Rikusentai : the illustrated encyclopedia of Japanese Naval Landing Forces 1927-1945 9781777532406, 9781777532413

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Print Edition ISBN 978-1-7775324-0-6 Digital Edition ISBN 978-1-7775324-1-3 © Rikusentai Publishing 2020 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the publisher, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other noncommercial uses permitted by copyright law. Rikusentai Publishing www.rikusentai.net/publications

Contents Rise of the Naval Landing Forces Special Naval Landing Forces...... Defense Units....................................... Base Forces........................................... Base Units.............................................. Guard Units........................................... Construction Units............................. Air Defense Units................................ Infantry Gear........................................ Infantry Weapons................................ Armored Vehicles................................

List of Units. References.

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RISE OF THE NAVAL LANDING FORCES

T

he S h o w a Era b e ck o n e d tw o d e c a d e s o f n ear-co n stan t e x p a n sio n and d e ve lo p m e n t o f the Naval Land ing F o rc e s , and with it th e m ost brutal o f fighting to be se e n yet.

Japan’s Meiji Restoration ushered the development of an Imperial Army and Navy modeled after con­ temporary western powers, with the British Navy serving as a basis for the Imperial Japanese Navy. One of the many aspects derived from the Brit­ ish Navy was the implementation of amphibious trained marine troops in 1871.' The Japanese Na­ vy’s marines were organized under two branches, artillery and infantry. Each vessel had a number of marines stationed onboard relative to its compla­ cent, allowing for prompt deployment in onshore operations. The implementation of marines within the Japanese Navy ultimately proved to be quite short-lived, with their dissolution in 1876.2 To fill the gap left by the marines, Kaigun Rikusentai—Naval Landing Forces were introduced. In contrast to marines, Naval Landing Forces did not exist as a permanent force, but rather were raised temporarily in times of need. Each ship could organize a portion of its crew as a Naval Landing Force and dispatch them onshore. The size of these

Left: A Naval Landing Force rifle squad in China, circa 1938. This squad is representative of those in the 1930’s and onwards, consisting of several enlisted men and a single petty officer serving as a squad leader. The riflemen are each armed with a Type 38 rifle, although the squad leader has opted to carry his personal sword in lieu of a rifle for the photo. The light machine gunner operates a Type 11 LMG and carries a Type 14 pistol as his sidearm.

landing forces varied in accordance with the ship size, deployment level, and fleet regulation. There were three levels of crew deployment, typically ranging from approximately one sixth, one quar­ ter, and one third of the total crew.3,4 Several ships could combine their Naval Landing Forces to create a Rengo Rikusentai or Combined Naval Landing Force. Similarly to their predecessors, Naval Landing Forces served as infantrymen with rifles or as artil­ lerymen operating naval guns on shore.5 The outbreak of the Satsuma Rebellion in 1876 saw Naval Landing Forces participating in their first large scale operation as they were dispatched to quell the rebels.2 By the end of the Meiji Era in 1912, Naval Landing Forces had already proven their worth in a number of conflicts, seeing consid­ erable action in the First Sino-Japanese War, Boxer Rebellion, and Russo-Japanese War With the advent of Naval Landing Forces, ground warfare became a fundamental aspect of training for all naval personnel, allowing for any sailor to fight onshore regardless of their rate or specialty. Training for ground warfare was mainly conducted at Kaiheidan, Naval Corps, training units for new recruits established at the four Naval Districts of Yokosuka, Sasebo, Kure, and Maizuru. Aside from training, Kaiheidan were responsible for the defense of their Naval Districts and could organize their troops as a Naval Landing Force to do so.2 As the intake of new recruits increased, additional Naval Corps were opened throughout the Japanese Empire. The majority of sailors received nothing more than 3

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

the basic training provided in their Kaiheidan, but a small minority seeking to become experts in the field advanced to Naval Gunnery School. The first Naval Gunnery School was opened in Yokosuka in 1907 and offered ground warfare as one of its many courses, and the second opened inTateyama in 1941 specialized in the subject.6-7 The dawn of the Taisho Era was soon followed by the outbreak of the First World War. Having declared war on the German Empire, Japan’s Naval Landing Forces laid siege to Germany’s concession in Tsingtao and holdings across the Pacific. Their suc­ cessful occupation of these Pacific territories granted them the strategically valuable South Seas Mandate. Towards the end of World War I Naval Landing Forces participated in the Siberian Intervention, landing in Vladivostok and Nikolayevsk for the

protection Japanese expatriates, before handing over the operation to the Army and returning to Japan in September of 1918.8 The Showa Era beckoned two decades of near-constant expansion and development of the Naval Landing Forces, and with it the most brutal of fighting to be seen yet. No more than half of a year after Emperor Hirohito’s rise to the throne in 1926, the largest and most advanced Naval Landing Force thus far had been established in Shanghai for the protection of Japanese expatriates. The January 28th Incident o f 1932 saw this force and Naval Landing Forces as a whole rise to prominence, while setting the stage for a much greater conflict to be waged against China in the coming years. Since their inception Naval Landing Forces had existed as tem­ porary forces for short-term operations, however the

Sailors dispatched from Shanghai arrive in Hankow to protect Jap an ese expatriates following a surge of violence in the city, summer of 1927. 4

RISE OF THE NAVAL LANDING FORCES

Infantry trainees at the Yokosuka Naval Gunnery School follow the command of their Petty Officer waving the naval ensign during a field exercise, 1935.

Second Sino-Japanese War would bring forth a doc­ trine that placed emphasis not only on the capture of territory, but the subsequent occupation as well. This doctrine coupled with the Army’s reluctance to provide manpower for the defense of the Navy’s assets ashore, inevitably resulted in the creation of the Navy’s own semi-permanent infantry units. Almost all of these units would be formed in accordance with revisions of the Tokusetsu Kansen Butairei—Specially Designated Vessels and Units Decree which was first introduced on December, 23rd, 1916.9 This decree authorized the creation of several types of temporarily established units for use during wartime, incidents, or when otherwise necessary, and was one of the most significant steps towards the creation of Naval Landing Forces serv­ ing independently of ship crews.

As infantry duties were viewed to be largely unfa­ vorable within the Navy, these units relied heavily on the least desirable of conscripts and reservists for their manpower, while volunteers were few and far between. During the height of the war it was not uncommon for as much as ninety percent of a unit’s personnel to be made up of reservists,10 of which many may be aged well into their thirties. Despite the substandard personnel that comprised these units, during the Second Sino-Japanese War and early days of the Pacific War the Naval Landing Forces achieved considerable success. Even in the later days of the war as losses became inevitable and the quality of units further declined, Naval Landing Forces maintained a fearsome reputation among their adversaries.

5

UNITS OF THE NAVAL LANDING FORCES

SPECIAL NAVAL LANDING FORCES Kaigun Tokubetsu Rikusentai— Special Naval Landing Forces (SNLF) were infantry units raised by the Imperial Japanese Navy. These units are most well-known for their participation in a number of offensive campaigns during the Second SinoJapanese War and Pacific War. The term “Special Naval Landing Force” was originally used to describe Naval Corps organized into a Naval Landing Force

and deployed away from their namesake Naval District.1 Although the official decree for Special Naval Landing Forces was not passed until 1932, the practice of organizing and dispatching SNLF units dates as far back as the Meiji Era, with sev­ eral unofficial SNLF units being raised and seeing deployment in various conflicts throughout the early twentieth century.2

Above: Shanghai Naval Landing Force Commander

THE SHANGHAI NAVAL LANDING FO RCE

Captain Matsumoto Chuza (center), and staff of the unit, summer 1927. Captain Matsumoto held the position of commander from August 1927 until December 1929.

Towards the later half of the 1920’s, international concessions along the Yangtze River had been caught in the crossfire of civil unrest evoked by the Chinese National Revolutionary Army’s expedition to over­ throw warlords and establish a unified China. Before long a number of countries had begun deploying troops and evacuating their expatriates in response to the fighting. In 1927 as tensions continued to rise, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s 1st Expeditionary Fleet landed approximately 300 men of the Kure

Left: The 2nd Company, 3rd Platoon of the Kure Special Naval Landing Force, serving as part of the 2nd Battalion of the Shanghai Naval Landing Force, assem bled in front of the Suigetsu club in the summer of 1927.

7

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

Right: A platoon serving under the Shanghai Naval Landing Force in a war-torn area of the city, shortly after the conclusion of fighting in spring of 1932. All of the enlisted men and petty officers wear old pattern Army-issued helmets—evident by the metal star insignias still present on many.

Special Naval Landing Force in Shanghai on Feb­ ruary 1st. Further reinforcements were dispatched the following month— the 312-man Sasebo Spe­ cial Naval Landing Force arriving on March 5th, followed by the 209-man Yokosuka Special Naval Landing Force on the 7th.3 By March 27th the Cruisers Tone, Tenryu, Sendai, and Isuzu had also raised Naval Landing Forces from their crews, bringing the combined strength in the area to a total of 1378 men arranged across five battalions under command of Tones cap­ tain, Uematsu Toma. This unique organization of naval infantry as a brigade-sized unit would come to be known as the Shanhai Rikusentai— Shanghai Naval Landing Force, although due to its temporary nature it lacked official recognition as an indepen­ dent unit and was technically nothing more than an extension of the 1st Expeditionary Fleet. As additional SNLFs and reinforcements from ship crews continued to arrive, the brigade reached over 2200 men organized into seven battalions by July 1st. Each of the battalions varied in size, but were organized similarly into a headquarters, two or more companies, and several supportive units. The companies were typically made up of a command platoon and between two to four rifle platoons depending on the battalion’s strength. The arma­ ment of the battalions consisted primarily of Type 38 rifles, pistols, Type 3 heavy machine guns, and a small number of field guns.4 As 1927 drew to a close, tensions had de-escalated and the brigade was reduced in size accordingly. While the number of personnel decreased over the following years, the armament of the force was strengthened with the arrival of nine Type Bi armored cars, Type 11 light machine guns, Type 11 angled infantry guns, and one hundred Type Be 8

!

submachine guns.11By 1931 the force had shrunk to a two company battalion with several supportive and specialized units built around their new weapons, at a total strength just over 400 men.6,7 Flowever, the Imperial Japanese Army’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 refueled tensions against Japanese expatriates, and thus in October a single company from the Sasebo 1st SNLF, followed by a battalion from the Kure 1st SNLF in early January were sent to rein­ force the Shanghai Naval Landing Force, increasing the strength to around 1,400 men.8 Continuous tensions eventually erupted into

UNITS ■ SPECIAL NAVAL LANDING FORCES

full-on warfare between the Shanghai Naval Landing Force and the Chinese 19th Route Army on January 28th, 1932. On the opening day of hostilities nearby ships were ordered to deploy their crewmen and the Sasebo 2nd SNLF landed to form the third battal­ ion, bringing the Shanghai Naval Landing Force to over 3000 men. Over the course of the battle the force would grow to a total of seven battalions with the arrival of the Yokosuka 1st and 2nd and Sasebo 3rd and 4th SNLFs— its strength peaking at around 4,400 men. The Yokosuka 1st SNLF, arriving on February 2nd, was a 523-man battalion consisting

of a battalion headquarters with a 15-man com­ mand platoon, and two 215-man rifle companies, each made up of a 19-man command platoon, four 39-man rifle platoons, and a 39-man machine gun platoon. Communications, construction, reserve ammunition, medical, and supply units were also attached to the battalion to support operations.9 Most of the other newly arrived SNLF battalions were close in size and arranged similarly. Fighting would continue for over a month before the retreat of Chinese forces in early March, although an official ceasefire agreement marking 9

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Members of the Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force’s 1st Battalion outside of the Suigetsu Club, 1933. The enlisted men all wear tallies on their caps bearing the title of Dai Nippon Kaigun Tokubetsu Rikusentai—Greater Imperial Jap anese Navy Special Naval Landing Force. Nine of the men in the front row are armed with Swiss-imported Type Be 7.63mm submachine guns, while the sailor on the far left has a Type 3 6.5mm machine gun and the sailor on the opposite end has a Type Ru 7.7mm machine gun.

R1KUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

the end of the hostilities would not be signed until May 5th. Despite a ceasefire being reached, rising anti-Japanese sentiments across China made it clear that the Shanghai Naval Landing Force would not be leaving the city anytime soon. TH E S P E C IA L NAVAL LANDING F O R C E D EC R EE

On June 1st, 1932, the Shanghai Naval Landing Force was finally recognized as an independent unit and given the title of Shanhai Kaigun Tokubetsu Rikusentai— Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force.10 The Special Naval Landing Force Decree was passed on October 1st, specifying the Shanghai SNLF’s duties and authorizing the brigade with a strength of 1979 men. As per the decree, the Shanghai SNLF was to serve under the 3rd Fleet or 1st Expeditionary Fleet and provide security for Japanese expatriates living in Shanghai and along the Yangtze River.11

The Shanghai SNLF focused the bulk of its strength within Shanghai and established a company-sized detachment upriver in the city of Hankow. By early 1937, the Shanghai SNLF’s main force consisted of approximately 2150 men organized across five battalions.12 The command battalion included a command platoon, signal unit, telephone unit, and an air defense company. The 1st through 3rd battalions each had a command platoon and two rifle companies, while the 4th had a command platoon and four rifle companies. These rifle com­ panies were all quite small, ranging between 90 to 120 men, with the exception o f the 8th company which was even smaller at around 60 men. There was also an armor unit with several Type 89 tanks, Type Ka light tanks, and armored cars, a special artillery unit with a number o f howitzers, field guns, and other artillery pieces, and communications, con­ struction and transport, and medical units directly

Men of the Shanghai SN LF’s third battalion, fifth company, photographed inside of their unit headquar­ ters in early 1937. 12

UNITS ■ SPECIAL NAVAL LANDING FORCES

The Shanghai SNLF Headquarters situated in the Hongkew District of Shanghai, circa 1939. During the Battle of the Shanghai the roof of the building was used as a position for autocannons and artillery.

attached to the brigade. W ith the outbreak of the Battle of Shanghai in August of 1937, the Shanghai SNLF was deployed across the city and expanded to accommodate the arrival of several newly-formed Naval District SNLFs temporarily serving under its command. Following their victory in Shanghai, the brigade dispatched several detachments to support the takeover of nearby ports and cities along the coast of China. The commencement of the Pacific War saw the Shanghai SNLF directly engaging against Allied forces for the first time while aiding the Army and other Naval Landing Forces in the Capture of Fiong Kong. As the Pacific War progressed, some excess manpower o f the Shanghai SNLF was removed and used to form the 65th Guard Unit on Wake Island, as well as the 62nd Guard Unit’s Mili Atoll Detachment. As the Navy’s training units in Japan struggled to manage the steadily growing influx of

new recruits, on August 15th, 1942, the Shanghai SNLF was granted permission to provide training for recruits as well.13Henceforth the brigade served partially as a training unit, facilitating basic training and education similar to what was taught in Naval Corps. The Shanghai SNLF spent the remaining dura­ tion o f the war guarding the city and engaging in minor cleanup operations in the surrounding area. As with many units, air defense had become a major concern for the brigade. By April of 1945 the unit had twenty 12cm dual-purpose guns, eight 8cm dual-purpose guns, and over 120 autocannons ranging from 25mm to 12mm. The unit’s strength had also grown considerably, with a total of 4141 troops, of which roughly ten percent were trainees.14 Following Japan’s capitulation the Shanghai SNLF surrendered to Chinese forces and was subsequently disbanded.

13

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

Two Special Naval Landing Force troops—both sailors first class, demonstrate the operation of a Type 11 light machine gun in China, 1938.

SPECIA LLY DESIGNATED SP EC IA L NAVAL LANDING FO R C ES

On October 15th, 1936, the Tokusetsu Chinjufu Tokubetsu Rikusentai, Specially Designated Naval District Special Naval Landing Force was added to the Specially Designated Vessels and Units Decree.15 In contrast to the brigade-sized Shanghai SNLF with several thousand personnel, the decree for Na­ val District SNLFs called for a significantly smaller unit— similar to those that had formed the Shanghai Naval Landing Forces battalions between 1927 and 1932. These SNLFs were to be a single 539 man battalion, consisting of the battalion headquarters, two rifle companies and several attached support units, as illustrated in Table 1. Naval District SN­ LFs would take the name of their home base of formation, eg. “Yokosuka 1st Special Naval Landing 14

Force” and were attached to Naval Districts, with authorization to serve under Guard District or Fleet command when necessary.16 On July 12th with tensions once again rising in Shanghai, the Yokosuka, Sasebo, and Kure Naval Districts each raised their first official SNLF bat­ talions— with one each from Yokosuka and Sasebo, and two from Kure. The Yokosuka 1st and Kure 1st SNLFs already deviated somewhat from the 1936 decrees organization, as both units each imple­ m ented a third company to operate artillery.17 O n August 17th Sasebo Naval District raised an additional three SNLFs. All of these newly created SNLFs were dispatched to serve as temporary battal­ ions of the Shanghai SNLF during the Battle of the Shanghai. After the battle concluded, the Yokosuka 1st SNLF resumed independent comm and and

UNITS ■ SPECIAL NAVAL LANDING FORCES

Table 1: Specially Designated Naval District Special Naval Landing Force Organization Chart October 15th, 1936

Amount

Unit

Position

Rank

Battalion HQ

Battalion Commander

Field Off.

1

Battalion Adjutant

LT/LCDR

1

Flag Bearer

PO

1

WO

1

Squad Leader

PO

1

Runners

EM

8

Squad Leader

PO

1

EM

8

LT

1

Command Platoon

Platoon Leader Runner Squad

Patrol Squad

Scouts 1st Company

Company Commander

19

Command Platoon 1st Rifle Platoon

Platoon Leader

WO

1

Platoon Runners

EM

2

Squad Leader

PO

1

Troops

EM

8

1st Rifle Squad

27

2nd, 3rd & 4th Rifle Squads

117

2nd, 3rd & 4th Rifle Platoons MG Platoon

WO

1

Platoon Runner

EM

1

Squad Leader

PO

1

Gun Crew

EM

7

Platoon Leader 1st MG Squad

18

2nd & 3rd MG Squads Ammo Squad

Squad Leader

PO

1

Ammo Bearers

EM

5

2nd Company

(Identical to 1st Company)

210

Support Units

Communications Unit

12

Construction Unit

20

Reserve Ammo Unit

17

Medical Unit

25

Supply Unit

23

15

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

Troops of the Yokosuka 1st SNLF repair the road for a convoy of their men as they move to occupy Chefoo and the surrounding area, early 1938.

would see extensive action along the northern coast of China, while all of the others were disbanded, of which many were incorporated into the Shanghai SNLF. W ith the Second Sino-Japanese War now well underway, several more SNLFs were formed, start­ ing with the Sasebo 5th and 6th SNLFs raised on December 20th, 1937, for the Capture ofTsingtao. The Specially Designated Vessels and Units Decree was also revised on the 20th, introducing the Combined SNLF— designated as a 38-man com­ mand headquarters led by a rear admiral or captain, with permission to attach extra personnel if neces­ sary.16, 18 On the same date, the 1st Combined SNLF was created to facilitate command of Sasebo’s two new SNLFs. On April 20th of the following year the 2nd Combined SNLF was raised for command of the Yokosuka 2nd, Kure 3rd, and Sasebo 7th SNLFs in the capture of Amoy. These Combined SNLFs were both fairly small, appearing to closely follow 16

the standard number of designated personnel. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s offensives along the coast of China between 1937 and 1939 would see a total o f 19 newly formed Naval District SNLFs— four from Yokosuka, six from Kure, and nine from Sasebo, as well as two Combined SNLFs. Fiowever, by November 15th, 1939, only the Yokosuka 4th, Sasebo 8th, and Shanghai SNLFs remained while all of the others had been disbanded following the completion of their objectives. Many o f the dis­ banded SNLFs were reorganized into stationary units and garrisoned in the area after their offensives had concluded. 1940 beckoned the second generation o f Naval District Special Naval Landing Forces. M aizuru Naval District, which had just regained its Naval District status the year prior, raised its first SNLF on June 10th and quickly dispatched it to China to aid in the occupation of Fiainan Island. On November 15th each Naval District raised an additional SNLF,

UNITS ■ SPECIAL NAVAL LANDING FORCES

creating the Yokosuka 1st, Sasebo 1st, and Kure 1st SNLFs in place of the previous battalions that had been disbanded, as well as the new Maizuru 2nd SNLF. Unlike the quick deployment upon forma­ tion seen by the previous generation of SNLFs, all four would remain attached to their Naval Districts until the outbreak of the Pacific War. By November of 1941, the num ber of active Naval District SNLFs had risen to eleven, of which three were more or less permanently stationed in China, while the remaining eight— two of which were airborne units, were ready for combat in the Pacific. By this point all had diverged significantly from the standard organization provided in their 1936 decree. These new battalions not only had multiple rifle companies, but also one or more spe­ cialized companies or platoons dedicated to artillery, anti-air, anti-tank, or other heavy weapons. The companies were rarely standardized— varying in size according to each unit’s mission. The Sasebo 1st SNLF represented the largest Pacific-ready formation at the time, with a total manpower of 1612. On the opposite end was the Yokosuka 2nd SNLF, with a modest 742.19 Alongside the new Naval District SNLFs came the formation of the 190-man Sasebo Combined SNLF, which planned to unify the Sasebo 1st and 2nd SNLFs under its command. This larger Combined SNLF was no longer merely a command headquarters, as it also contained an infantry component in the form of a small headquarters company and several attached support units including construction, medical, and supply units.20,21 By early 1942, the offensive campaigns carried out by these Special Naval Landing Forces had been largely successful. Seven SNLF units in the west had captured British Borneo, the Philippines, and much of the Dutch East Indies, while the Maizuru 2nd SNLF— the sole SNLF in the east, had captured Wake Island and the Bismarcks. Like those that had served in China, rather than continue with oper­ ations, most of these SNLFs were disbanded and their manpower used to form garrisons in the areas they had captured. Further waves of new SNLFs

continued from early-to-mid 1942 to support the push towards Australia and the United States. By June the Japanese Navy’s defeat at Midway shattered further plans of capturing American-held islands in the Pacific and the SNLFs earmarked for such operations were redirected southwards. No more than three months later the yet another cata­ strophic defeat was suffered, with the Yokosuka 5th, Kure 3rd and 5th, and Sasebo 5th SNLFs taking heavy casualties and retreating after failing to cap­ ture Milne Bay in New Guinea. This failure marked the end of the Japanese Navy’s major ground offen­ sives— henceforth units would shift to an almost exclusively defensive role, with the number of new SNLFs declining as Air Defense Units, Guard Units, and Special Base Forces took priority. As defense became the leading concern, mobil­ ity began to be sacrificed for heavier weapons and increased manpower. The Kure 6th SNLF, formed in November of 1942 with an authorized strength o f 1539 men, was one of the first SNLFs to be organized as a defensive formation.22 N ot long after its creation the unit was bolstered in strength and grew to exceed over 2,000 men in size. The unit was organized as a giant battalion consisting of a headquarters, two rifle companies, two heavy artillery companies, a dual-purpose gun company, anti-air autocannon company, field gun company, and communications, construction, transport, med­ ical, supply, and armorer units.23To accommodate this oversized battalion, the battalion headquarters had not one, but two command platoons. This unit would serve alongside the Yokosuka 7th and Maizuru 4th SNLFs under command of the newly created 8th Combined SNLF in the Solomons until the end of 1943. Almost all newly created SNLFs would follow similarly, adding several specialized or heavy weapons companies into a single oversized battalion. 1943 would see the formation of the Yokosuka 2nd, Sasebo 7th, Kure 7th, and Kure 8th SNLFs, as well as the 7th Combined SNLF for command over the Kure 7th SNLF and the 16th and 17th Air Defense Units. The Kure 8th SNLF was the 17

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

only small unit—with about 668 personnel24 and was sent to the Nicobars, while the others were all deployed in the Southeastern Pacific. Throughout the year the number of SNLFs continued to dwindle as units were either disbanded, reorganized into different units, or destroyed in combat. Thus, by the end of the year no more than five SNLF units remained active in the Pacific. The final two years of the war resulted in only two more SNLFs that saw deployment in the Pacific, while the few units remaining struggled to hold their ground as the state of the war grew increasingly dire. By the time of Japan’s surrender, the only SNLF units left in the Pacific were the Sasebo 6th and Kure 7th SNLFs on Bougainville, the Yokosuka 2nd SNLF on Nauru, and the Yokosuka 8th SNLF in Rabaul. AIRBORNE UNITS

In November of 1940 the Imperial Japanese Navy launched a secret airborne trials program known as Dai 1001 Jikken Kenkyu, Research Experiment #1001. The first period of trials were conducted by Sub-Lieutenant Yamabe Masao and 25 others serving in the Yokosuka Air Corps. By January 15th of the following year they had completed their first successful live test jump. A second period of trials began on March 22nd with the addition of 66 more researchers. This period of trials focused heavily on the deployment and usage o f infantry weapons by airborne troops. By the end o f May Research Experiment #1001 had concluded and 77 of the researchers were transferred to the Tateyama Naval Gunnery School upon its opening on June 1st. In mid-August of 1941, the Naval Ministry requested the formation of two 750-man airborne units by the end of October. Over the next two months, the 77 researchers at Tateyama were involved in the difficult task of training and forming the two units in such little time.25,26 O n September 25th, 1941, Com m ander Horiuchi Toyoaki was appointed to lead the Yokosuka 1st SNLF and the unit was reorganized for airborne operations. On October 20th, 1941, a second airborne unit known as the Yokosuka 3rd 18

SNLF was formed and placed under the command o f Lieutenant-Commander Fukumi Koichi. The two units each had an authorized strength of 844 men2 and were organized identically— consisting of a battalion headquarters, three rifle companies, an anti-tank unit, and attached communications, construction, transport, medical, and supply units.28 The personnel in the attached units, with the excep­ tion of communications, were not parachute trained and thus did not participate in airborne operations. Naval paratroopers were issued a Type 38 carbine and either a Type 94 pistol or Browning M1910 pistol as a sidearm. Other weapons included Type 96 light machine guns, Type 89 heavy grenade dis­ chargers, Type 92 heavy machine guns, and Type 94 37mm anti-tank guns. Paratroopers wore a twopiece jumpsuit, a modified version of the Model 2 helmet featuring a reduced brim and altered ties known as the Special Model helmet,29 lace-up jump boots, and an amm unition bandolier slung over each shoulder. For ground-based operations their jumpsuits and boots were replaced with the standard Green Summer Uniforms and ground combat boots worn regularly by Naval Landing Forces. The Yokosuka 1st SNLF carried out Japans very first airborne assault during the Battle of Manado in January o f 1942. O n January 11th the unit landed 334 men on Langoan Airfield in Manado and quickly overwhelmed the surprised Dutch gar­ rison. The following day another 173 men from the unit landed to support in occupation of the airfield.30 The Yokosuka 3rd SNLF partook in its own airborne assault the following month in the Battle of Timor. Worrying that a direct landing on the targeted Penfui Airfield would result in heavy casualties, the Yokosuka 3rd SNLF elected to land some distance away. The unit dropped 308 men on February 20th and a second wave of 323 on the 21st, both of which would make their way towards the airfield. After suffering 35 casualties along the way and the thick jungle hindering their advance, the Yokosuka 3rd SNLF arrived at the airfield on February 22nd. Upon their arrival they were met by troops of the Imperial Japanese Army which had

UNITS ■ SPECIAL NAVAL LANDING FORCES

Naval Paratroopers, most likely belonging to the Yokosuka 1st SNLF, escort surrendered prisoners of war during cleanup operations on Lombok Island in the Lesser Sundas, 1942. (NDL 9885013)

already occupied the area shortly beforehand.31 These two drops were ultimately the only air­ borne assaults conducted by the Navy. Afterwards both the Yokosuka 1st and 3rd SNLF were tasked with cleaning up what remained of their dwindling opposition in the surrounding islands. In August as pressure grew in the east, the Yokosuka 3rd SNLF was sent to temporarily guard Mili Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Towards the end of 1942 both units returned to Japan and on December 13th the Yokosuka 3rd SNLF was disbanded with its per­ sonnel incorporated into the Yokosuka 1st SNLF. The Yokosuka 1st SNLF continued to participate in airborne training at theTateyama Naval Gunner}’' School throughout 1943. During this time men of the unit received improved jumpsuits and a small number of Type 100 submachine guns.32 On June 10th, 1943, part of the Yokosuka 1st SNLF was

used to form the Yokosuka 2nd SNLF, a conven­ tional ground unit which would be garrisoned on Nauru Island for the remainder o f the war. The rest of the Yokosuka 1st SNLF was sent to Saipan in early September 1943, arriving on the island towards the end of the month. The unit was fur­ ther reduced in size with some personnel removed to accommodate the formation of the Sasebo 101st SNLF in January of 1944. Prior to the Battle of Saipan, the unit had a strength of approximately 850 men and had received reinforcements with the transfer of four Type 95 25mm autocannons and three light tanks from the 55th Guard Unit.33 The Yokosuka 1st SNLF was annihilated within the first few days of fighting around the beaches of Garapan and Tanapag following Allied landings on the island in June of 1944, marking the final SNLF to fall in combat during the Pacific War. 19

UNITS ■ SPECIAL NAVAL LANDING FORCES

Left: Leading Seaman Taniuchi of the Kure 101st SNLF, circa 1945. Taniuchi wears a December 1943 Work Uniform and a Type 94 pistol accompanied by a Prototype Type 1 short bayonet— initially designed for use by paratroopers on w eapons such as the Type 100 SMG. Men of this unit were intentionally ordered to disobey hair regulations.

RAIDER SPECIA L NAVAL LANDING FO R C ES

On January 10th, 1944, approximately 218 men from the Yokosuka 1st SNLF were withdrawn from the unit to form the Sasebo 101st SNLF.34 This was followed by the formation of the Kure 101 st and Sasebo 102nd SNLFs on March 1st— both with strengths of 287 men.35 Unlike the battalion-sized SNLFs that preceded them, these were organized as company-sized units and planned for subma­ rine-borne raiding operations. The troops in these units were exceptionally well-armed, with as many as half carrying submachine guns. 36 The original mission of these units was to strike deep into Allied territory, passing through enemy lines undetected in submarines and sailing their way ashore with Special Type 4 launch craft.-37However, the United States Navy’s vigilant anti-submarine patrols across the Pacific and overall worsening war situation left the Japanese Navy with no choice but to rethink such ambitious plans. While awaiting their assignments the Kure 101st and Sasebo 102nd SNLFs conducted extensive training at the Tateyama Naval Gunnery School. In the meantime the Sasebo 101 st SNLF had most of its men garrisoned in Truk and a small detachment inRabaul. In June of 1944 the Sasebo 102nd SNLF was merged with the Kure 101st SNLF, bringing the unit to roughly 450 men in strength.38 The Sasebo 101st SNLF would later be deactivated in March of the following year, leaving the Kure 101st SNLF as the sole raider unit. After Japan’s loss of the Marianas, Allied air­ fields on the islands had given their bombers deadly range, allowing them to cause unprecedented dev­ astation to major Japanese cities while further crippling Japan’s war effort. In the final months of

the war a plan to raid these airfields known as Ken Sakusen— Operation Blade was devised. Twenty-five Mitsubishi G4M Bombers each carrying a total of 250 members of Kure 101st Special Naval Landing Force were to crash land in the Marianas.39 Once crashed, the raiders of the Kure 101st SNLF would inflict as much damage to the airfields as possible, with B-29 bombers being their main target. In July the plan was revised to include an additional 300 Army paratroopers. By August the number of raiders and planes had been further increased, for a total of 300 men from the Kure 101st SNLF and another 300 Army Paratroopers carried by 60 G4M Bombers. The Kure 101 st SNLF would crash land 200 of its men on Guam and another 100 on Tinian. The Army would also land 100 men on Tinian and 200 more on Saipan. Execution of the operation was delayed to August 19th and 20th, with Japan surrendering before Ken Sakusen could see fruition.40 HOMELAND D EFEN SE

Fearing an imminent homeland invasion, in July of 1945 each of the Naval Districts raised a Combined Special Naval Landing Force and several SNLF units. In an unprecedented move, Guard Districts were given authority to raise their own SNLFs as well. By August of 1945 over 40,000 SNLF troops had been readied across nineteen SNLF units and the Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru, and Ominato Combined SNLF commands in Japan. Chinkai Guard District in Korea also raised a Combined SNLF and two SNLF units with a total strength nearing 8000 men. These units made no effort in conforming to any form of standardized organiza­ tion— desperately making use of whatever person­ nel and weaponry was left available. For the most part, these SNLF units appeared to be tactical re­ organizations of nearby existing units rather than entirely new formations. With Japan’s capitulation preceding the launch of a full-scale Allied invasion on the Japanese Home Islands, these last ditch Spe­ cial Naval Landing Forces were disbanded without seeing combat. 21

illif, I'

J

v

iM /iT ^ p f e r * &p*^v Jiy U\

UNITS OF THE NAVAL LANDING FORCES

DEFENSE UNITS

Defense Units had been part of the Imperial Jap­ anese Navy since the Meiji Era. The mission of Defense Units prioritized maritime defense, oper­ ating vessels such as minesweepers to protect ports and patrol the surrounding waters. They also bore partial responsibility for ground defense. These units were established at Naval Districts, Guard Districts, and Yokobu Major Ports, serving as an indispensable part of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s defenses across the Empire.1 Above: Gunboat crewmen of the 4th Defense Unit operating on the Yangtze River, early 1939. Each of the gunboats are fitted with a single Type Ru or Type 92 7.7mm machine gun.

Left: Petty Officer Hori and two enlisted men of the 4th Defense Unit, 1939. Each wears a junra—patrol duty armband above their left elbow.

SPECIALLY DESIGNATED D EFEN SE UNITS

When the Specially Designated Vessels and Units Decree was first introduced in 1916, one of the new unit types included in the decree was the Tokusetsu Bobitai— Specially Designated Defense Unit, a pro­ visional alternative to the more permanent Defense Units already established within Japan.2 Outside of their formal decree, their name was shortened to be “Defense Unit.” In accordance with the de­ cree, Defense Units would serve on the ground or aboard vessels, and were tasked with defending their area and the surrounding waters. Depending on the circumstances, Defense Units also bore the respon­ sibility of port control, construction, distributing supplies, and providing medical aid. Defense Units were named after their location or given a numeral designation, the latter convention was commonly used for those established outside of the Japanese Empire. The decree for Defense Units was quite 23

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

lenient, allowing for very flexible unit organizations. The 1st through 6th Defense Units raised between 1937 and 1939 in the Second Sino-Japanese War are of particular note. Although perhaps not exactly what the decree had originally had envisioned, these units served partly as Naval Landing Forces in addi­ tion to their expected maritime defense duties. The 1st Defense Unit was raised on July 28th, 1937, followed by the 2nd Defense Unit on December 6th. Both were mobile units and participated in a number of operations along the coast of China. As Special Naval Landing Forces completed their missions and were left with garrison duty, a few were reorganized as Defense Units. On December 1st, 1938, the Kure 4th SNLF was reorganized as the 4th Defense Unit in Hankow. No more than two weeks later, the Yokosuka 3rd SNLF was also reorganized as a Defense Unit, creating the 3rd

Defense Unit in Canton. The 4th participated in a number of riverine capture and cleanup operations along the Yangtze, with the 3rd serving similarly on the Pearl River. On January 20th of the following year, the 5th Defense Unit was raised for the cap­ ture of Hainan Island, and subsequently stationed in Haikow on the northern tip of the island. The Kure 6th SNLF, which had also participated in the capture o f Hainan, was reorganized into the 6th Defense Unit on April 1st, and garrisoned on the southern end of the island in Sanya. Both the 5th and 6th would spend much of their time engaging in cleanup operations within their respective areas.3,4 Ultimately, the Defense Units in China proved to be relatively short-lived. The 2nd Defense Unit was disbanded on October 25th, 1939, and used to form the security unit of the 3rd Combined Air Corps, followed by the disbandment of the 1st, 3rd,

UNITS ■ DEFENSE UNITS

and 4th on November 15th— each of which were incorporated into Special Base Forces. The remain­ ing 5th and 6th Defense Units were renamed to the 15th and 16th on November 15th, serving short of two years under their new designations before their eventual reorganization into Guard Units on July 31st, 1941. Between 1940 and 1941, a second generation of 1st through 6th Defense Units along with a new 7th was raised. Each of these units were administered by a Base Force sharing the same numeral designa­ tion. The 1st and 2nd were mobile units planned for the Pacific War, the 3rd was in Palau, the 4th in Truk, the 5th on Saipan, the 6th in Kwajalein, and the 7th on Chichijima. The 3rd through 7th, all serving on small distant islands, were much more static compared to their predecessors in China, with the sections operating onshore largely shifting their

focus to the operation o f heavy weapons such as anti-aircraft guns and coastal batteries.5 D uring the invasion o f the Philippines in December o f 1941, the 1st and 2nd Defense Units both deployed infantry in landing opera­ tions, although mostly as rearline support. The 5th Defense Unit also dispatched a Naval Landing Force detachment of roughly 370 men to aid the Imperial Japanese Army in the capture of Guam during the same month— with some of the detachment remain­ ing on the island afterwards and establishing the 54th Guard Unit.6 On March 10th, 1942, the 1st and 2nd were both disbanded, the 1st incorporated into the 21st Special Base Force in Surabaya and the 2nd incorporated into the 22nd Special Base Force in Balikpapan. On April 10th the 3rd and 5th were both consolidated with their commanding Base Forces and reformed as the 3rd and 5th Special Base Forces respectively, on the same date the 4th was reformed as the 41st and 42nd Guard Units in Truk, and the 6th was reformed as the 6 lst Guard Unit in Kwajalein, sig­ nifying the end of Defense Units in forward areas. Defense Units continued to be active for the remain­ ing duration of the war, but no longer saw service in forward areas, and thus did not play a significant role as infantry.

Left: Men of the 4th D efense Unit in Hankow during one of their last training exercises before the unit’s dissolution, November 3rd, 1939. Many of the men wear awards such as China Incident War Medals. Less than two w eeks later the 4th D efense Unit w as reorganized as the Hankow Area Special Base Force. 25

The third platoon, second company of the 4th Defense Unit during their operation to ^ ^ . v . erside city of Xiantao in late October, 1939. The number of personnel is identical to the 1936 SNLF rifle platoon formation—with 34 enlisted men, 4 petty officers serving as squad leaders, and a single officer commanding the platoon for a total of 39 men. In contrast to the usual four Type 11 light machine guns per rifle platoon, one has been substituted with a stronger Type Ru 7.7mm machine gun. Another devi­ ation from the standard is the inclusion of a Type 89 heavy grenade discharger, issued to the sailor in the bottom right corner. The majority of the platoon members make use of camouflage body nets, which have been rolled up and slung over their shoulders.

UNITS OF THE NAVAL LANDING FORCES

BASE FORCES

Base Forces and Special Base Forces were two similar types of ground-based units in the Imperial Japanese Navy. Both Base Forces and Special Base Forces were subordinate to Fleets and functioned as a forward base for the Navy, as well as serving as a command-

ing headquarters for nearby units. Base Forces were small administrative-orientated units that rarely ex­ hibited significant combat value, while Special Base Forces were much larger in size with heightened internal and tactical responsibilities. SPECIALLY DESIGNATED BASE FO R C ES

Above: Crewm em bers of the m inelayer tender Nihonkai-Maru organized as a small Naval Landing Force, circa 1942. Th eir ship served under the Shanghai Area Base Force from late 1941 until April of 1942 when it was transferred to the Tsingtao Area Special Base Force’s command.

Left: A sentry armed with a Type 38 rifle stands on guard outside of the Hankow Area Special Base Force’s Maritime Security Branch Headquarters, May 1941. Although designated as Special Base Force, the sign omits the title of “Special” from the name.

Tokusetsu Konkyochitai, Specially Designated Base Forces, otherwise simply known as Base Forces, have a relatively long history within the Navy, with their addition to the Specially Designated Vessel Unit Decree on July 19th, 1920.1A Base Force facilitated forward operations for the Navy, providing a num­ ber of administrative services and command over subordinate vessels and units. The primary respon­ sibilities of Base Forces were ground and maritime defense of both the immediate and surrounding area, surveying, harbor control, and communica­ tions. Their responsibilities could be expanded to include distributing supplies, servicing, and pro29

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

viding medical aid to Fleets when needed. A Base Force of significant importance could be upgraded to a Guard District, and conversely one of lower significance could consolidate subordinate units and create a Special Base Force when needed. According to the November 28th, 1935 revi­ sion of the Specially Designated Vessel and Units Standard Personnel Decree, a Base Force was com­ manded by a vice or rear admiral, and organized as a small headquarters made up of 10 officers, 2 special duty, 3 warrant officers, 15 petty officers, and 19 enlisted men. The Standard Personnel Decree also gave permission to attach additional officers to the headquarters as necessary.2 Base Forces served as a commanding unit— with most of their responsibilities assigned to subordi­ nate units serving under their command. A Base Force’s range of command may extend far beyond its immediate area of operations to provide admin­ istration for units in remote areas as well. In extreme cases, particularly towards the end of the Pacific War, some Base Forces commanded units situated over 1,000 kilometers from their headquarters. Base Forces occupying the most forward of areas often entrusted ground and maritime defense to one or more Guard Units serving under their command. Although rarely serving directly under their com­ mand, Special Naval Landing Forces cooperated with Base Forces to provide defenses as well. The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War spurred the creation of several Base Forces along the coast of China—the 1st Base Force in Shanghai was created in December of 1937, followed by the 2nd in Canton in September 1938, the 3rd in Amoy in November 1938, and 4th on Hainan Island in January 1939. By late 1939 the Base Forces in China were renamed or disbanded to make way for the next wave of Base Forces to be formed in Japaneseheld islands. Between 1940 and 1941 the mobile 1st and 2nd Base Forces were created in anticipation of the Pacific War, and the 3rd through 7th Base Forces created to administer the Japanese South Seas Mandate and Ogasawaras. The capture of much territory during 30

the early stages of the Pacific War called for the reor­ ganization of many units, and thus between March and April of 1942 the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Base Forces were all merged with subordinate Defense Units and reorganized to form various Special Base Forces throughout the Pacific. As the war situation grew more dire, a handful of Base Forces began to take a more direct approach to defense— creating or incorporating infantry sec­ tions within the Base Force itself. One of the first to do so was the third generation 1st Base Force in Bougainville, created in October of 1942 to aid in Japan’s occupation of the Solomon Islands. As time went on the 1st Base Force absorbed a large number of personnel from disbanded local units, particu­ larly former Air Defense Units, and grew immensely in manpower. By December of 1943 the 1st Base Force contained over 3,000 personnel organized into a number of buntai or divisions.2 Although not composed entirely of combatants, those that were operated a mixture of 8cm dual-purpose guns, 25mm and 13mm auto-cannons, a combination of 7.7mm and 6.5mm rifles and machine guns, and a small number of grenade dischargers.4A few others such as the Okinawa Area Base Force acted similarly, incorporating hundreds of additional personnel into the force for ground and air defense.5,6 Altogether a total of 33 Base Forces were formed between 1937 and 1945, with approximately 11 remaining active by the war’s end. NAVAL SPEC IA L BASE FO R C E S

O n October 19th, 1939 the Kaigun Tokubetsu Konkyochitai, Naval Special Base Force Decree was enacted.7 Special Base Forces had nearly identical responsibilities to the aforementioned Base Forces, but were considerably larger in size as most duties were to be carried out within the unit rather than by subordinate units under their command. The Special Base Force Decree included two authorized personnel charts, one consisting of 2170 personnel and a second smaller alternative consisting of 1070 personnel, both of which were commanded by ei­ ther a vice or rear admiral.8 In actual practice these

UNITS ■ BASE FORCES

Naval police and prison officers oftheTsingtao Area Special Base Force, circa 1940. The prison building behind them w as originally part of the German concession.

standard personnel charts would serve as more of a rough guideline, as the vast majority of Special Base Forces followed unique personnel charts. A Special Base Force consisted of ground security, maritime security, harbormaster and distribution, communications, engineering, construction, medi­ cal, and supply branches—with the forces personnel organized under each branch in accordance to whether it was a combat or regular duty formation. Personnel from one branch could be partially incor­ porated into another branch, or entire branches omitted from the organization if necessary. During combat formation personnel under the ground security branch could be reorganized into a Naval Landing Force if necessary to facilitate ease of command. The Naval Landing Force was

to be organized as a battalion, with the head of the ground security branch serving as the battalion com­ mander. The maritime security branch, which held the responsibility for sea and/or river defenses, could also be reorganized in combat for ease of command. This reorganization allowed for gunboats and other surface craft to form a gunboat unit headed by the branch’s commanding officer. A gunboat unit was to be divided appropriately into numbered flotillas known as shotai. Regular duty formation called for branches to be split into buntai, divisions and given numer­ ical designations. The organization and order in which personnel were assigned to divisions was the following: a. Ground Security Branch Personnel shall form

RiKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

one division or more b. Maritime Security Branch Personnel shall form one division c. Harbormaster and Provision Distribution Personnel shall be included in the formation of the Maritime Security division d. Communications Branch Personnel shall form one division e. Engineer Branch Personnel shall form one division f. Construction Branch Personnel shall form one division or be combined with the Engineer­ ing division g. Medical Branch Personnel shall form one di­ vision h. Supply Branch Personnel shall form one di­ vision On November 1st, 1943, a decree was passed alter­ ing the standardized organization of Special Base Forces, withdrawing both engineering and construc­ tion from the list of required branches. In place the administrative branch was added, with its personnel organized into one or more divisions.9 The first Special Base Forces were formed on November 15th, 1939, with the creation o f the Amoy, Canton, Hankow, and Tsingtao Area Special Right: A sailor in the Tsingtao Area S p e cial B a se Force wearing a cold-resistant uni­ form and armed with a Type 14 pistol operates a Daihatsu Model cargo tricycle, January 1940.

32

Base Forces. The Hankow Area Special Base Force was placed under the 1st Chinese Expeditionary Fleet, Amoy and Canton under the 2nd Chinese Expeditionary Fleet, and Tsingtao under the 3rd Chinese Expeditionary Fleet. All of these early Special Base Forces were raised from one or a com­ bination of the former Base Forces, Special Naval Landing Forces, and Defense Units in China. Additional Special Base Forces would not follow until almost two years later, with the formation of the 11th and 32nd Special Base Forces on November 20th, 1941. The 32nd Special Base Force was one of the few Special Base Forces to engage in large-scale ground offensives— capturing Davao, Zamboanga, and Cebu during the Japanese conquest of the Philippines between late 1941 and early 1942. The rapid drive of Japanese Forces throughout the early stages of the Pacific War resulted in the formation of several new Special Base Forces to pro­ vide security and administration in occupied areas. Many of these units were formed from Special Naval Landing Forces left in the area after completing their objectives. By the beginning of April in 1942, the IJN had established the 8th Special Base Force in Rabaul, 9th in Sumatra, 10th in Singapore, 11th in Saigon, 12th in Port Blair, 21st through 24th in

UNITS ■ BASE FORCES

Naval Landing Forces make their entrance into Surabaya, March 14th, 1942. The 21st Special Base Force occupied Java and its capital Surabaya from March of 1942 until the end of the war. (NDL 9885005)

the Dutch East Indies, and 31st and 32nd in the Philippines. O f these, the 8th, 12th, 23rd and 24th were all largely, if not almost entirely, organized from SNLFs. With the continued establishment of Special Base Forces across the Pacific, these forces constituted an indispensable portion of Japan’s outer defenses. Those in the most forward areas were almost unquestionably well-armed, possessing ample infan­ try weapons, complemented by a number of heavier weapons such as dual-purpose guns, autocannons, and occasional light armor.10 Their defensive capa­ bilities were not fully tested until the end of 1943, with the launch of the American-driven campaign to retake the Gilbert and Marshall Islands beginning at Tarawa Atoll. Despite being vastly outnumbered, the roughly 1,122-man strong 3rd Special Base Force, supported by another 1,497 men of the Sasebo 7th SNLF, held Tarawa with unprecedented tenacity.11

With no intent of capitulation, the two units would suffer all but total annihilation while defending the atoll, but not before inflicting a devastating amount of losses upon their attackers. As the end of the war drew nearer, Special Base Forces saw increasing participation in major battles. 1945 would prove to be one of the most brutal years yet, with a growing number of Special Base Forces falling as Allied Forces reclaimed the Philippines and moved to retake Borneo. By the end of the war, the Special Base Forces that had existed since the early days had grown considerably in manpower,12 but dwindling resources— further burdened by con­ tinuous attacks on their supply lines, had allowed for little to no growth in terms of actual fighting power. From their inception in 1939 to 1945 a total of 35 Special Base Forces had been raised, of which roughly half remained at the time of Japan’s surrender.

UNITS OF THE NAVAL LANDING FORCES

BASE UNITS

In mid-1939 the Imperial Japanese Navy’s coastal and riverine operations in China had shifted largely from offense to defense. The Navy had already begun to rely on Defense Units to occupy captured areas throughout China, but the creation of a new unit type specifically intended for such duties was soon deemed necessary. With the passage of the Naval Special Base Force Decree on October 19th, 1939, a decree for an alternative smaller unit type was introduced as well. This new unit type— officially

Above: Officers outside of the Nanking Base Unit’s Harbormaster Section Headquarters, circa 1940.

Left: A sailor first class of the Nanking Base Unit armed with a Type 14 pistol stands aboard one of the unit’s surface vessels patrolling the Yangtze River, 1941. Note the captured Czechoslovak Vz. 26 light machine gun to the left of the sailor.

known as the Kaigun Kichitai, Naval Base Unit, would be the answer to the Navy’s need for a new defensive unit type. Base Units served directly under Fleets in China and were named after their location. Similarly to Defense Units and Base Forces, they were responsible for the defense of the immediate and surrounding area in which they served. Secondary responsibilities included providing services such as harbor control, communications, distribution of supplies, and medical care to Fleets when neces­ sary. Issued alongside the decree were two standard authorized personnel charts for 740 and 310 men respectively, both commanded by either a captain or commander.1,2 On November 15th, 1939, the Chusan Island, Kiukiang, and Nanking Base Units were created. The Chusan and Nanking Base Units were placed under the command of the China Area Fleet, while 35

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

the Kiukiang Base Unit was placed under the 1st Expeditionary Chinese Fleet. The Kiukiang and Nanking Base Units both largely originated from prior units in the area— Kiukiang from the 13th Gunboat Unit and Nanking from the Kure 5th SNLF. Like Defense Units, they served both on the ground and water, with much of their person­ nel divided between ground and maritime security branches. Organization among the three units varied, but each appears to have followed the larger of the two personnel charts. The most detailed example of organization is derived from the Kiukiang Base Unit, which was divided into three sections, a headquarters, ground security branch, and water security branch. The headquarters was located in Kiukiang, with three surface craft attached. The headquarters held responsibility for patrolling the rivers and shorelines,

as well as managing communications, administering harbors, and distributing supplies. The attached surface craft patrolled waterways and assisted the headquarters in harbor control. The ground security branch was made up of three Naval Landing Forces Right: Enlisted men and petty officers of the Nanking Base Unit in front of their barracks proudly display the naval ensign, circa 1941. Below: The Kiukiang Base Unit’s Naval Landing Force detachm ent in Anqing, 1941. The force contained the typical elements of a rifle platoon, bolstered in strength by additional men and an added Type 92 heavy m achine gun. A small number of both military and civilian supportive personnel are attached—allowing the detachment to exercise some degree of autonomy.

UNITS ■ BASE UNITS

of vaiying sizes situated in Kiukiang, Nanchang, and Anqing. The water security branch consisted of a patrol boat, four gunboat flotillas, and gun­ boat bases in Hukow, Nanchang, Wucheng, and Xingzi. Each of the gunboat bases also included lightly armed personnel capable of acting as infantry if necessary.3' 4 On July 31st, 1941, all three of the Base Units were reorganized as Guard Units in their respective areas.5 Having been effectively replaced by Guard Units, the Naval Base Unit Decree was terminated. The reasoning behind the replacement of Base Units with Guard Units was not made clear, but it may have simply been a result of Naval Bureaucrats favor­ ing a unit type with a name that more appropriately conveyed their duties. Although Base Units existed for less than two years in total, the Naval Base Unit Decree was highly influential in the development of Guard Units and an overall important step in the Imperial Japanese Navy’s shift towards focusing on more stationary infantry units.

37

UNITS OF THE NAVAL LANDING FORCES

GUARD UNITS

By 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy had estab­ lished a significant presence aboveground in China. A number of Defense Units, Base Units, and Special Base Forces had already been created or reorganized from former units to serve as occupying forces in captured areas. O n July 31st, 1941, the Imperi­ al Japanese Navy introduced Tokusetsu Keibitai, Specially Designated Guard Units to the Specially Designated Vessels and Units Decree.1On the same

Above: Petty Officers Ishiyama and Tamura armed with a Type 38 rifle and Type 14 pistol, both of which are later production variants, stand on guard in the Pacific, Decem ber 1943.

Left: A rifle squad of the 16th Guard Unit on Southern Hainan Island, 1942. The petty officer in the back right carries a personal sword and wears privately-purchased officer-style leggings.

day, the first six Guard Units were created. O f them the Chusan Island, Kiukiang, and Nanking Guard Units were reformations of former Base Units, and the 15th and 16th on Hainan Island were refor­ mations of former Defense Units. The 81st Guard Unit created for deployment in Indochina was the sole entirely new formation. The duties of Guard Units were very close to the aforementioned Base Units, while the organization shared much in common with Special Base Forces, with some sections o f the decree directly copied from or nearly identical to the Naval Special Base Force Decree.2True to their name, the main duty of Guard Units was guarding a fixed location. Other duties included harbor control, communications, and distributing supplies when necessary. In the same manner as Special Base Forces, Guard Units were organized for either combat or regular duty. The standard organization called for a composition of ground security, maritime security, engineering, 39

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

Above: A section of the 15th Guard Unit on Northern Hainan Island, circa 1942. Th ese men are particularly well-armed, albeit with somewhat outdated weaponry. Note the bulletproof vests worn by three of the sailors. Despite the regulation change in 1940, the officer pictured in the center retains an earlier uniform with shoulder board insignia. A number of the sailors wear dyed Work Uniforms in lieu of the Green Summer Uniform.

medical, and supply branches, with personnel attached in accordance to the formation type. If necessary, a branch could be omitted from the for­ mation, or have a portion of its personnel combined with another. Other branches outside of those listed in the standard formation such as communications could be observed within unit formations as well.3 40

There was no standard am ount o f personnel for Guard Units, with very few units exhibiting identi­ cal strengths. Recorded sizes varied from as few as a couple hundred to nearly seven thousand personnel. During combat formation the ground and mar­ itime security branches were the primary areas of focus. The guidelines concerning the organization and duties of the ground security branch in combat were largely copied from the Naval Special Base Force Decree and likewise allowed for organization of the branch as a Naval Landing Force battalion if necessary to provide ease of command. In combat, the duties of the maritime security branch could be broadened to include harbor control and distribu­ tion of provisions.2 Regular duty formation called for the branches to be split into buntai or divisions and given numer­ ical designations. The organization and order in

UNITS ■ GUARD UNITS

which personnel were assigned to divisions was the following: a. Ground Security Branch Personnel shall form one division or more b. Maritime Security Branch Personnel shall form one division c. Engineering Branch Personnel shall form one division d. Medical Branch Personnel shall form one di­ vision e. Supply Branch Personnel shall form one di­ vision On May 14th, 1943, the engineering branch was removed, with the administrative branch taking its place.4 The tactical organization of Guard Units was subject to significant variation based on the level of threat presented in the area. The Guadalcanal

Detachment of the 84th Guard Unit represented one of the furthest forward examples of a Guard Unit and as such was organized as a 255-man Naval Landing Force.5 The unit contained a small head­ quarters, a command platoon, three rifle platoons, a machine gun platoon, mountain gun platoon, construction unit, transport unit, medical unit, and a supply unit. Also included were a small number of radiomen, weather surveyors, and interpreters. Representing the other end of the spectrum were isolated units such as the 46th Guard Unit stationed on Yap Island.3 The 46th was considerably more static in nature, focusing heavily on the usage of dual-purpose guns, autocannons, and machine guns for air and coastal defense. As such, its infantry units were built around batteries, with one serving at a 12cm dual-purpose gun position, and four more serving at 25mm autocannon emplacements. 41

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

Anticipating the arrival of enemy forces on the island, this angled infantry gun unit on Saipan—believed to be part of the 55th Guard Unit, conducts training with their weapons, 1944.

Guard Units would primarily serve outside of Ja­ pan and on distant Japanese islands. The units in Mainland China and Japanese Home Islands were named after the area, while those elsewhere were assigned a number. The first number o f a Guard Unit often coincided with its commanding Base Force or the Fleet in the area, for example the 54th through 56th Guard Units were all under the 5th 42

Base Force and the 81st through 89th Guard Units were each under Base Forces subordinate to the 8th Fleet at some point, although this practice proved to be quite loosely followed and thus had countless exceptions. Guard Units outside o f Japan were usually formed at the four main Naval Districts from Naval Corps or reorganized from local units, or in many

UNITS ■ GUARD UNITS

cases a mixture of the two. During the later stages of the war, Guard Units were raised from whatever means necessary, including stranded survivors from sunken ships. Initially Guard Units served primarily under Fleet comm and. However, from early 1942 onwards, almost all Guard Units serving outside of Japan received command from either Base Forces or Special Base Forces. As Japan’s territorial expan­ sion pushed some Special Base Forces into rearline areas, they were downgraded and reorganized as Guard Units accordingly. On the other hand, a few Guard Units were upgraded to Special Base Forces, typically those in forward areas where administrative needs exceeded what a Guard Unit was capable of. The static nature and defensive capabilities of Guard Units made them the most suitable choice for an occupying force across the Pacific. By mid1942 Guard Units had already grown to account for the bulk of the Navy’s active ground power— serving almost anywhere the Navy had established a presence in. Consequently, Guard Units would see the most significant amount of combat over the course of the war, with many of these units sustain­ ing heavy casualties or even complete annihilation against Allied forces. By the end of the war nearly 90 Guard Units had been established outside of Japan, of which over two thirds remained active in some capacity. GUARD UNITS WITHIN JAPAN

On November 11th, 1941, the decree for Kaigun Keibitai, Naval Guard Units was passed.6 Naval Guard Units carried the same primary responsibil­ ities as Specially Designated Guard Units, as well as providing communications and harbor control when needed. In contrast to Specially Designated Guard Units which were rather provisional in na­ ture, these units would exist as permanent installa­ tions. The first Naval Guard Units were established at the Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo, and Maizuru Naval Districts on November 20th. These four units were given authorized strengths between 600 to 800 men each, but would each increase by several thousand

men as the war progressed.8 On April 20th, 1944, a final Naval Guard Unit was established in Takao. On the day of its formation the Takao Naval Guard Unit had a strength just short of 250 men, but like the others would grow considerably in size.9,10 Naval Guard Units operated exclusively within the Japanese Empire, serving primarily under either Naval District or Guard District Command. The infantry component of these units was built around heavy machine gun, automatic cannon, and dual-purpose gun emplacements. Formation among the units varied, but the organization of personnel under security, anti-air/gunnery, transportation, engineering and construction, medical, and supply branches appears to have been com m on."'12 Japan’s devastating loss of Saipan in July of 1944 urged high command to make preparations for large-scale defense of the Home Islands. One of the first measures taken was raising a large wave of Specially Designated Guard Units drawn from personnel of the Naval Schools on July 20th, with the largest concentration of units placed around Yokosuka Naval District and the surrounding Tokyo Bay.13The number of Guard Units throughout the Japanese Home Islands would continue to steadily grow throughout late 1944 and early 1945 as the threat of a homeland invasion drew nearer. O n March 20th, 1945, in an effort to prop­ erly convey the importance of harbor security the Yokohama Guard Unit, one of the many units raised in the prior year, was renamed to the Yokohama Harbor Guard Unit.14Not long after this change no less than sixteen Harbor Guard Units were estab­ lished in major coastal cities across the Japanese Empire on May 1st. Like the preceding wave of units raised for homeland defense, these too were classified as Specially Designated Guard Units. The size and armaments varied heavily among the Harbor Guard Units— utilizing whatever personnel and weaponry at their disposal for air and coastal defense.15 By the time of Japan’s surrender a total of 23 Harbor Guard Units were active, 19 of which were in the Japanese Home Islands, three in Korea, and a single unit in China. 43

m * *

- ii f

’

i ■Lv

^ __ \ j^-

jt

gi. 4

Men of the 45th Guard Unit Peleliu Detachment photographed a t.th e ir barracks in Yokosuka shortly after the unit’s formation. All of the petty officers and enlisted men w ear Standard Caps and Decem ber 1943 Work Uniforms with name tags affixed above their left chest pockets, while the officers in the center retain their earlier reg­ ulation Green Summer Uniforms with matching wool caps. The men of the detachm ent would soon be deployed to Peleliu, and later face almost complete annihilation during fighting that ensued later in the year. (Photograph provided courtesy

UNITS OF THE NAVAL LANDING FORCES

CONSTRUCTION UNITS Throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War, the task of construction in forward areas was often carried out by naval ground personnel. At the dawn of the Pacific War, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s plans of rapid expansion brought forth a great dependency on the construction of forward bases, airfields, and defensive installations. Continuing to employ naval personnel for such tasks would undoubtedly result

in an excessive drain on their manpower. The solu­ tion to this problem was the creation o f civilian Construction Parties, soon followed by Construc­ tion Units— both of which would play an important role during the Pacific War. Although Construction Units were not intended to serve as naval infantry, a number of units were thrust into the role while operating on the frontlines. CON STRUCTION PARTIES

Above: A Naval Construction worker clears out an area for facilities with a tractor in the South Pacific, circa 1942. Note the golden anchor affixed to the front of the tractor. (N D L1880797)

Left: Naval Construction w orkers south of the equator chop down jungle thicket, circa 1942. Many units were burdened by a lack of mechani­ zation, with no other choice but to rely heavily on manual labor. (Same as above)

O n September 12th, 1941, Toksetsu Setsueihan, Specially Designated Construction Parties were introduced to the Specially Designated Vessels and Units Decree. Construction Parties were assigned to Fleets, with airfield construction as their main priority.1 Each was commanded by a civilian tech­ nical officer employed by the navy, with up to 3000 civilian laborers serving under their command. A small number of naval personnel could be attached to parties as well, primarily for medical and admin47

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

Right: Construction Petty Officer 1st Class Kitazawa, in Bali, Dutch East Indies, 1943. During the later stages of the Pacific War personnel from the con­ struction branch would account for the majority of workers within militarized Construction Units.

Opposite: Naval troops in the Pacific armed with a Type 38 rifle and two Type 14 pistols, December 1943. Such light weapons were commonly issued as a means of self-defense to naval personnel serving in Construction Units.

istrative duties.2 Between October and November of 1941, the 1st through 8th Construction Parties were formed in anticipation o f the Pacific War. These Construction Parties would play a critical role in supporting the Imperial Japanese Navy’s offensives in the Philippines, Dutch East Indies, and Melane­ sia during the early stages of the Pacific War. After Naval Landing Forces secured areas, Construction Parties would waste no time in quickly building or repairing captured airfields for use by the Navy’s Air Service. By April of 1942, a total of ten parties had been created— of those the 1st through 5th had already been disbanded and incorporated into local Kenchikubu Construction Departments earlier in the year. One last Construction Party known as the Provisional Construction Party was raised on March 20th, 1942. This party was tasked with the construction of wharves in Balikpapan, Halmahera and Manila, and establishing extraction facilities in the oilfields of Balikpapan. CONSTRUCTION UNITS

On April 27th, 1942, Toksetsu Setsueitai, Specially Established Construction Units replaced Construc­ tion Parties in the Specially Designated Vessels and Units Decree.3 On the same date, the 6th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Construction Parties each underwent transformations into Construction Units, leaving only the Provisional Construction Party remain­ ing. Construction Units would serve under Fleets, Naval Districts, and Guard Districts. Like the par­ ties that had preceded, civilians would account for 48

the bulk of the unit personnel. The first units were split between A and B formation types. Type A was a larger unit intended for regular construction, with 236 naval personnel, 10 civilian officers, and up to 1300 civilian workers. Type B was smaller in size, with 121 naval personnel, 5 civilian officers, and up to 800 civilian workers.'1All newly formed Construction Units would receive command from field or company grade naval officers of the line, engineering, or technical branches.5 Construction Units were frequently organized as a battalion, consisting of a unit headquarters, several companies— each o f which performed a specific duty, and a few smaller support units. The

UNITS ■ CONSTRUCTION UNITS

naval personnel within units were lightly armed for self-defense, usually with nothing more than rifles, pistols, and a very small num ber of light machine guns for those in forward areas.6 While on the frontlines, the unit’s armed personnel may be tasked with patrolling the area for enemy forces, and full-on combat during emergencies. As the war progressed, Construction Units would engage in combat against Allied Forces on a number of occa­ sions. One of the first instances being the 11 th and 13th Construction Units that fought alongside the Guadalcanal Detachment of the 84th Guard Unit during the Allied offensives on the island in August of 1942. These Construction Units both had well

over one thousand personnel, but no more than fifteen percent in either of the units were actually armed and capable of fighting.7 On November 20th, 1942, the Type C forma­ tion was introduced. Type C was intended for the construction o f fortifications and included 152 naval personnel, 10 civilian officers, and up to 1500 civilian workers.8 O n July 1st, 1943, yet another standardized formation was introduced with the addition of the Type D formation to the standard personnel chart. Type D was meant for mechanized construction, with 108 naval personnel, 10 civilian officers, and like the Type A formation, up to 1300 civilian workers.9

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

As more units were exposed to combat on the frontlines, the militarization of Construction Units became necessary. By early 1944 permission was granted to form Construction Units composed entirely of naval personnel rather than civilians. On April 18th, the standardized personnel charts for Type A, B, C and D formations were revised to reflect this change, as illustrated in Table 2 .10 The charts specified that each of the types were to be commanded by a field or company grade line officer, but could be commanded by a technical officer of the same grades if necessary. In actual prac­ tice, line officers serving as commanders proved to be fairly uncommon— as the vast majority of Construction Units formed in 1944 and later would

be commanded by technical lieutenants. One example of these new units was the 332nd Construction Unit deployed in the latter half of 1944 to Clark Airfield in the Philippines.11 It was a Type B formation, with a total o f450 personnel— of which over 80% belonged to the Kousaku-ka Construction Branch. The 332nd had a unit headquarters, three companies, and small transport, medical, and supply units attached. Although still not to the extent of dedicated infantry units, the new generation of militarized Construction Units was considerably better armed than their predecessors. The 332nd Construction Unit had six single-mount Type 96 25mm autocannons, two Type 92 7.7mm machine guns, one hundred Type 38 rifles, thirteen Type 14

Table 2: Standard Personnel for Construction Units, April 18th, 1944

Type

A

Officers

10

Special Duty Officers

2

C

D

6

5

3

1

2

1

4

3

Technical Civil Officers Warrant Officers

14

6

1

1

Petty Officers

72

29

33

12

6

7

67

58

Up to 1300

Up to 400

Junior Civil Officers Enlisted

956

409

Civilians

50

Total

1054

451

Up to 1418

Up to 485

Main Purpose

General Construction

Tunnel/Wharf Construction

General Construction

Tunnel/Wharf Construction

UNITS ■ CONSTRUCTION UNITS

Construction Unit personnel make use of a tamping roller to compact soil during the construction of an airfield in Rabaul, 1944. (Photograph provided courtesy of Takahiro Ishizawa)

pistols, and enough helmets to outfit everyone in the unit. The 332nd and several similar Construction Units in the area would account for a large por­ tion of the naval garrison serving under the 26th Air Flotilla tasked with defending Clark Airfield. These defenders later engaged against Allied forces in January of 1945 and suffered heavy casualties before ultimately losing the airfield and surround­ ing area. Construction Units continued to be raised in large numbers right into the final days of the war, with many building airfields, tunnels, and defen­ sive installations in the Japanese Home Islands in preparation for what was thought to be an inevitable homeland invasion. During the final two years of the war, Construction Units would see extensive

combat in the Marianas, Philippines, and Japanese Home Islands. Many of these units were older for­ mations— still overwhelmingly made up of civilian personnel, with only a small number of actual troops possessing very few weapons. Consequently, these units would suffer devastating losses against their adversaries. In total, over two hundred construction units were raised throughout the course of the war,12 of which roughly one third served in the Pacific—while the remaining units served in the Japanese Empire.

51

UNITS OF THE NAVAL LANDING FORCES

AIR DEFENSE UNITS By late 1942, the overwhelming strength of Allied airpower was taking its toll on Japanese forces. In response a number of Special Naval Landing Forces, Guard Units, and other naval ground units had already begun to dedicate part of their manpow­ er towards air defenses. Seeking to further combat Allied airpower, Tokusetsu Bokutai, Specially Desig­ nated Air Defense Units were introduced into the

Above: Cam ouflaged sailors operate a single mount Type 96 25mm autocannon in the South Pacific, 1944. The Type 96 autocannon proved to be one of the most commonly utilized weapons by Air Defense Units.

Left: A Type 3 machine gun crew performs an anti-aircraft exercise during a public demonstra­ tion in Japan, 1939. Note the Type 93 gas mask equipment worn by each of the crewmembers.

Specially Designated Vessels and Units Decree on December 3rd, 1942.' Air Defense Units were company-sized units, armed with various anti-air weapons ranging from heavy machine guns to large calibre dual-purpose guns. Similarly to Special Naval Landing Forces or Base Forces, they would serve directly under Fleets, Naval Districts, or Guard Districts. They were com­ manded by a company grade officer, of which many were special duty officers. Aside from air defense, these units bore a partial responsibility for ground defense as well.2 Type A, B, and C unit formation charts for Air Defense Units were published on December 3rd.3 Type A had 290 personnel and was outfitted with 12cm or 8cm dual-purpose guns, Type B with 335 men and Type 96 25mm automatic cannons, and Type C with 331 men and Type 93 13mm machine guns. The first of the Air Defense Units were raised on December 5th, 1942, and soon deployed 53

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

Table 3 : 11th Air Defense Unit Formation, December 5th, 1942

throughout the Pacific. Initially, Air Defense Units would operate exclusively outside of the Japanese Empire— the first generation of units heavily con­ centrated within the Solomons, Bismarcks, and New Guinea. Further waves of units would soon follow, forming an extensive network of air defenses across the Pacific. Towards the end of 1943, the majority of units were operating in the Southern and Central Pacific, while a few others defended more remote areas such as the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Indian Ocean, as well as the Kuriles in the far north. Wartime diaries from the 11 th Air Defense Unit headquartered in Rabaul provide an exceptionally detailed example of an early Air Defense Unit forma­ tion, as illustrated in Table 3.4 The unit was formed as an independent 329-man company made up of a headquarters, six platoons, and a small number of support personnel attached. The company head­ quarters was commanded by a lieutenant, with a warrant officer, three petty officers, and five enlisted men as his aides, and included two motorcycles 54

outfitted with sidecars and a cargo truck. Each pla­ toon commander was a warrant officer, of which half were reservists. The core of the unit’s firepower was embedded in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd platoons, each equipped with four twin m ount Type 96 25mm autocannons, three Type 92 7.7mm machine guns, a motorcycle sidecar, and two cargo trucks. Each platoon had approximately four 11-man weapon squads, a 16-man ammunition squad, and three runners. The command platoon was split into two 9-man signal squads and a 5-man plotting squad. The guard platoon had four runners and 44 infan­ trymen equipped with four Type 96 6.5mm light machine guns (each with 6000 rounds of ammuni­ tion), four Type 89 grenade dischargers (each with 100 shells), and Type 99 rifles. The searchlight platoon had eight runners, two 5-man searchlight squads that controlled a 90 cm and 75 cm search­ light, and nine engineers forming electrical squads to man two power generators and a cargo truck. Attached to the company was a medical sub-lieu­ tenant, a medical petty officer, four medics, a supply

UNITS ■ AIR DEFENSE UNITS

petty officer, and eleven paymasters to support oper­ ations. The unit’s platoons were divided into smaller sections and stationed throughout New Britain. In addition to the aforementioned major weapons, the unit had an arsenal of 310 Type 99 rifles (each with 300 rounds of ammunition) and 30 Type 14 pistols, allowing for the entire unit to engage in ground defense should it become necessary. On July 24th, 1943, the A, B, and C formation types of Air Defense Units were revised.5 Type A was reduced to 287 personnel and redesignated to operate anti-aircraft guns of an unspecified calibre, although it is assumed the 12cm and 8cm guns remained common. Type B was reduced to 225 men, with its main armament redesignated as either autocannons or machine guns of an unspecified cal­ ibre. Likewise, Type C was also reduced in strength, for a slightly smaller unit size of 316 men, and its armament changed to include anti-aircraft guns and either or a combination of autocannons or machine guns. An additional three standardized unit types, known as A l, A2, and C l were created around December of 1943.6' 7 In contrast with the prior types, these were smaller, more specialized forma­ tions. Type Al formations had a fire control system, six 12cm dual-purpose guns, and three Type 92 machine guns, operated by a total of 114 men. Type A2 had 136 men with six 7.5cm anti-aircraft guns and three Type 92 MGs. Type C l had 164 men with a fire control system, four 12cm dual-purpose guns, twelve 25mm autocannons, and like the other two, three Type 92 MGs. Each formation included six Type 96 light machine guns for ground defense, with additional infantry weapons issued individually to units in accordance with their tactical needs. On August 5th, 1943, the 26th, 27th, and 32nd Air Defense Units in the Kuriles were all disbanded and subsequently incorporated into the 51st Guard Unit.8 The 11 th Air Defense Unit in New Britain soon followed, as it was disbanded and incorporated into the 81st and 86th Guard Units on the 15th. By the end of 1943 several more Air Defense Units had been disbanded and incorporated into local units,

particularly in the Solomons where the 1st Base Force had absorbed many of those situated nearby. The disbandment and subsequent merging of Air Defense Units with neighboring units allowed for a more logical command structure, placing them under the command of local ground-based units instead of Fleets. The creation of several more waves of Air Defense Units continued in 1944, with many soon follow­ ing the previous generation of Air Defense Units as they were incorporated into nearby Guard Units, (Special) Base Forces, and Air Corps. By 1944, units were no longer operating solely outside of Japan, with a presence established in Taiwan, the Ryukyus, and Kyushu, among other places. By the end of the year the total number of Air Defense Units created had risen to 161. However, by this point all except for some in the Philippines had either been disbanded and incorporated into local units or destroyed in combat. This ultimately proved to be the end of Air Defense Units, as the final year of the war would not see the creation of further units.

A Type 10 12cm anti-aircraft gun on Guam, October 5,1944. Such weapons were common­ place in both Type A and A1 formation types. (NARA 80-G-247827) 55

EQUIPMENT OF THE NAVAL LANDING FORCES

INFANTRY GEAR UNIFORMS

When Naval Landing Forces were first deployed to Shanghai in 1927, they did not have specific uniforms for ground use. During this period, the standard Class I and Class II uniforms for their respective winter and summer seasons were worn. Enlisted men and petty officers alike denoted their rate and branch o f service with a round insignia Above: Sailors of the Kure Special Naval Landing Force wearing C lass I winter uniforms and caps with tallies bearing their unit’s nam esake Kure Naval Corps, in Shanghai, circa 1927.

Left: Sub-lieutenant H igurashi Saburo, com ­ mander of the Shanghai Naval Landing Force’s 2nd Company in summer of 1931. Higurashi wears a prototype of the modified brown Class II summer officer uniform featuring a stand and fall collar.

stitched above their elbow on their right sleeve. The insignias featured a red on black design for winter and a black on white design for summer. On the ground both enlisted men and petty officers wore their uniforms with a pair of white gaiters, while officers wore a Sam Browne belt with either rid­ ing boots or ankle boots and black leather gaiters. The white color of Class II summer uniforms soon proved to be unsatisfactory for extended onshore operations and before long a secretariat was issued on June 6th permitting the usage of modified Class II summer uniforms for Naval Landing Forces serv­ ing in China.' These modified uniforms were dyed a more suitable chakasshoku brown color. Aside from color, the overall design remained unchanged for enlisted and petty officers, while the officer uniforms were slightly altered with the addition of two exter­ nal chest pockets. Winter season insignia was worn on these brown uniforms in place of the tradition57

EQUIPMENT ■ INFANTRY GEAR

Right: Two sailors and a petty officer with a Jap an ese civilian shortly after the January 28th Incident. All w ear Arm y pat­ tern boots with black puttees, as well as old pattern Army helmets.

Left: An enlisted man of the Shanghai S N LF w earing a complete May 1933 regulation Green Summer Uniform, with a Green Short-Jacket, matching trousers, green puttees, ground combat boots, and a pith helmet. Although green under­ shirts were not made regulation until 1935, this sailor already makes use of one, perhaps a privately-purchased item or an earlier issued prototype.

al summer insignia. By early 1932 Naval Landing Forces began to replace their white gaiters with black puttees and service shoes with army pattern boots. On May 1st, 1933 a new set of uniforms and reg­ ulations were enacted for the Naval Landing Forces. Those serving in China were to be issued a newly designed open-collared Katsuao-Iro Natsu-I, Green (literally translated as brown-blue color) Summer Jacket, matching trousers, and insignia for the summer season.2 Officers and petty officers both wore a similar three-button suit-styled jacket. The officer jacket featured notched lapels and detachable rank epaulets and was worn with a bow tie. The uniform for petty officers was very similar in design, but had non-notched lapels and fixed epaulets that each exhibited a single golden anchor. For enlisted a two-button short-jacket with non-notched lapels was worn. Each of the jackets featured a fabric loop

on the left side to secure a belt. Enlisted were also given a brand-new visor cap, the overall design was based on the standard visor cap for petty officers, with the insignia derived from the caps worn by enlisted naval bandsmen. Officers and petty offi­ cers could wear their visor caps year-round, while enlisted were restricted to the summer season. A green-colored sunshade was to be attached to visor caps during summertime. A pith helmet that had been tested the year prior also made its official debut on May 1st and could be worn in place of a visor cap for men of all ranks. Alongside the uniforms and headgear came green puttees for use in summer and split-toed shoes with rubber soles known as jika-tabi, both of which were made available to all ranks. Ground combat boots were also introduced for enlisted and petty officers, the design very closely resembled Army pattern boots, but were instead 59

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

Men of the Shanghai SN LF’s Medical Unit, circa 1937. All of them wear visor caps with the summer sun­ shades introduced in 1933 and the 1935 regulation Green Summer Uniforms.

made of a smooth black leather. These new Green Summer Uniforms were meant to replace the prior brown Class II uniforms, but nonetheless sporadic usage of them could be observed as late as 1937. In March of 1935 the Green Summer Uniforms were slightly revised.3 Officers were no longer required to wear bow ties, with neckties taking their place. The lapels on both the petty officer and enlisted jackets were changed to a notched design, and a lower third button was added to the enlisted short-jacket design. Alongside these changes came a new collared undershirt for petty officers and a green undershirt for enlisted. As grievances were made concerning the lack of practicality offered by visor caps— namely in their inability to be worn in unison with helmets, development of several prototype field caps was conducted. The Navy experimented with its own 60

indigenous designs, but ultimately a wool soft-cap derived from the Army’s design was met with the most favorable reception. The cap was made of a green wool for summer and black for winter, with a yellow wool anchor insignia on a circular backing sewn to the front. As time went on the insignia was simplified to economize on materials and speed up production. These caps began to see heavy usage by summer of 1937, but were not officially adopted until November 27th of that year.4 O n the same day of the cap’s adoption the Green Summer ShortJacket for enlisted men was abolished. Henceforth, all enlisted would wear the same Green Summer Jackets as petty officers, but without the golden anchors on the epaulets. In 1937 the use of cloth name tags by enlisted men and petty officers became commonplace in many units. These name tags contained information

EQUIPMENT ■ INFANTRY GEAR

A Petty Officer wears a 1935 regulation summer uniform with a 1937 regulation green field cap.

Petty Officer Hori of the Kure 4th SNLF wears a special cold-resistant uniform in Hankow, 1938.

such as the unit or commander’s name, one’s own name, rate, and blood type, and were typically stitched above the left chest pocket. While the summer uniforms for Naval Landing Forces were subject to many changes, the standard Class I uniforms remained largely the same and continued to see use during wintertime. As Special Naval Landing Forces moved to take the northern coast of China in 1938, several units began to make use of cold-resistant equipment for the extreme weather. The equipment included a navy fur-lined greatcoat, a fur cap, trousers, and undergarments, all of which came in two variations— the standard type and a special type with additional fur lining.5 On May 25th, 1940, the epaulets on the Green Summer Jackets were removed from the design.6,7 Officers switched to rank insignia worn on their col­ lars, and the golden anchors worn by petty officers

were moved to their collars as well. In addition, a collared button-up undershirt known as the Katsuao-Iro Natsu Juban, Green Summer Shirt was introduced for both enlisted and petty officers. As Naval Landing Forces found themselves in hotter tropical climates, some began to substitute their jackets and undershirts with a more comfortable single layer in the form of Bosho Sagyo-I FleatResistant Work Tunics. The enlisted and petty officer insignia regulations were significantly changed on April 1st, 1942, with the elaborate round seasonal designs being replaced by a machine-embroidered insignia for year-round use.8This new insignia featured a yellow anchor on a shield-shaped black backing, with one to three bars above the anchor denoting one’s rate, and an addi­ tional wreath below the anchor for petty officers. Branches were denoted by a metal cherry blossom 61

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

Above: Sailors in Southern China wear May 1940 regulation Green Sum mer Uniforms and Shirts, circa 1942.

Below: A petty officer first class with a good con­ duct chevron wears a December 1943 Work Tunic and a Standard Cap with a substitute winter anchor insignia, 1944.

62

affixed between the bars and anchor, with yellow signifying seaman, purple for both engineering and construction, red for medical, and white for supply. Those who had already been issued the earlier insig­ nia did not necessarily replace it, and some older stock was still issued as well, resulting in much of the prior regulation insignia remaining in circulation until the war’s end. On November 30th, 1943, a year-round service uniform for all naval personnel known as Ryakuso— Standard Equipment was introduced.9 The uniform consisted o f a green open-collared four-button tunic with four external pockets, accompanied by a matching pair of trousers and a cotton cap. Like the 1940 revision of the Green Summer Uniforms, there was very little variation between the types for officers, petty officers, and enlisted men, providing a unified look across the ranks. Upon its introduc­ tion it was only authorized for use in war zones unless an exception was granted. The following day on December 1st a new type of work uniform for enlisted and petty officers was adopted, featuring a green five-button tunic with four pockets and matching green trousers.10 On August 21st, 1944, the Standard Equipment was reclassified as the Provisional Class III Uniform, becoming the Navy’s standard uniform for personnel both within and outside of Japan.11 These two new uniforms— par­ ticularly the work uniform, effectively replaced the Green Summer Uniforms for Naval Landing Forces.

EQUIPMENT ■ INFANTRY GEAR

Officers in Shanghai wear first pattern navy helmets with tenugui cloths worn underneath, March, 1932.

HELMETS

On April 1st, 1929, a shipment of 988 helmets from the Yokosuka Naval Arsenal was authorized for transfer to the 1st Expeditionary Fleet.12At the time these helmets did not have a model name and were simply referred to as tetsu-kabuto, steel helmets. The helmets were pan-shaped and featured no insignia, superficially resembling the British Brodie helmet in appearance. The helmet was secured by a leather chinstrap, which although commonplace with most western helmets at the time, was relatively unique in comparison to other Japanese designs. W hen the helmets were worn, caps were removed and a tenugui cloth was often tied around the wearer’s head for comfort. With the outbreak of the January 28th Incident in 1932, the Navy was in desperate need of more helmets to protect the growing number o f their infantrymen landing in Shanghai. An urgent request

was made to the Imperial Japanese Army for the purchase of 1000 old pattern helmets on January 30th,13 followed by another for 1700 more on February 20th.H These helmets were a derivative of the Adrian design and had been adopted as the Provisional Standard Steel Helmet in 1922 before eventually being superseded by the Type 90 helmet in 1930. There were two significant variations of these helmets— an early model with several vent holes on the top forming a star pattern, and a later improved model featuring a distinctive metal cherry blossom affixed above the vent holes to prevent rain­ water from entering. On September 15th, 1932, three helmet models were officially adopted by the Navy.14 Model 1 did not refer to a specific helmet, but rather anything outside of the Model 2 and 3 designations, which included the first helmets seen since 1929 and the old pattern Army helmets in circulation. The Model 63

EQUIPMENT ■ INFANTRY GEAR

Above: Sailors garrisoned on Hainan Island wear Model 2 or 3 helmets, only one of which makes use of a helmet cover, 1942.

Left: A leading seam an on lookout duty in the Japanese Home Islands wears a late production helmet featuring a painted anchor on the front, 1945. The large flared brim of the helmet suggests that it is not a standard navy model, but rather a civilian model that has been pressed into military service.

2 was identical in specification to the Army’s Type 90 helmet and had a thickness of 1mm. The Model 3 was a heavier version of the Type 90 with a thickness of 1.2mm. Both the Model 2 and 3 helmets could be furnished with a net, from which foliage was sometimes attached. Each model, including those that were originally devoid of insignia or displayed an army star, were fitted with a metal insignia on the front featuring a cherry blossom over an anchor.

The metal insignias were eventually replaced by a stencil-applied yellow anchor around 1944 in an effort to reduce production costs. The Model 2 and 3 helmets were the standard for frontline troops, while the Model 1 helmets saw little use outside of rearline and training units. The outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War once again caught the Navy in short supply of hel­ mets. In August of 1937, Vice Minister Yamamoto Isoroku sent an urgent letter to the Army for the requisition 4,000 Type 90 helmets.15 These hel­ mets were issued to many of the troops arriving in Shanghai and continued to see sporadic use later on in other parts of China. Midway through 1938 helmet covers were made available for the Model 2 and 3 helmets. The covers were green and featured a yellow anchor insignia on the front similar to those seen on field caps. Naval Landing Forces used these helmet covers in large numbers in both China and the Pacific, with very few frontline units seen without them until later stages of the war. 65

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

In the 1920’s the standard infantry equipment for enlisted men and petty officers consisted of a can­ teen and an ammunition belt.16 The ammunition belt held a Type 30 bayonet and various pouches depending on the weapon. W hen carrying addi­ tional provisions was necessary, a blanket containing supplies was rolled into a tube and tied over one’s left shoulder. Rain jackets were occasionally carried as well, rolled into a similar tube secured by cord ties, and worn over the right shoulder. By 1930 the blanket roll was replaced with a proper haversack. Enlisted and petty officers slung their haversacks

from the right shoulder and canteens from the left shoulder, securing the straps of both underneath their ammunition belt. Officers wore the same can­ teens and haversacks, but the positions of the two were reversed.17 Fearing chemical attacks, the Navy began to issue gas masks to its Naval Landing Forces sometime between the end of the 1920’s and beginning of the 1930’s. The first gas masks were acquired from the Army and saw use in Shanghai. Later on the Navy developed its own gas mask in 1933 known as the Type 93 gas mask. The Type 93 gas mask had two circular eyepieces and was secured to the wearer’s

Typical light field equipment in 1942—a hav­ ersack, canteen, and rifle pouches. Note the handmade cover on the bayonet sheath.

The rear view of field equipment seen on a sailor in 1938. A No. 2 first aid bag is worn between the haversack and canteen.

FIELD GEAR

66

EQUIPMENT ■ INFANTRY GEAR

head by a number of adjustable bands. A large tube was attached to the gas mask valve connecting to an anti-chemical canister carried on the wearer’s back by an adjustable harness. When not in use, the gas mask was stowed away in a bag worn above the hav­ ersack and supported by a small belt. At least four revisions were made to the design,18the third model introduced the most significant changes, increasing the size of the gas mask bag to allow for the canister and mask to be carried together and thus eliminat­ ing the need for a canister harness. An alternative model featuring an exhale valve that allowed the wearer to speak known as the Type 97 gas mask was developed in 1937. The Type 97 appears to have been primarily intended for use by officers and radio operators, and was worn in a similar configuration to the Type 93. Gas masks were treated as standard issue equipment, but as the actual threat of chemical attacks proved to be quite low, Naval Landing Forces often conducted operations without carrying any.

Medical Petty Officer Third Class Fukaya wears two first aid pouches with a Type 14 pistol in Yokosuka during the February 26th Incident, 1936.

Standardized first aid equipment was issued to indi­ vidual troops during the war with China and Pacific War that followed. Infantrymen carried a small No. 2 first aid bag containing medical supplies such as bandages and decontamination powder. The No. 2 first aid bag was slung from the right shoulder and rested above or on either side of the haversack. Medics were issued a No. 1 first aid bag which was similar in size to the haversack. Other equipment for medics included two leather first aid pouches worn on a belt and a tornister pack for carrying medical equipment.

Type 93 Model 2 gas masks worn by riflemen during a demonstration for the public in Osaka, 1939

*

EQUIPMENT OF THE NAVAL LANDING FORCES

INFANTRY WEAPONS

As Naval Landing Forces accounted for only a small fraction of the Imperial Japanese Navy, very little research and development on infantry weapons was conducted by the Navy itself. Naval Landing Forces largely relied on procuring weapons from the Imperial Japanese Army instead. The Navy also looked outside of Japan to arm its infantry, import­ ing a number of weapons from European countries during the 1920’s and 1930’s.

Above: Sailors practice an anti-aircraft volley with Type 38 rifles. Although questionablely effective at a first glance, a concentrated volley of small arms fire could have devasting effects on low flying reconnaissance planes encountered in China.

Left: A Petty Officer holds a Type 38 rifle with a Type 30 bayonet attached, circa 1941. Note the family sword slung over his shoulder.

RIFLES

After much effort was made to improve upon the Type 30 infantry rifle, the Imperial Japanese Army finished development of a new rifle known as the Type 38 infantry rifle and adopted it in 1905The rifle was a bolt-action design, chambered in a 6.5x50mm semi-rimless cartridge and fed by a five round internal magazine. The bolt featured a removable dust cover, preventing dust or other de­ bris from easily entering the action. Each rifle was issued with a Type 30 bayonet. At the time of its introduction, the Type 38 was one of the best service rifles in the world. The Navy had already developed its own improved version of the Type 30 infantry rifle known as the Type 35 naval rifle and adopted it in 1902, but by 1915 they too would adopt the Type 38 under the designation of Type 38 rifle— effectively replacing it. A shortened carbine model of the Type 38 was also produced and saw limited 69

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

use by the Navy, particularly within airborne units. By the 1930’s it had become evident that the 6.5x50mm cartridge was inadequate, suffering seri­ ous drawbacks at long ranges. The Army had already upgraded their Type 3 machine gun to the Type 92 machine gun in 1932, switching from 6.5mm to a 7.7mm semi-rimless cartridge. The Army decided to do the same with their service rifles but using a rimless cartridge instead. By 1939 the Army for­ mally adopted their new design, the Type 99 short rifle. The Navy omitted “short” from the name and simply referred to it as the Type 99 rifle. The Type 99 was chambered in 7.7x58mm rimless, and like its predecessor fed by a five round internal maga­ zine. As with the Type 38, the Type 99 short rifle featured a dust cover and was issued with a Type 30 bayonet. One of the unique features in the Type 99 design was the inclusion of anti-aircraft sights and a folding wire monopod. These features would later be eliminated from the design to save on production costs during the war. As was usual with the Navy, it was not until a few years after the Army’s adoption of the rifle for it to see widespread use by Naval Landing Forces, with units receiving rifles towards the end of 1942.2 In 1938 the Army made a contract with Italy for a large order of Type I rifles to be used by the Navy.3The Type I utilized an Italian Carcano-action, but was chambered in the Japanese 6.5x50mm car­ tridge and superficially resembled the Type 38 rifle. It employed a number of similar features from the Type 38, including a five round internal magazine and a mount for a Type 30 bayonet. The Type I rifles were primarily used for training, allowing Type 38 rifles to be freed up for frontline use by Naval Landing Forces. Nonetheless, a small number of Type I rifles were fielded by Naval Landing Forces as well, although rarely observed outside of rearline units.4 HANDGUNS

The first pistol to see large scale usage by the Navy was the Large Pattern Type Nambu Pistol. This pis­ tol was chambered in 8x22mm Nambu and fed 70

A medic first class armed with a Type 14 pistol. Pistols were primarily used by officers and supportive personnel such as medics and paymasters.

by an eight-round detachable magazine. The Navy purchased several thousand of these handguns in a number of batches throughout the 1910’s and 1920’s.5 Although replaced in the 1920’s, Naval

EQUIPMENT ■ INFANTRY WEAPONS

Sailors in the South Pacific operate a Type 92 heavy machine gun under the cover of several paim trees, 1943

Landing Forces continued to use them in China as late as 1945.6 In 1925 the Army adopted an improved version of the Type Nambu Pistol under the designation of Type 14 Pistol. Tire cartridge and magazine capacity remained unchanged, while the grip was narrowed and the overall design was optimized for mass pro­ duction. The Navy soon followed the Army and adopted the Type 14 Pistol in August of 1927.' The last type of pistol to be widely used by the Navy was the Type 94 Pistol. It was adopted by the Army in 1934, but did not appear to have been fielded by Naval Landing Forces until the 1940’s. Like the previous two pistols, it was chambered in 8x22mm Nambu. It featured a smaller frame compared to the Type 14 and a shorter six-round magazine.7 Due to its small size it was well-liked by airborne troops.

HEAVY MACHINE GUNS

In the early 1900 s American gunsmith Benjamin B. Hotchkiss had awed the world with his line of machine guns. Japan, like many other countries, sought to begin domestic production of their own Hotchkiss design for use by their military. By 1914 the Japanese Army had completed their domestic design known as the Type 3 machine gun, followed with its adoption by the Navy two years later. The Type 3 was chambered in 6.5x50mm semi-rimmed and fed via an ammunition strip from the left side. It was commonly mounted on a large adjustable tri­ pod, allowing for very precise and controlled firing. These machine guns would serve as the cornerstone of Naval Landing Force machine gun platoons. During the First World War the Japanese took a liking to the British-manufactured Lewis gun used by many of their Allies. The Lewis gun was 71

EQUIPMENT ■ INFANTRY WEAPONS

Above: Several m otorcycles fitted with Type 11 LMGs form a kijushatai—machine gun car unit in Shanghai, 1930.

Left: A sailor first class serving as a Type 11 gunner in the Shanghai SNLF, May 1937. He w ears two canvas ammunition pouches and two more bulk ammunition bags slung over his shoulders.

chambered in .303 British (otherwise known as 7.7x56mm rimmed by the Japanese) and fed by a distinctive pan magazine. In 1921 the Navy adopted it under the designation o f Type Ru machine gun. The Type Ru’s superior firepower compared with the Type 3 machine gun made it the recipient of much praise. By 1932 the Navy developed its own domestically produced clone known as the Type 92 7.7mm machine gun.8 Both the British and domes­ tic models saw much use by Naval Landing Forces, being highly preferred over the weaker Type 3. In the meantime the Army had become aware of the Type 3’s shortcomings in terms of firepower. After several improvements— namely rechambering

the gun to a stronger 7.7x58mm semi-rimmed car­ tridge, an upgraded model known as the Type 92 heavy machine gun was adopted in 1933.9The Type 92 heavy machine gun also featured improved grips that could be folded downwards into a more com­ fortable firing position and a mount for periscopic or telescopic sights. Early on the Type 92 Heavy Machine Gun was not subject to much use by Naval Landing Forces, seeing only sporadic usage in the late 1930’s. However, during the Pacific War they grew to be increasingly common within units. LIGHT MACHINE GUNS

Light machine guns began to be fielded regularly by Naval Landing Forces with the adoption of the Type 11 light machine gun in August of 1927.' The Type 11 had been introduced by the Army in 1922 and was quite unique in its design. It was not fed by a belt nor a magazine— but rather a side-mount­ ed hopper that held a maximum of six five-round stripper clips of 6.5x50mm cartridges. The Type 11 featured a folding bipod and a detachable leather grip on the barrel for carrying the weapon. The in­ troduction of the Type 11 revolutionized the tactical 73

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

Right: 22nd Special Base Force personnel conducting training in the hills above Balikpapan, circa 1944. Under the direction of their heavily cam ouflaged petty officer, two enlisted men operate a Type 9 9 LMG while sup­ ported by a sailor with a Type 99 rifle in the rear. (Australian War Memorial 03083/02)

organization of Naval Landing Forces, providing indispensable firepower to rifle platoons. However, the Army was not totally satisfied with the Type 11 s design— the lack of reliability stem­ ming from the hopper’s inherent flaws appearing to be the biggest grievance. Drawing inspiration from the Czechoslovak Vz. 26 light machine gun, the Army worked on a new 6.5x50mm light machine gun fed by a 30-round top-fed magazine. The result was the more conventional Type 96 light machine gun, introduced in 1936. The gun featured an adjustable carrying handle, folding bipod, threaded muzzle for a flash suppressor, and a mount for a Type 30 bayonet. An improved model chambered in 7.7x58mm rimless known as the Type 99 light machine gun was later adopted in 1939.10 Both models would not see significant use by Naval Landing Forces until the 1940’s, with the Type 11 continuing to see much use, particularly in China. SUBMACHINE GUNS

In March of 1929 a shipment from Sasebo Naval Depot containing 100 SIG Model 1920 machine 74

pistols and 150,000 rounds of machine pistol am­ munition was transferred to the 1st Expeditionary Fleet." The SIG M l920 was a Swiss-made subma­ chine gun based off of the revolutionary Bergman MP18 design. The export models purchased by the Japanese Navy were chambered in 7.63x25mm Mauser and fed by a 50-round magazine. The Navy referred to these submachine guns as the Type Berg­ man machine pistol, usually shortening the name to “Type Be machine pistol.” By July the shipment had been delivered to the Shanghai Naval Landing Force, where they would be distributed across the unit.12 In the mid-1930’s the machine pistols were retrofitted with detachable lugs for Type 30 bayo­ nets. Other Naval Landing Forces in China and the Pacific would employ Type Be machine pistols as well— particularly for use by platoon runners and within command platoons.13 Sometime between 1938 and 1939 the Navy purchased a shipment of Austrian-made SteyrSolothurn S1-100 machine pistols and gave them the designation o f Type Su machine pistol (Su is believed to derived from the Japanese

Men of the Sasebo 8th SNLF on Hainan Island, March, 1942. The sailors in the center of both the bottom and middle rows are armed with Type Su machine pistols. The grenadier in the bottom left corner has a Type 89 heavy grenade discharger and a custom-made vest for carrying his grenades.

pronunciation ofSchmeisser). The Type Su machine pistol was also based off of the M P18 and cham­ bered in 7.63x25mm, but smaller in size and fed by a 30-round magazine.14The Type Su machine pistols were issued with a Sam Browne belt which carried an ammunition bag and bayonet frog. Unlike the Type Be which was modified to accept Type 30 bay­ onets, the Type Su came from the factory with lugs for a side-mounted bayonet specifically designed for it. These machine pistols were used extensively on Hainan Island and in Northern China. Although the Army typically held the lead in infantry weapons over the Navy, it would not be until 1940 when the Army adopted their own

submachine gun known as the Type 100. The Type 100 submachine gun was chambered in 8x22mm Nambu and fed by 30-round curved magazines. It featured a m ount for the Type 30 bayonet, although many appear to have been issued with a shortened variation known as the Prototype Type 1 short bayonet. The Navy utilized two variations of the Type 100, the standard model and a special model which featured a folding stock for airborne troops.15 Field use of the Type 100 submachine gun by Naval Landing Forces began around late 1943 with the former airborne Yokosuka 1st SNLF acquiring a small amount. A number of other Naval Landing Force units made sporadic use of Type 100

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

Left: A sailor prepares to throw a practice grenade during a gre­ nade throwing competition, 1931. Note the sailor’s use of a grenade bandolier.

Right: Officers in Japan during a ground combat training exercise, circa 1945. Th e officers w ear a mixture of 1937 pattern swords, older sabers, and civilian blades.

submachine guns in the later days of the war— but few if not none appear to have ever seen combat with them. GRENADE DISCH ARGERS

In 1921 the Army introduced the Type 10 grenade discharger— essentially a light mortar that allowed for hand grenades to be fired over short ranges. The Type 10 grenade discharger was capable of firing 50mm Type 10 and Type 91 grenades for offensive use, as well as a variety of non-lethal projectiles in­ cluding signal, illumination, and smoke grenades. Eight years later a superior model known as the Type 89 heavy grenade discharger was developed. Like the Type 10 it was capable of firing a number of lethal and non-lethal 50mm grenades. W hat set the Type 89 apart from the Type 10, was that it was not only capable of firing hand grenades, but also Type 89 shells possessing superior range and lethality.16 The Navy began to make use of the Type 10 and Type 89 grenade dischargers in the mid-1930’s. As the Type 10 was already somewhat dated upon its introduction to the Navy, it was fielded by Naval Landing Forces in much smaller numbers compared to the Type 89. Little effort appears to have been made in standardizing the use of these weapons, as grenadiers are observed carrying grenade dischargers with a number of varying equipment configurations. 76

HAND GREN ADES

The Type 10 grenade made its debut alongside the Type 10 grenade discharger in 1921. This grenade was primarily intended for use with grenade dis­ chargers, but could be thrown as a conventional fragmentation grenade as well. A propellant base was fitted to a threaded socket on the bottom of the grenade for launching it from a grenade discharger. As it was typically meant to be launched rather than thrown, the grenade had a rather long 7.5 second delay before detonation. Ten years after its adoption, a virtually identical model with slight improvements known as the Type 91 grenade took its place.1 In 1937 the Type 97 grenade was introduced. This grenade largely took after the Type 91, but was only meant to be thrown by hand—eliminating the unnecessary socket and propellant base from its design. The delay before detonation was also reduced to a more appropriate 4 to 5 seconds. As the war with China continued to drain Japan of its resources, the Army sought to reduce produc­ tion costs with the development of an improved and more cost-effective grenade. This grenade was adopted in 194018 as the Type 99 and featured a smooth body unlike the segmented pattern seen on its predecessors, with further reductions made to its overall weight as well.

EQUIPMENT ■ INFANTRY WEAPONS

FLAMETHROW ERS

The Japanese Army designed two flamethrowers— the Type 93 developed in 1933 and an almost iden­ tical model with minor improvements known as the Type 100 in 1940. Like most militaries at the time, the Japanese intended to use them for attacks on fortified enemy positions. Both the Type 93 and Type 100 Flamethrowers saw considerable use by Naval Landing Forces during the mid to later stages of the Pacific War. Very few appear to have been used for their intended purpose and were instead used primarily in a defensive manner.13 SWORDS

Officers in the Imperial Japanese Navy were required to carry swords for ceremonial use and while serving in Naval Landing Forces or other ground units. The first swords to see use in the Navy were sabres introduced in the Meiji Era. These blades priori­ tized aesthetics over functionality, with little thought given to their viability in combat. As early as 1932, some naval officers had already begun to make use of traditional Japanese blades— temporarily using privately-purchased or heirloom swords in place of their sabres during the January 28th Incident.

In 1934 the Army adopted their first tachi-styled sword known as the Type 94 military sword. Shortly after the Type 94’s adoption, a number of officers serving in the Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force took an interest in the Army’s new blade and began to purchase them as well. In August of 1937 the outbreak of hostilities in Shanghai once again caught many officers still armed with sabres off guard. As the battle in the city waged on, it became unde­ niably clear that the sabre design was unsuitable for combat. On October 23rd, 1937, while still in the midst of fighting, the Navy urgently issued a new set of specifications for their own tachi-style sword design.19 This new sword was designed spe­ cifically with ground combat in mind and intended to replace the sabre, although never succeeded in entirely doing so. While not required to carry swords, enlisted men and petty officers occasionally brought their own personal swords to the battlefield with them. These swords were often family heirlooms and generally did not conform to naval regulations. Some of these blades were remounted into military style mounts to allow for easier carrying.

77

EQUIPMENT OF THE NAVAL LANDING FORCES

ARMORED VEHICLES

TYPE Bl ARM ORED CAR

In February of 1928, the Shanghai Naval Land­ ing Force received four Vickers Crossley Model 25 armored cars,1 followed later in the year with the arrival of five more and the creation of a 38-man armored car unit within the brigade.2 The Vickers

Above: The nine Type Bi Armored C ars of the Shanghai SNLF on parade, September 1938. Note that the radiator grilles have been opened to aid in cooling of the engines.

Left: An engineer second class, stands display­ ing his sword in front of a Type 93 armored car parked in the Shanghai S N LF’s vehicle garage, circa 1938. The vehicle is painted with the desig­ nation “Patriot-2”, and “ No. Fujikura” in reference to the organization which raised funds to purchase the vehicle.

Crossley armored cars were built on a four-wheeled chassis, featuring a rotating turret with four mounts for to accommodate its two Vickers 7.7mm machine guns. Initially the Navy simply referred to these vehicles as “armored cars”, but as the Navy came to utilize additional types of armored cars the name Type Bi (derived from the Japanese pronunciation of Vickers) armored car was given to them as a means of differentiation. The Shanghai Naval Landing Force trained exten­ sively with the Type Bi armored cars and employed them with m uch success in the January 28th Incident. After the incident two of the armored cars were sent to Japan for training use at the Yokosuka Naval Gunnery School. The Type Bi armored cars would see further action in the Battle of Shanghai, as well as in various coastside offensives and cleanup operations in China that followed. By the end of the war all but one of the cars had transferred outside of Shanghai.3 79

Students of the'Yokosuka ftaval Gunnery School train.with the No. 9 Type Bi armorecLcar, May 1935. This armored car retains its,large.:white identification band and humeral on the turret, which had been applied to the vehicle during the January 28th Incident. " • '

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

Crewmen stand beside their Type Sumida armored car in China, 1938.

TYPE SUMIDA ARMORED CAR

The first Japanese-made armored car to see use by Naval Landing Forces was the Type Sumida armored car. It was built on a six-wheeled imported chassis, featuring mounts for Type 11 or Type 91 6.5mm machine guns on each side, and a large turret with an observation window as well as another machine gun mount. The sides and rear door of the vehicle featured several sliding windows that could accom­ modate additional light machine guns. The first Type Sumida armored car was purchased with dona­ tions from Japanese citizens and transferred to the Shanghai Special Naval Landing Force in July of 1932.4 About three vehicles were produced, seeing service in both Shanghai and Tsingtao. TYPE 93 ARMORED CAR

In 1933 yet another Japanese-made armored car known as the Type 93 was introduced.5 Like the Type Sumida, the Type 93 armored car had a six­ wheeled chassis and was donated to the Navy on 82

behalf of charitable civilians. The Type 93’s main armament was a turret featuring an integral mount for a Vickers 7.7mm machine gun and external mount for an optional Type 91 6.5mm machine gun. T ie vehicle itself had a total of four mounts for 6.5mm machine guns, with one on each respective side. At least three Type 93 armored cars were pro­ duced— seeing action during the Batde of Shanghai and guarding the city afterwards.3 TYPE 94 LIGHT ARM ORED CAR

The first tracked armored car to be employed by the Navy was the Type 94. The development and design of this vehicle was conducted by the Army after studying the Carden Loyd MK.VIb tankette’s design, with its official adoption taking place in 1934. The Type 94’s only armament was a single Type 91 6.5mm machine gun.6Although a tankette by western standards, the Japanese did not intend for the Type 94 to serve as an offensive vehicle, but rather as a multi-purpose reconnaissance vehicle

EQUIPMENT ■ ARMORED VEHICLES

and thus designated it as a light armored car. The Navy purchased their first Type 94 light armored car from the Army in 1937 shortly after the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War,7 with the purchase of several more fol­ lowing over the next years.8 These armored cars would see usage by Naval Landing Forces in both China and the Pacific. TYPE 97 LIGHT ARMORED CAR

A Type 93 armored car in its original early configuration featuring a complete armament, circa 1933.

The Type 94 light armored car was a step in the right direc­ tion, but not long after its adoption the weak armament and engine had proven to be unsatisfactory. Using the Type 94s suspension as a basis, The Army began development of a new improved model known as the Type 97 light armored car. The hull and turret were completely overhauled in design and a stronger engine was installed. The Type 97 was produced in two armament configurations, one featur­ ing a 37m m gun and the other with a Type 97 7.7mm machine gun.6 Usage of these vehicles by Naval Landing Forces does not appear to have begun until the Pacific War, with a very limited number actually being fielded.

A Type 94 light armored car, most likely belonging to the 22nd Special Base Force, in Balikpapan, Dutch East Indies, July 1945. (Australian War Memorial 111262) 83

EQUIPMENT OF THE NAVAL LANDING FORCES

TANKS

TYPE 89 TANK

In the 1920’s the Imperial Japanese Army began research for the development of a domestically-made light tank. By early 1929 a gasoline-driven prototype weighing roughly 10 tons with a 57mm gun was completed.1After some improvements were made to the initial design, it was adopted later in the year as the Type 89 light tank, with production beginning two years later.2The Type 89 weighed just under 10

Above: A Type 89A light tank, followed by two more Type 89A medium tanks, and four Type Ka light tanks on parade in Shanghai, early 1937.

Left: Sailors at the Yokosuka Naval Gunnery School participate in a training exercise with a Type Ka light tank, 1935. This particular Type Ka features a reinforced gun mount and a Type 38 rifle tempo­ rarily mounted in place of the machine gun.

tons, featuring a Type 90 57mm gun complemented by a coaxial Type 91 6.5 mm machine gun, and an additional Type 91 machine gun on the front hull.3 By the early 1930’s the Imperial Japanese Navy had taken an interest in the Army’s new Type 89 tank and obtained an example to study and train with at the Yokosuka Naval Gunnery School. In May o f 1933, the school transferred its Type 89 light tank to the Shanghai SNLF, thus creating the first armored SNLF unit.4 In the meantime, the Army had been working on several improvements to the Type 89 light tank’s design. The rounded turret was changed to an asym­ metrical design with the front area for the gun being flattened. The positions of the front hull machine gun and the vision hatch had also been reversed, and the tall fez-shaped commander’s hatch was replaced by a wider low-profile hatch. With these changes came an increase to the overall weight, resulting in the improved model being reclassified as a medium 85

RIKUSENTAI ■ THE ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA

tank. Later on a transition to a diesel engine would culminate in the adoption of a new model known as the Type 89 B, while the previous gasoline models were referred to as the Type 89A. However, the Navy does not appear to have fielded any Type 89B tanks. The first unit to make use of the Type 89A medium tank was once again the Shanghai SNLF— obtain­ ing several in 1937 prior to the Battle of Shanghai. After their victory in Shanghai, the Shanghai SNLF dispatched at least two of their Type 89A medium tanks north to aid in the combined effort to capture Tsingtao. Neither the Type 89A light nor medium tanks would see use by Naval Landing Forces in the Pacific theater, but a number remained in use by units garrisoned along the coast of China until the war’s end. TYPE KA LIGHT TANK

Around the time of the Type 89A tank’s adoption by the Navy, approximately five British-made CardenLoyd Mark VIb tankettes were obtained as well. Although produced and marketed as a tankette by Vickers-Armstrongs, the Japanese Navy referred to them as Ka-shiki kei-sensha, Type Ka light tanks.4 The armament of these so-called tanks consisted of a single Vickers 7.7mm machine gun mounted on the front opposite to the driver’s position. The Navy retrofitted at least one model with rein­ forcements made to the gun m ount. The Type Ka light tanks saw action in the Battle of Shanghai and later during the occupation o f Hainan Island until the end of the war.

Right: O ne of the fourteen Type 95 light tanks used by the 3rd Special Base Force and S aseb o 7th SN LF on Tarawa sits abandoned after the battle, Novem ber 1943. (NARA 127-GW-1207-64077)

TYPE 95 LIGHT TANK

The Type 89 with its heavy weight and sluggish speed did not prove to be a satisfactory light tank. As the Army redesigned it to be a medium tank, a second attempt to develop a light tank began. The result was the Type 95 light tank, a design that sacrificed armor and firepower for greatly improved speed and mobility. While the Type 89B could only achieve a mere 25km/hr as its maximum speed, the Type 95 was capable of reaching 40km/hr. The Type 95’s armament consisted of a Type 94 37mm gun and two additional Type 97 7.7mm machine guns mounted in a similar configuration to the Type 89.3 Although adopted in 1935 by the Army, the Navy would not employ the Type 95 light tank in combat until midway through 1942— with its debut made by two of the tanks under the Kure 5 th SNLF during their failed assault on Milne Bay.6 The Type 95 would serve as one of the most commonly employed tanks by the Naval Landing Forces in the Pacific, albeit utilized in an almost entirely defen­ sive capacity. In the end these tanks proved to have a rather poor combat record against their Allied adversaries, standing little to no chance at odds with tanks such as the M4 Sherman.

EQUIPMENT ■ TANKS

A Special Type 2 launch craft captured on Kwajalein Atoll is shown with the stern and bow flotation pontoons removed.8 (Australian War Memorial 069438)

SPECIA L TY PE 2 LAUNCH C RA FT

W ith the Navy’s entrance into the Pacific War, there was a growing need for a means of conduct­ ing opposed amphibious landings. The answer to this need was found in the development of sev­ eral amphibious vehicles— the only of which to see combat was the Special Type 2 launch craft. The Special Type 2 used the Type 95 light tank as a basis for its design, with major modifications made to the hull to allow for buoyancy. The tank relied on two compartmented steel pontoons attached to the bow and stern to stay afloat, which could be quickly detached once ashore. Like the Type 95, its main armament was a Type 94 37mm gun, and two Type 97 machine guns, one coaxial to the main gun and the other mounted on the front of the hull. Later production models were fitted with the improved

Type 1 37mm gun. The Special Type 2 launch craft’s adoption in 1942 came too late for it to satisfy its intended offen­ sive purpose and was instead restricted to a defensive role. The Type 2 wTas first encountered in early 1944 on Kwajalein Atoll and several more shortly after during the Battle of Saipan.8 The only known amphibious assault carried out by these tanks took place in December of 1944 when a Naval Landing Force armed with five Special Type 2s under the command of Lieutenant-commander Ito Tokuo was dispatched to Ormoc Bay. The force had planned to reinforce other Japanese units defending Leyte, but by the time of their arrival American troops had already captured Ormoc and the Ito Naval Landing Force and all of its tanks were destroyed within a few days of fighting.9,10 87

SPECIAL NAVAL LANDING FORCES SPECIALLY DESIGNATED UNITS IN CHINA12

88

Unit

History

Formed

Disbanded

Yokosuka 1st

Battle of Shanghai, Occupation of Tsingtao, Weihaiwei, and Chefoo Incorporated into Tsingtao Area Special Base Force

1937/07/12

1939/11/15

Yokosuka 2nd

Capture of Amoy Incorporated into Amoy Area Special Base Force

1938/04/20

u

Yokosuka 3rd

Capture of Canton Reorganized as 3rd Defense Unit

1938/09/15

1938/12/15

Yokosuka 4th

Capture and cleanup operations on Hainan Island

1939/01/20

Postwar

Kure 1st

Battle of Shanghai, Capture of Tsingtao

1937/07/12

1938/03/26

Kure 2nd

Battle of Shanghai Incorporated into Shanghai SNLF

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