Rise and demise: comparing world-systems 9780813310060, 9780813310053

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
List of Ilustrations (page vii)
Preface (page ix)
Introduction (page 1)
Part One: Concepts and Definitions
1 A Hundred Flowers Bloom: Approaches to World-Systems (page 11)
2 Defining World-Systems (page 27)
3 Two, Three, Many World-Systems (page 41)
Part Two: Explaining World-System Evolution
4 New Territories: The Problem of Incorporation (page 59)
5 The Semiperiphery: Seedbed of Change (page 78)
6 Iterations and Transformations: A Theory of World-Systems Evolution (page 99)
Part Three: Investigations: Cases and Comparisons
7 A Very Small World-System (page 121)
8 The Unification of Afroeurasia: Circa 500 B.C.E.-1400 C.E. (page 149)
9 The Europe-Centered System (page 187)
10 Cross-System Comparisons: Similarities and Differences (page 200)
Part Four: Conclusions
11 The Transformation of World-Systems (page 233)
12 Conclusions, Questions, Speculations (page 247)
Notes (page 255)
Glossary (page 271)
References (page 276)
About the Book and Authors (page 307)
Index (page 309)

Citation preview

Rise and Demise

New Perspectives in Sociology Charles Tilly and Scott McNall, Series Editors

Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems,

Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall Freudians and Feminists, Edith Kurzweil FORTHCOMING

History Without a Subject, David Ashley

Rise and Demise Comparing World-Systems Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall

ve A Member of the Perseus Books Group

For Daniel, Adam, Dale Curtis, and Conrad Andrew

New Perspectives in Sociology

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Copyright © 1997 by Westview Press, A Member of the Perseus Books Group Published in 1997 in the United States of America by Westview Press, 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301-2877, and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, 12 Hid’s Copse Road, Cumnor Hill, Oxford OX2 9JJ

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Chase-Dunn, Christopher K. Rise and demise : comparing world-systems / Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas D. Hall

p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8133-1005-9 (hard). — ISBN 0-8133-1006-7 (pbk.)

1. Social change—History. 2. Capitalism—History. 3. Economic

history. I. Hall, Thomas D.,1946- . II. Title. HM101.C464 1997

303.4'09—dc21 96-5214] CIP

Typeset by Letra Libre

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

10 869 8 7 6 5 4

Contents

List of Illustrationsix vii Preface Introduction I Part One Concepts and Definitions

1 A Hundred Flowers Bloom: Approaches to World-Systems 11

2 Defining World-Systems 27

3 Two, Three, Many World-Systems 4]

Part Two Explaining World-System Evolution

4 New Territories: The Problem of Incorporation 59

5 The Semiperiphery: Seedbed of Change 78 6 Iterations and Transformations:

A Theory of World-Systems Evolution 99

Part Three Investigations: Cases and Comparisons

7 A Very Small World-System 121 8 The Unification of Afroeurasia: Circa 500 B.C.E.—-1400 C.E. 149

9 The Europe-Centered System 187 y

vi / Contents

10 Cross-System Comparisons: Similarities and Differences 200 Part Four Conclusions

11 The Transformation of World-Systems 233 12 Conclusions, Questions, Speculations 247

Notes 255 Glossary 271 References 276 Index 309

About the Book and Authors 307

Illustrations

Tables

8.1 Cycles of Chinese empires and steppe confederations 159 10.1. | Hypothetical population sizes of polities and interaction

nets across different types of world-systems 202

Figures

3.1 Nesting of the boundaries of the four networks of exchange 54

4.1 Three independent world-systems 60

information networks 62

4.2 Three world-systems merged at prestige-goods and

4.3 Three world-systems with merged prestige-goods and information networks, two with merged

political/military networks 62 4.4 Continuum of incorporation 63

formation model 102 6.2 The iteration model with temporary direct effects 116

6.1 The population pressure/intensification/hierarchy

8.1 Major eras of Afroeurasia 152 10.1. The incorporation of twelve PMNs into the Central PMN 203

10.2. The expansion of the Central and East Asian networks 205

intermittent jumps 208

10.3. Cycles of rise and fall of polity sizes punctuated with

10.4 | Corewide empire versus hegemony 211

10.5. City and empire sizes in the Central PMN 215 10.6 City and empire sizes in the East Asian PMN 216 10.7. Central and East Asian city size distributions 217 vil

viii / Illustrations

10.8 Central and East Asian largest cities 219 10.9 Central and East Asian empire sizes 220 10.10 Central, East Asian, and Indic SPIs 222 10.11 Central, East Asian, and Indic largest cities 223

Maps

7A Indigenous peoples of California \23 7.2 Wintu subregions and neighboring groups 125 8.1 Afroeurasia and various circuits of trade 153

8.2 Silk Road empires 155 8.3 The Silk Roads 165 8.4 Afroeurasian sea lanes 169 8.5 The extent of Islam 173 8.6 The Mongol Empire 179

Preface

As we noted in our introduction to Core/Periphery Relations in Precapitalist Worlds (1991), we probably crossed paths for the first time on a BART train from cheap digs in Berkeley to San Francisco on the way to the 1982 American Sociological Association meetings. Over the years we found an increasing convergence of interests and began to work together. As early as 1985, when Chase-Dunn was writing the last chapters of Global Formation (1989), he realized that a major unresolved problem in world-systems is how the basic structures and developmental logics of world-systems become transformed. Around the same time, as Hall was finishing Social Change in the Southwest, he remained puzzled by those “world-system-like” relations that had shaped social change in that region for many centuries before European contact and created a complex set of intergroup relations that subsequent Spanish intrusion drastically reshaped. As Chase-Dunn was negotiating with Westview Press to publish what originally had been the outtakes from Global Formation on precapitalist world-systems and Hall was rethinking—for the umpteenth time—what the study of nomads showed about incorporation and frontier formation, our interests converged more tightly. We began with pulling together some papers from various conferences for Core/ Periphery Relations in Precapitalist Worlds as a preliminary to writing a monograph on the comparative study of world-systems. The phrase “rise and demise” in our title was borrowed from Immanuel Wallersteins (1974a) famous essay, “The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System.” Our ideas have evolved considerably since we began our comparative study of world-systems, but the basic problem raised in Wallerstein’s discussion—how do world-systems change their basic nature?—tremains the focus of our efforts. Along the way, bits and pieces of our collaborative efforts have been published in many forms. But over the years, as we have presented our findings at various academic conferences, discussed issues with many colleagues, and considered comments, suggestions, corrections, and the like by many reviewers, we have thought and rethought our arguments. Nevertheless this book remains a work in progress. In fact, it is a part of a continuing conversation with Andre Gunder Frank, Barry Gills, George Modelski, Stephen Sanderson, William Thompson, David Wilkinson, Jonathan Friedman, Robert Denemark, and many others. To steal a line—as we have “stolen” much historical information—from William McNeill, it has been useful to be forced, or to force ourselves, to a temporary closure to get the story out for others to see. 1x

x / Preface Of the many conferences where we have presented our work, two held in 1995 were especially important. An early version of this book was the subject of a review panel at the International Studies Association meeting held in Chicago in February. Commentators were William McNeill, George Modelski, Matthew Melko, Jonathan Friedman, and Barry Gills. Between the time we sent drafts to the commentators and the meeting itself, we had already revised our schema for spatially bounding world-systems by adding an information network. We based this revision on our readings of history and especially on accounts by Katherine Moseley and Alice Willard of the role of Islam in medieval West Africa. The need to consider information turned out to be Professor McNeill’s chief criticism, and so he was pleased to find that we had already taken his critique to heart—before he made it. The second meeting was the conference, “World System History: The Social Science of Long-Term Change,” held at University of Lund, Sweden, March 25-28, cosponsored by the Swedish Research Council and the Wenner-Gren Foundation. This conference, organized by Robert Denemark and Jonathan Friedman, brought the scholars mentioned above, along with some fellow travelers and interested observers. The discussions during the conference convinced us that our comparative perspective is an important contribution and that we had reached sufficient closure to share our ideas with a broader audience. We would like to acknowledge the contributions made to our theoretical formulations and empirical research by Immanuel Wallerstein, Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Kajsa Ekholm, Stephen Sanderson, Albert Bergesen, Terry Boswell, Gary Fein-

man, Richard Blanton, Andrew Sherratt, Peter Peregrine, Mitchell Allen, Rein Taagepera, Elaine Sundahl, S. Edward Clewett, Alice Willard, Mahua Sarkar, Elena Ermolaeva, Sunil Sahu, Richard Schauffler, Eric Silverman, Andrew Bosworth, Kath» Woods, and Kelly Mann. We also thank John Hollingsworth, cartographer at Indiana University, who produced the figures and maps for Chapters 3, 4, and 8. His

probing questions in preparing our figures from sketches on napkins and maps culled from various sources led to several refinements and new research questions.

Thomas D. Hall is indebted to the Faculty Development Committee, the John and Janice Fisher Fund for Faculty Development, and the Presidential Discretionary Fund at DePauw University for support that helped in the research for this book, for travel to conferences, and for funds to spend time in Baltimore with Christopher Chase-Dunn. He is also indebted to several colleagues—Darrell La Lone in particular—and especially students in many classes for probing questions and puzzled looks that prompted him to rework and refine many explanations and examples. Finally, he thanks the Asian Institute of Technology for the use of e-mail connections that allowed continued collaboration on this book even while accompanying his wife on her American Library Association international fellowship. He also owes considerable thanks to Carolyn Hock and Mae and Frances ChaseDunn for gracious hospitality and putting up with his many visits to Casa ChaseDunn over years of work on this book. At home, Jean Poland has borne with good humor a partner lost somewhere in the ancient world. She also made important pro-

Preface / xi fessional contributions as a top-notch bibliographic sleuth—even in areas far from her native science and engineering turf. We also wish to extend our thanks to the many archaeologists and anthropologists who have not merely tolerated but welcomed our carpetbagging into their bailiwicks. We owe a similar debt to the members of the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations for welcoming and educating us and for many lively discussions.

We owe special thanks to George Modelski, Stephen Sanderson, and Mitchell Allen for reviewing the entire manuscript. All made useful suggestions. Mitchell Allen not only reviewed the manuscript but also brought to bear his many years as an editor in suggestions on bookmaking. He has also done us the singular honor of taking our work very seriously in his own interesting and masterful dissertation on the Neo-Assyrian world-system. Last, but far from least, we owe a huge debt to Dean Birkenkamp, former sociology editor at Westview, for working with us on this project as it went through many revisions and reconceptualizations. He was a treasure to work with. Jill Rothenberg made the transition to a new editor easy, and made the myriad tasks of converting a manuscript into a book as speedy and painless as possible. Evolutionary theories have come and gone, and now they are coming again. Is this merely an oscillation back and forth between equally meaningless cave shadows, or is there a spiral toward a truer comprehension of the patterns of human history? We hope the latter, and here is our best shot. Christopher Chase-Dunn Thomas D. Hall

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Introduction

Events like the fall of the Berlin Wall, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), ethnic warfare in the former Yugoslavia, in central Asian countries, and in Africa, governmental chaos in Chad, Somalia, and Liberia, the formation of the European Union (EU), and so on all suggest that a major realignment of global political economy may be in process. The relative decline of the United States and the relative rise of Japan and Germany are further evidence that major changes are occurring in the “world-system.” But like a close election with fewer than 50 percent of the precincts reporting, or a close football game early in the third quarter, or a partially cooked soufflé, the final results are notoriously difficult to predict. One way to predict the consequences of rapidly shifting events is to make short, linear extensions in the direction along which change is already occurring. If the change is nonlinear, however, as many major social changes are, then even short-term predictions are hazardous. Another strategy, one that is more difficult, is to compare current conditions with those of earlier major social changes and to look for resemblances. This often entails much more than reading the past into the future. It requires understanding past processes, then using that understanding to predict where current conditions might go, given the best understanding of current processes and conditions. A major breakthrough in the social sciences since the 1970s that may help us to reexamine the present in light of the past has been the discovery and analysis of social structures and processes beyond the level of the national state—the discovery of the “modern world-system.”! The world-systems paradigm? (terms in boldface may be found in the glossary at the end of the book) analyzes a new level of social organization—a global hierarchical division of labor that includes households, neighborhoods, communities, firms, regions, states, the world market, and the interstate system of competing states. A key insight of this approach is that the most important unit of analysis for the study of social change is not societies or states but the entire world-system. Changes in organization are not endogenous to individual societies. Rather, they are a consequence of complex interactions among local, regional, societal, and global processes. Over the past 12,000 years many small-scale intersocietal networks have merged into a single global political economy, the “modern world-system.” We focus on those processes by which small-scale world-systems expanded and merged into a single global system.

i

2 / Introduction Many observers suggest that the events noted in our opening paragraph indicate that the modern world-system is changing in fundamental ways. But are these changes really fundamental, a rewriting of the rules of the game, or are they more or less routine, a reshuffling of the same old deck or a game of musical chairs? We propose to address this question by modifying and expanding Immanuel Wallerstein’s world-system theory into a general account of the role of intersocietal interactions in social change. We are not attempting to rewrite the history of the world. Rather, we are building a general model that we—and, we hope, others—may use to reexamine the history of the world. Though world-systems theory was developed to explain the history of national societies and global patterns of development in the modern age, it is not simply a

matter of “international relations.” Rather, it is a holistic structure of local, regional, national, interstate, transnational, and global relations. Thus, for example, the world market is composed of all the national markets plus all the international market exchanges. The modern world-system is stratified by what is termed a core/periphery hierarchy in which core regions dominate and exploit peripheral regions. The core is composed of the “advanced” or “developed” core states—those in Western Europe, the United States, and Japan—themselves unequally powerful and competing with one another. The periphery consists of the least powerful countries in the system and includes many of the states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Some states are in the semiperiphery because they are in an intermediate position in the core/periphery hierarchy. Though they sometimes dominate peripheral areas, they are usually dominated by core areas (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, India). The core/periphery hierarchy is a fundamental structure of the modern world-system that is reproduced over time rather than eliminated by national development. All countries—and the whole world-system—‘“develop” over time, but the relative gap between core and periphery is reproduced. Some regions are upwardly or downwardly mobile in this hierarchy, but most only run hard in order to stay in the same

place. This modern system emerged in the sixteenth century in Europe and expanded to incorporate the whole globe by the early twentieth century (Wallerstein 1974a, 1974b). We use the concepts developed to explain the modern world-system as a basis from which to develop our conceptual apparatus and theory of very long-term social change. The basic concepts that have been developed for analyzing the modern world-system—world-system, world-economy, interstate system, core/periph-

ery hierarchy—must be redefined to some extent to make them useful for comparing the modern system with prehistoric, ancient, classical, and medieval systems. We seek to understand how world-systems have changed fundamentally. This is a

question of the logic of systemic reproduction. Hence much of what is commonly studied as social change may be irrelevant to the transformation problem. A system may experience an expansion of scale or the rise and fall of new core areas without

Introduction | 3 undergoing a qualitative transformation of its logic of reproduction. We hope that our focus on systemic transformation will help us to assess whether current changes are fundamental or recurrent. The question of systemic transformation is not only a matter of academic curiosity. It is also a crucial question for the future of our species. If the logic of world-system reproduction is basically similar across many world-systems, or if developmental logic only oscillates between state-based and private forms of capital accumulation (as several world-system scholars contend), this has important implications for possible futures. We seek to learn from earlier transformations about the potentials and processes by which the contemporary world-system might be transformed into a more balanced, peaceful, and humane world society. The comparative study of world-systems raises a number of important questions. Are world-systems the most fundamental units of social development? Are core/ periphery relations similar in all world-systems? Or, as Owen Lattimore (1962b) claimed, does each historical core produce the kind of periphery that is appropriate to its own nature? If many world-systems exhibit uneven development in which new cores replace old ones, does this process differ in important ways across very different kinds of world-systems? Is it true that precapitalist world-economies always became world-empires? Is the polity of the modern world-system permanently structured as

an interstate system? If there is a tendency for world-economies to become worldempires, is it true that the modern world-system has resisted this tendency for an unusually long time? And if the modern system is indeed atypically resistant to empire formation, why is this so? These questions and their answers presume much about the way in which we classify, categorize, and conceptualize human social interaction and institutions. By the use of such terms as “system logic” we do not presume a determinist view of human history. Nor by “evolution” do we presume a unilinear, progressive, continuous process of change from simple to complex society. History is usually discontinuous, conjunctural, and somewhat open-ended. Nevertheless, certain long-run patterns are observable. We hope that an explanation of these patterns may improve our collective chances of survival.

Our theoretical formulation is a synthesis of work by many scholars from different academic disciplines who have analyzed premodern states and societies. Some ethnographers, archaeologists, historians, political scientists, geographers, and sociologists have employed explicit world-system concepts to analyze premodern systems and to compare them with the modern system. This literature, which began with Jane Schneider's important 1977 article, “Was There a Pre-capitalist World-System?” has expanded rapidly in recent years. We have also made use of many studies that do not use explicit world-system concepts but that are nevertheless directly relevant to comparing world-systems. We contend that shifting the focal unit of analysis from societies to world-systems will produce more powerful theories of long-run historical development and that these theories will have important implications for the possibilities and probabilities

4 / Introduction that our own global system will face in the next half century. We do not claim to present the final word. On the contrary, we aim to stimulate further empirical research and continued theory building.

The intellectual history of theories of social change has seesawed between grandiose evolutionary theories on the one hand and historicist description on the other.3 This oscillation has been progressive because the two phases have interacted with one another to produce both more accurate generalizations and more theoretically relevant descriptions. Neo-evolutionism has been rejected for another round of historicism that stresses the uniqueness of places, mentalities, and cultures. This latest crisis of theory, like earlier ones, has been buttressed by the repetition of old claims that social science is impossible because human beings are not billiard balls and by new (and often correct) charges that social theories have been used to justify domination and exploitation. Undaunted by all this deconstructionist and postmodermist nay-saying, we sally forth to jump-start a new theoretical research program (Lakatos 1978) by formulating a theory of the development of world-systems that is sensitive to both the conjunctural and the systematic differences between various kinds of systems.4 While postmodernists are celebrating the demise of grand theories and social science seems headed into another long night of Paradigm Lost, we boldly proclaim Paradigm Regained.°5 We define world-systems as intersocietal networks that are systemic. By “systemic”

we mean that they exhibit patterned structural reproduction and development. We contend that the developmental logics of world-systems are not all the same, though they do share some general properties. Of interest to us are the processes by which world-systems undergo transformations of their developmental logics. Until the end of the nineteenth century, when the entire globe became incorporated into a single intersocietal network, processes of transformation occurred as a result of both internal world-system logic and occasional exogenous impacts due to the diffusion of cultural artifacts, migrations from other world-systems, and/or climatic changes or other “natural,” that is, nonhuman, causes. We envision a sequence of changes in which thousands of very small-scale world-systems merged into larger systems, which eventually merged to become the global modern world-system. Our use of the term world-system for small-scale interaction networks requires explanation. We conceive of a world-system as an interactional entity that is self-contained in the sense that the important social processes that reproduce or transform social structures are within that interactional entity. Before the development of oceanic transportation, there were no consequential interactions between Eurasia and the Americas. Before the emergence of regular long-distance trading expeditions, local groups lived in substantially independent systems delimited by networks of down-the-line trade. In such systems the spatial gradient of the consequences of an event or action for any one local group was rather steep. Thus these people lived in small-scale interaction networks, even though interactions of trade, warfare, and intermarriage often crossed cultural boundaries. These were autonomous “worlds” in the sense that nearly all of the important processes affecting the reproduction of so-

Introduction | 5 cial structures were contained within these small networks. One major question, then, is, How and why did these many small systems coalesce and transform over many millennia into a single, global world-system:? It is important to emphasize that we are not proposing a unilinear theory of evolution in which a single small system goes through a series of stages that eventually result in a global system; that is, we eschew all teleological explanations.° On the contrary, we recognize that past transformations were similar across different regions only in a broad sense and that development has always been spatially uneven. It is this pattern of uneven development involving both changes of organization within world-systems and leapfrogging across world-systems that we seek to explain. We will develop a working, heuristic typology of world-systems as a tool to facilitate comparisons. There is no reason to expect one type necessarily to change into another, although certain kinds of organization and production are necessary before other features can emerge. The conditions under which such changes occur is what we seek to explain. Our theory specifies ecological constraints and demographic forces within which

the uneven development of social structures occurs. We affirm the importance of material production practices, resource constraints, environmental degradation, and population pressures, but we also emphasize the centrality of those social institutions that facilitate consensus, legitimate power, and structure competition and conflict within and between societies. It is important to remember that social development is uneven across both space and different institutional realms. Spatially uneven development means that those regions that have developed a new level of social complexity and political hierarchy typically are not the locations where further increases in complexity or hierarchy occur. Thus the “leading edge” of increases in societal complexity typically moves through space. Institutional unevenness means that changes in complexity or hierarchy do not occur in all institutional realms simultaneously. This is why the mix of institutional features in any particular society is usually developmentally uneven. We analyze processes of cyclical rise and fall of hierarchies such as chiefdoms, states, empires, and modern hegemonic core powers. We also study those rare instances in which the scale of polities increases greatly.

We portray social change as a series of iterations as world-systems grow from very small to global. In order to eventually understand the particularities of world-systems we must first build a framework for comparison that abstracts from the particular. We need to abstract from space and time, to suspend considerations of scale

and location, and to think analytically about the simplest structural features of world-systems. All world-systems, large and small, involve networks of interaction among a set of socially constructed groups or societies. These networks of interaction must be important for the reproduction or systemic change of the “internal” social features of the constituent groups. As world-systems expand and combine to become larger, the general model must be modified to take into account the peculiarities of each transformation in scale and social organization. Thus the transition from nomadism to world-systems containing sedentary villagers is somewhat different from

6 / Introduction the transition from sedentary villages to chiefdoms, or from chiefdoms to states, or from states to empires, or from empires to the capitalist world-economy. A chronograph of the process we wish to study and explain would look like a river system in which many small rivulets flow into creeks, which flow into streams, which flow into rivers, which join together finally in a single immense river (see Chapter 10). Most other world-system theorists begin their studies with rivers that already contained states and cities. Because we want to search for important structural differences as well as similarities, and because we want to study as many instances of fundamental transformation as possible, we choose to begin with very small creeks—those local systems composed of sedentary hunter-gatherers who began the geopolitical game of defending particular territories. Our analysis proceeds in terms of iterations of a basic model that must be respecified somewhat as the scale and nature of processes of uneven development expand and change. Our ultimate purpose is to develop a theory of transformations of world-systems useful for creating a more humane and collectively rational world in the future. We assume that knowledge of past transformations will shed light on the possibilities and probabilities for future transformation. Given the narrow time horizon that the current dizzying rate of social change produces for most people, this may seem farfetched. Most social scientists who are interested in the future are content to focus on one or another recent development in technology, policy, or organization and to project this into a future touted as the next wave or the latest stage of capitalism. The notion that there could be anything else but capitalism in the world’s future is currently understood as either anachronistic complaining or merely wishful thinking. Nevertheless, we propose that understanding past transformations will help us to understand future possibilities. Even more rashly perhaps, we hope that such understanding will help us all to act in ways that will promote the more humane of the possible futures. Whether or not this is a fool’s errand, only time will tell. We are convinced, however, that it is a task worthy of sustained effort. Because our analytic strategy is iterative, we have organized the book in four parts. The first part presents definitions, our concepts, and theoretical accounts of world-system transformations. Since we draw on several disciplines and sometimes several different schools within each discipline we trace the pedigrees of our concepts in Chapter 1. We note how and why we came to the modifications we have made in each. We do not claim to present a thorough review of each of our predecessors but rather to indicate where we took, and often modified, concepts, ideas,

and theoretical insights from others. In Chapter 2 we present our definition of world-systems and our approach to modes of accumulation. We end with a brief overview of relations within world-systems and a sketch of measurement problems. In Chapter 3 we present a provisional typology of world-systems to guide our discussions and develop a few elementary hypotheses about world-systems. We then devote considerable attention to the problem of bounding world-systems, conceptually and spatially. We end with a description of what a theory of world-systems transformations should do.

Introduction / 7 Part Two addresses the problem of how and why world-systems change. We begin in Chapter 4 with a discussion of the problem of incorporation, that is, what happens when new areas and new regions are drawn into an expanding world-system. A key issue here is how incorporated areas, peoples, and social processes are transformed by incorporation. This is important to all evolutionary discourse because many changes that have been thought to be due to internal evolutionary processes were in fact results of incorporation. In Chapter 5 we address the problem of semiperipheral regions and actors who, we show, have often been major initiators of world-system transformations. Chapter 6 completes Part Two with a theory of world-system evolution. We discuss a basic model and then describe how and why it changes at times, leading to transformations of world-systems. In Part Three we use the analyses from Part Two and the concepts from Part One to examine three different cases and to explicate the important similarities and differences in different types of world-systems. In these chapters we not only show how such case studies might be done but also how case studies lead to modifications in concepts and theories. It would be preferable to have a large number of worldsystems of each type for formal comparative analysis and proposition testing, but this level of sophistication will have to wait. We begin with an examination of what is probably the smallest limiting case of a world-system: prehistoric northern California. This helps us to sort out what properties are general to all world-systems and to examine the question of core/periphery relations in a system that was radically different from larger and more hierarchical systems. We then turn to an analysis of the expanding linkages that formed in Afroeurasia from about 500 years B.C.E. to about 1500 C.E.” This puts flesh on the theoretical bones of our approach to incorporation and mergers explicated in Chapter 4. Our third case study is a reexamination of the modern world-system in the light of our comparative perspective and our theory of world-system evolution. This produces new insights and revisions of our understanding of the contemporary system. In Chapter 10 we undertake a formal comparison of different types of world-systems, though this is necessarily a tentative and exploratory effort because of the paucity of existing studies. In Part Four we draw conclusions, raise questions, and speculate (some might think wildly) about the future of the modern world-system. In Chapter 11 we address the issue of transformations. Though we see convincing evidence that there have indeed been transformations in world-systems, we also note that there have been important continuities. On the basis of these transformations and continuities, we speculate about the kinds of future transformations that might occur and offer some comments about agents and actions that might either encourage or discourage some of these processes. Thus we come full circle to the issues we raised at the beginning of this introduction. Finally, we conclude with a chapter that summarizes our findings and describes the many.as yet unanswered questions. We think that this is the best organization for this book. However, some readers may prefer to proceed in other orders. To facilitate this we have included a glossary so that readers can easily check what we mean by our terms. Precisely because we

8 / Introduction have borrowed from many different disciplines, and from competing schools within them, these definitions are important. For instance, among many social scientists (and the general public) the terms “state,” “nation,” and “country” are used as synonyms and interchanged freely. To those scholars who study international politics, ethnicity, or nationalism (and other related topics) the differences between these terms are of crucial significance. We also use a number of terms from archaeology and anthropology that are not widely known in the other social science disciplines. Readers who eschew definitional discussions might start with Part Two and jump to Part Four to see our overall argument, using Parts One and Three to fill in any gaps. Others may choose to begin with the case studies in Part Three to see how we use our concepts. However a reader approaches the book, we stress that the entire book is only the first round of an iterative process that moves from theory to reexamination of data, back to theory, and so on. Though we have written it as one such iteration, it is the result of several such cycles for us.

Hence this book by no means constitutes a complete theory. Rather, it is, we hope, a well-reasoned starting point from which to study the historical evolution of world-systems. We further hope that by taking down the “ceiling panels” and exposing the formulation and reformulation of theory in the light of evidence, we will inspire others to join us in studying past transformations—not only because it is a fascinating project but also for the light it may shed on our collective future.

ee PART ONE

Concepts and Definitions

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1 A Hundred Flowers Bloom: Approaches to World-Systems

In this chapter we summarize the main theoretical issues raised by scholars whose work contributed to the development of the world-systems perspective or who are extending this approach to precapitalist settings. Our discussion is organized into three interrelated topics: ¢ definitions of world-systems; ° spatial bounding of world-systems; and ¢ the problem of systemic logic.

The world-systems perspective has expanded the temporal and spatial scope of theorizing about social change. Our understanding of modernity has been radically transformed by the study of the Europe-centered world-system over the past five hundred years. But the analysis of a single system encounters methodological and theoretical limitations. If we are to fathom fundamental change, we need to comprehend the causes of those structural “constants” that are usually taken for granted in the modern world-system. These structural constants exhibit variation when we

| broaden the scope of comparison to include very different kinds of world-systems. Are interstate systems or core/periphery hierarchies inevitable features of all human organizational wholes? Do all world-systems share a similar underlying developmental logic, or do systemic logics undergo fundamental qualitative transformations? We can best address these questions through a comparative perspective that employs evidence produced by historians, geographers, ethnographers, ethnohistorians, and archaeologists on human activities over very long periods of time—much longer than the five-hundred-year span of the modern world-system. In order to expand the scope of comparison we must modify those concepts originally developed for the analysis of the modern world-system. We must take care to avoid projecting contemporary reality onto the past. A rather large body of literature has emerged in which scholars from several different academic disciplines (sociology, political science, history, anthropology, and archaeology) have utilized world-systems concepts to analyze premodern systems.! These theoretical, conceptual, and empiri11

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cal efforts provide the basic tools with which we begin to rethink very long-term human social change.

The involvement of scholars from many disciplines brings semantic difficulties. , Most archaeologists, for example, use the term “prehistoric” to refer to societies that do not keep written records. They do not mean to imply that such societies are non-

historical in the sense of mechanically determined systems in which human will plays little part in social change. Many world-system anthropologists and archaeologists demonstrate proper sensitivity to the issues of historicity and open-endedness in social change (e.g., Friedman and Rowlands 1977; Kohl 1987a). Only a few sociologists, those least familiar with preliterate societies, have argued that history—in the sense of historical action—only begins with the emergence of states.?

Anthropologists and archaeologists are considerably less paranoid about the “e-word,” evolution, than are most historians and sociologists. They usually make a clear distinction between biological and social evolution. They construct multilinear, conjunctural, and probabilistic models—that is models that include many paths of change, where the specific path taken is a consequence of the specific conditions and the probabilities for each path at the point of change. These differ vastly from the unilinear determinist nightmares that haunt those who shun the word “evolution” (see Sanderson 1990). Even within this broad area of agreement, there are competing concepts of what a world-system is. We begin with a review of them.

Contending Definitions of World-Systems Several scholars restrict the concept of a world-system to those intersocietal systems that contain states and cities (e.g., Frank and Gills 1993a). Others claim that smaller stateless and classless systems also can be meaningfully studied using world-systems concepts and that including these in the scope of comparison adds useful variation for the understanding of processes of structural transformation (e.g., Collins 1992). This difference raises the issue of whether or not a world-system must have a core/ periphery hierarchy. Some build this into the definition, while others think it important to study variation in the degree to which different systems have socially structured intersocietal inequalities. Some classless and stateless systems apparently do not have core/periphery hierarchies. Virtually all contending definitions of world-systems claim or imply that the par-

ticular kinds of interaction upon which they focus are necessary or systemic, but there are vociferous disputes about the relative importance of specific kinds of interconnectedness. Fernand Braudel (1975, 1984), a major forerunner of world-systems analysis, de-

veloped his terminology in order to make sense of the modern Europe-centered world-system. Thus he considers commodity trade to be the most important type of interconnection. He also thought that hegemony is best defined in terms of eco~ nomic domination, which is arguably the case for the modern world-system but is

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debatable for earlier world-systems. In world-systems in which the dominant means of accumulation of wealth was payment of taxes, fees, or other tribute, socially structured inequalities, including those between an imperial core and dominated peripheral regions, rested more on political/military power than on economic power. Immanuel Wallerstein conceives of world-systems as multicultural economies in which there is a division of labor in the production of foods and raw materials necessary for everyday life. This “bulk goods” definition of world-systems is certainly an important aspect of systemic cross-cultural interaction in many systems. Wallerstein

contends that networks of the production, distribution, and consumption of basic goods create the systemic unity of a world-system. In today’s world-system a map of the material links that connect each of us with the global economy could begin with breakfast. Unlike ancient foragers or subsistence farmers, we do not produce much of what we eat. Rather, “commodity chains” link the food we eat for breakfast to the labor and resources of distant others. They might go most directly to nearby truck, dairy, and poultry farms. More often some of our breakfast was grown on other continents. The fuel used to produce food on local farms typically came from far away. It would not take very many links to trace our material connections with people all over the globe. Wallerstein (1984a) also distinguishes between world-systems and “minisystems.” Whereas world-systems are defined as regional divisions of labor composed of several different cultural groups, minisystems are defined as “small-scale systems covering a limited geographical area, within which all that is essential for the survival of the collectivity is done. We might think of such systems as bearing the motto: one economy, one policy, one culture. That is to say, the boundaries of the division of labor, the structures of governance, and the values, norms, and language which are current

are more or less the same” (Wallerstein 1984b, 148). Wallerstein contends that small-scale stateless and classless systems were minisystems because there was little exchange of food and raw materials across cultural and/or political boundaries. Other types of interconnection that have been proposed as constituting systemic relations are exchanges of prestige goods, political protection, regularized military conflict, and information exchange networks. Each of these has its advocates. The earliest debate is about bulk goods versus prestige goods (which Wallerstein calls “preciosities”). Prestige goods are symbolically important goods, typically exotic imports, often of high value to weight ratio, that confer prestige on the owner. A prestige-goods economy is an exchange network in which a local leader monopolizes the supply of prestige goods that he uses to reward subordinates. Wallerstein (1974a, 41-42) contends that the exchange of “preciosities” (by which he means luxury goods utilized primarily by elites) does not produce important systemic effects. Jane Schneider (1977) and many others (e.g., Friedman and Rowlands 1977; Blanton, Kowalewski, and Feinman 1992; Peregrine 1992, 1996) argue that such prestige-goods economies constitute systemic networks because the ability of local leaders to monopolize the supply of these goods is an important mainstay of their power, and changes in the availability of such goods can have important effects

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on the society's authority structures. Monopolized exotic imports are used to reward subordinates and in many systems are necessary for important social rituals such as marriage. Other theorists have emphasized political interconnections in defining systems. Charles Tilly (1984, 62) has suggested the following “rule of thumb for connectedness”: the actions of powerholders in one region of a network rapidly (say within a year) and visibly (say in changes actually reported by nearby observers) affect the welfare of at least a significant minority (say a tenth) of the population in another region of the network. Such a criterion indubitably makes our own world a single system. . . . The same criterion, however, implies that human history has seen many world systems, often simultaneously dominating different parts of the globe. Only in the last few hundred years, by the criterion of rapid, visible, and significant influences, could someone plausibly argue for all the world as a single system.

This definition focuses on intentional political authority that is popularly perceived. The requirement that interconnections be visible to the connected actors excludes consideration of opaque objective relations. Marx (1967, 71ff.) argued that market societies normally operate in terms of a “fetishism of commodities” in which objective relationships between human producers are hidden behind what appear to

be relations among things—commodities and their prices. In the contemporary world-system most actors are only vaguely aware of the extent of the global network of production that materially links them with the labor of distant others, though recently there has been a significant increase in this awareness. David Wilkinson (1987b) takes a different political approach. He focuses on the

importance of interaction through conflict, especially military competition. Thus two empires that regularly engage each other in military confrontations are part of the same system. Citing Georg Simmel and Lewis Coser, Wilkinson writes: Conflict always integrates in a mildly significant way, in that the transaction of conflicting always creates a new social entity, the conflict itself. But durable conflict also integrates more significantly, by creating a new social entity that contains the conflict but is not reducible to it, within which the conflict must be seen as occurring, which is often of a larger scale and longer-lived than the conflict that constituted it. It is therefore legitimate, and it is indeed necessary, to posit the existence of a social system, a single social whole, even where we can find no evidence of that whole existence other than the protracted, recurrent or habitual fighting of a pair of belligerents. Such continuing relations, however hostile, between groups however different, necessarily indicates that both are (were or have become) parts of some larger group or system (Wilkinson 1987b, 34; emphasis in original.)

Because Wilkinson focuses only on state-based urbanized “civilizations,” he excludes

from consideration those intersocietal networks in which there are no states, but his criterion could also be applied to them. For example, Raymond Kelly (1985) has studied the ways in which habitual raiding between Nuer and Dinka pastoralists reproduced their kin-based social structures in a fascinating instance of “tribal imperialism.”

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Another approach to defining intersocietal linkages has been formulated by Schortman and Urban (1987, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c). Their review of the development of theoretical perspectives in archaeology provides valuable insights into the contributions of diffusionism, studies of acculturation, ecological/evolutionism, and world-system approaches to intersocietal interactions. They also review and evaluate the literature of the last two decades on the archaeological study of trade. Their own theoretical formulation of the problem of intersocietal linkages focuses on the concept of information, which is defined broadly as “energy, materials, social institutions, and ideas” (Schortman and Urban 1987, 68). They point out that the economic aspects of trade are only part of intersocietal interaction, and they emphasize ideological diffusion and especially cross-cultural intermarriages among elites involved in prestige-goods economies. Though Schortman and Urban emphasize the importance of the symbolic and cultural aspects of trade for some intersocietal systems, they completely ignore the systemic aspects of military competition emphasized by Wilkinson. One problem with trying to be specific about the most important and systemic types of interaction is that these probably vary greatly across different kinds of world-systems. Nevertheless, it is important for comparative research to specify the most significant types of connectedness.

What Are the Parts of a World-System? Another issue might be called the subunit problem—what are the parts that constitute world-systems? When we use the term “intersocietal networks” we seem to imply that the important subunits are “societies,” but this is not necessarily so. Much recent analysis has emphasized the difficulties of bounding societies even within the modern world-system (e.g., Tilly 1984). In the modern world-system there are many national states, a few multinational states, several states that govern only portions of nations,4 many transnational actors, and societal elements operating at the global level. There is

no single kind of subunit, and many subunits are not easily bounded. The study of the modern world-system is much more than the study of “international relations” among states. By “whole system” we mean individuals, households, neighborhoods, firms, communities, cities, and so on, as well as states and the interstate system.5 The subunit problem is even more complicated when we try to compare the modern world-system with precapitalist world-systems of very different sizes and kinds.

Eric Wolf (1982) cautions that group boundaries are inherently fuzzy and permeable. Wolf claims that “by endowing nations, societies, or cultures with the qualities of internally homogeneous and externally distinctive and bounded objects, we create a model of the world as a global pool hall in which the entities spin off each other like so many hard and round billiard balls” (1982, 6). Schortman and Urban’s solution is to define the subunit as a “spatially delimited body of individuals living within and adapting to a specific physical environment” (1987, 63). This may work well for some systems, but it ignores important larger and smaller subunits.

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The way out of this problem is to recognize that the sizes and types of organizations that interact within regional world-systems vary, and Larger systems have increasingly nested and overlapping levels of organization. In the simplest intergroup systems,

households are politically organized at the village or intervillage level, and there are no larger overarching political organizations. Households and villages are important subunits in all world-systems, large and small. One important difference between smaller, regional world-systems and larger, more complex world-systems is the size of polities and the range of direct economic, military, and cultural interactions. The

task, then, is not to define a single type of subunit that is common to all worldsystems but rather to pay attention to the types and scales of organization within each world-system.

Spatial Boundaries of World-Systems Disputes over which kinds of connectedness to emphasize are related to disagreements over the best way to spatially bound world-systems. The shift of the unit of analysis from societies to world-systems suggests to us that interconnections rather than uniformities are the important features of boundedness, because world-systems are usually composed of differentiated but interacting parts. There are, however, scholars who bound systems by their shared characteristics. Those who have debated the best ways to spatially bound “civilizations” (e.g., Melko and Scott 1987; Melko 1995) have divided themselves into the “culturalists,” who stress the homogeneity of central values as defining civilizational boundaries, and the “structuralists,” who use criteria of interconnection rather than homogeneity. The tradition of “culture area studies” (e.g., Wissler 1927; Kroeber 1918, 1936, 1945) also focuses on typological homogeneities to define cultural regions. Stephen Kowalewski (1992a, 1992b, 1996) suggests that world-systems in precontact North America were contiguous with the “culture areas” designated by anthropologists on the basis of cultural element distributions. This is an instance of using typological similarities to bound systems rather than actual interaction patterns. Interaction densities were often as high across the boundaries of culture areas as they were within them (see Peregrine and Feinman 1996). Wallerstein (1979b) uses modes of production to bound world-systems spatially.

He uses mode of production in its conventional Marxian sense: a deep structural logic that is composed of forces of production (technology) and relations of production (class relations). Wallerstein contends that Europe and the Ottoman Empire were separate systems because capitalism was dominant in Europe but not in the Ottoman Empire. This use of mode of production as a bounding criterion is very confusing. If we assume, as Wallerstein does, that each world-system has only one mode of production, it becomes impossible to analyze those systems in which modes of

production are contending with one another. This unnecessarily complicates the study of how modes of production are transformed within world-systems. Many scholars avoid this problem by focusing on interactions to bound systems. The scholars who focus on interconnections employ several different approaches. Virtu-

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ally all agree that world-systems are networks of intersocietal interaction, but the type of interaction, the frequency of interaction that constitutes a system, and the distances over which interactions have important consequences are in great dispute. In order to study world-systems comparatively we must conceptualize the spatial boundaries of such systems in a way that facilitates comparisons of very different kinds of intersocietal networks with the modern system. We must also address a number of problems encountered in all network analyses. These include: e differential interaction densities, that is, differences in the frequency and intensity of interactions; ¢ nested structures, that is, whether smaller systems are embedded within larger ones, like a series of Russian dolls; ¢ direct and indirect connections, that is, down-the-line versus direct exchanges; ¢ hierarchical versus decentralized networks, that is, networks that stack up neatly, each larger one subsuming smaller ones, or those having web-like structures; ¢ levels of hierarchy, that is, how many layers a system has; and

¢ multicentric hierarchies in which the centers are either directly connected or only indirectly connected through shared peripheries. In addition to these complexities, the type of connection and the institutional nature of interactions are important. Thus even if we decide to focus only on material exchanges, it is important to know what is being exchanged and what is the institutional nature of the exchange (gift, tribute, commodity trade, etc.). It is a commonplace that everything in the universe is in some way connected to everything else. An example of this is Gerhard Lenski and Jean Lenski, who say that: Throughout history, human societies have established and maintained relations with one another. . .. During much of the past direct ties were limited to neighboring societies, since direct relations with distant societies were not possible. But, even then, indirect relations existed. Society A maintained ties with Society B, which in turn, maintained ties with Society C, and so on throughout the system. No society was ever totally cut off from the world system of societies for long, since even the most isolated societies had occasional contacts with others. With advances in transportation and communication during the last five thousand years, relations between societies have increased greatly and direct relations have been established between societies far removed from one another. As a result, the world system of societies has grown more integrated and more complex, and has come to exercise a greater influence on the life of individual societies (1987, 51).

This notion of a single global system in antiquity ignores the problem of “falloff” —the gradient of degradation of consequences over space. Systemness implies that things that happen in one locality have important consequences for either the reproduction or the change of social structures in another locality. Though everything in the universe is in some way connected with everything else, only some of these connections are important. Neighboring groups of foragers (hunter-gatherers) may have im-

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_ portant interactions with one another, but in the absence of long-distance communica-

tions and transportation, these are vot likely to have important consequences for groups that are great distances away. Thus we argue that there were myriad small world-systems that eventually became joined into the single global system of today.

World-systems scholars can be arrayed along a continuum of “lumpers” and “splitters.” The extreme lumpers are those who see only one global system far back in time (e.g., the Lenskis). Among those who agree that the Afroeurasian system was separate from the Mesoamerican system before 1492, there are disagreements about how many separate systems there were in the Americas or in the Old World (Frank and Gills 1993a; Hall 1996b; Kowalewski 1996). Extreme splitters are those who focus only on local processes to the exclusion of all more distant connections. Despite their emphasis on the world-system, Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills (1993a) do not deny that there were autonomous world-systems on Earth before the sixteenth century C.E. Rather, their contention that the contemporary world-system has ancient roots (5,000 years) focuses on the system that came out of Mesopotamia and expanded to eventually include the entire globe. Frank and Gills are toward the “lumper” end of the continuum because they argue that interactions were systemic earlier, and on a larger scale, than do most other scholars. We are toward the “splitter” end of the continuum. We argue that our position is both empirically more accurate and scientifically cautious. If the “lumpers” should prove to be more accurate, this should emerge during the course of empirical investigations originating from a “splitter” approach. Another difficulty for bounding world-systems is the question of endogenous (in-

ternal) systems versus exogenous (external) impacts. If the sweet potato had not somehow got from Peru to the Hawaiian Islands in prehistoric times, the large semiarid regions of the Hawaiian archipelago would not have been able to sustain dense populations, and arguably, the hierarchical, complex chiefdoms that Captain James Cook found would not have developed. The diffusion of genetic materials and technologies can have profound long-distance effects even though there are no regularized or frequent interactions. But should we conclude that prehistoric Hawaii and Peru were in the same world-system because of the diffusion of the sweet potato? A notion of systemness should distinguish between, on the one hand, endogenous processes that are regularly interactive and systemic, and on the other, exogenous impacts that may have large effects on a system but are not part of that system. Climatic changes may have important impacts on human societies, but we do not try to include them as endogenous variables in our models of social systems.® Similarly, long-distance diffusion is an important process that must be studied in its own right, and its impact on local systems must be acknowledged and understood, but models of social change must distinguish between endogenous processes and exogenous im-

pacts. This is a replay of the old “internal/external” problem, but here the unit of analysis is the world-system rather than the society.

Whereas world-systems analysts often must remind other social scientists that their time horizons are too short, it is also possible for time horizons to be too long.

A generalized version of the approach to time scale taken by David Wilkinson

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(1988a) and Charles Tilly (1984) will probably turn out to be quite useful for empirically bounding world-systems. Wilkinson defines interconnectedness in terms of “regularized” military conflict, by which he means political/military interactions that are perceived by the actors as likely to be repeated soon enough that it makes sense to take this possibility into account in social action. Wilkinson does not count a connection that is constituted by a single war, such as Alexander's invasion of India. Charles Tilly’s (1984, 62) criteria of interaction-based connectedness suggest another way to bound world-systems spatially. Though his suggested criteria are somewhat arbitrary, any method of bounding systems empirically will be forced to adopt conventions of this kind. Similar criteria would need to be specified for exchange networks of bulk goods and prestige goods. The arrival in Egypt of one piece of silk from China does not a system make. Another issue is the question of whole systems versus parts of systems. Some analysts (e.g., Santley and Alexander 1992) focus on core/periphery structures as the unit of analysis. This approach has two problems. First, it is possible that some world-systems do not have core/periphery structures. The existence and nature of regional stratification should be investigated rather than assumed. Second, there may be several core regions, each with its own periphery, or there may be peripheries that are intermediate between two noncontiguous core regions. Focusing on core/periphery structures as the focal unit makes it difficult to analyze nonhierarchical interactions and complex whole systems. Fernand Braudel (1984, 27) defines the boundaries of world-systems in terms of the scope of economic hegemony of a single city-state. Thus he describes world-systems centered on Venice, Malacca, Genoa, Antwerp, and the like. Defining a network in terms of a single center precludes the possibility of multicentric networks. It is like treating the British Empire as a separate system from the French Empire. The reality was that these were colonial empires within a single, larger, multicentric, intersocietal system. Many, if not most, ancient world-systems were also multicentric in the sense that either the core areas were constituted as an interstate system of several autonomous states, or there were a few large empires interacting with one another. There were also important instances of noncontiguous core regions that were interacting with one another in important ways. The Afroeurasian world-system had three separate core areas linked by long-distance trade and by interactions with shared peripheral regions (see Chapter 8 and Abu-Lughod 1987, 1989). Conversely, we should not assume that all systems are multicentric. Rather, the extent of centralization should be a subject of research.

System-centric Versus Locale-centric Bounding The search for bounded world-systems also must address the problem of direct and indirect links. Only impassable physical barriers produce separate networks if we consider very indirect connections, as do the Lenskis. Even this criterion produces a large number of world-systems before the advent of regularized oceanic transportation. Still, it seems advisable to use a criterion of a steeply declining gradient of con-

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sequences of events and actions to further restrict what we consider to be significant

indirect connections. Thus, even though each precontact California tribelet was connected to its neighboring tribelets and therefore to the entire North American continent through indirect connections, the gradient for such connections declined steeply, even within northern California (see Chapter 7). What this means is that when we are considering down-the-line interactions in which a group interacts primarily with its immediate neighbors and has few direct long-distance interactions, we will not find world-system boundaries (e.g., regions where the density of interaction is low) except insofar as these may be created by natural barriers to interaction such as mountains, deserts, or oceans. In such cases it makes

sense to choose one group as the focus of analysis and to use it to determine the boundaries of the relevant interactional network, taking the gradient of decline into account. If we focus on a particular locale we can bound the world-system in the sense of the relevant local and regional interaction networks of which the people in that locale are a part. If we choose a different locale as the focal point, the boundaries of the relevant world-system will shift. In this situation a “group-centric” approach to spatial boundaries is necessary because of the unbroken nature of most interaction networks. Obviously, however, when there are steep gradients, they should be used to define the system. In such cases the boundaries of the system do not change when attention shifts from one locale to another. Once we can bound a system, the question of how it works arises.

Systemic Logic The very term system implies that an entity works in some specified way—that is, it

has a “logic.” Most theoretical approaches have either an explicit or an implicit model of the underlying logic that operates in world-systems. The terms for this logic vary. Some refer to it as the mode of production or mode of accumulation. Others reveal their assumptions about system dynamics in their descriptions of central processes such as state formation, cycles of political centralization and decentralization, or modes of social integration. Besides the descriptive content that is given to notions of systemic logic, there are

different metatheoretical positions’ regarding the ways in which systemic logics change or remain the same. Some, the “logical continuationists,” argue that worldsystems all have pretty much the same system logic; others, the “qualitative transformationists,” contend that system logics undergo fundamental transformations. The transformationists disagree over the definitions of different system logics and the

timing of transformations. We begin with those theorists who maintain that all world-systems have essentially the same logic.

Logical Continuationists This discussion is somewhat complicated by the different positions taken on whether or not stateless intersocietal networks ought to be analyzed as world-

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systems. It is obviously easier to maintain that systemic logic does not change fundamentally if one excludes the substantially different cases from consideration. There are five theoretical positions that contend that there are no great watersheds in system logic: the geopolitics approach, the capital imperialism approach, the rational choice or “formalist” approach, cultural ecology, and the population pressure approach. In other words, among those who say that nothing changes, there are five different descriptions of that which does not change.

Geopolitics. The geopolitics approach is taken by those who stress the universal importance of power politics. David Wilkinson (1987a, 1987b) focuses primarily on the rise and fall of states—the oscillation between interstate systems and “universal states.” This is the state-as-war-machine “neorealist” approach that has been a major theoretical school in international relations within political science. Wilkinson sees the power process as operating in fundamentally similar ways in all historical epochs, ancient and modern. As Wilkinson quips, “diamonds may be forever, but clubs are trumps.” Geopolitics and Weberian state legitimacy are also emphasized by sociologist Randall Collins (1978, 1981, 1986b). He argues with respect to state territorial expansion that there is a no intervening heartland rule. That is, states do not expand successfully when that expansion entails leaping over, or passing through, the heartland of some competing state. Inevitably expansion becomes too expensive, strains financial resources, and often leads to delegitimization of the current regime. In tributary systems this can lead to a palace coup or create an opening for a semiperipheral state to conquer an overextended core state.® Collins also uses these ideas to understand processes of alliance formation in kin-based world-systems (1992). His willingness to consider kin-based systems in these terms adds considerable scope to the comparative approach. A somewhat different variant of the state-centric approach is taken by Michael

Mann (1986). Mann emphasizes the importance of “techniques of power,” by which he means all sorts of institutional inventions that allow states to exercise control over great expanses of territory. Though this includes political, organizational, and religious innovations, Mann's primary focus is on military technology and organization. Although Mann sees important changes as contingent upon the development of new techniques of power, power itself remains the crucial factor within all systems.

Rational Choice. Rational choice universalists are those who argue that market models and individual rationality are useful for understanding all types of human social systems. This approach is also called “formalism.” Philip Curtin (1984) defends the formalist position in connection with his study of cross-cultural trade in world history. To be sure, he adds careful consideration of the roles of various social institutions in the pursuit of profit in his analyses of widely dispersed ethnic groups who specialize in trade (which he calls “trade diasporas”) and more-or-less self-contained trade networks with wide consensus on the rules of trade (which he calls “trade ec-

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umenes’). Curtin shows that long-distance trade has often been conducted by and through trade diasporas and that the formation of a cross-culturally shared set of assumptions about the basic rules of exchange, a trade ecumene, lessens the need for specialized trading ethnicities. Most of the formalists have not utilized world-system concepts explicitly, although much of their work is useful for world-systems analysis. Marvin Harris (1977, 1979) also emphasizes economic rationality and efficiency in his analyses of the material bases of culture (called “cultural materialism”). Blanton, Kowalewski, Feinman, and Appel (1981) employ a formalist approach to explain several patterns of evidence from ancient Mesoamerica. The formalist approach has been applied to hunter-gatherers in “optimal foraging’ models that have implications for intergroup interactions in very small worldsystems. Such models, based on formal economics and studies of animal foraging patterns, explain technological intensification and diversification of foraging patterns in terms of individual and family “rational choices” in minimizing procurement costs. According to this approach, a mix of foraging activities, all exploited at the same procurement costs, should remain stable except when upset by changes in population density, technology, or the environment (Johnson and Earle 1987, 12). Capital Imperialism. Some scholars contend that the geopolitics of capitalism has been the dominant force in both ancient and modern world-systems. Kajsa Ekholm and Jonathan Friedman (1982) and Frank and Gills (1993a) claim that capitalist accumulation has been an important process since the emergence of the first states in Mesopotamia. These authors contend that there has been a single world-system for 5,000 years that displays a logic that oscillates between periods in which states are the main engines of accumulation followed by periods in which private wealth— accumulating families are the central actors. Ekholm and Friedman call the logic of this system “capital imperialism.”9 These authors portray world history as having had a continuous system logic that has been reproduced as the system expanded, empires rose and fell, old core regions declined, and new ones emerged. They see core/periphery economic exploitation as having been essential to the construction of new core regions. The modern world-system is understood as a continuation of these long-term processes.

These authors deny that there have been systemic transformations such as that from feudalism to capitalism. Rather, the logic of capital imperialism continued in the context of a shift of hegemony from East to West. Frank (1991, 1993a) contends that the notion of a transition from capitalism to socialism is also a theoretical error that will only confuse our understanding of world-system processes. Cultural Ecology. The ecological evolutionism of Gerhard Lenski (Lenski 1966; Lenski and Lenski 1987) combines the cultural ecology developed by Julian Steward (1955)—which emphasizes the interaction between society and environment—with a focus on changes in productive technology as the main engine of social evolution.

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Cultural ecologists see social change as social adjustments or inventions that are intended to maintain a balance between social institutions and local ecology. Cultural ecology traditionally has been applied locally and has tended to ignore intersocietal interactions, in part as a reaction to the macrodiffusionism of V. Gordon Childe (1936, 1951).!° Lenski’s original theory of technology-led development focused primarily on societies, but he has moved in the direction of applying his theory to the world-system.

Population Pressure. Esther Boserup (1965) developed a “demographic” theory that focuses more tightly than cultural ecology on population growth and population pressure as the master variables behind social change. Technological change is explained as an adaptation to population density nearing or exceeding the carrying capacity!! of the environment under a given technological regime. Cultural ecology and population pressure have important implications for world-system development when they are combined with the idea of social and ecological circumscription!2 proposed by Robert Carneiro (1970, 1981). Carneiro explains the social organizational ruptures that produced the first states in terms of population pressure in a geographic situation in which outmigration was impossible or very costly. Under these conditions people stay and fight. Sometimes fighting may be controlled by the invention of larger-scale political organization that regulates resource use. The notion of social circumscription requires analysis of relations among peoples in adjacent regions. Thus it is quite congruent with world-systems studies. The elements of population pressure, technological change, conflict, and circum-

scription are combined in different ways by different theorists, but these are the main ingredients that comprise most of the recent explanations of long-run cultural evolution by archaeologists and many anthropologists (e.g., Johnson and Earle 1987). Usually the scholars who construct these theories emphasize continuity through time and hence see uniformity across all system logics, and so we have included these with the continuationist approaches. We now turn to those theorists who argue that world-system evolution has been marked by significant changes in system logic.

Qualitative Transformations Qualitative transformationists include Polanyian substantivists, neo-Marxist modesof-production theorists, and Marxist structuralists in anthropology.

Substantivism.!3 Karl Polanyi (1944, 1977; see also Dalton 1968) argues that different kinds of societies have qualitatively different institutions for producing social order. His analysis is focused on types of exchange, or modes of integration. Small societies, Polanyi contends, were integrated by reciprocal exchange systems based on culturally defined rights and obligations. The moral order, usually expressed in kin-

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ship terms, provided a basis for the production and exchange of goods in these societies. Thus the social structure, based on kinship, promoted norms and values that emphasized sharing and reciprocity and motivated individual behavior toward the attainment of social approval. Polanyi characterizes the emergence of more hierarchical societies as the rise of “redistributive” forms of exchange in which a central authority gathered necessary resources and redistributed them. Exchange in such systems was characterized as “state-administered.” Those persons directly involved in executing these exchanges were described as agents of the state rather than as merchants operating on their own account. In more complex and larger-scale systems Polanyi focuses on the importance of price-setting markets!4 as the key integrative mechanism. Polanyi sees the emergence of market relations as a long-term development in which monetized ex-

change penetrated more and more deeply into society, and price-setting market mechanisms replaced customary or politically set rates of exchange. He emphasizes the socially constructed historicity of markets as well as their failure to provide, by themselves, for many of the necessities of social order in complex societies. While Polanyi and his followers do not explicitly analyze world-systems, both their theoretical concepts and many of their empirical studies are relevant for comparative worldsystems analysis (e.g., Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson 1957). Polanyi’s schema has been modified in some respects by those neo-Marxists who share a transformational approach with Polanyi (addressed in the following section), but it has also been vigorously attacked by the “formalists” who emphasize the rational economic basis for decisionmaking in all human societies. Much of the attack on Polanyi has been based on research that has found that some of his empirical claims

were untrue. There is convincing evidence that marketlike mechanisms existed within certain early state-based systems that Polanyi claimed were marketless. For example, Polanyi (1957a) points to the Kultepe tablets as evidence supporting his case that trade between Bronze-Age Assur and Anatolia was state-administered. Reanalysis of these and the discovery of additional tablets have shown that Polanyi’ interpretation is mistaken in important respects (Curtin 1984; Allen 1992, 1996). What remains in dispute is the relative significance of these early forms of market exchange for the systems in question. Even though market systems may have been important in state-based systems much earlier than Polanyi claims, there have certainly been societies that had no market mechanisms whatsoever. Thus Polanyi’s theoretical point about the historicity of markets stands.

Modes of Production. Some neo-Marxists have combined Polanyi’s analysis of modes of integration with Marx’s analysis of modes of production (Wolf 1982; Sahlins 1972; Amin 1980, 1991; Wallerstein 1974a, 1974b). Mode-of-production analysis concentrates on the nature of the institutional mechanisms of accumulation (Taylor 1979; Russell 1989). In so-called kin-based societies accumulation and the mobilization of social labor was accomplished through the mechanism of the moral order—-socially agreed-upon rights and obligations, usually embedded in kinship relations.!5 This type of integration closely resembles Polanyi’s “reciprocity.”

Approaches to World Systems / 25

As societies became more hierarchical, a class of nonproducers used institutions based on coercive control of key resources (means of production) to extract surplus product from direct producers. Though this was organized as hierarchical kinship relations in complex chiefdoms, some class societies eventually developed states in which the institutional bases of power and property were separated from kinship ties. State-based systems used politically structured coercion as the main basis for the extraction of surplus product from direct producers. Amin and Wolf term the pre-

dominant underlying logic behind appropriation in such societies the “tributary modes of production.” This type of integration differs from Polanyi's “redistribution” primarily in its emphasis on the element of organized coercion that stands behind state-based accumulation. Commodification is a process in which the exchange of social goods comes to take place in price-setting markets. The emergence of commodified land, wealth, goods, and labor eventually created the basis for a capitalist logic of accumulation based on the production and sale of commodities using commodified labor. There are important distinctions between merchant capitalism and production capitalism, but as with Polanyi, the development of commodification is understood as a longterm process in which marketlike relations penetrate more and more areas of societies and intersocietal relations. The Polanyian/Marxist approach to transformation argues that different logics may be present in the same system, but that in most systems a single logic dominates and reshapes other institutions into forms more or less congruent with it. Most of the scholars who take this approach argue that world-systems were predominantly kin-based until the emergence of the first states. Tributary modes predominated in world-systems composed of states and empires, though commodification developed

slowly and partially throughout the history of the tributary world-systems. The strong development of capitalist forces in China nearly led to the emergence of capitalism as a predominant mode in the Sung and early Ming dynasties. According to this approach, capitalism was successful in becoming a fully predominant mode of production for the first time in modern Europe. '!6

Marxist Structuralism. Jonathan Friedman and Michael Rowlands (1977) see a major transformation in systemic logic occurring with the rise of states, but they emphasize the continuities of “capital imperialism” from then on. Their theory of the transformation from kin-based to state-based society is an explicitly world-system and structuralist Marxist interpretation of the politics of kinship. Their work develops the intergroup interaction aspects of the debate in the kinship literature between Edmund Leach (1954) and Claude Lévi-Strauss (1969). Leach’s work analyzed the oscillation between hierarchical and egalitarian kinship systems. Friedman and Rowlands theorize the ways in which strategies of wife-giving and wife-taking among chiefly rivals interact with changes in gender relations and prestige-zoods economies

to produce new levels of centralization and hierarchy. Friedman (1982) has employed this theory to explain the rise and fall of chiefdoms and variations in social structure across Melanesia and Polynesia.

26 / Approaches to World Systems

In a more recent contribution Friedman (1992a) reviews and presents afresh the theoretical struggles that motivated Ekholm and him to formulate a new approach to the problem of systemic logic. They, like several other world-system scholars, have been traumatized by the orthodox “productionist” Marxists. They have also reacted

to the “vulgar materialism” of Marvin Harris by emphasizing the institutional and cultural aspects of social structure. Rather than simply renaming and retooling modes-of-production concepts for world-systems use, they have formulated a new version of systemic logic that marries geopolitics and accumulation—the oscillating

logic of “capital-imperialism.” Friedman and Ekholm also substitute the term “global system” for world-system, but they do not mean to imply that there has been a single system on earth for millennia. For them a “global system” is a large regional system that includes many societies. Friedman's explication of the differences between prestige-goods systems and “capital imperialism” is a valuable contribution to our understanding of system change. The three main theoretical issues—the conceptualization of world-systems, the spatial bounding of these systems, and the problem of system logic—are fundamental to the project of comparative and historical analysis. The question of continuationism versus transformationism is important both for social science and for politics. In the following chapter we describe our positions on these conceptual issues.

2 Defining World-Systems

The survey of related approaches presented in the previous chapter provides the materials we need to construct our own conceptual apparatus. In order to understand the reproduction and transformation of basic structures of world-systems, we must compare systems that have very different structures.! Our task is to construct concepts sufficiently broad and flexible to capture similarities and differences across very different world-systems without becoming so vague as to be vacuous. We agree with those who contend that the most important institutional structures are those that are related to the mobilization of social labor and the accumulation of social surplus. Immanuel Wallerstein built his analysis of the modern world-system

around the notion of an intersocietal division of labor in the production of basic goods and the idea of capitalist accumulation. These ideas cannot simply be exported wholesale to very different systems. They must be modified significantly. Hence in this chapter we draw on our discussion in Chapter 1 to rethink world-system concepts. We then discuss the relations among modes of accumulation, worldsystems, and core/periphery relations and finish with a few remarks on operationalization and measurement of our concepts. This prepares us to suggest a few simple hypotheses for comparative research in Chapter 3, and it is the first step in an iterative process that moves from theory construction to empirical investigation and then

back to theory construction. | Our Definition of World-Systems

As we noted in the previous chapter, Wallerstein (1974a, 1974b, 1979a) defines a world-system as a multicultural network of the exchange of “necessities.” A multicultural network is one in which economic exchange links a number of culturally different societies in which people speak different languages and have somewhat different normative institutions. Wallerstein distinguishes between two types of world-systems: world-empires and world-economies. A world-empire is an intersocietal division of labor that is encompassed by a single overarching imperial polity. A worldeconomy is an intersocietal division of labor that is politically organized as an interstate system—a multicentric system of unequal and competing states (like the 27

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modern international system). As we have seen, Wallerstein (1984a) excludes stateless societies (minisystems) from his category of world-systems because (allegedly) important economic exchanges occur only within single cultures. However, archaeological and ethnographic evidence shows that most peoples who live in stateless and classless societies are engaged in important cross-cultural interactions (including exchange of basic foodstuffs) that affect their cultural reproduction and historical development (e.g., Sahlins 1972). Thus, contra Wallerstein, we contend that small stateless and classless systems also can be studied meaningfully with world-systems concepts. Including stateless world-systems in the scope of comparison also extends the range of variation. This inclusion raises the issue of whether or not world-systems must have core/periphery hierarchies—that is, some type of domination between components of the system. We conceive of hierarchy as a variable characteristic. This allows us to study differences in the degree and nature of intersocietal inequalities in different world-systems.

We posit the theoretical possibility of a world-system that does not have a core/periphery hierarchy but that is rather an egalitarian world-system of equal exchange among social entities. This hypothetical possibility separates the world-system concept from the core/periphery concept and makes intersocietal hierarchy an empirical question rather than a theoretical assumption. Hence we define world-systems as intersocietal networks in which the interactions (e.g., trade, warfare, intermarriage, information) are important for the reproduction of the internal structures of the composite units and importantly affect changes that occur in these local structures.

The inclusion of very small world-systems in the scope of comparison necessitates a broader term—“composite units”’—in place of the usual “societies” in our defini-

tion. The boundaries of nonstate social units—“bands” or “tribes”—are often so fuzzy that the concept of “society” is misleading. Furthermore, many state-based world-systems include stateless societies, most of which have been transformed by their interaction with states into class segments or ethnic groups (issues discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). Thus we prefer broad concepts that reflect a fuzzy world. Finally, some readers may object to applying the term “world-system” to small regional networks of societies because the word “world” implies a large scale or global extent. We use the term “world-system” to refer to the whole social context in which people live and the material networks important to their daily lives. The intersocietal interaction networks of sedentary foragers (e.g., in precontact northern California— see Chapter 7) were quite small in comparison with the contemporary global system.

Still, they constituted the universe of social interactions that sustained and transformed the social structures in which the people lived.?

Our empirical universe for comparison, then, includes those sedentary small, medium, and large world-systems that have existed on earth over the past 12,000 years. In this manner we maximize the variation among cases in order to study the few basic transformations that have occurred in human history. Similarly, in order to understand the conditions that generate intersocietal inequalities, we must examine

Defining World-Systems [ 29

cases in which they are absent. We now turn to a discussion of systemic logics and transformations.

Modes of Accumulation The world-systems perspective has stimulated a new approach to the understanding of capitalism that emphasizes the necessity of peripheral forms of capitalism, the importance of the interstate system, and the various forms and degrees of the commodification of labor within the capitalist world-economy (Chase-Dunn 1989). The extension of the world-systems perspective to precapitalist settings raises new questions and reopens old debates about other modes of accumulation and systemic transformations. One such debate is that between the “substantivists” and the “formalists” (discussed in Chapter 1). Substantivists argue that exchange relations are embedded in social structures, whereas formalists argue that economic rationality is found in all human societies. Another is that between the “primitivists” and the “modernists” about the natures of modern, classical, and ancient societies.3 , The modernists argue that economic development in the ancient or classical worlds already involved commodified relations and processes of economic development quite similar in their basic nature to modern societies (e.g., Rostovtzeff 1941). The primitivists emphasize the existence of important differences between modern and classical societies with respect to the logic of competition, the rationality of accounting practices, the nature of taxation, forms of property, types of labor control, and so on (e.g., Finley 1973). As we saw in the preceding chapter, these debates have been reincarnated in the discussions of the “capital-imperialist” mode of accumulation (Ekholm and Friedman 1982) and the argument for 5,000 years of continuous capital accumulation (Frank and Gills 1993a). The arguments of these scholars are similar to those of the formalists and the modernists. On the other side, the claims of the transformationists reinvigorate the ideas of the substantivists and the primitivists. In order to shed light on these debates, we formulate our concepts in ways that facilitate evaluation by comparative empirical research. We expect that if the continuationists (Ekholm and Friedman; Frank and Gills) are correct, they will be able to demonstrate the existence of important similarities among all world-systems. Likewise, if we (the transformationists) are correct, we expect to be able to demonstrate the existence of fundamental transformations in systemic processes through detailed empirical and explicitly comparative studies. In order to clarify the terms in this debate, we define mode of accumulation as the deep structural logic of production, distribution, exchange, and accumulation. We prefer

it to “mode of production” because we do not want to restrict our focus solely to the analysis of production. Rather, we want to focus on the institutional mechanisms by which labor is mobilized and social reproduction is accomplished. In all societies reproduction and change are related to the accumulation of surplus. Even egalitarian

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(classless) groups organized accumulation in the sense that foodstuffs were stored and resource usage was socially regulated. We derive the following heuristic typology from the works of Amin (1980, 1991)

and Wolf (1982), supplemented by those of Polanyi (1944, 1977). We distinguish among four classes of systemic logics: 1. kin-based modes of accumulation, in which social labor, distribution, and collective accumulation are mobilized by means of normative integration based on consensual definitions of value, obligations, affective ties, kinship networks, and rules of conduct—a moral order; 2. tributary modes, in which accumulation of surplus product is mobilized by means of politically institutionalized coercion based on codified law and formally organized military power; 3. capitalist modes, in which land, labor, wealth, and goods are commodified and strongly exposed to the forces of price-setting markets and accumulation occurs primarily through the production of commodities using commodified labor; and 4. socialist modes, a hypothetical class of logics in which major policy, investment, and allocation decisions are controlled democratically by the people they affect according to a logic of collective rationality.

We emphasize that this typology is heuristic and subject to reformulation on the basis of further empirical research. We choose terms that are broadly familiar to students of long-term social change. We note further that the typologies developed by most evolutionary thinkers are broadly convergent, even while differing in the details.4 We now turn to the relationship between modes of accumulation and world-systems.

World-Systems and Modes of Accumulation Comparisons between the contemporary global political economy and earlier regional intersocietal systems raise the question of whether human societies sometimes change their basic modes of social reproduction, or only alternate between different forms of the same basic logic. We refine this question by further examination of the relationship between world-systems and modes of accumulation. As we noted earlier, we use “accumulation” instead of “production” to emphasize that we do not restrict our analysis to production processes or class relations. Since all world-systems are organized at several levels, the understanding of class relations and production necessitates comprehension of all levels of control and resistance. By mode of accumulation we mean a logic of development in which the reproduction of social structures and cyclical processes occur by means of certain typical forms of integration and control. The main features of modes of accumulation that can be used as empirical indicators are forms of exchange (gift-giving, state-administered exchange, market trade)

Defining World-Systems / 31

and forms of control that are employed to mobilize social labor and/or to extract surplus product (normative regulation, serfdom, slavery, taxation, tribute, wage-labor).

We recognize that different modes of accumulation are often present within the same system, and that some forms of exchange and control have elements of more than one mode. We speak of “predominant” modes, and our analysis of transitions and transformation utilizes Foster-Carter’s (1978) notions of articulation (complementary interpenetration of two modes) and contradiction (conflict and competition between different modes). We do not claim that modes of accumulation are features of whole societies or of whole world-systems. As logics of interaction, modes of accumulation may exist at any level of a system (see Chase-Dunn 1989, 335-337). The broad category of tributary modes includes both centralized and decentralized political forms that rely on organized coercion to mobilize labor and to extract taxation, tribute, or rent. Thus feudalism is a subtype of the tributary mode, one of its most decentralized forms. Similarly, the so-called “Asiatic” form, in which the state owns the land, is one of the most centralized forms of the tributary mode. We claim that different modes may coexist within the same system, and we also acknowledge that some forms of organization are best understood as transitional or mixed. For example, class-stratified but stateless systems in which kinship metaphors are used to legitimate the exploitation of commoners by a noble class (e.g., precon-

tact complex chiefdoms in Hawaii) constitute a mix of kin-based and state-based (coercive) systems.>

Slavery is often found in mixed modes. Slavery in tributary modes is usually based on state-organized coercion, but when slaves are treated as the private property of individuals and can be traded on a price-setting market, slavery is partially commodified labor. We conceive of the commodification of labor as a variable, with commodified slavery depending more on laws and a coercive state apparatus than does the commodification of labor time in the wage system. “Market socialism” is another mixed mode that is made up of both capitalism and socialism. We contend that the socialist mode has never been predominant in any existing society or world-system, and thus, in a pure form, it is an empirically empty category. The communist states were mixtures of capitalism, socialism, and tributary modes. We maintain that the possibility of constructing a socialist mode remains— despite the failure of attempts to do so up to now.® These possible transitional and mixed forms clutter and complicate the analysis of _ transitions and transformations. Still, we contend that there have been qualitatively distinct logics of accumulation. We do not assume a theory of unilinear evolution by which one mode necessarily changes into another. Rather, we seek to uncover, via empirical analyses, the patterns, possibilities, and probabilities of past transformations. We assert further that modes of accumulation are differentially desirable with respect to their consequences for the quality of human life. We also contend that it is possible—even if difficult—to use knowledge of past transitions to help humans to

choose among more desirable future alternatives. Obviously, this last contention

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must remain more of a hope than an established claim until we can explain past transitions and delimit future possibilities. We see the coherence of modes of production, relations of production, and forces of production as a typical consequence of the integration of local and intersocietal interaction processes within the dominant mode of accumulation, Many world-systems articulate different modes into a single, larger, more-or-less coherent system that derives from the dominant mode of accumulation. Rather than to proclaim ex cathedra how these modes of production articulate and how transformations happen, we seek to study them empirically. Such empirical research is necessary to evaluate the transformationist-continuationist debate. Our typology and concepts differ from those of other world-system scholars. In the following sections we review these differences in order to clarify our position.

Contending Approaches to World-Systems and Modes of Accumulation Immanuel Wallerstein argues that the transition between feudalism and capitalism

in Europe during the long sixteenth century (that is, 1450-1640 [Wallerstein 1974b]) constituted a change in mode of production. He defines capitalism as a feature of the whole world-system, not of its parts (1979b). This “totality assumption” is motivated by Wallerstein’s intention to emphasize the importance of peripheral exploitation for the reproduction of capitalism, a goal that can also, however, be accomplished by redefining capitalism as including both core and peripheral forms (see Chase-Dunn 1989, chap. 1). An unfortunate implication of the “totality assumption” is that each world-system can have only one mode of production, since the mode of production is a feature of a whole world-system. This theoretical assumption makes the study of transitions between modes of production difficult because it implies that transformation occurs in a whole system simultaneously. Thus under Wallerstein’s formulation it is theoretically impossible to have world-systems in which modes of production are contend-

ing with one another or in which a predominant mode is articulated with other modes.

Wallerstein also uses mode of production to spatially bound world-systems. He claims that the Ottoman Empire and India were external arenas of the modern world-system before Europe incorporated them into its hierarchical division of labor because the Ottoman Empire and India were noncapitalist. Thus, despite extensive trade and political and military interactions, especially between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, Wallerstein defines the Ottoman Empire, India, and Europe as separate world-systems. In contrast, we argue that modes of accumulation should not be used to spatially bound world-systems. Rather, as we elaborate in Chapter 3, interactions and intercon-

nections of all sorts should be used to delineate world-system boundaries. Once

Defining World-Systems / 33

whole world-systems and regions within world-systems have been so defined, empirical studies should determine which modes of accumulation are predominant. Similarly, actual historical processes of transformation should be studied in order to build a theory of transformations. Some scholars do not employ any explicit notion of systemic logic, though they often seem to have implicit models. As we have seen, David Wilkinson's (1987b) valuable work on “civilizations/world systems” is based on a state-centric model that sees state building, war making, and power politics as the central processes in all sys-

tems in which there are cities. He thus excludes what we have called kin-based world-systems. Because Wilkinson defines civilizations in terms of regularized politi-

cal-military interaction, he sees the expansion of “Central Civilization” from the merger of the Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations about 1500 B.C.E. to today’s global system as a continuous, if episodic, process.’ Wilkinson also describes the alternation between “universal states” and “states systems” in his twelve different civilizations. This work is quite useful for studying similarities and differences across different world-systems. Wilkinson does acknowledge that the modern interstate system is more resistant to empire formation than were earlier systems; he attributes this to the invention of balance-of-power policies by European statesmen who were (and are) willing to mobilize “general war” in order to prevent any one state from systematically conquering the others. Thus he sees no watershed between the modern era of “Central Civilization” and its earlier eras—except for the invention of the balance-of-power strategy. In contrast, Chase-Dunn (1990b) argues that the unusually high resistance of the modern interstate system to empire formation is due to the predominance of capitalism. Capitalists prefer a multicentric international political system. Hence the most powerful states in the modern interstate system do not try to create a corewide em-

pire but seek rather to sustain the interstate system. This is because their main method of accumulation is commodity production, which contrasts with precapitalist systems, in which state power itself was the main basis of accumulation, through taxes or tribute. Phrased differently, capitalist states are qualitatively different from tributary states. Other analysts do propose explicit ideas about systemic logic but argue that this logic did not change with the rise of modern Europe. In Ekholm and Friedman's (1982) original work comparing ancient, classical, and modern world-systems, they emphasized several systemic continuities that were presented as features of a “capitalimperialist” mode of production. They stressed the importance of core exploitation of peripheries, the rise and fall of core powers, and the emergence of former peripheral areas as new core powers. They also emphasized the alternating phases of centralization and decentralization of political power in state-based world-systems and the cyclical expansion of “private” forms of exploitation by core elites in competition with state accumulation. This dynamic of intra-ruling-class competition accounts for the rise and fall of states, the phases of centralization/decentralization, and the emergence of new core regions.

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The formulation developed by Frank and Gills (1993a) is similar to the Ekholm and Friedman approach in many respects. However, they contend that instead of one “capital-imperialist” mode of production, there are two modes of accumulation. These are state and private modes of accumulation, which are articulated yet contend with each other throughout the history of the 5,000-year-old world-system. Ekholm and Friedman and Frank and Gills explicitly argue that there was no important transformation between an earlier tributary mode and the capitalist mode. They argue, rather, that states have always been central to accumulation and remain so. In their view, markets, money, and private wealth have always been important, although state and private forms of accumulation alternate in relative importance. Earlier work by Friedman and Rowlands (1977) and Friedman (1982) developed a world-system theory of the transition from kin-based to state-based systems that focused on changes in kinship structures and regional interactions, especially prestige-goods economies. That work explicitly acknowledged the analytic comparability of stateless and state-based world-systems. While Friedman and Rowlands acknowledged a transition from kin-based to tributary modes, Ekholm and Friedman (1982) deny a significant transition from tributary to capitalist modes. To support their contention about a “capital-imperialist” mode, Ekholm and Friedman point to growing evidence that markets, trade, and money existed much further back and to a much greater extent in the ancient world than was formerly accepted. We also accept the new evidence, but we dispute the conclusion that the existence of Mesopotamian markets proves that capitalist accumulation has always been the dominant mode of accumulation. In contrast, we see commodity forms of wealth, goods, land, and labor as emerging slowly within the tributary mode of accumulation. Similarly, Charles Tilly's (1990) recent study of European state formation between 900 and 1990 C.E. focuses on states, state making, and warfare as master variables of change. However, Tilly explicitly discusses the role of capitalism and capitalists in European states as they increased their powers over domestic groups. He identifies capitalism and capitalists with cities. Hence trading cities are one of the major distinguishing variables that explain different paths to state formation. Still, Tilly does not observe that between 900 and 1900 C.E. the political power of European capitalists was multiplied by their increasing control over national states in the core of a world-system. In 900 C.E. European capitalists were rulers of a few semiperipheral city-states. Only in the seventeenth-century Dutch state did capitalists take power in a core state. By 1990 capitalists controlled the majority of states. Tilly's definition of capital is part of why he does not see an important transition in the mode of accumulation in Europe. He defines capital “generously” as “any tangible mobile resources, and enforceable claims on such resources” (Tilly 1990, 17). By this definition, a Nuer headman’s cows are capital. This is similar to Frank and Gills’s (1993a) definition of accumulation, which is any savings or wealth. For us, in contrast, capital is commodified wealth used to produce commodities. Thus, as we

Defining World-Systems 1 35

specified in Chapter 1, capitalist accumulation is the amassing of wealth by means of the production and sale of commodities for profit, whereas general accumulation ts the amassing of wealth in any form. Capitalist accumulation is not equivalent to all accumulation. The storing of yams by a Trobriand chief is not capitalist accumulation; nor is the hoarding of treasure in temples or cathedrals. Attending to these differences in the nature of social resources makes it much easier to see that the modern world-system has qualitatively different dynamics than earlier systems. Now that we have clarified our definitions of world-systems and modes of production, we turn to a discussion of how the parts of a world-system are interconnected.

Core/Periphery Relations Functionalist theorists tend to see all hierarchies, including intersocietal ones, as serving some systemic need. As a result, many theorists see exploitation and domination everywhere that inequality, in any form, exists. We contend that core/ periphery relations need to be considered on a case-by-case basis lest we ignore or misperceive instances of systemic equality or coevolution of societies at different levels of development. Considerable controversy still exists about the best way to conceptualize and measure coreness and peripherality in the modern global political economy (e.g., Arrighi

and Drangel 1986; Chase-Dunn 1989, chap. 10). The issues become even more complex when we consider comparisons of intersocietal hierarchies across very different kinds of world-systems. Here we need a general concept that can accommo-

date considerable variation. We also need to allow for the possibility that some world-systems may have core/periphery relations with little or no hierarchy or inequalities, or no core/periphery relations at all.

Applying the notion of a core/periphery hierarchy to world-systems other than the modern world-system is itself somewhat controversial (Bairoch 1975; O’Brien 1982; Stern 1988a, 1988b; Wallerstein 1988). The economic historian Paul Bairoch (1986) argues that premodern core/periphery relations were unimportant because differences in the level of living between the populations of core and peripheral areas were minimal, at least compared to the large gap that has emerged during the industrialization of modern Europe. Most historians of the ancient empires would disagree with the statement that core/periphery relations were unimportant. Although a sizable portion of both core and peripheral populations lived close to the level of subsistence, important differences in social structure did exist. Some scholars have claimed that the extraction of resources from peripheral peoples was necessary for the maintenance of ancient states and empires (e.g., Eisenstadt 1969; Ekholm 1980). However, the large difference in internal stratification between core and peripheral areas that Bairoch noted may turn out to be an important structural difference between the modern world-system and earlier world-systems. Though in the modern world-system there is typically less in-

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come inequality among households within core societies than within peripheral societies, this relationship was undoubtedly the reverse in many of the ancient world-systems, in which the core was an urbanized and class-stratified society and the periphery contained less-stratified groups of pastoralists and horticulturalists.

We distinguish two aspects of core/periphery relations. The first we call core/ periphery differentiation, in which societies at different levels of complexity and population density are in interaction with each other within the same world-system as we defined it earlier. The second we call core/ periphery hierarchy, in which political, economic, or ideological domination exists among different societies within the same world-system. This includes political domination and unequal exchange as well as extraction of resources through raiding, taxation, and tribute. We are also inter-

ested in cultural definitions of superiority/inferiority and how these may interact with more objective forms of exploitation and domination. We distinguish between differentiation and hierarchy because we think it is mistaken to assume that all relations among “more developed” and “less developed” societies involve exploitation and/or processes of the development of underdevelopment.8 Indeed, there may be cases in which domination exists between societies at nearly the same level of complexity or even cases in which the “less complex” society dominates a “more complex” society. On the one hand, we seek to analyze how differences within societies or regions such as size, complexity, technological productivity, and internal stratification are related to intersocietal domination. On the other hand, we wish to study the effects of variations in core/periphery relations on the nature, longevity, and kinds of social change in both core and peripheral societies or regions. We intentionally omit consideration of the nature of what is produced and traded between cores and peripheries in our definition of these concepts. The notion that coreness and peripherality in the modern world-system are essentially constituted around a division of labor in which the core produces manufactured goods and the periphery produces raw materials is itself controversial (Chase-Dunn 1989, chap. 10; Martin 1994a). Furthermore, important reversals of this relationship sometimes occurred within ancient world-systems. Kohl (1987a, 1987b) cites evidence that in the ancient Mesopotamian world-system, steatite (soapstone) bowls were manufactured on the peripheral Iranian plateau

and traded to the core cities of the Mesopotamian lowland in exchange for food. This is the reverse of the core manufacturing/peripheral raw materials division of labor typical of the modern world-system. The explanation for it is relatively straightforward. In the absence of cheap bulk transportation it is easier to move already manufactured goods to the core than to move the raw materials there. The point is that the patterns of core/periphery relations found in the modern world-system may not be typical of earlier world-systems. Such differences should be the foci of comparative investigation. This can best be pursued by not building these distinctions into our definition of core/periphery relations. Rather, we need to investigate the linkages between intersocietal differentiation and core/periphery

Defining World-Systems / 37

domination in each case. We also hold that the question of the nature and degree of systemic interaction between two locales is prior to the question of core/periphery relations. Mitchell Allen (1996, chap. 1) has developed the concept of a “contested periphery,” a peripheral region for which one or more core regions compete. On the basis

of an elaborate case-study of Philistia and its relations to the Neo-Assyrian and Egyptian world-systems, he finds that once an area has been incorporated into one world-system it can more easily be moved into another world-system than if it were being incorporated for the first time. Not surprisingly, contested peripheries have more leverage in responding to core demands. Furthermore, what is a periphery to one core region can become a semiperiphery to another. If such a region provides access to valuable resources or other cores, it can often leverage this control into a semiperipheral relationship. (This issue is further discussed in Chapter 5.) We also need to rethink the idea of the semiperiphery. As with coreness and peripherality, the definition of the semiperiphery remains controversial even within the modern world-system (Chase-Dunn 1980, 1988, 1989, chap. 10, 1990a; Arrighi 1985; Arrighi and Drangel 1986). When applied to premodern settings, the semiperiphery concept is even more problematic. What kinds of semiperipheries have existed? What roles have they played in the reproduction or transformation of each system? Have some core/periphery structures had no semiperipheries? Have others had multiple semiperipheral layers? We advocate that the semiperiphery be defined suffciently broadly to encompass all of the following meanings: 1. A semiperipheral region may be one that mixes both core and peripheral forms of organization. 2. A semiperipheral region may be spatially located between core and peripheral regions. 3. A semiperipheral region may be spatially located between two or more competing core regions.? 4. Mediating activities between core and peripheral areas may be carried out in semiperipheral regions. 5. A semiperipheral area may be one in which institutional features are in some ways intermediate between those forms found in core and periphery. Sorting out these different types of semiperipheries remains an empirical as well as

a theoretical problem. Until more detailed comparisons among different kinds of world-systems are completed, it would be premature to define the semiperiphery concept more narrowly. It is not wise to assume a priori that all core/periphery hierarchies have three distinct tiers. The existence or nonexistence of one or more middle tiers should be determined empirically, as should the roles those tiers play in system reproduction or transformation.!° We discuss the role of the semiperiphery in

the development of world-systems in greater detail in Chapter 5. We now turn to some of the difficulties in operationalizing these concepts.

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Measurement Problems Undoubtedly we must operationalize the concepts of world-systems and core/ periphery relations in various ways for different cases. Still, we must think about how to operationalize concepts in ways that facilitate comparisons of cases in order to test general propositions. Comparable measures will be especially important for studies that compare several world-systems using formal methods. We may find that it is necessary to use different empirical criteria for bounding world-systems depending on the type of system being analyzed. Though this would be somewhat messy, at least it would make the analytic comparison of very different world-systems possible. Our multicriteria conceptualization of boundaries requires us to examine the spatial properties of exchange and interaction networks. We also

need to consider methods for determining the fall-off of the consequences of events. Archaeological methods for examining trade networks are rather well developed.

One method is to look for typological similarities in artifacts and to assume that these reflect interaction. This is useful, but it can also be problematic because of Galton's problem in reverse: Typological similarities can emerge due to independent invention or what is sometimes called parallel evolution rather than because of interac-

tion.!! Similarly, it may not be possible to distinguish empirically between the spread of an idea and of a related material object. For instance, did stirrups themselves spread rapidly throughout Eurasia, or only the knowledge that such a device was a significant enhancement to mounted combat? Archaeologists have made great strides in the sourcing of materials, which allows precise determination of the origins of several kinds of lithic materials, ceramics, some kinds of shells, some types of metals, and occasionally of skeletal remains through DNA analysis. For example, it possible to determine the chemical fingerprint of obsidian (volcanic glass) from a particular natural source location. Once this is known, the distribution across different archaeological sites of this kind of obsidian may be determined. If several different sources of obsidian were used for the manufacture of projectile points, the overlapping networks of distribution from these sources may ve determined. Since it is also possible to date the working of obsidian by measuring the thickness of the hydration rind, it is possible to study changes over time in the networks of obsidian distribution (see, e.g., Hughes 1986, 1989). Testing hypotheses about the operation of core/periphery hierarchies requires, ideally, that we be able to compare degrees of intersocietal exploitation and of the stability of core/periphery hierarchies. Further, we distinguish two types of interaction effects, following Myrdal (1971). Under some circumstances core-periphery interaction causes peripheral areas to become more corelike. We call these spread effects. Other sorts of interactions may cause development of underdevelopment in peripheral areas. We call these backwash effects. We would like to compare rates of intersocietal mobility and the relative balance of spread and backwash effects for

Defining World-Systems / 39

differential rates of development between cores and peripheries. These operational problems have not yet been resolved even for the contemporary global world-system. Nevertheless, we want to designate clearly the desiderata of a general comparative research project so that case studies may be undertaken with these purposes in mind. The problems of measuring differences in the magnitude of inequalities across social systems are well known. When the kinds of resources that are socially valued differ and the dimensions of inequality are structured in completely different ways, statements about relative degrees of overall inequality are problematic. This is just as true of intersocietal inequalities as of intrasocietal inequalities. Though it is often possible to rank objects within a system, such rank orderings do not help with the question of the magnitude of inequalities. For this, interval or ratio level measurement is required. Nevertheless, rough estimations of differential magnitudes of intrasocietal inequalities have been made convincingly by Lenski (1966) across very different societal types (e.g., hunter-gatherer, horticultural, agrarian, and industrial). We propose to make analogous “guesstimates” of degrees of inequality across very different core/periphery hierarchies. The problem of indicators of core/periphery inequality has been considered by some archaeologists. Often it is simply assumed that archaeological indicators of core/periphery differentiation may be taken as evidence of core/periphery hierarchy. For example, the existence of a settlement system in which villages and towns are of substantially unequal population sizes may be interpreted as indicating hierarchical interaction between large and small settlements (e.g., Nissen 1988). As many archaeologists have recognized, differentiation may exist without domination (e.g., Renfrew and Cherry 1986). Not all exchange is unequal exchange. Looking for more direct archaeological evidence for core/periphery domination is challenging. Lamberg-Karlovsky (1975) has argued that the village of Tepe Yahya on the Iranian plateau (where carved soapstone bowls were manufactured and exported to the Sumerian cities) must have been subjected to unequal exchange because burials did not become richer at Tepe Yahya over the long period during which trade occurred. This case contrasts with many others in which involvement in regional ex-

change networks did lead to increased local stratification as indicated by the emergence of richer burials (e.g., Marfoe 1987). Such observations might be used to differentiate between nonexploitative and exploitative intersocietal interactions and to study the trajectory of interactions within particular world-systems. The use of mortuary evidence may, however, encounter grave problems. Wealthier Native Californians were cremated, while the remains of poorer villagers were buried. In this case the appearance of more elaborate burials could mean less rather than greater local stratification. Of course, there are causes of changes in burial practices other than the nature of intersocietal interaction. Although archaeologists have made amazing strides in the use of recoverable results to develop indicators of the spatial structure and the social form of exchange (Schortman and Urban 1987, 49-55), archaeological evidence alone is often quite

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problematic for the kind of inferences we want to make. This is why it is important to study cases for which archaeological data may be combined with historical documentary or ethnographic evidence. Now that we have defined the concepts we are using and considered some of the problems of operationalization, we turn to a discussion of the theoretical scope of comparative world-systems analysis and present some general hypotheses about similarities and differences across this universe of world-systems.

3 Two, Three, Many World-Systems

In this chapter we begin by presenting our working typology of world-systems as a tool for making comparisons. We then use that typology and the discussions in the previous chapters to derive four sets of hypotheses about world-systems. Finally, we delineate how we bound world-systems spatially and conclude with a sketch of how a theory of world-system transformations might be constructed.

A Working Typology of World-Systems We base this typology on our discussion of modes of accumulation and on distinctions in recent literature on social evolution and historical development. These categories are not fixed boxes into which a complex set of intersocietal networks must be stuffed. Rather, they are a set of general signposts to guide comparisons across the immense variety of world-systems. The smallest and earliest world-systems have kin-based, normative modes of accumulation. In world-systems without classes or states or markets, kin-based mechanisms of control and distribution are the predominant sources of social cohesion. We strongly disagree with Patricia Crone’s (1986, 1989) characterization of these societies as based on “natural” or “biological” relationships such as age and gender. Kin ties, age groups, and gender relations are socially constructed in all human societies. These institutions are composed of cultural agreements about the nature of roles, role obligations, and rights. The crucial institution here is language and symbolic meaning.! Kin-based societies are normatively regulated because culturally agreedupon understandings constitute the basic glue of the social order, and these are not backed up by states or market integration. In state-based and market modes, other types of integration take the determinative role in regulating social relations. This does not mean, however, that kinship, age, and gender cease to have social importance. Rather, we emphasize that normative factors become secondary in shaping social relations. How this transition occurs, how many times it has occurred, and the range of flexibility of the transformations remain important problems.” The tributary mode of accumulation entails the use of organized coercion to mobilize labor. A ruling class establishes control over some essential social resource and 41

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then uses this control to extract “surplus product” from direct producers. There are many different institutional forms by which this has been accomplished—for example, taxation, tribute, serfdom, slavery, corvée, and so on. Most historical systems in which tributary accumulation was predominant mixed a variety of these forms of surplus appropriation. Many of these systems also included elements of both kinbased and market forms of integration, but in ways that reinforced the fundamental coercive state-based logic of the tributary mode. The capitalist mode of accumulation is based on the commodity form—the mediation of human interaction by price-setting markets, and marketlike institutions. The commodification of goods, land, wealth, and labor are never complete within capitalist systems, but here markets play a much greater role than in systems dominated by other modes. Aspects of other modes continue to be found, but they generally supplement the reproduction of commodified relations. Thus, most world-systems contain more than the predominant mode of accumulation. For instance, most tributary systems contain an urban sector that has an important price-setting market and a rural sector that mobilizes labor through kin obligations. Each such sector, viewed in narrow isolation, might appear to be capitalist or kin-based, respectively. In broader view, though, each sector is embedded within a system in which state-based coercion is the predominant form of integration. We wish to distinguish between world-systems in which kin-based, state-based, and capitalist modes of production are predominant without denying the possibility that some parts of some overall systems have characteristics that resemble other modes. By utilizing these distinctions we are in no way endorsing a unilinear model of evolution. Historical development is open-ended and path dependent. That is, it operates on a social structure provided by historical legacy within the confines of its current context. Important bifurcations and discontinuities of development, rapid transformations, and instances of devolution are normal characteristics of the historical processes of social change (see Lenski 1976; Sanderson 1990, 1995a). Our argument that world-systems are the primary unit of analysis for understanding these processes does not vitiate the importance of processes that operate within societies. A world-system is composed not only of intersocietal interactions but also of the totality of interactions that constitute the whole social, economic, and political system. In order to study the processes and patterns by which modes of production become transformed, we present a working typology of world-systems based on the modes of accumulation introduced in the preceding chapters. This typology is not a replacement for the study of very long sequences of historical change in particular regions. Nor is it a means of spatially bounding world-systems. Rather, it is a tool for organizing comparison.

I. Kin-based mode dominant A. Stateless, classless 1. Sedentary foragers, horticulturalists, pastoralists 2. Big-man systems

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B. Chiefdoms (classes but not states)

II. Tributary modes dominant (states, cities)4 A. Primary state-based world-systems (Mesopotamia, Egypt, Indus Valley, Ganges Valley, China, Precolumbian Mexico and Peru) B. Primary empires in which a number of previously autonomous states have been unified by conquest (Agade, Old Kingdom Egypt, Magahda, Chou, Teotihuacan, Huari) C. Multicentered world-systems composed of empires, states, and peripheral regions (Near East, India, China, Mesoamerica, Peru) D. Commercializing state-based world-systems in which important aspects of commodification have developed but the system is still dominated by the logic of the tributary modes (Afroeurasian world-system, including Roman, Indian, and Chinese core regions)

III. Capitalist mode dominant A. The Europe-centered subsystem since the seventeenth century B. The global modern world-system The smallest autonomous polities were nomadic foraging groups. These groups usually consisted of a cluster of families who generally lived together and associated with other such groups that shared language and culture. Anthropologists call such groups bands. Band membership was somewhat fluid. The intersocietal relations among many of these were a series of overlapping networks, each with a band at the center, with relationships fading with distance, shaped by terrain and resource availability. We include such systems in the scope of world-system comparisons. Thus Paleolithic nomads constitute fluid and moving world-systems in which constituent groups competed for territory. But territorialism as well as the processes of competition and cooperation that we associate with territorial groups became much more sustained and organized once groups became sedentarized. These first sedentary societies were frequently in interaction with nomads, and so world-systems with sedentary villagers exhibit a pattern of nomadsedentary relations that was important for millennia in the development of larger and more hierarchical systems. Hence we begin our comparative study of world-systems with those sedentary foragers (complex hunter-gatherers) who lived most of the year in hamlets.5 Often called tribelets, these groups usually consisted of a single village but sometimes included two or three villages under the nominal “leadership” of a single headman. A headman is a leader by virtue of personal charisma and respected abilities, typically in oratory, mediation, hunting, and fighting. He leads by influence. Typically, tribelets defined communal territorial boundaries and engaged in regularized intergroup relations that constituted very small world-systems. As population density increased, foraging strategies sometimes became more diversified and intensification of production sometimes occurred, giving rise to horticultural or pastoral groups.

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| Big-man systems sometimes emerged where there were pressures to increase coordination among groups. A big man is a leader who operates by persuasion and prestige and whose prestige is based on his ability to influence his followers to amass wealth for give-away ceremonies. A big man is more powerful than a headman, but less powerful than a chief (see Sahlins 1963). In classless societies, relatively small inequalities of power, prestige, and wealth are based almost entirely on culturally defined age and gender criteria. Sometimes a big man succeeded in institutionalizing access to substantial social re-

sources, giving him coercive power. His resources would then be somewhat autonomous from the control of other lineage heads. Typically, but not always, his office was hereditary. Under these conditions he is called a chief. A chiefdom is a stratified polity that relies on generalized institutions for regional coordination and control. It usually has a hierarchical kinship structure that legitimates chiefly authority. Chiefdoms are distinguished from less stratified stateless societies by the size of the polity, population density, intensification of production, and, obviously, the degree of internal stratification. Complex chiefdoms are larger stratified polities. In some chiefdoms a noble class—a group of people with shared and distinctive politicoeconomic interests—formed, which had increasing control over basic societal resources (land, water, trade, and so on). Such a class uses politically institutionalized means to appropriate surplus product based on the labor of direct producers. In chiefdoms the institutional basis of this appropriation is a kinship order in which lineages are ranked or genealogical seniority is specified.

We include under the heading “kin-based mode dominant” all those world-systems in which none of the societies may be said to have had states; here kinship is the predominant mode of accumulation. This category includes a wide variety of types, often labeled as “tribes” in common parlance. This practice is unfortunate because the use of a single term implies a kind of unity of form that is far from the truth. Some anthropologists use the term tribe more narrowly to describe those groups that range from large big-man systems to small chiefdoms (see Fried 1975 for a more detailed discussion). There is a similar confusion with regard to the term “chief,” which in common parlance is used for headman, big man, and chief as we defined it above. The formation of states marks a clear watershed in societal and world-system or-

ganization. A state (following Johnson and Earle 1987, 246) is a regionally organized society with specialized regional institutions—military and bureaucratic—that perform the tasks of control and management. A state is distinguished from a complex chiefdom by the degree to which specialized control organizations not based on kinship have developed. A key problem in historical development is how chiefdoms and states first developed out of less hierarchical kin-based societies. The causal relationship between primary state formation and class formation has been the focus of a long and vociferous debate among anthropologists (e.g., Fried 1967, 1975; Service 1975; Carneiro 1970, 1978, 1981). We follow many anthropologists in adopting the important distinction

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between pristine or primary states (which developed without contact with other prior existing states) and reactive or secondary states (which developed in interaction with other states). The same distinction can, of course, be applied to empires, and we do so in category II-B of our typology.®

Much of the work done on the emergence of primary chiefdoms and primary states has not considered explicitly that these developments occurred within the context of existing intersocietal networks and core/periphery relations. But some of the literature does consider the interactional and regional context in which primary state formation occurred.” Contrary to any simple functional theory of state formation, the archaeological evidence indicates that increases in social hierarchies are problematic and conflict-ridden. Some of the evidence about the rise and fall of chiefdoms is summarized in Michael Mann’s essay on “how prehistoric peoples evaded power” (1986, chap. 2). Patricia Crone (1986) argues that primary state formation occurred only twice in human history, once in Mesopotamia and once in Mesoamerica. Contrary to our list in item IJ-A above, she argues that state formation in Egypt, the Indus Valley, the Ganges Valley, China, and Peru were secondary, having been importantly stimulated by the prior developments in Lower Mesopotamia and Mexico.8 Crone’s emphasis

on kinship as a “natural” form of social order leads her to distinguish between “tribal” and “temple” economies. She argues that primary state formation in Mesopotamia and Mexico took the form of “temple economies,” in which religion constituted a new form of social organization that did not utilize kinship as its basis. All producers were seen as slaves of god, including political leaders. Thus, according to Crone, the first states were “egalitarian.” As competition, especially warfare, increased between city-states, military leaders were able to displace religious leaders. One major defect of this explanation is the lack of an account for the origin of the new religions. There is evidence that these religions were vehicles for the seizure of social

power via control of specialized knowledge necessary to operate production systems. The portrayal of primary state formation as “egalitarian” falls easily into functionalism. The theory of circumscription proposed by Carneiro (1970) and developed by Mann (1986) and Johnson and Earle (1987) takes local and regional social structures into account and is a much more persuasive explanation of primary state formation. According to the circumscription hypothesis, intensification of the production of food normally leads to population growth and increased pressure on local resources. If people have access to new regions in which production processes with which they

are familiar can be undertaken, they will migrate. State formation occurs when no outlet exists for emigration (a condition of circumscription) and so consequent population pressure sustains increasing competition for scarce resources. This kind of competition leads to conflict and endemic warfare. Conflict can be reduced through the erection of hierarchical structures (states) that enforce the social peace and regulate the use of resources.

This approach can also fall into a functionalist mode. Obviously some members of society benefit more than others when states emerge. The uneven, rise-and-fall na-

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ture of state formation indicates that the process is anything but smooth. Mann’s principle that people will try to evade power is evinced in the emergence of class conflict and conflict among elite groups vying for power in the new states. These states also contend with each other for access to trade routes and for opportunities to obtain raw materials from distant sources. A division of labor between core producers and peripheral hinterlands emerges and becomes another arena of struggle. The transition from “temple economy” to militarized city-states mentioned by Crone is consistent with this scenario of increasing competition. This process operated differently to some extent in each instance of primary state formation. Early empire formation in the valley of the Nile was facilitated by topography. A key centralizable resource, control of riverine transport and communications was fairly simply accomplished by a single political organization—the Egyptian state. The less centralizable transportation network of Mesopotamia operated to sustain a multicentric inter-city-state system for hundreds of years. What at times confuses discussions of the larger context of state formation is the role of nomadic peoples. Once states existed, nomadic groups were greatly trans-

formed by their interactions with states. It is for this reason that we must be extremely cautious in using more recent historical knowledge of nomad-sedentary interactions in our efforts to explain the origins of primary states.9 Studies of nomad-sedentary relations demonstrate that nomadic groups, whether foragers or pastoralists, often oscillated between trading and raiding. This is because city-dwellers and nomads produced very different types of goods and were subject to very different patterns of stress and volatility (see Cribb 1991, chap. 3). Nomad raids prompted the development of defensive mechanisms on the part of urbanized core societies, both passive (walled cities) and active (armies and, after the domestication

of horses, cavalries). Military organizations that had been developed for defense against nomads were often also useful against sedentary neighbors, leading to a situation of continual military competition. The specifics of such competition, its vari-

ability, and its consequences for further historical development remain empirical problems. A key point here is that we must examine the entire interaction system if we are to understand these transformations. Within category II (tributary modes dominant) there are a number of distinctions that need to be explained. We hypothesize that primary state-based world-systems were politically structured as interstate systems of competing city-states within a core region. Secondary multicentric empire systems are distinguished from primary empire systems by the prior existence of empires and often by the larger size of the constituent empires. The commercializing Afroeurasian world-system is distinguished from most earlier systems by its size, the existence of widely separated core regions, and most important, the increasing commodification of goods, land, wealth, and labor. The use of money spread to the day-to-day lives of common people with the development of smaller standardized denominations of coins. Forms of credit and interest became widespread and important. Wage labor and other semicommodified forms of labor

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control became more common. Price-setting markets and commodity production for sale became more widespread within the political economy. Within empires, rulers became somewhat more sophisticated about the way in which they taxed merchants and commodity producers so as not to “kill the golden goose.” Outside the

bounds of empires, in interstitial semiperipheral regions, autonomous city-states controlled by merchant and production capitalists created and sustained market relations between empires and peripheral regions. The degree of commodification increased, but unevenly and not in the same way in each area. There were spurts ahead and then either devolution to subsistence feudalism or reassertion of imperial control of the economy. The coming to predominance of capitalism in a core region was a tipping point that nearly occurred first in

Sung and Ming China (Fitzpatrick 1992). The differential impact of the Mongol Empire stalled capitalist development in China and created the opportunity for Europe, a former peripheral region, to emerge as the first regional system in which capitalism was the predominant mode of accumulation. The expanding European system then spread capitalism around the world. We do not want our typology to generate a lot of dispute about which cases go into which categories. Obviously there are many borderline cases for which it is difhcult to decide. Rather, the point is to define a set of types that will allow us to investigate the problem of structural similarities and differences. A complementary ap-

proach would be to analyze very long historical sequences that include the transformations of the social structural characteristics that we are using to distinguish among our types. This would eliminate the problem of “transitional” cases and would focus attention on those major transformations that must be studied in order to provide a comparative basis for understanding the possibilities of fundamental change in our own time. We contend that the job of mapping out structural similarities and differences is logically prior to the analysis of processes of transformation. We now present some general questions and working hypotheses that emerge from our comparative approach.

Questions and Hypotheses The most general questions for a comparative study of world-systems are:

1. Do all world-systems have core/periphery differentiation and/or core/periphery hierarchies?

2. Do the stability, magnitude, and nature of core/periphery relations vary systematically with the types of societies that compose world-systems? 3. What is the relationship between core/periphery differentiation and core/ periphery hierarchy within single world-systems and over the range of worldsystem types?

4, What are the relationships between core/periphery structures and processes and the reproduction/transformation of basic systemic logics?

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5. What are the similarities and differences between sequences of political centralization and decentralization across different kinds of world-systems?

Intersocietal networks in which the constituent societies are all at about the same level of complexity do not have core/periphery differentiation as defined above. Nevertheless, they may evince core/periphery hierarchy if some of these societies exploit or dominate others. Do all world-systems have relatively stable core/periphery hierarchies in the sense that some societies exploit or dominate others over extended periods of time? This involves consideration of the nature, degree, and longevity of in-

tersocietal exploitation and domination. In addition, it is desirable to consider differential rates of development, “coevolution,” the development of underdevelopment, and processes affecting these to determine if and how socially structured intersocietal relations may produce these results. Also of interest are the relative sizes of core, peripheral, and semiperipheral areas and the nature of relations among core societies and among peripheral societies.

Hypothesis 1 Our first hypothesis is that stable relations of intersocietal domination are difficult to create and reproduce in the absence of hierarchical social institutions within the societies involved. The development of internal stratification and forms of the state are

quite important for the stabilization and reproduction of core/periphery exploitation, and vice versa. Thus we hypothesize that kin-based intersocietal systems had only minimal and short-lived core/periphery hierarchies. We expect that those world-systems composed of chiefless sedentary foragers did not have any regularized intersocietal domination or exploitation. We suppose that intersocietal exploitation among sedentary foraging groups is limited to episodic raiding and competition over favorable natural sites. When these egalitarian societies became involved in interaction with more hierarchical societies, they may have engaged in raiding for captives to trade. War-captive slavery in these societies did not usually create a permanent class of slave producers because slaves must be incorporated into existing kinship networks if their labor is to be mobilized. Kinship networks of this kind bestow rights as well as obligations, and so slaves did not usually form a permanent class of exploited producers (Patterson 1982).! Kristiansen (1982, 1987, 1991) has studied local and regional hierarchical relations among Bronze-Age chiefdoms in Scandinavia. Although he uses the terms core and periphery to describe these relations, he characterizes them as based on the “rit-

ual superiority” of local centers over hinterlands based on the control of prestige goods. Friedman and Rowlands (1977) have argued that core/periphery structures based solely on prestige-goods economies are relatively unstable. To some extent this is because it may be difficult for the elites to monopolize the importation of prestige goods. Control of a periphery by a core that is based solely on the supply of prestige goods or ritual superiority is likely to be unstable. This is because peripheral areas

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may readily substitute other goods, or they may adopt core-like characteristics when the ideological structure of intersocietal stratification is not backed up by military coercion or more stringent dependencies on nonreplaceable goods. Prestige-goods hierarchies and religious hierarchies are more subject to redefinition by oppressed groups, whereas military advantages and monopolies of basic foods or raw materials are less easily outmaneuvered. Katherine Spielmann’s (1989, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c) discussion of Plains-Pueblo interactions is of considerable interest here. She delineates two ways in which exchange between what had theretofore been relatively autonomous groups could have developed into systemic exchange (core/periphery differentiation in our terms). The first scenario, which she favors, is mutualism, in which sedentary horticulturalists (the Pueblo peoples) engaged in systematic exchange with nomadic hunters (Plains groups) in such a way that the total caloric intake over the necessary variety of food types mutually benefited both Plains and Pueblos. The second possible explanation, favored by Wilcox (1991) and Baugh (1991), is buffering, in which sedentary agriculturalists used exchange with nomadic hunters to buffer volatile production results in marginal horticultural lands. The latter characterization suggests the possibility of unequal exchange and the existence of a kind of core/periphery hierarchy. The ability to differentiate empirically between equal exchange and exploitation is one of the most challenging problems for world-systems research. Core-periphery relations differ in their effects on the interacting societies in different world-systems. Under some circumstances, core-periphery interactions cause spread effects, whereas other sorts of interactions cause backwash effects. It is not entirely clear at this point which conditions promote spread effects and which conditions promote backwash effects. The following two hypotheses suggest some general patterns.

Hypothesis 2 Our second hypothesis is that the stability and exploitativeness of core/periphery hierarchies increase with the degree of stratification within core societies and with the development of “techniques of power” (Mann 1986), which enable centralized empires to extract taxes and tribute from peripheral regions. Specialized military organization, logistics, strategy, and weaponry as well as organizational techniques for ruling distant provinces and extracting tribute and taxes are the key institutions that allow core domination to work. We hypothesize that primary states were more successful at extracting resources from peripheral areas than kin-based cores, but still not as successful as later, more centralized, empires. Furthermore, in early state systems, spread effects due to interaction with original core areas (Schortman and Urban 1987; Renfrew and Cherry 1986) were relatively strong in comparison with backwash effects. This was because the techniques for concentrating and sustaining resources in the core were less developed than in later empires.!!

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Thus we further hypothesize that core/periphery hierarchies were relatively more stable, more hierarchical, and more underdevelopmental for peripheral regions once centralized empires emerged and perfected their techniques of power.

Hypothesis 3 Our third hypothesis is that the expansion of long-distance exchange and the growth of market forms of exchange and monetary systems increased spread effects relative to backwash effects. Peripheral regions were able to adopt the social and technological features of core regions more quickly once long-distance trade became more intensified and commodified. The more sophisticated empires learned to extract surplus from market trade without smothering it. Empires that provided pacification and protected trade routes strengthened spread effects.!2 Commercialized states also learned to control some of the disruptive aspects of market relations. Ancient core/periphery hierarchies were often central to the reproduction of centralized state apparatuses. Keith Hopkins (1978b) contends that the Roman Empire was a system that, like capitalism, needed to expand in order to survive. But unlike the capitalist world-economy, its expansion was based almost exclusively on the conquest and exploitation of peripheral regions. The importation of booty and slaves and the distribution of land and dependent laborers to a growing class of nonproducers were the major dynamic forces causing growth in the Roman system. When

the empire reached a zero rate of return in terms of spatial expansion it was no longer able to provide the resources necessary to sustain its growing overhead costs.

It then began to turn in upon itself, and eventually crumbled. Hopkins’s model, which is similar to the analysis of Anderson (1974a), sees the “barbarian invasions” as exogenous shocks that conjuncturally dismembered a state that was already falling from its own contradictions. However, the analysis of Eurasia as a single world-system of which the Roman Empire was a part casts the barbarian invasions in a new light (see Chapter 8). In China the mode of accumulation was “tributary” in the sense that coercive power was used to extract surplus product from peasants, but this accumulation was

, accomplished with little exploitation of peripheral regions. At the eastern end of the Eurasian system the periphery regularly exploited the core for the two millennia between around 500 B.C.E. and 1500 C.E. and had major effects on the development of Chinese civilization (Barfield 1989; see also Chapter 8). Whether as a source of exploitable resources or military threats, peripheral regions were important to the reproduction and transformation of social structures within the core regions of the classical world.

The emergent predominance of capitalism in the Europe-centered subsystem pro-

duced a core/periphery hierarchy in which the gap between core and periphery rapidly increased. This occurred because technological change was much more rapid than it had been in systems dominated by the tributary mode. This was due to the historically unique effects of capitalism on incentives for revolutionizing technology.

Two, Three, Many World-Systems / 51

Capitalism also protected the interstate system against empire formation by substituting the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers for the rise and fall of corewide empires (see Chase-Dunn 1990b). This helped to sustain the high rate of technological innovation and implementation. The core/periphery gap in the modern world-system is a relative one in which peripheral areas do develop, but at much slower rates than the core. Regarding the matter of core/periphery relations and transformations of the mode of accumulation, world-system theory contends that capitalism is buffered from its own developmental contradictions by the core/periphery hierarchy (Chase-Dunn 1989, chap. 11). This implies that peripheral capitalism and core exploitation of the periphery should be understood as necessary and constitutive parts of the capitalist mode of accumulation. The modern core/periphery hierarchy acts to sustain the multipolity structure of the core (the interstate system) and to disorganize those political forces within core states that would try to transform capitalism into socialism. This last consequence is accomplished primarily by sustaining national class alliances between labor and capital within core states. This alliance is cemented by intracore rivalry and peripheral exploitation.

Hypothesis 4 Many semiperipheral regions have played important roles in large-scale social change. We hypothesize that this is because of the organizational opportunities available to groups who are “in the middle” of core/periphery hierarchies. Semiperipheral regions, we argue, are unusually fertile zones for social innovation because they can combine peripheral and core elements in new ways, and they are less constrained by core domination than are peripheral areas, and less committed than older core re-

gions to the institutional baggage that comes with core status. We expect that the particular techniques used by upwardly mobile semiperipheries vary depending on the nature of the world-system in which they are operating. Four types of semiperipheral development are delineated in Chapter 5.

°°°

These working hypotheses form a starting point for systematic empirical investiga-

tion of the evolution of world-systems. By redefining world-systems in general terms, we propose to sort out the important similarities and differences that ought to be the explicit backdrop for understanding past transformations and future human possibilities. Not everything is different now, nor is everything the same. In order to know which things are importantly different and which things are importantly the same, it is helpful to have a systematic theoretical framework for comparing worldsystems. Eventually it will be necessary to compare formally large numbers of worldsystems in order to evaluate hypotheses about similarities, differences, and the causal connections between structures and transformations.

52 / Two, Three, Many World-Systems

Now that we have explained our comparative framework, we must address the problem of spatially bounding world-systems.

Spatial Boundaries: A Multicriteria Approach We follow those theorists who study interaction networks rather than those who study distributions of cultural or social traits. The latter do not address the problem of interconnectedness. In general we think that it is presumptuous to argue that some forms of interaction are always causally more important for social change than others. Since the relative importance of different types of interaction probably varies across different kinds of systems, statements about relative importance should be the

result of research, not its initial assumptions. On the basis of our discussion in Chapter 1, we propose using four types of exchanges or interactions for bounding criteria:

¢ bulk-goods network (BGN) * prestige-goods network (PGN) ° political/military network (PMN) ¢ information network (IN)

Both economic and political forms of interaction are important features of all world-system networks. We agree with Wallerstein (1974a, 1974b, 1979a) that bulk-goods exchanges are very important and constitutive forms of interconnection, but we also agree with Schneider (1977) that luxury goods, especially when they are used in a prestige-goods economy, are very important for the reproduction of power structures. Intermarriage networks are also central institutions of interconnectedness in most systems, but especially in kin-based systems, where the exchange of marriage partners is a fundamental basis of geopolitics and geoeconomics. We also agree with Tilly (1984, 62) and Wilkinson (1987a, 1987b) that political interconnections are

important. We employ the criterion of regularized political-military conflict proposed by Wilkinson. Often this will produce a network different from the bulkgoods and prestige-goods networks. Following the insights of Schortman and Urban

(1987), discussions of civilizationists (Melko and Scott 1987; Melko 1995), and Jerry Bentley's (1993) masterful survey of cross-cultural encounters in Eurasia, we note that networks of information in a variety of forms, including ideology, religion, and technical information, must also be included as a bounding mechanism. We do not expect the information network to coincide with any of the other networks. Hence all regularized material and social exchanges should be included as criteria for bounding world-systems. This formulation makes it necessary to consider how relatively localized networks of bulk-goods exchange, intermarriage, and political interaction are embedded within larger networks of prestige-goods exchange in many systems. We must also consider the relationship of the information network to the other networks.

Two, Three, Many World-Systems / 53

The use of multiple bounding criteria often will result in nested levels of system boundedness. Generally, bulk goods will compose the smallest regional interaction net. Political/military interaction will compose a larger net that may include more than one bulk-goods net, and prestige-goods exchanges will link even larger regions that may contain one or more political/military nets (see Figure 3.1). We expect the information net to be of the same order of size as the prestige goods net: sometimes larger, sometimes smaller. At first it may seem counterintuitive to have the information boundary inside the prestige goods exchange, since exchange of goods typically implies some exchange of information. There are, however, well-known mechanisms by which goods can be exchanged beyond the range of information. First is down-the-line trade. When trade goes from partner to partner, the physical objects may move along unaltered, but information typically will be garbled and lost. Anyone who has observed the transformations of a phrase whispered from person to person recognizes how quickly information may be lost. Occasionally, when warfare is severe, the political/military boundary may cut the flow of information even while prestige goods may effectively cross the boundary via circuitous down-the-line exchanges (this is indicated in Figure 3.1 by the lobe of the information net in the lower right that coincides with one political/military net). The bulk-goods net of the Roman Empire was smaller than the system of regularized military interactions of which the Romans were a part. The prestige-goods network, utilizing the “Silk Roads,” linked the Chinese, Indian, and Roman core re-

gions into an Afroeurasian PGN. Finally, sometimes missionaries or explorers regularly carried information beyond the bounds of prestige or luxury goods exchange (see Chapter 8). Rather than to apply the term world-system to only one of these types of linkage and using other words for the others, we propose that entire world-systems are constituted by all of these forms of linkage. In order to be clear, we will use terms that indicate the interaction networks we are studying. Thus we shall refer to bulk-goods

networks (BGNs), prestige-goods networks (PGNs), political/military networks (PMNs), and information networks (INs). All of these nets in combination constitute an entire world-system. We do not claim that the networks will always be nested in the fashion described. Indeed, the relative sizes of these four boundary criteria remain a theoretical and empirical problem. Occasionally, as in both the modern global world-system and some earlier geographically isolated systems (e.g., the Hawaiian Islands), these four networks converge. This convergence may be an important characteristic that differentiates some world-systems from others. In many cases the boundaries of these networks may be fuzzy. It will be necessary to define degrees of connectedness and to study the importance of different sorts of connections for social change. Here again, further empirical research will guide the specification of network boundaries.

We use the notion of fall-off to bound world-systems. Thus, as described in Chapter 1, world-systems are best bounded on a “group-centric” rather than a

54 / Two, Three, Many World-Systems

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The chronograph in Figure 10.1 shows when the several separate PMNs became integrated into the Central PMN. Our Figure 10.1 is based on Wilkinson's (1987b, 32) chronograph, but it differs in some details. Our figure shows the emergence in North America of an early state-based political/military network, the Mississippian

PMN, centered at Cahokia (East St. Louis). Wilkinson (1992, 86) is unsure of whether the Mississippian PGN was separate or was a northern extension of the Mexican PGN.3 Wilkinson (1992, 1993a) has also designated the spatial boundaries

of larger “oikumenes,”4 or trade networks, and the points in time at which they merged. These correspond to the prestige-goods networks of our multicriteria ap-

204 / Cross-System Comparisons

proach to spatial boundaries. If we were to redraw Figure 10.1 using the boundaries of oikumenes it would look quite similar, though the dates along the left margin would shift down because regions were always linked by trade earlier than they were linked by political/military interaction. For example, the linkage of the separate Egyptian and Mesopotamian PMNs into the same prestige-goods trade network occurred before 2250 B.C.E.,> whereas their merger into a single PMN (shown in Figure 10.1) did not occur until 1500 B.C.E. We do not choose to call either the PMN or the PGN the “real” world-system. Rather, we have argued that the whole (“real”) system, from the perspective of any one place, consists of all the nested networks that impinge upon that place. Typically the integration of two separate world-systems occurs in stages. First they make con-

tact via down-the-line information flows. Then their PGNs touch. Later their PMNs merge, and after that their separate BGNs come together. Figure 10.2 illustrates how this looks when we consider the pulsating expansion and merging of two world-systems—the Central and the East Asian systems.® As in the chronograph in Figure 10.1, time moves down the vertical axis and both the Central and the Eastern systems become larger. The PGNs of each system come into contact first and then retract as both systems pulsate. The PMNs join episodically in the Mongol Empire and then separate again, not to be rejoined until the nineteenth century.

Pulsation What are the common developmental patterns that can be observed in all sedentary world-systems, including very small-scale systems composed of sedentary foragers as well as the contemporary global political economy? All world-systems pulsate in the sense that the spatial scale of integration, especially by trade, becomes larger and then smaller again. During the enlarging phase, trade networks grow in territorial size and become more dense in terms of the frequency of transactions.”? During the declining phase, trade slackens and local areas become less connected and reorganize around self-sufficiency. Local identities and the cultural distinctions between local groups and outsiders are emphasized. The point here is that a// world-systems undergo these sequences of expansion and contraction, even very small, egalitarian ones. In the next section we discuss a pattern that is widespread but not universal—the rise and fall of large core polities. That pattern, it seems, does not occur in egalitarian world-systems. We have found no archaeological or ethnographic reports of cycles of increasing and decreasing size of polities among sedentary foragers. Rise-and-fall patterns are definitely present in systems composed of chiefdoms. But pulsation occurs in all systems. In systems of sedentary foragers, trade networks are institutionalized as down-theline exchanges of gifts among local leaders. Goods move long distances, but there are no long-distance traders. In northern California (Chapter 7) we saw archaeological evidence for pulsation cycles as the rise of one trade network, its decline, and the rise of a new, larger trade network. Thomas L. Jackson (1992) links the declines to periods of

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Undoubtedly the strategies of players at the different size levels in Figure 10.3 are

qualitatively different. For example, the strategy appropriate to the creation of a complex chiefdom is quite different from those that would function to create an empire out of separate states or to consolidate hegemony over other core states in the modern world-system. There are also qualitatively different strategies that work under different circumstances in the same world-system types. Thus Friedman (1982) notes that prestige-goods systems allow for the creation of complex chiefdoms when long-distance trade is feasible but that a very different strategy is necessary in regions

in which regularized long-distance trade between quite different polities is more costly and therefore irregular or lacking.

According to Friedman (1982) this explains why prestige-goods chiefdoms emerged in Melanesia and western Polynesia (where interarchipelago trade was more feasible), whereas in eastern Polynesia and Hawaii (where long-distance trade was much more difficult) large and hierarchical polities had to rely on the ability of the chiefly class to control access to land and other resources.? Blanton et al. (1993) have analyzed two distinct strategies that interacted in the development of the Mesoamerican world-system. Certainly there are different strategies that are appropriate to the rise of hegemons in the modern world-system.!°

Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills (1993a) have built upon the work of Kajsa Ekholm and Jonathan Friedman (1982) to conceptualize and study the sequences of political centralization and decentralization that have occurred in the Central System over the past 5,000 years. This sequence is well-known to students of political history as the rise and fall of empires. The sequence of political centralization/decentralization is a prime example of a continuity between the modern worldsystem of the past 500 years and the earlier Central System. Indeed, even chiefdombased world-systems exhibit a somewhat similar pattern. But these processes also evince important differences in various kinds of systems. Both chiefdom systems and state-based systems became centralized through mili-

tary conquest, but the polities erected by chiefly conquerors relied on kinship alliances in order to implement regional control, whereas states made use of specialized, non-kin control institutions. This is a major reason why state-based empires were able to incorporate larger territories and populations than chiefdom-based polities did.

In the modern world-system the pattern of political centralization/decentralization takes the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers. This is analytically similar to the rise and fall of empires, but the differences are important. In the process

of empire-formation, a “rogue power’—most often a semiperipheral marcher state—conquers the other core states to form a universal state or a “world state.” Well-known examples are the Roman Empire and the Han Empire. Wallerstein juxtaposes the political structure of the modern world-system (an interstate system of competing states within a single economic division of labor) with earlier “world-empires” in which the economic division of labor allegedly came to be encompassed by a single state.!!

210 / Cross-System Comparisons

In reality there have been no whole economic divisions of labor in which a single state encompassed the entire division of labor. Even the largest of states have traded both bulk and prestige goods with their neighbors. There have been many large states that managed to conquer all or nearly all of the adjacent core region, however. This is the peak of political centralization in such systems. It is convenient to conceptualize centralization and decentralization as two ends of a continuum. Thus there have not been true “world-empires” in the sense that a single state encom-

passed an entire trade network (either a PGN or a BGN). Rather, the so-called world-empires have a relatively high degree of control over a relatively large proportion of a world-system. The term we prefer, because it is more precise, is corewide empire. This more exactly indicates the structure of precapitalist world-systems and usefully contrasts that structure with the nature of empires that have existed in the

modern world-system—colonial empires. Both the capitalist and precapitalist world-systems have had colonial empires (in which core states conquer and dominate peripheral regions), but the modern (capitalist) world-system has not had corewide empires.

State-based world-systems prior to the modern one oscillated between corewide empires and interstate systems. In some regions the decentralization trend went so far as to break the system up into ministates. Thus feudalism may be understood as a very decentralized form of a state-based system. Figure 10.4 illustrates the structural difference between a corewide empire and a hegemonic core state. In the modern world-system the cycle of political centralization/decentralization takes the form of the rise and fall of hegemonic core powers. As we noted in Chapter 9, the hegemon is the most powerful state in the system, but it never takes over the other core states. This is not merely a systematic difference in the degree of peak political concentration. The whole nature of the process of rise and fall is different in the modern world-system. This structural difference is primarily due to the relatively much greater importance that capitalist accumulation has in the modern system.

The Long Rise of Capitalism As we argued in Chapter 9, capitalist accumulation—the appropriation of surplus value from the production and sale of commodities—is not unique to the modern world-system. Frank (1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995) is correct to note that this kind of activity existed well before the sixteenth century. But existence is not predominance. Commodified forms of wealth, land, goods, and labor existed and became more important over the 5,000-year history of the state-based world-systems, but capitalism only began to predominate over the tributary modes of accumulation in the Europecentered subregion of the Central System in the seventeenth century. The tributary modes of accumulation rely more directly on organized political power to extract surplus product. Taxation, tribute, and other forms of exploitation that rely directly on political coercion are the primary means by which ruling classes

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Capitalist states had a hard time in world-systems dominated by the tributary modes of accumulation. It was only after a long period in which market relations within and between states and empires had grown in importance that core states became able to sustain a stable commitment to accumulation through commodity production for the world market. Before the demise of the Soviet Union some socialists contended that world socialism would eventually emerge by means of a domino process, the simple accretion of socialist parties coming to power in separate states (e.g., Szymanski 1982). ChaseDunn (1982) contended that the domino theory was wrong because the socialist mode of accumulation is difficult to sustain in a world-system in which capitalism remains predominant. This point would hardly need to be argued now. But a further point is worth mentioning: It may be the growth of international and transnational forms of socialism that might eventually allow this new mode of accumulation to become predominant. Seen in a long-run comparative perspective, the struggle for democratic socialism

within core states, though currently in the doldrums, is crucial for eventual systemic transformation. Contemporary involvement in electoral politics, in coalition

242 / The Transformation of World-Systems

formation, and in reformist movements represents a realistic adjustment to the cur-

rent period of neoliberal ideological hegemony. A new mode of accumulation builds by accretion in the interstices of an old one. The continuation of capitalist uneven development will likely spur new, broad, populist, antisystem movements.

World socialists should be prepared to provide direction and leadership to such movements lest they be harnessed by reactionaries or neofascists. A period of social polarization is quite likely, and this, in the context of the potential nuclear holocaust, is a frightening prospect. Building ties of cooperation and friendship among peoples, developing institutions based on democratic and collectively rational (i.e., planned) economic organization and exchange, and implementing a more ecologically balanced and egalitarian form of global development are important both as immediate goals and as long-run means for reducing the probability of systemically produced warfare. A vivid contrast between the historical transition to capitalism and the potential transition to democratic socialism stems from differences in the logics of the two modes of accumulation. Capitalism can exist and thrive as a subsystem in the interstices of another mode of production, as it did for many centuries, gradually creating the institutional bases for its own eventual predominance. Its individualist and partial rationality thrives in a competitive and conflictive setting. Democratic socialism, in contrast, is a holistic mode of accumulation in which the whole arena of interaction must be organized on a collectively rational and democratic basis in which reciprocity and politically articulated redistribution play important roles. Hence efforts to build socialist relations (those that survive) tend to become reintegrated into the institutional logic of capitalism because they are ex-

posed to the strong forces of the larger capitalist system. But the interaction of capi- | talism and socialism has produced a spiral in which the spatial scale of organization of each has increased in interaction with the other—the spiral of capitalism and socialism (Chase-Dunn 1992c). People have long struggled against market forces that would convert them into commodities. Guilds, labor unions, cooperatives, socialist parties, welfare states, communist states, and movements for national liberation in peripheral areas are all social movements that have attempted to resist commodification and exploitation. So, too, are many of the contemporary “fundamentalist” and conservative movements. Many justify their resistance through ideologies that originated in tributary

world-systems (Islam and Christianity). For the most part, these struggles have been subverted by the growing scale and wider institutionalization of the capitalist world market. Even the largest communist states found themselves influenced not only by the military threats of the capitalist core states but also by the opportunities

of the world market for high technology and profitable commodity production. The partial rationalities of state capitalism and state socialism do not in themselves help to build cooperation at the world level. Rather, they create a world in which semicollectivized subunits compete with one another militarily and through commodity production.

The Transformation of World-Systems / 243

This does not mean that efforts by socialist parties to come to state power in the periphery and semiperiphery will cease or should cease, or that socialists in core states should stop trying to organize more humane, just, and democratic institutions. But it does imply that these efforts alone will not be enough. Democratic socialism must be organized as well at the level that has been attained by the capitalist mode of accumulation, and that is the global level. That is why transnational and international socialist forms of exchange and political organizations are crucial. The struggle for socialism already has a history of 200 years. Labor unions, workers’ cooperatives, agrarian cooperatives, socialist parties, and communist states have all tried to protect members from exploitation and to transform the capitalist system into a more collectively rational mode of accumulation. These efforts have interacted with the trends and cycles of capitalism. The increasing scale of socialist organizational forms has been an important force behind the expansion and reorganization of capitalism. Workers’ struggles were the main force behind democratic reforms (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). Labor movements caused wages to rise and supported the emergence of welfare states in the core. This was an important spur to capitalist expansion into the periphery. Socialist parties played their part in these same reform movements. Communist states in the semiperiphery made the strongest efforts to create a selfsustaining socialist mode of accumulation, though they were greatly compromised by the need to organize military and economic protection from capitalist core states. The successes of the communist states at catching up with capitalist industrialization, mass education, urbanization, and health care were another important stimulus to reform within the capitalist states and to the rising international liberalism pro-

moted by the United States in the twentieth century. The communist threat sustained U.S. leadership and “Western” solidarity and facilitated the emergence of an even more integrated and spatially larger world market than had existed before. The technological dynamism of global capitalism and the extraordinary costs of the modern arms race led to the reincorporation of the Soviet Union into the inter-

national polity of the capitalist states and to the partial reincorporation of China. Thus capitalism has evolved partly as a result of the socialist challenges mounted over the past 200 years. Have these challenges now ended, with the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism? We think not, because the structural causes of socialist challenges—uneven development, increasing inequalities, environmental degradation—

are still prevalent. Despite the global scale of capitalist organization and the new forms of production that are characterized as “flexible accumulation,” we expect that both old and new forms of resistance will again play an important part on the stage

of world politics. ,

Socialist modes of integration and exchange involve democratic planning that organizes reciprocity and politically mediated forms of redistribution that can place

limits on the operation of uneven development and unequal exchange. Some of these ends can also be achieved by socialist markets. The Soviet tendency to try to convert all exchanges into redistributive exchange was excessive. Markets are good

244 / The Transformation of World-Systems

institutions for providing some goods and services and need not be subsumed by an all-encompassing planned economy as long as certain functions, such as collective security and planning for basic infrastructural development, are socialized.

Johan Galtung’s (1980) vision of a multicentric, multilevel world economy emphasizes self-reliance at various levels wherever feasible and encourages a multicultural approach in which peoples and civilizations cultivate their own expressive forms and identities. Many other social theorists who see the horrors of exist-

ing capitalism and the soulless future painted by the ideologues of capitalist globalization have emphasized self-reliance and multiculturalism. Contemporary nationalisms, ethnic identities, and alternative lifestyles are part of the postmodernist philosophy and are motivated by powerful currents of resistance to the declining cultural, economic, and political hegemony of the United States and the older European core. Jonathan Friedman (1992b, 1994) produces evidence that multiculturalism and identity resistance have occurred during periods of hegemonic decline in all state-based world-systems.® The question here is whether or not it makes sense to try to construct a better world around these decentralization forces, or whether we should instead build a more humane, balanced, and sustainable global system. In this we side with Wagar (1992, 1995), who argues that overcoming the problems that capitalism has created (danger of terminal warfare, ecological crisis, and huge inequalities) will require the construction of a democratic and socialist world federal state. Wagar’s vision of the future includes an ecotopia of decentralized communities, but this can only emerge after the work of creating a more balanced, sustainable, and integrated world society has been done. The instrument that Wagar proposes for the job of building the world socialist state is a “World Party.” Despite current unhappiness with the Old Left and formal organizations in general because of their “oligarchical” tendencies, Wagar contends that there is really no workable alternative to a dedicated and rationalized organization for carrying out the process of “mundialization.” This is not the place to engage the issues raised by the idea of the World Party. But we contend that Wagar could be right. What about semiperipheral development? We have already noted that the com‘munist states were semiperipheral. Class struggles in the capitalist world-system have been dampened by nationalism in both the core and in the periphery. In the core, the domination of the periphery and competition with other core states have operated to reinforce nationalism at the expense of working-class solidarity in several ways. In the periphery, peasants and workers have either been suppressed by elites in alliance with the core or they have made common nationalist alliances with elements of the elite against the core. Thus class struggle was either suppressed or weakened by nationalism in both the core and the periphery. In the semiperiphery, class struggles have been less dampened by the core/periphery hierarchy. The contradictory interests of semiperipheral elites and masses regard-

ing alternative development paths have provided contexts in which strong peas-

The Transformation of World-Systems [ 245

ant/worker socialist and communist parties could come to state power. The Russian and Chinese Revolutions are the best examples, but the Mexican Revolution and populist regimes in Brazil and India also fit this model to some extent. We predict that semiperipheral challenges to capitalism will continue to emerge in the future. The industrialization of the semiperiphery has already led to important labor movements and electoral challenges. It is likely that these forces will continue to grow. If all the semiperipheral industrializing countries could attain core status these movements might pose only mild challenges to capitalism. But it is quite likely that most of the semiperipheral countries will not move into the core. This will create the context for future democratic socialist movements to come to state power (electorally or by means of revolution) in the semiperiphery. Older forms of socialist organization will require retooling for the new conditions of global capitalism. Newly socialist states can learn from the mistakes as well as the partial successes of the Soviet Union and People’s Republic of China. Labor unions will organize in new ways to meet the challenges of global capitalism and

flexible specialization—though it must be remembered that many of the older forms of organization are still quite usable and appropriate. Mass-production industry (Fordism) has not been eliminated by flexible specialization. Rather, much of it has moved to the semiperiphery. Trade unions of the traditional kind will continue to be quite relevant in these contexts. Both trade unions and socialist parties need to develop international structures for protecting constituents and the | environment. We mentioned earlier that socialism does not thrive in the interstices as well as capitalism does. Socialism—democratic and collective rationality—requires much more in the way of normative structures than do capitalism or tributary systems; it is much more dependent on consensus among all the people and across different types of people. In this way it bears some similarity to the kinbased world-systems. The communications technology that the capitalist world-system has produced can greatly facilitate the formation of world society while at the same time allowing people to understand one another’s differences. The emergence of global democracy will require more than an international civil society composed of national elites, though this is how it is emerging. Trade unions and socialist parties need to understand the dynamics of the modern world-system and the prospects for transforming it into a socialist system. This will require organization at the global level, though that must be linked to local and regional organizations. Communications technology will help in this grand organizational task. But a clear understanding of the developmental dynamics of the capitalist world-system will also be necessary. The processes of globalization are an important arena of contention for ideological and organizational hegemony.

Despite the current hegemony of neoliberalism we are optimistic about the prospects for world socialism if we can survive the next window of vulnerability without bringing on a nuclear holocaust. World state formation and international

246 / The Transformation of World-Systems

and transnational socialist organization and forms of exchange are thus our prescriptions for political action. Further comparative study of world-systems and earlier systemic transformations will help us to survive and to build the institutions of a more peaceful and just world. We have made great advances in the natural and biological sciences that have transformed us from servants of the gods to kings of the jungle. Social science can now help us to understand our own past and to shape a more harmonious and wise collective future. In the final chapter we summarize our findings and suggest questions for future research.

°‘

Conclusions, Questions, Speculations °

In this final chapter we summarize the ground we have covered, draw some conclusions, note the ground we have missed, raise some new questions, and review our speculations about possible futures for the contemporary world-system. We begin with a summary.

Conclusions We have made several major arguments throughout this book. These constitute the foundation of a theoretical research program for constructing new explanations of social evolution based on world-systems as the unit of analysis. First, sociocultural evolution should be studied from a “world-system” or intersocietal interaction perspective. Approaches that focus solely on change in individual “societies” or “groups” fail adequately to attend to the effects of intersocietal interaction on social and cultural change. These effects have been important since the beginning of sedentary human societies. The comparative method for understanding social change must be applied to cross-cultural interaction networks because it is these that evolve, not only individual societies. World-systems are a fundamental unit of systemic social change in both small and large systems. Both long-term studies of single systems and systematic comparisons of many different systems are valuable methodological approaches for evaluating propositions about the historical evolution of world-systems. Second, in order to be useful, concepts developed for explaining and interpreting the history of the modern world-system must be modified extensively to deal with the problem of comparing rather different kinds of world-systems. These changes often entail transforming underlying assumptions in theories of the modern worldsystem into empirical questions. Thus we define world-systems as intersocietal networks in which the interactions (trade, warfare, intermarriage, information, etc.) are im-

portant for the reproduction of the internal structures of the composite units and importantly affect changes that occur in these local structures. We separate the definitions of world-systems and core/periphery structures, arguing that core/periphery relations should be investigated rather than assumed. We bound systems by starting at 247

248 / Conclusions, Questions, Speculations

a particular point and noting all the important interaction networks that impinge on that point. We note that for many systems the largest interaction networks are those that pass information (INs) but that these are only weakly systemic. The second largest networks are those in which prestige goods are exchanged (PGNs). These are sometimes (but not always) systemically important, and the basis of this importance is different in different systems. Many prestige-goods networks are important because local elites maintain control and extract resources from local groups because they are able to monopolize the importation of socially necessary prestige goods. In California we found a prestigegoods network that was systemically important because it facilitated smaller networks in which basic foods were exchanged. Political/military interaction nets based on conflicts and alliances (PMNs) are usually smaller than prestige-goods networks. Finally, networks based on the exchange of basic foods and raw materials (BGNs) are usually smaller than PMNs. We note that each of these networks may or may not be systemically important in any particular system. Furthermore, the way in which they are important may be different in different systems. Nevertheless we surmise that the size hierarchy of these nets generally corresponds to their differential importance for local structural reproduction. In other words, it is usually the case that information networks are only weakly important, whereas bulk-goods nets are always systemically important. A plausible hypothesis here is that the four networks generally evince significantly different degrees of systemness. In order from weakest to strongest these are: the information net, the prestige-goods net, the political/military net, and the bulk-goods net. Thus the positions of different authors on the question of spatially bounding world-systems may be somewhat reconciled. Wallerstein’s bounding of world-systems in terms of bulk-goods networks may be understood as the most conservative, because bulk goods are virtually always important, whereas larger nets (PMNs, PGNs) may in some cases not be systemically very important. In asserting the generalization of differential importance we do not mean to substitute this supposition for careful research to determine the systemic importance of the different nets in each case. Furthermore, it may be the case that when networks coincide—as in the modern world-system—the effect on system coherence or systemness is multiplicative, not simply additive. In separating the concept of world-system from that of core/periphery relations we allow for the examination of the rise of core/periphery structures in world-systems rather than excluding this phenomenon by definition. In our approach the spatial dimensions of each of the systemic networks are determined first and then the problem of core/periphery relations is examined. A state cannot be in a core (or peripheral) position relative to another society unless it is systemically connected with it. We also distinguish between core/periphery differentiation and core/periphery hierarchy. Core/periphery differentiation exists if two societies with different levels of population density, complexity, or internal hierarchy are importantly interacting. But this still does not tell us about possible power relationships between these two

Conclusions, Questions, Speculations { 249

societies. Core/periphery hierarchy exists when one society is exploiting or dominating another. The determination of core/periphery relations (both differentiation and hierarchy) must be made at each level of network interaction. It is generally difficult for one society to exploit or dominate another society that is very distant from itself, and thus core/periphery hierarchies are more likely to exist within smaller networks (BGNs and PMNs) and less likely to exist in larger ones (PGNs and INs). Our nested network architecture sheds light on an important matter raised in the approach developed by Frank and Gills (1993a)—the idea of superhegemony. Superhegemony is alleged to occur when a single system has noncontiguous core regions and one of these core regions economically exploits a distant and separate core region. The debate between Wilkinson (1993b) and Frank and Gills over superhegemony may be resolved in terms of the differences between a system connected only by the informational and prestige-goods networks versus those also connected by the political/military networks. Disagreements between Braudel and Wallerstein on the one hand and Frank, Gills, Wilkinson, and ourselves on the other about whether or not the Ottoman Empire was systemically connected with the Europe-centered system can be resolved by studying the connections by the information, prestige-goods, political/military, and bulk-goods networks separately. Third, world-system evolution involves three interlinked processes: semiperipheral development (Chapter 5), iterations of population pressure and hierarchy for-

mation, and transformations of modes of accumulation (Chapter 6). These three processes account for the evolution of human societies from thousands of nomadic foraging bands to the single complex and global system of today. Semiperipheral de-

velopment linked core/periphery structures to institutional innovations that expanded and transformed social networks. Iterations of population pressure, intensifi-

cation, and hierarchy formation provided the engines of development and the dynamics of political rise and fall that are visible in all systems. The transformations of modes of accumulation altered the nature and dynamics of production, distribution, and accumulation. This in turn changed the way the processes of rise and fall and expansion operated. This theory needs further elaboration and testing, but we think that we have included all the essential elements for explaining the evolution of world-systems. The case studies in Chapters 7, 8, and 9 apply our theoretical apparatus to specific instances: first, a very small and egalitarian world-system in northern California; second, the Afroeurasian system as it pulsated back and forth between regional and interregional networks and as core regions interacted and affected one another; and third, the modern capitalist world-system. These applications show how our conceptual apparatus works. These studies caused us to rethink some of our analytic proposals, notably adding the information net to our considerations.

Our reconceptualization of the problem of incorporation—the processes by which formerly separate systems became linked—is informed by our case studies and utilizes the nested networks approach. We expanded the continuum between contact peripheries and full incorporation developed by Thomas Hall (1986, 1989)

250 / Conclusions, Questions, Speculations

to include each of the four interaction types. As we have noted, all systems tend to expand at times. When they do, they absorb or displace other peoples and smaller systems. The ways in which they incorporate new territories and peoples seem to vary with changes in modes of accumulation. Because the study of state-level peoples generally has been divorced from the study of nonstate peoples, these differences have seldom been studied and consequently are poorly understood. In Chapters 9 and 10 we discussed the modern world-system in terms of the light shed by our comparative perspective. The modern world-system shares many general characteristics with other systems: cycles of rise and fall, pulsation, and pressures for (and processes of) internal differentiation and similarity. But what is truly unique about the modern world-system? We argue that the mode of accumulation—capitalist accumulation—is a unique feature of the modern world-system in the sense that it has become the predominant logic of the system. This accounts for the unusually rapid rate at which the modern world-system revolutionizes technology. The population pressure/intensification/hierarchy formation model has developed technology in all systems since the Stone Age, but the modern world-system is unique in the extent to which it provides incentives for the creation and implementation of new technologies. The iterations of the basic model continue to occur in the modern world-system but with certain important differences due to the predominance of capitalist accumulation. As we noted earlier, the modern system is also the first large system in which the four networks have come to coincide spatially. Obviously too, it is the first worldsystem to be truly global, to encompass the entire planet. Other characteristics are less clearly unique. The oft-noted interstate system (multiple and competing states) is clearly not unique to the modern world-system. But the modern system may be unique in the longevity and degree of decentralization of power in the core and in the mechanisms by which the cycle of rise and fall operate. The sequence of hegemonic rise and fall that has occurred for 500 years in the Europe-centered regional system is substantially different from the alternation between state systems and universal states that characterized most earlier state-based systems. We also argued in Chapter 9 that Europe has long been systemically linked with the West Asian system and has long been part of a systemic prestige-goods network of Afroeurasian scope. We also contend that the rise of Europe was due both to its semiperipheral position in the larger Afroeurasian system and to its ability to implement fully the institutional characteristics of capitalism that were already present, but in a more diluted form, in the larger Afroeurasian system. We agree that, as Frank and Gills (1993a) have argued, Europe remained in a somewhat peripheral relationship with China until quite recently, and that this is indicated by the terms of trade by which Europe paid for Chinese manufactured goods with silver and gold. But Europe was not a fully peripheralized segment of a China-centered core/periphery hierarchy because China did not control Europe militarily and did not have any direct control over Europe’s access to bulk goods. Thus the superhegemony of China over Europe, unlike the hegemonies of later European states, was based solely on su-

Conclusions, Questions, Speculations / 251

periorities in the production of fine goods. This was hegemony, but it was not of the fully imperial kind.

Questions Though our theoretical research program requires both close case studies of single systems and formal comparisons of a large number of systems to test the hypotheses we have proposed, we have gone ahead in the absence of these to suggest what such studies might find. Much more research must be done before we can be certain about the utility of our framework. Regarding the empirics of the nested networks approach, we have employed the decisions made by David Wilkinson about the ex-

_ panding boundaries of the Central PGN and the Central PMN. Wilkinson’s chronographs are a helpful beginning, but they need to be restudied with an eye to the problems of pulsation and fall-off. No one has yet proposed a chronograph of the expansion of the Central information net or the Central bulk-goods net. Both of these involve tremendous difficulties regarding the problem of fall-off—the spatial extent of systemic effects. Since nearly all bulk-goods nets connect with local neighbors, there are few breaks or discontinuities over space. But this does not mean that systemic consequences of changes (e.g., shortages or surpluses) extend indefinitely. The range of systemic interaction is a function of transportation and communications costs, and these change greatly across systems. Research on this aspect of interaction is very much needed at this point.

Another lacuna in the boundaries realm is the bounding of kin-based systems. Wilkinson's work focuses only on systems that have cities. Few smaller and less hierarchical systems have had their interaction network boundaries specified. We have proposed that all world-systems pulsate in the sense that interaction networks expand and contract, or at least expand more rapidly and then less rapidly. We also surmise that all systems that contain hierarchical forms of social organization ex-

hibit cycles of rise and fall in which the largest polities grow and then decline in power. These propositions suggest several further questions: Are the cycles of pulsation of each of the four kinds of interaction temporally related to each other in regular ways in most systems? That is, does pulsation in the size of PGNs correspond temporally with pulsations in PMNs or BGNs? And are the pulsation cycles temporally correlated with the sequences of centralization and decentralization of political power among polities? Just what is driving these two different cyclical processes and

how are their causes related? Our evolutionary theory of iterations in the population pressure/intensification/ hierarchy formation model, along with the idea of semiperipheral development, proposes a general explanation for the relationships among these processes. But we recognize that it will take more sophisticated studies to verify the existence of these cycles and to determine their causes. One of the largest debates is on the issue of transformations of modes of accumulation. Although we outlined in Chapter 11 our best guesses regarding the transfor-

252 / Conclusions, Questions, Speculations

mation problem, explicit long-term and comparative studies of transformations need to be done. There are important differences within the broad types that we have designated as kin-based systems. Some are without hierarchy and have little accumulation (e.g. !Kung San, Wintu), and others have greater hierarchy (tribes and chiefdoms) and

more accumulation. Our study of the Wintu revealed only mild forms of core/ periphery hierarchy in this very small and egalitarian system. What has not been done are close studies of more complex and hierarchical kin-based systems (big-man systems and chiefdoms) to determine to what extent core/periphery hierarchies exist

and how they operate. Though we have proposed a hypothesis about the role of semiperipheral marcher chiefdoms in the rise of larger chiefly polities, this has not yet been evaluated by means of a close case study. We have made a rough evaluation of the hypothesis of semiperipheral development in Chapter 5 by utilizing David Wilkinson's (1991) specification of changes in cores, peripheries, and semiperipheries in twelve state-based PMNs. This problem requires further study. There is a partial mismatch between our definition of semiperiphery and Wilkinson's that might alter our conclusions if it were fixed. What needs to be done is a new consideration of upward and downward mobility in the cases that Wilkinson covers and an extension of this kind of study to a representative sample of kin-based systems. A closer study of the phenomenon of semiperipheral capitalist city-states would also provide a firmer evaluation of our contention that these entities played an important role in the spreading and intensification of commodification. Our hypotheses in Chapter 10 about the relative sizes of different interaction nets need to be confronted by empirical studies; in order to be substantiated, they require formal comparisons of a large number of different systems. The research reported in Chapter 10 about the relationships between empire and city sizes in different PMNs must be improved by the use of more and better data. Our serendipitous finding of synchronicities between the Central and East Asian PMNs requires further examination. Were there similar synchronicities of urban and empire growth in earlier sepa-

rate PMNs that were connected to the same PGN, for example, Egypt and Mesopotamia? Why did the Indic patterns diverge from those found in the Central and East Asian PMNs? And what caused the Central/East Asian synchronicity? These are fundamental questions that can only be resolved by further research.

Speculations Many authors contend that the contemporary system has undergone fundamental changes during the 1980s and 1990s. We disagree with this assessment. ChaseDunn (1994), for example, has argued that most of the visible changes in technology, globalization of investment and trade, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the appearance of “world culture” do not constitute fundamental changes in the logic of the modern world-system. We contend rather that the systemic trends and cycles that have been characteristic features of the modern system for hundreds of years are

Conclusions, Questions, Speculations / 253

continuing and that fundamental change has not yet occurred. But we argue that fundamental change (systemic transformation) is likely to occur within the next few centuries. In Chapter 11 we outlined several possible scenarios for future transformation. In one version, the world-systemic cycles and trends continue much as they have in the past, and the whole system is destroyed by a global war among core powers. According to the projections of Donella Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, and Jorgen Ran-

ders (1992) on world population, resource consumption, and pollution, a global ecological disaster could produce much the same consequences as a nuclear war. Another possibility we envision is the emergence of a world state. This would in-

volve another round of the iteration cycle in which a global state emerges to deal with global problems. But in the past the iteration model has usually operated through long phases of conflict and centralization by conquest. These mechanisms would likely be fatal under contemporary levels of military destructiveness. The transformation of the rise-and-fall sequence from empire formation to hegemonic rise and fall involved an increase in the importance of economic competition over political/military competition, though it did not eliminate warfare. But this longrun evolutionary trend may presage the eventual elimination of warfare as a method of choosing global “leadership.” The problem is to find an alternative to conquest as a mechanism for allowing global political integration. It is obvious that democratic political institutions at the global level could serve several purposes—the legitimation of a global collective security provider; a mechanism for addressing global environmental problems; and an opening for democratizing and balancing the processes of economic development.

We also discussed the prospects and nature of a possible future transformation from capitalism to democratic socialism. We suggest that further experiments with socialism are likely to emerge in the contemporary semiperiphery and that the rise to predominance of socialism as a mode of accumulation will require global socialist or-

ganizations. :

Though the main purpose of this book has been to construct a scaffolding for the comparative study of world-systems, our ultimate goal is to use this apparatus to address the real problems and possibilities of the contemporary system. To do that well will require further research and more refined theorizing. Our speculations here are meant to prod others to join the effort to provide a solid scientific basis for understanding our species and the processes of social evolution.

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Notes

Introduction 1. The world-systems perspective was developed by Samir Amin (1980, 1989, 1990, 1991), Andre Gunder Frank (1966, 1969a, 1969b), Giovanni Arrighi (1979, 1985, 1994), Immanuel Wallerstein (1974a, 1974b, 1979a, 1979b, 1980, 1984a, 1989, 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1992a, 1992b, 1994), and other scholars at the Fernand Braudel Center of the State University of New York at Binghamton. Shannon (1996) provides a readable introduction to the world-systems perspective. Martin (1994a) provides a detailed assessment of developments in the two decades since Wallerstein’s introduction of world-system theory (1974a, 1974b), and Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995) and Hall (1996c) summarize recent developments. 2. A paradigm is a very general framework from which specific theories are constructed. See Thomas Kuhn 1970, 1977, for detailed discussions of paradigms. 3. For example, see Nisbet 1969, Lenski’s (1976) reply, and Granovetter’s (1979) useful discussion. Sanderson (1990) presents an exhaustive review of the issues and discusses |

world-system theory explicitly in a later book (1991). Some other relevant works are: Adams 1966; Adams and Nissen 1972; Anderson 1974a, 1974b; Price and Brown 1985; Childe 1936, 1951; Fried 1967; Glassman 1986; Gledhill 1988; Gledhill, Bender, and

| Larsen 1988; Gregg 1988, 1991; John A. Hall 1986, 1987; John R. Hall 1992; Harris 1977, 1979; Huntington 1915; Johnson and Earle 1987; Lenski 1966; Lenski and Nolan 1984, 1986; Mann 1986; Modelski and Thompson 1995; Parsons 1966; Paynter 1989; Quigley 1979; Sahlins and Service 1960; Service 1971, 1975; Steward 1955; Teggart 1918, 1925, 1939; Tilly 1986; Trigger 1984, 1990; Upham 1990; Max Weber 1975; and Wright 1986. 4. Andrew Sherratt (1995) makes a very similar argument about archaeology. While recognizing the need to deconstruct old concepts, he argues forcefully that the time has come to reconstruct “the grand narrative” of human history. He, too, makes the point that all the “postwhatever” movements are merely phases on the way to rethinking our concepts, and not the end of theorizing, as some mistakenly believe. 5. A line we stole with brazen folly, From our dear colleague, Goldfrank, Wally. 6. A teleological explanation is one that explains an outcome in terms of final causes or ultimate purposes. We argue—as do all scientific evolutionary thinkers—that social change and evolution are due to prior causes, not immanent purposes. 7. We follow the new convention in listing dates: C.E. for “common era” and B.C.E. for “before the common era,” which replace A.D. and B.C.

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256 / Notes

Chapter 1 1. Since the mid-1970s there have been many studies that have applied world-systems concepts to pre-sixteenth-century systems. The first of these were the studies by Pailes and Whitecotton (1975, 1979), Schneider (1977), Whitecotton and Pailes (1979, 1983, 1986), Ekholm and Friedman (1980, 1982), Friedman (1983), and Ekholm (1980). More recent works that explicitly discuss the relevance of world-systems concepts are: Kohl 1978, 1979,

1981, 1985, 1987a, 1987b, 1992; Kohi and Wright 1977; Blanton and Feinman 1984; Upham 1982, 1986, 1990, 1992; Edens 1992; Kowalewski 1982, 1990, 1992a, 1992b, 1996; La Lone 1992; Nassaney 1991; O’Brien 1992a, 1992b; Pailes and Reff 1985; Wilkinson 1976, 1987a, 1987b, 1988a, 1988b, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1995a, 1995b;

White and Burton 1987; McGuire 1980, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1992, 1996; Algaze 1989, 1993; Gailey and Patterson 1987a, 1987b, 1988; Baugh 1984, 1991, 1992; Schortman 1989; Schortman and Urban 1987, 1992a, 1992b, 1992c; Dincauze and Hasenstab 1989; Feinman and Nicholas 1990, 1991a, 1991b, 1992, 1996; Patterson 1990; Peregrine 1991, 1992, 1995, 1996; Peregrine and Feinman 1996; Collins 1992; Kepecs, Feinman, and Boucher 1994; Upham, Lightfoot, and Jewett 1989; Upham, Feinman, and Nicholas 1992; Berquist 1995; Allen 1992, 1996; Woolf 1990; and the articles by Foster, Mathien, Stark, and Wilcox in collections edited by Mathien and McGuire (1986); articles by Haselgrove, Hedeager, Kristiansen (as well as Kristiansen 1982), Larsen, Liverani, Rowlands, and Zaccagnini in Rowlands, Larsen, and Kristiansen 1987; Champion 1989a, 1989b; Champion

and Champion 1986; articles by Helms, Santley and Alexander, Weigand, Wells, and Whitecotton in Schortman and Urban 1992a; articles by Lintz, Spielmann, and Wilcox (as well as Wilcox 1993) in Spielmann 1991a (and see also Spielmann 1989); articles by ChaseDunn and Hall, Gills and Frank, and Sanderson in Chase-Dunn and Hall 1991a (and see also Chase-Dunn and Hall 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995a, 1995b; Hall 1996a, 1996b, 1996c; and Hall and Chase-Dunn 1996); articles by Allen, Blanton et al., Collins, Fitzpatrick, Friedman, Moseley, O’Brien, and Upham et al. in a special issue of Review on com-

paring world-systems, edited and introduced by Chase-Dunn (1992b); and articles by Bosworth, McNeill, and Sanderson as well as introductory essays by Sanderson and Sanderson and Hall in Sanderson 1995b. Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills have written a great deal about precapitalist world-systems; see Frank 1989, 1990a, 1990b, 1991, 1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995; Frank and Gills 1990, 1992, 1993b, 1995; and Gills and Frank 1991, 1992. There are important articles by Abu-Lughod, Wallerstein, and Wilkinson in Frank and Gills 1993a. We have reviewed much of this literature in detail in Hall and Chase-Dunn 1993, 1994.

2. Michael Mann (1986, chap. 2) claims that general evolution ended and history began with the emergence of the first states. According to Mann, prior to the formation of early states social change was “prehistoric” in the sense that evolutionary processes (mainly ecological constraints) set tight limits on the kinds of social organization that were possible, and human action had very little effect in determining the nature of social change. Mann introduces the protagonist of the first empire formation, Sargon of Agade, as the first historical actor on Earth. But Mann’s own discussion of how “prehistoric peoples evaded power” suggests that intentional action and struggles over social institutions were important elements of social organization well before the emergence of states. Ethnographic studies support the notion that stateless societies exhibit historicity in Mann's sense.

Notes / 257 3. On commodity chains, see Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (1993). 4, We use the terms state and nation in their technical senses. See the glossary for definitions. 5. Such a unit—say, a household or ethnic group—may have considerably different characteristics in different types of world-systems. For an early discussion of this problem with respect to ethnicity, see Hall 1984. William Martin (1994b) notes that the modern, core-centric versions of most of these subunits have been accepted as “natural” for so long that their existence in other forms is unthinkable. 6. We note, however, that in the present humans may, by their own actions, be affecting climatic changes. Anthropogenic climate change is an endogenous variable in human social evolution. Though these kinds of effects may have existed on a small scale in the past, most climatic changes were exogenous to social evolution. We have in mind here clearly external effects such as solar flares or collisions with comets. 7. A metatheoretical consideration is a basic assumption about the way the world works. The dialectic and the chaos theory are examples. In the case of systemic logics those who attempt to explicate the nature of logics usually assume that logics become transformed, whereas those theorists who only imply systemic logic usually assume continuity. It is important to make these assumptions explicit, and it would be desirable to formalize contending theories so that their contrary empirical implications could be subjected to research. 8. For an application to the collapse of the Soviet Union see Collins 1986b, chap. 8, and Collins and Waller 1992. 9. Ekholm and Friedman are not strict “continuationists” because they do accept that there was a transformation of systemic logic when prestige-goods economies evolved into urbanized states in which “abstract wealth” (capital) became an important element of social reproduction. But once states appear, Ekholm and Friedman emphasize the continuity of systemic logic across all state-based systems, ancient and modern. Thus their position (especially in Friedman 1992a) straddles our continuationist-transformationist division. They are transformationists in that they acknowledge a major shift with the invention of states; they are continuationists in that they argue that the logic of capital imperialism dominates all systems once states were invented. 10. Elizabeth Brumfiel (1992) criticizes cultural ecologists for overemphasizing the natural environment and for neglecting such factors as gender, class, and faction. We find her critique insightful, and our approach attends to these factors while also acknowledging the importance of demographic and ecological processes. 11. “Carrying capacity” is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 12. “Circumscription” is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 13. In addition to sources cited in this section, the following articles describe the substantivist-formalist issues in more detail: Dalton 1968; Gledhill and Larsen 1982; Hopkins 1957; Pearson 1957; Polanyi 1944, 1957a, 1957b, 1977; and Polanyi, Arensberg, and Pearson 1957. 14. Many forms of exchange that look like markets are not price-setting markets. In no society are all social objects commodified, but market societies are those in which the provision of substantial elements of the daily life of the average member are commodities whose exchange is mediated by market forces. 15. All societies accumulate resources, which some scholars refer to as “capital.” But capitalist accumulation in Marx’s sense is a qualitatively different process from that which is used by nomadic pastoralists to increase their herds or by sedentary foragers to store food. Thus we distinguish between general accumulation—the amassing of wealth in any form—and capi-

258 / Notes talist accumulation—the amassing of wealth in the form of stored labor-value (capital) in a system in which labor has become a commodity. 16, The transformationists differ among themselves regarding their claims about the timing of the rise to predominance of the capitalist mode of production in modern Europe. Wallerstein (1974b) claims that the transition to “agrarian capitalism” occurred in the “long sixteenth century,” from 1450 to 1640. Wolf (1982) sides with many other Marxists who date the arrival of fully developed industrial capitalism as occurring with the industrial revolution of the eighteenth century.

Chapter 2 1. A comparative research strategy requires the study of a group of cases across which the variables of interest vary. Because we are interested in explaining the basic structural features of world-systems we need to compare cases that have very different structures. 2. We are not talking here about social cosmography, the conscious awareness of interaction networks, but rather of the objective interaction networks themselves. Direct interactions re-

quire consciousness but indirect interactions do not. In both global and smaller regional world-systems the objective world of indirect economic and political interconnections is usually much larger than that portion of the system of which people are consciously aware. The worlds of people living in stateless societies were relatively small, in terms of both those interactions of which they were aware and those whose indirect effects influenced the social structures in which they lived. 3. Pearson (1957) provides a helpful review of the older literature on this debate. 4. Moseley and Wallerstein (1978) present a useful concordance of most evolutionary typologies. 5. Another mixed mode is the “Germanic mode of production” or “decentralized stratified society” described by Kristiansen (1991, 19) in connection with his study of systemic cycles in Bronze-Age Europe. 6. This argument is elaborated in Chase-Dunn 1992c. Obviously, too, there may be yet other modes of accumulation, as yet unthought of and unseen. 7. A somewhat modified version of Wilkinson's chronograph of this process is presented later, in Chapter 10.

8. The phrase “the development of underdevelopment” was coined by Andre Gunder Frank (1966) to describe the process in which core countries extract resources from their economic and/or political colonies. This core/periphery exploitation not only blocks development in the periphery but also systematically distorts development in harmful ways. Thus it is the core/periphery relationship itself that causes “underdevelopment.” 9. Jon Berquist (1995) brought this possibility to our attention in his discussion of the Achaemenid empire's treatment of its various western colonies. Mitchell Allen (1996), as noted earlier, discusses this issue in considerable detail. 10. Greg Woolf (1990) argues that there was no semiperiphery in the Roman world-system according to Wallerstein’s definition. However, the situation he describes would seem to fit some of our other types of semiperipheries. The larger point is that the confusion that Woolf points out is generated by an overly narrow definition of the semiperiphery. 11. Galton’s problem, simply stated, is that in the absence of complete isolation, it is nearly impossible to distinguish independent invention (or parallel evolution) from diffusion. Here we are addressing the reverse problem: Parallel forms cannot be assumed to demonstrate interaction

Notes / 259 because of the possibility of independent invention or parallel evolution. Our point is the interaction networks must be discovered by means other than artifact similarities or differences.

Chapter 3 1. Service (1975) points out the irony that, contrary to notions of “savage anarchy,” stateless societies are the most “civilized” in the sense that the moral order is the most important producer of social integration. 2. Some anthropologists have indicated an important watershed within the category we have designated as kin-based. With increased institutionalization of relations among hamlets, intergroup marriage takes on importance as a means of stabilizing intergroup alliances. Control of marriage by male lineage heads is a form of power based on gender inequality that distinguishes such systems. Meillassoux (1981) designates such societies as operating according to the logic of a “domestic mode of production.” Work by Gailey (1985, 1987) and Silverblatt (1987, 1988) suggests that the development of a “domestic mode of production” and the tran-

sition from chiefdom to state are part and parcel of both the universal subordination of women in state societies and the tremendous variability in the types and degrees of such subordination. The interplay of gender roles and status differentials, the transition from chiefdom to state, and intermarriage as a political alliance system need careful study and rethinking, especially with respect to the formation of core/periphery hierarchies. This is one of several instances where feminist critiques of the male-centric approach to theorizing is especially apt (see Ward 1993, 1990). 3. Though the theoretical approach behind these distinctions is Marxian, the categories produced are somewhat congruent with those issuing from very different perspectives. Thus societies in which the kin-based mode is predominant correspond roughly to Parsons’s (1966) “primitive” societies and Lenski and Lenski’s (1987) preagrarian (hunter-gatherer, horticultural) societies. Societies in which the tributary (state-based) modes are dominant are roughly equivalent to Parsons’s “ancient” and Lenski and Lenski’s “agrarian” categories; and societies dominated by the capitalist mode overlap to some extent with Parsons’s “modern” and Lenski and Lenski’s “industrial” societies. There are important theoretical differences between these perspectives, to be sure, but our point here is that the general categories of comparison are similar at the operational level. 4, The tributary mode accounts for most of written history. Our distinctions within this broad category are based on size, complexity, and political structures, but we expect that these divisions correspond to important differences in institutional features and developmental processes.

5. Many standard evolutionary studies assume that sedentism occurred first among neolithic horticulturalists and that hunter-gatherers (foragers) were nomadic. This is partly a consequence of ethnographic studies of recent foraging groups, most of whom have lived in very stark environments because they have been pushed out of prime locations by more hierarchical peoples. Earlier foragers were able to occupy ecologically prime locations. It was in these locations that mesolithic sedentary and population-dense societies first developed in the Levant some 12,000 years ago (Henry 1985). There are a few ethnographically known examples of sedentary foragers (e.g., Native Californians). See Chapter 7. 6. The primary versus secondary (or “reactive”) distinction can also be applied to tribes and chiefdoms. Reactive or secondary social change implies that interactions between various social structures induce changes in some of them toward increased similarity. For example, a

260 / Notes state system interacting with a big-man system may induce the formation of a tribe with appointed leaders and may even induce the formation of a chiefdom (Hall 1983, 1989). 7. We reviewed in Chapter 1 the explicit world-systems approach developed by Friedman and Rowlands (1977). Others who take account of regional relations are Carneiro (1970, 1978, 1981) and Renfrew and Cherry (1986). 8. The issue of which instances of state formation were primary and which were secondary is a complex one. Those who argue that state formation in China was largely a consequence of the diffusion of bronze-making technology and the chariot from West Asia tend to ignore the local and regional conditions in China that led up to the emergence of the Shang state. An emerging debate among those utilizing the world-systems perspective to analyze premodern social change is shaping up between the “lumpers” and the “splitters” (discussed in Chapter 1). This debate has an earlier incarnation within archaeology between the diffusionists and the ecological school. The diffusionists contended that long-distance diffusion of cultural elements was a central causal factor in most local developments, whereas the cultural ecologists focused on local interactions with the natural environment. Those archaeologists and anthropologists adopting a world-systems approach are often reacting to the overly “local” focus of the cultural ecologists, but they also remember the simplistic and facile use of diffusion models. Long-distance interaction can occur in several ways and can have various effects depending upon what is already going on in a locality or region. One purpose of our conceptualization of world-systems is to facilitate empirical study of the consequences of different kinds of long-distance interactions for local social structures. 9. For analyses of nomad-sedentary relations, see Chapters 4 and 8 and Hall 1991a, 1991b. 10. An intermediate case is that of the Nuer-Dinka relationship studied by Kelly (1985). The Nuer, pastoralists in the Sudan, lacked strong and permanent chiefs, but they did have three levels of hierarchy among villages that enabled them to form larger war bands than the neighboring Dinka, who were similar pastoralists, but had only two levels of intratribal hierarchy. Thus the Nuer systematically raided the Dinka for cattle and women, and expanded into Dinka territory over a 150-year period. Though the Nuer were clearly exploiting the Dinka by appropriating cattle and women, the limited forms of hierarchy within the Nuer society prevented this relationship from stabilizing into a core/periphery hierarchy based on exploitation of coerced labor in the periphery. The Dinka women taken as captives were rapidly assimilated into Nuer kinship structures. 11. Arguments to this effect have already been put forth by Kohl (1987b) and by Diakonoff (1973) for the Sumerian-centered world-system, but contrary evidence has been found by Lamberg-Karlovsky (1975). Renfrew’s (1986) model of early state modules and peer polity interaction emphasizes the coevolutionary aspects of polity formation in chiefdoms and early states. However, findings based on one or two instances are not sufficient for testing our propositions. Only fairly comprehensive and complete studies that compare a large number of whole world-systems can confirm or disprove these hypotheses. 12. Mann (1986, chap. 5) emphasizes the beneficial effects on economic development of the “compulsory cooperation” and pacification of large areas organized by the early conquest empires. Other scholars (e.g., Diakonoff 1973) emphasize the exploitative and destructive effects that these empires had on peripheral regions. It is undoubtedly the case that some empires had greater beneficial effects than others. These matters need to be sorted out by studies that examine all the regions within each relevant world-system and systematically compare world-systems.

Notes / 261 13. Recall from Chapter 1 the diffusion of the yam from Peru to Hawaii. Though we are not concerned with rare, one-shot excursions, such as the yam or Eric the Red, for these group-centric bounded systems, just where to bound them remains a thorny empirical and theoretical issue.

Chapter 4 1. The term “region of refuge” (Aguirre Beltran 1979) describes areas that are only partially incorporated into a state system. Partial incorporation has the consequence of freezing social change within such areas. This “preserves” the area in two ways. First, it sets it aside for future development. Second, it “preserves” older, “traditional,” social forms and hence is a “refuge” for social forms that have been destroyed elsewhere in the system. 2. These processes are discussed more fully later in this chapter. Eric Wolf (1982), P. Nick Kardulias (1990), and Thomas Abler (1992) provide summary discussions and introductions to the vast literature on the fur trade. We note further that the fur trade in southeastern North America, in what is known as southern Appalachia, differed significantly from that in the northeast. Trade in deerskins was a major industry, often second only to exports of tobacco or

cotton. This trade was much more important to European powers since it involved large quantities of staples. Consequently, incorporation processes differed in a number of ways. These are discussed in detail by Wilma A. Dunaway in her book (1996a, chap. 2) and in her article (1996b), which examines incorporation through both conventional world-systems analysis and the approach we advance in this chapter. 3. Wallerstein describes the differences between them: “What you [Hall] call ‘contact periphery’ is exactly what I mean by ‘external arena.’ The external arena is only of interest if there is some market articulation. The question is what kind. What you call ‘marginal periphery is what we have been calling ‘incorporation’ and what you call ‘full-blown periphery’ we have been calling the process of peripheralization that occurs only after our ‘incorporation’” (personal communication, October 15, 1985; published as note 3 in Hall 1986). 4. If we use the criteria of trade in bullion, West Africa has been linked to the Mediterranean and Near Eastern core regions since at least 800 C.E. (Curtin 1990, 32). Most of the gold coins, which played an important part in the Eurasian world-system, were minted from West African gold in Byzantium and Egypt (Abu-Lughod 1989). Moseley (1992) and Willard (1993) study the long-term incorporation of West Africa. 5. Many scholars distinguish between empires and modern national states in terms of indirect versus direct rule (e.g., Tilly 1990). It is alleged that empires did not penetrate deeply into local social or economic processes. The comparative study of precapitalist empires, however, reveals that the extent of penetration varied greatly. The Aztecs gathered tribute by military threat, rarely even bothering to change the leadership of local polities (Hassig 1988). In contrast, the Incas fundamentally reorganized local economic and social structures. 6. This is documented for some cases in North America. In the Old World bows eventually became so powerful that this was no longer possible. 7. On the one hand, those groups who continued occasional gardening could now gather in larger groups because the increased transportation efficiency of horses also allowed them to hunt

over larger territories from one fixed base. On the other hand, those groups that were entirely nomadic, or became so, could now travel a much wider range of territory. See Secoy 1953.

262 / Notes 8. Meat from the American bison has a higher protein content than beef or chicken, but lower levels of fat, cholesterol, and calories than beef, chicken, or pork. 9. Elsewhere in Latin America the spread of feral horses and cattle also vastly disrupted indigenous world-systems (Baretta and Markoff 1978) and in the Pampas region of southern South America gave rise to a whole new type of society: the Gauchos (Slatta 1983). 10. Our study of the Wintu presented in Chapter 7 is potentially subject to this kind of error. We have carefully considered the archaeological and ethnographic evidence with this in mind. 11. For detailed examples, see Barfield 1989 or Hall 1989. 12. The point here is not terminology, but underlying similarity in analyses. Sherratt’s “margin” corresponds approximately to the range from our contact through marginal peripheries.

The concept of “hinterland” used by Frank and Gills (1993a), Gills and Frank (1991), and Collins (1978, 1981) also corresponds roughly to the same range of degrees of incorporation. 13. Our analysis of frontiers draws upon but is different from Frederick Jackson Turner's

classic work. See Hofstadter and Lipset 1968; Jeffrey and Weber 1994; Lattimore 1940, 1962a; Markoff 1994; Norton 1983; Osborne and Rogerson 1978; Paynter 1985; Slatta 1992; Taylor 1972; and Weber 1986, 1987. 14. This analysis is confirmed in the work of Rudi Lindner (1981, 1983). He argues that the Huns abandoned the use of horses after invading Europe west of the Carpathians. The movement to forested areas made horses a liability, hampered a nomadic lifestyle, and promoted sedentary living. 15. The distinction between external and internal frontiers should not be confused with Barfield’s (1989) distinction between inner and outer frontier strategies; these are discussed in Chapter 8. 16. The underlying cause is often population imbalance with resources, which usually creates political or religious disagreements and factionalization. Hence fissioning, which states see as problematic, had important positive survival consequences for nonstate societies because it distributed and redistributed population spatially. 17. Culturicide, often called “cultural genocide,” refers to a process in which a culture is destroyed, even though not all individuals in that culture are killed. For an insightful discussion of this process for Native American groups, see James Fenelon 1995, 1996.

Chapter 5 1. This last form of semiperipherality has been termed “subimperialism” by Marini (1972). 2. See Anderson 1994 for a useful recent review. 3. A conical clan is an extensive common descent group, ranked and segmented along genealogical lines and patrilineal in ideological bias. 4. March lands or the marches are terms for border or frontier areas. A “marcher” is one who inhabits such areas, and a marcher state is a border or frontier state. 5. The language is Akkadian and the people are Akkadians. The city is Agade. 6. Some scholars of the ancient Near East dispute the idea that the Akkadians were recently settled pastoralists, contending that Sumerian and Akkadian speakers had resided next to one another in this region for millennia. Evidence relevant to determining the core/periphery position of Agade in the Sumerian system is thin. The archaeological site of Agade has never been found. But documentary evidence supports the claim that it was located well north and upriver of the old Mesopotamian core region, and the fact that the Akkadian Empire substi-

Notes / 263 tuted the Akkadian language for the older written Sumerian supports the interpretation of the Akkadian conquerors as semiperipheral marchers. 7. Contrary to Mann's claim that Sargon used heavy infantry, Diakonoff (1991, 85) says, “Sargon and his successors changed the traditional battle tactics by replacing the small, heavily armed detachments with large masses of lightly armed, mobile warriors, who either fought in chain formations or dispersed.” 8. Mann (1986) uses the term “protection rent” to mean extraction of surplus by coercive taxation of merchants. We would classify this as one form of the tributary mode. Lane's usage suggests rather the nature of policy and action taken by capitalist states. 9. Wilkinson's distinction between semiperiphery and periphery is different from that in our definition. For Wilkinson a semiperiphery is “strongly connected to the core (younger, fringeward, remote, more recently attached, weaker, poorer, more backward),” and a periphery is “weakly connected ... (nomads; peasant subsistence producers not yet attached to a

city ...)” (1991, 121). In our concept, full-blown peripheries are strongly connected, but they are even poorer, weaker, and so on than semiperipheries. Thus Wilkinson's semiperiphery contains both our semiperiphery and at least part of our periphery. This difference means that we cannot completely rely on Wilkinson’s survey for our analysis. It is beyond our means now to recode Wilkinson’s survey, and so we can only counsel caution regarding inferences made here on the basis of his catalogue of core shifts. That said, we can still learn from examining Wilkinson’s survey. All of his cases (PMNs) are state-based systems with cities larger than 10,000 in population, and so chiefdom world-systems are excluded. Many core shifts involve not the conquest of an old core state but rather the rise in an adjacent region of a new core area. We call these instances of “semiperipheral ascent.” There are also instances of “core return,” in which a formerly powerful core state resumes hegemonic status.

Chapter 6 1. One major criticism of the population pressure explanation of hierarchy formation and intensification is based on the existence of regions in which population density had not yet reached “carrying capacity” and yet hierarchy or intensification occurred. The population pressure model need not claim to explain all hierarchy formation and intensification in order to explain much of it. Furthermore, population pressure can affect resource availability and thus create economic pressures well before a region or locale has become so populated that no further increases are possible.

Chapter 7 1. A complete presentation of the findings of this project, which was supported by the

National Science Foundation, is contained in Chase-Dunn and Mann (forthcoming). Throughout this chapter, “we” includes all of the people who worked on the project: Katherine Woods, Elaine Sundahl, Ed Clewett, Mahua Sarkar, Elena Ermolaeva, Kelly Mann, and Tem Calfee. 2. As we discussed in Chapter 4, most societies of the kind we studied in northern California were fundamentally altered by long-distance interaction with state-based systems before they became ethnographically known. Many contemporary ethnographers, now sensitive to

264 / Notes this problem, refuse to believe that the foragers of northern California were pristine in this regard. The Spanish missions had stopped at Sonoma and only one exploring party had entered the lower Sacramento Valley before the late 1820s. The Russian fur trappers at Fort Ross had influenced the Pomo, but this influence did not extend very far inland. The possibility of epidemic diseases cannot be completely discounted, but Sherburne Cook (1955) does not think that there were epidemics before 1830 to 1833. The Wintu were not involved in the fur trade, and “war in the tribal zone” was not a phenomenon that occurred in northern California. The incorporation was not gradual. Rather, it was sudden and severe. Though the indigenous groups continued to operate much as they had for centuries up until 1849, after that they were massively disrupted. Only a few ethnographers worked in the 1880s, and the most thorough and professional work was done in the 1920s and 1930s. By this time the Wintu world-

system was a “memory culture.” This is why it is so important to supplement the ethnographic evidence with archaeological research. 3. This coding project was originally intended to cover the entire corpus of literature about the Wintu and all their immediately contiguous neighboring linguistic groups, but we realized early on that this would be impossible because this literature is too vast. We then concentrated our focus on the northeastern quadrant of the world-system surrounding the Wintu (see Map 7.1). This corresponds to the Shasta in the north, the Pit River groups (Achomawi, Atsegewi) in the northeast, and the Yana in the east. For other areas we coded only those events that in-

volved interaction with the Wintu, whereas for the Shasta, Pit River, and Yana groups we coded all the interaction events, whether or not they involved interaction with the Wintu. The list of sources from which we coded is available via the internet for perusal or retrieval from the World-Systems Archive (wsystems) at http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/wsarch.html in the Appendix subdirectory under Chase-Dunn/wintu_appendix-a.

4. In central California the cultural assemblage that is similar to the Shasta Complex is termed the Augustine Pattern (Moratto 1984). 5. This is what Walter Goldschmidt (1951, 324) reports for the Nomlaki, and it undoubtedly holds for the Wintu as well. 6. We follow anthropological convention and use the term “shaman” for any of a variety of part-time religious-magical-spiritual-pharmacological specialists found in nonstate societies. Such specialists are often called “medicine men” among North American Indians. They are different from “priests,” who typically practice religion full-time and are officials in an institutionalized church. The fate of unsuccessful shamans described here is quite typical, and not a upecial characteristic of northern California groups. 7. The nine surrounding linguistic groups were the Nomlaki Wintun to the south (another group of Penutian-speakers); the Yuki, Lassik, Nongatl, Chimariko, and New River Shasta groups to the west; the Okwanuchu to the north; the Pit River (Achomawi) to the northwest; and the Northern and Central Yana to the east (see Theodoratus 1981). 8. The Wintu were also on the southern edge of a large northern trading network that exchanged Dentalium shells (tooth shells, also called dentalium, plural dentalia). Archaeological evidence indicates that this was of relatively minor importance for the Wintu in comparison with the trade in clamshell disk beads. 9. Obsidian is volcanic glass, a material with a very sharp edge, that was used to fashion arrowheads and knife blades. Tuscan obsidian is a type of volcanic glass similar to that found in Tuscany. 10. Barbara Bocek (1991) argues that the close clustering of archaeological sites in the San Francisquito drainage (San Francisco Peninsula) may be due to a pattern of “short distance

Notes / 265 sedentism” whereby villages were relocated periodically within a local area. It is possible that the Wintu also utilized such a pattern in some areas. This might account for the existence of very closely spaced archaeological sites along some streams. The close spacing of these sites makes it difficult to believe that they were all occupied simultaneously. “Short distance sedentism” might be the explanation. 11. Wayne C. Wiant's (1981) study of the Southern Yana subsistence and settlement pattern confirms the distinctions posited here. The Tehama or milling stone pattern does not work very well for the Achomawi and the Okwanuchu, probably because they developed a more riverine-oriented subsistence strategy after contact with the Wintu. 12. Note that the association of a “people” with archaeological patterns is a complex problem. Skills and technologies can be learned and passed on without people moving. Changes in patterns could as easily indicate changes in habits as in inhabitants. 13. Mortars and pestles were present among Hokan groups prior to Wintu arrival but were not nearly as common as milling stones. The Wintu probably introduced the first hopper mortars. 14. Salmon flour is produced by drying and powdering the flesh of salmon. It is a highly nutritive and storable source of protein. 15. Melissa L. Meyer (1994) reports a similar buffer between the Anishinaabe and Lakota peoples in what is now the Dakotas and Minnesota. 16. Sydney M. Lamb (1962) and Thomas L. Jackson (1989) report instances of this kind of peaceful acculturation in other areas of California. 17. Just to the north, the Modocs were engaged in systematic slave raiding in which captives were sold to groups linked with the Columbia River basin system of slave exchange (Neasham 1974 [1957]). But this did not have an impact on the relations between the Wintu and their neighbors. 18. A complete explanation of this usage of archaeological evidence to estimate Wintu expansion is contained in Chase-Dunn and Mann forthcoming. 19. DuBois (1935) reports that the Wintu had two counting systems, one for clamshell disks and another for “ordinary purposes.” The terms used to count clamshell disks were shared with the Nomlaki (adjacent neighbors to the south), and DuBois suggests that this may indicate “a relation between the southern origin of clamshell disks and a southern terminology in counting them” (1935, 71). 20. Despite the fact that all the intermediate groups spoke Penutian languages that were derived from a single protolanguage, the languages were mutually unintelligible over rather short distances. Even within the territory that we identify as Wintu there were mutually unintelligible dialects. 21. At contact the Wintu were participating in two different prestige-goods networks. When local people have only one source of socially recognized symbols of value, they are somewhat dependent on that source, but access to two different prestige-goods networks decreases dependence on either one. The two forms of wealth may be substitutable. But archaeological evidence suggests that Wintu participation in the northern prestige-goods network was rather minimal. The ethnographic evidence suggests that the dentalia shells obtained from the north served more as adornment than as protomoney. Consequently, access to the

northern supply source would not have appreciably reduced Wintu dependence on the clamshell disk network.

22. Hudson (1975 [1897], 9-20) provides a fairly detailed description of the process by which clamshell disk beads were produced.

266 / Notes

Chapter 8 1. There was also an emerging state-based world-system in Southeast Asia. 2. As does Wilkinson, we use the term “central” only in a geographical sense. This is the system that developed states and cities first and that eventually incorporated all other systems into itself.

3. Archaeologists have found what is very likely to be Chinese silk in an ancient Egyptian context. A little silk does not a system make, but a lot of silk does. 4. See Allen 1996 for a characterization of the Mesopotamian and Egyptian world-systems. 5. “Barbarian” comes from the Greek and means essentially “non-Greek,” much as “gentile” means non-Hebrew. While the term is derogatory from the point of view of “civilized” people, not everyone, even in ancient times, took it that way (e.g., Philip of Macedon also was known quite proudly as “Philip the Barbarian”). The best paper we have found (Beckwith 1987d) on the concept of “barbarian” in Chinese unfortunately remains unpublished. In it Beckwith argues that “the concept ‘barbarian’ does not exist in Chinese—even now, actually, despite all the cultural influence via Conan movies and similar things—and never did exist; its a purely Western idea. Of course the peoples that Westerners in the past called barbaroi (and so on) were found not only in the West but in the East—and other directions as well; they just weren't perceived by the Chinese through the cultural construct of the ‘barbarian” (personal communication, October 21, 1996). 6. Our discussion of Central Asian nomads draws on Barfield 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993; Lattimore 1940, 1962a, 1962b, 1980; Khazanov 1983; Irons 1979; Burnham 1979; Morgan 1986; Seaman 1989, 1992; Seaman and Marks 1991; Szynkiewicz 1989; Jagchid and Symons 1989; and Beckwith 1987a, 1987b, 1987c, 1991. Jagchid and Symons (1989, intro.) review the debates in this literature. Hall (1991a, 1991b) and Frank (1992) offer world-systems interpretations. 7. McNeill also maps this gradient (1987, 266, 323). 8. The phrase “barbarians against barbarians” is found often in translations of Chinese accounts of frontier policy. A specific citation is found in Yii 1967, 15. See also Kwanten 1979, 12f.; and Beckwith 1987d. 9. Note that shifts in climate that cut the productivity of local grazing lands could produce identical effects. Research needs to be done on whether climate change could have produced the synchronization of empire rise and fall in the Central and Far Eastern systems. 10. Transhumant nomads move among more-or-less fixed camps, typically between summer and winter grazing pastures where they spend much of the year. Hence they are sometimes called semisedentary because they live in two different more-or-less fixed places and do not move frequently. Truly nomadic pastoralists keep moving, even if they follow an essentially standard circuit. The shift to fully sedentary life was easier for transhumant peoples than for true nomads. 11. Yii (1967, 133) uses the term “Western countries” to refer not only to the numerous small client states incorporated early in the former Han dynasty in Central Asia but also to India, Parthia, and Rome. More typically, though, the term was used to refer to those small states at the western edge of the Chinese empire, as we do here. 12. See Hudson 1931; McNeill 1963, 1976, 1987; Simkin 1968; and Yii 1967.

13. Simkin (1968, 47) cites ancient Indian documents that list interest rates for trade loans: ordinary secured loans, 15 percent per annum; trade loans, 5 percent per month; caravan loans, 10 percent per month; and sea loans, 20 percent per month. Though not conclusive, this is a good indication of the relative risks involved in different modes of trade transport.

Notes / 267 14, Simkin (1968, 45) estimates that this trade was worth about 10 million British pounds in 1967. In the mid-1990s that would be about US$120 million, not a very large amount in terms of international trade, but not a trivial amount either. 15. See Crosby 1972, 1986; Ramenofsky 1987; Reff 1991; Thornton 1987; and White 1990. 16. A world religion separates membership in the moral community from ethnicity or kinship, allowing the creation of a moral order that integrates peoples from different cultural backgrounds. 17. Major sources for this section are Elvin 1973 and McNeill 1963, 1976, 1982, 1987. 18. The spread of rice cultivation and the occupation of the Yangtze River valley go very far back in Chinese history. The key point here is that these processes accelerated greatly during this era. 19. We are making neither an “Islam caused everything” nor an “inevitability” argument. Rather, we are claiming that contact with Islamic fighters spread this technology more rapidly than otherwise would have been the case.

20. This section draws from Pirenne 1937, 1980; McNeill 1963, 1964; Bloch 1961; Bartlett 1993; and Sanderson 1995a. 21. For a review of the literature on Kondratieff cycles, see Goldstein 1988. 22. We are following new transliterations—Beijing (Peking) and Chinggis (Genghis). Khan is generic term for ruler. Chinggis Khan means “ruler of all between the seas” (McNeill 1987, 386). 23. Barfield (1989, 211) shows the lineage from Chinggis.

24. See Fitzpatrick 1992 for a world-system explication and interpretation of these changes. 25. The Secret History of the Mongols (Kahn 1984) is the basic source for conditions during Chinggis’s lifetime.

26. Lateral descent or succession refers to inheritance that passes from older to younger sons, whereas lineal descent refers to inheritance that passes from father to son. Lineal descent may be by primogeniture, that is, to the first-born (legitimate) son, or ultimogeniture, that is, to the last-born (legitimate) son. The practice of polygyny complicates all these forms of descent. Barfield (1989) offers many detailed accounts of how this worked—and how it did not work—among Central Asian nomads. 27. Thomas Barfield (personal correspondence February 10, 1994) suggests that the spread of Islam (600-1000) is often overrated because of its later accomplishments. Conversely, the Turkish conquest is often underrated because of the Turks’ subsequent conversion to Islam (see Barfield 1990).

28. Such conversions may suggest a key role for ideology in social change. But Bartlett (1993) notes that rulers who saw the value of trade and alliances often decided that access would be improved if they converted. 29. Two points bear elaboration here. First, this situation was not unique to Europe but had parallels in Japan. Second, self-rule was not mass democracy but rule by rich merchants and guilds. 30. See Sanderson 1994d and 1995a for an extended comparison of Japan and Western Europe. 31. Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 collectively comprise a very abstract portrayal of what happened in Afroeurasia. The scale is wrong, but the idea of merging systems is right. 32. We thank William R. Thompson for pointing out how these “key inventions” are linked to the various nets. See Thompson 1990 and Collins 1986a.

268 / Notes

Chapter 9 1. On the famous “amber route” connecting the Mediterranean with the Baltic, Sherratt (1993a, 47) writes, “[I]nterrupted in the centuries before 1000 BC, it reappeared c. 900, shifted eastwards c. 700, disappeared for some centuries again, before re-emerging in Roman

times... .” 2. The Hapsburg effort to convert the nascent European capitalist interstate system into a corewide tributary empire (Wallerstein 1974b) was only stopped by the French alliance with the Ottoman Empire. 3. In this regard, the spread of Frankish culture described in The Making of Europe (Bartlett 1993) was doubly significant. On the one hand, it helped to create a common culture that facilitated trade, while on the other, it did not succeed in building states sufficiently large to hold traders in line. 4. This was structurally similar to the relationship between the Wintu and the distant and more developed Pomo/Patwin reported in Chapter 7. 5. Generally, political/military and market integration are superior to normative regulation for cross-cultural interaction. However, as we allude to in the text, new technologies of communication—the internet, cellular phones, satellite systems, and so on—may change radically the relative scales of normative, political/military, and market integration. Despite some of the wilder claims of advertisers, this has not happened—yet.

Chapter 10 1. For simplicity we assume in Table 10.1 that prestige-goods networks and information networks are the same size, even though this is often not the case in actual interaction networks. 2. We modify Wilkinson’s terminology for purposes of clarity. He refers to PMNs as “civilizations,” and so he maps how “Central civilization” came to engulf all the other formerly separate PMNs. Wilkinson uses the term “central” only as a geographical designation, as do we. The fact that it was the Central System that ate all the others is not necessarily evidence of its progressive nature. 3. The archaeological evidence on this issue is problematic. Our reading of the evidence is that there was a down-the-line informational linkage and that if there was a PGN linkage, it was extremely weak. 4, Wilkinson defines “oikumene” as “a trading area, a domain internally knit by a network of trade routes, in which there is enough internal trade so that the whole trading area evolves

to a significant degree as a system, while trade outside the area, though perhaps important both to the oikumene and to other oikumenes with which it trades, is not sufficiently dense and significant to cause system-level development to encompass these external systems” (1992, 55-56). 5. This merger of prestige-goods nets may have occurred as early as 3000 B.C.E. (Marfoe 1987). Allen (1996) contends that state formation in the Egyptian world-system was importantly influenced by interaction with the Mesopotamian world-system. 6. Figure 10.2 is not drawn to scale. It is a heuristic illustration of the processes of pulsating expansion and merging. 7. Of course BGNs and PGNs may be related to one another in different ways in different systems. Recall that in northern California the late prehistoric PGN facilitated the expansion and intensification of the BGN. The mechanisms of linkage differ in true prestige-goods sys-

Notes / 269 tems (Friedman and Rowlands 1977), but here again the two levels of interaction expand and contract together. 8. The most complete and recent review of the literature on the rise and fall of chiefdoms is contained in David G. Anderson's (1994) study of the Savannah River chiefdoms. 9. This is also a possible contextual explanation for the important structural and strategic differences between complex chiefdoms and states that are based on “staple finance” versus those based on “wealth finance” (D’Altroy and Earle 1985). 10. The differences among strategies within similar world-systems (e.g., chiefdom-based systems) are probably smaller than the differences between strategies in completely different types of world-systems. 11. The term “world-empire” has been used to refer to single tributary states such as Sassanid Iran (e.g., Foran 1993), but this is a mistaken usage because all tributary states are involved in trade of basic goods with other regions. Thus they are not whole world-systems but rather are parts of systems. 12. The Standardized Primacy Index is an indicator of the relative steepness or flatness of a city size distribution (see Walters 1985). Every settlement system has a size distribution that varies from flat (in which settlements or cities in a region have approximately the same population sizes) to steep (in which the largest city is much larger than the second largest city and so forth). Urban geographers postulate a so-called rank-size rule in which the second largest city is half the size of the largest, the third largest is one-third the size of the largest, and so on. The SPI uses the rank-size rule as a norm and calculates a statistic in which zero corresponds to a rank-size distribution. Negative scores are flat relative to the rank-size rule and positive scores are steep. 13. See the previous note for an explanation of relative flatness of a city size distribution. 14. A megameter is one million meters. 15. We have few numbers for Indic empire sizes, and so we are unable to compare these with Far Eastern and Central empire sizes. Future research should supplement Taagepera’s (1978a, 1978b, 1979) data with Indic empire sizes. 16. Climate change could also have been a result rather than a cause of urban and empire growth and decline. This possibility could also be examined with fine-grained data on the timing of climate changes. 17. This argument was first made in world-system terms by Jane Schneider (1977) and was developed and elaborated in Janet Abu-Lughod’s (1987, 1989) study of the thirteenth century. 18. Recent increases in the inequality of wealth and income distribution in the United States run in the direction of a Third World—like stratification system, but the remaining differences are still very large.

Chapter 11 1. Diarchy is a dual political structure in which there are two more-or-less equal kings in one polity. Many chiefdoms and early states had both a military and a religious leader. 2. Recall the model of increasing territorial size of tributary empires (Figure 10.3). At the beginning of any one of the major leaps it is difficult to distinguish between a slightly larger-thantypical fluctuation from the onset of a major qualitative shift. Once the shift is well under way it becomes very clear. Given the volatile nature of capitalism, it is especially hard to distinguish—in advance—a new, major, qualitative shift from a more-or-less typical fluctuation.

270 / Notes 3. For a fuller explanation of this scenario and its causes, see Chase-Dunn and Podobnik 1995. A related future that emphasizes the interaction of regional challengers to global leaders is presented in Rasler and Thompson 1994. 4, We are using the term “socialism” to mean a mode of accumulation that is qualitatively both more democratic and collectively more rational than capitalism. Such a system would have no more than a faint resemblance to those of the former Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China. 5. Assur made the transformation from a semiperipheral trading city to the capital of the Assyrian Empire. Carthage more than flirted with the marcher-state route, led by Hannibal, but in the crucial moment the supporters of capitalist accumulation in the Carthaginian state carried the day and support for Hannibal's venture was not dispatched. Rome survived and part of its own rise as a marcher state included the complete destruction of Carthage. 6. Even surviving “indigenous peoples” use the United Nations and international law to protect their rights (Wilmer 1993). That is, they are protecting their right to remain different

by accepting dominant definitions about what it means to be different and how a people strugeles to remain different. One reason this tactic works is that the denial of indigenous claims often undermines the overall ideology of legitimate state sovereignty. This is why even states with large populations that include small indigenous minorities (e.g., Canada and the United States) strongly resist indigenous rights movements (Russell 1994; Churchill 1994).

Glossary adaptation: an institutional adjustment to social and environmental pressures for change, adaptation undercuts adaptivity. [5] adaptivity: the ability to make adaptive changes in response to any social or environmental changes, adaptivity aids adaptation. [5] backwash effect: core-periphery interaction that causes a peripheral area to become more underdeveloped. [2] band: a cluster of families who generally live together and associate with other such groups that share language and culture. Band membership is typically somewhat fluid. [3] big man: a leader who operates by persuasion and prestige and whose prestige is based on his ability to influence his followers to amass wealth for give-away ceremonies. A big man is more powerful than a headman, but less powerful than a chief (Sahlins 1963). [3] bulk-goods network (BGN): the network of exchanges of “necessities,” or low value-toweight ratio goods; typically the smallest exchange network in a world-system. [3] capital: commodified wealth used to produce commodities. [2] capitalism: production of goods (commodities) for sale on a market. See also merchant capitalism. {5}

capitalist accumulation: the amassing of wealth by means of the making of profits from commodity production. [1] carrying capacity: the population any natural environment can support within a specified region with a given production technology. [1] chief: a leader with institutionalized access to substantial social resources, giving him coercive power. His resources are somewhat autonomous from the control of other lineage heads. Typically, but not always, an hereditary office. [3] chiefdom: a stratified polity that relies on generalized institutions for regional coordination and control, usually a hierarchical kinship structure that legitimates chiefly authority. [3] circumscription: a situation in which emigration is blocked by physical barriers (environmental circumscription) or by social barriers such as a competing population (social circumscription), or both. [6] class: a group of people with shared and distinctive politicoeconomic interests. [3] colonial empire: a situation in which one or more core states dominate peripheral regions. [10]

Where terms are taken directly from another source we cite that source. When only an author’s name is mentioned, we are taking that author’s general sense without quoting directly, Terms in italics have their own entry elsewhere in the glossary. We note in square brackets the chapter in the text where the term is first used. 271

272 / Glossary commodification: the process or result of turning something into a commodity. Commodification is a matter of degree. [1] commodity: a standardized good produced for sale on a price-setting market. [1] commodity chains: networks that link all the actors involved in the production and consump-

tion of a commodity—from food producers for workers, raw-material producers, transportation, final production, and final consumers. [1] conical clan: an extensive common descent group, ranked and segmented along genealogical lines and patrilineal in ideological bias. [5] contact periphery: a periphery that is minimally incorporated into a world-system. This is the weakest level of the continuum of incorporation, much weaker than nominal (formal) incorporation. [4] core: region of a world-system that dominates the system. Typically it consists of the most complex social groups in the system. [Introduction] core/periphery differentiation: societies at different levels of complexity and population density are in interaction with each other. [2] core/periphery hierarchy: intersocietal domination or exploitation. [2] corewide empire: a single state controls most of the territory within the core of a world-system. [10]

dependent periphery (full-blown periphery): a periphery that is maximally incorporated into a world-system. This is the strongest level of the continuum of incorporation, where development of underdevelopment takes place. See also effective (real) incorporation. |4] development of underdevelopment: the process in which developing countries extract capital from their economic and/or political colonies, which not only blocks development but also systematically distorts development in harmful ways—that is, it is the relationship itself that causes “underdevelopment.” [2] down-the-line trade: a system of trade in which A trades to B, who trades to C, who trades to D, and so on. In this type of system goods can travel a long way without the endpoints ever coming into contact. [Introduction] effective (real) incorporation: “a situation in which the patterns of production and reproduction typical of external arenas have ceased to be dominant within the region and tend to disintegrate qua systems” (Arrighi 1979, 162). [4] external arena: an area outside of a world-system. [4] external frontier: a zone of incorporation on the edges of an expanding world-system. [4] fall-off: the gradient of degradation of consequential effects over space. [1] formal incorporation: see nominal incorporation. [4] full-blown periphery: see dependent periphery. [4] Galton’s problem: in the absence of complete isolation, it is difficult to distinguish independent invention (or parallel evolution) from diffusion. [2] headman: a leader by virtue of personal charisma and respected abilities, typically in oratory, mediation, hunting, and fighting. He leads by influence. A headman is less powerful than a big man and much less powerful than a chief: [3] hegemon: the one core state with an unusually large share of world economic and military power over other core states. [5] hegemonic sequence: the rise and fall of hegemons. [5] hegemony: a situation in which one core state has an unusually large share of world economic and military power over other core states. [5]

Glossary / 273 hierarchy formation: an increase in socially structured inequalities within or among societies (e.g., class formation, state formation, empire formation). [6] information net (IN): the network of exchange of information in a variety of forms, including ideology, religion, technical information, and culture. [3] intensification: the implementation of changes in production technology that increase the productivity of land, labor, or other resources. [6] interchiefdom system: a set of chiefdoms that make alliances and war with one another. [5] internal frontier: a zone of incorporation that is encapsulated within an expanding system. [4]

interstate system: a set of interacting states that make alliances and war with one another. [1] Kondratieff waves: forty- to sixty-year economic cycles of growth and stagnation, discovered by the Soviet economist Nikolai Kondratieff. [8] least effort, principle of: people usually prefer to continue in the way that they know as long as this does not require substantially greater effort. [6] marginal periphery: a periphery that is incorporated into a world-system more strongly than a contact periphery, but more weakly than a dependent periphery. Equivalent to a region of refuge. [4]

merchant capitalism: accumulation through exploiting price differentials across different regions. (5] minisystems: small-scale systems in which all socially essential networks are contained within a single cultural or linguistic group (Wallerstein 1984, 148). [1] mode of accumulation: a logic of development in which the reproduction of social structures and cyclical processes occur by means of certain typical forms of integration and control, a deep structural logic of production, distribution, exchange, and accumulation. Empirical indicators are forms of exchange and forms of control used to mobilize social labor and/or to extract surplus product. Different modes of accumulation may be present in the same system, and some forms of exchange and control have elements of more than one mode. Generally, one mode “predominates,” [2] mode of production: a deep structural logic that is composed of forces of production (technology) and relations of production (class relations). [1] nation: a group of people with a shared identity and sense of separate sovereignty. [1] nation-state: a group of people with a shared identity who are citizens or subjects of the same state. [1] no intervening heartland rule: states do not expand successfully when that expansion entails leaping over or passing through the heartland of a competing state (Collins 1978, 1981). [1] nominal (formal) incorporation: “political domination by an external power and/or economic relations with the capitalist world-economy have been established but the dominant patterns of production and reproduction within the region are still those typical of external arenas’ (Arrighi 1979, 161-162). [4] oscillation: the alternation between private, market-mediated accumulation versus accumulation more heavily reliant on state institutions. [10] paradigm: a very general framework from which specific theories are constructed. [Introduction] periphery: region of a world-system that is dominated by the core and semiperiphery. Typically it consists of the least complex social groups in the system. [Introduction]

274 / Glossary political/military network (PMN): the network of regular political or military “exchanges,” including warfare and statecraft; typically a medium-sized network in a world-system. {3] population pressure: population density (the number of people per unit of land area) rises to levels that degrade natural resources in a way that increases the costs of production. [6] prestige goods: symbolically important goods, typically exotic imports, often of high value-toweight ratio, whose ownership confers prestige on the owner. [1] prestige-goods economy: systemic exchange network in which local leaders monopolize the supply of symbolically important goods, typically exotic imports (prestige goods), which they use to reward subordinates. In many systems these goods are defined as necessary for important social rituals such as marriage. [1] prestige-goods network (PGN): the network of exchanges of “prestige” or luxury goods, or high value-to-weight ratio goods; typically the largest exchange network in a world-system. [3]

price-setting market: a market in which the competitive buying and selling of goods by actors operating to maximize their own returns largely determines the rates of exchange (prices) among traded goods. [1]

pristine state (primary state): a state that developed without contact with other existing states. [3]

protection rent: the differential returns received by merchants whose trading efforts are supported by a cost-efficient and protection-providing state. (See Lane 1979.) [5] pulsation: periodic spatial expansion and contraction of interaction networks. [7] reactive (secondary) social change: a consequence of interactions between various social structures that induce changes in some of them toward increased similarity. [3] reactive state: a state that developed in reaction to interactions with other already existing states. Also known as a secondary state. [3] region of refuge: describes an area that is only partially incorporated into a state system. This tends to freeze social change and hence: (1) it sets the area aside for future development; and (2) it “preserves” older, “traditional,” social forms and is a “refuge” for social forms that have been destroyed elsewhere in the system. (After Aguirre Beltran 1979.) [4] rise and fall: cycles of intersocietal political centralization and decentralization, usually indicated by growth (or decline) of the largest core polity. [6] secondary state: see reactive state. [3]

segmentary lineage: a form of kinship that can activate ties at various levels of relatedness. Support or opposition in any conflict is governed by the degree of relatedness of two groups. This is encapsulated in the proverb “Me against my brother; my brother and | against the clan; my clan and us against the tribe; my tribe, my clan, my brother, and I against the world.” (For further discussion see Barfield 1993, especially 75ff.) [8] semiperipheral development: semiperipheries are fertile locations for innovations in techniques of power that enable upward mobility and the transformation of world-systems. [5] semiperiphery: an intermediate location in an intersocietal core/periphery structure. [Introduction] shaman: any of a variety of part-time religious-magical-spiritual-pharmacological specialists found in nonstate societies. They are different from “priests,” who typically practice religion full-time and are officials in an institutionalized church. [7] socially necessary labor time: the amount of labor required to produce a commodity using the current standard technology. [5]

Glossary / 275 spread effect: core-periphery interactions that cause peripheral areas to become mote corelike. [2]

state: a regionally organized society with specialized regional institutions—military and bureaucratic—that perform the tasks of control and management (Johnson and Earle 1987, 246). [1] techniques of power: Michael Mann’s term for political and cultural institutions that facilitate the wielding of power: “They all have in common a capacity to improve the infrastructure of collective and distributive power, and they all have a proved survival capacity” (Mann 1986, 525). [1] teleology: a teleological explanation explains an outcome in terms of final causes or ultimate purposes. [Introduction] trade diaspora: Philip Curtin’s term (1984) for specialized trading ethnicity that occupies a scattering of settlements for conducting trade across cultural boundaries. [1] trade ecumene: Philip Curtin’s term (1984) for a region in which the norms of trade are widely understood and agreed upon among formerly separate and different cultural groups. A trade ecumene obviates the need for trade diaspora. [1] transhumant: a lifestyle in which nomads move among more-or-less fixed camps, typically between summer and winter grazing pastures where they spend much of the year. Sometimes called semisedentary because they live in two different places but move between them seasonally. [8]

tribe: an overly general term referring to any of the kin-ordered groups (tribelet, big-man system, chiefdom). [3] tribelet: usually consists of a single village but sometimes includes two or three villages under the nominal “leadership” of a single headman. [7] world-economy: an intersocietal division of labor in which the core is politically structured as an interstate system—a system of competing states. [2] world-empire: an intersocietal division of labor that is politically controlled by a single state. [2]

world-systems: intersocietal networks in which the interactions (trade, warfare, intermarriage, information, etc.) are important for the reproduction of the internal structures of the composite units and importantly affect changes that occur in these local structures. [2]

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306 / References Yii, Ying-shih. 1967. Trade and Expansion in Han China: A Study in the Structure of Sino-Barbarian Economic Relations. Berkeley: University of California Press. Zaccagnini, Carlo. 1987. “Aspects of Ceremonial Exchange in the Near East During the Late Second Millennium B.C.” In Centre and Periphery in the Ancient World, edited by Michael Rowlands, Mogens Larsen, and Kristian Kristiansen, 57-65. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Zagarell, Allen. 1986. “Trade, Women, Class, and Society in Ancient Western Asia.” Current Anthropology 27:5 (December):415—430. Zipf, George K. 1949. Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort. Cambridge, MA: Addison- Wesley.

About the Book and Authors Spanning 12,000 years of social change, this book examines the ways in which world-systems evolve. A comparative study of stateless societies, state-based regional empires, and the modern global capitalist political economy, it reveals the underlying processes at work in the reproduction and transformation of social, economic, and political structures. Chase-Dunn and Hall show that stateless societies developed in the context of regional intersocietal networks that differed significantly from larger and more hierarchical world-systems. The processes by which chiefdoms rose and fell had broad similarities with the ways in which states, empires, and modern hegemonic core states have experienced uneven development. Most world-systems exhibit a pattern of political centralization and decentralization, but the mechanisms and processes of change differ significantly. Looking at the systemic similarities and differences among small-scale, middle-sized, and global world-systems, the authors address such questions as: Do all world-systems have core/periphery hierarchies in which the development of one area necessitates the underdevelopment of another? How were kin-based logics of social integration transformed into statebased tributary logics, and how did capitalism emerge within the interstices of tributary states and empires eventually to become the predominant logic of accumulation? How did the rise of commodity production and the eventual dominance of capitalist accumulation modify the processes by which political centers rise and fall? Rise and Demise offers far-reaching explanations of social change, showing how the comparative study of world-systems increases our understanding of early history, the contemporary global system, and future possibilities for world society.

Christopher Chase-Dunn is professor of sociology at Johns Hopkins University. Thomas D. Hall is Lester M. Jones Professor of Sociology at DePauw University.

307

BLANK PAGE

Index Abbasid Empire, 172 Agriculture, 106-107, 111-112, 199. See Abler, Thomas S., 65, 68 also Technological intensification Abu-Lughod, Janet L., 19, 151, 175, 184,191 | Aguirre Beltran, Gonzalo, 61, 69, 261(n1)

Achomawi people, 137, 138 Akkadian Empire, 104, 256(n2), 262(n5),

Adams, William Y., 78 263(n7) Adaptivity, 81 Alexander, Rani T., 19

Adaptation, 81 semiperipheries, 85-89, 97, 262-263(n6) Aftica, 64, 68-69, 172, 261(n4). See also Alexander the Great, 156, 157

Afroeurasian world-system Algaze, Guillermo, 86 Afroeurasian world-system, 149-186, Allen, Mitchell, 24, 37, 286(n5)

250-251 Allsen, Thomas T., 178

Central Asian nomads, 158-163, “American System,” 95

159(table) Amin, Samir, 24, 25, 30, 77, 150, 191

core/periphery relations, 150, 161, 162, Anderson, Perry, 50, 189

190-192 Anthropology, 12, 16, 260(n8). See also

and disease, 114-115, 151, 166-167, specific topics

175, 181, 183 Appel, Jill, 22

and Europe-centered world-system, Archaeology, 12, 38, 39-40, 260(n8)

187-189, 190 Northern California, 126-127, 264(n4),

implications, 184—186 : 265(n12)

incorporation, 76, 77, 150, 172, See also specific topics

174-175, 184-185 Arensberg, Conrad M., 24, 92

and Islam, 168, 171, 173(figure), 173, Arrighi, Giovanni, 35, 37, 61, 63, 64, 65,

175, 181-183, 267(nn19, 27) 75, 96, 212

land trade, 163-164, 165(figure), Asiatic mode of production, 31, 111 166-168, 266(n11), 267(nn13, 14) Atsegewi people, 137 maps, 153, 155, 165, 169,173, 179 Augustine Pattern, 264(n4)

1000-1400 c.z., 175-184 Aztecs, 261(n5)

periodization, 151, 152(figure)

population pressure, 113-114 Backwash effects, 38-39, 50, 86

pre-600 c.z. history, 150-168 Bairoch, Paul, 35 , sea trade, 168, 169(figure) Balance-of-power strategy, 33

and semiperipheries, 94, 162 Bands, 43

600-1000 c.z., 168, 170-175, 267(n19) — Barfield, Thomas J., 50, 88, 150, 151, 152,

theoretical issues, 150 158, 160, 161, 162,177, 178, 181,

and world-systems typology, 46—47 267(n27) world-systems within, 151, 152, 154, Barth, Frederik, 71, 159

156-158, 266(n2) Bartlett, Robert, 151, 174, 182 309

310 / Index

Baugh, Timothy, 49 and incorporation, 74, 76

Bean, Lowell John, 126 and interstate systems, 194-196

266(n5) 15, 16)

Beckwith, Christopher I., 151, 154, 175, and modes of production, 25, 32, 258(nn

Bennyhoff, James A., 126 and population pressure, 112—113, Bentley, Jerry, 52, 151, 154, 166, 168, 176, 234-235

181 and rise-and-fall patterns, 111-112

BGN. See Bulk-goods networks Sanderson theory, 111, 113

Big-man systems, 44, 128, 178, 180 and semiperipheries, 90-93, 112, 241,

Biological constraints, 99-100 270(n5)

Bison, 66, 262(n8) and state formation, 34, 236 Black Death, 114, 175, 181, 183 and technological intensification, Blanton, Richard, 13, 22, 209 196-198 Bocek, Barbara, 265(n10) totality assumption, 32 Boserup, Esther, 23, 113 See also Capitalist accumulation; EuropeBosworth, Andrew, 77, 213, 226 centered world-system

249 190, 258(n15)

Braudel, Fernand, 12-13, 19, 91, 192-193, | Capitalist accumulation, 30, 35, 51, 113,

Bride-price, 136, 137, 138 and systemic logic, 25 Brown, James A., 121 and world-systems typology, 42,

Brown, Michael F, 68 259(n3) Brumfiel, Elizabeth, 257(n10) See also Capitalism

Bubonic plague. See Black Death Carneiro, Robert, 23, 44, 45, 103, 104, 105,

Buddhism, 175 110, 115, 207

Buffering, 49, 71, 134, 265(n15) Carrying capacity, 23, 100, 174, 257(n11), Bulk-goods networks (BGN), 52, 53, 61, 263(n1) 190-191. See also specific systems Cattle, 262(n9)

Bunker, Stephen G., 76 Central Asian nomads, 158—163, 159(table),

Byzantine Empire, 172, 182 170, 176, 266(nn 8,9)

kinship systems, 162, 180, 267(n26)

California. See Northern California See also Mongols

Capitalism 209

Capital, defined, 34-35 Centralization/decentralization, 19, 74-75, and Afroeurasian world-system, 186 Central System, 151, 266(n2) capital imperialism, 22, 29, 34, 257(n9) and Europe-centered world-system,

challenges to, 96, 245 183-184, 187-189, 190, 268(nn 1, 3) China, 25, 47, 190 and global modern world-system and commercialization, 111, 113 creation, 201, 203, 204, 268(n2) and core/periphery relations, 22, 33, growth/decline cycles, 214-221,

50-51, 190, 192 215-217(figures),219-220(figures)

212-213 267(n29)

and cross-system comparisons, 210, 1000-1400 c.x. history, 182-184,

defined, 34 pre—600 c.z. history, 154, 156-158 and effective incorporation, 63 pulsation, 204, 205(figure), 206

and expansion, 193 600~—1000 c.x. history, 171, 172, and future transformation, 6, 239, 241, 174-175

242, 243 and systemic logic, 33

Index / 311 See also Afroeurasian world-system; and state formation, 45, 102 Global modern world-system and systemic transformation, 234—235,

Chagnon, Napoleon A., 132, 141 236-237 Chandler, Tertius, 212, 213 See also Population pressure Chase-Dunn, Christopher, 29, 31, 32, 33, City-states, 19, 85-89, 212, 236. See also

35, 36, 37, 51, 76, 95, 96, 98, 135, specific systems and topics 144, 195, 212, 214, 225, 226, 227, Class, 44, 127, 198

241, 242, 252 and semiperipheries, 88-89, 244

Chaudhuri, K. N., 171 and state formation, 44-45, 110,

Cheng Ho. See Zheng He 161-162 Cherry, John F, 39, 49 inequalities

Cherokee people, 66 See also Classless societies; Intrasocietal

Chi, Ch’ao-ting, 170 Classless societies, 13, 28, 29~30. See also Chiefdoms, 25, 44, 83-84, 103, 110, 137, Fgalitarianism

269(nn 9, 10) Clay, Henry, 95

Chilcote, Ronald H., 61 Clewett, S. Edward, 126, 131

China ZONES

Childe, V. Gordon, 23, 105, 187-188 Climate. See Climatic changes; Ecological and “barbarian” concept, 170, 266(nn 5,8) Climatic changes, 18, 257(n6)

capitalist development in, 25, 47, 190 Coast Miwok people, 128, 143

and Central Asian nomads, 158, Cohen, Mark, 103, 105, 110, 115

159-160, 159(table), 170, Collapse phenomenon, 112-113

176,266(nn 8, 9) Collins, Randall, 12, 21, 76, 89, 135, 183 core/periphery relations, 50 Colonial empires, 210

and Egypt, 266(n3) Colonialism, 167

and Europe-centered world-system, 98, Commercialization, 111, 113, 176,

191-192, 250-251 185-186

and global modern world-system, 245 Commodification, 25, 46-47, 56, 238

incorporation, 64, 74 resistance to, 242

and iteration model, 112 and semiperipheries, 90, 91, 212 modes of accumulation, 212 See also Capitalism; Capitalist

1000-1400 c.z. history, 176-178, accumulation

179(figure), 180-181 Commodity chains, 13

pre-G00 c.z. history, 152, 154 Commodity trade, 12 role in Afroeurasian world-system, 151, Communications technology, 245, 268(n5)

152 Communist states, 31, 243, 245

and Roman Empire, 151, 152, 157-158 Conflict

as semiperiphery, 96, 98 and future transformation, 239, 240,

600-1000 c.z. history, 170-171, 241, 242

267(n18) and global modern world-system, 196,

state formation, 260(n8) 239

See also Afroeurasian world-system; Far and interaction networks, 14, 19, 33, 52,

Eastern world-system; Mongols 53, 89 Chinggis Khan, 149, 176, 177, 178 in kin-based societies, 68-69

Chirot, Daniel, 61 Northern California, 133-135, 144, 145, Christianity, 174, 182, 192, 267(n28) 147-148 Circumscription, 23, 104, 240, 257(n12) and population pressure, 100, 104

312 / Index raiding, 46, 134, 147-148, 164 growth/decline cycles, 213-224,

topics 269(n12)

See also Military technology; specific 215-~217(figures), 219-220(figures),

Conical clans, 83~84, 262(n3) pulsation, 204—206, 205(figure)

Consumerism, 198 rise-and-fall patterns, 206-210,

Contact peripheries, 61, 69, 261(n3) 208 (figure), 211 (figure), 269(nn 9,

Contested periphery, 37 10) , Cook, Sherburne E, 126 similarities/differences, 224-226, Core/periphery relations, 12, 35-37, 47-48, 228-229

224-225 size, 200-201, 202(table), 268(n1)

Afroeurasian world-system, 150, 161, Crusades, 181, 182, 190, 268(n3)

162, 190-192 Cultural ecology, 22-23, 257(n10), 260(n8) and capitalism, 22, 33, 50-51, 190, 192 Cultural genocide. See Culturicide

and chiefdoms, 84 Culturalists, 16 cross-system comparison, 226-228, Cultural materialism, 22 269(n18) Culture area studies, 16, 122, 124

defined, 2 Culturicide, 77, 262(n17)

and definitions of world-systems, 28-29, | Curtin, Philip D., 21-22, 24, 92, 93, 168 247, 248-249 development of underdevelopment, 32, Dalton, George, 23-24

258(n8) Davis, James, 130

differentiation vs. hierarchy, 36, 130 D’Azevedo, Warren L., 71

and gender roles, 259(n2) Decentralized stratified society. See global modern world-system, 227, Germanic mode ofaccumulation

269(n18) Deconstructionism, 4, 255(n4)

and incorporation, 37, 59, 75 Demographics. See Population pressure

(n10) peripheries

and kin-based societies, 48-49, 260 Dependent peripheries. See Full-blown

measurement problems, 38-39 Diakonoff, Igor M., 86, 88, 89, 104, 212,

Northern California, 130, 131-132, 261(n12), 263(n7) 138-139, 140, 141-142,144, 145 Diarchy, 236, 269(n1)

and plunder, 64 Diffusion, 18, 105, 174, 187-188, and spatial boundaries, 19, 55 259(n11), 260(n8), 261(n13). See also spread/backwash effects, 38-39, 50-51 Interaction networks

and state formation, 46 Dinka, 64, 260(n10) and techniques of power, 49-50, Disease

260(n11) and Afroeurasian world-system, 114-115,

See also Semiperipheries 151, 166-167, 175,181, 183 Core-wide empires, 210 and European-North American contact,

Coser, Lewis, 14 65, 66-67, 166-167 Cribb, Roger, 46, 106, 162 immunity, 167-168 Crone, Patricia, 41, 45, 46 and towns, 182

Cross-system comparison, 200—229 Divisions of labor, 13, 188, 191, 210

capitalism, 210-213 Dotta, James, 134, 135, 144 core/periphery relations, 226-228 Down-the-line interactions, 4—5, 20, 53,

and global merging, 201, 203-204, 129-130, 140-141, 188

203(figure), 268(n2) Drangel, Jessica, 35, 37, 96

Index / 313

Drennan, Robert D., 93 Europe-centered world-system, 187-192 DuBois, Cora, 122, 127, 128, 135-136, and Central System, 183-184, 187-189,

265(n19) 190, 268(nn 1, 3)

Dunaway, Wilma, 66, 74 and China, 98, 191-192, 250-251 Dutch Republic, 94, 190, 238 contextual factors, 238 Dyson, Stephen L., 151, 162 and core/periphery relations, 190-192 hegemonic core states, 94-96, 194-195,

Earle, Timothy, 22, 23, 44, 45 250

East Asian world-system, 151, 204, modes of accumulation, 25, 33, 258(n16)

205(figure), 206 and Ottoman Empire, 249, 268(n2) Ecological constraints, 5, 99, 100-101, 110 and plunder, 64

Ecological zones, 70-71, 84, 103, 104, rise of, 33, 189-192

167-168 as semiperiphery, 93-94 Education, 198 and trade, 183-184 Effective incorporation, 63 See also Capitalism

Egalitarianism, 28, 225 Evolution, 12. See also Systemic northern California, 127-128, 137—138, transformation

142, 145, 146 Evolutionary potential, 81

See also Classless societies External arenas, 61, 63, 261(n3) Egypt, ancient, 77, 266(n3). See abo Central External frontiers, 71-72 System

Eisenstadt, S. N., 35, 180 Fall-off, 17-18, 38, 53-55 Ekholm, Kajsa, 22, 26, 29, 33, 34, 35,209, | Far Eastern world-system. See East Asian

212, 257(n9) world-system

Empires, 33, 47, 49-50, 97, 207, 261(n5) erowth/decline cycles, 214—221, and core/periphery relations, 49-50, 51 215-~217(figures),219—220(figures)

and iteration model, 111-112 See also Afroeurasian world-system; China See also Tributary world-systems; specific Feinman, Gary M., 13, 16, 22

empires and systems Feminism, 259(n2) Endogenous vs. exogenous impacts, 18 Ferguson, Brian, 68, 69, 70, 168

England, 94, 177, 184 Fernandez, Eduardo, 68 Environmental circumscription, 102(figure), | Feudalism, 31

103 development of, 171, 172, 174, 188

Environmental degradation, 101, transition to capitalism, 22, 32, 47

102(figure), 103, 194 Finley, Moses, 29, 90 Ericson, Jonathan E., 133 Fissioning, 73-74, 262(n16)

Ermolaeva, Elena, 225 Fitzpatrick, John, 47

Ethnic groups, 68, 168 Flexible accumulation, 243, 245 Europe. See Afroeurasian world-system; Foraging, 22, 121. See also Hunter-gatherers

Central System; Europe-centered Foran, John, 191

world-system Formalism, 21-22, 29, 90, 110 European-North American contact, 74, 77 Foster-Carter, Aidan, 31

and disease, 65, 66-67, 166-167 Fox, Edward W., 195

and frontiers, 71, 72 Frank, Andre Gunder, 12, 18, 22, 29, 34, and incorporation theory, 61, 65-67, 75, 150, 152, 187, 191, 209, 210,

261(n2), 262(nn 6-8) 212, 213, 214, 218, 225, 228, 229,

Northern California, 122, 146, 264(n2) 249, 250, 258(n8)

314 / Index Frankenstein, Susan, 91, 237 Global modern world-system creation, 1, 4, Friedman, Jonathan, 12, 13, 22, 25-26, 29, 5, 203(figure), 268(n2) 33, 34, 48, 86, 136,137, 138, 141, and Central System, 201, 203, 204,

206, 207, 209, 212, 228, 244, 205 (figure), 268(n2)

257(n9) and prestige-goods networks, 203—204,

Fried, Morton, 44, 110, 151 268(nn 4, 5)

Frontiers, 70-72, 160-161, 180, 193, 240, | GNP. See Gross national product

262(nn 14, 15) Goldschmidt, Walter, 130, 133

Full-blown peripheries, 61 Goldstein, Joshua, 196

Functionalism, 35, 45, 107—108, 110, 142 Goldstone, Jack, 113, 114, 115 Future transformation, 6, 239-246, 252-253 —__ Gold trade, 261(n4)

and population pressure, 199 Greece, ancient, 91 and socialism, 241-244, 245-246 Gregg, Susan A., 187 Gross national product (GNP), 96

Gailey, Christine W., 259(n2) Growth/decline cycles, 213-224, Galton’s problem, 38, 259(n11) 215-217(figures), 219-220(figures)

Galtung, Johan, 239, 244 Guilford-Kardell, Margaret, 135

Gender roles, 65, 136, 259(n2) Gunawardana, R.A.L.H., 68, 72 Genghis Khan. See Chinggis Khan

Genocide, 77 Haaland, Gunnar, 71, 159

Geopolitics approach, 21 Hall, Thomas D., 18, 61, 67, 71, 72, 74, Germanic mode of accumulation, 258(n5) 75, 76, 88, 97, 249 Gerschenkron, Alexander, 79, 80-81, 82 Hapsburg Empire, 268(n2) Gills, Barry K., 12, 18, 22, 29, 34, 187, Harris, Marvin, 22, 26, 103, 105, 110, 115 209, 212, 213, 214, 218, 225, 229, Hassig, Ross, 68, 162

249, 250 Hawaii. See Polynesia

Global modern world-system, 192-199 Hayden, Brian, 104 and Afroeurasian world-system, Headmen, 43, 127, 128, 132, 133, 136,

185-186 138, 145

ancient roots of, 18, 22 Hegemonic sequence, 95 circumscription in, 104 Hegemony, 12—13, 19, 22 and conflict, 196, 239 of core states, 94—96, 194-195, 209, 210, core/periphery relations, 227, 269(n18) 211 (figure)

current realignment, 1, 2 Heizer, Robert EF, 71, 134 future transformation, 6, 199, 239-246, | Helms, Mary W., 163

252~—253 Hierarchy formation, 101-104, 102(figure), incorporation, 63, 64, 77 115, 116(figure), 263(n1) interaction networks, 228, 250 and functionalism, 107-108

iteration model, 193-199 northern California, 145 lack of frontiers, 193, 240 unevenness of, 235 resistance to, 243, 244 See also Core/ periphery relations; and semiperipheries, 96 Egalitarianism; Intrasocietal

size of, 191-192, 268(n5) inequalities , technological intensification, 196-199, Hinterland, 262(n12)

239, 250 Hobbes, Thomas, 68

See also Global modern world-system Hodgson, Marshall G. S., 152

creation Hoebel, E. A., 71

Index / 315 Hokan speakers, 131, 134, 135, 137, 138- indirect, 258(n2) 139, 143. See also Northern California multiple theories, 12-15

Hopkins, Keith, 50, 61, 161, 163 multiple types, 52-55, 60-61, 261(n13) Horses, 66, 171, 174, 262(nn 7, 9, 14) Northern California, 122, 124

Hudson, G. F, 164 and spatial boundaries, 16-17, 18-19 Hughes, Richard E., 38, 126 See also Spatial boundaries; specific

Huns, 262(n14) networks and systems

Hunter-gatherers, 22, 43, 259-260(n5). See Interchiefdom systems, 83, 206

also Foraging Internal frontiers, 72

International law, 270(n6)

IN. See Information networks International relations field, 21

Incas, 64, 261(n5) Interstate systems, 33, 95, 194-196, 207 Incorporation, 59-77, 60(figure) Intrasocietal inequalities, 12-13, 45-46 Afroeurasian world-system, 76, 77, 150, northern California, 39, 127-128,

172, 174-175,184-185 264(nn 5, 6)

continuum of, 61, 63, 63(figure), 65, 67, See also Class; Core/periphery relations;

249-250, 261(n1),262(n12) Hierarchy formation conventional theory, 63-65, 261(n3) Islam and core/periphery relations, 37, 59, 75 and Afroeurasian world-system, 168, 171,

and empires, 261(n5) 172, 173(figure), 175, 181-182, and frontiers, 70-72, 262(nn 14, 15) 267(nn 19, 27)

and interaction networks, 59, 60-61, and Europe-centered world-system, 188,

62(figure), 249-250 190, 191 mild forms, 65-68 116(figure)

as malleable change, 65-69 Iteration model, 5—6, 99-117, 102(figure), precapitalist world-systems, 64, 67-69, biological constraints, 99-100

261(n5) and capitalism, 112-113

reversibility, 75 and disease, ]14—115

262(n16) 110

stateless societies, 72, 73-76, 77, ecological constraints, 5, 99, 100-101,

world-system merging, 76-77 and future transformation, 253 Indic world-system, 151, 154, 171, 182 and global modern world-system,

growth/decline cycles, 221-224, 193-199

222-223 (figures) population pressure, 100-104,

See also Afroeurasian world-system 102(figure), 113-114, Information networks (IN), 52, 53, 188, 192 115,116(figure), 263(n1)

and incorporation, 60-61, 67 and progress, 108 Intensification. See Technological and revolutions, 113-114

intensification technological intensification, 101,

Interaction networks, 5, 12, 13, 54(figure), 102(figure),103, 105~107, 111-112,

248 115, 116(figure), 263(n1)

and conflict, 14, 19, 33, 52, 53, 89

cross-system comparison, 225, 228 Jackson, Thomas L., 127, 133, 147, 204

Galton’s problem, 38, 259(n11) Jagchid, Sechin, 160, 162 global modern world-system, 228, 250 Japan, 177, 178, 184, 198, 267(n29) and incorporation, 59, 60-61, 62(figure), Johnson, Allen W., 22, 23, 44, 45

249-250 Johnson, Dale L., 61

316 / Index

Johnston, Jim, 134 Levathes, Louise, 176 Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 25

Kelly, Raymond C., 14, 64, 260(n10) Lindner, Rudi, 178, 180, 262(n14)

Kennedy, Paul, 196 Line wars, 133-134

Khazanov, Anatoly M., 160 Linguistic differentiation, 123(figure), 128,

Khubilai Khan, 176, 177, 182 264(n7), 265(n20)

Kin-based societies, 25, 30, 52, 88 Loeb, Edwin M., 128

conflict, 68-69 Lowie, Robert H., 71 and core/periphery relations, 48—49, Luttwak, Edward, 162 260(n10) and world-systems typology, 41, 43-44, Macrodiffusionism, 23

259-260(nn 2, 3, 5) Mann, Michael, 21, 45, 49, 86, 87-88, 89, See also Northern California; Stateless 111, 127, 135, 144, 172, 175, 189,

societies 206, 228, 256(n2), 261(n12), 263(nn

Kinship systems, 23—24, 206 7, 8)

Central Asian nomads, 162, 180, Marcher states, 84-89, 97, 98, 111, 156,

267(n26) 172, 183, 236, 262(n4)

conical clans, 83-84, 262(n3) Marfoe, Leon, 39 Mongols, 180, 267(n26) Marginal peripheries, 61, 69, 261(n1) northern California, 135—138 Market models, 21—22, 24, 257~—258(n14)

Kirch, Patrick, 83-84, 103, 104 Market socialism, 31

Knights, 171, 174, 178 Marriage

Kohl, Phillip L., 12, 36, 86 in kin-based societies, 52, 259(n2) Kondratieff waves, 176, 212 Northern California, 128, 135, 135-138, Kowalewski, Stephen A., 13, 16, 18, 22 144, 145 Kristiansen, Kristian, 48, 82, 188, 258(n5) See also Kinship systems

Kroeber, Alfred L., 16, 122, 124, 127 Martel, Charles, 171

Kutsche, Paul, 70 Martin, William G., 36, 61, 63, 257(n5) Marxism, 105, 108, 111, 258(n16), 259(n3)

Labor movement, 244, 245 on commodification, 14, 90 Laissez-faire ideal, 195 on merchant capitalism, 92, 263(n9)

Lakatos, Imre, 4 on systemic transformation, 24—26

La Lone, Darrell E., 64 See also Capitalist accumulation; Modes

La Lone, Mary B., 64 of production

Lamberg-Karlovsky, C. C., 39 Mattingly, D. J., 68, 151, 162-163

Lane, Frederick, 91 Mauryan Empire, 154 Lane, Phil, Jr., 167 McCarthy, Helen, 134 Lattimore, Owen, 3, 70-71, 78, 151, 158, McNeill, William H., 71, 78, 87, 88, 149, 161, 163, 180, 240 151, 152, 156, 159,164, 166,

Law, Robin, 68 167-168, 170, 171, 174, 176, 178, Lawton, Harry, 126 180, 181, 183, 197, 221, 239

Leach, Edmund, 25 Meadows, Dennis L., 199, 253 Least effort principle, 100-101 Meadows, Donella, 199, 253 Lenski, Gerhard, 17, 18, 19, 22-23, 39,42, | Meillassoux, Claude, 259(n2)

65, 101, 259(n3) Melko, Matthew, 16, 52

Lenski, Jean, 17, 18, 19, 22-23, 65, 101, Melody, Michael E., 71

259(n3) Merchant capitalism, 91, 92-93

Index | 317 Merging, 76-77, 185. See also Global overthrow of, 176 modern world-systemcreation; Moral order, 23-24, 129, 147, 259(n1)

Incorporation Morgan, David, 178

Mesopotamia, 36, 39, 77, 85, 260(n11). See | Moseley, Katherine P, 172 also Akkadian Empire;Central System = Multiculturalism, 244, 270(n6)

Meyer, Melissa L., 65 Murphy, Craig, 240 Military technology, 87-88, 236, 263(n7) Mutualism, 49 and Afroeurasian world-system, 171, 174, | Myrdal, Gunnar, 38 176, 185, 267(n19)

and incorporation, 65 Native Americans. See European-North nuclear weapons, 239, 240, 242 American contact

Miller, Tim, 65, 167 Navajo people, 72

Milner, Claire McHale, 206 Neo-evolutionism, 4

Minisystems, 13 Neolithic “revolution,” 110 Minority groups, 77. See also Ethnic groups —- Netherlands. See Dutch Republic Mishkin, Bernard, 66 New Zealand, 103 Mississippian political/military network, Nissen, Hans J., 39, 235

203, 268(n3) “No intervening heartland rule,” 21, 76, 183

Mixed modes of accumulation, 31, 258(n5) = Nolan, Patrick, 65, 101

Modelski, George, 176, 212 Nomadism, 46, 71, 97, 107

Modernists, 29 and Afroeurasian trade, 163-164 Modes of accumulation, 24, 30-35, 148 Central Asia, 158-163, 159(table), 170,

defined, 29-30 176, 266(nn 8, 9),267(n26)

flexible, 243, 245 and horse introduction, 66, 262(n7) iteration model of transformation, 99, transhumant, 162, 266(n10)

105-107 See also specific peoples

and systemic transformation, 31—-32,55, | Nominal incorporation, 63-64

235 Nonstate societies. See Stateless societies

and world-systems typology, 41—42 North American-European contact. See See also Capitalist accumulation; Modes European-North American contact of production; Socialism; Systemic Northern California, 121—148, 264(n3)

logic archaeological evidence, 39, 126-127,

Modes of integration, 23 264(n4), 265(n12)

Modes of production, 16-17, 24—25, 32, conflict, 133-135, 144, 145, 147-148

258(nn 15, 16) core/periphery relations, 130, 131-132,

and incorporation, 63, 66 138-139, 140,

See also Modes of accumulation; Systemic 141-142, 144, 145

logic and definitions of world-systems, 28

Modoc people, 265(n17) European contact, 122, 146, 264(n2)

Méngke Khan, 178 implications, 146-148

Mongols, 47, 150, 151, 177-181, interaction networks, 122, 124

179(figure), 218 intrasocietal inequalities, 39, 127-128,

big-man system, 178, 180 264(nn 5, 6)

and centralization, 74-75 linguistic differentiation, 123(figure),

and disease, 114, 181, 183 128, 264(n7), 265(n20)

and Europe, 183 maps, 123(hgure), 125(figure) and Islam, 182 marriage, 128, 135, 135-138, 144, 145

318 / Index obsidian, 130, 133, 143, 264(n9) Political/military networks (PMN), 14, 19, prestige-goods networks, 128, 141, 142, 33, 52, 53

145-146, 264(n8),265(n21) and Europe-centered world-system, 191

pulsation, 147, 204, 206 and incorporation, 61, 64

regional interactions, 128, 139-143, and semiperipheries, 89, 97, 263(n10)

265(nn 19-21) See also specific systems

settlement/subsistence patterns, 131-132, Polo, Marco, 176

265(nn 11-14) Polynesia, 18, 83-84, 103, 104, 225

spatial boundaries, 20, 128-130, Pomo people, 128, 139-140, 142, 143, 146.

146-147 See also Northern California

trade feasts, 128, 129, 132-133 Population pressure, 23, 45, 262(n16)

as world-system, 122, 264(n2) and capitalism, 112-113, 234-235 Nuclear weapons, 239, 240, 242 and global modern world-system,

Nuer, 64, 260(n10) 198-199

and iteration model, 100-104,

O’Brien, Patrick, 35 102(figure), 113-114, Obsidian, 130, 133, 143, 264(n9) 115,116(figure), 263(n1) Octavian, 157 and least effort principle, 100-101 Oikumenes, 203, 268(n4) Sanderson theory, 110-111, 112 Okwanuchu people, 135 See also Circumscription

Opium Wars, 64 Postmodernism, 4, 244

Optimal foraging models, 22 Precapitalist world-systems, 15, 64, 67-69,

Ortiz, Alfonso, 71 261(n5). See also Kin-based societies; Oscillation, 22, 212-213, 234, 236 Tributary world-systems; specific Ottoman Empire, 182, 249, 268(n2) societies and topics Prehistory, 12, 256(n2). See also specific

Paradigms, 1 world-systems

Parallel evolution, 38 Prestige-goods networks (PGN), 13-14, 25,

Parsons, Talcort, 110, 259(n3) 52, 53

Pastoral peoples, 88, 97, 150, 158-159. See Afroeurasian world-system, 158, 164, 186

also Nomadism; specific peoples Europe-centered world-system, 188, 191

Patterson, Orlando, 48 and global modern world-system Patwin people, 140, 141, 142, 146 creation, 203-204, 268(n4)

Pearson, Harry W., 24, 92 importance of, 248

Peregrine, Peter N., 13, 16, 142 and incorporation, 61, 76

Persian Empire, 156 northern California, 128, 141, 142, PGN. See Prestige-goods networks 145-146, 264(n8),265(n21)

Philip of Macedon, 156 See also specific systems Phoenicia, 91, 93, 156, 188, 212 Price, T. Douglas, 121, 147, 206

Pirenne, Henri, 213 Price-setting markets, 24, 47, 92, Plague. See Black Death; Disease 257-258(n14) Plains peoples, 49, 66, 71, 262(nn 7, 8) Primary states, 45

Pliny, 166 Primitivism, 29, 90

Plunder, 64, 76 Pristine states. See Primary states

PMN. See Political/military networks Productive technology, 22, 257(n11) Polanyi, Karl, 23-24, 25, 30, 90, 92, 112, Progress, 108

154 Protection rent, 91, 263(n8)

Index / 319 Protein availability, 66, 262(n8) Saladin, 181

Pueblo people, 49 Sanderson, Stephen K., 12, 42, 65, 108,

Pulsation, 108, 147, 205(figure), 269(n7) 110-111, 112, 113, 115, 156

: Sapir, Edward, 136 Quigley, Carroll, 81-82 Sargon, 85, 87, 256(n2) system similarities, 204-206, 225, 234 Santley, Robert S., 19

Saunders, J. J., 178

Ragin, Charles, 61 Schneider, Jane, 3, 13, 52, 141, 142, 191 Raiding, 46, 134, 147-148, 164 Schortman, Edward M., 15, 39, 49, 52

Randers, Jorgen, 199, 253 Scott, Leighton R., 16, 52 Randsborg, Klavs, 174 Secondary social change, 260(n6) Rational choice approaches. See Formalism Secondary states, 45

Reactive states. See Secondary states Secoy, Frank R., 66

Realization problem, 198 Sedentism, 43, 103, 107, 121,

Redistribution, 25 259-260(n5), 262(n14)

Reff, Daniel T., 65 Segmentary lineage, 158

Regions of refuge. See Marginal peripheries Semiperipheries, 2, 37, 78-98, 259(n10)

Religions, 45, 138, 167 Afroeurasian world-system, 94, 162

175, 185 270(n5)

and Afroeurasian world-system, 168, 172, and capitalism, 90-93, 112, 241,

world, 168, 267(n16) Central System, 156 See also specific religions chiefdoms, 83-84

Renfrew, Colin R., 39, 49, 54, 187 city-states, 85-89, 212, 236, 237-238

Revolutions, 113-114 and class, 88-89, 244

Rise-and-fall patterns, 208(figure), 269(nn cross-system comparison, 225—226

9, 10) and future transformation, 241, 244-245

hegemonic core states, 94-96, 194-195, Gerschenkron theory, 80-81

209, 210,211 (figure), 234 hegemonic core states, 94-96 and iteration model, 109, 111-112 and hierarchy formation, 104

and state formation, 45—46 marcher states, 84-89, 97, 111, 156, 183, system similarities, 206—210, 225, 234, 236, 262(n4)

269(n16) Quigley theory, 81-82

Roman Empire, 50, 53, 74, 157, 188, 212 rise of Europe, 93-94

and China, 151, 152, 157-158 Service theory, 81

and nomads, 162-163 and systemic transformation, 51, 104,

and semiperipheries, 95-96 237-238

See also Afroeurasian world-system Trotsky theory, 79-80

Rome and China (Teggart), 158 types of, 78-79 Rostovtzeff, Mikhail, 29, 91, 157, 237 Wilkinson theory, 97, 263(n10) Rowlands, Michael J., 12, 13, 25, 34, 48, Service, Elman R., 44, 79, 81, 82, 259(n1)

86, 136, 137, 138, 141, 206 Shamans, 127, 138, 264(n6)

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, 243 Sharp, Lauriston, 106

Russell, James W., 24 Shasta Complex, 126-127, 131, 139, Russia, 98. See also Soviet Union 264(n4) Sherratt, Andrew, 69, 75, 76, 187, 188,

Sahlins, Marshall D., 24, 28, 44, 81, 83, 255(n4), 268(n1)

158, 178, 206 Sherratt, Susan, 188

320 / Index

Shih Huang Ti, 152 and world-systems typology, 44-46, Short History of the Future, A (Wagar), 240 260(n8)

Shuttle pattern, 97 See also Systemic transformation

Silk trade, 163-164, 172 Stateless societies, 13, 20-21, 259(n1) Silverblatt, Irene, 259(n2) and definitions of world-systems, 28, Simkin, C.G.EF, 164, 166, 267(nn 13, 14) 258(n2)

Simmel, Georg, 14 historicity of, 256(n2)

Slatta, Richard, 70 and incorporation, 72, 73-76, 77, Slavery, 31, 94, 163, 265(n17) 262(n16)

and incorporation, 64, 68-69, 72 States. See City-states; State-centric Small-scale interaction networks, 4-5 approaches; State formation; specific

Snipp, C. Matthew, 61 states and systems

So, Alvin, 61, 64, 76 Stephens, Evelyne Huber, 243 Social circumscription, 102(figure), 103, Stephens, John D., 243

104, 237 Stern, Steve J., 35

Social cosmography, 258(n2) Steward, Julian, 22, 104-105

Socialism, 30, 31, 270(n4) Stiffarm, Lenore A., 167 and future transformation, 241-244, Strathern, Andrew, 68

245-246 Structural interdependence, 69

and semiperipheries, 96, 98 Structuralism, 16-17, 110 Socially necessary labor time, 92, 263(n9) Subimperialism, 262(n1)

Sokolovsky, Joan, 61, 64 Substantivism, 23-24, 29, 90, South Asia. See Afroeurasian world-system; 257-258(n14)

Indic world-system Subunit problem, 15-16, 257(n5) Soviet Union, 96, 98, 243, 245. See also Sumer. See Mesopotamia

Russia Sundahl, Elaine, 126, 130, 131, 144

Spatial boundaries, 16—20, 38 Superhegemony, 249

and ecological zones, 71 Symons, Van Jay, 160, 162 and modes of accumulation, 32-33 Systemic logic, 20-26 multicriteria approach, 52-55, 146, implicit models, 33

247-248, 261(n13) logical continuationists, 20—23,

Northern California, 20, 128-130, 257(n9)

146-147 metatheoretical positions, 20, 257(n7)

See also Interaction networks qualitative transformationists, 23—26 Spielmann, Katherine, 49, 107 See also Modes of accumulation; Systemic

Spier, Leslie, 136 transformation

Spread effects, 38-39, 50-51, 86 Systemic transformation, 2—3, 233-246

State-centric approaches, 12, 21, 256(n2) and capital imperialism, 257(n9)

State formation, 25, 103, 257(n9) contextual factors, 237-238

and capitalism, 34, 236 and cultural ecology, 22-23

and class, 44-45, 110, 161-162 and deconstructionism, 4, 255(n4)

global, 239-240, 253 denial of, 20-23

and intrasocietal inequalities, 45-46 future possibilities, 3, 199, 239-246,

and prestige-goods networks, 268(n5) 252-253 primary vs. secondary, 45, 260(n8) general characteristics of, 233-239, 249

unevenness of, 235-236 and incorporation, 65

Index / 321 and modes of accumulation, 31-32, 55, Transportation, 93, 95, 192-193, 237

235 Treganza, A. E., 134

and modes of production, 16, 25 Tribal imperialism, 14

rate of, 239, 270(n2) Tribal zone, 68

research strategies, 55—56 Tribelets, 20, 43, 127, 133

Sanderson theory, 110-111 Tribes, 44 secondary, 260(n6) Tributary world-systems, 30, 31 and semiperipheries, 51, 104, 237-238 capitalism within, 90-93, 263(n8)

and substantivism, 23-24 and incorporation, 74, 76

theories, 23—26 oscillation in, 212—213

and totality assumption, 32 and world-systems typology, 41—42,

unevenness of, 5, 234-236, 238 46-47, 259(nn 3, 4)

variation in, 5-6, 108-109 See also specific systems and topics See also Iteration model; Semiperipheries Trotsky, Leon, 79-80, 81, 82, 96

Szymanski, Albert, 241 Turks, 181, 182, 267(n27). See also

Szynkiewicz, Slawoj, 160 Ottoman Empire

Taagepera, Rein, 111, 207 Underdevelopment, development of, 32, 36, Tainter, Joseph A., 109, 110, 113, 115, 161 258(n8) Tamerlane. See Timur the Lame Unequal exchange, 142, 191-192

Tangut Empire, 175 United States, 94-95 Taylor, John G., 24, 94, 190 Universal state, 207

Techniques of power, 21, 49-50, 172, 175, Urban, Patricia A., 15, 39, 49, 52 260(n1 1)

Technological intensification, 22, 104 Vayda, Andrew P.,, 132 Afroeurasian world-system, 172, 174 Violence. See Conflict; Military technology

239, 250

global modern world-system, 196-199, Voegelin, Erminie W., 124

and iteration model, 101, 102(figure), Wagar, W. Warren, 240, 244

103, 105-107, 111-112, 115, Wallerstein, Immanuel, 2, 13, 16, 24, 27,

116(figure), 263(n1) 28, 32, 35, 52, 61, 63, 64, 78, Technological rent, 192 188-189, 207, 209, 248, 249, Teggart, Frederick J., 152, 158 258(n16), 261(n3)

Teleological explanations, 5, 255(n6) Warfare. See Conflict; Military technology Thompson, William R., 156, 176, 196,212 | Warren, Jonathan, 65, 167

Thornton, Russell, 65, 166-167 “Was There a Pre-capitalist World-System?”

Tibet, 175 (Schneider), 3 Tilly, Charles, 14, 15, 19, 34, 52, 197 Weber, Max, 21, 90, 197

Time scale, 18-19 Wells, Peter S., 151, 188

Timur the Lame, 183 West Africa, 64, 68-69, 172, 261(n4) Totality assumption, 32 Wheatley, Paul, 154 Towns, 174, 182, 267(n28) Whistler, Kenneth W., 126, 134

Toynbee, Arnold, 81 White, Lynn, Jr., 174

Trade diasporas/ecumenes, 21-22, 93, 168, | Whitehead, Neil, 68, 70, 168

171, 172 Whittaker, C. R., 151, 158, 180

Transhumant nomads, 162, 266(n10) Wiant, Wayne C., 265(n11)

322 / Index

Wife-taking. See Marriage World-systems theory, 11-26

Wilcox, David R., 49 spatial boundaries, 16-20, 32-33, 38 Wilkinson, David, 14, 15, 18-19, 21, 33, subunit problem, 15—16, 257(n5) 52, 64, 97, 151, 157, 201, 203, 206, systemic logic, 20-26, 257(n7) 207, 213, 218, 221, 249, 251, 252, See also specific topics

263(n10), 268(n2) World-systems typology, 41-47,

Wilkinson, Richard, 113 259-—260(n4)

Willard, Alice, 172, 212, 214, 226 and gender inequality, 259(n2) Wintu people. See Northern California primary vs. secondary distinction, 45,

Wissler, Clark, 16 260(nn 6, 8)

Wolf, Eric R., 15, 24, 25, 30, 67, 192, sedentism, 43, 259—260(n5) |

258(n16) state formation, 44—46, 260(n8)

Woolf, Greg, 259(n10) theoretical approach, 259(n3) World-economies, 27-28 Worldwatch, 199 World-empires, 27, 207, 209, 269(n1 1)

World marker, 2 Yana people, 131, 134, 137, 138, 139, 145

World-systems | Yurok people, 141

defined, 4—5, 12—15, 27-29, 247-249 Yii, Ying-shih, 164, 166, 266(n1 1) measurement problems, 38-40, 259(n11) research strategies, 55-56, 247, 251-252 Zagarell, Allen, 235 See also World-systems theory; World- Zheng He, 176

systems typology; specific topics Zipf, George, 100