Richard of Saint-Victor, On the Trinity: Prologue and Six Books (Brepols Library of Christian Sources, 4) (English and Latin Edition) [Bilingual ed.] 9782503594125, 2503594123

Table of contents :
Front Matter
Introduction
Text and Translation
Back Matter

Citation preview

Brepols Library of Christian Sources Patristic and Medieval Texts with English Translations The cry ‘ad fontes!’ has been a constant among theologians of every variety since the mid-twentieth century. This is no simple process. Each generation needs to engage with the ancient and medieval sources afresh in a great act of cultural, intellectual, and linguistic translation. More than reproducing an historical artefact or transferring it into a new linguistic code, it requires engaging in a dialogue with the text. One dialogical pole is to acknowledge the inherited text’s distance from us by reading it in its original language, the other is to explore what it says within our world and language. Here the facing-pages of text and translation express this. These editions respect the original context by providing the best currently available Greek or Latin text, while the task of stating what it says today is found alongside it the translation and in the notes and commentaries. The process testifies to the living nature of these texts within traditions. Each volume represents our generation’s attempt to restate the source in our language, cognisant that English is now the most widely used language among theologians either as their first language or their adopted language for scholarly communication.

Brepols Library of Christian Sources Patristic and Medieval Texts with English Translations

4 EDITORIAL BOARD Professor Thomas O’Loughlin, Director Dr Andreas Andreopoulos Professor Lewis Ayres Dr Lavinia Cerioni Professor Hugh Houghton Professor Doug Lee Professor Joseph Lössl Dr Elena Narinskaya Dr Sara Parks

Richard of Saint-Victor On the Trinity Prologue and Six Books

Translated, with an Introduction, by AAGE RYDSTRØM-POULSEN Latin Text Critically Edited by JEAN RIBAILLIER

F

Cover image: Ebstorfer Mappa mundi © Kloster Ebstorf. Used with permission. For the Latin text edited by Jean Ribaillier: © Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1958 (http://www.vrin.fr). © 2021, Brepols Publishers n. v., Turnhout, Belgium. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. D/2021/0095/166 ISBN 978-2-503-59412-5 eISBN 978-2-503-59413-2 DOI 10.1484/M.BLCS-EB.5.123003 Printed in the EU on acid-free paper.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements7 Abbreviations9 Introduction11 1. Richard of Saint-Victor’s De Trinitate and the Twelfth Century 11 a. The Augustinian Tradition 14 b. Human Love 16 c. Richard’s Influence 17 2. Richard and Saint-Victor 18 a. The Abbey 20 b. Monastery and School 21 c. Internationalism 24 d. The Death of Richard 26 3. The Theological Method 27 a. Faith and Reason 27 b. Reason and Experience 28 c. The Augustinian-Anselmian Tradition 29 d. The Necessary Reasons 31 e. Reason and Mysticism 33 4. Love and Trinity 38 a. Love and the Highest Love 38 b. Caritas ordinata and amor discretus 40 c. Condilectio 41 d. Unity and Plurality in Love 42 e. Anthropomorphism? 45 Text and Translation: Richard of Saint-Victor De Trinitate / On the Trinity49 Prologus / The Prologue 50 Capitula libri primi / The Headings of the First Book 56 Liber primus / Book One 58 Capitula libri secundi / The Headings of the Second Book 84 Liber secundus / Book Two 86 Capitula libri tertii / The Headings of Book Three 116 Liber tertius / Book Three 120 Capitula libri quarti / The Headings of Book Four 154 Liber quartus / Book Four 158

Capitula libri quinti / The Headings of Book Five Liber quintus / Book Five Capitula libri sexti / The Headings of the Sixth Part Liber sextus / Book Six

198 202 246 248

Bibliography299 Index of Names 303

Acknowledgements

For the first time an English translation is here presented along with the critical edition of Richard of Saint-Victor’s De Trinitate, published by Jean Ribaillier (1958, Vrin, Paris). I am thankful to Vrin for letting us publish this excellent edition of the text. As a matter of course, I wish to thank all the scholars who have studied and written about Richard of Saint-Victor, his treatise on the Trinity, the Victorines, and the history of theology of the twelfth century. They represent an impressive international scholarship, old and new, including American, Danish, English, French, German, Italian, and now also Japanese scholarship. I have highly benefitted from almost all of them, especially in the introduction.

Abbreviations

AHDLM Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge BGPMA Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters BiblThom Bibliotèque thomiste CCCM Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Medievalis CCSL Corpus Christianorum Series Latina CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum DR Downside Revue DS Denzinger-Schönmetzer, Enchiridion symbolorum HS Historische Studien HT Historisk Tidsskrift EPM Études de Philosophie médiévale ETL Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses FS Franziskanische Studien FTS Frankfurter theologische Studien HeyJ Heythrop Journal Greg Gregorianum ML.H Museum Lessianum, séction historique MM Miscellanea Mediaevalia MRANL Memorie della Reale Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Classe de scienze morali, storiche e filologiche NRT Nouvelle revue théologique PFLUS Publications de la faculté des lettres de l’Université de Strasbourg PIEMO Publications de l’Institut d’études médiévales d’Ottawa PL Patrologia Latina RAM Revue d’ascétique et de mystique RC.SS Records of civilization, sources and studies RMAL Revue du moyen-âge latin RSR Revue des sciences religieuses RSPT Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques RTAM Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale RTPM Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales SC Sources chrétiennes Schol Scholastik SMRL Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin Theol Théologie Thought Thought, A Review of Culture and Ideas TPMA Textes philosophique du moyen âge TQ Theologische Quartalschrift

Introduction

1. Richard of Saint-Victor’s De Trinitate and the Twelfth Century In the twelfth century the Western European intellectual and artistic culture was permeated with a fascination of the phenomenon of human love. Theologians of the time went even so far as to seeing in the human love a revelation of the divine being. They referred to biblical texts,1 but they were in fact building on a long tradition among the early Western theologians. First, the North-African bishop Augustine,2 but also the monk John Cassian of Marseilles,3 also from the fifth century. Likewise, the monk Candidus of Fulda4 and the abbot Pascasius Radbertus5 of Corbie, both from the ninth century. In the twelfth century the teaching spread remarkably among theologians as Hugh of Saint-Victor,6 William of Saint-Thierry,7 Aelred of Rievaulx,8 Gilbert of Poitiers,9 and not least Peter Lombard who, in the middle of the twelfth century, wrote the dogmatic textbook that became valid for centuries, and here he taught that the Holy Spirit is identical with the human love of God and neighbor.10 In other words, according to this Western tradition,

1 Especially 1 Jn 4:16 and Rom 5:5. The following Introduction builds to a large extent on my introduction to and Danish translation of Richard’s De Trinitate, Rydstrøm-Poulsen (1986). 2 ‘If among God’s gifts there is nothing greater than love, and if there is no greater gift of God than the Holy Spirit, what is more logical than that it is the love which is said to be both God and from God?’, Augustine, De Trinitate 15,19,37. 3 ‘God is spread in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who lives in us’, John Cassian, Conlationes 24, conlatio 16,13. 4 ‘The Holy Spirit is called love (amor) because both [i.e. the Father and the Son] love each other. Therefore, love (amor), that is charity (caritas), which God has towards us and we have towards God, is called the Spirit himself in our scriptures’, cf. Rydstrøm-Poulsen (2002), 383. 5 ‘Anyone who loves is from God because the Holy Spirit, who is love, is God … So, anyone who has love, has the Holy Spirit in him, because the Holy Spirit is love’, Pascasius Radbertus, Liber de charitate (1460b–c). 6 ‘It is so much to have love because God is love. Only love has this privilege that it is called God and it is God …’, Hugh of Saint-Victor, De laude caritatis (975b). 7 Love is ‘… the substance of the giver [God] and the quality in the gift … but the gift is expressly also God, because this virtue of love above all virtues is coherent and assimilated to God’, William of Saint-Thierry, De natura et dignitate amoris 12. 8 ‘God is friendship … those who abide in friendship abide in God, and God in them’, Aelred of Rievaulx, De spirituali amicitia 1,70. 9 ‘Just as the carnal body is nothing but flesh, so the gift of the Holy Spirit is nothing but the Holy Spirit’, Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentarius in Epistolas S. Pauli, British Museum cod. add. 11.853 (fol. 81r). 10 ‘The Holy Spirit is identical with the love by which we love God and our neighbor’ and this love ‘which is thus in us, makes us love God and neighbor’; consequently, ‘he who loves this love by which we love our neighbor, he loves thereby God because God is love himself (1 Jn 4:8.16), that is the Holy

12

in tro ducti o n

God is to be found and understood in and by the human love. As it could be expected, there were also theologians who reacted against this teaching of the otherwise so influential Lombard, but a greater number of theologians followed him.11 Richard of Saint-Victor’s De Trinitate, written about the same time, or maybe a little after the Lombard’s Four Books of Sentences, belongs clearly to the same flourishing Augustinian Western tradition in which God is to be found and understood in and by the phenomenon of love. This understanding is also the result of the most recent investigation of Richard of Saint-Victor’s thought, Hideki Nakamura’s ‘amor invisibilium’ from 2011.12 Basically, that humans know about God is a divine gift in the ‘raptus mentis’, the author shows.13 Thus, knowing God is a contemplative affair, as the monastic tradition will say. But the rational understanding and the confirmation of this knowledge is a human affair, Richard thinks, again according to the mentioned investigation; it is a task for the human reason. And the reason proves not only that God is one, the highest good, and the highest unity, but also that God must be the highest caritas, and then finally the highest trinity.14 Thus, the theory of Richard is that God is to be found and explained in the understanding of love, since God is love. And for us humans, what love is can only be found in the human phenomenon of love. This remarkable common understanding in the monasteries and now among a majority of the early scholastic teachers, such as among the Victorines and thus close at the beginning of the universities, shows a fundamental and far-reaching feature in the history of the Western European theological anthropology. According to this understanding, the most important above all in the human world and the highest thinkable in the entire universe is the phenomenon of love which can only be understood in terms of human love. It is fascinating to consider this pivotal factor of human love in the early development of the Western understanding of the human existence and the worldview in general. In this perspective, Richard’s De Trinitate is a blossoming result of a long tradition in the Western intellectual history from the late Roman Empire of the fifth century to the Western European world of the twelfth century. According to this tradition, the highest in the universe and the world is caritas, and the meaning, goal and ambition of the human existence is caritas. God is love. And: Love is God. This could be the heading of Richard of Saint-Victor’s De Trinitate. Richard’s starting point for his argumentation in the axiom that God is

11 12 13

14

Spirit’, Dist. 1,17,1,2. On Peter Lombard’s theology of love and the Holy Spirit, see Rydstrøm-Poulsen (2002), 380–91, Rosemann (2004a), 71–92, and Rosemann (2004b), 409–36. In the period until the beginning of the thirteenth century I have counted 13 scholastic teachers as followers, and seven as critics, see Rydstrøm-Poulsen (2002), 392–466. Nakamura (2011), 487. Nakamura (2011), 216 about the ‘excessus mentis’ and the knowledge of God: ‘Dei est hoc donum, non hominis meritum’ (note 6, quoted from Richard’s Benjamin minor 73). Nevertheless, the Jesuit Nakamura, maybe less convincingly, is looking for a human ‘Mitwirkungsmöglichkeit’ (possible cooperation) in relation the to divine giver (283) and for the necessary human endeavors of ‘Tugendbildung’ (edification of virtues) as conditional for the process (317). Nakamura (2011), 331–88 with an analysis of De Trinitate book 1–3.

i nt ro d u ct i o n

to be defined as the highest of everything. From this definition it follows that God is the highest unity, that God is almighty, has eternal being from himself, and is the highest good. But what is the highest good? It must be the highest and the best of all that can be experienced and thought to be found, since all that has been, is, and will be has emanated from God the creator. If we ask more precisely about what the highest and the best is that can be experienced and thought, Richard’s answer is love. So, God must be love. This reasoning implies the thought that what humans understand to be love also is God. It is clearly Richard’s understanding that the insight in the human love necessarily gives us knowledge about God. So, if we want to understand God, we can explore love. However, it cannot be any kind of love that we can know from experience or can think of. According to the above it must be the highest kind of love that we know. And the highest kind of love is to Richard that in which the relationship between the loving persons does not abolish the individuality but consists of a mutual and equal giving and receiving in which the persons respect each other as equal. When we experience this love, Richard reasons, we understand the divine nature, since this kind of love, thought in its highest form, must be found in God, indeed must be God, because God is the highest good. Therefore, the divine substance must consist of a plurality of persons who have this relationship to one another. Richard of Saint-Victor was an Augustinian canon in the Parisian abbey Saint-Victor. He worked in the middle of the twelfth century when the abbey had its prime time as one of the leading centers of study and teaching in Paris and Europe at that time. Richard was Scotch by birth, and as a young man he was taken in among the Victorines in Paris. His master was Hugh of Saint-Victor, called the new Augustine, and Richard became the heir to Hugh’s leading position in the School of Saint-Victor. Richard took care of the position as sub-prior from 1159 and was elected prior in 1162, a position he held until his death March 10, 1173. We do not know much more than this about the life of Richard.15 Richard did not, as Peter Abélard, leave a biography, or, as Suger of Saint-Denis, a description of some of his activities. Neither in Richard’s extensive production, nor in other sources, special attention is paid to his person. It was not the person but the matter that was in focus. But his thoughts were widely known and appreciated in the twelfth century and the following two centuries. His comprehensive production was referred to and quoted by a row of scholars in the High Middle Ages. As far as we know, Richard’s writings were copied and distributed widely. Even if manuscripts containing Richard’s works have been lost, all Richard’s works have probably been preserved intact until today.16 Richard’s outstanding position in the medieval intellectual world is maybe best of all witnessed by Dante. In Paradiso, the tenth song, he placed Richard close to the uncreated light in the Sun-heaven in the company of the two who were regarded the most learned in Europe in the seventh and the eighth century, the archbishop of

15 See below about Richard’s biography in relation to the history of Saint-Victor, 17–23. 16 See Goy (2005).

13

14

in tro ducti o n

Sevilla, Isidore, and Bede the Venerable. About Richard Dante wrote: ‘he saw more than any man was given’.17 It is undoubtedly a remarkable praise. De Trinitate is Richard’s main work, a large-scale work in six books with 25 chapters in each, often entitled Libri sex de Trinitate. Already in Richard’s own century, the work got a great diffusion which is witnessed by the large number of manuscripts that were spread widely in Europe and still are preserved in the libraries.18 De Trinitate was already praised by the Victorine Thomas Gallus (c. 1170–1226).19 A similar witness of the work’s reputation is given by the Dominican Wincent of Beauvais (c. 1190–1264).20 Richard’s work on the Trinity is still being studied as one of the most fascinating works of Medieval theology.21 Regarding its place in the professional division of theology, De Trinitate has its background in the mystical theology.22 Several places in the work one can trace a certain vision of the inner life of the deity. But this does not mean that the work belongs to Richard’s contemplative writings. De Trinitate is undoubtedly Richard’s most important contribution to the dogmatic theology.23 a. The Augustinian Tradition

The theological world of the twelfth century was basically Augustinian. It is even justified to talk about an Augustinian renaissance in the leading theology of the twelfth century. However, regarding the trinitarian theology, the image of the divine inner life, the traditional Augustinianism had a rather static image, underlining the unity and immutability of the divine nature. Augustine saw the image of God in the individual human soul. The human soul consisted in one and the same spiritual being, but its abilities and properties could be divided into trilogies.24 This way of thinking about an imago Dei in the individual human soul is usually called the psychological

17 Dante, Paradiso 10:130–32: ‘Vedi oltre fiammeggiar l’ardente spiro / d’Isidoro, de Beda e di Riccardo, / che a considerar fu più che viro’. 18 See Goy (2005). 19 ‘Precipua mihi videtur esse doctrina prioris Richardi de Sancto Victore Parisiensis in volumine quod dicitur Justus Meus’ (the opening words of the work), quoted by Ghellinck (1946), 59. 20 ‘Circa idem tempus floruit magister Richardus …, qui in libris et tractatibus variis multa ecclesiae sanctae utilia descripsit. Inter quos eminent de sancta Trinitate libri septem [sic]: in quibus iudicio meocunctos qui ante ipsum de hac materia tractatibus multiplices ediderunt probabili rationum inductione simul et dulcedine quaedam ac venustate sermonis excellit’, Wincent of Beauvais, Speculum Historiale 27,58. When the De Trinitate here is said to contain seven books instead of six, the reason is probably that Wincent included Richard’s small writing De tribus appropriatis personis in Trinitate, ed. Ribaillier (1967), 182–87. 21 See Salet (1959), 12 s. The most recent contributions are Schniertshauer (1996); Coolman and Coulter (2010), 197–208; Angelici (2011), 3–61; and Matter and Smith (2012). 22 For the most recent studies of Richard’s mystical theology see Barnes (1990) and Haberkern (2000). 23 Cf. Coulter (2006). 24 For instance mens-notitia-amor, memoria sui-intelligentia-voluntas and especially memoria Deiintelligentia-amor, cf. Augustine, De Trinitate 8–15 (passim).

i nt ro d u ct i o n

trinitarian doctrine, and it became the common view in the Western theological tradition for centuries. According to Augustine, love was primarily a vestigium, a trace of God. In his analysis of love, Augustine pointed out that there must always be a duality where there is love. First, there is the loving subject, amans, and then the beloved object, quod amatus est, which or who could be identical to the loving subject, and finally the love itself that connects the loving subject and the beloved object, amor.25 However, Augustine could also see in the human caritas the explanation of the unification of the trinitarian persons. This is so in Augustine’s sermons on the Gospel of John. And these sermons were popular reading among the Victorines. Here Augustine makes an analogy between the mental unification of love in friendship and the unity of the trinitarian persons.26 Richard has probably been inspired by Augustine’s use of the idea of caritas for his explanation of the trinitarian persons’ relationship to each other. But there is still a difference between Augustine’s understanding of caritas as a vis unitiva for the explanation of the unity of the divine nature and Richard’s understanding of caritas as the love that requires a plurality of persons. Richard stressed the altruistic character of caritas. In Richard’s analysis caritas is interpersonal. The object of love must always be another person, and the unity of love does not abolish the individuality of the loving persons. So, according to Augustine, the unifying power of love can well illustrate the unity of the divine nature, but it cannot explain why there must be a plurality of persons in the divine nature. Augustine’s way of thinking about the Trinity is called the psychological theory. Richard’s new thinking is accordingly called the interpersonal theory of the Trinity. Richard finds the logic of the mystery of the Trinity in the mutual, self-giving love between equal persons. So, to Richard the way to knowledge of God went through the experience of, and the analytical insight in, that the human person is basically relational, and that the relation is a relationship of love. When it was about the question of the existence of God itself, Richard could use the experience of the being of the transitory things, but when he wanted to understand that God consists of persons in one being, Richard built on the experience of the interpersonal love. Thus, to Richard love became the fundamental quality in the definition of all personal existence. He built on the experience that the persons are born in a community of love. The person is brought about when the human meets another person with love, and this relationship of love becomes mutual. So, the personalism of Richard is based on the idea that the realization of the existence as personal being happens when love becomes love-of-others, caritas. This experience of and insight in the connection between love and the existence of the person is the fundament 25 Augustine, De Trinitate 9,2. 26 ‘Si enim hic tanta caritas est ut animam tuam et animam amici tui unam animam faciat, quomodo ibi non est unus Deus Pater et Filius?’, Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium 14,9 (Bibliothèque Augustinienne Oeuvres 71, Paris 1969), 744, and ‘Et hoc de illis scriptura dicit, quod erat in anima et hinc agnoscite mysterium Trinitatis’, 39,5 (PL 35:1684), cf. Nédoncelle (1954), 594–602. Nédoncelle points out that Richard could be inspired by this use of caritas for his explanation of the divine nature.

15

16

in tro ducti o n

of Richard’s explanation of the fact that God, who must be the highest caritas, also must consist of persons. b. Human Love

It is not surprising that Richard chose the human love as the main theme in his work about the image of God – just as love was the central theme in his mystical writings. As a Parisian in the middle of the twelfth century Richard lived in the middle of an intellectual, religious, and poetical fascination of love and an epoch-making re-valuation of the human love. The humanism of this century was interested in the human person as it was, and it judged the human values positively as created – or rather new-created following the Augustinian theological anthropology. But the new-created humanity was understood in human terms and values. Hugh of Saint-Victor (1099–1141), Richard’s master, is an excellent example of the theological re-valuation of love. He could argue that the mutual love in the ordinary human marriage was a good by itself, and he considered this kind of love to be even a sacrament that pointed at the perfect divine love.27 At that time there was a great interest in and positive valuation of the human feelings and longings, the human affectationes and affectus, in the love of God and in the interpersonal relations. The love of God and the love in the intimate friendship was the object of letters and treatises of some of the greatest names of the twelfth century. Besides Richard of Saint-Victor, it applies to Bernard of Clairvaux, William of Saint-Thierry, Aelred of Rievaulx, and Peter Abélard.28 Coincident with this new intellectual and theological interest in and appreciation of the human love we find a secular fascination of the human love among the troubadours of southern France. The troubadours (from medieval Latin: tropator, a composer of Latin poetry for liturgical use) expressed in their songs their admiration of the human person. As C. S. Lewis said, they were fascinated by the young, strong, and beautiful human person. They celebrated the human abilities and possibilities, especially the aptitude for fighting and loving passionately. The troubadours invented, discovered or were just the first to express the new vision of the human love which we call the romantic or the passionate love. Undoubtedly the songs of the troubadours about love have influenced the visions and ethics of love in the Western culture from the twelfth century until today. This is the conclusion of C. S. Lewis and he calls the upcoming of the new understanding of love in the twelfth century a revolution so radical that the renaissance of the sixteenth century in comparison must be called just a superficial ripple!29

27 Hugh of Saint-Victor, De Sacramentis 2,11,2 (482a-d), cf. Chydenius (1970), 21 s. 28 Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones super Cantica Canticorum and Liber de diligendo Deo; William of Saint-Thierry, De natura et dignitate amoris; Peter Abélard and Heloïse, Epistolae; Aelred of Rievaulx, Speculum caritatis; and Richard of Saint-Victor, In Cantica Canticorum explicatio and De quattuor gradibus violentae caritatis. 29 Lewis (1958), 4.

i nt ro d u ct i o n

The German Minnesang (Minne means love), as well as the Iberian cantiga de amigo, are similar phenomena. Both the monastic amicitia-culture and the secular poetical fascination of fin’amors, the courteous or cultivated love, are witnesses of the fact that love had become something central in the understanding of the human existence. This new understanding of the human love was confirmed by the antique literature. In the twelfth century a great activity of study took place about the antique authors – both in the schools and in the monasteries. They read Vergil, Horace, Sallust, Cicero, and Seneca; even Ovid was studied. Richard himself is an example of how also learned men in the monasteries not only had a superficial knowledge of the antique literature but included it in their thinking and made it their own. Richard quoted or paraphrased, without references, both Cicero, Sallust, and Seneca about friendship.30 In the theological and philosophical literature, it was the concept of caritas that was chosen to express the relationship between God and the individual and the interpersonal relationship of love. Caritas became the core concept for the mutual love between humans and for the intimate love of God. In this way caritas got status as the reality which better than anything else was the expression of the divine nature in creation. Caritas simply opened the way for knowledge of God. c. Richard’s Influence

Richard’s theology of the Trinity influenced many important theologians of the High Middle Ages: Peter of Blois, William of Auxerre, William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus, Matthew of Aquasparta, Thomas Angelicus, and Thomas Aquinas.31 However, Thomas Aquinas became also the turning point for Richard’s significance. Richard’s interpersonal theory of the Trinity was used by Aquinas in his Sentences in which the divine nature was described as an interpersonal mutuality. Thomas referred here to Richard as the authority, and he mentioned Augustine’s psychological theory of the Trinity under sed contra.32 But later, Thomas changed his viewpoint. In his later writings, especially in the Summa, Thomas emphasized Augustine’s psychological theory on the Trinity.33 However, Richard’s thoughts about the mutual personal love in the Trinity did not totally loose its place in the Thomistic image of God. Thomas combined the Augustinian position – that the love in God is reflexive and underlines the unity of the divine nature – with Richard’s understanding of the divine love as altruistic and mutual and thus forming a plurality.34 But the result was that Richard thinking on the Trinity did not keep its high esteem after Thomas. This has undoubtedly to be seen in connection with Thomas’ general break with Richard’s theological basis: the Augustinian unity-thinking. Thomas’ sharp 30 Cf. Roos (1973), 127. 31 On Richard’s medieval influence, see Rousselot (1908), 65; Stohr (1925), 113–35; Schmaus (1930), 656 s.; Landgraf (1948), 73 s. 32 I. Sent., d. 2, q. 1, art. 4; and d. 10, q. 1, art. 1–4; cf. Penido (1937), 51 s. 33 Summa Theologica Ia, q. 32, art. 1, and q. 36, art. 1. 34 Cf. Aagaard (1973), 130–35.

17

18

in tro ducti o n

division between the knowledge field of the faith and that of the reason could not avoid to have consequences for the view on the theological method of the school of the Victorines, according to which the faith, the reason, and the experience cooperated in the cognition of the same truth. Therefore, in the Thomistic dominated history of theology through centuries, also Richard of Saint-Victor was accused of crossing the limits of the reason and for being irrational in his mystical thinking. Not until the end of the nineteenth century Richard’s thoughts on the Trinity were rehabilitated in so far that they were paid attention to again.35 The renewed interest in Richard of Saint-Victor’s thoughts must be seen together with the increased scholarly activity of the twentieth and now in the twenty-first century about the twelfth century. Especially Richard’s De Trinitate has gained renewed current interest.36 For the philosophy, especially Richard’s thoughts about the person and the interpersonal relations have been interesting. Many Richard-researchers have drawn attention to the connection between Richard and the existentialism of the twentieth century.37 In the field of theology, the renewed interest is mainly preoccupied with Richard’s analogy between the human interpersonal love and the divine Trinity. In various ways a series of treatises on trinitarian theology, both in the Protestant and the Roman-Catholic tradition, have used Richard’s interpersonal theory about the Trinity and its ‘social analogy’.38 The most recent study on Richard is focused on the phenomenon of love in Richard’s anthropology, his cognition through love, and the understanding of God and the approximation to God in love.39

2. Richard and Saint-Victor The Victorine John of Toulouse from the seventeenth century wrote the first total biography of Richard, Vita Richardi, edited in Rouen in 1650.40 John based his

35 The first elaborate presentation of Richard’s theory on the Trinity was given by Régnon (1892), Études X: Théorie de Richard de S. Victor, 235–335. 36 Cf. the two most recent translations into English of the treatise: Coolman and Coulter (2010) and Angelici (2011). 37 Cf. Cousins (1966), 208 (note 2); Cousins mentions G. Marcel, (1951) ‘Sketch of a Phenomenology and a Metaphysics of Hope’ in Homo Viator, 29–67, and E. Fromm, (1956) The Art of Loving, besides Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrandt and Herbert Spiegelberg; Richard’s thought can meet with modern psychoanalysis, phenomenology and existentialism, according to Cousins (1970), 82; Roos (1973), 127 points at the dialogical thinking of Martin Buber as an echo of Richard’s personalism and mentions Buber’s Ich und Du (1962); Javelet (1961) mentions Bergson and Blondel who both work with Richard’s existential cognition through the experience of love; Penido (1937), 49 points at Bergson’s Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion (1932) and Blondel’s L’Être et les êtres (1935). 38 Cf. Henry (1960); Alfaro (1960); Fraigneau-Julien (1965); Clark (1966); Mühlen (1969); Wipfler (1977); Moltmann (1980); Balthasar (1976–82); Hofmann (1984). 39 Nakamura (2011). 40 John of Toulouse (1650).

i nt ro d u ct i o n

biography on notes from the archives of the Victorines, on Richard’s epistolarium, and on two epitaphs on Richard from 1348 and 1531, respectively. All the sources confirm Richard’s Scotch origin. Scotus erat, the epitaph from 1348 verse 9 reports, and on the memorial table from 1531, the 3rd verse says: quem tellus genuit felici Scotica partu.41 Richard’s letters show also that he had special feelings for the British Islands. In the letter to Robert of Melun, on occasion of his promotion in 1163 to bishop of Hereford, he declared his love of the British church with speciali affectione, natura suadente, and in another letter he talks about thesauro Anglia nostra.42 Regarding his own person, Richard was almost silent. In a few passages in the De Trinitate he mentions his Christian upbringing.43 The year of Richard’s birth is unknown, and we do not know the time of his arrival in Saint-Victor in Paris. Probably, however, Richard was young when he became a Victorine, considering how much he achieved until his death in 1173. His admission to the Victorines must have taken place before 1141 when his teacher, Hugh of Saint-Victor, died. Taking the low average age of the time into consideration, he was probably born between 1110 and 1120 and entered Saint-Victor in the late 1130s. Richard’s kinship and social relations are unknown, probably they have been common and moderate; at least, it has not been worth mentioning. Unlike for instance Hugh of Saint-Victor whose origin was remarked.44 Whereas we do not know when Richard was admitted to the canon community, we do know how the admission took place.45 First, an enquiry has been sent to SaintVictor about the possibility of admission of the person in question. Then, the abbot as the first has considered the qualification of the applicants. By the way, the abbot who assessed both Hugh and Richard, has been the first abbot, Guilduin. After this, the abbot’s recommendation has been brought before the community for approval. The ritual of admission was carried out in the chapter hall where the applicant has laid out-stretched on the floor in front of the abbot and asked for admission. Then the abbot has asked: ‘My brother, will you surrender to God in order to serve him in the community and, in obedience to this forum, live a canon’s life according to our rule and to the traditions of this place?’ After the affirmative answer of the applicant, the abbot has asked: ‘Do you promise me obedience and perseverance, all according to the grace that God will give you?’ After the confirmation of this, the admitted applicant received the Book of Rules and a bread, as a symbol of the community. The act of admission was ended with the new brother’s leading out of the chapter hall for becoming tonsured and dressed in the Victorine habit.

41 42 43 44

PL 196:xi–xii. PL 196:1225a-b and 1228c. ‘Nos … qui a ipsis cunabulis vere fidei traditionem accepimus’, DT, prologue. Hugh was son of the count Conrad of Blankenburg; he arrived in Saint-Victor together with his uncle who was a clergyman and teacher in Albertstadt. At the arrival in Saint-Victor they presented the abbot with two valuable relics of the martyr St Victor in Marseilles – according to John of Toulouse a tooth and a shoulder blade! 45 Cf. Bonnard (1904), vol. 1, 57 s.

19

20

in tro ducti o n

How this habit looked like we know from a drawing in a manuscript from the thirteenth century in which Godefroid of Saint-Victor is portrayed in full figure.46 Richard’s physiognomy is unknown. The only portrait of Richard – as far as we know – is to be found in a small oil painting from the seventeenth century by an anonymous painter who probably has never had the possibility of seeing a Victorine.47 a. The Abbey

When Richard became a Victorine, the abbey had not existed for more than about 30 years. The founder was William of Champeaux, born about 1070 in Champeauxen-Brie near Melun. He was the first important magister at the cathedral school at Notre-Dâme de Paris, and he was called the first dialectician by Abélard, one of William’s many students. However, William was not satisfied by his position in the new scholastic environment. He wished to leave his public teaching chair and instead devote himself to an idealistic hermit life. In 1108, he took the consequence of this wish and withdrew from the cathedral school and moved, together with some of his dearest students, into a small, solitary chapel, with some belonging buildings, at the foot of the Saint-Geneviève hill on the left bank of the Seine, just south of Île de la Cité. The small hermitage was conferred to William by the bishop of Paris, Gilbert.48 Thus, at first Saint-Victor was a solitary monastic environment without teaching. However, on the occasion of William’s resignation from his teaching chair and his giving up of all teaching, the bishop of Le Mans, Hildebart of Lavardin (1056–1134), wrote an urgent letter to his friend William in which he called on him to take up his teaching again.49 Probably, the letter has made an impression on William. In any case, he began to teach in Saint-Victor. By this he led the scholarly work into a monastic setting, from which the scholarly work already had its roots and background, and the beginning was made to the Victorine school’s characteristic synthesis of the new scholastic rational humanism and the traditional monastic, more practical and

46 B.N. Paris Lat. 14515 (earlier II,14), fol. 106v. 47 The painting is hung up in a side chapel in the church Chiesa di San Frediano in Lucca near Florence, Italy. 48 The name of the place, Saint-Victor, is due to the original dependence of the chapel and the buildings of the big monastery of Saint-Victor in Marseilles, one of the most important monasteries of France in the Middle Ages and also the oldest (founded in the fifth century). The cult of St Victor was one of the many Victor-cults in the Mediterrenean. In Marseilles it was based on a certain Victor of Marseilles, mentioned both as sailor, soldier, and bishop, probably originally a shipping patron; he is celebrated on July 21. 49 Hildebert’s letter has been preserved and is reprinted in PL 171:41–143A: ‘The rumor says that friends have advised you to give up teaching. About this you must listen to what I say. For he who does not do what he can, when he has the capacity for it, he is not a servant for others … He [sc. God] wants you to give a burnt offering, not an ordinary sacrifice … In an ordinary sacrifice one gives only a part of oneself, but in the burnt offering one gives oneself fully … When one devotes all of oneself to the almighty God, one’s whole life, all one’s intelligence, then it is precisely a burnt offering. So, give yourself wholly to God … You must not close the streams of your learning for your students, but – as Solomon says – ‘let out your streams, lead out your waters on the streets’’, cf. Prov 5:16 (Vulg.).

i nt ro d u ct i o n

mystical, life. After a few years, the small monastery became an important part of the learned environment in Paris. William and his monastery enjoyed the favor of the Crown. Louis VI offered three times to William to become bishop of Châlon.50 William refused the offer three times, but the fourth time he accepted the choice. In 1113, William moved to Châlon and stayed there until his death in 1121. It is characteristic for the mentality of William – and with him Saint-Victor – that he as a bishop reestablished the canon community in Châlon, and that he in his episcopal function as count took the initiative to organize a municipal militia for the preparation of the local liberation from the feudal regime. In connection with the consecration of William, Louis VI issued a carta which was signed by the king and all the present archbishops, bishops, and other principals of the kingdom. The document approved the foundation of Saint-Victor and gave the abbey the special privilege to hold free choice of abbot without interference of the king or any church authority.51 Thus, Richard entered into an institution which was a result of the liberation process away from the feudalism and the ecclesiastical nationalism. Saint-Victor became an internationally open abbey, only subject to the Holy See. The year after, 1114, Pope Pascal the Second gave the official confirmation of the foundation. b. Monastery and School

The brothers chose Guilduin as their first abbot. Just like William, Guilduin was in the good graces of the French king. Guilduin became the father confessor of Louis VI and helped the king in his efforts to reform the clergy. It was under Guilduin’s long term of office (1114–55) that the Victorines developed the special Victorine Augustinian Rule. The Augustinian Rule, which was not written by Augustine, was designed in more places in the late eleventh century and the early twelfth century on basis of Augustinian and Pseudo-Augustinian writings; it was mentioned for the first time by the Victorines in 1134. The center of the Rule was the community life following the three evangelical advices: poverty, obedience, and celibacy. The Augustinian Rule was not identical in the different canon houses that emanated from Saint-Victor during the twelfth century, unlike for instance the Premonstratenses who followed the same Augustinian Rule everywhere. However, the Victorine Rule has not been considered less severe than the Premonstratense or the Benedictine Rule.52 The life in Saint-Victor was strictly monastic with hours and priest functions. All, including the abbot and the prior, did practical work in the morning of the weekdays indoors or outdoors in the garden. During the meals they listened to the reading aloud of the sermons of the Fathers, especially the sermons of Origen, Augustine’s sermons 50 Cf. Bonnard (1904), vol. 1, 12 s. 51 The text is preserved in Archives Nationales, Paris, K 21, no. 8 A. 52 The Victorines were vegetarians; only the sick might eat a little fish. There were rules for how much the brothers might talk together, and because of this a curious system of more than a hundred mimic signs is described in the Liber Ordinis. This work describes the life in Saint-Victor during Guilduin’s term of office and is printed in Martène et al. (1737).

21

22

in tro ducti o n

on the Gospel of John, and the sermons of Gregory the Great. At the daily meeting, the abbot himself or another from the abbey, or someone invited from outside, has delivered a sermon or a short lesson. Probably it has been on these occasions that Richard has explained his works and has delivered his many preserved sermons. The management of the abbey consisted of the abbot and the priory, which again consisted of the prior major and the subprior. In 1159 Richard was elected subprior. Together with a certain Nantier as prior, Richard functioned as subprior until 1162 when Nantier – vir sanctissimus – died, and Richard hereafter – virtutibus aequalis, sed scientia praevalens – was elected to sit up front in the left side of the choir and take care of the office as prior, and be the substitute of the abbot. Richard’s time as prior became highly problematic, since in the same year, 1162, a certain Ervisius became abbot. He appeared to be unreliable and criminal, and not until 1172, the year before Richard’s death, Ervisius was forced to retire from his office.53 However, the Victorines were not monks in the traditional way. They were canonici regulares, canons, learned priests. The Victorines were generally wealthy, and they prioritized studies and teaching. They were what can be called more aristocratic than for instance the Cistercians whom they in many ways can remind of. The Victorines were probably recruited mainly from the ‘better’ social classes whereas the Cistercians admitted poor people as lay brothers. The monastic life, in which Richard lived, was characterized not least by the intellectual activity. The monastery has soon appeared as a learned academy. When Richard arrived in Saint-Victor, Hugh of Saint-Victor was an internationally famous teacher. Without disregarding the founder of the school, William, it is Hugh who created the school of Saint-Victor. He was the first of the three greatest figures who made the school of Saint-Victor one of the leading centers of study and teaching in Paris, and which fame reached all over Western Europe. It was under the leadership of Hugh in the years from the end of the 1120s until 1141, when he died only 42 years old, that the abbey became a center of biblical-exegetical studies, rational-humanistic theology, and contemplative-experimental mysticism.54 The love of the concrete was characteristic for Hugh. It can be seen in his interest in the literal meaning of the Bible and his use of the experience in his proofs of the existence of God, just as he was occupied with the psychological aspects of the contemplative life. Hugh was an encyclopedic gifted person who after a few years attained to be famous both as a philosopher, a historian, an exegetic theologian, and a mystic. His call to ‘learn everything – omnia disce! – and you will see that nothing is superfluous’55 was also the motto for his Didascalicon, a comprehensive study guidance for and introduction in the artes liberales and the theology. Hugh presented here the scientific character of the Victorine school which was universal and seeking the truth in several ways. Hugh’s world of thought was the Augustinian continuum in which science could be occupied with everything, both the physical and the metaphysical,

53 On the Ervisius case see below p. 25–26. 54 Cf. Baron (1957) and Smalley (1952), 83–106. 55 Hugh of Saint-Victor, Didascalicon 6,3 (Buttimer, 115).

i nt ro d u ct i o n

the human and the divine. Also, the antique literature belonged to Hugh’s field of interest. He read Horace, Cicero, and especially Vergil. Within a decade, Hugh attracted a unique elite in Saint-Victor. In the biblical-exegetical field the great names were – besides Hugh himself – Richard and Andrew of Saint-Victor (died 1175).56 In the dogmatic theology, Hugh contributed with De sacramentis and Summa Sententiarum (however, possibly written fully or partially by Hugh-pupils); the Summa became a textbook of Scholasticism throughout the Middle Ages. Achard of Saint-Victor (abbot from 1155, bishop of Avranches from 1161 until his death in 1171) wrote a treatise on the Trinity which may have inspired Richard somewhat in his De Trinitate.57 Both Hugh and Richard were occupied with ethics and psychology. Hugh wrote among other things De unione corporis et animae, just as parts of his Didascalicon consist of psychological studies; Achard wrote the treatise De discretione animae, and finally Richard’s Benjamin minor and Benjamin major are considered the most important mystical-theological works of the Victorines.58 In the musical field should be mentioned Adam of Saint-Victor (1110–92). As mentioned, Hugh of Saint-Victor was the first great figure in the school of Saint-Victor, and Richard became the second most famous Victorine. Now, Adam became the third excellent name from the flowering period of Saint-Victor in the twelfth century. Adam is undoubtedly the greatest poetical theologian in Saint-Victor, and, after Notker Balbulus, he is considered the most influential liturgical poet in the Middle Ages.59 As mentioned, Saint-Victor consisted of a community of learned canons, but they were also a community of teachers. We know that public teaching was given on biblical exegesis, philosophy, theology, artes liberales, and mysticism. The Victorines were both claustrales and scholares. Saint-Victor in the twelfth century had a university character – before the universities were invented about 1200 in Paris and Bologna. The university character is also shown by the library of Saint-Victor. Through the twelfth century, its public library became one of the leading book collections in Paris. One can get an impression of the size of the library already in the first half of the twelfth century, when one assumes that it contained all the books that Abélard quoted in

56 Cf. Smalley (1952), 112–95 and Spicq (1946), 128 s. 57 Cf. Ribaillier (1958), 27–33; Achard’s treatise De Trinitate – De unitate et pluralitate creaturarum is partially published by d’Alverny (1954). 58 Hugh’s works are edited in PL 177, besides Didascalicon, De studio legendi, a critical text, ed. Buttimer (1939); English translation by Taylor (1961); Achard’s De discretione animae is edited by Morin (1935); the two Benjamins of Richard are edited in PL 196: De preparatione animi ad contemplationem, liber dictus Benjamin minor (1–64), and: De gratia contemplationis, seu Benjamin major, (63–192). Benjamin minor has been translated among others by Yankowski, (1960). Benjamin major has been partially translated by Kirchberger (1957). 59 Cf. Ghellinck (1946), 1, 295 s. Adam’s sequences are edited in PL 196:1423–1534 and in: Adam de Saint-Victor, Sämtliche Sequenzen, lateinisch und deutsch, München 1955; several of Adam’s hymns have been re-created; for instance by Hans Rosenberg in German in Die Victoriner, Mystische Schriften, Wien 1936, 313–36, and by N. F. S. Grundtvig in Danish, The Danish Hymnbook (of 2003) no. 235 and 292.

23

24

in tro ducti o n

his works: Aristotle, Plato, the antique Latin authors as Cicero, Ovid, Seneca, and Vergil, the Latin Fathers and almost all the Greek.60 c. Internationalism

From its beginning, Saint-Victor attracted international attention which is clearly shown by the recruitment of its members. The members consisted of persons who probably had received some education in their homelands which could be Italy, Germany, England, French provinces and the Nordic countries.61 At the same time, a rapid diffusion came from Saint-Victor. Already in 1137, 20 houses had emanated from the mother-abbey. In 1155, 45 houses. In the period of 1130–80, three Victorines became cardinals, and the popes Innocent II and Alexander III visited the abbey. Richard had as prior received Alexander as a guest in Saint-Victor in March-April 1164 and later again in 1169 and 1171. Richard had also had the opportunity of knowing the archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Becket, who, during his exile and shortly before his death, stayed in Saint-Victor in 1170.62 Richard had also been well-known by Scandinavian learned. Nordic clergy visited Saint-Victor during the twelfth century. Among the Danish should be mentioned Eskil (about 1100–81), archbishop of Lund and close friend of Bernard of Clairvaux. Also, Absalon (1128–1201), bishop of Roskilde and successor of Eskil in Lund was inspired by the Victorines. The successor of Absalon in Lund, Anders Suneson (about 1160–1228) studied in Paris and was the author of a big didactic poem Hexaëmeron. The brother of Anders, Peter Suneson (1164–1214), who became bishop of Roskilde, did his studies in Saint-Victor.63

60 Cf. Index auctorum qui in operibus Abaelardi citantur, PL 176:1879–1886. Also, the collections in Saint-Victor contained a large collection of letters. The most important of these are kept in the Vatican Library, Cod.reg.lat. 179 (from the end of the twelfth century), cf. Wilmart (1939), Bibliothecae apostolicae Vaticanae cod.reg.lat. 1,419–30. Some of the letters are kept in copies from the seventeenth century in Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, BN 14615 and 14664; most of these have been printed in Historiae Francorum Scriptores 4 (ed. Duchesne 1641), 557–762, no. 1–143 and 149–559 and in Veterum scriptorum amplissima collectio 6, (ed. Martène 1729), 218 s. 61 Thus, as mentioned, Hugh came from Germany, Richard from Scotland, the abbot Ervisius came also from the British Islands, Adam was from Bretagne, Achard from the Normandy, a certain Henrik of Saint-Victor was from Norway, another Henrik was from Rome, and a certain Ulrich was Italian. 62 Cf. J. Chatillon, ‘Thomas Becket et les victorins, Thomas Becket’, Actes du colloque international de Sédières, 19–24 août 1973, (1975), 89–102. On the relations of Saint-Victor and England, see J. C. Dickinson, The Origins of the Austin Canons into England, (1950). 63 Anders and Peter Suneson both lived at Saint-Geneviève where also the Danish student hostel was placed, close to Saint-Victor. Among the many Danes, who had connection with the learned environment of Paris and not least Saint-Victor, can be mentioned the bishops Salomon in Aarhus, Waldemar in Schleswig, and Gunner in Viborg, cf. Verrier (1928), 51; bishop Henricus and bishop Theodoricus came from Norway, just as the Norwegian bishops Erik and Tore stayed in Saint-Victor for longer periods in the 1160s and the 70s. On the relations France-Scandinavia in general, see Ohnsorge (1929).

i nt ro d u ct i o n

The many learned visitors have brought new thoughts back home. Thus, the Victorine Peter Comestor’s (about 1100–79) big Historia scholastica64 has been well-known among Norwegian and Icelandic learned in the Middle Ages. The book is also the main source for the Icelandic Stjórn (that is, fragments from the early Norwegian translation of The Old Testament after Vulgata provided with allegorical interpretations, from about 1225–1310) and for the Gydinga Saga, just as extracts from Richard’s Liber Exceptionum are part of Stjórn at least in eight places.65 A good example of Saint-Victor’s internationalism at Richard’s time is to be found in the relations to Denmark. The mentioned bishop Absalon was interested in the Victorines’ reform of the clergy. Absalon wanted to strengthen the discipline in his bishopric and in the years 1160–69 he took step to introduce the Canon reform in Denmark and particularly to reestablish the canon chapter on the island of Eskil (Eskilsø) in Roskilde Fjord. In 1165, Absalon asked his friend William of Saint-Geneviève to take care of this, and William agreed. The case was so important that both the king and Absalon welcomed William at his arrival in Ringsted, Denmark. William introduced the Victorine Rule in the mentioned Eskilsø and later, about 1175, in a new established monastery in Æbelholt near Hillerød.66 He played an important role in the church life of Denmark during more than 30 years.67 However, one painful affair disturbed the good relationship between Saint-Victor and Denmark at the time of Richard. It was Eskil, the archbishop of Lund, who made costly experiences with the corrupt abbot Ervisius of Saint-Victor, who nevertheless functioned in ten years (1162–72). On one of his travels in France, between 1161 and 1168, Eskil deposited a sum of silver money with Ervisius in Saint-Victor. The deposition was made, according to William, properly in the presence of witnesses; but when Eskil later wanted to pick up the money, they were nowhere to be found. Eskil had to leave France without his fortune, and after his homecoming, he sent three letters to Ervisius who did not answer. After this, Eskil laid the case before king Louis VII in Paris and mentioned the sum to be 370 mark of pure silver.68 Also bishop Absalon was drawn into the case, and he applied to pope Alexander III who then asked the bishops Manasse in Troyes and Thibaut in Amiens to be judges in the controversy between Eskil and Saint-Victor. The abbey was also under suspicion since the abbot could have let the disappeared money become part of the fortune of the abbey. However, Alexander III gave up the charge against Saint-Victor, since there was no evidence that the abbey had profited by the theft. Only Ervisius was

64 PL 198:1053–1644. 65 Cf. Bekker-Nielsen (1968), 32 s. 66 The confirmation of the foundation by Pope Alexander III in 1180–81 is printed in Diplomatarium Danicum 1, 3 (Part 1, 1976–77), no. 95, 146–50, cf. no. 79, 118–21. 67 Cf. William’s many letters Epistolae Abbatis Willemi De Paraclito are edited in Diplomatarium Danicum 1, 3 (Part 2, 1977), 413–576. 68 Cf. Diplomatarium Danicum 1, 3 (Part 1, 1976–77), no. 32, 44–45.

25

26

in tro ducti o n

regarded the criminal. The pope commanded hereafter the archbishop William in Sens and bishop Mauritius in Paris to imprison Ervisius.69 d. The Death of Richard

It must have been a relief for the abbey, and particularly for Richard as prior, that the management was restored in 1172 when Guerin of Saint-Victor was elected abbot, and Richard continued as prior. However, Richard did not function very long time after this. The last witness from his hand is his signature on a document concerning a transaction between Saint-Victor and the chapter of Saint-Côme de Luzerches. Richard died on Friday, March 11, 1173. In the death-book of Saint-Victor is noted: ‘eodem die anniversarium Richardi huius ecclesie prioris, que exemplo sancte conversationis et scriptorum elegantia dignam sui nominis memoriam reliquit’. Richard was buried in the abbey. Soon after the death of Richard, the period of decline began. It did not mean, as it has been suggested, that the school of Saint-Victor after Richard did not have any influence at all in the twelfth century or later.70 But the beginning decline meant that the Victorine synthesis between the knowledge by experience and the knowledge by reason on basis of the faith, so that the traditional mysticism and the new scholasticism could meet, in the course of time lost its esteem and impact. The new scholasticism that built on the ideas of Aristotle divided sharply between the knowledge of the reason and the information of the revelation. With this, the concepts that the Victorines and most other theologians in the Western tradition had kept together, were kept apart. After 1620, the Abbey of Saint-Victor lost its privileged independency and was laid under the archbishopric of Paris. By the end of the eighteenth century, during the French revolution, the whole property of the abbey was confiscated, and, in 1811, the medieval buildings were torn down.71 Whereas all visible traces of the buildings of Saint-Victor have been lost, most of the riches of the abbey have been saved for the future. The collection of relics was transferred to a church nearby, Saint-Nicolas du Chardonnet, and the stock of manuscripts, printed books, letters, copperplates, and medals were brought to the Bibliothèque Nationale.

69 Cf. Diplomatarium Danicum 1, 3 (Part 1, 1976–77), no. 35, 49–51. On the entire case, see the Diplomatarium no. 32–44, 44–64. We do not know whether Ervisius was imprisoned or how the whole case ended. However, Ottaviano (1933), 420, reports that Ervisius lived on in Saint-Paul des Aulnois, a priory dependant of Saint-Victor, ‘where he continued his extravagant life and did not stop bothering his fellow brothers’. About Eskil we know that he resigned as archbishop and retired to the Cistercian monastery of Clairvaux in 1177. 70 Lazzari (1965), 115: ‘Dopo di lui [sc. Richard], la scuola vittorina non ha più nulla da dire’. 71 Saint-Victor’s buildings and garden were situated along with the present Rue de Saint-Victor and close to the present École Polytechnique. The Abbey has also given name to the local quarter, the first in the 5th arrondissement, Quartier Saint-Victor, just as the name lives on in a children’s school nearby in Rue Jussieu: École Saint-Victor.

i nt ro d u ct i o n

3. The Theological Method a. Faith and Reason

Richard of Saint-Victor begins the first book of De Trinitate by mentioning the three sources of cognition of the truth. We get knowledge, firstly, by experiencing, experiendo, secondly, by thinking, ratiocinando, and finally, by believing, credendo. The experience gives knowledge about the temporal things, whereas the thought and the faith lead to knowledge about the eternal truths. More exactly, it is said soon after, the faith is the foundation for the knowledge of the truth as the faith is the highest possible certainty: ‘nothing is more sure and nothing is more firm’ than the faith (DT 1:2). In another place Richard says that the constructions of thought cannot be ‘stable’ if they have not been built on the unshakable truth of the faith.72 In certain matters – for instance the agreement of certain seemingly conflicting divine qualities – Richard prefers to stick fully to the faith in order to avoid any contradictions (DT 4:1). Finally, Richard points out that the statements of the faith are testified by so many wonders and signs that they should not be doubted (DT 1:2). In Richard’s theology, faith is defined as faith in the divine revelations such as they are known from the Bible, from which Richard quotes directly or indirectly 46 times in De Trinitate, especially Rom 1:20, Is 7:9 (after LXX) and Heb 1:3. Richard includes also the three creeds among the holy writings, but only from the Ps.-Athanasian creed, Symbolum Quicumque, he quotes eight times in De Trinitate.73 The formulations about the truth are to be found in these holy writings, according to Richard, and in the faith is owned the unshakable certainty about the truth of the words (DT 1:2). The certainty of the faith is thus above the certainty of reasoning; as Richard says in another place: The certainty of the faith is above the opinion, opinio, but the certainty of the faith is on the other hand not as certain as knowledge, scientia.74 This knowledge is gained by experience. But such a knowledge of experience about the divine truths is not attained in the time of the earthly life; only the blessed will see God face to face (DT prol.).75

72 ‘Et certe, si in solido veritatis fidei nostrae structura non fundatur, non potest esse stabile quod supraaedificatur’, De Emmanuele 1,21 (PL 196:634b). 73 Quicumque, DS 41 s., was also the preferred creed in Saint-Victor, cf. Richard’s own remark in DT 2:1 ‘that we hear about every day in the divine praises’. Except from this, the patristic tradition plays almost no role in De Trinitate. The Fathers are regarded inspired in general (DT 3:10; 4:5), but their importance is very different. Richard takes exception to the Greek Fathers’ formulations about the divine person (DT 4:4; 4:20) whereas he has confidence in Augustine’s formulations which also are used by the Latin church (DT 4:5). However, none of the Fathers are sufficient when it comes to the experimental-rational knowledge about the inner structures of the contents of the faith (DT 1:5). According to Ribaillier (1958), 269, there are, apart from the mentioned quotations from Ps.Athanasius, only five patristic quotations in the entire De Trinitate. 74 ‘Sed constat quia fides est certitudo quaedam supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta’, Declarationes nonnullarum difficultatum Scripturae, (PL 196:266B). 75 ‘Si necdum ad illam sufficiamus, que est per experientiam’; as to the reading of this sentence we follow Ebner (1917), 72. Éthier (1939), 57, seems here to misunderstand experientia as experience in this life: ‘si nous ne sommes même pas capables des sciences inférieures’.

27

28

in tro ducti o n

When Richard wrote his Benjamin major,76 he seems to exclude the Trinity from the cognition of reason, just like later Thomas Aquinas did not allow ratio to prove the trinitarian existence of the divine nature. When it concerns the Trinity, Richard says here, we must stick to the words of the faith, as ‘no bodily sense teaches us, and no human reason can convince us fully, that God is three persons in one substance’.77 But in the De Trinitate Richard seems not to find reason incapable of proving God’s triune being. It was traditional since Plato to let reason prove God as the Highest Good, but in De Trinitate also God’s inner being becomes inside the reach of reason. It is expressly Richard’s ambition to understand by reasoning – ratione comprehendere – what the faith says about God’s trinity and unity. b. Reason and Experience

Before reason can reach so far, the reasoning must be built on the ‘the solid and immovable base of plain and clear truth’ (DT 1:6). But here Richard is not thinking – which is to be expected from the just mentioned – of the faith. The truths of faith are what is to be proved. The starting point of the demonstration is at the same time the goal: the words of the faith. The words of the faith must be supplied with the necessary testimonies which will lead to demonstrativa certitudo (DT 5:1). The unshakable truth in this connection, according to Richard, is not the faith, but the experience. It is on basis of the experience about the world, the human being, and the soul that the reason shall achieve knowledge about the truths which interim – in this life – lay above experience. In this way experience is the foundation in Richard’s theory of knowledge. Without the outer experience reason cannot get knowledge about the visibilia, which is the condition for the reason’s analogizing up to its notions about invisibilia (DT 1:1; 1:4; 1:7 et passim); and without the inner experience there could not be a cognitio sui which could lead to reflections and conclusions about the super-experiential (DT 6:1; 6:23 et passim). So, instead of a metaphysical and abstract access to the cognition of the divine, Richard takes his starting point in the experience of the created reality. On basis of this, by its logical reasoning, the reason can conclude about the super-experiential. Richard does not make any hermeneutical considerations about the validity of experience. He understands experience as an immediate and direct sensation of the outer and inner human reality. The first example of the method is to be found in the first book, chapter 7 and 8, in which Richard concludes from the experience of the transitory being to the necessity of a being which is from itself. The being, that we experience, is, Richard says, changeable, as it begins and it perishes, and, thus, it has not its being from

76 De gratia contemplationis libri quinque seu Benjamin major (PL 196:63–202). The title Benjamin major refers to Richard’s understanding of the son of Jacob, Benjamin, as the symbol of the ecstatic contemplation, cf. Ps 67:28 (Vulg.): ‘Ibi Benjamin adolescentulus in mentis excessu’. This allegorical interpretation of the verse was common in the Middle Ages, cf. Pourrat, 179, note 2. 77 Benjamin major 4,2 (PL 196:136B).

i nt ro d u ct i o n

itself. The being must necessarily come from something which is from itself, ‘for’, Richard reasons, ‘if nothing was from itself there would not be anything at all from which those things could exist that do not have or are able to have their being from themselves’. This being must also be eternal, Richard says, ‘otherwise there was a time when there was nothing and then there would be nothing at all from which the future beings could have their being, since they did not give or were able to give beginning of existence neither to themselves nor to other’. Richard is the first in the history of Scholasticism who works out a proof of God’s existence on basis of experience. Later, Thomas Aquinas goes ahead on the same road.78 With this, Richard has only given one proof for the existence of God. It is Richard’s ambition in his De Trinitate to give evidence of God’s being itself as one in substance and three in persons. The method is again that the experience forms the basis, and that the reason, on this basis, makes conclusions by analogy about the divine. But, at the same time, it must be underlined that this experimental-rational method never stands alone in the thought of Richard. The faith is always his starting point and, at the same time, the frame and goal for the methodical reflection. c. The Augustinian-Anselmian Tradition

Thus, Richard’s theological method belongs to the Augustinian and Anselmian tradition which seeks rational knowledge of the truth on basis of the faith with the purpose to obtain insight in the truths of the faith.79 The task of the reason consists in examining the truth about God which is contained in the words of faith about God. And what the faith says about God is the full truth about God. The field of exploration for the rational speculations and proofs are marked out by the statements of the faith. ‘I hear daily about these three ones’, Richard writes, ‘that there are not three eternals but one eternal; that there are not three uncreated, neither three immense, but one uncreated and one immense. I hear about the three that there are not three “almigthies”, but one almighty; nevertheless, I hear that there are not three gods, but God is one, and there are not three Lords, but the Lord is one. I hear that the Father is neither made nor born; that the Son is not made but born; that the Holy Spirit is neither made nor born, but proceeds. All this I hear or read frequently, but 78 Cf. Ebner (1917), 15 s; Grünewald (1907), 78 s.; Richard’s proofs of God’s existence are regarded the most philosophical in the time between Anselm and Thomas Aquinas, cf. Wulf (1934), 222. Richard’s arguments are found again in Thomas’ five ways of proving God’s existence, especially his first proof which takes its starting point in the movement, and in the third proof in which Thomas’ points of departure are birth and corruption, Summa Theologica I, q. 2, art. 3. 79 Cf. Augustin, De Trinitate 15,28,51: ‘desideravi intellectu videre quod credidi’, (PL 42:1098a); Anselm, De fide Trinitatis 2: ‘Semper eandem fidem indubitanter tenendo, amando, et secundum illam vivendo, humiliter, quantum potest, quaerere rationem quomodo sit’, (PL 158:263c), and likewise in Prologion 1: ‘desidero aliquatenus intelligere veritatem tuam, quam credit et amat cor meum. Neque enim quaero intelligere ut credam; sed credo, ut intelligam. Nam et hoc credo, quia, nisi credidero, non intelligam’, (PL 158:227c). Richard’s De Trinitate has been called the ‘das kräftigste und begeisterste Echo von Anselms “Credo ut intelligam” während des 12. Jahrhunderts …, ein Echo, das bis tief in die Ära der Hochscholastik weiterklingt’, Grabmann (1911), 310.

29

30

in tro ducti o n

how all this is proven I do not recall having read’ (DT 1:5). It is, thus, for the deeper insight in these statements of the faith that Richard requires arguments, proofs, and experimental proofs. Even though Richard underlines that he stands alone with this investigation and is aware of his originality (DT 3:1), he stands clearly in the Augustinian-Anselmian tradition regarding this relationship between the rational analysis and the statements of the faith. The addition of the experience in the rational analysis does not change anything in this. Even if the reason, with its basis in the experience, can achieve knowledge and fix it in the logical form, the ratio is not an independent, autonomous cognition. The reason will always, just like the faith, be part of an epistemological participation in the absolute truth. God is the source of all being as God is the only being a semetipso (DT 1:6). Therefore, ‘everything that exists in the universe of things receives its being from the power of being’ (DT 1:12). This is the reason of the existential participation. As the highest being God is also the highest wisdom, goodness, power, etc.; all the divine attributes are identical with God’s being and substance in accordance with the aseity. Just as all being comes from God, also all wisdom, all goodness, all power, etc. comes from God. Therefore, God is wisdom whereas the human being is not wisdom, but humanity participates in the wisdom (DT 2:13).80 The reason has its roots in the divine sapientia, and just like all being all truth comes from God. Richard’s theory of cognition must be seen on the background of the traditional Augustinian understanding of the participation between the created and the uncreated. Thus, there exists a continuum between the created and the uncreated. Richard points at the biblical evidence in Genesis about the human being as created to the image and the likeness with God (Gen 5:3) (DT 6:1; 6:19) and Paul’s words about the manifestations of God’s wisdom in all creation (Rom 1:20) (DT 1:8; 5:6; 6:1 et passim). However, Richard underlines often that the unlikeness between the divine and the human is much greater than the likenesses (e.g. DT 6:1), and that the Fall destroyed the nativa possibilitas, the ability of the reason to perform the good and understand the truth without being disturbed by the urges as in the natura corrupta.81 But this reality does not abolish the participation of the created with the uncreated, and it does not prevent us from using ‘the ladder of likeness … when we want to examine and prove the sublime and invisible things’ (DT 6:23). The participation makes it possible to compare the created things with the uncreated, between the timely and the eternal, between the visibilia and the invisibilia. This continuum-thinking implies that all understanding ultimately elucidates the one and same truth. In this way, the experience of the created reality becomes an experience of the divine manifestations in the creation which the reason interprets and understands clearly, as images, or less clearly, as vestiges of the Creator. In this way, according to the Augustinian universe of thought, the experience and the reason are working inside an overall perception which is transformed by the faith.

80 About the theory of participation, see Javelet (1962 and 1963), 1962:230 s. and 1963:117. 81 E.g. De statu interioris hominibus 1,20 and 22 (PL 196:1130d and 1132b).

i nt ro d u ct i o n

Thus, the faith, the experience, and the reason have the same truth as their object: the whole and full truth about God, and this truth is God himself. What these three sources of cognition are saying is therefore in principle identical. The difference is only this that the faith already possesses the truth whereas the experience and the reason must seek the truth. Already in the Prologue of De Trinitate Richard stresses that the faith shall not be enough for the truth-seeking person. One has also to seek insight into the truths of the faith, and it is by itself a merit to seek this insight by the reason. However, the reason can never go its own, independent ways. It is by nature bound to seek the truth that faith is talking about. A truth of the faith, which is proved to be true by the reason, does not leave the field of faith and is removed to the field of the reason. The fields are in principle congruous. So, when Richard maintains that the faith shall not be enough but one shall seek insight in the truths of the faith it might seem to contradict the before mentioned that the faith possesses all the truth and owns all certainty, nichil certius, nichil constantius (DT 1:2). However, Richard does not contradict himself for according to him the faith is indeed certain and true, but it does not contain any proofs. Here it is the task of the experience and the reason to strengthen the faith by proofs and testimonies. With the confirmation of the experience, the reason shall be able to convince so strongly about the truth of the faith that even an unbelieving should be convinced (DT 3:5). Indeed, one must be crazy – mente captus – if one is not convinced (DT 3:20). However, the purpose of the De Trinitate is not to convert infidels. The aim of the treaty is not primarily apologetic. The work is written for those who are believers already (DT 1:2; 5:21 et passim). Richard’s intention consists of letting reason and experience enter the statements of the faith about God. In other words, Richard gives the reason the task to work out an experimentally based commentary to the Creed’s statements about God. d. The Necessary Reasons

It is on this background that Richard’s use of rationes necessariae shall be understood. As mentioned above, Richard declares to give experimental proofs (DT 1:5) that will be based on reasons, rationes, not only probabiles, but necessary, necessariae (DT 1:4). And Richard gives the reason why it is possible to give necessary reasons for the divine being and substance in this way: ‘For I believe without a doubt that for the explanation of anything that necessarily exists there cannot lack not only probable but certainly also necessary arguments, even though they may lie outside our capacity here on earth’ (DT 1:4). Thus, in the necessarily existing divine being, which is rational (DT 1:12; 4:20), there must be found a necessary ratio. In his rationes, Richard wants to uncover and express this rationality inherent in God. Richard’s use of the concept rationes necessariae is dependent on Augustine and Anselm. Augustine uses the expression rationes aeternae, and Anselm uses the same expression as Richard, rationes necessariae. Anselm uses the concept as an argument which is founded on the truth of the faith. The rationality of the necessity with which God is understood, is for Augustine, Anselm, and Richard not mathematical and

31

32

in tro ducti o n

deductive. On the contrary, it is inductive in relation to the revelation – to Richard with this special method that he gives his proofs by a rational reflection on basis of the experience of the reality which is interpreted by the faith.82 Richard’s confidence in the ability of the reason to form true expressions about the divine nature must not be confused with the much later phenomenon in the European intellectual history, the rationalism. Richard’s necessary rationes do not pretend to be scientific and philosophical proofs for the Trinity, made by an autonomous rational cognition. The misunderstanding, that Richard’s necessary reasons were thought as purely philosophical reasons as conditions for accepting the statements of the faith about God and the divine Trinity – just like the philosophy that Abélard was accused of –, has led to the accusation against Richard for an Abélardian ‘rationalism’.83 One cannot ignore that Richard may have been inspired by Abélard’s well-known confidence in the ability of the reason. In any way, Richard cannot be called an anti-dialectician like Bernard of Clairvaux. However, it is not right to place Richard on the same line as Abélard. It is true about Richard, as about Anselm, that the Christian faith is the absolute starting point for all cognition of the truth. There exists no pure, truly independent philosophical cognition. But the faith does not prevent that one wants to understand with one’s reason what one believes.84 With the intention to defend Richard against the accusation of rationalism, some researchers have proposed that Richard not at all thinks of ‘necessary’ reasons, but actually just of ‘probable’ reasons.85 However, Richard’s formulations do not need reservations of this kind when the concept of ‘rationes necessariae’ is understood in continuation of the Augustinian-Anselmian tradition. Undoubtedly, it is the influence of the Thomism which has caused the misunderstanding of Richard’s necessary rationes. Thomas accepts the expression of necessary reasons about the reasons inherent in God, but he must reject that there can be put forward rational reasons for the divine Trinity. To Thomas the reasonable knowledge consists of mathematical-logical argumentations which can prove the existence of God, but not God’s Trinity.86 This Thomistic delimitation of the rational cognition in relation to the field of the faith has also led to the accusation against Richard for confusing the limit between faith

82 Cf. Jacquin (1930) and Jansen (1930). This is also how Thomas Aquinas understands Richard in De Veritate q. 14 (De fide), art. 9, ad 1: ‘Any truth, that can be understood, can also be proved by a necessary reason, and according to Richard of Saint-Victor, all the truths of the faith must have a reason, “not only probable, but necessary”; ergo, one can have knowledge about the truths of the faith’. 83 Thus, Heitz (1909), 80–84, and Bligh (1960), 118–139. 84 Cf. Gilson (1955), 113 s.; 128 s.; 155 s.; 162 s. 85 Ribaillier (1958), 21: ‘Pour Richard, les “rationes necessariae” ne signifient évidemment pas que les mystères de la foi soient accesibles à l’homme, mais qu’il est capable de percevoir la non contradiction qu’il y a entre les données de la Révélation et les exigences de la raison’; Ebner (1917), 91: ‘Der Ausdruck “Rationes necessariae” darf jedenfalls nicht im stricktem Sinne genommen werden’; Wulf (1934), 223: ‘Il ne faut pas prendre la formule a la lettre’. 86 Cf. Gilson (1921), 101 s.; M. Grabmann (1948), Die theologische Erkenntnis – und die Einleitungslehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin auf Grund seiner Schrift ‘In Boethium de Trinitate’, ThomSt 4, 97 s.

i nt ro d u ct i o n

and reason.87 To this accusation one must give the same answer which was given above to the accusation of rationalism in Richard’s theological method. e. Reason and Mysticism

De Trinitate is Richard’s greatest contribution to the dogmatic theology, but the treatise has also an affinity with the field of mystical theology. In the prologue of De Trinitate, Richard explains how the knowledge of the truth is not only grounded on the words of the faith, but also on a life of faith. The faith implies, Richard says, that the believers are hoping for a reward from God when they are seeking him. The hope implies that they expect something good from God. By this they love him. When they love God, he will also love them and reveal himself to them. By this they get knowledge about the divine. When God in Christ reveals himself to them, they recognize God and Christ. By this they gain the eternal life. So, the path leads from faith to knowledge through hope and love. Richard does not talk about ‘the believers’, he says ‘we’. The ascent to knowledge of the divine is also expressed in another way. We shall follow Paul, Richard says, up to the third heaven, indeed, we shall follow Christ, our ‘head’, up to the heaven, as we go with the Holy Spirit who has descended so that the human spirit can ascend with him. The spiritual ascent to the heaven is called an introduction into insight in the eternal ‘by the grace of contemplation’. Contemplation is a main concept in Richard’s mystical theology. Indeed, it is possible for the contemplative reflection to ascend to the insight in the divine trinity. Richard has systematized his understanding of contemplation in his Benjamin major in which he divides the contemplation up into three ‘areas’ defined by the contemplated object. The imagination, imaginatio, works in the first aera. Reason, ratio, works in the second area, and the intelligence, intelligentia, works in the third area. Each of these areas is divided into two ‘degrees’. So, the contemplation has six degrees.88 In the first degree the visible things’ form and image are considered and here the vestigia of the Creator are seen (PL 196:70c). In the creation the Creator is admired (79a). In the visible things the works and morals of the nature and the arts are seen, including the human and divine institutions (laws and sacraments) (82c–83d). In the second degree the reason – ratiocinando – explores the knowledge of the imagination and extracts the rationes of this. In this degree the contemplation has the same object as in the first degree, but it looks deeper into God’s order and ways in the creation and the history (87d s.). In the third degree the human spirit ascends to seeing the invisible (89d s.). Invisibilia Dei are seen per ea quae facta sunt (the invisible things of God are seen by means of the created things, Rom 1:20). By the analogy with the visible things the reason extracts definitions about the qualities of the invisible. However, the likenesses have different degrees (90c). In the first degree of this there is analogy between

87 Cf. Régnon (1892), 52 s. 88 Cf. Andres (1921) and Robilliard (1939).

33

34

in tro ducti o n

the corporeal things and the created invisible things (90d); in the second degree there is analogy between the invisible created things and God, because the radiance from God’s majesty is shining here (90d). This is especially the case in the analogy between the soul and the divine wisdom. In the fourth degree, ratio is dealing with the intelligibilia, the soul, the angels, and the divine truths (71c-d). The passage to this goes through the human person: ‘Redeas as teipsum, intres ad cor tuum, disceas spiritum tuum’ (113a).89 Here the mystical vision begins. The human person shall sink into himself for the consideration of the spiritual. The consideration of oneself includes the intelligentia spiritualium and paves the way for the knowledge of the divine spirit (71c, 113b). The soul is understood as the oculus intelligentiae and is the main object of the fourth contemplation as the soul owns the clearest vestigia Dei (51c s., 161d, 164a). The objects of the fifth degree lie above the reason, supra rationem (72a). In the fifth degree the work of the reason is dependent on the divine illumination and elevation (78b). The objects are all that the faith teaches about God’s highest and most simple nature, but they are not against – praeter – the reason since they do not contradict the reason (72a). This contemplation understands that all is one in God (156c). In the sixth degree the objects are not only above, but preater rationem. It considers the big mysteries: The Trinity, the incarnation, the double nature of Christ and the eucharist (158a). It is the intelligentia that works in the fifth and sixth contemplation. We notice that the degrees of the contemplation do not form an ascent so that one degree excludes the other. The division of the degrees follows the objects of the contemplation. The contemplation includes all the degrees, but different things are considered. As it has been suggested, one should rather talk about the different genres of contemplation than about degrees of contemplation.90 The contemplation by itself, in all its degrees, is also defined by Richard as the clear appearance of the truth followed by the soul’s joy and happiness in the beauty of the truth.91 Richard’s theory of the contemplation is also to be seen several times in De Trinitate. The three heavens in the Prologue correspond to the three areas of the contemplation. The sphere of the human spirit corresponds to the consideration of the traces of God in the visible (first and second degree); the sphere of the angelic spirit corresponds to the consideration of the invisible and the understanding of its rational order (third and fourth degree); and the sphere of the divine spirit corresponds to the consideration of God’s unity and plurality and the order of the uncreated (fifth

89 One can notice the similarity between Richard and medieval Socratism with its motto ‘Cognosce teipsum’, cf. J. Daniélou (1947), ‘Les sources bibliques de la mystique d’Origène’, RAM 23, 130, and Gilson (1944), 214–233. 90 Cf. Javelet (1959), 125. 91 Cf. Benjamin major 1,4 and Nonnullae allegoriae Tabernaculi foederis, (PL 196:67d and 193c respectively).

i nt ro d u ct i o n

and sixth degree). In all the places, where Richard considers the order of the truth, he sees its harmonious beauty.92 In several places in De Trinitate, Richard uses the harmonious beauty of the truth as an argument. The divine truth, which is the highest truth, is also the highest beauty, he says. And the highest beauty must have a harmonious structure according to Richard (DT 4:25; cf. 5:2). Thus, it is an argument for an allegation if it seems to further a harmony: ‘Who will say that there is or can be anything in the highest beauty which diminishes the beauty and confuses the order?’ (DT 5:14). The consideration of the truth is also combined with the enjoyment of its beauty. Richard expresses himself with enthusiasm: ‘there is the highest joy in the contemplation of these truths. They are the highest riches; they are the everlasting pleasures; tasting them is an intimate sweetness and enjoying them is an unending delight’ (DT 1:3). In some way the entire De Trinitate can be said to be a contemplative work. The first two books consider the unity of God, corresponding to the fifth degree of contemplation. The rest of the treatise considers God’s trinity, corresponding to the sixth degree of contemplation. Again, it must be said that De Trinitate is not a mystical-theological work, but the treatise is a rational reflection on the contemplated truth. The relationship between the contemplation and the rational speculation is already pointed out in the Prologue, as also mentioned above. Here Richard declares that he wants to aim at an elevatio, an elevation in the spirit, an introduction to the knowledge about the eternal ‘by the grace of contemplation’. The faith is not enough, we must also catch the knowledge from the contemplation; but at once it is said: ‘might it be given to us with the witness of the reason also to prove what we believe’. So, the contemplative knowledge is not detached from the rational cognition. The knowledge, which is received from God in the mystical vision, in the visio of the contemplation, shall be confirmed by the witness of the reason, even proofs. However, as mentioned, Richard calls the sixth degree of contemplation praeter rationem. But to Richard the highest degree of contemplation does not mean that the reasonable world is left behind. The degrees of contemplations consist, according to Richard, of a continuous ascent in which the ratiocinatio is left out in the two highest degrees, but not so the intelligentia; in the two highest degrees the knowledge simply becomes clearer, it becomes ‘pure knowledge’.93 Ratio draws itself back in the two highest degrees, but the mens does not.94 Thus, the two highest degrees are super-rational, but they are – as it has been said – not anti-rational.95 So, the ‘grace of contemplation’ involves both an empirical, a rational, and a mental knowledge.

92 Cf. Salet (1964), 76 s. with reference to Benjamin minor 74, PL 196:53a-d, Benjamin major 8, PL 196:118b, and Adnotationes mysticae in Psalmos 11, PL 196:270d–271a. 93 Cf. Ivánka (1955) in which Richard’s theory of contemplation is compared to that of Thomas Gallus – also a Victorine, dead 1246 – and that of Bonaventure. Both these authors are building on Richard’s systematism, but they isolate the two highest degrees from the other defining them as purely affective-mystical ‘cognition’. Richard, instead, maintains the continuity from the first degrees’ experientia, the two following degrees’ ratiocinatio, to the highest degrees’ intelligentia. 94 Cf. R. Javelet, art. ‘Extase’, DSAM 4:2118; cf. DT prol.: ‘nos ascendamus mente’. 95 Cf. Ivánka (1956), 36 s.

35

36

in tro ducti o n

In the elevation of the mind, in which the mind is raised above itself in the excessus mentis, sublevatio, and the alienatio – expressions from the Benjamin major – the intellect grasps the ‘rays’, as it is said in the Prologue of the De Trinitate, from the contemplative visio. After this, the insight is perceived and analyzed by the reason, just as it is confirmed or contradicted by the experience. At the same time as the contemplative knowledge of the divine truths is mental-intellectual and not irrational, the contemplation is also affective in Richard’s system. The contemplative understanding is conditioned by the love, Richard says in the Prologue to the De Trinitate. Without love, there is no revelation, and thus no contemplation or knowledge and thus no rational understanding. There is no understanding without the love: ‘Whatever I would have if I did not have love of neighbor would not be good for me [1 Cor 13:3]. And you hear from the mouth of Truth what the fruit of love of neighbor is: If someone loves me, then he will be loved by my Father, and I will love him and will reveal myself to him [ Jn 14:21]. Thus, out of love comes revelation, and out of revelation comes contemplation, and out of contemplation comes understanding’ (DT, prol.). So, it is through the experience of love that the knowledge about God is obtained. Love, and especially caritas plays an important role in Richard’s thinking. The most important work about love – besides the third book of De Trinitate – is De quattuor gradibus violentae caritatis, in which Richard systematizes love in four degrees.96 The degrees stand for the degree of the absorption and the transformation in the union of the lovers. Richard talks about the experience of love in general, but it is basically about the love between the soul and God. Shortly described, the first degree of love is the awakened longing for the beloved (God). The soul is ‘wounded’ and is longing incessantly. In the second degree, the loved one is seen and recognized, and the soul is raised up to God where the soul is ‘bound’ to him. In the third degree, the soul’s excessus happens, and the soul is transformed into the divine love. The soul pays no attention to anyone but the loved one. In the fourth degree the soul has become fully united with God. The human soul is now totally identified with Christ and is led into knowledge of the divine persons. In this fourth degree of unification, in the highest form of the intense love, the soul experiences the divine love itself. Thus, in its highest display, the love of God involves a knowledge of God. Where there is love, there is also knowledge, Richard says: ‘Ubi caritas, ibi oculus!’97 The melting together of the soul with God, and the knowledge of God in this, is also to be seen in Richard’s thought about the sending of the Holy Spirit (DT 6:14).98 After having distinguished between the ‘free’ and the ‘indebted’ love in God as expressions of the giving and receiving between the divine persons, Richard defines the proprietas of the Holy Spirit as the indebted love, amor debitus. When 96 Here is used the edition PL 196:1207–1224. 97 Benjamin minor (PL 196:10a). The fourth degree of love is thus part of the widespread tradition, especially in the twelfth century, of seeing God in the human love united with God, cf. William of Saint-Thierry’s theory of the Unitas Spiritus and Peter Lombard and many others’ interpretation of Rom 5:5, see Rydstrøm-Poulsen (2002), 251–307 and 380–434. 98 See also Richard’s De missione Spiritus sancti.

i nt ro d u ct i o n

the Holy Spirit is sent and spreads the love in our hearts (cf. Rom 5:5), the human person receives the indebted love: ‘When this Spirit enters into the rational spirit, it inflames its feeling with divine glow and transforms it into likeness with its property, so that the rational spirit can give to its author the love which it owes’ (DT 6:14). It is explained by the image of the fire that transforms the iron: ‘For what is the Holy Spirit other than divine fire? All love is fire, but spiritual fire. What the physical fire does to the iron, the spiritual fire, that we talk about, does to the evil, cold, and hard heart. For in the setting on fire of the divine fire, the whole mind is set on fire and it is inflamed and becomes liquid in God’s love, according to the Apostle: The love of God is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us’ (Rom 5:5) (DT 6:14). The union of the soul with the Holy Spirit in the absorption and transformation, just as in the highest degree of the love, gives an impression of the coherence between the theological speculations of Richard and his mystical experience. However, it is remarkable that the soul, which is melting and transformed and absorbed into the Holy Spirit’s indebted love in the Trinity – the divine love itself – is thus absorbed into insight and mystical experience of the trinitarian movement of love itself – that this soul is called spiritus rationalis. It is not said that the Holy Spirit should reshape the soul into a spiritus affectionalis (and such an expression does not occur in De Trinitate) and thus excludes the rationality for a purely irrational affection. When the Holy Spirit goes into the rational spirit, Richard says, it inflames the affectus of this spirit. In this way love leads to revelation and knowledge,99 just as love is the condition at all for the realization of the rational and contemplative knowledge. In his Benjamin major Richard talks of the mystical experience of the divine secrets as a reward to those who eagerly and devoted contemplate and study the divine mysteries.100 From this thought, one could conclude that Richard looks at the rational theological speculations as a preparation for the intellectual-mystical visio which then is the reward. However, this is not the case; the order is the opposite. In the mystical writings the speculations about God are performed by means of the various contemplations. When the contemplation is about the Trinity, it is mystical, but, as mentioned above, it is not over-intellectual or irrational. The intelligentia grasps the ‘rays’ (DT, prol.), which, at the same time, involves joy and happiness over the beauty of the truth. The joy and the happiness are the expressions of the mental experience which the contemplation gives. In the same way, the love of God, in its highest devotion, includes a knowledge of God and a spiritual union with the divine love. Finally, as mentioned above, the mission of the Holy Spirit involves a knowledge of the inner-trinitarian amor debitus and an experience of this as ‘fire’, which is lit in the soul by the Holy Spirit. Seeing the divine truths involves the experience of an ‘intimate sweetness’ and an ‘unending delight’ (DT 1:3). Thus, in the highest degrees of the contemplation, in the love of God and in the unity with the Holy Spirit, the human person receives an inner experience and an intellectual knowledge. All these ways of understanding God are mystical.

99 Cf. Javelet (1961), 273–90 and 429–50; Vigneaux (1938), 57–61, and Landgraf (1935), 43–61. 100 Benjamin major 4,21 (PL 196:164a).

37

38

in tro ducti o n

The method in the De Trinitate answers then the question, how ratio is related to mysticism, according to Richard. On basis of the inner spiritual experience – and likewise, on basis of the external experience of the feelings of love –, Richard works out rational arguments for the divine substance. By this, Richard’s reasonings have a premise in the mystical experience. But just as it is the task of the reason to prove the words of the faith about God, it is the task of the reason, according to Richard, to transform the contemplative-intellectual vision of the divine truths into rational arguments. In the De Trinitate, the mystically viewed and experienced truth becomes displayed rationally and formed logically. Finally, the reason shall show that the statement of the faith and the witness of the human experience agree with each other. Thus, it is Richard’s method in the De Trinitate to transform the mystical visio of the divine love’s reality as a threefold harmony of the highest beauty into a clear and obvious reason, confirmed by the human experience.

4. Love and Trinity a. Love and the Highest Love

The central and original in Richard of Saint-Victor’s contribution to the field of trinitarian theology consists of the fact that he is seeking insight in God’s substance as love on basis of the experience of the human love. That this method is possible for Richard is due to – as described in the previous paragraph – Richard’s background in the Augustinian understanding of the coherence between the created and the uncreated. The exemplar-thought and illumination-theory of Augustine, which again is built on the faith in the creation of the humanity in the image of the Creator, lie behind. The continuum-thought of the Augustinianism includes an understanding of the created reality as vestiges and images of the divine reality. It is a consequence of this that Richard involves the experience as a source of the understanding of God. Thus, it is Richard’s understanding that he, in the investigation – that is, by experiencing and analyzing the experience rationally – of the human love, gains insight in the divine love. In this way he arrives at the description of the inner life of God which he sees as a harmonious and dynamic display of interpersonal love among three equal persons. In the most perfect display of the human love, in which the human persons devote themselves totally in the love of one another, Richard sees the reflection of the divine love in which the trinitarian persons mutually love one another as eternally self-transcendent persons. The most important definitions of love, under the name of caritas, are to be found in De Trinitate’s third book, the second chapter. First, caritas is defined as the highest value in the created universe: ‘nothing is better than charity, nothing is more joyful than charity’. This definition is based on experience. That the love is the best and most happy, Richard says, is confirmed by the conscience and ‘multiple experiences’ (DT 3:3). Secondly, caritas is defined as altruistic. Even though Richard often uses other words about love in the same meaning as caritas – amor and dilectio –, he only connects the definition of altruism to caritas as the special proprietas of this kind of

i nt ro d u ct i o n

love (DT 3:2). Richard has taken this characterization from Gregory the Great who wrote: ‘sed dilectio in alterum tendit, ut caritas esse possit’.101 Richard’s formulation sounds: ‘Oportet itaque ut amor in alterum tendat, ut caritas esse queat’ (DT 3:2). Now, it is Richard’s thesis that the caritas, thus defined, in its most perfect form, necessarily must be identical with the divine love. The thesis is already supported by the proofs of God’s existence in the first two books of De Trinitate. God’s being is here defined as the highest of everything: ‘quo nichil est majus, nichil est melius’ (DT 1:11), and God is so by himself: ‘a semetipso’ (DT 1:8). When God is all the best and the highest to be defined, and when God is all what he is, by himself, God must also be identical with the highest good, summum bonum (DT 2:16). All is one and identical in God, and therefore all the properties must be identical with the divine substance (DT 2:17). Therefore, what can be said about the divine substance, can also be said about the properties of this substance. So, what is called the divine persons must be identical with the divine substance. Thus, there must identity between what is in God and that by which it exists. The definition summum bonum, must then be valid both substantially and existentially in God.102 This thinking is a condition for understanding Richard’s explanation of the divine trinity of persons on basis of the divine substance as the plenitudo bonitatis. But we miss another precondition for understanding that Richard can complete this definition of God as the fullness of the Good with the definitions of the human goodness. This precondition again lies in the Augustinian participation-theory and continuum-thinking as described above in the previous paragraph. The ontological and epistemological participation between God and humanity shows the continuity between God and all that has originated from him as Creator. However, Richard defines the divine being as supersubstantialis essentia or supersubstantiale esse (DT 2:22; 4:16.18.19; 5:1). But despite these formulations which express the fundamental transcendence of the divine substance, the continuity and the participation are not broken in Richard’s Augustinian universe of thought. The formulations might remind of the pseudo-Dionysian hyperúsias-concept, and if they were dependent on this, they would describe a dichotomic separation of the created and uncreated being. But this is not the case in Richard’s plenitudo. Therefore, Richard can say that one must ‘attribute to God whatever is the highest according to human estimation’ (DT 1:20). Now, on this premise Richard can maintain that caritas, which according general human consensus is the highest bonitas in the human world, necessarily must be in God who is the highest bonitas. Therefore, God must necessarily be summa caritas

101 Gregory the Great, XL Homiliarum in Evangelia 1,17,1 (PL 76:1139a), cf. Éthier (1939), 91, note 2, and Guimet (1943–45), 376 s. On Gregory’s general influence on the Victorines, see R. Wasserlynck (1953), ‘La part des “moralia in Job” de S. Grégoire-le-Grand dans les “Miscellanea” victorins’, MSR 10, 289–92, and (1965) ‘Présence de Saint Grégoire le Grand dans les recueils canoniques (X-XIIe siècles)’, MSR 22, 205–19. 102 Richard defines the divine person as ex-sistentia, a being which is dependent on its offspring, its origin (ex); Richard defines the difference between the persons on basis of the ex as the way in which the person absorbs its being, modus obtinentia (DT 4:11–12). On Richard’s theory of the person see Wipfler (1965), 53–91 and Cousins (1966), 171–232.

39

40

in tro ducti o n

(DT 3:2). The experience of the human caritas will then – thought in its highest form as summa caritas – have implications for the definitions about God’s being, God’s substance, his essence, and his persons. Thus, the experience of the love of neighbor involves an insight in God’s personal being. When the reason analyses the experience of love, it will, according to Richard, also uncover the immanent truths of God, God’s rationes necessariae. b. Caritas ordinata and amor discretus

The love of neighbor was defined as altruistic. So, the love as caritas must always have an object outside the loving subject. By this, love of oneself, amor privatus, is excluded from the caritas-love. Consequently, for being true love of neighbor, God’s love must be love of another. The question is now: could this other be a created person? Richard rejects this possibility referring to the highest love’s character of being caritas ordinata. This concept is decisive for the argumentation in the third book of De Trinitate. In its highest form, the love of neighbor must, as altruistic love, love another with the highest love. The right measure is defined by the beloved object. So, the caritas does not have the highest degree of perfection if the beloved object is not worthy of the highest love. Therefore, the love in God would be inordinata if God loved the creation with the highest love since the creation is not worthy of the highest love. Any created person is tied to the natura corrupta. This is also the case with the angels since they, as created, are not eternal by nature. Thus, the love can only be ordinata in its highest form if it is displayed between absolute equally worthy persons. So, the highest love can only be given to someone who is just as worthy as the one who is able to love with the highest love. The concept of caritas ordinata may seem to be a theoretical and rigorous understanding of love out of touch with the living love among humans. However, to Richard, the order is an inalienable quality in anything beautiful and true (DT 4:25; 5:2 et passim). Therefore, it is an argument for the truth of a statement that it furthers the harmony and the order (DT 5:14). The order of love can also be seen in the Gospel’s ideal of loving one’s neighbor as oneself.103 Now, the only equally worthy to God is God himself. Therefore, the equally worthy must be found in God himself. There must, therefore, be found a condignus in God. And consequently, in this one and highest simple divine substance there must necessarily exist a plurality of persons, Richard argues. It is also rejected by another property of the love of neighbor that there should be anything disorderly or chaotic in God. Thus, the love of neighbor is accompanied by a rational evaluation, a distinction. There is no caritas without an estimation of the beloved object. According to Richard, the love of neighbor does never give itself

103 Cf. Guimet (1948), 225 ss., and Chatillon (1948), 65–66. The commentaries on the Song of Songs in the twelfth century uses the Songs. 2:4b (Vulg.) ‘ordinare in me caritatem’ as the occasion for defining the order of love, cf. Guimet (1943–45), 379 s.

i nt ro d u ct i o n

blindly, it is never irrational. It loves in the right measure another who is worthy of this love. Richard calls this rationality in the love of neighbor for amor discretus. Therefore, in the highest and most perfect love of neighbor, caritas is inseparable from amor discretus. The love in God is never displayed independently of the divine sapientia – as Richard says: the flame of love burns as the highest wisdom orders. In its highest display the love of neighbor follows the discretionis regula (DT 3:7). Now, in accordance with these definitions of the love of neighbor, Richard can maintain that there must be perfect likeness between the loving persons in God. The perfect love of neighbor can only be displayed between persons in summa equalitas and summa similitudo (DT 3:7). When persons are totally equal, it must likewise be so that they are fully identical in the interaction and, thus, they are mutual. To Richard, love in its nature is never condescending or ambitiously victorious; the true love is displayed between equally worthy persons in a mutual relationship of identical giving and receiving. The mutuality is even called ipsius amoris proprietas (DT 3:7). So, the divine love is necessarily reciprocal or mutuus (DT 3:3.7.11). If not, there would be a difference in God. c. Condilectio

At this point, Richard has explained that there must be at least two persons where there is love of neighbor. The two persons must be perfectly equal, and each of them must love the other with the same love with which they love themselves. But is the possibility of a selfish amor privatus then excluded? There would exist a self-love if a person condescendingly loved a person of lower dignity. Then, the self-love would be greater than the love of neighbor, which would result in an amor privatus. Richard rejects this kind of love that does not respect that the love of another person shall be just as great as that love which the loving person has for himself. However, Richard argues, such a self-love is not excluded in even the most perfect love relationship between two equally worthy persons. Richard is aware of the possible, or even the fundamental, selfishness of the one-to-one relationship. For both the loving persons will each have reason to have a private happiness for their relationship (DT 3:11). The ‘joy and happiness’ will grow in each of them (DT 3:18). This does not disturb the equality between them, but it breaks with the fundamental altruism of caritas. Caritas must always share and make common; summa caritas will always require perfect communicatio and communio. When there is an amor privatus in the relationship, the one-to-one relationship cannot realize the highest love of neighbor. The highest love of neighbor is instead realized in the relationship which Richard calls condilectio. The word is invented by Richard and is difficult to translate into English: co-relationship or co-love. The concept does not add anything new to the mentioned definitions of caritas; it is just a logical consequence of the definition of the love of neighbor as altruistic and ordinata. The condilectio stands for the relationship in which everything can be shared. The love between two persons involved an amor privatus which is unacceptable for the altruistic love. This selfishness, which fundamentally is against the essence of love, according to Richard, is now removed in the condilectio

41

42

in tro ducti o n

relationship, because in this relationship there is now a co-loved person, a condilectus, with whom both the loving persons will share their happiness. Thus, in principle, the selfishness of the one-to-one relationship is broken by the introduction of the third co-loved person, with whom both the loving persons have the same relationship as they have with each other. ‘In the mutual and most glowing love there is nothing more wonderful and nothing more beautiful than you want that the one, whom you love above everything and by whom also you are loved above everything, also loves another person with the same love’ (DT 3:11). Because of the caritas ordinata and amor discretus, the third person in the divine nature must be an absolute equally worthy person, that is, a divine person (DT 3:11.18.19). The condilectus-person is, with the same necessity as the condignus-person, fully equal and identical with the two other persons. Richard’s arguments for the condignus (DT 3:2–4) are the same as the arguments for the condignus (DT 3:11–13); after his rationationes, Richard exclaims ‘See the triple cord which … by the gift of God’s wisdom firmly binds any madman who fights against our faith’! (DT 3:5, cf. 3:13). The properties of love, according to Richard, can be said to have three levels.104 On the first level there is the self-love, amor sui, which cannot be called love of neighbor since it is not altruistic. On the second level is the love which has another person as its object; that is caritas. On the third and highest level we find the mutual love between two persons and their love opens up for a third person, ‘where the feelings of both are melting together in the inflammation of love of the third person’ (DT 3:19); this is condilectio or summa caritas. Each level means that the humanity participates at a higher degree in the perfection of love. And the highest perfection is the divine love itself that realizes the condilectio in an eternal and unchangeable perfection which can never be reached in the human world. However, the thought implies that the love, that God is, and from which all love originates, is also the love which all human love will be aiming at. Thus, to Richard, the condilectio is the expression of the fundamental essence and dynamics of life, whether it is in the human or the divine personal existence. d. Unity and Plurality in Love

Thus, the condilectio is the full realization of caritas, according to Richard. It excludes the amor privatus and ensures the perfect communicatio amoris. The perfect communicatio amoris means the full giving of the loving persons themselves to each other. In the summa caritas the loving persons give themselves up to one another in the mutual relationship. Thus, the highest love is an intimate union. But it is obvious that Richard is concerned with an interpersonal love-relationship. The integrity of the loving persons is never dissolved in this perfect communicatio. If also the individual personality was communicated, and thus was dissolved and united, one could, Richard argues, just as well say that one person was two and two were one (DT 4:17). If the persons were dissolved there would no longer exist any personal relationship. And if 104 Cf. Cousins (1970), 80 s.

i nt ro d u ct i o n

the integrity of the person was not maintained in Richard’s thought about love, the human relationship of love could never be used for the explanation of the plurality in the divine one substance. By maintaining the interpersonal character of love, Richard can manage to transfer the understanding of the human love to the divine nature and underline the personal plurality of God in one substance. If the interpersonality did not stand firm, the unifying power of love, vis unitiva, would be the dominating feature, and then the human love would only be a vestigium – as in Augustine – of the Trinity, since it would only point at the unity of the divine substance. According to Richard, the highest relationship of love is thought as an ongoing exchange between equally loving persons of giving love, amor gratuitus, and reciprocating love, amor debitus (DT 5:17–19). The highest love is thus understood as movement, mutual exchange, giving and receiving, mutuality in its highest imagined form and most harmonious state. Richard’s experience of the nature of the human love as dynamic makes him view the divine being as a relationship of love between loving persons in a dynamic mutual relationship. The language of Richard reaches its climaxes when he tries to describe this relationship of love between the trinitarian persons. He uses images of exuberant water, abundance, and wawes: summi amoris affluentia, divinitatis unda (DT 5:23), just as the word for wave, unda, appears in many places in expressions as abundantia (DT 3:4.7.14.17, 5:17), amore abundare (DT 5:19), and delicie abundarent (DT 3:17). Undoubtedly, these metaphors of fluidity most be understood with some caution. They are poetical, approximative expressions of a contemplative visio of God’s inner life. The words are expressing a never static, but dynamic image of God, an always loving, giving, and receiving God. The danger might be, however, that these metaphors can be misunderstood as dependence on the pseudo-Dionysian ideas about love as ‘ecstatic’. By the ecstatic love the high scholastics understood a total submission, a radically altruistic love, a fusion between the loving persons with a loss of identity. And the ecstatic love is streaming freely and is centrifugal. Critics of Richard’s thought have seen, therefore, in Richard’s understanding of love as fundamentally altruistic and his metaphors of water and waves, signs of the ecstatic love ideas. By this, the division between the persons in the Trinity is dissolved, just as the limit between the ad intra and the ad extra of the Trinity is blurred.105 However, the idea of the ecstatic love is foreign to Richard’s understanding of caritas as altruistic. As described above, love, according to Richard, is always rational and distinguishing, so that it will not cross the limit between the ad intra and the ad extra of the Trinity, just as it realizes itself ‘orderly’, that is, without invalidating the personal integrity as the personal self-love is not abolished by the love of neighbor. Richard rejects also expressly any ‘disorderly effusion’, inordinata effusio, in God or from God to the creation (DT 3:4). But Richard is not in doubt about the gift of the love of God as the gift of the Holy Spirit to humans (DT 6:14). Richard’s experience of love has undoubtedly been the love between friends in a community. But his enthusiastic mention of love as the greatest, most beautiful, 105 Cf. Gélot (1938), 11 s.

43

44

in tro ducti o n

and the best in all the living, gives no reason to assume that his experience of love should have been less intense than for instance Abélard’s in his love of Héloïse! Why should love between friends be less than this? The question about Richard’s personal experience of love, about which he never mentions anything, may in a way be irrelevant. He is concerned about the matter in De Trinitate, and the essential for Richard is here to point at the experience of the human love as the source for the understanding of God. Knowledge of God by means of the human love has been considered before in the theological tradition,106 but nobody has as Richard set up an image of the Trinity with such a consequent method and on basis on the concept of caritas. Nobody has as he drawn an image of God after the structures of the human interpersonal love. It has been discussed whether Richard is ‘Latin’ or ‘Greek’ oriented in his approach to the mystery of the Trinity. In the Latin tradition the definition of God’s nature leads to the definition of the persons, whereas in the Greek tradition a definition of the persons leads to a definition of God’s one nature. On the one side it can be maintained that Richard takes his starting-point in the definitions about God’s unity (Book I and II), and that he, out from these definitions, deducts the trinitarian persons as the different properties of God’s substantial being as love. On the other hand, one can maintain that Richard in his Book III of the De Trinitate in fact does not deduct from the unity of God, but from a concept of love, which has already been defined as interpersonal, and, thus, does not require, but presupposes a plurality of persons. In this case Richard works like the ‘Greek’ by going from the definition of the plurality to the definition of the unity of the divine nature as mutual love. It is the general understanding that Richard in this way is ‘Greek’, which, however, he in another connection refuses to be.107 However, Richard is not clearly ‘Greek’ or ‘Latin’ oriented. His method in De Trinitate is first to argue for the unity of God (Book One and Two). Thereafter, he argues on new premises for the plurality of God (Book Three). Richard does not prove the Trinity in the third book; here he does not go further than showing that there must necessarily be a plurality and at least three persons in God, since God is love. If you say that God is love, you will also have to say that there are three persons in God. You must either confirm that there are three persons in God, or you must deny that God is love. That is the result of the third book. Not until Book Four it is the task to compare the two results, the unity of God and the plurality of God. And in Book Five Richard takes up the problem, which until now has lied unsolved in his argumentation, namely why there are only three persons in God? The argumentation in the third book does not exclude the possibility of a fourth person in the divinity or a fifth, etc. Why should not the happiness, that the three persons each have in

106 ‘Immo vero vides trinitatem, si caritatem vides’, Augustine, De Trinitate 8,8,12; ‘Amor ipse notitia est’, Gregory the Great, XL Homiliarum in Evangelia 2,27,4 (PL 76:1207a); ‘… imo quae Dei visio est; ego autem dico in charitate. Charitas illa visio, illa similitudo est’, Bernard of Clairvaux, In Cantica Canticorum, Sermo 82,8 (PL 183:1181ab). 107 ‘Ut de nomine ypostaseos taceamus … de nomine greco taceamus, qui greci non sumus’, DT 4:4.

i nt ro d u ct i o n

the condilectio-relationship, not rightly be shared with a new condilectus, so that any suspicion of an amor privatus in the three persons could be excluded? The arguments against a quaternitas may not seem convincing unless one will accept the argument about the harmony of triad in the highest truth (DT 5:15–21). e. Anthropomorphism?

In his explanation of the divine Trinity on basis of caritas, Richard is aware that he is talking ‘in the human way … about the divine’ (DT 3:18). However, he refers at once in the same chapter to the fact that the biblical authors do the same. Maybe he is thinking of 1 Jn 4:8 and 4:16 where God is defined as agápë. In any case, Richard reasons in this way, that if all agree that what is called God must be the Highest Good, then the love, which is the highest good in the world of experience, must also be found in God. What can be said with logical necessity about the human love – thought in its highest form as summa caritas – must also be said with necessity about God, Richard reasons. Is Richard then guilty of anthropomorphism? Some critics are of this opinion. They cannot accept that Richard lets the altruistic mutual love, which he finds is the highest display of love in the created nature, apply to the definition of God’s love. Specifically, Richard is accused of maintaining that the altruism of the highest love both excludes the divine amor sui, which must be natural for the highest of all, and binds God to a mutuality in his natural unity which is foreign to the unity.108 These objections have in common that they misunderstand Richard’s thought as if the love of neighbor or the interpersonal love should be in opposition to the selflove. As it has been mentioned above that is not the case. Amor sui is the right measure of the love of neighbor in the caritas ordinata and thus a precondition of the highest realization of love of neighbor. The selflove is identical with the love of neighbor in God. The ‘order’ of caritas is love of others according to the evangelical measure sicut teipsum. It is characteristic that all the critics are referring to Thomas Aquinas in different ways.109 Partly because Thomas defines the divine love as amor sui, partly because

108 According to Penido (1937), 60 s., Richard excludes the amor sui in God’s love and add to God ‘un caractère de réciprocité dont celui manque’; the altruistic character of the human love makes Richard ‘bind’ God to a mutuality which is foreign to him, cf. Penido (1931), 212; Penido concludes that Richard’s trinitarian theory is clearly anthropomorphic: ‘Loin que Richard nous paraisse avoir édifiée “theoriam elegantissimam” [thus according to Alexander of Hales], nous croyons que sa tentative pour transposer en Dieu l’amitié est a ranger parmi les examples achevés d’anthropomorphisme théologique … Il faut abandonner sa conception de l’amour mutuel en Dieu’ (1931), 67. Penido’s criticism finds an echo in Gélot (1938), 20, who reads Richard thus, that ‘the natural love’, amor sui, should exclude the presence of ‘the personal love of friendship’, amor mutuus, and vice versa. Also Bligh (1960), 139, cannot accept that caritas, according to Richard, is above amor sui in the divine nature – that is precisely Richard’s ‘fallacy’, ‘Thus Richard departs from Augustine in defining “caritas” so as to exclude selflove; and it is precisely at this point that his attempted demonstration of the Trinity is fallacious’. Finally, Simonis (1972), 114, joins Penido’s critique. 109 Penido (1937), 58 s.; Gelot (1938), 26; Bligh (1960), 138; and Simonis (1972), 114, who, as mentioned, follows Penido who – as he writes – goes out ‘vom sicheren Boden des Thomismus’.

45

46

in tro ducti o n

Thomas excludes the possibility that the reason can attain to knowledge of the trinitarian persons.110 The reason can understand the essence of God, but not his personal being ad intra. However, the criticism against Richard for letting the altruistic caritas exclude the amor sui in God is a mistake according to the above. But Richard does not think with the same dichotomy between faith and reason as Thomas and the Thomistic critics of Richard do. If Richard did so, God would be fully understood by logical-scientific reasonings and in Richard’s version, the understanding of God would be clearly anthropomorphic. But Richard does not distinguish between faith and reason in the Thomistic way. As shown above, Richard’s method is different. Richard’s thinking operates within an Augustinian universe of thought in which all is hold together in a plenitudo. The universal truth is one, and the faith works together with the reason and the experience. The truth is one, and it is manifesting itself in different ways and can be understood in different ways. God is the entire truth which interim communicates itself in different ways but not entirely. When the humanity reaches the ibi, it can understand God fully, but hic the entire truth – God – will continue to be a mystery. When Richard talks about God in De Trinitate it happens on basis of the faith. The faith in the triune God goes before the rational proofs for the Trinity of God. The mystery remains sovereign, but it can be approached. From the statements of the faith we know something, from the experience of faith we know something, and with the reason we shall seek to penetrate the full and entire truth about God (DT 1:1). However, we cannot be sure that we will succeed (DT 3:1). In Richard’s universe, the conclusions of the reason are called proofs. As it has been pointed out,111 this is not how we will understand proofs today, because a modern universe of thought is different; we will not accept proofs on basis of the faith. In the modern Western post-Kantian philosophy, it is not acceptable that the reason and the experience and the faith can contribute to the understanding of the one and same reality. When Richard talks about experience and reason it must be understood as faith-transformed experience and reason. Richard’s rationes necessariae are not philosophical-scientific arguments when they are about God’s trinity of persons. Richard’s rationes are resting on the faith. The construction of necessary reasons builds on the world of faith and is, in fact, what we today would call a systematic-theological work that wants to show the logical structure of the given truth, formulated by the faith on basis of the tradition. So, it does not abolish the transcendence of God when Richard talks ‘in the human way … about the divine’. But still, the argument of Richard is clearly that God is to

110 Thomas writes in art. 1 in Summa Theologica 1, q. 32, (Ottawa: 1953), 209a: ‘homo per rationem naturalem in cognitionem Dei pervenire non potest nisi ex creaturis. Creatura autem ducunt in Dei cognitionem, sicut effectus in causam. Hoc igitur solum ratione naturali de Deo cognosci potest, quod competere ei necesse est secundum quod est omnium entium principium … Virtus autem creativa Dei est communis toti Trinitati, unde pertinet ad unitatem essentiae, non ad distinctionem personarum. Per rationem igitur naturalem cognosci possunt de Deo ea quae pertinet ad unitatem essentiae, non autem ea quae pertinet ad distinctionem Personarum’. 111 Cf. Dumeige (1963), 213 s.

i nt ro d u ct i o n

be seen and understood in the reality of love; when the highest of all, God, is love, then the divinity must also be understood in and by the highest of all in the human world which is love. As Richard reasons, the highest and the best of all must also be the highest and the best of all that we know.

47

Text and Translation

INCIPIT PROLOGUS LIBRI RICHARDI DE SANCTO VICTORE DE TRINITATE1 Justus meus ex fide vivit. Apostolica sententia est simul et prophetica. Nam Apostolus dicit quod Propheta predicit, quia justus ex fide vivit. Si sic est, immo quia sic est, debemus utique studiose cogitare, frequenter retractare sacramenta fidei nostre. Sine fide namque inpossibile est placere Deo. Nam ubi non est fides, non potest esse spes. Oportet enim accedentem ad Deum credere quia est, et inquirentibus se remunerator sit; alioquin que spes esse poterit? Ubi autem non est spes, caritas esse non potest. Quis enim amet de quo nil boni speret? Per fidem igitur promovemur ad spem, et per spem proficimus ad caritatem. Quicquid autem habuero, si caritatem non habuero, nichil michi prodest. Quis autem sit fructus caritatis, audis ab ore Veritatis: Si quis diligit me, diligetur a Patre meo, et ego diligam eum, et manifestabo ei meipsum. Ex dilectione itaque manifestatio, et ex manifestatione contemplatio, et ex contemplatione cognitio. Cum autem Christus apparuerit, vita nostra, tunc et nos apparebimus cum ipso in gloria, et tunc similes ei erimus, quia videbimus eum sicuti est. Vides unde quo pervenitur, vel quibus gradibus ascenditur, mediante spe et caritate, de fide ad cognitionem divinam, et per cognitionem ad vitam eternam. Hec est autem, inquit, vita eterna, cognoscere te verum Deum, et quem misisti Jhesum Christum. Vita itaque ex fide, et vita ex cognitione. Ex fide vita interna, ex cognitione vita eterna. Ex fide vita illa qua interim vivimus bene, ex cognitione vita illa qua in futuro vivemus beate. Fides itaque totius boni initium est, atque fundamentum. Quam studiosos ergo in fide esse nos convenit, a qua omne bonum et fundamentum sumit, et firmamentum capit? Sed sicut in fide totius boni inchoatio, sic in cognitione totius boni consummatio atque perfectio. Feramur itaque ad perfectionem, et quibus profectuum gradibus possumus, properemus de fide ad cognitionem; satagamus, in quantum possumus, ut intelligamus quod credimus. Cogitemus quantum in hujusmodi cognitione studuerint, vel quousque profecerint mundi hujus philosophi, et pudeat nos in hac parte inferiores illis inveniri: Quod enim notum est Dei, manifestum est illis. Teste enim Apostolo, quia cum cognovissent Deum, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt. Cognoverunt ergo! Quid ergo nos facimus, qui ab ipsis cunabulis vere fidei traditionem accepimus? Amplius aliquid debet in nobis amor veritatis quam in illis potuit amor vanitatis; amplius aliquid nos in his posse oportebit quo fides dirigit, spes trahit, caritas inpellit. Parum ergo nobis debet esse que recta et vera sunt de Deo credere;



1 The title is safe: De Trinitate; all the manuscripts entitle the work in this way apart from 11 mss. in which the following variants appear: De unitate trinitatis, De summa trinitate, De sancta trinitate, De trinitate beatissima, De sancta et indivisa trinitate. The translation of the whole work is based on the critical edition of De Trinitate by J. Ribaillier in: Textes Philosophiques du Moyen Âge 6 (Paris: Vrin, 1958), 79-266. In some passages, however, a different reading has been chosen than that of the critical edition; it has been done with reference to the variants according to Ribaillier’s notes and after collation with the basic ms., Paris Mazarineus 769, in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, and the other to me available mss.: Vat.lat. 818, Vat.urb.lat. 103, in the Biblioteca Vaticana, Rome, and Assisi 98, in the Biblioteca communale, Assisi.

HERE BEGINS THE PROLOGUE OF RICHARD OF SAINT-VICTOR’S BOOK ON THE TRINITY My just one lives by faith [Heb 10:38; cf. Rom 1:17 and Gal 3:11]. These words are apostolic and prophetic as well, for the Apostle says what the Prophet predicts, namely that the just one lives by faith [Hab 2:4]. If this is so, indeed because this is so, we shall eagerly think about and again and again treat the mysteries of our faith. For without faith it is impossible to please God [Heb 11:6a]. Because, where there is no faith there cannot be hope. For anyone who comes closer to God must believe that he exists, and that he will reward those who seek him [Heb 11:6b]; if not, what hope could there be? Further, where there is no hope there cannot be any love of neighbor.1 For who will love someone from whom he does not hope for something good? Thus, by faith we are moved forward to hope and through hope we come to love of neighbor. Whatever I would have if I did not have love of neighbor would not be good for me [1 Cor 13:3]. And you hear from the mouth of Truth what the fruit of love of neighbor is: If someone loves me, then he will be loved by my Father, and I will love him and will reveal myself to him [ Jn 14:21]. Thus, out of love comes revelation, and out of revelation comes contemplation, and out of contemplation comes understanding. And when Christ, our life has revealed himself, then also we will appear with him in glory and then we will be like him because we will see him just as he is [Col 3:4]. Now you see our starting point and the grades through which we ascend: from faith through hope and love of neighbor to understanding of the divine and through this understanding to eternal life. And this is the eternal life, he says, to know you the true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent [1 Jn 3:2]. So, life comes from faith and from understanding. Faith brings the internal life, and the understanding brings the eternal life. From faith comes the life that we are living well here temporarily, and from the understanding comes the life that we will live happily in the future. So, faith is the beginning and the basis of everything good. How eager should we not be in the faith in which all the good both has its basis and gets its strength? But just as all the good has its beginning in faith, so all the good has its fulfilment and perfection in understanding. Let us, therefore, bring ourselves to perfection and hurry forward through the steps that we can from faith to understanding; let us strive as much as we can to understand what we believe. Let us think about how much the philosophers of this world have worked with this kind of understanding and how far they have reached with it, and we should feel ashamed if we should be found inferior in this: for what is known about God is revealed to them [Rom 1:19]. As the Apostle witnesses, even though they knew God they did not glorify him as God [Rom 1:21a]. So, in fact, they knew him! But what do we do, we who have received the true faith already in the cradle? Our love of the truth should be greater than their love of vanity; and we should be able to do better in this knowledge in which faith guides, hope draws, and love of neighbor compels. Therefore, it should not be enough for us just to believe what is right and true about God, but, as we

1 Definition of caritas in III:2.3.5.13.14.

52

te xt a n d tr a n s l at i o n – P ROLO G U S

sed satagamus, ut dictum est, que credimus intelligere. Nitamur semper, in quantum fas est vel fieri potest, comprehendere ratione quod tenemus ex fide. Sed quid mirum si ad divinitatis archana mens nostra caligat, cum omni pene momento terrenarum cogitationum pulvere sordescat! Excutere de pulvere, virgo filia Syon! Si filii sumus Syon, sublimem illam contemplationis scalam erigamus, assumamus pennas ut aquile, in quibus nos possimus a terrenis suspendere et ad celestia levare. Sapiamus que celestia sunt, non que super terram, ubi Christus est ad dexteram Dei sedens. Sequamur quo Paulus precessit, qui usque ad tertii celi secreta volavit, ubi audivit archana illa que non licet homini loqui. Ascendamus post caput nostrum. Nam ad hoc ascendit in celum, ut provocaret et post se traheret desiderium nostrum. Christus ascendit, et Spiritus Christi descendit. Ad hoc Christus misit nobis Spiritum suum, ut spiritum nostrum levaret post ipsum; Christus ascendit corpore, nos ascendamus mente. Ascensio itaque illius fuit corporalis, nostra autem sit spiritualis. Utquid enim ascensionis nostre doctorem atque ductorem Spiritum exibuit, nisi quia ascensum nostrum interim spiritualem esse voluit? Nam ad corporalem ascensionem illam que futura est in nobis, veniet ipse corporaliter, in ea carne quam assumpsit pro nobis, secundum illud: Sic veniet quemadmodum vidistis eum euntem in celis.2 Ascendamus igitur spiritualiter, ascendamus intellectualiter, quo interim non licet corporaliter. Parum autem nobis debet esse ad primi celi secreta mentis contemplatione ascendere. Ascendamus de primo ad secundum, et de secundo ad tertium. Contemplatione ascendentibus de visibilibus ad invisibilia, de corporalibus ad spiritualia, primo occurrit consideratio immortalitatis, secundo consideratio incorruptibilitatis, tertio consideratio eternitatis. Ecce triplex regio inmortalitatis, incorruptibilitatis, eternitatis. Prima est regio spiritus humani, secunda spiritus angelici, tertia spiritus divini. Spiritus siquidem humanus inmortalitatem quasi quamdam sui juris hereditatem possidet, quam nullo tempore, nulla diuturnitate in perpetuum amittere valet. Nam semper eum oportet vel vivere in gloria, vel durare in pena. Hic itaque spiritus quotiens terrenis et transitoriis actualiter incumbit, quasi semetipsum deserit et sub semetipsum descendit. Nil aliud ergo ei est ad primum celum ascendere quam ad semetipsum redire, et que immortalitatis sunt et seipso digna pensare et agere. Incorruptibilitas autem longe quidem supra ipsum est, quam interim possidere non potest. Sed quod interim non habet, virtutum merito optinere valet. Ad secundum itaque celum est ei ascendere, incorruptibilitatis gloriam meritis comparare. Hanc utique angelicus spiritus quasi hereditario jura jam possidet, quam perseverantie sue merito ea conditione optinuit, ut de cetero in perpetuum amittere non possit. Tertium autem celum ad solam pertinet divinitatem; nam de Deo scriptum est, quia solus habitat eternitatem. Cetera vero omnia que ex tempore esse ceperunt, eo ipso eternitatem habere non possunt, quo ab eterno non fuerunt. Sed singulare donum



2 The critical edition proposes a correction of the basic ms.’s in celis (witnessed by 24 mss.) to Vulgate’s in celum; since Richard often quotes inexactly, probably from memory, there seems to be no reason for correcting the text here.

P ROLO G U E – t e xt and t ranslat i o n

said, we shall strive to understand what we believe. So, let us always, as much as it is right and possible for us, endeavour to understand by reason what we hold by faith. But no wonder if our mind is darkened for the divine secrets as it almost every moment is soiled by the dust of earthly thought! Shake off the dust, virgin daughter of Zion! [Is 52:2]. If we are the sons of Zion, let us then raise the high ladder of contemplation, let us put on wings as eagles [Is 40:31b] by which we can rise from the earthly and lift us up to the heavenly. We shall taste not what belongs to the earth but what is heavenly where Christ is seated at the right hand of God [Col 3:1–2]. Let us follow Paul where he went ahead, as he flew up to the secrets of the third heaven where he heard the secrets which no man may utter [2 Cor 12:2b]. Let us ascend after our head [cf. Eph 4:15; Col 2:19]. Because he ascended into heaven with the purpose of calling forth our longing and drawing it after him. Christ ascended, and the Spirit of Christ descended. Therefore, Christ sent his Spirit to us so that our spirit could uplift after him; Christ ascended in the body, but we are ascending in the mind. So, his ascension was bodily, whereas ours will be spiritual. Why should he give us his Spirit as our teacher and leader of our ascension if it were not his will that our ascension should be spiritual here on earth? It is for our bodily ascension which will take place in the future that he himself will come bodily in the same flesh which he took on for us, according to this: He will come in the same way as you saw him ascending into the heavens [Act 1:11]. So, let us ascend in spirit, let us ascend in our minds, into the place where we are not yet allowed to ascend into in our bodies. But let it not be enough for us to ascend to the secrets of the first heaven in our mental contemplation. Let us ascend from the first heaven to the second, and from the second to the third.2 Those who are ascending by contemplation from the visible to the invisible, from the bodily to the spiritual, will first meet the consideration of immortality, secondly the consideration of incorruptibility, and thirdly the consideration of eternity. You see, there are three regions: that of immortality, that of incorruptibility, and that of eternity. The first is the region of the human spirit, the second is that of the angelical spirit, and the third region is that of the divine spirit. Thus, the human spirit owns immortality as its rightful inheritance, as it were, that it never in any time or durability in eternity can lose. It must always either live in glory or remain in pain. Anytime this spirit turns itself down towards the earthly and corruptible it betrays itself, so to speak, and descends below itself. The ascension up to the first heaven is for it, therefore, just like returning to itself, and the thought and action of it will be both according to what is immortal and what is worthy for it. Incorruptibility, however, is far above it and cannot be owned by the human spirit here on earth. But what the spirit does not own here, it is able to obtain by the merits of virtues. In this way it is possible for it to ascend to the second heaven and be united with the glory of incorruptibility by merits. This glory is owned by the angelical spirit as its rightful inheritance, as it were, that it has obtained by merit



2 On the three heavens see Javelet (1959), 11ss., 123ss. The Florentine poet Francesco da Barberino (1264–1348) quotes this passage, cf. I documenti d’amore, ed. F. Egidi (Rome: 1954), 3.278.

53

54

te xt a n d tr a n s l at i o n – P ROLO G U S

et pre omnibus precipuum, usque ad hoc celum penna contemplationis volare et intellectuales oculos ejus radiis infigere Ad primum itaque celum ascenditur actualiter, ad secundum virtualiter, ad tertium intellectualiter. Ad hoc utique ultimum celum spiritales viros Spiritus Christi sublevat, quos revelantis gratie prerogativa ceteris altius pleniusque illustrat. Totiens enim ad hoc celum spiritu sublevante attollimur, quotiens per contemplationis gratiam ad eternorum intelligentiam promovemur. Parum itaque debet nobis esse que vera sunt de eternis credere, nisi detur et hoc ipsum quod creditur cum rationis attestatione convincere. Nec nobis sufficiat illa eternorum notitia que est per fidem solam, nisi apprehendamus et illam que est per intelligentiam, si necdum ad illam sufficimus que est per experientiam. Hec in operis nostri prefatione premisimus, ut animos nostros ad hujusmodi studium attentiores et ardentiores redderemus. Magni etenim meriti esse putamus in hujusmodi exercitio multum studiosos fore, etiamsi non detur idipsum quod intendimus pro voto perficere.

P ROLO G U E – t e xt and t ranslat i o n

of its perseverance in this condition, so that it can never in eternity lose it. But the third heaven belongs to the divinity alone; as it is written about God that he alone lives in eternity [Is 57:15a]. Everything else that has its beginning in time, can, as a matter of course, not own eternity since it did not exist from eternity. Therefore, it is a unique and precious gift above all other gifts to fly up to this heaven on the wings of contemplation and to fasten our mental eyes on its rays. So, you ascend into the first heaven by yourself, into the second by means of virtues, and into the third in your mind. To this highest heaven the Spirit of Christ lifts spiritual men up and enlightens them more clearly and more fully than others by the sure signs of the revealing grace. So, every time we are being uplifted to this heaven in the spirit, we are led to the understanding of the eternal by the grace of contemplation. Therefore, it should not be sufficient for us just to believe what is right about the eternal unless it is also given to us by the testimony of reason to be convinced of what we believe.3 Thus, the knowledge about the eternal by faith alone is not sufficient for us unless we also grasp the knowledge by our understanding, as we are not yet able to get the knowledge that is by experience. We have now written this introduction to our work in order to make our minds more attentive and more ardent for such a study.4 We consider it to be a great merit in itself to be very eager in such an exercise also even if it may not be given to us to fulfil our intention as we wish.

3 Cf. I:5 and III:1. 4 Cf. I:4.

55

SEQUUNTUR RUBRICE CAPITULORUM PRIMI LIBRI DE TRINITATE I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. XVIII. XIX. XX. XXI. XXII. XXIII. XXIV. XXV.

Quod rerum notitiam triplici apprehendimus modo: experiendo, ratiocinando, credendo. Quod nichil firmius tenetur quam quod constanti fide apprehenditur. Quod de his agitur in hoc opere que jubemur de eternis credere. Modus agendi in hoc opere: non tam auctoritates inducere quam ratiocinationi insistere. Breviter prelibatur de quibus in sequentibus agitur. Quod universaliter omnis modus essendi potest sub triplici distributione comprehendi. De illo essendi modo qui non est ab eterno, et eo ipso nec a semetipso. De illo essendi modo qui est a semetipso, et eo ipso ab eterno. De illo essendi modo qui est ab eterno, nec tamen a semetipso. Quod circa duos tantum modos qui sunt ab eterno, versatur tota hujus operis intentio. De summa substantia, quod sit a semetipsa, et eo ipso ab eterno et sine omni initio. Item, quod una sola substantia sit a semetipsa, a qua et cetera omnia, et quod nonnisi a se ipsa habet totum quod habet. Quod summa substantia sit idem quod ipse potentia, idem quod ipsa sapientia; unde et quelibet illarum est idem quod altera. Quod summa substantia non possit habere parem, sicut nec superiorem. Quod sit inpossibile summam substantiam proprie nature consortem habere. Quod summa substantia sit idem quod divinitas ipsa; et quod Deus non sit nisi substantialiter unus. Item, quod non sit Deus nisi unus; quod ab ipso est omne quod est; quod nonnisi a se habet totum quod habet; quod idem sit quod ipsa potentia, quod ipsa sapientia. Quod omnino sit inpossibile vel ipsum Deum quod Deo sit melius diffinire posse. Si Deus ipse non potest per intellectum attingere aliquid melius Deo, multo minus humana cogitatio. Investigantibus et disputantibus de Deo quid soleat esse quasi maxima propositio et velud quedam communis animi conceptio. Quod Deus sic sit summe potens ut etiam sit omnipotens. Quod Dei sapientia sic sit summa ut sit usquequaque perfecta. Quod de Dei sapientia dicitur, alia adhuc ratione confirmatur. Confirmatur eadem ratione quod superius dictum est de divine potentie plenitudine. Quod non possit omnipotens esse nisi unus solus, et quod consequens est, nec Deus nisi unus.

HERE FOLLOW THE HEADINGS OF THE FIRST BOOK ON THE TRINITY 1. That we gain knowledge about things in three ways: by experience, by thinking, and by believing. 2. That nothing is held more firmly than what we hold in a stable faith. 3. That in this work it is all about what we are to believe about the eternal truths. 4. The procedure of this work: not so much to bring up the authorities than to focus on reasoning. 5. A brief survey of what it is treated in the following. 6. That all way of being in general can be understood in three categories. 7. About the way of being that is not of eternity and therefore not from itself. 8. About the way of being that is from itself and therefore of eternity. 9. About the way of being that is of eternity but not from itself. 10. That it is the intention of this work only to treat the two ways of being that are of eternity. 11. About the highest substance that it is from itself and therefore is of eternity and without any beginning. 12. Likewise, that there is only one substance that is from itself and from which all other has its being, and that it has all that it has from itself. 13. That the highest substance is the same as the power itself, and the same as the wisdom itself, and therefore they are all identical to each other. 14. That the highest substance cannot have any equal and, likewise, not any superior. 15. That it is impossible that the highest substance can have a partaker in its own nature. 16. That the highest substance is the same as the divinity itself; and that God is nothing but one in substance. 17. Likewise, that there is only one God; that all that exists comes from him; that he has all that he has only from himself; that he must be identical with the power itself and the wisdom itself. 18. That it is totally impossible even for God to define anything as better than God. 19. If even God himself in his understanding cannot attain to anything better than God, how much less can human thought? 20. What is usually like the highest principle and like the common mental conception for those who investigate and discuss about God. 21. That God is the highest power so that he is also almighty. 22. That God’s wisdom is the highest so that it is perfect in all ways. 23. That what is said about God’s wisdom can be confirmed by yet another reason. 24. It is confirmed by the same reason what has been said above about the fullness of the divine power. 25. That there can only be one single almighty being and, consequently, there can only be one God.

LIBER PRIMUS

CAPUT I. Quod rerum notitiam triplici apprehendimus modo: experiendo, ratiocinando, credendo Si ad sublimium scientiam mentis sagacitate ascendere volumus, opere pretium est primo nosse quibus modis rerum notitiam apprehendere solemus. Rerum itaque notitiam, ni fallor, modo triplici apprenhendimus: nam alia experiendo probamus, alia ratiocinando colligimus, aliorum certitudinem credendo tenemus. Et temporalium quidem notitiam per ipsam experientiam apprehendimus; ad eternorum vero notitiam modo ratiocinando, modo credendo assurgimus. Nam quedam ex his que credere jubemur, non modo supra rationem, verum etiam contra humanam rationem esse videntur, nisi profunda et subtilissima indagatione discutiantur, vel potius divina revelatione manifestentur. In horum itaque cognitione vel assertione magis inniti solemus fide quam ratiocinatione, auctoritate potius quam argumentatione, juxta illud Prophete: Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis. Sed et hoc in his verbis diligenter attendendum videtur, quia horum quidem intelligentia hac nobis auctoritate non generaliter, sed conditionaliter neganda proponitur, cum dicitur: Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis. Non ergo debent exercitatos sensus habentes de talium intelligentia comparanda desperare, dum tamen se sentiant firmos in fide, et per omnia probate constantie in fidei sue assertione.

CAPUT II. Quod nichil firmius tenetur quam quod constanti fide apprehenditur Sed hoc in his supra modum mirabile, quoniam quotquot veraciter fideles sumus, nichil certius, nichil constantius tenemus quam quod fide apprehendimus. Sunt namque Patribus et celitus revelata, et tam multis, tam magnis, tam miris signis vel prodigiis divinitus confirmata, ut grandis videatur esse dementie in his vel aliquantulum dubitare. Innumera itaque miracula, et talia que nonnisi divinitus fieri

BOOK ONE

CHAPTER 1. That we gain knowledge about things in three ways: by experience, by reasoning, and by believing If we want to ascend to knowledge about the highest truths by the sharpness of the mind, it is useful first to know the ways in which we use to get to know things. If I am not wrong, we get knowledge about things in three ways: some things we prove by experience, other things we deduce by reasoning, and again other things we are sure about by believing. We learn about the temporal things by the experience itself, whereas we rise to knowledge about the eternal things sometimes by reasoning, sometimes by believing. Because certain things, that we are asked to believe, not only seem to be above reason but also against human reason, unless they are investigated deeply and diligently, or better, are shown by divine revelation. Therefore, in the knowledge or assertion of these things we usually rely more on faith than on reasoning, more on authority than on the arguments, according to this by the Prophet: If you do not believe you will not understand [Is 7:9 (LXX)].1 However, in these words it seems also important to observe carefully that by this authority we are not denied the understanding of these things in general but only on condition, when it is said: If you do not believe you will not understand [Is 7:9 (LXX)]. Therefore, those who have trained senses should not give up hope of getting knowledge of these things when they feel firm in their faith and in all things confirm their faith in proven endurance.

CHAPTER 2. That nothing is held more firmly than what we hold in a stable faith2 This is absolutely wonderful for all of us who are truly believers that nothing is more sure and nothing is more firm than what we hold in faith. These truths have been revealed from above to the Fathers and have been confirmed divinely by so many, so great, and so wonderful signs and omens, that it seems to be most demented to doubt the least about them. Thus, countless miracles and things that can only happen divinely, create the faith



1 The text is often used by the fathers and in the Middle Ages about faith as the premise for understanding. However, the text of LXX is a misreading of the Masoretic text of the Old Testament which is correctly translated by the Vulgate: ‘Nisi crederitis, non permanebitis’. 2 Richard defines faith as ‘certitudo quaedam supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta’ in Declarationes nonnullarum difficultatum Scripturae (PL 196:266).

60

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r p r i m u s

possunt, in hujusmodi nobis fidem faciunt, et dubitare non sinunt. Utimur itaque in eorum attestatione seu etiam confirmatione signis pro argumentis, prodigiis pro experimentis. Utinam attenderent Judei, utinam animadverterent pagani, cum quanta conscientie securitate pro hac parte ad divinum judicium poterimus accedere! Nonne cum omni confidentia Deo dicere poterimus: “Domine, si error est, a teipso decepti sumus; nam ista in nobis tantis signis et prodigiis confirmata sunt, et talibus que nonnisi per te fieri possunt. Certe a summe sanctitatis viris sunt nobis tradita, et cum summa et auctentica attestatione probata, teipso cooperante et sermonem confirmante sequentibus signis”? Hinc est utique quod perfecte fideles paratiores sunt mori pro fide quam fidem abnegare. Nichil enim procul dubio firmius tenetur quam quod constanti fide apprehenditur.

CAPUT III. Quod de his agitur in hoc opere que jubemur de eternis credere Ad eorum itaque notitiam de quibus recte dicitur nobis: Si non credideritis, non intelligetis, oportet quidem per fidem intrare, nec tamen in ipso statim introitu subsistere, sed semper ad interiora et profundiora intelligentie properare, et cum omni studio et summa diligentia insistere, ut ad eorum intelligentiam que per fidem tenemus, cotidianis incrementis proficere valeamus. In horum plena notitia et perfecta intelligentia, vita obtinetur eterna. In hac sane adquisitione summa utilitas, in eorum contemplatione summa jocunditas. He sunt summe divitie, he sempiterne delicie; in horum gustu intima dulcedo, in eorum fruitione infinita delectatio. De illis itaque proposuimus agere in hoc opere que jubemur ex catholice fidei regula, non de quibuscumque sed de eternis credere. Nam de redemptionis nostre sacramentis ex tempore factis, que credere jubemur et credimus, nichil in hoc opere intendimus. Nam agendi modus alius in his, alius vero in illis.

CAPUT IV. Modus agendi in hoc opere: non tam auctoritates inducere quam ratiocinationi insistere Erit itaque intentionis nostre in hoc opere ad ea que credimus, in quantum Dominus dederit, non modo probabiles verum etiam necessarias rationes adducere, et fidei nostre documenta veritatis enodatione et explanatione condire. Credo namque sine dubio quoniam ad quorumlibet explanationem que necesse est esse,

b o o k o n e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

in us about these truths and do not allow any doubt. Therefore, when we witness about and confirm these truths, we use the signs more than the arguments, the wonders more than the proofs. If only the Jews would have paid attention to them, if only the pagans had considered them, since we can meet the divine judgement with such a security of conscience in this regard! We would never be able to say with any trust in God: ‘Lord, if there is something wrong then we have been deceived by yourself; because these truths have been confirmed by so many signs and wonders and by such events that could only happen by you. They have been given to us from men of the highest holiness and they have been proved by the best and most trustworthy witness, as you yourself worked with them and confirmed the word with the signs that followed [Mk 16:20; cf. Act 14:3, Heb 2:4]. This is also the reason why the perfect believers are more ready to die for their faith than to deny it. For nothing is undoubtedly held more firmly than what is held in a stable faith.

CHAPTER 3. That in this work it is all about what we are to believe about the eternal truths So, it is with the faith as entrance that we get knowledge about these truths, about which it is rightly said to us: If you do not believe you will not understand [Is 7:9 (LXX)]; however, let us not be standing in this entrance, but always hurry on to a closer and deeper understanding and do this most eagerly and most carefully, so that we with daily advancement will be able to reach the understanding of what we are holding in faith. Indeed, it is in the full knowledge and perfect understanding of these truths that we obtain the eternal life. So, there is the highest benefit in the attainment of this and there is the highest joy in the contemplation of these truths. They are the highest riches, they are the everlasting pleasures; tasting them is an intimate sweetness and enjoying them is an unending delight. Thus, in this work we are going to treat those truths that we are to believe according to the universal creed about the eternal truths – not about all truths. For instance, about the mysteries of our redemption that have taken place here in time and that we are to believe and that we do believe, we do not intend to say anything in this work. The method of treatment is different about these truths in comparison with the eternal truths.

CHAPTER 4. The procedure of this work: not so much to bring up the authorities than to focus on reasoning It is, therefore, our intention in this work to add – as much as the Lord will give us – not only probable but also necessary reasons3 for that which we believe, and to add explanation and interpretation to our faith’s witness of truth. For I believe without a doubt that for the explanation of anything that necessarily exists there

3 Rationes necessariae, on this concept see above in the Introduction.

61

62

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r p r i m u s

non modo probabilia, immo etiam necessaria argumenta non deesse, quamvis illa interim contingat nostram industriam latere. Omnia que ceperunt esse ex tempore pro beneplacito Conditoris, possible est esse, possibile est non esse. Unde et eo ipso eorum esse non tam ratiocinando colligitur quam experiendo probatur. Que vero eterna sunt, omnino non esse non possunt; sicut nunquam non fuerunt, sic certe nunquam non erunt; immo semper sunt quod sunt, nec aliud, nec aliter esse possunt. Videtur autem omnino inpossibile omne necessarium esse necessaria ratione carere. Sed non est cujusvis anime hujusmodi rationes de profundo et latebroso nature sinu elicere, et velud de intimo quodam sapentie secretario erutas in commune deducere. Multi ad hoc minus digni, multi ad hoc minus idonei, multi in hoc minus studiosi; et quod semper, si fieri posset, pre oculis habere deberemus, vix vel raro cogitamus. Cum quali, queso, studio, quanto desiderio deberemus illi incumbere negotio, illi inhiare spectaculo, de quo pendet salvandorum omnium summa beatitudo? Credo autem me nonnichil fecisse, si detur michi mentes studiosas in hujusmodi negotio vel in modico adjuvare, et ad tale studium tepidas mentes meo studio provocare.

CAPUT V. Breviter prelibatur de quibus in sequentibus agitur Legi frequenter quod non sit Deus nisi unus, quod sit eternus, increatus, inmensus, quod sit omnipotens et omnium dominus, quod ab ipso est omne quod est, quod ubique est, et ubique totus, non per partes divisus. Legi de Deo meo quod sit unus et trinus, unus substantialiter, sed personaliter trinus. Hec omnia legi; sed unde hec omnia probentur, me legisse non memini. Legi quod in deitate vera non sit nisi una substantia; quod in unitate substantie sint plures persone, singule a singulis ceteris proprietate distincte; quod sit ibi persona que sit a semetipsa, non ab alia aliqua; quod sit ibi persona que sit ab una sola, non autem a semetipsa; quod sit ibi persona que sit a persona gemina, non autem ab una sola. Cotidie audio de tribus quod non sint tres eterni, sed unus eternus; quod non tres increati, nec tres inmensi, sed unus increatus, et unus inmensus. Audio de tribus quod non tres omnipotentes, sed unus omnipotens; audio nichilominus quod non tres dii, sed unus est Deus, nec tres Domini, sed unus est Dominus. Invenio quod Pater non sit factus, nec genitus; quod Filius non sit factus, sed genitus; quod Spiritus sanctus non sit factus, nec genitus, sed procedens. Hec omnia frequenter audio vel lego, sed unde hec omnia probentur me legisse non recolo; abundant in his omnibus auctoritates, sed non eque et argumentationes; in his omnibus experimenta desunt, argumenta rarescunt. Puto itaque me nonnichil fecisse, sicut superius jam dixi, si in hujusmodi studio studiosas mentes potero vel ad modicum adjuvare, etsi non detur posse satisfacere.

b o o k o n e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

cannot lack not only probable but certainly also necessary arguments, even though they may lie outside our capacity here on earth. To everything that – by the good will of the Creator – takes its beginning in time it is possible either to exist or not to exist. Therefore, these things are obviously understood less by reasoning than by experience. But the eternal things can absolutely not be non-existing; just as they never began to exist, they were never non-existing; indeed, they are always what they are and can never be something different or in another way. Furthermore, it seems absolute impossible that any necessary being should be lacking a necessary reason. However, it is not possible for any soul to draw out such reasons from the deep and secret bosom of nature and bring them, so to speak, from the most inner secret place of wisdom out into the open. Many are less worthy for this, many are less capable, and many are less eager, and we are scarcely or seldom thinking about these things that we always should have before our eyes, if possible. With what eagerness, I ask, and with what desire should we not engage ourselves in this affair and gaze at this vision when the highest happiness depends on this for all who are to be saved? But I do think that I have not done nothing if it is given to me, even just a little bit, to help eager minds in this affair, and with my study to wake up more slow minds to such a study.

CHAPTER 5. A brief survey of what it is treated in the following I have often read that there is none but one God,4 that he is eternal, uncreated, immense, that he is almighty and the lord of everyone, that everything that exists is from him, that he is everywhere and everywhere entirely and not divided into parts. I have read about my God that he is one and three, one in substance but three in persons. All this I have read, but how all this is to be proven, I do not remember to have read. I have read that in the true divinity there is only one substance; that in the unity of substance there is a plurality of persons who are different from each other by a special property; that there is a person there who is from himself and not from anyone else; that there is a person there who is from one other person but not from himself; and that there is a person there who is from two persons but not from one person alone. I hear daily about these three ones that there are not three eternals but one eternal; that there are not three uncreated, neither three immense, but one uncreated and one immense. I hear about the three that there are not three almighty ones, but only one almighty; nevertheless, I hear that there are not three gods, but God is one, and there are not three Lords, but the Lord is one. I hear that the Father is neither made nor born; that the Son is not made but born; that the Holy Spirit is neither made nor born, but proceeds. All this I hear or read frequently, but how all this is proven I do not recall to have read; the authorities abound with all this, but not equally with argumentations; the proofs for all this are lacking, and there are only few arguments. I think, therefore, that I have not done nothing, as I said above already, if I can help the eager minds in this affair, even just a little bit, also even if it is not given to me to be able to satisfy them.

4 Here and in the following allusions to the Athanasian creed, DS 41 s., preferred by the Victorines.

63

64

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r p r i m u s

CAPUT VI. Quod universaliter omnis modus essendi potest sub triplici distributione comprehendi Ut igitur plane et perspicue veritatis solido et velud inmobili fundamento insistat, inde ratiocinationis nostre ordo initium sumat, unde nemo dubitare valeat, vel resilire presumat: omne quod est, vel esse potest, aut ab eterno habet esse, aut esse cepit ex tempore; item omne quod est vel esse potest, aut habet esse a semetipso, aut habet esse ab alio quam a semetipso. Universaliter itaque omne esse triplici distinguitur ratione. Erit enim esse cuique existenti, aut ab eterno et a semetipso, aut e contrario nec ab eterno nec a semetipso, aut mediate inter hec duo ab eterno quidem nec tamen a semetipso. Nam illud quartum quod huic tertio membro videtur e converso respondere, nullo modo ipsa natura patitur esse. Nichil enim omnino potest esse a semetipso, quod non sit ab eterno. Quicquid enim ex tempore esse cepit, fuit quando nichil fuit; sed quamdiu nichil fuit, omnino nichil habuit, et omnino nichil potuit; nec sibi ergo, nec alteri dedit ut esset, vel aliquid posset. Alioquin dedit quod non habuit, et fecit quod non potuit. Hinc ergo collige quam sit inpossibile ut aliquid omnino sit a semetipso, quod non sit ab eterno. Ecce ergo quod superius jam diximus, manifesta ratione colligimus, quia omne esse triplici distinguitur ratione.

CAPUT VII. De illo essendi modo qui non est ab eterno, et eo ipso nec a semetipso Ab illo itaque rerum genere incipere debemus, de quibus nullo modo dubitare possumus, et per illa que per experientiam novimus, ratiocinando colligere quid de his que supra experientiam sunt, oportet sentire. De illo sane essendi modo qui non est ab eterno, et eo ipso utique, jucta predictam rationem, nec a semetipso, cotidiano et multiplici certificamur experimento. Incessanter videmus alia secedere, alia succedere, et que prius quidem non erant in actum prodire. Hoc in hominibus, hoc in animalibus incessanter videmus; idem in arbustis et herbis cotidianis probamus experimentis; quod in operatione nature, idem videmus in operibus industrie. Quod igitur innumera sint que ab eterno non fuerunt, cotidiana experimenta latere non sinunt. Superior autem ratio invenit quia quicquid ab eterno non fuit, a semetipso esse non possit; alioquiam aperte convincitur quia aliquid sibi initium existendi dedit sub illo instanti, quando nichil habuit, quando omnino nil potuit; quod quam sit omnino inpossibile, sane mentis hominem nullatenus potest latere. Omnibus itaque illis que esse ceperunt ex tempore, constat esse illud habere commune, quod non

b o o k o n e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 6. That all way of being in general can be understood in three categories In order to stand upon the solid and immovable base of plain and clear truth, on which our reasoning can take its beginning, and that no one can doubt about or presume to remove, we can say:5 all that exists or can exist, will either have its being from eternity or begin to be in time; likewise, all that exists or can exist, has its being either from itself or from something other than itself.6 Therefore, all universal being can be distinguished by reason in three categories. For any existence will either be of eternity and from itself or, in contrast, neither of eternity nor from itself, or as something between these two, be of eternity, but not from itself. A fourth existence, that should correspond as an opposition to the third one, cannot be allowed by nature itself. Absolutely nothing can be from itself if it is not of eternity. For all, that begins to be in time, there was a time when it was nothing; but when it was nothing it could absolutely not have or do anything; so it could not give itself or any other being to be or to do anything. Otherwise, it could give what it did not have and do what it could not do. From this you can see how impossible it is that anything at all which is from itself is not of eternity. See, how we can conclude by clear reason what we have said already above, that all being can be distinguished by reason in three categories.

CHAPTER 7. About the way of being that is not of eternity and therefore not from itself We ought to take our starting point in that kind of things about which we cannot doubt in any way, and by those truths, that we know from experience, we will understand by reasoning what we ought to think about the realities that are above experience. Thus, by daily and multiple experiences we are made sure about the way of being that is not of eternity and therefore, for the just mentioned reason, not from itself. So, we see things go away and things come up all the time, and things, that had no being before, we see come about. We see this among human beings and among animals all the time; and we can prove the same from daily experiences about trees and herbs; and what we see happen in nature, the same we see in our own activities. So, our daily experiences let us not be ignorant about the fact that there are innumerable things that are not of eternity. Reason concluded above that all that is not of eternity, cannot have its being from itself; otherwise it is obvious that something has given itself the beginning of being at a time when it did not have anything and when it could not do anything at all; that this is totally impossible cannot escape any human being with a sane mind.



5 Without changing the critical edition of the text, it seems natural for an English translation to follow J. de Toulouse’s insertion here of ‘sic possumus dicere’, cf. PL 196:893d. 6 Alexander of Hales (1170–1245) uses this argument about the possibility of being in his introduction to the first treatise of Summa Theologica 1, inq. 1, q. 1, cap. 1,1, (Quaracchi: 1924) 1, 40 s.

65

66

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r p r i m u s

est ab eterno, et eo ipso, uti jam dictum est, nec a semetipso. Ecce de illo essendi modo jam diximus de quo dubitare non possumus, utpote illud quod usu cotidiano probamus.

CAPUT VIII. De illo essendi modo qui est a semetipso, et eo ipso ab eterno Sed ex illo esse quod non est ab eterno nec a semetipso, ratiocinando colligitur et illud esse quod est a semetipso, et eo ipso quidem etiam ab eterno. Nam si nichil a semetipso fuisset, non esset omnino unde ea existere potuissent que suum esse a semetipsis non habent, nec habere valent. Convincitur itaque aliquid esse a semetipso, et eo ipso, uti jam dictum est, etiam ab eterno; alioquin fuit quando nichil fuit, et tunc quidem futurorum nichil futurum fuit, quia qui sibi vel aliis existendi initium daret vel dare potuisset, tunc omnino non fuit; quod quam falsum sit, ipsa evidentia ostendit, et rerum existentium experientia convincit. Sic sane ex eis que videmus, ratiocinando colligimus et ea esse que non videmus, ex transitoriis eterna, ex mundanis supermundana, ex humanis divina. Invisibilia enim Dei, a creatura mundi, per ea que facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur.

CAPUT IX. De illo essendi modo qui est ab eterno, nec tamen a semetipso Fuisse autem aliquod esse ab eterno, quod tamen non sit a semetipso, nemini videatur inpossibile, quasi sit necessarium causam semper effectum precedere, et omne quod de alio est, suo principio semper succedere oportere. Certe radius solis de sole procedit, et de illo originem trahit, et tamen soli coevus existit. Ex quo enim fuit, de se radium produxit, et sine radio nullo tempore fuit. Si igitur lux ista corporalis habet radium sibi coevum, cur non habeat lux illa spiritalis et inaccessibilis radium sibi coeternum? In natura creata legimus quid de natura increata pensare vel estimare debeamus: videmus cotidie quomodo nature ipsius operatione existentia existentiam producit, et existentia de existentia procedit. Quid ergo? Nunquid in illa superexcellenti natura operatio nature nulla erit, aut omnino nil poterit? Nunquidnam natura illa que huic nature nostre fructum fecunditatis donavit, in se omnino sterilis permanebit? Et que

b o o k o n e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

Therefore, it must be certain that all things that have their beginning in time, have in common the being that is not of eternity, and, therefore, as said already, is not from itself. See, this is what we have said already about this way of being that we cannot doubt about, inasmuch as it is proven in our daily life.

CHAPTER 8. About the way of being that is from itself and therefore of eternity However, from this being that is not of eternity and not from itself, we understand by reasoning the being that is from itself and therefore also of eternity. For if nothing were from itself there would not be anything at all from which those things could exist that do not have or are able to have their being from themselves. So, it is proven that something must be from itself and therefore, as it is said already, also is of eternity; otherwise there was a time when there was nothing and then there would be nothing at all from which the future beings could have their being, since they did not give or were able to give beginning of existence neither to themselves nor to other; how false this is, is self-evident and proven by the experience of the existing things. Indeed, from the things we are seeing we understand by reasoning also the realities that we do not see, from the transitory we see the eternal, from the earthly the heavenly, from the human the divine. For since the creation of the world the invisible things of God are understood by the mind through the created things [Rom 1:20 (Vulg)].7

CHAPTER 9. About the way of being that is of eternity but not from itself However, it should not seem impossible to anyone that there can exist a being from eternity that is not from itself, as if it should always be necessary that a reason goes before its effect, and that all that comes from some other always will come after its origin. Clearly, a sunray goes out from the sun and has its origin in it, but nevertheless it is coeval with the sun. For as long as the sun has existed it has produced rays and it has never existed without rays. If therefore this corporal light has rays, coeval with itself, why should not the spiritual and inaccessible light also have a ray which is coeval with itself? We read in the created nature how we ought to think or estimate about the uncreated nature:8 so, we see every day how nature out of its own existence produces another existence and how existence proceeds from existence. What then? Would there not be, or could there not at all be, such a natural operation in this super-excellent nature? So,



7 The Vulgate text is ‘Invisibilius enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur’, also quoted with variation below in I:10, V:6, VI:1.15.17. 8 About the similarity between the created and the uncreated nature see below III:8.10; IV:10.12.25; V:6; VI:1.

67

68

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r p r i m u s

aliis generationem tribuit, nunquid sine generatione et sterilis erit? Ex his itaque videtur probabile quod in illa superessentiali incommutabilitate sit aliquod esse quod non sit a semetipso, et fuerit ab eterno. Sed super hoc ampliori et efficaciori ratione suo disputabitur loco.

CAPUT X. Quod circa duos tantum modos qui sunt ab eterno, versatur tota hujus operis intentio De gemino itaque essendi modo quos diximus esse ab eterno, intendimus agere in hoc opere, et de his que ad ejusmodi considerationem videntur pertinere. Nam de consideratione rerum temporalium, de his videlicet que pertinent ad tertium modum, nichil interim intendimus, nisi quantum eorum considerationem ad eternorum investigationem necessariam vel utilem comprobamus; sicut enim ex Apostolo habemus, et superius jam diximus: Invisibilia Dei per ea que facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Quotiens igitur per visibilium speculationem ad invisibilium contemplationem assurgimus, quid aliud quam quamdam velud scalam erigimus, per quam ad ea que supra nos sunt, mente ascendamus? Inde est quod in hoc tractatu omnis ratiocinationis nostre processus initium sumit ex his que per experientiam novimus. Quod igitur in hoc opere de eternis dicitur, est ex intentione; quod vero de temporalibus, ex occasione. Nam tota hujus operis nostri intentio versatur circa illos duos essendi modos qui sunt ab eterno.

CAPUT XI. De summa substantia, quod sit a semetipsa, et eo ipso ab eterno, et sine omni initio Nunc igitur latius disserendum de illo esse quod est a semetipso, unde, uti jam dictum est, constat ipsum esse ab eterno. Illud autem certissimum est, et unde, ut credo, nemo dubitare potest, quia in tanta multitudine rerum existentium, et tam multiplici differentia graduum, esse oporteat aliquid summum. Summum vero omnium dicimus, quo nichil est majus, nichil est melius. Absque dubio autem melior est natura rationalis quam natura irrationalis. Oportet itaque ut aliqua rationalis substantia sit omnium summa. Quam autem constat in hac rerum universitate summum locum tenere, non potest hoc ipsum quod est a suo inferiori accipere. Oportet ergo ut aliqua substantia existat, que utrumque habeat: et summum videlicet locum tenere, et a

b o o k o n e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

would the nature, that has given such a fruit of fertility to our nature, just remain totally sterile in itself? And would that nature, that has given generation to others, just exist without generation and be sterile? From this it seems probable, therefore, that in this super-essential immutability there will be a being that is not from itself and has being from eternity. But this will be discussed with a stronger and more compelling reason later.9

CHAPTER 10. That it is the intention of this work only to treat the two ways of being that are of eternity In the present work it is our intention to discuss the two ways of being that we have called of eternity, and the questions that seem to relate to this consideration. So, it is not our intention to consider the temporal things and the questions that relate to the third way of being, unless we acknowledge that the consideration of these things are necessary or useful for the investigation of the eternal things; for we read in the Apostle as we mentioned above: The invisible things of God are understood by the mind through the created things [Rom 1:20 (Vulg)].10 Anytime we rise from the speculation11 of visible things to the contemplation of the invisible things, is this not just like putting up a ladder by which we can ascend in the mind to the things that are above us? This is the reason why we, in this treatise, let all our reasoning take its starting point in the things that we know by experience. What is said in this work about the eternal, therefore, is said intentionally; whereas what is said about the temporal things is said occasionally. For the whole intention of our work is about the two ways of being that are from eternity.

CHAPTER 11. About the highest substance that it is from itself and therefore is of eternity and without any beginning Let us now, therefore, discuss in more detail the being that is from itself and thus evidently is of eternity, as it has been said already.12 It is most certain, and I believe that no one can be in doubt about this, that in such a multitude of existing things and in so many different grades of being there must be a highest being. We call that for the highest being compared to which nothing can be greater, and nothing can be better. There is no doubt that the rational nature is better than the irrational nature. So, the being that is the highest of all must be a rational substance. It is also certain that the being that holds the highest place in the universe of things cannot receive what it is from something which is lower than itself. Thus, there must exist a substance that holds

9 This happens below in VI:6. 10 I:8. 11 Speculatio; by analyzing the created nature as a mirror of the uncreated nature, human reason can draw conclusions about the divine nature. 12 I:8.

69

70

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r p r i m u s

semetipsa esse. Nam, sicut superius jam diximus atque probavimus, si nichil esset a semetipso, nichil esset ab eterno, et tunc quidem nulla rerum origo, nulla esset rerum successio. Convincit itaque rerum expertarum evidentia aliquam substantiam esse oportere a semetipsa. Nam si nulla a semetipsa esset, nullum eorum omnino foret que aliunde originem trahunt, et a semetipsis esse non possunt. Pertinet itaque substantia illa que non est nisi a semetipsa, pertinet, inquam, ad illud esse quod est ab eterno et sine omni initio.

CAPUT XII. Item, quod una sola substantia sit a semetipsa, a qua et cetera omnia, et quod nonnisi a se ipsa habet totum quod habet Sed illud quod de summa substantia dictum est, adhuc ampliori ratione probari potest. Illud autem certissimum est, quod in tota rerum universitate nichil esse potest, nisi possibilitatem essendi vel de seipso habuerit, vel aliunde acceperit; quod enim esse non potest, omnino non est. Ut igitur aliquid existat, oportet ut ab essendi potentia posse esse accipiat. Ex essendi itaque potentia esse accipit omne quod in rerum universitate subsistit. Sed si ex ipsa sunt omnia, nec ipsa quidem est nisi a semetipsa, nec aliquid habet nisi a semetipsa. Si ex ipsa sunt omnia, ergo omnis essentia, omnis potentia, omnis sapientia. Si omne esse ab illa est, ipsa summa essentia est. Si ab illa omne posse, summe potens. Si omne sapere, summe sapiens est. Est enim inpossibile majus aliquid dare quam habere. Sapientia quidem a possidente tota potest dari simul et a dante tota retineri. Sed majorem sapientiam quam habes, omnino inpertire non vales. Summe sapientem itaque esse oportuit, unde omnis sapientia originem trahit. Sed ubi substantia rationalis non est, sapientia omnino inesse non potest; soli enim rationali substantie potest sapientia inesse. Est itaque rationalis substantia et omnium summa, cui inest summa sapientia. Est, inquam, omnium summa, a qua est omnis essentia, omnis utique tam rationalis quam irrationalis natura. Non itaque aliud est essendi potentia quam summa substantia. Quam igitur non est nisi a semetipsa ipsa essendi potentia, tam non potest esse nisi a semetipsa summa quidem substantia, que non est aliud aliquid quam ipsa essendi potentia. Constat itaque quod a summa quidem substantia est omne quod est. Sed si ab ipsa sunt omnia, preter illam solam nulla est a semetipsa. Et si ab ipsa est omne esse, omne posse, omne habere, procul dubio a seipsa habet totum quod habet. Recte ergo hec substantia primordialis dicitur, a qua omne quod est principium et originem sortitur.

b o o k o n e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

both: both to be in the highest place and to be from itself. Because, as we have said and proven already above, if nothing was from itself, nothing would be from eternity, and then there would not be any origin of things and there would not be any succeeding things. In this way the experienced things prove with evidence that there must be a substance that is from itself. For if nothing was from itself there would certainly not exist any beings that have their origin in others and cannot exist from themselves. Therefore, the substance that can only be from itself, belongs – belongs, I say – to that being that is from eternity and without any beginning.

CHAPTER 12. Likewise, that there is only one substance that is from itself and from which all other has its being, and that it has all that it has from itself Now, what has been said about the highest substance can, however, be proven by an even better reason. Thus, it is the most certain truth that in the entire universe of things there cannot exist anything that has not the possibility of being either from itself or from something else; for what does not have the possibility of being, cannot exist. So, in order that anything can exist it must receive the possibility of being from the power of being. Therefore, everything that exists in the universe of things receives its being from the power of being. But if all exists out of it, then it cannot but be only from itself and it cannot have anything except from itself. If everything is from it, then all being, all power, and all wisdom come from it. If all being is from it, then it is the highest being itself. If all power comes from it, it is the highest power. And if all wisdom, then it is the highest wisdom. For it is impossible to give more than one has. Indeed, wisdom can be given totally by one who owns it, and at the same time it can be withheld totally by the giver. But it is totally impossible that you can give a greater wisdom than you have. So, that wisdom must be the highest from which all wisdom has its origin. But where there is no rational substance, there can certainly not be any wisdom; wisdom can only exist in a rational substance. Therefore, the highest of everything, in which there is the highest wisdom, must be a rational substance. And it is the highest of everything, I say, from which all being comes, both of rational and of irrational nature. Therefore, this power of being is no other than the highest substance. So, just as the power of being can only exist from itself, so the highest substance, which is no other than the power of being itself, can also only exist from itself. So, it is a sure thing that everything that exists comes from the highest substance. But if everything is from it, nothing but it has its being from itself. And if it is from it that all being, all power, and all possession comes, there is no doubt that it has all that it has from itself. It is therefore right that we call this substance primordial, since it is from it that all that exists has its beginning and origin.

71

72

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r p r i m u s

CAPUT XIII. Quod summa substantia sit idem quod ipse potentia, idem quod ipsa sapientia; unde et quelibet illarum est idem quod altera Nunc illud consideremus quod jam dictum est, quia summa substantia summe potens est. Sed illud certissimum est, quoniam hoc ipsum quod potens est, illi est de ipsa potentia; hoc ipsum quod sapiens est, de ipsa sapientia. Probatum est autem quia totum quod habet, nonnisi a semetipsa habet. Ut igitur habeat nonnisi a semetipsa quod habet de ipsa potentia, quod habet de ipsa sapientia, necesse est ut ille omnino non sint aliud aliquid quam ipsa. Alioquin que sine potentia atque sapientia potens vel sapiens esse non valet, quod ab ipsis habet, non tam a se quam aliunde haberet. Consequens autem est quoniam si utraque illarum est idem quod summa substantia, quelibet earum est idem quod altera.

CAPUT XIV. Quod summa substantia non possit habere parem, sicut nec superiorem Hoc autem in loco nunc illud summopere attendendum est, quia si substantia hoc ipsum quod summa potentia est, diversa aliqua substantia idipsum esse non potest. Alioquin diverse substantie essent una et una diverse; quod est utique omnino inpossibile. Sed dicis ad ista fortassis: “Quid si potest diversa aliqua substantia summam potestatem habere, et si non possit summa potentia esse? Nonne equipotentes erunt, si ambe summam potestatem habuerint?” Absque dubio et incunctanter affirmo quia, si una earum summam potentiam habere potest, et esse non potest, equipotens ei non est que utrumque potest. Ex parte enim posse et ex parte non posse quod alteri est ex toto possibile, hoc non est de potentie ipsius plenitudine sed de ejus participatione gaudere. Multo autem est majus multoque excellentius magne alicujus rei habere plenitudinem quam optinere participationem. Ex his igitur aperte colligitur quod primordialis substantia non potest habere parem, sicuti ex superioribus patet non posse habere superiorem.

CAPUT XV. Quod sit inpossibile summam substantiam proprie nature consortem habere Substantie itaque primordiali videtur naturaliter inesse omnibus presidere et parem vel superiorem habere non posse. Quod enim inest substantialiter,

b o o k o n e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 13. That the highest substance is the same as the power itself, and the same as the wisdom itself, and therefore they are all identical to each other Now, let us consider what we have said here, namely that the highest substance is the highest powerful. It is a most certain truth that it has from the power itself what it is powerful to do; and that it has its wisdom from wisdom itself.13 We have proved that everything that it has, it has from itself. So, in order that it can have from itself what it has from the power itself, and what it has from the wisdom itself, it is necessary that the power and the wisdom are not at all other than the highest substance. Otherwise, what cannot be powerful and wise, without having it from the power and the wisdom itself, would not have this from itself but rather from elsewhere. Consequently, since each of them is identical to the highest substance, both are identical to each other.

CHAPTER 14. That the highest substance cannot have any equal and, likewise, not any superior At this point it should be remarked diligently that if this substance is the same as the highest power, there cannot be a different substance that is the same. Otherwise, different substances would be one and one would be different substances which is totally impossible. Maybe you will say to this: ‘What if some different substance could have the highest power even though it cannot be the highest power? Would they not be of equal power if they both would have the highest power?’ Here I can answer without any doubt or hesitation that if one of these substances can have the highest power but cannot be the same, then it cannot be of equal power as the being that can be both. For the being, that can only be partly and partly not what is fully possible for the other being, cannot be happy for the fullness of power itself but for its participation in it. So, it is much greater and more excellent to have something in its fullness than to have it by participation. From this it is clearly understood that the primordial substance cannot have any equal, just as it cannot have any superior as said above.

CHAPTER 15. That it is impossible that the highest substance can have a partaker in its own nature So, it seems to be natural for the primordial substance that it is above everything and cannot have anything equal to it or superior to it. Because what belongs to it regarding

13 Richard follows the Platonic theory of participation, just like Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109), Monologion 16 (PL 158:164c): ‘Omne namque quod justum est, per justitiam justum est … Quare ipsa summa natura non est justa, nisi per justitiam. Videtur igitur participatione qualitas, justitiae scilicet, justa dici summa bona substantia’.

73

74

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r p r i m u s

absque dubio et naturaliter. Ex eo namque quod ipsa primordialis substantia idem omnino quod summa potentia est, naturaliter ei inest quod summe potest, et quod potentiorem vel equipotentem habere non potest. Videamus ergo si vel inferiorem possit habere proprie nature consortem. Sed quomodo, queso, quevis substantia primordiali essentia inferior esse poterit, si naturaliter cum illa commune habuerit, quod parem vel superiorem habere non possit? Juxta hoc erit una quelibet altera, immo unaqueque se ipsa superior et inferior, major et minor. Est ergo inpossibile primordialem substantiam proprie nature consortem habere.

CAPUT XVI. Quod summa substantia sit idem quod divinitas ipsa, et quod Deus non sit nisi substantialiter unus Juxta superiorem disputationem jam pro certo tenemus quod a summa et sola substantia est omne quod est, et quod a semetipsa habet totum quod habet. Sed si ab ipsa sunt omnia, ergo et divinitas ipsa. Si vero illam alteri dedit, nec sibi retinuit, superiorem habet, que, juxta quod superius probatum est, superiorem habere non valet. Constat itaque illam sibi retinuisse, simul et habere. Deus autem est qui deitatem habet, et hoc ipsum quod Deus est, ex deitate habet. Sed si summa substantia hoc ipsum quod Deus est, habet ex divinitate sua, que nichil habet nisi a semetipsa, profecto ipsa deitas non aliud aliquid est quam summa substantia. Non ergo potuit alteri alicui substantie dare, non dicam ut deitatem haberet, sed ut ipsa deitas esset. Alioquin, quod inpossibile est esse, parem haberet. Hinc ergo colligitur quod vera divinitas est in unitate substantie, et vera substantie unitas in ipsa divinitate. Non est itaque Deus nisi substantialiter unus.

CAPUT XVII. Item, quod non sit Deus nisi unus; quod ab ipso est omne quod est; quod nonnisi a se habet totum quod habet; quod idem sit quod ipsa potentia, quod ipsa sapientia Audi nunc quam de facili probare possumus quod non sit Deus nisi unus. Ex eo quod nichil habet nisi a se, constat quia divinitas ipsa non est aliud aliquid quam ipse, ne convincatur habere aliunde quam a seipso quod habet ex divinitate. Divinitas itaque ipsa aut erit incommunicabilis, aut aliquibus communis. Sed si est incommunicabilis, quod consequens est, non est Deus nisi unus. Si autem aliquibus communis fuerit, communis utique erit et substantia illa, que non est aliud quam divinitas ipsa. Sed substantia una non potest esse communis pluribus substantiis; alioquin una eadem substantia esset plures, et plures una; quod quam falsum sit ratio latere non sinit. Si vero dicitur esse communis pluribus personis, juxta id quod dictum est, erit eis utique communis et substantia illa, que non est aliud quam divinitas ipsa. Juxta hoc utique erunt in divintate una plures persone, sed nonnisi una substantia. Sive ergo una tantum, sive plures persone dicantur

b o o k o n e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

substance undoubtedly also belongs to it regarding nature. Since the primordial substance itself is absolutely the same as the highest power, it belongs to its nature to be supremely powerful and not to have anyone with more or the same power. Therefore, let us see whether it can have a partaker in its own nature who is inferior to it. But how, may I ask, can any being be inferior to the primordial substance, if it by nature shares this substance that cannot have anyone equal or superior? If so, one substance would be both bigger and smaller than the other, indeed, one substance would be bigger and smaller than itself. Thus, it is impossible that the primordial substance can have a partaker in its own nature.

CHAPTER 16. That the highest substance is the same as the divinity itself; and that God is nothing but one in substance In accordance with the discussion above we can maintain as certain that all that exists comes from the highest and one substance, and that it has all that it has from itself. But if everything comes from it, then also the divinity itself comes from it. If it had given the divinity to any other and did not hold it back for itself, then it would have a superior, which – according to what was proved above – it was not able to have. Thus, it is certain that the highest substance itself must possess and keep the divinity. Now, God is the one who has the deity and who has from the deity what God is. But if the highest substance – which can only have all that it has from itself – has what God is from its divinity, then the deity itself is nothing other than the highest substance. Thus, it could not have given to any other substance – I do not say to have deity – but to be the deity itself. Otherwise, it would have an equal to itself, which is impossible. From this it is obvious that the true divinity exists in the one substance, and that the true, one substance exists in the divinity itself.14 Therefore, God is nothing but one in substance.

CHAPTER 17. Likewise, that there is only one God; that all that exists comes from him; that he has all that he has only from himself; that he must be identical with the power itself and the wisdom itself Now, hear how easily we can prove that God can only be one. From the fact that God can only have what he has from himself, it is certain that the divinity is no other than himself, so that no one should think that he has from any other than himself what he has from the divinity. Now, the divinity itself can either be incommunicable or it can be common with some other. But if it is incommunicable then it follows that God can only be one. If it is common with some other, then also the substance, which is the same as the divinity itself, will be common. But the one substance cannot be common to multiple substances; otherwise the one and same substance would be multiple, and multiple would be one; reason cannot avoid seeing how false this is. But if it is said that 14 Allusion to Quicumque.

75

76

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r p r i m u s

esse in una divinitate, nichilominus non erit Deus nisi substantialiter unus. Solus itaque et unus Deus est a semetipso, et eo ipso ab eterno. Et juxta quod de summa substantia, que non est aliud quam ipse, probatum est, ab ipso est omne quod est, a semetipso habet totum quod habet, et ipse idem ipsum est quod ipsa potentia, quod ipsa sapientia.

CAPUT XVIII. Quod omnino sit inpossibile vel ipsum Deum quod Deo sit melius diffinire posse Si itaque Dei sapientia et Dei potentia unum idemque sunt per omnia, nichil perfectionis, nichil consummationis comprehenditur ab una, quod sub eadem integritatis mensura non comprehendatur ab alia. Nichil itaque majus, nichil utique melius est in ejus nosse quam in ejus posse, et eo ipso in ejus esse, quia non est aliud aliquid ejus posse quam ejus esse. Quicquid ergo optimum, quicquid precipuum ab ejus sapientia deprehenditur vel diffinitur, totum hoc juxta eamdem integritatis plenitudinem ab ejus potentia comprehenditur, totum in ejus essentia concluditur. Nam quantum ad perfectionis culmen, si aliquid per intelligentiam attingerit, quod per efficaciam apprehendere non posset, jam se procul dubio magnificentius per sapientiam quam per potentiam extenderet, essetque una eademque substantia et seipsa major, esset et seipsa minor. Nam Dei quidem substantia, cum sit nil aliud quam ejus potentia vel sapientia, si se latius per sapientiam quam per potentiam extenderet, si se per illam quam per istam latius extendere potuisset, esset utique una eademque substantia potentie comparatione seipsa per sapientiam major, esset eadem ipsa sapientie comparatione sese utique per potentiam minor. Nichil ergo Deo majus, nil utique melius vel ab ipso Deo potest diffiniri vel per intelligentiam attingi.

CAPUT XIX. Si Deus ipse non potest per intellectum attingere aliquid melius Deo, multo minus humana cogitatio Si itaque nichil quod Deo perfectius sit potest per intellectum capere scientia divina, quanto minus aliquid Deo majus, aliquid Deo melius excogitare potest scientia humana! Nam quod humana cogitatio per intellectum caperet, divinam intelligentiam latere non posset. Dementie genus est credere hominem supra id quod est Deus, cogitatione posse ascendere, qui nec hoc ipsum quod Deus est, potest ulla investigatione attingere! Quanto itaque melius, quanto est perfectius quod humana cogitatio attingit, tanto ad id quod Deus est vicinius accedit, nec tamen pertingit.

b o o k o n e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

it is common to multiple persons, then also the substance, which is no other than the divinity itself, will be common to them, according to what has been said. According to this, there will be multiple persons in the one divinity but still only one substance. So, whether it is said to be only one or multiple persons in the one divinity, nevertheless God will only be one in substance. Therefore, the one and only God is from himself and thus from eternity. And, according to what has been proved about the highest substance, which is no other than God, everything that exists is from him, and he has all that he has from himself, and he is the same as the power itself as well as the wisdom itself.

CHAPTER 18. That it is totally impossible even for God to define anything as better than God If God’s wisdom and God’s power is one and the same in all ways, then there will be no perfection or fulfilment in the one that is not to be found in the other in the same full measure. Therefore, there is nothing greater or better in his knowledge than in his ability, and likewise in his being, since his ability is identical to his being. So, whatever is found and defined to be the best, the most precious, by his wisdom, all this will also be there in the same full measure by his power, just as it will be fully included in his being. For if God reached a height of perfection in his intelligence, which he was not able to obtain in his performance, then his magnificence would undoubtedly be greater in his intelligence than in his power, and then the one and same substance would be both greater and smaller than itself. Because if God’s substance, which is no other than his power and his wisdom, could go further by his wisdom than by his power, so that he was able to go further by the one than by the other, then the one and same substance would be greater than itself in its wisdom in comparison to its power and one and the same substance would be lesser than itself in its power compared to its wisdom. Therefore, nothing can be defined or understood as bigger or better than God, not even by God himself.

CHAPTER 19. If even God himself in his understanding cannot attain to anything better than God, how much less can human thought? If the divine knowledge is not able to understand by thinking anything that is more perfect than God, how much less can the human knowledge think out anything greater or anything better than God! For the divine understanding cannot miss what the human thought can understand by thinking. It is a kind of madness to believe that the human person, who is not able by any investigation to reach that which God is, can ascend by thinking to anything above that which God is! So, the more the human thought can attain to what is better and what is more perfect, the more it comes close to that which God is, however it does not reach him.

77

78

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r p r i m u s

CAPUT XX. Investigantibus et disputantibus de Deo quid soleat esse quasi maxima propositio et velud quedam communis animi conceptio Contingere itaque videtur quadam quasi dote nature, quod cuncti pene tam eruditi quam minus eruditi solent habere familiare et quasi pro regula tenere, Deo videlicet quicquid optimum judicant, incunctanter attribuere; et quod quosdam de hac regula perspicua ratio ratiocinando non docet, sine dubietatis ambiguo devotio persuadet. Hinc est quod ipsum Deum inmensum, eternum, incommutabilem, summe sapientem, omnipotentem indubitanter affirmant, etiam illi qui quomodo idipsum probari possit ignorant. Est itaque eruditis velud maxima propositio, est cunctis in commune velud communis animi conceptio, Deo attribuere quicquid altius attingit humana estimatio. Ex hoc certitudinis solido et velud intime veritatis fundamento, summi etiam magistri passim quidem disputationis sue initium sumunt, cum de divinis proprietatibus altius et augustius disserere intendunt.

CAPUT XXI. Quod Deus sic sit summe potens ut etiam sit omnipotens Quod Deus summe potens existat, satis quidem ex superioribus constat. Sed queri adhuc potest utrum inde dicatur summe potens, quia nemo in potentia eo superior sit, an sic sit summe potens ut omnia possit et veraciter omnipotens sit. Sed si omnipotentem diffitemur, majus aliquid Deo jam posse cogitare convincimur. Majus namque est omnipotentiam habere quam qualemcumque potentiam cui aliquid desit de omnipotentie plenitudine. Et hoc quidem quod homini ad intelligendum perfacile est, divinam sapientiam latere non potest. Deus itaque si aliquid de potentie plenitudine intelligit quod habere non possit, erit majus aliquid in ejus nosse quam in ejus posse, quorum neutrum nil aliud est quam ipsius esse. Erit ergo, juxta superiorem disputationem, unum idemque esse et seipso majus et seipso minus, quo nichil est inpossibilius. Hinc igitur absque dubio colligitur quod omnia potest quecumque posse potentia est. Nam multa dicimur posse que multo melius esset non potuisse quam posse. Posse decrescere, posse deficere, posse destrui et in nichilum redigi, et quelibet hujusmodi, majus est omnino non posse quam posse. Magis enim sunt ista infirmitatis indicia quam majestatis insignia. Omnia itaque illa, et sola utique illa, potest, que, uti jam diximus, posse potentia aliqua est. Et eo rectius atque verius eum omnipotentem dicimus, quo ejus potentie omnia infirmitatis argumenta detrahimus.

b o o k o n e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 20. What is usually like the highest principle and like the common mental conception for those who investigate and discuss about God So, it seems to be almost like something given by nature that almost anyone, both learned and less learned people, have in common and almost hold as a rule, that they attribute without hesitation what they consider to be the best to God; and those, who are not taught by reason in thinking about this clear rule, will undoubtedly be persuaded by devotion. This is the reason why also those people who do not know how this can be proved, without any doubt confirm that God himself is without measure, eternal, immutable, the highest wisdom, and almighty. Thus, it is like a highest principle for learned people and like a common mental concept for all people in general, to attribute to God whatever is the highest according to human estimation.15 It is also on the sure basis of this solid and, as it were, inner truth that the most excellent teachers everywhere take this beginning of their discussions when they want to examine the divine properties more deeply and more highly.

CHAPTER 21. That God is the highest power so that he is also almighty That God is the highest power is sufficiently clear from the above. But it can still be asked whether God is called the highest power because no one is superior to him in power, or he is the highest power in that way that he is able to do everything and thus is truly almighty. But if we reject that he is almighty then we have demonstrated already that we can think something greater than God. For it is greater to be almighty than to have some power which is missing some of the fullness of omnipotence. And what it is easy for humans to understand cannot be lacking in the divine wisdom. So, if God can understand something about the fullness of power which he cannot have, then there would be something greater in his knowledge than in his power, and both cannot be other than his own being. Then there would, according to the discussion above, be one and the same being that is both greater and smaller than itself, and nothing is more impossible. From this it appears without any doubt that all that God can do, is also in his power. We often call many things power where it would be better to say non-power than power. For instance, when we say to be able to decrease, to be able to fail, to be able to destroy and to wipe out, then it is greater not to be able to it than to be able to it. For these things are more indications of weakness than signs of majesty. Therefore, God can do all things and all those things alone which, as we have said already, can be realized in power. And so, it is more correct and more rightly that we call him almighty when we remove all terms of weakness from his power.

15 ‘Communis animi conceptio’ is an echo of Boëthius (c. 480–525), De consolatione 3, 10 (PL 63:765a): ‘Deum rerum omnium principem, bonum esse, communis humanorum conceptio probat animorum. Nam cum nihil Deo melius excogitari queat, id, quo melius nihil est, bonum esse quis dubitet?’; see also below IV:5.

79

80

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r p r i m u s

CAPUT XXII. Quod Dei sapientia sic sit summa ut sit usquequaque perfecta Quod de divina potentia jam dictum est, simili quidem ratione de divina sapientia queri potest. An inde dicatur summa quod nullius unquam possit major esse quam illa? An ita veraciter est summa ut sit usquequaque perfecta? Sed certissime constat quoniam ubi omnipotentia est, plenitudo sapientie deesse non potest. Nam si ei de sapientie plenitudine aliquid perfectionis deesset quod habere non posset, absque ulla ambiguitate omnipotens non esset. Constat itaque de Dei sapientia quod de omni omnino scientie et prudentie perfectione nichil ei desit, cujus adjectione major vel melior esse possit. Notandum quomodo ex consideratione divine sapientie plenitudo potentie ipsius deprehenditur. Et rursus ex omnipotentie consideratione sapientie plenitudo manisfestatur atque convincitur.

CAPUT XXIII. Quod de Dei sapientia dicitur alia adhuc ratione confirmatur Sed quod de divine sapientie plenitudine jam diximus, alia adhuc ratione convincere possumus. Constat siquidem quoniam quisquis sapiens est, aut sapientie ipsius plenitudine, aut sapientie participatione sapiens est. Sed jam ex superioribus habemus quod ipsa sapientia sit idem quod divina substantia. Quis igitur, nisi demens, dicat quod Dei substantia sapientiam quidem, hoc est seipsam, ex parte habeat et ex parte non habeat, et plenitudinem sui ipsius habere non valeat? Quam igitur non potest Dei substantia se totam non habere, tam non potest sapientie plenitudine carere.

CAPUT XXIV. Confirmatur eadem ratione quod superius dictum est de divine potentie plenitudine Simili ratione confirmatur quod superius de omnipotentia dicitur. Sicut enim sapiens quisque aut sapientie plenitudine, aut ipsius participatione est sapiens, sic sane potens quisque potentie plenitudine seu ipsius participatione est potens. Est autem inpossibile aliquid seipso participare. Quod igitur Deus omnipotens est, potentie participatione esse non potest; siquidem potentie plenitudo non est aliud aliquid quam ipse. Constat itaque eum potentem esse potentie plenitudine. Ubi autem plenitudo potentie est, nullum posse deesse potest. Consequens ergo est omnipotentiam habere et veraciter omnipotentem esse, cui inest omne posse.

b o o k o n e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 22. That God’s wisdom is the highest so that it is perfect in all ways What has been said now about the divine power can with a similar reason be asked about the divine wisdom. So, is it called the highest wisdom because nothing can be greater than it? Or is it truly the highest so that it is perfect in all ways? Now, it is most certain that where there is omnipotence, the fullness of wisdom cannot be missing. For if any perfection was lacking in the fullness of wisdom, that he could not have, then he would undoubtedly not be almighty. So, it is certain that God’s wisdom cannot be lacking any perfection at all in knowledge and intelligence by the addition of which he would be greater or better. See how his fullness of power is discovered from a consideration of the divine wisdom. And again, how the fullness of wisdom is shown and demonstrated from a consideration of the omnipotence.

CHAPTER 23. That what is said about God’s wisdom can be confirmed by yet another reason Now, we can confirm with yet another argument what we have said already about the fullness of the divine wisdom. Thus, it is certain that anyone who is wise is so either in the fullness of wisdom itself or by participation in the wisdom. But we maintain already from the above that the wisdom itself is the same as the divine substance. So, who will, except an insane, say that God’s substance partly has and partly does not have wisdom, which is its very self, and thus is not able to have the fullness of itself? Therefore, just as God’s substance cannot but be itself fully, it cannot be lacking the fullness of wisdom.

CHAPTER 24. It is confirmed by the same reason what has been said above about the fullness of the divine power It is confirmed by a similar reason what has been said above about the omnipotence. For just as one is wise either in the fullness of wisdom or by participation in it, so one will be powerful in the fullness of power of by participation in it. But it is impossible that something can participate in itself. So, when God is almighty, he cannot be so by participation in the power; thus, the fullness of power is nothing other than himself. Therefore, it is certain that he is powerful in the fullness of power. And where there is fullness of power, no power can be missing. It follows clearly that he who has all power has also omnipotence and is truly almighty.

81

82

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r p r i m u s

CAPUT XXV. Quod non possit omnipotens esse nisi unus solus, et quod consequens est, nec Deus nisi unus Est autem inpossibile plures omnipotentes esse. Qui enim vere omnipotens fuerit, facile efficere poterit ut ceterorum quilibet nichil possit; alioquin vere omnipotens non erit. Ecce quales omnipotentes, qui de facili fieri possunt nullipotentes! Ecce quam facile convincitur quod nonnisi unum omnipotentem esse ipsa rerum natura non patitur! Deum autem omnipotentem esse perspicua ratione collegimus, et jam inde dubitare non possumus. Quam igitur non potest esse omnipotens nisi unus, tam non potest esse Deus nisi unus. Constat itaque, quod credimus et quod superius jam diximus, quia vera divinitas manet in unitate substantie et substantie unitas in vera divinitate. Ecce de divinitatis unitate multa jam diximus; superest nunc ut de nature ipsius singularitate aliqua dicamus.

b o o k o n e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 25. That there can only be one single almighty being and, consequently, there can only be one God Now, it is impossible that there can be several almighties. For he, who is truly almighty, can easily make it so that any of the other can nothing; otherwise he would not be truly almighty. See those almighties who can so easily be made ‘non-mighties’!16 See, how easily it is proved that the very nature of things does not allow more than one almighty! We have now concluded with clear reason that God is almighty, and we cannot doubt about it after this. Consequently, just as there can only be one almighty, so there can only be one God. Thus, it is certain what we believe, and what we have said above, that the true divinity remains in the one substance and the one substance remains in the true divinity. See how much we have said about the unity of divinity; now we shall say something about the particulars of this nature.

16 Nullipotentes.

83

LIBER SECUNDUS I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. XVIII. XIX. XX. XXI. XXII. XXIII. XXIV. XXV.

Quod in hoc libro agitur de divinis proprietatibus; et primo quod Deus sit increatus. Quod sempiternus sit Deus. Quod sit incorruptibilis, et omnino incommunitabilis. Unde colligere possumus quod sit eternus. Quod sit infinitus; et eo ipso inmensus. Quod non sit, immo esse non possit inmensus nisi unus solus. Quomodo ex eo quod non sit nisi unus inmensus, probatur quod non sit nisi unus eternus. Quod solus Deus sit increatus, solus ab eterno, cetera omnia creata de nichilo. Alius de Deo probandi modus quod sit eternus; et quod non sit eternus nisi unus. Alius de Deo probandi modus quod sit inmensus; et quod non sit inmensus nisi unus. Quod inmensitas et eternitas sint incommunicabiles, nec possint esse pluribus substantiis communes. Quod divinitas superius incommunicabilis dicitur, hic enucleatius et plenius exprimitur. Quomodo secundum diversos modos dicendi possit sapientia seu potentia modo communicabilis, modo incommunicabilis dici. Multiplex probandi modus quod non sit Deus nisi unus. Quod non potest esse nisi unus Dominus, sicut nec nisi unus Deus. Quod Deus ipse sit suum, quod ipse sit summum bonum, et quod summum bonum sit universaliter perfectum. Quod in illo summo bono universaliterque perfecto sit vera unitas et summa simplicitas. Quod de summi boni simplicitate vel unitate dictum est, quomodo alia ratione confirmari potest. Quod illud bonum universaliter perfectum sit summe unum et unice summum. Quam sit incomprehensibilis simplicitas illa vere et summe unitatis. Quomodo quisque possit in sua scientia ex comparatione colligere quid debeat de illa supereminenti incomprehensibilitate sentire. De Dei substantia quid dicatur rectius; et quod ipse sit sine quantitate magnus, et sine qualitate bonus. Quod sit in omni loco incomprehensibiliter; in omni tempore invariabiliter; et quomodo uniformis, et quomodo multiformis. Quod ejus facere sit a se fieri velle, et ejus pati non nolle fieri; et quod eque habet et quod actualiter est, et quod actualiter non est. Quod quicquid dictum est de divinis proprietatibus usque modo, videtur pertinere ad illud esse quod est ab eterno et a semetipso.

THE SECOND BOOK 1. That it is about the divine properties in this book; and first, that God is uncreated. 2. That God is everlasting. 3. That he is incorruptible and totally immutable. 4. From this we can understand that he is eternal. 5. That he is infinite; and therefore immeasurable. 6. That there is not, indeed cannot be, more than one immeasurable alone. 7. How it is proved from the fact that there is no more than one immeasurable that there is no more than one eternal. 8. That God alone is uncreated, that he alone is from eternity, and that everything else is created out of nothing. 9. Another way of proving that God is eternal and that there is only one eternal. 10. Another way of proving that God is immeasurable and that there is only one immeasurable. 11. That immeasurability and eternity are incommunicable and cannot be shared by more substances. 12. That what is said above about the incommunicable divinity is expressed here more clearly and fully. 13. How, according to various ways of speaking, wisdom and power sometimes can be called communicable and sometimes incommunicable. 14. More ways of proving that there is only one God. 15. That there cannot be but one Lord, just as there cannot be but one God. 16. That God himself is his own, that he himself is the highest good, and that the highest good is totally perfect. 17. That there is true unity and the highest simplicity in the highest and totally perfect good. 18. That what has been said about the simplicity and unity of the highest good can be confirmed by another reason. 19. That the totally perfect good is the highest unity and uniquely the highest. 20. How this simplicity of the true and highest unity is incomprehensible. 21. How one can understand in his own knowledge by comparison what should be thought about this totally supreme incomprehensibility. 22. What can be said more rightly about God’s substance; and that he is great without quantity and good without quality. 23. That he is incomprehensible in every place; invariably in every time; and how he is uniform and multiform. 24. That his actions are done out of his will to be done by him, and his permissions are done by his not rejecting that they be done; and that he equally has both what actually is and what actually is not. 25. That what is said about the divine properties until now seems to be about that being which is from eternity and from itself.

LIBER SECUNDUS

CAPUT I. Quod in hoc libro agitur de divinis proprietatibus; et primo quod Deus sit increatus Postquam de divinitatis unitate que dicenda videbantur superius jam diximus, superest ut de ejusdem nature proprietatibus aliqua dicamus, et maxime de his que in laudibus divinis cotidiano usu frequentamus. In quibus quidem quedam ejusmodi sunt ut animus eis facile adquiescat et ultroneus acceptet, quamvis qua ratione probentur ignoret. Quibusdam vero minime vel minus firmiter inhereret, nisi in hoc ipsum catholice tradita fides ipsa dirigeret. Nam quod Deus sit increatus, eternus, inmensus, facile suscipit et libenter adquiescit animus humanus. Esse autem inpossibile plures eternos, plures inmensos esse non facile crederet, nisi hoc ipsum fidei regula persuaderet, maxime cum tres esse credantur, quorum eternitatem, inmensitatem omnium ora fateantur. Quod autem Deus increatus sit, satis ex superioribus patet et nova expositione non indiget. Si enim creatus esset, creatorem haberet. Sed qui nonnisi a semetipso est, creatorem habere non potest. Quid autem dicimus creatum, nisi de nichilo factum? De nichilo vero fieri non potuit qui nunquam nichil fuit, qui a semetipso et ab eterno esse1 habuit.

CAPUT II. Quod sempiternus sit Deus Ecce jam constat increatum esse qui est ab eterno et caret omni initio. Nunc illud querendum utrum etiam sicut initio sic et fine careat, et sempiternum esse habeat. Nam hoc est sempiternum esse, carere initio et fine. Nunc ergo ex eo quod certissimum est, convincamus illud unde aliquis dubitare potest. Est autem certissimum quod in sapientia que Deus est, nichil falsitatis inesse potest. Alioquin non summe saperet, qui vel fallere vellet vel falli potuisset. Constat itaque Deum veracem esse, et hoc ipsum est ei ex veritate. Veritas igitur non est aliud aliquid quam ipse, cum veraciter convinci possit non habere nisi ex se quod tamen



1 Ribaillier 109 line 23 reads here esset.

BOOK TWO

CHAPTER 1. That it is about the divine properties in this book; and first, that God is uncreated After that we have said above what we think should be said about the unity of the divinity,1 it remains that we say something about the properties of the same nature, and especially about those that we hear about every day in the divine praises.2 Some of these properties are of such a kind that our mind easily gives assent to them and willingly accepts them, even though it does not know with what reason they are proved. Regarding other properties, however, it would not or less firmly accept them if not the traditional universal faith guided it in this. For the human mind understands easily and accepts freely that God is uncreated, eternal, and immense. But it would not be easy for it to believe that there cannot be more eternal and more immense beings if not the rule of faith would convince it about it, especially when it is believed that there are three whose eternity and immensity should be confessed by all. That God is uncreated is sufficiently clear from the above3 and does not require a new exposition. For if he were created, he would have a creator. But he who can only be from himself cannot have a creator. For what do we mean by ‘created’ if not ‘made of nothing’? But he who has never been nothing, and who has his being from himself and from eternity, could never have been made of nothing.

CHAPTER 2. That God is everlasting See, now it is certain that he who is from eternity and lacks any beginning, is uncreated. Now it is to be examined whether he who lacks beginning also will be without an end and thus have everlasting being. For an everlasting being is to be both without a beginning and an end. On basis of what is most certain let us now show what someone may be in doubt about. Now, it is most certain that in the wisdom which God is, there cannot be anything false. Otherwise he would not be the highest wise if he wanted to be false or could be deceived. So, it is certain that God is truthful and that he is so from the truth. Therefore,

1 I:12–25. 2 Quicumque. 3 I:8.11.

88

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

habet ex veritate. Veritas autem sicut nunquam non fuit, sic nunquam non erit. Ab eterno verum fuit et in eternum verum erit quod hec universitas esse potuit. Nam si esse non posset, omnino non esset. Veritas itaque ab eterno fuit, ex qua verum fuit quod ab eterno verum fuit, et veritas in eternum erit, ex qua verum erit quod in eternum verum erit. Si ergo ex veritate que Deus est, verum esse habuit quod semper verum fuit, quod semper verum erit, profecto Veritas Deus, sicut initio, sic et fine carebit. Sempiternus itaque est Deus, sempiternum esse habens, utpote initio et fine carens.

CAPUT III. Quod sit incorruptibilis et omnino incommutabilis Quoniam jam constat de Deo quod habeat sempiternum esse, consequens est ut queramus an etiam habeat esse incommutabile. Sciendum itaque quia omnis mutatio est aut de statu in statum meliorem, aut de statu in statum deteriorem, aut de statu in statum priori equalem; ubi autem nichil horum esse potest, vera incommutabilitas inest. De singulis igitur que premisimus diligenter investigemus. Sed qui omnipotens est, quomodo deteriorari potest? Quid est enim deteriorari nisi corrumpi? Sed qui vere omnipotens, immo ipsa omnipotentia est, nulla ei corruptio dominari potest. Sed videamus nunc si saltem possit crescere, quem jam constat non posse decrescere. Sed omne quod crescit, qualecumque boni augmentum suscipit unde meliorari possit. Verum illud boni augmentum unde haberet, qui nichil nisi a semetipso habet, sed nec habere valet? Nam si prius habuit, quomodo ad illud crescendo pervenit? Et si prius non habuit, certe nec sibi nec alteri dare potuit quod omnino non habuit. Ex his itaque potest colligi quia non potest crescere vel minui. Sed nunc videndum si vel possit de statu in statum equalem mutari. Sed ut aliquid de statu in statum alium et equalem transeat, oportet ut qualitercumque deficiat ab aliquo quod prius habuit, et ut in ejusdem defectus recompensationem aliquid ei accedat quod prius non habuit; et tunc in una eademque alteratione predictis duabus mutationibus subjacebit, quarum utramque superior ratio inprobavit. Qui igitur deteriorari non potest, est incorruptibilis; qui meliorari vel alio quolibet modo variari non potest, omnino est incommutabilis. Vere itaque et absque ulla ambiguitate habet incommutabile esse.

CAPUT IV. Unde colligere possumus quod sit eternus Sed si tria illa que premisimus in unum colligimus, non modo sempiternum verum etiam eternum convincimus. Nam aliud sonare videtur eternum, aliud autem sempiternum. Sempiternum namque esse videtur quod caret initio et fine; eternum quod caret utroque et omni mutabilitate; et quamvis forsitan neutrum sine altero invenitur, recte tamen inter nominum significationem distinguitur. Quid itaque aliud est eternitas quam diuturnitas sine initio et fine, et carens

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

the truth is no other than himself since it can be demonstrated that he cannot have from any other than himself what he nevertheless has from the truth. Thus, just as truth has always existed, it will never disappear. It has been true from eternity, and it will be true in eternity, that the universe could exist. For if it could not exist, it would not exist at all. So, the truth is from eternity from which it was true that it was true from eternity, and the truth will be eternal from which it will be true that it will be true in eternity. Therefore, if it is from the truth, which God is, that he had true being that always was true and always will be true, then God the Truth will be without an end, just as he is without a beginning. Thus, God is everlasting, having everlasting being, as being without beginning and end.

CHAPTER 3. That he is incorruptible and totally immutable Since it is now certain about God that he has an everlasting being, it is consequent that we examine whether he also has an immutable being. So, one must know that any change will be either from one state into a better state, or from one state into a worse state, or from one state into a state equal to the first; where none of these can be there, there is true immutability. Let us, therefore, look carefully into each of the mentioned cases. But how can someone almighty deteriorate? For what is to deteriorate other than to be spoiled? But nothing spoiled can dominate him who is truly almighty, yes who is the omnipotence itself. Now, it is certain that he cannot decrease, but let us see whether he can at least grow. But anything which grows receives some increase of the good by which it can become better. However, from where can it have an increase of the good when it only can and is able to have something from itself? For if he had it before, how could he reach it by becoming better? And if he did not have it before, he could certainly not give to himself or any other what he did not have himself at all. From this one can understand that he cannot grow or become smaller. Let us now see whether he can be changed from one state into an equal state. But in order for something to pass from one state into another and equal state, it must depart somehow from something which it had before and achieve something which it did not have before in compensation for the same loss; and then, in one and the same alteration, he would be subject to the two mentioned changes both of which reason has rejected above. Thus, one who cannot decrease is incorruptible; and one who cannot become better or be changed in any way is totally immutable. Certainly, and without any doubt he has an immutable being.

CHAPTER 4. From this we can understand that he is eternal If we understand these three qualities together, we can prove that he is not only everlasting but truly also eternal. For the words eternal and everlasting seem to have different meanings. Everlasting seems to mean that there is no beginning and no end; eternal that there is no beginning and no end and no mutability at all; and even though maybe none of these qualities are found without the other, it is right to distinguish between the meanings of the words. For what is eternity other than duration without

89

90

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

omni mutabilitate? Sed qui increatus et sempiternus est, caret initio et fine; et cujus status invariabilis est, manet absque omni mutabilitate. In his itaque tribus probatur esse eternus. Nam hec tria absque ambiguitate dant eternitatem habere et eternum esse.

CAPUT V. Quod sit infinitus; et eo ipso inmensus Quod caret initio et fine, procul dubio constat infinitum esse. Queri itaque potest, qui infinitus est per eternitatem, utrum etiam infinitus sit per magnitudinem. Longe superius monstratum est quod divina substantia sit idem quod ipsa potentia, quod ipsa sapientia. Eadem utique ratione probari potest de substantia illa que nichil habet nisi a semetipsa, quod eternitas unde est eterna, quod magnitudo unde est magna, non sint aliud aliquid quam ipsa. Si igitur eternitatem Dei infinitam convincimus, procul dubio magnitudinem ipsius infinitam esse negare non possumus. Alioquin manifesta ratione fateri convincimur quod una eademque substantia est et seipsa major, et seipsa minor. Nam, si eternitas ejus est infinita, magnitudo autem finita, erit una et eademque substantia secundum eternitatem major magnitudine sua, hoc est semetipsa, et erit secundum magnitudinem minor eternitate sua, hoc est semetipsa. Manifeste itaque colligitur quia si infinita est una, infinita erit et alia. Habet itaque Deus magnitudinem infinitam, et eo ipso inmensam. Quod enim infinitum est, nulla mensura comprehendi potest. Recte ergo Deus inmensus dicitur, cujus magnitudo nulla mensura comprehenditur.

CAPUT VI. Quod non sit, immo esse non possit inmensus nisi unus solus Libet modo etiam illud considerare, utrum sit possibile plures inmensos esse. Inmensum sane merito dicitur quod nulla mensura comprehenditur; inmensum dicitur, quod nulli mensure equalis vel comparabilis invenitur. Si ergo plures inmensos dicimus, erit quilibet eorum cuilibet alteri incomprehensibilis, erit quilibet eorum cuilibet alteri incommensurabilis. Nullius itaque mensura ab altera cujuslibet alterius comprehenditur, et consequenter unaqueque quamlibet alteram supergreditur. Erit ergo unaqueque quavis altera major, erit et unaqueque quavis altera minor. Quod si est inpossibile, immo quia est inpossibile, inpossibile et erit plures inmensos esse. Quod si nullus est quolibet altero major vel quolibet altero minor, sicut unusquisque eorum est comprehensibilis et commensurabilis sibi, sic erit comprehensibilis et commensurabilis cuilibet alteri. His allegationibus indubitanter colligere possumus quod omnino non est, sed nec esse potest inmensus nisi unus.

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

beginning and end, and the absence of all mutability? But he who is uncreated and everlasting, is without beginning and end; and he whose state is invariable will remain without any mutability. By these three qualities it is proved that he is eternal. For undoubtedly, these three qualities grant to have eternity and eternal being.

CHAPTER 5. That he is infinite; and therefore immeasurable It is undoubtedly certain that what is without a beginning and end is infinite. Therefore, it can be asked whether he who is infinite in his eternity is also infinite in his magnitude. Long above it has been shown4 that the divine substance is the same as the power itself and the wisdom itself. By the same reason it can be proved about the substance which has nothing but from itself, that the eternity, by which it is eternal, and the magnitude, by which it is great, are nothing other than this substance itself. So, if we demonstrate that God’s eternity is infinite then, without a doubt, we cannot deny that his magnitude is infinite. Otherwise we are clearly proven to acknowledge that one and the same substance is greater than itself and smaller than itself. For if his eternity is infinite, but his magnitude is finite, then one and the same substance would be greater in his eternity than in his magnitude, that is himself, and he would be smaller in his magnitude than in his eternity, that is himself. It is obviously understood that if the one is infinite then the other is infinite, too. So, God has an infinite magnitude which is, therefore, immeasurable. For what is infinite, cannot be understood by any measure. Therefore, God is rightly called immeasurable whose magnitude cannot be understood by any measure.

CHAPTER 6. That there is not, indeed cannot be, more than one immeasurable alone Now we would also like to consider whether it is possible that there are more than one immeasurable. Surely, that which cannot be understood by any measure is rightly called immeasurable; and the same is that which cannot be found equal or comparable to any measure. Therefore, if we say that there are more than one immeasurable, any of them will be incomprehensible to any of the other, and any of them will be incommensurable to any of the other. So, the measure of none of them will be understandable to any of the other, and thus any of them will surpass any of the other. Any of these will, therefore, be bigger than any of the other, and any of them will be smaller than any of the other. If this is impossible, indeed because this is impossible, it will also be impossible that there is more than one immeasurable. And if none of them is bigger than any of the other or is smaller than any of the other, then any of them will be comprehensible and commensurable to any of the other, just as it will be comprehensible and commensurable to itself. From these arguments we can conclude without doubt that there is absolutely not and cannot be more than one immeasurable being. 4 I:13.18.23.

91

92

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

CAPUT VII. Quomodo ex eo quod non sit nisi unus inmensus, probatur quod non sit nisi unus eternus Ecce jam novimus quod inpossibile sit esse plures inmensos; videamus nunc utrum possible sit esse plures eternos. Jam ex superioribus agnovimus et pro certo habemus quod substantia divina non sit aliud aliquid quam inmensitas sua, quam eternitas ipsa. Unde et de inmensitate et eternitate constat quod quevis earum sit idem quod altera. Constat itaque quia qui eternitatem habet, inmensitatem utique non habere non valet. Sed si inmensitate carere non potest qui est eternus, erit procul dubio simul utrumque eternus et inmensus. Sicut ergo non possunt esse plures inmensi, sic esse non poterunt plures eterni. Inter hec autem illud est maxime notandum et diligenti consideratione dignum, quod in his que ratiocinando colligimus, quedam ex inspecta illius rei de qua agitur proprietate elicimus, quedam ex alterius rei considerata proprietate et mutua utriusque habitudine convincimus. Nam quod non possit esse inmensus nisi unus, ex inmensitatis proprietate collegimus. Quod vero non possint plures eterni esse, tum ex eadem convincitur inmensitatis considerata proprietate, tum ex mutua inmensitatis et eternitatis habitudine.

CAPUT VIII. Quod solus Deus sit increatus, solus ab eterno, cetera omnia creata ex nichilo Certum tenemus quod sola divina substantia sit a semetipsa, et quod ab ipsa sint cetera omnia. Sed quicquid ab ipsa est, seu etiam esse potest, aut est secundum operationem nature, aut est secundum inpertionem gratie. Quam vero certum est quod divina natura degenerare vel omnipotentia corrumpi non valet, tam certum fore oportet quod de divina substantia nature ipsius operatione esse non posset quod Deus non esse. Sed satis superius probavimus quod non possit esse Deus nisi substantialiter unus. De ipso itaque Deo, de unica illa et singulari substantia ipsius esse non potest alius Deus, sed nec aliud aliquid quod non sit Deus. Constat itaque ab illo esse secundum operationem gratie quicquid est aliud quam ipse. Sed quicquid ab illo est, non tam exigente natura quam operante gratia, pro arbitrio beneplacit potuit ab illo fieri, potuit eque et ab illo non fieri. Que igitur ab illo fiunt, divinam illam et incorruptibilem et incommutabilem substantiam materiam habere non possunt. Constat itaque, sola divina substantia excepta, cetera omnia vel ex nihilo facta vel mutabile aliquid habere pro materia. Sed primordialis materia, queso, unde

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 7. How it is proved from the fact that there is no more than one immeasurable that there is no more than one eternal See, now we know how impossible it is that there should be more than one immeasurable being; now we will see whether it is possible that there can be more than one eternal being. We recognize already from the above and hold for certain that the divine substance is nothing other than its immeasurability and its eternity itself.5 From this it is also certain that any of these is identical to the other. Therefore, it is certain that anyone who has eternity will not be able not to have immeasurability also. But if the one who is eternal cannot be without immeasurability, he will undoubtedly be both eternal and immeasurable at the same time. So, just as there cannot be more than one immeasurable, there cannot be more than one eternal being. Among these things there is something which must be especially noted and which deserves careful consideration, namely that in these things which we understand by reasoning, some things have been concluded by looking at the property of the matter in question whereas we have proved other things by looking at the property of another matter and the mutual relationship between them. For that there cannot be more than one immeasurable, we concluded from the property of immeasurability. But that there cannot be more than one eternal being was proved both from considering the property of the same immeasurability, and from the mutual relationship between immeasurability and eternity.

CHAPTER 8. That God alone is uncreated, that he alone is from eternity, and that everything else is created out of nothing We hold for certain that the divine substance alone is from itself and that everything else is from that. But everything which is or can be from that can either exist according to the operation of nature or according to the gift of grace. But just as certain it is that the divine nature cannot be diminished and the omnipotence cannot be degraded, just as certain it must be that there cannot be any existence from the operation of the divine nature itself which is not God. Above we have proved sufficiently that God can only be one in substance.6 Therefore, from God himself, from this unique and singular substance of his, there cannot not only be another God but there cannot be anything else which is not God. So, it is certain that anything other than himself must exist by the work of grace. But whatever is of him by the work of grace, rather than by the necessity of nature, could be created by him by his good will but it could just as well not have been created. Thus, these things which are created by him, cannot have as its matter the divine and incorruptible and immutable substance of his. Therefore, it is certain that anything except the divine substance alone is either created out of nothing or it has a mutable matter. But

5 II:5. 6 I:16.25.

93

94

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

fuit, que vel a semetipsa esse, vel divinam substantiam pro materia habere omnino non potuit? Et si primordialis materia materiam habere dicitur, et primordialis asseritur simul et primordialis esse negatur. Hinc ergo manifeste colligitur quod primordialis materia, quod materialia omnia, mediante materia, quod inmaterialia queque et universaliter omnia sint ex nihilo creata. Constat itaque, quod veraciter credimus, quod solus Deus sit increatus. Sicut ergo solus a semetipso, sic absque dubio et solus ab eterno.

CAPUT IX. Alius de Deo probandi modus quod sit eternus, et quod non sit eternus nisi unus Quicquid autem ex creatione esse accipit, fuit procul dubio quando omnino nichil fuit, alioquin ex nichilo creari non potuit. Omne itaque creatum ex tempore esse cepit; quod autem increatum est, omne tempus precessit. Quod vero fuit quando nullum tempus fuit, procul dubio mutabile esse non potuit, alioquin tempori obnoxium fuit, quando nullum adhuc tempus fuit, quod omnino esse non potuit; quod enim obnoxium est mutabilitati, eo ipso obnoxium est tempori. Tempus enim semper in motu est, et vel ad modicum quidem omnino stare non potest. Et si nulla mutatio esset, procul dubio tempus omnino non esset. Constat itaque, quod superius jam dixi, quia quod obnoxium est mutabilitati, obnoxium est et tempori. Obnoxium autem mutabilitati aliquid esse non potuit, quando tempus nullum fuit. Quod ergo increatum est, quoniam ante omnia tempora fuit, mutabile esse non potuit. Quod autem est incommutabile, sicut non potest mutari de esse ad non esse, sic non potest mutari de esse ad aliud esse. Quod vero non potest mutari de esse in non esse, durat sine fine. Quod non potest mutari de esse in aliud esse, manet sine omni mutatione. Itaque quod increatum est, non solum initio caret, verum etiam sine fine et omni mutabilitate manet. Carere autem initio, et fine, et omni mutabilitate dat eternum esse. Igitur quod est increatum, convincitur esse et eternum. E converso autem quicquid est eternum, constat esse et increatum. Nam quod eternum est, ab eterno fuit, et eo ipso creari non potuit. Colligitur igitur hujusmodi rationibus, quia si non est increatus nisi unus, nec est eternus nisi unus. Et eque e converso, si non est eternus nisi unus, nec est increatus nisi unus.

CAPUT X. Alius de Deo probandi modus quod sit inmensus, et quod non sit inmensus nisi unus Quod de divinitatis inmensitate superius jam diximus, alia adhuc ratione, inmensitatis ipsius videlicet considerata proprietate, colligere possumus. Quicquid enim ad mensuram habetur, majus esset si ejus mensura duplicaretur; multo autem

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

this primordial matter, I ask, where does it come from when it absolutely not could be of itself or have its divine substance as a matter? If it is said that the primordial matter has a matter, one affirms that it is primordial and at the same time denies that it is primordial. From this it is clearly understood that the primordial matter, that anything material, that anything created by matter, that anything immaterial, indeed that absolutely everything is created out of nothing. It is thus certain what we truly believe that God alone is uncreated. Just as he alone is from himself, he alone is without a doubt also from eternity.

CHAPTER 9. Another way of proving that God is eternal and that there is only one eternal Anything which has received being by creation must without doubt once have been absolutely nothing, otherwise it could not have been created out of nothing. Thus, anything created begins to exist in time; but what is uncreated must exist before all time. Now, what existed before all time, could undoubtedly not have been mutable, otherwise it was subject to time when there was not yet any time, which could not be at all; for what is subject to mutability is for the same reason subject to time. For time is always in motion and it absolutely cannot stand still just for a moment. And if there was no change there could undoubtedly be no time. It is thus certain, what I already have said above, that what is subject to mutability is also subject to time. But nothing could be subject to mutability when there was no time. So, what is uncreated, since it existed before all time, could not be mutable. And what is immutable can neither be changed from being into non-being nor be changed from one being into another being. Now, what cannot be changed from being into non-being will endure endlessly. And what cannot be changed from one being into another being will remain without any change. Therefore, what is uncreated will not only be without any beginning but will truly also remain without end and any mutability. And a being without beginning and end and mutability is eternal being. Thus, what is uncreated must also be eternal. And, conversely, what is eternal must also be uncreated. For what is eternal existed from eternity and could not, for the same reason, have been created. By these reasons it is proved that if there cannot be but one uncreated there cannot be but one eternal. And likewise, conversely, if there cannot be but one eternal there cannot be but one uncreated.

CHAPTER 10. Another way of proving that God is immeasurable and that there is only one immeasurable What we have said above about the immeasurability of the divinity7 we can prove by another reason, namely by considering the property of immeasurability itself. Now, whatever has measure will become bigger when the measure is doubled; and it would 7 II:6–7.

95

96

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

majus si cresceret in decuplum, vel potius in centuplum; quid si cumularetur in millies, immo in millesies millies tantum? Hinc ergo, ut credo, potes animadvertere quod magnitudinem ad mensuram habere, hoc est ipsam participare, non magnitudinem esse. Deus autem, ut superior ratio probavit, ipsa magnitudo est, et nulla res omnino se ipsa participare potest, et hoc ipsum quod est, ex parte esse et ex parte non esse. Deus itaque, qui magnitudo ipsa est, magnitudinem ad mensuram habere non potest. Supra omnem itaque mensuram, et eo ipso inmensum esse deprehenditur quod nulla mensura comprehenditur, seu etiam comprehensibile perpenditur. Stat ergo inconcussum quod credimus, quod cotidiana confessione clamamus, quod Deus sit inmensus. Hoc ipsum ex omnipotentie consideratione probari valet. Sed quoniam hoc ipsum ad perpendendum perfacile est, in eo inmorari non oportet. Habemus autem ex superioribus quod non est alius omnipotentia quam inmensitas, quam eternitas ipsa. Consequens ergo est ut qui inmensitatem, qui eternitatem habet, simul et omnipotentiam habeat. Quam igitur non potest esse omnipotens nisi unus, tam non potest esse nisi unus inmensus, nisi unus eternus.

CAPUT XI. Quod inmensitas et eternitas sint incommunicabiles, nec possint esse pluribus substantiis communes Longe superius monstravimus quod divinitas sit omnino incommunicabilis, nec possit esse pluribus substantiis communis. Quod ibi dictum est de divinitate, simili ratione dici potest de Dei inmensitate, nichilominus autem de ejus eternitate. Quam non potest enim esse communicabilis pluribus substantiis substantia quelibet una, tam non potest esse communicabilis pluribus substantiis inmensitas ipsa, eternitas ipsa, cum non sint aliud aliquid quam divina substantia. Nullus ergo inmensus nisi solus et unus Deus; nullus eternus nisi solus et unus Deus. Sed hic magna questio oritur, que simplices auditores movere potest, nisi aperta enodatione solvatur: probatum est superius quod divina substantia sit idem quod ipsa potentia, idem quod ipsa sapientia. Quis autem dicat quod potentia sit incommunicabilis, quod sapientia non sit pluribus substantiis communis? Sed iccirco incommunicabiles dicuntur inmensitas et eternitas ipsa, quod idem esse probantur quod divina substantia, cur non eadem ratione ipsa potentia atque sapientia dicantur incommunicabiles et pluribus substantiis non posse esse communes? Ubi enim eadem ratio premittitur, cur similis consequentia non merito subinfertur? Sed ut hunc perplexionis nodum facilius dissolvamus, quod de divinitatis singularitate superius diximus, altiori adhuc perscrutatione discutiamus.

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

become much bigger if it grew ten times, and much more if it grew a hundred times; and what if it grew a thousand times, or even a million times? From this, I believe, you can understand that to have a greatness, which can be measured, means participating in a greatness, not being identical with it. Now, God, as the reason proved above,8 is identical with greatness itself, and absolutely nothing can participate into itself and it cannot partially be and partially not be what it is. Thus, God who is greatness itself, cannot have a greatness which can be measured. And what is above any measure and therefore is immeasurable must be understood without being contained by measure, even if it is considered understandable. Thus, it remains unshaken what we believe and say in our daily confession that God is immeasurable.9 The same can be proved by the consideration of omnipotence. But since this is easily considered we should not spend time on this point. And we know from what is already said above that omnipotence is nothing other than immeasurability and eternity itself. It follows therefore that one who has immeasurability and eternity, also has omnipotence at the same time. And likewise, there can only be one omnipotent since there cannot be but one immeasurable and one eternal.

CHAPTER 11. That immeasurability and eternity are incommunicable and cannot be shared by more substances Far above we have shown that the divinity is totally incommunicable and that it cannot be shared by more substances.10 What is said here about the divinity can for a similar reason be said about God’s immeasurability as well as about his eternity. For just as any one substance cannot be shared by more substances, so immeasurability and eternity cannot be shared by more substances since they are nothing other than the divine substance. Thus, there is no one immeasurable other than the sole and one God; there is no one eternal other than the sole and one God. But here a great question arises which can trouble more simple listeners, if it is not resolved with a clear answer: above it was proved that the divine substance is the same as its power and the same as its wisdom.11 But who says that the power is incommunicable and that the wisdom is not shared by more substances? If we say that immeasurability and eternity are the same as the divine substance, why can it not be said that the power and wisdom for the same reason are incommunicable and cannot be shared by more substances? Where the same reason is premised, why will there not be a similar consequence? But for untying this complicated knot more easily we will discuss more thoroughly what we have said above about the singularity of the divinity.12

8 II:5–6. 9 Quicumque. 10 I:17. 11 I:13.18.23. 12 I:17.

97

98

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

CAPUT XII. Quod divinitas superius incommunicabilis dicitur, hic enucleatius et plenius exprimitur Sciendum itaque de omni substantia quod habeat esse ex substantialitate sua. Nam cui substantialitas nulla inest, substantia recte dici non potest. Substantialitatem namque dicimus illam proprietatem subsistentie ex qua habet substantia dici et esse. Humane substantie substantialitas est ipsa humanitas; substantia siquidem que humanitatem non habet, homo nisi falso dici non valet. Quod autem de hac dictum est, in ceteris eque videri potest. Substantialitas vero alia generalis, alia specialis, alia individualis. Substantialitas autem illa est generalis, que est aliquibus speciebus communis, ut corporalitas, que inest omnibus corporibus, tam animatis quam inanimatis. Illa vero est specialis, que competit unius tantum speciei omnibus individuis, ut humanitas, que est omnibus hominibus communis. Individualis autem est illa, que uni soli quidem individuo inest et pluribus substantiis omnino communis esse non potest. Ad designandam individualem aliquam substantialitatem, nomen in usu non habemus, sed ad majorem dicendorum evidentiam ponere et a proprio nomine trahere possumus. Dicatur itaque a Danile Danielitas, sicut ab humine humanitas. Danielitas itaque intelligitur illa substantialitas, vel, si magis placet, illa subsistentia ex qua Daniel esse habet illa substantia que ipse est et quam participare non potest aliqua alia. Humanitas itaque, sicut corporalitas, est multis communis. Danielitas vero omnino incommunicabilis; incommunicabilem vero iccirco dicimus, quia sic est ejus ut non possit esse alterius. Nam qui hanc substantialitatem habuerit, profecto Daniel erit; qui vero non habuerit, isdem Daniel esse non poterit. Diversa namque substantialitas facit substantiam diversam. Singularis autem et individua non potest facere nisi unam. Incommunicabilis itaque est Danielitas, ut diximus, quia sic est subsistentia substantie unius ut non possit esse alterius. Si igitur iccirco incommunicabilis dicitur esse, quia non possit esse alterius substantie, quanto magis si Danielis substantia esset idem ipsum per omnia quod substantialitas sua? Divinitas autem ipsa est idem ipsum per omnia quod divina substantia; idem, inquam, quod singularis illa substantia que sola est a semetipsa, et a qua sola sunt cetera omnia. Tam igitur non potest ipsa divinitas communicabilis esse, quam non possunt diverse substantie esse una, et una diverse. Ecce quomodo divinitas ipsa sit incommunicabilis, tam aperte monstravimus ut lectitor qui super hoc dubitaverit non tam hebes videatur quam cecus. Inmensitas autem et eternitas, juxta predictam ratiocinationem, sic sunt unius ut non possint esse alterius, et eo ipso incommunicabiles perpendimus. Addamus quod idem ipsum quod divina substantia sunt; unde et constat quia incommunicabiles existunt.

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 12. That what is said above about the incommunicable divinity is expressed here more clearly and fully It should be well known that every substance has its being from its substantiality. For where there is no substantiality there cannot rightly be said to be a substance. For we call substantiality that property of subsistence from which a substance has its name and being. The substantiality of the human substance is humanity itself; thus, a substance which has not humanity can only falsely be called a human person. And what is said about this can be seen equally in all other substances. But substantiality is different when it is general, when it belongs to a species, and when it is individual. So, the general substantiality is common to any species, such as corporality which is in all bodies, both animate and inanimate. The substantiality which belongs to a species comprises all individuals of one species, such as humanity which is common to all human beings. And the individual substantiality is the one which is in one single individual and which absolutely cannot be shared by more substances. We do not have a word in use to describe the individual substantiality, but for giving more evidence to what has been said we can take one from a proper name. So, we can call it Danielity from the name of Daniel just as we call it humanity from a human being. Danielity means that substantiality or, if you prefer this, that subsistence from which Daniel has the substance which he is himself and which cannot be shared by anyone else. Humanity, like corporality, is common to many. But Danielity is totally incommunicable; and we call it exactly incommunicable because it is so that it cannot belong to somebody else. The one who has this substantiality will certainly be Daniel; and someone who does not have it cannot be the same Daniel. For different substantiality makes a different substance. But a single and individual substantiality can only make one substance. Danielity is thus incommunicable, as we have said, because it is the subsistence of one substance so that it cannot belong to someone else. So, if it is called incommunicable because it cannot belong to any other substance, how much more would this be the case if the substance of Daniel in all respects would be identical to his substantiality? Now, the divinity itself is entirely identical to the divine substance; identical, I say, to that single substance which alone is of itself, and from which alone all other exist. So, just as the divinity cannot be communicable, so diverse substances cannot be one, and one cannot be diverse. See, how clear we have shown that divinity is incommunicable, so that the reader who might be in doubt about this seems to be just as dull as blind. According to the reasonings above, immeasurability and eternity are one in such a way that they cannot belong to any other, and therefore we can call them incommunicable. And we add that they are identical to the divine substance; from this it is also certain that they are incommunicable.

99

100

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

CAPUT XIII. Quod secundum diversos modos dicendi possit sapientia seu potentia modo communicabilis, modo incommunicabilis dici Sed ut ad id redeamus propter quod ista digessimus, cur non eadem ratione potentia ipsa atque sapientia incommunicabiles dicuntur, si idem ipsum quod divina substantia veraciter esse comprobantur? Sed sciendum est quod tam nomine potentie quam nomine sapientie abutimur, cum modo de divinis, modo de humanis loquimur, ut non tam unicam quam equivocam predicationem fecisse videamur. De Deo dicimus quod sapientia sit, de homine dicimus non quod sapientia sit, sed quod ei sapientia insit; ibi sapientie nomine designatur tale quid quod sit substantia, et plus quam substantia; hic nomine sapientie designatur tale quid quod sit substantia nulla; utrobique dictio una, sed ratio nominis diversa. Si equivocatio est, ubi nomen unum sub diversa significatione designat substantiam diversam, quanto magis cum unum nomen distrahitur ad designandum et id quod negamus, et id quod dicimus substantiam. Dicimus item ipsum hominem, dicimus nichilominus Deum sapientiam habere, et videtur enuntiatio equivoca esse, sed de Deo non dicitur nisi abusive. Nec minor abusio videtur quam si Abraham non homo esse sed hominem habere diceretur. Hic dicendi abusio vel dictionum equivocatio sensum confundit, et potentiam atque sapientiam incommunicabiles dici non sinit. Denique demus tale nomen quod non possit nisi divine potentie vel divine sapientie convenire, et videbimus utramque incommunicabilem esse. Nam nomen ipsum omnipotentie, quod non potest nisi divine potentie convenire, omnino deprehenditur incommunicabile; siquidem, sicut jam probavimus, non potest esse omnipotens nisi unus. Sed ad exprimendam divinam sapientiam, omnipotentie simile nomen non habemus, sed sepe eam ex adjuncto determinamus, cum sapientiam summam, cum sapientiam ipsam vel plenitudinem sapientie nominamus. Sed quovis modo exprimatur divina et increata potentia vel sapientia, ita ut non possit omnino subintelligi alia aliqua, absque dubio utraque erit incommunicabilis, nec poterunt esse communes pluribus substantiis, non dicam angelicis, non dicam humanis, sed nec aliquibus quasi divinis.

CAPUT XIV. Multiplex probandi modus quod non sit Deus nisi unus Excepto eo quod de divinitatis singularitate superius jam diximus, ecce quam multis modis probare possumus quod non sit Deus nisi unus: unus increatus, unus eternus, unus inmensus, quorum singula probant atque convincunt quod non sit

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 13. How, according to various ways of speaking, wisdom and power sometimes can be called communicable and sometimes incommunicable But let us return to that which caused this consideration,13 namely why power and wisdom are not called incommunicable for the same reason, if they are proved truly to be the same as the divine substance? Now, one must know that we misuse both the word power and the word wisdom when we use them soon about the divinity, soon about humanity, so that we seem to have made an unequivocal term rather than an equivocal one. We say about God that he is wisdom, but about a human being we do not say that he is wisdom but that there is wisdom in him; in God the word wisdom designates that which is a substance and more than the substance; in the human being the word designates that which is no substance; in both cases the wording is the same, but the meaning is different. If there is equivocation where one word with different meanings designates different substances, how much more will that be the case when one word is used to designate both what we deny being a substance and what we call a substance. Thus, we say not only that a human being, but also that God has wisdom, and it seems to be an equivocal expression, but it is only about God that it is wrong. Not less wrong would it be if it said about Abraham that he is not a human being but that he has human being. This wrong use of words or this equivocation of expressions confuses the meaning and does not allow us to call power and wisdom incommunicable. If we could find a word which could be used only about the divine power and the divine wisdom, then we could see that both are incommunicable. For the word omnipotence, which can only be used about the divine power, is clearly understood to be incommunicable; and likewise, as we have demonstrated already,14 there can only be one omnipotent. But we do not have a word like omnipotence in order to express the divine wisdom, but we use to determine it with an addition such as the highest wisdom, wisdom itself, or the fullness of wisdom. But whatever expression is used about the divine and uncreated power and wisdom, so that it cannot be understood about anything else, both will without a doubt be incommunicable and cannot be shared by more substances, whether it might be angelic or human or any quasi-divine substances.

CHAPTER 14. More ways of proving that there is only one God Except from what we have said already about the singularity of the divinity,15 see how many ways we can prove that there is only one God: one uncreated, one eternal, and one immeasurable, which each of them proves and is convincing that there is

13 Namely II:11, so that II:12 is a digression. 14 I:25. 15 I:17 and II:12.

101

102

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

Deus nisi unus. Si bene attendis, idem probare poteris ex consideratione unitatis.2 Nam si quis dicat plures deos esse, convinci poterit ex hac consideratione unum quemlibet ab altero quolibet esse, quorum singulis sit proprium nonnisi a semetipsis existere. Sed quoniam hoc ex ante jam dictis perpendi et probari posse cognovimus, ex industria preterimus et lectoris sagacitati elicienda reliquimus.

CAPUT XV. Quod non potest esse nisi unus Dominus, sicut nec nisi unus Deus Nunc illud queramus, utrum juxta cotidianam confessionem non possit esse Dominus nisi unus solus. Ille utique veraciter dominus dicitur, cujus libertas nulla potestate premitur, cujus potestas vel dominium nulla inpossibilitate prepeditur. Veraciter autem dominus dici non poterit qui aliene voluntati invitus deservit vel cedit. Videtur itaque inpossibile plures dominos esse. Nam si plures esse dicuntur, vide quid inconvenientis inde consequitur. Nam si aliquis eorum alium quemlibet sue servituti addicere velit, si ille qui inpetitur oppressoris violentiam repellere non poterit, quomodo non potius servus quam dominus erit? Si vero oppressionis presumptor violenter repulsus et victus cedit, quomodo verus dominus erit qui repellentis voluntati invitus quidem, cedendo tam subservit? Sic fit ut, si plures equipotentes plures dominos esse contendimus, nullum procul dubio veraciter dominum efficimus. Sed quod ex considerata dominationis ipsius proprietate convincitur, ex omnipotentie consideratione confirmatur. Quam enim non poterit esse omnipotens nisi unus, tam non poterit esse Dominus nisi unus. Quis enim poterit ejus violentie resistere, quem veraciter constiterit omnia posse? Pro certo itaque tenendum quod non sit, sed nec esse possit Dominus nisi unus, sicut Deus nonnisi unus et solus.

CAPUT XVI. Quod Deus ipse sit suum, ipse sit summum bonum, et quod summum bonum sit universaliter perfectum Ei autem qui vere omnipotens est, expetendorum nichil deesse potest. Ubi enim omnipotentia est, nulla plenitudo, nulla perfectio deesse potest. Alioquin si vel aliquid de qualicumque perfectione summe potenti deesset quam habere non posset, veraciter omnipotens omnino non esset. Universaliter autem perfectum est, cui in nullo nulla perfectio deest, sed nec deesse potest. Nichil autem melius, nichil potest esse majus eo quod est plenum et perfectum in omnibus. Constat itaque de Omnipotenti quod ipse sit summum bonum, et quod consequens est, quod ipse sit sibi suum bonum. Sicut enim superiorem habere non valet qui supremum locum tenet, sic omnium



2 The mss. read bonitatis; the edd. (Faber Stapulensis, 1510) read unitatis which the critical edition for good reasons follows in accordance with the heading of the paragraph.

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

only one God. If you pay attention you can prove the same by the consideration of unity. For if somebody says that there are several gods, then he will be convinced by this consideration that anyone of those must exist from any other, and each of these is its own being and can only exist out of itself. But since we know that this can be understood and proved from what has been said already, we will deliberately pass by this issue and leave it to the keenness of the reader.

CHAPTER 15. That there cannot be but one Lord, just as there cannot be but one God Now let us investigate whether, according to the daily confession,16 there cannot be but one Lord alone. We call truly him a lord whose freedom is not suppressed by any power and whose power and lordship is not restricted by any impossibility. And one cannot truly be called a lord who against his will has to obey or yield to the will of another. Thus, it seems impossible that there can be several lords. If it is said that there are several lords, you will see how inconsistent the consequences are. For if one of them wants to make any of the other into a slave, and the attacked one could not repel the violence of the oppressor, how would he not rather be called a slave than a lord? But if the presumptuous oppressor is repelled violently and is conquered and he surrenders, how can he be a true lord when he against his will must give in by surrendering to the will of the repelling lord? Thus, if we maintain that there are several lords with the same power, we would without a doubt not have any true lord. What is thus proved by the consideration of the property of lordship can be confirmed by considering the omnipotence. For there cannot be any omnipotent but one, just as there cannot be but one Lord. For who can resist the force of him who truly is able to do everything? Therefore, one must regard as certain that there is not and cannot be but one Lord, just as there cannot be but one God alone.

CHAPTER 16. That God himself is his own, that he himself is the highest good, and that the highest good is totally perfect He who is truly omnipotent cannot lack anything which is desirable. For where there is omnipotence, any fullness or any perfection cannot be lacking. Otherwise, if the almighty was lacking something or could not have something in its perfection, he would certainly not at all be almighty. But he who does not lack and cannot lack anything in its perfection is totally perfect. For nothing can be better and nothing can be greater than that which is full and perfect in all ways. So, it is certain that the almighty is the highest good by himself and, consequently, that he is his own good for himself. Just as he who holds the highest place cannot have any superior, so the highest of all cannot

16 Quicumque.

103

1 04

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

summus de suo inferiori bonus fieri vel beari non valet. Quomodo autem aliunde bonus vel beatus fieri posset, qui a semetipso habet totum quod habet? Est itaque de semetipso bonus, est et de semetipso beatus. Ipse ergo sua, ipse summa bonitas; ipse sua, ipse summa felicitas. Constat itaque, quod dictum est, quod ipse sit summum bonum et quod ipsum sit universaliter perfectum. Quid est enim beatitudo, nisi bonorum omnium plenitudo atque perfectio? Constat itaque quia bono illi summo universaliterque perfecto nichil omnino desit cujus adjectione meliorari possit.

CAPUT XVII. Quod in illo summo bono universaliterque perfecto sit vera unitas et summa simplicitas Sed si in illo vero et summo bono universaliterque perfecto plenitudo est omnium bonorum, nunquid illud bonum usquequaque perfectum est ex multis bonis compositum? Sed quod ex pluribus compositum est, naturaliter et divisibile est; et quod naturaliter est divisibile, naturaliter est et commutabile; et ubi est commutabilitas, non potest esse eternitas, et sic nec vera felicitas. Sed in bono quod universaliter perfectum est, nichil horum deesse potest. Nam, ut de ceteris taceam, ex solius omnipotentie consideratione convincitur nichil perfectionis, et quod consequens est, nichil horum ibi deesse potuisse. Constat itaque quia in illa eterna felicitate et vere felici eternitate sit vera incommutabilitas, et consequenter vera et summa simplicitas. Ubi autem summa simplicitas, ibi vera et summa unitas. Quicquid ergo in summo bono est, vere et summe unum est, nec ibi aliud et aliud esse potest, sed idem ipsum est totum quod est.

CAPUT XVIII. Quod de summi boni simplicitate vel unitate dictum est, quomodo alia ratione confirmari potest Quod autem de summi illius et veri boni simplicitate vel unitate hic dicimus, alia adhuc ratione convincere possumus, sicut ex his colligi potest que jam superius posuimus. In superioribus namque ratio invenit quod divina substantia sit idem quod ipsa potentia, idem quod ipsa sapientia; unde et quelibet earum convincitur idem esse quod alia. De eadem substantia superius est dictum, immo et simili ratione probatum quod sit vera inmensitas, quod sit idem quod ipsa eternitas. Attende itaque quoniam omnia ista unum et idem ipsum sunt, et adinvicem quidem de alterutris predicari possunt. Quod de istis dicimus, hoc de ejus bonitate, hoc de ejus beatitudine simili consequentia convincere possumus. Nam ista quidem, sicut superiora, de semetipsis et premissis mutuam predicationem suscipiunt; et omnino omnia que divine substantie dicuntur inesse, vel unde dicitur aliquid habere, in eamdem consequentiam currunt. Quoniam igitur vere et summe unum

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

be made good or happy by anyone inferior to him. How could he, who has all which he has from himself, be made good or happy from somewhere else? So, he is good from himself, and he is happy from himself. Therefore, he is himself his own and the highest goodness; and he is himself his own and the highest happiness. It is certain, then, what we have said, that he is the highest good and that he is totally perfect. And what is happiness other than the fullness and perfection of all the good? So, it is certain that the highest and totally perfect good cannot lack anything which could make him better.

CHAPTER 17. That there is true unity and the highest simplicity in the highest and totally perfect good When this true and highest and totally perfect good is the fullness of all the goods, could this totally perfect good then be a composite of many goods? Now, what is a composition of more things is naturally also divisible; and what is naturally divisible is naturally also mutable; and where there is mutability there cannot be eternity and thus not true happiness. But in the good which is totally perfect there cannot lack any of these things. For, leaving aside the other things, just the consideration of the omnipotence makes it certain that nothing of perfection and consequently none of the other things can be lacking here. Thus, it is certain that in the eternal happiness and truly happy eternity there will be true immutability and consequently true and supreme simplicity. And where there is the highest simplicity, there must be true and supreme unity. So, whatever there is in the highest good must be truly and supremely one, there cannot be one and another thing here, but it is fully the same all that it is.

CHAPTER 18. That what has been said about the simplicity and unity of the highest good can be confirmed by another reason What we have said here about the simplicity and unity of the highest and true good we can prove with yet another reason, just as it can be understood from what we have shown already above. Above, reason found that the divine substance is the same as the power itself and the same as the wisdom itself; from this it was also proved that they both are the same as the other.17 It was said above, indeed it was proved by a similar reason, that the same substance was true immeasurability, and that this was the same as eternity itself.18 You can see that since all of these things are one and the same, they can be deduced mutually from each other. What we say about these things we can prove with similar consequences about his goodness and his happiness. For just as the properties mentioned above, these can throw light on themselves and the mentioned properties mutually; and absolutely all that can be said to be in the divine substance and about its origin leads into the same conclusion. Since whatever is in the

17 I:13.18.23. 18 II:5.7.10.11.

105

1 06

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

est quicquid in summa substantia, immo quicquid summa substantia est, non est ei aliud esse quam vivere, nec vivere quam intelligere, nec ab his aliud atque aliud potentem vel sapientem fore; sed nec ab eis sicut nec a semetipsis diversum aliquid bonum vel beatum esse. Rationis itaque hujusmodi consideratione colligi potest, quoniam quicquid in summo bono et vera divinitate est, vere et substantialiter, et summe unum est.

CAPUT XIX. Quod illud bonum universaliter perfectum sit summe unum et unice summum Esse itaque oportet summum bonum summe unum, et non solum summe unum, sed et unice summum. Non enim possunt esse duo summa bona, sicut nec duo universaliter perfecta. Nam si duo eque perfecta esse concedimus, oportet ut et consequenter concedamus quoniam quicquid plenitudinis, quicquid perfectionis est in uno, totum juxta eumdem modum atque mensuram erit et in altero. Erit itaque utrobique una et eadem plenitudo, erit utrobique una indifferensque perfectio. Sed ubi differentia nulla est, pluralitas omnino recte dici sicut et inveniri non potest. Plura itaque universaliter perfecta sicut omnino non sunt, sic et omnino esse non possunt. Et quidem, sicut et ante nos dictum est, si unum universaliter perfectum est, ad omnia sufficit. Alioquin usquequaque perfectum non erit, et si unum omnino sufficit, altero superfluum erit; et si omnino est superfluum, quomodo utile, vel si inutile, quomodo bonum? Bonum igitur illud universaliter perfectum erit, ut dictum est, non solum summe unum, sed et unice summum. Ecce, ut vides, quod de summo bono dicimus, in eamdem consequentiam currit quam superior ratio de divine substantie unitate ratiocinando invenit. Nam si Deus veraciter est summum bonum, quam non potest esse summum bonum nisi unum, tam veraciter constat quod credimus, non posse esse nisi unum Deum. Est itaque in illa vera et summa felicitate et vere et summe felici divinitate, est, inquam, summa et substantialis unitas, et in ipsa unitate vera et summa simplicitas, ubi, uti superius probatum est, idem ipsum est totum quod est.

CAPUT XX. Quam sit incomprehensibilis simplicitas illa vere et summe unitatis Sed si in ista unitate vera et summa simplicitas est, nichil ipsi ad illam que est ex compositione partium in substantiam unam. Si idem ipsum est totum quod in ea est, nichil ipsi ad illam que est ex conformitate multarum substantiarum in unam naturam. Si vere et summe simplex est, quid ipsi ad illam que est in unione diversiformium substantiarum in personam unam? Si simplex identitas

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

divine substance is truly and to the highest degree one, indeed since whatever is the divine substance, to be and to live is one and the same, and the same is to live and to understand, just as its power and wisdom is the same as these properties; and to be good and to be happy is not different from each other or from the mentioned properties. From this reason and consideration, it can be concluded that whatever exists in the highest good and true divinity is truly and substantially and to the highest degree one.

CHAPTER 19. That the totally perfect good is the highest unity and uniquely the highest So, the highest good must be to the highest degree one, and not only to the highest degree one, but also uniquely the highest. For there cannot be two who are the highest good, just as there cannot be two who are totally perfect. For if we admit that there are two who are equally perfect, we will have to admit also that whatever fullness and perfection there is in the one will also be in the other in the same way and measure. Thus, in both there will be one and the same fullness, and there will in both be one and the same perfection. However, where there is no difference it is not at all right to talk about or to find plurality. So, just as there are not at all more totally perfect beings, so they are not at all able to exist. And, just as it has been said before us, if there is one totally perfect being, then it is able to everything. Otherwise, it will never be perfect, and if the one is able to everything, then another one will be superfluous; and if this is totally superfluous, how would it be useful, and if it is useless, how would it be good? Thus, as we have said, this totally perfect good will not only be to the highest degree one but also uniquely the highest.19 As you see, what we have said about the highest good leads to the same conclusion as that which the reason above by thinking found about the unity of the divine substance. For if God truly is the highest good, then just as there cannot be more than one highest good, then it is truly certain what we believe, that there cannot be but one God. So, in this true and highest happiness and true and highest happy divinity there is, I say, the highest unity of substance, and in this unity there is true and the highest simplicity where, as we have proved above,20 all that it is, will be identical to it itself.

CHAPTER 20. How this simplicity of the true and highest unity is incomprehensible But if there is true and the highest simplicity in this unity, then it has nothing to do with that substance which is one in a composition of parts. If all in it is identical to itself, then it has nothing to do with that unity which consists of a conformity of more substances in one nature. If it is the true and highest simplicity, what can it have to do with that unity which is a union of differently formed substances in one person? If

19 I:16.25. 20 II:17.

107

1 08

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

in ipsa est, quid ipsi ad illam que est in concretione subsistentis et subsistentie in essentiam unam? Nichilominus et longe est supra unitatem illam que est ex collectione multarum proprietatum in unam formam. Incomparabiliter autem et incomprehensibiliter supra ejusmodi omnes constat hanc fore, que in infinitatis identitate habet summe simplex et incommutabile esse. In illo itaque summo bono universaliterque perfecto vera unitas, in illo summa simplicitas, in illo vera et summe simplex identitas. Ibi, quod adhuc mirabilius est, vera unitas cum plenitudinis universitate; ibi summa simplicitas cum perfectionis inmensitate; ibi summe simplex identitas cum totius consummationis infinitate. Attende ergo quam sit incomprehensibilis et omnino inestimabilis simplicitas illa vere et summe unitatis!

CAPUT XXI. Quomodo quisque possit in sua scientia ex comparatione colligere quid debeat de illa supereminenti incomprehensibilitate sentire Sed ne quis ex simplicioribus existimet me contraria et sibi invicem repugnantia astruere, quasi ea que dicta sunt non possint simul stare, ostendo ei qui ejusmodi est, quomodo possit quasi per speculum videre et in semetipso ex comparatione colligere quid debeat de illa supereminenti incomprehensibilitate sentire. Si granum aliquod in manu teneret, nonne veraciter sentiret et incunctanter affirmaret quod nichil ceterorum omnium esset numero idem quod ipsum? Si igitur interrogaretur sigillatim de singulis granis cujusqumque holeris vel segetis, nonne constanter responderet diversum esse ab omnibus et singulis? Idem sentiret de omni pilo, idem affirmaret de omni capillo. Quid de qualibet gutta maris? Quid de quolibet folio cujuscumque arboris? Si tota terra solveretur in pulverem, et de singulis illius minutiis interrogari potuisset, ad singulas interrogationes idem tam constanter quam veraciter responderet. Si mensura terre in infinitum cresceret, de minutissimis partibus in ipsius eamdem sententiam teneret. Hec studui diligentius exprimere, ut quilibet quantumvis simplex in propria scientia legat et intelligat quomodo sub una et simplici veritate comprehenduntur infinite. Quid ergo mirum si in illa sapientia, que Deus est, et in qua omnis veritas est, alioquin perfecta non esset, si eam aliqua veritas lateret, quid, inquam, mirum si in illa est et juxta aliquid summa simplicitas, et juxta aliquid infinita multiplicitas? Quid, inquam, mirum si ibi concordet et in unum concurrat identitas cum multiplicitatis infinitate, simplicitas cum magnitudinis inmensitate, vera unitas cum totius plenitudinis universitate? Ecce habet quisque quomodo potest in sua scientia legere quid debeat de illa supereminenti incomprehensibilitate estimare.

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

there is simple identity in it, what can it have to do with a unity which is a composition of a subsistent and subsistence in one being? Likewise, it is far above that unity which consists of a collection of many properties in one form. It is thus certain that this unity, which has the highest degree of a simple and immutable being in endless identity, is incomparably and incomprehensibly far above all these unities. So, in this highest good and totally perfect being there is true unity, there is the highest simplicity, and there is the true and highest simple identity. There we have, which is even more admirable, a unity together with the fullness of everything; there we have the highest simplicity together with the endless perfection; there we have the highest simple identity together with the infinity of everything’s fulfilment. Here you can see how incomprehensible and totally invaluable it is, this simplicity of the true and highest unity!

CHAPTER 21. How one can understand in his own knowledge by comparison what should be thought about this totally supreme incomprehensibility So that any of the more simple minds may not think that I am adding arguments against myself and in a self-contradictory way, so that the things I have said cannot stand at the same time, I will show to someone who thinks so, how he can see like in a mirror and understand by comparing to himself what one should think about this absolutely supreme incomprehensibility.21 If anyone holds a grain in his hand, would he not clearly think and say at once that none of all the other grains were the same as this one? And if the same was asked about every single grain of corn or herb, would he not answer all the time that it is different from one and all? He would think the same about every hair, and he would say the same about every strand of hair. And what about any drop of the sea? And what about any leaf of a tree? And if the whole earth would be dissolved into dust, and we could ask him about every single small piece, he would constantly and truly answer the same to all questions. And if the size of the earth would grow endlessly, he would have the same opinion about every of its smallest parts. I have wanted to express this more carefully so that anyone, however simple-minded, can read in his knowledge and understand how infinite truths can be understood by means of one simple truth. And what wonder is it if in this wisdom, which God is and in which all truth is, otherwise it would not be perfect, if it would be lacking any wisdom, what wonder is it, I say, if there in this wisdom would be the highest simplicity in one way and an endless multiplicity in another way? What wonder is it, I say, if there here is harmony and unity between identity and endless multiplicity, between simplicity and immeasurable greatness, and between true unity and the universal, total fullness? See, anyone has gotten here how he can read in his own knowledge what he should think about this absolutely supreme incomprehensibility.

21 Above I:7 with allusion to 1 Cor 13:12a.

109

110

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

CAPUT XXII. De Dei substantia quid dicatur rectius; et quod ipse sit sine quantitate magnus, et sine qualitate bonus Ex superibus agnovimus quod in natura illa, que Deus est, sit vera unitas et summa simplicitas; nulla ibi compositio, nulla concretio; ipsa nulli, nichil ipsi inest velud in subjecto. Dicitur et est summa potentia; dicitur et est summa sapientia; et ne in subjecto esse putetur, substantia nominatur. Sed quia contra substantiarum naturam nichil ei velud in subjecto inherere deprehenditur, non tam substantia quam supersubstantialis essentia esse convincitur. Superior ratio invenit, si non excidit, quod non sit aliud aliquid ejus bonitas, et aliud aliquid ejus inmensitas. Quid ergo? Si idem est ejus inmensitas quod bonitas, nunquid erit inmensitate sua bonus? Si idem est ejus bonitas quod inmensitas, nunquid erit bonitate sua magnus? Sed bonitas videtur pertinere ad qualitatem, inmensitas ad quantitatem. Quid ergo? Eritne qualitate magnus et quantitate bonus? Et ad hec quis idoneus? An quia non est aliud inmensitas sua vel bonitas sua quam substantia sua, nunquid erit et sine qualitate bonus, et sine quantitate magnus? Et ad hec quis idoneus? Ex his, ut arbitror, perfacile est intelligere quam sit ineffabile, immo et incomprehensibile quod ratio ratiocinando compellit de Deo nostro sentire.

CAPUT XXIII. Quod sit in omni loco incomprehensibiliter, in omni tempore invariabiliter; et quomodo uniformis, et quomodo multiformis Tenemus ex ante jam dictis quod Deus omnipotens sit, et quod absque dubio omnia possit. Si ergo vere omnipotens est, consequenter et ubique potest. Si ubique potest, potentialiter ubique est. Si ubique potentialiter, et ubique essentialiter. Neque enim est aliud ejus potentia, atque aliud ejus essentia. Si autem essentialiter ubique est, ergo et ubi locus est, et ubi locus non est. Erit itaque et intra omnem locum, erit et extra omnem locum; erit supra omnia, erit infra omnia; intra omnia, extra omnia. Sed quoniam simplicis nature est Deus, non erit hic et ibi per partes divisus, sed ubique totus. Erit itaque in quantulacumque cujuslibet parte totius totus, et in toto totus, et extra totum totus. Si igitur extra omnem locum est totus, in nullo loco concluditur; si in omni loco est totus, a nullo loco secluditur; localiter igitur nusquam est, qui a nullo loco concludi, a nullo loco secludi potest. Et sicut in omni loco est presentialiter, in nullo localiter, sic in omni tempore est eternaliter, in nullo temporaliter. Sicut enim per loca non distenditur, qui summe simplex et incompositus est, sic nec per tempora variatur qui eternus et incommutabilis est.

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 22. What can be said more rightly about God’s substance; and that he is great without quantity and good without quality From the above we have acknowledged that in this nature which God is, there is true unity and the highest simplicity; there is no composition here, there is no growing together; it is not subject to anything and there is nothing in it which is subject to anything. It is called and it is the highest power; it is called and is the highest wisdom; and so that it should not be meant to be subject to anything it is called a substance. But because, contrary to the nature of substances, there can be nothing in it which can be subject to anything, it is understood to be not only a substance but a super-substantial being. Above, reason found, if it has not been forgotten, that his goodness and his immeasurability is one and the same.22 What follows from that? If his immeasurability is the same as his goodness, will he then be good because of his immeasurability? If his goodness is the same as his immeasurability, will he then be great because of his goodness? But goodness seems to pertain to quality, and immeasurability to quantity. What follows from this? Would he not be great in quantity and good in quality? But who can understand this? [cf. 2 Cor 2:16b]. Or since his immeasurability is the same as his goodness and his substance, would he not be good without quality and great without quantity? But who can understand this? [cf. 2 Cor 2:16b]. From this, I think, it is easy to understand how ineffable and indeed incomprehensible it is what reasoning impels us to think about our God.

CHAPTER 23. That he is incomprehensible in every place; invariably in every time; and how he is uniform and multiform From what has been said already we maintain that God is almighty and that he undoubtedly can do everything. If he thus is truly almighty, it follows that he can be so everywhere. If he can be everywhere, he is everywhere almighty. If he is everywhere almighty, he will also be everywhere in being. For there is no difference between his power and his being. But if he is everywhere in his being, he must be both where there is a place and where there is not a place. Thus, he will be within all place and he will be outside all place; he will be above all, and he will be below all; he will be inside everything and he will be outside everything. But since the nature of God is simple, he will not be divided into parts here and there, but he will be whole everywhere. So, he will be whole in any small part of the whole, and he will be whole in the whole, and he will be whole outside the whole. If he is whole outside all place, then he cannot be contained in no place; if he is whole in all places, then he cannot be excluded from any place; so, he is never in a place when he cannot be contained in a place and cannot be excluded from any place. And just as he is present in all places and in no place locally, so he is eternally in all time and 22 II:18.

111

112

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

Sicut igitur eorum que nundum sunt nichil ei futurum, sicut eorum omnium que jam non sunt nichil est preteritum, sic eorum omnium que jam presentialiter sunt nichil est ei transitorium. Est igitur in omni loco incomprehensibiliter et in omni tempore invariabiliter. Et miro modo qui quantum ad se semper est uniformis, in aliis et aliis invenitur multiformis. Nam si situm queris ejus qui situ caret, quantum ad se, juxta simplicitatem nature, ubique uniformiter se habet; et tamen secundum participium gratie in aliis et aliis multiformem se exibet. In aliis est secundum participium potentie, nec tamen secundum participium vite; in aliis etiam secundum participationem vite, nec tamen secundum participationem sapientie. Quibusdam inest secundum participium bonitatis, nec tamen secundum participium beatitudinis; quibusdam vero constat eum inesse secundum participationem utriusque. Et qui in se uniformis est et mutari nescit, largitatis sue manum in aliis contrahit, in aliis largius, in aliis largiter extendit.

CAPUT XXIV. Quod ejus facere sit a se fieri velle, et ejus pati non nolle fieri; et quod eque habet et quod actualiter est, et quod actualiter non est Et cum vere omnipotens sit, quicquid est, aut ejus operatione aut ejus permissione subsistit. Nam quicquid fit, nisi ad nutum ejus fieret, procul dubio omnipotens non esset. Ejus itaque facere est a se fieri velle, ejus autem pati est non nolle ab alio fieri. Et sicut omne ejus pati est sine omni passione et compati sine propassione, sic omne ejus agere est sine sui agigatione et indeficiens facere sine fatigatione. Sed si ejus facere est idem quod a se fieri velle, nunquid quando aliquid facit quod prius non fuit, nunquid, inquam, aliquid vult quod prius noluit? Sed qui vere inmutabilis est, velle suum variare non potest. Quod ergo semel voluit, semper voluit. Nunquid ergo que volendo fecit ab eterno fecit, quia ut fieret ab eterno voluit? Et si fecit que futura sunt, nunquid adhuc facit et faciet que jam preterita sunt et de cetero futura non erunt? Nunquid perseverat faciendo sicut et volendo? Et cum aliquid esse desinit, nunquid habere desinit quod prius habuit, vel habere incipit quando aliquid esse incipit quod prius non fuit? Nam quod esse desinit vel nundum cepit, nichil est, et quod nichil est possideri non potest. Sed omnipotens possessor nec potest ditescere, nec in sua ditione decrescere. Quid ergo? Sed vide ne forte hoc ipsum quod actualiter est, excellentius sit, ubi actualiter non est quam ubi actualiter est. Nam hic est transitorium, ibi eternum; et quod factum est, ibi vita erat, etiam tunc quando necdum actualiter erat. Qui igitur nichil amittere vel adquirere potest, eque habet et quod actualiter est, et quod actualiter non est.

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

in no time temporally. For just as he who is to the highest degree simple and genuine cannot be spread in places, so he who is eternal and immutable cannot be changed in time. So, just as those things which do not yet exist will not be future for him, so those things which do not exist anymore are not past for him, and so are those things which are present now not transitory for him. Thus, he is incomprehensibly in all places and unchanged in all time. In an admirable way he is uniform regarding himself, and at the same time he is found multiform in so many others. For if you seek the place of him who is without any place, regarding himself, he is everywhere uniform by his simple nature; and yet he presents himself multiform in so many by the participation of grace.23 In some he is present by the participation of power, but not by the participation of life; in some he is present by the participation of life, but not by participation of wisdom. In some he is present by the participation of goodness, but not by participation of beatitude; but in some he is surely present by the participation of both goodness and beatitude. For he who is uniform in himself and who cannot change, narrows the generosity of his hand in some, in others he extends it broadly, and in others even more broadly.

CHAPTER 24. That his actions are done out of his will to be done by him, and his permissions are done by his not rejecting that they be done; and that he equally has both what actually is and what actually is not Because he is truly almighty, everything exists either by his work or by his permission. For if he did something against his will, there is no doubt that he would not be almighty. His doing is his willing that something is done by him, and his permission is not refusing something to be done by another. And just as his permission is no loss, and his compassion is not suffering, so all his action is without effort and his constant creating without tiredness. But if his creating is the same as his willing that something is done by him, will he then when he creates something which did not exist before, will he then, I say, something which he did not will before? When he is truly immutable, his will cannot change. So, what he willed once, he has willed always. So, can it be that what he creates after his will he has created from eternity since he has willed from eternity that it should be created? And if he already created what should be in the future, will it then be so that he creates and still will create what already existed before and will not be in the future? Will his creating not be as constant as his willing? And when something ceases to exist, will he then cease to have something which he had before, or will he begin to have something which he did not have before when something begins to exist? For what ceases to exist or not yet has begun to exist, is nothing, and what is nothing cannot be possessed. But the almighty possessor cannot become richer nor lose any of his wealth.

23 Cf. Eph 3:10 and 1 Pet 4:10.

113

114

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s ecu n d u s

CAPUT XXV. Quod quicquid dictum est de divinis proprietatibus usque modo, videtur pertinere ad illud esse quod est ab eterno et semetipso De his que de Deo dicuntur relative, volumus hoc loco supersedere; nam eorum significatio latius se extendit quam que sub compendiosa brevitate comprehendi possit. Ut enim michi videtur, eorum significatio ad omnia predicamenta evagatur. Nam cum ea quam significant relatione, quod consignificant solet modo ad hec, modo ad illa predicamenta pertinere. Substantive namque dicitur unus alteri consubstantialis, quantitative equalis vel inequalis, qualitative similis vel dissimilis. Ubi consignificat superior et inferior, quando anterior et posterior, situm consessor et consessio, habere possessor et possessio; pertinet ad facere et pati generator et genitus, amator et amatus. Melius itaque est his interim supersedere quam attemptare quod non possumus debita brevitate succingere. Notandum est autem hoc loco quod quicquid de divinis proprietatibus dictum est usque modo, ad illud esse pertinere videtur quod est a semetipso, et eo ipso ab eterno. Nam quicquid de hujusmodi hucusque dictum est, nichil minus constaret etiamsi nichil ab eterno esset quod aliunde quam a semetipso originem traheret.

b o o k t wo – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

What follows from this? Let us see if perhaps something which exists in actual is more excellent when it is not actualized than when it is actualized. In this world it is transitory, with God it is eternal; and what is created here was life [cf. Jn 1:3–4]24 there, also when it was not yet actualized. So, he who cannot lose or acquire anything will possess both what exists actually and what is not actualized.

CHAPTER 25. That what is said about the divine properties until now seems to be about that being which is from eternity and from itself Here we will pass by the things which can be said about the relations in God; for their meaning extends further than what could be comprised in a brief survey. For it seems to me that their meaning pertains to all the properties. For in addition to what they signify about relations, they also signify soon about one property and soon about another property. So, it pertains to substance when we say that one is consubstantial with another, it is about quantity when we talk about equality and inequality, and about quality when about likeness and unlikeness. When something is called above or below it pertains to the place, before and after pertain to time, to sit together and sitting together pertain to situation, to possess and possession pertain to having something; the one who gives birth and the born pertain to be active and passive, and the same about the lover and the beloved. It is better to refrain from this for now instead of trying to treat something which we cannot do properly in a brief manner. It should be noted here that whatever has been said until now about the divine properties seems to pertain to that being which is from itself and therefore from eternity. For what has been said about this being until now will not be less certain even if there would not exist any being from eternity which has its beginning from any other than itself.

24 Richard reads – like most of the Greek and Latin fathers – Jn 1:3–4a with the following punctuation: ‘Omnia per ipsum facta sunt et sine ipso factum est nihil. Quod factum est, in illo vita erat’ whereas Vulgate reads: ‘… et sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est, in ipso vita erat’.

115

INCIPIUNT CAPITULA TERTII LIBRI I.

Quod hucusque actum sit de divine substantie unitate, quod amodo querendum quid sentiendum sit de divinarum personarum pluralitate. II. Quomodo ex caritatis proprietate plenitudo bonitatis convincit quod in vera divinitate personarum pluralitas deesse non possit. III. Quod idem quod de divinarum personarum pluralitate plenitudo bonitatis loquitur, plenitudo divine felicitatis attestatur. IV. Quod de personarum pluralitate in dictis duobus testibus astruitur, ex considerata divine glorie plenitudine confirmatur. V. Quod jam dicte divine pluralitatis assertio triplici confirmatur testimonio. VI. Quod personas divinas oporteat omnino esse coeternas. VII. Quod in illa personarum pluralitate oporteat tam summam equalitatem quam summam similitudinem esse. VIII. Quam miranda ratione sit substantialis unitas in vera pluralitate, et personalis pluralitas in vera unitate substantie. IX. Quod in divina natura pluralitas personarum sit in unitate substantie, et in humana natura pluralitas substantiarum in unitate persone. X. Quomodo ex pluralitate et unitate quam invenit in semetipso docetur homo quid quasi ex opposito estimare debeat de his que sibi credenda proponuntur de Deo suo. XI. Quomodo convincitur ex caritatis integritate quod vera Trinitas sit in vera unitate et vera unitas in vera Trinitate. XII. Quod summa bonitas et summa felicitas Trinitatis assertionem concorditer clamant et mutua assertione confirmant. XIII. Quod plenitudo divine glorie in contestationem summe bonitatis et felicitatis videatur acclamare. XIV. Quod communicatio amoris non potest esse omnino minus quam in tribus personis. XV. Quod oporteat geminam personam in divinitate pari voto, consimili ratione tertiam personam requirere. XVI. Quod plenitudo potentie et sapientie videtur possideri posse in sola unitate persone. XVII. Quod completio felicitatis non videtur posse subsistere sine geminatione persone. XVIII. Quod consummatio vere et summe bonitatis videtur non posse subsistere sine completione Trinitatis. XIX. Quomodo ex inspecta solum proprietate condilectionis deprehendi possit vestigium Trinitatis. XX. Quod ex tertie persone consodalitate in illa Trinitate agitur ut concordialis caritas et consocialis amor ubique nusquam singularis inveniatur. XXI. Quod summa equalitas sit in illa Trinitate, ubi oportet omnes eque perfectos esse. XXII. Quod in singulis personis sit summa simplicitas, et in omnibus simul vera et summa unitas, et utrobique miranda identitas.

HERE BEGIN THE HEADINGS OF BOOK THREE 1. That until now it has been about the unity of the divine substance, and that it should now be examined what to think about the plurality of the divine persons. 2. How the fullness of goodness in its property of charity demonstrates that there must be a plurality of persons in the true divinity. 3. That the same as the fullness of goodness says about the plurality of divine persons is testified by the fullness of the divine happiness. 4. That what is shown by the mentioned two witnesses about the plurality of persons is confirmed by considering the fullness of the divine glory. 5. That what is said now about the divine plurality is confirmed by a threefold testimony. 6. That the divine persons must be totally coeternal. 7. That in this plurality of persons there must be both the highest equality and the highest likeness. 8. How by a wonderful reason there is a substantial unity in the true plurality and a personal plurality in the true unity of substance. 9. That in the divine nature there is a plurality of persons in the unity of substance and in the human nature a plurality of substances in a unity of person. 10. How humans learn from the plurality and unity in themselves what to think in contrast, as it were, about the things which are proposed to them to be believed about their God. 11. How it is demonstrated from the perfect charity that the true Trinity is in true unity and the true unity in true Trinity. 12. How the highest goodness and the highest happiness unanimously testify and mutually confirm the Trinity. 13. That the fullness of divine glory seems to consent to the testimony of the highest goodness and happiness. 14. How that communication of love absolutely cannot exist in less than three persons. 15. That the two persons in the divinity with an equal wish and for a similar reason must desire a third person. 16. That the fullness of power and wisdom seems to be able to be found in one single person. 17. That the complete happiness does not seem to exist without two persons. 18. That the perfection of the true and highest goodness does not seem to exist without the complete Trinity. 19. How a trace of the Trinity can be seen by examining simply the property of the love of a third person. 20. That the community with the third person in the Trinity brings about that charity is found mutual and love common everywhere, never individual. 21. That there will be the highest equality in the Trinity in which all must be equally perfect. 22. That there will be the highest simplicity in each person, and that there in all at the same time is true and the highest unity, and that there in both cases is wonderful identity.

118

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – C ap i t u l a T e rt i i Li b ri

XXIII. Quomodo in his personis sit intelligenda dicta equalitas, ubi est tanta unitas et talis identitas. XXIV. Quam sit incomprehensibilis illa omniformitas summe coequalitatis. XXV. Quod in illa Trinitate nusquam aliquis est dissimilis sibi, nec inequalis in aliquo alicui alteri.

H e ad i n g s o f b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

23. How the mentioned equality between these persons is to be understood where there is such unity and identity. 24. How incomprehensible this total uniformity of the highest common equality is. 25. That there in this Trinity is never anyone who is dissimilar to himself or unequal in anything in relation to any of the other.

119

LIBER TERTIUS

CAPUT I. Quod hucusque actum sit de divine substantie unitate, quod amodo querendum quid sentiendum sit de divinarum personarum pluralitate In his que hucusque dicta sunt de divine substantie unitate vel proprietate, secundum quod nobis videbatur, executi sumus. De reliquo vero investigare proposuimus quid de divinarum personarum pluralitate vel proprietatibus sentire debeamus. Primo itaque querendum videtur utrum in illa vera et simplici divinitate vera pluralitas sit, et si ille personarum numerus, prout credimus, in ternarium assurgit; deinde quomodo possit convenire unitas substantie cum personarum pluralitate; tertio vero loco querere oportebit utrumnam, juxta fidei nostre documenta, sit ibi sola una persona que sit a semetipsa, ceterarum vero quelibet procedat ex alia, et si qua sunt alia circa eamdem considerationem querenda. Quod si detur nobis et ista ex ratione convincere, ultimo loco oportebit adhuc querere an in illis duabus personis aliunde quam a se procedentibus sit diversus procedendi modus, et quis cuique sit proprius, et quod consequens est, juxta propria singularum de earum nominibus. Oportet autem in his que ad querendum restant tanto majorem diligentiam inpendere eoque ardentius insistere quanto minus in Patrum scriptis invenitur unde possimus ista, non dico ex Scripturarum testimoniis, sed ex rationis attestatione convincere. In hoc autem inquisitionis mee proposito, qui voluerit rideat, qui voluerit irrideat, et digne quidem. Nam, ut verum fatear, ad temptandi ausum non me quidem tam scientia elevat quam estuantis animi ardor instigat. Quid si non detur pervenire quo tendo? Quid si in currendo deficio? Gaudebo tamen in querendo faciem Domini mei semper pro viribus cucurrisse, laborasse, desudasse. Et si contingat pre nimia vie prolixitate, asperitate, arduitate deficere, nonnichil effeci, si veraciter michi dicere contingat: feci quod potui, quesivi et non inveni illum, vocavi et non respondit michi. Et ecce asina illa Balaam que sessorem suum in suo itinere retardavit, nescio quo pacto me ad currendam viam inceptam urget et inpellit. Audio et ego adhuc loquentem et dicentem michi: “Qui quod loquerer potuit dare michi, poterit procul dubio dare et tibi.” Sed nunc ad id quod proposuimus, cum omni diligentia intendamus.

BOOK THREE

CHAPTER 1. That until now it has been about the unity of the divine substance, and that it should now be examined what to think about the plurality of the divine persons In this which has been said so far about the unity or property of the divine substance, we have followed what has been shown to us. Now we have set ourselves to investigate what we should think about the plurality or properties of the divine persons. First, therefore, it should be investigated whether there is a true plurality in the true and simple divinity, and if the number of persons comes up to three, as we believe; thereafter, how the unity of substance can fit together with a plurality of persons; third, it should be investigated whether, according to the documents of our faith, there is here only one person who is of himself whereas the other persons proceed from another, and if there are other things which should be investigated in this connection. If it is given to us by the reason to prove also these things, then it should finally be investigated whether the two persons who proceed from another than themselves have different ways of procession, what is proper to each of them, and consequently, how their properties relate to their names. In these things which remain to be investigated we should be so much more diligent and work so much more eagerly as there is nothing to be found in the writings of the fathers by which we can prove these things, I am not saying from the witnesses of the Scriptures, but from the confirmation by the reason. He who would like to, can laugh at the plan of my investigation, and he who would like to mock it, let him do it, and even rightly so. For, honestly, it is not so much knowledge that lifts me up as it is the ardour of my glowing mind which urges me to venture this attempt. What if it not given to me to reach what I am intending? What if I fall in the run? Anyway, I will be happy that I have always run, worked, and sweated as much as I could in my search of the face of my Lord.1 And if it turns out that I have to give up because the distance is far too long and difficult and steep, then I have reached something if I can truly say: I have done what I could, I have sought but not found him, I have called and he has not answered me [Song 5:6]. It is as if the donkey of Balaam, which delayed its rider on his journey,2 urges and persuades me to run down the road that I have begun. Also, I hear it still speaking, and to me it says: ‘He, who could give me to speak, will undoubtedly also give the same to you’. But now let us undertake most carefully what we have decided to do.



1 Ps 23:6. 2 Num 22:23–31.

122

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

CAPUT II. Quomodo ex caritatis proprietate plenitudo bonitatis convincit quod in vera divinitate personarum pluralitas deesse non possit Didicimus ex superioribus quod in illo summo bono universaliterque perfecto sit totius bonitatis plenitudo atque perfectio. Ubi autem totius bonitatis plenitudo est, vera et summa caritas deesse non potest. Nichil enim caritate melius, nichil caritate perfectius. Nullus autem pro privato et proprio sui ipsius amore dicitur proprie caritatem habere. Oportet itaque ut amor in alterum tendat, ut caritas esse queat. Ubi ergo pluralitas personarum deest, caritas omnino esse non potest. Sed dicis fortassis: “Etsi sola una persona in illa vera divinitate esset, nichilominus tamen erga creaturam suam caritatem quidem et habere posset, immo et haberet.” Sed summam certe caritatem erga creatam personam habere non posset. Inordinata enim caritas esset si summe diligeret qui summe diligendus non esset. Est autem inpossibile in illa summe sapienti bonitate caritatem inordinatam esse. Persona igitur divina summam caritatem habere non potuit erga personam que summa dilectione digna non fuit. Ut autem caritas summa et summe perfecta sit, oportet ut sit tanta quo non possit esse major, oportet ut et sit talis quo non possit esse melior. Quamdiu autem quis nullum alium quantum seipsum diligit, ille quem erga se habet privatus amor convincit quod summum caritatis gradum necdum apprehendit. Sed persona divina profecto non haberet quem ut seipsam digne diligeret, si condignam personam omnino non haberet. Divine autem persone condigna non esset persona que Deus non esset. Ut ergo in illa vera divinitate plenitudo caritatis possit locum habere, oportuit divinam aliquam personam persone condigne, et eo ipso divine, consortio non carere. Vide ergo quam de facili ratio convincit quod in vera divinitate pluralitas personarum deesse non possit. Certe solus Deus summe bonus est. Solus ergo Deus summe diligendus est. Summam ergo dilectionem divina persona exibere non posset persone que divinitate careret. Plenitudo autem divinitatis non potuit esse sine plenitudine bonitatis. Bonitatis vero plenitudo non potuit esse sine caritatis plenitudine, nec caritatis plenitudo sine divinarum personarum pluralitate.

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 2. How the fullness of goodness in its property of charity demonstrates that there must be a plurality of persons in the true divinity We have learned from the above3 that the fullness and perfection of all goodness is in this highest and totally perfect good. Now, where the fullness of all goodness is, the true and the highest charity cannot be missing. For nothing is better than charity, nothing is more perfect than charity. But no one can be said rightly to have charity in a private and own love of oneself. Therefore, love must be directed to another for being charity.4 Consequently, where there is not a plurality of persons there can certainly not be charity. However, maybe you say: ‘Even if there were only one person in the true divinity, he would still be able to have, and indeed he would have, charity towards his creation’. But surely, he would not be able to have the highest charity towards a created person. For it would be a disordered charity5 if a person loves most highly someone who should not be loved most highly. And it is impossible that the charity in the highest wisdom’s goodness should be disordered. Therefore, a divine person could not be able to have the highest charity toward a person who would not be worthy of the highest love. So, in order that charity can be the highest and to the highest degree perfect, it must be so great that no greater can exist, and so good that no better can exist. When someone does not love some other as much as himself, this private love, that he has towards himself, shows that he has not yet reached the highest degree of charity. But a divine person would certainly not have someone who is worthy to be loved as himself if he did not at all have a person of the same dignity.6 However, a person of the same dignity as a divine person cannot be a person who is not God. Therefore, in order that the fullness of charity can be found in the true divinity, the divine person cannot be missing the fellowship of a person who is of the same dignity and thus a divine person. See, how easily the reason proves that there cannot be missing a plurality of persons in the true divinity. Surely, only God is the highest good. Therefore, only God is to be loved to the highest degree. Consequently, a divine person cannot have the highest love to a person who is not divine. But the fullness of divinity cannot be without the fullness of goodness. And the fullness of goodness cannot be without the fullness of charity, and so the fullness of charity cannot be without the plurality of divine persons. 3 II:16. 4 Richard quotes from Gregory the Great, XL Homiliarum in Evangelia 1,17 (PL 76:1139a): ‘Ecce enim binos in praedicationem discipulos mittit, quia duo sunt praecepta charitatis, Dei videlicet amor, et proximi, et minus quam inter duos charitas haberi non potest. Nemo enim proprie ad semetipsum habere charitatem dicitur, sed dilectio in alterum tendit, ut charitas esse possit’. See also the altruistic definition of charity in Augustine, De Trinitate 8,12 (CCSL 50:287): ‘Caritas enim non est quae nihil diligit. Si autem se ipsam diligit, diligat aliquid oportet ut caritate se diligat. Sicut enim verbum indicat aliquid, indicat etiam se ipsum, sed non se verbum indicat nisi se aliquid indicare indicet; sic et caritas diligit quidem se, sed nisi se aliquid diligentem diligat non caritas se diligit. Quid ergo diligit caritas nisi quod caritate diligimus? Id autem ut a proximo provehamur frater est’. 5 Caritas inordinata. 6 Condignus.

123

1 24

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

CAPUT III. Quod idem quod de divinarum personarum pluralitate plenitudo bonitatis loquitur, plenitudo divine felicitatis attestatur Sed quod de pluralitate personarum plenitudo bonitatis convincit et probat, plenitudo felicitatis simili ratione approbat; et quod una loquitur, altera attestatur; et in una eademque veritatis attestatione una clamat, altera acclamat. Conscientiam suam unusquisque interroget, et procul dubio et absque contradictione inveniet quia sicut nichil caritate melius, sic nichil caritate jocundius. Hoc nos docet ipsa natura, idem ipsum multiplex experientia. Sicut igitur in plenitudine vere bonitatis non potest deesse quo nichil est melius, sic in plenitudine summe felicitatis deesse non potest quo nichil est jocundius. Necesse est itaque in summa felicitate caritatem non deesse. Ut autem caritas in summo bono sit, inpossibile est deesse et qui et cui exibere vel exiberi possit. Proprium autem amoris est, et sine quo omnino non possit esse, ab eo quem multum diligis multum diligi velle. Non potest ergo esse amor jocundus, si non sit et mutuus. In illa igitur vera et summa felicitate sicut nec amor jocundus, sic nec amor mutuus potest deesse. In amore autem mutuo oportet omnino ut sit et qui amorem inpendat, et qui amorem rependat. Alter itaque erit amorem inpendens, et alter amorem rependens. Ubi autem unus et alter esse convincitur, vera pluralitas deprehenditur. In illa itaque vere felicitatis plenitudine pluralitas personarum non potest deesse. Constat autem quia nichil aliud est summa fecilitas quam ipsa divinitas. Gratuiti ergo amoris exibitio et debiti amoris recompensio indubitanter convincit quod in vera divinitate personarum pluralitas deesse non possit.

CAPUT IV. Quod de personarum pluralitate in dictis duobus testibus astruitur, ex considerata divine glorie plenitudine confirmatur Certe si dixerimus in illa vera divinitate esse solam personam unam, quemadmodum solam unam substantiam, juxta hoc procul dubio non habebit cui communicare possit infinitam illam plenitudinis sue abundantiam. Sed, queso, ut quid hoc? An quia communicantem habere non possit cum velit? An quia habere nolit cum possit? Sed qui absque dubio omnipotens est, per inpossibilitatem excusari non potest. Sed quod constat non esse ex defectu potentie, nunquidnam erit ex solo defectu benevolentie? Sed si communicantem habere omnino nollet, cum veraciter habere posset si vellet, iste in divina persona benivolentie defectus attende, queso, qualis esset vel quantus! Certe, ut dictum est, nil caritate dulcius, nil caritate jocundius. Caritatis deliciis rationalis vita nil dulcius experitur; nulla unquam delectatione delectabilius fruitur. His deliciis in eternum carebit, si consortio carens in majestatis solio solitaria permanserit. Ex his itaque animadvertere

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 3. That the same as the fullness of goodness says about the plurality of divine persons is testified by the fullness of the divine happiness But what the fullness of goodness shows and proves about the plurality of persons is now confirmed by the fullness of happiness by a similar reason; what the one says, the other confirms; what the one proclaims about the confirmation of one and the same truth, the other one acclaims. If anyone asks his conscience, he will without a doubt or contradiction find that just as nothing is better than charity, nothing is more joyful than charity. Nature itself teaches us this, and multiple experiences do the same. So, just as that which cannot be better cannot be missing in the fullness of true goodness, that which cannot be more joyful cannot be missing in the highest happiness. Therefore, it is necessary that charity cannot be missing in the highest happiness. But in order that there can be charity in the highest goodness it is impossible that there is not someone who is giving and someone who is receiving. It is a condition for love, and without this it absolutely cannot exist, that from him whom you love much you also want to be loved much. Therefore, love cannot be joyful if it is not mutual. So, in this true and the highest happiness just as happy love cannot be missing so mutual love cannot be missing. In the mutual love it is necessary that there is both one who gives love and another who returns the love. There will be one who is giving love and another who is returning love. But where there thus are one and another, there must be true plurality. So, in this fullness of true happiness there cannot be missing a plurality of persons. But it is still certain that the highest happiness is nothing but the divinity itself. Consequently, the free giving of love and the due returning of love proves without a doubt that a plurality of persons cannot be missing in the true divinity.

CHAPTER 4. That what is shown by the mentioned two witnesses about the plurality of persons is confirmed by considering the fullness of the divine glory Certainly, if we would say that there is only one person in this true divinity, just as there is only one substance, then he would not have anyone with whom he could share his endless and abundant fullness. But why is that? Is it because he cannot have a participant in his fullness even if wants to have one? Or because he did not want one even if he could? But he who is undoubtedly almighty cannot excuse himself by something being impossible. Now, if there cannot be any lack of power, there could maybe just be a lack of good will? But if he absolutely would not have a participant whom he could have if he wanted to, look, I am asking, what a lack and how great a lack of good will would there not be in this divine person! Certainly, as we have said, there is nothing sweeter than charity, and there is nothing more joyful. In the rational life nothing is experienced to be sweeter than the happiness of charity; and nothing wonderful is enjoyed being more wonderful. But this happiness will be missing in eternity if he did not have company and remained

125

1 26

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

possumus qualis quantusve esset iste benivolentie defectus, si plenitudinis sue abundantiam mallet sibi soli avare retinere, quam posset, si vellet, cum tanto gaudiorum cumulo, cum tanto deliciarum incremento alteri communicare. Si sic esset, merito angelorum, merito omnium aspectum subterfugeret; merito se videri, merito se agnosci erubesceret, si ipsi tantus benivolentie defectus inesset. Sed absit! absit ut supreme majestati illi aliquid insit, unde gloriari nequeat, unde glorificari non debeat! Alioquin ubi erit plenitudo glorie? Nam ibi, uti superius probatum est, nulla poterit plenitudo deesse. Quid autem gloriosius, quid vero magnificentius quam nichil habere quod nolit communicare? Constat itaque quod in illo indeficienti bono summeque sapienti consilio, tam non potest esse avara reservatio quam non potest esse inordinata effusio. Ecce palam habes, sicut videre potes, quod in illa summa et supprema celsitudine ipsa plenitudo glorie compellit glorie consortem non deesse.

CAPUT V. Quod jam dicte divine pluralitatis assertio triplici confirmatur testimonio Ecce de pluralitate divinarum personarum tam aperta docuimus ratione ut insanie morbo videatur laborare, qui tam evidenti attestationi velit contraire! Quis enim, nisi insanie morbo laborans, dicat summe bonitati deesse quo nichil perfectius, quo nichil est melius? Quis, queso, nisi mentis inops, contradicat summe felicitati inesse quo nichil jocundius, nichil est dulcius? Quis, inquam, nisi rationis expers, in plenitudine glorie putet posse deesse quo nichil est gloriosius, nichil magnificentius? Certe nil melius, nil certe jocundius, omnino nil magnificentius vera, sincera et summa caritate, que omnino esse non novit sine personarum pluralitate. Hujus itaque pluralitatis assertio triplici confirmatur testimonio. Nam quod summa bonitas, quod summa felicitas super hac re concorditer clamat, plenitudo glorie confirmando acclamat et acclamando corfirmat. Ecce super hunc fidei nostre articulum triplex habemus testimonium, de summis supernum, de divinis divinum, de profundis altissimum, de occultis apertissimum; et scimus quia in ore duorum vel trium testium stat omne verbum. Ecce funiculus triplex qui difficile rumpitur, unde freneticus quivis fidei nostre inpugnator, donante Dei sapientia, fortiter alligetur.

CAPUT VI. Quod personas divinas oporteat omnino esse coeternas Ecce, ut ex superioribus manifeste colligere possumus, perfectio unius consortium requirit alterius. Invenimus nil esse gloriosius, nil magnificentius quam nichil habere velle quod nolis communicare. Majestatis itaque sue consorte carere noluit persona

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

alone on his majestic throne. From this we can consider what a defect, and how great that would be, in the good will if he preferred greedily to keep his abundant fullness to himself which he could share with another, if he wanted to, with such an accumulation of happiness and great increase of joy as consequence. If this were so, he would rightly avoid the sight of angles and of all; he would rightly be ashamed of being seen and to be recognized if there were such a defect of good will in him. But far be it! Far be it that there should be something in the highest majesty which prevents him from glorying and for which he ought not to be glorified! Otherwise, where is the fullness of glory? But, as it was proved above, there cannot be missing any fullness there. And what is more glorious and what is more magnificent than to have nothing which one will not share? It is certain then that in this unfailing good and this highest wisdom’s counsel that just as there cannot be any greedy reservation, there cannot be any disordered profusion. So, here you have clearly, as you can see, that in this highest and supreme majesty the fullness of glory itself requires that there cannot be missing a participant in the glory.

CHAPTER 5. That what is said now about the divine plurality is confirmed by a threefold testimony Look, now we have taught about the plurality of divine persons with such a clear reason that it must someone who suffers from the illness of insanity who would go against such a clear evidence! For who would say, except someone who suffers from the illness of insanity, that the most perfect of all and the best of all would be missing in the highest goodness? Who, I ask, except a fool, will contradict that the most joyful of all and the sweetest of all would be missing in the highest happiness? Who, I say, except a person devoid of reason, would think that the most glorious of all and the most magnificent of all would be missing in the fullness of glory? Certainly, nothing is better, nothing is happier, absolutely nothing is more magnificent than the true, genuine and highest charity which cannot be found without a plurality of persons. This plurality is thus confirmed by a threefold witness. For what the highest goodness and what the highest happiness unanimously proclaims, the fullness of glory acclaims with confirmation and confirms with acclamation. See, how we have a threefold witness about this article of our faith, a supernatural about the highest, a divine about the divine, the most high about the most profound, the most open about the most secret; and we know that any word will stand in the mouth of two or three witnesses [Mt 18:16b]. See the triple cord which is broken with difficulty [Qo 4:12b] and by the gift of God’s wisdom firmly binds any madman who fights against our faith.

CHAPTER 6. That the divine persons must be totally coeternal As we now clearly can understand from the above, the perfection of the one person requires the fellowship with another person. We have found that nothing is more glorious and more magnificent than wanting to have nothing which one will not share

127

1 28

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

que summe bona fuit. Absque dubio autem esse oportuit quod esse voluit, cujus voluntas omnipotens fuit; quod vero semel voluit, semper voluit, cujus voluntas incommutabilis fuit. Oportuit ergo eternam personam coeternam habere; nec potuit una alteram precedere, nec una alteri succedere. Nam in illa eterna et incommutabili divinitate nichil potest velud antiquatum transire, nil novum supervenire. Personas itaque divinas inpossibile est omnino non esse coeternas. Ubi namque vera divinitas, ibi summa bonitas, ibi plena felicitas. Summa autem bonitas, sicut dictum est, non potest esse sine perfecta caritate, nec perfecta caritas sine personarum pluralitate. Plena vero felicitas non potest esse sine vera incommutabilitate, nec vera incommutabilitas sine eternitate. Personarum pluralitatem exigit vera caritas, personarum coeternitatem vera incommutabilitas.

CAPUT VII. Quod in illa personarum pluralitate oporteat tam summam equalitatem quam summam similitudinem esse Notandum sane quod sicut caritas vera exigit personarum pluralitatem, sic caritas summa exigit personarum equalitatem. Summa autem caritas necdum esse convincitur, ubi vere dilectus summe non diligitur. Discretus vero amor non est ubi summe diligitur qui summe diligendus non est. Sed in summe sapienti bonitate amoris flamma sicut non aliter, sic nec amplius flagrat quam summa sapientia dictat. Quem itaque secundum summam illam caritatis abundantiam oportet summe diligere, necesse est absque dubio secundum summam illam discretionis regulam summe diligendum esse. Sed ipsius amoris proprietas convincit quoniam summe diligenti non sufficit, si summe dilectus summam dilectionem non rependit. In mutuo itaque amore plenitudo caritatis exigit ut uterque ab altero sit summe dilectus, et consequenter secundum predictam discretionis normam ut uterque sit summe diligendus. Ubi autem uterque est eque diligendus, oportet ut uterque sit eque perfectus. Oportet itaque utrumque esse eque potentem, eque sapientem, eque bonum, eque beatum. Sic summa plenitudo dilectionis in mutue dilectis exigit summam equalitatem perfectionis. Sicut itaque in vera divinitate caritatis proprietas exigit personarum pluralitatem, sic ejusdem caritatis integritas in vera pluralitate requirit summam personarum equalitatem. Ut autem sint per omnia equales, oportet ut sint per omnia similes. Nam similitudo potest haberi sine equalitate, equalitas vero nunquam sine mutua similitudine. Qui enim in sapientia nichil similitudinis habent, quomodo in ea pares esse valent? Quod autem dico de sapientia, idem dico de potentia; idem vero invenies in ceteris omnibus, si curras per singula.

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

with another. The person who is the highest good will therefore not be missing a partaker in his majesty. And there is no doubt that what he has wanted, this will also exist since his will is almighty; and what he wanted once he has wanted always since his will is immutable. Therefore, the eternal person must have a coeternal person; and the one person could not precede the other, neither could the one person succeed the other. For in this eternal and immutable divinity nothing old, as it were, can disappear, and nothing new can appear. It is therefore totally impossible that the eternal persons should not be coeternal. And where there is true divinity, there is also the highest goodness and there is total happiness. But the highest goodness, as we have said, cannot exist without the perfect charity, and the perfect charity cannot exist without a plurality of persons. Now, total happiness cannot exist without true immutability, and true immutability cannot exist without eternity. True charity requires thus a plurality of persons, and the true immutability requires that the persons are coeternal.

CHAPTER 7. That in this plurality of persons there must be both the highest equality and the highest likeness It should be noted that just as the true charity requires a plurality of persons, so the true charity requires also the equality of persons. The highest charity cannot be said to exist where the beloved one is not loved with the highest charity. And love does not show discretion where someone is loved with the highest love who should not be loved with the highest love. But in the highest wisdom’s goodness the flame of love does not burn differently or better than the highest wisdom tells it to do. So, the one who should be loved to the highest degree, in accordance with the highest abundance of charity, must without a doubt necessarily also be loved to the highest degree in accordance with the highest rule of discretion. But the nature of love itself shows that the one who loves to the highest degree is not satisfied if the one who is loved to the highest degree does not respond with the highest love. So, in the mutual love the fullness of charity requires that both are loved to the highest degree by the other and consequently, according to the mentioned rule of discretion, that both also ought to be loved to the highest degree. Now, where both ought to be loved equally, both must be equally perfect. It is necessary that both are equally powerful, equally wise, equally good, equally blessed. Thus, the highest fullness of love in the mutually loved ones requires the highest equality of perfection. So, just as the nature of charity in the true divinity requires the plurality of persons, so the fullness of the same charity in the plurality requires the highest equality of the persons. And in order that they can be equal in all ways, it is necessary that they are similar in all ways. For there can be similitude without equality, but never equality without mutual similitude. How can those, who are in no way similar in wisdom, be able to be equal in wisdom? And what I say about wisdom, the same I say about power; and you will find the same in all the other properties if you run them through one by one.

129

130

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

CAPUT VIII. Quam miranda ratione sit substantialis unitas in illa pluralitate, et personalis pluralitas in vera unitate substantie Quesivimus et invenimus quia in dictis mutuo dilectis mutuoque diligendis, ut merito debeat esse summa dilectio, oportet ut in singulis sit summa perfectio totiusque perfectionis plenitudo. Erit itaque in utrisque plenitudo potentie, in utrisque plenitudo sapientie, plenitudo bonitatis, plenitudo divinitatis. Ecce unde longe superius mentionem fecimus, nec tamen aliquid diffinivimus, quod divinitas, quam ibi invenimus non posse esse communem pluribus substantiis, hic evidenter apparet communis esse pluribus personis. Sed si mutuo dilectis omnis, ut dictum est, perfectio est communis, patet profecto quoniam si omnipotens est unus, omnipotens erit et alius; si inmensus est unus, inmensus est et alius; si Deus est unus, Deus erit et alius. Sed sicut in superioribus satis evidenter ostendimus, non potest esse omnipotens nisi unus, non potest esse inmensus nisi unus, nec Deus nisi unus. Quid ergo? Utique absque omni dubio sic erit uterque omnipotens ut ambo simul non sint nisi unus omnipotens; sic erit uterque inmensus ut ambo simul non sint nisi unus inmensus; sic absque dubio erit uterque eorum Deus ut ambo simul non sint nisi unus Deus. Et ad hoc quis idoneus? Sed si divinitas ipsa, ut diximus, pro certo est communis ambobus, pro certo et ambobus communis erit divina substantia, que, ut supra probatum est, nil aliud est quam divinitas ipsa. Convincitur itaque utrumque unam eamdemque substantiam communem habere, vel si hoc melius sonat, convincitur ambos simul unam eamdem substantiam esse. Quid itaque mirum si simul ambo sunt non nisi unus omnipotens, unus eternus, unus inmensus, nonnisi unus Deus et Dominus, quando quidem ambo simul non sunt nisi substantialiter unus? Vide ergo quam admiranda ratione sit substantialis unitas in illa personarum pluralitate et personalis pluralitas in vera unitate substantie, ita ut sit et in personis proprietas et in substantia unitas et in majestate equalitas!

CAPUT IX. Quod in divina natura pluralitas personarum sit in unitate substantie, et in humana natura pluralitas substantiarum in unitate persone Miraris fortassis qui hec audis vel legis, miraris, inquam, quomodo possit esse plus quam una persona, ubi non est nisi una et sola substantia. Sed quid mirum, qui mirabilis est in tam multis operibus suis, quid, inquam, mirum si super omnia est in semetipso mirabilis? Miraris quomodo in natura divina sit plus quam una persona,

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 8. How by a wonderful reason there is a substantial unity in the true plurality and a personal plurality in the true unity of substance We have looked for and found that in order that the highest love in the mentioned mutually beloved and mutually loving persons, there must be in each of them the highest perfection and the fullness of all perfection. So, in both there is the fullness of power, in both the fullness of wisdom, the fullness of goodness, the fullness of divinity. Now, we have long above mentioned,7 but not further defined, that the divinity which we found could not be common to more substances, but here it seems clearly to be common to more persons. So, if all perfection is common to the mutually beloved, as we have said, it follows necessarily that if the one is almighty, then the other is also almighty; if the one is immeasurable, then the other will also be immeasurable; if the one is God, then the other is also God. But, as we have shown above sufficiently clearly, there can only be one almighty, there can only be one immeasurable, and only one God. What then? Then both will undoubtedly be almighty in such a way that both at the same time is only one almighty; and both will be immeasurable in such a way that both at the same time is only one immeasurable; and without a doubt both of them will be God in such a way that both of them at the same time will only be one God. And who is capable of this? [2 Cor 2:16b]. But if the divinity itself, as mentioned, surely is common to both of them, then the divine substance is surely common to both of them, since, as it is proved above, this is nothing different from the divinity itself. Thus, it is proved that they both have one and the same substance in common, or if this sounds better, it is proved that they both are one and the same substance. What wonder is it then that they both are nothing but one almighty, one eternal, one immeasurable, nothing but one God and Lord, when both are at the same time one in substance? See how by a wonderful reason, there is unity of substance in the plurality of persons, and personal plurality in the true unity of substance, so that there is both property in the persons and unity in substance and equality in majesty!8

CHAPTER 9. That in the divine nature there is a plurality of persons in the unity of substance and in the human nature a plurality of substances in a unity of person Maybe you, who are hearing or reading this, are wondering, I say you are wondering, how there can be more than one person where there is not more than one substance alone. But what wonder is it that he who is wonderful in so many of his works, what wonder is it, I say, if he is also above all wonderful in himself? You are wondering

7 II:11.13. 8 Richard quotes from the prefation to the Trinity in Missale Romanum: ‘ut in confessione verae sempiternaeque Deitatis, et in personis proprietas, et in essentia unitas, et in maiestate adoretur aequalitas’.

131

13 2

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

ubi non est plus quam una substantia, nec tamen eque miraris quomodo in natura humana sit plus quam una substantia, etiam ubi non est plus quam una persona. Constat namque homo ex corpore et anima, et hec duo simul nonnisi una persona. Habet itaque homo quomodo legat et discat in seipso quid per contrarium estimare debeat de Deo suo. Conferamus in unum, si placet, que ratio ratiocinando invenit in natura divina, et ea que experientia reperit in natura humana. Utrobique unitas, utrobique pluralitas; ibi unitas substantie, hic unitas persone; ibi pluralitas personarum, hic vero pluralitas substantiarum; ibi siquidem pluralitas personarum in unitate substantie, hic autem pluralitas substantiarum in unitate persone. Ecce quomodo natura humana atque divina videntur se mutuo et quasi ex opposito respicere, et alterutra alteri veluti per contrarium respondere. Sic invicem respicere habent et mutuo respondere debent natura creata et natura increata, temporalis et eterna, corruptibilis et incorruptibilis, mutabilis et incommutabilis, tantilla et inmensa, circumscriptibilis et infinita.

CAPUT X. Quomodo ex pluralitate et unitate quam invenit in semetipso docetur homo quid quasi ex opposito estimare debeat de his que sibi credenda proponuntur de Deo suo Addamus quia in illa personarum pluralitate est plena similitudo et summa equalitas, in hac autem pluralitate multa dissimilitudo et magna inequalitas. Nam in illa personarum pluralitate incorruptibilis una, incorruptibilis et alia; incommutabilis una, incommutabilis et altera; incircumscriptibilis una, incircumscriptibilis et altera; hec et illa eque potens; hec et illa eque sapiens, eque bona, eque beata. In hac vero substantiarum pluralitate, ex quibus constat humana persona, alia est corporea, alia incorporea; alia visibilis, alia invisibilis; alia mortalis, alia inmortalis; dissolubilis una, indissolubilis alia; exterminabilis una, inexterminabilis alia. Nichilominus tamen personali proprietate ita in unum conjuncta sunt ut in patiendo vel condelectando, ne dicam separari, sed nec secerni possint. Ecce vidisti quanta dissimilitudo vel diversitas substantiarum sit in natura humana; audisti nichilominus quanta silimitudo vel equalitas personarum in natura divina. Explica michi, obsecro, quomodo personalis unitas sit in tanta substantiarum dissimilitudine et diversitate, et ego dicam tibi quomodo substantialis unitas sit in tanta personarum similitudine et equalitate. “Non”, inquis, “capio, non comprehendo; sed quod non capit intelligentia, persuadet michi tamen ipsa experientia.” Bene utique et recte! Sed si experientia te docet aliquid esse supra intelligentiam in natura humana, nonne eo ipso te docuisse deberet aliquid esse supra intelligentiam tuam in natura divina? Potest itaque homo discere ex semetipso quid, quasi ex opposito, estimare debeat de his que sibi credenda proponuntur de Deo suo. Hec propter illos dicta sint, qui alitudinem divinorum secretorum nituntur diffinire vel determinare juxta capacitatis sue modum, non juxta traditionem sanctorum Patrum, quod constat didicisse et docuisse per Spiritum sanctum.

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

how there can be more than one person in the divine nature where there is no more than one substance, but you are not equally wondering how there is more than one substance in the human nature, even where there is no more than one person. For the human person consists of a body and a soul, and these two are at the same time no more than one person. Thus, the human person can read and learn in himself what he in contrast to himself must think about his God. Let us now compare what the reason by thinking has discovered in the divine nature and what the experience has found in the human nature. In both there is unity, in both there is plurality; in the first there is unity of substance, but in the second there is unity of person; in the first there is a plurality of persons, in the second there is a plurality of substances; in the first there is thus a plurality of persons in a unity of substance, in the second there is a plurality of substances in a unity of person. See, how the human nature and the divine seem to look at one another as in opposition and respond to one another as in contrast. In this way the created nature and the uncreated nature will have to look at one another and respond to one another, the temporal and the eternal, the corruptible and the incorruptible, the mutable and the immutable, the so little and the immense, the limited and the infinite.

CHAPTER 10. How humans learn from the plurality and unity in themselves what to think in contrast, as it were, about the things which are proposed to them to be believed about their God Let us add that there is full likeness and the highest equality in the divine plurality of persons, whereas there is much unlikeness and inequality in the human plurality. For in the divine plurality of persons the one is incorruptible and so is the other; the one is immutable and so is the other; the one is unlimited and so is the other; they have the same power; they are equally wise, equally good, equally happy. But in the plurality of substances, of which the human person consists, one is corporeal, the other is incorporeal; the one is visible, the other is invisible; the one is mortal, the other is immortal; the one is perishable, the other is imperishable; the one is destructible, the other is indestructible. But nevertheless, they are so joined in the property of a person that they neither in suffering nor in happiness cannot not only be separated but cannot even be distinguished. Now you have seen how great dissimilitude and diversity of substances there is in the human nature; at the same time, you have heard how great the likeness and equality are between the persons in the divine nature. Explain to me, I ask you, how there can be a personal unity in such a dissimilitude and diversity of substances, and I will tell you how there can be a substantial unity in such a similitude and equality of persons. ‘No’, you say, ‘I do not understand, I do not comprehend; but what my intelligence does not understand, the experience itself convinces me about’. Good and right! But if the experience itself teaches you about something which is above understanding in the human nature, should not this also teach you that something is above your understanding in the divine nature? In this way the human person can learn from himself what in opposition, as it were, he should think about what he is proposed to believe about his God. I say this for the sake of those who want to

133

134

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

CAPUT XI. Quomodo convincitur ex caritatis integritate quod vera Trinitas sit in vera unitate, et vera unitas in vera Trinitate Sed nunc ordine quo cepimus, ratiocinationis nostre modum prosequamur. Constat jam de divinarum personarum pluralitate, necdum tamen de trinitate. Nam pluralitas esse potest, etiam ubi nulla trinitas est. Ipsa namque dualitas pluralitas est. Eosdem itaque testes super trinitatis assertione interrogemus quos superius in attestationem pluralitatis adduximus. Et prius quidem quid super hac re testetur, summa, si placet, caritas interrogetur. Oportet autem caritatem summam universaliter esse perfectam. Ut autem summe perfecta sit, sicut oportet esse tantam quo non possit esse major, sic necesse est talem fore quo non possit esse melior. Nam sicut in summa caritate non potest deesse quod est maximum, sic nec deesse poterit quod constat esse precipuum. Precipuum vero videtur in vera caritate alterum velle diligi ut se; in mutuo siquidem amore multumque fervente nichil rarius, nichil preclarius quam ut ab eo quem summe diligis et a quo summe diligeris, alium eque diligi velis. Probatio itaque consummate caritatis est votiva communio exibite sibi dilectionis. Sane summe diligenti summeque diligi desideranti precipuum gaudium solet esse in desiderii sui adinpletione, optate videlicet dilectionis adeptione. Probat itaque se in caritate perfectum non esse, cui necdum potest in precipui gaudii sui communione complacere. Est itaque indicium magne infirmitatis, non posse pati consortium amoris; posse vero pati signum magne perfectionis. Si magnum est pati posse, majus erit gratanter suspicere; maximum autem ex desiderio requirere. Bonum magnum illud primum, melius secundum, sed tertium optimum. Demus ergo summo quod precipuum est; optimo quod optimum est. In illis itaque mutuo dilectis, quos superior disputatio invenit, utruisque perfectio ut consummata sit, exibite sibi dilectionis consortem equa ratione requirit. Si enim nolit quod perfecta bonitas exigit, ubi erit plenitudo bonitatis? Si autem velit quod fieri nequit, ubi erit plenitudo potestatis? Hinc ergo manifesta ratione colligitur quod precipuus gradus caritatis, et eo ipso plenitudo bonitatis esse non possit, uni voluntatis vel facultatis defectus dilectionis consortem precipuique gaudii communionem excludit. Summe ergo dilectorum summeque diligendorum uterque oportet ut pari voto condilectum requirat, pari concordia pro voto possideat. Vides ergo quomodo caritatis consummatio personarum

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

define and determinate the deep divine secrets according to their own capacity and not according to the tradition of the holy Fathers about whom it is a fact that they have learned from and been taught by the holy Spirit.9

CHAPTER 11. How it is demonstrated from the perfect charity that the true Trinity is in true unity and the true unity in true Trinity But let us now proceed in our reasoning in the order in which we began. It is already certain that there is a plurality of divine persons but not yet that there is a trinity. For there can be a plurality also where there is no trinity. Even a duality is a plurality. Let us, therefore, ask about testimonies for a trinity among the same witnesses whom we presented above to bear witness to the plurality. First, if I may, we want to ask the highest charity as witness about this matter. Now, the highest charity must be totally perfect. In order that it can be the highest perfect, it must be so great that no other can be greater, just as it must be so good that no other can be better. For just as nothing of the highest can be missing in the highest charity, nothing of the best can be missing in it. But the very best in the true charity is that you want to love another as yourself; in the mutual and most glowing love there is nothing more wonderful and nothing more beautiful than you want that the one, whom you love above everything and by whom also you are loved above everything, also loves another person with the same love. The proof of the perfect charity is, therefore, that the love which you yourself receive also is shared with another. Now, for the one who loves with the highest love and who desires to be loved, there will usually be the highest happiness in the fulfilment of this desire and in the attainment of this desired love. This proves that you are not perfect in charity if you are missing someone with whom you cannot yet share your highest happiness. Yes, it is a sign of the highest weakness if you cannot permit a partaker in your love; but to be able to permit it is a sign of the highest perfection. If it is great to permit it, it would be even greater to receive it; but the greatest would be if you require it with desire. The first is a great good, the second is better, but the third is the best. Let us, therefore, ascribe to the highest what is the greatest; and to the very best what is the very best. Now, in order that the two mutually loving persons, which the discussion above has found, both can be totally perfect, both must for the same reason seek a partaker in that love which they have received. For if they did not want what the perfect goodness requires, where would the fullness of goodness be? And if they wanted something which they were not able to, where would the fullness of power be? From this it is clearly understood that the highest degree of charity, and thus the fullness of goodness, cannot exist where a defect of will or ability excludes a partaker in the love and a communion in the highest happiness. Therefore, those who are loved to the



9 Richard opposes himself to the theologians who do not base their definitions of the divine nature on the patristic tradition, probably Peter Abélard and Gilbert Porretanus. Richard’s definitions are in accordance with the formulations of the Quicumque.

135

1 36

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

Trinitatem requirit, sine qua omnino in plenitudinis sue integritate subsistere nequit. Ubi ergo totum quod est universaliter perfectum est, sicut nec integra caritas, sic nec vera Trinitas abesse potest. Est igitur non solum pluralitas, sed et vera Trinitas in vera unitate, et vera unitas in vera Trinitate.

CAPUT XII. Quomodo summa bonitas et summa felicitas Trinitatis assertionem concorditer clamant et mutua attestatione confirmant Si quis autem solos illos mutuo dilectos quod superior ratio invenit in vera divinitate esse contenderit, quam, queso, attestationis sue rationem reddere poterit? Nunquid, queso, utrique eorum precipui gaudii consors deerit? An quia uterque habere noluit, an quia unus voluit et alter noluit? Sed si quod unus voluit, alter noluit, ubi erit illa que semper veris et perfectis amicis inesse solet, et semper inesse oportet? Ubi, inquam, erit individua illa intimi amoris prerogativa, animorum videlicet unanimitas et intima concordia? Et certa, si quis dixerit alterum velle et alterum nolle, quemcumque in sua voluntate non posse prevalere concesserit, summe potentem negabit. Si vero neutrum dixerit exibite sibi dilectionis communioni posse adquiescere, quomodo, queso, de superius assignato dilectionis defectu poterit eos excusare? Scimus autem quia summe sapientes nichil potest latere. Si itaque vere et summe se invicem diligunt, quomodo unusquisque poterit alterius defectum videre et non dolere? Nam si alteruter alterius defectum videt nec dolet, ubi erit plenitudo dilectionis? Si videt et dolet, ubi erit plenitudo felicitatis? Constat autem quoniam ubi causa dolendi nunquam deerit, plenitudo felicitatis esse non poterit. Hinc igitur colligitur et indubitata ratione deprehenditur quod plenitudo felicitatis omnem caritatis defectum excludit, cujus consummatio, ut dictum est, personarum Trinitatem exigit, nec posse deesse convincit. Ecce quomodo summa bonitas et summa felicitas Trinitatis assertionem concorditer clamant et mutua attestatione confirmant.

CAPUT XIII. Quod plenitudo divine glorie in contestationem summe bonitatis et felicitatis videatur acclamare Grandis procul dubio defectus caritatis non posse pati consortium amoris; quis hoc nesciat vel dissimulare queat? Si hic itaque defectus sepe jam dictis illis mutuo dilectis inesset, haberet uterque non solum quod in altero doleret, sed et simul quod in seipso erubesceret. Nam verus et intimus amicus sicut non potest

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

highest degree and who ought to be loved to the highest degree must both by the same wish desire a third person10 whom they have in agreement in accordance with their wish. Thus, you see how the perfection of charity requires a Trinity of persons without which it could not at all exist in its perfection. So, where everything is totally perfect, the highest charity cannot be missing, and so cannot the true Trinity be missing. Thus, there is not only true plurality but also true Trinity in the true unity, and true unity in the true Trinity.

CHAPTER 12. How the highest goodness and the highest happiness unanimously testify and mutually confirm the Trinity Now, if someone will contend that there are only those two mutually loved persons in the true divinity, which the above reason found, what reason, I am asking, could he give for this assertion? Could it be, I ask, that both can be missing a partaker in the highest happiness? Is it because both do not want to have one, or because one of them wants it, but the other does not want it? But if one of them wants it and the other does not want it, where is then that which always uses to be and always must be among true and perfect friends? Where would be, I ask, that special property of intimate love, namely the unanimity and intimate concord of souls? And truly, if someone would say that the one wants it and the other does not want it, then he would admit that whoever of them is not allowed to do what he wants and he will deny that any of them can be the highest powerful. Conversely, if he would say that they did not want to share the love which they had received, how would he be able to excuse them for such a defect of the love mentioned above? But we know that nothing is hidden for those who are the highest wise. So, when they love each other truly and most highly, how can one of them see a defect in the other and not be sad? For if any of them sees a defect in the other and is not saddened, where would then be the fullness of love? And if any of them sees a defect and is saddened, where would then be the fullness of happiness? For it is true that the fullness of happiness cannot exist where there is always a reason for sadness. From this it is clear and undoubtedly understandable that the fullness of happiness excludes any defect in the charity, and the perfection of this, as mentioned, requires and cannot be without a Trinity of persons. See, how the highest goodness and the highest happiness unanimously declare and mutually witness the assertion of the Trinity.

CHAPTER 13. That the fullness of divine glory seems to consent to the testimony of the highest goodness and happiness It is undoubtedly a great defect of the charity that you cannot allow a partaker in the love; who does not know this or who can hide this? So, if this defect was there in these so often mentioned mutually loving persons, then they would both not only be saddened by the other but also have reason to be ashamed of themselves. For just as the true and 10 Condilectus.

137

138

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

intime dilecti defectum videre et non dolere, sic sane de proprio defectu ante amici conspectum non posset non erubescere. Sed si illi personarum pluralitati inest unde merito debeat erubescere, ubi erit, obsecro, plenitudo glorie, que vere divinitati deesse omnino est inpossibile? Sed sicut summe felicitati non potest inesse causa dolendi, sic in summe glorie plenitudine non potest inesse materia erubescendi. Quis namque non videat quam sit extreme dementie vel tenuiter suspicari illi summe felici majestati aliquid inesse potuisse quod possit tante glorie splendorem vel in modico obnubilare? Ecce quomodo plenitudo divine bonitatis, plenitudo felicitatis et glorie in una veritatis attestatione invicem sibi occurrunt, et quid de divine caritatis plenitudine in illa personarum pluralitate sentiendum sit evidenter ostendunt. Totius defectus suspicionem in illa summa caritate pariter dampnant, totius in illa consummationis plenitudinem concorditer clamant. Caritas autem ut esse vera possit, personarum pluralitatem exigit; ut vero consummata sit, personarum Trinitatem requirit.

CAPUT XIV. Quod communicatio amoris non potest esse omnino minus quam in tribus personis Si autem concedimus unde post tot premissas rationes ambigere non possumus, si, inquam, concedimus unam aliquam personam in vera divinitate esse tante benivolentie ut nichil divitiarum, nichil deliciarum habere velit quod nolit communicare, tante potestatis ut nichil sit ei inpossibile, tante felicitatis ut nichil sit ei difficile, consequens est ut fateri oporteat divinarum personarum Trinitatem non posse deesse. Sed ut hoc melius elucescat, quod diffusius diximus, in unum colligamus. Certe si sola una persona in divinitate esset, non haberet cui magnitudinis sue divitias communicaret. Sed et e converso, illa diliciarum et dulcedinis abundantia, que ex intime dilectionis obtentu ei accrescere potuisset, in eternum careret. Sed summe bonum plenitudo bonitatis non sinit illas avare retinere, nec summe beatum plenitudo beatitudinis permittit istas non optinere. Et ad honoris sui magnificentiam tam de illarum largitate letatur quam de istarum fruitione gloriatur. Animadvertitis ex his quam sit inpossibile unam aliquam in divinitate personam societatis consortio carere. Sed si solam unam sociam haberet, ei utique non deesset cui magnitudinis sue divitias communicaret, sed cui caritatis delicias inpertiret, omnino non haberet. Dilectionis dulcedine nichil jocundius invenitur, nichil in quo animus amplius delectetur. Hujusmodi dulcedinis delicias solus possidet, qui in exibita sibi dilectione socium et condilectum non habet. Communio itaque amoris non potest esse omnino minus quam in tribus personis. Nichil autem, ut dictum est, gloriosius, nichil magnificentius quam quicquid habes utile et dulce in commune deducere. Non potest vero hoc summam sapientiam latere, nec summe benivolentie non complacere; et quam non potest summe potentis felicitas vel summe felicis potestas suo beneplacito carere, tam non potest gemine persone in divinitate tertia non coherere.

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

intimate friend cannot see a defect in his intimate loved one and not be saddened, so he must also feel ashamed of himself in the sight of his friend because of his own defect. But if there really is reason to be ashamed in this plurality of persons, where will then be the fullness of glory which the true divinity absolutely cannot be without? But just as there cannot be a reason for sadness in this highest happiness, so there cannot be something to be ashamed of in the fullness of the highest glory. Who cannot see now that it is highly insane to be the least suspicious of the highest happy majesty that it should contain anything which could throw the smallest shadow on the splendour of such a great glory? See, how the fullness of the divine goodness, the fullness of the happiness and the glory all together bear witness to the same truth and clearly show what we should think about the fullness of the divine charity in this plurality of persons. They condemn equally the suspicion of any defect in the highest charity and they declare unanimously the fullness of all perfection in it. And in order to be true, charity must require a plurality of persons; and in order to be perfected it requires a Trinity of persons.

CHAPTER 14. How that communication of love absolutely cannot exist in less than three persons Now, if we acknowledge this which we cannot be in doubt about after so many arguments, if, I say, we acknowledge that in the true divinity there is a person with such a great good will that he has no richness or happiness which he will not share, with such a power that nothing is impossible for him, with such a happiness that nothing is difficult for him, then it follows that we must admit that there must be a Trinity of divine persons. But for throwing more light on this, let us now summarize what we have said more diffusely. Clearly, if there was only one person in the divinity, he would not have anyone with whom he could share his great riches. And conversely, he would in eternity be missing that abundance of pleasure and sweetness which would have grown in him by the acquired intimate love. But the fullness of goodness does not allow the highest good to withhold his riches in avarice, just as the fullness of happiness does not allow that the highest happiness should not obtain these riches. And it belongs to the greatness of his honour both that he is delighted at giving them away and that he is honoured by enjoying them. From this you can see how impossible it is that one person in the divinity should be missing company. But if he had only one companion, he would not be without someone with whom he could share his riches of greatness, but he would not at all have someone with whom he could share the pleasures of charity. But there is nothing happier than the sweetness of love, nothing that the soul is more pleased with. But he would own alone the pleasures of this sweetness who does not have a companion and a mutual partaker11 in the love which he had received. So, the unity of love cannot at all take place among less than three persons. And nothing is more glorious, as mentioned, nothing greater than to share with others everything useful and sweet which you own. The highest wisdom cannot be 11 Idem.

1 39

140

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

CAPUT XV. Quod oporteat geminam personam in divinitate pari voto, consimili ratione tertiam personam requirere Notandum sane in divinis illis personis quod perfectio unius exigit adjunctionem alterius, et consequenter in geminis perfectio utriusque requirit coherentiam tertie. Nam in geminis personis, sicut alias jam diximus, ut utraque ab altera merito sit summe dilecta, oportet ut utraque sit summe perfecta. Sicut itaque utrobique sapientia una, potentia una, sic sane oportebit ut utrobique sit benivolentia una et summa. Est autem proprium summe et usquequaque perfecte benivolentie, omnem plenitudinis sue abundantiam in commune deducere. Ubi autem in alterutra persona equa benivolentia extat, necesse est voto pari, ratione consimili precipui gaudii sui consortem utraque requirat. Nam ubi se duo mutuo diligentes summo desiderio amplectuntur, et in alterutro amore summe delectantur, summum gaudium istius est in intimo amore illius, et e converso precipuum gaudium illius est in amore istius. Quamdiu iste ab alio solus diligitur, precipue dulcedinis sue dilicias solus possidere videtur; similiter et alius quamdiu condilectum non habet, precipui gaudii communione caret. Ut autem uterque possit istiusmodi delicias communicare, oportet eos condilectum habere. Ubi itaque mutuo diligentes tante, ut diximus, benivolentie sunt ut quicquid perfectionis est, commune esse velint, oportet, ut dictum est, utrumque pari voto, equa ratione condilectum requirere, et juxta potestatis sue plenitudinem pro voto possidere.

CAPUT XVI. Quod plenitudo potentie et sapientie videatur posse consistere in singularitate persone Inter delicias caritatis et sapientie hoc solet maxime interesse, quod sapientie delicie valent et solent hauriri de corde proprio; intime autem caritatis delicie hauriuntur de corde alieno. Nam qui intime diligit et intime diligi concupiscit, non tam delectatur quam anxiatur, si de dilecti sui corde non haurit dilectionis dulcedinem quam sitit. Sapientie vero delicie tunc magis delectant, quando de corde proprio hauriuntur. Nichil ergo diffinitur contrarium nature, si plenitudo sapientie dicatur posse subsistere in singularitate persone. Nam quantum videtur, etiamsi sola una

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

ignorant about this, and the highest good will like it; and just as it is impossible that the happiness of the highest power and the power of the highest happiness should be missing in his pleasure, just as impossible it is that the two persons should not be joined with a third person in the divinity.

CHAPTER 15. That the two persons in the divinity with an equal wish and for a similar reason must desire a third person It should now be noted about these divine persons that the perfection of one person demands the addition of the other, and it follows that the perfection of the two persons demands the cohesion of the third. As it is already said above about the two persons that they must be perfect to the highest degree in order that both rightly can be loved to the highest degree by the other. Just as both have the same wisdom and the same power, both must truly have one and the same highest good will. And it belongs to the highest and totally perfect good will to share with others all the abundance of its fullness. But where there is an equal good will in both persons, it is necessary that they with the same wish and for a similar reason must want a partaker in their most high happiness. For where two mutually loving persons embrace each other with the highest desire and are delighted in each other with the highest love, then the one finds his highest happiness in the intimate love of the other, and, conversely, the other finds his highest happiness in the intimate love of the first. But as long as he only is loved by the other, he seems to own the highest sweetness of his pleasures alone; likewise, as long as the other does not have a partaker in his love he will be missing the fellowship in his highest happiness. In order that both can share these pleasures they must have a partaker in their love.12 So, where two mutually loving persons, as mentioned, have such a great good will that they will share all their perfection with others, both of them must, as mentioned, with the same wish and for the same reason want a partaker in their love,13 and due to the fullness of their power they will also have what they want.

CHAPTER 16. That the fullness of power and wisdom seems to be able to be found in one single person Now, between the pleasures of charity and those of wisdom there is usually that great difference that the pleasures of wisdom are and usually come from your own heart; but the intimate pleasures of charity come from the heart of another. For the one, who loves intimately and longs to be loved intimately, is not happy but anxious, if the sweetness of love, for which he thirsts, does not come from the heart of the beloved. Whereas one is happier for the pleasures of wisdom when they come from one’s own heart. So, it is not contrary to nature if we say that the fullness of wisdom can be found in one single

12 Idem. 13 Idem.

141

142

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

persona in divinitate esset, nichilominus plenitudinem sapientie habere potuisset. Plenitudo autem sapientie non potest esse sine plenitudine potentie, sicut nec potentie plenitudo sine plenitudine sapientie. Sapientie namque plenitudinem procul dubio non haberet qui ignoraret quomodo optinere potuisset quod ei de omnipotentia deesset. E converso autem absque dubio careret potentie plenitudine qui aliquem sapientie defectum posset invitus sustinere. Plenitudo itaque unius non potest haberi sine plenitudine alterius. Quod igitur de sapientia diximus, consequens est ut idem de potentia intelligamus. Nam si omnipotentia deesse non potest, ubi plenitudo sapientie est, videtur utique quod plenitudo tam potentie quam sapientie possideri possit in singularitate persone.

CAPUT XVII. Quod completio felicitatis non videtur posse subsistere sine geminatione persone Completio autem vere felicitatis et summe nullo modo videtur posse subsistere sine geminatione persone. Constat hoc luce jam clarius ex his que in superioribus diximus. Nam si in illa vera divinitate sola una persona esset, utique non haberet cui summum amorem inpenderet, nec qui sibi summum amorem rependeret. Unde ergo illi summe dulces ille delicie abundarent, que, ut dictum est, non tam de proprio quam de alieno corde hauriri solent? Nichil enim, uti jam prefati sumus, his deliciis dulcius, nichil delectabilius, nichil hac suavitate salubrius, preclarius atque jocundius. Quomodo ergo divina felicitas totius plenitudinis abundantiam optinuisset, cui summa suavitas, summa jocunditas semper deesset? Persone itaque geminationem, ut dictum est, felicitas exigit, ut in omnis plenitudinis integritate subsistere possit.

CAPUT XVIII. Quod consummatio vere et summe bonitatis videtur non posse subsistere sine completione Trinitatis Neminem conturbet, nemo indignetur, si ad evidentiorem veritatis intelligentiam de divinis et supermundanis humano more loquamur. Hunc autem loquendi modum in usum nostre inopie tanto fidentius assumimus, quanto eum in Scripturis sacris frequentissime invenimus. Summus bonitatis gradus esse videtur, quando summus amor ibi inpenditur, unde ad felicitatis sue plenitudinem nichil optinetur. Sed hic summe perfectionis gradus, ut ex ante jam dictis evidentissimum est, inter duos tantum mutuo dilectos inveniri non potest. Ibi namque dilectorum uterque amorem inpendit, unde absque dubio melliflua illa dilectionis oblectamenta haurit; que unde haurire posset omnino non haberet, si solus esset et solitarius viveret. Magnus itaque cumulus gaudiorum

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

person. It seems then that even if there was only one person in the divinity, it would still be able to own the fullness of wisdom. But the fullness of wisdom cannot exist without the fullness of power, just as the fullness of power cannot exist without the fullness of wisdom. For one would not be able to have the fullness of wisdom and be ignorant about how to achieve what one is lacking in being almighty. And conversely, one would undoubtedly not have the fullness of power if one, against his will, should endure a lack in wisdom. So, one cannot have the fullness of the one without the fullness of the other. Therefore, what we have said about wisdom, the same we must consequently understand about power. It follows then that if omnipotence cannot be lacking where there is fullness of wisdom, then it seems that the fullness of power as well as the fullness of wisdom can be owned by one single person.

CHAPTER 17. That the complete happiness does not seem to exist without two persons But the completion of the true and highest happiness does not seem in any way to be able to exist without two persons. This is already clearer than light from what we have said above.14 For if there was only one person in this true divinity, he would not have any to whom he could give his highest love and neither anyone who could return this highest love. So, from where would the highest sweetness of pleasures gush forth when, as we have said, they usually do not come from one’s own but from the heart of another? And nothing, as we have said already, is sweeter than these pleasures, nothing is more delightful, nothing healthier than this sweetness, nothing more splendid or happier. Therefore, how could the divine happiness obtain its overwhelming fullness if it always would be missing the highest sweetness, the highest happiness? As we have said, happiness requires two persons in order that it can exist in all its genuine fullness.

CHAPTER 18. That the perfection of the true and highest goodness does not seem to exist without the complete Trinity No one should be worried, and no one should be indignant, when we are speaking in the human way to give a clearer understanding of the truth about the divine and the supernatural. We allow ourselves this way of speaking in our poor way so much more confidently as we very often find it in the holy Scriptures. It seems to be the highest degree of goodness when one gives the highest love where one does not obtain anything to one’s fullness of happiness. But this highest degree of perfection cannot be found, as it is most clear from what we have said above, just between two mutually loved persons. For here both the two loved persons give love whereby they undoubtedly receive the mellifluous pleasures of love; and they would not have anyone to receive these from if they were alone and solitary. Therefore, the great accumulation 14 III:3.

143

144

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

et jocunditatis accrescit cuique ex consortio exibite et accepte dilectionis. Hinc ergo manifeste colligitur quod summus ille benignitatis gradus in divinitate locum non haberet, si in illa personarum pluralitate tertia persona deesset; et certe in sola geminatione persone non esset cui posset quivis duorum precipuas jocunditatis sue delicias communicare. Hinc datur intelligi quod consummatio vere et summe bonitatis non possit subsistere sine completione Trinitatis.

CAPUT XIX. Quomodo ex inspecta solum proprietate condilectionis deprehendi possit vestigium Trinitatis Quod de Trinitatis assertione multiplici rationis attestatione probatum est, compendiosa satis multumque perspicua consideratione confirmari potest. Virtutem itaque ac proprietatem condilectionis diligenti consideratione perpendamus, et citius inveniemus quod querimus. Quando unus alteri amorem inpendit et solus solum diligit, dilectio quidem est, sed condilectio non est. Quando duo se mutuo diligunt et summi desiderii affectum invicem inpendunt, et istius in illum, illius vero in istum affectus discurrit et quasi in diversa tendit, utrobique quidem dilectio est, sed condilectio non est. Condilectio autem jure dicitur, ubi a duobus tertius concorditer diligitur, socialiter amatur, et duorum affectus tertii amoris incendio in unum conflatur. Ex his itaque patet quod in ipsa divinitate condilectio locum non haberet, si duobus tantum consistentibus tertia persona deesset. Non enim hic de qualicumque sed de summa condilectione loquimur, et qualem creatura a Creatore nunquam meretur, nunquam digna invenitur. Quis, queso, digne explicare valeat quanta sit virtus benivolentie summe et usquequaque perfecte? Quis, queso, digne estimare sufficiat que vel quanta sit dignitas intime et summe concordie? Si tanta itaque dignitas est in his duabus virtutibus cuique ex semetipsa, quid, queso, virtutis, quid dignitatis inerit ubi quevis conditur ex altera, ubi una magnificatur ex alia, ista consummatur ex illa? Quid autem aliud est intima et summa condilectio, nisi intime benivolentie et summe concordie mutua concursio? Virtus itaque tante dignitatis et supereminentis excellentie sicut non potest in summo bono universaliterque perfecto deesse, sic nec potest sine personarum Trinitate subsistere.

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

of joy and happiness will grow in each of them in the fellowship of given and received love. From this it is clearly understood that this highest degree of good will would not take place in the divinity if the plurality of persons would not include a third person; truly, with only two persons there would not be anyone with whom both of them could share the pleasures of their most high happiness. From this it is given to understand that the perfection of the true and highest goodness cannot exist without the Trinity.

CHAPTER 19. How a trace of the Trinity can be seen by examining simply the property of the love of a third person.15 What has been proved about the Trinity by multiple witnesses of reason can be confirmed by a rather brief and very evident consideration. Let us now carefully examine the virtue and property of the love of a third person16 and we will find very soon what we are looking for. When someone gives love to another and only loves one alone, it is love but it is not love of a third person.17 When two love each other mutually and give each other their feelings of the highest desire, as their feelings come from the one to the other, and conversely as opposing flows, as it were, then there is love in both but there is not love of a third person.18 Love of a third person is rightly said to exist when a third person is loved by the two other in harmony and community and where the feelings of both are melting together in the inflammation of love of the third person. From this it appears that love of a third person would not exist in the divinity if the two persons, who are there so close together, would be missing a third person. Here we are talking not of any kind of love but of the highest love of a third person, and the creation will never merit or be found worthy by the Creator of this love. Who, I am asking, can explain rightly how great the highest and totally perfect good will is? And who, I am asking, can value rightly how and how great the dignity of the intimate and highest concord is? If these two virtues are so worthy in themselves, how much greater will their virtue and dignity be when the one is born by the other, the one is magnified by the other, and the one is perfected by the other? And what is the intimate and highest love of a third person other than the mutual meeting of the intimate good will and the highest concord? So, just as this virtue of such a great dignity and unsurpassed excellence cannot be missing in the highest and totally perfect good, so this cannot exist without the Trinity of persons.

15 Condilectio. 16 Idem. 17 Idem. 18 Idem.

145

146

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

CAPUT XX. Quod ex tertie persone consodalitate in illa Trinitate agitur ut concordialis caritas et consocialis amor ubique nusquam singularis inveniatur Attende nunc quomodo tertie persone copula concordialem affectum ubique comparat, et consocialem amorem per omnes et in omnibus confederat. Si unam aliquam e tribus personis attendis, videbis quia cetere due eam concorditer amant. Si aliam respicias, et ibi eque invenis quoniam relique in ejus amore pari voto concordant. Si tertiam ab his in considerationem adducis, procul dubio ceterarum affectum pari concordia in illam confluere videbis. Si creatura attenditur, ibi amoris funiculus triplicatur, ut ubi de defectu amoris suspicio facilius oriri poterat, majori confederatione certitudo consolidetur. Ecce quomodo ex tertie persone consolidate in illa Trinitate agitur ut concordialis caritas et consocialis amor ubique nusquam singularis inveniatur. Ecce in Trinitatis assertione tanta, tam rata veritatis attestatio undique occurrit ut mente captus videatur cui tanta certificatio satisfacere non possit.

CAPUT XXI. Quod summa equalitas sit in illa Trinitate, ubi oportet omnes eque perfectos esse Quod superius probatum est de duobus, pari ratione inferri potest etiam de tribus, singulos scilicet a singulis summe diligendos, summe dilectos, quia summe perfectos. Plenitudo summe felicitatis requirit plenitudinem summe jocunditatis. Plenitudo summe jocunditatis requirit plenitudinem summe caritatis. Plenitudo summe caritatis exigit plenitudinem summe perfectionis. Ubi itaque oportet omnes eque perfectos esse, necesse est omnes in summa equalitate congruere. Erit itaque omnibus equalis sapientia, equalis potentia, indifferens gloria, uniformis bonitas, eterna felicitas, ut veraciter constet quod cotidiana professio Christiane institutionis docet, quoniam trium pariter una est divinitas, equalis gloria, coeterna majestas. Nullus ibi altero major, nullus ibi altero minor; nullus ibi anterior, nullus ibi posterior. Constat itaque in illa Trinitate omnes personas coequales simul et coeternas esse. Nam si coeterne non essent, eo ipso coequales non essent.

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 20. That the community with the third person in the Trinity brings about that charity is found mutual and love common everywhere, never individual See now how the bond of a third person makes the feelings concordant in all and binds them together with a common love through all and in all. If you look at any one of the three persons, you will see that the other two love him concordantly. If you look at the other, you find the same here as the two others, with the same wish, love him concordantly. If you take the third person into consideration you will, without a doubt, see that the feelings of the two others flow together in him with the same concord. If you look at the creation, you will see that the bond of love also here is threefold, so that the safety can be made stronger with a greater union here where the suspicion of a defect of love more easily could arise. See, how the community with the third person in this Trinity brings about that charity is found mutual and love is common everywhere and is never individual. See, how many and how valid witnesses of truth are coming from everywhere in order to attest to the Trinity so that it seems to be a fool who cannot be satisfied by such a great affirmation.

CHAPTER 21. That there will be the highest equality in the Trinity in which all must be equally perfect What was proved above about the two persons can with the same reason be applied to all three of them, namely that each of them is to be loved to the highest degree by any of the other, and that each of them are loved to the highest degree because they are to the highest degree perfect. The fullness of the highest happiness requires the fullness of the highest pleasure. And the fullness of the highest charity requires the fullness of the highest perfection. Now, where all must be equally perfect, all must be congruent in the highest equality. So, all of them must have equal wisdom, equal power, the same honour, uniform goodness, eternal happiness, so that it is truly a fact what the daily confession of the Christian institution teaches that the three persons are equally one divinity, equal honour, and coeternal majesty.19 No one is here greater than the other and no one is lesser than the other; no one is here before, no one here is behind. So, it is certain that all the persons in this Trinity are all just equal20 and at the same time equally eternal.21 For if they would not be equally eternal, they would not be just equal.

19 Quicumque. 20 Coequales. 21 Coeternas.

147

1 48

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

CAPUT XXII. Quod in singulis personis sit summa simplicitas, et in omnibus simul vera et summa unitas, et utrobique miranda identitas In illa itaque summa et usquequaque perfecta personarum equalitate, summum illud et summe simplex esse est omnibus commune. Idem ergo est omnibus esse quod vivere, vivere quod intelligere, intelligere quod posse. Non igitur ibi est aliud sapientia quam potentia, potentia quam essentia, et juxta hunc modum similis in similibus sententia. Vides ergo quoniam idem ipsum est totum quod in qualibet persona est. Sed si summa perfectio est in illa equalitate et summa equalitas in illa perfectione, erit singulis simul et omnibus summa plenitudo sapientie, erit singulis simul et omnibus summa plenitudo potentie. Sed quid est summa et plena potentia nisi omnipotentia? Novimus autem quod omnipotentia inde dicta sit quod omnia possit. Si vero omnipotentiam omnia veraciter posse constiterit, de facili efficere poterit ut quelibet alia potentia nichil possit. Hinc ergo manifestum est quod omnipotentia non potest esse nisi una. Superius autem probatum est quod omnipotentia idem ipsum est quod divina essentia. Si igitur commune est simul omnibus personis omni potentiam habere, immo et esse, quia ibi non est aliud esse quam habere, commune erit et omnibus unam et eamdem essentiam esse. Nam divina essentia, sicut et omnipotentia, non potest esse nisi una. Non solum itaque idem ipsum est totum quod est quelibet persona, verum etiam idem ipsum est quevis una quod quelibet alia. In singulis itaque summa simplicitas, in omnibus simul vera et summa unitas, utrobique autem, si bene attendas, miranda identitas.

CAPUT XXIII. Quomodo in his personis sit intelligenda dicta equalitas, ubi est tanta unitas et talis identitas Quod autem dictum est de personarum equalitate, possumus et bene et male intelligere. In tanta namque personarum simplicitate et unitate videtur potius identitas quam equalitas esse. Tres statuas aureas, si sunt ejusdem puritatis et ponderis et per omnia ejusdem similitudinis, possumus et solemus equales dicere. Sed ejusmodi equalitas multum peregrina est ad illam que est in divinarum personarum Trinitate. Nam in illa statuarum equalitate alia est massa auri statue unius, alia est massa auri statue alterius, et juxta hoc aliud aliquid est una, et aliud aliquid est altera. Nichil autem tale debemus cogitare de illa vera et summa Trinitate, quasi sit ibi aliud et aliud, sed unum alteri equale. Nam sicut jam demonstratum est, quod est in una aliqua persona, idem ipsum et totum est et in qualibet altera. Tres rationales

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 22. That there will be the highest simplicity in each person, and that there in all at the same time is true and the highest unity, and that there in both cases is wonderful identity So, in this highest and totally perfect equality of persons, the highest and the highest simple being is common to all. Therefore, for all persons being is the same as living, living the same as understanding, and understanding the same as being able. Here wisdom is not different from power, and power not different from being, and the same is the case for the other properties. You see that the very same is fully in each of the persons. But if the highest perfection is in this equality and the highest equality in this perfection, then every single person at the same time as the other persons will have the highest fullness of wisdom as well as the highest fullness of power. And what is the highest and full power other than omnipotence? We know that omnipotence is called so because it can do everything. But if the omnipotence truly consists in being able to do everything, then it would easily be able to make any other power unable to do anything. From this it is obvious that there can only be one almighty. It was further proved above that the omnipotence is the same as the divine being.22 So, if it is common to all persons at the same time to have omnipotence, indeed being omnipotent, since being is the same as having here, then one and the same being will be common to all. For the divine being, just as the omnipotence, can only be one. Therefore, there is not any one of the persons who is just fully identical to himself, but any of the persons is also fully identical to any of the others. So, in every single person there is the highest simplicity, and in all the persons there is, at the same time, true and the highest unity, and if you look closely after, there is total identity between both things.

CHAPTER 23. How the mentioned equality between these persons is to be understood where there is such unity and identity What has been said now about the equality of the persons,23 however, can be understood rightly and wrongly. For in this simplicity and unity between the persons there seems to be more identity than equality. We can and are used to call three statues of gold equal if they are of the same purity and weight and are like each other in all ways. But this kind of equality is very different from that in the Trinity of divine persons. For in the equality of the statues the mass of gold in the one statue is different from the mass of the other and thus the one is one thing and the other something different. But we should not think anything like this about the true and highest Trinity as if there is difference here where one is equal to another. For as it has been shown already, what is found in any one of the

22 I:13–18. 23 III:21.

149

150

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

spiritus equales non inmerito dicimus, si sint ejusdem potentie, ejusdem sapientie, ejusdem puritatis atque bonitatis; sed in hac spirituum trinitate sicut sunt tres persone, sic constat ibi et tres substantias esse. Summa autem Trinitas constat in unitate substantie. Aliud itaque et aliud, quamvis equale, invenitur in trinitate illa; sed talis equalitas longe est a Trinitate divina. Sed in illa summa Trinitate ea ratione personas equales dicimus, quia illud summum et summa simplex esse in ea plenitudine et perfectione qua est persone unius, in ea plenitudine et perfectione est cujuslibet persone alterius.

CAPUT XXIV. Quam sit incomprehensibilis illa omniformitas summe coequalitatis Certe una eademque substantia non est majus aliquid vel minus, melius deteriusve seipsa. Non igitur erit majus vel melius aliquid quevis in Trinitate persona quam quelibet alia, cum veraciter sit singulis una eademque substantia. Est autem singulis simul et omnibus eadem ipsa; unde nec majus vel melius aliquid erunt quelibet due quam quelibet sola, nec tres simul pariter accepte quam quelibet due, vel quelibet sola per se. In illa autem personarum trinitate ubi sunt plures substantie, minus aliquid est una sola quam due, et quibuslibet duabus majus aliquid tote tres pariter accepte. Nunc ergo attende, illa omniformis et omnifaria magnitudinis coequalitas in illa summa Trinitate quam incomprehensibilis sit, ubi unitas pluralitati non cedit, nec pluralitas unitatem excedit!

CAPUT XXV. Quod in illa Trinitate nusquam aliquis est dissimilis sibi, nec inequalis in aliquo alicui alteri Sed ut hanc divinarum personarum equalitatem amplius admireris, attende et illud in omnibus aliis personis, quoniam in nua qualibet eademque persona nec singularitas est sine pluralitate, nec unitas sine inequalitate. Taceo quod potest crescere vel minui, et sibi ipsi inequalis fieri; taceo quod aliud est ejus potentia, aliud est ejus sapientia, aliud est ejus justitia, et potest esse secundum aliud major, secundum aliud minor, melior sive deterior. Certe sola ejus potentia, certe sola ejus sapientia est sibi ipsi dissimilis, est sibi ipsi inequalis. Idemque ipsum contingit in ceteris: potentiam ejus attende, et invenies quia aliud est ei facile, aliud difficile, aliud inpossibile, et sic deprehenditur etiam sibi ipsi dissimilis et inequalis esse; similiter et ipsi sapientie aliud est comprehensibile, aliud vero incomprehensibile. Nam que humana vel angelica intelligentia poterit unquam, ut de ceteris taceam, ipsam divinitatis inmensitatem comprehendere? Dum itaque una eademque natura in aliis est efficacior, in aliis infirmior, in parte est minor et in parte est major, et ipsa sibi dissimilis, et ipsa sibi invenitur inequalis. Ex his itaque colligi potest quia ubi vera

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

persons, the same is fully to be found in any of the other. However, it is not wrong that we call three rational spirits equal if they are of the same power, the same wisdom, and of the same purity and goodness; but just as there are three persons in this trinity of spirits, there are clearly also three substances. But the highest Trinity consists of one substance. In the other trinity there is one and another even if they are equal; but this equality is far from the divine Trinity. In the highest Trinity we say that there are equal persons for that reason that the highest and highest simple being in its fullness and perfection, which is in one person, is also in its fullness and perfection in any of the other persons.

CHAPTER 24. How incomprehensible this total uniformity of the highest common equality is It is sure that one and the same substance is not bigger or smaller or better or worse than itself. So, there will not be anything bigger or better in any person in the Trinity than in any of the other persons since every single person truly is one and the same substance. Every single is at the same time the very same as all of them; therefore, any two of them cannot be bigger or better than any one of them, neither can three of them together be more than any two of them or any one of them alone. Whereas in the trinity of persons in which there are several substances, one alone will be less than two, and three of them together will be more than two of them. Now you see how incomprehensible this total and universal equality24 of greatness is in the highest Trinity in which unity does not give way to plurality and plurality does not exclude unity!

CHAPTER 25. That there in this Trinity is never anyone who is dissimilar to himself or unequal in anything in relation to any of the other But in order that you can better admire this equality among the divine persons, you should also notice this regarding all other persons, namely that in one and the same person there is never singularity without plurality and never unity without inequality. Not to mention what can grow and what can diminish and what can become unlike itself; and not to mention that his power is one thing, his wisdom another, and his justice yet another, and that he can be bigger and better in one thing and lesser and worse in other things. Just his power alone and just his wisdom alone, they are dissimilar to themselves and they are unequal to themselves. And the same is the case in the other properties: look at his power and you will find that something is easy for him and other things are difficult for him, and yet other things are impossible, and thus it is understood that it is dissimilar and unequal to itself; the same is the case with his wisdom, something is understandable, other things are not understandable. For will human or angelic intelligence ever be able to understand the very immensity of the 24 Coequalitas.

15 1

152

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r t e rt i u s

simplicitas non est, vera equalitas esse non potest. In illa autem Trinitate nusquam aliquis est dissimilis sibi, nec inequalis in aliquo alicui alteri. Sane ubi vera eternitas est, non potest esse prius vel posterius, sic ubi incommutabilis inmensitas est, non potest esse majus vel minus. Quibus itaque eadem eternitatis et inmensitatis ratio inest, nulla aliquatenus inequalitatis vicissitudo vel alternatio inesse potest, quia nulla ibi transmutatio vel vicissitudinis obumbratio. Nichil ibi prius, nichil posterius, nichil majus aut minus, sed tote tres persone coeterne sibi sunt et coequales. Ecce jam manifesta et multiplici ratione probavimus quam verum sit quod credere jubemur, ut unum videlicet Deum in Trinitate et Trinitatem in unitate veneremur.

b o o k t h r e e – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

divinity, not to mention other things? So, one and the same nature can be strong in something, weak in other things, small in something, great in other things, and thus it is found dissimilar and unequal to itself. From this it can be understood that where there is not true simplicity, there cannot be true equality. But in the Trinity no one is ever dissimilar to himself or unequal to any other in anything. And where there is true eternity, there cannot be any earlier or later, just as where there is immutable immensity, there cannot be any greater or lesser. Those who have the same principle of eternity and immensity, cannot have any changeableness or alteration of inequality since there is here no change or shadow of change [ Jas 1:17b]. There is nothing earlier, nothing later, nothing greater or lesser, but all three persons are eternal and equal together.25 See, how clearly and with how many reasons we have proved how true it is what we are told to believe, namely to honour one God in Trinity and the Trinity in unity.26

25 Coeterne sibi sunt et coequales, Quicumque. 26 Quicumque, the final sentence.

15 3

CAPITULA QUARTI LIBRI I.

Quam incomprehensibile videatur humane intelligentie quod pluralitas personarum sit in unitate substantie. II. Quam multa sunt que humana intelligentia non comprehendit, que tamen ipsam propria experientia latere non sinit. III. Quam multa sunt incomprehensibilia ad que experientia deficit, que tamen ratio manifesta latere non sinit. IV. Quod ad doctrine evidentiam oporteat persone significationem determinare et secundum datam determinationem Trinitatis unitatem assignare. V. Quod ante nos quesitum est qua necessitate, quod restat querendum qua veritate tres illi in Trinitate dicti sunt persone. VI. Quod multum differant inter se significatio substantie et significatio persone. VII. Quod non tam aliquis quam aliquid significatur nomine substantie, nec tam aliquid quam aliquis ex denominatione persone. VIII. Quod non sit necesse ubicumque sunt plures persone, etiam plures substantias credere. IX. Quod nichil diffinimus sibi contrarium in eo quod dicimus Deum nostrum et substantialiter unum et personaliter trinum. X. Quod nec pluralitas substantiarum dissolvit unitatem persone in natura humana, nec pluralitas personarum dividit unitatem substantie in natura divina. XI. Quod in discernendis personis opus est gemina consideratione, hoc est, ut sciamus quale quid sit et unde habeat esse. XII. Quod sub nomine existentie possumus utramque considerationem subintelligere: et illam que pertinet ad rationem substantie, vel que pertinet ad rationem obtinentie. XIII. Quod generalis existentiarum variatio triplici distinguitur modo. XIV. Juxta quid variatur personarum existentia in humana natura, et juxta quid variatur in angelica natura. XV. Quod divinarum existentiarum differentiam oporteat querere circa originem solam. XVI. Quod in natura divina sit existentia que est pluribus communis, et est existentia que omnino est incommunicabilis. XVII. Qua ratione in divinitate possint esse incommunicabiles existentie; et quod tot sint quot persone. XVIII. Quod quantum ad divina nichil aliud persona est quam incommunicabilis existentia. XIX. Quod possunt esse plures existentie, et quod consequens est, plures persone, ubi non est nisi unitas substantie. XX. Quomodo intelligendum sit, vel quomodo convenire possit quod quidam dicunt tres substantias, unam essentiam; quidam tres subsistentias, unam substantiam; alii autem tres personas et substantiam vel essentiam unam. XXI. Diffinitio persone non cujuscumque sed solius create. XXII. Descriptio persone non cusjuscumque sed solius increate.

THE HEADINGS OF BOOK FOUR 1. How incomprehensible it seems to the human understanding that there is a plurality of persons in one substance. 2. How many things there are that the human understanding does not comprehend but that it cannot be ignorant about by its own experience. 3. How many incomprehensible things there are which the experience cannot grasp but which cannot be hidden for the clear reason. 4. That we for the evidence of the doctrine should determine the meaning of the word person and describe the unity of the Trinity according to this determination. 5. That before us it has been examined by what necessity the three ones in the Trinity are called persons, and that it should be investigated now by what truth this is said. 6. That there is a great difference between the meaning of the word substance and the meaning of the word person. 7. That the word substance rather means something than someone and that the word person rather means someone than something. 8. That it is not always necessary to believe that there are several substances where there is a plurality of persons. 9. That we are not making a self-contradictory definition when we say that our God is one in substance and three in persons. 10. That a plurality of substances does not dissolve the unity of a person in the human nature, and that the plurality of persons does not divide the unity of substance in the divine nature. 11. That one must do two considerations to distinguish between persons so that we can know what it is and from where it has its being. 12. That we by the word existence can imply both considerations, that which pertains to its substance as well as that which pertains to its source of being. 13. That the existences in general can be different in three ways. 14. How the existence of the persons varies in the human nature, and how it varies in the angelic nature. 15. That one should seek the difference of the divine existences in the origin alone. 16. That in the divine nature there is an existence which is common to a plurality, and an existence which is totally incommunicable. 17. For what reason there can be incommunicable existences in the divinity; and that there are as many persons as there are existences. 18. That in the divinity a person is nothing other than an incommunicable existence. 19. That there can be a plurality of existences and, consequently, a plurality of persons where there is nothing but a unity of substance. 20. How it should be understood or how it can match together that some say three substances and one essence; and some say three subsistences and one substance; and others again say three persons and one substance or essence. 21. Definition of a person, not any person, but only the created one. 22. Description of a person, not any person, but only the uncreated one.

156

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – C ap i t u l a q uart i li b ri

XXIII. Descriptio persone que videtur soli et omni posse convenire. XXIV. Item descriptio persone que videtur soli et omni posse convenire. XXV. Quod proprium sit divine nature personarum pluralitatem habere in unitate substantie, et eo ipso ab aliis differre.

H e ad i n g s o f b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

23. Description of a person which can match both one person and all persons. 24. Likewise, a description of a person which can match both one person and all persons. 25. That it is special for the divine nature to have a plurality of persons in a unity of substance; and thus, it is different from other natures.

15 7

LIBER QUARTUS

CAPUT I. Quam incomprehensibile videatur humane intelligentie quod pluralitas personarum sit in unitate substantie Ecce in hujus operis exordio ea que de divine substantie unitate credimus, tam evidenti demonstratione et perspicuis rationibus probavimus ut diligenter intuentibus nil dubitationis remanere debeat, unde eos vel in modico hesitare oporteat. Similiter et suo loco de personarum pluralitate fidei nostre assertionem tam rata probatio persuasit, tam multiplex ratio confirmavit ut mentis inops videatur, cui tanta veritatis attestatio satisfacere non possit. Et quidem quelibet harum considerationum et assertionum cum per semetipsam solam et seorsum attenditur, nichil credibilius, nichil verius videtur. Si quando autem unam cum alia conferimus, et quomodo concorditer et simul stare possint attendimus, nisi fidei firmitas obsistat, protinus in ambiguum venit quicquid multiplex ratiocinatio persuasit. Non enim facile capit humana intelligentia ut possit esse plus quam una persona, ubi non est plus quam una substantia. Hinc illi innumeri infidelium errores, hinc multiplices ille scismaticorum hereses; hinc est quod alii divine substantie unitatem scindunt, alii personarum pluralitatem confundunt; hinc est quod Arriani et Sabelliani per contrarias sectas sunt ab invicem divisi; hinc est etiam quod aliqui ex modernis persone nomen sub multiplici significatione accipiunt, et tam profunde veritatis intelligentiam quam explicare debuerant, majori ambiguo involvunt. Nam si quis velit persone nomen sub communi et propria acceptione intelligere, nullo modo putant plures personas sub ea acceptione intellectas posse subsistere in unitate substantie.

CAPUT II. Quam multa sunt que humana intelligentia non comprehendit, que tamen propria experientia ipsam latere non sinit Verum hec assignata, queso, unitas Trinitatis et Trinitas unitatis, nunquid quia comprehendi non potest, iccirco esse non potest? Quis, nisi mentis inops, hoc

BOOK FOUR

CHAPTER 1. How incomprehensible it seems to the human understanding that there is a plurality of persons in one substance Look, in the beginning of this work1 we have proved what we believe about the divine substance with such obvious demonstration and clear reasons that those who have paid careful attention should not have any doubt left which would make them hesitate the slightest. Likewise, we were later2 convinced about the witness of our faith about the plurality of persons by such a valid demonstration and so many reasons that one must be a fool who cannot be satisfied by such a proof of truth. Indeed, when you look at both considerations and assertions on their own and independently, nothing seems more credible or righter. But when we compare the one with the other and look at how they can stand together in harmony and at the same time, then what the many reasons have convinced us about can easily lead us into doubt, unless the firmness of faith stands against it. For it is not easy for the human understanding to grasp that there can be more than one person where there is not more than one substance. This is why the multiple errors of the unbelievers and the many heresies of the schismatics arise; this is why some divide the unity of the divine substance and other confound the plurality of the persons; this is why the Arians and the Sabellians are divided from each other in contrary sects; this is also why some today understand the word person under many different meanings, and instead of explaining the meaning of such a deep truth, which they should, they are leading into greater doubt. For if someone wants to understand the word person under the common and proper meaning, then one can in no way think that several persons, understood in this way, can subsist in a unity of substance.

CHAPTER 2. How many things there are that the human understanding does not comprehend but that it cannot be ignorant about by its own experience Now, this mentioned unity in the Trinity and Trinity in the unity – can this, I ask, because it cannot be understood, for this reason not exist? But who else than a fool will

1 I:16–17 and II:17–19. 2 III:2–5.

1 60

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

sentiat? Quis dicere presumat? Quam multa sunt que humana intelligentia non comprehendit, que tamen quam vera sint mentem humanam multiplex experientia latere non sinit? Explica michi, queso, si potes, de quo omnino dubitare non potes, quid sit quod oculus corporeus ibi videndo non sentit ubi est, et videndo sentit ubi omnino non est. In celo ubi utique non est, stellam positam videt; palpebra tamen obductus, ipsam sub qua latet palpebram non videt. Ceteri sensus corporei sola adherentia sentiunt atque discernunt; solus oculorum sensus ad adherentia hebet et ad longinqua et remotissima viget. Nunquid quia quomodo hoc sit non comprehendis, iccirco verum non esse contendis? Explica michi, si potes, quod negare non audes, quomodo in teipso corpus et anima, tam diversa utique natura, sint una eademque persona; et tunc a me queras quomodo in summe simplici et communi natura personarum Trinitas sit una eademque substantia. Sed si illud incomprehensibile est quomodo sit, quod tamen humana mens per experientiam novit, quanto magis quod nulla humana experientia attingit!

CAPUT III. Quam multa incomprehensibilia sunt ad que experientia deficit, que tamen ratio manifesta latere non sinit Sed si te dicis de expertis nullo modo posse dubitare, etiamsi videantur humane capacitatis modum excedere, addo quod quedam que sunt incomprehensibilia esse non dubitas, que tamen per experientiam non probas. Multa namque ratio manifesta latere non sinit, ad que tamen comprehendenda mens humana non sufficit. Nunquid Dei eternitatem comprehendis, nec tamen de ejus eternitate diffidis? Nunquid de Dei inmensitate dubitas, quamvis eam comprehendere non valeas? Nunquid Dei omnipotentia ab omnibus comprehenditur, a quibus predicatur et creditur? Si singulos theologos interroges, ab omnibus id responsi accipies, quod idem sit Dei potentia quod ejus sapientia, quod ejus bonitas nil aliud sit quam ista vel illa. Si queras quid sint hec tria, nil aliud invenies quam divina substantia. Hec omnia ratio manifesta convincit et latere non sinit; in hoc sane omnes theologi consentiunt; hoc omnes in commune defendunt. Quid, queso, horum magis capabile, quid magis comprehensibile, quod substantia una sit dicta tria an quod tres persone sint substantia una? Utrumque incomprehensibile, neutrum tamen incredibile. Ex hac tamen, ut michi videtur, incomprehensibilitate efficitur ut secundum quosdam persone significatio per multas acceptiones varietur. Nam sunt qui dicant nomen persone aliquando substantiam, aliquando subsistentias, aliquando personarum proprietates significare. Significat autem, secundum quod volunt, substantiam quandoque in singulari, nunquam vero in numero plurali, ne tres

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

think so? Who will pretend to say so? How many things are there not which the human mind does not understand, but the truth of which multiple experiences do not allow the human mind to be ignorant about?3 Explain to me, I ask, if you can, something which you cannot be in doubt about, namely that the bodily eye by seeing does not perceive where it is itself, but perceives by seeing where it absolutely not is? In the sky, where the eye certainly is not, it sees a star; but hidden under the eyelid it does not see the eyelid which hides it. The other bodily senses perceive and discern only what they touch; only the sense of the eyes is made inactive by touching but it is active to things which are distant and very far away. Now, can it be that you will not call this true for that reason that you do not understand how this is so? Explain to me, if you can, what you do not dare to deny, namely how the body and the soul in yourself, which are of such a different nature, are one and the same person; and then you can ask me to explain how the Trinity of persons is one and the same substance in a highest simple and common nature. But if it is incomprehensible how that is, which the human mind knows by experience, how much more incomprehensible it is which no human experience can achieve!

CHAPTER 3. How many incomprehensible things there are which the experience cannot grasp but which cannot be hidden for the clear reason If you say that you cannot in any way doubt about experienced things also even if they seem to be outside the human capacity, I will add that there are certain incomprehensible things the existence of which you do not doubt about but which you nevertheless cannot prove by experience. Many things are not hidden for the clear reason even though the human mind is not able to understand them. So, do you understand God’s eternity even if you do not doubt about his eternity? Do you doubt about God’s immeasurability even if you are not able to understand it? Is God’s omnipotence understood by all who preach it and believe in it? And if you ask the theologians one by one, you will get the answer from all of them that the power of God is identical to his wisdom and that his goodness is no other than these two properties. If you ask what these three properties are, you will not find anything else than that they are the divine substance. The clear reason proves all this and cannot miss it; all theologians agree about this; they all together defend this. But I am asking, what is now more comprehensible and understandable: that one substance is the mentioned three, or that three persons are one substance? Both parts are incomprehensible but none of them is unbelievable. It seems to me that it is because of this incomprehensibility that, according to some, the word person has so many meanings. There are those who use the word person sometimes about the substance, sometimes about the subsistence, and sometimes

3 III:9–10.

161

1 62

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

personas confitentes videantur etiam tres substantias confiteri. Ad comprobandum autem quod personarum proprietates persone sunt, Ieronimi auctoritatem in hec verba dicentis adducunt: Sabelliani heresim declinantes, tres personas expressas sub proprietate distinguimus. Non enim nomina tantummodo, sed etiam nominum proprietates, id est personas, vel, ut Greci exprimunt, ypostases, hoc est subsistentias, confitemur. Sed, ut michi videtur, Ieronimus in his verbis non dicit personas proprietates personarum, sed proprietates nominum, hoc est quod proprie significant nomina personarum.

CAPUT IV. Quod ad doctrine evidentiam oportet persone significationem determinare et secundum datam determinationem Trinitatis unitatem assignare Ut de nomine ypostaseos taceamus, in quo secundum Ieronimum venemi suspicio est, ut, inquam, de nomine Greco taceamus, qui Greci non sumus, de nomine subsistentie tacite preterire non debemus. Quidam personas quidem subsistentias esse exponunt, et tres subsistentias et unam substantiam in una deitate dicunt magis quam ostendunt; siquidem sic hoc transeunt sine explanatione, ac si legentibus omnibus constet tres subsistenstias esse potuisse, etiam ubi constat nonnisi unam substantiam esse. Hanc vero eorum sententiam non arguo, non reprehendo, non falsam esse contendo; sed quod verum est compellor confiteri, quia hec eorum doctrina non satisfacit mee simplicitati. Si vultis mei similibus satisfacere, oportet primum tam substantie quam subsistentie significationem diligenter determinare, et secundum datam determinationem assignare quomodo possit esse plus quam una subsistentia ubi non est nisi una substantia. Alioquin, queso, quid prodest michi ignotum per ignotius ostendi? Nomen persone in ore omnium, etiam rusticorum, versatur; nomen vero subsistentie nec ab omnibus saltem litteratis agnoscitur. Quomodo ergo, queso, ex ejus proprietate quam ignorant, simpliciores quique colligere poterunt quod tres subsistentie, et eo ipso tres persone possint esse in unitate substantie? Quomodo, queso, illa doctrina satisfacere poterit, que litem lite resolvit? Quoniam ergo intentionis mee est in hoc opere simplicioribus deservire, et, ut sic dicam, non Minervam docere, studebo, prout Dominus dederit, non tam subsistentie quam persone significationem determinare, et juxta proposite determinationis assignationem ostendere quomodo possit personarum pluralitas cum substantie unitate convenire.

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

about the person’s properties.4 But when they use the word about the substance they always use it in the singular, never in the plural, so that they should not confess three substances by confessing three persons. And in order to prove that the persons are the properties of persons, they adduce the authority of Jerome: ‘As we reject the heresy of the Sabellians, we distinguish between the three persons by property. For we confess not just the names but also the properties of the names, that is the persons, or, as the Greeks put is, the hypostases, that is the subsistences’.5 However, it seems to me that Jerome in this passage does not say that the persons are the properties of persons but the properties of the names, and that is what the names of the persons really mean.

CHAPTER 4. That we for the evidence of the doctrine should determine the meaning of the word person and describe the unity of the Trinity according to this determination Let us pass by the word hypostasis in which, according to Jerome, there might be a suspicion of poison,6 let us pass by, I say, this Greek word, as we are not Greek, but we should not be silent about the word subsistence. Some people assert that persons are subsistences and they say, more than they show, that there are three subsistences and one substance in the one deity; thus they continue without explanation as if it is well-known to all readers that there can be three subsistences even where it is well-known that there is only one substance. I do not reprove their opinion, I do not reprehend it, I do not say that it is false; but I am compelled to confess what is true, namely that their doctrine does not satisfy my simplicity. If you want to satisfy people of my kind, you will have to define carefully the meaning of both the word substance and subsistence, and to show, according to this definition, how there can be more than one subsistence where there is only one substance. Otherwise, I ask, how will it be profitable to me to be shown the unknown through the more unknown? The word person is used by everyone, also uneducated people; the word subsistence, however, is not understood by everyone, not even by learned people. Therefore, I ask, would simpleminded people be able to understand from a property, which they do not understand, that there can be three subsistences, and thus three persons in one substance? How, I ask, can such a doctrine be satisfying when it explains something disputed with something just as disputed? Since it is my intention in this work to help the simpleminded and, if I may say so, not to teach Minerva, I will make an effort, as much the Lord will grant me, to determine the meaning of a person more than that of a subsistence, and according to this determination show how a plurality of persons can go together with the unity of a substance.



4 Cf. Peter Lombard: ‘Ex praedictis colligitur quod nomen personae in Trinitate triplicem tenet rationem: est enim ubi facit intelligentiam essentiae, et est ubi facit intelligentiam hypostasis, et est ubi facit intelligentiam proprietatis’, Sententiae 1, dist. 25, cap. 3, 5 (Grottaferrata: 1971), 195. 5 Cf. Pseudo-Jerome (Pelagius), Libellus fidei ad Innocentem 3 (PL 45:1717). 6 Jerome, Epistola ad Damasum Papam 15, 4 (CSEL 54:66).

163

164

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

CAPUT V. Quod ante nos quesitum est qua necessitate, quod restat querendum qua veritate tres illi in Trinitate dicti sunt persone Dicam, dicam certe quod sentio et quod firmiter et indubitanter credo, quod in illo tam sublimi et supereminenti Trinitatis misterio nomen persone nullatenus assignatum est sine instinctu divino et Spiritus sancti magisterio. Attendamus quomodo idem Spiritus tot sacramenta fidei nostre, redemptionis nostre, sanctificationis et glorificationis nostre per ora prophetarum predixit, per ora evangelistarum descripsit, per ora doctorum exposuit. Qui istud attenderit, nullo modo credere poterit quod summum fidei nostre articulum, quod sacratissimum et secretissimum Trinitatis misterium, quod nomen illud quod voluit ab omni corde credi, ab omni ore confiteri, estimationi hominum exposuit, et non potius sua inspiratione ordinavit. Ecce dicamus quia hi qui hoc nomen persone primo ad divina transtulerunt, ecce dicamus quoniam hoc ipsum ex necessitate fecerunt, ut haberent quid responderent querentibus quid tria tres illi in Trinitate essent, cum tres deos esse respondere non possent. Sed quod ab eis ex necessitate factum fuit, novit Spiritus sanctus qui eorum cordibus presidebat, qua ratione et veritate id fieri voluit. Si vero hoc fideliter credimus, cum omnia diligentia queramus, non jam sub qua acceptione primo humanis sit impositum, nec ex qua necessitate sit postea ad divina transsumptum, sed in qua veritate per Spiritum veritatis sit translatoribus inspiratum et a Latina Ecclesia universaliter frequentatum. Nulla autem sententia certior redditur quam que ex communi animi conceptione formatur; ergo secundum simplicem et communem animi intellectum quemquisque concipit ad nominationem persone, studebo assertionis nostre modum formare.

CAPUT VI. Quod multum differant inter se significatio substantie et significatio persone Dicamus inprimis quod dictum est ab aliis, quod persona secundum substantiam dicitur et substantiam significare videtur. Nichilominus tamen multum est inter significationem unius et significationem alterius. Sed ut melius elucescat quod dicimus, idipsum explanemus apertius. Quod animal substantiam significet quis neget, quis dubitet? Multum est tamen inter significationem unius et significationem alterius. Nomine enim animalis intelligitur substantia animata sensibilis. Animal itaque substantiam significat, sed et aliud aliquid consignificat. Nomine siquidem animalis significatur substantia, sed cum adjuncta sibi specifica differentia. Similiter et hoc nomen homo videtur

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 5. That before us it has been examined by what necessity the three ones in the Trinity are called persons, and that it should be investigated now by what truth this is said I will say, yes I will certainly say, what I think and what I firmly and without a doubt believe, namely that the word person in no way has been assigned to this sublime and super-eminent mystery of the Trinity without the divine inspiration and the instruction of the Holy Spirit.7 Let us consider how the same Spirit through the mouth of the prophets has predicted, through the mouth of the evangelists has described, and through the mouth of the doctors has exposed so many mysteries of our faith, our redemption, and our sanctification and glorification. Anyone who considers this can in no way believe that the highest article of our faith, that the most holy and secret mystery of the Trinity, that the name which he wanted should be believed by every heart and be confessed by every mouth, that all this was exposed to human discretion and not rather ordained by his inspiration. Look, we say that those who first used the word person about the divine, we say that they did so out of necessity in order to have something to answer to those who ask about the three ones in the Trinity, as they could not say that there are three gods. But the Holy Spirit, who guided their hearts, knew that they did so out of necessity, and for what reason and truth he wanted it to be done. If we faithfully believe this, let us then investigate most carefully this word, not its meaning which it originally had in the human language, and not in the reason why it was later used about the divine, but in that truth in which it was inspired by the Spirit of truth in those who used it and as it is used everywhere in the Latin Church. And no opinion is more certain than that which is held by the common mind;8 therefore, I will strive to form the way of my exposition after the simple and common understanding of the word person which is held by everyone.

CHAPTER 6. That there is a great difference between the meaning of the word substance and the meaning of the word person Let us first say what has been said by others, that a person is named after a substance and seems to indicate a substance. However, there is a great difference between the meaning of the two words. But to make it clearer what we are saying, let us explain it more simply. Who will deny or doubt about that an animal indicates a substance? However, there is a great difference between the meaning of the two words. For the word animal indicates an animate and sensible substance. Thus, the word animal means a substance, but it also means something more. The word animal means a substance, but by adding this word to a substance it gives it a specific meaning. Likewise, a human being seems

7 III:10. 8 I:20.

165

1 66

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

animal, et eo ipso substantiam significare. Quid enim est homo nisi animal rationale mortale? In eo ergo quod principaliter significat, aliquid consignificat. Animal itaque significat substantiam, non qualemcumque sed sensibilem. Homo autem non omnem sensibilem sed rationalem. Nunquam autem dicitur persona nisi de rationali substantia; et cum nominamus personam, nunquam intelligimus nisi unam solam substantiam et singularem aliquam. Itaque cum intelligentia substantie sub nomine animalis subintelligitur proprietas communis omni animali; et sub nomine hominis subintelligitur quedam proprietas communis omni homini; et sub nomine persone similiter subintelligitur quedam proprietas que non convenit nisi uni soli, nulla tamen determinate sicut in proprio nomine. Alias ergo subintelligitur proprietas generalis, alias proprietas specialis; ad nomen autem persone proprietas individualis, singularis, incommunicabilis. Ex his, ut arbitror, facile poteris advertere quod inter se multum differant significatio substantie et significatio persone.

CAPUT VII. Quod non tam aliquis quam aliquid significatur nomine substantie, nec tam aliquid quam aliquis ex denominatione persone Si bene perpendas et diligenter advertas, nomine substantie non tam quis quam quid significatur. E converso autem nomine persone non tam quid quam quis designatur. Cum aliquid tam longinquum a nobis fuerit ut discerni non possit, interrogamus quid sit. Et id quidem accipere solemus responsi, quod animal sit, homo, equus aut aliquid ejusmodi. Cum autem adeo appropinquaverit ut quod homo sit discerni possit, interrogamus jam non quid sed quis sit. Et respondetur nobis quod sit Matheus, Bartolomeus, pater vel filius illius. Videtis quia ad interrogationem quid, respondetur nomen generale vel speciale, diffinitio vel aliquid tale. Ad interrogationem autem quis, nomen proprium reddi solet vel aliquid quod equipollet. Per quid itaque inquiritur de proprietate communi, per quis de proprietate singulari. Notandum autem quod, si ad aspectum angelice visionis unus interroget alterum quis sit, et id responsi acceperit quod angelus Domini sit, talis utique responsio non est secundum proprietatem locutionis sed secundum intentionem querentis, ac si apertius dicat interroganti: Non est homo, ut putas, sed angelus Domini. Nam si angelum esse sciret, nec tale aliquid quereret, nec tale responsum nisi inepte reciperet. Per quid itaque, ut dictum est, inquiritur de proprietate communi, per quis de proprietate singulari. Per quid interrogamus ut certificemur de qualitate substantie, per quis ut certificemur de proprietate persone. Et notandum quod ad interrogationem: Que est ista persona? vel quis est iste? solemus idem respondere et nomen proprium vel equipollens reddere. Ex his, ut arbitror, satis intelligi datur quod ad nomen substantie non tam aliquis quam aliquid subintelligitur; e contra vero ad nomen persone non tam aliquid quam aliquis designatur. Ad nomen autem persone nunquam intelligitur nisi unus aliquis solus, ab omnibus aliis singulari proprietate discretus.

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

to be an animal and thus the word means a substance. For what is a human being other than a rational and mortal animal? So, just as the word has a main meaning it also means something more. The word animal means a substance, not any substance but a sensible one. However, a human being is not just a sensible substance but also a rational one. The word person is never used unless about a rational substance; and when we say a person, we always understand one single substance and an individual somebody. So, under the meaning of an animal’s substance is understood a property common to all animals; and under the word human being is understood a property common to all human beings; and under the word person is likewise understood a certain property which only matches one alone, however without the determination which is given by a proper name. So, sometimes is meant a general property, sometimes a special property; but by the word person is meant an individual, singular, and incommunicable property. From this, I think, you can easily understand how much difference there is between the meaning of substance and person.

CHAPTER 7. That the word substance rather means something than someone and that the word person rather means someone than something Now, consider well and observe carefully that by the word substance is rather understood something than someone. Conversely, by the word person is rather understood someone than something. When something is so far away from us that we cannot distinguish it, we ask what it is. And usually we receive the answer that it is an animal, a human being, a horse, or something like it. But when it has come closer and it can be distinguished as a human being, we do not ask what but who it is. And we get the answer that it is Matthew, Bartholomew, a father, or his son. You see that to the question about what, you usually get a general or special answer, a definition, or something like it. To the question about who, you usually get a proper name or something similar. So, by what is asked about a common property, by who is asked about a singular property. It should be noted, though, that if someone having a vision of an angel is asking another who this might be, and he gets the answer that it is an angel of the Lord, such an answer does not follow the rules of language but the intention of the inquirer, as if he said more clearly to the inquirer: It is not a human being as you think, but an angel of the Lord. For if he knew that it was an angel then he would not ask such a question, and such an answer would be thoughtless. Thus, as we have said, by a what is asked about a common property, by a who is asked about a singular property. Let us then ask by a what to be confirmed about the quality of a substance and by a who to be confirmed about the property of a person. Now it should be noted that to the question: who is this person? or: who is this? we use to answer the same and mention a proper name or something equivalent. From this I think that we can understand that by the word substance is meant something rather than someone; and conversely, that by the word person is meant someone rather than something. And by the word person is meant only one single someone who is different from all others by his individual property.

1 67

1 68

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

CAPUT VIII. Quod non sit necesse ubicumque sunt plures persone, etiam plures substantias credere Quando igitur tres personas dicimus, quid aliud quam tres aliquos significamus? Juxta intelligentiam secundum quam accipimus personam in singulari, juxta eamdem prorsus intelligentiam accipimus eam et in plurali, nisi quod hic plures, illic unus solus datur intelligi. Cum dicitur persona, pro certo intelligitur aliquis unus qui tamen sit rationalis substantia. Cum nominantur tres persone, absque dubio intelliguntur tres aliqui, quorum tamen unusquisque sit substantia rationalis nature. Sed utrum sint plures an omnes una eademque substantia, nichil interest quantum ad proprietatem veritatemque persone. Sed magis judicant homines juxta id quod experientia probat quam juxta id quod ratiocinatio dictat. Personas quidem humanas videmus, divinas autem videre non possumus. In natura humana quot persone, tot substantie. Et compellit eos cotidiana experientia de divinis similia estimare. In tamtum enim carnalis animus adquiescit eis que per experientiam didicit ut vix aliquid credere queat, quod eis que experiendo noverat, ex aliqua similitudine non appropinqueat. Sed qui ad fidem dormitat, saltem ad apertam rationem evigilet. Monstravimus jam aperta ratione quod non sit necesse ubicumque sunt plures persone, etiam plures substantias credere.

CAPUT IX. Quod nichil diffinimus sibi contrarium in eo quod dicimus Deum nostrum et substantialiter unum et personaliter trinum Certe ubicumque sunt tres persone, illud omnino est necesse ut alius aliquis sit iste, alius aliquis sit ille, et alius aliquis qui est tertius ab utroque, et quilibet eorum per se solus sit a ceteris duobus propria distinctione et distincta proprietate descretus. Sic procul dubio ubicumque sunt tres substantie, omnino est necesse ut aliud aliquid sit una, aliud aliqua alia, et aliquid aliud ab eis sit illa que est ab eis tertia. Nam si in nullo a se invicem differrent, utique plures esse non possent, siquidem ubi differentia nulla est, pluralitas esse non potest. Invenimus autem superius quod in illa summa Trinitate sit omnibus in commune summum et summe simplex esse, nec aliud aliquid sit quilibet unus quam quilibet alius, et iccirco in illa Trinitate tres substantias esse negamus. Nam in rationali natura esse aliud et aliud facit diversitas substantiarum, esse alium et alium facit alteritas personarum. Sed quia in illa divina et summe sapienti natura istam alteritatem, nec tamen antedictam diversitatem invenimus, iccirco plures personas ibi esse credimus, et plures substantias negamus. Ecce jam perspicua et compendiosa satis, ut arbitramur, ratione ostendimus quod nichil

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 8. That it is not always necessary to believe that there are several substances where there is a plurality of persons So, when we say three persons, what else can we mean but three ‘someones’? We use the word in the same meaning both in the singular and in the plural only with that difference that in the one case we mean a plurality, in the other case one singular person. Thus, when we say person, we certainly indicate a single someone who is of a rational substance. When we say three persons, we understand without a doubt three ‘someones’ who each of them consists of a substance of rational nature. But whether there are several substances, or all the persons are one and the same substance, it does not change anything regarding the property and truth of the person. Now, human beings prefer to make judgements based on the proofs of experience rather than on the requirements of reasoning. We can see the human persons, but we cannot see the divine persons. In the human nature there are just as many substances as there are persons. The daily experiences compel us to think something similar about the divine persons. The carnal mind is so content with what it learns from experience that it can hardly believe anything which is not closely comparable with what it knows from experience. But he who is sleepy in faith may at least wake up by the clear reason. And we have now clearly proved that it is not always necessary to believe that there must be a plurality of substances where there is a plurality of persons.

CHAPTER 9. That we are not making a self-contradictory definition when we say that our God is one in substance and three in persons It is certain that wherever there are three persons, it is absolutely necessary that there is one someone, another someone, and a third someone must be different from these two, and each of them is alone and different from the others by a special distinction and a distinct property. Accordingly, there is no doubt that wherever there are three substances it is certainly necessary that there is one something, another something, and again something different from these where there is a third something. For if they were not in any way different from each other they would not be able to be plural, and likewise, where there is no difference there cannot be plurality. Now, we found above that all in the highest Trinity have in common the highest and to the highest degree simple being, and that no one is different from anyone else there, and thus we deny that there are three substances in this Trinity.9 For when there is a something and a something else, it involves in a rational nature that there is a diversity of substances, and when there is a someone and someone else, there is a division of persons. But in the divine and the highest degree wise nature we do find this division, but not the mentioned diversity, and for that reason we believe that there is a plurality of persons, 9 III:23–25.

169

1 70

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

sibi contrarium diffinimus in eo quod dicimus Deum nostrum et substantialiter unum et personaliter trinum.

CAPUT X. Quod nec pluralitas substantiarum dissolvit unitatem persone in natura humana, nec pluralitas personarum dividit unitatem substantie in natura divina Diligenter notandum mutuaque consideratione conferendum quod, sicut esse substantialiter aliud et aliud non tollit ubique unitatem persone, sic esse personaliter alium et alium non scindit ubique unitatem substantie. Nam in humana natura alia substantia est corpus, et alia est anima, cum tamen non sint nisi una persona; in divina vero natura alius aliquis est persona una, et alius aliquis persona altera, cum tamen non sint nisi una eademque substantia. Et quidem scimus et superius jam monstravimus quod in illa divinarum personarum pluralitate sit summa similitudo et summa equalitas, in humane autem nature substantiarum pluralitate sit multa dissimilitudo et magna inequalitas. Quid ergo mirum si in illa tanta personarum equalitate maneat vera unitas substantie, quandoquidem in tam contrarie qualitatis diversitate invenitur unitas identitasque persone? In humana namque natura una eademque persona ex uno corporea, ex alio incorporea; ex uno visibilis, ex alio invisibilis; ex uno mortalis, ex alio inmortalis; nichilominus tamen unitas persone consistit in tam diversis substantiis. Pluralitas itaque substantiarum non facit alium et alium in humana natura, nec pluralitas personarum facit aliud et aliud in natura divina. Addamus autem et id quod consequens est, quoniam nec pluralitas substantiarum ibi dividit unitatem persone, nec pluralitas personarum hic dissolvit unitatem substantie.

CAPUT XI. Quod in discernendis personis opus est gemina consideratione, hoc est, ut sciamus quale quid sit et unde habeat esse Ecce invenimus non esse inpossibile plures personas esse in unitate substantie; consequens est autem ut queramus quomodo possit esse alteritas personarum sine alteritate substantiarum. In discernendis itaque personis opus est, ut arbitror, gemina consideratione, ut sciamus videlicet et quale quid sit et unde habeat esse. Una istarum considerationum versatur in discernenda rei qualitate; alia vero versatur in investiganda rei origine. Ad illam pertinet diligenter querere quid sibi sit, cum quibus commune, quid generale, quid speciale, quid denique proprium assignate nature. Ad

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

and we deny that there is a plurality of substances. See, in my opinion we have proved with a clear and sufficiently brief reason that we are not making a self-contradictory definition when we say that our God is one in substance and three in persons.

CHAPTER 10. That a plurality of substances does not dissolve the unity of a person in the human nature, and that the plurality of persons does not divide the unity of substance in the divine nature We should now carefully observe and compare these two considerations, that just as a plurality of substances not always divide the unity of a person, so does a plurality of persons not always divide the unity of a substance. For in the human nature the body is of one substance, whereas the soul is of another substance, although they are not more than one person; but in the divine nature one someone is one person and another someone is another person, although they are only one and the same substance. And we know and have already proved above that there is the highest similitude and equality in the plurality of divine persons, whereas there is much dissimilitude and great inequality in the plurality of substances in the human nature.10 What surprising it is if a true unity of substance remains in such an equality among the persons when we find unity and identity of the person in such a diversity of contrary qualities? For in the human nature one and the same person is on the one hand corporeal, on the other hand incorporeal; on one hand visible, on the other hand invisible; on the one hand mortal, on the other hand immortal; nevertheless, the person’s unity consists of so different substances. The plurality of substances does not create one and another person in the human nature, and accordingly, the plurality of persons does not create something and another thing in the divine nature. Let us add, what is consequent, that neither does a plurality of substances divide the unity of a person in the human nature, nor does the plurality of persons dissolve the unity of substance in the divine nature.

CHAPTER 11. That one must do two considerations to distinguish between persons so that we can know what it is and from where it has its being See, we have now found out that it is not impossible that there is a plurality of persons in a unity of substance; consequently, we must ask how there can be difference between the persons without difference in their substances. In order to distinguish between persons, I find it necessary to do two considerations, namely one, so that we can know what it is, and another, so that we can know from where it has its being. The one of these considerations is about distinguishing the quality of a thing, the other about investigating its origin. Regarding the first it must be investigated carefully what it is 10 III:21.23.

17 1

1 72

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

istam considerationem pertinet subtiliter indagare hoc ipsum quod est unde habeat esse, a semetipso vel aliunde; et si aliunde quam a se ipso, utrum modo isto vel illo, vel alio quocumque existendi modo. Illic itaque queritur rei ipsius diffinitio vel qualiscumque descriptio proprietatisque assignatio; hic vero nature ordo, rei ipsius origo et circa hujusmodi qualiscumque discretio. Illa itaque consideratio versatur circa modum essendi, ista vero versatur circa modum obtinendi. Illa circa rationem essentie, ista, ut sic dicam, circa rationem obtinentie. Ut taceam de ceteris, scio quod ‘obtinentia’ minus digne dicitur de divinis. Sed neminem scandalizet si verbis quibus valeo explico quod de divinis sentio. Illud autem gratanter accipio et pro magno munere habeo si quid a me quod verum sit minus proprie vel idonee dicitur, a quovis alio verbis idoneis et magis propriis explicatur. Obtinentiam dico hoc loco modum quo quisque obtinet quod substantialiter est vel naturaliter habet. Obtinendi siquidem modus in aliis et aliis est multum diversus, sive in accipiendo, sive in non accipiendo, sive in dandi vel accipiendi modo.

CAPUT XII. Quod sub nomine existentie possumus utramque considerationem subintelligere, et illam que ad rationem essentie, vel que pertinet ad rationem obtinentie Possumus autem sub nomine existentie utramque considerationem subintelligere, tam illam scilicet que pertinet ad rationem essentie, quam illam que pertinet ad rationem obtinentie; tam illam, inquam, in qua queritur quale quid sit de quolibet ente, quam illam in qua queritur unde habeat esse. Nomen existentie trahitur a verbo quod est exsistere. In verbo ‘sistere’ notari potest quod pertinet ad considerationem unam; similiter per adjunctam ‘ex’ prepositionem notari potest quod pertinet ad aliam. Per id quod dicitur aliquid sistere, primum removentur ea que non tam habent in se esse quam alicui inesse, non tam sistere, ut sic dicam, quam insistere, hoc est alicui subjecto inherere. Quod autem sistere dicitur, ad utrumque se habere videtur, et ad id quod aliquo modo et ad id quod nullo modo habet subsistere, tam ad id videlicet quod oportet quam ad id quod omnino non oportet subjectum esse. Unum enim est create, alterum increate nature. Nam quod increatum est, sic consistit in seipso ut nichil ei insit velud in subjecto. Quod igitur dicitur sistere, tam se habet ad rationem create quam increate essentie. Quod autem dicitur existere, subintelligitur non solum quod habeat esse, sed etiam alicunde, hoc est ex aliquo habeat esse. Hoc enim intelligi datur in verbo composito, ‘ex’ adjuncta sibi prepositione. Quid est enim existere, nisi ex aliquo sistere, hoc est, substantialiter ex aliquo esse? In uno itaque hoc verbo existere, vel sub uno nomine existentie datur subintelligi posse et illam considerationem que pertinet ad rei qualitatem, et illam que pertinet ad rei originem.

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

by itself, with what it is common, what is general, what is special, and finally what is characteristic to its nature. Regarding the second it must be investigated carefully, from where it has the being that it has, whether it is from itself or from elsewhere; and if it is from elsewhere, whether it receives its existence in one or the other way. So, in the first consideration is asked about the definition of a thing by itself and some description and determination of its property; in the other is asked about the order of nature, the origin of being itself and other distinctions of this kind. The first consideration deals with the way of being, the other deals with the way of obtaining being. The first is about the meaning of being, the other is about, so to speak, the meaning of obtaining. I do know that the word obtaining – putting aside the other words – is less fit for the divine. But no one should be offended when I use such words to explain what I think about the divine. I would only be grateful and appreciate it if anyone could explain a truth, which I have expressed less properly and suitably, with more proper and suitable words. Here I use the word obtaining about the way in which something obtains what it is in substance and nature. The way of obtaining is very different in one or another, whether it is in receiving or in not receiving, or in both the giving and receiving way.

CHAPTER 12. That we by the word existence can imply both considerations, that which pertains to its being as well as that which pertains to its source of being Now, by the word existence we can imply both considerations, namely that about the meaning of being and that about the meaning of obtaining; that is, I say, both the one in which we are asking about the being of something and the one in which we are asking about from where it has its being. The word existence is derived from the verb to exist, ‘sistere’. In this verb to exist, ‘sistere’, we note what pertains to the first consideration; similarly, by the addition of the preposition ‘ex’, from, we can note what pertains to the second consideration. By just saying that something is, ‘sistere’, we first remove those beings which do not have being by themselves but are being in something, that is, they do not be, ‘sistere’, rather they are being in something, ‘insistere’, that is, they are subject to something. What is said to be, ‘sistere’, seems to be both things, that is, both something which in some way has its being from something and something which in no way has its being from something, both something which must be subject to something, and something which absolutely must not be subject to something. The one belongs to a created nature and the other belongs to an uncreated nature. For what is uncreated exists by itself in such a way that nothing is subject in it. Thus, what is said to be, ‘sistere’, can mean both a created being and an uncreated being. But by what is said to exist, ‘exsistere’, is understood not only what has being, but also what has its being from somewhere else, that is, that it has being from something. This is the understanding that we get from the ‘ex’ which is the preposition in the compounded word. For what is to exist other than being, ‘sistere’,

17 3

1 74

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

CAPUT XIII. Quod generalis existentiarum variatio triplici distinguitur modo Exsistentia autem, ut ex antedictis potest colligi, tribus generaliter modis potest variari. Variari namque potest aut secundum solam rei qualitatem, aut secundum solam rei originem, aut secundum utriusque concursionem. Secundum solam rei qualitatem variatur existentia, quando pluribus personis est una eademque origo per omnia, singulis tamen singularis propriaque substantia. Plures namque substantie omnino non possunt esse sine differenti qualitate. Est autem hec talis variatio existentie secundum solam qualitatem, nichil varietatis habens secundum originem. Secundum solam vero originem est illa varietas existentie, quando pluribus personis est unum idemque et indifferens esse, inveniuntur tamen secundum originem mutuam adinvicem differentiam habere. Secundum originem vero differunt, si unus originem habet, alter origine caret, vel si originem habentium origo unius differt ab origine alterius. Hujusmodi ergo existentia variatur secundum originem solam, non secundum aliquam qualitatis differentiam. Tam secundum rei qualitatem quam secundum ejus originem variatur existentia, ubi singulis personis est substantia singularis et propria, et origo diversa. Ecce quod jam diximus, quia generalis existentiarum variatio triplici distinguitur modo, aut secundum solam existentis qualitatem, aut secundum solam ipsius originem, aut secundum utriusque alterationem.

CAPUT XIV. Juxta quid varietur personarum existentia in humana natura, et juxta quid varietur in natura angelica In humana pro certo natura, quam per experientiam novimus, personarum existentiam tam secundum personarum qualitatem quam secundum ipsarum originem variari videmus. Certe omni humane persone est qualitas singularis et propria, per quam absque omni ambiguitate differit a qualibet alia. Sic etiam singulis quibusque est origo propria, ab omnibus aliis diversa et singulari proprietate discreta. Nam aliud principium est isti, et aliud illi, quoniam alius est pater istius, et alius est pater illius. Et ubi unus pater est pluribus, alia tamen est paterne substantie decisio unde propagatus est unus, et alia paterne substantie decisio unde propagatus est alius. Videmus itaque, ut dictum est, in humanis personis existentiarum proprietatem variari quidem tam secundum singulorum qualitatem quam secundum ipsorum originem. In angelica autem natura nulla est propagatio, sed sola simplexque creatio. Est ergo singulorum simul et omnium unum solum indifferensque principium. Unum siquidem principium habent omnes solum Creatorem, et singuli et simul omnes secundum solam creationem. Sunt autem in angelica natura tot substantie quot persone, et iccirco oportet eas qualitate differre. Nam si nulla qualitate differrent, procul dubio plures substantie non essent. Variatur itaque existentiarum differentia

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

from, ‘ex’, something, that is, to be from something in substance? By this one verb to exist or by the word existence is given us to understand both the consideration about the quality of something and the consideration about the origin of something.

CHAPTER 13. That the existences in general can be different in three ways As it appears from the above, existence in general can be different in three ways. They can be different either in their quality alone, or in their origin alone, or in a coincidence of both. An existence is different in quality alone, when several persons have one and the same origin in all ways, but every single of them has his own substance. For there cannot be a plurality of substances where there is not a difference in quality. So, there is to be found such a difference between existences solely by their quality where there is no difference in their origin. But there is to be found a difference of existences solely by the origin, where there is one and the same identical being in all persons, but they are different from each other by their origin. For they are different in origin when one has an origin and another lacks an origin, or the origin of one is different from the origin of another among the existences which have origin. In this way the existences can be different by their origin alone and not by any difference of quality. However, existences can also be different by quality as well as by origin when every single person has its own individual substance but has different origin. Look, we have now said that existences in general can be different from each other in three ways, namely solely by the quality of the existence, or solely by its origin, or by a variation of both.

CHAPTER 14. How the existence of the persons varies in the human nature, and how it varies in the angelic nature In the human nature which we know from experience, we see that the existence of the persons is different both by quality of the persons and by their origin. It is sure that every human person has its own special quality by which it is different from anyone else. Every single has its own origin which is different from all the others and is different by its individual property. For they have different origins when they have different fathers. And when one is the father of more persons there is still difference in the allotment of the father’s substance from which they are propagated. So, we see, as it has been said, that the existences in the human nature in general can be different both by the quality of every single person and according to its origin. In the angelic nature, instead, there is no propagation but only one single creation. Therefore, every single of them, and at the same time all of them, has only one and the same beginning. They have all only the Creator as their beginning, and every single, and at the same time all of them, comes out of creation. So, there is in the angelic nature just as many substances as there are persons. For if they were not different in quality, there would undoubtedly not be a plurality of substances. Thus, in the

17 5

176

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

in angelica natura secundum solam qualitatem; in humana vero, uti jam dictum est, tam secundum qualitatem quam secundum originem.

CAPUT XV. Quod divinarum existentiarum differentiam oporteat querere circa originem solam In divinis autem, ut probatum est, personis nichil omnino dissimilitudinis, nichil est inequalitatis. Qualis est persona una, talis est et alia, talis nichilominus et tertia. Ubi itaque omnes sibi invicem consimiles et coequales sunt, secundum qualitatem quidem differre non possunt. Quibus enim est per omnia unum et idem et, sicut perspicua ratio probavit, summe simplex esse, nullo modo possunt aliqua qualitatis differentia ab invicem distare. Qui igitur nullatenus possunt juxta aliquam qualitatis proprietatem alternatim differre, relinquitur ut credantur juxta modum originis aliquam differentiam habere. Nam ubi nulla differentia est, nulla omnino pluralitas esse potest. Pluralitas itaque personarum convincit quod in illa Trinitate discretiva proprietas proprietatumque differentia deesse non possit. Sed quoniam identitas substantie omnem qualitatis differentiam penitus excludit, differentes personarum proprietates circa solam originem querere oportebit. Ut igitur breviter perstringamus quod diffusius diximus, patet quod in divina natura variatur existentiarum pluralitas secundum solam originem, in angelica autem natura secundum solam qualitatem, in humana vero natura tam secundum qualitatem quam secundum originem. Ecce jam invenimus quod superius querere proposuimus, quomodo videlicet possit esse alteritas personarum sine omni alteratione substantiarum. Invenimus namque quod plures ille in divinitate persone quamvis habeant unum et idem et per omnia indifferens esse, quod pertinet ad identitatem substantie, possunt tamen secundum originalem causam mutuam differentiam habere. Si unus extet a seipso, alter originem trahat ab alio, et si originem habentes differant in obtinendo modo. Unde autem alteratur proprietas personarum, inde procul dubio eque variatur proprietas existentiarum. In divina namque natura circa originem solam oportet querere tam personarum quam existentiarum differentiam.

CAPUT XVI. Quod in natura divina sit existentia que est pluribus communis, et est existentia que omnino est incommunicabilis Nomine existentie, ut ex superioribus patet, intelligitur quod habeat substantiale esse et ex aliqua proprietate. Proprium est mutorum habere substantiale esse ex sola

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

angelic nature there is difference between the existences in quality alone; in the human nature, instead, there is, as mentioned, difference both in quality and origin.

CHAPTER 15. That one should seek the difference of the divine existences in the origin alone As it has been proved already,11 there is absolutely no difference or inequality between the divine persons. What one person is, so is the second, and so is also the third. Where thus all are mutually similar and equal, they cannot be different in substance. For they have in all ways one and the same highest simple being, as the clear reason proved,12 and they cannot be different from each other in any way by some difference in substance. So, when they cannot in any way be different from each other by any special difference in quality, it remains that we must think that they can be different regarding their origin. For where there is no difference there can certainly not be any plurality. The plurality of persons in the Trinity shows that there must be some special property and a difference of properties there. Since the unity of substance totally excludes any difference in the quality, we will have to look for the different properties of the persons in the origin alone. So, in order to summarize what we have said more broadly, it is clear that the existences in the divine nature are different in their origin alone, in the angelic nature they are different in quality alone, and in the human nature they are different both in quality and in origin. See, how we have found what we planned to be looking for above, namely how there can be difference between persons without any difference of substance. For we have found that the persons in the divinity, even though they have one and the same, and in all ways identical being, which is the identity of substance, nevertheless they are different from each other regarding their origin. If one has his origin from himself, and another has his origin from another, and if they have an origin, they are different regarding their way of obtaining being. And that which makes the properties of the persons different will undoubtedly also make the properties of the existences different. So, in the divine nature we will seek the difference of the persons as well as of the existences in their origin alone.

CHAPTER 16. That in the divine nature there is an existence which is common to a plurality, and an existence which is totally incommunicable As it is clear from the above,13 the word existence indicates something which has substantial being out from some property. Thus, it is the property of animals to

11 III:21.23–24. 12 II:17, III:22. 13 The previous chapter.

17 7

1 78

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

propagatione; proprium est hominum habere substantiale esse ex propagatione, simul et ex procreatione. Nam caro propagatur, anima procreatur. Proprium est angelorum habere substantiale esse ex sola creatione; proprium est divine nature habere supersubstantiale esse, sed sine creatione et inchoatione. Existentia vero alia pluribus communis, alia autem omnino incommunicabilis. Nam, ut de illis taceam que non communicant nomen persone, commune est divine simul, et angelice, et humane nature habere rationale esse, sed tam angelice quam humane proprium est non esse ex se sed aliunde; solius autem divine nature non aliunde sed ex seipsa esse. Existentia vero incommunicabiblis est, que nonnisi uni alcui persone convenire potest. Sed, ut de ceteris taceamus, in divina procul dubio natura est existentia que est pluribus communis, et est ibi existentia que omnino est incommunicabilis. Existentiam demonstratum est superius substantiam significare, non tamen simpliciter, sed cum proprietatis alicujus denotatione, que pertineat ad considerationem originalis cause. Ad considerationem vero originalis cause pertinet non solum querere et invenire originem esse ubi est, immo etiam querere et invenire eam non esse ubi non est. Divine itaque existentie est habere substantiale, immo supersubstantiale esse sine creatione, sine inchoatione, quoniam proprium est omni substantie que vere nomen habet ex re, habere quidem esse compositum et accidentibus subesse; sola autem divina substantia, quod est supra naturam substantie, habet simplex esse, et incompositum, et nulli inherenti subjectum. Et iccirco recte dicitur habere non tam substantiale quam supersubstantiale esse. Sciendum vero est quod existentia designat substantiale esse, sed aliquando quod sit ex communi, aliquando quod sit ex incommunicabili proprietate. Communem autem existentiam dicimus, ubi intelligitur esse habens ex proprietate communi; incommunicabilem vero, ubi intelligitur esse habens ex proprietate incommunicabili. Tam vero est proprium divine substantie non esse ab alia aliqua substantia, sed solum a semetipsa, quam vere est proprium persone originem non habenti non esse ab alia aliqua persona. In uno autem intelligitur proprietas communis, in altero vero proprietas incommunicabilis. Commune est autem omnibus personis divinis esse substantia illa que non est ab alia aliqua substantia, sed a semetipsa. Substantia igitur divina quando dicitur vel intelligitur esse a semetipsa, idem est quod communis existentia. Ecce de existentia communi, nunc videamus de existentia incommunicabili.

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

have substantial being from propagation alone; it is the property of humans to have substantial being from propagation and at the same time from procreation. For the body is propagated and the soul is procreated. It is the property of the angels to have substantial being from creation alone; and it is the property of the divine nature to have super-substantial being, but without creation and beginning. One existence is common to several persons, whereas another existence is totally incommunicable. As I am leaving out of consideration those beings which cannot be called persons, I can say that it is common to both the divine, the angelic, and the human nature to have rational being, but it is specific to the angelic and the human nature to have being from another source than themselves; only the divine nature has being from itself and not from another source. Now, an existence which is incommunicable can only belong to one person alone. Passing over other natures, there is in the undoubtedly divine nature an existence which is common to several persons, and there is an existence which is totally incommunicable. We have shown above that existence means substance, however it is not simply called so, but by pointing out some property which has to do with its origin.14 Concerning the reason to its origin, however, it is not enough just to seek and find out that the origin is where it is, one must also seek and find out that it is not where it is not. So, only the divine existence has substantial, or rather super-substantial being without creation and without beginning, since it is common to all substances, that are rightly called so, that they have a composite being and are subject to accidents; only the divine substance is above the nature of substances and has that being which is simple, uncomposed, and not subject to any accidents. It is, therefore, rightly said to have not only substantial, but super-substantial being. One must know that an existence denotes a substantial being, but it is what it is soon by a common property, and soon it is what it is by an incommunicable property. Therefore, we are talking about a common existence when we understand that it has its being by a common property; but an incommunicable existence when we understand that it has its being by an incommunicable property. Just as special it is for the divine substance not to have its being from another substance, but only from itself, so it is truly special for one person not to have his origin of non-being in any other person. In the one case a common property is understood, in the second case an incommunicable property is understood. So, it is common to all the divine persons to have a substance which is not from any other substance but is from itself. And the divine substance is, when it is said and understood to be from itself, the same as a common existence. This was about a common existence, now let us look at an incommunicable existence.

14 IV:12–15.

17 9

1 80

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

CAPUT XVII. Qua ratione in divinitate possint esse incommunicabiles existentie; et quod tot sint quot persone Illud veraciter incommunicabile est quod commune quidem non est, sed nec esse potest. Considerandum itaque utrum vel quomodo in divinitate possit incommunicabilis existentia esse. Sed in illa absque dubio Trinitate oportet tot personales proprietates esse quot sunt persone. Proprietas autem personalis pro certo est incommunicabilis. Proprietas personalis est ex qua unusquisque habet esse is qui ipse est. Personalem proprietatem dicimus, per quam quilibet unus est ab omnibus aliis discretus. Nunquam enim personam dicimus nisi aliquem solum a ceteris omnibus singulari proprietate discretum. Si igitur personalem proprietatem communicabilem esse contendas, idem est ac si dicas unam personam posse esse duas. Sed si una dicitur gemina et gemina una, facile convincitur quod neutra earum sit ulla persona, quia neutra ab alia est singulari proprietate discreta. Hinc ergo aperte colligimus, quod superius jam diximus, quod proprietas personalis omnino sit incommunicabilis. In illa personarum Trinitate absque dubio est necesse personales, hoc est incommunicabiles, proprietates esse. Sed, sicut est probatum, eadem est differentia personarum et existentiarum. Si igitur proprietatibus incommunicabilibus differunt persone, utique incommunicabilibus differunt et existentie. Oportet autem ut sit incommunicabilis existentia cui est incommunicabilis differentia. Quot igitur in divinitate persone, tot incommunicabiles existentie.

CAPUT XVIII. Quod quantum ad divina nichil aliud est persona quam incommunicabilis existentia Et si diligentius consideremus, quantum ad divina nichil aliud ibi est persona quam incommunicabilis existentia. Ut superius probatum est, omnis proprietas personalis omnino est incommunicabilis. Et item eadem est in divinis differentia personarum et differentia existentiarum. Quid itaque ibi erit incommunicabilis existentia, nisi habens supersubstantiale esse ex proprietate personali? Et quid est persona divina, nisi habens divinum esse ex proprietate incommunicabili? Sed quid est divinum esse nisi supersubstantiale? Nam sive dicas divinum, sive supersubstantiale, sive summe simplex, sive omnipotens esse, vel quidlibet ejusmodi, ad idem videtur respicere. Tam itaque divina persona quam divina existentia habet divinum esse; tam ista quam illa habet esse supersubstantiale; utraque proprietatem personalem, utraque incommunicabilem. Vides quia totum quod dicitur de una, potest dici et de alia. Itaque, sicut dictum est, quantum ad divina nichil aliud est persona divina quam incommunicabilis existentia.

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 17. For what reason there can be incommunicable existences in the divinity; and that there are as many persons as there are existences What is not and cannot be common is truly incommunicable. Therefore, it should be investigated whether or how there can be an incommunicable existence in the divinity. Now, in the Trinity there must be as many persons as there are personal properties. And a personal property is totally incommunicable. For a personal property is that by which anyone is what he is. And we call that a personal property by which anyone is different from anyone else. Thus, we never call anyone a person if he is not different from anyone else by a special property. If you argue that a personal property is communicable it is the same as saying that one person can be two. But if one is said to be two and two are one, it is easy to understand that none of them is a person because none of them is different from the other by a special property. From this it is clearly understood, as we have said above already, that a personal property is totally incommunicable.15 So, in the Trinity of persons there must undoubtedly be personal, that is incommunicable, properties. But, as it has been proved, the difference between the persons is the same as the difference between the existences. If then the persons are different because of the incommunicable properties, then the existences are also clearly different by incommunicable properties. And the one who has an incommunicable difference must also be an incommunicable existence. So, there must be as many persons in the divinity as there are incommunicable existences.

CHAPTER 18. That in the divinity a person is nothing other than an incommunicable existence If we are looking at it more closely, then the person in the divinity is nothing other than an incommunicable existence. As it has been proved above, any personal property is totally incommunicable.16 Likewise, the difference between the persons in the divinity is the same as the difference between the existences. So, what else would an incommunicable existence be here than something that has super-substantial being by a personal property? And what is a divine person other than someone who has divine being by an incommunicable property? And what is the divine being other than a super-substantial being? For whether you say a divine, a super-substantial, a highest simple, or an omnipotent being or the like, it seems to mean the same thing. So, a divine person as well as a divine existence has divine being, both have a super-substantial being, both have a personal property, both are incommunicable. You see that all that can be said about the one can also be said about the other. Thus, as it has been said, in the divinity there is no difference between the divine person and an incommunicable existence.17

15 Cf. the precious chapter. 16 II:12. 17 Cf. the previous chapter.

181

1 82

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

CAPUT XIX. Quod possunt esse plures existentie, et quod consequens est, plures persone, ubi non est nisi unitas substantie Quoniam ex antedictis tenemus quod in divinitate possunt esse plures existentie, nunc est considerandum si possunt ibi esse, salva unitate substantie. Si hoc usus haberet, dici utique posset, sicut ab eo quod est esse essentia, sic ab eo quod est sistere sistentia. Rides fortassis qui hec audis vel legis, sed malo te ridere quam que dicere velim parum intelligere et incaute deridere. Si itaque sistentiam dicere usus haberet, quamadmodum essentia, simpliciter rei esse significaret. Nunc itaque sub nomine existentie aliquid amplius oportet intelligere. Sicut enim subsistentia recte dicitur ex eo quod alicui subsistat, sic existentia ex eo recte dici potest quod ex aliquo esse habeat. Existentia igitur significat rei esse, et hoc ipsum ex aliqua proprietate. Quis autem non videat quod sit differens existentia unum esse omnipotentem ex proprietate ista, et alium esse omnipotentem ex proprietate alia? Quamvis enim utrisque sit unus modus essendi, non tamen utrisque et idem modus existendi. Quis, queso, dicat inpossibile seu etiam incredibile, si duo vel tres dicantur eque potentes et eque sapientes esse? Vel quid dicitur inpossibile seu etiam incredibile, si hoc ipsum quod communiter sunt, unus dicatur habere ex proprietate una, et alius habere dicatur ex alia? Non itaque videtur inpossibile vel incredibile plures existentias, et quod consequens est, plures personas esse in divinitate. Quos si equipotentes dicimus, quod manifesta ratione convincimus, fateri oportebit quia si omnipotentiam habet una, omnipotentiam habebit et alia. Constat autem apud omnes theologos indubitabili ratione quod in vera divinitate sit summe simplex esse. Erit ergo necesse ut idem ipsum sit ibi omnipotentiam esse quod omnipotentiam habere, et quod non aliud aliquid sit omnipotentia quam divina substantia. Omnipotentia autem, ut alias probavimus, non potest esse nisi una; ergo nec divina substantia potest esse nisi una. Ecce ergo ex eo quod est cunctis probabile, et ex eo quod secundum theologos est necesse, colligitur quod querimus, quia possunt esse plures existentie, ubi non est nisi unitas substantie. Ut autem propter subtiliores adhuc aliquid subtilius loquamur, in rebus naturalibus et creatis diversum est esse et id quod est; in rebus autem increatis, idem ipsum est esse et id quod est. Constat itaque divinam substantiam nichil aliud esse quam substantiale, immo supersubstantiale esse. Substantiale in quantum tale quid est quod consistit in seipso, supersubstantiale in quantum ei nichil inest velud in subjecto. Timentes itaque ubi non est timor, recte timerent fateri personas secundum substantiam dici,

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 19. That there can be a plurality of existences and, consequently, a plurality of persons where there is nothing but a unity of substance Since we on basis of the above can maintain that there can be a plurality of existences in the divinity,18 it should be considered now whether they can be there without harming the unity of the substance. If it was common usage, then just as the word essence comes from what can be, so the word ‘sistence’ would come from existence.19 Maybe you who hear or read this will laugh, but I would rather that you laugh at what I want to say than you do not understand it and laugh imprudently. If then it was common usage to say ‘sistence’ just as essence, it would simply mean the being of something. But now we should understand something more under the word existence. Just as we rightly call that to subsist which is under something, so that is rightly said to exist which has its being from something. So, existence means the being of something and that being out from some property. Who cannot see that there is difference between an existence which is almighty out from one property, and an existence which is almighty out from another property? Even though both have the same way of being, they do not have the same way of existence. Who will say, I ask, that it is impossible or even incredible that two or three can be equally mighty or wise? And would it be impossible or even incredible if that which they have in common is had by one out from one property and by the other out from another property? So, it does not seem impossible or incredible that there can be a plurality of existences, and thus a plurality of persons, in the divinity. If we call them equally mighty, which we have proved clearly,20 it must also be admitted that if the one is almighty, also the other will be almighty. Now, all theologians fully agree that there is the highest simple being in the true divinity. So, it is necessary that being almighty here means the same as having omnipotence, and that omnipotence is nothing other than the divine substance. But, as we have proved elsewhere,21 there can only be one omnipotence; consequently, the divine substance can only be one. See, from this, which is found likely by everyone and is necessary according to the theologians, we can understand what we have investigated, namely that there can be a plurality of existences where there is only one substance. Now, for the sake of the more subtle minds we will add something more subtle, namely that in the natural and created things there is ‘difference between the being and the thing that is’;22 however, the being and the thing that is are the same in the uncreated things. So, it is certain that the divine substance is the same as the substantial, indeed the super-substantial being. It is substantial insofar it consists of itself, and it is super-substantial insofar there is nothing in it which is subject to anything. Those who fear, ‘where there

18 IV:17–18. 19 Essentia from esse, and sistentia from sistere. 20 III:10. 21 I:25; II:15, and V:8. 22 Boëthius, De Hepdomadibus (PL 44:1311bc): ‘Diversum est, esse, et id quod est’.

183

1 84

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

si persona simpliciter substantiale esse significaret, nec aliquid consignificaret. Significat autem habentem substantiale esse ex aliqua singulari proprietate. Ideo ergo fidenter fatemur personas in divinitate secundum substantiam dictas et substantiam significare, et plures ibi personas, non plures substantias esse, quia sunt ibi plures habentes unum et indifferens esse ex differenti proprietate. Unitas itaque ibi est juxta modum essendi, pluralitas juxta modum existendi. Unitas essentie quia unum et indifferens esse, plures persone quia plures existentie. Pie querentibus ista, ut puto, debent sufficere. Nam ut ad plenum in tanta profunditate sibi satisfiat in hac vita, nemo debet expetere vel expectare. Notandum autem de persona atque existentia quomodo se habeat una cum altera. Quod enim dubitatur ex alterutra, vicissim probatur ex alia. Nam quod in divinitate oporteat plures esse, facilius probatur ex notione persone; sed quod possint plures esse in unitate substantie, levius convincitur ex consideratione existentie.

CAPUT XX. Quomodo intelligendum sit, vel quomodo convenire possit, quod quidam dicunt tres substantias et unam essentiam, quidam tres subsistentias et unam substantiam, alii autem tres personas et substantiam vel essentiam unam Forte a me aliquis expectat audire quomodo oporteat intelligere, vel quomodo possit convenire, quod quidam dicunt tres substantias et unam essentiam; quidam tres subsistentias et unam substantiam; alii autem tres personas et substantiam vel essentiam unam. Multum dissentire et omnino contrarium videtur quod Latini unam in divinitate substantiam, Greci tres esse fatentur. Sed absit ab eis diversa credere, et hos vel illos in fide errare! In hac ergo verborum varietate intelligenda est veritas una, quamvis apud diversos sit nominum acceptio diversa. Quod persone ab aliis substantie, ab aliis subsistentie dicuntur, ad idem respicere videtur. Certum est quod respectu eorum que eis solent inesse, dicuntur substantie vel subsistentie quibus videntur subesse. Scimus autem quod ubique terrarum Christi Ecclesia psallit quia in personis est proprietas et in essentia unitas. Propter ejusmodi proprietates que personis divinis inesse videntur, quibus ab invicem distinguuntur, juxta nonnullam eorum similitudinem que veraciter sibi inherentibus subsunt, quamvis minus proprie, substantie vel subsistentie dici possunt. Nam tres illos in Trinitate, sive dicantur persone, sive substantie, sive subsistentie, nichil aliud oportet intelligere quam habentes substantiale esse sub discretiva et differenti proprietate. Iccirco autem nominibus alludendo dixi sub discretiva, non ex discretiva proprietate, ut intelligas

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

is no fear’,23 can, therefore, rightly be afraid of maintaining that the persons are defined of substances if person simply means a substantial being and did not have any further meaning. For it means having substantial being out from some individual property. We maintain, therefore, faithfully that the persons in the divinity are defined as substance and indicate the substance, and that there is a plurality of persons but not a plurality of substances because there are here several who own one and the same being out from different properties. There is thus unity in the way of being but plurality in the way of existence. There is unity of essence because there is one and the same being, but there is a plurality of persons because there are several existences. For those who are seeking piously, this should be enough, I think. For no one should demand or expect to be satisfied fully in this life regarding the knowledge about such a deep truth. It should be noted how the person and the existence are related to one another. For what is drawn into doubt about the one of these two, is in turn demonstrated by the other. So, that there must be plurality in the divinity is most easily demonstrated by the understanding of the person; but that there can be a plurality in the one substance is most easily proved by considering the existence.

CHAPTER 20. How it should be understood or how it can match together that some say three substances and one essence, and some say three subsistences and one substance, and others again say three persons and one substance or essence Maybe someone expects to hear from me how one should understand, and how it can match together, that some say three substances and one essence; and some say three subsistences and one substance; but others again say three persons and one substance or essence. It seems to be very different and absolutely contradictory when the Latins maintain that there is one substance in the divinity whereas the Greeks maintain that there are three. But far be it that we should believe something different from them, or that the ones or the others are erring in the faith! In this variety of words, one should understand one truth even if the meaning of the words is different with different people. That the persons are called substances by some and subsistences by others seems to be the same. It is certain that substance or subsistence are called so regarding what is in them and regarding what they seem to be under. But we know that everywhere in the world the Church of Christ sings that ‘there is property in the person and unity in the essence’.24 It is by means of the properties which seem to be in the divine persons that they are different from each other, and it is because of a certain likeness which is truly subordinate that they are called, however less properly, substances or subsistences. For these three in the Trinity, whether they are called persons, substances, or subsistences, should not be understood as anything other than

23 Ps 52:6 and Ps 13:5. 24 The Prefation to the Trinity in Missale Romanum.

185

1 86

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

unde illi in Trinitate dicantur substantie vel subsistentie, quamvis inproprie. Dicimus quidem proprietates personis inesse; sed illarum inesse, si bene perpendimus, non dat subsistere sed existere. Et iccirco persone rectius dicuntur existentie quam substantie vel subsistentie. Qui vero sola divina attendunt, nullam proprietatem inveniunt qua divina essentia differat ab alia aliqua divina, quia non est in divinitate nisi una sola, sicut proprietatibus ibi differt una persona ab alia. Non igitur juxta hanc considerationem inveniunt quomodo illam unitatem substantiam dicant, et iccirco eam simpliciter et satis proprie essentiam vocant. Et pluralitatem illam ubi proprietates insunt, quamvis minus proprie, subsistantias nominant. Et quidem in illa essentia increata proprietas nulla invenitur qua differat ab alia increata, ubi, uti jam dictum est, non est nisi una sola; invenitur tamen pro certo proprietas in ea, per quam differat a qualibet creata essentia. Hoc quidam attendentes non solum essentiam sed etiam substantiam nominant. Nomen vero subsistentie a propria significatione ad personarum designationem transsumunt. Ut autem inter substantiam et subsistentiam juxta horum acceptionem breviter distinguam, per substantiam intellige quod superius dixi existentiam communem, per subsistentiam quod dixi existentiam incommunicabilem. Qui igitur ex his que superius posui, novit quomodo in unitate substantie possint esse plures existentie, novit nichilominus quomodo ibi possint esse plures subsistentie. Non me latet subtiliori ratione ista discuti posse, sed puto hec simplicioribus et qualibus deservio debere sufficere. Illud autem notandum firmiterque retinendum ut tres illos in Trinitate sive substantias sive subsistentias sive personas nominare audias, secundum substantiam dictum intelligas. Nam in his omnibus quantum ad rei veritatem nil aliud oportet intelligere quam tres habentes rationale esse ex differenti et personali proprietate. Constat enim quod ubi rationalis substantia non est, rationale esse haberi non potest. Convenit autem omni persone habere rationale esse ex incommunicabili proprietate. Non dicam apud Grecos qui, ut scribit Augustinus, aliter accipiunt substantiam quam nos, sed apud Latinos puto nullum nomen inveniri posse quod possit melius aptari pluralitati divine quam nomen persone. Et quidem fideli animo nichil magis autenticum esse debet, quam quod in ore omnium sonat et catholica auctoritas confirmat.

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

three having substantial being under a distinct and different property. I said by a play of words precisely under and not by a distinct property so that you should understand why they are called substances or subsistences in the Trinity, however less properly. So, we say that the properties are in the persons; but that they inhere in them, if we consider it rightly, does not make them ‘subsisting’, but existing. And therefore, the persons are more rightly called existences than substances or subsistences. Those who consider only the divine do not find any property by which the divine essence is different from another divine essence because there is only one in the divinity, but the persons are different from each other by their properties. By this consideration they do not understand why this unity can be called a substance and, therefore, they simply and properly enough call it an essence. And the plurality in which the properties are, they call, however less properly, substances. However, in this uncreated essence there is not found any property which is different from anything uncreated since there is only one uncreated essence, as mentioned;25 but certainly, there is a property in this essence by which it is different from any created essence. Taking this into account they call it not only an essence but a substance. And they transfer the word subsistence from its own significance to designate the persons. Now, in order to distinguish briefly between substance and subsistence according to their perception, one must understand by substance what I called the common existence; and by subsistence what I have called the incommunicable existence.26 So, he who has learnt from what I have argued above, how there can be more existences in one substance, will no less know how there can be more subsistences there. I am not unaware that this can be discussed with more subtility, but I think that this must suffice to satisfy the more simpleminded and those I want to serve. Now it should be noted and firmly maintained that you shall understand the three in the Trinity according to the substance, whether you hear them called substance, subsistence, or persons.27 For the truth to be understood behind all these words is no other than three who have rational being from a special and personal property. It is certain that where there is no rational substance, one cannot have a rational being. So, any person must have a rational being from an incommunicable property. I do not say among the Greeks, who, as Augustine writes, have another understanding of substance than we have, but among the Latins I do not think there can be found a better word which can be applied to the divine plurality than person.28 And for a faithful mind nothing should be more valid than what sounds in all ears and is confirmed by the universal authority.29

25 III:22. 26 IV:17. 27 IV:6. 28 Augustin, De Trinitate 7,4,7 (CCSL 50:255). 29 IV:5.

187

1 88

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

CAPUT XXI. Diffinitio persone non cujuscumque sed solius create Ecce quod superius proposuimus, prout potuimus, executi sumus, quid videlicet ad invicem differant significatio substantie et significatio persone, et qua ratione plures persone consistere possint in unitate substantie. Consideremus nunc itaque, si placet, utrum data illa de persona diffinitio Boecii possit convenire omni et soli. Nam si inventa fuerit generaliter et sufficienter data, frustra procul dubio queritur alia. Diffinitio autem, ut perfecta sit, oportet ut totum et solum diffiniende rei esse comprehendat. Nam ut ex re nomen habeat, oportet ut se usque ad diffiniti fines extendat nec excedat, ut conveniat omni et soli, et possit in seipsa converti. Est autem diffinitio Boecii de persona, quod sit rationalis nature individua substantia. Ut itaque generalis sit atque perfecta, oportet ut rationalis nature omnis substantia individua sit persona, et e converso omnis persona sit rationalis nature individua substantia. Quero itaque de substantia illa divina, cum sit nonnisi una sola, quero, inquam, utrum sit individua. Nam quod illa substantia sit quedam personarum Trinitas, absque dubio creditur, et ut superius probatum est, manifeste convincitur. Si igitur divina substantia dicenda est individua, aliqua rationalis nature individua substantia erit aliquid quod non est persona. Nam Trinitas nec persona est, nec persona recte dici potest. Juxta hoc itaque hec diffinitio persone non videtur soli persone posse convenire. Si vero illa substantia non est dicenda individua, constat pro certo quia aliqua persona est, quia divina, que non est individua substantia. Diffinitio itaque ista persone non potest omni convenire. Sive ergo esse sive non esse individua substantia divina dicatur, dicta illa diffinitio generalis non esse deprehenditur.

CAPUT XXII. Descriptio persone non cusjuscumque sed solius increate Procul dubio quod infinitum est, digne diffiniri non potest; poterit tamen fortassis ad aliquem divine cognitionis provectum provenire si studuerimus qualem

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 21. Definition of a person, not any person, but only the created one See what we have decided above to do, we have now carried out so well as we could, namely how the meanings of the words substance and person are different, and how there can be more persons in one substance.30 Therefore, let us now consider, if this is agreeable, whether the definition of a person given by Boëthius can match all persons and the single person. For if we found that it matched generally and sufficiently, it would undoubtedly be in vain to seek any other definition. In order that a definition will be perfect it has to match all the things and the single thing which it defines. So, in order for the definition to match its name, it has to go to the limits of what is defined, but not transgress them, so that it can match the whole and the single thing, and that it can be conversed.31 Now, it is Boëthius’ definition of a person that it is ‘an individual substance of rational nature’.32 In order for this definition to be general and perfect, any individual substance of rational nature must be a person, and, conversely, any person must be an individual substance of rational nature. So, I ask if the divine substance, which can only be one, I ask, I say, whether it is individual.33 For we believe without a doubt, just as we are convinced about it, as it was proved above, that this substance consists of a Trinity of persons.34 So, if the divine substance must be called individual, there will be an individual substance of rational nature which is not a person. For the Trinity is not a person and cannot rightly be called a person. According to this, this definition of a person seems not to match one person alone. But if we cannot call this substance individual, then it is certain that there is some person who is not an individual substance because this person is divine. Thus, this definition cannot match any person. So, whether one says about the divine substance that it is individual or not, the mentioned definition does not match in general.

CHAPTER 22. Description of a person, not any person, but only the uncreated one Without a doubt, one cannot define properly what is infinite; but maybe we can reach a certain knowledge about the divine if we eagerly seek – as the Lord will grant us – to

30 IV:4.19. 31 Cf. Boëthius, In catagorias Aristotelis (PL 64:165a): ‘Illae enim certae diffinitiones sunt quae convertuntur, ut si dicas, Quid est homo? animal rationale mortale, verum est; quid est animal rationale mortale? homo, hoc quoque verum est’. 32 De persona et duabus naturis 3 (PL 64:1343d): ‘Persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia’. 33 Richard follows Abélard, Theologia christiana 3 (PL 178:1258c): ‘Persona est’, inquit, ‘naturae rationabilis individua substantia’. Quae quidem nequaquam diffinitio decenda est trium personarum in Divinitate superius a nobis distinctarum, hoc est Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Alioquin cum sint tres personae essent tres individuae rationalis substantiae’. 34 III:8.22.

189

1 90

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

Dominus dederit descriptionem persone divine assignare. Juxta illam itaque existentie significationem quam superius exposuimus, non inconvenienter fortassis dicere poterimus quod persona divina sit divine nature incommunicabilis existentia. Nomine existentie, ut ex superibus palam est, intelligere significatur quod substantiale quid sit et alicunde, quod quidem commune est omni substantie. Est autem existentia generalis que sit omnibus substantiis communis; et est generalis solis et omnibus rationabilibus communis; et est specialis solis angelicis vel solis humanis substantiis communis. Sed hujusmodi omnes excluduntur in eo quod existentie significatio restringitur et divine nature additione determinatur. Item in divina natura invenire poterimus, si diligenter consideremus, et existentiam pluribus communem, et existentiam soli uni persone convenientem et eo ipso incommunicabilem. Sed que est pluribus communis, excluditur in eo quod incommunicabilis dicitur. Non inconvenienter itaque dicere possumus, ut credimus, de divina persona, quod sit nature divine incommunicabilis existentia.

CAPUT XXIII. Descriptio persone que videtur soli et omni posse convenire Et si dividuum dicamus tam illud quod per plures personas quam illud quod per plures substantias potest distribui, et a pluribus communiter et a singulis integraliter possideri, illud vero dicamus individuum quod nonnisi soli uni possit aptari, si, inquam, juxta hunc modum dividuum et individuum velimus accipere, poterimus fortassis non inconvenienter dicere quoniam quam verum est quod quelibet creata persona est rationalis nature individua substantia, tam verum est quod quelibet persona est rationalis nature individua existentia. Sed ut manifestius fiat quod dicimus, idipsum diligentius discutiamus. Diximus superius nomine existentie significari substantiale esse. Significat absque dubio juxta superius datam determinationem non illud unde dicitur substantia, sed quod est in ea principale et convenit omni substantie. Est autem ei principale non quod habet subesse et quod aliquid habet ei velud subjecto inherere, sed quod tale quid est quod consistat in seipso et nulli hereat velud in subjecto. Hoc utique commune est omni substantie humane, angelice, divine. Recte hoc sane in substantia creata dignius et principalius dicitur in quo divine similitudini magis appropinquatur. Nam in ipso quod accidentibus subest, a divina similitudine degenerare videtur. Ab eo itaque quod omni substantie principale est, rectius essentia quam substantia dici potest. Notatur autem, ut dictum est, nomine existentie et quod habeat esse in seipso, et quod habeat esse ex aliquo. Et hoc ipsum omni substantie constat esse commune.

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

describe the divine person. So, according to the meaning of existence, which we have set forth above,35 it may not be improper to say that the divine person is an incommunicable existence of divine nature. As it is clear from the above,36 the word existence gives the understanding of the being and the origin of a substance, and it can be used about any substance. There is, however, a general existence which is common to all substances; and there is a general existence which is common only to all rational substances; and there is an existence which is common only to all angelic and human existences. But all these existences are excluded when the meaning of existence is confined and defined by the addition of divine nature. Likewise, if we look after carefully, in the divine nature we can find an existence which is common to more persons, as well as an existence which only fits to one person alone and, therefore, is incommunicable. But an existence which is common to more persons is excluded when we talk about an incommunicable existence. So, it is not improper to say, as we believe, about the divine person, that it is an incommunicable existence of divine nature.37

CHAPTER 23. Description of a person which can match both one person and all persons If we call that divisible which can be divided among more persons or among substances and can be owned entirely by more persons in common as well as by each of them, and if we call that individual which can only be owned by one single person – if, I say, we will understand the words divisible and individual in this way, it might not be inconvenient to say that just as it is true that any created person is an individual substance of rational nature, so it is true that any person is an individual existence of rational nature. But now to make this point clearer we will discuss it more carefully. We have said above that the word existence indicates a substantial being.38 But according to the definition above, the word existence undoubtedly does not indicate that which the word substance means, but it indicates the most principal in the substance and that which is common to any substance. Now, the principal in a substance is that it is not dependent on something or contains anything which is subject to something else, but that it is so that it exists by itself and is not subject to anything. This is common to any substance, human, angelic, and divine. It is right to say that the worthiest and principal in the created substance is that by which it comes most closely to likeness to the divine substance. For when something is just subject to accidents it seems to degenerate from the divine likeness. So, out from what is principal in any substance it can be more correct to call it essence than substance. It should be noted, however, as we have said, that the word existence both indicates to have being by itself and to accept being from someone else.39 And it is certain that this 35 IV:16. 36 Ibid. 37 Thomas Aquinas follows Richard’s definition of the divine person in Summa Theologica I, q. 29, art. 3, ad 4 (Ottawa: 1953), 1, 195b and q. 30, art. 4,2, 202a. 38 IV:12.16. 39 IV:16.

191

1 92

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

Nam omne quod est, vel est a semetipso vel ab alio aliquo. Cetera que sunt in eadem descriptione satis ex superioribus patent, et nova expositione non indigent, cur videlicet non quelibet existentia sed sola individua vel incommunicabilis dicatur persona.

CAPUT XXIV. Item descriptio persone que videtur soli et omni posse convenire Fortassis erit planius et ad intelligendum expeditius, si dicimus quod persona sit existens per se solum juxta singularem quemdam rationalis existentie modum. Quomodo quod dicitur existens accipiendum sit, satis ex superioribus innotuit. Ideo autem per se solum adjungimus, quia persona nunquam recte dicitur nisi unus aliquis solus a ceteris omnibus singulari proprietate discretus. Sed existere per se solum commune est omnibus individuis tam animatis quam inanimatis. Nunquam autem dicitur persona nisi de rationabili substantia aliqua. Ideo ad id quod premissum est, existens per se solum, adjungitur: secundum singularem quemdam rationalis existentie modum. Modus autem rationalis existentie alius est communis pluribus naturis, alius est communis ejusdem nature pluribus substantiis, alius ejusdem substantie pluribus personis. Sed personalis proprietas singularem rationalis existentie modum requirit sine quo persona nunquam subsistit. Ut ergo existens per se solum persona esse possit, singularem aliquem rationalis existentie modum habere oportebit. Quomodo autem singula accipienda sint, satis ex superioribus patet, et iccirco in ipsis explanandis inmorari non oportet. Hec, sicut pro modulo nostro potuimus, de persone significatione, variatione, discriptione digessimus. Si quis autem nomen individui, nomen persone vel existentie aliter quam assignavimus accipit, et secundum acceptionem non nostram sed suam argumentando procedit, et ratiocinationis sue exitum ad inconveniens deducit, sciat quoniam adversum me nichil agit. Et si putat agere, seipsum illudit et nescit.

CAPUT XXV. Quod proprium sit divine nature personarum pluralitatem habere in unitate substantie; et eo ipso habet ab aliis differre Proprium est divine nature personarum pluralitatem habere in unitate substantie. E contra vero proprium est humane nature substantiarum pluralitatem habere in unitate persone. Nam quod humana persona in simplicitate substantie quandoque invenitur, non de nature ipsius conditione sed de conditionis ipsius corruptione fore deprehenditur. Hinc est facile perpendere de proprietate divina atque humana

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

is common to all substances. For anything that is, has being either from itself or from something else. Other things in the description of the person seem to be sufficiently clear from the above and does not demand a new exposition, namely why only the individual and incommunicable existence, and not any existence whatsoever, is called a person.

CHAPTER 24. Likewise, a description of a person which can match both one person and all persons Maybe it will be more simple and easier to understand, if we say that a person exists by itself as a definite individual form of a rational existence. How to understand the word existence is sufficiently clear from the above.40 But we add ‘by itself ’ because one can only call someone a person who is one alone and different from any other by a special property. But existing by itself is common to all individuals with or without a soul. However, we use only the word person about a rational substance. This is the reason why we after ‘exists by itself ’ add ‘as a definite individual form of a rational existence’. However, the form of the rational existence varies, depending on whether it is common to more natures, whether it is common to more substances in the same nature, or whether it is common to more persons in the same substance. But a personal property requires an individual form of a rational existence, and without this there is no person. So, in order that a person exists by itself, it must have an individual form of a rational existence. How any of these concepts are to be understood, it is sufficiently clear from the above41 and we should not take time to explain them. In this which we, according to our poor ability, have been able to say about the person, we have firstly talked about the meaning of the word, hereafter about the differences between the persons, and finally we have described the person. If anyone understands the word individual, person, or existence differently than we have exposed them here, and who argues according to his own understanding and not ours, and if he with his arguments arrives at improper conclusions, he must know that he cannot hold anything against me. And if he thinks that he can, he will deceive himself and does not know it.

CHAPTER 25. That it is special for the divine nature to have a plurality of persons in a unity of substance; and thus, it is different from other natures It is special for the divine nature to have a plurality of persons in a unity of substance. In opposition, it is special to the human nature to have a plurality of substances in a unity of person. For when the human nature sometimes is found as one in substance it does not say anything about its nature but rather about the destruction of its nature. From this it is easy to see how the divine and the human property seem to

40 IV:12.16. 41 IV:14–19.

193

194

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

quomodo una alteri videatur opposita. His itaque duabus quasi ex opposito altrinsecus respicientibus et velud per contrarium sibi invicem respondentibus, angelica proprietas velud media interponitur et altrinseca similitudine hinc inde ambabus conjungitur, commune habens cum divina nunquam habere substantiarum pluralitatem in unitate persone, commune habens cum humana nunquam habere personarum pluralitatem in unitate substantie. Ecce quomodo angelica proprietas velud proportionali quadam ratione contrariorum dissidentiam sua interpositione connectit et alternantium dissonantiam in unam armoniam componit. Hec tamen dicens scio nonnullos de angelis aliter sentire. Nam sunt usque hodie qui putant eos corpora habere. Sed si instantius quererent, subtilius indagarent, indaginis hujus veritatem, ut credimus, citius invenirent. Quis sanum sapiens inficiari audebit quod rationalis nature proprietas tanto sublimior, tanto dignior sit, quanto ad incomposite et summe simplicis nature similitudinem vicinius accedit? Quis autem neget creaturam incorpoream et ab omni corporee concretionis adhesione alienam, ad divinam simplicitatem proprietatis sue similitudine magis appropinquare, familiarius inherere quam eam naturam que ex corporea et incorporea substantia componitur, et ad unius persone singularitatem ex duabus essentiis conjungitur? Absque dubio optimum genus creature quod consistit in sola et simplici puritate spiritalis nature. Quod ergo est in operatione humana humani corporis effigies sine capite, hoc esse videtur in operatione divina, universitatis fabrica sine optimo genere creature. Ad hoc illud accedit quod superior ratio de angelica proprietate disseruit. Quis tibi, queso, videtur ordo decentior, quis summe Sapientis dispositioni convenientior, si in illa naturarum trinitate, divine videlicet, angelice et humane, dicantur duarum proprietates tertie omnino per contrarium opposite, nulla ibi media interveniente, an vero si dicantur quod duas extremas tertia interveniat, et altrinseca similitudine alternatim conjuncta dictam contrarietatem in unam armoniam componat? Sed si hoc nostre demonstrationis documentum sit adhuc alicui forte suspectum, attendat quid sibi persuadere debeat evangelicum testimonium. Nonne ex Evangelio innotuit quod Dominus ab uno homine legionem demonum ejecit? Continet autem una legio sex milia sex centa sexaginta sex. Si tot ab uno homine ejecti sunt, tot in eo ante ejectionem fuerunt. Si demones corpora habent, ubi, queso, in eo fuere? In spiritu an in corpore? Constat autem quia omne corpus longitudinem, latitudinem, altitudinem, locales videlicet dimensiones, habet, et eo ipso sine locali capacitate subsistere non valet; qualem quidem spiritus omnino non habet. Ergo non in spiritu sed in corpore fuerunt. Sed quomodo vel in qua hominis parte tot corpora esse potuerunt? Sed dicis fortassis quod angelici spiritus tam boni quam mali subtilia corpora habent. Sed quantumcumque subtilia, duo ejusdem presertim qualitatis corpora unum eumdemque locum occupare non valent. Cujus ergo, queso, exiguitatis

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

be in opposition to each other. Between these two natures, which are, as it were, in opposition to each other and respond to each other in contrasts, the angelic nature is placed as an intermediate and is connected to both of them by its likeness to both, as it never has a plurality of substances in a unity of person just like the divine nature, and never has a plurality of persons in a unity of substance just like the human nature. See how the angelic nature by its interposition reconciles the opposite concepts as a kind of a mean proportional and composes their dissonances into a harmony. When I say this, I do know that some hold another opinion about angels. There are those, also today, who think that angels have a body. But if they were searching more urgently and were investigating more penetratingly, they would quickly discover, I believe, the truth about this. What sensible human being will dare to deny about the rational nature, that the more sublime and worthy it is, the more it resembles the incomposite and highest simple nature? And who will deny that an incorporeal creature, which is not dependent of being united to something corporeal, with its nature is more like the divine nature than it is related to that nature which is composed of corporeal and incorporeal substance and is joined together of two beings into one person? Undoubtedly, the best creature is the one which consists of the one and simple, pure, spiritual nature. Therefore, what in the human world is the picture of the human body without the head, would be like the work of God, the universe, without the most noble part of the creature. To this comes what we have discussed above about the angelic nature. Which order do you find the most beautiful and which one seems to be the most befitting to the highest Wisdom: that there in the trinity of natures, the divine, the angelic, and the human, is said to exist two natures which are totally opposite to the third one without having anything mediating between them – or: that between the two extreme natures, a third one is said to come in between which is combined with both of them and composes the mentioned oppositions into a harmony? If anyone is still in doubt about the evidence of our demonstration, he should let himself be persuaded by the evangelic testimony. Does the Gospel not teach that the Lord expelled a legion of demons from one man?42 One legion contains six thousand, six hundred and sixty-six men. If that many have been expelled from one human being, then there were just as many in him before the expulsion. If demons have bodies, where, I ask, were they in him? In the spirit or in the body? It is a fact that a body has a length, width, and height, that is, a body has spatial dimensions and cannot exist without a spatial capacity; something spiritual does not have this at all. So, the demons were not in the spirit but in the body. But how and in what part of the body could there be so many bodies?43 Now you may say that angelic spirit, good or bad, have very subtle bodies. But however subtle their bodies might be, two bodies of the same size, cannot occupy one and the same place. How small

42 Mk 5:9, Lk 8:30. 43 Richard agrees with Hugh of Saint-Victor on this question: ‘Non enim in materia praejacente creata est spiritualis natura’, De Sacramentis 1,5,7 (PL 176:249d). Augustine finds that angels have a body: ‘Sed fateor excedere vires intentionis meae utrum angeli manente spiritali sui corporis qualitate per hanc occultis operantes …’, De Trinitate 3,1,5 (CCSL 50:149).

195

1 96

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q uart u s

putas angelicum corpus esse, si credas vel solam hominis pellem corpori detractam tot angelica corpora posse comprehendere? Sed ecce hoc dum per excessum diximus, a nostro proposito longius evagati sumus! Puto autem pio et simplici animo debere et posse sufficere ea que dicta sunt de proposita questione, quomodo videlicet nil dissonat rationi, quod jubemur unum Deum in Trinitate et Trinitatem in unitate venerari.

b o o k fo u r – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

do you think, I ask, that the angelic bodies must be, so that just the skin, taken from the human body, can contain so many angelic bodies? But see how far, by this digression, we have moved from our topic! I think that a pious and simple soul must and can be satisfied with what has been said to the posed question, namely how there is nothing in discord to the reason in our commitment to venerate ‘One God in the Trinity and the Trinity in a unity’.44

44 Quicumque.

197

INCIPIUNT CAPITULA QUINTI LIBRI I.

Quoniam jam constat de divine substantie unitate et personarum pluralitate, constat et de concordi unitatis et pluralitatis adinvicem habitudine, superest de personarum proprietatibus querere. II. Quod jocundissima personarum germanitas non possit deesse in summa felicitate, nec ordinatissima proprietatum habitudo in summa pulcritudine. III. Quod exigit rerum natura ut sit aliqua persona que sit a semetipsa et non ab alia aliqua. IV. Quod non possit esse nisi una sola persona que sit a semetipsa. V. Quod due in divinitate persone habeant aliunde quam a semetipsis esse juxta illum existendi modum qui est ab eterno, nec tamen a semetipso. VI. Quod processio persone de persona alia sit tantum inmediata, alia tantum mediata, alia mediata simul et inmediata. VII. De processione tantum inmediata; et quod oporteat in divinitate esse personam que sit ab una sola. VIII. De processione que est mediata simul et inmediata; et quod oporteat esse in divinitate personam que sit a gemina. IX. Quod processio que sit ad aliquam personam tantummodo mediata, non possit esse in divina natura. X. Quod in divinitate non possit esse plus quam una que sit ab una tantummodo persona, nec nisi una sola que esse non habeat nisi ex gemina. XI. Quod oportet ut in divinitate sit persona a qua non sit alia aliqua, cum tamen eadem non sit a semetipsa. XII. Quod non possit esse nisi una sola in divinitate persona a qua non sit alia aliqua. XIII. Quod oportet ut in divinitate talis persona existat que ab alia procedat et de se procedentem habeat. XIV. Quod in divina natura non possit esse nisi una sola persona que et de alia procedat et de se procedentem habeat. XV. Quod in divina natura non possit esse quarta persona. XVI. De veri amoris plenitudine, et que circa illum consideratur proprietatum distinctione. XVII. Cui conveniat in Trinitate persone solius gratuiti amoris plenitudinem possidere. XVIII. Cui conveniat in Trinitate persone solius debiti amoris plenitudinem habere. XIX. Cui proprie proprium sit in Trinitate persone tam gratuiti quam debiti amoris plenitudinem optinere. XX. Unde ratio manifesta convincit quod quarta in divinitate persona locum habere non possit. XXI. Ex novissime posita speculatione quam multa possimus colligere.

HERE BEGIN THE HEADINGS OF BOOK FIVE 1. Since we are certain now about the unity of the divine substance and the plurality of the persons, and likewise about the mutual harmony of the unity and the plurality, it remains to investigate the properties of the persons. 2. That the happiest familiarity between the persons cannot be missing in the highest happiness, and that the most well-ordered relationship between the properties cannot be missing in the highest beauty. 3. That the nature of things requires that there be a person who must exist of himself and not from anyone else. 4. That there can only be one person who exists from himself. 5. That there are two persons in the divinity who have their being from somewhere else than themselves in accordance with the mode of existence which is from eternity but not from itself. 6. That one person proceeds from another person only immediately, only mediately, or both mediately and immediately at the same time. 7. About the procession which is only immediate; and that there must be a person who exists from one alone in the divinity. 8. About the procession which is both immediate and mediate at the same time; and that there must be a person who proceeds from two persons in the divinity. 9. That the procession of a person in a solely mediate way cannot be found in the divine nature. 10. That there cannot be more than one person in the divinity who only exists from one person alone, and only one person alone who can have his being only from two persons. 11. That there must be a person in the divinity from whom no other person proceeds, even though the same person is not from himself. 12. That there can only be one person alone in the divinity from whom no other person proceeds. 13. That there must exist a person in the divinity who proceeds from another person and has another person proceeding from him. 14. That there can only be one person in the divine nature who proceeds from another person and has a person proceeding from him. 15. That there cannot be a fourth person in the divine nature. 16. About the fullness of the true love and about the distinction between the properties seen with respect to this. 17. For which person in the Trinity it is proper to own alone the fullness of the gracious love. 18. For which person in the Trinity it is proper to own alone the fullness of the owed love. 19. For which person in the Trinity it is the special property to have the fullness of both the gracious and the owed love. 20. How the clear reason demonstrates that there is no room for a fourth person in the divinity. 21. How many things we can understand on basis of the last consideration.

200

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – C ap i t u l a q u i n t i li b ri

XXII. Quod dicitur plenitudo amoris gratuiti esse in solo dando, plenitudo debiti in solo accipiendo, non sic oportet intelligere quasi sit opus gratie et non potius operatio nature. XXIII. Quod quantum ad substantiam dilectionis in omnibus est amor summus et unus, quamvis in singulis proprietatum discretione distinctus. XXIV. Quod quantum ad integritatem perfectionis nulla sit differentia amoris vel dignitatis. XXV. Que sint quibus personis communia, vel que sint singularum propria; et que sint que restant adhuc in istis querenda.

H e ad i n g s o f b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

22. That the fullness of the gracious love consists in giving alone, and that the fullness of the owed love consists in receiving alone, is not to be understood as a work of grace as much as it is the work of nature. 23. That regarding the substance of love in all the persons there is the highest and one love, even though it is different in each of the persons by a distinct property. 24. That in the total perfection there cannot be any difference in the love and dignity. 25. What is common to the persons, and what is special to each of them; and what remains to be investigated about them.

201

LIBER QUINTUS

CAPUT I. Quoniam jam constat de divine substantie unitate et personarum pluralitate, constat et de concordi unitatis et pluralitatis adinvicem habitudine, superest de personarum proprietatibus querere Quemadmodum alias jam diximus, convenit omni persone habere rationale esse ex incommunicabili proprietate. Persona autem divina supra id adhuc amplius exigit ut merito divina dici possit. Proprietas autem divine persone exigit divinum esse. Divinum esse idem quod supersubstantiale, idem quod summe simplex esse. Summe simplex esse cui idem ipsum est esse quod sapere. Hoc autem solummodo habet substantia divina, et iccirco merito dicitur supersubstantialis essentia. Et quoniam in divina natura non est nisi unum solum summe simplex et indifferens esse, ideo ibi confitemur unitatem substantie. Sed quam constat de unitate substantie, tam veraciter constat de personarum pluralitate. Ubi autem nulla est alteritas, non potest esse pluralitas. Sed nec alteritas esse potest, ubi nulla differentia est. Quomodo ergo pluralitas potest convenire cum indifferenti esse? Sed ubi non est diversum esse, potest esse differens et discretum existere. Ubi enim plures habent indifferens esse ex differenti origine, sic servant unitatem substantie ut tamen non desint plures existentie. Sicut autem superius monstravimus, nichil aliud est persona divina quam incommunicabilis existentia. Notandum itaque quod quelibet existentia divina, si vel unum aliquid invenitur habere incommunicabile, ex eo utique solo deprehenditur atque convincitur persona esse. Nam etiamsi plura habeat incommunicabilia, sufficit tamen unum solum ad comprobandum quod sit persona. Nam ex eo constat quod sit aliquis solus ab aliis omnibus ex illa proprietate discretus. Hec de his que superius dicta sunt, quasi recapitulando perstrinximus, ut ad ea que adhuc inquirenda restant, quanto exercitatiores, tanto promtiores accedamus. Sed quoniam constat de divine substantie unitate, constat de personarum pluralitate, constat de concordi pluralitatis et unitatis mutua habitudine, locus postulat nunc de singularum personarum proprietatibus querere, et singulorum propria singulis assignare. Nam quod tres illi in Trinitate sive dicantur persone, sive existentie, sive alio quolibet nomine, quod tres illi, inquam, quibusdam proprietatibus

BOOK FIVE

CHAPTER 1. Since we are certain now about the unity of the divine substance and the plurality of the persons, and likewise about the mutual harmony of the unity and the plurality, it remains to investigate the properties of the persons As we have already said elsewhere, every person has a rational being by an incommunicable property.1 However, a divine person requires something more in order rightly to be called divine. Now, the property of a divine person requires divine being. Divine being is the same as super-substantial being and the same as the highest simple being. And in the highest simple being to be is the same as to understand. Only the divine substance owns this being and therefore it is rightly called super-substantial being. Since there is only one, the highest simple and indifferent being in the divine nature, we can confess that here is the unity of substance. But what is certain about the unity of substance is just as certain about the plurality of the persons. However, where there is no difference, there cannot be any plurality. And there can be no plurality where there is no difference. How can, therefore, plurality go along with an indifferent being? However, where there is no difference in being there can exist difference and distinction. Namely, when more persons own the same indifferent being from different sources, they preserve the unity of substance even though there are also more existences. As we have shown above, a divine person is nothing other than an incommunicable existence.2 It should be noted, therefore, that if any divine existence owns just one incommunicable property, it is understood and proved from this that the existence is a person. Also, even if it had more incommunicable properties, only one is enough to prove that it is a person. For it shows that someone is different from all others by this property. Now, we have looked at this as a recapitulation of the previous exposition so that the more prepared we are, the more ready we will be to proceed to what remains to be investigated. Since the unity of the divine substance is certain, and likewise the plurality of persons, as well as the mutual harmony of the unity of the plurality, it is now the place to investigate the properties of each of the persons and to ascribe to each of them their special property. We know already that the three ones in the Trinity, whether they are called persons, existences, or something else, that these three, I say, are

1 IV:6.16–17.20. 2 IV:16–18.22.

2 04

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

distinguantur jam novimus, et quod eas circa solam originalis cause differentiam querere debeamus agnovimus. Sed que quibus sigillatim conveniant, necdum ratiocinando apprehendimus. Studeamus itaque nunc in his, sicut et in aliis ante jam dictis, ut quod tenemus ex fide, detur nobis ratione apprehendere, et demonstrative certidudinis attestatione firmare.

CAPUT II. Quod jocundissima personarum germanitas non possit deesse in summa felicitate, nec ordinatissima proprietatum habitudo in summa pulcritudine Primo itaque illud dicamus, quod naturali quodam instinctu omnes in commune agnovimus, et usu continuato cotidianis experimentis probamus. Patet profecto quod personarum pluralitas quanto germanior, tanto est conjunctior; et quanto conjunctior, tanto et jocundior. Quis autem attestari audeat vel estimare presumat quod in illa summe felicitatis plenitudine desit quod magis jocundum agnoscitur, illud insit quod minus jocundum nullatenus dubitatur? Si itaque unaqueque persona a seipsa esse dicitur, talis utique pluralitas nulla sibi affinitate conjungitur, nulla mutuo germanitate copulatur. Quis autem credere possit vel affirmare audebit quod illa summe unitatis pluralitas tam sit ex uno conjuncta, ex alio tam longinqua et adinvicem velud omnino peregrina ut ex ea parte qua unum sunt, sit summa indifferentia, ex ea vero parte qua in plures secernitur, ab omni sit conjunctione aliena? Que tibi, queso, pluralitas pulcrior, que tibi, queso, convenientior videtur: an illa que ordinatissima quadam proprietatum varietate distinguitur et decentissimo quodam proportionalitatum modo miranda ratione contexitur, an illa que nulla differentiarum concordia vel concordiali differentia vicissim sibi connectitur, nulla alteritatum ordinatione perornatur? Neminem puto estimare quod magis pulcrum est summe pulcritudini posse deesse, et quod minus pulcrum est ipsi inesse. Credi itaque oportet quod nec jocundissima personarum germanitas potest deesse in summa felicitate, nec ordinatissima proprietatum varietas in summa pulcritudine. Sed ne hec quam proposuimus ratio alicui forte probabilis magis quam necessaria videatur, hoc ipsum quod dicimus altiori adhuc ratione investigetur.

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

differentiated by properties,3 and we know also that we must investigate them solely by the difference in their origins.4 But we have not yet discovered by reasoning what belongs to each of them. Let us therefore now study this, just as we have studied the other things earlier, so that it can be given to us by the reason to understand and by certain evidence to prove what we maintain by faith.

CHAPTER 2. That the happiest familiarity between the persons cannot be missing in the highest happiness, and that the most well-ordered relationship between the properties cannot be missing in the highest beauty Let us first say what we all know by an instinct of nature, as it were, and what we prove by our daily experiences. It is obvious that the more familial the plurality of persons is, the closer it will be; and the closer it is, the happier it will be. Now, who will like to confirm or to maintain that what is regarded to be the most happy can be missing in the fullness of the highest happiness, and what is undoubtedly less happy can be in it?5 So, if each person is said to have its being from itself, then such a plurality would not be gathered by any affinity with the others and would not be connected with each other by any mutual kinship. Who can believe or dare to maintain that this plurality in the highest unity in one way is so connected in itself but in another way is so deeply separated and foreign to itself, that on the one hand, where they are one, they are to the highest degree indistinguishable, and on the other hand, where they are divided into a plurality, it is foreign to any conjunction. Which plurality, I ask, seems to be the most beautiful to you, which one, I ask, seems to be the most appropriate to you: is it the one which is the most well-ordered in the difference between the properties, and which is united in an admirable way by the most appropriate relationship between the proportions, or is it the one which is combined by no harmony between the differences or by any harmonious mutual difference, and which cannot be ornamented by any order in the division? I do not think that anyone can maintain that the most beautiful can be missing in the highest beauty and what is less beautiful can be found there. So, we must believe that the happiest relationship between the persons cannot be missing in the highest happiness, and that the most well-ordered difference between the properties cannot be missing in the highest beauty. But now, in order that the argument in our presentation should not be found more probable than necessary by anyone, let us now investigate more closely what we have said.

3 IV:20. 4 IV:15. 5 Cf. III:2.

205

206

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

CAPUT III. Quod exigit rerum natura ut sit aliqua persona que sit a semetipsa et non ab alia aliqua Quod in primordio hujus operis dictum est de substantia, idem ipsum hoc loco absque ulla hesitatione dici potest de persona. Utrobique namque eadem ratio occurrit et de similibus simile judicium sumit. Dictum est ibi de substantia, dicatur hic de persona quod oportet ut aliqua existat que sit a semetipsa et non ab alia aliqua. Alioquin in una divinitate essent absque dubio persone infinite. Nam si ista esset ab illa et illa ab alia, et juxta hunc progressionis modum quelibet una esset ab alia aliqua, hujus concatenationis productio absque dubio in infinitum procederet et ejusmodi productionis terminus nullus occurreret. Sicque fieret ut rerum series et ordo, qui sine principio esse non valet, principium non haberet; principium, inquam, non tam temporis quam originis vel cujuscumque auctoris. Sed in his et ejusmodi aliis est ipsa veritas adeo manifesta et ratio perspicua ut omnino non egeant probatione aliqua. Nam quod nullus facit quod facere non valet, quod nullus potest dare quod ipse non habet, quod quicquid esse cepit, aliquando non fuit, quod quicquid est, quod aliquando non fuit, hoc ipsum ex tempore esse cepit, quod nulla compositio sine componente, nulla partitio sine distribuente, quod sit quo nichil est majus, quod sit quo nichil est melius, patet omnibus intellectum habentibus et ratione utentibus. Hec et hujusmodi qui audit, si sensum verborum percipit, statim adquiescit, nec est unde dubitare possit. Ne igitur contra conscientiam nostram divinarum personarum numerum in infinitum extendamus, oportet procul dubio ut concedamus quod aliqua persona ex semetipsa existat et aliunde omnino originem non trahat, personam autem esse non de alia aliqua persona quam de semetipsa. Consequenter querere oportet utrum sit communicabilis an incommunicabilis existentia, hoc est si sit solius unius ex semetipsa personam esse, an hoc ipsum possit esse pluribus commune.

CAPUT IV. Quod non possit esse nisi una sola persona que sit a semetipsa Quoniam diligentiorem considerationem locus iste expostulat et nos ad sublimiorem intelligentiam vocat, edificantium more oportet nos ibi quasi altius fodere, et in profundo certitudinis solido ratiocinationis nostre fundamentum locare, ubi necesse est operis nostri structuram ad secretioris intelligentie sublimiora consurgere. Inde ergo incipiendum est unde a nemine dubitari potest.

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 3. That the nature of things requires that there be a person who must exist of himself and not from anyone else What has been said about the substance in the beginning of this work,6 the same can be said without hesitation in this place about the person. For in both appears the same logic, and the similar reasons lead to similar conclusions. What was said above about the substance can be said here about the person, namely that there must be one who is from himself and not from someone else. Otherwise there would undoubtedly be an infinite number of persons in the one divinity. For if one person is from another, and this one again was from another, and in the same way any other was from another, this chain reaction would undoubtedly continue infinitely, and there would be no end of this production. Thus, the sequence and order of things, which must have a beginning, would not have a beginning; I am not talking about a beginning in time, but about an origin or an originator. In these and other similar considerations the truth is so clear, and the reason is so obvious that any proof is not at all necessary. For that nobody can do what he is not able to do, that nobody can give what he does not have,7 that something, which begins to be, was once nothing, that something, which is and once was nothing, has begun to exist in time,8 that there is nothing composite without a component, and that there is no division without a distributor, that there is something which is the highest of all, and there is something which is the highest good – all this is obvious for all who have brains and can use their reason. The one who hears this and the like, will – if he perceives the meaning of the words – immediately be satisfied, and there is nothing to be in doubt about. In order to avoid to extend – against our conscience – the number of the divine persons into the infinite, we must undoubtedly confess that some person must exist by himself and does absolutely not have his beginning from somewhere else, and that there must be a person who does not exist from any other person than himself. Consequently, it must be investigated whether it is a communicable or an incommunicable existence, that is, whether it belongs to one person alone to have being from himself, or whether this can be common to more persons.

CHAPTER 4. That there can only be one person who exists from himself Since this matter requires a more diligent consideration and summons us to a more sublime insight, we must, just like the builders, dig more deeply, as it were, and lay the foundation of our thought in the solid ground of certainty, here where it is necessary to raise the edifice of our work to higher insight into more secret things. Therefore, we should begin with that which no one can doubt about.

6 I:11. 7 Cf. I:12. 8 Cf. II:9.

207

208

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

Constat sane quia omne quod est, aut compositum esse habet, aut simplex. Constat nichilominus quoniam omne quod habetur, aut secundum participationem, aut secundum plenitudinem habetur. Aliud est ex pluribus et diversis unum aliquid componere, atque aliud quod unum est in plura dividere et per multos pro arbitrio distribuere. Sed, sicut jam diximus, nec compositio sine componente, nec partitio est sine distribuente. Videamus ergo si illud quod veraciter deprehenditur a semetipso esse, possit habere compositum esse. Constat autem quia omnis compositio compositore eget; et quod sine beneficio compositoris esse non valet, procul dubio idipsum quod est a semetipso non habet. Patet ergo quia quod a semetipso est, compositum esse habere non potest. Quod ergo omni origine et auctore caret, summe simplex esse habere oportet. Cui vero est summe simplex esse, oportet ut idem ei sit esse quod posse, sapientem quod potentem esse. Ecce de ejus esse habemus quod querimus, nunc de posse videamus. Queramus itaque de ipsius posse, utrum ei sit an secundum plenitudinem an secundum participationem. Sed ubi est participatio, simul et distributio. Nam nec participatio sine distributione, nec distributio sine distributore. Qui igitur possibilitatem nonnisi secundum participationem habere valet, procul dubio distributoris officio indiget. Constat itaque de eo qui est a semetipso, quoniam si posse accepit participando, ipsum suum posse est ei ex alterius beneficio. Sed si ex alterius beneficio est ejus posse, profecto et esse, quoniam, sicut jam probatum est, non ipsi aliud et aliud est esse et posse. Itaque aut utrumque a semetipso habet, aut utrumque a semetipso non habet. Hinc ergo colligitur quod is qui a semetipso est, posse ex potentie participatione habere non potest. Quod igitur non potest habere secundum participationem, habet secundum plenitudinem. Sed ubi est plenitudo potentie, ibi omne posse; persone igitur cui est idem esse quod posse, si ex semetipsa est ei suum esse, ex semetipsa est ei et suum posse. Sed suum posse est omne posse. Ergo ex ipsa est omne posse. Si ex illa est omne posse, ex illa est omne esse, ex illa omne existere. Ex illa itaque est omne quod est, ex illa omnis essentia, omnis existentia, omnis persona, omnis, inquam, persona humana, angelica, divina. Si ergo ceterarum quelibet ex ipsa esse habet, constat pro certo quia sola ipsa principio caret; constat nichilominus quia nulla alia potest nisi ex ipsa esse, ex qua est omne posse. Vides certe quia ejusmodi existentia omnino est incommunicabilis, nec potest esse pluribus communis.

CAPUT V. Quod due in divinitate persone habeant aliunde quam a semetipsis esse juxta illum existendi modum qui est ab eterno nec tamen a semetipso Habemus jam pro certo quod esse personam ex semetipsa omnino sit incommunicabalis existentia. Possumus ergo inde manifeste colligere quod non sit incommunicabilis existentia esse personam aliunde potius quam a se. Alioquin in divinitate

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

It is certain that all that exists either has a composite or a simple being.9 It is no less certain that everything, that one has, is possessed either by participation or in its fullness. It is one thing to gather more and different parts into one unity and another thing to divide a unity into more parts willingly. But, as we have said already, there is nothing composite without a component, and there is no division without a distributor.10 Therefore, let us see whether that being, which surely is from itself, can have a composite being. It is certain that all composition requires a component; what cannot be without the goodwill of a composer can undoubtedly not have from itself all what it is. So, that which is from itself cannot have a composite being. And that which exists without any origin and originator must have the highest simple being. Thus, in that which has the highest simple being, being and power and likewise wisdom and power must be the same. See, we have found what we looked for about his being, let us now inquire his power. Let us inquire whether he has power in its fullness or by participation. Now, where there is participation, there is also distribution. For there is no participation without distribution, or distribution without a distributor. Therefore, he who has power by participation needs undoubtedly the help of the distributor. It is thus certain that if he who exists from himself received power by participation, then he has his power by the goodwill of another. But if he has his power by the goodwill of another, then the same must be said about his being since, as we have shown already, being and power is the same in him.11 He must have both things from himself or he must not have both things from himself. From this it is seen that he who is from himself cannot have power by participation in the power. Now, he who has what he has not by participation, he will have it in its fullness. But where there is power in its fullness, there is all power; so, the person for whom being and power is the same, if his being is from himself, then his power is also from himself. But his power is all power. Therefore, all power is from himself. If all power is from himself, then all being is from himself, and from him is all existence. So, all that is will be from him, from him is all being, all existence, all persons, all, I say, persons – human, angelic, and divine. If then all other will have their being from him, it is most certain that he alone is without a beginning; and it is just as certain that when all other only can have their being from him, then all power comes from him. I am sure that you see that such an existence is totally incommunicable and cannot be common to more persons.

CHAPTER 5. That there are two persons in the divinity who have their being from somewhere else than themselves in accordance with the mode of existence which is from eternity but not from itself Now we know for certain that being a person, who is from himself, is a totally incommunicable existence. Therefore, we can clearly understand, that being a person

9 Cf. I:23. 10 Cf. the previous chapter. 11 I:21.

209

21 0

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

non essent, sed nec esse possent plus quam due persone. Proprie proprium itaque est uni persone ex semetipsa esse, ceteris autem commune ex semetipsis non esse. Vides ergo quod incommunicabilis existentia communicabilem, immo communem producit, et quomodo ista ex illa procedit et originem trahit. Ecce illum existendi modum jam indubitata demonstratione collegimus, de quo in hujus operis exordio locuti sumus, ubi probabili potius quam necessaria ratione usi sumus. Ut enim ibi prelocuti sumus, triplex est existendi modus: unus qui est ab eterno et a semetipso; alius qui nec est a semetipso nec ab eterno; et inter hos medius, qui est ab eterno nec tamen a semetipso. Sicut enim superius probatum est, tote tres persone sibi sunt coequales et coeterne. Sicut ergo ab eterno est existentia illa que a semetipsa existit, sic et ab eterno esse habet que ab eadem procedit. Ille itaque existendi modus qui est communis personis duabus, habet esse ab eterno nec tamen a semetipso. Vide ergo ceterorum proprietates quantum sunt diverse, immo omnino contrarie. Harum proprietatum contrarietatem tertius existendi modus proportionali quadam ratione connectit, et ad mutuam corcordiam sua mediatione duo extrema componit, habens commune cum uno esse ab eterno, commune habens cum alio non esse a semetipso. Habemus jam proprie proprium persone unius, habemus quid sit commune duabus; sed que sint singularum propria ratiocinando necdum apprehendimus.

CAPUT VI. Quod processio persone de persona alia sit tantum inmediata, alia tantum mediata, alia mediata simul et inmediata Ex rebus quas per experientiam novimus, admonemur quid circa inexperta et divina querere debeamus: Invisibilia enim Dei per ea que facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Ubi ad alta conscendere volumus, scala quidem uti solemus, nos qui homines sumus et volare non possumus. Rerum ergo visibilium similitudine pro scala utamur, ut que in semetipsis per speciem videre non valemus, ex ejusmodi specula et velud per speculum videre mereamur. In rebus humanis videmus quod persona de persona procedit, et ejusmodi processio tribus procul dubio modis fieri contingit. Procedit namque persona de persona, quandoque quidem tantummodo inmediate, quandoque vero tantummodo mediate, quandoque autem mediate

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

who is from another rather than from himself, is not an incommunicable existence. Otherwise there would not, and could not, be more than two persons in the divinity. It is thus a special property for one person to be from himself, whereas it is common to the other not to be from themselves. You see that the incommunicable existence produces a communicable, yes, a common existence, and how this existence proceeds from it and has its origin in the first mentioned. See, we have now by an undoubted demonstration understood this mode of existence which we have talked about in the beginning of this work where we used more probable than necessary reasons. For then we said that here are three modes of existence: one which is from eternity and itself; another which is neither from itself nor from eternity; and in between the two one which is from eternity but not from itself.12 Likewise, we have proved above,13 that all three persons are equal and eternal together.14 Likewise, just as the existence which exists from itself is from eternity, so it also has from eternity a being which proceeds from it. So, the mode of existence, which is common for the two other persons, is to have being from eternity but not from themselves. See, how different, indeed quite opposite, the properties of all other existences are in relation to the first mentioned. But the third mode of existence unites in a way these properties as a mean proportional, and by its mediation it composes the two extremes into a mutual harmony, having common to the one to have being from eternity and having common to the other not to have being from itself.15 Now we know that property which is special to the first person, and we know what is common for the two other persons, but we have not yet understood by reasoning what is special to each of them.

CHAPTER 6. That one person proceeds from another person only immediately, only mediately, or both mediately and immediately at the same time It is by the things we know through experience that we learn what we should investigate about the non-experienced and divine: For the invisible things of God are seen by the mind through the created things [Rom 1:20]. When we want to ascend, we usually use a ladder, we who are humans and cannot fly. Let us then use the likeness of the visible things as a ladder so that we, from this watchtower and like in a mirror,16 can attain to see the things which we are not able to see in themselves. In the human world we see that a person proceeds from another person; and such a procession can undoubtedly happen in three ways. For a person proceeds sometimes only in an immediate way, sometimes only in a mediate way, and sometimes only in a mediate and immediate 12 Cf. I:6. 13 III:21. 14 Coequales et coeterne, cf. Quicumque. 15 Only the Father has being ‘a se et ab eterno’, whereas all created persons have being ‘nec a se nec ab eterno’; the Son and the Holy Spirit make in this system a mean position as they are ‘ab eterno’ but not ‘a se’. 16 Cf. 1 Cor 13:12.

211

212

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

simul et inmediate. Tam Iacob quam Ysaac de substantia Abrahe processit, sed unius processio mediata tantum, alterius autem tantummodo inmediata fuit. Nam, mediante Ysaac, Iacob de Abrahe lumbis exivit; de substantia Ade Eva, Seth, Enos processere; sed prima processio ex his fuit tantummodo inmediata, media vero mediata simul et inmediata. Nam Seth quidem processit de substantia Ade, inmediate utique in quantum fuit de proprio semine, mediate vero in quantum fuit de semine Eve. Ecce in humana natura quomodo personalis processio triplici distinguitur modo. Et quamvis ista videatur multum peregrina ab illa singulari et superexcellenti natura, est tamen similitudo nonnulla, utpote in ea que est ad similitudinem illius facta. Oportet itaque ex hac natura ad illam contemplationis speculam erigere, et juxta dictam considerationem quid ibi sit vel quid ibi non sit, proportione similitudinis vel dissimilitudinis cum summa diligentia investigare. Sed si tres ejusmodi existentias ibi esse dicamus, quales jam superius distinximus, excepta ea que a semetipsa esse deprehenditur, procul dubio in illam naturam quaternarium personarum numerum introducere videmur. Quapropter querendum est diligenter quenam ex his proprietatibus veraciter ibi sunt, si omnes ibi simul esse non possunt.

CAPUT VII. De processione tantum inmediata; et quod oporteat in divinitate esse personam que sit ab una sola Illud autem constat certissime, et de quo nullo modo possumus dubitare, quod ab illa principalissima existentia necesse sit unam aliquam inmediate procedere; alioquin oportebit eam solam remanere. Constat namque quod ceterarum nulla omnino esse valeat que non ab illa inmediate vel mediate procedat. Ubi autem non est inmediata, non potest esse processio mediata, sicut nec illa que pariter est mediata et inmediata. Sed nil prohibet ut inmediata quandoque sit, etiam ubi mediatam deesse contingit. Processio inmediata consistit in personarum dualitate, mediata vero nunquam sine personarum trinitate. In inmediata siquidem processione oportet ut sit tam illa que aliam producit, quam illa que ex ipsa procedit. Mediata processio, exceptis illis personis in quibus incipit et desinit, habet et tertiam in qua mediatio consistit. Naturaliter autem prior est dualitas quam trinitas; nam illa potest esse sine ista, ista vero nunquam sine illa. Naturaliter itaque et illa processio prior est, que potest subsistere in personarum dualitate, quam illa que non potest esse sine personarum trinitate. Sed in illa personarum pluralitate et vera eternitate nichil ibi aliud precedit, nichil ibi alteri succedit, et eo ipso nichil ibi tempore prius, nichil ibi tempore posterius. Sed quod non potest esse prius temporaliter, potest esse prius causaliter, et eo

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

way at the same time. Both Jacob and Isaac proceeded from the substance of Abraham, but the procession of the one was only mediate whereas the other was only immediate. For Jacob proceeded from the loins of Abraham through the mediation of Isaac;17 Eve, Seth, and Enoch proceeded from the substance of Adam; but the first procession of these was only immediate, the other was both mediate and immediate. For Seth proceeded from the substance of Adam immediately insofar as he was of Adam’s seed, but mediately insofar as he was from the seed of Eve. See, how the procession of persons in the human nature can be divided into three ways. And even though the human nature seems to be very estranged from this unique and superexcellent nature, they are, however, not without likeness to one another since the one is created for the likeness to the other.18 We shall, therefore, ascend from our nature to the watchtower of contemplation19 and, in accordance with the mentioned consideration, investigate most diligently what there is and what there is not in the divine nature according to the likeness or the unlikeness to the human nature. But if we say that there are the three mentioned existences in the divine nature, which we have distinguished above, besides the existence which has its being from itself, then we undoubtedly seem to introduce four persons into that nature. Therefore, we must investigate carefully which of these properties that truly are in the divine nature if they cannot all be there at the same time.

CHAPTER 7. About the procession which is only immediate; and that there must be a person who exists from one alone in the divinity It is now most certain, and we can in no way doubt about this, that there necessarily must be an existence which proceeds immediately from the very first existence; otherwise it had to remain alone. For it is certain that absolutely none of the other persons can exist if they do not proceed from the first person, immediately or mediately. If there cannot be any immediate procession there cannot be any mediate procession, and there cannot be any procession which is both mediate and immediate. But nothing prevents that there may be an immediate procession also where there is no mediate procession. An immediate procession consists in a duality of persons, but a mediate procession is never found without a trinity of persons. For in the immediate procession there must be both the one who produces the other and the one who proceeds from the first mentioned. But the mediate procession requires, in addition to the two persons whom it begins and ends with, a third person as a mediation. Naturally, a duality is prior to a trinity; for the first can be without the other, but the other can never be without the first one. So, naturally is also the procession, which happens in a duality, prior to the procession which can only occur in a trinity of persons.

17 Isaac was the son of Abraham, Jacob was the son of Isaac and thus Abraham’s grandson, cf. Gen 21:3 and Gen 25:25. 18 Cf. Gen 1:26. 19 Cf. Prologue and I:10.

213

21 4

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

ipso naturaliter. Sicut enim longe superius diximus, perfectio persone unius exigit utique consortium alterius. Et ita fit ut una sit causa alterius. Ubi est enim plenitudo divinitatis, ibi et plenitudo bonitatis, et quod consequens est, plenitudo caritatis. Plenitudo autem caritatis exigit ut unus alterum sicut seipsum diligat; alioquin illius amor adhuc habet quo crescere valeat. Oportet vero condignum habere, ut sit quem possit et merito debeat ut seipsum diligere. Si igitur primordialem personam veraciter constat esse summe bonam, nolle omnino non poterit quod summa caritas exigit; et si veraciter constat eam omnipotentem esse, quicquid esse voluerit, non poterit non esse. Exigente itaque caritate condignum habere volet, et exibente potestate habebit quam habere placet. Ecce quod diximus, quod perfectio persone unius est causa existentie alterius. A quo autem est ei exitendi causa, ab ipso et existentia. Nec enim potuit ab illa non esse, a qua, uti jam diximus, est omne posse. Ecce quomodo ratio rationi attestatur, et quod ex una convincitur, ex alia confirmatur. Ecce habes personam de persona, existentiam de existentia, unam de una sola, processibilem de inprocessibili, nascibilem de innascibili, unam denique uni inmediate adherentem, quia unam de una inmediate procedentem. Quod in divina natura talis existentia sit, indubitanter agnovimus; sed utrum communicabilis vel incommunicabilis sit, necdum demonstrativa ratione collegimus.

CAPUT VIII. De processione que est mediata simul et inmediata; et quod oporteat esse in divinitate personam que sit a gemina Quoniam constat tertiam in Trinitate personam aliunde quam a se originem trahere, oportet ut ab aliqua dictarum aut ab ambabus simul habeat esse. Et quid horum qua ratione convinci possit, restat inquirere. Quod persona summe digna condignam habere oportuerit, superius prolata perspicue rationis demonstratio invenit. Ut autem omnipotenti persone condigna esset, oportuit ut ab omnipotente omnipotentiam acciperet, ut equam, immo eamdem potentiam haberet. Nam, ut sepe dictum est, omnipotentia non potest esse nisi una. Si autem idem posse accepit, illud utique posse accepit a quo est omnium

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

But in the true eternal plurality of persons nothing precedes something else and nothing succeeds something else, and so nothing comes before or after in time. But what cannot come before in time can come before in cause and thus in nature. For just as we said far above,20 the perfection of one person requires the fellowship of another. And so is the one the cause of the other. For where the fullness of divinity is, there is also the fullness of goodness and, consequently, the fullness of charity. Now, the fullness of charity requires that one loves another just as himself;21 otherwise, his love would still have something by which it could grow. He should therefore have a person of equal dignity,22 so that he can have someone whom he can, and rightly must, love as himself. If it is truly sure that the first person is the highest good, he cannot refuse what the highest charity requires; and if it is truly sure that he is almighty, what he wants must also exist. So, when the charity requires it, he wants to have a person of equal dignity, and due to his power, he will also have what he wants.23 See, what we have said, that the perfection of the one person is the cause of the existence of the other. For where the cause of his existence is, from there comes also his existence. And he has only been able to come from that person, from whom – as mentioned – all power comes.24 See, how the one reason is confirmed by the other, and what the one proves, is confirmed by the other. Now you have a person who proceeds from another person, an existence from an existence, one from one alone, one who can proceed from one who cannot proceed, one who is born from one who cannot be born, and finally one who is united immediately to one, because one proceeds immediately from this one. That there is such an existence in the divine nature we acknowledge without a doubt; but whether this existence is communicable or is incommunicable we have not proved yet.

CHAPTER 8. About the procession which is both immediate and mediate at the same time; and that there must be a person who proceeds from two persons in the divinity Since it is now sure that the third person in the Trinity has his origin elsewhere than in himself, he must have his origin in one of the mentioned persons or in both at the same time. Now it remains to investigate which one of them can be proved and for what reason. Reason has demonstrated clearly above25 that the highest dignified person must have a person of equal dignity. But to be of equal dignity with the almighty, he must receive the omnipotence from the omnipotent, so that he can have an equal, indeed the same, power. For, as it has been said several times, there can only exist one omnipotence.26 So, if he has received the same power, he must have received this power from that 20 III:4–5. 21 Cf. Mk 12:31. 22 Condignum, cf. III:2. 23 Cf. III:6.15. 24 I:12. 25 III:2. 26 Cf. III:22, II:13, 1:25.

215

21 6

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

posse, omnium esse, omnium existere, a quo, ut superius dictum est, habet esse omnis essentia, omnis existentia. Si igitur idem posse est absque dubio ambobus commune, consequens est tertiam in Trinitate personam ex ambobus et esse accepisse et existentiam habere. Sed ad hec fortassis dicturus est aliquis: si idem posse quod habet innascibilis, accepit et habet persona nascibilis, ergo accepit et habet posse a semetipsa esse, quod est proprie proprium innascibilis persone. Verum qui hoc dicit, quantum michi videtur, non bene intelligit quod dicit. Sed ut melius elucescat quod dicimus, hoc ipsum diligentius discutiamus. Dicitis quia, si innascibilis inmediate tantum a se procedenti dedit plenitudinem potentie sue, ergo et posse a semetipso existere, utpote qui omnipotens est et omnia potest. Ad hoc ipse respondeo et fidenter affirmo quia a semetipso est, si a semetipso esse potest. Nam natura divina omnino invariabilis est. Si ergo est a semetipso, constat eum esse quod est sine alterius dono. Sed si hoc posse ei innascibilis dedit, ergo ex alterius dono hoc habuit. Quid ergo? Nunquid ex semetipso, et eo ipso sine alterius dono habet quod ex alterius dono habet? Vides jam, credo, quam sit sibi ipsi contraria ista assertio. Est enim omnino contrarium rem eamdem et omnino idem ipsum haberi ex alterius dono et haberi sine alterius dono. Quid autem magis inpossibile quam unum aliquid simul esse et non esse? Sicut ergo superius jam diximus, ut summe digna persona condignam haberet, prout plenitudo bonitatis poscebat, de se inmediate procedenti existentie dedit quicquid ab omnipotente veraciter dari potuit. Est itaque eis commune illud posse a quo est ceterorum omnium et esse et posse. Ab hac itaque gemina existentia est omnis essentia, omnis persona, omnis existentia. Ergo et illa que est tertia in Trinitate persona. Huic procul dubio assertioni attestatur quod illa quam superius in Trinitatis indagatione posuimus, ratiocinatione convincitur. Ibi namque manifesta ratione probatur, immo multiplici demonstratione convincitur quod sicut perfectio unius est causa alterius, sic sane perfectio gemine causa est tertie in Trinitate persone. Sicut perfectio unius requirit condignum, sic certe perfectio utriusque exigit condilectum. Sed quoniam hec superius diligenter executi sumus, non oportet eadem hoc loco iterum ponere, cum possit quisque, cum voluerit, ex illo loco repetere. Illud autem certissimum esse debet, et hoc est, quod de tertia persona firmiter retinere oportet, quoniam a quibus est ei existendi causa, ab ipsis et existentia. Ecce jam ex ratione tenemus quod tertia in Trinitate persona esse habeat ex ceteris duabus. Quod igitur originem ex duobus trahat habemus; sed utrum ejusmodi existentia communicabilis sit an vero incommunicabilis, necdum ratiocinando tenemus.

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

person from whom all power and all being and all existence come, that person from whom, as said above,27 all essence and existence has its being. When both persons undoubtedly have the same power in common, consequently the third person in the Trinity must receive its being and have its existence from both these persons.28 But maybe someone will say to this: If the begotten has received and has the same power as the unbegotten, then he also receives and has the power of existing from himself, which precisely is the property of the unbegotten. However, he who says this does not quite understand what he is saying, as far as I can see. Now, let us discuss this more carefully to show more clearly what we are saying. You are saying that if the unbegotten has given all its fullness to him who proceeds just immediately from him, then he must also have given to him the power of existing from himself, since he who is almighty also can do everything. To this I respond and maintain full of confidence that he is of himself if he can be of himself. For the divine nature is fully immutable. So, if he exists from himself then it is sure that he is what he is without a gift from another. But if the unbegotten gave this power to him then he had it from a gift from another. What then? Would he have from himself, and thus without the gift from another, what he in fact has as a gift from another? I believe that you see how much this assertion is contrary to itself. For it is totally self-contradictory to have one and the same thing as a gift from another and not as a gift from another. What is more impossible that something is and not is at the same time? As we have said above already, in order that the highest worthy person can have another of equal dignity, as required by the fullness of goodness, he must have given all, which truly can be given by the almighty, to that existence which proceeds immediately from him.29 So, it is common to both of them to have that power from which all other has both being and power. Therefore, it is from these two existences that any being, any person, and any existence is. Consequently, also that existence which is the third person in the Trinity. With this assertion it is undoubtedly also confirmed what we proved by reasoning in the investigation above about the Trinity.30 For there it was proved with a clear reason, indeed we convinced with many demonstrations, that just as the perfection of the one person is the reason of the other person, so is the perfection of the two persons the reason of the third person in the Trinity. Just as the perfection of the one person requires one of equal dignity, so the perfection of the two persons certainly requires one who is mutually loved.31 But since this has been treated carefully above we should not take this up again here, as anyone, who might want to, can re-read it there.32 But what is absolutely sure, and what should be firmly maintained about the third person, is that its existence itself also comes from those who are the reason why it can exist. Look, we know now from the reason that the third person in the Trinity has its being from the two others. 27 V:4. 28 Cf. V:6. 29 V:7. 30 III:15. 31 Condilectum. 32 Sc. III:15.

217

21 8

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

CAPUT IX. Quod processio que sit ad aliquam personam tantummodo mediata, non possit esse in divina natura Ecce jam ex majori parte invenimus quod superius querendum proposuimus. Invenimus oportere esse unam aliquam existentiam innascibili quidem inmediate tantum conjunctam; invenimus et aliam eidem existentie tam mediata quam inmediata germanitate coherere. Illud nunc igitur querendum instat, utrum aliqua sit vel esse possit, que ei mediate tantum adhereat. Unum est quod neminem sane mentis credo posse sentire, quod videlicet sit aliqua persona in divinitate, cui non liceat vel que nolit innascibilem inmediate et, ut sic dicam, facie ad faciem videre. Quid autem aliud ibi est videre quam videndo cognoscere et cognoscendo videre? Quid autem est innascibilem cognoscere quam sapientie plenitudinem habere? Nichil autem aliud est ibi sapere quam esse. Unde igitur accipit ut sapiat, inde accipit ut existat. Unde igitur ei sapientia, inde et ei existentia. Et si inmediate ab illa accipit ut sapiat, et inmediate quidem ab illa accipit ut existat. Si quis vero dicat quod inmediate non videt, consequens est ut concedat quod omniformem Veritatis contemplationem non habet. Juxta id ergo non habet omnem plenitudinem, et quod consequens est, nec veram divinitatem. Forte ad hec aliquis opponit et dicit: “Sicut quelibet persona videt de se procedentem, sic quelibet procedens videt producentem. Cur ergo non eadem ratione convincatur illam esse ab ista, qua probatur atque convincitur istam esse ab illa?” Ad hec ergo breviter respondeo et dico quod quelibet divina persona ad aspectum alterius divine accipit plenum sapere et eo ipso divinum esse, nisi habeat aliunde. Necesse est namque ut inde habeat, si aliunde non habet. Sed si habet aliunde, non necesse est etiam inde habere. Et ut id exemplo melius elucescat, ecce veritatem scriptam uni aliunde cognitam, alteri autem aliunde minime notam. Uterque tamen legit et intelligit, sed solus ille veritatis scripte cognitionem ex inspecta lectione percipit, qui eam aliunde non habuit. Quoniam igitur omnes divine persone invicem se et inmediate conspiciunt, radium summe lucis in alterutrum effundunt aut excipiunt. Et quia inmediate vident, inmediate adherent. Inpossibile itaque est in natura divina esse aliquam personam mediata tantummodo alicui alteri germanitate conjunctam. Hac item ratiocinatione confirmatur quod de tertie persone processione superius dicitur. Quis enim eam neget ceteras personas et videndo cognoscere et cognoscendo videre? Est autem utraque persona una eademque sapientia. Quoniam ergo constat eam nichil habere ex se, consequens est ex inspectione sapientie accipiat sapere, et eo ipso accipiat et esse, ubi non est aliud esse quam sapere.

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

So, we hold for sure that it has its origin in the two; but we have not yet reached by reasoning whether this existence is communicable or incommunicable.

CHAPTER 9. That the procession of a person in a solely mediate way cannot be found in the divine nature See, we have now discovered for the most part what we decided above to investigate. We have discovered that there must be one existence which is united solely immediately to the unbegotten; and we have discovered another existence which is united with the same existence in a mediate and immediate relationship at the same time.33 So, now it should be investigated whether there is, or can be, an existence which is united to the unbegotten only mediately. I do not believe that anyone with a sane mind will think that there is a person in the divinity who cannot or does not want to see the unbegotten immediately and, so to speak, ‘face to face’.34 For what is it here to see other than to know by seeing and to see by knowing? And what is knowing the unbegotten other than having the fullness of wisdom? For here is wisdom and being one thing. So, where the person receives to be wise, he also receives to exist. Where his wisdom comes from, there also his existence comes from. And if he receives immediately from him to be wise, he must also receive immediately from him to exist. Now, if someone says that this person does not see him immediately, he must admit that he does not have the full contemplation of the Truth. In this case he does not have all fullness and, consequently, nor true divinity. Maybe someone opposes to this and says: ‘Just as any person will see one who proceeds from him, so will anyone who proceeds also see the one from whom he proceeds. Why is it not proved in the same way that just as the second person proceeds from the first, also the first one proceeds from the second?’ To this I will respond briefly and say that any divine person by seeing another divine person will also know him fully and at the same time receive divine being if he does not have it from elsewhere. For it is necessary that he has it from here if he does not have it from somewhere else. But if he has it from somewhere else, it is not necessary that he also has his being from here. But to make this more evident by an example, then look at a written truth which a person knows from somebody, whereas another person does not know about it from anyone. Both read and understand, but only the one, who does not know the truth from someone else, understands the truth by reading the written message. Now, since all the divine persons see each other mutually and immediately, they will all send to and receive from each other the rays of the highest light. And because they see each other immediately, they are united immediately to each other. It is therefore impossible for a person to exist in the divine nature who is united to another person in a mediate relationship alone.

33 V:6–8. 34 Cf. Gen 32:30 and 1 Cor 13:12.

219

220

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

Ecce jam quesitum est et inventum quod superius propositum est ad querendum. Invenimus quod in divina natura sit processio tantummodo inmediata, quod ibi sit que est mediata simul et inmediata, quod mediata tantum omnino ibi non sit, sed nec esse possit.

CAPUT X. Quod in divinitate non possit esse plus quam una que sit ab una tantummodo persona, nec nisi una sola que esse non habeat nisi ex gemina Ex his pro certo que jam diximus, veraciter et indubitanter colligere possumus quoniam si quarta in divinitate persona esse potuisset, procul dubio ex ceteris tribus eam originem trahere inmediate oporteret. Alioquin alicui earum nonnisi mediata germanitate cohereret, nec eam nisi mediate videret. Et si quinta persona ibi esset potuisset, simili ratione de ceteris quatour inmediate procederet. Juxta hunc ratiocinationis modum similis in consequentibus consequentia invenietur, quantumcumque hujus progressionis series intellectualiter protrahatur. Confirmatur autem quod hic dicimus ex his que jam superius prelibavimus. Sicut enim duabus personis commune est illud posse unde constat tertiam originem trahere, sic procul dubio illud posse tribus commune esset unde quartam esse oporteret, si quarta in divinitate locum haberet. Alioquin due avare sibi reservarent quod tertie salva utriusque proprietate dare possent. Quod de istis dicimus, absque dubio invenies in consequentibus. Nam quantumcumque hujusmodi prosecutionis lineam produxeris, eamdem semper congruentiam ubique provenire videbis. Notandum autem quomodo hujusmodi differentia proprietatum in solo constet numero producentium. Nam prima earum habet esse a nulla alia, altera ab una sola, tertia vero a gemina; et si numerus earum in plures abundaret, eumdem progressionis tenorem per omnes inveniri oporteret. Ecce quomodo hic ordo differentiarum surgit et excurrit juxta modum et ordinem numerorum. Illud quoque notandum, quod juxta quamlibet ejusmodi differentiam inpossibile est esse plus quam unam personam. Nam a sola una persona non potest esse nisi tantummodo una. Similiter que sit tantum a gemina, non potest esse nisi una sola; nam si gemina de una tantum

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

This reasoning confirms what was said above about the procession of the third person.35 For who will deny that the third person both knows the other persons, when he sees them, and sees them, when he knows them? Now, there is for both persons the one and same wisdom. So, because it is evident that the third person has nothing from himself, it follows that he receives wisdom from seeing the wisdom, and, therefore, he also receives his being, because being and wisdom are the same here. See, it is now sought and found what we planned to investigate above.36 We have found that in the divine nature there is a procession which is solely immediate, that there is one which is mediate and immediate at the same time, and that there absolutely not is, and cannot be, any which is solely mediate here.

CHAPTER 10. That there cannot be more than one person in the divinity who only exists from one person alone, and only one person alone who can have his being only from two persons From that which we have called certain already, we can surely and undoubtedly understand that if there also could be a fourth person in the divinity, it should undoubtedly have its origin immediately in the other three persons.37 Otherwise there would be a person to whom he would only be united in a mediate relationship and whom he could only see mediately. And if there were also a fifth person he must proceed from the four others immediately for the same reason. According to this way of reasoning the same will be the case about the following persons no matter how far the row can be thought to be extended. What we are saying here is confirmed by what we have examined above already.38 For just as the power is common to the two persons in whom the third person has his origin, thus the same power would be common to the three persons in whom the fourth person would have his origin, if there were room for a fourth person in the divinity. If this was not the case, then the two persons would keep something to themselves in miserliness which they could give to the third one without losing anything of their properties. And what we are saying about these, you will undoubtedly also find about the following. For as long as you will prolong this row you will see that the same is the case all the time everywhere. Now it should be remarked, how the difference of the properties only follows the order of the persons who are giving being. For the first has not being from anyone else, the second has from one other, the third has from two; if the number of them grew higher, the same proportional would be found for the rest. See, how this order of differences is made and how it follows the order of the numbers. It should also be remarked that it is impossible that there can exist more than one person according to each difference. For there can only exist one person who comes from one person alone. And likewise, there

35 V:8. 36 V:6. 37 V:9. 38 V:8.

221

222

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

procederet, pro certo procedentium neutra alteri inmediate adhereret. Quod quam inpossibile sit, superius quidem ratio manifesta perdocuit. Juxta quod dictum est de una differentia, intelligi datur de qualibet alia. Ecce in his gemine questionis solutionem habemus, quas superius sine solutione reliquimus. Constat siquidem quoniam, si ab una sola persona non potest esse nisi una tantummodo existentia, nec a gemina nisi una sola, constat, inquam, quod utraque sit incommunicabilis existentia. Sicut igitur in divinitate non potest esse nisi una sola persona que sit a semetipsa, sic non potest esse plus quam una que sit ab una tantummodo persona, nec nisi una sola que esse non habeat nisi a gemina.

CAPUT XI. Quod oportet ut in divinitate sit persona a qua non sit alia aliqua, cum tamen eadem non sit a semetipsa Invenimus in superioribus differentias personalium proprietatum, quomodo sibi invicem cohereant vel procedant juxta modum et consequentiam numerorum. Sed si tot essent persone divine quot possunt esse hujusmodi differentie, essent utique infinite. Oportet itaque personarum proprietates diligentius perscrutari, ne de earum numero possit aliqua sinistra suspicio oriri. Superius probavimus quod in illa divinarum personarum pluralitate oporteat personam aliquam esse que non habeat aliunde quam a se originem trahere. Sed sicut necesse est ibi esse aliquam que non sit ab alia, sic ibi esse oportet aliam a qua non sit alia aliqua. Utrumque namque simili ratione convincitur; utrumque pari quidem demonstratione comprobatur. Nam si in illa vera dinivitate non esset aliqua persona a qua non procederet alia aliqua, sed quelibet ex alia procedens de se procedentem haberet, ejusmodi diductionis protractio in infinitum procederet, et personarum series in infinitum ducta numerositatis sue nullum finem acciperet. Sed nulla opinio hoc recipit, nec ratio aliqua usquequaque admittit. Oportet itaque ut in divinarum personarum pluralitate talis aliqua existat de qua nulla alia originem trahat. Oportet nichilominus ut eadem ipsa existendi principium ex alia habeat, sicut et illam que ex alia aliqua non est oportet ut alteri existendi causam exibeat. Utriusque sententie eadem ratio, utrumque convincitur indissimili argumento. Cum enim convincat ratio manifesta nonnisi unam personam posse esse a semetipsa, si illa que ab alia non est nullam de se procedentem haberet, in perpetuum sola remaneret. Simili quidem ratione et illa que de se procedentem non habet, si a nulla alia procederet, divino consortio in perpetuum careret. Sed, uti superius satis evidenter ostendimus, multiplex ratio a vera divinitate solitudinem excludit, et personarum pluralitatem convincit. Oportet itaque ut ibi sit qui existendi principium aliunde non sumat sed exibeat; oportet eque ut et ibi sit qui e converso ipsum quod est, ab alio accipiat et nulli alii inpendat.

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

can only exist one who comes from two; for if two persons could proceed from only one person none of these persons would be united to each other immediately. But we have learned by clear reason above that this is impossible.39 And what we have said about this difference in the properties of the persons will also apply to the other differences. See, we have now the solutions of the two questions that we left unsolved above.40 When it is certain that there can only be one existence which is from one person alone, and when there can only be one existence which is from two persons, then it is certain, I say, that both of these existences are not communicable. So, just as there can only be one person in the divinity who is from himself, there can only be one who is from one person alone, and finally only one who only has his being from two.

CHAPTER 11. That there must be a person in the divinity from whom no other person proceeds, even though the same person is not from himself In the above we found the differences between the personal properties, how the persons are united to each other mutually, and how they proceed from each other according to the order of numbers. But if there could be as many divine persons as there are such differences, there would be an infinite number of persons. Therefore, we must take a closer look at the properties of the persons, so that there should not arise any obscure suspicion about their number. Now, we proved above that in the plurality of divine persons there must be a person who cannot have his origin other than in himself.41 But just as necessary it is that a person exists here who is not from any other person, so there must be a person from whom no other proceeds. Both things are proved by the same reason; both things are certain by the same proof. For if in the true divinity there were not a person from whom there was no one who proceeds, and if any person who proceeds from another also would have someone who proceeds from him, then this procession would go on infinitely, and the row of persons infinitely extended would have no end in plurality. But no one will be of this opinion and no reason will accept this. So, in the plurality of divine persons there must be such a person in whom no other has his origin. And likewise, that the same person must have his origin of existence in another person, just as the person who does not have his origin in another person must be the cause of existence for another. Both assertions have the same reason, and both are proved by the same argument. For when the clear reason proves that only one person can be from himself, then this person would be alone in eternity if he did not have someone proceeding from him. For the same reason the person who has no one proceeding from him would be outside the divine fellowship forever if he did not proceed from any other. But as we have shown clearly enough above, there are many reasons for excluding solitude

39 V:9. 40 V:5. 41 V:4.

223

224

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

CAPUT XII. Quod non possit esse nisi una sola in divinitate persona a qua non sit alia aliqua Oportet pro certo ut ejusmodi aliqua in divinitate persona existat, a qua, uti jam diximus, nulla alia procedat. Sed potest adhuc alicui in dubium venire, utrum hoc ipsum sit proprie proprium uni alicui persone, an possit et aliquibus esse commune. Sed si due persone essent que hoc commune haberent, procul dubio neutra illarum ab alia procederet. Si neutra ab alia procederet, nec una quelibet alteri inmediate adhereret. Si vero neutra alteri adhereret inmediate, forent utique adinvicem sola mediata germanitate conjuncte. Quod quidem quam inpossibile sit, superior demonstratio evidentissima ratione convincit. Est itaque proprie proprium unius tantummodo persone de se procedentem nullo modo habere. Quamadmodum ergo non potest esse in divinitate nisi una sola persona que non procedat ab alia, sic absque ambiguo non potest esse nisi una sola de qua non procedat alia aliqua. Erit itaque ista, quemadmodum et illa, existentia incommunicabilis, nec omnino poterit esse personis aliquibus communis. Solus enim unus in illa personarum pluralitate sic accipit et habet esse ex alio ut nullus alius omnino aut accipiat aut esse habeat ab ipso. Ecce duarum in Trinitate personarum proprietates tam aperta ratione collegimus ut nullo modo vel in modico inde dubitare valeamus.

CAPUT XIII. Quod oportet ut in divinitate talis persona existat que ab alia procedat et de se procedentem habeat De hac gemina dictarum personarum proprietate possumus absque omni scrupulo colligere quid de illius que inter has media est debeamus proprietate sentire. Nam si ibi nonnisi unus solus esse potest qui non sit ab alio aliquo, consequens est ut hic de quo modo agimus, non sit a semetipso. Item si ibi nonnisi unus solus esse potest qui de se procedentem non habet, hunc de quo modo loquimur, qui de se procedat habere oportet. Sic itaque procedit de alio ut nichilominus tamen alius procedat ex ipso. Ecce ergo, ut diximus, absque ambiguitate habemus quid de ejus proprietate sentire debeamus.

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

in the true divinity and for convincing about a plurality of persons.42 So, there must be a person here who does not have his origin in another but who is himself a reason for existence; and likewise, there must here be a person who receives what he is from another and who does not give this to any other.

CHAPTER 12. That there can only be one person alone in the divinity from whom no other person proceeds There must certainly be such a person in the divinity from whom no other proceeds – as we have said already.43 But one can still be in doubt whether this is only a special property for one person or whether it can apply to more persons. If there were two persons who had this in common, none of these could proceed from the other. And if none of them could proceed from the other, they would not be united immediately to one another. But if none of them were united immediately to the other, they would only be united in a mediate relationship. However, the demonstration above has shown most clearly that this is totally impossible.44 So, it is only the property of one person alone not to have someone proceeding from him. Thus, just as there can only be one person in the divinity who does not proceed from anyone, there can undoubtedly also only be one person from whom no one proceeds. Just as the first one, the other will also be an incommunicable existence, and they will absolutely not be common to more persons. For only one in the plurality of persons receives and has his being from another, so that absolutely no other can receive or can have being from him. See, we have now understood the properties of two of the persons in the Trinity so clearly that we in no way can doubt the least about it.

CHAPTER 13. That there must exist a person in the divinity who proceeds from another person and has another person proceeding from him From the properties of the mentioned two persons we can without scruples understand what we should think about the property of the person who is in the middle of these two persons. If there can only be one person in the Trinity who is not from any other, consequently the person in question cannot be from himself. Likewise, if there is only one alone who does not have anyone proceeding from him, the person in question must have someone proceeding from him. So, he must proceed from another in such a way, however, that he also has one proceeding from him. See, as we have said, we know without a doubt what we should think about his property.45

42 III:2–5.18. 43 Cf. the previous chapter. 44 V:9. 45 V:7–8.

225

2 26

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

Hec procul dubio attestatio illi assertioni concinit, quam premissa superius disputatio rata invenit. Nam persona illa que de innascibili procedit tantummodo inmediate, videtur, immo convincitur utrumque habere. Nam esse quod est in ea plenitudine quam ab innascibili accepit, alteri utique sine ulla integritatis diminutione inpendit. Tertia namque in Trinitate persona a nascibili simul et innascibili procedit. Ecce quomodo ratio rationi occurrit et attestationi contestatio alludit. Ecce quod constat luce jam clarius, tres in tribus proprietatum distinctiones invenimus. Unius est ab alio non procedere, de se tamen procedentem habere; alterius tam ab alio procedere quam de se procedentem habere; tertii vero ab alio procedere, nec tamen qui de se procedat habere. Et duas quidem ex his proprietatibus incommunicabiles esse jam novimus; sed quid de tertia sentiendum sit, necdum ratiocinando apprehendimus.

CAPUT XIV. Quod in divina natura non possit esse nisi una sola persona que et ab alia procedat et de se procedentem habeat Sed quia duas ex dictis proprietatibus rationis attestatione incommunicabiles esse jam novimus, eo ipso idem de tertia sentire admonemur. Sed ne hec ratio probabilis potius quam necessaria videatur, hoc ipsum quod dicitur altius investigetur. Inprimis itaque notandum diligenterque considerandum quomodo gemina duarum personarum proprietas una alteram quasi ex opposito respiciat, et una alteri velud per contrarium respondeat. Nam unius est plenitudinem non accipere sed dare; alterius e contra non dare sed accipere. Ubi autem est summa pulcritudo, ubi nulla potest deesse perfectio, constat, quod consequens est, et unde mens sana nullatenus dubitare potest, quod divinarum personarum pluralitas omnino sit congruentissima venustate conjuncta et ordinatissima alteritate distincta. Oportet itaque ut in divina illa personarum pluralitate summe pulcra et omnium ordinatissima sit mutuo hinc inde in alterutrum differens concordia et concors differentia. Videtur itaque esse necesse ut inter illam cujus est plenitudinem dare nec accipere, et eam cujus est accipere nec dare, sit sola una media cujus sit proprie proprium tam dare quam accipere, ut constituta in medio uni altrinsecarum cohereat ex uno, et alteri earum connectatur ex altero. Sicque fiet ut ex datione concordet cum dante, et ex acceptione concordet cum accipiente. Et e converso ex datione differat a non dante, et ex acceptione differat a non accipiente, ut sit in alterutrum, sicut superius jam diximus, et differens concordia et concors differentia. Si autem due medie inter duas altrinsecas personas esse dicantur, videamus quid inconsequentis hanc assertionem sequatur. Certe prima ex eis erit a nulla, altera ab una sola, tertia a duabus, quarta ex tribus, sicut superius satis diligenter explanavimus.

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

This testimony agrees with the assertion which the demonstration above found valid. For the person who only proceeds immediately from the unbegotten seems to have, indeed demonstrably has, both properties. The being which he receives in its fullness from the unbegotten, he passes on to another without any diminution of its perfection. For the third person in the Trinity proceeds at the same time from the unbegotten and the begotten. See, how the one argument matches the other, how the one proof matches the other. It is now more clearly than day that we have found three distinct properties in the three persons. The property of the one is not to proceed from another, but to have someone proceeding from him; the property of the other is both to proceed from another and to have someone proceeding from him; the property of the third is to proceed from another but not to have someone proceeding from him. And we know now already that these properties are incommunicable; but we have not yet found by reasoning what we should think about the third one.

CHAPTER 14. That there can only be one person in the divine nature who proceeds from another person and has a person proceeding from him As we now know that two of the mentioned properties, demonstrated by reason, are incommunicable, we are urged to think the same about the third. But in order that this reason shall not seem more probable than necessary, we are going to investigate what we are saying more closely. First, one must note and carefully consider how the properties of the two persons look at each other as in opposition and respond to each other as contraries. The property of the one is not to receive its fullness but to give it; conversely, the property of the other is not to give but to receive it. But where there is the highest beauty and where there cannot be lacking any perfection, this consequence is sure, and no healthy mind can doubt about it, namely that the plurality of the divine persons is united in the absolutely most harmonious beauty and is different in the most orderly distinction. In this divine plurality of persons which is the highest beauty and the most orderly of all, there must, therefore, be mutual difference in the concordance and concordance in the difference. Thus, between the person whose property it is to give and not to receive its fullness, and the person whose property it is to receive and not to give its fullness, it seems to be necessary that there is one person in the middle whose property it is both to give and to receive so that he is united to the one by the one property and united to the other by the other property. By giving he is in concordance with the giving and by receiving he is accordance with the receiving. And conversely, by giving he is different from the one who is not giving, and he is different from the one who is not receiving so that there is, as we have already said above, both difference in the concordance and concordance in the difference between them.46

46 Cf. V:2.

227

228

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

Et hec quidem dispositio juxta hanc considerationem videtur habere aliquid cum arimetica medietate. Sed modo videamus quomodo geometrice medietatis speciem, quam, ut superius patet, personarum Trinitas pretendit, quaternitatis ista dispositio juxta aliam considerationem confundit. Certe persone causaliter prime proprium erit plenitudinem solummodo dare, duarum mediarum tam dare quam accipere; quarte vero tantummodo accipere, non atiam dare. Ecce ex his prima in solo uno concordat cum altera; altera vero illa non in uno tantum sed in duobus concordat cum tertia; tertia autem non in duobus quidem sed in solum uno concordat cum quarta. Vides certo quomodo unius proprietatis geminatio atque communio proportionalitatis rationem non tam pretendit quam confundit, ordinis pulcritudinem non tam auget quam minuit. Quis autem dicat in illa summa pulcritudine aliquid esse vel esse potuisse, quod pulcritudinem minuat ordinemque confundat? In illa autem superiori proprietatum dispositione, juxta unam considerationem medietas arimetica, juxta considerationem aliam medietas geometrica, juxta trinitatis et unitatis collationem medietas armonica specietenus occurrunt, et miranda ratione invicem sibi alludunt. Constat itaque ex his unius persone proprie proprium esse plenitudinem tam dare quam accipere, et hanc proprietatem, sicut et ceteras duas, incommunicabilem esse.

CAPUT XV. Quod in divina natura non possit esse quarta persona Omnibus absque dubio divinis personis constat esse commune omnem plenitudinem habere. Proprietatum autem distinctio versatur circa duo. Constat namque in dando et accipiendo. Unius namque persone proprietas, ut ex premissis patet, consistit in solum dando, alterius in solum accipiendo; inter has autem media tam in dando quam accipiendo. Sed ad ista fortassis dicturus est aliquis: “Si una proprietas constat in sola datione, altera in sola acceptione, media inter has in datione simul et acceptione, cur non sit quarta sine datione et sine acceptione, in solo habere? Quod si recipimus, quaternitatem divinarum personarum fateri videmur.” Sed hujus questionis nodum in superioribus tam aperta ratio dissolvit ut diligens lector, quamlibet idiota, inde in aliquo dubitare vix possit. Ut enim superius monstratum est, ratio manifesta convincit quod nisi una sola in divinitate persona a semetipsa esse non possit. Que igitur aliunde non accipit ut sit vel aliquid possit, si nulli inpenderet quod habet, absque dubio, ut alias dictum est, in perpetuum sola remaneret. Nullum itaque in divinitate locum quarta proprietas habere cognoscitur, unde et quaternitatis suspicio omnino secluditur. Constat itaque quod in divina natura omnino esse non possit quarta persona.

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

If one should say that there could be two persons in between the two others, then let us look at the inconsistence that follows from this view. It is certain that the first person does not come from anyone, that the second comes from one alone, that the third comes from two, and that the fourth comes from three, as we have explained sufficiently above.47 According to this consideration this order seems to have a certain arithmetic logic. But let us see how this view of a quaternity confuses the geometric figure which is made by the Trinity of persons according to the above. The first person, regarding the cause, has as his property to give his fullness, whereas the two persons in between should both give and receive; the fourth person should only receive and not give. See, how the first would only be in concord with the other in only one thing; the other would be in concord with the third not in one but in two things; and the third would be in concord with the fourth not in two but in one thing. Surely, you can see how the doubling and communication of one property does not promote the proportionality but confuses it, and how it does not increase the beauty, but diminishes it. But who will say that there is or can be anything in the highest beauty which diminishes the beauty and confuses the order? In the above-mentioned order of properties, however, there was according to one consideration an arithmetic order, according to another consideration a geometric figure, and by the comparison of the trinity and the unity there appeared a harmony of likenesses in which all matched each other in a wonderful way. Thus, it is obvious that it is the special property of one person both to give and to receive his fullness, and that this property, just like the other two properties, is incommunicable.

CHAPTER 15. That there cannot be a fourth person in the divine nature It is undoubtedly certain to everyone that all divine persons have all fullness in common. Now, the distinction between the properties consists in two things. It consists in giving and receiving. As it is clear from the above, the property of one person consists in giving alone, the other consists in receiving alone; and the property in the middle of these consists in both giving and receiving. Perhaps somebody will say to this: ‘If one property consists in giving alone, and another in receiving alone, and the one in between in giving and receiving at the same time, why not also a fourth one who alone is without giving and receiving? If we say so, we seem to accept a quaternity of divine persons’. But the knot in this question has been loosened with such a clear reason above that the diligent reader, even if he is ignorant, hardly can come in doubt. For as it has been demonstrated above, the clear reason proves that only one person in the divinity can be of himself alone. So, if he who did not receive to be or to do anything, did not have anyone to give what he has, he would undoubtedly, as we have said elsewhere, remain alone in eternity.48 We know then that there is no place for the mentioned fourth property in

47 V:10. 48 V:4.14.

229

23 0

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

CAPUT XVI. De veri amoris plenitudine, et que circa illum consideratur proprietatum distinctione Ea que superius dicta sunt de amovenda a divina natura quaternitatis suspicione, possumus adhuc altiori et evidentiori ratione confirmare. Nam si veri amoris plenitudinem in considerationem adducimus, proprietatumque ad eam considerationem pertinentium distinctionem diligenter attendimus, quod querimus fortassis citius inveniemus. Vere autem dilectionis plenitudo in solo constat amore summo universaliterque perfecto. Summus vero amor solus ille jure nominatur, qui tantus est quo non potest esse major, simul et talis quo non potest esse melior. Unde et animadvertere licet quia veri amoris plenitudo haberi non potest ab aliqua persona que Deus non est. Alioquin, si preter Deum aliquis veri amoris plenitudinem habere prevaluisset, utique in caritate, et eo ipso in bonitate equalis Deo esse potuisset persone que Deus non esset. Sed quis hoc dicat vel tenuiter estimare presumat? Constat autem quia verus amor potest esse aut solum gratuitus, aut solum debitus, aut ex utroque conjunctus, id est, ex uno debitus et ex alio gratuitus. Amor gratuitus est, quando quis ei a quo nichil muneris accipit gratanter inpendit. Amor debitus est, quando quis ei a quo gratis accipit nichil nisi amorem rependit. Amor ex utroque permixtus est, qui alternatim amando et gratis accipit et gratis inpendit. Plenitudo autem amoris gratuiti, plenitudo amoris debiti, quemadmodum et plenitudo in utroque perfecti, a persona que Deus non est nullo modo potest haberi. Sed quoniam non satis ex superioribus patet, adjuncta expositione non indiget.

CAPUT XVII. Cui conveniat in Trinitate persone solius gratuiti amoris plenitudinem possidere Manifestissimum esse jam constat quod una in Trinitate persona nil nisi a semetipsa habeat; nichil omnino accipit ab alio aliquo, nil prorsus possidet ex munere alieno. Amorem itaque debitum et qualem tibi superius descripsimus, nullo modo videtur posse habere qui a nullo alio deprehenditur aliquid accepisse unde ei obnoxius fieret vel in aliquo debitor existeret. Gratuitum autem amorem se habere ostendit qui procedentibus de se plenitudinis sue abundantiam tam largiter

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

the divinity, and thereby the suspicion of a quaternity is totally excluded. It is thus certain that there cannot at all be a fourth person in the divine nature.

CHAPTER 16. About the fullness of the true love and about the distinction between the properties seen with respect to this What has been said above to remove the suspicion of a quaternity in the divine nature49 we can now confirm with a further thorough and more obvious reason. For if we also bring the fullness of the true love into consideration, and carefully observe the distinction of the properties in connection with this consideration, perhaps we will find more quickly what we are looking for. Now, the fullness of true love consists alone in the highest and totally most perfect love.50 But only that love is rightly called the highest which is so great that no love can be greater, and at the same time so good that no love can be better.51 From this, one can also understand that the fullness of the true love cannot be owned by anyone who is not God. Otherwise, if someone besides God was able to own the fullness of the true love, then there would exist a person, who was not God, but who in charity,52 and thus in goodness, would be similar to God. But who will say so and really want to think so? Now, it is certain that the true love can be either only gracious, only owed, or be both gracious and owed, that is, in one way be owed and in another way be gracious.53 Love is gracious when one gives freely to someone from whom one does not expect any reward. Love is owed when one gives nothing but love to the one from whom one receives the freely given love. Love is a mixture of both when it both receives freely and gives freely. And the fullness of the gracious love, the fullness of the owed love, and likewise the fullness of both perfections, can in no way be owned by any person who is not God. But since this is clear enough from the above it does not require any further explanation.

CHAPTER 17. For which person in the Trinity it is proper to own alone the fullness of the gracious love It is already most evident that one person in the Trinity has everything from himself; he receives absolutely nothing from any other and has certainly nothing as a foreign gift. Therefore, he seems in no way to be able to own the owed love, as we have described it above, since he does not receive anything for which he would be dependent on another, and by which he would be obliged and be a debtor to somebody. He appears instead to have the gracious love since he both generously, voluntarily, and freely gives

49 V:10.14–15. 50 Here and in the following: amor. 51 Cf. I:22; III:2.11. 52 Caritas. 53 Amor gratuitus and amor debitus.

231

23 2

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

quam libenter et gratis inpendit. Quid enim ab ipso persone procedentes ab ipso, quid, inquam, quasi ex debito exigere possunt, qui ipsum debitum amorem, quem gratuito dilectori rependunt, ex ejus dono accipiunt? Alioquin aliquid haberent quod ex ipso non accepissent. Quod autem falsum sit superiora docent. Habet itaque amorem gratuitum et gratuitum solum. Habet, inquam, gratuitum amorem, et quod adhuc amplius est, gratuiti amoris plenitudinem. Amoris gratuiti plenitudinem se habere demonstrat qui ex illa plenitudine quam habet, nichil sibi soli reservat, sed totum communicat. Si omnem plenitudinem haberet, nec communicare vellet, cum posset, plenitudinem gratuiti amoris non haberet. Convincitur ergo gratuiti amoris plenitudinem habere cui ad omnem benivolentie effectum non deest vel velle vel posse.

CAPUT XVIII. Cui conveniat in Trinitate persone solius debiti amoris plenitudinem habere Illam autem personam, cujus est proprium procedere nec tamen de se procedentem habere, quoniam aliunde accipit totum quod habet, plenitudinem debiti amoris habere oportet; alioquin si summe diligentibus summum amorem non rependeret, summo amore digna non esset. Summo sane amore ab ipsis diligitur, a quibus omnem plenitudinem accepisse cognoscitur. Quid itaque indebiti amoris possit eis rependere, a quibus constat eam omnem plenitudinem gratis accepisse? Et quoniam proprium ipsius est, ut ante jam diximus, de se procedentem non habere, non est in divinitate cui possit plenitudinem gratuiti amoris exibere. Et quidem erga creatam personam gratuitum amorem habere potest; sed gratuiti amoris plenitudinem erga creaturam habere non potest, que inordinatum amorem habere non potest. Inordinatus enim amor esset, si summo amore diligeret qui summe diligendus non esset. Summo siquidem amore omnino dignus non est, qui summe bonus non est. Persona vero que Deus non est, summe bona esse non potest, quoniam Deo equari non potest. Plenitudinem itaque debiti amoris dicta persona juxta supra dictam rationem et habere valet et habet. Plenitudinem vero gratuiti amoris omnino non habet, sed nec habere valet. Solius itaque debiti amoris plenitudinem habere oportet personam illam que de se, quemadmodum dictum est, procedentem non habet.

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

the abundance of his fullness to those who proceed from him. For what can these persons who proceed from him, what can they, I ask, require as a debt with him from whom they have received even the owed love which they return to the giver of the gracious love? Otherwise they would have something which they had not received from him. But we have learned from the above how false that would be. So, he owns a gracious love and only a gracious love. He has, I say, the gracious love, and what is greater than this, the fullness of the gracious love. And that he has the fullness of the gracious love, he shows by holding nothing back for himself but giving it all away. For if he had all fullness, and would not give it away, if he could, then he would not have the fullness of the gracious love. So, it is proved that he has the gracious love who is not lacking the will and the ability to carry out all benevolence.

CHAPTER 18. For which person in the Trinity it is proper to own alone the fullness of the owed love It is necessary that the fullness of the owed love must be owned by the person whose property it is to proceed but not to have someone proceeding from him, since he has everything that he has from elsewhere; otherwise, if he did not return the highest love to those who love him most highly, then he would not be worthy of the highest love.54 He is certainly loved by them with the highest love as we know that he receives all fullness from them. Which kind of love, which is not owed, should he be able to give them as he freely receives all his fullness from them? And since, as already mentioned above, it is his property not to have anyone proceeding from him,55 there is no one in the divinity to whom he could give the fullness of gracious love. He can certainly have gracious love towards a created person; but he cannot have the fullness of gracious love towards the creation, since he cannot have a disordered love.56 For that love would be disordered if someone loves with the highest love someone who should not be loved most highly. Now, he who is not the highest good is certainly not worthy of the highest love. And a person who is not God, cannot be the highest good since God cannot have an equal. So, for the mentioned reason this person can have and does have the fullness of the owed love. But he has not and is not able to have the fullness of the gracious love. The person who, as mentioned, has no one proceeding from him, must therefore have the fullness of the owed love alone.

54 Cf. III:2. 55 V:11–13. 56 Cf. III:2.

233

23 4

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

CAPUT XIX. Cui proprie proprium sit in Trinitate persone tam gratuiti quam debiti amoris plenitudinem optinere Ex his que de duabus personis circa instantem considerationem jam diximus, satis elucescit quid de reliqua sentire debeamus. Nam quoniam est proprie proprium ipsius tam ab alia procedere quam de se procedentem habere, oportet eam tam gratuito quam debito amore abundare, et utriusque plenitudinem, utpote unius amoris uni, alterius alteri integraliter exibere. Debitum quippe est, quod summo amore diligit a quo totum accipit et nichil inpendit; gratuitum vero, quod summe diligit a quo nichil accipit sed totum inpendit. Ecce jam aperta ratione tenemus quomodo singulorum propria juxta hanc considerationem distinguere debeamus. Constat namque quia in uno ex tribus est amor summus et solum gratuitus; in altero vero sic summus ut sit solum debitus; in tertio autem sic summus ut sit ex uno debitus, ex altero omnino gratuitus. Ecce in amore summo trina proprietatum distinctio, cum sit tamen una eademque in omnibus, utpote summa et vere eterna dilectio. Nunc itaque ex hac veri et summi amoris possumus speculatione colligere utrumnam in illa divinarum personarum pluralitate quarta possit persona locum habere.

CAPUT XX. Unde ratio manifesta convincit quod quarta in divinitate persona locum habere non possit Superiora satis probant atque demonstrant quod in divinitate non possit esse nisi una sola persona que sit a semetipsa. Hinc autem potest diligens veritatis indagator indubitata ratione colligere quod in illa mutua personarum caritate non possit amor esse, qui non sit autem solum gratuitus, aut solum debitus, aut simul utrumque debitus atque gratuitus. Constat nichilominus de dictis tribus quod gratuiti amoris plenitudo sit in solo uno, debiti vero amoris plenitudo sit in solo altero, tam debiti quam gratuiti plenitudo sit in solo tertio. Sed quid ad ista dicemus? Nunquid aliquis ex his tribus aliud aliquid est, et aliud aliquid amor suus? Nunquid eorum alicui aliud est esse quam diligere, diligere quam esse? Ubi ergo est vera illa et summa simplicitas quam superius quesivimus, invenimus et multa rationum attestatione probavimus? Oportet itaque absque dubio ut in summa simplicitate idem ipsum sit esse quod diligere. Erit ergo unicuique trium idem ipsum persona sua quod dilectio sua. Nichil itaque aliud erit plures in una divinitate personas esse quam plures unam eamdemque, utpote summam, dilectionem habere, quin potius esse, ex differenti

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 19. For which person in the Trinity it is the special property to have the fullness of both the gracious and the owed love What we have just said in the previous considerations57 about the two persons, reveals sufficiently what we should think about the last person. Since it is his special property to proceed from someone and to have someone proceeding from him, he must also abound with both the owed and the gracious love and own both in their fullness so that he fully can give the one to the one and the other to the other. It is clearly an obligation that he loves with the highest love the one from whom he receives everything and to whom he gives nothing; and it is gracious that he loves most highly the one from whom he does not receive anything, but to whom he gives everything. See, it is now clear how we should distinguish between the properties of the persons according to this consideration. It is certain that in one of the three the love is the highest and gracious alone; in the other it is the highest in such a way that it is owed alone; and in the third the love is the highest in such a way that it is owed towards one and totally gracious towards another. See, in the highest love there is a distinction of three properties, although it is still the one and same in all of them, namely the highest and truly eternal love. From this consideration of the true and highest love we can now understand whether there could be room for a fourth person in the plurality of divine persons.

CHAPTER 20. How the clear reason demonstrates that there is no room for a fourth person in the divinity The above proves and shows sufficiently that there can only be one person in the divinity who is from himself.58 And from this the careful researcher of truth can undoubtedly understand that in the mutual love between the persons there cannot be found a love which is not either gracious alone, or owed alone, or both owed and gracious at the same time. It is just as certain about the mentioned three that the fullness of the gracious love is in the one alone, and the fullness of the owed love is found in the other alone, and the both owed and gracious love is found in the third alone. But what can we say to this? Could it be that any of these is different from his love? Could it be that any of these beings could be different from loving, or loving could be different from being?59 But then, where would be that true and highest simplicity which we sought and found and demonstrated with so many proofs above? There is no doubt, therefore, that in the highest simplicity being and loving are the very same. So, for any of these three, the person is the same as his love. Therefore, that there are more persons in the one divinity is the same as that there are more who have one and the same love, namely the

57 V:17–18. 58 V:4. 59 II:17–18.20.

235

2 36

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

proprietate. Nichil aliud est ibi persona ista quam dilectio summa hac proprietate distincta; nil aliud persona altera quam dilectio summa alia proprietate distincta; nec aliud aliquid est persona tertia quam dilectio summa tertia proprietate distincta. Juxta numerum itaque proprietatum erit et numerus personarum. Quoniam ergo quelibet persona, ut diximus, est idem quod amor suus, et assignata singularum discretio constat in solis jam dictis tribus, sicut quartam proprietatem, sic quartam personam nullatenus ibi invenire poterimus. Ne autem aliquis nos parum intelligat et ea propter inconsulte reprehendat in eo quod gratuitum vel debitum posuimus, non nos utique latet quod hec non semper sub eadem significatione accipimus. Dicimus quia hic illum amare debet eo quod dignus sit; dicimus nichilominus quod unus alium amare debet, eo quod eum alicujus doni vel beneficii merito debitorem reddiderit. Sic et gratuitum alias et alias, sub alia et alia significatione accipi poterit. Sed sub qua significatione utrumque hoc loco accipi volumus, ne calumpnie locus pateat, adjuncta descriptione determinavimus. Nemo autem miretur, nemo indignetur, si ea que de tanta profunditate sentimus, verbis eloquimur quibus possumus. Ecce jam explicavimus quomodo ad superiorum confirmationem ratio manifesta convincit quod quarta in divinitate persona locum habere non possit.

CAPUT XXI. Ex novissime posita speculatione quam multa possimus colligere Verum si huic novissime speculationi velit quid in ejusmodi exercitatos sensus habens diligenter insistere, multa superius disputata et diversis demonstrationibus probata poterit fortassis ex hac sola indubitanter colligere et probabili assertione convincere. Si quis unum Deum esse altius intelligit, et ipsum summe bonum, summe beatum esse manifesta ratione deprehendit, sed de personarum pluralitate diffidit, ex eo quam jam credit in id quod nundum apprehendit, per hanc speculam assurgere poterit. Ex hac una, ut arbitror, speculatione personarum pluralitatem, immo totam Trinitatem poterit elicere et documentis probabilibus astruere. Hec speculatio, ut superior ratio docuit, suspicionem quaternitatis excludit; hec veram divinitatem credentibus veraciterque confitentibus sic personarum pluralitatem commendat ut substantie unitatem convincat; ex hac speculatione cujusque persone proprietas elucescit et in manifestationem exit; nam diligenter requisita perspicua ratione clamat quod in divinitate sit persona que ab alia aliqua esse non habeat, quod ibi sit que a sola una, et altera que a duabus originem trahat. Cogitet qui hec legit quam magnum et utile sit promtum et familiare habere ad hec omnia ex una speculatione omni poscenti rationem reddere. Sed quoniam ex his que jam diximus ad horum indagationem pervium iter extruximus, hec diligentioribus perscrutatoribus plenius discutienda reliquimus.

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

highest love, or more precisely, have this love in different properties. The one person here is nothing other than the highest love in a special property; the other person is nothing other than the highest love in another special property; and the third person is nothing other than the highest love in a third special property. So, the number of persons comes from the number of properties. Since, therefore, each person is identical to his love, as mentioned, and since the difference between the persons consists in the mentioned three alone, we would never find a fourth property and thus a fourth person. In order to avoid that anyone should misunderstand us and thus thoughtlessly should refuse what we have said about the gracious and the owed love, we admit that these words do not always have the same meaning. So, we say that someone is owing to another because this other is worthy of it; but we say also that someone owes to another because the latter feels indebted to him because of a gift or a favor. In the same way also being gracious can be two things and can be understood in two ways. But we have defined the two words by an added description how they should be understood here, so that there should be no reason for accusations. No one should be surprised, and no one should feel offended, because we use the words, that we can, in order to express what we think about so deep things. See, we have now explained how the clear reason demonstrates and confirms what we have said above, that there can be no room in the divinity for a fourth person.60

CHAPTER 21. How many things we can understand on basis of the last consideration If anyone with a trained understanding of these things will carefully observe this last consideration, he might from this alone undoubtedly understand and find probable many of the things we have discussed above and proved with many demonstrations.61 For if anyone has a deeper understanding of the fact that God is one and clearly understands that God also is the highest good and the highest happiness, but is in doubt about the plurality of persons, then from this consideration he can lift himself up from what he already believes to what he does not yet understand.62 Just by this single consideration I think that it is possible to deduct and establish with probable proofs the plurality of persons, indeed the entire Trinity. And the consideration, which the reason taught about above, excludes any suspicion about a fourth person;63 and to those who believe and truly confess the true divinity, it assures them about the plurality of persons, and it convinces about the unity of substance; the property of each person becomes clear and evident from this consideration; for when it is carefully investigated, it shows clearly that there is one person in the divinity who does not have his being from any other, and that there is one who has his origin in one alone, and that there is another who has his origin in two. He, who reads this, should bear in mind how great and useful it is to have this consideration ready and

60 V:14–15. 61 I:1. 62 I:17.25; II:16; III:3. 63 V:14–15.

237

23 8

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

CAPUT XXII. Quod dicitur plenitudo amoris gratuiti esse in solo dando, plenitudo debiti in solo accipiendo, non sic oportet intelligere quasi sit opus gratie et non potius operatio nature Quod autem diximus unam personam habere vel esse plenitudinem amoris gratuiti, alteram vero plenitudinem amoris debiti, nemo ad id trahat quasi una aliqua quamlibet aliam in aliquo precellat, vel melius aliquid perfectiusque habeat vel existat. Nulla ibi differentia graduum, nulla diversitas dignitatum. Ecce constat quoniam proprietas unius est plenitudinem dare nec accepisse, alterius vero accepisse nec dare; nunquid iccirco oportet credere unam altera meliorem, unam altera digniorem? Absit, absit omnino hujusmodi aliqua suspicio! Hujusmodi suspicio multos supplantavit et per varios errores dispersit. Nichil habet majus, nichil omnino melius qui nichil eorum que habet ab alio accepit quam qui nichil habet quod non accepisset. Quicquid perfectionis, quicquid bonitatis, quicquid beatitudinis habet cujus est solum dare, in ea plenitudine possidet et ille cujus est proprium totum accepisse. Quod autem dicitur plenitudinem gratuiti amoris esse in solo dando, ple­ nitudinem debiti in solo accipiendo, nemo debet sic accipere quasi hoc in illa indifferenti equalitate sit opus gratie et non potius operatio nature. Sed tanti misterii altitudo nimis profunda est, et vix vel nunquam ab ullo homine verbis idoneis explicari potest. Nemo ergo miretur, nemo indignetur si more Virginis matris conceptam veritatem edendo, verborum panniculis involvo, qui diserti sermonis sericis non valeo, que me non habere cognosco. Sed ubi constat de veritate sententie, nil restat sagacis lectoris prudentie nisi verba idonea, quod cum omni gratiarum actione suspicio, veris assertionibus adhibere.

CAPUT XXIII. Quod quantum ad substantiam dilectionis in omnibus est amor summus et unus, quamvis sit in singulis proprietatum discretione distinctus Proprium est veri et intimi amoris illud efficere in illis etiam personis quibus est diversum esse, ut sit in eis idem velle et idem nolle. Quanto magis identitas

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

well-known so that one can give ‘answer to anyone who demands it’64 about all these matters. But since the above has opened a passable way for the investigation of these things, we will leave them to be discussed more fully by more diligent researchers.

CHAPTER 22. That the fullness of the gracious love consists in giving alone, and that the fullness of the owed love consists in receiving alone, is not to be understood as a work of grace as much as it is the work of nature When we have said that one person has or is the fullness of the gracious love, whereas another is or has the fullness of the owed love,65 no one should conclude from this that one of them in any way comes before the other or has or is something better or more perfect than the other. For there is no difference of degrees or dignity here. See, when it is certain that it is the property of one to give his fullness and not to receive fullness, and the property of the other is to receive it and not to give it – should we not believe that the one is better or more worthy than the other? No, certainly no to such a suspicion! This suspicion has overthrown many and divided them by various errors.66 He who has not received anything from another does not own anything which is greater or better at all than he who only owns what he has received.67 The fullness, goodness, and happiness of the one, who only gives, is also owned in its fullness by the one who receives all. When it is said that the fullness of the gracious love consists in giving alone, and the fullness of the owed love consists in receiving alone, no one should understand this as if this absolute equality is a work of grace and not rather a work of nature. However, such a great mystery is far too deep, and it can hardly or never be explained with suitable words by any human being. Therefore, no one should be surprised or feel offended if I, just like the holy Virgin, when I present a truth that I have born, wrap it in the rags of my words, because I cannot wrap it in the silk of the eloquent sermon which I realize that I do not have. But when it is about a true thought it is just up to the diligent reader to furnish the true testimonies with more suitable words, which I will receive with the greatest thankfulness.

CHAPTER 23. That regarding the substance of love in all the persons there is the highest and one love, even though it is different in each of the persons by a distinct property It is the property of a true and intimate love, also among persons of different being, that they ‘want the same and refuse the same’.68 How much greater identity of will there

64 Cf. 1 Pet 3:15. 65 V:17–18. 66 Probably Arians and Sabellians, cf. IV:1.3. 67 Cf. 1 Cor 4:7. 68 Idem velle et idem nolle, cf. Sallust, De conjuratione Catilinae 20.

239

24 0

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

voluntatis illis inerit personis quibus est idem esse quod velle, et quod consequens est, sicut unum esse, ita et unum velle! Est itaque in illa Trinitate omnibus una voluntas, una caritas, una et indifferens bonitas. Quantum igitur ad substantiam dilectionis erit unus atque idem amor in omnibus personis. Et cum sit in omnibus unus atque summus, non potest esse in uno quam in altero in aliquo major, non potest esse in uno quam in altero in aliquo melior. Certe si inest omnibus per omnia idem velle, unusquisque amat alterum quomodo seipsum, quantum seipsum. Si eorum unusquisque diligit alterum ut se, totum quod communicabile est ibi, vult cuilibet alteri ut sibi. Si diligit quantum se, quicquid ibi est communicabile, nec ardentius desiderat sibi quam alteri, nec tepidius alteri quam sibi. Ejusmodi itaque amor ex uno erit talis quo non potest esse melior, ex altero tantus quo non potest esse major. Erit itaque, ut dictum est, quantum ad substantiam dilectionis unus et idem in omnibus, verumtamen modo mirabili in singulis proprietatum discretione distinctus. Nam secundum eam acceptionem quam superius assignavimus erit in isto ad illos tantum gratuitus, in illo ad istos tantummodo debitus, in tertio debitus ad unum, unius ad alterum gratuitus. Juxta humanum namque loquendi modum recte dicimus amorem gratuitum qui nichil accipiens totum inpendit. Debitum vero qui nichil inpendit a quo totum accepit. Dicatur itaque illa divinitatis unda et summi amoris affluentia in alio tantum effluens nec infusa, in alio tam effluens quam infusa, in tertio non effluens sed solum infusa, cum sit tamen in omnibus una et eadem ipsa. Et in his omnibus una veritas, etiamsi sit de ea loquendi multiformitas.

CAPUT XXIV. Quod quantum ad integritatem perfectionis nulla sit in Trinitate differentia amoris vel dignitatis Inter hec aliquis fortassis humanum aliquid cogitans de divinis personis, illam personam majoris dignitatis reputat et ceteris excellentiorem judicat que a semetipsa habet totum quod eam habere constat. Sed absit ut ibi credatur esse aliqua dignitatum distantia, ubi vere et absque dubio est equalitas summa! Sed qui hoc per intelligentiam necdum capit, est unde cogitationem suam ex alia consideratione reprimere possit. Sciendum itaque est, sicut superius jam dixi, quia quicquid omnibus est communicabile ibi, unaqueque persona tam amat alteri quam sibi; sic e converso quod sue proprietatis est et incommunicabile, magis diligit sibi quam alteri. Quelibet namque persona ex eo quod est omnibus commune, habet esse eadem substantia cum ceteris; ex eo quod est sue proprietatis et incommunicabile, habet esse singularis persona discreta ab aliis.

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

will be in those persons in whom being and willing is the same and, consequently, just as they have one being they have also one will! In the Trinity there is in all, therefore, one will, one charity, and one and the same goodness. The substance of love will, consequently, also be one, and there will be one and the same love in all the persons. And when it is one and the highest in them all, it cannot be greater in one than in another, and it cannot be better in one than in another. If all will the same in all things, each of them will also love the other as himself and as much as himself. And if each of them loves the other as himself, he will also share all, which is communicable, with any other. If he loves the other as himself, he does not desire anything, which is communicable here, for himself more eagerly than for any other, and will not be more lukewarm for the other than for himself. And thus, the love from the one will be so that no love can be better, and the love from the other will be so that no love can be greater. Therefore, as mentioned, the substance of love is one and the same in all of them, even though in a wondrous way it is different in each of them by a difference in the properties.69 For according to the understanding, which we presented above, there is in the one a love, which is only gracious towards the others, in the other a love, which is only indebted towards the others, and in the third a love, which is indebted towards the one and gracious towards the other.70 According to the human way of speaking we call rightly that love gracious which gives all as it receives nothing. And that love owed, which gives nothing to him from whom it receives all. So, we can say that this wave of the divinity and the flood of the highest love only flows out from one person and not in, in the other it flows in as well as out, and in the third it does not flow out, but only in, and nevertheless it is one and the same in all of them. About all this there is only one truth even though it can be expressed in many ways.

CHAPTER 24. That in the total perfection there cannot be any difference in the love and dignity Here may someone, who thinks something human about the divine persons, perhaps ascribe greater dignity to the person, who has all that he owns from himself, and regard him as more excellent than the other. But away with the thought that there can be any order of precedence where there is truly and undoubtedly the highest equality! He who cannot yet understand this, may improve his thought by another consideration. One should know now, what I have said already above, that each of the persons loves the other just as much as himself in all which is communicable to all; whereas, conversely, each of them loves himself more than the other regarding what is his own incommunicable property.71 Each of the persons has a being of the same substance as the others because of that which is common to all of them; and each of the persons has a being which is different from the others because of that which is his own incommunicable property. So,

69 V:16. 70 Cf. V:17–19. 71 V:23.

241

242

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

Si ergo unaquelibet quod sue proprietatis est magis amaret alteri quam sibi, et quod alterius proprietatis est magis amaret sibi quam alteri, quid hoc aliud esset vel quid aliud videri posset quam nolle esse persona que ipsa est, et velle esse persona que ipsa non est? Sed neminem puto esse tante dementie qui audeat hoc estimare vel possit patienter audire. Illa itaque persona cujus est ea proprietas quam putas prerogativam dignitatis, absque omni ambiguo magis vult eam sibi quam ceteris, et cetere sine contradictione omni magis volunt eam illi quam sibi. Quid ergo? Nunquid estimandi erunt majoris benignitatis esse qui illud quod putas preeminentiam excellentie malunt alterius persone quam proprie, quam ille qui mavult proprie quam alicui alteri persone? Sed si recte estimantur benigniores, cur non et eo ipso digniores? Dicis adhuc fortassis quod multo gloriosius sit plenitudinem habere et dare quam solum habere nec alicui dare. Ecce iterum, ut tibi videtur, si secundum hominem judicamus, in duabus personis quamdam glorie prerogativam invenimus. Sed iterum dico quia hanc quam putas praerogativam, juxta rationem predictam tertia in Trinitate persona mavult ceteris quam sibi, quam tamen cetere sibi ipsis malunt quam illi; nunquid ergo illa dicetur ceteris benignior, et eo ipso gloriosior? Ecce dum incedimus juxta judicia humana, invenitur divina queque persona qualibet alia magis et minus benigna, magis et minus digna. Ecce opinio falsa que invenitur sibi ipsi contraria. Debemus itaque hujusmodi fantasias de cordibus nostris abicere, et omnino firmiter credere que necdum possumus per intelligentiam capere. Pro certo et absque omni ambiguo, quantum ad integritatem perfectionis, nulla in Trinitate differentia est amoris vel dignitatis.

CAPUT XXV. Que sint quibus personis communia, vel que sint singularum propria; et que sint que restant adhuc in istis querenda Nunc igitur in unum, si placet, breviter colligamus que in hoc libro ratiocinando executi sumus. Omnibus divinis personis est commune omnem plenitudinem habere; commune est solis duobus omnem plenitudinem dare; commune est solis duobus omnem plenitudinem accepisse; commune est solis duobus non habere utrumque. Unius namque proprietas est in solo dando; alterius proprietas in solo accipiendo; tertii proprietas tam in accipiendo quam dando. Solis duobus est commune personam de se procedentem habere; solis duobus est commune aliunde procedere; solis duobus est commune non habere utrumque. Nam tantummodo de se procedentem habere est proprietas unius; tantummodo vero procedere est proprietas alterius; proprietas autem tertii tam ab alio procedere quam de se procedentem habere. Proprium est solius persone procedere a nulla; proprium solius alterius procedere ab una sola; proprium solius tertie procedere a gemina. Sola autem una est a qua est nulla; sola similiter una a qua est una sola; sola vero una a qua procedit gemina. Cum igitur sit duabus personis commune a semetipsis non esse, sed aliunde procedere, restat adhuc cum summa diligentia

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

if one of them loves another more because of what is his own property and loves himself more because of what is the property of the other, what else is this, or what else can be seen from this, that he does not want to be the person that he is, and that he wants to be the person that he is not? But I do not think that anybody is so foolish that he will dare to think so or would listen patiently to this. So, the person who has this property which you find of greater dignity, will undoubtedly find himself greater than the other persons, and the other persons will undoubtedly find the first mentioned greater than themselves. What follows from this? Would the persons not be regarded more benevolent who wish what is more dignified to be for others rather than for themselves, than the person who wishes it for himself rather than for others? But if they are rightly regarded to be more benevolent, then why not also consider them more worthy? Maybe you will say that it is much more glorious to have and give the fullness than having it for oneself and not giving it to anyone. See, then again, according to your understanding, and when we judge after human standards, we will find a precedence of honor, this time in two of the persons. And then, I say again, the third person in the Trinity will prefer that property, which you find greater, for the two others than for himself, and yet the two others will prefer this for themselves and not for him; should we then call this person more generous than the others and therefore more glorious? So, when we follow human standards, we find any divine person more and less generous and more and less worthy than any other. See, how false that opinion is which is found self-contradictory. We should then cast these phantasies out of our hearts and absolutely firmly believe what we are not yet able to understand by the intelligence. It is certain and without any ambiguity that in the total perfection there cannot be any difference in the love and the dignity in the Trinity.

CHAPTER 25. What is common to the persons, and what is special to each of them; and what remains to be investigated about them Let us now briefly summarize, if this is acceptable, what we have treated by thinking in this book. It is common to all the divine persons to own all fullness; it is common to two alone to give all fullness; it is common to two alone to receive all fullness; it is common to two alone not to have both properties. For the property of the one consists in giving alone; the property of the second consists in receiving alone; and the property of the third consists in both giving and receiving. It is only common to two to have someone proceeding from him; it is common to two alone to proceed from another; it is common to two alone not to have both properties. For there is only one who has the property to have only one person proceeding from him, and it is only one who has the property only to proceed from another; and it is the property of the third both to proceed from another and to have one proceeding from him. Only the one person does not proceed from anyone; only the second person proceeds from one; and only the third person proceeds from two. So, there is only one person who has no one proceeding from him; and likewise, there is only one who has only one proceeding from him; and there is only one who has two proceeding

243

24 4

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r q u i n t u s

querere in quo adinvicem differant processio unius et processio alterius. Inventa autem differentia habitudinis mutue pro similitudinis ratione, oportet ad ultimum nominum propria assignare. Proposueram quidem quid de his sentirem in commune proferre, sed quoniam in ipsis alta profunditas est, satius erit hec altioribus ingeniis altius discutienda relinquere, et quid ex his que jam dicta sunt gratitudinis vel ingratitudinis merear, ex aliorum judicio probare.

b o o k fi ve – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

from him. Now, since it is common to two persons not to be from themselves but to proceed from another, it remains to investigate most carefully how the procession of the one is different from the procession of the other. And when the difference in the mutual relationships of the persons, and their likeness, is found, then we shall finally ascribe the names to them. I had planned to present in public what I think about these things, but since these truths are so deep, it will be better to leave it to greater spirits to discuss them more profoundly, and let it be up to others to judge whether I deserve acknowledgement or criticism for what I have said.72

72 In spite of this remark there seems to be no reason to doubt the authenticity of the following last and sixth book.

245

CAPITULA SEXTE PARTIS I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. XVIII. XIX. XX. XXI. XXII. XXIII. XXIV. XXV.

Quod in vera divinitate nichil sit juxta donum largientis gratie, sed totum juxta dotem proprietatemque nature. Quod germanitas que est inter parentem et prolem, videtur esse omnino inter innascibilem et personam de ipso principaliter procedentem. Quod in producenda prole diversus modus sit pro diversitate nature. Quam convenienter optinuit usus ut in illa Trinitate unus ex duobus diceretur Pater et alius Filius. Quomodo certa et manifesta ratione tenemus cur unum Patrem, alterum ipsius Filium dicamus. Cum sit ceteris duobus commune de Patre procedere, quid sit inter processionem unius et processionem alterius. Quod alia sit germanitas quam habet ad unum, et alia quam innascibilis habet ad alium. Quod ille qui a Patre Filioque procedit eorum filius recte dici non possit. Qua ratione Dei Spiritus dictus sit qui a Patre Filioque procedit. Qua ratione procedens a duobus dictus est Spiritus sanctus. Qua ratione solus Dei Filius Imago Patris sit dictus. Qua ratione solus Dei Filius Verbum sit dictus. Secundum quem clarificandi modum solus Filius clarificat Patrem suum; unde et merito ejus dicitur Verbum. Cur Spiritus sanctus dicatur Donum Dei, et unde est quomodo habeat mitti vel dari. Quare speciali quodam dicendi modo potentia attribuitur Ingenito, sapientia Genito, bonitas Spiritui sancto. Quare Pater dicatur ingenitus, Filius genitus, Spiritus sanctus nec genitus nec ingenitus. Quid sit Patrem gignere, quid Filium nasci de Patre, quid procedere ex generatione, quid procedere sine generatione. Item docetur alia ratione quid sit Patri Filium generare. Quod Spiritus sanctus non sit imago Unigeniti, sed nec debeat ejus filius dici. Quod ibi sit querenda imago paterna ubi est mutua convenientia non sine differentia aliqua, nec differentia sine mutua convenientia. Qua ratione Dei Unigenitus dicatur figura substantie ipsius. Quod ea que de ingenita et genita substantia secundum catholicam fidem a sanctis Patribus accepimus, credere debeamus, quamvis quam vera sint interim per intelligentiam capere nequeamus. Qua ratione convinci possit quod de ingenita et genita substantia catholica fides tradit. Ex qua consideratione possimus colligere quod geminatio persone possit esse sine geminatione substantie. Ex qua consideratione et quasi per exemplum confirmatur quod de Trinitate et unitate a catholicis creditur.

THE HEADINGS OF THE SIXTH PART 1. That in the true divinity nothing can be found as a gift from the generous grace but only as the gift and property of nature. 2. That the relationship between a parent and a child seems to be just the one that is between the unbegotten and the person who first proceeds from him. 3. That there are different modes of begetting offspring according to the diversity of nature. 4. How appropriate it is that we are used to call the one of the two in the Trinity Father and the other Son. 5. How we give firm and obvious reasons for why we call the one Father and the other Son. 6. When the two other persons proceed from the Father, what is then the difference between the procession of the one and the other. 7. That the relationship of the unbegotten with the one is different from that which he has with the other. 8. That the person, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, cannot rightly be called their son. 9. For what reason the person, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, is called the Spirit of God. 10. For what reason the person, who proceeds from the two persons, is called the Holy Spirit. 11. For what reason only the Son of God is called the Image of the Father. 12. For what reason only the Son of God is called the Word. 13. According to what way only the Son glorifies his Father; why it is also right to call him the Word. 14. Why the Holy Spirit is called the gift of God and why and how it is sent or given. 15. Why it is said specifically that the power is attributed to the Unbegotten, wisdom to the Begotten, and goodness to the Holy Spirit. 16. Why the Father is called unbegotten, the Son begotten, and the Holy Spirit neither begotten nor unbegotten. 17. What it means that the Father begets, and the Son is born of the Father, and what is proceeding by generation and proceeding without generation. 18. Yet another reason shows what it means that the Father begets the Son. 19. That the Holy Spirit is not the image of the Only-Begotten and should not be called his son. 20. That one should seek the image of the Father where there is mutual harmony not without a certain difference, nor difference without a certain harmony. 21. Why the Only-Begotten of God is called the figure of his substance. 22. That we should believe what we have received from the holy Fathers about the unbegotten and the begotten substance according to the universal faith, even though we cannot, in this life, understand how true it is. 23. With what reason it can be proved what the universal faith hands down about the unbegotten and begotten substance. 24. From what consideration we can understand that there can be two persons without two substances. 25. From what consideration, and just as by an example, it is confirmed what the universal church believes about the Trinity and the unity.

LIBER SEXTUS

CAPUT I. Quod in vera divinitate nichil sit juxta donum largientis gratie, sed totum juxta dotem proprietatemque nature Duobus, ut dictum est, tantummodo personis constat esse commune a semetipsis non esse sed aliunde procedere; in quo illud adhuc videtur ad inquirendum restare, utrumnam idem procedendi modus sit tam in una quam in alia, an potius unus in ista et alius in illa. Materia satis modica sed multum profunda et diligenti inquisitione dignissima. Puto tamen ex ante jam dictis non mediocriter elucescere quod possit ad hujus perplexionis enodationem multum valere. Sed quoniam invisibilia Dei, juxta Apostolum, per ea que facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur, ubi profundum aliquid de divinis queritur, merito ad illam naturam recurritur, ubi, Deo operante, Dei imago depicta videtur. Est autem notissimum ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei hominem factum; et quamvis incomparabiliter copiosior sit dissimilitudinis quam similitudinis ratio, est tamen humane nature ad divinam nonnulla, immo multa similitudo. Possumus itaque, ut credo, in hoc divine imaginis speculo cernere, immo et juxta ratiocinantis animi judicium discernere, quid ibi sit vel pro similitudinis ratione approbandum vel pro ratione dissimilitudinis inprobandum. Invenimus itaque quoniam in humanis personis productio persone de persona non est ubique uniformis. Nam si ad propagationis nostre originem recurrimus, in ipso prothoplasto videmus quoniam alia fuit productio ejus uxoris, et longe alia multumque diversa productio prolis ipsius. Illa supra naturam, ista secundum naturam; illa secundum solam operationem creatricis gratie, ista secundum operationem nature. In divina autem natura nichil est vel esse potest ex operante gratia. Quod enim est ex sola operatione gratie, pro auctoris beneplacito potest esse vel non esse. Sed tale aliquid non potest esse in ipsa deitate; alioquin mutabilitas ei inesset, nec veram eternitatem haberet. Nichil itaque ibi est juxta donum largientis gratie, sed totum juxta proprietatem exigentis nature. Sicuti enim innascibili naturale est ab alio non procedere, sic sane ei naturale est de se procedentem habere.

BOOK SIX

CHAPTER 1. That in the true divinity nothing can be found as a gift from the generous grace but only as the gift and property of nature It is certain, as mentioned, that it is only common to two persons not to be of themselves but to proceed from another;1 it seems to remain to be investigated whether there is the same way of proceeding both in the one and in the other, or if there rather is one in the one and another in the other. It is a rather small, but very profound issue, most worthy of a careful investigation. However, I think that by that which has been said already, we have given a not mediocre explanation that is most able to solve this problem. Since the invisible things of God are understood by the intellect through the created things [Rom 1:20],2 according to the Apostle, it is right, when seeking a deep truth about the divine, to turn to that nature where God’s image is depicted by God’s own work. It is most well-known that the human being was created to God’s image and likeness;3 and even though the unlikeness without comparison is greater than the likeness, there is nevertheless no small but even great likeness between the human nature and the divine. And so, as I believe, we can see in this mirror of the divine image, and not least, by the judgement of the human thinking, discern what can be approved because of the likeness, and what must be refused because of the unlikeness. We have found that among human persons the production of a person from a person is not uniform everywhere.4 For if we turn back to the first beginning of our production we see in the primordial human that the production of his wife was of one kind and the production of his children was quite another and very different. The first was above nature, the other was according to nature; the first happened by the work of the creative grace alone, the other happened by the work of nature alone. In the divine nature, however, there is and cannot be anything which exists by the work of grace.5 For what exists by the work of grace alone, can exist or cannot exist according to the pleasure of the author. But any such thing cannot exist in the deity itself; otherwise there would be mutability in it, and it would not have true eternity. Thus, nothing



1 V:5.10.25. 2 I:8.10; V:6. 3 Cf. Gen 1:26. 4 V:6. 5 II:8; V:22.

250

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

CAPUT II. Quod germanitas que est inter parentem et prolem, videtur esse omnino inter innascibilem et personam de ipso principaliter procedentem Naturalem itaque in hominibus procedendi ordinem debemus diligenter inspicere, et quid divinum simile in se habeat cum omni sagacitate inquirere; quo invento et cognito, juxta theologice discipline morem, pro similitudinis ratione de humanis ad divina proprietatum nomina transsumere. In humana itaque natura videmus, sicut superius jam diximus, quia productio sive processio persone de persona alia est tantummodo inmediata, alia tantummodo mediata, alia vero mediata simul et inmediata. Inmediata processio est illa que est prolis de utrolibet parente, que fit nulla alia persona mediante. Mediata processio est illa quam videmus in solo hominis alicujus nepote, que non fit nisi mediante ipsius prole. Est autem ibi processio mediata simul et inmediata, ubi contingit unum eumdem hominem esse alicujus filium et nepotem. In humana natura mediata processio multiplex et multiformis est, que in divina natura omnino non esse potest. Secundum varium vero procedendi ordinem et modum affinitatis variantur et multiplicantur in humana natura gradus et nomina germanitatis. Alia enim est germanitas quam habet homo ad filium, alia vero quam habet ad nepotem suum. Secundum quod dico de istis, intelligi potest et de aliis. In tanta autem germanitatum multitudine primum locum tenet et principalem germanitas illa que est inter parentem et prolem. Nisi enim in humana natura illa precessisset, ceterarum omnium omnino nulla fuisset; et si ceterarum omnium omnino nulla foret, nichilominus tamen absque dubio ipsa esse potuisset. Ubi autem contingit unum eumdemque multos liberos habere, omnes utique idipsum dicuntur una et eadem ratione. Et si contingit unum eumdemque hominem esse nepotem et filium ejusdem persone, utrumque quidem dicitur, non tamen eadem sed diversa valde ratione. Notandum autem quod Eva inmediate producta est de substantia Ade, non tamen, ut superius jam diximus, secundum operationem nature. Et inde est quod nec illa proles istius, nec iste dicitur parens illius. Sed ubi persona alicujus producitur de substantia alterius, producitur, inquam, principali procedendi ordine et secundum operationem nature, solemus absque dubio unam ex his personam parentem, aliam prolem nominare. Quoniam igitur solemus juxta divinarum Scripturarum morem humane germanitatis nomina pro similitudinis ratione ad divina transsumere, possumus non inconvenienter dicere quod illa germanitas

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

can be here as a gift of the generous grace, but everything is according to the demand of the property of nature. So, just as it is natural for the unbegotten not to proceed from another, so it is truly natural for him to have someone proceeding from him.

CHAPTER 2. That the relationship between a parent and a child seems to be just the one that is between the unbegotten and the person who first proceeds from him Therefore, we should investigate carefully the natural order of the human procession and with all acuteness search for what it has similar to the divine; when we have found and understood that, we will, according to the method of the theological discipline, transfer the names of the properties from the human to the divine according to their likeness. As we have said above already, we see in the human nature that the production or procession of a person from another person is either only immediate, only meditate, or mediate and immediate at the same time.6 The immediate procession is the offspring from either of two parents, which happens without the mediation of another person. We see the mediate procession when a person has a grandchild, which can only happen when it is mediated by his own offspring. The procession, which is mediate and immediate at the same time, we see when one and the same person is someone’s son and grandson.7 In the human nature the mediate procession is numerous and various which absolutely cannot exist in the divine nature. And the degrees and names of relationship are various and manifold in the human nature according to the ways of procession and affinity. Thus, the relationship between a man and his son is different from that between a man and his grandson. And other relationships can be understood according to what I say about these. But in this great multitude of relationships the first and principal place is held by the relationship between a parent and a child. For if this relationship did not come first in the human nature, all other relationships would certainly not exist; and even if all the other relationships did not exist, this one would undoubtedly be able to exist. But where it happens that one and the same person has many children, all of them will be called the same for one and the same reason. And if it happens that the same person is son and grandson of the same person, he is surely said to be both, not for the same reason but for very different reasons. It should be noted that Eve was produced immediately from the substance of Adam, however not by the work of nature, as it was already said above.8 Therefore, she is not called his child, and he is not called her parent. But when a person is produced from the substance of another person, and produced, I say, by the basic order of producing and by the work of nature, we use undoubtedly to call one of these persons a parent and the other a child. Now, as we are used to, just like the divine

6 V:6. 7 Cf. V:6 where Richard gives an example of this procession: Seth proceeds from Adam mediately and at the same time immediately since Seth is the immediate offspring from Adam but at the same time is mediated by Eve; cf. also below VI:16. 8 VI:1.

25 1

252

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

est inter innascibilem et personam de ipso principaliter procedentem que est inter parentem et prolem. Processio enim illla persone de persona usquequaque est inmediata, et est secundum principalem procedendi ordinem et secundum nature operationem. Quod quia satis ex superioribus liquet, ampliori expositione non indiget.

CAPUT III. Quod in producenda prole diversus modus sit pro diversitate nature Quod autem diversus sit modus in producenda prole pro diversitate nature, neminem puto posse ambigere. Si autem scire volumus quis sit singularis ille producendi modus in illa deitatis supereminentia et superexcellenti natura, innascibilis bonitatem, sapientiam, potentiam cogitemus, et citius fortassis inveniemus quod querimus. Pro certo cui summe sapiens bonitas inest, nichil omnino velle potest, et maxime circa divina, nisi ex ratione, ut sic dicam, intima et summa. Et si vere constat eum omnipotentem esse, quicquid ibi esse voluerit, erit pro voluntate. Nam si in solo volendo non poterit optinere quod voluerit, quomodo, queso, omnipotens veraciter dici poterit? Erit itaque ei de se consubstantialem et conformem producere, ratione exigente idipsum inmobiliter velle. Hoc procul dubio erit ei prolem producere, in eo ipso sibi per omnia complacere.

CAPUT IV. Quam convenienter optinuit usus ut in illa Trinitate unus ex duobus diceretur Pater et alius Filius Notendum quod in humana natura sexus geminatur, et iccirco secundum diversum sexum germanitatis nomina variantur; parentem in uno sexu patrem, in alio dicimus matrem; prolem in uno sexu filium dicimus, in alio filiam nominamus. In divina autem natura, ut in commune novimus, omnino nullus est sexus. Dignum ergo fuit ut ab eo sexu qui dignior esse cognoscitur, ad id quod omnium dignissimum est nomina transferrentur. Vides ergo quam convenienter optinuit usus ut unus ex duobus in Trinitate diceretur Pater, et alius diceretur Filius. Sed ne in his aliquid a nobis indiscussum remaneat quod infirmum auditorem juste movere debeat, idipsum quod de transsuntione nominum diximus diligentiori adhuc consideratione discutiamus. Mirabitur aliquis fortassis quare ad divina inde transferuntur nomina ubi ratio similitudinis obviat, et non potius inde ubi habitudinum collatio ex nonnulla parte concordat. Non enim habet humana natura ut filius procedat de solo patre secundum operationem nature; solus unus homo in genere humano processit de sola matre sine carnali patre, nec tamen sine operatione nature. Si igitur indignum est germanitatis vocabula transferre ad divina ex ea parte qua nonnulla similitudinis ratio alludit, quomodo congruum erit inde transsumere ubi proportionalitatis congruentia nulla occurrit?

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

Scriptures, to transfer the human names of relationship to the divine because of the likeness, we can properly say that the relationship between the unbegotten and the person, who primarily proceeds from him, is the same as that between a parent and a child. This procession of a person from a person is absolutely immediate, and it is so according to the basic order of producing and by the work of nature. This is now sufficiently clear from the above and does not require further explanation.

CHAPTER 3. That there are different modes of begetting offspring according to the diversity of nature I think that no one will doubt that there are different modes of begetting offspring according to the diversity of nature. But if we want to understand the unique mode of begetting in the super eminent and super excellent nature of the deity, then let us think about the goodness, the wisdom, and the power of the unbegotten, and we will perhaps sooner find what we looking for. It is certain that he who has the highest wise goodness cannot want anything at all except by, so to speak, the most intimate and highest reason, especially when it is about something divine. And when it is just as certain that he is almighty, then what he wants to exist here will also be here according to his will. For if he could not obtain what he wanted just by willing, how, I ask, could he truly be called almighty? So, when he produces a person who is of the same substance and equal to himself, it is something that he immutably wants by a necessary reason. Undoubtedly, for him the producing of an offspring will be the same as having totally pleasure in it.

CHAPTER 4. How appropriate it is that we are used to call the one of the two in the Trinity Father and the other Son We note that there are two sexes in the human nature, and therefore the names of the relationships vary according to the different gender; the parent in the one sex is called father, in the other sex mother; we call the offspring in the one sex son, in the other we call it daughter. But in the divinity, as we all know, there is no sex at all. Therefore, it is dignified that the name of the sex, which is regarded the most dignified, is transferred to that which is the most dignified of all. So, you see how appropriate it is when we are used to call the one of the two in the Trinity Father and the other Son. However, to avoid that we have not discussed something which rightly should disturb the weak listener, let us now discuss more carefully what we have said about the transference of names. Maybe someone will wonder why we transfer names to the divinity where the principle of similitude prevents it and not rather where a comparison shows accordance in some parts. For in the human nature a son does not proceed from a father alone by the work of nature; only one man in the humanity proceeded from a mother alone without a father in the flesh, however not without the work of nature. So, if it is not decent to transfer names of relationship to the divine in a case where there is some likeness, how appropriate will it be to transfer names where there is no congruence of proportions at all?

25 3

254

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

Notandum itaque in primis: si merito in illa deitate dicitur Filius qui ab uno solo procedit, si merito dicitur Pater a quo solo et unico originem trahit, admonemur ex his vocabulis quod principalis procul dubio germanitas ibi est, quemadmodum hic in nostra natura omnino esse non potest. Ex his, inquam, vocabulis compellitur carnalis animus de divina generatione nil carnale sapere, sed ad altiorem intelligentiam corde ascendere, et de tante profunditatis misterio nil temere secundum hominem judicare.

CAPUT V. Quomodo certa et manifesta ratione tenemus cur unum Patrem, alterum ipsius Filium dicamus Sed si ad illud recurrimus quod superius jam indubitata ratione collegimus, quod ad hujus perplexionis enodationem sufficiat elicere poterimus. Quesivimus et invenimus quod id sit innascibili de se prolem producere, exigente ratione hoc ipsum velle. Procul dubio si prothoplastus ille Adam naturale haberet ut pro voluntate etiam de se solo consubstantialem sibi et per omnia conformem producere potuisset, principali nichilominus germanitate jungerentur, et eisdem germanitatis nominibus hic pater, ille filius recte dicerentur. Nam si omnino conformes essent, nec in sexu quidem discreparent. Vides certe quomodo ex hac consideratione ratio manifesta occurrit et evidenter ostendit quam convenienter in illa personarum Trinitate ex duobus unus ad alterum Pater dicitur, alter ad unum eumdem ipsum Filius nominatur. Ecce in tanti misterii profunditate quomodo in simulacro similitudinis divine et nostre infirmitatis consideratione elucescit quidem nec dissimilitudo sine similitudine, nec similitudo sine dissimilitudine. Dissimilitudinis absque dubio est quod in nostra natura filius de solo patre procedere non potest; similitudinis autem quod, si hoc esse potuisset atque contingeret, eadem germanitatis vocabula in simili germanitate singulis convenirent. Ecce jam, ut credo, certa et manifesta ratione tenemus cur unum Patrem, cur alterum ipsius Filium dicamus: Patrem quidem illum qui est a nullo, Filium vero ipsius qui est ab ipso solo.

CAPUT VI. Cum sit ceteris duobus commune de Patre procedere, quid sit inter processionem unius et processionem alterius Habemus jam que sit germanitas unius persone ad alteram, restat adhuc querendum quid sciendum sit de germanitate amborum ad tertiam. Estimabitur fortassis ab aliquo quod amborum filius merito dici possit qui ab utroque inmediate procedit. Sed si est filii filius, nunquid innascibilis erit ei pater et avus, et ille ipsius innascibilis erit et nepos et filius? Hec autem tanto sunt diligentiori indagatione querenda quanto sunt occultiora, et necdum inveniuntur ratiocinationis enodatione discussa. Illud autem

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

So, in the first place it should be noted: if he who proceeds from one alone in the deity is rightly called Son, and if he, in whom he solely has his origin, is rightly called Father, these words tell us that there undoubtedly exists a principal relationship here which cannot be found in our nature at all. These words, I say, compel the carnal mind not to think anything carnal about the divine generation, but to ascend with the heart to a higher understanding and not to judge rashly according to human thought about so deep mysteries.

CHAPTER 5. How we give firm and obvious reasons for why we call the one Father and the other Son But if we return to what we already and without any doubt have understood above, we will be able to bring an adequate solution to this problem. We have sought and found that when the unbegotten produces an offspring, he wants this for a necessary reason.9 It is certain that if the first man, Adam, by nature had been able by his own will to produce a person of the same substance as himself and who was like him in all ways, they would be united by a principal relationship and in accordance with this, they would rightly be called father and son. For if they were like each other in all ways, they would not be different in sex. You surely see how clearly and obviously it appears from this consideration how appropriate it is that the one of the two persons in the Trinity is called Father to the other, and that the other is called Son of one and the same. See how the reflection of our likeness with the divine and the consideration of our weakness, in which there is not likeness without unlikeness and not unlikeness without likeness, lights up in such profound mysteries. For it is undoubtedly an unlikeness that in our nature a son cannot proceed from a father alone; but it would be a likeness if this could be so and also happened, and then the two names of relationship would match the two persons in a similar relationship. See, as I believe, we have now a certain and clear reason why we call the one Father and the other his Son: Father as he is from no one and his Son as he is from him alone.

CHAPTER 6. When the two other persons proceed from the Father, what is then the difference between the procession of the one and the other We know now the relationship between the first and the second person; now it remains to be investigated what we should know about the relationship of the two to the third. Maybe someone will think that he who proceeds immediately from both, rightly could be called the son of both. But if he is the son of the son, then will the unbegotten not be both father and grandfather, and will he himself not be son of the unbegotten and his grandson? This should be investigated so much more carefully 9 VI:3.

25 5

2 56

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

jam constat certissime, quod sit ceteris duabus personis commune de innascibili persona procedere. Querendum itaque in primis, juxta intentionem producentis, quid sit inter processionem unius et processionem alterius. Quamvis enim uterque procedat de voluntate paterna, potest tamen esse in hac gemina processione causa diversa. Sed si mente retinemus quod superius ratiocinando invenimus, in hac fortassis allegatione non oportet nos diu vel multum laborare. Manifesta namque ratio ibi evidenter deprehendit quod innascibilis condignum habere voluit, et pro voluntate habere oportuit, ut esset cui summum amorem inpenderet et qui sibi summum amorem rependeret. Nec solum condignum sed et condilectum habere voluit, et pro voluntate habere oportuit, ut consortem amoris haberet, ne vel aliquid sibi soli reservaret quod in commune deduci potuisset. Condignum itaque habere voluit, ut esset cui communicaret magnitudinis sue divitias, condilectum vero, ut haberet cui communicaret caritatis delicias. Communio itaque majestatis fuit, ut sic dicam, causa originalis unius; communio amoris videtur velud quedam causa originalis alterius. Quamvis igitur utriusque persone productio procedat, ut diximus, de voluntate paterna, est tamen in hac productione vel processione gemina ratio, alia et alia, et causa diversa.

CAPUT VII. Quod alia sit germanitas quam habet ad unum, et alia quam innascibilis habet ad alium Interest autem multum per omnem modum inter velle habere condignum et velle habere condilectum. Videamus autem nunc quid horum sit prius, quid horum vero posterius. Prius autem et posterius hoc loco intelligi volumus non temporum successione, sed ordine nature. Quid est autem velle habere condignum, nisi velle habere quem intime diligat et coequalitatis merito digne diligere debeat? Quid est vero velle habere condilectum, nisi habere velle qui secum a suo dilectore pariter diligatur et exibiti sibi amoris deliciis secum fruatur? Sed illud primum potest consistere in sola personarum dualitate; istud autem posterius omnino subsistere non potest sine personarum trinitate. Quantum vero ad ordinem nature prior est dualitas quam trinitas; nam ubi est trinitas, non potest deesse dualitas; potest autem dualitas esse etiam ubi contingit trinitatem deesse. Constat itaque naturaliter prius esse dilectum quam condilectum habere. Quantum ergo ad nature ordinem, principalior est processio illa cui inest procedendi principalior causa.

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

as it is so much more obscure, and since this problem has not yet been explained by reasoning. However, it is already most certain that the two other persons have in common to proceed from the unbegotten person. So, it must be investigated first which difference there can be according to the intention of the originator, between the procession of the one and the procession of the other. For even though both proceed from the paternal will, there can still be a different reason for these two processions. But if we keep in mind what we have found by reasoning above, it should maybe not be necessary to work long or much with this question. For then we found it clear and obvious that the unbegotten wanted to have, and by his will also must have, a person of equal dignity so that there could be someone to whom he could give the highest love and who could return the highest love. And he has wanted, and by his will also must have, not only a person of equal dignity10 but also a person who is loved equally together with them11 in order to have a partaker of his love, and so that he should not keep something for himself which could be shared by others. So, he would have a person of equal dignity in order to have someone to give the richness of his greatness, and a person who is loved equally together with in order to have someone to give the happiness of love. So, it was the fellowship of majesty, so to speak, that was the reason of the origin of the one; whereas the fellowship of love seems, as it were, to be the special reason of the origin of the other.12 Thus, even though the procession of both persons, as we have said, is from the paternal will, there are still two reasons and causes for these productions or processions.

CHAPTER 7. That the relationship of the unbegotten with the one is different from that which he has with the other However, there is a great difference in all ways between willing to have a person of equal dignity and willing to have a person who is loved equally together with. Let us therefore see which of these wills is the first and which is the second. However, here we are not going to understand the words first and last as a succession in time but as an order of nature. Now, what is the will to have a person of equal dignity other than to have someone whom one can love intimately, and because of the likeness who is worthy to love? And what is the will to have someone who is loved equally together with other than to have someone who is loved equally with oneself by one’s own lover and who enjoys with oneself the happiness of love given to oneself? The first can happen just in a duality of persons; but the last can certainly not exist without a trinity of persons. In the order of nature, a duality comes before a trinity;13 for a duality cannot be lacking in a trinity; but a duality can exist also where there is no trinity. So, it is certain that having a loved one comes naturally before having someone

10 Condignus. 11 Condilectus, cf. III:14–15.18; V:8. 12 Cf. III:2; V:7–8. 13 Cf. V:7.

25 7

258

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

Scimus autem quod secundum ordinem processionis erit procul dubio et ordo germanitatis. In humana pro certo natura primum locum tenet germanitas illa qui est hominis ad filium, secundum autem illa que est hominis ad nepotem suum, tertium locum tenet quam homo quilibet ad suum pronepotem habet, et consequenter quidem in consequentibus videre licet. Quid autem in hac nostra natura facit hos differentes germanitatis gradus, nisi diversus in diversis procedendi modus? Nam ubi non est in pluribus procedendi multiformitas, nec ulla in germanitate diversitas. Contingit namque unum eumdemque hominem habere liberos plures, sed propter eumdem procedendi modum una est germanitas quam habet ad omnes. Sic utique, sic pro simili vel dissimili modo processionis variatur procul dubio et qualitas germanitatis. Sed jam luce clarius constat quod uterque duorum de Patre procedat. Est tamen alius procedendi modus in uno, et alius procedendi modus in alio. Oportet ergo ut alia sit germanitas quam habet ad unum, et alia quam innascibilis habet ad alium.

CAPUT VIII. Quod ille qui a Patre Filioque procedit eorum filius recte dici non possit Principalior autem est illius processio pro modo nature quem constat ab innascibili solo procedere. Ubi vero est principalitas processionis, ibi et principalitas germanitatis. Obtinet autem principalem locum germanitas illa que est patris ad filium. Merito ergo, ut superius jam diximus, filius ipsius dicitur qui ab innascibili principaliter procedere comprobatur. Sed si alia germanitas est quam innascibilis habet ad unum, et alia, uti jam probavimus, quam habet ad alium, si unus ex eis ejus filius veraciter dictus est, alius ipsius filius veraciter dici non potest. Quid est enim dici unum alterius esse filium, nisi principali germanitate illi esse conjunctum? Sed ille qui tertia in Trinitate persona est, principali, ut probavimus, germanitate innascibili conjunctus non est; unde nec ejus filius recte dici potest. Sed scimus, sicut sufficienter in superioribus probavimus, quod ille in Trinitate tertius procedit a ceteris duobus. Si igitur non est filius unius, nec erit filius alterius. Nam prorsus uno eodemque modo procedit tam a Patre quam a Filio. Siquidem utrobique una eademque est per omnia ratio. Sed quoniam hoc satis ex superioribus patet, eadem replicare non oportet. Sed si non est Filii filius, nex Pater Filii erit ipsius avus, nec ipse nepos illius. Sed inter germanitatem que est patris ad filium, et illam que est ejusdem ad nepotem suum nulla occurrit media in humana natura. Que ergo, queso, erit germanitas illa quam habet Pater et Filius ad eam que est tertia in Trinitate persona? Certe in humana natura omnis processio persone de

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

who is equally loved together with. Thus, in the order of nature the more principal procession is the one that has the more principal cause of procession. We know that the order of relationship will necessarily follow the order of procession. So, in the human nature the relationship between a man and his son holds the first place, that between a man and his grandson holds the second place, that between a man and his great-grandson holds the third place, and so on in the same way. But what is it that brings about these different levels of relationship in our human nature other than the differences of the different ways of procession? For where there are not multiple processions in many persons there will not be a diversity of relationships. So, it happens that one and the same man has several children, but he has the same relationship with them all because of the same way of procession. Thus, without a doubt, the relationships are different according to a similar or a dissimilar way of procession. But this is already clear as day that the two persons proceed from the Father. However, the one has one way of procession, the other has another. So, consequently, the unbegotten must have one relationship with the one and another with the other.

CHAPTER 8. That the person, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, cannot rightly be called their son The person who proceeds only from the unbegotten has naturally the more principal procession. Where there is a principal procession there is also a principal relationship. And the relationship between a father and a son has the principal place. Therefore, as we have said already above, he who is proved to proceed principally from the unbegotten is rightly said to be his son.14 But if the relationship of the unbegotten to the one is different from that to the other, as we have demonstrated, and if one of them rightly is called his son, then the other cannot rightly be called his son. For what is it to be called the son of another other than to be united with him in a principal relationship? But, as we have demonstrated, the third person in the Trinity is not united with the unbegotten in a principal relationship;15 that is why he cannot rightly be called his son. However, as we have demonstrated sufficiently above already, we know that the third person in the Trinity proceeds from the two other persons.16 So, if he is not the son of the one, he cannot be the son of the other. Because he proceeds in absolutely one and the same way from the Father as from the Son. Indeed, they have both one and the same reason for this. But since this is sufficiently clear from the above, it should not be explained again. Now, if he is not the son of the Son, then the Father of the Son will not be his grandfather, nor will he be his grandson. But in the human nature there is no intermediate relationship between the relationship that a father has with his son and the relationship that he has with his grandson.

14 VI:6–7. 15 VI:7. 16 V:8.

259

26 0

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

persona principalis quidem est qui fuerit inmediata; aliter autem contingit, uti jam evidentissimum est, in natura divina. Nam aliam ibi invenis que est inmediata et principalis, aliam autem que est inmediata nec tamen principalis. Quoniam igitur que sit inmediata nec principalis in humana natura omnino non est, ex humanis ad divina vocabulum ejusmodi germanitatis transsumi non potest. Vides certe quod ad exprimendam germanitatem Patris et Filii ad eam personam que ab utroque procedit, usitati eloquii inopia omnino defecit.

CAPUT IX. Qua ratione Dei Spiritus dictus sit qui a Patre Filioque procedit Cui igitur pro more nostro germanitatis vocabulum aptari non potuit, quod in Scripturis divinis Spiritus Dei vel Spiritus sanctus dicitur, penitus preter similitudinis rationem non fuit. Dictus est spiritus qui ab homine procedit, et sine quo homo omnino non vivit. Si pro hujusmodi similitudine ille de quo loquimur Spiritus Dei dici asseritur, forte alicui hec adnominatio quantum ad illum nimis peregrina videbitur. Spiritum namque qui procedit ab homine constat ipsi homini consubstantialem non esse. Spiritus autem Dei ei a quo procedit, pro certo est consubstantialis et omnino per omnia equalis. Quid tamen mirum si pro similitudinis ratione dicitur spiramen Patris et Filii qui in divinis Scripturis dictus est digitus Dei? In eo autem quod Dei digitus dicitur, nulla inequalitas notatur, sed ad aliquam proprietatis sue similitudinem refertur. Digitum sane protendimus, cum aliquid alicui ad oculum ostendere volumus. Quando igitur Deus alicui interna et occulta sapientie sue Spiritus sui illustratione revelat, quid aliud quam quod videri vult digito suo demonstrat? Nam Pater quidem et Filius, unus idemque per omnia Deus, Spiritus sui inspiratione docet nos de omnibus. Nonne magister Veritatis Spiritum sanctum divinum esse spiramen velud per similitudinem docuit, quando discipulis apparens insufflavit et dixit: Accipite Spiritum sanctum? Sicut superius diximus, spiritus de homine procedit et sine ipso homo omnino non vivit. In eo igitur quod Spiritus sanctus Spiritus Dei dicitur, eterna de eo qui eternus est processio denotatur. Immo et in eo ipso quod est ei de Deo eterna processio, in eo ipso, inquam, intelligi datur quod Deo consubstantialis sit, quia de Deo procedere et eternitatem habere non potest quod Deus non sit. Quomodo autem singularis quedam ipsius proprietas exprimatur in eo quod Dei flamen vel spiramen vel Dei Spiritus dicitur, in sequentibus commodius explicabitur.

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

What is then, I ask, the relationship which the Father the Son has to the third person in the Trinity? In the human nature any immediate procession of a person from a person is principal; but this is different, as it is most evident, in the divine nature. For you find here a procession that is immediate and principal and another procession that is also immediate however not principal. And so, since there is absolutely no procession in the human nature that is immediate and not principal, a word for such a relationship in the human nature cannot be transferred to the divine nature. You certainly see that there is no expression at all in the common language about the relationship of the Father and the Son with the person who proceeds from both.

CHAPTER 9. For what reason the person, who proceeds from the Father and the Son, is called the Spirit of God So, the person, who could not have a name of relationship after our usage, is hardly called the Spirit of God or the Holy Spirit in the divine Scriptures without a certain likeness. Thus, that is called breath which proceeds from a man and without which a man cannot live at all. But if this was the only likeness that allows us to call the mentioned person the Spirit of God, this name may seem to someone to have a far too remote relation with this person. For the spirit that proceeds from a man is not of the same substance as the man. But the Spirit of God is certainly of the same substance and in all ways similar with the one from whom he proceeds. What wonder is it then, because of the likeness, to call him for the breath of the Father and the Son when he is called the finger of God in the divine Scriptures? For to call him the finger of God does not indicate an unlikeness but refers to some likeness with his property. Thus, we stretch out a finger when we want to show something to someone’s eye. And so, when God reveals to someone the inner and hidden things of his wisdom by the illumination of his Spirit, what other than his finger would God use to show what he wants to be seen? For the Father and the Son, who in all ways are one and the same God, teaches us about everything by the inspiration of his Spirit.17 Did the teacher of Truth not teach us as in a likeness, that the Holy Spirit is the divine breath when he appeared to the disciples and breathed on them and said: Receive the Holy Spirit [ Jn 20:22]? As we have said above, the spirit proceeds from a man, and a man cannot live without it at all. And thus, that the Holy Spirit is called the Spirit of God indicates that he has an eternal procession from the eternal. Indeed, by this fact that he is the eternal procession from God, by this very fact, I say, it is given us to understand that he is of the same substance as God because one who is not God, cannot proceed from God and be eternal. We will explain more specifically in the following how his individual property is expressed, when he is called God’s blowing or breathing or the Spirit of God.

17 Cf. Jn 2:27.

261

262

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

CAPUT X. Qua ratione procedens a duobus dictus est Spiritus sanctus Ad profundiorem intelligentiam nos vocat et magno misterio non vacat quod ille qui procedit de duobus, ut diximus, dictus est Spiritus sanctus. Nam Pater spiritus est, et Filius spiritus est, sicut ex Evangelio didicimus, quoniam Spiritus est Deus, similiter et Pater sanctus est, et Filius absque dubio sanctus est, et utrumque de utroque veraciter dici potest. Quod igitur utrique pari ratione convenit, quomodo solus ille quasi proprium nomen accepit? Sed adpropriatio ejusmodi denominationis omnino non videtur esse preter rationem exprimende cujuscumque proprietatis. Si vero simile quid habet divine proprietatis spiritus ille qui de humano corpore procedit et est corporalis, cur non multo magis spiritus ille qui de spiritu humano procedit et est spiritualis? Quis est enim spiritus ille qui de corde humano in aliis levius, in aliis vehementius spirat, in his tepidius, in illis ardentius flagrat, nisi intimus animi affectus et estuantis amoris inpulsus? Hinc est quod illi quidem dicuntur unum spiritum habere, uno spiritu incedere, quibus inest unum consilium, idem propositum, qui idem amant, idem affectant et pari voto desiderant. Sed spiritus iste spiritualis tunc veraciter sanctus est, tunc veraciter sanctus dici potest, quando pietate inpellitur et secundum veritatem movetur. Sine hoc spiritu nullus spirituum est sanctus, neque spiritus humanus, neque spiritus angelicus. Spiritus enim humanus tunc procul dubio sanctus esse incipit, quando quod pietatis est diligit, quod inpietatis detestatur et odit. Hic utique pietatis affectus, hic sane spiritus quando spirat de multorum cordibus facit in multis cor unum et animam unam. Ad hujus itaque spiritus similitudinem qui procedit et spirat de multorum cordibus, dictus est Spiritus sanctus ille qui in personarum Trinitate procedit ex duobus. Quis enim dubitet, nisi summa insania ductus, quod in Patre et Filio sit idem pietatis affectus et amor veraciter idem et unus? Hic igitur amor qui communis est ambobus, dictus est Spiritus sanctus; hic est ille qui a Patre et Filio sanctorum cordibus inspiratur, iste per quem sanctificantur, ut sancti esse mereantur. Sicut spiritus humanus vita est corporum, sic Spiritus iste divinus vita est spirituum. Ille vita est sensificans, iste vita est sanctificans. Merito ergo Spiritus sanctus dicitur, sine quo nullus spiritus sanctus efficitur. Habet itaque nomen ex re, habet nomen pro rationis similitudine.

CAPUT XI. Qua ratione solus Dei Filius imago Patris sit dictus Hoc itaque nomen quod est Spiritus sanctus soli uni quasi proprium attribuitur, quamvis juxta rationem substantie omnibus commune videatur. Notandum quod

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 10. For what reason the person, who proceeds from the two persons, is called the Holy Spirit It summons us to a deeper understanding, and it shows a great mystery to us, that the person, who proceeds from the two persons, is called the Holy Spirit, as mentioned. For we have learned from the Gospel that since God is Spirit [ Jn 4:24a],18 the Father is spirit, and the Son is spirit, and likewise, the Father is holy, the Son is undoubtedly also holy, and both things can truly be said about both of them. So, when this matches both for the same reason, why has only the third person received this as his proper name? But the appropriation of a name can certainly not be contrary to the reason for expressing some property. If the spirit that proceeds from the human body and is corporeal is similar to the divine property, how much more will be so the spirit that proceeds from the human spirit and is spiritual? For what is the spirit that blows from the human heart in some people more lightly, in other more violently, and burns more weakly in some and more strongly in other, other than the intimate feeling of the soul and the incitement of a burning love? This is the reason why it is said that some people have the same spirit, are walking in one spirit, when they have the same conviction, the same goal, love the same, are feeling the same and are desiring it unanimously. But the spirit that is spiritual is also truly holy, and can rightly be called holy, when it is driven by piety and moved by the truth. Without this spirit no spirits are holy, neither human nor angelic spirits. Thus, the human spirit begins to be holy when it loves what is pious and detests and hates what is impious. This feeling of piety is exactly the spirit, when it blows from the hearts of many, that in many creates one heart and one mind [Act 4:32a]. So, it is in the likeness to this spirit, which proceeds and blows from many hearts, that the spirit, which is proceeding from two persons in the Trinity, is called the Holy Spirit. Who will doubt, unless one led by complete foolishness, that there is the same feeling of piety and truly one and the same love in the Father and the Son? This is the love, which is common to both of them, that is called the Holy Spirit; this is the love which is inspired by the Father and the Son in the hearts of the holy, this is the love by which they are made holy so that they deserve to be called holy. So, just as the human spirit is the life of the bodies, so the divine Spirit is the life of the spirits. But the first is life which makes sensible, the other is life which makes holy. Therefore, it is right to call him the Holy Spirit without whom no spirit can be made holy. So, he has his name from the reality and he has his name by reason of likeness.

CHAPTER 11. For what reason only the Son of God is called the Image of the Father This name the Holy Spirit is only given to one alone as a proper name, even though it seems to be common for all three persons regarding the substance. It should be 18 Cf. VI:21.

263

264

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

sunt quedam proprietatum nomina que nulla ratione possunt convenire nisi uni soli persone. Hinc est quod solus unus dictus est Pater, solus unus dictus est Filius, sicut superius jam satis ostendimus. Hinc est quod solus Dei Filius imago Patris dicitur, hinc item quod solus ipse Verbum Dei nominatur. Fides catholica fatetur et ratio multiplex attestatur quod qualis Pater, talis Filius, talis Spiritus sanctus. Absque dubio uterque Patri consimilis, uterque Patri per omnia coequalis. Si sapientiam, si potentiam penses, si bonitatem, si beatitudinem cogites, nichil majus in uno, nichil minus in altero remota ambiguitate reperies. Si igitur Dei Filius recte dictus est imago Patris pro ratione expresse in eo similitudinis, cur non etiam Spiritus sanctus imago Patris recte dicatur, cum utrique similis et coequalis inveniatur? Sed hujus questionis nodum, ut credo, citius solvimus, si ad proprietatum considerationem recurrimus. Commune est omnibus, ut superius jam diximus, omnem plenitudinem habere; commune Patri et Filio tam habere quam dare; proprium autem Spiritui sancto habere nec alicui dare. In hoc igitur solus Filius expressam in se Patris similitudinem habet et imaginem tenet, quod sicut divinitatis plenitudo manat de uno, sic et eadem plenitudinis largitio manat et de alio; nec minus aliquid nec alio modo accipit Spiritus sanctus ab uno quam ab alio. Nulla autem persona omnino a Spiritu sancto plenitudinem divinitatis accipit, et iccirco imaginem Patris in seipso non exprimit. Ecce habes cur imago Patris dicatur solus Filius, et non etiam Spiritus sanctus. Sed hoc ipsum quod diximus propter simpliciores adhuc expressius, vel, ut sic dicam, grossius loquamur. Imago juxta consuetudinem humanam magis solet dici propter similitudinem extrinsecam quam propter similitudinem intrinsecam. Ecce hominis imaginem dicimus statuam aliquam, et hoc utique propter solam similitudinem extrinsecam. Nam si interiora statue cogites, non tam similitudinem quam dissimilitudinem invenies. Ut igitur de illa personarum Trinitate aliquid loquamur juxta humanum modum, quasi intrinsecus cuique est quod est apud semetipsum, quasi vero extrinsecus est habitudo quam habet ad alium. Eamdem autem habitudinem quam habet Pater ad Spiritum sanctum, eamdem, inquam, constat habere et Filium. Quoniam igitur Patris habitudinem in plenitudinis sue largitione preferre videtur, recte solus Filius Patris imago nominatur. Nam Spiritus sanctus nec Patris nec Filii imago dicitur, quoniam in habitudine quam diximus neutri assimilatur. Ecce in tanta misteriorum profunditate uni clare videre non possumus, similitudinem attrectatione palpamus. Sed nec illud pretereundum quod iccirco fortassis non inmerito Spiritus sanctus dicitur, ut eo ipso false opinioni obvietur, ne quis propter predictam ejus proprietatem de ejus benignitate minus digne sentire videatur.

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

noted, however, that there are certain names of properties which can only be applied to one person alone. This is why only one person is called Father, only one is called Son, just as we have shown sufficiently above.19 This is why only the Son of God is called the image of the Father and, likewise, that he alone is named the Word of God. The common faith confesses and the reason proves in many ways that as the Father is, so is the Son, and so is the Holy Spirit.20 There is no doubt that both are similar to the Father, and both are equal to the Father in all ways. If you think about the wisdom, the power, and if you think about the goodness and the happiness, you will find without any uncertainty that nothing is greater in the one, and nothing is less in the other. So, if the Son of God is rightly called the image of the Father in order to express his likeness to the Father, why is the Holy Spirit not also rightly called the image of the Father since he is similar and equal to both of them? However, I think we can undo this knot faster if we consider the properties again. As we have already said above, it is common to all the persons to have all fullness;21 it is common to the Father and the Son both to have and to give; but it is particular to the Holy Spirit to have and not to give to someone. By this, only the Son expresses the likeness to the Father and carries his image, as the fullness of the divinity pours out from the one and the same great fullness pours out from the other; and the Holy Spirit does not in any way receive more from the one than from the other. But there is no person who receives the fullness of the divinity from the Holy Spirit, and therefore he does not express the image of the Father. Now you know why only the Son, and not also the Holy Spirit, is called the image of the Father. But we can say this more explicitly or more crudely, so to speak, for the sake of the simpler minds. According to the human habit we use to call something an image because of its external likeness more than because of its internal likeness. You see, we call a statue an image of a man, and we only do so because of the external likeness. For if you think of the interior of the statue you will find more unlikeness than likeness. So, in order that we can say something about the persons in the Trinity according to the human habit, we must see what a person is in himself as something internal, as it were, and his relationship to some other as something external, so to speak. Now, the relationship that the Father has to the Holy Spirit is the very same, I say, as also the Son has to it. And since he seems to prefer the Father’s way of giving his fullness, it is right to call the Son alone the image of the Father. The Holy Spirit is not called the image of the Father or the Son, since he does not have a similar relationship as we have said about the other two. See, how we can feel our way by groping for the likeness in so deep mysteries where we cannot see clearly. But it should not be passed by that maybe he is exactly called the Holy Spirit in order to avoid the false opinion that his kindness could seem to be less worthy because of his property as mentioned.

19 VI:5.8. 20 Quicumque. 21 V:25.

265

26 6

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

CAPUT XII. Qua ratione solus Dei Filius Verbum sit dictus Item si queritur qua ratione solus Dei Filius Verbum dicatur, ex proprietatum nichilominus consideratione hoc ipsum eliciendum videtur. Ecce dicamus quod proferentis verbum sensus et sapientie ipsius a quo profertur solet esse indicativum. Recte ergo Verbum dicitur per quem Patris, qui fons sapientie est, notitia manifestatur. Sed ad ista fortassis respondes et dicis quia nomen Patris manifestatur non solum per Filium verum etiam per Spiritum sanctum; siquidem ipse Spiritus sanctus est illa unctio que nos docet de omnibus, ipse qui nobis omnia docet et suggerit, et in omnem veritatem introducit. Si juxta hanc rationem Verbum dicitur Filius, cur non similiter Verbum dicatur etiam Spiritus sanctus? Addamus itaque quia verbum nascitur de corde solo, et ipso propalatur proferentis intentio. Jure igitur solius Patris sola genitura Verbum nominatur, per quem ipse qui principalis sapientia est manifestatur. Juxta hoc itaque nuncupatio Verbi pro similitudinis ratione videtur convenire Filio soli. Sed adhuc fortassis iterum dicis quia aliud videtur esse verbum cordis, et aliud videtur esse verbum oris; illud de corde oritur, istud vero ore profertur. Illud interius latet, per istud cordis cognitio patefieri solet. Et neutrum eorum utramque dictarum proprietatum habet, sed una unius, altera videtur alterius. Sed dico quia, si subtilius penses, idem verbum esse invenies et quod corde concipitur et quod voce profertur. Quid enim est vox, nisi verbi vehiculum, vel, si magis placet, verbi indumentum? Nunquid est alius aliquis homo indutus, et alius aliquis cum fuerit exutus? Nunquid, queso, verbum quod ore profers proferre potuisses, nisi ipsum prius per cogitationem in corde habuisses? Et cum verbum prolatum ab auditore fuerit intellectum, nonne idem verbum incipit esse in corde suo quod prius erat in corde tuo? Si vero aurem haberet ad locutionem cordis, quemadmodum habet ad locutionem oris, non omnino opus haberet ut ei exterior locutio fieret. Ex his, ut credo, patenter intelligis quod idem verbum est oris quod cordis, sed in corde est sine voce, in ore vero cum voce. Absque dubio una et eadem veritas corde concipitur, verbo profertur, auditione addiscitur. Verbum esse habet ex solo corde, auditio autem ab utroque. Quoniam ergo verbum de solo corde procedit, et per ipsum cordis sagacitas innotescit, recte a simili Dei Filius Verbum Patris dicitur, per quem paterna claritas manifestatur. In Patre omnis veritatis conceptio, in ejus Verbo omnis veritatis prolatio, in Spiritu sancto omnis veritatis auditio, juxta hoc quod in Evangelio legitur de ipso: Non enim loquetur a semetipso, sed quecumque audiet loquetur. Non igitur Pater potest dici Verbum, qui non est ab aliquo, sed nec Spiritus sanctus, qui non est ab uno solo; sed solus Filius, qui est a solo uno, a quo emanat omnis veritatis manifestatio. De hoc verbo habes in Psalmo: Eructavit cor meum verbum bonum. In

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

CHAPTER 12. For what reason only the Son of God is called the Word In the same way, if it is asked for what reason only the Son of God is called the Word,22 then this seems also to be elicited by considering the properties. Look, let us say that a word normally indicates the reason and wisdom of the person who utters it. Therefore, it is right to call him the Word through whom knowledge about the Father, who is the font of wisdom [Qo 1:5], is revealed. But to this you will perhaps respond and say that the name of the Father is revealed not only by the Son but also by the Holy Spirit; thus, the Holy Spirit himself is the anointing that teaches us about everything [1 Jn 2:27b], he is the one who teaches and advises us about everything and leads us into all truth. So, if the Son is called the Word for the same reason, why is not also the Holy Spirit called the Word? Let us add, therefore, that a word is only born in the heart, and the word reveals the intention of the speaker. So, what is born by the Father alone is rightly called the Word, since it is through this that he who is the original wisdom, is revealed. According to this, the name Word seems by its likeness to be appropriate for the Son alone. But maybe you will say again to this that there seems to be a difference between the word of the heart and the word of the mouth; the one is born in the heart, the other is uttered by the mouth. The one is hidden in the interior whereas the other reveals the intention of the heart. And neither of them owns both properties, but the one has the one and the other has the other. But I say that if you think about it more sharply, you will find that it is the same word that arises in the heart and is pronounced by the voice. For what is the voice other than the vehicle of the word or, if you prefer this, the garments of the word? Is a clothed person different from an unclothed person? Could you, I ask, utter a word, which is uttered by the mouth, which you had not previously thought in your heart? And when the spoken word was understood by the listener, would not the same word that was first in your heart, begin to be in his heart? If he had an ear for the speech of the heart, just like he has for the speech of the mouth, it would not at all be necessary to speak to him in the external way. From this, I believe, you can see clearly that the word of the mouth and the word of the heart is the same, in the heart without a voice, in the mouth with a voice. There is no doubt that it is the same truth that is conceived in the heart, uttered by the mouth, and learned by listening. So, the word has its being from the heart alone, but the hearing is from both. Since the word proceeds from the heart alone, and since the wisdom of the heart is known by the word, it is right by this likeness to call God’s Son the Father’s Word by whom the fatherly glory is revealed.23 The conception of all truth is in the Father, the expression of all truth is in his Word, and the hearing of all truth is in the Holy Spirit, according to what we read in the Gospel about him: For He will not speak from himself, but he will speak whatever he will hear [ Jn 16:13b]. So, the Father cannot be called the Word since he is not from any

22 Cf. Jn 1:1.14; 1 Jn 1:1–3; 5:7; Apoc 19:13. 23 Cf. Jn 17:5.22.

267

26 8

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

hoc verbo loquitur Pater Spiritui sancto; in hoc loquitur spiritui creato, angelico, humano. Locutio autem, secundum superius dicta, alia intrinseca, alia extrinsica. Intrinseca vero est illa quam capit solus Spiritus sanctus, ad quam extrinsica est illa quam capit spiritus creatus. Et sicut interior locutio in nobis fit sine humani flatus cooperatione, exterior autem omnino non fit nisi ipso cooperante, sic sane in illa supereminenti natura interna illa locutio agitur auctore Patre solo. Nam solus Pater dicit, solus Spiritus sanctus audit. Exterior autem locutio peragitur auctore etiam flamine divino, hoc est Spiritu sancto. Hinc est etiam quod idem spiritus nunc flamen, nunc spiramen, nunc Spiritus Dei dicitur, per quem spiritibus angelicis, spiritibus humanis Dei Verbum inspiratur. Ecce habes quod superius proposuimus, cur unus solus in Trinitate dictus sit Dei Spiritus; habes nichilominus cur Verbum Dei dictus sit solus Filius.

CAPUT XIII. Secundum quem clarificandi modum solus Filius clarificat Patrem suum, unde et merito ejus dicitur Verbum Ecce dum unam questionem solvere laboramus, aliam incidenter incurrimus. Diximus quod Dei Filius Verbum dicitur eo quod ipse paternam claritatem loquatur, et qualis vel quanta sit per ipsum manifestatur. Sed sicut Filius clarificat Patrem suum, nonne et Pater revelatione sua clarificat Filium suum, juxta hoc quod ipse Filius ait ad Petrum: Beatus es, Simon Bariona, quia caro et sanguis non revelavit tibi, sed Pater meus qui in celis est? Sed attende ne forte secundum quemdam clarificandi modum Filius clarificet Patrem suum, secundum quem tamen modum Pater non clarificat Filium suum. Est enim Filius a Patre suo, non autem Pater a Filio. Apparet itaque in Filio paterne proprietatis gloria quanta sit, qui Filium talem et per omnia sibi equalem et habere voluit et potuit. Quante benignitatis, quante dulcedinis, quante benivolentie fuit quod de magnitudinis sue divitiis nichil sibi soli reservavit, nichil habere voluit quod non illi communicaverit! Ecce habes singularem quemdam clarificandi modum secundum quem Filius clarificat Patrem suum. Sed forte ad hec obicis et dicis quia eodem clarificandi modo Pater clarificatur etiam a Spiritu sancto. Sicut enim Filium coesse sibi voluit, ut haberet cui communicaret magnitudinis sue divitias, sic et Spiritum sanctum coherere sibi voluit, ut esset cui communicaret caritatis sue delicias. Utrumque paternam gloriam loquitur, in utroque paterna proprietas declaratur. Sed nota quod predicta paterne proprietatis clarificatio quam habet Pater in Filio, non est ei communis cum aliquo, quoniam Filius est a Patre solo. Illa autem clarificatio que relucet in Spiritu sancto, non est declaratio

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

other, nor can the Holy Spirit since he is not from one alone; but only the Son who is from one alone and from whom the revelation of all truth emanates. About this word you read in the Psalm: My heart has emitted a good word [Ps 45:2]. In this word the Father speaks to the Holy Spirit; in this word he speaks to the created spirit, the angelic and the human. However, according to what we have said above, the external speech is different from the internal. So, the internal speech is what the Holy Spirit alone understands, whereas the external is what the created spirit understands. And just as the internal speech in us occurs without the cooperation of the human breath, whereas the external cannot occur at all without the cooperation of it, so the internal speech in the most excellent nature occurs only because of the Father. For only the Father speaks, and only the Holy Spirit listens. But the external speech occurs by the divine breath which is the Holy Spirit. This is the reason why the same spirit soon is called breath, soon breathing, and soon God’s Spirit, by whom the Word of God is inspired in the angelic spirits and the human spirits. See, here you have the answer to what we proposed above, namely why only one person in the Trinity is called the Spirit of God; and likewise, why only the Son is called the Word of God.

CHAPTER 13. According to what way only the Son glorifies his Father, why it is also right to call him the Word See, while we are working on solving one problem, we have at once run into another. We have said that the Son of God is called the Word because he expresses the fatherly glory, and it is revealed by him both how and how great it is.24 But just as the Son glorifies his Father, is it not also the case that the father glorifies his Son [ Jn 17:1] in his revelation of him, according to what the Son himself says to Peter: You are blessed, Simon son of John, because flesh and blood did not reveal this to you, but my Father who is in heaven? [Mt 16:17]. But notice now if possibly the Son glorifies the Father in a way that the Father does not glorify the Son. For the Son is from his Father, whereas the Father is not from the Son. So, the Son reveals how great the glory of the paternal property is, when he both would and could have such a Son who is equal to him in all ways. What kindness, what sweetness, what good will it is not to hold anything of the richness of his greatness for himself, not to own anything that he would not give to him! See, here you have the special way in which the Son glorifies his Father. Maybe you will object to this and say that the Father also is glorified in the same way by the Holy Spirit. For just as he wanted that the Son should be together with him, so that he could have someone to whom he could give the richness of his greatness, so he also wanted to have the Holy Spirit with him so that there could be someone with whom he could share the happiness of his charity. Both express the glory of the Father, and both proclaim the paternal property. But notice that the mentioned glorification of the paternal property, which the Father has in the Son, is not shared with anyone

24 Cf. Jn 17:4a.

269

270

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

paternitatis, nec est solius Patris, sed est ei cum suo Filio communis. Nam Spiritus sanctus non est a Patre solo, sed prorsus pari modo tam a Patre quam Filio. Recte ergo Filius Verbum vel lingua Patris dicitur, in quo solo juxta predictum modum paternitatis gloria declaratur.

CAPUT XIV. Cur Spiritus sanctus dicatur donum Dei, et unde vel quomodo habeat mitti vel dari Diligenti consideratione dignum videtur qua ratione Spiritus sanctus Dei donum dicatur. Sicut in superioribus evidenti explanatione ostendimus, in Patre est plenitudo amoris gratuiti, in Spiritu sancto plenitudo amoris debiti, in Filio plenitudo amoris debiti simul et gratuiti. Quomodo autem hec omnia oporteat intelligi, satis ibi diligenter expressi. In illa vero summe simplici natura, ubi non potest esse compositio aliqua, pro certo non est aliud aliquid Spiritus sanctus, et aliud aliquid amor ipsius. Quid itaque est Spiritus sancti datio vel inmissio, nisi debiti amoris infusio? Spiritus sanctus ergo tunc homini divinitus datur, quando debitus deitatis amor menti humane inspiratur. Cum enim hic Spiritus spiritum rationalem intrat, ipsius affectum divino ardore inflammat, et ad proprietatis sue similitudinem transformat, ut auctori suo amorem quem debet exibeat. Quid enim est Spiritus sanctus nisi ignis divinus? Omnis enim amor est ignis, sed ignis spiritualis. Quod facit ignis corporalis circa ferrum, hoc agit hic ignis de quo loquimur circa cor fedum, frigidum et durum. Nam ad hujus ignis inmissionem, animus humanus omnem nigredinem, frigiditatem, duritiam paulatim deponit, et totus in ejus a quo inflammatur similitudinem transit. Nam ex succensione ignis divini incandescit totus, exardescit pariter et eliquescit in amorem Dei, juxta illud Apostoli: Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis. Sed cur, queso, dicitur per Spiritum sanctum magis quam per Patrem aut Filium? Sed scimus quia Pater auctorem vel datorem non habet; unde nec nisi gratuitum amorem habere valet. Filius autem, ut superius est dictum, habet amorem tam gratuitum quam debitum. In divino itaque amore proprietati Filii vel proprietati Patris conformari non possumus, qui simul utrumque vel saltem solum gratuitum amorem erga divina habere non valemus. In quo enim, queso, creatura Creatorem suum gratis diligere valet, a quo habet totum quod habet? In quantum igitur auctori nostro debitum amorem reddimus, in tantum pro certo Spiritus sancti proprietati configuramur. Ad hoc namque homini datur, ad hoc illi inspiratur, ut illi, in quantum sibi possibile est, configuretur. Mittitur autem hec datio, vel datur hec missio simul et pari modo quam a Patre tam a Filio. Spiritus namque sanctus ab utroque habet totum quod habet. Si igitur ab utroque habet esse, posse et velle, merito eum dicuntur mittere vel dare a quibus accepit ut possit et velit venire et nobis inesse.

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

else since the Son is from the Father alone.25 The disclosure that shines in the Holy Spirit is not a disclosure of the paternity, nor is the Father’s alone, but it is shared with his Son. For the Holy Spirit is not from the Father alone, but it is absolutely in the same way from the Father and the Son. So, it is right to call the Son the Word or the tongue of the Father in whom alone the glory of the paternity is revealed in the mentioned way.

CHAPTER 14. Why the Holy Spirit is called the gift of God and why and how it is sent or given It seems to be worthy of a careful consideration for what reason the Holy Spirit is called the gift of God. As we have shown above with an evident explanation, the fullness of the gracious love is in the Father, the fullness of the indebted love is in the Holy Spirit, and the fullness of both the gracious and the indebted love is in the Son. There I explained carefully enough how all this should be understood.26 In this the highest simple nature, in which there cannot be any composition, there is absolutely no difference between the Holy Spirit and his love. What is then the gift or the sending of the Holy Spirit other than the infusion of the indebted love? So, the Holy Spirit is divinely given to the human person in the moment when the indebted love of the divinity is inspired in the human mind. When this Spirit enters the rational spirit, it inflames its feeling with divine glow and transforms it into likeness with its property, so that the rational spirit can give to its author the love which it owes. For what is the Holy Spirit other than divine fire?27 All love is fire, but spiritual fire. What the physical fire does to the iron, the spiritual fire, that we talk about, does to the evil, cold, and hard heart. For in the setting on fire of the divine fire, the whole mind is set on fire and it is inflamed and becomes liquid in God’s love, according to the Apostle: The love of God is poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who is given to us [Rom 5:5]. But why, I ask, is it said by the Holy Spirit rather than by the Father or the Son? Now, we know that the Father does not have an author or giver; this is the reason why he is not able to have but a gracious love. But the Son has a love that is both gracious and indebted, as it was said above.28 But we cannot be transformed into the property of the divine love of the Father and the Son since we are not able to have both kinds of love of the divine at the same time, and not at all a love that is only gracious. How should the creature be able to love its Creator graciously when it has all, that it has, from him? But as much as we return the indebted love to our author, we are conformed to the property of the Holy Spirit. This is the reason why it is given to humans, this is the reason why it is inspired, so that they can be conformed to it as much as possible. This gift is being sent, or this sending is given, both by the Father and the Son at the same time and in the same way. For the Holy Spirit has all

25 Quicumque. 26 V:17–19. 27 Cf. Gregory the Great, XL Homiliarum in Evangelia 2:30 (PL 76:1223a). 28 V:19.

27 1

272

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

CAPUT XV. Quare speciali quodam dicendi modo potentia attribuitur Ingenito, sapientia Genito, bonitas Spiritui sancto Libet me hoc loco repetere quod recolo me alias scripsisse: quare speciali quodam dicendi modo potentia attribuitur Ingenito, sapientia Genito, bonitas Spiritui sancto. Quid sit potentia, quid sit sapientia, quid caritas vel bonitas, omnes in commune novimus, et cotidiano experimento probamus. In his itaque que manifesta et nobis nota sunt erudimur, ni fallor, ad eorum notionem que humane capacitatis modum excedunt. In his enim tribus forma quedam et imago summe Trinitatis exprimitur, et quoddam nobis velud speculum proponitur, ut invisibilia Dei per ea que facta sunt, intellecta conspiciantur. Que igitur sunt in trinitate ista respondent his que sunt in Trinitate illa, tria tribus, similia similibus, propria propriis, singula singulis. Videmus quia potest esse multiplex potentia, etiam ubi nulla est vel esse potest sapientia. Taceo de elementis vel quibuslibet rebus insensatis. In rebus autem animatis et brutis est potentia audiendi, videndi, potentia ambulandi, comedendi et bibendi et cetera hujusmodi. In his vero nulla sapientia est, nulla naturaliter inesse potest. Constat ergo, quod superius jam dictum est, quia potest esse multiplex potentia, ubi nulla potest esse sapientia. E contra autem ubi nulla potentia est, nulla sapientia inesse potest; nam posse sapere absque dubio est aliquid posse. Dat itaque esse posse non sapientia potentie, sed potentia sapientie. Item constat quod Lucifer ille qui mane oriebatur: multam habet potentiam, multam sapientiam, sed nullam omnino voluntatem bonam. Bonitatis est autem bene velle: quid est enim bonitas nisi bona voluntas? Testis itaque est Lucifer ille obduratus in sua perversitate, quod possit esse multiplex potentia simul et multiformis sapientia, ubi nulla manent bonitatis vestigia. E contra autem nulla bonitas inesse poterit, ubi sapientia vel potentia omnino defuerit. Nam posse bene velle est aliquid posse. Sapientie vero est discernere inter bonum et malum; et sine hujusmodi discretione nescit voluntas quid sit eligendum. Ut possis ergo bonitatem habere, oportet ut scias et valeas bonum eligere. Potentia dat posse, sapientia dat nosse, sine quibus bonitas non prodit ad esse. Contrahit itaque suum esse bonitas vera tam a sapientia quam potentia. In hac itaque rerum trinitate sola potentia non est de reliquarum aliqua. Sapientia autem est de potentia sola, bonitas vero de potentia simul et sapientia. Vides certe quomodo in hac rerum trinitate expresse sunt proprietates Trinitatis illius summe et eterne: ibi est persona Ingeniti, que non est ab alio aliquo; ibi est persona Geniti, que est ab Ingenito solo; ibi est persona Spiritus sancti, que est

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

that it has from both. So, when it has its being, power, and will from both, it is right to say that they send and give it, since it has received from them that it can and will come and be in us.

CHAPTER 15. Why it is said specifically that the power is attributed to the Unbegotten, wisdom to the Begotten, and goodness to the Holy Spirit I would like to repeat here what I recall to have written elsewhere: why the power is specifically attributed to the Unbegotten, wisdom to the Begotten, and goodness to the Holy Spirit.29 We all know and prove from daily experience what power, wisdom, and charity or goodness is. It is by these things that are evident and well-known to us, that we are educated, if I am not mistaken, for the notion of things that are above the human capacity. In the mentioned three words a form is expressed, as it were, and an image of the highest Trinity, and there is displayed a mirror for us, as it were, so that the invisible things of God are seen by the intellect through those things that are created [Rom 1:20].30 So, what is in the one trinity corresponds with what is in the other Trinity, the three to the three, the likenesses to the likenesses, the properties to the properties, and the individual to the individual. We see that there can be many powers also where there is no, and cannot be any, wisdom. I do not talk about the elements or any irrational things. But in the animate creatures and the animals there is the power to hear and to see, the power to move, to eat and to drink, and the like. But in these creatures, there is no, and cannot be by nature, any wisdom. So, as we have already said above, it is certain that many powers can exist where there can be no wisdom. And conversely, there cannot be any wisdom where there is no power; to be able to know is undoubtedly also to be able to something. So, it is not wisdom that gives power to exist, but conversely, power gives wisdom to exist. The same is the case with Lucifer who rose in the morning [Is 14:12 (Vulg)]: he has great power and great wisdom but absolutely no good will. Goodness is to will the good: for what is goodness except a good will? So, Lucifer, who is hardened in his wickedness, is a witness that there can be many powers and at the same time many kinds of wisdom where there is no trace of goodness. Conversely, however, there cannot be any goodness where there is no wisdom or power at all. To have a good will is also a power. And wisdom is to discern between good and evil; without this discretion the will does not know what to choose. So, for having goodness, you must know and be able to choose the good. The power gives the ability, and the wisdom gives the knowledge, and without them the goodness would not come to be. In this way the true goodness comes to be from both wisdom and power. So, in this trinity of things it is only the power that does not come from any of the other. The wisdom is from the power alone, and the goodness is from the power and the wisdom at the same time.

29 Cf. De tribus appropriatis personis in Trinitate (Ribaillier, 1967, 186–87). 30 Cf. I:7.10; V:6; VI:1.

27 3

2 74

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

tam a Genito quam ab Ingenito. Quoniam ergo in potentia exprimitur proprietas Ingeniti, speciali quodam considerationis modo merito ascribitur illi. Sed quoniam in sapientia exprimitur proprietas Geniti, merito et illa juxta eumdem modum ascribitur ipsi. Item quia in bonitate proprietas Spiritus sancti invenitur, merito et ei bonitas specialius assignatur. Ecce quomodo ex hac rerum trinitate surgit consideratio ex qua per exemplum ostenditur qualiter intelligi valet quod de divinis proprietatibus legitur.

CAPUT XVI. Quare Pater dicatur ingenitus, Filius genitus, Spiritus sanctus nec genitus nec ingenitus Quare autem Pater dicatur ingenitus, Filius vero genitus perfacile est videre, nec eget laboriosa expositione. Solus Pater a nullo alio est, et iccirco genitus nulla ratione dici potest. Nam si genitus esset, ipsum quod est ab alio accepisset. Merito ergo ingeniti nomen accepit, qui ab alio aliquo originem non habuit. Si vero Filium non genuisset, Pater nullatenus dici debuisset. Quod autem Filium ab eterno habuerit, ex predictis jam patuit. Filius itaque, quem ab eterno habuit, ab eterno genitus fuit, et merito dici debuit quod ab eterno esse accepit. Dicitur ergo genitus, nec solum genitus sed etiam unigenitus. Nam in Trinitate non est nisi unus Filius. Germanitatem namque illam quam habet Pater ad Filium, nec Pater nec Filius habet ad Spiritum sanctum. In humana natura ubi persona de persona gignitur, unus pater, alter filius nominatur. Recte ergo Spiritus sanctus genitus non dicitur, ne qui filius non est, filius esse putetur; nec tamen ingenitus dicitur, ne eo ipso is qui a semetipso non est, aliunde originem habere negetur. Nomen enim geniti quandoque strictius, quandoque largius accipimus. Non enim omnibus que gignere vel gigni dicimus, eadem secundum usum loquendi germanitatis vocabula attribuimus. Cum homo hominem gignit, hunc parentem, illum prolem, hunc patrem, illum filium, hunc genitorem, illum genitum norma loquendi dicere consuevit. Arbor ramum gignere dicitur, nec tamen arbor parens, nec ramus proles illius nominatur. Ramus florem gignit, nec tamen ille pater, hic filius dici consuevit. Vermis ex fructu gignitur, nec tamen hic genitor, ille hujus genitus nominatur. Ecce vermem secundum unam acceptionem genitum dicimus, et secundum aliam acceptionem genitum negamus. Generatio autem quando large accipitur, nichil aliud videtur esse quam productio existentis de existente secundum operationem nature. Productio vero, que secundum nature operationem non est, generatio juxta usum dici non potest. Eva de Adam secundum operationem nature non est producta, et iccirco non dicatur generata. Quedam autem naturalis productio predicta illa germanitatis nomina suscipit, quedam, uti jam diximus,

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

You can surely see how the properties of the highest and eternal Trinity are expressed by the trinity: there is the Unbegotten person who is not from any other; there is the Begotten person who is from the Unbegotten alone; there is the person of the Holy Spirit who is both from the Begotten and the Unbegotten. Since the property of the Unbegotten is expressed by the power, this is rightly ascribed to him according to this special consideration. Since the property of the Begotten is expressed by the wisdom, it is also right in the same way to ascribe that to him. And likewise, since the property of the Holy Spirit is found in the goodness, goodness is rightly ascribed to him more specifically. See, how the mentioned trinity of things leads to a consideration where it is shown by an example how to understand what we read about the divine properties.

CHAPTER 16. Why the Father is called unbegotten, the Son begotten, and the Holy Spirit neither begotten nor unbegotten Why the Father is called unbegotten, but the Son begotten, is easy to see and does not require a laborious explanation. Only the Father is from no one other, and therefore he can in no way be called begotten. If he was begotten, he would have received what he is from another. So, it is right to call him unbegotten since he has not his origin in any other. But if he had not begotten the Son, then he should in no way be called Father. And it is already clear from the above that he has had the Son from eternity.31 So, the Son, whom he had from eternity, was begotten from eternity, and is rightly said to have his being from eternity. He is called begotten, however not just begotten, but only-begotten. For in the Trinity there is only one Son. And neither the Father nor the Son has the same relationship to the Holy Spirit which the Father has to the Son. In the human nature where a person is born from a person, one is called the father and the other the son. It is right, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is not called begotten, so that it is not supposed that he, who is not a son, should be a son; however, he is not either called unbegotten so that we by this would deny that he, who is not from himself, has his origin elsewhere. Now, we use the word begotten soon in a stricter sense, soon in a broader sense. For not all who are said to beget or to be begotten are given the same name of relationship according to everyday language. When a human begets a human, we are used by everyday language to call the former a parent, the latter a child, the former a father, the latter a son, the former the begetter, the latter the begotten. A tree is said to beget a branch, but the tree is not called a parent, nor the branch a child. A branch begets a flower, but we are not used to call the branch a father and the flower a son. A worm is begotten by the fruit, but the fruit is not called the begetter and the worm not the begotten. See, how we call the worm begotten in one meaning, and we deny it to be begotten in a another meaning. Now, broadly understood, generation seems to be nothing but the production of an existence from another existence by the work of nature. A production that is not by the work of nature, cannot be called generation 31 Cf. III:6.21.25.

27 5

2 76

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

omnino non suscipit. Quoniam igitur productio Spiritus sancti, prout diximus, talis non est ut debeat dici filius, merito quidem non dicitur genitus. Sed quia ejus processio secundum nature productionem est, non debuit dici ingenitus. Rationabiliter itaque, sicut jam diximus, genitus non dicitur, ne qui filius non est, filius esse credatur. Rationabiliter nichilominus ingenitus non dicitur, ne in hoc naturalem originem habuisse negetur.

CAPUT XVII. Quid sit Patrem gignere, quid Filium nasci de Patre, quid procedere ex generatione, quid procedere sine generatione Quantum ad humanam spectat naturam, consubstantialem sibi de seipso producere idem videtur esse quod prolem gignere, quod filium generare. In natura autem divina, si bene perpenditur, multo aliter invenitur. Pater siquidem tam Filium quam Spiritum sanctum de seipso producit, uterque autem sibi consubstantialis existit. Et tamen uterque ejus filius dici non potest, quoniam utriusque productio uniformis non est. Si enim utraque uniformis esset, una secundum ordinem nature altera principalior non fuisset. Quod autem una principalior altera sit, superior disputatio invenit. Scimus autem quoniam in propagatione humanarum personarum multiformis est modus secundum diversos germanitatis gradus, sicut superius jam diximus. Nam alius est procedendi modus filii de patre suo, alius nepotis ab avo, alius autem pronepotis a proavo; quod vero dico de istis, videri potest et in reliquis. Inter omnes autem procedendi modos constat primum locum tenere et ceteris principaliorum esse illum procedendi modum qui est filii de patre. Nam ubi iste non precesserit, ceterorum nullus existendi locum omnino habebit. Quando autem transsumuntur nomina de humanis ad divina, constat utique hoc fieri similitudinis gratia, juxta id quod in Apostolo legitur: Quia invisibilia Dei per ea que facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur. Juxta rationem ergo similitudinis proposite, quid aliud intelligitur cum Deus dicitur Deum gignere, Pater Deus Deum Filium generare, quid, inquam, aliud oportet intelligere quam illum qui producit alium, de se procedentem juxta principalem procedendi modum producere? Credimus et rationis attestatione consecuti sumus Patrem gignere, et quod consequens est, Filium nasci de Patre. Creditur ex generatione esse processio Filii, sine generatione esse processio Spiritus sancti. Si queris quid sit Deum divinam personam gignere,

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

according to this usage. So, Eve did not proceed from Adam by the work of nature, and therefore she is not called generated. There are, as mentioned, some natural generations that are given names of relationship, and some generations are not at all given such names, as we have said already.32 So, as mentioned, since the production of the Holy Spirit cannot be said to be the same as the production of the Son, he cannot rightly be called begotten. But because his production is a natural generation, he cannot be called unbegotten. It is reasonable, then, as we have said, that he is not called begotten lest he, who is not a son, could be believed to be a son. And it is just as reasonable that he is not called unbegotten lest it could be denied that he has a natural origin.

CHAPTER 17. What it means that the Father begets, and the Son is born of the Father, and what is proceeding by generation and proceeding without generation When we look at the human nature, the production from oneself of someone, who is of the same substance as oneself, seems to be the same as bringing forth an offspring or bearing a son. In the divine nature, however, this is very different if you consider it carefully. Thus, the Father brings forth from himself both the Son and the Holy Spirit, and both are of the same substance as he. But both cannot be called his son, since the production of both is not uniform. If both productions were uniform the one would not be more principal than the other in the order of nature. And above, the reasoning found that the one is more principal than the other.33 We know that the propagation of human persons is multiform according to the different grades of relationship, as we have said already above.34 For the way of procession is one between a son and his father, another between a grandson and a grandfather, and yet another between a great-grandson and a great-grandfather; and what I say about these can be seen in the rest. Among all these ways of procession, it is certain that a son’s procession from a father holds the first place and is more principal than the other. For if this did not exist first, none of the other would exist at all. Now, when the names are transferred from the human to the divine, it is certain that this is done, thanks to the likeness according to what the Apostle says: For the invisible things of God are seen by the intellect through those things that are created [Rom 1:20].35 In accordance with this principle of likeness, what else should we understand when God is said to beget God, that God the Father begets God the Son, what else, I say, should we understand that he, who produces the other, produces the one proceeding from him in the principal way of procession? We believe and have followed the witness of reason that the Father begets and, consequently, that the Son is born from the Father. We believe that the procession of the Son happens by generation, and that

32 VI:8. 33 VI:8. 34 V:6; VI:2. 35 Cf. I:8; VI:1.

27 7

278

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

de se sibi conformem et consubstantialem secundum principalem procedendi modum producere, queris quid sit Filium nasci de Patre: hoc est unum de altero secundum principalem procedendi modum procedere. Ex generatione procedere idem videtur quod in procedendo principalem procedendi modum habere. Sine generatione procedere idem videtur quod in procedendo principalem procedendi modum omnino non habere. Generationem, nativitatem, processionem per omnia oportet intelligere pro modo et dignitate tante excellentie et proprietate supereminentis nature. Si igitur queris quis sit producendi modus, ille pro certo quem superius jam diximus. Producenti procul dubio qui est ipsa omnipotentia, idem erit de se alium producere quod ex ordinatissima causa idipsum velle. Ex principaliori autem causa id velle idem erit quod generare. Nam cum uterque procedendi modus constet in voluntate, differunt tamen pro cause alteritate; unde et in causa principaliori constat principalior modus procedendi. Vultis super his que diffusius jam diximus, audire verbum abreviatum? Ingenitum velle habere de se sibi conformem atque condignum idem michi videtur quod gignere Filium; tam Genitum quam Ingenitum velle habere condilectum idem videtur quod producere Spiritum sanctum. In illo nota communionem honoris, in isto communionem amoris. Quod autem conformem diximus, diligens lector querat attentius, ne forte ad id referri valeat vel debeat in quo juxta quamdam proprietatum conformitatem solus Filius Patris imaginem portat.

CAPUT XVIII. Item docetur alia ratione quid sit Patri Filium generare Sicut jam superius notavimus, paupertas humane loquele compellit nos sepe dictionum significationem variare. Hinc est illud, uti jam diximus, quod generationis significationem modo extendimus, modo restringimus. Quod dictum est de generatione, idem dicimus et de processione. Quod enim dicimus procedere, non ubique solemus uniformiter accipere. Quantum ad generalem acceptionem, idem esse videtur gigni quod existens de existenti secundum naturalem operationem produci. Juxta hanc acceptionem solus in Trinitate Pater ingenitus dicitur, Spiritus sanctus ingenitus esse negatur. Productio autem existentis de existente, pro diversis naturis, procul dubio invenitur esse multiformis. Pre ceteris autem omnibus pro dignitate nature, ille productionis modus precipuus videtur qui secundum naturalem, qui inanimatis

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

the procession of the Holy Spirit happens without generation.36 If you ask what it means that God begets a divine person, that he produces someone like himself and of the same substance in the principal way of procession, if you ask what it means that the Son is born from the Father, I will answer: it means that the one proceeds from the other in the principal ways of procession. Proceeding by generation seems to be the same as proceeding in the principal way of procession. Proceeding without generation seems to be the same as not having the principal way of procession at all. The words generation, birth, and procession should always be understood according to the dignity of their excellence, and the property of their super-eminent nature. So, if you ask what the way of procession is, I will answer that it certainly is what we have said already above. Without a doubt, the producer is the omnipotence itself, and so the production of another will be identical to what he wants for a most orderly reason.37 And willing this for the most principal reason is the same as generating. So, even though both ways of proceeding are due to the will, they are different as to the reason; and therefore, there will be the most principal reason for the most principal way of proceeding. Do you want to hear a short explanation of what we have said more broadly? It seems to me that for the Unbegotten wanting to have someone of the same form and dignity, is the same as begetting a Son; and it seems to me that for both the Unbegotten and the Begotten wanting someone they can love in common,38 is the same as producing the Holy Spirit. We notice that in the first case there is a communion of honor, in the second a communion of love. When we have said conform, the diligent reader will ask more eagerly whether perhaps this is able to or ought to refer to a conformity of properties according to which only the Son bears the image of the Father.

CHAPTER 18. Yet another reason shows what it means that the Father begets the Son Just as we already have noted above,39 the poverty of human language often compels us to vary the meaning of words. As we have said before,40 this is the reason why we sometimes make the meaning of the word generation broader, and sometimes narrower. And what is said about generation, we also say about procession. For when we say proceeding, we do not always understand it in the same way. In the general understanding of the word, to be begotten seems to be the same as to say that an existence is produced by an existence by a natural operation. According to this understanding only the Father in the Trinity is called unbegotten, and it is denied that the Holy Spirit is unbegotten. But the production of an existence from an existence is undoubtedly found to have many forms because of the different natures. Among all other ways of production, the principal one, because of

36 Cf. Quicumque; cf. VI:4.5.16. 37 Ex ordinatissima causa, cf. III:2.15; VI:3 on caritas ordinata. 38 Condilectus. 39 II:12; IV:11. 40 VI:17.

27 9

280

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

inesse non potest, appetitum agitur, et secundum quem solum genitor et pater dicitur ille qui generat, genitus et filius ille qui generatur. Juxta hanc considerationem possumus dicere quod idem videtur esse naturalis productio animantis de animante in conformitatem substantie quod parenti prolem generare. Non autem omnis productio animantis de animante secundum operationem nature potest in hanc diffinitionem concurrere. Vermis enim cum ex homine nascitur, quis eum hominis prolem, vel hominem ipsius parentem fateatur? Sciendum autem quod si homo non peccasset, si nature sue integritatem servasset, in producenda prole duceretur quidem non tam secundum appetitum animalem quam secundum consensum rationalem. Esset itaque homini in generis sui propagatione non tam appetitiva quam votiva productio prolis juxta conformitatem imaginis sue. Si itaque homo primordialis puritatis integritatem servasset, ad divine similitudinis rationem in ejusmodi magis accederet. Sed ut ad id redeamus propter quod et ista interposuimus, videtur idem esse Deo Filium gignere quod personam de sua persona naturaliter et pro voto producere juxta singularem quamdam configurationem proprietatis sue. Commune est omnibus in illa Trinitate plenitudinem divinitatis habere. Proprie proprium autem Spiritui sancto habere nec persone alicui dare. Commune autem Patri et Filio tam habere quam dare. Merito quidem ejus Filius dici debuit cui Pater hanc proprietatis sue figuram et imaginis formam intime inpressit et plene expressit. Propter hanc conformitatis expressionem solus Filius imago Patris dicitur, propter hoc solus Filius figura substantie illius recte nominatur. Quoniam ergo Pater in producendo Spiritum sanctum ei, ut sic dicam, imaginis figuram non inpressit, ejus filius dici non debuit, quamvis de eo naturaliter processerit. Sicut non in omni processione existentis de existente secundum operationem nature solet usus uniprolis, alteri parentis nomen accommodare.

CAPUT XIX. Quod Spiritus sanctus non sit imago Unigeniti, sed nec debeat ejus filius dici Sed sicut commune est Patri et Filio divinitatis plenitudinem naturaliter dare, sic est commune Filio et Spiritui sancto plenitudinem divinitatis a semetipsis non habere. Si igitur Filius recte dicitur Patris imago propter proprietatis similitudinem quam habet cum Patre suo, cur non eadem ratione Spiritus sanctus dicatur imago Filii propter proprietatis similitudinem quam habet cum ipso? Itaque tam Filio quam Patri videtur esse commune de sua persona personam producere ad imaginem similitudinis sue. Utrobique procedens de altero videtur esse producentis imago. Si igitur recte Ingeniti Filius dicitur quem producit de se ad imaginem similitudinis sue, cur eadem ratione non recte dicatur filius Geniti quem Genitus producit de se sub imagine similitudinis sue? Sed res rei imago dici non solet pro eo quod

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

its more worthy nature, appears to be the one which follows the natural appetite, which the inanimate beings do not have, according to which the one who begets can be called the begetter and father, and the one who is begotten can be called begotten and son. According to this consideration we can say that the natural production of an animate being from an animate being, regarding the conformity of substance, is the same as the parents’ begetting a child. But not every production of an animate being from an animate being by the work of nature matches this definition. For when a worm is born from a man, who will then say that it is a man’s child, or that the man is its parent? However, one should know that if humanity had not sinned and it had preserved its integrity of nature, it would produce children less by animal appetite rather than by rational consensus. Thus, in their reproduction, humans would produce children less by appetite than by promise in accordance with their image. So, if man had preserved his original integrity and purity, he would in this matter more easily come closer to the likeness to the divine. But let us return to what made us make this insertion, namely that God’s begetting the Son seems to be the same as his producing by nature and wishing a person from his own person who has singular likeness to his own property. Now, it is common to all in the Trinity to possess the fullness of divinity. It is special to the Holy Spirit to have and not to give. But it is common to the Father and the Son both to have and to give. Therefore, it is right to call him his Son in whom the Father intimately stamped and fully expressed his property and image. Because of this expression of conformity only the Son is called the image of the Father, and therefore the Son alone is rightly called the figure of his substance.41 Therefore, since the Father did not stamp his image, so to speak, on the Holy Spirit when producing him, he should not be called his son, even though it proceeded naturally from him. So, it is not in every procession of an existence from an existence by the work of nature that we use to give the one the name of child and the other the name of parent.

CHAPTER 19. That the Holy Spirit is not the image of the Only-Begotten and should not be called his son But just as it is common to the Father and the Son naturally to give the fullness of divinity, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit not to have the fullness of divinity from themselves. So, when the Son rightly is called the image of the Father because of the likeness of the property that he has with his Father, why is the Holy Spirit not called the image of the Son for the same reason because of his likeness of the property that he has with him? It does seem to be common to the Son and the Father to produce someone from their own person in the image of their likeness. Both proceed from another and seem to be the image of the producer. So, when he is rightly called the Son of the Unbegotten who is produced in the image of his likeness, why is not rightly for the same reason also he called the son of the Begotten who is 41 Hebr 1:3.

281

282

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

utraque similiter non habet, sed pro eo quod utraque simile habet. Quomodo ergo unus dicatur alterius imago esse ex eo quod uterque dicitur non habere? Neuter enim habet a semetipso esse vel aliquid a se ipso habere. Alioquin lapis recte dicitur imago hominis, et homo recte dicitur imago lapidis, quoniam neuter a semetipso habet quod habet, sed nec habere valet. Quod quam frivolum sit, nemo non intelligit. Sed dicis ad ista fortassis: “Sicut commune est Patri et Filio divinitatis plenitudinem dare, sic Filio et Spiritui sancto commune est eamdem plenitudinem accepisse. Cur ergo eadem affinitas germanitatis utrobique non ascribitur alterutris propter conformitatem alterne similitudinis?” Sed notandum quod sua Spiritus sancti acceptio est ei tam a Patre quam a Filio. Sed pro accipiendo non potest dici Patris imago qui nichil omnino accepit ab alio aliquo, cum sit unius in hoc ad alterum dissimilitudo magis quam similitudo. Non ergo ex eo in quo ei dissimilis est, ejus imago vel ejus filius recte dici potest. Sed si non est filius unius, nec debet dici filius alterius, quoniam germanitatem quam habet ad unum, eamdem procul dubio habet ad alterum, eo quod uniformiter omnino procedat tam ab Ingenito quam ab Unigenito, et totum quod accipit ab uno, accipit et ab alio, et eodem modo. Denique ex eo quod dicitur Spiritus sanctus omnem plenitudinem accepisse, ostenditur a semetipso non habere. Et ex eo, uti jam diximus, quod dicitur non habere, non recte dicitur alterius imago esse. Sed ubi ad imaginem et similitudinem producentis procedens non gignitur, juxta usum loquendi nec pater qui gignit, nec filius dicitur qui generatur. Legitur de Adam quod genuerit ad imaginem et similitudinem suam. In sola autem hujusmodi generatione solet usus dicta illa principalia germanitatis nomina accommodare. Ex his itaque que dixi, colligitur quod Spiritus non sit imago Unigeniti, sed nec ejus filius debeat dici.

CAPUT XX. Quod ibi sit querenda imago paterna ubi est mutua congruentia non sine aliqua differentia, nec differentia sine mutua congruentia Existimabit forte aliquis quod Filius iccirco dictus sit imago Patris quod ei sit in potentia, sapientia et bonitate per omnia similis et omnino equalis. Sed si ex hac consideratione diceretur Filius imago Patris sui, cur non eadem ratione Spiritus sanctus dicitur imago Patris simul et Filii? Nam ubi dictum est: Qualis Pater, talis Filius, statim adjunctum est: talis Spiritus sanctus. Ubi premittitur: Omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, ilico et subjungitur: omnipotens Spiritus sanctus. Dicitur quia Deus Pater, Deus Filius, ubi et adnectitur quod Deus sit Spiritus sanctus. Si Filius itaque dicitur imago Patris pro hujusmodi similitudine vel equalitate, quare non oportet de Spiritu sancto pro similibus similia sentire?

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

produced by the Begotten in the image of his likeness? However, a thing is usually called the image of another thing, not because of what they are not alike, but because of what they are like each other. Therefore, how can the one be said to be the image of the other because of something they both are said not to have? For none of them has being or anything from themselves. Otherwise, a stone is rightly said to be the image of a man, and a man is rightly called an image of a stone because none of them has, and cannot have, from themselves what they are. Everyone can understand how silly this is. But maybe you will say to this: ‘Just as it is common to the Father and the Son to give the fullness of divinity, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Spirit to receive the same fullness. So, why not ascribe the same relationship to them in both cases because of the similitude of both likenesses?’ But here it should be noted that the Holy Spirits receives from both the Father and the Son. And since he is receiving, he cannot be called the image of the Father who is not receiving anything at all from any other, and therefore there is more unlikeness than likeness between them. So, it is not right to call him his image or son because of an unlikeness. But if he is not the son of the one, he should not be called son of the other either, since the relationship that he has to the one undoubtedly is the same as that which he has to the other, as he proceeds absolutely likewise both from the Unbegotten and the Only-Begotten, and all that he has received from the one, he has also received from the other, and in the same way. And since the Holy Spirit is said to receive all fullness, he is shown not to have it from himself. And, as we have said already, no one is rightly said to be the image of another because of something that he does not have.42 But where the one who proceeds is not begotten in the image and likeness of the producer, we cannot, according to our usage, call the one who begets father and the begotten son. We read about Adam that he was born in his image and likeness [Gen 5:3]. Only in such a generation we use to employ the terms of the principal relationship. From what I have said here it is understandable that the Spirit is not the image of the Only-Begotten and should not be called his son.

CHAPTER 20. That one should seek the image of the Father where there is mutual harmony not without a certain difference, nor difference without a certain harmony Maybe someone will think that the Son is called the image of the Father because he is similar in all and totally equal to him in power, wisdom, and goodness. But if the Son is called the image of his Father on basis of this consideration, why is it that the Holy Spirit is not called the image of the Father and at the same time the image of the Son for the same reason? For where it is said: as the Father so the Son, it is added at once: and so is the Holy Spirit. Likewise, where it is said first: Almighty Father, almighty Son, it is added at once: almighty Holy Spirit. And where it is said God the Father, God the Son, it is added that God is the Holy Spirit.43 So, when the Son is said

42 VI:11. 43 Quicumque.

283

284

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

Sed valde notandum et cum summa diligentia considerandum quid pro capacitatis nostre exiguitate de divinis dicatur minus proprie, vel quid magis dicatur expresse. In Scriptura siquidem sacra multa quidem, et velud ex industria, minus proprie dicuntur, ut ab exiguitate nostra facilius capiantur. Sepe autem ea que dicit minus proprie, solet evidentiori expressione corrigere. Hinc est quod ubi premittitur: Eternus Pater, eternus Filius, eternus Spiritus sanctus, quasi ad veritatis expressionem statim adnectitur: et tamen non tres eterni, sed unus eternus. Sic sane ubi dictum est: Omnipotens Pater, omnipotens Filius, omnipotens Spiritus sanctus, subsequenter quasi corrigendo adjungitur: et tamen non tres omnipotentes, sed unus omnipotens. Dicto similiter quia Deus Pater, Deus Filius, Deus Spiritus sanctus, statim subjungitur: et tamen non tres dii, sed unus est Deus. Ubi itaque est simplex unitas et summa simplicitas, quid ibi facit qualis et talis? Nichil recte dicitur sibi ipsi simile, sibi ipsi equale. Ubi vera unitas est, non tam equalitas quam identitas convenienter dici potest. Pater potentia est, Filius potentia est, Spiritus sanctus potentia est, nec tamen nisi una et eadem potentia Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Quod dicimus de divina potentia, idem et de divina sapientia, idem per omnia et de divina substantia. Neque est aliud Dei potentia vel sapientia quam ejus substantia. In humana natura substantia filii convenienter dici potest imago patris sui, quoniam alia est substantia patris, alia filii. In divina vero natura una eademque substantia est Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Que igitur comparatio esse potest, ubi vera unitas est? In summe namque simplici unitate non potest similitudo vel dissimilitudo inesse. Imago paterna ibi est querenda ubi est mutua congruentia non sine differentia aliqua, nec differentia sine permaxima convenientia. Oportet itaque ad proprietatum considerationem recurrere, qui ista de quibus loquimur, cupit plenius agnosse. Est autem, uti sepe jam diximus, omnibus commune plenitudinem deitatis habere. Proprium vero est Patri non accepisse sed dare, proprium autem Filii tam accepisse quam dare. Convenientia itaque est in dando, differentia vero in accipiendo. Quomodo autem in hac mutua convenientia Patris imaginem Filius gestat, sicut superius docuimus, aperta ratio demonstrat.

CAPUT XXI. Qua ratione Dei Unigenitus dicatur figura substantie ipsius Opus est alta consideratione, si cupimus certius agnosse qua ratione Deus Dei Filius dicatur figura substatie illius. Ubi nominatur figura alicujus substantie,

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

to be the image of the Father because of such a likeness and equality, why is it that one should not think the same about the Holy Spirit for the same reason? But here one must clearly notice and consider diligently what has been said less precisely about the divine, because of our weak capacity, and what has been expressed in a better way. Thus, in the Holy Scripture many things are said less precisely, as on purpose, so that it could be understood more easily by our weak capacity. But often the less precise expressions are corrected by more clear expressions. So, when it is first said: Eternal Father. eternal Son, eternal Holy Spirit, it is added at once to express the truth, as it were: and yet not three eternals, but one eternal. Likewise, when it is said: Almighty Father, almighty Son, almighty Holy Spirit, it is added to correct it, so to speak, and yet not three almighties, but one almighty. And in the same way where it is said: God Father, God Son, God Holy Spirit it is added at once: and yet not three gods but only one God.44 Thus, where there is simple unity and the highest simplicity, what is the need of words as like and similar? It is not correct to say, ‘like oneself ’ or ‘similar with oneself ’. Where there is true unity, it is more appropriate to talk about identity than about likeness. The Father is power, the Son is power, the Holy Spirit is power, but the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are nothing but one and the same power. What we say about the divine power, the same we say about the divine wisdom, and the same in all ways about the divine substance. God’s power and wisdom are nothing other than his substance. In the human nature it is appropriate to call the substance of a son for the image of a father, since the substance of the father and the son are different. But in the divine nature the substance of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one and the same. What comparison can be made where there is true unity? For in the highest simple unity there cannot be any likeness or unlikeness. The image of the Father must be sought where there is mutual harmony not without a certain unlikeness, but no difference without the highest harmony. So, one should go back to the consideration of the properties, if you want to get a fuller understanding of the things we are talking about here. As we have said already many times, it is common to all the persons to have the fullness of the deity.45 The property of the Father is not to receive but to give, the property of the Son is both to receive and to give. So, there is harmony in giving, but difference in receiving. And, as we have taught above, the reason shows clearly how the Son bears the image of the Father in this mutual harmony.46

CHAPTER 21. Why the Only-Begotten of God is called the figure of his substance A more deep consideration must be made if we want to have a more certain knowledge about the reason why God the Son of God is called the figure of his substance [Heb 1:3].47

44 Quicumque. 45 III:2–3.8. 46 VI:11.18. 47 Cf. VI:18.

285

286

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

possumus hoc ipsum, ni fallor, duobus modis intelligere. Nam si ad humana recurrimus, ut per speculum videre possimus, alia videtur hominis figura que ejus substantiam informat, et alia est figura imaginis que eum representat. Utraque tamen figura est, utraque ipsius figura dici potest. Ubi itaque est substantia gemina, potest esse hinc informans, illinc representans figura. Sed Patris et Filii est una eademque substantia. Juxta itaque hunc modum non potest Filius dici paterne substantie figura. Sed si non potest dici figura juxta hunc modum representans, nunquid dici poterit figura informans? Sed si Filius Patrem informaret, eum utique eo ipso formosum redderet, et tunc non tam Filius a Patre quam Pater a Filio pulcritudinem acciperet. Sed in hoc nec ratio consentit, nec fides catholica hoc recipit. Testante Veritate didicimus quoniam Spiritus est Deus. Super his itaque que querimus, spiritualem naturam interrogemus. Spiritualis autem natura est anima tua. Anima vero tua aut formosa est, aut deformis ex voluntate sua. Formosam facit voluntas bona, deformis fit ex voluntate mala. Formosam eam facit sua benignitas, deformem sua malignitas. Ex his licet perpendere que sit figura spiritualis substantie. Procul dubio, dante Domino, eadem perfectionis forma potest informare animam tuam et animam meam. Si itaque juxta voluntatis similitudinem Patris ac Filii conformitatem vel configurationem querimus, absque dubio et sine omni contradictione inveniemus quod, sicut Pater vult habere personam procedentem de se, cui possit inpense sibi dilectionis delicias communicare, ita et Filius per omnia similiter et habere vult et habet pro voluntate. Sicut ergo superius diximus de imagine, sic et configuratio colligenda est ex proprietatum consideratione, ubi, uti jam diximus, invenitur mutua convenientia nec tamen sine aliqua differentia, nec differentia sine permaxima convenientia.

CAPUT XXII. Quod ea que de ingenita et genita substantia secundum catholicam fidem a sanctis Patribus accepimus credere debeamus, quamvis quam vera sint interim per intelligentiam capere nequeamus Sed dicis ad ista fortassis: “Ubi non est pluralitas, non potest esse conformitas. In vera autem divinitate nulla est pluralitas substantiarum, cum tamen veraciter ibi sit pluralitas personarum. Quid ergo est quod Filius dicitur figura paterne substantie, et non potius paterne persone? Nam, sicut dictum est, non potest dici paterne substantie figura quasi ipsam informans, nec, si utruisque est una eademque substantia, videtur posse dici figura paterne substantie figuram representans.” Sed notandum quoniam quod Filius ab Apostolo dicitur figura paterne substantie, idem

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

When someone is called the figure of someone’s substance, we can understand it in two ways, if I am not mistaken. If we go back to the human world, so that we can look through a mirror,48 then it seems that the first meaning is the figure of a human being who forms his substance, and the second meaning is the figure of an image which represents him. However, both are figures and both can be called somebody’s figure. So, where there are two substances, the one can be the figure forming the substance and the other the figure representing it. But the substance of the Father and the Son is one and the same. So, the Son cannot be called the figure of the Father’s substance in that way. But if he cannot be called the figure that represents it, maybe he could be called the figure that forms the substance? But if the Son formed the Father, he would also give to him his beauty, and then the Son would not receive his beauty from the Father, but the Father would receive it from the Son. But the reason will not agree with this, and neither will the universal faith. With the testimony of Truth, we have learned that God is Spirit [Jn 4:24]. So, when we deal with these questions, we must ask about the spiritual nature. Now, your soul is of spiritual nature. And your soul is either beautiful or ugly because of its will. The good will makes it beautiful, and the evil makes it ugly. Its kindness makes it beautiful, and its malice makes it ugly. From this it is understandable what the figure of a spiritual substance is. Undoubtedly, by the gift of the Lord, the same form of perfection can form your soul and my soul. So, if we seek the form or the image that the Father and the Son have in common by the likeness of their will, we will undoubtedly and without any contradiction find that just as the Father will have a person who proceeds from him and with whom he can share the delights of the love that he enjoys himself, so also in quite the same way the Son wants such a person and he will have him after his will. Therefore, just as we have said about the image, also being a figure should be understood by considering the properties in which, as we have said already, there is found mutual harmony, yet not without a certain difference, and difference not without the greatest harmony.49

CHAPTER 22. That we should believe what we have received from the holy Fathers about the unbegotten and the begotten substance according to the universal faith, even though we cannot, in this life, understand how true it is But maybe you are saying to this: ‘Where there is no plurality there cannot be any likeness. But in the true divinity there are not more substances even though there are truly more persons. So, why is the Son called the figure of the paternal substance and not rather the figure of the paternal person? For, as it has been said, the Son cannot be called the figure of the paternal substance as if the Son forms the Father, and if both are one and the same substance, it does not seem possible to call the figure of the paternal substance a representing figure’.50 But one must note that when the Apostle calls the

48 Cf. II:21; V:6. 49 VI:20. 50 VI:21.

287

288

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

valet ac si diceretur figura substantie ingenite. Nichilominus autem si diceretur figura ingenite substantie, idem esset ac si diceretur figura ingenite persone. Si Patrem dicis, si ingenitam substantiam, si ingenitam personam nominas, eamdem procul dubio personam designas. Procul dubio nichil aliud est Patris persona quam substantia ingenita, nichil aliud Filii persona quam substantia genita. Sed multi temporibus nostris surrexere qui non audent hoc dicere, quin potius, quod multo periculosius est, contra sanctorum Patrum auctoritatem et tot attestationes paternarum traditionum audent negare et modis omnibus conantur refellere. Nullo modo concedunt quod substantia gignat substantiam, vel sapientia sapientiam. Pertinaciter negant quod omnes sancti affirmant; ad id quod ipsi dicunt, auctoritatem invenire non possunt. Afferant, si possunt, auctoritatem, non dicam plures, sed saltem unam, que neget substantiam gignere substantiam! Nam ad hoc quod dicimus, auctoritates multas etiam sibi adducunt, et in morem Golie gladium in quo jugulentur deferentes, ad certamen procedunt. “Sed sic intelligendum est”, inquiunt, “quod Patres dicunt”. Bene! Patres dicunt quod substantia substantiam gignit; vestra expositio ad hoc contendit, ut credamus quod substantia substantiam non gignit. Fidelis expositio et omni acceptione digna, que hoc quod sancti Patres pariter clamant contendit esse falsum, et quod nemo sanctorum asserit contendit esse verum! Sed dicunt: “Si Filii substantia est genita, Patris vero ingenita, quomodo utriusque erit una eadem substantia?” Absque dubio substantia Filii est genita, substantia Patris ingenita, nec ingenita substantia est genita, nec genita est ingenita. Nec tamen sequitur ut ibi sit alia et alia substantia, sed alia et alia persona. Pro certo aliter est in natura divina, et aliter in natura humana. In humana natura si substantia unius alicujus sit genita, alterius vero ingenita, absque omni contradictione consequens erit ut alia sit substantia unius, et alia omnino substantia alterius. In divina vero natura, procul dubio unius substantia est ingenita, alterius genita, nec tamen consequens est ut alia sit substantia unius, et alia alterius, sed ut alia sit persona istius, et alia persona illius. “Non capio”, inquis, “non intelligo!” Sed quod per intelligentiam capere non potes, per fidei devotionem credere potes. Alioquin tibi tuisque similibus dicitur: Si non credideritis, non intelligetis. Cur non creditis quod universalem Ecclesiam cotidie de Christo confitentem agnoscitis: Deus est ex substantia Patris ante secula genitus? Sed forte non vultis hoc credere, eo quod non potestis exemplo probare vel per intelligentiam capere. Nunquid per intelligentiam capitis vel exemplo probatis quod unitas substantie possit esse in personarum pluralitate, et personarum pluralitas in unitate substantie? Nunquid magis excedit humanam intelligentiam illud quod pertinaciter negatis quam istud quod nobiscum veraciter affirmas? Si

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

Son the figure of the paternal substance [Heb 1:3], it is the same as if he had called him the figure of the unbegotten substance. Likewise, saying ‘the figure of the unbegotten substance’ is the same as saying ‘the figure of the unbegotten person’. If you say the Father, the unbegotten substance, the unbegotten person, you are certainly indicating the same person. Without a doubt, the person of the Father is nothing other than the unbegotten substance, and the person of the Son is nothing other than the begotten substance. But many rise up in our days who do not dare to say this, or rather, which is much more dangerous, against the authority of the holy Fathers and so many witnesses from the Fathers’ tradition they dare to deny and try to refute this in all ways.51 They will in no way admit that substance begets substance or that wisdom begets wisdom. They firmly deny what all the holy affirm; they cannot find any authority for what they say themselves. Let them, if they can, adduce an authority, I do not say several, but just one authority that denies that substance begets substance! For they are also themselves adducing many authorities that support what we say, so they go like Goliath into the fight with the sword that will cut their own throats.52 ‘But what the Fathers say is to be understood in this way’ they say. Good! The Fathers say that substance begets substance; your presentation contends that we believe that substance does not beget substance. What a faithful and fully trustworthy presentation it is that contends what the holy Fathers equally declare, to be false, and what none of the holy asserts, to be true! But they say: ‘If the substance of the Son is begotten, but the substance of the Father is unbegotten, how will they both have one and the same substance?’ Undoubtedly, the substance of the Son is begotten, the substance of the Father is unbegotten, and the unbegotten substance is not begotten, nor is the begotten unbegotten. However, it does not follow that there are different substances here, but there are different persons. Now, there is difference between the divine and the human nature. In the human nature, if somebody’s substance is begotten and that of another is unbegotten, consequently and without discussion the substance of the one will be totally different from that of the other. But in the divine nature, the substance of one is undoubtedly unbegotten and that of the other is begotten, but is does not follow that the substance of the one is different from that of the other, but that the person of the one is different from the person of the other. ‘I do not grasp this’, you say, ‘I do not understand this!’ But what you cannot grasp with your mind, you can believe with your devotion to faith. Otherwise it is said to you and those like you: If you do not believe, you will not understand [Is 7:9 (LXX)].53 Why do you not believe what the universal Church confesses every day about Christ, as you know: God is born from the Father’s substance before all time?54 But maybe you will not believe what you cannot prove by an example or can grasp with your mind. But can you grasp with your mind and prove with an example that there can be one substance in a plurality of persons, and a plurality of persons in one substance? Indeed, what you 51 See Peter Lombard, Sententia 1, dist. 5, cap. 1,1: ‘Ad quod, catholicis tractatoribus censentientes, dicimus quod nec Pater genuit divinam essentiam, nec divina essentia genuit Filium, nec divina essentia genuit essentiam’ (Grottaferrata: 1971), 81. For Richard’s argument see above in VI:23. 52 1 Kgs 17:51. 53 Cf. I:1. 54 Quicumque.

289

290

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

vero ejus assertionis enodationem nostis quam astruitus, cur eam in lucem non profertis? Cur eam fratribus invidetis? Et si vos latet utriusque enodatio, cur creditis sanctis Patribus in uno, et non eque eis creditis in altero? Si ipsis jure creditur, non aliud est Patris persona quam substantia ingenita, nec aliud Filii persona quam substantia genita. Ut autem breviter dicamus quod super propositam questionem sentimus, in hoc genita substantia ingenite figuram gerit, quod eamdem quam ista de se personam et eodem modo producit, et ejusdem doni causa et origo, auctor et principium existit. Eadem sane totius plenitudinis largitio per omnia manat tam ab una quam ab alia, tam a genita quam ab ingenita substantia.

CAPUT XXIII. Qua ratione convinci possit quod de ingenita et genita substantia catholica fides tradit Quando ad sublimium et invisibilium investigationem et demonstrationem nitimur, similitudinem scala libenter utimur, ut habeant qua ascendere possint qui contemplationis pennas nundum acceperunt. In illa itaque natura quam ad divinam imaginem et similitudinem factam agnovimus, divinum simile libenter querimus et elicimus, unde ad divinorum intelligentiam sublevari valeamus. Ecce sint duo quorum unus alicujus rei scientiam vel alicujus artis notitiam per seipsum excogitando invenit, et quicquid inde adinvenire potuit, alteri tradidit, et ad plenum et ad integrum erudivit. Quid ergo? Nunquid non eadem scientia, eadem veritas absque ambiguitate aliqua constat esse tam in corde unius quam in corde alterius? Alioquin alium non docuit scientiam quam alter invenit. Ecce unus eorum scientiam tradidit, alter accepit. Vides certe quod unius scientia sit ab alio accepta, illius, ut sic dicam, omnino inaccepta. Nunquid tamen aliud aliquid est ista quam illa? Si quicquid veritatis est in ista, totum nec aliud est in illa, procul dubio utriusque scientia erit essentialiter una. Constat tamen nichilominus quod accepta scientia non sit inaccepta, nec inaccepta possit dici accepta, cum tamen inaccepta et accepta, ut dictum est, sit essentialiter una. Ex hac rerum, ut credo, speculatione possumus perpendere quid oporteat de divinis sentire. Huic igitur specule innitendo videamus si ex his que nobiscum credunt, convinci possit quod de ingenita et genita substantia quidam necdum crediderunt. Credunt nobiscum quod Pater quicquid habet, a semetipso habet. Credunt nobiscum quod Filius a Patre accepit quicquid ab eterno habuit. Constat itaque quod plenitudinem sapientie Filius accepit a Patre. Concedunt nobiscum quod non sit alia sapientia Patris, et alia sapientia Filii, sed una eademque per omnia tam Patris quam Filii. Nichilominus tamen constat quod sapientia Filii sit accepta,

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

so firmly reject, is that not more beyond human understanding than what you truly approve together with us? But if you have an explanation about the statement that you affirm, why do you not show it in the light? Why do you hide it for your brothers? And if you do not have an explanation of both questions, why do you believe the holy Fathers regarding the one and not likewise regarding the other? If they are believed correctly, there is no difference between the person of the Father and the unbegotten substance and no difference between the substance of the Son and the begotten substance. Now, let us say briefly what we think about the mentioned question, whether the begotten substance bears the image of the unbegotten in that respect that it produces the same person in the same way as also the unbegotten does, and that it is cause and origin, author and beginning of the same gift. All the fullness flows out in the same measure and in all ways from the one as from the other, from the begotten substance as well as from the unbegotten substance.

CHAPTER 23. With what reason it can be proved what the universal faith hands down about the unbegotten and begotten substance When we strive to investigate and prove the highest and invisible, we freely use the ladder of likeness, so that they, who do not yet have got the wings of contemplation, can have something by which they can ascend.55 For in the nature, about which we know that it is created to the image and likeness of the divine, we can freely seek and search the likeness to the divine by which we can be lifted up to understanding the divine. Now see, there are two men of whom the one by thinking have gained knowledge about something or got understanding of some matter, and what he has found out, he has passed on to the other and taught him fully and perfectly. What then? Undoubtedly, will it not be the same knowledge, the same truth, that is found in the heart of the one as that in the heart of the other? Otherwise he has not taught the other about the knowledge that he has found. See, one of them passed on a knowledge, the other received it. You surely see that the knowledge of the one was received by the other, and that his own knowledge, so to speak, was totally not received. Is there, then, any difference between the knowledge of the one and the other? But if there is some truth in the one and this is fully the same in the other, then the knowledge will undoubtedly be essentially one in both. However, it is certain that the received knowledge is not not-received, and the not-received cannot be called received, although the not-received and the received is, so to speak, essentially one. From this speculation about these things I think that we can understand what we should think about the divine. Therefore, when we lean on this mirror we can see, on basis of what they believe together with us, if we can prove what some of them do not yet believe about the unbegotten and the begotten substance. They believe, like us, that the Father has from himself all that he has. They believe, like us, that the Son receives from the Father what he has had from eternity. So, it is certain that the Son has received 55 Cf. Proloque; I:1; V:6.

291

292

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

sapientia Patris inaccepta. Constat eque quod inaccepta non sit accepta, nec accepta sit inaccepta, cum tamen tam accepta quam inaccepta sit procul dubio essentialiter una. Quis adeo simplex vel hebes ut neget de sapientia divina quod possibile videt in scientia humana? Sed ut adhuc diligentius huic speculationi insistamus, illud in commune omnes novimus quoniam Filius habet esse a Patre ex Patris generatione; si ex generatione habet esse, ergo et sapere; nam non aliud est ei esse, et aliud sapere. Unde itaque est ei essentia, inde et sapientia. Quod autem accipit esse ex generatione, constat et ipsum genitum esse. Constat quod Filii sapientia, vel potius Filius, sapientia sit ex Patre genita. Nec aliud est Patrem Filio sapientiam dedisse, vel Filio accepisse, quam Patrem eum qui sapientia est generasse. Pater siquidem Filio et generando donat, et donando generat. Recte ergo de Filio dicitur quod sit genita sapientia, sicut et de Patre quod sit sapientia ingenita. Nichil vero omnino sapit unus quod non eque sapiat et alius. Utrobique itaque una eademque sapientia, cum tamen nec ingenita sit genita, nec genita sit ingenita. Si vero Filius est genita sapientia, consequenter et genita substantia. Neque enim aliud est ejus sapientia quam ejus substantia. Quod igitur dictum est de genita et ingenita sapientia, juxta eamdem consequentiam concedere oportet de genita et ingenita substantia. Frustra itaque quidam timent dicere quod substantia gignat substantiam, sapientia sapientiam, et quod Pater sit substantia ingenita, Filius substantia genita, quasi inde convinci possit quod alia substantia sit Ingenitus, alia sit Genitus. Sicut enim superius jam diximus, ex eo quod Pater est substantia ingenita, Filius genita, non ex eo sequitur quod sint alia et alia substantia, sed prorsus alia et alia persona.

CAPUT XXIV. Ex qua consideratione possimus colligere quod geminatio persone possit esse sine geminatione substantie Sed ut plenius elucescat quod de geminatione persone sine geminatione substantie jam diximus, superius posito exemplo adhuc diligentius insistamus. Superius docuimus quod una eademque scientia possit esse in duobus, si artis alicujus notitiam quam unus apprehendit, alterum ad plenum docuerit. Si itaque nomen doctrine tam passive quam active accipiatur, ut doctrina dicatur tam ejus qui docet quam ejus qui docetur, profecto si hoc gemino modo doctrinam

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

the fullness of wisdom from the Father. They admit, like us, that there is no difference between the wisdom of the Father and the wisdom of the Son, and that their wisdom is one and the same in all ways. Nevertheless, it is certain that the wisdom of the Son is received whereas the wisdom of the Father is not received. It is just as clear that not-received is not received, and received is not not-received, even if the received and the not-received undoubtedly is essentially one. Who is so simple and dull that he will deny about the divine wisdom what he sees to be possible in the human knowledge? But let us now pursue this speculation more carefully that we all know that the Son has his being from the Father by the generation of the Father; if he has his being from generation, he also has wisdom from generation; for there is no difference between his being and his wisdom. So, where his being comes from, also his wisdom comes from. But when he receives being from generation, it is certain that he is begotten. And it is certain that the wisdom of the Son is begotten from the Father, or rather, that the Son is that wisdom that is begotten from the Father. That the Father has given wisdom to the Son, or that the Son has received wisdom, is not different from the fact that the Father has begotten him who is wisdom. Thus, the Father gives to the Son as he begets him, and he begets him as he gives to him. It is right, therefore, to say about the Son that he is the begotten wisdom, and likewise about the Father that he is the unbegotten wisdom. The one does not think anything that the other does not think in the same measure. So, both has one and the same wisdom even though the unbegotten is not begotten and the begotten is not unbegotten. But if the Son is the begotten wisdom, he is consequently also the begotten substance. For his wisdom is not different from his substance. Therefore, what has been said about the begotten and the unbegotten wisdom must, following the same logic, be valid for the begotten and the unbegotten substance. Thus, it is without reason that some fear to say that substance begets substance, that wisdom begets wisdom, and that the Father is unbegotten substance, and the Son is begotten substance, as if it by this would be proved that the substance of the Unbegotten is different from that of the Begotten. As we have said already above, the fact that the Father is the unbegotten substance and the Son is the begotten substance does not have the consequence that their substances are different, but certainly that their persons are different.56

CHAPTER 24. From what consideration we can understand that there can be two persons without two substances But now, in order to throw more light on what we have said, that there can be two persons without two substances, let us pursue more carefully the aforementioned example.57 We have taught above that there can be one and the same knowledge in two persons when the one taught another fully about the knowledge of some sort that he had learnt. If therefore the word instruction can be understood both actively and passively, so that the instruction is both that of the teacher and that of him who is taught, certainly, if we

56 Cf. the previous chapter. 57 Ibid.

293

2 94

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

accipiamus, alia erit doctrina unius, et alia absque dubio doctrina alterius. Sicut scientia dicitur ab eo quod est scire, sic sane doctrina ab eo quod est docere. Utrobique est idem scire, utrobique autem non est idem docere: nam unus docet, alter docetur; unus erudit, alter eruditur. In uno itaque est doctrina docens, in altero doctrina discens. Alia ergo est doctrina unius, et alia alterius. Juxta hunc itaque modum alia potest esse doctrina tua, et alia mea, quamvis utrobique tam in discendo quam in docendo sit una et eademque scientia. Et si idem esset utrique nostrum substantia sua quod scientia sua, posset esse utrique substantia una sicut et scientia una. Et si utrique nostrum idem esset persona sua quod doctrina sua, esset utique persona sicut doctrina unius una, et alterius altera. Si scientia mea originem trahit ex tua, nonne suo quodam modo una gignitur ex alia? Si in humana natura scientia ex scientia gignitur, cur in divina natura non multo rectius sapientia sapientiam gignere dicatur, ubi sapientia idem quod substantia omnino esse convincitur? Sicut in humana natura scientia docens et scientia edocta est una eademque scientia, verumtamen alia et alia doctrina, sic in divina natura sapientia gignens et sapientia genita est una eademque sapientia, et quod consequens est, una eademque substantia, verumtamen alia et alia persona. Sicut itaque in humana natura ex eo quod unius scientia est accepta, alterius inaccepta, nec accepta sit inaccepta, nullatenus sequitur quod sit in eis alia et alia scientia, sed alia et alia doctrina, sic in natura divina, ex eo quod unius substantia est genita, alterius ingenita, nec genita sit ingenita, nullo modo sequitur quod ibi sit alia et alia substantia, sed alia et alia persona.

CAPUT XXV. Ex qua consideratione et quasi per exemplum confirmatur quod de Trinitate et unitate a catholicis creditur Dictum est de Patre quod sit substantia ingenita. Dictum est de Filio quod sit substantia genita. Dicendum et de Spiritu sancto quod sit substantia nec genita, nec ingenita. Quomodo autem hoc sit intelligendum, ex superioribus est manifestum. Sed quamvis solus Pater dicatur substantia ingenita, solus Filius substantia genita, solus Spiritus sanctus substantia nec genita nec ingenita, nichilominus tamen Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti est una eademque substantia, sicut et una eademque sapientia. Nam sicut sepe jam dictum est, non est aliud aliquid divina substantia, et aliud aliquid divina sapientia. Nam et ad hoc ipsum quod modo loquimur, paulo latius explicato superiori exemplo informamur. Ecce sint tres aliqui quorum unus scientiam aliquam invenit et docuit, alter ab eodem inventore didicit et scripsit, tertius legit et intellexit: primus habet a

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

understand the word in these two meanings, the instruction of the one and that of the other are undoubtedly different. Just as knowledge derives from knowing, so instruction derives from instructing. For both persons the knowing will be the same, but for both the instructing is not the same: for the one instructs, the other is instructed; the one educates, the other is educated. In the one person the instruction is instructing, in the other the instruction is learning. Therefore, the instruction of the one and that of the other are different. So, in this way your instruction and my instruction are different even though for both of us the knowledge is one and the same in both learning and teaching. And if for both of us our substance was identical to our knowledge, both of us would have one substance just as one knowledge. And if for both of us the person was identical to our instruction, the one’s person, just as his instruction, would be different from that of the other. If my knowledge has its origin in your knowledge, would the one not be born from the other in a certain way? If knowledge is born from knowledge in the human nature, why would it not be so much more correct to say that wisdom is born from wisdom in the divine nature where it is proved that wisdom and substance are totally identical? Just as the knowledge that instructs and the knowledge that is learnt is one and the same knowledge in the human nature, even though the instruction is different, so also the wisdom that begets and the wisdom that is begotten is one and the same wisdom in the divine nature, and consequently, the substance is one and the same, even though the persons are different. So, just as it is in the human nature, that the knowledge of one is received whereas that of another is not-received, and the received knowledge is not not-received, it does in no ways follow that there is a different knowledge in them but that their instruction is different, so in the same way it also is in the divine nature, that the substance of the one is begotten whereas that of another is unbegotten, and the begotten substance is not unbegotten, it does in no way follow that the substance is different there, but that the persons are different.

CHAPTER 25. From what consideration, and just as by an example, it is confirmed what the universal church believes about the Trinity and the unity It is said about the Father that he is the unbegotten substance. It is said about the Son that he is the begotten substance.58 And it should be said about the Holy Spirit that he is neither begotten nor unbegotten substance. How this is to be understood is clear from the above. But even though the Father alone is called unbegotten substance, the Son alone begotten substance, and the Holy Spirit alone neither begotten nor unbegotten substance, nevertheless the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one and the same substance, just as they are one and the same wisdom. For, as it has been said many times already, the divine substance is nothing other than the divine wisdom.59 But in order to understand what we are talking about here, we will evolve the mentioned example a little more.

58 VI:22.23. 59 I:17.18.23; II:18; III:22; VI:23.

295

296

TEXT AND TRANSLATION – l i b e r s e x t u s

semetipso, secundus a solo primo, tertius tam a primo quam a secundo. Nam ex eo quod primus eam invenit et alter scripsit, ad tertii notitiam pervenit. Si itaque eadem intelligentie veritas plena et integra est in omnibus, nunquid, quantum ad essentie veritatem, alia scientia est alicujus unius, et alia alicujus alterius? Denique si ille qui didicit audiendo didicisset legendo, vel ille qui didicit legendo didicisset audiendo, nunquid scientia consecuta erit in alterutris alia et alia? Si ergo in tribus personis potest esse una eademque scientia, quare in tribus illis Trinitatis divine non multo magis credatur esse una eademque sapientia? Nec tamen sapientia accepta ab uno solo est sapientia non accepta ab aliquo, nec accepta a duobus est sapientia vel accepta a nullo, vel accepta a uno solo. Absque dubio tamen in his omnibus nonnisi una eademque sapientia, et quod consequens est, nonnisi una eademque substantia. Substantia tamen Patris, sicut et sapientia, non est ei ab alio aliquo; substantia Filii a Patre solo; substantia Spiritus sancti tam a Patre quam a Filio; et que de sapientia dicta sunt, per omnia et de substantia dici possunt, quoniam sapientia et substantia in divinis non aliud et aliud ponunt. Et si scientia eruditi inde disciplina dicatur, quod ad plenum discatur, ut idem intelligatur disciplina quod, ut sic dicatur, discentia plena; et si id quod disciplinam dicimus, ad modum discendi referamus, juxta hanc utique acceptionem alia erit disciplina discentis excogitando, alia discentis audiendo, alia autem discentis legendo. Ecce secundum hanc acceptionem, ut vides, in humana natura potest esse disciplina trina, ubi non est nisi una eademque scientia. Quid ergo mirum si in illa natura, ubi est substantia idem ipsum quod sapientia, quid, inquam, mirum si ibi est persona trina, ubi non est nisi una sola substantia? Ecce quam plano et aperto exemplo confirmatur quod de divina unitate vel Trinitate fides catholica confitetur. Item et illud consideremus, quoniam si ego, et tu, et aliquis tertius eamdem et omnino equalem scientiam haberemus, nunquid majus aliquid esset mea et sua quam sola tua, vel mea et tua quam sola sua, vel sua et tua quam sola mea? Denique mea, tua et sua nunquid majus aliquid erit quam sola mea, vel sola tua, vel sola sua? Quis hoc dicat, nisi quod dixerit minime intelligat? Sic sane in illa Trinitate quelibet due persone vel tote tres majus aliquid non sunt, pariter accepte, quam sola persona Ingeniti, vel sola persona Unigeniti, vel sola persona Spiritus sancti. In hujus operis nostri calce illud replicare et memorie commendare volumus, sicut ex superioribus satis evidenter ostendimus, quod omnipotentie consideratione facile convincitur, quod non sit, sed nec esse possit Deus nisi unus; ex bonitatis plenitudine, quod sit personaliter trinus; ex plenitudine vero sapientie liquido colligitur quomodo conveniat unitas substantie cum personarum pluralitate. Richardus de Trinitate.

b o o k s i x – TEXT AND TRANSLATION

Look, there are three persons of whom one has found and taught some knowledge, the other has learned it from the originator and wrote it down, and the third read it and understood it: the first has it from himself, the other has it from the first alone, and the third has it both from the first and the second. Because the first found it, and the second wrote it down, it came to the knowledge of the third. So, if all have the same full and complete understanding of some truth, then would the knowledge of one of them, regarding the essence of this truth, be different from that of any of the other? Moreover, if he who had learned by listening had learned by reading, or if he who had learned by reading had learned by listening, then would the knowledge of any of them be different from that of the other? So, if there can be one and the same knowledge in the three persons, why should it not be believed so much more that there is one and the same wisdom in the three persons in the divine Trinity? And yet a wisdom, which is received from one alone, is not received from any other, and a wisdom, which is received from two, is not received from no one or from one alone. But there is no doubt that there is only one and the same wisdom in all of them and, consequently, only one and the same substance. So, the substance of the Father, just as his wisdom, has not come from any other; the substance of the Son is from the Father alone; and the substance of the Holy Spirit is both from the Father and the Son; and what is said about the wisdom can be said about the substance in all ways, since wisdom and substance are not different in the divine. And if you call the knowledge of a learned man learning because he is fully learned, learning is understood to be the same as full learning, so to speak; and if we refer what we call learning to the way of obtaining the learning, then, according to this understanding, the learning by thinking, the learning by hearing, and the learning by reading, are all different. You see, according to this understanding, that there can be three kinds of learning in the human nature, where there is only one and the same knowledge. Why wonder, then, if in the divine nature where substance is the same as wisdom, why wonder, I say, if there are three persons here where there is only one and the same substance? See, how by a simple and clear example it is confirmed what the universal faith confesses about the divine unity and Trinity. Let us also consider this, that if I, and you, and a third one, would have one and the same and in all ways equal knowledge, then would my and his knowledge be greater than yours alone, or would mine and yours be greater than his alone, or his and yours greater than mine alone? Finally, would mine, yours and his be greater than mine alone, or yours alone, or his alone? Who would say so unless someone who does not understand what he is saying? This is how it is in the Trinity that any two of the persons or all three persons taken together are not anything greater than the Unbegotten person alone, or the person of the Only-Begotten alone, or the person of the Holy Spirit alone. At the end of this work of ours we will repeat and remind of this, which we have shown clearly enough in the above, namely that it is easily proved by considering the omnipotence that there is and can only be one God; by the fullness of goodness that he is three persons; and by the fullness of wisdom it is clearly understood how the unity of substance fits together with the plurality of persons. Richard On the Trinity.

297

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ancient and Medieval Authors Achard of Saint-Victor, De Trinitate – De unitate et pluralitate creaturarum (d’Alverny, M.Th., partially ed., 1954, RTAM 21, 299–306). —, De discretione animae (G. Morin, ‘Un traité inédit d’Achard de Saint-Victor’, Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters, 1935, BGPMA Suppl. 3,1, 251–62). Adam of Saint-Victor, Sämtliche Sequenzen, lateinisch und deutsch (1955, München). Aelred of Rievaulx, De spirituali amicitia (1971, CCCM 1). —, Speculum caritatis (1971, CCCM 1, 3–161). Anselm of Canterbury, De fide Trinitatis (PL 158). —, Proslogion (PL 158). Augustine, De Trinitate (Mountain et al., 1968, CCSL 50A). Bernhard of Clairvaux, Sermones super Cantica Canticorum and Liber de diligendo Deo (Leclercq, J., and M. Rochais, 1957–77, Rome, 165–203). Dante Alighieri, La divina Commedia (Malato, E., 2018, Rome). Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentarius in Epistolas S. Pauli (MS British Museum cod. add. 11.853). Hugh of Saint-Victor, De laude caritatis (PL 176). —, De Sacramentis (PL 176). —, Didascalicon, De studio legendi, a critical text (Buttimer, C. H., SMRL 10, 1939). John Cassian, Conlationes XXIIII (translation Petschenig, M., 1886, CSEL 13 II). Pascasius Radbertus, Liber de charitate (PL 120). Peter Abélard and Heloïse, Petri Abelardi et Heloissae epistolae (1849, Petri Abelardi Opera 1, Paris, 1–236). Peter Lombard, Sententiae in IV libris distincte: Liber I et II (1971, ed. tertia, Grottaferrata). —, Sententiae in IV libris distincte: Liber III et IV (1916, ed. secunda, Quaracchi). Richard of Saint-Victor, De Trinitate (Ribaillier, J., 1958, TPMA). —, De tribus approprietatis personis in Trinitate (Ribaillier, J., 1967, TPMA, 182–87). —, In Cantica Canticorum explicatio (PL 196:405–524). —, De quattuor gradibus violentae caritatis (Ribaillier, J., 1955, TPMA, 126–77). —, De preparatione animi ad contemplationem liber dictus Benjamin minor (PL 196:1–64). —, De gratia contemplationis, seu Benjamin major (PL 196:63–192). —, De missione Spiritus sancti (PL 196:1011–1032). Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum Historiale (1624, Duaci, and facsimile 1965, Graz). William of Saint-Thierry, De natura et dignitate amoris (Verdeyen, P., 2003, CCCM 88, 177–212).

3 00

bi bl io g r a phy

Modern Authors Aagaard, A. M., (1973) Helligånden sendt til Verden, Aarhus. Alfaro, J., (1960) ‘Persona y Gracia’, Greg 41, 5–29. Andres, F., (1921) ‘Die Stufen der Contemplatio in Bonaventuras Itenerarium mentis in Deum und im Benjamin major des Richards von St Victor’, FS 8, 189–200. Angelici, R., (2011) Richard of Saint Victor, On the Trinity – English Translation and Commentary, Eugene, Oregon. Balthasar, H. U. von, (1976–82) Theodramatik II–IV, Einsiedeln. Barnes, D., (1990) Richard of St Victor’s Treatise of the Study of Wisdom That Men Call Benjamin, Lewison/Queenston/Lampeter. Baron, R., (1957) Science et sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Victor, Paris. Bekker-Nielsen, H., (1968) ‘The Victorines and Their Influence on Old Norse Literature’, in The Fifth Viking Congress Torshavn 1965, ed. B. Niclasen, Tórshavn, 32–36. Bligh, J., (1960) ‘Richard of St Victor’s De Trinitate: Augustinian or Abélardian?’, HeyJ 1, 118-139. Bonnard, F., (1904–07) Histoire de l’abbaye royale et de l’ordre des chanoines réguliers de SaintVictor, 1–2, Paris. Chatillon, F., (1948) ‘Au dossier de la caritas ordinata’, RMAL 4, 65–66. Chydenius, J., (1970) The Symbolism of Love in the Medieval Thought, Helsinki. Clark, M., (1966) ‘The Human Person and God’, DR 84, 15–30. Coolman, B. T. and D. M. Coulter, (eds), (2010) Trinity and Creation – A Selection of Works of Hugh, Richard, and Adam of St Victor, Turnhout. Cousins, E. H., (1966) ‘The Notion of the Person in the “De Trinitate” of Richard of St Victor’ [unpublished doctoral dissertation, Fordham University, New York]. —, (1970) ‘A Theology of Interpersonal Relations’, Thought 45, 56–82. Coulter, D. M., (2006) Per visibilia ad invisibilia – Theological Method in Richard of St Victor (d.1173), Turnhout. Davy, M.-M., (1932) Un traité de l’amour au XIIe siècle – Pierre de Blois, Paris. Dumeige, G., (1952) Richard de Saint-Victor et l’idée chrétienne de l’amour, Paris. —, (1963) ‘Efforts métaphysiques chez Richard de Saint-Victor’, MM 2, 207–14. Ebner, J., (1917) Die Erkenntnislehre Richards von St Viktor, BGPMA 19,4. Éthier, A.-M., (1939) Le ‘De Trinitate’ de Richard de Saint-Victor, PIEMO 9. Fraigneau-Julien, B., (1965) ‘Réflection sur la signification religieuse du mystère de la sainte Trinité’, NRT 87, 673–87. Gélot, M.-J., (1938) Les doctrines psychologiques de Richard de Saint-Victor sur la procession du Saint-Esprit et leur influence sur Saint Bonaventure dans son commentaire sur le livre des Sentences, Tunis. Ghellinck, J. de, (1946) L’Essor de la littérature latine au XIIe siècle, ML.H 4. Gilson, É., (1921) Études de philosophie médiévale, PFLUS 3. —, (1944) ‘L’Esprit de la philosophie médiévale’, EPM 33, 214–33. —, (1955) History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, London, 65–178. Goy, R., (2005) Die handschriftliche Überlieferung der Werke Richards von St Viktor im Mittelalter, Turnhout. Grabmann, M., (1911) Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode 2, Die scholastische Methode im 12. und beginnenden 13. Jahrhundert, Freiburg im Breisgau.

b i b li o graphy

Grünewald, G., (1907) Die Geschichte der Gottesbeweise im Mittelalter bis zum Ausgang der Hochscholatik, BGPMA 6,3. Guimet, F., (1943–45) ‘Notes en marge d’un texte de Richard de Saint-Victor’, AHDLM 14, 371–94. —, (1948) ‘“Caritas ordinata” et “amor discretus” dans la théologie trinitaire de Richard de Saint-Victor’ RMAL 4, 225–36. Haberkern, E., (2000) Richard von St Viktor: ‘Benjamin Minor’, deutsch – Ein neu aufgefundenes Handschriftenfragment – Edition und Untersuchung, Göppingen. Heitz, Th., (1909) Essai historique sur les rapports entre la philosophie et la foi, de Bérenger de Tours à Thomas d’Aquin, Paris. Henry, P., (1960) Saint Augustine on Personality, New York. Hofmann, P., (1984) ‘Analogie und Person, Zur Trinitätstheologie Richards von St.-Victor’, in Theologie und Philosophie 59, 191–234. Ivánka, E. von, (1955) ‘Zur Überwindung des neuplatonischen Intellektualismus in der Deutung der Mystik: intelligentia oder principalis affectio’, Schol 30, 185–94. —, (1956) ‘Zum Problem des christlichen Neuplatonismus’, Schol 31, 31–40. Jacquin, A. M., (1930) ‘Les “rationes necessariae” de saint Anselme’, BiblThom 14, 67–78. Jansen, B., (1930) ‘Zur Lehre des hl. Augustinus von dem Erkennen der “rationes aeternae”’, Aurelius Augustinus, Cologne, 111–36. Javelet, R., (1959) ‘Psychologie des auteurs spirituels du XIIe siècle’, RSR 33, 62–95. —, (1961) ‘Intelligence et amour chez les auteurs spirituels du XIIe siècle’, RAM 37, 273-90 and 429–50. —, (1962 and 1963) ‘Thomas Gallus et Richard de Saint-Victor Mystiques’, RTAM 29, 206–33, and RTAM 30, 88–121. John of Toulouse, (1650) ‘Vita Richardi’, M. Richardi S. Victoris parisiensis doctoris præclarissimi Opera, Rouen. Kirchberger, C., (1957) Richard of Saint-Victor, Selected Writings on Contemplation, London. (translation of the Benjamin major 1,1–7, 4,1–7, 4,15–16, 4,21–23, and 5,1–19). Landgraf, A., (1935) La théorie de la contemplation mystique dans l’oeuvres de Richard de Saint-Victor, Paris. —, (1948) Einführung in die Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Frühscholastik unter dem Gesichtpunkte der Schulenbildung, Regensburg. Lazzari, F., (1965) Il Contemptus Mundi nella scuola di San Vittore, Napoli. Lewis, C. S., (1958) The Allegory of Love, New York. Martène, E. et al. (eds) (1737) ‘Antiquae consuetudines Canonicorum Regularum insignis Monasterii Sancti Victoris ad usum Monasterii Sancti Evurtii accomodatae’, in De antiquis Ecclesiae ritibus, Antwerp, 3, 701–814. Matter, E. A. and L. Smith, (eds), (2012) From Knowledge to Beatitude – St Victor, TwelfthCentury Scholars, and Beyond. Essays in Honor of Grover A. Zinn, Jr., Notre Dame, Indiana. Moltmann, J., (1980) Trinität und Reich Gottes, Zur Gotteslehre, München. Mühlen, H., (1969) Der Heilige Geist als Person. In der Trinität, bei der Inkarnation und im Gnadenbund: Ich-Du-Wir, Münster. Nakamura, H., (2011) ‘amor invisibilium’ – Die Liebe im Denken Richards von Sankt Viktor (d.1173), Münster. Nédoncelle, M., (1954) ‘L’Intersubjectivité humaine est-elle pour saint Augustin une image de la Trinité?’, in Augustinus Magister, Paris, 595–602.

301

302

bi bl io g r a phy

Ohnsorge, W., (1929) Päpstliche und gegenpäpstliche Legaten in Deutschland und Skandinavien 1159–1181, HS 188. Ottaviano, C., (1933) Riccardo di San Vittore, la vita, le opere, il pensiero, MRANL 6,4,5, 409–43. Penido, T.-L., (1931) ‘Le rôle de l’analogie en théologie dogmatique’, BiblThom 15, 208–12. —, (1937) ‘Gloses sur la procession d’amour dans la Trinité’, ETL 14, 33–68. Pourrat, P., (1921) La spiritualité chrétienne 2, Le moyen âge, Paris. Régnon, Th. de, (1892) Études de théologie positive sur la sainte Trinité, Théories scholastiques, Études X: Théorie de Richard de S. Victor, Paris, 235–335. Ribaillier, J., (1958) Richard de Saint-Victor: De Trinitate – texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables, Paris. Robillard, J., (1939) ‘Les six genres de contemplation chez Richard de Saint-Victor et leur origine platonicienne’, RSPT 28,1, 229–33. Roos, H., (1973) ‘Richard af St Victor og det 12. århundredes teologi’, Lumen 47–48, Copenhagen, 114–28. Rosemann, Ph. W., (2004a) Peter Lombard, Oxford. —, (2004b) ‘Amor amicitiae: On the Love that is Friendship’, RTPM 6, 409–36. Rousselot, P., (1908) Pour l’histoire du problème de l’amour au moyen âge, BGPMA 6,6. Rydstrøm-Poulsen, A., (1986) Om Treenigheden. Introduktion og oversættelse, Copenhagen. —, (2002) The Gracious God – Gratia in Augustine and The Twelfth Century, Copenhagen. Salet, G., (1959) Richard de Saint-Victor, La Trinité, SC 63. —, (1964) ‘Les chemins de Dieu d’après Richard de Saint-Victor’, Theol 57, 73–88. Schmaus, M., (1930) ‘Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Angelicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus’, BGPMA 29, 656–58. Schniertshauer, M., (1996) Consummatio Caritatis – Eine Untersuchung zu Richard von St Victors De Trinitate, Mainz. Simonis, W., (1972) ‘Trinität und Vernunft. Erforschungen zur Möglichkeit einer rationalen Trinitätslehre bei Anselm, Abaelard, den Viktorinern’, FTS 12, 1–112. Smalley, B., (1952) The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, Oxford. Spicq, C., (1946) ‘Esquisse d’un histoire de l’exégèse latine au moyen âge’, BiblThom 26, 128–31. Stohr, A., (1925) ‘Die Hauptrichtungen der spekulativen Trinitätslehre in der Theologie des XIIIten Jahrhunderts’, TQ 106, 113–35. Synan, E. A., (1972) The Fountain of Philosophy, Toronto. Taylor, J., (1961) Didascalicon: A Medieval Guide to the Arts, RC.SS 64. Verrier, P., (1928) ‘Les rapport intellectuels et artistiques entre la France et les pays scandinaves’, HT 28 suppl., 41–74. Vigneaux, P., (1938) La pensée au moyen âge, Paris. Wipfler, H., (1965) Die Trinitätsspekulationen des Petrus von Poitiers und die Trinitätsspekulation des Richard von St Viktor. Ein Vergleich, BGPMA 41,1. —, (1977) Grundfragen der Trinitätsspekulation. Die Analogiefrage in der Trinitätstheologie, Regensburg. Wulf, M. de, (1934) Histoire de la Philosophie médiévale 1, Louvain-Paris. Yankowski, S. V., (1960) Richard of Sct. Victor, Benjamin minor, translated from Latin, Ausbach, 17–97.

Index of Names

Aagaard, A.M.  27 Abélard, P.  23, 16, 20, 23, 32, 44, 135, 189 Absalon of Lund  24, 25 Achard of Saint-Victor  23, 24 Adam of Saint-Victor  23, 24 Aelred of Rievaulx  11, 16 Albertus Magnus  17 Alexander of Hales  17, 65 Alfaro, J.  18 d’Alverny, M.-Th.  23 Anders Suneson  24 Andres, F.  33 Andrew of Saint-Victor  23 Angelici, R.  14, 18 Anselm of Canterbury  29, 31, 32, 73 Alexander III  25 Aristotle 24 Augustine  11, 14, 15, 17, 29, 31, 123, 187, 195 Balthasar, H.U. von  18 Barnes, D.  14 Baron, R.  22 Bede the Venerable  14 Bekker-Nielsen, H.  25 Bergson, H.  18 Bernard of Clairvaux  16, 32, 44 Bligh, J.  32, 45 Blondel, M.  18 Boethius  79, 183, 189 Bonaventure  17, 35 Bonnard, F.  19, 21 Buber, M.  18 Cassian, John  11 Candidus of Fulda  11 Chatillon, J.  24, 40 Cicero  17, 23, 24 Clark, M.  18

Coolmann, B.T.  14, 18 Coulter, D.M.  14, 18 Cousins, E.H.  18, 39, 42 Daniélou, J.  34 Dante Alighieri  13, 14 Dickinson, J.C.  24 Duchesne, A.  24 Dumeige, G.  46 Ebner, J.  27, 29, 32 Ervisius of Saint-Victor  22, 24, 25, 26 Eskil of Lund  25, 26 Éthier, A.-M.  27, 39 Fraigneau-Julien, B.  18 Francesco da Barbarino  53 Fromm, E.  18 Gélot, M.-J.  43, 45 Ghellinck, J. de  14, 23 Gilbert of Paris  20 Gilbert of Poitiers  11, 135 Gilson, É.  32, 34 Goy, R.  13, 14 Grabmann, M.  29, 32 Gregory the Great  22, 39, 44, 123, 271 Grundtvig, N.F.S.  23 Grünewald, G.  29 Guerin of Saint-Victor  26 Guilduin of Saint-Victor  19, 21 Guimet, F.  39, 40 Gunner of Viborg  24 Haberkern, E.  14 Heitz, Th.  32 Henrik of Saint-Victor  24 Henry, P.  18 Hildebart of Lavardin  20 Hildebrandt, D. von  18 Hofmann, P.  18 Horace  17, 23

3 04

in d e x o f n a me s

Hugh of Saint-Victor  11, 13, 16, 19, 22, 23, 24, 195 Isidore 14 Ivánka, E. von  35 Jacquin, A.M.  32 Jansen, B.  32 Javelet, R.  18, 34, 35, 37, 53 Jerome 163 John of Toulouse  18, 65 Kirchberger, C.  23 Landgraf, A.  17, 37 Lazzari, F.  26 Lewis, C.S.  16 Louis VI  21 Louis VII  25 Manasse of Troyes  25 Marcel, G.  18 Martène, E.  21, 24 Matter, E.A.  14 Matthew of Aquasparta  17 Mauritius of Paris  26 Moltmann, J.  18 Mühlen, H.  18 Nakamura, H.  12, 18 Nédoncelle, M.  15 Notker Balbalus  23 Ohnsorge, W.  24 Ottaviano, C.  26 Ovid  17, 24 Pascal II  21 Pascasius Radbertus  11 Pelagius 163 Penido, T.-L.  18, 45 Peter of Blois  17 Peter Comestor  25 Peter Lombard  11, 12, 36, 163, 289 Peter Suneson  24 Plato  24, 28 Pourrat, P.  28 Régnon, Th. de  18, 33 Ribaillier, J.  14, 23, 32, 50, 86 Robert of Melun  19

Robilliard, J.  33 Roos, H.  17, 18 Rosemann, Ph.W.  12 Rosenberg, H.  23 Rousselot, P.  17 Rydstrøm-Poulsen, A.  11, 12, 36 Salet, G.  14, 35 Sallust  17, 239 Salomon of Aarhus  24 Scheler, M.  18 Schniertshauer, M.  14 Seneca  17, 24 Simonis, W.  45 Smalley, B.  22, 23 Smith, L.  14 Spicq, C.  23 Spiegelberg, H.  18 Stohr, A.  17 Suger of Saint-Denis  13 Taylor, J.  23 Thibaut of Amiens  25 Thomas Angelicus  17 Thomas Aquinas  17, 28, 29, 32, 45, 46, 191 Thomas Gallus  35 Vergil  17, 23, 24 Verrier, P.  24 Vigneaux, P.  37 Waldemar of Schleswig  24 Wasserlynck, R.  39 William of Auvergne  17 William of Auxerre  17 William of Champeaux  20, 21, 22 William of Sainte-Geneviève  25 William of Saint-Thierry  11, 16, 22, 36 William of Sens  26 Wilmar, A.  24 Wincent of Beauvais  14 Wipfler, H.  18, 39 Wulf, M. de  29, 32 Yankowski, S.V.  23