Resistance to Public School Desegregation : Little Rock, Arkansas, and Beyond 9781593323639, 9781593322601

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Resistance to Public School Desegregation Little Rock, Arkansas, and Beyond

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Frances Lisa Baer

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Baer, Frances Lisa, 1968Resistance to public school desegregation : Little Rock, Arkansas, and beyond / Frances Lisa Baer. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-59332-260-1 (alk. paper) 1. Discrimination in education--United States--History. 2. School integration--United States--History. 3. Discrimination in education-Arkansas--Little Rock--History. 4. School integration--Arkansas-Little Rock--History. I. Title. LC212.52.B34 2008 379.2'630973--dc22 2008021806

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CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

vii

INTRODUCTION

1

CHAPTER ONE: Preparations for Compliance in the “City of Roses”

11

CHAPTER TWO: Segregationist Arkansans Rear Their Heads

33

CHAPTER THREE: James Jackson Kilpatrick, Jr., and the

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“Transcendent Issue”

61

CHAPTER FOUR: The Citizens’ Council Turns Up the Heat

87

CHAPTER FIVE: Last Ditch Attempts at Avoidance

111

CHAPTER SIX: Governor Faubus Calls Out the Guard

135

CHAPTER SEVEN: The Little Rock Crisis in the Eyes of the World and at Home CHAPTER EIGHT: The “Prevailing Spirit of Defiance”

169 207

CHAPTER NINE: The Moderates Awaken: “Massive Resistance” After Cooper

245

CHAPTER TEN: The Forces of Moderation Reclaim the “City of Roses”

269

CONCLUSION

305

BIBLIOGRAPHY

311

INDEX

319

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This manuscript was completed with the support and guidance of a great many people. First and foremost, I wish to thank Professor Tony A. Freyer for his advice and encouragement. I am also extremely grateful to the History Department at the University of Alabama, which funded my endeavors. Gathering research materials for this project was made considerably easier by the help offered by the friendly and welcoming staffs at the special collections libraries at the University of Virginia, the University of Arkansas-Fayetteville, the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, Louisiana State University at Shreveport, the New Orleans Public Library, the Oral History Research Office at Columbia University, and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. My gratitude for their assistance is immeasurable. Of course, I would never have been able to complete this work had it not been for the incredible support of my family and friends. Without all of their help, and the help of others too numerous to name, the production of this manuscript would not have been possible.

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INTRODUCTION Numan V. Bartley opens The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950’s with the proclamation that “by any rational standard of measurement, mid-twentieth century America seemed an alien habitation for an extensive system of racially segregated public schools.”1 By the time the United States Supreme Court announced its determination that segregated public educational facilities were inconsistent with the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution on May 17, 1954,2 “Jim Crow appeared as anachronistic as slavery had been a century before.”3 The majority of white southerners, however, were no more willing to let go of segregation in the 1950s than their ancestors had been to let go of slavery. Like their nineteenth century forefathers, the “neobourbons”4 of the mid-twentieth century clung desperately to their established racial order, despite the changing conditions that lay behind Bartley’s charge of obsolescence. Anachronistic or not, institutionalized white supremacy was the centerpiece for what was euphemistically referred to as the “Southern Way of Life,” and the threat posed by Brown v. Board of Education set the defenders of that way of life scrambling to mount an effective opposition to it. Bartley’s text undoubtedly provides the most comprehensive treatment of that opposition to date. In casting Massive Resistance as elite-led, or “neobourbon,” however, the critical role played by segregationist sentiment among the general population in fueling the resistance to Brown is given less emphasis than is perhaps necessary to fully appreciate the nature of the movement. As George Lewis has stated, “Massive Resistance… was not a tidy historical phenomenon neatly conducted and directed by a select coterie of elite leaders.” Lewis’ research led him to conclude that when pro-segregation politicians “led, they were more often than not reflecting the will of their constituents; likewise, there is ample evidence to indicate that, when the grass roots demanded resistance, politicians obliged.”5 The events surrounding the integration of Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, in the fall of 1957 can best be viewed within the context of the sort of interplay between the political leadership and the

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grass roots that Lewis describes: where “the more rarified intellectual arguments” put forth by certain elite leaders of Massive Resistance, such as James Jackson Kilpatrick, Jr. of the Richmond, Virginia, News Leader and United States Senator James O. Eastland of Mississippi, for example, were adopted in “popularized and simplified” forms by ordinary citizens, which were then, in turn, “latched onto” by local and state politicians “in an effort to garner wider approval in their constituencies.”6 Recognizing that the intricacies of Massive Resistance are simply too complex to deal with in a single-volume, Lewis elected to confine his treatment of it to one of the tactics employed by opponents of public school desegregation: anticommunist rhetoric. This study takes a different approach. Here, the states’ rights and interposition arguments used to avoid compliance with federal court orders to implement the gradual desegregation plan adopted by the Little Rock School Board are emphasized. An effort is made, too, to place the Little Rock school integration crisis within the context of the Cold War – by examining both the motivations behind President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s decision to deploy federal troops to Little Rock to meet the challenge presented by Arkansas Governor Orval E. Faubus’ obstructions to the enforcement of federal court orders and the segregationist response to Eisenhower’s decision. Several historians have, in recent years, examined the international pressures bearing on the Eisenhower Administration as it considered its role in enforcing the mandate for desegregation issued in Brown in the face of Massive Resistance.7 Until Lewis, however, few historians concentrated on the exploitation of Cold War anxieties by prosegregation forces. Several of the conclusions reached below are supported by Lewis’ research. Lewis contends, for example, that smearing civil rights activists’ demands for integration as Communist inspired, or, at the very least, favorable to Communist goals, was useful in the attempt to “recast what was a particularly southern problem as one of national concern.”8 Similar contentions are made here, with regards to both anti-communist and states’ rights arguments. Each divorced the sensitive “race issue” from Massive Resistance, and allowed segregationists to portray themselves as patriotic defenders of not only the “Southern Way of Life,” but of the American system of government as originally conceived by the Founding Fathers. In this way, massive resisters sought to win over northern support for the

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Introduction

3

southern cause. And, as Lewis maintains, anti-communism was useful in a way that states’ rights or interposition was not: as a weapon against southern integrationists.9 Ultimately, the segregationists failed to win the battle for northern opinion, and anti-communism proved a stronger weapon for the integrationist side. Derrick Bell points out that Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, used the rhetoric of the Cold War to greater success than the massive resisters.10 One of the ways in which King facilitated a convergence of interest between northern whites and pro-integration forces was by highlighting the propaganda value of images of racial discrimination and violence for the Soviets in the contest over the alignment of newly independent non-white nations in Africa and Asia. George M. Fredrickson also identifies the convergence of interests between pro-integration activists in the United States and the federal government resulting from the “geopolitical context of the Cold War” as crucial to the success of the civil rights movement. Segregation in the American South became “a serious international liability” for the presidential administrations of that era.11 Once the United States federal government was recruited to the side of the integrationists in enforcing Brown, the states’ rights and interposition arguments of the massive resisters were doomed to fail.12 When Governor Faubus ordered the Arkansas National Guard to bar the “Little Rock Nine” from Central High School in early September 1957, however, the Eisenhower Administration had not yet determined what stance it would take with regards to the enforcement of federal court desegregation orders. At that point, when Massive Resistance was at its zenith, many segregationist leaders, if not most, genuinely believed that they could win the battle for northern opinion, and that they could prevent the races from being mixed in the region’s public schools. Before Little Rock, if it can be said that the resisters were pursuing a strategy of delay, their goal was simply to forestall the implementation of Brown long enough to either win national opinion for their cause, or to wait for northern supporters of desegregation to lose interest in the “Second Reconstruction,” as they had in the first. Why Little Rock? It is perhaps an irony of the Little Rock Crisis that it should have begun with a voluntary plan for compliance with the Supreme Court’s determination that legally enforced racial segregation in the public

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schools was constitutionally impermissible. In another very real sense, that fact is more tragic than ironic, for it served as a lesson to other school districts in the states of the old Confederacy that it was best not to make any plans for integration at all. In most places in the South where no attempts at compliance were made, controversy was avoided and the schools remained segregated for many years. Arguably, then, it was precisely because Little Rock, Arkansas, was a racially moderate, progressive city – and perceived by its leaders as such – that it became the arena for the first and most significant battle over the related constructs of state sovereignty and the Doctrine of Interposition. Had School Superintendent Virgil T. Blossom not set out to frame a plan for the gradual desegregation of the Little Rock schools immediately following the announcement of Brown, this crucial test of Massive Resistance would surely have occurred elsewhere. The city’s, and, indeed, the state’s reputation for moderation in matters of race caused it to be looked upon as a “bright spot” for peaceful compliance by hopeful observers. The Arkansas Council on Human Relations (ACHR), for example, took pride in the state’s past record on race relations, and noted that the esteem with which Arkansas was regarded throughout the nation was increased by its early announced “official policy” to meet the dictates set out in the Brown rulings “with calmness” and with the intent to “obey the law of the land.” The even greater respect it would earn as a result of its enlightened policies would “undoubtedly… put the state in an enviable position among the Southern states with regard to future economic development.” Implementing the mandate for desegregation quickly and calmly presented an opportunity, in the eyes of the ACHR, “to set forward the timetable of Arkansas progress and to confirm in deeds the voice of America to other lands.”13 These projections of the future by the ACHR seem perverse when it is considered that precisely the opposite ensued. The capital city did not meet the “opportunity” presented by Brown calmly, the economy of the city and state suffered great harm, and the events surrounding the attempt to integrate a small number of black children into a single high school weakened the influence of the “the voice” of the nation abroad. Governor Faubus blamed the crisis on the overzealous desire of “integrationists” to turn Little Rock into the shining paragon the ACHR envisioned. The Blossom Plan, he said, “was to be the great example, not only for Arkansas but for the South; and in publicizing it in that

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Introduction

5

manner, it attracted… interest… and, therefore, made Little Rock a focal point of contest. That is mainly what created the situation in Little Rock.”14 Others, of course, were just as quick to point the finger at the governor himself. To school board member Wayne Upton, for instance, “what the Little Rock crisis, the Little Rock tragedy, was all about,” was simple. “It stemmed from the political ambition of one man, a demagogue, Orval E. Faubus.”15 On one level, Upton was correct. Just as it can be said that, if the Blossom Plan was never formulated the crisis would not have occurred, a similar argument can be made that the conflict would have been avoided had the governor not intervened to prevent its implementation. And, for that matter, if the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) had never challenged the plan, and there had been no court order, the calamity would have been averted as well. But all of these circumstances conspired only to make Little Rock the stage on which the drama was played. There can be no doubt, however, that a showdown between state and federal authority over the enforcement of the Brown decrees would have taken place. As Arkansas Gazette publisher Hugh Patterson observed, “we didn’t think [it] would occur in Little Rock, but we certainly thought [it] would occur in Louisiana or Mississippi or Alabama, or Georgia.”16 Many of the causes suggested by the various players in the Little Rock drama have been hashed out in the historiography on the subject. Nat Griswold of the ACHR believed that the pressures exerted on Faubus to assume responsibility for enforcing the Little Rock Phase Program by Blossom and the school board, combined with the failure of school officials to recruit or accept the help of business, religious, and civic leaders in the community forced the governor into the segregationist camp and elicited the crisis.17 This, generally, is the conclusion arrived at by Numan V. Bartley in The Rise of Massive Resistance. Michal R. Belknap, in Federal Law and Southern Order, agrees with Hugh Patterson’s assessment that the resistance to demands that segregated schools be eliminated would inevitably result in a challenge to federal authority, and that the national administration was inexcusably unprepared to meet that challenge.18 Upton’s theory that Faubus created the Little Rock crisis to further his own political aspirations matches that proposed by J. W. Peltason in Fifty-Eight Lonely Men.19 Upton’s colleague on the school board, Harold Engstrom, noted that the board framed its presentation of the desegregation plan in such a fashion that appealed to the rule-of-law,

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because the community in general preferred segregation and had no qualms regarding its morality. He admitted, though, that framing the need for compliance with Brown invited the segregationists to propose the counter-argument, later advocated by Faubus as well, that the order of the Court was not “the law of the land,” and that the state had the authority to interpose to prevent integration. This, he said, confused the people in the community as to what the law was, and “kindled a hope… that perhaps we’d been entirely wrong.”20 Thus, archsegregationists were able to seize the initiative, and exert a greater influence over the events at Little Rock than their numerical strength would seem to justify. Tony Freyer, too, proposes this as a source of difficulty in The Little Rock Crisis.21 The Little Rock crisis that began with a shout in September 1957 ended with a whimper in the fall of 1959. By then, all but the staunchest of segregationists in the “City of Roses” had resigned themselves to the fact that the price of defiance was simply too dear. Here, as elsewhere, however, the reluctant acceptance of token integration by the general population did not require a corresponding rejection of the principles the battle had been waged to protect. There were two basic principles that underlay the program of Massive Resistance to the Supreme Court’s directives in the Brown cases. One of these was a deeply held conviction in the idea of white supremacy. As Roy Reed explains it, “The resistance was based on a supremely confident racism: a belief among millions of white people that black people were inferior and should be treated so under the law.”22 Over time, the commitment that most southerners held to that belief weakened, eventually to the point where “it is difficult for young people today to understand” the depths to which it once ran in the southern psyche.23 Some abandoned this precept more slowly than others, and of course, some never did at all. The second principle upon which the battle was waged was based on a theory of state sovereignty that asserted the right of interposition. James Jackson Kilpatrick, Jr., the “godfather” of the Doctrine of Interposition who promoted its use to justify defiance of federal desegregation orders, argued in 1955 that the Union victory in the Civil War did nothing to alter the sovereign powers of the states. The South, in that conflict, was ultimately forced to succumb to a superior force.24 Likewise, he asserted nearly a decade later, the rights of the states to exert their sovereign powers against unconstitutional encroachments by

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Introduction

7

the federal government was put down by might, and not by right, when compliance to federal integration orders was forced on the southern states. He had, he explained, “come to understand that enforced segregation violates principles of freedom that are of the first importance to me,” but he still insisted that “the theoretical power and right of the States to enact such laws, in the absence of clear, constitutional amendment, is something else entirely.”25 The various analyses of Little Rock crisis offered in the existing historiography are in many ways correct. But “the fight,” as Faubus explained at the end of 1958, was “mainly one of constitutional government and States’ Rights.”26 By framing the struggle to maintain segregation in such terms, an appeal was made to deeply intuitive emotions imbedded in the southern heritage and cultural identity. This appeal was extremely effective in convincing the white south of the righteousness of their cause. Even after the Supreme Court announced in Cooper v. Aaron27 that its ruling in Brown was the law, and that the police powers of the states could not justify the denial of the constitutional rights of black children to attend desegregated schools, and even after Virginia had exhausted its legal arsenal and gave up its massive resistance, Helen Fuller was able to state with conviction that the majority of white southerners “firmly believe as their political leaders and newspapers, with few exceptions, have told them” – that Brown was not the “law of the land,” that the federal insistence on compliance with Brown was a violation of the Tenth Amendment, and that desegregation was not inevitable.28 In some ways, Bartley’s contention in The Rise of Massive Resistance that interposition was primarily employed as a short-term political tactic to delay integration, and Neil McMillen’s suggestion that it provided a way to achieve racist ends in a fashion that was colorblind on its face in The Citizens’ Council are both quite accurate.29 But the use of the doctrine to attain short-term goals does not lessen the symbolic value of interposition in relation to ideas of southern identity. Concepts of state sovereignty and the right of interposition were not mere abstractions to the southerners who asserted them. Rather, they were fundamental elements of American constitutionalism that defined the very nature of the Union. The continued reliance on the “States’ Rights” argument and appeals to these values even after their repeated rejection in the federal courts is evidence that federal pronouncements against them meant little to true believers. After all, if a corollary premise of the theory insists that Supreme Court opinions are not law,

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and that the court of state opinion is the final arbiter of the Constitution – not the nine justices in Washington – then insistences by the jurists themselves that Brown was the “law of the land” were no more valid in the southern mind than were the decrees of 1954 and 1955. Despite the straightforward language of Cooper, then, the idea that a state could interpose to prevent the enforcement of federal desegregation orders was not settled by this case. A pamphlet by Drew L. Smith of the New Orleans based pro-segregation group the Federation for Constitutional Government entitled “Interposition – The Neglected Weapon” was being widely distributed in 1959. In it, Smith asserted, “Interposition has never failed. Interposition will succeed now, if our southern governors and state courts will stand firmly upon the rights of the state.”30 In 1960, Louisiana Governor Jimmie Davis attempted to interpose to deny admission to four six-year-old AfricanAmerican girls to two elementary schools in New Orleans. There, Federal District Judge Skelly Wright found it necessary to again reject the legitimacy of the doctrine in a pronouncement from the bench. And, clearly, the later rhetoric and actions of Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi and Governor George Wallace of Alabama further evidence the fact that the issue was not laid to rest by the Supreme Court in the Little Rock case. Arguably, however, the situation was different after Little Rock than it had been before. When the United States Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Cooper v. Aaron at the end of 1958, the steam was let out of interposition. The doctrine was not laid to rest, but the more respectable and influential politicians of the South had abandoned, if reluctantly, any hope of finding salvation in it. After Little Rock, interposition became the sole domain of demagogues and race-baiters – a rhetorical tool to win elections and to make a show of the defiance demanded by their constituents before backing down to the superior force wielded by the “tyrannical South-haters” in Washington.

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Introduction

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NOTES 

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1

Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950’s, (Baton Rouge, 1969, 1997), 3. 2 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 3 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 3. 4 Ibid., 17. 5 George Lewis, The White South and the Red Menace: Segregationists, Anticommunism, and Massive Resistance, 1945-1965, (Gainesville, 2004), 3. 6 Ibid., 31-32. 7 Mary Dudziak, for example, has written extensively on the subject in “Brown as a Cold War Case,” Journal of American History 91:1 (June 2004), Cold War Civil Rights (Princeton, 2000), and “Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,” Stanford Law Review 41:61 (Nov. 1988). And Thomas Borstelmann and Azza Salama Layton have also contributed to the historiography of the Cold War implications of the enforcement of Brown in The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, 2001) and “International Pressure and the U. S. Government’s Response to Little Rock,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56:3 (Autumn 1997), respectively. 8 Lewis, The White South and the Red Menace, 52. 9 Ibid., 60. 10 Derrick Bell, Jr., “Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,” Harvard Law Review 93 (1980), 518-533. 11 George M. Fredrickson, The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements (Berkeley, 2000), 184. 12 For a good review of the views presented by Bell and Fredrickson regarding interest-convergence, see Tony A. Freyer, “Crossing Borders in American Civil Rights Historiography,” in Larry Eugene Jones, Crossing Boundaries: The Exclusion and Inclusion of Minorities in Germany and the United States (New York, 2001), 224-225. 13 “Simple Steps in Compliance,” publication of the Arkansas Council on Human Relations (c. 1956). ACHR Papers, University of ArkansasFayetteville Special Collections Division (hereafter referred to as UA-F). Vernon McDaniel, an “educational specialist” sent to Arkansas by the NAACP in early April 1955, too, considered Arkansas the “brightest prospect” in the South. Southern School News (hereafter referred to as SSN), May 4, 1955. 14 “Face The Nation” television broadcast, Aug. 31, 1958. Transcript located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. The governor frequently made this allegation. And others, usually segregationists, made similar claims. See Dr. Dale Alford interview, Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration Oral History Project (hereafter referred to as DDEP) (Columbia University, 1970), 10, and Rev. Wesley Pruden interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 3. 15 Wayne Upton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 12. 16 Hugh Patterson interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970) 28.

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17

Nat R. Griswold interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 3, 26, 6869. 18 Michal R. Belknap, Federal Law and Southern Order: Racial Violence and Constitutional Conflict in the Post-Brown South (Athens, 1987); Hugh Patterson interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970) 28. 19 J. W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (New York, 1961). 20 Harold Engstrom interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 19-20. 21 Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation (Westport, 1984). 22 Roy Reed, “The Contest for the Soul of Orval Faubus,” in Elizabeth Jacoway and C. Fred Williams, Understanding the Little Rock Crisis: An Exercise in Remembrance and Reconciliation (Fayetteville, 1999), 100. 23 Ibid. 24 Richmond News Leader, Nov. 23, 1955. 25 Address by Kilpatrick at Vanderbilt University, April 10, 1964. James Jackson Kilpatrick Papers, University of Virginia Special Collections Library (hereafter referred to as UVA). 26 Faubus to Stephen Somody, Dec. 10, 1958. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 27 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 28 Helen Fuller, “Southerners and Schools,” reprinted from The New Republic and distributed by the Southern Regional Council, 1958. Copy located in ACHR Papers, UA-F. 29 Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens’ Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-1964 (Urbana, 1994). 30 Drew L. Smith, “Interposition – The Neglected Weapon,” printed and distributed by The Federation for Constitutional Government [undated]. Copy located in William M. Rainach Papers, Louisiana State University at Shreveport Special Collections (hereafter referred to as LSUS).

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CHAPTER ONE

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Preparations for Compliance in the “City of Roses” Little Rock, Arkansas, in the 1950s seemed a strange place and time for a showdown between federal and state governments over the issue of public school desegregation. Little Rock, after all, was known for its racial moderation and business opportunity, and boasted an active civic leadership more concerned with attracting industry and promoting an image of Little Rock as a modern, prosperous city than with any romanticized ideal of the Old Confederacy steeped in Southern tradition. In post-World War II Little Rock, people generally looked optimistically to the future, rather than nostalgically back at the past. Racial unrest was not permitted to interfere with the progress of this All-American city. In the interests of the community as a whole, by the time integration was to begin at Central High School in 1957 Little Rock citizens had, with some prompting by the local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), voluntarily desegregated public transportation, hospitals, the main branch of the public library, and some department stores. All state-supported colleges and universities had also been desegregated before 1957. “Of course,” as Professor Tony A. Freyer has written, “none of this meant that in Little Rock there was any fundamental alteration of the social and institutional segregation in racial life that characterized the rest of the South and, in many ways, the rest of the United States.”1 Still, there was good reason to believe that such progress as the city had already seen would continue, and that further strides would be made in the area of race relations. The Response to Brown And yet, Little Rock in the fall of 1957 did become the setting for “the first really fundamental test of the national resolve to enforce Negro rights in the face of southern defiance.”2 When the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its historic decision in Brown v. Board

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of Education3 on May 17, 1954, the majority of Arkansans appeared prepared, albeit reluctantly, to accept the ruling as “the law of the land.” The day after the opinion was issued, Governor Francis Cherry told the people of the state: “Arkansas will obey the law. It always has.”4 Within a week, two school districts announced plans to integrate, although one, the Sheridan School District, decided it was not ready after all, and rescinded its announcement. The other, Fayetteville, went ahead with its plan to integrate the handful of black students in the district with the five hundred whites attending the high school that fall. The principal reason cited was financial; Wayne White, Superintendent of the Fayetteville schools, divulged that transporting black students to schools at Fort Smith and Hot Springs cost the district an average of $5000 annually. “Segregation was a luxury we no longer could afford,” he admitted.5 Soon thereafter, the Charleston School Board announced on September 13 that it, in fact, had been the first to integrate; eleven blacks had been attending school there with whites since August 23.6 These early examples of Arkansas compliance, however, occurred in the western part of the state, where blacks comprised a small percentage of the population. In the delta region of east Arkansas, where blacks resided in significant numbers, resistance to the Court’s decree in Brown was more likely. In February 1955 White America, Inc. was incorporated in Pine Bluff by those prepared to fight to maintain racial segregation, and east Arkansas members of the state’s legislature introduced segregation measures into the General Assembly. The overall tenor of racial moderation in the state was demonstrated when the pupil placement bill, which had been approved by the House, was defeated in the Senate in March. State Senator Max Howell of Little Rock announced that “just because Alabama or some other dyed-in-the-wool southern state jumped in haste to preserve something doesn’t mean Arkansas should.”7 But Arkansas had its own share of “dyed-in-thewool” southerners – whom Little Rock School Board President William G. Cooper, Jr. would later call “professional Southerners”8 – as well, and they believed that integration threatened their very way of life. When the pupil placement bill failed to become law, White America, Inc. seized upon the occasion to appeal to the white people of Arkansas to join them, or, at the very least, to vote those who rejected the bill out of state office. “Remember,” they cautioned in an ad in the Arkansas Democrat, “A silent vote is a vote for integration.”9

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Preparations for Compliance in the “City of Roses”

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In Little Rock, however, School Superintendent Virgil T. Blossom was no “professional Southerner.” He was a school man, and although some would later accuse him of having greater ambitions, he took that job very seriously. Immediately following Brown he set to work framing a plan complying with the High Court’s order. From the outset, the “Blossom Plan,” as it came to be known, envisioned a gradual transition away from segregated schools. And while this was disappointing to some black leaders in the community, Blossom estimated that he had the support of “probably 95 percent of the Negro citizens.”10

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The Little Rock Phase Program While the story of the genesis of the Blossom Plan has been told before,11 it bears repeating here, for examination of the desegregation program’s origins and development helps to understand how it happened that racial moderation in Little Rock disintegrated to the point that, in September 1957, the city became “the epitome of state resistance” 12 and the setting for one of the most significant constitutional crises in United States history. As first conceived, the plan would begin desegregation with the first grade. As that class of students progressed through elementary and eventually high school, integration would follow them. In other words, Blossom initially favored the sort of “stair step” plan that would later be adopted by several other school systems in the South, including New Orleans, when they were forced to adopt schemes for integration. According to Blossom, he began to doubt the wisdom of starting with the six-yearolds after consulting with parent-teacher groups, where “almost invariably” the greatest opposition to mixing the races in the schools came from those parents with the youngest children. Therefore, he altered his plan, determining that integration should instead be initiated with older students, and eventually, over a period of years, be extended downward into the junior high and elementary schools. 13 School board member Harold Engstrom later reflected that such considerations were only partly responsible for the decision to begin with the high schools. “Our justification,” he said, “was that we could avoid uncontrolled public disorder” if the high schools were desegregated first.14 Where there were many elementary schools throughout Little Rock, according to the plan there would be only three high schools in the city that would be integrated, two of which would

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have only minimal integration because of residential patterns.15 Engstrom and the other board members, and Blossom in particular, since it was he who convinced the school board on this, believed that if there were a need for police when these schools opened with racially mixed student populations, law enforcement would be made less difficult since unrest would be confined to a few, concentrated areas in the city. Of course, this would run both ways, allowing segregationist groups to concentrate their protests and possibly resulting in larger masses of protesters at the high schools. Curiously, Blossom and the board did not consider that, perhaps because they refused to believe that desegregation in the Little Rock high schools would attract such a large and vehement crowd of resisters that local law enforcement officers would be unable to control the scene. In any event, the desirability of concentrating integration where police could better deal with disruptions was “the principal reasoning” behind the decision to begin with the high schools.16 It was also determined that the desegregation process should not begin until the fall of 1957. School construction projects, planned long before and already underway, influenced this decision. In the northwestern part of the city, in the “silk stocking district,” which was predominantly white, Hall High School was being built. In the eastern, heavily black area of the city, Horace Mann High School was under construction. With the opening of Mann, the present black high school, Dunbar, would be made into a junior high school for blacks. Central High School, located in the working class section of Little Rock, would continue to operate. A fourth high school, Technical High School, drew students from throughout the city, but no plans were made at this time to extend desegregation to that facility. Blossom envisioned dividing the city into three attendance areas, and assigning students to the high schools on a residential basis, irregardless of race. Mann High School, under this scheme, would have a total projected student population of 959: 426 white and 533 black. The largest school, Central, would be assigned 2,651 students: 2,135 white and 516 black. Hall High School was projected to have 706 students: 700 white and 6 black. A liberal and voluntary transfer program was to be offered, wherein any student who was in the racial minority at their assigned school would be permitted to transfer to another school in the district where their race was in the majority. It was anticipated that under this transfer program, every white student assigned to attend Mann would

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choose to transfer out, leaving that school all black. It was further believed that the six black students assigned to Hall would elect to transfer to Mann, leaving Hall all white. “The question,” Blossom reflected, “was whether a large majority of the Negro students” assigned to Central High School “would transfer to Horace Mann, thus permitting us to start the integration program by having only a few Negro students among the 2,000 attending Central High.”17 Ultimately, Blossom decided not to leave such things to chance. By May 1955 the Blossom Plan had undergone further evolution, or, as some would contend, devolution. Rather than simply making assignments on the basis of residence within a school attendance area, the superintendent approached the principals of the black junior and senior high schools and requested a list of names of students who were interested in attending Central High School. He then instructed the principals to contact the parents of the students on the list, and the students themselves, who Blossom numbered at approximately eighty, and explain to them how difficult things might be for them as the first black students to attend a formerly white high school in Little Rock. As a result, and purely “in the interests of the students,” Blossom insisted, the pool of potential black students considered for assignment to Central was reduced to thirty-two.18 Blossom himself then reviewed the records of these students and met with them and their parents. By his own report, the superintendent used these meetings to convince a number of the interested students to withdraw their applications. In the end, after careful screening, the district offered admission to Central High School to seventeen black children; the rest would attend Horace Mann. Still later, “when tension became great” in the weeks before school was to open in 1957, “eight of the seventeen who had been accepted withdrew for reasons of their own, leaving nine to enter the school.”19 It was this plan, then, a minimal and gradual integration plan concentrated in a single high school, officially styled the Little Rock Phase Program, that was presented to the school board and adopted by unanimous vote on May 24, 1955 – one week before the United States Supreme Court handed down its implementation decree in Brown II.20 Criticism for the Blossom Plan In the light of history, the Little Rock Phase Program has been almost universally criticized for several fundamental flaws.21 Some have

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contended that integration, after all, should have begun in the lower grades. Additionally, several historians, including Freyer and Numan Bartley, and most notably C. Fred Williams, have noted that the only high school targeted for integration, Central, was located in a largely working-class neighborhood. While the majority of whites in all sections of Little Rock preferred to maintain segregated public schools, the business and professional elite represented the racially moderate backbone of the city. Most of these individuals, who generally tended to believe that peaceful, if reluctant, compliance with the Supreme Court’s mandate for change was in the best interests of community progress and prosperity, lived in the northwestern part of the city. Their children, therefore, would attend the all-white Hall High School. On the other hand, segregationist feelings in Little Rock, as elsewhere, ran strongest among the working-class. Parents in the Central High School attendance area, besides being more conservative and segregationist, understandably resented the fact that their children were selected to be at the vanguard of racial integration while the power brokers of their society would themselves continue to live in relative insulation from the turmoil of race-mixing. Thus, “this arrangement added an element of class conflict to the racial controversy and allowed segregationist spokesmen to charge that integrationists were sacrificing the common citizens while protecting the wealthy.”22 Furthermore, since those most likely to be supportive of Blossom’s and the school board’s efforts – the business and professional elite – were not to be directly affected by school desegregation at the outset, they were less inclined to involve themselves in the conflict and did not provide the leadership on this issue that Bartley insists was necessary for things to run smoothly.23 Still, despite the fact that the civic leaders of the community were given little incentive to jeopardize their own positions in society by actively supporting an unpopular initiative, Superintendent Blossom spent virtually all his attention in “selling” his plan on them. Blossom made over two hundred presentations to promote the Phase Program, complete with color-coded maps and graphs, to various civic organizations, churches and business groups “whose members had little direct involvement with the public schools.”24 No community education programs were conducted for the benefit of parents or students of Central High School, and Blossom, who wanted “to handle the community education himself,” declined offers of assistance with

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an educational program by the clergy, the Arkansas Council on Human Relations (ACHR)25 and even the teachers of Central High.26 It was this aspect of the plan that led C. Fred Williams to conclude that “the Little Rock School Crisis in 1957 was more about class than race.”27 As Superintendent Blossom worked tirelessly to convince the city’s civic elite that his vision for the gradual desegregation of the Little Rock schools was the best that could be had and should be supported, “working-class citizens, black and white, had little opportunity to learn about the Blossom Plan, and many white workers watched with mounting resentment as the new school year approached.”28 While Williams is quick to point out that there was in fact “no conspiracy” to lay the burden of integration on the working class and that white citizens in the Arkansas capital at all class levels disapproved of any amount of race mixing, he notes that “for workingclass Little Rockians, the Blossom Plan was unfair, a favor to the privileged class, who already had more than enough.”29 In Williams’ final analysis, race was not at the heart of the resistance. Rather, it was “fundamentally an expression of class conflict” for which race was merely “the triggering mechanism.”30 Such a conclusion, however, is not fully warranted by the facts of the resistance movement leading up to September 1957. Undoubtedly, the class issue was a contributing factor, adding to the level of resentment felt by those directly affected by the desegregation plan – a resentment that was exploited to great effect and political gain by Governor Orval E. Faubus who referred to the city’s civic leaders as the “Cadillac Brigade.” But race was most definitely the core issue for segregationists, in Little Rock as elsewhere. The justifications that Blossom offered for voluntary compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision in The School Cases were as problematic as his choice of audiences. The superintendent presented the Phase Program as one that offered as little integration as possible, given the requirements of the Court’s order. Little Rock School Board President Dr. William G. Cooper, Jr. later denied that the Blossom Plan was ever intended to be a “minimum plan” that sought to avoid true integration. “We were going to marry the girl,” he said, “the commitment was total but the approach was gradual.”31 Of course, Dr. Cooper, a surgeon originally from upstate New York, was the “most willing” member of the school board to effect desegregation.32 Still, while Little Rock was voluntarily undertaking the task of planning for and implementing desegregation of the public schools, both Blossom and the school board consistently expressed their having instituted the

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plan under the compulsion of law. “By stressing compulsion,” Freyer observed, they “appealed to the value of the rule of law, a value which they hoped would transcend disagreement with the principle of integration.”33 As school board member R. A. Lile explained, “We were trying to be good citizens and obey the edict of the Supreme Court…. None of us were integrationists but we were trying to follow the orders of the Court, and the Blossom Plan really was a plan to follow the orders of the Court and keep peace and harmony and have no violence, and accept the situation and make the best of it.”34 No attempt was made to secure support for desegregation as a matter of moral right. The problem with this approach was twofold. Firstly, as would soon become all too evident in Little Rock, and throughout the South, there were considerable differences of opinion as to whether integration was in fact the “law of the land.” And secondly, the reliance on the rule of law left “the moral initiative in the hands of the racists, who can claim that theirs is the true doctrine and that the leaders of the center are only being expedient.”35

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The Little Rock NAACP Virtually all of the activity engaged in the planning and publicizing of the desegregation plan for the Little Rock schools took place entirely within the white community. And, generally, in the historiography of the Little Rock school crisis, black participation has been completely ignored on the presumption that, as Tony Freyer put it, “It is just not a place where the local black community made much of a visible contribution.”36 That presumption, however, does not withstand closer scrutiny. Freyer goes on to explain that “Little Rock is more representative of the broader movement than its treatment by historians seems to allow.”37 Another notable exception to the lack of attention paid to black activism in Little Rock has been the work of John A. Kirk. Kirk agrees with Freyer, noting that “the school crisis fitted into a much larger struggle over race relations in city and state,” which “had its roots in the growing militancy of black activism in Arkansas after the Second World War.”38 By the end of the war years the NAACP, which had struggled in Arkansas to overcome factionalism and a lack of direction, emerged “as a force in the state” led, in Little Rock, by L. C. and Daisy Bates.39 Under the direction of the Bateses, the Little Rock chapter scored

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victories in various areas where civil rights had been denied to blacks. Through the federal courts, teacher salary equalization, greater participation in electoral politics – including the right to vote in Democratic Party state primaries – and access to higher education in the state were achieved. Through mediation at the local level, they were able to secure the hiring of black police officers and access to the main branch of the public library, some public parks, the city zoo, department stores, and hotels, if only in a limited way and with restrictions. An attempt to have selected black students attending Dunbar High School admitted into individual classes at Little Rock (Central) High School to take courses not otherwise available to them failed in 1952. Significantly, though, the school board was willing to meet with representatives of the Little Rock Committee on Schools, which proposed the plan and which was affiliated with the NAACP. Unfortunately, the board canceled the meeting after Thaddeus D. Williams, as attorney and president of the local NAACP chapter, divulged plans for it to the press. The board, apparently, feared public outcry against race-mixing in the public schools.40 Although these inroads were achieved as the result of agitation by the NAACP, the concessions that were given represented mere tokenism and were made to ensure that, in the end, whites retained “control over the segregated system by self-regulating reforms rather than risk being forced to change more radically by federal order.”41 The incident in 1952 that let to the failure of the proposal to allow black students limited access to white high schools reinforces Kirk’s interpretation. In the interests of trying to avoid lawsuits that could potentially mean wholesale integration and in the interests of avoiding the negative publicity that accompanies outbursts of racial tension and could harm Little Rock’s reputation as a modern, racially moderate city anxious to attract new industry, some racial barriers were slowly and quietly being dismantled. When Williams spoke to reporters about plans to desegregate certain classes and about the meeting, and threatened court action if the courses were not “available by September,”42 both of those interests were threatened. Ultimately, however, Kirk’s assessment of the Little Rock crisis, as valuable as his contributions on black activism are to the historiography, fails to accept that the story of the resistance to school integration in the 1950s, unlike the later civil rights movement, is essentially a story of whites battling whites. In the Little Rock case, the initial court suit challenging the Blossom Plan, which was filed by the NAACP, was a crucial factor in

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the evolution of the conflagration of September 1957, but otherwise, except for the fact that the entire struggle was over educational opportunities for black children, the main players were all white.43

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The NAACP Responds Initially, the Little Rock chapter of the NAACP had been cautiously optimistic about the integration plan, but when the Phase Program was announced in its final form, they felt betrayed. Arkansas in general had been perceived as the “brightest prospect among the southern states” for compliance with the Brown directive,44 and integrationists in Little Rock had been heartened by the early announcement by school officials that they intended to comply, voluntarily and in good faith. But, “by the summer of 1955 the atmosphere regarding integration had changed” in the self-styled “City of Roses.”45 Segregationist activity in the city increased, and a Little Rock chapter of White America, Inc. was formed in April. Groups interested in the peaceful, and complete, desegregation of the public schools, such as the NAACP and the ACHR, felt they were being excluded from the planning stages of integration. Georg Iggers, a white professor at Philander Smith College, a Negro institution, and chairman of the Little Rock NAACP executive committee, believed that it was the increasingly felt pressure from White America, Inc.46 that convinced the school board that it was “no longer… necessary to consult black leadership which it could expect to be dissatisfied with these modifications” to the Blossom Plan.47 Late in the year, after it was announced that Horace Mann High School would open in January 1956 with only black faculty and students, the NAACP determined that the school board was not acting in good faith after all. They decided then to challenge the Little Rock Phase Program in the federal courts. As Iggers explained in a letter addressed to “Friends” of the NAACP on January 10, 1956, “While public opinion on the whole is moderate and it seems likely that school integration can be accomplished with little social tension, school board officials, for political and other reasons, are generally unwilling to move unless directed by court order.” Although “the Little Rock School Board has announced its willingness to comply with the Supreme Court decision,” he continued, “its plan is so vague as to appear more like circumvention than like compliance.”48

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At one point, the Little Rock chapter of the NAACP considered seeking an injunction to prevent the opening of Mann as an all-black school in January 1956. Iggers, in his capacity as chairman of the local branch, discussed the advisability of filing such a suit with U. Simpson Tate, a NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorney at the regional office in Dallas, Texas. Tate indicated that seeking such an injunction would be a bad idea. First of all, he told Iggers, such an attempt was not likely to be successful. Also, it would not look good for the NAACP to argue against the opening of a new educational facility for black students.49 Undoubtedly such an attempt would lend credence to those segregationists who argued that the goal of the NAACP was not improved educational opportunities for Negroes but, rather, racemixing, social equality, and, ultimately, racial amalgamation. Attorney Thaddeus D. Williams had reservations about filing a suit at all. He believed that Little Rock was not the proper venue for a court challenge, but that lawsuits should be filed instead in those districts where there were no plans for desegregation whatsoever. He feared that the “phoney ‘Blossom Plan’” would be upheld by the court “and thus set a pattern which would encourage other school districts in this jurisdiction to concoct similar dodges.” Williams also contended that if a suit was filed against the Little Rock School Board it should involve not the high schools, but the elementary schools, which were not scheduled for integration. 50 In the end, Iggers and Tate and the Little Rock NAACP executive committee agreed that the proper course of action would be for black students at all grade levels in every part of the city to present themselves for admission to the schools closest to their homes. When those children were denied registration into the white schools, as Iggers admitted “we expected they would” be, “we would ask for relief from the court.”51 Although the manner in which to initiate the federal court challenge had been determined, there then developed differences in opinion between the local chapter and Tate regarding the objectives of the suit. The local branch wished to secure immediate relief for the plaintiffs. That is, a court order directing the school board to admit those students who had applied for and been denied admission to their neighborhood schools forthwith. Attorney Tate, in line with the policies of the national office, however, insisted that the plaintiffs seek from the court an order for the immediate and complete integration of the entire Little Rock School District.52 According to Iggers, “the branch believed that

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the former was attainable with guide lines for integration and that the latter could not succeed in court.”53 Members of the local branch harbored some resentment over the fact that the objectives of the national office did not coincide with their own and that Tate did not seem to make an effort to represent the wishes of the local black community in Little Rock. Iggers complained later that Tate “offered no assistance whatsoever,” and that, although the “national office did agree to furnish the services of its legal staff if we would hire a local lawyer, pay his fee, and cover court costs,” the bulk of the great deal of work involved was shouldered by the members of the Little Rock branch, “who already had full-time jobs.”54 In The Little Rock Crisis, Freyer states that Tate’s behavior, which he described as “embarrassing,” “reflected the less than enthusiastic support shown by the Legal Defense Fund and the NAACP’s New York general office.”55 But the national NAACP had very clearly stated on more than one occasion its policy regarding integration suits in the post-Brown South. In fact, as recently as October 29, 1955, at a state meeting of the NAACP at Little Rock, Tate himself had announced that, “If you want the banner of the NAACP, you must settle for no less than complete and immediate integration.”56 Preparations for Litigation In any event, the Little Rock members of the NAACP secured local counsel and began a drive to raise funds for the litigation. Iggers admitted that, while the task seemed herculean, financial and representative needs were met with greater ease than anticipated. Within a period of weeks, $1300 was raised from local sources; from both “white sympathizers” and “local Negroes, who in the past had shown no great disposition to underwrite Negro protest and betterment causes.”57 As far as retaining local counsel was concerned, after little interest was shown by lawyers within the city of Little Rock to accept what the branch could afford to pay, the executive committee turned to Pine Bluff attorney Wiley A. Branton, who took the case “for a quite modest fee.”58 Branton was chairman of the State Legal Redress Committee and had worked with the NAACP in the past. In fact, he had been president of the Pine Bluff chapter for a time and was also a member of the ACHR, though the Little Rock NAACP had not had much contact with him prior to this occasion. “They simply asked me,”

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he recalled, and “I treated it just as any other school desegregation case, and I had filed several by that time.”59 Also less difficult than might have been expected was recruiting students to attempt registration at their neighborhood white schools. Executive committee members, including Iggers and his colleague at Philander Smith College, Dr. Lee Lorch, visited the homes of families with children who lived closer to white schools than the Negro schools they were assigned to attend. On the morning designated, January 23, 1956,60 virtually all of the parents they visited tried to register their children in their neighborhood school for the spring semester. “Apparently the word had spread in the Negro community,” Iggers mused, since “a number of parents whom we had not talked with also appeared with their children and attempted to register.”61 Virgil Blossom reported that he had been informed very early that morning of the NAACP’s plans and had instructed the school principals to send all Negro children who attempted to register at white schools to his office. Early that day “a procession of Negro children and a few parents, accompanied by Mrs. Daisy Bates, state president of the NAACP, and by the Rev. J. J. [sic] Crenchaw, arrived at my office.”62 According to the superintendent, they brought a photographer with them and had also notified the press, so reporters and news photographers were present as well.63 As expected, the black students were turned away, and “upon being refused admission” a majority of the parents “applied to the local NAACP branch for legal aid.”64 Enthusiasm for the suit was so great, Iggers remembered later, that several of the parents had to be dissuaded from joining as plaintiffs. Executive committee members convinced those who had too much to lose by joining the suit, particularly those employed in any capacity by the school district whose job might be jeopardized, to allow others to make this stand for them.65 Drs. Iggers and Lorch, too, discovered that they had to defend themselves for their activities to their employer, in the person of M. LaFayette Harris, president of the predominantly black college, Philander Smith. Upon complaints that the two professors had been observed on the grounds of Horace Mann High School “soliciting students to transfer,” Harris noted the impropriety of such agitation and reminded Iggers that “freedom always entails responsibility.” President Harris warned that Iggers and Lorch “will take the consequences of anything which follows as a result of your action.”66 Iggers told Harris that he had been misinformed; that neither he nor Lorch had ever approached any black student directly on the grounds of a city public

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school regarding transfer to a white facility. To do so, he agreed, would be improper. Rather, he, along with his wife and Dr. Lorch, “visited Negro parents in their homes,” and “each time we were accompanied by a prominent person in the Negro community.”67 While nothing of consequence resulted from this exchange between the college administration and Iggers, the message was clear. These two white professors had attracted attention that could cause trouble for themselves, the Negro college at which they taught, and the black community they wished to help advance.

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Aaron v. Cooper Filed On February 8, 1956, Wiley A. Branton and U. Simpson Tate, on behalf of thirty-three black children who had been denied admission to Little Rock white public schools, admittedly for no other reason than their race, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The case was styled Aaron v. Cooper, since it was John Aaron’s name that appeared first among those of the plaintiffs, listed alphabetically, and Little Rock School Board President William G. Cooper’s that was listed first among the defendants, which also included the board secretary, the superintendent, and the rest of the school board.68 The school district engaged a team of four attorneys, each from among Little Rock’s “most prestigious law firms” to join with their regular counsel, A. F. “Archie” House, to defend the Phase Program against the attack.69 Freyer has noted that each of the four special attorneys retained were specifically chosen by Blossom to represent a “cross-section of professional opinion concerning integration.”70 Henry E. Spitzberg believed in the correctness of the Brown decision and was considered to be supportive of school integration on moral grounds. Frank E. Chowning was a moderate who disagreed with the ruling, but felt strongly that it was now the law of the land and must be complied with in good faith. Richard C. Butler described himself as a “middle of the roader” on the segregation issue, although he believed that the Supreme Court had abandoned its principles when it intruded upon the rights of the states in deciding Brown.71 Of the four, Leon B. Catlett proved himself the most opposed to integration. House, who led the defense team, was a racial moderate who was “perceived among both whites and blacks as a man without prejudice.”72

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House and his associates chose to defend the Blossom Plan as one that was designed to make the transition from segregated to nonsegregated schools as smooth as possible, with a minimum of disruption among the community at large. At the same time, they would argue, while the plan entailed gradual change, it represented a “prompt and reasonable start” towards integration that met the guidelines that the Supreme Court had outlined in the 1955 implementing decree in Brown II.73 As far as House was concerned, his legal argument represented the facts of the matter. The plan was reasonable, he thought, and was offered in good faith. Integration was a very sensitive issue, however, that stirred up strong emotions on both sides and needed to be handled delicately if tragic consequences were to be avoided. He had consulted with Blossom as the Phase Program evolved and understood the concerns that helped shape it. Blossom, he knew, was “terribly disappointed” that the NAACP had decided to attack his plan. House also believed, wrongly, that the attack originated with the national office of the NAACP; that they “took out after Little Rock.” This mistaken belief also helped to form the Little Rock School District’s argument: they would present their defense as one in which a sincere and genuine attempt at compliance was being attacked by extremists agitating from outside the community.74 In March 1956 Judge John E. Miller, sitting at Fort Smith, was assigned to hear the case by Chief Judge Archibald K. Gardner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit at St. Louis. The federal district judge at Little Rock, Thomas C. Trimble, who would normally have handled the case, disqualified himself because one of his sons was a lawyer for one of the firms representing the school district.75 The taking of depositions was set for May 4, and the trial date for August 15. In April, Judge Miller denied a request by plaintiffs to empanel a three-judge court in the case, since he did not believe that the constitutionality of any Arkansas law was in question. The desegregation plan challenged in the suit, he reasoned, had been formulated as an attempt to comply with the Supreme Court’s directives, and not by compulsion of state law.76 Judge Miller, whom Archie House described as an “excellent judge and a real scholar,” as well as a “disciplinarian,” made no secret of his basic disagreement with the Brown decision.77 Still, Brown was now the law, and “there is no attitude to take other than to enforce the law as it was declared by the high court.”78 The impression on both sides was that Judge Miller

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would do his duty, if without enthusiasm. As House later alleged, “it seemed to me that he couldn’t put his heart into trying to enforce Brown v. Board of Education.”79

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The Phase Program Upheld The most significant development arising from the taking of depositions on May 4 had no bearing, specifically, on the case itself. Rather, it was the behavior of Leon B. Catlett, one of the special attorneys for the school district. In his questioning of Daisy Bates and Rev. Crenchaw, Catlett was “boorish, rude, and impertinent.”80 As Lee Lorch related the interviews to Tate, who was not present, “Mrs. Bates had to correct his pronunciation of the word Negro.” Furthermore, Catlett repeatedly referred to Bates by her first name, “although they were not personally acquainted.” When she asked him to address her as Mrs. Bates, “he replied by stating that he would not call her anything if she objected to being called Daisy.”81 In a statement issued following the deposition, Bates proclaimed, “This behavior is not an affront to me alone. It is an insult to every Negro.” She continued, “It shows clearly the contempt in which he holds us and the determination with which he would relegate us to second-class citizenship.”82 Branton, who represented the plaintiffs at the deposition, stated frankly that he was “quite surprised and embarrassed at the conduct of a fellow lawyer.”83 Needless to say, the White Citizens Council of Arkansas, a segregationist group, found nothing wrong with Catlett’s conduct. Rather, calling her “an arrogant mulatto,” they lambasted Bates for “brazenly” showing “her contempt for White people” by insisting that the school board’s attorney refrain from referring to blacks as “niggers” and by requesting that Catlett address her with respect.84 At trial in August, the school board defended its plan as reasonable compliance with the Brown directive, as per their intentions noted above. U. Simpson Tate, for the plaintiffs, made his arguments in accordance with the policy of the national organization and attacked the Little Rock Phase Program on constitutional grounds, demanding immediate total integration. To no surprise, then, based on the arguments offered, Judge Miller’s opinion, issued on August 28, 1956, upheld the gradual, and limited, desegregation plan that had been approved by the board. Considering the great deal of room for maneuver provided by the Supreme Court’s 1955 implementation

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decree, it was not difficult for Miller to conclude that the Blossom Plan clearly met the minimal standard laid out in Brown II. The court retained jurisdiction in the case, thus insuring the continued oversight of desegregation in Little Rock by federal judges.85 The NAACP attorneys filed an appeal with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals at St. Louis. The chief counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Thurgood Marshall, was dispatched to join Branton in presenting arguments before that tribunal. On April 29, 1957, Miller’s ruling was sustained. “We were not satisfied” with the outcome of the case, Branton acknowledged, but plaintiff’s attorneys opted not to appeal to the Supreme Court for two reasons. First, they feared that the High Court would sustain the ruling and “adopt the Little Rock plan as a model plan for the rest of the nation,” and second, by that point the starting date for desegregation was only months away. Branton and his associates thought that they should “allow for an opportunity for it to proceed in a peaceful atmosphere.”86 The atmosphere in Little Rock, of course, would not remain peaceful for long.

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A Moderate Governor By the time Judge Miller handed down his opinion in Aaron v. Cooper in August 1956, some degree of desegregation had already occurred in a small handful of Arkansas communities.87 With the exception of Hoxie, each of these school districts was located in the western part of the state, where black populations were low. Despite difficulties arising from segregationist opposition to the admission of black students to the Hoxie schools, the school board, civic elite, and the black community in the state capital were hopeful that the implementation of the court-approved program for the gradual integration of the Little Rock high schools would go smoothly. The election of Governor Orval Eugene Faubus in 1954 was no cause for concern. Like Governor Cherry before him, Faubus was “generally inclined toward a moderate stance on the question of school desegregation.”88 This governor, in fact, was regarded as a liberal. During the 1954 Democratic primary campaign he had even been forced to defend himself against charges of Communism. The allegations were not true. Orval Faubus was no Communist. But his father, Sam, was well known as a Socialist who had given his son the middle name “Eugene” to honor Eugene V. Debs.

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Although the political necessity for courting favor with influential east Arkansas nabobs prevented Faubus from making any strong public statements of approval for the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown, he had, according to his biographer Roy Reed, privately acknowledged that he thought the decision “morally right.”89 When the governor stated after Brown II was handed down that “it has been my stand for some time that the best solution can be worked out on the local level according to the particular circumstances of each school district,”90 the feeling in Little Rock was that he would do nothing to alter their plans for desegregation. While the trouble in Hoxie evidenced the potential for resistance, the fact that Faubus, true to his word, refused to intervene there was apparent confirmation that the City of Roses would be left free to move forward with the Phase Program unfettered by state interference.

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NOTES 

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1

Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation (Westport, CT, 1984), 21. 2 Numan V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950’s (Baton Rouge, 1969, 1997), 252. 3 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 4 Southern School News (hereafter referred to as SSN), Sept. 3, 1954. 5 Ibid., Oct. 1, 1954. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., April 7, 1955. 8 William G. Cooper, Jr. interview, Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration Oral History Project (hereafter referred to as DDEP), (Columbia University, 1970), 10. 9 SSN, April 7, 1955. 10 Virgil T. Blossom, It Has Happened Here (New York, 1959), 13. 11 Ibid., 10-24; Daisy Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock: A Memoir (New York, 1962), 3, 49, 51-53; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 15-18; Freyer, “Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis, 1954-1957,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 40 (Autumn 1981), 199-201; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 253-255; John A. Kirk, Redefining the Color Line: Black Activism in Little Rock, Arkansas, 1940-1970 (Gainesville, 2002), 92-96; Kirk, “The Little Rock Crisis and Postwar Black Activism in Arkansas,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56 (Autumn 1997), 289-291; C. Fred Williams, “Class: The Central Issue in the 1957 Little Rock School Crisis,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56 (Autumn 1997), 342-344. Sara Alderman Murphy, Breaking the Silence: Little Rock’s Women’s Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools, 1958-1963 (Fayetteville, 1997), 33-35. 12 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 252. 13 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 16. 14 Harold Engstrom interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 4. 15 Little Rock’s fourth high school, Technical High, was to remain segregated. 16 Harold Engstrom interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 4. 17 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 16-18. Quote on page 18. Provisions in desegregation plans that allowed students to transfer from schools where their race was a minority into schools in which their race was the majority were eventually disallowed by the United States Supreme Court. Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683 (1963). 18 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 20. 19 Ibid., 21. 20 349 U.S 294 (1955). 21 See, for example: Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, and “Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis, 195-219; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, and “Looking Back at Little Rock,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 25 (Summer 1966), 101-116; John A. Kirk, “Arkansas, the Brown Decision, and the 1957

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 Little Rock School Crisis: A Local Perspective,” in Elizabeth Jacoway and C. Fred Williams, Understanding the Little Rock Crisis: An Exercise in Remembrance and Reconciliation, (Fayetteville, 1999); and Murphy, Breaking the Silence. 22 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 254. 23 Ibid. 24 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 34-36; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 17. Quote from Freyer. 25 The ACHR was affiliated with the Southern Regional Council, and, unlike some of its counterparts in other southern states, “took an unequivocal stand on integration.” Georg G. Iggers to Tony Freyer, Sept. 17, 1980. Georg G. Iggers Papers, University of Arkansas at Little Rock Special Collections (hereafter UALR). On offers by the clergy to endorse and promote the Blossom Plan, see Mark Newman, “The Arkansas Baptist State Convention and Desegregation, 1954-1968,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56 (Autumn 1997), 301. 26 Elizabeth Huckaby, Crisis at Central High: Little Rock, 1957-58, (Baton Rouge, 1980), 4, and Elizabeth Huckaby interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1972), 2. Quote from DDEP interview. Mrs. Huckaby, Vice Principal for Girls of Central High School, stated that she was told this by the school principal, J. W. “Jess” Matthews. 27 C. Fred Williams, “Class: The Central Issue,” 341. 28

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29

Ibid., 342.

Ibid., 342, 343. 30 Ibid., 343. 31 William G. Cooper, Jr. interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 22. 32 A. F. House interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 6. 33 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 18. On the general subject of the appeal to the rule of law by the Little Rock School Board, see: Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis and “Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis.” 34 R. A. Lile interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 2. 35 Report by Mike Yarrow in the American Friends Service Committee publication Comment, 1 (Oct. 14, 1957). ACHR Collection, University of Arkansas – Fayetteville Special Collections Division (hereafter UA-F). 36 Freyer, “The Little Rock Crisis Reconsidered,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56 (Autumn 1997), 361. 37 Ibid., 362. 38 John A. Kirk, “The Little Rock Crisis and Postwar Black Activism in Arkansas,” 274, 275. 39 Ibid., 280. 40 Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 51-68; Georg G. Iggers, “An Arkansas Professor: The NAACP and the Grass Roots,” in Wilson Record and Jane Cassels Record, Little Rock, USA (San Francisco, 1960), 283-291; Freyer, “Objectivity and Involvement: Georg G. Iggers and Writing the History of the Little Rock School Crisis,” in Larry Eugene Jones, Crossing Boundaries: The

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 Exclusion and Inclusion of Minorities in Germany and the United States (New York, 2001), 175-177. 41 Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 63-64. 42 Williams was quoted as saying, “We want complete integration. However, we are seeking it through mediation immediately to get Negroes enrolled into courses in the white schools,” and, “We plan to enter litigation if the school plan fails.” Arkansas Gazette, February 1952 (exact date unknown). Newspaper clipping located in Iggers Papers, UALR. 43 Of course, the bravery and dignity of “The Nine who Dared,” and the role played by Daisy Bates during the Little Rock crisis is a compelling and well documented story. See Melba Pattillo Beals, Warriors Don’t Cry (New York, 1994); Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock; Huckaby, Crisis at Central High. 44 This statement was made by Vernon McDaniel, an ‘educational specialist’ sent to Arkansas by the NAACP in an address to the Little Rock NAACP on April 2, 1955. SSN, May 4, 1955. 45 Georg G. Iggers to Tony Freyer, Sept. 17, 1980. Iggers Papers, UALR. 46 Ibid. Iggers actually identified the Citizens’ Council as the source of segregationist pressure. At the time in Little Rock, however, there was yet no organized Citizens’ Council. The White Citizens Council of Arkansas (associated with James D. Johnson) would be established in September 1955 at Walnut Ridge, and on October 11, 1956 White America, Inc. elected to dissolve itself and become a part of the Citizens’ Councils. 47 Ibid. 48 Georg G. Iggers to “Friends,” Jan. 10, 1956. Iggers Papers, UALR. 49 Iggers to Freyer, Sept. 17, 1980. Iggers Papers, UALR. See also, Iggers, “The NAACP and the Grass Roots,” 288; Freyer, “Georg G. Iggers and the Little Rock School Crisis,” 181-182. 50 Lee Lorch to U. Simpson Tate, Dec. 7, 1955. Iggers Papers, UALR. 51 Iggers to Freyer, Sept. 17, 1980. Iggers Papers, UALR. 52 The national office was not directly involved in this lawsuit, although the New York office was kept apprised of developments. Freyer, “Georg G. Iggers and the Little Rock School Crisis,” 182. Still, Tate’s conduct of the litigation was consistent with the objectives of the national organization as outlined by Thurgood Marshall, general counsel for the NAACP, in an interview for Southern School News. SSN, Sept. 1955. 53 Ibid. 54 Iggers, “The NAACP and the Grass Roots,” 289. 55 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 51. 56 SSN, Dec. 1955. 57 Iggers, “The NAACP and the Grass Roots,” 289. 58 Ibid., 290. 59 Wiley A. Branton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 54. 60 In his account of these events, Superintendent Virgil Blossom set the date as January 24. Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 27.

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61

Iggers, “The NAACP and the Grass Roots,” 289. Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 27. Reverend J. C. Crenchaw (not J. J. Crenchaw, as Blossom wrote in his book) was the president of the Little Rock branch of the NAACP. 63 Ibid., 27-28. 64 Iggers, “The NAACP and the Grass Roots,” 289. 65 Iggers to Freyer, Sept. 17, 1980. Iggers Papers, UALR. 66 M. LaFayette Harris to Iggers, Jan. 25, 1956. Ibid. 67 Iggers to Harris, Jan. 25, 1956. Ibid. 68 Aaron v. Cooper, U.S.D.C.E.D. Ark. Civ. No. 3113 (1956). 69 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 46. 70 Ibid. 71 Richard C. Butler interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 3, 21-22, 24. 72 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 47. 73 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 74 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 47-49, and A.F. House interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 3,6,9. Quote from House interview, 9. 75 SSN, April 1956. 76 Ibid., May 1956. In Arkansas, incidentally, the basis for ‘separate but equal’ public schools had been statutory rather than constitutional. 77 A. F. House interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 16, 17. 78 Hope Star, June 8, 1955. Located in Judge Harry J. Lemley Papers, UALR. 79 A. F. House interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 16. 80 Statement of Mrs. L. C. Bates, President, Arkansas State Conference of NAACP Branches, May 4, 1956. Located in Iggers Papers, UALR. 81 Lee Lorch to Tate, May 19, 1956. Ibid. 82 See note 81, above. 83 Branton to Lorch, May 20, 1956. Iggers Papers, UALR. 84 Arkansas Faith (published by the White Citizens Council of Arkansas), May 1956. Located in Daisy Bates Collection, UA-F. 85 Aaron v. Cooper, U.S.D.C.E.D. Ark. Civ. No. 3113 (1956), Race Relations Law Reporter (hereafter referred to as RRLR) 1 (1957), 851-860. 86 Branton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 54. 87 The following Arkansas school districts had made starts at integrating black students into previously all-white schools: Charleston (1954), Fayetteville (1954), Hoxie (1955), and Bentonville (1955). SSN, Oct. 1957. The Southern School News September 1956 issue reported only three, since Bentonville had not made public the fact that it had enrolled the two black children residing in the district into classes at the Bentonville schools. See SSN, Sept. 1956. 88 Kirk, “Arkansas, the Brown Decision, and the 1957 Crisis,” 69. 89 Roy Reed, Faubus: The Life and Times of an American Prodigal (Fayetteville, 1997), 169. 90 SSN, June 8, 1955.

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CHAPTER TWO

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Segregationist Arkansans Rear Their Heads In June 1955, as members of the Little Rock NAACP were beginning to lose faith in the sincerity of the school board’s efforts towards compliance with the Supreme Court’s desegregation order, the small town of Hoxie, Arkansas, one hundred and twenty-five miles from the capital, announced that it would integrate its twenty-five Negro schoolchildren with its 1,025 white students when school opened in July.1 Hoxie, in Lawrence County in the northeast part of the state, was not located in the delta, but was near enough to it to have a split school term to accommodate the cotton harvest. The black population was sparse, however; only fourteen black families lived in the town. In that sense, it was a long way from the delta.2 When the time came, the schools in Hoxie opened with little fanfare, and no apparent incidents. For a few weeks, integration proceeded smoothly. In fact, things were going so well in this tiny enclave of the former Confederacy that it attracted a degree of national media publicity. A spread in Life magazine appeared in late July to celebrate the peaceful desegregation of the Hoxie schools, complete with pictures of a little white girl hand in hand with two black playmates at recess.3 This, of course, was too much for members of extreme segregationist organizations, such as the Citizens’ Councils in Mississippi and White America, Inc. A steady flow of anti-integration materials streamed into the town, much of it from Citizens’ Councils in Mississippi. Hoxie School Board members claimed that money was pouring in from the same sources as well, though local segregationists denied such allegations.4 On August 3 about three hundred and fifty angry people attended a pro-segregation meeting at Hoxie City Hall. They voted to form a citizen’s committee and named a local man, Herbert Brewer, to lead it. The first action of the committee was to organize a boycott of the school. Brewer claimed that more than half of the white parents in town kept their children out of school the following day, though school

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officials, while refusing to offer exact figures, claimed the absentee rate was not that high. Less than a week later, the Citizen’s Committee presented a petition to the school board demanding either that segregation be restored or that the board members resign, presumably so they could be replaced with a board that would reestablish segregated schools. Two representatives from the Capital City Chapter of White America, Inc. (Little Rock), attorney Amis Guthridge and chapter president Finos C. Phillips, traveled to Hoxie to speak to a crowd of about seven hundred on August 13. Herbert Brewer and five others from Hoxie went to a meeting at Senatobia, Mississippi, on August 25 where they conferred at length with U.S. Senator James O. Eastland (D-Miss.) after he addressed that crowd. The situation at Hoxie was becoming more heated by the day. School board members, who reported they were being harassed by rabid segregationists, decided to close the schools and ended the summer term two weeks early.5

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The Citizens’ Councils The Citizens’ Councils were first organized in July 1954 by a young farmer and former Mississippi State football star named Robert B. Patterson in Indianola, Mississippi, about thirty miles from the Arkansas border. Patterson had attended a meeting at the local school in Indianola in November 1953 where the speaker told those present that the Supreme Court of the United States had cases pending before it that challenged laws requiring segregated schools, and that if the justices of the Court ordered the schools desegregated, Mississippi and the rest of the South would have to comply. “I just sat there like the rest of them,” the thirty-one-year-old father of two small girls later remembered, “like a bump on a log. But I couldn’t sleep that night.” He tried to rouse others to the danger lurking on the Supreme Court docket, to urge them to prepare for resistance, but few shared his alarm. Even after the May 17, 1954, decision he had difficulty stirring his neighbors into action. By his own report, Patterson “became obsessed with the thing,” and he “started agitating around town.” He was gripped by fear and rage at the very suggestion that some day his children might be compelled to sit in the same classrooms with black children. His labors began to bear fruit in early July, and on the eleventh of that month fourteen men met at the home of the town’s

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compress manager, D. H. Hawkins. They called a public meeting at the city hall later that week that was attended by about one hundred people, and there the Indianola Citizens’ Council was officially formed. Soon, Patterson left the daily operation of the farm he managed to his partners, and he dedicated himself to Citizens’ Council matters fulltime. The fight against “race-mixing” became the driving force in his life.6 Patterson’s organization was assisted by association with figures of such stature as Senator Eastland, U.S. Representative John Bell Williams (D-Miss.), and Mississippi Circuit Judge Thomas Pickens Brady. Judge Brady7 had issued a call for organized resistance in his famous “Black Monday” speech to the nearby Greenwood, Mississippi chapter of the Sons of the American Revolution.8 Soon, local Citizens’ Councils formed throughout Mississippi, and, inevitably, the movement crossed state borders into other areas of the South. The integration at Hoxie offered an opportunity for the organization to extend its reach into Arkansas. In September 1955 the White Citizens Council of Arkansas was formed at Crossett, about ninety miles from Indianola, Mississippi. On September 17 they conducted a rally at Walnut Ridge, adjacent to Hoxie.9 Herbert Brewer spoke at the rally, as did Curt Copeland, a former newspaper publisher at Hot Springs, and one-time State Senator James D. Johnson, who had recently run unsuccessfully against T. J. Gentry for the position of Arkansas State Attorney General. Copeland and Johnson were the leaders of the Arkansas Council and, together, they would publish its official journal, the ultimately short-lived Arkansas Faith. Crowd estimates for the gathering varied widely, from three hundred and fifty to one thousand. Days before, at a rally of four hundred in DeWitt, Jim Johnson had promised, “Arkansas people didn’t start integration, but Arkansas people are going to stop it in Arkansas.”10 Undoubtedly, he delivered the same message to the throng at Walnut Ridge. The speakers harangued their audience, reproving a host of groups and individuals they claimed were interested in sacrificing the innocent white children of Hoxie, and, eventually, all of Arkansas’ white schoolchildren to the evils of race-mixing. They “denounced the NAACP, the Hoxie School Board, Hoxie Supt. K. E. Vance, Rev. H. L. Robison of the Hoxie Methodist Church, U.S. Atty. Gen. Herbert Brownell, the U.S. Supreme Court, Gov. Orval E. Faubus, Arkansas Atty. Gen. T. J. Gentry, the University of Arkansas and its president John Tyler Caldwell, Arkansas college presidents in general,

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the Methodist Church, the Arkansas Gazette and its executive editor, Harry S. Ashmore.”11 Copeland and Johnson then played a phony recording of what they claimed was an address by an “Arkansas Negro” to a “secret” meeting of the NAACP in Mississippi in December, 1954 that was given to them by Robert Patterson and Senator Eastland. This inflammatory recording had made, and would continue to make the rounds at various Citizens’ Council events. The fictional orator was supposedly an NAACP organizer and was identified as a Howard University professor named Roosevelt Williams, although the NAACP claimed never to have heard of him and there was no record of his ever having been on the faculty of Howard.12 In this speech, “Professor Williams” asserted that “the negro is the white man’s superior,” and that the NAACP demanded “the right for any negro, man or woman, to marry a member of the white race if we can find one fit to marry.” He further contended that “we will absolutely control the next election in Arkansas” and that they “completely… control this man Faubus.”13 Here was, then, those in attendance believed, confirmation of their worst fears. The NAACP was conspiring to destroy the white race, and school integration was a major step towards reaching their ultimate nefarious goal. The Hoxie Injunction Although segregationist pressure had induced the Hoxie School Board to prematurely dismiss the summer term, board members elected not to meet either of the demands of Herbert Brewer’s Citizen’s Committee. On October 24, they reconvened the schools on schedule, integrated. Back at the beginning of September, the board’s attorney, William Penix, laid down the gauntlet and invited the anti-integration forces to file suit. Hoxie school officials, Penix announced, were “ready and willing” to defend their actions in court.14 By the end of the month, however, the segregationists had not taken up the challenge. They preferred, apparently, the extralegal methods of intimidation and harassment to court action. Exasperated by the constant hounding of protesters, and fearful that extremists might act on their threats, the board decided to go on the offensive. They filed Hoxie v. Brewer15 with the federal court at Little Rock. The next day, October 14, Federal District Judge Thomas C. Trimble issued a seven-day temporary injunction restraining all

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defendants from interfering with the desegregation of the Hoxie schools. The preliminary restraining order was extended twice,16 keeping it in effect until a hearing set for December at Jonesboro to determine whether defendants should be permanently enjoined. In a court hearing on October 31, 1955, Judge Trimble rejected defendants’ contention that public school integration was contrary to state law, stating simply, “there are no valid segregation laws of the State of Arkansas, for they have been declared unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court of the United States.”17 On January 9, 1956, visiting Judge Albert L. Reeves found, “that the defendants did conspire within the purview of the general law on conspiracy is hardly open to question.” He was convinced, he stated, that “if the restraining order should be dissolved, there would in all probability be a recurrence of trouble and interference with the operation of the schools in the Hoxie School district.” As to the argument by defendants that the fact they had obeyed the temporary injunction made a permanent order unnecessary, Reeves suggested that they “should not complain against an injunctive order that restrains them from doing things that might result in criminal prosecutions and civil suits against them.”18 The segregationist defendants now permanently enjoined, they appealed the case to the Eighth Circuit Court, “but the judges there upheld Reeves on every point.”19 The Justice Department Steps In A significant development at appeal, however, was the entrance of the United States Department of Justice into the case. Before the Justice Department officially intervened as a friend of the court in the Hoxie litigation, its policy had been one of non-interference in school desegregation suits unless ordered to enter a case by a federal court. Local United States Attorneys were instructed in June 1955 “not to have integration disturbances investigated as possible violations of the civil rights statutes.”20 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) did investigate episodes of violence, but not through the Civil Rights Section of the Criminal Division. Rather, incidents were monitored by the Internal Security Division as part of its Cold War policy of tracking the activities of potential “subversives.” Copies of investigation reports were forwarded to the Civil Rights Section, but the agents who wrote them were not particularly concerned with civil rights violations.21

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In fact, however, the Justice Department had been involved in the Hoxie situation almost since the beginning. As early as August, when segregationist pressure forced the early closing of the schools, Bill Penix contacted United States Attorney General Herbert Brownell. Penix suggested that, in his opinion, there were sufficient grounds for an inquiry into possible violations of 18 U.S.C. 241 by White America, Inc.22 Under Section 241, the federal government has the authority to prosecute criminally conspiracies to deprive a citizen of the exercise of his federal rights. The Civil Rights Section responded by authorizing an FBI investigation into anti-integration activities in Hoxie. Department of Justice attorneys hoped that the visible presence of FBI agents in the town might serve as a deterrent to further interference with school officials’ attempts to peacefully administer desegregation in the schools. Although Civil Rights Section chief Arthur Brann Caldwell agreed that prosecutions under Section 241, and also Section 242, which prohibited “willful action under color of law” to deprive a citizen of his federal rights, could be justified, neither he nor his superiors in the Department of Justice believed charges should be filed. “We… proceeded as though we intended to prosecute criminally under § 241 and § 242,” Caldwell recalled, but “the information was not presented to a grand jury… because we knew that no grand jury in that community would indict, or having indicted, no petit jury would convict Brewer and the other agitators.”23 A. B. Caldwell operated as an unofficial advisor to Penix through much of the ordeal. Caldwell was an Arkansan who had lived near Hoxie for a time and was acquainted with the school board’s attorney, who was from nearby Jonesboro.24 When the head of the Civil Rights Section learned that Penix was considering applying to the federal district court for injunctive relief, he pressed him to do so. “It is my opinion that that would be more effective at this time than almost anything else that could be done,” Caldwell urged, “for you must know the burdens that are imposed on the Government in trying to make out a criminal case in a matter of this kind.”25 Penix hoped that the Justice Department would join in the case he filed against the segregationist organizations and their leaders on October 13. As it happened, the lawyer for the school board had, besides Caldwell, another connection in the Department. Marcus Hollabaugh, an attorney in the Anti-Trust Division, was his brother-inlaw. He appealed to Hollabaugh, explaining the pressure he was under,

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and the threats and intimidations he was forced to endure. In Washington, Caldwell and Hollabaugh went together to Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers and told him of their desire to file an amicus curiae brief with the court.26 After Judge Reeves issued the permanent injunction restraining the segregationists from interfering with the Hoxie School Board on January 9, 1956, and Brewer and his associates indicated they would appeal, Penix formally requested the entrance of the United States into the case. As it turned out, Georgia’s Attorney General Eugene Cook also wanted to file a brief – in support of the segregationists. Since, “in the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, before a third party can enter as amicus all parties to the litigation must consent,” the Hoxie School Board allowed Georgia to join “on the condition that Brewer and the other side agree that the Department of Justice be permitted to enter as amicus on their behalf.”27 On February 22, the United States announced it would enter the case.28 The department submitted its brief in August. In it, the position of the United States was that school officials have a federal right to be able to perform their duty under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution without interference. The brief filed by Attorney General Cook for the State of Georgia contended that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction in this case, and that the injunction ordered deprived defendants of their First Amendment rights of free speech and assembly. On September 10, William Penix and Henry Putzel, Jr., appearing for the Justice Department, presented oral arguments to the court. Defendant segregationists made their arguments in a brief written by W. V. Moody of Little Rock.29 On October 25, 1956, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit issued its opinion. Judge Joseph W. Woodrough of Omaha, Nebraska, wrote the decision for himself, Judge Charles J. Vogel of Fargo, North Dakota, and Judge Martin D. Van Oosterhout of Sioux City, Iowa. Woodrough stated, first of all, that the federal courts do have jurisdiction in this case, as both Judges Trimble and Reeves had held. Second, he declared that defendants’ “acts and… speech were calculated and intended… to incite disobedience to the law and the overthrow of law and order and to coerce, intimidate, and compel the school board to cease and desist from the performance of its sworn and lawful duty, and to engage in unlawful conduct.”30 Therefore, they are not protected speech. Finding “no error in the judgment appealed from,” the judges affirmed Reeves’ District Court opinion.31

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The Significance of Hoxie In 1962, A. B. Caldwell stated that “Hoxie was unique and of greater significance than most people realize.”32 Of course, historians are not “most people,” and several have identified a variety of reasons why the episode is important. J. W. Peltason, in his book Fifty-Eight Lonely Men on the crucial role that federal judges played in implementing the Supreme Court’s directive in Brown, suggests that Hoxie is significant for the precedent it set. To him, the “lesson of the Hoxie case” was that it showed school boards that wished to comply with the law in the face of community hostility had recourse to the courts for injunctive relief against outside interference with desegregation.33 Jack Greenberg, who was a lawyer for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and succeeded Thurgood Marshall as its chief counsel when Marshall left to become a judge in 1961, made the same observation in Race Relations and American Law.34 Benjamin Muse made note of Hoxie as one of the earliest clashes with extremist opposition against the integration of a particular school district. He further stated, in Ten Years of Prelude, that the Hoxie case was interesting because it represented a struggle between two sets of whites, with no NAACP involvement whatsoever. That the conflict over the Hoxie schools was fought between white citizens was not unique; that was fairly typical of the debate over integration in individual districts during the 1950s. The absence of NAACP involvement, however, was unique.35 Of prime importance to Muse was that this occasion marked the first time the United States Department of Justice entered directly into a school desegregation suit since the Supreme Court issued its decision in Brown.36 Both Robert Fredrick Burk and John T. Elliff considered the entrance of the United States into the case the most important development at Hoxie. Burk, in his book on The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, asserted that this marked a significant shift away from a policy of non-intervention.37 Elliff discussed the Civil Rights Section’s involvement at Hoxie at great length in his dissertation on the Justice Department where he examined the evolution of government policy regarding school desegregation. “The story begins and ends in Arkansas,” he declared. “The first initiative by the Civil Rights Section came in Hoxie, Arkansas in 1955;

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and the Government’s policies were finally established during and after the Little Rock crisis in September, 1957.”38 Neil McMillen, whose emphasis in The Citizens' Council was on organized resistance to Brown, cited Hoxie as a point of entrance and expansion of racist groups into Arkansas. Within a year, White America, Inc., Johnson’s White Citizens Council, and Brewer’s Citizens’ Committee, along with a few smaller groups, would combine to form the Association of Citizens’ Councils of Arkansas.39 In his biography of Orval E. Faubus, Roy Reed attributed significance to Hoxie because it gave prominence to James D. Johnson, who would challenge Faubus in his bid for re-nomination as the Democratic candidate for governor in 1956. Since the governor refused to intervene in Hoxie, the episode gave Johnson ammunition that could be used against the incumbent in his campaign.40 Tony A. Freyer identified several of the previously mentioned significances assigned to Hoxie in his book, The Little Rock Crisis. He noted that this was the first time the Justice Department submitted an amicus brief in a post-Brown desegregation case, that a statewide Citizens’ Council organization was formed, and that local officials could apply to the federal courts for injunctive relief. Local authorities, he asserted, could successfully defend an integration plan against segregationist opposition if it operated with a firm hand and provided community leadership. It is not necessary for the state to intervene, furthermore, as long as the governor remained neutral. In addition, Freyer contends that federal investigations “could serve a useful function” – but only if violators of federal civil rights statutes were prosecuted. Otherwise, segregationist forces could exploit the “alien” presence of the FBI. But, “perhaps the most significant” in Freyer’s estimation, was the emergence of Jim Johnson as a figure to be reckoned with in Arkansas politics.41 To all of these points, another may be added. The events at Hoxie highlighted the role played by the media in the struggle for racial integration in public schools. It should be recalled that integrated schools operated peacefully for a few weeks at Hoxie, without notice and without serious opposition. It was not until after Life magazine published its July 25, 1955 article, holding up the Hoxie example as proof that integration could work, that major resistance formed. As Allison Graham noted, “In retrospect, the inflammatory elements of the Life article are obvious to anyone acquainted with the rhetoric of the times.”42 To segregationists, such obvious pro-integration propaganda

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required an immediate and severe response. This lesson was not lost on some other Arkansas school districts. When schools at Charleston and at Bentonville desegregated, for example, they did so under media blackouts and had no trouble.43

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Johnson Proposes an Amendment Within weeks of Reeves’ making the injunction against segregationist interference at Hoxie permanent, and the day after black students’ unsuccessful attempt to register for classes at white schools in Little Rock, James D. Johnson filed a proposed amendment to the Arkansas constitution with Attorney General T. J. Gentry. Based on the doctrine of interposition, under which states had the theoretical authority to nullify the effects of the Brown decisions, the amendment contended that the Supreme Court’s rulings were “encroachments upon rights and powers not delegated to the [United States] Constitution.”44 If ratified, the Johnson Amendment would require the Arkansas General Assembly to enact laws evading federal desegregation orders and subject state officials to criminal prosecution for failure to enforce the state’s segregation laws. “When this amendment is approved,” Johnson asserted with confidence, “it will absolutely guarantee continued segregation in the public schools of Arkansas and in other phases of Arkansas society.”45 A few days after this Interposition Amendment was submitted to the attorney general, on January 28, 1956, Governor Faubus issued a written statement in response to questions posed to him by New York Times reporter Damon Stetson. In it, the governor announced the results of a poll he had ordered be taken to gauge popular opinion on the integration issue in the state.46 Faubus was “a constant poll taker and pulse taker” according to his former friend and future enemy, exGovernor Sid McMath, and he tended to place great stock in the results of such surveys.47 Eighty-five percent of the people of the state of Arkansas, Faubus now declared, had indicated their desire to maintain racial separation in public schools. Restating the old “Folkways” position first enunciated by William Graham Sumner in 1906,48 he stated, “It should be obvious that centuries-old customs, and regional traditions, cannot be changed overnight – even by court edict,” and he added that he could “not be a party to any attempt to force acceptance of a change to which the people are so overwhelmingly opposed.”49

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While Faubus’ biographer, Roy Reed, suggested “there was no reason to doubt” the accuracy of the poll,50 the facts warrant a closer look. The head of Mid-South Opinion Surveys, Eugene F. Newsom of Paragould, Arkansas, conducted the poll. Rather than relying on a statewide random sampling of respondents, however, Newsom based his results on a sample of only five hundred people, all of whom lived in the strongly segregationist eastern part of the state. Furthermore, the eighteen percent who indicated that they were undecided or had no opinion were not counted in the announced figures.51 Ultimately, then, “the statistics provided far less conclusive evidence for widespread opposition to school desegregation than the governor claimed.”52 The results of the school board election in Hoxie less than two months later did little to confirm Faubus’ survey findings. Two of the five seats on the board were contested in the March 17 election. The two positions had been vacated by Leslie Howell, who did not stand for reelection, and L. L. Cochran, who moved out of the Hoxie School District. For one of the vacant posts, segregation leader Herbert Brewer edged out Herbert A. Green, 471 to 318. For the other, E. A. Nichols, also a segregationist, defeated Irwin Campbell, 478 to 299. Both Green and Campbell had indicated their support for the Hoxie School Board’s decision to desegregate. While the segregationist candidates carried the day, the board members who were not up for reelection claimed “a great moral victory.” A statement issued by the three declared, “Gov. Faubus said 85 per cent of the people in Arkansas were opposed to our efforts to obey the law. Here in the Hoxie District, where feelings are higher on this issue than anywhere in the state, we have secured the support of approximately 40 per cent of the voters.”53 The Bird Committee Partly in response to Johnson’s proposal of an extreme interposition amendment, and partly out of his belief that Newsom’s poll was an accurate reflection of the people’s wishes to evade federal integration directives, Governor Faubus appointed a five-man committee to study the “Virginia Plan” of the Old Dominion’s Gray Commission. Virginia Governor Thomas B. Stanley had created the thirty-two member Commission on Public Education, which was made up of state legislators and chaired by State Senator Garland Gray, in August of 1954 to investigate all legal methods that could be employed to maintain racial separation in that state’s public schools.54 Faubus

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named five east Arkansas notables to the Special Committee, each with a long list of credentials. Every one of them lived “within 50 miles of the Mississippi River and within 50 miles of each other.”55 At the head of the Committee was Marvin E. Bird of Earle, in Crittenden County. Bird was a successful banker and civic leader, and was the Chairman of the State Board of Education. B. G. “Bert” Dickey also hailed from Earle, and was an attorney, a banker, a businessman, and a civic leader. Charles T. “Charlie” Adams of Hughes, in St. Francis County, was the governor’s “old friend from the 1954 campaign.”56 Adams was a planter, chaired the Hughes School Board, and was a member of the State Games and Fish Commission. Also on his résumé was his former membership on the Arkansas Highway Commission and his previous presidency of the Arkansas Cotton Council. Noted attorney J. L. “Bex” Shaver of Wynne, in Cross County, had formerly been a state senator and lieutenant governor. Rounding out the Committee was Robert B. McCulloch, Sr. of Forrest City, in Crittenden County. McCulloch was, according to Federal District Judge Harry J. Lemley, “probably the ablest Constitutional Lawyer in Arkansas.”57 Even before the Bird Committee began its investigation, however, Jim Johnson challenged its mission. In a telegram to Faubus on February 13, 1956, Johnson insisted that “the Virginia Plan referred to by Southern States, as contained in my proposed amendment to [the] Arkansas Constitution, is the plan for interposition and nullification advocated by Calhoun, Madison, and Jefferson, not the watered down resolution adopted by [the] present Virginia Legislature.” Johnson pressed upon the governor to call the General Assembly into special session, to give those legislators who had voted against the 1955 pupil placement measure a chance to remedy their “grievous wrong to the people of Arkansas.” He further advised Faubus to prove his “sincerity” in his claims that he would not allow integration to be forced on an unwilling people by “enforcing segregation statutes of Arkansas to restore segregated schools at Fayetteville, Charleston and Hoxie.” Johnson sent copies of this telegram to the Arkansas Democrat, the Memphis Commercial Appeal, and to the wire services in Little Rock.58 Still, members of the Bird Committee traveled to Richmond, Virginia to confer with Governor Stanley and members of the Gray Commission.59 The Committee issued a report of its findings on February 24. They noted that the final report of the Gray Commission,

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which was submitted to Governor Stanley on November 11, 1955, did “not contain any specific mention of the so-called ‘Doctrine of Interposition.’” It did, however, “contain an emphatic statement that the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court ‘transcends the matter of segregation in education’ and that, as a result of that decision, ‘the most fundamental of the rights of the states and of their citizens exist by the Court’s sufferance and that the law of the land is whatever the Court may determine it to be by the process of judicial legislation.’”60 The “Virginia Plan” that was recommended by the Gray Commission to the Virginia legislature consisted of four points. The first was essentially a statement of support for the principle behind interposition, although the Commission did not advocate applying that principle through outright defiance or nullification by the state. Second was the adoption of an amendment and legislation providing for tuition grants to individual students to attend “private” segregated schools. Third was the passage of a pupil placement act that would have the effect of maintaining racial separation in the public schools, though the assignment of students to particular facilities would be made for reasons other than race. And the fourth recommendation was for “other miscellaneous and related statutory changes.” Such “miscellaneous” acts would include repealing compulsory attendance laws, vesting local school boards with the authority to employ and assign school faculty, authorizing the state attorney general to “provide services” to local school boards, and repealing any law that might present an obstacle to the continuance of segregation.61 Acting on these recommendations, the Virginia General Assembly had adopted what Johnson had referred to as a “watered down” resolution of interposition on February 1, 1956. According to a statement issued by Virginia Attorney General J. Lindsay Almond, the resolution was “not one of nullification.” Rather, it was the Supreme Court, he insisted, that had “nullified basic provisions of the Constitution of the United States” with its unconstitutional decision in Brown. Almond admitted “that it was not within the powers of the General Assembly or the people of Virginia to legally nullify, in whole or in part, the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court or to suspend for any period of time the enforcement of the decisions in Virginia.”62 What the Virginia Resolution did do was make an appeal to the other states to settle the question of school integration by passing an appropriate amendment to the United States Constitution. In addition, it pledged Virginia’s intention “to resist this illegal encroachment upon

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our sovereign powers” through whatever legal means existed to do so, and the state’s desire for her sister states to do likewise.63 Other southern states produced interposition resolutions in early February 1956 as well. Alabama’s became effective on February 2 without Governor James E. Folsom’s consent, and was no “watered down” expression of the doctrine. The Alabama legislature declared all federal court orders involving desegregation in public education to be, “as a matter of right, null, void, and of no effect” within the state.64 Georgia and Mississippi also resolved that federal court integration decrees were without force of law within their borders.65 The Bird Committee, however, based its report entirely on its examination of the Gray Commission’s “Virginia Plan” – just as Johnson had complained it was instructed to do. According to Freyer, this was consistent with Faubus’ desire to have the Committee “develop a set of interposition recommendations that would enable Arkansas to comply with Brown II, but that would also preserve the symbolic appeal of states’ rights.”66 Bird and his associates complied with this directive, and announced that they were “in full and complete accord with the principles set out in the Virginia Interposition Resolution.”67 They suggested that a similar measure be drawn up for the state of Arkansas. They stated their opinion that the “emergency” precipitated by the 1954 Brown ruling required “that appropriate steps be taken by which the will of the majority of the people of Arkansas can be officially determined.” To that end, the Committee recommended that an interposition resolution be either voted on by the representatives of the people in the General Assembly or by the people themselves by a popular vote on the November 1956 ballot. Regarding the other actions of Virginia’s Gray Commission, the Bird Committee felt that pupil placement should be adopted, but that any step taken at that time to provide tuition grants would be premature. 68 Based on the Committee’s advice, it was determined that both an interposition resolution and a pupil placement act should be put directly to the people for a vote in November. Once this decision was made, Governor Faubus announced his approval of the Bird Committee’s recommendations, informed Arkansans that measures to implement them were in the process of being constructed, and appealed to his constituents’ respect for governmental authority. “It is my sworn duty and obligation to be the governor of all the people, and to uphold and protect any and all citizens in the exercise of their individual and

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collective rights under the laws of the Commonwealth,” he said, and he vowed to fulfill that duty “to the utmost of my ability.”69

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The 1956 Gubernatorial Race Faubus again assured the people of Arkansas that he would do whatever he could to prevent integration from being forced upon any community that did not want it. At the same time, he permitted districts that chose to do so to voluntarily desegregate without state interference. Even as he asserted this relatively benign and racially moderate position, however, he was becoming increasingly concerned over the potential threat posed to his continued residence in the Governor’s Mansion by Jim Johnson. Johnson had been a relative unknown in Arkansas politics before the Hoxie episode. He served as a state senator when he was only twenty-five, but was unable to translate his local success to the state level and lost the race for attorney general in 1954. As the southern white backlash to the Supreme Court’s school segregation decisions took form, the ambitious lawyer from Crossett, near the Arkansas-Louisiana border, “saw his chance.”70 As a potential candidate, Johnson had much in his favor. Goodlooking, charismatic, and quick, “he was altogether the most effective wielder of the language that Arkansas had seen in many years.”71 A man with Johnson’s talents could do much with such an explosive, emotional issue as racial segregation. Speculation into his designs circulated as early as September, before the battle over the desegregation of the Hoxie schools had moved from the streets and into the courtroom, and such talk was perpetuated by Johnson’s periodic denials that he sought the office.72 On April 22, Johnson finally admitted that he was considering entering the race for the Democratic nomination, vowing, “The ballot will not close without a man who is completely against integration on it.”73 Eight days later he told a crowd gathered at Little Rock’s Robinson Auditorium for a states’ rights rally that he would be pleased to run if they wanted him to, but he could not afford to pay the filing fee. “I have never been so honored,” he announced, “or so broke.” As thousands74 of supporters chanted his name, he turned to them and declared, “Don’t put this burden on my back unless you are ready to go to work and willing to put up the money to finance this campaign.” Then Hoxie Citizens’ Committee leader Herbert Brewer took the cue and appealed to those present to dig deep in their pockets and contribute to the cause. To start things

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rolling, Brewer took out his own wallet and threw some money into the orchestra pit. On an organ, choruses of “Dixie” filled the hall. As reported in Johnson’s own Arkansas Faith, “pandemonium broke out” as “hundreds of people filed down the aisles and upon the stage, shaking hands with everybody else and tossing coins and bills into the orchestra pit.” The next day, May 1 – one day before the deadline – Johnson took the $2,300 that was collected, “still wrapped in a raincoat,” and paid his filing fee to Arkansas Secretary of State C. G. “Crip” Hall.75 When Governor Faubus filed as a candidate for reelection on April 25, he had been quoted as saying that he did not believe segregation would be “too much of an issue” in the campaign.76 What he meant was that, since each of the candidates opposed forced integration in the public schools, the choice for Arkansas voters should devolve upon other issues. Johnson and his supporters seized upon this statement by “Awful Faubus.”77 They announced, “We have news for Awful. Segregation of the races and preservation of Constitutional Government will be the paramount issue this summer.”78 The governor was accused of “pussy-footing” on the issue, and of having “personally killed” the same sort of pupil placement law that he was now proposing to place on the November ballot as an initiated act.79 In separate campaign speeches on July 18, both Johnson and another candidate, Jim Snoddy, charged again that Faubus was responsible for the failure of the 1955 bill. Responding to that assertion, Faubus defended himself by proclaiming that he had nothing to do with the defeat of the school assignment bill in the State Senate in 1955, and that he had not opposed it and would have signed it into law had it been approved by the General Assembly.80 The Johnson camp also attempted to malign Faubus by attacking those supporting him or associated with him, such as Arkansas Gazette executive editor Harry Ashmore and Arkansas Industrial Development Commission chairman Winthrop Rockefeller. Rockefeller, who was referred to as “Sly Winnie” or “Winsome Winnie,” was accused of being a wife-beater in Arkansas Faith. In the same article it was noted that “Rockefeller and Faubus have been buddies since the rich, spoiled, brattish, Yankee Carpet-bagger racemixer came to the Wonder State” and that it was expected that “Winnie will underwrite Faubus to the tune of $500,000 to beat Johnson.”81 The old charge of Communism that backfired on the incumbent Francis Cherry in the 1954 gubernatorial race was now revisited in the

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White Citizens Council of Arkansas’ official publication as well. At the height of the Great Depression, in the spring of 1935, Faubus had spent a semester at Commonwealth College, a leftist school in Mena, Arkansas. In 1954, he had disassociated himself from any affiliation with the school by employing “a combination of fact, half-truth, and outright falsehood.”82 Faubus claimed that he had never actually attended a class at Commonwealth; that he left the school almost immediately upon his arrival after learning that coursework there would not be recognized for credit by other accredited institutions and observing there “other things not to my liking, nor in conformity to my philosophy of life.”83 While the claim that he had never attended a class was patently untrue, so too was the characterization of Faubus as “the honor student of Commonwealth College.”84 Faubus had attended the school to please his father, who was a Socialist. To Roy Reed, “the only surprising thing about his Commonwealth experience is that he surrendered to his father’s urging and went there in the first place.”85 In any event, Orval E. Faubus, who had been “in harm’s way for months during some of the heaviest fighting in Europe” as an intelligence officer in the Third Army under General George S. Patton during World War II,86 was tainted by the charge of Communism long before Johnson, his Arkansas Faith partner Curt Copeland, and his other supporters began flinging mud. The association of the governor with Soviet Communism that lingered in the minds of many Arkansans was easily exploited by segregationists, many of whom believed that integration was part of a Communist plot to destroy the United States.87 Campaign Tactics While the governor tried to steer clear of the integration issue, “there were several incidents on the campaign trail,” where Johnson’s segregationist supporters threatened violence at Faubus rallies.88 Having “deduced that Johnson’s strategy was to send toughs to disrupt his talks and thereby distract the media and the audiences from Faubus’ campaign message,” the governor decided to have his own “toughs” on hand as well.89 He called on Jimmy Karam, a small business owner in Little Rock, who had previously been a strike-breaker. At a Faubus campaign appearance in Warren, Karam, with a heavy club in hand, patrolled the area with a small gang, and so terrorized protesters that one ran to the police and another vomited in fear.90

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Faubus also adopted Johnson’s tactic of disparaging his opponent’s associates, particularly Curt C. Copeland. Copeland was an easy target – he had been arrested for counterfeiting in El Paso, Texas and had been run out of Hot Springs for producing “a recklessly libelous periodical,” the Hot Springs Rubdown.91 Faubus displayed the mug shots from his arrest, publicizing his exploits and calling him a liar. This criminal would be made a top advisor if Johnson were elected, he warned.92 Furthermore, the governor claimed on July 16, Johnson had “made a living for the past year as a purveyor of hate” and, along with Copeland, produced “one of the vilest, most dissolute, neopornographic publications it has ever been my disgust to see.”93 Faubus also portrayed Johnson as a political opportunist who “didn’t mention” the issue of racial separation at all when he campaigned for attorney general two years before.94 The governor himself, on the other hand, had always contended that segregation was a matter of local concern that was best left to individual school districts. No school had ever been forced to desegregate under his administration, he was quick to remind his constituents, and he vowed, “There will be NO forced integration of public schools as long as I am governor.”95 Reed claims that, due to Faubus’ “politically risky” tax reform program, “Jim Johnson’s prospects in 1956 were better than many people understood.”96 Still, the incumbent won the Democratic nomination for governor by a wide margin in the first primary.97 According to Virgil Blossom, Faubus’ primary victory, which was tantamount to reelection in the one-party state, indicated “that moderates were in control.”98 But the matter was not so straightforward. The governor had been “regarded as a liberal” and Johnson “ran against Faubus as a liberal.”99 Still, Reed contends, “his personal attitude on race was not as simple as liberal or conservative.”100 Despite his perhaps naïve prediction that segregation would not be a major issue, it was Johnson who “set the tone of the campaign,”101 and Faubus was prepared to use the race question to his advantage. Johnson’s extremism allowed Faubus to stake a relatively moderate course that was “consistent with his centrist politics,”102 but, as Numan Bartley pointed out, “since the race developed no other issue, Faubus turned to a more positive defense of segregation.”103 Johnson’s position was too extreme for all but the most vehement segregationists, and his base of support was concentrated in those areas where segregationist sentiment ran deepest; in the southern and eastern

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counties.104 But Faubus “saw what somebody could do with that issue” when this “unknown… polled a pretty heavy vote.”105 In fact, while Faubus’ victory may rightly be called a landslide, “the vote for Johnson was the highest of any runner-up in a race against an incumbent governor in the state’s recent history.”106 Johnson’s showing in the 1956 primary “kind of scared Faubus.”107 At the same time, it inspired him. The governor “recognized the potential” in his opponent’s message, and, in ex-Governor Sid McMath’s opinion, determined to harness that potential for his own benefit, “pretty much like George Wallace in Alabama.”108 Johnson’s challenge was a significant factor in what was generally perceived as a “shift to the right” by the governor. Whether he would continue to move in that direction was not immediately apparent, and, according to Bartley, further conservatism was not altogether justified by the events of the campaign. “Whatever else the election demonstrated,” he wrote, “it did not provide a basis for convincing Faubus and his advisors that the route to political success in Arkansas lay along the path of racial extremism.”109 There was, however, no turning back either, and, as Freyer notes, the governor’s decision to support interposition “tarnished his image as a moderate.”110 Segregationist Anxieties Mount The 1956 gubernatorial primary race and Faubus’ belief that the vast majority of Arkansans opposed integration nudged the governor towards a more conservative position on segregation. But these were not the only factors exerting pressure on him to move in that direction. On March 12, 1956, Senator Walter George of Georgia and Representative Howard W. Smith of Virginia introduced a “Declaration of Constitutional Principles” in their respective houses of Congress.111 Signed by 101 Southern congressmen, including each of Arkansas’ representatives, this “Southern Manifesto,” as it was more commonly known, referred to the Brown decision as “unwarranted” and a “clear abuse of judicial power.” The signers commended “the motives of those States which have declared the intention to resist forced integration by any lawful means” and pledged themselves to work towards the reversal of Brown “and to prevent the use of force in its implementation.”112 Although strong interpositionist statements had been purged from earlier drafts, the manifesto marked a turning point in the resistance to

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the Court’s decrees. “The proclamation,” as Bartley states, “tended to confuse legal and moral issues and to undermine any sense of inevitability a Supreme Court decision normally commands.”113 Bartley’s estimation of the situation is confirmed by Nat Griswold’s statement that the manifesto “was a key blow” to the work of the ACHR. “Everything we were doing was based on the idea that eventual compliance with the Court’s ruling was inevitable,” he explained, “and the Manifesto cut the ground out from under that assumption by giving people the feeling that maybe they wouldn’t have to comply.”114 Faubus believed that the manifesto required him to resist integration. “He conveniently ignored,” however, “the role he himself played in creating that pressure” by persuading “the two most liberal members of the delegation,” Brooks Hays and James W. Trimble, to sign it despite their misgivings.115 Segregationist anxieties in Arkansas, as elsewhere in the South, were also roused by the Montgomery, Alabama bus boycott and by the complete integration of the Louisville, Kentucky public school system. Also, in February 1956, when a black woman named Autherine Lucy was ordered admitted to the University of Alabama, riots occurred at Tuscaloosa, Alabama. When a federal court upheld Lucy’s expulsion from the university, on the ground that she had slandered school officials by alleging their complicity in the rioting, segregationists everywhere were heartened.116 The episode showed that “federal court orders could be forcibly nullified – provided that sufficient elements of the white power structure countenanced or encouraged it.”117 The following fall, Texas Governor Allan Shivers intervened to restore segregation at Texarkana Junior College and Mansfield High School by invoking the police powers of the state to ensure peace and good order. The federal government made no move to counter the governor’s use of Texas Rangers in either situation. In a press conference shortly after Shivers’ actions, President Dwight D. Eisenhower stated that maintaining law and order is a state responsibility, and that in this case the governor performed his duty to preserve order in his state.118 When asked again to comment on the situation at the next week’s press conference, Eisenhower expressed the opinion that “the youngsters that are indulging in violence are not being counseled properly at home,” and reiterated that the states are responsible for maintaining order. When pressed to discuss at what point the federal government must step in to see that federal laws are

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enforced, the President hedged, made a vague statements regarding the court’s authority to issue contempt charges, noted that federal judges are federal officers, and said, “if anyone is in contempt, I assume that it is the job of the U. S. Marshal to serve the warrants and to take the men, the offenders, to jail or to pay their fines or whatever happens.” He admitted, frankly, that “I really don’t know what the next step is,” but what he did know, he said, was that “the Federal Government is not allowed to go into any state unless called upon by the Governor.”119 The message received by those pledged to resist integration was clear: interposition could be used to maintain racial separation in the schools. Within this atmosphere, Governor Faubus felt even greater pressures to offer his constituents the alternative to integration they craved. “To protect the populism he so cherished,” Freyer concluded, “Faubus would now respond to the segregationists’ interposition arguments with an increasingly aggressive states’ rights stand.”120 Still, Faubus believed, as the November general election date approached, that the moderate interposition resolution that was recommended by the Bird Committee, combined with the pupil placement act, was the best way to address white Arkansans’ concerns. The governor wanted to play both sides of the issue, recognizing the theoretical supremacy of the federal courts in interpreting the Constitution on the one hand, and, on the other, to give his people what they wanted and maintain segregated schools – de facto if not de jure. The Johnson Amendment would require outright defiance of the federal courts, and if adopted would leave Faubus in a position he would rather avoid. He had no doubt of the amendment’s unconstitutionality, but until it was struck down, he would be bound by its provisions. Apparently, even Johnson himself confessed that his proposed amendment was too severe. It was “damned near a declaration of war against the United States,” he later said, that would “kill corn kneehigh.” And, he admitted, “It was strong. Actually, too strong for me.”121 Ultimately, the choice would come down to the voters of the state. Would they select Faubus’ mild resolution or Johnson’s declaration of war? Arkansans Approve Interposition The results of the November 6 election “further confused the issue.”122 Both Johnson’s proposition, Amendment 47, and Faubus’ Interposition Resolution passed. As expected, the pupil placement measure, Initiated

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Act No. 2, was approved as well. All three were to become effective on December 6, 1956.123 As Freyer put it in The Little Rock Crisis, “the vote in the 1956 election demonstrated widespread popular doubt concerning the means of, and necessity for, complying with the Brown decisions.”124 What was clear was that the majority of white Arkansans, like their counterparts in other southern states, believed that a sovereign state could interpose its authority between its citizens and the federal government to prevent the destruction of the “Southern Way of Life.” Or, at least, that was what they were willing to believe.

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NOTES  1

SSN, July 6, 1955. Kirk, “Arkansas, the Brown Decision, and the 1957 Crisis,” 74; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 63-64. 3 “A ‘Morally Right’ Decision,” Life (July 25, 1955), 29-31. 4 SSN, Sept. 1955. 5 Ibid. 6 John Bartlow Martin, The Deep South Says “Never,” (New York, 1957), 1-4; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 85; Hodding Carter III, The South Strikes Back (Garden City, 1959), 25-35. The definitive work on the Council movement remains Neil R. McMillen’s The Citizens’ Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-64, (Urbana, Ill., 1971, 1994). Quotes in Martin, The Deep South Says “Never,” 1,3. 7 Pronounced brǽdi (rhymes with “laddie”). 8 The reaction to the “Black Monday” speech was so overwhelming that “shortly afterward Brady formalized his message in Black Monday, a pamphlet that became the handbook for the [Citizens’ Council] movement.” Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 85. The phrase “Black Monday” was first used by U.S. Representative John Bell Williams in a speech to the House on May 19, 1954, days after the original Brown decision. 9 SSN, Oct. 1955. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. They included the state university presidents in their denunciations for having accepted some degree of integration in their institutions. 12 McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 36. Eventually, as evidence of the recording’s illegitimate origin became known – more than a year after the Citizens’ Councils began distributing it, Patterson stated, “we never claimed it to be authentic,” and challenged the NAACP to prove that it was not. Ibid. 13 A transcript of the “Roosevelt Williams” recording was printed in Arkansas Faith, May 1956. Located in Daisy Bates Collection, UA-F; also located in Rainach Papers, LSUS. 14 SSN, Oct. 1955. 15 U.S.D.C. E.D. Ark., No. J-918 (1955). 16 In the temporary injunction issued by Judge Trimble on November 1, 1955, Jim Johnson was specifically excluded from the list of those enjoined. He was not, however, relieved as a defendant. 17 RRLR 1 (1956), 44. 18 U.S.D.C. E.D. Ark., 137 F.Supp. 364 (1956), RRLR 1 (1956), 302. 19 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 67. 20 Michal R. Belknap, Federal Law and Southern Order: Racial Violence and Constitutional Conflict in the Post-Brown South, (Athens, Ga., 1987, 1995), 37. See also: John T. Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, 1937-1962, (New York, 1987; Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1967), 408.

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21

Robert Fredrick Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, (Knoxville, 1984), 166. 22 Elliff, The U.S. Department of Justice, 409. 23 A.B. Caldwell to J. W. Peltason, Jan. 18, 1962. A. B. Caldwell Papers, UAF. 24 A.B. Caldwell to J. W. Peltason, Jan. 18, 1962. A. B. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 25 Caldwell to Penix, Sept. 30, 1955, cited in Elliff, The U.S. Department of Justice, 411. 26 Elliff, The U.S. Department of Justice, 411-412. 27 Caldwell to Peltason, Jan. 18, 1962. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 28 SSN, March 1956. 29 Ibid., Oct. 1956. 30 RRLR, 1 (1956), 1035. 31 Ibid., 1037. 32 Caldwell to Peltason, Jan. 18, 1962. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 33 J. W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation (New York, 1961), 149, 151. 34 Jack Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law (New York, 1959), 7172, 229. 35 In one other case, also in Arkansas, the NAACP was not a participant. Matthews v. Launius, U.S.D.C.W.D. Ark. 134 F. Supp. 684 (1955), involving the Bearden School District, was originally filed as an equalization suit, but became an integration case after Brown. In the Bearden litigation, plaintiffs were an independent group of blacks not affiliated with the NAACP. In Hoxie, none of the participants in any court action was black. The NAACP may have desired to enter the case as a friend of the court, but, believing it was best that they did not, A. B. Caldwell contacted Thurgood Marshall and requested that the NAACP not intervene. See Caldwell to Peltason, Jan. 18, 1962. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 36 Benjamin Muse, Ten Years of Prelude: The Story of Integration Since the Supreme Court’s 1954 Decision (New York, 1964), 85. 37 Burk, The Eisenhower Administration, 154, 156. 38 Elliff, The Department of Justice, 406. 39 McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 94-95. 40 Reed, Faubus, 172-173. 41 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 66, 67-68. 42 Allison Graham, “Remapping Dogpatch: Northern Media on the Southern Circuit,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56:3 (Autumn, 1997), 339. In an interview with Graham on January 18, 1997, Bill Penix would refer to the Life article as an “uncalled-for and inexcusable” lapse in judgment by the publishers. Ibid. 43 The status of integration in these districts was updated in SSN, Oct. 1957. Both were in western Arkansas, however, and the numbers of black children involved was small.

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44

SSN, Feb. 1956. Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Sid McMath interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 26. 48 William Graham Sumner, Folkways (New York, 1906). 49 SSN, Feb. 1956. 50 Reed, Faubus, 176. 51 SSN, Feb. 1956; Kirk, “Arkansas, the Brown Decision, and the 1957 Crisis,” 77. 52 Kirk, “Arkansas, the Brown Decision, and the 1957 Crisis,” 77. The suggestion that 85% of the entire population of Arkansas (presumably including the greater part of the state that lies outside of the delta region, where the black population was sparse) opposed the desegregation of the schools defies logical evidence. Although precise numbers would be impossible to determine, it is safe to assume that the majority of Arkansans would have preferred, in the absence of federal orders to the contrary, continued school segregation. That a majority preferred defiance of the law to compliance with federal orders cannot be assumed. Certainly the fact that several school districts had already complied, or had plans to comply, voluntarily, with the Supreme Court’s directive indicates a willingness to accept the law as interpreted by the Court. 53 SSN, April 1956. Also significant is that, while individuals identified as segregationists eventually gained a majority on the Hoxie School Board, the district continued to operate on a desegregated basis. Still, within a year the number of black students attending the Hoxie schools dropped to eleven. 54 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 80. 55 SSN, March 1956. 56 Reed, Faubus, 177. 57 McCulloch to Lemley, Sept. 5, 1958 (handwritten note in margin). Located in Harry J. Lemley Papers, UALR. McCulloch was the author of the brief submitted by the State of Arkansas to the Supreme Court for consideration in Brown II. 58 Telegram, Johnson to Faubus, Feb. 13, 1956. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 59 Charlie Adams did not go with the rest of the Committee to Virginia. SSN, March 1956. 60 “Interim Report of Special Committee,” Feb. 24, 1956. Located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 RRLR 1 (1956), 445-447. 64 Ibid., 437. 65 Ibid., 438-440, 440-443. 66 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 78-79. 67 “Interim Report of Special Committee,” Feb. 24, 1956. Located in Faubus Papers, UA-F.

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68

Ibid. Undated statement located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 70 Reed, Faubus, 170. 71 Ibid. 72 SSN, Oct. 1955, Feb. 1956. 73 Ibid., May 1956. 74 One article in the May 1956 issue of Arkansas Faith puts attendance at the rally at 3,000, and another article in the same issue puts it at 2,500. In his book, Reed states that 2,000 were present, although he does not cite the source for this figure. Arkansas Faith, May 1956. Copy located in Daisy Bates Collection, UA-F; Reed, Faubus, 175. 75 Arkansas Faith, May 1956. Copy located in Daisy Bates Collection, UA-F. 76 SSN, May 1956. 77 Faubus was variously referred to as “Awful Faubus” and “Orval Fabulouse” on the pages of the Arkansas White Citizens Council publication Arkansas Faith. 78 Arkansas Faith, May 1956. 79 Ibid. 80 SSN, Aug. 1956. 81 Arkansas Faith, May 1956. 82 Reed, Faubus, 96. 83 From a statement issued by Faubus on August 2, 1954. Cited in Reed, Faubus, 95. 84 Arkansas Faith, May 1956. 85 Reed, Faubus, 113. 86 Ibid., 79. 87 Segregationist use of anti-Communist rhetoric is explored in Chapter 7, below. 88 George Douhtit interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 3. 89 Reed, Faubus, 179. 90 Ibid., 180. 91 Ibid., 170-171. 92 Ibid., 178. 93 SSN, Aug. 1956. 94 Ibid. 95 Arkansas Gazette, July 27, 1956. 96 Reed, Faubus, 169. 97 SSN, Aug. 1956, Sept. 1956. 98 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 29. 99 George Douhtit interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 2. 100 Reed, “The Contest for the Soul of Orval Faubus,” in Jacoway and Williams, Understanding the Little Rock Crisis, 101. 101 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 142. 102 Reed, “The Contest for the Soul of Orval Faubus,” 101.

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103

Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 261. Brooks Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks (Chapel Hill, 1959), 155. 105 Henry Woods interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1972), 21. 106 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 81. Of course, Faubus himself had beaten the incumbent in the previous election. 107 Henry Woods interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1972), 21. 108 Sid McMath interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 3. The reference is to the alleged comment by George Wallace of Alabama that would not be “out-niggered” again after losing the 1958 gubernatorial election in that state to the arch-segregation candidate John Patterson. McMath, who had been close to Faubus during his early career in politics, was his enemy at the time of this interview in 1970 and believed that Faubus engineered the 1957 Little Rock crisis for his own political gain. 109 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 261. 110 Freyer, “Politics and Law,” 206. 111 SSN, April 1956; RRLR 1 (1956), 435-437. 112 Ibid. 113 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 117. 114 William Peters, The Southern Temper (New York, 1959), 71-72. 115 Anthony J. Badger, “The White Reaction to Brown: Arkansas, the Southern Manifesto, and Massive Resistance,” in Jacoway and Williams, Understanding the Little Rock Crisis, 96, 94; Reed, “The Contest for the Soul of Orval Faubus,” 102. See also: Tony Badger, “The Forerunner of Our Opposition”: Arkansas and the Southern Manifesto of 1956,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56:3 (Autumn, 1997), 353-360. 116 SSN, March 1956; Lucy v. Adams, RRLR 1 (1956), 85-89, 2 (1957), 350-58. 117 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 146. 118 Presidential Press Conference, Sept. 5, 1956. Eisenhower Library, Ann Whitman File, Press Conferences Series. 119 Presidential Press Conference, Sept. 11, 1956. Eisenhower Library, Central Files, Official File. 120 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 82. 121 Reed, Faubus, 175. 122 Freyer, “Politics and Law,” 207. 123 SSN, Dec. 1956. 124 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 87.

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CHAPTER THREE

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James Jackson Kilpatrick, Jr., and the “Transcendent Issue” “Interposition,” Numan V. Bartley declared, “was the theory and the battle cry of massive resistance.”1 And James D. Johnson was the “point man for massive resistance” in Arkansas.2 Johnson first learned of the potential of interposition for justifying noncompliance with the Supreme Court’s mandate for desegregation of the public schools by reading editorials by James Jackson Kilpatrick, Jr. of the Richmond News Leader.3 Jack Kilpatrick had authored a series of editorials on the subject in late 1955 that were collected and published as a supplement and distributed throughout the South. Eleven thousand copies were printed before a “newsprint shortage” forced the News Leader to cease production.4 Louisiana State Senator William M. Rainach, chairman of that state’s Joint Legislative Committee to Maintain Segregation, wrote Kilpatrick to tell him that the Interposition Supplement was “the clearest, completest and most concise publication that I have yet seen on the subject of interposition and nullification,” and that he would happily distribute copies of it to each member of the Louisiana legislature and to “about 15 other officials in the state who should read your booklet.”5 In addition to the Interposition Supplement, other materials that sprang from the pen of the Richmond editor were circulated among the faithful. The conservative weekly Human Events published a four-page article by Kilpatrick on “The Right to Interpose” on December 24, 1955, for example, and, from its inception in October 1955, The Citizens’ Council regularly reprinted editorials from the News Leader. The Citizens’ Council was issued by the Citizens’ Council of Mississippi and was edited by W. J. Simmons.6 This tabloid reached virtually all members of the Arkansas Councils, since “free” copies were mailed directly to their homes. “Free” in this instance meant that the subscription rate of two dollars each was paid for collectively through the local organizations with funds taken from membership dues. The News Leader Interposition Supplement was possibly

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distributed through Council mailing lists as well. Kilpatrick sent some 2,500 copies to Simmons and Robert Patterson in Mississippi along with his wishes that they could “put these to really effective use in Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana.”7 Certainly, as the president of the Citizens Council of Arkansas, Johnson would have received a copy. Kilpatrick was by no means the only journalist extolling the virtues of the Doctrine of Interposition in the mid-1950s. Thomas R. Waring of the Charleston News and Courier was a well-known supporter of the doctrine and his editorials were frequently reprinted in The Citizens’ Council as well, as were pieces by John Temple Graves, a syndicated columnist in Birmingham, Alabama. Editorials by George Shannon of the Shreveport Journal and a series called “The Runaway Court” from the Indianapolis Star were read throughout the region. Nationally syndicated columnist and editor of U. S. News & World Report, David Lawrence, was also a champion for states’ rights. In Little Rock, Karr Shannon, who wrote a daily column for the Arkansas Democrat called “Run of the News,” penned a series during late 1957 and 1958 that proclaimed the Brown decision unconstitutional and insisted that the use of force by the federal government to enforce it was illegal as well.8 Kilpatrick, however, was foremost among them. He is credited with resurrecting the idea, which originated in Madison’s and Jefferson’s Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions in 1798 and 1799 and was developed in the 1828 by John C. Calhoun of South Carolina.9 And it was James J. Kilpatrick who became “the intellectual guru of massive resistance.”10 Brown II: An Invitation to Resistance When the Supreme Court handed down its opinion of May 17, 1954, southerners accepted the ruling with a sort of stunned resignation. Kilpatrick’s editorial the following day is representative of southern reaction. “This is no time for rebellion,” he wrote. As distasteful as it was, the Court had spoken and the affected states had no choice but to deal with the consequences of the decision. Virginia and her sister states must “accept it because we have to, and we accept it in the profound and prayerful hope that the Court, when it comes to a final decree many months from now, will exercise wisdom and forbearance in drafting a mandate that will preserve good race relations, and

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recognize that the States and localities should be left a wide area for local responsibility consistent with the Court’s opinion.”11 Even before the Court issued its implementing decree, however, Kilpatrick was candid about his desire that desegregation orders be circumvented. Although he was “far from certain that public schools throughout the South will be integrated any time soon, the Supreme Court notwithstanding,” he confessed to an audience at the University of Richmond that Brown was “now the law of the land, and as good citizens we must accept it as such.” Still, he was searching for a legal means to maintain separated schools. “In brief,” he said, “I am not at all interested in how to attain integration; I am concerned with how best to prevent it.”12 After Brown II was announced at the end of May 1955, many editors and political leaders declared it a victory for the South. The Arkansas Gazette announced that “the high court showed profound wisdom” in Brown II, though it predicted that integration would not take place “any time soon in many counties of the South,” since “the public in general simply isn’t ready for that monumental change.”13 The Arkansas Democrat believed that the South had “been given a chance to proceed in its own way toward the resolution of this difficult social problem within the limits imposed by the new interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.”14 In places of the Deep South, the decision was welcomed as an invitation to resist desegregation. An editorial in the Jackson, Mississippi, Daily News noted that the Court had required that a “prompt and reasonable start” be made towards desegregating the public schools, but warned that in Mississippi they were “very slow starters.” Furthermore, “any attempt toward a start in this state is going to meet with stern resistance right at the beginning.”15 State Representative John Garrett of Haynesville, Louisiana, probably expressed the southern view of Brown II best when he said, “This is as much as we could have hoped for.” The decree, he told reporters, was the “mildest” that could have been issued, and he suggested that this was evidence that “the justices realized that they had made a mistake May 17 (1954), and this was their easiest way out, putting it back on the local level.”16 For Kilpatrick, too, despite the fact that the high court appeared to have given the South everything it wanted short of a reversal of their original 1954 ruling, the “time for rebellion” had apparently arrived. “Now that the United States Supreme Court has laid down its program for ending segregation in the public schools,” he wrote in the New

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Leader on June 1, “we in the South can begin making more definite plans to preserve it.”17 The Court, he railed, had chosen “to throw away the established law” and to “spit on the tenth amendment,” which preserved the powers of the states. “If it be said now that the South is flouting the law,” he concluded, “let it be said to the high court: You taught us how.”18 What form the rebellion against the Supreme Court’s “repudiat[ion of] the Constitution”19 should take, Kilpatrick did not yet know. In August 1955 a “Committee of 52” in South Carolina appealed to their state legislature to “interpose the sovereignty of the State of South Carolina between federal courts and local school officials with respect to any effort of such courts to usurp state authority in the matter of public education.”20 This appeal, however, “attracted little attention.”21 The idea that interposition could be useful in the resistance against federal court desegregation orders came to Kilpatrick not from South Carolina, but from an elderly attorney at home in Virginia.22 In October 1955 Jack Kilpatrick read a pamphlet on interposition by William Old. To the “zealous resister” who was “groping for a formula” for rebellion, “Old’s findings were pure gold.”23 Within a month, the News Leader editor had become a doctrinaire interpositionist. The struggle, he now informed his readers, was not about segregation after all. Rather, what was really at stake was the very survival of the sovereign states. The Law is Not “Whatever the Court Says it is” Brown, it was now argued, was not the “law of the land” after all. It was a corruption of the law and a usurpation by the federal judiciary of powers not properly belonging to it, or to the federal government at all. As Kilpatrick wrote in his 1962 book, The Southern Case for School Segregation, “The South’s legal position in the school controversy is essentially a constitutional position; it cannot be fully understood without some understanding of how the Southerner views the Constitution. He views it through the eyes of the States.”24 And, as Senator Eastland asserted in a speech to the Association of Citizens’ Councils of Mississippi on December 1, 1955, the Brown decision was “an attack upon the sovereignty of the States, and a State has the legal right and the legal duty to protect its sovereignty.”25

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The problem was, as Leander Perez of Louisiana told a meeting of the American Bar Association in Dallas, Texas on August 27, 1956, “because of the great regard in which the highest court of the land has been held in the esteem of the American people, with some forgotten episodes, it has been generally accepted that whatever the Court says, is the law.”26 But the law, Perez scolded, is not “whatever the Court says it is.” Only the people, he continued, through their duly elected representatives, are vested with the authority to make laws, and he cautioned, “the separation of legislative and judicial power is one worthy of eternal vigilance because the judiciary owes no responsibility to the electorate.”27 Not only was the Brown decision, as an instance of judicial legislation, a transgression against the American people, but, since it trampled on the police powers of the states, it violated states’ rights as well. Compounding the wrong done to both the people and the states was that the Court in Brown “did not hold Plessy vs. Ferguson to be bad law. The court held it to be bad sociology.”28 It was not within the competence of the Supreme Court to determine cases put before it by any reasoning other than matters of law, the south Louisiana political kingpin argued. Even worse, “when the Supreme Court junked the Anglo-Saxon concept of equality under law, or equal protection under the law, for sociracial equality, or social equality under the Constitution,” it corrupted the very basis of the American republic into an instrument of Communist propaganda. “So,” he fretted, “we have been taken in the Russian orbit by infiltration from within.”29 The states did not have to quietly acquiesce to the Court’s dismantling of American republicanism. The “remedy” he recommended was interposition. “How else can the Constitution be preserved against deliberate, palpable and dangerous usurpations by a branch of the Federal Government from which there is no appeal, except by the Interposition of the reserved sovereignty of the States[?]” Perez asked, rhetorically. South Carolina journalist William D. Workman, Jr. also asserted that the law was not “whatever the Court says it is” in The Case for the South. The conflict between the southern states and the federal judiciary represented “a clash of sovereignty, not a breakdown of laws,” he insisted. Furthermore, even if it could be argued that “there is defiance of the Supreme Court, it does not necessarily follow that ‘the law of the land’ is being flouted.” 30 As Georgia’s one-time governor and later United States Senator Herman E. Talmadge pointed out in You and Segregation, “respect for law and order is one thing.

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Respect for political decrees by the Court is another.” And, after the travesty of the Brown decision, he continued, “If there is disrespect for the Court, then the Court has no one to blame but itself.”31 By couching the attack on the Court ruling in Brown in legalistic terms, segregationist leaders were able to confuse southerners hopeful for a means to maintain their segregated institutions by referring to historical documents enshrined by American folklore. As George Lewis has pointed out, these types of arguments “allowed southern resisters to indulge in their fondness for constructing defenses of their racial position in the language of the Founding Fathers.”32 The phrase “deliberate, palpable and dangerous” that Perez used, and that was used frequently by Kilpatrick and other interpositionists, for example, was taken from the 1798 Virginia Resolution in which James Madison introduced the theory of “interposition.” On November 21, 1955, the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were printed in full in the Richmond News Leader “as historic documents of interest to Virginians who may wish to recur to ‘fundamental principles,’ as their own Constitution reminds them to do at frequent intervals.”33 When the nine justices of the Supreme Court decided Brown as they had, they amended the Constitution; something they had no authority to do. “Over a period of 86 years,” Kilpatrick pointed out, “from ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in1868 to the court’s opinion of 1954, it was repeatedly held that the power to operate separate but equal schools had not been prohibited to the States by the Constitution.” In the School Segregation Cases, the Court claimed that power was prohibited to the states. This was “the transcendent issue.”34 Here was a message that held tremendous appeal for the majority of white southerners who wished fervently to defend their cherished institutions but were hesitant to defy the “law of the land.” As the respected editor of a respected newspaper assured them, to resist the unconstitutional encroachment of the Supreme Court into areas not delegated to the federal government was not defiance of law. It was one’s patriotic duty. As Workman put it, “In the eyes of the Southerner, no honor attaches to that decision, and no dishonor to those who scorn it.”35 The concept of the “transcendent issue” was a crucial part of Kilpatrick’s and other interpositionists’ strategy. By insisting that southern resistance to Brown was motivated more by the federal government’s alleged violation of states’ rights than by a desire to maintain racial segregation, “a practice that many persons regard as

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indefensible,”36 these segregationists attempted to claim the higher ground. Significantly, as a result, the appeal of the interposition argument attracted the support of “liberals who oppose segregation on moral grounds, but share our concern for encroachments by the Federal government upon powers long reserved to the States.”37 Of course, Kilpatrick, like other segregationists, favored the continuation of racially separate public schools for other reasons as well. Although he claimed that his “own overriding interest is in the constitutional question,” he freely admitted that he would prefer closing the schools to integrating them because schools were “not only public educational institutions, but personal social institutions also; and we cannot consent to a judicial experiment that we fear would destroy both education and society in a single revolutionary stroke.”38 Southerners, Kilpatrick claimed, “know the sound reasons behind school segregation… because we have been reared in a dual society… but others do not know these things.”39 Still, as Freyer indicated, “Despite an underlying concern with race relations, the doctrine of interposition deflected attention away from questions of moral principle and equal justice, emphasizing instead a legalistic abstraction.”40 Such an emphasis allowed interpositionists to claim that in resisting integration, “Southern people are right both legally and morally.”41 What is Interposition? The Doctrine of Interposition was premised on the Compact Theory of the Union. The United States was formed, not by “the people” as a whole, but through a compact, or contract, between preexisting independent and sovereign states. Upon entering into the contract, the states voluntarily surrendered a portion of their sovereignty to the newly created national government. The powers of the United States consisted entirely of those surrendered to it by the respective states and were enumerated in the contract, the Constitution of the United States. All powers not expressly granted to the national government remained the domain of the states. This fundamental truth was enunciated in the Bill of Rights as the Tenth Amendment.42 The authority to operate public schools, it was asserted, was never delegated to the federal government. Therefore, education fell squarely within the sphere of state sovereignty. The Supreme Court, then, was not free to “interpret” the Constitution in such a fashion as to effectively amend the contract to grant the federal government the power to regulate how schools were

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run. “There is an authority higher than the Supreme Court,” Kilpatrick emphasized. “This higher authority is the three-fourths majority of the States which holds the absolute and final power of decision on amendment of the Constitution.”43 Talmadge echoed this denial of the Court’s role as the final arbiter on constitutional questions when he wrote, “The Supreme Court of the United States is not the Court of last resort. The citizens of the sovereign states are the court of last resort.” And, “if the citizens of the South are determined to maintain segregation in their schools and in their social order, then their will shall prevail.”44 Kilpatrick acknowledged that the Supreme Court has the authority “to interpret doubtful provisions” of the United States Constitution, and “so long as these constructions are generally acceptable, State Legislatures may give tacit assent to Constitutional evolution simply by remaining quiet.” But he denied that it was ever “intended to give the Court power to make radical changes in Constitutional constructions, subject to no effective check by anyone.”45 As was argued by many southerners before the Civil War, Kilpatrick claimed that the compact is not immutable. If the federal government becomes so uncontrollable as to threaten the sovereignty of the states, they, as principals to the contract, may choose to void it. When the Constitution was first referred to the individual states for ratification in 1787, he maintained, “theirs was the power… to reject the proposed union if they wished.” And, he contended, “theirs is the power today to dissolve it at their pleasure.”46 The Civil War changed nothing. “If it proved anything,” he said, it “proved that when one group of States is determined by force to contest the effort of another group of States to withdraw from the Union, law and sovereign rights are blown to the four winds and the issue is resolved on naked force alone.”47 Workman made the same point when he wrote that “what non-Southerners cannot get through their heads is the fact that their winning the War Between the States proved nothing except that they had the stronger military and economic establishment. The outcome of the struggle proved who was stronger, not necessarily who was right.”48 Kilpatrick was not suggesting that the South secede over the issue of school segregation. While small number of extreme segregationists did go so far as to intimate that secession was a viable option, in the minds of most southern leaders, the idea was simply unthinkable.49 As for the Virginia editor, he merely insisted that the states had that right if it

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should come to that. “The significant point is that the Reconstruction Amendments in no way altered the basic structure of the compact,” Kilpatrick insisted. “Ours is still a Union of States, each State retaining certain sovereign rights that it never has surrendered to the general government, each State still entitled to make its own decisions except where a power has been prohibited to the States by the Constitution.”50 When it was suggested to him that what the Supreme Court found in Brown was simply that the Fourteenth Amendment had, in fact, prohibited the states from exercising the power to require racial separation in the schools, Kilpatrick responded that that was a matter for the states to decide.51 The journalist John Bartlow Martin wrote in 1957 that Southerners “love legalisms” and that they “enthusiastically” debated the doctrine of interposition, “for no one knew precisely what it meant.”52 As Bartley notes, “Southern news media and the region’s politicians spent uncounted words explaining, debating, and advocating interposition, but the overall result was more confusion than clarity.”53 Kilpatrick, among them, spent much time explaining the concept behind the theory, without stating clearly how it should properly be put into effect.54 The great Virginians Jefferson and Madison had foreseen that the national government might overstep its bounds, Kilpatrick instructed. When that happens, “the State may declare their inherent right – inherent in the nature of our Union – to judge for themselves not merely of the infractions, but ‘of the mode and measure of redress.’” And this, he wrote, “is the right of interposition.”55 He knew, as he composed his editorials, that the great majority of his readers would not fully comprehend what he wrote.56 But that was ultimately unimportant. Without understanding, they would adopt his language and that of other leaders who took up the message. They would trust that if such “smart” men as Kilpatrick and Senator Eastland and Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, a former presidential candidate and a driving force behind the Southern Manifesto,57 told them the doctrine was valid and could be used to preserve segregation, then it was and it could. “The right of interposition,” Kilpatrick assured them, “exists because it has to exist. Without such a right, the Constitution is a hollow shell; and the ‘perfect Union’ it was intended to insure is disclosed as no Union at all, no joining of respective parts, but rather a single mass, monolithic, a creature more powerful than its creator.”58

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The ambiguous, conceptual nature of interposition resulted in its meaning different things to different people. Kilpatrick denied that it necessarily meant nullification. The terms should not be used interchangeably, he insisted. Interposition “is the genus,” and nullification “a species thereof.”59 This distinction was useful to southern political leaders, such as Mississippi Governor James P. Coleman, who could assert their support for interposition, but refuse to condone nullification.60 “Politicians,” as Bartley suggests, “considered nullification a more profound political commitment.”61 The question for southern leaders was not whether to support interposition, since “the issue held too much emotional appeal to be effectively opposed.”62 Instead, debate centered on what type of interposition resolution to enact – a more extreme measure like the Johnson Amendment in Arkansas or a milder statement like that Faubus supported. But, if interposition was not expressed through nullification, of what practical use was it? As United States Representative John Bell Williams of Mississippi announced on the House floor on January 25, 1956, “The very purpose of interposition is to nullify. If that is not to be the purpose, the act of interposition becomes merely an expression of disfavor and is meaningless.” Though Williams admitted that there were those who claimed to support the one and not the other, he scoffed at their hedging. He emoted: “Interposition without nullification is a knife without an edge, a gun without bullets, a car without an engine, a body without a life.”63 Interposition Resolutions As leaders in various states of the South discussed interposition, the question of what steps could be taken to put the theory into practice was a major concern. Like Virginia with its Gray Commission, many states organized committees to study the school situation in the wake of the Brown ruling.64 South Carolina was the first. As one of the four states involved in the cases that were heard collectively as Brown v. Board of Education, South Carolina created a School Committee, chaired by State Senator L. Marion Gressette of Calhoun County, in 1951.65 Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, and Virginia followed suit by establishing committees of their own in 1954.66 Texas, whose “lawmakers complied” with the wishes of Governor Shivers “by virtually ignoring the subject” of school desegregation, did

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establish an Advisory Committee on Segregation in the Public Schools in August 1955, following Brown II.67 Many of these committees studied, and then recommended, interposition resolutions to their respective legislatures.68 In its report to the governor on January 31, 1956, for example, the Gressette Committee submitted that it was “convinced that the over-riding issue is the usurpation by the Supreme Court of the power to amend the Constitution of the United States merely by superimposing its own interpretation upon its clear meaning and the encroachment upon the powers reserved to the states in the Constitution itself.” South Carolina, the Committee urged, should assert its sovereignty to protect the people of the state.69 Ultimately, all but two southern states, North Carolina and Texas, issued resolutions of interposition. Interposition resolutions carried no force of law. Some declared the Supreme Court’s decisions on school segregation “without effect” within the state; others merely protested the rulings and urged the states to respond by amending the Constitution. The extreme pronouncements of interposition and nullification by Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi prompted NAACP attorney Jack Greenberg to comment, “If it wasn’t so serious, the orotund language would be grist for an H. L. Mencken-style lampoon of Southern pomposity.”70 In North Carolina, Governor Luther H. Hodges contemplated interposition. He doubted the usefulness of a mere statement of disapproval of the Supreme Court’s decrees. Having read the News Leader’s Interposition Supplement, he turned to its author for advice. He asked Kilpatrick, what, “if anything,” his state could “do in this ‘interposition’ matter except to pass a resolution[?]”71 The editor agreed that “the right of a State to interpose its sovereignty would be meaningless if the right could not be exercised effectively.” He recommended that states do pass resolutions to the effect “that until the asserted question of contested power is resolved by the States, we would recognize no obligation of right to comply with the court’s decrees in matters dealing with the maintenance and operation of racially separate public facilities.”72 Should the states decide, through an amendment to the United States Constitution, that segregation must be eliminated, “then so be it.” Interposition should not, in Kilpatrick’s opinion, “take the form… of a ‘positive defiance’ of the court.” If the federal government should act to force the southern states to yield to its usurpation of state powers, “we would bow to force,” but “at no point would we relinquish the Constitutional position we had asserted.”73

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To Hodges, all this smacked too much of nullification, despite Kilpatrick’s semantic distinctions, and his state did not pass any resolution of interposition. Kilpatrick’s home state of Virginia, too, shied away from the vigorous position advocated on the editorial page of the Richmond newspaper. It did issue a resolution, but it represented, as Arkansas’ Jim Johnson termed it, a “watered down” version of the doctrine.74 Kilpatrick himself had originally supported the Gray Commission’s recommendations, and campaigned for the passage of the initiative to call a limited constitutional convention to put them into effect in the News Leader.75 On December 9, 1955 he wrote to Thomas R. Waring of the Charleston News and Courier, telling him that interposition “works well with” the Gray Commission’s program.76 Less than a year later, however, Kilpatrick editorialized against pupil placement, a central feature of the Commission’s program. In an editorial in September 1956 he charged that “pupil assignment is not resistance; pupil assignment is compliance.” Once Virginia put into effect any sort of placement plan, even to minimize or avoid completely any actual integration in the schools, he wrote, the state will have “abandoned her constitutional position entirely.”77 Such a plan, by seeking to circumvent Brown, would implicitly concede the validity of the decision, and that, to Kilpatrick, was simply unacceptable. In Bartley’s estimation, Kilpatrick did not merely have a change of heart as his thinking on the question at hand evolved. Rather, he contended in The Rise of Massive Resistance, the editor “was guilty of questionable journalistic tactics.”78 Kilpatrick perpetrated an elaborate “bait and switch” on the Virginia populace when he advocated approval of the January 9, 1956 referendum. After the voters registered their overwhelming support of the initiative at the polls, Bartley points out, “The News Leader immediately dismissed this endorsement of the Gray Plan… explaining that Virginia citizens had not voted for what they thought they had voted for at all but had ‘with a perfect, intuitive clarity’ actually endorsed a policy of open and notorious opposition to the Supreme Court ruling.” In other words, they had voted for interposition.79

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Historical Precedents for Interposition Proponents of the doctrine believed that it provided the best chance to defeat those forces determined to destroy the Southern Way of Life. The goal was “not so much to avoid or evade the Court order” but “to defeat it – to achieve total victory.”80 Louisiana segregationist Drew L. Smith claimed in his essay “Interposition – The Neglected Weapon” that “interposition has never failed. Interposition will succeed now, if our southern governors and state courts will stand firmly upon the rights of the state.”81 Frequently, the theory’s advocates cited uses of interposition throughout United States history as proof of its validity and efficacy.82 Generally these historical sketches began with a description of the clash over sovereignty between the state of Georgia and the federal government in 1792. In this episode, two South Carolinians sued the state of Georgia to recover property belonging to a deceased Georgia citizen, which had been confiscated by the state. The plaintiffs were the executors of the dead man’s estate. When the case, Chisholm v. Georgia, came before the Supreme Court, the state denied the authority of the tribunal to render judgment in the case and refused to appear. Proceedings continued, and, in the absence of the state’s representatives, Chief Justice John Jay issued an opinion in favor of the plaintiffs.83 Protestations against the Chisholm decision came from every state in the Union. At issue was not the facts of the case itself but the Court’s jurisdiction, which was based on the presumption that a sovereign state may be sued by citizens of another state. Both Virginia and Massachusetts adopted resolutions insisting that such jurisdiction be denied to the federal judiciary. In Georgia, two bills were introduced in the legislature – one denying the constitutionality of the Court’s decision and the other declaring that any United States Marshal attempting to enforce the Court’s ruling would be hanged “without benefit of clergy.”84 Neither was signed into law. But, neither was the judgment carried out. The United States Congress acted quickly, passing an amendment that was ratified by the states in 1795. The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution states, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” It thus ensures that the Supreme Court no longer has the authority to act as it did in Chisholm.

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This earliest example of “interposition” by the state of Georgia exemplifies what the post-Brown supporters of the doctrine most fervently wished it could do for them. Resolutions by individual states acting singly spurred Congress and the states collectively to change the United States Constitution, in accordance with the amendatory procedures outlined in the Constitution itself. When Georgia refused to appear before the Supreme Court or to allow the execution of the Court’s judgment it “interposed.” The doctrine as such, however, was not enunciated until several years later, in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799. The occasion for these resolutions was the passage by Congress of the Alien and Sedition Acts.85 Protests against these two acts came from several states, on the grounds that the power to enact such laws was not delegated to Congress in the Constitution and that the acts violated First Amendment rights.86 On November 16, 1798 the Kentucky General Assembly passed a resolution, written anonymously by then Vice President Thomas Jefferson. A month later, on December 21, Virginia also enacted a resolution, this one written by James Madison. Madison, a member of the Virginia General Assembly, had been an active in the Philadelphia Convention that drafted the federal Constitution in the summer of 1787, and he had kept meticulous notes of the Convention proceedings. He was therefore considered an authority on constitutional matters and the original intent of the Framers. After these resolutions “received violent criticism in the form of reply resolutions from other states dominated by the Federalist Party,” Kentucky issued a second resolution in 1799, written by Jefferson.87 Founding Father James Madison wrote in the Virginia Resolution “that in case of deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of other powers not granted by the said compact, the States who are parties have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of evil, and for the maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them.”88 Segregationist leaders urging the states to interpose in the mid-1950s popularly cited this section of the resolutions, which were published in full and distributed by the Richmond News Leader. Jefferson’s Kentucky Resolution used even stronger language, asserting that “whensoever the General Government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force.”89

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The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were directed at the United States Congress, not the Supreme Court. It may be noted, however, that in 1798 the role of the Court as the “final arbiter” of the Constitution had not yet been conceived. Presumably, the pronouncements of Madison and Jefferson apply equally to each branch of the federal government – if not more so to the judiciary which, as Jack Kilpatrick pointed out, was “subject to no effective check by anyone.”90 An article in the Race Relations Law Reporter discussing the history of the interposition doctrine noted that within two years James Madison had retreated somewhat from his position in 1798. Speaking before the Virginia legislature in 1800, he denied that the states had the power to nullify federal law, stating, “The declarations (by interposition resolution) in such cases are expressions of opinion, unaccompanied with any other effect than what they may produce on opinion by exciting reflection. The exposition of the judiciary, on the other hand, are carried into immediate effect by force.”91 Kilpatrick and other proponents of interposition also cited the Hartford Convention of 1814-1815 in their examinations of the history of the doctrine. The New England Federalists involved in this episode directed their protest at the executive branch of the United States rather than at the judiciary. Borrowing heavily from the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, the delegates at the Convention resolved that “in cases of deliberate, dangerous, and palpable infractions of the Constitution, affecting the sovereignty of a State, and the liberties of the people, it is not only the right, but the duty of such State to interpose its authority for their protection, in the manner best calculated to secure that end.”92 Here, then, former President Thomas Jefferson saw his own arguments turned against him. Like the earlier Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, which inspired no favorable action by the states before the Alien and Sedition Acts were allowed to expire in 1801, the pronouncements of the Hartford Conventioneers became moot when the Treaty of Ghent was signed in 1814, ending the War of 1812 before the Convention even ended. After the war public opinion turned sharply against the Convention, leading, incidentally, to the demise of the Federalist Party. Virtually all supporters of interposition in the 1950s quoted passages from John C. Calhoun’s statements on nullification. As the South clamored in protest against the 1828 “Tariff of Abominations,” which benefited northern industry at the expense of the South, there were

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rumblings in South Carolina on the possibility of secession from the Union. Vice President Calhoun, from South Carolina, offered up his theory of nullification as a substitute for secession. Calhoun’s “South Carolina Exposition and Protest” contained his thoughts on the subject. It was issued through the state legislature in December 1828. The Exposition concluded that “if the present usurpations and the professed doctrines of the existing system be preserved in, after due forbearance on the part of a State… it will be her sacred duty to interpose; a duty to herself, to the Union – to the present, and to future generations – and to the cause of liberty over the world, to arrest the progress of a usurpation which, if not arrested, must, in its consequences, corrupt the public morals and destroy the liberty of the country.”93 In 1832, the South Carolina General Assembly passed a law declaring the 1828 tariff “null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers or citizens.”94 President Andrew Jackson responded by sending eight vessels, including a warship, into Charleston Harbor. He also asked Congress to authorize him to use armed force to compel obedience to federal law. While this “Force Bill” was held up in Congress, the “Great Compromiser” Henry Clay proposed a new tariff – one that was less of a burden on the southern states. Both Clay’s Compromise Tariff and the Force Bill became law on the same day. Accepting the new tariff, South Carolina rescinded its “Statute of Nullification.” At the same time, however, the state “nullified” the Force Bill. Again, then, the interpositionists, or “nullifiers” as they were called in this case, got what they wanted in the end, but the validity of the twin doctrines of interposition and nullification was not truly tested or determined. Segregationists also discussed the 1859 case of Ableman v. Booth95 in their defenses of interposition. This case, which brought about “one of the best examples of interposition”96 arose out of Wisconsin’s interference with federal enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. The federal marshal arrested newspaper editor Sherman M. Booth in 1852 for his role in helping a runaway slave escape. Before Booth could be tried in federal court, however, the Wisconsin state court issued a writ of habeas corpus demanding that Booth be turned over to state custody. The Wisconsin court then held the Fugitive Slave Act, under which Booth had been arrested, unconstitutional and released the defendant. In 1854 Booth was again taken into federal custody and this time tried and convicted. Again the Wisconsin court

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issued a writ and proceeded to release the defendant on the same grounds as before. The Supreme Court heard the case on a writ of error. The Wisconsin court refused to turn the records of its proceedings over to the Supreme Court, alleging that the federal judiciary had no authority to review its judgments. Eventually, the records were obtained and Booth’s conviction was affirmed. After the federal ruling, officials in Wisconsin refused to turn Booth over to the federal marshal.97 “As a result of the decision in Ableman v. Booth,” Drew L. Smith wrote in “Interposition – The Neglected Weapon,” “the Wisconsin legislature enacted a resolution of interposition in 1859.” Furthermore, Smith continued, “Most of the other northern states enthusiastically supported the action taken by Wisconsin in interposing the power of the state, to check unconstitutional and unlawful acts of the Federal Government.” Interestingly, although Smith and others of his ilk were loath to admit it, the southern states, which were strong advocates of states’ rights when it came to defending slavery, applauded the Supreme Court’s opinion in Ableman v. Booth. To be sure, though, Wisconsin’s assertion of interposition, which was followed by action in several other northern states to prevent the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act within their borders, was the most successful application of the doctrine in United States history.98 Historical Precedents Against Interposition Not generally mentioned by supporters of interposition were those occasions where the United States Supreme Court had spoken out against the validity of the doctrine. In United States v. Peters99 “the Supreme Court passed directly upon an instance of state interposition.”100 In this 1809 case, the state of Pennsylvania refused to allow the enforcement of a judgment in a federal court regarding the sloop Active. The state legislature issued a resolution alleging that the federal court had no rightful jurisdiction in the matter and that Judge Peters’ ruling was made in violation of the Eleventh Amendment and “ought not to be supported or obeyed.”101 The Supreme Court’s opinion, drafted by Chief Justice John Marshall, ordered Judge Peters to take the appropriate steps necessary to execute his judgment. Marshall went on to say, “If the legislatures of the several states may, at will, annul the judgments of the courts of the United States, and destroy the rights acquired under those judgments, the constitution itself

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becomes a solemn mockery; and the nation is deprived of the means of enforcing its laws by the instrumentality of its own tribunals.”102 The response to this decision was the “Pennsylvania Rebellion.” At the urging of the governor, the state legislature issued an extreme resolution of interposition. When the United States Marshal took action to execute the judgment he was met by armed state militia. The militia commander was then ordered arrested by a federal grand jury. The Pennsylvania governor appealed to then President James Madison to intervene, but was informed by the author of the Virginia Resolution of 1798 that “the executive is not only unauthorized to prevent the execution of a decree sanctioned by the Supreme Court of the United States, but is expressly enjoined by statute, to carry into effect any such decree, where opposition may be made to it.”103 The governor then backed down and ordered his troops to withdraw. The militia commander was convicted, but Madison remitted the man’s sentence a few weeks later. The state legislature did appeal to the other states to amend the Constitution to create a special tribunal to hear disputes between the states and the federal government, but without success. Several states sent reply resolutions expressing their faith in the Supreme Court to hear such cases.104 Statements by the Court in other cases also have relevance to the debate over the legitimacy of interposition. Justice Story, for example, proclaimed in 1816 in his opinion for the Court in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee that “the Constitution of the United States was ordained and established, not by the states in their sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution declares ‘by the people of the United States.’”105 Three years later Chief Justice Marshall made the same point in McCulloch v. Maryland. There, he wrote, “The government proceeds directly from the people.”106 Legal Professionals’ Opinions There was no shortage of individuals, some of them respected men of the law, who argued that interposition was a valid and useful tool for preventing the execution of the Brown directives in southern schools. Many more, on the other hand, agreed with the assertion of the Southern Regional Council that the doctrine “has no legal force and so is useless.”107 On October 23, 1956, for example, the Chairman of the

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Council and former president of the American Law Institute, George Wharton Pepper, issued a statement on behalf of that body that was signed by one hundred prominent attorneys, three former presidents of the American Bar Association among them. In it, Pepper wrote that “as members of the bar we have been deeply disturbed by recent attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States.” The federal Constitution, he declared, was supreme, and the Court is the final arbiter on matters of constitutional interpretation. “There are ways of bringing about changes in constitutional law,” Pepper insisted, “but resistance is not such a way.”108 Dean Robert Farley of the University of Mississippi law school conceded that in the Brown decision the Supreme Court had, in essence, legislated. But he denied that such “judicial legislation is something new and unconstitutional.” By insisting that it was, interpositionists, especially those who were lawyers, were doing “our institutions and our form of government a disservice” by misleading the public.109 Professor Wylie H. Davis of the University of Texas School of Law, too, stressed that although technically there are procedural differences between interposition and nullification, “as a matter of basic doctrine, there is no substantial difference” between the two. “‘Interposition,’” he said, “is just a euphemism for nullification,” and it “is historically nothing more than a political method of achieving nullification.” That being said, he expressed his opinion that “there is no legal basis whatever for ‘interposition’ as a nullifying or voiding device.” The resolutions that had been enacted or were being considered by several southern states served only as expressions of protest. The doctrine itself, he announced, “is a legal absurdity.” Davis went on to examine many of the “precedents” that had been cited by segregation leaders as proof of the doctrine’s legitimacy and concluded that it was “questionable whether any of these instances of state defiance are pertinent to the present imbroglio over racial desegregation.” As for how the national government could potentially respond to actual defiance of federal court orders, Professor Davis suggested that there was a variety of coercive measures the government had at its disposal and, he added prophetically, “to meet a test of really tragic proportions the President’s command of the U. S. military is a theoretically available weapon in support of the federal courts.”110 And, on March 15, 1956, the California Legislature responded to the passage of interposition resolutions by issuing a resolution of its own. House Resolution No. 16 referred to the “nefarious attempts” by

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various southern states “to defy the Supreme Court of the United States and to threaten nullification of the Constitution” and memorialized the executive and legislative branches of the federal government to take “the necessary action to support the recent decisions of the Supreme Court on civil rights.”111

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Interposition Embraced by Segregationists By the time Arkansas added itself to the list of southern states that passed resolutions of interposition in response to the United States Supreme Court’s pronouncements regarding school segregation, the doctrine had been almost universally embraced by die hard segregationists as the best hope for total victory in the fight to maintain racially separate schools. Jim Johnson’s 1956 assurances from the stump that the Brown decision was not valid law and that the doctrine of interposition justified resistance to it meant that there was good reason to believe that in Arkansas the attitude towards compliance with the Court’s mandate to integrate the schools had changed by 1957. And all the while, the Little Rock School Board moved forward with its plans for admitting black students into the all-white Central High School.

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NOTES  1

Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 126. Reed, Faubus, 174; Francis M. Wilhoit, The Politics of Massive Resistance (New York, 1973), 178. 3 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 70. 4 Kilpatrick to Richard D. Morphew, Associate News Director, WJDX and WLBT (TV), Jackson, Mississippi, Dec. 28, 1955. James Jackson Kilpatrick Papers, University of Virginia Special Collections Library (hereafter UVA). 5 Rainach to Kilpatrick, Apr. 18, 1956. Rainach Papers, LSUS. 6 The Citizens’ Council ran for six years as a newspaper. In 1961, the paper was discontinued and The Citizen, a monthly journal, was published in its stead. The Citizen survived until 1983. See McMillen, The Citizens’ Councils, 118-119. A complete collection of The Citizens’ Council and The Citizen is located in the Citizens’ Council Papers, UA-F. 7 Kilpatrick to Patterson, Dec. 14, 1955. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 8 This series was published as: Karr Shannon, Integration Decision Is Unconstitutional (Little Rock, 1958). 9 Bartley notes that Herman Talmadge of Georgia discussed the theory of interposition in the context of school segregation as early as May 1951. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 128-129. It was not until Kilpatrick popularized the idea in the News Leader, however, that the theory was widely embraced by pro-segregation forces. 10 Reed, Faubus, 174. 11 Richmond News Leader, May 18, 1954. 12 Address by Kilpatrick at the University of Richmond, 1955. Draft of speech located in Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 13 SSN, June 8, 1955. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. Garrett was the Vice-Chairman of the Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee to Maintain Segregation. 17 Richmond News Leader, June 1, 1955. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 SSN, Sept. 1955. 21 Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 70. 22 Ibid. Email communication from Kilpatrick to the author April 8, 2003. 23 Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 70; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 129. 24 Kilpatrick, The Southern Case for School Segregation (New York, 1962), 107. 25 Address of Sen. James O. Eastland (D-Miss.), entitled “We’ve Reached Era of Judicial Tyranny,” to the Association of Citizens’ Councils of Mississippi at Jackson, Miss., Dec. 1, 1955. Published as a pamphlet and distributed by the

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2

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 Association of Citizens’ Councils of Mississippi. Copy located in Citizens’ Council Papers, UA-F. 26 Address of Judge Leander H. Perez of Louisiana to the 79th Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, Dallas, Texas, Aug. 27, 1956, entitled “Interposition: What is It?” Copy located in Leander H. Perez Papers, New Orleans Public Library Special Collections (hereafter NOPL). Also in Rainach Papers, LSUS. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 William D. Workman, Jr., The Case for the South (New York, 1960), 31. 31 Herman E. Talmadge, You and Segregation (Birmingham, 1955), 12. 32 Lewis, The White South and the Red Menace, 32. 33 Richmond News Leader, Nov. 21, 1955. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. This and other editorials by Kilpatrick from November 21 through November 29 were included in the Interposition Supplement, published as Richmond News Leader, Interposition: Editorials and Editorial Page Presentations (Richmond, 1956). 34 Ibid. 35 Workman, The Case for the South, 8. 36 Kilpatrick, “The Right to Interpose,” Human Events 12:52 (Dec. 24, 1955). Copy located in Rainach Papers, LSUS. 37 Kilpatrick to L. Marion Gressette, Dec. 19, 1955. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 38 Opening remarks by Kilpatrick on “Comment” television program, NBC, Aug. 31, 1958. Transcript located in Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 39 Kilpatrick, “The Right to Interpose.” 40 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 73. 41 Eastland, “We’ve Reached Era of Judicial Tyranny.” 42 The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” 43 Richmond News Leader, Jan. 10, 1956. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 44 Talmadge, You and Segregation, 76. 45 Kilpatrick, “The Right to Interpose.” 46 Richmond News Leader, Jan. 16, 1956. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 47 Ibid., Nov. 23, 1955. 48 Workman, The Case for the South, 18. 49 Paulsen Spence, for example, thought secession an available option that should be given due consideration. Spence, “The Constitution vs. The Supreme Court,” (1956), 17. Copy located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 50 Richmond News Leader, Nov. 23, 1955. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 51 Letter to the Editor by D. W. Woodbridge, and editorial response, Richmond News Leader, Jan. 2, 1956. Ibid. 52 Martin, The Deep South Says “Never”, 35. 53 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 126.

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The clearest statement on how interposition could be effectively used may be found in Marion H. Sass, “The Impending Crisis of the South: An Appeal to the People of South Carolina.” Copy located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 55 Richmond News Leader, Nov. 22, 1955. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 56 Email correspondence from Kilpatrick to the author April 8, 2003. 57 Senator Thurmond (D-S.C.) was the States’ Rights Democrat (Dixiecrat) candidate for United States president in 1948. See Frederickson, The Dixiecrat Revolt. 58 Richmond News Leader, Nov. 22, 1955. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 59 Ibid., Jan. 19, 1956. Other supporters of the doctrine believed interposition and nullification synonymous. Mississippi Circuit Judge M. M. McGowan, for example, said “the words are considered as one and the same thing, and in fact are one and the same thing.” McGowan, “Interposition or Nullification,” The Citizens’ Council, Jan. 1956. Copy located in Citizens’ Council Papers, UA-F. 60 SSN, Jan., Feb. 1956. 61 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 136. 62 Ibid. 63 Address by Rep. John Bell Williams (D-Miss) in the House of Representatives, Jan. 25, 1956. Published as a pamphlet entitled “Interposition, The Barrier Against Tyranny” by the Association of Citizens’ Councils of Mississippi, Greenwood, Miss. Copy located in Rainach Papers, LSUS; also in DeLesseps Morrison Papers, NOPL. 64 In January 1956, the Southern School News reported the existence of 150 such groups. SSN, Jan. 1956. 65 The four cases decided together as Brown, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), were: Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Kansas), Briggs v. Elliott (South Carolina), Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County (Virginia), and Gebhart v. Belton (Delaware). A companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), applied the principles of the Brown ruling to the District of Columbia. See Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality (New York, 1975). 66 The Georgia Commission on Education, chaired by Herman Talmadge, was formed in January 1954. SSN, Sept. 3, 1954; New York Times, Jan. 19, 1954. In Mississippi, the Legal Educational Advisory Committee, chaired by Governor Hugh L. White, was established by the regular session of the legislature in 1954. It was replaced by the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission in 1956. SSN, Sept. 3, 1954; June 1956. Alabama’s Joint Interim Legislative Committee on Segregation and Public Schools was led by State Senator Albert Boutwell of Birmingham. SSN, Sept. 3, 1954. The Louisiana legislature, the only southern state legislature in session when the opinion in Brown was issued, immediately created the Joint Legislative Committee to Maintain Segregation and named William M. Rainach of Claiborne Parish its head. SSN, Sept. 3, 1954. 67 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 79.

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In Louisiana at least, Kilpatrick’s writings on interposition were relied upon “in presenting the case” to the state legislature for the passage of an interposition resolution. Rainach to Kilpatrick, Apr. 18, 1956. Rainach Papers, LSUS. 69 Interim Report of South Carolina School Committee, Jan. 31, 1956. Ibid. 70 Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts (New York, 1994), 216. 71 Hodges to Kilpatrick, Dec. 9, 1955. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 72 Kilpatrick to Hodges, [undated]. Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Johnson to Faubus, Feb. 13, 1956. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 75 Richmond News Leader, Nov. 21, 22, 29, 1955. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 76 Kilpatrick to Waring, Dec. 9, 1955. Ibid. 77 Richmond News Leader, Sept. 6, 1956. Ibid. 78 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 130. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid., 128. 81 Drew L. Smith, “Interposition – The Neglected Weapon,” printed and distributed by The Federation for Constitutional Government [undated]. 82 Smith, for example, did so in “Interposition – The Neglected Weapon,” as did Kilpatrick and other journalists on their respective editorial pages. 83 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 84 1 Warren 100. 85 1 Stat. 570 (1798); 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 86 “Interposition vs. Judicial Power,” RRLR 1 (1956), 471. 87 Ibid. Reply resolutions were passed by Delaware, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont. Each asserted the supremacy of the national government and denied the power of the states to nullify federal laws. 88 Virginia Resolution (1798), reprinted in full in the Richmond News Leader, Nov. 21, 1955 and included in the News Leader Interposition Supplement. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 89 First Kentucky Resolution (1798), Ibid. 90 Kilpatrick, “The Right to Interpose.” 91 Madison, quoted in “Interposition vs. Judicial Power,” RRLR 1 (1956), 473. 92 Quoted in the Richmond News Leader, Nov. 28, 1955 and included in the News Leader Interposition Supplement. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 93 Calhoun, “South Carolina Exposition,” quoted in “Interposition vs. Judicial Power,” RRLR 1 (1956), 485. 94 Ibid. 95 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 16 L.Ed. 169 (1859). 96 Smith, “Interposition – The Neglected Weapon.” 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 3 L.Ed. 53 (1809).

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“Interposition vs. Judicial Power,” 476. Quoted in Ibid. 102 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 3 L.Ed. 53 (1809). 103 Quoted in “Interposition vs. Judicial Power,”477. 104 Ibid. Reply resolutions were enacted by Tennessee, Kentucky, New Jersey, Maryland, Ohio, Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, New Hampshire, and Vermont. 105 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816). 106 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). 107 Undated publication of the Southern Regional Council entitled “Next Steps in the South,” (Atlanta). Copy located in ACHR Collection, UA-F. Freyer noted that “the general view among American jurists and government officials” was that interposition “lacked any legal or constitutional authority.” Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 73. 108 RRLR 1 (1956), 1024-1025. 109 SSN, July 1956. 110 SSN, March 1956. 111 RRLR 1 (1956), 756.

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CHAPTER FOUR

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The Citizens’ Council Turns Up the Heat By 1957, interposition was, by popular vote, the official policy in the state of Arkansas. What this would mean for those school districts that chose voluntarily to desegregate, however, was not clear. In Little Rock, school superintendent Virgil Blossom put several questions to school board attorneys Archie House and Leon Catlett regarding the effect the three anti-integration measures passed in the November 1956 general election would have on the district’s Phase Plan, scheduled to begin the following September. House responded that “the measures have no effect on the plan of integration as adopted by the Little Rock School District.” Additionally, it was the lawyer’s opinion that it would not be possible for the state’s General Assembly to pass any legislation pursuant to the Johnson Amendment to prevent the board from moving forward with its plan.1 Even as the school board’s attorneys assured Superintendent Blossom and the Little Rock School Board that the desegregation of Central High School should take place in September 1957 as planned, segregationists in the city loudly and publicly insisted that the interposition amendment made integration “unnecessary.” And when, on February 26, 1957, the state legislature enacted four segregation acts, hopes that the Blossom Plan would be abandoned were increased.2 The 1957 Segregation Program The passage of a segregation program by the 1957 Arkansas General Assembly surprised no one. As Representative Lucien C. Rogers of Crittenden County, one of twenty-seven representatives who introduced the measures in the house, declared, the legislature was “required” to enact the pro-segregation laws because of the mandate by the people who voiced their desire in the November general election that the state interpose its sovereignty to maintain racially separate schools in Arkansas.3

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The first of the four laws created a twelve-man State Sovereignty Commission endowed with vast investigative authority. On the Commission would be the governor, who would serve as chairman, the lieutenant governor, the attorney general, and the speaker of the house of representatives, as well as three members named by the governor, two by the president of the senate, and three by the speaker of the house.4 As conceived by the law, the Commission would “perform any and all acts and things deemed necessary and proper to protect the sovereignty of the State of Arkansas, and her sister states… from encroachment thereon by the Federal Government… and to resist the usurpation of the rights and powers reserved to this State or our sister states by the Federal Government.” The Sovereignty Commission was authorized to issue subpoenas, pay witnesses, and to hold both public and private hearings at its discretion. Failure to comply with requests for information by the Commission was a misdemeanor punishable by fines up to one thousand dollars and six months in jail.5 Another of the acts required that organizations engaged in activities concerned with integration register with, and make periodic reports to, the Sovereignty Commission.6 By the end of October 1957, however, only Little Rock acted to enforce the statute. And there, Mayor Mann interpreted the law liberally, applying it equally to all groups that were considered extremist on the segregation issue. He ordered the NAACP to comply with the requirements of the registration act within fifteen days, but also demanded the same of the Capital Citizens Council, the Freedom Fund, Inc., and the League of Central High Mothers – all segregationist groups.7 The third and fourth acts, which were passed in the Senate by greater margins than the first two, removed requirements for compulsory education for students attending schools that were racially mixed and authorized school districts to engage legal counsel to defend board members and school officials against integration suits, and “to pay compensation therefor.”8 Justification for all four of the new laws was based on the state’s police power. Each declared that in some way the “health, safety and general welfare” of the people of Arkansas was threatened by the United States Supreme Court’s Brown rulings, and that, as a result of such threat, a “state of emergency” existed within the state. It was hoped, then, that although the intent of the statutes was clearly to avoid compliance with federal directives, they could survive the inevitable

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legal challenges by asserting that concerns over public safety outweighed any potential restrictions on individuals’ civil rights. The act creating the State Sovereignty Commission, furthermore, specifically provided that if any section of the law was declared unconstitutional, the rest of the act “shall remain in full force and effect.”9 The Commission was to function at the center of Arkansas’ resistance efforts, and if it could be destroyed by mere judicial fiat, it was feared, the entire segregation program for the state would crumble. The provision that would preserve the Commission if, as seemed likely to many observers,10 certain sections were disallowed, ensured that the segregationists could remain organized to regroup and quickly throw up further obstacles to integration.

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Debate over the Segregation Program While Daisy Bates’ assertion that the segregation laws were passed over “the protest of thousands of citizens”11 must be tempered by the knowledge that the majority of white Arkansans supported the measures, dissent was sounded from several quarters. Besides being opposed by black organizations, which could be expected to disprove of the segregation acts, opposition came from other groups and individuals as well. Such opposition was strongest against the State Sovereignty Commission and the registration act. On February 12 the Arkansas Gazette editorialized against the acts, calling them “extremist” and unconstitutional. They were certain to be ruled invalid by the courts, the editorial pronounced, but, for having been enacted in the first place, would have negative consequences on race relations throughout the state.12 Winthrop Rockefeller was also outspoken in his opposition to the 1957 laws. The legislative program could hurt attempts by the state to attract and develop new industries, he reasoned. The Sovereignty Commission in particular, he insisted, could act as “what you might call an Arkansas Gestapo.” “No organization would be safe from embarrassment of an investigation,” he complained, “and behind closed doors, too.”13 Such sentiments were echoed by Reverend W. L. Miller, Jr., president of the Arkansas State Convention of Christian Churches, at a public hearing conducted by the Senate Constitutional Amendment Committee on February 18. Miller claimed that the bills being considered by the legislature “would set up a secret police with undefined powers and that could only mean the loss of our freedom.”14

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Little Rock resident Odell Smith, president of the Arkansas State Federation of Labor, expressed his opinion that the legislative program under consideration was undemocratic. The segregation laws embodied “the principles of Communist and Fascist governments,” he announced at the senate hearing.15 The Social Education and Action Committee of the Arkansas Christian Missionary Society, perceiving that the Christian Church could be construed as an organization subject to the registration requirements of Act No. 85, later issued a statement to the effect that despite the fact that the NAACP was the obvious target of the law, church groups could be forced to register with the Commission as well. Such an application of the law, they protested, would violate the principle of church and state.16 While the Christian Church, as such, was arguably safe from persecution, the language of the act creating the Sovereignty Commission was certainly sufficient to justify the fears of those who opposed it. Speakers supporting the segregation bills at the senate hearing included Richard B. McCulloch, Sr., who had authored the measures. McCulloch denied that the language used in the act creating the Sovereignty Commission was copied from that which created the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission, which by the beginning of 1957 had already established itself as that state’s “segregation watchdog agency.” Rather, he insisted, the Arkansas law was modeled after the federal civil rights legislation being considered by the United States Congress.17 McCulloch told those present at the senate hearing that the legislative package was crafted in such a way that it was sure to survive any court challenge. Furthermore, it did not represent an abandonment of moderation in dealing with the segregation issue and it would not have the effect of reversing integration in those places where it had already been achieved, including the state’s university system. Anticipating the charges of some of those slated to speak after him at the hearing,18 the Forrest City attorney assured the crowd that there was no reason for anyone to fear that his civil liberties were endangered. The Bill of Rights, he insisted, would not be violated in Arkansas.19 Also speaking on behalf of the bills were former governor Ben Laney and Bird Committee member Bex Shaver. To Laney, ever the Dixiecrat, the only “segregation question” was whether Arkansas would stand against the present attack on states’ rights. Shaver took a more moderate position. Candidly admitting that the bills were intended merely to delay integration, he urged their passage, saying

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they would give people time to “settle down, and face the matter realistically.”20 Governor Faubus supported all four of the segregation statutes, and he signed them into law. The governor defended the new legislation against the attacks made on it, dismissing charges that the Sovereignty Commission would engage in “witch hunts” or threaten “the rights of any citizen” as “unfounded.” On the contrary, he assured his constituents that the intention of the Assembly was to provide measures to ensure that “the rights of the people as to the will of the majority” were protected.21 Again, as had been his position all along, Faubus stated that no district that chose voluntarily to desegregate its schools would be barred from doing so. The acts of the legislature simply provided the means for school districts to maintain segregation if that was their wish.22 Clearly, Governor Faubus’ public contention that the prosegregation legislative program would not prohibit individual school districts from opting to desegregate their schools was made to the chagrin of segregationist forces throughout the state. Despite his declared support for the measures that he signed into law, Faubus had certainly not, at this juncture, aligned himself with the segregationists. That he successfully prevented, or at least delayed, the Sovereignty Commission from being duly constituted as required by its act of creation by refusing to name his three appointments to it until his hand was forced by the filing of a lawsuit on July 26 to compel his compliance with the law, suggests that his “support” was half-hearted at best.23 Roy Reed states that the governor signed the laws “unenthusiastically,” and that his “ignoring the legal mandate to appoint commission members” was indicative of his “distaste for the agency.”24 The registration act, too, was stayed from enforcement when it went into effect on June 13 because Faubus’ failure to appoint meant that there was “no one to report to because the commission hasn’t been organized.”25 According to John A. Kirk, the governor, “once the immediate political necessity of hard-line rhetoric had passed,” retreated to a “more moderate position on school desegregation.” 26 Why, then, did the governor acquiesce in the enactment of the segregation laws if it was not his intent to see to their enforcement?

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Faubus’ Tax Program Freyer has argued that the segregation laws passed by the 1957 General Assembly “should be viewed in the context of private political maneuvering that had even larger implications.”27 When Faubus first took office in January 1955, he recognized the serious need for improvements in education and state services. Per-capita income in the state was among the lowest in the United States. Arkansas teachers’ salaries were well below the national average, and some districts were forced to shorten their school terms due to lack of funds. In state mental hospitals, many patients had to sleep on the floor because of a shortage of space and finances. Reed, by contrast, asserted that “it would have been hard to find a time in Arkansas history, except for the Great Depression and the Civil War and Reconstruction era, less propitious for a tax increase.”28 The governor spent much of his first term cultivating the support of powerful men in Arkansas politics through the shrewd distribution of patronage and private deals. After his decisive victory in the 1956 gubernatorial race, he found himself “in the odd posture of having more clout in his second term than in his first.”29 Faubus was determined to use that clout to push through the legislature a tax program that would allow him to improve conditions in the state. Even before the 1957 legislative session opened, he made known the basic details of his plan – increases in severance, income, and sales taxes to raise revenue for education, industrialization, and other necessary state services.30 When the state’s chief executive appeared before the General Assembly to present his second inaugural address on January 15, 1957, the members of that body were unsurprised to find that it was primarily devoted to promoting his tax program.31 Perhaps, too, it was no shock to at least some in attendance that in his speech the governor “linked passage of the tax program to desegregation.”32 “This problem of racial relations,” Faubus orated, “is another compelling reason for favorable consideration of the tax program that has been recommended.” He continued, “If ALL our people are given good service in the fields in which the state government can properly function, there is less likelihood of discord and disorder in dealing with this or any other problem.”33 The very next day, drafts of the tax bills were distributed to Arkansas legislators. Less than a week later, though, several counter

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proposals were also submitted to the Assembly. Faubus worked furiously to prevent his plan from being gutted in the legislature. Aware that he was asking for the largest tax increase in Arkansas history – in a state where “antitax sentiment… has always ranged from hostile to explosive”34 – the governor appeared before a statewide television audience to stress the need for the increases.35 He threatened, too, to veto any raises for state judges and attorneys – who were hoping to get pieces of the tax revenue pie – if his package was not approved in its entirety, and thus secured their support as lobbyists on behalf of its passage. To woo the influential oil men of the southern counties, Faubus offered to exempt stripper wells from the proposed increase in severance taxes.36 The staunchest opponent in the senate to the governor’s plan was Senator Ellis M. Fagan of Little Rock, “one of the most powerful members of the legislature.”37 Faubus aggressively sought the support of other legislative powerhouses to offset Fagan’s influence. According to Faubus biographer Roy Reed, the governor particularly courted Senator Lee Bearden of Leachville, “a quietly powerful man from east Arkansas,” and Representative Paul Van Dalsem of Perry County, “the House bull, who had repeatedly killed tax legislation in the past.”38 Reed credits Senator Bearden especially with seducing “virtually all of Fagan’s fellow veterans in the General Assembly… over to Faubus’s side.”39 Where Reed appears to exult in Faubus’ crafty political maneuvering elsewhere, however, the one-time Arkansas Gazette reporter offers no insight into what the governor offered these men in exchange for their invaluable support.40 To Freyer, the “price” that Faubus paid for their backing is no great mystery. Simply put, “Faubus conceded to the east Arkansas interests on the interposition legislation, and consequently his tax plan passed too.”41 Irving J. Spitzberg, Jr. and Numan Bartley also noted that there was evidence to suggest an arrangement between Governor Faubus and east Arkansas lawmakers joining the success of the tax program to the governor’s sponsorship of the anti-integration measures passed by the 1957 General Assembly.42 While it was undoubtedly not recognized by the general public, the connection between the segregation and tax bills was not completely unnoticed at the time, nor was it denied by Governor Faubus in private conversations. When Arkansas Gazette publisher Hugh Patterson advised the governor that his sponsorship of the segregation bills would damage his reputation as a moderate, for example, “Faubus told

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Patterson that the bills represented ‘sops’ for Eastern Arkansas and that he would never use them.”43 And school board member Wayne Upton later recollected that Faubus told the board only weeks before the desegregation of Central High School that he thought the Blossom Plan was sound but he could not make any public statements in support of it, as the board requested, because he had made a deal with “certain eastern Arkansas interests” to oppose integration in exchange for their backing his tax plan. He reportedly explained to the board, “These people supported me and my three percent sales tax legislation and I’m going to have to go along with them.”44 Superintendent Blossom was also aware of the arrangement. He wrote, in his account of the Little Rock crisis, It Has Happened Here, that “it was possible for representatives from eastern Arkansas, who were usually able to dominate the Legislature, to block the Governor’s tax program unless he accepted the segregation bills. In other words, he honestly and realistically believed he had to do some horsetrading to get his tax program.”45 Considering that the schools were to be the greatest beneficiaries of the revenues raised by the increases – of the $22 million projected in new taxes, over $14 million was to go towards education46 – it is not inconceivable that Blossom approved. In any event, and as Freyer acknowledged, in Faubus’ mind, progress and development in Arkansas was “entwined” with efforts to maintain school segregation.47 And it was also true that “entangling the fate of the neo-populist developmental program with interposition politics had ominous implications.”48 Faubus’ “horsetrading” committed him to endorsing the segregationists’ stance. At the very least, it prevented him from using his position to urge compliance with the Little Rock Phase Plan. Certainly he was constrained from using state resources to assist the school board in putting the desegregation plan into effect. Furthermore, the governor’s position “undermined the persuasiveness of the constitutional and legal arguments set forth in the Blossom-House letters” which contended that the state was powerless to prevent the integration of Central High School in September 1957. And “all this could not help but encourage segregationists to stir up more trouble.”49

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The March 1957 School Board Election Not that the segregationists needed much encouragement. In Little Rock, they were already busy. In February 1957, two extreme segregationists filed as candidates for the Little Rock School Board. Dr. George P. Branscum, a dentist, and Robert Ewing Brown, a radio and television executive, were both on the executive board of the Constitution Party, a political body committed to the preservation of states’ rights. Brown was also the president of the Capital Citizens Council.50 Running against Dr. Branscum was Henry V. Rath, an accountant for a bakery in Little Rock. Attorney Wayne Upton ran against Brown. Both Rath and Upton campaigned as supporters of the policies of the existing school board, including its plan for gradual desegregation. Upton later stated that he favored compliance with the Brown rulings because he believed the decisions were “the law of the land.”51 The campaign was “vicious,” and the Citizens Council, backing Branscum and Brown, “fired its heavy guns,”52 turning the March 16 election into what is widely perceived as a referendum on the Little Rock Phase Program.53 At the election, both of the pro-segregation candidates were soundly defeated by a nearly two-to-one margin.54 According to Virgil Blossom, the election results indicated “a powerful moderate majority in the city.”55 Central High School English teacher and Women’s Vice Principal Elizabeth Huckaby agreed, noting that the election of Rath and Upton “seemed an endorsement of the law and order stand of the superintendent and the board, and of their plan of gradual (and token) integration.”56 Upton himself felt that his victory in March 1957 “very definitely was” evidence that Little Rock voters were willing to comply with federal desegregation orders.57 Harold Engstrom, who had been a member of the school board since 1955, believed so, too, but later rationalized that “an issue that is a year or so or six or eight months away is not as significant to a voter as something that’s imminent in the next week or two. The climate at the time that school started that fall was entirely different.”58 The assumption, however, that the outcome of the March 1957 Little Rock School Board election proved a willingness among the city’s citizens to desegregate, and that the events of September 1957 was the result of a “change in climate,” is problematical. Certainly, in some ways, the “climate” in Little Rock grew colder towards integration during the summer months, and especially during the final weeks

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before school opening. But the segregation candidates’ loss, or at least their margin of loss, may be partially explained by errors in judgment during the campaign rather than entirely by a significant numerical majority of moderates in the city. Branscum and Brown, and the Capital Citizens Council behind them, concentrated their efforts where they could expect their greatest support – on the working-class parents who harbored the strongest pro-segregation sentiments and who lived in the Central High School attendance area. While they dedicated their time preaching to the converted, very little effort was spent convincing this segment of Little Rock society of the crucial importance of turning out to vote on election day. This was a serious strategic error, since despite the fact that white, working-class voters out-numbered upperclass and black voters, that group has always been associated with low voter turn-out in local elections. The occasion at hand proved no exception. Ultimately, then, a coalition of moderate whites from the wealthier Pulaski Heights section of the city – who were unlikely to be directly affected by integration in the foreseeable future – and black voters formed to hand Rath and Upton a sizeable victory. In any event, the six-member Little Rock School Board maintained its moderate majority and was reinforced in its belief that Blossom’s Phase Program would work and had the approval of at least a preponderance of the city’s people. And when, on April 26 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in St. Louis announced its approval of Judge Miller’s August 28, 1956, decision upholding the desegregation plan, the board was further encouraged. 59 Circuit Judge Charles J. Vogel’s opinion for the Court of Appeals rested on the section of Brown II that recognized that the actual desegregation of public schools would involve difficulties that could best be solved at the local level. The federal district courts, which were responsible for overseeing the execution of the Brown decrees, “will have to consider whether the action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles.”60 Vogel noted that District Judge Miller found that the Little Rock School Board had acted in good faith when it adopted the Phase Program and that that “finding is not challenged in these proceedings.”61 The appellants in this case requested only that the desegregation be ordered accelerated. Attorneys Wiley A. Branton and Thurgood Marshall cited several cases in which courts had made such an order. The court held, however, that the precedents cited “serve

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only to demonstrate that local school problems are ‘varied’ as referred to by the Supreme Court” in Brown II.62 Until the plan is put into effect, such problems that might arise in its implementation could not be predetermined. That was the reason for the district court’s retention of jurisdiction in the case. The district court would have the power to speed up integration in the Little Rock schools if it was later shown that the process was moving along more slowly than local conditions could withstand. Conversely, if there are more difficulties than anticipated, the district court could allow the process to be slowed down. The point was, according to Vogel and his colleagues, Circuit Judges Joseph W. Woodrough and Martin D. Van Oosterhout, “That remains for future determination.”63 Judge Miller’s ruling, then, was affirmed, and the Court of Appeals reiterated that “jurisdiction of this case shall be retained by the District Court to insure full opportunity for further showing in the event compliance at the ‘earliest practicable date’ ceases to be the objective.”64 After the opinion was announced, Branton stated that he was unsure whether he would make an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, and that “some aspects” of the ruling pleased him. There could be no backing out by the Little Rock School Board now, he believed. If nothing else, he rejoiced, “The courts have given us a cloak of protection against some die-hard, anti-integration groups who might still try to delay integration.”65 Despite the “cloak of protection” surrounding the Blossom Plan, of course, “die-hard, anti-integration groups” – particularly the Capital Citizens Council – did still attempt to prevent the desegregation of Central High School. Faubus Called Upon to Interpose When, in June 1957, Lester Granger of New York City, the executive director of the National Urban League, told a reporter in Little Rock that in his opinion the desegregation of the Little Rock schools would take place “without serious trouble,” he was challenged by Capital Citizens Council president Robert Ewing Brown.66 Brown’s associate, Amis Guthridge, legal counsel for the segregationist organization, also disagreed with Granger. Guthridge vowed to a Council meeting in Tulsa, Oklahoma, on June 21 that there would be no integration in the Arkansas capital’s public schools come September. If, he warned, there was an attempt to admit black students to any school in Little Rock, there would be “hell on the border.”67

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Earlier, on April 30, Brown had made an appeal to Governor Faubus to stop the planned integration. In an open letter that had been published in the newspapers and printed and distributed by the Capital Citizens Council as a pamphlet entitled “Race Mixing in Little Rock High Schools Can Be Stopped by the Governor,”68 Brown quoted sections from Mississippi Senator James O. Eastland’s December 1, 1955, address to a state convention of the Association of Citizens’ Councils of Mississippi.69 Eastland was undoubtedly dismayed at the prospect of desegregation in Little Rock. In his 1955 speech the Senator had specifically mentioned Arkansas as a chink in the armor of massive resistance, as the state appeared to have embraced the “deadly doctrine of gradualism” and allowed “race mixing” to occur in some schools districts.70 Generally, though, however troublesome these instances of desegregation were to extreme segregationists, they had taken place in rural communities and involved only small numbers of black children. Little Rock, on the other hand, was the state capital, and integration there could potentially involve much larger numbers of black students.71 Furthermore, national media attention had already been focused on Little Rock,72 and there could be no doubt that reporters from beyond the “paper curtain” would be on hand in the city when school opened in September 1957.73 Charleston, Fayetteville, Bentonville, Hot Springs, and even Hoxie could be considered isolated incidents, but Little Rock, it was feared, would set a precedent that the rest of the state would be under pressure to follow. As a school superintendent from Union County, in south central Arkansas, lamented in November 1956, “I don’t like to see a leading community like Little Rock take the lead too fast. In the end, the other communities will have to follow suit.”74 As the chief executive of a sovereign state, Robert Ewing Brown urged in his April 30, 1957, letter, Faubus could invoke the authority asserted in the interposition amendment to save Arkansas citizens from the tragedy of integration. As Brown quoted Eastland, “The effective way to oppose integrated schools and this attack on a segregated society is through the governments of the state.” If the state does not act to protect its people, “we are sitting ducks and will be picked off one by one.”75 Brown’s open letter continued, pointing out that the will of the people had been expressed in November 1956, when the voters “approved overwhelmingly the three segregation proposals on the

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ballot,” and in the 1957 General Assembly, when the duly elected representatives of the people enacted the four segregation laws. Brown claimed that these actions represented a mandate for the governor to do everything in his power to maintain racially separate schools. And, he insisted, Faubus’ authority was sufficient to prevent integration from taking place. “Under our police powers,” Brown stated in his letter, “in order to preserve domestic tranquility, order the two races to attend their own schools.” The federal government could do nothing to Faubus should he act on this mandate to interpose, since “as the sovereign head of a state, you are immune to federal court orders.”76 The Citizens’ Council president reminded Faubus of Governor Alan Shivers’ successful use of Rangers to reverse the integration of Mansfield High School in Texas. And, Brown instructed, there was no trouble in Mansfield because of Shivers’ action. In Clinton, Tennessee, however, or in Clay and Sturgis, Kentucky, where Governors Frank G. Clement and Albert B. “Happy” Chandler elected to enforce integration, they had to use “the militia, with tanks, guns, and armored cars” against their own people “to force the entrance” of a handful of black children into the schools.77 At Little Rock, Brown implied, similar steps would be necessary to impose race mixing on an unwilling public – steps that Faubus was clearly aware would be unpopular and politically unwise – unless he did as Governor Shivers and not as Governors Clement or Chandler.78 According to Virgil Blossom, the highly publicized letter of April 30 “was designed to put Faubus ‘on the spot’ as the man who held the key to success or failure of our integration plan. But the Governor had no desire to accept that role.”79 Faubus ignored the appeal. But Brown’s letter was only the opening salvo it what proved to be a massive propaganda campaign by the Capital Citizens Council to stir up opposition to the implementation of the Blossom Plan.80 Amis Guthridge, whom Little Rock School Board attorney Archie House called “uncontrollable” in his rabble-rousing,81 explained that the example provided by Texas Governor Alan Shivers’ use of Rangers at Mansfield, Texas, was not only stressed by Brown in his open letter to the Arkansas governor, but it became the “premise” for a series of fullpage advertisements that the Capital Citizens Council placed in the Arkansas Democrat. These weekly ads were directed at Faubus. “Governor Faubus,” they essentially read, “if Governor Shivers of Texas can stop integration, why can’t you?”82

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Council members, led by Guthridge and the Reverend Wesley Pruden, pastor of the Broadmoor Baptist Church in Little Rock, also attended meetings of the school board, intent on disrupting them and making it difficult for the board to conduct business.83 They jammed into the conference room where meetings were held, and by “the summer of 1957,” Superintendent Blossom complained, “we could be confident that members of the Capital Citizens’ Council or some other segregationist group would tear into the Board, often in a highly emotional burst of oratory, at every meeting.” Frequently the Councilors would notify the press in advance of their filibusters, “and we had reporters and photographers added to the crowd.”84 At one particularly eventful school board meeting on June 27, Guthridge and Pruden addressed the board. Both men were “frequent spokesmen for the segregationists” at the meetings.85 On this night, Guthridge purported to be speaking as the attorney for the parents of several white students at Central High School.86 The tall, bespectacled lawyer and small business owner, who left Blossom with “the impression that he believed the world would come to an end if the Little Rock schools were integrated,”87 requested that a separate school for white children who did not want to attend the same school as black children be established. The rights of white children would be violated if they were forced against their and their parents’ wishes. Under the desegregation plan, he pointed out, black students would be offered the choice whether to request transfer into a formerly white school or to remain at the all-black Horace Mann High School. White students at Central would have no choice. Therefore, he contended, whites were to be denied the equal protection of the law for no reason other than race, and the Supreme Court had declared that to be unconstitutional.88 After making his request, Guthridge shifted gears and launched into a tirade against Harry S. Ashmore, the executive editor of the Arkansas Gazette and a supporter of the gradual integration plan, calling him “a selfappointed oracle on the race question,” and accusing him of misleading the public about desegregation.89 Either of which comment could easily have been made about Guthridge himself. Then Reverend Pruden took the floor. Pruden questioned the board on the policies they planned to institute regarding social functions once black students were admitted into Central High School along with whites. Would they attend dances together? Would they use the same locker rooms? Bathrooms? Would they go on overnight school trips

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together? Would black boys and white girls perform romantic scenes together in school plays? Pruden played on white parents’ fears that, as William Peters put it in The Southern Temper, “the average male Negro is little more than a potential rapist, waiting only for his opportunity to seize the South’s white women.”90 The specter of sexuality and the threat to the ideal of “Southern Womanhood” lurked behind every argument for continued segregation. John Bartlow Martin noted it, too, in his series of articles for The Saturday Evening Post that was published as the book The Deep South Says “Never” in 1957. Segregationists, he wrote, “accuse the North of treating Negroes worse; declare their own love for Negroes; recall the horrors of Negro rule during Reconstruction; denounce desegregation as a Communist plot and unconstitutional invasion of states’ rights; and in the end without a single exception they come around to sex: school desegregation leads to close association, and close association leads to miscegenation, amalgamation, mongrelization.”91 Jim Johnson exploited such fears as a candidate for governor in 1956, when he reportedly “stuffed rural mailboxes with the most unbelievable material against blacks, and what they wanted integration for – it was ‘to get into your bedrooms.’”92 Pruden knew it as well and, like Johnson, almost certainly shared that fear, although he later proclaimed, “We made our fight on the basis of states’ rights,” and made no mention of any threat to Southern Womanhood of the purity of the white race.93 At the school board meeting on June 27, 1957, though, Pruden said nothing of states’ rights. He only, in the overcrowded conference room in the school administration building in downtown Little Rock, in the presence of reporters and photographers, demanded that Superintendent Blossom and the members of the board reveal their policies regarding the social interaction betweens students of different races at Central High School. And, he informed them, he had already conferred with an assistant state attorney general who told him there was no way to legally bar black students from participation in school sponsored activities of events.94 Perceiving that it would be wise to answer both Guthridge’s request and Pruden’s questions with care and deliberation, the board instructed the two segregation leaders to submit their concerns in writing. Pruden did so on July 8, and Guthridge on July 11.95 Eager to get as much public exposure as possible for the emotional appeal to white parents’ fears for the safety of their children, the Capital Citizens Council had the contents of the letter Reverend Pruden submitted to school officials

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published “in big newspaper advertisements” even before the superintendent “had time to open” it.96 In the advertisement, which was addressed to “Virgil Blossom & Little Rock School Board,” Pruden was identified only as “a prominent Little Rock minister” who had grave concerns regarding the welfare of the city’s schoolchildren. “When you start race-mixing – where are you going to stop?” a banner above the list of questions inquired. “This advertisement,” Blossom later wrote, “was highly damaging to the cause of peaceful integration.” That the questions were attributed to a member of the clergy who was not otherwise identified as a Citizens’ Council leader magnified their harmful effects.97 The Little Rock School Board released its responses to Pruden’s questions on July 27. All students, the board announced, would use regular school facilities, including bathrooms and gym locker rooms and showers. Racially mixed social functions, such as dances, would not be held, nor would there be any interracial club trips. To prevent mixing, some social functions “which have been desirable in the past may have to be eliminated.” Social clubs would not have to be integrated because “they are not a required part of the school program.” In the interest of racial harmony, teachers at Central High School (who would all be white) would avoid any interracial scenes in class plays. As for the Parent-Teacher Association, about which Pruden also asked, the board indicated that it was a private organization and the decision whether to integrate would be a matter for that body to determine for itself.98 Amis Guthridge’s demand for a separate school for white students who preferred to remain segregated was answered by the school board in a separate, four-page statement issued on July 20. The Little Rock School Board denied forthrightly segregationists’ charge that the Johnson Amendment and the 1957 segregation laws “make it unnecessary for the board to comply with the Supreme Court decisions.” At issue, the board maintained, was not whether they agreed or disagreed with Brown. What mattered was “whether they will insist that we violate our oaths as citizens of America and Arkansas by attempting to disobey the decree of the United States Supreme Court.”99 The board then invited segregationists to test their interpretation of the law by filing a suit in federal court seeking a declaratory judgment on the laws involved. In the absence of such a

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judgment, the school board was constrained against granting Guthridge’s request.100

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“They’ll Never Get Me Out of Office” Publicly, Governor Faubus continued to maintain that desegregation was a “local problem” that was best left to the individual school districts, in Little Rock as elsewhere throughout the state, to handle on their own. He acknowledged to reporters that he had some concerns over integration in any city with a black population as large as that in the state’s capital.101 Still, when questioned directly about segregationists’ insistence that the extreme Interposition Amendment and the laws enacted by the 1957 General Assembly in pursuance thereof made integration in Little Rock “unnecessary,” the governor replied that “everyone knows that state laws can’t supersede federal laws.” Furthermore, he said that anyone who expected him to use the state laws as a justification to intervene to prevent the desegregation of Central High School was “wrong.”102 Clearly, not everyone seemed to “know” or at least to accept that states could not nullify federal laws. But Faubus’ response was consistent with his own views on interposition. He had never expressed any belief in the legitimacy of the doctrine as a means to ignore or to defy outright the mandate of the United States Supreme Court. And, thus far, he had given no indication that he questioned Brown’s status as “the law of the land.” Indeed, he felt certain that the measures that segregation forces relied upon in their pleas for intervention were unconstitutional and would be so declared when tested in the federal courts. Still, Faubus was, above all else, a neo-populist whose primary goal as governor was to champion the “common man.” Early in his first term that goal led him to cultivate the support of certain prointegrationists. According to Roy Reed, Faubus had once said, during a small, informal gathering at Winthrop Rockefeller’s Winrock Farm “that he saw the Supreme Court’s school decision as the law of the land and morally right.” And, he reportedly confided to those present that had he been a member of the Court that declared public school segregation a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “I would have voted that way myself.”103 But in 1956, when Jim Johnson set the tone for the gubernatorial race, and in 1957, when Faubus found it expedient to appease the powerful east Arkansas nabobs who controlled the state legislature, the governor adopted a

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degree of segregationist rhetoric in his public pronouncements when necessary. As John Kirk noted in his discussion of the 1956 campaign, Faubus the politician “skillfully managed to be all things to all people,” and he proved himself able to “carry off the segregationist or the moderate stance to order.”104 Despite Faubus’ public pronouncements that he would not intervene in the desegregation of Central High, segregationist pressure was getting to him. It also appeared that state Attorney General Bruce Bennett, an avowed segregationist, was posturing himself for a run at the governor’s mansion in 1958.105 Although only one other governor, Jeff Davis, had ever run successfully for a third term in Arkansas history, Faubus enjoyed being governor and hoped to keep the job. Roy Reed contends that Faubus recognized the enormous potential represented by the Brown ruling immediately when it was announced. At the time “he thought the issue wasn’t yet ripe,” but he felt eventually it “would elect a governor of Arkansas.” Orval Faubus, wrote Reed, “matter-of-factly told a small gathering of campaign associates at the Marion Hotel one day in 1954 that if he could find a way to capitalize on the race issue, ‘they’ll never get me out of office.’”106 With the Capital Citizens Council running large newspaper advertisements, sponsoring rallies, and coordinating a massive letter-writing campaign all demanding that the governor act to maintain racial separation in Little Rock schools, the issue appeared to be “ripening.” After about three weeks of running the ad that appealed to Faubus to follow Texas Governor Alan Shivers’ lead and use state forces to protect Arkansas from the evils of race mixing, Amis Guthridge claims to have been contacted by Jimmy “the Flash” Karam, “a real buddy of Governor Faubus.” Karam, supposedly, asked Guthridge outright, “Amis, would you all support Orval Faubus for a third term if he would stop integration of Central High?” The Citizens’ Council attorney and leader answered in the affirmative, and “we arranged a meeting.”107 But what really “tilted it on our side,” according to Guthridge, was the August 22 speaking appearance at a $10-a-plate fundraiser for the Capital Citizens Council at the Marion Hotel Ballroom by Georgia Governor Marvin Griffin and Roy V. Harris, executive director of the States’ Rights Councils of Georgia, Inc.108

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NOTES 

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1

SSN, Jan. 1957. In addition to being published in the monthly Southern School News, House’s answers were made public in both the Arkansas Gazette and the Arkansas Democrat. 2 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 88. 3 SSN, March 1957. 4 Act No. 83, approved Feb. 26, 1957. RRLR 2 (1957), 491-494. 5 Ibid., 493. 6 Act No. 85, approved Feb. 26, 1957. RRLR 2 (1957), 495-496. 7 SSN., Nov. 1957. 8 Act No. 84 (removal of compulsory attendance requirements), approved Feb. 26, 1957. RRLR 2 (1957), 453. Act No. 86 (authorizing school districts to retain special counsel), approved Feb. 26, 1957. RRLR 2 (1957), 456. 9 RRLR 2 (1957), 494. 10 Virgil T. Blossom reported that the governor expressed to him his belief that the segregation laws were unconstitutional and would be declared invalid by the courts. Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 52. Faubus also told Arthur Brann Caldwell, in a meeting in late August 1957, that he believed the segregation laws to be unconstitutional, and that “a number of leading attorneys had privately confided in him that the statutes were probably unconstitutional.” Still, Faubus felt bound by them until they were ruled invalid. Summary of Meetings with Faubus, Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 11 Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 56. 12 Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 12, 1957. 13 SSN, March 1957; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 89. 14 Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 54. 15 Ibid. 16 SSN, March 1957. 17 Ibid. McCulloch’s denials ring hollow, however, when Arkansas Act No. 83 is compared side by side with Mississippi’s House Bill No. 880, which created the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission in March 1956. The two are very nearly identical. See Mississippi House Bill No. 880, RRLR 1 (1956), 592-595. On the Mississippi Commission in general, see Yasuhiro Katagiri, The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission: Civil Rights and States’ Rights (Jackson, Miss., 2001). 18 McCulloch was the first speaker at the Feb. 18 hearing. 19 SSN, March 1957; Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 55. 20 Ibid. In her book, Bates referred to Shaver as “Ben Shaver of Wynne, former Attorney General.” Undoubtedly she meant J. L. “Bex” Shaver, of Wynne, who was formerly a state senator and lieutenant governor. 21 SSN, March 1957. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid, Aug. 1957. 24 Reed, “The Contest For the Soul of Orval Faubus,” 103.

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25

SSN, July 1957. Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 105. 27 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 90. 28 Reed, Faubus, 134. 29 Ibid., 155. 30 Ibid., 154-156. 31 Ibid., 156; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 261; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 90; SSN, Feb. 1957. The full text of Governor Faubus’ address was printed in the Arkansas Gazette, Jan. 16, 1957. 32 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 90. 33 Ibid., 91; SSN, Feb. 1957. 34 Reed, Faubus, 134. 35 Ibid., 156. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., 157. 39 Ibid. 40 Reed covered Faubus’ activities for the Gazette during the late 1950s. Perhaps it is significant that the Gazette supported the governor’s tax proposals but did not approve of the 1957 segregation laws. 41 Freyer, “Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis,” 209. Freyer indicates in The Little Rock Crisis, 91, fn. 16, that he was told of the connection between the passage of Faubus’ tax program and his support for the 1957 segregation legislation in an interview with Marcus Halbrook of the Arkansas Legislative Council, and that Faubus confirmed that connection in an interview on July 15, 1980. 42 Both Spitzberg and Bartley were more tentative in noting the relationship than was Freyer. Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 63; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 262 fn. 43. John A. Kirk, like Freyer, was blatant in asserting the connection. Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 104. 43 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 61. 44 Wayne Upton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 9. 45 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 32. 46 SSN, Feb. 1957. 47 Freyer “Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis,” 207. 48 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 91. 49 Ibid., 91-92. 50 SSN, March 1957. 51 Wayne Upton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 4. 52 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 32. 53 Ibid.; Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 5; Peters, The Southern Temper, 7273; Freyer, “The Past As Future: The Little Rock Crisis and the Constitution,” in Jacoway and Williams, Understanding the Little Rock Crisis, 143-144; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 92; Robert R. Brown, Bigger Than Little Rock,

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 10; Wayne Upton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 4; and Harold Engstrom interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 7-8. 54 Rath defeated Branscum 4,267 to 2,455 and Upton beat Brown 4,340 to 2,398. SSN, April 1957. 55 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 32. 56 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 5. 57 Wayne Upton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 4. 58 Harold Engstrom interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 8. 59 Aaron v. Cooper, 243 F.2d 361. RRLR 2 (1957), 593-595. The Southern School News reported that this decision was announced on April 29, 1957. SSN, May 1957. 60 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 61 RRLR 2 (1957), 594. 62 Ibid., 595. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 SSN, May 1957. Ultimately, the NAACP decided not to appeal Aaron v. Cooper to the United States Supreme Court, as Branton announced on July 13, 1957. SSN, Aug. 1957. 66 SSN, July 1957. 67 Ibid.; Arkansas Democrat, June 23, 1957. 68 SSN, June 1957. A copy of the Capital Citizens Council pamphlet is located in the Rainach Papers, LSUS. 69 Eastland, “We’ve Reached Era of Judicial Tyranny.” Copy located in Citizens’ Council Papers, UA-F. 70 Ibid. 71 Blacks comprised approximately 24% of Little Rock’s population in 1957. Brown, Bigger Than Little Rock, 6. 72 In September 1956, for example, the U. S. News & World Report published an article on the Little Rock desegregation plan. “How One Southern City Plans to Integrate,” U. S. News & World Report, Sept. 28, 1956. The article suggested that Little Rock’s gradual plan might serve as a model for other southern cities. 73 The term “paper curtain,” an obvious reference to the “Iron Curtain,” was applied to the alleged anti-southern bias of the northern, liberal press. 74 SSN, Dec. 1956. See also, Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 90. 75 Eastland, as quoted in Robert Ewing Brown’s “Race Mixing in Little Rock High Schools Can Be Stopped by the Governor.” 76 Brown, “Race Mixing in Little Rock High Schools Can Be Stopped by the Governor.” Brown fails to consider, however, that in Little Rock itself, nearly half of the voters rejected the extreme Johnson Amendment in November 1956. See Corinne Silverman, The Little Rock Story (University, Ala., 1959), 36; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 251; Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 157. In addition, most of the Little Rock delegation in the state senate

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 disapproved of the State Sovereignty Commission, which was the cornerstone of Arkansas’ segregation program. SSN, March 1957. 77 On the events at Clinton, Tennessee, see: SSN, Sept. 1956; SSN, Oct. 1956; Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 92-104; Wilma Dykeman and James Stokely, “Courage in Action: Clinton, Tennessee,” The Nation (Dec. 22, 1956). Copy located in ACHR Collection, UA-F. On Clay and Sturgis, Kentucky, see: SSN, Sept. 1956; SSN, Oct. 1956; Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 32-33. 78 Brown, “Race Mixing in Little Rock High Schools Can Be Stopped by the Governor.” 79 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 36. 80 Ibid., 34-43; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 257; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 93-97; Reed, Faubus, 186-188; Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 105. 81 A. F. House interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 15. 82 Amis Guthridge interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 11. See also, Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 95. 83 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 257; Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 39. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid., 40; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 93. 87 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 40. 88 SSN, Aug. 1957; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 93-94; Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 40. It is interesting that in making this argument, Guthridge tacitly accepted the legitimacy of the Supreme Court’s Brown rulings. 89 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 40. 90 Peters, The Southern Temper, 202. Peters, writing in 1958, then proceeds to debunk this “myth.” 91 Martin, The Deep South Says “Never”, 170. 92 Nat R. Griswold interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 68. 93 Rev. Wesley Pruden interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 1. 94 SSN, Aug. 1957. 95 Ibid. 96 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 40. 97 Ibid. 98 SSN, Aug. 1957; Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 41-43. 99 SSN, Aug. 1957. 100 Ibid.; Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 43; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 94. Guthridge would eventually file a suit on August 19, 1957, not in federal court, but in Pulaski County Chancery Court. 101 Ibid., July 1957. 102 Ibid., Aug. 1957; New York Times, July 18, 1957. 103 Reed, Faubus, 169. 104 Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 103.

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105

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By August 1957 Bennett was “talking openly” about running for the office of governor. Reed, Faubus, 196. 106 Reed, Faubus, 169. 107 Amis Guthridge interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 11. Both Rev. Wesley Pruden and Jimmy Karam agreed that there were “clandestine” meetings between Governor Faubus and Citizens’ Council leaders, and Karam acknowledged that he was the intermediary through which such meetings were arranged. Rev. Wesley Pruden interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 8; James T. Karam interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 20. Faubus’ personal counsel, Bill Smith, very tactfully deflected questions regarding contacts between the governor and Council leaders, saying only that “they did not frequent his office, nor did they frequent the Mansion.” William J. Smith interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 49. 108 Guthridge interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 15; SSN, Sept. 1957.

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CHAPTER FIVE

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Last Ditch Attempts at Avoidance Marvin Griffin succeeded Georgia’s segregationist Governor Herman Talmadge in 1954.1 Griffin, who emerged from the Talmadge camp, vowed during his campaign for the Democratic nomination that “come hell or high water, races will not be mixed in Georgia schools.”2 During the primary, Griffin and Roy Harris had been political enemies, with Harris, a recognized “kingmaker” in Georgia politics, supporting Fred B. Hand. Griffin’s victory marked the first time Harris had ever backed a losing candidate.3 But even more important than politicking to Harris, a “short, round, balding man of sixty-plus” years,4 was his devotion to white supremacy.5 The two men put their differences aside and joined forces in late 1955 to form the States’ Rights Council of Georgia.6 And, both were associated with the interstate Federation for Constitutional Government.7 By the time of their appearance in Little Rock in the summer of 1957 Griffin and Harris were popular speakers at resistance rallies throughout the South. The timing of their visit to Little Rock seemed calculated to achieve maximum effect for the segregationist cause. School was scheduled to begin in the city ten days later. Also, during the week leading up to the fundraising dinner, three different lawsuits were filed regarding the integration of Central High School,8 and within days of the rally, Arkansas Attorney General Bruce Bennett filed two suits in chancery court designed to force the NAACP to cease operations within the state.9 John A. Kirk claims that the Capital Citizens Council “tried to exploit the unease brought about by the lawsuits by inviting” the “two high-profile segregationists” to speak at the Marion Hotel on August 22.10 While there can be no doubt that the timing of their appearance was fortuitous for the segregationists, the original invitation, in fact, had been extended much earlier. Griffin and Harris initially intended to speak to the Little Rock Council early in the spring of 1957, but the flight they were to have taken was grounded due to inclement weather. The speaking engagement was then rescheduled for August 22.11 The prospect of Governor Griffin and Roy Harris stirring up the already tense situation in Little Rock had Orval Faubus on edge. Two days before they were to arrive in the capital city, Faubus telephoned

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Griffin to urge him not to come if his intent was to inflame the people of Little Rock and to encourage disobedience of the law. The Georgia governor apparently reassured the Arkansas chief executive, telling him that he planned merely to “give ‘em hell on the constitution.” And Harris, said Griffin, would “give ‘em hell on the civil rights thing.” But, he promised, “nobody will advocate violence.” Faubus took Griffin to mean that he would speak on interposition and states’ rights, while Harris would rouse the crowd with an emotional appeal against the evils of race-mixing. Assuming, then, that the Georgians would simply engage in the usual rhetoric, and taking Griffin at his word that neither man would encourage the Councilors to resist integration through overt acts of violence, Faubus invited both Griffin and Harris to be his guests at the governor’s mansion during their stay in Little Rock.12 The invitation to stay at the mansion was extended as a professional courtesy from the governor of one state to another, and it was accepted for the same reason. Harris later stated that he and Griffin “had to accept Faubus’ invitation,” but they “had to apologize to the Council folks for staying there.” In his explanation to the Citizens’ Councilors, Harris pointed out that Faubus’ playing host to pro-segregation speakers was actually helpful to their cause. “Having us two there at the Mansion’s the worse thing could happen to Faubus,” he told them. “It’ll ruin him with the integrationists and liberals.”13 Griffin and Harris Address the Citizens’ Council On the night of August 22, Griffin and Harris addressed a packed room of about three hundred and fifty at the Marion Hotel in downtown Little Rock. Griffin told the crowd, whom he referred to as “a courageous bunch of patriots,” that the United States Supreme Court’s Brown rulings had had no effect on the operation of segregated public schools in the state of Georgia. “That fact is no mere accident,” he declared. “The determined and cooperative efforts of a dedicated people, a steadfast General Assembly and an administration committed unequivocally toward preservation of our cherished institutions – all of these working in concert have stemmed the tide.”14 Griffin received a standing ovation when he threw down the gauntlet and dared the Supreme Court to order Georgia public schools desegregated.15 Where Governor Griffin, keeping his word to Faubus, refrained from stating directly that he would interpose to prevent integration in

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his state, Roy V. Harris did not. He told the cheering crowd that Griffin would use the highway patrol, or even the state’s militia to prevent black children from entering white schools, and if that was not enough he would enlist “every white man in Georgia” to keep the schools segregated.16 Jim Johnson was at the Marion Hotel that night, shaking hands with people as the rally broke up.17 Governor Faubus himself stayed away, having the convenient excuse of a previously scheduled speaking engagement elsewhere,18 although he did entertain the Griffin party at breakfast the following morning. There is no evidence, despite the speculations of some, that the Arkansas governor discussed the school situation with his guests.19 There would have been no point in any such conversation, Roy Harris believed. As he explained afterward, he and Griffin assumed Faubus “was so far on the other side that we didn’t even speak about it.”20 Historian J. W. Peltason wrote that “all observers – segregationists, moderates, integrationists – agree that this visit by the emissaries from Georgia had an electrifying impact on Little Rock.”21 Certainly that is the view of most historians, although John A. Kirk insisted that, while “clearly unhelpful,” the Georgians’ speeches were, by themselves, not “enough to derail the desegregation process.”22 At the time, thoughts on the effects of Griffin’s and Harris’ orations were mixed. Little Rock School Board President Dr. William G. Cooper, Jr. believed they inflamed the situation “quite considerably,” but R. A. Lile, Cooper’s colleague on the school board, did not “think it had any appreciable effect,” and said the board “didn’t consider that it created a problem.” Arkansas Gazette publisher Hugh Patterson “didn’t feel… that it was a material thing, that Griffin’s appearance really had that much impact.” Patterson did later admit, on the other hand, that the Georgia governor’s speech had a greater impact than he appreciated at the moment.23 Roy Reed reports that the effects of the speeches at the rally were “felt far beyond the ballroom at the Marion Hotel,” and that “Griffin’s appearance quite suddenly convinced large numbers of white people that the entire integration problem could be solved quickly and simply.”24 That Griffin’s words should resonate far beyond the walls of the meeting room was certainly the intent of the Capital Citizens’ Council, which “taped Gov. Griffin’s speech and ran it – over and over – on KARK radio.”25 The Council also stepped up its telephone and letter-writing campaign to the governor immediately following the fundraising dinner, increasing the pressure on Faubus to intervene as

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Governor Shivers had in Texas, and as Griffin and Harris now urged him to do.26 The goal was to further amplify the perceived effect of Griffin’s words on the city’s people, and it worked. Virgil Blossom noted that after the Georgians came to Little Rock, “the School Board immediately found that it was more difficult to deal with the Governor.”27 And, late during the night after the Citizens’ Council dinner on August 22, a rock was thrown through a window at the home of NAACP activist Daisy Bates. A note tied to it read: “Stone this time. Dynamite next.” Showing it to her husband, L. C., Mrs. Bates commented that it was “a message from the Arkansas patriots.”28

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The Justice Department is Consulted Despite Governor Griffin’s assurances to Faubus that he would not incite to violence when he addressed the diners at the Marion Hotel, the prospect of his appearance, combined with other Citizens’ Council activities, had the Arkansas chief executive sufficiently concerned to contact the United States Department of Justice on August 21 – the day before Griffin was to speak. Faubus spoke to Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers, and asked what the Department would do if the situation in Little Rock should become violent. Rogers told the governor that he would send someone to discuss the matter with him in person. Faubus was not the first from Little Rock to contact the Justice Department regarding the upcoming integration of Central High School. In early June 1957 Superintendent Blossom and the school board were troubled by such segregationist agitation as the challenge posed by Capital Citizens Council President Robert Ewing Brown’s April 30 open letter to the governor insisting that Faubus had the power to stop desegregation in Little Rock. School board attorney Archie F. House visited the head of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Section, Arthur B. Caldwell, in Washington, D. C., on June 5. Caldwell, who was from Arkansas, had known House his entire life, as the nearly sixty-five-year-old lawyer was a friend of Caldwell’s father.29 House met with Caldwell “to alert the Department to the potential trouble and to seek whatever assistance the Department might render to the Little Rock officials.”30 He left a copy of Robert Ewing Brown’s open letter with the Justice Department lawyer, and told him that the letter had been widely distributed throughout Little Rock and

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beyond to no little effect on the climate in the city. Amis Guthridge’s comment on June 21 that there would be “hell on the border” come September if black students were admitted into any white school in Little Rock did not escape the notice of the Justice Department either, and it served to justify the fears of school officials.31 As a result of the June 5 meeting, Caldwell traveled to the Arkansas capital. There, he “conferred at length” with a number of individuals, including House, Blossom, Little Rock Police Chief Marvin H. Potts, local United States Attorney Osro Cobb, Arkansas Gazette executive editor Harry S. Ashmore, and Al Bryant, who was the lead FBI agent on the scene in Little Rock. Since the federal district court had retained jurisdiction over the Little Rock case when it approved the gradual integration plan in Aaron v. Cooper in February 1956, Caldwell believed it wise to consult the presiding judge of that court, John E. Miller, before determining what, if anything, the Department could do to assist the school board in its attempt to comply with federal directives to integrate the public schools.32 On June 27 Caldwell, accompanied by Archie House, went to Fort Smith to confer with Miller. The district judge informed his two callers that since “there was no outstanding order or injunction directed towards anyone” there was nothing he could do to restrain or enjoin Citizens’ Council activists or anyone else from urging resistance to the orderly desegregation of the Little Rock schools. He could only issue an order prohibiting interference by segregationist agitators if a request for an injunction was properly brought before his court by an interested party, such as the school board or the NAACP lawyers representing the black children. Miller suggested that “if such a petition were filed, supported by affidavits, he would grant a request for injunctive relief.” Furthermore, “the Judge volunteered that if the proceedings included a motion for declaratory judgment concerning the constitutionality of certain new Arkansas laws recently enacted by the State legislature, he probably would hold those State laws unconstitutional also.”33 Despite the plain invitation to the school board to initiate proceedings in the district court to enjoin the likes of Guthridge and Pruden, House admitted that the board would be “extremely reluctant” to do so. He indicated that there was a possibility, however, that “certain colored attorneys might be persuaded to file a petition in behalf of the colored children.”34 Roy Reed asserts that Archie House later repealed his implication that the school board might try to convince NAACP lawyers to request

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an injunction. According to Reed, House “declared that he would not allow his clients to collude in such a sham.” Further, he was shocked that Miller would permit himself to be maligned by the segregationists, who had accused him of participating in a “‘Communist’ plot to destroy the white race” by upholding the Blossom Plan. House, Reed says, “a gentleman of nineteenth century sensibilities,” believed Judge Miller should have acted on his own to put an end to such attacks, presumably under the court’s contempt powers.35

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Justice Department Attorney Caldwell Considers His Options After his return to Washington, Caldwell considered possible action by the Department of Justice. The Department could not pursue any injunctive option if neither the school board nor the NAACP were willing to institute the necessary proceedings. It was precisely this sort of situation, where the interested parties were either unable or unwilling, for financial reasons or because of insecurities regarding their positions in the community, to seek an injunction of the type obtained by the Hoxie School Board to prevent interference with school officials’ attempts to comply with federal desegregation mandates, that led the Justice Department to seek the authority to initiate such proceedings on its own. By the time of this meeting between Caldwell, House, and Miller, however, Section 121 of Part III of what was destined to become the Civil Rights Act of 1957, which would have endowed the Department with this power, had already been excised from the bill after vehement opposition to it by southern senators. On the other hand, it was possible, conceivably, for the federal government to prosecute individual segregationist leaders under Section 241 of Title 18 of the United States Code. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had, in Hoxie v. Brewer, already agreed that conspiracies by private citizens to interfere with school officials’ efforts to comply with Brown did constitute a violation of Section 241.36 The only available evidence of such a conspiracy, though, were Brown’s April 30 letter, the advertisements that the Capital Citizens Council had begun to place in Arkansas newspapers, and reports of inflammatory remarks such as Guthridge’s “hell on the border” warning. A full investigation by the FBI into the activities of the Capital Citizens Council might uncover concrete evidence of a violation of Section 241, Caldwell reasoned. In the absence of more incriminating affirmative action by the Council,

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however, Caldwell felt compelled to conclude that such an investigation was premature. Still, he believed that agents from the local office of the FBI should “be asked to follow developments closely and inform the Department promptly of any and all activities of the Capital Citizens Council in Little Rock in connection with the integration of Little Rock schools.” A copy of his report on his meetings with Little Rock officials and Judge Miller was forwarded to the FBI.37 Reed, who alleges that Miller had missed an opportunity to halt segregationist resistance to the integration of Central High School by refusing to hold Council leaders in contempt of court, also charges that Caldwell allowed a similar opportunity to slip through his fingers when he opted not to order an FBI investigation and pursue prosecutions under Section 241.38 But Caldwell’s reluctance to seek prosecutions was here, as it was earlier during the Hoxie incident and later during the ensuing crisis in Little Rock, largely motivated by pragmatic concerns over the likelihood of success of such a strategy. Violation of Section 241 was a felony, and a conviction could be secured only after an indictment by a grand jury and a guilty verdict in a jury trial. Caldwell seriously doubted that either could be obtained in southern communities where there was general disapproval of racial integration. In the long run, he was sure, the inevitable acquittals would do more to encourage resistance to federal court orders than failure to prosecute in the first place.39 Judge Miller Appears Amenable to Delay The June 1957 contacts with Justice Department Attorney Caldwell, and the conference with Federal District Judge Miller, did nothing to reassure the school board that September’s school opening would proceed smoothly. Although school board members felt there was no indication that violence would occur when Central High School opened its doors to a small group of black students,40 the increasingly visible presence of the Capital Citizens Council and its mounting pressure campaign during the summer of 1957 undoubtedly made the board members extremely anxious. Wayne Upton, himself a lawyer, suspected that segregationists would seek a ruling in state court to prevent school officials from putting the gradual integration plan into effect. Should such a judgment be granted, Upton fretted, he and his colleagues would be subject to conflicting federal and state court

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orders. In Judge Miller’s Fort Smith courtroom on August 13 for an unrelated case, Upton, who had likely been told of the Miller’s comments during his earlier meeting with House and Caldwell, took the opportunity afterwards to approach the judge in his chambers regarding his concerns. Then, Miller “gave the first indication that he might be weakening in his determination to carry out his own order,” and “he suggested that someone of standing, not a radical segregationist, might file a suit in a state court to test the state’s anti-integration measures.”41 Miller advised Upton that if such a case was filed the school board would have cause to appear before his court to request a delay in integration until a final determination on the validity of the 1957 segregation laws could be made. And, he let it be known, that under those circumstances he would be inclined to grant such a request.42 Back in Little Rock, Upton discussed his conversation with Judge Miller with Blossom, and, according to Freyer, when the two breakfasted with the governor on August 15 they “talked with Faubus in very general terms” about Miller’s suggestions.43 In Reed’s account, the meeting between the schoolmen and Faubus was rather more explicit. He alleges that the governor indicated his approval of a lawsuit to settle the constitutionality of the Arkansas segregation statutes and he “volunteered the opinion” that the laws were surely illegal. Additionally, and “more significantly,” Reed contends that “the news delivered by the two men was a signal to the alert Faubus that he could move boldly without fear from Judge Miller.” The message Faubus took away from this meeting, then, was that he was free to reach out to the segregationists and tell them what they wanted to hear; to court their support for his intended bid for a third term in office.44 That night, the school board members met with Faubus’ attorney William J. Smith at the home of Virgil Blossom. Smith remembered later that Blossom did approach him around this time to ask him to file a suit to enjoin the school board from implementing its gradual integration plan. As Smith recalled the event, the superintendent begged him, desperately, to bring such litigation because he was worried that violence would occur when school opened. He said he had received so many threatening phone calls that he had to send his teenaged daughter, a Central High School student, to stay with relatives out of town because he feared for her safety.45 Freyer argues that “Blossom hoped that a court invalidation of the segregation laws would make it politically feasible for the governor to

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issue a public statement acknowledging Little Rock’s constitutional duty to comply with Miller’s order in Aaron.46 Such a statement, Blossom and the board believed, would do much to undermine the Citizens’ Council’s efforts to encourage local resistance to the admission of black students into the high school. Neither Governor Faubus nor Bill Smith, however, offered any aid to school officials. The next day, August 16, ten black ministers filed a suit in the United States District Court at Little Rock challenging the constitutionality of the state’s 1957 anti-integration acts and requesting an injunction to prevent the enforcement of those acts by the State Sovereignty Commission.47 A three-judge panel was appointed to hear the case. Another suit was filed on August 17 by William F. “Billy” Rector, an insurance man with two children attending the Little Rock schools, seeking a declaratory judgment on the segregation laws in the Pulaski County Chancery Court. Rector’s intent, he said, was to resolve the “confusion and contention” that created “the possibility of civil commotion” because of “the present conflict between the federal statutes, state statutes and court decisions.”48 After these suits were filed Blossom, along with school board members Upton and Harold Engstrom, met with Judge Miller. Miller suggested that the board consider seeking an injunction. Again, the possibility was considered and rejected. Blossom dutifully reported the board’s decision to the governor.49 All of these events gave Governor Faubus much to think about. It would be helpful to him to know, of course, in planning his next moves, what the federal government intended to do to ensure the peaceful integration of Little Rock schools. And so, to find out, he telephoned Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers in Washington, D.C., even as Marvin Griffin and Roy V. Harris made their way towards the Arkansas capital. Faubus Meets with Caldwell As he said he would, Rogers sent a man to Little Rock to meet with the governor. That man was Arthur B. Caldwell. On August 28, Caldwell and Faubus conferred privately for a little over an hour. Faubus asked the Justice Department representative what the Department would do in the event that the situation at Central High School became violent the following Tuesday, when the school term began. Caldwell explained that, with the failure of Part III, the new federal civil rights legislation

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“would have no effect whatever on any school situation.” Still the government lawyer told Faubus, a situation might arise in which criminal statutes, Sections 241 and 242 of Title 18 of the United States Code, could be applied. Caldwell also described the role the Justice Department played, as amicus curiae, in the Hoxie case and in the contempt proceedings at Clinton, Tennessee. Even as he spoke, Caldwell developed the impression that the Arkansas governor “was not so much interested in the application of the law as he was in explaining to the Department what he planned to do.”50 Faubus told Caldwell that he anticipated trouble when Central High School opened its doors the next week. Before Georgia Governor Marvin Griffin spoke at the Citizens’ Council dinner at the Marion Hotel on August 22, Faubus said “only the ‘rabble rousers’ were opposing integration, but now he felt that the vast majority of respectable Little Rock citizens had been so impressed and aroused by Governor Griffin’s speech and comments that they were determined to prevent integration.” Faubus also lamented that he was “on the spot” because the legislation enacted by the Arkansas General Assembly during its last term had not been invalidated by any court. These laws directed him, as governor, to do whatever was necessary to stop the integration of the schools. Caldwell reported that Faubus complained that “he could not tell the people that these Acts were unconstitutional although he admitted that a number of leading attorneys had privately confided in him that the statutes were probably unconstitutional.”51 The governor went on, telling his visitor that he was so upset over the impending violence that he had arranged a lawsuit, filed the day before in the chancery court, requesting that Blossom and the school board be enjoined against implementing the desegregation plan. His hope, in arranging this suit, was that the injunction would place the school board in such a position that they would return to the federal district court to ask Judge Miller to grant a postponement of integration until the validity of the state laws could be determined. The head of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Section was extremely distressed by the governor’s admission. He made it clear that he “could not, under any circumstances, agree or give the Departmental approval” to Faubus’ plan. He also revealed that he had spoken to Chief Potts, FBI agents, and others in the capital, and “all were unanimous in their belief that there would be no violence.”52

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Freyer states that Governor Faubus was “disappointed to learn that the federal authorities had no plans to intervene.”53 Caldwell’s own impression was that the governor was not so much disappointed as reassured, a conclusion also arrived at by J. W. Peltason, who wrote that “Faubus, thus assured that he need not fear federal intervention, was free to proceed with his own plans.” If anyone in Little Rock was truly disappointed by Caldwell’s message it was school and city officials, to whom the Department of Justice could offer “no promise of protection.”54 By Caldwell’s reckoning, Governor Faubus entered the August 28 meeting having already determined his course of action.55 Such was not the case, however, or at least it was not to the extent later imagined by Justice Department officials, including, also, Warren Olney III, head of the Criminal Division, of which the Civil Rights Section was then a part. In October 1958 Olney told a roomful of lawyers at a meeting of the California State Bar that “at the time” Faubus’ “request for a conference seemed curious to us.” But, he continued, “the Governor’s subsequent action has given it a significance which was not appreciated by us at the time.”56 Beyond a sincere desire for delay, though, Faubus does not appear to have predetermined any specific course of action for use in the event that integration was ordered to proceed at Little Rock Central High School. Ironically, it was a blunder by the federal government itself that helped to push the governor more firmly into the oppositionist camp. Roy Reed, who covered Faubus’ activities as a reporter for the Arkansas Gazette in the late 1950s, commented that the governor and Caldwell had managed to elude reporters when they met on August 28. “Little Rock’s cadre of reporters was above average,” Reed defends. Still, “it missed practically all of the behind-the-scenes maneuvering leading up to the opening of schools.”57 This was no mere accident. The governor purposefully kept many of his dealings involving racial desegregation secret during the summer of 1957. Numan Bartley seriously understated the case when he wrote that “the 1950s was not a period when consorting with the federal government on racial issues was regarded as politically advantageous in the South.”58 When the federal government released a copy of a report on the August 28 meeting to the press, Faubus was, understandably, angered. According to Blossom, the governor considered the breach of confidence by the federal government a “betrayal,” telling reporters, “now you can see how much faith you can put in the national administration.” And when he was questioned about the conference, the governor went on the

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offensive, accusing federal authorities of “cramming integration down our throats” and then leaving the state governments to “protect ourselves while we’re carrying out their orders.” 59

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The Thomason Suit On the morning after his meeting with Governor Faubus, Caldwell attended the chancery court proceedings in the case the governor had arranged to force a delay in integrating Central High School. The plaintiff of record in the suit was Mrs. Clyde Thomason, the recording secretary of the newly formed League of Central High Mothers, a segregationist organization. Mrs. Thomason was the first witness before Chancellor Murray O. Reed. Mrs. Thomason testified that she feared that children of both races could be injured if integration was to take place at the high school as planned. “The mothers,” she pleaded, “are terrified and are afraid to send their children to Central High School.”60 Caldwell noted in his report of the proceedings that “examination and cross-examination failed to bring out much evidence to support these fears of violence except that she had heard rumors from a filling station operator whose name she would not divulge, that there was a possibility of shotguns and shooting in Central High School if the colored children entered.”61 The “main witness of the day” was Governor Faubus himself.62 He claimed, while on the stand, that he could not imagine a time worse than the present for the high school to integrate. He had personal knowledge, he said, that guns had been confiscated from students, black and white. He did not elaborate or offer any evidence, nor was he asked to.63 He stated that until recently he believed that the citizens of Little Rock were prepared to comply with the federal court order to admit black students into the formerly white school despite their distaste for desegregation, but that the climate in the city had changed and he now was convinced that the situation would become violent if blacks were permitted to attend Central. Faubus testified that “one of the things that triggered” this change in the people’s sentiments was Governor Marvin Griffin’s speech at the Citizens’ Council rally on August 22. “People are coming to me and saying if Georgia doesn’t have integration, why does Arkansas have it?” he explained.64 When Faubus finished his testimony, observers in the courtroom, “which was crowded with the members of this Mothers’ organization,” erupted into

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cheers and applause, “and the Governor bowed.”65 What the governor did not say in court was that he himself had initiated the suit brought by Mrs. Thomason. Nor did he indicate his doubts regarding the constitutionality of the state’s segregation laws. These, Caldwell noted wryly, “were not mentioned at all.”66 Little Rock Police Chief Marvin Potts, School Board President Dr. William G. Cooper, Jr., and School Superintendent Virgil T. Blossom each offered testimony for the school board. All three stated that there was no evidence to suggest that violence would occur at the school if the desegregation plan was implemented and that they expected none. Blossom also told the court that he had gotten assurances from the city police that they were prepared to handle any trouble that might arise.67 Despite the lack of concrete evidence,68 the appeals of Mrs. Thomason and Governor Faubus carried the day. When Chancellor Reed announced that “in view of the testimony and the show of the threat of violence, riots and bloodshed, and particularly in the opinion of Governor Faubus, I feel I can only rule to grant the injunction,” the courtroom again burst into applause.69 “Considering the fact that the Chancellor, Murray O. Reed, was appointed by Governor Faubus, it came as no surprise,” to Arthur B. Caldwell “that the judge promptly granted the injunction restraining the school board from taking action under its plans for integration.”70 The outcome of the proceedings did not surprise Archie House, either. Although Faubus later claimed that, when he went to testify in Thomason v. Cooper on the morning of August 29, he was under the impression that Blossom and the school board wanted integration to be postponed, and that “that’s the reason why I was so completely amazed” at Blossom’s contention that he anticipated no violence or disorder at the school, “when that’s all he talked to me about for thirty days or more,”71 Blossom recalled that the board had informed the governor of its intentions to proceed with integration at a meeting on August 26. The entire school board was present, as were Blossom, House, and Faubus. According to school board member R. A. Lile, they met that evening “for the special purpose” of asking Faubus to issue a public statement to the effect that, although he did not approve of racial integration in the public schools, the Little Rock School Board was under a federal court order and would comply, and that he, as governor, would not tolerate disorder and would act to preserve law and order in the city of Little Rock.72

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The board asked the governor what he planned to do. He told them that he “didn’t know what he would do, but that he knew that if we opened the schools to those nine black children, that there was going to be a great deal of violence, that there was going to be rioting in the streets.”73 The board did not agree, and informed Faubus of their opinion.74 Still, they said, they believed there was a need for a show of support by the governor. A public statement of support, they felt, would discourage the fomenting of trouble in the city by outsiders.75 Faubus flatly refused to issue any statement, because, he told them, he thought that integration ought to be delayed. The governor then, Blossom claims, suggested that a state court injunction would enable school officials to seek a postponement in federal court. At that point, House declared, “Under no circumstances will the Board enter into collusion with a state agency to counteract the federal court order. And if a court suit is brought we will have to fight it and you must understand that it will not be a token fight.” At that, Faubus got up to leave, testily announcing that a suit would be filed and the board would be ordered to delay.76 In any event, House was prepared for the chancery court ruling and had ready a petition to submit to the federal district court requesting, not a delay, but a restraining order against Mrs. Thomason or anyone else attempting to use Reed’s injunction to interfere with the desegregation of Central High School. Federal Judge Davies Comes to Town Things were not working out the way Faubus planned at all. Despite House’s insistence of the contrary, until Blossom’s testimony in chancery court the governor still believed that the school board shared his desire for delay. He also, from Upton’s and Blossom’s reports of conversations with Judge Miller, had reason to believe that the federal district judge would be willing to order a postponement if he was asked for it. Ideally, integration could be put off until the Rector case testing the Arkansas segregation laws made its way through the state courts and, then, the ministers’ suit through the federal courts. A final determination of the cases could conceivably take years. Certainly, in the governor’s vision, no integration would occur in Little Rock at least until after the gubernatorial election of 1958. But the school board’s decision to oppose the move to set aside the desegregation plan

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confounded Faubus’ scheme. Miller, who, in Archie House’s opinion, believed the Brown ruling to be wrong and just “couldn’t put his heart into trying to enforce” it,77 could have ordered a suspension of the Little Rock Phase Program even in the face of the board’s apparent opposition to such a ruling. But any hope Faubus might have had of such an outcome was short-lived indeed. Immediately following the issuance of the state injunction, the Little Rock case was transferred out of Judge Miller’s court and into that of Federal District Judge Ronald N. Davies.78 Unaware that it was Miller himself who requested the change, Faubus saw evidence of a conspiracy behind the move. The governor charged that Davies, who was from North Dakota, was “imported” by the federal government; a Republican, “foreign” judge who was assigned solely for the purpose of forcing integration to proceed in the Arkansas capital.79 After all, the seat he was named temporarily to occupy had been vacant since the retirement of Judge Trimble in 1956. The timing of the assignment, and the fact that it was a temporary appointment, which meant Davies did not have to undergo normal confirmation procedures, contributed to the impression held by Faubus and others that he was, in fact, sent to Little Rock to ensure that there was no delay of integration. Actually, Judge Davies took his seat at the federal court at Little Rock and began dealing with the backlog of cases there on August 26 – the day before the Thomason suit was filed. Furthermore, since Arkansas was the only southern state in the Eighth Circuit, it cannot be considered unusual for a northern or midwestern judge to be named as an interim appointment to a vacant seat in the state.80 Additionally, the man responsible for assigning Davies, and for granting Miller’s request that the Little Rock case be transferred onto his docket, was Chief Judge Archibald Gardner of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Gardener, who at nearly ninety was the oldest active federal judge, was himself no fan of racial integration.81 Several explanations have been suggested for Judge Miller’s decision to ask to be removed from the Little Rock case. Roy Reed posited that it might have been for personal reasons – that the judge’s own feelings regarding desegregation conflicted with what he knew to be his official duty and that when Davies began holding court at Little Rock he saw a way out.82 Alternatively, Reed also indicated that it was possible that House privately informed Miller that the board preferred to “get it over with” and did not want to delay desegregation. Since he had already indicated that he would order a postponement, Judge Miller

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asked that the case be assigned to a different judge. 83 House himself later stated only that he “called Judge Miller,” after the chancery court granted Mrs. Thomason her injunction, “and he said he couldn’t come down. He didn’t want to get into it, so then they appointed Judge Davies.”84 John Elliff contends that, “with the prospect of suddenly expanding litigation in Little Rock,” House “complained to Judge Miller about the time, distance, and expense involved in conducting the case from a distance of 160 miles,” and that it was for that reason that Miller asked to be excused and for the case to be heard locally within the city of Little Rock.85 Elliff’s source was apparently Olney’s October 3, 1957, address, “A Government Lawyer Looks at Little Rock,” in which he cites the distance and inconvenience of traveling to Fort Smith as the reason for Judge Davies having been assigned the case. The transfer of the case into Davies’ court was, Olney explained, “entirely normal,” and Davies’ appointment to Little Rock in the first place was for purposes “quite aside from this litigation.” The whole affair was really rather benign, Olney assured his audience, and yet “this is the assignment Governor Faubus represents as sinister.”86 On August 30, 1957, attorneys for the school board submitted to Judge Davies their petition for an injunction “to prevent the board from being placed in a position of risking federal court contempt charges by obeying the chancery court order.”87 In the petition, House indicated that the school board had “proceeded in good faith” in preparing for desegregation in the district, and that “they are now ready to commence integration.”88 Having announced that his court would “neither hesitate nor equivocate” on the matter of racial integration,89 Davies immediately granted the relief requested by the board. The Pulaski Chancery Court, Judge Davies determined, had no jurisdiction to interfere with the Blossom Plan since it had already been approved by the federal district court. Therefore, the state injunction issued by Chancellor Reed the previous morning was “void and of no effect.”90 Mrs. Thomason, “the Class she represents and all others” were then enjoined from using Reed’s pronouncement to block the admission of black children into Central High School, from attempting to have school officials charged with contempt for failing to abide by the chancery court order, and, furthermore, from “in any manner, directly and indirectly, interfering with or hindering the actions of the petitioners in carrying out the Decree of this Court entered herein on August 15, 1956.”91

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Judge Davies, then, actually went beyond what had been requested in the petition by warning against any interference whatsoever by anyone at all with the implementation of the desegregation plan. Apparently the intent was to provide the basis for contempt citations against individual segregationists who decided to cause trouble for school authorities when school opened. But, as J. W. Peltason points out, “because of its sweeping nature,” the injunction was of doubtful utility for that purpose except against Mrs. Thomason alone. Still, Davies’ order certainly destroyed any hope that Governor Faubus may have been holding out that the state courts could save him by preventing integration in the Arkansas capital.92

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Winthrop Rockefeller Counsels Against Defiance Here it was, then, the weekend before school was to begin, and the governor, convinced that the scene would turn violent at Central High on Tuesday morning, fretted over what to do. It appeared that there was no way to stop integration now without direct action by Faubus. He had hoped to avoid the situation he now found himself in, but the failure of his behind-the scenes maneuvers for delay left him with few choices. He could, of course, allow desegregation to proceed without interference, leaving it to city police to deal with whatever protest materialized. He was certain, however, that local law enforcement officers would not be able to contain the large numbers of resisters he suspected were poised to converge on the capital, despite assurances from city officials that they could. He could, alternatively, wait for the scene to become too much for the Little Rock police and then use the forces available to him to restore peace and good order – either by reinstituting segregation at the school, as Governor Shivers had done in Texas, or by crushing the protest against desegregation, as Governor Clement had done in Tennessee. Supporting integration, however, was too politically unpopular for Governor Faubus’ tastes. And, although his attorney, Bill Smith, recommended waiting for trouble to develop before taking steps to bar the black students from the school by force, Faubus pleaded that he did not want to take the chance when people’s lives were at stake.93 The governor leaned towards another option, then, preemptively calling out the Arkansas National Guard to prevent school integration. He placed the Guard on alert. Rumors that Faubus was contemplating using the Guard reached Virgil Blossom and the school board. Extremely concerned, Blossom

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and Lile called on Winthrop Rockefeller at his home in Morrilton, Arkansas, and convinced him to meet with the governor to urge him not to do anything drastic.94 On Sunday, September 1 Rockefeller, accompanied by William Ewald, the Chief of Development of the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, met with Orval Faubus. Rockefeller stressed to the governor his belief that the use of Guardsmen to defy federal court orders could have a negative impact on industrial development in the state. Faubus countered that violence and bloodshed would do even greater harm. Rockefeller then told Faubus that integration was no longer the paramount issue. The issue had become one of defiance of the United States Constitution and rebellion against the national government. According to his statement to the FBI, Rockefeller “was not able to secure any comment from Governor Faubus regarding this remark.”95 He then lobbied the governor to make the public statement that the school board had been pleading with him to make for weeks. Rockefeller left the conference unsure about what Faubus would do, and he immediately reported to Blossom and Lile that he did not believe his efforts would have any appreciable effect on the governor’s actions.96 His impression was that the governor “appeared to be more concerned about political obligations and the future than he was with the integration of Little Rock schools.”97 Faubus had reconfirmed to Rockefeller his approval of the aims of the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, but asserted that in order to achieve their shared goals he needed, first of all, to retain power and, second, to appease powerful eastern Arkansas leaders. He feared that if he did not “hold the support of eastern Arkansas, James Johnson, Bruce Bennett… and Amis Guthridge would take over the state in the next election as the extremist group.”98 Later that afternoon, Governor Faubus received a telegram from Jim Johnson. Johnson, who had seen news reports covering the governor’s testimony at the Thomason hearing, commended him for his “recent stand for state sovereignty.” He encouraged his opponent from the 1956 gubernatorial campaign to follow the precedent set by Governor Shivers at Mansfield, Texas, and assured him that should he “choose to follow that precedent to its logical conclusion the vast majority of the people of Arkansas,” including, presumably, Johnson himself, “will be forever grateful.”99

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Faubus Calls Out the Guard By Labor Day, the day before school was to open, Orval Faubus had made his decision. He would call out the Arkansas National Guard. That night, the governor took to the airwaves to announce his verdict to a statewide audience. The state of Arkansas, he began, had a wellearned reputation as “perhaps the most liberal and progressive state in the South today.”100 He offered a litany of the advances made in the state in the racial desegregation of state-supported colleges and universities and in voting rights for blacks. “These facts,” he exclaimed, provided “irrefutable proof that the people of Arkansas have not been unmindful of their problems, as they relate to the good relations of the races” and were more than willing to remedy them. But the situation at hand, he insisted, represented “a far different problem.” The overwhelming majority of the people had expressed their disapproval of public school desegregation at the polls, approving the state’s segregation statutes which “are the law of the land” in Arkansas. Furthermore, he contended, there was “every evidence and indication” that the admission of black students into Central High School “will bring about wide-spread disorder and violence.” He announced that he had been given information that “revealed a sale of unusually large numbers of weapons in the Little Rock area,” the majority of which had been purchased by “Negro youths, but many have been sold to whites as well.” And he repeated his testimony in Chancery Court regarding the confiscation of guns from high school students. On the basis of this information, he said, he determined “to act and act now,” instructing that, “it is only good judgment to act before the situation gets out of hand – and before the resulting violence creates lasting enmity, animosity and hate between citizens of this community, and which could do irreparable harm to the good relations that have existed between the races.”101 Therefore, he explained, even as he spoke, Guardsmen were taking up positions around Central High School. He claimed he could not stand by idly and allow the violence he was sure would accompany the integration of the high school to occur when classes began the next morning. Soldiers would be present to ensure that peace and good order be maintained in the city. It was, he told his constituents, a decision he had reached “prayerfully,” and he asserted that the Guard “will act not as segregationists or integrationists, but as soldiers” assigned the task of protecting “the lives and property of citizens.” He

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added, however, that it was his belief that it would “not be possible” to keep peace in the city “if forcible integration is carried out tomorrow.” Consequently, “the inevitable conclusion” he had come to was that the schools, “for the time being, must be operated on the same basis as they have been operated in the past.”102

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NOTES 

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1

Herman E. Talmadge was the author of a book, You and Segregation, published in 1955. 2 McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 9. 3 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 43. 4 Peters, The Southern Temper, 74. 5 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 43. 6 McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 82. 7 Ibid., 117. Harris served on the Federation’s executive committee. 8 As reported in Southern School News, ten black ministers filed suit in federal court on August 16 to determine the status of the Johnson Amendment and the segregation package enacted by the Arkansas General Assembly (Roland Smith, et al v. Orval Faubus, et al., and Arkansas Sovereignty Commission). A similar suit was filed on August 17 in Pulaski County Chancery Court by Little Rock businessman Billy Rector, a moderate on the integration issue. Amis Guthridge filed his suit on behalf of Eva Wilbern and her daughter Kay asking that the school board provide separate schools for whites who preferred not to be integrated in Pulaski County Chancery Court on August 19 (Mrs. Eva Wilbern, for Kay Wilbern v. School Board). SSN, Sept. 1957. 9 Filed August 26. SSN, Sept. 1957. 10 Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 113. 11 Peters, The Southern Temper, 73. Amis Guthridge confirmed that the Council “already had a big meeting planned for a long time for them to come over here.” Guthridge interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 15. 12 Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 113; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 258; Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 131; McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 273; Chappell, Inside Agitators, 103; Peters, The Southern Temper, 73; Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 54. 13 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 132. 14 SSN, Sept. 1957. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 There is general agreement that Faubus did not attend the Council’s fundraising dinner on August 22. Irving J. Spitzberg, Jr. was mistaken when he implied that the governor was there. Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 64. Council leader Wesley Pruden’s memory was similarly faulty. Pruden also recalled that there were “perhaps 3000” people at the dinner – quite a feat for a room that, with 350 present, was filled to capacity. Rev. Wesley Pruden interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 9-10. 19 Henry Woods, for example, was sure that Faubus had discussed the matter with Griffin and Harris. Henry Woods interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1972), 27. According to Faubus biographer Roy Reed, however, the most serious topic at the breakfast table concerned bird hunting. Reed, Faubus, 197.

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20

Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 258. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 163. 22 Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 113. 23 Dr. William G. Cooper, Jr. interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 12; R. A. Lile interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 17; Hugh Patterson interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 15. 24 Reed, Faubus, 197. 25 Amis Guthridge interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 15. 26 Faubus apparently told Superintendent Blossom that he was bombarded with letters and telegrams opposing integration in the days following the Citizens’ Council dinner. Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 56. 27 Ibid. 28 Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 4. 29 Reed, Faubus, 194. 30 Justice Department memorandum from Arthur B. Caldwell to Warren Olney III, “Segregation in Public Schools in Arkansas,” July 24, 1957, #144-100-9. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Memorandum from Caldwell to Olney, July 24, 1957. Caldwell Papers, UAF. 35 Reed, Faubus, 194. 36 RRLR 1 (1956), 1027-1037. 37 Memorandum from Caldwell to Olney, July 24, 1957. Caldwell Papers, UAF. 38 Reed, Faubus, 193-195. 39 See Caldwell to J. W. Peltason, Jan. 18, 1962. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 40 See, for example, Lile interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 5. 41 Reed, Faubus, 195. 42 Ibid.; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 99. 43 Ibid. 44 Reed, Faubus, 195-196. 45 William J. Smith interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 8-12. 46 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 99. 47 Roland Smith, et al. v. Orval Faubus, et al, and Arkansas Sovereignty Commission, U.S.C.A. 8th Cir. 1957, RRLR 2 (1957), 1103. 48 The filing of Rector’s suit was reported in SSN, Sept. 1957. 49 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 100. 50 Arthur B. Caldwell, “Summary of Conference with Faubus on August 28,” Aug. 30, 1957. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Freyer, “Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis,” 212.

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21

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54

Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 165. Arthur B. Caldwell, “Summary of Conference with Faubus on August 28,” Aug. 30, 1957. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 56 Olney, “A Government Lawyer Looks at Little Rock,” address to Conference of Barristers of the State Bar of California,” Oct. 3, 1957. Ibid. This speech was published in Congressional Record 104 (March 24, 1958), 4532. 57 Reed, Faubus, 197-198. 58 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 263. 59 Ibid., 263-264; Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 63. Faubus’ quotes are from the Arkansas Gazette, Aug. 31 and Sept. 1, 1957. 60 Quoted in Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 60. 61 Caldwell, “Summary of Conference with Faubus on August 28,” Aug. 30, 1957, Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 62 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 60. 63 SSN, Sept. 1957. 64 Ibid. 65 Caldwell, “Summary of Conference with Faubus on August 28,” Aug. 30, 1957, Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 66 Ibid. 67 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 60. 68 Police Chief Marvin H. Potts, for example, told reporters the day after Faubus’ testimony that weapons had been seized from students, “Let’s say I haven’t heard what Gov. Faubus says he has heard.” SSN, Sept. 1957. 69 Ibid. 70 Caldwell, “Summary of Conference with Faubus on August 28,” Aug. 30, 1957, Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 71 U. S. News & World Report (June 20, 1958), 101-106. 72 R. A. Lile interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 4-5. North Carolina Governor Luther H. Hodges had recently made a similar appeal for obedience to the law, and, Lile said, the school board merely wanted Faubus “to make the same sort of announcement.” According to Lile, “his answer was that he couldn’t do that, it wouldn’t be good politics.” When asked by his interviewer whether Faubus had “put it in those terms,” Lile responded that he had. Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 59. 76 Ibid. 77 A. F. House interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 16. 78 SSN, Sept. 1957. 79 “Excerpt of interview of Governor Orval Faubus, Arkansas, by Frank McGee, National Broadcasting Company News, on Dave Garroway television program ‘Today.’” Located in Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 80 Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 114. 81 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 25, 186.

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82

Reed, Faubus, 200. Ibid. 84 A. F. House interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 22. 85 Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, 464465. 86 Olney, “A Government Lawyer Looks at Little Rock.” 87 SSN, Sept. 1957. 88 Aaron v. Cooper, RRLR 2 (1957), 934. 89 SSN, Sept. 1957. 90 RRLR 2 (1957), 936. 91 Ibid. 92 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 166. 93 William J. Smith interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 12-14. 94 “Summary of statement of Winthrop Rockefeller to the FBI on September 8, 1957,” Sept. 9, 1957. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. See also, Hugh Patterson interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 14; Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 133. 95 “Summary of statement of Winthrop Rockefeller to the FBI on September 8, 1957,” Sept. 9, 1957. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 96 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 65. 97 “Summary of statement of Winthrop Rockefeller to the FBI on September 8, 1957,” Sept. 9, 1957. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 98 Ibid. 99 Telegram from James D. Johnson to Faubus, Sept. 1, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 100 Faubus speech on radio and television, Sept. 2, 1957. Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid.

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CHAPTER SIX

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Governor Faubus Calls Out the Guard Governor Faubus insisted that he had placed the Arkansas National Guard around Little Rock Central High School to preserve the peace in light of evidence he possessed of imminent threats of violence and disorder. And, in his address on September 2, he made reference to “a police check” that confirmed reports of increased weapons sales.1 Reporters at the Arkansas Gazette investigated the claim, along with another regarding the impending convergence of caravans of armed resisters to school desegregation in the city, “and just frankly couldn’t find any evidence that [either] was true. Nobody had any unusual gun sales or knife sales, and none of the law enforcement authorities, sheriff, state police, people like that, knew anything about those caravans.”2 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which formally began investigating at Judge Davies’ instruction on September 5, looked into the governor’s allegations as well, and also could find no truth in them. Fifty agents interviewed “more than 500 persons” including members of Faubus’ staff and his attorney and “down through all city and state officials who might have had information, including school board members, school teachers, the colored custodial help at Central High School and the colored children involved.” No one questioned was able to offer any confirmation of any impending violence “prior to the time the Governor called out the Guards on September 2, 1957.”3 The agency’s report noted that “even the information which the Governor supplied through his own personal attorney to the Bureau contained no tangible evidence whatever of any immediate threat to the peace and good order.” Bill Smith’s statement, “instead of supplying definite information,” included “only questions, inferences and criticisms of the School Board’s assessment of white and colored children and one rumor concerning the increased sale of guns attributed to a Mrs. Eva Heath.” Agents questioned Mrs. Heath, who told them that she had received a few calls about pistols from “unidentified Negro men.” This, the report concluded, “was the basis of the Governor’s concern

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about the sale of guns.” The FBI followed up Mrs. Heath’s interview by speaking with “every owner and manager and clerk in every store, pawnshop, or other place in Little Rock and North Little Rock where guns and knives might be obtained,” and found that, not only had there been no increase in sales, but “if there was any change over prior years it was that there were less sold this summer than in any previous similar period of time.”4 Smith also apparently told agents that his yardman, a member of the city police force, had complained to him that the situation in Little Rock was extremely “explosive” and that he feared violence. When questioned by the FBI, however, the man, Robert Green, denied even having spoken with Smith during the previous few months and also denied that he believed there would be any trouble in the city when school opened. In its final analysis, the FBI report found that there was simply no evidence to justify Governor Faubus’ mobilization of the state militia, and that such lack of evidence explained “the complete surprise and consternation of all the city officials of Little Rock who normally would be the ones most concerned with impending riots and disorder, and who would be expected to maintain order.” Faubus’ action, therefore, could “be explained only as a political move.”5 Winthrop Rockefeller, then, was not the only one who regarded the governor’s action as having been motivated primarily by his own political interests, to maintain himself in office. Many others, in fact, shared that opinion.6 A member of Faubus’ own inner circle, Commerce Commission Chairman William M. Berry, confirmed to the FBI that the governor’s determination to order the state militia to block integration at Central High School was influenced by political considerations. Berry had attended closed sessions held by Faubus with his closest staff advisors on August 30 and August 31. There, Faubus had indicated that he was inclined to use the Guard because he believed that such a show of defiance would increase his popularity and help him achieve another term in office, overcoming the state’s tradition against three consecutive terms.7 Former Governor Sid McMath, still identified in the fall of 1957 as a “longtime political friend” of Faubus in the Southern School News, said at the time, “I don’t agree with the stand taken by Governor Faubus but I do think that it must be emphasized that those who know him well believe that the firmest criticism should be that it was an action out-of-character.”8 Years later, after their friendship had ended

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over Faubus’ conduct regarding public school desegregation, McMath issued harsher criticisms. Governor Faubus’ use of Guardsmen at the high school was, he condemned, “calculated, planned, premeditated. It was a power play. No question about it.”9 School board member Wayne Upton agreed that the move was a “calculated” ploy which Faubus made “with the sole idea in mind of perpetuating himself in office.”10 Little Rock Mayor Woodrow Wilson Mann issued a public statement critical of the governor’s using troops to interpose and prevent integration. Mann alleged that “the governor’s excuse for calling out the Guard is simply a hoax,” and that the presence of soldiers at the school had, as its sole effect, created “tensions where none existed.” The mayor noted that Little Rock voters had indicated their approval of the school board’s plans when they elected the moderate candidates, Wayne Upton and Henry Rath, to the board “by an overwhelming vote” the previous spring, and he announced, wryly, that but for his own “respect for due process of law” he “would be tempted to issue an executive order interposing the city of Little Rock between Governor Faubus and the Little Rock school board.”11 That night, a large cross was set afire on the mayor’s lawn.12 In Little Rock attorney and political guru Henry Woods’ estimation, the only explanation for the governor’s actions was that, faced “with a kind of Faustian choice,” he had chosen to sell “his soul to the Devil” for the price of maintaining his beloved residence in the governor’s mansion. After all, Woods mused, Faubus was “a Truman Liberal,” the son of “a left wing Socialist,” who obviously “did not believe this business.”13 Faubus’ Action Assessed Not everyone believed the governor acted only in his own self-interest, of course. Nat Griswold, of the pro-integration organization the Arkansas Council on Human Relations, determined, after serious study, that “the devil theory of history is not sustained, in my view, in this situation.”14 Painting a rather sympathetic portrait of the governor as a tortured figure who “hesitated greatly to go against his liberal tendencies,”15 Griswold and the ACHR concluded that it was ultimately the fault of Virgil Blossom and the Little Rock School Board that the soldiers were sent to Central High School. The superintendent and the board attempted to “use” Faubus and put constant and intense pressure

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on him to make a public statement in favor of the gradual integration plan. Issuing such a statement, Griswold recognized, would have been politically unpopular for the governor. Faubus would have preferred to take no position at all on such a volatile issue, and would not have interfered with the desegregation of Central High, as he had not at Hoxie or at any of the other districts in the state where black children had been admitted to formerly all-white schools, were it not for the badgering by school officials. Virgil Blossom and the school board drove the governor “against his will” into the segregationist camp,16 and once there he became their champion and was bound to step in and take drastic measures.17 Historian Numan V. Bartley agrees with Griswold’s conclusions, though he lays the blame for backing Governor Faubus into a corner on a general “breakdown in community leadership, compounded by the refusal of both state and federal governments to accept responsibility for desegregation in the city,” rather than on school officials alone.18 “Although political expediency eventually overrode executive responsibility,” he wrote, the governor had not “coolly” masterminded the crisis for his own gain, but agonizingly arrived at his decision to abandon his long held position of laissez faire on matters of school integration only when he was forced to align himself with one side or the other.19 Segregation leaders were naturally pleased with the governor’s interposition. Years later, Reverend Wesley Pruden heartily agreed that calling out the National Guard to prevent integration in Little Rock was exactly what he and his associates wanted Governor Faubus to do. When asked whether the threat of violence, which Faubus cited as his justification for placing Guardsmen at the high school, was real, however, Pruden hedged. “Well, it was pretty real,” he said, “the people were really stirred.” But he admitted that, since the governor had acted preemptively, there was ultimately no way to know whether violence would actually have occurred. “To ask what would have been, if something that happened hadn’t happened, is pretty iffy,” he conceded.20 Pruden acknowledged, too, that Faubus clearly reaped political benefits from the stand he took at Little Rock, commenting that he “rode the wave right into office” and that he sincerely doubted that he would have been elected to a third term had he not done so.21 Ultimately, though, in determining how the governor arrived at the decision to use the Arkansas National Guard to block the integration of

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Central High School, the question of whether the potential for bloodshed was real or imaginary is less important than whether Orval Faubus believed it was real. Bill Smith, forever loyal, insisted that, although he had advised the governor not to act preemptively, he “truly believed that Governor Faubus stopped what could have been a very bloody race riot in Little Rock, Arkansas, that could have cost not one life but many lives.”22 Faubus himself still insisted decades later that he acted to save lives and that, faced with the same choice, he would act no differently than he had in September 1957.23 It is quite possible that Orval Faubus was truly convinced that a fullblown race war would result if Central High School was permitted to open on September 3 with black students in attendance. Even Brooks Hays, who flatly disagreed with the governor’s use of troops to delay the federal court order to implement the desegregation plan, did not doubt his sincerity.24 Roy Reed, too, appears to agree with the assessment that Faubus legitimately feared that riots would occur in the city and acted out of a desire to avoid them. The governor, he notes, had in his possession “evidence of impending violence – evidence that was either real or handcrafted by Jim Johnson’s invisible army.”25 What Faubus did not know was that there was a member of the segregationist “invisible army” among his closest associates. Jimmy “the Flash” Karam Jimmy “the Flash” Karam, the son of Lebanese immigrants, grew up in the South Arkansas town of Lake Village, where there was a significant black population. As Karam himself described it, in Lake Village, being considered “a foreigner was bad enough… but being a Catholic on top of that, why, that was even almost worse than being black, where I’m from.”26 Still, he confessed later, “I was going to force people to look up to me. I knew that I was certainly better than a black person. Certainly I was. I felt like I was.”27 Jimmy Karam had a long history as a rabble-rouser. As Reed portrayed him, “Karam was a… one-time goon who had terrorized labor organizers in other parts of the South.”28 In 1950, however, he became the owner of a clothing store in downtown Little Rock and worked to transform his image into that of a respectable businessman. Still, “when he heard of the possibility of a brawl, he could not stay away.”29 He had met and become friendly with Orval Faubus when the latter was a candidate for the gubernatorial nomination in 1954, and it

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was Karam that the governor called upon to act as a “tough” when the situation became heated during his campaign against Johnson in 1956.30 By 1957, Karam counted himself among Faubus’ closest and most trusted friends. When the governor wished to, discreetly, query leaders of the Capital Citizens Council about their willingness to support him in a bid for a third term in exchange for his assistance in preventing school desegregation, Karam was the go-between. He was not, however, publicly associated with the Citizens’ Councilors. In fact, Jimmy Karam was a member of both the Southern Regional Council and the Urban League.31 Despite his membership in the prointegration organizations, Karam, who had a son and a daughter enrolled at Central High School in 1957, was vehemently opposed to the admission of black students into the school, and even took advantage of his affiliations with these groups to work at crosspurposes to their aims.32 In addition to his personal desire to see segregation continued, the Little Rock clothier enjoyed the advantages that his relationship with the governor brought him and was eager to see Orval Faubus retain his seat of power. He believed that if Faubus took a stand to prevent the mixing of the races at Central High he would be reelected in 1958.33 He also believed that he was in a unique position to influence the governor to take such a stand. 34 During the weeks before the opening of school, Karam virtually moved into the governor’s mansion and offices. He “slept and ate with” Faubus, and “answered all the phones.” “I wouldn’t let anybody get to Faubus unless they believed the way that I believed, that the whites ought to be in that school alone,” he claimed.35 As an associate and observer of Governor Faubus, Jimmy Karam knew that the politician’s concern with public opinion bordered on obsession, and that he felt obliged to comply with what he perceived to be a mandate from his people. Aided by the Citizens’ Councilsponsored telephone and letter-writing campaigns to urge the governor to interpose, Karam’s efforts to convince him that the overwhelming majority of his constituents were rabidly opposed to the implementation of the Blossom Plan were highly successful. Anyone who attempted to contact Faubus to express the opinion that desegregation should be permitted to take place without interference was simply told that “the Governor wasn’t in,” and “pretty soon he got to believing everybody”

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in the city and state desired for him to do something to maintain segregation.36 Although Faubus most frequently identified Superintendent Blossom as the source for his information that bloodshed was likely if Central High School was integrated on September 3,37 Jimmy Karam also plotted to convince his friend of the legitimacy and severity of the threat. Faubus “knew there was going to be violence,” he stressed. “We made him know it.”38 With all the agitation that the Capital Citizens Council was fomenting, and Karam’s own efforts at organizing protesters, many of whom were men he had dealt with during his old union-busting days, “the Flash” himself was certain that there would have been trouble had his campaign to convince the governor to use the National Guard failed. “I’m scared to imagine what would have happened,” he admitted. “You’ve got to remember,” he told an interviewer in 1971, “masses are not leaders, they’re followers.” Recalling an episode where he had stirred several hundred “decent people” to riot against strikers at a Goodyear plant in Garrison, Alabama, he observed, “It don’t take a lot of people to instill that type of ignorance” and “fear” that leaves bodies in the streets.39 That Faubus actually believed the streets in front of Central High School would run with blood is uncertain. Karam, had, however, certainly succeeded in convincing the governor that the overwhelming majority of his people wanted him to act to stop the impending desegregation of the school. And, for the neo-populist Governor of Arkansas, that was enough. Desegregation Must Proceed “Forthwith” Following Governor Faubus’ announcement of the presence of Guardsmen at Central, school officials, anxious to avoid confrontation, contacted the families of the black students, now numbered at nine, and asked them not attend the next day. They did not. The school board did not know what to do. They knew they could not simply disregard the federal court order that integration begin under the Phase Program that fall, but they also did not feel comfortable with the prospect of thrusting nine teenagers into a situation where they could suffer great harm or where their presence might trigger violent disorder. The board members, for the most part, had not anticipated any major disruption as the handful of carefully selected black students were integrated into Central High School classrooms. Now it was imminent. They turned

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to Federal Judge Ronald N. Davies for advice. Davies, determining that “the evidence presented to this court reveals no reason why the original Plan of Integration approved by this court cannot be carried out,” ordered the board to proceed “forthwith.”40 Having been ordered to proceed, Superintendent Blossom called a meeting with the parents of the “Little Rock Nine” and with a few leaders from the black community. While Blossom did not invite Daisy Bates, the NAACP leader who was working closely with the nine as an advisor, to the conference, at least one of the parents notified her and she attended as well. At the meeting, the superintendent urged the parents not to accompany their children to the school the next morning, telling them, “It will be easier to protect” the nine from violence “if the adults aren’t there.” 41 Neither Bates nor the others agreed with Blossom, particularly since he had offered “little assurance that the children would be adequately protected.” Later that night, it was decided that the students would not go to the school alone. Four ministers, two white and two black, would accompany them. It was hoped that the mob sure to assemble outside the school would be hesitant to attack them if they had these men of the cloth by their sides. Daisy Bates was also able to secure the promise of the Little Rock City Police that a squad car would be present at a meeting place for the students to gather, to protect them until they and the ministers had all arrived and left to approach the school together. The police could not, however, escort the black students or enter the school grounds at all, since the school was “off-limits” to them as long as the Guard was on duty there.42 By the time Bates had settled plans with the ministers and arranged for the squad car, it was late. Hastily, at two-thirty a.m., she telephoned the parents of Carlotta Walls, Jefferson Thomas, Thelma Mothershed, Melba Pattillo, Ernest Green, Terrance Roberts, Gloria Ray, and Minnijean Brown to notify them of the plan. All agreed for their children to meet at the corner of Twelfth Street and Park Avenue at eight-thirty in the morning. One of the nine, however, had no telephone. Exhausted, Daisy Bates went to bed, having decided to send someone to Elizabeth Eckford’s house to collect her and take her to meet the others.43 In the anxiety and haste of the fateful morning of Wednesday September 4, Daisy Bates “forgot” to get in touch with Elizabeth Eckford.44 Around eight that morning, Eckford, “a slight, dusky girl

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wearing sunglasses and a freshly-ironed white dress” arrived at Central High School alone, her schoolbooks tucked under her arm.45 There, at the corner of Fourteenth Street and Park Avenue, she was met by a line of armed and helmeted National Guardsmen who wordlessly denied her entrance to the school. The girl then went around to the front of the school and tried the main entrance. “Again, guardsmen lining the sidewalk pressed closely together to block her path.” She altered her course again, looking for another way in, but “she found none.”46 At that point, the throng of protesters gathered at the school spotted her and closed in around her. The slight fifteen-year-old girl then “had to walk a hundred-yard gauntlet of sneering, threatening demonstrators”47 back across the street to the bus stop. Only one white woman came to Elizabeth Eckford’s aid. It was Grace Lorch, the wife of Philander Smith mathematics professor Lee Lorch. The Lorches were members of the NAACP who had helped recruit plaintiffs for the original Aaron v. Cooper suit. Mrs. Lorch also drew the wrath of the riotous crowd as she sat with the girl until the bus arrived and carried the tearful teenager away. The other eight students met as planned. Accompanied by the two black ministers, the Reverend Z. Z. Driver of the African Methodist Episcopal Church and the Reverend Harry Bass of the Methodist Church, and the two white ministers, the Reverend Will D. Campbell of the National Council of Churches and the Reverend Dunbar Ogden, Jr. of the interracial Little Rock Ministerial Alliance, as well as by Ogden’s twenty-one year old son David, they made their way to the school.48 They, too, were turned away. The Showdown The showdown had begun. The senior officer stationed on the grounds at Central High School, Lieutenant Colonel Marion Johnson, had confirmed, as the Guardsmen placed themselves between the legally enrolled black students and the school, that the soldiers were acting on the direct orders of the governor.49 This admission cast doubts on Governor Faubus’ insistence on the night of September 2 that the troops were not deployed to defy the federal court’s orders but solely guarantee that peace was maintained in and around the school, and throughout the city. Faubus later claimed that “the Negro students were not barred from the school when the Guard was first placed on duty,”50 but that he did give the order to refuse entry to the Little Rock

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Nine at “about midnight after the first day of school”51 because, “as the situation developed” there was no other way to maintain peace and good order.52 Just what “situation” could have developed on the first day of school, however, is difficult to imagine considering that none of the black children attempted to enter the school on that day, at the behest of school officials, and no disturbances occurred. After September 4 the purpose of the Arkansas National Guard seemed evident. Concerned over the apparent interposition by the governor to interfere with the enforcement of federal court orders to proceed with integration at Central High School, Judge Davies contacted the Department of Justice and requested a full investigation into the developments at Little Rock. The Bureau already had agents on the scene, but, as Freyer has pointed out, “following Davies’s request… the government’s role became official.”53 Governor Faubus then composed a telegram to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, copies of which were also sent to every governor in the country and released to the press. In it, he declared that “the question at Little Rock at this moment is not Integration vs. Segregation.” Rather, what was at issue was whether he, as “the head of a sovereign state” had the authority to “exercise his constitutional powers” to insure the safety of his people in the manner he deemed necessary. He also accused federal authorities of plotting his arrest, “in complete disregard of the constitutional guarantees of the separation and independence of the three branches of government and the rights and powers of a state,” and of tapping his telephones. The situation, the governor stressed, was growing “more explosive by the hour.” The problems in the city, he alleged, had been caused by the rulings of Judge Davies who, he claimed, had a “misunderstanding” of local conditions. The situation now “is further aggravated by the impending unwarranted interference of federal agents.” If he was not left free to act to protect the lives and property of his people, he wrote, then he could not “be responsible for the results” and any “blood that may be shed will be on the hands of the federal government.” Finally, he appealed to the president to end the uninvited interference by federal authorities which threatened to destroy “the splendid progress we have made in Arkansas in the past few years toward meeting our problems of race relationship.”54 That day’s editorial in the Arkansas Gazette echoed the governor’s contention that whether Central High School should be desegregated was no longer paramount. The issue, however, was not quite, as

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Governor Faubus put it, a matter of the state’s sovereign powers either. Instead, “the question has now become the supremacy of the government of the United States in all matters of law.” And, although the city of Little Rock may suffer great harm as the result, it was the newspaper’s opinion that “the federal government cannot let this issue remain unsolved.”55 President Eisenhower responded to Faubus’ telegram on September 5, advising the governor that “there is no basis in fact” for the allegations made that federal authorities were considering arresting him, or that his telephones were being tapped. He acknowledged that the FBI was “presently collecting facts as to interference with or failure to comply with the district court’s order.” He also informed Governor Faubus that “the only assurance I can give you is that the federal Constitution will be upheld by me by every legal means at my command.”56 Privately, however, the president had noted during a prepress conference briefing on September 3 that he was not convinced that the Justice Department had any authority to intervene in the situation at Little Rock, and, he told the press that day, the federal government had no plans to involve itself in Little Rock affairs. “The next decision,” he insisted, “will have to be by the lawyers and jurists.”57 The Little Rock School Board members found themselves in a bind. They were still under court orders to integrate the high school, but the governor’s orders to the Guard had confounded their efforts to comply. Furthermore, events on the morning of September 4, when a jeering crowd of about two hundred white adults harassed the black students as they attempted to enter the school, convinced them that public protests would prove disruptive to the orderly conduct of operations of the school. As a result, school officials again turned to Federal District Judge Davies, on September 5, this time asking that the implementation of the gradual integration plan be delayed.58 In its petition to the court, the board contended that it was impossible for the school to perform its primary task of educating the community’s youth in the tense atmosphere created by the scene outside the building.59 At the hearing two days later, Blossom took the stand to testify “to the confusion and the troubles out there, and how the teachers were all distraught and pupils couldn’t get their minds on their studies.” There was no testimony from “the other side.”60 After the board had made its case, Davies simply “picked up a sheet of paper from his desk and began reading his decision, creating the

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impression… that it had been written even before he came into court to hear the arguments.”61 Davies announced that the arguments offered in his courtroom were “as anemic as the petition itself.” He, he said, in his role as a federal judge, had “a constitutional duty and obligation” from which he “shall not shrink.” He curtly denied the board’s request for a temporary suspension of the implementation of the desegregation plan with the caveat that “in an organized society there can be nothing but ultimate confusion and chaos if court decrees are flouted, whatever the pretext.”62 The school board was disappointed with Davies’ ruling. While he admitted that delaying integration at Central High School probably “wouldn’t have done a bit of good,” Archie House complained that the district judge “did not understand the attitude of the Board at all.” Davies, it seemed to school officials, never appreciated that they were trying to comply with the court’s orders in good faith, and that they felt like “a little powerless thing in the middle of two great conflicting forces, and one of them was compelling us to do something and giving us no relief, and the other was doing everything it could do to frustrate and abuse us.” Unhappily, House lamented, “That’s the reason I didn’t think much of him as a judge.”63 Governor Faubus, too, responded to Judge Davies’ insistence that integration proceed at Little Rock with consternation. On September 9, the governor issued a statement in which he called Davies’ “methods… high-handed and arbitrary.” In an obvious appeal to emotionalism, he further stated that while “Negro leaders and white integrationists and even Federal Judge Davies are willing to sacrifice the lives of a certain number of people in this community in order to take one more step toward final and complete integration of the schools,” he would not be a party to their machinations. He reasserted his own authority to use the National Guard to protect the lives of his people, and again insisted that the issue at hand was one of state’s rights. “I cannot abdicate my office and let a Federal Judge substitute his judgment for mine,” he proclaimed, adding that if the federal judiciary could second-guess his judgment in this instance, it could do so on all matters. “If this be the law,” he cautioned, “then every state in this union is nothing more than a vassal state to a central government,” a proposition that “strikes at the very heart of our system of government composed of a dual sovereignty.” Here was Orval Faubus, then, appealing directly to a national audience whose attention he knew he had attracted, to embrace

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what James Jackson Kilpatrick, Jr. had earlier referred to as the “Transcendent Issue.”64 The federal government, Faubus implied, was attempting through judicial fiat to co-opt the rights of the states. If it succeeded, and “blood is then shed,” the governor warned, “my conscience will be clear, but I will weep for my people.”65 That same day, Judge Davies, having received a report of the FBI’s investigation,66 directed that a petition to enjoin the governor against interfering with the integration of Central High School be filed by the United States as amicus curiae.67

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The President Considers His Response The Eisenhower Administration was not anxious to become embroiled in the drama unfolding at Little Rock. When the governor of Arkansas placed armed Guardsmen around Central High School and ordered them to deny entry to the school to the Little Rock Nine, however, federal intervention became inevitable. Still, precisely how the federal government would respond was not immediately clear. NAACP Executive Secretary Roy Wilkins telegrammed Eisenhower on September 5 to impress upon him the great concern of black citizens of the United States “over the prevalent idea that states and regions are free to decide whether to abide by the Constitution and the federal rulings or not as they see fit,” and to urge him “as chief executive” to act decisively “to preserve the authority of our national government.”68 William R. Ming, Jr., the first black National Chairman of the American Veterans Committee, was notably more specific regarding the action the president should take in the face of Governor Faubus’ defiance. Ming reasoned that while the Arkansas governor had the authority to issue orders to the Guard, “equipment, uniforms, training facilities and many other provisions are made for the Guard by the Federal Government.” Therefore, he suggested that President Eisenhower withdraw “federal recognition and support of the Arkansas National Guard as long as Governor Faubus continues to use the Guard to defy the rulings of the Supreme Court and the Federal District Court of Arkansas.”69 There is no evidence that Eisenhower considered taking Ming’s advice. Clearly, it was preferable to the president to resolve the challenge Faubus’ action represented diplomatically. The nation’s chief executive preferred to negotiate with the upstart governor to provide him an avenue for “orderly retreat.”70 Here, United States

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Congressman Brooks Hays of Arkansas stepped into the fray. Hays was friendly with presidential advisor Sherman Adams. He called Adams on the morning of September 9 to offer his assistance. The offer was quickly accepted and Hays became a go-between for mediation between the White House and the governor’s mansion in Little Rock, Arkansas.71 On September 11, Sherman Adams telephoned President Eisenhower. He described the conversations that he had had with Congressman Hays, and Hays’ talks with Faubus, which had left him with the impression that “the Governor would like to find a way out of the situation in which he has gotten.” Faubus, Adams told the president, was prepared to send a telegram, which in fact had been carefully crafted for him by Adams and Hays, requesting an appointment to discuss the situation at Little Rock. Adams indicated that he had mentioned the possibility of such a meeting with Attorney General Herbert Brownell. Brownell, he reported, did not favor the idea since he believed the Arkansas governor had “‘soiled’ himself badly,” but Adams himself was convinced that Faubus “realizes he has made a mistake and is looking for a way out,” and he recommended that the president entertain him.72 President Eisenhower commented that he thought the Attorney General and others in the Justice Department did not “take into consideration the seething in the south,” and stated plainly his belief that the Department “must make very clear” that it had filed the petition to enjoin Faubus at Judge Davies’ request and only to prevent the governor from using troops to interfere with the enforcement of court orders. “By no means” did the federal government wish to imply that a governor did not have the authority to use the National Guard to preserve law and order within his state. As far as a proposed conference between himself and Faubus was concerned, the president “agreed that if Governor Faubus honestly wanted to talk with him, he would see him any time any place.”73 After speaking with Sherman Adams, President Eisenhower telephoned Herbert Brownell and lectured him on states’ rights. “No matter what the Federal government resents in this case,” Eisenhower told the attorney general, the preservation of law and order in Little Rock was rightfully and entirely the responsibility of Orval Faubus. “We cannot in any way question the rights of governors to call out [the] National Guard whenever they want,” he instructed. Eisenhower

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further stated that even if the “whole U.S.” was of the opinion that he had the authority as president to “walk in and say ‘disperse – we are going to have negroes in the high schools and so on,’” that would still not make it so. Brownell agreed that that was true. What was at issue in the Little Rock situation was not that soldiers had been ordered to the school, but that they were being used to prevent the black students from entering the building in defiance of federal court orders. And, put on the defensive, Brownell quickly pointed out that several attempts had been made to dissuade Governor Faubus from his present course. Hays’ current intervention was, in fact, the fifth. Before Hays, Winthrop Rockefeller, Senator John L. McClellan, Harry Ashmore, and Sid McMath had all tried, and failed, to prevent the governor from interfering with the court-ordered desegregation of Central High School. “All,” he told the president, “came to [the] conclusion it was hopeless.” Perhaps, Eisenhower suggested, “the time was now ripe, where it had not been before.” If the Arkansas governor was willing to agree beforehand that he would comply with federal court orders, the president would meet with him.74 Eisenhower called Adams back and apprised him of his conversation with Brownell. They then discussed whether the meeting with Faubus should take place in Washington, DC at the White House or at the “Summer White House” in Newport, Rhode Island, where the president was vacationing. Eisenhower believed that it was preferable for the governor “to come all the way here,” and Adams agreed.75 Faubus Meets With the President The meeting was set for September 14, 1957, at President Eisenhower’s office at the naval base in Newport. Governor Faubus, accompanied by his private secretary, Arnold Sikes, and Brooks Hays, flew into Providence, Rhode Island on Friday the 13th, where their reception was “not friendly.” Neither the governor of Rhode Island nor the mayor of Providence greeted the small Arkansas delegation upon their arrival. As Hays observed, “There were curious crowds but no cheering.” The Arkansas congressman found it “rather pathetic to see Governor Faubus looking vainly for some sign of enthusiasm.”76 Saturday morning, Faubus met privately with President Eisenhower in the president’s “tiny office” at the naval base for about twenty minutes. In their private conference, according to Eisenhower’s dictated notes of the meeting, the governor “protested again and again

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he was a law abiding citizen, that he was a veteran, fought in the war, and that everybody recognizes that the Federal law is supreme to State law.” The president then “suggested” to Faubus that he return to Little Rock and change his orders to the National Guard troops to allow the admission of the black students to Central High School in compliance with federal court orders. Eisenhower indicated that, were Faubus to heed his suggestion, the Justice Department would move, in the federal district court, to drop the petition for injunction against the governor, on which matter Faubus was to appear in court the following Friday, September 20. “I further said that I did not believe it was beneficial to anybody to have a trial of strength between the President and a Governor,” Eisenhower noted, “because in any area where the Federal government has assumed jurisdiction and this was upheld by the Supreme Court, there could only be one outcome – that is, the State would lose, and I did not want to see any Governor humiliated.” In the president’s estimation, Faubus “seemed to be very appreciative of this attitude,” and the Commander in Chief was left with “the understanding that he was going to go back to Arkansas to act within a matter of hours to revoke his orders to the Guard.” The two then adjourned to the larger, outer office where they continued speaking for another two hours, joined by Hays, Sherman Adams, and, eventually, Herbert Brownell. There, “the ensuing conversation was generally along the same lines” as had been their private talk.77 In Brooks Hays’ account of the meeting, Governor Faubus, “in his usual unhurried way,” pressed upon the president his belief in the desirability of a delay in proceeding with integration at the Little Rock high school, and that Eisenhower implied his agreement “but thought that the matter fell so completely within the jurisdiction of the courts that little could be done by the Executive in that regard.” Hays recalled that the president emphatically assured the governor that he recognized Faubus’ right to call out the Guard and that his only objection was to the instructions they had been given. “At one stage,” Hays wrote, the governor did say that he expected “‘to send the Guard home.’” In the end, Congressman Hays felt that there were “loose ends” left after the meeting. He had hoped that a meaningful settlement would be reached at Newport, and suggested that “the rigidity of Brownell’s position” stood in the way of a mutually satisfying agreement.78 President Eisenhower’s personal secretary, Ann Whitman, reflected that she “got the impression that the meeting had not gone as well as

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had been hoped,” and that “the Federal government would have to be as tough as possible in the situation.” In her opinion, the Arkansas governor had “seized this opportunity and stirred the whole thing up for his own political advantage.” The FBI report on Little Rock only further confirmed this assessment of Faubus’ motives, she knew. And, she noted, if the details of that report were revealed in court on September 20, “the consensus is that it will backfire badly for Governor Faubus.”79 Later that afternoon, both Governor Faubus and President Eisenhower issued statements regarding their discussion. In his statement, which was largely written by Hays and pre-approved by Adams, Faubus referred to the 1954 Brown ruling as “the law of the land” which “must be obeyed.” He further acknowledged that he “must harmonize” his “actions under the Constitution of Arkansas with the requirements of the Constitution of the United States.”80 The president’s statement indicated that Faubus had conveyed to him “his intention to respect the decisions of the United States District Court and to give his full cooperation in carrying out his responsibilities in respect to these decisions.” He also announced that he was “gratified” by the governor’s attitude at the meeting, which both he and Faubus termed “constructive,” and that Governor Faubus would enjoy the full “cooperation of Federal officials” to insure the “orderly progress of the plans which are already the subject of the order of the Court.”81 The Democratic Advisory Council responded to the statements emanating from Newport by releasing one of its own, issued by former President Harry S Truman and Adlai Stevenson and signed by fifteen of its twenty-four members, including the governors of New York, Michigan, and Arizona. It declared the outcome of the Newport conference to be “disappointing,” and denounced the actions of Governor Faubus, which, “it need hardly be said,” did “not represent the position or policy of the Democratic Party.” The Council criticized President Eisenhower as well, since it was “apparent” to them that the president had “failed in his duty to make the principle clear to all of the country; that the first responsibility of a Governor is to uphold the Federal Constitution and that Governor Faubus should be using his powers to uphold the orders of the Courts instead of using them to bar the negro students, and thereby thwart the Law.”82 Democratic National Committee Chairman Paul Butler also lamented the failure of the Newport negotiations to put an end to Faubus’ defiant stand in Little Rock. In his view, “Eisenhower [had] not taken [an] active

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enough hand in presenting a solution” to what was “one of the greatest crises of American History.”83

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Efforts at Conciliation Fail When Orval Faubus returned home, he did not remove the troops from their positions around Central High School. Nor did he change their orders so as to permit the Little Rock Nine to attend classes. Brooks Hays’ conciliatory efforts failed, just as Attorney General Brownell had predicted they would. Arthur B. Caldwell wrote to Congressman Hays shortly afterwards to express his disappointment with Hays’ decision to intervene, which, he agreed with Brownell, was doomed from the start. Still, the attempt might have served some purpose, Caldwell remarked to Hays, if “your frantic and futile conferences with Faubus have… convinced you… that this an is one of the most dangerous tyrants that has ever been graced with public office in Arkansas” whose “crime is exceeded only by treason.” Faubus had acted selfishly in his own political interests without regard to the harmful effects his actions would have on the people of Little Rock, of Arkansas, or of the nation. “I write this as a friend and not in a critical way,” the Justice Department lawyer assured Congressman Hays, “for I know that you meant well; you simply did not realize the true character of Orval Faubus.”84 But Hays was not convinced that the governor had operated with nefarious intent. In his memoir of the Little Rock crisis he expressed the opinion that Faubus “was sincere in his fear of the outbreak of violence,” although, more than anything else, it was the perception that the vast majority of Little Rock’s citizens were strongly opposed to public school integration “that accounted for most of the Governor’s actions.”85 President Eisenhower was “furious” that Faubus had not done what he had agreed to do at Newport.86 He told Brownell during a telephone call on September 20 that he “wished someone would tell Brooks Hays just how low the Governor has fallen” in his eyes “since he broke his promise.”87 For his own part, Faubus later stated that “there were not any commitments and there were no agreements” made at Newport.88

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Support for Orval Faubus Despite the cold reception Governor Faubus received in Rhode Island, which Hays believed “reflected national sentiment (outside the deep South),”89 he believed the people were behind him.90 Support for the governor’s act of defiance was already pouring in, from Arkansas and beyond. Statements collected by the Arkansas State Police confirmed his belief that he was doing as his constituents wished. The Reverend W. Chester Dyer of The Bible Church in Little Rock pledged his support, saying, “I think the Governor has done this well in his rights, and I don’t think it was a political move on his part…. I think he only has the welfare of the people in mind.” Although he admitted that “integration is inevitable,” Reverend Dyer insisted, with reference to Judge Davies, “It is our problem to work out, not some judge from the north.” Echoing Governor Faubus’ own words from his telegram to President Eisenhower on September 4, Dyer added, “The issue goes beyond the question of integration; and the big issue now is States Rights vs. Federal Government.”91 The Reverend W. B. Blaunt of the Sylvan Hills Community Church in North Little Rock expressed the same sentiment. “I am an ardent believer in States Rights,” he said. “The question has gone beyond integration; the question now is ‘Do we still have the right to govern our people and to educate their children without dictatorship?’”92 Robert R. Wright, an attorney in Forrest City, Arkansas, wrote to assure the governor that he had “the support of practically every individual in this area of the state, as well as in South Arkansas, which is my home originally,” and to urge him not to back down under federal pressure. “The real danger in this situation,” the east Arkansas lawyer warned, “is that the federal government will encroach even further into the realm of state power and function.”93 A member of the segregationist Mothers’ League, Mrs. Katherine Dame, telephoned the governor on September 17 to tell him that they were “still behind him 100%,” and that if he was forced to remove the National Guard he should give them a call and they would “take the guns and guard the school” themselves.94 Letters came from outside of the state as well, such as those from Thomas W. Fulton of Houston, Alan Franklin of Los Angeles, Alfred F. Goshorn of Washington, DC, and attorney Marvin Brooks Norfleet of Memphis, who offered his legal services for free if it would help with the cause.95 Fulton, who considered Faubus a general at “the front

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line of this battle to preserve our constitutional rights,” was particularly galled by the realization that he was “forced to bear confiscatory tax rates in order to finance the unconstitutional activities of the federal government in this situation,” and he forwarded copies of his letter to Faubus to a host of other political leaders and public figures, including Lyndon B. Johnson and J. Edgar Hoover.96 Louisiana State Senator William M. Rainach sent a telegram advising the governor that “federal officials have no more right to violate the peace than other citizens,” and that should a United States marshal attempt to intervene in Little Rock, Faubus should have the Guard “arrest and jail” him for “violating your orders as governor of the sovereign State of Arkansas.”97 Governor Faubus estimated that at one point he was receiving “several sacks of mail a day,” of which “ninety-six to ninetyeight percent” was “favorable, and sixty percent… comes from outside of the South.”98 By Roy Reed’s count, Faubus “received some 250,000 letters and telegrams” regarding the school crisis, “and most supported his actions.”99

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Faubus Enjoined As the date for the hearing on the petition filed by the United States to enjoin Faubus from interfering with the enforcement of federal court orders by barring the black students from Central High School approached, policymakers in the White House wondered what the governor would do. There was some speculation that he would not “carry out the order of the Court,” but would “engage in some legal maneuvering to try to block and frustrate the order of that Court.” If the district court ordered that integration must proceed forthwith and the Arkansas chief executive did not comply, “then an obligation falls upon the Federal government to require Faubus to do so by whatever means may be necessary.”100 On September 19, the day before the hearing, attorneys for Governor Faubus filed an affidavit with the federal district court requesting that Judge Davies remove himself from the bench. The affidavit cited several reasons, including the judge’s contacts with the Justice Department, his “personal bias favorable to the plaintiffs,” and his “personal prejudice against this respondent” for Davies’ alleged inability “to conduct a fair and impartial trial.”101 Attorneys for the

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United States then filed a motion to strike the affidavit, which Davies granted, finding the affidavit “not legally sufficient.”102 The following morning, when Judge Davies called the court to order promptly at nine o’clock a.m., “the attention of the world was focused on this small room.”103 Before the packed courtroom, attorneys representing Governor Faubus and his co-respondents, Adjutant General Sherman T. Clinger and Lieutenant Colonel Marion E. Johnson, requested that the petition against them be dismissed. They alleged procedural problems with the federal government’s case and that the court lacked jurisdiction. “The petition,” they argued, “is in truth and in fact an attempted action against the sovereign State of Arkansas,” and “this court is wholly without jurisdiction to question the judgment or discretion” of Governor Faubus or his military aides.104 Davies denied this motion, too. Upon Davies’ denial, counsel for the respondents announced their refusal to accept the court’s authority to pass judgment on the prerogatives of the chief executive of a sovereign state and asked to be excused from the proceedings. Thus, “the governor’s attorneys walked out of the courtroom, sparing themselves the embarrassment of having to present evidence to support Faubus’s contention that he had acted to prevent violence, not to prevent integration.”105 The hearing then continued in their absence. Of the over one hundred witnesses that the federal government had subpoenaed, only eight were called upon to testify. The line of questioning pursued by Justice Department lawyers centered on the issue of whether the threat of violence, which the governor said had necessitated his calling out the National Guard, was real. None of the testimony supported Faubus’ claims that violence was imminent.106 Curiously, attorneys for the United States did not have the lengthy FBI report entered into evidence and the details of the investigation were not made public during the hearing, or at any time afterward, for that matter. Roy Reed called the failure to present the FBI report “a startling, inexplicable miscalculation.” Not doing so, he contends, “left the public free to believe whatever version of events it chose without challenge from the nation’s premier investigative agency.” Furthermore, “it also left Faubus free to continue insisting that he had surely prevented violence by scotching integration.”107 Peltason makes the same argument in Fifty-Eight Lonely Men. The government should have “gone all out” to disprove Faubus’ professions that he had acted only to protect the lives and property of Little Rock citizens, black and white. “They could have released the FBI report,

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called all their witnesses, piling it on so convincingly that Faubus would be thoroughly discredited,” he wrote.108 In Peltason’s view, however, that the lawyers from the Justice Department did not present all the evidence they had at their disposal to challenge the governor’s insistence of impending bloodshed was not their gravest error. The entire basis of their argument in court was a “strategical mistake.” Whether the threat of violence was real, he maintains, is a “largely irrelevant question.” The federal government should have made it plain, before Judge Davies’ court, that “even if there had been such evidence [that violence was imminent], it would in no way have legally justified Faubus’s using troops to prevent Negroes from attending Central High.”109 Peltason’s point is well taken, particularly in light of the federal government’s frank admission that the governor of a state has the unquestionable authority to use the National Guard to maintain peace and good order within the boundaries of his state. As Eisenhower had told Governor Faubus, the only real objection was to the orders that the soldiers were given; they should have been instructed to keep the peace while enforcing the federal court orders to desegregate the school. Compounding their error in presenting the wrong argument before the court was the potential for that argument to play “right into Faubus’s hands” by indirectly encouraging violence to occur. If, as was expected, Judge Davies granted the injunction against the governor and Faubus then removed the troops, rather than changing their orders, “Faubus and his supporters could claim vindication only if riots did develop.” The lack of foresight of federal authorities to predict this outcome was, according to Peltason, “naïve.” 110 Even as the courtroom proceedings took place, plans were being made in the White House to deal with the result. Attorney General Brownell informed President Eisenhower that Faubus’ attorneys had walked out on the hearing, “but,” he commented, “it did not necessarily mean that the Governor would not comply with the court order.” Brownell told the president that the FBI agents had spoken with Chief Potts of the Little Rock police about the possibility of deputizing citizens to help patrol the school grounds and that he would be meeting with Wilber M. Brucker, the Secretary of the Army, later that day to discuss the option of using federal troops. “Assuming the Judge does issue the injunction against the Governor,” the attorney general noted, “there are two courses that the Governor can take. One is to say all

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right, he will withdraw the Guard; [the] other would be straight defiance.” Regardless of the path Faubus chose, he said, “decisions” would have to be made “on the President’s part.” Although Eisenhower made it clear that he was opposed to using federal troops in Little Rock, Brownell assured him that there was “no doubt whatever” that he had the authority to do so. He “cannot use them to preserve law and order,” but could use them to enforce federal court orders and to guarantee the safety of the children.111 At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Davies made a statement in open court in which he held that it was “very clear” that the courtapproved desegregation plan for the city of Little Rock had been “thwarted” by the actions of Governor Faubus. He also announced that it was “equally demonstrable from the testimony here today that there would have been no violence in carrying out the plan of integration, and that there has been no violence.” He granted the preliminary injunction that was requested by the United States as amicus curiae, and determined that “such injunction shall issue without delay enjoining [the] respondents from obstructing or preventing by use of the national guard or otherwise attendance of Negro students at Little Rock high school.”112 Faubus Withdraws the Guard Within hours of Judge Davies’ granting of the injunction, Governor Faubus withdrew the Arkansas National Guard from the grounds of Central High School. “That night, every television in Little Rock was channeled to hear Faubus,”113 as he solemnly announced, “I have instructed my attorneys to exhaust every legal remedy to appeal this order. However, so long as this order is in effect, and until its certain reversal on appeal, I will comply.” He had done what he could to protect the lives of the good people of Little Rock, he said, but “now that a Federal Court… has chosen to substitute its judgment” for his, and his “authority to preserve and maintain the peace and good order of this community” had been “so greatly curtailed by this unwarranted action of Judge Davies,” there was nothing left for him to do but “offer a fervent prayer” that blood would not run in the streets when the school opened on Monday. Noting that it was “inconceivable” to him that the parents of the nine black students “would want their children in the school now in the situation that prevails,” he asked to them to keep their children out of Central High School indefinitely, until the

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community was prepared to accept their presence at the school. Such an act, he said, would display “prudence and good judgment that would be applauded by a vast majority of the people.”114 The next day, President Eisenhower issued two statements, both applauding Faubus’ compliance with the directive of the federal district court and appealing to the people of Little Rock to act peacefully with respect for the law.115 The proscription against Faubus’ use of the Guard to refuse the admission of the Little Rock Nine into the high school did not prevent its use to protect the students and maintain order while allowing desegregation to occur. Less than a year later, Faubus responded in an interview that he had not instructed the Guardsmen to protect the black children in that fashion “because it isn’t the duty of State authorities to enforce federal laws or federal orders. That’s the duty of federal agents.” He added that if he had directed the soldiers to preserve the peace while the nine black students entered the school he would have had to use many more troops than he had to keep them out, and “the people would have been enemies of the Guard and enemies of mine, because we would have been forcing them to do something which they don’t want to do.”116 Tension filled the air in Little Rock as school and city officials prepared for the opening of school on Monday morning. During the weekend, and on behalf of the school board, Superintendent Blossom went to Judge Davies to ask that United States Marshals be made available to assist the police in providing protection for the black students entering the school. Davies instructed him to make the request through the local U. S. Marshal, Beall Kidd. Kidd promised that he would pass on the request to his superiors, but “about an hour later,” Kidd phoned Blossom to inform him that “it would not be possible” for marshals to be assigned for duty at Central.117 School officials were disappointed by the lack of federal aid in preparing for the potentially explosive scene when classes resumed after the weekend. Blossom complained that “the federal government was still handing out court decrees but doing nothing to assist local efforts to enforce the court orders.” And, he added that “this unhappy attitude was further emphasized” by the statements issued by President Eisenhower.118

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A Mob at Central High Early on Saturday, September 21, the day after he had ordered the National Guard removed from the high school, Governor Faubus left the city to attend the Southern Governors’ Conference at Sea Island, Georgia. He claimed later that he had gotten “considerable assurance” from people “connected with the NAACP,” both personally and through Congressman Hays, that the black students would not attempt to enter the school on Monday. And, he remarked, he “possibly would not have gone to the conference had it not been for these assurances,”119 since he was sure that there would be rioting in the city if the Nine were determined to attend Central High School. For his own part, however, Hays insisted that he had not spoken with anyone in the NAACP. In fact, he stated that he was “determined not to” because he “disagreed with their tactics.”120 That the governor’s claim was ingenuous is buttressed by the fact that when he left for Sea Island, he took with him Jimmy Karam’s wife, leaving “the Flash” to do what he could to stir up trouble.121 Karam himself insisted that he did not rile the crowd that gathered outside the high school on Monday morning. “I didn’t no more do that than you,” he told an interviewer in 1971. “Oh, no, you had Amis Guthridge, Wesley Pruden, you had some real pros,” getting the people worked up, he said.122 He did not deny being at the school that day, though he averred he was present only because he was a concerned parent. But several individuals identified him as a ringleader, orchestrating the scene that took place in Little Rock on September 23. Vivion Brewer, who would later be associated with Little Rock’s Women’s Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools, observed, “I don’t think it’s any secret that Jimmy Karam’s the one who was there in the first trouble,” and she implied that the governor himself encouraged his activities.123 School board member R. A. Lile suggested the same implication. “You hardly ever saw the Governor out in public unless Karam was with him, during that period of time,” he remembered. “And in the groups where there was a little bit of violence,” on the Monday after the National Guard was withdrawn, “you’d usually see Karam around the fringes of it.” As for whether Faubus had put him up to it, Lile noted, “It’s just a question of putting two and two together.”124 Mayor Mann sent President Eisenhower a telegram on the evening of September 23 that named Karam “one of the principal agitators”

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outside the school whose presence “leads to the inevitable conclusion that Governor Faubus at least was cognizant of what was going to take place.”125 Several reporters on hand at Central High School that Monday also noted Karam’s role in choreographing violent outbursts, where he would hold “whispered consultations with first one and then another person who would then move into the crowd where a new eruption would occur.”126 From Sea Island, Georgia, Governor Faubus made some comments to the press that critics have asserted invited exactly the sort of riotous activities he purported to fear. And, he said, it was “always possible” that he might need to call out the Guard again in the event of violence.127 Another of his fellow governors attending the conference, Republican Theodore McKeldin of Maryland, offered his opinion that it was Faubus who “wrote the book, set the stage and directed the plan,” for the multitude that gathered at Central High School on Monday. “Even across the miles from Sea Island he gave the cues to his players in screaming headlines predicting violence.”128 In fact, the mob was out in full force on September 23. No one, however, was killed or seriously injured, and the overwhelming majority of Little Rock citizens went about their business that day as on any other. Approximately one thousand people milled about the grounds of Central High School, of which most were curious onlookers and at least fifty were newsmen.129 The Mothers’ League was there, egging on the mob and urging the men in the crowd to break through the police barricades.130 Shortly after classes were scheduled to start at 8:45 a.m. the black students were able to enter the building, unmolested, through a side entrance while “a diversionary group of Negro adults fought with an angry crowd of whites to divert their attention.”131 After the black children were inside the school, the hordes outside became increasingly agitated, until finally, at about noon, the police determined they could no longer hold the crowd back and the black students were removed from the school. That afternoon, Daisy Bates appealed to Eisenhower, saying that the Little Rock Nine “would not return to Central High School until they have the assurance of the President of the United States that they will be protected against the mob.”132 Eisenhower released a statement that evening. In it, he declared that “the Federal law and orders of a United States District Court implementing that law cannot be flouted with impunity by any

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individual or any mob of extremists,” and he indicated his determination to “use the full power of the United States including whatever force may be necessary to prevent any obstruction of the law and to carry out the orders of the Federal Court.”133 In addition, the president issued a proclamation ordering the mob to disperse.134 By eight o’clock Tuesday morning, the throng surrounding Central High School was even larger than the day before. Mayor Woodrow Wilson Mann sent a telegram to the president shortly after nine a.m. that described the situation as uncontrollable by local authorities and asked him to send federal soldiers into Little Rock. “I am pleading with you as President of the United States in the interest of humanity law and order and the cause of democracy world wide to provide the necessary federal troops within several hours.”135 Later that day, September 24, 1957, President Dwight D. Eisenhower did a thing he had hoped he would never have to do. He issued Executive Order 10730 authorizing the use of the United States military to enforce the orders of the federal courts in Little Rock, Arkansas, and units of the integrated, 101st Airborne “Screaming Eagles” were dispatched to Central High School.136 As recently as July 17, 1956, during his reelection campaign, Eisenhower had stated during a press conference that he “can’t imagine any set of circumstances that would ever induce me to send Federal Troops… into any area to enforce the orders of a Federal court, because I believe that common sense of America will never require it.”137 Opponents of his decision to use troops in Little Rock were quick to throw his words back at him, but the truth of the matter was that, just over a year earlier, the president was simply unable to “imagine” the “set of circumstances” that had come to pass in the Arkansas capital.

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NOTES  1

Faubus address on radio and television, Sept. 2, 1957, Faubus Papers, UA-F. William T. Shelton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 11. 3 “Summary of FBI report in Little Rock, Arkansas integration difficulty,” Sept. 13, 1957. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. 6 See Elizabeth Huckaby interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1972), 10; George Douhtit interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 11; Harold Engstrom interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 18-19; Henry Woods interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1972), 22, 25-27; Irene Samuel interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 25; Sid McMath interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 26; Wayne Upton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 12; Wiley Austin Branton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 57-58. William T. Shelton stated that he was surprised by Faubus’ use of the Arkansas National Guard because he believed “the community was ready to accept” the implementation of the Blossom Plan. Still, he said, perhaps naively, that he did not think Faubus had acted with an eye towards a third term, because the governor could not have known that the people of the city would support his decision. Shelton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 3, 5, 6-7, 8-9. Several historians have accepted the notion that Faubus interfered with the desegregation plan in September 1957 because he believed that such a move would lead to his being elected to a third term as governor. See, Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men; Chappell, Inside Agitators; Harry S. Ashmore, Civil Rights and Wrongs: A Memoir of Race and Politics, 1944-1996, (Columbia, S.C., 1997). Freyer notes that “superficially,” Faubus acted to gain a third term, but argues that his actions did “not represent the calculated maneuvering of a demagogue” but of a politician striving to accommodate what he believed was a “popular mandate.” Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 109. 7 “Summary of FBI report in Little Rock, Arkansas integration difficulty,” Sept. 13, 1957. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 8 SSN, Oct. 1957. 9 Sid McMath interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 26. 10 Wayne Upton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 12. 11 SSN, Oct. 1957. Mayor Mann’s comments were also reported in the Arkansas Democrat on September 6, 1957. 12 Reed, Faubus, 231; Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 90. 13 Henry Woods interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1972), 27. 14 Nat R. Griswold interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 26. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid., 3. 17 Ibid., 68-69.

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18

Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 252. Ibid., 263. 20 Rev. Wesley Pruden interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 12, 21 Ibid., 30. 22 William J. Smith interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 34. 23 Reed, Faubus, xii. Ten years after the school crisis Faubus forwarded to Gene Foreman, the executive editor of the Pine Bluff Commercial, his answers to questions submitted to him by a student interested in the affair. One of Faubus’ responses stated that he “called out the National Guard to keep order – to prevent injury and death to individuals, including all people, and to prevent property damage.” And, he added, “I cannot think at the moment, of any action which I should have taken, which was overlooked at the time.” Faubus to Foreman, Aug. 17, 1967. Faubus Papers, UA-F. And, in 1970, George Douhtit remarked that “to this day and time,” Faubus “says that he brought out the troops because he knew that there would be bloodshed if he didn’t make a move.” Douhtit interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 12. 24 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 137. Hays’ disapproval was not of the use of the Guard per se, but with the orders they were given to bar the black students from the school rather than to ensure their peaceful admission. Ibid. 25 Reed, Faubus, 207. Reed reports that Johnson himself readily admitted to him during an interview on February 3, 1994, that he and his cohorts endeavored to convince Faubus that a horde of armed resisters were poised to converge on the Arkansas capital, even though there really “wasn’t any caravan.” As Johnson explained, “The only weapon we had was to leave the impression that the sky was going to fall.” Ibid., 213. 26 James T. Karam interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 2-3. 27 Ibid., 2. Karam was inclined to be candid about his past indiscretions when he gave this interview on August 20, 1971. He had been, he explained, converted through the preaching of the Reverend Billy Graham at New York City’s Madison Square Garden on April 9, 1959 and became active in the Billy Graham Crusade. Ibid., 1. 28 Reed, Faubus, 179. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., 122, 179-180. 31 Karam interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 6; Reed, Faubus, 227. 32 Karam interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 3, 6-7, 9, 16. 33 Karam clearly implies his belief that Faubus would be reelected if he acted to bar the black students from the Little Rock high school, and, he pointed out, “don’t let anything kid you, he was motivated a great deal by the [hope for a] third term.” Ibid., quote at 16. 34 Bill Smith, perhaps still trying to distance Faubus from Karam’s antics during the school crisis even long after the fact, denied that Karam was very close to or wielded any particular influence over the governor. William J. Smith interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 59.

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35

Karam interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 3. Karam’s claim that he answered the governor’s telephones is supported by the fact that many of the calls made to Faubus’ office were recorded by Karam. See Faubus Papers, UA-F. 36 Karam interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 4. Karam was absolutely convinced that his scheming had the desired effect. When asked what persuaded Faubus to call out the National Guard, he answered, bluntly, “Not letting anybody get information to him except what we wanted him to have.” Ibid., 9. 37 See, for example, the interview with Faubus in U. S. News & World Report, June 20, 1958. 38 Karam interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 15. 39 Ibid., 17. 40 RRLR 1 (1957), 937-939; SSN, Oct. 1957. 41 Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 63. 42 Ibid., 64-65. 43 Ibid, 65-66. 44 Ibid., 66. 45 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 79. 46 Ibid., 80. 47 Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 128. 48 Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 127; Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 66-67. 49 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 81; Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 67. 50 Faubus to Foreman, Aug. 17, 1967. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 51 “The Story of Little Rock – As Governor Faubus Tells It,” U. S. News & World Report (June 20, 1958), 102. 52 Faubus to Foreman, Aug. 17, 1967. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 53 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 104. 54 Telegram from Faubus to Eisenhower, Sept. 4, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. In addition, a transcript of this telegram appears in SSN, Oct. 1957. 55 “The Crisis Mr. Faubus Made,” Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 4, 1957. 56 Telegram from Eisenhower to Faubus, Sept. 5, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. Also published in SSN, Oct. 1957. 57 Pre-press conference notes, Sept. 3, 1957; Official White House Transcript of President Eisenhower’s Press and Radio Conference, Sept. 3, 1957. Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter DDE Library). 58 SSN, Oct. 1957. 59 RRLR 1 (1957), 939. 60 A. F. House interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 24. Although there was no testimony offered against the school board’s petition, it was not because their arguments “stood uncontradicted,” as House contended. Ibid.

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 Attorneys Wiley A. Branton and Thurgood Marshall submitted a response to the board’s petition on behalf of the original plaintiffs in the Aaron v. Cooper litigation that contended that tensions at Central High School had been created by Faubus’ use of the National Guard to defy federal court orders and urged Davies to deny the petition. RRLR 1 (1957), 939-940. 61 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 88. 62 RRLR 1 (1957), 940-941; SSN, Oct. 1957. 63 A. F. House interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 25. 64 Richmond News Leader, Nov. 21, 1955. 65 Statement of Governor Orval E. Faubus, Sept. 9, 1957. Faubus Papers, UAF. 66 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 106. 67 SSN, Oct. 1957. 68 Telegram from Roy Wilkins to Eisenhower, Sept. 5, 1957. Central File, Official File, DDE Library. 69 William R. Ming, Jr. to Eisenhower, Sept. 5, 1957. Central File, Official File, DDE Library. 70 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 105; Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, 470. 71 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 136-145. 72 Record of telephone calls, Sept. 11, 1957. Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, DDE Library. It should be observed that this record is not a transcript of the president’s telephone calls, but an account written by Eisenhower’s personal secretary Ann Whitman who, at the president’s direction, listened in on his calls and made notes. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 146. 77 “Notes dictated by the President on October 8, 1957 concerning visit of Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas on Little Rock on September 14, 1957.” Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, DDE Library. 78 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 148-150. 79 Ann Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, DDE Library. 80 “Statement by the Governor of Arkansas,” Sept. 14, 1957. Copy located in Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 81 “Statement by the President,” Sept. 14, 1957. Copy located in Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 82 Associated Press report of September 15, 1957. Copy located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 83 Ibid. 84 “Personal and Confidential” letter from Caldwell to Hays, Sept. 19, 1957. Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 85 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 153-154. 86 Reed, Faubus, 219.

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87

Telephone call from Eisenhower to Brownell, Sept. 20, 1957. Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, DDE Library. 88 “The Story of Little Rock – As Governor Faubus Tells It,” U. S. News & World Report (June 20, 1958), 103. 89 Ibid., 146. 90 See Faubus’ remarks in interviews in U. S. News & World Report, June 20, 1958 and in American Opinion, November 1959, for example. 91 Statement of Rev. W. Chester Dyer to Arkansas State Police, Sept. 17, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 92 Statement of Rev. W. B. Blaunt to Arkansas State Police, Sept. 17, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 93 Robert R. Wright to Faubus, Sept. 17, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. Wright was also one of several attorneys who suggested that Governor Faubus’ legal representatives file “a motion that Judge Davies disqualify himself due to obvious prejudice.” Ibid. The governor’s lawyers did, in fact, file such a motion days later. 94 Telephone call from Mrs. Katherine Dame to Faubus, Sept. 17, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 95 Thomas W. Fulton to Faubus, Sept. 5, 1957; Alan Franklin to Faubus, Sept. 4, 1957; Alfred F. Goshorn to Faubus, Sept. 6, 1957; Marvin Brooks Norfleet to Faubus, Sept. 3, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 96 Fulton to Faubus, Sept. 5, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 97 Telegram from Rainach to Faubus, Sept. 4, 1957. Rainach papers, LSUS. 98 David Franke and Douglas Caddy, “An Interview With Governor Orval Faubus,” American Opinion 17:10 (Nov. 1959), 9-15. Copy located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 99 Reed, Faubus, 215. 100 Memorandum for Press Secretary Jim Hagerty, dictated by Andy Goodpaster after conferring by telephone with Sherman Adams, Sept. 19, 1957. Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, DDE Library. 101 RRLR 1 (1957), 952-954. 102 Ibid., 954-956, 957. 103 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 171. 104 RRLR 1 (1957), 944. 105 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 172-173. Blossom makes a similar statement in It Has Happened Here, 96-97. 106 J. W. Peltason and Benjamin Muse list these as: Superintendent Blossom, Mayor Mann, Police Chief Potts, School Board President Cooper, Central High School Principal Jess Matthews, and three of the Little Rock Nine. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 173; Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 136. Virgil Blossom provides the same list, with the exception that only two of the black students were called, and he included General Clinger, who was questioned on the orders Faubus gave to the Guard, as the eighth. Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 97.

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107

Reed, Faubus, 222. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 173. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Telephone call from Eisenhower to Brownell, Sept. 20, 1957. Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, DDE Library. 112 RRLR 1 (1957), 958. Davies’ full opinion, which was issued the following day, appears in Ibid., 958-963. 113 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 174. 114 Address of Governor Orval Faubus, Sept. 20, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 115 SSN, Oct. 1957. 116 “The Story of Little Rock – As Governor Faubus Tells It,” U. S. News & World Report (June 20, 1958), 102. 117 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 101. According to Elliff, school officials did approach Judge Davies with a request for marshals on Monday, September 23, and that Davies referred them to United States Attorney Osro Cobb, rather than to Marshal Kidd as Blossom reported. Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, 477. Elliff’s version, which is cited in Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 107, is not footnoted, and his source cannot be checked. 118 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 101. 119 “The Story of Little Rock – As Governor Faubus Tells It,” U. S. News & World Report (June 20, 1958), 104. 120 Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks, 167. 121 Faubus’ attorney, William J. Smith, who also went to Georgia with the governor, confirmed that Karam’s wife traveled with them. Smith interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 59. 122 Karam interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 17. 123 Mrs. Joe Brewer interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 30. 124 Lile interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 8. 125 Telegram from Mann to Eisenhower, Sept. 23, 1957. Central Files, Office Files, DDE Library. Mann also cited Faubus’ having taken Karam’s wife with him to Sea Island as evidence of their collusion in raising the mob and inspiring it to violence. Ibid. 126 Reed, Faubus, 227. 127 New Orleans Time-Picayune, Sept. 23, 1957. 128 Quoted in Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 113. 129 Reed, Faubus, 224; Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 103; Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 138. An Associated Press release from that morning numbered representatives of the press at fifty. Copy located in White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 130 Reed, Faubus, 226. 131 Associated Press release. Located in White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. In another report later that day

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Daisy Bates is quoted denying that the altercation involving the black men, who were with the press, was an intentional diversionary tactic. Ibid. 132 Ibid. 133 Statement by the President, Sept. 23, 1957. Copy located in Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 134 Proclamation No. 3204, Sept. 23, 1957. Copy located in Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 135 Telegram from Mann to Eisenhower, Sept. 24, 1957. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 136 Executive Order 10730. Copy located in Caldwell Papers, UA-F. It might be noted that, although the 101st Airborne was integrated, no black soldiers were placed on active duty around the high school. 137 Press conference of July 17, 1956; Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series, DDE Library.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

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The Little Rock Crisis in the Eyes of the World and at Home President Dwight D. Eisenhower spoke to the nation on Tuesday night, September 24, about his decision to send troops into Little Rock. “In that city,” he explained solemnly, “under the leadership of demagogic extremists, disorderly mobs have deliberately prevented the carrying out of proper orders from a Federal Court.” The proclamation he had issued the previous day instructing the mob to disperse had been disregarded and again, that morning, a crowd had gathered at the school “obviously for the purpose” of preventing the court’s rulings from being put into effect. As a result, he was left with no choice but to send federal troops “to aid in the execution of Federal law at Little Rock, Arkansas.” He made it clear that “personal opinions” regarding the wisdom of the Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown decision “have no bearing on the matter of enforcement.” Ultimately, he stressed, “the very basis of our individual rights and freedoms rest upon the certainty that the President and the Executive Branch of Government will support and insure the carrying out of the decisions of the Federal Courts, even, when necessary, with all the means at the President’s command.” To do any less would result in “anarchy.” The president stated very plainly that the army was not sent into Little Rock “to relieve local and state authorities of their primary duty to preserve the peace and order of the community.” Nor were they there to take over the operation of Central High School. Soldiers had been dispatched to Little Rock “solely for the purpose of preventing interference with the orders of the Court.”1 Eisenhower went on, pointing out that “at a time when we face grave situations abroad because of the hatred that Communism bears toward a system of government based on human rights, it would be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the prestige and influence, and indeed to the safety, of our nation and the world.” As a matter of fact, the president informed the American public, “Our enemies are gloating over this incident and using it everywhere to misrepresent our whole nation.” He concluded with an appeal to the

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people of Arkansas to immediately cease their obstructionism and to put an end to the calamity that not only reflected poorly on the citizens of Little Rock and Arkansas, but also was a “blot upon the fair name and high honor of our nation.” 2

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The International Response to the Little Rock Crisis Eisenhower’s speech “was also an address to the world”3 that was translated into forty-three languages and broadcast over the Voice of America.4 The president’s address highlighted an issue that has largely been overlooked by students of the Little Rock school integration crisis. As Mary Dudziak has noted, textbooks on American history generally consider the McCarthy era and the Brown case, or the reaction to Brown, “in separate passages alongside each other, as partners in chronology alone, rather than as part of the same story.”5 Her observation applies not only to general surveys of United States history, but to the majority of the more specialized treatments of the Little Rock affair or of the course of Massive Resistance as well.6 And yet, the federal government carefully measured its responses to outbreaks of racial violence at home in a manner designed to achieve the most positive perception of the United States abroad as possible under the circumstances. Certainly the president’s final determination to use federal troops in Little Rock was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to counter the effects of negative media coverage in the international press devoted to Governor Faubus’ refusal to allow the nine black children to attend school with whites in the Arkansas capital. “During the Cold War years,” Dudziak wrote, “when international perceptions of American democracy were thought to affect the nation’s ability to maintain its leadership role, and particularly to ensure that democracy would be appealing to newly independent nations in Asia and Africa, the diplomatic impact of race in America was especially stark.”7 In fact, according to George Lewis, the continued existence of racial segregation in the United States “hamstrung” the country in its “attempts to win over” these Asian and African nations.8 The concern that the federal government had over the apparent inconsistency between the image of the United States as a nation devoted to individual freedoms and the reality of institutionalized racism in the South was evident in the brief submitted by the Justice Department as amicus curiae in the original Brown cases. In it, the

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government emphasized that “it is in the context of the present world struggle between freedom and tyranny that the problem of racial discrimination must be viewed.”9 As Thomas Borstelmann explained, “The State Department’s leading argument in dealing with foreign critics had been that segregation was a regional and declining phenomenon, which would soon be eliminated through the established American legal system.”10 If the Supreme Court had upheld the right of states to maintain separate public schools for blacks and whites when it decided Brown, “the American position in a mostly nonwhite world would be devastated – and the United States revealed for the hypocrite its critics accused it of being.”11 The Eisenhower Administration generally, however, preferred not to involve itself in matters of race within the individual states at all, if such involvement could be avoided. When Texas Governor Allan Shivers used Rangers to block integration at Mansfield High School, for example, the event did not attract significant international attention and the president was able to more or less ignore it. Of course, since the Supreme Court refused in Brown II to mandate the immediate desegregation of public schools, or to establish a timetable for desegregation, and Mansfield, Texas, was not under specific federal court instructions to integrate, the episode did not involve the refusal by a governor permit the enforcement of federal court orders in the way that the Little Rock crisis had. And Eisenhower was, after all, a firm believer in states’ rights. At the State Dinner of the 1957 Governors’ Conference in June he reminded those in attendance that “the Founding Fathers… reserved to the people, and they reserved to the States, all power not specifically bestowed upon the national government.” He also told them, “I believe that the preservation of our States as vigorous, powerful governmental units is essential to permanent individual freedom and the growth of national strength.” But, he cautioned, “It is idle to champion States’ rights without upholding States’ responsibilities as well.”12 One of those state responsibilities was to ensure that the directives of the federal courts were carried out within its borders, or, at the very least, that the machinery of the state was not used to prevent the carrying out of such orders. Governor Faubus’ failure to meet even his minimum responsibility in this regard when he called out the Arkansas National Guard to prevent the integration of Central High School was not merely a challenge to federal authority. It focused international attention on the issue of American racism and was an embarrassment to the entire

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nation on the world stage. And, as Azza Salama Layton explains, “the timing of this federal-state showdown was unfortunate.” The Civil Rights Act of 1957 had been passed in Congress only days before Faubus placed the Guardsmen around the school, and President Eisenhower signed it into law on September 9. “But the positive effect” the act, which was the first piece of civil rights legislation enacted since the Reconstruction era, could have had on the United States of America’s reputation as the flag-bearer for democracy and individual liberty, “was lost on international audiences as the world watched mobs defy the federal troops and attack black students.”13 In England, “the Little Rock story” was “front page news,” and Faubus was “the target of editorial criticism in London’s Chronicle, Guardian and Economist.”14 A Japanese newspaper commented that it was “difficult to understand why this problem should arise in the US, the champion of democracy,” although it reminded the Japanese people that their countrymen were once the subject of official discrimination in the Unites States as well.15 And the “influential Mainichi press” in Tokyo lambasted the display in Little Rock as “‘a serious disgrace to the U.S.’” that would negatively impact respect for America throughout the world.16 A radio broadcast in Egypt noted the current situation in Little Rock and then “laboriously attempted to link the plight of the American Negro with alleged US imperialist efforts to overthrow the Syrian government.”17 Editorials in French newspapers criticized President Eisenhower’s failure to act in the face of the Arkansas governor’s defiance, and the Swiss press lamented the damage to western prestige in the non-European world that would surely result from this latest example of racial bigotry emanating from the United States.18 The United States Information Service received reports from The Hague that the scene in Little Rock was “widely and unfavorably covered in the Dutch press with widespread revulsion being expressed by the Dutch public regarding these ‘latest indications of anti-Negro sentiment in the U.S.’”19 For the Soviet Union, the Little Rock school integration crisis must have seemed heaven sent. “The Soviets,” as Lewis explains in The White South and the Red Menace, “openly and continually pressed for explanations of America’s treatment of its minorities, in an ongoing attempt to keep the South’s racism in the world news.”20 The images provided by Faubus’ placement of the Arkansas National Guard around

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Central High School made their job easy in this regard, and the Soviet “media single out the Little Rock situation for special attention and take pains to point out that the armed national guardsmen are not there to protect the Negro children from the fanatics of the Ku Klux Klan, but to prevent them from entering the school.” The Soviets also made the most of the debacle “to discredit the US position on Hungary before the UN,” and labeled hypocritical United States Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.’s address to that body regarding the Soviet occupation of Hungary, for “‘while he discusses the ideals of civilization, humanity, the rights of man, etc., US papers report unbelievable crimes and violations of the most elementary human rights which are taking place in the US.’”21 Thus Arkansas Gazette editor Harry Ashmore’s lamentation in a June 1958 article in Harper’s that the governor’s obstruction of federal court ordered desegregation at Central “was about as handy a package as the Russians have had handed them since they set out to woo the colored peoples of the earth.”22 In the light of the overwhelmingly negative coverage of Governor Faubus’ move to block integration at Central High School in the world press, it is easy to conclude that President Eisenhower’s ultimate show of force in Little Rock, Arkansas, was staged for an international audience as a form of propaganda “damage control” as much as it was designed to meet the challenge to federal authority that Faubus’ action represented.23 And the response to the eventual use of federal troops in Little Rock had the desired effect of ameliorating the damage to American prestige abroad, at least to some degree. The president’s action was applauded throughout Western Europe and in most of Asia and Africa, except perhaps in those African nations with whitecontrolled governments such as South Africa where whites resented American condemnations of Apartheid policies in view of the United States’ record on race.24 Despite the positive reception of the president’s response to Governor Faubus’ defiance on the world stage, however, “federal action could not stop the long-term negative impact the event had on U. S. prestige, international public opinion, and America’s geopolitical objectives.”25 That when the Little Rock story was finally displaced from the front page in both domestic and foreign newspapers, it was by the successful launching of the Soviet satellite Sputnik on October 4, 1957, did little to improve the image of the United States. “Sputnik, following Little Rock,” was, in Dudziak’s description, “a second blow to U. S. prestige.”26

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Integration a Communist Plot? The atmosphere of the Cold War had its impact on the segregationists as well as on the federal government, and “even as red-baiting in general declined in American politics after the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the Senate censure of Joseph McCarthy in 1954, white Southerners increased their use of anti-Communist rhetoric after the Brown decision as part of a strategy to equate integration with Communism.”27 David Alan Horowitz suggests that such references to “communism” were indicative of white southerners’ anti-corporate orientation in which the “obliteration of racial distinctions” that was a presumed result of integration was equated with “mass depersonalization,” which, in turn, was “inextricably connected in the minds of these critics [of racial integration] with the political tyranny of bureaucratic communism and government intervention in local and private affairs.”28 In this context, then, accusations of “communism” did not necessarily refer to the Communist Party per se, but to a broader, more generalized construct signifying “a centralized, administrative state that used coercive methods to intervene in areas of social and personal relations that customarily were left in private hands in a free society.”29 The language used by many segregationists in their condemnations of “race-mixing” as a Communist-inspired plot to American democracy, however, clearly shows that they did mean, for the most part, the Communist Party in the United States, under the direct control of the Kremlin. Some surmised that Communist infiltration had permeated even the Supreme Court itself. And “many segregationists” in fact, “were quite willing to believe that the nation’s highest court might, at best, have left-wing tendencies and, at worst, be communist-tainted.”30 As early as May 27, 1954, a mere ten days after the Supreme Court’s announcement of their opinion in Brown, Senator James O. Eastland of Mississippi elucidated on the link between Communism and desegregation and the nefarious subversion of the Court in a speech to the United States Senate. The justices who had decided Brown, he alleged, had been “indoctrinated and brainwashed” by Communist forces. After all, he reminded the president and his colleagues in the Senate, “Everyone knows that the Negroes did not themselves instigate the agitation against segregation. They were put up to it by radical busybodies who are intent upon overthrowing American institutions.”31

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A little over six months later, at the state convention of the Association of Citizens’ Councils of Mississippi, Eastland elaborated further. The Supreme Court “has responded to a radical pro-Communist political movement in this country” that runs “broader and deeper than the NAACP.” There were so many “organizations and groups who back, support, cooperate with and direct the NAACP” that run in “all shades of Red” that he declined to list them, but, he assured his audience, the threat to the United States was dire. “Never in the history of this country has there been such a campaign as they now wage against us.” He congratulated those in attendance for enlisting in the fight to safeguard southern traditions, state sovereignty, and the future of the nation. “The Communist conspiracy can never succeed in America unless there is first destroyed the powers of the States,” he advised.32 Eastland’s insistences that Communist forces drove integration were repeated often by a number of other prominent segregationists. Herman E. Talmadge of Georgia wrote in his 1955 treatise You and Segregation, “We have seen and are seeing our Bill of Rights endangered by trying to appease the Reds.”33 He stated frankly that, in its push for integration, the ultimate goal of the NAACP was really intermarriage, and “certainly history shows that nations composed of a mongrel race lose their strength and become weak, lazy and indifferent. They become easy preys to outside nations.” He concluded, rhetorically, “Isn’t that just exactly what the Communists want to happen to the United States?”34 The idea that the way to the bedroom was through the schoolhouse door was a common theme in pro-segregation literature. The conviction that “the South was the last repository of the ‘pure’ white race” was commonly held in the states of the Old Confederacy, and, with this belief, they had also “developed a pathological fear of miscegenation, and of the damage that they believed interracial sex and marriage would cause to white southern society.” Frequently, this fear of race-mixing found expression in anti-Communist rhetoric, as “it did not escape the notice of southerners in the twentieth century that the Communist Party of the United States had no objection to interracial sex.”35 South Louisiana political boss Leander H. Perez, for example, was convinced that the “mongrelization” of the white race would result if Southern schools were compelled to integrate. Then, as Glen Jeansonne summed up Perez’ thoughts on the matter, “the oncesuperior white race” would become “a flabby, dull strain of Africanized Americans, robbed of their vigor, lacking the ability and the will to

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resist international bolshevism.”36 Perez, who was apt to see the specter of Communism behind every door, also contended that the elimination of racially separate schools would result in a lowering of standards in the classroom to accommodate black students, whom he believed to be mentally inferior. A booklet that he wrote entitled “The Unconstitutionality of the 14th Amendment and the Evils Resulting From Subversive Use of its ‘Equal Protection’ Clause” included the prediction that “as a result of forced racial integration of public schools,” educational opportunities for white students would suffer such a decline that the impact on the “next or succeeding generation can only be a deteriorated industrial empire and a weakened national defense, which must result in abject surrender to our mortal enemy, – world-wide Communism.”37 Perez’ fellow Louisianan, State Senator William M. Rainach, was also convinced that Communists were behind efforts to desegregate the schools. In his mind, attempts to force integration were part of a “serious political conspiracy, receiving its origins and much of its support from radicals and communists in the United States and foreign countries” whose aim was to destroy American governmental institutions by mongrelizing the white race.38 Rainach believed that Americans, once alerted to the nefarious motives behind the integration movement, would resolve themselves to defeat the attempt to end segregation, and he dedicated himself to exposing Communist and Communist-front organizations that supported race-mixing.39 He contacted the editors of 2500 southern newspapers to inquire if they had yet printed stories noting the “Communist-front leadership of the NAACP.”40 Additionally, the Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee, which was headed by Rainach and was dedicated to maintaining segregation, held hearings in March 1957, to expose the connection between the Communist Party and integrationism. “The real purpose of the hearing was propaganda,” William McFerrin Stowe, Jr. explains, where Rainach choreographed “a media event carefully staged to portray integration as a communist plot, conceived by Moscow to divide the United States with the ultimate goal of warless conquest.”41 One of the witnesses at the hearings was Martha Nichols Edmiston who, along with her husband, had infiltrated the Communist Party in 1940 as an informant for the FBI. Edmiston testified that the Party had committed itself to forcing school integration, and, interestingly, named Lee Lorch, who became active in the Little Rock NAACP, as one of the

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Party faithful. She described how Lorch, who was white, had attempted to enroll his own daughter in a black school when he was a professor at Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee.42 The report of the Joint Legislative Committee hearings was published in the twovolume Subversion In Racial Unrest: An Outline of a Strategic Weapon to Destroy the Government of Louisiana and the United States, March 6-9, 1957. The introduction to the first volume, which was released on September 28, 1957, called the “invasion of Little Rock… a striking example of the ‘make-conflict’ tactics of the Communist Party described by expert witnesses before this Committee last March.”43 Thousands of copies of Subversion In Racial Unrest were distributed all over the country, with the Joint Legislative Committee providing free copies to Louisiana state officials, President Eisenhower, every member of the United States Congress, and a variety of other government figures, as well as to the editors of over three hundred newspapers throughout the United States.44 Of course, Rainach had come to the realization that integration was being promoted to the advance of international Communism well before the testimony of the “imported, professional witnesses”45 “proved that communism and integration are inseparable.”46 Representative Fred C. Petersen, a member of the Florida State House of Representatives, agreed, and wrote to Rainach to say, “Your conclusion that this is a communist inspired onslaught is absolutely correct.” Attempts to compel race-mixing in the public schools were meant to “create disunity between the races, operating on the divide and conquer theory, and to mongrelize our race so that we will eventually be worthy of the slave state status that awaits us in the future.”47 Tom P. Brady, the Mississippi state judge whose orations helped to spawn the Citizens’ Council movement, was also outspoken on the subject of Communism and integrationism. In an address to the Commonwealth Club of California, he declared that “ninety-eight per cent of both races prefer segregation,” but “integration is urged by the NAACP, a few Southern mulattoes, Northern Communist-front organizations and left-wing labor groups who would use the unsuspecting Negro as their tool.” The impetus behind efforts to compel race-mixing in the South was “of world wide Communist origin and design,” and was “but a small segment in the over-all plan to first socialize and then communize America.” Brady offered, as “positive proof” of that plot, the national platform of the American Communist

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Party adopted on May 25, 1928, “which included every demand for Negroes which is now found in TARGET FOR 1963, a pamphlet published by the NAACP in 1956, giving its program and objectives.”48 The president’s deployment of the army to Central High, Brady railed, played into the hands of the Communists and was “tyrannical” in the extreme. Brady’s choice of the word “tyrannical” was, according to Lewis, carefully calculated “not only to describe Eisenhower’s willful dismissal of states’ rights but also to conjure up images of the very totalitarian regimes that made up the West’s Cold War opposition.”49 Judge Brady’s speech was broadcast over fourteen radio stations in California and published in pamphlet form and distributed by the Association of Citizens’ Councils. President Eisenhower’s sending paratroopers into Little Rock on September 24, 1957, “confirmed the worst fears of those who objected to government intrusion in race relations.”50 Daisy Bates certainly did not help to allay those fears when she declared at the beginning of November that “I think at that moment, if I could have lifted the Cotton Curtain, and walked through it to the Iron Curtain, I would have done so without looking back.”51 Shortly after the troops entered the city, Joseph P. Kamp issued a tract called “The Lowdown on Little Rock and the Plot to Sovietize the South,” in which he characterized the Brown decision as “lawless” because it was “based not on the law, but solely and alone on psychological, sociological, and anthropological opinions expressed by propagandists and agitators who are part and parcel of the Communist conspiracy to destroy our country.” The tragedy of Little Rock, he claimed, came about through the “constant hammering away at Southern traditions and culture by many wellmeaning but misguided meddlers, and a horde of political opportunists, Negro misleaders, lawless labor organizers and revolutionary agitators – mainly from the North – all wittingly or unwittingly accepting direction from masterminds in the Kremlin at Moscow.”52 In Little Rock, Arkansas, the “City of Roses,” anti-Communist propaganda emanating from the Association of Citizens’ Councils of Arkansas reached a peak during the “federal occupation.”53 Various tracts produced by Jim Johnson’s organization carried such titles as: “Have the Intelligentsia of America Fallen Victim to the Communistic Program For America?,” “The Fifth Column in America,” and “Has Communism Engulfed Us Beyond the Point of Recall?” In addition,

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“pamphlets printed in other states, particularly Mississippi and Georgia, poured into Little Rock” during this period.54 In fact, Little Rock segregation leader Amis Guthridge was still insisting that Soviet influence was determining policy in the United States, threatening to destroy the nation from within, as late as 1971. “This whole thing is a conspiracy,” he confided in an interview, “and this race mixing thing is part of it… the Communists actually took over the operation of the government of the United States from the inside when Franklin Delano Roosevelt was made President in 1933.” Ever since then the men who held that office had been tools of the Communist Party. “So I won’t be misunderstood,” Guthridge emphasized, “I’m talking about Roosevelt, Truman, John F. Kennedy, – wait, I missed Eisenhower, don’t let me forget him – but anyway, Truman, Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Baines Johnson.” Johnson was the worst of them all, in his opinion, because, as a southerner, “he knew better.”55

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Segregationists Label “Occupied” Little Rock a Communist Victory While Eisenhower’s dispatch of troops from the 101st Airborne Division to Little Rock was being hailed in the international press as furthering the cause of individual freedom, critics in the American South charged that it was dictatorial and a Communist victory.56 Georgia Senator Herman Talmadge equated the president’s move “to destroy the sovereignty of Arkansas” with “the destruction of the sovereignty of Hungary by Russian tanks and troops in the streets of Budapest.”57 David Lawrence’s syndicated column, which appeared in newspapers all over the nation, pointed out that the deployment of federal troops to Little Rock would allow the Soviets to justify “what they did in Hungary when they overrode the local parliament at the point of the bayonet and told the local officials what they could or could not do,” since precisely the same thing was happening in the Arkansas capital.58 F. Edward Hebert, a United States Congressman from south Louisiana and a close associate of Leander Perez, bemoaned, dramatically, “Blood is on the moon tonight, smeared there by the Supreme Court and its minions, aided and abetted by the President of the United States.” In the Soviet Union, he said, “the halls of the Kremlin undoubtedly ring with joy,” because “the police state, which

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we denounced as Russian, has become a method of forced compliance in the once ‘Land of the Free and Home of the Brave.’”59 In Little Rock, Arkansas Democrat columnist Karr Shannon shared Hebert’s visions of rejoicing in Moscow of Eisenhower’s actions in furtherance of the Communist cause. In his “Run of the News” column on November 13, titled “Russia is Winning – Without Bombs,” Shannon remarked, “When Ike sent terror troops to Little Rock to force integration at bayonet points, the Russians must have gone wild with jubilation.” To celebrate, “they fired their first sputnik shortly afterwards.”60 W. L. Eason, a Waco, Texas, attorney, composed an essay denouncing the president’s action in which he asserted, “The invasion of Arkansas was like the Russian invasion of Hungary, and history will so record it.”61 And a letter to the editor of the New Orleans Times-Picayune on September 26 pronounced “the issue of states’ rights… dead,” killed by the sending of armed, bayoneted paratroopers into an American city against the wishes of the state, which “reminds us of Hungary and Poland.” The letter was signed: “Ex-Ike Voter.”62 Even Governor Faubus, who generally, and wisely in light of past charges of Communism made against him and his father’s acknowledged socialism, avoided applying the red-baiting rhetoric of the Cold War to the integration issue, used coded, anti-Communist language in his speech of September 26. “We are now an occupied territory,” he proclaimed, and he denounced the “police state” methods of the federal troops and FBI agents operating in his state’s capital. He offered, as emotionally charged examples, exaggerated descriptions of soldiers with “unsheathed bayonets in the backs of school girls,” and the “bloody” faces of Little Rock citizens who had been victims of the monstrosities perpetrated by the federal paratroopers. There had been, too, he alleged, falsely, “wholesale arrests.” And, he claimed that “swarms of FBI agents” had detained and “held incommunicado for hours of questioning” young girls, “while their frantic parents knew nothing of their whereabouts.”63 When the Arkansas National Guard had surrounded the school on his orders, he said, there had been peace in the city. But, after the president put into execution “the cleverly conceived plans of the Justice Department, under Herbert Brownell, for the military occupation of Arkansas,” there was no peace; there was no order. Instead, there had been rioting and disorder. As to the reports of the northern, liberal media that had descended on the city that there was

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a “calm” in Little Rock under the watchful eyes of the professional soldiers, he remarked, “You will recall that it was quiet in Paris during the German occupation, and it is quiet in Budapest today.” He added in conclusion, very likely for the northern audience he knew was listening, “Today the excuse for use of federal troops, is said to be integration. Tomorrow, in any state, the excuse could be a labor dispute, or any number of other things.”64

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Another “Transcendent Issue” This last comment highlights another purpose of segregationist propaganda efforts. James Jackson Kilpatrick, Jr. of the Richmond News Leader had earlier spoken of the “Transcendent Issue” that threatened to destroy American federalism by reducing the sovereign states to mere vassals of an all-powerful, centralized government, in an attempt to draw northerners who believed that racial separation was morally wrong to the defense of segregation as a matter of states’ rights under the Tenth Amendment. Now, many of the statements condemning Eisenhower’s use of troops were also designed to that end. Scores of southern politicians and other public figures eagerly issued quotable remarks to the press that emphasized the matter of state sovereignty and implied that no state, North, South, or West, was safe from federal encroachments on their constitutionally reserved powers. Senator Olin D. Johnston of South Carolina, for instance, insisted that the question was one of states’ rights and declared that if he were in Faubus’ position he would call out the Guard again to fight against the president’s illegal use of troops in Little Rock.65 In Alabama, then Circuit Judge George Wallace announced that President Eisenhower, “who was raised with a bayonet in his hand and a pistol on his hip,” had, in sending the “Screaming Eagles” of the 101st Airborne to the Arkansas capital, “substituted military dictatorship for the Constitution of the United States.” And, he added snidely, the president’s “beliefs, evidently, are the same as Hitler’s and the Communists, that ‘might makes right.’”66 North Carolina Congressman A. Paul Kitchin stated that “the impatient action of our President is shocking disclosure of things to come. The issue of integrated schools is dwarfed by the precipitous and dictatorial stab at the rights of an individual state.”67 Virtually from the moment of President Eisenhower’s announcement that he was sending federal troops to ensure that federal court orders regarding the desegregation of Central High School were

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enforced, the chief executive began receiving a barrage of letters and telegrams in response to his action. Texas Governor Price Daniel telegrammed Eisenhower immediately following his address on the night of September 24. In his communication, which Daniel released to the press, “Does this mean you will occupy with troops every nonintegrated school in the South?”68 In his response, the president remarked that he was “sorry to see that your… telegram wholly misses the point in respect to the mission of federal soldiers in Little Rock.”69 It was a complaint that a frustrated Eisenhower would repeat often, despite his frequent clarifications that the United States Army was employed in Little Rock not to take over the state’s responsibility for maintaining law and order, not to compel racial integration on an unwilling populace, but only to see to it that the orders of a federal court in one particular case was enforced in the face of state action to defy that order – so often, in fact, that it is apparent that opponents of the action were intentionally, and publicly, misinterpreting the objectives of the military deployment for propaganda purposes.70 A telegram from Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, on September 26 “vigorously” protested “the highhanded and illegal methods” of the troops “who are carrying out your orders to mix the races in the public schools of Little Rock, Arkansas,” and he likened their “methods” to those of “Hitler’s Storm Troopers.”71 Eisenhower, in his response, told the senator that he was “saddened” by the necessity for federal military forces, especially since he believed that “the Arkansas National Guard could have handled the situation with ease had it been instructed to do so.” Actually, he added, he was sure that the implementation of the courtordered desegregation plan “would have gone along quite smoothly and quietly as it has in other Arkansas communities,” if Faubus had not activated the Guard in the first place. Then, after explaining again his justification for resorting to the use of regular Army troops, he indicated his failure to “comprehend your comparison of our troops to Hitler’s Storm Troopers. In one case military power was used to further the ambitions and purposes of a ruthless dictator; in the other to preserve the institutions of free government.”72 Naturally, since Russell and his ilk were quick to describe the president’s ordering the “Screaming Eagles” into Little Rock as illegal and dictatorial, and the very basis for the court decisions they were sent to enforce as themselves unconstitutional, the distinction asserted by the

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Commander-In-Chief rang hollow in their ears. As Representative to Congress E. C. “Took” Gathings of Arkansas telegrammed the president, “Tuesday, September 24 marked a day of unjust oppression and wrongful federal encroachment on local institutions of government. The movement of an airborne unit to Little Rock to enforce a decree of a power-mad Supreme Court was unwarranted, unlawful, and violated all of the rules of propriety.”73

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The Statutory Basis for Eisenhower’s Use of Troops The “misinterpretations” of the justifications for assigning the units of the army to duty at Central High School were intended to implant in the public mind the idea that the federal government was intent on using military might to compel the complete and immediate integration of the public schools. By implication, then, any city where schools were yet operating on a segregated basis was potentially the next “Little Rock.” Alternatively, the president’s decision to intervene was portrayed as a step toward the creation of a totalitarian “police state” where the armed forces would constitute a national police force, encroaching on the powers of the individual states whose primary responsibility it was to maintain peace and order. But, as Michal R. Belknap points out, Eisenhower himself clearly “did not believe he could use the army to preserve law and order.” However, “he found it possible to distinguish between doing that and protecting the black students at Central High.”74 It should be noted, though, that Eisenhower’s primary concern was not for the physical safety of the nine black teenagers who were at the center of the crisis at Central High School, but, rather, with meeting the challenge to federal authority posed by Governor Faubus’ interposition. As the president wrote in a personal letter to his childhood friend Captain E. E. “Swede” Hazlett on November 18, 1957, “My biggest problem has been to make people see, particularly in the south, that my main interest is not in the integration or segregation question…. The point is that specific orders of our Courts, taken in accordance with the terms of our Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, must be upheld.” By instructing the National Guard to refuse entry to the school to the Little Rock Nine, Faubus had, in effect, ordered them to block the execution of federal court mandates. And “if the day comes when we can obey the orders of our Courts only when we personally approve of them, the end of the American system, as we know it, will not be far off.”75

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President Eisenhower was able to find statutory basis for the deployment of troops to Little Rock in two sections of Title 10 of the United States Code that were brought to his attention by Attorney General Herbert Brownell.76 Justice Department attorneys began investigating the legal authority of the president to use the United States military to compel compliance with directives of the federal courts on September 10, after Judge Davies invited the Department to enter the Little Rock case as amicus curiae on the matter of enjoining Faubus against interfering with the execution of the court-approved desegregation plan for Central High School.77 On November 7, 1957, Brownell formally submitted to the president a record of “the legal advice which I have given you on separate recent occasions… between September 3, 1957, and October 1, 1957,” regarding Little Rock.78 Even before the injunction prohibiting Governor Faubus from using the Arkansas National Guard in such a fashion as to effectively prevent the enforcement of federal court orders was granted, Brownell noted in his report, the attorney general had advised President Eisenhower that “it is the duty of State officers… to suppress… disorders in a manner which will not nullify and will permit the effectuation of State and federal law.” Should the governor of a state “refuse or fail” to meet his responsibility in this respect, “it becomes the responsibility of the national government, through the Chief Executive, to dispel any such forcible resistance to Federal law.” If the President of the United States could not exercise such authority, “lawlessness would be permitted to exist for lack of any counteracting force.” When a mob assembled at Central High School on September 23, after Faubus, under injunction, had removed the National Guard, the governor neglected his duties by not “using his powers to support the local authorities.” At that point, Brownell indicated to Eisenhower that he had the “undoubted” authority to use military forces “to suppress the domestic violence, obstruction and resistance of law then and there existing,” as provided in Sections 332 and 333 of Title 10 of the United States Code.79 These sections empowered the president to call into service the National Guard, and to use federal troops, whenever he believed such action was required “to remove obstructions to the authority of the United States and to put down violence which hindered the execution of federal law.”80 On September 23, 1957, the attorney general informed Eisenhower that “the requisites of the law were met,” and that

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he was authorized to order the use of the armed forces and to federalize the Arkansas National Guard. When President Eisenhower exercised his powers under Sections 332 and 333, many of his critics charged that his actions were illegal. W. L. Eason, for one, denounced the move as “wrong and unconstitutional.” Federal court orders were properly “enforced by the marshals and his deputies, a thousand or more, if need be.” Using the armed forces rather than United States marshals was a usurpation of the powers of the judiciary in violation of the separation of powers between the three branches of the federal government.81 W. Scott Wilkinson, a Louisiana attorney and Citizens’ Council leader who helped draft antiintegration legislation in that state, also argued that, while the federal government can properly use marshals to enforce court orders, “there is no provision in the United States Constitution for the carrying out” of such orders “by the use of National or State troops.”82 Faubus himself also insisted, “I think the use of troops is illegal,” and that the only legitimate way for the federal government to enforce court orders was through the office of the United States Marshal.83 The Eisenhower Administration, however, had considered, and then rejected, the possible use of federal marshals in Little Rock because “the local strength of the United States Marshal was insufficient to achieve enforcement of the order of the United States District Court, and that, because of the local situation and the need for timely action, it would not have been reasonable, or effective in the circumstances, to attempt to have the Marshal enlist the support of the citizenry to carry out the order.”84 Both Eason and Wilkinson alleged also that the dispatch of troops to the Arkansas capital violated Article 4, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, under which the federal government is obliged to ensure that each state has a republican form of government. Eason decried, “Instead of guaranteeing the State of Arkansas a Republican form of government, the President destroyed that form of government by sheer force of military power, and without even the semblance of authority,”85 and Wilkinson further contended that the second paragraph of Section 333 “is obviously in conflict with Article 4, Section 4,” and therefore unconstitutional.86 Wilkinson attacked Sections 332 and 333 of Title 10 more generally, as well, stating that both acts were insufficient to justify Eisenhower’s actions because they applied only to the president’s affirmative duty to ensure that the properly constituted laws of the United States are faithfully executed.

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But, he plainly stated, “A decision of the court is not a law.”87 That court opinions were not laws was the main point in R. Carter Pittman’s essay, “The Federal Invasion of Arkansas in the Light of the Constitution,” too. “Such a decision is never anything more than the law of the case actually decided by the court,” he instructed, and federal laws can only be “‘made’ by lawmakers in the manner provided in the Constitution.” Thus, he concluded, “There is no ‘law of the Union’ on which the President’s order may legally rest.” 88 Karr Shannon demanded, in the Arkansas Democrat, to know “what is the ‘federal law’ that is being forced to obedience?” in Little Rock. “Since the troops occupied [Central High School], President Eisenhower has been asked to quote the law that the troops are enforcing. Attorney General Herbert Brownell has been asked to quote the law,” but they had not done so. They could not, Shannon proclaimed, because “there is no law to quote.”89 The influential editor and columnist David Lawrence insisted the same, as did Governor Faubus, despite his earlier admissions that desegregation was “the Law of the Land.”90 Governor Faubus was also quick to assert that the federalizing of the Arkansas National Guard was improper because the order was not transmitted through him. He claimed afterwards that he had received a directive from the Pentagon to order the Guard into federal service, but that he “declined to transmit the order.”91 But, while Section 331 of Title 10 provides that “the State militia and the armed forces” may be used by the president “upon call of the State legislature or of its Governor if the legislature cannot be convened, to put down any insurrection against a State government,” Justice Department lawyers agreed that “this authority was not appropriate for use and was not used in Little Rock.”92 Instead, “President Eisenhower acted under the authority of Sections 332 and 333, rather than 331,” and “under Sections 332 and 333, no request from the Governor of Arkansas for federal aid is specified as a condition of the presidential action.”93 Another of the arguments against the legality of the assignment of the “Screaming Eagles” to Little Rock, and the federalizing of the Arkansas Guard, was based on Title 18, Section 1385 of the United States Code, the “Posse Comitatus Act.” As Wilkinson explained it, this statute deliberately prohibited the president’s use of troops.94 Under that section of the Code, the use of the Army or Air Force “as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws,” except where authorized in the Constitution or by Congress, was a criminal act that

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could result in a fine of up to ten thousand dollars or an imprisonment of up to two years, or both. Orval Faubus had the text of the Posse Comitatus Act inserted into an interview he gave for U. S. News & World Report, followed by the comment, “Now, if I understand that section of the United States Code, the use of troops or Air Force in such a situation is clearly illegal and expressly forbidden.”95 Interestingly, President Eisenhower himself cited the Posse Comitatus Act as prohibiting his intervention in Mansfield, Texas, when Governor Shivers used Texas Rangers to reestablish segregation at the high school there in 1956. That law was, he explained to the press, “the thing that keeps the Federal Government from just going around where he pleases to carry out police duties” – as his opponents accused him of doing in Little Rock, Arkansas a year later.96 The Department of Justice inquiry into the possible use of the military in Little Rock had considered the implications of Title 18, Section 1385, but Brownell assured the president that the authority to use troops to enforce the federal court orders regarding the desegregation of Central High School was “predicated upon express statutory right (10 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333) and, therefore, would be within the exception contained in the Posse Comitatus Act.”97 A direct challenge of the legal basis for the “federal occupation” was issued on October 2, 1957, when Mrs. Margaret Jackson, president of the League of Central High Mothers, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas asking that the troops be removed from Little Rock and seeking a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 332, 333, and 334 of Title 10 of the United States Code.98 Mrs. Jackson, who brought the suit on behalf of herself and her two daughters, students at Central High School, contended that Sections 332, 333, and 334 violated Article 4, Section 4 of, and the Tenth Amendment to, the United States Constitution and should be invalidated. She asked that a three-judge court be assigned to hear the case. Chief Judge Archibald Gardner of the Eighth Circuit Court in St. Louis acknowledged that he was trying to determine which judges would be available to hear the suit when Judge Davies issued an order dismissing the petition.99 In his order of dismissal, Davies noted that although a three-judge proceeding is appropriate when the constitutionality of a statute is to be reviewed, the case at hand “presents no substantial federal constitutional issue” since the acts in question had already been reviewed, and upheld, by the Supreme Court of the United States. Therefore, the court had “both the right and the

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duty to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.”100 Jackson’s attorney, Kenneth C. Coffelt, denounced the dismissal, which he said had been issued “without notice to anyone and without a hearing,” as grounds for impeaching Judge Davies.”101 He promptly appealed the dismissal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, where Circuit Judges Sanborn, Johnson, and Vogel denied the motion for appeal.102

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Public Opinion Regarding the Use of Troops Despite Orval Faubus’ later insistence that “without question, if people are given the chance to say, their sentiment is quite overwhelmingly in my favor over the Nation,”103 at least two polls conducted in the wake of the arrival of 101st Airborne paratroopers in Little Rock, Arkansas, suggest that the embattled governor overestimated national support for his position. On September 26, 1957, the Trendex organization reported that telephone surveys with one thousand individuals across the country the night before revealed that 68.4 percent of respondents nationwide indicated they approved of the president’s actions in dispatching federal troops to Central High School, and that the percentage of respondents supporting the use of troops in Little Rock increased to 77.5 percent if those residing in southern states were excluded. In the South alone, however, only 33.9 percent approved and 62.6 percent disapproved of President Eisenhower’s actions, with 3.5 percent of the interviewees in the South offering no opinion on the matter.104 At the same time, a Gallup Poll revealed that nearly twothirds of all Americans supported Eisenhower’s use of federal soldiers, while 53 percent of southerners disapproved.105 Within the city of Little Rock, opinion was evidently mixed. A situation report filed by the army on September 25 indicated that “civilian reaction… ranged from wholehearted approval to wholehearted disapproval,” and another the next evening noted that “the local populace reaction to the President’s order was generally one of surprise and relief.” By the end of the school week, reports suggested that the attitude in the city had changed “to one of passive defiance,” where opponents of integration, sure that the “occupation” would have to end sometime, had simply determined to “wait until the troops leave” before resuming their protests.106 As they bided their time, Little Rock citizens could go to the movies, where the Main Theatre was advertising a double feature: D. W. Griffith’s “Birth of a

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Nation,” followed by “The Story of the 101st Airborne Division ‘The Screaming Eagles.’” The ad in the Arkansas Democrat proclaimed “Birth of a Nation” to be “the Greatest Picture of All Time!” that was “the motion picture of yesterday that exposes the threats of today!” and invited cinema-goers to view the “Shocking Story of the 101st Airborne!!” who earned the sobriquet “the Screaming Eagles” “by Bayoneting, Killing, and Fighting German People.” Now, the ad asked, “what Name Have They Earned by Their Presence in the School Dispute??”107 Archie House recalled many years later, that “everyone I knew was relieved,”108 while William T. Shelton’s impression was that the community was “resentful” of the presence of armed, federal soldiers. Of course, he noted, “most of the reaction I can remember is that coming from the segregationist side, and they were just furious and made known their feelings day after day in loud tones.”109 Of the members of the school board, segregationist Dr. Dale Alford was undoubtedly alone in his thinking “that the greatest domestic error of administration by any President was made when the paratroopers were sent to Little Rock.”110 Harold Engstrom acknowledged that, although most of the board members would not have cared to admit it at the time – and, as it turned out, they never had to – they had “already voted” to contact the Eisenhower Administration with a request for federal military assistance at Central High School if Mayor Mann did not make the request himself after the mob outside the school proved uncontrollable by local law enforcement authorities on September 23. As it happened, the mayor did ask the president to send troops and they were grateful to have been excused from the difficult and unwelcome task they would otherwise have felt obliged to perform. “Of course,” Engstrom noted, “Dale Alford wasn’t even present” when the board voted to make the request.111 As for himself, Engstrom said he felt relieved when the soldiers entered the city, but among the community at large “there was quite a reaction against the troops, a resentment of the invasion, so to speak, and the occupation. Those were words that were used by everyone at the time.”112 Engstrom wrote to President Eisenhower to tell him that, unfortunately, the board did not feel they could issue a public statement in support of his decision to send troops, because it would “irritate… and agitate” the troublemakers in the community. “However,” he assured the president, “if I met you in an elevator or cab,” Engstrom would congratulate him for his “most appropriate” response to the

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situation at Little Rock.113 School board secretary Wayne Upton sent a letter as well, to “commend” Eisenhower “most heartily in sending troops to Little Rock…. Any other course on your part,” he predicted, “would have been disastrous.”114 And former Little Rock Mayor Pratt Remmel, the only Republican ever to have held the office, also contacted the president to offer his support. He told the man in the Oval Office that many of the city’s most prominent citizens and leaders “are behind you… 100 percent.”115 Harry Ashmore’s editorial in the Arkansas Gazette on September 27 asserted that President Eisenhower’s use of federal troops in Little Rock was necessitated by Faubus’ own defiance. He wrote, “The day Orval Faubus put armed and uniformed men around Central High School under his personal order to nullify the order of a United States District Court he invited a show of force.”116 Atlanta Constitution editor Ralph McGill, who Eisenhower called “the only person down there [in the South] who had really spoken up in favor” of his actions,117 agreed with Ashmore. “The President had no other recourse save sustain the Federal Court in Arkansas,” he insisted. The situation being what it was, McGill determined, “It seems to me that if was Governor Faubus who, as the saying has it, ‘sent’ the troops to Little Rock, and not the President.”118 The Southern Governors Respond Reaction to the show of federal force from Deep South attendees at the Southern Governors’ Conference in Sea Island, Georgia, was predictably negative. Georgia Governor Griffin, of course, was vehemently opposed to President Eisenhower’s use of the military in Little Rock and had earlier commented that he was “pleased” if his address to the Citizens’ Council there on August 22 had influenced Faubus to take his stand. Griffin’s segregationist colleague, Governor George Bell Timmerman of South Carolina, was also outspoken against the federal action, and derided it as an attempt by the president “to set himself up as a dictator.” Even James E. Folsom, the governor of Alabama disapproved. In the face of die-hard segregationist opposition, Folsom had consistently maintained a position of racial moderation in his state. Only recently he had pocket vetoed several anti-integration enactments by the Alabama Legislature, including a resolution of commendation for Faubus’ use of the National Guard at

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Central High School. After the 101st Airborne was sent into Arkansas, however, Folsom remarked that he would issue a proclamation discharging every member of the Alabama Guard before allowing it to be federalized for use against his own people.119 On the other hand, representatives of the upper and border South at the conference, whose political standings at home were somewhat less dependent on adopting strong, pro-segregation stances than were those of their counterparts in the Deep South, generally supported Eisenhower’s decision. Oklahoma Governor Raymond D. Gary, Kentucky Governor A. B. Chandler, and Maryland Governor Theodore R. McKeldin each commented that the dispatch of federal paratroopers was regrettable, but necessary to as the Republican McKeldin put it, “the maintenance of respect for the law and in the keeping of order where state and local authorities shall have failed.”120 Frank Clement, the Tennessee chief executive who had used state militiamen to enforce desegregation at Clinton, Tennessee, in September 1956, suggested to his fellows at Sea Island that a conference be arranged with Eisenhower to discuss the Little Rock controversy and to negotiate a possible settlement. Clement’s proposal was agreed upon and a committee of five – Southern Governors’ Conference Chairman Luther H. Hodges of North Carolina, LeRoy Collins of Florida, Clement, McKeldin, and Griffin – was named to participate in the mediation.121 As reported in the Southern School News, “the committee wished to confer with President Eisenhower concerning the federalizing of the Arkansas guard and ordering paratroopers into Little Rock.”122 But Eisenhower, though willing to meet with the delegates from the Southern Governors’ Conference, preferred that the talks not be restricted to negotiating conditions for ending the military’s mission at Little Rock. As United States Information Agency Director Arthur Larson advised the president, who clearly agreed, that “from the point of view of world opinion, it would be unfortunate if the Conference were limited to discussion of early withdrawal of troops. This would seem to place the President in a negative and defensive posture.” If Eisenhower could instead use the opportunity presented by a meeting with the heads of several states effected by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown to talk about desegregation in general, and to stress the need for orderly compliance with federal court orders, then the conference could also be exploited for its potential propaganda value in helping to improve United States prestige abroad. After all, the nation was “still

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being tested in the eyes of the world.” It would be especially helpful, Larson counseled, if the president could “get across the point that the vast majority of the American people believe that American children must be given access to the kind of educational rights assured them by the Supreme Court decision, and firmly support peaceful and systematic progress toward that goal.”123 The Southern Governors’ Committee was informed through a presidential aide that Eisenhower would “be glad to meet” with them “to discuss the problems of integration.” Uneasy over the president’s wishes that talks not be confined to negotiating a peaceful conclusion to the Little Rock Crisis, Governor Collins telegrammed him to inform him that, according to the resolution that created the Committee, they were authorized only to discuss “the earliest possible withdrawal of federal troops.” While “any individual Governor” was certainly free to speak with the president about any matter he desired, as representatives of the Southern Governors’ Conference, they could not do so as a group.124 Governor Griffin made much of Eisenhower’s apparent insistence that the scope of the conference be “broadened… to include the entire integration question,” and “refused to attend.”125 Griffin implied that if he were to go to Washington and speak his mind, the result might be that his state could be targeted as the next site for the federal military’s armed crusade to force race-mixing in the schools.126 The other Committee members thought the Georgia governor’s decision not to attend “unnecessary” because of Collins’ telegram explaining the limitations placed on them, but, as Hodges told the press afterwards, “that was up to him, and we respected him for whatever he wanted to do.” In any event, in the end, “the whole discussion [at the conference with Eisenhower] revolved around the one situation on how to get troops out of Little Rock.”127 The Southern Governors’ Committee Meets With the President The remaining four governors on the Committee met with President Eisenhower at the White House on October 1. Early that day they gathered in a room at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington to work out the proposal they would offer the nation’s Chief Executive for a peaceable conclusion to the predicament in Arkansas. They agreed that they would report to the president that Faubus would guarantee that law and order would be maintained in the Arkansas capital if the federal

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troops were withdrawn and command of the National Guard relinquished to the governor. Faubus was contacted and asked for his approval for this proposal, which he reportedly granted on the condition that he be consulted again at the conclusion of the meeting, before he was asked to give “a final answer as to how I feel.”128 The conference took place at two-thirty in the afternoon. In addition to the Committee members and the president, Frank Bane, the secretary for both the Southern and the National Governors’ Conferences, and White House staffers Sherman Adams and Howard Pyle attended.129 According to Robert Fredrick Burk, Attorney General Brownell was intentionally absent because he was “seen by Southern officials as the ‘villain’ of Little Rock.”130 According to Governor Hodges, they had a “very frank discussion” about Eisenhower’s assignment of soldiers to Central High School and the conditions under which he would agree to their withdrawal. As Faubus had authorized them to say, the southern governors assured the president that he was prepared to assume responsibility for ensuring that law and order prevailed in Little Rock, and that the enforcement of federal court orders there would not be obstructed. Eisenhower responded that if the Arkansas governor would publicly announce that that was his intention, he would order the troops to stand down.131 Pleased that they had accomplished their goal, the Committee adjourned to a conference room with Adams and Pyle. Press Secretary Jim Hagerty joined them as they sat down to work out one statement, to be issued jointly by the president and the Committee, and another for Faubus to release. Once they settled upon the wording for both, Hodges telephoned Governor Faubus and read the joint statement to him, and asked for his endorsement of it – “meaning all of it.” According to Hodges, Faubus approved the statement. The North Carolina governor told Faubus that a statement had been prepared for him to issue as well, which, it was proposed, he should “release to the press in a few minutes.” Hodges recalled in a press conference two days later that he was very specific with Faubus, stressing to him that there must be “complete understanding, there can’t be any differences… in the approach of what is agreed to, because this thing is of national interest.” Frank Bane then also spoke to Faubus, and told him much the same thing. Again, Orval Faubus agreed to do as he was advised.132 The four governors went to meet the press in Hagerty’s office. After answering questions regarding the conference with the president,

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Hodges related, “it was said, and I wish it had been said even more conclusively – it was said by Mr. Haggerty [sic] and by me, representing the Governors – that, of course, this agreement is dependent upon what Governor Faubus wires back, but this looks like ‘it,’ and we said that in complete sincerity.”133 They then issued their joint statement, which outlined the arrangement that had been made, to the press.134 On the assumption that this was, in fact, “it,” a hopeful Herbert Brownell instructed Justice Department attorneys to prepare an executive order returning command of the Arkansas National Guard to Governor Faubus. The order was quickly composed, and was ready to be signed by the Secretary of Defense upon the issuance of the anticipated declaration by Faubus that he would conform to the conditions set at the meeting.135

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“By Me” Faubus did not issue his statement “within a few minutes,” and the executive order was not delivered to the Secretary of Defense for his signature. Finally, after several tense hours, a statement was released by Governor Faubus, but, as a member of the White House staff informed the Southern Governors’ Committee, – who had not yet seen it – “it doesn’t seem to be to our satisfaction.” The four southern governors tried frantically to get in touch with Faubus to find out what had happened, but, as Hodges explained to the press on October 3, “we never have reached him.”136 What had happened was that Faubus had altered the language of the statement. Where the original text worked out carefully by the Committee and White House aides had read: “the orders of the Federal Courts will not be obstructed and… I am prepared to assume full responsibility for maintaining law and order in Little Rock,” the governor now announced: “it has never been my intention to obstruct the orders of the Federal Courts,… the orders of the Federal Courts will not be obstructed by me, and… I am prepared, as I have always been, to assume full responsibility for maintaining law and order in Little Rock.”137 Both Governors Hodges and McKeldin indicated to reporters that it was their impression that the addition of the words “by me” was the point of major objection.138 White House officials would say only that there were “many things” wrong with the statement.139

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The addition of the words “by me” did suggest that Faubus would not act affirmatively to prevent others from obstructing federal court orders. More than that, the entire tone of the declaration had been changed by Faubus’ amendments. As Eisenhower explained during a press conference on October 3, the statement that had actually been issued needed to be considered “as an entire whole” and, throughout, the Arkansas governor gave no indication that his position had changed. Therefore, “that telegram merely took the situation back to where it was before Federal troops arrived.”140 In other words, nothing in Faubus’ message could be taken for a promise that he “would do other than use the National Guard, if returned to his order, for the same purpose he originally did – i.e., to prevent Negro children from going to school…. He said he would act ‘as he had done in the past.’”141 Without such a promise, Eisenhower said, he could not approve of any plan to remove the troops from Little Rock.142 Both he and the Southern Governors’ Committee were “unquestionably… disappointed by what had happened.”143 Committee member Theodore McKeldin, it seemed, was more than disappointed,” – he was outraged. Faubus, who he later referred to as the “sputtering sputnik from the Ozarks,”144 was deliberately trying to prolong the crisis for his own political ends, without care for the effects his actions had on both his state and the nation. The Arkansas governor, he charged, “Now stands as the only man of prominence in all America who wants the troops of the federal government kept in Little Rock.” Otherwise, why would he have sabotaged the arrangement agreed upon during the October 1 conference? “By his ignominious double-crossing of the sincere and serious governors” who endeavored to resolve the catastrophe, Faubus “has elected to pile infamy on the heap of disgrace which he has inflicted on the great state of Arkansas.” Faubus, McKeldin was sure, was “no more opposed to interracial use of public school facilities” than he or the other members of the Southern Governors’ Committee that had met with the president. “The difference is that Governor Collins, Hodges, and Clement,” along with himself, “believe in constituted governments of law,” where “Governor Faubus prefers the demagogue’s dangerous and destructive appeal to the emotions of the mob.”145 At the time, Faubus claimed that the words “by me” “were in his statement as agreed to by telephone” with Governor Hodges, and that the message he released to the press “was the unequivocal assurance” that he would do what was required by President Eisenhower as a pre-

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condition for ending “the military occupation of Arkansas.” He was not the one who stood in the way of an amicable solution. The problem was that Attorney General Brownell and the “palace guard” were pulling the strings at the White House and as long as that was the case, he was doubtful that any settlement could be reached.146 Later, Faubus admitted that the words “by me” were not in the original text, but that it was his understanding that he did not have to issue the prepared document “word for word.” He had added those two words to protect himself, since the federal government “evidently” was “trying to worm me into the position of making the guarantee that there would be no obstruction to the court order from any source whatsoever.”147 Had he offered such a guarantee, he said, “I would have been in a very untenable position – I could have been blamed with anything that happened.” Looked at that way, he noted, “I don’t think the Governor of any state” would have agreed to take on that responsibility.148 In fact, he insisted, it was “the most unfair request by a responsible official to another, in the history of the Republic.”149

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Negotiations Fail The effort to negotiate an end to the Little Rock situation failed. Orval Faubus, for one, predicted that it would be necessary to keep the federal troops in place as long as black students remained in the school. President Eisenhower, on the other hand, was extremely eager to pull the soldiers out of Arkansas as soon as it was practicable to do so. As the scene in the vicinity of Central High School quietened, reductions in troop strength were made. On October 14 half of the federal paratroopers were withdrawn and the great majority of the Arkansas Guardsmen were defederalized.150 Over time, further reductions occurred and eventually the 101st Airborne was removed altogether, leaving the responsibility for ensuring the safety of the Little Rock Nine to a small contingent of Guardsmen that remained in federal service. For the remainder of the school year, however, the black pupils continued attending the high school under the aegis of military protection.151 And, the president, increasingly frustrated by Faubus’ recalcitrance and his persistence that the state was not obligated to enforce federal court orders – or even federal laws, as he began to claim by the beginning of 1958 – stopped insisting that state authorities were properly responsible for maintaining law and order in Little Rock.

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On January 15, 1958, Eisenhower indicated that he was no longer interested in shifting the onus for enforcing court-ordered desegregation in Central High School to the state. Instead, he now supposed, “I don’t know that the State office is the one that is responsible for the police duties and peace and order in the city. I think it probably belongs to the locality.”152

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NOTES 

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1

Address by the President of the United States, Sept. 24, 1957. Ann Whitman File, Speech Series, DDE Library. Copy also located in Caldwell Papers, UAF. 2 Ibid. 3 Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights (Princeton, 2000), 133. 4 Cary Fraser, “Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower Administration and the Dilemma of Race for U.S. Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 24:2 (Spring 2000), 247; Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), 104. 5 Mary Dudziak, “Brown as a Cold War Case,” Journal of American History 91:1 (June 2004), 32. 6 For example, Freyer’s The Little Rock Crisis makes no attempt to place the events of the school integration controversy within a Cold War context. He does remedy this, however, by addressing the issue in his most recent work, Little Rock on Trial. Spitzberg’s does not consider the Cold War context in Racial Politics in Little Rock. Neither do any of the essays in Jacoway and Williams, Understanding the Little Rock Crisis. None of the following more generalized works on the reaction to the Brown decision consider the international implications of Massive Resistance: Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance; McMillen, The Citizens’ Council; Muse, Ten Years of Prelude; Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men; or Chappell, Inside Agitators. McMillen, Muse, and Peltason do, however, mention the use of anti-Communist rhetoric by segregationists, and Bartley discusses its use in some detail in The Rise of Massive Resistance, 186-189. Interestingly, Elliff does not discuss the Cold War atmosphere either, in his The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, despite the fact that the federal government maintained a keen awareness of the relationship of civil rights at home to the reputation of the nation abroad in its policymaking decisions during this period, nor does Belknap in Federal Law and Southern Order, which is concerned primarily with the federal response to episodes of racial violence. George Lewis does treat with the Little Rock crisis in The White South and the Red Menace, his work on anti-communism and massive resistance. 7 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 6. 8 Lewis, The White South and the Red Menace, 43. 9 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), as quoted in Dudziak, “Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,” Stanford Law Review 41:61 (Nov. 1988), 61. 10 Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 57. 11 Ibid., 57-58.

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12

Address by the President at the State Dinner of the 1957 Governors’ Conference held in Williamsburg, Virginia, June 24, 1957. Ann Whitman File, Speech Series, DDE Library. 13 Azza Salama Layton, “International Pressure and the U. S. Government’s Response to Little Rock,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56:3 (Autumn 1997), 261-262. 14 Staff Report: “World Reaction to US Racial Integration Incidents”, Sept. 12, 1957. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 15 Ibid. 16 Staff Notes No. 193, Sept. 13, 1957. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 17 Staff report: “Reaction to US Integration Incidents Increases,” Sept. 13, 1957. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 18 Ibid. 19 Staff Notes No. 193, Sept. 13, 1957. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 20 Lewis, The White South and the Red Menace, 44. 21 Staff Report: “World Reaction to US Racial Integration Incidents”, Sept. 12, 1957. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 22 Quoted in Lewis, The White South and the Red Menace, 76. 23 This interpretation of Eisenhower’s decision to send troops to Little Rock was held by “many diplomats and other figures in foreign countries” at the time. Layton, “International Pressure,” 270. 24 Fraser, “Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock,” 249. Layton noted that “Eisenhower’s intervention received mostly positive international response, though some accused him of procrastination, which ‘leaves a bitter aftertaste,’ as one foreign newspaper abroad put it, and of taking a weak stand on civil rights legislation,” Layton, “International Pressure,” 269. 25 Ibid., 270. 26 Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights, 145. 27 Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 108. 28 David Alan Horowitz, “White Southerners’ Alienation and Civil Rights: The Response to Corporate Liberalism, 1956-1965,” Journal of Southern History 54:2 (May 1988), 175-176. 29 Ibid., 175. 30 Lewis, The White South and the Red Menace, 54. 31 “The Supreme Court, Segregation, and the South,” an address by Sen. James O. Eastland (D-Miss.) in the United States Senate, May 27, 1954. Copy located in Citizens’ Council papers, UA-F. 32 “We’ve Reached Era of Judicial Tyranny,” an address by Sen. James O. Eastland to the statewide convention of the Association of Citizens’ Councils

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 of Mississippi, in Jackson, Miss., Dec. 1, 1955. Copy located in Citizens’ Council papers, UA-F. 33 Talmadge, You and Segregation, vi. 34 Ibid., 44-45. 35 Lewis, The White South and the Red Menace, 16. 36 Glen Jeansonne, Leander Perez: Boss of the Delta (2nd edition, Lafayette, La., 1995), 224. 37 Leander Perez, “The Unconstitutionality of the 14th Amendment and the Evils Resulting From Subversive Use of its ‘Equal Protection’ Clause,” undated. Leander Perez papers, NOPL. 38 William M. Rainach, “guest editorial” in the Shreveport Journal, Sept. 9, 1955. Rainach papers, LSUS. 39 William McFerrin Stowe, Jr., “Willie Rainach and the Defense of Segregation in Louisiana, 1954-1959.” Unpublished dissertation (Texas Christian University, 1989), 202. 40 Form letter from Rainach to newspaper editors, May 23, 1957. Rainach papers, LSUS. A handwritten note at the top indicated that it had been sent to 2500 southern newspapers. 41 Stowe, “Willie Rainach and the Defense of Segregation,” 152. 42 Ibid., 157, 159-160. 43 Quoted in ibid., 165. 44 Ibid., 166. Several letters to Rainach requesting copies of Subversion In Racial Unrest can be found in Rainach papers, LSUS. 45 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 187. 46 Rep. John S. Garrett, Joint Legislative Committee member and Citizens’ Council spokesman. Quoted in Ibid. 47 Fred C. Petersen to Rainach. Rainach papers, LSUS. There is some uncertainty as to the date of this missive. It is dated January 18, 1956, but stamped received on January 23, 1957. 48 “Segregation and the South,” an address by Judge Tom P. Brady to the Commonwealth Club of California, in San Francisco, Oct. 4, 1957. Copy located in Citizens’ Council papers, UA-F. 49 Lewis, The White South and the Red Menace, 77. 50 Horowitz, “White Southerners’ Alienation and Civil Rights,” 176. 51 Address by Daisy Bates to the Williams Institutional CME Church, New York City, Nov. 3, 1957. Published in W. Stuart Towns, Public Address in the Twentieth-Century South: The Evolution of a Region (Westport, CT, 1999). 52 Joseph P. Kamp, “The Lowdown on Little Rock and the Plot to Sovietize the South” (1957). Copy located in Rainach papers, LSUS. 53 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 141. 54 Ibid. 55 Guthridge interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 26-27.

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56

Leander Perez, for example, declared Eisenhower’s use of federal force was “the greatest victory for the Communist cold war against the people of this country.” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sept. 26, 1957. 57 Ibid., Sept. 25, 1957; SSN, Oct. 1957. 58 New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sept. 25, 1957. 59 Ibid. 60 Karr Shannon, Integration Decision Is Unconstitutional (Little Rock, 1958), 40. 61 W. L. Eason, “Segregation Is Constitutional but Compulsory Integration Is Unconstitutional,” undated. Copy located in Lemley papers, UALR. 62 New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sept. 26, 1957. 63 FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover denied this charge as an outright “falsehood.” SSN, Nov. 1957. 64 Faubus speech of Sept. 26, 1957. Faubus papers, UA-F. 65 New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sept. 25, 1957. 66 SSN, Oct. 1957. 67 Ibid. 68 Telegram, Price Daniel to Eisenhower, Sept. 24, 1957. Central File, Office Files, DDE Library. 69 Eisenhower to Daniel, Oct. 3, 1957. Ibid. 70 While Eisenhower made it plain, in his speech on September 24, his reasons for sending federal soldiers to Little Rock, Arkansas, he found it necessary to explain himself again in a telegram to Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia on September 28, 1957; in his response to Daniel, which the Texas governor made public; in press conferences on October 3 and October 9, 1957; in a memorandum entitled “Notes on the Legal Principles Guiding the President,” which was released to the press in October, 1957; in a letter responding to Mississippi Senator John Stennis’ “misimpressions” on October 7, 1957; and again in a press conference on May 14, 1958. And still, in 1960, Eisenhower wrote in the margin of a report distributed by Republican Senator Norris Cotton of New Hampshire to his constituents in which the president underlined the comment that resort “to the club and the bayonet” at Little Rock was unjustified, “the marked sentence evidences the lack of understanding of most people as to the reasons for sending soldiers to Little Rock.” In White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries; Central File, Office Files; Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series; White House Office File, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries; Central File, Office Files; Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series; and Ann Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary; respectively. All in DDE Library. 71 Telegram, Richard B. Russell to Eisenhower, Sept. 26, 1957. White House Office File, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 72 Telegram, Eisenhower to Russell, Sept. 28, 1957. Ibid. 73 Telegram, E. C. Gathings to Eisenhower, Sept. 26, 1957. Central File, Office Files, DDE Library. 74 Belknap, Federal Law and Southern Order, 49.

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75

Eisenhower to Hazlett, Nov. 18, 1957. Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary, DDE Library. 76 A third section, 10 U.S.C. 334, which required that a proclamation be issued before deploying troops or federalizing the National Guard under the authority of §§ 332 and 333, applied, and was complied with by the president on September 23, 1957. 77 Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, 473474; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 122-123; Belknap, Federal Law and Southern Order, 49. 78 Brownell to Eisenhower, Nov. 7, 1957. Caldwell papers, UA-F. 79 Ibid. 80 Belknap, Federal Law and Southern Order, 49. 81 W. L. Eason, “Segregation Is Constitutional but Compulsory Integration Is Unconstitutional,” undated. Copy located in Lemley papers, UALR. 82 W. Scott Wilkinson, “The Little Rock Case: Authority of the President to Use Federal Troops in a State of the Union,” Oct. 1, 1957. Copy located in Rainach papers, LSUS. Wilkinson’s paper is perhaps the most thorough refutation of Eisenhower’s legal grounds for using military force. 83 “The Story of Little Rock – As Governor Faubus Tells It,” U. S. News & World Report (June 20, 1958), 105. 84 Brownell to Eisenhower, Nov. 7, 1957. Caldwell papers, UA-F. Elliff argues that the entire “question of marshals vs. troops misses the central factor in Little Rock – the consequences of the Administration’s policy of declining to take initiative in school desegregation cases.” Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, 486. Belknap would agree with that statement. In his view, “what happened at Little Rock in the fall of 1957 demonstrated dramatically the folly of the Eisenhower administration in refusing to accept responsibility for preventing violent interference with implementation of the Brown decision.” Belknap, Federal Law and Southern Order, 44. 85 W. L. Eason, “Segregation Is Constitutional but Compulsory Integration Is Unconstitutional,” undated. Copy located in Lemley papers, UALR. 86 W. Scott Wilkinson, “The Little Rock Case: Authority of the President to Use Federal Troops in a State of the Union,” Oct. 1, 1957. Copy located in Rainach papers, LSUS. 87 Ibid. 88 R. Carter Pittman, “The Federal Invasion of Arkansas in the Light of the Constitution,” undated, but stamped received on October 2, 1957. Copy located in Rainach papers, LSUS. 89 Karr Shannon, Integration Decision Is Unconstitutional, 27-28. Originally published in “Run of the News” as “The Troops are There to Enforce What Law?,” Arkansas Democrat, Oct. 22, 1957. That the Supreme Court’s mandate for desegregation in Brown was not the “Law of the Land” was a common theme in Shannon’s columns. See also, for example, “Who Knows What ‘The

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 Law of the Land’ Is?” on Sept. 13, 1957, and “Real Meaning of ‘Law of the Land,’” Nov. 1, 1957. Ibid., 3-4, 32-34. 90 See David Lawrence’s nationally syndicated column of Aug. 23, 1958, for example, and Faubus’ comments in “The Story of Little Rock – As Governor Faubus Tells It,” U. S. News & World Report (June 20, 1958), 102. 91 Ibid., 105. 92 Brownell to Eisenhower, Nov. 7, 1957. Caldwell papers, UA-F. 93 “Enforcement of Court Orders: Federal Contempt Proceedings and Prevention of Obstruction,” RRLR 2 (1958), 1078. 94 W. Scott Wilkinson, “The Little Rock Case: Authority of the President to Use Federal Troops in a State of the Union,” Oct. 1, 1957. Copy located in Rainach papers, LSUS. 95 “The Story of Little Rock – As Governor Faubus Tells It,” U. S. News & World Report (June 20, 1958), 105. 96 Presidential press conference, Sept. 11, 1956. Central Files, Office File, DDE Library. 97 Brownell to Eisenhower, Nov. 7, 1957. Caldwell papers, UA-F. 98 Mrs. Margaret Jackson, et al. v. Colonel William A. Kuhn, individually and as Commanding Officer of the 101st Airborne Infantry Regiment [sic], United States Army, et al. SSN, Nov. 1957; RRLR 2 (1958), 1099-1101. 99 SSN, Nov. 1957. 100 RRLR 2 (1958), 1101. The Supreme Court had upheld the validity of the statutes challenged by Jackson in Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 12 (1827), Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849), and Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932). Ibid. 101 SSN, Nov. 1957. 102 RRLR 2 (1958), 1102. 103 David Franke and Douglas Caddy, “An Interview With Governor Faubus,” American Opinion 17:10 (Nov. 1959). Copy located in Faubus papers, UA-F. 104 Carroll P. Newton to Sherman Adams, Sept. 26, 1957. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 105 George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971 (3 vols.; New York, 1972), II, 1517. 106 Situation Reports, Sept. 25, 26, and 27, 1957. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 107 Advertisements for this double feature ran in both the Democrat and the Gazette. Copies of the ads are located in Ibid. 108 A. F. House interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 39. 109 William T. Shelton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 22. 110 Dr. Dale Alford interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 4. 111 Harold Engstrom interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 24. 112 Ibid., 26. 113 Engstrom to Eisenhower, Sept. 25, 1957. Central File, Office Files, DDE Library. 114 Upton to Eisenhower, Sept. 26, 1957. Ibid.

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115

Telegram, Pratt Remmel to Eisenhower, Sept. 24, 1957. Ibid. Arkansas Gazette editorial, “The Case For Orval E. Faubus,” Sept. 27, 1957. 117 Telephone call between Eisenhower and former HEW Secretary Oveta Culp Hobby, Oct. 19, 1957. Ann Whitman Files, DDE Diary, DDE Library. 118 Ralph McGill to William J. Miller of the New York Herald-Tribune, Oct. 26, 1957. Copy sent to Press Secretary James C. Hagerty, who forwarded the letter to Eisenhower. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 119 SSN, Oct. 1957. 120 Ibid. McKeldin was the only Republican governor at the conference. And, perhaps it is significant, Kentucky’s Chandler was “an avowed candidate” for the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination and was therefore especially attentive to national sentiment regarding Eisenhower’s response to the Little Rock situation. Ibid. 121 Ibid. Marvin Griffin was the sole arch-segregationist of the group. The others were all moderates on the integration question. A copy of the resolution adopted by the Southern Governors’ Conference on September 25, 1957, which created the Committee and outlined its mission, is located in White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 122 SSN, Oct. 1957. 123 Memorandum, “Notes for President’s Conference with Southern Governors,” Larson to Eisenhower, Sept. 30, 1957. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 124 “Remarks by Governor Luther H. Hodges in Reporting on Negotiations Between the President of the United States and the Governor of Arkansas with Reference to Removal of Troops from Little Rock,” Governor’s Press Conference, State Capitol, Raleigh, North Carolina, Oct. 3, 1957. Transcript sent to Faubus by Governor LeRoy Collins, Nov. 5, 1957. Faubus Papers, UAF. 125 Diary, Sept. 14 – 30, 1957. Ann Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary, DDE Library. 126 SSN, Nov. 1957. 127 “Remarks by Governor Luther H. Hodges,” Oct. 3, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, 189. 131 “Remarks by Governor Luther H. Hodges,” Oct. 3, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 A copy of the “Joint Statement Issued by President and Governors’ Committee After Conference on Tuesday, October 1, 1957,” is located in Faubus Papers, UA-F.

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Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, 480. “Remarks by Governor Luther H. Hodges,” Oct. 3, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 137 “Text of Statement Discussed by Telephone With Governor Faubus and With Which We Understood He Agreed,” released to the press by Hodges on October 3, 1957; “Text of Statement Issued by Governor Faubus of Arkansas,” Oct. 1, 1957. Ibid. 138 “Remarks by Governor Luther H. Hodges,” Oct. 3, 1957. Faubus Papers, UA-F. SSN, Nov. 1957. 139 SSN, Nov. 1957. 140 Presidential Press Conference, Oct. 3, 1957. Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series, DDE Library. 141 Pre-Press Conference Notes, Oct. 3, 1957. Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary, DDE Library. 142 Presidential Press Conference, Oct. 3, 1957. Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series, DDE Library. SSN, Nov. 1957. 143 Presidential Press Conference, Oct. 3, 1957. Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series, DDE Library. 144 SSN, Nov. 1957. 145 McKeldin, as quoted in Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 131. 146 SSN, Nov. 1957. 147 “The Story of Little Rock – As Governor Faubus Tells It,” U. S. News & World Report (June 20, 1958), 106. 148 These responses are from unpublished portions of the interview that appeared in U. S. News & World Report on June 20, 1958. Faubus Papers, UAF. 149 Faubus to Foreman, Aug. 17, 1967. Ibid. 150 Burk, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights, 190. 151 On May 29, 1958, two days after graduation ceremonies, the final 425 Arkansas National Guardsmen that remained in federal service were released from duty. SSN, June 1958. 152 Presidential Press Conference, Jan. 15, 1958. Ann Whitman File, Press Conference Series, DDE Library.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

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The “Prevailing Spirit of Defiance” At the end of the school year, Governor Faubus confidently asserted that the primary effect of the federal government’s “illegal” action in Little Rock, Arkansas, had been a hardening of opposition against forced integration. The people, he insisted, were “a great deal more determined” to resist federal usurpation of states’ rights than ever before.1 Signs of that trend in public opinion in the city, “and elsewhere,”2 were apparent months earlier, and, perceiving that his constituents would respond to a more radically segregationist stance, the neo-Populist governor obliged them. In December 1957, Faubus publicly pronounced, for the first time, that the Brown decree was not “the law of the land,” after all, and, therefore, the federal government’s constant insistences that the troops had been deployed only to guarantee that federal law was enforced and not to promote racial integration were disingenuous.3 Faubus found, to his pleasure, that the more unequivocally segregationist his statements became, the more he “grew in popularity as a result.”4 Indications that hard-line segregationism had the potential to capture votes in the traditionally “moderate” city of Little Rock were revealed by the November 1957 elections for the City Manager Board. The decision to switch from a mayor-council to a city manager system of municipal government had been made before the desegregation crisis began at Central High School, and was made for reasons that did not involve the integration question, but the deadline for candidates to file for the seven seats on the board of managers was September 26, when conflict in the city was at its peak. Segregationists scrambled to enter candidates. Three “officials of segregationist groups” entered the race. Four of the eleven independents who had filed earlier joined with the segregationists to offer a full slate of seven candidates. All were political “unknowns,” and “most of them had never been in the public eye until the integration controversy at Central High.”5 They directed their challenge primarily at the slate of moderate candidates sponsored by the Good Government Committee, a group of business- and civic leaders, which had been created expressly for the purpose of promoting the switch to the new governmental system in Little Rock and had been

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campaigning for nearly a year.6 The Good Government candidates “tried to ignore the race issue, took no stand on it” in the campaign. They stressed, as they had all along, the need for an efficient and honest board capable of promoting economic progress and prosperity. The segregationists waged their battle entirely on the race issue.7 The election results are instructive as an indication of popular sentiment in Little Rock. Surprisingly, the “segregationists gave moderate candidates close and heated competition” in that race, where the moderates eked out a “narrow victory.”8 One of the segregationists, in fact, did win a seat on the board. Furthermore, voter turnout was low, with almost half of Little Rock’s eligible voters staying away from the polls. The ballots cast in the wealthy Pulaski Heights section of the city, and in those wards with a majority of black voters, determined the margin of victory.9 It was in these wards as well, that voter turnout was greatest. Very likely, then, in a statewide election in which higher percentages of eligible voters could be expected to participate, an archsegregationist who ran on that issue alone stood a strong chance of success.

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“Little Rock Laws” By the beginning of 1958, the Governor of Arkansas had firmly aligned himself with the segregationist camp. He no longer felt it necessary to be discreet in his dealings with the Capital Citizens Council, and he entertained three representatives from that organization in his office during December. The Councilors requested that Faubus convene a special session of the legislature to consider legislation that would permit the closing of any school to which federal soldiers had been sent. Clearly, it was hoped that the governor would use such a law, if adopted, to close Central High School, and thus end both the “occupation” and, effectively, desegregation in the city. Faubus told them that there was “a good possibility that there will be a special session” called for that purpose.10 By February, several other southern states had already passed, or were considering, similar acts, commonly referred to as “Little Rock Laws.” Florida was the first, its legislature having previously been scheduled to meet in special session in October to consider matters unrelated to segregation. That subject, however, quickly “became the major topic” for discussion among the representatives. They passed a

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law designed to ensure that the calamity taking place in Little Rock could not occur in any Florida school district. It provided for the “automatic” closure of any school “upon the employ of federal troops in the vicinity of said school for certain purposes.” Although it was expected by many that Governor LeRoy Collins would veto the measure, he signed it into law. Still, Collins said, the act was not necessary because the statutes protecting segregation that already existed were sufficient to prevent the Little Rock crisis from being duplicated anywhere in Florida.11 Texas already had a “Little Rock Law” on the books as well. There, Governor Price Daniel, who had demanded that Eisenhower reveal whether he intended to station forces to “occupy” every segregated school in the South,12 the moment he learned that paratroopers had been sent to deal with the situation in Arkansas, called the state legislature into extraordinary session. The Texas legislators passed two laws, one providing for school closure upon the dispatch of federal troops and stipulating that funds budgeted for the school be used to furnish “out-of-classroom instruction” for the displaced pupils. The second appropriated $50,000 for use by the state’s attorney general to defend segregation statutes challenged in local school districts. The Texas school closure act specifically directed the governor to use police to maintain order, not the National Guard, and authorized individual school boards to shut down any school if the police were unable to keep the peace.13 A Virginia bill was introduced in January 1958 at the recommendation of Governor Lindsay Almond, and was signed into law in February. This “Little Rock Law” required the automatic closure of any school where the federal government sent military or civilian agents to enforce integration, thus determining that the state would interpose to prevent United States marshals from enforcing court-ordered desegregation, despite the general agreement among opponents to Eisenhower’s methods at Little Rock that enforcement of federal court orders by marshals would have been legal.14 In his fourth annual message to the South Carolina Assembly when it convened on January 14, 1958, Governor George Bell Timmerman, Jr. recommended that they adopt a “Little Rock Law.” “I am opposed to children attending school with bayonets pointing in their backs,” he declared. Instead, “let federal agents patrol empty halls and empty classrooms. Let them point their weapons at the backs of empty seats.” The assembly did issue a strong resolution of condemnation against

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President Eisenhower’s handling of the Little Rock affair in January, but by the time the session drew to a close on April 24, it had done little else regarding the school integration question. 15 Legislation was introduced in Mississippi that would have required the automatic closure of individual public schools in the event of federal military intervention. In January, the bill was being studied in the senate by both the judiciary and the education committees, where it remained when Mississippi determined to change its tactics in the struggle to maintain segregation two moths later. Instead, the state created a law that authorized the closing of any school where integration was imminent, even in the absence of federal enforcement efforts. Under the Mississippi statute, the governor, at “his discretion” could close any school if he determined that doing so would be in “the best interests of a majority of educable children,” involved.16 Interestingly, a “Little Rock Law” was introduced in the border South state of Delaware as well. Representative Charles P. West sponsored the bill, which he said was based on the Florida act, in January 1958. The proposed statute would have “authorized and directed” school boards to shut down any school where federal troops, or federalized Guardsmen, were sent, and further stipulated that transfers to other schools must be granted upon request. Students who did not transfer elsewhere would be exempted from compulsory education requirements – they would simply be marked “present” “for the purpose of attendance records required by law.” The Delaware bill never made it out of the house. In May 1958, the Southern School News, noting that the state legislature would return to session that month, commented that “there is always the chance” that the measure would come up for another vote. By this time, the proposal had already been rejected three times, but the determined West insisted it be restored to the calendar each time.17 Inside the School In Little Rock, segregationist activities outside of Central High School waned in the presence of federal soldiers. The Capital Citizens Council and the Mothers’ League lobbied to attract public support for a proposal to shut the school down rather than abide its continued operation, “racially mixed” and patrolled by paratroopers. In this attempt, “the misleading argument was advanced that, if the school was

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closed, it could later be reopened as a private school on a segregated basis.”18 At the same time, opponents of public school integration began a campaign to incite disorder within the school building itself. In the days after the 101st Airborne was first dispatched to the Arkansas capital to enforce federal court desegregation orders, the Mothers’ League, whose leaders met with Governor Faubus to discuss the school situation, attempted to organize a boycott of the high school. Several parents reported to federal officers in the city that they had received telephone calls “from unidentified females” who “requested the parents ‘to withdraw their children from school… in order to allow Governor Faubus to take action.’”19 Hundreds of students did not return to classes following the arrival of federal soldiers on campus. A small handful of the absentees were actually on active duty as members of the federalized Arkansas National Guard.20 Others were likely kept at home because they or their parents feared for their safety in the first, turbulent days when the black students entered the school. And, of course, there were certainly the usual number of normal absences due to reasons having nothing to do with the crisis. The majority, however, refused to attend in protest of the admission of the Little Rock Nine and the “occupation” of Central High School by “invading” federal forces. But, as it became clear that sufficient numbers would not stay away to support an effective boycott, the children flocked back to the school.21 Consequently, conditions became increasingly disagreeable for the blacks at Central High, “due, in part to the continued increase of attendance coupled with the return to school of a part of the approximately one hundred known trouble makers.” It was further observed that there was a concerted “effort… being made by this group to increase the number of this element returning to school.”22 News quickly reached school and military authorities that the ringleaders among these “known troublemakers” in the student body were trying to recruit their fellow classmates to stage a dramatic walkout on Thursday, October 3. School officials announced that any student that participated in the demonstration would immediately be suspended.23 Like the attempted boycott before it, however, the walkout, too, was an acknowledged failure. On the designated morning, a throng of two- or three hundred white students loitered outside to harass the “Nine Who Dared” as they were escorted into the building by a Guardsman from the 153d Infantry Regiment.24 A few boys moved to block their entrance, but immediately let them pass when ordered by an officer to step aside.25 The majority of the

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teenagers that had gathered on the lawn in front of the high school then entered the building themselves. Nearly fifty did not, joining instead the group of some twenty or thirty adults that had shown up that morning for the demonstration. Inside Central High School, Elizabeth Huckaby, an English teacher and Vice Principal for Girls, frankly admitted that she “just didn’t know what to expect.” Recognizing that there was “something appealing to all youngsters, especially teenagers, about cutting school,” and that “entirely aside from their feelings about segregation and integration,” peer-pressure to participate “would be a force pulling them into [the] walkout,” the faculty prepared for a major protest. The school nurse was instructed not to excuse from class any child who claimed to be “sick,” and she, Principal Jess Matthews, Vice Principal for Boys J. O. Powell, the Army captain in charge of operations at the school, and the president of the Parent-Teacher Association stationed themselves at the front doors just before the nine o’clock bell signifying the end of homeroom and the designated time for the walkout.26 When the bell sounded, “approximately 40 to 60 students exited to participate in the previously announced ‘walkout.’” Guardsmen swiftly dispersed the crowd. One man was arrested, for setting afire “an effigy of a Negro” that one of the children had brought, and a female student was detained for slapping one of the soldiers. The girl, whose name appeared on a list of “Habitual Troublemakers,” was “escorted to the school and suspended by school authorities.”27 In all, sixty-seven students were suspended for their participation in the day’s events. Agitators within and without Central High School had hoped that fiveor six hundred would join in the protest.28 Huckaby noted, with some amusement, that some of the pupils who exited the building, “just walked across the grounds and reentered the school through another door” when they realized how few of their classmates walked out with them. And, she realized after the morning’s attendance records were examined, several of the students who had not attended school “since the Nine came” turned up in their homerooms that day “specifically to walkout.” One of them was the older daughter of Margaret Jackson, president of the Mothers’ League. Interestingly, Jackson’s younger daughter “was in school… and did not join the walkout.”29 Over the next several days, many of the suspended students, who were required to appear in Superintendent Blossom’s office with their

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parents before being readmitted, gradually returned to school.30 Recognizing that efforts to motivate the bulk of the student body or their parents to place their presumed preference for continued segregation over the desire for uninterrupted education would not succeed, the “troublemakers” decided to dedicate themselves to intimidating the black students into retreating from the school. According to Daisy Bates, “early in October, 1957, a small but wellorganized group of segregationist students gained complete control inside the school.” She noted that this development coincided with the taking over of patrol operations within Central High by the federalized National Guard soldiers. The young tormentors of the Little Rock Nine, apparently, quickly realized that, “unlike the Army paratroopers, many of the guardsmen looked the other way when the Negro pupils were attacked.”31 Consequently, “the Negro pupils became constant targets for torture, both the physical and the psychological variety.”32 Details of the many incidents of harassment of the Little Rock Nine by white students are well documented and need not be discussed here.33 It was strongly suspected that such activities inside the school were being encouraged, even directed, by adults on the outside. Huckaby, while refraining from making any outright accusations against specific individuals, was certain that the most unruly students were not acting entirely on their own initiative, however willing they might have been to do as they were urged. Some of the printed materials distributed in the school, she determined, looked too professionally produced or were too sophisticated in language usage to have originated with the children themselves. School board member Dr. William G. Cooper agreed, and singled out Amis Guthridge as one who “took the lead” in instructing the principal agitators among the student body. Blossom, too, believed that segregationist leaders from the Capital Citizens Council and the Mothers’ League influenced disruptiveness inside Central High.34 Ultimately, the segregationists tasted success when one of the Nine could take no more and retaliated against her harassers. Minnijean Brown was suspended, and then permanently expelled from Central on February 17, 1958.35 Overnight, cards appeared in the school that read, “One Down – Eight To Go,” which were distributed among the students and worn by some as badges. A few who were caught passing out the cards were suspended, including a pretty, sixteen-year-old named Sammie Dean Parker, a recognized leader among the troublemakers. Blossom described her as an “intelligent,” white girl who “had marked qualities of leadership, but who was obviously under

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strong outside influence by segregationists whom we never definitely identified.”36 Sammie Dean herself was expelled on February 28. Perhaps the identity of the segregationists who “influenced” her is revealed by the fact that her expulsion was immediately followed by “a protest campaign” unleashed by the Reverend Wesley Pruden and Amis Guthridge insisting she be reinstated.37 Guthridge presented himself as her attorney, and threatened to sue the school if she was not readmitted. When the school board failed to lift her expulsion, Sammie Dean, along with her mother and Guthridge, appeared on a television program sponsored by the pro-segregation organization the Freedom Fund for Little Rock, on March 4 to explain “her side” of the story. She insisted that she had been “singled out” for persecution by school officials because she had gotten some publicity during the riotous days in September when federal troops were first sent into the city, and now they were making an “example” of her, without providing sufficient explanations for their actions. Furthermore, she charged, a Guardsman “had been assigned to follow her everywhere” she went, and had made life difficult for her at school. By the end of the thirty-minute program, both Sammie Dean and her mother were “in tears.” Public response was unsympathetic to poor Sammie Dean, and the school board issued a statement insisting that the program was inaccurate as far as what really had occurred in her case. Still, Guthridge filed a suit against the school board three days later, and, within a week, a settlement had been reached. On March 11 the school board reinstated Sammie Dean Parker after she signed a statement promising that she would obey all school rules from then on. The lawsuit was dropped.38 With Sammie Dean’s reinstatement, Minnijean Brown remained the only Central High School student permanently expelled from the school for disciplinary reasons related to integration that year.39 The next primary target for systematic intimidation was Ernest Green, the only senior among the blacks at the high school. The campaign directed against him was not successful – Ernest Green became the first black student to graduate from Central High School that May.40 His diploma, Daisy Bates remarked, “cost taxpayers approximately $5,000,000.”41

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School Authorities Struggle to Maintain Discipline The intimidation campaign waged inside Central High School was not successful in driving the black students out. It was, however, creating consternation among the superintendent and the school board members. Unruly behavior at the school was disrupting the business of educating the children, they felt, and dealing with troublemakers was an aggravating affair. January 1958 was, the Southern School News reported, the “worst month for ‘incidents’ since nine Negroes were integrated” into the Little Rock high school. Thurgood Marshall feared that the black students “can’t take much more.” Daisy Bates quickly interjected that they had no intentions to quit, but insisted that stricter disciplinary action needed to be taken against those who bullied them.42 But every action taken to reprimand white students brought loud and angry protest by their parents, and often by the Mothers’ League as well, which was constantly engaged in mailing reports of the “injustices” inflicted upon white children at Central High School.43 The Mothers’ League “more or less controlled the discipline within the school that year,” recalled Irene Samuel, an avowed integrationist who would later become active in a women’s group dedicated to promoting the continued operation of the Little Rock schools. “They had a good organization, and they had a voice, and it was the only voice.” She commiserated with “poor Mr. Blossom” and the school board, because, “when you have only these people to listen to, it does tend to make you a little… frightened.”44 When, in January, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting in New Orleans, granted a delay in integration requested by school officials in Dallas, Texas, the Mothers’ League and the Capital Citizens Council demanded that the Little Rock schoolmen return to the courts and seek a delay, too. If the board refused, Amis Guthridge declared, he would file a request himself. The board sent attorney Archie House to New Orleans “to study the case.”45 The next month, the Guy Committee, a group of Little Rock businessmen that had formed in October to see what could be done to resolve the crisis, offered their recommendation, too, that the board seek a temporary reprieve from continuing desegregation.46 A day after the Guy Committee offered its support for the idea, on February 20, 1958, the Little Rock School Board filed a petition with the federal district court. The petition cited the difficulties school officials had encountered in their attempt to comply in good faith with federal court orders to proceed with desegregation

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even in the face of violent opposition. The actions of the Governor of Arkansas, the board argued, had resulted in a hardening of resistance to integration in the city, and had created doubts among the citizens that compliance with the Brown decisions was unavoidable. Furthermore, the school district lacked the means “to enforce the provisions of the plan” that they were ordered to put into effect, and had received no assistance in that regard by the city, the state or the federal government, which “except for having placed troops around the school grounds, [was] apparently powerless to force compliance with this court’s order.” They requested, therefore, that they be permitted to transfer the black students attending Central High to the all-black Horace Mann High School and to postpone the re-implementation of the Little Rock Phase Program “until such a time as the concept of ‘all deliberate speed can be clearly defined’ and until effective means for enforcement are established.”47 Finally, then, the segregationists and the moderates in Little Rock, Arkansas, found that they were able to agree on something: the people of Little Rock were simply not ready to accept the admission of black children into a white school. Segregationists rejoiced in their success. Faced with their incessant agitation, the superintendent and the school board, and the moderate, business elites, had capitulated. Peltason has argued, in Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, that school officials, in fact, neither desired nor expected that their request would be granted. Rather, they trusted that the federal court would once again insist that desegregation proceed, quieting the opposition’s demands that they “try again” to forestall the inevitable. “After the anticipated rebuff,” he wrote, “it was hoped it would be clear to all that no matter how much disorder the segregationists produced, no matter what the governor might do, integration was in Little Rock to stay.”48 While Peltason’s assertion that the school board wished for the court to “take the heat” by making compliance mandatory is reasonable, and accurately describes the goals of school authorities in other instances, – including the Little Rock officials themselves in earlier rounds of litigation – this analysis of the petition for delay has flaws. In the first place, the Little Rock School District was already under federal court orders to proceed with integration. Therefore, they already had resort to the “rule of law” as a justification for compliance. Certainly interposition by the state had weakened the effectiveness of this appeal in the Little Rock situation, but further orders by the court would not

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add weight to the claim. Second, the convergence of interest regarding the genuine desire for delay between the city’s moderate business elite, represented by the Guy Committee, and the segregationists surely influenced the decision to make such a request. In addition, the fact that the board had House travel to New Orleans to scrutinize the successful application for postponement filed by school officials in Dallas, Texas, – even before the Guy Committee made its recommendation known – suggests that the Little Rock petition was sincere. And, of course, there can be no doubt that Blossom and the board did feel, as the petition asserted, besieged by “the prevailing spirit of defiance” that created an atmosphere in which it was “exceedingly difficult for teachers to teach and for pupils to learn.” They had been abandoned by all; “left standing alone, the victim of extraordinary opposition on the part of the state government and apathy on the part of the federal government.”49

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The School Board Seeks Delay When the school board filed its petition on February 20, they did not know what judge would rule on it. The federal district court bench in Little Rock remained vacant, and the temporary assignment of Judge Davies would expire on March 5.50 It was possible, of course, that Davies would be asked to stay on to consider the motion, but the objections to his previous involvement in the Little Rock case highlighted the desirability of having a native Arkansan take up the gavel in future proceedings. Judge John E. Miller oversaw the initial action in Aaron v. Cooper, and the case could be transferred back to his court, but it had been removed from his consideration by his own request and, presumably, his reasons for making that request remained unchanged. Ideally, the vacancy created by Judge Thomas C. Trimble’s retirement in 1956 would be speedily filled – that it had not yet been was a subject noted by conspiracy theorists who claimed the federal government intentionally left the position available so that temporary assignments of integrationists, not subject to Senate confirmation, could be made to hear school cases. Faubus himself had made such a claim when Davies was seated. As it turned out, an appointment had been made the same day that the school board filed its petition. “Well aware that he must appoint a man whose background would not make him a target for either segregationists or civil rights activists”

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President Eisenhower selected J. Smith Henley for the post. Henley lived in the Western District of Arkansas, so his was not a local selection, but it was thought that since he had spent the last five years serving “quietly… in a Department of Justice office which in no way involved him in controversial questions” and “had no known stand on public issues,” his nomination would be offensive to no one.51 Eisenhower was wrong. L. D. Poynter of Pine Bluff, the president of the Arkansas Association of Citizens’ Councils, and Kenneth C. Coffelt, the Little Rock lawyer who had twice attempted to challenge the legality of federal troops at Central High, vigorously protested Henley’s appointment. They wrote to Senators John L. McClellan and J. William Fulbright and demanded that they oppose the nomination in the Senate. They charged that Henley’s association with the Justice Department was evidence that his appointment was made “for the specific purpose of enforcing the Justice Department’s unlawful military-force integration policies in the Little Rock schools.” Assistant Attorney General W. Wilson White, who led the Office of Legal Counsel, in which Henley had worked, came to the man’s defense, insisting that he had never been involved with school desegregation cases. Of course, that White was then himself awaiting confirmation as director of the Civil Rights Division meant his endorsement was seen as damning confirmation of their suspicions in the eyes of arch-segregationists.52 Henley, and White, would eventually be confirmed, but the question of who would hear the board’s petition for delay remained. On April 18, 1958 Chief Judge Archibald K. Gardner of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals at St. Louis answered that question when he named Harry J. Lemley to the court at Little Rock.53 The seventy-four year old Lemley, who had once commented that his love for the South was so great “it is almost a religion with me,”54 was born in Virginia, but moved to Hope, Arkansas, as a young man after graduating from the law school at Washington and Lee University in his home state.55 The assignment pleased segregationists, who were happy to have an Arkansas judge selected to hear the case, and who also knew that he “was unsympathetic to desegregation.”56 Moderates were satisfied, too, because the designation of Lemley, who was accepted as an Arkansan, “removes one of the perhaps extraneous issues that nevertheless has come to have considerable bearing on the political background of the case before the Court – the fact that the judge who last sat on the

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continuing litigation was assigned here from North Dakota.”57 It was largely a “psychological” palliative, an editorial in the Memphis Commercial Appeal instructed, perhaps naively as it turned out, because while “the Supreme Court granted a certain amount of individual discretion… an Arkansas judge, simply by virtue of being an Arkansan and a Southerner, cannot rule differently on the facts and the law in matters of this kind and still remain within the bounds of a Supreme Court mandate applicable to all states.”58 But the “bounds” of the mandate at issue had been only vaguely defined by the high court in Brown II, and many had hopes that Judge Lemley would allow them to be stretched to the limit. As an old friend and attorney back in Virginia wrote to the judge upon hearing of his appointment, “I am sure this is good news for the people of Little Rock. I am confident that the Court has designated the proper person to correct the mistakes that have been made.”59 Judge Lemley directed the school board to resubmit its petition after revising the motion to make its position clearer and to indicate how long a delay it hoped to receive. After the amended request, now asking for a postponement of two and a half years – until January 1961, – and an opposing motion by NAACP attorneys representing the eight black students attending Central High School were received, he announced that he would hear arguments on June 3.60 “No explanation” was offered as to why the board had selected January 1961 as an appropriate time to resume desegregation at the Little Rock school.61 Testimony was taken before the federal district court over the course of three days, from June 3 to June 5. Upon being questioned by NAACP attorney Wiley A. Branton about the board’s thinking as to why two and a half years was a reasonable time for delay, now School Board President Wayne Upton indicated that, even if Faubus were elected to a third term as governor, that term would come to an end in January 1961, and “that could make a difference.” The governor, Upton pointed out, had been cited in the newspapers “just less than two weeks ago” saying that if Central High School was integrated in September, “he might do the same thing again.” Virgil Blossom noted in his testimony that it was possible that over the course of the next two and a half years the courts could have determined the validity of the Arkansas segregation laws and, in doing so might clear away some of the obstacles to peaceful integration in Little Rock. Thurgood Marshall honed in on this point, asking if there was “any question” in his mind

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that federal law is supreme over state law. Blossom replied, “not in the least.” Marshall also wanted to know, if the Arkansas legislature enacted new segregation statutes, would he then request “more delays?” The superintendent claimed that he would not. Blossom repeatedly stressed, during his cross-examination by the chief counsel for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, that there was a difference between “the legal and the practical.” He knew, he said, that the state did not have any right to defy the laws of the United States, and that federal law was supreme, but, he insisted, as a practical matter, “there’s a complete misunderstanding on the part of the people because of all this propaganda as to what is and what is not law.”62 Generally, the witnesses for the school board tried to portray the problems involved with desegregation as having been detrimental to the quality of education at the school. Blossom, for example, stated that “the educational processes at Central High School have been impaired materially.” Two teachers, Mrs. Govie Griffin and Mrs. Sybil Hefley, attested to the “tension” that permeated the school while there were black children in attendance that had existed at no other time in the past. They both agreed that their ability to teach was affected, even in classes where none of the black students were present, because of the effects that incidents in the school had on all of the pupils’ ability to concentrate on their lessons. Mrs. Griffin, who was a known segregationist, reported that in her college-preparatory chemistry class, in which three of the Nine had initially been registered but later withdrew, the class was not able to get through all of the course material. As a result, the students could not take the standardized exam normally given at the end of the term.63 In addition, both teachers claimed that the stress of the past year had affected their health. Each had to seek medical attention, and, in fact, Mrs. Hefley had been advised by her physician not to appear in court to testify, because the strain would be too great. Instead, her written statement was read into evidence.64 The NAACP contended that, as unfortunate as it was, increased “tension” due to violent opposition to desegregation at the high school was not sufficient grounds for denying constitutional rights to the black teenagers. It was not only unfair, but it would invite similar resistance elsewhere. NAACP attorneys Branton and Marshall called only two witnesses, education “experts” Dr. Virgil M. Rogers, Dean of the School of Education at Syracuse University in upstate New York, and

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Dr. David Salten, Superintendent of Schools at Long Beach, Long Island, New York. Rogers asserted that the school board in Little Rock simply “has no choice” but to conform to the requirements of the federal court orders to proceed with integration, even if confronted by community opposition. Furthermore, the best way handle the situation at Central High School would have been to prosecute the troublemakers, which school officials had refused to do. Salten also contended that strict disciplinary measures should have been taken by school administrators. In fact, Boys’ Vice Principal J. O. Powell, testifying for the school board, admitted that he had been instructed by the superintendent and the board not to take forceful action in dealing with unruly students. Had he not been so restrained, he believed, making “examples” of a few of the ringleaders with expulsions at the beginning of the year might have deterred the incessant tormenting of the Little Rock Nine.65 Dr. Salten responded to prior testimony about the tensions in the school by countering that that was not necessarily “a bad thing.” He explained, “There is a psychological and educational principle that people grow best, that they develop most rapidly during a period of strain and tension.” And, he continued, “I think there is a general public awareness throughout America that public education in the United States has slowed up because there hasn’t been enough strain and tension, and I am not suggesting that we carry strain and tension [to the point] of making the children mentally ill, but a certain amount of strain and tension shall be accepted – not attempt to do away with it.” Both of the NAACP witnesses, when cross-examined by school board attorney Richard C. Butler, admitted that they were not familiar with the specific details regarding the situation in Little Rock, or in Central High School. Their statements, they explained, were based on their extensive knowledge of educational methodology and personal experiences in their own institutions. When Superintendent Blossom was recalled by Butler to respond to Dr. Salten’s remarks, he stated, nonchalantly, “As I listened to his testimony, I thought maybe we studied the same textbooks in administration,” leaving the impression that the “expert witness” was no more “expert” than Blossom himself. And, making much of the New Yorkers’ apparent ignorance about the particular difficulties encountered by school officials in the unique atmosphere of Central High School during the 1957-1958 school year, Butler, at one point, mockingly inquired of Dr. Rogers whether he knew who Mr. Faubus was.66

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The “Lemley Delay” Judge Lemley issued his opinion on June 21, 1958, after considering the arguments presented by the school board and the NAACP. The Little Rock School Board, he determined, had unquestionably “made a prompt and reasonable start toward compliance with the principles laid down in the Brown cases; thereafter, it put its plan into operation and has adhered to it in good faith in the face of great difficulties.” But the burdens of continued operation under the desegregation plan had proven too disruptive of the educational process at the school. Moreover, it was prohibitively expensive, draining the resources of the district that should rightfully be allotted to educational purposes. And, if that were not enough, the program of integration had negatively impacted the health and well-being of both the students and the faculty. Although he recognized that “under the Brown decisions the Negro students in the Little Rock district have a constitutional right not to be excluded from any of the public schools on account of race,” the testimony presented by the board’s witnesses had convinced him that “the time for the enjoyment of that right has not yet come.” The interests of the black students at Little Rock “must be balanced against the public interest, including the interest of all students and potential students in the district, in having a smoothly functional educational system.” Judge Harry J. Lemley then granted the board its delay.67 The attorneys for the NAACP immediately filed a notice of appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and requested that a stay be granted pending the final determination of the case. At a hearing on June 23, however, Lemley declined to stay his order. Three days after that, the NAACP requested that the Supreme Court of the United States allow them to bypass the appeals court and hear the case directly. They feared that it would not be possible for the case to wend its way through the appeals process in time, before school opened in September. On June 29, the Supreme Court turned down this request, saying it was confident that the Court of Appeals would, being aware of the time constraints involved, be sure to dispose of the matter in a timely fashion, before the school year commenced.68 “Judge Lemley’s ruling,” Peltason affirms, “was a major victory for the segregationists,”69 and they lavished him with praise for his wise and momentous decision. Margaret Jackson of the Mothers’ League said she was “grateful,” for his ruling and that she sincerely hoped “that

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the United States Supreme Court may reverse its decision” in Brown during the next two and a half years.70 George Shannon, editor for the Shreveport Journal, called the “Lemley delay” “the South’s greatest victory to date in its fight against a dictatorial President and a socialistminded Supreme Court,”71 and his virtual giddiness over the opinion carried over to the judge’s refusal to stay his order, in which the great jurist, he wrote, “for the second time in less than 72 hours… has given Southerners in general and States’ Righters in particular cause for thanksgiving.”72 A Mr. Marvin M. Hamilton of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, wrote a letter to the editor of the Arkansas Gazette which noted that there was “abundant reason for rejoicing now,” and that, with the Lemley decision in effect, Arkansans would be “foolish” not to reelect Governor Faubus, because “the NAACP, the Communists, the Ashmores, McMaths, and what-have-you would hail his defeat with great delight. And attempts would be made to integrate all the schools in Arkansas next fall.”73 Letters of congratulations poured in from across the country, as well. From Arlington, Virginia, Alice C. Lemmond sent her best wishes to the judge, telling him that “God will continue to give you his strength and understanding to carry on with courage and confidence to preserve our American way of life based on the law by the people in upholding States ‘Rights’ under our Constitution.”74 Maude Tipton in Bessemer, Alabama sent him a letter on stationery emblazoned with the motto: “The South Will Never Surrender,” to thank him “for holding the line” and to let him know how glad she was that the South had such “a champion – one who is not afraid to lift his voice against those forces which have set out to destroy us.”75 A woman from Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania, just outside the city of Philadelphia, sent her congratulations, too, and told him to “be assured that conservative, traditional, States’ rights northerners have the greatest, heart-felt sympathy for Southerners, both white and colored. We know what’s back of all this un-American agitation and pray that somehow enough people can be waked up before it is too late.”76 And F. H. Johnson, pastor of the Central Baptist Church in Dayton, Ohio, expressed to Judge Lemley that his decision “is greatly appreciated,” and that “thousands of God fearing sincere Americans” have had “their convictions… strengthened and their hope increased by your fearless and honest ruling.”77 And, naturally, Lemley received a great deal of mail from Little Rock. One man wrote that the name Harry J. Lemley

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would be recorded as yet another “illustrious” Virginian, alongside “Washington, Jefferson and Robert E. Lee.”78 Not everyone was pleased with the outcome of the proceedings, however. The Cleveland Plain Dealer ran an editorial that commented, “Many segregationists in the South have… hailed Judge Lemley’s order, as if it vindicated their perpetual opposition to school integration. It did nothing of the kind, of course. If they take this as a major victory, they must realize deep down in their hearts that they are fighting a losing battle, for two and a half years in such a program of social evolution is but a short time.”79 The Washington Post characterized the opinion as “an unmistakable step backward” that would promote disorder and that would result in “the spreading of violence and the use of Federal troops” in more areas of the South.80 Private citizens also expressed their disapproval of the Lemley delay. Although the judge scribbled across the bottom of one particularly nasty letter that much of the “hate mail” he received was explicitly abusive and “not considered worthy of being placed in this file,”81 Lemley also apparently considered quite a few “worthy” enough to be kept among his papers. One was from Esther R. Coady from Cincinnati, who wrote: “You, who are supposed to sit in judgment of other people, in your decision to yield to the bigots, ignoramuses, hoodlums, pool-room punks, and the rest of that assortment of unsavory canaille, make me ashamed to be an American.”82 And a man from Baltimore sent a telegram that said, simply, “You stink. You should be impeached. I am a Democrat.”83 One can only imagine the correspondence the judge threw away. In white Little Rock there was nearly universal appreciation for the respite afforded by Lemley’s granting of the delay. Governor Faubus announced that he was “most gratified” with the decision, which he believed showed great “wisdom and understanding” on the part of Judge Lemley. Although he acknowledged that the postponement did not represent “a final settlement of this problem,” he hoped that it would at least provide “a peaceful interlude.” But he exhorted the “public officials and people of Arkansas” to use the time wisely, “to shore up the defenses of the state against the sea of federal intervention and domination, which threatens to engulf us all,” and he assured his people that “in this struggle we will have the sympathy and support of millions of Americans, both North and South, East and West.”84 Even Harry S. Ashmore at the Arkansas Gazette appeared satisfied with the

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outcome of the hearing. Although he doubted that the ruling would be upheld upon appeal, he editorialized that if it was, “this beleaguered community has gained a breathing spell, and it is welcome.” But, like Faubus, he noted that delay was not resolution. Unlike the governor, however, Ashmore did not believe that Arkansans should spend the next two and a half years devising new ways to obstruct the orders of the courts. Yes, “the problems are still with us,” but “as they have from the beginning,” they cried out “for sober, responsible leadership” to discourage disorder as the city complied with the mandate for desegregation.85 Two days after Lemley issued his opinion approving the school board’s petition, and the same day that he refused to stay his order, – June 23 – a delegation of four black leaders met with President Eisenhower to discuss solutions to racial problems in the United States. A. Philip Randolph, vice president of the AFL-CIO; Lester B. Granger, executive secretary of the National Urban League; Roy Wilkins, executive secretary of the NAACP; and Martin Luther King, Jr., president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference informed the president that black Americans were “frustrated and angry” over the setbacks constantly occurring in their “fight for equal rights,” and that Lemley’s decision in Little Rock was merely the most recent example. They urgently requested that the United States government enter the case as amicus curiae at the appeal. Also attending the meeting were Attorney General William P. Rogers, who succeeded Brownell to the post after the latter’s resignation at the end of October 1957, and Assistant Attorney General W. Wilson White, Acting Director of the Civil Rights Division. Rogers refused to comment on the Lemley delay, but White did mention, reportedly, that the Department of Justice was preparing its position so that it would be ready to file a brief should they decide to do so.86 Back in February, when the Little Rock School District filed its original petition requesting that integration at Central High School be suspended, Rogers and White had discussed the possibility of the United States becoming a party to the litigation. At that time, White counseled against the idea, recommending that the Justice Department not involve itself in the matter, “even if the court should indicate a desire for our participation.”87 According to Peltason, Judge Lemley did invite the Department to join the case, but the local United States Attorney, Osro Cobb, “refused.”88 After the board’s request was granted, pressure on the Justice Department to argue, as a friend of the

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court, in favor of reversing Lemley came not only from the black leadership delegation that conferred with Eisenhower at the White House, but also from the NAACP in Arkansas, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the General Council of Congregational Churches.89 And Peltason indicated that it was “at this stage” that “the Department of Justice entered the proceedings.”90 Elliff, however, points out that Peltason was mistaken, and that the Department, while keeping a close eye on the case as it progressed, still refrained from participating in it.91

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The Delay Appealed A hearing was scheduled for August 4 for the full complement of seven judges on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals at St. Louis to entertain arguments in the NAACP’s appeal of the delay.92 The NAACP’s brief contended that Judge Lemley’s sole justification for granting the postponement was that there was opposition to integration in the Arkansas capital, and that “this constituted no legal basis for a delay.”93 The decision of the appeals court was announced on August 18, 1958, a mere sixteen days before the Little Rock schools were slated to open on September 2. The opinion for the six to one majority was drafted by Circuit Judge Marion C. Matthes, who wrote that they agreed with the NAACP that “the precise question at issue” was “whether a plan of integration, once in operation, may lawfully be suspended because of popular opposition thereto, as manifested in overt acts of violence.” The question was expressly not, then, as Judge Lemley apparently understood it to be, whether such violent opposition existed or if it interfered with the “educational processes” within the school.94 While the Court of Appeals had no doubt as to the truthfulness of the testimony regarding the “appalling” examples of mob violence and unruliness with which Little Rock school officials were forced to contend, the judges could not “accept the legal conclusions drawn by the District Court from these circumstances.” The court commiserated with the district officials for the difficulties they endured while trying to comply with previous federal court orders, although Matthes’ opinion did point out that they never turned to the courts for injunctive relief, as school authorities in Hoxie, Arkansas, and Clinton, Tennessee, had successfully done. Nor did they attempt to quell strife among the student population through strict disciplinary action. But

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ultimately, what the board had or had not done to deal with troublemakers was irrelevant. And while they were “mindful” of the adverse effects that disorder had on the normal operation of Central High School, they felt “compelled to hold that such incidents are insufficient to constitute a legal basis for suspension of the plan to integrate the public schools in Little Rock.”95 It was the opinion of the court that the constitutional rights of black children guaranteed by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could not be denied to suit the will of a lawless mob. Furthermore, “an affirmance of ‘temporary delay’ in Little Rock,” Matthes continued, “would amount to an open invitation to elements in other districts to overtly act out public opposition through violent and unlawful means.” Accordingly, Judge Lemley’s order of delay was reversed.96 Chief Judge Archibald K. Gardner cast the single dissent. In Little Rock, Daisy Bates thought it “worth noting” that Gardner, “then reported to be ninety years old and the oldest active judge in the nation,” was the only one of the judges on the appeals court that thought Lemley’s determination of the case should be sustained, and that the author of the majority opinion, Marion C. Matthes, “then fiftytwo,” was “the youngest judge on the Eighth United States Circuit Court bench.”97 The United States Supreme Court Meets in Special Session After deciding to overturn the district court ruling, the seven judges of the circuit court consented, on August 21, to stay their own order, thus leaving the Lemley delay in effect until the United States Supreme Court could make its own determination in the case.98 The problem was, however, that the Supreme Court term was not scheduled to begin until October 6. Central High School, on the other hand, would open in less than two weeks. Unless extraordinary action was taken, segregation would once again be in force in all Little Rock schools and the remaining black students who had suffered through the 1957-1958 school year in Central High would be transferred into the all-black Horace Mann. Peltason surmises that the circuit judges might have made this move “to compel the Supreme Court to re-enter the fight.” They felt that, as a matter of law, Lemley’s order could not be permitted to stand. But if they had simply overruled the delay, “the Supreme Court could have taken its time, eventually affirmed without

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opinion the decision of the court of appeals.”99 If this interpretation is correct, the judges had engaged in a risky business. And, as it was, the court’s majority was in the odd position of having declared that the black children’s constitutional right to attend Central could not be denied, and yet, at the same time, denying it to them. The appeals court’s gamble, if that is what it was, paid off. Attorneys for the NAACP and the Little Rock School Board raced to file motions with the highest court in the land. Thurgood Marshall got there first. He filed two motions, one asking that the stay entered by the Eighth Circuit Court be vacated, and the other that that court’s reversal of the district court ruling be affirmed. Richard C. Butler submitted an answer to Marshall’s motions on August 26 requesting that the stay of the circuit court judgment remain in effect on the grounds that the school district could not “operate Central High School on an integrated basis under conditions as they now exist.” To allow time for the Supreme Court to consider the motions, the opening of the school was postponed until September 8.100 The Supreme Court met in a special session on August 28 to hear arguments on the motions before it. It was “most unusual” occurrence, “calling back out of summer recess all nine of the Supreme Court judges,” Butler recalled, and it attracted “a lot of nationwide publicity.” He further remembered that one of the justices, “and I believe it was Judge Harlan,” had to be “called back from a European trip.”101 Since 1920, the Court had only convened such a session four times before it had the occasion to do so again to hear the Little Rock case in 1958.102 Now, finally, at the invitation of the Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Justice Department submitted a brief as amicus curiae. The brief, submitted by Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin, contended that Judge Lemley’s “reliance upon overt manifestations of opposition to desegregation” in arriving at his judgment in the federal district court was a “fundamental error…. For inherent in that ruling is the idea that the constitutional rights of some citizens may be suspended or ignored because of the antagonistic acts of others. If constitutional rights could be so easily negated, they would amount to little.” The position of the United States was in agreement with the NAACP’s on all points. Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright, who had generally avoided any involvement in – or even comment on – the Little Rock school integration controversy, also prepared a brief for the Court as amicus curiae, arguing in favor of the delay. His brief, which did “not purport

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to be argument on the legal technicalities of the case to be considered,” was intended merely to express to the justices his “views as an individual deeply concerned by a problem of extraordinary complexity and one which is novel and unprecedented in this nation.” Additionally, Fulbright wished to provide his personal testimony regarding the “local conditions upon which Judge Lemley based his decision.”103 The brief, which was prepared by his attorney, Lee Williams, asserted that the people of Arkansas are as law abiding, and respectful of the traditions of our Anglo-Saxon heritage as are their fellow Americans; they abhor anarchy and disorder.” Still, despite their abhorrence of disorder, the people’s feelings against compulsory integration of the public schools ran so deep that otherwise peaceful men, women, and children acted out, creating, as the Circuit Court itself put it in its decision, “bedlam and turmoil in and upon the school premises.” But Fulbright alleged that the appeals court “was unduly preoccupied by the violent and unlawful acts of individual citizens and failed to give proper weight to the equitable nature of the proceeding,” and to the fact that there was a larger issue involved – the conflict between state and federal sovereignty. Where the Court of Appeals had held that upholding the postponement granted by the federal district court would represent a capitulation to the threats and demands of the mob and serve to encourage similar violent protests in other localities, Fulbright insisted that “the Court’s refusal to support the good faith position of the board can only intensify the effect of those outside forces.” In dissent from the Circuit Court ruling, Chief Judge Gardner noted that segregated schools had legally existed in the United States for so long that “it had become a way of life” in the South, and that this type of engrained tradition could be best changed through evolution and not through revolution. Fulbright agreed, and asserted that the majority of the circuit judges failed “to take note of these truths.” He requested that the justices of the Supreme Court take note of them now. The Supreme Court, however, as Judge Lemley wrote on a copy of Fulbright’s submission that was sent to him, “refused to receive the Senator’s brief or to permit him to be heard.”104 After listening to arguments, the justices informed all parties involved that they would issue no ruling until at least September 11, and another hearing was scheduled for that date. To accommodate the new timeframe, it was determined that the Little Rock high schools would not open before September 15.105

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A Third Term For Governor Faubus Back in March, Orval Eugene Faubus, as it was expected he would, had officially declared that he was again a candidate for governor. He denied that the actions he had taken concerning the integration of Central High School had been related to his aspirations for another term in office in any way. He claimed that he would have done no different, “whether he was running or not.”106 There had been others before Faubus who had attempted to win a third consecutive term in the Arkansas governor’s office, but in the history of the state only one had ever succeeded: Jeff Davis had been elected to the state’s highest office in 1900, 1902, and 1904.107 At the time Faubus announced his candidacy, only one other gubernatorial hopeful was in the running, millionaire meat-packer Chris E. Finkbeiner of Little Rock. The next month another candidate threw his hat into the ring. Lee Ward from Paragould, in the northeast part of the state – about thirty miles due east of Hoxie.108 Both Finkbeiner and Ward, a chancery court judge, were “men of only regional reputations.”109 And they both, of course, ran as segregationists. “By this time,” Reed explains, “with massive resistance in full cry, it was nearly impossible for a candidate to admit to integrationist tendencies anywhere in the South.”110 Ward’s stated position on the issue, however, could best be described as moderate. He did not contest the right of any man to question, or to disagree with the Supreme Court’s decisions in the School Cases, but he felt that they were the law of the land, and unless that ever changed, they had to be obeyed. His idea, his plan for changing the law of integration, was an amendment he proposed be added to the United States Constitution that would permit racially separate schools by “local option,” to be determined by popular referendum anywhere in the country where segregation had been the law for a half a century or more.111 Faubus quickly dismissed Judge Ward as a “puppet” of the integrationists who supported, and would submit to the national government’s “illegal usurpation of power.”112 Ward joined the fight, and called Governor Faubus, in turn, a “fence-straddling, pussy-footing demagogue.”113 But Faubus, in his campaign appearances, did not pay much attention to either of his challengers. Instead, he “devoted most of his attention… to Ashmore, the Gazette, and Sid McMath, the supposed sponsor of the opposition candidates.”114 Former Governor McMath had helped Faubus first gain entry into state politics, but was

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an outspoken critic of Faubus’ handling of the Little Rock situation. After Faubus’ attacks against him during the campaign, McMath took the “unprecedented move” of securing time on statewide television and radio to explain his break with the current governor, where he charged that Faubus had deliberately created the integration crisis to rouse support for an intended third term bid.115 Daisy Bates, too, was a common target of the governor’s ire. He did not share the vision of the nation held by Bates or her kind, he claimed, in which the State of Arkansas would be reduced to a mere colonial holding, administered by Sherman Adams, – with Daisy Bates its colonial governor, Ashmore the secretary of state, and McMath holding the purse strings.116 Besides McMath, three other former governors made public their thoughts on Faubus’ use of the National Guard the previous September. Francis Cherry, who was in office when the original Brown decree was announced in 1954, and who insisted that Arkansas would not react “with the idea of being outlaws,”117 and Ben T. Laney, who was active in the Dixiecrat movement in 1948 and a frequent speaker at Citizens’ Council rallies, both disagreed with Faubus’ use of the Guard. Each insisted that the use of force by the state would ultimately do more harm than good for the cause of maintaining segregation.118 Laney claimed that had he been residing in the governor’s mansion, he never would have been put in the position that Faubus found himself in when school opened in 1957, because “I would have recommended legislation… in 1955 and 1957 upon which I could have met such a situation.” He insisted that “everyone should have known something of this kind would have happened. The Hoxie incident and others were sufficient to clearly show the thinking of our people.” In any event, “the Governor’s action did not prevent integration of Central High School,” and was therefore a failure, but he quickly added that Faubus’ failure at Little Rock would not weaken resistance to school desegregation in Arkansas. He further stated his opinion that the solution to the integration problem would not depend on the election of any of the candidates running in 1958.119 Another past governor, Homer M. Adkins, stated that he backed Faubus “wholeheartedly.”120 He did not elaborate, but when he occupied the office in 1944, he asserted in an address to the Arkansas Press Association that “one of the gravest problems confronting the nation today lies in the whittling away of state sovereignty by a mass of congressional legislation, executive rulings, and some court decisions placing straining constructions upon the Federal Constitution.” And he

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had warned then that “if the concentration of power in the National Government and the destruction of the sovereign power of the states is not checked, it will be a matter of only a short time until the several states – sovereign under our original scheme of government – will be reduced to the status of mere provinces, and all real governmental power will be concentrated in the National Government in Washington.”121 The occasion for Adkins’ statements did not concern racial integration, but his words could have as easily come from the mouth of any leader of the “massive resistance” to the Brown decrees in the mid-1950s. James D. Johnson, Faubus’ old nemesis from the 1956 Democratic Party gubernatorial nomination race reemerged on the scene in 1958 as well. After Faubus himself had begun to out-Johnson Johnson, and reaped the political benefits that, by 1958 accompanied every step the governor took toward rabid demagoguery, Johnson decided to make “the best of his changed situation” and increasingly tried to associate himself with his former enemy. He made public shows of advising Faubus on segregation measures, and pressed the governor to call the General Assembly into special session to pass new anti-integration acts. Johnson, again publicly, promised the governor that he would not run against him for the office in 1958 and would, instead, support his bid for a third term.122 Ultimately, the Citizens’ Council leader decided to take another shot at a state office himself, and set his sights on the Arkansas Supreme Court seat occupied by the reserved and wellrespected Justice Minor W. Milwee.123 Reed relates that while Johnson later claimed that “Faubus encouraged him to enter the race,” the governor was actually “lukewarm” towards the idea and did not do much to support his old foe. Still, Faubus did put the word out to his people around the state that he preferred for Jim Johnson to win. When, late during the race, Johnson, whose mother was seriously ill, became somewhat “distracted” from his campaign and lost some footing in the polls, “Bill Smith, acting with Faubus’s knowledge, tried unsuccessfully” to convince him to drop out of the running. “Having one of his candidates lose would have hurt Faubus’s growing image of invincibility,” remarked Reed.124 Jim Johnson was not the only die-hard, arch-segregationist to make a run for public office in 1958. Unlike Johnson, who had been a state senator at one time and whose challenge to Faubus in 1956 was

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impressive, despite Faubus’ margin of victory at the polls, Amis Guthridge was a neophyte in the field of election politics. On April 29, Guthridge filed as a candidate for Brooks Hays’ job in the United States House of Representatives. Also, Mothers’ League recording secretary Mrs. Clyde Thomason, who had been narrowly defeated in a run for the Board of City Managers in November, announced that she wished to enter the state house, as the representative for Pulaski County.125 The Democratic primary election took place on July 29. Faubus won his coveted third term easily, “with an avalanche of votes.” Carrying all seventy-five counties in the state, “his victory was reportedly the most complete in the recent history of the state.” In a race centered around the integration question, Faubus presented himself as the champion for states’ rights “who called out the National Guard to keep Negroes out of Central High in Little Rock and would do it again in a similar situation.” And yet, he had still never revealed his own personal feelings regarding desegregation.126 Ashmore, in the Gazette, lamented that “the moderate position formerly espoused by many Southern political leaders, and by this newspaper as a matter of principle, has been rejected by the mass of voters in this Upper Southern state and is now clearly untenable for any man in public life anywhere in the region.” The governor’s landslide victory stood, he conceded, “as Arkansas’ endorsement of the course of massive resistance.”127 The election results confirm that that endorsement was virtual – 264,346 for the incumbent, 61,017 for Finkbeiner, and 59,385 for Ward. The total of votes cast, 383,904, indicated a turnout of sixty-eight percent of the eligible voters, a state “record for a Democratic primary.”128 “Oddly enough,” Reed observed, “Faubus won large numbers of black votes.” Reed attributed this phenomenon to the fact that, in the eastern counties, black votes were controlled by their employers. In Little Rock and its environs, he states, “the situation was more complex.” There, he contends that the charisma of certain individuals of influence within the black community, notably Bishop O. L. Sherman, a leader of the African Methodist Church from North Little Rock, helped to sway black voters. Sherman roused the emotions of blacks in the community by spouting the same sort of message as Faubus: that outsiders – northern liberals and the federal government – were trying to control the South and tell them how to run their business. Reed also claims that Faubus was paying Bishop Sherman to do this.129 Freyer also took note of the fact

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that most blacks cast their ballots for Faubus, an occurrence, he states, that must have “bewildered” federal officials. Freyer ascribed it to the governor’s reputation on other issues besides integration, particularly “his impressive record of accomplishments in improving Arkansas’s economy and social services.”130 The contest between Brooks Hays and Amis Guthridge was also a rout. Hays easily retained his seat.131 As noted by Reed, “only Johnson’s race was close.”132 Johnson edged out Milwee and took a seat on the bench of the state’s highest court.133

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The 1958 Segregation “Package” The NAACP’s appeal of the Lemley delay was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit less than one week after Governor Faubus’ unprecedented victory at the polls. After the district court decision was reversed, but before the circuit judges issued the stay that would leave integration at Central High School in a suspended state until the Supreme Court could rule, Faubus declared Matthes’ opinion to be “most alarming and dangerous.” Curiously, he accused the school board of having secret plans for the complete integration of all the city’s schools, and demanded that they reveal their schemes, despite the fact that Superintendent Blossom had issued a statement the day before that called the circuit court decision “disappointing” and vowed to appeal it to the Supreme Court. Faubus suggested that the school board members should retire, and “allow the people to select a new board which would have the courage to act in conformity to their wishes.”134 The next day, President Eisenhower addressed the issue in a statement before a press conference where he said: “This case… or any person’s agreement or disagreement with its outcome, must not be confused with the solemn duty that all Americans have to comply with the final orders of the court.”135 Faubus, bolstered by his recent reelection, responded to the president’s statement. Although he always insisted, and would continue to insist for the rest of his life, that he never defied any “final orders” of a court, he averred on August 20 that compliance with federal court decrees “cannot be obtained by invoking the sacred name of the Constitution, or by the use of the once-magic name of Eisenhower…. If it is the purpose of Mr. Eisenhower’s statement to reaffirm the position of last fall, that it is my duty as Governor to use

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the military to enforce integration in any school district in this state, then I must say that my position of last fall is unchanged.”136 “While desegregation was being debated in the courts,” Kirk wrote, “Faubus used his political influence to turn the situation to his advantage.”137 He called the Arkansas General Assembly into extraordinary session. There, “defiantly waving a fist at federal law,”138 the governor explained to the Arkansas solons that they were there “not through our own choices and desires, but because it is our responsibility to face up to some problems that have been forced upon us, by the unwise actions of others.” To meet those responsibilities, he recommended that the assembly enact six new laws, and he pressed them to do so in such a way as to suggest that any man among them who voted against the measures had submitted to the federal usurpation of state power. The first of the acts he pushed on them would provide for the closing of any school threatened with forced integration. Another specified that funds be withheld from any school closed under the first to be used to subsidized the education of the displaced students at “another school within the district, a school in another district, or a private non-profit school.” He asked, also, for a law that would allow students to transfer to other schools in the same district “under certain conditions.” A fourth bill would ensure that students attending schools that had been desegregated must be provided with segregated classes within those schools at their request. The fifth measure called for the appropriation of funds to be used at the discretion of the governor to provide the means for effectuating any of the other acts that comprised the recommended segregation package. And the last would mandate the postponement of the opening date of “certain high schools from September 2 to September 15.” The governor stressed the importance of passing these measures, and insisted that they be considered as a “package.” “This is not a half serious problem,” he told them, “and it cannot be met with half measures.” And he reminded all those present that “the eyes of the nation are upon us; the hopes, and the prayers of millions of our fellow citizens of our sister states, are with us in our efforts.”139 As they had been asked, the state representatives passed each of the new segregation laws on the very same day.140 Once the acts he had asked for had been passed, “Faubus waited before signing any of the bills into law.”141 Before the Supreme Court was scheduled to hear the arguments in the Little Rock case, George Shannon suggested in an editorial in the Shreveport Journal on August 30 that Governor Faubus teach the Court

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“a lesson” by opening the Little Rock high schools early, while the delay of integration granted by Judge Lemley was still in effect. The act postponing the onset of school had not yet been signed, he noted, and would not be binding until Faubus himself signed it. “At no time has the Supreme Court seemed to have exhibited any patience or tolerance for the views of Arkansas citizens,” Shannon decried, so why should Arkansas show any for the Supreme Court now? “Why, then, should not the people of Arkansas give the Supreme Court ANOTHER LESSON in the law of the land and proceed immediately to open Central High School – LEGALLY under the federal court’s own rulings – to white pupils only?”142 Writing in the Arkansas Gazette, Harry Ashmore responded to Shannon’s exhortations, and to Faubus’ own indications that he might try to outmaneuver the Supreme Court by immediately opening the schools. The school board, which had already announced that the city’s high schools would not open until September 15 regardless of whether the governor signed the bill that would require those schools to open on that day and no sooner. Ashmore pointed out that school board attorney Richard C. Butler had insisted that “any departure from the date by the School Board would be considered as a violation of good faith.”143 Also before the Supreme Court ruling on the matter of the delay, Harry J. Lemley announced that he was retiring from the federal bench. Despite the judge’s assertion that he was stepping down for medical reasons, which he documented with a letter from his physician, an article in the Arkansas Democrat reported that, “Having ruled in a carefully documented opinion for a ‘peaceful delay’ to preserve ‘a smoothly functioning educational system,’… Judge Lemley could not have conscientiously presided over a speeding-up process.”144 The announcement in the Gazette the previous day saw no reason to doubt the veracity of Lemley’s claims of declining health.145 The Democrat notice pointed out that Lemley’s retirement left Judge John Miller “the only federal judge in the state at the moment.”146 Governor Faubus Closes the Schools On September 11, the Supreme Court conducted a hearing in the Little Rock case. News media throughout the nation “portrayed the case as the most significant test of integration since Brown.”147 The next day,

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the Court, realizing the “urgency of the situation” delivered its judgment orally “without waiting for the preparation of its formal opinion.”148 Unanimously, the nine justices of the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that the Lemley delay must be reversed. Within hours of the announcement by the Court, Governor Faubus signed the laws passed by the General Assembly and invoked the first of them. On September 12, 1958, Faubus closed by proclamation all four high schools in the city of Little Rock. As provided by the law, he set a date for a special election to determine whether the schools should remain closed.149 Two weeks later, on September 29, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Cooper v. Aaron.150 In an unusual move, the nine justices each signed the opinion individually, underscoring their unanimity in the decision. The opinion itself was, in Peltason’s words, “blunt, forceful, and powerfully written.”151 In it, the Court held that “the constitutional rights of respondents are not to be sacrificed or yielded to the violence and disorder which have followed upon the actions of the Governor and Legislature.”152 The justices went even further, challenging the entire program of massive resistance. The rights of the black children that had been articulated in the original Brown ruling, the Court held, “can neither be nullified openly and directly by state legislators or state executive or judicial officers, nor nullified indirectly by them through evasive schemes for segregation whether attempted ‘ingeniously or ingenuously.’” As for the argument that decisions of the Court were not the “law of the land,” they asserted that, on the contrary, “the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States.” The Governor of the State of Arkansas, then, had an affirmative duty, which he had acknowledged in taking his oath of office, to support and uphold the law requiring the desegregation of the public schools. While it was recognized that “the responsibility for public education is primarily the concern of the States,” that responsibility must be carried out in such a fashion that is consistent with “federal constitutional requirements as they apply to state action.” In other words, a state may operate its own public schools in any way it sees fit, provided that there are no conflicts with contrary provisions of the United States Constitution or federal laws, which must take precedence over the will of the individual states. In direct response to the recent enactments of the special session of the

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Arkansas legislature, and to similar acts passed in other southern states, the Court took another step beyond the question put to it in the facts of the case at hand and determined that “State support of segregated schools through any arrangement, management, funds, or property cannot be squared with the [Fourteenth] Amendment’s command that no State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”153 The Court had spoken. The state had answered. If the public high schools in Little Rock could not remain segregated, then there would be no public high schools in Little Rock. If the decision to close the schools altogether could also not “be squared” with the federal Constitution, the Court would have to wait for another day to so declare.

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NOTES 

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1

“The Story of Little Rock – As Governor Faubus Tells It,” U. S. News & World Report (June 20, 1958), 106. 2 Ibid. 3 SSN, Jan. 1958. When asked about his earlier admissions that Brown was the “law of the land,” on the television program “Face the Nation” on August 31, 1958, Faubus replied that just because he “said it was… wouldn’t make it so.” Transcript of CBS Television Network broadcast of “Face the Nation,” Aug. 31, 1958. Located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 4 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 141. In May, 1958, while campaigning for a third term as governor, Faubus candidly acknowledged that public opinion always guided his actions. SSN, June 1958. 5 SSN, Dec. 1957. One of the candidates on the segregation slate was Mrs. Clyde Thomason, the Mother’s League officer who had sought to enjoin the school board from proceeding with integration at the end of August. Thomason “was barely beaten by a former member of the Little Rock School Board.” Ibid., May, 1958. 6 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 41. 7 SSN, Dec. 1957. 8 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 140. 9 SSN, Dec. 1957. 10 Ibid., Jan. 1958. This was the first direct contact between Governor Faubus and the Capital Citizens Council, as far as it is known, since before the crisis began. The governor had, however, met with officers of the Mother’s League since that time. 11 Ibid., Nov. 1957. 12 Telegram, Price Daniel to Eisenhower, Sept. 24, 1957. Central Files, Office File, DDE Library. 13 SSN, Dec. 1957. 14 Ibid., Feb., March, 1958. 15 Ibid., Feb., May, 1958. 16 Ibid., Feb., March, April, May, 1958. 17 Ibid., Feb., March, May, 1958. 18 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 131. 19 Situation Report, Sept. 29, 1957. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 20 Situation Report, Oct. 1, 1957. Ibid. 21 Elizabeth Huckaby noted that by Wednesday, October 16, “only nineteen boys and girls were being withheld from attendance because of integration.” Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 66. 22 Situation Report, Oct. 1, 1957. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 23 Situation Report, Oct. 2, 1957. Ibid.

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24

In fact, only eight arrived; one of the Nine did not attend school that day, “reportedly due to illness.” Situation Report, Oct. 3, 1957. Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 58. 27 Situation Report, Oct. 3, 1957. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. The same girl was also one those named by Governor Faubus as having been held “incommunicado” by the FBI. Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 59. 28 Situation Report, Oct. 4, 11, 1957. White House Office Files, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, DDE Library. 29 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 59. 30 Some pro-segregation parents, however, refused to permit their children to attend classes with blacks and removed them from the school permanently. Ibid., 64. 31 Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 124. 32 Ibid., 116. 33 See, especially, Huckaby, Crisis at Central High; Pattillo Beals, Warriors Don’t Cry; and Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock. 34 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 168, 169, 203, 212; Huckaby interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1972), 35; Cooper interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 23; Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 168-169; and the transcript of John Wyllie’s “Conversations in the South,” broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting Company, March 3, 1959. Copy located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 35 SSN, March 1958. 36 Blossom, It Has Happened Here, 168. 37 Ibid., 169. 38 SSN, April 1958. 39 Another student, Richard Boehler, was suspended for a combination of disciplinary problems and academic failures, and was to be expelled before he and his parents agreed that he would not return to the school. Officially, Boehler’s exit from the school was recorded “neither as an expulsion nor a withdrawal.” Ibid. 40 Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 189-190, 211, 216-217. 41 She based this figure on the “estimate publicized by the segregationists.” Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 150. 42 SSN, Feb. 1958. 43 See, for example, Huckaby, Crisis at Central High, 89-90. 44 Irene Samuel interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 32. 45 SSN, Feb. 1958. 46 Ibid., March 1958; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 143. On the formation of the Guy Committee, see Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 70. 47 The text of the petition of the Little Rock School Board in Aaron v. Cooper, February 20, 1958, appears in SSN, March 1958.

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48

Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 96-97. SSN, March 1958. 50 Ibid. 51 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 75. 52 SSN, April 1958. 53 Arkansas Democrat, April 21, 1958. 54 Arkansas Gazette, June 22, 1958. 55 Arkansas Democrat, April 21, 1958. 56 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 97; SSN, May 1958. Quote in Peltason. 57 Arkansas Gazette, April 23, 1958. 58 Memphis Commercial Appeal, April 22, 1958. 59 Roscoe B. Stephenson, Covington, Va. to Lemley, April 24, 1958. Lemley Papers, UALR. 60 SSN, June 1958. 61 Ibid. 62 Transcript of testimony in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas at Little Rock, June 3-5, 1958. Copy located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. Excerpts from the testimony are also published in U. S. News & World Report (June 20, 1958), 74-86. 63 Statement of Mrs. James E. (Govie) Griffin (chemistry teacher) to the Arkansas State Police, Feb. 6, 1958. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 64 Transcript of testimony in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas at Little Rock, June 3-5, 1958. Copy located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark. 1958); SSN, July 1958. 68 Ibid. 69 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 185. 70 The New York Times, June 22, 1958. 71 Shreveport Journal, June 21, 1958. 72 Ibid., June 24, 1958. 73 Arkansas Gazette, July 10, 1958. 74 Mrs. W. P. (Alice C.) Lemmond, Arlington, Va. to Lemley, June 23, 1958. Lemley Papers, UALR. 75 Maude Tipton, Bessemer, Ala. to Lemley, June 23, 1958. Ibid. 76 Mrs. Philip L. Payson (Helen) Corson, Plymouth Meeting, Pa. to Lemley, June 23, 1958. Ibid. 77 F. H. Johnson, Dayton, Oh. to Lemley, June 25, 1958. Ibid. 78 John H. Greene, Little Rock, to Lemley, June 21, 1958. Ibid. 79 Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 22, 1958. 80 Washington Post, June 23, 1958. 81 Handwritten note, on Dr. F. A. Shannon, Wickenburg, Ariz. to Lemley, June 28, 1958. Lemley Papers, UALR.

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82

Mrs. R. E. (Esther R.) Coady, Cincinnati, Oh. to Lemley, June 22, 1958. Ibid. 83 Telegram, Harry K. Smart, Baltimore, Md. to Lemley, June 23, 1958. Ibid. 84 Statement of Orval Faubus, June 21, 1958. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 85 Arkansas Gazette editorial, cited in SSN, July 1958. 86 SSN, July 1958. 87 Quoted in Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, 603. 88 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 185. 89 SSN, Aug. 1958. In addition, the Department received telegrams urging it to become directly involved in the case from over a hundred local branches of the NAACP. Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, 605; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 146. 90 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 186. 91 Elliff, The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, 606; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 146-147, fn. 41. A possible source of Peltason’s confusion was a report in the Southern School News on the Justice Department’s interest in the litigation. It was noted, in the August 1958 issue, that Wilson White’s Civil Rights Division had been assigned the task of preparing a brief. SSN, Aug. 1958. 92 SSN, Aug. 1958. Chief Judge Gardner had initially assigned three circuit judges to consider the appeal, but then decided that the case was of such importance that it warranted the convening of the entire court. Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Aaron v. Cooper, RRLR 3 (1958), 648; SSN, Sept. 1958. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 152. Here, Bates mistakenly identifies Marion C. Matthes as “Martin C. Matthes.” Another member of the circuit court was Judge Martin D. Van Oosterhout, and she might simply have confused their names. Ibid. 98 SSN, Sept. 1958. 99 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 187. 100 SSN, Sept. 1958. 101 Butler interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 10. 102 SSN, Sept. 1958. Freyer states that this was “only the third such term in the modern history of the Court.” Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 148. 103 “Statement of Senator J. W. Fulbright, Aug. 27, 1958. Copy located in Lemley Papers, UALR. 104 Brief of J. W. Fulbright as amicus curiae in the case of Aaron v. Cooper, in the Supreme Court of the United States, August Special Term 1958. Published in Congressional Record 104:151 (Sept. 4, 1958). Copy located in Lemley Papers, UALR. 105 SSN, Sept. 1958.

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106

SSN, April 1958. Ibid. 108 Ibid., May 1958. 109 Reed, Faubus, 242. 110 Ibid. 111 SSN, May 1958. 112 Ibid. 113 Reed, Faubus, 242. 114 Ibid.; SSN, Aug. 1958. Quote in Reed. Reed states that Jim Johnson, too, “decided that the same villains were opposing him,” in his race for a state supreme court seat, and also attacked Ashmore and McMath. Reed, Faubus, 242. The Southern School News noted that Amis Guthridge did as well, in his bid for United States Representative. SSN, Aug. 1958. Sara Alderman Murphy also noted that both Faubus and Johnson “had run vicious campaigns against Harry Ashmore, the Gazette, and Daisy Bates, paying little attention to other candidates in their races.” Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 67. 115 SSN, Aug. 1958. 116 Ibid. 117 Ibid., Sept. 3, 1954. 118 Ibid., Aug. 1958. 119 Interview with Ben T. Laney, precise date unknown, but within ten days of the Democratic primary election on July 29, 1958. Copy located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 120 SSN, Aug. 1958. 121 Address by Governor Homer M. Adkins to the Arkansas Press Association, June 24, 1944. Copy located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 122 Reed, Faubus, 240. 123 SSN, June 1958. 124 Reed, Faubus, 240. 125 SSN, May 1958. 126 Ibid., Aug. 1958. 127 Arkansas Gazette editorial, “Mr. Faubus Wins A Famous Victory,” July, 31, 1958. 128 SSN, Sept. 1958. 129 Reed, Faubus, 243-244. 130 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 147. 131 The count, “with all but a handful of precinct” totals complete, was 30,054 for Hays and 19,246 for Guthridge. A third candidate, “a political unknown” named E. M. Harrington, garnered 1,021 votes. Ibid., Aug. 1958. 132 Reed, Faubus, 243. 133 Election totals in this race were: 142,927 for Johnson and 140,620 for Wilwee. Another segregationist running for the state supreme court was defeated. The incumbent, Justice Ed F. McFaddin beat Griffin Smith, Jr., of Little Rock, 172,966 to 105,105. SSN, Sept. 1958.

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134

SSN, Sept. 1958. Faubus’ statement of August 19, 1958 is also located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 135 SSN, Sept. 1958. Presidential press conference, August 20, 1958. Also located in Ann Whitman Files, Press Conference Series, DDE Library. 136 SSN, Sept. 1958. Faubus’ statement of August 20, 1958 is also located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 137 Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 133. 138 Ibid. 139 Address by Governor Orval E. Faubus to the Extraordinary Session of the Sixty-First General Assembly, August 26, 1958. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 140 In addition to the package requested by Faubus, the General Assembly passed two laws during this session which were designed to inhibit the NAACP. One required that all school employees, including those at the college level, disclose their membership in or affiliation with any association or organization, and the other required certain organizations to disclose certain information regarding their finances and memberships. See pamphlet, “Arkansas Anti-Integration Acts of 1958,” published by the Arkansas Recorder, Sept. 1958. Copy located in Ibid. The text of these acts are also published in RRLR 3 (1958), 1048-1049. 141 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 148. 142 Shreveport Journal, August 30, 1958. 143 Arkansas Gazette editorial, “The School Board And the Courts,” Sept. 3, 1958. 144 Arkansas Democrat, Sept. 7, 1958. 145 Arkansas Gazette, Sept. 6, 1958. 146 Arkansas Democrat, Sept. 7, 1958. 147 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 152. 148 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 190. 149 SSN, Oct. 1958. The special election was originally scheduled for October 7, but Faubus later changed his mind and rescheduled it for September 27. Ibid. 150 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 151 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 190. 152 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 153 Ibid.

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CHAPTER NINE

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The Moderates Awaken: “Massive Resistance” After Cooper The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Cooper v. Aaron had, it seemed, sounded the death knell for “massive resistance.” In Virginia, James Jackson Kilpatrick, the great proponent for interposition, labeled the Court’s ruling “a harsh, arrogant, uncompromising opinion” that was “shocking in its disregard for judicial restraint and judicial custom.” But he acknowledged that the edict handed down on September 29, 1958, had a devastating effect on the program of resistance in which he and other southerners had placed their faith. Until Cooper, he explained, “many of us cherished a hope that the Court’s reckless policies might be tempered by the weight of informed and temperate criticism, if not the melancholy evidence of the chaos wrought by Brown vs. Board of Education.” Now, “These hopes have been shattered.” The Brown decrees, he conceded, “illegal and void as they may seem to us as a matter of right,” could no longer “be regarded as void as a matter of law.” Still, he did not admit defeat. While the laws that had been enacted in Virginia and elsewhere had “outlived their usefulness,” Kilpatrick suggested that “new weapons and new tactics” be devised. “The war has just begun,” he declared. “We can wage this war for years, and we will win it in the end.”1 Kilpatrick approved of school closings, which had occurred in his state as well, and indicated his belief that an appropriate “new weapon” would be a mechanism to permanently finance private schools. In that way, the states “would defy the Federal courts to do their worst.” By establishing a system of private schools, along with provisions for “local option” by popular referendum in individual school districts, “no child would be denied admission to any public school by reason of race, usually because in such circumstances there wouldn’t be any public schools for him to apply to…. If they want equal protection, that would be equal protection.”2 Kilpatrick was not the only one who bemoaned the Supreme Court’s most recent school desegregation opinion. George Shannon opined in

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an editorial in the Shreveport Journal that in Cooper the Court “showed that it did not speak the truth when, in handing down its infamous 1954 race-mixing decree, it said Federal district judges on the scene would be permitted to determine how the integration should be carried out.” To remain true to their word, he contended, the nine justices would have been bound to affirm Federal District Judge Harry J. Lemley’s determination that the desegregation of the Little Rock schools ought to be postponed. In his editorial, Shannon quoted Strom Thurmond, the United States Senator from South Carolina, who “expressed the view of many Americans” when he decried the Court’s ruling as being “‘in keeping with the court’s record of putting the interests of Communists and other criminals ahead of the court’s duty to sustain the Constitution.’” And he noted that a Shreveport businessman had “said the same thing in another way” when he commented that “‘If I ever have a case before the Supreme Court, I’m going to black my face and join the Communist party before I show up.’”3 Little Rock attorney E. L. “Buddy” McHaney disparaged the judgment as well, for having gone beyond the question put to it by precluding state support for private education, lamenting, “I cannot understand how one can justify the Supreme Court’s action in considering circumstances not in the record before it and presume to pass upon the legal situation that might be created by those circumstances.” By having done so, of course, the Court had theoretically removed another means by which the state could further delay integration with additional litigation in the Little Rock case. “In any event,” McHaney grumbled, “I am convinced that the Government, with a cooperative Supreme Court, can do anything it desires,” and he concluded, “If I am right this eliminates the Constitution as a guide to the powers of the Government.”4 Memphis, Tennessee, attorney Marvin Brooks Norfleet, who had offered his free legal services to Governor Faubus the previous September, now pronounced that the nation’s highest tribunal had “taken by its hand the crown, so to speak, similarly as Napoleon did at Paris when he took it from its bearer and placed it upon his own head.” The Cooper decision was “unbelievable” and “outrageous.” And Norfleet grieved that “we are fast becoming serfs and slaves to such philosophy of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is becoming unbearable.”5 But where Norfleet had apparently given up hope, W. J. Waggoner had not. Although he complained that the members of the

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federal judiciary were “completely dominated by the NAACP and instead of being judges they have turned to be school directors,” he stated his belief, like Kilpatrick’s, that “the South will win out in time if we do not give up,” aided by the asserted fact that “sentiment is growing throughout the nation in our favor.”6 In the city of Little Rock, Mothers’ League president Margaret Jackson pledged, upon hearing of the Supreme Court decision, that she and her cohorts would continue to fight for segregated public schools “as long as there is breath in our bodies.”7 And school board member Henry V. Rath resigned, purportedly in protest of the verdict,8 but really, Sara Alderman Murphy observed, because Meyers Bakery, where he was employed as an accountant, was the subject of a boycott by grocery stores, which refused to stock its products at the behest of segregationist forces.9 Rath announced his resignation one hour after the school board issued a statement indicating its intent to comply with court orders and open Central High School, desegregated, on September 15, and one half-hour before Faubus proclaimed that all four high schools in the city would not open at all.10

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The Women’s Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools A mere ten minutes after Faubus signed the acts of the 1958 extraordinary session of the Arkansas General Assembly, and invoked Act 4, which gave the governor the authority to close any school to, among other enumerated reasons, “maintain the peace against actual or impending domestic violence,”11 Little Rock attorney Kenneth C. Coffelt filed a suit on behalf Mrs. Gertie Garrett, who had a son who was supposed to attend Central High School that year, challenging the legality of Act 4 in Pulaski County Chancery Court. A second suit, testing the validity of Act 5, which provided that funds allocated for the operation of a school closed under Act 4 be withheld from the school district and used to finance individual students’ education at other institutions public or private, was filed by former attorney general James L. Sloan on behalf of Little Rock tax-payer L. R. Fitzhugh.12 Although Freyer cited these lawsuits as evidence that “the governor’s willingness to support the closing down of the public schools created confusion among some segregationists,”13 they were very likely filed – in the state court – as a preemptive strike to forestall a federal court ruling on the legality of the school closure. There was, in fact, speculation that Faubus himself was behind the litigation, although he

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refused to acknowledge any involvement.14 The Garrett case asked that an injunction be granted to prevent the schools from being shut down, or, if they were already closed, to reopen them, and also that the court issue a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of Act 4. Notably, though, the petition “did not ask for a temporary injunction… so the action will take the normal leisurely legal course.”15 It could be expected, then, that the case could conceivably take quite a long time to reach a final determination as it worked its way through the state court system, especially if a sympathetic chancellor dragged his feet on the matter. And, while it was anticipated that a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the school closure measures would be filed in federal court, there was reason to believe that a federal judge would assent to a request by state authorities that hearings on it be tabled until the Arkansas Supreme Court could rule.16 As required by Act 4, Faubus scheduled a special election for October 7 to determine whether the schools should remain closed.17 Later, he decided to reschedule the referendum for September 27, so that, he claimed, the schools could be reopened sooner and so the voters would be able to participate in the election under their 1957 poll taxes.18 According to Murphy, who was a member of Little Rock’s Women’s Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools (WEC), an organization that devoted itself to defeating the school closure in the special election, the governor changed the date “after he realized public pressure against him was growing.” Of course, Faubus “denied that was the reason for the change.”19 Another WEC member, Vivion Brewer, observed, too, that the new date the governor announced for the referendum fell, “conveniently for him, on a Saturday when most of the university people were in Fayetteville at a [University of Arkansas Razorback] football game.”20 The “university people,” Faubus knew, were among the “moderates” who opposed him. Slating the referendum for September 27 would allow very little time for the WEC, and others who hoped to see the schools opened, with limited integration if necessary, to mount a campaign against his action. The election was further rigged in Faubus’ favor by the requirement in Act 4 that, to reopen any school shut down at the governor’s discretion, a majority of all qualified voters in the district must reject the closure, rather than the majority of those who actually cast ballots. Perhaps the most insurmountable obstacle to reversing the closure was the language on the ballot, which had been written by the

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segregationist state attorney general Bruce Bennett in such a way that a vote against school closure was a vote “for racial integration of all schools within the school district.”21 The Women’s Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools represented the first organized attempt by moderates in the Arkansas capital to oppose Governor Faubus’ interpositions to prevent the enforcement of federal court orders requiring the implementation of the limited desegregation plan first conceived by school Superintendent Virgil Blossom in 1954, following the Supreme Court ruling in Brown. The idea to establish some sort of association of racially moderate women to help resolve the school crisis was hatched even before Governor Faubus closed the schools. Seventy-six year old Adolphine Terry, the well-respected wife of former state congressman David Terry, went to see Arkansas Gazette executive editor Harry S. Ashmore in late summer 1958 to discuss the school situation. Before she left, she reportedly told him: “The men have failed. It’s time to call out the women.”22 On September 12, before Faubus issued his proclamation closing the schools, Terry had two other women who shared her interest in settling the school question, Vivion Brewer and Velma Powell, over to her home to discuss what could be done. Brewer was the daughter of former Little Rock mayor W. E. Lenon, and Powell was the secretary for the Arkansas Council on Human Relations and the wife of Central High School’s Boys’ Vice Principal J. O. Powell. All three women were integrationists at heart and wished to see black students admitted into the city’s public schools. They decided to issue a call for likeminded women to meet the following Tuesday. As Terry wrote in her diary that night, “it is high time for the moderates to be heard from.”23 By the time of the first meeting of the new organization, which was attended by nearly sixty women, “much to the delight of the three founders,”24 the four Little Rock high schools had been closed. They determined to work to defeat the referendum to keep the schools inoperative, and selected a name for themselves that “reflected both the urgency and the single-mindedness with which the Little Rock women viewed the task at hand.”25 When the special election was rescheduled for September 27, less than two weeks away, the women quickly organized a campaign to convince the citizens of Little Rock to vote “for” the integration of the schools, and to keep the public schools open. They endeavored to explain that the ballot was misleading – a vote “for” would not mean the total integration of the schools, but,

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rather, a continuation of the “token” desegregation begun the previous year. Others in the city had also indicated their preference for the continued operation of the schools, even if that meant limited integration. An advertisement had been placed in both the Gazette and the Democrat on September 21 that was signed by sixty-three Little Rock lawyers urging that the schools be permitted to open and declaring that Faubus’ plan to reopen the schools as private, segregated institutions was illegal.26 That was the extent of their involvement, however, and the WEC felt that “despite the individual lawyers’ ad” and the apparent desire of “the County Bar Association, the PTA Council, the Chamber of Commerce, [and] the Ministerial Alliance” for the schools to resume normal operations, “the burgeoning WEC was alone” in “voicing opposition to the governor’s actions.”27

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The Little Rock Private School Corporation & The Special School Closing Election Faubus shared Kilpatrick’s conviction that compliance with the Court’s order to proceed with desegregation could be avoided through the establishment of private schools. Five days after he closed the schools, the Little Rock Private School Corporation (LRPSC) was incorporated, and the governor recommended that the Little Rock School Board lease the public high school facilities to the corporation to be reopened under private control and operated as segregated institutions.28 The school board members, fearing that they would be subject to contempt charges for disobeying the federal court’s mandates that it proceed with its gradual desegregation plan, appealed District Court Judge John E. Miller for advice on what to do. The NAACP, and the United States Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, petitioned Miller, too, asking that he declare the private school scheme illegal and that he issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the school district from transferring the high school buildings to the LRPSC. At a hearing on September 25, Judge Miller declined to advise school officials on the matter, claiming that it would be inappropriate for him to do so. He also held that he could not pass judgment on the NAACP’s motion because a three-judge court would have to be constituted to make a determination on it, and he refused to grant an emergency, temporary restraining order until such a tribunal could be constituted.29

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Peltason has argued that a three-judge panel was not necessary to rule on the NAACP request. “The plaintiffs,” he instructs, “were not asking him to enjoin the enforcement of state laws, which does require three judges.” Rather, “they were asking only that he keep the school board from co-operating in an unconstitutional maneuver.” Furthermore, Miller could certainly have issued the temporary injunction regardless. That he chose not to do so – a mere two days before the referendum on school closing – “helped to convince” the people in Little Rock that Faubus’ plan for privatizing the secondary schools to prevent integration would work.30 The night before the special election Governor Faubus appeared on television to urge Little Rock voters to approve his plans for foiling the federal “conspiracy” to foist racial integration on the unwilling people of the Arkansas capital. He warned people not to be taken in by the integrationist “propaganda” of the WEC and others who were willing to accept race-mixing in the schools. “The aim and intent of the integrationists” he expounded, was to “confuse you and lead you to believe that you cannot have schools for your children this year unless you vote for the integration of the public schools at this election tomorrow. Nothing could be farther from the truth.” He insisted that the NAACP and the United States Department of Justice, who had attempted to get Judge Miller to enjoin the school district from leasing the school buildings to the LRPSC, “know full well” that such transfer of the schools to private hands was legal, and he assured Little Rockians that the high schools would be opened “as private schools immediately following the election tomorrow.” He reminded his audience that conditions in the high schools would be “terrifying” if they were integrated, and restated his opinion that integration was “certainly not the law of the land,” although the Supreme Court would shortly pronounce that it was in their formal opinion in Cooper. And, he said, “even if it were” the law, “it applies only to public schools” and the federal government was powerless to compel desegregation in private institutions.31 In the special referendum on the use of Act 4 of the 1958 extraordinary legislative session to shut down the schools on September 27, the people of Little Rock voted, in overwhelming numbers, to keep the high schools closed. More than nineteen thousand chose to cast their ballots “against” integration, while just over 7,500 voted “for.”32 The NAACP’s Daisy Bates “commented wryly after the election that it was heartening to know that there were 7,500 persons in

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Little Rock who would vote for integration.”33 The WEC’s Irene Samuel later marveled over the number, commenting that while it represented an obvious minority of the people of Little Rock, the vote in favor of racially mixed schools “was remarkable in our community at that time.”34 Murphy admitted that the women’s organization had little hope of success in the election. “With the prevailing ugly racial mood in Little Rock,” she recalled, “no one expected more than a few people to vote for integration.”35 The realization that there would be no free public schools for Little Rock teenagers to attend that year, however, drew greater numbers of women into the ranks of the WEC,36 and they counted nearly a thousand members by November 1958.37

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The School Board Resigns After Judge Miller refused to advise the school board regarding the legality of the private school plan, and the referendum on school closing, Governor Faubus and the LRPSC continued to pressure school authorities to sign the high school buildings over to the Corporation. Finally, at eight-thirty in the morning on September 29, the board capitulated and signed the lease. That same morning, however, the Supreme Court’s full opinion in Cooper v. Aaron was issued – just as attorneys for the NAACP were able to get two judges of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Omaha, Nebraska, to hear their petition for injunction. A temporary restraining order was granted and was instantly wired to Little Rock, where “more than one hundred marshals,” sent by the Justice Department to aid in the enforcement of federal court orders in the city, “immediately served it on all members of the school board, all teachers, and all staff officials.”38 The governor’s grand design for reopening the city’s four high schools as private institutions was thus stymied. Opponents of desegregation cried foul. They insisted that the question of using publicly supported private schools was not introduced in arguments before the Supreme Court in Cooper, and therefore, that section of the decision violated traditions against issuing advisory opinions. There was, of course, nothing they could do about it.39 The LRPSC promptly announced that it would open a segregated private school anyway, and a Faubus supporter from east Arkansas, Vance Thompson, purchased a building that had at one time been used as an orphanage, for fifty thousand dollars and donated it to the Corporation

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for use as a school.40 Named for one of the LRPSC incorporators, the T. J. Raney High School opened its doors to 750 white students in Little Rock shortly thereafter.41 On November 10, 1958, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals formally vacated Judge Miller’s dismissal of the NAACP’s petition to disallow the leasing of school properties to the LRPSC and instructed him to enjoin the school board against acting or abetting acts to impede the court ordered integration of the Little Rock schools, and to take “affirmative steps” to accomplish desegregation. Miller, away on vacation, said that he would set a hearing on the matter when he could. Taking his time, he eventually set a hearing for January 6, 1959.42 Two days after the circuit court issued its ruling, five of the six members43 of the Little Rock School Board resigned, citing “the utter hopelessness, helplessness and frustration of our present position,”44 which Roy Reed summed up as “having just been ordered by a federal appeals court to get on with integration even though it had no high schools to integrate.”45 As board member R. A. Lile later explained, “We’d just about had a bellyful by then.”46 The sixth member, and the only one not to resign, was avowed segregationist Dr. Dale Alford, who had recently defeated Brooks Hays as a “write-in” candidate for United States Representative, running as an “independent Democrat.”47 As its last official act, the school board, over Alford’s objections, bought out Superintendent Blossom’s contract, to spare him the indignity of being fired by the succeeding board.48 Since Alford, who would have been up for reelection in December anyway, was soon to depart for Washington, DC, the voters in Little Rock would have the opportunity to elect an entirely new school board on December 6. Candidates for the New Board Fifteen candidates for the school board filed before the November 15 deadline. Two later dropped out, one of whom was Jimmy Karam, Faubus’ rabble-rousing friend, who had declared his candidacy for Harold Engstrom’s seat in October, after Engstrom indicated that he would not seek reelection.49 When the board resigned, Karam, who was endorsed by the Capital Citizens Council, heralded an entire slate comprised of arch-segregationists such as himself, who would work diligently to avert the disaster of race-mixing in the Little Rock schools. In a statement issued when he initially announced his bid for Engstrom’s seat, Karam stated his intention to see to it that Virgil

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Blossom, the progenitor of the city’s integration woes, would be dismissed from his position as superintendent of schools, although he added, “half-seriously,” that Blossom might be assigned instead as an assistant principal at the all-black “Dunbar High School.”50 It was Jimmy Karam’s candidacy, according to Murphy, “that shook moderates sufficiently” to inspire Little Rock businessman Ted L. Lamb to run.51 Lamb owned an advertising agency and had offered his professional services to the women of the WEC during their effort to defeat school closure in the September special election. Now, he counted on their support, and the organizational skills they had developed in their first foray into electoral politics, to help him win over Karam.52 Other businessmen in the capital, too, were stirred to join the race. The turmoil in the city since the beginning of the school crisis had had a negative impact on industrial development, as Winthrop Rockefeller had predicted it would when he tried to convince Governor Faubus not to call out the National Guard on September 1, 1957.53 And it was clear that the closing of the Little Rock high schools would further discourage new industries from moving into the Arkansas capital, largely because company executives and other employees would be hesitant to relocate to a district that would not provide free public education for their children. Until the city was able to effectively resolve the school problem, it was unlikely that industry would recover – investors everywhere crave stability, and, in November 1958, Little Rock, Arkansas, was anything but stable. Frank Lambright, who had been appointed to the Little Rock School Board to serve out Henry V. Rath’s term after Rath resigned in September, related that there was an awareness in the community “that business was falling off, Little Rock wasn’t getting any industry.”54 John A. Kirk writes of a report in the Nashville Tennessean that indicated, “The school crisis… had cost the city five new industrial plants, which would have brought in a revenue of $1 million and three hundred new jobs.” The integration controversy, Little Rock moderates were aware, “was an embarrassment to the city, a detriment to community life, and plainly bad for business.”55 Motivated by their awareness of this situation, and in hopes of arranging for an end to the troubles, before the board members announced their decision to step down, they met privately with a group of bank presidents. The defeated school directors informed the bankers of their intentions, and asked if they would “run as a slate” for the school board in the

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December elections. They explained their belief that people in the city would accept their leadership, and that the difficulties in Little Rock “had become economic more than anything else.” As a group, however, the bank presidents refused to run.56 Murphy reports that after the failed attempt to convince the bankers to run, Chamber of Commerce vice president E. Grainger Williams, along with a few other Chamber members, most notably William F. “Billy” Rector – who apparently considered the effort to produce a slate comprised of Little Rock businessmen a personal crusade, worked to come up with a list of potential candidates. Rector “placed his own name at the top of the list.”57 Billy Rector, who was described by Murphy as a “blustery businessman full of self-importance,”58 was a real estate developer and an insurance man. In August 1957, he had filed a suit in the Pulaski County Chancery Court challenging the legality of the package of segregation laws enacted by the Arkansas General Assembly that year,59 and had had a run-in with Governor Faubus in February 1958 that received significant coverage in the press. He had personally suffered financial losses when his plans for a ten million dollar shopping center in Little Rock had fallen apart after the New Jersey developing company he was working with decided to pull out of the deal, reportedly because of the integration troubles in the city. Rector publicly blamed Faubus, and charged further that the governor’s actions were costing the city millions more in lost industrial opportunities. Faubus angrily responded to the allegations, implying that Rector’s business reversals were the fault of his own failings and the fact that there was “a recession on.” He then called the businessman a liar, an integrationist, and a Republican. Billy Rector, in turn, called Governor Faubus a “skunk.”60 The day after the school board members resigned on November 12, Grainger Williams brought the list of potential candidates, compiled largely by Billy Rector, to Adolphine Terry and asked her to contact as many as she could until she was able to convince enough of them to field the desired “businessmen’s” ticket. Terry agreed, on the condition that she could fill one of the places on the slate with a selection from within the ranks of the WEC. “All that stood between Karam and his segregationist slate,” then, with less than two days until the filing deadline, “was a relatively unknown contender named Ted Lamb and [the now] seventy-seven-year-old Adolphine Terry.” It was midnight when she was finally able to stop making telephone calls.61 The moderate candidates for the Little Rock School Board would be Ted

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Lamb, Billy Rector, Everett Tucker, Jr., Russell H. Matson, Jr., and WEC steering committee member Margaret Stephens.62 Everett Tucker, who was the industrial manager for the Chamber of Commerce, remembered that he decided to run after it was pointed out to him that since there had been no new industries in Little Rock since the crisis began, and there could be none expected until it was resolved, he “wasn’t going to have anything else to do” so he “might as well try to get on the School Board and try to rectify the situation so that we could get back in the business of developing our economy.”63 At the urging of Rector, Ed I. McKinley, Jr., a member of the opposing slate, was permitted to run uncontested. Rector knew McKinley, who was an attorney, as a fellow member of the Little Rock Country Club, and assured his colleagues on the Chamber of Commerce and the women of the WEC that he would be a reasonable man to deal with.64 Rector would come to rue having vouched for McKinley, who would, as Irene Samuel later remarked, be reasonable only in so far as he consistently “reasoned” for the other side.65 Besides McKinley, who was a close friend of Dale Alford, the prosegregation candidates were Robert W. (Bob) Laster, Ben D. Rowland, Sr., C. C. Railey, Mrs. Roy (Margaret) Morrison, John Wesley Clayton, Mrs. Pauline Woodson, and Dr. George P. Branscum.66 Jimmy Karam, who had hoped to be unchallenged when he announced his candidacy in October, “backed down from running when opposition materialized.”67 The Capital Citizens’ Council backed all but two of the segregationists in the race. John Clayton and George Branscum were sponsored by the States’ Rights Council, which had broken off from the Capital Citizens Council in the spring of 1958.68 Rowland, an attorney, ran against Billy Rector. Morrison, who, like the moderate candidate Stephens, was identified in the Southern School News only as a housewife, was described by Murphy as “a segregationist maverick who was president of the NAAWP (National Association for the Advancement of White People).” Both she and Clayton, an insurance agent, challenged Tucker. Railey’s opponent was Matson. Bob Laster, the Little Rock Traffic Court Judge, faced the WEC’s Stephens. Woodson, a real estate agent who was a member of the Mothers’ League, and Branscum, a dentist, each vied for the same seat as Lamb.69 Dr. Branscum had run unsuccessfully against Henry V. Rath in the 1957 school board election.70

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The December 1958 School Board Elections The segregationist slate campaigned on the race issue alone. Bob Laster, for example, proclaimed that if he were elected, he would vote to open the public schools as segregated institutions, and that he was personally willing to go to jail for defying the federal courts if it should come to that.71 Frequently, they dropped Faubus’ name, trying to associate themselves with the immensely popular governor. Faubus did not openly endorse any of the candidates.72 He did, however, attack the businessmen’s slate as “integrationist.”73 In fact, all of the candidates for the school board campaigned as “segregationists.” The businessmen, while insisting that they personally preferred that racial separation be maintained, argued that providing quality public education for all the city’s children was simply more important, and that they were willing to have a small number of individually selected black children sit in the same classrooms with whites if that was what it took to open the schools. A few of the moderate candidates were actually more liberal in their privately held racial beliefs, but, as Everett Tucker noted, it would have been “impossible for integrationists in those days to be elected.”74 Billy Rector, who Faubus had “periodically… used… as an example of an integrationist,” was sincere in his insistences that he favored segregated schools.75 His moderate “support of integration extended only so far as it meant new business for him.”76 Rector appointed himself the unofficial spokesman for the businessmen’s slate, much to the frustration of the WEC, whose leaders found him difficult to work with. Vivion Brewer described him, in his dealings with her, as “decisively abrupt, almost belligerent,” and related that “he wanted total efforts of our organization on behalf of ‘his’ slate but made it clear that no one should know of our alliance.”77 The WEC had already been tainted by association with “integrationism” as a result of their agitation against the referendum on Faubus’ closing the secondary schools, so Brewer and other directors of the women’s group understood Rector’s desire to downplay the relationship between them and “his” slate. Still, Brewer made it plain that the WEC would assume the responsibility for organizing and managing the campaign only on the condition that the candidates did not attempt to portray themselves as doctrinaire segregationists. Ted Lamb, whose advertising agency produced most of the moderates’ campaign materials, “readily agreed.” Rector, on the other hand, “antagonized the WEC” by answering Faubus’ charges in

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integrationism by issuing a statement revealing that he had made financial contributions to the Citizens’ Council in 1957, and by running advertisements in the newspapers that stressed the business candidates’ support for school segregation.78 In the end, at the polls on December 6, 1958, Little Rock voters elected McKinley, Tucker, Laster, Rowland, Matson, and Lamb to the school board.79 Billy Rector lost, unable to overcome the effects of his ongoing public feud with Governor Faubus, who painted him as an integrationist who was willing to put the welfare of innocent children at risk to line his own pockets. Murphy exposes his bitterness over this defeat, telling of his demand for “a recount, which he paid for, of both his and Margaret Stephens’s votes,” and of his making a scene at a luncheon hosted by Terry honoring the three moderates who had won positions on the school board. At the luncheon, where about thirty people were present to witness his tantrum, Rector started complaining loudly about his failure to capture a seat on the new board, and then “suddenly turned to Brewer and said, ‘And you are the chief reason I lost.’” Adolphine Terry promptly gave him a dressing-down, after which Rector jumped up from the table and stormed out.80 In spite of the losses by Rector and Stephens, the Chamber of Commerce leaders and the WEC were extremely pleased with their success. Their pleasure was dampened within a few weeks, however, when “after a board meeting or two, McKinley made it clear that his loyalties were with the governor,” and that he was not willing to compromise on the absolute integrity of racial separation in Little Rock schools. The new board, then, was split down the middle: Tucker, Matson, and Lamb were moderates, where McKinley, Rowland, and Laster were diehard segregationists. Political Maneuvering During “The Lost Year” One month later, on January 6, 1959, Herschel Friday, the attorney for the new school board81 appeared in Judge Miller’s courtroom in Little Rock for the hearing Miller had been directed to hold by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The judge questioned Friday regarding the school district’s current policy regarding the integration of the schools. The attorney replied that, since there were no public high schools operating in Little Rock, the board had, at that time, no plans for desegregation. Miller instructed the district to “move forward” on a plan for

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compliance with federal court orders to desegregate the city’s schools and to report back to him within thirty days. Eleven days later the board’s representative returned with a proposal that the high schools be permitted to open segregated while they worked on devising a new strategy for effecting desegregation. Board members had already been in contact with education “experts” to help them come up with a good plan, Miller was told, and the school board promised to submit its program to the court by August 15, before the opening of the next school year.82 The NAACP quickly and rigorously objected to the proposal, which they claimed was not a “move forward” as the court had required, but, rather, a “step backwards.” To allow the Little Rock high schools to reopen with no integration would, in effect, be the same as granting anew the delay approved by Judge Lemley, which they pointed out had already been rejected by both the appeals court and the Supreme Court of the United States. The Justice Department, too, had objections. The amicus brief submitted by the Department stated that the United States was opposed to any plan that involved the resegregation of the schools for any amount of time. On February 3, Judge Miller rejected the school board’s proposal to open the schools with segregation in effect. But he did not instruct them to open them desegregated either.83 “Clearly,” Peltason professed, “Judge Miller was going to be of little help to the moderates. If they were going to regain control of their schools they would have to do so by political rather than legal victories.”84 The city’s moderates, though, had not yet mobilized in opposition to Faubus’ actions to the point that political victories were likely. While the business elites were motivated enough by the negative economic effects of the crisis to attempt to seize control of the school board, the WEC remained the only organization committed to taking affirmative steps towards the reopening of integrated schools. Even the limited success that had been achieved in the election of three moderates to the school board was tempered by the fact that, since three arch-segregationists had been elected as well, a deadlock effectively neutralized the board, disabling it from accomplishing anything to advance the cause of either side. In December 1958, E. Grainger Williams became the new president of the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce. In his speech at his inaugural dinner on January 14, 1959 Williams addressed the school issue, saying: “The time has come for us to evaluate the cost of public education – and the cost of the lack of public education,” and he urged

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the business community to work towards a resolution of the school problem. After a moment of stunned silence, the room exploded with applause.85 While Spitzberg hailed this breaking of the “taboo” against mentioning the subject in a public forum as the “formal turning point in the life of the Little Rock crisis,”86 it did not signify the beginnings of a movement to defeat the forces of resistance that had taken over the city. The 62nd Arkansas General Assembly commenced its two-month session on January 12, 1959. Governor Faubus recommended in his third inaugural address, and on other occasions, that the legislature adopt three new measures designed to further enable local school districts to stave off integration. One of these was a proposed constitutional amendment that would allow the people in individual communities to vote, by popular referendum, to close their schools and instead provide tuition grants for students to use in seeking an education elsewhere, presumably in segregated private schools. Since this was an amendment that would require ratification by the people in the 1960 general election, the governor indicated his desire to see the Arkansas solons enact a second measure to provide a statutory basis for tuition grants that could be put into effect immediately upon passage and his signing it into law. His final suggestion was for a law to guarantee that teachers who left the public schools to teach in private ones in the state would not lose their retirement benefits. The legislators acted swiftly on the second and third of Faubus’ recommendations, quickly passing both. Later, they would approve the amendment as well.87 Faubus shortly requested a fourth enactment, to provide for the release of an individual student’s share of state education funds to the student to pay private school tuition, in the event that a pupil enrolled in a school that had integration desired to withdraw and register somewhere else. This, too, passed easily. By the end of February, nearly fifty new laws relating to desegregation had been introduced in the legislature.88 Ultimately, by the time the assemblymen finished their work and adjourned on March 12, thirtytwo new segregation laws had been enacted. Only two had aroused serious debate, and just one of the bills put to a vote was rejected.89 On February 26, Representative Tom E. Tyler of Little Rock, at the behest of Governor Faubus and School Board President Ed I. McKinley, introduced a bill that would have authorized the governor to appoint three additional members to the school board. Labeled the “board-packing plan” by its detractors, it would have put an end to the

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paralyzing effects of the three-three split. That Tyler had agreed to sponsor the measure stunned the WEC, who until that time had considered him one of the “reasonable” members of the assembly.90 Tyler himself conceded, “I know it’s a little on the dictatorship side, but we have no choice.”91 Along with women from the PTA Council and the American Association of University Women, the WEC had formed a coalition devoted to lobbying the legislature during its 1959 term. As one segregation bill after another succeeded in becoming law, Murphy explained, “the WEC coalition lobbyists… abandoned whatever reserve they had attempted to show at first,” and when the board-packing proposal was introduced, “large numbers of coalition women…swarmed into the state capitol, surrounded Tyler, and demanded that he withdraw it.”92 The segregationist Mothers’ League was lobbying the Arkansas lawmakers as well, and they exerted considerable pressure in support of the proposed law.93 Meanwhile, school board member Bob Laster had, as he promised he would during his campaign, moved that that body immediately reopen the schools, segregated, and the courts be damned. If the federal government wished to send the “occupying forces” back into the city, and Laster did not believe they would, then let them. If federal judges wanted to make martyrs of the school board by charging them with contempt and throwing them in jail, well, that was just fine with Laster, too. A disgusted Ted Lamb denounced Laster’s posturing, and implied that the traffic court judge was simply trying to keep his name in the newspapers to set up a run for the governor’s office in 1960, “an ambition,” the Southern School News reported, that “Laster does not conceal.” Laster further moved that a provision be written into all teacher contracts that would make them automatically void if they worked in integrated schools. In this way, he contended, if the federal authorities forced a white school to admit blacks, they would find that there was no faculty and they would then have to deal with that.94 On February 27, the day after Tyler introduced the board-packing plan in the General Assembly, the moderate board members, fearful that the bill would pass, pushed for an immediate vote on Laster’s motions. They wished to quickly dispose of his absurd proposals before the legislature could give Faubus the authority to add additional segregationists to the board. McKinley, however, refused to call a board meeting. Tucker then scheduled one, for March 1, as he was

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empowered to do as vice president. But the three segregationists stayed away, and the board, lacking a quorum, was unable to vote.95 In the General Assembly, Tyler’s bill easily passed in the house, although one member, Gayle Windsor, Jr., of Little Rock, was so frustrated by the absolute submission of the other representatives to the governor’s caprices that he sarcastically introduced an amendment to the state constitution that would abolish the legislature and the courts altogether and give all of their powers to Faubus. In the senate, on the other hand, the plan was hotly debated, and was vigorously opposed by Senator Ellis M. Fagan, who requested that a vote on the bill be tabled – a move that would effectively kill the measure. Fagan, from Little Rock, had been a respected member of the state senate for twenty-six years, so when he vehemently declared that the board-packing scheme in question was so repugnant to him that he would resign his office right then and there if his colleagues refused to table it, they deferred to his wishes and they did not vote on it. During the remaining ten days of the legislative session, “Faubus put on extraordinary pressure to revive the bill but couldn’t.” An alternative, compromise proposal was offered by Senator Max Howell, also from Little Rock. He suggested that three additional board members be added to the six-man school board, but that they be chosen by the voters in the district through a special election called for that purpose. The senators approved that plan, as did the house representatives, with amendments and without the emergency clause that would have permitted it to immediately go into effect. When the amended bill was returned to the senate, Senator Sam Levine of Pine Bluff, urged to do by the WEC coalition lobbyists, “filibustered it to death.”96 Virginia Abandons Massive Resistance Although Little Rock moderates were concerned that the General Assembly had enacted a great deal of pro-segregation measures during the 1959 session, they were relieved that the school board-packing measure was defeated. Also heartening to them was the failure of the “school closure experiment” in Virginia – a state that had considered itself a leader, and an example for her sister southern states to follow, in the resistance to Brown. In January 1959, however, Governor J. Lindsay Almond threw in the towel after both a three-judge federal court and the State Supreme Court of Appeals declared the Virginia

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school closing law unconstitutional. The governor convened a special session of the legislature to do as Virginian James Jackson Kilpatrick, Jr., had earlier said was necessary: devise “new weapons and new tactics” with which to fight integration.97 In his opening address to the legislature, Governor Almond dismissed the complaints of extreme segregationists who had insisted that he “invoke the police power of this state to prevent the opening of the closed schools on an integrated basis,” or that he recommend to the legislators that they pass laws empowering him to “padlock and police any school threatened with the imminence of integration.” He simply had, he stated with resignation, no legal authority to do that. The Virginia assembly then enacted a new program that recognized the inevitability of desegregation and sought to minimize its effects. Virginia had abandoned massive resistance. Where the state had previously endeavored to defeat the Brown decrees completely, through a program of outright defiance, it had now adopted a strategy of delay.98 Even Herman Talmadge, the arch-segregationist former governor and now United States Senator from Georgia, seemed to be retreating, if only slightly, from his previous position. Whereas he had always in the past maintained that the Brown rulings were not the “law of the land,” he admitted in Congress in January 1959 that the Supreme Court mandate was “an accomplished fact,” and the problem was not one of legality but of enforcement. Still defiant, though, he insisted that while desegregation was now the law, the vast majority of the people in his state, and throughout the South, “will neither accept nor submit to the forced implementation of that bill” and recommended an amendment to the federal Constitution that would place control of the schools entirely in the hands of local governments.99

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NOTES 

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1

Address by James Jackson Kilpatrick, Jr., “Tactics in the School ‘War,’” delivered to the Richmond (Va.) Rotary Club, Nov. 11, 1958. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 2 Kilpatrick to Fred Haislip, Nov. 13, 1958. Kilpatrick Papers, UVA. 3 Shreveport Journal editorial, “Courage for a Showdown,” Sept. 13, 1958. 4 E. L. McHaney to Lemley, Sept. 30, 1958. Lemley Papers, UALR. 5 Marvin Brooks Norfleet to Lemley, Sept. 30, 1958. Ibid. 6 W. J. (Bill) Waggoner to Lemley, Feb. 12, 1959. Ibid. 7 Quoted in Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 69. 8 Ibid; SSN, Oct. 1958. 9 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 69. 10 SSN, Oct. 1958. 11 A copy of Act 4, and of all the enactments of the August 1958 special legislative session, is located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 12 SSN, Oct. 1958. 13 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 154. 14 SSN, Oct. 1958. 15 Ibid. 16 The federal court had, for example, consented to a similar request made regarding Roland Smith, et al v. Orval Faubus, et al., and Arkansas Sovereignty Commission, challenging the validity of the 1957 Arkansas segregation laws that was originally filed in federal district court August 1957. Ibid., Sept. 1957. The constitutionality of the 1957 laws had yet to be determined by the state courts in September 1958. Freyer further states that “nothing became of the suit[s]” challenging Acts 4 and 5. Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 154. In fact, Chancellor Murray O. Reed – who had granted the injunction against integration requested by Mrs. Clyde Thomason in August 1957 – upheld the legality of both Acts 4 and 5 in October 1958, and after appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court, Reed’s decisions were affirmed in April (Act 4) and May (Act 5). SSN, Nov.; May; June 1958. 17 Ibid., Oct. 1958. 18 Ibid. Under Arkansas law, to be eligible to vote citizens had to pay a $1 poll tax, which was due no later than October 1. If the referendum on school closing were to take place after that deadline, as originally scheduled, eligibility would be determined by the tax collected for 1958. Ibid. 19 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 79. 20 Mrs. Joe Brewer interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 3. 21 A copy of the referendum questions is located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. Many have noted the inherent advantage to Faubus’ position in the wording of the questions. See, for example, Brewer interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 3; Irene Samuel interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 14; William T. Shelton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970),

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 31. Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 76; Peters, The Southern Temper, 90; Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 198. Shelton asserted that the referendum’s wording, which offered alternatives “that didn’t match anybody’s plan,” was Faubus’ “own idea.” Shelton interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 31. 22 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 67. 23 Ibid., 68, 70-71. 24 Ibid., 73. 25 Ibid., 77. 26 SSN, Oct. 1958. 27 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 88. 28 SSN, Oct. 1958. 29 Ibid; Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 196-197. 30 Ibid., 197-198. 31 Television address by Faubus, Sept. 26, 1958. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 32 The election count was 19,470 against integration and 7,561 for integration. SSN, Oct. 1958; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 90; Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 198. Faubus’ attorney William J. Smith cited the referendum results when he later claimed that it was not the governor who “closed the schools.” “That’s hogwash,” he said, “He didn’t close them,” – the people of Little Rock closed the schools when they cast their ballots on September 27. Smith interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 34-35. 33 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 90. 34 Irene Samuel interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 14. 35 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 76. 36 Mrs. Joe Brewer interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 3. 37 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 95. 38 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 199; SSN, Nov. 1958. Shortly after it became clear that the schools would not open the federal marshals were withdrawn from the city, “subject to recall if needed.” SSN, Oct. 1958. 39 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 199. 40 SSN, Nov. 1958. 41 Reed, Faubus, 245-246. 42 SSN, Dec. 1958; Jan. 1959. 43 After his resignation in September, Henry V. Rath had been replaced by the appointment of Frank Lambright, an insurance salesman whose wife was a member of the WEC. Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 102. 44 SSN, Dec. 1958. 45 Reed, Faubus, 246. 46 R. A. Lile interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 20. 47 Alford edged out the moderate Hays, who had served in the United States Congress for sixteen years, 30,739 to 29,483. SSN, Dec. 1958. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., Nov. 1958.

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50

Quoted in Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 103. It is unclear whether he simply misspoke when he said “Dunbar High School,” and actually meant Horace Mann High. It is possible that he meant to say Dunbar Junior High School. The former Dunbar High School had been converted into a junior high upon the opening of Mann in January 1956. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid., 104. 53 “Summary of information received by the FBI from Mr. Winthrop Rockefeller on September 8, 1957,” Sept. 9, 1957. Copy located in Caldwell Papers, UA-F. 54 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 102. Quote is from an interview conducted by Murphy with Frank Albright on August 21, 1992. 55 Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 135. 56 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 102. 57 Ibid., 104. 58 Ibid., 102. 59 SSN, Sept. 1957. 60 Ibid., March 1958; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 104; Reed, Faubus, 240. 61 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 105-106. 62 Ibid., 106; SSN, Dec. 1958. The Southern School News did not identify Margaret Stephens as a member of the WEC. She was listed only as “Mrs. Charles W. Stevens” [sic], a “housewife.” 63 Everett Tucker, Jr., interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 2. 64 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 106; Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 97-98. Curiously, while he acknowledges that “the Women’s Emergency Committee provided campaign organization and assistance in the School Board election,” Spitzberg does not mention Margaret Stephens at all. He merely notes that there were “four businessmen who ran on the Moderate slate.” Ibid. 65 Irene Samuel interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 15. 66 SSN, Dec. 1958. 67 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 107. 68 SSN, Dec. 1958. 69 Ibid.; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 106-107. 70 SSN, April 1957. 71 Ibid., Dec. 1958. 72 Bartley states that the segregationist slate was “supported by Governor Faubus.” Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 328. The governor, however, never explicitly endorsed any candidate – his tacit support for the segregationists can only be inferred from his condemnations of the moderate candidates. 73 SSN, Jan. 1959. A Faubus press release of December 5, 1958 labeling the moderate ticket the “integration slate” is located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. Roy Reed observes that Governor Faubus was by this time freely “using the term integrationist as a pejorative.” Reed, Faubus, 240.

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74

Tucker interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 5. Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 104. The quote is from an interview with Rector conducted by John Pagan on January 2, 1973. 76 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 105. 77 Quoted in Ibid., 107. 78 Ibid. 79 SSN, Jan. 1959. 80 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 108. The recount resulted in no alteration to the board’s membership. 81 Archie House left the employ of the Little Rock School Board in November 1958. As he put it, “They ran me off when they ran the original Board off.” A. F. House interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 34. When the board elected on December 6, 1958 met for the first time, its second official act was hiring the law firm of Mehaffy, Smith, & Williams to represent them – Faubus attorney William J. Smith’s firm. There was no apparent conflict of interest at this point in the Little Rock saga, though, because the school board was no longer engaged in fighting the governor in the courts. The board’s first official act had been to elevate Hall High School Principal Terrell E. Powell to superintendent, filling the vacancy left by Blossom’s acceptance of the old board’s offer to buy out his contract. 82 SSN, Feb. 1959. The Little Rock case was now renamed Aaron v. McKinley, to reflect the change in personnel on the school board. 83 Ibid.; Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 200. 84 Ibid. 85 SSN, Feb. 1959. 86 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 105. 87 SSN, Feb.; March; April, 1959. 88 Ibid., March 1959. 89 Ibid., April 1959. Just before the April 4 deadline, Governor Faubus surprised observers by vetoing one of the bills passed by the assembly. Before his veto, Faubus had never stated any objections to it and appeared to support it when it was considered in the legislature. The bill in question provided that any school closed by the governor under Act 4 would automatically reopen at the beginning of the following school year. In explaining his rejection of the measure, the governor claimed that it would, by implication, preclude him from ordering the school(s) reopened before the end of the school year, a power that he now said he had, despite his previous denials that he possessed that authority. Ibid., May, 1959. 90 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 123. 91 SSN, March 1959. 92 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 123. 93 Ibid., 124. 94 SSN, March 1959. 95 Ibid.

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96

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Ibid., April 1959; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 123-124; Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 107-108. Quotes from SSN, April 1959. Murphy notes that Levine was voted out of office in the next election because of his opposition to the board-packing bill. Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 124. 97 SSN, Feb. 1959. For source of Kilpatrick quote, see note 1, above. 98 SSN, Feb. 1959. Almond’s capitulation here was not the end of school closings in Virginia, however. Having been ordered in September 1958 to begin desegregation, the Prince Edward County Board of Supervisors refused to appropriate any money for the operation of the public schools in June 1959, and all of the public schools in the county ceased operations. Ibid., July 1959. On the abandonment of massive resistance in Virginia, generally, see: Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 323-326. 99 Ibid., Feb. 1959.

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CHAPTER TEN

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The Forces of Moderation Reclaim the “City of Roses” A shocking move by the segregationist school board members in May 1959 finally stirred the moderate business elites of Little Rock, Arkansas, to act. As early as February, rumors began to circulate involving a secret proposal offered by Governor Faubus to the moderates on the school board. Aware that the effects of Act 5 of the 1958 special legislative session, under which state financial support for the high schools had been withheld from the Little Rock school district, had left the school board unable to meet its expenses, the governor apparently suggested that he would ensure the restoration of funding if they agreed to fire several school administrators and teachers in exchange. Those supposedly targeted for dismissal included the Central High School principal and vice-principals, Jess Matthews, J. O. Powell, and Elizabeth Huckaby, and Horace Mann High School Principal L. M. Christophe. Superintendent Terrell Powell (no relation to J. O. Powell) was suspected to be the courier of this clandestine offer to Tucker, Matson, and Lamb.1 When questioned by a reporter from the Arkansas Gazette who had caught wind of this Faustian bid, Ted Lamb purportedly corroborated the rumor. Tucker and Matson declined to comment, and would neither confirm nor deny that they had been offered any covert deal. Ed I. McKinley refuted the allegation outright, branding it a “ridiculous falsehood.” The day after the Gazette story appeared, Faubus claimed to know nothing about any impending “purge” of school faculty or administrators, or of any surreptitious arrangements. At the same time, though, he did state his belief that Matthews, J. O. Powell, and Huckaby each deserved to be fired, because “they did everything they could to discriminate against white students” while the Little Rock Nine were in attendance at Central. After the governor made this opinion known, the segregationist faction of the school board announced that they intended to vote against renewing the contracts of the three Central High School administrators.2

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After months elapsed with no action taken against any of those reported to be on Faubus’ and the segregationist board members’ “hit list,” the incriminating exchange reported in the Gazette faded into memory. Then, at a meeting of the school board on May 5, 1959, the “Purge” came. All six members were present when the school board convened its session at nine o’clock in the morning. According to Murphy, “tension was high because it was the last meeting for considering teacher contracts for the coming year.”3 Under both state law and municipal bylaws, after this time all teacher contracts that had not been acted upon would automatically be renewed. The board dealt with several matters before lunch, including the submission of teacher resignations and hearing a report from Superintendent Powell regarding a survey that suggested even more intended not to return to work the next year. There could be, he warned them, a teacher shortage in the Little Rock schools for the 1959-1960 academic year, and he suggested that efforts be made to actively recruit qualified teachers. Next came a proposal that Terrell Powell be restored to his previous position as the principal of Hall High School and that T. H. Alford be named the new superintendent of the district’s schools. Alford was a school principal in the Pulaski County Rural School District, and the father of former school board member and now United States Representative Dale Alford. All present voted on the motion, which, unsurprisingly, ended in a three to three deadlocked vote. The motion, therefore, failed to pass, and the board members continued on to consider the matter of teacher contracts. One of the moderate board members moved that all of the contracts be renewed en masse with a single vote of acclamation. In light of the report they had just heard regarding a potential faculty shortage, it was noted, school authorities ought to make every effort to retain all of the educators already in the district’s employ. Again, the vote ended in a stalemate, with McKinley, Laster, and Rowland rejecting the proposal. “That established the pattern of the meeting,” it was reported in the Southern School News, as the board began the tedious process of considering the teachers “school by school, one by one.” After the meeting was reconvened following a lunch break, Everett Tucker announced the dissatisfaction of the moderate faction with the course of the meeting, and then he, Matson, and Lamb walked out.4 Ted Lamb informed WEC leaders the next day that the three had excused themselves “on the advice of their attorney who felt that, in the

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absence of a quorum, the meeting would be declared illegal in court.”5 After the moderate faction of the school board left, however, Ed McKinley declared that since the entire board had been in attendance at the time the meeting convened, voting requirements had been met, and that it was not necessary to reestablish a quorum in order for further decisions to be valid. For all practical purposes, he determined, with the approval of Laster and Rowland, the three of them now represented a quorum. Additionally, the board president rejected the contention, made earlier in the session by Tucker, that no teacher could be dismissed who had not been notified of the possibility prior to January 15. While acknowledging that the courtesy of such notification had traditionally been observed by previous school boards going back many years, he pointed out that the current membership had never formally adopted that policy and, therefore, was under no obligation to abide by it.6 Having so declared, McKinley, Laster, and Rowland proceeded, replacing Terrell Powell with T. H. Alford and declining to renew the contracts of forty-four of the district’s “most highly respected teachers and administrators at the afternoon rump board session.”7

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Stop This Outrageous Purge The “Purge” truly represented a turning point in the Little Rock saga. “The outcry,” Neil McMillen observed, “was instantaneous,”8 and, as Bartley notes, the effect was a revitalization of the moderate leadership in the city.9 Former school board member R. A. Lile, too, identified the Purge as the point at which “sentiment shifted” in Little Rock.10 Women’s Emergency Committee member Billie Wilson was present at the school board meeting where the dismissals occurred. When she attempted to protest the firing of the principals of the schools her own children attended, Board President McKinley cut her off, telling her that the matter was not open for public discussion. Wilson immediately left the meeting and news of the Purge reached the leadership of the WEC even as it was going on. Thus, before the board “adjourned that day, the WEC became ‘the first organization in the city formally to condemn the dismissals.’”11 That night, the teachers at two elementary schools in Pulaski Heights, whose principals had just learned that their contracts were not renewed, met and decided to go on strike in protest of the school board’s actions. The principals themselves convinced the teachers not to do so, and they determined instead to call a meeting of

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the Parent-Teacher Association for the next evening at Forest Park Elementary School.12 The day after the Purge, May 6, the PTA Council’s executive committee gathered to discuss McKinley, Rowland, and Laster’s actions. It quickly and unanimously came out in opposition to the dismissals and suggested that an attempt to recall the three offending members of the school board be initiated. “Since the council represented a membership of roughly thirteen thousand members in twenty-six schools,” Murphy notes, “this was no idle request.”13 The four hundred distressed parents who attended the Forest Park meeting that night took up that suggestion and passed a resolution demanding such a recall. The WEC and the PTA were not alone in condemning the Purge. Statements of protest issued from the Greater Little Rock Ministerial Alliance, the local branch of the League of Women Voters, the American Association of University Women, the Arkansas Education Association, the Little Rock Classroom Teachers Association, the Chamber of Commerce, and the Junior Chamber of Commerce as well.14 Immediately following the adjournment of the May 6 meeting, Dr. Drew Agar, the vice president of the Forest Park PTA, called for the creation of an ad hoc committee. The committee wasted no time in the setting the recall in motion: “by the next day five hundred of the three thousand recall petition forms ordered had been delivered,” and they began the task of collecting signatures.15 As the petition drive was getting underway that Thursday morning, a small group of young professionals gathered, as they often did, at Breier’s Restaurant in downtown Little Rock. They discussed the budding recall movement over coffee, and agreed that “something should be done” by the business community to help it along. They determined to form an association of their own, to which they hoped to attract some of the older, more established and influential civic leaders, to publicize the recall and to convince the Little Rock community that this time the segregationists had just gone too far, and they should not stand for it. One of the men present, Gene Fretz, a feature editor for the Arkansas Gazette, came up with a name for the proposed organization of businessmen: the Committee to Stop This Outrageous Purge (STOP).16 While they met, the Chamber of Commerce board, called into session by Chamber President Grainger Williams, issued a resolution of its own. It condemned the Purge, which, it stated, was “a disgrace to

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this community” that should be “erased.” Word of this action reached the young men at Breier’s Restaurant, who “were euphoric” at the news.17 A day later, Friday, May 8, 1959, STOP unveiled its intentions when one hundred and seventy-nine moderate businessmen released a statement denouncing the firing of the forty-four school district employees as “a denial of basic rights” that would “cause irreparable damage” to the Little Rock school system “by destroying academic freedom and the faith of our teachers in themselves as free citizens.” STOP concluded with the declaration that “the actions taken by Ben D. Rowland, Ed I. McKinley Jr., and Robert W. (Bob) Laster are a breach of public trust and justify their recall as members of the Little Rock school board.”18 The PTA Council endorsed the STOP pledge and sent it out to the individual school chapters. Of the twenty-six local PTAs, eighteen approved of both the censure of the segregationist board members and the recall resolution, three indicated their support only for the censure of the purgers and not for the recall, two – both located in working class wards – disapproved of the STOP statement in its entirety, and three local PTA units did nothing. The WEC organized telephone chains to encourage sympathetic parents to attend the meetings and elect to support STOP. At one PTA meeting, the moderate school board members addressed a friendly crowd of more than three hundred and fifty. Ted Lamb took a moment to survey the patrons of Williams School before speaking. “I was wondering where you people were three months ago,” he told them.19 While the Arkansas Gazette article that reported the formation of STOP noted that “many of the city’s best known and most influential persons” were associated with the group and had signed the published statement of principles,20 the committee was led by junior, “second rank executives,” and not by the true economic power brokers within Little Rock society. The more prestigious and established members of the business elite shied away from direct involvement in the recall campaign, and “gave its approval to STOP only in its tacit permission to the younger executives and in its financial support of the movement.”21 Such financial support, of course, was extremely helpful to the cause, but the hesitancy of the Old Guard elites to publicly identify themselves with STOP was a source of concern for at least one man who felt the task at hand was made all the more difficult as a result. William H. (Bill) Hadley, Jr., who had been a local television newsman in the capital at the height of the school crisis in 1957, had

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doubts regarding the potential for STOP to swing popular sentiment to the moderate viewpoint. In December 1960 he explained to Daisy Bates that he “wasn’t sure STOP was the answer.” The young Turks of the committee just did not wield the sort of influence that Hadley felt was necessary to make a difference. The established leaders, the members of the One Hundred, were notably absent from the ranks of the association, and “that was what had been wrong all along.” He believed that the powerful men of the business community ought to have come out publicly in favor of free public education and peaceful compliance with the federal court-approved program of limited integration long before the Purge, and that the need for their responsible leadership was absolutely imperative in the wake of it. “The real pillars of the community did almost no good whatever, and probably a great deal of harm,” he lamented, “by simply keeping their mouths shut when they should have been on their toes fighting…. But STOP was all we had.”22 In part to address the concerns of individuals like Bill Hadley, STOP members selected an older gentleman, W. S. (Will) Mitchell, to co-chair, along with Dr. Agar, the committee’s thirty-four member advisory board. Mitchell was apparently reluctant to accept the role at first, but soon he became “a solid community voice speaking for STOP.” Agar, too, despite being a driving force behind the initiation of the recall movement at the Forest Park PTA meeting, had some misgivings about taking a visible, active part in the drama. According to Murphy, Agar was cognizant of the fact that “many professional and business men had previously declared that they could not join such a movement because it would be bad for business,” and she quoted him as admitting, “‘I was one of those myself,’” until he became so indignant over the Purge that he overcame such fears.23 Murphy describes Will Mitchell as a “prestigious” attorney who would later become president of the Arkansas Bar Association.24 Spitzberg acknowledges that he was a “senior lawyer” who had “high community prestige,” but at the same time categorizes him generally with the younger, less established businessmen that made up the rank and file of STOP. “Mr. Mitchell,” Spitzberg says, “though older than many of the other leaders, was still in the process of moving up.” Still, Spitzberg cites Ed Lester as pointing out that “‘Will Mitchell kept the organization from looking like a group of young men popping off,’” an

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indication that placing the older man at the forefront of the movement did have its desired effect.25 The advisory board named a man with undeniable influence and political savvy to manage the recall campaign. Attorney Henry Woods had been former Governor Sid McMath’s chief of staff and former Little Rock Mayor Woodrow Wilson Mann’s personal counsel. Woods, who had supported Faubus opponent Lee Ward in the 1958 race for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination, knew much about electoral politics, and STOP benefited greatly from his advice. Woods worked closely with the WEC’s Irene Samuel in managing the crusade. Just as they sought to conceal the relationship between Brewer and Samuel and the committee, STOP leaders also kept quiet Woods’ appointment as chief strategist. He, too, had a reputation for liberalism that could attract unwelcome controversy to the STOP campaign. Combined with the organizational strength and womanpower of the Women’s Emergency Committee, Henry Woods’ strategy for success was extremely effective.26

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The May 1959 Special Recall Election Recall of school board members was made possible by a law adopted by the Arkansas General Assembly in 1957, and amended during the August 1958 extraordinary session of that body to make recall easier by reducing the percentage of voters in a school district required on petitions for a special election from twenty-five to fifteen percent. Ironically, the enactments were originally intended to enable segregationists to remove the moderates who then held a clear majority on the Little Rock School Board, and who favored orderly, if minimal, compliance with desegregation orders.27 There had, in fact, been attempts by segregationists to remove board members. In September 1958, for example, the Mothers’ League circulated petitions requesting a special election to recall the entire school board, with the exception of Dr. Dale Alford. But the Mothers’ League lacked the organizational machinery to coordinate such an effort, and, failing to secure the necessary signatures after several weeks, gave up the attempt.28 Faced with the present endeavor by STOP to rid the Little Rock School Board of its three pro-segregation members, supporters of McKinley, Rowland, and Laster, and of the Purge, responded by generating petitions to recall Tucker, Matson, and Lamb. This counterattack surfaced almost instantly – Mothers’ League members

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began canvassing the city with their petitions by Saturday, May 9, within forty-eight hours of the commencement of the STOP petition drive. Mothers’ League president Margaret Jackson claimed responsibility for the action for her organization, but reports in both the Gazette and the Democrat gave credit to then United States Congressman Dale Alford.29 Eventually, a coalition of segregationist organizations comprised of the Mothers’ League, the Capital Citizens Council, and the States’ Rights Council, formed a committee, too, known also by a pithy acronym: CROSS – the Committee to Retain Our Segregated Schools. Henry Woods’ counterpart on CROSS was Claude D. Carpenter, Jr., formerly of the Faubus administration, and now Representative Alford’s chief aide.30 The emergence of the segregationists’ call for the recall of the moderates on the school board “merely spurred on the STOP petition circulators,” who “felt it was important to be first” in submitting the signatures they were collecting “because the law was unclear concerning whether more than one recall election could be held in the same year.” Stop This Outrageous Purge succeeded in beating CROSS to the office of the county clerk with their completed petitions – by seven hours. Both requests were submitted on May 12. After the county clerk certified the petitions three days later, the election commissioners set the date for the recall: May 25, 1959. The partisans on each side then had ten short days to convince the city’s voters to recall the bloc of school board members they opposed and to retain the bloc they supported.31 The Committee to Stop This Outrageous Purge plastered the town with a deluge of broadsides advertising the upcoming special election, and Irene Samuel, advised by Henry Woods, painstakingly culled through the poll tax records and identified which of the approximately forty thousand voters could be expected to opt for removal of the segregationist board members, which would surely oppose, and which were not yet committed to either side. Samuel then assigned volunteers from the WEC and the League of Women Voters to each ward in the city and instructed them to press STOP supporters to turn out to vote on May 25 and to work towards winning over the undecideds to their cause. Known segregationists were to be ignored. “It was,” Murphy affirms, “an old but effective technique for winning elections by getting one’s own vote out while attempting not to stir up a large vote on the other side.” The key to success lay in the “precision-tuned organization and… almost endless stream of womanpower” to canvass the

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neighborhoods before election day. In this, the STOP campaign was aided by the fact that the WEC had “a good many of the ward captains, precinct secretaries, and block workers… already in place from previous elections.”32 The operation was aided as well by a group of more than one thousand of the displaced high school students who organized themselves into a “Jr. STOP.” These teenagers assisted with the clerical work involved in mounting the campaign, “which freed the adults for more productive activities,” and also distributed STOP fliers throughout the state capital. In addition, Jr. STOP members “offered a number of written testimonials” extolling the virtues of individual teachers who had been victims of the Purge.33 In its promotion of recalling the segregationist faction of the Little Rock School Board, “STOP waged a dignified battle” that sought to avoid the question of race, and confined its statements and advertisements to what it considered the only real issue involved; the unfair firing of the school district employees targeted for persecution by McKinley, Rowland, and Laster, – and Faubus as well – without due process and despite their prior records as fine educators. Some of the “purged” had taught in the Little Rock schools for as long as thirty-nine years, and had been commended for their work in the classroom before the integration crisis occurred. None of those who had been dismissed, furthermore, had been offered any explanation for their dismissal at the time.34 The Committee to Retain Our Segregated Schools, on the other hand, “insisted that the election gave voters a choice between integration and segregation.”35 While the anti-integration members of the school board had offered no public explanation for their refusal to renew the contracts of the forty-four recipients of their wrath on the afternoon of May 5, CROSS now placed an advertisement in the Arkansas Democrat that offered reasons for the fate of the purged teachers and administrators. They had been fired for cause, the ad claimed, because each was guilty of one or more of the following offenses: “Teaching alien doctrines, incompetency, breaking and entering, trespassing on private property, invasion of privacy, improper punishment, intimidation of students, [and/or] immorality.” The Democrat advertisement was signed by Reverend M. L. Moser, Jr., in his capacity as CROSS chairman. When reporters questioned Moser regarding the source of his information, he indicated that it had come from school board president Ed McKinley himself.36 The allegations made against the dismissed educators was, in Peltason’s estimation, “the worst tactical error” made by CROSS

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during the campaign.37 Although he does not elaborate, the implication is that the charges were so extreme as to sway significant numbers of Little Rock citizens who had supported the school closing and other maneuvers to evade federal integration orders into the moderate camp out of sympathy for the victims of the Purge, whom they believed to be guilty of nothing worse than consenting to the courts’ mandates and trying to protect the Little Rock Nine – victims themselves – against abuse by their white classmates. In further contrast to the dignity displayed by STOP, CROSS spokesmen “indiscriminately identified all those who protested the firings as ‘integrationists,’ ‘left-wingers,’ ‘fellow travelers,’ and ‘Communists.’” Rabble-rousing United States Representatives Alford and John Bell Williams of Mississippi contributed to the segregationists’ effort with emotional orations that appealed to the racial fears associated with the race-mixing that the STOP-supported board members would force on Little Rock’s schoolchildren if they won the present contest.38 In final days of the campaign, Governor Faubus also joined in the attacks against the “integrationist” STOP committee. On May 22, the governor spoke out in favor of the Purge and for retaining McKinley, Rowland, and Laster in the upcoming election. He introduced the class issue into the election, cautioning the “good, hard-working, honest people of the lower and middle classes” against the manipulations wrought by the “charge of the Cadillac brigade of wealthy and prominent leaders” that was pressuring them to cast their votes in favor of the “integrationists” on the board. If the integration slate was retained, Faubus contended, they would waste no time in admitting black children to the public schools patronized by working class whites, while they themselves could afford to send their own children to segregated private schools, if necessary, to protect them from the disastrous effects of race-mixing.39 The next night, Faubus addressed the city again, informing his audience that “token integration implies an unfulfilled obligation,” and that once begun, the process would accelerate until there was complete and total integration of the races in the city’s schools. Again, he warned, the working classes who resided in “salt and pepper” neighborhoods would suffer most, because it was in their schools that the greatest amount of mixing would occur. The governor commended McKinley for his brave commitment to the preservation of segregation. McKinley had recently announced, as Bob Laster had earlier, that he

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was prepared to go to jail to protect the racial purity of the schools.40 Will Mitchell responded to McKinley’s apparent willingness to martyr himself for the lost cause of legally enforced racial separation in the public schools with the declaration: “If he wants to go to jail, let him go. But he has no right to take with him the keys to every grammar school, junior high school and high school.”41 In the special recall election on May 25, which saw the greatest voter turnout in Little Rock history for any school election save the September 27, 1958 referendum on school closing,42 “the three STOP candidates… won by a hair.”43 All three of the CROSS candidates were recalled, and each of the STOP candidates were not. As McMillen quipped, in The Citizens’ Council, “the purgers” were “themselves purged by the voters, and the moderates exonerated.”44 Segregationists McKinley, Rowland, and Laster were removed from their positions by only a “slightly larger” margin than the moderate Tucker, Matson, and Lamb were retained,45 but the election “nevertheless… marked a decisive victory for the moderates.”46 An editorial in the Arkansas Gazette exulted in the moderates’ success, proclaiming on May 27 “the air is clearer today, and the future brighter.”47 An examination of the election results reveals that the moderates’ margin of victory was accounted for by overwhelming turnout of voters in the “silk stocking” Pulaski Heights section of the city and in those precincts with large majorities of black voters.48 Spitzberg recognizes that the outcome was by no means a foregone conclusion when the people of Little Rock set out for the polls on that fateful Monday in May. “One day earlier or later the balance could have shifted,” he observes, and he acknowledges that “the black vote won the election for STOP. In the predominantly white precincts, the CROSS slate won.”49 The tremendous turnout by the black electorate was not left to chance. Roy Reed credits “the political know-how of the furious women of the Women’s Emergency Committee” with making “the difference.” The long hours of hard work put in by Irene Samuel’s army of election workers to promote the STOP campaign certainly outperformed any similar attempt by their opponents. Perhaps even more significant, however, was Henry Woods’ strategy for getting black voters to the polls. He arranged for carpools to bring them to polling places, and had students from Philander Smith College go through black neighborhoods door-to-door, reminding the people to vote, and offering free rides to the election sites. This effort paid off.

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Woods recalled later that the crucial factor in the moderate victory in the recall election was, simply, “We got our vote out. And the other side was not that successful. If everybody had voted, we would have lost.”50

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The Moderates Prevail The recall election of May 1959 was a significant event in the Little Rock saga. Although it was likely, as both Spitzberg and Woods point out, that a numerical majority in Little Rock still supported segregationist attempts to evade compliance with federal court-ordered desegregation, the moderate elites of the state capital had finally stirred to action and seized control of city affairs. While STOP’s success at the polls could not be regarded as providing a popular mandate for reopening the high schools with some degree of integration in effect, it did indicate that, an article in the Southern School News noted, “For the first time since September 1957 there was widespread opposition to Faubus at Little Rock on a school matter.”51 The Southern Regional Council (SRC) similarly viewed the recall as “the first clear-cut instance of popular unwillingness to follow the Governor.” An SRC report identified a variety of causes for what it perceived as a “stiffening of local opposition” to Faubus’ obstructionism. First of all, it was felt, the community was growing sure “that the administration was irresponsible and oppressive.” Furthermore, that the local economy had suffered as a result of the school controversy was a source of consternation among the city’s businessmen. Third, the report suggested, “The whole city… grew tired of the wearying load of its own notoriety, and concerned with the hardship being imposed on its children.” A final cause of discontent with the ongoing struggle to maintain segregation in the schools was “a spreading popular awareness” that in the end, federal authority would undoubtedly prove too strong and that the federal courts “and not the Governor, represented the ‘immovable object.’”52 And within the United States Justice Department, it was considered that a year without public secondary education had convinced the people of Little Rock that STOP was right, and that “the issue is not between segregation and integration but is between no public education on the one hand, and compliance with Federal court orders on the other.”53

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Governor Faubus, who had insisted before the election that a failure to retain McKinley, Rowland, and Laster on the school board and to recall the “integrationists” from the board, would have tragic results, “backpedaled afterward.” The recall, he claimed, changed nothing.54 He was as committed to defiance as ever. All along he had maintained that his primary point of contention with the federal demand that the schools be racially integrated rested upon the fact that the people had never had the opportunity to vote on the matter. The previous summer, after he had escalated his oratories against Brown to where he emphatically denied that it was the “law of the land,” he railed that “it has never been, in a democracy, possible to enforce a law to which the people were overwhelmingly opposed, and there’s a name for those who try – tyrants!!”55 Now, however, the people had had the opportunity to vote on the question, and a majority of the electorate had indicated that they were willing to suffer limited integration rather than endure another year without public high schools. Faubus himself, after all, had proclaimed that to be the issue involved in the recall, despite the insistence of STOP that it was not. Instead of acceding to the apparent will of the people, the governor stayed his course, and offered no indication that he would not take action to prevent school authorities from proceeding with the original plan for desegregation. But the governor was wrong. The recall had changed the situation considerably. As Freyer notes, “The election broke the power of the governor and his supporters over the Little Rock school system.”56 Murphy agrees with that assessment. “Although Little Rock was still a divided community,” she wrote, “the STOP victory had finally shifted control and influence away from the extremist diehards and into the hands of those who supported open schools.”57 The forces of moderation had reclaimed the “City of Roses,” and they would not relinquish it again. On June 11 the Pulaski County Board of Education appointed three new members to the Little Rock School Board to take the place of the recalled “purgers.” Named to the board were J. H. Cottrell, Jr., a loan executive and state representative; B. Frank Mackey, an insurance salesman and one-time police detective; and building contractor Henry Lee Hubbard. The selection of Hubbard turned out to have been a mistake – he was forced to resign four days later without ever having met with the board because it was discovered that he was ineligible as a result of a 1938 felony conviction that deprived him of the right to vote, a requirement for service. A replacement was not immediately

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assigned, so the school board convened as a five-man body in the interim. As its first official action, the newly constituted school board undid the Purge, reinstating the forty-four teachers and administrators who had been dismissed on May 5, and restoring Terrell Powell to his position as superintendent. And, at its second meeting, the five men unanimously determined that the high schools would be opened on schedule in September, with limited integration. School assignments, they decided, would be made using the state’s pupil placement laws. In July, a sixth member was added to the school board. Upon joining the board, William C. McDonald issued a statement indicating his approval of the resolve of his new colleagues to reopen the high schools in compliance with federal mandates, “in spite of our feelings about integration and segregation.”58 When two of the schoolmen, Everett Tucker and Frank Mackey, stood for reelection in December, Little Rock voters handed them decisive victories against segregationist opponents. As he had in 1958, Tucker squared off against Margaret Morrison. Mackey was challenged by Mrs. H. H. Ray. Both women claimed no affiliation with any segregationist organization, although they were heartily endorsed by both the Capital Citizens Council and the Mothers’ League, and Morrison was identified by Murphy as having been the president of the National Association for the Advancement of White People. Again the people of Little Rock “rejected the segregationist candidates in favor of the two moderate incumbents, but this time it had been by a two-to-one margin.”59 School Closing Laws Declared Invalid Days after the Little Rock School Board announced its intention to reopen the city’s high schools in September, Governor Faubus was denied an avenue for preventing that from happening when a threejudge federal court declared the state’s school closing laws unconstitutional. Back in January 1959, NAACP attorneys had petitioned the federal district court in Little Rock to invalidate Acts 4 and 5 of the August 1958 special session of the Arkansas legislature. The petition, which was filed on behalf of black students, also requested that the court issue a temporary injunction restraining state officials from enforcing the two acts. Since the petition involved the constitutionality of state statutes, a three-judge panel was required to decide the case.60 As expected, Arkansas Attorney General Bruce

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Bennett filed a motion with the court that asked that no judgment be made on the NAACP suit until the two cases that had been initiated in the Pulaski County Chancery Court in September, which challenged the same acts, had reached a final determination.61 Breaking with tradition, the three judges assigned to hear the latest action in the ongoing Little Rock case, now re-titled Aaron v. McKinley, to reflect the change in school board personnel, refused Bennett’s request on March 7, 1959. At the same time, they granted a temporary injunction against Act 5, preventing the state from diverting any more of the funds being withheld from the Little Rock School District into the coffers of the private, and segregated, Raney High School. They did not, however, enjoin state officials from enforcing Act 4. Thus, the city’s four public high schools remained closed. The temporary injunction against Act 5 would remain in effect until the hearing the judges set for May 4.62 Meanwhile, the Chancery Court having earlier upheld both Acts 4 and 5, the state cases made their way to the Arkansas Supreme Court. Briefs were submitted to the state’s highest court on March 23. Both Governor Faubus and the WEC submitted amicus briefs in the Gertie Garrett case, which asked that the legality of the school closing act be determined. That filed for the governor, which argued in favor of Act 4, charged that closing the schools was a legitimate use of the state’s police powers, to protect the lives and property of citizens against impending violence. The WEC brief, on the other hand, asserted that Act 4 violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as Articles 14 and 2 of the Arkansas state constitution. Under Article 14, the state was obliged to provide free public schools, and Article 2 guaranteed the equal protection of the laws. Additionally, the WEC responded to Faubus’ claim that the police powers of the state could be used to shut down the high schools in Little Rock. Since Act 4 was created for the sole purpose of defying the orders of the federal courts, it was maintained, its use could not be justified under any circumstances. In addition, the WEC questioned how violence could possibly be considered to be “impending” when the very provisions of the law itself allowed up to thirty days before the required special election to determine public approval for school closing. Surely in that time arrangements could be made for effective law enforcement against potential violence.63 Decisions were reached by the Arkansas Supreme Court on both Acts 4 and 5 before the federal court ruled on the NAACP case. On

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April 27, the Arkansas tribunal, in a four to three split decision, affirmed the Pulaski Chancery Court opinion in favor of the validity of Act 4. The majority opinion, written by Justice Paul Ward, agreed with the governor’s contention that the state’s police powers authorized the closing of the schools, and further held that the law did not conflict with the state constitution. Moreover, it was not necessary for the state chief executive to justify his discretionary use of Act 4 to close the schools by producing the evidence upon which he had determined that violence was imminent. The court could only assume that the governor acted always in the best interests of his people. Chief Justice Carleton Harris, and Justices Sam Robinson and Jim Johnson concurred. Justice Ed F. McFaddin produced a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices J. S. Holt and George Rose Smith. McFaddin announced that he could not square the school closing enactment of the 1958 extraordinary legislative session with the provisions of Article 14 of the Arkansas constitution. He did not, however, address the issue of the law’s consistency with either the federal or state equal protection clauses.64 A week later, on May 4, the same day that Federal Circuit Judge John B. Sanborn and District Judges Axel J. Beck and John E. Miller conducted a hearing on the matter of the constitutionality of Acts 4 and 5, the Arkansas Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the legitimacy of Act 5. Justice McFaddin concurred in the affirmation since, the court having held that Act 4 was lawful, it must logically follow that Act 5 was valid as well.65 Peltason remarks that “the decision of the Arkansas court had no legal significance,” since the ruling was clearly at odds with the United States Supreme Court’s 1958 opinion in Cooper. There, after all, the nation’s highest court had specifically proscribed any scheme for statesupported private schools to evade compliance with its own ruling in Brown, which it declared, in no uncertain terms, was the “law of the land.” Despite being legally specious, however, the Arkansas Supreme Court pronouncement had political implications, since it served to further “confuse,” in the minds of the people, what was the law. At the same time, Peltason suggests that “perhaps of greatest significance… was the fact that even three Arkansas Supreme Court jurists had ruled against Faubus” on Act 4.66 By this point in the Little Rock saga, though, despite preceding the Purge, if only by a very short time, rumblings of discontent could be heard among moderates in the capital city against the governor’s actions. A majority on the Little Rock

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Chamber of Commerce, for example, had already indicated willingness to endure limited desegregation in the public schools if only the crisis could be put to rest,67 and the harmful effects of the school closings on the city’s schoolchildren were readily apparent. And, more important, Peltason apparently overlooks the fact that dissent in the Garrett case was based not on the conflict between federal and state authority at all, but entirely on Act 4’s inconsistency with the state’s own constitutional requirement that free public education must be provided for its children. The three-judge federal court announced its opinion in Aaron v. McKinley on June 18, 1959.68 Both Acts 4 and 5, the judges declared, were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court had already held in Cooper69 that the threat of violent resistance could not justify the use of police powers to deny constitutional rights. Therefore, Faubus’ closing of the schools was void, and the Little Rock School District remained bound by the orders of the federal courts to proceed with racial desegregation. The court’s opinion directly addressed the decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court upholding Acts 4 and 5, stating, “With all due respect to the considered views” of the justices of that tribunal “who concluded that Act No. 4 represented a valid exercise of the police power of the state and therefore did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, we are firmly of the opinion that Act No. 4 cannot be sustained upon that ground, and is clearly unconstitutional under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and conferred no authority upon the governor to close the public high schools in Little Rock.” While the Arkansas court did not consider the legality of Act 4 with respect to the Federal Constitution, the Judges Sanborn, Beck, and Miller believed that clearly they should have. And, since the federal jurists found that “Act No. 5 is complementary to and depended upon Act No. 4,” they held that statute to be likewise invalid.70 Faubus announced that he found the ruling of the three judges disappointing, and that he would file an appeal with the Supreme Court.71 The opinion was troubling, also, because he was sure, he said, that the Little Rock schools could not be opened as integrated institutions without the support, once again, of “federal force” and “live ammunition.” Yet, Murphy observes, Governor Faubus “knew he had lost the shaky legal crutches he had used to justify keeping the schools closed and transferring the money elsewhere. There was still apprehension, however, that he might try some other ploy, such as

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calling a special session of the legislature to pass more laws.”72 On December 14, 1959, the Supreme Court justices affirmed the lower court opinion eight to one, upon which the Arkansas governor scorned, “It’s no surprise that the court ruled without a hearing. It usually rules on things without knowing what the hell they are all about anyhow.”73

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Preparations for Reopening the Schools The Purge behind them, and reversed by the new school board, STOP no longer had its raison d’etre. Still, the moderate businessmen that had comprised that association believed that there was still much that needed to be done to ensure that the high schools could be opened in September, and that there remained a need for an organization of responsible leadership to prevent the Capital Citizens Council, the Mothers’ League, and the States’ Rights Council from regaining the initiative if the business and civic elites returned to their previous slumber. That the arch-segregationists could succeed to the extent that they had in 1957 was unlikely, of course, considering that most Little Rock citizens were anxious to see school controversy come to an end, but the rabble-rousers could yet create problems for school authorities. Furthermore, they knew that the diehard segregationists in the city still held considerable influence over Governor Faubus, who was so deeply invested in his defiance that he could no longer back down gracefully without incurring political damage. Rather than disband altogether, then, STOP transformed itself into an entirely new organization. On July 17, the Committee for the Peaceful Operation of Our Free Public Schools was created. To maintain the illusion of a clean break with STOP, the leaders of the recall movement stepped aside and J. Gaston Williamson assumed the chairmanship of the new group.74 Williamson was an attorney with the Rose Law Firm, as was former school board attorney Archie House. Williamson and House were close friends and had lunched together daily for years. As a result, Williamson had had knowledge of the details of the original Blossom Plan from its inception, and had a deep understanding of the difficulties that faced the school board throughout the crisis. The Committee named one hundred and thirty-two members to its advisory board, and this time the industrious Irene Samuel was invited to join. Twenty other women sat on the board as well, including the WEC’s Adolphine Terry and Pat House.75

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At a meeting of the Committee for the Peaceful Operation of Our Free Public Schools at the end of July, Williamson issued a statement of principles for the new organization that was printed in its entirety by the Arkansas Gazette. The Committee declared that all of the public schools in Little Rock must open that fall, and they must stay open. “But that is not all. We say that they must be opened in compliance with constitutional law,” and they must be permitted to operate within “an atmosphere of order, peace and tranquility in which no child will go to school under threat of violence, or under armed protection against such threat.” Williamson reminded Little Rockians, on behalf of the Committee, that the eyes of the world remained fixed on their city, and to consider how they would like to be seen by outsiders. Would they like to be viewed, as they once had been, as a modern and progressive city that cared for its children and saw to their education? Or would they be content to be seen as a place “wrecked by dissention and possibly even violence?” The Committee was dedicated to assisting schools authorities in every way possibly to ensure that the high schools could be integrated without further unrest that fall, and the statement released by Williamson informed the people of Little Rock that the Committee would be calling upon them to join in taking “a public stand in support of our School Board in its endeavor to reopen our public high schools…. Only through the open support of a majority of our citizens can we insure the peaceful operation of free public schools in our city.”76 Several individuals in Little Rock feared that Governor Faubus was preparing “to stage another spontaneous outbreak of violence and opposition to integration” similar to that which had occurred the last time black students were admitted into Central High School. Many believed that the governor “would succeed” in rekindling the school crisis unless the federal “Administration states firmly and clearly, sufficiently ahead of the school opening day, what it will do.”77 Governor Faubus was publicly predicting that violence would surely occur if the school board were permitted to go ahead with its plan to open integrated schools. The board had already made a move that suggested that some degree of integration would take place in more than one facility. On July 14 Everett Tucker revealed that the board had redrawn the boundaries of the high school attendance zones, moving a one hundred and fifty-six block section of what had been in the Central High School attendance area into that for Hall High School. This change placed approximately twenty-six black students into the

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Hall High area. Before this change was made, no black students lived within the Hall High School zone. No explanation was offered for this move, but it was speculated that it was done to redress a source of criticism against the original Blossom Plan – that the wealthier citizens who resided in the “silk stocking” Pulaski Heights section of the city could send their children to a high school that remained lily-white while the children of the less privileged working class were forced to endure race-mixing.78 The presumed intention of the school directors was to diffuse “the class tensions that had contributed to the segregationists’ strength,”79 by assigning black pupils to attend the school patronized by the “Cadillac brigade” that Governor Faubus warned his core supporters to hold suspect. The prospect of having yet another of the city’s high schools desegregated, on the other hand, lent credence to the claims of Faubus and segregationist leaders that the idea that, once begun, integration could be controlled and limited was a myth. Like a cancer, they argued, desegregation would spread and grow until all the schools were completely integrated. The governor had accused the old board of secretly desiring the total integration of the schools after the Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Lemley delay, suggesting that once the flood-gates were opened, black students would quickly increase from nine to ninety or nine hundred, “the latter figure being the number eligible to attend Central High School” based upon residence with the school’s attendance area.80 In the summer of 1959, he similarly objected to the plans of the new “moderate” school board.81 At the same time that they disclosed their alterations to the city’s attendance zones, the board members announced that high school registration for the fall term would take place between July 21 and July 24. All students, black and white, were instructed to register at that school in which attendance area they resided. Two exceptions to that general policy were allowed. The first was that any child wishing to attend Technical High School, which drew students from throughout the district, might register there. No reference was made to race regarding applications to Technical High. The second exception was that any pupil residing within the attendance area of a high school that had been operated in the past for children of the other race would be permitted to register at a facility previously operated for children of their own race. Thus, black students living within the Central or Hall High School zones would be permitted to register at Horace Mann High

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School if they so chose, and the handful of white students who lived closest to Horace Mann could elect to register elsewhere as well. Students were further advised that they would not be automatically enrolled at the school where they registered, but that final determination on school assignments would be made by the school board guided by the standards established in the Arkansas Pupil Placement Law. It was not yet known, then, how many black students would be admitted into previously white schools for the upcoming term, or how many of the three historically white schools would be involved.82 While the segregationists in the city had remained relatively quiet since their loss in the May recall elections, the Capital Citizens Council reared its head again after the new school board announced its commitment to reopening the high schools in September, and that it intended to proceed with desegregation at that time. On the same day that Tucker announced the board’s policies for registration for the fall 1959 term, July 14, Amis Guthridge vehemently declared that the Council would resist the admission of even a single black student into any white public school in Little Rock, “with everything at its command.” And, he continued, “We do not mean in the courts, we mean by action.” Although Guthridge quickly qualified his statement to imply that such resistance would employ only “legal” methods when he was asked by reporters to elaborate, it was clear that the segregationists were gearing up to stage some sort of public demonstration against integration when the schools opened that fall. Furthermore, an FBI informant reported to the Bureau that the Council’s board of directors was increasing its level of activity in preparation for the reopening of the high schools, and that one of the Capital Citizens Council directors had said that the organization would set out to rile the people to the point that, come September, “they will be ready to do anything.”83 While Faubus and the Citizens’ Councilors opposed the school board’s plans because it would bring about integration, local NAACP attorney Wiley A. Branton denounced them for not offering enough of it. Branton considered the pupil placement act one of the “evasive schemes for segregation” prohibited by the justices of the Supreme Court in Cooper, and he charged, in an angry letter to the board, that every black child in the city was entitled by right to attend the school in which attendance area he resided. The school assignment law could

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not be used as a means to deny the federal constitutional rights of black students by excluding them from their neighborhood schools.84 The NAACP lawyer’s contention that the application of standards for school assignments established by the state legislature was proscribed in Cooper conveniently overlooked a later per curiam decision by the Court that affirmed the ruling of three federal judges in Alabama upholding that state’s similar pupil placement law.85 W. Wilson White, director of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, did not, when he advised Attorney General William P. Rogers that Branton’s charge “is clearly wrong.” Furthermore, White “strongly” recommended that, “should the matter come up in court, we appear as amicus curiae and take the position that the placement law, fairly administered, is not only legal, but… essential,” to the success of the school board’s plans for reopening the high schools in compliance with federal orders. The Justice Department, he believed, should assist in any way that it could to support the Little Rock School Board as it endeavored to resolve the integration crisis, even as Governor Faubus and the city’s segregationist organizations obviously desired to prolong it.86 Despite the opposition schoolmen faced from both the archsegregationists and, apparently, the NAACP, during the summer of 1959, the board displayed a resolve that was lacking in their predecessors as the commencement of the 1957 school year approached.87 Governor Faubus continued to publicly harangue the board that the course it was following would lead to disaster, and hinted that he might be forced to act, once again, to avert the violent outbreak they were courting. During a press conference in July, the governor commented: “I think there is something the Legislature can do to delay any integration,” confirming suspicions that he would again convene the assembly in an August special session to contrive some new method of defiance, as he had done the previous summer. The school board responded by challenging Faubus to produce a plan for legally maintaining racial separation in the high schools. They would be open to such a scheme, they said, because they personally preferred segregation, but “if no choice is offered, we will not abandon free public education in order to avoid desegregation.”88 Orval Faubus answered the challenge by a submitting a proposal for “voluntary integration” in the city’s secondary schools on July 29. In the introductory discourse preceding the details of his plan, Faubus

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stated plainly, and, it should be noted, incorrectly, that “those who advocate the forcible integration of the schools on the theory that it is the ‘law of the land’ have a very weak case, indeed. A citizen is bound no less by the laws of his own state than by the federal law.” The governor’s plan called for those who voluntarily wished to attend an integrated school to come forward and make their preference known. Then, half of them should be assigned to Hall High School and the other half to Horace Mann. One of these schools should be designated for boys only and the other for girls. He stressed that both of these facilities, which were the newest and most modern, were located in those neighborhoods that seemed most amenable to desegregation anyway. Since it was assumed that the majority of whites would not volunteer to attend school with blacks, Central High School, which was larger than the others, would admit only whites. If it turned out that an insufficient number of white children opted to attend classes with blacks to justify two integrated schools, the few who did make that choice should simply be assigned to Horace Mann. Then, he pointed out, every black high school student in Little Rock would attend an integrated school, and there would be no need for segregation to be ended at Hall or Central High Schools.89 Upon receiving the governor’s submission, the board stated that it would take it under advisement and refer it to its attorneys for evaluation. Capital Citizens Council leaders, who had always in the past objected to any plan that involved even the least bit of desegregation, bit their tongues and refused to comment on the governor’s suggestions. The Mothers’ League’s Margaret Jackson said only that she did not like the fact that it would abide integration in at least one of the high schools, but she was willing to live with it if it was the only way to keep Central segregated. J. Gaston Williamson of the Committee for the Peaceful Operation of Our Free Public Schools vehemently denounced the proposal. Later, the school board rejected Faubus’ proposal and released attorney Herschel Friday’s opinion on it, which Wilson White described as “wordy and somewhat equivocal,” but ultimately concluded it would not survive legal attack.90 Afterwards, Faubus disregarded the board’s formal rejection of his idea, and its nearly unanimously cold reception by segregationists, integrationists, and moderates alike. He accused school officials of ignoring it, despite its having “met with wide approval throughout the city and the state,” and claimed, fantastically, that “the board was advised by its own attorneys that the plan was not illegal and was

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workable.”91 In an interview published in November, he conjectured that the school board refused to accept his proposal “principally because they didn’t have the courage to put it into effect against the wishes of the Federal government and the NAACP,” which, he implied, dictated its actions. He continued to insist that his plan was obviously constitutional, and that it was “still the only solution I can think of whereby we can restore a state of harmony and calm” in the Arkansas capital.92

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The High Schools Reopen On August 1, 1959, Little Rock school officials announced that it had completed making school assignments and that it had decided to enroll six black students at two predominantly white high schools. Three of the original Little Rock Nine were readmitted into Central High School, and three black girls had been accepted for enrollment at Hall.93 No black students were assigned to attend Technical High School, a decision that Peltason characterizes as “prudent” because there, “segregation strength could be expected to be especially strong since Technical enrolled noncollege-bound students.”94 Peltasons’ supposition that the atmosphere inside the trade school would have been extremely unwelcoming towards black students is very likely correct, but it should also be noted that only a single black teenager submitted an application for admission to Technical High during the four-day registration period. Perhaps if there had been more, a few black students might have been permitted to enroll at that school.95 Governor Faubus condemned the assignments, reiterating his objections to compulsory integration against the will of the majority of the people and his belief that token integration was impossible to maintain. “Six this year, 60 next year and 600 the next – it could go something like that,” he railed. Amis Guthridge, too, issued a statement on behalf of the Capital Citizens Council raging against the board’s admitting the handful of black pupils into the overwhelmingly white schools. It was “Communist-inspired” he ranted, and the board members were “cowardly yellow quitters.” He concluded his diatribe with the proclamation: “Our answer to the leaders of this diabolical race-mixing plot is NEVER.”96 Both the Committee for the Peaceful Operations of the Public Schools and the WEC, disappointed that so

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few had been assigned to Hall and Central High Schools, “reluctantly supported the School Board.”97 Fearful that the governor would call the Arkansas General Assembly into extraordinary session to prevent the six black children from entering their assigned schools, as he had already indicated he might, “the school board did an awfully smart thing,” three days after their placement decisions were revealed, and “just suddenly announced schools were open, the 12th of August.”98 Ostensibly, the decision to open the high schools99 nearly a month earlier than the originally scheduled date of September 8 was to provide an extra nineteen additional schools days for “orientation,” necessitated by the fact that the schools had been closed the previous year. School board secretary Ted Lamb, however, admitted on a national television appearance a short time later that the intent was to thwart any last-ditch obstructionism by the “demagogue” Faubus.100 Privately, Everett Tucker had also acknowledged in a telephone conversation with Wilson White before the board made its August 4 announcement that he had received information that the governor planned to convene the General Assembly on August 15, “and said that it would be most desirable if the Board could open the schools before the legislature met.”101 Earlier in the summer, with the Little Rock School Board’s assurances that the public high schools would reopen on schedule in September 1959, all but one of the private schools that had been specially created to provide basic schooling for the displaced highschoolers of Little Rock closed due to an inability to continue financing operations or for insufficient enrollment.102 Only T. H. Raney High School, which had plans to expand its physical plant and become permanent, remained.103 In June 1959 the LRPSC, however, indicated that the school would no longer operate tuition-free, but would begin charging each student fifteen dollars a month in fees. Still, Raney High School Principal W. C. Middleton was able to announce that by July 24 enrollment had already surpassed that for the previous year by nearly four hundred, with 1,208 students registered for the upcoming term. Based on projected enrollments for the district’s public schools, Raney would be the second largest school – public or private – in the city, with only Central High School serving a greater student population.104 Although there were some concerns that the private school would draw students away from the public institutions, moderates were generally thankful for the Raney School, believing that it “served an important, almost… constructive purpose in Little Rock” because it “satisfied the

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educational needs of most of the staunch segregationists and tended to lessen their interest in the desegregation controversy.”105 In the Justice Department, the existence of the private, segregated school was similarly considered a positive development, since it “should relieve some of the parental pressure on the public high school and it may also mean that the public high school will not be burdened by the presence of the white students who were particular troublemakers during the 1957-58 school year.”106 On the same day that the Little Rock School Board announced that the district’s four high schools would open earlier than originally scheduled, August 4, the LRPSC suddenly, “to the surprise of friend and foe alike,”107 declared that Raney High School was closing its doors, despite having already begun construction on twenty-eight new classrooms. By then, 1,226 students had registered for classes. Dr. T. H. Raney, president of the Little Rock Private School Corporation and the man for whom the school had been named, issued the statement explaining the decision to cease operations at the Raney School. Although the LRPSC had collected over $297,500 in donations from supporters around the world since it was incorporated, the construction project had gone significantly over-budget and was rapidly depleting the corporation’s coffers. In short, the LRPSC was broke.108 Although some saw no reason to doubt the veracity of the LRPSC’s protestations of financial duress, the unexpected closing of the private school confounded others. A report by the Southern Regional Council considered the possible effects of the “puzzling” decision by the “apparently solvent” corporation. Conceding that “attempts to plumb the motivations of the directors of the private school are purely speculative,” the SRC report concluded that “the surprise closing may work on the side of those who wish to disrupt public education,” by depriving extreme segregationists of an alternative to sending their children to the minimally desegregated public schools.109 In Little Rock, school board president Everett Tucker contemplated possible explanations for the move. It could have been, he conjectured, simply a ploy to elicit a spate of monetary donations to the LRPSC fund. A second theory was that closing the school was more deviously inspired “to remove the safety valve and give Governor Faubus more ammunition to oppose the desegregation of the high schools.” And, perhaps too naively hopeful, Tucker imagined that it was possible that “the very moderate assignments which the School Board has made to

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Central and Hall Highs has had such a good reaction on the community generally that they would not support the Raney High School.” He, too, admitted that these were mere speculations, and that neither he nor anyone else “in our camp knows the reason.”110

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Order is Maintained During the week between the school board’s announcement that the high schools would open early and the first day of classes, the board, nervous that opponents of integration would take Faubus’ forebodings of doom as an invitation to turn out in force at the high schools on August 12, took steps to facilitate the preservation of order on the two campuses. Tucker met frequently with Police Chief Eugene G. Smith and Mayor Werner Knoop to discuss preparations for law enforcement.111 Gene Smith had been the assistant chief under Marvin H. Potts during the 1957 riots, and it was he who had taken charge of the officers that attempted to repel the crowds at Central High School on September 23, 1957. In January 1958 Smith was named to replace Potts, who had resigned in October, over the vehement objections of segregationist leaders who recognized him to be abler and more aggressive than his predecessor in dealing with anti-integration agitators.112 Tucker explained to Smith that the results of a WEC survey of police personnel was a source for some concern, as they revealed that “twenty-three had signed CROSS petitions during the recent election, while only six had signed the STOP petitions; twentysix lived outside the school district, and two were members of the White Citizens Council.”113 But Chief Smith assured school officials that his men would behave professionally and do their jobs. The school board president also contacted the Pinkerton Protection Service in Memphis, Tennessee, to hire private guards to patrol Hall and Central High Schools. The Pinkertons, however, refused to accept the case.114 And, so that police would not have to divide their strength between the two schools on opening day, the board determined that Hall High School would open for classes at 9:30 am, and that Central would begin its day at one o’clock in the afternoon.115 All they could do then was wait to see what would happen. Governor Faubus appeared on television on the night before the schools opened. In a short address to the people, he offered a quick run-through of the crisis that had beset the city for the past two years, for which he blamed the “integrationists” and “federal puppets,” and he

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rattled off a litany of groups and individuals he considered such, including Tucker, Matson, Lamb, Harry Ashmore, the NAACP, the Little Rock Police Department, and the Supreme Court of the United States. He urged his people not to give up the “struggle for freedom,” but to fight on. But, he said, “I see nothing to be gained tomorrow by disorder and violence.” The last fight over local control of the schools had been “lost in last December’s school election and in the recall election of this spring.” Likewise, the battle to regain what had been lost “must be fought in this arena also.”116 The three girls assigned to Hall High School reported for classes the next morning without event. Shortly after they began their school day, and three hours before Jefferson Thomas was to arrive at Central High School, alone,117 a throng of segregationist protesters rallied on the grounds of the state capitol. Several speakers urged them on with “fiery speeches,” including one by Representative Alford’s wife, after which the crowd began to call for the governor to speak. Faubus came out to meet them.118 From the capitol steps, he again suggested, as he had the night before, that the battle be fought at the polls, and not on the streets. “I see no reason for you to be beaten over the head today by the forces in the field, or to be jailed. That should be faced only as a last resort, and when there is much to be gained. Honestly, I do not think that should be faced today.”119 Most of the protesters heeded the governor’s words, contenting themselves by parading around with signs proclaiming “Save Our Constitution – Follow Faubus,” “Race Mixing is Communistic,” “Arkansas is For Faubus,” and the like, and singing “Dixie,” before dispersing. A group of about two hundred, however, decided to march to Central High School, fifteen blocks away. Gene Smith’s men met them a block away from the school. Chief Smith ordered them to disperse, but the angry horde refused, cursing the police as cowards and Communists. When the mob tried to push through the barricade, the officers repelled them with billy clubs, and, finally, “Smith called in fire hoses and cooled off the remaining hotheads.”120 They did not make it to the school. More than twenty people were arrested that day, several of whom later sued Chief Smith, charging that he had “violated their rights,” and asking for $50,000 in damages.121 At a “chicken-fry” Governor Faubus attended on the night of August 12, he spoke out again against the “integrationists, puppets, and hypocrites” who had allowed the two Little Rock schools to be

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desegregated that day, and he denounced the methods employed by Police Chief Smith to turn back the protesters marching on Central. Smith, he said, had proven himself another “Janos Kadar,” the Hungarian “puppet” of Soviet Russia. And the Capital Citizens Council’s Guthridge and Pruden held a press conference the next day where they likened the Smith’s handling of the situation to “Hungarian Gestapo tactics,” and also accused him of terrorizing the women and children innocently expressing their right of assembly. Margaret Jackson made a similar charge in a telegram to Mayor Knoop. She demanded that a public forum be held where the good citizens of Little Rock could question the City Manager Board and the police chief on “who gave Smith the right to use such brutal force against such unarmed people who were peacefully assembled in protest of the integration of Central High.” No forum was held, but both Knoop and the city managers issued statements that categorically denied that anyone had been “brutalized” by police.122 Within days of the schools’ opening, Superintendent Powell began to receive demands that, under Act 7 of the 1958 extraordinary session of the General Assembly, arrangements be made for segregated classes within the desegregated schools for white children that refused sit in the same classrooms with blacks. Ultimately, sixty-eight students made such requests. School officials acceded to the wishes of these pupils and their class schedules were altered, if necessary, to accommodate them. Noting that there were more than two thousand white children between the two schools, Powell commented that he and the board members had expected more requests than had been received.123 After the Crisis So ended the Little Rock school crisis. To be sure, while the city’s white high schools had been desegregated, they were not integrated, and they would not be for some time. Furthermore, Spitzberg’s assertion that, “The events of August 12, 1959… finished completely the political power of segregationists in Little Rock,”124 seems more of a wish than a wish fulfilled, considering the influence they maintained with Governor Faubus throughout the 1960s.125 At the same time, however, his proclamation that “from the Fall of 1959 onward, Little Rock was a Moderate City” is essentially correct.126 When a handful of segregationists decided to celebrate the second anniversary of Faubus’ calling out the Arkansas National Guard by dynamiting an office at the

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school administration building, Mayor Knoop’s private office (located at a construction company he owned an interest in), and a city-owned vehicle parked in the driveway at Fire Chief Gann Nalley’s home, “community reaction was immediate.”127 The Chamber of Commerce offered a $25,000 reward for information leading to an arrest. Within days, the culprits had been apprehended, and five men were convicted for their participation in the crimes.128 E. A. Lauderdale, who was identified as the “mastermind” of the operation, was fined five hundred dollars and sentenced to three years in prison, although Faubus ordered his release after serving only six months and had his fine money returned to him.129 When the blasts occurred, Faubus publicly intimated his belief that they were the work of his “enemies” in an effort to discredit him, and Bruce Bennett suggested that “Communists” were responsible.130 Later it was revealed that the dynamitings had been planned at a Ku Klux Klan meeting, but Lauderdale, who had twice run, unsuccessfully, for city manager, was not a Klan member. He was on the board of directors of the Capital Citizens Council.131 The “moderate victory” in Little Rock was confirmed in the 1960 elections. Faubus won an unprecedented fourth Democratic nomination for governor at the end of July, a success for the moderates only in terms of his having beaten the arch-segregationist Bruce Bennett to win it. The greatest triumph for the forces of racial moderation, and Faubus’ worst defeat, came in November, when the constitutional amendment on “local option” school closing was put to a vote. Faubus campaigned heavily for the ratification of the amendment, which he had recommended to the 1959 General Assembly. The Citizens’ Councils promoted it as well, declaring that a vote against it was a vote for racial amalgamation. The amendment was overwhelmingly defeated, however, by a three to one margin, on November 8, 1960, and failed of passage in every county in the state. “Having once tasted the bitter fruit of defiance,” McMillen pronounced, “Arkansas clearly wanted no more of it.”

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NOTES 

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1

Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 8, 1959; SSN, March 1959; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 157-158; Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 108. 2 Arkansas Gazette, Feb. 10, 1959. 3 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 161. 4 SSN, June 1959. 5 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 161. According to Spitzberg, “during the lunch hour, the three Moderate Board members and the superintendent met with some local lawyers and quickly searched Robert’s Rule of Order.” Together, they determined that if Tucker, Matson, and Lamb walked out of the meeting, a quorum would cease to exist and no actions could be taken by the remaining board members. Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 15. Of course, had the moderates stayed, they would have had a very long afternoon, but the Purge would have failed as a result of the inevitable deadlock over each dismissal. 6 SSN, June 1959. 7 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 162. Of the forty-four “purged” on May 5, 1959, thirty-four were teachers, seven were principals, and three had held “other” positions. The vast majority (thirty-nine) was white. Horace Mann High School Principal L. M. Christophe was among the five blacks fired. Not surprisingly, most of those dismissed (twenty-seven) had been assigned to Central High School. The remaining seventeen had been employed at ten other schools. Ibid.; SSN, June 1959. Like Murphy, R. A. Lile, who had resigned with the “Blossom” school board in November, also noted that victims of the Purge included “many of the best teachers in the school system.” Lile interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 23. 8 McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 280. 9 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 328. 10 Lile interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1971), 23. 11 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 162. 12 Ibid., 163. Spitzberg states that the May 6 gathering at Forest Park was a “regularly scheduled PTA meeting.” Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 16. 13 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 163. 14 Ibid., 163-165; Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 16. 15 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 165. The members of the ad hoc recall committee were Agar, Frank Gordon, Olga Frick, and Jennie Harrel. Frick and Harrel were also members of the WEC. Ibid. 16 Ibid.; Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 17. Spitzberg identifies four men as the progenitors of STOP: Edward Lester, Robert Shults, and Maurice Mitchell, each of whom were lawyers, and Gene Fretz. He also notes that “three out of the four men who sat around the coffee table at Breier’s were husbands of WEC members.” Ibid., 18. 17 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 166.

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18

SSN, June 1959. The signers of the STOP statement of principles were 178 men, “and one woman, Jean Hoffman, president of the Little Rock PTA Council.” Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 170. 19 Ibid., 169-170. 20 Ibid., 170; Arkansas Gazette, May 9, 1959. 21 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 19. 22 Quoted in Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 208. 23 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 171. Eight women, including Adolphine Terry, sat on the STOP advisory board, “most of them with WEC connections.” 24 Ibid. 25 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 19-20. 26 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 48, 65, 174-175; Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 20-21. 27 SSN, Sept. 1958. Both Spitzberg and Murphy note only the 1958 law, and that it was meant to “intimidate ‘integrationist’ school boards,” as Spitzberg put it. Despite its clear intent, however, Murphy comments that “there was nothing [in the statute] that said it could not work the other way.” Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 18; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 163. J. W. Peltason cites the 1957 law alone, and does not mention the second piece of recallenabling legislation adopted in 1958. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 203. The Southern School News, in its report on the May 1959 petitions for recall of school board members, does state that the efforts were made under the 1958 law, which was, being the most recent, that which pertained. SSN, June 1959. 28 Ibid., Nov. 1958; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 172; Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 193. 29 Ibid., 171; Arkansas Gazette, May 10, 1959; Arkansas Democrat, May 10, 1959. 30 SSN, June 1959; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 171-172; McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 281; Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 204; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 330; Reed, Faubus, 255; Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 21. 31 Ibid., 172-173; Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 21. 32 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 175-176; Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 21-23. Quotes are in Murphy. Samuel labeled STOP supporters “saints,” CROSS supporters “sinners,” and undecideds “salvables.” Ibid. 33 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 23. Irving J. Spitzberg, Jr., was himself one of the founders of Jr. STOP, and served as a co-chair of the organization. Ibid. 34 McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 281; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 330-331; SSN, June 1959. Quote is in McMillen. 35 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 330. 36 SSN, June 1959. 37 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 204. 38 McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 281.

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Television address by Governor Orval Faubus, My 22, 1959. Faubus Papers, UA-F. 40 Television address by Governor Orval Faubus, May 23, 1959. Ibid. 41 Quoted in Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 25. 42 SSN, June 1959. 25,457 votes were cast out of an approximate 42,000 eligible voters in the district. This figure represented a turnout of nearly double that expected for regular school board elections, and was a mere 2,000 shy of the historic total in the September 1958 referendum on school closing. Ibid. 43 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 181. 44 McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 281. 45 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 181. 46 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, 331. The election results were as follows: for McKinley, 13,340 for recall and 11,860 against; for Rowland, 13,692 for recall and 11,527 against; for Laster, 13,996 for recall and 11,235 against; for Tucker, 12,093 for recall and 13,317 against; for Matson, 12,320 for recall and 12,971 against; and for Lamb, 12,513 for recall and 12,944 against. SSN, June 1959. 47 Arkansas Gazette, May 27, 1959. 48 SSN, June 1959; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 182; Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 162. 49 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 27. 50 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 182. Quote is from an interview with Henry Woods conducted by Murphy on August 30, 1992. 51 SSN, June 1959. 52 “A Background Report on School Desegregation for 1959-60,” Southern Regional Council, Aug. 10, 1959. Copy located in ACHR Papers, UA-F. 53 Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: School Situation – Little Rock, Ark.; submitted by W. Wilson White, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, August 4, 1959. William P. Rogers Papers, DDE Library. 54 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 185. 55 From an unpublished section of the interview for “The Story of Little Rock As Governor Faubus Tells It,” U. S. News & World Report (June 20, 1958). Copy located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 56 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 162. 57 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 184. 58 SSN, July, Aug., 1959. 59 Ibid., Dec. 1959, Jan. 1960; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 207-209. Quote is in Murphy, 208. Tucker bested Morrison, 8,878 to 4,165, and Mackey defeated Ray, 8,882 to 4,082. SSN, Jan. 1960. 60 Ibid., Feb. 1959. 61 Ibid., April 1959. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. Copies of the briefs for Governor Faubus and the WEC are located in Faubus Papers, UA-F, and ACHR Papers, UA-F, respectively. 64 SSN, May 1959.

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65

Ibid., June 1959. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 205. 67 A poll of Chamber members at the end of February 1959 revealed that 819 favored reopening the schools “with limited, controlled integration,” while only 245 did not. SSN, April 1959. 68 U.S.D.C. E.D. Ark. Civ. Act. No. 3113 (1959). 69 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 70 U.S.D.C. E.D. Ark. Civ. Act. No. 3113 (1959). 71 SSN, July 1959. 72 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 185. 73 SSN, Jan. 1960. 74 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 111-112. 75 SSN, Aug. 1959; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 191-192. 76 Arkansas Gazette, July 30, 1959. Lengthy excerpts from this statement also appear in a memorandum to the Attorney General, August 7, 1959, prepared by Joseph M. F. Ryan, Jr., Acting Assistant Attorney General: “Statements of Little Rock Officials and Private Organizations Regarding Preservation of Law and Order.” William P. Rogers Papers, DDE Library. 77 Eric Stein, University of Michigan Law School Professor, to C. D. Jackson, vice president for Time and Life, Inc., July 24, 1959. Copies were also sent by the author to Henry Cabot Lodge, and by Jackson to Attorney General Rogers. 78 Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: School Situation – Little Rock, Ark.; submitted by W. Wilson White, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, August 4, 1959. Ibid.; SSN, Aug. 1959. 79 Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis, 163. 80 SSN, Sept. 1958. 81 Ibid., Aug. 1959. 82 Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: School Situation, August 4, 1959. William P. Rogers Papers, DDE Library. 83 SSN, Aug. 1959; Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: School Situation, August 4, 1959. William P. Rogers Papers, DDE Library. 84 Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: Recent Developments in Little Rock; prepared by W. Wilson White, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, August 4, 1959. Ibid. 85 SSN, Dec. 1958. 86 Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: Recent Developments in Little Rock, August 4, 1959. William P. Rogers Papers, DDE Library. 87 Wilson White cited the fact that “the present school board is acting with a firmness and consistency – almost aggressiveness – which was not displayed by the school board in 1957,” as a cause for optimism regarding the school situation in Little Rock at the beginning of August 1959. Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: School Situation, August 4, 1959. Ibid. 88 SSN, Aug. 1959.

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89

Ibid.; “Plan submitted by Gov. Orval E. Faubus to the Little Rock School Board For a Peaceful, Democratic, Constitutional Solution to the Little Rock School District’s Segregation-Integration Controversy, and Editorial Comment,” published in pamphlet form on August 21, 1959. Copy located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 90 SSN, Aug., Sept., 1959; Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: Recent Developments in Little Rock, August 4, 1959. William P. Rogers Papers, DDE Library. 91 “Plan submitted by Gov. Orval E. Faubus,” August 21, 1959. Copy located in Faubus Papers, UA-F. 92 David Franke and Douglas Caddy, “An Interview With Governor Orval Faubus,” American Opinion 17:10 (Nov. 1959). 93 SSN, Sept. 1959. 94 Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men, 205. 95 SSN, Aug. 1959. 96 Ibid., Sept. 1959. 97 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 116. 98 Elizabeth Huckaby interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1972), 73. 99 Only the city’s high schools were to open on August 12. Elementary and junior high schools, which remained segregated, opened as scheduled on September 8, 1959. 100 SSN, Sept. 1959. 101 Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: Recent Developments in Little Rock, August 4, 1959. William P. Rogers Papers, DDE Library. 102 Several small private schools were hastily organized after the schools were closed in 1958. Most were church-run and provided only limited instruction. SSN, Aug. 1959; McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 282. 103 Kirk incorrectly states that the Raney School operated only for a short time, and that the LRPSC folded before the end of the 1958-1959 academic year while the public high schools were still closed. Kirk, Redefining the Color Line, 133. In fact, the Little Rock Private School Corporation continued to function as a corporate entity even after it did announce that Raney High School would not open as scheduled in September 1959, as a vehicle through which other segregated private schools received financial assistance. 104 SSN, July, Aug., 1959. 105 “A Background Report on School Desegregation for 1959-60,” Southern Regional Council, Aug. 10, 1959. Copy located in ACHR Papers, UA-F. 106 Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: School Situation, August 4, 1959. William P. Rogers Papers, DDE Library. 107 McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 282. 108 SSN, Sept. 1959; Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: Recent Developments in Little Rock, August 4, 1959. William P. Rogers Papers, DDE Library; “A Background Report on School Desegregation for 1959-60,” Southern Regional Council, Aug. 10, 1959. Copy located in ACHR Papers, UA-F; Muse, Ten Years of Prelude, 193.

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“A Background Report on School Desegregation for 1959-60,” Southern Regional Council, Aug. 10, 1959. Copy located in ACHR Papers, UA-F. 110 Memorandum for the Attorney General, Re: Recent Developments in Little Rock, August 4, 1959. William P. Rogers Papers, DDE Library. 111 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 117. 112 Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 183. 113 Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 197. 114 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 117. 115 SSN, Sept. 1959. 116 SSN, Sept. 1959; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 196-197. 117 Carlotta Walls, the other black student registered at Central, had left town for the summer and had not yet returned. Elizabeth Eckford, however, while not registered at the school, did decide to accompany Thomas that day. She needed to have her school records sent to the college she would attend that fall anyway, she said, and “besides, I just can’t let Jeff go out there alone.” Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 164-165. 118 Ibid., 164.; SSN, Sept. 1959. Dale Alford did not attend the rally. In addition to his wife, his three children were there, including his youngest, who was only eight years old. Ibid. Bates wrote that “over a thousand segregationists” made up the mob that morning. Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 164. By Spitzberg’s count, there was only half that number. Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 118. 119 SSN, Sept. 1959. 120 SSN, Sept. 1959; Reed, Faubus, 256. Quote in Reed. 121 SSN, Sept., Nov., Dec., 1959. 122 SSN, Sept. 1959. 123 Ibid., Nov. 1959; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 199-200. 124 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 118. 125 See Reed, Faubus, 259-292. 126 Spitzberg, Racial Politics in Little Rock, 119. 127 SSN, Oct. 1959; Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock, 186-187; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 202. Quote in Murphy. A fourth blast was planned for the office of one of the city managers, but did not occur. SSN, Oct. 1959. 128 Ibid. 129 Reed, Faubus, 257; McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 284; Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 203. One of the bombers had pleaded guilty and was sentenced to five years in prison. He served two years – the longest of all the perpetrators. SSN, Oct. 1959; Reed, Faubus, 257. Vivion Brewer later complained that the sentences doled out were too lenient, and that black participants in the 1960 sit-ins at Little Rock received harsher punishments. Murphy, Breaking the Silence, 203. 130 SSN, Oct. 1959. 131 McMillen, The Citizens’ Council, 284.

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CONCLUSION The story of the Little Rock Crisis has been told before. Individuals who were participants in, or witnesses to it, such as Virgil T. Blossom, Elizabeth Huckaby, Daisy Bates, Melba Pattillo Beals, Brooks Hays, Robert R. Brown, and Sara Alderman Murphy have offered their versions.1 Even local United States Attorney Osro Cobb, who by most accounts remained relatively inactive throughout the crisis, wrote a book, although it was never published. Irene Samuel, a member of the Women’s Emergency Committee in Little Rock, commented later, “Everybody wrote a book.” And, with reference to Cobb’s manuscript, added, “Well, he was sort of the hero of his book, and of course, we’re the heroines of ours.”2 Numerous historians have considered the events at Little Rock in 1957 as well, most notably Tony A. Freyer, but also Numan V. Bartley, Neil R. McMillen, Elizabeth Jacoway and C. Fred Williams, and others.3 Why, then, is there a need to tell it again? The answer to this question lies in the interpretations of the events described in these various works. Traditionally, evaluations of the Little Rock Crisis have tended to present it as having arisen from the political ambitions of one man, Arkansas Governor Orval E. Faubus.4 Alternatively, it sprang from Faubus’ being pressed into taking a stand by the failure of Little Rock’s community leaders or of the federal government to take responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of the federal court orders mandating integration.5 But the Little Rock story is larger than the attempt of one politician intent on maintaining racial separation in a single high school. The crisis arose from the symbolic and constitutional ambiguities inherent in the very nature of American federalism. Segregationist leaders exploited these ambiguities to silence racial moderates and overcome the division that existed within the white community. Interposition, based on the idea that individual states had the authority to protect themselves and their citizens against federal encroachment on the reserved powers of the states, was the tool used to achieve a unified resistance – “Massive Resistance” – to the enforcement of the Supreme Court’s 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of Education.6 In a sense, the Supreme Court itself appeared to invite this sort of response from southern opponents of “race-mixing.” When it handed

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down its implementing decree in Brown II on May 31, 1955, the Court left it to the individual communities involved to work out on their own how to effect the mandates of the law under Brown.7 The nine justices of the nation’s highest court set no guidelines for achieving desegregation. Equally, if not more important, Brown II set no timetable for compliance. Instead, noting that “local conditions” could be taken into consideration, school districts in the South must desegregate with “all deliberate speed.” Throughout the South, where there had been, generally, a stunned, begrudging acceptance of the legitimacy of the Court’s 1954 opinion, Brown II was viewed as an excuse to avoid compliance. Furthermore, the fact that a full year was allowed to elapse between Brown I and Brown II gave opponents a chance to discover an old, abandoned constitutional doctrine that suggested the states might not have to comply at all. At the heart of all of this was the deeply felt belief that the end of the “dual society” in the South meant an end to all of southern society and culture. Southerners claimed that their northern countrymen simply did not understand the necessity for maintaining segregation. And, as much as they desired that their position be made clear, a “paper curtain” existed, dividing North and South, that made it difficult to explain themselves. Here, again, the symbolic value of interposition was great. By placing the argument in terms of federalism and states’ rights, concepts of race could be kept out of the discourse entirely, and an appeal could be made for local autonomy in the administration of the schools in language that was race-neutral. The city of Little Rock was essentially racially moderate, and plans for compliance with Brown were immediately undertaken. Unfortunately, those plans contained crucial flaws that made it not only unsatisfying to leaders of the black community but also provided opportunities for segregationists to exploit class conflict to arouse whites against integration. That desegregation was to first occur in a school located in a working-class neighborhood stirred resentment that made the people in the community more receptive to the message of massive resistance. Several of the segregationist players in the Little Rock crisis were involved in the opposition that emerged to the desegregation of the public schools at Hoxie, Arkansas, in 1956. There, integration seemed to be a relatively uneventful affair until national media attention focused on images of white and black children socializing with one

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another in the schoolyard. In response, opponents of “race-mixing” from outside of the community helped stir local segregationists to mount an offensive against it. In the end, desegregation proceeded. The Hoxie episode reveals that, on the one hand, resistance to integration could be overcome through the determined efforts of local school officials acting without the interference of the state and with the assistance of the United States Department of Justice. On the other hand, events at Hoxie also brought to prominence James D. Johnson, whose run for the governorship in 1956 made evident to Faubus the necessity to adopt the rhetoric of Massive Resistance to retain his political position. As a result, the governor felt obliged to support a package of segregation laws, and a resolution of interposition in the legislature in 1957. Still, in the city of Little Rock, the election of racially moderate candidates to the school board in the spring of 1957 may be taken as a sign that the community was generally receptive to the idea of minimal and gradual desegregation, despite the state’s now official position against the enforcement of Brown. Interposition, then, was the Arkansas policy concerning public school desegregation by the time the Little Rock schools were scheduled to begin admitting African-American students into formerly all-white classrooms. Proponents of this constitutional theory, most notably James Jackson Kilpatrick, Jr. of the Richmond News Leader, insisted that the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown was not law, and that southern states need not comply. These claims confused the issue of the “rule of law” on which the Little Rock School Board justified its desegregation plan to the community, and gave hope to segregationists that Faubus could use his authority as governor to prevent the integration of Central High School. Arkansas segregationists increased the pressures weighing on the governor to adopt a stronger stance of interposition. Through letterwriting and telephone campaigns, opponents of integration strove to convince Faubus that the overwhelming majority of the people in Little Rock and throughout the state demanded action to prevent opening Central High School to black students. Faubus was extremely susceptible to this sort of campaign, because he felt strongly that it was his responsibility, as governor, to yield to the wishes of his constituents. In addition to his desire to give the people what they wanted, the governor was also motivated to support segregation measures in the state legislature by political expediency. He believed that he could do a lot of good for the state of Arkansas with his

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programs for industrialization and economic progress. To push through his program, which required a tax increase, he needed to enlist the support of powerful east Arkansas politicians whose primary concern was for maintaining segregation. The pressure campaigns undertaken by segregationist groups operating in Little Rock had their desired effects on the governor. Eager to avoid confrontation, Faubus attempted to have desegregation delayed. Although he had reasons to believe that delay was possible, the assignment of a new federal judge to the district court in Little Rock short-circuited his efforts, and integration was ordered to take place “forthwith.” The Arkansas chief then made the decision to act to prevent desegregation. He justified his action with the contention that it was his duty to ensure peace and good order in his state. By claiming this, he invoked the police powers of the state to “interpose.” However, by placing armed units of the Arkansas National Guard around the school, he did, in fact, obstruct the enforcement of federal court orders in Little Rock. Such a move presented a challenge to federal authority that could not be ignored by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Still, Eisenhower hoped to negotiate a solution with Faubus that would allow the court-ordered desegregation to proceed while at the same time giving the governor a chance to back down gracefully. Attempts to negotiate with Faubus were unsuccessful. Within the context of the Cold War, the Eisenhower Administration was forced to take a strong hand in dealing with the situation in Little Rock in order to remediate some of the damage done to United States prestige abroad that resulted from the reporting of Faubus’ blocking nine black children from Central High School in the foreign press. The decision was made, then, to federalize the Arkansas National Guard and to send U. S. Army troops into Little Rock. While the move was hailed as a victory for democracy in much of Western Europe and in the non-white countries of Asia and Africa, and supported by a majority of Americans in the United States, southerners denounced it as illegal and a victory for international Communism. While the black students were able to attend Central High School for the remainder of the 1957-1958 school year, with troops in place in and around the school, attempts were again made to restore segregation and delay desegregating the school. Then, however, the request was made by the school board, which claimed that the presence of troops made it impossible to conduct the business of educating students at

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Central. The Little Rock case made its way to the Supreme Court where the justices handed down an opinion that addressed the claims of segregationists that Brown was not the “law of the land.” The opinion asserted that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the Constitution, and that “the interpretation of the 14th Amendment enunciated by this court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land.” It further stated that no state official, including the governor, has any authority to nullify a court order through the use of interposition.8 Many southerners viewed Cooper as further evidence that the federal government had abandoned the founding principles of the Union. Some greeted the decision with a renewed commitment to resistance, and charged that the United States had “sold out” to the interests of Communism. Others, like James Jackson Kilpatrick, who never engaged in red-baiting in his crusade to defend the rights of states to enforce segregation within their public schools, took the ruling as a cue to shift gears, and to take up new weapons in the battle to maintain racial separation. Without admitting the invalidity of interposition, Kilpatrick recommended that his own Virginia, and her sister states, concentrate instead on delaying and minimizing the effects of what he now begrudgingly accepted as the inevitable desegregation of public schools. One of the new tactics he promoted was the elimination of public schools altogether; replaced by private school systems that he believed could be supported by the state through tuition grants. In Arkansas, after the attempt to forestall integration in the courts failed, a flurry of new segregation laws were passed by a special session of the legislature called for that purpose. Under one of these, Governor Faubus was able to close the schools, and all four high schools in Little Rock closed their doors for the entire 1958-1959 academic year. By keeping the high schools closed, Faubus was able to ensure that no black children would attend classes with whites in the state capital. Initially, the decision to close the schools was welcomed by the majority of whites in Little Rock. As the year wore on, however, the inconveniences caused by the closure, and the economic harm that befell the city that had earned a reputation for racial strife, stirred the long-silent racially moderate business and civic elites to take steps towards ending the crisis and reopening the schools. By the following fall, these forces for moderation in Little Rock had prevailed, and the schools were reopened, integrated. The crisis in Little Rock was over.

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NOTES  1

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Blossom, It Has Happened Here; Elizabeth Huckaby, Crisis at Central High; Daisy Bates, The Long Shadow of Little Rock; Melba Pattillo Beals, Warriors Don’t Cry (New York, 1994); Brooks Hays, A Southern Moderate Speaks; Robert R. Brown, Bigger Than Little Rock; Sara Alderman Murphy, Breaking the Silence. 2 Irene Samuel interview, DDEP (Columbia University, 1970), 43. 3 Tony Freyer, The Little Rock Crisis; Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance; Neil R. McMillen, The Citizens’ Council; Elizabeth Jacoway and C. Fred Williams, Understanding the Little Rock Crisis. 4 J. W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men; David L. Chappell, Inside Agitators. 5 Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance and Michal R. Belknap, Federal Law and Southern Order, respectively. 6 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 7 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 8 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).

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BIBLIOGRAPHY MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Papers William P. Rogers Papers Louisiana State University at Shreveport Special Collections William M. Rainach Papers New Orleans Public Library Special Collections deLesseps Morrison Papers Leander H. Perez Papers University of Virginia Special Collections Library, Charlottesville, Virginia James Jackson Kilpatrick Papers University of Arkansas – Fayetteville Special Collections Division Arkansas Council On Human Relations Papers Daisy Bates Collection Arthur Brann Caldwell Papers Citizens’ Council Collection Brooks Hays Papers Orval Eugene Faubus Papers University of Arkansas Little Rock Special Collections Georg G. Iggers Papers Harry J. Lemley Papers PERIODICALS Arkansas Democrat Arkansas Faith Arkansas Gazette Arkansas Recorder The Citizen The Citizens’ Council Cleveland (Oh.) Plain Dealer The Congressional Report Hope (Ark.) Star Memphis (Tenn.) Commercial Appeal New Orleans Times-Picayune New York Times

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Race Relations Law Reporter Richmond (Va.) News Leader Shreveport (La.) Journal Southern School News Washington Post ORAL HISTORIES Oral History Research Office, Columbia University Dwight D. Eisenhower Administration Oral History Office Reminiscences of: Dale Alford Wiley Austin Branton Mrs. Joe Brewer Richard C. Butler William G. Cooper, Jr. George Douhtit Harold Engstrom Nat R. Griswold Amis Guthridge Brooks Hays A. F. House Pat House Elizabeth Huckaby James T. Karam R. A. Lile Sid McMath Hugh Patterson Rev. Wesley Pruden Irene Samuel William T. Shelton William J. Smith Everett Tucker, Jr. Wayne Upton Henry Woods

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PRIVATE TRACTS Brown, Robert Ewing. “Race Mixing in Little Rock High Schools Can Be Stopped by the Governor,” (1957). Eason, W. L. “Segregation Is Constitutional but Compulsory Integration Is Unconstitutional,” (undated). Kamp, Joseph P. “The Lowdown on Little Rock and the Plot to Sovietize the South,” (undated). Perez, Leander. “The Unconstitutionality of the 14th Amendment and the Evils Resulting From Subversive Use of its ‘Equal Protection’ Clause,” (undated). Pittman, R. Carter. “The Federal Invasion of Arkansas in the Light of the Constitution,” (1957). Sass, Marion H. “The Impending Crisis of the South: An Appeal to the People of South Carolina,” (1956). Smith, Drew L. “Interposition – The Neglected Weapon,” (c. 1959). Spence, Paulsen. “The Constitution vs. The Supreme Court,” (1956). Wilkinson, W. Scott. “The Little Rock Case: Authority of the President to Use Federal Troops in a State of the Union,” (1957). LEGAL CASES Aaron v. Cooper, U.S.D.C. E.D. Ark. Civ. No. 3113 (1956). _____________. 163 F. Supp. 13 (E.D. Ark. 1958). _____________. 243 F. 2d 361 (1957). Aaron v. McKinley, U.S.D.C. E.D. Ark. Civ. No. 3113 (1959). Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Goss v. Board of Education of Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683 (1963). Hoxie v. Brewer, U.S.D.C. E.D. Ark. No. J-918 (1955). ____________. U.S.D.C. E.D. Ark. 137 F. Supp. 364 (1956). Jackson, et al. v. Kuhn, et al., 2 RRLR (1957), 1099. Lucy v. Adams, 1 RRLR (1956), 85; 2 RRLR (1957), 350. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S.1 (1849). Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 12 (1827). Matthews v. Launius, U.S.D.C. W.D. Ark. 134 F. Supp. 684 (1955). McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala. 1958).

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Smith, et al. v. Faubus, et al., U.S.C.A. 8th Cir. (1957). Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932). Thomason v. Cooper, U.S.C.A. 8th Cir. (1958). United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809). Wilbern, et al. v. School Board, 108316 (1957). ARTICLES “A ‘Morally Right’ Decision,” Life (July 25, 1955). “How One Southern City Plans to Integrate,” U. S. News & World Report (Sept. 28, 1956). “Interposition vs. Judicial Power,” RRLR 1 (1956). “The Story of Little Rock – As Governor Faubus Tells It,” U. S. News & World Report (June 20, 1958). Badger, Tony. “‘The Forerunner of Our Opposition:’ Arkansas and the Southern Manifesto of 1956,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56:3 (Autumn 1997). ____________. “The White Reaction to Brown: Arkansas, the Southern Manifesto, and Massive Resistance,” in Jacoway and Williams, Understanding the Little Rock Crisis (Fayetteville, 1999). Bartley, Numan V. “Looking Back at Little Rock,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 25 (Summer 1966). Bell, Derrick, Jr. “Brown and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,” Harvard Law Review 93 (1980). Dudziak, Mary. “Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,” Stanford Law Review 41:61 (Nov. 1988). ____________. “Brown as a Cold War Case,” Journal of American History 91:1 (June 2004). Dykeman, Wilma and Stokely, James. “Courage in Action: Clinton, Tennessee,” The Nation (Dec. 22, 1956). Franke, David and Caddy, Douglas. “An Interview With Governor Orval Faubus,” American Opinion 17:10 (Nov. 1959). Fraser, Cary. “Crossing the Color Line in Little Rock: The Eisenhower Administration and the Dilemma of Race for U. S. Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 24:2 (Spring 2000). Freyer, Tony A. “Politics and Law in the Little Rock Crisis, 1954-1957,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 40:3 (Autumn 1981). ____________. “Crossing Borders in American Civil Rights Historiography,” in Jones, Crossing Boundaries (New York, 2001).

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____________. “The Little Rock Crisis Reconsidered,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56:3 (Autumn 1997). ____________. “Objectivity and Involvement: Georg G. Iggers and Writing the History of the Little Rock School Crisis,” in Jones, Crossing Boundaries (New York, 2001). ____________. “The Past as Future: The Little Rock Crisis and the Constitution,” in Jacoway and Williams, Understanding the Little Rock Crisis (Fayetteville, 1999). Fuller, Helen. “Southerners and Schools,” reprint. The New Republic (1958). Graham, Allison. “Remapping Dogpatch: Northern Media on the Southern Circuit,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56:3 (Autumn 1997). Horowitz, David Allan. “White Southerners’ Alienation and Civil Rights: The Response to Corporate Liberalism, 1956-1965,” Journal of Southern History 54:2 (May 1988). Iggers, Georg G. “An Arkansas Professor: The NAACP and the Grass Roots,” in Record and Record, Little Rock, USA (San Francisco, 1960). Kilpatrick, James Jackson. “The Right to Interpose,” Human Events 12:52 (Dec. 24, 1955). Kirk, John A. “The Little Rock Crisis and Postwar Black Activism in Arkansas,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56:3 (Autumn 1997). ___________. “Arkansas, the Brown Decision, and the 1957 Little Rock School Crisis: A Local Perspective,” in Jacoway and Williams, Understanding the Little Rock Crisis (Fayetteville, 1999). Layton, Azza Salama. “International Pressure and the U. S. Government’s Response to Little Rock,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56:3 (Autumn 1997). McGowan, M. M. “Interposition or Nullification,” The Citizens’ Council (Jan. 1956). Newman, Mark. “The Arkansas Baptist State Convention and Desegregation, 1954-1968,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56:3 (Autumn 1997). Olney III, Warren. “A Government Lawyer Looks at Little Rock,” Congressional Record 104 (March 24, 1958), 4532. Pranke, Edward J. “Integration Decision and Enforcement Are Unconstitutional,” American Mercury (July 1958). Reed, Roy. “The Contest For the Soul of Orval Faubus,” in Jacoway and Williams, Understanding the Little Rock Crisis, (Fayetteville, 1999). Williams, C. Fred. “Class: The Central Issue in the 1957 Little Rock School Crisis,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 56:3 (Autumn 1997).

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316

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BOOKS Ashmore, Harry S. Civil Rights and Wrongs: A Memoir of Race and Politics, 1944-1996. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1997. Bartley, Numan V. The Rose of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950s. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969, 1997. Bates, Daisy. The Long Shadow of Little Rock: A Memoir. New York: David McKay, 1962. Belknap, Michal R. Federal Law and Southern Order: Racial Violence and Constitutional Conflict in the Post-Brown South. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987. Blossom, Virgil T. It Has Happened Here. New York: Harper Brothers, 1959. Borstelmann, Thomas. The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. Brown, Robert R. Bigger Than Little Rock. Greenwich, CT: Seabury Press, 1958. Burk, Robert Fredrick. The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1984. Carter, Hodding, III. The South Strikes Back. Garden City, 1959. Chappell, David L. Inside Agitators: White Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994. Dudziak, Mary. Cold War Civil Rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. Elliff, John T. The United States Department of Justice and Individual Rights, 1937-1962. New York: Garland, 1987. Fredrickson, George M. The Comparative Imagination: On the History of Racism, Nationalism, and Social Movements. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. Freyer, Tony A. Little Rock on Trial: Cooper v. Aaron and School Desegregation. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007. Freyer, Tony. The Little Rock Crisis: A Constitutional Interpretation. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984. Gallup, George H. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971. 3 volumes. New York, 1972. Greenberg, Jack. Crusaders in the Courts. New York, 1994. _____________. Race Relations and American Law. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.

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Hays, Brooks. A Southern Moderate Speaks. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959. Huckaby, Elizabeth. Crisis at Central High: Little Rock, 1957-1958. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980. Jacoway, Elixabeth and Williams, C. Fred. Understanding the Little Rock Crisis: An Exercise in Remembrance and Reconciliation. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1999. Jeansonne, Glen. Leander Perez: Boss of the Delta. 2nd edition. Lafayette: University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1995. Jones, Larry Eugene. Crossing Boundaries: The Exclusion and Inclusion of Minorities in Germany and the United States. New York: Berghahn Books, 2001. Katagiri, Yasuhiro. The Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission: Civil Rights and States’ Rights. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2001. Kilpatrick, James Jackson. Richmond News Leader, Interposition: Editorials and Editorial Page Presentations. Richmond, 1956. ____________________. The Southern Case for School Segregation. New York, 1962. Kirk, John A. Redefining the Color Line: Black Activism in Little Rock, Arkansas, 1940-1970. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2002. Kluger, Richard. Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality. New York, 1975. Lewis, George. The White South and the Red Menace: Segregationists, Anticommunism, and Massive Resistance, 1945-1965. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004. Martin, John Bartlow. The Deep South Says ‘Never’. New York: Ballantine Books, 1957. McMillen, Neil R. The Citizens’ Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954-1964. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994. Murphy, Sara Alderman. Breaking the Silence: Little Rock’s Women’s Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools, 1958-1963. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1997. Muse, Benjamin. Ten Years of Prelude: The Story of Integration Since the Supreme Court’s 1954 Decision. New York: Viking, 1964. Pattillo Beals, Melba. Warriors Don’t Cry. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994. Peltason, J. W. Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961. Peters, William. The Southern Temper. New York: Doubleday, 1959.

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Record, Wilson and Record, Jane Cassels. Little Rock, USA. San Francisco, 1960. Reed, Roy. Faubus: The Life and Times of an American Prodigal. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1997. Shannon, Karr. Integration Decision Is Unconstitutional. Little Rock, 1958. Silverman, Corinne. The Little Rock Story. Tuscaloosa: University, 1959. Spitzberg, Irving J., Jr. Racial Politics in Little Rock, 1954-1964. New York: Garland, 1987. Sumner, William Graham. Folkways. New York, 1906. Talmadge, Herman E. You and Segregation. Birmingham: Vulcan Press, 1955. Towns, W. Stuart. Public Address in the Twentieth-Century South: The Evolution of a Region. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999. Wilhoit, Francis M. The Politics of Massive Resistance. New York, 1973. Workman, William D., Jr. The Case For the South. New York, 1960.

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DISSERTATIONS Stowe, William McFerrin, Jr. “Willie Rainach and the Defense of Segregation in Louisiana, 1954-1959.” Texas Christian University, 1989.

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INDEX Aaron v. McKinley, 283, 285 Aaron v. Cooper, 24-27, 115, 143, 217 Ableman v. Booth, 76-77 Adams, Charles T., 44 Adams, Sherman, 148-151, 193, 231 Adkins, Homer M., 232 Agar, Drew, 272, 274 Alford, Dale, 189, 253, 256, 270, 275-276, 278, 296 Alford, T. H., 270, 271 Alien and Sedition Acts, 74-75 Almond, J. Lindsay, 45, 209, 262263 American Association of University Women, 261, 272 American Civil Liberties Union, 226 Arkansas Council on Human Relations (ACHR), 4-5, 17, 20, 22, 52, 137, 249 Arkansas Democrat, 12, 44, 62, 63, 99, 180, 186, 189, 236, 250, 276, 277 Arkansas Faith, 35, 48-49 Arkansas Gazette, 5, 36, 48, 63, 89, 93, 100 113, 115, 121, 135, 144, 173, 190, 223, 225, 231, 233, 236, 249-250, 269270, 272-273, 276, 279, 287 Arkansas General Assembly, 12, 42, 44, 46, 48, 87, 91-93, 99, 103, 120, 232, 235, 237, 247,

255, 260-262, 275, 290, 293, 297, 298 Arkansas gubernatorial election of 1954, 48, 139 of 1956, 47-51, 53, 92, 103, 128, 232 of 1958, 124, 230, 232, 275 Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, 48, 128 Arkansas National Guard, 3, 127129, 135-138, 141-160, 171173, 180-186, 190-196, 209214, 231, 233, 254, 297, 308 Arkansas Pupil Placement Law, 53-54, 282, 289, 290 Arkansas State Sovereignty Commission, 88-91, 119 Ashmore, Harry S., 36, 48, 100, 115, 149, 173, 190, 223, 225, 231, 233, 236, 249, 295 Atlanta Constitution, 190 Bane, Frank, 193 Barnett, Ross, 8 Bartley, Numan V., 1, 5 7, 16, 50, 51-52, 61, 69, 70, 72, 93, 121, 138, 271, 305 Bass, Harry, 143 Bates, Daisy, 18-19, 23, 26, 89, 114, 142, 160, 178, 213-215, 227 231, 251 274, 305 Bates, L. C., 18-19, 114 Beals, Melba Pattillo, 142, 305 Bearden, Lee, 93 Beck, Axel J., 284, 285 Belknap, Michal, 5, 183

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320 Bennett, Bruce, 104, 111, 128, 249, 282-283, 298 Berry, William M., 136 Bird Committee (Arkansas), 4346, 53, 90 Bird, Marvin E., 44, 46 “Black Monday”, 35 Blossom Plan, 4-5, 13-18, 20-21, 24-28, 87, 94-97, 99, 116, 125-126, 140-141, 216, 286, 288 Blossom, Virgil T., 4-5, 13-17, 2325, 50, 87, 94-96, 99-102, 114-115, 118-121, 123-124, 127-128, 137-138, 141-142, 145, 158, 212-213, 215, 217, 219-221, 234, 249, 253-254, 305 Booth, Sherman M., 76-77 Borstelmann, Thomas, 171 Brady, Thomas Pickens, 35, 177178 Branscum, George P., 95-96, 256 Branton, Wiley A., 22, 24, 26-27, 96-97, 219, 221, 289-290 Brewer, Herbert, 33-36, 38-39, 41, 43, 47-48 Brewer, Vivion, 159, 248, 249, 257-258, 275 Brown II, 4-6, 15, 20, 25-28, 42, 54, 62-65, 71, 78, 88, 95-97, 170-171, 216, 219, 222, 232, 245, 263, 306 Brown v. Board of Education, 1-7, 11-12, 20, 22, 24-28, 40-42, 45-46, 51, 54, 62-66, 69-72, 74, 78-80, 88, 95-97, 102104, 112, 116, 124, 151, 169171, 174, 178, 191, 207, 216,

Index 219, 222-223, 231-232, 237, 245, 249, 262-263, 281, 284, 305-307, 309 Brown, Minnijean, 142, 213-214 Brown, Robert Ewing, 95-96, 9799, 114, 116 Brown, Robert R., 305 Brownell, Herbert, 35, 38, 148149, 150, 152, 156-157, 180, 184, 186-187, 193-194, 196, 225 Brucker, Wilber M., 156 Bryant, Al, 115 Burk, Robert Fredrick, 40, 193 Butler, Paul, 151 Butler, Richard C., 24, 221-222, 228, 236 Caldwell, Arthur Brann, 38-40, 114-115, 116-117, 118, 119123, 152 Caldwell, John Tyler, 35 Calhoun, John C., 44, 62, 75-76 Campbell, Irwin, 43 Campbell, Will D., 143 Capital Citizens Council, 88, 9599, 102, 104, 111, 114, 116117, 140-141, 208, 210, 213, 215, 253-256, 276, 282, 286, 289, 291, 292, 297, 298 Catlett, Leon B., 24, 26, 87 Central High School, 1-3, 11, 1419, 80, 87, 94-97, 100-104, 111, 114, 117-129, 135-150, 152, 154, 156-161, 169, 171, 173-174, 178, 181, 183-191, 193, 196-197, 207-208, 210216, 218-223, 225-228, 230236, 247, 249, 269, 287-288, 291-297, 307-309

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Index Chandler, A. B. “Happy”, 99, 191 Charleston News and Courier, 62, 72 Charleston School Board, 12, 42, 44, 98 Cherry, Francis, 12, 27, 48, 231 Chisholm v. Georgia, 73 Chowning, Frank E., 24 Christophe, L. M., 269 Citizens’ Council, 33, 34-36, 41, 61, 64, 87, 98-100, 102, 104, 112-115, 119-120, 122, 140, 175, 177-178, 185, 190, 218, 231-232, 256, 258, 289, 298 City Manager Board, 297 Civil Rights Act of 1957, 116, 119, 172 Civil Rights Section of the U. S. Department of Justice, 37-38, 40, 120-121 Clay, Henry, 76 Clayton, John Wesley, 256 Clement, Frank, 99, 127, 191, 195 Clinger, Sherman T., 155 Clinton, Tennessee, 99, 120, 191, 227 Cobb, Osro, 115, 226, 305 Cochran, L. L., 43 Coffelt, Kenneth C., 188, 218, 247 Coleman, James P., 70 Collins, LeRoy, 191, 192, 195, 209 Committee for the Peaceful Operation of Our Free Public Schools, 286-287, 291, 292 Committee to Retain Our Segregated Schools (CROSS), 276-279, 295

321 Committee to Stop This Outrageous Purge (STOP), 272-281, 286, 295 Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA), 174-177, 246 Constitution Party, 95 Cook, Eugene, 39 Cooper v. Aaron, 7-8, 237, 245246, 251-252, 284, 285, 289290, 309 Cooper, William G., Jr., 12, 17, 24, 113, 123, 213 Copeland, Curt C., 35-36, 49-50 Cottrell, J. H., Jr., 281 Crenchaw, J. C., 23, 26 Daniel, Price, 182, 209 Davies, Ronald N., 124-127, 135, 142, 144-148, 153-158, 184, 187-188, 217 Davis, Jeff, 104, 230 Davis, Jimmie, 8 Davis, Wylie H., 79 Democratic Advisory Council, 151 Democratic National Committee, 151 Dickey, B. G. “Bert”, 44 Driver, Z. Z., 143 Dudziak, Mary, 170, 173 Dunbar Junior High School, 14, 19, 254 Eason, W. L., 180, 185 Eastland, James O., 2, 34-36, 64, 69, 98, 174-175 Eckford, Elizabeth, 142-143 Edmiston, Martha Nichols, 176 Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 25, 27, 37, 39, 96-97, 116, 125, 187-188, 218, 222, 226-

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322 229, 234, 237, 252-253, 258, 284, 288 Eisenhower, Dight D., 2-3, 52, 144-145, 147-153, 156-158, 160-161, 169-173, 177-193, 195-197, 209-210, 218, 225226, 234-235, 308 elections of 1957, 207 Eleventh Amendment, 73, 77 Elliff, John T., 40, 126, 226 Engstrom, Harold, 5, 13-14, 95, 119, 189 Ewald, William, 128 Fagan, Ellis M., 93, 262 Farley, Robert, 79 Faubus, Orval E., 2-7, 17, 27-28, 35-36, 41-44, 46-53, 70, 9194, 97-100, 103-104, 111114, 118-129, 135-141, 143160, 170-173, 180-188, 190, 192-196, 207-208, 211, 217, 219, 222-225, 230-237, 246255, 257-262, 269, 275-278, 280-298, 305, 307-309 Faubus, Sam, 27 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 37-38, 41, 115, 116117, 120, 128, 135-136, 145, 147, 151, 155-156, 176, 180, 289 Federation for Constitutional Government, 8, 111 Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 215 Finkbeiner, Chris E., 230, 233 Fitzhugh, L. R., 247 Folsom, James E., 46, 190-191 “Force Bill”, 76

Index Fourteenth Amendment, 1, 39, 63, 66, 69, 103, 176, 227, 237, 238, 283, 285, 309 Freedom Fund, Inc., 88, 214 Fretz, Gene, 272 Freyer, Tony A., 6, 11, 16, 18, 22, 24, 41, 46, 51, 53, 54, 67, 92, 93, 94, 118, 120, 144, 234, 247, 281, 305 Friday, Herschel, 258, 291 Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 76-77 Fulbright, J. William, 218, 229 Gardner, Archibald K., 25, 125, 187, 218, 227, 229 Garrett, Gertie, 247-248, 283, 285 Garrett, John, 63 Gary, Raymond D., 191 Gathings, E. C. “Took”, 183 George, Walter, 51 Good Government Committee, 207-208 Graham, Allison, 41 Granger, Lester, 97, 225 Graves, John Temple, 62 Gray Commission (Virginia), 4346, 70, 72 Gray, Garland, 43 Greater Little Rock Ministerial Alliance, 143, 250, 272 Green, Ernest, 142, 214 Green, Herbert A., 43 Green, Robert, 136 Greenberg, Jack, 40, 71 Gressette Committee (South Carolina), 70-71 Gressette, L. Marion, 70 Griffin, Govie, 220 Griffin, Marvin, 104, 111-114, 119, 120, 122, 190, 191-192

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Index Griswold, Nat, 5, 52, 137-138 Guthridge, Amis, 34, 97, 99-104, 114-116, 128, 159, 179, 213215, 233-234, 289, 292, 297 Guy Committee, 215, 217 Hadley, William H., Jr., 273-274 Hagerty, Jim, 193 Hall High School, 14-16, 270, 287, 288, 291-292, 294-296 Harris, Carleton, 284 Harris, M. LaFayette, 23 Harris, Roy V., 104, 111-113, 119 Hartford Convention, 75 Hays, Brooks, 52, 139, 148-153, 159, 233-234, 253, 305 Hazlett, E. E. “Swede”, 183 Heath, Eva, 135-136 Hebert, F. Edward, 179-180 Hefley, Sybil, 220 Henley, J. Smith, 218 Hodges, Luther H., 71-72, 191195 Hollabaugh, Marcus, 38-39 Holt, J. S., 284 Hoover, J. Edgar, 154 Horace Mann High School, 14-15, 20-21, 23, 100, 216, 228, 269, 288, 291 Horowitz, David Alan, 174 Hot Springs Rubdown, 50 House, A. F. “Archie”, 24-26, 87, 94, 99, 114-116, 118, 123126, 146, 189, 215, 217, 286 House, Pat, 286 Howell, Leslie, 43 Howell, Max, 12, 262 Hoxie v. Brewer, 36, 116, 120 Hoxie, Arkansas, 27-28, 33-44, 47, 98, 116-117, 138, 227, 230-231, 306-307

323 Hubbard, Henry Lee, 281 Huckaby, Elizabeth, 95, 212-213, 269, 305 Hungary, 173, 179-180, 297 Iggers, Georg, 20-24 Interposition resolutions, 45-46, 53, 70-72, 77, 78, 79-80, 307 Interposition, 2-4, 6-8, 42-46, 51, 53, 61-80, 87, 93-94, 98, 103, 112, 138, 144, 183, 217, 245, 249, 305-307, 309 Jackson, Andrew, 76 Jackson, Margaret, 187-188, 212, 223, 247, 276, 291, 297 Jacoway, Elizabeth, 305 Jay, John, 73 Jeansonne, Glen, 175 Jefferson, Thomas, 44, 62, 69, 7475, 224 Johnson Amendment, 42-44, 53, 70, 87, 98, 102-103 Johnson, F. H., 223 Johnson, James D., 35-36, 41-51, 53, 61-62, 72, 80, 101, 103, 113, 128, 139-140, 178, 232234, 284, 307 Johnson, Lyndon B., 154, 179 Johnson, Marion E., 143, 155 Johnston, Olin D., 181 Joint Legislative Committee (Louisiana), 61, 176-177 Kamp, Joseph P., 178 Karam, Jimmy “The Flash”, 49, 104, 139-141, 159-160, 253256 Kidd, Beall, 158 Kilpatrick, James Jackson, Jr., 2, 6, 61-75, 147, 181, 245, 250, 263, 307, 309 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 3, 225

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324 Kirk, John A., 18, 19, 91, 104, 111, 113, 235, 254 Kitchin, A. Paul, 181 Knoop, Werner, 295, 297 Ku Klux Klan, 173, 298 Lamb, Ted L., 254, 255-258, 261, 269-270, 273, 275, 279, 293, 295 Lambright, Frank, 254 Laney, Ben T., 90, 231 Larson, Arthur, 191, 192 Laster, Robert W., 256-258, 261, 270-273, 275-280 Lauderdale, E. A., 298 Lawrence, David, 62, 179, 186 Layton, Azza Salama, 172 League of Central High Mothers, 88, 122, 153, 160, 187, 210211, 212, 213, 215, 223, 233, 247, 256, 261, 275-276, 282, 286, 291 Legal Defense Fund of the NAACP, 21, 22, 27, 40, 220 “Lemley delay”, 222-227, 234, 237, 288 Lemley, Harry J., 44, 218-219, 222-229, 236, 246, 259 Levine, Sam, 262 Lewis, George, 1-3, 66, 170, 172, 178 Life magazine, 33, 41 Lile, R. A., 18, 113, 123, 127, 128, 159-160, 253, 271 Little Rock Chamber of Commerce, 250, 255, 256, 258, 259, 272, 284, 298 “Little Rock Laws”, 208-210 Little Rock ministers’ suit, 119, 124

Index “Little Rock Nine”, 3, 142-144, 147, 152, 157-160, 183, 196, 211-213, 220-221, 269, 278, 292 Little Rock Phase Program, see Blossom Plan Little Rock Private School Corporation (LRPSC), 250253, 293-294 Little Rock School Board election of March 1957, 95-96 of December 1958, 253-258 Little Rock School Board, 2, 5, 12-21, 24, 26-27, 33, 80, 8788, 94-97, 99-103, 113-120, 123-128, 135, 137-138, 141142, 145-146, 158, 159, 189190, 213-222, 225-229, 234, 236, 247, 250-262, 269-273, 275-278, 280-283, 286-296, 297, 307-308 Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., 173 Lorch, Grace, 143 Lorch, Lee, 23-24, 26, 143, 176177 Lucy, Autherine, 52 Mackey, B. Frank, 281, 282 Madison, James, 44, 62, 66, 69, 74-75, 78 Mann, Woodrow Wilson, 88, 137, 160-161, 189, 275 Mansfield, Texas, 52, 99, 128, 171, 187 Marshall, John, 77-78 Marshall, Thurgood, 27, 40, 97, 215, 220-221, 228 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 78 Martin, John Bartlow, 69, 101

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Index Massive Resistance, 1-4, 6, 7, 6162, 98, 170, 230, 232, 233, 237, 245, 262-263, 305-307 Matson, Russell H., Jr., 256, 258, 269-270, 279, 295 Matthes, Marion C., 226-227, 234 Matthews, Jess, 212, 269 McCarthy, Joseph, 170, 174 McClellan, John L., 149, 218 McCulloch v. Maryland, 78 McCulloch, Robert B., Sr., 44, 90 McDonald, William C., 282 McFaddin, Ed F., 284 McGill, Ralph McKeldin, Theodore McKinley, Ed I., Jr. McMath, Sid McMillen, Neil R. Middleton, W. C. Miller, John E. Miller, W. L., Jr. Milwee, Minor W. Ming, William R., Jr. Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Mitchell, W. S. “Will” Montgomery Bus Boycott Moody, W. V. Morrison, Margaret (Mrs. Roy) Moser, M. L., Jr. Mothers’ League, see League of Central High Mothers Mothershed, Thelma, 142 Murphy, Sara Alderman, 247, 248, 252, 254, 255, 256, 258, 261, 270, 272, 274, 276, 281, 282, 285, 305 Muse, Benjamin, 40 Nalley, Gann, 298

325 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 5, 11, 1823, 25, 27, 33, 35-36, 40, 71, 88, 90, 111, 114, 115-116, 142-143, 147, 159, 175-178, 219-223, 225, 226, 228-229, 234, 247, 250-253, 259, 282283, 289-290, 292, 295 National Association for the Advancement of White People (NAAWP), 256, 282 National Urban League, 97, 140, 225 Newsom, Eugene F., 43 Nichols, E. A., 43 nullification, 44, 45, 61, 70, 71, 72, 75-76, 79, 80 Ogden, David, 143 Ogden, Dunbar, Jr., 143 Old, William, 64 Olney, Warren III, 121, 126 Parent-Teacher Association (PTA), 102, 212, 250, 261, 271, 272-274 Parker, Sammie Dean, 213-214 Patillo, Melba, see Beals, Melba Patillo Patterson, Hugh, 5, 93-94, 113 Patterson, Robert B., 34-36, 62 Peltason, J. W., 5, 40, 113, 121, 127, 155-156, 216, 223, 226, 228, 237, 251, 259, 277, 284285, 292 Penix, William, 36, 38-39 Pepper, George Wharton, 79 Perez, Leander, 65-66, 175-176, 179 Peters, Fred C., 177 Peters, William, 101

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326 Philander Smith College, 20, 23, 143, 279 Phillips, Finos C., 34 Plessy v. Ferguson, 65 posse comitatus, 186-187 Potts, Marvin H., 115, 120, 123, 156, 295 Powell, J. O., 212, 221, 249, 269 Powell, Terrell, 269, 270-271, 282, 297 Powell, Velma, 249 Poynter, L. D., 218 Pruden, Wesley, 100-102, 115, 138, 159, 214 Pulaski County Board of Education, 281 Pulaski County Chancery Court, 119, 126, 247, 255, 283-284 pupil placement, 12, 44, 45, 46, 48, 53, 72, 282, 289-290 Putzel, Henry, Jr., 39 Pyle, Howard, 193 Railey, C. C., 256 Rainach Committee, see Joint Legislative Committee Rainach, William M., 61, 154, 176-177 Randolph, A. Philip, 225 Raney High School, 253, 283, 293-294 Raney, T. H., 294 Rath, Henry V., 95-96, 137, 247, 254, 256 Ray, Gloria, 142 Ray, Mrs. H. H., 282 recall school board election, 272281, 286, 289, 296 Rector case, 124

Index Rector, William F. “Billy”, 119, 255-258 Reed, Murray O., 122-123, 124, 126 Reed, Roy, 6, 28, 41, 43, 49, 50, 91, 92, 93, 103, 104, 113, 115-116, 117, 118, 121, 125, 139, 154, 155, 230, 232-233, 234, 253, 279 Reeves, Albert L., 37, 39, 42 Remmel, Pratt, 190 Richmond News Leader, 2, 61, 64, 66, 71, 72, 74, 181, 307 Roberts, Terrance, 142 Robinson, Sam, 284 Robison, H. L., 35 Rockefeller, Winthrop, 48, 89, 103, 127-128, 136, 149, 254 Rogers, Lucien C., 87 Rogers, Virgil M., 221-222 Rogers, William P., 39, 114, 119, 225, 290 Rowland, Ben D., Sr., 256, 258, 270-273, 275, 277-280 Russell, Richard B., 182 Salten, David, 221 Samuel, Irene, 215, 252, 256, 275276, 279, 286, 305 Sanborn, John B., 188, 284, 285 segregation package of 1958, 234236, 237, 255, 307 Shannon, George, 62, 223, 236, 245-246 Shannon, Karr, 62, 180, 186 Shaver, J. L. “Bex”, 44, 90 Sheridan School District, 12 Sherman, O. L., 234 Shivers, Allan, 52, 70, 99-100, 104, 113, 127-128, 171, 187

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Index Shreveport Journal, 62, 223, 236, 246 Sikes, Arnold, 149 Simmons, W. J., 61-62 Sloan, James L., 247 Smith, Drew L., 8, 73, 77 Smith, Eugene G., 295-297 Smith, George Rose, 284 Smith, Howard W., 51 Smith, Odell, 90 Smith, William J. “Bill”, 118-119, 127, 135-136, 139, 232-233 Snoddy, Jim, 48 “South Carolina Exposition and Protest”, 76 Southern Governors’ Committee, 192-195 Southern Governors’ Conference, 159, 190, 191, 192 Southern Manifesto, 51-52, 69 Southern Regional Council (SRC), 78, 140, 280, 294 Spitzberg, Henry E., 24 Spitzberg, Irving J., Jr., 93, 260, 274, 279, 280, 297 Sputnik, 173, 180 Stanley, Thomas B., 43, 44-45 states’ rights, 2-3, 7, 46, 47, 53, 62, 65, 66, 77, 90, 95, 101, 112, 148, 171, 178, 180, 181, 207, 223, 233, 306 States’ Rights Council, 256, 276, 286 States’ Rights Councils of Georgia, Inc., 104, 111 Stephens, Margaret, 256, 258 Stowe, William McFerrin, Jr., 176 Sumner, William Graham, 42 Talmadge, Herman E., 65, 68, 111, 175, 179, 263

327 “Tariff of Abominations”, 75-76 Tate, U. Simpson, 21-22, 24, 26 Technical High School, 14, 288, 292 Tenth Amendment, 7, 64, 67, 181, 187 Terry, Adolphine, 249, 255, 258, 256 Terry, David, 249 the “purge”, 269, 270, 271-279, 281, 284, 286 The Citizens’ Council, 7, 61, 62, 279 Thomas, Jefferson, 142, 296 Thomason case, 122-128 Thomason, Mrs. Clyde (Mary), 122-127, 233 Thompson, Vance, 252 Thurmond, Strom, 69, 246 Timmerman, George Bell, 190, 209 Trimble, James W., 52 Trimble, Thomas C., 25, 36-37, 39, 125, 217 Tucker, Everett, Jr., 256-258, 261262, 269, 270-271, 275, 279, 282, 287, 289, 293, 294-295 Tyler, Tom E., 260-262 U. S. Army 101st Airborne Division, 161, 178-181, 183, 188-189, 191, 196, 209-211, 213 U. S. News & World Report, 62, 187 U. S. v. Peters, 77-78 United States Department of Justice, 37-41, 114-121, 144145, 148, 150, 152, 154-156, 170-171, 180, 184, 186-187, 194, 218, 225-226, 228, 250-

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328 252, 259, 280, 290, 293-294, 307 United States Information Agency (USIA), 191 United States Information Service (USIS), 172 University of Alabama, 52 University of Arkansas, 35-36, 248 Upton, Wayne, 5, 94-96, 117-119, 124, 137, 190, 219 Van Dalsem, Paul, 93 Van Oosterhout, Martin D., 39, 97 Vance, K. E., 35 Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, 62, 66, 74-75, 78 “Virginia Plan”, 43-46 Vogel, Charles J., 39, 96-97, 188 Wallace, George, 8, 51, 181 Walls, Carlotta, 142 Ward, Lee, 230-231, 233, 275 Ward, Paul, 284 Waring, Thomas R., 62, 72 Warren, Earl, 228 West, Charles P., 210 White America, Inc., 12, 20, 33, 34, 38, 41 White Citizens Council of Arkansas, 26, 33-35, 49 White, W. Wilson, 218, 225-226, 290-291, 293 White, Wayne, 12 Wilkins, Roy, 147, 225 Wilkinson, W. Scott, 185-186 Williams, C. Fred, 16, 17, 305 Williams, E. Grainger, 255, 259, 272 Williams, John Bell, 35, 70, 278

Index Williams, Lee, 229 Williams, Roosevelt, 36 Williams, Thaddeus D., 19, 21 Williamson, J. Gaston, 286-287, 291 Wilson, Billie, 271 Women’s Emergency Committee to Open Our Schools (WEC), 159, 247-252, 254-259, 261262, 270-277, 279, 283, 286, 292, 295, 305 Woodrough, Joseph W., 39, 97 Woods, Henry, 137, 275-276, 279280 Woodson, Pauline, 256 Workman, William D., Jr., 65, 66, 68 Wright, Robert R., 153 Wright, Skelly, 8

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