Rethinking Moral Status 0192894072, 9780192894076

Common-sense morality implicitly assumes that reasonably clear distinctions can be drawn between the "full" mo

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Rethinking Moral Status
 0192894072, 9780192894076

Table of contents :
Cover
Rethinking Moral Status
Copyright
Contents
Preface
Notes on Contributors
1: Rethinking our Assumptions about Moral Status
1. The Idea of Moral Status
2. Human Moral Status
3. Species Membership and the Boundary between Full and Partial Moral Status
4. Revisionary Approaches to Moral Status
5. More-than-fullMoral Status?
6. Moral Uncertainty and Moral Confusion
Notes
References
Part I: The Idea of Moral Status
2: Suffering and Moral Status
1. Introduction
2. Unconnected Individuals
3. Combining Reasons of Different Types
4. A Challenge
5. A Gradualist Understanding of Moral Status
6. Gradualism and Suffering
Notes
References
3: An Interest-Based Model of Moral Status
1. The Model
2. Implications
2.1 Ordinary, self-awarehuman beings
2.2 Nonparadigm humans
2.3 Nonhuman animals
2.4 Robots and advanced AI systems
2.5 Brain organoids
2.6 An enhanced hominid species
3. Conclusion
Notes
References
4: The Moral Status of Conscious Subjects
1. Theorizing about Moral Status
2. Phenomenal Consciousness and Value
3. Implications: Mapping Value to Moral Status
4. Making Phenomenal Value Practical
4.1 Proportionality
4.2 The source of phenomenal value
5. Conclusion
Notes
References
5: Moral Status, Person-Affectingness, and Parfit’s No Difference View
1. Senses of Moral Status and Ways of Mattering Morally
2. Moral Status, Affecting a Definite Future Person, and Parfit’s No Difference View
Notes
References
6: The Ever Conscious View and the Contingency of Moral Status
1. Introduction
2. What Moral Status Is, and How Harm-Based and Benefit-Based Reasons Arise
3. The Ever Conscious View
4. Objections to the Ever Conscious View
5. Defending the Good Method in the Face of the Asymmetry
6. Conclusion
Notes
References
7: Moral Status and Moral Significance
1. Moral Significance More Fundamental than Moral Status
2. Capacity for Sentience as a Basis for Moral Status
3. Why Capacity for Sentience but not Organic Life is Morally Significant
4. The Endless Variability of Status-Grounding Mental Capacities Among Humans
5. Further Personal Features that Could be Morally Significant
6. Deontological Constraints Agent-Focused Rather than Victim-Focused
7. Conclusion
Notes
References
8: Moral Recognition and the Limits of Impartialist Ethics: On Androids, Sentience, and Personhood
1. Moral Status and Moral Standing
2. The Easy Bits: Chimeras and Cyborgs
3. The Difficult Bits: Self-learning Artificial Intelligence Machines
4. Justice Now for Stones, Rivers, and Androids!
Note
References
9: Is Moral Status Good for You?
1. Introduction
2. Recognition Value
3. Protective Value
4. Vulnerability Disvalue
5. Noninstrumental Value
6. Concluding Thoughts
Notes
References
Part II: Specific Issues about Moral Status
10: Toward a Theory of Moral Status Inclusive of Nonhuman Animals: Pig Brains in a Vat, Cows versus Chickens, and Human–Nonhuman Chimeras
1. Toward an Account of Moral Status Inclusive of Nonhuman Animals
1.1 The key category of welfare interests
1.2 Levels, tiers, and hierarchies of moral status
1.3 From a sketch to a theory fit for policy purposes
2. The Problem of Human–Nonhuman Chimeras
2.1 Background on the science and ethics of chimera research
2.2 The suffering problem
2.3 The humanizing problem
2.4 Tentative proposal for the near term
Notes
References
11: Revisiting Inexorable Moral Confusion About the Moral Status of Human–Nonhuman Chimeras
1. Introduction
2. Moral Status
3. The Science of Human–Nonhuman Chimeras
3.1 Human–nonhuman chimeras as assay systems
3.2 Human–nonhuman chimeras as models
3.3 Human–nonhuman chimeras as sources of organs for transplantation
4. The Ethics of “Humanized” Chimeras
4.1 Human–nonhuman chimeras as assay systems
4.2 Human–nonhuman chimeras as models
4.3 Human–nonhuman chimeras as sources of organs for transplantation
5. Inexorable Moral Confusion, Revisited
6. Conclusion
Notes
References
12: Chimeras, Superchimps, and Post-persons: Species Boundaries and Moral Status Enhancements
1. Introduction: Moral Status and Biological Species
2. Thinking about Moral Status
2.1 Moral status, interests, and identity
3. Moral Status Enhancements
4. Obligations to MSE?
5. Conceptual Issues in Moral Status Enhancement
6. Post-persons and FMS
7. Moral Agency, Moral Status, and Obligations
8. Conclusion
Notes
References
13: Connecting Moral Status to Proper Legal Status
1. Introduction
2. The Strong Connection
3. The Moderate Connection
4. An Objection to the Strong Connection and the Moderate Connection
5. The Weak Connection
6. Conclusion
Notes
References
14: How the Moral Community Evolves
1. The Natural History of Normativity
1.1 The moral mismeasure of man
1.2 The evolution of ends-in-themselves
1.3 Flourishing in a social world
2. Evolution of an Imperfect Moral Sense
2.1 Becoming a moral species
2.2 Adaptive mechanisms that distort MSS ascription
2.2.1 Empathy
2.2.2 Disgust
2.2.3 Mental state attribution
2.3 The case of invertebrate ethics
3. Conclusion
Note
References
15: Moral Status of Brain Organoids
1. Ethical Regulation of Brain Organoid Research
2. Brain Organoids and Consciousness
3. The Connection between Consciousness and Moral Status
4. Implications of Moral Status for Brain Organoid Research
5. Utilitarian Approaches
6. Rights-based Approaches
7. Animal Research Ethics Principles
8. Indirect Moral Significance
9. Conclusion
Notes
References
16: How Much Moral Status Could Artificial Intelligence Ever Achieve?
1. What is Moral Status?
2. Does Moral Status Come in Degrees?
3. What is the Basis of Moral Status?
3.1 Sentience
3.2 Multiple bases
4. Can Future AIs have the Basis of Moral Status?
4.1 Intelligence
4.2 Consciousness
4.3 Free will
4.4 Moral understanding
5. Conclusion
Notes
References
17: Monkeys, Moral Machines, and Persons
1. Introduction
2. The Moral Machine Problem
3. Moral Models
4. Ape-Machines
Notes
References
18: Sharing the World with Digital Minds
1. Introduction
2. Paths to Realizing Super-beneficiaries
2.1 Reproductive capacity
2.2 Cost of living
2.3 Subjective speed
2.4 Hedonic skew
2.5 Hedonic range
2.6 Inexpensive preferences
2.7 Preference strength
2.8 Objective list goods and flourishing
2.9 Mind scale
3. Moral and Political Implications of Digital Super-beneficiaries
3.1 Creating super-beneficiaries
3.2 Sharing the world with super-beneficiaries
4. Discussion
Notes
References
Index

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