Reluctant Restraint: The Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Policies and Practices, 1980-2004 9780804768245

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Reluctant Restraint

SERIES EDITORS

Muthiah Alagappa East-West Center G. John I ken berry Princeton University

Amitav Acharya Nanyang Technological University

Victor D. Cha

T.V Paul

Georgetown University

McGill University

Alastair lain Johnston Harvard University INTERNATIONAL BOARD

Rajesh M. Basrur Center for Global Studies, Mumbai

Brian L.Job University of British Columbia

Barry Buzan London School of Economics

Miles Kahler University of California, San Diego

Thomas ]. Christensen Princeton University

Peter]. Katzenstein Cornell University

Stephen P. Cohen The Brookings Institution

Khong Yuen Foong Oxford University

ChuYun-han Academia Sinica

Byung-Kook Kim Korea University

Rosemary Foot Oxford University

Michael Mastanduno Dartmouth College

Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University

Mike Mochizuki The George Washington University

Sumit Ganguly Indiana University, Bloomington

Katherine H. S. Moon Wellesley College

Avery Goldstein University of Pennsylvania

QinYaqing China Foreign Affairs University

Michael]. Green Georgetown University CSIS

Christian Reus-Smit Australian National University

Stephan M. Haggard University of California, San Diego Takashi Inoguchi Chuo University

Rizal Sukma CSIS, Jakarta Wu Xinbo Fudan University

Studies in Asian Security A SERIES SPONSORED BY THE EAST-WEST CENTER

Muthiah Alagappa, Chief Editor Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center The aim of the Asian Security series is to promote analysis, understanding, and explanation of the dynamics of domestic, transnational, and international security challenges in Asia. Books in the series will analyze contemporary security issues and problems to clarifY debates in the scholarly and policy communities, provide new insights and perspectives, and identifY new research and policy directions related to conflict management and security in Asia. Security is defined broadly to include the traditional political and military dimensions as well as the nontraditional dimensions that affect the survival and well-being of political communities. Asia, too, is defined broadly, to include Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia. Designed to encourage original and rigorous scholarship, books in the Asian Security series seek to engage scholars, educators, and practitioners. Wideranging in scope and method, the series welcomes an extensive array of paradigms, programs, traditions, and methodologies now employed in the social soences.

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The East-West Center is an education and research organization established by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to strengthen relations and understanding among the peoples and nations of Asia, the Pacific, and the United States. The Center contributes to a peaceful, prosperous, and just Asia Pacific community by serving as a vigorous hub for cooperative research, education, and dialogue on critical issues of common concern to the Asia Pacific region and the United States. Funding for the Center comes from the U.S. government, with additional support provided by private agencies, individuals, foundations, and corporations and the governments of the region.

Reluctant Restraint THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA'S NONPROLIFERATION POLICIES AND PRACTICES, 1980-2004

Evan S. Medeiros

SPONSORED BY THE EAST-WEST CENTER

An imprint

of Stanford University Press • Starzford, California

© 2007 by the Board of Trustees of the Le land Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any intl)fmation storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Medeiros, Evan S. Reluctant restraint :the evolution of China's nonproliferation policies and practices, 1980-2004 I Evan S. Medeiros. p.cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-o-8047-5552-8 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Arms control--China. 2. Nuclear nonproliferation--China. 3· China--Foreign relations-United States. 4. United States--Foreign relations--China. I. Title. ]Z6oo9.CiiM43 2007 327. 1'7470951 --dc22

Typeset by I3ruce Lundquist in IJ.slrs.s Bembo

For my loving parents, Antone and Beverly Medeiros

Contents

List if Illustrations Acknowledgments

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Xlll

Introduction: A Framework for Analyzing the Evolution of China's Nonproliferation Behavior 2

A Gradual Engagement: China and Nuclear Nonproliferation

3 Reluctant Participant: China, Missile Nonproliferation, and the Missile Technology Control Regime

30

97

4 Negative Feedback: Assessing the Impact of U.S. Missile Defense on Chinese Arms-Control and Nonproliferation Policies

175

5 A Cultural Evolution: The Development of China's Arms-Control and Nonproliferation Community

210

6

Conclusions

240

Notes Bibliography Index

265

319 351

Illustrations

Figures I. I Evolution of China's nonproliferation policies, I98o-2004

3

3. I China's original interpretation of the MTCR Guidelines

II5

3.2 Recurring pattern ofU.S.-China interactions on missile proliferation, I992-2000

I45

3-3 US. arms sales to Taiwan, I980-2000

I53

5.I Participation in the ISODARCO-Beijing arms-control seminars, I988-2004

22I

Tables Evolution of nuclear nonproliferation policies and practices in China, I98I-2004

32

2.2 China's early nuclear nonproliferation commitments, I98I-I989

37

2.3 Key events in U.S.-China negotiations on the nuclear cooperation agreement, I981-1985

45

2.4 China's nuclear nonproliferation compliance problems, 1990-1996

55

2.5 China's expanding nuclear nonproliferation commitments, I996-2004

79

3. r Evolution of missile nonproliferation policies and practices in China, 1987-2004

99

2. I

Xll

ILLUSTRATIONS

3.2 China's initial missile nonproliferation pledges, I987-1991

IOI

3.3 China's missile nonproliferation compliance behavior, 1992-2001

133

3-4 Concrete improvements amid continued exports, 2001-2004

r64

6. I Nature of US. policy influence on Chinese nonproliferation policies and practices, 1980-2004

245

Acknowledgments

The publication of this book represents an ending and a beginning. It's the end of a long and laborious-but always interesting and rewarding-process that began in the earliest stage of my career, as I was working to develop expertise in two fields, China studies and international security studies. This book, which is based on my PhD dissertation, is an effort to fuse empirical findings and analytical insights from these two fields into a comprehensive study that expands the understanding of Chinese behavior on this critical international security challenge. It is a beginning in the sense that it marks my first major research project on Chinese foreign and security policy. More are coming. The book benefited enormously from the intellectual, emotional, and financial support of many teachers, colleagues, friends, and family members. Michael Yahuda, my dissertation adviser at the London School of Economics and Political Science, deserves much gratitude for giving me both the freedom to pursue my interest in Chinese foreign policy and the guidance I needed to get through the long process of forging a dissertation. Many colleagues were instrumental in the production of this manuscript. Bates Gill showed faith in my aspiration to be a China-watcher when none was warranted; he encouraged me to develop my dual interests in China and security studies; and he graciously gave me numerous opportunities to attend conferences, to travel to China, and to publish research. These opportunities shaped the basis of this study. Bates has been a superb friend, colleague, and mentor in so many ways. Monte Bullard was always generous with his

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

time and shared invaluable insights as a longtime China-watcher. He read and commented on virtually every page of the manuscript. Monte pushed me to spend more time in China and then helped me get there. I am a far better China-watcher because of Monte Bullard. Much of the original manuscript was written during several sun-filled years at the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies. At CNS, William Potter and Amy Sands gave me a job, supported my move to China in 2000, and pushed me to write. I could not have asked for better support and advice. My immediate colleagues in the East Asia Nonproliferation Project at CNS, Phillip C. Saunders andYuanJing-dong, helped direct my research efforts, read a number of drafts, and encouraged me to think more analytically. Michael Bareletta, Tim McCarthy, Guarav Kampani, and several other CNS colleagues were great friends through the process, and I thank them all. At the RAND Corporation, a number of colleagues pushed me to refine my original arguments, a process that was essential to transforming a dissertation into a book. I am grateful for the help and counsel of Jasen Castillo, Roger Cliff, Eric Heginbotham,Andy Hoehn, SethJones,John Parachini, and Scot Tanner. I also thank the many colleagues in the fields of China studies and nonproliferation studies who shared invaluable insights, information, and help. Many of them were interviewed for this book. They include Peter Almquist, Michael Armacost, Adam Brookes, Tom Christensen, Erin Chung,John Corbett, Richard Cupitt, Karl Eikenberry, Robert Einhorn, Evan Feigenbaum, David Finkelstein, Mike Forsythe, John Frankenstein, Taylor Fravel, Chas. W Freeman Jr., John W Garver, Bonnie Glaser, Paul Godwin, Chris Hegadorn, Wen Hsu, Jo Husbands, Harlan Jencks, lain Johnston, Ann Kambara, Roy Kamphausen, Arnold Kanter, Kamala Lahkdir, Susan Lawrence, Alex Lennon, John W Lewis, James Lilly, Melinda Liu, Michael May, Michael McDevitt, Derek Mitchell, James Moriarty, James Mulvenon, Robert Stan Norris, Doug Paal, Renee Pan, Wolfgang Panofsky,Jonathan Pollack, Kevin Pollpeter, Denise Pong, Susan Puska, Brad Roberts, Robert Ross,]. Stapleton Roy, Gary Samore, Larry Scheinman, Randy Schriver,Andrew Scobell, David Sedney, David Shambaugh, Leonard Spector, Robert Suettinger, Robert Sutter, Michael Swaine, Christopher Twomey, John Tullius, Vann Van Diepen, Jon Wolfsthal, David Wright, and Xue Litai. In China, I am greatly indebted to the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The institute gave me an office and hosted me during 2000. Gu Guoliang and Fan Jishe, ofiAS's Centre for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Research,

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

XV

helped set up many meetings with Chinese specialists; I would have been lost without their guidance. I am grateful, too, to Niu Jun, Tao Wenzhao, Wang Jisi, Yuan Zheng, Zhou Qi, and many others at the IAS for their friendship and hospitality. They provided me with one of the most exciting and challenging periods of my development as a China specialist. Li Genxin and his colleagues at the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association also were helpful in arranging interviews and audiences with government specialists with whom I could exchange and vet my ideas. There are literally dozens and dozens of other Chinese scholars and officials from the foreign ministry, the military, the defense industry, government research institutes, and Chinese universities who shared insights and information with me. Special thanks to all of them. Discretion and the ground rules of our interviews preclude me from naming them. I am especially grateful to the wonderful group of friends and family that supported me with patience through this process. Special thanks to Daniel Blatt, Reuben Brigety 11, Josh and Michiko Burack, Cristyn Elder, the Fains, Jane Gibbon, the Gibbon-Taylor family, Paul Haenle, Kojo Hakim and Nobue Kaite, the Hale family, the Harris family, Scott Henricks and Melissa Fisher, Tyler Johnson, Andy Levitt, Julie Medeiros, Jamie Medeiros,Ann Medeiros, Peter and Duane Muller, the O'Briens,Joshua and Denise Starr, Chris Timura and Elise Frasier, Margaret-Rose Tretter, and the vanWerkhovens. Finally, at Stanford University Press, my editor Carolyn Brown was instrumental in improving the quality of the manuscript and moving the book production process forward. I am indebted to her patience and fortitude.

Reluctant Restraint

1

Introduction: A Framework for Analyzing the Evolution China's Nonproliferation Behavior

cif

Two of the great security challenges confronting the international community are China's rise and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) .1 These issues will directly influence the future shape of the international system, the distribution of power within that system, and the probability of armed conflict-including the use ofWMD-among major and lesser powers alike. This book addresses the intersection of these issues by examining the evolution of China's policies and practices on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As China joined the international community beginning in the late 1970s, it became a new and significant actor affecting global nonproliferation affairs. China gradually transitioned from staunch opposition to participation in and advocacy of international nonproliferation efforts. This evolution is one of the most important and under-examined changes in China's international behavior since the beginning of the reform era. Examination of this policy shift provides insights into the sources and patterns of change in Chinese foreign policy, at a time when China is emerging as an influential global actor. These shifts in China's nonproliferation behavior also illuminate prominent policy and scholarly questions about China's rise in international security affairs, such as the extent to which China supports current international institutions and norms or seeks to revise them in support of its own vision of global order. 2 This study documents and explains China's gradual integration into the global nonproliferation regime over the past two and a half decades. Contrary

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INTRODUCTION

to common beliefs and some recent analyses, China's increasing support for WMD nonproliferation has been both substantial and enduring. 3 This shift in behavior, for a country historically known for its resistance to change in its long-standing foreign policy interests, demands explanation. 4 This study puts forward an analytical framework that clarifies the complex set of external and internal forces that fostered the evolution in Chinese policies and practices on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The changes in Chinese behavior have evolved along three dimensions. The first has to do with China's official policy. During Mao's time, China remained outside, skeptical about, and largely hostile toward international nonproliferation agreements. Since the early 1980s, China has joined most major multilateral nonproliferation accords, and it has made a number of bilateral nonproliferation commitments. For example, China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984; signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1992, and has been a member of the Zangger Committee since 1997; joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) when it first was opened for signing in 1993; signed the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 (although it has yet to ratifY the treaty); and became a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004. In 1991, China also agreed to the original guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and it applied for membership in 2004. China's compliance with some of these commitments has been and remains problematic, but the degree of change since the early 1980s is notable and in some cases dramatic. The second dimension relates to China's exports ofWMD and related goods and technologies. As China expanded its formal commitments to nonproliferation, it has reduced the geographic scope, technological content, and frequency of its WMD-related exports. 5 In the early 1980s, Chinese entities exported nuclear materials, equipment, and technologies that were not subject to international safeguards to would-be nuclear proliferants in Latin America, Africa, and South Asia. Most notably, China directly and extensively assisted Pakistan with its nuclear-weapons program. In the late 1980s, state-run companies in China began exporting a wide variety of ballistic and cruise missiles and missile-related goods to a number of customers in the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. A few countries received production assistance for ballistic and cruise missile systems as well. Today, Chinese exports of nuclear-related goods and technologies are few in number, dualuse in character, and under safeguards. Chinese exports of missile-related goods and technologies, however, continue. Although most of these exports

INTRODUCTION

Step 5: Supports

Step 3: Complies with Step 2: Joins Step 1: Supports nonproliferation

principles; adopts basic nonproliferation policies and related

international nonproliferation agreements; limits sensitive exports

treaties and agreements;

Step 4: Institutionalizes commitments with regulations

international nonproliferation efforts; assumes extrainstirutional

and procedures

commitments

Jl

further limits sensitive exports

11

IJ

controls

11 FIGURE I. I

Evolution of China's nonproliferation policies,

1980-2004

involve dual-use goods and are transferred to just a few nations, they substantially aid key aspects of ballistic and cruise missile programs in such countries as Pakistan and Iran. The third dimension relates to developments within the Chinese government. In the latter half of the 1990s, the Chinese government began to institutionalize its nonproliferation commitments by issuing detailed export-control regulations and establishing an interagency review system. In addition, a community of Chinese diplomats, scientists, military officers, and analysts involved in nonproliferation policymaking has emerged over the last two and a half decades. This cadre of experts has helped formulate and, more critically, implement China's nonproliferation commitments. The development of this community of specialists played a central role in all phases of the expansion of China's participation in international nonproliferation affairs. The changes in these three areas have been neither quick nor sequential: They occurred gradually and sporadically beginning in the early 1980s, at times overlapping and at other times not. Yet despite the starts and stops, the direction of change in China's nonproliferation policies and behavior is clear: In the period from 1980 to 2004, China slowly adopted, implemented, expanded, and institutionalized a variety of nonproliferation commitments (Figure I.I). Puzzling Through Chinese Nonproliferation Behavior The gradual shifts in China's views and policies on nonproliferation over the last two and a half decades are puzzling because they often ran counter to the nation's economic and security imperatives-some of which were particularly

4

INTRODUCTION

stark for Beijing. Throughout the reform-and-openness period, which began in the late 1970s and continues today, China's domestic priority has been to develop its economy and raise the living standards of the population. Beijing's primary goal in much of this period was to achieve wenbao, a level of development in which all Chinese citizens are clothed and fed. 6 Its long-term goal was and remains to reemerge as a great power by growing what the Chinese refer to as their comprehensive national power. To free up resources for economic development in the 1980s, the Chinese government chose to make major reductions in military spending and to civilianize the nation's defense industries. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the government's assumption of nonproliferation commitments obligated state-owned defense enterprises to forgo the profitable sales of nuclear and missile-related materials, equipment, and technologies; at the same time, those enterprises were being encouraged to export materials, equipment, and technologies to compensate for sharp declines in government procurement. To many Chinese policymakers and industrialists, then, the concept of nonproliferation seemed to fly in the face of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP's) imperative to foster economic reform and development. China's growing commitment to nonproliferation was also at odds with elements of its foreign policy preferences and interests. Chinese leaders had to make hard choices about limiting sensitive military assistance to key friends and quasi allies in South Asia and the Middle East. In addition, many Third World nations criticized the principle of nonproliferation in the 1980s, claiming it was discriminatory; China's public support for that concept meant turning away from its decades-long association with the interests of developing countries. For the sake of nonproliferation, Chinese leaders were making decisions that from their vantage point appeared contrary to their longstanding foreign policy identity and interests-and they believed they were doing so for a Western-derived concept. Another puzzling aspect of the evolution of China's nonproliferation policies has been its uneven character. The curve in a notional graph of this evolution would be neither steep nor linear; instead it would zig and zag as China sporadically expanded its nonproliferation commitments and reduced the scope of its sensitive exports. Although the overall trend has been positive, the erratic phases and trajectories in the evolution of China's nonproliferation behavior make that trend difficult to explain. Yet analyzing this process is particularly important to understanding and generalizing about the sources and manifestations of one of the most significant changes in Chinese foreign policy in the reform era.

INTRODUCTION

5

This book seeks to explain these puzzling and complex changes m China's nonproliferation behavior. Specifically, it focuses on questions like these: When, why, and how did China commit to regulating and limiting exports ofWMD-related goods and technologies? Why was the Chinese government willing to bear the domestic and foreign policy costs of nonproliferation? To what extent has China met its nonproliferation commitments? And what does China's record suggest about its future compliance? Is China's compliance record a reliable indicator ofBeijing's willingness to play by other international rules, like those governing environmental protection and trade?

The Importance of Analyzing Chinese Nonproliferation Behavior Understanding the changes in China's nonproliferation behavior is important for policymakers, analysts and scholars because it provides insights into current and future trends in Chinese foreign policy, in global nonproliferation, in U.S.-China relations, and in U.S. policy toward China. First and foremost, the evolution of Chinese policies and practices on nonproliferation is arguably one of the most significant developments in Chinese diplomacy in the reform era. It represents not only one of the most dramatic shifts in Chinese foreign policy in this period but also one of the most enduring. Understanding this process provides insight into the sources and patterns of change in Chinese foreign policy, which in turn helps in evaluating the implications of China's rise for contemporary international affairs. Moreover, Beijing has become increasingly involved in managing global nonproliferation challenges, and its behavior will continue to be a major factor in determining the success of those efforts. China's position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its seat on the Board of Governors of the IAEA afford it much influence over the way those bodies respond to global nonproliferation threats. Since the mid-I990s, Beijing has taken several steps to further legitimize the NPT and the nuclear nonproliferation regime as a whole. Beijing continues to play a central role in managing the Six-Party negotiations over North Korea's nuclear-weapons program and is involved in the international effort to halt Iran's nuclear-weapons program. By contrast, China's continued willingness to export missile-related goods and technologies complicates international efforts to stop missile proliferation and foster regional stability in South Asia and the Middle East.

6

INTRODUCTION

China still has the potential to play the spoiler in international nonproliferation affairs. In the past, China was a major supplier of materials, equipment, and technology for nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and ballistic and cruise missiles. Even a limited reversal on certain pledges would undermine current nonproliferation efforts. Failure to understand the forces driving China's growing support of nonproliferation could precipitate such a retrenchment. Understanding the decisions China has made, then, is critical to adopting policies that deepen China's support for and involvement in the global nonproliferation regime. Beyond nonproliferation questions, this evolution in Chinese policies and practices provides an important window into the broader sources of change in Chinese foreign policy. The shifts in China's positions on nonproliferation are useful cases for assessing the forces shaping China's international behavior. Is China acting solely on realpolitik motives, to gain relative economic and military power? Is it motivated by concern for its image and reputation? Is it motivated by concerns about its relationships with major powers, from which it derives material benefits? Or is some combination of these forces at work? 7 The evolution of Chinese nonproliferation behavior may also be helpful in understanding China's negotiating behavior. Chinese responses to external pressure and sanctions, in the context ofU.S.-China negotiations, provide further empirical data on Chinese negotiating strategies and how they interact with U.S. diplomatic tactics. China's policies and practices on nonproliferation elucidate critical aspects ofU.S.-China interactions as that relationship becomes more central to global stability. Nonproliferation has been a point of contention in U.S.-China relations for decades. U.S. policymakers have made nonproliferation an issue in bilateral relations, often a high-priority one, since the normalization of relations with China in 1979. Washington has actively sought to shape China's nonproliferation behavior through diplomacy, frequently at the highest levels of the relationship. Examining U.S. efforts and Chinese reactions to them reveals important dimensions ofbilateral bargaining on hard security issues. Furthermore, analyzing the role of U.S. policy in shaping China's nonproliferation policies can help in assessing the effectiveness of U.S. engagement strategies toward China. After the end of the cold war, engagement with China on economic, political, and security issues became the operative (but loosely defined) concept driving America's China policy. Washington used multiple tools and tactics to prod Beijing to assume and comply with nonproliferation commitments-as well as pledges on trade and human rights. Understanding U.S. policy tools, the context in which they are used, and the

INTRODUCTION

7

degree to which they succeed, then, will inform future US. efforts to engage China on nonproliferation and other contentious bilateral topics. To date, there is surprisingly limited research on the success or failure of specific US. engagement strategies regarding security or economic issues. This study helps fill the gap. 8 Current Research on China and Nonproliferation Two general bodies of literature address Chinese nonproliferation behavior. They are drawn from the fields of Chinese foreign policy studies, on the one hand, and nonproliferation studies, on the other.

The Literature on Chinese Foreign Policy Within the China-specific literature, there are two categories of research. The first is largely descriptive: It documents past and current trends in Chinese nuclear and missile exports, but offers few explanations for those trends. 9 The second analyzes China's motivations for its proliferation activities and for assuming nonproliferation commitments. 10 In this category is research on Chinese arms control policies as well as on key nonproliferation policy decisions, including the decision in 1991 to adopt the MTCR Guidelines and the decision in 1992 to sign the NPT. 11 The focus in this study is on the second set of writings and the eclectic mix of arguments it offers to explain China's proliferation and nonproliferation behavior. This literature has several weaknesses. One problem is that much of it examines Chinese actions as individual events at specific times; few of these studies compare types of behavior over different periods. Most are partial explanations based on analysis of a narrow set of Chinese actions. In the 1990s, Western analysts offered just a few broad explanations for China's gradual willingness to assume limited controls on WMD-related exports. 12 There are several difficulties with these explanations. First, they are gleaned mainly from analyses of China's decision to accede to the NPT in the early 1990s. Though useful in understanding that particular decision, they fail to explain other changes in China's nonproliferation behavior, specifically its mixed record of compliance. Also, the literature does not distinguish between explanations that apply to China's nuclear nonproliferation policies and those that apply to its missile nonproliferation decisions, which at times varied greatly. Nor does the literature evaluate the relative importance of the explanations in different circumstances. In other words, do all of the explanatory variables apply to all of China's commitments to nuclear nonproliferation or just to certain

8

INTRODUCTION

pledges at certain times? And do they also apply to China's policies on missile nonproliferation? A second major shortcoming with the current research is that none of it reflects a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the changes in Chinese nuclear and missile proliferation activities over time and at different stages of their evolution. Instead, much of the literature makes broad generalizations about both the growth of China's nonproliferation commitments and its continued exports based on straight-line projections of China's past behavior. The generalizations inherent in straight-line projections confuse key differences between China's support for nonproliferation norms (i.e., its willingness to change its behavior), on the one hand, and the government's ability to control exports, on the other. These arguments also obscure other important distinctions-for example, those between China's policymaking on nuclear versus missile nonproliferation. Research on specific nonproliferation policies also suffers from certain inherent limitations. It often relies on single-factor explanations and so fails to take into account the multiple internal and external influences on Chinese decision making. And because it focuses on short periods, it fails to examine how policies have changed over the last two and a half decades. A third broad limitation of current research is simply that much of it is dated: It was written before China adopted new policies and promulgated a series of export-control regulations in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Current research also predates organizational changes that have improved the government's ability to regulate sensitive nuclear exports. The need for new research on Chinese missile exports is even greater. For example, existing work by John Lewis and Hua Di is based on data from the late 1980s and early 1990s. 13 Since then a number ofkey developments have taken place-including China's adoption of new missile nonproliferation policies, reorganization of its defense industry, changes in its security environment, and new diplomatic priorities-and their implications have yet to be assessed. 14 Fourth, some of the research on changes in Chinese nonproliferation policy asserts a role for U.S. diplomacy but offers minimal evidence to support that claim. 15 For example, Robert Ross, in his work on U.S. sanctions on China, argues that U.S. economic penalties helped shape Chinese nonproliferation policies in the 1990s. 16 But Ross largely fails to explain the reasons driving China's responses to U.S. pressure. Perhaps more important, none of this research attempts to weigh the U.S. factor against other factors to determine their relative influence on the changes in Chinese behavior. In particular, there is very little research on the role ofU.S. policy in constraining Chinese

INTRODUCTION

9

missile exports. 17 The small body of existing research focuses on specific periods and fails to explain the evolution of Chinese policies and U.S. influence on that process.

The Nonproliferation Literature The vast majority of current nonproliferation studies address just two questions: Why do states acquire, abandon, or refrain from developing nuclear weapons? And what are the international security implications of proliferation, especially nuclear proliferation? Most research focuses on the first question regarding the dynamics of the demand side of nuclear proliferation. 18 Much less work has been done on the supply side of proliferation/nonproliferation questions: Why do nations export WMD goods and technologies, and why do they stop? There is no theory of supply or restraint in the literature on nonproliferation. The limited work on supply-side proliferation is not particularly helpful in explaining Chinese behavior. 19 That research tends to document trends in nuclear trade, omitting missiles, and to examine specific supplier nations. It largely ignores comparisons across countries as well. These case studies also focus on traditional nuclear suppliers, not second-tier suppliers. In addition, much of this research is outdated; and most of what is not outdated fails to offer analyses or theories that can be generalized to international security challenges today. More recent publications on supply-side proliferation challenges are heavily oriented toward analyzing the sources and patterns of WMD-related exports from the former Soviet republics, particularly managing the problem of "loose nukes" after the fall of the Soviet Union. 2° Current concerns about illicit nuclear- and missile-related exports from Pakistan and other second-tier suppliers appear to be renewing interest in supply-side proliferation questions; but the literature on these questions remains limited. 21 In contrast to some of the newest research on demand-side nuclear proliferation, significantly less analytical rigor has been applied to what motivates some states or state-supported actors to sell WMD materials and technologies and others to limit these transfers. The literature has not addressed questions like these: Why do supplier states engage in WMD proliferation, especially when proliferation could eventually compromise their own security interests? Who has a voice in decision making in supplier states? What role do domestic constituencies and/or bureaucratic politics play in such decisions? What makes supplier states decide to limit their exports ofWMD-related goods and technology and assume nonproliferation commitments? What factors shape suppliers' compliance with their nonproliferation pledges? Are the answers

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INTRODUCTION

to these questions necessarily country-specific, or can they be generalized to other cases? This study begins to establish an empirical basis for answering these important questions. A New Framework for Analyzing China's Nonproliferation Behavior A new analytical structure is needed to address the limitations of the current literature and to explain the complex and puzzling patterns of change in China's nonproliferation behavior since the early 1980s. This book provides such an analytical framework. The arguments here are based on a controlled comparison of two multidimensional case studies that use process tracing to evaluate the development of China's policies and practices on nuclear and missile nonproliferation. The book also includes two analyses that further test and document the study's claims by examining China's responses to U.S. missile-defense policies and the development in China of a community of arms control and nonproliferation specialists. Ultimately, the research identifies several independent variables that explain the uneven evolution of Chinese policies on nonproliferation, and documents their relative influence. This study aims to forge an analytical framework that is causal, falsifiable, and generalizable. The following sections outline the study's analytical framework, first identifying four independent variables, then explaining the multiple relationships among the four variables in assessing their ability to explain the changes in China's nonproliferation behavior.

The Vilriables The four independent variables are U.S. policy intervention, the degree of China's acceptance of nonproliferation norms, China's foreign policy priorities, and China's institutional capacity. U. S. Policy Intervention The first variable encompasses all U.S. policy actions since the early 1980s that have contributed to China's growing support for nonproliferation. This variable is comprised of four broad components: economic incentives and disincentives, and political incentives and disincentives. The United States has used these tools, at different times and to varying degrees, to prod China to expand its nonproliferation commitments and to limit sensitive exports. Among the economic incentives the United States has offered China are access to U.S. civilian and dual-use technologies, trade, aid, and investment. Economic

INTRODUCTION

11

disincentives have included the threat and imposition of trade and investmentrelated sanctions. For example, at times the United States has restricted China's access to US. civilian technology or has prohibited US. entities from launching satellites on Chinese rocket boosters. Both have played important roles in shaping China's nuclear and missile nonproliferation decisions in the 1980s and 1990s. The political incentives the United States has offered China include meetings with high-level US. officials (e.g., presidential summits), the promise of improved bilateral relations, and possible changes in key US. policies with relevance to China (e.g., US. policies toward Taiwan). Political disincentives have taken the form of demarches, public reproaches, and the opprobrium that often resulted from the US. imposition of sanctions. In addition, Washington has regularly signaled Beijing that continued proliferation is a significant barrier to stable and productive U.S.-China relations. China's Acceptance cif Nonproliferation Norms The second variable is the degree to which China recognizes and accepts a particular nonproliferation norm. For example, does China accept the existence of global norms against both nuclear and missile proliferation? That acceptance can reflect the leadership's view that various nonproliferation commitments contribute to China's foreign policy and national security interests. China's acceptance of nonproliferation norms also indicates the government's willingness to marshal the nation's political and economic resources to comply with specific commitments. In broad terms, China's acceptance of nonproliferation norms over the past few decades has been influenced by at least four factors: China's assessment of international support for individual norms (i.e., their perceived universality), its perception of trends in global arms control and nonproliferation, the form and function of the treaties and agreements that comprise a specific norm, and China's historical experiences, such as in past combat and warfare.22 Documenting China's acceptance of nonproliferation norms is not an easy task because few policymakers in China talk in social science terms. This study evaluates the acceptance variable by examining the arguments set forth in Chinese publications and official statements, and in the government's positions on the NPT and other major nonproliferation agreements. 23 China's Foreign Policy Priorities The third, and perhaps broadest, variable is China's foreign policy priorities. This factor encompasses both China's assessment of the relative importance at certain times of its bilateral relationships with the United States, Iran, Pakistan, or India, and China's broader foreign policy goals, including fostering a secure environment that is conducive to

12

INTRODUCTION

economic development, reducing its international isolation, and building its reputation as a major power that acts responsibly. At different times and on varying issues, China's foreign policy priorities have shaped Beijing's willingness to commit to nonproliferation agreements, to comply with them, and to expand its commitments. For example, China's perception of its strong stake in stable U.S.-China relations and its hopes for greater bilateral cooperation have often been important influences on Beijing's willingness to limit sensitive exports in response to US. diplomacy. At other times, China's long-standing commitment to checking India's power has made Beijing reluctant to limit its nuclear and missile cooperation with Pakistan and, in some cases, has led China to violate its bilateral nonproliferation pledges to the United States.

China's Institutional Capacity China's institutional capacity is the fourth variable examined in this study. In contrast to the others, this variable serves primarily as a measure of the government's ability to understand and implement its various nonproliferation commitments. Institutional capacity in this study has two dimensions: institutional capabilities and institutional incentives. Institutional capabilities refers to the bureaucratic structures (e.g., laws and regulations), resources, and organizational dynamics that enable the government to control exports by state and nonstate actors. This dimension incorporates the interactions between China's community of nonproliferation experts, which tended to support expanded controls, and the uniformed military and the defense industries, which were often skeptical of nonproliferation commitments. Institutional incentives refers to the economic incentives that led government entities and private enterprises to export nuclear- and missile-related items, often despite government prohibitions. China's institutional capacity played an important role in explaining the uneven evolution of China's nonproliferation behavior. Institutional capacity in China has grown, but its rate of growth has varied between the nuclear and missile case studies addressed in this volume. These variations have directly affected the Chinese government's ability to comply consistently with its commitments, and the US. government's ability to understand Chinese intentions on nonproliferation questions. Evaluating the variables The four variables-US. policy intervention, China's acceptance of nonproliferation norms, its foreign policy priorities, and its institutional capacity-have all contributed to change in China's nonproliferation policies and practices. But it is their relative influence-assessed across cases and over time-that

INTRODUCTION

13

fully illuminates the sources, mechanisms, and patterns of change in China's nonproliferation behavior since the early 1980s. Although the variables interact in a number of ways, one dominant relationship explains much of the change in China's nonproliferation policies and practices: US. policy intervention functioned as an independent variable in shaping Chinese nonproliferation behavior, with the other three factors acting as intervening variables, or scope conditions, that enabled and constrained US. policy tools. This study argues that US. policy intervention played a significant and enduring role in fostering China's increasing commitment to nonproliferation. America's use of rewards and sanctions repeatedly led China to expand its commitments and to comply with them. In fact, US. policy intervention is evident in most of the major shifts in China's nonproliferation behavior over the past two and a half decades. 24 The study identifies six ways in which US. policy intervention, as the independent variable, influenced the development of China's policies and practices on nuclear and missile nonproliferation: US. policy (r) sensitized China to US. and international concerns about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; (2) encouraged China to accept nonproliferation principles and join international nonproliferation organizations; (3) coerced China into complying with its nonproliferation commitments; (4) was a catalyst for China's institutionalization of those commitments; (5) pressured China to adopt commitments to nonproliferation that went beyond the requirements of international agreements; and (6) fostered the development in China of a community of arms control and nonproliferation specialists. 25 The three other variables-China's acceptance of nonproliferation norms, its foreign policy priorities, and its institutional capacity-most often functioned as scope conditions. That is, one or more of these variables at times increased the effectiveness of US. policy tools and at other times constrained their effectiveness. Thus, these variables explain how, when, and why US. diplomacy was or was not successful at shaping Chinese nonproliferation behavior. In this role, these three variables seldom uniquely or independently explain changes in Chinese proliferation policies; instead they commonly operated in concert with or against US. policy. These three variables also capture the general parameters of negotiations among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the military, the defense industry, and other Chinese bureaucracies about adopting or rejecting and complying with or violating various nonproliferation commitments. In this sense, they encompass many of the competing interests in China's various nonproliferation decisions. That the relative importance of the three intervening

14

INTRODUCTION

variables shifted over time and across cases helps explain the decidedly nonlinear and sporadic expansion of China's nuclear and missile nonproliferation policies. This, in turn, explains the mixed effectiveness of U.S. efforts to limit China's proliferation activities. The role of the independent and intervening variables in shaping China's nonproliferation behavior is particularly complex because of the many variations in them over time and across cases. The relationship between the independent variable and the intervening variables also shifted as Chinese policies evolved: Constraining factors became enabling ones and vice versa. Two patterns of interaction were particularly important. First, U.S. policy intervention was most effective during periods when China placed a high value on improving U.S.-China relations to further its economic and foreign policy goals. 26 When Chinese leaders believed a positive relationship was valuable (with corresponding expectations of material benefits for China), Beijing responded to U.S. nonproliferation diplomacy-or at least claimed to have done so. At those times, the United States was able to sensitize Beijing to the dangers of its proliferation activities, to catalyze policy shifts, and to coerce compliance and further commitments. Absent Beijing's interest in stabilizing or growing the political and economic dimensions of its relationship with the United States, U.S. policy intervention seldom had initial or lasting influence. A second important pattern is that as acceptance of a nonproliferation norm expanded, it contributed to the government's willingness to pay the costs of assuming and implementing nonproliferation pledges, which often included compromising specific economic and foreign policy interests for the sake of nonproliferation. Over the past few decades, normative acceptance most often functioned as an internal driver for compliance and, eventually, as a force for assuming new commitments-even absent U.S. policy intervention. This variable was particularly important in driving improvements in China's compliance behavior because it explained the government's gradual willingness in the 1990s to bear the costs involved in strictly interpreting its commitments. In this sense, normative acceptance was necessary for consistent compliance; it was not essential to China's making an initial nonproliferation commitment. Absent normative acceptance, changes in Chinese nonproliferation behavior were still possible, but they required external stimulation (most often from the United States), were incremental, and often involved backtracking and serial compliance problems. As normative acceptance on a specific nonproliferation issue became common within Chinese policymaking circles, it increasingly played a catalytic role, acting as an independent internal force pushing for greater nonproliferation controls and related policymaking

INTRODUCTION

I5

and, in some instances, seemed to replace the motivating role of U.S. diplomacy and other external influences.

A Feedback Loop There is an important relationship between the first explanatory variable (U.S. policy intervention) and the three intervening variables. It has a causal dimension of sorts. U.S. policy intervention, in addition to promoting the shifts described above in Chinese nonproliferation behavior, encouraged normative acceptance, shaped Chinese foreign policy preferences, and bolstered China's institutional capacity. Thus the three intervening variables were not just autonomous variables; at times they were shaped by U.S. policy intervention and associated bilateral bargaining. That the first variable influenced the other three further attests to its role as a significant and enduring influence on Chinese behavior. By sensitizing China to global nonproliferation threats and encouraging acceptance of nonproliferation commitments, U.S. diplomacy jumpstarted internal debates that eventually led to normative acceptance among Chinese leaders and officials. Moreover, U.S. policy actions and U.S.-China nongovernmental interactions contributed to the expansion of China's institutional capabilities to understand and implement its nonproliferation pledges. These developments collectively produced a feedback loop among the four variables, a dynamic that enhanced China's support for nuclear and missile nonproliferation. U.S. policy intervention sensitized China to proliferation threats and focused its attention on nuclear and missile nonproliferation. That led to China's initial consideration of nonproliferation norms and enhancements in institutional capacity, which created domestic conditions that were increasingly receptive to future behavioral shifts. Subsequent U.S. policy actions, in turn, engendered further changes in Chinese nonproliferation policies while also deepening normative acceptance and triggering additional improvements in institutional capabilities. These positive changes in the internal variables subsequently enabled U.S. policy to push China's nonproliferation policy in new directions. In limited instances, these dynamics created self-sustaining forces within China for expanding both domestic nonproliferation controls and Beijing's role in international nonproliferation diplomacy.

Partial Exceptions The three intervening variables-China's acceptance of nonproliferation norms, its foreign policy priorities, and its institutional capacity-did not always function as factors that enabled or constrained U.S. policy intervention. In a limited number of instances, they acted as independent variables.

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INTRODUCTION

First, these three variables explain why China engaged in WMD proliferation activities in the first place and was reluctant to embrace nonproliferation, even in response to U.S. pressure. That is, these three variables offer a supply-side theory, an explanation for why a major nation would export sensitive nuclear and missile materials and technologies. In the early 1980s, for example, China's deep skepticism of nonproliferation principles and treaties, its close identification with the international interests of developing countries, its economic need for such exports, its lack of an export-control system, and its strong strategic imperatives to support key regional clients all contributed to its decision to sell sensitive WMD-related goods and technologies. In addition, these three variables independently explain specific decisions on China's part to broaden its nonproliferation commitments. Beijing's decision to join the NPT was strongly determined, not by U.S. diplomacy, but by the development in China of a community of nonproliferation specialists in key bureaucracies, changes in Chinese foreign policy priorities, and new assessments of trends in international security affairsY U.S. policy intervention had little to do with China's NPT decision, although Chinese leaders knew the United States would welcome its NPT membership. After the events of 9/n, major changes in Chinese perceptions of U.S. national security priorities and the nontraditional security threats confronting China influenced Beijing's decision to join several supplier-oriented nonproliferation groups (of which it had long been disdainful) and to play a more active role in international nonproliferation efforts. Furthermore, China's selfidentified aspiration, beginning in the mid-1990s, to be seen as a responsible major power and to reassure the international community that it is engaged in a "peaceful rise" contributed to China's expansion of its nonproliferation commitments and capabilities. 28 Alternative Explanations There are four possible alternative explanations for the changes in Chinese nonproliferation policies and practices. This study maintains that most are overly simplistic and rely on single-factor analysis, and that all are incomplete. The limitations of these four arguments underscore the value of the analytical framework presented in this book.

The International-Integration Argument The first argument is that the changes were part of China's gradual integration into the international community and so were largely inevitable. 29 In

INTRODUCTION

other words, even absent U.S. policy intervention, China eventually would have embraced nuclear and missile nonproliferation. This argument captures, at least in part, China's motivation for certain key policy shifts. It is reasonable to assume, based on evidence of subsequent policy decisions, that China's decision to join the IAEA in 1984 and its decision to sign on to the NPT in 1992, for example, were in part a response to the high degree of international acceptance of both. Yet even in these cases, U.S. policy played a facilitating role. Consider China's membership in the IAEA. During bilateral trade talks in the 1980s, Washington made clear to Beijing the importance it placed on IAEA membership as a precondition for bilateral nuclear cooperation. By making this link, the United States likely accelerated China's IAEA decision given that membership was already a widely accepted standard for international nuclear commerce. After joining the IAEA and in direct response to U.S. requests, senior Chinese leaders made successive public statements clarifYing China's new policy on nuclear nonproliferation. However, the integration argument fails to explain the multitude of changes in Chinese nuclear and missile nonproliferation policies since 1980. It is especially weak in explaining China's compliance with and institutionalization of its nonproliferation commitments. In these cases, internal forces for change were limited, and U.S. diplomacy was a catalyst. China's limitations on nuclear trade with Algeria, Iran, and Pakistan, for example, were a result of U.S. diplomacy and bilateral bargaining. China's initial decision to issue export-control regulations also stemmed from U.S. policy intervention. The case for U.S. policy influence is even stronger in the area of missile nonproliferation. Given the limited and ad hoc nature of global efforts to control the proliferation of missiles, there is little evidence to support the argument that China would have voluntarily adopted limitations on missile exports or basic MTCR controls absent U.S. pressure. The empirical evidence of the missile case simply belies the argument that China's policy shifts were inevitable.

The Treaties- Versus-Agreements Argument Second, some argue that the inconsistencies in China's nonproliferation compliance behavior are best explained by Beijing's greater support for nonproliferation treaties than for multilateral supply-side agreements. 3u This explanation is also incomplete. It is valuable insofar as it broadly captures one of the key differences in China's thinking on nuclear versus missile nonproliferation. But it fails to explain the mixed evolution of China's policies and practices on nuclear nonproliferation. It also oversimplifies the multiple differences

18

INTRODUCTION

between China's approaches to nuclear and missile nonproliferation; and it applies only to China's motivation for adopting major nonproliferation agreements. The argument does not account for China's decisions to comply with and institutionalize its commitments. The analytical framework in this study subsumes this argument by including a variable that addresses China's acceptance of nonproliferation norms.

The Collective-Pressure Argument A third explanation is that other countries encouraged and coerced China to change its nonproliferation behavior. One could argue that this study, by focusing on the role of US. policy intervention, obscures the importance of other nations' diplomacy; but there are limited data to support that position. No other country played as substantial and persistent a role as the United States in curbing China's exports of nuclear- and missile-related exports. In the early 1980s, the United Kingdom and France did link the conclusion of bilateral nuclear trade agreements to China's membership in the IAEA and its adoption of nuclear safeguards. But they were following America's lead. Even after China joined the IAEA, the United States pushed for additional assurances from high-level Chinese officials, and it got them. In the 1990s, neither the United Kingdom nor France made nonproliferation compliance or institutionalization a priority in its bilateral relations with Beijing. Washington took the international lead in prodding China to curb its nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran, Pakistan, and other nations. Israeli diplomacy offers another possible example. In the late 1980s, Israel reportedly pressed China to limit its missile exports to the Middle East. Israeli diplomacy likely played a role in China's eventual decision to cancel the sale of M-9 missiles to Syria in the early 1990s, but the extent of Israel's role is not clear given the limited information available. At the time, Israel and China did not have formal diplomatic relations; but the two nations did have a robust military-trade relationship that probably gave Israel some leverage in negotiating with Beijing. There is simply not enough evidence to assess the degree of Israel's influence on China's nonproliferation policies and practices at that time or later. 31 The United States, by contrast, consistently treated missile proliferation as a high-level concern in U.S.-China relations. The United States has imposed sanctions on Chinese companies numerous times since 1987 for exporting missiles and related technology, something no other country has ever done publicly. Nonproliferation issues have been raised and agreements reached at almost all of the U.S.-China presidential summits since normalization.

INTRODUCTION

19

The Internal-Forces Argument Lastly, some scholars maintain that internal forces were the principal drivers of change in China's nonproliferation behavior. 32 This is perhaps the weakest of the alternative explanations. There is little empirical evidence to support the claim that internal actors advocated a reorientation of policy. In the early 1980s, both the nuclear and missile industries had significant financial incentives to export sensitive technologies. Few Chinese policymakers believed that nonproliferation served China's interests. And even if they did, the government was not organized to effectively control exports from either industry. Once the nuclear industry adopted basic nonproliferation controls in the mid- 1980s, its economic incentives to export did not disappear, a tension that may explain, at least in part, China's narrow interpretation of its nonproliferation commitments in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Domestic variables offer only a partial explanation of the forces pushing for greater support for nonproliferation; and in many cases, internal variables were pushing China in the opposite direction. Domestic variables are best understood as scope conditions that shaped the problem and influenced the effectiveness ofU.S. policy tools. Previewing the Conclusions

Key Findings An initial key finding of this study is the importance of distinguishing between China's policies on nuclear and missile nonproliferation in evaluating how and why China's nonproliferation policies and practices have evolvedY There are important differences between these two categories, and understanding them provides insights into both Chinese motivations and the effectiveness of U.S. diplomacy. The pace and scope of policy change in these arenas was (and continues to be) substantially different, reflecting different Chinese perceptions and capabilities. China's policies and practices on nonproliferation should not be lumped into one comprehensive category or characterized using broad generalizations. A second core finding is that U.S. policy exhibited two types of influence on Chinese nonproliferation behavior: major and supportive. Major policy influence refers to changes in Chinese behavior that probably would not have occurred absent U.S. policy intervention. Supportive policy influence refers to instances where U.S. diplomatic intervention accelerated the pace and scope of policy shifts already in progress, leaving room for other explanatory variables. This finding makes clear that U.S. policy was not the only force influencing the evolution of China's nonproliferation policies and practices.Yet, on

20

INTRODUCTION

a range of Chinese policy shifts, the role of U.S. policy has been critical and largely unexamined. More specifically, Chinese policies on nuclear nonproliferation changed extensively over the last two and a half decades. China moved from refusing to take a seat at the nonproliferation table to being one of the hosts: China has become a strong proponent of global efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and related goods and technologies. Chinese leaders appear to have internalized the global norm against nuclear proliferation; that is, they have come to believe that nuclear nonproliferation contributes directly to the nation's security interests. U.S. policy played a central role in this evolution, especially by increasing the speed and depth of key changes. In the early 1980s, at a time when Chinese companies were exporting unsafeguarded nuclear materials and equipment to potential proliferants, the United States sensitized the newly opened nation to global nonproliferation concerns. The American government leveraged China's eagerness for positive political relations and a bilateral nuclear trade agreement to elicit Beijing's first nuclear nonproliferation pledges in 1984 and 1985.Yet China refused to sign the NPT at that time, and it continued to provide assistance to Pakistan's nuclear-weapons program. At the time, China's continued skepticism of the NPT, its nuclear industry's need to generate income in the face of declining government funding, and its mutually beneficial nuclear cooperation with Pakistan prompted Beijing to reject NPT membership and to refuse to limit its trade with Islamabad or to improve its internal nonproliferation controls. In the early 1990s, U.S. pressure on China-especially regarding its nuclear cooperation with Iran and Pakistan-led Beijing to begin to limit the scope, content, and frequency of its nuclear exports. There is little evidence that China would have taken these steps absent U.S. intervention. The United States was far more effective at curbing economically motivated nuclear transfers (e.g., Chinese exports to Algeria and Iran) than geopolitically motivated transfers (e.g., to Pakistan). U.S. diplomacy also catalyzed the Chinese government to recognize the weaknesses in its controls on nuclear exports and to accelerate efforts to forge first internal rules and eventually public regulations governing these sensitive exports. In the latter half of the I990s, U.S. intervention was also central to China's assumption of extrainstitutional commitments, commitments that exceeded the standards set by international accords. By 2000, China began to emerge as an international advocate of nuclear nonproliferation, as evidenced by the responsibilities it assumed in international organizations and its responses to regional nonproliferation crises.

INTRODUCTION

2!

During the 1990s, numerous shifts in the internal variables made US. policy tools more effective. First, as support for the NPT specifically and nuclear nonproliferation generally grew in China, so did support for other nonproliferation commitments. Along with adopting new policy commitments, Chinese officials gradually recognized the importance of formulating public and detailed export-control regulations. China's nuclear industry acknowledged the economic value of basic nonproliferation controls to ensure its continued access to civilian nuclear trade with other countries. Also, the relatively small size and centralized nature of China's nuclear industry-and the industry's endorsement of nonproliferation-made regulating its exports a feasible task for the government. In the context of these developments, US. diplomacy was able to effect deeper, more comprehensive, and faster policy changes. The trajectory of change in China's policies on missile nonproliferation was significantly different. China only grudgingly placed controls on exports of missiles and related goods, and its compliance with stated commitments was (and continues to be) weak. Several factors were at work. First, Beijing rejected the existence of a global norm governing the nonproliferation of missiles. Second, it lacked the bureaucratic structures to control missile exports: China's aerospace industry was large and spread out, far more so than its nuclear industry. Chinese missile producers also had significant incentives to export missiles and missile-related items. Moreover, missile exports contributed to many of China's national security and foreign policy goals, among them bolstering Pakistan's security and registering opposition to US. arms sales to Taiwan. Perhaps most important, over time China's position on missile nonproliferation became closely linked to vicissitudes in its relationship with the United States. Largely due to these internal factors, US. policy intervention had far less influence on limiting China's missile proliferation than it had on limiting Chinese nuclear nonproliferation. U.S.-China interactions on missiles did not precipitate the recognition by Chinese policymakers that missile proliferation undermined China's security interests. China subsequently adopted just a few, basic limits on exports of missiles and related goods and technologies. These changes in Chinese policy occurred exclusively in the context ofbilateral bargaining and often as a result of US. coercion in the form of demarches, public reproaches, and economic sanctions. Economic incentives played a lesser role, although they did facilitate progress at certain points. These tactics led to successive bilateral disputes about compliance. In the post 9/rr era, Chinese policymakers' growing concern about missile

22

INTRODUCTION

proliferation was reflected in the formal missile export-control regulations China issued in 2002. However, compliance problems persist, and they continue to raise questions about the depth of China's commitment to missile nonproliferation. China's missile nonproliferation behavior highlights both the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. policy intervention. That China adopted any controls on its missile exports indicates the impact of U.S. policy intervention: Few other forces-external or internal-were pushing for such controls. On the other hand, the limited nature of those controls and China's weak compliance with them point to the limitations ofU.S. diplomacy in this arena.

Additional Findings Beyond the study's core findings are a set of conclusions that elaborate on the sources and patterns of change in China's nonproliferation behavior. One important ancillary finding is that America's persistent intervention to limit Chinese nuclear and missiles exports had the effect of "bilateralizing" certain aspects of nonproliferation in Beijing. That is, Chinese officials saw many of their bilateral nonproliferation commitments as political pledges contingent on continued stable relations with the United States. This thinking has been most prevalent in the area of missile nonproliferation, where normative acceptance was very limited for years. Chinese officials viewed most bilateral nonproliferation negotiations as competitions between national interests, not as discussions about adhering to mutually beneficial and universally accepted norms. In this sense, Beijing saw many of its nonproliferation negotiations with the United States as venues to limit what it perceived as U.S. efforts to constrain Chinese options and to extract concessions from Washington. A second finding is that U.S. policy actions and U.S. interactions with Chinese officials, scientists, military officers, and academics contributed to the expansion, pluralization, integration, and professionalization of China's community of arms control and nonproliferation specialists. 34 U.S.-China interactions-both governmental and nongovernmental-fostered the emergence and growth of this community by exposing Chinese experts to arms control and nonproliferation issues in the early 1980s and helping them to formalize and expand their research a decade later. As China's community of experts has developed, China has become a more active and effective practitioner of arms control and nonproliferation diplomacy, especially regarding implementation of its domestic controls on WMD exports.

INTRODUCTION

23

Implications for International Relations Theory The evolution of China's nonproliferation policies and practices challenges prominent paradigms in international relations theory. No individual paradigm-realism, liberalism, or social constructivism-can fully explain the patterns of change in China's nonproliferation behavior. Each approach elucidates distinct dimensions of the shifts in Chinese policies and practices, but collectively these three paradigms contribute far more to explaining the evolution in Chinese behavior than they do individually. 35 The realist paradigm (and associated variants) stresses that states exist in an anarchic-but not necessarily chaotic-international system that lacks central authority; that states primarily seek to maximize their survival and autonomy; that they are unsure of other states' intentions, which contributes to a high degree of uncertainty about survival; and that states are rational actors that monitor their external security and think strategically about threats. They are also acutely aware of the relative distribution of material power in the global system. 3 ~>

Given these general tenets, realism cannot adequately explain many of China's proliferation activities or most of its nonproliferation decisions. Contrary to what realism would predict about Chinese behavior, China did not use WMD proliferation to balance the international system's dominant power during or after the cold war. In fact, China often assumed nonproliferation commitments that constrained its freedom of action during a period in which the United States emerged as the predominant international power. But realism does help explain China's resistance to policy change in a few instances. For example, China consistently provided nuclear weapons-related and missile-related assistance to Pakistan in an effort to balance Indian power. By contrast, liberal approaches offer several insights into both the sources and the patterns of change in Chinese nonproliferation behavior. The liberal paradigm argues that economic interdependence and participation in international organizations lessen the self-help tendencies of major powers in an anarchic system; in doing so, these forces shape state preferences and interests in ways that counteract the natural tendency toward power balancing that realists predict. Liberal approaches claim that some states, when their survival is not immediately threatened, place a higher value on economic development and accumulating wealth as means of ensuring long-term relative power. Liberal approaches similarly emphasize that as a state becomes more integrated into the global economy and international institutions, it has a greater stake in avoiding behavior that would undermine economically

24

INTRODUCTION

critical bilateral relationships or take actions that would upset the stability of the international system. 37 Much of China's nonproliferation behavior appears consistent with liberal arguments. There is a broad correlation between the narrowing of China's proliferation activities and its growing economic interdependence and involvement in international institutions. Specifically, there is a positive relationship between China's expanding economic and political relationship with the United States and its expanding commitment to nonproliferation. However, liberal arguments cannot explain the uneven evolution of Chinese nonproliferation policies and practices since the early 1980s. They fail to explain the inconsistent changes in Chinese behavior both within and across nuclear and missile nonproliferation cases. Social constructivists argue that the "material" factors cited by realism and liberalism are not nearly as important in explaining state behavior as "ideational" variables are. Social constructivists highlight the influence of global norms (like nonproliferation), changing conceptions of appropriate international conduct, and shifts in a state's identity as an international actor as defining influences on state behavior. 38 The social constructivist emphasis on these normative structures and their effect on a state's behavior explains some of the variations in the pace and scope of change in China's nuclear nonproliferation behavior versus its missile nonproliferation behavior. Also, the social constructivist emphasis on epistemic communities-networks of experts with similar interests-highlights a key source of China's eventual recognition that nonproliferation contributes to its national security interests. In China's case, the development of a collection of arms control and nonproliferation specialists was an important pathway though which nonproliferation norms came to be accepted and information about those norms was disseminated throughout the Chinese system. But social constructivist explanations cannot account for China's decisions in the 1980s to make its first nonproliferation pledges, at a time when Chinese leaders still viewed the international community through a MaoistMarxist lens, and when most Chinese policymakers treated the concept of nonproliferation with derision. Furthermore, social constructivism has difficulty explaining China's frequent noncompliance-for example, its continued missile assistance to Pakistan. Structure, Methodology, and Sources The book is structured around four empirical chapters. Each of the chapters addresses distinct aspects of the external and internal forces that collectively have shaped Chinese nonproliferation policies and practices. Chapters 2 and

INTRODUCTION

25

3 are multidimensional case studies that examine the evolution in China's nuclear and missile nonproliferation policies. These two cases were chosen because of their importance to international nonproliferation affairs. Also, they are good examples ofboth the substantial change in Chinese policies and practices and the sporadic and uneven nature of that change. Each of the case studies spans the years from 1980, to 2004, a period in which nonproliferation was a high-profile and controversial issue in China's foreign relations. 39 In the case studies, this overall time frame is then divided into smaller periods. Within each of these periods, three broad issues are examined: the types of changes in Chinese nonproliferation policies and practices, the policy tools the United States employed to encourage those changes, and the prevailing scope conditions (China's normative acceptance, foreign policy priorities, and institutional capacity). This approach offers two benefits. 4° First, it allows for within-case comparisons, which are key to understanding the role of U.S. policy intervention relative to the changing constellation of scope conditions in a given case study. This method importantly permits this study to control for certain variables in assessing their relative influence on Chinese behavior. Second, this approach facilitates a comparison of policy changes in China across nuclear and missile nonproliferation cases, providing an added dimension of controlled comparison; this also allows further analysis of the relative influence of the four variables across the two cases. Thus by distinguishing between the nuclear and missile case studies and then further disaggregating each case into multiple periods, the approach facilitates analysis across issues and over time. Chapter 4 differs from the previous two. It analyzes the hypothesized relationship between U.S. policy intervention and changes in China's nonproliferation behavior from a different angle. It examines U.S.-China disputes over missile defense and their impact on China's nonproliferation behavior. It looks at whether or not U.S. nonproliferation goals for China are undermined when a U.S. defense policy (specifically missile defense) leads to change in the values of a key scope condition (specifically China's foreign policy priorities). Thus the chapter raises two questions: To what extent did U.S. missile defense policies cause negative shifts in China's support for nonproliferation? And did the other intervening variables exacerbate or moderate that outcome? Chapter 5 analyzes the evolution of China's community of arms control and nonproliferation experts, and looks at the U.S. role in that process. The purpose of this analysis is to determine the means by and the degree to which the United States contributed to the development of this epistemic

INTRODUCTION

community of arms control and nonproliferation specialists in China. The chapter argues that the evolution of China's arms control and nonproliferation community was a reactive process that was fostered primarily by China's serial exposure to international arms control processes. It also argues that the United States influenced this evolution through two pathways: via U.S. policy actions, which placed demands for information and expertise on China's government, and via exchanges between U.S. and Chinese nongovernmental experts. In doing so, the chapter identifies a distinct-and largely unexplored-channel through which the United States influenced Chinese arms control and nonproliferation policies.

Methodological Challenges Despite the numerous strengths of the case studies, the arguments in this study do face methodological challenges. None disqualifies the book's core arguments. They are described here for the sake of clarity and full disclosure, and because they suggest avenues for future research. First, the book's claim that U.S. policy intervention shaped China's nonproliferation policies is a threshold argument, not a linear one. In other words, the study maintains that the application of various economic and political incentives and disincentives in different circumstances resulted in changes in Chinese nonproliferation policies and practices. Following the logic of this argument, the more these tools were applied, the greater the changes in Chinese behavior, assuming certain scope conditions. But current information is insufficient to fully quantify the relationship between U.S. policy intervention and the degree of change in Chinese nonproliferation behavior. The data needed to make such comparisons are likely classified, in materials documenting politically sensitive bilateral negotiations. The book's research correlates three considerations: the U.S. policy tools used, the scope conditions in China, and the changes in Chinese behavior. These correlations permit plausible conclusions about the relative influence ofU.S. diplomacy and internal conditions in China that shaped Chinese nonproliferation policies and practices between 1980 and 2004. However, quantifying these factors within each category is beyond the reach of current information. Second, some changes in China's nonproliferation policies likely resulted from several distinct causes. Accurately measuring the specific weight of each cause is difficult, which creates a problem in evaluating the changing relationships among the four variables. The study addresses this issue by assessing changes in Chinese policies over time and across cases, which allows conclusions about the relative importance of the distinct variables in different

INTRODUCTION

27

situations. In addition, the study uses data from interviews with Chinese and U.S. officials to provide direct evidence of the specific factors that were most important at specific decision points for China. Third, some of the analyses, like the one on the evolution of the arms control and nonproliferation community in Chapter 5, rely heavily on interviews of Chinese and American officials and experts. Interviews are somewhat suspect because they can be self-serving and based on selective memories. Wherever possible, the study uses additional evidence to corroborate the key claims of those interviewed.

Addressing Chinese Policies on the Nonproliferation of Biological and Chemical Weapons Another methodological issue for this study is that it does not address Chinese policies and practices on the nonproliferation of biological or chemical weapons (CW), which are also considered WMD. There are several explanations for this choice. First, there is little consistent or reliable public information indicating that China has engaged in the export of goods or technologies related to biological weapons, and in the absence of open-source information on this topic, meaningful research is not possible. 41 Although information on China's CW-related exports is available, the lack of high-quality data and space constraints precluded inclusion of a separate case study on it. Moreover, in comparison to the case studies on nuclear and missile nonproliferation, a case study on China's proliferation of chemical weapons would be far narrower, making cross-case comparison and generalization difficult. There is nothing in China's CW policy or practice that either contradicts or invalidates the analytical framework used in this study. China's recognition of an international norm against the proliferation of chemical weapons and China's security concerns about chemical weapons are of long standing. Japan's use of chemical weapons against Chinese troops in the 1930s and 1940s sensitized Chinese leaders to the dangers and horrors of chemical warfare. In their rhetoric, Chinese leaders have supported CW nonproliferation for decades, dating back to the 1970s, when these same leaders were rejecting nuclear nonproliferation. And China actively participated in negotiations to develop the Chemical Weapons Convention from their inception in the early 198os-when China was a newcomer to the arms control world. Beijing signed the ewe in 1993, along with 130 other countries. In 1995, in preparation for China's ratification of the treaty, the government issued its first regulations governing exports of CWC-controlled items. Thus Chinese policy shifts

28

INTRODUCTION

on the proliferation of chemical weapons have not been nearly as pronounced as those regarding nuclear and missile exports. 42 The United States grew concerned over China's exports of CW-related goods in the early 1990s, when private companies in China began to export dual-use chemicals and CW-related production equipment to entities in Iran that the United States believed were producing chemical weaponsY The scope of these exports and their timing were far more limited than China's nuclear and missile proliferation behavior. The United States intervened on several occasions to prod China to curb these exports, and the resulting bilateral interactions support the core arguments of this study. US. policy played two important albeit limited roles: sensitizing China to the weaknesses of its nascent CW controls and continually pressuring China to improve the quality of those controls. Ultimately, US. policy intervention accelerated the speed and expanded the scope of government improvements in its controls on exports of CW-related goods and technologies. These preliminary conclusions are broadly consistent with the shifts in China's nuclear and missile nonproliferation policies described in Chapters 2 and 3.

Sources The information and analysis in this book are drawn from a broad, specialized, and unique collection of sources that distinguishes this study from previous research on Chinese nonproliferation and arms control policies. This included extensive interviews with Chinese and U.S. officials, numerous Chineselanguage source materials, and primary and secondary Western publications. Specifically, much of the data and many of the arguments in this study are based on more than fifty interviews with Chinese officials and scholars involved in nonproliferation policymaking and research. The interviewees included both active and retired officials and experts from China's foreign ministry, military, defense industry, government-run research institutes, and universities. Many of them were directly involved in internal decisions and bilateral negotiations with the United States dating back to the 1980s. The information from these interviews provides many new details about and insights into China's official nonproliferation policymaking. On the US. side, the research draws on more than thirty interviews with senior and midlevel officials who took part in bilateral and multilateral negotiations with China. They include several former U.S. ambassadors, undersecretaries and assistant secretaries of state, and officials from the National Security Council. A small number of non-Chinese foreign diplomats and policymakers were interviewed as well.

INTRODUCTION

29

The study utilized an equally extensive collection of Chinese printed materials to supplement the interviews: government statements and documents, scholarly and industry journals, newspaper articles, and books on foreign policy and national security affairs. Many of the Chinese materials, including internal-circulation documents, have never before been cited by Western experts. And many of the Chinese articles on arms control and nonproliferation date back to the early 1980s, when this discipline was just developing in China. Information on China's nuclear and missile industries is based on the author's reading of years' worth of biweekly newspapers produced by China's nuclear and aerospace industries, as well as highly specialized publications produced by China's defense industry. Much of the data on the evolution of China's expert community are based on information from specialized, smallcirculation Chinese publications and a large collection of Chinese papers presented at international arms control conferences beginning in the late 1980s. Some of the Chinese writings were translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Among the English-language materials this study made use of were primary sources, including congressional testimony, U.S. government reports, and official U.S. government statements. In recognition of the sensitivity surrounding information on Chinese proliferation activities and the amount of misinformation on this topic in the public domain, the study primarily relied on a set of unclassified U.S. government documents for data on Chinese WMDproliferation activities, including the Central Intelligence Agency's biannual Section 721 report to Congress on global weapons proliferation developments, the Defense Department's Proliferation: Threat and Response reports, the State Department's annual reports on arms control treaty compliance, and the speeches and testimony before Congress ofU.S. government officials.

2

A Gradual Engagement China and Nuclear Nonproliferation

The evolution of China's support for the nuclear nonproliferation regime is one of the most important developments in the short history of China's association with the world of arms control and international security affairs. 1 It also represents one of the most significant shifts in Chinese foreign policy during the reform era. These changes-in thinking, policy, and bureaucratic structure-are impressive considering their relative speed and scope, and the nation's long-standing rejection of nuclear nonproliferation. As of this writing, China has been a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for fifteen years. In that time, Beijing has clarified its nonproliferation commitments, curbed dangerous nuclear exports, formalized these commitments into export control regulations, worked to buttress global nonproliferation institutions, and assumed greater responsibility for managing regional nonproliferation crises. What explains these substantial and sustained shifts in Chinese behavior? This chapter argues that U.S. diplomacy consistently played a significant role in the evolution of China's support for nuclear nonproliferation. Since 1980, the United States has sensitized China to international and U.S. concerns about nuclear proliferation, encouraged China to limit the scope of its nuclear exports and to assume formal nonproliferation commitments, coerced China to comply strictly with its commitments, helped China develop the domestic capability to implement its pledges, and pushed China to adopt certain practices that go beyond the terms of the NPT and other agreements. Although

GRADUAL ENGAGEMENT

3I

it is difficult to quantify US. influence, this chapter maintains that absent US. policy intervention certain changes in Chinese nuclear nonproliferation policies and practices would not have occurred; and that in other cases, where internal forces for change existed, US. policy intervention led to faster and more extensive changes. There were three internal forces for change in China, China-specific variables that influenced China's nonproliferation policies and practices, both hindering and assisting them. The first was China's gradual acceptance of international nonproliferation norms. Over time, China's recognition that nuclear nonproliferation served its own security interests (or, at least, didn't undermine them) would become a strong force for adopting new commitments and complying with old ones, tightening controls on exports, and assuming a leadership role in global nonproliferation efforts. The second was China's weak institutional capacity to understand and implement its nuclear nonproliferation commitments. For decades following the initiation of economic reform, China lacked a system to control the exports of a nuclear industry with substantial incentives to trade in nuclear goods and technologies. The third variable was China's foreign policy interests and priorities. China's expectations about U.S.-China relations as well as its political and economic relations with countries like Pakistan and Iran heavily influenced China's willingness to limit its nuclear assistance to other countries. As noted above, these three factors both constrained and enabled US. efforts to promote nonproliferation in China. During certain periods, changes in Chinese proliferation practices were constrained by China's skepticism of the NPT. But in other periods, key shifts in this and other variables helped expand China's support for nonproliferation. In particular, growing acceptance of nuclear nonproliferation norms in China and shifts in Chinese foreign policy goals would serve as the foundation for numerous policy changes and, eventually, for a more enduring commitment to nuclear nonproliferation. The analysis of changes in China's nonproliferation policies and practices, and the external and internal forces behind those changes, is divided into four sections. The first is an overview of China's thinking on nonproliferation in the prereform era, a historical baseline through the 1970s for understanding the scope of change in China's policies and practices. The rest divide the years from 1981 through 2004 into three periods and then examine Chinese policy decisions and their links to specific variables in each period (Table 2. r).A clear pattern emerges across the three periods and the many changes in Chinese nonproliferation behavior: China's growing acceptance of nonproliferation

GRADUAL ENGAGEMENT TABLE 2.1

Evolution rld: Progress and Prospects, ed. Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg, 161-205 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).Also see Michel Oksenberg, Pitman B. Potter, and William B.Abnett, "Advancing Intellectual Property Rights: Information Technologies and the Course of Economic Development in China;' NBRAnalysis 7 (November 1996): 1-35. 12. See the testimony of Margaret M. Pearson (associate professor of government and politics, University of Maryland, College Park) before the U.S.-China Commission, Hearing on China~ WTO Compliance, January 18,2002, www.uscc.gov/textonly/transcriptstx/tespea. htm; and U.S. General Accounting Office, IM>rld Trade Organization:Analysis of China~ Commitments to Other Members, Report GA0-03-4 (Washington, DC, October 2002). 13. See Steven E. Miller, "The Former Soviet Union," in Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War, ed. Mitchell Reiss and Robert S. Litwak, 89-128 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1994); and Graham T. Allison, Owen R. Cote Jr., Richard A. Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller, Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996). q. See Vladimir A. Orlov, "Iran and Russia-U.S. Non-Proliferation Dialogue," PONARS Policy Memo 314 (PIR Center-Center for Policy Studies in Russia, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, November 2003), www.csis.org/ media/ csis/pubs/pm_0314.pdf. 15. See the testimony ofDr.James Clay Moltz (deputy director, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies) before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittees on Europe and on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, US. Efforts to Halt WMD Proliferation: Past Experience, Current Programs, and Future Priorities, May 14, 2003; Michael Jasinski, "Russia's Nuclear and Missile Technology Assistance to Iran," CNS Iran Special Collection (Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, CA,

NOTES TO CHAPTER

6

317

June 26, 2003), cns.miis.edu/research!iran/rusnuc.htm; and William Hoehn, Final Report of Activity in the First Session of the 108th Congress Affecting US.-Former Soviet Union Cooperative Nonproliferation Programs, RANSAC Policy Update (Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, Washington, DC, April 2004), www.ransac.org/Documents/ £Y2004legwrapupo41204.pdf. 16. See Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992); and Ross, "Engagement in U.S.-China Policy."

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