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Responsible Conduct in Chemistry Research and Practice
 9780841233065, 0841233063, 9780841233072

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Responsible Conduct in Chemistry Research and Practice: Global Perspectives


Responsible Conduct in Chemistry Research and Practice: Global Perspectives Ellene Tratras Contis, Editor Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, Michigan

Dorothy J. Phillips, Editor Waters Corporation (Retired), Milford, Massachusetts

Allison A. Campbell, Editor Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington

Bradley D. Miller, Editor American Chemical Society, Washington, DC

Lori Brown, Editor American Chemical Society, Washington, DC

American Chemical Society, Washington, DC Distributed in print by Oxford University Press

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Tratras Contis, Ellene, editor. | Phillips, Dorothy (Dorothy J.), editor. | Campbell, Allison (Allison A.), editor. | Miller, Bradley D., editor. | Brown, Lori, 1985- editor. Title: Responsible conduct in chemistry research and practice : global perspectives / [edited by] Ellene Tratras Contis (Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, Michigan), Dorothy J. Phillips (Waters Corporation (retired), Milford, Massachusetts), Allison A. Campbell (Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington), Bradley D. Miller (American Chemical Society, Washington, DC), Lori Brown (American Chemical Society, Washington, DC). Description: Washington, DC : American Chemical Society, [2018] | Series: ACS symposium series ; 1288 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018038282 (print) | LCCN 2018047270 (ebook) | ISBN 9780841233065 (ebook) | ISBN 9780841233072 (alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: Chemistry--Social aspects--Congresses. | Chemistry--Moral and ethical aspects--Congresses. | Chemistry--Research--Moral and ethical aspects--Congresses. | Chemists--Professional ethics--Congresses. | Responsibility--Congresses. Classification: LCC QD39.7 (ebook) | LCC QD39.7 .R47 2018 (print) | DDC 174.954--dc23 LC record available at

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48n1984. Copyright © 2018 American Chemical Society Distributed in print by Oxford University Press All Rights Reserved. Reprographic copying beyond that permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the U.S. Copyright Act is allowed for internal use only, provided that a per-chapter fee of $40.25 plus $0.75 per page is paid to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Republication or reproduction for sale of pages in this book is permitted only under license from ACS. Direct these and other permission requests to ACS Copyright Office, Publications Division, 1155 16th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20036. The citation of trade names and/or names of manufacturers in this publication is not to be construed as an endorsement or as approval by ACS of the commercial products or services referenced herein; nor should the mere reference herein to any drawing, specification, chemical process, or other data be regarded as a license or as a conveyance of any right or permission to the holder, reader, or any other person or corporation, to manufacture, reproduce, use, or sell any patented invention or copyrighted work that may in any way be related thereto. Registered names, trademarks, etc., used in this publication, even without specific indication thereof, are not to be considered unprotected by law. PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Foreword The ACS Symposium Series was first published in 1974 to provide a mechanism for publishing symposia quickly in book form. The purpose of the series is to publish timely, comprehensive books developed from the ACS sponsored symposia based on current scientific research. Occasionally, books are developed from symposia sponsored by other organizations when the topic is of keen interest to the chemistry audience. Before agreeing to publish a book, the proposed table of contents is reviewed for appropriate and comprehensive coverage and for interest to the audience. Some papers may be excluded to better focus the book; others may be added to provide comprehensiveness. When appropriate, overview or introductory chapters are added. Drafts of chapters are peer-reviewed prior to final acceptance or rejection, and manuscripts are prepared in camera-ready format. As a rule, only original research papers and original review papers are included in the volumes. Verbatim reproductions of previous published papers are not accepted.

ACS Books Department

Contents Preface .............................................................................................................................. ix

Global Efforts in Chemical Safety and Security 1.

Chemical Disarmament in a Technologically Evolving World ............................ 3 Jonathan E. Forman and Christopher M. Timperley


Chemical Issues in Context: The Role of Intent in Nonproliferation & Disarmament .......................................................................................................... 37 Kabrena E. Rodda


Emerging Chemical and Biological Technologies: Security & Policy Challenges ............................................................................................................... 51 Margaret E. Kosal


Education and Outreach: Key Elements To Promote the Responsible and Peaceful Uses of Chemistry ................................................................................... 69 R. A. Spanevello and A. G. Suárez


Finding Better Therapeutics for Chemical Poisonings ....................................... 83 Shardell M. Spriggs, Houmam Araj, Hung Tseng, and David A. Jett


Chemical Safety and Security Challenges in Academic Institutions in Developing Countries ............................................................................................. 97 Ahmed F. A. Youssef

Ethics, Human Rights, and the Chemical Sciences 7.

Exemplary Science and Human Rights Initiatives at ACS .............................. 109 Dorothy J. Phillips, Lori Brown, and Bradley D. Miller


The Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics: International Cooperation for Increased Chemical Security and Safety ........................................................... 129 Lori Brown


Scientific Societies for Human Rights: The American Chemical Society’s Role in the AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition ................................. 139 Theresa L. Harris and Jessica M. Wyndham


10. Chemists Contributing to Human Rights: Enhancing Research, Teaching and Global Impact ............................................................................................... 149 Jeffrey H. Toney

Responsible Conduct and Challenges in Chemistry 11. Responsible Conduct in Chemical Safety and Security Practices in South Asia ........................................................................................................................ 157 Ellene Tratras Contis, Uzma Ashiq, Shazma Massey, Sammia Shahid, and Amita Verma 12. Responsible Conduct in Chemical Safety and Security Practices and Its Development in Malaysia .................................................................................... 171 H. L. Lee, M. F. Abdul-Wahab, C. T. Goh, and D. M. Chau 13. Responsible Conduct of Research and Challenges in the Middle East ........... 191 Abeer Al Bawab 14. Research in Africa: Responsible Conduct in Research Reporting and Challenges ............................................................................................................. 203 Berhanu M. Abegaz 15. Responsible Conduct and Challenges in North Africa ..................................... 215 Mama El Rhazi and Majda Breida 16. Responsible Conduct of Chemical Sciences Research and Challenges in Nigeria and West Africa ...................................................................................... 223 Eucharia O. Nwaichi 17. Responsible Conduct and Challenges in East Africa ........................................ 239 Dickson Andala Editors’ Biographies .................................................................................................... 251

Indexes Author Index ................................................................................................................ 255 Subject Index ................................................................................................................ 257


Preface The development of “Responsible Conduct in Chemistry Research and Practice: Global Perspectives” was both inspired and informed by a symposium “The Interface of Chemical and Biological Sciences International Disarmament Efforts” held in 2015 at the 249th ACS National Meeting & Exposition in Denver, Colorado, USA. Organized by the ACS Committee on International Activities (IAC) and with co-sponsorship from the ACS Division of Analytical Chemistry and nominal support from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the event highlighted educational, policy and practice dimensions of advancing the peaceful application of chemistry worldwide. In addition to the symposium speakers, we also invited several other colleagues in the global chemistry enterprise to contribute papers furthering the editorial center of the present volume. Our intended readership is all chemists, chemistry educators and chemical engineers, particularly those with an interest in the responsible global practice of chemistry, science and human rights, scientific mobility, and international relations. We extend our collective gratitude for the efforts of the authors who brought their volunteer time and talent to the preparation of their manuscripts and to the reviewers for their support and participation in a rigorous peer review process. We also thank our colleagues at ACS Books for their enduring and professional handling of manuscript development, submission and refinement.

Ellene Tratras Contis, PhD Eastern Michigan University 501R Mark Jefferson Science Complex Ypsilanti, MI 48197 [email protected] (e-mail)

Dorothy J. Phillips, PhD Waters Corporation (retired) 10 Lamplight Circle Natick, MA 01760 [email protected] (e-mail)


Allison A. Campbell, PhD Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 902 Battelle Blvd Richland, WA 99354 [email protected] (e-mail)

Bradley D. Miller, PhD American Chemical Society 1155 16th Street NW Washington, DC 20036 [email protected] (e-mail)

Lori Brown American Chemical Society 1155 16th Street NW Washington, DC 20036 [email protected] (e-mail)


Global Efforts in Chemical Safety and Security

Chapter 1

Chemical Disarmament in a Technologically Evolving World Jonathan E. Forman1,* and Christopher M. Timperley2,* 1Office

of Strategy and Policy, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Johan de Wittlaan 32, 2517JR, The Hague, The Netherlands 2Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (Dstl), Porton Down, Salisbury, Wiltshire, SP4 0JQ, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland *E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

This chapter looks at chemical disarmament and technological change, using the example of progress in, and the review of, the operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, whose implementing body is the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The discussion looks at chemicals in war, treaty implementation, chemical warfare agents, the role of technical experts in disarmament, scientific advancement and future challenges. Advances in science and technology benefit chemical disarmament, and are necessary for effective non-proliferation, yet some advances can potentially be misdirected to cause harm. In this context, international disarmament treaty policymakers require actionable science advice. The OPCW Scientific Advisory Board provides this advice through the review of relevant science and technology to identify risks and to help further strengthen the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Introduction The science of chemistry has a rich history (1), playing an important role across human societies long before we arrived at modern understandings of atoms, molecules, reactivity and the intra- and inter-molecular forces that are © 2018 American Chemical Society

so fundamental to chemistry research and development today. The production of chemicals is one of the largest, as well as one of the most research and development intensive manufacturing sectors (2), and one that exerts profound impact on economic growth. Likewise, chemistry contributes to a broad range of products and applications that permeate day-to-day life. Numerous innovations and discoveries from chemistry are seamlessly integrated into the world around us, yet the term “chemical” is often associated more with substances that cause harm than with discoveries that have provided societal benefits. Examples of chemicals that have been deployed as weapons of war can further contribute toward an unfavorable view of chemistry. Chemistry itself remains one of the most important scientific fields. Just as it has over the course of its history, chemistry’s future will continue to be one of change and advancement (3), generating new knowledge and inspiring new technologies. To those who view chemistry as a potential threat, advancements in the field can be seen as emerging challenges with “dual-use” (4) potential for the development of new weapons of war or terror (5). Chemicals in War Chemicals have been used as weapons of war from ancient times. The deployment of “Greek fire”, the use of boiling oils and molten metals to fend off besieging armies, and coating the tips of weapons with poisonous plant extracts (6), are familiar historical examples. Evidence of the use of poison gas has been found at archeological sites: Dura-Europos (located in modern day Syria) for example, where in the year 256 AD, Roman soldiers appear to have been killed by a toxic gas released into tunnels (7). Arguments in favor of deploying chemicals (including the delivery of chlorine gas in munitions) were put forth by both combative sides during the American Civil War (8), and while such weapons were not used, conceptually similar weapons were deployed 50 years later on a mass scale during the First World War (9). After the First World War, chemical weapons appeared on battlefields throughout the Twentieth-Century, including in the Russian civil war in 1919, in conflicts in North Africa (1920’s), Abyssinia (1930’s), Manchuria (1930’s and 1940’s), Yemen (1960’s), and during the war between Iran and Iraq in the 1980’s (10). Other Twentieth-Century wars have seen the use of chemicals that include tear gas (11) and herbicides (12), as well as poison gas as a means of genocide (13). More recently, incidents of the use of chlorine gas, organophosphorus nerve agents, and sulfur mustard have been reported in the Syrian Arab Republic. In regard to the recent incidents, investigative bodies have attributed individual incidents to actors across sides of the relevant conflicts. However, some of these conclusions have been contested in international fora, and it should be appreciated that the conclusions of the investigative bodies do not represent the findings of a court of law (14, 15). Chemists and chemistry have contributed to the development of chemical weapons, and have advanced scientific knowledge that has led to improvements in quality of life across human societies through work unrelated to military needs. Advances with both beneficial and harmful impacts have influenced 4

history. For example, the use of toxic chemicals delivered by bullets in the Seventeenth-Century giving rise to the Strasbourg Agreement of 1675 signed by France and Germany. This was the first international agreement to limit the use of chemical weapons through prohibiting the signatories from using poison bullets (16). This agreement came forth during the time of chemist Robert Boyle (1627-1691), who is often referred to as a founder of modern chemistry, after his 1661 book, The Skeptical Chemist, provided the modern definition of an element (17). Boyle’s contributions to chemistry have been historically celebrated, while another famous chemist, Fritz Haber, is commonly presented as an example of someone facing the dual-use dilemma in scientific development (18) (he is one of a number of famous chemists who have harnessed their knowledge for military purposes (19)). Haber, having been the architect of the German chemical weapons program of the First World War (18), was also the recipient of the 1918 Nobel Prize in Chemistry “for the synthesis of ammonia from its elements” (20). The Haber-Bosch process he invented is still used today to produce ammonia from atmospheric nitrogen, for the production of fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and many other classes of chemicals. The modern implementation of this process is estimated to consume about 1% of the world’s total electricity (21)! The legacy of chemical weapons in warfare includes (a) former Belgian battlefields where to this day, unexploded chemical munitions from more than 100 years ago are still being unearthed (22); (b) on-going efforts to recover and destroy chemical munitions abandoned by retreating armies of past wars (22); (c) sites scattered about the world’s seas that served as dumping grounds for chemical weapons (23) (a practice that ended with the entry-into-force of the London Convention in 1975 (24)); and (d) observable long-term health effects in survivors of exposure (25). Just as advances in chemical knowledge may have inspired the development of weapons, the legacy of the use of some of these weapons has inspired improved analytical capabilities for studying environmental contamination and fate of toxic chemicals (which is important for risk assessments related to safety and security) (26), and observations of cell death in soldiers who had been exposed to sulfur mustard has led to research that ultimately informed the development of chemotherapy agents (27). An International Ban on Chemical Weapons: The Chemical Weapons Convention Attempts to ban the use of chemical weapons did not end in 1675. Next came the Brussels Convention on the Law and Customs of War which prohibited the use of poison or poisoned weapons, and arms, projectiles or material that cause unnecessary suffering; this agreement, however, never entered into force (16). Chemical disarmament efforts of the Twentieth-Century were rooted in the 1899 Hague Peace Conference, where parties to the 1899 Hague Convention agreed to ‘abstain from the use of projectiles, the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases (16)’. In 1907, a second Hague Convention reiterated earlier bans on the use of poison or poisoned weapons (16). After the First World War, the 1925 “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 5

Warfare”, the Geneva Protocol, emerged. While this Protocol banned the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in war, it did not prohibit development, production, or possession of such weapons (28). Furthermore, countries could sign this Protocol with reservations that permitted the use of chemical weapons against countries that were not members of the Protocol, or to respond in kind if attacked with such weapons (28). The Geneva Protocol, like those agreements before it, was not a disarmament treaty, rather it was an arms control agreement. The first international disarmament treaty for weapons of mass destruction of the Twentieth-Century, the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) (29), opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975. Today the BTWC has 180 States Parties (nations that have agreed to support and uphold its obligations). The BTWC is a comprehensive prohibition of biological and toxin weapons. It also requires destruction of any existing stockpiles within the States that join it. Furthermore, the BTWC’s Article IX recognized the effective prohibition of chemical weapons as an objective (30). Twenty years after the BTWC opened for signature, this objective had been negotiated and agreed upon with the “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction” (more commonly referred to as the “Chemical Weapons Convention” or “CWC”) (31). The CWC opened for signature in 1993 and entered into force in 1997, with 87 States Parties. Today 192 States have joined the CWC. This leaves only four - the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, Israel, and South Sudan - outside the CWC, making the universality of the prohibition regime almost complete. The CWC is a comprehensive prohibition on chemical weapons. Its States Parties are obligated to declare and destroy any chemical weapon stockpiles they possess and to prohibit the use of scientific and technological advancements for any chemical weapon purposes. The CWC, unlike those treaties before it, includes a verification regime that allows international chemical weapons inspectors to verify the destruction of declared chemical weapon stockpiles and to inspect chemical production facilities (including commercial facilities) meeting certain criteria within the territories of the States Parties. The verification regime contains mechanisms to address non-compliance, including through challenge inspections and investigations of alleged use of chemical weapons. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) serves as the implementing body of the CWC (32). The OPCW was awarded the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize “for its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons” in recognition of its progress toward a world permanently free of chemical weapons (33). Eight of the States that joined the CWC declared chemical weapons (Albania, India, Iraq, Libya, the Russian Federation, the Syrian Arab Republic, the United States of America, and “a State Party” that does not wish to publicly disclose its identity). These declarations amounted to over 72000 metric tonnes. As of 31 December 2017, over 96% of this amount had been verifiably destroyed, with destruction activities of the remaining amounts ongoing. Figure 1 illustrates the progress toward complete destruction since entry-into-force of the CWC over 20 years ago (34). 6

Figure 1. Twenty years of progress in destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles since the entry-into-force of the CWC in 1997. The height of the black area represents the total amount of chemical weapons declared, and the light area shows how many chemical weapons have been cumulatively destroyed in the corresponding year (34). The amount of chemical weapons continues to decrease with on-going destruction of the declared stockpiles under verification by OPCW inspectors.

Treaty Implementation Implementation of the CWC involves four main areas of focus: (a) the destruction of chemical weapons; (b) non-proliferation and the prevention of re-emergence of chemical weapons (this includes verification activities that involve declarations from States Parties, inspections, and when called upon, investigations); (c) capacity building and training in assistance and protection (CWC Article X); and (d) promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry for economic and technological development (CWC Article XI). While it is the destruction and non-proliferation areas that receive the most attention, the provisions of capacity-building obligate States Parties to provide assistance to one another if requested in the case of chemical incidents and also the supporting of mechanisms to promote international cooperation (Article XI might be viewed as an endorsement of the value of science diplomacy in an international disarmament regime). Multilateral treaties like the CWC require States Parties to work together. The inclusion of the capacity-building obligations aids promotion of trust and cooperation across international borders. 7

The verification obligations lie at the heart of the trust and confidence needed for an international treaty to be successful, allowing all States Parties to the treaty to verify each other’s compliance. States Parties make declarations to the OPCW and the OPCW checks and confirms the declarations for accuracy (which includes on-site inspections by the OPCW). The States Parties are required to submit detailed declarations on chemical weapon and industry-related activities within their territories. Information must be provided on chemical weapons and associated facilities by a State Party that possesses them, as well as facilities used in the past for the development of chemical weapons. Similarly, industrial chemical facilities with capacities and capabilities of relevance to the CWC, must also be declared. Implementation requires States Parties to take the steps necessary to enforce the obligations of the CWC within their territories; this is an important aspect of the CWC and other multilateral treaties – where individual States through their own systems implement legally-binding legislation to ensure compliance within the State. This national implementation outlaws activities prohibited by the Convention (whether by an individual, organization or industry); it includes criminal legislation and regulatory monitoring relevant to chemicals and trade controls. Events in the Syrian Arab Republic and Iraq have seen OPCW inspectors participate in non-routine missions that include fact-finding in regard to incidents where chemical weapons may have been used (35), declaration assessment (36), and technical assistance visits (37). The OPCW also maintains a rapid response and assistance mechanism, to assist States Parties in case of a chemical attack by terrorists on the territory of a requesting State Party (38, 39). In regard to non-compliance, it is important to recognize that the OPCW is neither a law enforcement agency nor a court of law; its mandate is to collect and verify information, and to report this information to the States Parties. The ultimate authority for decision-making to the CWC are the States Parties who meet regularly to oversee and direct, by consensus, the implementation of the CWC. To gain better insight into the overall activities of the OPCW in the implementation of the CWC, the annual reports published by the Organisation provide useful fact and figures (34).

Prohibited Chemicals: What Is a Chemical Weapon? Fundamental to full implementation of the obligations of the CWC is the definition of a chemical weapon. In the text of the CWC, “chemical weapons” are defined by one or more of the following criteria (40): (a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes;


(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in point (a) above, which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; (c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in point (b) above. These definitions cover the chemical agent that defines the chemical weapon, precursor chemicals used to produce the chemical agent, and equipment and devices associated with the deployment (weaponization) of the chemical agent. The first of the three criteria warrants further explanation. First, a “toxic chemical” is defined within the CWC as “Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere” (41). The toxic chemical definition alleviates the need to define a toxic dose, which varies according to the nature of the chemical (for many chemicals such data are often unavailable). This definition also includes any chemical if weaponized in such a way that it employs the toxic properties of the chemical to harm humans and animals (as opposed to causing harm through an explosive or incendiary effect) and dispersed in a relevant way. Furthermore, chemicals whose toxic properties affect vegetation detrimentally (i.e. cause permanent harm to plants) may not be considered chemical weapons under international law. This might include defoliant chemicals which have been deployed in past military scenarios to cause plants to deliberately shed their leaves. The definition of a chemical weapon is also noteworthy in that ‘toxic’ chemicals are not considered chemical weapons if they are used for purposes not prohibited by the CWC. Examples of chemicals that can constitute “chemical weapons” when placed in a delivery system, but also have other uses, include nitrogen mustard (HN2 in Figure 2, developed as a chemical warfare agent and also used for chemotherapy) and isopropanol, which is a precursor for the organophosphorus nerve agent sarin. Sarin belongs to Schedule 1A(1) (Figure 2) with R1 being a methyl group and R2 being an isopropyl group. Purposes not prohibited are defined as (42): (a) “Industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes;” (b) “Protective purposes, namely those purposes directly related to protection against toxic chemicals and to protection against chemical weapons;” (c) “Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare;” (d) “Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes.”


Figure 2. Schedule 1 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Annex on Chemicals (44).

Under the CWC, it is possible that any chemical could potentially be used as a chemical weapon, yet there is a common misconception that chemical warfare agents are simply those that feature on the CWC’s Annex on Chemicals. This Annex contains three Schedules (Figures 2-4) which list chemicals associated with historical military weapons programs and/or identified as chemicals of high risk to the intent and purpose of the CWC. Many of the chemicals contained within the Schedules have important economic value (43); however States Parties are prohibited to trade such chemicals to States not party to the CWC.


Figure 3. Schedule 2 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Annex on Chemicals (44).

Chemical structures belonging to the first of the schedules, Schedule 1, appear in Figure 2. These chemicals have been developed, produced, stockpiled or used as a chemical weapon, as defined by the CWC; in particular, such chemicals have little or no use for purposes not prohibited by the CWC (44). This includes the nerve agents of Schedules 1A(1), 1A(2) and 1A(3); blistering agents (vesicants) such as the sulfur and nitrogen mustards, and Lewisites of Schedules 1A(4) and 1A(6), and 1A(5); and two biological toxins, saxitoxin and ricin, of Schedules 1A(7) and 1A(8). Other criteria that would place a chemical into Schedule 1 include a high risk to the CWC due to chemical structures similar to other Schedule 1 chemicals that are expected to produce comparable properties, lethal or incapacitating toxicity to make them suitable for use in a chemical weapon, and/or chemicals that could be used as precursors at the final stage of formation of a Schedule 1 Part A chemical (44).


Figure 4. Schedule 3 of the Chemical Weapons Convention Annex on Chemicals (44).

Chemical structures comprising Schedule 2 are shown in Figure 3. Criteria that would place a chemical here include chemicals that pose a significant risk to the object and purpose of the CWC because of sufficient lethal or incapacitating toxicity and other properties that could enable them to be used as a chemical weapon; chemicals that can be precursors for the formation of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 Part A (in one of the chemical reactions at the final stage of formation, or as an important chemical within the overall production process); and chemicals that are not produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited by the CWC (44). The final schedule, Schedule 3, is reproduced in Figure 4. It contains 17 chemicals that have been produced, stockpiled, or used as chemical weapons that may be produced in large commercial quantities for purposes not prohibited under the CWC. This includes chemicals of significant economic importance, such as phosgene and hydrogen cyanide, in addition to chlorinating agents used in known production routes to chemical warfare agents. Criteria that would place a chemical on this schedule include (a) posing a significant risk to the object and purpose of the CWC because of sufficient lethal or incapacitating toxicity and other properties that could enable it to be used as a chemical weapon; and (b) if it has importance for the production of chemicals listed in Schedule 1 or Schedule 2 Part B (44). 12

The CWC does make reference to chemicals not on the Schedules. Chemical production plants that produce “discrete organic chemicals” (compounds of carbon except for its oxides, sulfides and metal carbonates) meeting certain criteria are subject to declaration and inspection. Additionally, riot control agents (RCAs) are defined as “Any chemical not listed in a Schedule, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure” (45). The use of RCAs are prohibited as a method of warfare under the CWC, while law enforcement use of such chemicals would qualify under the non-prohibited activities mentioned earlier in this chapter. Although specific chemicals are not identified as RCAs in the CWC, the OPCW’s Scientific Advisory Board (a body of experts that will be described later in this chapter) has identified a set of 16 chemicals and a chemical mixture (Figure 5) that would meet the criteria by which the CWC defines an RCA (46–48). These chemicals act by binding to specific proteins (ion channels) present in the eyes, nose, throat, respiratory tract, and skin. When used under appropriate conditions, such as open spaces, in low to moderate concentrations, RCAs cause transient discomfort and pain (49, 50). There are many chemicals not contained within the Schedules that might seem relevant. Chlorine gas, for example, is notably absent. Chlorine is produced in large amounts in States around the world and used for a variety of non-prohibited applications, one of the most important being water purification. It has also been implicated in the majority of recent allegations of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic (51). Biological toxins, chemicals of biological origin (including proteins) can also be used as chemical warfare agents, as exemplified by the inclusion of ricin and saxitoxin in Schedule 1 (Figure 2). This can be a source of confusion as toxins of biological origin are also considered to be biological agents (under the BTWC) because they are produced naturally by living organisms. Chemicals that when weaponized fall under the provisions of both the CWC and BTWC are often referred to as “mid-spectrum” agents; that is, agents that sit in the center of the threat spectrum, between known and potential chemical and biological warfare agents (Figure 6). Figure 6 illustrates a chemical-biological threat spectrum that is useful to visualize the range of chemical and biological agents that might constitute a security concern (52). This spectrum shows categories of chemicals and biologicals that have been used as weapons classified according to their type, from classical chemical warfare agents (far left) to traditional biological warfare agents (far right). Moving from left toward the center are toxic chemicals (which could include industrial, agricultural, or pharmaceutical chemicals) and non-traditional biologicals (genetically-modified organisms for example); and in the center are chemicals of biological origin (the mid-spectrum agents). Mid-spectrum agents include the biological toxins as previously noted and also bioregulators; these are chemicals that occur naturally in the body that mediate a wide range of biological processes, including physiological and neurological functions. Bioregulators constitute a broad range of chemicals that include peptides, small proteins, nucleotides, lipid derived metabolites, and neurotransmitters. Figure 6 provides two examples of bioregulators, Substance P (53) and Neurokinin A (54), 13

both being neurologically-active peptides associated with inflammatory and pain responses (55). As indicated in Figure 6, absence from the CWC Schedules does not exclude a chemical from being a chemical weapon, or suggest that a chemical is not subject to regulatory oversight (just that regulations specific to scheduled chemicals may not apply). Similarly, chemicals that are used in weapons that do not meet the definition of a “chemical weapon” (not prohibited by the CWC) may be subject to prohibitions under other international agreements (which have their own national implementation requirements and own composition of States Parties). For example, restrictions on the military use of herbicides falls under the Environmental Modification Convention (56), and the use of napalm (a mixture of a gelling agent and gasoline or similar fuel, used in incendiary weapons, that is also a “chemical”) against civilian populations, falls under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (57).

Figure 5. A set of chemicals identified by the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board that meet the criteria of a riot control agent (RCA) under the CWC. 14

Figure 6. Chemical and biological agent threat spectrum. Moving from the left side to the middle there are classical chemical agents, other chemicals, and the “mid-spectrum” chemicals that are produced by living systems (bioregulators and toxins), and, often with difficulty can be synthesized. All these chemicals would fall under the provisions of the CWC if used as a chemical weapon. From the right side to the middle there are biological agents and chemical agents derived from living systems that if used as weapons would fall under the prohibitions of the BTWC. The agents listed are intended to be examples; the lists are not comprehensive. Adapted with permission from reference (52). Copyright (1990) Controller HMSO London.

Science and Technology A treaty prohibiting chemical weapons, requiring verification of destruction and on-site inspections, containing provisions for assistance and protection activities and promoting international scientific collaboration, depends on scientific expertise for effective implementation. For the CWC, scientists participated in the negotiations of its text, informing policy through the provision of technical inputs. Scientific and technological principles underpin the articles of the CWC, from the definitions of weapons, through to governance mechanisms and procedures employed for verification of compliance and inspections. The drafters of the CWC recognized that given the dynamism of science, technological change that might impact the implementation of the CWC was inevitable. In order to remain relevant with regard to technological change, the CWC instructs the OPCW to consider measures to make use of advances in science and technology in the undertaking of verification activities (58) and instructs the States Parties to review scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of the treaty (58). The latter is facilitated through the assistance of a Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), a body composed of 25 scientists from across the States Parties of the CWC that renders specialized and independent science advice to the OPCW Director-General (59). To support the activities of the SAB, the OPCW has a Science Policy Adviser, who also serves 15

as Secretary to the SAB to facilitate the Board’s work and ensure advice and recommendations are effectively communicated to policymakers. In practice, it is not trivial to monitor scientific and technological change and predict the impact it may have on the implementation of an international treaty, until such time as an unexpected or unforeseen issue might arise. The volume of new science and the rate at which it is being generated is itself staggering. Just consider that in 2014 alone, more than 2.5 million scientific papers (across all fields of science) were published (60), and in 2016 nearly 1.6 million patent applications were filed (61), yearly publication figures that can only be expected to increase. In 1997, when the CWC entered into force, the Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) RegistryTM contained less than 20 million CAS numbers. At the beginning of 2018, it contained CAS numbers for more than 137 million unique organic and inorganic chemical substances, as well as more than 67 million sequences (62); a startling amount of previously unknown or undiscovered chemicals being added on a daily basis. In 2015 it was reported that at the rate with which genome sequence data is being generated, it is conceivable that by 2025 the number of bytes of genomic data produced could exceed the number of bytes of astronomy data, YouTube Videos, and Twitter Tweets combined (63). In terms of total data generated by humans to date, it is estimated that 90% of the existing data of the world was generated in just the last two years (64), and two years from now we will likely be saying the same thing. In terms of access to data and information, there are estimates of being as many as 75 billion devices connected to the internet by the year 2020 (65), and the number of internet users has grown from 70 million users at the time of entry-into-force of the CWC in 1997, to over 4 billion users at the end of 2017 (66). For those who consider security issues (particularly weapons of mass destruction related-security), scientific advances, and an unprecedented global diffusion of information (and especially scientific knowledge), raise many concerns. Those of relevance to the CWC might be the following: Are there new toxic chemicals that might be weaponized and pose a potential threat? Are there new production routes and production equipment for chemical warfare agents and weapons that might not be recognized by inspectors? Are there new developments that might enable weaponization of chemicals previously discounted as chemical warfare agents? Are there new developments that would facilitate easier accessibility of chemical weapons technology to those who traditionally would not have had the skills or resources to acquire them? These concerns may overshadow consideration of any potential benefits made available by scientific advances, as well as create a distrust of science, and a divide between science and the security communities. As with all of these concerns, one can never rule out the possibility that new scientific discoveries might be used for prohibited purposes, even if the likelihood would seem low. This uncertainty about how a new development might be used once discovered only reinforces the concerns that are raised, and the need for scientists and policymakers to remain vigilant and knowledgeable about scientific advances and the capabilities they enable. The way science is practiced can also generate questions and concerns. Within chemical and biological disarmament communities, there has been 16

increasing recognition of progressively blurred boundaries between research in the chemical and the life sciences, an issue that has been referred to as “convergence” (55, 67, 68). To provide guidance, the OPCW SAB undertakes a review of developments in science and technology and produces a report that is submitted to the States Parties of the CWC every five years, as part of a five-year review cycle of the operation of the treaty. The SAB has noted that Twenty-First Century science as a whole benefits from increasingly transdisciplinary approaches to problem solving and technology development (69). In practical terms, this concept of convergence and scientific research crossing disciplinary boundaries is not new. It has been seen throughout the history of science, and given that biological systems do not exist without the chemistry of life processes, a convergence of chemistry and biology might be looked at as fundamental to life itself. In fact, in the early days of science, those that practiced it called themselves philosophers because their studies combined the whole of the natural world. It was only later when amateurism shifted to professionalism that scientists began to develop the familiar and separate disciplines we think of today (e.g. chemistry, biology, physics and their many specialized sub-disciplines). Now that these disciplines have reached some level of maturity, reversion to trans-disciplinary ways of working, and the pioneering spirit of the natural philosophers of old, has returned and is only serving to accelerate the progress of science. However, for policies and regulatory frameworks, scientific developments that do not fit into precise definitions used in implementation may expose potential gaps in, and/or the means to avoid oversight and compliance. The CWC does not actually specify that chemistry is the field of science that should be reviewed. Also, the definition of a chemical weapon itself is not strictly a chemistry definition, rather it is linked to the life sciences. As chemical effects on life-processes define a toxic chemical and toxicity, one might argue that a chemical weapon is defined by molecular biology. The purpose of the CWC is, after all, not to define fields of science, but to prohibit a specific class of weapon of mass destruction, and in so doing, it requires the most appropriate scientific basis for its Articles and their effective implementation. To effectively review science and technology having implications for the CWC, an important consideration is which field of science should be reviewed. Science involved with chemical weapon development and disarmament is itself highly transdisciplinary, as illustrated in Figure 7. Chemistry lies at the heart of a chemical weapon, yet chemical production on an industrial scale is the province of chemical engineering. Understanding which chemicals can cause harm to humans and how to treat victims of exposure requires expertise in life and medical sciences. Protective equipment involves chemistry and materials science. Decontamination and destruction also requires chemistry and engineering knowledge (safely containing large-scale chemical processes is again chemical engineering). Delivery devices (e.g. munitions and sprayers) might require knowledge of physics and engineering. As OPCW’s SAB has noted, CWC-relevant developments in science and technology may not be recognized if only chemistry is considered (69). 17

Figure 7. The range of technical expertise required for chemical weapons programs and chemical disarmament. The protein structure in this figure (non-aged soman conjugate of acetylcholinesterase, PDB Structure 2WFZ) (70) was obtained from the RCSB Protein Data Bank (PDB) and under the no copyright conditions granted through the RCSB PDB; further details on the structure and the research that produced it can be found in reference (70).

The science review process requires attention to both the existing and new. It also requires a holistic view that considers practical capabilities and limitations of science and technology. New technologies and scientific discoveries attract significant attention for their potential for causing harm, yet recent reports of chemical weapons are dominated by allegations of the use of chlorine gas. Other recently reported incidents have involved sulfur mustard (originally developed as a chemical weapon in the First World War, and a chemical first reported in scientific literature in the Nineteenth-Century) (71), sarin (a nerve agent developed as a weapon in the 1930’s), and VX (a nerve agent developed as a weapon in the 1950’s) (72, 73). A cloud of toxic chemicals was also released by setting a sulfur mine on fire in 2016 (74). These are not chemical threats arising from new science. In responding to, or mitigating these threats, new science might be able to provide improved capabilities. However, potential benefits must be evaluated to determine if desired capability enhancements can actually be realized. 18

In regard to the previously noted concerns about new science, the following examples and observations illustrate some of the complexity of providing sound science advice. However, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a comprehensive review of all of the issues and examples that have received attention.

Are there new toxic chemicals that might be weaponized and pose a potential threat? New chemicals are being continuously discovered, and there are theoretically more possible chemical structures that could have drug-like characteristics than there are atoms in the universe (75), making this always a possibility. Yet from a practical perspective, there are already significant numbers of known harmful chemicals and examples of their weaponization; fentanyl for example, an opioid anesthetic and analgesic (painkiller), has lethality comparable to the organophosphorus nerve agents if misused outside the clinic in the absence of medical support (76).

Are there new production routes and production equipment for chemical warfare agents and weapons that might not be recognized by inspectors? Methods used for chemical production continue to evolve and see adoption in industry. The use of biotechnology to produce chemicals has seen increased innovation in recent years (77) and production lines based around fermentation processes might be expected to have certain characteristics that look different than traditional chemical methods. However, production of highly toxic chemicals would involve more than the reactor or fermenter (Figure 7) and perhaps other aspects of a facility, including safety equipment and the way in which chemical products are contained, stored or neutralized, might be indicators that inspectors can recognize. In the lead up to previous CWC Review Conferences, the use of microreactors (specifically small-scale continuous flow systems) has been discussed as technologies that might challenge the implementation of the CWC (78). The idea that small footprint systems might be used to clandestinely produce banned chemicals is not however unique to microreactors; traditional modular glassware might also be easily assembled and disassembled, and hidden in small facilities that might not be subject to inspection. The difference is in capability, the continuously-flowing “numbered up” microreactors being potentially able to produce larger amounts of material within a given timeframe compared with batch-production using traditional glassware. This provides a pertinent example of new technology challenging regulation; export controls on the sale of equipment used to produce chemicals are often guided by the volume of the equipment - microreactors as individual parts have extremely small volumes and thus may be exempt from certain export restrictions. 19

Are there new developments that might enable weaponization of chemicals previously discounted as chemical warfare agents? In regard to this concern, developments in drug delivery, particularly with nanomedicines and the development of nanoparticles that can target specific types of cells, are often referenced (79). The premise is that the development of nanoparticles to target cell types (the majority of nanomedicines target cancer cells (80)) might lend themselves to the weaponization of toxic chemicals. There are, however, difficulties in making assessments on this concern through monitoring progress in nanomedicines. For practical reasons, the types of nanoparticle used for medicines are limited due to a need to minimize drug toxicity and side-effects (e.g. the particle itself should not be toxic), and nanoparticles developed as medicines are intended for medical use (delivery of particles under controlled conditions, in controlled doses, overseen by a medical doctor). These requirements are different than those that might be desirable for dispersal of nanoparticles over a wide area as a weapon. Furthermore, it has been estimated that 50% of pre-clinical research is not reproducible (81), suggesting that development of targeted drug delivery is difficult even within experienced laboratories. It is unlikely that there is a risk to the CWC from nanomedicine developments at the present time. Questions have also been raised on whether a nanotechnology-based weapon would fall outside the prohibitions of a weapon treaty (82). In the case of the CWC, the definition of chemical weapon described earlier in this chapter extends to any weapon exerting its effect through a chemical action on life processes. Thus, from a technical standpoint, a weapon that uses nanoparticles to deliver toxic chemicals to harm humans or animals would appear to qualify as a chemical weapon. Are there new developments that would facilitate easier accessibility of chemical weapons technology to those who traditionally would not have had the skills or resources to acquire them? The feasibility of producing a chemical weapon or carrying out a chemical attack is difficult to assess in the absence of specific details on capabilities and resources of those who wish to undertake such an action. There will always be scientific and technological developments that can be used for harm, but to incorporate these into a weapon requires consideration of a number of factors, as illustrated in Figure 7. There are the challenges of producing and handling highly-toxic chemicals, which requires certain expertise, suitable equipment and facilities, and the ability for the perpetrators to keep themselves protected from the toxicity of the agent during handling and storage (83). Scaling-up production has technical challenges when compared to producing small quantities of material under well controlled laboratory conditions (83). Furthermore, weaponization of the chemical produced requires finding the means to disperse it into the surrounding population. Less scientifically-demanding scenarios might be more attractive, such as the use of a toxic industrial gas (e.g. chlorine) (83) which might be readily accessible and may not require a sophisticated delivery system (meaning that the threat from existing 20

science and technology could exceed that from newer developments that require a greater level of technical expertise and resources). Of the four concerns discussed above, it is difficult to make a definitive conclusion that there is a problem due to new science, only that there could be, and only under certain circumstances. The CWC does not actually state that the impact of scientific and technological change is a challenge (nor does it state that it will be beneficial), yet challenge to the CWC from scientific advancement is how the topic is often discussed in statements from the States Parties. It is here, helping policymakers to navigate the questions, concerns and issues raised by scientific developments, where professional and learned scientific societies can have a significant impact on chemical disarmament. Without active participation by scientists and suitable technical experts, it is not possible to evaluate risks and provide practical advice for policy inputs in the face of continual technological change.

Role of Technical Experts Technical experts are required for operational implementation of the CWC. Chemical weapons inspectors require deep technical knowledge of chemical production processes, chemical weapons destruction methods, and chemical analysis. Inspectors and supporting staff may also be called on to deploy at short notice in case of compliance concerns, when the use of chemical weapons has been alleged and/or if a State Party requires assistance in response to a chemical incident (requiring a variety of other practical skills and knowledge). OPCW maintains a laboratory that is mandated to enable the Organisation to conduct sampling and analysis missions, and it must maintain and continue to enhance capabilities for the analysis of relevant chemicals. Such chemicals may be found in a broad variety of sample types, including neat agents, degradation products in samples collected from the site of a suspected incident, in biological fluids and tissues, on contaminated materials such as clothing or construction materials, and munition fragments. OPCW staff engaged in capacity building to enhance international cooperation and the promotion of peaceful uses of chemistry must have suitable technical backgrounds to act as trainers and facilitators. Scientific experts must also be available to provide technical guidance for decision makers reviewing the findings reported back to OPCW and its States Parties from inspections and investigations. International cooperation sits at the core of a successful multilateral disarmament treaty, providing opportunities for scientists to work in a variety of ways that support the norms and implementation of the CWC. OPCW maintains a network of Designated Laboratories (84, 85), with 24 laboratories located across 17 States Parties, a truly international example of scientific cooperation. This network, illustrated in Figure 8, is facilitated through the OPCW Laboratory: it adds a high level of confidence to the verification regime and acts as a deterrent to non-compliance. The laboratories within the network participate in scientifically-rigorous yearly proficiency tests to maintain designatation. In the Proficiency Test, laboratories are allowed to miss the 21

presence of a spiking chemical in a sample or make a reporting error only once in three tests or lose designated status (reporting a false positive will also result in loss of designation status). To regain the designated status, further testing and evaluation to a very high standard is required.

Figure 8. The OPCW Designated Laboratory network as of 31 August 2017 (84, 85). (1) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (United States of America); (2) Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center (United States of America); (3) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (United States of America); (4) TNO (The Netherlands); (5) Defence Laboratories Department (Belgium); (6) Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (United Kingdom); (7) DGA Maltrise NRBC (France); (8) Laboratorio de Verificación de Armas Químicas, INTA Campus La Marañosa (Spain); (9) Spiez Laboratory (Switzerland); (10) Bundeswehr Institute of Pharmacology and Toxicology (Germany); (11) Bundeswehr Research Institute for Protective Technologies and NBC Protection (Germany); (12) FOI (Sweden); (13) VERIFIN (Finland); (14) Research Institute of Hygiene, Occupational Pathology and Human Ecology (Russian Federation); (15) State Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology (Russian Federation); (16) Laboratory for the Chemical and Analytical Control of Military Research Centre (Russian Federation); (17) Defense Chemical Research Laboratory (Islamic Republic of Iran); (18) Vertox Laboratory (India); (19) Academy of Military Medical Science Sciences (China); (20) Research Institute of Chemical Defence (China); (21) Agency for Defense Development (Republic of Korea); (22) Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defense Research Institute (Republic of Korea); (23) DSO (Singapore); (24) Defence Science and Technology Group (Australia). An “E” on the map indicates the laboratory is designated for environmental samples, a “B” on the map indicates the laboratory is designated for biomedical samples. (Figure is based on United Nations Map 4170 of May 2016). The proficiency testing scheme has been developed over the past 24 years (it began after the CWC was signed in 1993 in preparation for its entry-intoforce in 1997) and has continued to evolve over time, as it is essential to review 22

the testing scheme and ensure that (a) it remains fit for purpose, (b) considers new developments in analytical chemistry, and of critical importance, (c) remains relevant with respect to real-world samples. When Designated Laboratories are called upon to perform an analysis, samples are split between two laboratories (in two States Parties) who carry out the analysis blindly to one another. In order for a result of the detection of a specific chemical to be accepted, both laboratories must confirm its presence. The OPCW Laboratory and Designated Laboratories also collaborate on Recommended Operating Procedures for analysis in the verification of chemical disarmament; these are available in the VERIFIN “Blue-Book” which was most recently updated in December 2017 (86). Analytical chemistry can have a significant impact on world events, as seen with the samples analyzed from the United Nations (UN) led mission to investigate a chemical attack in Ghouta in the Syrian Arab Republic in 2013 (87). The UN-led team that included OPCW inspectors collected both environmental and biomedical samples. Five different laboratories participated in the analysis and all confirmed that sarin had been used (88). The laboratory results formed part of the information given to world governments, and this information informed the negotiation by diplomats of an agreement to see the Syrian Arab Republic become a State Party to the CWC. The agreement involved the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic relinquishing more than 1300 tonnes of chemical warfare agent-related chemicals for destruction, and also the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons production facilities, under the verification of OPCW inspectors (89). This was a huge undertaking, moving chemicals out of a country in which a war was being fought, and requiring maritime cooperation among several governments to deliver the chemicals (90), and neutralization effluents, for destruction and safe disposal at facilities located in Finland, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Further allegations of use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic have continued since 2013. Designated Laboratories are still being called upon for sample analysis in connection with these ongoing investigations (91–93). OPCW’s SAB and its contributions to the CWC have already been mentioned. This Board represents another important example of an international scientific collaboration in support of disarmament, one that provides scientific advice and considerations to multilateral diplomacy. The SAB is an independent advisory body whose 25 members serve up to two consecutive three-year terms in their individual capacity, not as a representative of the State Party from where they are from. Since the entry-into-force of the CWC, scientists from 44 States Parties have served on the SAB or in one of its Temporary Working Groups (working groups that allow the SAB access to broader scientific expertise to focus on specific areas of need for science advice to the CWC). The Board meets once to twice a year and has held twenty-seven meetings since it first session in 1998, with the most recent being in March 2018. Members of the SAB are nominated by their State Party and appointed by the Director-General. They typically come from research institutions, universities, scientific industries, and/or defense organizations, with expertise in one or more of the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of the CWC. Recent 23

calls for nomination to the Board have emphasized the need for candidates whose area of expertise reaches across traditional disciplinary boundaries (94). Advisory bodies such as the SAB must not only consider scientific issues of relevance to disarmament, but also communicate the science to diplomats and policymakers so that they can understand why the science is important and how it relates to the CWC. The OPCW initiated a Science for Diplomats event series in 2014 in an effort to engage diplomats from CWC States Parties more effectively on scientific issues (95), and the SAB Chair regularly addresses the States Parties to provide them with updates on the work of the Board (96, 97). Science, however, represents only one of many dimensions policymakers must consider in their decisions. This may mean that some advice and recommendations are not taken forward by States Parties; yet, the value of the science advisory mechanism is to ensure that discussions are appropriately informed on scientific dimensions of an issue and for facilitating increased levels of scientific literacy amongst decision makers. Individual scientists and scientific societies not directly associated with the OPCW can and do support chemical disarmament by practicing science (sometimes unknowingly). Building productive international collaborations and generating scientific knowledge that drives further advancements, from where those working on tools that benefit the CWC can draw inspiration, play an important role in chemical disarmament. Scientists who engage with policymakers, even outside of disarmament communities, also contribute, as many of the diplomats they engage with will move between a number of postings during their careers. Those diplomats who find themselves in a post that involves disarmament issues will have benefited from previous engagement with scientists. Scientific literacy can only help to make decision making more effective. Many of the world’s scientific societies as well as chemical industry actively support and contribute to the CWC and OPCW. The International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) has worked as a partner with OPCW since the late 1990’s. IUPAC committees and members have supported OPCW’s efforts in monitoring scientific developments, science communication, science advice for policy, promoting adherence to the norms of the CWC, and in engaging with scientific expert communities (98). In 2016, beginning with the Seville Declaration of the European Association for Chemical and Molecular Sciences (EuCheMS) (99), more than 40 national chemical societies (including the American Chemical Society (100)), IUPAC and chemical industry organizations from Europe and the United States of America (101), have condemned the use of toxic chemicals, especially chlorine, as weapons. These statements serve to raise further awareness of the OPCW and its mission across communities of chemical practitioners.

Future Directions and Challenges in Chemical Disarmament Some of the successes of the CWC and the OPCW have already been highlighted in this chapter. Progress toward compete destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, and the 2013 Nobel Peace Prize, are high-profile examples. 24

Also, as of 31 December 2017, OPCW inspectors had conducted over 6700 inspections since entry-into-force of the CWC, amounting to a collective 864 years of inspector time (34). It should also be appreciated that the CWC originated in the Cold War era, and contains within it the means to address issues relevant to that time. Suffice to say, that in the 21 years since its entry-into-force, the operating environment of the OPCW, and the world, has witnessed great political, technological, social and economic change, which has impacted on international disarmament efforts. The CWC was drafted as a comprehensive treaty to deal with the threat of chemical weapons for all time. This is clearly stated in its preamble, where States Parties declare their determination “for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of the use of chemical weapons, through the implementation of the provisions of this Convention” (31). In discussing the future of the OPCW, this determination could be upheld by OPCW contributing “…as a treaty-based international organisation, to the disarmament of chemical weapons, to preventing their re-emergence, to providing assistance and protection against them, to supporting national implementation of the Convention, and to facilitating peaceful uses of chemistry through verification, capacity development, or engagement activities” (102). Looking ahead, stockpile destruction is moving toward completion and the OPCW’s activities are progressively shifting from the disarmament of chemical weapons to preventing their re-emergence (102). Other issues facing the future of the CWC include retaining chemical weapons-related knowledge and expertise, and maintaining capabilities for rapidly-deployable assistance and protection missions, as well as other non-routine inspection, verification and technical assistance activities (102). There is also the possibility that new States Parties could join the CWC as chemical weapons possessor States (102), and increased potential for the hostile use of toxic chemicals by Non-State Actors (especially terrorists). Chemical security (103) and addressing the threats of Non-State Actors (104) have been recognized as areas to address by the States Parties of the OPCW. There are also challenges, both real and perceived, that arise from technological change and there is a need to ensure the scientific and technological capabilities of those implementing the CWC keep pace with technological advances. Scientists can and do play a key role here, ensuring that the policymakers who must address these issues have an adequate degree of scientific literacy and access to expert advice. To this end, the OPCW SAB contributes a report on developments in science and technology, containing recommendations for the Director-General to consider and discuss with States Parties, for the five-yearly CWC Review Conferences previously described (105). These reports are informed by the outcomes of the previous Review Conference, and meetings held, and reports produced, by the SAB in the five year run-up to the next Review Conference. As this chapter goes to press, the OPCW is preparing to hold the Fourth Review Conference of the CWC in November 2018 and the OPCW SAB is drafting its science and technology report. States Parties will be reviewing the 25

developments of the previous five-year period and setting priorities and directions for the future. All of the issues raised above are sure to become part of the debate.

Conclusions In the face of the OPCW’s objectives, and current and future challenges, a widening range of activities related to verification, capacity development, stakeholder engagement, and governance of the Organisation are being discussed in the lead-up to the Fourth Review Conference of the CWC. The OPCWs “Vision Paper” placed verification to ensure confidence in compliance at the heart of the work of the OPCW, noting that its methods and practices will need to adapt to changing realities (102). This requires maintaining a viable industry verification regime, being prepared for non-routine inspections, and enhancing analytical capabilities (102). To maintain an effective treaty regime, additionally requires capacity development to support the norms of the CWC, and assistance and protection measures against chemical weapons (102). Enhancing chemical security is also a topic of increasing importance (103). Ensuring that the OPCW remains fit-for-purpose and leads the way in preventing the re-emergence of chemical weapons requires all these issues be given due consideration, especially in regard to their scientific dimensions. Given the rapid pace of scientific advancement and the broad and complex technological landscape that might impact on the CWC, there is a need for continual review. This should be an appraisal of the benefits of a technologically evolving world, as well as an understanding of the potential risks to the CWC this evolution might bring, if not monitored and acted upon when necessary. Technological change is inevitable and not something that can be easily controlled. Some scientific developments may generate security questions from their first reporting (and, despite their potential, may never actually be used for harm), while other scientific developments may not provide indicators of anything potentially harmful until such time as an incident occurs. Technological change can always be monitored; however, one might ask if it is truly possible to monitor it all and predict with certainty where a threat will be sure to come from. Looking for opportunities to harness benefits of technological change can be a valuable approach to take in the monitoring process. Technologies that allow recognition or detection of unusual events may reduce risk and/or impact of an intentional chemical release. Examples might include the use of unexpected chemical (or biological) signatures in the environment to recognize the presence of a clandestine laboratory synthesizing chemical warfare agents or testing of an improvised chemical weapon (106). Likewise, advances in medicine and toxicology might lead to better countermeasures and treatment options for those exposed to toxic chemicals, and technologies that enable more efficient emergency response to chemical events (including protective equipment and monitors for responders) would all be valuable (107). Beyond the science, reducing the capability to cause harm with chemical weapons would itself contribute to a reduction of desire to cause harm with chemical weapons. 26

Individual scientists and scientific societies all have a role to play (108), whether by using science to contribute to the betterment of human society, participating in international scientific collaborations (helping to build international trust), developing the tools and technologies that may ultimately keep us safe and secure from those seeking to do harm with toxic chemicals, or by engaging with policymakers to ensure that the scientific dimensions necessary for sound decision-making are well understood and given due consideration. Technological change and its influence on disarmament can only be expected to increase the importance and need for productive scientist-policymaker engagement.

Acknowledgments The authors thank past and present members of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board for productive discussions that have led to some of the thoughts presented herein, and to Ms Fauzia Nurul Izzati, Ms Siqing Sun and Ms Amy Yang of the OPCW Office of Strategy and Policy for their assistance with the preparation of this chapter. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of OPCW, or Dstl or the British Ministry of Defence. Dr Timperley served as the Chairperson of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board from 2015-2018.

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Chapter 2

Chemical Issues in Context: The Role of Intent in Nonproliferation & Disarmament Kabrena E. Rodda* Signatures Science and Technology Division, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington 99354, United States *E-mail: [email protected]

Recent advancements in chemistry have led to improvements in personalized medicine, alternative energy, environmental protection, and many other aspects of our daily lives. However, with such advancements come serious challenges to international regulatory systems. An oft-quoted sentiment attributed to Paracelsus puts these challenges in context: “All things are poison and nothing is without poison; only the dose makes a thing not a poison.” It also serves as a cogent reminder of the importance of understanding a State’s intent with regard to production, possession and use of chemical warfare agents (CWAs). At the heart of these matters is the intent of the individual, which can and does impact national and international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. Clearly, when considering intent, there are no simple answers. In this chapter, the unique technical and policy challenges associated with chemical issues are highlighted. Real-world examples are presented and discussed.

Overview Recent advances in chemistry are resulting in significant improvements in personalized medicine, alternative energy, and environmental protection. However, with such advancements come substantial challenges to international regulatory systems that are designed to prevent the development, use, and proliferation of weaponizable chemicals and associated technology. This chapter © 2018 American Chemical Society

begins by reviewing what constitutes chemical warfare (CW) and chemical warfare agents (CWAs) according to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Australia Group. Next, difficulties inherent in determining a State’s intent regarding a real or potential chemical program are discussed, particularly as it pertains to cognitive bias. Methods for mitigating the impact of cognitive bias are discussed. Following this discussion, the role of the human element implicit in a State’s effort to encourage ethical practices in the chemical sciences will be examined through a series of real-world and fictitious case studies. The chapter continues with a survey of historical examples of use or possession of CWA and a discussion of what has been reported in open sources regarding the intent of the State or Non-State Actor (NSA). This chapter concludes with an exploration of the unique technical and policy challenges associated with new and emerging dual-use issues involving the chemical sciences. It should be noted that in this chapter, the terms “CWA” and “weaponized chemicals” are used interchangeably to emphasize the fact that in a number of instances chemicals not classified as CWA have been used as a weapon.

Definitions April 22, 2015 was the hundred-year anniversary of the first major use of CW on the battlefield at Ypres, Belgium, killing over 90,000 soldiers. Ten years later, the Geneva Convention banning CW and including some dual-use chemicals, was drafted. The League of Nations declared that the use of CW “has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world,” and Newton Baker, then War Department Secretary, argued for a US capability to defend against a CW attack but no offensive CW capability (1). Despite these facts, the use of CW in Syria and Northern Iraq since 2012 highlights the fact that despite international condemnation against its use, the use of chemicals as weapons continues to be perceived as a viable option for a number of States and Non-State Actors. While some issues are similar for all Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Paracelsus’ statement that “all things are poison” points to the unique dual-use challenges associated with CW. Before delving into a discussion about States’ intent, therefore, it is important to understand what is required for a chemical to be considered a CWA, and more broadly, what constitutes CW. Article II of the CWC defines chemical weapons, together or separately, as •

Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for nonprohibited purposes, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of toxic chemicals specified above, which are released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified above. 38

The clause, “purposes not prohibited” is defined later in Article II as industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other peaceful purposes; protective purposes related to protection against toxic chemical or chemical weapons; military purposes not dependent on the use of a chemical’s toxic properties, and law enforcement and domestic riot control purposes. Important to note is the fact that as chemicals of biological origin, toxins are covered under both the CWC and the Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention (BWTC), although only ricin and saxitoxin are specifically listed (2). While produced by biological organisms, toxins are subject to many of the same issues as those associated with other CWAs (2, 3). Based on the above definition, in order to be classified as CW use, for any case involving a specific chemical, the following questions must be answered: • • • • •

Is it a toxic chemical or precursor? Was it used for purposes that are not prohibited by the CWC? If so, were the types and quantities consistent with such use? Despite the above, was it used with intent to cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm? Was the chemical used to exploit its toxic chemical properties?

Implicit in determining whether a chemical incident constitutes CW, therefore, is ascertaining whether intent to harm was present. In this regard, it is worth noting that determination of intent may be both subjective (known only to the individual) and objective (imputed from behavior). For example, while the release of methyl isothiocyanate (MIC) in Bhopal, India in the 1980s resulted in the death of thousands of people, the release was accidental, and therefore was not considered to be CW. The waters become murky, however, when considering the use of chemicals for law enforcement or riot control. While such use is allowed under the CWC, intent to temporarily incapacitate is clearly evident in such use. Should any deaths occur as a result of such use, the question of whether death was intended leaves the decision of whether it was CW somewhat open to interpretation. In the next section, issues that may impact State and NSAs’ intent with regard to the use of chemicals as weapons are explored, followed by a discussion of the role of individual intent in a State’s or NSA’s decisions.

The Human Element in Decision Making States’ Intent, Interagency “Swarm Ball,” and Cognitive Bias Because the US Constitution gives Congress the “Power of the Purse,” national agencies tend to focus all or most of their efforts on pursuing the issue of the day, rather than addressing all issues that may impact our nation’s security. As a result, when the US Interagency undertakes efforts to address an issue with national security implications – such as the case for WMD in Iraq in 2003, many players rush out onto the field. Just like young soccer players who tend to go 39

for the ball rather than maintaining their positions on the field, which ultimately can lead to their defeat, federal agencies tend to collectively flock to the most visible issues while neglecting others. This phenomenon has come to be referred to as “the children’s soccer game,” or simply, “swarm ball” (4). In addition to neglecting some important issues in favor of others, there are several practical challenges posed by interagency swarm ball: • • •

The various interagency players are unaware of each others’ capabilities, Little to no oversight is exercised to direct players’ efforts, and Players fail to coordinate their actions with those of the rest of the team.

To make matters worse, in international cooperation scenarios, national narratives and other cognitive biases may blind them to the reality of the situation, such as what occurred during the Iraq Survey Group’s inspections from 2003-2004 (5). As a result of these confounding issues, USG or international response is at best, disjointed and suboptimal, and at worst, actively works against itself, sometimes with catastrophic results. In notes maintained in George Washington University’s National Security Archive, Dr. John Prados describes how cognitive bias played out in intelligence judgments regarding the status of Iraq’s WMD programs prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom: “American intelligence knew that Saddam had worked through the 1990s to deceive UN weapons inspectors—they assumed he was hiding his WMDs rather than concealing the lack of them…and since they could not account for every Iraqi missile, assumed Saddam was hiding a covert force of ballistic missiles” (6). It is impossible to completely eliminate cognitive biases from the human condition. Because cognitive bias can negatively impact both data collection and analysis in matters impacting national security, discipline must be employed to avoid the errors to which it can lead. Fortunately, strategies – collectively referred to as “debiasing” – exist that can be employed to minimize its effects. Common debiasing approaches include • • •

Incentivizing more rigorous data collection and analysis by making people more accountable for their decisions, Nudging, whereby the manner in which information is presented or by which decisions or conclusions are elicited is changed, and Training people to make more accurate, less-biased decisions by recognizing patterns and applying appropriate responses.

While debiasing does not always work, such strategies can certainly help lead US interagency and international cooperative efforts to make more accurate judgments (7). Having discussed ways people unconsciously arrive at inaccurate or unethical decisions, in the following section, ways in which aspects of the human condition can more directly impact ethical decision making are explored. 40

The Human Element in Ethical Chemistry: The Role of Individual Intent “Researches into poisonous gases cannot be suppressed…they can be carried on in out- of-the-way cellar rooms, where complete plans may be worked out to change existing industrial chemical plants into full capacity poisonous gas plants on a fortnight’s notice, and who will be the wiser” (8)? A television show that ran for several years in the United States called “Breaking Bad” depicts two central characters who, over the course of the show, get very good at cooking methamphetamine: Walter White and Jesse Pinkman. Walter is a world-class scientist who, after he finds out he is dying of cancer, turns to cooking “meth” to earn enough money for his family to live off of after he dies, continually rationalizing every deplorable thing he does as necessary for his family’s sake. As time goes on it becomes clear he is only thinking of himself, his true motivation being only that he become recognized as the best methamphetamine cook ever. Jesse Pinkman, on the other hand, seems to be more of a victim of circumstance. Troubled throughout his teen years, he had been on the wrong side of the law several times and used drugs himself. Toward the end of the series, Jesse is seen in chains, being kept in a cage like an animal and taken out only to cook methamphetamine. One might think of these two individuals as unrealistic caricatures, but both have real-world counterparts. Like Walter White, Fritz Haber – the Nobel Laureate known for inventing CW – has been described as “power-hungry, egotistical, and a morally bereft monster” (9) and was motivated in large part by his desire for international recognition as a great scientist. This self-interest, combined with intense nationalistic fervor, led him to make a series of decisions that eventually led to the deaths of millions of people. Meanwhile, since 2014, university campuses in Iraq, Turkey, Kenya and elsewhere have been attacked by terrorist groups. In a handful of cases, chemistry departments were specifically targeted, with attackers forcing university staff to gather chemicals to make a bomb or face death. Like Jesse Pinkman (although for very different reasons), these university staff are victims of circumstance: during these attacks they must decide whether to do something they believe to be morally wrong or be killed. These examples are included to underscore a key point regarding intent as it pertains to nonproliferation and disarmament: being a scientist is not just about doing science. It is about being a human who is doing science. When we choose chemistry – or any other science – as a profession, we do not leave our human problems behind us. Moreover, sometimes, despite our aspiration to noble discovery, life circumstances may lead us toward a less than ethical path. As a result, it is critically important for scientists as a whole to be trained in ethics, to practice ethical decision-making in realistic scenarios, and to support each other when they make the right choice. This subject will be discussed in detail later; for the moment, we will turn our attention to applying the definitions and principles described earlier regarding intent to determine whether or not some famous chemical incidents should be considered CW. 41

Used for Purposes Prohibited: Exploring State & NSA Intent “Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question.” -- General John Pershing (10)

Schools of Thought Regarding CW Two schools of thought dominate the history of the development and use of CW. Some say since the advent of nuclear weapons, CW does not present a serious concern, downplaying its use as a weapon of mass destruction For example, in an interview published in New York in 1921 in which he reflected on the use of CW in World War I (WWI), Fritz Haber concluded, “poison gas caused fewer deaths than bullets.” With the drafting of the Geneva Convention banning CW in 1925, hearings being held to consider abolishing of the US Army’s Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) from 1920-1935, and the advent of nuclear weapons in the mid-1940s, this sentiment grew. CW began to be seen as obsolete, and of historical interest only (1). Others, however, subscribe to the opinion that CW represents a significant, persistent threat that should continue to be taken seriously in military readiness exercises because of the likelihood of its presence on the battlefield and the horror associated with its effects. Among those promoting continuation of the US Army CWS to maintain the capability to defend against a chemical attack, despite their belief that US forces ought not to initiate it, were Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, Army Chief of Staff General Peton C. Marsh, and Major Generals Wlliam L. Sibert and Alden H. Waitt. (both Chiefs of the CWS). However, none of these officials’ arguments were as graphic or as clear as the words of a 1919 poem, written by a young lieutenant who clearly understood the horrible impact of CW on the battlefield: “There is nothing in war more important than gas The man who neglects it himself is an ass The unit Commander whose training is slack Might just as well stab all his men in the back.” (1) The apparently contradictory views of CW – that on the one hand the terrifying effect of CW makes its use on the battlefield undesirable, but on the other, US troops should continue to receive CW-related training in case of its use by the enemy, continue to the present day. Moreover, the exception to the CWC allowing the use of chemicals to temporarily incapacitate further downplays the threat posed by the use of weaponized chemicals, but argues for an understanding of reasons why a State or NSA might resort to the use of CWAs against a specific target in order to understand why this seeming contradictory approach continues. In the next section, strategies for use of chemicals as weapons are explored, followed by a brief discussion of several real-world instances of CWA use or possession. 42

Strategies for Use or Possession of Chemicals as Weapons There are a number of reasons why a State or NSA might resort to the use of CW, or at least possess weaponized chemicals. For example, one State may wish to obtain CWA to demonstrate a high degree of technical expertise, with no expectation that is enough to deter adversaries. Meanwhile, another may rationalize using CWA against its own people for riot control, without ever intending to use such chemicals offensively. Yet another State may successfully deter adversaries by making them believe they possess CWAs when they in fact do not, and other states, particularly those that lack the resources to develop a nuclear arsenal, may view the use of CWA as an effective equalizer, in the same way a nuclear power may conclude nuclear warfare is necessary in some cases. Further complicating characterization of intent is identifying specific compounds that can be used for riot control and which must be controlled as CWA. While the CWC schedule of chemicals provides a starting point, the use of chlorine in Syria and the apparent use of fentanyl against terrorists in Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater blur the lines significantly between what does and does not constitute CW. Finally, the need for inter-agency and international coordination further complicates response efforts and foreign policy formulation. To understand these issues more clearly, a series of real-world cases involving use or possession of weaponized chemicals is presented below.

Historical Uses of CW and Apparent Intent Ypres, Belgium, April 22, 1915; Possession and Use Is Important Although references to the use of CW can be found as far back as the beginnings of recorded history in Egypt, Babylon, India and China, the first major battlefield use of CW is generally agreed to have occurred during WW I at Ypres, Belgium. During the war, the CWAs tear gas and mustard and the toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) phosgene and chlorine were all used at least once by French, German, and British forces (1). While a number of motivations were likely at play leading to the use of chemicals as weapons during this war, it is commonly accepted that the biggest reason for moving from planning to actual use of CW was the overarching sense that it was necessary to end the war. Fritz Haber, commonly referred to as the “father of chemical warfare,” was convinced that all deaths are terrible but that CW would lead to “an end of trench warfare, permit a rapid decision by a mobile war, and save countless lives” (11). On this count, despite being hated by many of his colleagues in France and England, the views of allied forces were similar, as summarized by Major General Amos A. Fries, head of the Gas Service of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France and later chief of the CWS: “Had there been a Chemical Warfare Service in 1915 when the first gas attack was made, we would have been fully prepared with gases and masks, and the Army would have been trained in its use. This would have 43

saved thousands of gas cases, the war might easily have been shortened six months or even a year, and untold misery and wasted wealth might have been saved.” (12)

US Use and Possession of CW: Necessary To Respond to an Adversary’s Attack Fries’ perspective on the necessity of CW capabilities continued into the interwar period. He and others recognized that mustard gas in particular completely changed the nature of warfare. Mustard alone caused 20,000 casualties in only 6 weeks after its introduction, created confusion, and lowered morale among enemy ranks. In 1922, in accordance with stipulations of the Limitation of Arms Conference, the War Department ordered the discontinuation of filling projectiles and containers with “poisonous gas,” except the limited number required to perfect defensive countermeasures. In practice, this limited CWS research and development to only that which could be predicted to be used in future wars (13). International efforts to ban not only the use but also research, production and training related to CW elicited an unexpected response from the US, leading to the formulation of new US policy opposing any restrictions on the peacetime preparation or manufacture of CWAs, means of launching such weapons, or in the production of “defensive chemical materiel” (1). As a result, the War Department saw the continued existence of the CWS to experiment, train, and produce CW materials as necessary for national defense. This policy, continuing into WWII, may have directly led to the US’ decades-long delay in ratifying the 1925 Geneva Protocol until 1975.

Iraq, 1988: Production and Use of CW Is Necessary against a Country’s Citizens for Law Enforcement From February to September, 1988, toward the end of the Iran-Iraq war, Project Anfal (Spoils of War) was carried out by Saddam Hussein and his government primarily against his Kurdish enemies. One particular incident occurred on March 16-18, 1988 in the Kurdish city of Halabja where 5,000 people were killed, mainly through the use of CW – specifically, mustard, tabun, sarin, and VX. During Project Anfal, it is estimated that at 50,000-182,000 people were killed (14). Anfal was the culmination of long-term efforts by the Ba’ath Party to put an end to Kurdish efforts to attain independence from Iraq, obtain revenge for what Saddam’s regime perceived to be treason, and reestablish control over the region. Such a claim, although specious, could be made under the literal wording of the CWC. According to the International Court of Justice, however, the methodical killing of whole families was undertaken primarily to de-Kurdify the region around Kirkuk, and thus constituted genocide, despite the regime characterizing the incident as solely a counterinsurgency operation (15). 44

Russia, 2002: Use for Riot Control Is Necessary On October 23, 2002, 41 Chechen terrorists seized a southeastern Moscow theater and took the audience hostage at the beginning of the second act of the musical Nord-Ost. the terrorists were armed with explosives, land mines, and automatic weapons. Their demand was an end to the war in Chechnya and removal of Russian forces from that province. Of the original 800 hostages taken, about 200 were released by the second day of captivity during the course of negotiations, but finally those meetings stalled. Just before dawn on October 26, special police units released an incapacitating agent into the air system of the theater, which quickly rendered everyone in the theater unconscious. The chemical used was probably fentanyl or a fentanyl derivative, although this was never officially confirmed. Fentanyl itself is an anesthetic, commonly used during medical surgeries, but it can be highly lethal in larger doses (16).

Iraq, 1990s: Making Adversaries Believe You Possess CW When You Do Not In his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2004, David Kay, then leader of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Iraq Survey Group, famously stated, “We were almost all wrong” on the question of Iraqi WMD. He went on to recount daily discussions with analysts in the field in which the analysts apologized because in their on-the-ground inspections they were not finding the situation they thought existed. Much has been written about failures on the part of the intelligence community leading to inaccurate judgments about Iraq’s WMD programs. However, it is also true that Saddam’s refusal to fully cooperate with United Nations (UN) weapons inspections and produce complete and categorical evidence that his WMD programs had been dismantled baffled the international community. As former UN weapons inspector, Hans Blix, has concluded, “The UN and the world had succeeded in disarming Iraq without knowing it” (5). While Saddam’s personal pride certainly was part of his calculus, regional security appears to have been his primary motivation. In interrogations after his capture in 2003, he revealed that he was “more concerned about Iran discovering Iraq’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities than the repercussions of the United States for his refusal to let inspectors back into Iraq. In his opinion, the UN inspectors would have directly identified to the Iranians where to inflict maximum damage” (17).

Syria, 1970s through 2013: A CW Program Is Necessary for Deterrence In the 1970’s, after repeated military defeats against Israel in 1967, 1973 and 1982, Syria began to pursue the acquisition a stockpile of weaponized chemicals. Adding to Syria’s motivation to establish and maintain a CW program were the weakening of Arab unity against Israel following the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and Israel’s then-presumed acquisition of nuclear weapons (18). In July, 2012, the existence of its CW program was implicitly disclosed when a 45

representative of the Assad regime stated any such stockpile were only to be used “in the event of external aggression against the Syrian Arab Republic” (19). Not until October 2013, when the Organisation for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) found a total of 1,300 tons of CWAs in Syria, was the full scope of the Syrian CW program revealed, however. Prior to signing the CWC a month earlier, Syria had not confirmed the existence of its CW program.

Chemical Warfare or Not? In the preceding section, each program discussed clearly met the conditions for designation as CW as outlined in Article II of the CWC. Below, a number of less-clear cases are discussed in order to test the boundaries of the CWC. Tokyo Subway Incident: March 20, 1995 The Aum Shinrikyo religious cult, established in the 1980’s by Shoko Asahara to secretly take over the Japanese government, convinced its members to make deadly weapons by assuring them that the US intended to carry out a chemical or another nuclear attack against Japan. By December 1993, the cult had managed to prepare 20 grams of pure sarin. Realizing they would need a much bigger facility to carry out their plans, the cult built the $10 million Satyan 7 facility in Kamikuishiki in 1994 with the intent to prepare 70 tons of sarin. On June 27, 1994, a van outfitted to deliver sarin was parked near the apartment where the three judges lived in Matsumoto City and the sarin was released. The wind conditions altered the intended path of the gas, and the judges were not harmed, but seven other nearby residents were killed and 500 were injured in the attack, some never completely recovering from the sarin exposure. In March 1995, cult members released sarin in a coordinated attack on five trains in the Tokyo subway system, killing 13 people, injuring 54, and otherwise affecting 980 others (20). Like the States’ programs discussed in the previous section, the production and use of sarin by Aum Shinrikyo meets all four criteria to be categorized as CW under Article II of the CWC. The cult’s intent was to use sufficient quantities of toxic chemicals to kill as a result of their toxic chemical properties. The fact that the residents killed in the June 1994 attack were not those targeted is immaterial. Fentanyl Use by an Individual: The Rose Petal Murder Case On Nov 6, 2000, an extremely promising young forensic toxicologist working at the San Diego Medical Examiner’s office killed her husband by poisoning him with a fatal dose of fentanyl, collected from transdermal patches she had collected over time. In addition to being highly educated and well-published, she was a known methamphetamine addict who was found to have stolen drug standards from the lab where she worked to support her habit (21). In this case, while each of the conditions specified by Article II of the CWC was met by Rossum’s use of fentanyl to kill her husband, her intent was to kill just one person. Therefore, it is more properly classified as murder than CW. 46

Coalition Explosive Ordnance (EOD) Teams Exposed to CWAs On multiple occasions from 2004-2010, US EOD teams in Iraq came across CWA-filled munitions amidst conventional rounds and were exposed. According to New York Times, over 3000 chemical munitions were discovered on the battlefield in this manner. Unfortunately, these troops were often denied medical countermeasures because medical personnel did not believe chemical munitions were present in Iraq since media reporting of the Iraq Survey Group’s findings focused on the lack of evidence of active WMD programs (22). In this case, the criteria for classification as CW are not fully met. While the chemicals in question clearly were toxic, of type and quantity sufficient to be used for CW, and their presence in munitions point to the fact that Iraq once intended to take advantage of their chemical properties to kill, US troops’ exposure was accidental. Since no indication of Iraqi intent to injure coalition forces with these CWA-filled munitions has been found, these accidental exposures cannot be considered CW according to Article II of the CWC.

The Dual-Use Conundrum: Can We Impact Intent? “Our work has changed the conditions in which men live, but the use made of these changes is the problem of governments, not of scientists.” – J. Robert Oppenheimer (23) Oppenheimer made the above comment in reference to the use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, after stating he “carried no weight on his conscience.” There is an element of truth in these words, in that scenarios in which a chemist chooses to develop weaponized chemicals does not fully explain the various instances of their use. There are many other instances in which chemicals end up being used by governments, organizations or wily entrepreneurs for nefarious purposes which the chemist whose intellectual property is being used did not intend. However, this reality does not absolve scientists of their responsibility to encourage their specialized knowledge is used for peaceful purposes. CWAs have been called “the poor man’s atomic bomb,” and the parallels are obvious. The question of intent is pivotal when deciding whether the actions of a State or NSA, under certain circumstances, violate the CWC, and only diplomatic efforts are likely to influence the choice of using weaponized chemicals. However, the actions of each individual in the process of developing and weaponizing chemicals can be influenced by the intent of those individuals. It is in this arena, therefore, that some progress might be made to deter, detect and disclose the intention of a State or NSA to engage in CW, and to that end we now turn our attention. A growing problem in the chemical sciences relates to the use of the outcomes of molecular probe research to produce and sell novel psychoactive drugs without regulation by the Food and Drug Administration or scheduling on the Controlled Substances Act by the Drug Enforcement Agency. In a 2011 letter to Nature magazine, Dr David Nichols, a synthetic chemist and endowed 47

chair of pharmacology at Purdue University, described how his research on psychoactive compounds has been abused. In it, he said he was stunned, because he had published information “that ultimately led to human death” (24). History is replete with similar instances in which scientists – particularly those in the life sciences – recognizing the potential for their knowledge to be used for nefarious purposes, refrain from publishing findings from dual-use research such as this. Unfortunately, however, despite any potential consensus within a particular scientific discipline to avoid publishing research on certain topics, nefarious use of chemicals continues. There are, however, at least three things chemists can do to decrease the likelihood of this happening: • •

Require those pursuing careers in chemistry to adopt a code of ethics, Promote the beneficial applications, uses, and development of science and technology while encouraging and maintaining a strong culture of safety, health, and security, and Use security measures to keep dual-use knowledge and chemicals out of the hands of those who might use them as weapons against others.

In recognition of these opportunities, in September 2015, the OPCW convened 36 scientists from 24 countries to draft and reach consensus on key elements any code of ethics or code of conduct for chemical practitioners must address in order to be considered responsive to the CWC. The full text of The Hague Ethical Guidelines is available online at OPCW’s website, and was later used in a State Department-funded workshop in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to draft a code of ethics for implementation by chemical practitioners from countries around the globe, known as the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE) (25, 26). Since its drafting in 2016, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have created an engaging, scenario-based E-learning module (accessible at that teaches learners the principles behind the GCCE and allows them to practice making ethically sound decisions in challenging situations chemical practitioners face in their daily lives (27).

Summary In this chapter, the importance of addressing intent to stop further proliferation or continued use of CW was underscored by examining real-life examples of weaponized chemical possession and use. While nonproliferation frameworks and industry regulation play important roles in nonproliferation and disarmament, they cannot be effective if individuals’ intent is not addressed. In this regard, shaping the intent of the individual is just as important as securing relevant knowledge and chemicals. Because the opportunity to use chemicals as weapons often precedes intent, the human element cannot be separated from the practice of science. The use of CW in attacks by terrorist groups since 2013 highlights the reality that the stakes have never been higher! 48

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Hilmas, C. J.; Smart, J. K.; Hill, B. A. History of Chemical Warfare. In Medical Aspects of Chemical Warfare; Tourinsky, S. D., Ed.; Office of The Surgeon General, Department of the Army: Washington, DC, 2008; pp 09−76. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction; Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: The Hague, 2005. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Depositary Governments: London, Moscow, and Washington, DC, 1972. Jensen, C. J.; McElreath, D. H.; Graves, M. Introduction to Intelligence Studies; Taylor & Francis Group, LLC: Boca Raton, FL, 2013. The Economist Group Ltd. A Disarming Tale: Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Economist [Online], March 11, 2004. (accessed November 28, 2015). Prados, J. U.S. Intelligence and Iraq WMD; The National Security Archive [Online]; 2008. (accessed November 28, 2015). Morewedge, C.; Yoon, H.; Scopelliti, I.; Symborski, C.; Korris, J.; Kassam, K. Debiasing Decisions: Improved Decision Making With a Single Training Intervention. Policy Insights Behav. Brain Sci. 2015, 2 (1), 129–140. Fries, A. Gas in Attack. Chemical Warfare 1919, 2, 3, 8. Charles, D. Master Mind: The Rise & Fall of Fritz Haber, the Nobel Laureate Who Launched the Age of Chemical Warfare; Harper Collins: New York, 2005. Final Report of General John J Pershing; US Government Printing Office: Washington, DC, 1920. Nachmansohn, D. German-Jewish Pioneers in Science 1900-1933: Highlights in Atomic Physics, Chemistry and Biochemistry; Springer-Verlag: New York, 1979. Fries, A. Sixteen reasons why the Chemical Warfare Service must be a separate department of the Army. Chemical Warfare 1920, 2, 4. General Orders No. 26; US War Department: Washington, DC, 1922. Iraq’s Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds; Human Rights Watch: New York, 1995. Hiltermann, J. R. A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja; Cambridge University Press: New York, 2007; pp 133−134. Center for Nonproliferation Studies. The Moscow Theater Crisis: Incapacitants and Chemical Warfare [Online]; February 2014. From James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program. the-moscow-theater-hostage-crisis-incapacitants-and-chemical-warfare/ (accessed October 11, 2018). 49

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Chapter 3

Emerging Chemical and Biological Technologies: Security & Policy Challenges Margaret E. Kosal* Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, 781 Marietta St. NW, Atlanta, Georgia 30318, United States *E-mail: [email protected]

This chapter examines current and changing concerns surrounding the role of emerging technologies in politics, diplomacy, and war. The primary focus is on outlining an analytical framework, which considers both technical and non-technical factors, for methodologically thinking about the relationship between international security and emerging chemical and biological technologies, such as nanotechnology and synthetic genomics. Current and new policies for countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which considers efforts to prevent the proliferation of dangerous new technologies; underlying security puzzles; the changing strategic environment; and geopolitical concerns are all considered along with technologies that potentially will enable new capabilities for chemical and biological defense.

Introduction This work is part of a larger research program probing the interactive causal relationships among strategy, technology, and governance with an emphasis on understanding the complex and interdependent relationships in order to explain how these phenomena intersect and potentially impact US and international security policies. As part of this endeavor, efforts to understand previous and generate new approaches to domestic and international control and nonproliferation of potentially dangerous technologies are being pursued. That is, how can we govern our own ingenuity in such a way as to maximize beneficial outcomes and minimize the negative ones. © 2018 American Chemical Society

This work broadly focuses on two interrelated areas: understanding the role of emerging technologies for national and international security and reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Within today’s most cutting-edge scientific and technological innovations – nanotechnology, biotechnology, the cognitive sciences, advanced materials, and the intersection with advanced analytics – is emerging research and technology cited as carrying the potential of bringing utopian or dystopian visions closer, including having an even greater potential than nuclear weapons to radically change the balance of power internationally. The goals of this work are to aid in understanding the underlying geopolitical drivers and to develop new strategic approaches and implementable policy options. Future trends are critical to thinking about the challenges of the 21st Century at the interface of chemical and biological sciences and technologies with international nonproliferation and disarmament efforts. Understanding current efforts is an important step as it establishes a connection to history and aids in identifying trends. Future trend analysis is a tricky task. Historian and strategist Colin Gray noted, “Trend spotting is easy. It is the guessing as to the probable meaning and especially the consequences of trends that is the real challenge” (1). With that in mind, the following is an effort to establish a broad context for consideration of chemical and biological technologies in future security scenarios.

Background There is long-standing scholarly and popular interest in understanding how technology intersects with war and peace across scholarly pursuits and more popularly, and furthermore the role those interactions played in creating the world as it is today, including explaining the origin, rise, and collapse of civilization and societies around the world. One of the best known works at a broad level is by physiologist and environmental biologist, Jared Diamond. His 1997 Pulitzer prize-winning book, Guns, Germs and Steel, as well as more recent work such as that by Peter Turchina and colleagues in their 2013 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences paper, “War, Space, and the Evolution of the Old World” (2), examines the emergence of what they call “large polities,” otherwise known as the first cities or the emergence of civilization, compared to the innovation and emergence of groups of technologies. They observed that where groups of technologies emerged with use in warfare correlated with the emergence of some of our first civilizations: the Fertile Crescent, the Nile River Valley, the Yellow River. In looking at and modeling the emergence of these technologies, those regions were found to correspond to our first societies. Regions without these innovations did not have the same level of early political – city structure. Beyond those works, there is a rich literature exploring the intersection of science, technology, and understanding the outcomes of armed conflict (3–14). For strategists and international relations scholars of revolutions in military affairs (RMA) (15–21) and of fourth generation warfare (4GW) (22–26), the nexus between technology and military affairs is not just speculation but a reality that bears directly on the propensity for conflict and outcomes of war, as well as 52

the efficacy of security cooperation and coercive statecraft. The 4GW concept shares many theoretical similarities with Martin van Creveld’s Trinitarian warfare model (27). Emerging innovations within today’s most cutting-edge science and technology (S&T) areas are cited as carrying the potential of bringing the future envisioned to bring both near term capabilities, as well as those that might appear scientific fictions, closer. The goal of this work is not to predict new specific technologies but to help develop a robust analytical framework for assessing the impact of new technologies on national and international security and identifying policy measures to prevent or slow proliferation of new technology for malfeasant intentions. Understanding the changing paradigms and limiting the proliferation of unconventional weapons for the 21st Century starts with an awareness of the factors driving the capabilities, analysis of the changing nature of technological progress, the nature of warfare, and the relationship between science and international security.

Current Domestic and International Policy Reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) remains one of the most significant priorities of the United States (28–35) and the international security community (36–41). The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) asserted “the instability or collapse of a WMD-armed state is among our most troubling concerns. Such an occurrence could lead to rapid proliferation of WMD material, weapons, and technology, and could quickly become a global crisis posing a direct physical threat to the United States and all other nations” (42). This was reiterated in the 2017 National Security Strategy, “The danger from hostile state and non-state actors who are trying to acquire nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons is increasing … The longer we ignore threats from countries determined to proliferate and develop weapons of mass destruction, the worse such threats become, and the fewer defensive options we have” (43). Denying the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by hostile states, sub-state actors, or non-state actors as part of nonproliferation and counterproliferation and possessing robust capacity to manage the consequences are desired strategic ends. Counter-WMD (C-WMD) is defined as “efforts against actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD and related capabilities” (44). These efforts emphasize policies and actions to affect, that is to ‘shape,’ the political and security environment in order to influence both states and non-state actors to avoid and end any WMD-related activities (45). C-WMD aims to address WMD developments as early as possible and develop means to protect against significant threats. Strategy for C-WMD delineates three desired end states: reduce incentives to pursue, possess, and employ WMD; increase barriers to the acquisition, proliferation, and use of WMD; manage WMD risks emanating from hostile, fragile, or failed states and safe havens; deny the effects of current and emerging WMD threats through layered, integrated defenses. Or to express it more concisely: no new 53

actors obtain WMD; those possessing WMD do not use them; and if actors use WMD, their effects are minimized. C-WMD encompasses pre-conflict, during conflict, and post-conflict activities centered on securing and destroying material and delivery systems; but, more broadly, it also entails activities to address the associated programs, infrastructure, and expertise (46, 47). The potential actors involved in foreseeable threat trends consist of states and non-state actors, as well as recognition of the dynamic inter-play that exists among these two variables along the range of state to state-sponsored to the extreme self-radicalized lone wolf ventures. This strategy recognizes and aims to enable efforts to address the complexities and challenges of the 21st Century.

Changing Strategic Environment With a decade of experience now to draw from, this is the moment to ask ourselves hard questions – about the nature of today’s threats and how we should confront them. (48) From the chlorine gas attacks of World War I to the use of atomic weapons against Japan in WWII through the development of biological capabilities during the Cold War and to the present day, limiting the proliferation of unconventional weapons enabled by technological innovation has been and remains a significant international issue. The last two decades, however, have brought an intersection of two key drivers that suggest the need for new ways to understand and assess the implications of new and emerging technologies and the potential ramifications for proliferation of new and unconventional weapons. The first, the changing nature of global security threats, began with the fall of the Soviet Union and was punctuated by the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001. Second is the shifting nature of technological progress, which brings entirely new capabilities, many of which are no longer the exclusive domain of a few large states. These drivers offer new opportunities and new challenges for defense, arms control, nonproliferation, cooperation, and the security community. In thinking about the potential security implications of emerging chemical and biological technologies, one of the first things one must recognize is that the strategic environment has changed. We are no longer in a purely post-Cold War international security environment, but we are in an environment that combines those characteristics with greater uncertainty in the nature of our adversaries and in their capabilities. As the lone superpower remaining, the United States has an unprecedented level of military and other technology capabilities. Rising and revisionist powers seek to challenge the role of the US in the international community. Because of these asymmetric advantages, particularly in traditional military power, adversaries seek nontraditional and unconventional means to affect the United States and our allies. In the post-Cold War environment, the most technologically advanced military power no longer guarantees national security. Globalization and the information revolution, including the Internet and other communication leaps 54

– have led to much greater visibility into the availability and potential for technology (49). New technological developments have become accessible and relatively inexpensive to a larger number of nations and within the grasp of non-state actors: advanced technology is no longer the domain of the few (50). In the 21st century, both nation-states and non-state actors may have access to new and potentially devastating dual-use technology (51, 52). Understanding these changing paradigms and limiting the proliferation of unconventional weapons for the 21st Century starts with an awareness of the factors driving the capabilities, understanding the underlying science and the challenges of defense, considering the changing nature of technological progress and the changing nature of warfare, and the relationship between science and security domestically and internationally. Communication of those new discoveries is occurring faster than ever, meaning that the unique ownership of a piece of new technology is no longer a sufficient position, if not impossible. The information revolution and globalization themselves have been major drivers. It is widely regarded that recognition of the potential applications of a technology and a sense of purpose in exploiting it are far more important than simply having access to it today. Technological surprise has and will continue to take many forms. A plethora of new technologies that are under development for peaceful means but may have unintended security consequences and will certainly require innovative countermeasures. For example, tremendous developments in biotechnology have occurred since the advent of recombinant DNA and tissue culture-based processes in the 1970s. If the potential for biotechnology to affect fundamental security and warfighting doctrines had been more clearly recognized twenty-five years ago, the situation today could be very different. Defense against biological weapons – from both states and non-state actors – currently presents a threat that is difficult to predict and for which traditional solutions are increasingly less effective. The dual use conundrum applies to all modern technologies. Because of the other characteristics of the changing strategic environment, it is of greater concern. Historically, dual use previously referred to technologies that could be meaningfully used by both the civilian and military sectors. In light of an ever-changing security environment in which the potential for technologies to be misused by both state and non-state actors has become increasingly prevalent, however, a new conceptualization of dual use, in which the same technologies can be used legitimately for human betterment and misused for nefarious purposes, such as terrorism, has emerged. The National Institutes of Health’s Office of Science Policy has recently promulgated a similar understanding of dual use in its discussions and policies on biosecurity. In keeping with these understandings, this work adopts a similar definition of dual use as research “conducted for legitimate purposes that generates knowledge, information, technologies, and/or products that could be utilized for both benevolent and harmful purposes” (53), i.e., research that can have beneficial impacts as well as unintended deleterious consequences. Reducing the risk from misuse of technology will mean consideration of the highly transnational nature of the critical technology required. Traditional and innovative new approaches to nonproliferation and counter proliferation 55

are important policy elements to reduce the risk of malfeasant application of technology that may enable advanced weapons or make production or dissemination of biochemical agents available to a much wider group of actors. Efforts to strengthen existing international regimes to control transfers of dual-use materials are important (54). Verification still remains a technical as well as diplomatic challenge. The role of international agreements and cooperative programs in the 21st Century is a contested intellectual and policy field.

Complexity and Disruptive Technologies New and unpredicted technologies are emerging at an unprecedented pace around the world. Communication of those new discoveries is occurring faster than ever, meaning that the unique ownership of a new technology is no longer a sufficient position, if not impossible. In today’s world, recognition of the potential applications of a technology and a sense of purpose in exploiting it are far more important than simply having access to it (55). Advanced technology is no longer the domain of the few. These concepts were articulated at the multi-national level in NATO’s New Strategic Concept paper, exemplifying the high-level policy interest in the potential role for new technologies to affect the security environment of the 21st Century. Within that document, the first review of NATO since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was noted that: Less predictable is the possibility that research breakthroughs will transform the technological battlefield. Allies and partners should be alert for potentially disruptive developments in such dynamic areas as information and communications technology, cognitive and biological sciences, robotics, and nanotechnology …. The most destructive periods of history tend to be those when the means of aggression have gained the upper hand in the art of waging war. (56) That passage conceptually highlights the uncertainty, complexity, and issues of interdependence that exist in trying to understand the interactions between emerging technologies and international security. Predicting how these new innovations and breakthroughs in scientific understanding may be used is a challenge. Looking to history is one valuable past insight. One must be careful, however, to not be purely technologically deterministic. That is to not assume that because something is possible or something potentially may come about that it is inevitable. History shows us that human ingenuity and use is more often a function of political decisions, regional security threats, and other factors of social, political, historical, economic, and cultural origin. It is this question of unpredictability that has been highlighted not only by NATO but also by national security leaders as a point of concern regarding emerging technologies. When asked what are the current approaches and thinking on means for deterring emerging technologies of concern to then- US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Commander General Robert Kehler, U.S. Air 56

Force, responded that “surprise is what keeps me up at night” and cited current uncertainty in how to assess and address emerging and disruptive technologies (57). The threats of disruptive technologies are of constant concern, and Kehler acknowledged that there is uncertainty on how to assess and how to address such potential perils to the nation and our allies. More than twenty years earlier, former U.S. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David E. Jeremiah (retired), asserted that military applications of nanotechnology “have even greater potential than nuclear weapons to radically change the balance of power” (58). This observation resonates with NATO’s observations on the potential security consequences of one or a small number of nations excelling at the use of an emerging technology for offensive military applications. While complex does not intrinsically equal dangerous nor does complicated necessarily equal unpredictable, the lives of individuals on the planet are orders of magnitude more complex and complicated than they were just 100 years ago. Since 1945, a few nation-states have been able to decimate the planet in ways previously unmatched. While the threat of true nuclear existential destruction, which would arise from massive thermonuclear exchange, has decreased over the last thirty years, the number and widespread availability of potentially dangerous technologies has grown at an unprecedented pace. The threat of nuclear weapons remains and may even be increasing from rogue states and non-state actors. Counter-WMD threat trends are consistent with a future envisioned to be complex and uncertain as we progress with limited understanding through rapid social and technological changes. Threat trends under the auspice of WMD are characterized mainly by two drivers that exist in complementary yet separate conceptual spheres. First is, the familiar nuclear characteristics of threats that drive policies to account for the knowledge and material related to nuclear weapons capabilities. Secondly, the characteristics associated with chemical and biological threats continue to evolve, are fundamentally dual-use, and in many cases, are either so wide spread (basic chemical technologies) or part of the natural world (pathogens). These differing – & more complex – characteristics of chemical and biological-based threats drive policies to account for innovation and technology diffusion of those capabilities.

Security Puzzles There are number of security puzzles that underlie this work. Not all of them can be answered nor even necessarily addressed in this chapter, but they are questions that drive scholarly research and key policy makers up at night. The first is the broad question of how does technology affect international security and the security dilemma. The security dilemma is a concept from international relations and political science that two or more parties, such as adversarial nation states, will assume the other has the maximum potential capabilities. That is, states will hedge and assume that their adversary does not have good intentions and will be attempt to develop new capabilities that surpass those held by others. 57

Traditionally, states have attempted to reduce the security dilemma through confidence international arms control treaties and other international legal mechanisms that include verification regimes and mechanisms to build confidence in a stated capabilities, numbers, and ability to use those military capabilities. Most relevant to this work are the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, which seek to limit proliferation, achieve unilateral disarmament, and advance peaceful uses of the biological and chemical sciences. The BWC and the CWC seek to establish norms of dis-use that contribute to prenting the misuse of biotechnology and related sciences and technologies. States parties to both the BWC and the CWC pursue efforts to enhance the education and awareness of scientists to the problems of dual use and responsible use. These treaties are not panaceas, however, which is evidenced by the difficulties that the international community has had in stopping the ongoing use and preventing future of chemical agents by the Syrian regime in its ongoing civil war and the transfer of material and knowledge from North Korea. One critical security puzzle is the question of the potential unique strategic value of these emerging technologies. Whether it is derived from security capabilities, economic, or other political applications, is there something truly novel or disruptive about an emerging technology? Advances in atomic physics in the first decades of the 20th Century enabled the innovations that led to the first nuclear weapons. At this point whether any of these emerging technologies will produce similar strategic value is yet to be observed. In order to address that question there are number of critical factors that need to be explored. One needs to distinguish the potential for unique capabilities from those technologies that further enable previous capabilities. While there certainly are concerns regarding enabling or enhancing previous capabilities, that is not the same as the development of a unique new, unprecedented application of the technology. Mny current federal research and development programs seek to further enable existing capabilities or incorporate new, state-of-the art technology into current or evolutionary advancements of existing platforms. Such efforts can be contrasted with those aiming to deliver revolutionary capabilities through incorporation of emerging science and technology, such as those originating in the chemical and biological sciences.

New Capabilities from Emerging Chemical and Biological Technologies Realization of truly revolutionary capabilities will require commitment to basic research aimed at fundamental understanding as well as acceptance of more technical and programmatic risk in applied research and advanced development. This is especially true in emerging fields such as nanotechnology, advanced biotechnology, the cognitive neurosciences, artificial intelligence, and in what are called the converging technologies (59), that is the interdisciplinary intersections of multiple emerging scientific and technology fields. Historical precedent, while not predictive, shows that revolutionary breakthroughs occur at interdisciplinary junctions (60). In spite of this, federal support for research in the US is historically 58

biased toward strongly disciplinary research (61). Potential capabilities from converging technologies will require proactive strategic planning and program management to foster such innovative research. A vast array of technological research is under way that possess the potential to radically enable new defensive capabilities, as well as hypothetically permitting grave consequences. One of the illustrative areas of evolving, new, and emerging technologies likely to fill current gaps and deliver new capabilities are advanced materials, including nanomaterials, for structural and functional applications (62). The current state of knowledge of nanomaterials may be compared with the synthetic chemical industry seventy-five years ago: a host of discoveries and interesting materials – such as modern plastics, nylon, and Teflon – were being uncovered, but little fundamental predictability in molecular synthesis was possible. Now, decades later, chemists can imagine almost any molecule and then synthesize it. Synthetic chemistry can be likened to a giant three-dimensional puzzle coupled with a game of chess that continually yields new capabilities. Emerging technologies, like nanotechnology and synthetic biology, hold similar promise. While structural nanomaterials have already been incorporated into security applications, functional nanomaterials may afford even greater capabilities. Two examples are meta-materials for cloaking and quantum dots (nanocrystal semiconductors) for infrared optoelectronics, e.g., advance “night vision” capabilities. Meta-materials are synthetic structures that bend light obscuring an object from view (63–65). Today most meta-materials are limited to narrow regions of the visible or infrared spectrum; advances in the technology will widen the effective part of the light spectrum cloaked (66, 67). Quantum dots or nanodots are essentially very small transistors that produce a unique optical signal that can be changed by the addition or removal of an electron or photon. They have the potential to detect single molecules of light or a target substance, which may lead to enhanced capabilities beyond what is available today (68). Biologically-inspired or biomimetic offer routes to functional materials that offer additional routes to new capabilities (69–71). Evolving, new, and emerging technologies will also enable new capabilities for countering WMD. While there are many possibilities, some highlights include application for passive and active defense that are likely to originate in materials science research, systems biology, and chemistry. In terms of individual protection, future protective clothing may more closely resemble a system of interacting active sensors and stimulus responding intelligent materials than the passive material of today’s DoD Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST). For example, a protective system could ‘harden’ as necessary to prevent ballistic penetration or limit radiological exposure. A semi-permeable membrane could neutralize chemical or biological threats before they reach the soldier. A key aspect of such an ensemble could be a network of sensors acting in unison to sense ambient threats, to report incoming threats to the individual, and to broadcast this knowledge to others in the area. An advanced uniform system could react autonomously to ambient threats as well as warnings broadcast from other systems, without needing input from the soldier. 59

Such a protective system should neutralize threats near or at the surface of the uniform before they can come into direct physical contact with the warrior. Active material properties – ion channels and functionalized nanolayers, for example – are being investigated today at the basic research level to accomplish this (72). In addition to such active approaches integrated into personal protection, the individual reactive sensing entities should communicate near-instantaneously. This may involve chemical, magnetic, and electrical transmission of signals across multiple reactive sensing nodes. This future of personal protection envisions a network-aware system that would be capable of sharing data from its own integrated sensor system with the surrounding network. New materials could accomplish these tasks on the nanoscale by using electric and magnetic fields, as well as other mechanisms, to adjust the functional characteristics of the surface (73). Material surfaces may also induce nanoparticle agglomeration (clumping) and clustering to promote threat sequestration and neutralization. Multifunctional nanofiber structures incorporating high-capacity selective adsorbents, such as metal organic frameworks (MOF) (74) or metal organic polyhedra (MOP) (75), are one route to enabling capabilities to neutralize or to safely sequester hazardous breakdown products in nanoscale traps. Self-cleaning materials are an additional area of basic nanoscience research currently under exploration for direct use in protection, as well as other non-traditional applications such as commercial building materials (76). Another route is through smart materials that are able to change porosity and surface energy on demand for self-decontamination and self-detoxification (77). Biomimetic approaches to material design include synthetic analogs of microand nanotextured surfaces of plant leaves that replicate the water-repelling (hydrophobic) characteristics and enable a self-cleaning capacity (78). Additional experimental work to enable further a priori design and allow functional control of self-cleaning materials by a user is needed, as well as integration into an overall ensemble. A critical factor is the alignment of technology development to incorporate these novel materials into existing platforms using scalable manufacturing processes. Nano-enabled technologies offer some inherent advantages for chemical and biological agent detection and diagnostics at all levels. To start, the innovative properties of nanostructures can be exploited for the transduction of agent contact into a discernible signal (79–83). Detecting and identifying an aerosolized or contaminated agent before contact is made is referred to as remote or “standoff” detection (84) and has been a high priority requirement for over a decade. A major difficulty in remote detection is low signal strength in electromagnetic molecular signatures. While electromagnetic wave scattering from particulates in the atmosphere makes it possible to establish their presence with reasonable sensitivity, the collection of spectral information is more difficult. Nanostructures could provide a high degree of enhancements that would make them viable for lower signal strength IR, Raman and terahertz (THz) spectroscopies, for example, silver or gold nanoparticles engineered to create highly efficient surface enhanced Raman scattering (SERS) coupled to an efficient laser light reflector to create smart dust that could be detected from an autonomous vehicle or to drop 60

nanostructured materials into the suspect site and to extract the Raman signal from a distance (85). New materials open opportunities for this approach. There are many routes to embedded future detection capabilities, such as flexible nanowire sensor arrays ‘printed’ on plastic or polymeric substrates that may be implantable or wearable, such as from printable silicon nanowires (86). With the miniaturization enabled by the use of nanostructures and lab-on-a-chip, detection or identification devices may easily fit onto small robotic platforms both aerial and ground. Systems biology is the integrated discovery, characterization, and understanding of the interactions between components of a biological system. The study of systems biology has experimental, computational, and theoretical components, involving measurement, data mining, modeling, and manipulation. Systems biology involves an integration of molecular biology (information transfer), physiology (adaptive states), developmental biology (physiological growth), and evolutionary biology (natural selection). It is a method and approach to gain understanding of the translation from biological systems to multifunctional materials resulting in the mimicking of chemical or biochemical interactions through design and engineering of biotic or abiotic materials and systems (87). Using a systems biology approach, it may be possible to find the nodes of interaction among various pathways and agents. Countermeasures may then be targeted to nodes of interaction (for example, a binding pocket of a critical protein) for diagnostic, preventative, or therapeutic purposes. Another approach leveraging systems biology is to mimic the processes in the innate and adaptive immune system. This approach has the potential to connect a capability of non-specific sensing to the very agent specific mechanisms. Living systems present a number of defenses when contacted by a threat agent, whether intentionally genetically engineered, naturally occurring, or manipulated in some other means. To mimic sensing mechanisms and processes with engineered or synthesized materials has the potential to create a robust and field-deployable sensing array. Realization of such a countermeasure will require multidisciplinary work across the fields of molecular biology, biochemistry, and nanotechnology. Information and computer sciences will be important as well, including new artificial intelligence systems, algorithms, and integration. New materials for the purposes of reducing the toxicity and even destroying toxic chemical or biological agents are needed. Certain metal oxides and metal oxide composites may meet these requirements. For example, nanoscale magnesium oxide for sorption and ability to start the chemical breakdown combined with environmentally-safe polyoxometalates (POM) that use oxygen in the air to catalytically destroy select agents (87–89). New materials that start the breakdown of chemical agents or biological agents in sunlight through photocatalysis are another area for decontamination and elimination. In situations in which an agent may not need to be completely destroyed on site effective passivation – rendering near inert – may be highly desirable. This could be accomplished by developing a porous material that causes the liquid agent to form a gel or a solid. Thus, a small amount of gelation agent or a catalyst for polymerization could offer significant on site protection. 61

Conclusions Among the highest international security priorities is preventing the acquisition and use of WMD by hostile states, sub-state actors, or terrorists. At the onset of the 21st Century, this has emerged as a national and international priority for today and also important for a wider range of future challenges. Understanding and anticipating the types of threats that may emerge as science and technology advance; the potential consequences of those threats; and the motivation for enemies to seek, to intentionally pursue proliferation, and to obtain unconventional weapons is necessary for preparing for the future security of the nation and allies. How, when, where, and in what form the shifting nature of technological progress may bring enhanced or entirely new capabilities, many of which are no longer the exclusive domain of the United States, is contested and requires better analytical tools to enable U.S. assessment. Contemporary analyses of these emerging technologies often expose the tenuous links or disconnections among mainstream scholarship on international security, understanding of the military technological innovation and acquisition processes, and fundamental understanding of the underlying science. Currently variables and metrics are neither well-characterized nor well-quantified, particularly for specific-defense related concepts. Conceptually, technologies can be seen as evolutionarily advancing current capabilities or pressing to the bleeding edge and enabling disruptive, revolutionary capabilities developments. The ability to differentiate or gain insight into such has thus far not been explored or analyzed robustly with respect to strategic implications beyond a technologically-deterministic lens. The novel scientific principles that underlie the character of these uncertain technologies and their convergence with political and social institutions reveal conceptual and empirical confusion associated with assessing the national security implications. There also is palpable confusion over the technical and strategic distinguishability and dominance of prospective offensive and defensive systems. Flexible approaches to nonproliferation and counterproliferation are important policy elements to reduce the risk of malfeasant application of nanotechnology. Past practices and policies that do not take the international nature and prominent commercial nanotechnology sector into account are increasingly rendered inadequate. Yet, failure to appreciate divergent national incentives and inclinations in these emerging technology domains, risks misconceiving of the challenges for ensuring strategic stability with the attendant consequences for introducing counter-productive international security policies. As the United States looks to the future – whether dominated by extremist groups co-opting advanced weapons in the world of globalized non-state actors or states engaged in persistent regional conflicts in areas of strategic interest – new adversaries and new science and technology will emerge. Choices made today that affect emerging revolutionary science and technologies such as nanotechnology, will impact how ably states will respond. The changing strategic environment in which security operations are planned and conducted impacts science and technology policy choices made today and affects how science and technology may play a beneficial or deleterious role in the future. The emerging 62

field of nanotechnology has received global attention, and the world hangs on the cusp of new discoveries that may significantly alter military capabilities and may generate new threats against military and civilian sectors. This interdisciplinary research intentionally straddles the social sciences and technical disciplines. While its foundation is in social science methods, ideas and examples from across the experimental physical and life sciences and engineering are integrated throughout. To paraphrase former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates (90), the challenges facing the world today require a much broader conception than during the Cold War, and the solutions will require application and engagement of additional intellectual disciplines that transverse previous conceptions of interdisciplinary.

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Chapter 4

Education and Outreach: Key Elements To Promote the Responsible and Peaceful Uses of Chemistry R. A. Spanevello and A. G. Suárez* Facultad de Ciencias Bioquímicas y Farmacéuticas-Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Instituto de Química Rosario-CONICET-UNR Suipacha 531, Rosario, S2002LRK, Argentina *E-mail: [email protected]

Education and outreach are long term strategic tools for the promotion of the responsible and peaceful uses of chemistry. Chemistry is a wonderful science which has done, and will continue to do much good for humanity. Thousands of new chemicals are synthesized every day that can render enormous benefits for the common good. However, as with any science, there is the possibility that chemistry may be misused as it has been done in the past. For this reason, awareness-raising about the multiple uses of chemical substances and the dual use of scientific knowledge is needed at all levels of chemistry education and public outreach programs. This chapter describes a practical approach on the incorporation of these issues into the chemistry curricula. It The opportunity provided by green chemistry to consider safety, security and sustainability also needs to be stressed.

Introduction Since the caveman period, the scientific achievements of human beings and our technological applications have transformed not only the material conditions of our lives, but also the very way in which we view the world. They have thus become the key factors for the economic developments of the nations. In particular, chemical sciences had a crucial role in this development (1).

© 2018 American Chemical Society

Chemistry, the discovers of chemistry, and chemical products are vital and beneficial to daily life. Chemicals, both natural and synthetic, are all around us. They are also within us, part of the fundamental structures of living systems. The world´s food supply has seen an explosive expansion in the last century due to the development of agrochemicals that protect crops and enhance growth. In virtually every arena and every aspect of life, transportation, communication, clothing, shelter, medicine, etc., the diverse industrial applications of chemistry has resulted in an improvement in the quality of the life of all human beings. However, these almost unbelievable achievements have come at a price. That price is the toll that the manufacture, use, and disposal of synthetic chemicals have taken on human health and the environment. On the other hand, although chemicals provide a vast array of benefits, they also present the potential for misuse. Important industrial chemicals can be used to create chemical warfare agents, some of the world’s most terrible weapons. These types of chemicals have been created with the purpose to kill or injure humans, and used in several regional wars and conflicts. Chemicals per se are not good or bad but even chemicals and technologies intended for the best of purposes could be misused. Throughout history, it is possible to find different examples on the misuse of chemicals or the scientific knowledge, even before the Archimedes era. In the 6th Century B.C. Assyrians contaminated the water supply of their enemies by poisoning their wells with Rye Ergot. The great Leonardo da Vinci disclosed his military knowledge on chemical weapons. In a letter dated in 1482 and addressed to Ludovico il Moro, Duke of Milan, in which he offered his services, he suggested “[…] throw poison in the form of powder upon galleys. Chalk, fine sulfide of arsenic, and powdered verdigris may be thrown among enemy ships by means of small mangonels, and all those who, as they breathe, inhale the powder into their lungs will become asphyxiated” (1). The first full-scale deployment of chemical warfare agents took place on April 22, 1915, in the Second Battle of Ieper during World War I (2). Unfortunately, this date is considered the beginning of the modern era of chemical warfare. In the last decade of the 20th century, a new episode surprised the world when members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult acquired the capacity to produce nerve agents, starting a new era in chemical terrorism. The Tokyo subway attack engendered feelings of fear all over the world. Throughout history there were several international attempts to codify the ban on chemical weapons, but those agreements did not prevent their use and their production. Finally, in 1993 the countries of the world finalized the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (3, 4), the first disarmament treaty to include a time frame for the elimination of an entire class of weapons of mass destruction, but also the first multilateral arms control treaty to incorporate an extensive verification regime. The implementing body of the CWC is the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (5). In 2013, in recognition of its extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons, the OPCW was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize (6). In spite of these efforts, recent example of the use of chemicals as weapons, like the use of sarin in Syria (7) among others, demonstrates that these weapons are not just issues of the past. Consequently, nonproliferation actions are important to 70

be undertaken by all nations and societies, and policy makers should not forget them. On the other hand, the importance of accident prevention in chemistry and the chemical industry is another aspect of the responsible practice of chemistry which should have special consideration. There have been a number of important chemical accidents like the ones in Bhopal (8) India, and Seveso (9), Italy, that have resulted in the loss of hundreds of human lives, with dramatic consequences to the environment. In general, chemists have limited or no exposure to ethical norms during their careers. Furthermore, the new developments in science and technology that are paving the way for multiple opportunities beneficial to humankind could also open the door to unforeseen challenges and abuses. Scientific literature and technical information is easily accessible nowadays, which can be searched quickly and thoroughly with simple computer facilities. With the availability of the procedures and some starting materials, it becomes evident that awareness-raising about the multiple uses of chemical substances and the dual use of scientific knowledge is an urgent need, in particular in the field of chemistry education.

The Challenge To Introduce the Responsible Use of Chemistry in the Chemistry Curricula The importance to introduce concepts about ethics and the responsible practice of chemistry into curricula for the degree in chemistry motivated different debates in the academic and scientific community at our Institution. We arrived to the general consensus that chemistry educators have a duty to prevent the misuse of chemistry and should educate students about chemical safety, waste disposal, and social responsibility promoting the peaceful uses of chemistry. This approach represented a new challenge for educators, scientists and decision makers. One of the main questions that arose was how to introduce these topics in higher education, as there was a generalized idea that it will create new subjects in the already crowded chemistry curricula. A general agreement was that awareness raising about the multiple uses of chemicals and the potential dual use of the scientific knowledge needed a multidisciplinary approach, chemist, pedagogue, specialist in e-learning and ethics, among others. The new objective focused on the consideration of issues of ethics and responsibility in the chemistry curriculum at all levels of education. It was considered essential that the planning of any initiative include a focus on strategies to make the project sustainable from the beginning. Taking advantage of the design of a new curricula for the Degree in Chemistry in our Institution, we decided to includes these topics in curricular activities, elective courses and complementary activities. The new curricula for the degree in chemistry was organized in two main groups of subjects: one dealing with disciplinary courses needed for a chemistry professional, such as mathematics, physics, general chemistry, organic and inorganic chemistry, analytical chemistry, physicochemical, environmental chemistry, among others; the second group of subjects included epistemology and 71

seminars to consider topics of bioethics, responsible use of chemicals, and ethical guidelines (10). Among the curricular activities, the seminars for undergraduate students in the first and second year of their careers, which usually approach different issues related to the student future professional activities in the former curricula, were reformulated to stress the achievements of chemistry and its contribution to the humankind, examples of the misuse of chemistry (waste disposal, chemical accidents, and chemical weapons), the objectives of the CWC and the achievements of the OPCW. In the second year, exercises of certain themes are approached by case studies regarding problems that arise from inappropriate domestic and industrial waste disposal. Other subjects include “Epistemology and Methodology of Research” in which the responsible use of the scientific knowledge is discussed; “Legislation, Hygiene and Safety”, topics of this subject consider technical aspects of the CWC. To develop the different activities we took advantage of the resources for students and teachers provided on the official website of the OPCW, in particular the “Fires” and the “Multiple Uses of Chemicals” projects (11). Among the elective courses, it can be mentioned “Green Chemistry”, “Bioethics” and “Education for sustainability”. It was decided to consider these topics due to the fact that green chemistry rests on a set of principles, and the principles, in turn, rest on certain ethical assumptions, the modern concept of sustainability has an inherent ethical dimension. Another elective subject is “Social Problems of Technologies”; the focus of this project is based on the generation of technologies for social inclusion; for example, related to cleaning reservoirs that are used to store water in times when there is no provision. The students are also invited to participate in all complementary activities that are developed. The first of them was a pilot workshop entitled “Chemistry for peace: ethics and professional responsibility in education”, which was held in Rosario, Argentina, on 27 and 28 June 2013 (12). The participants were academics, scientists, and representatives of professional and scientific associations, from all over the country. The objectives of the workshop were to provide an opportunity to exchange experiences, and to develop proposals for chemical education related to the prevention of the misuse of toxic chemicals; facilitate chemical safety and chemical security; build skills and capabilities in areas related to the peaceful uses of chemistry; raise awareness of the CWC among the broad community of relevant professionals who should be aware of it; and build networks in chemical education. The workshop included two round tables: one on institutional policies, and one on strategies in chemical education. The round table panels were made up of representatives of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the National Research Council, Professional and Scientific Associations, and the Forum of Deans from Schools related to chemistry. The topics of general discussion were: •

How can undergraduate and postgraduate education programs address the ethical and practical aspects of preventing the misuse of chemistry? 72

• • • •

How can we encourage universities to reflect the issues of the CWC in their curricula? What information should be provided? Strategies for the implementation Teaching material for professors

The main conclusion from the workshop was a complete general consensus on the urgent need to address the subject of professional ethics and responsibility at different levels during the careers of the future professionals. The OPCW has contributed to the participation of international experts on education. The workshop had an important recognition and the results were commented by radio interviews and published in different articles in newspapers. The relevance of this event in our society was due to the fact that the chemical industry in our region is one of the main economic activities. This workshop was the first activity in Argentina regarding education and outreach relevant to the CWC, which was a catalyst to generate different educational programs that are supported nowadays by the National Authority and the Ministry of Education (13). Another initiative devoted to teachers and professors in chemistry, as well as graduates and undergraduates students from our institution was the workshop “The challenge to educate in Chemistry” (November, 2014) (14). Thanks to the support of the OPCW, it was possible to have the participation of Mr. Chretien Schouteten, a retired chemistry teacher from the Netherlands who spent most of his career being concerned about chemists’ responsibilities towards society (15). Among the different activities developed during the workshop, undergraduate students interpreted an extract from “The Chemist” a moving play wrote by Mr. Schouteten about the tragic life of Fritz Haber and his family. This activity was used as a starting point for a general debate among the participants to create awareness about the potential misuse of chemistry and challenging them to imagine what they would do if their knowledge were demanded not for noble causes, but for evil purposes. The 22 of April 2015 was the centenary of the first massive use of chemical weapons (2), which was considered a paramount opportunity to promote the objectives of the CWC and the achievements of the OPCW, as well as the responsible use of chemicals and the scientific knowledge among chemistry educators and students. For this reason, we organized the event “The commemoration of the Centenary of the First Massive Use of Chemical Weapons” (April, 2015), focused to raise awareness about the OPCW and its activities, stressing the importance of the peaceful uses of chemistry. Although we were able to make good progress in our objective towards including relevant educational issues related to responsible use of chemistry in the curricula, some aspects are still being implemented, and the project is constantly under review. For this purpose, we focused on the design of a tool that could allow us to evaluate the impact on the new curricula, in order to make the necessary modifications to accomplish our objectives (16). In order to achieve this goal, a group of researchers prepared an anonymous and voluntary questionnaire to analyze the values and beliefs of chemistry by the students starting their careers at university. The study was performed in our school which offers degrees 73

in Chemistry, Biotechnology, Pharmacy, Biochemistry and Food Science and Technology. The total number of students who answered the questionnaire was 498, with an average age of 19 years old, and were asked about: Degree of involvement of chemistry: in food, clothes, cleaning products, technological devices, medicines, illegal drugs, furniture. Influence that chemistry has on: sustainable development, sport, health, climate change, war. Student´s information about OPCW, 2015 UN Climate Change Conference and Sustainable Development Goals; how were they informed? Assessment of the impact of chemistry in society. Preliminary analysis of the results have demonstrated that the design of the questionnaire was adequate to obtain a diagnosis with respect to the believes and values built by the students about chemistry. Considering the dimensions of the representations that were investigated, it was observed that the students recognize a clear involvement of chemistry in the production of medicines, food, cleaning products and illegal drugs, but they do not fully identify it in clothing, furniture or telecommunications. In addition, health, climate change and war conflicts are considered events where chemistry has a very strong influence. This brings us closer to a first representation constructed by students, according to which chemistry is related in everyday life with events that are socially negatively valued, such as pollution, warfare and illegal drugs. Half of the students stated that they knew about OPCW, 2015 UN Climate Change Conference and Sustainable development Goals, the information is mainly obtained by internet and TV/radio; the high school is not perceived as a preponderant place for the approach to this information. Clearly, this shows the need for all high school actors to carry out a systematic and sensitizing work, so that the school becomes the main stage for the promotion of critical and reflexive thinking about the responsible use of knowledge and chemical substances. In this way, it is necessary to reinforce the work with schools in order to plan, design, implement and evaluate new educational proposals that improve the perception of chemistry in all areas of society. These actions will encourage the formation of students within the framework of a culture of social responsibility in the use of chemical substances and the scientific knowledge in general, contributing as well to the improvement of the teaching of sciences. This scenario motivated a strong interaction of academics with teachers and students of high school. In particular, we considered the institutions that include Chemical Technician Degree Programs, as their graduate students will get into the chemical industry after finishing high school. Two main approaches were developed to accomplish our task. One of them is “The Chemistry Week”, an activity organized annually since 2006 (17). It’s a great opportunity for youth to get connected with the wonders of chemistry and to appreciate the positive aspects of chemistry through hands-on experiments, games, demonstrations, lectures, exhibitions and more. Teachers are encouraged to explore with their students the impacts of the chemistry involved 74

in everyday life. Taking advantage of this event we introduce topics of the responsible use of chemicals and the scientific knowledge by the conference such as “Chemistry for Peace”, “The sins of chemistry” and “The responsible use of chemistry”. Another approach is to give presentations in special events that are organized by high schools, to stress the importance of chemistry in everyday life and to promote the responsible use of chemistry. This activity is developed by scientific researchers, in certain cases it also includes simple experiments to learn how chemistry relates to everyday life.

Green Chemistry an Opportunity for Safety, Security and Sustainability It was only fairly recently that the issue of environmental impact of chemical substances has come into the public domain and recognised as a problem. In the early 1960s it started to develop the concern over how chemicals may cause harm to humans and the environment. In the last decades, this concern has meant that a whole focus within chemistry was directed to prevent or minimize pollution from its origin, both on an industrial and laboratory scale. This is called Green or Sustainable Chemistry. This is a step beyond the mere fact of proper treatment of potentially polluting waste that can be generated, it is something much more important, to avoid the formation of polluting waste and propitiate the economy of time and resources. Much can be mentioned about sustainable development or sustainable activities, but few can define the concept of sustainability with the precision and simplicity that the Commission Brundtland (World Commission on Environment and Development) did in 1987: “Sustainable Development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (18). The design of environmentally benign products and processes should be guided by the 12 Principles of Green Chemistry that have been widely accepted by the international scientific community. The 12 Principles of Green Chemistry were introduced by Paul Anastas and John Warner in 1998 (19, 20), which are described as: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Prevention Atom Economy Less Hazardous Chemical Syntheses Designing Safer Chemicals Safer Solvents and Auxiliaries Design for Energy Efficiency Use of Renewable Feedstocks Reduce Derivatives Catalysis Design for Degradation 75

11. Real-time analysis for Pollution Prevention 12. Inherently Safer Chemistry for Accident Prevention The very essence of green chemistry is to “reduce or eliminate the use or generation of hazardous substances” and there is an intrinsic connection to laboratory safety. The majority of the green chemistry principles will result in a scenario that is also safer. The elimination of hazard chemicals is an objective of green chemistry. Although the principles of green chemistry are interconnected to achieve this goal, some of the twelve principles are directly related to this issue: less hazardous chemical synthesis, designing safer chemicals, real-time analysis in process monitoring to avoid the formation of hazardous substances and inherently safer chemistry for accident prevention. All the hazards posed by toxicity, explosively and flammability need to be addressed in the design of chemical products and processes. For this reason, the goals of green chemistry are not only focused on pollution or ecotoxicity, but also involve the full range of hazards. A green chemistry approach to risk reduction may be seen as another economic benefit associated with its implementation. Some of them may include lower feedstock costs, higher conversion rates, shorter reaction time, greater selectivity, enhanced separations, lower energy requirements and reduction of waste materials. Promoting the principles of green chemistry is a major priority in support of actions to protect human health and the environment, turning it vital to achieve sustainable forms for development. In addition to prioritizing safety, another aspect of green chemistry aims to reduce, or even fully eliminate, the use of toxic chemicals. Major concern about these types of chemicals include their production, transport, storage, use, and disposal not only for global environmental protection, public health, but also for prevention of theft and misuse. The aspects of peace and security bear directly upon the concept of sustainable development; indeed, they are central to it. The environmental consequences of armed conflict are devastating and the damaging effects comes from conventional, biological, nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as from the disruption of economic production and social organization in the wake of warfare and mass migration of refugees. Along with the increase in public awareness on sustainability issues, there is a strong weight on industrial companies, research centers and academia to put their focus on embracing the principles of green chemistry to produce safer chemicals, developing innovative technologies to accomplish the goals of the sustainable development. An essential requirement in order to be able to apply the concept of sustainable development within the chemical sector and society is to have a solid understanding of the meaning and implications of this issue. Different approaches have been undertaken worldwide, most of them focused on education and awareness raising. Among the different initiatives one stands out, the UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (ESD, 2005-2014) which was intended to mobilize the educational resources of the world to help create 76

a more sustainable future (21). The overall goal was to integrate the principles, values and practices of sustainable development into all aspects of education and learning. This educational effort encouraged changes in behavior that created a more sustainable future in terms of environmental integrity, economic viability and a just society for present and future generations. The Decade of ESD is followed-up by the Global Action Programme (GAP) which seeks to generate, scale-up and accelerate progress towards sustainable development (22). The GAP aims to contribute substantially to the 2030 agenda. In September 2015 the GAP adopted the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which represent a universal, ambitious, sustainable development agenda, an agenda “of the people, by the people and for the people,” crafted with UNESCO’s active involvement (23). As it was already stressed vide supra that green chemistry is an important tool in achieving sustainability. The ethical dimension of green chemistry and sustainability is an essential and inherent component of the concepts of climate change, sustainable environment, energy, toxics in the environment, and the depletion of natural resources (24).

The Hague Ethical Guidelines As chemists possess the understanding of molecular manipulation and have the information necessary to access how those manipulations may or may not put human health and the environment at risk, they have entered an area where this knowledge must play a central role in the professional conduct. Due to this fact, chemistry practitioners should become and remain aware and responsible of the potential dual use of scientific knowledge and the multiple uses of chemicals. To adequately respond to societal challenges, education, research and innovation in chemical sciences and industries, must respect fundamental rights and apply the highest ethical standards. To assist chemical practitioners with this challenge, the OPCW facilitated two workshops involving a group of 30 scientists and chemistry professionals from over 20 countries to discuss and draft ethical guidelines for chemistry practitioners (25, 26). Developed in 2015, The Hague Ethical Guidelines is intended to serve as elements for ethical codes and discussion points for ethical issues related to the practice of chemistry, promoting a culture of responsible conduct in the chemical sciences and to guard against the misuse of chemistry. The core element of the guidelines is based on the premise that “achievements in the field of chemistry should be used to benefit humankind and the environment”. Other key elements refer to sustainability (responsibility for promoting and achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals), education (cooperate to equip anybody working in chemistry and others with the necessary knowledge and tools to take responsibility for the benefit of humankind, the protection of the environment, and to ensure relevant and meaningful engagement with the general public), awareness and engagement (promote the peaceful applications of chemicals and work to prevent any misuse of chemicals, scientific knowledge, tools and technologies, and any harmful or unethical developments in research and innovation), ethics (education, research, and innovation must respect fundamental rights and apply the highest ethical standards), safety and 77

security (promote the beneficial applications, uses, and development of science and technology while encouraging and maintaining a strong culture of safety, health, and security), accountability (responsibility to ensure that chemicals, equipment, and facilities are protected against theft and diversion and are not used for illegal, harmful, or destructive purposes), oversight (responsibility to ensure that chemicals, equipment, and facilities are not used by other persons for illegal, harmful, or destructive purposes) and exchange of information (promote the exchange of scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for peaceful purposes). The complete text of The Hague Ethical Guidelines has been translated into all OPCW official languages and is available on the website of the OPCW (27, 28). The International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) endorsed The Hague Ethical Guidelines in April 2016 (29). A Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics was recently developed, which is the first international code based on the key elements outlined in the Hague Ethical Guidelines (30).

Final Comments Education and outreach efforts should be tailored to different types of audiences (such as: age, profession, educational background, country and region). The educational programs should be addressed to primary and high school students and teachers, university undergraduate and graduate students and faculty, professionals, trainers, scientists, journalists, lawmakers, and diplomats. The important role of partnerships between national and international scientific organizations, national academies of sciences, and other international organizations should allow increasing cooperation to maximize efficiencies and avoid duplication of efforts. In this context, it is necessary that the chemical societies and IUPAC convince national authorities as well as academic authorities about on the imperative need to include topics regarding the responsible and peaceful uses of chemistry into curricular activities. The challenge will be to cover holistically all disarmament and non-proliferation issues including chemical-, biological-, and nuclear-focused organizations. The scientific development can enhance human wellbeing; however, there is always the potential for unforeseen risks and unintentional negative effects. The occurrence and consequences of discoveries in basic research are virtually impossible to foresee (31). The “Declaration on Science and the use of Scientific Knowledge” from the 1999 World Conference of Science stated in its preamble: “The nations and the scientists of the world are called upon to acknowledge the urgency of using knowledge from all fields of science in a responsible manner to address human needs and aspirations without misusing this knowledge. […] The sciences should be at the service of humanity as a whole, and should contribute to providing everyone with a deeper understanding of nature and society, a better quality of life and a sustainable and healthy environment for present and future generations” (32). 78

Only with a focus on the long-term of education and outreach to future generations we will come closer to ensure that chemicals and the scientific knowledge are only used for the benefit of humankind and the environment.

References 1.

2. 3.





8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13.


Spanevello, R. A. Dual use of scientific knowledge and the weapons of mass destruction. In Academic Forum, Conference Proceedings; Trapp, R., Ed.; Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael: The Hague, The Netherlands, 2007; pp 139−144. Everts, S. When Chemicals Became Weapons of War. Chem. Eng. News. 2015, 93 (8), 8–21. The Chemical Weapons Convention: A Synopsis of the Text. https:// Full text available at: (accessed April 15, 2018). Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the OPCW. https:// (accessed April 15, 2018). The Structure of the OPCW. Fact_Sheets/Fact_Sheet_3_-_OPCW_Structure.pdf (accessed April 15, 2018). A section that contains all the content related to the award at: https:// (accessed April 15, 2018). (accessed April 15, 2018). Broughton, E. The Bhopal disaster and its aftermath: a review. Environ. Health: Global Access Sci. Source. 2005, 4, 1–6. Bertazzi, P. A. Long-term effects of chemical disasters. Lessons and results from Seveso. Sci. Total Environ. 1991, 106, 5–20. Suárez, A. G. Education and Engagement: Key Elements to Achieve and Maintain a World Free of Chemical Weapons. Pure Appl. Chem. 2017, 89, 197–204. Resources for Students and Teachers at: (accessed April 15, 2018). Suárez, A. G.; Spanevello, R. A. Projects in Education and Outreach Relevant to the CWC: A Pilot Activity in Argentina. OPCW Today 2013, 2, 27–28. More information about the National Project in Education at: (accessed April 15, 2018). More information at: (accessed April 15, 2018).


15. Schouteten, C. Chemistry and Ethics in Secondary Education: 25 years of experience with classroom teaching on chemical weapons. OPCW Today 2013, 2, 33–35. 16. Research projects: “Química en contexto: estrategias para el mejoramiento de su enseñanza en el marco de la responsabilidad social” (Ref. 2010-148-14); Secretaría de Estado de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación de la Provincia de Santa Fe, Argentina; and “Responsabilidad social en la formación en química para la promoción del desarrollo sustentable” (Ref. 1BIO505); Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina. 17. Press release at (accessed April 15, 2018). 18. World Commission on the Environment and Development (WCED). Our Common Future; Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1987; p 16. 19. (accessed April 15, 2018). 20. Anastas, P. T.; Warner, J. C. Green Chemistry: Theory and Practice; Oxford University Press: New York, 1998; p 30. 21. (accessed April 15, 2018). 22. (accessed April 15, 2018). 23. (accessed April 15, 2018). 24. Chen, Y. J. The ethical dimension of green chemistry and sustainability. J. Chem. Pharm. Res. 2014, 6, 276–281. 25. Report of the Workshop on Guidelines for the Practice of Chemistry under the Norms of the Chemical Weapons Convention; The Hague: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. OPCW/SAB/en/March_2015_Ethical_Codes_Workshop-Report.pdf (accessed April 15, 2018). 26. Report of the Second Workshop on Ethical Guidelines for the Practice of Chemistry under the Norms of the Chemical Weapons Convention; The Hague: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Hague_Ethical_Guidelines_2nd_Workshop_Report.pdf (accessed April 15, 2018). 27. The complete text of “The Hague Ethical Guidelines”, preamble, key elements and endorsement, in the official languages of the OPCW can be found at: (accessed April 15, 2018). 28. Husbands, J. L.; Suárez, A. G. The Hague Ethical Guidelines: Applying the norms of the practice of chemistry to support the Chemical Weapons Convention. Toxicol. Environ. Chem. 2016, 98, 1110–1114. 29. (accessed April 15, 2018). 30. and 80

international/scifreedom/global-chemists-code-of-ethics-fi-2016.pdf (accessed April 15, 2018). 31. Committee on the Conduct of Science National Academy of Sciences. Report: On Being a Scientist. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 1989, 86, 9053–9074. 32. Taken from the Preamble of the UNESCO - ICSU Declaration on Science and the use of scientific knowledge, Budapest, Hungary, July 1, 1999.


Chapter 5

Finding Better Therapeutics for Chemical Poisonings Shardell M. Spriggs,1 Houmam Araj,2 Hung Tseng,3 and David A. Jett1,* 1National

Institutes of Health/National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Rockville, Maryland 20852, United States 2National Eye Institute, Rockville, Maryland 20852, United States 3National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases, Bethesda, Maryland 20817, United States *E-mail: [email protected]

Chemical Warfare Agents (CWAs) pose a threat to society because of their global availability, ease and inexpensive production and demonstrated use with the intent to cause harm to civilians. This, taken together with chemical poisonings from industrial accidents or misuse, requires an increased effort to develop safe and more effective therapeutics that can reduce mortality and morbidity. The NIH Countermeasures Against Chemical Threats (CounterACT) program has supported research since 2006 that is focused on developing medical countermeasures (MCMs) for chemical threats, with special emphasis on the civilian population. The program supports numerous laboratories across the United States and abroad that are developing new antidotes for threat agents such as organophosphorus nerve agents, chlorine, cyanide, sulfur mustard, opioids and many other CWAs and toxic industrial chemicals. This article will describe the chemical threat and the NIH CounterACT program aimed at bolstering medical response capabilities in the event of chemical emergency.

Not subject to U.S. Copyright. Published 2018 by American Chemical Society

Introduction Lethal poisonings after acute exposures to toxic chemicals represent a significant threat to military and civilian population. This includes chemical warfare, terrorism, accidents, and common household poisonings, some examples are listed in Table 1.

Table 1. Types of Acute Chemical Exposures Chemical Warfare World War I and II: thousands of fatalities Iran-Iraq War (1980-88): thousands of fatalities Current conflicts in the Middle East: unknown Terrorism/Non-military malicious use Tokyo Subway Attacks (1995): 5000 injured; 13 fatalities Jonestown mass suicide (1978): 900 fatalities (1) Tylenol and Excedrin poisonings (1980’s): few fatalities Industrial Accidents Common Occurrence; thousands of injuries and fatalities annually(need numbers Bhopal Union Carbide disaster (1984): 5,000 fatalities General Poisonings Over 2 million calls to Poison Control Centers for human poison exposures each year (2)

Chemical warfare agents (CWAs) are highly toxic chemicals that are fast-acting and have high mortality and morbidity when used against human populations. Historically, these CWAs were reserved for military conflicts and human suffering on the battlefield such as in World War I where the first chemical attacks using chlorine, phosgene and sulfur mustard were unleashed (3). Other such attacks were used during the Iran-Iraq war with sulfur mustard and sarin in the Middle East. There is also concern over long-term effects from the Iran-Iraq conflict (4–6). More recently CWAs have also been used in noncombatant urban areas to incite terror and fear in civilian populations. Perhaps one of the most infamous incidents was the terrorist attack in the Tokyo, Japan subway system in 1995 where there were several deaths, many more victims requiring medical attention, and reports of long-term effects in those who survived (7, 8). The global availability of CWAs suggested by recent activity in the Middle East poses the question of when they will be used again as weapons of terror. Another significant concern related to toxic chemicals and a major cause of chemical poisonings are small- and large-scale industrial accidents. These events are common and account for hundreds of fatalities and injuries each year globally (9). The 1984 Union Carbide industrial accident in Bhopal, India released 40 metric tons of methyl isocyanate and resulted in over 3000 deaths (10). Additionally, there is an exceedingly large number of general chemical poisonings from non-occupational exposures. The Poison Control Centers in the United States (U.S.) receives millions of calls each year due to unintentional 84

human exposures and poisonings. Taken together, chemical exposures from warfare, terrorism, industrial accidents, and general poisoning account for a large burden of illness and the availability of safe and effective medical treatments for these toxic exposures is a global unmet need.

Chemical Threats and Toxidromes The civilian chemical threat spectrum includes chemical warfare agents, toxic industrial chemicals, pesticides and other chemicals. These chemical threats have a diverse spectrum of effects. The cholinesterase and GABA-inhibiting chemical agents induce prolonged and uncontrolled excitation of the nervous system and include the CWAs sarin, soman and VX, as well as pesticides such as parathion, aldicarb, and tetramine (TETS). Although cholinergic warfare agents, cholinergic pesticides, and convulsant agents differ to some extent in their effects, they all cause nervous system excitation that lead to seizures and neuropathology. Chemical threat agents can be grouped together according to their mechanisms of action and the types of clinical signs and symptoms they cause. General toxidromes of important chemical threats are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. General Toxidromes of Chemical Poisonings Agent Class


Signs and Symptoms



reduced clotting to severe hemorrhaging



miosis, sweating, dyspnea, seizure



dizziness, vomiting, intermittent seizures



headache, GI damage, respiratory arrest

Metabolic Poison


reduced cellular respiration, seizure, coma



confusion, respiratory depression and arrest

Pulmonary Agents


cough, dyspnea, pulmonary edema


sulfur mustard

mild to severe burns, pulmonary edema

Metabolic and cellular poisons such as cyanide and hydrogen sulfide prevent cellular respiration; vesicating agents such as Lewisite and sulfur mustard cause moderate to debilitating ocular, dermal, and mucosal injuries; and pulmonary agents such as chlorine and phosgene corrosively injure, irritate, or react with the lining of the respiratory tract. There is some overlap in the effects of chemical agents among the different toxidromes. For example, metabolic poisons and convulsants cause seizures similar to cholinergic CWA and pesticides (Table 2). This overlap underscores the importance of adequate detection and diagnostic technologies to help differentiate the types of chemical agents both during and after a chemical attack or emergency, especially if an antidote is only effective for a specific toxic agent. 85

Windows of Opportunity for Medical Intervention All chemical threat agents are highly toxic and many act rapidly to cause serious morbidity and lethality. This creates a significant challenge when developing strategies for medical interventions, including the need to develop antidotes and therapeutics that have an efficacious mode of action that counters the rapid toxic effects of the chemical agents. This is further complicated by the time it takes first responders to arrive at the scene of a chemical incident, the uncertainty of which specific chemical agent has been released, and the exposure level and dose for each victim. There are the three windows of opportunity in which chemical medical countermeasures may be utilized for treating chemical poisonings during an emergency. The first window of opportunity is during the pre-exposure period and may only be feasible in military settings if information is available that personnel are entering an area where CWAs have been deployed. However, prophylactic measures are not possible in most civilian scenarios because chemical releases are rarely predictable. If information is known regarding the chemical threat agent used in a civilian chemical exposure Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and prophylactic drugs may be administered to first responders and other personnel before arriving at the scene of a chemical release. In antidotes where the intended indication is for prophylactic use, favorable safety profiles are especially important. We must ensure that otherwise healthy individuals (i.e., first responders and receivers) do not experience deleterious side effects that could compromise their health and ability to respond effectively to chemical events involving civilians. Once chemical exposure has occurred, the second window of opportunity presents itself and the goal for medical intervention here is to reverse the toxic action at the target site immediately or treat the physiological response (symptoms) as soon as possible. Ideally a “post-exposure, pre-target” or post-exposure prophylaxis approach in the pre-hospital (field) setting would be best since the chemical agent exerts its toxic physiological effects only after reaching the molecular targets. The last window of opportunity is in the hospital if pre-hospital intervention has been successful in preventing death, or the dose of the chemical agent is sub-lethal. Some agents such as sulfur mustard may cause a delayed toxicity after initial exposure or long-term pulmonary effects such as fibrosis years later. Therefore, medical interventions aimed at improving the long-term health outcomes of non-lethal exposures are critical, and these may be administered in both the pre-hospital and hospital.

National Institutes of Health CounterACT Program Since the 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S., there has been heightened awareness of chemical, biological, and radiation/nuclear (CBRN) threats to the civilian population. In response, agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and other federal agencies have bolstered initiatives and sustained a highly focused effort to improve upon current emergency response capabilities, including the development of medical countermeasures (MCMs). An effort within the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) to develop MCMs for chemical threat agents is The NIH Countermeasures Against Chemical Threats 86

(CounterACT) program (see CounterACT). This program is led by the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke (NINDS) and National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), with participation from several other NIH Institutes and Centers (see CounterACT). There are two important goals for this program. First, the program supports basic research to obtain knowledge of the toxicology of chemical threat agents so that novel therapeutic targets and approaches can be identified. In this regard, the program serves as a science and technology base for the larger federal scientific enterprise and has supported research that has contributed well over 1,000 publications in peer-reviewed journals. Second, the NIH CounterACT program supports more advanced translational research with promising lead compounds that can be transitioned to other agencies such as the Health and Human Services Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) for more advanced clinical and pre-clinical studies required for FDA approval. The CounterACT and BARDA programs operate within a highly collaborative environment that includes similar research agencies within the Department of Defense (11). The NIH CounterACT program supports mechanistic research to identify targets for therapeutic development. If targets are known, the program supports the creation and development of screening assays and animal models of chemical effects on humans. Using these models, the program supports safety and efficacy studies required for the identification and optimization of lead candidate therapeutic small molecule and biologic compounds. Antidotes that are specific to a chemical are supported; however, the program is very interested in the acute effects and pathologies that are common to several chemical threat agents, so that the therapeutics can be developed with a broader spectrum of activity against more than one chemical. In the CounterACT program, special consideration is given to research that is relevant to people who are particularly vulnerable, including the young, the elderly, pregnant women, and individuals with pre-existing medical conditions. Children and pregnant women, for example, have been shown to be much more sensitive to the toxicity of some PAMs than the general population, and thus may require specialized medical management after exposure. The NIH CounterACT program includes a network of Research Centers of Excellence, individual research projects, contracts and Interagency Agreements with the DoD. The CounterACT Centers are a principal component of the overall larger effort and are designed to support collaborative programs consisting of three or more subprojects and scientific cores that synergistically produce rigorous interdisciplinary research of the highest quality. Most of the individual grants are also multidisciplinary research endeavors, often bringing together several laboratories with different expertise and resources. For projects that are not as mature as the Centers and individual project grants, the program supports exploratory small grants, many of which transition to more extensive CounterACT support once they have generated promising preliminary data that can be included with grant applications to NIH. The program also includes contract research facilities that support the grant program by providing services such as pre-clinical pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic (PK/PD) and safety studies and provide a resource for testing potential therapeutics in animal models that use restricted CWAs. Finally, the NIH CounterACT program works in partnership with the 87

U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (MRICD) which has extensive experience with defending military personnel from the harmful effects of chemical attacks on the battlefield.

New Therapeutics Being Developed at NIH The NIH CounterACT program has had a far-reaching impact on chemical MCM development as evidenced by its contribution to the science and technology knowledge base, and robust product development pipeline. Highlights of this effort are presented below. Please see the program website (https:// for general information and a list of current researchers and publications. Nervous System Agents The organophosphorus (OP) CWAs are nerve agents that are highly toxic poisons that cause seizures and other pathophysiological effects caused by hyperexcitation of the central and peripheral nervous systems. Fatalities are usually due to respiratory failure. The NINDS supported a clinical trial led by the University of Michigan within the NINDS Neurological Emergencies Treatment Trials Network (NETT) to test the effectiveness of intramuscular (I.M.) injection of the drug midazolam for treating seizures in the pre-hospital setting compared to the standard of care which is intravenous (I.V.) administration of lorazepam. The study was done in partnership with DoD and BARDA who, along with NIH, are interested in the drug for use against seizures cause by OP CWAs and pesticides. The study found that midazolam delivered rapidly to patients by I.M. autoinjector worked very well against seizures, and it was not inferior to the standard of care (12). Many other studies are focused on nerve agent antidotes. The oxime molecule pralidoxime (2-PAM) is an approved drug that reactivates acetylcholinesterase (AChE), but has poor penetration across the blood-brain barrier and does not work after aging of the bound AChE-nerve agent complex has occurred. Within the portfolio managed by NINDS, researchers are developing novel phenoxyalkyl pyridinium oximes as brain-penetrating antidotes for surrogates of sarin and VX (13), as well as other novel oximes that could be more effective than 2-PAM (14). Even more novel approaches such as a PRAD (proline-rich attachment domain) peptide that can rescue and stabilize AChE are being developed (15). If one survives the acute lethal effects of nerve agent exposure, the seizures may cause brain damage and long-term effects. Drugs to prevent the seizures and brain damage are being developed as well, including the glutamate receptor antagonist LY293558 which counteracts nerve agent-induced seizures, neuropathology, and anxiety-related behavioral deficits in adult, young, and aged rats (16, 17). Neurosteroids are a promising antidote for the neuropathological inflammatory damaged caused by nerve agents, and in vivo imaging has provided an excellent tool for studying the effect of nerve agents and efficacy of promising antidotes (18–20). 88

Model development and screening compounds are also a large part of the effort related to neurological chemical threats. Various animal models of status epilepticus (SE) induced by nerve agents or pesticide exposure are used in experiments to identify novel therapeutic targets within the CounterACT Neurotherapeutics Screening program (21). Model development has led to important therapeutic approaches such as pharmacological blockade of the calcium plateau after paraoxon-induced SE in rats neuroprotection (22). Some chemical threats that are not known for neurological effects have been found to have serious effects on the brain. For example, the anticoagulant rodenticide brodifacoum has been shown by CounterACT researchers to cause lasting neuropathology in rats (23) and indicates that some agents have symptoms that span two toxidromes. Cyanide and Other Metabolic Poisons There are current antidotes approved for cyanide poisoning, but they require I.V. administration that delays delivery of the drug to target sites and is not practical in a mass casualty scenario where many people need to be treated quickly. However, CounterACT researchers have shown that the approved I.V. cyanide antidotes sodium nitrite and sodium thiosulfate are also effective against acute cyanide poisoning when administered by intramuscular injection (24). A novel compound and vitamin B12 analog, cobinamide, has been shown to be effective against cyanide in various oral, inhalation, and other animal models (11, 25, 26). This drug is also effective for hydrogen sulfide poisoning (24, 27), as are other novel treatments like methylene blue (28). Researcher have also shown that a newly developed formulation of dimethyl trisulfide (DMTS) is efficacious against inhalation and injection of cyanide, and is effective by I.M. injection (29). Many novel mechanisms of cyanide toxicity and consequently, new targets for therapeutic development are being discovered. For example, cisplatin analogs protect against cyanide toxicity in zebrafish, mice, and rabbit animal models (30). New cyanide scavenging molecules are being developed as well, such as the cobalt Schiff-base macrocycle chemical CoN4[11.3.1] that allow for faster recovery from acute intoxication (31). Pulmonary Agents Pulmonary agents such as chlorine and phosgene damage the respiratory tract and can have serious cardiopulmonary effects. Inhaled sulfur mustard is of great concern as a pulmonary agent in addition to its vesicant effects. The NIH CounterACT-funded laboratories managed by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences (NIEHS) include research on the underlying mechanisms, and pathophysiology of inhalational lung injuries, and the identification new specific therapeutic targets and compounds, and it includes research on chlorine, bromine, phosgene, and sulfur mustard (SM) (32). Major research advances have been made on the understanding of sulfur mustard inhalation toxicity as well, and exciting new potential medical countermeasures are emerging. Pulmonary vascular thrombi occurs following SM inhalation in 89

rats, and fibrinolytic therapy (tissue plasminogen activator) is a very promising therapeutic approach that is undergoing advanced development (33–35). Approaches that are being investigated also include targeting the underlying pathophysiologic mechanisms of toxicity, such as targeting inflammatory cells and mediators including reactive oxygen and nitrogen species, proteases and proinflammatory/ cytotoxic cytokines (36), and well-known compounds such as valproic acid are demonstrating efficacy based on advances in mechanistic research (37). Many new targets and compounds to address the need for chlorine antidotes are emerging from this program. For example, in studies with cardiomyocytes, pretreatment with ranolazine or istaroxime, FDA-approved activators of sarcoendoplasmic reticulum Ca2+ ATPase prevented chlorine-induced cell death (38), and nitrite therapy prevents chlorine gas toxicity in rabbits (39). Further insight into the acute cardiopulmonary toxicity of inhaled chemical threats has been made. TRPA1 mediates changes in heart rate variability and cardiac mechanical function in mice exposed to acrolein (40). Halogens such a bromine can be toxic to the developing fetus, and treatment with tadalafil, an inhibitor of type 5 phosphodiesterase, attenuated systemic blood pressures, decreased inflammation, ameliorated pulmonary and cardiac injury, and improved maternal survival and fetal growth (41). Chemical Agents that Affect the Skin and Eye The CountACT portfolio at the National Institute of Arthritis Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases (NIAMS) focuses on research and development of countermeasures against agents that damage the skin. Anti-inflammatory drugs are showing great promise in treating sulfur mustard skin injury, for example a multi-inhibitor prodrug shown to significantly enhance the therapeutic response compared with the individual agents (42). A novel indomethacin-anticholinergic prodrug (4338) was found to markedly suppress nitrogen mustard toxicity, and inhibited mast cell degranulation, suppressed keratinocyte expression of iNOS and COX-2, as well as markers of epidermal proliferation (43). Exposure to the vesicant itself evokes a primary injury (1st hit), the direct injury to the skin, and a secondary damage (2nd hit), resulting from an influx of activated hyper-inflammatory monocyte/macrophages (Mø), rampaging through the skin injury and beyond, causing severe destruction in skin and other vital organs. CounterACT researchers realized that the interval between the first and second hits represents a countermeasure opportunity, i.e., attenuating Mø activation by vitamin D may be an intervention to reduce or halt the damage of the 2nd hit, a key morbidity factor following exposure to vesicants. A multidisciplinary approach was taken to test the vitamin D intervention, including studies in human and mouse (44, 45). The researchers are taking advantage of an ongoing human clinical trial using nitrogen mustard (a chemical analog of sulfur mustard) as a cancer treatment (see project_info_description.cfm?aid=9137501&icde=37741992 for general description). This is a first in the CounterACT program to test an intervention/ countermeasure directly in human subjects. 90

The eyes are particularly vulnerable to nitrogen mustard injury. Compared to skin mustard injury, ocular effects are seen earlier and at lower concentrations (as low as 1/10th the dose) (46). CounterACT research managed by the National Eye Institute has supported several projects directed towards the goal of understanding vesicant-induced eye injury and testing medical measures to counteract such damage. Among the findings were data that showed that nitrogen mustard-induced corneal injury involves DNA damage and as well as pathways related to inflammation, epithelial-stromal separation, and neovascularization (46). In another publication, the investigators reported on clinical progression of ocular injury following arsenical vesicant lewisite exposure (47). Researchers also reported on the efficacy of different agents in reversing nitrogen mustard-induced injury in ex vivo cultured rabbit cornea (48), including dexamethasone, doxycycline, and silibinin. This report built on earlier results by the same group (49). Other CounterACT researchers working on ocular effects tested glutathione (GSH) monoesters as treatment for cornea depth of injury following nitrogen mustard exposure. The project employed an ex vivo isolated rabbit eye model and reported on the lipidome of nitrogen-mustard exposed cornea (50). Interestingly, they found that corneas exposed to nitrogen mustard generated increased levels of sphingomyelins, ceramides, diacylglycerols, and platelet activating factor. This is the first report of the involvement of the sphingomyelin-ceramide pathway in corneal damage induced by nitrogen mustard exposure. Using a rabbit cornea organ culture, researchers have found that corneal injury after nitrogen mustard exposure results in activation of matrix metalloproteinases (MMPs), which in turn degrade the extracellular matrix thereby leading to separation of the epithelial and stromal layers of the cornea. It has been reported that while nitrogen mustard-induced corneal injury showed significant activation of ADAM17 (which is an enzyme involved in wound healing and is able to cleave collagen XVII), corneas treated with hydroxamates showed dose-dependent inhibition of ADAM17 resulting in enhanced epithelial-stromal attachment (51).

Summary and Conclusions CWAs and other toxic chemicals pose a threat to society because of their potential use with the intent to cause harm, as well as exposures associated with accidents or misuse. They can cause a variety of effects in many organ systems and can be classified in terms of chemical toxidromes. The window of opportunity for treating chemical poisoning is small due to the rapid action of most chemical agents, but opportunities for reducing mortality and morbidity do exist. The NIH CounterACT program is dedicated to supporting research on developing MCMs for chemical threats, with special emphasis on the civilian population and civilian exposure scenarios. The program supports many laboratories across the United States and abroad that are developing new antidotes for threat agents such as OP nerve agents, chlorine, cyanide, sulfur mustard and many other CWAs and toxic industrial chemicals. In partnership with other federal agencies, these 91

programs are bolstering the medical response capabilities in the event of chemical emergency.

Acknowledgments We would like to thank all the principle investigators funded by the NIH CounterACT program for their tireless dedication and research towards developing better therapeutics for chemical poisonings.

Disclaimer The information in this article is provided for educational purposes only and does not necessarily represent endorsement by, or an official position of, the National Institutes of Health or any other Federal agency.

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Chapter 6

Chemical Safety and Security Challenges in Academic Institutions in Developing Countries Ahmed F. A. Youssef* Chemistry Department, Faculty of Science, Cairo University, Giza, Egypt 12612 *E-mail: [email protected]

Risk reduction of hazardous chemicals can be achieved by both the best practices for chemical handling and chemistry processes and preventing the illegal or inappropriate use of chemicals. This means safety and security vulnerability assessment should be applied to the life cycle of chemicals. In developing countries, although the chemical industrial sectors have, to some extent, made good progress towards the development of chemical management systems, academic institutions are still in need of technical and financial support to develop their chemical management systems. Based on the current situation, chemistry laboratories in academic institutions are unsafe environments because most of them lack safety measures. Also, they can be considered a target for terrorist activities; in addition chemical industrial facilities contain not only hazardous chemicals, but also equipment which can be used in chemical diversion. These institutions should include personnel with the responsibility to maintain a safe/secure environment for their administrative structure and provide chemical safety/security courses in their curriculum.

1. Introduction Chemicals are an essential part of improving our life, health, and well-being. However, the handling and storage of chemicals can present safety and security © 2018 American Chemical Society

risks. The daily use of large amounts of chemicals all over the world, especially those with hazardous effects on health and the environment, make them a target for terrorist activities. Many of these chemicals are of interest to terrorist organizations because they can be used to produce explosives or toxic sources, and chemical weapons. In many terrorist hideouts inspected by the police, the main substances found, in addition to the conventional types of weapons, are hazardous chemicals such as ammonium nitrate and cyanide salts. In some countries that were attacked, the main target for terrorists was the chemicals in academic institutions and chemical industrial facilities. This means there is a need for security measures to protect the hazardous chemicals from theft and misuse in criminal activities during their life cycle. Although the number of chemicals in academic institutions are not as large as those in the industry they are of a wide variety and can be used for chemical diversion or synthesis of more dangerous substances. Also, some of the available instruments or glass equipment in chemistry laboratories could be used for crystallization, purification, and derivatization to produce highly hazardous chemicals. On the other hand, the chemical industry has made good progress towards the development of safe and secure environments relative to academic institutions. In 1985, the Chemistry Industry Association of Canada launched a new initiative known as “Responsible Care” to improve the health, safety, and environmental performance of chemical companies. This initiative inspired chemical facilities to implement responsible care ethics and principals for sustainability and to take actions that reduced harm and environmental impact throughout the life cycle of their products. Members of this initiative must be transparent about their activities. Now, the principals of this initiative are practiced in more than 60 countries including some developing countries. In this chapter, there will be an overview of the chemical safety and security challenges during the chemical life cycle in academic institutions. Although chemical safety and security are correlated because both have good intentions towards people and the environment, there are important differences between them. Chemical safety refers to the best practices to protect people from hazardous chemicals, while chemical security refers to the best practices to protect chemicals from malicious use.

2. The Life Cycle of Chemicals To maintain a safe and secure environment in academic institutions, careful tracking and monitoring of chemicals and personnel is required for those who have access to these chemicals during their life cycle. The life cycle of chemicals begins with the chemical supplier and end with chemical waste disposal. During this life cycle, chemicals pass through many steps, such as the procurement process, chemical handling, transportation, storage, processing of new material formation and finally waste disposal. This life cycle should be both safe and secure. Figure 1 represents the life cycle of chemicals. 98

Figure 1. Chemical life cycle

3. Chemical Hazards The hazards associated with chemicals can be identified from the labels and the safety data sheet (SDS) provided by the producers and/or suppliers for the chemical substances. In 1992, an international mandate adopted during the United Nations conference on the environment and development, established a globally harmonized system (GHS) for hazard communication (1). This system classified chemicals as physical, health, or environmental hazards (2). The system was developed not only to improve the control of chemical hazards but also to provide an international comprehensive system for hazards communication and to facilitate the international trade of chemicals. The first edition of the GHS was completed in 2001 and it was published in 2005 as the first revised edition. Modification was applied to this version which included codifications for hazard and precautionary statements, etc. In 2017, the seventh revised version of GHS was published (2). Table 1 summarizes the GHS hazard classes of chemicals.

4. Dual Use of Chemicals Many of the chemicals available in chemistry laboratories or in chemical industrial facilities can be used directly for mass destruction or as a toxic agent, while others could be used as precursors to highly hazardous substances or chemical weapons. Laboratory equipment and chemical experts play a critical role in chemical diversion. Terrorist groups and disgruntled employees are looking to procure chemicals and/or equipment to use for malicious actions. They are looking for diverse ways to obtain their required chemicals, such as stealing from laboratories or chemical warehouses, buying from the black market or interfering with the chemical transfer process. Some examples of those chemicals with dual use are ammonium nitrate, which is a chemical fertilizer that can be used as an 99

explosive, nitromethane, which is a degreaser that can be used as explosive, and potassium cyanide, which is used in the electroplating industry and can be used as a toxic agent. The development of a secure system for hazardous chemicals can help in reducing the potential of misuse by controlling the ability of terrorists to acquire chemicals and equipment.

Table 1. GHS hazards classes of chemicals Physical Hazards

Health Hazards

Environmental Hazards


Acute toxicity

Hazard to the aquatic environment

Flammable gases (including unstable gases)

Skin corrosion/irritation

Hazard to ozone layer


Serious eye damage /eye irritation

Gases under pressure

Respiratory or skin sensitization

Flammable liquids

Germ cell mutagenicity

Flammable solids


Self-reactive substances and mixtures

Reproductive toxicity

Pyrophoric liquids

Specific target organ toxicity – single exposure

Pyrophoric solids

Specific target organ toxicity – repeated exposure

Self-heating substances and mixtures


Substances and mixtures which in contact with water emits flammable gases Oxidizing gases Oxidizing liquids Oxidizing solids Organic Peroxides Corrosive metals


5. Chemical Safety and Security in Academic Institutions Safe and secure academic laboratories require a shared commitment to and effort from all people to prevent and respond to an accident. The chemical safety and security culture is well recognized around the world in academic institutions. Although many of these institutions developed their own safety and security systems according to their own needs, a vast number of them are still in need of such development. An institution’s administrative structure should include personnel with a responsibility to maintain a safe and secure laboratory environment. They should be able to provide guidance and training for staff, faculty members and students. Preplanning of all experiments, reporting the theft of materials, and suspicious activities is very important, and it should be the responsibility of all persons in chemical laboratories.

6. Chemical Safety and Security Challenges There are many challenges facing chemical safety and security in academic institutions, especially those in developing countries. Most of these institutions have no safety and security office/department in their administrative structure and as a result, they have no a specific policy for chemical management. In such cases, many of the activities related to safety and security depend on the interest of the personnel involved rather than general rules. It was recorded that one of these institutions received chemicals from closing companies without any restriction on the quality or quantity of the chemicals received. This lead to the accumulation of many chemical containers in the chemical storage rooms. The most important issue, in this case, is the absence of a database recording the amount and kind of chemicals received, the mixing of incompatible substances, and the ease of access to those chemicals. Figure 2 shows the dangerous situation of the accumulated chemicals in a storage room. The main reasons for such problems are a lack of information, instructions and training of persons working with hazardous chemicals. Such institutions need help for the development of their own chemical safety and security management programs. This program should be integrated into chemistry education programs. Safety and security training should be treated as a critical component for the preparation of students as chemical professionals. Faculty and staff members should also be familiar with the chemical safety and security procedures.


Figure 2. Chemical storage area in an institution that received chemicals from some companies going for closure, by Dr. Ahmed F. A. Youssef. 6.1. Purchasing and Ordering of Chemicals One of the most important challenges in chemical management in an academic institution is the procedure of purchasing chemicals. In many countries, although institutions have a responsibility to save the chemicals required for all the students’ and research activities, they do not have a restricted policy for the ordering of chemicals. Due to financial constraints, the purchase of chemicals could proceed without any pre-approved or authorization of requests to order chemicals. Sometimes orders can proceed as a personal order by using a personal credit card. On the other hand, when institutions have a large enough budget for their activities, they order a large amount of chemicals. They consider these chemicals as a backup for future activities. Usually, the order includes large chemical containers rather than small ones because they are cheaper and cost-effective. 6.2. Transport and Transfer of Chemicals Hazardous chemicals are not produced in the same location as their use; thus, we must transport these chemicals to the points where they will be used. Two transportation processes should be considered. The first is outside the chemical facility or institutions using ships, rail systems or the highway. The second is on-site, from the storage room to the production area or laboratory. This means transportation must be considered as a vulnerability point in the life cycle of 102

chemicals. Many challenges from a safety and security point of view are related to the transportation process. Ship, rail or highway transport of hazardous chemicals is subjected to specific regulations for safe chemical transfer, such as chemical labeling, hazard warning words/symbols, and the name and address of the manufacturer. Although this labeling is very important for hazard identification and for emergency cases, this makes the shipment a target for hijacking, theft of material or sabotage. This could not be detected until it is in progress. In addition, one person is often responsible for chemical transport without any support from security personnel; thus no one protects these hazardous chemicals during the transportation process, which makes this shipment an easy target. Also, information about the amount and type of chemicals, route and schedule of shipment transport should be considered targets. Access to such information is very helpful for preventing a chemical attack. For on-site chemical transfer, most of the challenges are related to safety issues rather than security, especially if the hazardous materials are transferred without using a secondary containment.

6.3. Chemical Storage The safe and secure storage of chemicals is an essential part of the chemical management system. Many challenges were recorded in some institutions related to chemical storage. The following points highlight some of them. Many storage facilities do not meet the minimum standard criteria for hazardous chemicals storage conditions. In addition, materials are not always segregated according to their hazard groups. Some laboratories store their chemicals alphabetically instead of by compatibility. This increases the risk of creating an unsafe environment for chemical storage. Inadequate or absence of a chemical inventory system: many institutions have inadequate or have no chemical inventory system. Although the paper-based system for stock management is an old system for managing chemical information about the storage of chemicals in institutions, it is still functional. This system does not give enough or accurate information about the number of chemicals, their location in the storage room and their expiration. The absence of such information may lead to critical problems especially for those chemicals considered peroxide forming reagents or those that form crystals with prolonged storage time. Figure 3 shows the critical situation developed due to inadequate information about store chemicals. New electronic chemical inventory systems are important and helpful not only for identifying the amounts and location of chemicals but also chemical tracking. It can track purchase, sources, storage, consumption, expiration date and users of hazardous chemicals. Access to the chemical storage room: in some institutions, stockroom access is not limited to authorized personnel. This may be due to the absence of safety and security policies and consequently the absence of an access control system. In such cases, chemicals are an easy target for the interiors and/or exteriors of chemical storage rooms. 103

Figure 3. Expired chemicals create risk, by Dr. Ahmed F. A. Youssef. Chemical storage in the laboratory: the nature of chemical laboratory work allows for easy access to a limited number and amount of chemicals. Sometimes people store their chemicals inside the chemistry laboratory on the benchtop or in the hoods. This may aid in the theft of hazardous chemicals and create the critical problems. 6.4. Laboratory Activities In most academic institutions in developing countries, a culture of chemical safety is not commonly practiced. The researchers and students proceed with their laboratory activities without following the minimum requirements of using personal protective equipment (PPE). A lot of chemical accidents have been recorded, such as chemical fire, explosions, spills, and injuries of students. Investigations indicated mostly that, , people working with chemical substances have no background information on chemical hazards or hazard identification. Institutions did not provide any courses or orientations before starting laboratory activities. 6.5. Chemical Waste The hazardous waste generated from laboratory activities poses a threat to human health and the environment; thus, the development of an appropriate waste 104

management system is very important to minimize the adverse effect on human safety. The best method for waste management is a hierarchy for decision making. The waste management hierarchy involves waste elimination, minimization, treatment, and disposal according to the proper selection options. Replacement of very hazardous chemicals with less hazardous or non-hazardous ones, when it is possible, is very important for risk reduction. Also, reducing the amount of hazardous substances or the recovery and reuse of this substance will be very helpful. Waste treatment is one of the most important options for the conversion of hazardous waste to non-hazardous. Treatment methods (3) are available not only for large quantities but also for small quantities and for laboratories. These methods include neutralization, precipitation, and hydrolysis. At the institutional level, two important challenges are related to chemical waste disposal. The first, which is the most common, is the unavailability of the waste collection system. The second, for those who have a waste collection system, is the waste transport and disposal. The only way for chemical waste disposal, in the case of waste collection system unavailability, is a sink or drain system. This method is still applied in many developing countries where many serious environmental problems arise, such as contamination of the sewer system, surface water and soil. The main reasons for such problems are a lack of information about chemical hazards, the unavailability of training programs for chemical management and the cost for the development of a waste management system. For the institutions that have chemical waste collection systems, waste transportation could be subjected to the same challenges as those for hazardous chemical transport, such as hijacking and theft. Also, hazardous chemical waste can be considered a target and can be used for the contamination of water resources. Concerns related to hazardous waste must result in the development of a safe and secure system for waste disposal. Institutions can reduce their hazardous chemical waste by replacing them with less hazardous ones, using virtual labs, developing a practical curriculum which involves the formation of products that could be used as raw materials for other experiments, and ordering the minimum amount of chemicals needed for the experiments.

6.6. Recycling of Chemical Waste Recycling is one of the most important actions in waste management strategy. It provides opportunities to reduce the quantities of chemical waste requiring disposal and reduce the cost associated with purchasing new chemicals. Chemical recycling facilities are not common in developing countries. In general, the investment in waste recycling is very limited. The development of regulations on waste disposal could be helpful in encouraging investment in the recycling industry. Investors could help in such industries where recycling is considered a higher priority than waste disposal in legislation. This action is very important for supplying recycling companies with chemical waste to keep their industry running. 105

7. Legislation and Responsibility Each country needs a legislative framework for chemical safety and security. Appropriate legislation should designate the responsibility to ensure that chemical safety and security is engaged in the production, trade, use and disposal of chemicals. The legislation should describe the various obligations of stockholders and designate the competent authorities to assure that safety and security policies are implemented with good governance. Implementation of legislation requires clear definition of what will be covered under chemical management and which classes of chemicals should be included. There are many obstacles a country may face in chemical management. The most common one is the mechanism of management, which is under the authority of different ministries, some of which are not specialized for chemical management. Also, inadequate coordination mechanism among all ministries sometimes creates corruption, duplicitous authority, and vulnerability in the chemical management system. In addition, most of the developing countries do not yet have serious measures to establish national policy or legal frameworks for chemical management.

8. Conclusion The peaceful triangle of chemicals is safety, security, and sustainability. Capacity building in this area is very important for moving towards the safe and secure practice of chemistry. Lessons from countries that have developed and implemented chemical management programs could be very helpful for developing countries. Establishing a legal base with timely initiation of actions, including an administrative structure with a budget for development and implementation of a chemical management system, should be of the highest priority. Effective indicators of progress need to be developed to follow up the success in the implementation of a chemical management system. Institutions should establish a culture of chemical safety by following and enforcing safety and security rules and procedures at all levels. Safety and security courses or orientation should be included in an institution’s curriculum.

References 1. 2. 3.

United Nations Conference on Environment & Development, Rio de Janerio, Brazil, 1992. Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS), 7th Revised ed.; United Nations: New York and Geneva, 2017. Armour, M. A. Hazard Laboratory Chemicals Disposal Guide, 3rd ed.; Lewis: New York, 2005.


Ethics, Human Rights, and the Chemical Sciences

Chapter 7

Exemplary Science and Human Rights Initiatives at ACS Dorothy J. Phillips,*,1 Lori Brown,2 and Bradley D. Miller2 1Waters

Corporation (ret.), Milford, Massachusetts 01757, United States Chemical Society, Washington, DC 20036, United States *E-mail: [email protected]


The American Chemical Society (ACS) has many years’ history of leadership working on international cases in which the rights and welfare of chemists, chemical engineers and related practitioners have been threatened and abridged. Our efforts are informed by protections afforded by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and are directed toward overcoming human rights and scientific mobility abridgments and issues where ACS is uniquely positioned and qualified to impact cases in a meaningful way. This chapter gives a brief history of ACS’s human rights activities.

When you practice science, your work is tied to the progress of humanity and the general betterment of the quality of life for all. Providing access to science and its benefits, as well as ensuring the freedom for scientists to pursue their work, is where chemistry and human rights meet. In his seminal work on Science in Service of Human Rights, Richard Pierre Claude observed that good science and a respect for human rights rely heavily on each other. Scientists depend on human rights to protect their own scientific freedom — which in turn lets them promote well-being and human rights through their work. This requires scientists to go beyond knowing how their work relates to human rights and demands that they strive to secure and affirm human rights through the knowledge they produce (1). The American Chemical Society (ACS) has long been involved in issues that connect science with human rights. The ACS Charter on Science and Human Rights invokes the ACS Constitution, pointing to Article II, Section 3, which © 2018 American Chemical Society

states, “The SOCIETY shall cooperate with scientists internationally and shall be concerned with the worldwide application of chemistry to the needs of humanity” (2). Through this statement, ACS seeks the best means to contribute to human rights issues and initiatives, from availability of basic rights, such as food, clean water and health care, to access to education (particularly science education), and monitoring/advocacy. A key focus of the ACS Science and Human Rights initiative is Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) which requires governments to: (1) recognize the right of everyone to “enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications”; (2) take steps necessary for the “conservation, the development and the diffusion of science”; (3) respect the “freedom indispensable for scientific research”; and (4) recognize the benefits of “international contacts and co-operation in the scientific and cultural fields” (3). Several professional and learned associations and soceities have chosen Article 15 as a focal point because the article lies at the nexus of science and human rights and it cannot be accomplished without the scientific community. In the case of the AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition it has direct relevance for each of the areas of activity to which the Coalition is already committed. As a founding member of this group, ACS uses this article to guide it’s science and human rights activities. This chapter explores the history, current focus, continued involvement, and future for ACS as the Society continues its superb work at the intersection of science and human rights. This will report on examples of ACS involvement in cases, symposia, member outreach and engagement, and other interactions and activities. ACS recognizes that chemists, chemical engineers, chemistry educators and allied professions are in a unique position to bring their specialized knowledge, networks and influence to promote and protect human rights in their disciplinary communities and beyond.

Monitoring Cases You might be asking, how does ACS recognize when a potential human rights abridgement is occurring? Through the efforts of an ACS Board appointed liaison, elected officers, members, and staff , the following points are used asguidelines to assess whether action is needed: 1.

Does it violate the rights of scientists and engineers, whether individually or as a group? Scientists and engineers should enjoy the same rights as all other members of society. The Society’s work in this area is informed by several policy positions, including the ACS Public Policy Statement on Freedom of International Scientific Exchange, which states “It is important for organizations that represent scientists and educators to advocate the most open and fair exchange among scientists without limitations imposed by national and global political concerns” (4). 110



Does it interfere with science and scientific discovery conducted in the service of human rights? Much of the work that scientists and engineers do can help to realize fundamental human rights, like the right to food and water. Does it restrict the right to enjoy and benefit from scientific progress and its applications? This is part of Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “…Everyone has the right…to share in scientific advancement and its benefits” (5).

Chemists, chemical engineers and related chemistry professionals are at risk for having specific rights abridged. In 2011 the Board of Directors made the decision to limit ACS cases to just chemistry-related scientists. Examples of rights that might be abridged include: • • • •

Freedom of expression – or freedom to speak without fear of government reprisal Freedom of association – the right to join or leave groups and the right for a group to take collective action Freedom of movement –or the right to travel freely within and outside of their country Freedom from torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading punishment – particularly, no one shall be subject to medical or scientific treatment without their consent

Since the 1980s, ACS has had the opportunity to be involved in dozens of cases to assist persecuted chemists, chemical engineers and other scientists. ACS’s efforts—which include writing letters to key government stakeholders and visiting at-risk scientists in their home countries—have long been a model in the scientific community. ACS has experienced challenges with addressing these cases including privacy of the individual, sensitivities with governments, and other roadblocks. Defining the scope between opportunities and challenges has always been a key part of the ACS’s work. It is important to emphasize that case monitoring is a major part of the ACS science and human rights initiatives. The ACS also encourages chemists and allied scientists to explore the connection that their work has to human rights. To bring this initiative to the attention of scientists, ACS produces a webinar series, publishes a science and human rights section in Global Chemistry (ACS’s international e-newsletter) and hosts related symposia at ACS national meetings. ACS has also built strong connections to other organizations in both the scientific and human rights communities and developed new initiatives to assist at-risk scientists. For an international or domestic case to be selected for monitoring by ACS, it must meet the following criteria: •

Grounded in principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Council for Science (ICSU) Statute 5 about the Universality of Science, and the Objects of the Society; 111

Oriented toward professional chemists, chemical engineers, or practitioners in closely related fields (prior to 2011 the discipline of the person was not restricted); Directed towards human rights and scientific mobility abridgements and issues where ACS is uniquely positioned and qualified to impact the case in a meaningful way; Considered in the context of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted, unless it appears that such remedies would be ineffective or unreasonably prolonged; Based upon clear evidence and a factual description of the alleged rights violations (6).

After ACS accepts a human rights case for monitoring, several actions can take place: •

Letters to key diplomats in the U.S. and the offending country – official correspondence is sent to the government of the detained/persecuted scientist as well as to diplomatic leaders in the U.S., such as the Secretary of State. Notification of network – we also inform our network of allied sister societies and human rights organizations of our actions and encourage them to take action, if possible. These organizations include the Committee on Human Rights of the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine, Scholars at Risk and others. In-country visits – occasionally, there is an opportunity to make a site visit to meet with the case subject. This not only gives the accused the comfort of knowing that he or she has international support, but also gives us an opportunity to ensure that their living conditions are adequate.

Cases Involving Individuals and Organizations The following cases highlight the range of cases that ACS has supported. They give examples of cases in different countries and for a range of causes and with different outcomes.

Emmanuel Lurie (1981-88) One of the first cases that ACS monitored was that of Emmanuel Lurie, a Russian chemist. He was detained for political beliefs with threats to his personal welfare. ACS wrote to Russia multiple times over the span of seven years, both to government officials as well as Lurie’s family. He was ultimately freed and able to immigrate to the United States in 1988. 112

Hadi Hadizadeh Yazdi (2004) In 2004, Hadi Hadizadeh Yazdi, an Iranian physicist, was detained.Yazdi was persecuted by the Iranian government and had significant difficulties obtaining a visa to enter the United States along with his family. ACS President Charles Casey (2004) wrote a letter to the U.S. Consulate General, Dubai. Yazdi was ultimately granted a visa and came to the United States, where he taught at Ohio University. Bulgarian Nurses and a Palestinian Doctor (2004) In May 2004, a Libyan court sentenced to death five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor of deliberately infecting 400 children with HIV and causing the death of 40 children. After the case was appealed in 2005 and retried in 2006, they were sentenced to death again at the end of 2006. In 2007 the sentences were commuted to life imprisonment; later in 2007 the French government negotiated their extradition and they were then pardoned upon return to Europe. ACS worked diligently on their behalf until their pardon. ACS President William Carroll sent the first letter to Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi in 2005. A second letter was sent by ACS in 2006 to Gaddafi. In that same year, letters were also issued to Libya’s Secretary for Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the General People’s Congress M. Abdullah Al-Harari, Secretary of the People’s Committee for Justice and General Security M. Ali-Misrati,and Minister of the Libyan Liaison Office A. Suleiman Aujali. In 2007, a third set of letters were sent to Gaddafi, al-Harari, Aujali, Misrati,and Condoleezza Rice, 66th United States Secretary of State. Doctors Alaei (2008) The abridgement of the rights of the Alaei brothers began in 2008. Doctors Arash and Kamiar Alaei, two well-known Iranian physicians and HIV/AIDS leaders, were detained in June 2008 by Iranian authorities without cause and without charges or trial. They were held in Tehran’s notorious Evin Prison for over six months. On December 31, 2008, a one-day, closed-door trial was held, in which the brothers were tried as conspirators working with an “enemy government” to overthrow the government of Iran. They were also tried at that time on unspecified other charges which neither they nor their lawyer could know, see the evidence of, or address. On January 19, 2009, the doctors were convicted and sentenced under charges of being in “communications with an enemy government” and “seeking to overthrow the Iranian government under article 508 of Iran’s Islamic Penal Code.” Kamiar was sentenced to three years and Arash was sentenced to six. The Alaeis’ crime: traveling the globe and liaising with other health workers to find solutions to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The Iranian government used the doctors’ travel to international AIDS conferences as a basis for the charges — a dangerous conflation of public health diplomacy with treason that will harm Iran’s ability to be a worldwide medical leader and protect its people from disease and death. 113

In November 2010, Kamiar was quietly released after over two years of detention. His brother Arash remained in Evin Prison, but Physicians for Human Rights and colleagues and friends of the Alaeis continued to work tirelessly for his release, which eventually took place in October 2011. A letter from Arash and Kamiar following Arash’s release from prison can be found here: ACS helped in securing the release of the brothers by sending letters from ACS Presidents Bruce E. Bursten and Thomas H. Lane to the Supreme Leader in Iran, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, the Minister of Health and Medical Education and the Office of the Head of the Judiciary. After the brothers were released from prison, they founded the Global Institute for Health and Human Rights at the University of Albany. The Institute focuses on promoting a deeper understanding of the intersection between health and human rights.

Kemal Gürüz (2012) A case that ACS has monitored since 2012 is that of professor Kemal Gürüz, a chemical engineer and former president of the Turkish Council of Higher Education. Professor Gürüz was originally jailed in 2012 as part of the fabricated Ergenekon conspiracy, which targeted academics, journalists and other individuals as members in a coup against the Turkish government (7). In addition to sending letters to officials in both the U.S. and Turkey, ACS brought the case to the attention of the U.S. Department of State. This meeting had a meaningful outcome: Gürüz’s case was included in the Turkey section of the “2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” published by the Department of State (8). Additonally, ACS staff met with Gürüz in August 2014 while in Turkey to inquire about his welfare and the status of his case. As a result of this and other efforts, Gürüz was released from prison pending the appeal of his case. Gürüz, who still faces challenges, expressed his gratitude for the efforts of ACS and its members.

Binayak Sen (2009) Binayak Sen was detained and imprisoned in India under charges of sedition in 2007. Sen was a pediatrician providing health care to rural indigenous populations in the Chhattisgarh state in India; he was also a human rights defender who spoke out against the unlawful killings of indigenous people by the state’s police. He was found guilty of sedition and conspiracy by the state court and sentenced to life imprisonment; in April 2011 the Supreme Court of India granted him bail after throwing out the sedition case against him. ACS participation in this case involved letters issued from ACS President Thomas Lane to the Chhattisgarh governor as well as India’s Chief Minister and Prime Minister in 2009. 114

Outreach and Meetings Part of how ACS advances science and human rights is through outreach events and symposia at conferences. The following section will detail some of these activities. Malta Conferences (2003-17) Another relevant example of ACS serving to advance its commitment to science and human rights is the support of the Frontiers of Chemical Science: Research and Education in the Middle East conference series. Also known as the Malta Conferences, these meetings aim to provide a venue for scientists to meet and discuss applications of chemical sciences in the Middle East and to promote scientific collaboration on regional problems. The conferences contribute to peace in the troubled region by providing a neutral forum for scientists to convene and identify common problems and potential solutions that transcend political, cultural and religious borders. The Malta Conferences represent the realization of the vision of Zafra Lerman, an ACS member, leader in chemical sciences diplomacy and world-renowned champion of human rights and social justice. In helping to launch the conference series in 2003 and in its formative stages, the ACS Board of Directors materially and nominally supported the conferences over the years. More recently ACS provided support to the Malta Organizing Committee to incorporate itself as a 501(c)3 organization, enabling donations to be tax deductible in the U.S. and assuring the Malta series sustainably fulfills its mission and continues its remarkable journey to helping make the world more peaceful (9). Science and Human Rights Symposia ACS National Meetings have offered a myriad of presentations on topics related to science and human rights over the years. This section documentats some examples (10). •

2002 Symposium The ACS International Activities Committee organized a symposium on U.S.-Cuba relations and scientific engagement at the ACS national meeting in Orlando, Florida, in 2002. Topics included: “CHED in Havana: December 1998,” by M. Z. Hoffman; “Cuba and the United States: 100+ years of tension?” E. L. Eliel; “U.S.-Cuba collaborations in chemical research: Fact or fantasy?” L. Echegoyen; “The supramolecular chemistry of cyclodextrins in Cuba,” R. Cao, A. Fragoso, E. Almirall and R. Villalonga; “Becoming a chemist in Cuba,” H. L. Taft; “Chemistry and daily life,” L. Bello, A. García and J. A. Fernández; “Potential applications of ozone in Cuban-American connections,” T. Manning; and “Public policy issues surrounding U.S.-Cuba connections,” E. E. Burns. 115

2015 Symposium ACS stepped up its support of the destruction of chemical and biological weapons with a symposium at the March 2015 ACS National Meeting in Denver, Colorado, about the “Interface of Chemical and Biological Sciences International Disarmament Efforts.” Dorothy Phillips was symposium chair; symposium organizers included Lori Brown and Bradley D. Miller. While chemical and biological weapons have been utilized in a number of modern conflicts, only in recent years have coordinated transnational efforts been made to discourage their use and promote the destruction of any remaining stockpiles. Central to these efforts is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which is administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). While the OPCW is gaining ever-increasing recognition due to its tireless efforts and its receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013, non-proliferation is still generally restricted to nuclear weapons in the public’s mind. Recent high-profile efforts to eradicate the use of chemical weapons are helping to increase awareness of the issue of chemical weapons, but there is still a long way to go in educating the general population. In this ACS symposium senior-level chemical professionals from a variety of government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and academia touched on three key components of chemical and biological weapons non-proliferation: policy, science and public outreach. The presentations included perspectives on the role that national chemical and learned societies can play to help foster dialogue with key stakeholders, assist with educating the public on possible threats, and pursue research to assist in the eradication of these weapons and treatment of victims. The full list of speakers and topics for this event are listed in Appendix A, Also in Denver, during the open session of the ACS Board of Directors meeting, the Board honored the OPCW for it’s recognition of 2013 Nobel Peace Prize, and for the work of the OPCW in championing peaceful applications of the chemical sciences worldwide (11).

2016 Symposium The symposium at the ACS National Meeting in August 2016 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, entitled “Chemical Sciences and Human Rights” featured speakers from allied organizations including the Committee of Concerned Scientists and Scholars at Risk. The full list of presentations were: “The Committee of Concerned Scientists: Scientists Acting for Scientists,” by Z. Lerman, Committee 116

of Concerned Scientists; “Chemists Contributing to Human Rights: Enhancing Research, Teaching and Global Impact,” J. Toney, Kean University; “The Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics: International collaboration as a path to the ethical practice of chemistry,” N. Jackson, ACS Past President & International Activities Committee Member; “How science and scientists can ensure the accessibility of water as a fundamental human right,” W. Lawal, University of Texas at Arlington; “Assisting threatened scientists and scholars: the Scholars at Risk Network,” R. Anderson, Scholars at Risk; “U.S. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s Committee on Human Rights,” R. Everly, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine •

45th MARM Senior Chemists Breakfast The 45th Mid-Atlantic Regional Meeting Senior Chemists Breakfast in June 2017 was sponsored by the ACS Committee on International Activities. The guest speaker was Kabrena Rodda of Pacific Northwest National Lab, who discussed “Responsible Science and the Role of the Chemist: Toward a Safer, More Secure World.” Rodda noted that since roughly 2007, incremental progress had been made in 17 countries to promote responsible science to improve chemical safety and security. She described recent efforts led by ACS to facilitate the development and adoption of the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics. She also explored best practices for teaching ethics across the curriculum to improve the practice of science and nurture a sense of moral responsibility in emerging scientists. She concluded that, working together, chemists can build a culture of responsibility that is more resilient and less likely to be negatively affected by a single person’s or government’s unethical or irresponsible choices.

Science and Human Rights Webinar Series One of ACS’ more recent efforts to engage members and the public at large includes a successful webinar series (12). The ACS Science and Human Rights webinar series is meant to inform the public on how to identify appropriate and practical solutions to human rights problems facing the scientific community. These sessionsdemonstrate the applications of chemistry in addressing global challenges such as access to safe water and sanitation, as well as organizations working at the nexus of science and human rights. The webinar series launched in 2011 as part of the International Year of Chemistry celebrations but has continued to be a successful and dynamic portion of the ACS Science and Human Rights program. In the past several years (through 2017) ACS hosted 10 webinars that address a wide range of topics, which are listed below. 117

Scholars at Risk (August 2017) This episode discussed Scholars at Risk (SAR), a network of over 450 universities in 37 countries that promotes academic freedom and supports threatened scholars through advocacy, research and learning, and protection. SAR places scholars with concerns over their safety and well-being in temporary placements to continue their research uninterrupted.

International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) Young Observers Program (December 2016) This webinar featured IUPAC organizers who provided details on the Young Observers program and the application process. This program is for early career chemists under the age of 45 who planned to attend the 46th IUPAC World Congress in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in July 2017. This webinar was a joint effort between the ACS International Center and ACS Science and Human Rights program.

Chemists Contributing to Human Rights: Enhancing Research, Teaching and Global Impact (October 2016) This presentation was given by Jeff Toney of Kean University. The discussion focused on integrating human rights perspectives into chemists’ work that can enhance research and teaching by adding global impact to benefit humanity. This presentation was originally given at the ACS National Meeting in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in August 2016 as part of the symposium “Chemical Sciences and Human Rights.”

SESAME (Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science and Applications in the Middle East) (October 2015) Sir Chris Llewellyn Smith, President of the SESAME Council, discussed how the project came together, ACS’s involvement, key research at the site in Jordan and what the future holds for this UNESCO-initiated project.

Physicians for Human Rights (July 2015) This webinar featured the Nobel Peace Prize winning Physicians for Human Rights (PHR). Widney Brown, Director of Programs, discussed the history of PHR, how the organization uses science to help document and analyze human rights violations and opportunities to contribute to the group’s work.


Science Diplomacy in the Middle East: the Malta Conferences and their Lasting Impact (May 2015) This webinar was a follow-up to ACS’ previous webinar on the Malta Conferences. This session featured Zafra M. Lerman, President of the Malta Conferences Foundation, discussing how the meetings have helped to establish diplomatic ties in the Middle East and the importance of this meeting within the context of the current issues in the region.

ACS Science and Human Rights: Past, Present, and Future (February 2015) Dorothy Phillips presented on the Society’s efforts in human rights. Topics covered included the history of the ACS’ work in science and human rights, how participants could get involved in these issues, and upcoming plans to continue the ACS tradition in this area.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (2015) Jonathan Forman, Science Policy Adviser for the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), spoke on the history of the organization, its 2013 Nobel Peace Prize and the importance of the eradication of chemical weapons.

Science Diplomacy as a Bridge to Peace in the Middle East (February 2014) Zafra M. Lerman, President of the Malta Conferences Foundation, presented on the importance of science diplomacy in working toward stability in the Middle East. This session was moderated by Norman Neureiter, Acting Director of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

American Association for the Advancement of Science (July 2014) The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Science and Human Rights Coalition is a network of scientific and engineering membership organizations that recognize a role for scientists and engineers in human rights. As of January 2018 the coalition has 24 members and one affiliated organizations. This webinar was hosted by Jessica Wyndham and Theresa Harris from AAAS, who spoke on the history of the coalition, the importance of science in human rights and the continued work of the coalition and AAAS in this area.


A Look at Seeding Labs (August 2013) Nina Dudnik, Founder and CEO of Seeding Labs, spoke about the organization and how it supports the ACS mission to explore the role the scientific community plays in empowering talented scientists in developing countries to conduct life-changing research that facilitates access to medicine, safe water and education.

External Partnerships AAAS ACS is a founding member of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Science and Human Rights Coalition, which was established in 2009. The coalition is a network of scientific and engineering organizations that recognize a role for science, scientists and engineers in efforts to realize human rights. It comprises member associations (learned societies like ACS) and affiliated individuals (individual members who don’t formally represent an organization or group, but hold a general interest and desire to participate in the work of the coalition). ACS sends representatives to the coalition’s biannual meetings and contributes to many of its efforts. As an example, ACS helped produce a primer on scientific freedom and human rights to help guide scientific and engineering societies on how to begin addressing human rights issues within their respective disciplines. The primer was meant to serve as an internal document for these organizations. It was published in 2011 as part of the AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition Welfare of Scientists Working Group (13). Allied Organizations and the United Nations ACS maintains a network with a variety of scientific and human rights focused organizations to stay informed about new cases and to receive updates on trends in human rights, such as the recent example of Turkish academics losing their jobs and being arrested for signing a petition regarding the treatment of Kurds in Turkey. In addition to AAAS, some of the other organizations we work with include the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; Committee of Concerned Scientists; the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy; Human Rights, and Labor; Amnesty International; Physicians for Human Rights; and Scholars at Risk. In April and May 2014 ACS visited organizations in Washington D.C. as part of the onboarding of Dorothy Phillips as new Board liaison to the ACS Science &Human Rights Program. The visits included a meeting with representatives from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to discuss Kemal Gürüz and general work of both organizations; a meeting with Jessica Wyndham and Theresa Harris from the AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition to discuss coalition membership and topics for the upcoming July 2014 meeting; and a meeting with representatives from the Amnesty International (AI) Crisis 120

Prevention and Response Unit to discuss their Science for Human Rights program. The AI representatives shared their approach to gathering information about cases and their work with student clubs to help raise awareness about human rights. During a January 2015 trip to New York City, ACS Director-at-Large Dorothy Phillips and Lori Brown and Bradley Miller from the ACS Office of International Activities participated in several meetings related to science and human rights. The stops included a visit with Ivan Šimonović, Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for the United Nations (Figure 1). The group also visited the Scholars at Risk, Physicians for Human Rights, the New York Academy of Sciences and the Committee of Concerned Scientists (14).

Figure 1. ACS representatives at the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. L to R: Dorothy Phillips, Ivan Šimonović, Lori Brown, Bradley Miller. During a trip to New York City in January 2017 Lori Brown and Dorothy Phillips visited Scholars at Risk, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The reason for this trip was two-fold: to gain information on the post-coup situation in Turkey and to further establish relationships with these partners. Scholars at Risk presented the organization’s report: “Free to Think, Academic Freedom” monitoring project. It includes a chapter on the impact of the failed coup in Turkey on the academic community. The organization hopes the report will be the basis for a UN review.

Broadening ACS Impact A lot has changed since Dorothy Phillips became the ACS Board liaison to and published her first comment on the American Chemical Society’s Science and Human Rights program (7). The global political landscape has been unsettled by attempted coups and recent elections, and security is understandably on the minds of many world leaders. These issues, coupled with misinformation shared through social media, contribute to growing threats to scientific mobility and have an impact on rights, scientific discovery and the practice of chemistry. 121

Therefore, upholding human rights is more important than ever. As a sciencedriven organization, ACS can and should be a leader in matters of transnational importance, such as health care, higher education and the environment. The ACS Science and Human Rights initiative, with its long-standing reputation, is well suited to address these issues at the cross-section of science and human rights. Although ACS can justifiably celebrate its past successes, many opportunities exist for new endeavors in the future. Several topics rise to the top of our list: sustainable development goals, mobility of scientists, ethics, and outreach through the ACS Science and Human Rights Alert Network. Sustainable Development Goals ACS is positioned to take a lead on the Sustainable Development Goals, (SDGs) which were developed by the United Nations as a continuation of the Millennium Development Goals and adopted by the General Assembly on September 25, 2015. The seventeen SDGs tackle issues such as hunger, education and energy, all critical aspects that need to be addressed by cooperation between scientists and human rights experts. Each goal has specific targets to be achieved over the next fifteen years. With one hundred and sixty-nine targets and an end date of 2030, the SDGs have an ambitious mandate. Many of the SDGs have direct and indirect connections to the chemical sciences. For example, Goal 2, which emphasizes zero hunger, can be addressed by ACS members who work in food science. The preamble to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Goals states: “This Agenda is a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity. It also seeks to strengthen universal peace in larger freedom. We recognize that eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, including extreme poverty, is the greatest global challenge and an indispensable requirement for sustainable development. All countries and all stakeholders, acting in collaborative partnership, will implement this plan. We are resolved to free the human race from the tyranny of poverty and want and to heal and secure our planet. We are determined to take the bold and transformative steps which are urgently needed to shift the world on to a sustainable and resilient path. As we embark on this collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left behind” (15). A preponderance of the SDG’s and their associated targets can be substantively advanced through chemistry related science, technology and innovation. For 2018, ACS has in place a piloting initiative for joint ACS and sister society / organizations called Chemistry Enterprise Partnership (CEP) programs. In this new arrangement, we are working to advance mutual interests and vision, to increase the likelihood of SDG achievement, and to serve our respective chemistry communities. Our efforts initially take the form of identifying and ‘branding’ existing society / organization activities (technical meeting content; journal articles and editorials; communicating science to the public activities; grants, awards and recognition; joint policy statements; etc.) furthered through agreement upon jointly advancing individual chemistry SDGs. For example, we are currently working with the Chemical Society of Nigeria (CSN) on advancing SDG 5 – Gender Equity, and in particular working within 122

chemistry communities – including our ACS Chapters in Nigeria and CSN networks to help in undertaking reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources. Civil society organizations such as ACS can play a key part in achieving several of these objectives. Indeed, addressing the issues outlined in the SDGs would be nearly impossible without the use of chemistry. Mobility of Scientists We are also concerned with mobility for ACS members and scientists around the world. The ability to move freely and with ease is vital to scientific exchange and collaboration, and the restrictions on visas are a threat to scientific progress. If you’d like to learn more about ACS’s position on this issue, I encourage you to review the ACS statement (16) in reaction to the presidential executive order “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” as well as the recent response to the proposed form DS-5535 (17), which mandates additional questioning for visa applicants. Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics ACS is also leading the effort to promote ethical practices in chemistry through the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE) project. This initiative, funded by the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program, developed a code of ethics that could be adopted by or applied to chemistry-related businesses, academic institutions and civil society organizations. In April 2016, the ACS International Activities Office gathered thirty scientists from eighteen countries for a workshop in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to draft a code of ethics, guided by The Hague Ethical Guidelines (18) and the Code of Conduct Toolkit from the OPCW. After the workshop, participants as well as other stakeholders were invited to adopt the code and share it with other scientists in their organizations, professional societies and communities upon their return home. By working together, scientists and their institutions can define, detect and discourage misconduct in their field and deter questionable research practices. Additionally, the code encourages the global chemistry enterprise to adopt internationally recognized practices for chemical safety and security as well as compliance with national arms control and nonproliferation commitments. Workshops held in 2017 resulted in the training of more than 8,000 scientists in the code and related topics. This effort was coordinated with assistance and support from the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (19). ACS Science and Human Rights Alert Network The participation of ACS members through the ACS Science and Human Rights Alert Network is also a vital component of the initiative. In an effort to further engage ACS members, ACS Science and Human Rights created this network to directly communicate with registered members. This Network alerts 123

interested subscribers to new cases of scientists and/or scholars whose rights are have been abridged. Network members are directed to letter writing campaigns, petitions, and other means of communication that will be sent to politicians, members of the media, and other appropriate groups on behalf of the threatened scholar. Network members will also receive updates on relevant Science and Human Rights activities, such as webinars and symposia. Several alerts have been sent out on behalf of chemists and chemical engineers seeking placement from Scholars at Risk.

Conclusion Humankind faces many challenges with development, scientific progress, and protection of rights. Efforts through the ACS Science and Human Rights initiatives strive to address these issues while defending the rights of chemists, chemical engineers, chemistry educators and allied professionals worldwide. This work can’t be done without ACS members and coordination with external organizations. With this support, ACS Science and Human Rights stands ready to meet the challenges - today and in the future - in fulfillment of the Society’s mission: to advance the broader chemistry enterprise and its practitioners for the benefit of Earth and its people.

Appendix A - 2015 Symposium Program: “Interface of Chemical and Biological Sciences International Disarmament Efforts.” Part 1: Policy “Chemistry, International Disarmament and Policy in a Technologically Evolving World,” by. J. Forman, Science Policy Advisor, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; “U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program: Challenges, successes, and expanding international disarmament/nonproliferation efforts,” D. Verdugo, Program Officer, Chemical Security Program, Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (ISN/CTR), Department of State; “Chemical Issues in Context: The Role of Intent in Nonproliferation and Disarmament Policy,” K. Rodda, Technology & Policy Integration Specialist, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Part 2: Science “Finding the Needle in the Haystack: The Development of Analytical Capabilities at the OPCW And Partner Laboratories In Support of Verification of The Chemical Weapons Convention,” by M. Blum, Senior Analytical Chemist, OPCW Laboratory, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; “Finding Better Therapeutics for Chemical Poisonings: The NIH Countermeasures Against Chemical Threats (CounterACT) Program,” D. Jett, Program Director, NIH Countermeasures Against Chemical Threats (CounterACT) Program, Office of Translational Research, NIH/NINDS; 124

“Eradication Techniques for Chemical and Biological Weapons,” R. Holmes, Project Manager, Bechtel Pueblo Team, Program Executive Office, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives. Part 3: Public Outreach “Education and Outreach Relevant to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Chemical Weapons Convention,” by Prof. A. Suarez, Chairperson, Scientific Advisory Board, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; “Emerging Technologies and Diffusion of Innovation: Security challenges for the 21st century,” Prof. M. Kosal, Assistant Professor, Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts, Georgia Institute of Technology; “Not in My Backyard: Outreach Efforts by the Program Executive Office, Assembled Weapons Alternatives (PEO-ACWA) on Chemical Weapons Destruction,” G. B. Mohrman, Site Project Manager, Pueblo Chemical Agent-Destruction Pilot Plant, Program Executive Office, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives Concluding Remarks by. N. Jackson, Past President, ACS

Appendix B – Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts Goal 14. Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development 125

Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development (15)

References Claude, R. Science in Service of Human Rights; University of Pennsylvania: Philadelphia, 2002, pp 14−17. 2. American Chemical Society. ACS Governing Documents, Charter, Constitution, Bylaws and Regulations of the American Chemical Society, 30 January 2018. charter/bulletin-5.pdf?_ga=2.24068280.302489648.1517235655-3471956 91.1502998742. 3. United Nations, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966. Pages/CESCR.aspx [accessed 30 January 2018]. 4. American Chemical Society. publicpolicies/science-policy/scientificexchange.html [accessed 30 January 2018]. 5. United Nations. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, December 1948. [accessed 30 January 2018]. 6. American Chemical Society. New ACS Human Rights Case Selection Criteria. [accessed 30 January 2018]. 7. Phillips, D. Science And Human Rights: A Call To Action. Chem. Eng. News 2014, 92 (41), 30. 8. U.S. Department of State. Turkey 2013 Human Rights Report. https:// [accessed 30 January 2018]. 9. Malta Conferences Foundation. https://www.maltaconferences [accessed 30 January 2018]. 10. American Chemical Society. Human Rights Symposia. https:// symposia.html [accessed 30 January 2018]. 11. Hess, G. Mission To Destroy Syria’s Chemical Weapons Moves Slowly. Chem. Eng. News 2014, 92 (7), 6. 12. American Chemical Society. ACS Human Rights Webinars. https:// webinars.html [accessed 30 January 2018]. 1.


13. American Association for the Advancement of Science. AAAS Welfare of Scientists Working Group AAAS Welfare of Scientists Working Group, 2011. scifreedom/human-rights-primer-final.pdf [accessed 30 January 2018]. 14. Brown, L. ACS Meets With Human Rights Advocates. Chem. Eng. News 2015, 93 (6), 30. 15. United Nations. Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 2015. content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20 Development%20web.pdf [accessed 30 January 2018]. 16. American Chemical Society. American Chemical Society statement on the Presidential Executive Order: “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”. American Chemical Society, 30 January 2017. acs-statement-on-presidential-executive-order-protecting-the-nation-fromforeign-terrorist-entry-into-the-us.html [accessed 9 February 2018]. 17. Connelly, T. American Chemical Society, 16 May 2017. https:// response-to-dos-2017.pdf [accessed 9 February 2018]. 18. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague Ethical Guidelines. [accessed 9 February 2018]. 19. American Chemical Society, The Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics. https:// global-chemists-code-of-ethics.html [accessed 30 January 2018].


Chapter 8

The Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics: International Cooperation for Increased Chemical Security and Safety Lori Brown* American Chemical Society, Washington, DC 20036, United States *E-mail: [email protected]

Since 2014 the American Chemical Society (ACS) has led the development and dissemination of the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE or Code). This document is a guide and starting point for institutions from industry, academia, and government that may lack a code of conduct or feel the need to update current ethical standards with new components. Over the course of four years, ACS implementers have gathered information and a consensus among leading chemistry related organizations. Through a series of workshops in 2016 and 2017, the ACS has enabled the training of over eight thousand individuals around the world in principles of ethical security, safety, and publishing standards in the chemical sciences. This chapter will provide background on the GCCE’s development, the dissemination of the Code, and future plans regarding the continued expansion of this initiative. The GCCE project is funded by the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program, and has been convened and facilitated by the ACS with assistance from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL).

Introduction The biologist Edwin Grant Conklin once said, “Ethics … has been well called “the religion of science” (1). Indeed, many scientists pride themselves in their ability to adhere to strict professional standards: conducting and publishing research in an ethical manner to progress humankind and improve quality © 2018 American Chemical Society

of life. Despite these lofty aspirations, some chemical science practitioners engage in nefarious scientific activities, both deliberately and unintentionally. The exploitation of scientific knowledge for disreputable purposes, such as weaponizing chemicals in conflicts like the ongoing Syrian civil war and the proliferation of harmful recreational drug use, continues to be an issue for the global chemistry community. To curb participation in these negative activities many universities, chemistry-related companies, and governing bodies create codes of conduct that mandate what is and is not acceptable behavior. Unfortunately, there is no central unifying document between these many various and highly specified codes of conduct. To help fill this gap, in 2014 ACS proposed organizing the creation of the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE), a document created by consensus from a diverse group of international leaders in the chemical sciences. This chapter will discuss the origin of this effort, the steps taken to ensure broad consent, and the successful leadership institutes that have helped to reach over eight thousand scientists to date. Information from this chapter has been pulled from reports, proposals, and other records from GCCE events.

Ethics and Chemistry The need for a unifying ethical document does not negate the presence of ethics in the practice of the chemical sciences up to this point. In fact, there are numerous examples of learned societies, academic institutions, industry groups, government bodies, and other chemistry-related entities that have incorporated ethical standards and codes into their management. As a chemistry related professional society that was founded in 1876 (2), the ACS obliges members to hold themselves to the highest standards. Indeed, Article II, Section 3, of the ACS Constitution states, “The SOCIETY shall cooperate with scientists internationally and shall be concerned with the worldwide application of chemistry to the needs of humanity” (3). With this statement the ACS address how to best contribute to issues related to human rights, including ethics. To ensure this, there are several governing bodies and documents that provide guidance to members and the global chemistry enterprise at large. The volunteerled ACS committees that involve ethical issues include: the Committee on Ethics, the Committee on Economic and Professional Affairs, the Committee on Chemical Safety, the Committee on Environmental Improvement, Committee on Patents and Related Matters, and the Division of Professional Relations (4). While other committees and divisions might broach topics of proper conduct and standards, these are the main groups who determine ethical standards for the Society. The documents that guide ACS members and staff are numerous, but several of the most important texts are: • • •

Ethical Guidelines to Publication of Chemical Research Professional Employment Guidelines Scientific Insight and Integrity in Public Policy 130

• •

Volunteer/National Meeting Attendee Conduct Policy Academic Professional Guidelines (4)

The deep knowledge and history of ACS’s involvement with ethical issues made the organization well suited to helm the development of the GCCE. While the ACS is the largest and arguably most influential chemistry-related society in the world, other standards have been around for decades in the chemistry world. According to a report from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), there were already over one hundred and forty codes of conduct in English related to chemistry across industry, government, and academia as of 2015 (5). The proliferation of codes can be attributed in part to increased awareness of the need for safety measures within chemistry related bodies through initiatives such as Responsible Care® (6). While it is encouraging to see so many organizations already actively pursuing ethical standards, it begs the question: why create another code? One key component was missing from each of these codes: a document developed with input from a cohort of international scientists explicitly with the purpose of providing a roadmap for institutions that lacked ethical guidelines. This is where the GCCE was different. Rather than creating another code that was tied to a specific organization or institution, the GCCE could be adopted as is or with modifications by chemical societies, universities, or companies.

GCCE Background and Development Preparation for the GCCE involved months of groundwork and discussions with a wide range of stakeholders. Perhaps the most integral partner in the development in the Code was the OPCW. This implementation body for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a multinational authority for responsible conduct in the chemical sciences. With one hundred and ninety-two member states, this organization is a vital ally for any multilateral ethics endeavor (7). To ensure proper coordination of efforts between the OPCW and the GCCE organizers, ACS and PNNL representatives traveled to The Hague several times for meetings and workshops. It was soon discovered that there were several parallel efforts by the OPCW and German government to create similar ethics-related documents. This provided an excellent opportunity work with contributors prior to GCCE events through discussions and workshops in the Netherlands. A key influential effort from the OPCW for the GCCE organizers was the development of The Hague Ethical Guidelines. Drafted over two workshops with a broad range of delegates from around the globe, The Hague Ethical Guidelines were “intended to serve as elements for ethical codes and discussion points for ethical issues related to the practice of chemistry under the Convention.” Nine key elements are the central part of this document: • •

Core Element Sustainability 131

• • • • • • •

Education Awareness and Engagement Ethics Safety and Security Accountability Oversight Exchange of Information (8)

Many of the future facilitators and participants for the GCCE drafting workshop took part in the creation of the Guidelines, and brought lessons learned from that experience into the pending workshop.

Kuala Lumpur Workshop: The Drafting of the GCCE The drafting workshop was originally planned to take place in Dhaka, Bangladesh, in conjunction with the 16th Asian Chemical Congress in November 2015. However, an outbreak of violent and fatal attacks against foreigners in Bangladesh in the months preceding the workshop necessitated a change in venue to a more secure location. The event was postponed and moved to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. This was seen as an ideal spot: easy to travel from most countries, accessible visa requirements, and amenable to budget restrictions. The Institut Kimia Malaysia (IKM) served as a nominal co-sponsor of the event. The meeting took place April 4-6, 2016 with thirty-five participants from eighteen countries, including ten current or former presidents of national chemical societies (full list of participants is in Appendix B). The participant list was expected to be higher, but unfortunately several potential drafters had to cancel their travel plans at the last minute due to the inability to secure a visa and personal emergencies. The agenda for the GCCE drafters was rigorous. On the first day, facilitators Drs. Nancy Jackson, Kabrena Rodda, and Abeer Al-Bawab led the delegates through a series of small group discussions around the topics of ethics in research, safety, environment, publishing, and security. The entire group came together to review the other groups’ work to discuss and reach a consensus to create a first draft. On the second day, the group identified common language and themes for the next draft. Another small group activity took place for the production and subsequent full group review of three preambles targeted at addressing three key audiences for the GCCE: Policy Makers, Academia, and Industry & Export Control. After reviewing the final documents on their own time overnight, the drafters met again on day three to finalize the language and discuss potential follow-up activities. Suggested activities included encouraging their societies and home institutions to adapt and/or adopt the Code, as well as the possibility of approaching the OPCW and its state parties and national authority representatives for approval from government representatives.


GCCE Science and Technology Leadership Institutes Following the completion of the GCCE summit in Kuala Lumpur, the next step was to disseminate the GCCE with a special concentration for institutions in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia. To accomplish this, ACS proposed using the Building Opportunities out of Science and Technology (BOOST). This train-the-trainer program had previously taught soft skills to thousands of early career chemists throughout South Asia and South America. This would become basis for the GCCE Science and Technology Leadership Institutes (STLI) – a series of workshops for early career chemists and chemical engineers from the aforementioned regions. After a peer-reviewed application process, participants were selected to take part in a weeklong workshop that had all travel expenses covered through the State Department grant. These young scientists took part in a variety of tracts on topics related to chemical security, safety, and publishing ethics, as well as communications tips such as explaining scientific work to a non-technical audience and how to organize volunteers. The requirement for taking part in the workshop was for the participants to train at least one hundred colleagues upon their return home. The SLTI workshops took place between February and August in 2017. Participants gathered in Rabat, Morocco; Nairobi, Kenya; and Melbourne, Australia for weeklong events. Each event involved an ample amount of discussion time and the participants gave presentations at the end of the week on their plan for adapting the workshop material to their unique audience. The follow-up events from GCCE STLI participants exceeded all expectations. The fifty-four people who joined in the three workshops were obligated to reach five thousand four hundred attendees at their home institution. In reality, over eight thousand people attended these follow-up sessions hosted by forty-seven STLI leaders. Examples of some of the most successful events include: • • •

A two-day long event in Morocco coordinated between five STLI participants with over four hundred attendees. Over two hundred attendees for a workshop in Yemen despite an on-going civil war. In Pakistan, nearly nine hundred attendees for a three-day workshop organized by a single STLI participant.

Unfortunately, several participants had to delay their events due to political and civil unrest in their respective countries. However, many have held multiple events, and some professors have even incorporated the GCCE STLI presentations into their regular teaching schedule. This final outcome – the huge amount of attendees at the follow-up events – has demonstrated the need and desire for content around ethics, safety and security in the chemical sciences from the GCCE STLIs.


Future The need for ethical standards and codes in chemistry is unlikely to wane anytime soon. The GCCE will continue to be a focal point in workshops related to chemical safety, security, and ethical conduct, among other topics. Initiatives from several workshop participants ensure that the Code will continue to propagate. Many delegates have indicated their intention to incorporate the principles and past presentations into their regular syllabi. In addition, some have taken on the responsibility of translating the materials into their native language or edited translated materials for increased accuracy. PNNL also created an online e-learning module that heavily features the GCCE (9). ACS has taken several steps to ensure that the Code will spread. To encourage additional adoption, the GCCE has been translated into seven non-English languages: Arabic, Turkish, Urdu, Pashto, Hindi, Bahasa, and Tagalog. Future plans are coalescing to ensure that the Code continues to proliferate. With continued support from the already strong GCCE community and a little luck, this bold initiative will serve scientists around the world as a handbook for responsibly practicing science.

Appendix A – The Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics •

Introduction -Making Positive Change Happen: Chemical practitioners should promote a positive perception and public understanding and appreciation of chemistry. This is done through research, innovation, teamwork, collaboration, community outreach, and high ethical standards. Chemistry professionals should act as role models, mentors, and advocates of the safe and secure application of chemistry to benefit humankind and preserve the environment for future generations. They should instill and encourage curiosity and innovation early and often, and recognize and award achievements where appropriate. Finally, chemistry professionals should provide professional inputs and opinions to government and other decision makers regarding industrial, environmental, and other issues. Environment: Environmental sustainability should be an integral part of research and education. Chemistry professionals must use their expertise to ensure the safety and health of coworkers and the community, and to protect the environment for future generations. Chemical practitioners should work within their organizations to help develop sound environmental plans and policies. Chemistry professionals should encourage inclusion of environmental sustainability as a key element in chemistry instruction and engagement with the community. Chemical practitioners are responsible to ensure the proper use and disposal of chemicals and instruments. They should endeavor to increase their knowledge of the short and long term effects of chemicals on the environment and to apply informed quality control principles. 134

Research: Research in chemical sciences should benefit humankind and improve quality of life, while protecting the environment and preserving it for future generations. Researchers should conduct their work with the highest integrity and transparency, avoid conflicts of interest, and practice collegiality in the best way. Research should promote the exchange of new scientific and technological information and knowledge relating to the application of chemistry for the benefit of humankind and the environment. Scientific Writing and Publishing: Scientific publication is a way to share new knowledge. Chemistry professionals should promote and disseminate scientific knowledge in research and innovation through outreach, scientific writing and publication for sustainable development. Chemistry professionals should maintain honesty and integrity in all stages of the publication process, which must meet the highest possible standards of data reproducibility and correctness without plagiarism. Chemistry professionals who supervise others have a responsibility to ensure that their scientific writings are free of defects and errors.Chemistry professionals should promote peaceful, beneficial applications and uses of science and technology through a variety of media. Chemistry professionals have a responsibility to assess information intended for release prior to dissemination. Safety: A culture of safety is very important and should be sustained by management, including academic, industrial and government leadership. Management should work with chemical practitioners in all aspects of safety including training, regular audits and the development of safety culture. There should always be awareness of safety regulations protecting health and the environment. All chemical practitioners should exercise safety procedures. Engineering and administrative controls for safety should be in place. Proper personal protective equipment and garments should be used when working with chemicals or in an area with hazards. Security: A culture of security is important to protect dual use chemicals and facilities. All stakeholders in the chemical supply chain should ensure and practice chemical security. Chemical practitioners should ensure that laboratories and industrial facilities have the capacity to secure chemicals. Security measures need to be reviewed regularly. Management should have oversight of security and should follow all local and international laws and regulations (10).

Appendix B – Global Chemists Code of Ethics Workshop Participants for Drafting Document, April 2016 • • •

Datuk Dr. Soon Ting-Kueh: Past President, Malaysian Institute of Chemistry Dr. Abeer Al Bawab: President, Jordanian Chemical Society Dr. Ali Esat Karakaya: Professor of Toxicology, Gazi University 135

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• • •

• • • • • • •

Dr. Allison Campbell: President-Elect, American Chemical Society Dr. Austin Ochieng Aluoch: Professor - Department of Chemistry, Technical University of Kenya Dr. Bilal R. Kaafarani: Associate Professor - Department of Chemistry, American University of Beirut Dr. Bipul Saha: Senior Vice President - R&D, Nagarjuna Agrichem Limited Dr. Dickson Andala: Professor - Department of Chemistry, Kenyatta University Dr. Ellene Tratras Contis: Chair, American Chemical Society International Activities Committee Steven Hill: Staff, American Chemical Society Dr. Emad Yousif: Professor - Department of Chemistry, Al-Nahrain University Dr. Fadwa Mohammad Ali Odeh: Professor - Chemistry Department, University of Jordan Dr. Gloria U. Obuzor: President, Nigerian Chemical Society Dr. Joab Otieno: Lecturer - Deparment of Chemical Sciences and Technology, Technical University of Kenya Dr. John Webb: Research Professor, Swinburne University of Technology Dr. Kabrena Rodda: Pacific Northwest National Laboratories Dr. Mohammad Nahid Siddiqui: Associate Professor - Department of Chemistry, King Fahd University of Petroleum & Minerals Dr. Mohammed Fakher: First Secretary, Executive Secretary of the Yemeni National Committee for the prohibition of Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons Dr. Mohd Jamil Maah: Professor - Department of Chemistry, University of Malaya Dr. Muhammad Raza Shah: Professor - Department of Chemistry, University of Karachi Dr. Muna Abu Dalo: Director - Queen Rania Al Abdallah Center for Environmental Sciences & Technology, Jordan University of Science & Technology Dr. Nancy Jackson: Facilitator, American Chemical Society International Activities Committee Dr. Patrick Lim: Chair - Department of Chemistry, University of San Carlos Dr. Phillip Koech: Pacific Northwest National Laboratories Dr. Sammia Shahid: Chair - Department of Chemistry, University of Management and Technology Dr. Taghreed Al Noor: Professor - Department of Chemistry, University of Baghdad Dr. Tetemke Mehari: President, Ethiopian Chemical Society Dr. Zuriati Zakaria: Professor - Department of Environmental Engineering and Green Technology, University of Technology Malaysia 136

• • • • • • • •

Halimatussaadiah Mat Som: International Cooperation Officer, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Ms. Saleha Abd Rahman @ Ngah Undersecretary, Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, OPCW Malaysian State Party Representative Prof. Dr. Ghulam Abbas Miana: President, Chemical Society of Pakistan Prof. Dr. Jasim Uddin Ahmad: President, Federation of Asian Chemical Societies Prof. Dr. Muhamad A. Martoprawiro: President, Indonesian Chemical Society Prof. Mamia El Rhazi: President, Moroccan Society of Analytical Chemistry for Sustainable Development Prof. Mehmet Mahramanlioglu: Professor - Department of Chemistry Istanbul University Prof. Joshua Ayoola Obaleye: Professor - Department of Chemistry, University of Ilorin

References Conklin, E. Science and Ethics. Nature 1938, 191 (3559), 101. American Chemical Society, Fast Facts about ACS. content/acs/en/about/aboutacs.html [accessed 16 February 2018]. 3. American Chemical Society, ACS Governing Documents of the American Chemical Society, 2018. governance/charter/bulletin-5.pdf?_ga=2.142697781.1869047521.152 8125799-1269847825.1525092882 [accessed 5 June 2018]. 4. American Chemical Society, Ethical and Professional Guidelines. https:// 384007.1395997238.1518719683-347195691.1502998742 [accessed February 2018]. 5. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Compilation of Codes of Ethics and Conduct, September 2015. fileadmin/OPCW/SAB/en/2015_Compilation_of_Chemistry_Codes.pdf [accessed February 2018]. 6. American Chemistry Council, Responsible Care. https://responsiblecare. [accessed February 2018]. 7. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, About OPCW. [accessed February 2018]. 8. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, About OPCW. [accessed February 2018]. 9. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, The Global Chemists Code of Ethics e-Learning Module, 2017. index_wrapper.html [accessed February 2018]. 10. American Chemical Society, The Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics [Online]. Available: eventsglobal/global-chemists-code-of-ethics.html [accessed February 2018]. 1. 2.


Chapter 9

Scientific Societies for Human Rights: The American Chemical Society’s Role in the AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition Theresa L. Harris* and Jessica M. Wyndham Scientific Responsibility, Human Rights and Law Program, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1200 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20005, United States *E-mail: [email protected]

Since 2009, the AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition has leveraged the influence of its member societies to promote the human rights responsibilities of scientists and scientific associations. As one of the Coalition members, the American Chemical Society has played an important leadership role that has positively impacted the human rights of scientists around the world, improved the scientific community’s understanding of connections between human rights and ethics, supported the human rights efforts of other scientific societies, and expanded opportunities for individual chemists and chemical engineers to apply their expertise to advancing human rights.

Introduction Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the international human rights system has undergone tremendous development and expansion. Once the purview primarily of international lawyers and diplomats, the work of protecting human rights is now widely recognized as requiring active participation by all sectors of society – including industry, academia, and the professional associations that represent those sectors. At first glance, the connections between science and human rights may not be evident. However, scholars, practitioners, and the scientific societies engaged in human rights efforts have together revealed at least five connections: (1) scientists, as all human beings, have rights and some human rights have © 2018 American Chemical Society

particular relevance to the work of scientists, including the rights to freedom of information and expression, to movement, and to cooperate internationally; (2) science, the knowledge generated by it, as well as the services and products it gives rise to, can be used in support of human rights; (3) at the same time, the way science is conducted and the methods and technologies arising from science are applied, can lead to violations of human rights; (4) according to international treaty law, everyone has a right to “enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications”; and (5) scientists can serve as a constituency for human rights (1). Indeed, over the past forty years, the U.S.-based scientific community has been increasing its engagement with human rights issues, both in terms of substantive contributions and influence. The geopolitical situation of the 1970s thrust the issue of the human rights of scientists onto the agenda of scientific societies in the United States. The American Chemical Society (ACS), among others, recognized the need for their advocacy on behalf of their colleagues at risk. The American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) was also among the scientific membership organizations that became involved in advocacy efforts, but then expanded in the 1980s to pioneer new applications of scientific methods and technologies for human rights purposes, such as forensic and genetic scientists identifying victims of mass atrocities; statisticians applying statistical and information management techniques to document large scale human rights violations; and geographers using satellite imagery to document human rights violations involving physical destruction and mass displacement. Scientists have also independently organized, forming non-governmental organizations that provide scientific tools and methods for human rights documentation, such as the International Commission of Missing Persons’ endeavors to document genocide in the former Yugoslavia and the Nobel Prize-winning work of Physicians for Human Rights. In a few cases, discipline-specific scientific organizations have expressly included human rights principles in their codes of ethics, for example prohibiting members from participating in activities that may constitute or contribute to torture and other human rights violations. However, much more is possible when the scientific community fully embraces its potential role and works in collaboration to use its influential voice for the defense of human rights, for which the need is immense. As a network of scientific associations that recognize a role for science and scientists in human rights, the AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition was created to realize these possibilities by building bridges across and within the scientific community and the human rights community. From the outset, the ACS has made vital, lasting contributions to the Coalition, from the articulation of its mission and goals, to defining its activities, and contributing substantively and substantially to its accomplishments. This chapter describes the AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition as a venue for building a constituency for human rights within the scientific community, the ACS’s role in creating the Coalition and contributing to its accomplishments, and the outcomes and impacts the ACS’s involvement in the Coalition has had on its members, on other professional associations, and on the human rights community. 140

Building a New Coalition of Scientific Associations for Human Rights The idea for the Coalition emerged from a two-day meeting held in July 2005, attended by representatives of leading human rights and scientific organizations with the purpose of exploring ways in which the scientific community can be proactively engaged in promoting human rights domestically. The goal of the meeting was to lay the groundwork for the development of a human rights network of scientists and scientific societies working on domestic human rights issues. Often representing large constituencies, scientific organizations are influential and well-respected. They play a significant role in the regulation of specific scientific disciplines and have access to diverse networks of scientists in academia, industry, and government. Consequently, they constitute important partners in efforts to bring more scientists to human rights. Approximately 40 scientific associations and human rights organizations were represented at the meeting, including the ACS. From the two-day meeting emerged a clear interest within the scientific community to move forward in the organization of a coalition of scientific societies and academic associations that are concerned about human rights issues in the United States. This alliance was seen as completing and strengthening existing ongoing informal networks of societies that worked on individual cases of persecuted scientists in other countries and on specific issues affecting science. Following a brief hiatus, momentum for the creation of the Coalition was regained and from June 2007 to December 2008 a group of approximately 20 scientific organizations, many of which, but not all, had participated in the initial meeting, gathered to define the mission, goals and areas of focus of the Coalition. The ACS was an integral part of those discussions. Early in the planning process a brief online survey was conducted of the then 262 AAAS affiliated organizations. Eight were identified as having a section or committee on human rights. The ACS was one of them. It was the work of this ACS Committee, with its focus and expertise on individual cases, that served as a valuable model for one of the key areas of Coalition activity: ‘welfare of scientists’. The proposed objectives of the Welfare of Scientists working group (which are reflected in the final version) are below. Although they do not exclude action in support of scientists in the US, because the committees identified as working on individual cases did so with a primary focus on individuals overseas, that became the focus of the proposed activity for the group. There was no apparent deliberate decision or discussion about whether to address cases domestically as well. • •

Advocate on behalf of scientists in need; Encourage the scientific community to speak with a common voice on human rights issues that affect fellow scientists as well as the development of science and dissemination of scientific knowledge; Educate the broader scientific community about human rights abuses and how these abuses affect their fellow scientists; and 141

Help the scientific community to better appreciate how human rights abuses happening “elsewhere” jeopardize their own scientific endeavors.

At the same time, the ACS representative in the process helped define another area of Coalition activity broadly described as ‘service to the scientific community’, recognizing that, while there were scientific organizations already engaged in human rights activities, there was significant scope to expand both the types of activities undertaken and the number of organizations/disciplines involved. Thus, the proposed content of the area was as follows: •

• •

Through outreach and communication, expand the network of scientific and professional associations engaged in human rights as well as their understanding of human rights and its interface with science and technology. Offer training programs to interested professional societies and associations to help them organize their membership to contribute to human rights issues and activities. These training modules could be tailored for each specific field, incorporating human rights workshops/trainings/lectures into ongoing annual meetings. Hold ongoing trainings on human rights at the meetings of scientific associations in order to educate scientists about human rights generally and the connections between their work and promoting and defending human rights. Encourage academic institutions to develop and introduce human rights curricula, sub-fields, and/or clinics. Provide training and network development for in-coming human rights committee chairs.

The AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition was launched on January 14-16, 2009. Currently, 26 scientific societies are members of the Coalition or affiliated organizations. In addition to the ACS, the network includes some of the world’s largest associations of mathematicians, social scientists, physicists, and psychologists. The network’s mission is to “facilitate communication and partnerships on human rights within and across scientific communities, as well as between these and human rights communities” (2). To advance this mission, “the Coalition strives to improve human rights practitioners’ access to scientific and technological information and knowledge and to engage scientists, engineers and health professionals in human rights issues, particularly those issues that involve scientists and engineers and the conduct of science.” In addition to the organizational memberships, the Coalition also welcomes affiliated individuals. By facilitating communication and partnerships on human rights within and across the scientific community, and between the scientific and human rights communities, the Coalition works to: •

Expand both communities’ appreciation of and commitment to collaboration on human rights; 142

• • •

Enhance both communities’ capacity to incorporate the concerns and methods of the other; Encourage scientific membership organizations to explore disciplinespecific contributions to human rights work; and Support the establishment of human rights committees and programs within more scientific membership organizations.

At the launch of the Coalition, then-CEO of AAAS, Alan Leshner hailed this Coalition as an opportunity for scientific associations to collectively identify “some of the best strategies we can mobilize in order to use the power of scientists and the power of the scientific community in the service of human rights… I can’t think of an issue that is more important.” Another speaker at the event, Mercedes Doretti of the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team, emphasized the important role of science and scientists in providing “not only support, but also legitimacy, and credibility to the human rights movement,” noting that working to advance human rights has often meant operating “outside of the protection of academia, research or governmental institutions, [which] has often been a deterrent for scientists to get involved in the human rights field.” The founders of the Coalition saw addressing this challenge and mainstreaming human rights in the practice of scientists, engineers, and health professionals as central responsibilities of professional associations. By working together on shared goals, Coalition members could collectively expand the space for scientists, engineers, and health professionals to contribute to, and learn from, human rights.

The American Chemical Society’s Leadership in the AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition To appreciate the role of the ACS in the Coalition’s activities and accomplishments, it is helpful to understand the Coalition’s governance structure and working methods. Member associations designate two representatives to serve on the Coalition’s Council, which meets twice each year to oversee the Coalition’s progress toward its goals and make decisions on the Coalition’s direction. The Council also serves as a forum for sharing questions, experiments, and successes, and for garnering support for human rights-related initiatives led by one or more of the member associations. The current Council representatives for the ACS are Dorothy Phillips, a member of the Board of Directors whose responsibilities include ACS activities related to human rights, and Bradley Miller, Director of the ACS International Office. A Steering Committee, appointed by the Council, meets in between the Council’s meetings and is more actively involved in the Coalition’s on-going projects. Members of the Steering Committee include Council members, affiliated individuals, and representatives of the human rights community for whom two seats on the Steering Committee are reserved. Dorothy Phillips is currently a member of the Steering Committee. The AAAS Scientific Responsibility, Human Rights and Law Program serves as the Secretariat for the Coalition. Together, these structures support the Coalition’s activities. 143

Initially, the activities of the Coalition were organized within five Working Groups: Welfare of Scientists, Science Ethics and Human Rights, Service to the Scientific Community, Service to the Human Rights Community, and Education and Information Resources. These Working Groups identified resources – white papers, guidelines, annotated bibliographies, and other compilations –needed to further the Coalition’s goals. Developing these resources served as a critical focal point of the Coalition’s early years, and the resources the working groups delivered provided the foundation for future efforts. It was in the Welfare of Scientists Working Group that the ACS assumed an early leadership role and generally served as a strong example of an organization with a history and expertise in addressing human rights. At the Coalition launch, Bradley Miller of the ACS spoke on a panel titled, ‘Scientific Associations Engaged in Human Rights: Learning from their experience.’ He also co-chaired the introductory sessions about the Welfare of Scientists Working group. Arguably the ACS’s most significant contribution to the work of the Coalition was in the development of the Primer on Scientific Freedom and Human Rights (3). The Primer is intended to equip scientific and engineering societies, as well as other scientifically-oriented organizations, “with the tools to effectively develop processes and procedures to address human rights issues, particularly responding to allegations of human rights violations.” The idea for the primer arose in the Welfare of Scientists working group which was largely constituted of representatives of organizations which, like the ACS, had long histories of involvement in work to protect persecuted scientists. With input from members of the group, the ACS drafted the Primer which has served as a valuable tool for the many scientific organizations that do not have staff or volunteer structures focused on the protection of persecuted scientists but which receive ad hoc requests for assistance or become aware of cases involving members of their discipline and do not have the knowledge and contacts necessary for an effective response. Indeed, it is because of the ACS’s established expertise in this area that among Coalition member organizations the ACS is one of only a small handful that have been available to advise society leaders on options for action when cases have arisen involving their members or members of their discipline. With its knowledge of the risks, the responsibilities, and potential rewards of getting involved in a case, as well as the US governmental structures, and international contacts that can be drawn upon, the ACS has served a very useful advisory function. In 2016, the Council decided to transform the Working Groups into interest groups and to encourage proposals for new time-limited projects that respond to urgent needs. This new project-based set of activities has served to make the Coalition, as an entity, more agile and flexible. One of the first of these projects, initiated by representatives of the ACS, was a Rapid Response Team to coordinate efforts by member associations to address the Turkish government’s crackdown on academics in that country after an attempted coup. Through this coordination, scientific associations had a forum to share and corroborate information they were receiving from colleagues at risk and develop strategic responses. The Coalition has also benefited from the perspective and insights the ACS brings on the relationship of industry to discussions on human rights, science and technology. Whereas much focus in Coalition activities and meetings is given 144

to NGOs, governments, academia and publishing, interventions of the ACS’s representatives have emphasized the relevance of discussing human rights in an industry context, and the unique considerations that arise when doing so. Whether as participants on Council and the Steering Committee, or through formal interventions such as that by ACS Chief Executive Officer Tom Connelly, Jr. during the Coalition’s meeting on Business and Human Rights (a theme first suggested by Dorothy Phillips), the ACS has demonstrated the need and value of bringing industry into the dialogue. In addition to the activities undertaken in the name of the Coalition, member associations’ own human rights activities are recognized as a measure of whether the Coalition collectively is advancing its mission. These include activities developed expressly for an association’s members, actions aimed at policy makers, programs for the public, and collaborations with the human rights community. Since the launch of the Coalition, the ACS’s human rights efforts have broadened in scope and increased over time and they have included all of these areas of work. Highlights include: •

• •

A webinar series on chemistry and human rights for members of the ACS, exploring such topics as how chemists are supporting the right to access clean, safe water, “Coffee for Justice – Chemistry in Service to Small-holder Coffee Producers,” international scientific collaborations that support progress in the Middle East, how to maximize the effect of multicultural teams, and integrating human rights perspectives into chemists’ work to enhance research and teaching; Letters of appeal, online petitions, and other actions on behalf of imprisoned scientists; Statements by ACS leadership, including the CEO, President, and Board members, emphasizing chemists’ responsibility to advance human progress, including human rights; Symposia at the ACS annual meeting, including “Forensic Chemistry, Science and the Law Presents: Innocence! The Work of the Innocence Project,” in 2012, “The Interface of Chemical and Biological Sciences International Disarmament Efforts,” in 2015, and “The Chemical Sciences and Human Rights” in 2017; An award to recognize the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, for its efforts to promote the peaceful use of chemistry; and Articles in C&E News about the association’s human rights activities and Coalition meetings.

This array of activities is testament to the commitment of the ACS, from the very highest levels of leadership, to integrate human rights into the society’s ongoing programs. These activities across all of the Coalition’s benchmarks provide an outstanding example for other members of the Coalition and for ACS members of the potential contributions of chemistry to advancing human rights as well as the responsibilities of chemists and the professional association to promote and protect human rights. Members of the ACS have been motivated 145

to enter the Coalition’s student competitions, to publish journal articles about the human rights responsibilities of chemists, and to reflect on their research and teaching. Jeffrey Toney, Provost and Vice President for Academic Affairs at Kean University, a Coalition representative for Sigma Xi, and a speaker at a session of the ACS Presidential Symposium series on Human Rights, said the sessions “reminded me of the responsibility, and privilege, of scientists to solve problems for the benefit of humanity and human dignity. As an educator, I was inspired to incorporate human rights case studies into teaching to highlight the relevance of chemical principles to everyday life, and to work with students on research projects that connect science and human rights.”

Looking to the Future With leadership comes responsibility, and part of that responsibility is to model behaviors and approaches that can serve as examples for others. The ACS is clearly a leader among its peer scientific organizations in the attention it has given to human rights, from its programming to the place that human rights have in its leadership structures and considerations. One key challenge in the work of the AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition, and in human rights work generally, is to be able to identify and, when possible, quantify impact. For the ACS to approach its human rights activities in the way of a scientific experiment with a hypothesis to test, articulated goals and measurable outcomes would be to apply the rigors of the scientific approach to human rights in a way that few in the community are yet doing. Modeling that approach and providing an example and lessons learned for other scientific societies could be the next step in the ACS’s major contributions to human rights. In addition, among the scientific membership organizations that address human rights and are part of the AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition, another challenge is the engagement of the individual members of the membership organizations. That an institution should recognize the role for science and scientists in human rights is important, but it is through the millions of individual members represented by scientific organizations that systemic and long-term change will occur. Educating the membership about the connections between their discipline, the practice of their discipline and human rights is an important contribution. Incorporating standards of human rights into existing codes of ethics and codes of conduct to which members of the organization are expected to adhere is another. Cultivating among members a commitment to serve as advocates for human rights in whatever contexts and sectors they work and empowering them to do so is still another contribution. Finally, facilitating and supporting current members in nurturing of the next generation of scientists, building into their education and their understanding of their role and responsibilities towards society a commitment to human rights promotion and protection, that is the next frontier and the ACS is well positioned to take us there.


References 1. 2.


Claude, R. P. Science in the Service of Human Rights; University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, PA, 2002. AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition, Foundational Documents. FoundationalDocuments_Revised_January2017.pdf (accessed February 9, 2018). AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition, Primer on Scientific Freedom and Human Rights. (accessed February 9, 2018).


Chapter 10

Chemists Contributing to Human Rights: Enhancing Research, Teaching and Global Impact Jeffrey H. Toney* Division of Academic Affairs, Kean University, 1000 Morris Avenue, Union, New Jersey 07083, United States *E-mail: [email protected]

As chemists, we focus on research or teaching hoping to open new vistas, creating new questions and to inspire our students. Contributing to human rights issues, such as access to clean water, food or medicine might seem daunting in our busy schedules, perceived by some as requiring extraordinary effort or even as political activism. I believe that integrating human rights perspectives into your work can enhance your research and teaching by adding global impact to benefit humanity, sparking interest in students who often ask: Why do I need to learn this? I will discuss efforts led by the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Science and Human Rights Coalition, representing over a half million professional scientists and engineers, of which the American Chemical Society is a member organization. This Coalition offers a range of opportunities for chemists to enhance research, teaching and global impact of their work.

“The SOCIETY shall cooperate with scientists internationally and shall be concerned with the worldwide application of chemistry to the needs of humanity .” (1) Every Chemist seeks to apply their skills to help solve global challenges, ranging from improving public health, mitigating climate change, or enhancing

© 2018 American Chemical Society

the quality of life. The impact of our work can be broadened and enriched if we are mindful of human rights issues. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, articulated a vision of inherent human dignity and achievement, including the right “to share in scientific advancement and benefits” (Article 27). The right to enjoy the benefits of science was later enshrined in Article 15 of the International Covenant on Social, Economic, Cultural and Social Rights in 1966 (2). Reflecting upon the human right to the benefits of science can enhance chemistry’s contributions to society by highlighting what we often take for granted, such as access to clean water, food and medicine, safety and security as well as freedom of information, including the internet, necessary for education. Chemists can apply their skills to each of these fundamental issues without losing focus of their primary research interests. In this Chapter, I describe a range of opportunities that can be pursued through volunteering with organizations such as the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Science and Human Rights Coalition (3), through the use of innovative pedagogy in the classroom (4, 5) or by more effective science communication and public advocacy (6, 7).

Research Science and human rights is an emerging field of research, exemplified by the pioneering work of Richard Pierre Claude (8, 9) that established a foundation on which scientists have built to combat human rights abuses, and to teach the next generation of scientists to become global ethical citizens. While scholarly works focused on science and human rights have been increasing since Claude’s seminal work, there is a paucity of literature on chemistry and human rights, offering chemists an opportunity to address their research projects through a rights-based perspective (10). Such approaches can complement funding proposals submitted to agencies such as the National Science Foundation, which includes benefits to society as a component of the broader impacts criteria used to evaluate merit (11). Incorporating the value of your research to human rights issues fosters interdisciplinary approaches otherwise not typically considered, such as collaboration with attorneys, social or political scientists, artists, writers, including journalists, as well as physicians, health professionals, engineers and scientists outside of chemistry. Scholarly inquiry at the intersection of these disparate fields offers rich opportunities to reveal new perspectives on issues at the heart of human dignity and achievement. Human rights organizations are predominantly focused on the application of local, national and international law to address allegations of human rights abuses, often relying upon victim testimonies as the primary evidence. The strength of such cases can be bolstered significantly if analysis of scientific data independently supports violation of human rights (12). Chemical research can be applied to a wide variety of cases. For example, tracking of environmental contamination depends upon reliable chemical analysis of samples and comparative analysis to regulatory safety standards. Such environmental forensics is critical in the case of 150

disaster relief of affected communities. Testing of groundwater for arsenic prior to installation of tube-wells in Bangladesh, intended to provide clean drinking water, could have prevented the poisoning of 35 to 77 million people (13). Chemists also played a key role in revealing lead contamination in water supplies in Flint, Michigan (14). Chemists are well equipped to address these issues and many more, limited only by our imagination.

Teaching and Learning The pedagogy of chemistry has evolved along with the research of teaching and learning that highlights best practices focused on active engagement of students and problem-based learning relevant to everyday life (15). Use of case studies can engage students to apply chemical principals to human rights issues. The AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition (see below) offers a range of teaching and learning materials, including course syllabi connecting science and human rights (16) as well as an extensive annotated bibliography (17). While these courses include social and political science, as well as medicine and philosophy, the physical sciences are underrepresented, offering an opportunity for chemistry educators to develop and share case-based course materials with a wide audience. This approach will improve teaching and learning through the use of current content connected to the curriculum, engaging students with problems related to everyday life on a global scale. Assessment of student learning outcomes in the chemistry curricula will be a welcome addition to the scholarship of teaching and learning. A human rights-based approach to teaching and learning could be critical to inspire the next generation of chemists to pursue their work in an ethical manner to support human dignity on a global scale.

Global Impact through Volunteering Human rights organizations, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Scholars at Risk, welcome contributions from chemists to advance their mission. Chemists can offer data analysis, analytic measurements of field samples such as water, sample preparation, literature research as well as preparation and interpretation of technical reports to enhance science communication for use in litigation and to the public (see below). The AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition, established in 2009, brought together a wide range of professional science and engineering organizations recognizing the essential role of scientists and engineers in support of human rights issues. This Coalition currently includes 24 member organizations representing over a half million scientists and engineers, including members of the American Chemical Society. Members can propose or participate in Coalition Projects, collaborating across disciplines, as well as partipate in biannual meetings held at the AAAS Headquarters in Washington, DC. The Coalition offers webinars, campus tool-kits designed to introduce human rights issues to academic communities, as well as annual student and poster competitions. 151

The On-Call Scientists program coordinated by the AAAS Scientific Responsibility, Human Rights and Law Program matches volunteer scientists and engineers with Human Rights Organizations, offering a unique opportunity to volunteer, whether remotely or in the field. Multilingual chemists can serve as translators of technical documents and of interviews if needed when NGO’s are pursuing projects in non-English speaking cultures. This network has expanded to over 1,000 volunteer scientists, engineers and health professionals, contributing to projects in 58 countries speaking 38 different languages (18). Currently 86 chemists have joined On-Call Scientists. Highlighted projects include investigation of chemical weapon attacks in Syria, environmental impact of a proposed dam in Mexico and investigation of war crimes. In each case, these volunteers have made a major impact in the documentation of human rights abuses, critical for holding perpertrators accountable.

Global Impact through Science Communication and Public Advocacy Effective communication to the public about the value of what we do as chemists, and public advocacy of human rights issues, is becoming increasingly important to help guide public policy makers towards data-driven decisions. Explaining the relevance of chemistry, and of science in general, to everyday life to the public remains a challenge (19). For example, climate change remains a controversial topic, exemplified by a geographic dependence in the United States on whether citizens believe that global warming is happening, ranging from 43 to 80% (20). The gap between findings in the scientific literature and effective communication to the public is widening. The likelihood of the results of scientific studies reaching a wide audience through traditional media such as television, radio and print is extremely small, estimated to be at most three out of every 1,000 published articles (21). Reaching a wide audience does not necessarily lead to an understanding, or acceptance, of the message we as chemists wish to send, or its broader implications to society. As the public relies more on the internet and mobile devices for instantaneous fact-checking, more scientists are sharing their findings directly through blogs and social media, or through the use of lay summaries of scholarly research that can be shared with traditional mass media (21). This fundamental shift in science journalism offers an opportunity for chemists to use blogging and social media intentionally to enhance an intelligent discourse on scientific issues impacting the public. Such public advocacy is an important service both to the profession and to society. Chemists can share their findings as well as their informed perspectives in response to the news media, and on topics impacting public policy and human rights issues. This may seem to be a daunting task amid the 24 hour, seven days per week, frenetic coverage of news by mass media, while balancing the responsibilities of chemists working in industry or in academia. However, a concerted, mindful approach by the chemical community can make a significant impact by highlighting human rights issues that are too often lost in the news of the day. Representation of informed, rational 152

perspectives by chemists, whether in the form of a blog or social media post, a Letter to the Editor or an OpEd in a newspaper, is an important opportunity to help guide public opinion, and policy makers, towards informed decisions that will help make the world a better place – the very reason why we chose to become chemists in the first place.

References 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.


12. 13.

14. 15. 16.


American Chemical Society Constitution, Article II, Section 3. Chapman, A.; Wyndham, J. A Human Right to Science. Science 2013, 340, 1291. Toney, J. H. Advancing Human Rights Through Science. Science 2010, 324, 176. Toney, J. H.; Kaplowitz, H.; Pu, R.; Qi, F.; Chang, G. Human Rights Q. 2010, 32, 1008–1017. Greer, A. Chemistry Students and Human Rights. Chem. Biodiversity 2011, 8, 2158–2161. Science Blogging: The Essential Guide; Wilcox, C., Brookshire, B., Goldman, J. G., Eds.; Yale University Press: New Haven, CT, 2016. Dean, C. Am I Making Myself Clear? Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 2009. Claude, R. P. Science in the Service of Human Rights; University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, PA, 2002. Toney, J. H.; Stover, E. Retrospective: Richard Pierre Claude (1934 – 2011). Human Rights Q. 2011, 33, 1195–1197. Miller, B. D. In Stereochemistry and Global Connectivity: The Legacy of Ernest L. Eliel; Cheng, H. N., Maryanoff, C. A., Miller, B. D., Schmidt, D. G., Eds.; ACS Symposium Series; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 2017; Vol. 1257, pp 95−102. National Science Foundation, Broader Impacts Review Criterion. (accessed December 26, 2017). Vayena, E.; Tasioulas, J. The dynamics of big data and human rights: the case of scientific research. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. A 2016, 374, 0129. Smith, A. H.; Lingus, E. O.; Rahman, M. Contamination of drinking-water in Bangladesh: a public health emergency. Bull. World Health Organ. 2000, 78, 1093–1103. Bellinger, D. C. Lead contamination in Flint – An Abject Failure to Protect Public Health. N. Engl. J. Med. 2016, 374, 1101–1103. Bain, K. What the Best College Teachers Do; Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 2004. AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition, Syllabi on Science and Human Rights. (accessed December 26, 2017). AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition, Science, Engineering and Human Rights: A Select Annotated Bibliography. 153


19. 20.


page/science-and-human-rights-select-annotated-bibliography (accessed December 26, 2017). AAAS Scientific Responsibility, Human Rights & Law Program, Impact Report: On-Call Scientists and Human Rights. impact-report-call-scientists-and-human-rights (accessed December 26, 2017). Ceci, C. Take Concepts of Chemistry out of the Classroom. Nature 2015, 522, 7. Howe, P. D.; Mildenberger, M.; Marlon, J. R.; Leiserowitz, A. Graphic Variation in Opinions on Climate Change at State and Local Scales in the USA. Nature Climate Change 2015, 5, 596–603. Kuehne, L. M.; Olden, J. D. Opinion: Lay summaries needed to enhance science communication. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 2015, 112, 3585–3586.


Responsible Conduct and Challenges in Chemistry

Chapter 11

Responsible Conduct in Chemical Safety and Security Practices in South Asia Ellene Tratras Contis,*,1 Uzma Ashiq,2 Shazma Massey,3 Sammia Shahid,4 and Amita Verma5 1Department

of Chemistry, Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, Michigan 48197, United States 2Department of Chemistry, University of Karachi, Karachi 75270, Pakistan 3Department of Chemistry, Forman Christian College, Lahore 54600, Pakistan 4Department of Chemistry, University of Management & Technology, Lahore 54770, Pakistan 5Bioorganic & Medicinal Chemistry Research Laboratory, Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Sam Higginbottom University of Agriculture, Technology & Sciences, Allahabad 211007, India *E-mail: [email protected]

Comprehensive training in chemical safety and security is a worldwide need. The ability to bring representatives from all fields in the chemical enterprise together to learn and to share best practices is worthy and timely. Many universities in South Asia are striving to network to teach their students these best practices in chemical safety and security. Examples of workshops instituted through the Global Chemists Code of Ethics (GCCE) initiative ( a-new-opcw-report-brings-chemical-safety-and-security-bestpractices-to-your-fingertips/), ( admin/OPCW/ICA/ICB/OPCW_Report_on_Needs_and_Best_ Practices_on_Chemical_Safety_and_Security_Management V3-2_1.2.pdf), ( hosted by the American Chemical Society (ACS) through the Office of International Activities (OIA) and the International Activities Committee (IAC) and funded by the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program (, ( grants-funding/) will be described. These facilitators were © 2018 American Chemical Society

trained either at the first GCCE workshop in Kuala Lumpur in April 2016 or at the last GCCE workshop in Melbourne, Australia in July 2017. The instituted workshops were conducted at universities in India and Pakistan.

Introduction ACS provides a valuable forum that gives opportunities to chemists, chemical engineers, and chemical educators worldwide to not only become aware of the latest trends in chemistry, but also to make use of opportunities for intellectual and professional growth and research in their respective fields. International members of the ACS, especially, avail themselves of the opportunities to be part of workshops and conferences in different countries, as well as in the U.S. These workshops bring chemists together to network and present novel ideas to share with faculty, students and laboratory staff at various universities in India and Pakistan. In this chapter, the corresponding author and immediate past chair of the ACS-IAC invited some participants from South Asian universities to share their experiences of participating in the GCCE workshops. These participants were tasked to develop and implement chemical safety and security workshops in their home universities. Examples of these successful workshops on chemical safety and security will be described. The outcomes of these workshops will be reported and testimonials of the participants and experiences of the facilitators will be shared.

Report of Dr. Uzma Ashiq, University of Karachi The workshop on Chemical Laboratory Safety and Security, sponsored by the American Chemical Society, was held on November 11, 2017. The organizing secretary and presenter of the workshop was Dr. Uzma Ashiq. This report summarizes various sessions on safety and security; a discussion of relevant case studies, videos, and activities; and demonstrations of personal protective equipment (PPE), spill control materials, and a fire protection drill. More than 400 participants expressed interest to join the workshop. Because of the lack of space, only 300 participants could be accommodated. The workshop was conducted in the auditorium of the Department of Chemistry, University of Karachi, Pakistan. The second workshop was conducted on December 14, 2017, in the same place with 104 participants. The module used in both workshops was “Chemical Laboratory Safety and Security.” The objective of the workshop was to provide awareness of safety in academia and industry in order to protect personal health and the environment. Security was the second focus of the workshop. A conscious attempt was made to share good laboratory practices and to fill chemical safety and security gaps among practicing chemists, chemical engineers, 158

and local and regional chemical organizations. There was an overwhelmingly positive response from the audience. The Chemical Society of Pakistan launched an effective advocacy campaign for this workshop through emails to members. For further promotion of the workshop, notices were posted on the bulletin boards of the biochemistry, applied chemistry, and chemical engineering departments at the University of Karachi. Social media was also used to publicize the workshop. The audiences of the workshop included: • • • • • •

Graduate students Undergraduate students Faculty members Lab employees Members of the Chemical Society of Pakistan Chemists from other chemical organizations

At the time of registration, participants were provided a folder bag with writing pads and pens. The workshop started with a comprehensive introduction of the American Chemical Society with an emphasis on its services for chemists all over the world. This was followed by best practices training in safe chemical management, chemical hazards, chemical storage, chemical waste disposal, and emergency response to spills and fires. An awareness of chemical threats was also introduced among practicing chemists and chemical engineers. It was emphasized that without chemical safety and security, we all are at risk. The presenter taught the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics to the paticipants. It was a very healthy activity for the scientific community at large. Lab accidents can happen because of a lack of safety measures. A few relevant case studies were discussed through the playing of videos that addressed the challenges faced by researchers and educators in developing countries. Even when safety protocols are followed, emergencies can happen in the laboratory. Therefore, it is essential to know what to do in case of an accident. Case studies about the lab accidents of Sheri Sangji (1–4) at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) in 2008 and Professor Karen Wetterhahn (5–8) at Dartmouth College, New Hampshire in 1996 were discussed. It was explained that in the case of Sheri Sangji, who was a 23-year-old lab technician, the lab accident occurred when pyrophoric tertiary butyl lithium spilled and flashed. She was not wearing a protective lab coat, and her clothing caught fire. A second case study was presented about Professor Karen Wetterhahn who died due to mercury poisoning. She used dimethyl mercury in her experiment and accidentally spilled a drop or two of the colorless liquid on her latex gloves. However, later on, it was found that latex gloves offered no protection from the dimethyl mercury and that heavier laminated gloves should be used when working with toxic chemicals. This activity was followed by a live demonstration of spill control materials and different types of protective gloves and other personal protective equipment (PPE). It was reiterated that proper personal protective equipment and garments should be used when working with chemicals or in an area with hazards. 159

In the activity session, participants shared incidents that happened at their institutions involving chemicals, their causes, and measures taken to prevent them in the future. One example incident was narrated by one of the workshop participants, Dr. Rifat Ara Jamal. “She used thionyl chloride in her experiment without safety glasses during her Ph.D. research in 2006. Unfortunately, the fume hood was also non-functional. On the very same day, she had severe irritation in both her eyes and later it was found that the eye layer was damaged. It took more than 15 days to fully recover from this injury” (9). A fire protection drill session was conducted during the workshop in collaboration with Dr. Ismail Vohra, Director of Sales and Marketing, and his team from the chemical organization Musaji Adam & Sons. The fire alarm was sounded and the participants were instructed on how to evacuate and exit safely. During the session, hands-on training was given, and several participants practiced how to use fire extinguishers. The fire protection drill session was followed by an awareness session regarding the dual use of chemicals, like cyanide, ammonium nitrate, potassium chlorate, and chlorine. The negative use of chemicals as weapons or for other destructive purposes was emphasized. It was discussed that scientists are the first line of defense in protection, as one chemical alone cannot make a weapon. The emphasis was on the role of the person with expertise in the use of chemicals as weapons, so material and knowledge are required to use chemicals for harm. Scientists hold sensitive knowledge that others can use for harm, so chemists have a great responsibility in this regard. Examples included the Bali, Indonesia bombing and the use of potassium chlorate in 2002 (10), and attacks with pesticides in Afghanistan in 2012 (11, 12). Further effective chemical security was explained, which involved the use of Physical Protection Systems (PPS) and descriptions of kinds of chemical facilities that need protection and why. It was concluded that chemical safety and security are inextricably related. The aim of both is protection of the environment and of us. A review of the current situation of safety and security in all chemical facilities in Pakistan was discussed, along with any possible measures to ensure the proper use and handling of chemicals. At the end of the workshop, feedback from the participants was gathered using a questionnaire with multiple types of questions. An overall rating along with a summary of the responses, comments, and suggestions are found in Table 1. Additional constructive comments and suggestions follow. Attendees appreciated and showed keen interest in the entire workshop. They suggested that laboratory management should ensure safe procedures and regular audits and to take extraordinary measures to develop the culture of safety and security. The audience appreciated this program very much. They enjoyed the presentations, as well as the live demonstrations of PPEs, spill control materials and the fire protection drill. The case studies session was highly rated. A majority of participants commented that the workshop was very educational to them because they had never attended this type of workshop. They wanted to get a chance to attend other such workshops. One interesting comment came from an undergraduate student who wanted the workshop instructor to slow down and keep the information on the slide longer so participants could finish writing down their notes. 160

Table 1. Data of Testimonials Testimonial

Overall rating


a) Faculty 95

The chemical safety and security should be a part of our curriculum.


These types of workshops must be at the start of the semester for all students, staff, and faculty.


The laboratory management should provide SOPs and PPEs to all students.


Handouts of the workshop should be provided at the start of the workshop.


In workshop, online webinar should be included from any representative of ACS.


The workshop was comprehensive. It was great for community and environment.


These types of workshops must be repeated once in a year to recall it.


Hands-on training must be a part of future workshops.

b) Graduate students

c) Undergraduate students

d) Industry scientists

The workshop concluded with the certificates distribution ceremony and refreshments. It is important to mention that those associated with chemistry from academia and from chemical organizations responded very positively to the format and content of the workshop. Responses from graduate students and their eagerness to learn the knowledge imparted in this workshop strongly suggest that this workshop was beneficial to them. In addition, adding the participation certificates to their resume will help gain employment. Students showed a keen interest during the question-answer session, and at the end of the workshop participants requested additional advanced workshops. Working employees were also interested in the theme of the workshop. The facilitator highlighted the efficient measures that are a must for employees in industry. In developing countries, precautionary measures and safety protocols for workers and other staff can be lacking because of a lack of chemical safety knowledge. There was one shortcoming to the workshop. Because of the limited timeframe for the organization of this workshop, the organizer barely tapped owners, production managers, and HR managers of the concerned industries. 161

However, the results and objectives of the workshop were disseminated to various industries and received very positive responses from them. The instructor hopes to continue these initiatives in the future. As a faculty member and researcher, the facilitator is confident that this workshop will help establish an academia-industry relationship in the future. Additional workshops will be organized in 2018. The first workshop will be conducted in February 2018 as the academic year at the University of Karachi will commence from mid-January. This workshop will be held to provide the opportunity for those who could not be accommodated at the first workshop and for those new admits in the Chemical Sciences. The module of the workshop will be “Chemical Laboratory Safety and Security.” Upon the request of the Department of Chemistry, NED University of Engineering & Technology, Karachi, Pakistan, a workshop on Chemical Safety will be conducted in May 2018. Another workshop will be conducted specifically for postgraduate students and faculty in mid-July at the Department of Chemistry, University of Karachi. The module of the workshop will be “Publishing Your Research.” In summary, Professor Uzma Ashiq would like to share her experience in organizing this workshop. Initially when she discussed the idea with the chairman of the department and colleagues, they thought that it would be difficult to attract enough of an audience from the industry, but she got an opposite response. The other concern was about the substance material for the training. It was her first experience in designing a safety workshop, and her expectations were not too high. However, she went through such an encouraging experience that she should plan an annual calendar for training workshops on safety measures. Another lesson she learned through this workshop was that she must develop a sustainable interaction with the industry to know the real issues that the workforce faces in Pakistan. This experience helped her understand the potential of training in this field and the limitation of resources and logistics at her institution.

Report of Dr. Shazma Massey, Forman Christian College (A Chartered University) Last year in July 2017, I attended an ACS workshop in Melbourne, Australia and learned about the safety and security of chemicals. After attending this workshop, my first and foremost objective was to conduct a similar workshop at my university for the optimal benefit of students, laboratory staff, and faculty. The reason for being so passionate about conducting this workshop was very strong in order to ensure the safety of students, staff and faculty at academic institutions. Keeping with my objective, I conducted a workshop on safety and security of chemicals on November 15, 2017 at Forman Christian College (a chartered university) in Lahore, Pakistan, that was highly acclaimed by all the participants. I was so honored that the Rector, Vice Rector, Dean of Natural Sciences, Chairperson of the Chemistry Department, Chairperson of the Pharmacology Department, along with faculty, staff, and students from my university and other 162

universities participated in this workshop. There were 150 participants. Because of limited seating capacity in the hall, I had to apologize and turn away many other interested candidates. The following were the topics addressed in the workshop: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Safe Management of Hazardous Chemicals Chemical Procurement Chemical Hazards Safe Handling & Personal Protective Equipment Chemical Storage Chemical Waste Disposal Emergency Responses to Spills & Fires Case Study (Chemical Laboratory Fire) The Importance of the Security of Chemicals

The participants found this workshop very interesting because of the importance and efficacy of every topic that was substantiated by relevant and comprehensible pictures and video clips. I was pleased and satisfied to disseminate awareness among participants in dealing with chemicals. The reason for this happiness and satisfaction was that I had been suffering from nausea regularly while dealing with methanol in the chemistry laboratory. During my Ph.D. research, I did not have a clue nor was I ever told that methanol could be the reason. However, when I went to the University of Nottingham, U.K., I was told to consult and properly read the SDS sheets before using any of the chemicals. There I read that methanol inhalation leads to blurred vision, headache, dizziness, nausea, and can even damage our kidneys and liver and ultimately spoil our health. Here is another example of not being aware of proper methanol use. Students soaked plants in methanol using uncovered beakers and then went to lunch in the canteen without realizing the possible hazards. Similarly, one of my colleagues prepared a compound and smelled it directly that led him to fall unconscious and be hospitalized for a few weeks! There was another incident in which one of the students in the chemistry laboratory was working without goggles in front of another student who was boiling dilute sulfuric acid that bubbled out of the test tube and injured one of his eyes. The students used the fume hood and kept the sash of the hood open without realizing that it is important to close the sash of the hood. The eye opener was Sheharbano “Sheri” Sangji’s video (13). She died at the age of 23 while working at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). The research assistant Sheri Sangji suffered severe burns from a fire that occurred on December 29, 2008. In fact, it happened when a plastic syringe that she was using to transfer the pyrophoric reagent tert-butyllithium from one sealed container to another dropped and caught fire. Sangji was not wearing a protective laboratory coat and her clothing caught fire, resulting in severe burns that led to her death 18 days later. A criminal case was filed against the supervising professor who hired her and the institution because she was not given proper safety and security training to work with such chemicals. 163

There was another incident in a Texas Tech laboratory (14) in which an explosion severely injured a graduate student at the University in Lubbock, Texas, in the chemistry department in 2010 during the handling of a high-energy metal compound, which suddenly detonated. The security of chemicals and proper maintenance of inventory is equally important. Safety precautions are needed in dealing with chemicals because they can be used for both constructive and destructive purposes. There are many incidents in which terrorists acquired chemicals from unregistered vendors and laboratory staff who were not aware that the same chemical could be used for destructive purposes. Take the example of ammonium nitrate that is used as fertilizer. It was used by a terrorist in bombing the federal building in Oklahoma City in 1995, in which 168 people were killed, including 19 children, and almost 700 were injured (15). Similarly, the misuse of cyanide that is used in mining and the metal plate industry is popular with criminals and terrorists because it is relatively easy to obtain and in one incident was added to Tylenol capsules that killed 7 people in the U.S. in 1982 (16). In all these incidents, the common element is a lack of knowledge in working with chemicals in a laboratory environment. The most relevant result of this workshop in my university was the immediate action of the Vice Rector to form a committee to ensure the safety and security of students, staff, and faculty in laboratories. I was asked to be the coordinator of this committee. As a coordinator, I was assigned the task of finding gaps and taking the necessary actions to ensure that people working in laboratories are not only well aware of the hazards and precautions, but that they are also practicing awareness of possible dangers. Moreover, I was also asked to check the availability of equipment used for users’ safety and security when working in laboratories. I took immediate action and: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Requested the authorities purchase fire blankets immediately. Requested the authorities purchase eye stations immediately. Suggested the regular monitoring of first aid boxes and fire extinguishers. Suggested that the laboratory staff immediately prepare SDS sheets of all available chemicals in our laboratories. Advised the students not to throw acids and bases and harmful chemicals into the sink without proper neutralization Advised the authorities to contact different industries for the proper disposal of hazardous waste. As a result, the department is in contact with different industries.

The committee further decided that this workshop must be conducted for all Master of Philosophy and Ph.D. chemistry students at the time of their orientation. The committee emphasized that this workshop be mandatory for all students before working in laboratories. The laboratory environment itself is hazardous by nature and the people who are working in the laboratories determine risk. It is the responsibility of lab workers to recognize potential dangers and follow the rules while working in lab. Besides professional responsibility, it is also our social and moral responsibility 164

to spread such awareness to our fellow human beings and to the environment. If we love human beings and our environment, it is better to correct an unsafe friend than to bury one!

Report of Professor Dr. Amita Verma, Sam Higginbottom University of Agriculture, Technology & Sciences The seminar and workshop were organized at the Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Shalom Institute of Health & Allied Sciences, Sam Higginbottom University of Agriculture, Technology & Sciences, Allahabad, India on November 6 and December 16, 2017. The organizing convener of the seminar and workshop was Professor Dr. Amita Verma and the chairman was Dr. Arvind Dayal. The events were conducted with a generous grant and support provided by ACS International Activities and in pursuit of learning about the need for chemical safety and the safe use of chemicals for those working in academia, industry, research institutes, medical stores, etc. The entire workshop was divided into two parts. The first part of the seminar was on chemical lab safety and security, and the second part comprised a workshop on effective science communication. More specifically, the seminar on chemical lab safety and security was conducted to encourage ethical laboratory practices and adopt internationally recognized standards for chemical safety and security. The goal of the workshop on effective science communication was to provide an overview of communication tools to convey scientific concepts to bridge communication barriers between a variety of audiences in public and professional interactions. The speaker, Dr. Sourav Pal, Director of the Indian Institute of Sciences, Education & Research (IISER), Kolkata, expressed his views toward the technical disposal of laboratory chemicals. Professor Sushil K Singh, Head of the Department of Pharmaceutical Engineering & Technology, IIT-BHU, Varanasi, said that chemical safety is a vital topic for researchers. He emphasized fund allocation and enforcement of safety guidelines for protection from chemical hazards. Professor Ramendra K Singh of the Bioorganic Research Laboratory at the Department of Chemistry, University of Allahabad, presented a lecture on various hazards of laboratory chemicals and safety measures. Dr. Niraj Kumar, Executive Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences India (NASI), Allahabad, said that science should work for the development of society. Dr. Kumar also explained that original and true science with accurate rationale is necessary for a real redress of issues. He shared that failures in research should also be reported and that negative findings should not worry researchers. He further emphasized developing scientific temperament in oneself. Dr. Jeetendra Kumar Vaishya from the National Medicinal Plants Board, New Delhi, presented on research proposal writing skills for obtaining grants from different research organizations. I discussed chemical security programs and 165

ACS grant opportunities. I also discussed tips for writing a research paper in an effective manner and structural aspects of presenting research findings. Delegates enthusiastically participated in panel discussions, group discussions and various competitions such as essays, slogans, collages, and scientific quizzes. Results The participants enjoyed the various events and took keen interest in learning more about the safe use of chemicals and science communication. They learned about ethical practices in laboratories through various working models, collages, and posters presented by delegates. They also interacted with the speakers in an open atmosphere and were impressed to learn about the importance of chemical safety. Outcomes Delegates were interested to learn how to include safety practices into their day-to-day laboratory exercises and in the safe disposal of chemicals. They also learned to implement chemical safety and security in their curriculum. They were further interested in participating in additional sessions and working to organize similar events at their institutes. They were highly interested to know about ACS, its membership, and ACS grant opportunities. On the basis of these events, our institution is also going to create initiatives to mandate the following of ethical lab practices and to improve current standards of safety protocol in laboratories. Attendance was strong at all events. The seminar on Chemical Laboratory Safety and Security drew 470 participants from all across India. The workshop on Effective Science Communication had 100 delegates. My Experience I was highly delighted to be part of the ACS GCCE workshop and very thankful to the ACS for providing the necessary support and suggestions to organize such events for the awareness of chemistry to the public. I experienced that people are very curious to know more about chemistry and ACS. Future Workshops Based on the response, I am highly interested to organize more events in the future with the support of ACS. I wish to conduct more outreach programs to create awareness about chemistry. I want to be part of the ACS International Committee and want to be involved in more ACS programs. Testimonials 1.

From this program, we have learned the importance of chemical safety and security, which we have never done before. 166

2. 3. 4.

This program is an eye opener for us. We will seriously include safe practices in our laboratories. We will include these topics in our curriculum and also provide an overview to newly admitted students. We will organize this type of event at our institute.

Report of Dr. Sammia Shahid, University of Management & Technology The ACS International Activities Committee organized the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE) workshop, from April 4–6, 2016 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Three scientists, Dr. G.A. Miana, Dr. Raza Shah, and Dr. Sammia Shahid from Pakistan attended the workshop. All three planned to conduct the same kind of workshop in their cities. In its continuation, the first national workshop on Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics was conducted at the University of Management and Technology in Lahore, Pakistan, on December 2, 2016. More than 100 active researchers in the chemical sciences participated in the workshop. The workshop started with the lecture of Professor Dr. Raza Shah, who covered the safety and security aspect of GCCE and actively interacted with the participants. He explained all the points of GCCE related to safety and security and listened to the opinions of the audience. Dr. Sammia Shahid highlighted the importance of publication and scientific writing in the domain of GCCE. She also gathered the opinion of the audience through pamphlets that were distributed to the audience. Professor G.A. Miana highlighted the role of GCCE in environment and research. At the end of the workshop, Professor Miana invited the consent of the participants on the GCCE. All the participants agreed to adopt the code in its current form. It was also agreed during the workshop that the Urdu version and English version of the code might be distributed among all members of the Chemical Society of Pakistan in order to seek their consent. The audiences were informed that the English version of the GCCE has already been circulated among members of the Chemical Society of Pakistan. The input from the members of the Chemical Society of Pakistan was excellent. It was also decided at the workshop that the GCCE will be published in the upcoming issue of Al-Chemy, a newsletter of the Chemical Society of Pakistan and that this newsletter is distributed to all members of the chemistry community throughout the country freely. The second National Workshop on the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics was conducted on February 23, 2017, in the Department of Chemistry, Jinnah University for Women in Karachi. Chemistry is the physical science that studies the composition of substances and the elemental forms of matter. Because everything is ultimately made of chemicals, this makes it an incredibly important branch of science. Chemistry has contributed more to the betterment of human life than any other science. The chemical systems are the right size to affect humans directly, for better or worse. They are the building blocks of biological organisms; they are the substances we eat and drink; they are the drugs that have dramatically improved human health over the past century; they comprise the 167

materials that we use to construct the products that we use daily, but they are also the environmental pollutants that can plague our world. Chemicals can also be used as weapons. The circumstances of today’s world provide both scientific and ethical challenges for chemistry. The most important ethical issues involve synthetic chemicals, which have become a major part of our lives. There is an old saying “Chemists think with their hands.” They are discoverers of knowledge and creators of new substances. When a new substance is created, if the substance is made commercially, they need to develop “greener” methods of production that conserve non-renewable resources and minimize the effects on the environment. On a broader level, they need to consider the problems of today’s world and work on problems that will improve the human condition, particularly the lives of those in underdeveloped countries. Chemists also need to think carefully about their role in preserving the health and safety of the planet, including their role in the creation of weapons. More than the other sciences, chemistry is centered in the laboratory so it is important that laboratory practices adhere to the highest professional and ethical standards. The practice of chemistry, and all other sciences, raises ethical questions on several levels. Many of these questions arise from the day-to-day work in the laboratory: the responsible conduct of research. Others are related to the relationships of chemists to their colleagues and to the relationship between science and society. To put these questions in context, there is a need to understand the nature of professional ethics and the moral ideals that underlie the profession of science. Based on the format of the first workshop in Lahore, the second workshop was conducted in Karachi. More than 100 chemistry students attended the workshop and agreed to adopt the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics approved by the Kuala Lumpur participants of the GCCE. A third workshop is planned for March 2018 in Islamabad.

Concluding Remarks These reports show the importance of sharing information in workshop format on building a world consensus of the chemical codes of ethics by training our chemists on chemical safety and security. In this way, global chemists unite in their understanding of these important topics. The number of participants impacted, the number of university personnel trained, and the training of our young chemists for tomorrow is enhanced. The testimonials of the participants give us all hope for the future chemical safety and security in our field. These trainers continue the wonderful work of the GCCE and will continue in their efforts to improve the safety and security of all chemists worldwide.

Acknowledgments All the authors want to acknowledge the invitation by ACS to participate in the GCCE workshops and the financial assistance in travel and supplies to continue 168

this effort in their home institutions and countries. This initiative indeed reaches across borders. As past Chair of the ACS International Activities Committee, the corresponding author would like to personally acknowledge the co-authors for their willingness to share their stories and reports on these successful GCCE workshops. In addition, all the co-authors would like to thank the American Chemical Society (ACS) for providing them an opportunity to participate in the first GCCE workshop in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in April 2016 or the GCCE STLI workshop at Melbourne, Australia in July 2017. The ACS International Activities contribution to complete these workshops was invaluable. The co-authors greatly appreciate the support ACS and the Department of State have provided towards these workshops. The co-authors also want to thank their respective universities and their departments who provided venues and support to run the workshops.

References 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.


Kemsley, J. N. Learning from UCLA, Details of the experiment that led to a researcher’s death prompt evaluations of academic safety practices. Chem. Eng. News 2009, 87, 29–31, 33–34. (accessed October 21, 2017). Promoting a culture of safety in academic chemical research. https:// (accessed October 15, 2017). (accessed October 21, 2017). (accessed October 21, 2017). (accessed October 25, 2017). Lyme, N. H. Scientist’s death helped increase knowledge of mercury poisoning. Los Angeles Times, 1997. Two drops of death: dimethylmercury. 06/two-drops-of-death-dimethylmercury (accessed November 2, 2017). Jamal, R. A. Verbal Communication; Department of Chemistry, University of Karachi: Karachi, Pakistan, 2006. Royds, D.; Lewis, S. W.; Taylor, A. M. A case study in forensic chemistry: The Bali bombings. Talanta 2005, 67, 262–268. (accessed September 12, 2017). Official : 160 girls poisoned at Afghan School. 2012/05/29/world/asia/afghanistan-girls-poisoned/index.html (accessed November 5, 2017). (accessed November 10, 2017).


14. (accessed November 5, 2017). 15. (accessed November 10, 2017). 16. (accessed November 10, 2017).


Chapter 12

Responsible Conduct in Chemical Safety and Security Practices and Its Development in Malaysia H. L. Lee,1,* M. F. Abdul-Wahab,2 C. T. Goh,3 and D. M. Chau4 1School

of Chemical Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 USM, Penang, Malaysia 2Faculty of Biosciences and Medical Engineering, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, 81310 UTM Skudai, Johor, Malaysia 3Institute for Environment and Development (LESTARI), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 43600 UKM Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia 4Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, Universiti Putra Malaysia, 43400 UPM Serdang, Selangor, Malaysia *E-mail: [email protected]

The Malaysian economy has expanded rapidly since its independence in 1957, spurring the growth of the chemical-related industries, and the research and development activities. In view of this, it is essential to have the educational tools, guidance and best chemical practices in the chemical safety and security management. This chapter provides an overview of the responsible conducts in chemical practices in Malaysia, which covers four major topics: (1) chemical safety at the workplace; (2) chemical security in Malaysia; (3) responsible conduct of research, and finally (4) chemical safety education at Malaysian higher education institutions. Each topic comprehensively discusses various aspects of chemical safety and security, and the good practices, to reflect on the implementation and enforcement mechanisms in Malaysia. This chapter was written in a simple manner for easy understanding and hence, is suitable for chemistry practitioners at all levels, especially those interested in chemical safety and security practices and its development in Malaysia.

© 2018 American Chemical Society

1.0. Introduction The chemical industry is one of the leading industries in Malaysia, significantly contributing to Malaysia’s exports of manufactured goods. This industry produced organic and inorganic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and fertilizers, among many others. In 2014, the Malaysian oil and gas company, Petroliam Nasional Berhad (PETRONAS), initiated a refinery and petrochemical integrated development (RAPID) project in Pengerang, in the southern state of Johor. The refinery project is anticipated to be completed by early 2019 (1). This mega project will generate 4,000 new jobs after completion, and brings Malaysia’s chemical industry to a whole new level. With this development, comes the need to have a stronger policy on chemical safety and security in the country. At the same time, industry and academic research in the fields of science and technology is also rapidly expanding. Hundreds if not thousands of chemicals are used in the research laboratories every year. Many of these chemicals are classified as hazardous to health, or can pose a threat according to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). It is thus critical to have standardized and widelyadopted laws, regulations and ethical codes to protect personnel against hazardous chemicals, and to avoid misuse of these chemicals for malicious purposes. In this chapter, current developments in regulating chemical safety and security at the industry and academic laboratories in Malaysia are discussed. Discussion on chemical safety at the workplace dates back to the gazettement of the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) in 1994, enforced by the Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH). This Act then formed a platform for the introduction of further regulations strengthening various aspects of chemical safety. The industry is also taking a proactive role in ensuring compliance to the highest safety standard, by working together with various government agencies and the academics to come up with useful safety tools. On the other hand, chemical security became a national agenda when Malaysia ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 2000. The ratification was later followed by the introduction of related act and regulations. The functions of the National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC) is explained in this book chapter, particularly concerning its function as the referral point for chemical security in the country. To support the country’s efforts in strengthening chemical safety and security aspects among researchers, an educational program on responsible conducts of research is urgently needed. This chapter describes the current effort of Academy of Sciences Malaysia (ASM), and Young Scientist Network-Academy of Sciences Malaysia (YSN-ASM) in developing an educational module on this topic. Back in 1997, the University of Malaya was the only Malaysian university that had a policy on code of ethics in place. Currently, research ethics has become a more common discussion topic among the wider academic community in the country. The Malaysian Educational Module on Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR) has been developed with the aim of ensuring that researchers in Malaysia conduct research ethically and responsibly. In addition, a formal course on chemical safety and security, particularly at the undergraduate level, is 172

urgently needed. The final part of this chapter discusses current chemical safety training programs in Malaysian universities, and the extent of safety aspects in the chemistry undergraduate curricula. A recommendation on the need to have a dedicated course on chemical and laboratory safety in Malaysian public and private universities offering undergraduate Chemistry programs is also included.

2.0. Chemical Safety at the Workplace The government of Malaysia has gazetted the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 1994 (Act 514), which is enforced by the Malaysian Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) to secure safety, health and welfare of persons at work. The OSHA 1994 mandates establishment of the National Council for Occupational Safety and Health, and stipulates general duties of employers, self-employed persons, employees, designers, manufacturers and suppliers for the protection of worker’s health and safety. Subsequently, DOSH established several regulations under OSHA 1994, namely the Occupational Safety and Health (Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards) Regulations 1996; Occupational Safety and Health (Classification, Packaging and Labelling of Hazardous Chemicals) (CPL) Regulations 1997; and the Occupational Safety and Health (Use and Standards of Exposure of Chemicals Hazardous to Health) (USECHH) Regulations 2000. In 2013, the CPL 1997 was revoked and replaced by the Occupational Safety and Health (Classification, Labelling and Safety Data Sheet of Hazardous Chemicals) (CLASS) Regulations 2013. The reformation in the regulatory requirement was triggered by several international initiatives, particularly the establishment of the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS). GHS is a system that was developed by a group of multidisciplinary experts with the culmination of more than a decade of work, where it is a logical comprehensive approach to define chemical hazards, apply agreed hazard criteria to classify chemical substances and mixtures, and then communicating hazard information to users via chemical labels and safety data sheets (SDS). According to the United Nations, it is anticipated that, when implemented, GHS will (2). 1. 2. 3. 4.

enhance the protection of human health and the environment by providing an internationally comprehensive system for hazard communication; provide a recognized framework for those countries without an existing system; reduce the need for testing and evaluation of chemicals; and facilitate international trade in chemicals which have had their hazards properly assessed and identified on an international basis.

The GHS document (also known as the GHS purple book) was published in 2003 and the current version, which is the seventh revised edition, was released in 2017. 173

According to the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), the GHS can be seen as the basis for the development of a National Chemicals Management System via promoting safe use of chemicals (3). Under the Malaysia’s CLASS 2013 regulation enforced by DOSH, any person who supplies a hazardous chemical, including a principal supplier and subsidiary supplier, must comply with the regulations. ‘Principal supplier’ means a supplier who formulates, manufactures, imports, recycles or reformulates a hazardous chemical; whereas ‘subsidiary supplier’ means a supplier who repacks, distributes or retails a hazardous chemical. It is the supplier’s obligation to classify and label the hazardous chemicals, as well as to prepare the SDS in accordance with the requirement of CLASS 2013. Supplier should also prepare classification record to be made available for inspection by the authority. In addition, CLASS 2013 also stipulates that any importer or manufacturer that imports or supplies each hazardous chemical more than one metric tonne and above per calendar year must submit an inventory to the Director General of DOSH not later than 31 March of the following year. In 2016, DOSH published a brief report on the inventory of chemicals imported and manufactured based on importers’ or manufacturers’ notification in 2015, a total number of 33,003 chemicals (types) with the total volume of 686,066,068 tonnes of chemical substances and mixtures have been notified to DOSH via Chemicals Information Management System (CIMS) (4). CLASS 2013 only stipulates chemical classification results but not the classification criteria. This was rectified when DOSH incorporated the classification criteria and hazard communication elements in the Industrial Code of Practice on Chemicals Classification and Hazard Communication (ICOP) 2014. ICOP 2014 is a legally binding document and it is in line with the third revised edition of the GHS purple book (5). Both CLASS 2013 and ICOP 2014 regulations complement each other. The chemical classification criteria are based on the physical, health and environmental hazards, and the respective hazard classes under CLASS 2013 and ICOP 2014 are shown in Table 1. Under the Eleventh Malaysia Plan (RMK-11) (2016-2020), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) has been taking the lead on the High Value-added and Complex Product Development Programme. As chemical trading plays an important role in the country’s economic growth, MITI has embarked on a project entitled ‘Globally Harmonized System of Classification – Chemical Industry’. The project was awarded to Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), with the following objectives: (i) to facilitate import and export of chemicals; (ii) to enhance compliance of CLASS 2013; and (iii) to provide technical assistance to SME (small and medium enterprises) particularly on chemical mixture classification. As output of the project, a system known as CATCH (Classification Tool for Chemical Mixture) ( has been jointly developed with MITI. CATCH provides an alternative approach for industry to classify chemicals based on the requirements of CLASS 2013 and ICOP 2014. Among the benefits of using CATCH include simplified procedures, overcome technical barriers, and time-saving when classifying chemical mixtures. The system requires user registration, and at this moment, is only limited to Malaysian companies and institutions. 174

Table 1. Hazard classes under CLASS 2013 and ICOP 2014. Physical Hazards: 1. Explosives 2. Flammable gases 3. Flammable aerosols 4. Oxidising gases 5. Gases under pressure 6. Flammable liquids 7. Flammable solids 8. Self-reactive substances and mixtures 9. Pyrophoric liquids 10. Pyrophoric solids 11. Self-heating substances and mixtures 12. Substances and mixtures which, in contact with water, emit flammable gases 13. Oxidising liquids 14. Oxidising solids 15. Organic peroxides 16. Corrosive to metals

Health Hazards: 1. Acute toxicity (Oral) 2. Acute toxicity (Dermal) 3. Acute toxicity (Inhalation) 4. Skin corrosion/irritation 5. Serious eye damage/eye irritation 6. Respiratory sensitization 7. Skin sensitization 8. Germ cell mutagenicity 9. Carcinogenicity 10. Reproductive toxicity 11. Specific target organ toxicity – single exposure 12. Specific target organ toxicity – repeated exposure 13. Aspiration hazard Environmental Hazards: 1. Hazardous to the aquatic environment (acute and chronic) 2. Hazardous to the ozone layer

As far as chemical safety is concerned, the Malaysian Institute of Chemistry (IKM) also plays an important role in enhancing awareness of chemical safety in the academic and industrial laboratories. IKM is a statutory professional organization established under the provisions of Chemist Act 1975 and Chemist (Amendment) Act 2015. Members of IKM come from private and government sectors, as well as research and higher education institutions. There are many professional and safety-related courses offered by IKM, such as the courses on ‘Management of Chemicals and Chemical / Laboratory Wastes’, ‘Basic Laboratory First Aid for Laboratory Personnel’, and ‘Laboratory Safety Manual’. In addition, IKM has also collaborated with the American Chemical Society from 2010-2017 to conduct courses on chemical safety and security. From all these efforts, it is evident that Malaysia is taking a proactive role in ensuring that the highest standards in chemical safety is implemented. Chemical security aspects are also getting the required attention lately, via the roles carried out by the National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC).

3.0. Chemical Security in Malaysia 3.1. Malaysia and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) The chemical security rules and regulations in Malaysia are mainly a manifestation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC), which was signed in Paris on the 13th of January 1993. The instrument of ratification was then 175

deposited seven years after the signing of the Convention, on the 20th of April 2000 (6). The Convention entered into force in Malaysia on the 20th of May 2000. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Act (Act 641) was enacted in Malaysia in 2005 to implement the Convention, and was gazetted on the 16th of June 2005 before coming into effect on the 1st of September 2006 (6). Two years later, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Regulations 2007 (7) was enacted and enter came into force on the 1st of November 2007 (6). The National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC) was established under Section 6 of the CWC Act 2005 to monitor and implement Malaysia’s obligations under the Convention. The NACWC is led by a Chairman, and is composed of 14 members, who are the Director Generals or the representatives of relevant Ministries and agencies (Table 2). The Chairman’s office and secretariat is placed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs located at the Federal Government Administrative Centre of Putrajaya. The NACWC receives assistance and support from its stakeholders to carry out all functions for the realizations of Malaysia’s obligations as listed in the Convention. Specific NACWC committees for three Articles (VI, X and XI) are also appointed to focus on different tasks. Articles VI, X and XI are Articles under the Convention. The members of each committee are shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3.

Table 2. Members of the National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC). Reproduced with permission from reference (8). Copyright 2016 NACWC. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lead Agency)

Ministry of Defence

Ministry of International Trade & Industry (MITI)

Ministry of Home Affairs

Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI)

Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (NRE)

Department of Chemistry (DOC)

Department of Environment (DOE)

Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH)

Royal Malaysian Customs

Royal Malaysian Police

Pesticides Board

Pharmaceutical Services Division, Ministry of Health

Science and Technology Research Institute for Defense (STRIDE)


Figure 1. Article VI Committee (Activities Not Prohibited by CWC). Reproduced with permission from reference (8). Copyright 2016 NACWC.

Figure 2. Article X Committee (Assistance and Protection against Chemical Weapons). Reproduced with permission from reference (8). Copyright 2016 NACWC.


Figure 3. Article XI Committee (Economic and Technological Development). Reproduced with permission from reference (8). Copyright 2016 NACWC. Article VI and Article XI are directly relevant to this chapter, and will be emphasized and discussed in details. Article VI concerns the non-proliferation of chemical weapons through trade control (import and export) of the scheduled chemicals; whereas Article XI focuses on the development and promotion of scientific and technological knowledge of the scheduled chemicals. Article VI establishes the right of a State Party to manufacture and use toxic chemicals and their precursors for activities not prohibited under the Convention. It also creates legal bases for Declaration, Verification and Transfer regimes related to such chemicals, facilities and activities in the State Party. Article XI states that “the Convention recognizes the need to promote technological and economic development and the peaceful use of chemistry. The implementation of the Convention should not hamper the technological and economic development of States Parties” (9). Hence, the State Party will facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment and scientific and technological information and also to continuously review national regulations in the trade of chemicals. As such, under the legislation in Malaysia, the import and export of the scheduled chemical under the CWC Act 2005 is controlled by the Royal Malaysian Customs Department, which is monitored under the Customs (Prohibition of Imports/ Exports) Order 2012 (10). In addition to that, the export control is also regulated by the Strategic Trade Act (STA) 2010 (Act 708) (11). STA 2010 “is the legislation that controls the export, transhipment, transit and brokering of strategic items and technology, including arms and related material, as well as activities that will or may facilitate the design, development, production and delivery of weapons of mass destruction. This Act is consistent with Malaysia’s international obligations on national security” (11).


3.2. CWC as the Basis for Safeguarding Chemical Security in Malaysia

Before any trading activity involving scheduled chemicals is carried out, one must refer to the NACWC for approval. Declaration of past activities of the scheduled chemicals should be made to the NACWC annually, regardless of the amount of chemicals involved in the activities. The declaration can be made by writing to the NACWC as indicated in the CWC Regulations 2007. Hence, any party who fails to declare the scheduled chemicals and is found to commit the offence and will be subjected to the penalty stated in the CWC Act 2005. Chemical security issue is an emerging concern in Malaysia. Besides the roles of NACWC to reinforce national chemical security, Chemical Industries Council of Malaysia (CICM) (12) has also taken a proactive action voluntarily to introduce the Seventh Code under the Responsible Care® (RC) program. CICM has adopted this Seventh Code, known as the Security Code of the Management Practices, and is expected to be launched in Malaysia in 2018. This is the only Security Code designed for chemical security purposes. The other six Codes developed earlier are for the promotion of continuous improvements in safety, health and environmental (SHE) performance. The Seventh Code is established to “provide protection to people, property, products, information and information systems. The purpose is achieved by enhancing the security in preventing pilfering of products, covering potential bomb and terrorist attack along the chemical value chain. The chemical value chain covers activities associated with design, formulation research, procurement, manufacturing, marketing, distribution, storage, customer use, recycling and final disposal of the products. The Code uses the risk-based approach to identify, assess and address vulnerabilities, prevent or mitigate incidents, enhance training and response capabilities and maintain and improve relationship with key stakeholders” (13). Since the signing of the Convention in 1993, Malaysia, particularly through the NACWC, has been very committed to support and facilitate the purpose and objectives of the Convention. Malaysia has a strong stance against chemical weapons and believes that international collaboration through sharing of information is the best approach to establish mutual understanding among the regulatory partners and to respond to chemical weapons issues. Therefore, it is anticipated that more engagements between NACWC and the industries, universities and research institutes will be conducted in the future. NACWC also strongly supports the efforts of CICM to introduce the Security Code as a voluntary effort by the private sector to enhance the security management of the chemical industry. Among the academic and research institutions, a new effort to promote safe and secure science through Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR) education is also taking place in Malaysia. One of the aims of RCR education is to ensure responsible behavior and conducts when hazardous chemicals are involved.


4.0. Responsible Conduct of Research RCR education has been established in the U.S. since 1989. The National Institute of Health (NIH) of the United States of America required applicants of institutional training grant to include a description of “activities related to the instruction about the responsible conduct of research” (14). The content of responsible RCR instructions suggested by NIH included, but not limited to, conflict of interest, data recording and retention, and responsible authorship. This requirement for RCR training came in response to numerous high profile research misconduct cases in the 1980s that cast a shadow on research integrity (15). The goal of this RCR education is to produce high quality researchers who are expected to conduct research responsibly and with integrity. In an updated NIH policy, a comprehensive list of RCR training topics have been included, such as mentor/mentee responsibilities, collaborative research including collaborations with industry, and peer review (16). Although many developed countries have placed increasing emphasis on research, comprehensive RCR education, such as the one mandated by NIH, has yet to be formally established elsewhere. Nevertheless, many countries address issues concerning RCR by producing codes of conduct that provide guidelines for researchers on research ethics. These codes of ethics include those published by the European Federation of Academies of Sciences and Humanities (17), UK Research Integrity Office (18), and the Australian National Health and Medical Research Council (19). One of the seminal international efforts of fostering research integrity worldwide is the released of the Singapore Statement on Research Integrit (20) (2010), which was drafted during the Second World Conference on Research Integrity. Although it is a brief document, the Statement is comprehensive in providing a framework for institutes to develop policies and guidelines on research integrity. The goals of the RCR education, coupled with the codes of conduct, are to build public trust, protect research subjects, safeguard the research ecosystem and, ultimately, mitigate the negative effects of research misconduct and irresponsible conduct of research. The dialogue on RCR has intensified in recently years with the rising fears of biosafety and biosecurity issues. The threat of bioterrorism and Dual Use Research of Concern further deepens the need for greater discourse on RCR. Although chemical safety and security issues are not explicitly mentioned in the various RCR-related initiatives, it is nonetheless apparent that RCR is vital in ensuring chemical safety and security to not only protect the researchers but also the public and the environment. In Malaysia, the efforts to promote RCR among the academic and research institutions are championed by the Young Scientists Network-Academy of Sciences Malaysia (YSN-ASM), an organization in the Academy of Sciences Malaysia (ASM)


4.1. Young Scientists Network-Academy of Sciences Malaysia (YSN-ASM) Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR) Program The YSN-ASM RCR Program was formally established in 2015 to foster research integrity in Malaysia. This initiative came after a two-year period (2013-2015) where members of YSN-ASM actively conducted RCR awareness workshops and seminars in Malaysia. The goal of this Program is to create a responsible scientific ecosystem in Malaysia. It also aims to mitigate the negative consequences of research misconduct as well as potential risk associated with unsafe and unsecure science such as those related to chemical safety and security. One of the key initiatives of this Program is the Educational Program on RCR. The purpose of this initiative is to create awareness on best practices and professional norms in research through RCR education. The target audience of the Educational Program on RCR are the principal investigators, students, and research assistants as well as research administrators. This catch-all approach is meant to ensure that RCR education penetrates all level of the research ecosystem. Active learning pedagogy is used to deliver the content of the RCR education. Through case-studies, role-playing, peer-learning and self-reflection, active learning allows the learner to appreciate the complexity of research ethics and to flex their ethical reflexivity. The second main initiative of the YSN-ASM RCR Program is to publish the Malaysian Educational Module on RCR. The goal of publishing this Module is to provide Malaysian researchers with a RCR reference material that is easily accessible and digestible. One of the unique features of the Module is the contextualization of the content for Malaysians by taking into account the unique research ecosystem in Malaysia. In addition to being a reference material, this Module is also designed to be used as a trainers’ handbook for those who wish to provide RCR education at their respective institutions. This Module contains 10 chapters (Figure 4) that covers major areas of RCR.

Figure 4. The Ten Chapters of the Malaysian Educational Module on RCR.


YSN-ASM RCR Program is currently working towards training a cohort of RCR trainers who are then able to provide RCR education throughout Malaysia. The Program will also facilitate the development of a nationalized and formal educational curriculum on RCR in universities across Malaysia. This formal curriculum could also be embedded in chemistry- and chemical-based programs at universities in Malaysia. With RCR education becoming mainstream in Malaysia, this will enhance the quality of research and the training of future scientists in Malaysia as well as strengthen chemical safety and security aspects among the different stakeholders in Malaysia.

5.0. Chemical Safety Education at Malaysian Higher Education Institutions 5.1. Safety-Related Courses at the Undergraduate Level Education and training form an important aspect in strengthening chemical safety culture. A survey conducted on science students at a local public university on laboratory safety aspects found that most students are aware of the safety precautions needed when handling chemicals (average scores of 3-4 on a 5-point Likert scale for all the assessed criteria) (21). The students were assessed based on their knowledge on the training provided, personal protective equipment (PPE) and engineering controls, safe work practices, and accident response and prevention. However, given the seriousness of accidents involving chemicals when they occur, the level of awareness among the science students is expected to be higher. In Malaysia, safety elements are more synonymous with engineering courses, probably due to stricter requirements by the Engineering Accreditation Council (EAC), and the needs from the engineering industry. Although there is still no dedicated government agency specifically coordinating chemical education at higher education institutions, Malaysian universities are starting to take the initiative to incorporate chemical safety education elements in their Chemistry-related course curricula. Chemistry courses are highly specialized and technical, which is why only a handful of universities offer either pure, or applied Chemistry-related courses (Table 3). This includes eight public universities, namely University of Malaya (UM), Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM), Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM), Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS) and Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS); and two private institutions, namely Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman (UTAR) and International Medical University (IMU). Universities such as UM, UTM, and IMU have included safety-related courses in their curricula. UTM, for example, offers a Laboratory Management and Safety course, which incorporates chemical safety elements in it; while UM offers an Ethics and Safety course, which contains general laboratory safety aspects. IMU offers an Ethics and Laboratory Safety course in their 182

Bachelor of Science (Pharmaceutical Chemistry) program. The course includes a comprehensive discussion on related laws and regulations, chemical handling and exposure, safe storage, accident handling procedures, and chemical waste disposal. Although the other universities do not specifically offer such courses yet, many have already incorporated chemical safety elements in their general courses, such as Research Methodology in Chemistry (USM), and Chemical Industry Management (UKM). It is also common for Malaysian universities to provide an introductory and safety briefing before the students begin their laboratory practical sessions. Final year students are also required to attend a safety talk before they embark on their final year undergraduate project. Despite this promising trend, a push towards a more formal chemical safety education is still needed, in order to increase the awareness and implementation of chemical safety among Malaysian undergraduate students.

5.2. Chemical Safety Training for Postgraduate Students and Staff Chemical safety trainings for postgraduate students and staff are usually conducted by the occupational safety, health and environment (OSHE) department at each university (Table 4). Information regarding chemical safety guidelines and training programs for the campus community can always be found on their websites. Individual faculty and department usually have a safety briefing for all new postgraduate students every semester before they are allowed to embark on their laboratory work. UM, for example, provide general guidelines on laboratory safety, and information regarding the safe handling of flammable/toxic vapors, and cryogenic materials. In their OSH Manual, several detailed guidelines regarding chemicals are included, such as guidelines for handling chemical spillage, chemical waste collection procedures; preparation of the register of chemicals hazardous to health (as per DOSH guidelines); and chemical labelling procedures (as per DOSH guidelines). In UTM, chemical safety trainings are conducted by the Chemical Management Centre (CMC), a centre under the University Laboratory Management Unit. CMC is responsible for chemical procurements, ensuring chemical safety, and managing chemical waste disposal. Trainings are usually conducted in collaboration with the University’s Occupational Safety, Health and Environment (OSHE) Unit. Several safety-related talks and seminars have been conducted, which include talks on: 1) USECHH 2000; 2) CLASS 2013; 3) Safety Data Sheet and Register of Chemicals Hazardous to Health; and 4) Hazardous Chemical Waste Disposal according to the Environmental Quality (Scheduled Wastes) (EQ-SW) Regulations 2005. In addition, the website ( also provides regulatory documents and guidelines needed by the campus community to understand laws and regulations governing chemical handling and use, exposure, storage, and packaging. Campus-wide implementation is investigated and enforcement is performed annually during the Occupational Safety and Health Audit exercise. 183

Table 3. Malaysian universities offering undergraduate Chemistry-related courses. Status


Department /Faculty

Courses name

Chemical Safety-related Courses


Universiti Teknologi Malaysia (UTM), Skudai, Johor

Faculty of Science

BSc (Chemistry) BSc (Industrial Chemistry)

Laboratory Management and Safety (Semester 3)

University of Malaya (UM), Kuala Lumpur

Faculty of Science

BSc (Chemistry) BSc (Applied Chemistry) BSc (Biochemistry)

Ethics and Safety (Semester 3)

Universiti Sains Malaysia (USM), Penang

School of Chemical Sciences

BSc (Chemistry) BAppSc (Analytical Chemistry) BAppSc (Industrial Chemistry)

Embedded in Research Methodology in Chemistry course.

Universiti Putra Malaysia (UPM), Serdang, Selangor

Faculty of Science

BSc (Chemistry) BSc (Industrial Chemistry) BSc (Petroleum Chemistry)

No information.

Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Bangi, Selangor

Faculty of Science and Technology

BSc (Chemistry) BSc (Biochemistry) BSc (Oleochemical) BSc (Chemical Technology)

Embedded in Chemical Industry Management course.

Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM), Shah Alam, Selangor

Faculty of Applied Sciences

BSc (Chemistry) BSc (Applied Chemistry) BSc (ChemistryForensic Analysis)

No information.

Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS), Kota Kinabalu, Sabah

School of Science and Technology

BSc (Industrial Chemistry)

Laboratory Safety and Accreditation (Semester 2)

Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS), Sarawak

Faculty of Resource Science and Technology

BSc (Resource Chemistry)

No information.

Continued on next page.


Table 3. (Continued). Malaysian universities offering undergraduate Chemistry-related courses. Status


Department /Faculty

Courses name

Chemical Safety-related Courses


Universiti Tunku Abdul Rahman (UTAR), Kampar, Perak

Faculty of Science

BSc (Chemistry) BSc (Biochemistry)

No information.

International Medical University (IMU), Kuala Lumpur

School of Pharmacy

BSc (Pharmaceutical Chemistry)

Ethics and Laboratory Safety (Semester 2)

Table 4. Example of departments managing occupational safety, health and environment (OSHE) at Malaysian public universities. Institution




Office of Safety and Health administration/registrar-s-office/ occupational-safety-health-unit


Occupational Safety, Health and Environment Unit


Occupational Safety and Health Unit


Centre for Risk Management, Sustainability and Occupational Safety


Office for the Management of Occupational Safety and Health


CMC UTM has also issued several guidelines, which include 1) Guidelines for Safe Transport of Chemicals on Campus, 2) Guidelines on Handling Spills of Hazardous Chemicals, and 3) Guidelines on Safe Handling and Storage of Compressed Gases. These guidelines can be downloaded by students and staff working with hazardous chemicals as handy guides and kept in each laboratory for reference when needed. They can be accessed at The guidelines are regularly updated and checked for accuracy. The Centre is also regularly invited to provide specific trainings at individual faculty when needed, and has become a one-stop-center for any issues pertaining to chemical safety at UTM. The US National Research Council in its report on “Promoting Chemical Laboratory Safety and Security in Developing Countries (2010)” (22) states that “universities have unique risks that can include lack of safe practices, presence of chemicals of concern (COCs), improper management and storage of chemicals, and lack of enforcement of safety rules”. In Malaysia, with the stricter enforcements by DOSH (for chemical management, exposure, personal protective equipment, labelling) and Departmet of Environment (DOE) (for chemical waste disposal), universities are now taking a more pragmatic approach towards safer practices in chemical safety. This is evident from the addition of ethics and safety-based courses in the undergraduate curricula, and the active roles played by university OSHE departments in providing trainings to comply with the related laws and regulations. While there has been no major accidents due to negligence or chemical safety non-compliance reported at university chemistry departments lately, there is still room for improvements. 5.3. Recommendations It is recommended that all public and private universities offering undergraduate Chemistry programs to have a dedicated course on chemical safety. The course content can include, 1) Introduction to acts and regulations related to chemical safety (e.g. USECHH 2000, CLASS 2013, EQ-SW 2005); 2) Chemical handling and storage (e.g. PPE and engineering controls, chemical compatibility group, safety data sheet); 3) Handling of chemical spillage; and 4) Hazardous chemical waste management (e.g. waste storage, disposal). Chemical security aspects can also be included as part of this course. Discussion on the implementation can be initiated through the Higher Education and Research Institutions Joint Council on Occupational Safety and Health (MBKKP) with cooperation from DOSH and the Ministry of Higher Education. MBKKP has members from many public and private universities, and research institutes. Discussion can also be initiated via the Council of Deputy Vice Chancellors for Academic Affairs. A more thorough inspection and monitoring are also needed among the staff and postgraduate research students. OSHE committee at departmental or faculty level can play a more active role in ensuring all the acts and regulations are complied, with a stronger involvements and support from the administration. A demerit system can be implemented when any non-compliance acts are observed. 186

Finally, principal investigators and project leaders need to be made aware of the related laws and regulations governing the use of chemicals in their research. A system whereby safety documents are supplied (and a pledge to comply) whenever the researchers are awarded a new research grant can also be put in place. Ultimately, students, technical staff, and researchers need to understand that these safety regulations are enforced mainly to safeguard the health of personnel using or dealing with hazardous chemicals, and to avoid major accidents from happening, instead of just another bureaucratic red tape.

6.0. Concluding Remarks The development of responsible conduct in chemical safety and security practices is still at its infancy in Malaysia. This chapter summarizes how Malaysia has proactively implemented the top-down and bottom-up approaches in establishing tools and best practices in the chemical safety and security management. These approaches are developed to include governing bodies, industries, educational institutions, and the general public. Based on the analysis, there are still gaps in the current practices which need to be identified and addressed. For this reason, the regulatory authorities, industries and educational institutions are working very closely to explore the best practices in good research conducts and also, in managing chemical safety and security matters. For instance, a system known as CATCH (Classification Tool for Chemical Mixture) has jointly been developed by Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) as part of the chemical safety management plan. Besides, the National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC) is closely monitoring scheduled chemicals, to reinforce its role in chemical security management. On the other hand, Chemical Industries Council of Malaysia (CICM) has voluntarily introduced the Seventh Code: Security Code of the Management Practices under the Responsible Care® (RC) program as part of its corporate social responsibilities. At the ground level, the Young Scientists Network-Academy of Sciences Malaysia (YSN-ASM) has taken the lead to develop the first Malaysian Educational Module of Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR) for researchers. In addition, many Malaysian universities have incorporated chemical safety education elements in their Chemistry-related course curricula, which is an excellent step to create safety awareness at the undergraduate level. At this moment, the implementation and enforcement mechanisms on chemical safety and security in Malaysia are still being refined and continuously improved. Hence, the country is always ready and willing to collaborate with the more experienced counterparts to inculcate responsible conducts in chemical practices among all the stakeholders.

Acknowledgments The authors would like to acknowledge Professor Abhi Veerakumarasivam and Dr. Chai Lay-Ching for contributing to the section on the YSN-ASM 187

RCR Programme. They would also like to thank the Academy of Sciences Malaysia (ASM) and Young Scientists Network-Academy of Sciences Malaysia (YSN-ASM) for establishing the YSN-ASM RCR Programme.

References 1. 2.












Hydrocarbons Technology. projects/petronas-rapid-project-malaysia/ (accessed March 28, 2018). United Nations. Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS), 7th revised ed.; United Nations: New York and Geneva, 2017; p 3. United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). Developing a National GHS Implementation Strategy: A guidance document to support implementation of the GHS; UNITAR: Geneva, 2010; p 4. Malaysia Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH). Brief Report on the Inventory of Hazardous Chemicals; DOSH: Putrajaya, 2016; pp 5−6. Malaysia Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH). Industrial Code of Practice on Chemicals Classification and Hazard Communication; DOSH: Putrajaya, 2014; p 1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC). (accessed January 4, 2018). National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC). Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia. index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=58&Itemid=56 (accessed December 17, 2017). National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention, August, 26, 2016, An Introduction to the Functions and Activities of the National Authority Chemical Weapons Convention Ministry of Foreign Affairs (powerpoints). Organization for the Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. (accessed December 17, 2017). Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Amendment of Customs (Prohibition of Imports and Exports) Order 2012. index.php/pages/view/3504 (accessed December 30, 2017). Royal Malaysian Customs Department. Strategic Trade Act 2010. (accessed December 31, 2017). Chemical Industries of Council Malaysia, Responsible Care® Program, Distribution code Of management practices. images/RC/Code_Dist.pdf (accessed January 4, 2018). American Chemistry Council. Responsible Care® Program. Security code. 188


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Responsible-Care-Program-Elements/Responsible-Care-Security-Code/ (accessed December 31, 2017). National Institutes of Health. NIH Guide: For Grants and Contracts; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: Washington D.C., 1989; Vol. 18; issue 45. Kalichman, H. A Brief History of RCR Education. Account. Res. 2013, 20 (5−6), 380–394. National Institutes of Health. Update on the Requirement for Instruction in the Responsible Conduct of Research. 2009. guide/notice-files/not-od-10-019.html (accessed January 16, 2018). All European Academies. The European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity. 2011. Conduct_ResearchIntegrity.pdf (accessed December 20, 2017). UK Research Integrity Office. Code of Practice for Research: Promoting Good Practice and Preventing Misconduct; Aldridge Press: London, 2009. National Health and Medical Research Council, Australian Research Council and Universities Australia. Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research; Australian Government: 2007. Singapore Statement on Research Integrity. 2010. http://www.singapore (accessed December 23, 2017). Ismail, Z. S.; Arifin, K.; Aiyub, K. Promoting OSHA at Higher Institutions: Assessment of Level of Safety Awareness among Laboratory Users. Taylor’s Bus. Rev. 2015, 5 (2), 155–164. National Research Council. Promoting Chemical Laboratory Safety and Security in Developing Countries; Technical Repor; United States Department of State: Washington, DC, 2010.


Chapter 13

Responsible Conduct of Research and Challenges in the Middle East Abeer Al Bawab* Chemistry Department, School of Science, The University of Jordan, Amman 11942, Jordan *E-mail: [email protected]

Responsible Conduct of Research (RCR) in the Middle East is a complex topic to analyze or find available information on. The fact that the Middle East is developing at a fast rate in education, research, industry, and related areas to chemistry and safety, makes this report or chapter pivotal. Most advancements are seen in the educational sector with a huge emphasis on the medical, engineering and scientific fields, as well as in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries. In addition, there is a huge demand for graduate studies in the region focusing on scientific research. The development of national or regional codes of conduct in scientific research however, is not consistent with such developments. The main participants in the Middle East forming a driving force for the formulation of regional or national codes of conduct in research are universities and chemical societies (as in the case of Jordan). This chapter will focus on providing a brief introduction of RCR in the Middle East following with the sectors interested in that role: policy makers, chemical societies, industry, schools and universities in different countries of the Middle East; moreover Jordan will serve as a case study for the area. The challenges will be analyzed, taking into consideration the whole MENA region with respect to RCR. In the end, the regulations that govern proper conduct in research are still in the early stages despite all the efforts to establish a code of ethics. There is potential for collaboration in order to develop such codes via

© 2018 American Chemical Society

scientific societies and Middle East universities with faculty members of national chemical societies.

Introduction Research has always played a major role in people’s lives, either directly or indirectly. However, this role has expanded greatly in the 21st century due to the information and communication revolution that has been marked by the development of computers, mobile phones, and the internet. In view of the expansion in the field of research, it has become a must to regulate and define the way research is being conducted around the world, and a need to globalize such codes has become necessary (1). For that reason, it has become a matter of utmost important to introduce RCR polices to the research community (2). The following is an overview of the rules, regulations, and professional practices that define RCR, including most of the professional work that is part of a researcher’s career (3). It consists of nine areas that have been widely recognized. -



Collaborative Science, which includes a variety of forms, such as; borrowing and lending supplies, resources and equipment amongst researchers; furthermore, seeking an expert opinion in a different discipline and partnering with colleagues for up-to-date ideas and expertise. Conflict of Interest and Commitments, the way conflict itself is resolved is fundamental. Data Acquisition, Management, Sharing and Ownership. Human Research Protection, research with human participants plays a central role in advancing knowledge in many fields. Lab Animal Well-being, which is applied through the implementation of polices and regulations that both maintain the integrity of scientific research and the well-being of animals. Mentoring, is the professional responsibility of all scientists to mentor a researcher with less experience than themselves. Peer Review. Publication Practice and Responsible Authorship. Research Misconduct, such as: fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism are incompatible with responsible conduct of research.

Scientists in general, as well as chemists have responsibilities towards different sectors beginning with their responsibilities to the public, to the science of chemistry and to the profession itself. Their responsibilities to the public are related to the safety and well-being of co-workers, consumers and the communities using chemically derived consumer goods. They are responsible for serving the public interest and to further improve the knowledge of scientists. As for the science of chemistry, a scientist should seek to advance chemical science and to understand the limitation of their knowledge. Professionally, chemists should try to remain up-to-date with the latest developments in their field, share 192

ideas and information, as well as keep accurate and up-to-date laboratory records. Moreover, they should maintain honesty in all conduct and publications, and give due credit to the contribution of others (4, 5). In the Middle East, the research sector has experienced a large expansion, especially in the medical trials field. Some attribute such growth to the lenient, and sometimes absence of established and mandated ethics of conduct in scientific research. The situation, however, varies tremendously from one Arab state to another due to the huge differences in laws, guidelines, and robustness of the scientific research environment. In general, countries in the Middle East can be classified into two sections: the first type includes countries that have some regulations that govern scientific research, such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Lebanon, while the other types have not established such regulations yet such as Oman and Yemen (6). Even though most of these regulations are mainly concerned with medical trials, they may also include all types of research (7).

Policy Makers Government Governments have a mandate to ensure that proper conduct of research is adhered to. As a result, regulations and laws are issued to define the guidelines and responsibilities of all involved in the process. In addition, these mandates make it easier for institutes, individuals and communities to be aware of their rights and responsibilities. On the other hand, it is very difficult to agree on the various definitions of scientific research misconduct, let alone formulate laws and regulations. What makes it even more difficult is the need for the scientific community to carry out research in a free and uncontrolled way. Such requirements for free research, however, can not contradict borders and regulations that govern the process with the intention of keeping rights and ensure accountability when these rights are being assaulted and the common good for the society is breached (3). Consequently, governments usually assign the task of formulating such laws and guidelines to national and scientific committees to ensure the process will not hinder scientific research and at the same time make sure that the well-being of whomever is related is protected (3). Chemical Societies The main role of chemical societies (which include national chemical societies, associations and unions) is to promote, support and spread knowledge of chemical science, as well as emphasize its importance to communities. As a result, chemical societies are also concerned with spreading knowledge about the importance of RCR and to encourage chemists to be committed and adhere to the rules and codes that have been accepted worldwide (3). Chemical societies should promote the responsible conduct of research as universal language all around the world. The unity of codes will make it easier and more effective to educate young chemists and scientists about such codes. 193

Multiple attempts have been conducted to unify these codes such as the Global Chemist Code of Ethics (GCCE) (2). Chemical societies should cooperate with the educational sector to build a new generation that will be more committed to adhering to RCR and research ethics. These efforts will be more successful if the benefits of the ethical conduct of research are made clear, especially how a society will benefit and how individuals and communities are being protected from misconduct (3). Industry Misconduct is not restricted only to educational and research institutions. Industry may also become involved in such misconduct and clear regulations should be put in regulate industrial activities. As a further matter, research misconduct could be observed in this sector after being reported as, the financial outcome is an important goal. For that reason, violations could happen. Thus, having more solid and detailed codes will play a major role in controlling such violations. Hiring well-educated employees will also benefit the chemical community and assist them in reaching the optimum application for the RCR. The industry sector can have a positive or negative impact, depending if the industry follows the RCR or not (3). Education The educational sector (including schools and universities) has a fundamental role in preparing, teaching and implementing ethics and conduct codes. When students and young scientists learn and adhere to RCR and research ethics, they will transfer the knowledge to their future workplace and therefore apply it. Moreover, the well-educated young scientists will be able to affect the chemical community and the effect will be long lasting since they will lead the chemical community in the near future. Because they are students, the principles can be implemented in the educational process. Conducting courses or separate lectures over the years can promote a greater respect and understanding of the importance of adhering to the RCR (3).

Middle East The research infrastructure in Arab countries is variable and might be more robust in certain countries. However, research ethics are still not well established in most of these countries. Al Ahmad et al. conducted a survey of thirteen Arab states that have screened all (or any) documentation, legislation or regulation that govern scientific research (with emphasis on medical trials) and have found an absence of such regulations of the national level in most of these countries (6). Current research practices in most Middle East countries are rarely governed by nation-level guidelines, nor do they involve mandates for the use of formal research ethics committees. Therefore, different initiatives have been conducted 194

to enhance the application of RCR and spread ethical guidelines which would allow additional leeway during research (8), such as the Middle East Research Ethics Training Initiative (MERETI). In general, there are no clear and published regulations, codes or instructions regarding ethics of conduct in chemical sciences in the Middle East. However, there are different activities and efforts to establish such codes of ethics. These efforts started with The Hague initiative to establish guidelines followed by a Global Chemists Code of Ethics (GCCE). Several participants from the Middle East were involved in GCCE charter preparation. These efforts have been initiated, continued and sponsored by the American Chemical Society (ACS) (2). As a result, several activities have been conducted in universities in several parts in the Middle East, including Jordan. In the following parts of this chapter, these efforts and activities will be reviewed, and final conclusions presented regarding the codes in the Middle East (9, 10). Universities Spreading Knowledge In the Middle East, universities are considered the most active sector which focuses on the development and implementation of the national code of ethical conduct in scientific research. Hence, universities in general, are the main research conducting entity in the region. Universities in the Middle East are developing their curriculums to introduce research ethics and responsible conduct of research (11). It is of importance that students become familiar with these guidelines and codes of conduct, as well training them to implement these practices in their course and lab work before commencing any project. It has become mandatory to develop a course about research ethics and RCR, especially for chemistry departments. Most universities have been conducting such courses for several years. Moreover, there is an initiative to transfer knowledge to Middle Eastern countries with curriculum guides for research ethics workshops (12). In addition, a specific website has been constructed to provide resources and tools for teachers, trainers, students and researchers regarding research ethics (13). Its goal is to promote optimum practice and evidence-based research ethics education. There are many materials that are able to assist universities in implementing RSR in their courses. Professional associations are also essential in advancing the profession as well setting and enforcing ethical standards.

Case Study: Jordan Jordan’s educational and research sector is considered a driving force for development. It has one of the highest literacy rates in the world (98.01% in 2015) according to UNESCO data (14). Regarding scientific research, Jordan has the highest number of researchers per million (8060 per million) in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) which is higher than the European Union’s (EU) average (6494 per million) and much higher than the world average (2532 per 195

million) (15). The scientific research community in Jordan is considered the most advanced in the Middle East, hence, it is one of the few countries in the region to have national regulations dealing with conducting research and the only one that refers to international protocols for research conduct, especially in medical research (directly related to and in published by Parliament). In addition, the Ministry of Labor in Jordan has a special department that inspects and overviews all regulations and guidelines being followed (Department of Occupational Health and Safety). Despite these advancements in research and its regulations, Jordan does not have a documented code of ethics related to chemical research. Due to the importance of this field and its impact on all other fields of research in Jordan which include the economy and the security of the country, several efforts to develop such a code have been initiated. The two main participants in such efforts were universities and the Jordanian Chemical Society (JCS). On the other hand, there were some similar initiations in Jordan, such as Amman Codes, an international project undertaken by Jordan and other countries in the Middle East in addition to Northern Africa. A Code of Ethics and Conduct (and related guidelines) were compiled between 2010-2012. During a series of workshops on Ethical Guidelines for the Practice of Chemistry under the Norms of the Chemical Weapons Convention, these documents listed several guidelines and commitments for several countries; For example Amman Codes (page 30-33) (16). In the course of these workshops, several chemists participated (chemistry professors from Jordanian universities, members of the JCS, industry representatives and other stakeholders) in national and international workshops for the preparation of the Amman Codes and codes for other countries. A combination of these documents related to numerous countries were collected and kept as reference. Although they are not directly related to RCR, they are useful as a reference for researchers (16). In 2014, Germany proposed developing ethical guidelines for its chemistry community, related to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The OPCW facilitated two workshops held in March and September 2015 (17, 18). There were participants from over twenty countries, covering all regions and involved around thirty chemistry professionals and scientists. Jordan was invited and represented only by one researcher, the president of JCS: Prof. Abeer Al Bawab (19). A draft of Ethical Guidelines for the Practice of Chemistry under the Norms of the Chemical Weapons Convention was produced out of these workshops at OPCW Headquarters in The Hague (19, 20). A version in Arabic was published on OPCW’s website, while JCS distributed these brochures and conducted lectures during many national meetings and conferences (21, 22). Afterwards, it was decided that there was a need for a Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE) regarding different aspects of chemical sciences and research. Jordanian researchers also took part in the formulation of the GCCE guided by The Hague Ethical Guidelines (Kuala Lumpur workshop, April 2016). A group of Jordanian chemists participated in that particular workshop Prof. Abeer Al Bawab, Dr Muna Abu Dalo, Dr Fadwa Odeh. Moreover, Prof Al Bawab was also a moderator. The stakeholders and participants were encouraged to disseminate these codes and apply them in their respective countries (23, 24). 196

As a result, several activities were held in several Jordanian universities including JCS to introduce the GCCE to the chemistry community in Jordan (22). Participants in these workshops included teachers, students, researchers and workers in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries in Jordan. It was hoped that these activities would spread the knowledge of the GCCE and pave the road to the preparation of a national code of ethics in chemical research in Jordan. The following are examples of activities held in Jordan to enhance, spread, and develop a culture of safe and accountable scientific research: -




Chemical Safety and Security Workshops: Several workshops that focus on chemical safety and security are being held in Jordan. Some are for training the trainers (chemistry Prof., chemistry teachers and chemists from industry and the private sector) on chemical safety and security, while others are focused on training researchers, staff, students and all who work in the chemical sector (educational, research, industry or civil defense) on best practices in chemical labs and work places including the proper actions when accidents take place. These workshops are now being published as periodicals to enhance and spread the knowledge of proper conduct. GCCE Workshops: After the participation of one academic chemist during The Hague workshop (2015) and many academia chemists in different GCCE workshops sponsored by ACS (2016, 2017), a series of workshops were held in Jordan. These workshops were held in various institutes and universities; The University of Jordan, Jordan University of Science and Technology, Al-Albayt University (25), in different geographical regions in Jordan (Amman, Irbid and Mafraq). The primary goal was to spread knowledge regarding good practices and conduct in the chemical sector; another goal was to initiate a debate about the statute of regulations and guidelines for scientific research in Jordan. Several outcomes and gains were achieved including (but not exclusive to): Awareness was raised regarding good practices in chemistry New activities have been (and are being) conducted. For example, it is becoming essential for new staff, researchers and students to take such workshops for more acceptable conduct and at the same time to protect themselves, their fellow workers, the students and community from any misconduct. A growing demand is being noticed from other sectors which cover chemical processes, in schools of agriculture, engineering and conservation sciences, for ethical guidelines.

Challenges There are many challenges that must be overcome in order to establish a formal and mandatory code of ethics in chemical research. These challenges 197

include production and sharing of knowledge, dissemination of information including lack of information, transparency and a lack of funding. Production and Sharing Knowledge One of the main challenges to prepare and follow a responsible code of ethics in research in the Middle East is the production and sharing of information. Lack of transparency and data throughout the Middle East hinders efforts of this kind. One possible source of hindrance comes from adapted educational policies that have emphasized quantity over quality. At the same time, most Arab curricula have focused fact-acquisition rather than the development of cognitive skills. The learning process has been the mastery of an existing body of knowledge, rather than promoting the ability to seek out, analyze or generate new knowledge. Moreover, the priority of universities is to teach, not to produce research due to the large number of students enrolled in public universities. Such high numbers create pressure on departments, infrastructures and researchers, leaving only a very small portion of time and effort dedicated to research activities. Recently, the number of research institutions and centers have grown rapidly. On the other hand, the lack of well-defined national research strategies limits their effectiveness. In addition, there is a weak link between policy-making and research institutions and centers. Another source of hindrance is weak communication and cooperation between universities, institutes and research centers between each other both nationally and regionally (26). The Financial State Limited sources of funding can be considered one of the major challenges. Consequently, local funding (in countries with limited resources such as Jordan) is very scarce and when obtained, it is mainly channeled to consumables and testing. Such scarcity makes it difficult to pay attention to other requirements of carrying out research. Because of the shortage of local funding, research priorities are increasingly set by external funding agencies whose agendas are not always in tune with local development needs. Such funding tends to be short term and project oriented, which damages the continuity and sustainability of research efforts. Research funding by the private sector is extremely limited. Governmental financial support in the Middle East is low for the research section, which include research ethics and RCR (26). Reporting of Misconduct A lack of reporting of any research violation and misconduct to the chemical community or the authorized committee is a major problem. For that reason, many violations can occur without the proper management. There are many challenges that face the reporting process, such as gathering information, spreading information about the misconduct, and the person in charge of it. Sometimes, institutions try to cover up an incident especially when careers, 198

reputations and research funding are at stake. In the Middle East almost 75% of misconduct reporting is carried out by colleagues (12, 26). Safety Inspections Most of the violations that occur in international educational labs and industries are due to a lack of safety application management, while in the Middle East there is a lack of regular safety inspections, which should be managed and supervised in the near future (27, 28).

Conclusion The Middle East is growing quickly in all fields. Most advancements are seen in the educational sector with a huge emphasis on medical, engineering and scientific fields and in chemical and pharmaceutical industries. In addition, there is a huge demand for graduate studies in the region which focus on scientific research. The development of national or regional codes of conduct in scientific research however, is not on track with such developments. The main participants in the Middle East driving the formulation of regional or national codes of conduct in research are universities and chemical societies (as in the case in Jordan). The main obstacles that face researchers in the Middle East can be summarized as follows: -


Poor communication: Communication in the Middle East between researchers themselves and between researchers and policy makers is substandard. This can be attributed to the lack of a group work ethic (high individualism) in the Middle East. Funding: Scientific research needs more funding to achieve its goals. Researchers in the Middle East face serious problems securing funding for their research, and when they do, the funding they get is barely enough for the essentials (such as materials and equipment). This scarcity of funding forces researchers to overlook their conduct since their research is only results driven.

However, despite this bleak situation with governing proper conduct in research, there are promising efforts to establish such codes. There is potential for cooperative development of such codes via scientific societies and Arab universities (such as national chemical societies for example Jordanian Chemical Society (JCS) in the Middle East which is also organized under the umbrella of the Arab Union of Chemists.

Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Dr Fadwa Odeh and Miss Sara Mansour from The University of Jordan for their valuable contributions in this chapter. 199

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Chapter 14

Research in Africa: Responsible Conduct in Research Reporting and Challenges Berhanu M. Abegaz* Department of Chemistry, University of Johannesburg, Auckland Park Campus PO Box 524, Auckland Park 2006, Johannesburg, Republic of South Africa *E-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]

The Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics and the Science and Technology Leadership Institute (GCCE-STLI) workshop on responsible conduct and ethical practice, safety, security, education and risk management held in Kenya in 2017 formed the basis for this chapter. The number of African universities has increased from a mere 35 in 1960 to 2000 at present. Most of the new universities were created during the last decade or so. Concurrent with the creation has been the launching of postgraduate programs and new journals. Postgraduate programs are used as a means of training new faculty members. Many theses are not properly documented and evaluated. Publications are prepared from them and generally submitted to local journals. Many of the editors of these journals are inexperienced and find it difficult to meet the rigors of maintaining scholarly journals. Studies have shown that plagiarism and other unethical practices, especially in locally produced academic journals and in the writing of theses are rampant. There is a strong need to create awareness about the seriousness of these unethical practices and research misconduct and to find solutions. One approach is to adopt the proposed Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics and to find ways of ensuring compliance through the engagement of national professional associations and academies. Chemical societies and academies including the global organizations like the American Chemical Society (ACS), the Royal Society, the African Academy of Sciences (AAS), the World Academy of Sciences (TWAS), © 2018 American Chemical Society

and the InterAcademy Panel: the Global Network of Science Academies (IAP) could also engage in training and mentoring early career scientists on the preparation of manuscripts for publication, peer review, and authorship issues. Many of the sections of the chapter are presented from the author’s personal experiences in Africa. Examples of irresponsible research conduct from across the world are presented to show that these concerns have a global nature.

Introduction In May 2017 the ACS organized the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE) Science and Technology Leadership Institute (STLI), a symposium/workshop in Nairobi, Kenya, on responsible conduct and ethical practice, safety, security, education and risk management. The meeting was attended by chemists from several countries from Africa and the Middle East. It became clear from the discussions held during the meeting that ethical issues related to research are not adequately addressed in the continent and that professional associations and academies can play a vital role in raising awareness and finding solutions. This chapter is derived from contributions made by the author at this symposium on Publishing, Peer Review, Copyright and Ethics of Scholarly Publishing and personal experiences while working in a few countries in Africa. The topics discussed below will clearly reveal why responsible conduct in research is a timely topic, especially in Africa.

Expansion of Higher Education, Local Journals and Plagiarism In 1960 there were only 35 universities in Africa and almost all of them were public universities. Now, there are close to 2000 public and private universities in the Continent (1). Nigeria and Ethiopia are the two most populous countries in Africa and accordingly, Nigeria has the highest number of public and universities in Africa (149) (2), followed by Ethiopia (107) (3). Most of the increase in number occurred during the last decade or so. One of the critical areas of assessment for promotion of staff is publications in “reputable” journals. What is a “reputable” journal has also been the subject of many debates and discourse in African institutions, particularly in university senate boards and in academic staff review and promotion committees. Some committees want to consider only those publications that are included in ISI (Institute for Scientific Information) list of journals as reputable. Some of the criteria used to refer to a “reputable” journal include: (1) issues should appear regularly and without delay; (2) a strict peer-review process is followed; (3) has international visibility, as indicated by the composition of the international advisory board and/or authorship; (4) has established impact factor; etc. While these discussion and debates go on, many universities have resorted to launching their own journals. In one study 204

(4) by the Ethiopian Academy of Sciences (EAS), it was noted that there are as many as 74 academic journals published in Ethiopia by universities, government research institutions and professional associations, the latter being responsible for 17 (23%) of them. These journals cover all disciplines with a significant number in the basic and applied sciences including chemistry. Thirty-three (45%) of the journals were launched only during the last seven years. While a few of the established journals have good standing, most of the others do not appear regularly, publish only a few articles per issue, have poor online visibility and accessibility, do not have well developed editorial, copyright, review and conflict of interest policies; and unclear guidelines on ethical, author and/or style guidelines, suggesting that their level of accountability and awareness is low. The report revealed that many of the journal editors lack relevant experience. The study concluded that plagiarism is rampant and recommended the establishment of a system of evaluation and accreditation. Plagiarism is a major issue in many, if not all, African countries (5). The University of Nairobi experienced such a high level of plagiarism that it developed a policy which was approved by the University in 2013 (6). The University of Dar es Salaam issued a similar policy in 2016 (7) where the guidelines hold accountable not only the students for committing plagiarism but also the research supervisors for failing to detect it.

Staff Shortages, Graduate Programs, Research Supervision, and Unethical Practices Apart from the lack of research infrastructure, the new universities have dire shortages of qualified staff. To deal with the latter, they have resorted to training their own staff by launching postgraduate programs, in some cases, using the so-called “sandwich model” through collaboration with European universities. This is a model that allows the graduate student to undertake part of the program (course work or research) at the home university and the remaining part in another institution overseas. This will allow the student to access resources and facilities that are not available in the home institution while at the same time avoiding inbreeding. Academic staff publish with their postgraduate students drawing on the theses work of the latter. Faculty members generally teach many courses some with large class sizes in addition to supervising the research of postgraduate students. Some of the staff with rare skills and experiences are also sought in block teaching of courses in other universities. Contact and consultation hours between postgraduate students and supervisors are reduced to a minimum and this has created opportunities for unethical practices. For example, a postgraduate student in food sciences may choose a topic to undertake the nutritional and chemical analysis of a local legume, but may end up submitting a thesis from another university on another legume, by replacing the name of the legume, and by dressing up other sections of the introduction, acknowledgment, etc. Antiplagiarism softwares may either not be available or may fail to catch the offense if the source thesis is not well documented to start with. Some of the flagship universities of Africa may have properly set up functional review boards to address the ethical issues associated with the use 205

of animal and human subjects in research and on the handling, use, storage and disposal of dangerous materials. It is, however, unlikely that the large majority of newly created higher education institutions have such approval and clearance processes in place. Recent studies (8, 9) have shown a substantial increase in the rate of publications coming from African institutions. Though the numbers are low the growth has been noted to be much higher than the world average. However, it is also noted that the majority (over 95%) of these publications are based on international collaboration with co-authors based in institutions outside the continent. It is hoped and assumed that these collaborations have ensured adherence to international ethical standards. The growth in the number of higher education institutions in Africa has been phenomenal. Even with this growth it should be noted that the enrollment level remains at a mere 6% as opposed to the world average of 26% (10). Therefore, we should expect further growth to take place even as Africa grapples with quality and relevance issues in addition to the equally important concerns of maintaining ethical and safety standards and procedures.

Global Chemists Code of Ethics in Research In addressing the aforementioned concerns there are huge roles for professional bodies such as societies and academies. The development of appropriate and relevant guidelines and policies aligned to the best international practices need to be developed, regularly reviewed and updated. Plagiarism, the handling, use, storage and disposal of dangerous materials and the proper use of animals and humans in research should be properly regulated through the development of appropriate policies and ensuring their implementation. Historically physicians take the Hippocratic Oath promising the best professional conduct and practice in their work. Likewise, lawyers, engineers, nurses, pharmacists, etc. either take similar oaths or are required to get certifications and licenses. Thus, while a number of professionals are under oath to adhere to specified codes of ethics and practices, and those with licenses risk losing it for misconduct, such measures have not been applied to professional chemists. While it may be a worthwhile subject for professional associations and academies to explore the merits of introducing such measures, it is worth noting that the American Chemical Society has in fact developed what has been called Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE), which contains sections on Research (Scheme 1), and on Scientific Writing and Publishing (Scheme 2). The contents of these schemes were presented at the Nairobi Workshop in May 2017 and generated very lively discussions, which gave further motivation for writing this chapter.


Scheme 1. Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics “Research.”. Used with permission from reference (11).

Scheme 2. Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics “Scientific Writing and Publishing”. Used with permission from reference (11).


Peer Review Subjecting the scholarly research or literary work or research proposal ideas of an author to the scrutiny of experts in the field is important not only to build capacity, but also to ensure that due scientific processes are followed and risks of malpractices and misconduct minimized. For chemists the idea of peer review is as old as the field itself. The French lawyer/tax collector Antoine Lavoisier (1743-94) is regarded as the father of chemistry and his first book written in 1774 entitled Opuscules physiques et chymiques (12) lists a series of experiments which contributed to the rejection of the phlogiston theory and led to the discovery of oxygen. It is reported that Lavoisier had to “re-perform” all the experiments before the Commissioners of the Royal Academy of Sciences in Paris before the book was published (13). Thankfully, peer review has since evolved to more practical ways and decentralized since it is now the duty of editors of journals, funding bodies and academic review boards. One aspect of the challenge in Africa is to get experienced reviewers. It is often realized that papers sent for review are not reviewed on time, and this is exacerbated by the reports which are sometimes inadequate to help the editor or editorial board to make decisions or send useful feedback to the authors. It is important for early career chemists to fully understand the importance of the peer review process. Many national and pan-African chemical societies and academies in Africa are suitably placed to engage themselves in this regard. Unfortunately, less than half of the 54 countries in Africa have national chemical societies and academies (14) and therefore, other bodies (academic institutions, some pan-African organizations such as African Academy of Sciences (AAS), the Royal Society sponsored pan-African Chemistry Network PACN, etc.) are making some effort to fill the gaps.

Authorship Issues Who should be an author and in what sequence should the authors be listed in a publication? This was another important topic discussed in the Nairobi workshop where participants shared experiences. Participants mentioned when leaders of academic institutions, such as heads of departments or deans of faculties, either expected to be authors by virtue of their respective academic positions or sometimes researchers felt obliged to put them as authors. The common term here is “guest author,” which is used to indicate those who have not contributed to the work, but are included as authors. In some cases guest authors are included to give more credibility to the work and they may not even know about it. Participants were informed that such persons should not be recognized as authors unless they have made significant contribution to the work. They may, however, be acknowledged if they have encouraged or facilitated the research. On the other hand, “ghost authors” (15) are those who should be included as authors but are not. These may be professional writers who may be paid for composing 208

the manuscript given the raw data. All these were described with mentions of anecdotal encounters and participants were advised to avoid engaging in such practices. The take home messages were (i) only those who have made important contribution to the research work should be included as authors, (ii) who should be an author, including the order of listing, should be discussed and agreed as the research is conceived and if necessary, reviewed and updated prior to writing the manuscript for publication, and (iii) all authors must approve the final draft before submission for publication.

Avoid Reporting Fragmented Work It is not uncommon to see a series of papers which are fragmented, which are commonly referred to as “salami publications.” Such papers appear to be based on what has been referred to as “minimum publishable entity – principle”. They often have a standard format template, and, usually, have similar, even identical introduction and methodology. A given paper may vary from previous publications only in regard to one or two variables. Thus, one of the series of a “salami” publication may be investigating the antifungal properties of the dibasic acid, oxalic acid; a second paper may be that of malonic acid, a third, succinic acid, etc. The advice here is that such papers should be combined in one comprehensive report detailing the antifungal properties of the dibasic acids.

Preparing for a Successful Peer-Review of a Manuscript for Publication Researchers would be wise to do a self-analysis of the work they have done in order to determine the novelty of the results and convince themselves that they have results that need to be published, or it may even be that the preliminary results on hand need to be communicated quickly. At this stage, the most important first step before writing a manuscript for publication is probably to select the most appropriate journal. Carefully read the editorial policy, authors’ guidelines, read articles in current issues and confirm that you have selected the right journal. As Africa-based authors we may have the desire to publish in the most prestigious chemistry or scientific journals in the world. This is a valid ambition but there are a whole lot of other issues to consider as well. Is the work reported of interest to a global audience of chemists or scientists? From what is known by the author of this paper there are quite a number of Africa-based works in natural products, materials science, medicinal chemistry, etc., that are published in the best scientific journals of the world. Note that editors will receive a manuscript and do a preliminary review to determine if the submitted material should be considered for publication or not. If favorably considered then it will be sent to reviewers. It is important for authors to note some of the questions that editors of journals ask of reviewers: 209

• • • • • • • • •

Is the scope of the work appropriate for the journal? Are the methodology and data valid? Are the references complete and well documented? Does the work represent a significant contribution? Is the manuscript original? Is the manuscript written in a concise and effective manner? Is the coverage of the topic complete and well organized? Are the conclusions valid? Will the work have lasting value?

On the basis of the comments made by the reviewers, the editors will a) accept the manuscript, or b) return it for revision, or c) decline to publish. It is important that authors should read the comments of the reviewers carefully and give full and complete responses to each of the comments. If a researcher feels that a comment is irrelevant or inappropriate, then this should be explained politely and respectfully. It is useful to note that none of the comments made are intended to be personal and hence should not take any offense and avoid responding emotionally. My personal experience has been that in almost all cases the comments of reviewers are very useful and I have taken positive lessons from them even when the manuscript I submitted was rejected.

Copyright and Ethics of Scholarly Publishing The Nairobi workshop also addressed copyright and associated ethical issues. Copyright was defined as The exclusive legal right to reproduce, publish, sell, or distribute the “matter and form of” something (as a literary, musical, or artistic work). Some of the most common ethics violations were:

Self-Plagiarism Plagiarism is an act of academic fraud that implies “taking over the ideas, methods, or written words of another, without acknowledgment and with the intention that they be taken as the work of the deceiver”. If one “borrows” one’s own ideas from one’s own publication(s) without attribution, is the deception still academic fraud? Yes, it is, because it is an intentional attempt to deceive a reader by implying that new information is being presented. (16) Self-plagiarism often arises from a tendency by researchers who continue to publish on similar subjects over time and end up using the same phrases or sentences that were presented in previous publications. Sometimes it may be a verbatim, near verbatim, or very closely paraphrased reproduction of a methodology that was used in reporting previous work. It amounts to 210

plagiarism because it recycles parts of paper that have been published already. Self-plagiarism should be avoided by using such phrases as: “This work was done using methodologies that we have described in previous publications” and giving the appropriate references. Authors are also expected to notify the editor if part of the work has been presented at conferences, or if the work presented is drawn from a thesis that has already been defended. Authors’ letter of submission to the editor should indicate that the work described in the manuscript is not presented concurrently to other journals. Submitting the same manuscript to multiple journals at the same time is called hedging, and is to be avoided, as it is also unethical.

Africa-Based Editors

There are many Africa-based journals of good standing, no doubt, in part due to the diligence of the respective editors. Most of these are hosted by the South Africa-based African Journals on Line (AJOL). AJOL hosts 521 Journals on line (17) of which there are only 11 journals that include the word “chemistry” in their titles. But there are many journals that are devoted to science that also publish chemical research results. The need to have more journals dedicated to science including chemistry is no doubt justified but there is a dearth of good editors who are well experienced and able to handle the rigors of good editing and practice. The recent mushrooming of higher education institutions has also led to the launching of many university-based journals. The Ethiopian case where many university-based journals do not have experienced editors has already been mentioned. Once again this points to the need for the well established professional societies, the global academies like TWAS and the InterAcademy Panel, the International Council for Science, the American Chemical Society and the US National Academy of Sciences, the Royal Society, etc. to work closely with the Africa-based professional societies and academies in supporting editors of scientific journals.

Notable Cases of Irresponsible Research Conduct

The InterAcademy Council – the global network of science academies produced a policy report in 2012 (18) on the Responsible Conduct in the Global Research Enterprise, where it included six “notable cases of irresponsible research conduct”. These are presented in the Table below (Table 1) as concrete examples of unethical practices in different countries and among some of the highly regarded scientists. Most of the information in the Table comes from the IAP report with additional information of “action taken” included by searching in the literature. 211

Table 1. Concrete Examples of Irresponsible Research Conduct. Name, Country/Institution

Fraud Committed

Action Taken

Hwang Woo Suk, Seoul National University, South Korea.

Fabricated results of research on human stem cells that was reported in Science in 2004 and 2005.

Was fired from Seoul National University in March 2006 and in 2009, Hwang was found guilty of embezzling research funds and illegally purchasing human eggs, for which he received a two-year suspended jail sentence (19).

Gopal Kundu, National Centre for Cell Sciences in Pune, India.

Reused images in a 2005 paper that had been published earlier.

Was debarred from academic activities for three years by a committee of the Indian Academy of Sciences in 2010. The 20 paper was retracted by the journal that published it (18).

Li Liansheng, Xi’an Jiaotong University, China.

Is reported to have plagiarized the work of others online and this was the basis for him to receive an award.

Was stripped of a national award by the Ministry of Science and Technology in 2010 (18).

Diederik Stapel, Tilburg University, Netherlands.

Fabrication and falsification of data underlying numerous publications.

Was suspended from his institution and after subsequent investigation and “In June 2013 Stapel agreed, in a settlement with the prosecutor, to perform 120 hours of community service and to lose the right to some benefits associated with his former job equivalent to 1.5 years of salary. In this way, he avoided further criminal prosecution” (20).

Jon Sudbø, Norwegian Radium Hospital, Norway.

Fabricated patient data for multiple studies published through 2005 on pain killers and smoking risk.

His authorizations as a physician and a dentist were revoked by the Norwegian Board of Health Supervision in November 2006. Subsequently, in 2006 he was allowed to work as an assistant and in 2009 he received authorizations to practice as dentist and as a physician, but was permanently barred from engaging in research (18).

Scott Ruben, Tufts University, US.

Fabricating data of clinical trials during his research on pain management treatments.

Was sentenced to prison for health care fraud in 2010 (18).


Conclusions We, in Africa, as elsewhere, are in a period of fast global change with technological tools, untapped resources, possibilities, and a huge youth population that expects and demands quality education to be empowered to contribute to Africa’s and the global future. The higher education sector has undergone huge expansion without the concomitant injection of human and financial resources. This has happened at the expense of quality due to lack of investments, assurance, and compliance mechanisms. In turn, the declining quality has made institutions unattractive to the young and bright minds who wish to go to the best schools for higher degrees. Therefore, it is understandable that these institutions are facing serious challenges. They are trying to launch postgraduate programs to train faculty members and to increase their visibility and usefulness through publications. However, these efforts are exacerbated by increasing incidents of unethical practices. Mentoring of early career academic staff is very important to develop values, such as self-respect, confidence, honesty and integrity.

References 1.

Wikipedia listing of private and public universities for each of the 54 African countries came to an actual count of 1755. However, the entry dates for some are 2011. Hence the conservative estimate of 2000. 2. Iruonagbe, C. T.; Imhonopi, D.; Egharevba, M. E. Higher Education in Nigeria and the Emergence of Private Universities. Int. J. Educ. Res. 2015, 3 (2), 49–64. 3. Oral communication from an official of the Ministry of Education of Ethiopia. 4. EAS. National Journal Evaluation and Accreditation: A Strategy for Standardizing the Rating of Scholarly Performance in Ethiopia; Ethiopian Academy of Sciences: Addis Ababa, 2017. 5. Bruin, A. T. Plagiarism in South African Management of Journals. S. Afr. J. Sci. 2015, 111, 1–3. 6. Plagiarism Policy of the University of Nairobi. 2013. http://legaloffice. UoN_Submitted_Final_Version.pdf (accessed 2 January 2018). 7. Plagiarism Policy of the University of Dar es Salaam. 2016. http:// (accessed 2 January 2018). 8. AOSTI. Bibliometric series 1, 2013: Assessment of Scientific Output in the African Union 2005-2010; AOSTI: Malabo, 2014. 9. Elsevier Ethics in Research and Publication. Factsheet: Authorship. 910160WP0P126900disclose09026020140.pdf (accessed 6 January 2018). 10. AAI. The State of Education in Africa 2015; African American Institute: New York, 2015. 11. American Chemical Society, “Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics.” global-chemists-code-of-ethics.pdf (accessed 29 June 2018). 213

12. Lavoisier, A. L. Origins of Modernity: Alchemy and Chemistry. modernity/lavoisier.html (accessed 5 January 2018). 13. modernity/lavoisier.html (accessed 5 January 2018). 14. Abegaz, B. M. Challenges and Opprotunities for Chemistry in Africa. Nat. Chem. 2015, 8 (6), 518–522. 15. Elsevier. 2015. Ethics in Research and Publication. https:// (accessed 9 January 2018). 16. Bonnell, D. A.; Hafner, J. H.; Hersam, M. C.; Kotov, N. A.; Buriak, J. M.; Hammond, P. T.; Javey, A.; Nordlander, P.; Parak, W. J.; Schaak, R. E.; Wee, A. T.; Weiss, P. S.; Rogach, A. L.; Stevens, M. M.; Willson, C. G. Recycling is not Always Good: the Dangers of Self-plagiarism. ACS Nano 2012, 6 (1), 1–4. 17. African Journals on Line (AJOL). browse/alpha/index. 18. InterAcademy Council IAP – the global network of science academies. Responsible Conduct in the Global Research Enterprise: A Policy Report; IAP: Amesterdam, 2012. 19. Craine, A. C. Hwang Woo-Suk South Korean Scientist. Encyclopaedia Brittanica. (accessed 9 January 2018). 20. Wikepedia. Diederik Stapel. (accessed 9 January 2018).


Chapter 15

Responsible Conduct and Challenges in North Africa Mama El Rhazi* and Majda Breida Laboratory of Materials, Membranes and Environment, Faculty of Sciences and Technologies, University Hassan II of Casablanca, BP 146, Mohammedia 20650, Morocco *E-mail: [email protected]

The guidelines and codes of conduct that exist today have been created in response to a number of major incidents in the area of medical, health, and chemical research. They can be traced directly to the Nuremberg Code (1949) and the Declaration of Helsinki (1962). The implementation of a code of ethics in higher education institutions is generally a multidisciplinary activity, which demands experienced managers. This chapter will discuss experiences in these topics in Northern Africa and a possible vision to implement a code of conduct in universities in this region. Indeed, higher education institutions and learned societies should promote ethical values and attitudes among students that strengthen their responsibility toward society. Two crucial points will be discussed in this chapter: communicating science with the public and safety and security in the lab.

Introduction In April 2016, International Activities of the American Chemical Society (ACS) gathered 30 scientists from 18 countries for a workshop in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to collaboratively draft an actionable Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE). The GCCE converts the specific guidelines of Code of conduct (1) into rules, while being guided by The Hague Ethical Guidelines, the Code of Conduct Toolkit, and other codes (2–4). At the conclusion of the workshop, participants and other stakeholders were invited to adopt the code and share it with scientists in their institutions, professional societies, and communities upon their return © 2018 American Chemical Society

home. During the workshop, participants also decided to organize follow-up activities. One follow-up activity, which was organized by ACS, was the GCCE Science & Technology Leadership Institutes Program (STLIP). STLIPs were workshops for early-career chemists and chemical engineers to receive training to educate other chemists on the GCCE, as well as a variety of other related topics, such as publishing, research, communicating science, and lab safety. These workshops had limited availability (only 25 attendees per workshop) and were only available to citizens and residents of the countries represented at the Kuala Lumpur workshop. The first workshop took place in Rabat, Morocco, from February 6–11, 2017. The Moroccan Society of Analytical Chemistry for Sustainable Development agreed to serve as the host and assisted in planning this event, which brought together over five countries (Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Sudan, Nigeria). Our roles as teachers and researchers are to promote science and share knowledge. We have to play an important role in helping students become competent in communicating science, chemical safety and security, and publishing their research. The question is: what should be the role of academia in North Africa? Also, what should be the role of graduate students in North Africa? Is there any vision to align academia’s efforts with students in the field of chemical security and safety? Based on our personal experience, we propose actions for the implementation of codes of ethics, safety, and security in North African universities to help us continuously improve and move forward. Implementing an effective GCCE requires four main stages: Assess, Plan, Train, Inform (Figure 1).

Figure 1. GCCE implementation’s stages. As previously mentioned, in order to share knowledge and highlight the importance of adapting the GCCE, two events were organized in Morocco. The first was a workshop on STLIP held in Rabat, Morocco, from February 5–11, 2017. For one week, 18 people from North Africa, Egypt, and Sudan attended a training conducted by Bradley Miller, Abeer Al-Bawab, Ahmed Youssef, and Lori Brown. Three sessions were organized over the course of a week. By the end of October, the second event was organized by our society, the Moroccan Society of Analytical Chemistry for Sustainable Development, followed by the “scientific days of chemistry.” For two days, more than 500 hundred students were invited to attend the courses (target audience: bachelor’s, 216

master’s, and Ph.D. students). The event demonstrated excellent collaborative work from both professors and students, as well as from GCCE workshop participants and members of the Moroccan Society of Analytical Chemistry for Sustainable Development. Each session had a complex and varied audience composed of professors, laboratory technicians, and Ph.D., master’s, engineering, and undergraduate students. Participation of external experts and professors in the session’s program was of great importance to the debate. The event program was divided into three sessions, and each session had its own thematic debate. Firstly, and before starting the sessions, an overview of the GCCE (its development and the importance of ethics in practicing science) was addressed. The first presentation outlined ethical practices in scientific research writing and publishing, by giving definitions, clarifications, and methods to carry out poster presentations, oral communications, and articles and publish them in a way that effectively addressed the needs of Moroccan scientists. The second session discussed innovation, led by Saad Alami Younssi and external speaker Mohammed Tahiri (Innovation Chair Holder at University Hassan II of Casablanca), who defined innovation and discussed its use from the initial idea to final product. The presentation also gave some useful tips and contacts for innovators and inventors. The vast presentation covered an important point for chemists: safety and security. Mohamed Ouammou and Majda Breida presented the basics and guidelines of chemical safety and security in laboratories. They also significantly enhanced the presentation by giving examples and recommendations from their last experiences for better and safe work. These subjects were based on the GCCE principles.The attendees asked questions but mostly reacted by giving comments and advice from their own experience. For example: -



The audience asked about the background of the team who established the GCCE and if there was a French version of the GCCE. A brief overview of the team was provided, along with an explanation for the nonexistence of a French version but with an open invitation to start it. During the debate, there were questions related to the journal impact factor and the adequate method to publish in an indexed journal. How can students avoid plagiarism in their manuscript and is there specific software to check their work? How can innovation be protected? And what different organizations can support innovative projects? The feasibility of appropriate guidelines for chemical disposal and management for faculty of sciences and technologies in Mohammedia city was discussed. The availability of protection tools for chemicals spills and accidents was also mentioned.

Communicating Science with the Public According to the GCCE: “Research in chemical sciences should benefit humankind and improve quality of life, while protecting the environment and 217

preserving it for future generations. Researchers should conduct their work with the highest integrity and transparency, avoid conflicts of interest, and practice collegiality in the best way. Research should promote the exchange of new scientific and technological information and knowledge relating to the application of chemistry for the benefit of humankind and the environment” (5). The best way to share knowledge is, of course, to communicate science. Three main methods are generally adopted by professionals: 1.

Publication in a scientific journal is the best way to share new knowledge. Chemists should promote and disseminate scientific knowledge in research and innovation through outreach, scientific writing, and publication for sustainable development. Some fundamentals of ethics were identified (5). a. b. c.

2. 3.

Honesty and integrity in all stages of the publication process, which must meet the highest possible standards. Data reproducibility and correctness without plagiarism. Responsibility of supervisors to ensure that students’ scientific writings are free of defects and errors (5).

Oral presentations/posters at meetings. Blogs, open notebooks, Facebook, tweets, etc.

Two questions were consistently posed by Ph.D. and master’s students: 1. 2.

How important is a journal’s impact factor? How can students avoid plagiarism in their manuscripts and is there specific software to check their work?

In the interest of helping students and supervising teachers and to avoid plagarism, establishment of a plagiarism editor for articles and dissertations is necessary for universities. Each article and thesis should be submitted to the plagarism editor. Therefore, it is incumbant upon the thesis director to make sure that the scientific results have not been tampered with. The students were so interested in the subject that the implementation of a specific course for the students in the doctoral study center is envisaged for next year.

Chemical Safety and Security As chemists, we should promote the beneficial application, use, and development of science and technology while encouraging and maintaining a strong culture of safety, health, and security. Many chemicals that are used in the lab can be harmful if not handled properly (Figure 2). Chemical safety best practices are designed to protect people from accidently being exposed (5).


Figure 2. Bad laboratory practices.

Universities in Africa are in need of chemical safety and security facilities, professionals, and resource materials. It seems that the more the universities engage themselves with advanced chemistry research, the more they need the safety and security facilities and skills (6–8). The creation of a safety and security department in science faculties is a first step toward improving the process. In our opinion, the first step on making these improvements is to clarify the role of each manager. Establish who has which responsibilities and put measures in place to get the right people in the correct place. Universities should regularly include a module on chemical safety and security especially in training for technicians who work in the lab every day (9). In our master’s program, there has been a seven-week module dedicated to health and safety at work—an essential safety standard since 2000; however our technicians did not receive any training about safety and security.

Challenges to Safety and Security The state has a fundamental role in promoting safety and security by establishing a predictable global framework and conducting the reforms needed to establish rules for safety and security and stimulate innovation. Still, major transformations can be achieved with the involvement of academics, deans, and presidents of universities (Figure 3).


Figure 3. Involved parties.

In the private sector, large industrial companies and private universities in North Africa have already adopted charters for sustainable development and have central hygiene, safety, and security departments. These companies are investing in research and development and setting up partnerships with international universities and laboratories (10–12). Public security and safety programs must be launched in North African countries to promote sound chemical safety laboratories in universities. Recent reports regarding chemical management in North African universities have been released (13–16). These programs should be supported by a range of incentives and financial and technical measures to encourage the adoption of the GCCE and to obtain international certification or national recognition and the development of universities. To implement codes of ethics in North Africa and expand knowledge in this area based on the Moroccan Society of Analytical Chemistry for Sustainable Development, two symposiums will be organized in the next year. The first symposium will be specific to the personnel working in the laboratories, namely the laboratory technicians. Morocco has more than 10 public universities. Training should be provided to all technicians on good laboratory practices, classification of chemicals, and how to store them. This training should also be carried out in countries such as Algeria or Tunisia. Each research center within faculties of science must have a chemical management team or department as in developed countries. Similarly, the teaching laboratories dedicated to practical work in different departments using chemicals, namely, chemistry, biology, environment, or physics departments, must have a specific room where chemicals are stored. Procedures must be followed to prevent accidents due to improper storage or mishandling. The second symposium will aim to bring together scientists from the four North African countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya) to discuss the implementation of the Code of Ethics. The meeting organized in Morocco last October should be replicated in other countries like Algeria or Tunisia through their own society and in collaboration with the Federation of African Societies of Chemistry. We must have an exact overview of the current situation about publishing, chemical safety, and security in different universities of North Africa (Figure 4). We can begin by initiating a study to examine the existing situation and necessary action. Similar case studies have been done in the Philippines and Indonesia (12, 17).


Figure 4. Overview of publishing and chemical safety and security.

Acknowledgments Many thanks to Bradley Miller and Lori Brown from the American Chemical Society for organizing the GCCE Science & Technology Leadership Institutes Program in Rabat, Morocco. We met wonderful people and learned a lot. Many thanks to all those who helped us produce this chapter, especially Lauren Cashmore.

References 1.

2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7.

Van Valey, T. L. Ethical Guidelines and Codes of Conduct in Social and Behavioral Research. In International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences; Elsevier: 2015; pp 37–42. Cook, R. J.; Dickens, B. M.; Fathalla, M. F. Reproductive Health and Human Rights; Oxford University Press: 2003. Tang, C. The Hague Ethical Guidelines; 2004; p 32. 2014 Code of Conduct Toolkit; p 124. The Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics. international/regional/eventsglobal/global-chemists-code-of-ethics.html (accessed Aug 1, 2018). Engida, T.; Ababa, A. Chemical safety in laboratories of African universities. Afr. J. Chem Educ. 2011, 1 (2), 15. Walters, D. B.; Ho, P.; Hardesty, J. Safety, security and dual-use chemicals. J. Chem. Health Saf. 2015, 22 (5), 3–16.



9. 10.








Govere, E. M. The role of international chemists in developing countries and the pre-requisite for their success. In Mobilizing Chemistry Expertise To Solve Humanitarian Problems Volume 2; ACS Symposium Series; Grosse, R. L., Ed.; American Chemical Society: Washington, DC, 2017; Vol. 1268, pp 21–48. Langerman, N. Chemical safety – chemical security. J. Chem. Health Saf. 2016, 23 (1), 47–48. Ensuring the Right to Equitable and Inclusive Quality Education: Results of the Ninth Consultation of Member States on the Implementation of the UNESCO Convention and Recommendation against Discrimination in Education; 2017. 251463e.pdf. Education for All 2000 - 2015: Achievements and Challenges, 1st ed.; Benavot, A., Ed.; EFA Global Monitoring Report; UNESCO Publications: Paris, 2015. Lestari, F.; Budiawan; Kurniawidjaja, M. L.; Hartono, B. Baseline Survey on the Implementation of Laboratory Chemical Safety, Health and Security within Health Faculties Laboratories at Universitas Indonesia. J. Chem. Health Saf. 2016, 23 (4), 38–43. Almansour, S.; Kempner, K. The Challenges of Delivering Public Good in Arab Universities: Faculty Perspectives. Educational Research for Policy and Practice 2017, 16 (3), 219–234. Fagnani, E.; Guimarães, J. R. Waste Management Plan for Higher Education Institutions in Developing Countries: The Continuous Improvement Cycle Model. J. Cleaner Prod. 2017, 147, 108–118. Housni, H.; Amri, M.; Tahiri, N. J.; Tahiri, M. Qualitative Study on the Management of Chemicals at Research Laboratories at Casablanca Medecine and Pharmacy Faculty (Morocco). In Recent Advances in Environmental Science from the Euro-Mediterranean and Surrounding Regions; Kallel, A., Ksibi, M., Ben Dhia, H., Khélifi, N., Eds.; Springer International Publishing: Cham, 2018; pp 2019–2020. Abou-Elela, S. I.; Ibrahim, H. S. Management of laboratory hazardous wastes: Experience from egypt; International Waste Working Group: 2014; p 9. Uy, M. M. The Status of Chemical Safety and Security in Universities in Mindanao, Philippines. J. Chem. Health Saf. 2011, 18 (6), 8–14.


Chapter 16

Responsible Conduct of Chemical Sciences Research and Challenges in Nigeria and West Africa Eucharia O. Nwaichi* Department of Biochemistry, Faculty of Science, University of Port Harcourt, P.M.B.5323, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria *E-mail: [email protected]

West Africa (and Africa in the broader sense) has continued to battle poor water quality, food security, and a spate of disease spread. The learned society has continued to make contributions to overcoming these hurdles through the chemical sciences that have brought huge benefits to humanity. These range from advances in healthcare (pharmaceuticals and clinical applications) to contributions to healthy and productive lives, to agriculture in higher crop yields and advances in technology that have done everything from compiling the cell phones in our pockets to bringing mankind to the moon. The practice of chemical science research comes with huge responsibility and this requires the deployment of acquired specialized knowledge thereof to help the environment and other people. Representative samples from chemical scientists culled from academia, government and industry were randomly chosen to assess the manner to which the conduct of chemical science research is upheld in Nigeria, and by extension West Africa, vis-à-vis chemical science ethics and human rights. Most West African countries do not have national professional societies for chemical science researchers and the few existing regional counterparts were formed out of Western intervention. Identified ethical and rights concerns in the chemical science profession were linked to poor chemical science research funding, policy implementation, reward mechanisms, regulation, infrastructure, exposure, patronage,

© 2018 American Chemical Society

and government and industry support. Responsible conduct in the chemical sciences in Nigeria was found to be heightened in research institutions where there are existing interactions with industries. Such relationships birth innovative research that is needed to successfully accomplish the technological advances that will enable Nigerian companies to continue to participate in and compete in the global economy.

Introduction In the history of science, West Africa has a strong farming tradition for which the captives from this region became notable in the agricultural growth in the West. The drying of clay under the sun and irrigation terraces (1) in Nigeria among other West African countries testifies to the early presence of engineering activities by ancient natives. Explosive population growth in Nigeria and the continent has not come with commensurate growth in science and, in particular, the chemical sciences and engineering as this field explains the reactions around agriculture, preservation techniques and irrigation for which they are famous. The ACS Global Chemists Code of Ethics (GCCE) Science & Technology Leadership Institute (2) described chemistry practitioners as scientists, engineers, technicians, trades people, business people or anyone else who has contact with chemicals at work or at home. They also defined chemistry professionals as subsets of chemical practitioners in the sense that chemistry professionals are scientists and engineers, who, by virtue of their specialized education, certifications or licensures, are authorized to offer chemistry services to the public (2). The Division of Chemical Health and Safety and the Committee on Chemical Safety of the American Chemical Society jointly outlined the responsibilities of a chemical scientist (3) to include working with chemicals safely; developing competency in carrying out assessments, evaluating hazards, and mitigating the risks of those hazards; participating actively in their organizational culture on the safe practice of chemistry; acquiring safety skills; and providing appropriate chemical safety information to impacted parties. These carefully crafted roles cannot be effectively lived out by a chemistry professional working in isolation and in the wake of misconduct like duplicity, plagiarism, or falsification. This requires strategized development and capacity building among professionals. Industrial, economic, social, and professional prospects relating to chemical sciences cannot be realized amidst misconduct in related research and scholarship. Also, weak international cooperation among chemical scientists may not be unconnected with irresponsible conduct in the laboratory. Responsible conduct of research (RCR) is the pursuit of scientific investigation with integrity and take into account the recognition and utilization of established professional norms and ethical principles in the delivering tasks related to scientific research (4). Ethical and responsible conduct of research is critical for excellence, as well as public trust, not just in chemical science but in the whole of science and engineering. Consequently, education in the responsible and ethical conduct of research is considered essential in the preparation of future scientists and engineers. 224

The America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science (COMPETES) Act of 2007 (5) focuses public attention on the importance of the U.S. national research community’s enduring commitment and broader efforts to provide RCR training as an integral part of the preparation and long term professional development of current and future generations of scientists and engineers (5). Responsible conduct of research and scholarship in the chemical sciences can only be measured by performance in chemical scientists’ codes of conduct, chemists’ codes of ethics, record keeping (data acquisition, management and sharing), authorship (including anti-plagiarism initiatives) and the responsibilities of individual chemists and, by extension, individual scientists as well as those of the institution. It is indeed compulsory to optimize all effective communication (6) channels to bring about desired changes. To develop chemical sciences education and research in West Africa and to build capacities, societies like the West African Chemical Society (7), the Federation of African Societies of Chemistry, the Pan Africa Chemistry Network (8), the Chemical Society of Nigeria, the ACS International Center (on, Mauritanian Chemical Society, and several other national allied chemical science and engineering societies were formed. This study submits that many West African chemical scientists have yet to form professional societies that will strive to strengthen their advancement and professional interests. This is not a good sign in a region laden with developmental challenges. How do they provide feedback to the profession and get updates from global discussions? This work seeks to investigate the nature of conduct of chemical sciences research and posed challenges, with emphasis on ethics and human rights in Nigeria and West Africa.

Materials and Methods: Study Structure This study was constituted in a three-way data generation approach in that the data harvested were derived from responses to administered questions using the instrument - questionnaire, key informant (administrators) interviews (with site visitation) and reported studies in literature. Study Population A research population consists of a complete set of items or individuals that are of interest to the researcher or investigator. The population was culled from among chemists, chemical engineers, and allied scientists of issues and activities at the intersection of chemistry, human rights, and ethics from the academia, industry and government. For ease of comparison and administration, the research population was selected of those working in Port Harcourt Nigeria. Port Harcourt is the capital and largest city of Rivers state Nigeria (9), the social and economic live-wire of the state that lies along the Bonny river. It is located in the Niger Delta and was estimated to have a population of 1,865,000 as of 2016. The Port Harcourt urban area’s population as increased from 1,382,592 as of 2006 (10, 11). Port Harcourt is growing rapidly with industrializating activities and houses 225

a great number of institutions of secondary and tertiary education (both private and government - owned), oil firms and other related industries, and regulatory agencies of government, where chemistry, among other fields, is being practiced. Between prominent tertiary education institution, oil firm and government agencies, there are about 750 professionals working in chemistry and related fields. Relevant administrators like deans of science, heads of departments, chief lab technologists, directors of agency, and store managers were interviewed for management-level input. This study intends to sample the opinions, experience and perception of chemistry professionals such as academics, laboratory scientists and technologists, process chemists, pharmacists, chemical engineers, managers of chemical laboratories, managers of chemical stores and safety desk officers for chemicals and their products, etc. in Port Harcourt Nigeria to address set study objectives. Sample Size and Sampling Technique A stratified random sampling technique which involves dividing the study population into strata and then randomly sampling the study group in these strata was adopted to select a subset of the population whose properties are to be generalised to the entire population. The three job categories (academia, industry and government) were adopted as the strata and no less than two chemistry and related departments were selected for sampling in each spread. This gave a representative data of the three spreads of the study population. Taro Yamane’s formula was employed to determine the sample size (n) from the population size (N) at the level of significance (e) thus:

This implies that n = 750/{1+750(0.05)2} which is approximately 261. A cross-sectional descriptive study design was adopted. Ott and Longnecker (12) defined a cross-sectional study as ‘a type of observational study that analyzes data collected from a population, or a representative subset, at a specific point in time, capturing people who are similar on other characteristics but different on a factor of interest’. Data Collection Pre-tested adapted questionnaire was administered to 400 subjects. Data Analysis Analysis of retrieved questionnaire: a simple grid was prepared on an Excel spreadsheet to collate provided data on valid instruments (questionnaires correctly filled). A coding system was adopted thus: a)

11 of 12 questions were closed questions so were straightforward to code and reverse numerical scale as code was used. i.e. scales 1, 2, 3, 4, 226



d) e) f) g) h)

and 5 were coded 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1 respectively because 1 represented the highest score in the questionnaire and 5 describe the highest score for easy comprehension. Question 12 was an open question and provided feedback was reviewed and grouped into sufficiently manageable sets of groups and coded. To do this effectively, all responses were read to be able to group them meaningfully. Question 11’s scale (Excellent, Very good, ….) were translated to numerical scale 1, 2, …respectively and transposed to 5, 4,… respectively on grounds earlier stated. Three grids independently done represented males, females and unidentified sexes. The scores were added between questions. There was no need to design a code for missing data as there was an entry for all questions. Two - way (vertical and horizontal) approach was adopted The mean score was used as an index of the overall quality in awareness, patronage and enforcement of ethical practice and responsible conduct of chemical sciences research with lower scores indicating low adoption, patronage and enforcement and vice versa.

A more legitimate approach of adding of scores over a number of related questions to derive some indicators of the overall quality. Basically, simple percentage frequency tables and other descriptive statistical tools such as bar charts and pie charts to present the data were generated. Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) Version 20 was utilized to analyze collected data. Frequency distributions and percentages of all relevant variables were represented in tables and charts for ease of assimilation. Kendall’s Coefficient of Concordance (W), a statistical tool used in measuring the trend of agreement among the respondents (13) was used and is given as:

where Sd, m and n represent the sum of squared deviation, total number of respondents, and total number of questions. Its value ranges from 0 (no agreement) to 1 (complete agreement)

Ethical Consideration Ethical approval was obtained from the quality assurance & control of the academic institution studied while permission to carry out this study was obtained from the officer in-charge of the various study departments in academia, government and industry before the questionnaire was administered to each respondent. The concept and purpose of the study as well as the associated confidentiality clause were carefully explained to the respondents. Only consenting workers were given questionnaires. 227

Results and Discussion Data collected from site visitation, questionnaire administration, key informant (administrators) interviews and reported studies in literature are reported. Of 400 questionnaires distributed based on the adopted stratified random sampling technique, from a population size of 750, 290 properly completed questionnaires were retrieved (Table 1). This number conforms to the sample size of 261 determined using Taro Yamane’s formula.

Table 1. Questionnaire Retrieval No. administered Questionnaire

No. retrieved Questionnaire

No. not retrieved

% retrieved

% not retrieved






Social demographics showed that there were more male chemical scientists than females sampled in this study (Table 2). Data harvested here buttresses the position of Smith (14) and Elsevier (15) that chemistry and science respectively remain a male - dominated arena.

Table 2. Gender of Respondents Gender












Participants within the age range of 36 - 55 constitute the majority of respondents, representing 69% of the total respondents. This is closely followed by those within the age range of 56 and above representing 24%, and 7% for the participants aged between 25 and 35 years. There are no significant differences among the age ranges of 36 - 45, 46 - 55 and 56 and above. However, significantly fewer are the number of chemical science professionals in the age range of 25 - 35 (Figure 1). This may be due to staggered interest among very young professionals in partaking in studies of this sort. Qualification of respondents indicated that more chemistry professionals in government and industry had a Bachelor as their highest degree obtained although they have attended other professional training. Figure 2 also revealed that two respondents from the industry have a higher diploma as their highest qualification. 228

Figure 1. Age of respondents. Bars represent mean±SE and values with different letters are significantly different at p ≤ 0.05.

Figure 2. Qualification of respondents. Bars represent mean±SE and values with different letters are significantly different at p ≤ 0.05.


Results from the field show that 55% of the study population are aware of RCR while 10% were undecided. Schulz (16) submits that reporting misconduct in scientific (and chemistry in particular) research - everything from minor ethical violations, such as, intentionally failing to cite literature that disagrees with the logic and/or conclusions of a research report, to utter fabrication and falsification - is a responsibility shared by all scientists. How can the remaining 35% identify and report misconduct in chemical science research when they do not understand the concept and its major implications? It therefore creates the need for urgent action on the part of chemical professional societies and research institutions. The informed group ranked the frequency of occurrence of ethical and human rights misconduct in their field as ‘high’ on a 5-point scale running from ‘very high’, ‘high’, ‘moderate’, ‘low’ to ‘very low’ and enumerated challenges/precursors as: a)

No strategic directions to guide the chemical scientists to new competencies in the area and this leads to uneven practices in job delivery. This gap can be filled if employing institutions make and communicate (6) clear expectations that new chemical science professionals be knowledgeable about, skilled in, and committed to safe practices and provide tailored training that supports these expectations from both new and existing staff. b) The physical location of researchers in scattered offices breaks cohesion among them. This scattering was a result of poor and inadequate infrastructure which when new ones are built, unsettled members will be accommodated in the new building. Respondents agreed that such arrangements are inimical to boosting confidence and building informal relationships that can spark off collaborations and build trust instead of working in isolation. c) Poor research funding that supports researchers to participate in international chemical science and engineering activities that keeps them informed and active in the global discussion and direction of the field. It is the responsibility of employers to provide appropriate resources and support for responsible chemical science and laboratory practice. Chemical science is capital intensive and should be supported financially by professional societies, government, industries, and philanthropists since it in turn brings development and gives confidence to the researcher. RSC (8) reported it has invested over £2 million in the Pan Africa Chemistry Network since 2008 and has collaborated with more than 35 different organisations on events and activities. Edwards (17) opined that the biggest challenges facing the continent with regards to chemical analysis is the prohibitive costs of the equipment. d) Compromised recruitment processes that trample on human rights and ethics. According to the National Academy Press (18), the primary reason for the high calibre of the work at National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), during inspection, is the impressive collection of staff. They reported evidence that resulted in a number of awards from external organizations, as well as from institutions within the federal government, experiences serving on regional and international standards 230

committees, responsible positions occupied in professional societies, in standards and trade organizations, and on editorial boards (18). e) Weak or no regulation by relevant government agencies and little or no interest from the industry. There is a weak link among government, universities, and industry and this situation discourages relevant knowledge creation, development and application of technology, measurements, and standards, resulting in a sickly economy and creating insincerity and irresponsibility within the system. f) Poor, non-functional, outdated or no chemical measurement infrastructure to improve the industry’s productivity and competitiveness. Such a facility, if available, would enhance public health, safety, environmental quality and guarantee equity in trade. This would attract money in the form of awards/prizes, grants, professorial chairs, etc. from pertinent industries. As employers, chemical research institutions must recognize and encourage the all-important connection between scientific excellence and excellence in safety as stressed by the American Chemical Society (3). g) Unrealistic requirements for promotion. Many of respondents from academia (75%) agreed that the criteria for promotion, in a bid to join their global peers, puts pressure on researchers to cheat through guest authorship, plagiarism, duplicity and breach of other ethical stipulations. h) Poor remuneration. Poorly paid chemical science professionals, if not highly trained and inwardly motivated, indulge in all forms of non-career related activities to raise money for upkeep. These man-hours lost could have been invested in sustainability and inherent safety research and programs, green chemistry, and peer discussion or even healthy reflection.

Table 3. Perception about employer’s commitment Question

Strongly Agree




Strongly Disagree

Employer is concerned about responsible conduct of chemical science research and scholarship

37 (13%)

72 (25%)

53 (18%)

73 (25%)

55 (19%)

There is adequate monitoring and supervision of the chemical science practices in this facility.

22 (8%)

21 (7%)

58 (20%)

81 (28%)

108 (37%)


Clearly, respondents across strata insisted that there is a weak institutional commitment to RCR in chemical science (Table 3) and few mechanisms are in place to monitor practices in the chemical science field. This may have led to increasing misconduct as reported by the administrators. Some misconduct led to summary dismissal after culprits failed to prove themselves innocent during interaction with various committees including disciplinary, plagiarism and ethics committees. The government’s commitment to RCR from this study is imaginary. Expired reagents were seen standing in a government-owned lab waiting for bureaucratic approval to be sent to the Head Office for ‘supposed’ destruction, likely for years. No supervision in chemical research facilities is shown in Figures 3 and 4. These time bombs await professionals, the environment and other people who directly or indirectly interact with the facility. Such practice by a chemistry professional negates the ethics and rights of the profession. Supervision and monitoring could adequately flush out such saboteurs and respond urgently. These findings corroborated the responses to whether chemicals were safely and properly handled and stored as 80% of respondents answered in the negative.

Figure 3. Photograph showing gross misconduct in storing gas cylinders, unidentified reagents and unsorted bottles of reagents in a study chemical science facility. (Port Harcourt, 3rd March 2017. Photo by author).


Figure 4. Photograph showing dilapidated and inappropriate holders and racks containing both expired and non-expired reagents in a study facility. (Port Harcourt, 3rd March 2017. Photo by author).

Many respondents (41%) were not aware about Responsible Conduct of Research, (RCR). Only 54% of 290 respondents knew and understood RCR (Table 4). Knowledge of RCR in the practice of chemistry is important to forming a positive attitude that will inform behaviour (19). The knowledge gap identified from this study may have contributed to incessant misconduct observed.

Table 4. Knowledge of responsible conduct of research (RCR) Question




Do you know about and understand RCR?

156 (54%)

119 (41%)

15 (5%)

A spearman’s rank order correlation was performed, to determine the relationship between the chemistry professionals’ knowledge of RCR and how they apply and observe these practices in their work.


Research Question 1 Is there a relationship between the knowledge of RCR and application/ observation of RCR practices? H0: there is no significant relationship between the knowledge of RCR and application/observation of RCR practices. H1: there is a significant relationship between the knowledge of RCR and application/observation of RCR practices. Original data was used to minimize suppression of variance and a correlation score (ρ) of 0.15 was obtained. This result shows that there is a 15% relationship between both variables which proves that the relationship is significant, hence the hypothesis is accepted. There was a positive linear correlation between the knowledge gained and the practices observed by the chemistry professionals given the correlation coefficient = 0.150 (asterisked), making our relationship statistically significant (Table 5). The alternate hypothesis (H1) is therefore accepted, as there is a significant relationship between the knowledge of RCR and the application/observation of RCR practices in chemical sciences.

Table 5. Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation Correlations

Spearman’s ρ


Chemistry professionals have knowledge and training

Correlation coefficient

Observe RCR practices

Correlation coefficient

Chemistry profession also have knowledge and training

Observed RCR practices


.150a .013

Sig. (2-tailed) N





Sig. (2-tailed)





Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

As shown in Figure 5, a total of 140 and 90 respondents which accounts for 48% and 31% of the study group, rated occurrence of various acts of misconduct in chemical science facilities as high and moderate respectively and these ratings were statistically significant. The study also submits that there is a poor perception of reporting misconduct due to cultural biases (that infringes on rights and chemical science ethics) based on ethnic ties, ‘age-seniority’, expected behaviour of a particular gender and scapegoatism.


Figure 5. Ranking of recorded misconduct. Bars represent mean±SE and values with different letters are significantly different at p ≤ 0.05.

Conclusion The conducting of chemical science research in Nigeria, and West Africa by extension, is marred by poor awareness of Responsible Conduct of Research in the practice of chemistry. A direct relationship has been found with resulting behaviour among science professionals. Chemical misconduct is on the rise among chemistry professionals, of whom many of their activities are not supervised and monitored. Such irresponsibility is capable of jeopardizing the existence of future generations and causes a huge violation of right to live and survive. The ethical expectations of a chemistry professional demands that they be poised to protect themselves, the people around them, and the environment. More commitment and oversight from the government is urgently needed in this sector, which will boost the economy in a win-win and restore age-long integrity in various areas of competencies in the Nigerian nation and West African region at large. The lack of reward mechanism for teams, units and departments conducting responsible chemical science research is inimical to the struggling growth in RCR among chemical scientists in Nigeria. Laboratories and chemistry professionals that are in constant interaction with the industry recorded more successes with RCR in the chemical sciences. That is attributable to the high implementation of sanctions and rules/regulations in the industry especially the multinationals. More cooperation is therefore encouraged between industry and academia for technological development championed by responsible chemistry professionals.


Recommendations i)

ii) iii) iv)




Seminars, establishment of RCR club for students, do-it-yourself training with support staff available for concerns arising thereof, online or onsite training for new staff and/or a refresher course for existing staff may be a requisite for promotion or every three years for staff ‘who are at the bar.’ This will improve the knowledge gap in RCR in chemical sciences for Nigerian and West African chemistry professionals. Science communication models should be leveraged for proper assimilation. Inclusion of institutional RCR plans in the requirements for accessing research funds/funding should be made. The research community should be encouraged to attend ethics seminar series to be organized by the institutional office of research. A desk officer for research compliance position should be established with clear terms of reference and specific regulations spelled out for chemical sciences in terms of ethics and rights. Effective documentation of action is non-negotiable and an appropriate reward mechanism should be instituted for compliant teams or departments and publicized. Thematising chemical science research areas by hatching departments and units, may be more appetizing for ‘ever busy’ industry, chemical science professionals and practitioners to understand at a glance what is at stake for them and to spark interest. A concerted effort should be made by the government and other employers of chemical scientists to set agendas, communicate set objectives clearly, and to provide appropriate infrastructure, research funds, and adequate training for new and existing chemistry professionals to boost integrity, confidence and responsibility.

Tomorrow’s science and residual development needs today’s responsible chemical scientists.

References 1. 2.



Asante, M. The History of Africa; Routledge: New York, 2007. ACS GCCE Science & Technology Leadership Institute. Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE) workshop material; Rabat, Morocco, 5−11 February, 2017; pp 1−5. American Chemical Society. Responsibilities of Chemistry Professionals and their Organizations. 2017. chemical-safety/responsibilities-of-chemistry-professionals-and-theirorganizati.html (retrieved 12 January 2018). RCR. Responsible conduct of research. Office of Research, UC Santa Barbara. 2010. (retrieved 11 January 2018). 236


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America COMPETES. 110th Congress (2007-2008). 2007. https:// (retrieved 10 January 2018). Nwaichi, E. O.; Abbey, B. W. Essentials of scientific communication in a productive research. J. Sci. Res. Rep. 2015, 7 (7), 525–531. IUPAC, International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry. Report of the congress that took place in Cotonou in August 1998. Chem. Int. 2000, 22, 2. (retrieved 11 January 2018). RSC. Royal Society of Chemistry. The Pan Africa Chemistry Network: Building strong scientific networks across Africa and the globe. geographically/pacn/ (retrieved 12 January 2018). Ogbonna, D. N.; Amangabara, G. T.; Ekere, T. O. Urban solid waste generation in Port Harcourt metropolis and its implications for waste management. Manage. Environ. Qual. Int. J. 2007, 8 (1), 71–88. Demographia. Demographia World Urban Areas, 11th ed.; 2016. (retrieved 7 January 2018). Arizona-Ogwu, L. C. Port Harcourt PDP Rally Stampede: Irregular Or Deregulated Police Action? Nigerians In America. 2011. Retrieved 25 June 2014. Ott, R. L.; Longnecker, M. T. An Introduction to Statistical Methods and Data Analysis; Cengage Learning, Mathematics: 2015; pp 17−1125. Nwaogazie, I. L. Probability and Statistics for Science and Engineering Practice; University of Port Harcourt Press: Port Harcourt, RV, 2011; pp 7−44. Smith, D. Women in Chemistry. Angew. Chem., Int. Ed. 2011, 50, 782–783. Elsevier. Science remains male-dominated. Women in Research. 2018. (retrieved 12 January 2018). Schulz, W. G. Ethics and the Responsible Conduct of Research in the Chemical Community: The Unique Role and Challenges of the News Media. Account Res. 2015, 22 (6), 384–401. Edwards, G. Fostering Chemical Science Training for Africa’s Development. 2017. (retrieved 13 January 2018). The National Academy Press. An Assessment of the National Institute of Standards and Technology Measurement and Standards Laboratories: Fiscal Year. 2001. (retrieved 12 January 2018). Tuvadimbwa, J. Knowledge and practices among registered nurses on occupational hazards in Onandjokwe Health District: Oshikoto Region, Namibia. MPH Thesis of the University of Namibia, Namibia, 2005. (retrieved 16 January 2018).


Chapter 17

Responsible Conduct and Challenges in East Africa Dickson Andala* Chemistry Department, Multimedia University of Kenya, PO Box 15653-00503, Magadi Road, Nairobi, Kenya, 00503 *E-mail: [email protected] or [email protected]

Responsible conduct in research is fundamental for sustainability and advancement of Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) driven economy. It ensures good practices through mentoring and education since it allows for self-correcting nature of research to operate effectively. The East Africa region is rapidly accelerating the advancement of STI-driven economy by building institutional frameworks that promote research. This should be in tandem with establishing procedures and institutions aimed at preventing irresponsible conduct. This chapter highlights the role of professional bodies in promoting responsible conduct in academic institutions and industries within East Africa region and challenges abound. Notably, the Kenya Chemical Society (KCS) and Tanzania Chemical Society (TCS) have been instrumental in advocating for responsible conduct in research and development through: Establishing Chemists Code of Ethics, Chemical Safety and Security trainings, Journal articles review and publishing, and registration of professional chemists.

1. Introduction The intricacies and challenges of achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) revolve around the utilization of Science, Technology, and Innovation (STI) to address the seventeen SDGs (1). The practice of responsible conduct in research is fundamental to attainment of sustainable development worldwide. © 2018 American Chemical Society

The practice of a responsible culture in East Africa has been majorly pioneered and dominated by manufacturing industries as required by regulatory agencies such as environment protection and occupational health and safety agencies (2, 3). For industries, safety is critically important since, if ignored, the penalty could be heavy and may put them out of business. Each East African country has an environmental protection as well as occupational health and safety agency. In Kenya, there exists the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) and Directorate of Occupational Safety and Health Services (DOSHS), respectively. For compliance and self-regulation amongst industries in Kenya, an umbrella association exists to guide and to ensure implementation of these mandatory regulations. This responsible conduct by industries is championed by the Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) (4). Similar associations exist in Uganda, the Uganda Manufacturers Association (UMA) (5), and in Tanzania, the Confederation of Tanzania Industries (CTI) (6). Most government agencies and parastatals in the East Africa region practice responsible conduct in their operations. In Kenya for instance, the Kenya Nuclear Electricity Board (KNEB) promotes safe and secure application of nuclear technology for sustainable electricity generation and distribution in Kenya as well as medical diagnosis (7). Likewise, the National Biosafety Authority promotes transparent, science-based, and predictable processes for reviewing and making decisions on the development, transfer, handling, and use of genetically modified organisms and related activities (8). Similar agencies exist in Uganda and Tanzania with an oversight role in more specialized area including intellectual property rights such as copyright. In East Africa, the academic community engaged in research has not been under pressure to underscore need for responsible conduct in their performance. For instance laboratory safety, chemical safety and security measures are lacking. This can be attributed to the absence of a clear regulation on safety in laboratories within learning institutions. The Occupational and Safety Act is in effect, but is only strongly enforced within industries (2). There exists in the East Africa states, agencies formed to regulate, fund, and inform respective governments to matters related to Science, Technology and Innovation. In Kenya for instance, the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) (9), whose objective is to regulate and assure quality in the Science, Technology, and Innovation sector and advise the government. Among its functions, two are geared towards promoting responsible conduct in research: accredit research institutes and approve all scientific research in Kenya, and assure relevance and quality of Science, Technology and Innovation programmes in research institutes. In Uganda there exists the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST) (10) whereas in Tanzania, the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) (11) both have similar mandate to NACOSTI (Kenya). These state agencies are responsible for formulating ethical guidelines, accrediting research ethics committees and ensuring the ethical conduct of research, but they are silent on research integrity. They have relegated matters of responsible conduct to individual institutions within respective East African countries. For instance, research requiring ethical review is handled by individual institutions with minimal oversight. Similarly, the formation of 240

Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) units to oversee responsible conduct is at the discretion of individual institutions. These challenges compelled professional societies from different specialties in sciences and engineering across East Africa to promulgate professional code of ethics and conduct. This aimed at fostering institutionalization of responsible conduct in research as well as promoting an ethical and safety culture within the East Africa region. In Kenya, this has been championed by the Kenya Chemical Society both locally and regionally. In Tanzania, the Tanzania Chemical Society (TCS) has been at the forefront in championing for responsible conduct in research. In Uganda as of now, there exists no platform nor association for professional and allied chemists. It is still in its formative stages. This chapter highlights roles played by professional bodies in Chemistry in advocating responsible conduct in research and challenges encountered within East Africa.

2. Professional Chemical Societies 2.1. Kenya Chemical Society (KCS) The Kenya Chemical Society is the professional body for chemical scientists under the Society’s act of Kenya. It holds the accountability for advancement and certification of competence in chemical science, and maintaining the integrity of its members. As such the KCS is a non-political scientific and professional society for chemists in Kenya. It was officially registered on the 19th September, 1991. Membership can be individual as in the case of technicians, technologists, researchers, lecturers, or students drawn from universities in Kenya. Additionally, membership is open to professional chemists from the government, research institution, industry and internationals (11). The KCS also has institutional and cooperate membership open to any organization or industry involved in the advancement of Chemistry or manufacturing. This can be through active technical, financial, and moral support for training, or research and development (manufacturing, processing, distribution and disposal). The KCS has adopted five core values with one of them being responding to the need for responsible conduct; that is ‘Chemical Safety and Security’. The Kenya Chemical Society has a constitution that governs its operations steered by the governing council which constitutes the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, Vice–Secretary, and Editor-in-Chief (11). All members are expected to uphold the constitution as well as the ‘The Professional Practice and Code of Conduct’ which applies to all members upon joining the society (11). The objectives of the code include: i.

To provide a benchmark of professional conduct by which the members of the Kenya Chemical Society must adhere to, ii. To guide Kenyan Chemists and allied professionals, and the public in defining their ethical, moral rights and responsibilities, iii. To provide a system of nurturing competence, knowledge, professional conduct, consistency, integrity, and ethics in the carrying out of Chemical research, Chemical Manufacturing, and in teaching Chemistry, 241

iv. To provide for the regulation and discipline of Chemists and allied practitioners. The Kenya Chemical Society, steered by the governing council, is fully committed to ensuring that it operates as an ethical organization with regard to maintaining responsible conduct. Members undertaking any activities on behalf of the KCS are expected to be fair and honest and act with a lawfully correct behaviour at all times. As a requirement, all members: i.

Should never engage in an action that conflicts with their integrity, or that of the KCS, ii. Must never act in a way that could be interpreted as being discriminatory in any form, iii. When speaking out against alleged wrong-doing on the part of an employer or others, one should seek KCS advice since the KCS has a role to fulfil in such matters, iv. When faced with situations that may cause ethical problems we solve them by approaching senior colleagues. Similarly, members can consult the KCS for advice and support in the strictest confidence, v. Should fulfil their contractual responsibilities to the best of their ability, vi. Have a duty to serve the public interest, and maintain and enhance the reputation of the profession, vii. Should carry out lawful instructions from a senior colleague and maintain the right to have reservations put on record, or seek further consultation, viii. Accept that resignation or dismissal may be the ultimate consequence of sustained disagreement with their employer. The coordination of KCS activities are conducted through local chapters distributed regionally across Kenya. The KCS presently has six active chapters: Nairobi, Coast, Western, Mt. Kenya, North Rift, and South Rift (11). The governance structure of local chapters is similar to the national KCS governing council. Each chapter is responsible for organizing regional conferences, workshops, and symposia on special topics of interest to the members, during which new research findings in chemistry and allied fields will be presented and discussed. Similarly, regional training courses on Chemical Safety and Security, and responsible care for industries and chemical suppliers are also conducted. The KCS has an active ‘Journal of Kenya Chemical Society’ where peer reviewed articles and proceedings are published. As part of responsible conduct all articles are subjected to rigorous review and plagiarism-checking prior to publishing. This is to ensure the chemistry professionals maintain honesty and integrity in all stages of the publication process, which must meet the highest possible standards of data reproducibility and correctness without plagiarism. 2.2. Tanzania Chemical Society (TCS) The Tanzania Chemical Society (TCS) was founded in June 1997 and officially registered on the 17th of October, 1997 (12). As in KCS, the TCS 242

draws its membership from students, technicians, technologists, researchers, lecturers, and professors working within university, research institutes or tertiary institutions, and industry. The TCS accepts institutional and cooperate membership and are open to any organization or industry involved in the advancement of Chemistry. The constitution of the TCS entrusts the management of its affairs to the governing council composed of: Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Assistant-secretary, and six ordinary members. The TCS organizes conferences, workshops and symposia on special topics of interest to the members during which new research findings in chemistry and allied fields will be presented and discussed. The TCS has held three international conferences with the inaugural conference in 1999 and the second in 2011. The third TCS international conference was held on the 11th to 15th of September, 2017 in Arusha Tanzania. During this conference, it was honoured to host the 6th Federation of African Societies of Chemistry (FASC) and was partly sponsored by the Pan African Chemistry Network (PACN) and American Chemical Society (ACS) (12). A notable TCS contribution towards responsible conduct was during the 2nd International conference, whereby a two-day preconference workshop on ‘Modern Laboratory Management Practice’ from the 3rd to 4th of October, 2011 was held at the Chemistry Department, University of Dar es Salaam, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The training focused on developing the knowledge, skills and abilities to run a laboratory efficiently and effectively so as to enhance the working environment of laboratory managers in Tanzania, in addition to managing chemicals and the health effects emanating from these chemicals are of concern (12). The TCS has a newsletter published biannually and is in the process of establishing the ‘Journal of the Tanzania Chemical Society’. A journal and newsletter provide a forum for the exchange of ideas. The newsletter is published online and has an editorial committee for review of articles submitted for originality and required standards in both format and content.

3. Responsible Conduct and Challenges East African countries are investing substantial sums money in scientific and engineering research and development. For instance, Kenya has devoted about 0.8 percent of their gross domestic products (GDP) to research and development (R&D), and has pledged to increase capitation (13). Similarly, Tanzania and Uganda have raised their stakes in funding R&D. This can be attributed to the realization that knowledge from Science Technology and Innovation (STI) are at the centre stage of economic success. Science and technology have raised living standards, improved health, and augmented the ability of people to access information and communicate with each other. Responsible conduct is an essential component of ethical research since it allows the self-correcting nature of research to operate effectively and accelerates the advancement of knowledge. Thus, the protection of its core values and 243

norms is important for both the research community and the broader society. In this regard, institutions and procedures to effectively investigate and act on allegations of irresponsible research conduct are necessary. These efforts aimed at preventing irresponsible conduct and ensuring good practices can be nurtured through scientific professional bodies. Professional bodies play an important role in mentoring and educating recently established institutions focusing on STI in East Africa on responsible conduct. The Kenya Chemical Society and Tanzania Chemical Society have been on the forefront in championing for responsible conduct in research both at Institutional and Industry level. Similar efforts are at nascent levels within other East African community countries; Uganda, Rwanda, South Sudan, and Burundi. However, they still benefit from initiatives coordinated by the KCS and TCS through regional trainings, workshops, and seminars. In 2016, three members from the governing council of the Kenya Chemical Society joined other Chemistry professionals and Chemical practitioners from leading academia, industry, and research associations to collaboratively draft an actionable Global Chemists’ stakeholders Code of Ethics (GCCE) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (14). The GCCE serves as a guide to basic values that govern the conduct of research and the communication of research results, and recommends specific actions that should be used to ensure and maintain the integrity of research in chemistry. The key recommendations in the report include: •

Making Positive Change Happen. Chemical practitioners should promote a positive perception and public understanding and appreciation of chemistry. This is done through research, innovation, teamwork, collaboration, community outreach, and high ethical standards. Chemistry professionals should act as role models, mentors, and advocates of the safe and secure application of chemistry to benefit humankind and preserve the environment for future generations. Environmental sustainability should be an integral part of research and education. Chemistry professionals must use their expertise to ensure the safety and health of co-workers and the community, and to protect the environment for future generations. Research in chemical sciences should benefit humankind and improve quality of life, while protecting the environment and preserving it for future generations. Researchers should conduct their work with the highest integrity and transparency, avoid conflicts of interest, and practice collegiality in the best way. Scientific publication is a way to share new knowledge. Chemistry professionals should promote and disseminate scientific knowledge in research and innovation through outreach, scientific writing, and publication for sustainable development. Chemistry professionals should maintain honesty and integrity in all stages of the publication process, which must meet the highest possible standards of data reproducibility and correctness without plagiarism. A culture of safety is very important and should be sustained by management, including academic, industrial and government leadership. 244

Management should work with chemical practitioners in all aspects of safety including training, regular audits, and the development of safety culture. There should always be awareness of safety regulations protecting health and the environment. A culture of security is important to protect dual use of chemicals and facilities. All stakeholders in the chemical supply chain should ensure and practice chemical security. Chemical practitioners should ensure that laboratories and industrial facilities have the capacity to secure chemicals. Security measures need to be reviewed regularly.

Following a successful launch of GCCE in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (14), a follow up workshop coordinated by the American Chemical Society and the Kenya Chemical Society was held in Nairobi, Kenya on the 15th to 19th of May, 2017. This Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE) Science & Technology Leadership Institute (STLI) workshop was tailored to train the trainer whereby participants were required to organize an event/lecture on at least one of the topics covered in the STLI workshop in their home country. A total of 28 participants, including facilitators, drawn from these countries participated: Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, Turkey, Yemen, and USA. The topics covered in the GCCE workshop in Nairobi include: Communicating Science, Publishing Research, Chemical Laboratory Safety, and Chemical Security. In this regard, the STLI participants were to be reimbursed expenses incurred in planning and organizing the workshop whose deadline was the 31st of December, 2017. Majority of STLI participants have shared their training experiences through social media where pictures of participants by individual trainers were posted. The KCS participants who participated in the training correspondingly organized similar trainings in their home institutions. All over the world, concerns have been raised by the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (15) and other international agencies such as USA Chemical Security Program (CSP) (16), United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) (17) and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) (18) etc. over the misuse of chemicals. The CSP responded to this initiative by partnering with several institutions worldwide to promote chemical safety and security through awareness and training workshops. In Kenya, the inaugural training was on ‘Advanced Chemical Safety and Security’, held at the School of Physical Science Boardroom (Chiromo Campus), University of Nairobi, by Sandia National Laboratories, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program (CSP) on the 28th to 30th of April, 2015. During this training, 20 members of Kenya Chemical Society were trained on hands-on skills on Chemical Security, Safety, and Waste management. This training was tailored to make them potential trainers in Chemical Safety and Security as alumni. This opened the opportunity for the trained KCS experts/alumni to apply for grants from the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Engagement Program (CSP) to implement local chemical security and safety best practices trainings in academic and industrial settings (16). These trainings engage scientists, technicians, engineers and academics to convey international best 245

practices for safe and secure chemical management. The CSP support grants have been through the KCS which has coordinated the trainings. At the start of 2018, over 500 members have benefitted from Chemical Safety and Security trainings. Since the trainings are done regionally across Kenya, personnel from these wide range of institutions and industries have been trained. The monitoring of trickledown effect has been through regular audits by the KCS and monitoring of new membership recruited into the KCS. The Kenya Chemical Society members have since offered several trainings in ‘Chemical Security, Safety, and Waste management’ with aims at developing a culture of best practices in the management, utilization, and disposal of chemicals in academic institutions and industries. The training resources, such as modules, training materials, e-books, and tools, are available online at The training usually covers a broad range of topics, including: •

• •

Chemical management concepts and fundamentals: Laboratory lay out and safety compliance, Emergency response guide, Safety in the laboratory, Security vulnerability, GHS labeling, Laboratory assessment and audit Chemical Inventory management systems: Chemical inventory in Universities, Chemical stores, Chemical Purchasing for labs, Proper chemical labeling (GHS)-Barcodes, bottle labels, Peroxide compounds (hazards, formation and testing), chemical compatibility storage guide Personal Protective Equipment: Chemical resistance guide for gloves, Lab coats, Helmets, Nose masks, goggles types etc. Waste Management: Chemical management and clean-up in laboratories, Recycling of Chemicals, Containers and Packages, Secondary containment, Chemical waste categorization, Identifying Unknown Chemicals, Minimizing Chemical wastes in the labs, and Disposal methodology

The Chemical Safety and Security training also extended regionally to the Eastern Africa region. For instance, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratories (PNNL), in cooperation with the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program (CSP) organized a ‘Chemical Security Workshop’ for Kenyan and Somali Scientists, Technologists, and Engineers in June 21st - 23rd, 2016 at the University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya. The purpose of the workshop was to promote awareness of chemical security best practices and provide Somali participants with practical tools to identify and reduce chemical security vulnerabilities based on locally adopted curricula for the region. Apart from the Chemical Security Training grants the CSP, through CRDF Global, an independent non-profit organization that promotes international, scientific, and technical collaboration, to administer chemical security and safety training (CSST) awards on behalf of CSP, supports the Chemical Security Professional Development Grant and Chemical Security Improvement Grants (16). The Chemical Security Program (CSP) Professional Development grants provide a short-term travel support to chemical scientists, engineers, 246

technicians, and project managers to attend conferences and seminars for career enhancement and/or to network with other scientists, industries, and academic organizations, with the intent of developing collaborative projects and/or new research opportunities that improve chemical security. The Chemical Security Improvement Grants (CSIG) offers grants to improve the physical and procedural security of chemical laboratories and facilities. These (CSIG) contribute to the security of industrial and academic chemical facilities, including their employees and their communities, and aim to prevent the accidental or intentional misuse of chemicals. Several KCS members have benefited from the Chemical Security Program (CSP) Professional Development grants and Chemical Security Improvement Grants (CSIG). The CSIG has benefited two universities, one manufacturing industry, and Government Chemist facilities which have installed physical and procedural security of chemical laboratories and facilities. Similarly, KCS members have participated in conferences and attended training workshops through support from Chemical Security Program (CSP) Professional Development grants. The OPCW through its International Cooperation branch runs a Chemical Safety and Security Management industrial outreach programme (19). This programme is an international-cooperation programme designed to focus on chemical-industry outreach and industry-related aspects of the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Under this programme, seminars are held in order to meet the increasing need for specific safety and security training with regard to the rapidly expanding and increasingly complex chemical industries. Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have been beneficiaries of this programme where African CWC member states have been trained on Chemical Safety and Security. Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania are members of the CWC and each country is on course towards implementation of the convention. To this end, the Kenya Chemical Society is involved in Kenya in the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as a stake holder. Currently, the KCS is working in conjunction with stakeholders in institutions of higher learning and industry to develop a curriculum on Chemical Safety and Security. The scope of training targets undergraduate students and refresher training for those already employed within manufacturing industries. The Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) have engaged the KCS to train KAM members on Chemical Safety and Security as part of responsible conduct and care by KAM. The KCS experts are developing short courses tailored to specific safety and security threats within KAM membership. The courses will be flagged later in 2018. Kenya, like other East African countries, have signed and ratified most of Multilateral Envirionmental Agreements (MEAs) related to sound chemicals and waste management. These include the Stockholm, Rotterdam, the Minamata, the Basel Conventions, etc. In this regard, recognizing the challenges in production, use, and disposal of chemicals as well as concerns raised by stakeholders in many forums on chemicals, Kenya has developed a draft policy on chemical management. This policy covers aspects of sound management of chemicals at all stages of their life cycle with emphasis on social, economic, health, labour, and 247

environment protection. In particular, it considers risk reduction, knowledge and information, governance, capacity building and technical cooperation, and illegal international traffic. It also commits Kenya to regularly review and incorporate new data and information arising from research and monitoring of impacts of chemicals and hazardous waste. Kenya, like other East African countries, has to maintain both global and regional competitiveness. In order to boost productivity, there is an increased demand to use agrochemicals in agriculture and industrial practices leading to unintentional release of persistent organic pollutants (UPOPs). As such, there is need to closely monitor the use of chemicals and generation of UPOPs from a policy perspective. The Kenya Chemical Society has actively participated in the drafting chemicals management policy on UPOPs towards implementation and domestication of the Stockholm Convention. Agriculture is the main economic activity driving the economy within all East African countries. Consequently, the use of chemicals mainly in agriculture and health sectors over time has shown an upward increase as the country pursues its goals of meeting domestic and export needs of agricultural produce and for pests control. In this regard, the Kenya Chemical Society in conjunction with Agrochemicals Society of Kenya and Pests Control Products Board (PCPB) carry out Agrochemical safety and security trainings. The most recent one was held at Maseno University Kenya from the 27th to 29th of June, 2017, entitled ‘Safe and secure production, transit, use and storage of pesticides and fertilizers for agrobased stakeholders’. East African countries have benefited as a group in campaigns against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats spearheaded by European Union i.e. (EU CBRN). The CBRN Initiative aimed to boost cooperation at national, regional and international levels, and to develop a common and coherent CBRN risk mitigation policy at the national and regional level. Regional team of experts drawn from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Ghana, DR Congo, Seychelles, and Zambia were tasked with formulating the policy. This was to ensure a high level of cooperation and coordination between the participating partner countries, other donors, and international organizations. In this regard, the Kenya Chemical Society was at the forefront in the process of formulating CBRN risk mitigation policies within Kenya. This initiative was successful since Kenya has the National Disaster Management Unit (NDMU) which works with other agencies in responding to CBRN risks. Members of the Kenya Chemical Society have been trained on risk mitigation and emergency response against dual use of chemical agents and accidents. In East Africa the question of integrity and responsible conduct in research has not featured prominently in public debate hence no coordinated efforts to address the problem of misconduct. Research and academic institutions do not have clear policies and procedures on responsible conduct in research. There is no oversight body or association of interested parties mandated to prevent, directly address, investigate and correct allegations or cases of scientific misconduct even at the institutional level. Technically, NACOSTI for Kenya (9), UNCST for Uganda (10), and COSTECH for Tanzania (11) are responsible for formulating 248

ethical guidelines, accrediting research ethics committees and ensuring the ethical conduct of research, but they are silent on research integrity. Although there are guidelines for health research ethics, national guidelines for the promotion of responsible conduct in research are lacking posing regulatory framework challenge. In East Africa, predator journals are a hindrance to upholding responsible conduct in research. They often publish articles in scholarly journals without provision proof of ethics approval of the research having been undertaken, as well as a clear indication of authorship allocations (20). This is a requirement by reputable mainsteam publishers. They don’t have adequate reviewers to improve the quality of articles published within their journals since they publish for a profit. Furthermore, they lack plagiarism-checking software to trace incidents of plagiarism. Research networks and professional associations provide platforms for the exchange of information and shared learning. These associations conduct training programmes on research ethics and integrity through workshops or online. The Kenya Chemical Society trains its members on research ethics and integrity. This can be emulated by other professional associations in East Africa especially in Uganda and Tanzania. Scientists should receive regular refresher courses and continuing professional education on ethics, research integrity and the responsible conduct in research (21). This will avert gross violations of research integrity, since the scientific community must be alert and more vigilant at preventing, detecting and admonishing scientific misconduct In conclusion, research institutions in East Africa need to establish clear, well-communicated rules that define irresponsible conduct and ensure that all researchers, research staff, and students are trained in the application of these rules to research. The Singapore statement emphasizes the principles and professional responsibilities that define research integrity irrespective of national and cultural disparities in standards for scientific research. The statement enunciates four basic principles: honesty in all aspects of research; accountability in the conduct of research; professional courtesy and fairness in working with others; and stewardship of research on behalf of others (22). This mandate calls upon, research institutions, to establish effective mechanisms for addressing allegations of research misconduct; to create an environment that fosters research integrity through education, training, and mentoring and by embracing incentives that deter irresponsible actions. This is necessary since the professional societies can only deter irresponsible conduct in research whereas the individual institutions need mechanisms of curbing the same via stringent disciplinary measures. This may include ultimate dismissal by individuals found culpable. In addition, respective East African countries should formulate policy and laws that curbs irresponsible conduct in research to enhance transparency, integrity and value for money for funded research. This can be achieved through the establishment of national oversight bodies responsible for developing national guidelines on research integrity as well as preventing, identifying and investigating cases of scientific misconduct. If this achieved they stand to surmount the challenges of achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through the utilization of Science, Technology, and Innovation. 249

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Editors’ Biographies Ellene Tratras Contis Dr. Ellene Tratras Contis, PhD, is Professor of Chemistry at Eastern Michigan University (EMU). At EMU she has served as Women’s Studies Director, Associate Dean and Dean in the College of Arts and Sciences, Assistant Vice President for Academic Services, and Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs. She has done research in trace metal analysis of water and has traveled internationally for STEM education. Dr. Contis holds a Ph.D. in analytical chemistry from the University of Michigan, an M.S. degree in chemistry from the University of Pittsburgh, and a B.S. degree in chemistry from Youngstown State University.

Dorothy J. Phillips Dr. Dorothy Phillips, PhD, serves as a Director-at-Large for the ACS Board of Directors. She received her bachelor’s degree in Chemistry from Vanderbilt University in 1967 and Ph.D. in biochemistry from the University of Cincinnati in 1974. She began her career with the Dow Chemical Company, but spent a majority of her career with the Waters Corporation, joining in 1984 and ending in 2013 as the Director of Strategic Marketing. Dr. Phillips has been involved with the ACS Northeastern Section since 1990, serving as Chair, Counselor, and, currently, Trustee. She has also served as chair for the ACS Analytical Chemistry Division.

Allison A. Campbell Dr. Allison A. Campbell, PhD, served as President of ACS in 2017. She works as Associate Laboratory Director of the Earth and Biological Sciences Directorate at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, where her research has focused on biomaterials and understanding the role of proteins in biomineralization. Dr. Campbell holds a Ph.D. in Physical Chemistry from State University of New York at Buffalo and a B.A. from Gettysburg College. She was elected AAAS Fellow in 2013 and is a member of the National Academy of Sciences Chemical Sciences Roundtable and the Washington State Academy of Sciences.

© 2018 American Chemical Society

Bradley D. Miller Bradley D. Miller, PhD, is Director, American Chemical Society (ACS) International Activities, Office of the Secretary and General Counsel, External Affairs and Communications. He has worked at ACS since 1999 developing programs to advance chemical sciences, engineering and education through exchange and collaboration. Dr. Miller serves on the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO. In 2006 he was recipient of an NSF Chemistry Discovery Corps Fellowship fostering U.S./Brazil collaboration in the chemistry. He has published ten articles and book chapters, and serves as co-editor of three published volumes of the ACS Book Series. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Arizona.

Lori Brown Ms. Lori Brown is an International Project Manager for ACS International Activities whose responsibilities include science and human rights, diplomatic outreach, and managing federal grants. She has been with ACS since 2013. Since 2016 she has managed the Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics, which is funded by the U.S. Department of State’s Chemical Security Program. Ms. Brown has a background in politics, and has worked for the U.S. House of Representatives and a lobbying firm. Prior to joining ACS, she served as an election observer in El Salvador. She holds a B.A. in History from the University of Evansville.



Author Index Abdul-Wahab, M., 171 Abegaz, B., 203 Al Bawab, A., 191 Andala, D., 239 Araj, H., 83 Ashiq, U., 157 Breida, M., 215 Brown, L., ix, 109, 129 Campbell, A., ix Chau, D., 171 El Rhazi, M., 215 Forman, J., 3 Goh, C., 171 Harris, T., 139 Jett, D., 83 Kosal, M., 51 Lee, H., 171

Massey, S., 157 Miller, B., ix, 109 Nwaichi, E., 223 Phillips, D., ix, 109 Rodda, K., 37 Shahid, S., 157 Spanevello, R., 69 Spriggs, S., 83 Suárez, A., 69 Timperley, C., 3 Toney, J., 149 Tratras Contis, E., ix, 157 Tseng, H., 83 Verma, A., 157 Wyndham, J., 139 Youssef, A., 97


Subject Index A AAAS Science and Human Rights Coalition, American Chemical Society’s role introduction, 139 leadership, American Chemical Society, 143 looking to the future, 146 Scientific Associations for Human Rights, building a new coalition, 141 ACS, exemplary science and human rights initiatives, 109 broadening ACS impact, 121 Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics, 123 sustainable development goals, 122 cases involving individuals and organizations, 112 conclusion, 124 external partnerships, 120 ACS representatives at the United Nations Office, 121f monitoring cases, 110 outreach and meetings, 115 science and human rights webinar series, 117 Africa, research, 203 conclusions, 213 higher education, expansion, 204 authorship issues, 208 avoid reporting fragmented work, 209 Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics research, 207s Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics in research, 206 scientific writing and publishing, 207s staff shortages, 205 introduction, 204 scholarly publishing, copyright and ethics, 210 irresponsible research conduct, concrete examples, 212t

C Chemical disarmament chemical disarmament, future directions and challenges, 24 conclusions, 26 introduction, 3

chemicals in war, 4 chemical weapons, international ban, 5 declared chemical weapons, 20 years of progress in destruction, 7f science and technology, 15 issues and examples, comprehensive review, 19 policies and regulatory frameworks, 17 scientific advances, 16 technical expertise, range, 18f technical experts, role, 21 OPCW Designated Laboratory network, 22f recommended operating procedures, analysis, 23 treaty implementation, 7 chemical and biological agent threat spectrum, 15f chemical-biological threat spectrum, 13 Chemical Weapons Convention Annex on Chemicals, schedule 1, 10f Chemical Weapons Convention Annex on Chemicals, schedule 2, 11f Chemical Weapons Convention Annex on Chemicals, schedule 3, 12f OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, set of chemicals identified, 14f prohibited chemicals, 8 Chemical poisonings, finding better therapeutics, 83 chemical threats and toxidromes, 85 chemical poisonings, general toxidromes, 85t introduction, 84 acute chemical exposures, types, 84t medical intervention, windows of opportunity, 86 National Institutes of Health CounterACT Program, 86 NIH CounterACT program, 87 NIH, new therapeutics being developed, 88 summary and conclusions, 91 Chemical safety and security practices, Malaysia, 171 chemical safety at the workplace, 173


CLASS 2013 and ICOP 2014, hazard classes, 175t concluding remarks, 187 introduction, 172 Malaysia, chemical security, 175 Article VI Committee, 177f Article X Committee, 177f Article XI Committee, 178f Malaysia, CWC as the basis for safeguarding chemical security, 179 National Authority for Chemical Weapons Convention (NACWC), members, 176t Malaysian higher education institutions, chemical safety education, 182 Malaysian public universities, example of departments managing occupational safety, health and environment (OSHE), 185t Malaysian universities offering undergraduate Chemistry-related courses, 184t recommendations, 186 responsible conduct of research, 180 Malaysian educational module, 10 chapters, 181 Chemistry, responsible and peaceful uses chemistry curricula, responsible use of chemistry, 71 final comments, 78 green chemistry, 75 introduction, 69 The Hague Ethical Guidelines, 77

D Developing countries, chemical safety and security challenges in academic institutions academic institutions, chemical safety and security, 101 chemical hazards, 99 chemicals, dual use, 99 chemicals, GHS hazards classes, 100t chemicals, life cycle, 98 chemical life cycle, 99f chemical safety and security challenges, 101 chemical storage, 103 chemical storage area in an institution, 102f chemical waste, recycling, 105 expired chemicals create risk, 104f conclusion, 106

introduction, 97 legislation and responsibility, 106

E East Africa, responsible conduct and challenges introduction, 239 professional chemical societies, 241 responsible conduct and challenges, 243 Emerging chemical and biological technologies background, 52 changing strategic environment, 54 complexity and disruptive technologies, 56 conclusions, 62 current domestic and international policy, 53 emerging chemical and biological technologies, new capabilities, 58 introduction, 51 security puzzles, 57

G Global Chemists’ Code of Ethics ethics and chemistry, 130 future, 134 GCCE background and development, 131 GCCE Science and Technology Leadership Institutes, 133 introduction, 129 Kuala Lumpur Workshop, 132

H Human rights, chemists contributing, 118 global impact through volunteering, 151 research, 150 science communication and public advocacy, global impact, 151 teaching and learning, 151

M Middle East, responsible conduct of research and challenges, 191


challenges, 197 conclusion, 199 introduction, 192 Jordan, case study, 195 policy makers, 193

N Nigeria and West Africa, responsible conduct of chemical sciences, 223 conclusion, 235 introduction, 224 materials and methods, 225 results and discussion, 228 age of respondents, 229f enumerated challenges/precursors, 230 gender of respondents, 228t knowledge of responsible conduct of research (RCR), 233t perception about employer’s commitment, 231t photograph showing dilapidated and inappropriate holders, 233f qualification of respondents, 229f questionnaire retrieval, 228t recorded misconduct, ranking, 235f Spearman’s rank order correlation, 234t storing gas cylinders, photograph showing gross misconduct, 232f Nonproliferation and disarmament, role of intent chemical warfare or not?, 46 decision making, human element, 39

human element in ethical chemistry, 41 purposes prohibited, 42 definitions, 38 dual-use conundrum, 47 overview, 37 summary, 48 North Africa, responsible conduct and challenges challenges to safety and security, 219 involved parties, 220f publishing and chemical safety and security, overview, 221f chemical safety and security, 218 bad laboratory practices, 219f communicating science with the public, 217 introduction, 215 GCCE implementation’s stages, 216f

S South Asia, responsible conduct in chemical safety and security practices, 171 Ashiq, Uzma, report, 158 fire protection drill session, 160 Massey, Shazma, report, 162 testimonials, data, 161t workshop, audiences, 159 concluding remarks, 168 introduction, 158 Shahid, Sammia, report, 167 Verma, Amita, report, 165