Religion, Values & Development in Southeast Asia 9789814379076

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
CONTRIBUTORS
INTRODUCTION
MAX WEBER'S HERITAGE AND MODERN SOUTHEAST ASIAN THINKING ON DEVELOPMENT
THE USE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
THE IMPACT OF THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL (DAKWAH) ON THE RELIGIOUS CULTURE OF MALAYSIA
BUDDHISM, MODERNIZATION AND NATIONAL PURPOSE
BUDDHISM AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF BUDDHIST UNIVERSITIES
A BRIEF EXPLORATION INTO THE NATURE OF MEN-WOMEN RELATIONS AMONG PRE-COLONIAL MALAY AN PEOPLE
WOMEN'S STUDIES IN RURAL INDONESIA
FORMS OF RATIONALITY, RATIONALIZATION, AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN A NORTHERN PHILIPPINE COMMUNITY
ANGKOR WAT EXAMINED FROM A SACRIFICIAL POINT OF VIEW
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY MEANINGS OF THAI KHWAN: THE USE OF LEXICAL MEANING CHANGE AS AN INDICATOR OF CULTURE CHANGE

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RELIGION., VALUES and

DEVELOPMENT in Southeast Asia

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in May 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interest is focused on the many-faceted problems of development and modernization, and political and social change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees on which are represented the National University of Singapore, appointees from the government, as well as representatives from a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A tenman Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer. The responsibility for facts and opinions expressed in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the Institute or its supporters.

RELIGION, VALUES and

DEVELOPMENT in Southeast Asia

Edited by BRUCE MATTHEWS and JUDITH NAGATA

I5EII!i INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 0511 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

© 1986 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Cataloguing in Publication Data Religion, values and development in Southeast Asia/edited by Bruce Matthews and Judith Nagata. 1. Asia, Southeastern-Religion-Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Values. 3. Social change. I. Matthews, Bruce. II. Nagata, Judith A., 1940111. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. BL 1055 R38 1986 ISBN 9971-988-20-8 Printed and bound by MCD Pte Ltd

CONTENTS

Contributors

vii

Introduction Professor Bruce Matthews Max Weber's Heritage and Modern Southeast Asian Thinking on Development Andreas Buss

4

The Use of Customary Law in Development in Southeast Asia Lakshman Marasinghe

22

The Impact of the Islamic Revival (Dakwah) on the Religious Culture of Malaysia Judith Nagata

37

Buddhism, Modernization and National Purpose Bruce Matthews

51

Buddhism and National Development: A Case Study of Buddhist Universities Chatsumarn Kabilsingh

62

vi A Brief Exploration into the Nature of Men-Women Relations Among Pre-Colonial Malayan People Marie-Andree Couillard

Contents

81

Women's Studies in Rural Indonesia Pudjiwati Sajogyo

100

Forms of Rationality, Rationalization, and Social Transformation in a Northern Philippine Community Raul Pertierra

118

Angkor Wat Examined from a Sacrificial Point of View Helene Legendre

140

Historical and Contemporary Meanings of Thai Khwan: The Use of Lexical Meaning Change as an Indicator of Culture Change Wilaiwan Kanitlanan and James Placzek

146

CONTRIBUTORS

ANDREAS BUSS teaches Asian studies at the Universite Ste-Anne, Church Point, Nova Scotia. LAKSHMAN MARASINGHE teaches Law at the University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario. JUDITH NAGATA teaches Anthropology at York University, Downsview, Ontario. BRUCE MATTHEWS teaches Comparative Religion at Acadia University, Wolfville, Nova Scotia. CHATSUMARN KABILSINGH teaches Philosophy at Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand. MARIE-ANDREE COUILLARD is in the Departement d'Anthropologie, Universite Laval, Quebec. PUDJIWATI SAJOGYO is at the Centre for Rural Sociological Research, Boger Agricultural University, Indonesia. RAUL PERTIERRA teaches Sociology at the University of New South Wales, Kensington, Australia. HELENE LEGENDRE is chercheur antonome in the Departement d'Anthropologie, Universite Laval, Quebec. WILAIWAN KANITTANAN teaches Linguistics at Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand. JAMES PLACZEK teaches Linguistics at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C.

INTRODUCTION

Bruce Matthews

This monograph consists of selected papers initially presented at the Second International Conference of the Canadian Council for Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, in June 1982. They cover a wide range of issues pertinent to the non-Communist countries of Southeast Asia, and represent a diverse cross-section of research methods and aims. Most of the authors have expressed an interest in the various challenges associated with development in this traditional part of the world. Some have chosen to examine the impact of modernization on culture and religion. In this regard, Andreas Buss addresses the whole question of whether the Western free-enterprise economic model is appropriate to the Asian world-view. Using Max Weber and S.H. Alatas as theorists who have capably probed this problem before, Buss reflects on alternative definitions of progress that may be more viable for the East. Likewise, Lakshman Marasinghe shows how indigenous or customary law contributes to national and social cohesiveness, despite years of dominance by colonial or "foreign" laws in many Asian countries. He rightly argues that law should be a reflection of the spirit of a people, and that its role in development is therefore obvious and critical. It is something that must be re-examined and advanced by Third World societies. Elsewhere, Judith Nagata analyses the impact of the contemporary Islamic revival in Malaysia. She outlines the various fundamentalist groups which aspire to win the allegiance of both urban

2

Introduction

and rural Muslims. Especially interesting are her reflections on how this kind of religious force fails to meet the needs of villagers and country people used to a much more liberal and practical kind of religious life. Two papers that deal specifically with Buddhism centre on Burma and Thailand. Bruce Matthews first provides a review of different attitudes towards modernization in the Theravada countries, showing how Buddhism can be used as an agency for nation-building and national identity. He then concentrates on the unique response of Burma. Chatsumarn Kabilsingh reviews the leadership role of the Buddhist monastic order in Thailand, as it seeks to strengthen and stabilize society. She does this by examining the educational system in Buddhist universities, and reveals interesting and important attitudes on the part of both monks and lay students to the place of religion in contemporary Thai society. Other papers are more specifically aimed at sociological issues. Marie-Andree Couillard offers an excellent study of men-women relationships in the Malay "world". She clears up some mis· understandings about male domination, and carefully shows how the role of women as chief agents in the production of food gives access to prestige goods and respect. Unlike some other societies, Malay women's housework is recognized and compensated, and the married pair is still perceived as the basic economic unit in the community, and as equals in the "business adventure" of life. In another paper, Pudjiwati Sajogyo examines the position of rural Indonesian women in the family and in the greater community. This is the result of a two-year survey of nearly five hundred selected households from villages in Java, Sumatra and Timor. It addresses such themes as the status of women, incomes and decision-making processes in the family. Raul Pertierra similarly investigates various responses of Philippine villagers to the technical and strategic choices made available to them. Arguing that sometimes the topic of "modernization" portrays peasant society as static and conservative, he goes on to point out that such a view fails to appreciate the often flexible way this element of society reacts to new forces and influences. Not infrequently, however, village institu· tions have imposed on them "rationalized" urban-based values (namely, in education and law) as a necessary pre-condition for modernization. Using J. Habermas as a primary source, Pertierra continues by pointing out the many ways in which peasant society may be said to exhibit useful and authentic degrees of "rationality". Two final papers address historical and linguistic topics. Helene Legendre discusses the meaning of Angkor Wat, concentrating on its traditional sacrificial focus, and tracing out some of the myths and theological themes identified by modern scholarship. She avers that

Bruce Matthews

3

since 1975, the Khmer Rouge have broken away from any religious empathy or spiritual affection for Angkor, so that it is now deprived of a "living" cultural significance. Finally, James Placzek and Wilaiwan Kanittanan offer an interesting study on how a once-central psychological and theological concept is affected by an evolving cultural setting. They set down the several meanings associated with the Thai word khwan ("consciousness"), showing how it has traditionally been used as a definition of that which is reborn, and as a kind of energizing spirit in both animate and inanimate things. Among the remote Taispeaking people in Southeast Asia, there has been little or no change in the way the word and concept is used. Elsewhere, however, khwan is lexically and culturally re-defined to be consistent with contemporary psychology, or simply ignored as an outdated word and concept. It is a good example of the stages involved in the secularization of a religious term. It is our hope that these essays will provide both data and ideas worthy of further reflection. Given the crucial importance of the place of religion and tradition in Southeast Asian culture, any understanding of their ongoing role in this era of change and development is encouraged. I want to thank in particular the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies for their help in the preparation of this manuscript, and my colleague Judith Nagata for her editorial assistance. Thanks are due also to Mrs Christine Hughes and Messrs Jess Boudreau and Bev Keddy for their work in word-processing. I also wish to acknowledge the generous outreach of Acadia University, which helped fund the initial steps of preparing this manuscript for publication. Finally, it should be noted that the references and bibliographies in the assembled papers are not necessarily consistent in style. They are set down in the manner originally submitted by each author.

MAX WEBER'S HERITAGE AND MODERN SOUTHEAST ASIAN THINKING ON DEVELOPMENT

Andreas Buss

The Fate of the "Weber Thesis" in Asia There has been a relatively negative reaction in Asia to Max Weber's studies on Indian, Buddhist and Chinese religions and to his scattered remarks about Islam. As Weber was a Westerner and lived and wrote during a time when colonialism still flourished, it has been assumed as obvious that he was a defender of Western capitalism and proud of that capitalist spirit to which the Protestant ethic has contributed so much. His studies on the world religions have even been seen as an implicit defence of colonialism, imperialism, or simply the dominance of the West. But few are those who have read Weber's studies on India and China within the context to which they belong, namely the "Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion", and who have interpreted them in the light of the "Prefatory Note", the "Introduction" and the "Intermediate Reflection", essential parts of the "Collected Essays". Weber never attempted anything like a monograph on India or China. His studies intentionally emphasize only the elements in which other cultures differ from Western civilization. They are "oriented to the problems which seem important for the understanding of Western civilization" (Weber 1930, p. 27), its form of rationalism and its origins. Nor was it Weber's intention to prove the other-worldliness of Asian religions in order to validate his thesis about Western Protestantism, as has often been suggested.

Andreas Buss

5

While Weber's studies dealt with the purely historical question of the absence of the modern Western spirit of capitalism in Asia (contemporary conditions were mentioned only incidentally), his purpose was much more profound. According to the expertise of F. Tenbruck (1980), Weber was interested in the more general question of how rationality develops and evolves at the confluence of ideas and interests. We can therefore say that one of the major intentions of Weber was to produce a "typology and a sociology of rationalism" (Gerth and Mills 1948, p. 324), to confront the various types of rationalization produced by India, China, Islam and the West, and to show why a certain kind of rationalization, of which one can find embryonic stages elsewhere, has developed mainly in the West. This certainly does not mean that he considered non-Western societies as irrational. It is instructive to read the reactions and comments of many Indian, Buddhist, Chinese and Muslim authors in this regard. They seem to have felt that they must either refute what they believed to be the "Weber thesis", or accept underdevelopment and stagnation for many years to come. Some of them, finally, perhaps under the influence of American functionalist interpretations of Weber's oeuvre, have tried to point to functional equivalents of the Protestant ethic, or to capitalist "strands" in their own countries and cultures. On the whole, it may be said that some authors accepted Weber's theory-and then tried to show that he missed some facts (e.g. capitalistic "strands" in Asia), while others accepted Weber's facts, but tried to prove wrong what they thought to be his theory. 1 Weber himself never addressed the issues of industrializing and modernizing "underdeveloped" countries, at least not directly. While many Asian (and Western) authors have tried to prove that there is a potential for capitalist development in their region-in some regions proofs are obviously not necessary any longer-Weber would not have denied that possibility. Predictions of trends were abhorred by him; more than anyone else he foresaw the possibility of unexpected consequences of historical phenomena and actions, and he would not have tried to predict a future of any kind. Moreover, he clearly accepted the theoretical possibility of transplanting the capitalist system (although perhaps not the "capitalist spirit" as he understood it) to Asia: The Chinese in all probability would be quite capable, probably more capable than the Japanese, of assimilating capitalism which has technically and economically been fully developed in the modern culture area (Weber 1951, p. 248).

6

Max Weber's Herilage

In India, he saw more difficulties, although he did not deny the possibility of transplanting the system: It is quite evident that no community dominated by inner powers of this sort (caste system, etc.) could out of its substance arrive at the "spirit of capitalism". Even the take-over of the economically and technically finished form as an artifact, as occurred in Japan, encountered clearly and undoubtedly greater difficulties than in Japan, despite the English domination. 2

A Southeast Asian Interpreter of Weber: S.H. Alatas

A Southeast Asian critique of Weber has been provided by S.H. Alatas who, in an article entitled "The Weber Thesis and South-East Asia" has tried to use Southeast Asian examples in order to correct the so-called "Weber-thesis". In an introductory chapter, Alatas tries to establish that Weber not merely wished to have the Protestant ethic included among the conditions of modern capitalism, as most of his interpreters have suggested, but that he considered it as the decisive and significant condition. However, this is a rather questionable point, for Weber has clearly stated that he considered the professional ethic to be only one constitutive part of the capitalist spirit, that he considered it foolish to deduct the capitalist spirit out of the Reformation alone, and, finally, that the capitalist spirit is not the sole cause of capitalism (Weber 1978, p. 285). Alatas also tries to show, in response to Fischoff and others, that for Weber the relationship between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism was not merely one of congruence, but of causation. Alatas then suggests that Weber appealed to Asian history in order to show that modern capitalism did not develop independently in Asia primarily because of the restraining influence of religion (the caste system in India, the "other-worldliness" of Buddhism, the acceptance of Confucianism in China). What Weber said about Islam, although particularly relevant in the context of Alatas' paper, is left unmentioned: according to Turner, Weber stressed that mainly the patrimonial nature of Muslim political institutions precluded the emergence of the preconditions of capitalism. 3 While Weber attributed the emergence of modern capitalism in contemporary Asia to Western influence, Alatas' main objective is to show that the spirit of capitalism can rise in Asia from within itself ( 1963, p. 28). The Islamic ethic, according to him, demands honesty in dealing, hard work, frugality and rational calculation. But let us note that those who have tried to show that Islamic or

Andreas Buss

7

Hindu or Confucian ethics are able to further a spirit of capitalism, have not seen that Weber was only to a very limited extent concerned with the official ethics of religions. If one wishes to study at all the influence of a religion on life, one must distinguish between its official teachings and a certain sort of actual procedure upon which in reality, perhaps against its own will, it places a premium (Weber 1981, p. 364).

Weber provided an example from Egypt: The most important prescriptions of Egyptian ethics were futile when, by laying a scarab on the region of the heart, one could prepare the dead man to successfully conceal the sins committed and deceive the judge of the dead (Ibid.).

Moreover, rational calculation, frugality and specialization may well exist independently of the capitalist spirit, but will then lack coherent unity (Weber 1978, p. 297). This was also the conclusion which Weber drew with regard to Confucianism, which, although rational, did not produce, in the last analysis, the spirit of the vocational man: "Mere sobriety and thriftiness combined with acquisitiveness and regard for wealth'' are ''far from representing and far from releasing the 'capitalist spirit' in the sense that this is found in the vocational man of the modern economy" (Weber 1951, p. 247).

As an example for his thesis that the spirit of capitalism can rise in Asia from within itself, Alatas mentions certain Muslim traders and small industrialists. If the capitalist spirit is closely tied up with the religious attitude, he says, we can expect a uniform pattern of expression among Muslims of common schools and mystical interests. But this is, according to Alatas, not the case. In Malaysia there are, for instance, important differences between Malay Muslims and Indian Muslims engaged in business, with regard to their "capitalist spirit", although both belong to the same religion, the same school of thought, and share a common interest in mysticism. Apparently, what is decisive here are not religious, but other factors, and he mentions in particular the "emigrant" spirit. If in Asia, Alatas concludes, capitalism has appeared without the stimulus of religion, perhaps in Europe the Protestant spirit was not very decisive either. As so many others before him, Alatas has tried to demonstrate that the spirit of capitalism can rise in Asia itself, and that at least in some cases religious factors are not decisive. It is not necessary here to discuss Alatas' conclusion as such, but one must note the total absence in his paper of any realization that capitalism and a capitalistic spirit (not to mention the so-called "acquisitive drive") may exist independently of each other. A capitalistic spirit may well appear somewhere without

8

Max Weber's Heritage

producing capitalism-and capitalism may well exist without its spirit, like an army without a militaristic spirit, "as a fatalistically accepted necessity or as some kind of optimal means to achieve the relatively best end in the relatively best of all worlds" (Weber 1978, p. 297). In this case, however, Weber added, it does not appear to serious people as an expression of a style of life founded on the unity of the personality. This, in turn, would not be of negligible importance for its position in the total culture and for its future (Ibid., p. 297). Equally important, though, is the absence in Alatas' paper of a clear conception of the term "capitalism", and of its implications. Did he find just "capitalism" among certain Muslims, or did he find modern Western capitalism or its "spirit"? The "Weber thesis" is treated in isolation and is not integrated into a sociology of rationalism, or into the global outlook which Weber himself gave to his studies on Asian religions.

Weber's Attitude towards Capitalism It has been suggested that for Weber, modern capitalism could have developed independently of Calvinism because it was also conditioned by several other factors (Freund 1968, p. 10). However, the absence of this particular ethic would have given it another typical form, another face. Alatas may therefore be quite correct in suggesting that in some areas of Southeast' Asia, capitalism has developed independently without the benefit of a Protestant ethic-but is it "modern rational capitalism"? Weber never questioned the existence of an acquisitive drive among Asia's merchants and tradesmen; indeed, the Indian or Chinese merchant or artisan might well have more acquisitive drive than the Western Protestant. Throughout his oeuvre, mention is made of the most obvious kinds of capitalism to be found in various cultures and times (e.g. political capitalism, of which colonial and speculative capitalism are frequent examples, monopolistic capitalism, robber capitalism, adventurist capitalism, slave capitalism, "tax farming", money lending, etc.). Numerous kinds of capitalism exist even today. They simply reflect the attitude which is common to most merchants anywhere: the will and the ability to use ruthlessly any chance of gain. Economic success and profit maximization are often achieved by means of raising prices (bargaining) rather than by means of lowering costs, as would be necessary for successful industrial entrepreneurship. "Monastic capitalism" is found even today in Sri Lanka (Evers 1969). Capitalism, said Max Weber, is simply the provision for the needs of a group by the method of enterprise, irrespective of what needs are

Andreas Buss

9

involved. Today, for instance, our everyday needs are supplied capitalistically. Our political needs, however, are met through compulsory contributions (i.e. military service). This has often not been the case in the past. Modern Western capitalism, on the other hand, is characterized, according to Weber, by 1. 2.

a rational organization of labour and a lifting of the barrier between the internal economy (of clans, tribes, groups, etc.) and the external economy, of internal and external ethics, and the entry of the commercial principle into the internal economy (1981, p. 312).

As a consequence, there has appeared (not only in modern Western capitalism but also in the economic systems which are its children, e.g. socialism) what may be called the reign of impersonal relationships or, as Weber said, "unbrotherliness". Even in Western history there was a great amount of antipathyfor instance, in Roman Catholic ethics-to capitalist tendencies, resting precisely on the repugnance of the impersonality of relations within a capitalist economy. In the "Intermediate Reflection", Weber described the tensions which normally appear between a religion and the various aspects of culture. On the relationship between rational economics and religion, he said: Rational economy is a functional 4 organization oriented to money prices which originate in the interest struggles of men in the market .... Money is the most abstract and "impersonal"' element that exists in human life. The more the world of modern capitalist economy follows its own immanent laws, the less accessible it is to any imaginable relationship with a religious ethic of brotherliness (Gerth and Mills 1948,

p. 331). There exists, therefore, according to Weber, this necessary tension between "salvation religions" and what he called "the modern unbrotherly economic powers". If one tried to bridge the tension, he continued, "the results would be the same as those we have come to know from China, namely stifling formal rationality. For in China, formal rationality and substantive rationality were in conflict". In Weber's terminology, formal rationality refers to the degree to which conduct is organized according to rationally calculable principles, while substantive rationality refers to the furtherance of definitive goals or values. Weber perceived a tension or a conflict between "formal" and "substantive" rationality and also admitted that "formal rationality" contradicts some of the most distinctive values of Western civilization. Weber would not have dreamed of using Western society as an

10

Max Weber's Heritage

example for the East because of his ambivalent attitude toward capitalism, science and Western society in general. Rather than being a modernization theorist and being preoccupied by underdevelopment, he dreaded the implications of too much development in the West. He viewed contemporary Western civilization as diseased, a dead-end street or an iron cage without escape, which suffocates the individual and which certainly does not have anything to offer to other civilizations. He regretted the lack of brotherliness in modern Western society, and noted the practical impossibility therein to lead the life of a Buddha or Jesus (Gerth and Mills 1948, p. 357). He foresaw the possibility of mechanized petrification because religious ascetism, which had contributed to the making of the spirit of the Western world, had left the "iron cage". In its place he saw the appearance of a pessimistic, though by no means ascetic, view of the world-such as that portrayed by Mandeville's "Fable of the Bees". Even science, he thought, may be trapped in an "iron cage" of its own making from which there is no escape, because the disenchantment of the world has reached science itself: no longer can it provide meaning. In principle, the empirical as well as the mathematically oriented view of the world develop refutations of every intellectual approach which in any way asks for a meaning of inner-worldly occurrences (Gerth and Mills 1948, p. 351). And finally, he lashed out against the results of modern Western development: For the last stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart, this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved (1930, p. 182). In this context, Weber's thoughts about progress are revealing. What is really meant, he asked, when we designate a series of events as "rational progress"? "There is a recurrence here of the widespread confusion of the three following meanings of the term 'progress': merely progressive differentiation, progress of technical rationality in the utilization of means and, finally, increase in value" (1949, p. 34). It is difficult and dangerous, Weber believed, to talk of progress in the utilization of means unless one can take a specified condition as a standard. On the other hand, if one wants to talk of progress in the sense of an increase in value, one must consider, he believed, the influence of technical rationalizations on all exterior and interior conditions of life. 5 Also revealing are Weber's comments on the happiness of the Indians around Salt Lake compared to that of the Mormons who

Andreas Buss

11

displaced them from there-or his remark on the more direct knowledge which primitive people have of their tools and of obtaining food (Freund

1968, p. 24). While Weber regretted the tragic consequences of Western development, he was very much intrigued by Tolstoy's ethic of ultimate ends and by his pacifism. Weber himself had chosen an ethic of responsibility, the "demands of the day" within the "iron cage". But in her biography of Weber, his wife Marianne mentioned the frequent discussions at their home about Tolstoy's consistency, especially on his teaching of love and brotherhood. The modern capitalist system has now been transplanted to a much larger extent in Asia than was the case in Weber's time; it has to co-exist with various traditional Asian attitudes (Chinese, Buddhist, Islamic, etc.), towards economic activity and, in dual economies, with other kinds of economic systems. The last twenty-five years have been dominated by what D. Kantowsky has called "the modern theodicy of development". He meant that in many non-Western societies in Asia and elsewhere the Westernized elites have tried to explain and to justify their own affluence by a development concept which implies that the less well-off are simply backward, behind schedule or "en vole de developpemenl" who will "take off" and "catch up". Western development concepts and policies, which are completely new to these countries because even the idea of development itself was developed in the West, were thus introduced because, as Weber said, The fortunate is seldom satisfied with the fact of being fortunate. Beyond this he needs to know that he has a right to his good fortune: he wants to be convinced that he deserves it in comparison with others .... Good fortune thus wants to be legitimate fortune (Gerth and Mills 1948, p. 271 ). But that the path of development will and should be the same for all societies, has come to be doubted, and in many countries, "progress" is not considered to be a self-justifying process any more; many unexpected consequences of development have been noticed; many observations made by Max Weber have been repeated in recent years: the tension between traditional values and rational economic activity, the unbrotherliness of economic society, the "mechanized petrification" of life in the bureaucratic state, the refutation of meaning and the specialization without spirit and heart. With regard to the last point, Alatas has written: There are specialists, technicians and modern educated people in Asia. Their number is growing rapidly. But the number of thinkers who could

12

Max Weber's Heritage

pave the way for the future of Asian civilizations is too small .... The Asian thinkers, if they are to fulfill their role in the intellectual and spiritual leadership of Asian societies, will have to point to an alternative direction of development (1972, p. 137).

If we limit our consideration to the Chinese, there will appear to be a definitive change from the traditional Confucian situation which Max Weber has described in the following passage: ... the "cultured man" (gentleman) was "not a tool"; that is, in his adjustment to the world and in his self-perfection he was an end unto himself, not a means for any functional end. This core of Confucian ethics rejected professional specialization, modern expert bureaucracy, and special training; above all, it rejected training in economics for the pursuit of profit (Weber 1951, p. 246).

Perhaps it is the lack of "elective affinity" between the Confucian ideal of the gentleman and modern specialized professionalism which causes anomie and, for instance in Singapore, frequent conversions of professionals to religious denominations which are closer to the "spirit" of capitalism. At the same time, there seems to be a general consensus as to the main unexpected and undesired consequences of economic development. While Weber felt that the modern capitalistic system is like an iron cage, particularly in its bureaucratic aspects, limiting freedom and individualism (he was very Western in this respect), many Asians are less concerned about individualism and freedom, but seem to feel that modern development is responsible for a decline in morals and traditions. The perceived deterioration of moral standards is supposedly totally due to modernization and industrialization. Consequently, a policy of moral education has been introduced in the schools of Singapore, where formerly only science and technology were stressed. Elsewhere, there is a new emphasis on the indigenous languages and, particularly in Buddhist countries, development models based on Buddhist traditional concepts have been implemented. Furnivall has advanced the theory that in plural societies-which, according to him, tend to lack a common will-there is materialism, rationalism, individualism and a concentration on economic ends far more complete and absolute than in homogeneous Western lands. And, "as each community tends to organize for production rather than for social life, cultural as well as moral standards deteriorate" (Evers 1980, pp. 3-4). It is interesting to note that this theory is hardly ever discussed now. An issue today is whether and how Asian morals and traditions can be retained in this era of rational development, either separately as a

Andreas Buss

13

Chinese or Islamic "spirit" within a capitalist (or socialist) system, or as a synthesis of several Asian "spirits", perhaps similar to Asoka's dhamma which was, not too successfully, introduced in India more than two thousand years ago. Three responses to the moral challenge of development are theoretically possible: 1. a complete retreat to traditional values, combined with total rejection of the capitalist system; 2. a compromise, where the capitalist system is accepted together with an insistence on Asian values; 3. the capitalist system is accepted together with the technico-scientific spirit, leaving only reduced room for Asian values and traditions. Subsequently, examples for these three possible responses will be described and analysed. The saruodaya movement and Chen's and Vente's articles will be analysed as representatives of the three basic choice categories although nothing is implied about their success in political, social or academic terms.

Development on the Basis of Indigenous Culture In a recent paper on Sri Lanka, one finds the following passage: What is necessary are radical alternatives to the Western model of economic development. This is the only escape from the continuing dependence of the World Bank, the IMF and other suppliers of credit .... One might ask whether it is really necessary to be bound by the Western conception of the good life which is measured in terms of maximizing consumption and the endless multiplication of wants. Instead, it may well be more practicable and desirable in the long run to build on Sri Lanka's Buddhist ethos with its ideological stress on minimal consumption and simple non-ostentatious living (Fernando 1979, pp. 74-75).

One could think of the saruodaya movement as an example of the proposed alternative. 6 Saruodaya is a non-profit community education cum development movement of mostly volunteer staff addressing itself to the rural population of Sri Lanka. It stresses low capital investment and high labour input. Saruodaya 's ideology has both material and spiritual aspects. The main aims of the movement are not material development targets as such but the transformation of the individual, the "fulfilment of man". On the material level, saruodaya workers help to dig wells, set up pre-schools, build community kitchens, etc. But saruodaya does not wish to be simply an agency for the improvement of the quality of life of the peasants through technical advice or capital investments; it wants people to realize the "true nature of things".

14

Max Weber's Heritage

Saruodaya volunteer workers share their time and energy in physical work to construct a well or organize a co-operative, but they also share their thoughts in cultural activities and wish to raise the peasants to a higher level of awareness. The movement may have a Utopian message, but it is certainly not irrelevant that peasants do participate in the definition of their situation and are able to keep their pattern of meaning. There is the idea that human suffering will not be overcome by material means alone and that a self-sufficient economy based on simple primary needs may be a precondition to fuller self-reliance. On the whole it may be said that saruodaya is based on a Buddhist definition of personality and on the traditional model of society, diametrically opposed to what Max Weber called the "unbrotherliness" of modern rational economic life. The individual is integrated into the larger whole of the community, and there is voluntary co-operative work and some stress on autarchy. Economic considerations, while certainly not absent, are not predominant. How is the saruodaya movement to be evaluated in Weberian terms? Weber distinguished between economic systems which are formally rational and economic systems of substantive rationality (which apply certain criteria of ultimate ends). In addition he noted that, quite independently, it is possible to judge from an ethical, ascetic or aesthetic point of view the spirit of economic activity as well as the instruments of economic activity (Weber 1968, Vol. 1, p. 86). Certainly, it is not incorrect to say that the saruoda!:Ja concept stresses a certain Buddhist spirit of economic activity and, to a lesser extent, a certain substantive rationality, while eliminating formal rationality with its potential indifference towards brotherliness. We have already noted that Weber was impressed by Tolstoy's consistency in pursuing an ethic of ultimate ends, his teaching of love and brotherhood. In the short article "Between Two Ethics" (1958b) he said: "Whoever takes only one penny of interest which others-directly or indirectly-have to pay, whoever owns a commodity or eats any food produced with another person's sweat, lives off the machinery of that loveless and pitiless economic struggle for existence which bourgeois phraseology tends to call 'peaceful civilization'." Millions, Weber added, are crippled, physically and spiritually, every year in this struggle of man against man. The ethics of conviction and the altruism of saruodaya would probably have appeared as impressive and consistent to Weber. Nevertheless, such economic systems are, in his opinion, acceptable or desirable only for smaller countries, while rational capitalism (or socialism) is in our times unavoidable for larger states, in spite of the fact that it often stifles "democracy" and "liberty". With regard to

Andreas Buss

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Germany, he wrote that it was not an anti-capitalistic policy of selfsufficient "retreat" but rather a decisive pursuit of the consequences of commercial development that was the only possible economic policy in an age of capitalism (1958b, p. 31 ). He believed that large national entities have more duties than smaller ones. "An economic policy of agrarian autarchy and feudalism would not only be Utopian, but dangerous for the national existence of Germany if it wanted to be a power-state (Machlslaat) and lead a national existence different from that of, for instance, Switzerland (Mommsen 1974, p. 97). For powerstates, he thought, determine the character of the civilization of the future. Naturally, he noted, "this does not mean that a small people (small numerically or in power) is 'worth' less or is less 'important' in the court of history. But such a people has less duties and therefore different cultural possibilities" (1958b, p. 142).

The Best of Two Worlds Sometimes it is assumed that technical and economic progress is simply a means to an end and that it hardly affects the culture in which it occurs. Many leaders of developing nations believe that they can achieve Western-style progress and at the same time retain their culture and their morals or, at the least, most of the essential parts of them, thus avoiding individualism, anomie and any other drawbacks of Western social life. Peter Chen (1977) starts his analysis of these issues with a distinction between development, industrialization and modernization, and suggests that it is possible to have one without the other. Adopting the analytical tools of Bendix and others, he notes that it is possible to industrialize without modernization or, on the other hand, to modernize without industrialization. Industrialization here refers to technicaleconomic changes, and modernization to socio-political changes. Particularly noteworthy is Chen's belief that, although industrialization involves the adoption of Western technology, it may or may not be accompanied by Western values. Chen's initial question is the following: "To what extent and in what ways can we in Southeast Asia retain some of our traditional past in the course of modernization?" (Chen 1977, p. 22). Singapore is, according to him, in a transition period from low modernization and high industrialization to a social type where both industrialization and modernization are "high". Chen then describes what he considers some important Asian values: the group spirit and a paternalistic employeremployee relationship which is not based on calculation of monetary

16

Max Weber's Heritage

remuneration, mutual assistance and community life, cohesive family life, friendship patterns and a normative ideology in the sciences. 7 In his conclusion, Chen simply states: "In the process of modernization, it may not be necessary that one adopts all the modern values which are, in many cases, Western values; certain elements of Asian values should also be retained." Although Chen does not directly say so, there seems to be the idea of an opposition of Eastern and Western values, the former being acceptable and the latter perceived as possibly decadent and open to rejection. There also seems to be the idea that Western technology can be borrowed without taking Western culture, or at least what Marx called its mode of production (the social relations of production). Cultures are thought to be divisible into several independent parts. How this can be done is not discussed, but in any case, Chen seems to believe that it is possible to reach out to the best of both worlds. The question of Asian values is obviously problematic. It is interesting to note that certain kinds of Asian values are often said to be desirable while other equally Asian values are ignored (for instance those which imply no privacy and no individual rights). The values stressed by Chen may be termed "brotherly" in the Weberian sense. They are opposed to the unbrotherliness of the dominance of rational economic activity (which, according to Weber, lifts the barrier between internal and external economy and of internal and external ethics), and are not fundamentally different from the corresponding Western values of the past. The question remains, though, how a certain lack of elective affinity between Chen's Asian (brotherly) spirit and the (unbrotherly) capitalist or socialist systems can be resolved.

The Total Technological World-view Is the reliance on industrialization, technology and science-so often necessary for survival-nothing but a means to an end? Vente (1980) analyses some traditional Asian values (group coherence, decision· making by consensus, respect of the elders) and finds that in almost all areas where change does not constitute a precondition for industrialization, change nevertheless did occur in Asian countries and very much along the same lines as in the West (Ibid., p. 96). Vente theorizes that science and technology are much more than the mere instruments they were expected to be; they cannot be just borrowed or bought. They have, rather, to be learned, digested and internalized. They are a whole system of explanation, of establishing truth-very different from the "old" sciences of philosophy and religion.

Andreas Buss

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Therefore, the eventual success of technical learning depends on an attendant cultural learning: changes have to occur in the minds of people to make them accept the new scientific world-view; to perceive nature as not having an end in itself; or to constantly doubt instead of accepting authority; or to accept a proposition as true until it has been falsified. Therefore, the success of technical learning is to a large extent determined by an attendant cultural learning. What is more, the distinct new world-view does not manifest itself in science and technology alone, but can also be discovered in seemingly unconnected areas like positive law, and a modern government and bureaucracy where traditional ascriptions, hierarchies and authorities are replaced by objective standards and decision making. Only if technical thinking (technical being understood in a wider sense) has invaded the whole social system, says Vente, can the scientific sub-system be more than an island with little impact on the surroundings. Science and technology must become the culture itself; the technical world-view must penetrate other subsystems of society (government, law, economy), and cultural learning, while procuring norms, has to adapt to the new challenge. Just going back to traditional norms will be futile. It is faulty to assume, says Vente, that educational policies can be based on a concept of "having the best of both worlds"-Western technology and Asian culture. Only if developing countries realize that industrialization and science are much more than simply a means to an end, will they be able to retain parts of their own culture. For Vente, cultural learning is the leaven which must further the totally new scientific world-view. But at the same time it is supposed to be the barrier which must prevent the "almost irrational dominance of a just technical rationality". This irrational dominance reveals itself in the fact that highly rational means are often applied to irrationally selected goals, or that economic development is often defined by what can be achieved through science and technology-not the other way around. Another drawback of science and technology is, according to Vente (and Weber), that they do not answer some of the most important questions man stubbornly continues to ask, such as the meanings of life and death, love and beauty. Vente is close to Weber in another sense. Weber analysed the processes and forms of rationalization in all sectors and activities of Western culture, not only in science and technology, but also in administration, commerce, law and even music. He then confronted them with the equally existing phenomena of irrationalism. But while for Weber this was a specifically Western development (of which he dreaded the consequences, as we have seen), Vente seems to believe

18

Max Weber's Heritage

that all cultures which wish to develop economically and scientifically, must submit to total rationalization of the same kind. Are there no specific Asian developments possible? It should not be forgotten that the process of rationalization (the concept which Max Weber applied to the history of Western civilization) was an ideal type, a heuristic concept, and not an iron law. The continuous eruption of irrationalities and the tension between different kinds of rationalities was only too obvious to him. Therefore, if with the introduction of Western science and technology, a process of rationalization has set in in Asia, it may also be assumed that the actual development will nevertheless contain tensions and irrationalities. Vente seems to assume a basic difference in modes of thought between Western scientific and non·Western societies. But, in spite of Levy·Bruhl's claim that there is a great divide between Western and other modes of thought, and in spite of Horton's belief in the "openness" of science and in the "closeness" of savage thought, it seems today that the differences are relative and quantitative rather than absolute and qualitative. There exist several spheres even in Western culture, each with its somewhat autonomous system of rules of thought: religion, science and art may serve as examples. Y. Elkana, in his reflections on the work of Horton, notes that there is no "savage mind" in a pure form just as there is no "modern mind" in a pure form, shared by all moderns. Recent studies of the seventeenth century have demonstrated the complexity of the issue and the fact that the so·called positive science of those times cannot be disentangled from the other intellectual activities. Neither can the persons who indulged in alchemy, magic, astrology, etc., be distinguished sharply from those who produced proper science (Eikana 1977, p. 169). Elkana thinks (and in this he has been supported by empirical studies), that evolution does not entail the total disappearance of old traits with the emergence of new ones, but consists in the continued presence of all cognitive ingredients with changing emphases among them. Only the future will tell what these new emphases will be in Asia.

Conclusion It has been assumed in this paper that Max Weber's oeuvre, and particularly his "Collected Essays in the Sociology of Religion", can significantly contribute to the discussion on development in Asia today. As Weber perceived different kinds of capitalism in various parts of the world and in history, different kinds of development have appeared and are likely to appear in different cultural settings today.

Andreas Buss

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Instead of arguing about the mostly rather misunderstood "Weber thesis", the discussion on development in Asia might perhaps: 1.

2.

take notice of Weber's distinction between various kinds of capitalism and, more importantly, of his distinction between a capitalist system and its spirit; take notice of Weber's critique of capitalism which he conceived of as an "iron cage", and of his carefully conceived concept of progress.

The distinctions and critiques made by Weber have been used in this paper to analyse some modern thought on industrialization, modernization and development in Southeast Asia. It is possible to say that modernization and industrialization may happen on the level of the "system" or on the level of "spirit", or there may be various Asian economic "spirits" combined with the Western system: and this is perhaps what gives a particular flavour to new developments in Asia today.

NOTES

2

3

This has been shown conclusively by D. Kantowsky in a paper on Indian interpretations of Weber ("Max Weber on India and Indian Interpretations of Max Weber", delivered in London, 1981 ). As an example of the difficulties English readers of Weber have to contend with, let us note that the Introduction of the "Economic Ethic of the World Religions", which is a part of the "Collected Essays", has been published under the title The Social Psychology of World Religions, and the "Intermediate Reflection" as Religious R~ections of the World and their Directions, both by Gerth and Mills (1947). This is my translation of the relevant passage of the German text of Max Weber's Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Religionssoziologie II (Hinduismuss und Buddhismuss), p. 359. The English translation in M. Weber, The Religion of India ( 1958) by Gerth and Matindale, p. 325, is plainly incorrect. In particular the statement: "It was also unable to take over the economic and technically finished form as an artifact ... " simply does not appear in the German text. Here is an example of the reasons why Weber has been misinterpreted in Asia for so long. "I hope to show that, for Weber, it was the patrimonial nature of Muslim political institutions which precluded the emergence of capitalist preconditions, namely rational law, a free labour market, autonomous cities, a market economy and a bourgeois class. When Weber attempted to show that, in addition, Islam as a religion of warriors produced an ethic which was incompatible with the "spirit of capitalism", "he was hopelessly incorrect". B.C. Turner, Weber on Islam (London: 1974), p. 2.

Max Weber's Heritage

20 4

5

6

7

"Functional" is a "functionalist" translation of the German word sach/ich, which normally means "unbiased" or "objective". Here is the complete statement on economic progress: "We may speak of 'economic progress' towards a relative optimum of want satisfaction under conditions of given resources-if it is assumed that there are given wants, that all these wants and their rank order are accepted, and that finally a given type of economic order exists-and with the reservation that preferences regarding the duration, certainty and exhaustiveness, respectively, of the satisfaction of these wants may often conflict with each other." Max Weber, On the Methodology of the Social Sciences (London, 1949), p. 35. A detailed description of the sarvodaya movement, starting with its origins in Gandhian thought, can be found in D. Kantowsky, Sarvodaya, the Other Development (New Delhi, 1980). The proposal of a normative ideology in the sciences in Asia is obviously very anti·Weberian, given Weber's insistence on value·neutrality. It is also a dangerous proposal because it could easily lead to the conception that Chinese science should be different from Indian science, and both again different from Malay science etc., a kind of cultural solipsism which challenges the universal validity of science. Weber and others have pointed out, however, that the conditions under which a science develops are one thing, and that the objective status of its discoveries or statements is quite another thing. The social sciences in particular should be alert to a certain obscurantism which believes that a universal language of the (social) sciences is impossible, that cultures cannot communicate. After all, cultures must communicate today, and science is not one of the least means of doing so.

REFERENCES Alatas, S.H. "The Weber Thesis and Southeast-Asia". Archiv. Social Relations 8(1963). ___ . Modernization and Social Change. Sydney, 1972. Chen, P.S.J. "Asian Values and Modernization: A Sociological Perspective". In Asian Values and Modernization, edited by Seah Chee-Meow. Singapore, 1977b. Elkana, Y. The Distinctiveness and Universality of Science: Reflections on the Work of Professor Robin Horton, 15, no. 2 (Minerva, 1977). Evers, ed. Sociology of Southeast Asia. Oxford, 1980. - - - · "Monastic Landlordism in Ceylon". Journal of Asian Studies 28, no. 4 (August 1969). Fernando, T. Goals and Means in Contemporary Sri Lanka, Contributions to Asian Studies, VoL 14 (1979). Freund, J. "L'ethique economique et les religions mondiales". Archiv. Social. Religions 26 ( 1968). Gerth and Mills, ed. From Max Weber-Essays in Sociology. London, 1947.

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21

Kantowsky, D. "Max Weber on India and Indian Interpretations of Max Weber". Paper read in London, 1981. Mommsen, W.J. Max Weber und die deutsche Politik, 2nd ed. Tubingen, 1974. Tenbruck, F. "The Problem of Thematic Unity in the Works of Max Weber". British Journal of Sociology 31 ( 1980). Turner, B.C. Weber on Islam. London, 1974. Vente, R.E. Culture and Industrialization: An Asian Dilemma. Singapore, 1980. Vente, R.E. et al. Cultural Heritage Versus Technological Development. Singapore, 1981. Weber, Marianne. Max Weber: A Biography. New York, 1975. Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London, 1930. ___ . On the Methodology of the Social Sciences. New York, 1949. _ _ .The Religion of China. New York, 1951. _ _ . The Religion of India. New York, 1958a. ___ . Gesammelte Politische Schriften. Tubingen, 1958b. ___ .Economy and Society. New York, 1968. ___ . Kritiken und Antikritiken-Die protestantische. Ethik II, 1978. ___ . General Economic History. London, 1981.

THE USE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Lakshman Marasinghe

The Role of Customary Law in the Process of Development: Experiences from Indonesia and Thailand

It is important to emphasize at the outset that "customary law" is not, in the Austinian context, merely "Jaw" in the nature of a body of rules ordained by a political superior for the purposes of determining and regulating the activities of political subordinates. 1 Customary law in essence is a reflection of the social, cultural and the religious "compact" of a group of people-in effect their Volksgeist. 2 Viewed in this way, the customary law of a given society finds its legitimacy from the internalized social forces rather than being the product of some external impositions by a conqueror. In spite of external impositions by conquerors, studies conducted by some 3 have established the view that customary law in this sense has persisted despite the conquests:

Law arose out of customs which grew up in a given race. If the race changed its place of abode, it carried its law with it. When isolated members of that race left their own realm, they continued to be governed by their own law. In other words, personality of law obtained at first. The conquered retained their laws, at least as between themselves, so long as they were not unfavourable to the conqueror. They did not adopt those of the conqueror. The foreigner, too, preserved his law. That of the land where he resided for the time being, as on a voyage, could not be used against him. 4 Customary law primarily provides a given social group with its cohesive elements. Based upon the religious, cultural and mythical

Lakshman Marasinghe

23

underpinnings of a given society, customary law provides a given social group with a reason for convergence rather than a stimulus for divergence. The imposed law of a conqueror does not, as a rule, take into consideration the rituals, the folk-lore, the sacred tales, the myths, the moral deeds, the peculiar social organizations 5 or their peculiar attitudes to harm, injuries and losses6 of a social group. To that extent, the divergence between the imposed law and its legal traditions, and the social group subject to those laws and its legal traditions, could constitute a very real hindrance to the effective administration of justice according to the wishes and the norms of the conqueror. The tension that must necessarily arise out of such incongruencies prevailing between the laws of the conqueror and the views and the attitudes of the conquered may be the path to social decay. Any supposed or real threat to the stability of the political order of a conqueror, as a rule, could result in the enactment of laws of increasing severity to suppress those destabilizing forces. The history of colonialism has been studded with numerous examples of such occurrences. This paper deals with the role of customary law in development, with particular reference to Indonesia and Thailand. The choice of Indonesia is self.explanatory. That country has had a distinct colonial past, having once been a Dutch colony. Thailand, however, has been free from colonial vicissitudes. The choice of Thailand was made to show the extent to which that country had advanced in recognizing the role of customary law as an element in the formula for development. The role of customary law in development requires restating. The restatement must begin with the supposition that development in its essence must be goal orientated. The goals towards which a given society finds itself motivated, or even compelled, to move, must be determined with reference to its internal needs, desires and aspirations. Such a determination must take into consideration the cultural, ethnic, religious and many other considerations peculiar to a given community which appear to be responsible in holding the individuals together. R.M. Unger, having explored some of the major doctrines of social order, wrote: If each of these doctrines is most appropriate to a particular kind of society, one should also expect to find that the character of law changes from one form of social life to another. Each society reveals through its law the innermost secrets of the manner in which it holds men together. 7

To the extent to which one believes that law should, at least from a functional standpoint, be the reflection of the spirit of the people in a given society, the role of customary law in development becomes a

24

The Use of Customary Law in Development

"very real one". 8 For others, development is but a euphemism for "social change" .9 Another euphemism under which development is often paraded is "modernization". 10 Whichever epithet one uses, development involves the introduction of a stimulus for change in a given society. The stimulus may operate on any number of social levels, depending on the type of stimulus utilized. Changes at the economic level may be brought about by radical changes introduced into the economic base of a given society. But that may sometimes affect a society's cultural or moral "underpinnings". One stimulus may come from multinational companies backed, for example, by the International Monetary Fund. Another may arise out of a recognized and wellorchestrated missionary enterprise. One might affect the economic or cultural "underpinnings", while the other might affect the education or the health of a society. In either case, certain fundamental assumptions of the society must "approve" these stimuli. If the latter appear to run counter to some of the basic religious, cultural or moral assumptions of a given society, then the external stimuli aimed at "change", "development" or "modernization" could surely become blunted and spent. It is in this determination as to the choice of the stimulus and the identification of the nature of the change that customary law, which is part of the Volksgeist, could become relevant and important. Customary law, as any positive law, could determine the choice of the stimuli and pre-ordain the goals that the process of "change", "development" or "modernization" should pursue. This calls for a clear statement of what customary law is in a given society. It calls upon the political orders of Third World societies to reexamine and advance the cause of customary law so that at the hour of "social change", "development" or "modernization", customary law may act as a beacon guiding the paths of Third World societies in their journey towards attaining pre-ordained social goals.

The Role of Customary Law in Development in Indonesia Customary law in Indonesia appears in the form of what is known as

adat law. Adat law, with minor regional variations, applies to a wide spectrum of ethnic groups, extending from Malaysia and running through the Indonesian archipelago and the former Portuguese Timor into the Philippines. The basis of adat law is largely the customs, cultures, ritual and myths of the communities that comprise the archipelago. Depending on the religious beliefs of the communities, adat law appears to take subtle variations in order to accommodate such beliefs. 11

Lakshman Marasinghe

25

As early as in 1747, the East India Company recognized the application of the customary law of the land to all those who were found outside the trading posts of Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya. These trading posts were governed by the Roman Dutch Law of the mother country, the Netherlands. This dualistic approach to the administration of justice was crystallized in the code of 1848. This code classified the inhabitants of the "Dutch West Indies", as it was then called, into four groups: (i) Europeans; (ii) those inhabitants (non-Europeans) who had become assimilated to the Europeans; (iii) natives; and (iv) those inhabitants (neither natives nor Europeans) who had become assimilated to the native group. Of these groups, the third or the natives, exclusively enjoyed the benefits of the adat law. This position remained unchanged both under the 1920 Law and under the Constitution of 1925. The 1925 Constitution merely changed the classification by creating three groups: Europeans, natives and foreign orientals. 12 The adat law, which applied to the natives, remained largely uncodified and therefore non-statutory. Although many attempts were made by the Dutch administration to break down this expanding sense of dualism, particularly by attempting to develop a law intermediate between European law and adat law, the idea failed to gain any appreciable momentum. 13 The adat law, therefore, survived the era of Dutch colonialism and has come down today as an instrument capable of maintaining internal order among the several native groups which extend from Malaysia to the Philippines. Adat law unites individuals within groups. The individual finds it totally satisfying to keep the group together so that he may as a member of that group, enjoy the benefits of that law. Thus, Ter Haar notes: No matter how the communal life of the peoples of the Indies is approached, the observer is struck by the presence of certain fundamental social units in interaction with the non-material environment, the external environment and parts of the material world. These social units may well be called autonomous groups. A number of individuals who feel themselves united participate in legal life as a single unit. When certain of them act, all are benefited or injured together. An internal order exists among them in accordance with which individuals and groups may have precedence, power and authority. Material objects-land, water, crops, temples and buildings-are subject to the joint care of the group. They are to be maintained and kept clean for the benefit of supernatural powers. The group jointly profits from these things and from these things they exclude non-members. The individual accepts the autonomous community as necessary and natural. To the Indonesian the possibility of dissolution of the group is unthinkable. Only in the case of localized groups is it possible for the individual to break off his group affiliation by moving out. 14

26

The Use of Customary Law in Development

The passage indicates the nature of group affiliation and the extent to which legal security provided by adat law is enjoyed by the inhabitants as a group. The foundation which adat law lays down helps to maintain a secure and cohesive society among the ethnic groups that are so governed. This social cohesiveness helps development enormously, because it effectively legitimizes the development strategies established by the political order for the groups within it. Under adat law, ethnic groups "with their rights to land, water, crops, buildings, sacred objects, and other property, are seen as legal personalities. In short, the native communities may be called ordered groups of permanent character, possessing their own government and their own property, material and incorporeal". 15 Furthermore, under adat law, the group at the level of the village community formed the basic group. A combination of these communities was recognized as a regional community comprising a union of villages. 15 By whatever name these organizations are called, the fact remains that the adat law is all-pervasive in creating and holding together a social structure both in its vertical and horizontal dimensions. This helps to spread the adat law across several territorial units and political orders, provided that the communities concerned recognize adat as the protector of their cultural, religious and mythical beliefs. The point to be emphasized is that this helps development to spread across a very large area so that its strategies translated into rules become automatically legitimized at the grass-roots level of society. At the level of specifics, too, adat appears to aid development. As a rule, adat recognizes collective ownership with no "right" of alienation. Ter Haar writes:

Soil and the communal group are closely bound each to the other. From the soil the group draws its nourishment. The soil receives its dead. It houses the ghosts of the departed ancestors and the protective spirits of the group. It is permeated by the spiritual, communal bond on which its life depends. This spiritual complex is rooted in a communal ideology which has its legal aspects as well as its socio-religious phases. 17 This close communal involvement with land has given rise to two categories of persons associated with land. Adat law refers to these two categories as "in-groupers" and "out-groupers". "In-groupers" are those who are members of the community and "out-groupers" are those who belong to different communities. The "out-groupers" may acquire an interest in land, but their interest is limited to usufruct. This again is significant for development, because the "out-grouper" would at all times during the "currency" of the usufruct remain interested in maximizing the produce he could obtain from the land. This also

Lakshman Marasinghe

27

prevents the sale of land to speculators or to those who are interested in utilizing the land for periodic visitations, such as holiday spots. The "in-grouper" on the other hand, shares with his kinsman an interest in the land. But he may, by developing an identifiable portion of the community land, acquire a personal right to the produce. This right of individual enjoyment is recognized in adat so long as the land is utilized in the proper manner. The moment a person neglects the land, it reverts to the community, thus terminating the individual right of enjoyment. It must be noted that in a number of Third World countries, confiscatory legislation has been enacted to take away land that has been either under-utilized or non-utilized, so that it could be given to individuals who are able to use it. Adat law dispenses with the need to resort to the established coercive order to obtain the same result. Again, TerHaar says: The first feature lies in the interaction of communal and individual rights, mentioned above. When a person puts his individual effort into a piece of land, he creates something of a personal identity of self and soil. To the degree that he intensifies this, it becomes a legal relation, and the powers of the collective community with respect to that particular cultivated field, fish pool, garden, or house compound are reduced. If he neglects his holding or permits its usufruct to lapse through inactivity, then the powers of the community are re-established, and the community right of disposal is once more freely asserted. 18

Adat law places a limitation on the individual's right of usufruct, acquired through personal development of communal property. Ter Haar further observes: If an individual overreaches his right and produces for the commercial market he is treated as would be an alien out-grouper, insofar as his commercial use of the land is concerned. To this extent the community rules applying to outsiders also apply to him. 19

This rule merely assures that the utilization of the land for commercial purposes would not rob the community of an interest in sharing the profits thus obtained. Cultivation of fields, planting of land and a whole catalogue of such productive activities have as a rule established the personal relationship of an individual to his soil. This rule of adat law may effectively propagate the utilization of the community property to the fullest extent. Both the "out-groupers" and the "in-groupers" who utilize the land for commercial enterprises are required to pay an agreed rent to the community. This is based on the widely used legal maxim: Lembaga dituang, adat diisi ("Strangers' own acknowledgement and retribution of the community"). This maxim requires all "out-groupers" and "ingroupers" who indulge in business to pay compensation to the

28

The Use of Customary Law in Development

community for the use of their property. The quantum of compensation is fixed by agreement and the agreement forms a part of the contract law of adat. Adat law does not recognize executory contracts. It recognizes and enforces executed contracts. To that extent, the adat law of contracts resembles the quasi-contractual obligations of common law. Adat law has a well developed doctrine of the "right of preference", in that the law permits the cultivator of land "A" to lay a claim to the adjoining land "B". This claim could be made by placing a mark on that land. However, if the placing of a mark is not immediately followed by a continuous process of land reclamation and cultivation, someone else could acquire an interest to land "B" by stepping into the interregnum. This again is a device to advance development and to prevent keeping land tied down by what is euphemistically referred to as the "dead-hand". However, if a land-owner finds it difficult to cultivate due to ill-health or old age, adat law recognizes in him a power to engage "share croppers" to step into his shoes. The contract of "share cropping" known as jual prevents the land from reverting to the community because of neglect. However, each share-cropping contract is only for one harvest, so that the jual cannot lead into a permanent condition of "absentee landlordism". Finally, adat law recognizes the institution of the wakap, an adaptation from Islamic law or the institution of wak{. Wak{ in the traditional mould is a religious endowment. The earliest wakf is that of Omar, the second Caliph. The creation of the wakf is described by Bukhari in this way: Ibn Omar reported, "Omar ibn ai-Khattab got land in Khaybar; so he came to the Prophet ... to consult him about it. He said, 'Oh Messenger of Allah! I have got land in Khaybar. I have never obtained more valuable property; what dost thou advise about it?' He said: 'If thou likest, make the property itself to remain unalienable, and give (the profit from) it in charity' ". 20

That marked the beginning of religious endowments in Islamic Law. Adat law, which applies both to Islamic and non-Islamic communities, adopted a modified form of the wakf called the wakap. The wakap essentially extends the wakf by permitting the creation of secular and non-religious or non-charitable foundations. Under the wakap, an individual may create a wakap (a form of trust) for his own benefit, leaving the management of his land to others. This was a valuable strategy for elderly parents or sick and infirm persons to hand over their land to able-bodied persons, who as managers, could cultivate the land and care for its owners. Because the wakf stated that "there is no blame

Lakshman Marasinghe

29

on him who managed it if he ate out of it and made (others) eat, not accumulating wealth thereby", 21 the managers of the wakap may equally utilize a part of the produce for their own personal benefit. The foregoing presents a random choice of examples from adat law, in which the rules of law and the strategies for development appear to intersect. The role of adat or customary law in development appears to be a positive one. To the extent that it appears to be useful as a tool for development, adat law in my view should indeed be utilized. For such a step would undoubtedly involve the community as a whole in the development process, while legitimizing at the community level the strategies set out by the overall political authority, namely the Government of Indonesia.

The Role of Customary Law in the Development of Thailand Thailand presents another unique picture. It remained free from colonial vicissitudes, but nonetheless had been greatly influenced by Western systems of law. The social infrastructure of Thailand has been uniquely "customary". The dominating influence has been Theravada Buddhism. Perhaps not unexpectedly, then, to understand the customs and traditions of Thai society one must understand the workings of the theory of karma. 22 The doctrine of karma provides the basis for the philosophical foundations of Buddhism. It declares that the pains and pleasures which a person experiences are the results of his own actions in a previous birth. Therefore, the individual who suffers pain is often consoled by the thought that he alone must ultimately bear the responsibility for this suffering. Similarly, the creator of pleasure will be regarded as none other than oneself. This belief in fate will be seen as the key to the settlement of disputes involving what may be characterized as offences against person and property in Thai. In this regard, D.M. Engel has written: Although many factors in Thai society work to inhibit overt responses to injury, the victims of wrongful acts may console themselves with the knowledge that cosmic or supernatural justice will ultimately be done. According to the Thai Buddhist conception of dharma, virtuous acts and acts lacking in virtue will eventually produce their own appropriate results: in external terms, dharma is the action which, provided it is conformable to the order of things, permits man to realize his destiny to the full, sustains him in this life, and assures his well· being after death. By its own virtue that act produces a spiritual benefit for him who has performed it, which will necessarily bear fruit in the other world. Conversely, an act contrary to dharma, called adharma, necessarily involves a sanction, a "fall"" for the one who does it, which

30

The Use of Customary Law in Development will strike him in his future existence if not actually in his present life. 23

This approach to offences against person and property creates an ideal atmosphere for a process of extra·judicial settlement of disputes. A principal characteristic of Thai society is its non· litigious nature. This too could be traced to the influence of the karma theory over other traditions and beliefs in Thai society. Traditional society in Thailand has recognized a number of emotional escape routes. The first is respect for one's ancestors. This provides the individual with emotional resilience in the belief that their activities are often watched by ancestors, to the extent that any act which could hurt their feelings could bounce back on the wrongdoer, to the latter's detriment. This belief may have a Hindu religious base, and looks rather to the ancestors of the victim than to the victim or his wrongdoer. Under this mode of redress, the wrongdoer is required to make a payment for the propitiation of the disturbed ancestral spirits of the victim. This is referred to as kha tham khwan, or the payment to propitiate the khwan. The second type of redress rests more specifically on the Buddhist view of karma, to which reference has previously been made. The type of redress here, as for instance in the case of a murder, is the provision of funeral expenses and expenses for various acts of piety, such as the provision of alms to the Buddhist monks in the name of the departed individual. These types of penalties are linked with the "spiritual" or "psychic" state of the victim. In this regard, Engels writes: Like the payment for the khwan, the payment of funeral costs defines the responsibility of the wrongdoer with reference to the spiritual or psychic state of the victim. An injury, in these terms, is an act that does damage to the vital essence of the individual and perhaps brings death. The remedy for such an act is to restore the spirit of the victim if possible. If this is no longer possible, then the wrongdoer must help to perform those meritorious acts which will enable the victim to lead a pleasant and successful existence in future lives. 24

Thirdly, the view is held that the wrong was one which had harmed the spirits of a particular household or village. Latent in such a belief is that: The injury must therefore be remedied by the payment of a fine or the performance of a ceremony in which all the villagers have a vested interest. Failure to obtain an appropriate remedy may have dangerous supernatural consequences for the entire community. The offence against an individual takes on the broader characteristics of an anti· social act. 25

The significance of these three approaches to the redressing of injuries to persons, including those resulting in death, is that each is

Lakshman Marasinghe

31

eminently suitable for mediation. The basis for mediation is the total acceptance of these modes of redress by the Thai community. That by itself legitimates the settlement arrived at. There is, however, a fourth method of redress which is more legalistic, and in that sense, least traditional in origin. That is the method whereby the wrongdoer is required to pay for the loss, defined in materialistic terms. This method does not look to the psychic or spiritual state of the victim or the effect the wrongdoing may have had on local supernatural "beings". The payment here is of an amount sufficient to restore the quantum of loss in material terms, and to that extent this method of redress may not be a good candidate for mediation. That does not necessarily mean that the Thais do not seek mediation under this fourth method. They indeed do. In doing so, the belief is often held that the community itself is best qualified to assess the proper quantum of damages in money for the loss sustained. These four methods of redress are alternatives to the methods of redress established by the non-traditional legal system. That system follows a process of adjudication before the Thai national courts. From these too, one often finds litigants seeking mediation rather than adjudication of their disputes. The latter appears to be common in land and domestic disputes. The idea which is often projected is that parties have been compelled to seek adjudication, because those who should have performed the mediation had failed in their responsibilities, thus forcing the parties to seek the aid of courts, albeit somewhat reluctantly. Engel (under the heading "The Missing Phuyai") cites a number of examples where the courts had been drawn away from their natural role of adjudicators towards their somewhat unusual role as mediators. This, Engel points out, had been done by the courts at the request of the litigants because the appropriate mediator had failed in his task: In this section, I shall discuss the general proposition that most law· suits involving private wrongs in the Chiangmai Court share a single characteristic: at some stage in the development of the dispute, a phuyai (a "big person") fails to play his expected role as mediator. The "missing phuyai ", like the dog in the Sherlock Holmes story conspicuous for its failure to bark, is the most important feature of these disputes in their pre-judicial stages. 26

This failure of the phuyai to act has often resulted in the courts having to abandon their traditional role and take the place of the "missing phuyai ".This clearly indicates the attachment which the Thai people appear to show towards mediation. It therefore suggests that Thai customary law to a marked extent espouses the settlement of dispute by mediation. Mediation in fact enhances social cohesion. It leaves no social scars, for there is neither victor nor vanquished. One

32

The Use of Customary Law in Development

is required in mediation to give a little and take a little. The end result towards which the settlement process is directed is one that could result in social cohesion, an aspect which is vital to development. Thai society (which has a natural affinity towards mediation) rests that belief upon a sound foundation. Here is a mixture of tradition and religion which appears to undergird the whole of Thai society. To that extent it is an important phenomenon which should be carefully preserved in any modernizing trend to which Thailand might become exposed.

Concluding Reflections In any legal system, one detects two basic types of rules: the primary and secondary rules of obligation. Expanding this idea, Hart writes: ... While primary rules are concerned with the actions that individuals must or must not do, these secondary rules are all concerned with the primary rules themselves. They specify the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined. 27

The secondary rules in Hart's view will contain most of the procedural and constitutional laws. What Hart calls the "rules of recognition" will determine what rules are law and what are not law. The rules as to change will determine how laws come into being. It will also be the responsibility of the secondary rules to determine the question of violation of a primary rule, and to see that the requisite punishment is imposed. Viewed in that way, both the role of a law-officer in making the system function, and the relationship between "a wish" of the "Austinian" sovereign and the "Austinian" sanction becomes evident. 28 The rule that "a thief is liable to be imprisoned for six months" becomes effective because, between the act of thieving and the sanction, a series of secondary rules appear to function. The rules as to the apprehension of the suspect, the police powers and their duties, the procedure as to arraignment before a competent court, the rules of evidence, the procedures required to be adopted by a court leading to an acquittal or to a conviction, the rules requiring the release of the acquitted and the sentencing of the convicted, the rules governing the imprisonment of offenders after sentence, and finally rules governing their release at the completion of their period of sentence are all functional as secondary rules of the legal system. Commenting on the scope of the secondary rules, Lloyd writes: These secondary rules are, therefore, mainly procedural and remedial and include, but go far beyond, the rules governing sanctions. For instance, they extend to the rules of judicial procedure and evidence

Lakshman Marasinghe

33

as well as the rules governing the procedure by which new legislation may be introduced. 2 9

Some have suggested that Hart's thesis has support in Austin's writings. Apart from a critical comment that Hart's thesis (namely, that of a legal system being a union of primary and secondary rules) is an over-simplification of what really occurs, there is general agreement that his thesis explains how a system of laws function normally within a given social context. Hart cannot be accused of overlooking other "elements of a different character", 30 which too are necessary elements in his thesis. These "elements of a different character" provide the worker in the area of development the opportunity to postulate a role for cultures, myths, religions and beliefs that contribute to the elements which hold a society together. Dealing with the minimum conditions necessary for the existence of a legal system, Hart writes: There are therefore two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system. On the one hand, those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials. The first condition is the only one which private citizens need satisfy. They may obey each "for his part only" and from any motive whatever .... The second condition must also be satisfied by the officials of the system. They must regard these as common standards of official behaviour and appraise critically their own and each other's deviations as lapses. Of course, it is also true that besides these there will be many primary rules which apply to officials in their merely personal capacity which they need only obey. 31

Hart requires every private citizen to satisfy the first requirement, namely, to obey "the rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity". It is difficult to postulate an ultimate criterion of validity for a traditional society of the Third World which fails to take note of the culture, religion and myths held in common belief by its community. Commentators have found that the critical point whether the system (of law) is effective rests upon the view taken by the officials who govern the secondary rules of obligation. Lloyd makes the point that: For a legal system "to exist", there must be general obedience by the citizens to the primary rules of obligation, but it would not be necessary for the citizens to possess "an internal point of view." In such a case, according to Hart, the importance of the internal point of view relates not to a body of citizens but to the officials of the system. These officials

34

The UsE

must not merely "obey" the secondar view" of these rules, and this is a nece! of a legal system. Official compliance therefore, involve both a conscious standards of official behaviour, and a c these standards. Whether this approp is for Hart a question of fact. Hart con• be a number of borderline cases, su countries subject to military occupatio the existence of a legal system in the I and the view taken of the secondary rL ingredients. 32

Hart's emphasis on the significa officials towards the legal system a effectiveness, also has relevance for cu~ rules of the system appear to be contrac values of a society to which they apply, who belong to that society may be su of the "primary" rules may suffer a s• system as a whole could become son The "secondary" rules have on rna adopt subtle institutional by-passes to of the customary law, so that the leg• lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the cor could be found in developing countrie: members of a certain tribe in northerr of a child with teeth was often associat custom among its members was to hav· This act of drowning was associatec unfortunate child was carried in a clo1 in a long procession of elders. The un• the river, stood with his back to the v procession proceeded to untie the kno1 in the cloth. The child was thus droppE death by drowning. The Zambian cou cases brought before them. A convict mandatory sentence of death accorc thought to be inconsistent with the cui the offence was in fact committed. The: took the view that it was manslaughter correctly followed. The system did no1 who had loosened the knot that drm charged with murder, but a plea of ~

36

The Use of Customary Law in Development

10

See D. Trubek, "Towards a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development", Yale Law Journal82 (1972): 1-58. B. TerHaar, Adat Law in Indonesia (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1948), pp. 1-2. Article 109 of the Government Act of 1814 was revised in 1920, and is now incorporated as Article 163 of the Constitution. See P.H. Fromberg, Verspreide Geschriften [Collected writings] (Leyden, 1926), pp. 236-40 and pp. 326-42. Those who opposed this idea called it the "Fantasy Law". B. TerHaar, op. cit., p. 49. Ibid., p. 50. Ibid., p. 52. Ibid., p. 81. Ibid., p. 82. Ibid., p. 83. See A.A. Fyzee, The Outlines of Mohammaden Law, 3rd ed. (Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 265. Ibid., p. 265. D.M. Engel, Code and Custom in a Thai Provincial Court (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1975), p. 65. Ibid., p. 63. Ibid., p. 62. Ibid., p. 137. Mart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 1961 ), p. 92. See J. Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p. 13-15. He defines law as a command of the Sovereign, a "command, as a wish of the Sovereign coupled with a sanction". Lloyd, An Introduction lo Jurisprudence, 3rd ed. (London: Stevens, 1972), p. 169. Mart, op. cit., p. 96. Ibid., p. 131. Lloyd, An Introduction, p. 170. Ibid.

11 12 13

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31 32

THE IMPACT OF THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL (DAKWAH) ON THE RELIGIOUS CULTURE OF MALAYSIA

Judith Nagata

Introduction Malay society is a Muslim society, and Malay culture claims to be Islamic, in that religion sets the tone of life and serves as one of the principal sources of identity. We know from history that Islam was superimposed upon an older substratum of lndic and even pre-lndic (including animistic) religious practices, some of which have survived to the present. While it is almost impossible to think of Malay culture without reference to Islam, which has shaped so much of the Malay ethos and daily round, there still remain many elements and styles in Malay culture whose links to Islam are tenuous at best. Despite their auth~ntic and indigenous Malay character, in relation to Islam the status of these elements has often been a source of contention and even acrimony over the ages. Their status sometimes seems to be less dependent on an inherent ideological or theological tension between Islamic and non-Islamic traditions than on conditions in the wider social environment, which weight the cause in one direction or another. One example, well-known to those familiar with Malay history, is the Kaum Muda episode of the 1920s and 1930s, when a certain self-defined "orthodox" body of Muslims, largely of nonSoutheast Asian origin, made an issue of the syncretism of Malay adat with the "pure" faith, and raised many basic questions as to the role of Islam in such areas as leadership, monarchy, family and ritual practice (cf. Roff 1967).

38

The Impact of the Islamic Revival

The terminology used in connection with such questions, whether by non-Malay Muslims (as in the Kaum Muda episode), or by "sophisticated" Malays themselves (as in recent dakwah developments) as well as by scholarly observers, has tended to take an ideological or theological form. Particular behaviours, beliefs and practices are judged as more or less "orthodox", with the indigenous Malay adat usually relegated to the heterodox/heretical/deviant end of the spectrum. A similar, though more subtly biased phrasing of the same problem surfaces in the language of the anthropologist, who refers to the "Little Tradition'' in opposition to the supposedly more evolved or orthodox "Great Tradition" of the scholarly centres of learning and civilization. It is also often pointed out that Islam is essentially an urban religion, born in an environment of merchants and craftsmen, and enabling the exercise of intellectual skills by scholars and jurists (whose casuistry and legalistic discourse are familiar practices among academics today!). The antithesis between urban and rural is also reflected by anthropologists in many studies of culture and religion, in which the latter is normally associated with the religiously more questionable practices of the "Little Tradition". Concentration on an ideological or theological approach, however, tends to obscure some of the more pressing realities of village existence, where acceptance of, and adherence to, specific religious precepts and practices (or conversely, rejection of some ancient Malay customs) are more often functions of complex interpersonal and social relationships. Religious (and secular) leaders and teachers (ulama and guru), commonly gear their religious behaviour and example to the predilections of their followings and to local social conditions, as much as to a more abstract, socially disembodied religious code, orthodox or otherwise. To a considerable extent, as I have argued elsewhere (Nagata 1982), the attitudes of religious leaders partly depend on their credibility and acceptability to their "constituents" in the local kampung. The nature of their relationship is thus partly determined by their mutual needs in a sort of implicit "bargain" arrangement. They are not only accepted on the basis of the theological orthodoxy in a strict sense, but also depend on a variety of other skills and qualities. Some of these are very individual, the outcome of a personal character which is in tune with the expectations of the local population and their perceptions of a religious leader. Rapport between leader and follower is an obviously important ingredient in a successful religious career and source of religious "authority" or legitimacy. Other qualities beyond the personal also carry considerable weight with specific local populations, and again may force strict theological

Judith Nagata

39

orthodoxy into second place. Many rural religious leaders and imam are expected to be able not only to read standard Islamic prayers (baca doa) at routine religious events (such as various rites of passage, the Prophet's Birthday, and so on), but also to provide more esoteric forms of service, sometimes regarded with circumspection by urban and other outside observers. Among these activities are some which may be labelled Sufi-like. These include various mystical practices, which vary from simple meditation to extended night vigils, nocturnal excursions into the countryside, lengthy retreats and chanting sessions (berzikir), as well as some more reminiscent of Indonesian kebatinan. The particular combination found in a given area greatly depends, like the appeal of the leader himself, on local needs and tendencies. It was, of course, just such qualities, or religious style, that initially carried Islam to the folk of Southeast Asia in the first place. Much of the Muslim expansion across what is now Indonesia, the Malay peninsula and South Thailand in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was through the vehicle of Sufism, by itinerant preachers and teachers from Sumatra, whose spiritual descendants tread a similar path today (S.N. AI-Attas 1963). Sufism, it has been argued, was particularly attractive to Southeast Asian congregations because of its affinity to some more indigenous practices of pre-Muslim Malay culture, with its orientation towards mysticism, and belief in a universe both populated with spirits (jinn, roh, hantu) and alive with alternate "powers" (semangat, ghaib) of its own. Through some forms of Sufism, these forces could be conveniently grafted on to an otherwise uncompromisingly monotheistic and legalistic religion, whose appeal to the man in the kampung was thereby enhanced. Modern religious leaders and officials in rural Malaysia are also often expected to show competence as healers (bomoh), and as masters of the martial arts (silat). Many kampung ulama and guru are simultaneously known for their medical skills, which characteristically involve a combination of pharmocopaeic and religious elements (for example, dissolving papers containing verses of the Koran in some herbal infusion), knowledge of chiropractics and bone-setting, with the invocation of healing spirits. Silat teachers likewise supplement instruction in physical self-defence and exercise, with the assistance of an assortment of spiritual forces, as well as the use of Islamic incantations and oaths (sumpah), sometimes with performances in the mosque (for example, Nasrul Haq). As such, silat is said to be dedicated to God and the people (agama dan bangsa), to deflect any criticism of its non-Islamic content. In both cases, curing and silat, the range of "supplementary" powers may extend eclectically into the realm of the

40

The Impact of the Islamic Revival

uncertain in terms of "orthodox" Islam, especially in the cultivation of the powers of invisibility (ghaib), invulnerability to bullets, exorcism of spirits, and so on. In other areas of life too, especially such rites of passage as marriage ceremonies, the strict Islamic requirements are enriched by non-Islamic observances, which in kampung eyes are equally essential for fulfilment of ritual and social obligations. Religious leaders and officials must officiate at both equally for social reasons. Other activities which extend themselves at the extreme end of the continuum to dubious areas (from the orthodox standpoint) of specialization (such as the invocation and pacification of spirits), recall the Malay animistic past, with little recognition in Muslim cosmology. Such is the case with the well-known appeasement of the sea-spirits (puja pantai), which was part of the regular ritual in coastal Kelantan, Kedah and Penang, especially among fishermen. This has come under increasing attack since the days of the Kaum Muda, and once again, this onslaught has intensified recently under the pressure of the Islamic revival of the dakwah movement. To come back to the original theme, it is argued that much of the appeal of religious leaders lies in their command of semi-Islamic skills and qualities, and that "orthodoxy" itself is not necessarily so instantly recognizable or clear-cut in an absolute sense, but arises out of a mutual accommodation between leader and follower, guru and disciple. In what follows, I shall select examples from rural religious life in parts of North Malaysia to illustrate the proposition that religious and ritual practice and legitimacy of leadership depend on the total social environment. This is not to deny concern with theology, or of the exercise of "pure" scholarship through direct contact with the Middle East, but to suggest that these are exercised in a broader context. To be explored below, however, is the question how far such theological concerns are in fact becoming relatively stronger (at the expense of the social), under the impact of the current religious ferment of dakwah, and how far other conditions still impinge. Finally, it may be asked, to the extent that a self-conscious trend towards "orthodoxy" is observable in the decade of dakwah, how far this represents a restoration of an earlier status quo ante (a true revival) and how far it is a manifestation of Islamization for the first time (cf. Antoun 1980), that is, the latest in a progressive trend which has been occurring over the centuries since the first inroads of the faith into Malay society. In any case, such a trend would not be expected to be uniform in pace, but would depend again on the nature of the local leadership and following. The religious situation in rural Malaysia is one of considerable diversity, for many cults and practices are of parochial significance only.

Judith Nagata

41

To the extent that these variations are the product of social conditions, I will tentatively list the following factors as among the principal contributors to a selection of religious strategies, more or less "orthodox" Islamic or with more concessions to Malay adat. One factor which invariably affects the style of leadership and authority is the tradition and preference of the local congregation. A second has to do with politics (including formal party membership), and the linkages between political and religious leadership. A third factor has to do with relative age (for example, of older incumbent religious leaders versus younger urban missionaries), although this may be less significant than the first two. Another factor may be financial, where the traditional position and life-style of religious school teachers can only be salvaged through some form of religious/ideological accommodation. Combinations of all of these factors may contribute to a single, multi-faceted profile of legitimacy, and of the authority and social standing of any local religious leader.

Orban Dakwah I turn briefly to the urban scene, locus of much of the Islamic revival (dakwah} and centre of the cadres of orthodoxy, whose influence is being carried by roving young lecturers, educational retreats and instruction, to the perimeters of Malay society. The religious revival itself shows considerable diversity. Sometimes it takes the form of a purely personal re-dedication, born again to the faith, in which meticulous attention is devoted to matters of prayer, fasting, food purity, modest dress and so on. Many "reborn" Muslims, however, also support or "lend a shoulder to" (menjadi bahu) one of the formal religious organizations, ABIM, Darul Arqam or Jemaat Tabligh. Of the three organizations, ABIM is probably the most universalistic, with a membership mostly of young, highly educated urbanites, from schools, universities, the professions and civil service. Their approach to Islam is strictly scriptural, for which they are often labelled fundamentalist, and they attempt to bring religion back into every facet of social existence in keeping with the idea of Islam as a "way of life" (ai-Din). Islam thus has an important role to play in politics-attempted implementation of an "Islamic state", in justice through the Syariah courts, and in all aspects of personal morality and daily behaviour. Thus, scrupulous attention is devoted to modesty of dress and to "clean" (halal) foods. It also applies a theological standard of judgment to the many kampung ritual practices, in finding fault with such non-Islamic

42

The lmpacl of lhe Islamic Revival

accretions (or residues) as the rites of passage, and ceremonies attending the Prophet's Birthday. Particularly under attack are bersandings at rites of passage, religious parades (mandi sa{ar, a purificatory ritual commemorating the death of the Prophet) and of course, puja pantai. So too are many of the scripturally less justifiable Sufi practices, and the curing and martial arts involvements of religious leaders. Young students, even those of rural origin, rigorously deny the practices of their past and of their parents, and claim to refuse to participate in the bersandings and other rites prepared for their weddings by their socially conscious elders. In addition to the effect of returning students and urban migrants, the active impact of visiting ABIM lecturers to the kampung also stimulates reaction, particularly when advocating the literal scriptural interpretation of dress and other personal observances to the busy practical peasant. Finally, ABIM was, until recently, said to be leaning towards PAS (the Islamic political party of the opposition), for several ABIM associates have run as PAS candidates in local elections. ABIM's image, therefore, has been coloured with PAS ethos, and what that party stands for. A second urban-based revival organization is Darul Arqam. If anything, Arqam is more scripturally fundamentalist than ABIM, and it too is preoccupied with literal and rather rigid interpretations of codes of dress, food and other items of personal behaviour, in the relations of man-to-man in society, as well as man-to-God. Arqam is distinctive for its economic experiments, and for its attempts to create a sort of Islamic shadow economy, for the production and marketing of pure food, cosmetics and other products, independent of non-Malay/non· Muslim control. Arqam is also known for its uncompromising approach to religious discipline, rigid segregation of the sexes, and insistence on full Muslim dress even at the kindergarten stage. Darul Arqam's general image is as an other-worldly group, rather aloof from mainstream Malay society, with a somewhat morally exclusivist, almost sectarian approach to its membership. It maintains a ritualistic emphasis on all things "Arab", in eating and dress styles and matters of daily hygiene. All this makes Arqam seem rather intimidating to many outsiders (urban as well as rural), and an obstacle to Muslims who feel personally insecure through limitations in their own knowledge of the faith. The third major urban revival movement is one which has been around for about thirty years in the vicinity of Penang and Singapore, but which until recently was largely associated with the Indian Muslim commercial community. Jemaat Tabligh originated (and still has its headquarters) in India, and is strongly entrenched among urban "Kiings". Today, however, it has expanded its missionary scope to the

Judith Nagata

43

"pure" Malay community, in both rural and urban areas. Tabligh's reputation for aggressive evangelism, on the streets, in door-to-door campaigning, and for its sometimes militant bombardment of mosque congregations and imams with warnings and injunctions against nonIslamic practices, has made the movement a controversial one. It is also highly demanding of its followers' time, energy and resources, in requiring periodic retreats (for males) and service as missionaries (muballigh). Like ABIM and Darul Arqam, Tabligh also tends to attract the more highly educated urban youth and civil servants, while its promotion of the distinctive Arabic green robe and turban (serban) for males, eating from a common dish (makan talam), and the solidarityengendering sessions of its retreats and mosque gatherings has found considerable favour among otherwise aimless unmarried young males for whom it has become something of a surrogate youth sub-culture. All of the above movements draw a high proportion of their followers from universities and colleges and urban occupations, which reinforces their association, in the rural mind, with high educational and social status, and a life-style marked by the "luxury" of sufficient leisure time for the practice of more esoteric religious and "Arabic" customs so alien to kampung existence. All are also highly critical of Malay customs without an Islamic rationale, and attempt to discourage them.

Impact of the Orban Revival on Rural Communities The three religious movements described above are, in Malaysia, popularly known as "dakwah", which somewhat erroneously is seen as synonymous with "Islamic revival". Properly, however, the generic meaning of dakwah is any Muslim missionary activity, whether personal, in the form of cults or other organization. Thus, in a strict sense, any of the Sufi-like cults and other activities of rural Malays are forms of dakwah, although in current Malay terminology they are not so designated. To follow present Malay convention, therefore, dakwah refers largely to the religious influences emanating out of the urban "Great Tradition" areas, and its effects on the rural sector are popularly seen as a one-way flow. Given the emphasis on missions and evangelism, on propagation of the pure, original and uncontaminated faith, the three urban revival movements have deliberately expanded their scope towards the kampung. This is achieved through lectures by itinerant preachers, but also through the urging and advice of returning kampung residents from

44

The Impact of the Islamic Revival

schools and jobs in the towns. This is sometimes reinforced by special university vacation programmes (kempegn kesedaran kampung), involving students in rural projects in which religious instruction figures prominently, or by drawing kampung youth into university-sponsored projects through which the new ideas are disseminated. Not only are the kampung people being increasingly exposed to religious campaigns, but in order not to be left out or labelled as "un-lslamic", government and UMNO officials are now also offering their own parallel (and competing) dakwah programmes. These are administered variously through the dakwah foundations (such as Yayasan Dakwah, lnstitut Datehan Dakwah), through the schools, and via arms and departments of the bureaucracy. Under these conditions, there are few rural kampungs which are not aware of, or influenced by, some form of external religious activity. Response to, and the degree of acceptance of, the new ideas depend not on their theological content and defensibility alone, but also on the vested social interest of the various constituencies of the rural population. Many of the ordinary peasants are satisfied to leave decisions to trusted religious leaders, and follow their footsteps. Others decide on the basis of their social status and commitments in the kampung. Where adoption of practices advocated by the revivalists would compromise their social standing, there is less opportunity for dakwah to penetrate. Thus, to celebrate marriage by the Islamic contract (akad nikah) alone, without the benefit of the customary (but religiously non-obligatory) bersanding, would be construed either as a sign of meanness, extreme arrogance or social withdrawal, or else that the marriage was not quite valid (sah), in that the bride and groom were not unsullied to start with. Similar considerations apply to the non-religious ceremonies attendant on most rites of passage. No kampung dweller could maintain social standing, or survive the daily and annual round without attention to such non-Islamic observances as "housewarming" and village-cleaning ceremonies. Furthermore, injunction as to the full Islamic attire for women are regarded as impractical for those who work in the muddy padi fields, as are the niceties of Arab custom for busy working peasants generally. Yet others are affronted by the affectation of raw young students, often neophytes in religious matters (being very recently "born again"), who in their enthusiasm, presume to tell their elders, and even venerable religious leaders, how to conduct themselves. What is more, these same young people have not even made the pilgrimage (haj ), yet adopt the attire generally regarded as a social reward for those who have, without having "earned" the right to do so. For all their religiosity, many kampung Malays are averse to

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extremes of religious observance. In one instance, for example, Darul Arqam took over a religious school from a well-respected guru in a Kedah community, and tried to enforce complete segregation of the sexes by closing school windows to obscure the view of the girls inside, and then refusing to permit "Western" fans and furniture. It also refused to accept the customary financial assistance from the State Department of Religious Affairs, causing the parents to dig deeper into their pockets for funds. The school's stress on trades and crafts at the expense of other secular subjects leading to the hallowed halls of government employment finally led to a groundswell of kampung opinion and resulted in the early demise of the Arqam school experiment. Rejection came less on theological grounds than on lack of feasibility of such instruction for the local children. Secular concerns for the children's occupational and financial future caused many parents to pressure the guru who had invited Arqam in to cast them out now. This he was obliged to do, in order to maintain his own authority and legitimacy, part of the mutual "bargain", as much as on principle alone. A minority of parents in the kampung, however, were favourable to Arqam, and after its departure even sent their offspring to the central Darul Arqam school at its Kuala Lumpur headquarters. In this case, religious principle eclipsed the immediate practical exigency. Other peasants prefer to manage their religiosity in different ways. Some of the distinctive local cults involving Sufi mystical practices, midnight chanting and so on, reflect "grassroots" religious preferences which conflict with more fundamentalist attitudes to prayer and Islamic law. Members of some of these groups (for example, Auratismailiyyah) have been brought before the Syariah Religious Court by an increasingly self-conscious Department of Religious Affairs, itself influenced by the new dakwah climate. They have been charged with "deviant/evil/ magical/un-lslamic" (songsang, menyelowsong, syirik) practices, for leaping around in trances (melompak macam Mak Yang) as though intoxicated (mabuk), for frequenting isolated caves and for venerating shrines of holy men (keramat). So close are these followers to their religious master that they are known to have mortgaged their land (as in one very poor area near Baling) to send their guru to Mecca, and faithfully spend their Friday nights, weekends or dedicate their retirement days sitting at his feet, and even to vote according to his instructions. At another critical juncture, where religion and politics intersect, the Malay peasant is also under pressures which are not strictly theologicaL Where identification with a particular revivalist group would also imply political connection, the latter often is decisive. Thus, ABIM's

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past (implicit) association with PAS was sufficient to alienate it from committed UMNO supporters, whereas government dakwah representatives are equally unacceptable to PAS sympathizers. Darul Arqam and Tabligh on the other hand are seen as politically neutral, and hence do not carry this risk. In many kampungs, therefore, political conflicts are played out through, or at least reflected in, selection of religious behaviour and affiliation. The revivalists, in association with the opposition party PAS, and the government dakwah leaders, together with official, Religious Council-appointed mosque officials, frequently engage in an activity known as kafir-mengafir. Kafir-menga[ir consists of mutual accusations of religious deviance or lack of orthodoxy between political opponents, supported by selected examples. Thus, PAS followers insist that marriages solemnised or meat slaughtered by UMNO imam or kathis are invalid (tak sah) and unacceptable. In fact, the theological basis of such accusations is generally weak or unfounded, but subordinate to personal, political and other vested interests. "Orthodoxy" then consists in being in the "right" political party in such situations. These examples show firstly, that religious identification and practice, revival or not, dakwah or adat, are contingent, at least in part, on other social factors. Secondly, the cultural impact will vary according to the revival body accepted. For example, dakwah instructors from the Prime Minister's Department are generally more tolerant than are ABIM, Darul Arqam or Tabligh, of Malay custom, for a threat to adat may be a threat to the vote. However, even they, when they see themselves in direct political competition, try to claim greater religious credibility by "holier than thou" emulation, for example, in discouraging religious parades on the Prophet's Birthday (or the participation in them by women), or abolishing the practice of mandi safar. Political factors alone, however, do not always suffice by way of explanation. For all its reputed association and sympathy with PAS, ABIM is often unpopular in the rural areas for other reasons. These have to do with the character and style of some of ABIM's lecturers and representatives, who are seen by some older kampung folk as too young and lacking religious education for religious leadership status, giving sermons or leading the prayer. It is also felt that their demands for Arab ritualism (to such details as stepping into the latrine with the left foot and out again with the right), betray a lack of understanding of the practical pressures of village life, and even reflect a certain arrogance towards the peasant. The denial of the rights of the villager to his socially gratifying (and necessary) practices of bersanding or the pleasurable customs of mandi sa[ar is little more popular than Darul Arqam's

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attempts to do away with furniture, televisions, fans and other modern luxuries, which for rural people mark aspirations towards modern life, progress and social status. The (past) president of ABIM once told me, sadly, that, just as some modern urbanites are beginning to rediscover Islam and to scale down their material needs, the villager still lags behind and hankers after the goods of urban life, in an inevitable bid to catch up. He also recognized that ABIM's popularity is thereby limited in rural areas, as is its influence on adat. The tension, and even inconsistency, between support for ABIM in its presumed political aspirations, and its other, less desirable associations, have led to situations where ABIM/PAS candidates (for example, in the Bukit Raya by-election of 1980) did not even advertise their ABIM connections during the campaign, for fear that negative consequences would outweigh the advantages. Partly for political reasons, and partly also for reasons of personality and style, therefore, ABIM has not made a deep or lasting impression on kampung religious culture. Only when kampung·born students discover ABIM at school or university, and return home to declare their reluctance to hold a bersanding for their wedding, or to accept the choice of spouse (as not religiously compatible), does the test arise. Yet, even these "renegades", when confronted with the social pressures of peers and parents, often succumb to the inevitable. Through the exercise of fine casuistry, and on the grounds that "heaven lies beneath a mother's feet" (syurga Letak dibawah tapak kaki ibu), they acknowledge the necessity of the full adat procedure. Likewise, those returning female dakwah residents who try to maintain the half-purdah (wearing the mini-telekung) in kampung conditions often frustrate themselves and irk their families by requiring constant household watchers and vigilante action to prevent their observation by unrelated males in the relatively open structure of the kampung house which has no equivalent to the Middle Eastern women's quarters. Many girls eventually abandon the attempt as impossible, since it requires attention to details of attire even in the tasks of the kitchen, an area often visible to the outside. Consequently, it is still relatively rare to see females in kampungs in "dakwah" dress; indeed, some dakwah sympathizers modify their behaviour somewhat according to whether they are at home, under the social pressures of family and rural life, or under the influence and peer pressure of fellow students at school. Apart from the reception by the ordinary villager of dakwah or religious revivalism, there is the question of the reaction of the traditional religious leader. With the exception of the recent trend to

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The Impact of the Islamic Revival

Religious Council appointments of some kathis and mosque officials, most u/ama have established their credibility and position with specific congregations in the manner already described. Thus, the impact of any new religious ideas are often filtered through these leaders first. The response of the leaders may be affected by some of the same factors which affect their followers independently, namely, politics, age, finances, and style and age of missionary. Those ulama who, for reasons of expedience, prefer not to be identified with PAS, are particularly reticent about encouraging ABlM visitors to their area, but may encourage dakwah instructors from the Prime Minister's Department. Even those sympathetic to PAS, however, may be apprehensive of undesirable competition and confrontation in religious matters, which could show the rural PAS leaders up to disadvantage. The ulama who also run religious schools (pondok or madrasah) are becoming increasingly dependent for financial support on the (Federal) Ministry of Education and/or State Religious Councils, which simultaneously increases their economic dependence and vulnerability. It also reduces their willingness to welcome members of dakwah organizations which the government regards as potentially subversive. Others, however, who value their political and institutional independence more highly, have found alternative ways of solving financial problems, namely, by making alliances with the schools and resources of the dakwah organizations themselves. In one case, a madrasah in Bukit Mertajam entered into partnership with ABIM's Yayasan Anda, and in another, the Kedah guru encouraged Darul Arqam to take over his school, only to retreat in the face of his kampung "constituents". Among the rural ulama, however, there are undoubtedly some who independently feel sympathy for the message of the revivalists, and who encourage them to visit their mosques and schools. In order to avoid undesirable political compromise or harassment, the choice often favours Arqam or Tabligh, for their low political profiles, and in Kedah at least, there are one or two well-known ulama who wish to hide their sympathy for PAS by publicly associating with Tabligh. Overall, the preference by rural ulama, among all of the dakwah movements, seems strongest for Tabligh. To what extent do the traditional religious leaders heed the revivalist's injunctions against non-Islamic adat? While I am not yet in a position to predict a priori which leaders are likely to reject the semi· religious customs of mandi sa{ar or puja pantai, a crucial issue seems to revolve around the sense of status security of the leader himself, as much as around theology, per se. Thus, if a leader feels that his position

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would be threatened by abandoning such popular customs, especially when requested by anxious fishermen for example, he is more likely to ignore dakwah recommendations. Others, aware of the growing pressures and religious changes in society at large, or under rival pressure from government dakwah, may detach themselves from the old puja pantai and mandi sa{ar, and even from some of the more dubious curing and martial arts functions. It is believed, however, that a number of these rituals and observances may be practised clandestinely, for example, at night, in remote places such as on islands) or at undisclosed times, to satisfy those constituents who demand them, and to avoid recriminations from other religious elements. Both puja panlai and Nasrul Haq are said to be among such rituals. Nasrul Haq was banned by most Religious Councils in 1977 and 1978, ostensibly on grounds of its illegitimate use of Islamic symbols in "pagan" rites, and for condoning the very un-lslamic dress (short sleeves, bare legs and heads for women) and mixing of the sexes. (In fact, even the banning of Nasrul Haq may reflect more urgent political conflicts at higher levels of UMNO, thus illustrating again the importance of social and nontheological considerations in apparently religious issues). Finally, another target of attack has been the traditional Malay art form of the shadow puppet play (wayang kulil), for its alleged use of pagan (lndic) themes and ideas. The pressure in some areas of Kelantan and Trengganu has led to a growing resistance by local ulama to permit public performances.

Conclusion

In the above, I have tried to make two main points. Firstly, the Islamic revival movements, popularly labelled "dakwah", emanating largely from the urban centres of Malaysia and beyond, are having a variable impact on rural Malays. The acceptance of dakwah ideas seems to be only partly (though possibly increasingly) theological, but more often is contingent upon such exogeneous factors as political tendencies, social pressures, financial situation, age and attitude of bearers of the message. This is not to say that rural Malays are any less religious, but that their Islam has a different social role to that in the cities, and is more bound to traditional Malay culture and social obligations. To the extent that the revivalists also try to implement changes in some of the basic kampung customs and adal, these reflect the concern of traditional rural religious leaders to m