial to also discuss the relevance of missiles in a post-Covid-19 order.

Conclusion The book concludes by adding the valuable observations and recommendations imbibed from the above chapters in a gist for easier and quicker understanding. For some states, a strong economy has enabled them to build a base for missile development infrastructure. Some sanctioned states on the other hand have used missile technology as a weapon for export purposes to earn hard cash. Again they have also proliferated such systems to non-state actors not just for hard cash but also for creating a two-pronged deterrent approach against their adversaries. Amid these developments, the project is relevant and timely to describe the prospects and nuances of cruise and ballistic missile developments from global perspective.

Contents

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Theoretical Understanding of Role of Missiles in International Security Structural Realism Offensive Realism Conclusion Technological Aspects of Missile: Missiles and Warheads A Theoretical Framework to Eplain the Relation Between Missiles and Warheads Missiles and Nuclear Warheads Missiles and Non-nuclear Payload Conclusion Role of Ballistic and Cruise Missiles in International Security Comprehensive National Power (CNP) National Security Combat Capability Coercive Diplomacy and Force Projection Deterrence and Stability Psychological and Weapon of Terror Foreign Policy and Decision Making Stature and Prestige Conclusion

1 3 10 17 19 19 26 27 30 33 34 35 35 38 40 45 46 48 49

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CONTENTS

Why States Desire for Missile Systems? Threat Perception Defence Budget Geostrategic Needs Technological Needs Political Requirements Foreign Policy Why States Give Up Missile Capabilities: Case Study of South Africa Conclusion Historical and Contemporary Missile Development: Nuclear Weapon States, Regional Powers and Other Powers Early Firepower Global Powers The United States Russia Britain France China Conclusion Regional Players: Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Israel Iran Turkey Saudi Arabia Syria Yemen Qatar UAE Iraq Libya Egypt Algeria Sudan Morocco Non-state Actors Hezbollah

51 52 55 56 58 60 63 66 67

69 70 70 70 74 79 82 86 91 92 92 95 99 100 101 103 105 106 106 107 109 112 113 114 115 115

CONTENTS

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Hamas ISIS Conclusion Regional Players: South Asia/North East Asia/Asia Pacific South Asia India Pakistan Regional Players: Asia Pacific/North East Asia North Korea South Korea Japan Taiwan Australia ASEAN Countries Other Powers Europe Central Asia Africa Latin America Conclusion

117 117 118 118 118 119 122 126 126 130 132 133 134 135 138 138 142 142 142 143

Survivability of Nuclear Missile Forces and Contemporary Debates First Strike and Role of Missiles Counter-Strike/Second-Strike Capability and Role of Missiles Making a Nuclear Missile Force Survivable Case Study: China Conclusion

145 146 152 154 160 161

Can the World Do Without Missiles? Complete Disarmament Arms Control Role of Missiles in a Post-Covid-19 Global World Credible Minimum Deterrence and ‘No-First Use’: The Ideal Answer to Global Stability Steps to Reduce Threat from Missiles Conclusion

163 164 168 171 175 175 176

Conclusion

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Index

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CHAPTER 1

Theoretical Understanding of Role of Missiles in International Security

Theories are “beacons, lenses, filters that direct us to what, according to the theory, is essential for understanding (some part of) the world.”1 Every phenomenon in international relations can be fathomed and explained with the help of international relations theory. The international system is anarchic where state is the referendum object. Therefore, in the absence of a supranational power, states seek to enhance their own capabilities to, both economic and military capabilities in order to preserve their sovereignty and most importantly, their survival. Based on the level of a state’s desire for power and prestige and its willingness to strengthen deterrence, the state may choose to work towards a credible conventional military capability or choose to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to further. Such decisions are driven by the level of power that a state wants to achieve. Ballistic and cruise missiles are a crucial component of a state’s hard power. Therefore, it is imperative to understand the role of missiles in building a state’s military capability and its role as a tool for coercive diplomacy and foreign policy decision making from a theoretical perspective.

1 Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in Theories of International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, First Edition: 1996, Last Edition: 2009).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Ghoshal, Role Of Ballistic And Cruise Missiles In International Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48063-8_1

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It is for this purpose that the chapter is attempted to understand how theories are relevant in security studies and to understand what incites states to develop ballistic and cruise missiles. Several theories in international relations can explain the causes and effects of how the international system functions. These include realism and its branches, liberalism, neo-liberalism, cognitive theories, constructivism and feminism, behaviouralism, collective defence theory, chaos theory and decisionmaking analysis. Most theories are formulated with the notion that national interest is of paramount importance to the state. Realism and its branches include classical realism, balance of power theory, neo-classical realism, neo-realism or structural realism and offensive and defensive realism. However, for broader understanding, the chapter discusses the aspects of structural realism and its branches—offensive realism and defensive realism—to understand the role of missiles in international security comprehensively. The choice of this theory is to be able to understand the subject from a more realist perspective. This would have helped in fathoming the issues covered in the book in a more easy and subtle manner. Adopting structural realism as a theory to understand this subject does not necessarily imply that other theories are not relevant in this study. However, there is scope for fathoming of concepts and developments taking place around the world by adopting this theory as central to one’s study. Not that structural realism does not have its flaws, but as long as states are driven by the motive to acquire power, understanding international security without the understanding of how structural realism is integral to power seeking states could become complex. While scholars could try to understand ‘security dilemma’ and arms build-up through liberalism, neo-liberalism and constructivism, they would still need to explore ‘realism’ to understand how states behave in certain circumstances to make conclusions about alleviating this ‘security dilemma.’ The theory covers an integral aspect ‘security dilemma’ that no other theories deal with. It mostly explains why states acquire weapon systems or behave with their weapon systems in a particular manner. Liberalism and neo-liberalism argue for ways to alleviate ‘security dilemma’ and constructivism argues for alleviating ‘security dilemma’ as “one of the channels through which reshaping identity can remake anarchy, they all

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discuss means to alleviate ‘security dilemma’ and argue for democratic institutions to achieve this.”2 Structural realism discusses how in the absence of a supranational institution to alleviate ‘security dilemma,’ states seek for weaponisation to lessen this concern. The theory also gives greater scope to deal with this issue as its branches of offensive realism and defensive realism (of which security dilemma is a component (component of defensive realism)) help understand the topic from both offensive and defensive perspectives. That ‘security dilemma’ can be regulated by both material and psychological factors3 both of which can be ensured through missile developments as missiles strengthen deterrence credibility as well as act as psychological weapons.

Structural Realism Structural realism is a theory propounded by Kenneth Waltz. A branch of realism and hence, this theory also had to perceive that war among states is a natural phenomenon since state is always the referent object. Neo-realism also called structural realism is defined as a “systemic theory about the way in which systemic pressures expressed through the balance of power constrain the behaviour of states.”4 Hence, neo-realism becomes a “coherent” method to understand the subject of missiles and its relevance in international security as unlike classical realism that would focus on variations in actor characteristics and how actors or observers would reflect on what they would do if they faced some crisis, structural realism relies on the changes in the attributes of the system itself.5 Hence, unlike classical realism that claims human nature responsible for a state’s behaviour, structural realism clearly negates any role of human nature on 2 Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies, October 8, 2009 (Full article: The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis [tandfo nline.com]). 3 Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies, October 8, 2009 (Full article: The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis [tandfo nline.com]). 4 George Sorensen, “‘Big and Important Things’ in IR: Structural Realism and the Neglect of Changes in Statehood,” in ed., Ken Booth, Realism and World Politics (Routledge: New York, 2011). 5 Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond” (https://www.rochelleterman.com/ir/sites/default/files/keohane%20neorealism.pdf).

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a state’s behaviour. As Robert Keohane puts it, structural realism “provides an insufficient basis for explaining state interests and behaviour,” …. “[y]et” [it] “is an impressive intellectual achievement: an elegant, parsimonious, deductively rigorous instrument for scientific discovery.”6 As mentioned, the global system today is anarchic and not hierarchic in nature, with the absence of a supranational body and structural realism is built upon the fact that the anarchic structure of the global order is the major reason for insecurities among states that could lead to situations of crisis, conflict and even war. War becomes possibility only when state system possesses capabilities to sustain war. Missiles form a component of that capability build-up for the state to be able to sustain itself in war. Waltz claims that states are driven by the motivation of survival—one of the crucial determinants of its father theory, realism.7 Waltz further argues, “in anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states seek such other goals as tranquillity, profit, and power…The first concern of states is not to maximise power but to maintain their positions in the system.”8 States usually resort to hard power prowess as a crucial means of survival. Ballistic missiles strengthen deterrence and ensure that a state possesses currency of power crucial to its survival. Hence, the chance of nuclear blackmail by adversaries could be limited even if the state does not possess nuclear weapons, but have nuclear capable missiles and bombs in basement for example, Iran. One of the central notions that encircle structural realism is the ‘security dilemma.’ Robert Jervis, a structural realist and who worked extensively on the concept of security dilemma, defines security dilemma as a situation in which “the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.”9 Though a branch of defensive

6 Robert O. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond” (https://www.rochelleterman.com/ir/sites/default/files/keohane%20neorealism.pdf). 7 “Political Realism in International Relations,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, July 26, 2010 (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/). 8 Sten Rynning and Jens Ringsmose, “Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist? Reviving Classical Realism as an Approach to Understanding International Change,” International Politics, Vol. 45, 2008, pp. 19–39 (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/palgrave. ip.8800217). 9 As defined by Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1, October 1997.

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realism, security dilemma is, however, independent of offensive or defensive capabilities. China is not only apprehensive of US nuclear capable ballistic missiles, a reason why China keeps its nuclear forces in ambiguity to strengthen deterrence against the United States, but China’s security dilemma also arises due to the missile defence network which the United States plans to field in the Indo-Pacific region as it negates China’s nuclear deterrent capability. This has resulted in China developing counter-measures on their ballistic missiles against US missile defence system. As Charles Glaser in his paper writes, without security dilemma, “a system of rational states motivated solely by security would never generate security competition, arms races or war.”10 Most states tend to act rational in the international system, and unless there is security dilemma existing between states, states would not drive for improvising their hard power prowess. This can be well fathomed taking into consideration the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). As long as both Russia and the United States were driven by security impulse that the treaty served their purpose, they remained obligated to the treaty. However, the security dilemma that China was developing INF category missile systems, and then both the parties accusing each other of violating the treaty led to the United States pulling out of the INF treaty. Glaser further argues, “uncertainty about other states’ motives is an essential component of the security dilemma.” Variation in a state’s information about an opposing state’s motives—both the information it possesses at the beginning of their interaction and the updated information that results from their interaction—influences the severity of the security dilemma and choices between competitive and cooperative policies. For example, when states develop satellite launch vehicles (SLV), the program is often misconstrued by adversaries as a step towards developing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) especially when the state had already progressed with a ballistic missile program or have showed interest to do so. For instance, based on technical parameters of Iran’s SLV program, there have been debates whether the SLV program could be used to

10 Charles L. Glaser, “Structural Realism in a More Complex World,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 403–414 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/200 97862).

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launch ICBM in the future.11 A flight test of a missile with capabilities to conduct anti-satellite (A-SAT) role can be viewed as an A-SAT weapon and lead adversaries to follow suit. Therefore, as Glaser further explains, “whereas information about motives may appear to be an optional variable for assessing alliance choices, it is an essential variable when assessing the magnitude and implications of the security dilemma.”12 It is also worthwhile discussing how information about motives can help assessing alliance choices. Despite a NATO member, Turkey had developed defence ties with China. Beijing provided Ankara with B-611 short range ballistic missile, and Turkey has improvised on this technology and developed more sophisticated Bora solid-fuelled ballistic missile.13 Interestingly, it is the same Chinese derived Bora missile, export version Khan, which is being sold to Indonesia to strengthen their deterrence capabilities against China.14 Waltz in his study writes, “competition in multipolar systems is more complicated that competition in bipolar ones because uncertainties about comparative capabilities of states multiple as numbers grow, because of the cohesiveness and strength of coalitions are hard to make.”15 Notwithstanding the attempt of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon) to promote a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) for Middle East, the effort has not yet fructified. Israel, for instance, is believed to be in a virtual state of possessing nuclear weapons

11 Michael Elleman, “Why Iran’s Satellite Launch Does Not Amount to an ICBM Test,” IISS, January 17, 2019 (https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/01/iran-satell ite-launch). 12 Stephen Evans, “Is North Korea’s Leader Kim Jong-un Rational?,” BBC News, March 18, 2017 (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39269783). 13 Dr. Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey’s Bora Missile Saw Combat Debut: What Next?,” AA, June 19, 2019 (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/turkey-s-bora-missile-saw-combatdebut-what-next/1508723#:~:text=At%20the%20time%20being%2C%20Bora,uptrend% 20in%20the%20Bora%20line). 14 Tayfun Ozberk, “Indonesia to Be First Foreign User of Turkey’s Khan Missile System,” Defense News, November 8, 2022 (Indonesia to Be First Foreign User of Turkey’s Khan Missile System [defensenews.com]). 15 Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 5–41 (http://jstor.org/stable/2626772).

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though they have also assured that they would not be the first to introduce the same in Middle East.16 In addition, Israel is reported to be possessing nuclear capable ballistic missiles both ground and sea-launched Jericho II and Jericho III of medium, intermediate-intercontinental ranges and submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).17 Iran too possesses medium and intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles that are nuclear capable. In addition, following US withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear deal, Iran is also feared to be pursuing a nuclear energy program that could lead to it producing weapons grade uranium in a short time.18 Turkey also prioritised the development of missile technology, and Bora missile has also witnessed combat debut in May 2019 during the Operation Claw in Northern Iraq.19 Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, has also expressed his interest to pursue nuclear weapons for Turkey, “several countries have missiles with nuclear warheads, not one or two. But [they tell us that] we can’t have them. This I cannot accept.”20 Again, Saudi Arabia has acquired medium range ballistic missile (MRBMs) of the DF-21 categories from China.21 This multi-polar competition in the region has made it difficult for Middle East region to achieve an NWFZ. However, unlike John Mearsheimer, a supporter of structural realism, Waltz’s claims are defensive in nature and he argues that states aspire for

16 “Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Israel,” Arms Control Today, July 2018 (https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/israelprofile). 17 “Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Israel,” Arms Control Today, July 2018 (https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/israelprofile). 18 Patrick Wintour, “Iran Resumes Uranium Enrichment in New Step Away from the Deal,” The Guardian, August 5, 2019 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/ nov/05/iran-announces-injection-of-uranium-gas-into-1044-centrifuges). 19 Can Kasapo˘ glu, “Turkey’s Nuclear Onset,” SWP Comment, October 2019, No. 38 (https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2019C38_k asapoglu.pdf). 20 “Shannon Bugos, “Turkey Shows Nuclear Weapons Interest,” Arms Control Association, October 2019 (https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-10/news/turkey-showsnuclear-weapons-interest). 21 Jeffrey Lewis, “Why Did China Saudi Arabia Buy Chinese Missiles?,” Foreign Policy, January 30, 2014, (https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/30/why-did-saudi-arabia-buychinese-missiles/).

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security by maintaining their relative power vis-à-vis other states.22 Glenn Snyder in his paper chalks out that Waltz’s states are less fearful than Mearsheimer’s, more accepting of risks, more oriented towards particular non-security interests and more willing to live with only a modest amount of security.23 Acceptance of a ‘no-first use’ doctrine by a nuclear weapon state and working on the survivability of nuclear delivery systems like developing solid propelled ballistic missiles, road and rail mobile missiles, developing submarine launched missiles leads to state to acquire modest amount of security. In fact, India’s nuclear posture of a ‘credible minimum deterrence’ seeks for a minimum nuclear deterrent capability that is credible, and hence, the focus has been to concentrate on survivability of the nuclear forces than the quantitative competition in nuclear arms race. Adoption of a ‘no-first use’ doctrine is also an implication to the fact that the state adopting such a doctrine is less fearful of the nuclear doctrines or strategy of other states and would prioritise on focusing on its own policies, strategies and postures to strengthen its nuclear deterrence. Waltz also states, “the absolute quality of nuclear weapons sharply sets a nuclear world off from a conventional role.”24 Nuclear weapons comprise not only nuclear warheads but also delivery systems like missile capabilities that become ‘weapons of terror.’ Glenn Snyder writes, “balance of terror” “centres on a different form of power- not the power to contest control of territory but the power to inflict severe punishment and to deter by the threat of such punishment.”25 Waltz also argues that there is no potential for miscalculation in a nuclear war. No such potential for miscalculation exists in a nuclear conflict. Nuclear war and the uncertainty of the outcomes given the cataclysmic effect of the nuclear weapons in case of nuclear exchange make it irrational for states to engage in nuclear war. Hence, possibility of 22 Zanvyl Krieger and Ariel Ilan Roth, “Nuclear Weapons in Neo Realist Theory,” International Studies Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 369–384 (http://www. jstor.org/stable/4621831?origin=JSTOR-pdf). 23 Zanvyl Krieger and Ariel Ilan Roth, “Nuclear Weapons in Neo Realist Theory,” International Studies Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 369–384 (http://www. jstor.org/stable/4621831?origin=JSTOR-pdf). 24 Zanvyl Krieger and Ariel Ilan Roth, “Nuclear Weapons in Neo Realist Theory,” International Studies Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 369–384 (http://www. jstor.org/stable/4621831?origin=JSTOR-pdf). 25 Glenn H. Snyder, “Balance of Power in the Missile Age,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1960 (Balance of Power in the Missile Age on JSTOR).

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a nuclear war among nuclear powers remains zero according to Waltz. While conventional war remains a possibility among states given the selfhelp nature of states, as seen in the Yemen crisis and the use of ballistic missiles by Houthi rebels, it also remains a possibility among two nuclear powers like the United States and Russia as seen in the Syrian crisis and the Ukrainian War fought under the nuclear shadow. Waltz further claims, “states perform or try to perform tasks, most of which are common to other states, the ends they aspire too are similar. Each state duplicates the activities of other states at least to a considerable extent.”26 The Russian and Chinese venture into hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) was a result of the US venture into hypersonic technology vehicle (HTVs). In one of my articles, as I have argued on India-Pakistan’s multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) equation, “Regional destabilization takes place when there is an offence-offence imbalance, meaning a state’s offensive capability is weaker than that of its adversary. Thus, when both Pakistan and India have MIRV capabilities, the offenceoffence balance is strengthened, which reinforces regional stability. The only other option to strengthen regional stability would be for both India and Pakistan to refrain from developing MIRVs and other new offensive capabilities in the first place. However, China’s venture into MIRV capability created a security dilemma in the region and left India with no other option but to develop similar capabilities to counter Chinese capabilities. Likewise, it would invite instability for Pakistan if it opted not to match India.”27 Waltz too argues on similar grounds, “[s]tability in the continent now exists; it had not existed since World War II and partition of India and Pakistan. Now with nuclear weapons, on both sides, India and Pakistan can no longer fight even conventional war over Kashmir.”28

26 As quoted in Daniel Deudney, “Dividing Realism: Structural Realism Versus Security Materialism on Nuclear Security and Proliferation,” Security Studies, Vol. 2, No. 3–4, 2010, pp. 5–36 (http://doi.org/10.1080/09636419309347518). 27 Debalina Ghoshal, “Pakistan’s MIRV Test: Positive Development for Strategic Stability?,” South Asian Voices, May 8, 2017 (https://southasianvoices.org/pakistan-mirvspositive-development-strategic-stability/). 28 “Rationality and Nuclear Weapons: Revisiting Kenneth Waltz by Gideon Hanft,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, October 24, 2011 (http://journal.george town.edu/rationality-and-nuclear-weapons-revisiting-kenneth-waltz/).

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Pakistan with MIRV capability + India without MIRV but with BMD capability = Destabilisation Pakistan with MIRV capability + India with MIRV and BMD capability = Stabilisation

Pakistan without MIRV capability + India with MIRV and BMD capability = Serious Destabilisation Pakistan with MIRV and BMD capability + India with MIRV and BMD capability = Strengthened stabilitya

a Debalina Ghoshal, “Pakistan’s MIRV Test: Positive Development for Strategic Stability?,” South Asian Voices, May 8, 2017 (https://southasianvoices.org/pakistan-mirvs-positivedevelopment-strategic-stability/)

Offensive Realism Offensive realism is a branch of structural realism. John Mearsheimer, founder of the offensive realism theory, builds his theory upon Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism while focusing on the effects of the international anarchic structure. Peter Toft in his paper lists five characteristics of Mearsheimer’s theory29 : i. International politics is played out in an anarchical realm meaning that there is ‘no government of governments’ to enforce rules and punish perpetrators. While United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions exist to prevent states from developing missile capabilities, international legal regimes like Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) exist, but lack of a supranational body to govern the effective functioning of them limits their capabilities. ii. No state can ever be absolutely sure of each other’s intentions nor be sure that other states will not use force against them. South Korea, for instance, has developed ballistic missiles of 800 kms range as the state is unaware of North Korea’s intentions and wants to keep offensive deterrent capability of longer ranges. The

29 Peter Toft, “John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics and Power,” Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 8, 2005, pp. 381–408 (http://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065).

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Hyunmoo-II C of 800 kms range can keep of North Korea within its target.30 Furthermore, states suffer from imperfect information about each other’s intentions and intentions are in constant flux. Benign intentions can quickly change into malignant ones and vice versa. Despite possessing solid propelled ballistic missiles of Shaheen category that are mobile as well moving towards sea-based nuclear deterrence, and more survivable, Pakistan has not disclosed its nuclear doctrine. In 2019, Pakistani Major General, Asif Ghafoor, did clarify that Pakistan does not “have any ‘no-first use policy…our weapons are for deterrence.”31 However, there is no written doctrine that states whether Pakistan has adopted a ‘first-strike’ ‘pre-emptive’ or ‘preventive strike’ doctrine. There is, though, an assumption that Pakistan has adopted a ‘first-use’ policy.32 iii. Survival is the primary motivation of all states in the international system. For the sake of state survival, states enhance their hard power prowess that enables them from being away from blackmail by adversaries. For instance, Qatar was seen parading, in 2018, Chinese ballistic missile of 400 kms range that will be capable of “encompassing Qatar’s neighbouring Gulf States.” Following the blockade of Qatar, the state strengthened its ties with China and Russia.33 iv. States are rational entities in the instrumental sense of the world; that is, they think strategically about their external situation and choose the strategy that they think to maximise their basic aim of

30 “Seoul Displays 800kms Ballistic Missile, Hyunmoo to Target North,” Defense World.net, September 29, 2019 (https://www.defenseworld.net/news/20797/Seoul_Dis plays_800Km_Ballistic_Missile__Hyunmoo_to_Target_North#.XlPQ7yozbIU). 31 “Amid Tensions with India, Pakistan’s Military Clarified on Wednesday That It Does Not Follow the “No-First Use’ Policy on Nuclear Weapons,” The Economic Times, September 5, 2019 (https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/wedont-have-any-no-first-use-policy-pak-military/articleshow/70981526.cms). 32 John Kryzaniak, “Is India “Creatively Reinterpreting” Its No-First-Use Policy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, August 30, 2019 (https://thebulletin.org/2019/08/ is-india-creatively-reinterpreting-its-no-first-use-policy/). 33 Debalina Ghoshal, “Qatar: Time to Shape Up,” Gatestone Policy Institute, November 26, 2018 (https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/13345/qatar-time-to-shape-up).

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survival. For instance, Pakistan has adopted ‘full spectrum deterrence’ in its nuclear strategy that involves nuclear weapon systems with ranges as low as 60 kms to as farther as 2,750 kms.34 Though many may believe that the strategy is formulated only as a deterrence against India, the author argues that this strategy is also a deterrence against Israel—owing to Pakistan’s Israeli threat perceptions and the fact that Israel reportedly had plans to bomb Pakistani nuclear facilities in the past.35 v. States always possess some military capacity enabling them to hurt and possibly destroy each other. The existence of submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) that are nuclear capable is a clear message by state that they are prepared to survive enemy strikes against them and launch a nuclear counter- or second strike against adversaries. In fact, it is the logic of mutual assured destruction (MAD) that strengthens deterrence between two states. Mearsheimer also argues “that the states soon realise that the most effective way to guarantee survival in anarchy is to maximise their relative power with the ultimate aim of becoming the strongest power- that is, a hegemon.”36 Since the 1995 Mischief Reef Incident in the South China Sea (SCS), China’s stance in the region has shifted to a more aggressive and assertive posture.37 China conducted anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) tests in the contested SCS region in 2019. China already placed anti-ship missiles in Spratly Island in 2018.38 All these steps by China point towards an ambition to become a hegemon in the region. 34 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan to Retain ‘Full-Spectrum Deterrence’ Policy,” Dawn, December 22, 2017 (https://www.dawn.com/news/1378106). 35 Debalina Ghoshal, “Pakistan’s Increasing Nuclear Stockpile: Is India the Only Threat Factor?,” Hudson Institute, October 28, 2015 (http://www.southasiaathudson.org/blog/ 2015/10/28/pakistans-increasing-nuclear-stockpile-india-the-only-threat-factor). 36 Peter Toft, “John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics and Power,” Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 8, 2005, pp. 381–408 (http://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065). 37 See Klaus Heinrich Raditio, “China’s Shifting Behaviour in the South China Sea: A Defensive Realist Perspective,” American Association of Chinese Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2, October 2015, pp. 309–328. 38 Steven Stashwick, “China’s South China Sea Militarisation Has Peaked,” Foreign Policy, August 19, 2019 (https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/19/chinas-south-chinasea-militarization-has-peaked/).

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But Mearsheimer also argues, “not all states can maximise their relative power simultaneously and, therefore, the state system is destined to be arena of relentless security competition as long as it remains anarchic.”39 While North Korea has developed and conducted nuclear testing, South Korea does not possess so. However, in the recent past, with the new President Yoon Suk Yeol’s keenness in nuclear weapons, the Forum for Nuclear Strategy was formed to discuss ways how South Korea to develop nuclear weapons.40 Relative power is the perceived power a state possesses in comparison with other states, and when states are not able to maximise their relative power despite strengthening their hard power prowess, they would have security competition. China is maximising its hard power prowess including developing sophisticated ballistic and cruise missile capabilities that are nuclear capable and survivable. However, in comparison with the United States, its quantitative and qualitative nuclear prowess is weaker, and hence, there is always a tussle for competition in the international system. China keeps its information on nuclear forces ambiguous to counter this limitation in relative power vis-à-vis the United States. Use of espionage for stealing information on missile, missile defence and nuclear warhead is a part of ‘assassin’s mace weapon strategy.’ Just like Waltz, Mearsheimer also rejects the reason for hunger for power as urge of human nature and concludes that it is due to the anarchic structure of the international system. One of the reasons why Iran has pursued its ballistic missile program despite UNSC Resolutions passed against it to prevent it from such programs is because Iran feels it has the right to develop such technologies to strengthen its deterrence and feel more secure in the region.41 Israel on the other hand, in response to Iran’s venture into sophisticated missile program, warns, “[t]o such a development, we have even better response-whether it be on land, in

39 Peter Toft, “John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics and Power,” Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 8, 2005, pp. 381–408 (http://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065). 40 Jean Mackenzie, “Nuclear Weapons: Why South Koreans Want the Bomb,” BBC News, April 22, 2023 (Nuclear Weapons: Why South Koreans Want the Bomb - BBC News). 41 “Iran Says It Has Developed Long-Range Cruise Missile,” Reuters, February 25, 2023 (Iran Says It Has Developed Long-Range Cruise Missile | Reuters).

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the air, or in the maritime arena, including both defensive and offensive means.”42 Mearsheimer discusses in his work the possibility of ‘hegemon’ or a ‘potential hegemon.’ Global hegemony is not a possibility unless a state has acquired the “capability to devastate its rivals without fear of retaliation” which in other words is to attain “nuclear superiority.” In the modern times, it is impossible to develop an assured ‘first-strike’ capability considering that states have better modes of nuclear forces survivability and have sophisticated air and missile defence systems. Hence, only regional hegemony can exist in the international system. However, if a region has more than one more power challenging the power of the hegemon, there would be no hegemony existing henceforth.43 The region of Middle East MENA has many powers struggling for regional hegemony with an absence of one particular power having achieved hegemony. This has become more complex with all major players in the region ballistic and cruise missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, Mearsheimer concludes that a state’s ultimate objective is to attain hegemony. Mearsheimer states, “for defensive realists, the international structure provides states with little incentive to seek additional increments of power; instead it pushes them to maintain the existing balance of power. Preserving power, rather than increasing it, is the main goal of states. Offensive realists, on the other hand, believe that status quo powers are rarely found in world politics, because the international system creates powerful incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs.”44 This could be both quantitative and qualitative improvements in power quotient. States like China, United States

42 Parisa Hafezi, “Iran Presents Its First Hypersonic Ballistic Missile, State Media Reports,” Reuters, June 6, 2023 (Iran Presents Its First Hypersonic Ballistic Missile, State Media Reports | Reuters). 43 Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, pp. 149–173 (https://www.jstor.org/stable/3092155?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#ref erences_tab_contents). 44 Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, pp. 149– 173.

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and Russia are competing in the nuclear arms race, but are also actively involved in the arms race of nuclear delivery systems. He further states that ‘appropriateness’ of power may keep varying from time to time owing to threat perceptions of states, and hence, what is appropriate in the present circumstance may not be appropriate for the future circumstance.45 Owing to its threat perceptions, Iran is focusing on long range ballistic and cruise missile capabilities. According to the reports, China is replacing its short range missile forces near Taiwan with long range DF-17 MRBMs. The DF-17s can carry HGVs and hence, can evade enemy missile defence systems.46 However, Mearsheimer does opine that war is a possibility in the international system even though it is costly. Rational states may choose war if benefits outweigh the cost as seen in the Ukrainian War. This notion of benefit is restricted to a state’s belief system and how it views its benefits. “Most importantly, a successful war might oust a rival thereby making the aggressor safer. Short of war, blackmail offers another option to make relative gains by threatening a rival to make concessions. Blackmail is, however, only effective against minor states as major states are able to resist.”47 For instance, China can indulge in nuclear blackmailing Taiwan as Taiwan does not possess nuclear weapons. China considers Taiwan as a part of its territory and its nuclear ‘no-first use doctrine’ does not apply to territories which fall under its jurisdiction. However, for Beijing to resort to nuclear blackmailing the United States, could be a complex task as the United States possesses nuclear weapons and is quantitatively and qualitatively ahead of China. In fact, it was the nuclear blackmailing of the United States in the 1950s’ Korean Crisis, when President Harry Truman blackmailed China of using nuclear weapons if it did not withdraw its

45 Glenn H. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1, Summer 2002, pp. 149– 173. 46 Shannon Bugos, “China Showcases Hypersonic Weapon Near Taiwan, U.S. Tests,” Arms Control Association, September 2022 (“China Showcases Hypersonic Weapon Near Taiwan | Arms Control Association). 47 Peter Toft, “John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics and Power,” Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 8, 2005, pp. 381–408 (http://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065).

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troops from Korea that became an important determinant for China to develop nuclear weapons. “Finally, states may gain power by way of bait and-bleed and bloodletting strategies — that is, by keeping or tricking rivals into protracted conflicts enabling the first state to get relatively stronger on the sidelines while the others fight. This is, however, difficult to do and the first state risks being exposed or confronting a winning rival alone should it unexpectedly prevail.”48 For instance, the India-Pakistan rivalry proves advantageous for China as the nuclear arms development between the two countries keeps India and its adversary focused on Pakistan, and China keeps arming Pakistan to strengthen its military capability making it another powerful nuclear power in the Southern Asia. Similarly, North Korea’s nuclear and missile developments in the Korean Peninsula act as a deterrent for China against its adversaries, the United States and its forward bases like Japan and South Korea. Both Waltz and Mearsheimer highlight the nuances of the international system from the prism of defensive and offensive realism, respectively. Every state that pursues missile capability seeks power and aspires only to maximise that power. This aspiration leads to technological advancements in missile capabilities. Powerful states like the United States also seek technology control regimes like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missiles (HCoC) to prevent states from acquiring power that could directly threaten the hard power prowess of the United States. But states maximise power with different logics that categorise them as offensive realists and defensive realists. India’s ‘no-first use’ doctrine coupled with its posture of concentrating on survivability of its nuclear forces rather than concentrating on a quantitative methodology of strengthening deterrence is an example of defensive realist posture. On the other hand, North Korea’s continued missile tests to express its angst and discontent arising due to any political and strategic steps taken by its adversaries are an example of offensive realism. Both the theories are relevant today to understand each state’s perspective to pursue missile technology program. A same state could adopt both offensive and defensive realist approach with changing circumstances. It is 48 Peter Toft, “John J. Mearsheimer: An Offensive Realist Between Geopolitics and Power,” Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 8, 2005, pp. 381–408 (http://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jird.1800065).

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a defensive realism paradigm that resulted in both the United States and erstwhile Soviet Union to sign the INF Treaty that restricted groundlaunched INF missiles. However, breaching of the treaty and developing INF category missiles by Russia as accused by the United States have led the United States to walk out of the INF Treaty. Again, same weapon system could be used from a ‘defensive realist’ approach and also from ‘offensive realist’ approach. For instance, states with first-strike or first-use doctrine will use MIRVs to strike first. On the other hand, states with nofirst use doctrine would use MIRVs to launch counter-strike on adversary. The ability to launch this assured counter-strike though enemy missile defence strengthens the state’s ‘no-first use’ doctrine and strengthens its will to follow the ‘defensive realist’ approach. France does not follow a ‘no-first use’ doctrine and adopts a ‘final warning’ limited nuclear strike should adversaries cross the red line.49 However, their nuclear deterrence (missiles) is based on SLBMs and not on land-based ICBMs. Despite the fact that SLBMs are more of a defensive weapon system used for a counter- or second strike owing to their survivability options, France has deployed them to suit their own doctrinal needs thereby adopting an ‘offensive realist’ approach. On the other hand, states like India and China that follow a ‘no-first use’ doctrine have concentrated on SLBM force for strengthening their counter-strike and second-strike doctrine, thereby adopting a ‘defensive realist approach.’

Conclusion Both the theories are relevant in the international system especially as the system is anarchic in nature. As long as the international system will remain anarchic, both defensive and offensive realisms to an extent could aid in providing a base to understand security imperatives. Each theory has its own relevance in strengthening nuclear and conventional deterrence and probably a logical approach to comprehending the role of missiles in international security. Since both the theories are a branch of structural realism and structural realism has been a basis of understanding this project, it became imperative to comprehend this complex issue of the role of missiles in international security by taking into account both the arguments and then inferring how the international system works placing 49 Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “French Nuclear Forces, 2019,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 7, 2019.

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the best arguments that could support the events of use or non-use of missile forces in international system. The same weapon for different states could lead to the adoption of a different doctrine, strategy and posture in the international system as a state’s decision making is dependent on its ‘security dilemma’ arising due to its threat perceptions. Both the theories, however, have their own limitations and anomalies. Having said that, both theories have contributed immensely to strengthen their father theory, structural realism. Mearsheimer, most importantly, fills the gap that Waltz had left in his research that helps readers to develop holistic understanding of structural realism from both defensive and offensive perspectives.

CHAPTER 2

Technological Aspects of Missile: Missiles and Warheads

Missiles are weapons of terror. Their cataclysmic nature is reliant not only on the sophistication of the missile system but also on the type of warheads being used. Inversely, the cataclysmic nature of warheads is also dependent on the sophistication of missile system as a missile with high circular error probable (CEP) will cause inaccuracy or with liquid propellants could cause hazards during their launch. An inaccurate ballistic missile even when carrying WMD may not be able to produce the strategic gains that could be achieved with an accurate ballistic missile with a conventional warhead also. In the present, even conventional warheads can have devastating impact against adversaries in order to gain strategic advantages. Amid this backdrop, this chapter aims to understand the relation between missiles and warheads—both strategic and tactical gains that they could provide taking structural realism from the perspective of structural realism.

A Theoretical Framework to Eplain the Relation Between Missiles and Warheads Anarchy is integral to structural realism and under anarchy “concerns with cheating and relative gains make states keen to their threat environment and leave them to their own devices to increase their capability © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Ghoshal, Role Of Ballistic And Cruise Missiles In International Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48063-8_2

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to balance material power.”1 This concern that other states would cheat and the greed to achieve relative gains by state can lead a state to develop lethal capabilities to negate its concerns and also to further its interests of achieving relative gains. Actual weaponisation of warhead demands sophisticated missile systems that would detonate a warhead at the desired heights of bursts and reliably disseminate the munitions or agent. Integration of missile and warhead thus is a crucial and complex task, but states are ready to undergo this technological challenge and fiscal constraints to maximise their security and prevent a scenario of ‘security dilemma.’ Based on how a state recognises its ‘security dilemma’ and how it wishes to negate that dilemma, states may choose to develop nuclear warheads or conventional or biological or chemical warheads for their missile system. If a state feels it could counter threats from adversaries with conventional warheads, the focus would be to develop sophisticated conventional warhead for missile delivery systems. For instance, the United States is developing capabilities to strike high value targets in any part of the world in less than one hour with conventional weapon systems. This is being strategised under Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) in which focus is on developing weapon systems including missiles that could carry conventional warheads. Self-help is integral to structural realism and states develop warheads best suited for their missile system or modify their missile system to suit their warhead requirements under this self-help notion. For CPGS to become successful, the United States considered the possibility of manoeuvring warheads that could slow down during re-entry and increase their angle of attack so that they could become “effective against some types of hardened and deeply buried targets.”2 However, focus was also on improving the accuracy of the long range missile systems to enable them to deliver conventional warheads effectively.3

1 Nori Katagiri, “Between Structural Realism and Liberalism: Japan’s Threat Perception and Response,” International Studies Perspective, Vol. 19, No. 4, November 2018, pp. 325–343, (https://academic.oup.com/isp/article/19/4/325/5067634). 2 “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,” Congressional Research Services, July 16, 2021 (https://sgp.fas.org/crs/ nuke/R41464.pdf). 3 “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,” Congressional Research Services, July 16, 2021 (https://sgp.fas.org/crs/ nuke/R41464.pdf).

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Structural realism asserts that a state aims to maximise military might, and given the fact that states view international system from materialistic lens,4 states will acquire most sophisticated missiles and warheads according to their capability in order to strengthen their materialistic prowess that constitutes hard power capability too. Hence, states could make efforts towards developing credible hard power capability. One of the major foci of states while developing missile systems is to be able to make them capable of evading missile defence systems of adversaries. For instance, warhead assembly may not separate from a missile as seen in the case of Pakistan’s Hatf-2 missile while in Hatf-3 the payload assembly is separated from the motor after burn out, and before re-entry.5 Separation of warhead from the ballistic missile adds to technical complexity but beneficial as they improve the accuracy of the missile system and also enables the missile system to evade missile defence system. Waltz also states that it is not just the desire for exerting military muscle but also the offensive projection of the state that enhances its security in the international system. Speed of the missile plays an integral part in determining the catastrophic effect of the warhead and thereby, determining the offensive advantage the state will have if it uses missile during conflicts or war. Higher speed missile systems can cause greater damage than lower speed ones. It is also noteworthy that the faster the missile and its warhead traversing, the lesser time it would take to close the distance between its launch pad and its target.6 This is a reason why states are concentrating on hypersonic and supersonic cruise missiles rather than depending on subsonic cruise missiles. Higher speed missile systems also have better chances of avoiding enemy missile defence system. In fact, HGVs can not only evade missile defence system of adversaries, but also help increase the range of ballistic missiles. Hence, those missiles that are travelling lofted or depressed trajectory to deliver warheads to the target can have an increased range on their missile system, as depressed or lofted trajectory flight reduces the 4 Ashfaq Ahmed, “The Philosophy of Nuclear Proliferation/Non Proliferation: Why

States Build or Forego Nuclear Weapons,” National Defence University, 2017 (http:// www.kirj.ee/public/trames_pdf/2017/issue_4/Trames-2017-4-371-382.pdf). 5 Duncan Lennox, “Pakistan,” in Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue Fifty Five (USA: IHS Global Limited, 2011). 6 “Physics of Ballistic Missiles,” Missile Threat.com (http://missilethreat.com/physcisof-ballistic-missiles).

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range of the ballistic missile. Similarly, MIRVs have an adverse effect on the range of ballistic missile systems. HGVs can correct this limitation as they increase the range of the missiles on which they mounted atop. Such developments enable a state to project its offensive capabilities and assure a state towards reaching the objective of power maximisation. Similarly, speed of warhead before re-entry is dependent on the range of its missile. Any inaccuracy can also be rectified (though not completely, but the Circular Error Probable (CEP) could be reduced) by re-estimating the ballistic co-efficient.7 Such measures enable a state to enhance their military power and prevent them from becoming a victim of blackmail by adversaries. Mearsheimer in his analysis lays stress on research and development in military avenues for developing sophisticated weapon systems that would ensure military self-sufficiency. One of the tasks of military planners is to ensure that weapons can reach their targets accurately. For this, warhead guidance is crucial. States may rely on their own research and development to develop such systems or acquire the same from other states that have pursued such research and development activities successfully. Warhead guidance is an important factor that determines the efficacy and hence the credibility of the missile system. It is important to ensure that the warhead is guided to the aim point with precision when the missile is close proximity to the target to produce military effect.8 The range/payload trade-off is not of much prominence in ballistic missile as compared to cruise missiles. It is comparatively easier to reconfigure cruise missile by decreasing the payload to increase the range. Though the same can also be done on ballistic missiles, the technical complexity as compared to cruise missile is greater. Increasing the accuracy of the re-entry vehicle could have a positive impact on the accuracy of the warhead on the missiles. This can be done with the help of inertial guidance system or global positioning system (GPS). Flab-based steering systems can be used on re-entry vehicles to enable it to manoeuvre so that the accuracy and angle of penetration can be increased. However, all these technologies would work successfully when states are able to distinguish the target from its surroundings. CEP must 7 Yasutada Kashiwagi, “Prediction of Ballistic Missile Trajectories,” National Technical Information Service, June 1968. 8 Dr. Carlo Kopp, “Military Technology: Cruise Missile Guidance Techniques,” Defence Today, June 2009 (http://www.ausairpower.net/SP/DT-CM-Guidance-June-2009.pdf).

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always be smaller than the kill radius,9 especially in the case of conventional warheads. If states have to balance against threats as a prerequisite of defensive structural realism,10 then their combat capability has to be credible. Credible combat and deterrence capability helps a state to balance against threats. One of the requirements of combat and deterrence capability is that such capabilities are accurate enough to be able to act as ‘weapons of terror.’ Payload bay can have small solid propellant motors at the rear that can be used after boost burn out or prior to re-entry to align the warhead for improved accuracy. Multiple-staging in missiles enables the missile to fly longer distances than single-staged ones. Accuracy of the warhead plays an even more crucial role in determining the destructive power of the missile than just the size of the warhead. Motors inside the re-entry vehicle can correct the trajectory during re-entry and reduce the CEP. Geodetic effects also affect the functioning of the warhead. The same warhead can have different effect in different geographical locations as was feared about the Soviet nuclear warheads carried by ICBMs during the Cold War.11 Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) with Terrain Contour Matching facilitate accurate delivery of both conventional and non-conventional warheads. Digital Scene Matching and Correlation improves terminal accuracy as seen in the Tomahawk cruise missile.12 Control jets in a missile enable the warhead to make steering corrections from separation to impact as seen in Chinese M-9 and M-11 missiles. However, only accuracy is not enough to cause destruction. The type of warhead also plays a crucial factor. For instance, sub-munitions

9 Kosta Tsipis, “The Accuracy of Strategic Missiles,” Scientific American, Vol. 233, July 1975 (The Accuracy of Strategic Missiles on JSTOR). 10 Sten Rynning, “Realism and the Common Security and Defence Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2011, pp. 23–42 (https://www.ies.be/files/ documents/JMCdepository/Rynning%2C%20Sten%2C%20Realism%20and%20the%20C ommon%20Security%20and%20Defence%20Policy.pdf). 11 See David Holloway, “Thinking About Nuclear War: The Soviet View,” in ed., Fred Holroyd, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London: Open University Press, 1985). 12 “BGM-109 Tomahawk,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/man/ dod-101/sys/smart/bgm-109.htm).

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have greater damage area cover than unitary warhead.13 For hard and deeply buried targets, the depth of the penetration of the warhead whether conventional or non-conventional or nuclear will also depend on the velocity of the warhead. The velocity can be increased by either dropping it from a higher altitude or using an external propellant. However, there has to be a limit on the velocity at which it would hit the ground. This is because warheads would need to hit the ground at speeds that would let its materials withstand the impact and survive the serve ground impact and cause destruction in order to prevent the warhead to destroy itself before it can even explode. For ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads, the control systems do not materially change beyond certain performance the accuracy of nuclear warheads. This is also the same case for chemical and biological warheads. Hence, the need to compensate for any high CEP in ballistic missile with technologies like homing guidance and terminal guidance is relatively lower than the need to do the same when the missile carries conventional warhead. If survival becomes one of the crucial objectives of states, states could resort to offensive power to survive. Missile whether ballistic or cruise is an integral component of military prowess that ensures state’s survival. In case of nuclear warheads, based on a state’s nuclear doctrine, nuclear posture and nuclear strategy, states decide whether to mate the warheads or keep them in semi-assembled state or completely assembled state, but these decisions are taken according to a state’s threat perceptions and thereby, the strategies and doctrine and postures best suited for its survival. States like Russia follow a ready deterrent posture where warheads are mated with some delivery systems14 while India follows a posture of ‘recessed deterrence’ where warheads are not mated with delivery systems.15

13 John Stillion and David T. Orletsky, “Emerging Threat Technologies,” in Airbase Vulnerability to Conventional Cruise Missile and Ballistic Missile Attacks: Technology, Scenarios and U.S. Air Force Responses (USA: RAND, 1999), p. 13. 14 Alex Lockie, “We Ranked the World’s Nuclear Arsenals—Here’s why China’s Came Out on Top,” Business Insider, January 26, 2019 (https://www.businessinsider.in/Weranked-the-worlds-nuclear-arsenals-heres-why-Chinas-came-out-on-top/articleshow/676 96646.cms). 15 Debalina Ghoshal, “India’s Recessed Deterrence Posture: Prospects and Implications,” The Washington Quarterly, April 29, 2016 (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ abs/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1170487?journalCode=rwaq20).

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China too keeps its nuclear warheads separate from its delivery systems. In fact, a major concern with both China and India’s sea-based nuclear deterrence is the fact that SLBMs would need to be mated with warheads while on patrol on SSBNs which would be a compromise to the posture of keeping the warheads separate from missiles.16 This has also been a concern with canister launched missile systems like the Agni-V. All these decisions taken by a state are dependent on a state’s objective of survival. Survival is also dependant on the credibility of the offensive missiles possessed by the state. If state possesses missile systems that could be intercepted by the adversaries’ interceptors, their offensive credibility remains doubtful. Reducing radar cross section of re-entry vehicle (RV) is crucial to increase their scope of remaining un-intercepted. Sharp nose-conned RVs have greater scope of remaining un-intercepted than blunt cone-shaped ones as the former has lower radar cross section and also helps the missile to maintain a high velocity during its flight increasing scope of evading enemy missile defence systems.17 Blunted nose, however, has an advantage that it resolves the heating problem in the missile, but when these missiles travel at hypersonic speeds they encounter large drag. Chromium coating of the nose of the missile can be helpful in reducing the drag and increasing the range of the missile.18 States do fathom that warheads whether conventional or nuclear will undergo diminishing returns after a certain level of destruction inflicted. The state needs to calculate the amount of destruction that can be caused accordingly. This is important as beyond a certain level of damage inflicted and strategic or tactical gain achieved or not, there would be no significant increase in the level of damage and even if that happens, the strategic or tactical gain may remain the same. Hence, the crucial decision that states would need to make is whether to focus on the quantitative factor of the missile, that is, to possess more number of missiles with single re-entry vehicle or to develop MIRV on missile systems to ensure less number of missiles are used to achieve the same rate of kill probability.

16 Ibid. 17 Richard A. Hartunian, “Ballistic Missiles and Re-entry Systems: The Critical Years,”

https://minutemanmissile.com/documents/ReentryVehicleDesignAndPhysics.pdf. 18 “Breakthrough Tech to Increase Range of High Speed Missiles,” Live Mint, October 16, 2008.

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Missiles and Nuclear Warheads Power maximisation according to Mearsheimer remains the ultimate aim of states. Whether the assumption is true for all states is difficult to fathom, but in the Cold War days, this assumption holds true in the case of the then two super powers. Throughout Cold War, strategic deterrence relied mostly on nuclear deterrence of the two super powers. Distinction was drawn between strategic nuclear warheads and TNWs based on their yield. The Soviets and the United States both developed TNWs resulting in the lowering of the nuclear threshold. Nevertheless, nuclear warheads, whether tactical or strategic, were considered as a means of massive firepower that could compensate for the poor precision and uncertainties in locating target. The presence of nuclear warheads with delivery systems like ICBMs and SLBMs raised the value of ‘force in being.’19 The symbolic value of nuclear warheads to strengthen deterrence was such that when the Soviets developed the ICBM R-7, it could be fitted with only two nuclear warheads,20 but the fact that the Soviets were capable of launching a nuclear attack on the United States became a determining factor to avoid war and initiate ‘perpetual peace.’ Waltz however, concludes, that this bipolarity coupled with nuclear weapons helped international system achieve a state of ‘the long peace’ and that bipolarity was good according to Waltz to counter the dangerous implications that nuclear weapons pose.21 A state’s materialistic possessions could determine the security it would wish to provide to its citizens.22 Nuclear warheads produce both anti-personnel and anti-material effects, thereby being the best WMD option for both counter-force and counter-value targeting. States with conventional inferiority vis-à-vis their adversaries could resort to nuclear warheads as a deterrent against adversaries’ conventional superiority. 19 Harvard Nuclear Study Group, “A Condition to Punish,” in ed., Fred Holroyd, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons (London: Open University Press, 1985). 20 Aleksnadr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “Grand Design,” in Khruschev’s Cold War:

The Inside Story of an American Adversary (USA: Norton & Company, 2006). 21 Harrison Wagner, “The Theory of International Politics,” War and State (https:// www.press.umich.edu/pdf/9780472099818-ch1.pdf). 22 Daniel H. Deudney, “Regrounding Realism: Anarchy, Security, and Changing Material Contexts,” Security Studies, December 24, 2007 (http://doi.org/10.1080/096364 10008429419).

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Increased range of missile systems increases the lethal range of the WMD, while the WMD warhead increases the lethality of the missile systems. Nuclear weapons and nuclear doctrines are not mainly for winning wars but for deterrence. In fact, according to Waltz analysis, nuclear weapons “negate the perennial political force of anarchy, and convert the anarchic state of war into peace more robust that could be reasonably provided by a global sovereign.”23 Nuclear weapons ensure lose-lose situation or a zero-sum game, deterring war since both states rely on mutual assured destruction (MAD) or assured destruction (AD) negating scope of achieving victory in war. But this mutual deterrence is not only dependent on nuclear warheads but also on the delivery systems. Without a credible capability to strike, deterrence becomes a paper tiger nullifying nuclear deterrence. If retaliatory or launch capability is zero, then deterrence is zero too and adversaries could launch an attack even if the state possessed nuclear warheads. With zero launch or retaliatory capability coupled with nuclear capability, crisis escalation becomes high as nuclear threshold is lowered. Ballistic missiles with counter-measures like decoys, chaffs, multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) can evade missile defence systems and, therefore, have better counter-strike/second-strike capability. Missile forces that are survivable have better scope of launching counter-strike/secondstrike capability. Hence, the nuclear zero-sum game also depends on the delivery systems not just quantitative but also on qualitative rather than just on nuclear warheads. This qualitative advantage does not only depend on qualitative improvements on the missile systems but also having a robust command and control system.

Missiles and Non-nuclear Payload As states exist in anarchy in the international system, they need to be prepared with capabilities that would be crucial to their survival—that is war-fighting capabilities than capabilities to strengthen deterrence. Conventional, chemical or biological warheads are actual warheads that have been used in warfare in the past. Thus, these warheads add to 23 Daniel H. Deudney, “Regrounding Realism: Anarchy, Security, and Changing Material Contexts,” Security Studies, December 24, 2007 (http://doi.org/10.1080/096364 10008429419).

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conventional and non-conventional capability. Hence, a state’s military capability is usually strengthened with real war-fighting capability like conventional, chemical or biological ones rather than just on weapons that are for power and prestige like nuclear weapons. The kind of warhead, whether nuclear or conventional or biological or chemical for missile system, would be a sovereign decision of the state unless bounded by international legal agreements. Conventionally armed ballistic missiles are becoming increasingly accurate and precise. Inertial guidance, terminal guidance and terminal homing systems with active millimetre wave radar could help improve accuracy of the missile considerably. GPS on ballistic and cruise missiles reduces the target location error of the missiles which in return would increase the accuracy of the missile systems. Warhead control thrusters can correct wind drift which can further enhance accuracy of the ballistic missiles. Midcourse guidance can also tremendously improve the accuracy in missile systems. Sub-munitions on ballistic missiles are far more effective against soft targets to blast or fragmentation damage than unitary warheads of the same weight as large overpressures are not required. With increase in payload, the destructive capability of the sub-munitions also increases. For unitary warhead, like high explosives, the lethal radius will be proportional to the cube root of the explosive weight, and hence, to double the lethal radius, eight times more explosives are required as compared to submunitions. Sub-munitions of chemical and biological warheads require lesser accuracy to achieve lethality against even targets located across large areas. Also, sub-munitions are difficult to be intercepted. This is because the sub-munitions have to be destroyed at sufficient range so that merely fragmenting the sub-munition could still cause lethality.24 Wider dispersal of biological sub-munitions would not just depend on the delivery system, but also on the shape of the sub-munitions. Submunitions can be spherical for wider dispersal and dart shape or cylindrical for compact dispersal.25 Cruise missile is a very efficient means to deliver 24 Charles R. Grizzle, “Theatre Missile Defence,” in Ballistic Missile Defence: Evolution and Current Issues (USA: General Accounting Office, 1993), p. 46. 25 Mark A. Prelas, “Biological Terrorism: Weaponisation and Delivery Systems,” in ed., Tushar K. Ghosh, Mark A. Prelas, Dabir S. Vishwanath and Sudarshan K. Loyolka, Science and Technology of Terrorism and Counterterrorism (USA: Taylor and Francis Group, 2010).

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biological agents as well as biological sub-munitions.26 Chemical weapons fitted on ballistic missiles, on the other hand, can become weapon for regional deterrence in the absence of a secure second-strike capability. States like Syria do not possess nuclear weapons, but their deterrence solely relies on chemical weapons and ballistic missiles.27 When ballistic missiles are manoeuvrable, they can be used to deliver biological and chemical weapons. However, a pure ballistic trajectory limits the effectiveness of chemical or biological attack due to the high re-entry speed that makes it difficult to distribute the agent. Tactical missiles on Multi Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) can do greater damage due to their greater area coverage owing to the ‘shoot and scoot’ tactics of MLRS. With better payloads, number of tactical ballistic missiles to cause damage would also reduce. States could make their missiles dual capable—that is capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional warheads as seen in the case of Chinese DF-26 category missiles. This raises concern and doubts in the minds of adversaries regarding the payload of the missile system in case they are deployed. Cruise missiles can be used to even deliver high-powered microwave weapons (HPM), electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and directed energy weapons (DEWs). The United States has fitted HPMs into ALCMs that can be launched from the B-52 bombers, namely the Counter-Electronics High Powered Microwave Advanced Missiles Project (CHAMP)28 that would be used to disable electronic devices, thereby destroying control and reducing collateral damage. EMPs also disrupt and damage electronic systems and electronic infrastructure that could affect telecommunications, financial systems, postal systems, trade and related works, electricity and many more.29 26 Ibid. 27 Interview of Robert McMohan, “Can Syria’s Chemical Weapons Be Stopped?,”

Council on Foreign Relations, April 16, 2018 (https://www.cfr.org/interview/can-syriaschemical-weapons-be-stopped). 28 “Air Force Deploys B-52 Missiles That Could Disable Enemy Military Electronics with High-Power Microwaves,” Military and Aerospace Electronics, May 17, 2019 (https://www.militaryaerospace.com/rf-analog/article/14033453/air-force-deploys-b52missiles-that-could-disable-enemy-military-electronics-with-highpower-microwaves). 29 “Threat Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse,” House Committee on Armed Services, July 10, 2008 (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg45133/html/ CHRG-110hhrg45133.htm).

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Conclusion The type of missile and warhead to be used or deployed depends on the strategic and tactical advantage the state wants to gain. A state desiring to rely on sea-based nuclear deterrence would deploy or induct SLBMs with nuclear warheads that would enable the state to ensure a counter/second-strike capability. A state desiring to rely on land-based nuclear deterrence will deploy or induct land-based ballistic or cruise missiles. A state desiring to rely on aerial-based nuclear deterrence will rely on air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) or air launched ballistic missile to deliver nuclear warheads. However, if nuclear deterrence is not the sole motive of the state, state could rely on conventional or non-conventional warheads. The ultimate aim is survival for the state and states will rely their deterrent capability on the type of weapon that would maximise its scope of survival. Weapons like HPMs, EMPs and DEWs act as defensive weapon systems even if they are mounted on offensive cruise missiles thus strengthening the concept of ‘defensive realism’ while missiles that can carry nuclear warheads, sub-munitions and conventional warheads strengthen the concept of ‘offensive realism.’ However, ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ realism is mostly dependent here on the target also rather than just the kind of warheads used. A nuclear warhead carried by ballistic or cruise missile used to destroy aircraft carrying cruise missiles is mostly a defensive in nature while nuclear warhead carried by ballistic or cruise missile used to destroy enemy cities or counter-value targets can be used as offensive weapon system. The choice of warhead and delivery systems depends on the ‘security dilemma’ and what weapon systems states choose to address this ‘security dilemma.’ Based on the choice of warheads and credible delivery systems, ‘security dilemma’ of adversaries can either become aggravated or adversaries could have more secure regarding the intention and posturing of the state’s weapon systems. Whatever be the choice of capability, deterrence remains crucial and states will develop those capabilities that would increase their status, power and prestige in the international system, thereby increasing their scope of survival.

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Having dealt with technological nuances of missile systems, the next chapter concentrates on the role of missiles in strengthening a state’s regional and international status, strengthening a state’s combat capability and preventing a state from being dominated by other states in its foreign policy and decision making.

CHAPTER 3

Role of Ballistic and Cruise Missiles in International Security

‘Security dilemma’ exists and because it exists, states fall victim to this. This leads states to strengthen their hard power prowess to possess credible combat and deterrent capability. This credibility is measured not only in quantitative terms but also in qualitative terms. If hard power is integral in a state’s power calculus, missiles are an integral component in that calculus. They provide a sense of power and prestige to the state possessing them. Any state that aspires to become great power or regional power ideally looks towards strengthening their hard power capability. This can enable a state to maintain its independent foreign policy, hence protecting its sovereignty rather than aligning with the decision and policy makings of its partners and allies. Hence, the study would remain incomplete without the understanding of how ballistic and cruise missiles play an integral role in strengthening international security. Structural realism provides a coherent understanding of the role of missiles in international security. However, to make our understanding of this chapter easy, the chapter studies how ‘security dilemma’ plays an integral role in enhancing a state’s comprehensive national power, combat capability, enabling coercive diplomacy and bargaining, ensuring deterrence and stability, psychological and weapon of terror and many more.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Ghoshal, Role Of Ballistic And Cruise Missiles In International Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48063-8_3

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Comprehensive National Power (CNP) CNP is the measure of comprehensive capability of a state to pursue its strategic objectives which include military power too. This concept of CNP grew popular in China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Some of the factors that need to take into consideration while comprehending CNP include economy, military, internal security and social harmony, human capital, governance, knowledge and information, science and technology, geography and natural resources, foreign policy and diplomacy, national will and leadership.1 While all these factors affect CNP, it must be noted that military power strengthens economic power and vice versa. If long range missile capability is a necessity, a state with a strong Gross Domestic Product (GDP) could invest in building credible missile capability and also missile industrial complex that could further add to its GDP. Those states like North Korea that invest in missile technology despite poor economy result in pushing the state towards misery. Hence, for such states, military prowess like missile capability adversely affects many aspects of the CNP, though strengthens aspects like possessing national will and leadership and strengthening foreign policy, military and science and technology. North Korea has contributed its ICBM technology into its space program. The recent Chollima-1 satellite launch vehicle (SLV) dual nozzle liquid-fuelled engines developed from Hwasong-15 ICBM.2 A credible missile capability that could target a state’s economic assets puts either the state or its adversaries’ economic security at threat as they form vital counter-value targets. Whether a state converts its space program into missile development program like India or converts its missile program into space program like China, both become epitome of how states progress in science and technology. A state with a strong CNP is also less vulnerable to suffer from ‘security dilemma’ and more stable to pursue its national security objectives. If a state desires to secure its trade interests, a strengthened military capability that includes long range

1 Rahul K. Bhonsle, “Strategies for Enhancing India’s Comprehensive National Power,” Vivekananda International Foundation, March 2016 (https://www.vifindia.org/sites/def ault/files/strategies-for-enhancing-india-s-comprehesive-national-power.pdf). 2 Josh Smith, et al., “A Space Race on the Korean Peninsula,” Reuters, July 21, 2023 (A Space Race on the Korean Peninsula [reuters.com]).

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strike capabilities could protect its sea lines of communication (SLOC) and result in the state being less vulnerable to ‘security dilemma.’

National Security National security is the ability of a state to cater for means and methods to strengthen the security of its citizens. When states’ national security objectives become stronger, their ‘security dilemma’ alleviates, but the ‘security dilemma’ of their adversaries and neighbours aggravates. Missiles are also viewed as weapons that strengthen national security. When India test-fired its nuclear capable IRBM, Agni-V, in 2022, the then Minister of Parliamentary Affairs, Pralhad Joshi claimed that the missile would “strengthen national security” to an extent.3 These developments are despite criticisms from neighbours regarding missile developments. 4 But states prioritise their national security objectives to an extent that they would hardly be concerned about the ‘security dilemma’ of their neighbours. India has also raised concerns over Pakistan’s ‘full spectrum deterrence’ that called for the introduction of TNWs. However, Pakistan has continued to progress with its nuclear capabilities that range from 2,750 to 60 km. Similarly, nuclear triad in the United States that includes ICBMs and SLBMs in addition to bombers serve as the backbone to US national security.

Combat Capability As is a known fact that ‘security dilemma’ helps scholars fathom some of the most intricate details of international relations and international security. It also helps us understand why states choose to adopt a particular security strategy or policy and why states reject other security policies and strategies. If a state felt secure enough in the international system, it would probably never move towards strengthening its combat capability. But since the global system is anarchic in nature, and ‘security dilemma’ persists in region and in the global order, states seek to strengthen their 3 “India Test-Fires Agni-V Missile Amid Border Tensions with China,” Al Jazeera, December 15, 2022 (India Test-Fires Agni-V Missile Amid Border Tensions with China | News | Al Jazeera). 4 Ananth Krishnan, “China Questions India’s Missiles Project,” The Hindu, September 16, 2021 (China Questions India’s Missiles Project - The Hindu).

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combat capability. The more lethality their weapon systems produce, the more secure the state could feel in the international system. For offensive realists, ‘security dilemma’ makes war inevitable and rational.5 If war is inevitable, then states must develop weapon systems that would offer them maximum combat advantage. Herbert Butterfield states that ‘security dilemma’ drives states to war even though they may not want to harm each other.6 Butterfield states that conflicts arising from ‘security dilemma’ are tragic. Many of these tragic conflicts and wars have witnessed the use of ballistic and cruise missiles which can be tagged as the “universal sin of humanity”—one of the crucial propositions of ‘security dilemma’ according to Butterfield.7 As opposed to their more common role of missiles as tools of deterrence, the Iran-Iraq War proved that ballistic missiles can be used for combat purposes too in times of conflict. The use of ballistic and cruise missiles during the world war days was a perfect example of how ‘security dilemma’ was exacerbated by psychological factors—another proposition of Butterfield’s understanding of ‘security dilemma.’8 In the recent past, the world reportedly witnessed Syrian Scud missiles been fired at rebels.9 On the other hand, the United States has used the Tomahawk LACMs against the Syrian Assad regime.10 The

5 Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies, October 8, 2009 (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/096364109 03133050). 6 Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies, October 8, 2009 (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/096364109 03133050). 7 For a detailed understanding read, Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies, October 8, 2009 (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ pdf/10.1080/09636410903133050). 8 Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security Studies, October 8, 2009 (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/096364109 03133050). 9 Barbara Starr, Jill Dougherty, and Mike Mount, “Assad Forces Fire Scud Missiles in Syria, U.S. Officials Say,” CNN , December 13, 2012 (https://edition.cnn.com/2012/ 12/12/world/meast/syria-civil-war/index.html). 10 Alex Ward, ““Siege, Starve, and Surrender”: Inside the Next Phase of the Syrian Civil War,” Vox, February 28, 2018 (https://www.vox.com/2018/2/28/17057736/syria-eas tern-ghouta-attack-assad).

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Tomahawks have also been used in Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States in the past. The Houthis in Yemen are using sophisticated ballistic missiles against Saudi cities.11 Turkey, for instance, has used its Bora missiles in 2019 against Kurdish rebels in Iraq.12 Use of missile for combat purposes could be between states or against asymmetric organisations firing missiles at state actors as seen in the case of Houthis or states firing missiles at nonstate actors. As a part of full-scale invasion in 2022, Russia had used missiles against Ukrainian cities by firing them far from the frontline. With long range capability of missiles, stand-off capability during combat has also improvised. Use of ballistic missiles including Kinzhal missile, to attack Ukrainian infrastructure,13 defied the archaic notion that ballistic missiles are only meant for deterrence purpose. States could hence use missile systems during war times between states or even as a weapon for counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. In times of state to state conflict, missiles can be used to destroy soft targets like ports, airfields, cities and against hard targets like manoeuvre forces to create direct impact. However, these missile forces also create indirect impact in times of conflict. They may require adversaries to divert their combat capabilities in search for the state’s missile launchers to destroy them. The Scuds, for instance, “entered the lexicon of military planners and defence analysts as a synonym of tactical ballistic missiles.”14 But today’s missile systems of not just the United States and Russia, but also of developing states are far more technologically sophisticated than the Scuds. They are capable of evading enemy missile defence systems, have improved accuracy and high speeds and undergo tests to 11 “Houthis Fire’10 Ballistic Missiles’ at Saudi Airport,” Al Jazeera, August 26,

2019 (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/houthis-fire-10-ballistic-missiles-saudiairport-190825200633019.html). 12 Dr. Can Kasapoglu, “Turkey’s Bora Missiles Saw Combat Debut: What Next?,” Anadulo Agency, June 19, 2019 (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/turkey-s-bora-mis sile-saw-combat-debut-what-next/1508723). 13 Felipe Dana, “Russian Missiles Kill at Least 6 in Zelensky’s Hometown in Central Ukraine,” AP, August 1, 2023 (Russian Missiles Kill at Least 6 in Zelensky’s Hometown in Central Ukraine | AP NEws). 14 Major Bryan E. Greenwald, “The History, Development, and Military Significance of Ballistic Missiles on Tactical Operations,” United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1994–1995, file:///C:/Users/PC1/Downloads/439672%20(1).pdf (https:// www.apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA293648.pdf).

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prove their combat mettle in any time of the day or in any weather conditions. These missiles have become a challenge to not just ground forces but also aircraft carriers, aircraft and other counter-force targets. Such improvements in missile systems to prove their combat mettle can be attributed to ‘security dilemma’ that results in states developing weapon systems that could be more lethal than their adversaries or then other states in the region.

Coercive Diplomacy and Force Projection Given that the world order is anarchic, states must develop their own combat and deterrent capabilities to prevent adversaries from exercising the leverage of coercive diplomacy against the state and also prevent interference in decision making and foreign policy objectives by allies and partners and also adversaries. Coercive diplomacy in simple terms means “a policy or statecraft in which threats or limited uses of force are used to persuade an enemy to stop or reverse an action it has already initiated.”15 The stronger the hard power capability of a state, the greater it believes is its stature in international forum and greater is the state’s scope of bargaining and greater is its scope of force projection. States like Iran and North Korea have used their ballistic missile capability as a tool for force projection and coercive diplomacy. Missile prowess of a state has become a tool for bargaining in global politics. In fact, Iranian missile systems are capable of reaching targets in NATO countries and US forward bases in the Middle East and NATO. Though the capability of Iranian missile systems as weapon of coercive diplomacy or force projection remains debatable, Iran considers the missiles as a component of its coercive diplomacy and force projection. On the other hand, coercive diplomacy of the United States regarding Iranian nuclear impasse has not worked as despite the Trump administration walking out of the deal, the nuclear deal still stays in place with other countries following the deal. One of the reasons for the United States to fail in making Iran cow-tow to its own demands regarding the nuclear issue is the fact that Iran’s military capability over the years have given Tehran a greater stature in the regional platform and its capability to reach US forward bases makes the task even more complex. 15 “Glossary,” Lenses of Analysis (https://wwnorton.com/college/polisci/lenses/pro tect/glossary.htm).

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North Korea also views its missile capabilities as a tool for coercive diplomacy and also a weapon to express its angst and disappointment over policies and actions of its adversaries.16 It has test-fired missiles occasionally as an “armed protest” to show its discontent over US-South Korea military drills and related affairs.17 North Korea, for instance, has used their missile capability to coerce the United States to sign the peace treaty with it since as of now only armistice exists between the two states.18 Anti-ship cruise and ballistic missiles form an integral component of force projection as they directly threaten the naval prowess of adversaries adversely affecting their ability to exert maritime influence in the region. Iran’s anti-ship missile systems that could target US aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf can directly check the maritime influence of the United States in the Persian Gulf region. China’s test of anti-ship missiles in the South China Sea19 is another example of missiles being used for coercive diplomacy and projection of its assertiveness. Russia’s transfer of dual-capable Iskander-M missiles to Belarus that borders Ukraine to negate NATO’s combat readiness20 is to strengthen Russia’s coercive diplomacy means. In fact, this transfer of Iskanders in Belarus was viewed as a response to NATO’s expansion with Finland. Security dilemma warns, “offensive arms races and competition in risk taking are likely to create incentives for preventive and pre-emptive war, which might trap even prudent competitors.”21 Force projection becomes

16 Debalina Ghoshal, “North Korea Continues to Develop Ballistic Missiles,” Gatestone Policy Institute, August 29, 2014 (https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4654/northkorea-ballistic-missiles). 17 Ibid. 18 Bonnie Jenkins, “A Peace Treaty Could Be Essential to North Korean Denucleari-

sation,” Axios, February 26, 2019 (https://www.axios.com/a-peace-treaty-is-essential-fornorth-korean-denuclearization-dc691119-dacd-4072-a7d0-546e5451b44c.html). 19 Ryan Pickrell, “China Has Been Practicing Sinking Ships in the South China Sea,” Business Insider, July 2, 2019 (https://www.businessinsider.in/defense/china-has-beenpracticing-sinking-ships-with-missiles-in-the-south-china-sea/articleshow/70043588.cms). 20 Burc Eruygur, “Russia Says Iskander Missile System Handed Over to Belarus,” AA, April 4, 2023 (Russia Says Iskander Missile System Handed Over to Belarus [https://www.aa.com.tr/en/russia-ukraine-war/russia-says-iskander-missile-sys tem-handed-over-to-belarus/2863152]). 21 Jack L. Snyder, “Perceptions of Security Dilemma in 1914,” in ed., Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (USA: John Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 179.

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a prerequisite for any war time preparation. Moreover, force projection is also a component of risk-taking ability of states. Dual-capable missiles negate scopes of arms control measures. Such missiles like the Kinzhal and the Iskander category possessed by Russia have been used against Ukraine. Though the missiles were unable to achieve strategic objectives, they became a tool for force projection for Russia.

Deterrence and Stability If security dilemma can result in arms race, then this arms race can help bring arms parity between adversaries. While deterrence is a separate theory by itself, the fact that strengthened deterrence strengthens strategic stability and hence, could ensure state’s survival and lessen ‘security dilemma’ cannot be eschewed. There is a difference between compellence and deterrence. While compellence is about adopting punishing strategies to achieve national objectives of a state and hence more active form of influence mechanism, deterrence refers to the strategies adopted by a state to prevent the worst scenario that could jeopardise global security and stability. Compellence would coerce another state to behave in a manner the compelling state wants it to behave22 ; deterrence would adopt offensive or defensive mechanisms to prevent another state to take actions that could prove irrational. While both deterrence and compellence are separate theories by themselves, a rationale that cannot be negated is the fact that ‘security dilemma’ and anarchy result in states adopting mechanisms to deter each other. Similarly, ‘security dilemma’ could result in states compelling and blackmailing other states to kowtow to their demands and policies. Russia’s use of missiles in Ukraine since 2022 was to compel Kyiv to prevent itself from joining NATO and consolidate control in the region. States acquire missile systems to possess long range strike capabilities for a credible stand-off capability. However, the same state may use these long range strike systems for different reasons against different states. While it could use its missile systems against one adversary for strengthening combat capability, it could use the same missile system for 22 John Merrill and Ilan Peleg, “Nuclear Compellence: The Political Use of the Bomb,” Israel Research Institute of Contemporary Society, Cross Roads, No. 11, 1984 (https://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Merrill-Peleg-NuclearCompellence-Crossroads-11-1984-pp-19-39.pdf).

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deterrence against other adversaries. For instance, Ethiopia has acquired SRBM capability to strengthen their combat capability against Eritrea, while it uses the same missile as deterrence against Sudan and Egypt.23 Parity in hard power prowess generally helps to strengthen deterrence and also have positive impact on strategic stability. Without credible delivery systems, both conventional deterrence and nuclear deterrence are negligible even if the state possesses nuclear or conventional warheads. If the adversary is confident that the nuclear or conventional weapons of the state could be easily defeated, deterrence does not prevail. Credible delivery systems do not only mean technologically advanced weapon systems but also capable of evading enemy missile and aerial attacks. A silo-based nuclear capable ICBM that is mated is equally cataclysmic for the state that possesses it if silos are not protected against enemy attacks. Lack of credible delivery systems of nuclear weapons that are survivable, could lower the nuclear threshold reducing the scope of deterrence and stability. A state lacking ‘assured destruction’ capability could affect adversary’s ‘security dilemma’ in a way that the adversary could be assured of the fact that the state would not have enough capability to cause cataclysmic damage as a response to the adversary’s attack. A state with a ‘no-first use’ doctrine but without a ‘counter-strike’ capability’ could negatively impact ‘security dilemma’ of the adversary, and the adversary may launch a preventive strike without the fear of retaliation as the nuclear delivery systems could be destroyed. It is the ability of a state surviving a first strike and being able to retaliate that strengthens the adversary’s ‘security dilemma’ and coerces the adversary to act rationally. Yet again, states could possess ‘assured destruction’ capability but lack ‘assured response’ capability. The author defines ‘assured response’ as possessing not just the capabilities to cause cataclysmic damage to adversary but also having credible intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability for launch on warning or launch under attack. The author hence argues that it is not only ‘assured destruction’ capability but ‘assured response’ capabilities that could strengthen deterrence and pacify a state’s ‘security dilemma.’

23 Patrick Kenyette, “Ethiopia Enhances Rocket and Artillery Capabilities,” Military Africa, February 1, 2023 (Ethiopia Enhances Rocket and Artillery Capabilities – Military Africa).

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It does not matter whether the nuclear warheads are fitted on ICBMs and SLBMs or even cruise missiles. All these credible delivery systems enhance deterrence and also stability. In fact, a global ‘no-first use’ policy for strengthened deterrence and strategic stability could only be made possible when states have credible delivery system to launch a nuclear strike and also survive one and launch the retaliation or counterretaliation. Any aorta of doubt in the minds of the state on its survivability of the nuclear forces will automatically push itself towards adopting a ‘first-use’ or ‘pre-emptive’ or even ‘first-strike’ doctrine, thereby lowering the nuclear threshold and weakening deterrence posture. Whether deterrence is relied on MAD, or massive retaliation or assured destruction or flexible response and again whether deterrence relies on limited deterrence, minimum deterrence, credible minimum deterrence, recessed deterrence, ready deterrence to name a few, missiles play credible role in strengthening these deterrence strategies and postures. For example, Pakistan’s strategy of ‘full spectrum deterrence’24 is not just reliant on long range solid propelled Shaheen category ballistic missiles and Nasr Tactical ballistic missile, but also on Ra’ad and Babur cruise missiles. However, it must be noted that the choice of strategy, doctrine and posture of a state is dependent on its ‘security dilemma’ that it faces vis-à-vis its adversaries. Nuclear deterrence as well as conventional deterrence could also be strengthened if a state is under the nuclear umbrella of another state as seen in the case of Japan. which is under the extended nuclear deterrence strategy of the United States. Japan is also working towards a ’counterstrike capability’ focusing on long range strike missiles. States accept and offer ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ due to ‘security dilemma’ existing in both the states that offer the ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ as well as the state accepting the same. Both the United States and Japan face threats in the region from China and North Korean nuclear capability. Though in the present scenario, the United States does not place any nuclear capable missiles in Japan, with the extinction of the INF Treaty, the United States could develop such capabilities in future to deploy in their forward bases. Japan has been keen to acquire conventional deterrent capabilities in the form of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or fighter jets, and in 2018, the then member 24 “Rare Light Shone on Pakistan’s Full Spectrum Deterrence Policy,” Dawn, December 7, 2017 (https://www.dawn.com/news/1375079).

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of House of Representatives and chairman of Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) security policy council Hiroshi Imazu stated, “ without deterrence North Korea will see us [Japan] weak.”25 Hence, extended nuclear deterrence strengthens both the United States and Japan’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis China and North Korea in the region. Such strategies convey a message to the two countries that Japan is not bereft of the same deterrent capability that China and North Korea possess. The United States on the other hand is able to convey the message that it could launch nuclear strikes on China from its forward bases, thereby reducing its time to launch attack and reducing China’s reaction time. A nuclear deterrence capable of attacking time-sensitive targets by moving nuclear forces closer to that of adversaries gives a clear message to adversaries that the United States’ nuclear deterrence is strengthened not just in its own territory but also at its forward bases and that any irrational act of adversary would be dealt with an appropriate and probably lethal response. This ensures that the adversary is kept in a ‘security dilemma’ situation. Missiles are weapons for nuclear as well as conventional deterrence. Iran, for instance, believes its missile forces would enhance conventional deterrence.26 Turkey, for one, does not possess nuclear weapons (apart from the US TNWs they host), but is still working on longer range ballistic missiles to strengthen its conventional deterrence posture vis-à-vis adversaries. None of the countries has become nuclear weapon power in the West Asian region. However, ‘security dilemma’ exists among these states to develop long range strike capability that includes missile systems capable of delivering credible warheads. Developing and constant testing of missile capabilities are viewed by Iran as a step towards building a “deterrent power.”27 Turkey’s top

25 Monica Montgomery, “Japan Looks to Purchase Cruise Missiles,” Arms Control Association, July/August 2018 (Japan Looks to Purchase Cruise Missiles | Arms Control Association). 26 See Abbas Qaidari, “President Hassan Rouhani’s Defence Policy,” Atlantic Council, February 11, 2016 (https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/president-has san-rouhani-s-defense-policy). 27 IRGC commander Maj Gen Hossein Salami’s interview, “Iran Tests Missile System— Revolutionary Guard,” Deutsche Welle, August 24, 2019 (https://www.dw.com/en/irantests-missile-system-revolutionary-guard/a-50149087).

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procurement official states that, “it is difficult for a country to be deterrent with defensive missiles only…This is the reason offensive missile systems too should be developed.”28 Saudi Arabia is barred from purchasing ballistic missiles from the United States under the US regulations implemented in 1987. However, to achieve a viable conventional deterrent capability, Saudi Arabia purchased ballistic missile capability from China including the DF-21s that were modified by Beijing for Riyadh for conventional roles only. This concern to acquire ballistic missile capability to counter Iran is despite the belief that Saudi air power is superior to Iran.29 In 2021, there were reports that Saudi Arabia was actively pursuing its own ballistic missile development program with help from China.30 Hence, the argument on achieving parity to strengthen deterrence holds true in this scenario. This argument can also be strengthened by a recent revelation by a Ukrainian Air Force official who regretted the fact that Ukraine did not possess Hrim-2 missiles of 300–500 kms range which could have deterred Russia from annexing Crimea and invading Ukraine. Kyiv lacked long range strike systems that could strike key Russian military assets in occupied Ukrainian territories including Crimea.31 Anti-ship missiles become a game-changer in the inter-state relationships as they directly hinder maritime influence of adversaries in the region. Turkey has indigenously built its own anti-ship cruise missiles Atmaca to replace its ageing Harpoon missiles.32 States realise that one 28 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey Eyes Offensive Missiles to Boost Deterrence,” Defense News, January 16, 2016 (https://www.defensenews.com/land/2016/01/16/turkey-eyesoffensive-missiles-to-boost-deterrence/). 29 Phil Mattingly, et al., “Exclusive: US Intel Shows Saudi Arabia Escalated Its Missile Program with Help from China,” CNN , June 5, 2019 (US Intel Shows Saudi Arabia Has expanded Its Ballistic Missile Program | CNN Politics). 30 Zachary Cohen, “CNN Exclusive: US Intel and Satellite Images Show Saudi Arabia Is Now Building Its Own Ballistic Missiles with Help from China,” CNN , December 23, 2021 (https://edition.cnn.com/2021/12/23/politics/saudi-ballistic-missiles-china/ index.html). 31 Ashish Dangwal, “If Ukraine Had Enough Hrim-2 Missile Systems, Russia Would Not Have Dared TO Invade—Air Force Spokesperson,” The EurAsian Times, June 12, 2023 (If Ukraine Had Enough Hrim-2 Missile Systems, Russia Would Not Have Dared TO Invade—Air Force Spokesperson [eurasiantimes.com]). 32 Burak Eke Bekdil, “Turkey’s Own Atmaca Missile to Replace Harpoons on Its Navy Ships,” Defense News, February 10, 2022 (Turkey’s Own Atmaca Missile to Replace Harpoons on Its Navy Ships [defensenews.com]).

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of the best forms of strengthening maritime deterrence is to create an anti-access strategy for adversaries and anti-ship missiles form the best component of anti-access strategy. “Stability enhancing security policies are not only a necessity, because of the dangers of the security dilemma, but also a great equaliser, because defence is almost always easier than offence.”33 In 2023, when Iran tested a 2,000 kms range missile, it viewed its missile program as a medium to strengthen regional stability for itself and its friends in the neighbourhood.34 In fact, missiles possessed by states make the international system multi-polar rather than a bipolar world, and according to Mearsheimer, “there is much less hostility among the great powers in multi-polarity, because the amount of attention they pay to each other is less than in bipolarity. In a world with only two great powers, each concentrates its attention on the other. But, in multi-polarity, states cannot afford to be overly concerned with any one of their neighbours only. They have to spread around their attention to all the great powers. Plus, the many interactions among the various states in a multipolar system create numerous cross-cutting cleavages that mitigate conflict. Complexity, in short, dampens the prospects for great power war.”35

Psychological and Weapon of Terror Security dilemma results in states possessing destructive capabilities that could create psychological impact on their adversaries. This desire to be able to create psychological impact on adversaries could be for many reasons: deterrence, coercive diplomacy or force projection. Ballistic and cruise missiles that are able to cause cataclysmic effects in adversaries’ territories against both soft and hard targets have psychological impact on the adversaries. This is even more a reality when the state can not only

33 Jack L. Snyder, “Perceptions of Security Dilemma in 1914,” in ed., Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (USA: John Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 179. 34 “‘Messages to Our Enemies’: Iran on Testing Ballistic Missile with 2000 km Range,” Hindustan Times, May 25, 2023, [https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/iransuccessfully-tests-ballistic-missile-with-2-000-km-range-101684998084084.html] 35 John Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism” (https://www.commackschools.org/Dow nloads/8_mearsheimer-_structural_realism.pdf).

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deliver conventional warheads with missiles, but also chemical and biological warheads with missiles creating a situation of danger for population centres. Nuclear weapons increase the psychological threat value of the missiles and become a ‘weapon of terror.’ Conventional, chemical and biological warhead missiles are capable of causing terrorising effects on populations; centres of adversaries, thereby, can coerce them into seeking for concessions. A state possessing nuclear capable ICBM with ‘first-use’ doctrine, coupled with a second-strike capability, makes it a weapon of terror for adversaries, playing in the psyche of adversary that the state can launch first strike and also a counter-retaliation. Hence, ‘security dilemma’ arises amid the adversaries that could result in a condition of lowered nuclear threshold. Similarly, the same ICBM in the arsenal of the state with a ‘no-first use’ doctrine coupled with counter- and second-strike capability could act as a weapon of deterrence. When states possess missile capability that become ‘weapons of terror,’ it can result in unchecked arms race among its adversaries, making war a likely outcome.

Foreign Policy and Decision Making A state with a credible conventional or nuclear deterrent capability is lesser subjected to nuclear and conventional blackmailing from its adversaries. This increases the scope of the state from pursuing its independent foreign policy and decision-making policies. Not only adversaries, a state is also less subjected to influence from its partners and allies on its foreign policy and decision-making capabilities, when its hard power prowess is credible. France is of the belief that its nuclear forces “strengthen the security of Europe through their very existence.” In 2020, the then French President Emmanuel Macron clearly stated, “France’s vital interests have European dimension.” He further stressed on French nuclear deterrence that “ensures [our] independence, our freedom to assess, make decisions and take action. It prevents adversaries from betting on escalation, intimidation, and blackmailing to achieve our ends.”36

36 Shannon Bugos, “France Offers Nuclear Deterrent to All Europe,” Arms Control Association, March 2020 (France Offers Nuclear Deterrent to All Europe | Arms Control Association).

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Ballistic and cruise missiles form a credible component of hard power prowess of a state enhancing their status in the international forum. Coercive diplomacy of adversaries also works less against states that build up its own deterrence—whether conventional or nuclear. Iran, for instance, has refused to give up on ballistic missile program despite UNSC sanctions imposed on Iran. Iran’s foreign minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, for instance, had made it clear to the then Trump administration that Iran would only discuss the issue of ballistic missiles if the United States stopped supplying conventional arms in the region.37 Iran’s strong stance on its ballistic missile arsenal is unarguably a result of its sophisticated missile systems which has resulted in Iran refusing to be dominated by US pressure. However, it would not be wrong to conclude that Iran’s ballistic and cruise missile capability is due to the ‘security dilemma’ existing owing to the missile developments of its neighbour states—some of them having missile capability that are nuclear capable. This security dilemma that had led Iran to develop missile systems has enabled the state to pursue independent foreign policy decisions as well as conduct proxy wars as a crucial component of its foreign policy objectives. Similarly, Turkey too has developed indigenous ballistic missile capability and is also working on long range indigenous missile capability38 —this has resulted in Turkey being able to take independent decisions of its defence procurements and foreign policy. Turkey is trying to play an active role in Sudanese Suakin Island strengthening Turkey’s engagement policy in Africa.39 At the same time, it must be noted that states with capable hard power prowess will implement foreign policies keeping in mind the ‘balance of power’ in the region and globally as well as its own capability to maintain or sustain the ‘balance of power’ in the region.40

37 “Iran Hits Back at US Demand on Ballistic Missiles,” Al Jazeera, July 17, 2019 (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2019/07/iran-hits-demands-bal listic-missiles-proxies-190716052354566.html). 38 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey Seeks to Expand Locally Built Missile,” Defense

News, May 2, 2018 (https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/05/02/turkey-seeks-toexpand-range-of-locally-built-missile/). 39 Ali Topchi, “Why Is Sudan’s Suakin Island Important for Turkey?,” TRT World (Why Is Sudan’s Suakin Island Important for Turkey? [trtworld.com]). 40 For more on this, see Stephen J. Cimbala, “Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Realism, Rationality and Uncertainty,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 11,

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Stature and Prestige When ‘security dilemma’ reaches a stage when a state enhances its offensive advantages and develop missile capabilities as an integral component of its offensive advantage, it indirectly strengthens its position and stature in the international platform. Ballistic missiles have been viewed by states as currency of power and prestige. This is not without a reason. If one takes the example of India, one would understand how nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles strengthened India’s position in the global platform. India ventured into missile technology program due to the threat emanating from missile capability of China. However, today, global powers have also realised India’s potential role if it became a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and barring China, all the four permanent UNSC members, the United States, United Kingdom, Russia and France, have backed India’s possibility of membership.41 While in the earlier phases of India’s missile development program, the United States had been critical of India’s missile program, as India advanced with its missile program and developed 5,000 kms Agni-V, the United States reportedly applauded India for the same.42 However, it would be wrong to say that only ballistic missiles provide states with power and prestige. Sophisticated cruise missiles like the supersonic and hypersonic cruise missiles also strengthen prestige and status of the state. The BrahMos supersonic missile and the future hypersonic versions provide India with strengthened stature in the regional domain and also make it enter the elite club of countries venturing into hypersonic technology. Opening up India’s scope of sale of this missile system provides India a stature in global missile market. If one takes the example of Russia, China and the United States, it can be seen that more is the stature and prestige of a state in the international forum, greater is the ‘security dilemma.’ For instance, Russia, China and No. 1, February 27, 2017 (https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/art icle.html/fe357e59-ce1c-48cb-aca6-0b35e43c2e54). 41 “Major Differences Among UN Members Over India’s Permanent Membership in UNSC: China,” The Economic Times, January 16, 2020 (https://economictimes.indiat imes.com/news/politics-and-nation/major-differences-among-un-members-over-indias-per manent-membership-in-unsc-china/articleshow/73304888.cms?from=mdr). 42 Debalina Ghoshal, “India’s Agni Missile Systems: Strengthening India’s Nuclear Deterrence,” Artha Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2018 (http://journals. christuniversity.in/index.php/artha/article/view/2006/1628).

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the United States are running the hypersonic glide vehicle arms race—a technology that can be mounted upon ballistic missile to deliver warheads to evade enemy missile defence system—as a result of security dilemma wherein, none of the three states is willing to be left behind in this technological arms race. This ‘security dilemma’ is not just to possess this system as a deterrent, but also to possess the weapon system to further its status in the international forum.

Conclusion Considering that states function in an anarchic world order, ‘security dilemma’ would continue to exist as long as anarchy exists. In fact, the global tensions are intertwined in such a way that even if a supranational body exists in future, ‘security dilemma’ among states would continue to exist due to the fear of the supranational body failing to act if necessary. ‘Security dilemma’ leads a state to weaponise itself based on its strategies and policies. Weapon systems will be acquired that would best suit a state’s policies, doctrines and strategies. Missiles form a lethal component of a state’s weapon system. Missile systems as seen in the chapters strengthen a state’s combat capability. As the aspiration to indulge into combat operations can increase in states with higher ‘security dilemma,’ states could be lured into the use of missiles as lethal combat weapons. Lethality in the missile systems that are credible means the missiles possess the capability to strengthen both deterrence stability and strategic stability. These missiles are able to create psychological fear into the minds of adversaries too. States possessing sophisticated missile systems are less susceptible to foreign interference on their foreign policy and decisionmaking process and hence, could be in better position to exert their sovereignty. A sovereign state with capable technological advancements including missile systems increases the state’s prestige and stature in the international forum. Having explored how missiles add to a state’s international and regional influence, the next chapter studies the various states that are developing different kinds of missile systems and their capabilities.

CHAPTER 4

Why States Desire for Missile Systems?

States desire for hard power and one of the reasons for this desire is due to security dilemma. States aim to achieve diversity in weapons capability always. Hence, states with superior air power capability would also aspire for missile systems to maintain this diversity in combat and deterrent capability. States have varied reasons to desire for sophisticated missile capabilities. These include threat perceptions, weaponisation, defence budget, geostrategic needs, technological needs, political requirements, and foreign policy objectives—all of these which can emanate from ‘security dilemma.’ In fact, if there is no ‘security dilemma,’ none of these factors could coerce a state to develop or acquire missile capabilities as seen in the case of South Africa. In this chapter, we shall study how ‘security dilemma’ affects the determinants that result in states acquiring missile capabilities with a case study on South Africa and how it progressed towards complete disarmament of missile capabilities.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Ghoshal, Role Of Ballistic And Cruise Missiles In International Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48063-8_4

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Threat Perception As John Herz writes, “because no state can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.”1 This power accumulation by one state can lead to threat perception in another state, and the choice of missile systems could depend upon this threat perception of the state. For instance, Pakistan’s Shaheen I and II class of ballistic missiles is developed as deterrence against India; however, its Shaheen III has a range of 2,750 kms which can reach targets in Israel—a threat Pakistan does not neglect.2 Israel’s threat perception is confined to Middle Eastern countries mostly, including Saudi Arabia, Iran and Syria. Apart from this, it may be noteworthy to mention that Israel also faces missile threats from Pakistan. There are also reports that Israel had also once planned to bomb the Pakistan’s nuclear facility.3 While Pakistan has claimed that its 2,750 kms range Shaheen III is capable of reaching India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands, there are also reports that this missile can reach targets in Israel.4 The biggest concern is the fact that the missile is nuclear capable. Not only state actors but Israel also faces threat from Iran-backed Shi’ite asymmetric organisation called the Hezbollah that is reported to be possessing missiles that could cause serious damage to natural gas fields in the Middle East that provide Israel with 60% of electricity.5 They could also target military establishments and refineries. During the 2006 Lebanese War, 1 Quoted in Shiping Tang, “The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis,” Security

Studies, October 8, 2009 (Full article: The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis [tan dfonline.com]). 2 Tim Craig, “Pakistan Tests Missile That Could Carry Nuclear Warhead to Every Part

of India,” Washington Post, March 9, 2015 (Pakistan Tests Missile That Could Carry Nuclear Warhead to Every Part of India - The Washington Post). 3 Ami Rojkes Dombe, “Pakistan—The Quiet Nuclear Threat,” Israel Defence, December 17, 2015 (https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/pakistan-%E2%80%93quiet-nuclear-threat). 4 Jeremy Bender, “Pakistan Successfully Tested a Nuclear-Capable Missile That Can Hit Any Point in India,” Business Insider, March 10, 2015 (https://www.businessinsider. in/Pakistan-successfully-tested-a-nuclear-capable-missile-that-can-hit-any-point-in-India/ articleshow/46521394.cms). 5 “IDF Acknowledges Serious Hezbollah Missile Threat to Israeli Natural Gas,” Algemeimer, February 7, 2018 (https://www.algemeiner.com/2018/02/07/idf-acknowled ges-serious-hezbollah-missile-threat-to-israeli-natural-gas-rigs/).

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Hezbollah rockets fired at Israel resulted in huge economic loss for Israel coercing businesses to close down while adversely affecting tourism also.6 China is well aware of the fact that a nuclear North Korea can be a deterrent against the United States as it would give the United States another threat to deal with other than China in North East Asia. Despite sanctions imposed on North Korea, China has continued with its trade with North Korea providing food and possible aid that kept the North Korean economy functioning.. In 2017, there were also reports that China’s Limac Corporation collaborated with North Korea’s Ryonbong General Corp. to establish a joint venture in 2008 for mining tantalum, zirconium and aluminium that could be used for missile technology.7 All these trade relations with North Korea helped the Hermit Kingdom function despite international sanctions and also develop long range missile capabilities that are nuclear capable. China and Belarus collaborated with each other to develop military capabilities because given NATO’s western expansion, especially NATO’s drills that are conducted close to the Belarus border and the Ukranian crisis, Belarus is apprehensive and wants to strengthen its security.8 For this, the state feels the need to develop indigenous missile systems in order to reduce reliance on foreign countries.9 Threat perceptions can not only result in two countries collaborating on defence systems, but also result in countries improvising their own weapon systems and developing new ones indigenously. Until 2014, Ukraine did not feel the need to develop cruise missiles or ballistic missiles. However, owing to the Russian threat following the Ukrainian crisis, the country focused on the development of indigenous missile systems. A state-owned company SE State Kyiv Design Bureau (Luch) is responsible for the designing of the Neptun cruise missile and the 6 “The Missile Arsenal at the Heart of Israeli-Iran Rivalry,” Stratfor (https://worldv iew.stratfor.com/article/missile-arsenal-heart-israeli-iranian-rivalry). 7 Ryan Pickrell, “Chinese Company May Have Helped North Korea Secure Missile Materials for Nearly a Decade,” National Interest, May 9, 2017 (http://nationalinte rest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinese-company-may-have-helped-north-korea-secure-missile20576). 8 Siarhei Bouhan, “Threats to Belarus, Ukrainian Border, Cooperation with KazakhstanBelarus Security Digest,” Belarus Digest, June 9, 2016 (http://belarusdigest.com/story/ threats-to-belarus-ukrainian-border-cooperation-with-kazakhstan-belarus-security-digest/). 9 “Belarus Targets Increased Self-Sufficiency in Missile Technology,” Janes, June 2, 2020 (Belarus Targets Increased Self-Sufficiency in Missile Technology [janes.com]).

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Vikha MLRS as also SE State Kyiv Design Bureau (Pivedine) for the development of short range ballistic missile Hrim-2.10 In fact, in 2023, a Ukrainian Air Force official even stated that the delayed development of the Hrim-2 missiles gave Russia an upper hand to attack Ukrainian territory and that the missile could have enabled Kyiv to strike vital Russian military installations with ease.11 Owing to threats from North Korea, China and Japan, the missile guidelines imposed by the United States on South Korea in 1979 was lifted in May 2021 enabling South Korea to develop ballistic missile capabilities of ranges that could reach targets beyond the Korean Peninsula.12 The guidelines have been modified in 1997 and 2012, in both the cases increasing the range of the missile system from 180 kms in 1979 to 300 kms in 1997 and 800 kms in 2012.13 Similarly, the Chinese missile threats have coerced Taiwan to concentrate on long range missile capabilities. The Taiwan Air Force in early 2021 has received the 1,200 km range Hsiung Feng II cruise missiles that could reach targets deep within mainland China.14 Iran refers to its missile development program as “defensive,” and in 2023, the Iranian Defence Minister Mohammadreza Ashtiani stated that Iran would “defend the country and its achievements.”15 Japan’s decision to focus on long range missile capabilities is to deter China as Japan is

10 Igor Fedyk, “Ukraine Advances Its Missile Production Programme,” Jamestown Foundation, February 20, 2018 (https://jamestown.org/program/ukraine-advances-mis sile-production-program/). 11 Ashish Dangwal, “If Ukraine Had Enough Hrim-2 Missile Systems, Russia Would Not Have Dared to Invade—Air Force Spokesperson,” The EurAsian Times, June 12, 2023 (If Ukraine Had Enough Hrim-2 Missile Systems, Russia Would Not Have Dared to Invade—Air Force Spokesman [eurasiantimes.com]). 12 Brian Kim, “US Lifts Restrictions on South Korea, Ending Range and Warhead Limits,” Defense News, May 25, 2021 (US Lifts Missile Restrictions on South Korea, Ending Range and Warhead Limits [defensenews.com]). 13 Ibid. 14 Steven Stashwick, “Taiwan Mass Producing New Long Range Missile,” Diplomat,

March 26, 2021 (Taiwan Mass Producing New Long-Range Missile – The Diplomat). 15 “‘Messages to Our Enemies’: Iran on Testing Ballistic Missile with 2,000 km Range,” Hindustan Times, May 25, 2023 (‘Message to Our Enemies’: Iran on Testing Ballistic Missile with 2,000 km Range | World News - Hindustan Times).

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concerned about the threat a Chinese attack on Taiwan could impose on Japanese islands in the region and hold its SLOC at threat.16

Defence Budget Increase in defence budget of a state can be fathomed from what Herbert Butterfield describes uncertainty17 which raises doubts in the minds of states and coerces them to beef up their deterrent and combat capabilities. Demand for a weapon system depends on the defence budget of the country. Despite the economic slowdown in North Korea following sanctions imposed by the UNSC, North Korea’s military expenditures according to 2016 report were averaged to about US$3.5 billion a year which accounted to around 23.3% of the country’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) which accounted to around only US$15 billion. The increase in defence spending is due to its focus on nuclear weapons program and missile development program. Arms sales to different countries as well as non-state actors are enabling North Korea to earn hard currencies. There are also reports that a North Korean construction company called the Mansudae, already sanctioned by the UNSC, is running construction projects like building ammunition factories, presidential palaces and apartment blocks, giant statues and monuments, and the income from the construction projects was diverted to the nuclear and missile development program.18 Inversely, the financial crisis in Brazil negatively impacted the missile development program in Brazil. This led to the delay in the development and production of the MTC-300 cruise missiles.19 16 Tim Kelly, “Japan to Hike Annual Defence Budget by a Quarter to Buy Toma-

hawks and Other Weapons,” Reuters, December 23, 2022 (Japan to Hike Annual Defence Budget by a Quarter to Buy Tomahawks and Other Weapons | Reuters). 17 See Alan Collins, “State-Induced Security Dilemma: Maintaining the Tragedy,” Cooperation and Conflict Journal, Vol. 39, No. I, 2004, pp. 27–44 (http://www.jstor.org/sta ble/45084134). 18 David Mckenzie, “The African Monuments Funding North Korea’s Missiles,” Business Day, October 25, 2017 (https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2017-1025-the-african-monuments-funding-north-koreas-missiles/). 19 “Brazilian MTC-300 Cruise Missile to Be Tested in 2019,” Army Recognition, March 28, 2018 (Brazilian MTC-300 Cruise Missile to Be Tested in 2019 | March 2018 Global Defense Security Army News Industry | Defense Security Global News Industry Army 2018 | Archive News year [armyrecognition.com]).

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In 2020, South Korea proposed for 5.5 percentage increase in defence budget, in 2021, for its various defence modernisation program along which Hyunmoo type ballistic missile project is also relevant.20 In 2020, Taiwan too sought to increase its defence spending in 2021 and one of the defence modernisation plans is to acquire cruise missiles for coastal defence.21 Similarly, in 2022, Japan announced it would double its defence spending to buy US Tomahawk cruise missiles as well as to develop long range strike capabilities.22 While Algeria is seeking to modernise its military, budgetary constraints led Algiers to focus on Chinese ASCM and cancel the Russian Bastion missile.23

Geostrategic Needs In 2022, there were reports that India signed contract with Philippines to export its BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to the former along with integrated logistics support package and training for operators and maintainers.24 China’s assertiveness in SCS region has raised concerns for Philippines and coerced the latter to seek weapon systems to deter Chinese aggression. China Coast Guard and China Maritime Militia “block, harass and interfere”25 in maritime affairs of Philippines, and hence, strengthened hard power prowess could help Philippines

20 Jon Grevatt and Andrew Macdonald, “South Korea Proposes 5.5% Defence Budget Increase,” Janes, September 2, 2020 (South Korea Proposes 5.5% Defence-Budget Increase [janes.com]). 21 “Taiwan to Boost Defence Budget 10% in Face of China Pressure,” Nikkei Asia, August 13, 2020 (Taiwan to Boost Defense Budget 10% in Face of China Pressure Nikkei Asia). 22 Tim Kelly, “Japan to Hike Annual Defence Budget by a Quarter to Buy Tomahawks and Other Weapons,” Reuters, December 23, 2022 (Japan to Hike Annual Defence Budget by a Quarter to Buy Tomahawks and Other Weapons | Reuters). 23 Kazim Abdul, “Algeria Strengthens Coastal Defence with Deadly YJ-12B ASCM,” Military Africa, May 20, 2022 (Algeria Strengthens Coastal Defence with Deadly YJ-12B Anti-ship Cruise Missile – Military Africa). 24 “First Delivery of BrahMos Missile to Philippines Will Happen in December,” The Hindu Business Line, May 11, 2023 (First Delivery of BrahMos Missile to Philippines Will Happen in December - The Hindu Business Line). 25 Kathleen Magramo, “Philippines Says South China Sea Outpost Resupplied Despite Chinese Harassment,” CNN Business, August 22, 2023 (Philippines Says South China Sea Outpost Resupplied Despite Chinese Harassment | CNN).

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possess a strong maritime presence in SCS. For India, arming Philippines worsens China’s tussle in the SCS region. One of the reasons why Turkey has focused on developing long range missile capabilities in addition to stand-off missile (SOM) capability is due to its ongoing conflict with Greece in the Aegean Sea. Turkey has accused Greece of militarising islands in the Aegean Sea.26 In fact, in 2022, Turkey has threatened Greece that its missiles could hit Athens unless if they “stay[ed] calm.” Turkish President Erdogan further threatened, “we can come down suddenly one night when the time comes.”27 According to Marsh E. Burfeindt, Iran being the world’s largest producer of oil “sees itself equally powerful as Saudi Arabia and the legitimate voice of Islam.”28 For China, the US missile defence system in the Indo-Pacific region is a reason why Beijing has developed missile systems that could possibly evade enemy missile defence capabilities. However, China’s ‘anti-access area denial’ (A2/AD) has also resulted in the development of offensive missile systems that could compliment the A2/AD strategy. In fact, according to Jane’s report, for the next decade, China’s ballistic missile market is expected to grow to meet this geostrategic need and the missile market is expected to be valued at US$37.7 billion.29 China’s NORINCO, for instance, in 2015, sold weapons worth $20 million to South Sudan that also included missiles and guided missile launchers. It must be noted that this deal has taken place despite China’s promise to not to deliver weapon systems to this country. China is South Sudan’s third largest customer of oil, and according to the report, China

26 “Turkey Says Greek Missiles Locked on Its Fighters Over Med,” VOA, August 28, 2022 (Turkey Says Greek Missiles Locked on Its Fighters Over Med [voanews.com]). 27 Nektaria Stamouli, “Erdogan Warns Greece That Turkish Missiles Can Reach Athens,” Politico, December 11, 2022 (Erdo˘gan Warns Greece That Turkish Missiles Can Reach Athens – Politico). 28 Marsh E. Burfeindt, “Rapprochement with Iran,” in ed., Thomas A. Johnson, Power, National Security, and Transformational Global Events (USA: CRC Press, 2012). 29 “Ballistic Missile Production and Ballistic Missile Defense Driving Strong East Asia Missile Market,” IHS Market, August 16, 2017 (https://ihsmarkit.com/research-ana lysis/ballistic-missile-production-and-ballistic-missile-defense-driving-strong-east-asia-mis sile-market.html).

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National Petroleum Company has been funding a militia group to guard the oil field in the Unity State in South Sudan.30 The Yemen crisis witnessed the use of sophisticated weapons systems by an asymmetric organisation—Houthis. The Houthis are backed by Iran to prevent a Saudi domination in Yemen. Iran provided ballistic missile systems like Burkan 2H to Houthis that could reach Riyadh and Yanbu in Saudi Arabia.31 Algeria’s quest to exert influence in the Mediterranean Sea and protect the Strait of Gibraltar led the country to focus on ASCM capabilities.32

Technological Needs Waltz states that in the nuclear era, international system remains a “selfhelp arena.”33 States will strive for missile systems also for demonstration of technological prowess in order to fit themselves in a “self-help” international system. Technology denial regimes like the MTCR denied India of cryogenic rocket engines and other technologies required in missile systems which led India to venture into indigenous missile development program. States in self-help system could focus on co-production or joint development of weapon systems rather than buying an entire class of weapon system from another state. For instance, Russia and India jointly developed the BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles. Turkey’s Roketsan that had developed the Stand-off Cruise Missile for Turkish Air Force teamed up with the Lockheed Martin to modify the cruise missile to fit it into the Lockheed Martin developed F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF). In fact, 30 Lily Kuo, “China’s Largest Weapons Manufacturer Is Allegedly Selling Arms to

South Sudan-Again,” Quartz, August 26, 2015 (https://qz.com/488342/chinas-largestweapons-manufacturer-is-allegedly-selling-arms-to-south-sudan-again/). 31 Michael Knights, “Yemen’s “Southern Hezbollah”: Implications of Houthi Missile and Drone Improvements,” The Washington Institute of Near East Policy, April 1, 2021 (Yemen’s “Southern Hezbollah”: Implications of Houthi Missile and Drone Improvements | The Washington Institute). 32 Kazim Abdul, “Algeria Strengthens Coastal Defence with Deadly YJ-12B ASCM,” Military Africa, May 20, 2022 (Algeria Strengthens Coastal Defence with Deadly YJ-12B Anti-ship Cruise Missile – Military Africa). 33 Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 5–41 (Structural Realism After the Cold War [columb ia.edu]).

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according to Roketsan chairman, Emin Alpman, “offering SOM-J to the international F-35 marketplace will bring critical business to Turkey and provide an important capability to allied nations.”34 Such co-development of weapon systems owing to ‘security dilemma’ and states being in self-help system can also lead to licensed production of weapon systems in one state. For instance, Turkey’s new Khan short range ballistic missile system was developed jointly by China and Turkey and is reported to be a Turkish license-produced version of the Chinese M-20 system while the Bora missiles are reported to be licensed version of Chinese DF-12A missiles.35 Again, states in self-help system choose technological features best suited to their missile technology program to cater to their security requirements. States like Russia and China have continued to rely on liquid-fuelled nuclear capable ballistic missiles despite its longer preparation time. China’s DF-5 category intercontinental range missile systems are liquid fuelled to provide it with greater thrust and ability to deliver heavier payloads across longer ranges. Russia too has focused on liquidfuelled ICBM capabilities other than solid-fuelled ones for delivering greater payload. Hence, nuclear deterrence is strengthened for Russia as Russian liquid-fuelled ICBMs could carry more number of warheads and hence, could increase the complexities of interception for enemy missile defence system. MLRS could be used to launch guided and unguided rockets. However, in the recent past, owing to the deterrent value of ballistic missiles, MLRS is also used to launch tactical ballistic missiles like the US Army Tactical Missiles (ATACMS) or even the Pakistani nuclear capable 60 kms range Nasr missiles. The ‘shoot and scoot’ feature of the MLRS provides greater flexibility to the missiles. Turkey’s Roketsan enterprise is also involved in the development and production of its missile capabilities both for its own security needs and for export purpose. Technological requirements for maritime prowess led Roketsan to also venture into ASCM missiles like the ATMACA. In 2023, reports claimed that Turkey would arm some of its naval platforms with

34 Lara Seligman, “Lockheed Teams with Turkey’s Roketsan for F-35 missile,” Defense News, September 16, 2015 (https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/afa-airspace/2015/09/16/lockheed-teams-with-turkeys-roketsan-for-f-35-missile/). 35 “Khan,” Military Today (http://www.military-today.com/missiles/khan.htm).

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the ATMACA missiles to replace the ageing Harpoon anti-ship missile.36 The need to replace ageing Soviet built ASCM led Algeria to focus on Chinese ASCM systems.37 Focus on solid propelled ballistic missiles shifted due to the hazards of fuelling the missiles with liquid propellants. For instance, the liquid rocket motor in the Thor IRBM was considered to be the biggest disadvantage negatively impacting its operational readiness and “made it vulnerable throughout its career with Bomber Command in the US.”38 The need for sophistication in missile systems led states to develop canister launched missiles systems. Canister launchers enable the missile to be stored for longer periods with the help of maraging steel. Carbon composite can be used to prevent a missile from corrosion. The missile can be cold launched, and the use of gas generators for ejecting the missile from the canisters enables the missile to be launched from any location without the need for any missile sites for launching them. Canisters reduce the reaction time of the missile. The Chinese DF-31 and the US Tomahawk cruise missiles are some examples of canister launched missiles.39

Political Requirements As Patrick James writes, “the highest priority for structural realism is the development of a rational choice-based theory of state behaviour in response to system structure.”40 Hence, political requirements that are component of the state structure determine the decision of acquiring hard power and determine the varied weapon systems that could fulfil the 36 Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey to Arm 11 Naval Platforms with Atmaca Missiles,” Defense News, August 17, 2023 (Turkey to Arm 11 Naval Platforms with Atmaca missiles [defensenews.com]). 37 Kazim Abdul, “Algeria Strengthens Coastal Defence with Deadly YJ-12B ASCM,” Military Africa, May 20, 2022 (Algeria Strengthens Coastal Defence with Deadly YJ-12B Anti-ship Cruise Missile – Military Africa). 38 “Thor Missiles Deployment in the United States,” Harrington Museum (Thor Missile

Deployment in the UK | Harrington Museum). 39 Debalina Ghoshal, “Credible Threat,” Force (Recently Canister Launched Test on Agni-V Strengthens Nuclear Deterrence [forceindia.net]). 40 Patrick James, “Structural Realism and the Causes of War,” Mershon International Studies Review, Vol. 39, No. 2, October 1995, pp. 181–208 (Structural Realism and the Causes of War on JSTOR).

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state’s political desires. While debates have come up on whether Japan should also develop counter-strike capabilities, Japan desired to acquire air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) as a need to develop such offensive weapons.41 The then ruling party, however, in 2018, argued that ALCMs used to attack enemy missile bases would be act of defence and therefore in compliance with Japan’s Article 9 of the constitution.42 In mid-2021, reports came in that South Korea’s ban on developing long range missile capabilities was lifted by the United States.43 The decision to lift the ban came just a year prior to the South Korean presidential elections in 2022. In Taiwan, President Tsai in 2018 due to economic and political needs coerced Taiwan to focus on home grown weapons. The government, according to President Tsai, wished to “transform the current dynamic of competition for resources between defence and economic growth into mutually beneficial relationship.”44 Although Taiwan imports its advanced weapon systems from abroad particularly from the United States that includes Patriot defence system and Harpoon missiles, its National Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) develops and manufactures Taiwan’s missiles— has expertise in both ballistic and cruise missiles, and missile defence systems.45 Air to ground cruise missiles developed indigenously can act as deterrent against China. In 2020, Tsai had a landslide victory and won her second term as President.

41 Michael Green and Zack Cooper, “Shinzo Abe Won Big on Sunday. This Is What

It Means for Japan’s National Security Policy,” The Washington Post, October 25, 2017 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/10/25/shinzo-abessupermajority-leaves-3-big-questions-about-japans-security-policy/?utm_term=.ca6b09 ffc1b5). 42 Tim Kelly, “Japan to Consider Strike Capability to Replace Missile Defense System,” Reuters, June 25, 2020 (Japan to Consider Strike Capability to Replace Missile Defence System | Reuters). 43 Sang Min Kim, “US Lifts Missile Limits on South Korea,” Arms Control Association, June 2021 (U.S. Lifts Missile Limits on South Korea | Arms Control Association). 44 Quoted Tsai in Timothy Ferry, “The Future of Taiwan’s Defense Industry Part 1: Politics, Aircraft, Missiles,” Taiwan Business Topics, February 16, 2016 (https://topics. amcham.com.tw/2016/02/future-of-taiwan-defense-industry-part-1/). 45 Timothy Ferry, “The Future of Taiwan’s Defense Industry Part 1: Politics, Aircraft, Missiles,” Taiwan Business Topics, February 16, 2016 (https://topics.amcham.com.tw/ 2016/02/future-of-taiwan-defense-industry-part-1/).

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Politics can also play a crucial role in the decision making of a country to export and import weapons technology to and from another country. Belarus had plans to export its Palanez MLRS system that can fire tactical missiles to Azerbaijan. However, owing to Armenian intervention which has clashes with Azerbaijan, and Armenia was also formerly partner with Belarus in Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Belarus cancelled the deal and struck the deal with Armenia instead.46 Prior to the Ukrainian War, Belarus’ President also demanded for an independent missile industry that could reduce its dependency on Russia, especially as Belarus refused to identify South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea as part of Russian territory. Some states, on the other hand, choose to develop their own military industrial complexes. Sudan, for instance, is an example of how international arms embargo on imposed on them in the 1990s led to state venturing into developing their own weapon systems. Sudan now displays its weapon systems in exhibitions for foreign states to buy.47 In the near future, Sudan could develop missile systems for export purpose as the Military Industry Corporation (MIC) has already developed MLRS for export.48 The effort to establish Shia dominance across West Asia resulted that Iran not just back Shia Houthis in Yemen, but also Shia backed militias in Iraq also. In fact, Iraq, according to experts, has become Iran’s forward base and Tehran has also attempted to dominate Iraq’s politics. While political requirements can coerce a state to acquire credible missile capabilities, political instability in a state can result in asymmetric organisations acquiring missile capabilities. One of the biggest concerns of the INF Treaty was the exclusion of China from the treaty which negatively impacted the deterrence of Russia

46 Siarhei Bohdan, “Belarusian Arms Exports to Grow with New Rockets and Missiles Planned,” Belarus Digest, February 13, 2018 (https://belarusdigest.com/story/belaru sian-arms-exports-grow-with-new-rockets-and-missiles-planned/). 47 “Sudan Becomes Major ‘Weapons Producer’,” Dabanga Sudan, February 25, 2015 (https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-becomes-majorweapon-producer). 48 Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, “Sudan’s Military Industry Corporation Pushes Sale to Africa,” Defence Web, February 8, 2023 (Sudan’s Military Industry Corporation Pushes Sales to Africa – defenceWeb).

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and the United States that were prohibited from developing groundlaunched ballistic and cruise missiles of 500–5,500 kms of range. In fact, the INF Treaty itself was a political decision of the NATO to counter the Soviet 5,000 kms range SS-20 that could reach parts of Western Europe, North Africa, Africa, South East Asia and Alaska.49 However, in the recent past, both Russia and the United States accused each other of developing capabilities that could have negative impact on the INF Treaty. This led to the extinction of the treaty with the United States walking out of the treaty. It was the INF Treaty that coerced the United States to remove the IRBMs like Thor it had stationed in Britain during the Cold War including the Cuban Missile Crisis. Again, to avoid political complications, the United States decided to provide the Royal Air Force (RAF) the authority to man the missiles even though the control of the nuclear warheads would be in the hands of the United States.50 In 1958, again due to political requirements, a joint government agreement was signed that provided for the Third Air Force to assist in construction of the Thor sites and deliver missiles to the RAF, which would maintain and control them, and make targeting a joint operational policy under the US Strategic Air Command and RAF Bomber Command.51

Foreign Policy Waltz writes, “democracies co-exist with undemocratic states.”52 However, co-existence of two different governances is a possibility only when states do not suffer from ‘security dilemma.’ This could only happen when state’s hard power is strengthened. As Michael Doyle writes, “although democracies seldom fight democracies,” they could fight their 49 “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treat),” U.S. Department of State, December 8, 1987 (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty [INF Treaty] [state.gov]). 50 “Thor Missiles Deployment in the United States,” Harrington Museum (Thor Missile

Deployment in the UK | Harrington Museum). 51 “Thor Missiles Deployment in the United States,” Harrington Museum (Thor Missile Deployment in the UK | Harrington Museum). 52 Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 5–41 (Structural Realism After the Cold War [columb ia.edu]).

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share of wars against other states.53 War can be an integral component of a state’s foreign policy objectives, and to strengthen these objectives, states seek for military capabilities for either combat or deterrence purpose. The former would prepare a state for war while the latter would prevent a state from entering into a war or conflict situation. Ballistic and cruise missiles form the best component of deterrence and combat capabilities. For instance, ballistic missile is integral to Iran’s security and foreign policy goals. The US shift in foreign policy post-Pearl Harbour incident from ‘isolationism’ to ‘expansionism’ to ‘globalism’ called for the development of hard power capability that could aid in pursuing such policies. Despite the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA) signed in 2015 that agreed to curb Iran’s nuclear program, Iran continued to develop curbing ballistic missile capabilities justifying their actions on grounds that ballistic missiles were not a part of the JCPoA. In fact, the Iranian Supreme Leader called any expectation that Iran would curb its missile program as part of the nuclear deal would be “stupid and idiotic.”54 While Iran’s ballistic missile program has surely strengthened its deterrence, it also had an indirect impact on its combat capability by strengthening its capability to inflict proxy wars in neighbouring states. The desire for credible military capabilities is not just to strengthen combat and deterrence capabilities, but to strengthen its Shia-based political system of governance in Iran as well as to influence Shia-based governance in nearby states in the region. Ukraine which was a satellite of the Soviet Union possessed the Soviet era missile systems. However, post-Soviet disintegration they had to get rid of the missile systems under Nunn Lugar Act. Probably, some missiles were retained and sold in black market. In fact, according to the reports, North Korean missile development program, especially the ICBM program, has been suspected to be a contribution of Ukraine that

53 Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 5–41 (Structural Realism After the Cold War [columb ia.edu]). 54 Quoted in Azriel Bermant, “How Should Europe Address Iran’s Missile Proliferation Activities,” Institute of International Relations, July 20, 2021 (How Should Europe Address Iran’s Missile Proliferation Activities? | Institute of International Relations Prague - Expertise to impact [iir.cz]).

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provided powerful engines from of the Soviet era its factory through black market.55 Sometimes, private or public sector companies of a state can be involved in facilitating black market sale of weapon systems between a state actor and a non-state actor. In 2014, North Korea is also reported to have sold missile systems and communication technologies to Hamas—a Palestinian asymmetric organisation in Middle East struck a deal worth millions of dollars which was being handled by a Lebanese-based trading company that had close ties with the Hamas.56 This report, however, has been denied by North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman “calling it a baseless sophism and sheer fiction let loose by the U.S. to isolate the DPRK internationally.”57 Recent reports also claim that Iran is helping build a missile factory in Lebanon along with North Korea for the Hezbollah—another asymmetric organisation fighting the Israelis. In 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron has also considered possibilities of how French nuclear deterrent can strengthen collective security in Europe since he believes that French nuclear forces “strengthen the security of Europe through their very existence.”58 He further stated how France’s vital interests “now have a European dimension” and that its nuclear deterrence “ensures” the independence, “freedom to assess, make decisions, and take action” as well as “prevents adversaries from betting on escalation, intimidation, and blackmailing to achieve their ends.”59 France is keen on reducing dependency on US nuclear umbrella and NATO in the European security realm for EU countries.

55 William J. Broad and David Sanger, “North Korea’s Missile Success Is Linked to Ukrainian Plant, Investigators Say,” The New York Times, August 14, 2017 (https:// www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/world/asia/north-korea-missiles-ukraine-factory.html). 56 Con Coughlin, “Hamas and North Korea Is Secret Arms Deal,” The Telegraph, July 26, 2014 (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/palestiniana uthority/10992921/Hamas-and-North-Korea-in-secret-arms-deal.html). 57 Emily Rauhala, “North Korea Denies Selling Missiles to Hamas,” Time, July 29, 2014 (http://time.com/3049799/north-korea-denies-selling-missiles-to-hamas/). 58 Shannon Bugos, “France Offers Nuclear Deterrent to All Europe,” Arms Control Association, March 2020 (France Offers Nuclear Deterrent to All Europe | Arms Control Association). 59 Ibid.

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Why States Give Up Missile Capabilities: Case Study of South Africa If ‘security dilemma’ drives states to develop military capabilities, states could also renounce such capabilities when the threat perception is minimal. During the Cold War, South Africa was apprehensive of Soviet Union’s southern Africa expansionist approaches. South Africa realised that possessing nuclear weapons could coerce the United States to come to South Africa’s aid should South Africa face aggressions from the erstwhile Soviet Union.60 Not just the threat perception, but South African nuclear bomb and delivery systems were driven by its quest for survival, especially as ‘apartheid’ existed. However, with the Berlin Wall coming down and disintegration of the Soviet Union, and also South Africa’s efforts to bring an end to apartheid, the need for the nuclear bomb did not exist any further.61 As South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons, it also dismantled its ballistic missile program.62 It would be worth noting that by the time South Africa announced it would dismantle its ballistic missile program, which it built based on Israeli Jericho category missile systems, the state already possessed missile capabilities of ranges extending up to 1,900 kms and even further.63 A three-stage rocket was already developed for longer range target ability. Not only did South Africa renounce its ballistic missile program but it also gave up its space program to limit any concerns that its SLVs would be utilised for military purpose. In September 1995, South Africa also joined the MTCR post which South African companies had to vow to give up key missile-related technologies. Under Comprehensive Anti-apartheid Act of 1986, the United States imposed sanctions on South Africa. The United States also imposed sanctions on South Africa following their clandestine ballistic missile program. But with the end of apartheid and repealing of sanctions which were

60 As stated by former South African President F. W. de Klerk in Uri Friedman, “Why One President Gave Up Its Country’s Nukes,?” The Atlantic, September 9, 2017 (Why FW de Klerk Gave Up South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons - The Atlantic). 61 As stated by former South African President F. W. de Klerk in Uri Friedman, “Why One President Gave Up Its Country’s Nukes,?” The Atlantic, September 9, 2017 (Why FW de Klerk Gave Up South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons - The Atlantic). 62 “South Africa,” NTI (South Africa | Countries | NTI). 63 “South Africa,” NTI (South Africa | Countries | NTI).

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imposed due to its ballistic missile program, would provide a boost to its sluggish economy. Also, South Africa, despite making progress in missile technology, lagged behind combat aircraft, attach helicopters and tanks that resulted in Angola dominating the battle space in its war with Angola.64 This is also probably why South Africa realised the need to concentrate on weapon systems that could be more conducive in warfare than to face sanctions and proceed with missile capabilities and neglect other forms of conventional deterrence. Again as South Africa signed the NPT in 1991, and dismantled its missile program, there were probably lesser doubts in the international forum regarding its nuclear weapons program. South Africa probably became one of the best examples of how a state could disarm its nuclear and ballistic missile program despite making impressive progress. It would not be wrong to infer that all these steps easened South Africa’s progress with its nuclear energy program—a crucial energy source for electricity supply. It would also not be wrong to infer that South Africa’s move towards a nuclear weapons free South Africa led it to even make the Pelindaba Treaty (a treaty to pledge for a nuclear weapons free zone in Africa) a successful one.65 By 1999, South Africa also joined the HCoC.66

Conclusion If threat perception is the reason why states resort to hard power capability including missiles, with the non-existence of such threats, states would either forego progressing with such capabilities and can also give up an active missile development program. If some states feel possession of missile capabilities can lessen their ‘security dilemma’ and ensure peace and stability, others may feel the existence of such capabilities in their 64 Gawin Cawthra, “Arms for Apartheid: The Secret World of Sanctions Busting,”

Index on Censorship, 1991 (Arms for Apartheid: The Secret World of Sanctions Busting [sagepub.com]). 65 Note: The Pelindaba Treaty restricts Egypt and Algeria from developing nuclear weapons. 66 “South Africa,” Federation of American Scientists (Missile Programs - South Africa [fas.org]).

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military arsenal threatens their peace and stability like in the case of South Africa. While legally binding regimes exist that can prevent a state from acquiring missile capabilities, states usually abide by these regimes when ‘security dilemma’ does not exist for them.

CHAPTER 5

Historical and Contemporary Missile Development: Nuclear Weapon States, Regional Powers and Other Powers

Development of weapon systems is a systematic approach that needs to take into account threat perceptions, geographical factors, economics and political factors into consideration. Both strategic and tactical level missile systems hold importance of being used as a tool for deterrence and for coercive diplomacy in addition to the fact that these systems allow a state to highlight its technological prowess and combat capability. All these factors in return help a state to ensure its survivability. One of the reasons for the development of missile systems to deliver lethal warheads was the absence of a supranational system that could check the growth of these developments in state. As states develop such capabilities, ‘security dilemma’ in other states aggravated, and hence, the concept of ‘self-help’ system led to the development of similar weapon systems in other states as well. In this chapter, we discuss the missile development of the erstwhile superpowers, rising powers and regional powers. The chapter highlights the current trends as well draws out the historical developments that led to the commencement of missile technology in each country for a simplistic understanding of what leads states to develop such systems and continue to do so. The chapter discusses missile development program of states in terms of global actors and regional actors.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Ghoshal, Role Of Ballistic And Cruise Missiles In International Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48063-8_5

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Early Firepower The Second World War marked the use of guided missile systems by Germany in the form of V1 missiles and later on the liquid-fuelled V2 ballistic missiles. They were technically the first ballistic missiles to be ever used in warfare and was used to target cities like London, Norwich, Paris, Lille and Antwerp.1 Post-Second World War, Britain, the United States and Soviet Union had gathered the V2 technology and based on this technology experimented with their missile technology program.2 With the advent of the Cold War, both the super powers, the United States of America and Soviet Union, conducted nuclear tests, and hence, the focus was on development of ballistic missile technology that could carry nuclear warheads. As mentioned, Britain also pursued with its missile technology program. France was another European country that pursued their missile technology program during the Cold War. However, missile technology program during the Cold War was not just confined to Europe and the United States but Asian states, China in the Indo-Pacific, India and Pakistan in South Asia and Israel and Iran in the Middle East, were also pursuing missile technology program during the Cold War.

Global Powers The United States Changes in polarity affect how a state provides for its security.3 With the commencement of the Cold War, and with a bipolar world order, the United States prioritised security to strengthen its survival. The United States acquired the German V2 missile and commenced on its missile development program based on this technology. There was also focus on command guidance and inertial navigation system. Air-breathing technologies including turbojet and advanced turbo engine fans were also

1 Richard Hollingham, “V2: The Nazi Rocket That Launched the Space Age,” BBC,

September 8, 2014 (http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20140905-the-nazis-space-agerocket). 2 Ibid. 3 Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol.

25, No. 1, Summer 2000, pp. 5–41 (http://www.columbia.edu/itc/sipa/U6800/rea dings-sm/Waltz_Structural%20Realism.pdf).

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prioritised.4 The Navy and Air Force started working on missile programs and developed the Regalus and Matador missile systems, respectively. By 1954, Regalus became the first sea-based nuclear deterrence (cruise missile) for the United States.5 By 1956, the Navy had commenced work on the US Navy Fleet Ballistic Missile Program.6 By 1957, the United States tested the ground-based Atlas missile, and by the 1959, the first ICBM version of the Atlas missile was test-fired.7 The United States had also stationed nuclear capable missiles in European countries like Spain, Greenland and other European states by 1958.8 The Thor missiles were the first IRBM that was stationed in Europe by the United States.9 By the 1960s, the United States already possessed the Minuteman, Titan II and Atlas in its ICBM inventory. They were America’s first generation ICBMs.10 The Minuteman was the first solid-fuelled ballistic missile of the United States deployed in the 1960s.11 Minuteman was replaced by more advanced Minuteman II and Minuteman III during the later phases. The Minuteman III had its third stage improvised and the missile was also capable of delivering MIRVs.12 The United States continued to work on

4 Kenneth P. Werrell, “The Evolution of the Cruise Missile,” Air University Press, September 1985 (https://media.defense.gov/2017/Apr/07/2001728474/-1/-1/0/B_0 006_WERRELL_EVOLUTION_CRUISE_MISSILE.PDF). 5 Harrison Jacobs, “See Inside the US’ First Nuclear Armed Submarine, Which Could Fire a Nuclear Missile Powerful Enough to Wipe Out New York City,” Business Insider, February 14, 2018 (https://www.businessinsider.in/See-inside-the-USs-first-nucleararmed-submarine-which-could-fire-a-nuclear-missile-powerful-enough-to-wipe-out-NewYork-City/articleshow/62907509.cms). 6 “Trident II D-5 Fleet Ballistic Missile,” Federation of American Scientists (https:// fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/slbm/d-5.htm). 7 “SM-65 Atlas,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/atlas/). 8 Robert Standish Norris, “United States Nuclear Weapons Deployments Abroad: 1950–

1977,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 30, 1999 (https://www. archives.gov/files/declassification/pidb/meetings/norris-addendum.pdf). 9 “US Missile Systems,” AU Space Primer, July 23, 2003 (http://www.au.af.mil/au/ awc/space/primer/us_missile_systems.pdf). 10 Ibid. 11 “The Minuteman Missile,” National Park Service (https://www.nps.gov/articles/

minuteman-icbm.htm). 12 “LGM-30 Minuteman III,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/ nuke/guide/usa/icbm/lgm-30_3.htm).

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enhancing performance of its ICBM systems in order to improve its deterrent capability. Use of hypergolic propellants to facilitate the MIRVs in the missile reduced reaction time and improved guidance and attitude control systems.13 Not only were MIRVs developed, but each re-entry vehicle had the capability of conduct manoeuvres.14 At present, the Minuteman III is present in the US arsenal with a range of 13,000 kms. However, the Pentagon is also focusing on Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) or the LGM-35 Sentinel to replace Minuteman ICBMs. The “Sentinel (GBSD) system is a complete recapitalisation of the current capability. Its modular open-system design reduces operational and sustainment costs and offers enormous system flexibility to keep relevant as the threat landscape continues to evolve.”15 The United States also focused on sea-launched nuclear capable ballistic missiles as a result of which the Polaris SLBMs—A1, A2 and A3 versions—were developed and operationalised.16 The MIRV-ed Poseidon SLBM went to sea in the 1970s.17 In order to achieve greater range for better stand-off capability, Trident C-4 was developed, and in the modern times, 12,000 kms range Trident D-5 exists in the SLBM arsenal of the United States. The missile can carry MIRVs and is canister launched that increases its survivability.18 Under the INF Treaty, the United States was forbidden to develop missiles ranging from 500 to 5,500 kms and hence, did not possess any MRBMs or IRBMs. However, with the extinction of the INF Treaty, the United States showed keenness to develop INF category missile systems.19 In 2019, they tested ground-launched cruise

13 Brian J. German, E.Caleb Branscome, et.al., “An Evolution of Green Propellants For An ICBM Post-Boost Propulsion System,” DTIC, 2000, (https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/ tr/pdf/ADA386589.pdf) 14 Ibid. 15 “Sentinel: The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent,” Northrop Grumman (Sentinel –

The Ground Based Strategic Deterrent | Northrop Grumman). 16 “Polaris 2,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/ slbm/a-2.htm). 17 “Lockheed UGM-73 Poseidon,” Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles, 2002 (http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-73.html). 18 N.8. 19 Idrees Ali and Phil Stewart, “After INF Treaty’s Demise, U.S. Seeks Funds for

Missile Tests,” Reuters, August 2, 2019 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russiainf/after-inf-treatys-demise-u-s-seeks-funds-for-missile-tests-idUSKCN1US0FJ).

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missile (GLCM) of 500 kms range.20 The same year, the Pentagon also tested IRBM that was conventionally configured.21 In order to strengthen its air power capability, the United States also focused on ALCMs and by 1976, the missile arsenal had AGM-86A and 86B. The United States also possesses the air launched AGM-158 with stealth technology. It is a Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) that can be used against relocatable targets. They can reach targets up to the range from 390 to 970 kms approximately.22 The JASSM has been used in Syria.23 There could be a possibility of a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile in the near future even though the present Biden administration has cancelled such a program.24 To acquire LACM capability, the Tomahawk subsonic cruise missiles were developed. This LACM missile was also used during the Gulf War, in Libya and also in the ongoing Syrian crisis.25 The Harpoons were also converted from ASCM to LACM in the 1990s. Washington is also working towards CPGS capability in which it aims to develop family of conventional weapon systems that can reach targets within an hour across any part of the world to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons. In fact, as the United States realised that developing

20 Aaron Mehta, “Watch the Pentagon Test Its First Land-Based Cruise Missile in a Post-INF World,” Defense News, August 19, 2019 (Watch the Pentagon Test Its First Land-Based Cruise Missile in a Post-INF Treaty world [defensenews.com]). 21 Joseph Trevithick, “Pentagon Conducts First Test of Non-nuclear Capable Ballistic Missile Post INF-Treaty,” The Drive, December 12, 2019 (Pentagon Conducts First Test of Non-nuclear Capable Ballistic Missile Post-INF Treaty (Updated) [thedrive.com]). 22 “AGM-158 JASSM,” Air Force Technology (https://www.airforce-technology.com/ projects/agm-158-jassm-standoff-missile/). 23 Kyle Mizokami, “The Pentagon’s New Strike Missile Just Saw Its First Combat,” Popular Mechanics, April 17, 2018 (https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/wea pons/a19843076/syria-attack-jassm-er-new-long-range-strike-missile/). 24 Bryant Harris, “GOP Moves to Instate Sea-Launched Cruise Missile Program,” Defense News, June 22, 2023 (GOP Moves to Instate Sea-Launched Cruise Missile Nuclear Program [defensenews.com]). 25 “Here Is All You Would Want to Know About the Tomahawk Missile That US Used to Strike Syria,” The Economic Times, July 14, 2018 (https://economictimes.indiat imes.com/news/defence/tomahawk-land-attack-missiles-the-weapon-donald-trump-usedagainst-syria/articleshow/58063710.cms?from=mdr).

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a global strike system at the moment is not feasible, in 2012, it restructured the concept as Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS).26 The United States has worked on HTV now commonly called as Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) that can be launched from Army’s Tactical Missile Systems.27 There are also assumptions that the modified Minuteman or the Peacekeeper ICBM or the Trident D-5 SLBM could be used as a prompt strike weapon system.28 There is also a Conventional Strike Missile (CSM) that is being developed by the Air Force as a possible weapon system for prompt strike capability.29 Russia According to Waltz, Cold War brought with it bipolarity, and hence, both the super powers had to keep balancing against each other for strengthening deterrence and stability.30 The Soviet Union had to balance polarity, and so developed capabilities to maintain this bipolarity and strengthen nuclear deterrence. Like the United States, the erstwhile Soviet Union was able to get hold of the German V-1 and V-2 missiles, rockets, supporting systems, air to surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles and air-to-air missiles post-Second World War along with German scientists.31 After the Soviet Union tested their nuclear weapons, they concentrated on ballistic missile systems and the Soviet nuclear forces were under the Strategic Rocket Forces also known as the Raketniye Voyska Strategicheskovo Naznacheniya (RSVN). The first ICBM developed by the Soviets was the liquid-fuelled R-7 with a range of 8,000 kms and the extended range version called the R-7A. But the missile was not capable of reaching

26 “Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues,” Congressional Research Service, January 8, 2019 (https://fas.org/sgp/crs/ nuke/R41464.pdf). 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 See Stephen Cimbala, “Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: Realism,

Rationality and Uncertainty,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1, February 27, 2017 (https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/fe357e59ce1c-48cb-aca6-0b35e43c2e54). 31 “Early History of the Soviet Missile Program (1945–1953)” (http://www.nsa.gov/ public_info/_files/cryptologic_spectrum/early_history_soviet_missile.pdf).

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targets in the United States nor was it survivable.32 This led to the development of R-16 ICBM as well as R9 ICBM with a range of 11,000– 13,000 kms and 12,500 kms, respectively, as well as development of silo base to make the missile survivable by the 1960s.33 Later on, the Soviets developed the SS-18 also called the R-36M to replace the R9 ICBM with modified silos that were well hardened to improve survivability of the ICBM. Some of the R-36M category ICBMs were also MIRV-ed.34 The missile became a game-changer during the Cold War with an increased range of 16,000 kms with better accuracy and given the hardened silos, limited the scopes of the United States to be able to strike Soviet ICBM force and destroy the same, thereby increasing the nuclear deterrent value of the missile.35 The missile was also cold launched leaving little scope of damage of the silos after launch making the silos capable of being reused unlike ICBMs that are hot launched.36 By the mid-1960s, the Soviets had already worked on the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)—allowing for performing near polar Low Earth orbit (LEO), deorbit, before one complete orbit.37 FOBS was a weapon system that was expected to evade US anti-ballistic missile shield. All these improvements in nuclear forces could be due to the lessons the Soviets learnt from the Cuban Missile Crisis that led Soviets to improvise their missile capability to be used as currency for bargaining and for coercive diplomacy. In addition, the Soviet also concentrated on sea-based deterrence to strengthen their second-strike capability and developed the R-30 SLBM. They also concentrated on cruise missile technology during the 1950s and

32 Sean O’Connor, “Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces,” Air Power Australia, Updated

2012 (https://www.ausairpower.net/APA-RVSN-Analysis.html). 33 Ibid. 34 “R-36 M/SS-18 Satan,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/nuke/

guide/russia/icbm/r-36m.htm). 35 “SS-18 Satan/R-36M2 Voyevoda,” Missile Defence Advocacy Agency (http://missil edefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/russia/ss-18satan/). 36 Ibid. 37 “R-360/FOBS,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/nuke/guide/rus

sia/icbm/r-36o.htm).

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developed the Kh-22 cruise missiles and deployed them by the 1970s, along with the development of the P-5 cruise missiles for the Navy.38 All these developments collectively strengthened Soviet’s doctrine of pre-emption. In fact, the Soviets had prepared for all three possibilities of pre-emption, launch-on-warning, retaliation by developing credible capabilities. Even though the Soviets renounced the doctrine of ‘pre-emption’ by 1981, and adopted the retaliatory posture, there was still a belief among the American planners that they could resort to pre-emption.39 Nevertheless, for the Soviets, this shift from pre-emption to retaliation was possible due to reduction in launch time for the ICBMs, hardened silos, increase in the number of missiles, improved command and control structure, all of which together improved survivability.40 Thus, deterrence was strengthened through both offence and defence by developing more and more ICBMs as a component of offensive realism and also subscribing to the concept of survivability as a component of defensive realism. Post-Cold War, the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Russian Federation was the only Federation that possessed nuclear forces. Competitive nature of the international system is a feature of structural realism, and this competition that stemmed not just from US nuclear weapons but also France, Britain and China was the reason why Russia continued to work on strengthening their nuclear deterrence. In order to make its missile forces more credible and to reduce the time to launch them, Russia has concentrated on solid propelled missiles. But liquid propelled missiles provide greater thrust and ability to carry greater payload and also help to cover greater range. Hence, there is a mix of both solid- and liquidfuelled ICBMs and SLBMs in its arsenal. The SS-N-32 intercontinental range SLBM is solid propelled missile with a range 8,300 kms with MIRV capabilities.41 The third stage of the missile is manoeuvrable making it easier for the missile to evade missile defence system.42 38 “Russian Cruise Missiles,” Russian Space Web (http://www.russianspaceweb.com/ rockets_cruise.html). 39 “Evolution of Soviet Strategy,” Soviet Intentions: 1965–1985 (https://nsarchive2. gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/doc02_I_ch3.pdf). 40 Ibid. 41 “SS-N-Bulava,”

Missile Threat

(https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-32-bul

ava/). 42 “Bulava Submarine Based Ballistic Missile,” Russian Space Web (http://www.russia nspaceweb.com/bulava.html).

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The R-29RM is a liquid-fuelled SLBM developed with a range of 8,000 kms and can be MIRV-ed. It is an improved version of the R29R with greater diameter allowing greater propellant loading that would provide greater thrust and hence, cover longer range.43 By 1988, the missile was improvised with improved warheads and with improved accuracy and could fly at depressed trajectory that can evade interception by enemy missile defence shield and also with a post-boost vehicle. Other SLBMs include the R-39 that is solid propelled and with post-boost vehicle attached to it. It is a three-staged missile and can be MIRVed.44 The Bulava SLBM is 8,300 kms range three-staged missile system with MIRVs with the ability of the re-entry vehicles to conduct in-flight manoeuvrability and retargeting to out-manoeuvre any enemy defence.45 The Cold War era Topol ICBM, also called the RS-12 M Topol, has three stages, which is solid propelled with a range of 11,000 kms.46 Solid propulsion makes it more mobile and hence, can be mounted easily on the Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) for greater mobility. The RS-26 Rubezh ICBM which is expected to replace the Topol will carry both manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) and MIRVs to evade enemy missile defence system, which is solid propelled and road mobile and will have a range of 5,600 km. The missile is also expected to carry the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) to evade missile defence.47 Russia’s RS-36 M2 Voyevoda/SS-18 SATAN ICBM is a two-staged missile with liquid propulsion system and is silo based with a range of 11,000–16,000 kms.48 In order to replace these ICBMs, the Russians are developing another liquid-fuelled silo-based RS-28 Sarmat missile that

43 R-29RM/SS-N-23 SKIF,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/nuke/ guide/russia/slbm/r29rm.htm). 44 “R-39/SS-N-20 Sturgeon,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/ nuke/guide/russia/slbm/r39.htm). 45 “SS-N-32 Bulava,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-32-bul ava/). 46 “Topol,” Military Today (http://www.military-today.com/missiles/topol.htm). 47 “RS-26 Rubezh,” Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvocacy.

org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/russia/rs-26-rubezh/). 48 “SS-18 Satan/R-36M2 Voyevoda,” Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance (https://mis siledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/russia/ss-18satan/).

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would be liquid–fuelled and capable of carrying MIRVs and also the YU74 HGVs in future.49 The missile will be a two-staged missile system with a maximum range of 16,000 kms. Russia also possesses the three-staged solid propelled RS-24 Yars ICBMs with a range of 10,500 kms and is road mobile and can be MIRV-ed.50 There could be a possibility that in future the missile can be made silo based.51 The missile has a new re-entry vehicle that can manoeuvre both in space and during re-entry, thereby evading missile defence.52 According to the reports, by 2030s, the Yars will be replaced newer ICBMs (the Yars will be replaced with newer ICBMs) with greater manoeuvrability and resistibility to enemy defence systems as well as with smaller size and mass.53 Russia has also concentrated on air-launched ballistic missile of hypersonic speeds called the Kinzhal missile, KH-47M2. The nuclear capable missile is a high precision missile capable of travelling at Mach 10 and is highly manoeuvrable. With a range of 2,000 kms, the missile is expected to provide greater stand-off capability of Russian fighter jets.54 Russian bombers Tu-160 Blackjack and Tu-95MS Bear H can carry nuclear capable Kh-55 ALCMs while the upgraded versions can carry Kh-102 cruise missile. The Blackjacks are also capable of carrying Kh-15 ALCMs.55 Russia also possesses the scramjet-powered hypersonic ASCM called the Zircon with a range of 500 kms and is manoeuvring. In order to evade missile defence system, the missile is covered by a plasma cloud

49 “RS-28 Sarmat,” Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvocacy. org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/russia/rs-28-sarmat-satan-2/). 50 “RS-24 Yars,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/rs-24/). 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 “New Mobile Missile Complexes May Replace Yars After 2030,” TASS, September

25, 2018 (https://tass.com/defense/1022996). 54 Debalina Ghoshal, “Russia’s New Kinzhal Missile and What It Means for the US,” Daily Sabah, April 29, 2018 (https://www.dailysabah.com/op-ed/2018/04/30/russiasnew-kinzhal-missile-and-what-it-means-for-the-us). 55 Hans M. Kristensen, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2019,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March 4, 2019 (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2019. 1580891).

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to absorb rays of radio frequencies which makes the missile invisible to radars.56 Russia has also developed the submarine launched 3M 14 Kalibr missiles that could be within the range of 1,500–2,500 kms and has been used during the Syrian conflict. The 3M 54 ones have a range of 660 kms. Both the Kalibr categories are low flying missiles bypassing terrain relief making them difficult to be intercepted.57 Russia is also reported to be developing 4,500 kms range Kalibr-M cruise missiles with a warhead weighing almost one ton.58 Russia has also been accused by the NATO of developing ground-launched nuclear capable cruise missile called the SSC-8 claiming that the missile violates provisions of the INF Treaty.59 Russia has also deployed short range ballistic missile called the Iskander also called SS-26 in the Kaliningrad exclave near the Baltic region. The missile has a range of 500 kms and is capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads.60 All these developments strengthen Russia’s strategic deterrent and strengthen the material characteristic of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, adhering to another assumption of structural realism. Britain State survival is one of the reasons for Britain to seek nuclear weapons. Britain’s lack of faith in the US guarantee of nuclear security to North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) despite Britain being a part of

56 “3M22 Zircon,” Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvocacy. org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/russia/3m22-zircon/). 57 “Russia to Upgrade Its 3M-14 Kalibr Cruise Missiles,” Navy Recognition, July 20,

2018 (https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2018/july2018-navy-naval-defense-news/6369-russia-to-upgrade-its-3m-14-kalibr-cruise-missiles. html). 58 “Russia Developing Kalibr-M 4500km Range Cruise Missile for Warship Deployment,” Defense World.net, January 8, 2019 (https://www.defenseworld.net/news/ 24023/Russia_Developing_Kalibr_M_4500_km_Range_Cruise_Missile_for_Warship_Depl oyment#.XRzWhj8zbIU). 59 “SSC-8 Novator,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ssc-8-nov ator-9m729/). 60 “Russia Deploys Iskander Nuclear-Capable Missile to Kaliningrad,” Reuters, February 5, 2018 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-nato-missiles/russia-dep loys-iskander-nuclear-capable-missiles-to-kaliningrad-ria-idUSKBN1FP21Y).

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NATO led the country to progress towards development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to ensure its survival.61 Britain’s nuclear weapons, however, hardly played any role in nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, but survival of state is a powerful desire and even if nuclear weapons play minimal role in strengthening survival of the state, the need for such weapons for survival is psychological and will be sought for should states feel the need for them.62 Though Britain possesses nuclear weapons, since the Cold War days, it has refrained from developing a land-based nuclear deterrence. Britain’s nuclear deterrence relied upon SLBMs strengthening its second-strike capability. Britain maintains the Trident II D-5 SLBMs that it directly bought from the United States.63 During the Cold War in the 1960s, under the 1962 Nassau Agreement, the United States struck an agreement with the United States for establishing command and control modalities that exist even to this day. In that respect, the US Polaris was provided to the United Kingdom with the condition that this missile ‘would be assigned as a part of NATO nuclear force and targeted in accordance with NATO plans.’64 It must also be noted that the United States also provided Thor IRBM to the Royal Air Force prior to the INF Treaty under the dual US-UK control agreement.65 This meant that Britain lacked the operational independence of its nuclear forces as the ‘launch key’ was controlled by both the NATO members. However, Britain’s

61 David A. Smith, “Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: Why Do States Seek Nuclear Weapons?,” Inquiries Journal, Vol. 8, No. 8, 2016 (http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/art icles/1434/theories-of-nuclear-proliferation-why-do-states-seek-nuclear-weapons). 62 David A. Smith, “Theories of Nuclear Proliferation: Why Do States Seek Nuclear Weapons?,” Inquiries Journal, Vol. 8, No. 8, 2016 (http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/art icles/1434/theories-of-nuclear-proliferation-why-do-states-seek-nuclear-weapons). 63 “United Kingdom,” NTI , August 2015 (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/uni ted-kingdom/nuclear/). 64 Ian Davis, “The British Bomb and NATO: Six Decades of Contributing to NATO Strategic Nuclear Deterrent,” SIPRI , November 2015 (https://www.sipri.org/sites/def ault/files/files/misc/NATO-Trident-Report-15_11.pdf). 65 “The British Bomb and the United States,” National Security Archive, May 13, 2021 (The British Bomb and the United States - Part One | National Security Archive [gwu.edu]).

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nuclear bomb was indigenous.66 Britain’s nuclear command is also independent and is under the Prime Minister even if the nuclear weapons are deployed as a part of NATO response.67 The 1958 Atomic Energy Cooperation Agreement signed between the United States and Britain “obliged Britain to outsource the components of the nuclear weapon system from the United States.” Before long, Britain renounced its guided missile development program and sought to acquire strategic missile systems from the United States.68 In the present scenario, the Trident has undergone a life extension program with the help of the United States’ Strategic Systems Programs that would extend their service up to 2042 and it would enter the Royal Navy.69 This in addition to advanced SSBNs that would be ‘continuous at-sea deterrence’ would strengthen Britain’s minimum nuclear deterrent posture by keeping the minimum nuclear deterrent capability to deter adversaries.70 Britain also possesses cruise missiles. The bunker buster ALCM called the Shadow Storm has been used during Syrian conflict.71 Britain will also have the SPEAR-3 ALCM of the Brimstone class of missiles in service.72 This next generation cruise missile will have a range of 120– 140 kms. Britain possesses ASCM Harpoons but plans to introduce a Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon to replace the obsolete Harpoons.73 However, until it acquires the Future Cruise/Anti-Ship Weapon, it plans to acquire a next generation surface ship guided weapons (SSGW) for 66 Hu Yumin, “British Nuclear submarines with its Own Distinct Features,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 24, 2012 (https://carnegieendowment.org/ 2012/01/24/british-nuclear-strategy-with-its-own-distinct-features-pub-46604). 67 “The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent: What You Need to Know” (The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent: What You Need to Know - GOV.UK [www.gov.uk]). 68 Ibid. 69 “Back to the Future with Trident Life Extension,” Undersea Warfare, Spring 2012

(https://www.ssp.navy.mil/documents/trident_life_extension.pdf). 70 Robert J. Downes, “Trident Missile Failure: Just How Safe Is UK’s Nuclear Deterrent?,” The Conversation, January 24, 2017 (https://theconversation.com/trident-missilefailure-just-how-safe-is-the-uks-nuclear-deterrent-71744). 71 Paul Withers, “World Powers Show Off Advanced Weaponry in Syrian War.” 72 “Spear-3,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/spear-3/). 73 Richard Scott, “UK Considers Options for Possible Off-the-Shelf Harpoon Replacement,” Janes, June 26, 2018 (https://www.janes.com/article/82025/uk-considers-opt ions-for-possible-off-the-shelf-harpoon-replacement).

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anti-ship roles.74 In 2017, Britain and France also signed an agreement to launch a joint concept phase of the Future Cruise Anti-Ship missile program with increased chances of survivability and increased range and lethality and also deep strike capability.75 France Mearsheimer states, “past behaviour of great powers has been more in accordance with the predictions of offensive rather than defensive realism.”76 France is no stranger to the world wars and it has even been a part of it. However, France has fought European powers in the past prior to the world wars, and hence, it could not rely solely on an American assurance of nuclear deterrence for its survival. Moreover, during the Second World War and after that, one of the concerns for France was a nuclear-armed Germany—a possibility that made France realise the need for its own deterrence. France conducted its first successful nuclear test in 1960 and like Britain relied on SLBMs rather than ICBMs to strengthen its nuclear deterrence. France possessed the M-45 SLBMs but reportedly moved towards an advanced M-51 SLBM.77 For France, nuclear weapons and delivery systems became necessary as Britain had developed the same in Europe. Moreover, the Soviets also possessed nuclear weapons. In addition, notwithstanding the fact that the NATO was formed, interrelationship between the allies was still settling.78 Relying on US nuclear

74 George Allison, “UK Looking for New Interim Anti-ship Missiles,” UK Defence Journal, March 8, 2019 (https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-looking-for-new-interimanti-ship-missiles/). 75 “France and UK Launch Next-Gen Missile Project with MBDA to Replace Harpoon/Scalp/Exocet by 2030,” Navy Recognition, March 28, 2017 (http://www.nav yrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2017/march-2017-navy-naval-forcesdefense-industry-technology-maritime-security-global-news/5032-france-uk-launch-nextgen-missile-project-with-mbda-to-replace-harpoon-scalp-exocet-by-2030.html). 76 John Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism” (https://www.commackschools.org/Dow

nloads/8_mearsheimer-_structural_realism.pdf). 77 “France,” NTI , Last Updated May 2016 (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/fra nce/nuclear/). 78 Niklas Granholm and John Rydqvist, “Nuclear Weapons in Europe: British and French Deterrence Forces,” FOI , April 2018 (https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOIR--4587--SE).

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deterrence to strengthen nuclear deterrence would have raised proliferation concerns. Therefore, developing an indigenous capability was a secure way to strengthen its deterrence. In addition, the Dein Bein Phu incident coupled with US fading support for France as well as US thwarting of the French-Britain-Israeli operations against Egypt in the Suez Canal zone in 1956 further alleviated concerns of France, coercing them to rely on an indigenous capability.79 France had relied upon both strategic and TNWs that can be carried by missiles, but in case of TNWs, France’s approach has been more of an operational doctrine relying on the concept of “final warning.”80 France’s sea-based deterrence comes under the Strategic Ocean Force.81 M-51.1 can carry MIRVs (TN75) with greater accuracy while the advanced M51.2 already operational in 2016 will be fitted with the warhead called the tête nucléaire océanique (TNO)—believed to be stealthier than the TN75.82 Also a more advanced version of the M-51 category missile, the M-51.3 with greater accuracy is in progress and will have greater range with the introduction of the third stage in the missile system.83 The air launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) act more as a tactical nuclear weapon that can be launched from their aerial delivery systems. These aerial delivery systems can take off from both land-based and sea-based platforms.84 This means that the ALCMs that can be carried by fighter bombers are operated by both the Strategic Air Forces and Naval Nuclear Aviation Force. The Air-Sol Moyenne Portée (ASMP/ASMP-A) is an air-launched land-attack ramjet-powered cruise missile with an integrated accelerator that carries a nuclear payload with a range of 80–300 kms. It is a

79 Niklas Granholm and John Rydqvist, “Nuclear Weapons in Europe: British and French Deterrence Forces,” FOI , April 2018 (https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOIR--4587--SE). 80 Ibid. 81 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “French Nuclear Forces, 2019,” Bulletin of

the Atomic Scientists, January 7, 2019 (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/ 00963402.2019.1556003). 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “French Nuclear Forces, 2019,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January 7, 2019 (Full article: French Nuclear Forces, 2019 [tandfonline. com]).

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central component of France’s nuclear deterrent force. The missile will be replaced by the ASN4G or air-sol nucléaire fourth-generation missile, currently under development, an extended range version of the ASMP-A with enhanced stealth and manoeuvrability.85 That France still focuses majorly on a sea-based nuclear deterrence probably provides a relief as of now about France’s nuclear policy, especially amid a doctrine that focuses less on deterrence and more on the possible use of nuclear weapons as a war-fighting weapon and also amid the fact that ALCMs can be termed as TNWs. Though ALCMs have been termed as TNWs, France’s aerial delivery systems to carry these missiles are viewed as strategic assets. France consists of four Triomphant class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Each of these SSBN can carry sixteen SLBMs. The Navy has sought to maintain a continuous at-sea deterrent posture, whereby one SSBN is continuously on patrol.86 However, owing to the recent Ukrainian crisis, there are reports that France has kept at least three of its SSBNs on continuous at-sea patrols, though the report had not been confirmed nor denied by the French Navy.87 However, France is also set to rely on a new class of third-generation SSBN for its sea-based deterrence. The new SSBN, SNLE 3G will be replacing the existing Le Triomphant class of SSBN by 2035.88 This is in compliance with France’s 2019–2025 Military Plan Law. The improved acoustic hydrodynamic manoeuvrability (ensured with sail cusp) and quieter propulsion technology in the new SSBN will strengthen the seabased deterrence capability of France which is strengthened only when sea-based nuclear assets are invulnerable. As described by the French Minister for Armed Forces in 2021, “the third generation SSBN will be slightly longer and heavier compared to the Le Triomphant-class SSBN. So it will hear better and defend itself better, it will be quieter: it will not be noisier than a shoal of shrimp, which is absolutely

85 “French Nuclear Forces,” SIPRI 2018 (www.sipri.org). 86 Ibid. 87 “France Has Increased Its Ballistic Missile Patrols for the First Time in decades,” The Drive, March 24, 2022 (www.thedrive.com). 88 “France Launches Third Generation SSBN Program SNLE 3G,” February 21, 2021 (France Launches Third Generation SSBN Program - SNLE 3G - Naval News].

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exceptional. Hence, it will be able to blend in perfectly with the ambient sounds of the sea, which is a guarantee of operational superiority.”89 In order to strengthen the deterrent capability of these SSBNs, France also deploys SSNs for sea denial and sea control roles.90 The new Barracuda class SSN will consist of F21 torpedo and Missile De Croisière Naval (MDCN) naval cruise missiles.91 These missiles are capable of being launched from both VLS and torpedo tubes providing the submarine with greater flexibility in launch mode. Even though these missiles are conventional in nature, they would provide greater attack capability to the SSN. Conventional missiles on SSNs enable France to strengthen their nuclear deterrence at sea as SSNs are for fast attack and hence, meant for tactical roles. The Naval Nuclear Aviation Force (Force Aéronavale Nucléaire or FANu) operates at least one, possibly two, nuclear squadron of Rafale M F3 aircraft92 for nuclear strike missions on-board France’s sole aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle. One of the counter-measures used by adversaries against enemy nuclear delivery platforms is the use of jamming systems. Improved resilience against GPS jamming present in these aircraft implies that they are capable of posing a threat to adversaries with their counter-counter measures. The Rafale fighter-bomber has a range of 2,000 kilometres and is operated by both French Air Force and the French Navy and both the aircraft can carry the nuclear capable ASMP. Its ability to carry nuclear ASMPs allowed the aircraft to replace the nuclear capable Mirage 2000Ns.93 France is a party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and hence, it doesn’t conduct any more nuclear tests. However, nuclear testing is done through simulation program to ensure the credibility of its nuclear stockpile. 89 “France Launches Third Generation SSBN Program SNLE 3G,” February 21, 2021 (France Launches Third Generation SSBN Program - SNLE 3G - Naval News). 90 “France Submarine Capabilities,” NTI , February 28, 2023 (France Submarine Capabilities [nti.org]). 91 “France Launches First Barracuda SSN,” Janes, July 12, 2019 (www.janes.com). 92 Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “French Nuclear Forces, 2019,” Bulletin of

Atomic Scientists, January 7, 2019 (Full article: French Nuclear Forces, 2019 [tandfonline. com]). 93 “Fact Sheet: France’s Nuclear Inventory,” Arms Control Centre, March 27, 2020 (armscontrolcenter.org).

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China Mearsheimer states that China will work towards increasing its military capabilities, and as China’s military capability increases, China will become an aggressive state and be determined to achieve regional hegemony.94 Further, Mearsheimer’s asserts that states seek to achieve territorial integrity and autonomy of its domestic politics.95 Such assumption can only fructify when states have hard power prowess to further their interest. After China’s nuclear testing in 1964, China resorted to a posture of ‘minimum deterrence’ which meant that China would maintain a nuclear deterrent capability sufficient enough to retaliate against adversaries. It adopted a ‘no-first use’ doctrine based on survivability of its nuclear forces; though its ‘no-first’ use doctrine is not applicable to territories, it considers its own. However, it must be noted that China commenced work on its Dong Feng (DF) category missile systems in the 1956 when the Research Academy No.5 was established.96 Though initially Soviet Union had played a crucial role in China’s missile development program, post-1960, following the Sino-Soviet split, Soviet Union had little role in China’s missile development program. However, by 1960, China had already tested the Soviet made R-2 missile, and in the same year, the Chinese launched their own version of the R-2 missile called the DF-1 ballistic missile and also commenced development of a 10,000 km range DF-3 missile.97 Substantial help was also received from a Chinese citizen called Qian Xuesen who was a part of many classified missile program of the United States. He was also referred to as the ‘father of China’s ballistic missile force.’98 By 1962, China had developed its DF-2 category of missile system. After a series of setbacks, by 1964, China commenced its research 94 Jonathan Kirshner, “The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China,” European Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. I, 2010, pp. 53–75. 95 Jonathan Kirshner, “The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China,” European Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. I, 2010, pp. 53–75. 96 “History of Dong Feng: East Wind,” Astronauticsnow.com, 2004 (http://www.ast ronauticsnow.com/history/dongfeng/index.html). 97 “China Missile Chronology,” NTI , Last Update June 2012 (https://media.nti.org/ pdfs/china_missile_1.pdf). 98 “PRC Missile and Space Forces” (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPOCRPT-105hrpt851/html/ch4bod.html).

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and development program on the DF-3 missiles which was to be developed as an MRBM of range 2,800 kms with Philippines as a target.99 The DF-3 became the first stage for developing the DF-4 IRBM.100 By 1980, the liquid-fuelled DF-4 came into service and this missile had a range of 4,500–5,500 kms.101 The missile is nuclear capable with single warhead, transportable and silo-based.102 Even though China was able to launch an IRBM range missile by the 1980s, it must be noted that progress on ICBM capability commenced in the 1970s itself. After initial development-related problems, China conducted flight tests of the liquid-fuelled DF-5 ICBM, and by 1983, China was attempting to modify the missile to MIRV it.103 The missile has a range of 12,000–13,000 kms and is silo-based.104 Despite progress made on solid propelled ICBMs, China has continued to make technological advancements in the DF-5 category ICBMs and in the recent past have constructed a “sprawling network” of silos for its ICBMs which include the DF-5s. Liquid-fuelled ICBMs are easier to launch from silos given the hazard to launch them.105 By 1990s, China’s MRBM and IRBM category DF-21 missile was also in service. It was China’s solid-fuelled mobile ballistic missile with a range of 2,150 km.106 The DF-21A version has a modified nose section and can be fitted with electromagnetic pulse bombs. The range DF-21C and

99 “China Missile Chronology,” NTI , Last Update June 2012 (https://media.nti.org/ pdfs/china_missile_1.pdf). 100 “DF-3A/CSS-2,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/nuke/guide/ china/theater/df-3a.htm). 101 “Dong Feng-4 (DF-4),” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ df-4/). 102 “Dong Feng-4 (DF-4),” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ df-4/). 103 “DF-5,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ icbm/df-5.htm). 104 “Dong-Feng-5 (DF-5),” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefen

seadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/china/dong-feng-5df-5/). 105 Brad Lendon, “China Is Building a Sprawling Network of Missile Silos, Satellite Imagery Appears to Show,” CNN , July 2, 2021 (China Is Building a Sprawling Network of Missile Silos, Satellite Imagery Appears to Show | CNN). 106 “Dong Feng 21,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-21/).

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Ds are conventionally capable land-attack and anti-ship missiles, respectively.107 The presence of DF-21C was first revealed in 2006, and the missile has a range of 1,700 kms with greater precision while the antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) version DF-21D has a range of 1,500 kms whose existence was confirmed in 2008. The missile is equipped with MaRV and terminal guidance making it possible for the missile to be able to target slow-moving aircraft carrier battle group from a land-based mobile launcher.108 The DF-16 SRBM first came into service in 2015 and is both conventional and nuclear capable with multi-stage and solid propellants. The missile is capable of manoeuvring to avoid enemy missile defence detection. The missiles are deployed near Taiwan and can reach targets up to Japan and Pacific first island chain.109 These developments were no surprise considering that China was moving from a posture of ‘minimum deterrence’ to a posture of ‘limited deterrence.’ China’s defence ministry in April 2019 announced DF-26 had been put into service with Rocket Force.110 This missile is an ASBM with a range of 4,000 kms and is super manoeuvrable owing to the four control fins around the missile’s nose section.111 The missile is solid propelled road mobile long range version of the DF-21 category ASBM.112 Apart from the liquid-fuelled ICBM, China has also developed solidfuelled ICBMs like the DF-31 and DF-41. The DF-31 is a three-stage ICBM with a range of 8,000 kms capable of reaching the West Coast of the United States and some cities in the northern Rocky Mountains.113 107 “Dong Feng 21,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-21/). 108 “DF-21,” Sino Defence.com (http://sinodefence.com/df-21/). 109 “Dong Feng-16,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvo cacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/china/dong-feng-16/). 110 Lee Jeong Ho, “China Releases Footage of ‘Guam Killer’ DF-26 Ballistic Missile in ‘Clear Message to the US’,” South China Monitoring Post, January 28, 2019 (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2183972/china-releases-foo tage-guam-killer-df-26-ballistic-missile-clear). 111 Andrew Tate, “China Touts Capabilities of DF-26 as ASBM,” Jane’s 360,

January 28, 2019 (https://www.janes.com/article/86013/china-touts-capabilities-of-df26-as-asbm). 112 “Dong Feng-26,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/dong-feng26-df-26/). 113 “DF-31,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ icbm/df-31.htm).

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The improved version of DF-31, the DF-31A was adopted in 2007, and according to the reports, the missiles have both road mobile and silobased versions with an increased range of 11,200 kms capable of reaching the United States, Europe and Russia. The improved DF-31A can be MIRV-ed, contrary to the DF-31s that carried single warhead.114 A more mobile and more accurate version called the DF-31B also exists that can travel through more rugged terrain and in difficult road conditions.115 The DF-41 is a fourth-generation solid propelled ICBM with a range of 15,000 kms and can carry MIRVs.116 The nuclear capable missile can hit targets in mainland United States and is rail mobile.117 China has adopted a ‘no-first use doctrine,’ and hence, its nuclear deterrence is reliant on survivability of its arsenal to strengthen its counter-strike capability, and apart from mobile ballistic missiles, solidfuelled ballistic missiles and counter-measures on ballistic missiles, China has also concentrated on sea-based nuclear deterrence and have developed the short range SLBM JL-1 and the long range intercontinental range JL2 SLBM. The JL-1 has an operational range of 1,700–2,150 kms while JL-2 has a range of 8,000–9,000 kms and can be MIRV-ed.118 China has also developed and also deployed the new 10,000 kms range JL-3 SLBM on their Jin class SSBN119 but later on these SLBM *SLBMs may be deployed on the new class of SSBNs that China is constructing. China has also concentrated on HGVs , the DF-ZF mounted upon the solid fuelled DF-17 missile that could strike targets at 1800km– 2500kms range. Though the DF-17s are meant for conventional roles, 114 “DF-31A,” Military Today (http://www.military-today.com/missiles/df31a.htm). 115 Minni Chan, “China Puts on Show of Force with DF-31B Mobile ICBM Missile

Test,” South China Monitoring Post, October 4, 2014 (https://www.scmp.com/news/ china/article/1609120/china-puts-show-force-df-31b-mobile-icbm-missile-test). 116 Lee-Jeong Ho, “Next Stop Guam? China Shows Off Its Next Generation DF-41 and DF-26 Ballistic Missiles,” South China Monitoring Post, February 2, 2019 (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2184782/next-stop-guamchina-shows-its-next-generation-df-41-and-df-26). 117 “Dong Feng-41,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvo

cacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/china/df-41/). 118 “JL-2,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/mis sile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/china/jl-2/). 119 Luke Caggiano, “China Deploys New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile,” Arms Control Today, May 2023 (China Deploys New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles | Arms Control Association).

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they could be used for nuclear attacks as well as the Chinese HGVs would be nuclear capable.120 The missile will reach its initial operational capability in 2020.121 Among the SRBM versions, China possesses singlestage solid propelled road mobile DF-11 and DF-11A with a range of 300 km and 500–800 kms, respectively,122 and the DF-15. The DF15 is a solid propelled single-stage road mobile SRBM with a range of 600–800 kms and is capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional warheads but does not carry MIRVs.123 Not only ballistic missile but China also possesses cruise missile capability. The YJ-63 is a LACM with a range of 200 kms and can be used against both land and maritime targets.124 Another longer range LACM of range 2,000 kms is the DH-10 or the CJ-10 that flies low flight altitude and with stealth capabilities to evade missile defence system.125 The air-launched version is labelled as CJ-20. Both the versions are nuclear capable. China also possesses the YJ-12 category radar-guided ASCMs with a range of 500 kms.126 The YJ-18 has an operational range of 540 kms and is capable of carrying either nuclear or conventional payload. Other class of anti-ship missiles includes the YJ-62 and YJ-82 categories.127 Mearsheimer states that hegemony is the ideal state that

120 “DF-17,” Missile Threat, (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-17/). 121 Richard Weitz, “China and Hypersonic Weapons,” Defense Info, January 18, 2019

(https://defense.info/air-power-dynamics/2019/01/china-and-hypersonic-weapons/). 122 “DF-11,” Weapon Systems.net (https://weaponsystems.net/weaponsystem/DD06% 20-%20DF-11%20(CSS-7).html). 123 “Dong Feng-15,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvo cacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/china/dong-feng-15/). 124 “YJ-63,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/mis sile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/china/yj-63/). 125 “DH-10/CJ-10,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvo cacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/china/dh-10-cj-10/). 126 Gabriel Dominguez and Neil Gibson, “Image Shows Ground-Launched Variant of China’s YJ-12 Anti-ship Missile,” Jane’s 360, November 8, 2018 (https://www.janes. com/article/84351/image-shows-ground-launched-variant-of-china-s-yj-12-anti-ship-mis sile). 127 “Ship Killers: New Anti-ship Cruise Missiles Raise the Stakes in North East Asia,” Jane’s Navy International (https://www.janes.com/images/assets/566/79566/Ship_kill ers_New_anti-ship_cruise_missiles_raise_the_stakes_in_Northeast_Asia.pdf).

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can make a state most secure.128 Strengthening hard power prowess that has greater reach and greater lethality pushes a state towards achieving this hegemony. China’s hegemonic tendencies are well complimented by its missile forces which it deploys to exert its influence and assertiveness in regions and against states with which it has entangled itself in territorial disputes.

Conclusion The theory of neo-realism is well understood taking the missile developments of the five NWS: the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China, into consideration. Both Britain and France have rejected a ‘nofirst use’ doctrine, resorting to offensive realism approach in its doctrine. Nevertheless, by confining its nuclear deterrence to sea-based deterrence, both the countries have sought for a ‘defensive realism’ approach in its posture. On the other hand, China’s adoption of a ‘no-first use’ doctrine means China had adopted a ‘defensive realism’ strategy. China is developing offensive weapon systems that are capable of evading missile defence system and are survivable to strengthen its defensive realism approach. The United States and Russia, on the other hand, have resorted to offensive realism in its doctrine, posture and force build-up. Whether offensive realism or defensive realism is the priority, the ultimate objective of these states is survival and to earn power and prestige in the international forum. One of the examples for this is the continued effort by Russia, the United States and China to stay relevant in the hypersonic arms race. The reason being not just survival but power and prestige too in the international forum. If neo-realists are of the belief that super powers should be heavily armed, the global order is slowly shifting towards multi-polarity, and hence, global powers will aspire to be heavily armed to strengthen their conventional and nuclear deterrence. A weak deterrence posture and capability will likely make them weaker vis-à-vis their competitors. Such weakness could also result in states losing allies. If one goes by Robert Jervis, the missile development in the global order can be well fathomed. The United States still considers Russia to 128 Jonathan Kirshner, “The Tragedy of Offensive Realism: Classical Realism and the Rise of China,” European Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No. I, 2010, pp. 53– 75.

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be a threat to its security and vice versa. However, their growth in military capability has resulted in China to feel less secure of the military prowess of Russia and the United States. On the other hand, China’s growth in military capabilities is making the United States and to some extent Russia wary of China’s aims and objectives leading to state of ‘security dilemma.’ Again, the lack of faith in US ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ and regional ambitions of Britain and France have led them to focus on strengthening their nuclear and conventional deterrence.

Regional Players: Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Missile development in the MENA region dates back to the 1940s. Since then, the region is witnessing missile development programs by various MENA countries—indigenously, sometimes through proliferation or sometimes simply by acquiring the system from another country. This chapter draws out the history of missile development programs in the MENA region. The chapter tries to understand the threat perception that led to the missile development programs in each of the countries in the region in the context of neo-realism/structural realism/offensivedefensive realism, the technological advancements and modifications that have been made from the past to the present in missile technology in the MENA region. Through the trends, the chapter also analyses the future trends in missile technology in the MENA region. The chapter also draws out the suppliers of missile technology to MENA countries, the arsenal that is being possessed by each country. States have been arranged in the chapter according to the order of importance and relevance of their missile program (according to the author) and is hence, is a relative order. Israel Israel has been in a state of insecurity ever since its inception regarding its survival. The state has sought for missile capability and reportedly virtual nuclear weapons as means of survival. This quest for survival has refrained Israel from not just joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

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Treaty (NPT) but also the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).129 The Science Corps within the Israeli Defence Forces was established in 1948 to develop Israel’s defence technology base. Between 1948 and 1951, this Science Corps was responsible for Israel’s nascent missile manufacturing infrastructure in the Ministry of Defence.130 This company became Israel’s national weapons development authority (Rafael) that initially specialised in rockets and experimental ballistic missile and then progressed towards full-fledged ballistic missile program in the late 1950s to early 1960s.131 Noteworthy institutes like the Israeli Institute of Technology in Haifa specialising in aeronautical and missile engineering, Weizmann Institute and other Israeli research institutions laid the foundation for the missile development program.132 Rafael, the Israeli Aircraft Industry (IAI), and Israeli Military Industries called Ta’as as well as France’s Marcel collaborated to develop the country’s missile program,133 but this cooperation ended owing to an arms embargo in 1968. Israel then started to work on the missile system indigenously by spending over $1 billion for the Jericho missile program.134 All these foundation led to the development of Israel’s strategic missile system called the Jericho category missile systems. The Jericho 1 is a 500 km range two-staged solid-fuelled ballistic missile with a payload capacity of 650 kg. This makes the missile system capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Jericho 2 missiles have a range of 1,500–3,500 kms and is presently operational. These medium range

129 “Israel Has Offensive, Chemical, Biological Warfare Capabilities, Swedish Report Says,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 6, 2006 (https://www.nti.org/gsn/article/isr ael-has-offensive-chemical-biological-warfare-capabilities-swedish-report-says/). 130 “Israel,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Updated 2012 (http://www.nti.org/learn/cou ntries/israel/delivery-systems/. Accessed on May 12, 2018). 131 Ibid. (Accessed on May 12, 2018). 132 “Israel: Case Study for International Missile Trade and Non Proliferation Project,”

in ed., William Potter and Harlan Jencks, The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers’ Network (Westview Press, 1993) (https://faculty.biu.ac.il/~steing/arms/mis siles.htm). 133 Ibid. 134 A Bowdoin Van Riper, “Ballistic Missiles and the Cold War, 1945–1990,” in Rockets

and Missiles: The Life Story of a Technology (USA: Greenwood Press, 2004), p. 91.

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missiles can be launched from either silos but are also capable of railroad mobility.135 Jericho-3 has ICBM capability with smaller fins for greater manoeuvrability and drag stabilisation.136 Israel also possesses Extended Range Artillery (EXTRA) and Long Range Artillery (LORA) to strengthen its firepower. LORA has range of 400 kms while EXTRA has a range of 150 kms providing greater strength to Israel’s artillery. Israel also developed its cruise missile system called the Delilah. This cruise missile is an air launched cruise missile with a range of 300 kms.137 Israel developed the Gabriel anti-ship missiles which could be ground, air as well as sea-launched and have a range of 350–400 kms.138 The missile was used by Israel during the Yom Kippur War. In future, Israel could equip its newer model submarines like the INS Dragon with nuclear capable cruise missiles.139 Despite the fact that ballistic and cruise missiles act as strategic deterrent for Israel, the country has never paraded these missiles capabilities nor are their flight tests frequent.140 One reason for this could be the nuclear capability of the missile systems, and hence, Israel prefers maintaining secrecy over its missile capability. Longer range missiles of IRBM category imply to the fact that Israel views Pakistan too as a threat and vice versa. Despite the limited tests of their missile capability, Israel views its missiles as tool for deterrence and force projection. In response to Iranian missile capability, the Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant in 2023 clarified, “we have better even response: be it on land, in the air, or in the maritime arena, including both defensive and offensive means.”141

135 “Jericho-2,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/jericho-2/). 136 “Jericho-III,” Military Today (http://www.military-today.com/missiles/jericho_3.

htm). 137 “Jane’s Defence Weekly: Israel Develops Its First Cruise Missile,” Haaretz, October 4, 2004 (https://www.haaretz.com/1.4708637). 138 “Gabriel,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/gabriel/). 139 “Israel Submarine Capabilities,” NTI, (https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/israel-

submarine-capabilities/). 140 Mark Fitzpatrick, Israel’s Ballistic Missile Programme: An Overview,” IISS, August 25, 2021 (Israel’s Ballistic-Missile Programme: An Overview [iiss.org]). 141 Parisa Hazefi, “Iran Presents Its First Hypersonic Ballistic Missile, State Media Reports,” Reuters, June 6, 2023 (Iran Presents Its First Hypersonic Ballistic Missile, State Media Reports | Reuters).

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Iran According to Waltz, sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program will likely not yield positive outcome for the international community as Iran’s nuclear program is less likely to be deterred by sanctions.142 If Iran seeks nuclear weapons for its survival, Waltz states that sanctions would not stop Iran from pursuing with such a program—as with the case of North Korea.143 Harsh sanctions have had minimal impact to deter Iran from pursuing missile capability. Iran sought to get help from China in the 1960s for missile development as the United States refused to help Iran. For China on the other hand, Iran’s richness in oil and natural gas attracted China to strengthen its ties with Tehran. In 1970s, Iran collaborated with Israel under ‘Project Flower’ to develop missile system. The collaboration with Israel took place after Iran was refused the Lance missile system by the United States.144 The 1973 Arab–Israeli War gave a boost to Iranian revenues for military spending that boosted the military modernisation program in Iran. Iran utilised this revenue to fund the missile development project, while Israel was to provide the technological know-how for the missile development program.145 This project was one of the six “oil-for-arms” contracts signed in 1977 between Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and Israeli Defence Minister, Shimon Peres, and the deal was kept secret from the United States.146 However, in the wake of Iran-Contra Affair, Iran-Israel relation completely severed and the project came to a standstill.

142 Kenneth Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Means Stability,” Foreign Affairs, July–August 2012 (https://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~fczagare/ PSC%20504/Waltz.pdf). 143 Kenneth Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Means Stability,” Foreign Affairs, July–August 2012 (https://www.acsu.buffalo.edu/~fczagare/ PSC%20504/Waltz.pdf). 144 John W. Garver, “The PRC-Kingdom of Iran Relationship,” in China & Iran:

Ancient Partners in a Post-imperial World (USA: University of Washington Press, 2006), p. 33. 145 Ibid., p. 33. 146 Elaine Sciolino, “Documents Details of Israeli Missile Deal with the Shah,” The

New York Times, April 1, 1986 (http://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/01/world/docume nts-detail-israeli-missile-deal-with-the-shah.html).

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Further, the hostage crisis from 1979 to 1981 resulted in the United States severing defence ties with Iran by cancelling the sale of combat aircraft like the F-4 and F-5 to Iran. This move from the United States affected Iran’s deep strike capability and shifted Tehran’s focus towards missile technology. The Iran-Iraq War hastened this need for deep strike capability, and in 1985, the first batch of Scud missiles appeared from Libya. These missiles with ranges around 150 kms were militarily ineffective, but since they targeted cities like Baghdad, they proved strategically advantageous. Iran also came to an agreement with North Korea to assist them in missile technology while Iran would fund North Korea’s missile program. Iran also used the Scud category missile systems from North Korea during the Iran-Iraq War. The missiles proved their combat capability while limitations of the missile systems were also identified and the required modifications were noted. The Iran-Iraq War hence proved conducive for North Korea as otherwise, they would have had to undergo the cumbersome and expensive process of constantly testing its missile systems to fathom the technological limitations of the missile systems and the necessary improvements needed. Scud-Cs from North Korea were the Iranian Shahab-2 ballistic missile. The IISS Reports suggest that Iran has been able to allot a greater range to Shahab-2 missiles by reducing the warhead weight than that of the Shahab-1 and by providing the missile with additional propellant.147 In 1988, Tehran developed the Mushak missile system that made Iran self-reliant in missile development program.148 Mushak was a solid fuel propelled system developed during the Iran-Iraq War using nitrocellulose fuel. Post-disintegration of the Soviet Union, when relations between Iran and Russia strengthened, Iran also received assistance from Russia too for its Shahab missile system. On the other hand, Iran’s solid propelled missile technology assistance came from China, which assisted Iran in the Oghab program initiated in 1982. This assistance resulted in the development of the

147 Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program,” in Iran’s Strategic Weapons Program, IISS (New York: Routledge, 2005). 148 “Iran Missile Milestone: 1985–2014,” Iran Watch, April 17, 2014 (http://www. iranwatch.org/our-publications/weapon-program-background-report/iran-missile-milest ones-1985-2014).

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Fajr solid propelled rocket system, and Iran has applied solid propulsion technology know-how to develop longer range missile systems. In May 2001, Iran tested its Fateh-110 missile for the first time. The advanced version Fateh-110A was test-fired in September 2002. China’s assistance could have also enabled Iran to shift beyond the technically hazardous double-based propellant systems and focus on solid propelled rockets. For long range capability, composite propellants were required for which China could have provided assistance. In 2008, Iran tested a 2,000 km solid propelled ballistic missile called the Sejjil.149 Despite international pressures like the UNSC Resolution 2231 on Iran to refrain from developing ballistic missiles, Tehran continued with its missile development program. Not only did Iran venture into ballistic missiles, but they also developed long range nuclear capable cruise missiles. The UNSC Resolutions on Iran are not applicable to cruise missile development. The Soumar cruise missile has a range of 2,500 kms with pinpoint accuracy and was test-fired in 2015.150 The missile bears resemblance to Russia’s Kh-55 cruise missile and is assumed to be nuclear capable.151 Iran also possesses anti-ship cruise missiles like the Chinese C-802 (Noor), C801 (Kowsar), and the C-704 under the name Nasr-1. These missiles provide Iran a greater leverage in the Persian Gulf. Later that year in October, Iran also test-fired the Emad ballistic missile with a range 1,700 kms with advanced guidance and control systems in its nose cone for better accuracy.152 In 2016, Iran displayed its SRBM called Zulfiqar with a range of 700–750 kms.153 149 “Iran Tests Second Solid-Fuelled Sejjil Missile, Capable of 2000kms,” Defense Update, May 28, 2009 (https://defense-update.com/20090520_sejjil_test.html). 150 Fred Lambart, “Iran Unveils New Land-Based Cruise Missile System Amid Nuclear Talks,” UPI , March 8, 2015 (https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/ 03/08/Iran-unveils-new-land-based-cruise-missile-system-amid-nuclear-talks/134142584 3385/). 151 Debalina Ghoshal, “Political and Strategic Signal Behind Iran’s New Soumar Cruise Missile,” Revue Defence Nationale, April 2015. 152 Sam Wilkin, “Iran Tests New Precision-Guided Ballistic Missile,” Reuters, October 11, 2015 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-military-missiles/iran-tests-new-precis ion-guided-ballistic-missile-idUSKCN0S505L20151011). 153 Behnam Ben Taleblu, “Assessing the Latest Iranian Ballistic Missile: The Zulfiqar,” Military Edge, September 29, 2016 (https://militaryedge.org/analysis-articles/assessinglatest-iranian-ballistic-missile-zulfiqar/).

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Tehran also tested a 2,000 kms range Khorramshahr missile system that can carry multiple warheads. According to the reports, the missile was smaller in shape as compared to the Shahab category missile systems and more tactical in nature.154 In 2018, Iranian also test-fired the long range ship launched Qadir cruise missile. The missile would strengthen Iran’s maritime deterrence capability. At the moment, the missile can reach targets up to a range of 3,000 kms. In 2019, Iran unveiled 1,300 kms range turbojet-powered Hoveyzeh cruise missile.155 Iran has also developed the 1,000 kms Abu Mehdi cruise missile to render enemy aircraft carrier useless and a 1,400 kms range Soleimani ballistic missile.156 The missiles were respectively named after Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis, head of Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Force (PMF), and Qassem Soleimani, al-Quds Force commander: both of whom were assassinated by the United States.157 According to the reports, the Abu Mehdi cruise missile is “the first long range cruise missile whose trajectory definition and command-and-control systems have been equipped with artificial intelligence.”158 Achieving greater speeds of supersonic level, in 2023, there were reports that Iran has also focused on ramjet-powered engines. The supersonic cruise missile is still in test stage.159 In 2023, Iranian Navy also received a 1000kms range Talaaiyeh cruise missile.160 Iran has

154 “Khorramshahr,” Global Security (https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/ iran/khorramshahr.htm). 155 Jeremy Binnie, “Iran Unveils Long Range Cruise Missile,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 4, 2019 (https://www.janes.com/article/86147/iran-unveils-new-long-rangecruise-missile). 156 Adil Al Salmi, “Iran’s Navy Acquires ‘Sanctioned’ Cruise Missiles,” Asharq AlAwsat, July 26, 2023 (Iran’s Navy Acquires ‘Sanctioned’ Cruise Missiles [aawsat.com]). 157 Adil Al Salmi, “Iran’s Navy Acquires ‘Sanctioned’ Cruise Missiles,” Asharq AlAwsat, July 26, 2023 (Iran’s Navy Acquires ‘Sanctioned’ Cruise Missiles [aawsat.com]). 158 Adil Al Salmi, “Iran’s Navy Acquires ‘Sanctioned’ Cruise Missiles,” Asharq Al-

Awsat, July 26, 2023 (Iran’s Navy Acquires ‘Sanctioned’ Cruise Missiles [aawsat.com]). 159 “Iran Develops Supersonic Cruise Missile,” Tasnim News Agency, August 9, 2023 (Iran Develops Supersonic Cruise Missile - Politics News - Tasnim News Agency). 160 “Iran navy receives new cruise missiles amid growing regional tension,” Reuters, December 24, 2023, (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-navy-receivesnew-cruise-missiles-amid-growing-regional-tension-2023-12-24/).

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also focused on hypersonic capability and has developed manoeuvrable hypersonic ballistic missile called Fattah.161 Turkey Most regional players in West Asia are seeking to shift the balance of power in the region in its own favour. Such players are called revisionist powers and Turkey is no exception. Turkey has focused on a spectrum of missile systems ranging from 300 to 2,500 kms.162 Turkey received missile systems from China initially, but its long range missile technology program is reportedly indigenous. The J600-T Yildrim which has a range of 250 kms is a Chinese technology. Turkey, in 2017, test-fired the Bora missiles, with a range of 280 kms. Though the missile has a tactical range, however, Turkey’s Defence Minister, Fikri Isik, is confident that Turkey could improve its technology.163 One of the reasons why Turkey has been concentrating on ballistic missiles (at least this has been the reason they have been focusing to strengthen their air and missile defence system) is the decrease in pilot training of the F-16 aircraft post-failed coup. Lack of enough pilots due to their dismissal by the Erdogan government, as suspicions were raised on them, has resulted in the Turkish government seeking for missile defence system as well as surface-to-surface ballistic missiles.164 In 2023, Turkey displayed the images of its long range Cenk ballistic missile and also successfully tested the Tayfun ballistic missile.165 Both are Turkey’s 161 Parisa Hazefi, “Iran Presents Its First Hypersonic Ballistic Missile, State Media Reports,” Reuters, June 6, 2023 (Iran Presents Its First Hypersonic Ballistic Missile, State Media Reports | Reuters). 162 “Turkey: Medium Range Ballistic Missiles,” Global Security (https://www.globalsec urity.org/wmd/world/turkey/mrbm.htm). 163 Suraj Sharma, “Turkey Test Fires First Domestically Made Ballistic Missile,” Middle East Eye, May 11, 2017 (http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/turkey-test-fires-first-dom estically-made-ballistic-missile-1395267736). 164 Michael Peck, “How Turkey Destroyed Its Own Air Force,” National Interest, March 16, 2018 (http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-turkey-destroyed-itsown-air-force-24942). 165 “Turkish Defense Giant Successfully Tests Ballistic Missile Tayfun,” Daily Sabah, May 23, 2023 (Turkish Defense Giant Successfully Tests Ballistic Missile Tayfun | Daily Sabah).

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MRBM capability, and while the former will have a range of 1,000 kms, the latter will have a range of 550 kms.166 In 2012, there were also reports that Turkey has embarked upon the ICBM journey and President Erdogan also requested the Turkish military to develop missiles of range 2,500 kms.167 Hence, in the near future, Turkey could also possess IRBM capability. Turkey is also developing stand-off missiles (cruise missiles) that would increase the stand-off range of the aircraft they are fired from. This was actually called the ‘Sensitive Guided Stand-off Cruise Missiles’ and the logic behind this was to enable the Turkish Air Force to hit behind enemy lines without entering the range of enemy defence systems to a great accuracy.168 Though initially the range of the missile was 180 kms, longer range versions of this missile system with range of 300–500 kms also became a point to focus upon, and there were reports that the missile’s range could be boosted up to 2,500 kms and Turkey has been able to achieve long range capability with enlarged tank.169 Saudi Arabia When regional players seek to shift balance of power in their favour, such acts could result in ‘security dilemma’ and other regional players tend to follow similar trends. Saudi Arabia was left with no choice but to join the missile arms race in the region owing to the fact that other regional players were following same suit. In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia purchased the modified version of the DF-3 liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles from China along with ten launchers that were capable of carrying conventional warheads only.170 In 2007, Saudi also acquired the modified versions of solid

166 “CENK Ballistic Missile Was Shown to the Public for the First Time,” Defence Turkey, May 31, 2023 (CENK Ballistic Missile was Shown to the Public for the First Time - Defence Turkey Magazine). 167 “Turkey Begins Work on ICBM,” Hurriyet Daily News, July 24, 2012 (Turkey Begins Work on ICBM - Türkiye News [hurriyetdailynews.com]). 168 “Sensitive Guided Stand-Off Cruise Missile,” Global Security (https://www.global security.org/wmd/world/turkey/lrcm.htm). 169 “Sensitive Guided Stand-Off Cruise Missile,” Global Security (https://www.global security.org/wmd/world/turkey/lrcm.htm). 170 “Saudi Arabia’s New Missile Force,” The Institute for National Security Studies, February 24, 2014 (http://www.inss.org.il/publication/saudi-arabias-new-missile-force/).

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propelled DF-21 long range ballistic missile with range of 1,700 kms from Beijing capable of carrying conventional warheads. In 2021, there were reports that Saudi Arabia was developing its indigenous ballistic missile capability with the help of China. In fact, according to the reports, there was multiple large-scale transfer of sensitive ballistic missile technology from China to Saudi Arabia.171 Riyadh has also taken interest in cruise missiles and has acquired Storm Shadow cruise missiles from Britain with a range of 500 kms, and the United States also plans to transfer SLAM-ER cruise missiles. The sale for the missiles for the Saudi Air Force has been approved by the United States in 2013 itself, and in 2018, production of the missiles for Saudi Arabian Air force restarted.172 There have also been reports that Saudi Arabia had funded the Ukrainian missile program called the Grom-2 short range surface-tosurface ballistic missile investing US$40 million. Riyadh is one of the clients to purchase the missile system. The missile is direct competent to Russian Iskander missiles.173 Syria Pre-civil war in Syria, Syria is reported to have possessed one of the largest ballistic missile arsenals that included the Soviet made Scud-B, Scud-C and Scud-D. The threat from Turkey, Israel and Saudi Arabia led Syria to acquire and develop ballistic missile systems. Its pursuit for the Scud category missile systems commenced during the Cold War era to counter conventional capability of Israel.174 Hence, it can be rightly said that 171 Zachary Cohen, “CNN Exclusive: US Intel and Satellite Images Show Saudi Arabia

Is Now Building Its Own Ballistic Missiles with the Help of China,” CNN , December 23, 2021 (CNN Exclusive: US Intel and Satellite Images Show Saudi Arabia Is Now Building Its Own Ballistic Missiles with Help of China | CNN Politics). 172 Jeremy Binnie, “SLAM-ER Production to Be Restarted for Saudi Air Force,” Janes Defence Weekly, April 11, 2018 (http://www.janes.com/article/79184/slam-er-produc tion-to-be-restarted-for-saudi-air-force). 173 “Ukraine Unveils New Grom-2 Short Range Ballistic Missile,” Army Recognition, January 3, 2018 (http://www.armyrecognition.com/january_2018_global_defense_s ecurity_army_news_industry/ukraine_unveils_new_grom-2_short-range_ballistic_missile. html). 174 “Syria,” Missile Defence Advocacy (https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-thr eat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/syria/).

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Syria’s ‘security dilemma’ over Israel’s conventional superiority led to the country’s missile development as a means of ‘self-help’ to strengthen its deterrence against Israel. With assistance from Russia and North Korea, Syria managed to commence its own domestic production of Scud category missile systems.175 It was also reported that Syria possessed chemical weapons stockpile that could have been delivered by the Scud missiles.176 The Scud-B category missile systems were acquired from Russia.177 Syria received missile technology assistance from North Korea and probably continues to do so. In 1992, Syria flight tested the Scud-C missile systems that it reportedly acquired from North Korea in 1991.178 According to the UN investigation report, North Korea from 2012 to 2017 transferred prohibited ballistic missiles along with other conventional arms to Syria. There are also reports that North Korea’s Ryonhap-2 Corporation had provided assistance to a Syrian ballistic missile program that involved the development of manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle (MaRV) Scud-D (MD) project.179 In fact, the range of the Scud-Ds was increased with the assistance from North Korea. Syria is also reported to possess SRBMs like the solid propelled M-600 and there are also unconfirmed reports of Damascus possessing Chinese DF-11 and DF-15 missiles and anti-ship cruise missiles for coastal defence.180

175 “Syria,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, Updated 2018 (http://www.nti.org/learn/cou ntries/syria/). 176 “Missile Programs,” Global Security (https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/ syria/missile.htm). 177 Ibid. 178 “Ballistic Missiles: Who Are the Future Suppliers?,” Iran Watch, March 2,

1999 (https://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/speech/ballistic-missiles-who-are-fut ure-suppliers). 179 “North Korea Arming Syria with Chemical Weapons, Ballistic Missiles, Secret UN Report Claims,” Haaretz, February 28, 2018 (https://www.haaretz.com/middleeast-news/syria/secret-un-report-north-korea-arming-syria-with-chemical-weapons-1.586 3797). 180 “Syria Missile Overview,” NTI, (https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/syria-mis

sile/).

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In August 2017, Russia was reported to have supplied shipment of 50 SS-21 missiles and four longer range SS-26 Iskander missiles to Syria.181 Yemen If war is a possibility in neo-realism, states will have to possess credible weapon systems to fight and win wars. Yemen too has been in possession of Scud category ballistic missile systems. There are also reports that Yemen possesses the North Korean Hwasong-5 and 6 missiles in their arsenal. According to the reports, Yemeni security forces had acquired the Scud missiles in the 1990s and 2000s from North Korea.182 Missiles were also supplied from the Soviets to Yemen during the North–South divide in Yemen.183 The Hwasong-5 missile was a version of Soviet Scud category missiles which were transferred to Egypt during the Yom Kippur War against Israel. However, despite the Soviet missile attack on Israel, Egypt lost the war with Israel. Later, Egypt sided with the United States and this made the replacement of Scud missiles with more advanced one an impossible task. Egypt decided to deliver these Scuds to North Korea. South Yemen was in conflict with North Yemen during the civil war and had received Soviet Scud missiles in 1994. North Yemen and South Yemen also received the Soviet Tochka. However, after the South and North re-unification, Yemen sided with the United States that resulted in Soviet Union prohibiting from supplying missiles to Yemen. This was the time when Yemen turned to North Korea for missile supplies. Due to Yemen’s cooperation with the United States in combating terrorism, the United States did not levy any sanction on Yemen for availing of missile technologies from North Korea.184

181 Lucas Tomlinson, “Russia Sends Syria Its Largest Missile Delivery to Date, US Officials Say,” Fox News, February 8, 2017 (http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/02/ 08/russia-sends-syria-its-largest-missile-delivery-to-date-us-officials-say.html). 182 Jacob Lokshin, “Yemen,” Missile Defence Advocacy, July 2016 (http://missiledefen

seadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/yemen/). 183 Ben Watson, “The War in Yemen and the Making of a Chaotic State,” The Atlantic, February 2018 (https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/02/ the-war-in-yemen-and-the-making-of-a-chaos-state/551987/). 184 “Yemen,” NTI , Last Updated July 2016 (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/ yemen/).

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During the Yemen crisis, the Houthis got hold of these missile systems and have launched them against Saudi Arabia—for lending support to the Yemeni government against Houthi rebels. Not only this, Yemen also converted the Soviet made surface-to-air missiles into surface-to-surface ballistic missiles called Qaher-1 and M2.185 The Qahers have a range of 250 kms and 400 kms, respectively. In 2016, Houthis unveiled advanced Scud version missile systems called the Burkan-1 and the missile has already been used by the Houthis against Saudi Arabia while the Burkan2 missiles have longer range. The Burkan-2 was reportedly fired against Riyadh in April 2018 and was believed to have travelled a distance of more than 800 kms.186 The Burkan-3 has been fired in August 2019 and has a range of 1,200 kms. It is the longest range missile existing in the Houthi missile arsenal.187 Ironically, neo-realism delves little into non-actions and asymmetric groups seeking for survival and self-help. However, if we apply the concepts in the case of Yemen and Houthis using missiles against state actors, then we can understand the actions and consequences from an angle of ‘security dilemma’ and regional hegemony. Non-state actors may become hostile towards a state actor/actors due to existential ‘security dilemma’ of another state actor and their desire to achieve regional hegemony that provides the non-state actors with all the facilities, financial and technological assistance. Both the state actor and the non-state actor pose tough challenge to the adversary of the state actor by throwing them into multiple war front scenarios that include both conventional and sub-conventional. Iran has also supplied short range missiles to the Houthi rebels in defiance of the UN Resolution 2231 which the rebels have fired at Saudi Arabia. Missiles recovered from Riyadh airport that were fired by Houthi rebels at the airport were reported to be Qiam missiles—variant of Scud

185 Sebastien Roblin, “How North Korean Weapons Could Start a War?,” National Interest, November 18, 2017 (http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-north-kor ean-weapons-could-start-war-the-middle-east-23251?page=2). 186 “Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Fire Ballistic Missile at Saudi Capital,” Al Jazeera, April 12, 2018 (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/yemen-houthi-rebels-fire-ballisticmissile-saudi-capital-180411153418562.html). 187 Jeremy Binnie, “Yemeni Rebels Claim Ballistic Missile Attack Against Dammam,” IHS Jane’s, August 2, 2019 (https://www.janes.com/article/90249/yemeni-rebels-claimballistic-missile-attack-against-dammam).

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that belonged to Iran.188 There are also reports that Houthis are in possession of Iranian Zelzal-3 missiles. The Houthi missiles are also being feared could reach Mecca though such reports of Iran supplying missiles to Houthi rebels have been denied by Iran.189 In 2017, Yemen also unveiled an anti-ship cruise missile called the Al-Mandab 1 missile that looked similar to the Chinese C-801 anti-ship missile that Yemen acquired in mid-1990s.190 Qatar In December 2017, Qatar unveiled the China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) developed Joint Attack Rocket and Missile System (JARMs).191 The missile is called the SY-400 BP-12A system that can reach targets with a range of 400 kms and can threaten the Gulf region.192 The missile is an export alternative to the Russian Iskander missile system. The Qatar crisis in which the Gulf Cooperating Countries (GCC) imposed embargo on Qatar led to a situation in which Qatar realised that its GCC allies cannot be trusted completely and that Saudi Arabia’s regional hegemony would need to be accepted by Qatar and this ‘security dilemma’ led Qatar to possess missile capabilities. Qatar proceeded with a ‘self-help’ philosophy to be able to exert an influence in the region. Purchasing Chinese missile systems also proved conducive from Qatar’s

188 “US Gives Evidence Iran Supplied Missiles That Yemen Rebels Fired at Saudi

Arabia,” The Guardian, December 14, 2017 (https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2017/dec/14/us-gives-evidence-iran-supplied-missiles-that-yemen-rebels-fired-at-saudiarabia). 189 Debalina Ghoshal, “Houthi Missile Attacks and the Many Influences of Yemen’s Conflict,” The Jamestown Foundation, March 9, 2018 (https://jamestown.org/program/ houthi-missile-attacks-many-influences-yemens-conflict/). 190 Jeremy Binnie, “Yemeni Rebels Unveil Anti-ship Missiles,” Jane’s 360, November 9, 2017 (http://www.janes.com/article/75566/yemeni-rebels-unveil-anti-ship-missiles). 191 Jeremy Binnie, “Qatar Parades Chinese Ballistic Missiles,” IHS Janes Defence Weekly, December 20, 2017 (http://www.janes.com/article/76529/qatar-parades-chinese-ballis tic-missiles). 192 Awad Mustafa, “Why Is Qatar showing Off its New Short-Range Chinese Ballistic Missiles?,” Al Arabiya English, December 20, 2017 (https://english.alarabiya.net/en/ News/gulf/2017/12/20/Qatar-showcases-offensive-ballistic-missiles-targeting-neighbors. html).

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foreign policy perspectives as the country could now actively take part in the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) of China. UAE In 1998, UAE procured Black Shaheen cruise missile from France and the United Kingdom despite the missile exceeding MTCR limitations. UAE in 1989 had also acquired Scud-B category missile systems from North Korea. In 2021, there were reports that UAE’s defence company Edge Group was in the early phase of development of ALCM, the Saber 220.193 In 2023, there were reports that the UAE was in talks with Israel for the purchase of cruise missiles.194 Iraq Revisionist states seek to resort to conflicts and war to achieve their state objectives and aims, and military capability plays an important role in Iraq. Iraq under Saddam Hussein constantly sought to develop long range ballistic missiles to deliver both conventional warheads and WMD. By mid-1980s, Iraq had Scud category missiles that it had acquired from the Soviet Union in the 1970s. These Scuds were modified to improve the range and Iraq used them in the Iraq-Iran war.195 By 1988, Iraq had successfully test-fired the Al-Hussein’s modified version Al-Abbas with a range of 950 kms. The missile achieved a greater range than Al-Hussein by using higher energy cryogenic fuel, but surprisingly, these missiles were never deployed by Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq War, Scud-B missiles were used along with the Al-Husseins and Al-Hijarah. The Al-Husseins were capable of carrying biological and chemical warheads with a longer range that was achieved

193 Tony Osborne, “UAE’s Indigenous Weapon Developments Accelerate,” Aviation

Week, November 18, 2021 (AE’s Indigenous Weapon Developments Accelerate | Aviation Week Network). 194 “UAE-Israel Defense Relations: Talks on Cruise Missiles,” Tactical Report, August 2, 2023 (UAE-Israel Defense Relations: Talks on Cruise Missiles [tacticalreport.com]). 195 “Iraq,” NTI , June 2012 (http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iraq/delivery-sys tems/).

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by cutting the fuel and oxidiser tanks in half, and reducing the payload mass to be able to target Iranian cities more effectively.196 However, the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War 1991, resulted in the UNSC resolution imposed on Iraq under Resolution 687 to halt its ballistic missile program. Though the Iraqi missiles were destroyed, Iraq was, however, not prohibited from maintaining the scientists and the infrastructure involved in the ballistic missile program. Iraq was then seeking long range capabilities that could deliver WMD. Iraq also financed the Iraq-Egypt-Argentina missile project, but the project was later on stalled due to internal conflicts between the three countries. Prior to 2003 US invasion, Iraq had developed Al Samoud ballistic missile and also surprised the coalition forces with the use of cruise missiles during the 2003 invasion.197 Libya The quest to achieve regional influence and become an important player in a region could become integral to a state’s foreign policy objectives. Developing credible capabilities ensures that a state is on its path to achieving regional influence or at least prevent other regional powers from interfering with its policy and decision making. In 2011, during the Arab uprising, according to the reports, Libya had used Soviet era Scud ballistic missiles on rebel troops. During 1970s–2003 until Colonel Mu’ammar Qadhafi’s renunciation of the WMD program, Libya continued to develop and improvise its missile capabilities. Libya managed to indigenously develop ballistic missiles based on the Scud-B and Frog missiles it had acquired from the Soviet Union. Libya also attempted to purchase MRBM and IRBM, but these efforts were thwarted by international pressures on Libya and the UN sanctions imposed on Libya between 1992 and 1997.198 Libya was able to, however, develop missile system of range 300–700 kms. This was possible as in the 1980s, Libya collaborated with a German firm called Orbital 196 N.23. 197 “Iraq Missile

Overview,” NTI, (https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/iraq-mis

sile/). 198 John Hart and Shannon N. Kile, “Libya’s Renunciation of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and Ballistic Missiles,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2005 (https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2005/14).

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Transport und Raketan AG (OTRAG) to set up a missile infrastructure in Libya, but this came to a standstill after the West German government barred the company from carrying out any activities in Libya.199 Libya managed to develop Al-Fatah missiles of range 950 kms, but the missile proved a failed attempt due to lack of technological assistance from foreign countries owing to US sanctions. But despite these sanctions, Libya reportedly managed to acquire components and technology from companies in former Yugoslavia, China and India while in 1990s, it reportedly had cooperation with Iran that could enable the country to progress with its missile technology program.200 However, Libya failed to acquire the M-11, M-9 and the DF-3 missile systems from China due to pressure from the United States. It however, received assistance from Serbia and Russia also. There are also reports that No Dong components from North Korea reached Libya.201 In June 2002, Libya signed a deal with Iran to transfer Shahab-3 missiles while Libya had provided the Scud category missile systems earlier to Iran that was used to develop the Shahab-1 missiles. In fact, even though Libya over the years made efforts to improvise its missile capabilities, most of its efforts proved failure.202 In 2003, however, Libya agreed to eliminate its WMD program. Qaddafi stated its reasons for doing so being that the United States invaded Iraq. Libyan officials also provided information and documentation of its nuclear, chemical, biological weapons program and also its ballistic missile program. It was thus clear that Libya wanted to avoid what Iraq had faced and at the same time wished to end the sanctions that were imposed on it.203 Thus, ‘security dilemma’ can not only lead a state towards developing similar capabilities, but could also result in a state

199 “Libya,” NTI , January 2015 (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/libya/deliverysystems/). 200 John Hart and Shannon N. Kile, "Libya’s Renunciation of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons and Ballistic Missiles," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2005 (https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2005/14) 201 “Libya Nuclear/Missiles Milestones,” Wisconsin Project, January 1, 2001 (https:// www.wisconsinproject.org/libya-nuclearmissile-milestones-1996-2000/). 202 “Libya: Delivery Systems,” NTI , Updated January 2015 (http://www.nti.org/ learn/countries/libya/delivery-systems/). 203 “Libya: Nuclear,” NTI , Updated January 2015 (http://www.nti.org/learn/countr ies/libya/nuclear/).

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resorting to disarming similar capabilities if it feels it could face adverse international consequences as that faced by its neighbours. In fact, one analysis even points out that it was international isolation and economic sanctions also that led Libya to normalise its relations with the United States in 1990s.204 Egypt Egypt’s missile development program commenced with assistance from Germany after Cairo was defeated in the Arab–Israeli War of 1948. This assistance came to a standstill due to Germany refusing to provide any help to Egypt. Post-Suez Crisis, Egypt’s financial condition deteriorated and mostly finance had to be diverted towards war damage and reconstituting of the armed forces. Thus, the cost-effective option for military modernisation was to acquire long range rocket systems. In the 1970s, until its relationship with the Soviet Union soured, Egypt had acquired the Frog missiles and the Scud-B category missile systems from the Soviet Union. One reason to acquire ballistic missile capability was the lesson that Cairo learnt from the Suez Crisis regarding the weakness of its air power to infiltrate Israeli airspace.205 In addition, Egypt wanted to set up its own missile production base that would have enabled it to produce missiles for export purpose in return for hard cash that Egypt was in dire need of. Some of these missiles acquired from the Soviet Union were also used by Cairo during the Arab– Israeli War (Six Day War) in 1967. Egypt initiated peace with Israel after the war. This gave Cairo the time and resources to be diverted towards its missile development program.206 This was also the time when Egypt’s relations with Moscow had soured, and hence, the Soviet Union did not play any further role in the missile development program.207 By 1982, Egypt signed agreement with Iraq and Argentina to become a part of the Condor project to develop missiles of range 1,000 kms. 204 Flynt L. Leverett, “Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb?,” Brookings, January 23, 2004 (Why Libya Gave Up on the Bomb | Brookings). 205 “Egypt Missile Overview,” NTI , January 29, 2015 (Egypt Missile Overview [nti.org]). 206 Ibid. 207 Owen L. Sirs, “Proliferation Lessons,” in Nasser and the Missile Age in the Middle

East (USA: Routledge, 2006), p. 197.

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By 1987–1990, many Egyptian technicians were working in Iraq on this project. During this span of time, Egypt had also acquired technical documents and drawings of the North Korean Scud-B program.208 However, from 1976 to 1981, it was North Korea that had received the ScudB missiles via Egypt. Nevertheless, this cooperation on Scuds between Egypt and North Korea led to development of North Korean No Dong as well as the Taepodong missile systems.209 Later, Egypt was assisted by North Korea in its Scud-C program also called the Project-T that aimed to increase the range of the Scud-Cs by reducing the payload of the missile. There were reports that in 2001, Egypt had acquired No Dong ballistic missiles from North Korea that could reach any part of Israel from deep within Egypt’s own territory. The Egyptian government had though denied that it had purchased such missile systems from North Korea.210 The United States was reported to have provided aid to Egypt to prevent it from pursing its missile technology program and according to the reports, also persuaded it to refrain from buying No Dong missiles. According to the reports, congressional leaders had threatened the then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak of cutting aid worth $1.3 billion if Egypt bought the No Dong missiles from North Korea.211 Hence, it is unclear if Egypt possesses such missile systems or not. In fact, Egypt’s then Foreign Minister Ahmad Maher reiterated Egypt’s stand during his visit to the United States, “My President said there is no missile deal, and

208 “Egypt Nuclear, Chemical, and Missile Milestones—1960–2000,” Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, September 1, 2000 (https://www.wisconsinproject.org/egyptnuclear-chemical-and-missile-milestones-1960-2000/). 209 Robert Windrem, “Concerns Grow Over Egypt’s WMD Research,” NBC News, February 7, 2011 (http://www.nbcnews.com/id/41452744/ns/world_news-mideast_n_ africa/t/concerns-grow-over-egypts-wmd-research/#.Wzxg5dIzbIU). 210 “Egypt to Pose a Future Threat,” The Washington Times, July 23, 2002 (https:// www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/jul/23/20020723-034656-1751r/). 211 “Report: US Trying to Stop Egypt from Buying No Dong Missile Engines,” Albawaba News, June 18, 2001 (https://www.albawaba.com/news/report-us-trying-stopegypt-buying-no-dong-missile-engines).

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my president does not lie.”212 But missile base imagery shows that the new buildings are tall to accommodate larger No Dong missiles.213 In 2013, there were reports that a shipment of spare parts of ScudB missiles was intercepted at the transit when being shipped by air from North Korean embassy in Beijing to Cairo labelling the parts as parts of fish processing machinery.214 Chinese and North Korean missile experts were also spotted in 2013 in Egypt to sell upgrades of missile design and production capabilities. There could be a possibility of these countries also training launch crews to prepare them for combat conditions. Not only from North Korea, but Egypt also received assistance from the China Precision Machinery Import–Export Corporation (CPMIEC), a company sanctioned by the United States in its short range missile program. The reason for this development then was probably due to the fact that the United States was delaying the sale of F-16s to Egypt.215 Egypt also possesses Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles, the HY-2 missiles with a range of 200 kms, US Harpoon Block 2 anti-ship missiles and also Italian Otomat and Chinese Scrub-brush cruise missiles.216 There are also reports that the Egyptian Air Force operates the MBDA Scalp EG long range cruise missiles on its Rafale fighter jets.217 Egypt possesses indigenous missile production facility for instance, the Jabal Hamzi Surface-to-Surface Missile Complex. At the moment, the existing

212 Nathan Guttman, “Egypt Gives U.S. Satisfactory Replies’ on Missile Deal with North Korea,” Haaretz, July 15, 2001 (https://www.haaretz.com/1.5358500). 213 Fabian Hinz, “After Half a Century Egypt’s Scuds Soldier On,” IISS, June 16, 2023 (After half a century Egypt’s Scuds soldier on [iiss.org]). 214 Declan Walsh, “Need a North Korean Missile? Call the Cairo Embassy,” The New York Times, March 3, 2018 (https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/03/world/mid dleeast/egypt-north-korea-sanctions-arms-dealing.html). 215 Bill Gertz, “Not-So Strange Bedfellows,” The Washington Free Beacon, January 29,

2013 (http://freebeacon.com/politics/not-so-strange-bedfellows/). 216 “Egypt,” NTI , January 2015 (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/egypt/del ivery-systems/). 217 Darek Liam, “Egyptian Air Force now operating MBDA SCALP cruise missile,” Military Africa, February 8, 2021, (https://www.military.africa/2021/02/egyptian-airforce-now-operating-mbda-scalp-cruise-missile/).

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missile forces in Egypt are divided into two brigades: one is strategic while the other is offensive.218 Algeria The MENA region comprises revisionist states developing capabilities to continuously improve their deterrence vis-à-vis other states in the region. Algeria acquired the Scud-B ballistic missiles and the Frog-7 missiles from Soviet Union in the 1980s. The Soviet Union was keen to expand its influence in the Middle East during the Cold War to curb the Western influence. One of the ways of doing so was by fostering ties with countries in the region. Providing weapon systems to countries in the Middle East was an easy way to develop ties with countries.219 Algeria, on the other hand, was at threat from Libya’s Scud missile systems, and these missiles could be used for tactical strike against Libya’s regional neighbours.220 In 2017, there were also reports that Algeria was acquiring the Iskander-E ballistic missile with a range of 280 km and payload capacity of 400 kg from Russia. Algeria’s efforts in counter-insurgency have led to the realisation of a need for sophisticated artillery systems. Over the years, Algeria has acquired self-propelled artillery systems to improve its war-fighting capability against terrorist organisations. The acquiring of the tactical range Iskanders would only bolster the strength of Algeria’s artillery.221 The missile is capable of delivering high precision strikes on ground targets and is equipped with stealth technology and can alter its flight trajectory during its flight course in order to evade enemy missile defence system. The missiles are solid propelled and can be launched from TELs,

218 “Egypt Missile Overview,” NTI , January 29, 2015 (Egypt Missile Overview [nti.org]). 219 A Bowdoin Van Riper, “Ballistic Missiles and the Cold War, 1945–1990,” in Rockets

and Missiles: The Life Story of a Technology (USA: Greenwood Press, 2004), p. 90. 220 Ephraim Kahana and Muhammed Suwaed, “Libyan Ballistic Missiles Program,” in A-Z of Middle Eastern Intelligence (Toronto: The Scarecrow Press, Inc, 2009), p. 190. 221 “The Slow Revolution of the Algerian Artillery,” Fighter Jets World, March 5, 2018 (http://fighterjetsworld.com/2018/03/05/the-slow-revolution-of-the-algerian-artill ery/).

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thus increasing their chances of survivability.222 Algeria was reported to be possessing the Russian Kh-35 anti-ship cruise missiles.223 Algeria has also been reported to have possessed the CX-1 ASCM, with a range of 280 kms and Mach 3 and can target and disable enemy warships.224 Algeria also acquired the ramjet-powered supersonic radarguided Chinese YJ-12B ASCM with a range of 400 kms and capable to undertaking “evasive manoeuvres” to target adversaries’ naval assets.225 The missile has good cross-country mobility and can travel over difficult terrain.226 In 2022, Algeria also entered into talks with China to acquire the SY-400 SRBM to complement the Iskander-E missile.227 Sudan Sudan was also believed to have possessed the Scud category missiles. According to the reports, in the 1990s, Iraq had deployed Scud missiles in Sudan228 though such reports of Scud cooperation between Sudan and Iraq were denied by Sudan. In 2000, there were reports that Iraq was investing $475 million to construct a missile factory in Sudan using

222 Martin Sieff, “Russia’s Iskander Is Ideal Weapon to Hit BMD Bases,” UPI , October 3, 2008 (https://www.upi.com/Russias-Iskander-is-ideal-weapon-to-hit-BMD-bases/218 41223055335/). 223 Jeffry Lewis, “Translating a Noun into a Verb Pyongyang Style: The Case of North Korea’s New Cruise Missile,” 38 North, June 16, 2014 (https://www.38north.org/2014/ 06/jlewis061714/). 224 “Algeria Acquires the Lethal Mach 3 Ship Hunting Missiles from China; How the CX-1 Allows Algiers to Close Off the Mediterranean,” Military Watch, July 27–28, 2018 (https://militarywatchmagazine.com/article/algeria-acquires-lethal-mach-3-ship-huntingmissies-from-china-how-the-cx-1-allows-algiers-to-close-off-the-mediterranean). 225 Kazim Abdul, “Algeria Strengthens Coastal Defence with Deadly YJ-12B ASCM,” Military Africa, May 20, 2022 (Algeria Strengthens Coastal Defence with Deadly YJ-12B Anti-ship Cruise Missile – Military Africa). 226 Kazim Abdul, “Algeria Strengthens Coastal Defence with Deadly YJ-12B ASCM,” Military Africa, May 20, 2022 (Algeria Strengthens Coastal Defence with Deadly YJ-12B Anti-ship Cruise Missile – Military Africa). 227 Ekene Lionel, “Algeria Continues Military Build-Up with New Chinese SY-400 Ballistic Missile Acquisition,” Military Africa, November 30, 2022 (Algeria Continues Military Buildup with New Chinese SY-400 Ballistic Missile Acquisition – Military Africa). 228 “Scud Missile,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/nuke/guide/ sudan/missile/index.html).

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North Korean missile technology and manpower.229 The assembled Scuds were planned to be held in Sudan for Iraq to use in case of conflict. In 1996, it was reported that China provided Scud missiles to Sudan under a $200 million loan from Malaysian government to Sudan against future oil extraction. In return, China was heavily investing in Sudan and buying oil reserves from Sudan—a much needed oil market for Sudan then, thereby making the relationship symbiotic.230 However, there are claims that Sudan then had not taken too much interest in Scuds as they were interested in combat aircraft given the kind of threat environment Sudan was subjected to which included mostly counter-insurgency operations.231 This is also probably the reason why Sudanese Air Force became one of the best equipped air force in Africa. But air power has limitations as they can be susceptible to enemy air defence. Also, in 2011, there were reports that Sudan has clandestinely struck deals with North Korea to purchase medium and short range ballistic missiles.232 However, in the recent past owing to North Korea’s recalcitrant attitude on its nuclear weapons and missile program, Sudan’s Foreign Ministry has declared that its “defence production sector has cancelled all contracts…with North Korea, and ended all relations, direct or through a third party.”233 Morocco In the recent years, owing to conflict with Algeria, Morocco has also concentrated on modernising its defence forces, and in 2023, there are reports that the US State Department has approved the potential sale for 229 “Saddam’s Rogue Alliance,” The Washington Times, April 3, 2000 (https://www. washingtontimes.com/news/2000/apr/3/20000403-011046-3402r/). 230 John Rocha, “A New Frontier in the Exploitation of Africa’s Natural Resources: The Emergence of China,” in ed., Firoze Manzi and Stephen Marks, African Perspectives on China in Africa (Fahamu: Nairobi, 2007), p. 75. 231 Andrea Berger, “North Korea in the Global Arms Market,” in Target Markets: North Korea’s Military Customers in the Sanctions Era (London: RUSI, 2015), p. 20. 232 “Wikileaks: Sudan Negotiating Purchase of Missiles from North Korea,” Sudan Tribune, September 5, 2011 (http://www.sudantribune.com/Wikileaks-Sudan-negotiati ng,40035). 233 “Sudan Says It Has Cut All Defence Ties with North Korea,” Reuters, June 6, 2018 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-north-korea/sudan-says-it-has-cutall-defence-ties-with-north-korea-idUSKCN1J22BU).

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ATACMS and Joint Stand-Off Weapons (JSOW).234 In future, Morocco could also be interested in SOM capability. Non-state Actors Missile proliferation to non-state actors is also driven by ‘security dilemma’ or a state’s quest for survival. States could use non-state actors as tool for proxy war vis-à-vis their adversaries to ensure their survival in the international system. Threat from non-state actors to adversaries divert adversaries’ attention and resources in combating threats from these actors in addition to countering threats from the states sponsoring the non-state actors. For instance, supply of missile systems to non-state actors by state actors can lead adversaries to divert resources in defensive capability to counter both threats from state and non-state actors. Non-state actors are irrational, and hence, they are added burden on a state’s ‘security dilemma.’ States that use non-state actors as tool for proxy war also use them to mitigate their own ‘security dilemma’ vis-à-vis their adversaries that could arise due to adversaries’ conventional and nuclear capability or military superiority. Hezbollah Hezbollah is an Islamic asymmetric group based in Lebanon fighting the Israelis. According to the reports, Iran provides ballistic missiles to Hezbollah. Hezbollah is believed to be possessing Scud-D missiles too that could reach targets in Israel. The long range ballistic missiles have been provided to Hezbollah by Iran and Syria, and most of them according to the reports have been disassembled and moved to Lebanon.235 The missile arsenal also included Scud-Cs, Zelzal and the Fateh category missile systems. In addition, Hezbollah also has North Korean missile systems in its arsenal. Not only this, North Korea is building tunnels for Hezbollah 234 Agnes Helou, “Why Morocco Is Investing Heavily in Long-Range Fires,” Breaking Defense, April 13, 2023 (Why Morocco Is Investing Heavily in Long-Range Fires Breaking Defense). 235 Anne Barnard and Eric Schmitt, “Hezbollah Moving Long Range Missiles from Syria to Lebanon, an Analyst Says,” The New York Times, January 2, 2014 (https://www. nytimes.com/2014/01/03/world/middleeast/hezbollah-is-said-to-transfer-missiles.html).

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in Lebanon for the storage of these missile systems. A sanctioned North Korean economy sells weapon systems to Hezbollah in return for hard cash. Hezbollah is believed to receive funds from Iran smuggled through Syria and also through Hawala transactions. Under Basahr al-Assad, Syria’s assistance to Hezbollah increased as compared to that during his father’s time. They also fetch funds through bank robbery and from drug profits. Other than this, the Lebanese diasporas that are settled in Africa and Latin America also provide funding to the Hezbollah. However, today, the question that arises is that why Hezbollah would need such weapon systems against Israel? Hezbollah initially used guerrilla tactics and terrorism against Israel. But later, the group realised that if it has to gain strategic victory, it would need sophisticated rockets and missile systems that could deter Israel’s military superiority. Such a strategy had two advantages—one that Hezbollah had realised from the Iran-Iraq War how missiles and rocket systems can act as psychological weapons and weapons of terror. According to the reports, Hezbollah has “[one lakh] missiles and rockets that can reach all corners” of Israel.236 Second was that acquiring such weapon systems put Israel into a burden of developing sophisticated missile defence system to protect its territory from rocket and missile attacks. This led to incurring of cost on missile defence system that could have otherwise been utilised for offensive strategy. In the recent past, reports emerged that Hezbollah has been building missile factories in Lebanon. All these efforts are being undertaken to uplift Hezbollah’s core goal—preserve the military content that it terms to be “resistance priority.”237 In 2017, reports emerged that Hezbollah has acquired Russian sophisticated Yakhont missiles—anti-ship cruise missiles. These missiles have a range of 300 kms that can become a threat to Israeli Navy.238 The cruise

236 “Hezbollah’s Rules of the Game and the Missile Threat,” Eye on Hezbollah, May 20, 2020 (Hezbollah’s Rules of the Game and the Missile Threat). 237 See Nicholas Blanford, “Hezbollah’s Evolution: From Lebanese Militia to Regional Player,” Middle East Institute, Policy Paper No. 4, November 2017 (https://www.mei. edu/sites/default/files/publications/PP4_Blanford_Hezbollah.pdf). 238 “Hezbollah Acquired Advanced Russian Yakhont Missiles with a 300km Range,” Ya Libnan, February 27, 2017 (http://yalibnan.com/2017/02/27/hezbollah-acquiredadvanced-russian-yakhont-missiles-with-a-300-km-range/).

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missile can render missile defence ineffective and can threaten Israeli newly built oil and rigs. Hamas Hamas acquired ballistic missiles from Iran which included the Fajr missiles. The IRGC had admitted in the past that it had provided Hamas with the technological know-how to develop Fajr missiles. Not only Iran, but North Korea too is a supplier of missile technology to Hamas and has reportedly provided the organisation with short range missile systems in return for cash down payment. In 2014, North Korea is also reported to have sold missile systems and communication technologies to Hamas and struck a deal worth millions of dollars which was being handled by a Lebanese-based trading company that had close ties with the Hamas.239 Hamas had indigenously developed an 80 km long range missile called the M-75 using Iranian technology. Both Fajr and M-75 missiles have been fired at Israel including Tel Aviv.240 Hamas’ interest in missile capabilities was due to the emergence of the new ground warfare concept within Hamas that focused on attacking enemy tunnels to ensure command and control, combat and incursions into the Israeli territory. Over the years, the group developed a proactive approach in warfare that led to the acquiring of rockets and missile systems.241 ISIS In March 2014, there were reports that the ISIS is also in possession of Scud missiles that it must have captured when the organisation was looting Iraq. In a video, they were believed to have paraded a Scud

239 Con Coughlin, “Hamas and North Korea Is Secret Arms Deal,” The Telegraph, July 26, 2014 (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/palestiniana uthority/10992921/Hamas-and-North-Korea-in-secret-arms-deal.html). 240 Chana Ya’ar, “Hamas Manufactures Longer Range M-75 Missiles,” Arutz Sheva, November 25, 2012 (https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/162492). 241 Dana Preisler- Swery, “The Last Missile War? The Influence of the “Iron Dome” on the Operational Concepts of Hamas, Hezbollah and the IDF,” The Dado Centre Journal, Vol. 4 (https://www.idf.il/media/11775/preisler-swery.pdf).

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missile. An ISIS member was also reported to have said that the missile was a threat to Israel given ISIS’ increased presence in Gaza in 2014.242

Conclusion The MENA region witnesses ‘security dilemma’ as a result of which there has been active missile development program. Iran, Israel, Turkey, Algeria, Morocco and Saudi Arabia namely face threats to their survival, and hence, focus on missile capability was a priority in its national security policy. Hence, not only are states in MENA region seeking missile capabilities but focus has also been on missiles with long range strike capabilities. Strengthening conventional deterrence is viewed as a means for securing their survival in the international system, and missiles play a crucial role in strengthening their conventional deterrence.

Regional Players: South Asia/ North East Asia/Asia Pacific Post-Cold War era has not just confined missile systems and its technological know-how to the permanent five (P5), Britain, France, China, Russia and the United States, but developing and developed giants in the Asian continent are also vying for such capabilities. The quest for regional influence, ‘security dilemma, the desire to achieve technological prowess for state survival and prestige have all catapulted into a common outcome—states advancing with missile technologies. South Asia, North East Asia and the Indo-Pacific region have not been bereft of witnessing the growth of such capabilities. This chapter will study how these regions have progressed with such capabilities. South Asia South Asia is one of the best examples of how ‘security dilemma’ works in the international and regional system. The region of South Asia comprises two nuclear powers with prolific missile development program—India and

242 Dalit Halevy, “ISIS Parades Scud Missile ‘Heading Toward Israel’,” Arutz Sheva, July 1, 2014 (https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/182409).

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Pakistan. Both the nuclear powers’ focus has been on ballistic as well as cruise missile capabilities. India’s missile development program has progressed keeping in mind its posture of ‘recessed deterrence,’ doctrine of ‘no-first use’ and credible minimum deterrence. Pakistan on the other hand has progressed from a ‘minimum credible deterrence’ posture to a ‘full spectrum deterrence’ posture, and its missile program has progressed accordingly with missiles ranging from 60 to 2,750 kms. This chapter tracks the development of missile program in Pakistan and India. India India’s ‘security dilemma’ that led to its missile development program was followed by the Chinese nuclear and missile development program. India’s concerns of a similar 1962 Indo-China War scenario led to its nuclear and missile development program. The threat from Pakistan also existed, and India’s two-front war necessitated for development of missile program. In the 1980s, pressures from the MTCR restricted India from acquiring components for its missile technology program from foreign countries. After this, India commenced with its indigenous missile development program under the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The first of the lot was the liquid-fuelled ballistic missile—the Prithvi land-, air- and sea-based versions of the missile. While Prithvi-I was inducted into the army in 1994, Prithvi-II was first tested in 1996 and inducted into the armed forces in 2003.243 Prithvi-II has a range of 350 kms while Prithvi-I has a range of 150 kms and PrithviIII (Dhanush) has a range of 750 kms. The Prithvi versions are derived from the Soviet surface-to-air (SAM) missile called the SA-2 and are road mobile and nuclear capable.244 India also developed its solid propelled ballistic missile capability—the Agni category of missile systems. By 1989, India had test-fired its Agni 243 “Timeline of India’s Missile Development Program,” The Hindu, June 2, 2017 (https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/timeline-of-indias-missile-develo pment-programme/article18708216.ece). 244 “Prithvi,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/nuke/guide/india/mis sile/prithvi.htm).

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missile for the first time, but Agni-I was more of a “technology demonstrator.” The missile used liquid propellant in its upper stage and solid propellant as second stage. Agni-II on the other hand uses solid propellant and highly mobile platforms that can transport the missile through rail and road. The missile has a range of 2,000 kms. The Agni-I and Agni-II underwent several tests since then in order to ensure the operational readiness of the missiles. In 2004, the AgniI missile was successfully inducted into the Indian Army. Even after the induction, Agni-I had undergone several tests to check the operational readiness. The Agni-II entered service in 2004. However, due to failed tests and technical issues, Agni-II achieved operational capability only in the year 2011. In fact, 2011 was a landmark year for India’s nuclear deterrence as it was in the same year that the intermediate range Agni-III was also inducted in the Indian Army. The Agni-III with a range of 3,000 kms underwent the first trial test in the year 2006, but there were several problems during the test and hence, the missile underwent its second test in 2007. Agni-III was developed owing to the need to develop long range missile system with deep strike capability against China that could hold major Chinese cities under threat.245 But India’s deterrence could not be confined to just Pakistan. Its missile capability needed to be such that it was capable of targeting China and hence, a deterrence against China. The Agni-IV was developed with an aim to deter China. The missile had a range of 4,000 kms and could target western and south western China if positioned correctly.246 India’s desire to achieve intercontinental range capability further led India to develop the Agni-V missile with a range of 5,000 kms. There are reports that Agni-V has been tested in both lofted and depressed trajectory to avoid enemy missile defence.247 The missile is also reported to be capable of carrying MIRVs. Agni category of missiles forms the main backbone of India’s land-based nuclear deterrence. The missile is reported 245 “Agni III,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/

missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/india/agni-iii/). 246 “Agni-IV,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/ missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/india/agni-iv/). 247 “2018: Landmark Year for DRDO,” The New Indian Express, December 31, 2018 (http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2018/dec/31/2018-landmarkyear-for-drdo-1918538.html).

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to be canister launched but also has been tested in open configurations providing greater launch flexibility.248 Canister launched missiles imply that the missiles are capable of surviving enemy radars and surveillance mechanisms and enhance the agility of the missile system.249 It also limits direct handling of the missile systems and protects the missile from extreme temperature. Canister missile reduces launch time preparation, strengthening ‘no-first use’ doctrine. In order to fit the missile with MIRV capability, the missile would need a post-boost vehicle (PBV) as a launch platform. The Agni-II already has a PBV. PBV would also enhance accuracy of the missile.250 In June 2023, India also tested Agni Prime ballistic missile with a range of 1,000–2,000 kms. The missile is a two-stage canister launched missile with solid propulsion technology and dual redundant navigation and guidance systems.251 Compared to the other Agni series missiles, this Agni Prime missile is lighter.252 India’s 600 km range Shaurya missile is also capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. The missile is reported to be based in underground silos and can be launched from canisters.253 India has also developed a conventionally capable missile of range 150 kms and is solid

248 Debalina Ghoshal, “Credible Threat,” Force, January–March 2019 (http://forcei ndia.net/guest-column/credible-threat/). 249 Debalina Ghoshal, “Credible Threat,” Force, January–March 2019 (http://forcei ndia.net/guest-column/credible-threat/). 250 Debalina Ghoshal, “Credible Threat,” Force, January–March 2019 (http://forcei

ndia.net/guest-column/credible-threat/). 251 Riya Teotia, “Agni Prime Missile: DRDO’s Boost to India’s Nuclear Arsenal—5 Things to Know About This Ballistic Missile,” WION , June 9, 2023 (Agni Prime Missile: DRDO’s Boost to India’s Nuclear Arsenal—5 Things to Know About This Ballistic Missile - India News [wionews.com). 252 Riya Teotia, “Agni Prime Missile: DRDO’s Boost to India’s Nuclear Arsenal—5 Things to Know About This Ballistic Missile,” WION , June 9, 2023 (Agni Prime Missile: DRDO’s Boost to India’s Nuclear Arsenal—5 Things to Know About This Ballistic Missile - India News News [wionews.com]). 253 Rajat Pandit, “India Successfully Test Fires Shaurya Missile,” Times of India, November 13, 2008 (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-successfully-testfires-Shaurya-missile/articleshow/3703369.cms).

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propelled called the Prahaar. It is a quick reaction, all weather, all-terrain, highly accurate battlefield missile.254 In addition, New Delhi has also concentrated on SLBM. The 700 kms Sagarika SLBM is being developed by the DRDO. According to the reports, DRDO is developing Agni-III variant of the SLBM, the K4 with a range of 3,500 kms and another longer range SLBM of 5,000–6,000 kms, K-5.255 India has also developed cruise missiles like the supersonic BrahMos cruise missile and the Nirbhay subsonic cruise missile. The BrahMos is LACM with a range of 290 kms but off late, the range of the missile has been reportedly increased to 500 kms.256 There is also sea-launched version of the BrahMos cruise missile, and India will soon have the airlaunched version of the BrahMos. India has also developed the 1,000 km range Nirbhay that can “loiter” in the air before it reaches its targets.257 India is also working on hypersonic capability which includes both hypersonic cruise missile and glide vehicles. In 2023, India tested the Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle (HSTDV) powered by scramjet engine.258 Pakistan Pakistan’s conventional asymmetry vis-a-vis India resulted in ‘security dilemma.’ However, its security dilemma is not only confined to India, but Pakistan’s fear that Israel has nuclear capable missiles that could

254 “Prahaar Missile Test-Fired Successfully: Know What’s Special About This Indigenously Developed Weapon,” Financial Express, September 20, 2018 (https://www.financ ialexpress.com/defence/india-successfully-test-fires-prahaar-missile/1320791/). 255 “India,” NTI (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/india/delivery-systems/). 256 Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, “Upgraded BrahMos with 500km-Range Ready: CEO,

BrahMos Aerospace,” July 8, 2019 (https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ defence/upgraded-brahmos-with-500-km-range-ready-ceo-of-brahmos-aerospace/articl eshow/70117273.cms). 257 Debalina Ghoshal, “Hot Takes: India’s Nuclear Cruise Missile: Nirbhay,” South Asian Voices, November 10, 2017 (https://southasianvoices.org/hot-takes-indias-cruisemissile-nirbhay/). 258 Ujjwal Shrotryia, “India Tests Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle; Here’s Everything We Know About It,” Swarajya Magazine, January 27, 2023 (India Tests Hypersonic Technology Demonstrator Vehicle; Here’s Everything We Know About It [swarajyamag.com]).

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reach territories in Pakistan led Rawalpindi to develop missiles capable of reaching Israel.259 Pakistan’s missile capabilities that can reach up to Israel indicate that Pakistan’s threat environment is broader than it claims. Israel in 1980s and 1990s had planned a raid on Pakistan’s nuclear facilities that, however, got stalled, but the existential threat from Israel remains.260 State cannot ensure its survival, if it is subjected to nuclear blackmail from adversaries, and hence, credible deterrence is needed to prevent this nuclear blackmail. A nuclear capable, survivable missile of 2,750 kms range that can reach Israel clearly acts as a nuclear deterrent and sends a message across to Israel that retaliation is a possibility. The possibility of a nuclear Iran is also a concern for Pakistan that the latter cannot eschew another nuclear neighbour in future to deal with, considering that border skirmishes exist between the two states.”261 Pakistan’s rocket technology development program commenced in the 1960s. The Space Sciences Research Wing of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was set up, and in the initial years, Pakistan was able to receive US rocket technology know-how through its scientists visiting the United States for such training.262 Pakistan also received assistance in missile technology from North Korea. The Iran-Iraq warfare brought North Korea and Pakistan close to each other to assist Iran’s missile development program. However, post-1996, there was reportedly no complete missile transfers from North Korea to Pakistan.263 But by then, Pakistan had already acquired the No Dong missiles from North Korea in

259 Debalina Ghoshal, “Pakistan’s Increasing Nuclear Stockpile: India the Only Threat Factor,” Hudson Institute, October 28, 2015 (http://www.southasiaathudson.org/blog/ 2015/10/28/pakistans-increasing-nuclear-stockpile-india-the-only-threat-factor). 260 Debalina Ghoshal, “Pakistan’s Increasing Nuclear Stockpile: India the Only Threat Factor,” Hudson Institute, October 28, 2015 (http://www.southasiaathudson.org/blog/ 2015/10/28/pakistans-increasing-nuclear-stockpile-india-the-only-threat-factor). 261 Debalina Ghoshal, “Pakistan’s Increasing Nuclear Stockpile: India the Only Threat Factor,” Hudson Institute, October 28, 2015 (http://www.southasiaathudson.org/blog/ 2015/10/28/pakistans-increasing-nuclear-stockpile-india-the-only-threat-factor). 262 “Pakistan: Missile,” NTI , April (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/pakistan/del ivery-systems/). 263 Joshua Pollack, “Ballistic Trajectory: The Evolution of North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Market,” Non Proliferation Review, Vol. 18, No. 2, July 2011 (https://www. nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/npr_18-2_pollack_ballistic-trajectory.pdf).

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exchange for civilian nuclear technology.264 Pakistan also received assistance in missile technology from China, especially on solid propelled missile systems. Pakistan’s missile arsenal comprises short range and medium range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles capable of carrying nuclear and conventional warheads. Its ballistic missile arsenal comprises: The 70– 100 kms range Hatf-1 is a solid propelled ballistic missile, and there are reports that the missile also has an improved version with enhanced range of 100 kms, the Hatf-1A missile.265 The solid propelled Hatf-2 also called Abdali missile is a 180–200 kms range missile and is road mobile. The Hatf-3 also known as Ghaznavi is a solid propelled road mobile missile with a range of 290 kms.266 Hatf4 or Shaheen-1 missile is reported to be version of the DF-11 and with a range of 750 kms and is nuclear capable unlike the above-mentioned Hatf category missiles. The missile is single warhead and road mobile.267 The Shaheen-2 is a longer range missile, the Hatf-5, with a range of 2,000 kms with solid propulsion and road mobility.268 The Shaheen-3 has a 2,750 kms range, solid-fuelled and road mobile too. Shaheen forms the main backbone of Pakistan’s land-based nuclear deterrence. Pakistan also has a liquid-fuelled ballistic missile, probably the North Korean No Dong version—called the Ghauri or Hatf-5. The missile has a range of 1,300 kms and can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads.269 Pakistan has also developed and conducted flight tests of its Ababeel missile that will reportedly carry MIRVs. The missile has a range 264 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “North Korea-Pakistan Axis Is Legacy Issue Dating Back to Bhutto’s 1970s,” The Economic Times, June 13, 2018 (https://economictimes. indiatimes.com/news/defence/north-korea-pakistan-axis-is-legacy-issue-dating-back-tobhutto-1970s/articleshow/64578993.cms?from=mdr). 265 “Hatf-1,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/ missile/hatf-1.htm). 266 “Ghaznavi,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-3/). 267 “Hatf-4 “Shaheen”,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hat

f-4/). 268 “Shaheen-II,” Missile Defense Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvocacy. org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/pakistan/shaheen-ii/). 269 “Pakistan Successfully Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Ghauri Ballistic Missiles,” The Economic Times, October 9, 2018 (https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/def ence/pakistan-successfully-test-fires-nuclear-capable-ghauri-ballistic-missile/articleshow/ 66123618.cms?from=mdr).

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of 2,200 kms and is nuclear capable and can evade enemy ballistic missile defence with MIRVs.270 In order to close the gap of India’s conventional superiority, Pakistan is also working on TNWs—the Hatf-9 also called the Nasr is a solid propelled tactical ballistic missile with a range of 60 km that can launched from MLRS.271 Pakistan has also developed longer range MLRS capability like the Fatah-I and II.272 Pakistan’s cruise missile arsenal is also nuclear capable. The Babur and Raad add to Pakistan’s nuclear strength. The Hatf-8, Raad 1 and Raad 2 have a range of 350 kms and 550 kms, respectively, and can be air launched. It is a LACM capable of delivering miniature nuclear warheads.273 The subsonic missile will provide Pakistan with a stand-off capability. Pakistan also possesses the Babur cruise missiles also called the Hatf-7. Babur has a range of 700 kms while the Babur-1B incorporates advance aerodynamics and avionics that can strike targets both at land and at sea.274 Not only ground launched, but Pakistan has also developed a submarine launched Babur cruise missile with a range of 450 kms.275 Strategic stability is maintained when there is parity in arms built-up between two countries. When both states have similar arms build-up, there is peace in the region. For instance, if either Pakistan or India did not possess MIRV capability while the other did, it would lead to a serious situation of strategic destabilisation. However, if both the states possessed

270 “Pakistan Conducts First Flight Test of N-Capable ‘Ababeel’ Missile,” The Economic Times, July 14, 2018 (https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-con ducts-1st-flight-test-of-n-capable-ababeel-missile/articleshow/56762833.cms?from=mdr). 271 “Hatf-9 “Nasr”,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hatf-9/). 272 “Pakistan conducts successful flight test of Fatah-II,” The Economic Times,

December 27, 2023, (https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-con ducts-successful-flight-test-of-fatah-ii/articleshow/106326091.cms). 273 Bilal Khan, “Pakistan Officially Unveils Extended Range Ra’ad 2 Air Launched Cruise Missile,” Quwa, March 23, 2017 (https://quwa.org/2017/03/23/pakistan-offici ally-unveils-extended-range-raad-2-air-launched-cruise-missile/). 274 “Pakistan Successfully Test Fires Enhanced Version of Babur Cruise Missile,” The Economic Times, April 14, 2018 (https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/ pakistan-successfully-test-fires-enhanced-version-of-babur-cruise-missile/articleshow/637 65730.cms). 275 Ayaz Gul, “Pakistan Tests Sub-launched Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missile,” Voice of America, March 29, 2018 (https://www.voanews.com/east-asia/pakistan-tests-sub-lau nched-nuclear-capable-cruise-missile).

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the same, there would be parity and the offence-offence balance would be maintained, thereby maintaining the strategic stability. India has adopted a ‘defensive realism’ posture by adopting a nofirst use doctrine and ‘credible minimum deterrence’ posture where focus would be on the survivability of its nuclear forces than on maximising its nuclear strength. However, a shift to developing canister launched missile system and MIRV capability, all these developments suggest that India is also strengthening its ‘offensive realism’ posture. For Pakistan, on the other hand, its nuclear forces and doctrine have evolved in a way that has drifted more towards ‘offensive realism,’ namely—believed to have a ‘first-use’ doctrine, developed TNWs—both battlefield ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and MIRV capability.

Regional Players: Asia Pacific/North East Asia One of the most concerning issues is the missile development in the North East Asian region. This growth in missile development program has had ‘domino effect’ in the Indo-Pacific region arising due to ‘security dilemma’ resulting in states like North Korea, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan to develop the same. While Japan has not yet ventured into ballistic missiles, its space capability, the satellite launch vehicles (SLV) that is, can be used to develop the same. Nevertheless, the country has taken active interest in cruise missiles. South Korea and Taiwan, on the other hand, have developed ballistic missiles capable enough to reach North Korea. Again, the threats from North Korea and China are major factors that have led to Australia taking active interest in cruise missiles. Amid these developments, the chapter studies the growing capabilities of North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Australia. North Korea The state of North Korea openly declares that it could attack the United States with nuclear weapons.276 This aggressive tendency can be related more to structural realism where states develop capabilities to threaten powerful states and also explicitly state their intention of using such 276 Hee Jae Shim, “The Dilemma of the North Korean Nuclear Issue: Denuclearisation or Co-existence,” University of Miami, May 2018 (https://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/ cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1728&context=oa_theses).

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weapons against powerful states. Nuclear weapons are weapons of survival for North Korea, and hence, despite the UNSC sanctions imposed on North Korea, the state continues with its nuclear and missile development program. Development of MLRS in the 1960s laid the foundation for the development of ballistic missiles in North Korea. In 1965, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung recognised the dire need missile development and established the National Defence University in Hamheung. Later, the base was shifted to Kankye for research and development of missile systems after the Pueblo incident.277 However, credit for North Korean missile systems can be given to Soviet era Scud missiles which it had acquired in the 1970s from Egypt during the Yom Kippur War. North Korea reverse engineered the Scuds and built its own missile systems and later exported the same to Egypt. By 1983 and 1986, the Scud-B and Scud-C were tested, respectively.278 The Scud-B is known as Hwasong-5 in North Korea and is singlestaged liquid propelled, with a range of 300 kms, and is road mobile.279 The Scud-C category of missiles is called Hwasong-6 which is a road mobile liquid-fuelled single-stage missile capable of carrying conventional/chemical warheads with a range of 500 kms.280 The extended range version of the Hwasong-6 or Scud-C ER or Scud-D is Hwasong-9 with a range extending to 1,000 kms and is single-stage liquid propelled with road mobility.281 North Korea also made progress with MRBM and it developed the nuclear capable No Dong (Hwasong-7) missile system with a range of 900–1,300 kms and liquid fuelled.282

277 “North Korean Missile Proliferation,” Committee on Government Affairs, 1997 (https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-105shrg44649/html/CHRG-105 shrg44649.htm). 278 “Case Study: North Korea’s Scud Story,” Tutorials NTI (https://tutorials.nti.org/ delivery-system/case-study-north-koreas-scud-story/). 279 “Hwasong-5,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hwasong-5/). 280 “Hwasong-6 (Scud-C variant),” Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance (https://missil

edefenseadvocacy.org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/north-korea/ scud-c-variant-hwasong-6/). 281 “Scud Extended Range,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/scu d-er/). 282 “No Dong,” Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvocacy. org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/north-korea/no-dong-1/).

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It must be well fathomed that North Korea’s long range missile systems are not just a result of its acquiring Scud systems, but also North Korean association in the then Chinese DF-61 missile program from 1976 to 1978 which, however, got cancelled.283 By 2010, North Korea also developed and paraded the No Dong B or the BM-25 Musudan missile based on Soviet R-27 SLBM. This nuclear capable liquid propelled road mobile IRBM has a range of 4,000 kms.284 North Korea also possesses the two-stage/three-stage configuration liquid-fuelled IRBM with a fixed launch platform and range of 2,000 kms (two-stage) and 5,000 kms (three-stage).285 The missile was reported to be a technology demonstrator.286 The Taepodong-2 missile has a range of 5,000–10,000 kms with liquid propulsion and is multi-staged.287 The quest for survival and international prestige not only led to North Korea developing long range missile systems but also opt out of an international legal treaty, the NPT, in 2003 as it felt that the Treaty could have hindered North Korea’s quest for survival. North Korea also possesses battlefield range road mobile ballistic missiles like the KN-09 with a range of 190 kms, KN-02 with a range of 120–170 kms and KN-23 with a range of 240–690 kms. The quasiballistic missiles KN-23 and KN-24 can travel depressed trajectory. The KN-24 has a range of 400 kms and can perform “pull-up manoeuvres during flight.”288 However, Pyongyang is also working on solid propelled SLBM with range of 700 kms called the Polaris-1 or the KN-11.289 North Korea

283 David C. Wright and Timur Kadyshev, “An Analysis of North Korean No Dong Missile,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 4, 1994 (http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/ archive/sgs04wright.pdf). 284 No-Dong-B BM-25 Musudan Ballistic Missile Technical Data Sheet Specifications

Video Pictures,” Army Recognition, April 4, 2013 (http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/ archive/sgs04wright.pdf). 285 “Taepodong-1,” ong-1/).

Missile

Threat

(https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/taepod

286 Ibid. 287 “Taepodong-2,” Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvocacy.

org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/north-korea/taepodong-2/). 288 “KN-24,” Missile Threat, January 18, 2022 (KN-24 | Missile Threat [csis.org]). 289 “KN-11,” Missile Defence Advocacy Alliance (https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/

missile-threat-and-proliferation/todays-missile-threat/north-korea/bukkeukseong-1/).

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is working on single-stage IRBM with a range of 4,500 kms called the Hwasong-12. North Korea also test-fired an ICBM in 2017 called the Hwasong-14 with a range of 10,400 kms.290 The Hwasong-15 has a range of 13,000 kms and can possibly carry multiple warheads, and even if not, the missile can carry more powerful single warhead.291 The Hwasong-17 has a range of 6,000 kms and is road mobile.292 All these ICBMs are liquid fuelled. In 2023, Pyongyang test-fired a solid-fuelled ICBM called the Hwasong-18.293 Not only this, North Korea also possesses ASCM called the KN-01 and the Kumsong-3. Just like ballistic missiles, North Korea uses its cruise missiles also for force projection and coercive diplomacy. Its long range cruise missiles can travel up to 2,000 kms range. In April 2020, North Korea launched salvo of cruise missiles towards the Sea of Japan amid nuclear negotiation talks with the United States.294 Similar missile postures of launching cruise missiles to express discontent were adopted in 2023 also when Pyongyang fired cruise missiles amid the US-South Korea military drills.295 The anarchic world order that lacks a supranational organisation coerced North Korea to show its military might when it had to deal with a state actor in order to prevent itself from nuclear blackmail. ‘Security dilemma’ in states brings in trust deficit, and North Korea’s lack of trust in the United States and its neighbours South Korea and Japan is one of the reasons why North Korea has gone ahead with nuclear 290 Michael Elleman, “North Korea’s Hwasong-14 ICBM: New Data Indicates Shorter Range Than Many Thought,” 38 North, November 29, 2018 (https://www.38north. org/2018/11/melleman112918/). 291 “Hwasong-15,” song_15.htmt).

Military

Today

(http://www.military-today.com/missiles/hwa

292 “North Korea Confirms Fired ICBM, Says It Was Hwasong-17,” Al Jazeera, March 17, 2023 (North Korea confirms fired ICBM, Says It Was Hwasong-17 | Weapons News | Al Jazeera). 293 “North Korea Says It Tested “Most Powerful” Missile to Date,” BBC News, April 14, 2023 (North Korea Says It Tested “Most Powerful” Missile to Date - BBC News). 294 “North Korea ‘Fires Multiple Suspected Cruise Missiles’,” Al Jazeera, April 14, 2020 (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/north-korea-fires-multiple-suspec ted-cruise-missiles-200414052712557.html). 295 “North Korea’s Kim Watches Cruise Missile Launches as U.S. and South Korean Troops Begin Drills,” NBC News, August 21, 2023 (North Korea’s Kim Watches Cruise Missile Launches as U.S. and South Korean Troops Begin Drills [nbcnews.com]).

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and missile development program despite sanctions and international criticisms and coercion.296 Mearsheimer also affirmed that North Korea would find it difficult to give up nuclear weapons due to its lack of trust in the United States as well as its lack of faith on the denuclearisation process. He further states, “as security competition heats up,” North Korea would find nuclear weapons as a viable weapon to “hand on to.”297 In 2023, Pyongyang conducted simulated tactical nuclear strikes against strikes in a drill with SRBMs that could target major command centres and operational airfields in South Korea.298 In 2022, Pyongyang claimed that it tested hypersonic capability with greater manoeuvrability.299 This ‘security dilemma’ is so strong not just for North Korea but also for China that a nuclearised North Korea according to Mearsheimer ensures a sovereign North Korea that helps to create a buffer for China between the Chinese territory and South Korea as well the United States’ forward forces.300 South Korea As long as North Korea does not give up its nuclear weapons and missile capabilities, South Korea will constantly be under ‘security dilemma’ and continue to develop long range missile capabilities. Moreover, South Korea’s security dilemma also arises due to China’s assertive behaviour in East Asia. Hence, power maximisation is the only way that South Korea can ensure its survival. Not only this, South Korea also faces threat from

296 “North Korea Will Not Give Up Nuclear Weapons: Mearsheimer,” Yonhap News Agency, March 20, 2018 (https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180320010200315). 297 “North Korea Will Not Give Up Nuclear Weapons: Mearsheimer,” Yonhap News Agency, March 20, 2018 (https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180320010200315). 298 George Wright, “North Korea Says It Stimulated Nuclear Strike on South,” BBC

News, August 31, 2023 (North Korea Says It Simulated Nuclear Strike on South - BBC News). 299 Josh Smith, “North Korea’s Expanding Missile Capabilities,” Reuters, October 5, 2022 (Factbox: North Korea’s Expanding Missile Capabilities | Reuters). 300 “North Korea Will Not Give Up Nuclear Weapons: Mearsheimer,” Yonhap News Agency, March 20, 2018 (https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20180320010200315).

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Japan and both the states are entangled in maritime disputes in the East China Sea over the Takeshima/Dokdo Island.301 Throughout 1960s and 1970s, the then President Park Chung-hee ordered for a self-reliant national defence policy owing to the strained relations with the United States on grounds that South Korea could not trust US commitment on the Mutual Security Agreement.302 By 1971, there was a quest to possess an indigenous missile development program. Under the ‘Aerospace Industry Project,’ South Korea aspired to develop surface-to-surface missiles, and it reached an agreement with the United States. In this agreement, Seoul could reverse engineer the Nike Hercules surface-to-air missiles to develop missiles of range limited to 180 kms and 500 kg payload.303 The country’s indigenous Hyunmoo missile is a product of this reverse engineering. Hyunmoo 2A and 2B have a range of 300 kms and 500 kms, respectively, while Hyunmoo 2C has a range of 800 kms.304 These missiles are a component of South Korea’s Kill Chain (pre-emptive strike).305 The range and payload of South Korean ballistic missiles were restricted by the US 1979 guidelines. However, with time and South Korea’s threat perceptions, the United States allowed South Korea to develop longer range missiles and in 2021, scrapped the range restrictions on ballistic missiles.306 Since the 1990s, South Korea has also worked on Haesong category ASCM. The supersonic Haesong II has a range of 500 km and is ship 301 Garret Bowman, “Why Now Is the Time to Resolve the Takeshima/Dokdo Dispute,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2014 (https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=jil). 302 “South Korea,” NTI (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/south-korea/deliverysystems/). 303 “South Korea,” NTI (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/south-korea/deliverysystems/). 304 “South Korea Shows Off Massive Weapons to Celebrate Armed Forces Day,” Xinhua Net, September 28, 2017 (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/28/c_ 136645591.htm). 305 Josh Smith, “Analysis: South Korea Doubles Down on Risky ‘Kill Chain’ Plans to Counter North Korea Nuclear Test,” Reuters, July 26, 2022 (Analysis: South Korea Doubles Down on Risky ‘Kill Chain’ Plans to Counter North Korea Nuclear Threat | Reuters). 306 Timothy Wright, “US and South Korea Scrap Ballistic-Missile Range Limits,” IISS, June 2, 2021 (US and South Korea Scrap Ballistic-Missile Range Limits [iiss.org]).

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based307 while the supersonic Haesong III has a range of 1,500 km and is submarine launched. The missile is a LACM.308 The Hyunmoo 3 series also form a component of Kill Chain and Hyunmoo3A has a range of 500 kms, 3B 1,000 kms (both ground-launched) and 3C 1,500 kms (sealaunched).309 South Korea is also working on ALCMs for stand-off capability.310 Seoul also possesses the European made Taurus KEPD 350K ALCM.311 However, Seoul is also working on an indigenous stand-off capability, the Cheon Ryong missile with a range of 500 kms.312 All these missiles form components of Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KPMR) (retaliatory strike).313 Japan Japan does not possess ballistic missiles; however, it does have the capability to develop ballistic missile. Japan’s advanced space-based capabilities, for instance, the Epsilon three-stage solid fuel rocket with less preparation time, can be used to develop long range ballistic missile systems like ICBMs.314 Japan is keen on acquiring stand-off capabilities in the form of ALCMs, and in 2023, the United States is reported to have cleared the sale of

307 “Haesong II,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/haeseong-ii/). 308 “Haesong III,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/haeseong-

iii/). 309 “Hyunmoo-3,” Missile Threat (Hyunmoo-3 | Missile Threat [csis.org]). 310 Jeff Jeong, “South Korea Plans to Locally Develop Missile for Home-Made Future

Jet,” Defense News, July 10, 2018 (https://www.defensenews.com/industry/techwatch/ 2018/07/10/south-korea-plans-to-locally-develop-missile-for-homemade-future-jet/). 311 Thomas Newdick, “South Korea’s KF-21 Fighter Will Get a New Bunker-Busting Cruise Missile,” The Drive, December 13, 2022 (South Korea’s KF-21 Fighter Will Get a New Bunker-Busting Cruise Missile [thedrive.com]). 312 Inder Singh Bisht, “South Korea Announces Air-Launched Cruise Missile Program,”

The Defense Post, December 13, 2022 (South Korea Announces Air-Launched Cruise Missile Program [thedefensepost.com]). 313 Doyeong Jung, “South Korea’s Revitalized “Three Axis” System,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 4, 2023 (South Korea’s Revitalized “Three-Axis” System | Council on Foreign Relations [cfr.org]). 314 “Japan,” NTI , https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/japan/delivery-systems/).

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Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missiles Extended Range (JASSM-ER).315 In 2022, there were reports that Japan would develop extended range version of GLCM Type 12 cruise missile and high velocity ballistic missile.316 In the near future, Tokyo could acquire the Joint Strike Missile also (JSM) for anti-ship roles.317 Japan is also keen to acquire sea-based stand-off capability in the form of SLCM by using existing torpedo tubes. It is also in the process of developing new VLS to launch these cruise missiles. Use of torpedo tubes for horizontal launch and VLS for vertical launch would provide Japan with rapid response capability.318 In 2023, there were also reports that Japan was planning to purchase the US Tomahawk cruise missiles.319 All these capabilities would form component of Japan’s counter-strike capabilities. Taiwan For Taiwan, state survival considering the threat environment in which it is subjected to with concerns that Beijing considers the territory to be its own are reasons why Taiwan has sought to militarise itself. Conflict and war are supplementary to structural realism, and hence, hard power is necessary to ensure deterrence and prevent conflict or war. Taiwan possesses both ballistic and cruise missile arsenals. Taiwan’s missile program dates back to the 1970s when it started development of

315 “US OKs Potential Sale of Air-Launched Cruise Missiles to Japan-Pentagon,” Reuters, August 29, 2023 (US OKs Potential Sale of Air-Launched Cruise Missiles to Japan-Pentagon | Reuters). 316 Tim Kelly, “Japan Plans to Develop Longer-Range Missiles to Counter China, Russia,” Reuters, August 31, 2022 (Japan Plans to Develop Longer-Range Missiles to Counter China, Russia | Reuters). 317 Tim Kelly, “Japan Plans to Develop Longer-Range Missiles to Counter China, Russia,” Reuters, August 31, 2022 (Japan Plans to Develop Longer-Range Missiles to Counter China, Russia | Reuters). 318 Yusuke Takeuchi, “Japan Eyes Torpedo Tubes to Speed Debut of Sub-launched Missile,” Nikkei Asia, April 13, 2023, Japan eyes Torpedo Tubes to Speed Debut of Sub-launched Missile - Nikkei Asia). 319 Luke Caggiano, “Japan to Purchase U.S. Tomahawk Cruise Missiles,” Arms Control Today, March 2023 (Japan to Purchase U.S. Tomahawk Missiles | Arms Control Association).

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its Hsiung Feng missile systems based on Israel’s Gabriel missile technology and it was successfully tested for the first time in 1978.320 By 1980s, fearing that the arms sales from the United States to Taiwan could slow down owing to pressure from China, Taiwan commenced its indigenous missile development program and this program resulted in the development of air-to-air missile. Taiwan is also developing Hsiung Feng IIE is a surface-to-surface cruise missile with a range of 1,200 kms.321 The Hsiung Feng III is a 120–150 km range ASCM. Taiwan is also working on extending the range of HF-III to 300–400 kms.322 Other than this, Taiwan also has another ASCM called the HF-II with a range of 120 kms. Taiwan also possesses ALCM called Wan Chien with a range of 240 kms.323 Taiwan also possesses solid propelled, silo-based SRBM with a range of 120 kms called Tien Chi.324 Australia Australia’s threat environment that complicates its ‘security dilemma’ comprises China, North Korea, Iran and Russia (especially after Russia’s Crimea accession). In 1942, Australia had faced a dire situation when Japan tried to cut its links with the United States in order to prevent the United States from developing base in Australia.325 Even though Japan and Australia are partners at the moment, Australia could face dire situations.

320 “Taiwan,” NTI (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/taiwan/delivery-systems/). 321 “Taiwan Is Building Long Range Cruise Missile That Aims Deep Inside China,” The

News Lens, November 15, 2018 (https://international.thenewslens.com/article/108186). 322 “Hsiung Feng-III,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/hsiungfeng-iii/). 323 “Wan Chien,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/wan-chien/). 324 “Tien Chi,” Missile Threat (https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/tien-chi/). 325 A. D. McLennan, “Australia’s Security Dilemma,” CIS, Vol. 18, No. 3, Spring 2002 (https://www.cis.org.au/app/uploads/2015/04/images/stories/policy-magazine/ 2002-spring/2002-18-3-a-d-mclennan.pdf).

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In the recent past, Australia has sent warships at the SCS owing to the assertive behaviour of China in the region.326 Hence, Australia is also entangled in the SCS region, and owing to the fact that China possesses anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles in its arsenal, Australia cannot be left behind. In 2022, there were reports that the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) would acquire the AGM-158B JASSM-ER while the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) would acquire the fifth-generation Naval Strike Missile (NSM) Block 1A variant327 to replace the Harpoon cruise missiles. In 2023, the Australian Government also announced that it would move ahead with its plan to acquire Tomahawk cruise missiles with a range of 1,500 kms.328 Australia has entered into cooperation with Norwegian Kongsberg Defence and Aerospace on the Joint Strike Missile (JSM).329 ASEAN Countries ASEAN countries possess anti-ship missiles to deter Chinese assertive posture in the region. Vietnam and Myanmar also possess ballistic missiles of Scud categories. In addition to maritime disputes with China, ASEAN states are also apprehensive of the nuclear and missile developments in the Korean Peninsula.330 Vietnam The quest to acquire maritime deterrence vis-a-vis China led Vietnam to develop ASCMs. In 2020, Vietnam unveiled the locally produced

326 Nicola Smith and Julian Ryall, “Australia Joins US Warship in South China Sea as Tensions Grow,” The Telegraph, April 22, 2020 (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 2020/04/22/australia-joins-us-warship-south-china-sea-tensions-grow/). 327 Robin Hughes, “Australia Approved for JASSM-ER Package,” Janes, July 25, 2022 (Australia Approved for JASSM-ER package [janes.com]). 328 “Australia Moves Forward with Tomahawk Missile Procurement,” Naval News, August 21, 2023 (Australia Moves Forward with Tomahawk Missile Procurement - Naval News). 329 “Norway and Australia to Cooperate on Joint Strike Missile-Development,” Kongsberg (Norway and Australia to cooperate on Joint Strike Missile-Development - Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace). 330 “ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Recent Surge of Missile Testing on The Korean Peninsula,” Association of South East Asian Nations, ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Recent Surge of Missile Testing on The Korean Peninsula ASEAN Main Portal).

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VCM-01 ASCMs, customised version of the Kh-35UE with a range of 300 kms.331 Vietnam is also in possession of the Russian Kh-35 Uran-E anti-ship missiles. There are also reports that Vietnam could also buy the BrahMos cruise missiles from India.332 Vietnam also possesses the Soviet era Scud ballistic missiles. These missiles are still operational and ready for use with the military. There are also reports that Vietnam possesses Hwasong-6 missiles from North Korea.333 Philippines In 2023, there were reports that Philippines is also acquiring BrahMos cruise missiles from India owing to China’s assertive military posture in the SCS region.334 Indonesia Indonesia is focusing on both ballistic and cruise missile capabilities. The country has showed interest in India’s BrahMos cruise missiles. In 2022, Indonesia signed an agreement with Turkey to acquire the 280 kms range high precision Khan ballistic missile, the export version of the Bora missiles.335 Malaysia In 2022, there were reports that Malaysia was keen to acquire the BrahMos missiles. Malaysia could also acquire the Spear miniature cruise missiles that are reported to be capable of proving its mettle in highly

331 “Vietnam Unveils Its New VCM-01 Anti-ship Cruise Missile,” Navy Recognition (Vietnam Unveils Its New VCM-01 Anti-ship Cruise Missile [navyrecognition.com]). 332 Anuvesh Rath, “Exclusive: India Likely to Sell BrahMos Missiles to Vietnam in

Deal Ranging up to $625 Million,” Zee Biz, June 9, 2023 (Exclusive: India Likely to Sell BrahMos Missiles to Vietnam in Deal Ranging up to $625 Million | Zee Business [zee biz.com]). 333 Vinnytsya Myrna, “Vietnamese Ingenuity or How to Load Soviet Elbrus with North Korean Missiles,” Defense Express, May 5, 2023 (Vietnamese Ingenuity or How to Load Soviet Elbrus with North Korean Missiles | Defense Express [defence-ua.com]). 334 “First Delivery of BrahMos Missile to Philippines Will Happen in December,” The Hindu Business Line, May 11, 2023 (First Delivery of BrahMos Missile to Philippines will happen in December - The Hindu Business Line). 335 Tayfun Ozberk, “Indonesia to Be the First Foreign User of Turkey’s Khan Missile System,” Defense News, November 8, 2022 (Indonesia to Be First Foreign User of Turkey’s Khan Missile System [defensenews.com]).

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contested environments.336 The Royal Malaysian Navy could acquire the NSM in future.337 In 2021, the Royal Malaysian Navy carried out demonstration of its anti-surface capabilities which included the coordinated launch of surface-launched French Exocet MM 40 anti-ship missiles and sub-surface-launched Exocet SM39 to prove its maritime prowess in SCS region.338 Thailand Thailand also possesses the Chinese YJ-83 ASCM. Interestingly, in 2020, there were reports that the Royal Thai Navy was set to receive the US Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles.339 In the near future, Thailand too could acquire BrahMos cruise missile from India. Singapore In 2023, there were reports that the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) would replace its Harpoon missiles with a 290 kms range subsonic Blue Spear surface-to-surface missile. This is an Israeli-made missile. The missile is capable of delivering “agile, highly penetrative, combined antiship and land attack capability.”340 In the 1970s, also RSN had used Israeli developed anti-ship missiles like the Gabriel.341

336 “MBDA Presents Latest Missile Technologies at LIMA 2023,” MBDA (MBDA Presents Latest Missile Technologies at LIMA 2023 [mbda-systems.com]). 337 “KONGSBERG Offering NSM-Equipped Kapal Serang Ringan to Malaysia,” Asian Defence Journal, May 31, 2023 (KONGSBERG Offering NSM-Equipped Kapal Serang Ringan to Malaysia – Asian Defence Journal [adj.com.my]). 338 Ridzwan Rahmat, “Malaysia Flexes Its Missile Capabilities of Submarine, Kasturi Class Corvettes in South China Sea,” Janes, August 16, 2021 (Malaysia Flexes Missile Capabilities of Submarine, Kasturi-Class Corvettes in South China Sea [janes.com]). 339 Jr Ng, “More Anti-ship Missiles on the Way for Royal Thai Navy,” Asian Military Review, May 21, 2020 (More Anti-ship Missiles on the Way for Royal Thai Navy - Asian Military Review). 340 Mike Yeo, “Proteus Reveals More Details of Blue Spear Missile,” Defense News, February 15, 2022 (Proteus Reveals More Details of Blue Spear Missile [defensenews. com]). 341 “Ridzwan Rahmat, “Parting Shot: Blue Spear Missile,” JANES, July 19, 2023 (Parting Shot: Blue Spear missile [janes.com]).

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Myanmar The Myanmar Navy is reported to possess the Chinese made C-801, C-802, C-802A, HY-2 and Kh-35U anti-ship missiles. It also possesses SRBM capability like the Chinese SY-400. Myanmar is also believed to be fielding the North Korean Hwasong-5 and 6 ballistic missiles.342 In the near future, Myanmar could also acquire the BrahMos cruise missile.343 Brunei Brunei also possesses anti-ship capabilities in the form of Exocet missiles. Brunei has shared border disputes with Malaysia. Bangladesh In 2008, “China assisted Bangladesh in setting up an anti-ship missile launch pad near Chittagong Port and a maiden missile test” of assumably the C-802 missiles “was conducted in the same year with active participation of Chinese experts.”344 In 2008, reportedly, Bangladesh Navy test-fired the C-802 cruise missile.345

Other Powers Europe In the light of Russian aggression and annexation in Crimea and interference in Ukraine, and as INF treaty fell apart, Ukraine expanded its missile development program. The Neptune cruise missile and Hrim2 SRBM program were two of its ongoing projects. The Neptune can reach a range of 280 kms putting Russia’s Black Sea Fleet at threat. The 342 “Myanmar Parades Chinese-Made SY-400 Short Range Ballistic Missiles,” Global Defense Corp, June 2, 2021 (Myanmar Parades Chinese-Made SY-400 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles – Global Defense Corp). 343 “Myanmar May Interest to Acquire BrahMos Cruise Missile,” Navy Recognition, August 2, 2022 (Myanmar May Interest to Acquire Brahmos Cruise Missile [navyrecog nition.com]). 344 P. C. Katoch, “Chinese Missile Repaid Base in Bangladesh,” SP Naval Forces, February 28, 2022 (Chinese Missile Repair Base in Bangladesh [spsnavalforces.com]). 345 “Bangladesh Navy Successfully Test Fires Long Range Missile,” The Daily Star, May 13, 2008 (Bangladesh Navy successfully Test Fires Long Range Missile | The Daily Star).

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missile will have anti-jamming resistance that could break through enemy counter-measures.346 In the light of the Ukrainian War, it is reported that Ukraine has used the Neptune cruise missile against Russian S-400 air defence system with land-attack variants of the Neptune missile.347 According to the reports, Ukraine has also successfully tested IRBM a few years back.348 Ukraine’s SRBM Hrim-2 is an answer to Russian Iskanders.349 The missile is being used in the Ukrainian War against Russia. The missile also has an export version. Owing to the Ukrainian War, many countries have sent Kyiv weapon systems and Denmark has sent Harpoon missiles. Kyiv also received the Storm Shadow and Scalp cruise missiles in 2023 from UK and France, respectively.350 Ukraine has also expressed interest in NSMs and has entered into negotiations with Poland for the transfer of NSMs from Warsaw’s arsenal.351 There are also talks in Germany to send Taurus cruise missile to Kyiv.352 346 Illia Ponomarenko, “Neptune Cruise Missiles Can Protect Ukraine’s Shores,” Kyiv Post, August 2, 2019 (https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/neptune-cruisemissiles-can-protect-ukraines-shores.html). 347 Howard Altman, “Ukraine Using Land Attack Variant of Neptune Anti-ship Missile,” The Drive, August 29, 2023 (Ukraine Using Land Attack Variant of Neptune Anti-ship Missile [thedrive.com]). 348 Alla Hurska, “Liquidation of INF Treaty and Ukraine’s Prospects,” April 5, 2019 (http://www.ukrweekly.com/uwwp/liquidation-of-inf-treaty-and-ukraines-prospects/). 349 “Ukraine Unveils New Hrim-2 SRBM,” Unian Information Agency, January 3,

2018 (https://www.unian.info/economics/2329504-ukraine-unveils-new-hrim-2-shortrange-ballistic-missile-photos.html). 350 “Can UK’s Storm Shadow Missiles Change Ukraine Fight Against Russia,” BBC News, June 6, 2023 (Can UK’s Storm Shadow Missiles Change Ukraine Fight Against Russia? - BBC News). 351 Ashish Dangwal, “Ukraine Eyes 5th-Gen, Long Range Naval Strike Missile (NSM) from Poland to Hit Russian Land & Naval Targets,” The Eur Asian Times, June 29, 2023 (Ukraine Eyes 5th-Gen, Long-Range Naval Strike Missile (NSM) from Poland to Hit Russian Land & Naval Targets (eurasiantimes.com). 352 “Germany in Talks to Send Taurus Missiles to Ukraine: Reports,” DW , August 11, 2023 (Germany in Talks to Send Taurus Missiles to Ukraine: Reports – DW – 08/11/ 2023).

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Belarus has developed MLRS called the Polenz and in the longer run can develop long range missile systems too.353 Reportedly, Belarus also funded the Ukrainian Hrim-2 missile project alongside Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.354 Belarus has also cooperated since 2014 with Pakistan and in future could acquire missile technology know-how from Pakistan.355 Belarus is also reportedly working on Aist cruise missile project, and it is believed that the Polenz MLRS has formed a base for Belarus missile development capability.356 Belarus already operates the Soviet era ScudBs and SS-21 Scarabs as tactical missiles. In the recent past, owing to the Ukrainian War, Russia transferred the 500 kms range Iskander tactical ballistic missiles to Belarus.357 Owing to the Russian threat, Scandinavian countries have also sought to acquire missile capabilities. For instance, the Royal Norwegian Navy possesses the NSMs, a successor to its Penguin missiles. Denmark had expressed its interest in US Tomahawk cruise missiles.358 It already possesses the Harpoon missiles. The Finnish Navy, on the other hand, possesses the Israeli Gabriel V cruise missile, designated as the “2020 System.”359

353 Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Belarus to Develop Missile Systems, Combat Drones with Eye on Rising Global Tensions,” Defense News, November 14, 2018 (https://www.def ensenews.com/global/europe/2018/11/14/belarus-to-develop-missile-systems-combatdrones-with-eye-on-rising-global-tensions/). 354 Siarhei Bohdan, “Does Belarus Have Its Own Missile Programme?,” Belarus Digest, September 30, 2016 (https://belarusdigest.com/story/does-belarus-have-its-own-missileprogramme/). 355 Siarhei Bohdan, “Does Belarus Have Its Own Missile Programme?,” Belarus Digest, September 30, 2016 (https://belarusdigest.com/story/does-belarus-have-its-own-missileprogramme/). 356 “Does Belarus Create Own Cruise Missiles Aist?,” Charter 97 , November 30, 2015 (https://charter97.org/en/news/2015/11/30/180690/). 357 “Belarus Says It Is Now Operating Russian Iskander Missiles Autonomously,” Reuters, February 1, 2023 (Belarus Says It Is Now Operating Russian Iskander Missiles Autonomously | Reuters). 358 “The Russian Ambassador Warned Denmark About the Dangers of Buying American Missiles,” VPK, February 9, 2023 (The Russian Ambassador Warned Denmark About the Dangers of Buying American Missiles - BPK.name [vpk.name]). 359 “Finnish Navy Lifts Veil on Its Future Anti-ship Missile: The Gabriel V,” NAVAL NEWS, December 14, 2019 (Finnish Navy Lifts Veil on its Future Anti-ship Missile: The Gabriel V - Naval News).

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There are also reports that the Netherlands is set to buy the Tomahawk cruise missiles.360 The country is also keen to acquire the JASSM-ER cruise missiles.361 Poland also possesses the NSMs. However, in 2023, there were reports that the country was all set to buy the new generation JASSM-XR. Poland already possesses the older versions of the JASSM-ER missiles—the AGM-158A and AGM-159B.362 Russian President Vladimir Putin, in 2019, expressed his concerns that the United States to station its Tomahawk cruise missiles in Poland and Romania.363 Germany is also reported to possess the Taurus cruise missiles. Italy, on the other hand, operates the Storm Shadow cruise missiles, but it is working on an Anglo-French anti-ship missile program with deep strike capability called Future Cruise/Anti-Ship missile to replace the Harpoon Block IC missile, Storm Shadow, Scalp and Exocet missiles in the British and French inventories, respectively.364 Latvian countries like Estonia are reported to have bought Israeli-made anti-ship missiles for Estonia’s naval defence.365

360 Richard Scott, “Netherlands Set to Buy Tomahawk Cruise Missile for Maritime Strike,” Janes, April 5, 2023 (Netherlands Set to Buy Tomahawk Cruise Missile for Maritime Strike [janes.com]). 361 “The Netherlands Plans to Purchase JASSM-ER Missiles for Its F-35 Fleet,” Defence Industry Europe, April 10, 2023 (The Netherlands Plans to Purchase JASSM-ER Missiles for Its F-35 fleet [defence-industry.eu]). 362 Jo Harper, “Poland Plans to Buy New Generation US Cruise Missiles: Premier,” AA, April 14, 2023 (Poland Plans to Buy New Generation US Cruise Missiles: Premier [aa.com.tr]). 363 Georgi Gotev, “Putin: US in Position to Deploy New Cruise Missile in Romania and Poland,” EURACTIV , August 22, 2019 (Putin: US in Position to Deploy New Cruise Missile in Romania, Poland [EURACTIV.com]). 364 Harry Lye, “Italy Sings up for Anglo-French Future Cruise Missile Programme,” Shephard Media, June 26, 2023 (Italy Signs up for Anglo-French Future Cruise Missile Programme | Shephard [shephardmedia.com]). 365 David Axe, “Estonia Is About to Aim Missiles at a Key Russian Weakness,” Forbes, October 11, 2021 (Estonia Is About to Aim Missiles at A Key Russian Weakness [forbes. com]).

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Central Asia Azerbaijan has acquired the Polenz MLRS from Belarus and will equip them with Israeli-made Long Range Artillery Systems (LORA), tactical ballistic missiles.366 Armenia, on the other hand, has acquired Russian Iskander-M that would replace the Soviet era Scud systems and Tochka from Russia.367 Armenia has used the Scud category ballistic missiles against Azerbaijan cities in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.368 Africa Ethiopia, in Africa, possesses sophisticated SRBM capabilities like the M-20 missiles and guided long range rocket capabilities. This SRBM is acquired from China and it has a range of 280 kms.369 In 2008, Iran signed an accord with the then Eritrean government to revamp the Russian-built Assab Oil Refinery. It was reported that Iran had sent submarines and missiles as well as troops also to Eritrea.370 Latin America Brazil does not possess ballistic missiles. However, it possesses nuclear submarines for which SLCMs are a necessity. Brazil has expressed interest

366 Edward Abrahamyan, “Azerbaijan’s Ballistic Missile Dilemma,” The Central AsiaCaucasus Analyst, August 22, 2018 (https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analyticalarticles/item/13530-azerbaijans-ballistic-missile-dilemma.html). 367 “Azerbaijani MP: Armenia’s Iskander Missiles Threat Whole Europe,” Azer News, May 30, 2017 (https://www.azernews.az/aggression/113953.html). 368 Nurlan Mustafayev, “The Legality of Use of Ballistic Missiles on Cities: The Case of Armenia-Azerbaijan Armed Conflict,” Ejil Talk, February 8, 2022 (The Legality of Use of Ballistic Missiles on Cities: The Case of Armenia-Azerbaijan Armed Conflict – EJIL: Talk! [ejiltalk.org]). 369 Patrick Kenyette, “Ethiopia Enhances Rocket and Artillery Capabilities,” Military Africa, February 1, 2023 (Ethiopia Enhances Rocket and Artillery Capabilities – Military Africa). 370 Tesfa-alem Tekle, “Iran Deploys Troops, Missiles in Eritrean Port—Opposition,” Sudan Tribune, November 29, 2008 (Iran Deploys Troops, Missiles in Eritrean Port— opposition - Sudan Tribune).

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in the Indian BrahMos cruise missiles.371 However, lessons learnt from Ukraine War have resulted in Brazil focusing on missile capabilities as artillery saturation systems and hence, developed the ASTROS-III multiple launching platform for four AV-M TC tactical cruise missiles per launcher.372 The indigenously developed cruise missile will have a range of 300 kms. Argentina has also expressed interest in BrahMos cruise missiles to strengthen their air power capability.373 Similarly, Chile and Peru have also expressed desires to acquire the BrahMos missile system. Venezuela is reported to have taken keen interest in Iranian medium and long range missile systems.374

Conclusion ‘Security dilemma’ is existing in every region that results in global repercussion. Every region is affected by the global anarchy resulting in states seeking for hard power as means of survival. The threat perceptions can either lead the state to acquire ballistic missiles or cruise missiles or both depending on the strategic and security needs. From the above study of missiles being possesses by various countries, it is clear that irrespective of the raison d’etre to develop missiles, each state decides the type of missiles they need to develop that would fulfil these raison d’etre.

371 “As Interest Grows in BrahMos Missile Systems, Here’s Why It Is the Future of

Defence Capabilities,” The Economic Times, July 19, 2023 (BrahMos Missile System: As Interest Grows In BrahMos Missile Systems, Here’s Why It Is the Future of Defence Capabilities - The Economic Times [indiatimes.com]). 372 Victoria Barreira, “Brazilian Avibras Unveils New Missile and Rocket-Launching System,” Janes, May 11, 2023 (Brazilian Avibras Unveils New Missile and RocketLaunching System [janes.com]). 373 Huma Siddiqui, “Argentina’s Need for Cruise Missiles: Exploring the Potential of BrahMos,” Financial Express, July 17, 2023 (Argentina’s Need for Cruise Missiles: Exploring the Potential of BrahMos | The Financial Express). 374 “Venezuela Looking to Buy Iranian Missiles: Colombian President Says,” Reuters, August 20, 2020 (Venezuela Looking to Buy Iranian Missiles: Colombian President Says | Reuters).

CHAPTER 6

Survivability of Nuclear Missile Forces and Contemporary Debates

Nuclear weapons have undoubtedly made global politics and international security more interesting and yet, more complex. Such catastrophic weapons have made states realise the relevance of maintaining peace and stability in the region to avoid any crisis situation. Deterrence to some extent, hence, depends on the goodwill of the adversaries. On the other hand, it must also be fathomed that nuclear deterrence cannot solely rely on the restraining intentions of the adversary but also on how credible the state’s delivery systems are. This credibility is not only ensured when state’s nuclear arsenal and nuclear forces are survivable, but also its conventional forces are survivable too. In this, survivability of missile forces, both conventional and WMD capable, is crucial for a holistic deterrent posture. This credibility is crucial as states function in an anarchic international system. In addition, ‘security dilemma’ of adversaries can be aggravated with the growing capabilities of the state which can result in adversaries attempting to destroy a state’s ability to launch cataclysmic and decapitating strikes on adversaries. Hence, if a state does not have survivable forces its survival becomes a concern and structural realism assert that states develop capabilities and function in a manner that is best for its survival. In the nuclear scenario, irrespective of the component of deterrence: whether counter-strike or first strike, survivability of the arsenal © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Ghoshal, Role Of Ballistic And Cruise Missiles In International Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48063-8_6

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is a priority. This is because being able to retaliate is not just about possessing adequate quantity of arsenals to do so, but also the capability of surviving the first strike, and then retaliating. Statespossessing ‘first-strike,’ ‘first-use,’ ‘pre-emptive,’ ‘preventive,’ ‘no-first use’ nuclear doctrines- irrespective of the doctrine they adopt, survivability of the arsenal is crucial to launch second strike or counter-strike. When adversaries are aware that states can survive an attack on their nuclear arsenal and launch retaliation, nuclear coercion or nuclear blackmailing by adversaries could fail. On the other hand, a humble number of nuclear weapons that are survivable become a concern for an adversary that possesses greater number of nuclear weapons and this concern is in its aggravated form if the state is a revisionist state. Conventionally armed missiles are also an asset for states seeking to exert its influence in their region and in their neighbourhood. Iran, Turkey and the South East Asian countries have conventionally capable missiles. Despite these missile systems carrying conventional warheads, their survivability is crucial for providing the states with long range and deep strike capabilities as well stand-off capability. It is in this context that the chapter aims to understand how survivability options for missile forces could be strengthened in order to make them credible forces for strengthening deterrence and combat capability.

First Strike and Role of Missiles First-strike capability or nuclear primacy is defined as ability “to destroy all of an adversary’s nuclear forces, eliminating the possibility of a retaliatory strike.”1 Launching a ‘first-strike’ or pre-emptive or even preventive strike requires greater preparedness and decision-making abilities as states would only adopt such doctrines if they were confident that they possessed the capability to destroy adversaries’ retaliatory capability. Nevertheless, proponents of ‘first strike’ like Stephen Cimbala and James Scouras

1 Keir A. Leiber and Darly G. Press, “The Rise of US Nuclear Supremacy,” Foreign Affairs, March–April 2006 (http://www.ituassu.com.br/theriseofusnuclearsuprem acy.pdf).

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suggest that launching a disarming first strike leaves that minimal scope for retaliation is a means of assured survivability.2 The objective is to launch a decapitating strike that could destroy the command, control and communication of the adversary so that they are not able to retaliate. Destroying command, control and communication systems paralyses the ability of the adversary to retaliate. However, this first strike or the willingness to pre-empt with missile capabilities is not only confined to nuclear capable missiles. Conventionally armed missile powers are also adopting such doctrines to target their nuclear-armed or conventionally powerful adversaries. For instance, South Korea has adopted a strategy to pre-empt North Korea’s deterrent capabilities as well as to decapitate North’s nuclear command with its conventionally armed missiles. North Korea, on the other hand, has already contemplated any nuclear or non-nuclear attack on its territory would be reciprocated with ‘preventive nuclear strike.’3 Land-based ballistic missiles could tend to motivate a state to resort to ‘first-strike’ or pre-emptive or preventive strike doctrines and adopt policies and strategies that could support and strengthen the doctrine. If state has a first-strike policy, silo-launched land-based missiles could be used as they usually have ‘use them or lose them’ capability. Silos can be accompanied by dummy silos to confuse enemy surveillance and reconnaissance about the real silo and the missile basing. Missiles that have the capability of being rapidly reloaded in silos with the help of hardware and the logistical support strengthen the state’s ‘first-strike’ capability. The RS-36 category ICBMs possessed by the Russians were capable of rapid silo reloading. In fact, one of the concerns during the Cold War was the “absence of a secure retaliatory US ICBM capability in combination with the existing Soviet ICBM reload capability” that could pose “a serious threat to a stable strategic environment.”4

2 Stephen J. Cimbala and James Scouras, “First-Strike Stability Modelling: The Crazy Mathematics of the Cold War,” in A New Century: Strategic Stability and Arms Control (USA: Praeger Publishers, 2002). 3 “North Korea Passes Law Allowing Nuclear First Strike, Says Programme ‘Irreversible’,” France 24, September 9, 2022 (North Korea Passes Law Allowing Nuclear First Strike, Says Programme ‘Irreversible’ [france24.com]). 4 Edgar Ulsamer and Edgar Ulsamer, “Alarming Soviet Developments,” Air & Space Forces, November 1, 1980 (Alarming Soviet Developments | Air & Space Forces Magazine [airandspaceforces.com]).

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Cold launched ICBMs could make the best option for ‘first strike’ as they would need to “first be ejected from launch cell and then ignited” extending their launch time.5 Those that are silo-based leave more scope for the silos to launch ‘first-strike’ capable missile systems as these silos could be reused after minor repairs. One of the reasons for using silo-based missiles is probably to divert adversaires’ targeting concentration to silos coupled with dummy silos while it prepares itself for counter-strikes with more survivable missile capabilities. Accuracy of missiles further provides an impetus to launch a ‘first strike.’ This accuracy of missiles may not just be confined to ICBM capabilities, but could take place in all range specifications of missile systems. For instance, Chinese DF-41s are very accurate ICBMs in addition to the DF-26 theatre range ballistic missiles which are more accurate than DF-21s.6 Air and missile defence systems near the silos further protect the silo and missiles inside them from being destroyed by enemy attacks. The US and Russian ICBMs are always on high alert and hence, make the best choice for first strike. The control and communication issues in ICBMs as opposed to in SLBMs are less complex as SLBMs are far away into the sea on patrol to maintain their continuous at-sea deterrence. Hence, ICBMs become a better choice for first strike where control issues need to be less complex. However, what makes ICBMs complex in the nuclear deterrence game is the fact that these missiles cannot be retargeted or recalled once fired, and if they depend on ‘launch on warning,’ they could make ‘first strike’ complicated in the nuclear deterrence game. Under false alarm, such ICBMs especially the silo-based ones could prove cataclysmic. In case the missiles have poor accuracy like the Polaris ICBMs possessed by the United States during the Cold War, they could become ‘weapons of terror’ as first-strike weapons. Heavier missiles could be used for launching a ‘first strike’ as their mobility could be adversely affected owing to their heavy size. Also missiles that have heavy throw-weight could carry more number of MIRVs in a missile. Liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles could be used to 5 Ryan White, “Cold Launch vs Hot Launch,” Naval Post, January 29, 2020 (Cold Launch vs. Hot Launch - Naval Post - Naval News and Information). 6 Fiona S. Cunningham, “The Unknowns About China’s Nuclear Modernization Program,” Arms Control Association, June 2023 (The Unknowns About China’s Nuclear Modernization Program | Arms Control Association).

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launch first strike as their launch preparation time is more compared to solid-fuelled ballistic missiles. Use of cryogenic oxidisers, for example, as used in the Soviet SS-8 ICBM during the Cold War, permitted the missile to be held in a state of readiness for only one hour or so and hence, was best suited for first strike. Long range ALCMs and Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) could also be first-strike weapons with stand-off capability. While such capabilities would offer ‘first-strike’ missile capability, whether conventional or nuclear, they would also reduce the dangers to the lives of pilots considerably. The concept of ‘first strike’ or pre-emption even with conventional weapons holds distinct relevance as a conventional weapon could invite an all-out nuclear war from adversary, or could be able to destroy nuclear arsenal or facilities hosting nuclear assets: both nuclear weapons and nuclear energy assets. Possessing a sophisticated air and missile defence system could increase the incentive for a state to launch a ‘first strike’ if the state is assured that an adversary’s residual retaliatory capability could be negated by its own air and missile defence system. However, for such assurance, it is important that the state possesses both air and missile defence capability and not just one of them. Both the air and missile defence system would need to be holistic and robust. This situation can be referred to as ‘conditional survivability.’ Inversely, air and missile defence system could also result in the decrease in incentive of the state to strike first when the state is confident that it has a ‘defence by denial’ capability to intercept adversaries’ incoming first-strike capabilities. A robust air and missile defence capability enhances the survivability options of the state’s missile forces: both conventional and WMD capable. In the nuclear dynamics, states could choose to adopt ‘launch under attack’ (LUA) which means nuclear missiles would be launched only when adversary has launched their nuclear weapons. Russia, for instance, claims that it would only launch a nuclear attack in response to an incoming missile attack and that “aggressor should know that retaliation is inevitable.”7 States that choose launch on warning (LOW) should be able to calculate the risks of LOW. If LOW proves failure, that is, if missiles are 7 “Putin Says Russia Would Only Use Its Nuclear Weapons in Retaliation,” PBS News, October 18, 2018 (https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/putin-says-russia-would-onlyuse-its-nuclear-weapons-in-retaliation).

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launched based on false information, then the nuclear missile should be capable of de-targeting to prevent crisis escalation. To prevent false information, the state must have a robust command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Also, it could be assumed that LUA and LOW can be the option when a state doubts the survivability options of its nuclear forces. Nevertheless, first strike, LUA and LOW are different kinds of ‘first-use’ doctrine. Dual-capable missiles with LUA and LOW roles complicate strategic stability. LOW and LUA are extremely dangerous postures that require immense training and alertness. The Norwegian missile crisis is an example of how a false alarm almost got the Russians to launching their nuclear weapons.8 In 1994, Norwegian scientists from Andoya Rocket Range in collaboration with the United States were to launch a four-stage scientific rocket, complete with NASA-tested, military grade boosters, to study the Northern Lights. This rocket was roughly the same size as the American Trident missile which raised alarm in Russia and almost resulted in the launch of a nuclear weapon by Russia.9 Cold War literature suggests that MIRVs have always been first-strike weapons.10 MIRVs ensure that states have more number of ballistic missiles in their arsenal for a second strike as with MIRVs only a few number of ballistic missiles would be needed to launch a first strike against adversary. For instance, during the Cold War, a single MIRV-ed Soviet SS-9 missile could threaten three Minuteman missile silos of the United States while it would have required three SS-9 un-MIRV-ed missiles to otherwise destroy three Minuteman silos.11 In fact, when issues were raised to ban MIRVs in the 1960s, Henry Kissinger raised concerns that if MIRVs were banned, the number of nuclear weapons available for attacking Soviet Union is cut back sharply from 8,000 to 4,000, that 8 “Nuclear Close Calls: The Norwegian Rocket Incident,” Atomic Heritage Foundation, June 15, 2018 (https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/nuclear-close-calls-norweg ian-rocket-incident). 9 “Nuclear Close Calls: The Norwegian Rocket Incident,” Atomic Heritage Foundation, June 15, 2018 (https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/nuclear-close-calls-norweg ian-rocket-incident). 10 Debalina Ghoshal, “How Agni-V Induction Will Enhance India’s Nuclear Deterrence,” The Week, August 22, 2018 (https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2018/08/22/ How-Agni-5-induction-will-enhance-India-nuclear-deterrence-china.html). 11 Richard Rhodes, “The Sorcerer’s Apprentices,” in Arsenals of Folly: The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race (USA: Random House, 2007).

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would enable Soviets offensive capability survive US attack.12 The more the re-entry vehicle (RV) carrying capacity of the missile, the more could be the scope of strengthening ‘first-strike’ capability. Possessing a PBV in MIRV-ed missile that could manoeuvre after separation from the final stage and release a re-entry post-every manoeuvre, further complicate the ‘first-strike’ equation with MIRVs. Any state with an assured second-strike capability could adopt a ‘firststrike’ policy should the state possess the capability to launch a first strike. Capability of launching a ‘first strike’ means that the ‘first-strike’ weapons are not intercepted and destroyed by enemy defence by denial systems. On the contrary, if both the adversaries lacked retaliatory capability, both could adopt a first-strike policy in which the state that struck first could be at an advantage. Hypersonic missiles like the scramjet-powered hypersonic cruise missiles and the HGVs that are mounted atop ballistic missiles to evade missile defence system complicate ‘first-strike’ stability with their ability to dodge enemy missile defence systems at hypersonic speeds. This can be a complex issue if the HGVs are launched from flattened or depressed trajectory.13 Further, the ability of HGVs to manoeuvre could make ‘firststrike’ stability more complex. For example, the Russian Avangard on the SS-19 ballistic missiles could not only manoeuvre but also carry countermeasured against missile defence systems. They are also nuclear capable.14 In addition, the combination of an HGV with FOBS as reportedly developed by China makes ‘first-strike’ stability more cumbersome. One of the military operations of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is to engage in ‘theatre strike’ which also calls for the disabling and destruction of US forward deployed military assets.15 ‘First-strike’ capability which includes both nuclear and conventional could enable China to pursue its strategy

12 Henry Kissinger raises this concern in the Analysis of Strategic Arms Limitation Proposals, Memorandum for the President, May 23, 1969 (https://www.cia.gov/library/ readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-484-15-1-7.pdf). 13 “Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons,” Federation of American

Scientists, November 14, 2022 (https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11459.pdf). 14 “Defense Primer: Hypersonic Boost-Glide Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists, November 14, 2022 (https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11459.pdf). 15 See Sam Goldsmith, “U.S. Conventional Access Strategy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 72, No. 2, Spring 2019 (U.S. Conventional Access Strategy: Denying China a Conventional First-Strike Capability [usnwc.edu]).

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effectively. Manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles (MaRVs) and sub-munitions on ballistic missiles make conventional ‘first strike’ with missile systems also cataclysmic. States whether resorting to ‘first-strike,’ ‘first-use’ or no-first use doctrine have one common objective and that it to ensure state survivability. They would adopt doctrines, strategies and postures to strengthen survivbility. States that adopt ‘no-first use’ policy automatically follow defensive realism. Even as they develop offensive capabilities like MIRVs, MaRVs, hypersonic systems, they still follow ‘defensive realism’ since these systems ensure they have a credible counter-strike capability enabling them to strengthen their ‘no-first use’ doctrine. On the other hand, states that adopt first-strike, first-use, pre-emptive, preventive doctrines, automatically follow offensive realism. Even if they develop missile and air defence capabilities for defence by denial purpose, they are still believed to follow offensive realism as they use their air and missile defence capabilities to prevent enemy residual retaliatory strike capabilities from targeting them.

Counter-Strike/Second-Strike Capability and Role of Missiles As states exist in an anarchic world, neo-realists like Waltz assume that possessing second-strike capability is an assured means of survival for states.16 It is also the best means of self-help since the common adage goes, “god helps those who help themselves” and a state with a secure second-strike or a counter-strike capability could avert a nuclear war or even a cataclysmic conventional attack on its WMD assets or conventional assets. States also avert a situation of nuclear blackmail by stronger nuclear power states. States could resort to a counter-strike option in which states decide not to launch nuclear weapons first, survive the enemy first strike and launch the nuclear attack or launch the nuclear attack while detecting or intercepting enemy nuclear attack. States like India and China have such

16 Shibley Telhami, “An Essay on Neorealism and Foreign Policy,” in ed., A. Hanami, Perspectives on Structural Realism (USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 105–118.

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strike options. States with first-strike policy would focus towards strengthening their second-strike capability to launch counter-retaliation. Firststrike capability without a second-strike capability can be a dangerous scenario and lowers the nuclear threshold making the state with ‘firststrike’ capabilities vulnerable. In a multipolar world, where states possess credible delivery systems that are survivable, possessing a decapitating ‘first-strike’ capability could be a herculean task. Hence, ‘second-strike’ capability has to be complemented with the ‘first-strike’ capabilities. In fact, ‘counter-strike’ capabilities complemented with ‘second-strike’ capabilities strengthen deterrence. The concept of counter-strike and second strike is carried out efficiently with a credible air and missile defence capability. It strengthens not just the state’s first-strike capability but also its second-strike capability by denying the adversary the combat advantage of launching its weapons first. The concept of counter-strike is only possible when forces survive enemy’s first strike. Even conventionally armed states like Japan is aiming to build counter-strike capabilities owing to its vulnerability to missile attacks from adversaries and its own limitations in missile defence systems to counter these missile threats.17 States work towards solid propulsion technology in ballistic missiles, SLBM capabilities to strengthen their counter-strike or second-strike capability. While land-based ballistic missiles form best modes for ‘firststrike’ option, road and rail mobile missiles that enhance the survivability options for these missiles could be best suited as a ‘second-strike’ weapon. Canister-launched missiles further strengthen survivability of the missiles and hence, could be best suited for counter-strike or ‘second strike.’ However, SLBMs strengthen survivability options as they are launched from SSBNs that could stay submerged in sea for months. Though they work best to suit a state’s second-strike and counter-strike policies, they could also be a weapon of choice for nuclear weapon states (NWS) like France and Britain which do not adopt a ‘no-first use’ policy. All these sea-based assets enable France and Britain to maintain a ‘continuous at-sea deterrence’ posture. This posture strengthens both the state’s first-strike capability and second-strike capability.

17 Mari Yamaguchi, “Why Japan Is Boosting Its Arms Budget and Counterstrike Capability,” PBS News Hour, December 17, 2022 (Why Japan Is Boosting Its Arms Budget and ‘Counterstrike Capability’ | PBS NewsHour).

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A credible SSBN force in addition to SSN force strengthens a state’s counter-strike and ‘second-strike’ capability. However, a strengthened ‘second-strike’ capability could lure a state to resort to ‘first-strike’ missions. Despite ICBM capabilities, North Korea is working on nuclearpowered submarines and plans to convert existing submarines into nuclear-armed attack submarines.18 In fact, the North Korean submarines at the moment are not much survivable as compared to their robust land-based missile capabilities19 and hence, could act as ‘first-strike’ weapons delivery platform while the land-based missiles could become ‘second-strike’ weapons. The submarines may carry SLCMs that could be launched for ‘pre-emption’ or ‘prevention.’

Making a Nuclear Missile Force Survivable While there several technological means to make a missile force survivable, let us first discuss doctrinal and postural means by which missile forces can be made survivable. Adopting a ‘no-first use’ nuclear doctrine is one of the best ways to make missile forces of nuclear weapon states (NWS) and nuclear weapon powers survivable against enemy attack. Of course, the same logic may not apply to conventional weapons as states with sophisticated conventional weapons can use them to strike enemy missile forces. However, let us first discuss the aspect of ‘no-first use’ and its role in strengthening survivability of missile forces. ‘No-first use’ increases the nuclear threshold, thereby strengthening deterrence and lowering the scope of a nuclear war. When states adopt a ‘first-strike’ or even a ‘firstuse’ doctrine, the nuclear threshold is lowered, and hence, both nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence are weakened. The chances of a pre-emptive first strike are a possibility risking the survivability options of the missile forces. Even if states are deterred from attacking each other in fear that there would be massive or assured retaliation from the adversary, such credibility in deterrence can only be assured when 18 “N Korea Heralds ‘New Chapter’ with ‘Tactical Nuclear Attack’ Submarine,” Al Jazeera, September 8, 2023 (N Korea Heralds ‘New Chapter’ with ‘Tactical Nuclear Attack’ Submarine | Weapons News | Al Jazeera). 19 See “North Korea Unveils First Tactical, Nuclear-Armed Submarine,” Business Today, September 8, 2023 (North Korea Unveils First Tactical, Nuclear-Armed Submarine – Business Today).

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states’ nuclear forces are constantly on alert, and constantly on a ready deterrence posture, putting immense pressure on command and control. Use of conventional weapons by adversaries on state’s nuclear missile forces to destroy and defeat them could result in the state resorting to nuclear weapons and attacking the adversary with its second-strike capability as a launch of conventional weapons on its nuclear force could be considered to be ‘first-use’ or ‘first-strike,’ and even with a ‘no-first use’ doctrine, states could resort to nuclear counter-strike on its adversaries. States with supersonic and hypersonic nuclear capable missiles could become the first party to launch a ‘first strike’ on adversary even with a ‘no-first use’ doctrine depending on the ability of the adversary to intercept incoming missiles and depending on LUA or LOW capability of the state and its own ability to intercept missiles of adversaries. In terms of postural aspects, states that keep their nuclear forces in a recessed deterrence posture rather than on a ready deterrence posture and keep the warheads de-mated from their delivery systems enhance the strategic stability and nuclear threshold, thereby resulting in the survivability of the missile forces. Both India20 and Pakistan21 keep their nuclear missile forces in a de-mated and de-alerted state, and hence, despite India adopting a ‘no-first use’ doctrine and Pakistan believed to have adopted a ‘first-use’ doctrine, the nuclear threshold is still high in South Asia leading to survivability of the two states’ nuclear forces which include missiles as the backbone of nuclear deterrence. From technological aspects, road and rail mobile missiles provide the best mode of survivability of missile forces. Nuclear propelled submarines or ship submersible ballistic nuclear (SSBNs) fitted with nuclear capable SLBMs or even conventionally capable SLBMs and guided missile submarines (SSGNs) fitted with SLCMs provide the best mode of survivability as they can operate underwater for longer period with limited chances of detection. Conventionally powered submarines with technological sophistication like being powered with air independent propulsion

20 Debalina Ghoshal, “India Pursues Status as Global Nuclear Power,” Yale Global Online, February 1, 2018 (https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/india-pursues-status-glo bal-nuclear-power). 21 Debalina Ghoshal, “Bilateral No-First Use Treaty Between India and Pakistan?,” South Asian Voices, February 11, 2016 (https://southasianvoices.org/bilateral-no-firstuse-treaty-between-india-and-pakistan/).

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(AIP) system to increase underwater endurance and carrying nuclear capable missiles become a survivable retaliatory asset. However, with adversaries developing anti-submarine warfare capabilities, it is important that states develop longer range SLBMs and SLCMs to keep the submarines away from the points of vulnerability. Keeping the SSBNs close to the port will also increase the vulnerability. Doublehulled submarines can sustain greater damages and have greater chances of survivability like the INS Arihant SSBN for the Indian Navy.22 Again nuclear retaliatory capabilities would need to be well supported by conventional capabilities which need not necessarily be missiles. When the Soviet Union fielded missiles like the R-12 and R-14 in Cuba, they were well protected by four motorised regiments, two tank battalions, MiG-21 fighter wing, anti-aircraft gun batteries and twelve SA-2 surfaceto-air missiles.23 Damage expectancy for survivability of an adversary’s missiles forces is important. If an adversary possessed four hundred ballistic missiles and the state was capable of destroying one hundred of them in the first strike, the damage expectancy is 100/400 = 0.25.24 States must adopt effective military war-fighting strategy to make a nuclear war tilt in its favour. States must work on improvising their missile capabilities to help increase the damage expectancy scope, for instance by MIRV-ing and MaRV-ing ballistic missiles or using high speed cruise missiles. Air and missile defence systems of an adversary aids in adversary being able to reduce the damage expectancy. Concealment forms an integral part of survivability of the missile forces. North Korea follows a policy of camouflage, concealment and

22 Yusuf T. Unjhawala, “Deep Diving into Facts About INS Arihant ‘Accident’,” The Economic Times, January 12, 2018 (https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/def ence/deep-diving-into-the-facts-about-ins-arihant-accident/articleshow/62468708.cms? from=mdr). 23 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, “I Think We Will Win This Operation,” in Khrushchev’s Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (USA: W. W. Norton, 2006). 24 Damage expectancy is the percentage of target set that a state can destroy after absorbing the adversary’s first-strike. Other probabilities include: (1) pre-launch survivability, (2) that a weapon does not fail for mechanical or other internal reasons, (3) probability of penetration, (4) probability of kill.

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deception at all levels of their WMD and ballistic missile program.25 In 2018, there were reports that while North Korea agreed on dismantling a major missile launching site, it improvised dozen other missile launching sites that “would bolster launches of conventional and nuclear warheads.”26 Pyongyang also reportedly indulged in production of nuclear weapons and missiles in 2018 which could be placed on mobile launchers and hidden in mountains at secret bases.27 China, for instance, developed hard and deeply buried tunnels to conceal its nuclear missile forces. Dummy silos also become a crucial component of concealment of nuclear forces. While use of chaffs or decoys in cruise missiles could increase its scope of survival, concealment will always remain its main layer of defence.28 Tactical ballistic missiles on MLRS like Pakistan’s Nasr are capable of ‘shoot and scoot’ tactics, and hence, their scopes for survivability increase.29 During warfare, MLRS can also be kept in defilade30 mode to enhance survivability. Wide spread dispersion of MLRS can also enhance the survivability of tactical ballistic missiles on MLRS. Survivability is enhanced by “rapid transmission rate of digital message traffic, secure voice communications, quick emplacement and displacement.”31 Positioning the MLRS forward and inter-mixing them with other fire

25 Elias Groll, “Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception,” Foreign Policy, November 13, 2018 (‘Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception’ – Foreign Policy). 26 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “In North Korea, Missile Bases Suggest a Great Deception,” The New York Times, November 12, 2018 (In North Korea, Missile Bases Suggest a Great Deception - The New York Times [nytimes.com]). 27 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “In North Korea, Missile Bases Suggest a Great Deception,” The New York Times, November 12, 2018 (In North Korea, Missile Bases Suggest a Great Deception - The New York Times [nytimes.com]). 28 “Land Attack Cruise Missile,” Federation of American Scientists (Land Attack Cruise Missiles – Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat – National Air Intelligence Center NAIC1031-0985-98 [fas.org]). 29 Shoot and scoot tactics is an added advantage of self-propelled artillery systems among which MLRS are one. This is done by shooting and then immediately displacing to alternate fire position so that the enemy is not able to trace the location from where the firing was exactly done. 30 Shield from enemy fire or observation by use of natural or artificial obstacles, usually with the purpose of engaging an enemy in the flank, defilade. 31 “Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Multi Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) Operations,” U.S. Marine Corps, April 23, 1996.

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support systems and manoeuvre units in the manoeuvre brigade sector could degrade the enemy’s ability to track MLRS locations and their operations.32 Bombers and fighter jets with counter-measures against enemy air defence systems could enhance survivability options for ALCMs. Similarly, long range ALCMs can increase the survivability options for bombers and fighter jets by being launched from a stand-off range. Dispersal is also integral to survivability of missile forces. Road and rail mobile missiles have the ability to be dispersed, and hence, tracking and destroying them is difficult. Even if there is intelligence available about the location of the missile system, by the time the adversary could target the missile at the location where it was tracked, the state could possibly alter the location of the missile forces. For example, Russian ICBMs like the SS-25 and SS-27 are always on patrol making it difficult for adversaries to locate and destroy it.33 A RAND report states about Chinese road mobile missiles, “any US operational concept that seeks to rapidly attack and kill the Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL)34 must be able to reliably discriminate TELs and their support vehicles.”35 Again, if missile silos are dispersed in various regions in a state, then the scope for survival of the silo-based missiles enhances. Counter-measures on ballistic missiles are another mode of post-launch survivability of the missile forces. This is crucial to deterrence as simply surviving adversary first strike or counter-strike is not enough. The missile force to launch retaliation or counter-retaliation must have the ability to cause cataclysmic result to the enemy and that could be made possible when the missile can evade missile defence systems of adversaries. Counter-measures on ballistic missiles make the missile systems less vulnerable to enemy defences. Decoys which include “anti-simulation balloon decoys” if using nuclear weapons and chaffs and also use of plasma weapons are such examples which can enable the missile to avoid interception. These balloons could be placed in aluminised mylar and could be released with similar 32 Ibid. 33 David J. Elkind, “American Nuclear Primacy: The End of MAD or a New START?,”

Centre for Strategic and International Studies, May 22, 2012. 34 The missile carried by TEL for greater mobility. 35 “New Concepts for Defeating Mobile Missiles,” RAND (http://www.rand.org/con

tent/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1398/MR1398.ch4.pdf).

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but empty balloons to create confusion in the adversary’s mind. Use of biological and chemical sub-munitions on the ballistic missiles reduces the radar cross signature (RCS) and hence, makes them difficult to be tracked and intercepted due to their small size. Ballistic missiles could have separated RVs and spin-stabilised RVs which could further make interception difficult. Other counter-measures on ballistic missiles which can make interception difficult are radar absorbing material, booster fragmentation, low proof jammers, stealth technology and also swarm missile attacks.36 Infra-red jammers could increase the sensor noise levels while stealth technology can reduce target radar cross section.37 Hence, these counter-measures could either just simply overwhelm the missile defence or it could reduce the interceptor’s single shot kill probability (SSKP). If warheads are cooled, their extra-atmospheric interceptor SSPKs is reduced since the hit-to-kill IR seekers cannot lock onto the target since these warheads heat up upon their re-entry.38 Ballistic missiles which are MARV-ed also have the capability of evading ballistic missile defence. Guidance systems on these MARV-ed missiles can further enhance their lethality due to their pinpoint accuracies. These missiles could wreath huge destruction even with conventional warheads. China for instance is trying to negate the US ballistic missile defence system by developing MARVs on its DF-31 ICBMs. Control fins of the ballistic missile can be used for terminal manoeuvring of the RV. The Russian SS-N-30 Bulava SLBM is capable of terminal stage manoeuvring to evade enemy missile defence system. On the other hand, missiles can also be made to have an accelerated ascent in the boost phase to avoid interception as seen in the case of the Bulava.39 ICBMs like Russian Sarmat have shorter than usual boost phase reducing the scope for US missile defence system to intercept it at boost

36 “The Changing Nature of Ballistic Missile Defense,” A Centre for Technology and National Security Policy Event Summary, Updated August 12, 2009 and accessed on February 14, 2014. 37 Dean A. Wilkening, “A Simple Model for Calculating Ballistic Missile Defense Effectiveness,” Science and Global Security, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1999. 38 Ibid. 39 “SS-N-30 Bulava,” Missile Defence Advocacy Agency (https://missiledefenseadvocacy.

org/missile-threat-and-proliferation/missile-proliferation/russia/ss-n-30-bulava/).

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phase.40 In fact, though boost phase interception of ballistic missiles is the ideal phase for interception as the missile system is most vulnerable then with minimal counter-measures, the American Physical Society does list some of the counter-measures that could make a boost phase interception slightly complex—launching on dummy missiles, manoeuvring at boost phase, rotation, ablative coatings and like already mentioned phase shortening.41 A ballistic missile can be cold launched which further enhances its ability to be un-intercepted. This is done by keeping the nuclear warhead covered in a shroud cooled to a very low temperature by liquid nitrogen which would reduce the infra-red radiation emitted by the warhead “by a factor of at least one million.”42 Missiles can be made to travel in depressed trajectory like the DF-31s of China or can be made to travel in a lofted trajectory. This also makes interception difficult.

Case Study: China One example of how a state develops doctrines and postures to assure survivability and ensures that the doctrine and posture complement each other can be fathomed with the case study of China. Over the years, with a ‘no-first use’ or ‘houfa zhiren’ doctrine, China has worked hard on enhancing survivability options of its nuclear missile forces (yanmi fanghu) to strengthen its counter-strike capability (zhongdian fanji). Under ‘houfa zhiren’ principle, China would strike only after enemy has struck.43 Such

40 Mathew Gault, “Russia’s New Nuclear Missiles Squeeze Response Times,” Scientific American, March 27, 2019 (https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/russias-new-nuc lear-missiles-squeeze-response-time/). 41 “Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System,” Union of Concerned Scientists, April 2000 (http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/missile_defense/tec hnical_issues/countermeasures-a-technical.html). 42 “Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System,” Union of Concerned Scientists, April 2000 (http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/missile_defense/tec hnical_issues/countermeasures-a-technical.html). 43 Forest E. Morgan, Karl P. Mueller, et al., “China’s Thinking on Escalation: Evidence from Chinese Military Writings,” in Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (USA: RAND, 2008).

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ability to retaliate against enemy ‘key points’ help China build on what they term as ‘counter-nuclear deterrence’ capability (fan heweishe).44 Replacing liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles with solid propelled, namely the DF-21 category missile systems, has been an integral component of survivability of nuclear forces. Road mobile ICBMs like the DF-31 and DF-31A add to Chinese nuclear deterrence prowess. The DF-5 and DF5As are surrounded by many bogus silos to confuse enemies about the real location of the missile silo. This confusion increases survivability options of the missile system.45 China’s sea-based deterrence, that is, nuclear capable SLBMs on SSBNs, is another mode of survivability of its missile forces. Concealment, obscurity regarding its missile and nuclear forces and demated warheads from missiles are other modes of survivability options for Chinese missile forces. Counter-measures on ballistic missiles, development of Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs) and cruise missiles that have the capability of staying un-intercepted ensure survivability of missiles post-launch against missile defence system. Hard and deeply buried targets hidden inside underground wall where missile forces are hidden ensure survivability.46

Conclusion A survivable missile force actually increases the state’s power and prestige in the international forum giving them a bargaining chip for coercive diplomacy. A state that does not possess survivable missile forces could lessen its scope for coercive diplomacy opening doors for blackmailing. Considering that the global order is anarchical, peace is a responsibility of states itself. Survivable missile forces reduce the dilemma of ‘use them or lose them,’ thereby ensuring that peace and stability are maintained.

44 Ibid. 45 Lyle Goldstein and Andrew Erickson, “China’s Nuclear Force Modernisation,” Naval

War College Newport Papers, No. 22, 2005 (https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/vie wcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=newport-papers). 46 “China Has ‘Underground Steel Great Wall” to Protect Nuclear Weapons from Potential Nuclear Attacks,” The Economic Times, January 14, 2019 (https://econom ictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-has-underground-steel-great-wall-to-protectnuclear-weapons-from-potential-attacks/articleshow/67529143.cms?from=mdr).

CHAPTER 7

Can the World Do Without Missiles?

The relevance of ballistic and cruise missiles to strengthen combat capabilities, deterrence posture, enabling states to pursue independent foreign policy and decision making, create psychological and terror factor, increase status and prestige is well fathomed. Hence, given the myriad advantages missiles provide a state with, should states give up on missile capabilities? The decision of disarmament of missile capabilities or even arms control of missile technologies depend on the national interests of the state as also on its regional goals and global objectives. Depending on the state’s desires and political and strategic needs, a state may choose to keep arming itself, or resort to arms control or pursue complete disarmament of missile systems. ‘Security dilemma’ and ‘selfhelp’ system in an anarchic world order and the quest for a state’s own survival will always remain crucial decisive factors to progress with missile development program for capability build-up.. It is in this context that the chapter describes the nuances and advantages of both complete disarmament, arms control and also discusses why states could choose to armament or restrict itself from any arms control or disarmament regime.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Ghoshal, Role Of Ballistic And Cruise Missiles In International Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48063-8_7

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Complete Disarmament Structural realists may not be in favour of complete disarmament of missile systems that form integral component of conventional capabilities as well as WMD capabilities. Experts like Waltz have also argued in favour of proliferation to strengthen security. On the other hand, the author believes that idealists who would voice their support for complete disarmament would do it as a result of ‘security dilemma.’ This dilemma could be of different concern. For instance, idealists could be concerned of an irrational launch of nuclear weapons from the state’s side that could result in counter-nuclear attack from adversaries or they could be worried about states focusing on lethal missile capabilities that could worsen ‘security dilemma.’ They could concerned about a conventional missile attack that could invite a WMD response from adversary. Hence, complete disarmament could become a solution to negate these security dilemma concerns. Those that argue in favour of banning tactical nuclear capable ballistic missiles could argue on grounds of such missiles being launched by battlefield commanders. Some could argue that such weapon systems could negatively interfere with state’s existing security and nuclear doctrines, thereby creating a strange kind of ‘security dilemma’ existing within its own security paradigm. Again idealists who would support complete disarmament support the notion to maintain a ‘balance of power’ in a region and also for the scope of survival of states that could be otherwise have its population being targeted and its vital assets beings destroyed due to missile attacks, especially with WMD or lethal conventional warheads. Complete disarmament of missile systems is referred to as complete physical destruction of the missile system. Complete disarmament is a decision that states would make when they do not wish to pose a threat to any other state, or they do not view that any state poses a threat to them, thus strengthening the argument of ‘security dilemma.’ States could also give up on their missile arsenal when they are coerced to do so by more powerful states, but this coercion could only work to an extent and depend on what characteristics the state possesses—revisionist or status quo. Complexities are greater in case of revisionist states as they would not wish to give up on their missile capabilities as seen in the case of Iran and North Korea. Post-Cold War and disintegration of Soviet Union, Soviet satellite states that had stationed Soviet missiles and nuclear warheads gave up

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their missile and nuclear arsenal and they were transferred to Russia under Nunn Lugar Agreement. States like Ukraine received immense assistance to dismantle ICBMs and ICBM silos of the Soviet Union under US funded Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. ICBMs were either dismantled or transferred to Russia.1 However, owing to the Russian military aggression in Ukraine, in the recent past, Ukraine is receiving missile capabilities from the West to counter Russian military aggression. While South Africa gave up its missile program on grounds that it faced no such severe threats, Libya renounced the same as it was apprehensive of a possible US invasion of Libya on grounds of destroying WMD program as was the case of Iraq. Sanctions against Libya also worked as due to sanctions imposed on Libya, its oil exports had reduced.2 Such sanctions failed to eliminate missiles from Iran and North Korean arsenals. Hence, while it was the ‘security dilemma’ of Libya that the state should not face similar invasion like Iraq that led to disarmament of missile systems, it was also the quest for survival, economic survival, without which Libya’s overall growth and development would have been jeopardised that led to Tripoli agreeing for disarmament of missile systems. While the Scud-Cs were transferred by Libya, the United States and United Kingdom did allow Libya to retain a humble number of ScudB systems after modification to comply with Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Those missile systems that do not comply with the MTCR guidelines were eliminated.3 Iraq, on the other hand, was coerced to destroy its missile forces after US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Iraq joined the MTCR and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Iraq did not show any keenness to reconstitute a missile development program at present.4 Argentina also received US pressure owing to which it gave up its Condor missile program; however, Argentina is eyeing India’s BrahMos cruise missiles recently. 1 “Nuclear Disarmament: Ukraine,” NTI , January 7, 2019 (https://www.nti.org/ana lysis/articles/ukraine-nuclear-disarmament/). 2 “Libya,” NTI , Updated January 2015 (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/libya/ nuclear/). 3 Paul Kerr, “Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force,” Arms Control Association, 2004–2005 (https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004-05/press-releases/libya-keeplimited-missile-force). 4 “Iraq,” NTI (https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iraq/).

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While for some states coercion, fear of being invaded by a powerful state, sanctions and the reduction in threats can encourage them to disarm their missile forces, some states decide not to let these factors interfere with their missile development program. This difference in behaviour and attitude is only because the world is anarchical and how states react to coercion is difficult to judge as they are reliant on their ‘security dilemma.’ Though a world free of missiles could make the world safer as not just conventional weapons but even nuclear weapons could lack credible delivery platforms, it would not leave the world order void of conflicts and wars. Conflict would exist and deadly weapons would find other mechanisms to be delivered. Moreover, states that have disarmed missile systems will always possess the technological know-how to do so or acquire the same from another friendly country. They could hence be in a virtual state of possessing missile systems creating further regional and sometimes global instability since due to security dilemma, its adversaries in the region could be apprehensive of a missile attack by a possible program of re-arming itself. Again, those states that pursue space program and possess credible space capability are believed to have the capability to develop ballistic missiles. Prohibiting Satellite Launch Vehicles (SLV) launches that could be used to develop ballistic missiles could be cumbersome process as states have the sovereign right to pursue space program for civilian benefits. For instance, Japan has been actively working on space-based activities and it has developed SLVs that could be diverted in future to develop ballistic missiles. States may agree for partial disarmament of missile capabilties. For instance, Saudi Arabia received modified DF-21 missile systems from China that are otherwise nuclear capable missiles for delivering conventional warheads. A ban on TNWs, battlefield weapons that lower the nuclear threshold, could lead a state to resort to partial disarmament. Thus, while states could possess SRBMs or MLRS that are capable of launching TNWs, they could prohibit themselves from developing battlefield range nuclear weapons. While technology control regimes like the MTCR can lead to disarming of long range missile systems that are nuclear capable, states still have the option of developing short range missiles of range 300 km and payload less than 500 kgs. States have the scope under MTCR to import missiles that are beyond the range of 300 kms and below 500 kg payload. In the longer run, states could receive missile capabilities to develop

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longer range missiles either by permission or clandestinely. States like South Korea, was barred from developing long range missiles. However, owing to ‘security dilemma’ because of North Korean missile threats, the United States allowed South Korea to develop missiles of longer ranges. States could also reverse engineer surface-to-air missiles and develop ballistic missiles. Moreover, HCoC and MTCR do not deal with cruise missiles leaving greater scopes for states to pursue cruise missile programs with supersonic and hypersonic speeds that could jeopardise strategic stability. ‘Defence by denial’ weapon systems that could intercept offensive missile capabilities could limit the scope for states to pursue an offensive technology. While there are no technology denial regimes to ban MIRVs, a sophisticated layered missile defence with multiple kill vehicles and multiple object kill vehicles that would destroy MRVs and MIRVs, respectively, could devalue the deterrent value of MIRVs and result in complete banning of the system. States could realise that the technology and cost of developing the same would not hold relevance as they could have scopes of being defeated. However, it could lead states to develop other offensive capabilities also that would be resilient to defensive mechanisms. These offence-defence imbalances would take place due to state’s ‘security dilemma’ of maintaining their offence advantage against adversary’s defence. If a ballistic missile free world exists, those pursuing nuclear weapons capability and also pursuing deterrence through conventional means could resort to bombers and fighter jets, and artillery systems for delivering nuclear and conventional weapons. Though bombers and fighter jets dramatically increase the decision-making time and thereby enhancing crisis stability,5 their chances of survivability are reduced without standoff capability. This stand-off capability is stregthened through air launched ballistic and cruise missiles. If states possess nuclear weapons and lack of SLBMs or mobile ballistic missiles, it could lead states to resort to pre-emptive strike, thereby limiting the scope of adopting a ‘global no-first use’ policy especially as the world is anarchical. States adopting ‘no-first use’ doctrine could find it difficult to resort to only bombers as a sole delivery system rather than 5 J. Jerome Holton, Lora Lumpe and Jeremy Stone, “Proposal for a Zero Ballistic Missile Program,” Federation of American Scientists (http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/ articles/zerobal93.htm).

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focusing their nuclear deterrence on land-based and sea-based missiles. States seeking minimalism in nuclear deterrence focus on credibility of their nuclear forces like China and India. Such states do not lay stress on quantitative nuclear forces development, but instead focus on qualitative nuclear forces development. States which rely on a strategy of MAD would also find it cumbersome to resort to bombers or fighter jets as a sole deterrent capability due to survivability factors. Also, states with weaker air power capability will find it difficult to eliminate missiles as they form a weapon for deep strike capability. This holds true not just for states possessing nuclear weapons but also conventional weapons as missiles strengthen conventional deterrence too. When, in 1983, the United States decided to eliminate strategic ballistic missiles, the NATO criticised the decision calling the move to be “utopian” and also raised concerns that eliminating ballistic missiles would seriously undermine the NATO’s conventional forces vis-à-vis Warsaw Pact’s conventional forces. States with weak artillery may depend on short range missile systems mounted on their MLRS for a credible ‘shoot and scoot’ capability. Complete disarmament of missile systems would attach with them the complexities of verification. Improved mode of survivability of missile forces and capability to store them in hard and deeply buried tunnels, not mating warheads with missile systems, could put more stress on the verification processes.

Arms Control Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty were a part of arms control regimes between the United States and erstwhile Soviet Union and now Russia. Arms control refers to “any unilateral or multilateral step taken to reduce or control any aspect of either a weapon system or armed forces. Such reductions or limitations might affect the size, type, configuration, production or performance characteristics of a weapon system, or the size, organisation, equipment, deployment, employment of armed forces.”6 However, states would focus on arms 6 Michael Wheeler, James Smith and Glen Segell, “Perspectives of Arms Control,” INSS Occasional Paper, July 2004 (https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a435093.pdf).

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control regime when they are aware that such measures could strengthen their mode of survival and not undermine the same. While INF treaty earned a lot of praises during the Cold War era, the development of INF systems by states like China, India, Pakistan and West Asian states made it difficult for the United States and Russia to abide by the treaty, and hence, the treaty was called off. Arms control regimes have limitations. States will only enter into arms control negotiations when they have deterrent capability to replace the arms that have been surrendered in the negotiations. While the United States gave up on ground-launched cruise missiles in INF Treaty, it maintained sea-launched cruise missile capability. With the United States pulling out of the INF treaty, it could resort to such systems and could extend such capabilities as a component of nuclear deterrence to its umbrella states like Japan in Asia and even to European countries. Waltz opines that proliferation of missile capabilities would strengthen deterrence in a region. Hence, when deterrence is enhanced, the region ensures strategic stability as there is arms parity between states and their adversaries. Pakistan’s development of TNWs on tactical ballistic missiles is destabilising; however, they compensate for the inferiority in Pakistan’s artillery strength. Hence, it would be difficult to persuade Pakistan to agree to a regional ban on TNWs. Though arms control measures can reduce the quantitative and qualitative advantage of arms build-up of a particular category/categories, they may not necessarily prevent wars from occurring. Also, arms control regimes can result in development of more sophisticated weapon systems. For instance, after the SALT-I, both United States and Soviet Union compensated their warhead numbers by the development of MIRVs.7 The issue of MIRVs made number of warheads in arms control negotiations a complicated process.8 The advent of technologically advanced cruise missiles that had varied ranges, launch platforms 7 Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Austin Long, “The Geopolitical Origins of US Hard Target Kill Counterforce Capabilities and MIRVs,” in ed., Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler and Shane Mason, The Lure and Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to Second Nuclear Age (USA: Stimson, 2016) (https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-att achments/Lure_and_Pitfalls_of_MIRVs.pdf). 8 James A. Lyons, “Transforming America Becomes Disarming America,” The Washington Times, July 29, 2013 (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul29/tra nsforming-america-becomes-diasrming-america/).

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complicated arms control process and required a new framework of arms control mechanism.9 While MIRVs became a major cause of concern in arms control negotiations, these MIRVs acted as catalyst themselves in partial disarmament process. MIRVs could control the escalation of development of ballistic missiles since the number of ballistic missiles needed to cause destruction with MIRVs fitted on them with effective guidance system and trajectory control systems would be lesser than ballistic missiles with unitary warhead. In fact, in the 1960s, the United States Air Force did not support the case for MIRVs since it would have adversely affected their case for a very large force of the Minuteman missiles. In fact, the US Air Force only supported the case of MIRVs when they realised that it was impossible to get more number of Minuteman missiles.10 Again arms control especially for nuclear capable missiles may not be possible owing to inter-service competition and armed forces may refuse to give up on their own share of nuclear war-fighting capability. Targeting strategies of states could restrict the scope of arms control. A state with counter-force or countervailing targeting strategy could require large number of missile forces than the one with counter-value targeting strategy. In addition to limiting missile systems, there also has to be limits on their launching facilities, launchers and alert facilities. For instance, when Kazakhstan disarmed Soviet missile forces, the ICBM silo launchers, launcher control centres and test silos were also destroyed.11 Even for arms control regimes like INF Treaty, the launchers for ground-launched nuclear capable cruise and ballistic missiles were eliminated. In, fact the US Mk.41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) became a major cause of concern for the Russians in the INF Treaty.12 FootNote:

9 Alexander R. Vershbow, “The Cruise Missile: The End of Arms Control,” Foreign Affairs, October 1976 (http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/26612/alexander-r-ver shbow/the-cruise-missile-the-end-of-arms-control). 10 Ten Greenwood, “Innovation,” in Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision

Making (USA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1975). 11 “Kazakhstan Special Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists (https://fas.org/ nuke/guide/kazakhstan/index.html). 12 Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen, “Sunday’s US Missile Launch, Explained,” Federation of American Scientists, August 20, 2019, [https://fas.org/publication/sundays-usmissile-launch-explained/].

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If a state is reliant on nuclear deterrence, missiles must form a credible component of its nuclear deterrence posture. Considering that adversaries could have credible air defence systems, nuclear deterrence that would rely solely on bombers could prove cataclysmic for the state possessing such bomber capabilities. There is not a single state that focuses on nuclear deterrence and stresses on bombers and fighter jets as sole platform for strengthening their nuclear deterrence. Missiles form the backbone for nuclear deterrence for both NWSs and nuclear weapon powers. Missiles are also backbone for deterrence, for conventional deterrence. Missiles strengthen conventional deterrence for NWS and nuclear powers also. For instance, in the light of the US aspiration to acquire CPGS weapon systems that include missile capabilities, Russia also focused on strengthening their missile capabilities that are dual capable.13 Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has made missiles more technologically advanced, and hence, states would not aspire to give up on such advancements that strengthen not only their combat and deterrent prowess but also provide them an impetus to become a global power with status and prestige in the global forum. States would always aspire to enter into the category of elite states possessing technologically advanced missile capabilities.

Role of Missiles in a Post-Covid-19 Global World Security dilemma, the quest for survival, the keenness to display a state’s power and prestige, and strengthening status in the international system lead states to seek for hard power capabilities. Hence, missile capabilities are not confined to developed and developing states, but lesser powers and even asymmetric powers also aspire to possess them. Even amid the pandemic, when there have been debates in favour for states to divert resources to healthcare systems and other non-traditional security threats to global security, states continued to focus on traditional security. States have continued to acquire or develop or test missile capabilities even amid the pandemic. Whether the spread of this pandemic was a spread of a biological warfare or not is a separate topic and beyond the scope of this book. However, the issue brings up a crucial question—what is the role of missiles in post-Covid-19 world? Bioweapons 13 Tytti Erästö, “New Technologies and Nuclear Disarmament,” SIPRI , 2021 (New Technologies and Nuclear Disarmament: Outlining a Way Forward [sipri.org]).

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can be used through human to human contact, thereby escaping the negative international repercussions and also spreading catastrophe in an inexpensive manner. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the Corona Virus epidemic as a pandemic. In addition, the WHO also declared that the pandemic would affect not just public health, but would affect every other sector.14 Even as the world was grappling with this deadly disease, states like North Korea conducted two tests of its SRBMs.15 The pandemic, despite its seriousness, could not eradicate the ‘security dilemma’ that arises in states regarding its adversaries, its existence and survival. The lockdowns in the country forced North Korean labourers from going to work, further causing a slowdown in its economy. North Korea itself faced severe challenges to cope with the pandemic. Owing to the UNSC sanctions prior to the pandemic, its economy had weakened. Nevertheless, Pyongyang conducted the missile tests probably as a message to the international community that it was not weak and fragile. As global concerns about North Korea’s preparedness regarding Covid19 worsened considering that the state had poor healthcare infrastructure, the missile tests were probably a message for the global order that North Korea could fight its own battles even if it was a pandemic. Turkey conducted successful missile test of an anti-ship missile called Atmaca. The missile would strengthen Turkey’s maritime deterrence even as it tussled for regional supremacy amid the pandemic in the Aegean Sea, near Libya and with Saudi Arabia over the Yemeni archipelago of Socotra. Yemen also struggled to cope with the pandemic owing to the war. There was a concern that the pandemic could spread with Yemen having little health and hygiene facilities. However, even as Yemen suffered from one of the worst global humanitarian crises, Houthis in Yemen continued to fire ballistic missiles against Saudi Arabia and UAE with support from Iran.

14 Jamie Ducharme, “World Health Organisation Declares Covid-19 a ‘Pandemic’: Here’s What That Means,” Times, March 11, 2020 (https://time.com/5791661/whocoronavirus-pandemic-declaration/). 15 Kim Tong Hyung, “North Korea Test Fires Two Missiles,” Defense News, March 23, 2020 (https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/03/23/north-koreatest-fires-two-missiles/).

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At the same time, as Iran struggled with its growing Covid-19 cases in the country putting immense pressure on its health care amid the sanctions, it has been accused by the internationally recognised Yemeni government of transferring missiles to Shia Houthis under the disguise of fishing vessels.16 In July 2020, even as Covid-19 cases kept increasing in Azerbaijan, the country threatened to fire missiles at Armenia’s nuclear power plant. Azerbaijan and Armenia have been entangled in conflict for long and amid the pandemic, the conflict on the border only worsened with Azerbaijan threatening missile attack.17 Similarly, as Baltic States also grapple with the Covid-19, Russia in July 2020 deployed Oscar-II class nuclear submarine that can carry long range cruise missile in the Baltic Sea.18 In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine and used missiles against Ukrainian targets. Thus, it is evident that despite Covid-19 and the need to concentrate on non-traditional security, states have been entangled in conflicts and hence, traditional security still remained prevalent. Missiles have become a credible deterrence and combat prowess for states. This is because states are driven by ‘security dilemma.’ While pandemics were a concern, states were willing to overlook their shortcomings and focus on hard power capabilities. In February and March 2021, Pakistan test-fired Ghaznavi19 and Shaheen IA missiles respectively as deterrent against India.20 The same month, North Korea too fired two short range missiles into the Yellow

16 “Yemen Denounces the Transfer of Arms from Iran to Houthi Rebels Through Fishing Boats,” Atalayar, July 7, 2020 (https://atalayar.com/en/content/yemen-denoun ces-transfer-arms-iran-houthi-rebels-through-fishing-boats). 17 “Azerbaijan Threatens Missile Attack on Armenian Nuclear Power Plant,” Azatutyun, July 16, 2020 (https://www.azatutyun.am/a/30731987.html). 18 “Powerful Russian Submarine Seen Entering Baltic Sea,” Missile Defence Advocacy, July 10, 2020 (https://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/missile-defense-news/powerfulrussian-submarine-seen-entering-baltic-sea/). 19 “Pakistan Says Its Successfully Test-Fired Short Range Missile,” Defense News, February 3, 2021 (https://www.defensenews.com/training-sim/2021/02/03/pakistansays-it-successfully-test-fired-short-range-missile/). 20 “Pakistan Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Ballistic Missile Shaheen IA,” India Today, March 26, 2021 (https://www.indiatoday.in/world/pakistan/story/pakistan-test-fires-nuc lear-capable-missile-shaheen-1a-1784072-2021-03-26).

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Sea.21 In May 2021, South Korea was permitted by the United States to develop missile systems of payload and range they could feel would act as a deterrent.22 In April 2021, the Houthis claimed they attacked Saudi oil installation in Aramco and also Patriot anti-missile batteries.23 Missiles post-Covid-19 would continue to be viewed by a state as a tool for prestige and status in the global forum like it did pre-Covid-19. Though states and non-state actors may find smarter means of delivering WMD, ‘security dilemma’ regarding each other’s capabilities could worsen as long as states continue to exist. Their quest for survival will continue even in a post-Covid-19 world order, and this quest would intensify. In a post-Covid-19 world order, states would also aim to possess secure deep strike capabilities against adversaries in response to biological and chemical attacks if proven. ‘Security dilemma’ could worsen among states as states that probably had trusted each other in the past may find it difficult to trust each other in the present scenario. In fact, states like China are using their missile capabilities as a weapon of protest and weapon to display its anger against the world for criticising and holding the state responsible for the spread of the disease. In May 2020, China test-fired its SLBM, the JL-3 with a range of 12,000 kms that could reach the United States.24 The test could have been an answer to the US accusations against China on the Covid-19 spread.

21 “North Korea Fires Two Missiles in First Test Under Biden: US, South,” The Times of India, March 24, 2021 (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/north-koreafired-two-missiles-in-first-test-under-biden-us-south/articleshow/81662967.cms). 22 Frank Smith, “Seoul Courts Risk After ‘No Shackles’ Missile Development Deal,” Al Jazeera, June 18, 2021 (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/6/18/no-limits-southkorea-missiles). 23 “Houthis Say They Attacked Aramco, Patriot Targets in Saudi Arabia,” Al Jazeera, April 15, 2021 (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/15/yemens-houthis-say-att acked-aramco-patriot-targets-in-jazan). 24 Vlad Tverdohleb, “China Fires Its SLBM in New South China Sea Test,” International Business Times, May 13, 2020 (https://www.ibtimes.com/china-fires-its-jl-3-sub marine-launched-ballistic-missile-new-south-china-sea-test-2975240).

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Credible Minimum Deterrence and ‘No-First Use’: The Ideal Answer to Global Stability While states may not resort to any arms control agreement, a credible minimum deterrence posture indirectly leads to controlled development of nuclear arms. Such a posture and doctrine could lead states towards focusing on survivability and increase the nuclear threshold in the region and globally. This could minimise the need to increase nuclear arms and encourage states to keep minimal nuclear weapons as a deterrent capability not meant for war-fighting. Minimalism and no-first use could serve as a motivation for states to move away from the cumbersome task of engaging in arms control agreement and its verification process. It also keeps the option of MAD or assured retaliation available to states without compromising on their minimum capability. Banning of weapon systems of particular category could become dicey. It could be difficult to ban hypersonic systems—whether cruise missiles or HGVs as that would require states to also ban ICBMs since ICBMs too have hypersonic speeds. Thus, a change in posture and doctrine could enable states to ensure ‘peace’ even amid development of lethally advanced weapon systems. This minimalist approach can be applied to missile used for conventional deterrence also as focus would on strengthening survivability of these missile systems and also on counter-measures against defensive mechanisms of adversaries. Steps to Reduce Threat from Missiles Establish peace zones: Those zones which are referred to as a zone of peace should ‘induct only’ and refrain from deploying minimum number of missiles required by them to strengthen deterrence and stability in the region in order to move towards a strong zone of peace. Induction is a peace time process while deployment is done during crises. New missiles with only the number of missiles to be replaced: As is a known fact that ballistic and cruise missiles will become obsolete and will need to be replaced in order to maintain a minimum deterrent level. However, these new missiles deployed should be equal to number of old missiles replaced (though new missiles could be less in number than the number replaced if minimum deterrent level is achieved due to technological sophistication).

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Reduction in defence budget: Reduction in defence budget would make it difficult for states to allocate their budget towards development of missiles in large quantities. De-mated warheads from missiles: Missiles could be kept in knocked-down state or semi-knocked-down state and warheads must be kept de-mated from delivery systems—whether nuclear or unconventional or conventional ones. De-alert and De-target : De-alerting and de-targeting missile systems whether nuclear or even conventional lessen the threat from these missile systems. This is even more crucial when states have dual-capable missile systems.

Conclusion Whether states choose complete disarmament or arms control or choose a credible minimum deterrence posture, the decision would be based upon the logic of state survivability and ‘security dilemma.’ A state that faces threat from its neighbours is least likely to give up on arms build-up despite coercion and sanctions. A state that views missile capability as a currency of power and prestige may not give up on the program even though the need for such systems is minimal. However, for states that follow defensive realism posture and view arms build-up as unwise then states could refrain from developing missile systems. However, states may refuse to join any technology control regimes and follow the path of armament should they aim to maintain parity with their adversaries or at least regional neighbours.

Conclusion

The book has made a humble effort to fathom the myriad features and relevance of ballistic and cruise missiles in international security through a holistic research in each of its chapters. The book has chosen structural realism as the theory to comprehend the nuances and substantiate the arguments. This is because given the focus on hard power, and missiles being a true currency of hard power, this theory was best applied in the comprehension of the issues, advantages and complexities of the weapon system—not just from a technological perspective, but also from security, foreign policy and also arms control and disarmament perspectives. The book infers that states in an anarchical world order would acquire missile capabilities to secure their own ‘security dilemma.’ In addition, since states exist in a self-help system as well as they strive for survival, they would continue to develop missile capabilities—both ballistic and cruise missiles. This could lead not just states to develop missile systems but its adversaries also to maintain parity and keep the offence-offence balance credible for the state as well as its adversaries. Moreover, a credible ‘hard power’ prowess also prevents a state from being a victim of nuclear blackmailing by powerful state even if that includes possession of nuclear weapons in virtual state. All these features of structural realism is even more complicated as the global order becomes multi-polar. Today, missile technology is not just confined to the Cold War super powers, but regional powers have also started to play a big role in missile deterrence. Every state that pursues missile capability seeks power and © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Ghoshal, Role Of Ballistic And Cruise Missiles In International Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48063-8

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aspires only to maximise that power. This aspiration leads to technological advancements in missile capabilities. Powerful states like the United States also seek technology control regimes like the MTCR and the HCoc to prevent states from acquiring power that could directly threaten the hard power prowess of the United States. Structural realism asserts that states will aim to maximise their military might, and since states view international system from materialistic lens, states will acquire most sophisticated missiles and warheads according to their capability. Hence, states enhance their military might by making missile systems capable of evading enemy missile defence systems. States have the desire for exerting military muscle through offensive projection that results in strengthened security in the international system. One of the requirements for combat and deterrence is that such capabilities are accurate enough to be able to act as ‘weapons of terror’ and technological sophistication enables the state to maintain such capabilities. In case of nuclear warheads, based on a state’s nuclear doctrine, nuclear posture and nuclear strategy, states decide whether to mate the warheads or keep them in semi-assembled state or completely assembled state, but these decisions are taken according to a state’s threat perceptions and thereby, the strategies and doctrine and postures are adopted that are best suited for its survival. States need to be prepared with combat capability, and conventional and unconventional payload like biological and chemical warheads is best suited for combat role than nuclear warheads. Also, warheads and missiles with counter-measures will increase survivability options of missile systems and hence, enhance their combat and deterrent value. States will develop missile capabilities to exert coercive diplomacy on other states and adversaries. States could acquire the same to prevent coercion. This would be common phenomenon among states functioning in an anarchic world order. Force projection is also a requirement in an anarchical world, and ballistic and cruise missiles are components of force projection. Missiles also form a crucial component of deterrence and stability—deterrence and stability are very crucial as the world is anarchical and instability and lack of deterrence can be detrimental to global security. Moreover, as ‘security dilemma’ exists in the international system, missiles act as psychological weapons and maintain the ‘balance of terror.’ Missiles strengthen hard power capability and so states are in better position to pursue independent foreign policies and also carry on with

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independent domestic policies without being coerced by powerful states to follow policies that suit the interests of powerful states or even adversaries. When a state develops missile capabilities to augment its offensive advantage, its position and stature in the international platform also strengthen. Ballistic missiles have been viewed by states as currency of power and prestige. ‘Security dilemma’ and the quest for survival as well as self-help system in an anarchical world order is so strong that in the present global order, not only the permanent fives (P5s), Britain, France, China, Russia and the United States, but also states in the Indo-Pacific, North East Asian peripheries, Middle East and North African regions, South Asia, South East Asia, Latin America and Europe have laid stress on missile capabilities for strengthening their combat and deterrent capabilities. States with survivable missile forces will always ensure that the balance of power either tilts in their favour or at least remains balanced. Assured retaliatory capabilities ensure that states missile forces that could survive enemy attacks. A survivable missile force increases the state’s power and prestige in the international forum giving them a bargaining chip for coercive diplomacy even with conventional warheads. A state that does not possess a survivable missile force lessens its scope for coercive diplomacy giving greater scope for nuclear blackmailing. Again, while structural realism may not be in favour of disarmament, most idealists who vouch for disarmament would also argue even if unconsciously, but from a structural realist perspective. The concept of disarmament will only be argued by states when ‘security dilemma’ of states regarding its adversaries does not exist any longer. As long as ‘security dilemma’ does exists, states would find it difficult to pursue the path of disarmament or even arms control. States will only agree for disarmament as long as they do not view missiles as a tool to maintain ‘balance of power’ or a currency for survival. Also, in a post-pandemic world order, suspicions against each other would only aggravate, and hence, states would continue to progress with their missile capabilities. From a structural realist perspective, both offensive realism and defensive realism have been best suited to understand the issues and nuances of this topic. Both the branches had their relevant views and arguments that helped broaden the horizon of understanding the role of missile systems— both ballistic and cruise missiles in the international system. States will select their modus operandi—whether to go ahead with offensive realism

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or defensive realism or both based on their threat environment and ‘security dilemma.’ Missiles will continue to become a weapon for combat capability, deterrence and stability, coercive diplomacy, force projection, independent foreign policy and decision making—to pursue every tactical, strategic and policy-driven ambitions of the state. While not every state could pursue missile capabilities, those that view missiles as crucial component to pursue these policies and strategic and tactical desires will continue to do so.

Index

A air-breathing, 70 Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCMs), 29, 30, 61, 73, 78, 81, 83, 84, 94, 106, 132, 134, 149, 158 anarchy, vii, 2, 19, 27, 40, 49, 143 Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD), 57 Anti-Satellite (A-SAT), 6 Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM), 12, 88 Anti-ship cruise missile, 44, 56, 58, 60, 97, 105, 111, 113, 116, 136 assassin’s mace weapon, 13 Assured Destruction (AD), 27, 41, 42

B ballistic co-efficient, 22

C canister, 25, 60, 72, 121, 126

coercive diplomacy, v–vii, 1, 33, 38, 39, 45, 47, 69, 75, 129, 161, 178–180 compellence, 40 Comprehensive National Power (CNP), 33, 34 Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS), 20, 73, 171 Counter-force, 26, 170 Counter-value, 26, 30, 34, 170 Credible minimum deterrence, 8, 42, 119, 126, 175, 176

D de-alert, 155, 176 defensive, vi, 2–5, 7, 16–18, 23, 30, 40, 44, 54, 76, 91, 115, 152, 167, 176, 179, 180 destabilisation, 125 De-target, 150, 176 Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs), 29, 30

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 D. Ghoshal, Role Of Ballistic And Cruise Missiles In International Security, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-48063-8

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INDEX

E Electromagnetic pulse, 87

F Flexible response, 42 Forward bases, 16, 38, 42, 43 Full spectrum deterrence, 12, 35, 42, 119

G geodetics, 23 ground-launched cruise missile, 169 guidance, 22, 24, 28, 70, 72, 88, 97, 121, 159, 170

H Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC), 10, 16, 67, 165, 167, 178 hard power, 1, 4, 5, 11, 13, 16, 21, 33, 38, 41, 46, 47, 51, 56, 60, 63, 64, 67, 86, 91, 133, 143, 171, 173, 177, 178 hegemon, 12, 14 High Power Microwave (HPM), 29, 30 Hypersonic glide vehicle (HGVs), 9, 15, 21, 22, 49, 77, 78, 89, 151, 161, 175 Hypersonic technology vehicle (HTVs), 9, 74

I interceptors, 25, 159 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), 5, 6, 17, 23, 26, 34, 35, 41, 42, 46, 59, 64, 71, 72, 74–78, 82, 87–89, 94, 100, 129, 132, 147–149, 154, 158, 159, 161, 165, 170, 175

Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), 5, 17, 42, 62, 63, 72, 79, 80, 138, 168–170

L Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACMs), 23, 36, 73, 90, 122, 125, 132, 149, 157

M Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicles (MaRVs), 27, 77, 102, 152, 159 midcourse, 28 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), 10, 16, 58, 66, 106, 119, 165–167, 178 Multi Launch Rocket System (MLRS), 29, 54, 59, 62, 125, 127, 140, 142, 157, 158, 166, 168 Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs), 9, 17, 22, 25, 27, 71, 72, 75–78, 83, 87, 89, 90, 120, 121, 124–126, 148, 150–152, 156, 167, 169, 170 multi-polar, 7, 45, 91, 177 Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), 12, 27, 42, 168, 175

N National security, 34, 35, 118 no-first use, 8, 17, 41, 42, 46, 86, 91, 119, 121, 126, 146, 152–155, 160, 167, 175 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 6, 67, 128 Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ), 6, 7, 67

INDEX

O Offensive, v, 2, 3, 5, 9, 10, 14, 16–18, 21, 22, 24, 25, 30, 36, 40, 44, 48, 57, 61, 76, 91, 94, 112, 116, 126, 151, 152, 167, 178, 179 P parity, 40, 41, 44, 125, 126, 169, 176, 177 payload, 21–23, 28, 29, 59, 76, 83, 90, 93, 107, 110, 112, 131, 166, 174, 178 power, v, vii, viii, 1, 2, 4, 9, 13–16, 22–24, 26, 28, 30, 33, 34, 43–45, 48, 51, 52, 69, 70, 73, 74, 82, 91, 99, 100, 107, 109, 114, 118, 119, 130, 143, 147, 152, 154, 161, 168, 171, 173, 176–179 prestige, v, vii, 1, 28, 30, 33, 48, 49, 91, 118, 128, 161, 163, 171, 174, 176, 179 R recessed deterrence, 24, 42, 119, 155 relative power, 8, 13 S Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV), 5, 34, 66, 126, 166 Security dilemma, vi–viii, 2–5, 9, 18, 20, 30, 33–36, 38–43, 45–49, 51, 59, 63, 66–69, 92, 100, 102, 104, 105, 108, 115, 118, 119, 122, 126, 129, 130, 134, 143,

183

145, 163–167, 171–174, 176–180 self-help, vi, viii, 9, 20, 58, 59, 69, 102, 105, 152, 163, 177, 179 semi-assembled, 24, 178 Structural realism, vi–viii, 2–4, 7, 10, 17–21, 23, 33, 45, 76, 79, 82, 92, 126, 133, 145, 177–179 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBMs), 12, 17, 25, 26, 30, 35, 42, 72, 74–77, 80, 82, 84, 89, 122, 128, 148, 153, 155, 156, 159, 161, 167, 174 Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCMs), 7, 133, 142, 154–156 Sub-munitions, 23, 28–30, 152, 159 supranational, 4, 49 survival, vi–viii, 1, 4, 11, 12, 24, 25, 27, 30, 40, 66, 70, 79, 80, 82, 91, 92, 95, 115, 118, 123, 127, 128, 130, 133, 143, 145, 152, 157, 158, 163–165, 169, 171, 172, 174, 177–179 Systemic theory, 3

T Tactical Boost Glide (TBG), 74 Tactical nuclear weapons, 83 thrusters, 28

W weaponisation, 3, 20, 51

Z zero-sum game, 27